THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES
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THE JOURNAL
OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
BUDDHIST STUDIES EDITOR-IN-CHIEF A. K. Narain University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA Heinz Bechert Universitiit Gdttingen, FRG Lewis Lancaster EDITORS Leon Hurvitz UBC, Vancouver, Canada University of California, Berkeley, USA Alexander W. MacDonald Universite de Paris X, Nanterre, France Alex Wayman B.]. Stavisky WNIIR, Moscow, USSR Columbia University, New York, USA ASSOCIATE EDITOR Stephan Beyer University of Wisconsin, Madison, USA Volume 3 1980 Number 1 the watermark THE JOURNAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES, INC. This Journal is the organ of the International Association of Buddhist Studies, Inc., and is governed by the objectives of the Association and accepts scholarly contributions pertaining to Buddhist Studies in all the various disciplines such as philosophy, history, religion, sociology, anthropology, art, archaeology, psychology, textual studies, etc. The jIABS is published twice yearly in the Spring and Fall. The Association and the Editors assume no responsibility for the views expressed by the authors in the Association's Journal and other related publications. Manuscripts for publication and correspondence concerning articles should be submitted to A. K. Narain, Editor-in-Chief,jIABS, Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin 53706, U.S.A. The Editor-in-Chief is responsible for the final content of the Journal and reserves the right to reject any material deemed inappropriate for publication and is not obliged to give reasons therefor. Books for review should be sent to the Editor-in-Chief. The Editors cannot guarantee to publish reviews of unsolicited books nor to return those books to the senders. EDITORIAL ADVISORY BOARD Andre Bareau (France) JosephM. Kitagawa (USA) John Brough (U.K.) Jacques May (Switzerland) MN. Deshpande (India) Hajime Nakamura (japan) R. Card (USA) John Rosenfield (USA) B.C. Cokhale (USA) Bardwell L. Smith (USA) P.S.Jaini (USA) David Snellgrove (U.K.) J. W. de Jong (Australia) E. Zurcher (Netherlands) Editorial Assistant: Roger Jackson The Editor-in-Chief wishes to thank Rena Haggarty for assistance in the preparation of this volume. Copyright The International Association of Buddhist Studies 1980 ISSN: 0193-600X Sponsored by Department of South Asian Studies, University of Wisconsin, Madison, and the Anonymous Fund of the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wisconsin, U.S.A. CONTENTS 1. ARTICLES L A Study of the Madhyamika Method of Refutation, Especially of its Affinity to that of Kathiivatthu, by Shohei Ichimura 7 2. Prajnaparamita and the Buddhahood of the Non-Sentient World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Nature and Middle Path Doctrine, by Aaron K. Koseki 16 3. A Clue to the Authorship of the Awakening of Faith: "Sik1?ananda's" Redaction to the Word "Nien," by Whalen W. Lai 34 4. The Abhidharmika Notion of Vijiui7Ja and its Soteriological Significance, by Braj M. Sinha 54 5. Some Comments on Tsong kha pa's Lam rim chen mo and Professor Wayman's Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real, by Geshe Sopa 68 Alex Wayman Replies to Geshe Sopa 93 Geshe Sop a Replies to Alex Wayman 98 II. SHORT PAPERS 1. Archaeological Excavations at Piprahwa and Ganwaria and the Identification of Kapilavastu, by K. M. Srivastava 103 2. Notes on the Textcritical Editing of the Bodhisattvavadiinakalpalata, by Frances Wilson III III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES 1. Santideva: Mystique bouddhiste des VIle et VIlle siedes, by Amalia Pezzali 115 2. On Knowing Reality: The Tattvartha Chapter of Asanga's Bodhisattvabhumi, by Janice Dean Willis 117 3. Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in Mahayana Tradition, by Diana Y. Paul 120 4. Wittgenstein and Buddhism, by Chris Gudmunsen. 122 IV. NOTES AND NEWS 1. A Report on the 2nd Conference of the lABS 2. Report on A Critical Dictionary of Piili Contributors 127 130 132 A Study of the Madhyamika Method of Refutation, Especially of its Affinity to that of Kathiivatthu by Shohei I chimura -1- It was a quarter of a century ago that Prof. T.R.V. Murti published his work on the Madhyamika philosophy, 1 which has made one essential point of Madhyamika negation thoroughly known to post-war scholar- ship, i.e., that Madhyamika philosophy is a critique of all philosophical theses, and that this critique does not imply any thesis of its own but exclusively reveals an inherent self-contradiction in any and every philosophical thesis. This method has been called reductio-ad-absurdum argument after the fashion Stcherbatsky used. My use of the term Miidhyamika Dialectic is also in this particular sense. Although Madhyamika dialectic is an age-old subject and has also been treated in modern scholarship frequently, I found that little atten- tion has been given to the fact that there is an intrinsic affinity between the Madhyamika and the pre-classical Abhidharmist methods of refutation. I am especially referring to the method which is recorded in the Kathiivatthu or the Points of Controversy. 2 To demonstrate this affinity is my primary objective in this paper. In orderto accomplish this demon- stration, first, I will try to show why the pre-classical Buddhist debators knew the two basic rules of Syllogistic Inference, namely anvaya and vyatireka, which I may translate as 'positive and contra positive instantia- tions.' They applied these rules in order to defend their own thesis in terms of logicality, while refuting the other's in terms of illogicality. Secondly, I shall make some point of affinity clear as to the Madhyamika method in parallel to that of the Kathiivatthu. 7 -,-1I- In the Vigrahavyavartani, and especially in his self-commentary, Nagarjuna frequently equates the term nif;,svabhava, or absence of own- being with that of sunyata, or emptiness. 3 He states, for instance, that 'light' and 'darkness' do not possess their own-being. They have no self- identifying essence, because they are co-relative, mutually interdepen- dent and hence unable to come into existence by themselves. Tradi- , , tionally, this absence of own-being, as equated by Nagarjuna with the concept of sunyata, has been regarded as one of the hardest subjects for rational and intellectual understanding, because the method of its exposition was and has been exclusively dialectical. In common sense thinking, we regard both the faculty of cognition (prarniir:a) and its object (prameya) as two different things, and yet we take their coalescence for granted for the fact of cognition. This is comparable to the fact of illumi- nation in which both a candle light and its object of illumination somehow partake. As the major objective of the Nagarjuna applies his dialectic to this particular context. I found an intrinsic affinity between his dialectical method as applied in this text and that of the Kathiivatthu. We know that our language works not only as an instrument for expressing inner thoughts, but also as an instrument for their communi- cation. Because of this, we accept that each and every word or sentence has its 'own-being,' or its self-identifying principle. For, such own-being constitutes not only the essence of a conception that each expression signifies, but also of an external existent it refers to. Accordingly, the above two terms, i.e., light and darkness, are regarded as differentiating their respective meanings in our consciousness as well as their respective objects extraneous to us as referents. Nevertheless, Nagarjuna arid his Madhyamika followers state that our very insistence upon the nature and function of our language convention ipso facto commits us to the truth of the reciprocal dependence of any two related terms and sentences, and that we are in fact subscribing ourselves to the truth of absence of own-being. 4 The questio:'l is: How and why can the Madhya- mika dialectic be said to be the only method that is capable of revealing the fact of universal reciprocity (parasparapek:jata) and absence of own- being I believe that the aspect of universal interdepen- dence can be disclosed by logically analysing the Madhyamika method of refutation. 8 -III- In Indian Syllogistic Inference, when two predications are related causally. or tautologically, they constitute a necessary relation which Buddhist and Hindu logicians called vyiipti. Logically, this relation or pervasion of one predication by another consists of the preceding predi- cation of Reason (hetu) and of the subsequent one as Thesis or Conclu- sion (siidhya). As briefly referred to, Dignaga (a Buddhist logician of the 5th century) introduced three conditions for the validity of any given vyiipti and theorized the dual rules of positive and contrapositive instan- tiations. In order to explain these rules, let me take one of the stock examples of the classical logicians, namely an inference of the existence of fire from the existence of smoke. In order for a person to let others know a breakout of a fire on a distant mountain, what he must do is to remind the listener of the commonly-known concomitance between smoke and fire by pointing at the rising smoke. On the part of the listener, upon perceiving a particular smoke rising from the slope of the mountain, his mind regulates itself into recalling a causal association of smoke and fire. It is this logical process of the mind itself that actually consists of the dual instantiations positive and contrapositive. I shall explain this point briefly. In order than an inference be correct, two logically related predica- tions (hetu and siidhya) must be verified by the substratum intended to be known. In our example the substratum, such as a mountain, must be able to bear smoke as well as fire simultaneously, because, otherwise, it may happen that the mountain may bear smoke but not fire, and vice versa. If this is the case with the substrarum in question, it is obvious that no valid inference becomes possible. The speaker, therefore, is obliged to demonstrate whether the substratum (a mountain) is a member of the class whose members are invariably able to bear smoke and fire. This is called positive instantiation, or anvaya. The same speaker, however, is also obliged to give contra positive instantiation as to whether the substratum in question is clearly outside the scope of the contrapositive class, because the latter members are neither capable of bearing fire nor smoke. This is contrapositive instantiation, or vyatireka, for which the speaker presents an instance, such as a lake or a water-dam, etc., where neither of the two predications can be applied. In short, by means of dual processes of instantiations, the speaker can confirm the demarcation between positive and contrapositive classes (sapak!;a and vipak!;a resp.) and thereby determine the particular substratum as a member of the positive one. 5 9 As to the question of why appeal has to be made not only to positive instantiation but also to the contra positive one, I believe it will become self-evident in my subsequent demonstration. H ~ r e it suffices to say that positive instantiation alone cannot fully differentiate those class members which are either "capable of bearing smoke but not fire," or "capable of bearing fire but not smoke." Suppose when, knowing all this, someone encounters an opponent in the arena of debate. How should he conduct his argument? He has to explore every possible error in his opponent's logic. Sometimes, he may even try to deliberately induce logical errors in his opponent. Nevertheless, he is obliged to abide in accordance with the basic rules of logic, such as dual instantiations. I believe that the debators of the Katluivatthu applied such method and in following their step N agarjuna innovated his Madhyamika method of refutation. -IV- There is clear evidence for the fact that the pre-classical Buddhist debators were fully aware of the dual rules of logical instantiation, and applied these as a method of refutation. The procedure of argument in the text is so repetitive in form that I shall have to take up only the initial refutation. The controversy here is concerned with the status of pudgala. The orthodox Theravadin who rejects the reality of pudgala faces the challenge by the Pudgalavadin in the arena of debate. Formally, the refutation consists of five consecutive sessions. First, the Theravadin presents (1) Refutation against the Pudgalavadin, which is followed by the latter's (2) Rejoinder, (3) Refutation, (4) Application, and (5) Conclu- sion. 6 Their arguments invariably include the dual demonstrations being applied positively and contrapositively. No.1 Two related predications cum substratum lO \. "P": (Pudgala) "is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing" (puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamattheniiti) "Q": (Pudgala) "is k n o ~ n in the same way a genuinely real thing is known" (yo saccikattho paramattho tato so puggalo upalabbhati saccikatthaparamattheniiti) The two predications, which lquoted from Mrs. Rhys Davids' transla- tion, can be transcribed as "P" and "Q" respectively. A notation "P" is given to the predication: A pudgala "is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing," and another notation "Q" to: A pudgala "is known in the same way a genuinely real thing is known." No.2 Positive (anvaya) and Contrapositive (vyatireka) Instantiations: Theravadin: "P and Q" is assumed to be verified by substratum such as dharmas, while "-Q and -P" is to be falsified by substratum such as pudgalas. Pudgalavadin: "Q and P" is assumed to be verified by substratum, such as pudgalas as well as dharmas, while "-P and -Q" is to be verified by all those remaining. In No. 2, I specify two mutually contrary concomitances as well as their respective contrapositions, which the Theravadin and the Pudgalavadin apply throughout their demonstration. It is also intended to show the workings of positive and contrapositive instantiations which respectively determine the positive and contrapositive classes and For the Theravadin, dharmas alone are real, and hence, they constitute the positive class. Accordingly, the position "P and Q" and its contraposition "-Q and -P" should respectively serve as criteria to distinguish whatever is real like a dharma and whatever is unreal like an empirical person For the Pudgalavadin, however, applying. the same concomitance as that of the Theravadin is obviously disadvantageous. Therefore, he introduces an exactly contrary con- comitance to refute the Theravadin, namely, "Q and P" and its contra- position, "-P and -Q". But the Theravadin logical strategy, and especially the Pudgalavadin's, cannot be understood fully without help from the Western form of logical implication, which I prepare in No.3. No.3 Hypothetical Syllogism based upon "P then Q" and "Q then P": If "P then Q," and "P," therefore "Q." (modus ponendo ponens) 11 If"P then Q," and "-Q," therefore "-P." (modusponendo to liens) If"Q then P," and "Q," therefore "P." If"Q then P," and "-P," therefore "-Q." The one obvious reason for the usefulness of western forms is evidentin the chart given in No. 4, i.e., the antecedent statement always binds to the consequent, and this conditional implication can best be expressed in the hypothetical syllogism oj the West. No.4 Five Refutational Sessions between Theravadin and Pudgalavadin: I Theravadin Refutation Pudgalavadin thesis "P.-Q" is false, because P ::J Q; "P.-Q" is false, because -Q ::J -P; Therefore, Pudgalavadin thesis "P.-Q" is false. III Pudgalavadin Refutation Theravadin thesis "-P.Q" can be refuted, because -P ::J -Q; "-P.Q" can be refuted, because Q ::J P; Therefore, Theravadin thesis "-P.Q" can be refuted. II Pudgalavadin Rejoinder Theravadin thesis "-P.Q" is false, because -P ::J -Q; "-P.Q" is false, because Q::J P; Therefore, Theravadin thesis "-P.Q" is false. IV Pudgalavadin Application Our thesis "P.-Q" is not falsi- fied,and Your refutation "-(P.-Q)" is not acceptable, because P ::J Q, and -Q ::J P Therefore, your refutation "-(P.-Q)" is not acceptable. V Pudgalavadin Conclusion Our thesis "P.-Q" is not refuted, because "P.Q" is not compelled; Your refutation "-(P.-Q)" is not convincing, because "-Q.-P" is not compelled; Because "P.Q" and "-Q.-P" are not compelled, our thesis "P.-Q" is not refuted. No.4 shows my transcription of the five consecutive sessions of argu- ments. 6 I consistently replace the form of Indian logical concomitance with that of Western logical implication. As a result, the chart shows not only the dynamism of the sessions but also the logical context in which 12 indeterminancy ensued. There seem to be two basic reasons for the indetermination of the controversy: (1) both parties violated the logical boundary of positive and contrapositive classes, and (2) this in turn allowed the Pudga:Iavadin to apply the contrary implication. F i r s ~ , for the Theravadin, both predications "P" and "Q" should be verified by the substratum of dharmas, i.e., a dharma "is known in the sense of a genuinely real thing" (="P"), and "is known in the same way a genuinely real thing is known" (="Q"). Therefore, he uses this implica- tion as a criterion to defend the reality of dharmas and to refute the Pudgalavadin heresy that pudgalas are also real. But he faces a problem here,because, he cannot reject "Q" about pudgalas though no problem to do so with "P." This means that the Theravadin violated the logical boundary of sapak:ja and vipak:ja in applying "Q" not only to dharmas but also to pudgalas. This logical ambivalence is in fact derived from doctrinal reasons. The repudiation of an empirical person (pudgala) constitutes the core of Buddhist doctrine. The Theravadin is obliged to assert "Q" because the unreality of pudgalas is knowable only through the way the reality of psycho-physical elements (dharmas) is known. To further complicate the matter, the Pudgalavadin also shows a similar logical ambivalence due to similar doctrinal reasons. He asserts "P" about pudgalas but fails to assert "Q," because if he does so, he is ipso facto completely identifying pudgala with dharma, which is heresy for the Pudgalavadin as well. Logically, he also violates the boundary between the classes of dharmas arid pudgalas in applying "P" to them equally. Second, the strike of ingenuity on the part of the Pudgalavadin is the use of contrary implication as a weapon to demonstrate the logical vulner_- ability of his opponent. This possibility must have been intuited from the fact that the two contestants stood in an exact contrariety, i.e., "-P.Q" by the Theravadin and "P.-Q" by the Pudgalavadin. Their forces of argument, as shown in the chart, come to an equal balance. The Thera- vadin argues: If you Pudgalavadin assert the reality of pudgala "P," you are also obliged to assert its knowability in the same way as dharmas are known "Q." But you do not, i.e., "-Q." If you do not assert "Q,"you are also obliged logically not to assert "P," i.e., "-Q::J -P." But you assert "P," Therefore, your claim "P.-Q" is false. Now, the Pudgalavadin replies: If you Theravadin assert the knowability of pudgala in the same way dharmas are known "Q," you should also assert its reality "P." But you do not, i.e., "-P." Since you do not assert "P," you are also obliged logically not to assert 'Q," i.e., "-p::J -Q." But you assert "Q." Therefore, your claim "-P.Q" is false. 13 '-v- My finding about the Madhyamika method as parallel to that of the Kathavatthu is rather a simple one, namely that it seeks to create a discon- nective relationship between conceptual terms, predications, or propo- sitions in the forms of"P.-Q" and "-P.Q." If one speaks of a motion, for instance, we can match his statement with another about its agent as regards to their relationship.7 In the Nagarjuna creates this particular context by the metaphor of 'light' and 'darkness.' He reminds us that our cognition always involves cognizer and cognized just as the fact of illumination. He assigns predications to the ilumining and the illumined respectively as "is capable of illumining" ("P") and "is capable of darkening" ("Q"). By applying both predications to 'light' and 'darkness,' he obtains the formulas of "P.-Q" and "-P.Q." He argues: Wherever there is a light illumining, there should be no darkness ("P.- Q") and vice versa ("-P,Q"), which means that the two never can meet. 8 The state of affairs is precisely parallel to that of the Kathdvatthu controversy. How did NagaIjuna try to solve this logical absurdity? As I understand, he generally takes two approaches. First, in accordance with convention, which assumes both 'light' and 'darkness' for the fact of illumination, he points out that the only way to make this positive concomitance "P.Q" possible is to repudiate the concept of own-being (self-identifying prin- ciple) from these entities, so as to accept light and darkness in terms of their reciprocal exchangeability. Second, in accordance to trans-con- vention, he repudiates both "P.-Q" and "-P.Q," which he must have justified in reference to two contrary implications "P ::J Q" and "Q ::J P" in parallel to the Kathdvatthu controversy. Here may I point out the fact that "P ::J Q" and "Q::J P" together express logical reciprocity. In concluding my paper, I am obliged to state two points: (1) As evi- dent in my demonstration, the logical concomitance of two predications differentiated four different classes of variables. I believe that the Buddhist fourfold logical category such as has its relevant basis in this logic of concomitance. (2) Our conceptual and logical treatment of religiotis insight in general has its own limitation. To deal with the statements that refer to the dialectical dimension which bridges the empirical and the trans-empirical in terms oflogical rules is itself to beg further question. In this sense, I cannot go along with the idea to identify religious truth with the logical formula of reciprocity such as "p::J Q.Q::J P." Nevertheless, I am convinced that this kind.of analysis 14 helps us to understand better as to how the same problem was approached by the ancients. NOTES 1. The Central Conception of Buddhism, London: 1960. 2. Kathiivatthu ed. by A.C. Taylor, PTS: 1894-7; tr. by S.Z. Aung and Mrs. Rhys Davids, PTS: 1915. 3. The Romanized text, ed. by Johnston and Kunst,MCB IX (1951), Appendix. sarvatra svabhiivo na vidyata iti krtvii siinyiilf sarvabhiivii iti/ .... yasmiin n0svabhiivas tasmiic chiinyalf/ (Comment on kiirikii 1; lac. cit., p. 10) The pattern of argument: "whatever is devoid of own-being is empty," recurs throughout the work. 4. Lac. cit., p. 52: kiirikii 70: prabhavati ca siinyateyaTfl yasya prabhavanti tasya sarviirthiih) prabhavati na tasya kiTfl cinna prabhavati fiinyatii yasya/ / 5. Sankrasvamin formulated Dignag's theory in his Nyiiyapravdaka- sutram very concisely as follows: (GOS Vol. 33, 1930, p. 1): pak:jadharmatvaTfl sapak:je sattvam vipak:je ciisattvam iti/ / The process involved in anvaya and vyatireka is threefold: (1) to determine in a the class of sapak:ja, of all of whose members the two related predications are correct separately and jointly; (2) to determine in a contra positive drHiinta the class of vipak:ja, of all of whose members those two predications are not correct in the same way; and (3) to apply this concomitance of those predications to a particular class member in question. 15 6. Respectively, Anuloma, Pa(ikamma, Niggaha, Upanayana, and Niggamana. 7. Madhyamikakiirikii, Chp. 2, kiirikii 10: pak:jo gantii gacchatiti yasya tasya prasajyate/ gamanena vinii gantii gantur gamanam icchatalf/ / 8. Vigraha., kiirikii 37 (lac. cit., p. 34): niisti tama! ca jvalane yatra ca t4thati pariitmani jvalanaf?/ kurute kathaTfl prakiisaTfl sa hi prakiiSo 'ndhakiiravadhaf?/ / Prajiiciparamita and the Buddahood of the Non-Sentient World: The San-Lun Assimilation of Buddha-Nature and Middle Path Doctrine by Aaron K. Koseki Prior to the Sui-T'ang period, the concept of Buddha-nature,l the fundamental or universal nature of enlightenment in sentient beings, was already a topic of central importance to Chinese Buddhists. In 418, when Fa-hsien translated the Nirviir;a-sutra in six fascicles (Ta-pan ni- yuan ching), the debate centering on Buddha-nature, as is well known, concerned Tao-sheng's (?-434) view of the icchantika, a spiritual outcast forever excluded from enlightenment. Tao-sheng's thesis that all sentient beings, including the icchantika, possessed the potentiality for Buddhahood was substantiated when the so-called "Northern edition" of the Nirviir;a-sutra was translated in 421 by (385-433). 2 While the icchantika issue would again surface during the T'ang with the popularity of the Fa-hsiang school and its triyiina doctrine, by the Sui period (589-612) the ekayiina theme was well established. In the inter- vening years of the Liang and Ch'en dynasties, Chinese Buddhists in the south had moved on to other aspects of the Buddha-nature theory and were primarily concerned with the composition of exegetical commentaries which speculated on the specific meanings of universal enlightenment. That a variety of commentaries and Buddha-nature theories existed during this period can be seen if one examines the Liang compilation of the Collection oj Nirvar;a-sutra Commentaries (Ta- pan n'!!,h-p'an ching chi-chueh).3 The Collection, however, represents the peak of Nirvar;a-sutra study in the south, for following the end of the Liang and Ch'en periods, the study of this text was superseded by the rise of Prajiiaparamita-based traditions like San-lun and T'ien-t'ai. Exegesis of the Nirvar;a-sutra and debate on the meaning of Buddha- nature continued within these schools, and while an independent 16 scholastic tradition centering on the sutra had long passed from the Buddhist horizon by Sui times, it was during this period that the discus- sion of universal enlightenment was taken to a new degree of explicit- ness. In the case of the San-Iun tradition, the most intriguing discussion on this subject occurred in the writings of its systematizer, Chi-tsang (549-623).4 In his Buddha-nature essay, contained in the Ta-ch'eng hsOOn-lun (A Compendium of Mahiiyana Doctrine), Chi-tsang sought to integrate the Prajiiaparamici. doctrine of emptiness and the NirvaTJa- sutra concept of Buddha-nature. 5 Assimilating two radically different aspects of Buddhist thought, Chi-tsang was the first individual in the history of East Asian Buddhism to argue that the inanimate world of grasses and trees also had the possibility of achieving Buddhahood. The most obvious pecularity of this theory was the fact that, prior to Chi-tsang's time it was not a commonly accepted view of universal enlightenment. Indeed, it was a view totally rejected by earlier commentators of the NirvaTJa-sutra, who associated the potentiality for Buddhahood with anthropocentric concepts such as "mind," "luminous spirit," "alaya-vijiiiina, " and "inherently pure mind." The textual basis for these earlier views was, of course, already established by the NirvaTJa-sutra, which extended the promise of Buddhahood to all sentient existence, that is, to those who possessed the faculty of "mind." Although there was no doctrinal precedent for Chi-tsang's assertion, in his examination of Buddhist texts he found several passages to substantiate his theory of a comprehensive Buddha-nature. As we shall see, Chi-tsang took a highly qualified step in expanding the notion of salvation to include all of the natural, phenomenal world. As a San-Iun scholar, however, Chi-tsang was neither interested, in a Taoist sort of way, in elevating nature to a religious dimension, nor simply concerned with the NirvaTJa-sutra's anthropocentrically-limited promise of eventual enlightenment. Rather, Chi-tsang's most significant contribution to the discussion lay in his assertion that the Buddha-nature was a synonym for the middle path doctrine. The route by which he came to his expanded conception of Buddha-nature, then, was based on his primary view of prajiiii, and it is this that we wish to investigate in what follows. 17 The Buddha-N atuTe Theories of the North-South Period Based on material preserved in Chi-tsang's essay, it appears that, when Buddhists of the North-South period debated the question of Buddhahood, they were primarily interested in defining the manner in which the Buddha-nature exists and in identifying its location or scope. Of the two characters comprising the term, "nature" (hsing) a was generally understood to mean "a seminal cause for enlighenment." The primary concern for Buddha-nature advocates lay in defining the "primary" or "true" cause for attaining Buddhahood (cheng-yin).bThat is to say, does the Buddha-nature "inherently exist" (pen-yu),c or is it something "acquired" (shih-yu).d Again, was the Buddha-nature a "result" stemming from some antecedent cause, or was it already a complete Buddha-essence? In the opening sections of his Buddha- nature essay, Chi-tsang presented, in broad, retrospective terms, a group of eleven theories that had beforehand advanced canonical evidence for universal enlightenment. These eleven theories on "true cause" were further divided into three major categories, "individual,"e "mind and vijiuina,"f and "principle,"g which are outlined as follows: I. Individual 1. Sentient being 2. Six elements (five skandha, fictious whole) II. Mind and Vijiuina 3. Mind 4. Perpetual activities of mind 5. "Avoiding suffering and seeking bliss" 6. Luminous spirit 7. Alaya-vijiuina, inherently pure mind III. Principle 8. Future result 9. Principle of realizing Buddhahood 10. Tathata 11. Emptiness 6 Although the present discussion does not seek to recapitulate the finer details of these individual theories, it is of importance to note here that the earlier theories were explicitly concerned with the problem of identifying the basic cause of enlightenment with some component element of either sar[lSara (theories 1-7) or nirvii'YJa (theories 8-11). Implicitly, the problem was also limited to the enlightenment of 18 sentient existence alone. While Chi-tsang seems to have been concerned with collecting and reviewing the various earlier speculations, the traditional material he presented was essentially used to clarify and to emphasize doctrinal differences. Accordingly, after summarizing the earlier theories, Chi-tsang remarked: The Dharma-masters Ho-hsi Tao-lang and trans- lated the Niroa:Tfa-siitra together. [Tao-lang] intimately received instruction from the Tripitaka master and wrote a commentary on the sutra (Nieh-p'an i-su). He correctly interpreted the meaning of Buddha-nature as the middle path. Consequently, later masters all depended on Master Lang's commentary to lecture on the NiroiirJa-siitra and to interpret the meaning of Buddha-nature. 7 This comment is significant, for it suggests the motivation behind Chi- tsang's summary dismissal of the traditional theories. To Chi-tsang, it seemed obvious that, in the years that had passed since Tao-lang had commented on the sutra, Buddha-nature advocates---:-if we may judge from his summary-no longer discussed the Buddha-nature theory on the basis of the middle path doctrine. Based on his own reading of the Niroii1fa-siitra, Chi-tsang also felt that the earlier theories ignored the Prajnaparamita doctrine articulated in the "Bodhisattva Lion's Roar" chapter on the identity of prajiui and Buddha-nature, viz., "The Buddha-nature is called the first principle of emptiness; the first prin- ciple of emptiness is called prajnii."8 Thus, in reviewing the earlier arguments from the perspective of non-duality, Chi-tsang isolated two major streams of thought, one arguing for enlightenment as a seminal cause (theories 1-7), and the other arguing for an a priori or inherent view of Buddha-nature as an ultimate principle 8-11). Central to this distinction were, of course, the somewhat ambigu- ous statements found in the Niroii1fa-siitra itself. Certain passages in the sutra, for example, would assert the real existence of the Buddha- nature, while other passages would claim that it was something acquired. Buddhists who adhered to the "inherent" view would explain, again following the similes given in the sutra, that the Buddha- nature was like a 'Jewel on the brow of a wrestler," 9 the "treasure store of a poor woman," 10 or the "sweet herb of the Himalayas." 11 That is to say, the Buddha-nature originally exists, but is not manifested or readily perceived. Other passages, however, were used to explain that this "fruit of Buddhahood" was the result of some "profound cause," and the most commonly cited examples on incipient possession were 19 the "seed and the sprout" and "milk and cream." 12 What these similes actually meant to Buddhists in the time preceding the Sui-Tang period can again be seen in Chi-tsang's summary of seven arguments, six by earlier North-South masters associated with the Nirvar.ta cum Ch'eng-shih (Tattvasiddhi?)htradition and one by a Ti-Iun master identified as Ching-yin Hui-yiian 523-592): 20 1. The two characters, "Buddha" and "nature," both refer to the result. "Buddha" is a term for "enlightenment," and for this reason it is not the cause. "Nature" means "unchanging," and hence, the essence of the result is permanent. For this reason it does not change. Because the deluded mind is present in cause, it is not enlightenment, but because it changes, it cannot be called nature. However, sentient beings will certainly realize this principle of the Buddha-nature because it is said that they all have the Buddha-nature. 2. The Buddha-nature is present within cause. Since the sutra . says that all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, how can it be said that this term is not present within cause? Sentient beings are Buddhas because is present within cause. They possess a "principle of certainty"! which is called an unchanging nature. 3. "Buddha" is a term for result and "nature" is a term for cause. Sentient beings are deluded and defiled, and consequently they do not possess prajiiii. If they possess the dharma of enlight- enment, one can then acknowledge their Buddhahood and enlightenment. However, since sentient beings are completely unenlightened, how can one say that they are Buddhas? Ac- cordingly, by refining an inferior knowledge of sarrsara, in the. end it becomes the result-stage of great enlightenment. This result is initially called Buddhahood, and thus, Buddha is a term for result. However, sentient beings will certainly attain it. Since this principle of realizing Buddhahood is unchanging, it is called nature. "Nature" is simply the principle [of realizing Buddha- hood] and is present within cause. 13 4. The Buddha-nature of sentient beings inherently exists it is the principle nature) the luminous spirit, k the alaya- VZJnana. 5. Since the sutra explains that the fruit of Buddhahood arises from a profound cause, how could impurities already exist within food? Therefore, we know that the Buddha-nature is acquired. 6. It is called inherent existence because inherent means "what will come about." 7. [The Ti-lun master said:] "There are two kinds of Buddha- nature, viz., the principle nature and the nature of practice'! Because the principle is not a created thing (samskrta), it inherently exists. Because the nature of practice depends on the completion of practice, the Buddha-nature is acquired."14 Although we are simply presented with brief descriptions of the earlier arguments, in almost every case they parallel the enigmatic position of the sutra. However, the predominant interpretation of Buddha-nature advocates in the south, and Chi-tsang was no ex- ception, was the presentation of Buddha-nature much more in terms of something already actualized than in terms of a potentiality. For exegetes, however, it was especially important to determine the overall them of the sutra, and the distinction of cause vs. result or inherent vs. acquired was a matter of selective emphasis. To Chi-tsang, however, the seemingly contradictory doctrine expressed by the Nirviir:a-siitra was simply a device designed to wean people away from conceptualized views of Buddhahood. Following the middle path doctrine, it was his opinion that the earlier theories created false distinctions, and this became the determining factor that aligned them under the heading of "dualistic interpretations." In the first argument, for example, although Buddhahood is defined as a result, the use of the term "deluded mind," viz., an antecedent stage, still implies the view of Buddha-nature as a seminal cause despite the initial thesis of a complete Buddha-essence. In the second and third arguments, Buddha-nature is defined as cause, but here, too, enlightenment is again seen as something which, by right ("principle of certainty"), is possessed by sentient beings from the outset. There were similar problems in the remaining four theories, where the question of enlightenment was discussed in acquired-inherent terms. In each argument certain conditions were still necessary to act in collaboration to produce the result. The seventh interpretation even argues for both inherent and acquired. It describes Buddha-nature as a complete Buddha-essence, and yet argues that the dynamics of enlightenment require progressive stages of development. "True Cause": The Buddha-Nature of the Middle Path In his review of the earlier arguments, Chi-tsang felt that their basic conceptual error lay in conceiving of Buddha-nature within a causative and temporal framework. By emphasizing one aspect over 21 the other, the earlier theories had in effect created two equally offe centered attitudes toward the "principle" reality of the middle path of non-duality. Two specific realms of understanding are implied, creating two parallel orders which do not participate in a process of mutual identity. His own approach was to combine two passages from the NirvarJa-siitra: 1) the twelve-fold chain of causation (pratl-tya- samutpada) as "neither arising nor ceasing, neither cause nor result," 15 and 2) the identity of Buddha-nature and the twelve-fold chain of causation. 16 While the first passage emphasized the Prajiiaparamici basis for the NirvarJa-siitra, the second passage articulated their common theme. The conflation of middle path doctrine and Buddha- nature theory may be seen in the following definition of "true cause": If one knows that cause and result are equal and nondual, then one can speak of Buddha-nature. Hence, the NirvarJa-siitra says: "Neither cause nor result is called the Buddha-nature." Now, the meaning of Buddha-nature explained by our doctrinal transmission is neither existent nor inexistent and neither inherent nor acquired; also, it is not what' will be manifested. Therefore, a sutra rVimalakirti] says: "Only because of worldly conventions, letters, numbers, is it said that the three time periods exist." It does not say that enlightenment has a past, a future, or a present. This is because it is neither inherent nor acquired. Or, one can say it is because of pratz1ya-samutpada. 17 The difference between his approach and the earlier theories is charac- teristic of the Prajiiaparamici approach to the question of universal enlightenment. Since the relation between cause and result is asserted in terms of essential emptiness, and hence, identity, this interpretation of Buddha-nature is not concerned with the temporal production of enlightenment. There are no conditions antecedent to Buddha-nature as it presently exists. By associating "true cause" with an element of sa'T[[sara (e.g., "sentient beings," "six elements," etc.), the earlier argu- ments also ran the danger of implying that Buddha-nature was not only incomplete and imperfect, but a svabhava as w e l ~ In contrast, by defining Buddhahood in terms of non-duality, Chi-tsang's "middle path = true cause" approach avoids relegating Buddha-nature to any incipient status and rejects any identification of a complete Buddha- essence with any specific component of the phenomenal or noumenal realms. By placing the question of universal enlightenment within a middle path framework, Chi-tsang tried to overcome this type of distinction. 22 Buddha-Nature and the Non-Sentient World: The Extensive View When Chi-tsang established the middle path framework for examining the Buddha-nature theory, he did not criticize the earlier speculations only on the basis of their causative and temporal interpre- tations of this theory. He also accused them of holding wrong views of the Buddha-nature's location. To support the position of sentient enlightenment alone, Buddhists of the North-South period usually relied on passages from the "Bodhisattva Lion's Roar" and the "Kasyapa" chapters of the Nirvii:rJa-sutra. 18 These passages assured eventual enlightenment to those who possessed a "mind" and identified all of the natural world, viz., walls, tiles, rocks, etc., as non- sentient, and hence, without Buddha-nature. What theNirvii'f!a-sutra's position actually meant to Buddhists prior to Chi-tsang's time can be seen to some extent in the writings of Seng-liang (438-496) and Pao- liang (444-509), two prominent Nirvii'f!a-sutra scholars of the North- South period. 19 Following material preserved in the Liang Collection, it appeares that both monks relied on the Srimiiliidevi-sutra for their definition of "true cause," viz., "avoiding suffering and seeking bliss" [T12, 222b]. Seng-liang, for example, declared that non-sentient existence was without the "nature of liberation."2o Since the "true cause" of enlightenment was defined as "avoiding suffering and seeking bliss," Buddha-nature was limited to those who possessed this' impulse or "functional quality" of mind. This attribute of sentient existence was maintained by the following generation of Nirvii'f!a-sutra exegetes and was adopted by the masters of the Liang Ch'eng-shih tradition. Pao-liang's view, for example, continued through his disciple, Kuang-chai Fa-yiin (467-522), one of three eminent Ch'eng- shih scholars. Fa-yiin's theory is preserved in the Nieh-p'an tsung-yao, a Tang commentary written by the Korean monk Wonhyo: [Fa-yiin said:] "The mind of sentient beings differs from trees and rocks because, by right, they have the nature of avoiding suffering and seeking bliss. Because they have this nature, they cultivate a myriad of practices and in the end realize supreme enlightenment. Therefore, it is said that the nature of mind is the essence of the true cause .... "21 Still another theory of sentient enlightenment may be seen in the following passage which defines "true cause" as a "luminous spirit": The mind possesses a nature which is not lost. This luminous spirit 23 is the essence of the true cause. Since it is already present within the body, it differs from trees, rocks, etc., objects which do not have this nature of the mind. This means that the nature of the luminous spirit already exists within cause, and hence, one can realize the fruit of true Buddhahood. 22 . Although the only feature that distinguishes these theories is the defi- nition of "true cause," it is clear that the question of universal enlighten- ment was limited to the framework of "all sentient beings have the Buddha-nature." That is to say, the question concerning the location of Buddha-nature was primarily discussed in terms of "mind and vijfiiina." The motives for this view, if any, are difficult to establish. This type of thinking is at least coincident with the primary objective of the NirviirJa- sutra, namely, the establishment of the icchantika's potentiality for enlightenment. In this respect, Buddhists of the North-South period may have simply followed the lead of the sutra, and expanding the boundaries of enlightenment to include all of the natural world was of secondary importance. With the establishment of ekayiina traditions during the Sui-Tang period, however, the earlier interpretations came under increasing scrutiny and challenge, and the broader implications of a universal Buddha-nature became an important question for San- lun and Tien-t'ai Buddhists. 23 In the San-Iun tradition, the distinction between sentient and non-sentient was analyzed in terms of "within and apart from the path"ID and "within and apart from principle."il These terms refer neither to the distinction between Buddhism and heterodox traditions nor to a distinction between the "actual" and "theoretical" possibility of non-sentient Buddhahood. For Chi-tsang, "principle" was synonymous with non-duality, and his assessment of non-sentient Buddha-nature concerns the development of a middle path perspective. When this perspective of identity and interdependency was applied to the tradi- tional distinction between sentient (intensive) and non-sentient (com- prehensive) beings, Chi-tsang maintained: If one seeks to explain the existence of Buddha-nature, then not only do sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, grasses and trees also have the Buddha-nature. This contrasts the inexistence of Buddha-nature apart from principle [middle path] by discus- sing the existence of Buddha-nature within principle. 24 This passage, which established the framework for investigating non- sentient enlightenment, shocked many Buddhists of his day. The 24 assertion of non-sentient Buddha-nature ignored the premise established by the Nirvii1}ll-siit:ra and was without doctrinal precedent. To substantiate his position, Chi-tsang cited the following passages from siitras and sastras. His comments on each passage follows the citations: 1. AvataT[tSaka-siitra: "Samantabhadra saw the stately mansion of Maitreya and then realized innumerable Dharma-gates." [Isn't this insight into objects, seeing their nature, and then realizing innumerable samiidhi-s?] 2. Mahiisa1(lnipiita-siitra: "The Buddhas and bodhisattvas see that all the dharmas are not without enlightenment." [This explains that, because of the delusion of Buddha-nature, there is sa1(lsiira. Comprehension of a myriad of dharmas is identical with enlightenment.] 3. "Not Absolute, But Empty" [Seng-chao]: "Is the path far away? While identical with objects, it remains ultimate. Is the sage far away? When you understand him, you are identical with his spirit." [If all the dharmas are not without enlightenment, then why is there no comprehension that all is Buddha-nature?] 4. Nirviir;,a-siitra: "All the dharmas are completely endowed with the nature of bliss." 5. Wei-shih-lun: "There is consciousness only; the external realm does not exist." [This explains that mountains, rivers, grasses, and trees are all mind; apart from the mind, there does not exist a separate dharma.]25 According to Chi-tsang these passages supported his view of a "pervasive" theory of enlightenment. The sources for this view are taken from a wide spectrum of texts, but the major idea that appears is the concept of non-duality. His view of non-sentient Buddha-nature, then, is concerned primarily with the relationship that exists between sentient and non-sentient beings. The key to this reduction is, again, prajiiii. The technical terms used to express this relationship are iO and cheng. P While these two terms are generally associated with primary and secondary retributions (e.g., the body and its external world), in his use of the terms, i ("secondary," "dependent") refers to the object-of- cognition (e.g., rocks, trees, etc.) and cheng ("primary," "chief') refers to the cognizing subject. His objective here is to rationalize the compre- hensive scope of Buddha-nature by describing a world in which all things are endowed with this non-duality quality:q 25 These passages explain that, within principle, all the dharmas are non-dual in terms of subject and object. Because of the non-duality of subject and object, if sentient beings have the Buddha-nature, then grasses and trees also have Buddha-nature ____ If you comprehend the equality of dharmas and do not see their dual marks of subject and object, the principle, in truth, is without the marks of attainment and non-attainment. 26 This line of thought is coincident with Chi-tsang's discussion of the inherent and acquired status of Buddha-nature_ In that context, since the "true cause = middle path" was removed from a causative and temporal framework, it also followed that any attempt to locate the Buddha-nature would not only falsely identify it with some element of sa1(lSara, but would also deny the universality of the middle path_ The Intensive View: Prajiiaparamita vs_ Vijiianavada From the preceding, one gains the impression that Chi-tsang was interested in the Buddhahood of the non-sentient world not because he was especially attuned to nature, but primarily because he was inter- ested in exploring the possible consequences of his Prajiiaparmita position. Yet, despite the face that the aim of his essay was to describe and rationalize Buddha-nature in middle path terms, Chi-tsang was equally sensitive to the qualities that distinguished the natural world from all that was human_ He did acknowledge the existence of "mind" in the make-up of sentient beings, for after defining the "pervasive" theory, he turned his attention to the "specific" theory or intensive view of Buddha-nature and wrote: Because sentient beings have the mind of delusion, they can realize the principle of enlightenment. Because grasses and trees are without mind, they are not deluded. How could they have the principle of enlightenment? For example, to dream is to experience and not to dream is not to experienceY An important element of enlightenment, then, was an experiential quality limited to those having "mind," and the Vijiianavada idea of "consciousness" was the determining factor. Not to experience or function, then, was simply not to exist in a sentient way. This type of thinking is similar to the Buddha-nature theory of Chi-tsang's con- temporary, the Ti-Iun scholar Hui-yUan. Although there is very little criticism of Hui-yUan's thesis in Chi-tsang's essay, the above Ti-Iun 26 position bothered Chi-tsang, not because it restricted enlightenment to sentient existence per se, but because the theoretical basis for that interpretation was quite different from his own. The conceptual difference between the two positions was left unstated in Chi-tsang's essay, and it remained for later San-Iun scholars to resolve what, at first sight at least, appeared to be two mutually exclusive views. For example, when asked about the differences between the intensive vs. extensive views, the Japanese Sanron scholar Chinkai (1091-1152) replied: The seventh master [i.e., Hui-yiian] said: "The iilaya-vijiiiina, inherently pure mind, is the true cause of Buddha-nature." These interpretations on mind and vijiiiina are not used in our tradition. The meaning of the [Ta-ch'eng] I-chang is that the nature of the "knower," the mind of the true vijiiiina, is the doctrine of Buddha-nature. The middle path, the first principle of emptiness, viz., [Hui-yiian's] "nature of the known," is the secondary meaning. Now, we hold that the middle path, the first principle of emptiness, is the true cause of Buddha-nature. 28 Chinkai's analysis suggests that the differences between the two positions are primarily conceptual. If we examine Hui-yiian's essay on Buddha-nature,29 he does, to a limited degree, also affirm the existence of Buddha-nature in non-sentient objects. For example, as it exists apart from the mind of sentient beings, the "nature of the known"r was synonymous with dharmatii, S "true mark," and the first principle of emptiness. This aspect of the VijIianavada theory of mind was referred to as the "general theory" and distinguished between the Buddha-nature existing "within" (sentient beings) and "without" (non- sentient beings).30 Hui-yiian's main concern as a Ti-Iun scholar, however, was in describing the "nature of the knower,"t the iilaya- vijiuina or the "mind of the true vijiiiina."u Thus, as far as a San-Iun scholar like Chinkai was concerned, this aspect of Hui-yiian's theory represented his fundamental doctrine. Within this dual context of the "knower" and the "known," the Buddha-nature was specifically identified with the "nature of the knower," and, according to Hui- yiian, did not "pervade non-sentient existence."3! For this reason, Hui- yiian's theory of non-sentient Buddhahood is not, in strictest terms, Buddha-nature, but dharmatii. While his interpretation of the "nature of the known" can be broadly construed to mean Buddha-nature, Hui- yiian's idea of "true cause" was limited to those possessing an iilaya-vijiiiina. 27 Chinkai's evaluation of the two positions also defines the limits of Chi-tsang's theory. In the first place, the San-Iun tradition is concerned with the so-called "secondary meaning" of Buddha-nature (i.e., Hui- yiian's "nature of the known"). Again, there is also a difference in the use of the terms "within" and "without." When Hui-yiian uses these terms, he is associating them with the alaya-vijiiiina and the remaining seven vijiiiina. In contrast, when Chi-tsang uses the same expressions they are specifically associated with prajiiii, the middle path. These differences are explicit in the following San-Iun interpretation of "subject" ("nature of the knower") and "object-of-cognition" ("nature of the known"): Now, when we speak of prajiia, it is not the past explanation of prajna. In the past it was simply explained that prajiiii was [sub- jective] knowledge and not the object-of-cognition. This, too, is a one-sided view and cannot be called the middle path. 32 When we compare the above with the Ti-Iun concept of "true cause," viz., "principle nature" and the "nature of practice," the "principle nature" refers to the Buddha-nature "within" (alaya-vijiiiina, pure mind). From this perspective, there is no strict distinction in the Ti-lun theory between the Buddha-nature "within" and "without," since one aspect of this "principle nature" corresponds to the "nature of the' known" in the sense of dharmatii, the emptiness of all dharmas. In this respect, the positions are not mutually exclusive. However, when the Buddha-nature was explained in terms of the "nature of practice," then Buddhahood was limited to sentient beings, since they alone possessed the "true cause" and were endowed with the "nature of the knower." Thus, in Ti-lun terms, when the adventitious covering of kleSa was removed, sentient beings achieved Buddhahood and realized the alaya-vijiiana in its pure form. From the Ti-Iun standpoint of practice, prajiia was limited to sentient existence, and grasses and trees were incapable of having Buddha-nature simply because they, along with everything else in the phenomenal world, were without both aspects of the "true cause." Since Chi-tsang was a San-Iun scholar, his position differs from Hui-yiian's arguments inasmuch as he is less interested in positing a quality that distinguishes sentient from non-sentient and more interested in pursuing and clarifying the Buddha-nature's connection with the middle path. To specify the real existence of such a quality 28 would, of course, mean to conceive of Buddha-nature in svabhiiva- terms. A key difference between the two positions, then, is that, for Chi-tsang, there was virtually no distinction between Buddha-nature and dharmatii, since both terms referred to the essential emptiness, and hence, identity, of sentient and non-sentient beings. As seen in the preceding passage, prajiui is not simply a quality possessed by the sentient (i.e., "subject") world, but is the principle that defines the proper relationship between the phenomenal and human spheres. These conceptual differences between the San-Iun and Vijiianavada perspectives are also dear in the following definition of vijiuina: The meaning ofVasubandhu's "consciousness only" is to borrow the mind to dispel the object. The dispelled object does not reside in the mind; though still and without point d'appui, the principles of themselves profoundly meet. 33 Again, in his commentary on the SnmaUidevi-siitra, the Sh'eng-man p'ao- ku, Chi-tsang briefly discussed the differences between the Buddha- nature as form (rupa) and mind: The Awakening of Faith in the Mahiiyana says: "Form and mind are non-dual; the nature of form is identical with knowledge and the nature of knowledge is identical with form."34 The most striking aspect of this interpretation of vijnana is that it borrows Seng-chao's concept of identity and defines mind in terms of prajna. 35 While there is no contradiction with the original meaning of the concept, the Vijiianavada notion of "mind" is manipulated in such a way that it is primarily a means for rationalizing the San-Iun view of interdependency ("stillness of subject and object"). It is regrettable that Chi-tsang did not further define this quality of sentient existence. As a San-Iun scholar, he reduced almost everything to middle path terms. Beyond this point, he was unwilling to speculate on the nature of "mind." However, in his desire to describe Buddha-nature as the complete interdependency of all things, he did, nevertheless, emphasize the contemplative experience of prajiui: 29 When the contemplative mind looks at it, what is the difference between sentient beings and grasses and trees? If the Buddha- nature exists, then it exists in both; if it inexists, then, it inexists in both. It both exists' and inexists, and neither exists nor inexists. For this reason, if you comprehend that existence and inexistence are non-dual and equal, then you can initially speak of the true cause of Buddha-nature .... The true caus.: is the very mind enlightened to it. However, nothing can describe this contemplative mind. Thus, Kasyapa always sighed, saying, "Inconceivable."36 By identifying prajiui as a quality equally possessed by sentient and non- sentient beings, Chi-tsang essentialy dissolved the traditional distinc- tion. He did not, of course, state that grasses and trees are capable of having Buddha-nature, but that, in a middle path context, both are equal participants in a process of pratztya-samutpada. The location of the Buddha-nature could be as intensive as sentient beings or as extensive as the entire natural world. This contrasts with the view of Buddha- nature as something projected from the sentient mind. For Chi-tsang, the Buddha-nature of the middle path was purely an operational term meant to expose the fallacy of conceiving of enlightenment in causative, temporal, and spatial terms. For this reason he is not describing a situation in which sentient existence is always primary; it is not a world in which those with the faculty of "mind" alone possess Buddha-nature. The question of non-sentient enlightenment, then, could not be answered by appealing to some quality that distinguished the human world from the natural world. Rather, the question for him was where the line could be drawn in terms of the location of the middle path itself. In Prajiiaparamici terms, no such line could be drawn, for to deny the Buddhahood of the non-sentient world was, in effect, to deny the enlightenment of sentient existence. Chinese Glossary a '[1 h p!z j( r fiJi' 9<lJt1 b i S 1id1 c j :@. tl: t 5;Q '[1 d k JU$ u Ji; e A 1 IT t!t o{:& f ie,\ m rt'l ill 5'1'- ill PiE g :@. n rt'l :@. 5'1'- q{:&iE:::G= 30 NOTES 1. Buddha-dhiitu or Buddha-gotra. Here we follow Takasaki]ikido, Nyoraizo Shiso no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1974), p. 11. See, also, his article, "Nyoraizo-Bussho shiso," Koza Bukkyo Shiso, vol. 3 (Tokyo: Rishosha, 1975), pp. 101-133. Further, see Ogawa Ichijo, Nyoraizo-BusshO no Kenkyu (Kyoto: Buneido, 1974), pp. 62-66. 2. Several works in]apanese deal with this early period of Niroii1Ja-siitra study. See, for instance, Fuse Kogaku, Nehandhu no Kenkyu, vol. 2 (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1973), pp. 12-44. See, also, Tokiwa Daijo, BusshO no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai, 1972), pp. 178-180. 3. A discussion of the Collection and its compiler (attributed to Pao-liang) can be found in Fuse, Nehanshu no Kenkyii, vol. 2, pp. 74-85. See, also, Ogawa K6kan, Chugoku Nyoraizo ShishO no Kenkyu (Tokyo: Nakayama Shooo, 1976), pp. 210-225. 4. For an overview of Chi-tsang's theories, see Kamata Shigeo, Chugoku Bukkyo Shiso-shi Kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1968), pp. 31-46, and Hirai Shun'ei, Chugoku Hannya ShishO-shi Kenkyu (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1976), pp. 617-637. 5. TaishO shinshu Daizokyo (hereafter T), 45, 35b-42b. 6. For further discussion of these earlier theories, see Aaron K. Koseki, Chi- tsang's Ta-ch'eng-hsuan-lun: The Two Truths and the Buddha-nature (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin, Madison, 1977), pp. 200-2J7. While Chi-tsang's essay does not refer to specific masters, the names of Buddhists associated with these interpretations of "true cause" are given in Chiin-cheng's Ssu-lun-hsuan-i [Cf. Daihion Zokuzokyo (hereafter ZZK), 1,1,74 recto b46l: 1. Sentient beings, Chuang yen Seng-min, a Ch'eng-shih scholar; 2. Six elements, Seng-jou (431-494) and K'ai-shan Chih-tsang, both Ch'eng-shih scholars; 3. Mind, also attributed to Seng-jou and Chih-tsang; 4. Perpetual activities of mind, Hsiao-an; 5. Avoiding suffering and seeking bliss, Kuang-chai Fa-yiin, a Ch'eng-shih scholar; 6. Luminous spirit, Liang-Wu-ti (emperor) and Ling-wei Pao- liang; 7. Alaya-vijiiiina, inherently pure mind, Hui-yuan; 8. Future result, Dharma- master Ai of Pai-ma temple; also attributed to Tao-sheng; 9. Principle of attaining Buddhahood, Ling-ken Seng-cheng, a Ch'eng-shih scholar; 10. Tathatii, Pao-liang; and 11. Emptiness, an unidentified "Mahayana master of the North." 7. T45, 35c. Tao-lang's commentary is no longer extant. Portions of it are preserved in Kuan-ting's (561-633) Ta-pan nieh-p'an ching-su, T38, 43a-b. 8. Cf. the "Southern edition" of the Nirvii1Ja-siitra, T12, 767c. 9. T12, 649a. 10. TI2,648b. 11. TI2,649a-b. 12. See, for example, T12, 775c, 776a, 777b. 13. The translations are summaries of the main points of each of the seven arguments. The complete section is in T45, 38b-39a and 39a-b. The first three arguments may be attributed to Ch'eng-shih scholars: (1) Lung-kuang Seng-ch'o; (2) K'ai-shan Chih-tsang; and (3) Chuang-yen Seng-min. With the exception of short excerpts preserved in Chi-tsang's WritiIlgS, the Liang Ch'eng-shih doctrines are not extant. For further discussion on the Liang theories, especially the two truths doctrine, see Whalen Lai, "Sinitic Understanding of the Two Truths Theory in Laing Dynasty," 31 and "Further Developments on the Two Truths Theory in China: Toward a Reconstruc- tion of Chou Yung's San-tsung-lun," both forthcoming in Philosophy East and West. 14. The proponents of the fourth, fifth, and sixth arguments are difficult to identify, and it appears that Chi-tsang simply combined.several different tenets. The expression, "principle nature," viz., the "principle of achieving Buddhahood," may be traced to Fa-yao (Kao-seng-chuan, T50, 374b-c) whose theory is found in the Liang Collection, T37, 448c. In Chi-tsang's short Niroii:,!a-siitra commentary (Nieh-p'an yu-i), the doctrine of the "luminous spirit" is attributed to Pao-liang, the compiler of the Liang Collection (T38, 237c). The seventh theory is clearly associated with the Ti-lun scholar Hui-yuan whose theories on niroa,,!-a and Buddha-nature are found in the Ta-ch'eng i- chang, T44, 817a and 473b-474a. 15. Tl2,768b. 16. T12,768c. 17. T45,38c. 18. "All who have mind will certainly realize supreme enlightenment .... " [TI2, 769al. "Those without Buddha-nature are non-sentient objects such as walls, tiles, and rocks; what is apart from non-sentient objects such.as these is called Buddha-nature." [Tl2,838bl 19. For further discussion of their Buddha-nature theories, see Ogawa, Chiigoku Nyoraizii ShishO, pp. 236-244. On Seng-Liang, see Fuse, Nehanshii no Kenkyii, pp. 232-241. 20. T37,598b. 21. T38, 249a. 22. Cited in Ssu-lun hsiian-i, ZZK, 1,1,74 recto b46. 23. For an extensive discussion of non-sentient enlightenment, see Kamata Shigeo, Chiigoku Kegon ShisiJ-shi no Kenkyii (Tokyo, 1965), pp. 434-443. Kamata's work (pp. 466-473) also discusses the Buddha-nature theories of Chan-jan (711-782), a T'ien- t'ai monk who is generally credited with the definitive theoretical formulation of non- sentient enlightenment in China. On the basis of written material, however, it appears that Chi-tsang may have been the first to advocate the theory of non-sentient Buddha- hood. In his study of Chan-jan's works, such as the Chin-kangpei-lun and the Chih-kuan fu- hsing-chuan-hung-chiien, Kamata believes that Chi-tsang and Chan-jan approached the question of non-sentient enlightenment from a similar doctrinal standpoint, viz., the "non-duality of subject and object" discussed below. 24. T45, 40b. 25. T45, 40c. The citation from Seng-chao's essay has been slightly altered from "it touches objects" to "identical with objects." The change is minor, but it may have been a conscious alteration i ~ view of Chi-tsang's desire to establish the theme of identity. The reference to "consciousness only" is taken from the Bodhiruci (arrived in China in 508) translation of the VirrJatikii-vijiiaptimatrata-siddhi, T31, 63c and 64b. 26. T45, 40c. 27. Ibid.,40c. 28. Sanron myiJkyiJshiJ, T70, 714b. 29. Ta-ch'engi-chang, T44, 472a-477c. 30. Ibid., 472c. 31. Ibid., 472a. 32. T45, 37c. 32 33 33. Ching-ming hsilan-lun, T38, 857c. 34. Sheng-man p'ao-ku, T37, 85b. 35. Cf. Preface to the Hundred Treatise, T30, 167c-68a. 36. T45, 41b, 39a. NINTH WISCONSIN CONFERENCE ON SOUTH ASIA November 7 - 9, 1980 The 1980 Conference on South Asia will be presenting 35 panels on a variety of topics, with a special emphasis on Tibet, Bangladesh and Afghanistan. If further information is desired, please contact: South Asian Area Center Outreach Office 1249 Van Hise Hall University of Wisconsin Madison, Wisconsin 53706 (608) 263-5839 A Clue to the Authorship of the . , Awakening of Faith: Redaction of the Word "Nien"a by Whalen W. Lai This teaching ... sets up wu-nien b (no-thought) as its doctrine, wu-hsiang C (no-form) as its substance and wu-chu d (non-abiding) as its basis. No-form is dissociation from form in the midst of form; no-thought is refraining from thought in the midst of thought; non-abiding is the entrance (ju1)e into Original Nature. -The Platform Sutra The text, Ta-ch' eng ch'i-hsin lun f (The Awakening ofF aith in Mahayana, henceforth abbreviated as AFM), has been the center of a long contro- versy in the field of Buddhist studies. It has been suspected by Mochizuki Shinkog2 and others to be a Chinese fabrication, while Tokiwa Daijoh and others defend its alleged Indian origin. The present short article will not review the past and present scholarship on the AFM or bring in my own studies on the matter. 3 It will be devoted to one tiny but crucial issue: the fate of a key concept in the two "transla- tions"-Paramartha's original (AFM) and version (AFMS for short). The concept is nien and wu-nien. To state the conclusion here so as to simplify our discussion: the nien complex, in my opinion, cannot be understood without reference to a pre-Buddhist (Han Chinese) usage of the term. It is foreign or jarring enough to the person responsible for the AFMS that it has been systematically modified or outright substituted so as to bring the AFM in line with the Yogacara (Wei-shih,i Vijiiaptimatrata) philosophy. By showing the sinitic character of the nien ideology, its centrality in the AFM, and the redaction of it by the AFMS, we can come one step closer to resolving the long controversy over the authorship of the AFM. From the limited evidence in this one short study, it would appear that the AFM was 34 authored in China and the AFMS was a conscious redaction of the AFM in China (or Korea?4) to bring this work into line with the demands of Hsiian-tsang'sj Wei-shih philosophy. We will begin with a survey of modern Sanskritists' attempts at identifying nien and why such attempts have ultimately failed. Then we will look at a similar attempt by the AFMS to edit off the nien ideology and how by so doing it violated the integrity of the original AFM message. The sinitic meaning of the term nien and wu-nien will be demonstrated with precedents in Han thought, usages in the Six Dynasties and in Ch'an. k I will conclude with a word on why AFMS was produced. Attempts at Identifying Nien and Wu-nien That nien and especially wu-nien are important concepts can be seen in the passage cited in the beginning from the Platform siitra. Wu- nien is supposed to be the doctrine of Southern eh'an and li-nien l that of the Northern Ch'an. If till now I have not rendered them into English, it is because of the controversial nature of these terms. Both li- nien and wu-nien came from the AFM. In 1900, when D. T. Suzuki m (then not yet the Zen spokesman he would later be) translated the AFMS, he added this note. The term (nien) is usually rendered by recollection or memory (smrti) but (sic) used it apparently in a different sense. It must mean subjectivity, or the perception of particularity, or that mental activity which is not in accordance with the suchness of things; if otherwise, the whole drift of the present Discourse becomes totally unintelligible. 5 This simplistic re-Sanskritization is based on the popular Japanese word nembutsu (Chinese: nienjon) for buddhanusmrti. Suzuki sidetracks the issue by using the English "subjectivity" to render the meaning of nien, drawing upon, no doubt, his study then on the Lmikiivatara siitra. Later, in 1949, as a Zenist introducing Hui-neng in the Zen Doctrine of No Mind, Suzuki suggested for nien. 6 In this he is closer to one of the literal meanings of nien. He also changed his vocabulary in accord- ance with the current interest in the "Unconscious." The No-Mind (wu-nien, wu-hsin)O ideal was dubbed the discovery of the creative 35 Unconscious. In the end, neither smrti nor subjectivity or U ncon- scious, exhausts the full range of meaning of nien or wu-nien. Jacques Gernet in his study of Shen-hui, the leading disciple of Hui-neng who capitalized on wu-nien, offers acitta, acittaka, asa'T(tjiiisamii- patti and nirodhasamiipatti for wu-nien. 7 All these Sanskrit words suggest the absence of mind or mental activity. They are better choices and justifiable as part of the Ch'an psychology. It is, however, risky to re- Sanskritize Ch'an terms since this tradition has always freely used words. Acitta etc., furthermore, cannot solve our problems with the AFM or the AFMS. Gernet works on the assumption, as Suzuki has to a large extent, that wu-nien is a synonym for wu-hsin (no-mind). Some- times in Ch'an, wu-hsin is indeed just one more radical way of saying wu- nien, but in the case of the AFM, the two terms are not the same. In almost all cases, nien is an inferior reality to hsin. Wu-hsin is used once only. Nien, as we will see, is intrinsically "negative." It is something to be "negated" (wu), emptied, abolished, so as to free the Mind (hsin). Hsin does not share the same negative connotations. If a negative mind is intended, the prefix wangP (deluded) is usually added, but it is almost redundant to add wang to the negative nien. PhilIp Yampolsky's translation of the Plaiform Siitra (1967) appeared at the same time as Yoshito Hakeda's translation of the AFM. Yampolsky has offered no-thought for wu-nien (with a reference to Gernet 8 ). Hakeda however consistently departs from his colleague in not using "no-thought." Instead he equates vikalpa with nien and takes wu-nien to imply its opposite, avikalpa, or else acintya. His choice is based on the assumption that nien is short for wang-nien (deluded thought), a synonym of wang-hsiangq (deluded thought), or fen-pieh r (differentia- tion), the preferred translations for vikalpa (differentiation, ating consciousness). The AFM does use the term wang-nien, and even wang-hsin (deluded mind). However, there are two technical problems here: (a) the AFM often uses nien simply by itself without the adjective wang, and (b) Hakeda also associates vikalpa with the AFM discussion on the ming-tzu-hsiang S function of the mind (the form of mind that differentiates names and realities). It is wu-nien that poses the greatest challenge to Hakeda's reading. Avoiding "no-thought," Hakeda takes wu-nien to mean acintya (the mithinkable) and the avikalpa (what is not analyzable by the intellect). In English, he stays with either "beyond empirical predication or deter- mination" and "beyond what they are thought to be."9 To do so, however, he often has to go around the original by using qualifiers. 36 Ironically, Hakeda is often only doing what the AFMS has tried to do. " S i k ~ a nanda," the alleged translator to the AFMS, had had the same trouble with nien and wu-nien. The AFMS' Attempts at Editing the Nienldeology Through a comparison of the AFM and the AFMS ideology, 10 we see, very interestingly, how the AFMS consistently (a) adds the adjective wang, deluded, to nien, thought, and (b) drops all references to wu-nien, even at the risk of tampering with the organic whole of the discourse. Because the AFM has more internal consistency than the AFMS in this and other areas 11, it can be assumed that the AFM is the original and the AFMS a redaction, and not the other way around. Below is one passage of the AFM (in my literal translation), followed by the same in the AFMS (Suzuki's, somewhat edited) and Hakeda's translation. The AFMS drops wu-nien, and adds such a long substitute passage that I have to skip some part of it. AFM: The object-realms of the five senses and the mind are ultimately wu-nien (no-thought) .... Sentient beings ... deluded by igno- rance mistake the mind as thought (nien) but the mind itself never moves (tung). t If a person can so examine it and realize that the mind itself is wu-nien (no-thought), he would smoothly and in due accord enter the gate of Suchness. 12 The AFM reference to wu-nien does not make the best of sense. How can the first five senses (matter, smell, etc.) be thoughtless? However, the basic message in Chinese is: the mind is passive ("never moves") until it is deluded ("moved") by thought, nien. To know that mind and reality are essentially free from thought, wu-nien, is to return the mind to Suchness. Suchness is, says the AFM, "free from thought." 13 AFMS: These modes of existence such as matter etc. (the skandhas) are imperfect. Why are they imperfect? When we divide some gross (or composite) matter, we can reduce it to atoms (anu). But as the atom will also be subject to further division, all forms of material existence, whether gross or fine, are nothing but the shadow of particularization produced by a subjective mind [vikalpa], and we cannot ascribe any degree of -(absolute or independent) reality to them. [The same applies to the other skandhas and the asa1[lkrtadharmas-the AFMS goes on at length to 37 enumerate.] All beings, because of their misleading ignorance, imagine that the mind is being disturbed, while in reality it is not. But when they understand that the disturbance of the mind is "neither birth nor death" 14 [Suzuki's translation: immortality]15, they would then enter into the gate of Suchness. 16 The AFMS passage here realizes precisely that one cannot appro- priately refer to the five senses (eyes, ears, nose, mouth and touch) as having "thought." Thought at best can be the correlate to the sixth faculty, the mind. Therefore the AFMS "very logically" re-interprets the passage by dropping the reference to wu-nien and reads the message as one of "absence of substance" in the skandhas misperceived by the "subjective mind." The AFMS then has to resurrect the theory of atoms, anu (used in the Abhidharma-kosa and more recently incorporated into the V ijitaptimiitratiisiddhi) to fill the gap left by its dropping wu-nien. This brings in the whole discussion of the compounded and uncom- pounded dharmas that have played no role in the AFM and no role in the rest of the AFMS. It is logical to assume that this is the result of redaction by the AFMS. Hakeda: The objects of the five senses and of the mind are in the final analysis beyond what they are thought to be (wu-nien) . ... People, because of their ignorance, assume Mind (Suchness) to be what they think it to be, though Mind in fact is unaffected (tung) even if it is falsely predicated. If a man is able to observe and understand that Mind is beyond what it is thought to be, then he will be able to conform to and enter the realm of Suchness. 17 Hakeda's translation is rather round-about. Probably relying on the AFMS, it manages to make better (Sanskrit) sense of wu-nien. It also follows the AFMS in taking the word tung (move) in the passive voice to mean "being disturbed" or "being affected." The mind is "unaffected even if it is falsely predicated." This reading is not warranted by the grammar. 18 It also does not concur with the discussion on hsin and nien elsewhere in the AFM. Tung is clearly the movement brought about by nien; this is called at one point wang-tung, deluded movement. 19 The mind by itself does not move; the nien naturally does. To mistake the movement of nien for the immovable mind is the mark of the ignorant; the reversal is the entrance into Suchness. So elsewhere the AFM well says, and Hakeda himself acknowledges: 38 AFM (Hakeda): Water and wind are inseparable; but water is not mobile by nature (tung . ... Likewise, man's Mind, pure in its own nature, is stirred (tung) by the wind of ignorance .... Yet Mind is not mobile by nature .... 20 The AFMS, incidentally, has changed somewhat this crucial passage in the AFM.21 The immutability of mind is as clearly set forth in another crucial passage in the AFM. AFM (My translation): In other words, the nature of the mind is always wu-nien (without thought); therefore it is said to be immuta- ble (pu-pien). U Because the mind may not (always) attain the One Dharmadhatu, therefore it fails to correspond (to Suchness). Suddenly a thought rose and this constituted ignorance. 22 AFM (Hakeda): What is called the essential nature of Mind is always beyond thoughts. It is, therefore, defined as "immutable." When the One W orId of Reality is yet to be realized, the Mind (is mutable and) is not in perfect unity (with Suchess). Suddenly, (a deluded) thought arises; (this state) is called ignorance. 23 In long notations, Hakeda suggests akasmiit for the Chinese hu-jan. 24v The AFMS preserves the sense of the changless mind, buy typically, it edits off all reference to wu-nien. AFMS (Suzuki, with minor changes): While the essence of the mind is eternally clean and pure, the influence of ignorance makes possible the existence of a defiled mind. But despite the defiled mind, the mind (itself) is eternal, clear, pure, and not subject to transformation. Further as its original nature is free from particu- larization ifen-pieh, vikalpa) , it knows in itself no change what- ever, though it produces everywhere the various modes of ex- istence. When the (Dharmadhatu) is not recognized, there is lacking the correspondence (with Suchness). Ignorance and particularization then arise, giving rise to various defiled consciousnesses. 25 The Sinitic Meaning of Nien and Wu-nien Nien is a complex concept involving several layers of meanings drawn from Indian and Chinese connotations. Of the Sanskrit, smrti is 39 tangential, even though the Platform sutra later would make free use of it (nien chenj'u 26 ,w mindfulness of Suchness as the meaning of nien in wu-nien). K ~ a n a is often implied. Vikalpa is the most relevant. The AFM and AFMS accept the inspiration of wu-nien as coming from a sidra. The sutra is suspected to be the Lankiivatiira sutra. AFM (My translation): Thus asutra says, "If there is any sentient being who can perceive wu-nien, he would be advancing toward Buddha-wisdom." (Hakeda gives "that which is beyond thought" for wu-nien.)27 AFMS (Suzuki): Therefore it is said in the Sutra that those who have an insight into the nonreality (wu-hsiang kharacterlessness}) of all subjectivity (wang-nien, vikalpa) attain the wisdom of the Tathagata. 28 The cited passage is not found in the Lankiivatiira sutra but the AFMS is probably right in prudently re-constituting wu-nien as wu-hsiang and wang-nien (vikalpa). It is safe to assume that the AFM simplifies the sutra's denunciation of vikalpa into wu-nien. Wu-nien, however, is more than vikalpa. Even Suzuki, Gernet and Yampolsky accept a Taoist source for wu-hsin or wu-nien. The boldest statement is that ofWing-tsit Chan commenting on the Platform sutra: The doctrine of the absence of thought (wu-nien) is no cult of unconsciousness. Nor is it a Zen invention (in the Platform Sutra). It goes back to Taoism, Neo-Taoism and the Early Seven Schools of Buddhism, all of which taught "having no mind of one's own," that is, having no mental attachment which would keep the mind in bondage. 29 Indeed, one can find the idea of wu-hsin or hsin-wu in Chuang-tzu Z and in the commentary on it by Kuo Hsiang. Y Below are offered a few samplings from the Eastern Chin and the Six Dynasties period, up to Tan Ch'ien, Z the first known scholar of the AFM: 40 a) Chih Min-tuaaofthe hsin-wuabschool: "When thesutra teaches that all dharmas are empty, it is intending that the people would empty their minds so as not to hold on to the empty illusions." 30 b) Ho Ch' eng-t'ien, ac an anti-Buddhist thinker: "The Great Man and the gentleman make humanity (jen)ad their concern. Their minds do not harbour nien, but take on form and shapes as [expedient] ornaments ... so that they be approachable to common men."3! c) Hui-yiian, ae defender of faith: "That which receives karma is without a master or lord. It is the mind. The mind has no permanent master. It receives stimuli from things without, and reacts accordingly. The responses can be speedy or slow, therefore the karmic retribution can be immediate or delayed."32 And, "Do not let emotions burden down sheng af (read hsing, ag nature) or sheng burden down shen ah (spirit)."33 Read hsinaI for shen. d) Tsung Ping, aj his student: "The Sage is without a permanent mind; he uses the mind of things as his mind," i.e., he goes along with things as his guide. 34 e) T'an-ch'ien, first known student of AFM: "There being no mind, all pros and cons (shih-fei, ak conflicts) would cease."35 There is, however, a fallacy in equating nien withhsin. Chuang-tzu did not know of wu-nien. Wu-nien has a shade of meaning, not available immediately in wu-hsin. After it has incorporated Sanskrit overtones, nien has the meaning of k:jana, "one sixtieth of a snap of a finger," that is not in its classical sense. Therefore nien is often best rendered as "thought-instance" or an "instance of thought," so as to preserve both the time element (momentariness) and its ideational content (thought). Because of the suggestion of "impermanence" (k:jana), nien is repeatedly contrasted with the permanence or invariability, pu-tung or pu-pien, of the absolute, pure mind, Suchness or Buddha-nature. Thus we have the set phrase, nien-nien hsiang-shu, al "moment-to-moment continuity" (implying actually also discontinuity, orpu-ch'ang am ). Hsiang-shu stands usually for santana as in citta-santarw (hsiang-shu hsin, an or, hsiang-shu shih, ao mental continuum). In the AFM and the AFMS, this is associated with the 36 A review of all the passages in the AFM involving nien would substantiate our contention that nien should be read within this larger matrix of meanings. The translations are mine; reference is given to the page number in Hakeda's translation. T. 576a/Hakeda 32: All the various dharmas, realities, are differen- tiated only because of wang-nien, deluded thoughts. If one li-nien departs or dissociates oneself from thought, then there would be no form to the object-realm at all. Wang-nien is explicitly named here; it is vikalpa that creates the uncalled- for differentiations. Li-nien, departure or freedom from thought, would bring us back to the undifferentiated state. 41 T. 576aiHakeda 34: [In truth] although all the various dharmas appear as thought-moments, there is neither that which can conceive of them (k'o-nien)ap nor that which can be perceived of such (neng- nien).aq The disappearance of the object-realm (the object to the senses) as well as the subject is dramatically put forth. The last part is not easily intelligible unless one is familiar with the usage of nien in meditation (smrti). As early as the third century A.D., Chinese following the Anapana sutra (An-pan shou-i ching)ar began to understand and use the word nien with reference to the psychological reduction of self and phenomena into thought-instances (nien, ~ a r : a ) that the mind is mindful of (nien, smrti) at the moment. All realities are momentary, and are due to the nien (not due to the mind, hsin). In so far as nien (vikalpa) is false, the True itself is beyond nien (wu-nien), beyond the conceiver or the conceived of (so-nien 37 ,as neng-nien). In Suchness, there is neither the subject nor the object. (See citations later.) T. 576a/Hakeda 34: By the Emptiness of Suchness is meant ... that it is free (li) from the all the differentiated forms of the dharmas because [the Suchness Mind] has no hsii-wang-hsin-nien, at vain, deluded, psychic thoughts (vikalpa). In contrast to this ideal, there is the deluded mind of sentient beings. T. 576b/Hakeda 35: Because all sentient beings, possessing the wang-hsin, deluded mind, experience nien-nien, the succession of thought-moments, each being different and not mutually corres- ponding, therefore (they have to be told that) everything is empty. However, once free from the deluded mind, li-wang-hsin, (they would know that) there is actually nothing here to be emptied. Here we see the several meanings of nien entering into the overall defi- nition of the "deluded thought." This passage also shows the properly qualified use of the term wang-hsin. One can say li-nien or li-wang-hsin but never li-hsin au by itself. T. 376b/Hakeda 38-39: The common people may attain (some) chiieh, av (realization): in knowing that a former nien, thought, has given rise to evil, they can stop a succeeding thought from rising .... The Two Vehicles of the sravaka and the pratyekabuddha as well as the initiate bodhisattva may realize, within nien-i, ay the variant thought, nien-wu-i, ax the nonvariance of thoughts .... The 42 Dharmakiiya bodhisattva may (further) realize, within nien-chu, ax the abiding thought, nien-wu-chu, the nonabiding thought .... (Only) he who completes all the bodhisattva bhumis and the upiiyas can in i-nien, az a single instant, align (his mind with Suchness), realizing that when the mind is first aroused, the mind itself has no initial form, because, in itself, the mind is far from (J'Uan-li) ba even the smallest of nien [that rises] .... Therefore a surra says "If there is any sentient being who can perceive wu-nien, he would be advancing toward Buddha-wisdom." The above passage involves an unorthodox use of the four forms ( s s u ~ hsiang), bb i.e., the Sarvastivadin analysis of four "moments" in any dharma-event, what I translated (in keeping with the meaning of the Chinese) as the rise, the abiding, the variance and the cessation of nien. The Four Moments and Their Reversal ... jati sthiti anaythatva nirodha birth ---........ abiding --_.-1 .... varying (sheng) (chu) (i) - __ II" cessation (mieh)hc the enlightened the Dharmakaya Two Vehicles and commoners can realizes the bodhisattvas can initiate bodhisattvas cease this unborn .... I---- attain nonabiding..- can realize non- .... 1------ variance Key: --..progression of life and death (sa1{!Sara) ~ reversal to nirvaTfa The second half of the diagram shows where the AFM places the achievement of the various yiinas. (The classification is itself a proble- matical innovation.) The logic is based on a gloss of the term sheng- mieh bd (jiiti and nirodha) for sa'T(tSiira. This is possible only in Chinese. Sheng-mieh happens also to be one Chinese rendition of sa'T(tSiira. The argument then goes: the progression from sheng to mieh means sa'T(tSiira; the regression from mieh to sheng is therefore nirvii1Ja. Nirvii1Ja is the Unborn (that which is prior to evenjiiti). Such liberal usages of sheng- mieh are found as early as the fourth century A.D. in China. How and when did the whole process of nien-nien sheng-mieh be (the arising and the dying of the continuous nien) begin? The answer is: The nien is beginningless. T. 576bc/Hakeda 40: As to the arousing of the Mind, there is no incipient form that can be known. To say that it can be known is 43 (to attain) wu-nien, no-thought. (Failing this) therefore all sentient beings are not said to be enlightened. This is because (for them), from the very beginning, thought has succeeded thought, nien-nien hsiang-hsil, and (they have) yet to li-nien, dissociate themselves from that stream of thought. Therefofe they are said to be in "beginningless ignorance." If a person attains wu-nien, no-thought, then he realizes how the forms of the mind undergo (the four forms of) rise, abiding, variance and cessation. This is because he is one with no-thought. Before the '''beginningless ignorance" is wu-nien. The wu-nien (suchness) mind is free from the vicissitude of thought-moments. For the deluded, there has always been nien in endless succession, hsiang- hsii from the beginning. To know the ultitnate paradox-how an incipi- ent thought can emerge from a thought-free mind-is the same as attaining wu-nien itself. Free from nien, a person can perceive the rising, abiding, varying and ceasing of nien itself. To do that, a person must break the "continuous mind," the hsiang-shii hsin, citta-santiina, that is, says the AFM, the iilaya-vijiuina. T. 376/Hakeda 41: He destroys the compound consciousness [the iilaya-vijiUina] and brings an end to the forms of the continuous mind, thereby letting manifest the Dharmakaya ... because all hsin-shih chih-hsiang, bf forms of mind and consciousness, are ignorance itself. But where does the continuity consciousness itself come from? From the mind! The hsin "somehow" gives. rise to nien which then continues on by itself with no end. T. 577a/Hakeda 45: Concerning the form of continuity: ... the Mind gives rise to nien, thought, and it correspondingly continues with no end. T. 577b/Hakeda 48: Concerning the continuity consciousness [evolved from the Mind]: as it corresponds to nien, it continues with no end. Nien is the form of ignorance itself. Sometimes it is ignorance that is the root of nien. Elsewhere, it is said that the sudden emergence of nien constitutes ignorance. Both ignorance and nien are beginningless. It is'also ignorance acting as Suchness 38 that gives rise to wang-hsin, bg a 44 deluded mind (vikalpa) within. Then, later, the deluded objects appear without. T. 755c/Hakeda 50: Suddenly a thought arises; this is called ignorance. T 578a/Hakeda 56: Because (ignorance) perfumes Suchness, there is the deluded mind .... The unenlightened nien, thought, arises and thereby the deluded object-realm is manifested. Nien is, within man, the deluded thought; in consciousness, it is the momentary frame by which all things are known; in time, it is a moment; in contrast with the immovable mind, it is the ever-changing' santiina. But is nien real? No. T. 579c/Hakeda 73: The object-realms of the five senses and the mind are ultimately wu-nien (not structured according to our thoughts) .... Sentient beings ... deluded by ignorance mistake the mind as nien [which changes], but the mind never moves. If a person could so examine it and realize that the mind itself is wu- nien (without thoughts), he would smoothly and in due accord enter the gate of Suchness. 39 Aside from those passages in which nien means "meditative recol- lection," these are virtually all the key passages in the AFM involving nien. The AFMS edited some of these, did away with wu-nien all together but, as with Hakeda, it is unable to abandon the tone of other nien passages. The editing being haphazard, the AFMS is better considered a redaction. Nien being somehow non-Sanskritic yet integral to the AFM, the AFM is better considered Chinese in origin. Differences between nien and hsin mean that wu-nien cannot be simply traced back to Chuang-tzu's "no-mind" as so many scholars suggest. The deeper nuance of nien has to be found elsewhere. In the chapter on (human) nature and feeling, hsing-ch'ing, bh in the Po-hu-t'ung bi (Comprehensive Discussion at the White Tiger Hall [in A.D. 39 under imperial sponsorship]),40 we find this subtler Han classification of hsin and nien: "What do hsing and ch'ing signify? Hsing is the work of yang bj as ch'ing that of yin. bkMan is born out of the reception of the yin-yang ethers and is thus endowed with the Five Natures [the five virtues] and the Six Emotions Goy, anger, grief, happiness, love, hatred]. Ch'ingalso means passivity (ching) bI while hsing bm is existence (sheng). bn Their reception procures life. Therefore, the Kou ming chueh says: 'Emotions 45 rise from yin; it is desires based on shih nien bo (momentary thought). Nature comes from yang; it is always in tune to the li bp(Principle).' Yang is considerate of other; yin knows only selfIsh gain. Therefore, emotions are greedy and nature is directed at humanity.42" T'ang Yung-t'ung bqcites a slightly different edition, which reads in part: Nien-lii br(thinking and pondering) is in accordance with shih (time) ... and hsing (human nature).42 Hsing should be read as ch'ing in the last line, i.e. nien-lii is associated with activated hsing or the emotions. The Chinese character nien is a combination of "present" and "mind." Its ties with shih (time) explain why it was chosen to render k!jaTJa, moment. Nien usually is employed to denote "to think of, to remember; thought, recollection." This is the reason for its being chosen to translate sm'(ti, to recall or be presently mindful of. The word did not have as yet a negative connotation in the classical period, but by Han, under the influence of yin-yang classifIcation, the mind (hsin) is aligned with yang and nien (and a host of other mental functions like i and lU) came to be regarded as yin. Such mental activities distract the mind from its originally passive, wholesome state. The mind becomes active, extroverted and restless in its mental activities (nien). This yin- yang division parallels the more basic one attending hsing and ch'ing. The Music chapter of the Book of Rites says: A human being at birth (sheng) is passive; this is his nature. In contact with things, [emotions] are activated; this is the desiring aspect of his nature. 43 The yang nature is the pen, bSbasis; the yin emotions are mo, btthe subse- quents. One should always preserve or return to the pen and not be misled by the mo. In the psyche, this means abiding with the passive mind, hsin, and not being pulled down by the active nien. In Han thought, the Sage abides with the pen so much so that he is said to be wu- ch'ing, bu without emotions. He is impassive as impartial Heaven itself. Although the original ideal in Confucian anthropology is not to elimi- nate feelings (jen-ch'ing bv ) altogether but to fInd the harmony between hsing and ch'ing (cf. the Doctrine of the Mean), post-Han thought leans more and more toward ascetical denial, being more aware of the harm 46 the i or the nien can do to the immobile mind. When the AFM describes the mind as basically pu-tung (not moving) and blames all deluded movements, wang-tung, on the nien, it is following this Han tradition much more than any known legitimate Indian Buddhist precedent. Han Psychology AFM Psychology I Nature, yang, and li Mind, passive, Suchness noutnenal phenomenal yin, and nien I Consciousness, active, nien The structural continuity is diagrammed above. The disjunction of .. having yang and passivity together on the "noumenal" side is a problem native to the Han classificatory system itself. Wu-nien is an early Chinese Buddhist ideal, a gateway to nirvii1fa and enlightenment long before Chinese knew all the fme points about vikalpa as the differentiating consciousness. Wu-nien was used as is, with no apology, and in need of no prefix, i.e. wu-wang-nien (avikalpa). Together with i (a close cousin of nien, meaning also the first stirring of mind), nien was understood as the incipient thought in the early An-pan shou-i (Amipana) meditative tradition. K'ang Seng-hui's bwpreface to this sutra describes the freedom gained through the four dhyiinas, or how the extraneous nien or deflled i-nien can be fmally removed: The mind is then controlled. The nien (thought process) has been reversed. The various skandhas are dead. This is called "returning." The various desires having died down, the mind is wu-hsiang (without thought). This is called "purity."44 Vikalpa is not an issue here. The Lankiivatiira sutra was then unknown, even to India. In the running commentary to the first chapter of the Ming-tu-ching bx(Chih Ch'ien by polished retranslation of the 14tasiihasrikii Prajiiaparamitiisutra)45 from the same period (ca. 222-229), we encounter the same general use of nien and wu-nien by the commentator. 47 Concerning consciousness as the root of all realities) jhe Dharma- pada has said, "The mind is the root of all realities. All good and evil come from it. Misfortune and punishment are likewise due to consciousness." When (our) skandhas are flawed (by desires and activity), we cannot recognize the truth of wu-nien. Wu-nien is without a source. 46 Not only is wu-nien beginningless, the emergence of the first thought or nien from the originally wu-nien mind is just as mysterious. Since nien gives rise to life and death of phenomena (jiiti-nirodha), the reversal of nien is freely seen as the negation of life and death or saT[tSiira (sheng- mieh): By activity is meant the mind oflife and death (sa'f!iSiira). The dark skandhas give rise secretly to the nien. Erase the nien and one can, in one step, attain the wu-pu-weibz(the wu-wei, nonaction, that is wu-pu-wei, accomplishing all).47 The Ming-tu commentary contains more explanations of the native concepts of i and nien. Examples from this early period can be multi- plied, but perhaps the most lucid usage that reveals its link with the Po- hu-tung is from Hsi Ch'ao, caa student of Chih Tun, cbin the fourth century. In his Fengja-yao cc (Essentials of Faith), he returns to the familiar theme of the mind as the creator of all realities, spoken of by the Dharmapiida. 48 The word i (intention) is often chosen in this period to render that active side of citta (mind, cetana, will) as well as the psychic predispositions, saT[tSkiira, in the twelve nidiinas. The Vimalakirti Sutra says: All the various dharmas take form (hsing) according to i (intention, thought). cd The sign of good fortune stirs (within) as the incipient elements and the affairs (of the world) respond accordingly as the result. As a nien rises, there is yu ce (being). As a lii ceases, there is wu ct (nonbeing). Where the i (intentions) is at peace, all encounters run smoothly. Where the ch'ing (feelings) are obstructed, hazards abound. Therefore it is said: Causes for penetration and impediment lie within ourselves and not in things. 49 It is also said: In his mind (the man of the Way) should guard against the tiniest beginning of lii. With the ultimate li (Principle) as his castle, he commands over the fundamental (pen) and restrains the secon- daries (mo, subsequents). He would not, prior to the events taking shape (hsing) , ever so lightly arouse any hsin-nien (mental thoughts).50 Here we see the more detailed parallel structure to the Po-Hu-tung: 48 changeless passive formless li (Principle) hsing (nature) wu (nonbeing) pen (origin) ----- ~ - - - - - ----- ------ active i (intention) yu (being) mo (subsequent.s) ch'ing nien (thought) hsing (form) (emotions) lU (pondering) The same structure then emerges in the AFM in the form of: Such ness Mind, ideal wu-nien i neither life nor death, immobile ___ ~ ~ ~ : : ~ : ~ ~ : ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ r ~ t __ _ Continuous nien (tilayavijiitina) I life and death, sa1(!stira, change Decidedly the AFM structure is much more complicated. The descent from pen (hsin, mind) into the mo (subsequent consciousness) alone is extremely intricate. Suchness is also given a double aspect just under the effable side of its essence: the siinya and the aSiinya (empty and not empty) etc. Still, the sinitic stamp of aligning hsin (mind) with an invari- able principle (Suchness) and shih (consciousness)-and the culpable nien-with momentary changes is unmistakable. There is indeed this basic thread running through Han reflection on hsin-nien and the AFM quasi-Yogacara psychology. The key concepts of nien and wu-nien in the AFM cannot be understood outside this native framework. Reasonsfor the Redaction of the AFM into the AFMS The above study shows that nien and wu-nien are problematical concepts in the AFM. They have defied the Sanskritist's attempts at direct correlation because they contain elements drawn from a Chinese pre-Buddhist use of the term. We have seen how Hakeda has repeatedly tried to make sense of the terms by remolding them so as to accord with Indian logic. The same motivation lies behind the AFMS redaction of the AFM. Within fifty years after the appearance of the AFM in China, there were already charges that the AFM was a six-century forgery by the masters of the DaSabhiimika sa.stra in the North. The criticism came from the Sa:qtgraha school founded by Paramartha in the South. Hsuan-tsang was frustrated enough with this unsettled controversy, so it is said, that he went to India to bring back the definitive answer. Due 49 to his translation of the Vijiiaptimiitratra-siddhi, Ch'eng Wei-shih-lun, cq the AFM was further discredited. We might never know who produced the AFMS or even where, but the AFMS preface shows what might be the motive for producing it. There the AFMS is said to be translated under , S i k ~ a n a n d a into two scrolls: However, there are discrepancies between it and the older transla- tion. This may be due to the different intention of the translators or that there might be different Sanskrit originals. 51 These are still the reasons offered by people for arguing Indian authorship. I think the real reason is found in this other statement:. The more mysterious the principle, the more difficult it is for people to believe it. The more sacred the Way, the more active is the Devil (who seeks to discredit it). How much more so in this defIled and degenerate age! Therefore men of biased opinions, holding on to the Vijiiaptimiitratii-siddhi, denounce this work (and its doctrine of) the mutual perfuming of Suchness and avidya. (The ineffable truth) being given in words can be obstructed because of the audience of that time. The previous dew of Mahayana can thus be turned (by irresponsible persons) into poison. 52 The preface then listed canonical justification for what the AFM preface characterized as its unique message ofju-li yuan-ch'i ch(causality from out of the suchness principle).53 The AFMS was probably produced in China, during that debate or in Wonhyo's ciKorea, known for "harmonious" teachings. Given these remarks in the AFMS preface, I would suggest that the AFMS was authored to counter the attacks of the new Wei-shih school. At that time, someone, comparable to Hakeda in our time, tried to rectify the AFM by rendering it in such a way that it would not be too offensive to the better Yogacara rationality. Those troublesome passages involving nien and wu-nien were therefore changed, to make the text "acceptable." It is not that the redactor consciously changed the text. He sincerely believed that the AFM concurred with the Vijiiapti- miitratii-siddhi logic but had a deeper message. The discrepancies, he thought, could be smoothed out. In the end, they cannot be smoothed out. The AFMS is so much love labour's lost. It never attracted the attention that the AFM did, nor resolved the conflict. The conflict between AFM and Wei-shih was a standoff. Fa-tsang then defended 50 the superiority of the Fa-hsingcj position of the AFM and henceforth demoted Wei-shih to the dubious inferiority of Fa-hsiang c l ~ ... All that, however, would belong to another study for another occasion. 54 NOTES 1. Given as jend (thus often translated as "man's original nature"); it could be ju cm ("to enter"). Translation mine. 2. Mochizuki, Daijo kishinron no kenkyu Cn (Kyoto, 1922). 3. Ongoing project since my dissertation (Harvard, 1975). 4. Mochizuki suggests Korea because of the discovery of the AFMS in Korea. 5. Suzuki, Asvaghosa's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana (Chicago: Open Court, 1900), p. 56. 6. ap. cit. (London: Rider & Co., 1949), pp. 29-30, 56. 7. Gernet, Entretiens duMaitre de Dhyana Chen-houei duHo-tso (Hanoi, 1949), pp. 12-13, note 5. He offers the French "absence de pensee." 8. Yampolsky, The Platform Sutra of The Sixth Patriarch (New York: Columbia Uni. Press, 1967), pp. 137-39, with note 69 devoted to wu-nien. 9. Hakeda, Awakening of Faith Attributed to Asvaghosa (New York: Columbia Uni. Press, 1967), p. 73 note. 10. Kashiwagi Hiroo failed to do this in his "Shikushananda no yaku to tsutaera- rem Daijo kishinron," Indogaku Bukkyogaku kenkyu, 10.2 (1962), pp. 124-25. 11. Another test-case is AFMS' redaction of the "water-wave" metaphor. 12. T. 44, p. 579c. 13. T. 44, p. 576ab. 14. Often taken in China to mean nirva:,!-a, but AFMS might have in mind the original dialectics of Madhyamika. 15. Suzuki trans. cit., p. 104. Unwarranted reading. 16. T. 44, p. 588a. 17. Hakeda, trans. cit., pp. 72-73. 18. The passive voice is not intended; the AFMS of Suzuki is probably the model. 19. T. 44, p. 580a. 20. Hakeda, trans. cit., p. 41. 21. Dealt with in my dissertation. 51 22. T. 44, p. 577c. 23. Hakeda, trans. cit., p. 5l. 24. The more immediate precedent of hu-jan is Hsi Ch'ao's Fengja-yao or, further back, Kuo Hsiang's use of k'uai-jan;co this issue is to be dealt with in companion pieces on "hu-jan nieh-ch'i"cP in the AFM. . 25. Suzuki, trans. cit., p. 79. 26. Platform sutra but only in the later popular version. 27. T. 44, p. 576b and Hakeda, trans. cit., p. 39. 28. Suzuki, trans. cit., p. 65. 29. A Source Book of Chinese Philosophy (Princeton: Princeton Uni. Press, 1963), p. 435. 30. As reported by Chi-tsang cq in his Chung-Iun-shu. cr 31. T. 52, p. 19b. 32. T. 52, p. 34b. 33. T. 52, p. 30c. 34. From my translation in an ongoing study of his Mingjo-Iun, cs T. 52, p. 18c. 35. From his Wang shihjei-Iun;ct see my translation in "T'an-ch'ien and the Early Ch'an Tradition," Early Ch'an in China and Tibet, ed. by W. Lai and Lewis Lancaster, forth- coming from the Berkeley Buddhist Series. 36. T. 44, pp. 577b, 586a. 37. AFM gives k'o-nien cu ("can be thought of'); AFMS gives the preferred so- nien cv ("that which is being thought of'); see T. 44, pp. 576a, 584c. 38. Touchy issue in the AFM philosophy. Wonhyocw realized that to posit this is contrary to the logic of Y ogaca.ra as listed in the Sa1!lgraha. 39. Translation slightly different from one offered earlier. 40. See translation by Tjan Tjoe Som, Po Hu Tung, in Sinica Leidensia (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1952). 41. My translation; compare ibid., vol. II, p. 565. 42. T'ang, Han-Wei liang-Chin Nan-pei-chao Fo-chiao-shih (Peking reissue: Chung hua, 1955). 43. My translation; see Theodore de Bary ed., Sources of Chinese Tradition (New York: Columbia Uni. Press, 1960), p. 168. 44. T. 55, p. 43b. Wu-hsiang is close to meaning wu-nien. 45. T. 8, no. 225, pp. 478-508. 46. T. 8, p. 480b. From my completed translation of this running commentary. 47. T. 8, p. 479a. 48. The first chapter in the Pali Dhammapada. 49. My translation, from T. 52, p. 88b; compare Zurcher's version in op. cit., I, p. 172. 50. My translation, from T. 52, p. 87a; compare Zurcher's, ibid., p. 167. 5. T. 52, p. 583c. 52. Ibid. 53. T, 52, p. 575a. 54. See my "Fa-tsang'sCX Criticism of Wei-shih," paper read at the national con- ference of the Association for Asian Studies (1979) in the North American Buddhist Association session; this is based on a translation of the hsin-shih-Iun cy chapter in the Wu- chiao-chang,-cz see also an accompanying piece to the present study, "Suddenly a Thougl Rose: Chinese Understanding of Mind and Conciousness" (mn., 1980). 52 b .1ft. i1ft t
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c z 15.. 'fJ. 1lf: The Abhidharmika Notion of V ijiiiina and its Soteriological Significance* by Bra} M. Sinha Introduction This paper is an attempt to articulate the Abhidharmika conception of vijiuina in phenomenological idiom. Our concern here is to bring out the uniqueness of the Abhidharmika understanding of the problem of consciousness and its relationship to the question of subjectivity, temporality and transcendence. For the Abhidharmika, reification of time, as an abstract category independent of entities and conditioning their mode of being, is a metaphysical presupposition which is not indispensable for an under- standing of the phenomenon of temporality. Temporality, then, is not conceived of as adjectival synonym of time as the transcendent condi- tion of our being and cognition. The whole question of temporality in Abhidharmika Buddhism revolves around the nature and structure of vijiuina as a dharma. V ~ i i u i n a , from the Abhidharmika point of view, as a dharma, is continually changing, is never self-identical, and as the structure of becoming and phenomenal conditioning it is essentially temporal. Temporality of the vijiiana then implies both the fact of the change and finitude of phenomenal existence as well as its "subjective" expenence . . Within the Abhidharmika scheme, one can discern two modes of the functioning of vijiiiina. First is the cognitive mode Qf consciousness, which implies the claiming of the object as the other by the subject (samyoga). The other is the reflective mode of consciousness leading to the disclaiming of this otherness of subject and object (visamyoga). First is the temporal mode of becoming, where the vijiiiina functions asa dharma, as the structure of world involvement of the existentially finite subject. Later is the mode of transcendence of vijiiana which goes 54 beyond the subject-object otherness of the world of becoming. However, since world involvement is structural to the very being of vijiuina, the transcendence also implies the dissolution of vijiiiina, the empiric consciousness which operates in the realm of otherness. Thus, the overcoming of temporality, the process of becomingness of the conditioned dharmas (samskrtatua) is essentially the dissolution of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. The consciousness which loses the other through which alone could it express itself, loses its subject- hood. Thus the eternity of nirviirJa as the stillness 6f consciousness (sthita) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness. The Category of Time and the Theory of Dharma as Temporal It is in early Abhidharmika literature that we find the first attempt to understand temporality in non-substantive terms. The Abhidharmika tradition disregarded the question of the substantive reality of time as a factor exists as an independent reality which in them was not whether time exists as an independent reality which in conjunction with other realities or events constitutes temporal deter- minations. Their primary concern was to account for the knowledge of things as temporally determined and that they could do by acknowledg" ing the reality of dharmas as past, present and future. Thus the on Jiianaprasthtina declared that everything is real; the past (atl-ta) and the future (aniigata) are as much real as the present (pratyutpanna). The theory proposed here does not make any distinc- tion between things in themselves such as past and future matter, and the representations one has of them. It is here that we find the realism of Abhidharmikas present in its most pronounced form. It is not the reality of past, present and future as three points of time that is posited by rather, it is the reality of things or dharmas as past, present and future that is admitted here. Time is no factor in the deter- mination of things or dharmas as past, present or future. In early Abhidharmika literature we come across an alternative to Kiilaviidins, when Abhidharmikas point out that the temporal determinations of things are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a being. Thus points out: 55 If all the three have not yet been active, the dharma is called future. If one of them has already finished its activity and thus is just active, then the dharma is called present. If it has already finished its activity, the dharma is called past. l It is important to note that early Abhidharmika literature never considered the determination of a dharma's tempor;;tl quality to be a function of transcendental eternal time which somehow contains things in three receptacles of time and is responsible for the temporal designations of past, present and future. Thus the Mahiivibhii!;a clearly rejected the option which would seem to suggest that the svabhava of time is nitya, but the svabhava of the sainskrtadharmas is a:"itya. The samskrtadharmas wander across the times just as a frUlt from one pot to another or as man from one house into another. This is also the case with the sarhiskrtadharmas: going out of the future they enter into the present, and they go out of the present and enter into the past. 2 In this rejection of the receptum notion of time is implicit the basic Buddhist denial of substantiality and permanence, a model set by the Mahavibhii!;a which is consistently adhered to by Abhidharmikas. All Abhidharmika statements about the reality of past, present and future must be interpreted in correspondence with this understanding of temporal determinations. It is true that in Abhidharmika literature we come aCrOSS statements to the effect that "dharmas wander across the three times, that nirva1fa lies beyond the three times; that there exists a future, a past, etc. ... " But all these statements, as Schayer has already noted, are expressed in colloquial sense and must be interpreted as metaphorical statements, rather than literally. Thus in the statement "each dharma exists in the three times as future, present, and past" the term "three times" is "consequently only a synonymous denomination (adhivacana) for sarhskrtadharma."3 Early Abhidharmika literature clearly rejected any distinction between a dharma and its temporal determination. Temporal deter- minations, instead of being a function of an eternal transcendent time, are built into the very structure of the becomingness of a dharma. Accordingly, they argued that there is no distinction between the temporality of a dharma and its conditionedness (sarhskrta). What is given as temporal flow is nothing but an incessant flow of conditioned 56 dharmas, apart from which time does not have an independent reality. In other words, time consists of conditional dharmas and conditional dharmas are time, and time is a manifestation of sarhskrta dharmas. The theory, then, considers time as a mere modality of the conditioned dharmas, apart from which it does not have any reality. In view of the above articulation of the Abhidharmika under- standing of temporality, it is surprising to note a tendency-among some modern scholars to suggest that the Abhidharmika contributed to a view of time which conceived time as an ontological reality containing change. Drawing upon P:ili sources, David J. Kalupahana maintains that "the Sarvastivada represented a school of realism and ... they upheld the independent reality not only of things, but also of time."4 John M. Koller agrees with Kalupahana's interpretation of the Sarvasti- vada and maintains that Nagarjuna's critique of time is "directed primarily at the Sarvastivadin, who took time to be an ontological container of change and divided the container into three segments: past, present and future."5 In the first place, both Koller and Kalupahana are mistaken in assuming that Nagarjuna's critique of time is directed against the Sarvastivada. There is nothing in N agarjuna's kiila parik:ja to substanti- ate their contention that the view of time criticized by Nagarjuna is in fact the one held by the Sarvastivadins. 6 As a matter of fact, it may be gathered from the Candrakirti's Vrtti on the Miilamadhyamakiirikii that the target of Nagarjuna's attack is a certain K:ilavadin who does not subscribe to the views of Buddha. The K:ilavadin (the upholder of the reality of time), under attack of Nagarjuna's relentless dialectic, refers to Buddha as the teacher of his opponents. 7 It is equally interesting to note that while Nagarjuna specifically rejects the reality of time, his critique never mentions the concept of dharma that is so central to Sarvastivada articulation of the problem. 8 In arguing that the Abhidharmika believed in the reality of time both Koller and Kalupahana seem to be victims of confusion between a view which takes the reality of things or dharmasas past, present and future as the ontological givens and a view which accords time a primary ontological status as the container of things or dharmas. That the Abhidharmika position is not the latter will be set forth in the body of the thesis. It may be noted here that there is no evidence from the Abhidharmika sources to support the contention that the Sarvastivadins believed in the reality of time. Time as a category is conspicuously absent from the Sarvastivada scheme of things. Secondly, as we will 57 show, they are primarily concerned with the reality status of dharmas or elements of existence which are either relegated to a non-actual mode of existence or which are still to achieve actuality. Accordingly, the doctrine is primarily concerned with postulating the reality of dharmas as past, present and future rather than the reality of dharmas in past, present and future as three distinct slices of time which somehow contain these dharmas. The Abhidharmikas attempt to provide a coherent picture of reality in terms of a whole conceived as a process, at the same time retaining the uniqueness of the irreducible events which go into the making of the process. In asserting the reality of all (sarvam asti) , Abhidharmikas insisted that dharmas are the ultimate constiuents of all phenomena, meaning by dharma what is discerned to be existent and real in all the three temporal phases. The reality, as such, of the conglo- meration of these dharmas is specifically denied. The basis of this denial is our experience, which consists only of a succession of dharmas. There is no warrant from experience to believe that cognition reveals such a thing as a continuing "being" or "self," the ultimate reference point being only the discrete dharmas which constitute as such the nature (svabhava) of reality. Our cognition reveals only the being of dharmas (svabhava) in the three temporal phases. The existence of dharmas as past, present and future is cognized without any mutual contradiction, experience being itself structured in terms of succession. It is signifi- cant that the Abhidharmikas do not recognize the existence of dharmas in past, present and future moments of time, but recognize their existence as past, present and future. There is no transcendental or empirical time in which real events may be conceived to take place or reside. Time is not an empty mould in which dharmas are deposited as they arise, stay and pass away. Time conceived as a transcendental background of our cognition or as an over-arching receptum of entities is totally unacceptable to any schoolof Buddhist thought, Abhidharmi- kas being no exception in this regard. The Abhidharmika discussions are conducted on the level where the concern is with lived time. The dharmas are tempoal in the sense of possessing reality by virtue of their own intrinsic nature in the three modes of temporal existence. The Cognitive Consciousness and Temporality The grounds for the reality of dharmas in the past, present and 58 i future mode of being are to be discerned within the framework of the empirically and realistically slanted epistemology of Sarvastivada. A careful review of the arguments offered by the Abhidharmikas in . support of their assertion will serve to highlight the nature of their orientation to knowledge. The empiricist-realist approach to cogni- tional experience and its compatibility with the soteriological goal of realizing freedom (nirvaTfa) are reflected in their arguments. The role of epistemology is conceived here, in conformity with the general tenor of Indian philosophy, as ancillary pursuit in the service of soteriology, and a mutually reinforcing role is assigned to them. 9 According to Abhidharmikas, all cognitions are contingent on two factors: 10 (a) the objective correlate (v'4aya, alambana) and the (b) cognizing consciousnes (citta, vijiiana). While sense experience relates to the cognition or consciousness of the present the mental cognition refers to past and future objects as well. If past or future objects (v'4aya) are denied reality, then on this basis, argues the Abhidharmika, there could arise no cognition produced by the coming together of the v'4aya and the citta. The Abhidhatmika seeks support for this common-sense theory from the "scripture" by referring to the unequivocal statement of " Buddha to such effect. 11 The postulation of the existence of reals in all three modes is implicit in this contention of the Buddha, and a denial of it will amount to the contradiction of the scripture (agamaviruddha) . .. The upshot of the argument formulated above is the realistic convic- tion that whatever causes mental cognition must have objective ex- istence, or be objectively real. 12 There is mental cognition of past and future dharmas. The crucial datum, here, on which the Abhidharmika builds or constructs his theory is the fact of the givenness of past and future dharmas to mental cognition. If they (past and future dharmas) . are not objectively real, how could there be mental cognition of them? Were they not real, "knowledge" of them would not be different from fantasy: their cognition will be non-cognition. A cognition by definition must have a specific real as its object. 13 Arguing against the position that cognition is possible without the objective correlate-which is the point of view of Sautrantika-the Abhidharmika argues: a consciousness (vijiiana) can only be defined qua "what cognizes" (vijanati vijnanam); if there is no object to be cognized (vijiieya), then it necessarily follows that no consciousness as cognition can exist. The Sautrantika alternative is that a consciousness as cognition 59 may be defined just by the 'mere fact of its being the "illuminating accompaniment" (bodhiinugama) of all cognitions. 14 There is no warrant, according to them, for invoking the object of cognition as part of the definition. To this the Abhidharmika answers in the following way: the "illumination" itself constitutes the objective correlate of consciousness as cognition. Cognition is defined as the coming together of consciousness (vijiiiina) and its objective correlate (rupa, vedana, etc.). But the two factors (the subjective vijiuina and objective riipa, vedanii, etc.), acording to the Abhidharmikas, stand on the same ontological footing in the sense that they are dharmas. As dharmas, they carry their "own nature" (svabhiiva). The "illuminating" element in the cognition is the "own nature" (svabhiiva) consciousness (vijiiiina) which consists of the dharma being objectively real. Thus, illuminating accompaniment (bodhiinugama) in cognition too is an objective element which has an independent reality as the svahbava or vijfiana in the three phases of its existence. This is the thesis of the Abhidharmika. Consciousness and Transcendence of Temporality The Abhidharmikas propose a purely functional understanding of consciousness. Emphasis here shifts from the givenness of conscious- ness as a transcendental condition of all reflection and cognition to the very process of the operation of consciousness, conceived as immanent in the functions of cognition and reflection. Consciousness is not the mode of being of a self-identical self which, essentially, is a-temporal and without differentiation and fissuration. Rather, consciousness (vijiiana) as a dharma is continually changing, is never self-identical; and as the structure of becoming and causal conditioning it is essentially temporal. IS Change, differentiation and fissuration are built into the mode of being of consciousness as a dharma. 16 Temporality, therefore cannot be overcome by consciousness as long as it is consciousness. Overcoming of temporality, i.e., transcendence of the realm of temporal existence implies the overcoming of the fissuration, change and becomingness of consciousness. But since these are structural to consciousness, it follows that its transcendence is its dissolution. Nirvar;a, or freedom, is not the recovery of an original mode of being of consciousness; it is the dissolution of any mode of being of conscious- ness. It is extinction of the very structure of the consciousness as flow. Phenomenologically speaking, the distinction between the 60 overcoming of temporality in the recovery of consciousness and the dissolution of consciousness is an extremely important distinction. Losing sight of this distinction will lead to an underestimation of the basic orientation of the Abhidharmikas. For the Abhidharmikas, temporality is essentially an imperfection!7 characteristic of finitude, and ought to be overcome in the mode of being of the non-temporal. However, the mode of being of the non-temporal has drastically different implications for the subject as the structure of world involve- ment. While for Samkhya-Yoga, the subject as pure consciousness retains its individuated identity and recovers its original mode of being, for Abhidharmikas the subject must give up its original mode of being and its individuality in order to attain nirva'l'}ll. N.irva'l'}ll, though eternally existent and constantly present, is not an original mode of being that the subject somehow lost and regains. World (samsara) as the structure of temporal becoming does not share the ontological character of nirva1fa, which for the Abhidharmikas is eternally existent and beyond the operation of the forces of conditionedness (sainskrtatva).!8 It is important to be reminded that for Abhidharmika Buddhism, nirva1fa is not a negative concept; it is not an emptiness either in the form of an ontological nothingness without any substance or a state of being which is rendered non-existent on conceptual analysis.!9 Rather, nirva""rJ,a is a mode of positive being, an eternal existence which is acquired or reached and Possssed (prapti).20 Nirva1fa is eternally existent and as a reality it is posited over and against the reality of temporally determined dharmas. Within the Abhidharmika context, it is possible to discern a distinction reminiscent of the Samkhya-Yoga categories of permanence (pariniimi nityata) and eternity (kutastha nityata). Saintana, or the continuum which, theoretically, is never-ending and is in that sense "permanent," is not, however, a case of the overcoming of temporality. 2! Endlessness is not conquest of temporality at all, but is, rather, a prolongation or perpetuation of temporality'S defect. Saintana (continuum) may be described as having a temporal mode of permanence in the sense that its coming to an end is not part of its meaning as becoming. But this "permanence" of the continuum can not be ascribed the value of eternity, because it is only continuity of imperfection (conditionedness), prolongation of non-perfection. Nirva1fa, on the other hand, is described by Abhidharmika as eternal (nitya) in a non-temporal sense. As dharma, or reality, nirva1fa is eternity precisely in the sense that it transcends the mode of imperfection or conditionedness (sainskr:tatva).22 Nirva1fa is unconditioned and eternal 61 because it is not subject to the operation of the forces of conditioned- ness, namely, jati, jam, sthiti, etc. 23 As the realm of eternity, nirva7Ja is fullness of spiritual being, a completedness that constitutes the horizon into which the individual as subject dissolves. Overcoming of temporality in the present case also is a function of reflection as a mode of the being of the subjectivity as consciousness. As reflection, subjectivity is essentially in fellowship with what is contemplated. Reflection as an act of consciousness consists of a fellowship of what is contemplated and what contemplates. 24 Contrasted with Samkhya-Yoga, which admits the possibility of consciousness without content, Abhidharma proposes an essential reciprocity of the and its content. In this reciprocity of consciousness and content consists the essential imperfection of consciousness (samskrtatva), for consciousness itself is both conditioning and conditioned by other dharmas. 25 Reci- procity and mutual conditioning also imply reciprocal otherness between the two. While Samkyha-Yoga recognizes this otherness as the very condition for freedom, the Abhidharmika holds that the other- ness must be dissolved. However, the dissolution of the otherness does not consist in the discerning of an identity overreaching the different, i.e., the consciousness claiming the object or the content of it as its own (such would be a case of the inveterate tendency to conceptualize in terms of being, the satkiiyadnti, which the Abhidharmika rejects). It consists in the disclaiming of consciousness as well as its content (visamyoga).26 Thus, the overcoming of temporality, the process of becoming- ness of the conditioned dharmas (samskrtatva) is essentially the dissolu- tion of the subjectivity in the mode of otherness. Subjectivity or consciousness which loses the other: through which alone it can express itself, loses its subjecthood. Just as the objects that become the posses- sion of the consciousness are not mere objects, and must be described as that which belongs to the consciousness (caitesika),27 so consciousness bereft of its content must completely lose its existing character as conSCIousness. Thus, within Abhidharmika scheme, at least two moments in consciousness can be discerned. Cognition is the mode of claiming of object as other by the subject. Reflection is the mode of disclaiming this otherness. It is the realization that all dharmas as conditioned are essentially on the same ontological footing. It is the realization that consciousness, as much as its content, is essentially impermanent and 62 conditioned. Reflection as an act of consciousness, then, inevitably brings about, as it were, a perfect unity of subject and object, but this unity is nothing other than the abrogation of the subject by its complete annulment. Temporality surely is overcome through the negation of the distinction of subject and object. But it must not be forgotten that this, in turn, entails an overcoming of subjecthood. The eternity of nirvarJa as the stillness of consciousness (sthita) overcomes the flow of temporality through complete extinction of consciousness as the cognitional basis of all temporality. In this lies the dialectical character of consciousness. There is another implication of this dialectic of consciousness. Consciousness, according to the Abhidharmikas, takes the form of the object that it cognizes. Accordingly the consciousness which cognizes nirvarJa must also become of the nature of nirvarJa. Consciousness itself is temporal because it is both conditioning and conditioned. It retains this character of temporality in its encounter with the objects which themselves are temporal and conditioned (sarhskrta dharma). But in its encounter with that which is unconditioned and beyond temporality and becomingness, consciousness necessarily must lose its own condi- tionedness and temporality. In other words it must lose its character of conSCIOusness. Eternity of nirvarJa in the sense of constant presence, or "eternal now," within the grasp of consciousness as reflection, brings out the true soteriological import of Abhidharmika speculation about the structure of temporal becoming. Here too structural similarity and thematic congruity with the Samkhya-Yoga soteriology are quite prominent. For both systems, freedom is not in the future, but it is in the present. It is not to be realized at some distant moment, when the temporal process will come to an end. The process of temporal becoming as the structure of world participation is a given fact, and as a fact it cannot be annihilated or terminated. It will never come to an end. The process as fact is permanent (in the temporal sense). Its termination is not conceivable. Freedom, therefore, necessarily lies in the present. It is in the temporal present that the nirvar;a can be attained. It is the present that constitutes the stepping-stone to the "eternal now." The realization of nirvar;a as eternity is possible precisely because it is an existent fact. It is not something previously nonexistent which becomes existent in the present. It is eternally present and as such is the very opposite of the temporal now which is constantly moving. But the act of transcendence as an act of 63 conSCIousness IS performed within the compass of this temporal present. Concluding Observations We have attempted to offer a phenomenological perspective on the Abhidharmika articulation of temporality and its implications for consciousness. The thrust of the argument was to bring out the structure of metaphyical transcendentalism as represented in the . conception of eternity that the system implies. Of pivotal importance to Abhidarma Buddhism is to analyze the experience of temporality defined as finitude, and to determine whether or not experiencing temporality necessarily implies positing a transcendental time as the receptum of entities. In other words, is temporality an experience of the flow of entities and events as they are present to consciousness in the original mode of their limitation, i.e., finitude, or is it an experience of the flow of entities and events as mediated through a transcendental principle of time ? We have attempted to show that in the Abhidharmika system temporality is explained in terms of our experience, which is radically and essentially a revelation of our immediate contact with the world of dynamic change and flow, exemplifying finitude. From this point of view, temporal differentiation is not an appearance to the pure subject, but enters into awareness as a specific fact in the life-history of subjectivity as the structure of world involvement. Thus, from Abhidharmika point of view, any attempt to reduce temporality to appearance in and for an atemporal consciousness is an exercise in futility. For a proper understanding of the phenomenon of temporality, the possibility of experience of temporality for an atemporal consciousness must be ruled out. The Abhidharmika position implies that the experience of temporality entails subjectivity immanent to the structure of world-involvement (the structure of skandhas, in the case of Abhidharma Buddhism). Subjectivity is immanent in this structure is always losing its autonomy precisely in the sense that subjectivity as empirical consciousness is inconceivable without the content of consciousness. In the mode of being of subjectivity, the mutual otherness of subject and object or conscious- ness and its content is constantly and steadily overcome. It is subject to systematic disapperance. This is what is implied by becoming aware of something. Awareness or experience, then, in a sense, is this very 64 structure of the "disappearance" of consciousness as consciousness, i.e., as entailing the otherness of subject and object. This is the mode of being of empiric consciousness which always is "consciousness of' (citta, [ruddhi). Phenomenologically speaking, this structure of "disappearance" of discernible in the experience of temporal becoming or temporality also provides the due for the transcendence of temporality. If empirical consciousness loses itself partially in the experience of temporality, it loses itself completely in the experience of eternity. This latter is accomplished through self-reflection or critical reflection as a mode of transcendence which is intrinsic to the very structure of consciousness as reflection. NOTES * The paper was originally delivered at the Second International Association of Buddhist Studies Conference held at Nalanda on 17-19 January, 1980. The paper has been revised for the purpose of publication in The Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. 1. Mahiivibh(4ii, 394a, cf. Schayer, Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian Philosophy, Karkowie, 1938, p. 20. 2. Mahavibh(4ii, 393a, cf. Ibid., p. 15. 3. Schayer, op. cit., p. 27. 4. David]. Kalupahana, "The Buddhist Coneption of Time and Temporality," Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No.2, April 1974, p. 187., 5. See Kenneth K. Inada, N iigiirjuna: A Translation of His Mulamadhyamakakiirikii, Tokyo: The Hokuseido Press, 1970, pp. 117-119. 6. John M. Koller, "On the Buddhist Views of Devouring Time," Philosophy East and West, Vol. 24, No.2, April 1974, p. 205. 7. See Niigiirjuna, op. cit., pp. 117-119. 8. See Y. Kanakura, "The Question of Time in Connection of Mi1indapaiiha, Abhidharma and Madhyamakakiirikii," Osaki Gakaho, Vol. 115, 1962, pp. 1-17. This is one of the most illuminating papers on the subject. Its special merit consists in its ability to see the question of time as integral to the ontological question. The relationship of the Milindapanha to the Abhidharmika tradition has been well brought out. 65 9. It is conceivable that Nagarjuna would have opposed the Sarvastivadin articu- lation of temporality in terms of the svabhiiva and a dharma. (See infra, p. 208). But no e;x:plicit rejection of Sarvastivada can be discerned in the Kiilapariksii, nor is there any claim that Sarvastivadins believed in the independent reality status of time. We tend to agree with Shoson Miyamoto when he observes: "Nagarjuna agreed with the Sarvasti- vadins' denial of the existence of time, but opposed their concept of entity-realism (svabhiivaviida). He drew the conclusion of the nonexistence of time from the Miidhyamika standpoint of non-substantiality (nihsvabhiivaviida), which was arestatement of the original Buddhist teaching of non-self." Shoson Miyamoto, "Time and Eternity in Buddhism," Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies, Toyko: Vol. 7, No.2, 1959, p. 824. 10. Thus, the Abhidharmika argued that past and future dharmas are real because the Buddha had taught that an enlightened disciple (iirya-friivaka) becomes indifferent to past and future material objects (riipa) only by concentrating on their riipas: . Uktam hi Bhgavatii atitam ched bhiksavo riipam niibhavisyanna srutaviiniiryaSriivako'tite rupe'napeksobhav4yat. yasmiittahryastyatitam riiq,m tasmiiccrutaviiniiryaSravokotite rupenapekso bhavati. aniigatam cedriipam nabhavisyai na Srutaviiniirya friivakao'niigatam riipa niibhyana. ndisyat. yasmiittahryastyaniigatam riipam iti vistarah. Abhidharmkosam, 1972, op. cit., p. 804. Also, see Sphutiirtha on the above. 11. dvayam pratitya vijiiiinasyotpadah, ityuktam. dvayam katamat caksu riipiini yavat manodharmii iti. asati viititiiniigate tadiilambanam vijiiiinam dvayam pratitya na syiit. evam tiivadiigamato'styatitiiniigatam. Abhidharmakosam, 1972, op. cit., p. 804. 12. The vogue of appealing to Buddha vacana for justification of the validity of statements is comparable to the Brahmanical use of sabda pramii1f-a (testimony as a valid means of knowledge). It is very difficult to decide which particular use is earlier, but there is a striking consensus among scholars over the question of the "priority" of the dIscussion of pramii1f-a at the hands of Buddhist logicians like Vasubandhu, Dignaga and Dharmakirti. The latter gave rise to the preoccupation with pramii1f-a in the differentsutra commentarialliterature in Brahmanical Hinduism. 13. See Vasubandhu's Bhiiva on Abhidharmkosa, kiirikii 24. sati v4aye vijiiiinam pravrtate, niisati. yadi ciititiiniigatam na syiidasadiilambanam vijiiiinam syiit. tato vijiiiinameva na syad; iilambaniibhiiviit. Abhidharmkosam, op. cit., p. 805. 14. atz-tiijiitayorjiiiinamanyathii'visayain bhavet; Tattvasamgraha, 1788, op. cit., p. 504. Also see Paiijika on it: prativast urijiiiiptyiitmakam vijiiiinam, asati ca jiieye na kincidanena jneyamityavijiiiinameva syiit, Ibid., p. 505. 15. Bodhiinugatimiitrena vijiiiinamiti cocyate; Tattvasamgraha, 1849, op. cit., p. 518. '16. Vijiiiina is a sarhskrta dharma. By definition, sarhskrta dharmas are temporal (adhva) and impermanent: ta eva sarhskrta gatagacchadgamisyadbhiiviidadhviinah, adyante nityatayeti vii; Abhidharmakosam, (1970), op. cit., p. 26, adyante' nityatayii bhaksyanta ityadhviina iti samskrtii eviidhvaSabdena bhagvatii desitiih; SPhu!iirthii Abhidharmakosa Vyiikhyii, 1949, p. 23. 17. "sarhskrta dharmas are called temporal (dhva) precisely because change or impermanence (anityata) eats them up." Ibid. 18. This is the connotation of the term vikrti, characteristic of phenomena as modification of prakrti in Samkhya-Yoga. A similar understanding of phenomena, as constituted of sarhskrta dharma, is present in the Abhidharma literature. 66 19. The question of the existence of nirvii1Ja as a separate dharma not subject to the . forces of conditionedness has been a matter of controversy between the Sarvastiviidins and the Sautriintikas. While the Sautriintikas deny that nirvii1Ja exists or is real, Sarviistiviida ;&-firms its reality as a separate dharma. For the details of the argument and counterargu- ment, see Abhidharmakosam, op. cit., pp. 318-328. Also see SPhu!iirthiiAbhidharmakosa Vyakhyii, op .. cit., pp. 145-152. 20. "Negativism" as a philosophical doctrine (siinyaviida) is associated with Niigar- juna, though its "negativity" is increasingly in modern times. Saffikara criticized it as expressly a negative doctrine (see Samkara's Bh(4ya on Brahma Siitra, 2.2.31). The other exponent of negativism as a viable philosophical doctrine is Prajiiakarmati, the author of the Paiijika on the Bodhicaryiivatiira of Santideva. As a paradigm of a negativism implying dissolution through conceptual analysis may be cited the Advaita Vediinta, according to which the state of being is rendered in retrospection non-existent by means of conceptual separation of the ground and the superimposed. see Mandana's Brahmasiddhi, Madras: Madras Law Journal Press, 1932, p. 136ff. 21. Abhidharmkosam, op. cit., pp. 23, 211-212, 319. 22. nityam kuSalam casti dravyiintaram. tadvisamyogascocyate pratisamkhyii (=nirviina) nirodhasceti sarvamevasamskrtamadravyamiti, Ibid., p. 321. 23. etiini hi samskrtasYa catviiri laksaniini. yatraitiini bhavanti sa dharmalf samskrto lakryate viparyiidasamskrtalf. Ibid., p. 253. 24. According to Abhidharikas, a citta, manas and vijiiiina are interchangeable terms for consciousness. Consciousness is always dependent upon what it cognizes: cittam mano' tha vijiiiinamekiirtha pamcadha, Abhidharmakosam, op' cit., p. 208-209, samprayuktaka- hetustu cittachaittiih, Ibid., p. 306; also saman alrayo yesiim 'te cittacaitta anyonyam samprayukta- hetulf, Ibid., p. 307. 25. Cittacaitah sahiivaryam sarva samskrtalaJganf!ih priiptyii, Ibid., pp. 185-186. 26. Visaihyogah Jgayo dhiyii. Jgayah = nirodhalf dhi = prajiiii. tena pratisamkhyiinirodho visamyogaphalamityuktam bhavati, Abhidharmkosam, 1970, op. cit., p. 332. . 27. See Abhidharmkosam, 1970, kiirika 23-33 and bhi4Ya on them, Ibid., pp. 186-211. 67 Some Comments on Tsong kha pa's Lam rim chen mo and Professor Wayman's Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real! by Geshe S opa I Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the great scholar-yogin and founder of the dGe lugs pa teaching, whose followers were to reunify Tibet at the time of the Fifth Dalai Lama, is one of the most important figures in the history of Tibetan Buddhism and one of the hardest to approach. He appeared several centuries after another great Tibetan religious teacher much better known to Western readers, the venerable. Milarepa. Unlike the charismatic qualities of Milarepa's simple life and lyricism, which are not lost even in poor, awkward English translations, Tsong kha pa's thought is often hard to approach even in Tibetan. The difference is partially in their respective audiences. Milarepa's time saw a revival of Buddhist learning and activity in Tibet, which continued unabated right up to the time ofTsong kha pa. By then, however, these very efforts had produced such an accretion of guru-transmissions, learned exegeses and yoga practices-often at loggerheads with one another-that a simple understanding of the thought of the Buddha and of the great iiciiryas of Buddhism was increasingly hard to arrive at. Thus,one writing at the time of Tsong kha pa had perforce to address his works to a Buddhist public that was at once complex and erudite. Such a writer, in composing any explanation of the teaching of the Buddhist tripitaka, needed also more or less to follow the traditional format of rejecting other explanations perceived as objectionable, establishing his own position, and dispelling anticipated criticism of his position. Tsong kha pa traveled widely in Tibet and studied with many of the most famous teachers of his time, representatives of all the sects of 68 Tibetan Buddhism. Later, he composed his own works, covering all major phases of Buddhism, both sutra and tantra. In composing these works, Tsong kha pa had churned the milk-ocean of Indian and Tibetan Buddhist learning and, like the gods of Indian legend, brought forth the most precious things, including the amrta-such was the judgement of many people of his own time and subsequently. Among Tsong kha pa's major works is the Lam rim chen mo (the longer "Steps of the Path"), his great manual of Buddhist yoga, a veritable vade mecum that for size and complexity finds little parallel in Western religious literature. It looks mainly to the Bodhipathapradipa (Lamp to the Path to Enlightenment) of Atisa, in which Tsong kha pa perceived many special virtues, in particular its quality of "holding level all the teachings of Buddhism, without a slant." A long section (about 150 Tibetan folios) in the final portion of the Lam rim chen mo is devoted to "right view," and this section constitutes one of Tsong kha pa's four main commentaries on the Madhyamika. 2 As a Madhyamika himself, Tsong kha pa upheld the superiority of the Prasailgika view of Buddhapalita and Candrakirti, which he especially tried to delineate dearly for Tibetans, and while he was not the first Tibetan teacher to maintain the supremacy of the Prasailgika Madhyamika, he was the {oremost in attempting to clarify it. II Professor Alex Wayman's Claming the Mind and Discerning the Real, 3 taken from the Lam rim chen mo, represents the first translation of a major work of Tsong kha pa into English, and contains Tsong kha pa's entire section on "right view" together with his immediately preceding section on the development of one-pointedness of mind, the lhag mthong (vipaJyarui) and ziti gnas (samatha) sections, respectively. The translation is of about two hundred folios of the original work's five hundred. In addition, the translation is provided with a substantial series of introductory essays and about fifty pages of notes, glossaries and bibliography. Professor Wayman brings to his work many years of devoted study and research into his subject-matter, along with a quite genuine appreciation and understanding of much important auxiliary material used by Tsong kha pa, and the translator's familiarity with this material serves to enrich both the translation and the introductory essays and notes. 69 On the other hand, while the book serves to show some of the main features of Tsong kha pa's presentation of the meaning of the Madhymika and the system of meditation based on the siitras, a reader who cannot refer to the Tibetan original needs often to be extremely cautious in coping with the sense of this or that specific sentence or passage, for the translation is quite heavily spotted with misconstruals of the original, and the introductory essays display some uneveness as well. The first essay, "The Lineage, and Atisa's 'Light on the Path to Enlightenment,'" discusses the guru-transmission of the Lam rim chen mo and gives a translation of Atisa's Bodhipathapradipa, the Lam rim chen mo's root text. The translation is especially helpful in placing the topics of "Calming" (zhi-gnas) and "Discerning" (lhag mthong) in their proper sequence as steps of the path. This is followed by "The Author of the Lam rim chen mo," a short biographical essay ably put together from the works of mKhas grub and bLo bzang bstan pa'i rgyal mtshan dpal bzang. The next, "Asanga on the Ancillaries of Calming and the Super- normal Faculties," is principally translation of passages from the Snivakabhiimi that supplement Tsong kha pa's treatment of "Calming." "Discursive Thought and the bSam-yas Debate" is a substantial and important essay on the debate at bSam yas. Professor Wayman champions Tsong kha pa's view that the debate at bSam yas between the Indian iiciirya Kamalasila and the Chinese Ch'an master Hva-shang Mahayana was not an argument between "sudden" and "gradualist" schools, but dealt with the nature of discursive thought and its role in meditation. Unfortunately, the final essay, "Tsoil kha pa's Position on Discerning," while advancing the meaning of the Madhyamika as middleism, contains two singularly misleading subsections, the "U se of Buddhist Logic" and "Svabhiiva of the Path." These, instead of guiding the reader through a rather long and quite important stretch of the translation, can only serve to confuse him. Here, the "Use of Buddhist Logic" is simply a misnomer. At the beginning, Professor Wayman notes that Tsong kha pa "devotes the first large topic in the 'Discerning' section to determining the principle to be refuted by considering the 'over pervasion' (ativyiipti, Tib. khyab ches pa) and 'non pervasion' (avyiipti, Tib. khyab chung pa) of the principle to be refuted."4 He proceeds to identify these as "fallacies of the reason (hetu) in earlier Indian logic, which includes the Buddhist logic that was transmitted to Tibet. ... " 5 While these terms do have a technical meaning in Buddhist logic, specifically as fallacies involving a non- 70 concomitance between the two terms of a major premise, they also have ()ther meanings, in common usage. These common meanings, like "to be too broad" or "to be too narrow," are preferable here, as Tsong kha is not dealing with the khyab pa of the logicians in any way, neither talking about logical concomitance nor using the notion oflogical con- comitance to talk about other things. In his discussion of the determina- tion of the object being denied by the negation entailed by emptiness, Tsong kha pa states simply that some scholars, by denying that things exist even conventionally, overextend the negation and make it cover tOO broad an object, i.e., overpervasionism (khyab ckes ba), w h e r e ~ others, in failing to deny that things exist by some kind of inherent nature, do not extent it far enough, i.e., underpervasionism (khyab chung ba). Much more serious, therefore, is the writer's complete inversion of Tsong kha pa's actual use of the terms. He says, "the overpervasion, affirms svabhiiva (self-existence); and the ... nonpervasion, denies svabhiiva."6 In fact, in Tsong kha pa's use of the terms, overpervasionism denies svabhiiva and is nihilistic, while underpervasionism fails to deny svabhiiva properly and is substantialist or eternalist. 7 The difficulty does not end there, however, for the writer goes on to identify the overper- vasionists as the realists, including the Yogacarins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas, and the underpervasionists as "the insider of the Madhymika, Prasangika school who has quite properly denied svabhiiva as a principle and then falsely denies svabhiiva in the Buddhist path."s Again, something more like the opposite is what Tsong kha pa is saying. In discussing overpervasionism, i.e., nihilism, Tsong kha pa addresses himself mainly to those Tibetan adherents of the Prasangika Madhyamika whose svabhiiva-denial is too all-encompassing; and in discussing underpervasionism he is addressing himself to those Madhyamikas, again mainly Prasangikas, whose svabhiiva-denial does not altogether relinquish the notion of existence by way of some kind of svabhiiva. The writer's confusion here cannot altogether be explained away as an effort on his part to bring the overpervasionists and underperva- sionists into accord with his inversion of their definitions, for as he notes on page 61, Tsong kha pa "first treats overpervasion in lengthy fashion (40 folios), then the nonpervasion rather briefly (4 folios)." Possibly, he has himself taken and overextended a discussion in Tsong kha pa's treatment of overpervasionism, where Tsong kha pa compares those Madhyamikas who see some contradiction between dt';nial of svabhava and acceptance of such dharmas as origination, cessa- 71 tion, sainsiira, nirvii1J-a, etc., as being like the realists, who also see such a contradiction-a point, incidentally, which is altogether lost in Professor Wayman's translation. Beyond this, there is litde help from the translation itself, which is rather to be explained by this essay instead of the essay's being supported by the translation, for the transla- tion here is generally so obscure as to who is talking about what that it may easily leave a reader with considerable uncertainty as to whether the positions being set fOItL' so unclearly are those of realists, Y ogaca- rins, or Svatantrika or Prasailgika Madhyamikas. . III Tn the [hag mthong, the "Discerning" section of the original, Tsong kha pa begins his actual discussion of overpervasionism (CMDR, pp. 189-191) by stating its basic positions, arguments and citations from authority. Tsong kha pa states fairly explicidy that he is setting forth a view of the meaning of the Madhyamika that was current in his time and that he considered nihilistic. The basic view is that nothing exists, and its proofs are the classic Madhyamika arguments of Nagarjuna against svabhiiva, i.e., that things are not produced from self, other, both or neither, etc. In appealing to authority, it cites Candrakiiti's Madhyamakiivatiira and Prasannapadii. All this clearly identifies over- pervasionism as a kind of Prasailgika Madhyamika viewpoint current in Tibet in Tsong kha pa's time. The translation has Tsong kha pa begin his discussion of over- pervasionism with the following: The generality of modern-day (i.e., Tibetan) adherents of the Madhyamika, while setting forth its meaning, say .... 9 In spite of its misconstrual of' dod pa as "adherent," and its misconstrual of the syntax of smra bar as "while setting forth," the passage more or less translates the sense of the original, and such tiny falts should barely deserve comment, did not the accumulation of many such small misconstruals, along with some major ones, obscure the sense of much of the original discussion here. The passage should read something like the following: 10 72 Nowadays, the majority who wish to explain the meaning of the Madhyamika say ... .u In what follows, most other such minor obscurantist mistranslations that do not seriously damage the sense of the passage will not be noted, as the reviewer wishes to comment on those that do, and to do so without becoming too long. The. discussion continues by stating that the overpervasionist position h ~ l d s t h ~ t nothing can withstand scrutiny by t ~ e reason that examines Its realIty, because not even an atom can wIthstand such scrutiny and, as the translation puts it, .... because when one refutes all the four alternatives of "it exists," "it does not exist," etc., there is no unconstructed nature (asainskrta-dharma) therein (i.e., in the four alternatives). 12 Here, apparently, ma 'dus pa'i chos has been misconstrued as 'dus ma byas chos (asainskrta-dharma), but the passage should read something like: .... because by rejection of all four alternatives, "it is," "it is not," etc., there is no dharma that is not included in those (four alterna- tives).13 The translation continues: Moreover, when with the noble knowledge that sees reality one sees that there is no (dharma) whatever of birth and decease, bondage and liberation, etc., then it must be the case as authorized by that (noble samiipatti), so there is no birth, etc. 14 Here, aside from the misconstrual of gzhal as "authorized," the transla- tion mainly fails to take into account the syntactical ambiguity in med par gzigs pa, which forms the basis for discussion later (p. 217), where med par gzigs pa vs. ma gzigs pa is a moot point, and consequently it might better be translated something like: 73 Moreover, since production, passing away, sainsara, nirva7fa, etc., are perceived as not at all existent by the arya's gnosis that perceives reality, there is no production, because it (production, etc.) ought to be as understood by that (arya's gnosis).15 The translation continues: If one claims that there is birth, etc., then either it can withstand or not withstand the examination with a principle that examines the reality in that case. In the event it can withstand (that examina_ tion), there would be (proved) explicitly as true that there is an entity which withstands the examinati(m by the principle. In the event it cannot withstand that examination, how could it be valid that there exists an entity countered by the principle?16 While it is not important that the first sentence is a question, syntactiCal misconstruals reduce the second sentence to bare redundancy, which loses the definition it is setting forth; of the third there is little criticism. The passage should read something like: If one accepts production, etc., does it or does it not withstand scrutiny by the reason that examines its reality? If it withstands, then it becomes a real entity, by virtue of being an entity that withstands scrutiny by (such a) reason. 17 If it does not withstand scrutiny, how can one admit the existence of an entity that is repudiated by the reason? 18 The translation continues: Accordingly, if one claims an existence of birth , etc., it is either proved or not proved by an authority. In the first case (i.e., proved by an authority), since it is proved by that knowledge (=arya-samapatti) which sees reality (directly), it is not valid that it sees the nonexistence of birth. If it is claimed to be proved by the cognition of the conventional eye, etc. (ear and so on), it is refuted that they constitute an authority, because the Samadhiraja-sutra shows as invalid that they (eye, etc.) serve to prove (form, etc.), as in this passage (IX, 23): "(The perception based on) eye is not an authority (pramarpa), nor are (the perceptions based on) ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind authorities. If these (perceptions based on) sense organs were authorities, who would need to resort to the Noble Truth!" 19 Again, the first sentence ought to be a question. However, the second sentence of the translation completely inverts the sense of the original, for according to the view Tsong kha pa is setting forth as pUrvapakja (i.e., a view to be criticized), the arya's gnosis validates, not invalidates, the nonexistence of production. Particularly objectionable in the final sentence before the quotation is the gloss, "(form, etc.)" in "they they (eye, etc.) serve to prove (form, etc.) .... " This gloss is quite gratuitous and misleading, and the same may be said about glossing the quotation 74 the Samiidhiriija-sutra with "(the perception based on)." The ,passage is quite complete as it stands without these glosses, and the . objects for which they do not constitute an avenue of validity are simply not stated. In fact, the whole question here, and later on, is just exactly for what objects they do not constitute an avenue of validity, i.e., their respective sense-objects or reality itself? The Samiidhiriija quotation itends, even on the surface, clearly to favor the latter, and would do so in "English, had not the translator misconstrued phags pa'i lam as "Noble ,Truth" rather than correctly translating it as "Noble Path," for again the reference is to the iirya's gnosis that directly perceives reality. We would translate the passage somewhat as follows: Likewise, if one accepts that there is a production, etc., is it established by an avenue of validity, or is it not so established? If the former, then since no origination is seen by the gnosis that perceives reality, it cannot be admitted as established by that (gnosis); but if one accepts it as established by the conventional consciousness of the eyes, etc., these are inadmissible as an avenue of validity in the Samiidhiriija-siitra: "The eyes, the ears, the nose are not an avenue of validity; the tongue, the body, the mental- consciousness are not an avenue of validity, either. If these sense qrgans were an avenue of validity, what need has anyone for the Aryan Path?" 20 The translation continues: And also because the Avatiira (=Madhyamakiivatiira, VI, 31a) states, "The world with its multitudinous aspects is not an authority." The claim that it exists although not proved by an authority is not held by us, and since it is not a principle it is (highly) invalid. If one claims there is birth, while denying it in an absolute sense, it is necessary that he claim it so in a conventional sense, but this is not proper, because this passage of the Avatiira (VI, 36) states that the principle by which birth is denied in the absolute sense, also denies it conventionally: "By whatever principle in the phase of reality there is no reason for birth from oneself or from another, by that principle there is no reason for it conventionally. Therefore, how can there be your -birth I 21 In the Avatiira quotation, "with its multitudinous aspects" is an indefen- sible translation of mam kun, "all its aspects." Aside from the fact that kun can mean only "all" and never "many," only something like "in all its aspects" can communicate the necessary ambiguity as to whether 75 rnam kun signifies "in every aspect" or "in any aspect," which is a moot point later on (p. 221). Confronting this problem on page 221, the translator changes his translation of the same passage to "by all means, the world is not an authority," and if one has to choose between a correct translation of kun or rnam, this is better. The next sentence has a slight syntactical problem in failing to assimilate the 'dod pa to 'dod pas on account of the cing. The next sentence again completely inverts the sense of the original by "but that is not proper," which makes it say the opposite of the original's meaning. Finally, the translation of the Avatiira quote does not distinguish between the noun rigs pa, meaning "reason," or "a reason," and the verb rigs pa, "to be true," or "to be right," and this creates a slight obscuration. We would translate the passage somewhat as follows: Also, because the Avatiira says, "The world in all its aspects is not an avenue of validity." To accept that it (production, etc.) exists, even though it is not established by an avenue of validity, is inadmissible, because even you will not accept that, and because it is illogical. If, in accepting production, one has to accept it conventionally because one cannot accept it as an ultimate, this is not right, because the Avatiira says that the reason that rejects production as an ultimate also rejects it as a phenomenon: "By what will your production become existent if it is false even conventionally by the reason that origination from a self or other is untrue by whatever line of reason one examines its reality?"22 The translation continues: And also because a thing does not arise from itself, from another, and so on-four in all-so if one claims that it arises, he counters by imagining the four alternatives to be a refutation of birth in the absolute sense and so do not disallow (birth); but (the f o ~ r alterna- tive means) there is no birth of them at all. Suppose there were birth from a particular one of the four alternatives, and denying three of them, suppose it were necessary to be born from another thing-that is not proper, because the Avatiira states (VI, 32d): "Even according to the world the birth is not from another." Therefore, when refuting birth, one should not apply the special feature of paramiirtha, because the Prasannapadii refutes the application in particular of paramiirtha. 23 The first sentence contains numerous syntactical misconstruals, which are not commented on, because the main difficulty is that in lieu of a 76 ''careful construal of the original, the translator simply has superimposed upon it a completely wrong sense, and is making Tsong kha pa repre- sent the overpervasionists as showing their own criticism of an essentially Svatantrika position, which they are not even remotely referring.to. So far in this section, Tsong kha pa has been showing the arguments of the overpervasionists by way of dichotomy; and he to do so here. Just above, the overpervasionists have shown their criticism of accepting production by means of an avenue of validity (pramii1Ja). Now, if someone is still accepting production, etc., just conventionally, he still confronts the problem of the tetralemma, i.e., it exists, it does not exist, it both exists and does not exist, it neither exists nor does not exist. So, again, dichotomizing: if one accepts even a conventional production, it either fits into the tetralemma or is outside it. If it is outside it, which is to say that there is a middle ground among the four alternatives, then production as an absolute or ultimate cannot be repudiated by the tetralemma, and this, of course, is unacceptable to Tsong kha pa's opponents' opponents, who are Madhymikas. On the other hand, if a conventional production is accepted as within the tetralemma, then the only that will be admitted is a conven- tional production from another, for all schools of Buddhism but the PcisaIigika do admit some kind of production from another while rejecting the other three alternatives; but even a conventional produc- tion from other is rejected by the leading exponent of the Prasangika school, the ricrirya Candrakirti. So, without commenting further on the translation of this passage, we simply give our own translation as some- .' thing like the following: 77 Moreover, if one accepts production even if it is not produced from any of the four alternatives, "from self," "from other," etc., the rejection of production as an ultimate becomes a non-rejection, by denying it within the four alternatives, because there is production that is none of these. If (you allow) production from one of the four alternatives, by not accepting the other three, production must be from other; and this is false, for the Avatara says, "There is not even a conventional production from another." Therefore, one should not put the designation, "ultimate," on the denial of production, because the Prasannapadii repudiates putting this designation of "ultimate." 24 The translation of this section concludes: In this matter also, some assert that they do not admit birth, etc., even conventionally; and some claim that there is (birth, etc:) conventionally. But all agree with a principle in refuti.ng for the dharmas a self-existence produced by own-nature, because while this acarya's school does not affirm and ,then deny, he simultane_ ously refutes the production by self-existence in the sense of both truths. If that is the way there is no self-existence, then what (else) is there? Therefore, the special application of paramiirtha to the refutable principle is now explained with special clarity to be only the school of the Madhyamika-Svatantrika. 25 We have no criticism of the translation of the first sentence, butthe second, in addition to various syntactical misconstruals, mistranslates bsnyon, "to deny the apparent," as "to affirm and then deny"; "simul- taneously" is gloss, and should be bracketed as such. We have no criticism of the third sentence. In the fourth, "application in particular" mistranslates khyad par sbyor, as "refutable principle" does dgag bya, and "with special clarity" does mgring pa bsal nas; "now" is again gloss and ought to be bracketed. In particular, the loss of the picturesque quality of mgring pa bsal nas, along with the interpolation of "now," may leave the reader with an ambiguous impression of this sentence that concludes the discussion of the positions of overpervasionism, for it may appear that Tsong kha pa is saying that in the next section he himself will "now" explain "with special clarity" that the qualification of a negation by "it does not exist 'as an ultimate'" is just the school of the Svatantrika Madhyamika; however, this is just the conclusion of the setting forth of the positions of the overpervasionists. We would translate the passage somewhat as follows: Here also some state that origination, etc., is inadmissible as a phenomenon, and others that it is existent phenomenally, but all say that in the school of this acarya (Candrakirti) there is no denying the obvious that the (above) reason rejects that dharmas have an inherently existent nature, because in both truths he rejects an inherent nature. Thus, if there is no nature, what else is there? Therefore, dearing their throats, they expatiate that a qualification of the negated thing by ("it does not exist") "as an ultimate" is the system of just the Svatantrika Madhyamika. 26 This concludes Tsong kha pa's laying out of the positions of the overpervasionists, and even from this much it ought to be quite dear that he is dealing only with a school of interpretation of the Prasarigika Madhyamika, and in no way with realism, etc. 78 IV Tsong kha pa's discussion now shifts to his own criticism of the above positions, and the translation gives the new topic headings: (2) SHOWING THAT THE THESIS IS NOT VALID This has two parts: (a) Showing that the special refutation of dharma by that school is not common to the Madhyamika .... 27. "Showing that the thesis is not valid" is partly gloss, and should be indicated as such by brackets. The original merely states, "Showing that this is inadmissible." Also, in supplying the gloss of "the thesis," why not "the theses," since many theses have been set forth and are treated later one by one? This is a minor point; more serious is the syntactical misconstrual, "Showing that the special refutation of dharma by that school is not common to the Madhyamika." This should read something like, "Showing that this school repudiates a special feature unique to the Madhyamika." This special feature of the Madhyamika is the first main topic of the new discussions that these headings have served to introduce. Introducing this topic of the special feature, or dharma, of the Madhyamika, Tsong kha pa begins his discussion by quoting a dedication by Nagarjuna extolling the two sublime bodies, or aggregates of illus- trious qualities, of a Buddha, which are the final result of the double accumulation, of wisdom and merit. Tsong kha pa then comments in a brief passage that the attainment of these resultant two bodies, the rupaktiya and dharmakiiya, is possible only through the path that joins wisdom (prajiiaj and method (upaya); and the joining of wisdom and method, in turn, is possible only through a proper understanding of the two truths. The conclusion of this passage Professor Wayman translates: Accordingly, a) the method of establishing the basic view that does not mistake the essential causal path for attaining both bodies in the phase of the fruit, and b) the method of establishing the view that depends on that (basic view) achieve the (two) certainties in the two truths as just explained. 28 Again, on account of some syntactical problems, the sense of the original has become slightly inverted, and we would translate it rather something like: 79 Thus, inasmuch as not mistaking the essentials of the path (that is) the cause of obtaining the Two Bodies at the time of its fruition is dependent on the method of establishing the view of the funda_ mentals (on which the path and its final result rest), and the method of establishing the view is getting ascertainment of the two truths as just explained. 29 There follows immediately a quite important passage, which Professor Wayman translates: Except for this kind of Madhyamika, what manner of other person who observes (only) the gathering of refutation and is ignorant of holding the irrefutable, would be called a Madhyamika skilled in possession of broad and possessed of subtle learning! Thus, the one skilled in the means of compre- hending the two truths, who is established without even a question of refutation, and resorts to achieving the ultimate purport of the Victor, engenders wondrous devotion to his teacher and the Teaching and gains understanding guided by the pure voice and words that tell him again and.again the mysterious words: the meaning of the voidness which is void of self-existence is the meaning of dependent origination, but is not the meaning of absence void of efficiency (arthakriyakiiritua).30 The translation of this passage is singularly garbled by numerous syntactical misconstruals and by misconstruals of a number of words, i.e., 'gal, "to be contradictory," as "to refute"; 'chad, "to say" or "to explain," as "to hold"; 'gal ba'i dri tsam, "the slightest smell of contra- diction," as "even the question of refutation"; shad gsangs, "dear voice," as "mysterious words"; and sgrags, "to make a big sound" or "to proclaim loudly," as "to tell." In particular, the mistranslation of 'gal, "to be contradictory," is most harmful to the sense ofthis passage, and of others later (e.g., p. 200),31 which set forth some ofthe key ideas of Tsong kha pa's position. The passage ought to be translated something like: 80 Here even anybody else, except a Madhyamika, on seeing the contradictory brought together, will not know how to explain it as not contradicting, but a master possessing a subtle, keen and very far-reaching wisdom, (our) so-called "Madhyamika," by his skill in the method of understanding the two truths, establishes (denial of self-existence and acceptance of origination, etc.) without the faintest scent of contradiction; he discovers the final purport of the Jina; and by having recourse to that (final purport), he proclaims again and again a high, clear voice, with pure words brought forth by the bIrth of a wondrous devotion to the Teacher and the Teaching, "You who have under- standing! The meaning of emptiness which is void of self-existence is dependent origination, but its meaning is not a nonentityness devoid of the capacity to do work!"32 This non-contradictoriness between denial of and acceptance of dharmas like production, passing away, etc., which is based on the equivalence of absence of self-existence and dependent origination (i.e., cause and effect), is one of the cardinal features of Tsong kha pa's own views as a Madhyamika, and with it he proceeds at length to counter one by one the positions of the overpervasionists, all of which are on the side of nihilism. v When, later, he finishes with overpervasionism, Tsong kha pa turns to a brief consideration of underpervasionism. Like the overpervasionists, the underpervasionists are also exegetes of the meaning of the Madhyamika. Tsong kha pa categorizes them as underpervasionists because instead of negating that things exist by virtue of a self-existence (svabJuiva) that is established by an own-entityness (svariipa), they merely deny a nature (svabJuiva) that is uncaused, unchanging and non-relative. Tsong kha pa argues that since the lower schools of Buddhism already understand that origina- ting things are not uncaused and unchanging, what need is there for the Madhyamika to deny existence by way of self-existence (svabhava) ifit means only that? The translation says here: Accordingly, when insiders (i.e., the Sautrantikas, etc.) hold that constructed natures (sainskrta) are generated by causes and conditions, if it is not required for them (i.e., those insiders) to comprehend that entities lack self-existence, with that (your determination) where is the unshared refutable (pertaining to the view that comprehends voidness)!33 This has many syntactical misconstruals, and should read something like: 81 Thus, inasmuch as our own schools already understand that conditioned things are produced by causes and conditions, there are these objections, that there would be no need to prove no self- existence to them, and that they also would understand that things are without self-existence, etc.; therefore, how can that (kind of nature) be the object of (the Madhyamika's) unique denial?34 However, Tsong kha pa's main criticism of this underpervasionist view is that it does not go nearly deep enough to uproot the innate nescience that is the basis for clinging to the two kinds of self, i.e., of persons and of dharmas, this clinging being the bond that ties all sentients to the round of suffering existences (sainsiira). Toward the end of this section, Tsang kha pa has this same criticism of another kind ofunderpervasionist view, which is essentially that oftheJo nang pa, who adhered to a kind of extreme realism, in particular with regard to the ultimate truth. Consequently, as the underpervasionists are Madhyamikas dearly not on the side of nihilism, it is difficult to understand the translator's placing them there in his essay on the "Use of Buddhist Logic." According to Tsong kha pa's view of the extremes, the extreme of nihilism is to hold that things do not exist at all, whereas the extreme of eternalism is to hold that things exist by an own-entityness. On page 258 of the translation, Tsong kha pa comments on a quotation from Candraklrti: In this context, the existence and non-existence of the entity was explained previously when speaking of the two possibilities, to wit, it exists with its own-form or it doesn't exist at all. Since "possibilities" is an unbracketed and misleading gloss, and gnyis su smra ba has been misconstrued, we would prefer to see this translation something more like the following: Here, as explained above in the section on the adherents of the two (extremes), entity and nonentity are (respectively) "existing by an own-entityness" and "not existing at all."35 Elsewhere, Tsang kha pa defines the side of nihilism as holding that things do not exist even nominally, and the side of eternalism as holding that they exist as ultimates. 82 Still more difficult and misleading is the statement in the "Use of Buddhist Logic," "Under the nonpervasion [i.e., our 'underpervasion- ism'], Tsong kha pa places the insider of the Madhyamika, Prasangika school who has quite properly denied svabhiiva as a principle and then falsely denies svabhiiva in the Buddhist path; i.e., takes it as the refutable of the path." 36 As indicated above, in Tsong kha pa'syiew the underpervasionist has not properly denied svabhava, and it is Tsong kha pa himself who takes the proper refutation of svabhava as the main object of understanding in the Buddhist path, as follows. Having indicated his view that the underpervasionist does not go far enough in his denial of svabhiiva, Tsong kha pa proceeds to show that the mere denial that phenomenal things have any uncaused and unchanging nature encounters also a problem with dharmatii (empti- ness, or the ultimate truth), which is the final nature (svabhiiva) of any and all dharmas, which is itself uncaused and unchanging, and which is the principal object of meditation on the Buddhist path. In the "Svabhava of the Path," Professor Wayman notes, "Small wonder that the Miidhyamika school should be misunderstood, when it vigorously rejects the svabhiiva that is something to establish by the mundane reasoning, and then upholds the svabhiiva that is something to realize in Yoga attainment." 37 In Tsong kha pa's treatment of this subject, there is no inconsistency here, for it is not that something called svabhiiva is first being denied on all phenomenal things and then the same thing called svabhva is later being affirmed on the ultimate truth, or dharmata, for the denial that things exist by way of an own-nature (svabhavatiis- siddha) is not to deny that they lack all logical definition or nature (svabhiiva) as well. Consequently, when svabhiiva is denied, what is being denied is rang gi ngo bos grub pa, "existence by an own-entityness," or rang bzhin gyis grub pa, "existence by an own-nature" (i.e., by svabhiiva). These are identified by Tsong kha pa as the essential object of negation for the Madhyamika in many passages, including that immediately following the one cited above: " ... this (preceding) is not the (Madhyamika's) unique object of negation. (But), if one establishes a nature which exists by an own-entityness .... " Other synonyms are also used, mainly, don dam par grub pa, "existence as an ultimate," yang dag par grub pa, "existence as a true thing," and bden par grub pa, "existence as a real." The existence of a nature establishable by an own-entityness Tsong kha pa denies for all dharmas, and for dharmatii as well, as will be shown later on. On the other hand, the svabhiiva that is affirmed on dharmatii is its 83 nature of uncausedness, its nature of unchangingness, its nature of being the final nature of all dharmas, etc. In precisely the same sense, all dharmas have their respective natures (svabhiiva), like fire its nature of hotness, water its nature of wetness, all dharmastheir final nature of dharmatri, etc. In discussing this affirmation of svabhiiva, Tsong kha pa cites and comments on a passage from Candrakirti, translated by Professor Wayman as follows: "By svabhriva one understands this innate nature, uncreate, which has not deviated in the fire in the past, present, and future; which did not arise earlier and will not arise later; which is not dependent on causes and conditions as are the heat of water, (one or another) of this side and the other side, long and short. Well then, does this own-nature of fire that is of such a manner (i.e., uncreate, nor dependent) exist? (In reply:) This (svabhiiva of such sort) neither exists nor does not exist by reason of own-nature. While this is the case, still in order to avoid frightening the hearers, we conventionally make affirmations (such as 'svabhiiva' and 'dharmatri') and say it exists." Thus that svabhiiva is said conventionally to exist, after its accomplishment by own-nature was denied. Now, while that represents to teach with designations so as to avoid frightening the hearers, does that not contradict the ricrirya himself? (In reply:) That is not right, because it is necessary (to avoid frightening the hearers); in fact all other dharmas as well are expressed by designations, because they are (all) nonexistent!38 Of the many misconstruals involved in the translation of the above, by far the most unfortunate is the total inversion of Tsong kha pa's meaning on such a crucial point, and the passage should read somewhat as follows: 84 "That (heat) of fire, which is the uncreate, inherent and nondelu- sory nature of fire even in the three times, which is not something that arises later not having arise before, (and) which does not have a dependence on causes and conditions like the heat of water, this side and that side, and the long and the short, that is said to be svabhiiva. If it is asked, 'What? Does something exist that is like the nature of fire?' it is neither so that it exists by an own- entityness nor is it so that it does not exist. So it is, but notwith- standing, in order to dispel the alarm of a hearer, we say it exists conventionally by imputation." Thus it is stated that this nature (svabhiiva), having been denied as existing by an own-entityness, exists nominally. If, on account of the statement that is shown by imputation in order to dispel the alarm of a hearer, one thinks it is not being accepted as existent, this would be incorrect, because other dharmas would become nonexistent as well, since they are also stated as imputations for this purpose. 39 Finally, in concluding this discussion, Tsong kha pa brings these twO together, for that svabhiiva which is both the ultimate truth and the final nature of all dharmas is just the non-existence of all things by an own-entityness (and this includes the ultimate truth, paramartha satya, itself), for the meaning of the ultimate truth does not go beyond just this absence of existence by way of svabhiiva. He first discusses briefly this kind of ultimate truth as understood conceptually, whereby phenomenal things are known as empty, i.e. dharmas are the loci of emptiness as an attribute-this way of understanding emptiness is called "the imputed ultimate truth"; then he shows the same emptiness as understood by yogic direct-perception, in which the dharmic locus (i.e., the phenomenal thing) does not appear: Now (in considering emptiness), dharmas have an emptiness that is the emptiness of self-existence (and) that is established as the nonexistence of even an atom establishable as a nature existing by an own-entityness, and because (this emptiness) is an attribute that takes (the dharmas of) form, etc., as a locus, both of these as the object of a single discernment is not contradictory; and, since there is no turning away of this appearance as two (i.e., attribute and locus of attribute), this emptiness is the imputed ultimate truth. Whenever by acclimitization to this view that understands the absence of self-existence-in the face of perceiving directly this object (i.e., emptiness)-there is no seeing of these loci of form, etc., by the knowledge that directly perceives this reality, because every illusory appearance wherein the absence of a self appears as a nature is turned away. Inasmuch as, in the fact of this discern- ment, there is not both a reality of this kind and a locus, this positing of both, a reality and its locus, has to be established from the point of view of another conventional way of discerning. Thus ultimate truth is set forth as just the turning away of any illusion of false appearances whereby things, while being without a self- existence, appear so (i.e., as self-existent), (this) in addition to its being free of any illusion of an own-entityness, and therefore, when one accepts that, what need is there for accepting a self- existence that is established as an entity?40 Here, to avoid a complete loss of continuity in our own discussion, we have included only our own suggested translation. We find it 85 preferable to Professor Wayman's translation, on page 258, where he has glossed Tsong kha pa's own view as the position of opponents. Professor Wayman's version is included in the notes. 41 From the above, it should be clear thatsvabluiva, in the sense of a nature existent by its own-entityness, is the very object that Tsong kha pa accepts as the primary object of negation on the Buddhist path, and a writer composing an essay on "Tson kha pa's Position on Discerning" need not look much farther than that. Consequently, the search by the sub-essay, on "Svabluiva of the Path," for a positive meaning for Tsong kha pa's view of the ultimate truth, called a svabluiva, is misled and misleading. In particular, the writer's effort at identification of this svabluiva as "name-and-form" brings together two incompatible passages from Asvaghosa and Asanga, in only the former of which "mune-and- form" functions as one of the members of the chain of dependent orgination, whereas in the latter passage it is something quite different. Likewise, the assertion that "the svabluiva which is here alluded to as 'name-and-form,' or the reality which is the object of discerning (vipaJyana) , is also referred to in this literature as the 'true nature' (dharmatii) , " 42 also brings together certain similar things without noting their important differences, for the various schools of Buddhism have a variety of views on such subjects as "name-and-form," vipasyanri, dharmatii, etc. Tsong kha pa's own position on "Discerning" is that of a Madhyamika, which all these eclectic speculations do not help clarify. "The Middle View," the remaining sub-essay in "Tson kha pa's ,Position on Discerning," states that it is often held that the Prasangika rejects all views and has none of its own, and that according to Tsong kha pa there is a great misunderstanding here. This seems very correct, as Tsong kha pa has devoted many pages to this subject, and comments at length on many of the key passages in Candrakirti from which the notion that the Madhyamika has no view has arisen. Professor Wayman goes on and develops the idea that while the Madhyamika definitely has a position of its own, it delineates this position negatively by rejecting other positions, and refutes an opponent without putting forth its own position. Here, it is a bit unclear whether this means to say that the Madhyamika never advances a thesis and always defines its own positions negatively; or whether it means that the Madhyamika, even when it refutes another position without setting forth a position of its own, has a position even at that time, and might on another occasion set forth its position. At any rate, the former will fmd little support in the "Discerning" section, whereas the latter will fmd many passages 86 supporting it. We refrain from looking at any more passages, as we already have become rather long, and should conclude. VI As a writer, Tsong kha pa contributed valuable innovations to the style of Tibetan philosophical writing. He looked past his contempo- raries to the older Tibetan writers and translators, whose style he made more congenial to contemporary scholars and, in a sense, updated. Both his thought and his style are clear and lucid, although given an often quite difficult subject matter, are hard to approach at first. His sentences are often turgid, as well as long and periodic, and his Tibetan requires that great attention be given to his constructions. Too great a looseness in dealing with Tsong kha pa's sentence construction is the single greatest problem in Professor Wayman's translation. Not only has it often led to obscure and misleading translations, but other qualities and nuances of the original, like a greater sharpness in presentation, or a greater profundity, or deference, or humor, or rhetorical exaggeration, etc., have generally disappeared into a mono- tone. Sometimes, the most explicit of these have been recolored, e.g., the following, from Candrakirti: "(The Madhyamika replies with compas- sionate interjection.) Alas! Because you are without ears or heart you have thrown a challenge that is severe on us!" The actual reading should be something more like, "Ouch! The hardship of an argument by one without ears or wits (i.e., a blockhead) has landed on me!" Also, isn't "nescience's caul" a little too strong for "nescience's defective vision" (rab rib)? Many Tibetan words have a common meaning as well as a special meaning in Buddhist philosophy. There is a tendency on the part of the translator to give too little attention to context and consequently to overlook the common meanings of these contingently technical words, and this had led to many mistranslations. The problem of taking over- pervasion and underpervasion as technical logical terms has already been mentioned. In another passage (p. 285), on account of yul thams cad du, a passage that ought to read, "However, the direct perception of (smoke and fire in the kitchen) does not establish a concomitance {between smoke and fire) everywhere," becomes, "so when there is (smoke, directly perceived) in all the sensory domain (v4aya), there is no (demon- stration of pervasion of smoke by fire). A little further down, Professor 87 Wayman translates, "Also, there is no (demonstration of that pervasion connection) by inference, because it (the authorityofinference)jinnly decides the object (vi.<;aya), as is now shown. The object of inference (as an authority) is the qualified negation oj all." Here, nges pa can and tharns cad ma yin respectively are at fault, and the passage should read something like, "Likewise, inference does not establish a concomitance either, because, again, its object is particularized. Thus, the object of an inference is not all (comparable instances)."43 Sometimes, because of 'gog and other such words that mean, among other things, "to refute," and sometimes because of glosses, much of the "Discerning" section has too many "refutations," "refuta- bIes," "opponents," "antagonists," etc., and reads like a very long debate on obscure points whose purport the general reader will most of the time be at a loss to discover. On the other hand, the most patient and determined reader, who is willing to put up with the inevitable idiosyncracies of any translator's translationese in dealing wi.th a work of this kind, will leave the book much less well-rewarded for his pains than he ought to be, because the sense of the original simply isn't there much of the time. Notwithstanding these numerous faults, such translations, especially those dealing with the Madhyamika, have had a long and honorable history in the development of Western Buddhist scholar- ship, especially in pioneer works, and Professor Wayman's translation is indeed a pioneer work. As both the rhetoric and dialectic of the West and of India-Tibet have developed so differently, each presents its own distinctive difficulties in the translation of any Tibetan philosophical . work into English. When a translator essays a translation of the "Discerning" section of the Lam rim chen mo, all the problems of translating every kind of text converge on him at once, for not only is the subject-mater often quite difficult, but so too can be the styles of the innumerable quotations from authorities, ranging in types and periods of literary composition over a period of more than fifteen hundred years. In addition, Western Buddhist scholarship has produced to date little reliable translation of the historical classics of the Madhyamika, and Tibetan-English and other lexicons frequently fail to show the meanings of Tibetan words as used in many classes of religio-philo- sophical texts, the terminology of the Madhyamika, Prajiiaparamitii and logic being particularly poorly represented in such dictionaries. However, the greatest difficulty of all is perhaps the mainstream Western interpretive tendency to explain the sense of the Prajiiapara- 88 rnici and the Madhyamika as atotal rejection of conventional reality in favor of some kind of bare non-dual knowledge, with Nagarjuna's criticism of the svabhiiva of dharmas taken to mean a wholesale repudiation of dharmas and abhidharma altogether. Professor Wayman's translation has avoided this in providing another important hermeneutical option by making available for the first time a major philosophical work by one of the foremost Tibetan exponents of the Madhyamika. Professor Wayman is to be congratulated for his long labor in translating and publishing a work which-not- withstanding its numerous faults in translation-may still give many readers a first real glimpse of an important sytem of Tibetan Buddhist meditation and a persistent dialectic that makes relativity itself the most unassailable basis for the development of certainty in matters of faith and morals. NOTES 1. I would like to thank Elvin W. Jones for asssistance in the preparation of this article. 2. His others are his commentary on the Mulamadhyarnakakiirikiis of Nagarjuna together with Candraklrti's Prasannapadii (the so-called Rigs pa'i rgya mtsho) , his commentary on the Madhyamaluivatiira of Candrakirti (the dBu rna dgongs pa rab gsal) , and his Drang nges legs bshad snying po. 3. Alex Wayman, tr., Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real. New York: Columbia University Press, 1978. Hereafter referred to as CMDR. 4. CMDR, p. 60. 5. CMDR, p. 61. 6. ibid. 7. Strictly speaking, both overpervasionism and underpervasionism, being exegeses of the meaning of the Madhyamika, and Tsong kha pa's own view of the exact meaning of Middleism (or Madhyamika), all deny svabhiiva. However, in the context of Tsong kha pa's discussion here on the ascertainment of precisely what is being negated by the reasons that deny svabhiiva, overpervasionism falls to one side of what Tsong kha pa views as the middle, and underpervasionism falls to the other. With this qualification, therefore, we see no fault with Professor Wayman's saying that one side "affirms" svabhiiva, at least in the sense that it has failed to deny it adequately, and our chief concern here is with Professor Wayman's reversal of the meanings of the two sides. 8. CMDR, p. 63. 9. CMDR, p. 189. 10. In following our own preferences in translation-words for our suggested translations of the various passages, we do not mean to imply any criticism of Professor Wayman's own choice of translation-words. 89 11. da Ita dbu rna'i don smra bar' dod pa phal mo che na rei Lam rim chen mo, Kalim pong, 1964, 375.b.1. Re!evant overpervasionism material at Peking Tibetan Tripitaka, vol. 152, pp. 132-3-3 to 133-1-6. 12. CMDR, p. 189. 13. yod med la sogs pa'i mu bzhi po thams cad bkag pas na der ma 'dus pa'i chos med pa'i phyir TOI 375.b.2. 14. CMDR, pp. 189-90. 15. gzhan yang de kho na nyid gzigs pa'i 'phags pa'i ye shes kyi skye 'gag dang beings grol sags ci yang med par gzigs pas na des gzhal ba Itar yin dgos pas skye ba sags med dol 37S.b.2-3. 16. CMDR, p. 190. 17. Here, and through to. the end of this section laying out the positions of the overpervasionists, the word "reason" refers only to "the reason that scrutinizes the reality of the object under consideration." 18. gal te skye ba sags 'dod na de la de nyid dpyod pa'i rigs pas dpyad bzod dam mi bzod/ bzod na ni rigs pas dpyad bzod kyi dngos po yod pas bden dngos su 'gyur ro/ dpyad mi bzod na ni rigs pas khegs pa'i don yod pa ji Itar 'thadI375.b.3-4. 19. CMDR, p. 190. 20. de bzhin duskye ba la sags pa yod par' dod na tshad mas grub bam ma grub/ dangpo Itar na de kho na nyid gzigs pa'i ye shes kyis ni skye ba med par gzigs pas des grub par mi 'thad la/ tha snyad pa'i mig gishes pa lasogs pas grub par' dod na ni de M.'; tshad ma yin pa bkagpa'i phyir de dag sgrub byed kyi tshad mar mi 'thad de ting nge ' dzin gyi rgyal po lasl mig dang rna ba sna yang tshad ma mini Ice dang Ius dang yid kyand tshad ma mini gal te dbang po 'di dag tshad yin nal 'phags pa'i lam gyis su la ei zhig byal 375.b.4-376.a.1. 21. CMDR, p. 190. 22. 'jug par Y(1ngl rnam kun 'jig rten tshad min zhes gsungs pa'i phyir ro/ tshad mas ma grub kyang yod par' dod pa ni rang yang mi 'dod eing rigs pa'ang min pas mi 'thad dol gal te skye ba khas len na don dam parmi 'dod pas kun rdzob tu 'dod dgos na de ni mi rigs tel 'jugpa las/ de nyid skabs su rigs pa gang zhig gisl bdag dang gzhan las skye ba rigs min pa'il rigs des tha snyad du yang rigs min nal khyod kyi skye ba gang gis yin par 'gyur/ zhes don dam par skye ba 'gogpa'i rigs pas tha snyad du'ang 'gog par gsungs pa'i phyir rol 376.a.1-3. 23. CMDR, pp. 190-91. 24. gzhan yang bdag gzhan lasogs pa bzhi po gang rung las mi skye yang skye bar 'dod na ni don dam par skye ba 'gog pa la mu bzhir brtags nas bkag pas mi khegs bar 'gyur tel de dag gang yang min pa'i skye ba yod pa'i phyir rol mu bzhi gang rung las skye na gzhan gsum mi 'dod pas gzhan las skye dgos na don mi rigs tel 'jug pa lasl gzhan las skye ba 'jig rten las kyang medl ces gsungs pas sol de'i phyir skye ba 'gog pa la don dam pa'i khyad par yang sbyar bar mi bya ste tshig gsallas don dam pa'i khyad par sbyor ba bkag pa'i phyir rol 376.a.3-6. 25. CMDR, p. 191. 26. 'di la'ang kha cig ni skye ba la sogs pa tha snyad du'ang mi 'dod zer lal kha eig ni tha snyad du yod par 'dod cingl thams cad kyang 'diskad durigspas chosrnams larang gi ngo bas grub pas rang bzhin 'gogpa ni slob dpon 'di yi lugs la bsnyon du med del bden pa gnyis char du rang bzhin gyis grub pa bkag pa'i phyir rol de ltar rang bzhin med na de nas ei zhig yodl de'i phyir dgag bya la don dam gyi khyad par sbyor ni dbu ma rang rgyud pa khona'i lugs yin no zhes mgrin pa bsal nas 'chad par byed dol 376.a.6-376.b.2. 27. CMDR, p. 191. gnyis pa de mi 'thad par bstan pa la gynisllugs des dbu ma'i thun mong ma yin pa'i khyad chos bkag par bstan pa dangl 376.b.2-3. 28. CMDR, p. 192. 90 29. de ltar 'bras bu'i shabs susku gnyis 'thob pa'i rgyu larn gyi gnad rni 'phyugpa gzhi'i Ita ba gta n la 'bebs tshulla rag las pa'i Ita ba gtan la 'bebs tshul ni de rna thag tu bshad pa'i bden gnyis la ng es pa rnyed pa 'di yin no/ 377.a.2-3. 30. CMDR, p. 192. . 3 L Professor Wayman translates: "In short, if they wish to refute the non-self- existence, bondage and liberation, arising and passing away, etc., then the two truths which validate all establishments of sarhsiira and nirviir:a and the void which is void of self-existence are not proper anywhere, so they have opposed only the special dharma of the Madhyamika." We would translate this somewhat as follows: "If you accept an absence of self-existence as contradictory to bondage, liberation, production and passing away, etc., then with regard to the emptiness that is the emptiness of self-existence, you are contradicting just the special feature of the Madhyamika, because you cannot admit the categories of nirviir:a and sarhsiira into either of the two truths." Professor Wayman further translates: "If they claim they do not oppose those (establishment of bondage and liberation, etc.) then there is certainly no need to add the special thing (of pararniirtha, etc.) to the thing opposed (i.e., arising, passing away, etc.) by (their) principle of cessation of self-existence, so there is no genuine reason at all for their belief about arising and passing away, and passing away of bondage and liberation." Our translation would run something like: "If you do not accept them (i.e., absence of self- existence on the one hand and bondage, liberation, production, passing away, etc., on the other) as contradictory, there is no right reason at all for accepting that bondage, libera- tion, production, passing away, etc., are unqualifiedly denied by the reason that rejects a self-existence. " 32. 'di na dbu rna pa rna gtogs pa gang zag gzhan su'i ngor yang 'gal ba 'du parrnthong nas mi 'gal bar 'chad mi shes pa la phra zhing rndzangs la shin tu rgya ehe ba'i rnarn dpyod dang ldan pa'i rnkhas pa dbu ma pa zhes pa des/ bden pa gnyis rtogs pa'i thabs la rnkhas pas 'gal ba'i dri tsarn yang med par gtan La phab nas rgyal ba'i dgongs pa'i rnthar thugpa rnyed del de la brten nas rang gi ston pa dang bstan pa la shin tu gus pa rrnad du byung ba skyes pas drangs pa'i ngag tshig rnam par dag pas/ shes ldan dag rang bzhin gyis stong pa'i stong pa nyid kyi don ni rten eing 'brei par 'byung ba'i don yin gyi/ don byed pa'i nus pas stongpa'i dngos po rned pa'i don ni rna yin no zhes shad gsangs mthon pos yang dang yang du sgrogs par rndzaddo/ 377 .a.3-6. 33. CMDR, p. 253. 34. de ltar na 'dus byas rnams rgyu rkyen gyis bskyed pa dang gzhan du 'gyur ba ni rang gi sde pa rnams kyis grub zin pas de dag la rang bzhin med pa bsgrub mi dgos par 'gyur ba dang/ de dag gis kyang dngos po rnams rang bzhin med par rtogs par 'gyur ba sogs kyi skyon yod pas de thun rnong rna yin pa'i dgag bya ga la yin/ 415.a.2-4. In P.T.T., vol. 152, the discussion of underperva- sionism runs from p. 145-4-7 to 147-2-6. 35. 'dir dngos po yod rned ni sngar gnyis su srnra ba'i shabs su bshad pa ltarrang gi ngo bos yod pa dang ye rned yin no/ 418.aA. 36. CMDR, p. 63. 37. CMDR, p. 69. 38. CMDR, p. 256. 39. dus gsurn du 'angme larne 'khrul bagnyugma'ingo bo rna beospagangzhig sngarrna byung ba las phyis 'byung ba rna yin pa gang zhig/ ehu'i tsha ba'arn tshu rol dangpha rolla rna ring po dang thung du ltar rgyu dang rkyen la ltos pa dang beas par ma gyur pa gang yin pa de rang bzhin yin par brjod dol ei me'i rang gi ngo bo de Ita bur gyur pa de yod darn zhe na de ni rang gi ngo bos yod pa'ang rna yin la rned pa' ang rna yin no/ de Ita yin rnod kyi 'on kyang nyan pa po rnams kyi skrag 91 paspag bar bya ba'i phyir sgro btags nas kun rdzob tu de yod do z.hes brjod par bya'ol z.hes rang bz.hin de yang rang gi ngo bos grub pa bkag nas tha snyad du yod par gsungs sol gal te nyan pa po skrag pa spang ba'i phyir du sgro btags nas bstan bar gsungs pas yod par mi bz.hed do snyam na de ni rigs pa rna yin tol dgos pa de'i phyir 'dibtags nas gsungs pa ni chos {['...han rnams kyangyin pas de dag kyang med par 'gyur rol 416.b.6-417.a.3. 40. da Ita chos roams la rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i rang bz.hin du grub pa rdul tsam yang med par gtan la phab pa'i rang bz.hin gyis stong ba'i stong nyid nil gzugs sogs kyi chos 'di dag khyad gz.hir byas pa'i steng du khyad chos su yod pas blo gcig gi yul na de gnyis ka yod pa mi 'gal z.hing gnyis snang de ma log pas stong nyid de don dam bden pa btags pa bar 'gyur rol gang gi tshe rang bzhin med par nogs pa'i Ita ba de nyid goms pas don de mngon sum du rtogs pa'i ngor ni rang bzhin med bz.hin du rang bz.hin du snang ba'i khrul snang thams cad ldog pas na chos nyid de mngon sum du byas pa'i shes pas chos can gzugs sogs de mi dmigs pasl de Ita bu'i chos nyid dang chos can gnyis blo de'i ngo na med pas de gnyis chos nyid dang chos can du jog pa ni tha snyad pa'i blo gz.han z.hig gi ngos nas bz.hag dgos sol de ltar na don dam pa'i bden pa ni rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i spros pa thams cad z.hi ba'i steng du rang bzhin med bz.hin du der snang ba'i 'khrul snang gi spros pa thams cad kyang mam par log pa tsam la jog pas de khas blangs kyang rang gi ngo bos grub pa'i rang bzhin khas blang ga na dgosl 418.a.4-418.b.3. 41. "Nowadays, they establish the dharmas that are without even an atom accom- plished as self-existent, accomplished by own-nature, as the voidness of what is void of self-existence. Now these dharmas of form, etc., amount to the 'special basis' (khyad gzhi) (i.e., void of self-existence); and thereupon there is a presence in the sense of the 'special dharma' (khyad chos) (i.e., voidness), thus in the scope of a single discrimination (eka- buddhi). (They say that) there is no contradiction in there being both of these (i.e., the special basis-form, etc.; and the special dharma-voidness), and that the second appearance is not wayward. But this voidness is the factitious (kiilpanika) paramartha-satya. "At whatever time, by habituation in that view which comprehends the absence of self-existence, one comprehends this entity in immediacy-on this face (of comprehension) one wards off all delusive appearance that takes what is without self- existence to be self-existent. The awareness which realizes directly that true nature (dharmata) does not have in view the factual bases (dharmin) form, etc. Thus, the two, the true nature of that sort (=voidness) and factual bases (form, etc.) are the absence on the face of buddhi. So the positing of these two, the true nature and the factual base, requires a positing by the face of a different buddhi that is conventional. That being the case, para- martha-satya is the quiescence of all elaboration (prapaiica) accomplished by own-form, and on it is the absence of self-existence; but whatever appears there, namely all the elaboration of delusive apparance, is what one posits just in waywardness. So, while accepting that Iparamartha), where is the necessity to accept a self-existence accomplished by own-form!" 42. CMDR, p. 69. 43. 424.a.4-5. Emphasis in Wayman passages ours. 92 Alex Wayman Replies to Geshe Sopa While responding to Geshe Sopa's COmments on my translation of the last tWO parts of Tsong-kha-pa's Lam rim chen mo (New York, .1978), I should like first to thank the learned Geshe for writing at length to make his point, because only so is it possible to use his comments to further the point I wish to make. Certain Tibetan sects represented by Western establishments have insisted that their important books should not be translated by Westerners except in collaboration with, or by help of native Tibetans who are more sensitive to the meanings and nuances of such texts. While this Geshe of the Gelugpa order does not explicitly say this, the attitude is rather pronounced, partly by his denial that any of the Madhyamika classics have been reliably translated into Western languages, and partly by a charged language in his comments. So as he makes this point, taking my translation up for comment, I too can make a point, to wit, that no matter how a learned Tibetan informant might help with this or that text, I did succeed by myself on the part of the Lam rim chen mo rendered from the Tibetan language with the title Calming the Mind and Discerning the Real. For this point, may I initially explain, what the Geshe never mentioned in his review article, that for every sentence of the Discerning section-on which the Geshe makes comments-besides original Sanskrit when available for quotations, I employed the 'four annotation' (mchan bzhi) commentarial edition of the Lam rim chen mo (cf. my book pp. 70-71). Thus, I resorted to informants of the Path lineage, who had taken great pains in writing up these annotations. The Geshe finds "particularly objectionable" certain glosses in my trans- lation, such as "eye, etc." in a Samiidhiriija-siitra citation. As I mentioned in my introduction, almost all glosses in parentheses, and including these ones, that are within the translation come from the 'four annotation' commentaries of the text. Also when I cite Asanga for an explanation of name-and-form (niima- rnpa), implicating it as the 'reality' object of vipalyanii (Discerning) and so also in Tsong-kha-pa's position, the Geshe disagrees on the grounds that "Tsong kha pa's own position on 'Discerning' is that of a Madhyamika." Then the Geshe should also disagree with Tsong-kha-pa'sown section on 'Varieties of Discerning' (my book, pp. 386-390) since these varieties are just taken from Asanga's Sriivakabhiimi and from the Yogacara scripture Sa7[ldhinirmocana. Of course, the Geshe might well be right that Asanga's mention of name-and- form as I cited it, is irrelevant, but he might be right merely as an outsider to the Path lineage, because as I showed in my introduction, Atisa's lineage, exemplified by Tsong-kha-pa in the Lam rim chen mo, is a combination of the 93 lineages of Nagarjuna and Santideva (both Madhyamika) and of Asanga (Yogacara). The Geshe feels that my translation should be used with caution by persons who cannot read the original Tibetan. I should hope the readers are cautious, both for my translation and for what the Geshe has to say about it. This raises the question of whether educated Tibetans while reading in the Tibetan language can understand Tsong-kha-pa's Discerning section. I for one would prefer that they could, but there are some disquieting COunter_ indications. Thus, it has been called to my attention that in the generation following Tsong-kha-pa, there was an eminent monk of the Sa-kya-pa order named Gorampa who sought to refute Tsong-kha-pa's type of Madhyamika, labelling it. a nihilism, and in a work entitled Dbu ma spyi don criticized this very Discerning section. Of course, Geshe Sopa and I both know that this nihilism charge is not justified. But then, the readers of the Geshe's review of my book should wonder why a monk so learned as Gorampa would misunderstand. Is it enough to say that he belongs to a rival sect, apprehensive of the then rising strength of the Gelugpa order, and so deliberately misrepresents Tsong-kha_ pa's position? Suppose we do discount Gorampa as an 'opponent' and credit a learned Gelugpa monk with ability to understand the Discerning section on the grounds that he is a sympathetic 'insider.' Of course, when the Geshe makes his various comments, he expects readers to believe him (since the argu- ments deal with subtle matters) as an 'insider.' Well, so far I have not found this Geshe talking as an insider of the Path lineage when he objects to glosses within parentheses taken from Path lineage annotations (calling them "parti- cularly objectionable"), and when he insists we should accept Tsong-kha-pa in the present context (including the introductions) as a Madhyamika, while Atisa's lineage followed in the Lam rim chen mo is a combination of Madhyamika and Yogacara. Indeed, the very title of Tsong-kha-pa's work abbreviated as Lim rim chen mo shows he is writing here with Buddhist path lineage, not as a commentator on a Madhyamika text, as he was in two other works with commentaries on Nagarjuna's Madhyamaka-kiirikii and on Candrakirti's Madhyamakiivatiira. But the Geshe's ability to read Tsong-kha-pa's work with understanding should be taken for granted, until proven otherwise. I do not deny that in a pioneer translation of this type-a rather long stretch of difficult text with involved sentences, and worked at intermittently over some years-I could, probably did miss some subtle points, or misrender some phrases or sentences. Fortunately, Tsong-kha-pa's 'right views' are often repeated, and anyone studying the text will eventually garner what he is driving at. Geshe properly caught my slip in the Samiidhiriija passage, where I had put 'Noble Truth' instead of 'Noble Path' (or 'Noble's Path'), and he is certainly right in criticizing my rendering of ma 'dus pa'i chos-a bad slip. After that, he made too much fuss over various passages without scholarly proof for his "improvements." When the Geshe says bsnyon means "to deny the apparent" 94 and that I mistranslate "to affirm and then deny," he paid no attention to my note referring to the Geshe Chos kyi grags native Tibetan dictionary, which I now cite for the term bsnyon can: dang por yod ces dam bcas nas rjes par med ces snyon rnkha n . Perhaps the trouble is that I have better reference works than the reviewer, or else that I actually consult them. Then in his section VI he cites my rendition, "(The Madhyamika replies with compassionate interjection.) Alas! Because you are without ears or heart you have thrown a challenge that is severe on us!" And the Geshe thinking to improve on this, first saying "by something like" as though he were not sure, goes on with his version: "Ouch! The hardship of an argument by one without ears or wits (i.e. a blockhead) has landed on me!" Aside from the fact that his 'improvement' changes the rendi- tion from a compassionate interjection to ajest, there is no word in the original for 'ouch' and so forth. His kind of rendition is symptomatic of some of his other 'improvements,' namely, that the first 500 English words learned by a foreigner are superior to the words, such as 'severe' and 'caul,' found in larger vocabularies. Unfortunately for his stance, Tsong-kha-pa had an extraordinary . Tibetan vocabulary and did not write such books for the Tibetans who only knew 500 Tibetan words or phrases. Why should the Western translator be so limited for his own potential readers-hopefully intelligent persons? Moreover, the Geshe's lengthy revision examples go along with attribu- ting a host of 'miscontruals' on my part; and one has to go to his note 10 to learn, "In following our own preferences in translation-words for our suggested translations of the various passages, we do not mean to imply any criticism of Professor Wayman's own choice of translation-words." It is impractical to take up these various paragraphs of his; and I shall concern myself only with what seem to bother the Geshe the most, to wit, my introductory section about Buddhist logic, and Tsong-kha-pa's position about svabhava, supposedly misrepresented by me. First, as to the Geshe's own ability to render these technical terms, when he renders the primary word of Buddhist logic, pramar;,a (Tib. tshad ma) as 'avenue of validity' he falls into the trap of translating it in instrumental manner, in agreement with the Hindu Kumarila and the Jaina critics of Dignaga, for whom pramar;,a is a phala (result), not an avenue (cf. Hattori, Dignaga, on Perception, p. 99). In the matter of my introductory chapter "Use of Buddhist Logic" (pp. 60-65), the Geshe's fervent denial that Tsong-kha-pa employed in strictly logical manner the two terms I render 'overpervasion and 'non-pervasion'-is amazing. It is hard to believe that anybody who had read through the entire Discerning section. in its original Tibetan with attentiveness could have avoided the conclusion that Tsong-kha-pa uses terms of Buddhist logic again and again and with strict adherence to the technical meaning in the logic system. So, for example, there occurred a great many times the term rtags in the technical meaning of Skt. linga, sometimes with explicit mention of its two 95 stipulations, anvaya and vyatireka, which are two kinds of 'pervasion' (vyripti). Besides, in Tsong-kha-pa's own little logic treatise, the 'Mun sel'-which my manuscript translation entitles "Guided Tour through the Seven Books of D harmakirti" - he discusses toward the end both the svatantra (rang rgyud:) and the prasanga (thai 'gyur), which in their derivative forms, the Svatantrika and the Prasangika, are the two main schools of Madhyamika. This suggests that the reason for writing the logic treatise was to further arguments in Madhya_ mika discussions. Then there is the testimony of Gene Smith, Library of Congress, who during his years at the Delhi office supervised the hundreds of Tibetan books that are pre-catalogued and sent to various American univer_ sities and depositories. He once told me in his Delhi home that the Gelugpa monks spend so much time reading the later yig cha-s (manuals) that they rarely read even the works of their founder Tsong-kha-pa. It is true that the usual monastic drill called mtshan nyid covering a number of years of learning the main works of Abhidharma, etc., does not include any works of Tsong- kha-pa, that there are many yig cha-s and other collected works of eminent Lamas. However, we should have hoped that a learned monk like Geshe Sopa would have at least read through Tsong-kha-pa's lhag mthong (Skt. vipaJyanaj section before adopting so confident a pose in commenting upon my transla- tion! After all, I as translator did not presume to know what this section was saying prior to translating it. Geshe writes about my Introduction, p. 61: "for the writer goes on to identify the overpervasionists as the realists, including the Y ogacarins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas." I made no such inclusion, saying rather, "The opponents are especially the realists, ... Other opponents [my present italics] are ... of the Yogacara school ... as well as the Madhyamika Svatantrika." And of course these are indeed the opponents of the section (my translation, pp. 189-252)," no matter how the Geshe tries to make them out as being other- wise. And the opponents guilty of the non-pervasion are certain Prasangika Madhyamikas of the next section (pp. 253-260) no matter how the Geshe tries to make them out as being otherwise. Unfortunately, as I shall now show, the Geshe's position itself is included in the deviation which Tsong-kha-pa refers to as 'non-pervasion.' Take the Geshe's conclusion (his own note 7): "Strictly speaking, both overpervasionism and underpervasionism, being exegeses of the meaning of the Madhyamika, and Tsong kha pa's own view of the exact meaning of Middleism (or Madhyamika), all deny sviibhava." However, Tsong-kha-pa (Tashilunpo edition of Lam rim chenmo, f. 389a-5,6) says: I gzugssogsrnamsrang bzhin gnyis gang du 'angma grub "pas chos nyid la rang bzhin du byas pa'i rang bzhin de blta ba'i phyir du lam bsgom pas na tshangs spyod kyang don med du mi 'gyur bar gsungs shing . .. I As I translate (p. 257): "The (elements) such as form are not accom- plished in either of the two svabhdvas ([annotation commentary:] the svabhriva in the meaning of true nature and the svabhriva accomplished by own nature). 96 Since one cultivates the path so as to view the svabhava that is the svabhava in the meaning of true nature, it is also said that the pure life is not purposeless." This is not just Tsong-kha-pa's own position, because he makes these remarks to introduce a passage of Candrakirti's Madhyarnakiivatara (on VI, 182) that has the same message. One can read this in my translation at that point. I . should explain here that the svabhava accomplished by own nature is what is denied again and again by the M:idhyamikas, and this insight (prajitii) of denial is referred to in AtlSa's Light on the Path to Enlightenrnent, verse 54 (my work, p. 13). It is frequently referred to as the denial in an absolute sense (pararnarthatas). Candrakirti's passage here clarifies that the svabhava of true nature be witnessed on the path by the yogin in in dependence on conventional truth (sarnvr:ti-satya). I should inform the readers of this, my rebuttal, that when translating this Discerning section it was as though I was in the presence of a great mind; and it would have been most ungracious and unappreciative of me to have had an introduction section entitled "Svabh:iva of the Path" (pp. 67-69), if the Tibetan author had not used the words of the above-cited passage and emphasized the importance of his communication at that point. If indeed my translation is guilty of numerous small one can believe Geshe least I avoided the huge 'misconstrual' of which the Geshe is guilty, namely, to have attributed a universal denial of svabhava to Tsong-kha-pa, thus to have had no pervasion of the svabhava of the path, thus to have been among the very partisans whose views of such sort are rejected by Tsong-kha-pa in this very 'non-pervasion' section. The above discussion, not edifying for me to have to write, does lead to a conclusion that even learned Tibetan monks, whether a spirited adversary like Gorampa, or a self-appointed defender like Geshe Sopa, share an over- confidence as to their ability to understand such texts. I am indeed happy to have seen the appearance in form useful to Western readers of this large section of Tsong-kha-pa's remarkable encyclopedic work, and to have written for it various introductions which are faithful to the Path-lineage being exposed; happy also to announce that an Indian reprint was quickly produced in Delhi. I should like also to inform the readers of what I did not explain in the book, why on the dedication page there occurs "in memory of Dilowa Gegen Hutukhtu." It was because early in the 1950's this grand Lama of Mongolia, carrier of the Path-lineage, at Berkeley, California, gave me the advice of how to proceed in case any expression was obscure or difficult. I followed his advice; while he did not say it, I am sure he would have approved a consultation with any learned Tibetan of the Path Lineage. 97 Geshe Sop a Replies to Alex Wayman I wish to thank the Editor for sending my review article to Prof. Wayman and giving him an opportunity to respond. I am of course sorry that he is upset by my observations on his translation. First, I regret that Prof. Wayman suspects my intentions and regards any criticism of mine of his own articles and translation as a wish to seize an opportunity to denigrate Western Buddhist scholarship in general. I did not say, as he quotes me, or even, I hope, seem to say that Western scholars have produced no reliable translation of the Madhyamika classics. My statement that Western Buddhist scholarship so far has produced few such translations is, I believe, fair and made with reference to the general problematic of transla- ting certain kinds of Buddhist texts in the absence of well-established norms that have the consensus of a majority of Buddhist scholars themselves. To an argument aimed not merely at me but at all dGe lugs pa monks and scholars, I would like to respond. For Prof. Wayman to say that "the dGe lugs pa'monks spend so much time reading the later that they rarely read eVen the works of their founder Tsong kha pa" is like saying that American college students take required courses and do required reading and little beyond that. In both the Tibetan and American educational systems, there always have been those who have gone beyond the requirements, and it is they, in general, who become the scholars and teachers. Tsong kha pa himself enjoined the study of the Buddhist classics (the gzhung chen ma) as offering the best advice (men ngags) for practicing Buddhism, and many dGe lugs pa monks and scholars have taken and continue to take him quite seriously here. Prof. Wayman is, however, right that many educated Tibetans, while reading in the Tibetan language, cannot understand Tsong kha pa's "Dis- cerning" section. This is not even a question, but a simple matter of fact, and is why Tibetan scholars spend a great deal of time learning these things from other Tibetan scholars who are regarded as pure and authoritative sources of the teaching-transmissions of important works. Even the reading of specific, and generally difficult, passages of such texts is more to be determined by such important teaching transmissions than by the way the meaning of a word may apear in a Tibetan dictionary. In the instances of Tsong kha pa's works, these teaching transmissions are thought to embody Tsong kha pa's own subsequent commentary on his own compositions, and this is why they are regarded as weighty by Tibetan scholars themselves. Some of these traditions are incor- porated in the Lam rim's annotations (the mchan bzhi). I have not commented on Prof. Wayman's use of the mchan bzhi, for the problem of utilizing them is not so substantially different from that of reading the Lam rim itself, and the handling ofthe Samiidhiriija citation is just such a case in point. "(Form, etc.)," 98 as the mchan bzhi note, is not the meaning of the passage but only its misunder- standing by the overpervasionists. As for myself, it is certainly unfair so gratuitously to imply that I have agreed to undertake the review of the translation of a work that I have not even read myself, and I wish to reassure Prof. Wayman that I have read the Lam rim in "its entirety. Having had the good fortune to have studied the Lam rim with some of its most famous teachers in Tibet, I was pleased to review its translation when I was asked to. My background is public and needs no testi- mony from me, and if Prof. Wayman has some serious doubts here, he can determine the matter much more tactfully through a proper investigation on his own. Also, leaving aside all consideration of yoga or meditation, I do not believe that the aims and methods of Western and Tibetan scholarship are so very substantially different. Each aims at arriving at an actual understanding of the thought of an author, and each utilizes the best means at its disposal for doing this, neither limiting itself to the mere exercise of looking up words in a dictionary and reading a few of somebody's footnotes. At any rate, while anyone can claim that dGe lugs pa monks and scholars do not really under- stand the thought of Tsong kha pa, it is indefensible to claim as well that they do not even make the attempt. On the other hand, if someone is mainly interested in the rediscovery of the real Tsong kha pa, he ought not to be too disquieted in finding himself confuted by someone more traditionally- minded, for this kind of originality always invites controversy. The burden of proof, however, now rests with the innovator to demonstrate the advantages of the "new" Tsong kha pa over the "old" one. Here, I would like to make a few brief observations on the response: Why say that I view Tsong kha pa's position as a total rejection of svabhiiva when I have devoted three pages of my review article to trying briefly to delineate the sense in which Tsong kha pa accepts as well as rejects svabhiiva? Why say that Prof. Wayman has been misrepresented by my stating, "realists, including Yogacarins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas" instead of "realists and Yogacarins and Svatantrika Madhyamikas"? In my summarizing, the "inclusion" may represent my view, not Prof. Wayman's, but the discussion was not of what realism is and who the realists are, but of Tsong kha pa's view of what overpervasionism is and who the overpervasionists are. Why say that translating pramii7!a by an "avenue of validity" "falls into the trap of translating it in the instrumental manner" (to wit, like a non- Buddhist)? "Validity" is not a cognition, and "avenue of validity" is free of the bifurcation into a consciousness (or cognition) and a pramii7!a-its agent or means. Prof. Wayman should have observed the difference between "avenue of validity" and "avenue" or "means of cognition." "Ouch," as Professor Wayman has quite rightly noted in his response, is indeed an unacceptable translation for kye ma kyi hu. It is too colloquial to 99 render an obsolete classical interjection, and "alas," or "woe is me" is mUch better. The translation of the passage was in fact to have read "alas," but the journal editors failed to incorporate this and some other corrections in the copy sent to Prof. Wayman. Beyond the above, there is still some rather questionable bit of misin_ formation about the Lam rim that Prof. Wayman seeks to promulgate in his response. I refer to his highly misleading talk about the Lam rim's path lineage. His claim that "Atisa's lineage followed in the Lam rim c h e ~ ma is a combination of Y ogacara and Madhyamika" is unfounded, and, to avoid becoming too long, J can only refer him to the Lam rim's introduction, where Tsong kha pa identifies the two path lineages of the Badhipathapradipa as the zab ma lta ba'i rgyud and the rgya chen spyad pa'i rgyud, through Naggrjuna and Asanga respectively. These lineages, however, are by no means coextensive with the Y ogacara and the Madhyamika as Prof. Wayman claims, and his difficulties on this point may go a long way in explaining his difficulty in understanding my own assertion that "Tsong kha pa's own position on discerning is that of a Madhya- mika." Likewise, the Asanga-lineage, aside from not being the Yogacara, is not particularly pertinent to Tsong kha pa's view of lhag mthong in the "Discerning" section, for Tsong kha pa does not follow Asanga's explanation here, and in calling Tsong kha pa's view on "Discerning" that of a Madhyamika, I am not referring to his view of lhag mthang in general, but only of that speciallhagmthang that perceives reality, and which is his major topic of discussion in the "Discern- ing section. In conclusion, if Prof. Wayman wished to discredit my objections to his translation and was also able, he might certainly have done so by addressing his response more to these objections and less "against the man." My rather long article confined its scope to two topics where I found Prof. Wayman's statements quite unrepresentative of Tsong kha pa's position. After all, these topics do occupy seventy pages of his translation. The former, the topic of overpervationism, is one of the larger and most important topics of the entire "Discerning" section of which it stands at the head, and by devoting sO much space to it Tsong kha pa evinces his quite genuine concern for nihilistic inter- pretations of the Prasangika. Here he has quite painstakingly set forth these nihilistic positions, grouped all the arguments proferred in their support into four key reasons, has laid out the essentials of his own position as a Prasangika, and has sought at great length to repudiate each of these positions along with its logical underpinnings-for about eighty Tibetan pages. Where in all this can Prof. Wayman find a single realist or a Yogacarin or a Svatantrika Madhya- mika as the overpervasionist opponent? And if the realists, etc., are there, why not bring them forth from so many pages, instead of flatly declaring, "Of course these [the realists, etc.] are indeed the opponents of the section (my translation, pp. 189-252), no matter how the Geshe tries to make them out otherwise? Something similar may be said about the second topic, i.e., under- pervasionism, which, far from being nihilist, is a position most congenial to theism. 100 Archaeological Excavations at Piprahwa and Ganwaria and the Identification of Kapilavastu by K.M. Srivastava There has been a long-standing controversy regarding the loca- tion of Kapilavastu, 1 the capital of the Sakyan State. As a result of our recent archaeological excavations at Pipriliwa and Ganwaria 2 in the Basti District of Uttar Pradesh, in India, we feel now encouraged to identify the site of Kapilavastu. These sites are about twenth-three kilo- metres north of N augarh, a tehsil headquarter and a railway station on the Gorakhpur-Gondo loop line on the Northeastern Railway, and they are nine kilometres north of Birdpur, which falls on the road to Lumbini from Naugarh. The first indication that Pipriliwa could be the site of the ancient Kapilavastu was provided by w.e. Peppe 3 in 1897-98 when eighteen feet below the summit of a stupa he came across a huge sandstone box which contained, amongst other objects, five caskets. An inscription on the lid of a steatite casket furnished a clue to the identification of Kapilavastu by its reference to the Buddha and his community, the Sakyas. 4 The following is the text of the inscription: Sukiti bhatinam sa-puta-dalanam iyam salila-nidhane Budhasa bhagavate sakiyanam. Although the text has been edited and translated variously, the reference to the enshrinement of the relics of the Buddha by the / Sakyas undoubtedly confirms the statement of the Buddhist text Mahaparinibbanasuttanta that the Sakyas of Kapilavastu were one amongst the eight claimants to a portion of the relics of the Buddha after he was cremated at Kushinagar and that they ceremoniously constructed a stupa over the relics. s 103 It is interesting to note that according to the Chinese traveller Fa-hsien, 6 Lumbini should be nine miles east of Kapilavastu, which corresponds very well with the distance of Lumbini from the site of Piprahwa. But this was not found to be ih conformity with the later account of Hsuan Tsang, 7 and some scholars therefore made other suggestions. Among them, Fuhrer (1897)8 and P.e. Mukherji (1899)9 thought of Tilaurakot, in the district of Taulihawa,in Nepal, as the site of Kapilavastu. It may be noted, however, that the difference between the routes and distances recorded by Fa-hsien and Hsuan Tsang, as supposed by scholars, are very confounded and indeed sometimes contradictory. Some scholars tried to reconcile the evidence of the two diverse accounts by proposing the existence of two Kapilavastus, one at Piprahwa and the other at Tilaurakot. 10 In 1962, Mrs. D. Mitra of the Arachaeological Survey of India led an expedition of exploration and excavation in the Nepalese tarai. During the course of her work, she excavated at Kodan and Tilaurakot, but could not find any evidence identifying Tilaurakot with Kapilavastu. In the absence of any evidence, she remarked, "In case Nyagrodharma (not Nyagrodhika town) represents Piprahwa, which is not unlikely, the remains of Kapilavastu are to be sought in the mounds immediately around Piprahwa, and not at the distant site of Tilaurakot." She further stated, "in fact, the inscription on the reliquary found within the main stupa at Piprahwa coupled with Piprahwa's correspondence with Fa-hsien's bearing and distance of Kapilavastu in relation to Lumbini raises a strong presumption for Piprahwa and its surrounding villages like Ganwaria being the ancient site of Kapilavastu."11 But some scholars, however, continued to refer to Tilaurakot as Kapilavastu. The district of Taulihawa, in Nepal, has even been renamed Kapilavastu in one-inch-to-a-mile survey sheet map No. 63 M/2 of Nepal. In 1971, when the present author was posted in Patna, we started a program of archaeological excavation at the site of Piprahwa with a view to continuing the search for Kapilavastu. In view of the considerable lapse of time between the death of the Buddha in 483 B.e. and the Piprahwa inscription, which may not be earlier than the third century, B.C., the author felt that the relic caskets found by Peppe in 1897-98 were not the original ones solemnised by the Sakyas immedi- iately after the death of Buddha. This provided grounds for expecting earlier and original caskets in the stupa. Sylvain Levi was of the opinion that the inscription merely recalled a more ancient consecration 104 ~ n d was engraved on the occasion of the reconstruction of the stupa. 12 Proceeding with the hypothesis that earlier and original relics . were still below in the stupa, a small trench was sunk in its north-eastern quadrant, which revealed interesting features. An outline of the shaft bored by Peppe could be easily observed. At a depth of six metres from the extant top of the stupa, two burnt brick chambers came to light. These chambers, separated from one another by 65 ems. of yellowish compact clay mixed with kankar, were at a much lower level than the spot where the stone box containing the inscribed casket had been found by Peppe. There was a pmd deposit, about six centimetres thick, between the last course of the burnt brick stupa and the chambers. The twO chambers were identical in shape, measuring 82 x 80 x 37 ems. .. The specific purpose of the brick chambers, to keep the sacred objects, was apparent enough from the nature of their construction. A soapstone casket and a red ware dish placed close to each other were observed in the northern chamber after the top three courses of brick ha.d been removed (Plate I). This dish was covered by another dish of the same type, which had broken into three pieces. Both the soapstone casket and the dish were found to be carefully packed with the help of bricks and brickbats. The casket contained fragments of charred bone. The contents of the dish could not be distinguished, because it was badly smashed and filled with earth. That there were no bone fragments in it, is, however, certain. The positions of the casket and dishes were different in the southern brick chamber. Two dishes, of the same type and size as in the northern chamber, were placed side by .side just below the topmost course of the brick. Both dishes were reduced to fragments. When two further courses of brick were removed, another soapstone casket, bigger in size, came to light. The lid of the casket was found broken. On removal of the earth, which had filled up the casket, charred bones were found inside. Since the relic caskets were found in deposits contemporaneous with the Northern Black Polished Ware, they could be dated to the .fifth-fourth centuries B.C., and thus earlier than the inscribed relic casket discovered by Peppe at a higher lever, and also distinguished stratigraphically. The possibility that the stupa at Piprahwa could be the same as that constructed by the Sakyas at Kapilavastu over their share of relics received at Kushinagar increased. The excavation was, there- fore, resumed in 1973. Greater attention was paid during that year to the eastern monastery, which was partly exposed in the first two years. When the cells and the verandah on the northern side of the monastery 105 were being exposed, some inscribed terr<lcotta sealings were found. About forty of them have so far been collected, from a depth ranging between 1.05 and 1.75 metres. The sealings were not found in a hoard but occurred at different levels and spots. Generally round in shape' some of the sealings were oval as well. The legend on the sealings c a n ' ~ classified into three groups. One of them reads "Om Devaputra Vihare Kapilavastu Bhikkhusamghasa." The sealings in the second series have been read as "Maha Kapilavastu Bhikshusamghasa" (Plate II). The sealings in the third group carry the names of monks. One of them has been read as Sarandasasa. The letters on the seatings are in Brahmi characters of the first-second centuries A.D. In 1974, a pot-lid carrying the same inscription as on the first group of sealings was also found, in the eastern monastery. The terracotta sealings and, above all, the pot-lid with the legend Kapilavastu, found during the excavations at Pipriliwa, seem to us to have settled the long-standing controversy regarding the precise loca- tion of Kapilavastu. They also establish that the monastery was meant for the order of monks at Kapilavastu. Further, the word Devaputra indicates that the monastery was probably built by the Kushan kings. That the stupa at Piprahw;i was built in its initial stages by the Sakyas of Kapilavastu over the corporeal relics of the Buddha should also be taken as settled now. Itwas reconstructed twice, first during the third century B.C. and the second addition, a square base with niches, appears to have been made during the period of Kushan kings. The caskets found in the brick chambers were those placed by the Sakyas; the rich and varied objects, along with five caskets contained in the massive coffer, were placed in the third century B.C.; and the one casket found by Peppe at a depth of ten feet was the donation of the Kushan kings. With the location of the Sakyan stupa and the monasteries of Kapilavastu the task of the identification of the site as that of ancient Kapilavastu seemed easy. After a limited exploration in the vicinity, excavation was undertaken at an adjoining mound, in Ganwaria, a kilo- metre to the southwest. The site is at least 200 (EW) x 250 (NS) metres in extent, having a maximum occupational deposit of seven metres. During the excavation, two massive burnt brick structural complexes, with impressive projected entrances to the east, were exposed. Of the two, the larger one, on the western fringe of the mound, is about thirty metres square. It has twenty-five rooms with a gallery at each of the four corners. In the last phase, the number of rooms had been raised to 106 tWenty-six with the help of a partition wall. The gallery at the corners was in alignment with the cardinal directions. In all, there were five phases in the The two rooms on side of the were the most spaoous. Generally, the floonng was made of bnck concrete mixed with lime, though in phase III pieces of burnt brick were also used. A ring well of structural phase I, having a diameter of 85 ems., was observed in the gallery on the northwestern corner. With an open courtyard about twenty-five metres square in the centre, the rooms and galleries were constructed all around it. The width of the outer wall was more than two metres and that of the inner one 1. 70 metres, on the top. The cross walls were more than a metre thick. The larger structural complex embodied certain extraordinary architectural features. Complete bricks were used only in the facing of the walls and the core was filled up with brickbats. The bricks used in the facing in the last two phases were rubbed and then set in order to present a beautiful appearance and to provide more strength to the structure. Two projecting bastion-like structures were constructed to give a majestic appearance to the entrance. As an additional attraction, three corners in each bastion were provided at the western end. In 'order to restrict entry, at a later stage, two walls, facing each other and projecting from the bastions, were raised at the easternmost fringe of the entrance. In front of the two walls there was a pavement made of brickbats with complete bricks used in the facing. The opening of the second entrance, however, continued to be 2.35 metres. But for a few additional features, the smaller structural complex, about thirty metres to the northeast, was, on the whole, similar to the larger one. It was about twenty-six metres square and had twenty-one rooms restricted to three phases. A small room in the northeast corner, . meant either for lavatory or bath, was a new feature in this complex. To maintain privacy, access to the room was provided through another small room opening onto the central courtyard. Though the number of rooms in the smaller complex was less, the entrance was wider, measuring 3.15 metres. In the earlier stages, the entrance was towards the east. Later on, it was sealed with the help of a curtain wall, and a narrow entrance, 1.20 metres wide, was provided towards the northern side. Unlike in the larger complex, the corner rooms on the southeast and northwest were the biggest, and square in shape. The entrances to the structural complexes at Ganwaria are not towards the stupa, as they were in the cases of all the monasteries at Piprahwa. On the basis of pottery and antiq?ities yielded by the excavation, 107 the earliest occupation at the site can be dated to about the eighth century B.C. Amongst the principal ceramic industries, mention may be made of grey ware, red ware vases associated with the Painted Grey Ware in the western part of Northern India, black polished ware and beautiful specimens of Northern Black Polished Ware in plenty. The site was occupied till about the fourth century A.D. The entire occupational deposit could be divided into four Periods. Period I was represented by dishes having a red rim and grey bottom, red ware vases, beautifully polished red ware dishes and boWls occasionally painted in black and black polished ware. The deluxe Northern Black Polished Ware characterized Period II. Period III is post N.B.P. belonging to Sunga times. Period IV was characteristically Kushan. The proximity of these structures to the ancient site of Piprawha, where the sealings with the name of Kapilavastu were found, their impressive size and constructional features and the large quantity of antiquities found within them, leave little doubt that the structures formed the residential complex of the chief of the capital town, Kapila- vastu, i.e., the Sakya King Suddhodhana and his predecessors. NOTES 1. C. Lasen, Indische Altertumskunde (Leipzig 1858), vol. III, p. 201; A. Cunningham, The Ancient Geography of India (reprinted, Varanasi 1963) p. 349; A.C.L. Carlleyle, in Cunningham, Archaeological Survey of India Reports (reprinted, Varanasi 1972), vol. XII, p. 87; A. Fuhrer, "Antiquities of the Buddha's birthplace in the Nepalese Terai," Archae- ological Survey of India, New Imperial Series (reprinted Varanasi 1972), voI.XXVI, p. 44; P. C. M ukherji and V.A. Smith, Antiquities of Kapilvastu, Tarai of Nepal, 1899, Archaelogical Survey of India (reprinted Varanasi 1969) p. 50; T.W. Rhys Davids, Buddhist India (London 1903) p. 18; W. Yost, "Identifications in the region of Kapilavastu,"jRAS, 1905, p. 553; Debala Mitra, Buddhist Monuments (Calcutta 1972) p. 253. 2. Indian Archaeology, a Review, 1971-72, 1972-73; K.M. Srivastava, "A Note on the Recent Excavations at Piprahwa, District Basti (U-P)," Puriitattva: Bulletin of the Indian Archeological Society, 6 (1972-73) p. 51; "Buddha's Lost Town of Kapilavastu Identified," Vishveshvaranand Indological j oumal, vol. XV, pt. 1 (March 1977), also, Kapilavastu in Basti District of V.P. (Nagpur 1978). 3. "Piprahwa Stupa containing relics of Buddha," jRAS, 1898, p. 573. 4. G. Buhler,jRAS, 1898, p. 387; T.W. Rhys Davids,jRAS, 1898, p. 588;J.F. Fleet,JRAS, 1905, p. 679, 1906, p. 150; D.C. Sircar, ed., Select Inscriptions bearing on Indian History and Civilisation (2nd ed.) vol. I (University of Calcutta, Calcutta, 1965), p. 81. 5. Mahiiparibbiina sutta, ed. by Childers, injRAS, 1876, p. 258. 6. Fa-hsien, A Record of the Buddhist Countries, tr. Li Yung-hsi (Peking, 1957), p. 51. 7. T. Watters, On Yuan Chwang's travels In India (London, 1904-05), vol. II, p. 108 8. Fiihrer, op. cit., p. 44. 9. P.C. Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 50. 10. V.A. Smith, op. cit., p. 10; T.W. Rhys Davids, op. cit., p. 11, 18 f.n.1; but contra w: Roey,JRAS, 1905, p. 454, W. Vast, op.cit., p. 553. 11. Buddhist Monuments, p. 253. 12. Iridian Antiquary, 36 (1907), p. 120. Plate 1. Piprahwa. Soapstone casket and dish in the northern chamber. 109 Notes on the Textcritical Editing of the Bodhisattviivadiinakalpalatii by Frances Wilson Fortunately, so the story! goes, K1?emendra was prevailed upon to compose a Bodhisattuiivadiinakalpalatii [BAKL]. neat and modest verse is a delight and deserves the care which de J ong has bestowed upon his textcritical remarks made toward a textcritical edition. (Textcritical Remarks on the Bodhisattviivadiinakalpalatii [Pallavas 42-108]. By].W. de Jong. Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1979. x + 303 pp.) These remarks are to be read with ... the text published by Sarat Chandra Das and PaT,lqit Hari Mohan (from 1906 onwards replaced by Satis Chandra in the Bibliothecalndica (Calcutta, 1888- 1917). That edition was based on a Tibetan blockprint [published 1664-1665] which contains both the Sanskrit text in Tibetan transliteration and the Tibetan translation. [Introduction, p. 3] .. De Jong gives textcritical remarks on both the Sanskrit and Tibetan manuscript traditions, which are described in the Introduction to . pallavas 42-48. 2 The Introduction is concluded with a request that readers offer critical remarks: de Jong notes that there are instances where the choice between readings was difficult to make and other instances where the Sanskrit was difficult to understand. I leave the fulfillment of this request to others. I can not fault the conservative and thorough textcritical remarks made by de Jong. His method is standard: The authoratative manu- script is Add. 1306, Cambridge University Library, written in 1302 A.D., just 150 years after composed the Kalpalatii. Within the body of the textcritical remarks de J ong carefully describes the primary entries and the secondary corrections contained within Add. 1306. He III also gives notes derivative from his use of other manuscripts of the Kalpalata and from standard reference works such as Franklin Edgerton's Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Dictionary. In a conversation Dr. Leonard Zwilling confirmed that the edition was without fault. He felt real indebtedness for this work, which clarifies the mistakes of previous Sanskrit editions. My concern about this edition (and all other editions focusing on the BAKL) is the lack of a pratika index. It is not easy to find if de Jong has over looked works that might have been pertinent to his volume. De Jong has no pratika index and no list of the many other works that he has used. I must assume that de Jong has looked at all the other works of I have yet to discover an entry from these works. They must not have been pertinent to these verses, or I have not discovered long's notes on them. Let me give an example of my difficulties here. K!?emendra's AucityavicaracarciP includes three verses from the Kalpalata. I can not place them in the BAKL tradition. It would help the critical reader if pratika indices and lists of works used were given. Furthermore, it would be dangerous but it might be in order at some point to apply rules on aucitya to determine the validity of readings. Certainly, this is usually a dubious if not completely wrong method. is one of the few writers whose works might be looked at in this way. He was both a writer on alar[lkiira and a poet. Still, there would be hazards in applying his rules to his poetic works. I give two examples. 1) Verse lab in pallava 91, satyapathaprakisanarp. karoty anillokapade sudipavat / snang-ba med-pa'i gnas-rnams dag-tu sgron-ma bzhin / legs-par bshad-pa bden-pa'i lam ni gsal-bar byed / Read with A dipavat, cf. T. Professor Narayana Rao remarked-in a casual conversation- that A (Add. 1306) has a less euphonic reading. The reading does not embody so nearly the principle of samata. 2) Verse 34ab in pallava 9l. 112 marge pradipayate sarp.v:idena pritirp. vinda:ti / with A rruirgalJ in a and para1(i, var,yati in b. Again Professor Narayana Rao felt var,yati to be inappropriate "(anaucitya) unless drought and deserts were the focus in the preceding verses. ;.:: To 'conclude, I leave textcritical matters and give the text and 'iranslation of a few verses from the Mithila edition. 4 There are no text- ''critical remarks on these. These verses give a third minor variant to the 'two traditions of the Sibi story that I know. J < , 113 pura sibir nama nardvara4 I babhuva dayadayitabandhavaq II 6 svargam naraiq. I tasya samayayau I I 7 n:rpatim etya sa4 I tadagrabhimukho 'bravit I I 8 anityaq. taralataravidyuddyutinibhaq. I I I 9 ityuktva asit sa I " k:rtciiijalir II 10 sadho mana4sukham I te bhutva aham I I 11 iti vinayan provaca I tvaya rajendra karomi kim II 12 pipasaparibhuto " naitan rajan gurugauravam 1113 6. Sivavati town there was, at one time, a King by the name of Sibi. He was the beloved and generous friend of all beings. 7. When Indra's heaven was filled with men who had sat for Sibi's meritorious instruction, He of the hundred sacrifices went to him to test his resolution. 8. As he approached the place where the king sat surrounded by the turrets of his jewel-pavilion, Indra took the fprm of a ferocious demon and when right in front of King Sibi, he said: 9. "This world of transmigration is momentary like flickering' lightning flashes. " It comes to an end in a dissolution of everything that has been born or produced ..... " 1 O. When the demon had uttered half of the subl7ii.yita, he became quiet; King Sibi did him homage and with his hands raised folded together in salutation he said: 11. "0 sadhu, say the last half of the subl7ii.yita for my benefit. I am your student and would hear your voice which is a 'limb of enligntenment.'" 12. The demon replied to the gentle address of the king: "What can I do with you? You arecuseless as my pupil. 13. I am overcome by thirst and my belly is pierced by the pangs of hunger. I desire more, 0 king, than the homage paid a teacher." NOTES 1. P.L. Vaidya, ed., Avadiina-kalpalatii of I andII. Buddhist Sanskrit Texts, no. 22 and no. 23. Darbhanga: The Mithila Institute of Post-Graduate Studies and Research in Sanskrit Learning, 1959. Vol. I, p. 9. [DeJong nowhere refers to this Mithila edition, which is "more or less a reprint ... of the Bibliotheca edition" (Vol. I, p. vii) upon which de Jong bases his remarks.] 2. De Jong does not mention publication of pallavas 1-4l. 3. Dr. Sliryakanta, Studies. (Poona Oriental Series No. 91) Oriental Book Agency, Poona, 1954, pp. 206 and 207. 4. Vaidya, op. cit., p. 518 (vol. II). 114 III. BOOK REVIEWS AND NOTICES S(intideva: Mystique bouddhiste des VIle et VIlle siecles, by Amalia Pezzali. Firenze: Vallecchi Editore, 1968. xviii + 161 p. $7.80. Siintideva, by Amalia Pezzali, presents us with quite an exhaustive account of the life and works of this great Indian Buddhist saint, at the same time providing the reader with ~ good general summary of his . thought. . Ms. Pezzali organizes the book into three sections of approximately equal length. The first, entitled "La vie" (The Life), presents the accounts of three major Tibetan historians as well as the only known Sanskrit versionof Santideva's biography. Though most of the transla- tions of historical and textual passages given in this work have previously appeared in Western languages, it is convenient to have the major bio- graphical accounts (by Bu-ston, Taranatha, Sum-pa mKhan-po and an anonymous Nepali manuscript) presented side by side in the original languages for easy reference. In addition to the translations, the author discusses the differences among the four accounts, and finally summa- rizes the data in tabular form. Yet for the tremendous work that was obviously done in editing and translating the biographical sources, one would have expected more discussion of a text-critical sort, especially with regard to redaction criticism. With the wealth of textual material examined, it seems logical to expect a substantial body of conclusions as regards the sources used by the above historians. Yet Ms. Pezzali concludes only that Taranatha and Sum-pa must have used Bu-ston (p. 21), and that Sum-pa must also have had before him a copy of Taranatha (p. 26). Given the dates of these scholars, the result can be hardly surprising. It seems to me that other conclusions are evident. For one, Taranatha must have drawn on a source other than Bu-ston (viz. the gazelle episode, which is found in the former but not in the latter). Also, Sum-pa must have drawn on a source different from both Bu-ston and Taranatha (viz. his mention of Kaliriga which is missing in the other two historians' accounts - p. 26). But statements of this sort are left implicit in Ms. Pezzali's analysis and never brought to light. I must, however, point out that the amount of data presented by the author does make it possible for the interested scholar to pursue such questions individually. The translations, I might add, are generally of a superior quality, reflecting Ms. Pezzali's obvious expertise in Tibetan and Sanskrit. The second section of the work entitled "Les oeuvres" (The 115 Works) is for the most part bibliographical in character. In it the author lists and the various Sanskrit manuscripts of the Bodhicaryii_ vatiira and Sikjiisamuccaya as well as their translation into both European and Asian languages. She also gives a very'good summary of the debate as to' whether Santideva was the author of a Siitrasamuccaya, and she comes, it seems to me, to a very reasonable conclusion when she states: ... one can conclude that Nagarjuna surely did write a Siitrasamuccaya ... (and) I believe that one exclude with absolute certainty there having been a Siitrasamuccaya of Santideva ... (p. 86 - my translation) As for the third section on "La pensee" (The Thought) of Santideva, It IS a good overview of Mahayana doctrine in general, and of the Madhyamika in particular. There are, however, some points to which I take exception. First of all, I must object to the author's claim that it is "only with the Mahayana" that the actual religion of the Buddha begins (p. 95). Moreover, it is clear that in Ms. Pezzali's view it is only a "theologie veritable" that establishes the seal of "religion" upon a philosophical system. Yet this description of religion seems far too restrictive, for to deprive the Hinayana of the title simply because it lacks the doctrine of the trikiiya is to make too large a distinction over too small a difference. What is more, it seems to me altogether too misleading to identify the doctrine of the trikiiya with any sort of "true theology" in view of the extensive refutations that the notion of God receives at the hands of Mahayana Buddhist logicians such as Dharmakirti (PramiiTfavarttikam chapter II). There are also certain points to be raised about Ms. Pezzali's exposition of emptiness. (1) When she claims that emptiness is "a truth which is not intel- lectual but more meditative" (p. 95) and also that it is impossible to "understand the absolute (paramiirtha) by reason" (p. 103); or again when she states that "he who eliminates all forms of thought can have insight into the truth" (p. 102), that "it is just there where thought is extinguished" (p. 103), it seems as though Ms. Pezzali falls into the same quietist and anti-rationalist position of which Hva-shang Mahayana was accused of during the famous bSam-yas debates. Granted that mere intellectual understanding of siinyatii is insufficient for the attainment of Buddhahood, but what must be remembered is that it is a prerequisite for the latter. In the traditional three steps to realization, consisting of hearing (thos-pa), thinking (bsam-pa) , and meditation (sgom-pa) , it is at the second stage that this intellectual and discursive analysis takes place; its indispensibility is continuously stressed in the Buddhist tradition. (2) Though Buddhist scholars usually assert that the Mahayana 116 schools demean the Hinayana Arhant for cognizing only pudgalanairiitmya d not dharma-nairiitmya (pp. 98, 99 and 103 in Ms. Pezzali's work), it an should perhaps be made clear that not all Mahayana tenet schools (siddhiinta) do so. For example, the Prasangika school, to which Santideva belongs, asserts that Arhantship can only be attained if both of these are realized. They thus make no distinction between the actual nature of these two kinds of "selflessness," although they would of course grant that the referent objects ("self' or "phenomena") are different. , (3) As for Nagarjuna's critique of pramii7}-as, it must be under- stood as a critique of p r a t y a ~ a and anumana having absolute power to prove a logical syllogism. He is by no means rejecting the conventional validity of logic, as seems to be suggested by Ms. Pezzali (p. 104). Yet apart from these few technical points (some of which are controversial in their own right) the author does give a rather good over- view of Madhyamika thought in general, and particularly of Santideva's place within it. The text of Ms. Pezzali, which gives us such a long- sought-after compilation of the life, works and thought of this great Buddhist saint is most certainly a welcome sight to the Buddhist Studies community. Jose Cabezon On Knowing Reality: The Tattviirtha Chapter of Asanga's Bodhisattvabhiimi, by Janice Dean Willis. New York: Columbia University Press, 1979.202 p. $20.00. Most people view Y ogacara as a philosophy of idealism. While there have been exceptions, some scholars pointing out that such a characterization may not be applicable to all Yogacarins, this view seems fairly entrenched. Speaking for myself, it is the view I was first taught. I didn't realize that it might be subject to modification until I began to study the subject with some Gelugpa teachers who held differently. Janice Willis, in her welcome book, joins the ranks of those who take exception, and argues a good case. Asanga, a prolific author, wrote the Bodhisattvabhiimi as one division of a much larger work, the Yogiiciirabhiimi. Nearly all of the Bodhisattvabhumi is practice oriented. Only one chapter actually takes doctrine as its principal subject, so that chapter is important for under- standing Asanga's views on reality. This is the Tattviirtha chapter, which Dr. Willis has ably translated. The odd thing about the Tattviirtha chapter, as Dr. Willis points out, 117 is that terms which one usually associates with the Yogacara, such as cittamiitra, vijiiaptimiitra, etc., are conspicuously absent. Why does the only chapter of a major work dealing with the nature of reality, written by Asariga, not discuss things in terms of "mind only"? Perhaps the answer is that Asanga did not consider mind as the ultimate mode of existence. Indeed, in this chapter, Asanga speaks of siinyatii, not mind, as ultimate truth. To be sure, Asanga had his own view of siinyatii, for which he argues in the Tattviirtha chapter against those whom he felt miscon_ strued siinyatii as meaning nothingness. Asanga's own view of siinyata is like this: Now, how is voidness righly conceptualized? Wherever and whatever place something is not, one rightly observes that place to be void of the thing. Moreover, whatever remains in that place one knows (prajanati) it as it really is, that "here there is an existent." This is said to be engagement with voidness as it really is and without waywardness. (II7) For Asanga, what this means is that there is no dharma identical with its verbal designation as "form," etc. So dharmas are void of identity with their verbal designations. What remains is the basis for the designa- tion. He who knows the basis asjust the basis and the designation as just the designation, neither affirms what is non-existent (i.e. the identity of designation and dharma) nor denies what is existent (i.e. the basis of the identity). This is a middle path and is considered "voidness rightly conceptualized. " Asa:riga criticized what he considered the realist position (i.e. the identity of dharmas and designations). He says that for each designa- tion, there would have to be a corresponding thing, but since one thing may have many designations, that idea is wrong. He argues against those who say that there are no bases whatsoever for designations by saying that if that were so, "no designations would occur at all." It is at this point, Dr. Willis says, presumably following Asanga's own exegesis to the text, that we can understand the three-nature theory of Asanga. Parikalpita, imaginary nature, refers to the conception of the identity of designations and dharmas. Paratantra, dependent nature, is the dependent relation between designations and their base. Parini)- panna, perfected nature, is the ultimate mode of the above two. Correct understanding of just what is parikalpita and just what is paratantra constitutes an understanding of p a r i n ~ p a n n a . What then of the terms like cittamiitra and vijiiaptimiitra, and why have many Buddhologists been misled? Prof. Willis deals with these questions in Chapter Three of the Introduction. She says, agreeing with Yoshifumi U eda's article, "Two Streams of Thought in Yogacara Philo- sophy" (Philosophy East and West. 17. pp. 155-65), that there were two 118 threads of Yogacira thought. The earlier, represented by Asariga and vasubandhu, was not idealist. The later, represented by Dharmapala . and Hsuan-tsang, was. It was a confusion between these two threads that led to the classification of all of Yogacara as idealist. As fqr the term cittamatra, Dr. Willis suggests that Asariga and Vasubandhu do not use it to mean "mind only" in the sense that all is mind. Rather, she sees three distinct uses. The first regards meditative experience per se, referring to the yogi's object of ;meditation, a mental image. The second regards its use as a device for weaning ordinary beings from materiality. In this, she also accepts the views of Prasarigikas like Tsong Kha Pa. Finally, the third treats the terms as the result of the analysis and description of the cause of suffering. It is this last use that is the most interesting. Instead of understanding cittamatra to refer to the ultimacy of mind, we should understand it to refer to our ideas and cognitions of the world, which are mistaken, non-ultimate-they are 'just thought," and therefore cause us misery. It is in light of the third usage that Dr. Willis interprets Vasu- bandhu's use of the term vijiiaptimatra, (here synonomous with citta- rniitra) in the TrimSika. She discusses also the well-known phrase, citta- miitram idam yad idam traidhatukam (these three realms are nothing but mind). This phrase is best known from the Dalabhiimikasiitra, where it appears in the midst of a discussion on dependent origination. Dr. Willis points out that the interpretation of the phrase as meaning that there are no external objects would be odd in view of the realistic language of the rest of the sutra. The same phrase occurs earlier however, in the Bhadrapalasiitra, where there is less doubt as to its meaning. There the phrase is used in connection with a bodhisattva's meditation, in which he realizes the illusory nature of the world. Dr. Willis' arguments have served to call attention to a different way of looking at Y ogacara in general and Asariga in particular. They should provide stimulus to further discussion. The only drawback to the book is that it could have gone into more detail concerning the above questions. Dr. Willis explains in the Preface that the book does not go into the detail that her dissertation (upon which the book is based) did. I, for one, wish that it had. The arguments for her interpretation are good, but more supporting evidence could make them ironclad. For instance, she might have gone into some more discussion on the alayavijiiana. She points out that it is not to be considered an ultimate, but she neglects to mention its role in the creation of the objects of designation, something which is quite relevant to her thesis. On the whole though, these draw- backs should not deter anyone from reacting the book. I recommend it. E. Todd Fenner 119 Women in Buddhism: Images of the Feminine in Mahayana Tradition, by Diana Y. Paul (with contributions by Frances Wilson and foreword by LB. Horner). Berkeley, California: Asian Humanities Press, 1979. pp. v + 333 (glossary, bibliography, index). Paul's examination of the "Images of the Feminine" is a worthy addition to the growing number of studies abollt women's roles in Buddhism and other institutional religions. Furthermore, Paul (for the Chinese texts) and Wilson (for the Sanskrit) have contributed the first English translations for nine of the nineteen accounts. By so doing, they have made these texts accessible to the larger body of interested students. In the book's three "Parts" and eight chapters, Paul covers a range of images of women that can be found in the canonical literature of Mahayana Buddhism. This range-from woman as "evil temptress" to woman as Buddha-is generally well supported by the texts she has included. In any such ambitious and innovative undertaking, some strain and unevenness, as well as a degree of repetitiveness, is unavoidable. Paul's weakest section is found in the first part. One suspects that the exigencies of scholarly feminist consciousness underly the problems with this section every bit as much as the actual content of the texts. Paul apparently needed to introduce "implicit" or "latent" meanings to prove that the male authors were actively misogynist. As presented, the texts themselves ("The Sutra of the Buddha Teaching the Seven Daughters" and "The Tale of King Udayana of Vats a") do not seem to convey the denigration of all women that Paul suggests. Her introduction to the section also is overtly one-sided. After quoting a statement that women are " ... purely sensual with uncontrollable desires ... " (p. 5) she admits only in a footnote that an unquoted statement discussed "the equivalent obsession men have for women." In her discussion on the role of "the Merchant's daughter" (in "Sadaprarudita and the Merchant's Daughter") on page 110 she again has relied on inference. On the basis of her translation, I question her view that the Merchant's daughter was a "good friend" to Sadaprarudita, acting out of pity or compassion for his sufferings. I read it as her reve- rence and awe for his selfless dedication. If the latter view is valid, the merchant's daughter's homage to Sadaprarudita represents no shift in role, nor subjection of female to male per se, but rather of follower to Bodhisattva. However, I make no claim to doctrinal expertise and would be quick to admit that Paul must have additional evidence for her interpretations, although those supports are not clearly stated. There are other areas where my own disciplinary inclinations- including psychological anthropology-make me uncomfortable with her commentaries. In particular she seems to have adopted a primarily 120 Western psychoanalytic view of the relationship between dependency and low self-image. Her argument-that the monk-authors resented their dependence upon female householders because it contributed to a loW self-image, and that dependency, and rejection of it, were a double- bind leadIng to hate and the projection of self-hatred upon the women- a ~ s u m e s that dependency is always contradictory to self-esteem. It may be a firm tenet in the West, but such a view is not as universal as we think. Furthermore, while CTOSS-CUTrents and conflicting views about the sexes exist in many "societies-at-large," Paul fails to recognize the specifically political considerations that arise between institutional religion and the State. Buddhism has never been "out of this world" and its monastic orders have never accurately reflected the "society-at-Iarge." Rather its monastic order has been counterpoised against the State. Even Buddhist kings have had to reconcile the conflicting demands of the sangha for expanding its membership, and the demands of the State for people to fulfill its requirements. Uusually these conflicts have been resolved by "purifying" councils, sponsored by the State, to "preserve and purify" and, incidentally, to limit sangha membership. Even in Buddhism's heyday in China, the State regulated how many monks could belong to each monastery by confining its subsidies to the permitted number. The rigors of monastic life-including celibacy and the dread of sex-could further restrict the attractiveness of membership. If the women also flocked to the sangha, the State's labor pool would shrink even more. Male abdication of the householder/progenitor role could be compensated by plural wives. Female abdication would be much more difficult to counteract. State-sangha rivalry well may underlie the difficulties placed in the path of female-and male-aspirants to the monastic life. These comments have not been intended to minimize the signifi- cance of Paul's contribution, but to suggest avenues to be considered in the next edition. Along these same lines, ekayiina is commonly inter- preted as "universal salvation." However, salvation's Western connota- tions of savior and saved make "salvation" less appropriate than "en- lightenment" of "buddhahood" as the universal goal. Hopefully, the next edition will not include reference to "the Louts Sutra" (p. 115) one of the amazingly scarce typographical errors in the volume, and will practice "truth in packaging" by entitling itself "Women in Buddhist Texts':: Images of the Feminine in Mahayana Canonical Literature. " Beatrice D. Miller 121 Wittgenstein and Buddhism, by Chris Gudmunsen. London: Macmillan Press, 1977. pp. viii + 128. Price: 8.95 (U.K.). Wittgenstein approached philosophy with a remarkable freshness of insight; some of his seminal reflections have, as a consequence, served to open new vistas to contemporary inquiry into such important philoso_ phical issues as the foundations of logic and the role of language in conceptual thought. His views, significantly, have a definite relevance to other fields of investigation as well. Wittgenstein's characteristically terse, suggestive and often arresting remarks on psychology, ethics, aesthetics and religion, for example, are topical, illuminating, and on occasion unusually instructive; and they have in turn attracted a good deal of recent attention. (Cf. C. Barrett, ed., Wittgenstein's Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief. Oxford, 1966. The religious aspect of Wittgenstein's thought has been carefully examined in W.D. Hudson, Wittgenstein and Religious Belief, New York, 1975.) The relation of this acute and very influential Western thinker's ideas to Buddhism-perhaps the most philosophical system of Oriental religious thought-has been the subject of intermittent discussion for some time among a select group of scholars engaged in the interpreta- tive study of Eastern philosophical standpoints. Works that deserve especial mention in this connection include those of F J. Streng (Empti- ness: A Study in Religious Meaning, 1967), W.A. Shibles ("Wittgenstein and Zen" in Wittgenstein, Language and Philosophy, 1969) and K.N.Jayatilleke (Early Buddhist Theory of Knowledge, 1963). These efforts have to all intents and purposes remained at the periphery of Wittgensteinian studies: none of the more prominent exponents of Wittgenstein's thought have ventured to comment upon them, or indicated an interest in them. Still, the importance of such efforts cannot be gainsaid, simply because there undoubtedly are some very striking resemblances between the approaches ofWittgenstein and Buddhism; and, surprisingly, this is so amidst many obviously deep seated differences between them- differences of time and place of origin of the respective philosophies, as well as the cultural contexts that generated them. The recognition of such differences perhaps accounts for the reluctance felt by Wittgen- stein scholars to compare these two systems of thought. Nevertheless, the points on which the reflections of an outstanding contemporary Western secular thinker who, evidently, was in search of intellectual truth, tend to coincide with the approaches of an ancient system of religious philosophy which, in contrast, elevated spiritual emancipation above everything else, are indeed worthy of attention, and deserve scholarly scrutiny. And such scrutiny-significantly enough, of a notably sustained kind, and on a scale which has not been hitherto 122 attempted-is the object of Chris Gudmunsen's Wittgenstein and Buddhism. Wittgenstein's philosophical views as well as the interpretation h at was given to some of the concepts and principles associated with t . Buddhism tended-of course in very different ways, and under the influence qf very different types of factors-to change or evolve. There is thus an 'early' and a 'later' Wittgenstein corresponding to the strikingly dissimilar ideas elaborated in his two epochal works, the Tractatus Logico- Philosophicus (1921) and the posthumous Philosophical Investigations (1953). It is possible similarly to make a distinction between the 'early' Buddhism of the Pali texts on the one hand, and the 'later' Buddhism of the Mahyanist thinkers on the other. Gudmunsen seeks for the most part to draw attention to parallelisms that exist between the approaches of 'later' Wittgenstein and 'later' (Mahayana) Buddhism. His central . point is that "much of what the later Wittgenstein had to say was antici- pated about 1,800 years ago in India." (p. 113) This is a statement that might understandably astonish many: Wittgenstein, after all, has been widely considered to be one of the prime founts of philosophical modernity and innovation in our age-an 'original'thinker who has had no precursors in any serious sense. However, the statement in question is amply-and on occasion impres- sively and illuminatingly-substantiated in the course of Gudmunsen's work. The author points to a number of topics on which there is a coinci- dence of view between the late Wittgenstein and Mahayana thinkers. Gudmunsen's discussion of these topics is preceded by an account of a viewpoint he considers antithetical to the later Wittgenstein and Mahayana Buddhism. This is identified as that of 'Russell and the Abhidharmists,' and is elaborated in Part I of the work, which covers its first two chapters. Here the author highlights early Buddhist Abhi- dhamma thought in the philosophical idiom of Bertrand Russell. Gudmunsen clearly underrates and disvalues the philosophical viability of this viewpoint: its characteristic features are examined mainly in order to contrast them polemically with those of the later Wittgenstein and the Mahayanists which are held to be more cogent and persuasive. This is a point that Gudmunsen emphasizes time and again, even in the course of his main discussion, in Part II of the book. Like the Mahaya- nists of old, he considers the approaches associated with the early Buddhist schools to be defective or otherwise vitiated. The major portion of the work is concerned with a systematic comparison of the later Wittgenstein and Mahayana Buddhism. Part II, 'Wittgenstein and the Mahayana' is wholly devoted to this task; individual topics for comparison are taken up systematically in chapters 3 to 7. Gudmunsen identifies resemblances on such issues as the process of knowing, the import of language and the function of language in 123 thinking, as well as the mind itself and its acts. He argues that many of Wittgenstein's widely-acclaimed contributions to philosophical analysis were, even in matters of detail, often foreshadowed in the Mahayana texts: a striking case in point is his linkage of Wittgenstein's celebrated reflections on the idea of'language-games' in the Philosophical Investigations with a noted Madhyamika scriptural source. (Cf. pp. 48-49) Gudmunsen refers to most major Mahayanist thinkers; yet Nagarjuna, under_ comes to the fore often: not only is his sunyata doctrine compared to Wittgenstein's philosophy in several contexts, but it is also argued that he actually anticipated some of the later Wittgenstein's luminous and profound observations on the complex relationships that exist between language and thought on the one hand, and thought and reality on the other. The author places his greatest emphasis through_ out on the affinities between the Madhyamika and Wittgenstein. Some attention, nevertheless, is also given to the Yogacaras. It is important to point out that though the resemblances between Wittgensteir, and Mahayana Buddhism form the primary focus of this book, the differences that separate them are not disregarded, but are, on the contrary, at times duly observed. Also, the resemblances themselves are not traced to any influence Buddhism may have exerted on Wittgenstein; they are, in his view, 'best explained as being similar reactions to similar stimuli' -in sum, both Wittgenstein and the Maha- yanists seem only to have responded to and interpreted experiential reality in similar ways. (pp. 112-113) Such, then, are the essential lines of argument in this short but complex attempt to juxtapose two recondite systems of philosophy. Though it has some shortcomings, it deserves to be recognized as a note- worthy contribution to both comparative philosophy and Buddhist (Mahayana) exegesis. Admirers of the Western analytic tradition in particular should find its discussions instructive; for they do serve to indicate that some of the philosophical techniques and procedures developed in the West in this century were enunciated and applied long before in India-though of course with different ends in view. (What has to be recognized here is that even in circumstances that required intellectual discussion or logical argument, the Buddhist stresses the primacy of the soteriological motive; the need, in other words, to keep the quest for liberation always in the foreground of our thinking.) At another level, Gudmunsen's study can be said to afford a helpful and timely reminder to one section of Buddhist scholarship-namely the exponents of early or Theravada Buddhism-that Mahayana doctrines (which the latter are apt to regard as metaphysical or speculative in a somewhat pejorative sense), do in part actually exhibit the analytic features and avant garde approaches of present-day Western philosophy, 124 and that those doctrines can, therefore, be exponded in a manner that would appeal to the contemporary mind. This, evidently, is a point that has a relevance to exegetical as well as apologetic efforts which proceed from a Buddhist context. . This,book is, by and large, laudable, but, as already hinted, it has a few shortcomings. First of all, the author has failed to provide any back- ground information on either Buddhism or Wittgenstein-it can indeed be held against him that he plunges into a knotty inquiry beset with many difficulties without preparatory observations of any kind. This procedure, unfortunately, tends to diminish the book's usefulness for those who lack considerable prior knowledge of the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy and the interpretation of Buddhism in the different schools. Of course, Gudmunsen's discussion is for the most part technical, and it is no doubt mainly addressed to the 'specialist' rather than the layman; but the 'specialist, it is well to add, will perhaps have complaints of his own: it appears, for example, that the book offers no systematic information-or for that matter clues of a serious kind- on previous research into its field of inquiry; and yet the scholarly reader might find such information valuable. The author is not unaware of previous research of the sort just alluded to; in fact he exten- sively uses the writings of Western interpreters of Buddhism who have discussed Wittgenstein, often in lieu of a direct examination of the primary sources on both sides, but sometimes, (and this might not be a harsh judgement), as a substitute for independent thinking as well. The bibliography-and indeed Gudmunsen's book as a whole-shows little evidence of an acquaintance with the enormous expository and critical literature on Wittgenstein's philosophy. The Buddhist scholar can perhaps afford to overlook this, and might not view it as a desideratum; but interpreters ofWittgenstein who happen to read this book cannot be blamed if the feel otherwise. These criticisms relate to the author's omissions; objections can also be raised against what he in fact says: it is possible, for example, to question the appositeness of some of the parallelisms that he draws. The points on which such questioning is admissible will perhaps increase when one delves into the philosophies as set forth in the original texts rather than the translations which the author actually used. Though Conze's largely negative approaches to comparative philosophy need not, as Gudmunsen himself recognizes, be taken as a guide, Conze was certainly not wrong when he cautioned that "the search for philosophical parallels is frought with many pitfalls." (E. Conze, "Buddhist Philosophy and Its European Parallels" in Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies, London, 1967). Further, one can with justice take exception to the manner in , which Gudmunsen views early Buddhism. The abrasive tones in which 125 he uses the term "Hinayana', and his largely negative assessment of that school might understandably offend those who appreciate and value the approaches of classical Buddhism. It is possible (and perhaps perferable) to see the development of Buddhist thought from wider perspectives, in a spirit of 'oecumenism.' Moreover, the tolerance this entails accords with the quintessential temper of Buddhism. Those who choose to adopt these perspectives and attitudes will no doubt f"md the author's persistent endeavour to pit Hinayanism against Mahayanism not only openly tendentious, but at times somewhat disagreeable, because it appears to have sectarian overtones. Though the shortcomings noted above are worthy of attention, they do not seriously undermine the book's overall significance or value. Gudmunsen's discussion clearly represents a substantial contribution to an interesting, complex theme in comparative philosophy. He has not, of course, exhausted it; but future scholars who seek to deal more amply or in greater depth with the same theme will find much of what is written in: Wittgenstein and Buddhism stimulating, provocative and, on the whole, instructive; and therefore, well-nigh impossible to ignore. Vijitha Rajapakse INFORMATION FOR ADVERTISEMENT AND BOOK REVIEWS IN THE 1981JIABS nos. 1 AND 2 1. Since the first issue of the 1981 ]lABS will go to the printers soon, we will be able to include your advertisement in this issue only if it is received by us by the middle of May, 1981. Books received by January 31,1981, may be reviewed in that issue. 2. The second number of the 1981 ]lABS is expected to go to the printers in Mid-July. Books received by May 30th, 1981, may be reviewed in that issue. The deadline for advertisements to be received by us for the JIABS no. 2 is, however, July 15th, 1981. 3. ADVERTISING RATES: ~ Full page-$100.00 Half page- $50.00 The above rates are set for Europe, the Americas,Japan, Australia, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Korea. For other countries the rates may be reduced upon inquiry. All advertisements should be submitted in a finished format, ready for the printer. 126 IV. NOTES AND NEWS A Report on the 2nd Conference of the lABS Held at N ava N alanda Mahavihara, N alanda, Bihar, India January 17-19, 1980 The 2nd C.onference .of the lABS, .originally scheduled t.o be held fr.om the 17-19 .of December, 1979, and P.ostp.oned .on acc.ount .of electi.ons in India, was held from the 17-19 .of January, 1980, at the Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, Nalanda, Bihat, India. The hist.orical and sentimental imp.ortance .of Nalanda as well as the enthusiasm .of the ;h.osts in .organizing the c.onference there made the event a mem.orable .one. There were cl.ose t.o 200 participants fr.om the f.oll.owing countries: :Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Burma, Canada, Pe.ople's Republic .of China, England, France, West Germany, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, K.orea, Ladakh, Nepal, Netherlands, N.orway, Sikkim, Sri Lanka, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, U.S.A., U.S.S.R. The General President .of the c.onference was Profess.or Prahlad Pradhan, .of Orissa, and the c.onference was ,inaugurated by His . Excellency Dr. A.R. Kidwai, the Rajyapal .of Bihar. The .opening . ~ e s s i . o n was graced by the presence .of Fuji Guruji fr.om Japan. Pr.ofessor C.S. Upasak, Direct.or .of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara, was the L.ocal Secretary f.or the c.onference. There were about 85 papers submitted t.o the c.onference, s.ome .of which were read in absentia, because s.ome .of th participants had tD cancel their plans t.o attend .on account .of the P.ostp.onement .of the dates. These papers c.overed the vari.ous fields .of Buddhist Studies and were divided int.o 24 panels as fDll.ows: Phil.osophy and Psych.oI.ogy (3 panels), Hist.ory, Meditati.on (2 panels), Religi.on and Ethics (3 panels), Literature (4 panels), Buddha, Buddhism and the W.orld (2 panels), Sangha and S.ociety (2 panels), Art (2 panels), Archae.oI.ogy, Tantra, P.olitics, Study .of Buddhism, and Recent Buddhist M.ovements (1 panel each). While we h.ope t.o publish the Presidential Address as well as a few .of the papers subject t.o the availability .of space in .our Journal, it is prDP.osed to publish a separate vDlume .of transacti.ons which will 127 include the papers or abstracts thereof, along with the proceedings. On the occasion of this conference the Archaeological Depart_ ment of the Government of India organized an exhibition on the art and archaeology of Buddhism on the Nalanda Museum premises. The Governor of Bihar unveiled a statue of the late Bikkhu ]. Kashyap, the Founder-director of Nava Nalanda Mahavihara on the premises of the institute. The following are the resolutions adopted at the conference: 1. It was resolved that the lABS considers of great import the publica- tion, with an English translation, of a corpus of Buddhist inscriptions and will support such a project by all means possible. 2. It was resolved that the lABS gives wholehearted backing to the concept of a University devoted to Buddhist Studies, located at Nalanda, the famous international center of Buddhist Studies in ancient India. 3. It was resolved that the lABS supports the continuation of the project of the "Sanskrit Dictionary of Buddhist Texts from the Turfan Finds", and the project of the "Systematic Survey of Buddhist Sanskrit Literture", both projects being undertaken by the Akademie der Wissenschaften in Goettingen, West Germany. 4. It was resolved that the lABS gives its full"support to the building of ' a scale model of the Sanctuary of Maha Bodhi as it existed in the 12th century according to the photos of the model of Rahula Sankrityana. 5. It was resolved that the lABS as soon as financially possible should undertake the publication of a directory of scholars and institutions of Buddhist Studies throughout the world and in the meanwhile it should use its influence to encourage other bodies to finance it, and requests Dr. Samtani at Benares Hindu University to make preliminary explorations in this direction. 6. It was resolved that the lABS should, as far as possible, encourage the establishment of departments of Buddhist Studi'es in various Universities through the world. 7. It was resolved that the lABS wishes to reiterate support for the resolution passed at its first conference in September of 1978, that the lABS take steps to investigate all the possibilities of support for the continuation of the Bibliographique Bouddhique, and request Professor Alexander W. Macdonald of the University of Paris X to take the initiative. It was agreed to hold the 3rd Conference of the lABS at Winnipeg Canada. Professor Herbert Guenther was elected as the General President of the conference, and the Local Secretary is Professor Leslie Kawamura. Following is a consolo dated statement of accounts as presented by Dr. Beatrice Miller, the Treasurer, lABS. 128 SECOND ANNUAL TREASURER'S REPORT FOR THE lABS for the period from 9/12/78-12/31/79 CURRENT ASSETS: $11,089.91 CURRENT LIABILITIES: Business savings Acct: One Year Passbook Acct: 90 day Passbook Acct: Checking Account: Total in Accounts: INCOME: Dues, subscriptions and 2 Journal ads: UNESCO contribution: Interest on accounts: Total income: Balance from 9/12/78: Total: Less expenses: Final total balance: 1979 Memberships: Full: Associate: Student: Founder: Life: Institutional: Subscribing libraries: Total: $ 3265.06 $ 5056.57 $ 5086.57 $ 985.86 $11089.91 $ 6164.50 $ 1500.00 $ 444.09 $ 8108.59 EXPENSES: Office: Berkeley Publishers: Offprints: U.I.E. O.A. dues: Legal fees: ALA (mailing list): Postage: Bank Charges (Exchange, returned checks): Total expenses: $6145.47 $14254.06 -$3164.15 $11089.91 173 $ 175.00 $2312.45 $ 105.00 $ 50.00 $ 70.00 $ 98.17 $ 307.08 $ 46.45 $3164.15 (As of 12/29/79, Full and 97 Associate Members from 1977 3 and/or 1978 had not paid 21 their 1979 membership fees.) 21 4 19 8 173 A full report on the 2nd Conference and the Proceedings is proposed to be published by Nava Nalanda Mahavhara study, and we will keep our members informed as to how to obtain the complete records. 129 Copy of Report Elaborated For Union Academique Internationale BruxeUes A Critical Piili PAST Volume I of A Critical Frili Dictionary, treating words beginning with the vowel A, appeared between 1924 and 1948. It comprised 11 fascicles and a supplement entitled Epilegomena. It was edited by Dines Andersen (until 1940), Helmer Smith, and Hans Hendriksen (from 1944). The costs, including those of publication, were met by various Danish foundations. A resolution passed at the XXIVth International Congress of Orientalists at Munich in 1957 urged the resumption of the project, and at a conference held in Copenhagen in 1958 it was agreed to continue the CPD on an international basis. By 1971 all the material for Volume II (the vowels A to 0) and material for the beginning of Volume III (the consonants K onwards) had been shared out among scholars from Czechoslovakia, Denmark, England, France, Germany, Holland, India, Japan, and Sri Lanka, and many of them had paid visits to Copenhagen to familarize themselves with working methods. PRESENT The first fascicle of Volume II appeared in 1960, and by the beginning of 1976 nine fascicles had been published, thus equalling or even bettering the rate of progress achieved during the publication of Volume I. It was possible to calculate that the remaining material would probably occupy another six fascicles. Volume II was published first under the general supervision of Mr. M011er-Kristensen, but from fascicle 5 onwards Professor Alsdorf was appointed as Editor-in-Chief. In the earlier fascicles a wide diver- gence between individual writers was discernible in their handling of the material and in their treatment of linguistic problems. In subse- quent fascicles, however, produced under Professor Alsdorfs editor- ship, and in the case of fascicles 8 and 9 actually prepared for the press by him, many of these inequalities of treatment have been eliminated. In 1975 Professor Alsdorf indicated that he <:lid not wish to continue as Editor-in-Chief to the end of Volume II, and Mr. Norman was asked to take over the responsibilities of producing the 130 fascicles of the volume, comprising the vowels E and O. Following the tragic death of Professor Alsdorf in March 1978, which was a great blow to QIe CPD, the task of supervising the remaining portions of the vowels U and U was also entrusted to Mr. Norman. Professor Alsdorfs death caused some delay to fascicle 10, which was in the press; it was published recently, in March 1979. some of the material for fascicle 11 has already gone to press. The remainder should be ready by the summer of 1979, and the fascicle should be published late in 1980 or early in 1981. FUTURE In March 1978 the Carlsberg Foundation and the Danish Research Council, which together with UNESCO have met the costs of Volume II to date, announced that they were unable to offer [mancial aid to the CPD after the completion of Volume II (the remaining vowel portions). At a meeting held at Mainz in February 1979, financed jointly by the Academy (responsible for the publica- tion in concordance with the Royal Danish Academy of Sciences and Letters since Professor Alsdorf took over as Editor-in-Chief) and CPISH, it was resolved that, despite the loss of financial backing, preparation should be made for the continuation of the Dictionary. It was reported that a certain arrangement between the "Bund" and "Lander" of the German Federal Republic would make it possible for the Mainz Academy to obtain a grant to enable an assistant to be employed on the Dictionary work at Mainz, and it was hoped that arrangements could be made for someone to be employed in Paris. When the preparatory work has been done, it will be necessary to recruit scholars to write articles and financial aid will have to be sought to publish material as it is prepared. 131 April 1979 K. R. Norman, Cambridge Editor-in-Chief A Critical Pali Dictionary 52 DK-1l50 Copenhagen K Names and AddJressres of Contributoll" to lIABS, Volume 3, NO.1 Mr. Jose Cabezon Dept. of South Asian Studies 1244 Van Hise Hall University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706 Mr. Edward Todd Fenner Dept. of South Asian Studies 1244 Van Hise Hall University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706 Dr. Shohei Ichimura 1176 Snada-Higashi-cho Hachioji-Shi, Tokyo 193 JAPAN Professor Aaron Koseki Program in Religious Studies 4016 Foreign Languages Bldg. University of Illinois Urbana, IL 61820 Professor Whalan W. Lai Dept. of Religious Studies University of California Davis, CA 95606 Dr. Beatrice D. Miller 1227 Sweet Briar Rd. Madison, WI 53705 Professor Kenneth Roy Norman Faculty of Oriental Studies Sidgwick A venue Cambridge CB3 9DA ENGLAND Mr. Gudmunseni Rajpakse 35950 Timberlane Dr. Solon, OH 44139 132 Professor Braj Mohan Sinha Dept.' of Religious Studies The College of Wooster Wooster, OH 44691, Professor Geshe Sopa Dept. of South Asian Studies 1250 Van Hise Hall University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706 Mr. K.M. Srivastava B-58, Bangur Ave. Calcutta 700055 INDIA Professor Alex Wayman Dept. of Middle East Languages & Cultures Columbia University 603 Kent Hall New York, NY 10027 Professor Frances Wilson Dept. of South Asian Studies 1246 Van Hise Hall University of Wisconsin Madison, WI 53706 Books on Indian Religion and Philosophy ACritical Study of Mahavastu Brahma Sutra Buddhist WiSdom: Th.e Mystery oj the Self Buddhist Sects zn Indza Buddhacharita: Acts of the Buddha Conquest of Suffering... . Dimensions [3 Renunczatzon zn Advazta Vedanta Doctrine of the J ainas History oj Indian Philosophy (5 Vol.) A History of Indian Logic index to the Names in the Mahabharata Indian and Indology-Selected articles of Professor W. Norman Brown indian Studies in Philosophy Life as Yoga Madhusudan Saraswati on Bhagvad Gita Mahayana Buddhism Nagarjuna's Philosophy Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta (Vol. I) Pratyabhijnahridyam Reflections on the T antras Rise of Esoteric Buddhism in Tibet Sacred Books of the East Series (50 Vol.) Sankhya Sutras of Pancasikkha and S amkhyatattvalok Studies in Buddhistic Culture oj India Study of Yoga .' The Prabhakam School of Purvamimasa Vadiraja's Refutation of Sankara's Non- 'dualism: Clearing the way for theism Vedic Metaphysics - Yoga ofGuhya Samaj Tantra Yoga System of Patanjali Yoga as Philosophy and Religion Bhikkhu Telwatte Rahula Swami Sivananda G. Grimm Nalinaksha Dutt F.H. Johnston P.]. Saher Kapil N. Tiwari W. Schubring S.N. Dasgupta M.M. Satiscandra Vidya Bhushan S. Sorensen Ed., Professor Rosane Rocher R.C. Pandeya Vimala Thakar S.K. Gupta Nalinaksha Dutt K. Venkata Ramanan Tr. by].V. Bhattacharya Tr. by Jaide Singh S. Chattopadhyaya Dr. Eva Dargyay Ed. F. Max Muller Hariharnanda Aranya L.M.Joshi J ajneshwar Ghosh Ganganath Jha L. Mefford Betty Bharati Krishnatiratha Alex Wayman ].H. Woods S.N. Dasgupta For a Detailed Catalogue, Please Write: Motilal Banarsidass Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar Delhi 110007 India DYES! I would like to know more about the Article Reprint Service. Please send me full details on how I can order. D Please include catalogue of available titles. Name _________ Title ________ _ Institution/Company ______________ _ Department ________________ _ Address __________________ _ City _______ State _______ Zip __ _ Mail 10: University Microfilms International Article Reprint Service 300 North Zeeb Road Ann Arbor, Michigan 48106 I I I I I I I I I THE RElYUKAI LIBRARY 5-3-23 TORANOMON, MINATO-KU, TOKYO 105, JAPAN Telephones: Tokyo (03) 434-6953, 438-1079 Cables: REUB TOKYO New Publication ......................... : R. E. Emmerick '. A GUIDE TO THE LITERATURE ON KHOT AN Studia Philologica Buddhica: Occasional Paper Series, HI) : : (Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library, 1979) : . vii + 63 pages .. i ...................... ............... " .............. 0 .................................................. ,. ............ c .......... . Khotan has been famous for its agricultural and manufacturing centre at the southern edge of the Tarim Basin in an oasis, as well as for its cultural and trading centre on the Tien-shan southern route of the Takla Makan Desert. Buddhism seems to have been introduced to the Khotan area well before the Christian era. It then flourished as a major centre of Mahayana studies as . attested by well-known pilgrims, for example Fa-hsien, Hsuan-tsang and Huei-chao, on their visits as early as the beginning of the fifth to the following centuries. It continued until the tenth century. All the material in the Khotanese language comes from the period covering the seventh to the tenth centuries. Thus all the surviving literature of Khotan is Buddhist in content, and even the secular documents are coloured by Buddhism in some way. In the present booklet the world-leading authority in the field of Khotanese studies attempts a critical and comprehensive survey of the literature based upon his own research work. It is not intended to provide a complete biblio- graphy, but is furnished with extensive bibliographical notes on all of the extant literature. The booklet will no doubt offer a good insight into the various fields of relevant studies. The author is very interested in obtaining any information regarding related or parallel passages or texts in other languages. Single copies of the Studia Philologica Buddhica (Occasional Paper Series) are obtainable free of charge on request direct from the Reiyukai Library, Tokyo. TI05 3% 1i. [gf APPLICATION FORM: THE INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF BUDDHIST STUDIES MEMBERSHIP APPLICATJON FORM Name: Address: Occupation: ______________________________________________ __ Affiliation: Interest in Buddhist Studies: ---""'---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- Please send membership fees to: Dr. Beatrice D. Miller, 1227 Sweetbriar Rd., Madison, Wisconsin 53705 U.S.A. I apply for membership as a Full Member/Associate Member/Student Member/Institutional Member of the International Association of Buddhist Studies. I am enclosing the membership fee for one year/ _________ years. FEES Full Member $15 Associate Member $10 Signed Student Member $ 5 Institutional Member $30 Date NOTE: Prospective individual members from such developing countries as India, Sri Lanka, Nepal, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Burma, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, Vietnam, Malaysia and Indonesia may contact the General Secretary for possible subsidized membership rates. GUIDELINES FOR CONTRIBUTORS TO JIABS Article manuscripts, including footnotes, should not exceed approximately 30 !pag es in length; the original and one clear copy should be submitted. Material ,for short incluliing footnotes, should not consist of more than 2,000 words and should be submitted in duplicate. Book reviews should not ordinarily exceed 1,000 words and items for Notes and News should not exceed 500 words. Manuscripts should be typed, doublespaced, preferably on 81/2 x 11 bond. Footnotes should be in the style of the MLA and placed at the end of the manuscript. All publication material should be in English; exceptions will be permitted in special cases by the Editor-in-Chit!' Generally the material for publication should follow the guidelines provided by the MLA Style Sheet published by the Modern Language Association of America. But certain aspects of it as well as modifications, as given below , must be adhered to in preparing the final draft of the material. Italics: Italicize all non-English words except proper names; words listed in ,Webster's Third New International Dictionary are normally considered to be words. Italicize all linguistic citations. Parenthesis and Brackets: Use square brackets to enclose editorial or explan- atory material inserted in a quotation or translation. Proper Names: Names of Asian origin should be given in standard 'transcription (see below) and in Chinese, Japanese, Korean and Vietnamese, ; the surname should precede the given name, except where modern writers or !public figures have established known for the romanizations of "their own names. For well-known place names, use the established forms. Transcription - Sanskrit, Pali and Other South Asian Languages: For ,Sanskrit and Pali use the standard system given in A.L. Basham, The Wonder "That Was India, Appendix X; for other South Asian languages use any available standard transliteration system which is consistent and intelligible. ,Chinese, Japanese, Korean: Chinese characters may be used in consultation ," with the Editors in the body of the text but always preceded by the appropriate ';romanization: for Chinese use the modified Wade-Giles system as found in , the "List of Syllabic Headings" in the American edition of Mathews' Chinese- > English Dictionary; for Japanese use the system of Kenkyusha's New japanese- English Dictionary, but with an apostrophe after syllable-final n before vowels; for Korean use the system given in McCure-Reischauer, "The Romanization of the Korean Language", Transactions of the Korean Branch, Royal Asiatic Society, 29 (1939), 1-55. Tibetan, Mongolian: For Tibetan use the transcription proposed by T. Wylie, "A Standard System of Tibetan Transcription", Harvard journal of Asian Studies, 22 (1959), 261-7; for Mongolian use the appropriate system from ,', Antoine Mostaert, Dictionnaire Ordos, 769-809. Footnotes and bibliographical references: Keep notes to a minimum. All notes and references should conform to the MLA Style Sheet, pages 16-26; note especially that the place, publisher and date of publication, within parentheses, should follow the title, as in, e.g. A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (N ew York: Grove Press, Inc., 1959).