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The Loom of Time: Between Empire and Anarchy, from the Mediterranean to China
A stunning exploration of the Greater Middle East, where lasting stability has often seemed just out of reach but may hold the key to the shifting world order of the twenty-first century
The Greater Middle East, which Robert D. Kaplan defines as the vast region between the Mediterranean and China, encompassing much of the Arab world, parts of northern Africa, and Asia, existed for millennia as the crossroads of empire: Macedonian, Roman, Persian, Mongol, Ottoman, British, Soviet, American. But with the dissolution of empires in the twentieth century, postcolonial states have endeavored to maintain stability in the face of power struggles between factions, leadership vacuums, and the arbitrary borders drawn by exiting imperial rulers with little regard for geography or political groups on the ground. In the Loom of Time, Kaplan explores this broad, fraught space through reporting and travel writing to reveal deeper truths about the impacts of history on the present and how the requirements of stability over anarchy are often in conflict with the ideals of democratic governance.
In The Loom of Time, Kaplan makes the case for realism as an approach to the Greater Middle East. Just as Western attempts at democracy promotion across the Middle East have failed, a new form of economic imperialism is emerging today as China's ambitions fall squarely within the region as the key link between Europe and East Asia. As in the past, the Greater Middle East will be a register of future great power struggles across the globe. And like in the past, thousands of years of imperial rule will continue to cast a long shadow on politics as it is practiced today.
To piece together the history of this remarkable place and what it suggests for the future, Kaplan weaves together classic texts, immersive travel writing, and a great variety of voices from every country that all compel the reader to look closely at the realities on the ground and to prioritize these facts over ideals on paper. The Loom of Time is a challenging, clear-eyed book that promises to reframe our vision of the global twenty-first century.
The Greater Middle East, which Robert D. Kaplan defines as the vast region between the Mediterranean and China, encompassing much of the Arab world, parts of northern Africa, and Asia, existed for millennia as the crossroads of empire: Macedonian, Roman, Persian, Mongol, Ottoman, British, Soviet, American. But with the dissolution of empires in the twentieth century, postcolonial states have endeavored to maintain stability in the face of power struggles between factions, leadership vacuums, and the arbitrary borders drawn by exiting imperial rulers with little regard for geography or political groups on the ground. In the Loom of Time, Kaplan explores this broad, fraught space through reporting and travel writing to reveal deeper truths about the impacts of history on the present and how the requirements of stability over anarchy are often in conflict with the ideals of democratic governance.
In The Loom of Time, Kaplan makes the case for realism as an approach to the Greater Middle East. Just as Western attempts at democracy promotion across the Middle East have failed, a new form of economic imperialism is emerging today as China's ambitions fall squarely within the region as the key link between Europe and East Asia. As in the past, the Greater Middle East will be a register of future great power struggles across the globe. And like in the past, thousands of years of imperial rule will continue to cast a long shadow on politics as it is practiced today.
To piece together the history of this remarkable place and what it suggests for the future, Kaplan weaves together classic texts, immersive travel writing, and a great variety of voices from every country that all compel the reader to look closely at the realities on the ground and to prioritize these facts over ideals on paper. The Loom of Time is a challenging, clear-eyed book that promises to reframe our vision of the global twenty-first century.
384 pages, Hardcover
First published August 22, 2023
About the author
Robert D. Kaplan
49 books1,124 followersRobert David Kaplan is an American journalist, currently a National Correspondent for the Atlantic Monthly. His writings have also been featured in The Washington Post, The New York Times, The New Republic, The National Interest, Foreign Affairs and The Wall Street Journal, among other newspapers and publications, and his more controversial essays about the nature of U.S. power have spurred debate in academia, the media, and the highest levels of government. A frequent theme in his work is the reemergence of cultural and historical tensions temporarily suspended during the Cold War.
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November 14, 2023
Kaplan's writing can be a little dry, but I love his work for the humility and realism it displays. Kaplan has been a geopolitical journalist for fifty years now, and his experiences have provided him with all-encompassing perspectives that few can match. His pragmatism is a breath of fresh air. I wish we had more people like him in government. Or at least more people like him on the news networks.
This latest offering from Kaplan focuses primarily on the Greater Middle East (think everything East of the Mediterranean to China). We get an update on recent geopolitical events of the region, and then Kaplan offers opinions on how certain countries might move forward in the near future. Kaplan also opines on the geopolitical approach of the US versus that of China. Spoiler alert; the US is dumb and China is kicking our ass.
It can be a bit dry at times, but this is a helpful update on a region of the world that will drive trade and economic competition in the coming decades, and there is nobody who covers this area in such an understanding and respectful manner as Kaplan.
This latest offering from Kaplan focuses primarily on the Greater Middle East (think everything East of the Mediterranean to China). We get an update on recent geopolitical events of the region, and then Kaplan offers opinions on how certain countries might move forward in the near future. Kaplan also opines on the geopolitical approach of the US versus that of China. Spoiler alert; the US is dumb and China is kicking our ass.
It can be a bit dry at times, but this is a helpful update on a region of the world that will drive trade and economic competition in the coming decades, and there is nobody who covers this area in such an understanding and respectful manner as Kaplan.
April 13, 2024
I read a few Robert Kaplan books every year. He writes the perfect mix of travel writing, history and geopolitical analysis. He's getting older every year and that makes me appreciated that he's still writing books. This was one of the best books I've read from him.
The Loom of Time deals with the countries the span from the Eastern Mediterranean starting from Turkey to Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Kurdistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In each country he details its history, politics, some travel experiences and also the writings of experts and local academics and politicians.
Turkey - is in the midst of neo-Ottomanism and rebuilding its old empire, even though it is part of NATO it is turning more towards Russia
Egypt - Experienced a popular revolution, brought down Mubarak only to end up even worse with the Muslim brotherhood taking power. The army had to come and take over control and restore a measure of normality. People think of the Arab Spring as a time of anarchy and are not interested in democracy but in stability.
Ethiopia - is actually a multiethnic empire with several competing groups such as the Oromo, Amhara or the Tigre. It went from a feudal monarchy under Emperor Haile Selassie who was world recognised to a communist revolution under the Derg who murdered the royal family and imposed a repressive regime. In the 1990s it faced war with Eritrea, civil war and instability. Today people long for the stable times of old and have pictures of Haile Selassie and Mengistu even though the former was murdered by the latter.
Saudi Arabia - is at the same time the most represive and the most liberal it's been in its history. MBS is stamping down on religious extremism, allowing concerts, cinema, music, giving women rights while at the same time instituting a police state which deals ruthlessly with any opposition. SA will pivot towards China if the US keeps insisting on human rights and democracy as the Saudis are not interested in that.
Syria - historically Syria has been a collection of city states and the cities like Aleppo and Damascus have had separate interests and areas of influence. It is more a geographical area rather then a country. The Ottoman Empire brought Syria under a single ruler. After WW1 Syria was partitioned and arbitrary lines were drawn which crossed religious and ethnic boundaries. Hafez al-Assad was probably the least bad dictator in the Middle East and brought a measure of peace. His son completely destroyed his father's legacy by clinging on to power and refusing to organise elections which he probably would have won. This led to a horrible civil war and a huge death toll as well as the disintegration of Syria.
Iraq - like Syria, Iraq was an artificial construct of the British Empire. It brings together three separate groups: Sunnis and Shia Arabs and Kurds. Iraq was a monarchy under the Hashemite dynasty but experinced multiple military coups and revolutions which led to the rise of Saddam Hussein. Saddam killed all his political rivals and imposed an iron rule, he then started wars with Iran and Kuwait. The American toppling of Saddam led to the expected disintegration of Iraq as there was nothing holding the various ethnic and religious groups together.
Kurdistan - the Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups without a country, being split between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. The Kurds in Iraq have the most stable polity but are split between two ruling clans: the Talibani and the Barzani. Compared to the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan is a measure more peaceful and a working society even though it is still very corrupt. Iraqi Kurdistan tried to breakaway but were stopped by an Iranian and Iraqi blockade. The Kurds in Syria under the PYD and their armed branch the YPG are marxist and are linked to the PKK in Turkey.
Afghanistan - experienced upheaval in the 1970s as the urban elite tried to modernise the country and bring the rural tribal areas under its control. The various Pashtun, Uzbek and Tadjik tribes had their own interests. The tribes did not want to modernise and when the USSR invaded they fought a bloody guerrilla war supported by Pakistan and the US. After the USSR retreated the various tribal groups devolved into a civil war which led to the rise of the Taliban. The US fell in the same trap as the USSR and retreated in shame. After spending billions on trying to build democracy in Afghanistan the US left with nothing while currently Chinese companies are extracting the valuable resources.
Pakistan - a country which was created after millions of refugees fled India. It is a military run country as the tribal areas are unruly and can not be controlled. China is currently investing millions into the Belt and Road initiative and this may be Pakistan's chance to stabilise and develop.
It is interesting reading about Kaplan's regret about supporting the Iraq war, even though he himself had written in 1996 that what would come after Saddam's collapse will be far worse and would destroy Iraq.
My favourite quote from the book was: the greater the disorder the more extreme the order that follows it. This was in relation to Afghanistan which had descended into tribal warfare in the 1990s and the extremist Taliban came in and brought a measure of order. However, this would could apply to any place that has faced anarchy, dissolution or revolution.
The Loom of Time deals with the countries the span from the Eastern Mediterranean starting from Turkey to Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Iraq, Kurdistan, Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. In each country he details its history, politics, some travel experiences and also the writings of experts and local academics and politicians.
Turkey - is in the midst of neo-Ottomanism and rebuilding its old empire, even though it is part of NATO it is turning more towards Russia
Egypt - Experienced a popular revolution, brought down Mubarak only to end up even worse with the Muslim brotherhood taking power. The army had to come and take over control and restore a measure of normality. People think of the Arab Spring as a time of anarchy and are not interested in democracy but in stability.
Ethiopia - is actually a multiethnic empire with several competing groups such as the Oromo, Amhara or the Tigre. It went from a feudal monarchy under Emperor Haile Selassie who was world recognised to a communist revolution under the Derg who murdered the royal family and imposed a repressive regime. In the 1990s it faced war with Eritrea, civil war and instability. Today people long for the stable times of old and have pictures of Haile Selassie and Mengistu even though the former was murdered by the latter.
Saudi Arabia - is at the same time the most represive and the most liberal it's been in its history. MBS is stamping down on religious extremism, allowing concerts, cinema, music, giving women rights while at the same time instituting a police state which deals ruthlessly with any opposition. SA will pivot towards China if the US keeps insisting on human rights and democracy as the Saudis are not interested in that.
Syria - historically Syria has been a collection of city states and the cities like Aleppo and Damascus have had separate interests and areas of influence. It is more a geographical area rather then a country. The Ottoman Empire brought Syria under a single ruler. After WW1 Syria was partitioned and arbitrary lines were drawn which crossed religious and ethnic boundaries. Hafez al-Assad was probably the least bad dictator in the Middle East and brought a measure of peace. His son completely destroyed his father's legacy by clinging on to power and refusing to organise elections which he probably would have won. This led to a horrible civil war and a huge death toll as well as the disintegration of Syria.
Iraq - like Syria, Iraq was an artificial construct of the British Empire. It brings together three separate groups: Sunnis and Shia Arabs and Kurds. Iraq was a monarchy under the Hashemite dynasty but experinced multiple military coups and revolutions which led to the rise of Saddam Hussein. Saddam killed all his political rivals and imposed an iron rule, he then started wars with Iran and Kuwait. The American toppling of Saddam led to the expected disintegration of Iraq as there was nothing holding the various ethnic and religious groups together.
Kurdistan - the Kurds are one of the largest ethnic groups without a country, being split between Turkey, Iraq and Syria. The Kurds in Iraq have the most stable polity but are split between two ruling clans: the Talibani and the Barzani. Compared to the rest of Iraq, Kurdistan is a measure more peaceful and a working society even though it is still very corrupt. Iraqi Kurdistan tried to breakaway but were stopped by an Iranian and Iraqi blockade. The Kurds in Syria under the PYD and their armed branch the YPG are marxist and are linked to the PKK in Turkey.
Afghanistan - experienced upheaval in the 1970s as the urban elite tried to modernise the country and bring the rural tribal areas under its control. The various Pashtun, Uzbek and Tadjik tribes had their own interests. The tribes did not want to modernise and when the USSR invaded they fought a bloody guerrilla war supported by Pakistan and the US. After the USSR retreated the various tribal groups devolved into a civil war which led to the rise of the Taliban. The US fell in the same trap as the USSR and retreated in shame. After spending billions on trying to build democracy in Afghanistan the US left with nothing while currently Chinese companies are extracting the valuable resources.
Pakistan - a country which was created after millions of refugees fled India. It is a military run country as the tribal areas are unruly and can not be controlled. China is currently investing millions into the Belt and Road initiative and this may be Pakistan's chance to stabilise and develop.
It is interesting reading about Kaplan's regret about supporting the Iraq war, even though he himself had written in 1996 that what would come after Saddam's collapse will be far worse and would destroy Iraq.
My favourite quote from the book was: the greater the disorder the more extreme the order that follows it. This was in relation to Afghanistan which had descended into tribal warfare in the 1990s and the extremist Taliban came in and brought a measure of order. However, this would could apply to any place that has faced anarchy, dissolution or revolution.
May 3, 2024
In Jesus Christ Superstar, Webber's Judas summarizes his perceptions of the shortcomings of Jesus' ministry by singing "All your followers are blind. Too much Heaven on their minds." Robert Kaplan's analysis of the shortcomings of American diplomacy in the Middle East during the past half century might be a similar observation, "Too much Democracy on their minds." Kaplan has spent much of that half century living in and writing about the Middle East and has concluded that American efforts to transplant American democratic institutions and practices in such places as Iraq and Afghanistan have been, at best, premature. He also suggests that officials in Ankara, Cairo and Riyadh may find it preferable to do business with China, rather than the US, as they receive no lectures on their human rights practices from Beijing.
I don't know if Kaplan's conclusions are right, but his in depth discussions of these countries is much more informative than the shallow assessments presented in newspapers and cable news.
I don't know if Kaplan's conclusions are right, but his in depth discussions of these countries is much more informative than the shallow assessments presented in newspapers and cable news.
September 5, 2023
The Loom Of Time: Between Empire And Anarchy, From The Mediterranean To China, by Robert D. Kaplan
If you remember where Robert Kaplan left off in the Revenge of Geography, he discussed the need to focus more on China and Mexico. In this book, Kaplan turns his attention to an area that he said got too much attention last time, in urging people to take seriously the promise and the problems of the Greater Middle East. The author views this region as extending from North Africa and the Sahel states across to the Horn of Africa, including the Levant, Turkey, and all the way into Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. As if to point out the author's distinct lack of self-awareness, the author claims that the American retreat from the region has emboldened the Chinese, Turks, Russians, and Iranians to increase their influence in the region, as if he does not remember that he had urged the United States to pay less attention to this supposedly unprofitable region. When you write as many books as this author has, and you pay as little attention to the contradictions in your thinking as this author does, you get cases like this particular book where it is clear that the author has bills to pay (and so writes about a popular subject) and is less than usually concerned about the contradictions of his work. It must be admitted, though, that the author wishes to make a mea maxima culpa about his misguided support of the US invasion of Iraq, which he regrets in hindsight, figuring he ought to have been smart enough to see that it wouldn't actually help create order and that it would inevitably increase the influence of Iran over the Shi'ite population of Iraq's south, both of which should have been possible to see in advance, it must be admitted.
This book is a bit less than 350 pages of contents. It begins with a map, and then contains a prologue about China in the afterlife of empire. This is followed by the author's discussion of time and terrain being essential aspects to history (1). After that the author takes a basically regional approach to the history of the Greater Middle East, starting with Greece (2). He then moves on to Turkey (3), which he views as a missed opportunity for Europe to help Turkey consolidate as a secular state, giving the Islamists support by denying their entry into the EU repeatedly. The author spends two chapters dealing with the Nile River area, focusing first on overpopulated and rigidly governed Egypt (4) and then moving on to discuss the problems of Ethiopia as an empire in search of a unifier (5). This is followed by a discussion of politics and history in the Arabian desert (6). Three chapters cover the fertile crescent, talking first about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and its consequences (7), and then focusing on Syria (8), and Iraq (9) and their struggles to maintain cohesion as artificial states. The book then moves to talk about the achievements of Safavid Iran (10) and its successors as well as the problems of statehood in Afghanistan (11). The book then ends with an epilogue that warns about the failure of imagination that things can always get worse than even the worst regime, as well as acknowledgments, notes, and an index.
It is clear that as an author, Kaplan has less of a systematic view of the world than he does make impressionistic sketches that are designed to reflect the needs and concerns of the time, like the author's pathological need to be accepted as an expert of the region and receive the plaudits of fellow beltway analysts and midbrow audiences of newspapers like the WaPo and New York Times. Does that pathological condition make this book a bad one? Not exactly. If you are looking at a breezy, journalistic account of the author's experiences in traveling through and reading about the Middle East, his praises of generally better writers whose work he views and underappreciated and worth championing, as well as an understanding of how the author's negative personal experiences with Saddam's Iraq made him biased against the regime and not sensitive to the difficulties of promoting order in the Middle East's artificial states, this book has some value. There is at least some continuity in this work as in his previous works in a general view of the importance of historical geography to current events analysis, his instinctive hostility towards anarchy that leads him to give a grudging support to empires as well as tyrannical regimes that nevertheless protect useful minorities from vengeful and petty majorities on the street, and his fondness of Iran as a cosmopolitan empire once its ayatollahs are removed from power (whenever that blessed event may take place). So, it is not as if the author is always in contradiction with his previous works, even if he values internal consistently less than most prolific writers, it would seem. This book can be enjoyed if one does not take it too seriously, but rather views it as a breezy and rather personal travelogue of the Greater Middle East, and one that speaks in praise of empires, which few writers who wish to be taken seriously these days seem to be willing to do. And that is worth something, at least.
If you remember where Robert Kaplan left off in the Revenge of Geography, he discussed the need to focus more on China and Mexico. In this book, Kaplan turns his attention to an area that he said got too much attention last time, in urging people to take seriously the promise and the problems of the Greater Middle East. The author views this region as extending from North Africa and the Sahel states across to the Horn of Africa, including the Levant, Turkey, and all the way into Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent. As if to point out the author's distinct lack of self-awareness, the author claims that the American retreat from the region has emboldened the Chinese, Turks, Russians, and Iranians to increase their influence in the region, as if he does not remember that he had urged the United States to pay less attention to this supposedly unprofitable region. When you write as many books as this author has, and you pay as little attention to the contradictions in your thinking as this author does, you get cases like this particular book where it is clear that the author has bills to pay (and so writes about a popular subject) and is less than usually concerned about the contradictions of his work. It must be admitted, though, that the author wishes to make a mea maxima culpa about his misguided support of the US invasion of Iraq, which he regrets in hindsight, figuring he ought to have been smart enough to see that it wouldn't actually help create order and that it would inevitably increase the influence of Iran over the Shi'ite population of Iraq's south, both of which should have been possible to see in advance, it must be admitted.
This book is a bit less than 350 pages of contents. It begins with a map, and then contains a prologue about China in the afterlife of empire. This is followed by the author's discussion of time and terrain being essential aspects to history (1). After that the author takes a basically regional approach to the history of the Greater Middle East, starting with Greece (2). He then moves on to Turkey (3), which he views as a missed opportunity for Europe to help Turkey consolidate as a secular state, giving the Islamists support by denying their entry into the EU repeatedly. The author spends two chapters dealing with the Nile River area, focusing first on overpopulated and rigidly governed Egypt (4) and then moving on to discuss the problems of Ethiopia as an empire in search of a unifier (5). This is followed by a discussion of politics and history in the Arabian desert (6). Three chapters cover the fertile crescent, talking first about the destruction of the Ottoman Empire and its consequences (7), and then focusing on Syria (8), and Iraq (9) and their struggles to maintain cohesion as artificial states. The book then moves to talk about the achievements of Safavid Iran (10) and its successors as well as the problems of statehood in Afghanistan (11). The book then ends with an epilogue that warns about the failure of imagination that things can always get worse than even the worst regime, as well as acknowledgments, notes, and an index.
It is clear that as an author, Kaplan has less of a systematic view of the world than he does make impressionistic sketches that are designed to reflect the needs and concerns of the time, like the author's pathological need to be accepted as an expert of the region and receive the plaudits of fellow beltway analysts and midbrow audiences of newspapers like the WaPo and New York Times. Does that pathological condition make this book a bad one? Not exactly. If you are looking at a breezy, journalistic account of the author's experiences in traveling through and reading about the Middle East, his praises of generally better writers whose work he views and underappreciated and worth championing, as well as an understanding of how the author's negative personal experiences with Saddam's Iraq made him biased against the regime and not sensitive to the difficulties of promoting order in the Middle East's artificial states, this book has some value. There is at least some continuity in this work as in his previous works in a general view of the importance of historical geography to current events analysis, his instinctive hostility towards anarchy that leads him to give a grudging support to empires as well as tyrannical regimes that nevertheless protect useful minorities from vengeful and petty majorities on the street, and his fondness of Iran as a cosmopolitan empire once its ayatollahs are removed from power (whenever that blessed event may take place). So, it is not as if the author is always in contradiction with his previous works, even if he values internal consistently less than most prolific writers, it would seem. This book can be enjoyed if one does not take it too seriously, but rather views it as a breezy and rather personal travelogue of the Greater Middle East, and one that speaks in praise of empires, which few writers who wish to be taken seriously these days seem to be willing to do. And that is worth something, at least.
October 29, 2023
1. Turkey: Attaturk modernised it, Erdogan wants it to return to the greatness of the Ottoman Empire. So it sides with Russia even though they fought in Crimea last time.
2. Egypt: a homogeneous country. Nasser was charismatic and liked, but had not enough power to justify his ambition. Disposing Mubarak during the Arab Spring led to the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak was disposed when he planned to ask his son to take over. This goes against the Mamluk tradition and so the military stood by.
3. Ethiopia: a weak Christian empire of different ethnicity. Hard to keep peace
4. Saudi Arabia: a kingdom of tribal people with oil money. MBS the crown Prince is both socially liberating and politically authoritarian. Lee Kuan Yew was the model.
5. Syria: a loose empire of tribes. Needed a strong man. The elder Assad actually used minimal terror to hold the country together. The younger Assad tried reform but then realise he needed terror too.
6. Iraq: Iraq is Syria on steroids. So Saddam was Assad on steroids. But post American invasion, it’s worse. There is ‘democracy’ but no rule of law. Kaplan deeply regretted supporting the Iraq war. Because actually Saddam had the rule of law.
7. Kurdistan: tribal people in a remote region, with their own language. Always needs outside powers to rebel against their rulers.
8. Iran: Persian revolution put modernity back into fundamentalism. It will vie for influence against Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
9. Pakistan: loose tribes that barely hold together. Has form of democracy but lots of corruption too.
Conclusion:
1. A modernising dictator is always worse than the absolute monarchy that precedes it.
2. Revolution in a dictatorship often leads to anarchy which is always worse
3. All Middle East sees Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore as the goal: economic development with benign dictatorship… but Singapore is a small city, and LKY is incorruptible…
4. Amazing conclusion: Western ‘liberalisation’ with installation of democracy is not suitable for the region. Chinese style development, Belt and Road which integrate them into world economy is the solution! This is shocking to the West indeed….
2. Egypt: a homogeneous country. Nasser was charismatic and liked, but had not enough power to justify his ambition. Disposing Mubarak during the Arab Spring led to the Muslim Brotherhood. Mubarak was disposed when he planned to ask his son to take over. This goes against the Mamluk tradition and so the military stood by.
3. Ethiopia: a weak Christian empire of different ethnicity. Hard to keep peace
4. Saudi Arabia: a kingdom of tribal people with oil money. MBS the crown Prince is both socially liberating and politically authoritarian. Lee Kuan Yew was the model.
5. Syria: a loose empire of tribes. Needed a strong man. The elder Assad actually used minimal terror to hold the country together. The younger Assad tried reform but then realise he needed terror too.
6. Iraq: Iraq is Syria on steroids. So Saddam was Assad on steroids. But post American invasion, it’s worse. There is ‘democracy’ but no rule of law. Kaplan deeply regretted supporting the Iraq war. Because actually Saddam had the rule of law.
7. Kurdistan: tribal people in a remote region, with their own language. Always needs outside powers to rebel against their rulers.
8. Iran: Persian revolution put modernity back into fundamentalism. It will vie for influence against Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Turkey.
9. Pakistan: loose tribes that barely hold together. Has form of democracy but lots of corruption too.
Conclusion:
1. A modernising dictator is always worse than the absolute monarchy that precedes it.
2. Revolution in a dictatorship often leads to anarchy which is always worse
3. All Middle East sees Lee Kuan Yew and Singapore as the goal: economic development with benign dictatorship… but Singapore is a small city, and LKY is incorruptible…
4. Amazing conclusion: Western ‘liberalisation’ with installation of democracy is not suitable for the region. Chinese style development, Belt and Road which integrate them into world economy is the solution! This is shocking to the West indeed….
November 3, 2023
OK, Boomer
"The Loom of Time" presents itself as a work of meta-history, ambitiously attempting to weave a narrative that connects the thoughts of historical giants like Gibbon and Said. In an era where brand names no longer guarantee widespread readership, Kaplan's execution doesn't stick.
The author's approach to discussing historical debate, particularly the one between Bertrand Russell and Edward Said, comes across as ill-conceived and is indicative of a broader issue within the text. The author feels misaligned with the depth of understanding one might expect from a writer dealing with such esteemed intellectuals. This sense of disconnect is further exacerbated by the author's own admission of a lack of intimate knowledge of the regions under discussion. Acknowledging neither residency in the concerned areas nor proficiency in the relevant languages, it's as if Kaplan takes pride in his ignorance.
Given the immense potential of the subject, it is unfortunate that "The Loom of Time" does not fulfill its promise. For readers seeking a rich, informed, and nuanced exploration of meta-history, the search continues.
"The Loom of Time" presents itself as a work of meta-history, ambitiously attempting to weave a narrative that connects the thoughts of historical giants like Gibbon and Said. In an era where brand names no longer guarantee widespread readership, Kaplan's execution doesn't stick.
The author's approach to discussing historical debate, particularly the one between Bertrand Russell and Edward Said, comes across as ill-conceived and is indicative of a broader issue within the text. The author feels misaligned with the depth of understanding one might expect from a writer dealing with such esteemed intellectuals. This sense of disconnect is further exacerbated by the author's own admission of a lack of intimate knowledge of the regions under discussion. Acknowledging neither residency in the concerned areas nor proficiency in the relevant languages, it's as if Kaplan takes pride in his ignorance.
Given the immense potential of the subject, it is unfortunate that "The Loom of Time" does not fulfill its promise. For readers seeking a rich, informed, and nuanced exploration of meta-history, the search continues.
September 27, 2023
Extraordinario ensayo. Los capítulos del libro nos llevan a Turquía, Egipto, Etiopía, Irak, Siria, Irán, Arabia Saudía, Afganistán y Pakistán. Como suele ser habitual en los libros de Kaplan, abundan las experiencias sobre el terreno, las conversaciones con distintas gentes, las referencias históricas y un sin fin de libros y autores para seguir profundizando en la temática del libro. Fantástico, me ha gustado mucho.
November 29, 2023
The evolutionary process between empire and anarchy is analyzed in depth, and the reasons and mechanisms for the constant alternation between empire and anarchy are explored by comparing historical developments in the Mediterranean region and China. The book discusses the characteristics of empire and the emergence of anarchy, as well as the interactions between the two. The author also explores the differences between the historical development of the Mediterranean region and China, and systematically analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of empire and anarchy. This book gives readers a fresh perspective on history and politics, and is a gem for scholars and enthusiasts of history, politics, and culture
Susan
Susan
November 25, 2023
Kaplan's new book once again underscores the critical role of geography in our understanding of the world's dynamics. Understanding geography means looking beyond the artificial borders created by humans and carefully observing the underlying realities of power that operate beneath the surface of human-constructed order. Abandoning an obsession with national borders, observing nature, and relying on the human order that grows from it.
In this context, Kaplan leads us to reexamine the empires that have existed throughout history. While empires and imperialism have become pejorative terms in the Western context, they are not only non-pejorative but symbolic of ancient glory and order when considering their historical effects and the cultural legacies carried by former imperial nations. Therefore, we should not discard the perspective of empires just because Westerners have abandoned their empires and their entire set of ideologies. Kaplan says:
“Empire may be dead, because in a globalized world one culture cannot simply appropriate and subjugate other cultures for its own ends. But the imperial mindset is experiencing a disturbing afterlife, as the example of China in the Greater Middle East demonstrates. Whereas the British East India Company n the early modern era advanced eastward from Europe across the MiddleEast to China, China is now advancing in the opposite geographical direction westward, though with similar commercial and strategic motive…For it isn’t only the Chinese, but especially the Iranians and Turks, who look proudly on their imperial pasts. Western imperialism may be looked down upon, but not so the record of indigenous empires.”
Despite having a long history, the nation-state is still a relatively new concept and cannot explain all processes and phenomena in human history. Even though all countries and civilizations exist in the same time, they do not share the same timeline for the growth of their respective community orders. Just as in the time of Columbus, Europe and the Americas coexisted in the same era, but they had entirely different timelines for the growth of their community orders.
Spengler's use of morphological observation to study different civilizations is actually much more precise than naive historical science. It is from this morphological perspective that we can liken the United States to a new Rome, and such a morphological view often has a poetic precision. Similarly, although we are currently in a world of nation-states, on the surface, all participants in the international order are nation-states, but such assertions have meaning only on paper. In reality, different regional powers are on their own timelines, so if we forcibly use the nation-state perspective to explain all human phenomena, we are likely to make a temporal and spatial misplacement error.
In Kaplan's view, this is also why experts now have a hard time understanding the complexities of the Middle East - because they have the wrong glasses on. Kaplan writes:
“Thus, to define the Arab world in particular as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism—as so many people do—is to impose simulated categories upon it, specific to America’s own historical experience, not to the historical experience of the
region in question.”
Therefore, he believes that the current turmoil in the Middle East is not a question of democracy or not, but a problem of Middle Eastern countries failing to create a new order in the power vacuum after the disappearance of imperial powers. In other words, the turmoil in the Middle East is precisely because of the absence of empires:
“In fact, the major reason for the violence in the Middle East in recent years and decades—the fleeting ripples to which the media pay attention—is that for the first time in modern history the region is in a post-imperial phase.There are no longer any world empires to keep order. The Assyrian, Roman,Persian, Byzantine, Ottoman, British, Soviet, and American empires are gone from the region. ”
Kaplan uses the theoretical framework of Yamamoto to understand empires. Empires are not an oppressive structure but a decentralized, multi-ethnic governing entity. Empires primarily represent not oppression but a survival order that exists collectively among different ethnic groups.
Kaplan's new book is built on this "archaic" perspective, offering a fresh look at various countries in the Middle East. His first stop in the observation is Greece and Turkey. It may seem strange to group Greece and Turkey together for those who belong to modern political categories; one represents the origins of European civilization, while the other is a model of Near Eastern monarchy. However, from the perspectives of culture, race, and history, Greece is far from the Europe we imagine it to be. In fact, a little over a hundred years ago, Greece was a part of Turkey, and Greece is not the origin of Europe but rather a gateway to the Near East.
Turkey's predecessor was the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, and it was only after the revolution led by Kemal Atatürk that Turkey began its modernization, or, in other words, its nation-state transformation. Nationalization primarily means giving up the multi-ethnic imperial tradition, as nation-states imply the national self-determination of a single ethnicity. Therefore, the traditional Ottoman claim of a Greater Turkey was incompatible with Turkey's modernization.
“Atatürk’s definition of Turkishness was racial, and thus he was opposed to the cosmopolitan bonding of different peoples that was a hallmark of Ottoman imperialism.[26] He wanted Turkey to escape from the backwardness of a declining empire, even as it was the multiethnic spirit of that empire that, deny it as he might, contributed to his otherwise broad-mindedness and obsession with making Turkey truly Western, and open to ideas in a scientific and technological age.”
Under Kemal Atatürk's leadership, Turkey's modernization took a drastically different path, which involved abandoning its Asian identity and striving to integrate with Europe, shifting from being a center in Anatolia to becoming a borderland of Europe. This approach proved effective during the Cold War, as Turkey successfully served as Europe's frontline defense against the influence of the Soviet Union.
However, despite Turkey's role in safeguarding Europe's borders, it did not receive recognition of its European identity. Even though Atatürk and his successors made significant efforts to secularize Turkey, the European Union still viewed Turkey as a Muslim country and, as a result, refused to acknowledge its qualification as a European member. This left Turkey in an identity crisis, as it was neither considered a part of secular Europe nor an integral component of the Muslim Middle East. This ambiguous position made Turkey quite uncomfortable, and if it failed to address this identity crisis in a timely manner, it would find it difficult to navigate its relationships with both Europe and its Middle Eastern neighbors.
Since it couldn't become a European member, Turkey had to reexamine its historical identity, which led to a series of de-secularization reforms after Erdoğan came to power. Kaplan observed:
“Erdoǧan’s nationalist Islamist approach to history asserted that once Turks had fully embraced Islam they would be prepared to become the natural leaders of the entire Muslim world, in a sort of return to empire. This was the core of the Ottoman mentality, which for many hundreds of years gave the Muslim world a dependable dynastic direction following the many wars over succession that had typified the early Islamic centuries under Arab leadership.
The imperial thread was thus reestablished, rendering Atatürk’s pro-Western policy of secular modernism and rejection of empire as but an interregnum in the long march of Turkish history.”
Erdogan's reforms were certainly not the result of European betrayal, but rather the result of a series of changing circumstances. For instance, Turkey's foreign policy is a consequence of the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of empires. An Istanbul's elite says to Kaplan,
“The big difference is not that Turkey had changed, but more crucially that the international situation had. “In terms of global leadership, we are in a transition period,” he explained, “between outright American dominance and whatever lies beyond. That means it’s a Hobbesian world, where the strong do what they want and the weak must adjust. And this guy,” continuing, with a reference to Erdoǧan, “saw power voids and kept pushing into them. And guess what, there was often no response.”
Kaplan's interviewee stated the following:
“The Turkey I grew up in had no imperial pride, except for the specific fact of the many Ottoman conquests. We were all at that time spiritual children of Atatürk, who had thought of the Ottoman past as backward and hindering our march to catch up with the West. The ultimate mission of Atatürk’s republic was to arrive at contemporary civilization, which was defined as European and American. After all, Kemalist doctrine taught us that the Ottoman Empire had collapsed under its own weight. Atatürk himself had spent his youth with the Young Turks trying to topple the bankrupt Ottoman system led by Abdul Hamid II,
The conservative rulers of modern Turkey want to constantly remind the nation of its glorified past, whether in new television dramas or in theme parks…In this way, Turkey’s military adventures in Syria, Libya, Qatar, and Somalia are part of an ‘imperial destiny,’ and ‘certainly not a liability.’”
Certainly, in addition to changes in the diplomatic landscape and the imperial tradition, the growing Turkish mass population has also been a reason for Erdogan's revolution. In contrast to the Western-educated elite, the mass population is more conservative, prouder of the imperial tradition, and more sensitive to their international status. Kaplan describes this segment as follows:
The Marxists used the term lumpen to denote an unshaped proletariat uninterested in revolutionary advancement, which therefore required direction from above. But as Asli Aydintaşbaş and Nuray Mert, as well as others, employed the term, it had a more pointed emphasis: a badly urbanized and angry class that constituted perfect fodder for revolutionaries. Mert explained that Erdoǧan was leading a drawn-out, neo-Ottoman “counter-revolution” against Atatürk’s republican revolution. “And after Erdoǧan there might only be left a wasteland of destroyed institutions,” with perhaps even paramilitary forces that he has gradually raised up following two decades in power. “This was no longer a state of laws.”
Therefore, to gain the support of these people (representing the vast majority of Turkey's population), Erdogan had to choose a more non-secular path.
For example, he banned certain art districts in Istanbul. Kaplan's interviewee summed it up by saying, "They closed down the entire art world. Now there are only dull cafes and kebab shops. This is the outcome that the revolution gradually evolved into. It all ends up barren."
In addition, he constructed many massive buildings, such as the new presidential palace, which cost one billion dollars and is 58 times larger than the White House. Kaplan suggests that this reverence for grandeur is either because Erdogan himself comes from this mass population, or because he wants to appease this mass population.
Erdoǧan was an urban peasant, a man of the ruralized city: not remotely as cruel as Ceauşescu, but there were certain similarities. Erdoǧan wanted to impress his own kind, people who were ambitious for themselves and for their families, but who lacked refinement. This mosque was for them, for those who had migrated to the city from the villages, and who needed proof that their values were conquering Istanbul.
“Erdoǧan uses neo-Ottomanism for domestic consumption only. He has a caliph mentality.”[*5] Turkish military involvement in Libya, Syria, Qatar, even if unsuccessful, appeals to people’s pride.”
When talking about Turkish education, one stated:
“The Turkish education system indoctrinated all of us in the belief that we are heirs to one of the great world-empires, that spanned three continents: from the Balkans and from North Africa to Asia. What was emphasized in school was the origins and rise of this great empire; not how it declined and failed. Ottoman greatness is implanted deep in our subconscious, therefore. Not even Atatürk’s republican revolution dared to challenge this notion of imperial pride, though it did impress us with the idea that it was the Ottoman Empire’s failure to modernize that led to its destruction.”
Finally, Kaplan mentions the crucial role of the military. He believes that the reason why Ataturk's republic could maintain Turkey's democracy was because the military intervened in politics from time to time. Firstly, the military, for the most part, consists of elites who have experienced Western-style education, making them faithful followers of Kemalism. Secondly, they have their own bureaucratic system and political influence, making them a natural check and balance within the system.
However, when Europe refused to recognize Turkey's European identity due to the significant power held by the Turkish military, Erdogan seized the opportunity to weaken the military elite in Turkey. In this way, a force that could have countered Turkey's anti-secular reforms gradually diminished.
This once again reminds us to pay attention to the separation of form and substance. We often view military governments as bad, but in the case of Turkey, the military government happened to be the custodians of Ataturk's legacy. Similarly, I also find it thought-provoking when looking at Thailand's military government. The reason they are unpopular is not just that they don't represent the urban middle class in Bangkok, but rather the interests of the vast rural areas and the monarchy.
In this context, Kaplan leads us to reexamine the empires that have existed throughout history. While empires and imperialism have become pejorative terms in the Western context, they are not only non-pejorative but symbolic of ancient glory and order when considering their historical effects and the cultural legacies carried by former imperial nations. Therefore, we should not discard the perspective of empires just because Westerners have abandoned their empires and their entire set of ideologies. Kaplan says:
“Empire may be dead, because in a globalized world one culture cannot simply appropriate and subjugate other cultures for its own ends. But the imperial mindset is experiencing a disturbing afterlife, as the example of China in the Greater Middle East demonstrates. Whereas the British East India Company n the early modern era advanced eastward from Europe across the MiddleEast to China, China is now advancing in the opposite geographical direction westward, though with similar commercial and strategic motive…For it isn’t only the Chinese, but especially the Iranians and Turks, who look proudly on their imperial pasts. Western imperialism may be looked down upon, but not so the record of indigenous empires.”
Despite having a long history, the nation-state is still a relatively new concept and cannot explain all processes and phenomena in human history. Even though all countries and civilizations exist in the same time, they do not share the same timeline for the growth of their respective community orders. Just as in the time of Columbus, Europe and the Americas coexisted in the same era, but they had entirely different timelines for the growth of their community orders.
Spengler's use of morphological observation to study different civilizations is actually much more precise than naive historical science. It is from this morphological perspective that we can liken the United States to a new Rome, and such a morphological view often has a poetic precision. Similarly, although we are currently in a world of nation-states, on the surface, all participants in the international order are nation-states, but such assertions have meaning only on paper. In reality, different regional powers are on their own timelines, so if we forcibly use the nation-state perspective to explain all human phenomena, we are likely to make a temporal and spatial misplacement error.
In Kaplan's view, this is also why experts now have a hard time understanding the complexities of the Middle East - because they have the wrong glasses on. Kaplan writes:
“Thus, to define the Arab world in particular as a contest between democracy and authoritarianism—as so many people do—is to impose simulated categories upon it, specific to America’s own historical experience, not to the historical experience of the
region in question.”
Therefore, he believes that the current turmoil in the Middle East is not a question of democracy or not, but a problem of Middle Eastern countries failing to create a new order in the power vacuum after the disappearance of imperial powers. In other words, the turmoil in the Middle East is precisely because of the absence of empires:
“In fact, the major reason for the violence in the Middle East in recent years and decades—the fleeting ripples to which the media pay attention—is that for the first time in modern history the region is in a post-imperial phase.There are no longer any world empires to keep order. The Assyrian, Roman,Persian, Byzantine, Ottoman, British, Soviet, and American empires are gone from the region. ”
Kaplan uses the theoretical framework of Yamamoto to understand empires. Empires are not an oppressive structure but a decentralized, multi-ethnic governing entity. Empires primarily represent not oppression but a survival order that exists collectively among different ethnic groups.
Kaplan's new book is built on this "archaic" perspective, offering a fresh look at various countries in the Middle East. His first stop in the observation is Greece and Turkey. It may seem strange to group Greece and Turkey together for those who belong to modern political categories; one represents the origins of European civilization, while the other is a model of Near Eastern monarchy. However, from the perspectives of culture, race, and history, Greece is far from the Europe we imagine it to be. In fact, a little over a hundred years ago, Greece was a part of Turkey, and Greece is not the origin of Europe but rather a gateway to the Near East.
Turkey's predecessor was the multi-ethnic Ottoman Empire, and it was only after the revolution led by Kemal Atatürk that Turkey began its modernization, or, in other words, its nation-state transformation. Nationalization primarily means giving up the multi-ethnic imperial tradition, as nation-states imply the national self-determination of a single ethnicity. Therefore, the traditional Ottoman claim of a Greater Turkey was incompatible with Turkey's modernization.
“Atatürk’s definition of Turkishness was racial, and thus he was opposed to the cosmopolitan bonding of different peoples that was a hallmark of Ottoman imperialism.[26] He wanted Turkey to escape from the backwardness of a declining empire, even as it was the multiethnic spirit of that empire that, deny it as he might, contributed to his otherwise broad-mindedness and obsession with making Turkey truly Western, and open to ideas in a scientific and technological age.”
Under Kemal Atatürk's leadership, Turkey's modernization took a drastically different path, which involved abandoning its Asian identity and striving to integrate with Europe, shifting from being a center in Anatolia to becoming a borderland of Europe. This approach proved effective during the Cold War, as Turkey successfully served as Europe's frontline defense against the influence of the Soviet Union.
However, despite Turkey's role in safeguarding Europe's borders, it did not receive recognition of its European identity. Even though Atatürk and his successors made significant efforts to secularize Turkey, the European Union still viewed Turkey as a Muslim country and, as a result, refused to acknowledge its qualification as a European member. This left Turkey in an identity crisis, as it was neither considered a part of secular Europe nor an integral component of the Muslim Middle East. This ambiguous position made Turkey quite uncomfortable, and if it failed to address this identity crisis in a timely manner, it would find it difficult to navigate its relationships with both Europe and its Middle Eastern neighbors.
Since it couldn't become a European member, Turkey had to reexamine its historical identity, which led to a series of de-secularization reforms after Erdoğan came to power. Kaplan observed:
“Erdoǧan’s nationalist Islamist approach to history asserted that once Turks had fully embraced Islam they would be prepared to become the natural leaders of the entire Muslim world, in a sort of return to empire. This was the core of the Ottoman mentality, which for many hundreds of years gave the Muslim world a dependable dynastic direction following the many wars over succession that had typified the early Islamic centuries under Arab leadership.
The imperial thread was thus reestablished, rendering Atatürk’s pro-Western policy of secular modernism and rejection of empire as but an interregnum in the long march of Turkish history.”
Erdogan's reforms were certainly not the result of European betrayal, but rather the result of a series of changing circumstances. For instance, Turkey's foreign policy is a consequence of the power vacuum created by the withdrawal of empires. An Istanbul's elite says to Kaplan,
“The big difference is not that Turkey had changed, but more crucially that the international situation had. “In terms of global leadership, we are in a transition period,” he explained, “between outright American dominance and whatever lies beyond. That means it’s a Hobbesian world, where the strong do what they want and the weak must adjust. And this guy,” continuing, with a reference to Erdoǧan, “saw power voids and kept pushing into them. And guess what, there was often no response.”
Kaplan's interviewee stated the following:
“The Turkey I grew up in had no imperial pride, except for the specific fact of the many Ottoman conquests. We were all at that time spiritual children of Atatürk, who had thought of the Ottoman past as backward and hindering our march to catch up with the West. The ultimate mission of Atatürk’s republic was to arrive at contemporary civilization, which was defined as European and American. After all, Kemalist doctrine taught us that the Ottoman Empire had collapsed under its own weight. Atatürk himself had spent his youth with the Young Turks trying to topple the bankrupt Ottoman system led by Abdul Hamid II,
The conservative rulers of modern Turkey want to constantly remind the nation of its glorified past, whether in new television dramas or in theme parks…In this way, Turkey’s military adventures in Syria, Libya, Qatar, and Somalia are part of an ‘imperial destiny,’ and ‘certainly not a liability.’”
Certainly, in addition to changes in the diplomatic landscape and the imperial tradition, the growing Turkish mass population has also been a reason for Erdogan's revolution. In contrast to the Western-educated elite, the mass population is more conservative, prouder of the imperial tradition, and more sensitive to their international status. Kaplan describes this segment as follows:
The Marxists used the term lumpen to denote an unshaped proletariat uninterested in revolutionary advancement, which therefore required direction from above. But as Asli Aydintaşbaş and Nuray Mert, as well as others, employed the term, it had a more pointed emphasis: a badly urbanized and angry class that constituted perfect fodder for revolutionaries. Mert explained that Erdoǧan was leading a drawn-out, neo-Ottoman “counter-revolution” against Atatürk’s republican revolution. “And after Erdoǧan there might only be left a wasteland of destroyed institutions,” with perhaps even paramilitary forces that he has gradually raised up following two decades in power. “This was no longer a state of laws.”
Therefore, to gain the support of these people (representing the vast majority of Turkey's population), Erdogan had to choose a more non-secular path.
For example, he banned certain art districts in Istanbul. Kaplan's interviewee summed it up by saying, "They closed down the entire art world. Now there are only dull cafes and kebab shops. This is the outcome that the revolution gradually evolved into. It all ends up barren."
In addition, he constructed many massive buildings, such as the new presidential palace, which cost one billion dollars and is 58 times larger than the White House. Kaplan suggests that this reverence for grandeur is either because Erdogan himself comes from this mass population, or because he wants to appease this mass population.
Erdoǧan was an urban peasant, a man of the ruralized city: not remotely as cruel as Ceauşescu, but there were certain similarities. Erdoǧan wanted to impress his own kind, people who were ambitious for themselves and for their families, but who lacked refinement. This mosque was for them, for those who had migrated to the city from the villages, and who needed proof that their values were conquering Istanbul.
“Erdoǧan uses neo-Ottomanism for domestic consumption only. He has a caliph mentality.”[*5] Turkish military involvement in Libya, Syria, Qatar, even if unsuccessful, appeals to people’s pride.”
When talking about Turkish education, one stated:
“The Turkish education system indoctrinated all of us in the belief that we are heirs to one of the great world-empires, that spanned three continents: from the Balkans and from North Africa to Asia. What was emphasized in school was the origins and rise of this great empire; not how it declined and failed. Ottoman greatness is implanted deep in our subconscious, therefore. Not even Atatürk’s republican revolution dared to challenge this notion of imperial pride, though it did impress us with the idea that it was the Ottoman Empire’s failure to modernize that led to its destruction.”
Finally, Kaplan mentions the crucial role of the military. He believes that the reason why Ataturk's republic could maintain Turkey's democracy was because the military intervened in politics from time to time. Firstly, the military, for the most part, consists of elites who have experienced Western-style education, making them faithful followers of Kemalism. Secondly, they have their own bureaucratic system and political influence, making them a natural check and balance within the system.
However, when Europe refused to recognize Turkey's European identity due to the significant power held by the Turkish military, Erdogan seized the opportunity to weaken the military elite in Turkey. In this way, a force that could have countered Turkey's anti-secular reforms gradually diminished.
This once again reminds us to pay attention to the separation of form and substance. We often view military governments as bad, but in the case of Turkey, the military government happened to be the custodians of Ataturk's legacy. Similarly, I also find it thought-provoking when looking at Thailand's military government. The reason they are unpopular is not just that they don't represent the urban middle class in Bangkok, but rather the interests of the vast rural areas and the monarchy.
November 2, 2023
The Loom of Time is shot through with insights discussed in The Tragic Mind (Kaplan’s preceding book published earlier in 2023), but it’s also a much more topical book. Kaplan began traveling in the Middle East and Eastern Europe in the 1970s, including several years living in Greece, and he’s traveled in the Mediterranean world, Africa, the Middle East, and Central Asia ever since. (Although, to be clear, I’m not sure there are many nations that haven’t put their stamp in their passport.) Thus, Kaplan brings the perspective of decades spent in the region “between the Mediterranean and China.” But Kaplan, as is his custom, brings more than the immediacy of reporting current events. Kaplan reads history and accounts of fellow “travel writers” (often great writers) to bear. In this volume, Edward Gibbon and Arnold Toynbee, along with Edward Said, Bernard Lewis, Clifford Geertz, Freda Stark, and T.E. Lawrence are called upon to provide their insights and wisdom about the cultures and political organizations of peoples in this vast expanse. In contemporary parlance, he addresses situations in Turkey, Syria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Kurdistan, and Iran. Yes, quite a list. Again, I must emphasize that Kaplan doesn’t simply provide a fact-book account of what’s going on in these locales at present, but he provides perspectives framed by geography and history that look into deep time. Indeed, he praises the insight of Clifford Geertz that we need a “thick description” in trying to come to understand an alien culture, and Kaplan endeavors to do this as much as possible in his work although he is a generalist. He doesn’t claim to have the most first-hand knowledge of a people or region. But he makes up for this deficit with his wide and deep reading, which he draws upon frequently with much admiration for those who came before him. All to his readers’ great benefit.
Because Kaplan considers each nation-state listed above in such depth and perspective, it’s far beyond my knowledge and ability to summarize, let alone critique, his reports. But I think I can and should share what I believe is the most important premise in this book: that tyranny can be horrible, but anarchy can prove worse. A corollary to that major premise is that milder forms of tyranny can provide a better life for ordinary individuals than the anarchy that often arises from attempts at democracy. This idea, he realizes, is a better pill for Washington policy-makers and many in the American public, to swallow. But Kaplan argues his point repeatedly as he recounts the political histories of the nations he reports upon. Kaplan, like me, favors a liberal, constitutional democracy for the U.S. and for many countries, but he also realizes the folly (and often tragedy) of trying to impose democratic practices and norms where the soil is not in a condition to allow the rare flower of democracy to grow. Can a nation’s soil be amended and democracy cultivated to allow democracy to grow and flourish where it once did not? Of course, democracy isn’t a given in any nation (or empire or city-state). It must always seek and continue to realize the necessary conditions to allow it to flourish. Indeed, we in the U.S., which in my life, has continually strived so ardently to spread the gospel of democracy, now find our own ship of state taking on water from demagogues, economic inequality, entrenched, sclerotic interests, and human cussedness such that our liberal constitutional democracy stands in real peril. In this aspect of reading Kaplan is no joy; it’s taking distasteful medicine. But our situation, everyone’s situation, could be much worse (and often has been).
In sum, after reading these two most recent books by Kaplan, I nominate him as one of the most important—if not the most important—writers about politics today. And while his beat might be described as “international relations” or “area studies,” these designations prove too limiting. Kaplan in his travels, his first-hand observations, and his reading has developed deep perspectives on the human political animal, in all our glory, shame, and tragedy. So if a young person or alien or even you, my patient reader, would ask what to better understand what’s going on in our world, I would readily send you forth to read the works of Robert D. Kaplan.
Because Kaplan considers each nation-state listed above in such depth and perspective, it’s far beyond my knowledge and ability to summarize, let alone critique, his reports. But I think I can and should share what I believe is the most important premise in this book: that tyranny can be horrible, but anarchy can prove worse. A corollary to that major premise is that milder forms of tyranny can provide a better life for ordinary individuals than the anarchy that often arises from attempts at democracy. This idea, he realizes, is a better pill for Washington policy-makers and many in the American public, to swallow. But Kaplan argues his point repeatedly as he recounts the political histories of the nations he reports upon. Kaplan, like me, favors a liberal, constitutional democracy for the U.S. and for many countries, but he also realizes the folly (and often tragedy) of trying to impose democratic practices and norms where the soil is not in a condition to allow the rare flower of democracy to grow. Can a nation’s soil be amended and democracy cultivated to allow democracy to grow and flourish where it once did not? Of course, democracy isn’t a given in any nation (or empire or city-state). It must always seek and continue to realize the necessary conditions to allow it to flourish. Indeed, we in the U.S., which in my life, has continually strived so ardently to spread the gospel of democracy, now find our own ship of state taking on water from demagogues, economic inequality, entrenched, sclerotic interests, and human cussedness such that our liberal constitutional democracy stands in real peril. In this aspect of reading Kaplan is no joy; it’s taking distasteful medicine. But our situation, everyone’s situation, could be much worse (and often has been).
In sum, after reading these two most recent books by Kaplan, I nominate him as one of the most important—if not the most important—writers about politics today. And while his beat might be described as “international relations” or “area studies,” these designations prove too limiting. Kaplan in his travels, his first-hand observations, and his reading has developed deep perspectives on the human political animal, in all our glory, shame, and tragedy. So if a young person or alien or even you, my patient reader, would ask what to better understand what’s going on in our world, I would readily send you forth to read the works of Robert D. Kaplan.
May 13, 2024
Excellent summary of Middle Eastern history
Kaplan provides a n understanding of the culture, history, and geography that explains the ongoing turmoil of the Middle East., from many native viewpoints. Although, I think he is a bit too optimistic about future prospects for Iran and Ethiopia.
Kaplan provides a n understanding of the culture, history, and geography that explains the ongoing turmoil of the Middle East., from many native viewpoints. Although, I think he is a bit too optimistic about future prospects for Iran and Ethiopia.
January 17, 2024
There were many strikes against Kaplan.
A superficial understanding of the societies he examines; anecdotes and references submerged in the amber of bygone eras (and somewhat hazily recounted); omission of some central historical processes (e.g., nothing much about Iran proxies like Hezbollah and Houthis); worst of all, the concluding thesis, where he concedes his tenet that the region is incapable of Western-style democracy.
On the other hand: his experiences, his reflections, his discussions with people on the ground, all of them earn him the right to have these opinions, whether or not they’re right. It is clear that he’s obsessed by the most primitive questions from political theory, and how could he not, given that almost all of the countries he encounters are trapped between two existential states, the Hobbesian jungle and the Leninist prison state.
Like Gertz’s theory of “thick description” that Kaplan loves so much — the technique of dense, ethnographic field research from which deeper insights emerge — his own work, which at some points reads like a meta-analysis of different theorists and reporters, gives rise to some important axioms and paradoxes:
- How can democracies emerge without strong institutions of civil society? But how could civil society emerge under stifling dictatorships, without democracy? Look at Egypt, which Kaplan says needs to move beyond “Nasserite pharaohs” like al-Sisi, Mubarak, and Nasser himself in order to achieve economic dynamism. Perhaps this is too simplistic of an explanation for Egypt but rings true — the people there may support a strongman for security reasons, economic reasons, historical and cultural reasons.
- How can democracies emerge if modernization often leads to ethnic strife? In Ethiopia, for example, which I knew little of and whose history Kaplan recounts compellingly, rising literacy under the socialist dictator Mengistu and his Derg regime may have accelerated the budding nationalist movements of the different ethnic groups that exist under the constructed artificial imperial entity, intensifying frictions between the Amhara, the Oromo, the Tigrayans, leading to the civil war of today. The analogy to Yugoslavia was particularly illuminating.
Other notes: Many people throughout the region appear to admire Lee Kuan Yew, the benevolent autocrat of Singapore, from Saudis (MBS sees him as a role model) to Kurds.
The connections to Israel were fascinating: The more artificial the political entity, the more its leaders were forced to appeal to anti-Zionist sentiment to unite their population (see Syria, Iraq). At the same time, only autocrats could take the pivotal, daring step of normalizing relations with the Zionist entity (see Sadaat, the Gulf monarchies.) Another data point to add to Kaplan's cynicism about majority rule.
Overall, Kaplan draws a lot of emotional resonance from the reactionary conclusions of scholars like Elie Kadourie, who survived the Farhud in Iraq with lasting resentment at the British mandate, which had failed at the responsibility of propping up a Leviathan central authority to protect minorities like the Jews from the mobs. At a certain point Kaplan (tastelessly) recognizes Hafez al Assad as "the least bloody tyrant in the Fertile Crescent", almost admiring his administration of Syria, even despite his credentials as a Baathist (which Kaplan constantly refers to as a toxic stew of Arab nationalism and Soviet East Bloc-style socialism.) After all, it’s “better to have one dictator than many,” someone in Kurdistan tells him. Under Saddam, (he gives the hypothetical example), a corrupt hospital administrator in the region would be shot on the spot rather than continue to torment the population like in today’s spoils-distribution system of sectarian mafia-like clannish patronage networks (see: Kurdistan, Iraq, also Lebanon, likely many other states.)
Kaplan’s conclusion: “consultative regimes”, like the Gulf sheikhdoms, should be the goal. It doesn’t help that he had been burned by his own self-admitted failure, that of support for the Iraq War, which he saw as a chance to topple one of the most ghoulish dictators in history but failing to fully estimate the anarchic tempest on which that man had kept a lid. He does make the convincing point that without the Iraq War, Saddam would've gone the way of Assad during the Arab Spring — that is, creating another major conflagration that would've consumed the region. We should “aim for what is possible rather than just,” Kaplan writes. That is China’s prerogative, since its foreign policy thrust has no need to stray from the most realpolitik path. So, naturally, to keep up with them, we should emulate them — I guess?
So overall, I don’t know if I agree — and I don’t know how necessarily profound his observations are in each country — but this audiobook had me glued, and left me with a lot of ideas to mull over.
A superficial understanding of the societies he examines; anecdotes and references submerged in the amber of bygone eras (and somewhat hazily recounted); omission of some central historical processes (e.g., nothing much about Iran proxies like Hezbollah and Houthis); worst of all, the concluding thesis, where he concedes his tenet that the region is incapable of Western-style democracy.
On the other hand: his experiences, his reflections, his discussions with people on the ground, all of them earn him the right to have these opinions, whether or not they’re right. It is clear that he’s obsessed by the most primitive questions from political theory, and how could he not, given that almost all of the countries he encounters are trapped between two existential states, the Hobbesian jungle and the Leninist prison state.
Like Gertz’s theory of “thick description” that Kaplan loves so much — the technique of dense, ethnographic field research from which deeper insights emerge — his own work, which at some points reads like a meta-analysis of different theorists and reporters, gives rise to some important axioms and paradoxes:
- How can democracies emerge without strong institutions of civil society? But how could civil society emerge under stifling dictatorships, without democracy? Look at Egypt, which Kaplan says needs to move beyond “Nasserite pharaohs” like al-Sisi, Mubarak, and Nasser himself in order to achieve economic dynamism. Perhaps this is too simplistic of an explanation for Egypt but rings true — the people there may support a strongman for security reasons, economic reasons, historical and cultural reasons.
- How can democracies emerge if modernization often leads to ethnic strife? In Ethiopia, for example, which I knew little of and whose history Kaplan recounts compellingly, rising literacy under the socialist dictator Mengistu and his Derg regime may have accelerated the budding nationalist movements of the different ethnic groups that exist under the constructed artificial imperial entity, intensifying frictions between the Amhara, the Oromo, the Tigrayans, leading to the civil war of today. The analogy to Yugoslavia was particularly illuminating.
Other notes: Many people throughout the region appear to admire Lee Kuan Yew, the benevolent autocrat of Singapore, from Saudis (MBS sees him as a role model) to Kurds.
The connections to Israel were fascinating: The more artificial the political entity, the more its leaders were forced to appeal to anti-Zionist sentiment to unite their population (see Syria, Iraq). At the same time, only autocrats could take the pivotal, daring step of normalizing relations with the Zionist entity (see Sadaat, the Gulf monarchies.) Another data point to add to Kaplan's cynicism about majority rule.
Overall, Kaplan draws a lot of emotional resonance from the reactionary conclusions of scholars like Elie Kadourie, who survived the Farhud in Iraq with lasting resentment at the British mandate, which had failed at the responsibility of propping up a Leviathan central authority to protect minorities like the Jews from the mobs. At a certain point Kaplan (tastelessly) recognizes Hafez al Assad as "the least bloody tyrant in the Fertile Crescent", almost admiring his administration of Syria, even despite his credentials as a Baathist (which Kaplan constantly refers to as a toxic stew of Arab nationalism and Soviet East Bloc-style socialism.) After all, it’s “better to have one dictator than many,” someone in Kurdistan tells him. Under Saddam, (he gives the hypothetical example), a corrupt hospital administrator in the region would be shot on the spot rather than continue to torment the population like in today’s spoils-distribution system of sectarian mafia-like clannish patronage networks (see: Kurdistan, Iraq, also Lebanon, likely many other states.)
Kaplan’s conclusion: “consultative regimes”, like the Gulf sheikhdoms, should be the goal. It doesn’t help that he had been burned by his own self-admitted failure, that of support for the Iraq War, which he saw as a chance to topple one of the most ghoulish dictators in history but failing to fully estimate the anarchic tempest on which that man had kept a lid. He does make the convincing point that without the Iraq War, Saddam would've gone the way of Assad during the Arab Spring — that is, creating another major conflagration that would've consumed the region. We should “aim for what is possible rather than just,” Kaplan writes. That is China’s prerogative, since its foreign policy thrust has no need to stray from the most realpolitik path. So, naturally, to keep up with them, we should emulate them — I guess?
So overall, I don’t know if I agree — and I don’t know how necessarily profound his observations are in each country — but this audiobook had me glued, and left me with a lot of ideas to mull over.
June 22, 2024
In his latest publication, Robert Kaplan focuses on the Greater Middle East. Despite previously implying that this region was overly scrutinised, Kaplan now urges readers to take its potential and challenges seriously. He broadly defines the Greater Middle East, encompassing territories from North Africa and the Sahel states to the Indian subcontinent. Interestingly, he criticises the American withdrawal from the area, arguing that it has encouraged other global actors like China, Turkey, Russia, and Iran. This seeming contradiction from his earlier works underscores Kaplan's tendency to overlook inconsistencies in his arguments.
The book, spanning nearly 350 pages, opens with a map and a prologue examining China's post-imperial trajectory. Kaplan then explores the significance of time and geography in history before adopting a regional perspective on the Greater Middle East's past. He covers various topics, including Greece and Turkey, the Nile River region, the Arabian desert, the fertile crescent, Safavid Iran, and Afghanistan. The concluding epilogue warns against underestimating the potential for further deterioration in the region. His core argument is that some parts of the world are anarchical by nature, and failed attempts at democracy incline these regions towards anarchy. In some measure, moderate tyranny may be better than anarchic chaos.
He argues that Turkey is a case of a missed opportunity as it was shunned by Europe and led into the arms of Islamists. Kaplan laments Egypt's stifling governance, arguing that historically, Egypt has always been an authoritarian state. On Ethiopia, he laments the need for a unifier. Kaplan discusses the political origins of the 'Fertile Crescent' and argues that statehood and boundaries are artificial constructs that have not furthered the cohesion of these states. He spends time cataloguing Safavid Iran's achievements and Afghanistan's struggles. Kaplan closes the book with a philosophical warning of the failure of imagination.
As an author, it's apparent that Kaplan provides impressionistic portrayals of the world rather than presenting a structured worldview. These portrayals are tailored to mirror the prevailing needs and concerns of the era, perhaps driven by a strong desire for acknowledgement as an authority on the region. While some may perceive this inclination as pathological, it doesn't necessarily diminish the value of his book. He also appears driven by a desire for recognition among peers and readers, often seeking validation from mainstream media. Despite these inclinations, the book offers value as a journalistic narrative of Kaplan's experiences in the Middle East. While his biases, particularly against Iraq in the time of Saddam, shape his perspective, there remains a thread of consistency with his previous works, emphasising the importance of historical geography and his tendency to support imperial structures for maintaining order.
While one can criticise Kaplan's lack of internal coherence, the book presents insights into the region and challenges prevailing narratives by advocating for the positive aspects of empires. Kaplan also seems to have become his nemesis as the travelogue dimension of his authorship schema is heavily weighed down by the excessive quoting of scholars. Many of the chapters are disproportionately peppered with ideas and the thoughts of Edward Gibbon, Arnold Toynbee, Edward Said, Bernard Lewis, Clifford Geertz, Freda Stark, and T.E. Lawrence.
Kaplan states, "The greater the disorder, the more extreme the order that follows it". While this appears to be an excellent geopolitical bumper sticker, if this were true, there isn't much evidence around. The book retains its merit if approached as a relaxed, journalistic narrative of Kaplan's experiences in the Middle East. Approaching the book with a light-hearted perspective and seeing it as a personal journey through the Greater Middle East can enhance its appeal. Overall, a worthy read for its distinctive style and wide-ranging substance.
The book, spanning nearly 350 pages, opens with a map and a prologue examining China's post-imperial trajectory. Kaplan then explores the significance of time and geography in history before adopting a regional perspective on the Greater Middle East's past. He covers various topics, including Greece and Turkey, the Nile River region, the Arabian desert, the fertile crescent, Safavid Iran, and Afghanistan. The concluding epilogue warns against underestimating the potential for further deterioration in the region. His core argument is that some parts of the world are anarchical by nature, and failed attempts at democracy incline these regions towards anarchy. In some measure, moderate tyranny may be better than anarchic chaos.
He argues that Turkey is a case of a missed opportunity as it was shunned by Europe and led into the arms of Islamists. Kaplan laments Egypt's stifling governance, arguing that historically, Egypt has always been an authoritarian state. On Ethiopia, he laments the need for a unifier. Kaplan discusses the political origins of the 'Fertile Crescent' and argues that statehood and boundaries are artificial constructs that have not furthered the cohesion of these states. He spends time cataloguing Safavid Iran's achievements and Afghanistan's struggles. Kaplan closes the book with a philosophical warning of the failure of imagination.
As an author, it's apparent that Kaplan provides impressionistic portrayals of the world rather than presenting a structured worldview. These portrayals are tailored to mirror the prevailing needs and concerns of the era, perhaps driven by a strong desire for acknowledgement as an authority on the region. While some may perceive this inclination as pathological, it doesn't necessarily diminish the value of his book. He also appears driven by a desire for recognition among peers and readers, often seeking validation from mainstream media. Despite these inclinations, the book offers value as a journalistic narrative of Kaplan's experiences in the Middle East. While his biases, particularly against Iraq in the time of Saddam, shape his perspective, there remains a thread of consistency with his previous works, emphasising the importance of historical geography and his tendency to support imperial structures for maintaining order.
While one can criticise Kaplan's lack of internal coherence, the book presents insights into the region and challenges prevailing narratives by advocating for the positive aspects of empires. Kaplan also seems to have become his nemesis as the travelogue dimension of his authorship schema is heavily weighed down by the excessive quoting of scholars. Many of the chapters are disproportionately peppered with ideas and the thoughts of Edward Gibbon, Arnold Toynbee, Edward Said, Bernard Lewis, Clifford Geertz, Freda Stark, and T.E. Lawrence.
Kaplan states, "The greater the disorder, the more extreme the order that follows it". While this appears to be an excellent geopolitical bumper sticker, if this were true, there isn't much evidence around. The book retains its merit if approached as a relaxed, journalistic narrative of Kaplan's experiences in the Middle East. Approaching the book with a light-hearted perspective and seeing it as a personal journey through the Greater Middle East can enhance its appeal. Overall, a worthy read for its distinctive style and wide-ranging substance.
November 4, 2023
This book almost felt like a goodbye (though I’m sure Kaplan’s pen powers on). From a man who has taken us from the bizarre tropical anarchy of West Africa to Tartary and on towards America’s Empire Wilderness and back, in “The Loom of Time” he returns to where history always returns – the greater Middle East. It is here where the story started; between the Tigris and the Euphrates, climbing down off a great volcanic mountain, trekking the deep sands of Arabia — the raw energy of Israel — the ancient monarchies and modern despots and the wayward American diplomats trying (and failing) to make sense of it all.
The book is more personal, more poetic than his others. Not that Kaplan’s tremendous learning is not on full display; but he has nothing left to prove. Now he gets to tell us about how the experiences over fifty years changed him and taught him. There is something of an anxious desperation and a patient frustration this time; with America. Kaplan’s home, his land but one that never quite can figure out what is going on. Powerful from geography and the privilege of “occupying the last un-taken temperate zone” on the planet. A Ukraine, deep black earth and healthy rains a broad rivers — but with no Russias or Finlands or Polands or Turkeys to cause unending problems. A stupid brute of an empire, ignorant and elatedly so, moral hazard on full display as we withdraw time and again from failures – Afghanistan and Iraq and Vietnam – without really any thought to what went wrong, without any delays to our holiday parades and backyard BBQs.
“The Loom of Time” is, like I said, about the greater Middle East. About the efforts of that area, destabilized at the end of the Ottoman empire (100 years ago) and which never has been able to find stability in a world dominated by empires far away but closer due to the shrinking of the planet. It is haunting and nostalgic; filled with the failures of Europe and America but also with a certain hope that maybe in the future the region will find some measure of order. The book continues on Kaplan’s ongoing efforts to remind us that people don’t really want ideology — at least not those who are attempting to build something in a world gone mad. People want order and a certain degree of predictability. They prefer a monarch to a despot. They prefer law to elections. They would rather work than march. Life is not lived between the covers of a book from Yale University Press but instead on the dusty streets of Baghdad.
The book ends with a reminder that things change, and often times rapidly. Russia invaded Ukraine; a pandemic shut down the world; Kabul fell. When Kaplan was writing this, he knew in his heart that Israel could go back to war. It was not only possible but probable. Yet — who could have predicted October 7th? And the rapid ramifications that will have across the greater Middle East, upending the best planning of the diplomats.
We need to read more; we need more life experience; we need to be humbler and gentler with each other; and we need to hold our ideology in an open hand. Our beautiful American experiment is something none of us would change for anything else – we fight for it and many die for it. But, at the point of a spear, our democratic evangelism has caused great harm. We need to listen more; to use our tremendous goodwill and our almost limitless wealth and our remarkable safety and freedom, turning them into statecraft that is wise; knowing that likely in many places we only have bad choices — and understanding that our way is not always or even most often the right way in places as complex as Adin or as old as Asmara.
The book is more personal, more poetic than his others. Not that Kaplan’s tremendous learning is not on full display; but he has nothing left to prove. Now he gets to tell us about how the experiences over fifty years changed him and taught him. There is something of an anxious desperation and a patient frustration this time; with America. Kaplan’s home, his land but one that never quite can figure out what is going on. Powerful from geography and the privilege of “occupying the last un-taken temperate zone” on the planet. A Ukraine, deep black earth and healthy rains a broad rivers — but with no Russias or Finlands or Polands or Turkeys to cause unending problems. A stupid brute of an empire, ignorant and elatedly so, moral hazard on full display as we withdraw time and again from failures – Afghanistan and Iraq and Vietnam – without really any thought to what went wrong, without any delays to our holiday parades and backyard BBQs.
“The Loom of Time” is, like I said, about the greater Middle East. About the efforts of that area, destabilized at the end of the Ottoman empire (100 years ago) and which never has been able to find stability in a world dominated by empires far away but closer due to the shrinking of the planet. It is haunting and nostalgic; filled with the failures of Europe and America but also with a certain hope that maybe in the future the region will find some measure of order. The book continues on Kaplan’s ongoing efforts to remind us that people don’t really want ideology — at least not those who are attempting to build something in a world gone mad. People want order and a certain degree of predictability. They prefer a monarch to a despot. They prefer law to elections. They would rather work than march. Life is not lived between the covers of a book from Yale University Press but instead on the dusty streets of Baghdad.
The book ends with a reminder that things change, and often times rapidly. Russia invaded Ukraine; a pandemic shut down the world; Kabul fell. When Kaplan was writing this, he knew in his heart that Israel could go back to war. It was not only possible but probable. Yet — who could have predicted October 7th? And the rapid ramifications that will have across the greater Middle East, upending the best planning of the diplomats.
We need to read more; we need more life experience; we need to be humbler and gentler with each other; and we need to hold our ideology in an open hand. Our beautiful American experiment is something none of us would change for anything else – we fight for it and many die for it. But, at the point of a spear, our democratic evangelism has caused great harm. We need to listen more; to use our tremendous goodwill and our almost limitless wealth and our remarkable safety and freedom, turning them into statecraft that is wise; knowing that likely in many places we only have bad choices — and understanding that our way is not always or even most often the right way in places as complex as Adin or as old as Asmara.
August 25, 2023
Robert Kaplan's The Loom of Time: Between Empire and Anarchy, from the Mediterranean to China is a fascinating journey through the 'greater Middle East' that blends memoir, reporting, interviews and history to look at many nations or peoples as they changed and shifted throughout their formation and continued existence. While mostly focused on the late 20th and early 21 centuries, Kaplan reaches back into history at pivotal or foundational moments that help explain the present.
But what is the 'Loom of Time'? Drawing from British historian and philosopher Arnold J. Toynbee as inspired by Goethe's Faust, the Loom of time are the rhythms of history as "manifests itself in the geneses and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of human societies." (Toynbee as quoted by Kaplan, pg. 19). Kaplan clarifies this definition by explaining it is not repetition, as in history repeating itself, each time around something new or different occurs, though at times the pace is glacial. It is with this formative concept the book unfurls moving West to East.
There are 11 full chapters with a prologue and Epilogue. Those latter two listed parts provide the framing and definitions of this work. The chapters look at a particular geographic space, that typically discuss multiple nations. Kaplan begins the the journey with the Aegean moving mostly eastward, ending at the borders of China.
For each chapter, Kaplan provides his own memories of visiting the locales across his career as a journalist, reflecting on changes. He frequently interviews historians, native experts or politicians, all also discussing change (or occasionally the lack of it). Recurrent topics are the destabilizing effects of the end of the Ottoman empire in the 'peace' process of the first world war and the rise of nations in regions more defined by geography and tribes and the roles of the Cold War in the post world war II world.
Government structure is an especially important focus, and Kaplan looks at the long timeline of colonialism and great game through the Soviet and American eras to our present that sees China as a growing power.
It is not an easy or happy read, Kaplan himself reflects on his changing attitudes and knowledge of the region. For example , for Iraq, where Kaplan at first support the US invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s, he has since renounced this viewpoint.
Much of the book is about failure. Failure to create change, failure to sustain stability, failure to maintain peace. Many chapters detail foreign powers (i. e. the US or Russia) failures to acknowledge the in compatibility of ideology in the face of accepting repressive regimes in the name of progress. For example, pre-2000s, under Saddam Iraq had water and electricity, but post US invasion it did not. There was certainly fear and brutally, but in some ways life was more stable.
For anyone questioning why the Middle East is such a conflict filled region, Kaplan's Loom of Time helps unravel the mystery; discussing many of the formative decisions and historic events that have led to the present. It will also be a useful work to measure the impact of China, as the US continues to wane as a super power and China grows as the next one.
It speaks to the importance of truly knowing a place before trying to change it. Kaplan presents another work of import to those interested in or studying history or politics.
I received a free digital version of this Ebook via NetGalley thanks to the publisher.
But what is the 'Loom of Time'? Drawing from British historian and philosopher Arnold J. Toynbee as inspired by Goethe's Faust, the Loom of time are the rhythms of history as "manifests itself in the geneses and growths and breakdowns and disintegrations of human societies." (Toynbee as quoted by Kaplan, pg. 19). Kaplan clarifies this definition by explaining it is not repetition, as in history repeating itself, each time around something new or different occurs, though at times the pace is glacial. It is with this formative concept the book unfurls moving West to East.
There are 11 full chapters with a prologue and Epilogue. Those latter two listed parts provide the framing and definitions of this work. The chapters look at a particular geographic space, that typically discuss multiple nations. Kaplan begins the the journey with the Aegean moving mostly eastward, ending at the borders of China.
For each chapter, Kaplan provides his own memories of visiting the locales across his career as a journalist, reflecting on changes. He frequently interviews historians, native experts or politicians, all also discussing change (or occasionally the lack of it). Recurrent topics are the destabilizing effects of the end of the Ottoman empire in the 'peace' process of the first world war and the rise of nations in regions more defined by geography and tribes and the roles of the Cold War in the post world war II world.
Government structure is an especially important focus, and Kaplan looks at the long timeline of colonialism and great game through the Soviet and American eras to our present that sees China as a growing power.
It is not an easy or happy read, Kaplan himself reflects on his changing attitudes and knowledge of the region. For example , for Iraq, where Kaplan at first support the US invasion of Iraq in the early 2000s, he has since renounced this viewpoint.
Much of the book is about failure. Failure to create change, failure to sustain stability, failure to maintain peace. Many chapters detail foreign powers (i. e. the US or Russia) failures to acknowledge the in compatibility of ideology in the face of accepting repressive regimes in the name of progress. For example, pre-2000s, under Saddam Iraq had water and electricity, but post US invasion it did not. There was certainly fear and brutally, but in some ways life was more stable.
For anyone questioning why the Middle East is such a conflict filled region, Kaplan's Loom of Time helps unravel the mystery; discussing many of the formative decisions and historic events that have led to the present. It will also be a useful work to measure the impact of China, as the US continues to wane as a super power and China grows as the next one.
It speaks to the importance of truly knowing a place before trying to change it. Kaplan presents another work of import to those interested in or studying history or politics.
I received a free digital version of this Ebook via NetGalley thanks to the publisher.
April 14, 2024
“The Loom of Time” is a book of Robert Kaplan’s exploration – from personal travels, expert interviews, and comprehensive literature study – of the Greater Middle East.
It covers much of the region, focusing on each of the main countries between the Mediterranean and China – excluding the “Stans”. It takes us on a journey through Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the Fertile Crescent (Iraq), Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan.
I was intrigued by the title – “The Loom of Time” – which the author draws from Arnold Toynbee, the famous British Historian who saw an overall tendency for civilisation to move towards “Standardisation” and where the world becomes more similar. For Toynbee “The people of every country get more like the country of every other”, but the path is not clear and is very slow and complicated.
According to Toynbee, this path follows the parable of Penelope’s web who avoids a forced re-marriage by weaving a pattern on her loom all day long, and then spend nights taking this pattern apart. The next day she weaves a different pattern before taking this apart, again. In this way Penelope’s efforts mirror the rise and declines of most civilisations -forward motion followed by backward motion and always featuring new patterns and incremental progress.
I loved many things in this book. It’s a tour de force based on Kaplan's 50 years of travels, journalism, academic research, and debate with a wide range of experts, throughout the Region. It clarified details of countries I knew quite well – Turkey and Egypt – and gave me a deeper perspective on how KSA, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan function. I rely too much on Western media and need different perspectives - such as the ones he suggests in this book.
That's one of the beautiful things about Robert Kaplan - he leaves you with many alternate sources of information to follow up.
Importantly the book also helps us imagine how this region will evolve – especially with the growing influence of China and the growing isolationism of the United States.
I also liked how this book was presented as it builds on a transformation within the author himself. In the last book I read from Kaplan – Adriatic: A Concert of Civilisations at the End of the Modern Age – the author admits to mistakes he made in judgement early in his reporting days covering the Adriatic while living in Greece. Rather than just say that new data had changed his mind, he actively criticises his earlier work. This self examination continues in The Loom of Time.
For example, in the section of Iraq, the author talks candidly about how he regretted his previous position on supporting the American led invasion of Iraq. After seeing the results of this conflict, he “fell into a deep depression that lasted several years and required medical help”. (Page 267.) Robert Kaplan did not have to tell us this. He could also have said that new information and the benefit of hindsight had helped him changed his mind.
That said, I see admission of weakness as an important statement. It takes a big man to admit they were wrong and to learn from it. And it shows me that the author is making a serious transition from being knowledgeably to being wise and more open minded about his I was very impressed with this.
The Loom of Time is an excellent book, albeit a very heavy read. I look forward to his next book – which I hope will be about China’s Belt and Road Initiative or about Central Asia and the Stans - based on the clues he set in this book.
It covers much of the region, focusing on each of the main countries between the Mediterranean and China – excluding the “Stans”. It takes us on a journey through Turkey, Egypt, Ethiopia, Saudi Arabia, the Fertile Crescent (Iraq), Iran and Afghanistan/Pakistan.
I was intrigued by the title – “The Loom of Time” – which the author draws from Arnold Toynbee, the famous British Historian who saw an overall tendency for civilisation to move towards “Standardisation” and where the world becomes more similar. For Toynbee “The people of every country get more like the country of every other”, but the path is not clear and is very slow and complicated.
According to Toynbee, this path follows the parable of Penelope’s web who avoids a forced re-marriage by weaving a pattern on her loom all day long, and then spend nights taking this pattern apart. The next day she weaves a different pattern before taking this apart, again. In this way Penelope’s efforts mirror the rise and declines of most civilisations -forward motion followed by backward motion and always featuring new patterns and incremental progress.
I loved many things in this book. It’s a tour de force based on Kaplan's 50 years of travels, journalism, academic research, and debate with a wide range of experts, throughout the Region. It clarified details of countries I knew quite well – Turkey and Egypt – and gave me a deeper perspective on how KSA, Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan and Pakistan function. I rely too much on Western media and need different perspectives - such as the ones he suggests in this book.
That's one of the beautiful things about Robert Kaplan - he leaves you with many alternate sources of information to follow up.
Importantly the book also helps us imagine how this region will evolve – especially with the growing influence of China and the growing isolationism of the United States.
I also liked how this book was presented as it builds on a transformation within the author himself. In the last book I read from Kaplan – Adriatic: A Concert of Civilisations at the End of the Modern Age – the author admits to mistakes he made in judgement early in his reporting days covering the Adriatic while living in Greece. Rather than just say that new data had changed his mind, he actively criticises his earlier work. This self examination continues in The Loom of Time.
For example, in the section of Iraq, the author talks candidly about how he regretted his previous position on supporting the American led invasion of Iraq. After seeing the results of this conflict, he “fell into a deep depression that lasted several years and required medical help”. (Page 267.) Robert Kaplan did not have to tell us this. He could also have said that new information and the benefit of hindsight had helped him changed his mind.
That said, I see admission of weakness as an important statement. It takes a big man to admit they were wrong and to learn from it. And it shows me that the author is making a serious transition from being knowledgeably to being wise and more open minded about his I was very impressed with this.
The Loom of Time is an excellent book, albeit a very heavy read. I look forward to his next book – which I hope will be about China’s Belt and Road Initiative or about Central Asia and the Stans - based on the clues he set in this book.
November 27, 2023
With his twenty-second publication, the prolific geopolitical whisperer Robert D. Kaplan has woven another splendid yearn that melds itinerant reflections, historiographical interpretation, and trenchant strategic insights in The Loom of Time. With his characteristic command of the literature and uniquely resplendent prose, Kaplan delves into the historical arc of Middle Eastern politics from imperial domination to civil war and anarchy. Kaplan argues that the contemporary Middle East – desolated by the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and evacuation by the British, Soviets, and Americans – has devolved into checkerboard of weak states hobbled by failed attempts at democratic governance and a corrosive tendency to anarchy. With the departure of empire, Kaplan argues that a post-imperial Middle East has become a pendulum that oscillates between tyranny and anarchy without the ballast of any stabilizing political traditions.
Kaplan draws upon his extensive travels to recount how different corners of the Middle East have changed over the years – mostly in non-salutary ways. From the neo-Ottoman theocratic authoritarianism of Erdogan’s Turkey, to the stillborn hopes of democratic dawns in Egypt and Syria, to the tottering theocracy of an increasingly turbulent Iran, Kaplan elucidates how progress in the Middle East hardly behaves in a linear or predictable manner. Rather, it is a more erratic wefting and warping which Kaplan likens to the allegory of Penelope’s loom in Homer’s Odyssey, where Penelope staves off hopeful suitors by telling them that she will choose one to marry as soon as she finishes weaving a burial shroud, but only ends up unweaving each day’s work and never ends up completing the project. With this framing, Kaplan argues that this creative and destructive process has thwarted Western attempts to sow democracy in the region and has instead unleashed a “ghost zone” of tyrannical strongmen, tribal conflict, and political anomie.
Kaplan closes by arguing that the Middle East today – from the headwaters of the Nile in Ethiopia to the ruins of Afghanistan – accurately represents Halford Mackinder’s “world island” on which the globe pivots. Kaplan sees the rise of resource-hungry China, and its geostrategic exhibition of “conscious realism” whereby men in suits come to do business without the moral lecturing. The primary objective, he continues, albeit without providing much in the way of a solution, is to preempt China from dominating this heartland. Kaplan’s extrapolations are perhaps overblown, given that China’s Belt and Road Initiative, once marketed as a masterstroke of geopolitics, has already run aground of unsustainable economics and failed expectations. Here, Kaplan neglects his own admonition: that Middle Eastern affairs operates according to its own excruciatingly inscrutable mechanics that has for far too long escaped the grasp of its Western suitors.
Kaplan draws upon his extensive travels to recount how different corners of the Middle East have changed over the years – mostly in non-salutary ways. From the neo-Ottoman theocratic authoritarianism of Erdogan’s Turkey, to the stillborn hopes of democratic dawns in Egypt and Syria, to the tottering theocracy of an increasingly turbulent Iran, Kaplan elucidates how progress in the Middle East hardly behaves in a linear or predictable manner. Rather, it is a more erratic wefting and warping which Kaplan likens to the allegory of Penelope’s loom in Homer’s Odyssey, where Penelope staves off hopeful suitors by telling them that she will choose one to marry as soon as she finishes weaving a burial shroud, but only ends up unweaving each day’s work and never ends up completing the project. With this framing, Kaplan argues that this creative and destructive process has thwarted Western attempts to sow democracy in the region and has instead unleashed a “ghost zone” of tyrannical strongmen, tribal conflict, and political anomie.
Kaplan closes by arguing that the Middle East today – from the headwaters of the Nile in Ethiopia to the ruins of Afghanistan – accurately represents Halford Mackinder’s “world island” on which the globe pivots. Kaplan sees the rise of resource-hungry China, and its geostrategic exhibition of “conscious realism” whereby men in suits come to do business without the moral lecturing. The primary objective, he continues, albeit without providing much in the way of a solution, is to preempt China from dominating this heartland. Kaplan’s extrapolations are perhaps overblown, given that China’s Belt and Road Initiative, once marketed as a masterstroke of geopolitics, has already run aground of unsustainable economics and failed expectations. Here, Kaplan neglects his own admonition: that Middle Eastern affairs operates according to its own excruciatingly inscrutable mechanics that has for far too long escaped the grasp of its Western suitors.
April 14, 2023
The Loom of Time by Robert D. Kaplan
I believe I have read all of Mr. Kaplan’s books. Many when they first came out and a few of them more than once. I also frequently listen and watch him present on geopolitics on YouTube. As a result, when I read his books, his voice is embedded in my brain and as I read these new sentences, they are spoken to me by Mr. Kaplan.
This book is a return to many regions he has lived and traveled through over the past 40 years. Specifically, the Southern rim of the Mediterranean through the Arab countries bordering the Black Sea and finishing in Afghanistan. Reading this book, it felt to me as though this might be his last hurrah in this part of the world. He makes what seems to me a profound discovery that even in this what may be thought of a short time, the dreams and hopes of the West to transform many of these countries into democratic images of the West has not nor will it happen. Why? Culture, geography and in many cases, these are made up countries that have no allegiance to a national flag but instead to their tribe.
Two countries he does see potential for change are Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Saudi Arabia contrary to the general opinion in the US, he sees Mohammed bin Salman as attempting to establish a governing body based upon the model of Lee Quan Yew of Singapore. In this case, instead of embedding family and tribal members he is having educated technocrats run the ministries. Time will tell if this will succeed. In the case of Iran, although nothing positive is happening now, it is one of the few historical countries in the area and still has an educated populace. Like him the current government just can not last. The questions will be when and how it is replaced.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book but I do not think it should be the first book to read by Mr. Kaplan. Too much of the emotion, nostalgia and thought from knowing this region as he does will be missed. For friends of Mr. Kaplan’s writing this is an excellent addition and I do hope it will not be his last.
I believe I have read all of Mr. Kaplan’s books. Many when they first came out and a few of them more than once. I also frequently listen and watch him present on geopolitics on YouTube. As a result, when I read his books, his voice is embedded in my brain and as I read these new sentences, they are spoken to me by Mr. Kaplan.
This book is a return to many regions he has lived and traveled through over the past 40 years. Specifically, the Southern rim of the Mediterranean through the Arab countries bordering the Black Sea and finishing in Afghanistan. Reading this book, it felt to me as though this might be his last hurrah in this part of the world. He makes what seems to me a profound discovery that even in this what may be thought of a short time, the dreams and hopes of the West to transform many of these countries into democratic images of the West has not nor will it happen. Why? Culture, geography and in many cases, these are made up countries that have no allegiance to a national flag but instead to their tribe.
Two countries he does see potential for change are Saudi Arabia and Iran. In Saudi Arabia contrary to the general opinion in the US, he sees Mohammed bin Salman as attempting to establish a governing body based upon the model of Lee Quan Yew of Singapore. In this case, instead of embedding family and tribal members he is having educated technocrats run the ministries. Time will tell if this will succeed. In the case of Iran, although nothing positive is happening now, it is one of the few historical countries in the area and still has an educated populace. Like him the current government just can not last. The questions will be when and how it is replaced.
I thoroughly enjoyed this book but I do not think it should be the first book to read by Mr. Kaplan. Too much of the emotion, nostalgia and thought from knowing this region as he does will be missed. For friends of Mr. Kaplan’s writing this is an excellent addition and I do hope it will not be his last.
August 24, 2024
Very interesting read on the extended Middle East on the risks of looking through a western historical lens, and applying a western value system, on other countries. Especially in artificial states that have no institutions or codes to rely upon, doing so will only change tyranny into anarchy; which is worse. Worse even than Saddam his totalitarian Iraq regime. On top of that if the western world keeps on doing that, China will strengthen its position, without asking any democratic efforts whatsoever.
I personally found the Saudi chapter extremely interesting since it shed a new light on the regime there.
In the end we ask ourselves the question what matters most when faced with multiple bad options? Choosing or even understanding a lesser bad is uncomfortable, and can even feel immoral. Is this not a sliding scale?
The book has that impact. Yes the tribal governance of Pashtun society might have been more stable on a country level than anarchy, how to reconcile that with the fact that girls had no right for education? Women no choices at all? No one has the answers, yet interfering and imposing another value system will not work.
The reflection that revolutions full stop, also coming from within, always (almost want to double check that always) lead to a worse situation was a good insight.
It includes a lot of personal reflections, especially in the Iraq chapter. Writing this book comes across as a personal catharsis for Kaplan.
I found the book tougher to read than some of his earlier works, especially the start of chapters. Should you experience that as well just hang on, it is worth it.
I personally found the Saudi chapter extremely interesting since it shed a new light on the regime there.
In the end we ask ourselves the question what matters most when faced with multiple bad options? Choosing or even understanding a lesser bad is uncomfortable, and can even feel immoral. Is this not a sliding scale?
The book has that impact. Yes the tribal governance of Pashtun society might have been more stable on a country level than anarchy, how to reconcile that with the fact that girls had no right for education? Women no choices at all? No one has the answers, yet interfering and imposing another value system will not work.
The reflection that revolutions full stop, also coming from within, always (almost want to double check that always) lead to a worse situation was a good insight.
It includes a lot of personal reflections, especially in the Iraq chapter. Writing this book comes across as a personal catharsis for Kaplan.
I found the book tougher to read than some of his earlier works, especially the start of chapters. Should you experience that as well just hang on, it is worth it.
September 8, 2023
I tried stepping out of my comfort zone with this one and trying to learn more about the world. Robert D Kaplan is a journalist who traveled all around the world and has experienced the political shifts in countries firsthand.
Not going to lie, my geography is a bit rusty so this took me some time to figure out where everything is because I found that important to understand in this context in regards to bordering countries etc.
Robert references tons of resources throughout the book, not only has he done his research, but he’s lived a lot of it firsthand traveling and documenting political/economic shifts all over the world. It’s very in-depth as each area gets its own chapter. He draws on his time in past decades of being in these countries and reporting on them at those times vs. how things have changed more recently. Technology seems to be a driving force in some of these shifts, being that you can get answers from an unbiased source.
If you’re into history and political/economic shifts and learning more about them, then I truly believe this is a wonderful resource. It is a little dry, but that was to be expected by me. However I enjoyed learning more about this topic and came to find out that Robert is a very seasoned author. His epilogue was raw and authentic as we went through many chapters regarding different areas, this part brought it altogether as an epilogue should do. He made me understand why it all matters. #goodreadsgiveaway
Not going to lie, my geography is a bit rusty so this took me some time to figure out where everything is because I found that important to understand in this context in regards to bordering countries etc.
Robert references tons of resources throughout the book, not only has he done his research, but he’s lived a lot of it firsthand traveling and documenting political/economic shifts all over the world. It’s very in-depth as each area gets its own chapter. He draws on his time in past decades of being in these countries and reporting on them at those times vs. how things have changed more recently. Technology seems to be a driving force in some of these shifts, being that you can get answers from an unbiased source.
If you’re into history and political/economic shifts and learning more about them, then I truly believe this is a wonderful resource. It is a little dry, but that was to be expected by me. However I enjoyed learning more about this topic and came to find out that Robert is a very seasoned author. His epilogue was raw and authentic as we went through many chapters regarding different areas, this part brought it altogether as an epilogue should do. He made me understand why it all matters. #goodreadsgiveaway
March 10, 2024
This was a great listen about the “Greater Middle East, which Robert D. Kaplan defines as the vast region between the Mediterranean and China, encompassing much of the Arab world, parts of northern Africa, and Asia…” The author’s perspective is based on his experience and perspective as a journalist and traveler. To understand the present and to shape the future, we have to understand the past and sort through the complexities of the present. Kaplan does a phenomenal job of providing historical, geographical, religious and cultural context of the region he defines as the Greater Middle East. As well, he suggests that total democracy for a country may not always be the immediate answer - it may depend on several factors - but that the goal should ultimately be democracy. The ongoing challenges of the Greater Middle East continue to reverberate around the world and will play a significant role in influencing the stability of our global future. I loved the title of the book in reference to Homer’s Penelope from the Odyssey, where she holds off her suitors when Odysseus is away, by weaving a funeral shroud for her father-in-law during the day and unraveling the threads during the night so it’s never complete. She could then never fulfill her word that she would marry when the shroud was complete. I would highly recommend this book - I did the audiobook - and enjoyed the narration.
September 18, 2023
Kaplan travels to and muses over the greater Middle East, from Constantinople to Afghanistan. The countries receiving the most focus include Turkey, Egypt, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Iran, and Afghanistan. Israel is, oddly, totally ignored. Because of the general state of things in most of these countries, this is probably the most pro-strongman work of Kaplan that I've read (and I've read a lot). He is, after all, a self-described realist, and he's seen the mess that democracy in places such as Egypt can do (hello, Muslim Brotherhood!).
Kaplan spends a lot of time ruminating on the second Gulf War and his previous support for that endeavor. I believe he is too cynical about the possibility of democracy in such lands, though he is clearly right that such values require the proper soil in which to grow--and that soil is currently severely lacking in most of the region. But his warm reminiscing of the reign of, say, Hafez al-Assad is off-putting. He should have traveled to Jordan to see a better hegemonic specimen.
Nevertheless, a book well worth reading. Kaplan spends almost as much time discussing old books as he does recounting conversations in these various nations. That is to his credit. Much wisdom has been gleaned in decades past, even as the loom of time continues to weave.
Kaplan spends a lot of time ruminating on the second Gulf War and his previous support for that endeavor. I believe he is too cynical about the possibility of democracy in such lands, though he is clearly right that such values require the proper soil in which to grow--and that soil is currently severely lacking in most of the region. But his warm reminiscing of the reign of, say, Hafez al-Assad is off-putting. He should have traveled to Jordan to see a better hegemonic specimen.
Nevertheless, a book well worth reading. Kaplan spends almost as much time discussing old books as he does recounting conversations in these various nations. That is to his credit. Much wisdom has been gleaned in decades past, even as the loom of time continues to weave.
January 28, 2024
A complex book that needs to be read carefully. I will give a brief synopsis and then address some of the criticism that it has received here on GoodReads.
Robert Kaplan for three decades reported on foreign affairs for The Atlantic; here he journeys back through the places he reported on in his younger days, from Greece through to China. The book covers Turkey (chpt 3), Egypt (chpt 4), Ethiopia & Eritrea (chpt 5), Saudi Arabia (chpt 6), the so-called Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Jordan - chpt 7,8,9), Iran (chpt 10), Pakistan & Afghanistan (chpt 11).
The book is an interesting mix of part memoire, part history lesson, and part political commentary on current affairs -interspersed with interviews of prominent people (on and off the record).
The subtitle will give the reader a clue of Kaplan theme: "Between Empire and Anarchy, from the Mediterranean to China". Kaplan's premise is that much of the Middle East's geography (esp. in Mesopotamia) provides the ideal stage for proving Thomas Hobbs correct! (p.243) In a world where political regimes lie along a continuum between autocracy and liberal democracy, wherever starting-point institutions are too weak to support (the moderate policing of) peaceful coordination, populations will yearn more for the order imposed by the former rather than the messy anarchy usually brought about by the latter.
Kaplan's premise runs directly counter to recent US foreign policy belief in democracy being a cure-all, and will not be to every reader's liking. However, in the current world experiencing growing intellectual tribalism, the book appeals to the GoodReads reader to suspend one's a priori beliefs (at least momentarily, as Brecht might have said) and put oneself in the position of those living in these countries and imagine how we might think if we had experienced what they have experienced.
Some GoodReads readers have criticised Kaplan for having previously been an exponent of that same US foreign policy and now, conveniently, changing his mind. While I respect those that have read Kaplan's previous works, I think the criticism is unfair. Firstly, in the book Kaplan owns up to his previous mistaken views. Secondly, this book is better understood as an experienced correspondent, now in his 70s, looking back at how he viewed the world in his youth and using that as a contrast background to better understand what he observes today traveling through the same places.
Intellectual consistency over time (rather than at any one point in time) is not a useful aim - after all, who amongst us has never changed their mind as we grow older?
Robert Kaplan for three decades reported on foreign affairs for The Atlantic; here he journeys back through the places he reported on in his younger days, from Greece through to China. The book covers Turkey (chpt 3), Egypt (chpt 4), Ethiopia & Eritrea (chpt 5), Saudi Arabia (chpt 6), the so-called Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Syria, Jordan - chpt 7,8,9), Iran (chpt 10), Pakistan & Afghanistan (chpt 11).
The book is an interesting mix of part memoire, part history lesson, and part political commentary on current affairs -interspersed with interviews of prominent people (on and off the record).
The subtitle will give the reader a clue of Kaplan theme: "Between Empire and Anarchy, from the Mediterranean to China". Kaplan's premise is that much of the Middle East's geography (esp. in Mesopotamia) provides the ideal stage for proving Thomas Hobbs correct! (p.243) In a world where political regimes lie along a continuum between autocracy and liberal democracy, wherever starting-point institutions are too weak to support (the moderate policing of) peaceful coordination, populations will yearn more for the order imposed by the former rather than the messy anarchy usually brought about by the latter.
Kaplan's premise runs directly counter to recent US foreign policy belief in democracy being a cure-all, and will not be to every reader's liking. However, in the current world experiencing growing intellectual tribalism, the book appeals to the GoodReads reader to suspend one's a priori beliefs (at least momentarily, as Brecht might have said) and put oneself in the position of those living in these countries and imagine how we might think if we had experienced what they have experienced.
Some GoodReads readers have criticised Kaplan for having previously been an exponent of that same US foreign policy and now, conveniently, changing his mind. While I respect those that have read Kaplan's previous works, I think the criticism is unfair. Firstly, in the book Kaplan owns up to his previous mistaken views. Secondly, this book is better understood as an experienced correspondent, now in his 70s, looking back at how he viewed the world in his youth and using that as a contrast background to better understand what he observes today traveling through the same places.
Intellectual consistency over time (rather than at any one point in time) is not a useful aim - after all, who amongst us has never changed their mind as we grow older?
February 24, 2024
A particular universal truth comes to mind upon finishing The Loom of Time: it's unavoidable that we all see the world through our own lens. And that means, in the sense of America's role in geopolitics, that we have seen it through a "democracy is best for us, so it's best for everyone" lens. Couple that bias with our own political reality that everything is short-term, and the result is we make some pretty big miscalculations. The invasion of Iraq in 2003 is the most obvious and egregious one, but of course many others.
Almost like some novels, the first chapters of The Loom of Time provide background and backstories, and even though they're written in an entertaining, sort of travelogue style, it still comes across as mostly pedagogical. But as you progress toward the later chapters, the stories begin to be woven together (sorry - cheap and inaccurate allusion to the title) into something of a moral and a warning. First, our way isn't necessarily the best way for everyone; second, we ignore the long game at our peril; and third, imagination is at least as important as analysis.
A history of our foreign (mis)adventures since World War II have shown that Kaplan's analysis is dead-on. The only problem is that we don't seem to learn those lessons.
The Loom of Time is not only educational and thought-provoking; it's a fun and interesting read.
Almost like some novels, the first chapters of The Loom of Time provide background and backstories, and even though they're written in an entertaining, sort of travelogue style, it still comes across as mostly pedagogical. But as you progress toward the later chapters, the stories begin to be woven together (sorry - cheap and inaccurate allusion to the title) into something of a moral and a warning. First, our way isn't necessarily the best way for everyone; second, we ignore the long game at our peril; and third, imagination is at least as important as analysis.
A history of our foreign (mis)adventures since World War II have shown that Kaplan's analysis is dead-on. The only problem is that we don't seem to learn those lessons.
The Loom of Time is not only educational and thought-provoking; it's a fun and interesting read.
September 24, 2023
Kaplan does it again, what he's good at, erudite learning, and seasoned travelling, and thoughtful analysis in the realm of politics, culture, religion, and geography. This book brought us into the Islamic world, which spans "the greater middle East" from Egypt to Western China. Perhaps, he stretched the middle east too much. China is in the middle east? He speaks of Turkic China, but then that would have to be greater Turkey, not the greater Middle East. Anyway, putting this descrepency aside, I enjoyed this book. Mostly, I learned the Islamic World, is not a democratic one. But that doesn't always mean dictatorship is bad. It is the degree of suppression that matters. You can have a good monarch, or a nasty monarch. Anyway, final thoughts, the Middle East is an interesting region, but also a volatile one, which lead to Bin Laden's Al Qaeda. But the Middle East also gave us Jesus, Bin Laden's polar opposite. On another note, I like Kaplan's Adriatic better, simply because I am from there.
October 9, 2023
This is an exceptional book. It probably deserves a several page review. It is part history, part travel journal, and part memoir. The book has several themes. Just a few: (1) For most of world history, empire has been the primary polity. And for much of the modern middle east, empires dominated until just the last few hundred years. We cannot expect democracy to flourish in such soil any time soon. (2) Is democracy even desired in much of the modern middle east? Kaplan demonstrates that in many places, democracy simply isn't valued. Westerners equate democracy with freedom, but in many places, there seems to be more "day-by-day" autonomy in autocracies than there are in democracies. Egypt is a prime example. (3) Geography is critically important. (4) Generalists are undervalued and specialists struggle to understand the complexities of a system or culture. (This last one was particularly prevalent in early chapter and could apply to any number of studies or environments.)
April 2, 2024
Een boeiend boek over het midden oosten , een reisgids, een geschiedenis boek , een politiek boek ( met soms een persoonlijke mening van de schrijver ). Voor deze lezer was het soms wat veel informatie ik wist niet zoveel ( ik kon alles wat ik wist over het midden oosten waarschijnlijk op 1 blz kwijt , 1 kant : ) , enzo was het boek wat (te) veel informatie ineens , en tussendoor nog de meningen en conclusies van de schrijver begrijpen, was het bij momenten wat veel , wel blij dat ik het heb uitgelezen ( en dat de schrijver het heeft geschreven). Het heeft me een andere blik op deze regio gegeven ,
4 sterren voor deze lezer ( wegens mijn gebrek aan kennis ). Als men niet veel weet over het midden oosten is het bij momenten een taai boek , maar men kan wel veel bijleren over deze fascinerende regio ,
4 sterren voor deze lezer ( wegens mijn gebrek aan kennis ). Als men niet veel weet over het midden oosten is het bij momenten een taai boek , maar men kan wel veel bijleren over deze fascinerende regio ,
January 22, 2024
Kaplan is so impressive--as a thinker, traveler and all-around well-read genius. When I think of life paths to be jealous of, Kaplan may well be first on my list.
His superpower is making the reader want to read more about the countries, empires and peoples he writes about. This book about the Greater Middle East is no exception. He doesn't just travel to a country--he travels and lives there for weeks, then goes back decades later for another taste.
The places he has visited, the people he has talked to about key issues, and the books he digests all work together to make Kaplan's books stunningly enlightening.
His superpower is making the reader want to read more about the countries, empires and peoples he writes about. This book about the Greater Middle East is no exception. He doesn't just travel to a country--he travels and lives there for weeks, then goes back decades later for another taste.
The places he has visited, the people he has talked to about key issues, and the books he digests all work together to make Kaplan's books stunningly enlightening.
July 14, 2024
A terrific read where kaplan assesses the current state of the middle east against its historical backdrop, recent events and western influence. The interesting point is that eventhough recent events may strike as surprising and hard to explain, against the larger historical background much of what we see is entirely logical and part of a larger, centuries old pattern (which explains the title of the book “the loom of time”), with one notable exception; vastly changing Saudi Arabia. A thoroughly enjoying read, with its only weakness being that it fails to bring everything concisely together to a conclusion, something this book would have deserved.
June 25, 2023
As always, Robert Kaplan does a wonderful job of exploring the history and current events in a region in an accessible and interesting manner. In The Loom of Time, he tackles the convoluted story of the Middle East, explaining why the failed policies of the past have resulted in the ongoing turmoil and tension we now see. An enjoyable and informative read!
Thanks to NetGalley and the publisher for the ARC!
Thanks to NetGalley and the publisher for the ARC!
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