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We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria ...
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This paper studies games with both strategic substitutes and strategic complements, and more generally, games with strategic heterogeneity (GSH).
Nov 21, 2004 · Abstract. We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo- potential” games.
Sep 23, 2021 · Abstract. <p>We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games.
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Topics · Aggregation · Pure Strategies · Nash Equilibrium · Strategic Complements · Potential Games · Games Of Strategic Complements · Convex ...
Aug 13, 2019 · We extend the global games method to the class of finite player, finite action games that includes games with strategic complements, ...
We show that games of strategic complements, or substitutes, with aggregation are "pseudo-potential" games. The upshot is that they possess Nash equilibria ...
Year: 2004 ; Type: article ; Source: Games and Economic Behavior ; Authors Pradeep Dubey, Ori Haimanko, Andriy Zapechelnyuk ; Institutions Stony Brook University, ...
Apr 11, 2002 · Abstract. We show that games of strategic substitutes (or complements) with aggregation are “pseudo-potential” games, and therefore possess Nash.