Pass-through, profits & the political economy of regulation

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 - Minimum wage legislation
 - Bank capital adequacy regulation
- Why is this question important?
 - Regulated firms
 - Policymakers and political economy of regulation
 - Institutional investors

Overview of this paper

• Theory:

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• Empirics:

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• Application:

- Political economy of regulation: Lobbying & market power
- Grossman-Helpman 1994 meets Buchanan 1969

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 - Demand for *i*'s (differentiated) product
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- In the spirit of Sutton 2007: "aim to build the theory in such a way as to focus attention on those predictions which are robust across a range of model specifications which are deemed 'reasonable'."

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- i's pass-through = sufficient statistic for i's profit impact
 - No information needed on (α, β, δ) or c_i

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• Trade-off

- Weaker assumptions & greater simplicity vs
- Narrower set of questions & no counterfactual analysis

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- **This paper**: Shift from market-wide to firm-specific pass-through, further simplification of incidence analysis

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- **This paper**: New results on political economy of low-cost vs legacy carriers, special role of Southwest also in terms of pass-through

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- Profits $\Pi_i = p_i x_i C_i(x_i, e_i) \tau e_i$
- Regulation may apply to all, some or none of *i*'s rivals

Assumptions of the GLM

Four assumptions hold for firm *i* for all relevant $\tau \geq 0$:

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A3. Constant returns to scale: i's unit costs are linear in output $C_i(x_i, e_i) + \tau e_i = k_i(\tau)x_i$, with unit cost $k_i(\tau) = c_i(\tau) + \tau z_i(\tau)$ • $z_i(\tau) \equiv e_i(\tau)/x_i$ is its emissions intensity Four assumptions hold for firm *i* for all relevant $\tau \geq 0$:

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A4. Linear product market behaviour: i's supply satisfies the linear schedule $x_i(\tau) = \psi_i[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)]$

• $[p_i(\tau) - k_i(\tau)] > 0$ is its profit margin, $\psi_i > 0$ is a constant

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- No equilibrium concept
 - Departures from Nash and/or profit-maximization
 - Rule of thumb behaviour

A4 is satisfied by a *very* wide range of IO models:

• Cournot-Nash with linear demand, including with firm-specific conjectural variations, and linear Stackelberg

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- Common ownership of firms (O'Brien & Salop 2000)

Main result

• Define *i*'s marginal pass-through rate $\rho_i(\tau) \equiv \frac{dp_i(\tau)/d\tau}{dk_i(\tau)/d\tau}$, and let average pass-through $\overline{\rho}_i(\tau) \equiv \frac{1}{\tau} \int_{s=0}^{\tau} \rho_i(s) ds$.

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Proposition (1)

In the GLM, the profit impact of emissions pricing τ on firm i satisfies $\Delta \Pi_i(\tau) \equiv -\gamma_i(\tau) [\tau e_i(0)]$ where:

(a) if τ is small, $\gamma_i(\tau) \simeq 2[1 - \overline{\rho}_i(\tau)]$, where $\overline{\rho}_i(\tau) \simeq \rho_i(0)$

(b) in general, $\gamma_i(\tau) \leq \max\{2[1-\overline{\rho}_i(\tau)], 0\}$

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- Formula for γ_i holds *approximately* even with modest departures from GLM (e.g. from A3 or A4)
 - No systematic upward or downward bias in γ_i

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- **(**) Choose specific theory of competition to determine ρ_i

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 - e.g. next part of this talk on US airlines

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• US aviation:

- $\bullet\,$ World's largest market, with 30% of global aviation emissions
- 2014: 172 million tCO_2 , value \$8.6 billion at $50/tCO_2$

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where $\rho_i = \sum_j \frac{e_{ij}(0)}{e_i(0)} \rho_{ij}$ is weighted-average pass-through

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- Predict carbon cost pass-through by estimating fuel cost pass-through
 - Wide variation in fuel costs over time (factor of 5)
 - Airlines cannot influence fuel price

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- Important heterogeneities across carrier-routes:
 - Product differentiation: leg room, service, refreshments, loyalty rewards, airports, etc
 - Cost structure
 - Routes flown (product mix)
 - Competitors on a given route: their identity, products, prices, costs, strategies

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- Per-passenger fuel cost k_{ijt} constructed from fuel expenditure by aircraft (Form 41), and aircraft share by route (T-100)

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- Resulting sample is a balanced panel:
 - N = 615 carrier-routes over T = 52 quarters
 - 26% by revenue of all US aviation activity over the period

Descriptive statistics

		Southwest				Legacy			
	mean	s.d.	min	max	mean	s.d.	min	max	
Price (\$)	157.31	40.52	74.78	298.91	230.82	78.21	52.14	683.50	
Fuel cost (\$)	29.22	15.69	5.29	101.52	50.08	31.05	2.33	366.63	
Distance (miles)	688	407	148	2,106	1,097	706	84	3,784	
Emissions (tCO_2)	0.13	0.06	0.03	0.44	0.21	0.11	0.02	1.18	
Emissions cost (\$)	6.70	2.92	1.71	21.92	10.47	5.54	1.12	59.12	
Passengers (000s)	195	172	5	1,172	153	135	4	1,263	
No. firms	3.28	2.41	1.00	17.00	3.67	2.24	1.00	17.00	
Fraction seats filled	0.72	0.10	0.33	0.97	0.79	0.10	0.23	0.97	
Revenue (\$ million)	24.76	18.78	0.83	135.07	28.99	24.92	0.33	238.11	
Revenue in sample	0.42	-	_	_	0.34	_	_	_	
No. routes	212	-	-	_	403	-	-	_	
No. observations	$11,\!024$	-	-	-	20,956	-	-	-	

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Fuel prices and fuel costs




Figure: Average per-passenger fuel cost k_t and the spot price of jet fuel.

Fuel costs and ticket prices




Figure: Ticket prices (left axis), and per-passenger fuel and non-fuel costs (right axis).

Baseline regression specification

• Estimate cost pass-through at the carrier-route level:

$$p_{ijt} = \rho_{ij}^m \sum_{m=0}^3 k_{ij,t-m} + X'_{ijt}\beta_{ij} + \epsilon_{ijt}$$
(1)

where:

- "Equilibrium" pass-through $\rho_{ij} = \sum_{m=o}^{3} \rho_{ij}^{m}$
- X_{ijt} is a vector of covariates:
 - GDP growth g_{jt} , proxy for demand
 - Index of labour and maintenance costs c_{it}
 - Number of competitor firms n_{jt}
 - Number of potential entrants n_{it}^p
 - Quarterly dummies q_t

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
$$k_{ij,t-m} = \sum_{q=0}^{7} \gamma_{ij}^{m,q} f_{t-q} + X'_{ijt} \beta_{ij}^{m} + \epsilon_{ijt}^{m} \quad \text{for each } m \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$$

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- Hence, k_{ijt} endogenous use spot fuel price as an instrument. First stage regression:

$$k_{ij,t-m} = \sum_{q=0}^{7} \gamma_{ij}^{m,q} f_{t-q} + X'_{ijt} \beta_{ij}^m + \epsilon_{ijt}^m \quad \text{for each } m \in \{0, 1, 2, 3\}$$


• 2SLS estimate using \hat{k}_{ijt} in Equation (1)

Illustration for Southwest on PHX-SAT



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Illustration for Southwest on PHX-SAT



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Illustration for Southwest on PHX-SAT

Results	
Pass through	$1.38 \\ (0.32)$
Profit impact (% of revenue)	2.22 (1.83)

Descriptive statistics

Price (\$)	200.32
Fuel cost (\$)	32.59
Number of firms	2.57
Number of potential entrants	8.10
Distance (miles)	843
Emissions (tCO_2)	0.13
Emissions cost $(\$)$	6.40
Passengers, annual	76,014
Proportion of seats filled	0.73
Revenue in 2014 (\$ million)	17.36
No. of observations	52

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Main empirical results


• Repeat 2SLS estimation for N = 615 carrier-routes, calculate weighted average pass-through and profit impact

Main empirical results

• Repeat 2SLS estimation for N = 615 carrier-routes, calculate weighted average pass-through and profit impact

	Southwest	Legacy	All
Pass through	1.48 (0.04)	0.55 (0.06)	0.78 (0.05)
Profit impact (% revenue)	2.95 (0.22)	-3.56 (0.51)	-1.59 (0.36)
Profit neutral permit allocation	-0.96 (0.07)	$0.90 \\ (0.13)$	$0.43 \\ (0.10)$
No. routes No. obs.	212 11,024	403 20,956	615 31,980
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Pass-through heterogeneity



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Estimated profit impacts of carbon pricing

- Substantial heterogeneity of profit impact:
 - Southwest +2.95% (± 0.44) of revenue
 - Legacy -3.56% (± 1.02) of revenue

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- Assuming our routes are representative of all routes flown by the airlines, total profit impacts:
 - Southwest +\$0.51 (± 0.07) billion
 - Legacy $-\$1.46 \ (\pm \ 0.41)$ billion
- For comparison, reported 5-year average profits:
 - Southwest \$1.17 billion
 - Legacy \$4.26 billion

What explains differences in pass-through?

	Southwest			Legacy			
	Short $distance \in [0, 570)$	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Medium} \\ distance \in \\ [570, 1034) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Long} \\ distance \in \\ [1034, 3784] \end{array}$	Short $distance \in [0, 570)$	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Medium} \\ distance \in \\ [570, 1034) \end{array}$	$\begin{array}{l} \text{Long} \\ distance \in \\ [1034, 3784] \end{array}$	
Small $n \in [1, 2.3)$	$2.00 \\ (0.10) \\ 34$	$1.03 \\ (0.07) \\ 30$	$0.80 \\ (0.07) \\ 24$	$1.03 \\ (0.22) \\ 39$	$0.26 \\ (0.29) \\ 29$	$0.73 \\ (0.09) \\ 49$	
$\begin{array}{l} \text{Medium} \\ n \in [2.3, 4.3) \end{array}$	$2.48 \\ (0.10) \\ 35$	$0.90 \\ (0.09) \\ 19$	$0.60 \\ (0.08) \\ 11$	$0.58 \\ (0.31) \\ 34$	$0.78 \\ (0.21) \\ 56$	$0.00 \\ (0.12) \\ 53$	
Large $n \in [4.3, 12.5]$	$2.55 \\ (0.10) \\ 33$	$0.87 \\ (0.09) \\ 20$	$0.64 \\ (0.16) \\ \gamma$	-0.18 (1.28) 27	$0.87 \\ (0.12) \\ 60$	$0.68 \\ (0.08) \\ 59$	
All n	$2.40 \\ (0.56) \\ 102$	$0.91 \\ (0.38) \\ 68$	$0.70 \\ (0.33) \\ 42$	$0.46 \\ (2.35) \\ gg$	$0.75 \\ (1.14) \\ 143$	$0.46 \\ (0.59) \\ 161$	

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What explains differences in pass-through?

		Southwest			Legacy			
	All weighted	All un- weighted	Common un- weighted	All weighted	All un- weighted	Common un- weighted		
Pass through	1.48 (0.04)	1.72 (0.04)	1.61 (0.09)	0.55 (0.06)	0.69 (0.06)	0.98 (0.18)		
No. routes	212	212	49	403	403	49		

Standard errors in parentheses, number of routes in italics.

Decomposition of pass-through difference

(1) Southwest flies different routes:

- Pass-through on all routes vs on common routes
- Explains 62% of the original difference

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(2) Southwest is more fuel efficient on like-for-like routes:

- Fuel cost: $k_{Southwest} = \$26$ and $k_{Legacy} = \$31$
- If products are homogenous, then $\frac{\rho_i}{\rho_i} = \frac{\Delta k_j}{\Delta k_i}$
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- (3) Residual: Southwest has a different demand profile on like-for-like routes:
 - Differentiated-product demand-side asymmetries
 - Pass-through heterogeneity even for a uniform cost shock

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• Entry and exit

- Allow $\rho_{ij}(n_{ijt})$ by including an interaction term in regression
- Look at subset of routes where n_{ijt} is stable over time

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- Log specification: Pass-through elasticity

Application: Political economy of regulation

- GLM brings together two strands of literature:
 - Second-best emissions tax with market power (Buchanan 1969; Requate 2006; Fowlie, Reguant & Ryan 2016)
 - Political contributions to lobby government "for sale" (Grossman & Helpman 1994; Goldberg & Maggi 1999; Bombardini 2008)

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- Government payoff: $U_{gov}(\tau) = W(\tau) + \lambda \sum_{i=1}^{n} K_i(\tau)$
 - K_i is *i*'s political contribution (in eqm, linear in profit)
- $\bullet\,$ Now assume GLM (A1–A4) holds for each i
- Constant emissions intensity for each i
- Utility-maximizing consumers (differentiated products)
- Emissions damages function D(E)

The political equilibrium carbon price

Proposition (2)

At an interior solution:

$$\tau^{\bigstar}(\lambda) = \left[\frac{D'(E(\tau))}{1 - \frac{(1+2\lambda)}{\eta(\tau)} \sum_{i=1}^{n} \frac{e_i(\tau)}{E(\tau)} [1 - \rho_i(\tau)]}\right]_{\tau = \tau^{\bigstar}(\lambda)}$$

where $\eta \equiv \left[dE(\tau)/E(\tau) \right] / \left[d\tau/\tau \right] < 0$ is the carbon price elasticity of industry-level emissions.

Political equilibrium carbon price for US airlines

Social cost of carbon $50/tCO_2$

		Carbon price elasticity of emissions (η)		
i	Lobbying nfluence (λ))	-0.16	-0.26
	0	\$10.71 (100%)	\$21.05 (100%)	27.08 (100%)
	0.1	\$9.26 (96%)	\$18.87 (93%)	\$24.81 (91%)
	0.2	\$8.15 (94%)	\$17.09 <i>(88%)</i>	\$22.89 (85%)
	0.5	\$6.00 $(89%)$	\$13.33 <i>(79%)</i> =	\$18.57 (<i>73%)</i> •
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- Understanding the profit impact of regulation is important for regulated firms, policymakers and investors
- We introduce a new, simple, flexible theoretical framework allowing large-scale estimation based on pass-through as a sufficient statistic
- For US airlines, we find large heterogeneities in carbon cost pass-through between Southwest and legacy carriers
- We hope the GLM will also be useful in other contexts in IO, public economics, international trade and networks

Thank you

Appendix: Southwest, PHX-SAT

Pass through	1.38^{***}
	(0.32)
No. firms	2.05
	(3.26)
No. potential entrants	-2.11
	(2.03)
Labour & maintenance cost index	166.81
	(99.12)
GDP growth	537.72^{*}
	(281.76)
Quarter 1	-3.87
	(7.87)
Quarter 2	5.55
	(4.54)
Quarter 3	15.81^{***}
	(5.58)
Constant	113.99^{***}
	(17.20)
No. of observations	52
Standard errors in parenthese	
* $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, *** $p < 0.05$	0.01
	 < < >>

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Appendix: Full Mean Group Estimates

	Southwest	Legacy
Pass-through	1.48^{***}	0.55^{***}
	(0.03)	(0.06)
GDP growth	173.85***	93.21^{*}
	(18.44)	(53.27)
No. firms	-1.91***	-7.08***
	(0.37)	(0.84)
No. potential entrants	-1.13***	-1.13**
	(0.15)	(0.42)
Labour and maintenance cost index	122.66***	97.88***
	(8.69)	(6.53)
Quarter 1	-5.75***	-7.97***
	(0.53)	(1.69)
Quarter 2	4.32^{***}	10.94^{***}
	(0.48)	(1.23)
Quarter 3	-1.71***	12.77^{***}
	(0.50)	(1.47)
No. routes	212	403
No. obs.	11,024	20,956

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Appendix: Descriptive statistics by carrier

	WN	AA	AS	DL	HA	UA	US
Price (\$)	157.31	226.29	205.46	230.86	166.68	245.56	240.44
Fuel cost $(\$)$	29.22	54.52	43.36	47.20	41.54	55.32	42.15
Distance (miles)	688	$1,\!163$	726	$1,\!041$	1,110	1,277	957
Emissions (tCO_2)	0.13	0.24	0.18	0.19	0.17	0.22	0.18
Emissions cost $(\$)$	6.70	12.04	9.13	9.39	8.33	11.15	9.06
Passengers (000s)	195	159	158	155	331	141	127
No. firms	3.28	3.79	2.57	3.35	2.78	4.65	3.05
Fraction seats filled	0.72	0.79	0.70	0.81	0.81	0.81	0.79
Revenue (\$ million)	24.76	31.46	24.82	29.36	35.12	29.46	24.19
Revenue in sample	0.42	0.39	0.41	0.26	0.40	0.45	0.27
No. routes	212	111	35	90	10	101	56
No. observations	$11,\!024$	5,772	1,820	4,680	520	5,252	2,912

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Appendix: Pass-through estimates by carrier

	WN	AA	AS	DL	HA	UA	US
Pass through	1.48 (0.04)	$0.90 \\ (0.08)$	$0.21 \\ (0.09)$	$0.79 \\ (0.14)$	$0.92 \\ (0.18)$	-0.09 (0.09)	$0.69 \\ (0.40)$
Profit impact (%)	2.95 (0.22)	-0.80 (0.69)	-6.41 (0.70)	-1.39 (0.94)	-0.54 (1.31)	-9.58 (0.76)	-2.31 (2.93)
No. routes No. observations	212 11,024	111 5,772	35 1,820	90 4,680	10 520	101 5,252	56 2,912

Appendix: Further pass-through results

	Southwest	Legacy
(a) Baseline (2SLS)	1.48	0.55
	(0.03)	(0.06)
	212	403
(b) OLS	1.34	0.43
	(0.03)	(0.04)
	212	403
(c) Late period: 2005-2014	4 only 1.50	0.62
	(0.06)	(0.06)
	229	413
(d) <i>n</i> -interaction	1.45	0.64
	(0.04)	(0.07)
	212	403
(e) Baseline with $\Delta n = 0$	1.54	0.66
	(0.12)	(0.19)
	24	17
(f) Baseline with $\Delta n < 1$	1.63	0.82
	(0.08)	(0.12)
	50	57
(g) Fixed effects specificat	ion 1.31	0.57
	(0.05)	(0.06)
	212	403
(h) Log specification	0.21	0.15
	(0.01)	
	212	
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Appendix: Interaction coefficients

	Southwest	Legacy
a) No. firms n	0.00	-0.01
·	(1.45)	(0.21)
	183	<i>379</i> ´
b) Volatility	-0.018	-0.010
	(0.001)	(0.001)
	212	403
) Bankruptcy dummy	-	0.15
, 1000	_	(0.03)
	-	358
d) Southwest present dummy	-	-0.24
· · ·	_	(0.08)
	-	209
e) Southwest present dummy	-	0.05
,	_	(0.20)
	_	108
Southwest potential	_	-0.91
-	_	(0.36)
	_	108

Standard errors in parentheses, number of routes in italics.

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Appendix: Emissions elasticity estimation

Fuel price elasticity	-0.16^{***} (0.04)
No. firms	-0.05 (0.04)
No. potential entrants	$ \begin{array}{c} 0.02 \\ (0.02) \end{array} $
Labour & maintenance cost index	-0.67^{**} (0.25)
GDP growth	-0.79 (0.84)
Quarter 1	-0.02 (0.02)
Quarter 2	-0.02 (0.02)
Quarter 3	-0.05^{***} (0.01)
Constant	15.73^{***} (0.34)
No. observations	52
Standard errors in parentl * $p < 0.1$, ** $p < 0.05$, ***	p < 0
	• • •

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