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    Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia
    Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia
    Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia
    Ebook732 pages9 hours

    Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia

    By Jennie L. Schulze

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    About this ebook

    Joseph Rothschild Book Prize Honorable Mention
    Strategic Frames analyzes minority policies in Estonia and Latvia following their independence from the Soviet Union. It weighs the powerful influence of both Europe and Russia on their policy choices, and how this intersected with the costs and benefits of policy changes for the politicians in each state.
    Prior to EU accession, policymakers were slow to adopt minority-friendly policies for ethnic Russians despite mandates from the European Union. These initiatives faced majority opposition, and politicians sought to maintain the status quo and their positions. As Jennie L. Schulze reveals, despite the credit given to the democratizing influence of European institutions, they have rarely produced significant policy changes alone, and then only when domestic constraints were low. Whenever domestic opposition was high, Russian frames were crucial for the passage of reforms. In these cases, Russia’s activism on behalf of Russian speakers reinforced European frames, providing powerful justifications for reform.
    Schulze’s attention to both the strategic framing and counter framing of external actors explains the controversies, delays, and suboptimal outcomes surrounding the passage of “conditional” amendments in both cases, as well as the local political climate postaccession.
    Strategic Frames offers a significant reference on recent developments in two former Soviet states and the rapidly evolving spheres of political influence in the postindependence era that will serve students, scholars, and policymakers alike.
    LanguageEnglish
    PublisherUniversity of Pittsburgh Press
    Release dateMar 7, 2018
    ISBN9780822983095
    Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia
    Author

    Jennie L. Schulze

    Sophocles (c.496–405 BC) was an ancient Greek tragedian. Of his more than 120 plays, only seven have survived in a complete form: Ajax, Antigone, Women of Trachis, Oedipus Rex, Electra, Philoctetes and Oedipus at Colonus.

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      Book preview

      Strategic Frames - Jennie L. Schulze

      PITT SERIES IN RUSSIAN AND EAST EUROPEAN STUDIES

      JONATHAN HARRIS, EDITOR

      STRATEGIC FRAMES

      EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND MINORITY INCLUSION IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA

      JENNIE L. SCHULZE

      UNIVERSITY OF PITTSBURGH PRESS

      Published by the University of Pittsburgh Press, Pittsburgh, Pa., 15260

      Copyright © 2018, University of Pittsburgh Press

      All rights reserved

      Manufactured in the United States of America

      Printed on acid-free paper

      10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

      Cataloging-in-Publication data is available from the Library of Congress

      ISBN 13: 978-0-8229-6511-4

      ISBN 10: 0-8229-6511-9

      Cover design by Jordan Wannemacher

      ISBN-13: 978-0-8229-8309-5 (electronic)

      For Marko, Luka, Emmett, and Sawyer

      CONTENTS

      ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

      PARTIES AND PARLIAMENTARY FACTIONS IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA

      INTRODUCTION

      THE STRATEGIC FRAMING OF BALTIC SECURITY: EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND MINORITY INCLUSION

      CHAPTER 1

      SETTING THE STAGE: THE NEXUS IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA

      CHAPTER 2

      MAKING ALIENS AND CITIZENS IN ESTONIA: FROM SECURITY TO CONDITIONALITY

      CHAPTER 3

      NATURALIZATION RESTRICTIONS IN LATVIA: GIVE A LITTLE, TAKE A LITTLE

      CHAPTER 4

      NATURALIZATION FOR STATELESS CHILDREN: RUSSIA AS A BRAKE AND AN ACCELERATOR FOR REFORM

      CHAPTER 5

      LANGUAGE AND ELECTORAL POLICIES: DEBATING EUROPE IN ESTONIA AND RUSSIA IN LATVIA

      CHAPTER 6

      EXPLAINING STRATEGIC FRAMING ACROSS CASES: KIN-STATE ACTIVISM AND DOMESTIC POLITICS

      CONCLUSION

      THE PATH AND FORM OF POLICIES: EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS, KIN-STATES, AND MINORITIES

      APPENDIX

      NOTES

      BIBLIOGRAPHY

      INDEX

      ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

      The road to the completion of this book has been long and therefore the debts owed are great. I begin by thanking faculty, friends, and mentors at The George Washington University. It was there that my interest in Russian-speakers in the Baltic states began with my doctoral thesis. Over the years, the members of my committee have been an infinite source of encouragement, critical and constructive feedback, and insight into the relations among European institutions, kin-states, resident states, and minorities in the post-communist world. I thank James Goldgeier for believing in the project, teaching me how to be a more effective writer, guiding me through the job market and publishing, and for all his sage advice through the years. I thank Henry Hale for helping to prepare me for my fieldwork and for his boundless positivity. Most importantly, I appreciate the careful attention, critical perspective, and insightful feedback he gave to every draft I sent, and for his generosity in continuing to offer invaluable advice on research and publishing. Last but certainly not least, I thank Zsuzsa Csergo for inspiring me to study nationalism, for always pushing me to ask harder questions and to embrace fresh perspectives, for reading numerous drafts, and for giving me endless advice on the job market, publishing, and achieving work–life balance. The generosity she has shown me with her time, knowledge, and friendship is a model of mentorship I can only hope to one day emulate. I would also like to thank Martha Finnemore, Deborah Avant, and Daina Eglitis. They were extremely generous with their time in helping me to think through my project and in offering constructive feedback. I also thank my friends, who read early drafts and provided tremendous support, especially Maryam Deloffre and Jacob Berg.

      This book would not have been possible without the generosity, assistance, and friendship of so many colleagues in Estonia and Latvia. I begin by thanking Raivo Vetik for giving me the opportunity to contribute to The Integration of the European Second Generation (TIES) project in Estonia. Living and working in Estonia for such an extended period was invaluable for my development as a Baltic scholar. It enabled me to conduct my own research and to immerse myself in these societies. I would also like to acknowledge all the other researchers at Tallinn University and the University of Tartu who provided feedback on research instruments and helped me to make contact with respondents. The stimulating conversations that I had with each of you helped to shape my thinking on this project in so many important ways. I thank the following persons for either providing critical feedback on earlier drafts, or for helping me to navigate the world of Estonian and Latvian politics. If I have overlooked anyone, please forgive my omission. I thank Gerli Nimmerfeldt, Pille Petersoo, Vello Pettai, Eva Maria-Asari, Klara Hallik, Andres Kesakamp, Külliki Seppel, Rune Holmgaard Andersen, Timofey Agarin, Daunis Auers, Nils Muižnieks, Boriss Cilevičs, Rasma Karklins, Lars Johannssen, and Kijetil Duvold. I also would like to thank Jon Ender at the Estonian Research Institute, and Brigita Zepa at the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences for overseeing translation on this project and providing crucial research support. Special thanks is also owed to my graduate assistants at various institutions who provided crucial research support, particularly Nastja Sokolova, Pēteris Nalivaiko, and Annette Mackay. Finally, I thank my respondents without whom this research project would not have been possible. While they remain anonymous, I am indebted to them for giving their time to speak openly with me.

      Other colleagues have also been an invaluable source of inspiration, feedback, and support throughout this process. I would like to thank Lowell Barrington, Julie George, Cynthia Kaplan, Patrice McMahon, Ada Regelmann, Philippe Roseberry, Oxana Shevel, Sherrill Stroschein, and Myra Waterbury for helpful comments on earlier drafts. I thank the editorial staff at the University of Pittsburgh Press, particularly Peter Kracht, Jonathan Harris, and Alex Wolfe for their enthusiasm for the project, valuable feedback, and guidance along the way. Finally, I thank the anonymous reviewers of the manuscript for their careful reading and constructive feedback.

      At Duquesne University, I am privileged to have supportive colleagues. I thank Patricia Dunham for her friendship, encouragement, and assistance in securing funding, as well as Charles Rubin and Lewis Irwin for their advice and support. I thank Clifford Bob for generously reading draft proposals, offering invaluable advice on publishing, and holding me to deadlines. I would especially like to acknowledge Mark Haas, who has been a tremendous source of knowledge, support, and guidance throughout the writing and publishing process, and whose positivity and friendship have been invaluable.

      This research project would not have been possible without generous funding from many sources, including the European Union’s Marie Curie Fellowship, as well as grants from the European Union Studies Association, the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, the Association for Women in Science, and the Institute for European, Russian, and Eurasian Studies at The George Washington University. Duquesne University has also provided financial support through grants from the Severino A. Russo Endowed Faculty Development Award and the Presidential Scholarship Award. Financial support from the political science department and the McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts has also been crucial for helping me to complete the project.

      The love and support of my family has been incredible throughout the lengthy research and writing process. I thank my parents and brother for always understanding my love of Eastern Europe, for visiting me during my fieldwork, and for believing I would eventually finish this book. Most of all, I thank my husband Marko Vujicic for being on this journey with me from the very beginning. I thank him for moving to Estonia with me and for falling in love with the country. I thank him for accompanying me on trips to Latvia, listening patiently about the project, and always providing constructive feedback. Most importantly, I thank him for being such a wonderful father to our three beautiful boys while I spent long days writing. I so look forward to taking our sons Luka, Emmett, and Sawyer to Estonia and Latvia so that they too can fall in love with these places that are so close to our hearts. I dedicate this book to Marko and our boys.

      PARTIES AND PARLIAMENTARY FACTIONS IN ESTONIA AND LATVIA

      PARTIES/ELECTORAL COALITIONS AND PARLIAMENTARY FACTIONS IN ESTONIA

      VII RIIGIKOGU (SEPTEMBER 30, 1992–MARCH 10, 1995)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Isamaa—Election Coalition Pro Patria

      Kindel Kodu—Election Coalition Safe Home

      Rahvarinne—Election Coalition Popular Front

      Mõõdukad—Election Coalition Moderates

      Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei—Estonian National Independence Party

      Sõltumatud Kuningriiklased—Election Coalition Independent Royalists

      Eesti Kodanik—Election Coalition Estonian Citizen

      Eesti Ettevõtjate Erakond—Estonian Entrepreneurs’ Party

      Rohelised—Election Coalition Greens

      Parliamentary Factions

      Isamaa fraktsioon, I—Pro Patria faction

      Keskfraktsioon, Kesk—Centre faction

      Mõõdukate fraktsioon, M—Moderate faction

      Maaliidu Ühenduse fraktsioon, MÜ—Rural People’s Union faction

      Koonderakonna Ühenduse fraktsioon, KÜ—Coalition Party Union faction

      Kuningriiklaste fraktsioon, K—Royalist faction

      Eesti Rahvusliku Sõltumatuse Partei fraktsioon, ERSP—Estonian National Independence Party faction

      Eesti Kodaniku fraktsioon, EK—Estonian Citizen faction

      Liberaalide fraktsioon, LB—Liberal faction

      Sõltumatute fraktsioon, S—Independents faction

      Vabade Demokraatide fraktsioon, VD—Free Democratic Party faction

      Parempoolsete fraktsioon, P—Right-Wing faction

      VIII RIIGIKOGU (MARCH 11, 1995–MARCH 13, 1999)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Koonderakonna ja Maarahva Liidu Ühendus—Coalition Party and Rural Union Election Coalition

      Eesti Reformierakond—Estonian Reform Party

      Keskerakond—Centre Party

      Isamaa ja ERSP Liit—Election Coalition Pro Patria and Estonian National Independence Party Union

      Meie Kodu On Eestimaa—Election Coalition Our Home Is Estonia

      Parempoolsed—Right-Wingers

      Parliamentary Factions

      Arengupartei fraktsioon—Progress Party faction

      Eesti Maarahva Erakonna fraktsioon, EME—Estonian Country People’s Party faction

      Isamaaliidu fraktsioon, IL—Pro Patria Union faction

      Keskfraktsioon, Kesk—Centre faction

      Koonderakonna fraktsioon, KE—Coalition Party faction

      Maaliidu fraktsioon, ML—Rural People’s faction

      Mõõdukate fraktsioon, M—Moderate faction

      Pensionäride ja Perede Erakonna fraktsioon, PPE—Pensioners’ and Families’ Party faction

      Reformierakonna fraktsioon, RE—Reform Party faction

      Vene fraktsioon, V—Russian faction

      Ühinenud Vene fraktsioon, ÜV—United Russian faction

      IX RIIGIKOGU (MARCH 14, 1999–MARCH 21, 2003)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Eesti Keskerakond—Estonian Centre Party

      Eesti Reformierakond—Estonian Reform Party

      Isamaaliit—Pro Patria Union

      Mõõdukad—Moderates

      Eesti Maarahva Erakond—Estonian Country People’s Party

      Eesti Koonderakond—Estonian Coalition Party

      Eesti Ühendatud Rahvapartei—Estonian United People’s Party

      Parliamentary Factions

      Eesti Keskerakonna fraktsioon, Kesk—Estonian Centre Party faction

      Eesti Koonderakonna fraktsioon, KE—Estonian Coalition Party faction

      Eesti Reformierakonna fraktsioon, RE—Estonian Reform Party faction

      Eestimaa Rahvaliidu fraktsioon, ER—Estonian People’s Union faction

      Eestimaa Ühendatud Rahvapartei fraktsioon, EÜR—Estonian United People’s Party faction

      Isamaaliidu fraktsioon, IL—Pro Patria Union faction

      Mõõdukate fraktsioon, M—Moderate faction

      X RIIGIKOGU (MARCH 22, 2003–MARCH 26, 2007)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Eesti Keskerakond—Estonian Centre Party

      Ühendus Vabariigi Est—Res Publica—Union for the Republic—Res Publica

      Eesti Reformierakond—Estonian Reform Party

      Eestimaa Rahvaliit—Estonian People’s Union

      Erakond Isamaaliit—Pro Patria Union

      Rahvaerakond Mõõdukad—People’s Party Mõõdukad

      Parliamentary Factions

      Eesti Keskerakonna fraktsioon, Kesk—Estonian Centre Party faction

      Eesti Reformierakonna fraktsioon, RE—Estonian Reform Party faction

      Eestimaa Rahvaliidu fraktsioon, ER—Estonian People’s Union faction

      Isamaaliidu fraktsioon, IL—Pro Patria Union faction

      Res Publica fraktsioon, RP—Res Publica faction

      Mõõdukate fraktsioon, M—Moderate faction

      Sotsiaaldemokraatliku Erakonna fraktsioon, SDE—Social Democratic Party faction

      XI RIIGIKOGU (MARCH 27, 2007–MARCH 26, 2011)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Eesti Reformierakond—Estonian Reform Party

      Eesti Keskerakond—Estonian Centre Party

      Erakond Isamaa ja Res Publica Liit—Pro Patria and Res Publica Union

      Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond—Social Democratic Patry

      Erakond Eestimaa Rohelised—Estonian Green Party

      Eestimaa Rahvaliit—Estonian People’s Union

      Parliamentary Factions

      Eestimaa Rahvaliidu fraktsioon, ER—Estonian People’s Union faction

      Erakonna Eestimaa Rohelised fraktsioon, EER—Estonian Green Party faction

      Isamaa ja Res Publica Liidu fraktsioon, IRL—Pro Patria and Res Publica Union faction

      Sotsiaaldemokraatliku Erakonna fraktsioon, SDE—Social Democratic Party faction

      Eesti Reformierakonna fraktsioon, RE—Estonian Reform Party faction

      Eesti Keskerakonna fraktsioon, Kesk—Estonian Centre Party faction

      XII RIIGIKOGU (MARCH 27, 2011–MARCH 23, 2015)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Eesti Reformierakond—Estonian Reform Party

      Eesti Keskerakond—Estonian Centre Party

      Erakond Isamaa ja Res Public Liit—Party Pro Patria and Res Publica Union

      Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond—Social Democratic Party

      Parliamentary Factions

      Isamaa ja Res Publica Liidu fraktsioon, IRL—Pro Patria and Res Publica Union faction

      Sotsiaaldemokraatliku Erakonna fraktsioon, SDE—Social Democratic Party faction

      Eesti Reformierakonna fraktsioon, RE—Estonian Reform Party faction

      Eesti Keskerakonna fraktsioon, Kesk—Estonian Centre Party faction

      XIII RIIGIKOGU (MARCH 24, 2015–PRESENT)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Eesti Reformierakond—Estonian Reform Party

      Eesti Keskerakond—Estonian Centre Party

      Sotsiaaldemokraatlik Erakond—Social Democratic Party

      Erakond Isamaa ja Res Public Liit—Party Pro Patria and Res Publica Union

      Eesti Vabaerakond—Estonian Free Party

      Eesti Konservatiivne Rahvaerakond—Conservative People’s Party of Estonia

      Parliamentary Factions

      Eesti Keskerakonna fraktsioon, Kesk—Estonian Centre Party faction

      Eesti Konservatiivse Rahvaerakonna fraktsioon—Conservative People’s Party of Estonia faction

      Eesti Reformierakonna fraktsioon, RE—Estonian Reform Party faction

      Eesti Vabaerakonna fraktsioon—Estonian Free Party faction

      Isamaa ja Res Publica Liidu fraktsioon—Pro Patria and Res Publica Union faction

      Sotsiaaldemokraatliku Erakonna fraktsioon—Social Democratic Party faction

      PARTIES/ELECTORAL COALITIONS AND PARLIAMENTARY GROUPS (FACTIONS) IN LATVIA

      V SAIEMA (JULY 6, 1993–NOVEMBER 7, 1995)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Savienība Latvijas ceļš—Alliance Latvia’s Way

      Latvijas Nacionālā neatkarības kustība—Latvian National Independence Movement

      Saskaņa Latvijai-atdzimšana tautsaimniecībai—Harmony for Latvia-economic renewal

      Latvijas zemnieku savienība—Latvia’s Farmers’ Union

      Līdztiesība—Equal Rights

      Vēlēšanu apvienība Tēvzemei un Brīvībai—Union For Fatherland and Freedom

      Latvijas Kristīgo demokrātu savienība—Latvia’s Christian Democratic Union

      Demokrātiskā Centra partija—Democratic Centre Party

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Frakcija Latvijas ceļš, LC—Faction Latvia’s Way

      Latvijas nacionālās neatkarības kustības frakcija, LNNK—Latvian National Independence Movement faction

      Latvijas zemnieku savienības frakcija, LZS—Latvia’s Farmers’ Union faction

      Frakcija Saskaņa Latvijai, SL—Faction Harmony for Latvia

      Frakcija Līdztiesība, LR—Faction Equal Rights

      Frakcija Tēvzemei un brīvībai, TB—Faction For Fatherland and Freedom

      Latvijas kristīgo demokrātu savienības frakcija, KDS—Latvia’s Christian Democratic Union faction

      Demokrātiskās partijas frakcija, DP—Democratic Party faction

      Tautas saskaņas partijas frakcija, TSP—People’s Harmony Party faction

      Demokrātiskās partijas Saimnieks frakcija, DPS—Democratic Party Saimnieks faction

      Tautsaimnieku politiskā apvienība, TPA—Political Union of Economists

      VI SAEIMA (NOVEMBER 7, 1995–NOVEMBER 3, 1998)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Demokrātiskā partija Saimnieks—Democratic Party Saimnieks

      Tautas kustība Latvijai (Zīgerista partija)—People’s Movement for Latvia (Zigerists’ party)

      Savienība Latvijas ceļš—Alliance Latvia’s Way

      Apvienība Tēvzemei un Brīvībai—Union For Fatherland and Freedom

      Latvijas Vienības partija—Latvian Unity Party

      Latvijas Zemnieku savienības, Latvijas Kristīgo demokrātu savienības, un Latgalē Latgales Demokrātiskās partijas, apvienotais saraksts—The Joint List of Latvia’s Farmers’ Union, Latvia’s Christian Democratic Union, and Latgale’s Democratic Party

      Latvijas Nacionāli konservatīvā partija—LNNK un Latvijas Zaļā partija—Latvian National Conservative Party—LNNK and Latvia’s Green Party

      Latvijas Sociālistiskā partija—Latvia’s Socialist Party

      Tautas saskaņas partija—People’s Harmony Party

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Demokrātiskās partijas Saimnieks frakcija, DPS—Democratic Party Saimnieks faction

      Frakcija Latvijai, L—Faction For Latvia

      Frakcija Latvijas ceļš, LC—Faction Latvia’s Way

      Deputātu bloks Sociālistiskā partija–Līdztiesība, SPL—Members’ Bloc Socialist Party–Equal Rights

      Latvijas Vienības partija—Latvian Unity Party

      LNNK un LZP, LNNK/LZ—LNNK and LZP

      Latvijas Zemnieku savienības frakcija, LZS—Latvia’s Famers’ Union faction

      Tautas saskaņas partija, TSP—People’s Harmony Party (November 7, 1995–July 6, 1996)

      Tautas saskaņas partijas frakcija, TSP—People’s Harmony Party faction (September 17, 1997–November 2, 1998)

      Tēvzemei un Brīvībai, TB—For Fatherland and Freedom

      Tautai un taisnībai—For People and Righteousness

      Sociālistiskā partija–Līdztiesība, SPL—Socialist Party–Equal Rights

      Latvijas Nacionālās Reformu partijas un Latvijas Zaļās partijas frakcija, NRP/LZP—Latvia’s National Reform Party and Latvia’s Green Party faction

      Apvienības Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK frakcija, TB/LNNK—Association For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK faction

      Tautas kopas Brīvība frakcija—People’s Union Freedom faction

      Darba partijas, Kristīgi demokrātiskās savienības, Latvijas Zaļās partijas apvienības frakcija, DP/KDS/LZP—Alliance of the Labor Party, Christian Democratic Union, and Latvia’s Green Party faction

      VII SAEIMA (NOVEMBER 3, 1998–NOVEMBER 5, 2002)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Tautas partija—People’s Party

      Savienība Latvijas ceļš—Alliance Latvia’s Way

      Apvienība Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—Union For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK

      Tautas saskaņas partija—People’s Harmony Party

      Latvijas Sociāldemokrātu apvienība—Latvia’s Union of Social Democrats

      Jaunā partija—New Party

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Frakcija Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK faction

      Tautas partijas frakcija—People’s Party faction

      Frakcija Latvijas ceļš—Latvia’s Way faction

      Jaunā frakcija—New faction

      Politisko organizāciju apvienības Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvij frakcija—Union of Political Organizations For Human Rights in a United Latvia faction

      Latvijas Sociāldemokrātiskās strādnieku partijas (LSDSP) frakcija—Latvian Social Democratic Worker Party faction

      Sociāldemokrātu Savienības frakcija, SDS—Union of Social Democrats faction

      VIII SAEIMA (NOVEMBER 5, 2002–NOVEMBER 7, 2006)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Jaunais laiks—New Era

      Politisko organizāciju apvienība Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā—Union of Political organizations For Human Rights in a United Latvia

      Tautas partija—People’s Party

      Latvijas Pirmā Partija—Latvia’s First Party

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība—Union of Greens and Farmers

      Apvienība Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—Union For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Frakcija Jaunais laiks—New Era faction

      Politisko organizāciju apvienības Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā frakcija, PCTVL—Union of Political Organizations For Human Rights in a United Latvia faction

      Tautas partijas frakcija—People’s Party faction

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienības frakcija, ZZS—Union of Greens and Farmers faction

      Latvijas Pirmās partijas frakcija—Latvia’s First party faction

      Frakcija Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—For Fatherland and Freedom/TB/LNNK faction

      Politisko organizāciju (partiju) apvienības Saskaņas Centrs frakcija, SC—Union of Political Organizations Harmony Centre faction

      Latvijas Sociālistiskās partijas frakcija—Latvia’s Socialist Party faction

      IX SAEIMA (NOVEMBER 7, 2006–NOVEMBER 2, 2010)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Tautas partija—People’s Party

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība—Union of Greens and Farmers

      Jaunais laiks—New Era

      Saskaņas Centrs—Harmony Centre

      Latvijas Pirmās partijas un partijas Latvijas Ceļš vēlēšanu apvienība—Latvia’s First Party and Latvia’s Way Electoral Union

      Apvienība Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—Union For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK

      Politisko organizāciju apvienība Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā—Union of Political organizations For Human Rights in a United Latvia

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Apvienības Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK frakcija, TB/LNNK—Union of Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK faction

      Tautas partijas frakcija, TP—People’s Party faction

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienības frakcija, ZZS—Union of Greens and Farmers faction

      Partijas Jaunais laiks frakcija, JL—New Era party faction

      Politisko organizāciju (partiju) apvienības Saskaņas Centrs frakcija—Union of Political Organizations Harmony Centre faction

      Latvijas Pirmās partijas un partijas Latvijas Ceļš frakcija, LPP/LC—Latvia’s First Party and Latvia’s Way Party faction

      Nacionālās apvienības Visu Latvijai! —Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK frakcija, NA—National Alliance All for Latvia! —For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK parliamentary group

      Partijas Par cilvēka tiesībām vienotā Latvijā frakcija, PCTVL—For Human Rights in a United Latvia Party faction

      Partijas Pilsoniskā Savienība frakcija—Civic Union Party faction

      X SAEIMA (NOVEMBER 2, 2010–OCTOBER 17, 2011)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Vienotība—Unity

      Politisko partiju apvienība Saskaņas Centrs—Association of Political Parties Harmony Centre

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība—Union of Greens and Farmers

      Nacionālā apvienība Visu Latvijai! —Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—National Association All for Latvia! —For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK

      Partiju apvienība Par Labu Latviju —Association of Parties For a Good Latvia

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Politisko partiju apvienības Vienotība frakcija—Association of Political Parties Unity faction

      Politisko partiju apvienības Saskaņas Centrs frakcija, SC—Association of Political Parties Harmony Centre faction

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienības frakcija, ZZS—Union of Greens and Farmers faction

      Nacionālās apvienības Visu Latvijai!—Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK frakcija, NA—National Alliance All for Latvia!—For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK faction

      Partiju apvienības Par Labu Latviju frakcija, PLL—Association of Parties For a Good Latvia faction

      XI SAEIMA (OCTOBER 17, 2011–NOVEMBER 4, 2014)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Politisko partiju apvienība Saskaņas Centrs—Association of Political Parties Harmony Centre

      Zatlera Reformu partija—Zatler’s Reform Party

      Vienotība—Unity

      Nacionālā apvienība Visu Latvijai!—Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—National Association All For Latvia!—For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība—Union of Greens and Farmers

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Politisko partiju apvienības Saskaņas Centrs frakcija, SC—Association of Political Parties Harmony Centre faction

      Reformu partijas frakcija, RP—Reform Party faction

      Frakcija Vienotība, V—Unity faction

      Nacionālās apvienības Visu Latvijai!—Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK frakcija, NA—National Alliance All for Latvia!—For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK parliamentary group

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienības frakcija, ZZS—Union of Greens and Farmers faction

      XII SAEIMA (NOVEMBER 4, 2014–PRESENT)

      Parties/Electoral Coalitions Represented

      Saskaņa sociāldemokrātiskā partija—Social Democratic Party Harmony

      Partija Vienotība—Unity Party

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienība—Union of Greens and Farmers

      Nacionālā apvienība Visu Latvijai! —Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK—National Association All for Latvia! —For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK

      No sirds Latvijai—For Latvia from the Heart

      Latvijas Regionu Apvienība—Latvia’s Regional Alliance

      Parliamentary Groups (Factions)

      Frakcija Saskaņa—Harmony faction

      Frakcija Vienotība, V—Unity faction

      Zaļo un Zemnieku savienības frakcija, ZZS—Union of Greens and Farmers faction

      Nacionālās apvienības Visu Latvijai!—Tēvzemei un Brīvībai/LNNK frakcija, NA—National Alliance All for Latvia!—For Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK parliamentary group

      Latvijas Reģionu apvienības frakcija, LRA—Latvia’s Regional Alliance faction

      Frakcija No sirds Latvijai, NSL—For Latvia from the Heart faction

      INTRODUCTION

      THE STRATEGIC FRAMING OF BALTIC SECURITY

      EUROPE, RUSSIA, AND MINORITY INCLUSION

      After the collapse of communism, most Central and Eastern European (CEE) elites were eager to resurrect national identities based on the ethnic majority culture and to return to Europe by pursuing membership in European institutions. These goals were not easily reconciled. Minority groups promoted conflicting conceptions of the nation and claims about their place within the (re)constructed post-communist space. Ignoring minority claims was difficult. Not only did kin-states advocate on behalf of their ethnic kin living in other states, but the European Union made membership conditional on the protection of minorities. In Estonia and Latvia, nationalizing policies that privileged ethnic majorities and politically disenfranchised large numbers of Russian-speakers drew an unprecedented amount of attention from both European institutions and the Russian kin-state. The influence of European institutions and Russia on the minority situation in these states has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate.

      Estonia and Latvia joined the European Union (EU) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 2004. In the period leading up to accession, the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Council of Europe (CE) monitored the minority situation and issued numerous recommendations for policy reforms. These recommendations were reinforced by EU conditionality, which made EU membership conditional on the removal of some of the most exclusionary aspects of citizenship and language policies. While these reforms are often considered wins for European institutions, early optimism that European institutions would transform the minority situation in these countries soon gave way to skepticism and disappointment. Post-accession backsliding on policies, slow progress along minority integration indicators, and continuing preferences for minority exclusion among ethnic majority elites demonstrated the limits of EU conditionality. What explains these less than spectacular policy outcomes in cases where European institutions had considerable leverage?

      The weaknesses of the European minority rights framework and the reluctance of politicians to pay the costs of reform at the ballot box are important pieces of the puzzle that have been identified in other studies. However, neither European-level variables nor domestic audience costs can tell us much about the path or specific form of policies in these cases, nor can they adequately explain the post-accession policy landscape. For example, how can we explain Latvia’s comparatively more restrictive minority policies, given that Russian-speakers are more politically organized and better represented at the national level in Latvia? Furthermore, how do we explain the passage of substantial liberalizing reforms to citizenship policies in Latvia in 2013 and in Estonia in 2015, a decade after EU accession? Similar initiatives had repeatedly failed in each state and there were no changes in parliamentary composition directly prior to the passage of amendments. Did Estonian and Latvian elites finally accept the legitimacy of further reforms, or were there other strategic incentives at work?

      Finding answers to these puzzles requires bringing Russia into the story of policymaking in these states. The twenty-five million ethnic Russians stranded outside Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union provided Russia with a pretext for meddling in the affairs of other states, including in Estonia and Latvia. Over the years, Russia has used a variety of harder military and economic levers, as well as other softer tools of influence, all in the name of protecting Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia. Concern over Russia’s influence in these states had been growing in response to Russia’s shift toward tactics aimed at the coopting Russian-speakers after 2007. However, it was Russia’s annexations of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in the course of the 2008 Russia–Georgia War, and its annexation of Crimea in 2014, all areas with sizable Russian-speaking populations that reawakened fears of a Russian military threat in the Baltic states. As this book goes to press, all three Baltic states strongly support raising defense budgets and the stationing of NATO forces on Baltic territory in order to deter Russian aggression. But how does the presence of a powerful and active Russian kin-state on their borders influence policymaking toward Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia? And how do Russian and European pressures interact in these cases to influence policymaking?

      This book explores those questions through an analysis of policymaking in the areas of citizenship, language, and electoral policies over the past twenty-five years. These policy areas have been consequential for the integration of Russian-speakers into these societies and politically fraught both domestically and internationally. While there are good reasons for domestic policymakers to fear angering Russia, or failing to live up to European expectations, neither European institutions nor Russia have had a direct effect on policy outcomes in these cases. Rather, the influence of external actors has depended to a large extent on how domestic policymakers frame them in order to bring policy outcomes more into line with their own domestic agendas. Attention to the strategic framing and counter-framing of external actors explains not only the controversies, delays, and suboptimal outcomes surrounding the passage of conditional amendments in both cases, but also policy landscapes in each case post-accession.

      By focusing on the policymaking process and the interaction between international and domestic fields, we can better understand how, and under what conditions, European institutions and Russia have collectively and interactively shaped policies in these states. Despite the credit given to the democratizing influence of European institutions in encouraging minority policy reforms in these cases, European frames alone have rarely produced significant policy changes, and then only when domestic constraints were low. In cases where policymakers faced greater domestic opposition, they used Russian frames to reinforce the necessity of reform and to justify the passage of more inclusive minority policies. This is not to say that European pressure did not matter at all. It clearly did, and provided powerful frames for setting the agenda and for shaping minority policies in a more inclusive direction, particularly during the EU accession period. However, the Russian kin-state has also provided powerful frames that have at times undermined and at other times reinforced European pressure in ways that have affected the path and form of policies. The strategic framing approach focuses our attention on how domestic policymakers in Estonia and Latvia were able to not only pass minority legislation when there was significant domestic opposition, but to wrest political compromises in the midst of considerable external pressure from comparatively powerful external actors. European institutions, Russia, and domestic policymakers are all key actors in that story.

      EUROPEAN INSTITUTIONS AND MINORITY PROTECTION IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE

      Post-communist Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) sought membership in European institutions, including the OSCE, CE, NATO, and the EU, not only to distance themselves from their communist past, but because membership in the EU and NATO, in particular, offered greater prosperity and security. Member states, however, were wary of eastern expansion after the eruption of violent ethnic conflicts in the former Yugoslav republics in the early 1990s. There, post-communist states with large ethnic minorities, exclusionary nation-building projects, and activist kin-states in the neighborhood had proved to be potent recipes for conflict. The comparisons to states like Estonia and Latvia, with their restrictive citizenship and language policies, large Russian-speaking minorities, and an antagonistic Russian kin-state on their doorstep, were striking.

      European institutions had hoped to dampen ethnic rivalries in EU candidate countries by including minority protection into the Copenhagen criteria for EU accession (1993), and by encouraging countries to sign and ratify conventions on minority protection during the accession process.¹ European institutions also engaged in active dialog with CEECs throughout the accession period and issued numerous recommendations with respect to minority protection. This European minority rights framework aimed broadly at preventing discrimination against minorities and creating opportunities for minority participation and cultural reproduction. These rights are not only essential features of liberal democracies and therefore important prerequisites for being accepted as full members of the liberal-democratic club; but they have been shown to prevent conflict in multiethnic societies.²

      The difficulties of meeting European minority requirements varied considerably across CEE. The challenges were substantial for states with sizeable minorities, historical legacies involving reversals of ethnic hierarchy, and active kin-states in the neighborhood. Such was the case for Romania and Slovakia, with their Hungarian minorities; Estonia and Latvia with their Russian-speaking minorities; and Lithuania with its Russian-speaking and Polish minorities. While communist legacies had instilled a sense of ethnic majority ownership over these territories, democratization gave a voice to both majority and minority groups, who articulated conflicting nation-building projects.

      Many post-communist states incorporated the protection of the ethnic majority language and culture into their constitutions and developed policies aimed at protecting both majority culture and majority ownership over state institutions. In reaction to these homogenizing projects, minorities have demanded the right to protect their own language and culture on territories they often consider to be their own national homelands. In Romania and Slovakia, minority claims revolve around the right to cultural reproduction and conflicts have developed in reaction to language policies that privilege ethnic majorities.³ In Estonia and Latvia, battles over citizenship and the right to participate in the political arena have been intertwined with conflicts over language and education policies.⁴ While Lithuania adopted a more inclusive approach to citizenship, which dampened conflicts both internally and with external actors, controversies surrounding language and education policies have been part of the policy landscape. In all cases, minority claims conflicted with the nationalizing projects of the state, which privileged ethnic majorities and aimed at the assimilation of minorities into the majority culture. Competing claims were fueled by ethnic tensions involving historical resentments, reversals of ethnic hierarchy, and difficult transitions from centrally planned to market economies. When kin-states began advocating on behalf of those minorities in the early 1990s, it intensified ethnic majority fears of irredentism and perceptions of minorities as disloyal.

      The problem of minorities can be addressed either by enforcing conformity or recognizing diversity,⁵ although the situation on the ground is often messier than this simple dichotomy implies. Since 1989, there has been a growing consensus among academics, policymakers, and international lawyers that recognizing diversity is the preferable and more appropriate response to ethnocultural heterogeneity, and is clearly the approach that has been favored by European institutions. Policies that aim at the homogenization of difference often provoke the kind of resentment and enmity that leads to ethnic conflict.⁶ Such was the concern with the strongly nationalizing policies of Estonia and Latvia in the early 1990s.

      By privileging the majority nations through citizenship, language, and education policies, nationalizing elites in Estonia and Latvia had hoped to encourage either the assimilation of Russian-speakers or their outmigration. Based on the concept of legal restoration, automatic citizenship was granted only to those who held citizenship in 1940 and their descendants, politically disenfranchising and rendering stateless over a half million people in each state, the vast majority of them Russian-speakers. This stateless problem, unprecedented in scope, was further compounded by the passage of naturalization requirements that included high levels of national-language knowledge. Language policies, which sought to protect and promote the use of Estonian and Latvian in the public sphere, further limited the ability of linguistic minorities to integrate into society.

      The eastern enlargement of the EU to include eight post-communist and seven former Warsaw Pact countries in 2004, sparked numerous studies on Europeanization, defined broadly as the ability of European institutions to socialize states toward the acceptance of the democratic norms, or rules, of the European community, including the protection of minorities.⁷ The EU accession process has undoubtedly had a democratizing influence on the region; however, the effectiveness of EU membership conditionality in the area of minority protection is less clear and remains the source of considerable debate among scholars. While early studies credited EU conditionality with forcing important policy reforms in Romania, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Estonia, and Latvia,⁸ later studies pointed to the shallowness of those reforms, and post-accession trajectories that included a return to more exclusionary orientations and the resurgence of political parties with antiminority platforms across the region.⁹ The ability of CEE elites to resist the adoption of more inclusionary minority policies while facing considerable pressure, not only from European institutions, but also from powerful kin-states, presents interesting questions to the international socialization literature. Perhaps nowhere in CEE have minority policy trajectories been more puzzling than in Estonia and Latvia.

      THE PUZZLES OF ESTONIA AND LATVIA

      European institutions engaged in an extensive dialog with these governments throughout the pre-accession period, issuing numerous and often repeated recommendations for reforms to citizenship, language, and electoral policies. Where recommendations were tied explicitly to EU or NATO membership, reforms were passed, eliminating some of the most exclusionary aspects of those policies.¹⁰ Given the policy trajectories of these states in the early 1990s, there is little doubt that minorities would be worse off today had it not been for European intervention. However, EU conditionality was not an automatic or uncontroversial mechanism for reform. Policy debates were contentious and lengthy, even when membership conditionality was applied, and policy outcomes still often failed to fully accommodate European recommendations.¹¹ As will be discussed in subsequent chapters, there were tendencies for governments to interpret European recommendations as maximum as opposed to minimum requirements, to ignore some recommendations, and to undercut reforms either through the passage of legislation in other areas or by rolling back amendments post-accession.

      The result is that a number of direct and indirect barriers to minority integration remain, particularly in the political sphere.¹² The number of residents without the citizenship of any state has decreased considerably in both states since the early 1990s; however, those without citizenship still comprise approximately 6 percent of the population in Estonia, and 12 percent in Latvia.¹³ It is also worth noting that another 7 percent have chosen Russian citizenship in Estonia, although this number is much smaller in Latvia.¹⁴ Noncitizens are not allowed to participate in national politics in either country or in local politics in Latvia. Ironically, Russian-speakers in Latvia are more civically and politically organized than in Estonia, and there are real Russian-speaking parties represented in parliament, despite the fact that minority policies are more restrictive. Russia has been outspoken regarding the absence of political rights for noncitizens in Latvia, and Latvia’s EU membership has actually increased tensions over political rights because EU citizens can participate at the local level. Furthermore, in both states the regulation of language in both the public and private spheres makes effective participation contingent on language skills, and broad sectors of the elite continue to favor exclusionary policies toward minorities.¹⁵

      The fact that Estonia and Latvia were reluctant minimal reformers with respect to minority protection contrasts with their highly compliant behavior with respect to other aspects of the Copenhagen criteria, which includes market liberalization and the creation of stable institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, and human rights.¹⁶ While such outcomes are hardly unique in the region, Estonia and Latvia are puzzling cases, given the unprecedented amount of international intervention in citizenship and language policies, and the fact that both states stood to benefit greatly from EU and NATO membership. Not only did membership in the EU hold out important economic benefits, but membership in the EU, and particularly NATO, provided important security guarantees against Russia.

      Because Estonia and Latvia were the only two states not to grant citizenship to all residents at the time of (re)independence in 1991, they became the primary targets of Russia’s kin-state activism throughout the pre-accession period. Russia’s kin-state activism has included military and economic pressures, favorable citizenship, visa, cultural and educational policies for Russian-speakers and former Soviet citizens, as well as financial and organizational support for minority-friendly parties, Russian cultural initiatives, and public demonstrations. Russia has also used both European institutions and the Russian-language media as platforms for internationalizing the situation of Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia and for influencing public opinion.¹⁷ We might have expected Estonian and Latvian elites to develop more inclusive policies toward their Russian-speaking minorities out of fears of Russian aggression, given Russia’s power and proximity, as well as historical legacies that included the forcible incorporation of the Baltic states into the Russian empire and the Soviet Union. At the very least, we might have expected greater compliance with European recommendations as a function of European security guarantees.

      While Russia’s recent aggressions in Georgia and Ukraine have reawakened Baltic elites to the realities of living next door to a militarily superior and territorially revisionist power, Russia has been on the security agenda of the Baltic states since independence. While the security threat that Russia posed to these states receded after their admission to NATO and the EU in 2004, the stakes in pursuing exclusionary policies toward Russian-speakers were high prior to accession. When restrictive citizenship and language policies were first adopted in the early 1990s, substantial numbers of Red Army troops were still stationed on Estonian and Latvian soil. Throughout the 1990s, exclusionary policies risked not only provoking intervention from the Russian kin-state, but also jeopardizing membership prospects in Western institutions.

      The possibility of being left out in the cold should have hit home after Latvia’s invitation to join the CE was delayed and made contingent on the passage of a citizenship law acceptable to European institutions in 1994. In December 1997, Latvia was left out again when it was not invited to begin accession negotiations along with Estonia and the other first-group countries as a result of its restrictive citizenship law. Despite such warnings from Western institutions, debates over minority policies remained protracted and Latvia continued to drag its feet on other conditional amendments, particularly concerning the regulation of language in the private sphere, which took parliament two years to pass, and the removal of language requirements for electoral candidates, which was finally passed in 2002, but only alongside the tightening of other legislation. Estonia drew few lessons from its neighbor’s exclusion and continued to drag its own feet and to look for compromises on naturalization reforms for stateless children in 1998. As in Latvia, the removal of language requirements for candidates in 2001 only passed alongside the tightening of language policy. In addition to possibly provoking Russia and delaying admission to Western institutions, exclusionary policies risked alienating Russian-speakers, which comprised around one-third of the population in each state. Not only could this have had consequences for domestic stability, but it risked pushing Russian-speakers more firmly into Russia’s camp, ultimately granting Russia greater leverage over these societies. Given the stakes involved, which were arguably high, how can we explain the reluctance of Estonian and Latvian elites to embrace a more inclusionary policy trajectory toward Russian-speakers prior to accession?

      Post-accession policy trajectories also present interesting puzzles. Several studies argue that EU conditionality actually produces lock-in effects that make passing liberalizing reforms difficult post-accession.¹⁸ From an incentive-based perspective, we would expect European recommendations to have less impact post-accession after the carrot of EU membership is removed, and might even expect some backsliding in states where policymakers only grudgingly made reforms, as was the case in Estonia and Latvia. European institutions had been continually calling for the further simplification of naturalization procedures for stateless children throughout the post-accession period. Yet reform initiatives consistently failed to gain enough support; outcomes consistent with lock-in effects. How then can we explain the passage of significant liberalizing reforms in Latvia in 2013 and in Estonia in 2015, in the absence of significant changes to the composition of parliaments directly prior to the passage of amendments?

      The failure of European pressure to have had a greater transformative effect on the minority situation in these states is typically explained by deficiencies in the European minority rights framework itself, or as a function of domestic audience costs. The former emphasizes the ambiguous and contested nature of the European minority rights framework, including the difficulties of translating the Copenhagen criteria into a clear policy and enforcing it in the absence of an international consensus on minority protection.¹⁹ From this perspective, it is hardly surprising that improvements in minority protection have been less dramatic, given that the benchmark itself is a vague, inconsistently applied, and constantly moving target. However, the weaknesses inherent in the minority rights framework alone cannot explain delays in the passage of legislation, why specific policies are chosen over others, or why liberalizing reforms would be passed post-accession in the absence of membership incentives.

      Other scholars, who are more positive about the application of the EU’s minority condition, explain the persistence of more restrictive policies as a function of domestic audience costs. From this perspective, elected officials were not willing to pay the costs of passing policies that would be unpopular with their electoral base, ultimately explaining suboptimal pre-accession outcomes.²⁰ Nevertheless, the removal of even the most exclusionary aspects of citizenship and language policies prior to accession was significant for minorities in these cases. How were reformers able to persuade others to vote in favor of even minimal changes to the status quo, given the resistance of nationalizing governments and domestic societies to adopting minority policy reforms prior to accession? Furthermore, how can we explain cases where nationalizing parties changed their preferences in favor of reform after protracted debates? Such dynamics were at work, for example, surrounding the passage of controversial citizenship reforms in Latvia in 1998.

      Recognizing the ways in which domestic policymakers strategically use Europe and Russia as justifications for their policy positions, in response to both external pressure and domestic constraints, is crucial for understanding the path and form of policies in these cases. Policymakers are clearly concerned with their domestic audiences. However, audience costs are to a large extent dependent on the ability of politicians to convince voters that they have their best interests at heart. The involvement of European institutions and Russia in minority policies provides opportunities for policymakers to present their policy preferences to other elites and their domestic audiences in new ways. The ambiguity surrounding the European minority rights framework provides the permissive conditions for elected officials to promote specific interpretations of their international obligations, ones that will resonate with their electorate. Policymakers can use Russia’s activism to reinforce or undermine those interpretations in ways that are consistent with their own policy preferences.

      THE STRATEGIC FRAMING APPROACH

      In the wake of the 2004 and 2007 EU enlargements, and the uneven compliance with European recommendations in new accession states, a new research agenda encouraged scholars to move beyond conditionality both temporally and with respect to theories of compliance.²¹ I contribute to this turn in scholarship by adopting a strategic framing approach that bridges the gap between scholarship in the Europeanization, kin-state, and minority politics fields in order to understand how both European institutions and Russia influence policymaking toward Russian-speakers in Estonia and Latvia. This approach moves beyond traditional approaches to the study of external actors and their influence in three ways.

      First, I approach the puzzles of the Estonian and Latvian cases from the perspective of the quadratic nexus. The conceptualization of minorities, nationalizing states, kin-states, and European institutions as a quadratic nexus of interactive and contingent fields has shaped much scholarship on nationalism and minority rights in CEE.²² However, I introduce a new innovation to this framework by operationalizing policymakers as their own field of contestation. I will discuss these fields and their interrelationships briefly in the following section and in much greater detail in chapter 1.

      Second, I adopt a predominately agency-oriented approach that focuses on how policymakers frame external fields. I define strategic framing as the deliberate effort of policymakers to promote a certain view of European institutions and/or the Russian kin-state in order to justify a particular policy preference and to persuade others to support it. While CEECs are often treated as passive targets of external pressure, a strategic framing approach draws our attention to the ways in which domestic policymakers can capitalize upon the contestation taking place both within and between fields of the quadratic nexus to persuade others to follow a particular policy course.²³ It therefore focuses our attention on the intermediary processes taking place between external pressures and policy outcomes. However, there are two sets of scope conditions that limit the strategic framing of the European and Russian fields in these cases: (1) the existence of external pressure, and perceptions or awareness of that pressure by policymakers; and (2) domestic political structures, particularly party systems and electoral policies. These scope conditions explain important differences in strategic framing across policy areas and countries, including the frequency and range of permissible frames.

      Third, I focus primarily on the policymaking process as opposed to policy outcomes. Some studies evaluate the influence of European institutions or kin-states on policy outcomes in CEE, by comparing the timing of external pressure with macropolicy changes, especially in the pre-accession period.²⁴ At times, these studies make references to the speech acts of high-ranking elites in order to lend evidence to the causal impact of external pressures. By contrast, a focus on the policymaking process draws our attention to the ways in which policymakers use external fields relationally and strategically in ways that affect both the path and form of legislation. Attention to policymaking as a process, as opposed to an outcome, shifts our focus from questions of whether external fields matter to how they matter. In order to sufficiently address the how, I adopt a broader scope for analysis than is done in previous studies, by analyzing debates surrounding both successful and unsuccessful policy initiatives and by looking at the entire post-independence period from the initial adoption of policies in the early 1990s through the end of 2015.

      Through this reorientation in perspective I address the following specific research questions: How do domestic policymakers use European institutions and Russia to frame their policy preferences toward minorities? What relationships exist between European and Russian frames? How do policymakers shift their strategic frames in response to changes in the external environment? What effects does framing have on the path and form of policies?

      Recent studies have advanced our understanding of the important relational interplays between European institutions and kin-states in CEE, in the process introducing new and important debates for the field. While some scholars argue that membership or prospective membership in the EU moderates kin-state behavior in CEE,²⁵ others conclude that European institutions can both dampen and intensify conflicts between kin-states and resident-states over minorities irrespective of their EU status.²⁶ For example, in cases where elites rely on the political and cultural resources of coethnics in neighboring countries, the EU’s ambiguous position on minority rights protection may actually encourage kin-state politics, even in prospective members.²⁷ In Estonia and Latvia, some find that European institutions have had a dampening effect on bilateral relations,²⁸ while others suggest that membership in European institutions has intensified conflicts over minorities by providing new venues for showdowns.²⁹ Several studies attribute European monitoring of the minority situation in Estonia and Latvia to Russia’s efforts to internationalize the situation of Russian-speakers.³⁰ To the extent that conditionality contributed to reforms, we might then conclude that Russia has had an indirect effect on improving the minority situation in these societies. However, others argue that the impression that Europe was giving in to Russia actually worked against the liberalization of minority policies, suggesting that outcomes may have been more substantial had Russia not been involved.³¹

      A strategic framing approach can shed new light on these debates. I find that European institutions and Russia have at different times served as accelerators and brakes on reform in these cases, and that the Russian kin-state has been used to both reinforce and undermine European pressure, sometimes in the context of a single policy debate. Consequently, the question of whether European institutions have had a dampening effect on conflicts between resident-states and Russia over the situation of Russian-speakers is considerably more complicated than existing debates might imply. In fact, everyone is right, depending on which policies and time period we are examining and from whose perspective. Understanding how policymakers strategically frame external fields in response to changes in the external environment and domestic constraints connects foreign actors to the policymaking process in ways that can more fully explain their influence on the path and form of policies. Observing such patterns over time can tell us quite a bit when we would expect strategic framing to emerge, and when European and Russian frames were significant for policy outcomes, ultimately moving us toward a more general theory of strategic framing and its effects.

      Policymakers are at the center of pressures from multiple overlapping, contingent, and relational fields. These fields include majority and minority groups, kin-states that claim to protect those minorities, and European institutions. However, policymakers are not simply passive targets of those pressures. Rather, they operate within their own field of domestic incentives and constraints. Policymakers are strategic, and external fields provide opportunities for them to justify policy preferences in new ways. The following sections operationalize the main components of the strategic framing approach including the quadratic nexus framework, the role of policymakers at the center of that nexus, and the concept of strategic framing.

      THE QUADRATIC NEXUS

      Rogers Brubaker reframed perspectives on nation-building in post-communist Europe as a triadic nexus of three overlapping relational fields consisting of minority groups, the host-states, or resident states, in which they live, and kin-states to which they are bound by ethnocultural affinity.³² These fields, which consist of differentiated and competing positions, were constructed through the post-communist reorganization of political space.³³ The reconstruction of state borders after the collapse the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia left many groups in the region, including Russians, Hungarians, Albanians, Serbs, and Turks, attached to one state by either formal residence or citizenship, and to another by ethnonational affinity. The mismatch between cultural and political boundaries in CEE, and the subsequent interactions between these fields generate distinct forms of nationalism.

      Estonia and Latvia, like many other CEECs, pursued nationalizing policies in the early 1990s that aimed at promoting the linguistic, cultural, political, economic, and demographic superiority of the dominant nation. The discourse of the nationalizing state stresses the idea that the state is of and for a single core nation that is ethnoculturally distinct from the rest of society. Policies that aim at the elevation of this core nation are intended to compensate for the weakened position of the core as a result of past policies of discrimination. The nationalizing state aims to assimilate minorities into the dominant nation, or to prevent them from influencing the political, economic, or cultural life of the state.³⁴ While the nationalizing state has been dominant in post-communist CEE, states differ with respect to how they are nationalizing and how nationalizing they are, both across cases and over time. This is the result of both the changing composition of this field as well as reactions to other fields.

      Kin-state nationalism challenges the nationalizing state when political or cultural elites protest violations of the rights of their conationals and assert the right to defend their interests.³⁵ Kin-states monitor the condition, promote the welfare, support the activities and institutions, assert the rights, and protect the interests of their ethnonational kin in other states.³⁶ Kin-state nationalism encompasses a wide range of policies and activities aimed at influencing the policies of other states or the situation of conationals in those states. At times, kin-states may adopt punitive measures that pressure the nationalizing state economically or militarily, however actual military intervention on behalf of conationals is historically rare.³⁷ Kin-states also have a number of other tools at their

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