In recent years, the United States and several of its allies and partners have taken steps to better prevent, reduce, and address civilian harm resulting from their military operations abroad through “Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response” (CHMR) policies. For example, in response to the 2021 U.S. airstrike in Kabul that killed ten civilians, the United States enacted the 2022 Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response Action Plan (CHMR-AP) and 2023 Department of Defense Instruction (DoD-I) on CHMR. Around the same time, the Dutch Ministry of Defense – following its 2015 airstrike on Hawija, Iraq, which caused at least 85 civilian fatalities – announced a series of CHMR-related policy initiatives. The United States and the Netherlands are spearheading the “International Contact Group on Civilian Harm Mitigation and Response”–an inter-state working group including, among others, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Germany, Norway, and the United Kingdom–that meets to discuss CHMR-related developments, best practices, and challenges.
The International Contact Group’s most recent meeting in December 2024 raised an important challenge with scaling current CHMR policies from counterinsurgencies to large-scale warfare. To date, CHMR practices largely have been developed during counterinsurgency operations in countries such as Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, which may be very different from other types of conflicts. Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which has witnessed widespread atrocities, has underscored the need to apply CHMR practices to large-scale combat operations, such as those that could be initiated under a NATO Article 5 scenario. A critical reflection on Ukraine’s use of CHMR practices in its defensive fight against Russia offers an important entry point to this discussion. Today, international peace organization PAX published a new briefing into patterns of civilian harm and CHMR efforts in the Ukraine war, identifying key takeaways on how to effectively scale CHMR for large-scale conflict. This briefing is based on research carried out by PAX’s Protection of Civilians team, where I lead research and advocacy on CHMR.
Civilian Harm in Ukraine
Since Russia’s invasion, Ukraine has experienced staggering levels of civilian harm. As of September 2024, the conflict had directly resulted in 12,000 civilian deaths and injured 25,000 more. Hundreds of healthcare facilities have been damaged or destroyed, as well as over 1,400 educational facilities, in addition to widespread destruction of residential areas and critical water, power and energy infrastructure. By October 2024, the conflict had resulted in over 9 million internally displaced persons and refugees. The war has further resulted in many reverberating and long-term impacts that are devastating to the civilian population. The widespread use of explosive weapons in populated areas is, for example, leading to the degradation of healthcare services and is causing toxic materials to be released into the air, water, and soil, thereby negatively affecting civilian health and the environment. The widespread presence of mines and unexploded ordnances poses a direct threat to civilians, contributes to loss of livelihoods in rural areas in particular, and will result in additional long-term risks for civilians and negative consequences for agriculture and land use.
The vast majority of this harm is caused by the operations of the Russian Armed Forces (RAF), often with an apparent intent to maximize civilian harm among the Ukrainian population through the deliberate targeting of critical infrastructure, the use of siege tactics, and “double tap” strikes. In its defensive operations, the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU) have also been linked to some civilian harm incidents, mostly related to misfire and the malfunctioning of Ukrainian air defenses. Both parties to the conflict have been linked to the use of widely banned weapon systems like anti-personnel landmines (APMs) and cluster munitions. Given that Ukraine is a State Party to the 1997 Mine Ban Treaty – prohibiting the use, production, stockpiling or transfer of APMs – the U.S. transfer of such mines to Ukraine has been criticized, including by PAX, for the risk this poses to civilians.
Key Takeaways for CHMR in Large-Scale Combat Operations
Despite the high intensity conflict, Ukraine has managed to sustain the CHMR systems and activities it developed prior to Russia’s full-scale invasion. From May-September 2024, PAX therefore conducted research into the main patterns of civilian harm from the Russia-Ukraine War, as well as efforts by Ukrainian actors to mitigate and respond to allegations of harm. From this, PAX identified eight takeaways to inform the effective implementation of CHMR in large-scale combat operations. The full briefing is available here.
1. Mainstream CHMR throughout the military apparatus
Ukraine demonstrates that large-scale conflict inevitably results in pressure on (scarce) military resources, which has the potential to undermine CHMR efforts. Many CHMR-related roles and responsibilities in the AFU are assigned to Civil-Military Interaction (CIMIC) officers. As CIMIC roles were developed relatively late within the AFU, former and current military staff confirmed to us that – by the time of full-scale conflict – not everyone in the AFU was aware of CIMIC’s role or of the importance of CHMR. Faced with an intense operational tempo and many (competing) military needs, this contributed to a situation where CIMIC officers were often underutilized or assigned different tasks, eroding the AFU’s CHMR capabilities. This risk can be mitigated by ensuring that CHMR practices are sufficiently mainstreamed or socialized throughout the military apparatus, with explicit backing from senior military leaders.
2. Expand the scope of CHMR to include mitigating harm caused by the adversary Consider harm from own actions, as well as harm from the actions of others
During large-scale combat operations, it is particularly important to complement a focus on mitigating and responding to civilian harm caused by one’s own military operations – how CHMR is traditionally understood – with attention for harm caused by the operations of other conflict parties. In Ukraine, the combination of having to defend its own territory and being faced with an adversary that shows little regard for civilian protection concerns, has meant that the AFU has necessarily had to focus on how to mitigate the impact of RAF operations. Ukraine implemented this through a high-level military order to AFU units to also track and report on RAF-caused civilian harm. CHMR considerations also informed Ukraine’s decision to redeploy certain of its (limited) military air defence assets away from the front lines and towards urban areas, to better protect civilians.
3. Take into account both the methods and means of warfare
Successful CHMR involves identifying opportunities to prevent and minimize civilian harm through chosen military methods as well as military means. The AFU has, for example, refrained from using heavy artillery in its advance on the cities of Kherson and Kharkiv in an effort to minimize civilian harm and material damage. At the same time, Ukraine has been linked to the use of widely banned and condemned weapon systems like the use of anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions, albeit to a much lesser extent than the RAF. To prevent unacceptable levels of harm, militaries should never resort to the use of such weapons.
4. Enhance preparedness for large-scale civilian evacuations
In a context of full-out war, states need to be prepared for large-scale population movement and the organization of evacuations, and should clearly plan for the military’s role in population transfers. In Ukraine, this emerged as a key mitigation measure and many of our interviewees from among the Ukrainian military, government, and civil society attributed the high numbers of civilian casualties in the first months following the full-scale invasion to limited preparedness for evacuations. Crucially, this preparedness also includes attention for (long-term) post-evacuation support: Interviewees told PAX that lack of sufficient support had contributed to many civilians staying behind in dangerous areas, as well as compelling some evacuees to return to their communities near the front lines.
5. Anticipate and recognize protection challenges related to civilian resistance efforts
In the event of war and specifically where it concerns a situation of territorial defense, civilians are likely to actively engage in support and resistance efforts. Ukrainians volunteered to provide basic supplies to frontline troops, organized evacuation efforts in at-risk areas, and even contributed intelligence regarding the location and movements of RAF units. Ukrainians’ resistance activities have undoubtedly been important to Ukraine’s defensive efforts. Nonetheless, armed forces must be prepared to facilitate civilian support while being mindful of the risks this may pose to civilians. Ukrainian volunteers providing aid deliveries to frontline areas, for instance, sometimes did so while wearing tactical clothing or driving armored vehicles. This often occurs in response to RAF targeting of civilians but it simultaneously makes it more difficult to distinguish civilians from combatants, and therefore to adhere to the principle of distinction.
6. Enhance preparedness for mitigating harm from information warfare
Hostile information operations by Russian or Russia-affiliated actors have – at an unprecedented scale – emerged as a cause of significant civilian harm in Ukraine. For instance, disinformation regarding evacuation plans and routes deliberately put civilians in harm’s way or, conversely, reduced people’s willingness to evacuate at-risk areas. Disinformation regarding the conduct of AFU combatants risks eroding support for the Ukrainian war effort, also internationally. The importance of the information domain as an area of warfare and cause of civilian harm will likely be a recurring characteristic of future large-scale conflict scenarios. States should prepare for this, among other things by developing dedicated civilian harm tracking, investigation, and reporting capacities, to facilitate combating disinformation that specifically seeks to discredit the military through false claims of civilian harm.
7. Set up large-scale dedicated civilian harm response funds
The Ukraine war has resulted in immense civilian harm response needs. At the current time, Ukraine is understandably struggling to find a suitable answer to this amidst an ongoing war and fight for survival. Nonetheless, it has launched various promising initiatives, such as the eRecovery program which provides compensation for housing that has been damaged or destroyed due to the war, and which has disbursed payments to well over 50,000 Ukrainians as of May 2024. However, response needs in all areas far outstrip current capacity. Ukraine’s pursuance of legal reparations is understandable but does little to address current needs. States should work to enhance their preparedness in peace time by setting up dedicated civilian harm response funds which can serve to address some of the most immediate needs and so prevent the exacerbation of harm in the event of large-scale conflict.
8. Develop a civilian-centered response framework
Finally, the war in Ukraine once again emphasizes the importance of taking a civilian-centered approach to the design and implementation of civilian harm response measures in particular. Many of Ukraine’s notable initiatives, such as the previously mentioned eRecovery program display some shortcomings where it concerns meeting the practical needs and realities of conflict victims. These include stringent requirements regarding proving home ownership, for instance, that do not reflect the practical reality of home ownership in many more rural areas of Ukraine, or that do not take into account considerable war-related damages to local archives. Such shortcomings can be prevented by including civilians or relevant civil society organizations in earlier phases of planning and design of response measures. A good practice example, though limited in scope, is Ukraine’s interim reparations program for survivors of conflict-related sexual violence, which has been informed by the needs and expectations of its intended beneficiaries from the stages of design to implementation.