What do you think?
Rate this book
Counterinsurgency
David Kilcullen is one of the world's most influential experts on counterinsurgency and modern warfare, a ground-breaking theorist whose ideas "are revolutionizing military thinking throughout the west" ( Washington Post ). Indeed, his vision of modern warfare powerfully influenced the United States' decision to rethink its military strategy in Iraq and implement "the Surge," now recognized as a dramatic success. In Counterinsurgency , Kilcullen brings together his most salient writings on this vitally important topic. Here is a picture of modern warfare by someone who has had his boots on the ground in some of today's worst trouble spots-including Iraq and Afghanistan-and who has been studying counterinsurgency since 1985. Filled with down-to-earth, common-sense insights, this book is the definitive account of counterinsurgency, indispensable for all those interested in making sense of our world in an age of terror.
251 pages, Paperback
First published January 1, 2010
Ratings & Reviews
Friends & Following
Create a free account to discover what your friends think of this book!
Community Reviews
Displaying 1 - 30 of 37 reviews
May 12, 2021
Kilcullen's work is always insightful. This books collects a a varied range of writings that reflect upon his first hand experience with counterinsurgency. It also contains the first sketch of his account of the theory of competitive control developed in Out of the Mountains. This idea has important implications for the thinking about political legitimacy and the role of ethics in facilitating local political stability.
August 25, 2014
The most fascinating part of counterinsurgency to me is how it is essentially a war fought with ideas more than violence. It is a propaganda war and he who has the most compelling message and ideas wins. In fact indiscriminate violence is more like using gasoline to put out a fire. Unless you literally want to burn everything down until there isn't anything left it is a poor choice for fighting a counter-insurgency. The use of brute force to counter insurgency is akin to a frontal assault on a machine gun position, it is doable, but you are going to pay dearly for it.
The American public and American military has been for years not very effective with fighting counterinsurgency and there are a variety of reasons for this. 1) American's don't have the will to persevere through long term commitments, 2) They prefer technological solutions to human problems, 3) An over inflated military budget produces expensive solutions to problems that could be solved with creativity and innovation. 4) Americans can't stomach military casualties.
Now this isn't to say that this could change. A smaller more agile and innovative force might be better suited to the current global-cultural insurgency. Only time will tell because thus far the American Public and Military have been pretty resistant to adapting.
The American public and American military has been for years not very effective with fighting counterinsurgency and there are a variety of reasons for this. 1) American's don't have the will to persevere through long term commitments, 2) They prefer technological solutions to human problems, 3) An over inflated military budget produces expensive solutions to problems that could be solved with creativity and innovation. 4) Americans can't stomach military casualties.
Now this isn't to say that this could change. A smaller more agile and innovative force might be better suited to the current global-cultural insurgency. Only time will tell because thus far the American Public and Military have been pretty resistant to adapting.
September 30, 2019
D. Kilcullen’s book (2010) can well be the continuation of D. Galula’s work (1964). Kilcullen’s main contribution is the scrutiny of global Jihadism, globalization and telecommunications in the activities of contemporary insurgency and counterinsurgency. I am inclined to adhere to his empirical approach (28 principles) in a judiciously and skeptically manner (D. Kilcullen, 2010: 30), for I am a believer of particularity of cases (relativity).
Even though he uses four cases to illustrate the pragmatism of his ideas, I believe that a general approach to his (28) commandments for any situation would add value to his theory; i.e. he could have suggested a basic planning process for commanders of counter-insurgency groups, beginning with the analysis of the internal (the counter-insurgency unit) and external (the insurgency) situations, continuing with the establishment of objectives, strategies, tactics, and finally the assessment of possible required adjustments to the plan. Simple, effective, and efficient tools could be employed, i.e., to carry out the first part, an S.W.O.T. analysis; to establish the objectives, an S.M.A.R.T. technic, etc. The application of such a procedure would make the choice of his propositions, a more educated than a folkloric one (Kilcullen, 2010: 30). In this sense, he does not include in his book occurrences that he mentions in his article from 2006, i.e.: insurgents might seek to preserve the “zeitgeist”, a political correspondence contrary to a classical approach could happen (counter-insurgents looking for revolutionary change), failure of the state could be the origin of insurgency, or insurgents can be older than governments.
The first part (first five chapters) is more of a collection of articles (except for chapter 6), therefore the lack of a method (except for chapter 3 that refers to his PhD. dissertation). This part reads as non-connected events, topics, especially when reading chapter 4 (Engagement at Motaain Bridge). Other shortcomings include Kilcullen’s case of insurgency smashed in Indonesia (50s, 60s) in which he does not explain that it was achieved without (much) support of the population (one of his postulates: win the hearts and minds of the people). The moment Darul Islam’s Kartusuwiryo was caught, the group started to fall apart, but he doesn’t explain what was done once the actions fell on civilian hands.
The second part of the book proposes a method (a complex system analysis) to destabilize and defeat what he calls global insurgency. I agree globalization has a direct effect on insurgency and COIN actions, however, I am not sure that even after the author explains the difference and links between the concepts of insurgency and terrorism, I agree that global insurgency is happening nowadays. Kilcullen considers bin Laden’s call to arms from August 1996 enough to classify al-Qaeda as an insurgent movement, however, he affirms that terrorists are “psychologically and morally flawed, with personal (psychopathic) tendencies towards violence, whilst insurgents use violence within an integrated politico-military strategy where violence is instrumental, not central to their approach...” (Kilcullen, 2010: 188); It doesn’t seem to me that al-Qaeda uses violence instrumentally, at least not at the tactical-operational level; it seems more to be a psychopathic behaviour, which can explain some of the attrocities carried out by members of this group.
Towards the end of part two, Kilcullen affirms that language is “intimately connected” to culture (Kilcullen, 2010: 222), but Language is not only “connected” as an independent factor; it is the most important element of culture (language is the main provider of identity: language is identity is a popular idea). Language also determines how human beings make sense of the world (how we think and structure ideas), it defines us, therefore, he could have elaborated more on understanding the language as the key to understanding two elements of “takfirism” (Kilcullen, 2010: 251). If language is that significant, understanding even subtle differences in the way of conceiving and using it, in different cultures (since culture is everything and anything that humans create within a group), becomes not only useful at the tactical level, but strategic. Speaking the language of insurgents is just the tip of the iceberg to understanding the how’s and why’s of their struggle. Logic thought is on the side of Kilcullen’s work; it could add depth at some parts.
Another idea in which he could elaborate, is when he implies that there is no magic solution (to defeat insurgent forces); it is a permanent matter of thought, creativity, and adaptability: “the imperative is to understand each environment, in real time [...], in ways that would be understood by the locals -and not by analogy with some other conflict, [...] some universal template or standardized rule-set.” (Kilcullen, 2010: 2). He mentions Vietnam as a (misunderstood) case of counterinsurgency success, from the part of the U.S., however, the fact is that the U.S. was expelled by the Viet Cong and far from applying much thought, creativity and adaptability, at some points they copied some tactics already proved wrong, applied by the French, before them.
I can relate this book to the findings of E. Shills et M. Janowitz (1948), where they assert that primary group life conditions was a key factor in the willingness of German soldiers to continue or discontinue the war effort towards the end of WWII, I believe this principle can apply with civilian populations willing (or not) to fall on the side of the state in Kilcullen’s ideas. If moral and physical integrity of civilian populations are guaranteed by the state, indigenous people support of COIN forces, can be achieved.
I can make other connections between this work and E. D. Swinton’s book (1986): both works are manuals based out of experience (originally dreams in Swinton’s case). Both attribute importance to the understanding of the elements that can disrupt their groups’ efforts to prevail, i.e. both mention how and why the flow of information between local populations and insurgents, must be avoided , like when they mention women and children (not fraternizing with them). Both suggest a series of actions to prevail (28 with Kilcullen’s, 22 with Swinton’s). Whilst Swinton’s book asserts that small infantry units can be more effective than large groups, Kilcullen’s focus on the possibility that small insurgents’ groups get isolated and defeated at the systemic level.
Even though he uses four cases to illustrate the pragmatism of his ideas, I believe that a general approach to his (28) commandments for any situation would add value to his theory; i.e. he could have suggested a basic planning process for commanders of counter-insurgency groups, beginning with the analysis of the internal (the counter-insurgency unit) and external (the insurgency) situations, continuing with the establishment of objectives, strategies, tactics, and finally the assessment of possible required adjustments to the plan. Simple, effective, and efficient tools could be employed, i.e., to carry out the first part, an S.W.O.T. analysis; to establish the objectives, an S.M.A.R.T. technic, etc. The application of such a procedure would make the choice of his propositions, a more educated than a folkloric one (Kilcullen, 2010: 30). In this sense, he does not include in his book occurrences that he mentions in his article from 2006, i.e.: insurgents might seek to preserve the “zeitgeist”, a political correspondence contrary to a classical approach could happen (counter-insurgents looking for revolutionary change), failure of the state could be the origin of insurgency, or insurgents can be older than governments.
The first part (first five chapters) is more of a collection of articles (except for chapter 6), therefore the lack of a method (except for chapter 3 that refers to his PhD. dissertation). This part reads as non-connected events, topics, especially when reading chapter 4 (Engagement at Motaain Bridge). Other shortcomings include Kilcullen’s case of insurgency smashed in Indonesia (50s, 60s) in which he does not explain that it was achieved without (much) support of the population (one of his postulates: win the hearts and minds of the people). The moment Darul Islam’s Kartusuwiryo was caught, the group started to fall apart, but he doesn’t explain what was done once the actions fell on civilian hands.
The second part of the book proposes a method (a complex system analysis) to destabilize and defeat what he calls global insurgency. I agree globalization has a direct effect on insurgency and COIN actions, however, I am not sure that even after the author explains the difference and links between the concepts of insurgency and terrorism, I agree that global insurgency is happening nowadays. Kilcullen considers bin Laden’s call to arms from August 1996 enough to classify al-Qaeda as an insurgent movement, however, he affirms that terrorists are “psychologically and morally flawed, with personal (psychopathic) tendencies towards violence, whilst insurgents use violence within an integrated politico-military strategy where violence is instrumental, not central to their approach...” (Kilcullen, 2010: 188); It doesn’t seem to me that al-Qaeda uses violence instrumentally, at least not at the tactical-operational level; it seems more to be a psychopathic behaviour, which can explain some of the attrocities carried out by members of this group.
Towards the end of part two, Kilcullen affirms that language is “intimately connected” to culture (Kilcullen, 2010: 222), but Language is not only “connected” as an independent factor; it is the most important element of culture (language is the main provider of identity: language is identity is a popular idea). Language also determines how human beings make sense of the world (how we think and structure ideas), it defines us, therefore, he could have elaborated more on understanding the language as the key to understanding two elements of “takfirism” (Kilcullen, 2010: 251). If language is that significant, understanding even subtle differences in the way of conceiving and using it, in different cultures (since culture is everything and anything that humans create within a group), becomes not only useful at the tactical level, but strategic. Speaking the language of insurgents is just the tip of the iceberg to understanding the how’s and why’s of their struggle. Logic thought is on the side of Kilcullen’s work; it could add depth at some parts.
Another idea in which he could elaborate, is when he implies that there is no magic solution (to defeat insurgent forces); it is a permanent matter of thought, creativity, and adaptability: “the imperative is to understand each environment, in real time [...], in ways that would be understood by the locals -and not by analogy with some other conflict, [...] some universal template or standardized rule-set.” (Kilcullen, 2010: 2). He mentions Vietnam as a (misunderstood) case of counterinsurgency success, from the part of the U.S., however, the fact is that the U.S. was expelled by the Viet Cong and far from applying much thought, creativity and adaptability, at some points they copied some tactics already proved wrong, applied by the French, before them.
I can relate this book to the findings of E. Shills et M. Janowitz (1948), where they assert that primary group life conditions was a key factor in the willingness of German soldiers to continue or discontinue the war effort towards the end of WWII, I believe this principle can apply with civilian populations willing (or not) to fall on the side of the state in Kilcullen’s ideas. If moral and physical integrity of civilian populations are guaranteed by the state, indigenous people support of COIN forces, can be achieved.
I can make other connections between this work and E. D. Swinton’s book (1986): both works are manuals based out of experience (originally dreams in Swinton’s case). Both attribute importance to the understanding of the elements that can disrupt their groups’ efforts to prevail, i.e. both mention how and why the flow of information between local populations and insurgents, must be avoided , like when they mention women and children (not fraternizing with them). Both suggest a series of actions to prevail (28 with Kilcullen’s, 22 with Swinton’s). Whilst Swinton’s book asserts that small infantry units can be more effective than large groups, Kilcullen’s focus on the possibility that small insurgents’ groups get isolated and defeated at the systemic level.
February 15, 2016
This collection of articles from an Australian advisor to General Petraeus presages a number of points he makes in his later work, The Accidental Guerilla. It's an important part of the dialogue in dealing with the asymmetric struggle with radical Islamists, although many of its points are broader.
December 26, 2010
This is apparently the prevailing thinking among military and security decision-makers in Washington right now. The proposed counterinsurgency strategy seems sound, intelligent, and impossible to execute. Cheering thoughts.
July 14, 2022
A collection of essays about counter insurgency which classes the current "Takfirism" terrorism as a global insurgency which needs to be dealt with at a global level as otherwise there are places of refuge and backing for any groups who are too pressurised.
With an interesting view, born from military experience as well as in country interviews, case studies and academic research.
Two tenants of counter insurgency 1) understand what drives the conflict in the area or population group. Constantly needs to be updated. 1a) dependable allies giving you info on the situation and helping design solutions. 2) to put the welfare of non combatants first.
In this way you should be able to bring the population onto your side by practicing "armed social services" as the "Object of war is not victory, but a better peace". Making sure that triage local grievances 1) issue is driving Afghan v Afghan violence 2) insurgents using this to drive propaganda 3) ISAF can solve in a reasonable time frame. Gets 2 or 3 priority problems from which you can use intelligence gathered in order to help in the local area.
If this sort of advice is vague that's because a key theme is no template can be applicable universally. As an opposition system is adapting to youre tactics you need to be more adaptable and able to pivot to what is important to the host population; usually this is stability and predictability, even if the predictable laws are harsh or abhorrent.
And interesting look and counter intuative to going into a land to kill and destroy.
With an interesting view, born from military experience as well as in country interviews, case studies and academic research.
Two tenants of counter insurgency 1) understand what drives the conflict in the area or population group. Constantly needs to be updated. 1a) dependable allies giving you info on the situation and helping design solutions. 2) to put the welfare of non combatants first.
In this way you should be able to bring the population onto your side by practicing "armed social services" as the "Object of war is not victory, but a better peace". Making sure that triage local grievances 1) issue is driving Afghan v Afghan violence 2) insurgents using this to drive propaganda 3) ISAF can solve in a reasonable time frame. Gets 2 or 3 priority problems from which you can use intelligence gathered in order to help in the local area.
If this sort of advice is vague that's because a key theme is no template can be applicable universally. As an opposition system is adapting to youre tactics you need to be more adaptable and able to pivot to what is important to the host population; usually this is stability and predictability, even if the predictable laws are harsh or abhorrent.
And interesting look and counter intuative to going into a land to kill and destroy.
April 3, 2023
Kilcullen's book is deeply problematic, but also a mirror image of imperialist foreign policy. His (and the US/NATO/EU's) approach to "counterinsurgency" is rooted in a conservative, militaristic worldview that prioritizes the use of force and the suppression of any dissent. His ideas are based on flawed assumptions about who the "insurgents" are, but also of the efficacy of military intervention and the ability of foreign powers to impose their will on other nations.
Kilcullen's emphasis on "winning hearts and minds" is particularly troubling, as it is often used as a justification for imperialism and the suppression of local resistance movements. His strategies for counterinsurgency are often geared towards protecting the interests of Western powers (money).
Overall, I found "Counterinsurgency" to be a deeply flawed and troubling book, but to be treated as a manual of the methods and arguments colonialist "peacekeepers" use to subjugate and harm. We're supposed to trust them while he emphasises we definitely shouldn't trust Afghan children because they're "resourceful" and "explosive".
Had to stop a few times with long gaps between reading sessions because it's such a disgusting book, especially because it's true.
Kilcullen's emphasis on "winning hearts and minds" is particularly troubling, as it is often used as a justification for imperialism and the suppression of local resistance movements. His strategies for counterinsurgency are often geared towards protecting the interests of Western powers (money).
Overall, I found "Counterinsurgency" to be a deeply flawed and troubling book, but to be treated as a manual of the methods and arguments colonialist "peacekeepers" use to subjugate and harm. We're supposed to trust them while he emphasises we definitely shouldn't trust Afghan children because they're "resourceful" and "explosive".
Had to stop a few times with long gaps between reading sessions because it's such a disgusting book, especially because it's true.
July 13, 2017
Erudite and insightful. The author's background is with the Australian military, and so he brings a wealth of knowledge about Indonesia and the rest of the Southeast Asian/Pacific theater. Interestingly, on the subject of the Vietnam war, he echoes the diagnosis of former CIA director Colby, whose biography I just finished, i.e. that the U.S. won the counterinsurgency against the Vietcong, and then withdrew, allowing North Vietnam to conduct a conventional military invasion. On the subject of the global war on terror, he advocates an approach which views an insurgency as an organic system, with subsystems and flows and linkages of energy and material both within the organism and between the organism and its ecosystem that can be cut off or disrupted in order to starve the organism of the energy it requires to function. One essential way of limiting the inputs to the insurgent system is to address the legitimate strivings of Muslim people worldwide, at the local and national level, devising legal, state-sanctioned pathways for them to pursue their political, economic and cultural goals in a democratic context and thereby reducing the attraction of the insurgent system.
December 16, 2020
This book is more of a collection of articles, though all from pre-2006 it is now annotated with updates as of 2009. This means some information is still out of date when talking about the "current" conflicts at the time and also misses many of the issues that arose from the Arab Spring and ISIS. But what it does well is to really show how our counter-insurgency theory has been going wrong and where we can readjust our view to fix it. The last 1/4 or so is totally dedicated to the current global insurgency and how best to combat it. The principles remain strong and it is still an advisable read. Even some of the lessons could be extrapolated to civilian or business life, though not many. Overall a good, if out of date, read that gives an idea on how we can still adjust to better counterinsurgency from military, civilian, and governmental institutions.
January 31, 2021
Another excellent book from Mr. Kilcullen. In this one he lays out the 28 articles of company level counterinsurgency, Indonesia's experience, his personal experience in East Timor, and a well thought out macro-view to counter the global jihad against the west. This is a book for study. I believe his ideas are the out-of-the-thinking that encompasses the need for multiple disciplines to achieve success.
February 8, 2018
Like Kilcullen's other books, this work is well thought out and insightful.
Unlike Kilcullen's other books, the articles collected here are mostly dry and dull.
It's of interest if you're a professional, perhaps, or for context in 20th century military history, but it is certainly not worth reading for pleasure or casual interest.
Unlike Kilcullen's other books, the articles collected here are mostly dry and dull.
It's of interest if you're a professional, perhaps, or for context in 20th century military history, but it is certainly not worth reading for pleasure or casual interest.
June 18, 2018
Although published in 2010 and a bit dated, a phenomenal look at counterinsurgency theory in its application to both the global war on terror and advice at the company level. Both the bottom up versus top down approaches used in reducing the threat of insurgency and the approach of insurgencies as a complex system proved to be highlights of the book for me.
October 22, 2017
I'm learning that I should read every word Kilcullen writes. A bit dated considering this largely contains pre-ISIS material, but his review of insurgency and counterinsurgency theory alone is concise and invaluable.
July 12, 2017
My politest comment to this book is to flip it off.
August 18, 2018
Interesting viewpoint on the winning hearts and minds to battle insurgency.
July 2, 2021
Excellent book that provides a different view on what the US focus should be on within our Wars
July 5, 2023
well written book, both the historical parts and the parts presenting a plan for the future. I am glad I came across it
July 11, 2010
Following the success and praise of his previous book, The Accidental Guerilla, David Kilcullen has released a compilation of his previously published articles on counterinsurgency that have impacted and evolved the theoretical understanding of the field. From the "Twenty-eight Articles" that initially went viral to a summary of his doctoral dissertation, Kilcullen's analysis can now be located in one book. Kilcullen, one of the leading counterinsurgency analysts, provides a wealth of information for COIN practitioners that stems from extensive hands-on experience.
Response:
In Kilcullen's last essay, he focuses on viable strategies to defeat the current global Islamist insurgency that makes up the War on Terror. However, he neglects to examine whether or not it's even possible to mobilize a global Muslim populace in a global insurgency. He readily admits the cultural differences that exist within and between insurgencies that can decrease operational capabilities but does not apply this same concept to the Islamist societies. Indeed, nationalism within Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, has not been readily adopted, facing fierce resistance towards efforts to consolidate state institutions and identities. If states are having such difficulties in unifying a populace, a global jihadist movement is unlikely to fair much better at a larger scale. The emergence of a Muslim caliphate that is directly opposed to the West is no small undertaking and requires a substantial degree of analysis and evidence before national security policy can developed in anticipation of it. While Kilcullen offers a highly intelligent strategy to combat radical Islamist terrorism through "disaggregation," his implicit assumption that this insurgency possesses legitimate challenges to the West may be overstated.
While Kilcullen's emphasis on a population-centric approach to COIN, the importance alleviating suffering for the populace may be overstated. Some scholars have claimed that civilian control methods that also force civilians to endure hardship can be effective in an insurgency. Kilcullen represents one of the more prominent experts that recommend alleviating as much suffering as possible for the populace and the reader should be aware of critiques of that perspective. For a recent debate between the two perspectives, John A. Nagl and Gian P. Gentile each wrote two articles debating the topic in Joint Force Quarterly 58.
The Bottom Line:
This is not the best book for those new to the study of counterinsurgency. Kilcullen's book will aid those with a foundation in classical counterinsurgency theory as well as a general knowledge of the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq more so than the general audience. For practitioners and scholars of COIN, this book is essential if the reader is unfamiliar with Kilcullen's writings. For the general audience or those that already follow the work of Kilcullen, there are likely more pressing books to give priority to.
For more reviews and a summary of Kilcullen's main points, find us at Hand of Reason.
Response:
In Kilcullen's last essay, he focuses on viable strategies to defeat the current global Islamist insurgency that makes up the War on Terror. However, he neglects to examine whether or not it's even possible to mobilize a global Muslim populace in a global insurgency. He readily admits the cultural differences that exist within and between insurgencies that can decrease operational capabilities but does not apply this same concept to the Islamist societies. Indeed, nationalism within Afghanistan and Pakistan, for example, has not been readily adopted, facing fierce resistance towards efforts to consolidate state institutions and identities. If states are having such difficulties in unifying a populace, a global jihadist movement is unlikely to fair much better at a larger scale. The emergence of a Muslim caliphate that is directly opposed to the West is no small undertaking and requires a substantial degree of analysis and evidence before national security policy can developed in anticipation of it. While Kilcullen offers a highly intelligent strategy to combat radical Islamist terrorism through "disaggregation," his implicit assumption that this insurgency possesses legitimate challenges to the West may be overstated.
While Kilcullen's emphasis on a population-centric approach to COIN, the importance alleviating suffering for the populace may be overstated. Some scholars have claimed that civilian control methods that also force civilians to endure hardship can be effective in an insurgency. Kilcullen represents one of the more prominent experts that recommend alleviating as much suffering as possible for the populace and the reader should be aware of critiques of that perspective. For a recent debate between the two perspectives, John A. Nagl and Gian P. Gentile each wrote two articles debating the topic in Joint Force Quarterly 58.
The Bottom Line:
This is not the best book for those new to the study of counterinsurgency. Kilcullen's book will aid those with a foundation in classical counterinsurgency theory as well as a general knowledge of the U.S. operations in Afghanistan and Iraq more so than the general audience. For practitioners and scholars of COIN, this book is essential if the reader is unfamiliar with Kilcullen's writings. For the general audience or those that already follow the work of Kilcullen, there are likely more pressing books to give priority to.
For more reviews and a summary of Kilcullen's main points, find us at Hand of Reason.
May 20, 2013
A themed collection of articles published in 2009/2010 by counterinsurgency thinker David Kilcullen, following up on ideas previously outlined in his 2006-era Twenty-Eight Articles: Fundamentals of Company-Level Counterinsurgency, as well as incorporating concepts and updates from later works, including The Accidental Guerrilla.
The article on the insurgencies in Western Java and East Timor was very informative, as I did not know much about them. Particularly notable was the look at the success (in the case of Java) and later failure (in East Timor) of the Indonesian government's tactic of using rural populations to surround insurgent territory.
In another article, Kilcullen recalls an engagement that took place in 1999 East Timor, where he was company commander of an Australian intervention force. The description of the firefight with a militia group illustrated the boots-on-the-ground realities of combat in the region, though didn't really do much towards the larger theme of the book.
Reading the article about the need to assert bottom-up good governance in Afghanistan, authored 3 years ago, was just depressing.
Kilcullen ends with a look at combating global Islamist insurgency -- not just al Qaeda -- viewing it as a complex network that acts like a virtual Islamic state, then attacking it by trying to disengage each local insurgency from the larger network.
Together, the articles try to be a primer and handbook for counterinsurgents.
On a more prosaic note, the most annoying thing about the book is that the author's notes, added as footnotes to show additional thoughts and new perspectives in the years since the articles were first published, are in teeny-tiny, barely readable type.
The article on the insurgencies in Western Java and East Timor was very informative, as I did not know much about them. Particularly notable was the look at the success (in the case of Java) and later failure (in East Timor) of the Indonesian government's tactic of using rural populations to surround insurgent territory.
In another article, Kilcullen recalls an engagement that took place in 1999 East Timor, where he was company commander of an Australian intervention force. The description of the firefight with a militia group illustrated the boots-on-the-ground realities of combat in the region, though didn't really do much towards the larger theme of the book.
Reading the article about the need to assert bottom-up good governance in Afghanistan, authored 3 years ago, was just depressing.
Kilcullen ends with a look at combating global Islamist insurgency -- not just al Qaeda -- viewing it as a complex network that acts like a virtual Islamic state, then attacking it by trying to disengage each local insurgency from the larger network.
Together, the articles try to be a primer and handbook for counterinsurgents.
On a more prosaic note, the most annoying thing about the book is that the author's notes, added as footnotes to show additional thoughts and new perspectives in the years since the articles were first published, are in teeny-tiny, barely readable type.
April 24, 2018
Kilcullen provides a a fascinating view of the problem of insurgency (which has gained prominence in the last two decades) from the perspective of an army officer, a policy adviser and a theoretician. While in my youth I had read classic works such asDefeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam and Counter-Insurgency Operations: Techniques of Guerrilla Warfare, these are now quite dated. The nature of insurgency has changed since the 1950s, 60s and 70s. Communism has been replaced by an Islamist Jihad, technology and economic development are quite different. Thus, Kilcullen provided a contemporary update - some things were quite new and other familiar.
But in a couple of ways, the book was disappointing. It was a collection of previously written articles collected in a single volume, with notes to update them to 2009. And it was dating quite quickly. The discussion of the Al Qaeda led global jihad seems dated since we have seen the rise and apparent defeat of ISIS.
But in a couple of ways, the book was disappointing. It was a collection of previously written articles collected in a single volume, with notes to update them to 2009. And it was dating quite quickly. The discussion of the Al Qaeda led global jihad seems dated since we have seen the rise and apparent defeat of ISIS.
June 20, 2011
Kilcullen presents really interesting, well-reasoned theory about dealing with modern insurgency. Several of the articles were engaging & well organized. I paricularly enjoyed the "28 Principles" and his battle report from Motain Bridge. A couple of the articles were, for me, text-book dry. I would liked to have seen the same quality of writing and level of reader-engagement throughout, but because it is a collection of individual articles that span more than 10 years of study and experience, the quality varies from chapter to chapter. Overall, I would recommend it to anyone who is interested in international politics/modern military theory; he presents refreshing insight into a very complicated but very relevant topic.
January 27, 2016
This book is more is a random assortment of pieces by Kilcullen, ranging from articles published on disaggregation theory, to COIN in general, as well as monographs and combat briefs based on personal experience in the field. Although the collection seems quite random at times, ranging from personal experiences of conflict in East Timor, to Indonesian COIN, to how to measure success in Afghanistan, it is all interesting stuff. The most useful chapter by far for most readers is likely to be the last chapter, which discusses the systems model of insurgency comparing an insurgent system to a biological organism, and the methods that COIN strategies must adopt in order to be able to adapt and combat such groups. Fascinating stuff.
December 10, 2016
Kilcullen fought insurgents in Indonesia, Iraq and Afghanistan. This is a collection of his essays on counterinsurgency. Pulled from a variety of sources, Kilcullen added notes to clarify his thinking before publishing it 2009.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way thru the military's recommended reading list, reading and listening to whatever I can get my hands on.
Why I finished it: Very interesting to see this from an Australian perspective.
Why I started this book: I'm working my way thru the military's recommended reading list, reading and listening to whatever I can get my hands on.
Why I finished it: Very interesting to see this from an Australian perspective.
April 29, 2011
Fascinating book thought provoking and extremely relevant to the whole "war on terror". Especially interesting analysis of Iraq and consequences/experiences/lessons learnt which should be applied in Afghanistan as well as dealing with godal Jihadism. Not the easiest book to read but one of the most thought provoking.
August 4, 2011
A book that takes a pragmatic look at counter-insurgency; and grounded in both research and reality. The author makes many useful points that are worth serious pondering. His final chapter on treating global extremist terrorism as a global-level insurgency makes sense, as would his suggestions on how to tackle the issue.
January 28, 2015
A good book that provides a lot of insight about modern COIN in the global insurgency sense. I've heard that The Accidental Guerrilla is better, so I'll be reading that shortly, but this is a useful book that adds onto the US Army Field Manual on Counterinsurgency with a more tactical, on-the-ground-level point of view to it.
June 4, 2015
There are many organizational strategy and insights from both the insurgency and counterinsurgency perspective that can be applied outside the theatre of war. Especially when you are instigating change from a bottom up approach, this book provides a paradigm for ways through large organizations and complex cultural & human dynamics.
August 24, 2016
A really good collection of essays on counterinsurgency. Kilcullen has a bit of a pretentious writing style, but there is some serious substance here. I especially liked the section on counterinsurgency metrics counterinsurgency activity besides SIGACTS - e.g. freight prices to rural Iraqi cities, the existence, the existence of imported fruits in villages, etc.
December 10, 2016
Very informative and interesting. The updated footnotes were very helpful. The main drawback is that it is more of a collection of previously published articles instead of a coherent and connected text. Everyone interested in foreign relations should read this book, especially those who want to be informed on the current landscape of US military operations.
September 17, 2010
A great read, begins to drift toward the end. His reflections on counterinsurgency reveal a healthy respect for same processes of bottom-up development that Bill Easterly emphasizes in his economic work. It's unfortunate that there has not been more dialogue.
Displaying 1 - 30 of 37 reviews