The Official CIA Interrogation & Manipulation Manual: The Cold War KUBARK Files - Updated 2014 Release with Glossary

Publisher’s Introduction

This interrogation manual, originally classified Secret, was written in July 1963 by agents of the Central Intelligence Agency — referred to under the alias KUBARK; see the new Glossary for more definitions of CIA cryptonyms used in the text. Created in that era’s climate of grave concern over Soviet penetration of American and Allied society, government, military and intelligence apparatuses, it provides a unique and valuable insight into the thoughts and actions of the Agency’s operatives at that point in history.

The manual appears to have been used well into the 1980s in one form or another, having been compiled into the Human Resource Exploitation Training Manual used by Agency and U.S. Army Green Beret trainers in various Latin American countries in the mid-eighties, which came to light as the result of the 1988 Senate Intelligence Committee hearings into the conduct of Honduran military forces.

While much of the material is technically of its time, its treatment of the human dynamic between interrogator and interrogatee, and the fundamentals of the counterintelligence mindset, are evergreen and highly instructive. Far from being a historical document only, this is a profitable read for anyone who wishes to better-understand the strategy, tactics, and interplay of the battle for possession of knowledge played out between investigator and suspect.

Moreover, its frank treatment of coercive techniques is a unique and salutary education in the ways of intelligence operatives and secret police around the world — in particular, those of countries ruled by repressive regimes whose representatives may not observe the profound moral objection[s] the book describes.

The 1963 manual was declassified twice: once, heavily redacted, in January 1997, and a second time in February 2014 — this time with much text that had been previously obscured now legible.

The newly-released material deals primarily with the Agency’s attitude towards foreign Allied intelligence services (liaison services) and local laws, the existence and operation of defector reception centers, and pointers towards the origins of what we now refer to as black sites and rendition.

This new edition effectively contains both versions: material that was classified in the 1997 release, but revealed in the 2014 release, is presented in bold text (this does not apply to headings).

Some material remains classified. Redacted sections, identified by obscuring black rectangles, have been maintained in this new transcription at their approximate original sizes, in order that readers may judge their scope and significance for themselves.

Note: If black rectangles do not display on your device, the word REDACTED displays instead.

Numerals in brackets, for example (7), are references to items in the bibliography.

Glossary

The following contains a list of the (probable) known cryptonyms/code-words and general abbreviations used in this manual. See also Section II. Definitions.

Note: CIA cryptonyms contain an initial two-character prefix, known as a digraph, denoting a geographical or functional area (e.g., KU indicating CIA internal apparatus) followed by an arbitrary (usually — those chosen for the F.B.I. and U.S. Federal government suggest occasional exceptions) dictionary word.

I. Introduction

A. Explanation of Purpose

This manual cannot teach anyone how to be, or become, a good interrogator. At best it can help readers to avoid the characteristic mistakes of poor interrogators.

Its purpose is to provide guidelines for KUBARK interrogation, and particularly the counterintelligence interrogation of resistant sources. Designed as an aid for interrogators and others immediately concerned, it is based largely upon the published results of extensive research, including scientific inquiries conducted by specialists in closely related subjects.

There is nothing mysterious about interrogation. It consists of no more than obtaining needed information through responses to questions. As is true of all craftsmen, some interrogators are more able than others; and some of their superiority may be innate. But sound interrogation nevertheless rests upon a knowledge of the subject matter and on certain broad principles, chiefly psychological, which are not hard to understand. The success of good interrogators depends in large measure upon their use, conscious or not, of these principles and of processes and techniques deriving from them. Knowledge of subject matter and of the basic principles will not of itself create a successful interrogation, but it will make possible the avoidance of mistakes that are characteristic of poor interrogation. The purpose, then, is not to teach the reader how to be a good interrogator but rather to tell him what he must learn in order to become a good interrogator.

The interrogation of a resistant source who is a staff or agent member of an Orbit intelligence or security service or of a clandestine Communist organization is one of the most exacting of professional tasks. Usually the odds still favor the interrogator, but they are sharply cut by the training, experience, patience and toughness of the interrogatee. In such circumstances the interrogator needs all the help that he can get. And a principal source of aid today is scientific findings. The intelligence service which is able to bring pertinent, modern knowledge to bear upon its problems enjoys huge advantages over a service which conducts its clandestine business in eighteenth century fashion. It is true that American psychologists have devoted somewhat more attention to Communist interrogation techniques, particularly brainwashing, than to U.S. practices. Yet they have conducted scientific inquiries into many subjects that are closely related to interrogation: the effects of debility and isolation, the polygraph, reactions to pain and fear, hypnosis and heightened suggestibility, narcosis, etc. This work is of sufficient importance and relevance that it is no longer possible to discuss interrogation significantly without reference to the psychological research conducted in the past decade. For this reason a major purpose of this study is to focus relevant scientific findings upon CI interrogation. Every effort has been made to report and interpret these findings in our own language, in place of the terminology employed by the psychologists.

This study is by no means confined to a resume and interpretation of psychological findings. The approach of the psychologists is customarily manipulative; that is, they suggest methods of imposing controls or alterations upon the interrogatee from the outside. Except within the Communist frame of reference, they have paid less attention to the creation of internal controls — i.e., conversion of the source, so that voluntary cooperation results. Moral considerations aside, the imposition of external techniques of manipulating people carries with it the grave risk of later lawsuits, adverse publicity, or other attempts to strike back.

B. Explanation of Organization

This study moves from the general topic of interrogation per se (Parts I, II, III, IV, V, and VI) to planning the counterintelligence interrogation (Part VII) to the CI interrogation of resistant sources (Parts VIII, IX, and X). The definitions, legal considerations, and discussions of interrogators and sources, as well as Section VI on screening and other preliminaries, are relevant to all kinds of interrogations. Once it is established that the source is probably a counterintelligence target (in other words, is probably a member of a foreign intelligence or security service, a Communist, or a part of any other group engaged in clandestine activity directed against the national security), the interrogation is planned and conducted accordingly. The CI interrogation techniques are discussed in an order of increasing intensity as the focus on source resistance grows sharper. The last section, on dos and donts, is a return to the broader view of the opening parts; as a check-list, it is placed last solely for convenience.

II. Definitions

Most of the intelligence terminology employed here which may once have been ambiguous has been clarified through usage or through KUBARK instructions. For this reason definitions have been omitted for such terms as burn notice, defector, escapee, and refugee. Other definitions have been included despite a common agreement about meaning if the significance is shaded by the context.

Assessment: the analysis and synthesis of information, usually about a person or persons, for the purpose of appraisal. The assessment of individuals is based upon the compilation and use of psychological as well as biographic detail.

Bona fides: evidence or reliable information about identity, personal (including intelligence) history, and intentions or good faith.

Control: the capacity to generate, alter, or halt human behavior by implying, citing, or using physical or psychological means to ensure compliance with direction. The compliance may be voluntary or involuntary. Control of an interrogatee can rarely be established without control of his environment.

Counterintelligence interrogation: an interrogation (see also) designed to obtain information about hostile clandestine activities and persons or groups engaged therein. KUBARK CI interrogations are designed, almost invariably, to yield information about foreign intelligence and security services or Communist organizations. Because security is an element of counterintelligence, interrogations conducted to obtain admissions of clandestine plans or activities directed against KUBARK or PBPRIME security are also CI interrogations. But unlike a police interrogation, the CI interrogation is not aimed at causing the interrogatee to incriminate himself as a means of bringing him to trial. Admissions of complicity are not, to a CI service, ends in themselves but merely preludes to the acquisition of more information.

Debriefing: obtaining information by questioning a controlled and witting source who is normally a willing one.

Eliciting: obtaining information, without revealing intent or exceptional interest, through a verbal or written exchange with a person who may be willing or unwilling to provide what is sought and who may or may not be controlled.

Interrogation: obtaining information by direct questioning of a person or persons under conditions which are either partly or fully controlled by the questioner or are believed by those questioned to be subject to his control. Because interviewing, debriefing, and eliciting are simpler methods of obtaining information from cooperative subjects, interrogation is usually reserved for sources who are suspect, resistant, or both.

Intelligence interview: obtaining information, not customarily under controlled conditions, by questioning a person who is aware of the nature and perhaps of the significance of his answers but who is ordinarily unaware of the purposes and specific intelligence affiliations of the interviewer.

III. Legal and Policy Considerations

The legislation which founded KUBARK specifically denied it any law-enforcement or police powers. Yet detention in a controlled environment and perhaps for a lengthy period is frequently essential to a successful counterintelligence interrogation of a recalcitrant source. Because the necessary powers are vested in the competent liaison service or services, not in KUBARK, it is frequently necessary to conduct such interrogations with or through liaison. This necessity, obviously, should be determined as early as possible.

The legality of detaining and questioning a