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In the Graveyard of Empires
“How we got to where we are in Afghanistan.”—Matthew Kaminski, Wall Street Journal
This definitive account of the American experience in Afghanistan “[zeroes] in on what went awry after America’s successful routing of the Taliban in late 2001” (Michiko Kakutani, New York Times) to explain how a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan and a collapsing government in Kabul catalyzed the Taliban resurgence. Examining what has worked thus far—and what hasn’t—Jones lays out “a blueprint for winning in a region that has historically brought mighty armies to their knees” (Doug Childers, Richmond Times-Dispatch). 12 maps and charts.
This definitive account of the American experience in Afghanistan “[zeroes] in on what went awry after America’s successful routing of the Taliban in late 2001” (Michiko Kakutani, New York Times) to explain how a growing sanctuary for insurgents in Pakistan and a collapsing government in Kabul catalyzed the Taliban resurgence. Examining what has worked thus far—and what hasn’t—Jones lays out “a blueprint for winning in a region that has historically brought mighty armies to their knees” (Doug Childers, Richmond Times-Dispatch). 12 maps and charts.
464 pages, Paperback
First published July 6, 2009
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July 22, 2021
Seth G. Jones - image from the National Museum for the United States Air Force
Seth G. Jones is currently a Fellow and Director at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), and was a “senior political scientist” at the RAND corporation (as in Research AND Development, not that other Rand) from 2003 to 2017. He worked in the Defense Department for a couple of years, and has taught classes on counter-terrorism issues from 2002 to 2009 at Georgetown and since 2005 at the U.S. Naval Postgraduate School. He has also written on nation building. His stated goal in this book is “to understand the motivations of the key actors and to assess what factors contributed to the rise of Afghanistan’s insurgency.”
If policy analysis is your cup of chai, this will serve you nicely. Jones has met with a host of relevant parties to the unpleasantness, both historical and ongoing, in Afghanistan and that region. He offers an academic analysis of what underlies problems with nation-building there, citing a list of the usual suspects, and arrives at a place that might strike some as unexpected. Why do so many people support the Taliban? Is it inherent religious extremism, or are there other reasons? What is Pakistan’s role in the persistent problems of its neighbor? What are Pakistan’s goals and how do their actions reflect them? How might the West promote stability, and freedom from tyranny in Afghanistan?
If you are new to the subject, this is not a bad introduction, although I would recommend Ahmed Rashid’s “Descent into Chaos” as a better intro to the area. If you have read a fair bit about Afghanistan and that region, there is little here that is new in his overview. Jones cites many, many sources, and a lot of them are familiar. Yes, we know that Pakistan is interested in maintaining Afghanistan as a buffer against India. We know that they have supported and continue to support the Taliban. We know that the central government in Afghanistan is corrupt
But aside from the broader strokes, Jones drills down to some revelatory information. For example he offers profiles of some of the significant warlords in Afghanistan. He presents telling details in other areas, such as the structure of how Al Qa’ida communicates. He goes into specifics about the ISI, which is associated with the military, and the Pakistani Frontier Corps, which reports to an entirely other ministry, and their roles not only in supporting the Taliban, but in attacking western forces. He talks about the “light footprint” notion espoused by Donald Rumsfeld, and shows how that affected the ability of the military to pacify the nation and begin rebuilding. A particularly interesting bit of data was a comparison of the number of personnel used in other post-war scenarios to pacify the entire country and provide security. The role of the U.S. vis a vis other Western nations regarding developing an Afghani police force is illuminating. His view of insurgency as a parallel attempt at nation-building and not merely as a negative force, is fascinating. He also looks at how some post-colonial governments had not been properly prepared for independence, thus leading to structural weakness and susceptibility to internal disruption. And Jones points out many instances in which American penny-wise-pound-foolish policies allowed the continuation and expansion of significant national problems. Jones’ wonkish appreciation for policy details is most welcome.
He writes about Al Qa’ida as a force multiplier, insisting that it is well incorporated into the Taliban and that the Taliban will, should it regain power, return to providing a safe haven for an organization that Jones insists offers a strategic threat to the U.S. It sounds like he is making a case that any acceptance of Taliban control of Afghanistan, partial or whole, would necessarily mean more attacks on the West from that base of operations. The implication is a need for continuing, probably increased Western military presence there.
In critiquing what is wrong in Afghanistan, one of the key problems is corruption. If people feel no trust in their police, judges, military or government, why should they not support someone or some group outside government? Although it was beyond the purview of this book, it does seem that the generic notion of a public loss of confidence in government impartiality, honesty and willingness and ability to deliver services has implications well beyond those in Afghanistan.
It is his take that top-down nation-building in Afghanistan is exactly the wrong approach. It would seem that, as of 2021, the evidence bears him out. But if we in the West remain unwilling to invest resources in building up from below, what is left?
One pet peeve I had with the book was that Jones introduces two voices, Zalmay Khalilzad and Ronald Neumann, into his narrative intermittently. While their involvement in the affairs of Afghanistan as diplomats was significant, telling us about their early careers seemed thrown in. It struck me as a bit of in-house politicking by Jones, who has connections to both men. Another gripe is that he seems to be trying as best he can to place outside the White House responsibility for a lack of investment in Afghanistan after the removal from power of the Taliban, citing, specifically, resistance from the department of OMB. Under an increasingly imperial Bush presidency, it defies reason that a program the White House wanted could be hindered by OMB. The president could simply inform the OMB director of his wishes and make it clear that remaining in his post was contingent on satisfying the person who put him there. It is the occasional item like this one that instilled in me a feeling of caution while reading the book. If a purely political motive informed the writing of this piece, how many other, less obvious, examples might there be tucked away in the crevices. Thankfully, I did not find enough of these ticking devices to fully counter the overall value of the book. Jones has added thoughtful analysis to a broad view of Afghanistan history and current (2009) goings-on to hone a pointed set of recommendations for securing progress in this battered nation that are worth considering.
His analysis seems worth examining in light of the US withdrawal in 2021.
Jones is on Twitter here
May 16, 2021
This book explores the historical invasions of the Greeks, the Mongolian hordes, the British, the Soviets, and now the United States. Afghanistan has a long and tumultuous history with one specific note: it has never been conquered. This book does a pretty good job of explaining why that is such. A very interesting read on Afghanistan and its long and bloody military history. I would recommend it to anyone interested in Afghanistan's history. Thanks!
October 22, 2010
The grim title and the KOd Soviet tank on the cover are misleading cliches to begin with. I imagine that the publisher went with the title/cover so Jones' work might find a place in the political nonfiction genre. But Jones is a Rand scholar, and he writes like one. The work is technical, heavily footnoted, and not exactly a breeze to read. The text is basically a very long Foreign Affairs article and will only be read for professional development.
The tank and the "Graveyard" epithet also misrepresent Jones' analysis of the direction and possible outcomes of the war. Jones doesn't look too much to the Soviet adventure to predict American success or failure. And well he shouldn't. The American war is about as far removed from the Soviet experience as the Soviets were from the British. Instead, Jones asks why an insurgency developed in Afghanistan at all, given the lightning success of the invasion and the remarkable popular support for the coalition. If the Soviets made a fatal error in committing massive conventional forces, why did the light footprint fail as well?
For Jones, the gravest error was the failure to press the advantage after the success of the CIA/JSOC invasion. All key players in the Bush Administration succumbed to a pathological fixation on Saddam Hussein, and left the job in Afghanistan undone. The Iraq project consumed the funds, expert diplomats, intelligence personnel, and supersoldiers that destroyed the Taliban overnight. As a consequence, training programs for the police and army foundered. No agency ever committed to the difficult tasks of rural development that would establish the government's presence in the countryside. In any case, top-down development efforts are doomed to failure in Afghanistan's culture of casual corruption. Meanwhile the Taliban had plenty of room to operate in the vacuum of local governance. Al Qaeda, too, benefited from the extraordinary convenience of American targets in its backyard. The "job unfinished" narrative is intuitive and by now very familiar- this take on the Afghan war was a common theme of Obama's 2008 candidacy. It is also hard to doubt with the crushing weight of evidence that Jones leverages here.
Jones also exposes Pakistan's frustrating role in the Afghan wars. A number of political dilemmas create a political situation in which Pakistan receives U.S. aid, calls itself a partner in the war, and simultaneously aides the insurgency. Pakistan's lawless provinces harbor Al Qaeda and serve as the main supply pipeline for the Taliban. Meanwhile, certain branches of Pakistani federal institutions, especially the intelligence service and border guard, aggressively aid insurgents.
The book let me down in the end, because its prescriptions for success are not very compelling. You can scroll through any economists blog and learn why top-down development will always fail, especially in a country with flimsy institutions. You can pick up any recent issue of Foreign Affairs and read a hopeful appeal to the weak-center tribal confederacy of the old Afghan Kingdom. What is not addressed in the forward-looking part of the analysis is the future role of Pakistan. Pakistan is the policy piece that must be reconfigured to change the dynamics in Afghanistan. Jones should have been more aggressive in insisting on that point.
The tank and the "Graveyard" epithet also misrepresent Jones' analysis of the direction and possible outcomes of the war. Jones doesn't look too much to the Soviet adventure to predict American success or failure. And well he shouldn't. The American war is about as far removed from the Soviet experience as the Soviets were from the British. Instead, Jones asks why an insurgency developed in Afghanistan at all, given the lightning success of the invasion and the remarkable popular support for the coalition. If the Soviets made a fatal error in committing massive conventional forces, why did the light footprint fail as well?
For Jones, the gravest error was the failure to press the advantage after the success of the CIA/JSOC invasion. All key players in the Bush Administration succumbed to a pathological fixation on Saddam Hussein, and left the job in Afghanistan undone. The Iraq project consumed the funds, expert diplomats, intelligence personnel, and supersoldiers that destroyed the Taliban overnight. As a consequence, training programs for the police and army foundered. No agency ever committed to the difficult tasks of rural development that would establish the government's presence in the countryside. In any case, top-down development efforts are doomed to failure in Afghanistan's culture of casual corruption. Meanwhile the Taliban had plenty of room to operate in the vacuum of local governance. Al Qaeda, too, benefited from the extraordinary convenience of American targets in its backyard. The "job unfinished" narrative is intuitive and by now very familiar- this take on the Afghan war was a common theme of Obama's 2008 candidacy. It is also hard to doubt with the crushing weight of evidence that Jones leverages here.
Jones also exposes Pakistan's frustrating role in the Afghan wars. A number of political dilemmas create a political situation in which Pakistan receives U.S. aid, calls itself a partner in the war, and simultaneously aides the insurgency. Pakistan's lawless provinces harbor Al Qaeda and serve as the main supply pipeline for the Taliban. Meanwhile, certain branches of Pakistani federal institutions, especially the intelligence service and border guard, aggressively aid insurgents.
The book let me down in the end, because its prescriptions for success are not very compelling. You can scroll through any economists blog and learn why top-down development will always fail, especially in a country with flimsy institutions. You can pick up any recent issue of Foreign Affairs and read a hopeful appeal to the weak-center tribal confederacy of the old Afghan Kingdom. What is not addressed in the forward-looking part of the analysis is the future role of Pakistan. Pakistan is the policy piece that must be reconfigured to change the dynamics in Afghanistan. Jones should have been more aggressive in insisting on that point.
February 17, 2012
A brief,useful, though not essential recap of Afghanistan's military history. He identifies the war's many successes and failures. Mainly, I was looking for some info on the 2001 portion, but there wasn't loads of new info there. It is technical, heavily footnoted, and challenging for the average reader that knows little about the region, or war in general.
Jones also exposes Pakistan's frustrating role in the Afghan wars. A number of political dilemmas create a political situation in which Pakistan receives U.S. aid, calls itself a partner in the war, and simultaneously aids the insurgency. Pakistan's lawless provinces harbor Al Qaeda and serve as the main supply pipeline for the Taliban. Meanwhile, certain branches of Pakistani federal institutions, especially the intelligence service and border guard, aggressively aid insurgents.
He writes about Al Qa’ida as a force multiplier, insisting that it is well incorporated into the Taliban and that the Taliban will, should it regain power, return to providing a safe haven for an organization that Jones insists offers a strategic threat to the U.S. It sounds like he is making a case that any acceptance of Taliban control of Afghanistan, partial or whole, would necessarily mean more attacks on the West from that base of operations. The implication is a need for continuing, probably increased Western military presence there.
In critiquing what is wrong in Afghanistan, one of the key problems is corruption. If people feel no trust in their police, judges, military or government, why should they not support someone or some group outside government? Although it was beyond the purview of this book, it does seem that the generic notion of a public loss of confidence in government impartiality, honesty and willingness and ability to deliver services has implications well beyond those in Afghanistan.
It is his take that top-down nation-building in Afghanistan is exactly the wrong approach. It would seem that, so far at least, the evidence bears him out. But if we in the West remain unwilling to invest resources in building up from below, what is left?
Jones also exposes Pakistan's frustrating role in the Afghan wars. A number of political dilemmas create a political situation in which Pakistan receives U.S. aid, calls itself a partner in the war, and simultaneously aids the insurgency. Pakistan's lawless provinces harbor Al Qaeda and serve as the main supply pipeline for the Taliban. Meanwhile, certain branches of Pakistani federal institutions, especially the intelligence service and border guard, aggressively aid insurgents.
He writes about Al Qa’ida as a force multiplier, insisting that it is well incorporated into the Taliban and that the Taliban will, should it regain power, return to providing a safe haven for an organization that Jones insists offers a strategic threat to the U.S. It sounds like he is making a case that any acceptance of Taliban control of Afghanistan, partial or whole, would necessarily mean more attacks on the West from that base of operations. The implication is a need for continuing, probably increased Western military presence there.
In critiquing what is wrong in Afghanistan, one of the key problems is corruption. If people feel no trust in their police, judges, military or government, why should they not support someone or some group outside government? Although it was beyond the purview of this book, it does seem that the generic notion of a public loss of confidence in government impartiality, honesty and willingness and ability to deliver services has implications well beyond those in Afghanistan.
It is his take that top-down nation-building in Afghanistan is exactly the wrong approach. It would seem that, so far at least, the evidence bears him out. But if we in the West remain unwilling to invest resources in building up from below, what is left?
March 3, 2024
Definitely an academic treatment of the subject, relying heavily on data and historical comparisons. But that’s actually a refreshing way to read about this topic. It’s politically agnostic and doesn’t caste any sort of normative or moral judgments on any of the contentious issues discussed. But it’s quite substantive and informative without be so “in the weeds” that it loses a layperson reader.
April 22, 2013
A intro level overview to the mess we have gotten to in Afghanistan. It comes in from a journalist point of view instead that of a historian (imaging a long form writeup in the New York Times and you won't be far off the mark.
The book opens with some historical background on past empires and their travails in Afghanistan (Alexander the Great, British in 19th Century, Soviets in the 20th). It then goes from the initial US invasion in 2001 until about 2009 (therefore it does not cover revent development like the capture of Bin Laden for example).
It is a depressing book to read. The tone of the book is very impartial and matter of fact, but a reader can not help (with hind sight and even some historical foresight), shake their heads on some of the short sighted decisions made and how they eventually fails.
Key Take aways:
1. Afghanistan has a culture since antiquity of local/tribal governance that tends to ignore the central authority. This means a top down approach to pacify the country is hard going to begin with, and does not have any past success scenario to look to.
2. NATO was ineffective due to its fractured command structure and the conflicting interests of its members.
3. Because of 1) above, the central government doesn't have the natural legitimacy and authority it needs. Government solder/civil servants are often "just a job" and not a calling (like that of the Taliban).
4. Key to control the country is controlling its rural areas, and the government is losing (Government troops can not be counted on to be there when needed, and the Taliban reps are RIGHT THERE.
5. Pakistan is a key partner to the Taliban (this is not a typo), and unless they are taken out of the equation situation will never improve.
6. This is a nation building exercise coupled with a counter insurgence operation. Unless we lower the goal post, the goals can not be met with the limited resources we committed to it.
Given that the conflict is still ongoing with no sign of being settled anytime soon, anyone with an opinion can not help to play arm chair quarterback on what should've been done if we were to go in. So here's mine:
a) light foot print+long duration: Smaller number of troops, be prepared to be there for 10 years. staying in place in major cities like Kabual.
b) Forget about chasing Taliban in the provinces. Limit our operations to hunting down specific Al Qaeda types in the NW Frontier provinces.
c) More effective dealing with Pakistan (not sure about details here, maybe play the India card?)
d) More money channeled into civilian nation building instead of military ops (i.e. cheaper in the long run). Build up Afghan police, civil servant system, justice system, etc.
e) THrough hook and crook gradually improve the corrupt Afghan government (Many US allies of old who were corrupt despots eventually transformed into semi democratic societies, so there is hope).
More Radical:
f) Partition the country into ethnic lines? (The countries border was an artificial construct anyway) Does not solve the fundemental problem but simplifies it by taking the Afghan central government out of the picture.
The book opens with some historical background on past empires and their travails in Afghanistan (Alexander the Great, British in 19th Century, Soviets in the 20th). It then goes from the initial US invasion in 2001 until about 2009 (therefore it does not cover revent development like the capture of Bin Laden for example).
It is a depressing book to read. The tone of the book is very impartial and matter of fact, but a reader can not help (with hind sight and even some historical foresight), shake their heads on some of the short sighted decisions made and how they eventually fails.
Key Take aways:
1. Afghanistan has a culture since antiquity of local/tribal governance that tends to ignore the central authority. This means a top down approach to pacify the country is hard going to begin with, and does not have any past success scenario to look to.
2. NATO was ineffective due to its fractured command structure and the conflicting interests of its members.
3. Because of 1) above, the central government doesn't have the natural legitimacy and authority it needs. Government solder/civil servants are often "just a job" and not a calling (like that of the Taliban).
4. Key to control the country is controlling its rural areas, and the government is losing (Government troops can not be counted on to be there when needed, and the Taliban reps are RIGHT THERE.
5. Pakistan is a key partner to the Taliban (this is not a typo), and unless they are taken out of the equation situation will never improve.
6. This is a nation building exercise coupled with a counter insurgence operation. Unless we lower the goal post, the goals can not be met with the limited resources we committed to it.
Given that the conflict is still ongoing with no sign of being settled anytime soon, anyone with an opinion can not help to play arm chair quarterback on what should've been done if we were to go in. So here's mine:
a) light foot print+long duration: Smaller number of troops, be prepared to be there for 10 years. staying in place in major cities like Kabual.
b) Forget about chasing Taliban in the provinces. Limit our operations to hunting down specific Al Qaeda types in the NW Frontier provinces.
c) More effective dealing with Pakistan (not sure about details here, maybe play the India card?)
d) More money channeled into civilian nation building instead of military ops (i.e. cheaper in the long run). Build up Afghan police, civil servant system, justice system, etc.
e) THrough hook and crook gradually improve the corrupt Afghan government (Many US allies of old who were corrupt despots eventually transformed into semi democratic societies, so there is hope).
More Radical:
f) Partition the country into ethnic lines? (The countries border was an artificial construct anyway) Does not solve the fundemental problem but simplifies it by taking the Afghan central government out of the picture.
October 8, 2017
This was a good one but I was hoping for more. The book is titled Graveyard of Empire's but I should have paid closer attention to the second portion of the title more. America's War. I was hoping for a bit more of the background of the Empires which was so prominently displayed in the title. I was hoping more of Alexander's campaigns. The unruly subjects of Great Britain. I also wanted to hear about the Soviet disasters. Discussion of all the aforementioned wishes occurred but only so slightly.
Discussion centered around the takedown of the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Later discussion focused on our assumption that the Taliban was finished and how the focus (along with all our military resources) shifted to Iraq. It is surprising to me we would assume the Taliban would not resuscitate itself. How our victory was guaranteed and all we had to do was round up the last of Al Qaeda. We were thinking terrorism...not insurgency. We were thinking anti-terrorism instead of nation building.
Successful insurgencies require a sanctuary. The Viet Cong and NVA had Laos and Cambodia. The Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani Network, and others had Pakistan. Pakistan is now the Taliban heartland. Pakistan, once our ally, nourished the Taliban as a way to destabilize Afghanistan, to keep their neighbor weak. Before the Taliban, we used Pakistan to funnel our weapons into Afghan hands for use against the Soviets. How did we not expect the Taliban to Pakistan?
Since our sights were set on Iraq, NATO came to source troop needs. Yet not enough NATO and US troops were available to successfully fight an insurgency. Conquer, hold, build in that order is how you fight an insurgency. The population are the Center Of Gravity. Only with the people can you win. We are still trying in Iraq and Afghanistan to this day.
Overall a good book, but I was hoping for more discussion on the Empires. Enjoy.
Discussion centered around the takedown of the Taliban and Al Qaeda forces. Later discussion focused on our assumption that the Taliban was finished and how the focus (along with all our military resources) shifted to Iraq. It is surprising to me we would assume the Taliban would not resuscitate itself. How our victory was guaranteed and all we had to do was round up the last of Al Qaeda. We were thinking terrorism...not insurgency. We were thinking anti-terrorism instead of nation building.
Successful insurgencies require a sanctuary. The Viet Cong and NVA had Laos and Cambodia. The Al Qaeda, Taliban, Haqqani Network, and others had Pakistan. Pakistan is now the Taliban heartland. Pakistan, once our ally, nourished the Taliban as a way to destabilize Afghanistan, to keep their neighbor weak. Before the Taliban, we used Pakistan to funnel our weapons into Afghan hands for use against the Soviets. How did we not expect the Taliban to Pakistan?
Since our sights were set on Iraq, NATO came to source troop needs. Yet not enough NATO and US troops were available to successfully fight an insurgency. Conquer, hold, build in that order is how you fight an insurgency. The population are the Center Of Gravity. Only with the people can you win. We are still trying in Iraq and Afghanistan to this day.
Overall a good book, but I was hoping for more discussion on the Empires. Enjoy.
February 3, 2024
Good history book. No complaints. “You [US] may have the watches, but we [T@liban] have the time”
May 2, 2015
Published in 2009 and missing the Obama years entirely, In the Graveyard of Empires would have been more aptly subtitled “Bush’s War in Afghanistan”. Such is the difficulty of writing history as events unfold even into the present day. As it is, the book misses important post-2009 events like the subsequent “surge” in troop levels through 2010, substantial increases in drone strikes, the raid and killing of Osama bin Laden, the 2014 Afghan presidential elections, the Peshawar massacre in December 2014, and the end of direct Western combat actions in 2015.
All of the above aside, the 2001-2009 narrative presented by Seth Jones is articulate, comprehensively footnoted, and on point in many of its assessments. A RAND fellow and professor of counterinsurgency, Jones writes like an academic and Graveyard certainly reads as such. This is not a thriller, nor is it an opinion piece, but nor is it meant to be. This is a facts and points approach of the light-footprint turned counterterrorism turned counterinsurgency operation. Jones does a fine job of reserving judgment until the final chapter. The book is littered with direct quotes from interviews of high-ranking officials of all parties involved. These interviews bring to life the facts and figures and further emphasize the human component of warfighting.
As noted, the book misses out on a further six years of combat operations from 2009-2014 that have significantly altered the course of action in Afghanistan. Considering this limitation, it is hard to recommend Graveyard as the complete history of America’s war in Afghanistan, as the subtitle suggests. A sequel to the book summarizing the Obama years, or at the very least a 2nd Edition with an additional chapter or two, would be well deserved.
All of the above aside, the 2001-2009 narrative presented by Seth Jones is articulate, comprehensively footnoted, and on point in many of its assessments. A RAND fellow and professor of counterinsurgency, Jones writes like an academic and Graveyard certainly reads as such. This is not a thriller, nor is it an opinion piece, but nor is it meant to be. This is a facts and points approach of the light-footprint turned counterterrorism turned counterinsurgency operation. Jones does a fine job of reserving judgment until the final chapter. The book is littered with direct quotes from interviews of high-ranking officials of all parties involved. These interviews bring to life the facts and figures and further emphasize the human component of warfighting.
As noted, the book misses out on a further six years of combat operations from 2009-2014 that have significantly altered the course of action in Afghanistan. Considering this limitation, it is hard to recommend Graveyard as the complete history of America’s war in Afghanistan, as the subtitle suggests. A sequel to the book summarizing the Obama years, or at the very least a 2nd Edition with an additional chapter or two, would be well deserved.
March 18, 2010
Really fascinating book about the various empires throughout history which have tried to conquer Afghanistan, only to be repelled. The basis of this historical lesson is to give context to America's current quaqmire. Book is relatively short in relation to the substance. It does not spend much time regarding Alexander the Great 3rd century BC, the British Empire of the 19th Century, and the Soviets failure in the 1980's, the author simply gives you a quick summary. The book's intentions is to spend most of the time relating to America's current situation.
It touches on the fact that we had a golden opportuntiy in Afghanistan squandered when valuable resources were re-allocated to Iraq in 2003 neglecting painfully crucial rebuilding and winning the hearts of the people of Afghanistan. Another lesson learned in this book was why insurgents exist, what their intentions are and simply put the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing. Talks about the sanctuary of Pakistan for Al - Qaida and what to do there. Another lesson is the failure of multi-national efforts that are left to manage their own affairs without a unified central body to control all efforts. So much wasted efforts because the overall strategy in Afghanistan is uniformally flawed. Too few troops, not enough resources, very little cohesion, too many chiefs, not enough indians and too much meddling from regional interests.
It paints a grim picture but what I really like is that it provides solutions at the end of the book to consider for success. All is not lost yet, but time is of the essence.
It touches on the fact that we had a golden opportuntiy in Afghanistan squandered when valuable resources were re-allocated to Iraq in 2003 neglecting painfully crucial rebuilding and winning the hearts of the people of Afghanistan. Another lesson learned in this book was why insurgents exist, what their intentions are and simply put the insurgency in Afghanistan is growing. Talks about the sanctuary of Pakistan for Al - Qaida and what to do there. Another lesson is the failure of multi-national efforts that are left to manage their own affairs without a unified central body to control all efforts. So much wasted efforts because the overall strategy in Afghanistan is uniformally flawed. Too few troops, not enough resources, very little cohesion, too many chiefs, not enough indians and too much meddling from regional interests.
It paints a grim picture but what I really like is that it provides solutions at the end of the book to consider for success. All is not lost yet, but time is of the essence.
May 23, 2012
This is a useful survey of American involvement in Afghanistan since 2001, if one which didn't surprise me with any of its analyses. The main reasons for the insurgency in Afghanistan were the Bush administration largely ignoring it once the Iraq invasion began, the historically low troop levels, and the wariness of various NATO members to commit forces outside of urban areas like Kabul. The thing which Jones covered that was most interesting to me was his analysis of the wider regional politics and Pakistan's involvement in the insurgency. Obviously, this has become much better known since In the Graveyard of Empires was published, with Osama bin Laden's killing making the ISI's involvement self-evident, but the behind-the-scenes stuff was fascinating.
I do wish that Jones had brought a little more of his own personal experiences in Afghanistan to play in this book. He states that he sat down to write it because of his various trips there and because of the unique access that he had to key players, but there were few moments where I really got a sense of that. Most of the book felt like a synthesis that could have been written from anywhere in the US. More moments from Jones' personal perspective would have helped to ground his analysis and give it more immediacy for the reader. As is, there are times when this reads a little too much like a briefing packet.
I do wish that Jones had brought a little more of his own personal experiences in Afghanistan to play in this book. He states that he sat down to write it because of his various trips there and because of the unique access that he had to key players, but there were few moments where I really got a sense of that. Most of the book felt like a synthesis that could have been written from anywhere in the US. More moments from Jones' personal perspective would have helped to ground his analysis and give it more immediacy for the reader. As is, there are times when this reads a little too much like a briefing packet.
May 11, 2011
Jones is good on the structure of the Afghan opposition to first the USSR and now the US. This is a useful although not essential addition to the literature. Based on good access to a number of important sources including ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad, Jones examines what went wrong in Afghanistan and what might have gone right if the effort there hadn't been sidetracked to invade and try to occupy Iraq.
The U.S. mission to the inhospitable mountains and plains of this Central Asian redoubt shows how little we learn from past wars: counterinsurgency is once again the strategic initiative of the day. It has never really worked when applied by the US since true counterinsurgency, like that practiced by the government of Sri Lanka against the Tamil insurgency and civil war, involves concentration camps, selective large scale slaughter and generally brutalizing those who, through ethnic or politcal ties, support the rebels. It is vicious, bloody and violates the laws of war and is a crime against humanity by its very definition.
Jones has an excellent grasp of the players on both (or rather all) sides of the war in Afghanistan and comes to the inevitable if unlikely to happen conclusion that nothing will be accomplished without the agreement of Pakistan and India.
The U.S. mission to the inhospitable mountains and plains of this Central Asian redoubt shows how little we learn from past wars: counterinsurgency is once again the strategic initiative of the day. It has never really worked when applied by the US since true counterinsurgency, like that practiced by the government of Sri Lanka against the Tamil insurgency and civil war, involves concentration camps, selective large scale slaughter and generally brutalizing those who, through ethnic or politcal ties, support the rebels. It is vicious, bloody and violates the laws of war and is a crime against humanity by its very definition.
Jones has an excellent grasp of the players on both (or rather all) sides of the war in Afghanistan and comes to the inevitable if unlikely to happen conclusion that nothing will be accomplished without the agreement of Pakistan and India.
January 22, 2014
It's really hard to find a book about Iraq or Afghanistan that is comprehensive but concise enough to assign to a class. Seth Jones achieves this for the latter country in this interesting, thorough, and readable book for the period of US involvement in Afghanistan up until the Obama troop surge in 2009. He has a great eye for the right amount of depth and does a great job chronicling the major mistakes of the war in Afghanistan so far. The biggest problems that he points out are the light footprint strategy in the early 2000's, the shift in attention to Iraq, the underestimation of the task of rebuilding a war-torn country, Pakistan as a sanctuary, AQ as a force-multiplier, and gov't corruption and inefficiency. Once again, the Bush administration comes off as a bungling gang. Jones offers an insightful and convincing argument that the US does have vital strategic interests in Afghanistan. He lays out an interesting new strategy based on tribal engagement and a balance between rural and central authority that is strongly rooted in historical precedents from Afghanistan's most stable times. I wish the book covered more of the Obama period, but overall this is a laudable work. 340 pages.
January 27, 2011
While much has surely been written about the war in Afghanistan Seth G. Hughes who serves as an advisor and plans officer for the commanding general of U.S. Special Operations Forces in Afghanistan adds new dimensions to an assessment of our country’s longest war since Vietnam.
Based upon interviews with countless military, diplomats, and experts in national security plus information from declassified government documents IN THE GRAVEYARD OF EMPIRES delivers a clear, concisely rendered account of our military efforts in Afghanistan. The begins with what first appeared to be a success, and follows with the many crises that ensued including, of course, how Pakistan became “a sanctuary for the Taliban and Al Qaeda.” Jones not only offers what might be best described as an accurate reportorial view of these events but also emphasizes where we erred and what we should do in order to bring stability to that area.
William Hughes, a professor of political science at Southern Oregon University provides a succinct, deliberate narration. This is the first time we’ve heard a reading by Hughes, and we certainly hope it won’t be the last.
- Gail Cooke
December 30, 2021
For anyone trying to understand Afghanistan, this is an excellent book to choose. The author has identified several powerful states that have tried to intervene and control the country only to fail miserably. The first example chosen is an ancient one, Alexander the Great, who built a large empire in 330 BC but could not exert lasting control over Afghans. Beginning with the British in 1839, he demonstrates how more modern empires tried and failed miserably to subdue the Afghans including the powerful Soviet Union that eventually had to withdraw in disgrace in 1989. Most of the book is spent on the contemporary situation beginning with the defeat of the Taliban in 2001 and the struggle by the US and other NATO states to build a democratic government here only to witness the rise of a very successful insurgency. The book unfortunately ends about 2009 so the author is not able to discuss the eventual success of the Taliban that we have witnessed in 2021 but he does explain the mistakes that were made early on by the Americans in focusing on Iraq and not providing the resources necessary to help the Afghan government to win control over the rural areas.
June 9, 2015
An appropriate title for this discouraging, yet well-researched and written history of America's involvement in Afghanistan, RAND analyst Seth Jones unpacks the complexities of a seemingly never-ending conflict sure to drain the US treasury of its finances and human capital. Personally, I've always held a somewhat dim view of a satisfying outcome of our objectives and this work reinforces that opinion. An excellent and unbiased read.
February 15, 2010
Seth Jones, and the Rand Institute, in The Graveyard Of Empires, have a grim prediction for the United State in Afghanistan, and how little the U.S. has learned from previous British and Russian campaigns in the country, but also some enlightening points like empowering elders. An excellent read!
January 23, 2012
The best history of post-9/11 Afghanistan and the U.S.-led war there. The afterword is an excellent synopsis of why the war matters and how to finish the job.
July 7, 2024
This book tells the story of a land with a complex history, a land which has seen the ruthless destruction of foreign armies. The narrative with Alexander the Great’s audacious sojourn into Afghanistan—one of the most distinguished failed attempts to conquer the region. Thereafter the plot follows the steady failure of governance in the late 60s and 70s that culminate in the Soviet invasion of 1979, which leads a band of Americans such as Congressman Charlie Wilson to increase U.S. assistance to the Afghan mujahideen as they evict the Red Army out of Afghanistan. In June 1993, CIA Chief James Woolsey tells a small gathering at CIA headquarters that “The defeat and breakup of the Soviet empire is one of the great events of world history.” The narrative continues with an examination of CIA and other U.S. government assessments of the bloody Afghan civil war in the early 1990s, the rise of the Taliban regime in the late 1990s, and the Taliban’s fateful alliance with Osama bin Laden and al Qa’ida. With the September 11 attacks, the story transitions to the overthrow of the Taliban regime that year by a diverse mixture of NATO, CIA, and the U.S. Special Forces. It follows the discussions in the U.S. government about establishing a “light footprint” in Afghanistan, as Pentagon, State Department, CIA, and White House officials deliberate whether or not to participate in nation-building. It also tracks the emigration of Taliban and al Qa’ida fighters into bordering Pakistan, and the establishment of a sanctuary for many of these fighters in Pakistan’s Baluchistan Province, Federally Administered Tribal Areas, and NWFP. The narrative then moves to the rise of Afghanistan’s insurgency and the collapse of Afghan governance. It outlines Afghan difficulties in establishing law and order in rural areas as well as challenges in delivering essential services to the local populations. Weak governance, it turns out, has been a critical factor in the rise of most insurgencies over the past half-century. The concluding chapters travel around the increase of violence beginning in 2006, catalyzed by what diplomats refer to as a “perfect storm” of crises. The book also reconnoiters the part of outside actors in abetting insurgent groups, including al Qa’ida and Pakistan’s ISI. An outstanding book, both for the novice as well as the expert.
September 21, 2020
The biggest critique I have of this book is that it was written in 2010. I feel like he needs to add an authors note that states where to find an update on the counterinsurgency circa 2020. Without really following this war closely, I have no idea if his recommendations were adopted, or, really, how the War is going (other than the fact that the US is still there and negotiating more with the Taliban).
He gives a brief history - high level - of other powers' (Macedonian, British, and Soviets) experience in Afghanistan. As I recall, he spends the most time highlighting the fractious nature of tribes within Afghanistan and the difference between operating a conventional war and a counterinsurgency.
When I read these books (The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor, Red Platoon: A True Story of American Valor, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the question I ask myself is how does the US compete against enemies that just kill anyone who collaborates with the US? I think the answer, as Jones points out, is that you need way more troops - especially early. I
He gives a brief history - high level - of other powers' (Macedonian, British, and Soviets) experience in Afghanistan. As I recall, he spends the most time highlighting the fractious nature of tribes within Afghanistan and the difference between operating a conventional war and a counterinsurgency.
When I read these books (The Outpost: An Untold Story of American Valor, Red Platoon: A True Story of American Valor, Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan, the question I ask myself is how does the US compete against enemies that just kill anyone who collaborates with the US? I think the answer, as Jones points out, is that you need way more troops - especially early. I
November 15, 2020
In the Graveyard of Empires: America's War in Afghanistan by Seth Jones is a very good look into the early stages of the Afghanistan War and its subsequent unravelling, particularly when given an international context. Jones does well to situate the Afghan conflict in a history of conflicts, but he does not allow the narrative to be bogged down by the weight of that history. After a few chapters, Jones comfortably proceeds to discuss the War as he lived through. Dave Barno receives a particularly large pride of place, which I really liked as there aren't many narratives that allow me to see more of my old professor in action. The reason why this book gets four stars instead of five is because it is now becoming too old. Obama and Trump are absent from the narrative, and while the book retains a lot of utility, it is rapidly fading into the background. An updated version, or a sequel, is needed. That said, some core lessons regarding state building, resource management, local corruption, ethnic make-up, problems with local security forces, too much dependence on Kabul, and the perpetual tensions between Pakistan, India, and Iran in the country remain highly useful.
89/100
89/100
July 15, 2020
Must read for anyone working in this region. After reading 20 or so other books on the topic, none of them explained the power brokers and influencers that shaped the post 1980 Afghanistan with the depth and rationale of Seth Jones.
This book is not to be judged by its cliche cover and title. It's not an anti-U.S. book and unlike many others in its class, it does not go out of its way to make political statements. It's a fantastic and vibrantly filthy look at these warlords, their tribes, and their interests in this bizarro world.
Before drilling down into tactics and COIN books, or looking up into the strategic realm of the greater India-Pakistan rivalry (yes, that's what it's all about), start here.
This book is not to be judged by its cliche cover and title. It's not an anti-U.S. book and unlike many others in its class, it does not go out of its way to make political statements. It's a fantastic and vibrantly filthy look at these warlords, their tribes, and their interests in this bizarro world.
Before drilling down into tactics and COIN books, or looking up into the strategic realm of the greater India-Pakistan rivalry (yes, that's what it's all about), start here.
January 16, 2024
My Amazon review on Ocrtober 30, 2014: Afghanistan: Next to fail?
Solid effort though obviously leaves you hanging with the situation utterly unresolved in about early 2009. So it does not deal with the Obama 'surge' or any of the political or military developments since that time. That alone reduced my rating by 1 star. After reading this book one salient point stands out above all else and that is the role of Pakistan in harboring and even helping the Taliban and other insurgents. One has to conclude that Afghanistan has next to no chance to succeed (on western terms) without Pakistan becoming serious about the border regions. And that seems utterly unlikely and in the end a depressing realization. Will this become the next Iraq? Stay tuned.
Solid effort though obviously leaves you hanging with the situation utterly unresolved in about early 2009. So it does not deal with the Obama 'surge' or any of the political or military developments since that time. That alone reduced my rating by 1 star. After reading this book one salient point stands out above all else and that is the role of Pakistan in harboring and even helping the Taliban and other insurgents. One has to conclude that Afghanistan has next to no chance to succeed (on western terms) without Pakistan becoming serious about the border regions. And that seems utterly unlikely and in the end a depressing realization. Will this become the next Iraq? Stay tuned.
September 15, 2021
This books connects the dots between 2002 AUMF, which paved the way for U.S. invasion in Iraq, and the Taliban's successful regrouping between 2005-2007 through not insignificant Pakistani input. By 2009, the insurgency war led by the Taliban has already brought the massively corrupted Kabul government almost to its knees. The fact the the U.S. has been brought to fight at once two invasion wars without justified goals and deliberate plans across its domestic made it harder to muster soldiers morale on the battlefield, and its courses of action became even more opaque and sinister, recourse to heavier use of drones and less regard for collateral civilian deaths after 2009's "re-engaging".
March 18, 2022
I listened to this because I had recently listened to a couple of other things about India and Central Asia and thought a modern perspective might be interesting. The author, Seth Jones, was an analyst at RAND when he wrote this in 2010 (he's now at CSIS). It was meant to be an analysis of how the US/Afghan War at that time, and some ideas for how to bring it to a successful conclusion.
Of course, it's now 12 years later and the War didn't come to a successful conclusion. So many things changed over time that it's unclear if a successful conclusion was even possible back in 2010. I still found it interesting and also wonder what Jones thinks of what actually happened.
Of course, it's now 12 years later and the War didn't come to a successful conclusion. So many things changed over time that it's unclear if a successful conclusion was even possible back in 2010. I still found it interesting and also wonder what Jones thinks of what actually happened.
August 13, 2020
A very good expose on the US involvement in Afghanistan. Once again, we're conducting counter insurgent operations in hostile land with little knowledge of the people's hearts & minds. We know the history well, yet didn't translate those lessons into a viable strategy. The author explains why the top down approach (used by the British, Russians, & Americans) was doomed from the start. He puts this in context of what the Taliban does to thwart that approach. He also offers suggestions reverse Taliban successes.
April 11, 2024
Hmmm??? I wonder if anyone in the Biden White House was paying attention when Joe pulled the plug? It will likely be another couple generations before we shake out the cobwebs of this part of the world and go back in to attempt a new round of straightening things out. Jones seems to have pretty good grasp of what transpired overall and his work may serve to guide that housecleaning process. Naturally, by then several key players will likely have shuffled the chairs on the deck, so some things will be quite differently intractable.
March 26, 2017
It's a little frightening.....the circumstances and conditions in Afghanistan from late 2001 through 2007 mirror quite closely what I read in the papers about the circumstances and conditions in Afghanistan in 2017. Corruption in the central government, an inept and corrupt ANA, Taliban and other insurgents capturing provincial centers and capitals. And Pakistan is still a safe haven for many. Time marches on but nothing substantive has changed.
March 24, 2019
Good information can be found in here, but only after reading (eventually skimming) through pages after pages of repetition and trivial incidentals. ItGoE comes off very much as an article stretched out to make a book.
Read
June 4, 2019Chock full of technical details of the military history of Afghanistan. Strongly recommend to anyone trying to understand the military climate in Afghanistan and how it has been formed over years of continuous conflict. Not a light read, but well worth your time.
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