MiGs at Area 51

MiGs at Area 51

Exploiting the Enemy

By

TD Barnes

Former CIA Special Projects at Area 51

Copyright 2024 TD Barnes

Table of Contents

Glossary

Introduction

Chapter 1- Articulating a New War

Chapter 2 - The Soviet Mystery Plane

Chapter 3 - MiG-21 Technical Evaluation

Chapter 4 - AFFTC Instrument Evaluation

Chapter 5 - FTD and the MiG-21

Chapter 6 - ADC Tactical Evaluation

Chapter 7 - Navy Tactical Evaluation MiG-21

Chapter 8 - MiG-17F Exploitation

Chapter 9 - AFETC Test Instrumentation MiG-17

Chapter 10 - Technical Exploiting the MiG-17

Chapter 11 - Tactical Exploitation M-17

Chapter 12 - F-4 vs MiG-17: Tactical

Chapter 13 - Navy Performance Testing

Chapter 14 - Capabilities and Limitations

Chapter 15 Red Eagles, Red Hats, and Beyond

About the Author

Bibliography

Glossary

A/B - Refers to afterburner in aircraft engines.

ACM - Air Combat Maneuvering - Tactical maneuvers performed by aircraft during combat engagements.

Adverse Yaws - The phenomenon in which an aircraft yaws in the opposite direction of the applied aileron input.

AERO-1A - F-4B Missile Control System.

AFFTC - Air Force Flight Test Center - A facility responsible for testing and evaluating aircraft and related equipment for the US Air Force.

AIM-7 - Refers to the AIM-7 Sparrow missile, an air-to-air guided missile used by military aircraft for engaging enemy targets.

AIM-9 - Refers to the AIM-9 Sidewinder missile, an infrared-guided air-to-air missile used by military aircraft for short-range engagements.

AIM-E-2 - SPARROW III (dogfight) Missile.

AIM-TE - SPARROW III Missile.

AN APR-25 - Radar Homing and Warning System.

APG-59 - F-4J Radar.

APQ-83B - F-8H Radar.

APO-12 - F-4B Radar.

APO-124 - F-8J Radar.

ATOLL - Soviet Air-to-Air Infrared Missile.

AWG-10 - F-4J Missile Control System.

BINGO - A term used in aviation to indicate that an aircraft has reached the minimum fuel required to return to base safely.

Cathode Ray Tube - CRT.

COMOPTEVFOR - Acronym for Commander Operational Test and Evaluation Force, an organization responsible for conducting operational testing and evaluating military systems.

CRM - Stands for Crew Resource Management, which refers to the training and practices that enhance communication, teamwork, and decision-making within a flight crew.

CW - Continuous Wave.

DCM - Defensive Combat Maneuvering - Tactical maneuvers performed by aircraft during combat engagements.

Defense Intelligence Agency - DIA.

Democratic Republic of Vietnam - DRV.

EGT - Exhaust Gas Temperature.

EI - Electronic Intelligence.

Elements - The basic fighting unit (two aircraft).

Energy Level (Es) - The total energy state of an aircraft, determined by its altitude and airspeed (Mach number) combination.

Energy Maneuverability - A concept used to assess an aircraft's overall in-flight performance by measuring its instantaneous and sustained maneuverability throughout its flight envelope.

Energy Rate (Ps) - An aircraft's ability to gain or lose energy, typically expressed Regarding altitude and airspeed or their combinations.

FEAR - Folding Fin Aircraft Rocket.

Fluid Element - The second or supporting element in fluid four formations, flying in a high or low element position.

Free F-4 - Tactical Wingman.

Fresco C Radar - Refers to the radar system used in the Fresco C aircraft, specifically designed for tracking and engaging targets.

HAVE DOUGHNUT – MiG-21 Exploitation Project.

HEI - High Explosive Incendiary.

I Band - Radio Frequency Energy (8,000 to 10,000 KC).

IMN - Indicated Mach Number.

In-Trains - Elements or flights, one behind the other.

In-Trail - Individual aircraft, one behind the other.

KIAS - Knots Indicated Airspeed.

KTAS - Knots True Airspeed.

Lethal Envelope - The region around a target aircraft where it was vulnerable to attacks.

Low-Speed Yo-Yos - A maneuver that facilitates closure and simultaneously allows an attacker to remain inside an opponent's turn radius.

LRCVW - An abbreviation or acronym not specified in the historical context provided.

Maximum - Maximum afterburner (A/B) power.

Maximum Performance - The optimal performance achievable by an aircraft within its operational limitations.

Maximum Performance Maneuvering Envelope - A maneuvering region for the wingman where optimum visual coverage and mutual support may be achieved in maximum performance maneuvers.

Maximum Rate Turn - The maneuver in which an aircraft achieves the highest number of degrees turned per second.

Maneuverability - The ability of an aircraft to change its direction and velocity vector magnitude.

Maneuvering Energy - An aircraft's energy that allows it to perform maneuvers.

Millimeter - MM.

NATC - Acronym for Naval Air Test Center, a facility responsible for testing and evaluating naval aircraft and related equipment.

NATOPS - Naval Aviation Training and Operational Standardization Program.

NM - Nautical Miles.

Padlock - A lookout technique that requires looking solely at the target once it has been visually acquired.

PD - Pulse Doppler.

PPS - Pulses Per Second.

PRE - Pulse Repetition Frequency.

Rave Doughnut - Refers to a project title or term not specified in the historical context provided.

RCVW - An abbreviation or acronym not specified in the historical context provided.

RHO - An abbreviation or acronym not specified in the historical context provided.

RHAW - Radar Homing and Warning.

Scan Fix - Refers to a radar technique where the radar system sweeps or scans the area to detect and locate targets.

SANDWICH - A maneuver placing the attacking aircraft/element between the defending elements like a train.

SEA - Southeast Asia - A region encompassing countries in the southeastern part of the Asian continent.

Separation - The distance between an attacker and defender, which could be lateral or longitudinal.

TAC - Tactical Air Command.

TAC LEAD - Tactical Lead.

TAC WING - Tactical Wing.

TCA - Track Crossing Angle.

VID - Abbreviation for Visual Identification, the process of visually confirming the identity of a target or object.

Pilot Lock-on Mode - A mode in which the pilot of an aircraft could manually lock onto a target using radar or other targeting systems.

Dynamic Pressure - The pressure exerted on an aircraft's surfaces due to its motion through the air, considering airspeed and density.

Readiness Attack Carrier Air Wing - Refers to a carrier air wing that was prepared and equipped for offensive operations and combat readiness.

Radar Intercept Officer - A crew member responsible for operating radar and weapons systems in a two-seat aircraft.

Safe Return to Base - A term used to describe the actions taken by aircraft to ensure a safe return to their home base in an emergency.

PL.M - An abbreviation or acronym not specified in the historical context provided.

RIO - Acronym for Radar Intercept Officer, referring to a crew member responsible for operating radar and weapons systems in a two-seat aircraft.

TUN - An abbreviation for tactical unit number, used to identify specific military units or squadrons.

Visual Identification - The process of visually confirming the identity of a target or object.

Introduction

The MiGs of Area 51 is an insider’s account that delves into the declassified world of foreign aerial asset exploitation at one of the most secretive locations in the United States. With firsthand experience as a member of the initial exploitations team at Area 51, the author brings a unique perspective to this captivating narrative.

The story begins in January 1968, when the Foreign Technology Division embarked on a study to conduct comparative tactical flight evaluations between the MiG-21, a Soviet Fishbed (MiG-21-F-13) aircraft, and US first-line aircraft. From January 23 to April 8, 1968, the team engaged in the tactical exploitation of the MiG-21, revealing crucial technological information, system and subsystem characteristics, and design features. The results of this exploitation were groundbreaking, providing valuable insights for the US military.

Building on this success, the Foreign Technology Division continued its efforts by meticulously exploring the technical data and findings obtained from exploiting two Soviet FRESCO C (MiG-17F) aircraft. From February 3, 1969, to May 15, 1969, the division examined various aspects of the aircraft, including performance, propulsion systems, design features, and signature evaluations. These comprehensive evaluations yielded invaluable intelligence insights and contributed to the growing knowledge base.

It is important to note that the data presented in this book represents raw technical intelligence information. While further analysis and data reduction may be necessary in specific cases, the exploitation results align remarkably well with published estimates, attesting to the reliability and accuracy of the findings.

The impact of the projects at Area 51, known as HAVE DOUGHNUT, HAVE DRILL, and HAVE FERRY, conducted in 1968 and 1969, reverberated throughout the US military. These endeavors paved the way for significant developments. Promptly following these projects, the US Navy established the Top Gun Weapons School, while the US Air Force conducted Red Flag Exercises at Nellis AFB Gunners Range near Las Vegas, Nevada, and Area 51. These initiatives aimed to provide essential training to pilots and aviators before entering the war zone, ensuring they gained critical experience in the skies of Nevada.

Consequently, the Top Gun Weapons School at Naval Air Station Fallon, Nevada, dedicated itself to training and tactics for US Navy and Marine Corps fighter aircraft. Simultaneously, the United States Air Force established the Red Eagle MiG squadron, the highly classified 4477th Test and Evaluation Squadron, at Tonopah, Nevada. This specialized unit played an instrumental role in advanced adversary training for US fighter pilots, simulating engagements against Soviet-designed aircraft, particularly MiG fighter jets.

Operating under a shroud of utmost secrecy, the Red Eagle MiG squadron at Tonopah played a vital role in preparing US fighter pilots for potential conflicts against adversaries equipped with Soviet-designed aircraft. Their meticulous training, realistic simulations, and rigorous exercises significantly improved US military aviators' combat readiness and capabilities during the challenging Cold War era.

The culmination of the MiG exploitation programs at Area 51 and subsequent US Navy and Air Force training initiatives left an indelible mark. Since the Vietnam War, the United States had lost only one aircraft in air-to-air combat—a testament to the knowledge gained through these programs and the dedication of our armed forces.

The MiGs of Area 51 opens a window into a clandestine world, providing a unique perspective on these exploits, findings, and the enduring impact of these groundbreaking operations. It takes readers on a captivating journey that sheds light on the vital role played by intelligence gathering, training, and simulation in shaping the military landscape of the United States.

TD Barnes

Former CIA Special Projects at Area 51 during Projects

HAVE DOUGHNUT, DRILL, and FERRY

Chapter 1- Articulating a New War

In 1959, the North Vietnamese established an air force using outdated and discarded equipment. This endeavor began when a pilot defected from the Laotian air force and brought a T-28 trainer aircraft. To enhance their capabilities, the Vietnamese People's Air Force (VPAF) sent pilots for training in MiG fighters to the Soviet Union and China. However, they lacked jet aircraft until February 1964, when the Soviets generously donated 36 MiG-15s and MiG-17s to the VPAF. Initially, these MiGs were stationed in southern China due to security concerns. The MiGs were deployed to Phuc Yen Air Base near Hanoi until August 1964, after the Tonkin Gulf incident escalated the US forces in Southeast Asia.

By November 1965, the VPAF had acquired its first MiG-21s. Although the MiG-15s and MiG-17s were not considered significant threats to the advanced US fighter jets, on April 3, 1965, two MiG-17s surprised and inflicted substantial damage on a US Navy strike flight south of Hanoi using 23 mm cannon fire. The North Vietnamese mistakenly believed they had destroyed aircraft. The following day, on April 4, MiG-17s shot down two US Air Force F-105s during an attack on the Dragon's Jaw bridge at Thanh Hoa. Taking advantage of haze cover, the MiGs caught the F-100s on protective air patrol off guard, rendering the heavily loaded F-105s unable to react.

The first confirmed victories for the US came in June 1965, when Navy F-4Bs operating from a carrier in the Tonkin Gulf achieved aerial victories. However, it wasn't until July 10 that the Air Force secured victories when F-4Cs based at Ubon Air Base in Thailand shot down two MiG-17s.

The confrontations between US and North Vietnamese fighters occurred in two phases: 1965-1968 and 1972-1973, with a pause in operations during negotiations to end the war. The nimble MiGs proved formidable opponents despite the American pilots and aircraft having clear superiority and numerical advantage. US forces downed 196 MiGs throughout the conflict, with the Air Force accounting for 137 kills and the Navy and Marine Corps for 59. Unfortunately, the US also suffered 83 losses.

How the Korean and Vietnam Wars Differed

The air war in Vietnam differed significantly from the air war in Korea, reflecting the unique characteristics of each conflict, the evolving nature of warfare, and the strategies employed by the United States.

In the Korean War, the air war focused primarily on establishing air superiority and providing close air support for ground forces. Limited objectives were set, and the conflict was primarily confined to the Korean Peninsula. The US Air Force and Navy engaged in intense aerial combat with North Korean and Chinese forces, marking the first large-scale use of jet aircraft. Air superiority was crucial in Korea, and the air war primarily revolved around attacking enemy troops, positions, and infrastructure supporting ground operations. Strategic bombing campaigns specifically targeted industrial and transportation targets in North Korea. This period saw the transition from propeller-driven aircraft to jet-powered aircraft, with dogfights between jets like the F-86 Sabre and MiG-15 highlighting the importance of air-to-air combat. The air war in Korea operated under the political objective of containment, with limited objectives dictated by political leadership—the war's proximity to China and the fear of broader conflict constrained Using airpower.

In contrast, the objectives of the air war in Vietnam were more complex. The US aimed to disrupt enemy logistics and lines of communication, interdict supplies along the Ho Chi Minh Trail, conduct strategic bombing campaigns, and support ground operations. The scale of the air war was significantly larger, extending operations beyond the borders of Vietnam into Laos and Cambodia. While air superiority remained a goal in Vietnam, it was more challenging due to the formidable North Vietnamese Air Force and the introduction of advanced Soviet surface-to-air missile systems. Extensive aerial combat occurred, including dogfights between US and North Vietnamese fighters. The air war in Vietnam employed a more comprehensive range of tactics and targeted broader objectives. In addition, to close air support for ground forces, US aircraft conducted interdiction missions to disrupt enemy supply lines. They targeted strategic sites such as industrial areas, bridges, and military installations. Using controversial tactics like carpet bombing and aerial herbicide spraying, such as Agent Orange, added to the complexities of the air war.

Technological advancements also played a significant role. Supersonic fighters like the F-4 Phantom II increased speed and firepower, while helicopters became prominent in various roles, such as gunships, troop transports, and aerial reconnaissance platforms.

Similar to the Korean War, political limitations and concerns about escalation influenced the air war in Vietnam. However, the lack of clear objectives and the prolonged nature of the conflict resulted in a broader range of air operations. The expansion of the war into neighboring countries also presented logistical and political challenges.

Overall, the US air war in Vietnam differed from the air war in Korea in terms of scale, targets, tactics, technological advancements, and the presence of a formidable air defense system. These factors and the complexities of the Vietnam War made the air war in Vietnam distinct.

In a broader historical context, the Vietnam War was unlike previous conflicts. Unlike World War II, where the Army Air Forces claimed thousands of aerial victories, or the Korean War, where the Air Force achieved a favorable kill ratio, the Vietnam War had a different strategy. Neither side aimed to win the air war in a conventional sense. The US focused on protecting its strike flights rather than destroying enemy aircraft. Meanwhile, the North Vietnamese utilized their MiGs to impede bombing attacks, taking advantage of US rules of engagement. Political considerations also shaped the air campaign, with the US targeting the flow of men and supplies from North Vietnam to South Vietnam. The air war in Vietnam was marked by limitations imposed by rules of engagement, the utilization of missiles over guns, and the dominance of the F-4 Phantom, ill-suited for close combat.

The US’s Changing War Philosophy

During the development of the F-4 in the 1950s, US planners believed that nuclear weapons had rendered air combat maneuvering obsolete. As a result, early models of the F-4 deployed to Vietnam did not include an onboard gun. This disadvantaged them in close-range encounters and battles against MiGs, where missiles could be impractical.

The main air-to-air missiles used by US forces were the radar-guided AIM-7 Sparrow and the heat-seeking AIM-9 Sidewinder. The Sparrow had an effective range of over 10 miles, while the Sidewinder had approximately two miles. Most kills were made using missiles, with 57.5 percent attributed to the Sparrow. However, the Navy heavily relied on the Sidewinder, particularly in engagements with MiG-17s in close-quarters combat. The MiG-21s of the Vietnamese People's Air Force (VPAF) primarily used Atoll heat-seeking missiles, supplemented by their guns. The MiG-21's weaponry included a 30 mm cannon and two AA-2 Atoll missiles for the point interceptor role.

The Soviet-built Atoll missiles were copies of the US-made AIM-9 Sidewinder. The USSR obtained a Sidewinder when a Nationalist Chinese F-86F pilot fired one at a MiG-17, but the missile failed to explode and became lodged in the MiG-17's fuselage. Through reverse engineering, the Soviets developed their version of the Sidewinder, which became the standard Soviet air-to-air missile for the MiG-21 and other fighters.

The North Vietnamese air defense system consisted of over 200 radar facilities that provided warnings and guidance to MiGs, surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), and antiaircraft guns. MiG-21s operated under strict ground control, often attempting to stalk American formations from the rear, firing missiles and then disengaging.

Operation Rolling Thunder, which lasted from March 2, 1965, to November 1, 1968, resulted in nearly 1,000 US aircraft losses in approximately one million sorties. The operation led the Navy and Air Force to draw nearly opposite conclusions.

The Air Force concluded its air losses were primarily due to unobserved MiG attacks from the rear. It treated this as a technology problem and responded by upgrading its F-4 Phantom II fleet by installing an internal 20 mm Vulcan cannon, replacing the gun pods carried under the aircraft's belly. The Air Force also developed improved airborne radar systems and worked to solve the targeting problems of the AIM-9 and AIM-7 air-to-air missiles.

By late 1966, the tactics employed by MiG-21s had become so effective that the US launched Operation Bolo on January 2, 1967, to deal with the MiG-21 threat. Led by Colonel Robin Olds, the operation lured MiG-21s into the air by appearing as an F-105 strike group. Instead, the MiG-21s found a sky full of F-4 Phantom IIs armed with missiles, ready for aerial combat. The VPAF lost almost half of its inventory of MiG-21 interceptors, while the US suffered no losses. Following this setback, the VPAF stood down for additional training. In 1967, the US believed the MiG threat had been neutralized, with only 40 North Vietnamese fighters remaining, including 12 MiG-21s. However, the North Vietnamese losses were replenished with assistance from the Soviets and the Chinese.

Combat Losses in SEA (South East Asia)

On April 4, 1965, the Vietnamese People's Air Force (VPAF) achieved its first confirmed victories in the Vietnam War. It shocked the US fighter community when MiG-17F fighters, considered relatively slow compared to the advanced F-105 Thunderchief fighter-bombers, successfully shot down two F-105s during an attack on the Thanh Hóa Bridge. The F-105s were carrying their average heavy bomb load, which limited their ability to react to the attacking MiGs.

The Soviet Union supplied the VPAF with supersonic MiG-21s that the VPAF utilized for high-speed, ground-controlled intercepts against American air strike groups. The MiG-21s were deployed in hit-and-run tactics to engage and disengage from the enemy quickly.

Using the F-4 in Vietnam primarily as a fighter rather than an interceptor proved a costly mistake for the Air Force and Navy aircrews. The air-to-air kill ratio sometimes dropped as low as 2:1 against the inferior North Vietnamese pilots flying small, highly maneuverable MiG-21s. This was a significant departure from the kill ratios experienced in the Korean War, where the US achieved a much higher ratio of 13:1. The lower kill ratio in Vietnam raised concerns. It highlighted the need for reassessment and adjustments in strategy and tactics.

A New Type of Aerial Warfare Called for Changes

The Vietnam War presented multiple challenges beyond the new type of aerial warfare. The conflict occurred during a troubled time in US history, characterized by a conservative regime and a growing anti-Vietnam War movement. Protests spread from college campuses to the streets, and federal agencies conducted secret investigations into the loyalty of American citizens. These factors affected the perception of the war and had implications for the US air campaign.

Complicating matters further, the Johnson administration issued restrictions on targeting North Vietnamese airfields, parked aircraft, command centers, and main radar installations. This limitation imposed constraints on the US air war, hindering its effectiveness.

In terms of weaponry, the AIM-7 missile, designed as an anti-bomber weapon, lacked the necessary range and maneuverability for fighter-versus-fighter engagements. However, the AIM-9 missile demonstrated a relatively better kill rate, reaching around twenty percent during the latter part of the 1965-1968 campaign.

The Vietnam War also saw the widespread tactical deployment of helicopters, which played a significant role in various operations. Unfortunately, the enemy successfully shot down over 8,000 helicopters, losing over 5,000 US helicopter pilots. The Bell UH-1 Iroquois, commonly known as the Huey, accounted for 2,200 losses. These figures do not encompass all the other helicopter models used in the war, nor do they include the non-pilot crew members, such as door gunners and crew chiefs.

Excluding helicopter pilots and aircrew, the US suffered over 6,000 casualties among fixed-wing propeller and jet pilots and aircrew during the Vietnam War. The US Air Force lost approximately 2,584 personnel, while the US Navy lost about 2,555. The combined losses of fixed-wing aircraft for the Air Force and Navy exceeded 2,000. Additionally, the US Army lost approximately 8,000 rotor-wing aircraft.

The high number of casualties and aircraft losses prompted a critical examination of the effectiveness and suitability of the planes employed in the war. Various factors, including the challenging operational environment, limitations in targeting, and the weapons systems' capabilities, contributed to the overall outcome of the air campaign.

US planes lost in Vietnam.

The aerial losses in Vietnam emphasized the need for the MiG activities in Nevada discussed in this book; the United States Air Force (USAF) played a significant role in the Vietnam War, conducting numerous sorties over South Vietnam, North Vietnam, northern and southern Laos, and Cambodia. Throughout the conflict, the USAF flew 5.25 million sorties. Unfortunately, this extensive aerial campaign resulted in the loss of 2,251 aircraft. Of these losses, 1,737 were due to hostile action, while 514 occurred in accidents.

The losses included a variety of aircraft, with 110 helicopters and the remaining being fixed-wing aircraft. However, the USAF maintained a relatively low loss rate compared to previous conflicts. With a ratio of approximately 0.4 losses per 1,000 sorties, the USAF performed favorably compared to the 2.0 rate during the Korean War and the alarming figure of 9.7 during World War II.

The losses encompassed a range of aircraft types employed by the USAF during the war. Here are some notable examples:

191 A-1 Skyraiders were lost, with 150 lost in combat. The first loss occurred on the night of August 28-29, 1964, near Bien Hoa, South Vietnam, when an A-1E belonging to the 1st Air Commando Squadron, 34th Tactical Group, was shot down. The final loss was an A-1H from the 1st Special Operations Squadron, 56th Special Operations Wing, shot down on September 28, 1972, with the pilot being rescued by an Air America helicopter.

A-7D Corsair II: Six A-7D Corsair II aircraft were lost, with four lost in combat. The first loss was on December 2, 1972, when an A-7D from the 355th Tactical Fighter Squadron, 354th Tactical Fighter Wing, was shot down on a CSAR mission in Laos, resulting in the death of Capt Anthony Shine. The final loss occurred on May 25, 1973, when an A-7D from the 354th Tactical Fighter Wing was shot down in Cambodia, and Capt Jeremiah Costello was killed.

B-52 Stratofortress: 31 B-52 Stratofortress bombers were lost, with 17 lost in combat. The first losses were operational (non-combat) mid-air collisions on June 18, 1965, involving two B-52Fs from the 441st Bomb Squadron, 320th Bomb Wing, over the South China Sea during air refueling. The final loss was a B-52D, which fell victim to a surface-to-air missile on January 4, 1973, but the crew was rescued from the Gulf of Tonkin.

These are just a few examples of the losses suffered by the USAF during the Vietnam War. Each aircraft type had its own set of losses and circumstances. The sacrifices the USAF and its personnel made throughout the conflict significantly impacted the war's outcome.

During the Vietnam War, the United States Navy (USN) made significant contributions through its aircraft carriers and various aircraft. Twenty-one aircraft carriers were deployed, conducting 86 war cruises and operating for 9,178 days in the Gulf of Tonkin. The USN suffered losses of 530 aircraft in combat and an additional 329 due to operational causes. These losses resulted in the deaths of 377 naval aviators, with 64 airmen reported missing and 179 taken as prisoners of war.

The aircraft losses encompassed a range of fixed-wing carrier-based aircraft employed by the USN. Here are some notable examples:

A-1 Skyraider: Out of 65 A-1 Skyraiders lost, 48 were in combat. The first loss occurred on August 5, 1964, when an A-1H from VA-145 aboard the USS Constellation was shot down, resulting in the death of Lt.j.g. R. C. Sather. The final loss was an A-1H from VA-25 aboard the USS Coral Sea, shot down by a MiG on February 14, 1968, with Lt.j.g. J. P. Dunn listed as missing in action.

A-4 Skyhawk: 282 A-4 Skyhawks were lost, with 195 in combat. The first loss was an A-4C from VA-144 aboard the USS Constellation on August 5, 1964, due to anti-aircraft fire, and Lt.j.g. Everett Alvarez became a prisoner of war, spending over eight years in captivity. The final loss was an A-4F from VA-212 aboard the USS Hancock on September 6, 1972, shot down by anti-aircraft fire, with the pilot being rescued.

F-4 Phantom: The USN lost 138 F-4 Phantoms, with 75 in combat. The first loss was an F-4B from VA-142 aboard the USS Constellation on November 13, 1964, due to an operational accident, and the crew was rescued. The last combat loss, and also the final USN combat loss of the war, was an F-4J from VF-143 aboard the USS Enterprise on January 27, 1973, shot down by anti-aircraft fire, with CDR H.H. Hall and LCDR P.A. Keintzer becoming prisoners of war. The final loss was an F-4J from VF-21 aboard the USS Ranger on January 29, 1973, due to an operational accident, and the crew was killed.

These are just a few examples of the losses suffered by the USN during the Vietnam War. Each aircraft type had its own set of losses and circumstances. The sacrifices made by the USN and its personnel played a crucial role in the conflict, and their contributions significantly impacted the war's outcome.

The United States Marine Corps (USMC) played a significant role in the Vietnam War, with numerous fixed-wing and rotary-wing aircraft lost in combat. The USMC lost 193 fixed-wing aircraft and 270 rotary-wing aircraft during the conflict.

Among the fixed-wing aircraft losses, the A-4 Skyhawk accounted for 81 losses, while the A-6 Intruder suffered 25 losses. Other fixed-wing aircraft losses included 2 C-117 Skytrains, 2 EA-6A Intruders, 5 EF-10 Skynights, 95 F-4 Phantoms (72 in combat), 21 F-8 Crusaders, 4 KC-130 Hercules, 7 O-1 Bird Dogs, 10 OV-10 Broncos, 4 RF-4 Phantoms, 1 RF-8 Crusader, 10 TA-4 Skyhawks, and 1 TF-9 Cougar.

Regarding rotary-wing aircraft, the USMC lost 7 AH-1 Cobras, 75 HUS-1 helicopters, 1 CH-37 Mojave, 109 CH-46D Sea Knights, and 9 CH-53 Sea Stallions.

The United States Army (USA) also suffered losses during the Vietnam War. Among its fixed-wing aircraft, 3 OV-1A Mohawks and 2 OV-1B Mohawks were lost. Additionally, the USA lost 297 O-1 Bird Dogs, which were extensively used for observation and reconnaissance missions.

In the rotary-wing category, the USA lost 5,086 helicopters, which included various types. These losses encompassed 1 Bell 205 (Air America), 270 AH-1Gs, 1 Bell helicopter, 14 CH-21Cs, 2 CH-34s, 1 CH-37B, 1 CH-37C, 83 destroyed CH-47As, 20 destroyed CH-47Bs, 29 destroyed CH-47Cs, nine destroyed CH-54As, three destroyed H-13Ds, two destroyed H-37As, 147 destroyed OH-13S, 93 destroyed OH-23Gs, 45 destroyed OH-58As, 842 destroyed OH-6As, 60 destroyed UH-1s, 357 destroyed UH-1Bs, 365 destroyed UH-1Cs, 886 destroyed UH-1Ds, 90 destroyed UH-1Es, 18 destroyed UH-1Fs, 1,313 destroyed UH-1Hs, and 176 destroyed UH-34Ds.

These losses represent the sacrifices the USMC and USA made during the Vietnam War. The aircraft losses resulted from combat engagements, operational causes, and the challenging conditions of the conflict. The USMC and USA played crucial roles in ground operations and air support throughout the war.

Chapter 2 - The Soviet Mystery Plane

The MiG-21 Fishbed, a Soviet mystery plane, captivated the imagination of aviation enthusiasts and military analysts alike. Developed in the late 1950s, this supersonic jet fighter and interceptor quickly became an iconic symbol of Soviet aviation prowess.

Codename Fishbed by NATO, the MiG-21 possessed remarkable characteristics that made it a formidable aircraft. It was renowned for its agility, low cost, and ease of maintenance, contributing to its overall export to countries worldwide. The MiG-21's success could be attributed to its versatility, capable of fulfilling multiple roles, including air superiority, ground attack, and reconnaissance.

The MiG-21's design featured a slender fuselage, delta wings, and a single engine, allowing it to achieve supersonic speeds. Its compact size and lightweight construction provided exceptional maneuverability, enabling the pilot to execute tight turns and high-g combat maneuvers. This attribute made the MiG-21 a formidable adversary during the Cold War, particularly concerning Western forces.

Several variants of the MiG-21 were developed over the years, each incorporating advancements in avionics and armament. The most-produced variant, the MiG-21bis, stood out with its improved capabilities and enhanced performance. The MiG-21bis further solidified its reputation as a fearsome combat aircraft with better avionics systems and a more potent arsenal.

The MiG-21's impact extended beyond military applications. It found utility in civilian roles, serving as a trainer aircraft for aspiring pilots and as a platform for scientific research. Its reliability and relatively low operating costs ensured its longevity in service with air forces across the globe.

One of the most intriguing aspects of the MiG-21's history was its involvement in the Vietnam War. American pilots faced a significant challenge when confronted by MiG-21s, as the Soviet-built planes had proven themselves formidable adversaries. In numerous encounters, MiG-21s downed American aircraft while American pilots struggled to achieve the same level of success. This lopsided aerial loss ratio of 9:1 against the United States underscored the MiG-21's combat prowess.

It was worth noting that the MiG-21's enigma was not limited to its Soviet origins. Israeli Colonel Shapira added another chapter to its mystique when he became the first Western world pilot to fly an Iraqi MiG-21. Obtained through a complex and secretive operation orchestrated by the Israeli Intelligence Community, this acquisition provided a unique opportunity to study the enemy's aircraft firsthand. Despite lacking prior experience, documentation, and substantial support, Colonel Shapira meticulously explored and evaluated the MiG-21's flight characteristics. His findings were then employed to enhance dissymmetrical combat training sorties conducted by the Israel Air Force.

The MiG-21 Fishbed, with its iconic design and remarkable capabilities, continued to hold a prominent place in aviation history. As a symbol of Soviet aviation achievements during the Cold War, its allure and impact remain intact, leaving an indelible mark on the annals of military aviation.

The United States Needed to Know —Was it the Planes?

Again, the US needed to acquire a MiG to determine the cause of its losses in the air war. The MiG-21F-13 mystery plane no longer appeared as a mystery once it first flew over Area 51 in 1968 with a YF-110B designation.

The HAVE DOUGHNUT story begins with Operation DIAMOND on 16 August 1966 in the Middle East; a year after Operation Rolling Thunder, the sustained air bombardment of North Vietnam began.

Operation DIAMOND

Operation Diamond was an operation undertaken by Mossad. Its goal was the acquisition of a Soviet-built Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21, the most advanced Soviet fighter plane at that time. The operation began in mid-1963 and ended on August 16, 1966, when an Iraqi Air Force MiG-21, flown by the Iraqi Assyrian defector Munir Redfa, landed at an air base in Israel. Israel and the United States could study the plane's design.

Mossad agent Jean Thomas conducted the first attempt to acquire the aircraft in Egypt. Thomas and his group were ordered to find a pilot who, for $1,000,000, would agree to fly the plane to Israel. However, their first attempt was unsuccessful. The Egyptian pilot they contacted, Adib Hanna, informed the authorities about Thomas' interest in the MiG. Thomas, his father, and three others were arrested and charged with espionage. Thomas and two others were hanged in December 1962. The other three members of the group received lengthy prison terms. The second attempt also failed. Mossad agents assaulted two Iraqi pilots who refused to cooperate with them to keep them quiet for some time.

In 1964, a Jewish Iraqi, Yusuf, contacted Israeli personnel in Tehran, as Israel and Iran still had diplomatic relations. Yusuf, since ten years of age, had been working as a servant for a Maronite Christian family. His girlfriend's friend was married to an Iraqi pilot named Munir Redfa. Redfa was annoyed that his Christian roots prevented his promotion in the military. He was also upset that he had been ordered to attack Iraqi Kurds. Yusuf believed that Redfa was ready to leave Iraq.

A female Mossad agent befriended Redfa and told her that he was forced to live far away from his family in Baghdad, his commanders did not trust him, and he was allowed to fly only with small fuel tanks because of his Christianity. He also admired Israelis, few against so many Muslims. Redfa was persuaded to travel to Europe to meet with Israeli agents. Meir Amit observed the meeting between Redfa and an intelligence officer using a peephole. Redfa was offered $1 million, Israeli citizenship, and full-time employment. Redfa demanded that his relatives be smuggled out of Iraq, which Israel agreed to do. Later Redfa traveled to Israel to see the airfield he would use to land the plane. He also met with the commander of the Israeli Air Force, Major General Mordechai Mottie Hod. They discussed the dangerous flight and its path.

Numerous Mossad agents were sent to Iraq to assist in transferring Redfa's wife, Betty, their two children, aged three and five, his parents, and several other family members out of the country. Betty and their two children went to Paris for what she thought was a summer vacation. Redfa, who promised to prepare her for what would happen, told her nothing. When Betty was contacted by a Mossad agent, who had her new Israeli passport, she initially became distraught and threatened to contact the Iraqi embassy before she calmed down. The other family members were taken to the Iranian border, where Kurdish guerillas helped them to cross into Iran, from where they were taken to Israel.

The opportunity to defect came about on August 16, 1966. While Redfa was flying over northern Jordan, his plane was tracked by radar. The Jordanians contacted Syria but were reassured that the plane belonged to the Syrian air force and was on a training mission. When Redfa's plane reached Israel, he was met by two Israeli Air Force Dassault Mirage IIIs, which escorted him to a landing at Hatzor. Later at a press conference, Redfa said he had landed the plane on the last drop of fuel.

Soon after his defection, Redfa's MiG was renumbered 007, reflecting how it had arrived. Within a few weeks, the aircraft took off again with Israeli test pilot Danny Shapira at the controls on the first of many test flights. The jet's strengths and weaknesses were analyzed and flown against IAF fighters, eventually training Israeli pilots to deal with the aircraft. In May 1967, director of CIA Richard Helms said that Israel had proven that it had made good use of the aircraft when on April 7, 1967, during aerial battles over the Golan Heights, the Israeli Air Force brought down 6 Syrian MiG-21s without losing any of its Dassault Mirage IIIs.

Israel initially hesitated to share its prize with the United States. However, Israel eventually did so after concluding an agreement brokered by the US Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) to lend the MiG-21 to the US for study. In exchange, the US allowed them to buy the F-4 Phantom II, the American front-line fighter of the day.

The exchange followed when the Israelis made several overtures to the Johnson Administration to purchase the Phantom, only to have President Johnson rebuff them out of fear of escalating matters in the Middle East. Having the MiG-21 provided the Israelis enough advantage to get the Phantoms headed their way, and the US could finally get a close study of its vaunted adversary in the skies of Vietnam.

In January 1968, Israel loaned the MiG to the United States, which evaluated the jet under the HAVE DOUGHNUT program. The transfer helped pave the way for the Israeli acquisition of the F-4 Phantom, which the Americans had been reluctant to sell to Israel.

In the context of the Vietnam War, the Soviet-built MiG planes proved to be formidable adversaries. American pilots struggled to shoot down MiG aircraft, resulting in a disproportionate aerial loss ratio of 9:1 against the United States. However, a significant turning point occurred when Israeli Colonel Shapira became the first pilot from the Western world to fly an Iraqi MiG-21. The Israeli Intelligence Community had acquired the aircraft through an arduous clandestine operation involving a defector. Despite the lack of prior experience, documentation, and minimal support, Colonel Shapira thoroughly examined and evaluated the flight characteristics of the MiG-21. He then instructed the Israel Air Force in dissymmetrical combat training sorties. This success in exploiting the capabilities of the MiG-21 was later discovered by CIA Director Richard Helms in May.

The objective was to acquire a Soviet-built Mikoyan-Gurevich MiG-21 fighter jet, study its advanced technology, and develop effective countermeasures against it.

Mossad agents successfully identified an Iraqi Air Force MiG-21 making a stop in Iran for refueling en route to Moscow. These agents convinced the Iraqi pilot to defect to Israel and the aircraft. After the pilot's defection, the MiG-21 was carefully disassembled and transported to Israel for thorough analysis.

The operation proved to be a resounding success. The Israeli military gained valuable insights into the capabilities of the MiG-21, enabling them to develop effective countermeasures against this advanced Soviet aircraft. Furthermore, the information obtained from the MiG-21 was shared with the United States, solidifying the alliance between the two nations.

Capt Munir Redfa, an Iraqi fighter pilot who had earned the trust of the new regime in Iraq following a coup, played a significant role in a related Mossad operation. As an Iraqi-born Jew, Redfa confided in a Mossad agent about his difficulties, including being forced to live far from his family and facing mistrust from his commanders. To secure Redfa's cooperation, Israel offered him a substantial sum of money, citizenship, and employment. However, instead of defecting immediately, Mossad orchestrated a daring plan to secretly transfer Redfa's family out of Iraq with the help of Kurdish guerrillas. In 1966, Redfa finally defected to Israel, piloting a MiG-21 aircraft. Israeli Air Force planes escorted him to an Israeli base, marking the culmination of this successful Mossad operation. The mission to smuggle Redfa's family and facilitate his defection was regarded as one of Mossad's most remarkable achievements.

Col Danny Shapira, an Israeli pilot, made notable contributions to understanding the MiG-21's capabilities. Despite needing prior experience or documentation, Shapira fearlessly explored and evaluated the flight characteristics of the MiG-21. He then shared his insights with the Israel Air Force, significantly enhancing their understanding of this Soviet fighter jet. As a result of Shapira's work, the Israeli Air Force loaned a MiG-21 to the United States for testing and intelligence analysis as part of Area 51's Project HAVE DOUGHNUT in 1968. Shapira's expertise also led to his assignment to Mojave, California, where he briefed United States Air Force and Navy pilots on combat tactics against the MiG-21 during the Vietnam War. Furthermore, Shapira became the first Israeli pilot to fly the F-4 Phantom. The knowledge gleaned from the analysis of the MiG-21 played a vital role in the successes achieved by the Israeli Air Force in future encounters with Arab MiG-21s and in their collaboration with the United States during the Vietnam War.

The MiG Project Pilots

Robert G. Ashcraft (1968–1969) – TAC, HAVE DOUGHNUT, HAVE DRILL/FERRY

Robert G. Ashcraft (1968–1969) – TAC, HAVE DOUGHNUT, HAVE DRILL/FERRY

Thomas J. Cassidy, Jr. (1968) – USN, HAVE DOUGHNUT

Fred J. Cuthill (1968–1969) – AFSC, HAVE DOUGHNUT, HAVE DRILL/FERRY

Joe Jordan (1968) – AFSC, HAVE DOUGHNUT

Gerald D. Larson (1968) – TAC (1137th SAS) HAVE DOUGHNUT

William T. Ted Twinting (1968) – AFSC, HAVE DOUGHNUT

The Venue

In the chronicles of Nevada's history, the State played a pivotal role in hosting clandestine military operations and secretive government projects. From its inception as the Battle Born State during the Civil War to its involvement in defending the West Coast against a feared Japanese invasion, Nevada emerged as a front line in times of conflict.

One such significant development occurred when the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) established a presence in Nevada to conduct atomic bomb testing. This brought a new dimension of military activity to the state, followed by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) setting up the NASA High Range and the NERVA Project at Jackass Flats. The NERVA Project aimed to develop a nuclear engine for a crewed flight to Mars. Subsequently, the CIA and Department of Defense (DOD) arrived, establishing Area 51. Nevada, therefore, became the convergence point for four distinct worlds: the military, atomic, space, and classified black projects.

A veil of secrecy enshrouded Nevada's national security endeavors, with classified activities taking place across the sparsely populated regions of the state. Remote areas like Jackass Flats, Yucca Flats, Yucca Mesa, Frenchman Flats, and the Nellis Air Force Base gunnery range witnessed highly classified operations. Tonopah Test Range was a testing ground for smart bombs and an impact zone for Regulus cruise missiles.

The desolate landscape of Nevada also facilitated covert operations. Apollo astronauts utilized the atomic bomb craters for lunar landing practice, while eight astronauts honed their skills in the X-15 after launching from a B-52 mothership tracked by NASA stations. In this setting, the CIA seamlessly concealed its activities, blending them with the prevalent culture of secrecy.

Only a tiny fraction of the personnel affiliated with Area 51 projects were privy to the CIA's involvement in the facility. With its inhospitable conditions and lack of vegetation, the remote valley surrounding Groom Lake proved an ideal location. The dry pluvial lakebed of Groom Lake itself served as an active runway controlled by Area 51's air traffic control tower. The CIA had been operating out of Area 51 for 13 years, conducting aerial reconnaissance missions worldwide with aircraft like the A-12, which had flown 1,250 secretive missions from the base.

Contrary to popular belief, the CIA did not conceal the existence of the Groom Lake facility, which eventually became known as Area 51. As other CIA and DOD projects joined, the facility changed names accordingly. Nevertheless, the Atomic Energy Commission, later renamed the Department of Energy, continued referring to the Groom Lake facility as the Ranch or Area 51. The AEC even listed Area 51 phone numbers in the Nevada Atomic Test Site phone books, and local television stations’ transponders provided coverage to the remote sites.

Facilities and amenities were provided to support the personnel stationed at Area 51. Deputy Commander Werner Weiss and his successor, Dick Sampson of the CIA, ensured a small Base Exchange was available, along with recreational facilities like a swimming pool, exercise room, softball diamond, putting green, pool room, and a bar called Sam's Place.

The dining facilities at Groom Lake, overseen by Murphy Green, left a lasting impression on everyone working at Area 51. Green maintained strict rules and commanded respect from all who visited the mess hall. His memorable catchphrase, Preciate it, preciate it, resonated with those who frequented the facility.

Operations at Area 51 were conducted around the clock, necessitating the functioning of various support facilities. Hobby shops, theaters, rod and gun clubs, swimming pools, bowling alleys, and more created an environment conducive to the remote location—all these facilities operated under the control of Werner Weiss.

Taking inspiration from the Office of Strategic Services (OSS) during World War II, the CIA integrated science and technology into its intelligence operations. Veterans from the OSS's Research and Development Branch joined the newly formed CIA, bringing cutting-edge scientific advancements and a penchant for utilizing pseudonyms and code names. By employing this approach, the CIA had successfully kept its science and technology operations at Station D-Area 51 secret for 13 years until the declassification of documents in 2013.

Following the achievements of the U-2 program, which emphasized technical expertise, the CIA recognized the need for a dedicated Directorate focused on science and technology. With control over its surroundings, the agency assumed responsibility for worldwide operations rather than simply running operatives in covert activities.

The establishment of Project OXCART marked a turning point for Area 51, as it shifted from a single-project facility to accommodate multiple customers. The arrival of Project HAVE DOUGHNUT in January 1968, a joint USAF/Navy evaluation of the MiG-21F-13 conducted by the Defense Intelligence Agency, brought various intelligence and specialized agencies to the station. This transformation necessitated restricted physical and social access to ensure the separation of projects and information.

Nevada's existing role in military and classified activities made it an ideal location for the CIA's Area 51. Nestled alongside Yucca Flats, Yucca Mesa, and Frenchman Flats, where atomic bombs were detonated, and adjacent to NASA's nuclear rocket development at Jackass Flats, Nevada already hosted four distinct worlds. The CIA leveraged this atmosphere of secrecy and the state's historical association with military endeavors to conceal its operations effectively.

Rather than secretly constructing the Groom Lake facility, the CIA announced its presence through the Atomic Energy Commission. Initially, the CIA used the cover story of NACA (National Aeronautics and Space Commission), establishing a high-altitude weather research facility. This provided enough information to satisfy public curiosity while concealing the CIA's involvement and the operational details of the U-2's mission.

Under the guise of the Atomic Energy Commission, the CIA organized construction crews led by Herbert Miller of the Development Projects Staff. The AEC's Las Vegas Field Office, represented by Seth Woodruff, Jr., announced preliminary work on a small satellite installation at the site. The facility, described as temporary, included a runway, dormitories, and other necessary buildings. Despite these announcements, the true nature of the facility remained largely unknown to the public.

Area 51, as the CIA's covert facility, flourished in Nevada, blending seamlessly into the state's military history and culture of secrecy. Though officially acknowledged, its presence remained enigmatic to those not needing to know. The facility's connection to the surrounding landscapes, its multifaceted operations, and the meticulous control exerted by the CIA all contributed to its legacy as a haven for classified projects.

The Participants

The genesis of the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate could be traced back to the Cold War era and the increasing importance of technological advancements in intelligence gathering and analysis. As the United States faced the challenges posed by the Soviet Union, there was a growing recognition within the intelligence community that scientific and technological innovations could provide a crucial edge in gathering intelligence and maintaining national security.

In response to this need, the Central Intelligence Agency established the Office of Scientific Intelligence (OSI) in 1952. The OSI was responsible for harnessing scientific knowledge and expertise to support intelligence operations. It focused on physics, chemistry, biology, and engineering, seeking to apply these disciplines to intelligence collection, analysis, and counterintelligence efforts.

Over time, as the role of technology in intelligence operations expanded, the OSI transformed to enhance its capabilities and effectiveness. In 1962, the OSI was reorganized and became the Directorate of Science and Technology (DS&T), reflecting its elevated status and broader scope of responsibilities.

The DS&T was vital in supporting CIA operations during the Cold War. It developed cutting-edge technologies and techniques for intelligence gathering, including advancements in imagery intelligence, signals intelligence, and measurement and signature intelligence. The directorate collaborated closely with other intelligence agencies and the scientific and engineering communities to stay at the forefront of technological innovation.

As the nature of global threats and intelligence challenges continued to evolve, the CIA recognized the need for a dedicated and centralized directorate focused on scientific and technological advancements. This led to the establishment of DS&T, which became instrumental in driving innovation and providing critical support to intelligence operations.

During the 1950s and 1960s, the CIA's involvement at Area 51, a highly classified CIA facility in the Nevada desert, significantly advanced aerial reconnaissance capabilities. The exact nature of the activities at Area 51 remained shrouded in secrecy for many years. Still, it was known that the CIA utilized the site for various classified projects related to aerial reconnaissance and advanced aircraft development.

One of the primary CIA projects at Area 51 during this period was developing and testing the U-2 spy plane. The U-2, designed for high-altitude surveillance and reconnaissance missions, was crucial in gathering intelligence during the Cold War. At Area 51, the CIA's Special Projects team worked alongside other personnel and contractors to test and refine the U-2 aircraft and its advanced reconnaissance systems.

The U-2 project at Area 51 involved conducting test flights and evaluating the aircraft's capabilities in secrecy. The facility's remote location and restricted airspace provided an ideal environment for testing cutting-edge technology and training pilots for covert surveillance missions. The CIA's involvement in the U-2 program at Area 51 represented a critical partnership between the agency and the United States Air Force in advancing aerial reconnaissance capabilities.

In addition to the U-2 program, Area 51 was also involved in developing the A-12 aircraft, which later became the precursor to the famous SR-71 Blackbird. The A-12 was a top-secret reconnaissance aircraft designed to fly at extremely high speeds and altitudes, enabling it to conduct surveillance missions over denied territories. The CIA's Special Projects team worked closely with aircraft manufacturers and engineers at Area 51 to refine the A-12's design, test its performance, and ensure its operational readiness.

The CIA's role at Area 51 extended beyond aircraft development. The facility was also utilized for training pilots, testing advanced radar systems, and conducting classified experiments related to radar cross-section (RCS) measurements. In collaboration with other agencies and contractors, the CIA's Science and Technology Directorate conducted research and experimentation to understand better and reduce the aircraft's radar signature, making them less detectable to enemy radar systems.

The CIA's presence at Area 51 during the 1950s and 1960s represented a critical component of the agency's efforts to enhance aerial reconnaissance capabilities and gather vital intelligence during the Cold War. The site's remote location, secrecy, and restricted access allowed for the development, testing, and training necessary to push the boundaries of technology and maintain the United States' intelligence advantage in a highly sensitive geopolitical environment.

During the 1960s and 1970s, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a significant role in the Defense Intelligence Agency's (DIA) MiG project codenamed HAVE DOUGHNUT. This project aimed to exploit and analyze captured Soviet MiG fighter aircraft to gain valuable intelligence on their capabilities, performance, and advanced technologies.

The CIA's involvement in the MiG project stemmed from its aerial reconnaissance and intelligence collection expertise. With the increasing importance of monitoring Soviet military developments during the Cold War, the CIA recognized the value of obtaining firsthand knowledge about Soviet aircraft.

The CIA's contributions to the MiG project were diverse and multifaceted. They included providing operational support, technical expertise, and logistical assistance to the DIA and other agencies involved in the project. The CIA's experience with reconnaissance aircraft and its knowledge of advanced aviation technologies were instrumental in ensuring the successful exploitation and analysis of the captured MiG aircraft.

One of the crucial aspects of the CIA's involvement was coordinating and facilitating the acquisition of MiG aircraft. Through covert means, the CIA acquired several Soviet MiG fighters, including the MiG-17, MiG-21, and MiG-23. These aircraft were transported to secure facilities, such as the remote Tonopah Test Range in Nevada, where the CIA worked closely with the DIA and other intelligence agencies to examine and evaluate the captured assets.

The CIA provided technical expertise in various areas, such as engineering, avionics, propulsion, and weapon systems. The agency's scientists, engineers, contractors, and industry experts played a crucial role in dissecting and analyzing the MiG aircraft. They sought to understand the aircraft's performance capabilities, radar systems, weapons systems, and other critical components.

The information gathered from the MiG project was shared with various stakeholders within the US government, including the military, defense contractors, and intelligence agencies. The insights gained from the analysis of MiG aircraft significantly contributed to developing countermeasures, tactics, and strategies to counter potential Soviet threats.

The CIA's involvement in the MiG project HAVE DOUGHNUT demonstrated the agency's commitment to exploiting captured enemy technology for intelligence. By leveraging its expertise in reconnaissance and aviation, the CIA provided invaluable support to the DIA and other agencies involved in understanding and countering Soviet military capabilities. The information from the project contributed to the United States' military preparedness and bolstered its intelligence advantage during the Cold War.

The Defense Intelligence Agency

During the 1950s and 1960s, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) played a crucial role in providing intelligence support to the United States military and policymakers. Established on October 1, 1961, the DIA was created to centralize and coordinate military intelligence efforts across different branches of the US armed forces.

One of the primary focuses of the DIA during this period was gathering intelligence on the Soviet Union and its military capabilities. As the Cold War intensified, the DIA conducted extensive analysis of Soviet nuclear weapons development, military technology, military doctrine, and overall military strength. The DIA's assessments were essential for understanding the Soviet threat and shaping US military and national security policy.

Imagery intelligence (IMINT) was a key area of expertise for the DIThe agency collected and analyzed satellite and aerial imagery, providing valuable insights into foreign military installations, capabilities, and activities. The DIA utilized reconnaissance aircraft and spy satellites to monitor the Soviet Union and other adversaries. Notably, IMINT played a critical role during the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, where it helped detect Soviet missile sites in Cuba.

The DIA also collaborated with the National Security Agency (NSA) in gathering and analyzing signals intelligence (SIGINT). This involved intercepting and decoding foreign communications, such as radio transmissions and encrypted messages. The DIA gained valuable information about adversaries' activities, military deployments, and capabilities by monitoring and analyzing SIGINT.

Human intelligence (HUMINT) operations were another vital aspect of the DIA's work. The agency conducted HUMINT operations to gather information through human sources and agents. DIA officers worked with clandestine agents, defectors, and other sources to collect intelligence on threats to US national security. HUMINT provided crucial insights into foreign military activities, intentions, and plans.

The DIA coordinated the activities of military attachés stationed at US embassies worldwide. These attachés played a vital role in collecting military intelligence in their host countries and reporting to the DIThey provided information on foreign military capabilities, exercises, equipment, and personnel, contributing to the overall intelligence picture.

The DIA's analysts assessed the collected intelligence and produced reports. They provided military intelligence briefings to military commanders, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and policymakers. The DIA's analysis and reporting informed defense planning, force posture, military operations, and national security policy.

Overall, the DIA played a critical role in gathering, analyzing, and disseminating military intelligence during the 1950s and 1960s, particularly in the context of the Cold War. Its work contributed to the understanding of potential threats and assisted in formulating US military strategy and policy decisions.

The US Air Force’s Foreign Technology Division (FTD)

The Foreign Technology Division (FTD) emerged as a pivotal organization within the United States Air Force during the Cold War and subsequent years. Its role was to assess and exploit foreign technologies, shaping US defense strategies and bolstering military capabilities. Initially established in 1946, it changed its name to become the Foreign Technology Center (FTC). Throughout its existence, the FTD focused on several key aspects:

The collection of Foreign Aerospace Technologies stood as a paramount responsibility for the FTD. This encompassed acquiring diverse assets like aircraft, missiles, radar systems, and advanced military equipment. By actively pursuing foreign technology through multiple channels, such as intelligence collection, open-source research, and direct engagement with foreign entities, the FTD sought to bolster the United States' understanding of international military advancements.

Once obtained, the FTD embarked upon rigorous exploitation and analysis efforts. Specialists within the division meticulously disassembled, examined, and evaluated acquired foreign systems to discern their capabilities, design features, and performance characteristics. This comprehensive examination allowed the US military to gain insight into foreign technologies' strengths, weaknesses, and potential vulnerabilities, thus facilitating the developing of US systems and military planning.

One of the outcomes of the FTD's endeavors was the generation of technical intelligence. The division's analytical expertise gave a detailed understanding of foreign aerospace technologies. This invaluable knowledge manifested in technical reports, assessments, and briefings shared with the Air Force, intelligence community, and other stakeholders. The technical intelligence derived from the FTD's work played an instrumental role in shaping US defense strategies, guiding force development, and fostering research and development efforts.

In certain instances, the FTD undertook the process of reverse engineering foreign technologies. This involved delving into the underlying principles, components, and manufacturing techniques of acquired systems to gain a deeper understanding. By doing so, the United States could replicate certain aspects of foreign technologies, leading to developing countermeasures, improved capabilities, and innovative solutions.

The FTD conducted extensive testing and evaluation to comprehensively evaluate foreign technologies' performance, capabilities, and limitations. Rigorous assessments encompassed flight tests of foreign aircraft, ground tests of radar systems, and meticulous other evaluations. The results derived from these tests provided crucial insights into foreign systems' operational capabilities and performance characteristics.

The FTD placed a strong emphasis on information sharing and collaboration. The division forged partnerships with various government agencies, military branches, and industry counterparts to disseminate the knowledge acquired from its analyses. This collaboration facilitated technology transfer, supporting the developing US defense systems and fostering interoperability with allied nations.

As time progressed, the FTD adapted to address emerging technologies and broadened its scope beyond aerospace systems. In 1993, it underwent a restructuring and was subsequently renamed the National Air and Space Intelligence Center (NASIC) to align with evolving