Australian Army in World War II
In World War II, the reaction was the same as that of 1914; Australia was automatically at war without further formality when Britain declared war on Germany on September 3, 1939. Again forces were sent to the Middle East. The Royal Australian Air Force was rapidly expanded, and some of its units took part in the Battle of Britain in 1940. In the difficult military campaigns that finally succeeded in eliminating or neutralizing Japanese military forces in the islands to the north and northeast of Australia, Australian army, navy, and air force units played a major role. Australia proper was not invaded but was subjected to 96 attacks by air, which included severe damage to Darwin. Some 691,400 men and women served in Australia's armed forces during six years of war. Casualties numbered about 71,000, of whom more than 29,000 were killed and almost 2,500 were missing; 30,000 were taken prisoner, of whom 8,000 died in captivity.
The Commonwealth's first line troops consisted of three divisions of the Australian Imperial Forces which were in the Middle East when the Pacific War began. This fact and the rapidity of the Japanese offensive dictated the return of the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions. They were scheduled to arrive in late March, while the 9th Division remained in Egypt. In the Southwest Pacific there were the 1st Armored Division of the Australian Imperial Forces and several divisions of militia troops conscripted for home defense. These units were only partially trained and inadequately equipped.
Steps were taken to integrate the United States and Australian forces and to develop the defensive strength of the continent on a purely co-operative basis. The Australian Army was reorganized and regrouped and more intensive efforts were made to train the new recruits. The combined Australian and United States air forces were placed under the command of General Brett and Vice Adm. Herbert F. Leary, USN, assumed command of the naval forces.
The Australian authorities readily adopted suggestions made by General MacArthur. The most complete co-operation existed throughout the war between him and the other nationalities within his command-Australians, Filipinos, Dutch, British, and New Zealanders. Not only was there an almost complete lack of friction and misunderstanding, but the ties of mutual respect, good will, and admiration among the commanders, staffs, and troops might well serve as a model for a mixed international force. General MacArthur's ability to gain and maintain the full confidence of these nations and their forces, of such marked national variance, was an important factor in the success of the Pacific War.
The strategic policy approved for the Pacific Theater was initially defensive. The Joint Chiefs of Staff directed General MacArthur to hold the key military regions of Australia as bases for a future offensive and to check the Japanese southward advance by destroying enemy shipping, aircraft, and bases in the Netherlands East Indies, New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. General MacArthur was also to attempt to maintain the position in the Philippines, protect communications, route shipping, and support the operations of Allied forces in the South Pacific and Indian Theaters. Economic pressure was to be exerted against the Japanese through attacks on vessels transporting raw materials from the conquered territories back to the Homeland.
The ground troops, designated Allied Land Forces, were placed under the command of Gen. Sir Thomas A. Blamey, Commander-in-Chief of the Australian Army. They consisted of several territorial divisions in various stages of development and training; the command echelons were represented by the Australian First and Second Armies, and III Corps; the combat elements consisted of the 6th Division (less two brigades diverted to Ceylon), the 7th Division (both divisions having been returned from the Middle East), and the US 41st Division. In addition, the 32nd Division was due to reach Australia from the United States in May.
The immediate and imperative problem was the defense of Australia. The forces available, however, were completely inadequate to cover such an extensive coastline. The Australian Chiefs of Staff would be virtually compelled to yield the northern part of the continent to the Japanese should they attempt an invasion; they recommended that the defense be made in the Brisbane area and had disposed their available forces accordingly. The Second Army, which had approximately two divisions under its control, although primarily a training command, was assigned the tactical mission of providing local protection for Melbourne. The First Army, with an allocation plan of seven training divisions, was directed to defend the coast from Brisbane to the Victoria border, inclusive, and Townsville with a garrison to be built up to one division. Defense by major units north of Townsville was not contemplated because the lack of communication facilities would not permit effective maneuver. Sufficient forces to secure Fremantle and Darwin against determined enemy assault were not available. The principal concentration areas of the air force were Melbourne-Sydney, Brisbane, Townsville-Cloncurry, and the main naval bases at Sydney and Brisbane.
Even if the Allies had not been surprised by the Japanese offensive in July-August 1942 they would never have been in a position to mount the offensive planned by MacArthur. At that stage, they lacked the ships, planes and trained troops. By January 1943, the ships and planes had started to arrive. However, the troops that had fought in New Guinea were exhausted and needed to be retrained.
General MacArthur felt strongly that passive defense was strategically unsound. He decided to move forward more then a thousand miles into eastern Papua and beat the Japanese to the punch. By making the first move, he could force them to fight on his terms - across the barrier of the Owen Stanley Range of mountains, almost 14,000 feet high, covered with dense jungle, which formed a natural barrier which ran the entire length of eastern New Guinea. General MacArthur's problem was to move his center of gravity forward fifteen hundred miles and secure this line before the enemy could seize it. The operation involved almost insuperable obstacles of time and space. The results achieved completely vindicated his judgment. This bold and imaginative decision was one of the most crucial and decisive of the war and the final successful culmination of the Papuan operations undoubtedly saved Australia.
As a small or middle power with limited resources and geographically isolated, Australia has relied upon external assistance to protect herself against attack. Traditionally, this assistance came from the British. Traditionally, too, political and strategic decisions affecting security were made in London rather than Canberra. This remained true until World War II. The unhappy events following the entry of Japan into World War II shattered the old concept that the strategic defense of Australia could be left to the British and the Royal Navy. By the end of the war, Australians had formed an appreciation of the immense strength that the United States was able to exert in Australia's area of primary strategic interest.
The experience of World War II caused the Australian Government to make a series of decisions which, while political in themselves, constituted the basis for the evolution of her defense policy. Australia placed her national survival above the previously acknowledged duty to sustain the military decisions taken by and in London. She openly sought the closest relations with the United States as the Pacific nation which possessed the power to insure her survival. Australia's postwar search for regional security arrangements was, in reality, generated by her determination to legalize and formalize a claim to United States military power as a substitute for that with which she had lived for a century. ANZUS and Australian membership in SEATO are two of the results.
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