MFP Finalrep

FINAL REPORT – APRIL2009
"WANT OF FORESIGHT, UNWILLINGNESS TO ACT

WHEN ACTION WOULD BE SIMPLE AND EFFECTIVE,
LACK OF CLEAR THINKING, CONFUSION OF COUNSEL
UNTIL THE EMERGENCY COMES, UNTIL SELF-
PRESERVATION STRIKES ITS JARRING GONG—THESE
ARE THE FEATURES WHICH CONSTITUTE THE
ENDLESS REPETITION OF HISTORY."
-WINSTON CHURCHILL
House of Commons, May 2, 1935

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT - Foreword
Foreword
Transforming any institution is an ambitious and complicated process that must
begin with a deep grasp of the past and an open mind about the future. To this end,
Allied Command Transformation’s Multiple Futures
Project aimed to strengthen our understanding of the
Alliance’s future threat environment through rigorous
analysis of emerging security challenges. The project was
never to become a modern “Oracle at Delphi” for NATO.
Rather it provides Alliance leaders with additional
considerations for anticipating the shape of future
challenges. Our goal is to have the fewest regrets in terms
of our readiness to address future security challenges that
may confront our political and military leaders. Based
upon a well-grounded intellectual framework, the project has benefited from the
contributions and active support of Alliance and partner nations, international
organizations, and research institutions.
The Security Implications and resulting recommendations contained in this report

will provide a solid foundation from which we can build a common understanding of
the nature of the risks and threats facing the Alliance and our populations. My aim is
for this report to buttress the continuing strategic dialogue, serve as a catalyst to
drive policy change, inform defence planning, and assist in prioritizing capability
development. If used as intended, it may also be used to evaluate defence plans,
update defence scenarios, influence concept and strategy development, and
improve training and education curricula. Lastly, it will enhance our individual
nations’ defence planning and threat analysis efforts. Thus, I am confident that the
Multiple Futures Project will improve the Alliance’s future security in many ways and
at many levels.
J.N. Mattis
General, US Marine Corps
Supreme Allied Commander Transformation
MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 ii

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Table of Contents
Table of Contents
Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 3

Project Approach .........................................................................................................4
Implications.................................................................................................................. 5
Security and Defence Challenges .................................................................................6
Navigating Towards 2030 ............................................................................................. 8
Introduction Perceiving Threats to the Alliance out to 2030 ........................... 11
Chapter 1 Drivers for Change ................................................................................... 13
BUILDING A COMMON PERCEPTION THROUGHOUT THE ALLIANCE ....................................... 13
STRUCTURAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE ................................................................................. 15
DETERMINISTIC DRIVERS ................................................................................................ 16
Chapter 2 The Multiple Futures ............................................................................... 17
FUTURE ONE – DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY ...................................................................... 19
FUTURE TWO – DECEPTIVE STABILITY.............................................................................. 20
FUTURE THREE – CLASH OF MODERNITIES ....................................................................... 21
FUTURE FOUR – NEW POWER POLITICS ........................................................................... 22
STRATEGIC SURPRISES – THE CHALLENGE OF DISRUPTIONS ............................................... 23
Chapter 3 Security Implications from Future Risks .............................................. 28
SOURCES OF THREAT..................................................................................................... 28
THREATENING ACTIONS/EVENTS .................................................................................... 30
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................ 31
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS INSIGHTS AND RESULTING CONSEQUENCES .................................. 33
MAKING CHOICES – MITIGATION OF SECURITY IMPLICATIONS ............................................. 39
MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Table of Contents
Chapter 4 Military Implications Preparing Alliance Military Forces for

2030 ................................................................................................................................. 42
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS ................................................................................................ 42
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS (TOP 5) ANALYSIS ......................................................................46
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOCUS AREAS ........................................................................... 47
Chapter 5 Findings and Recommendations ......................................................... 51
THE EVOLVING NATURE OF RISKS AND THREATS .............................................................. 52
INTERACTION WITH NON-NATO NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ................. 54
ALLIANCE VULNERABILITIES AND CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS
AND WARFARE.............................................................................................................. 55
SHAPING AND INFLUENCING IDEAS, VALUES AND EVENTS IN A GLOBALISED WORLD ............. 55
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS – FOCUS AREAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................................... 56
ADAPTING TO THE DEMANDS OF HYBRID THREATS ............................................................ 57
OPERATING WITH OTHERS AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS ................................................... 58
CONFLICT PREVENTION, RESOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT..........................60
COUNTER PROLIFERATION ............................................................................................. 61
EXPEDITIONARY AND COMBAT CAPABILITY IN AUSTERE ENVIRONMENTS .............................62
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND WINNING THE BATTLE OF THE NARRATIVE .................... 63
ORGANISATIONAL AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES .......................................................64
Concluding Remarks .................................................................................................... 66
MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 2

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT - Executive Summary
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
“SECURING, STABILISING AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IS OUR CORE BUSINESS AND

WILL CONTINUE TO BE SO INTO THE FUTURE”
NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,

th
45 Munich Security Conference, Munich Germany
7 Feb 2009
In the world of 2030, the inability to react with expediency and

purpose to events both expected and unexpected will be costly. In
the security context, where such costs are measured against
interests, values and public security, every effort must be made to
align functions and simplify decision making processes. The Multiple
Futures Project (MFP) is designed to support strategic decision
makers. It focuses on future challenges, on their relative nature and
gravity, and on what the Alliance can do today to prepare for
tomorrow. It offers insights into the difficult choices associated with
managing risk, in order to protect the most vital element of the
Alliance, its population. It is crucial that we build a mutual
understanding of the new and uncertain challenges for which NATO
must be prepared to respond.
To be open, transparent, inclusive and able to process the widest

spectrum of inputs objectively and comprehensively, the MFP was
built on the work of national and international organisations and
developed through extensive consultation across the Alliance.
Twenty-one workshops and strategic engagements were
conducted, including combined North Atlantic Council and Military
Committee (NAC/MC) sessions. This exhaustive process included
3 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Executive Summary
representatives from 45 nations and more than 60 institutions

bringing more than 500 political, military, civil and economic experts
to the table from the public and private sectors and from both
international and non-governmental organisations. These
engagements were used to capture the values, ideas, and
perspectives that, blended and distilled, make up the core of the
report.
PROJECT APPROACH
The MFP starts with a fundamental analysis of the drivers of change

that will affect the Alliance over the next 20 years. Nine drivers, all
of which are significant in terms of their relevance and potential
impact on the Alliance, are the building blocks of the project.
Reflecting the inputs from the many workshops, MFP drivers are
combined in different ways and with varying weights to create four
plausible futures. Futures are tools that help form a shared vision,
from which NATO can explore different paths by which the future
may unfold. Futures also provide an effective means to assess the
potential for strategic surprise, that is, a significant non-linear
development that radically changes the future. Two such surprises
(a Weapons of Mass Destruction/Effect event and a Global
Pandemic) were applied systematically to each of the four futures to
assess discontinuities and logical fault lines, and thus help to better
define the Risk Conditions and Implications that flow from the
futures.
The multiple futures yield some 40 Risk Conditions, ranging from

”failed states” and ”disruption of access to critical resources;” to
”increasing ethnic tension” and ”challenges to values and world
views.” When considered in the context of potential Sources of
Threat and Threatening Actions in 2030, they describe a complex
future security environment. From the Risk Conditions, some 33
Security Implications and 26 Military Implications were further
derived, discussed and evaluated during the workshops.

FRICTION in international level decision DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY (Integration, Climate Change,
making Resource Allocation, Changing State Capacity) Weak and
failed states generate instability in areas of interest, and the
Economic INTEGRATION of globalised states of the globalised world are faced with related strategic
actors choices.
ASYMMETRY of wealth and power
CHANGING STATE CAPACITY and the DECEPTIVE STABILITY (Demographics, Resource Allocation,
distribution and management of power Friction) Developed states preoccupied with societal change
RESOURCE ALLOCATION of raw and demographic issues rather than geopolitical risk.
materials, energy, water and food
COMPETING IDEOLOGIES AND WORLD CLASH OF MODERNITIES (Use of Technology, Demographics,
VIEWS Competing Ideologies and Worldviews) Advanced, rational
CLIMATE CHANGE impacting networked societies with inherent fragility challenged by
international relations and commerce external authoritarian regimes.
USE OF TECHNOLOGY and innovation

likely to produce breakthrough events NEW POWER POLITICS (Friction, Competing Ideologies and
Worldviews, Resource Allocation, Integration) Increasing
DEMOGRAPHICS including migration and number of major powers, competition and proliferation
urbanisation undermine value of international organisations.
Figure 1: Drivers of Change, Plausible Futures
IMPLICATIONS
The Security Implications point to four broad insights and associated

consequences. The first of these touches upon the cornerstone of
Alliance defence structures by discussing why and how the evolving
nature of threats will challenge efforts to reach a consensus on what
constitutes an Article 5 response. The second insight reflects on the
need for the Alliance to examine its responsibility to act outside
NATO’s traditional areas of engagement, in order to preclude or
minimise conflict with pro-active, integrated, and comprehensive
approaches. The third insight centers on the understanding that
readily available advanced technology will enable determined
adversaries to attack Alliance vulnerabilities in new and unexpected
ways, thus requiring NATO to consider changes in its operating
concepts, capabilities, and future force structure. The fourth insight
suggests that enhanced communications and increased interaction
with international partners will be required to positively shape and

influence values, ideas, and events in an increasingly globalised

world.
Military Implications point to seven broad focus areas. Five of the

focus areas identify potential roles within the military realm that
NATO could consider emphasizing for 2030: Adapting to the
Demands of Hybrid Threats, Operating with Others and Building
Institutions, Conflict Management (prevention and resolution)
including Consequence Management, Counter Proliferation, and
Expeditionary and Combat Capability in Austere Environments. The
remaining two focus areas, Strategic Communications and Winning
the Battle of the Narrative, and Organisational and Force
Development Issues, represent the essential enablers associated with
the roles its member nations envision for the Alliance.
Overall, the implications derived from the multiple futures reveal

that the security environment will continue to evolve and be subject
to a variety of unforeseeable and dynamic political, social,
technological and military developments. Accordingly, the Alliance
must strive to achieve a common understanding of perceived risks
and threats in order to anticipate and sense important trends,
developments and events. By doing so, the Alliance will be better
positioned to positively shape and react to the security environment
of the future.
SECURITY AND DEFENCE CHALLENGES
Despite potential interstate conflicts in the Middle East, the

Caucasus, and East and South Asia, large-scale conventional
confrontation is unlikely. The Alliance will need to respond to a wide
variety of security challenges that are mainly a consequence of
destabilisation and the absence of governance. The MFP forecasts
that these challenges will result from unbridled extremism,
uncontrolled and illegal migration, and friction caused by resource
scarcity.

Burgeoning technology also will increase both the breadth of

Alliance vulnerabilities, and the ease with which those who oppose
us will be able to use the advancements in technology to disrupt
society. The use of technology, especially the technology of
WMD/E, therefore will require increasing vigilance and positive
control, and close Alliance consultation with partners to protect our
vital technological advantage.
Adversaries will focus less on external attack and more on a

subversive undermining of what are in essence, the fundamental
principles that bind the Alliance. Specifically, adversaries will attack
the compact we have with governments, our solidarity, and the
values we hold dear – the sanctity of life, individual liberty, and
liberal democracy based on the rule of law. These attacks will use
both physical and psychological means to weaken the Alliance.
Whether the motives of our adversaries are based on religious

extremism, envy of or aversion to our accumulated wealth and
resources, or an assertion of power, hybrid attacks will target our
fundamental principles. These hybrid attacks will be both
interconnected and unpredictable, combining traditional warfare
with irregular warfare, terrorism, and organised crime.
Psychologically, adversaries will use the instantaneous connectivity
of an increasingly effective mass media to reshape or summarily
reject the liberal values, ideas, and free markets that characterise
the Alliance. They will attempt to gain relative advantage in the
world by using our civil norms, legal frameworks and freedom of the
media against us, as they manipulate and convince others to reject
our way of life. Our adversaries will attack our populations, our
centres of commerce, and our integrated global economy, including
our social networks and the facilitating, but vulnerable, global
commons that we use to connect and prosper. Adversaries will take
the initiative and exploit Alliance vulnerabilities in both the virtual
and physical domains of the global commons, including the realms
of sea, air, space, and cyberspace.

Advocating the values and ideas upon which the Alliance is founded
and engaging in the ‘battle of the narrative’ may be the most
effective tools to counter our adversaries. In this more optimistic
vein, the future presents NATO with unprecedented opportunities
to positively influence ideas, values and events in a globalised world
as the Alliance maintains and improves its ability to respond to
unpredictable and complex challenges, admittedly some of which
remain unknown at this time.
NAVIGATING TOWARDS 2030
It is essential that the Alliance continues to demonstrate its strength

and resolve, which are rooted in solidarity. These qualities sustain
the Alliance as we work to keep societies informed about the
methods of our opponent, to remain vigilant, and to lead in conflict
management. We must work tirelessly together to build support for
an Alliance that continues to espouse the values and ideas upon
which it was founded. To do this, the Alliance must re-evaluate the
meaning of an Article 5 attack, and in doing so send a clear signal of
deterrence to our adversaries. That signal is in essence the clarion’s
call that there will be strength behind the response to any attack,
whether territorial or not. A comprehensive approach, developed in
concert with other international organisations like the EU and UN, is
fundamental to the security of this diverse Alliance. It goes without
saying, however, that the more comprehensive our approach is, the
more our engagements will be affected by actions outside of our
geographic boundaries. To be effective in this environment, we
must develop better partnerships, leverage relationships and work
with other international actors to improve the transparency of
information and decision-making. Success will depend on our ability
to manage conflict effectively, and to mitigate the consequences
that spring from subversive activity.
The Alliance must maintain flexible, adaptable, well-trained, well-

equipped, deployable and sustainable expeditionary forces. These
forces require an equally adaptable and comprehensive command

structure that is able to integrate and work effectively with other

actors to meet threats across the spectrum of conflict, spanning
hybrid warfare and the potential use of WMD/E; relief and
reconstruction activities; and the mentoring, advising and training
of indigenous forces to support longer-term institution building. The
Alliance must be able to conduct a full range of operations and
missions concurrently, ranging from collective defence to
demanding stabilisation and reconstruction operations; and from
security sector reform to large-scale high-intensity combat
operations. Alliance forces must be ready to operate in WMD/E-
contaminated environments while assuring access to and unfettered
use of the sea, air, space and cyberspace global commons. This
unfettered access will be pivotal to the success of all Alliance
operations.
Developing the necessary capabilities and generating the required

forces for these myriad operations will remain a core responsibility
of the Alliance. We must study ways to re-establish and modernise
the NATO committed forces concept. New or dedicated capabilities
to protect logistics and major infrastructure nodes will be
increasingly important. Included must be the ability to ensure
unimpeded access to the electromagnetic spectrum, as well as the
appropriate means to detect, identify, locate and engage
adversaries intent on impeding our use of space and cyberspace.
Urbanisation also will present challenges to the effective conduct of

military operations. In light of present and future demographic
trends, it will be a significant challenge for the Alliance to recruit,
educate, train and retain a professional force of the highest calibre,
able to support these operations in the complex environment of
2030.
In the end, however, we must not lose sight of the fact that, no
matter how hard we try, the future is not foreseeable. More
importantly, no matter how hard we prepare– we will be surprised.
The challenge for NATO, like any complex large organisation, is to

learn how to manage uncertainty. This report calls for that next step
– the building of a shared vision of the future through rigorous
intellectual debate regarding the conditions, working assumptions,
and the framework behind the policies and doctrines of the Alliance.

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT - Introduction
Introduction
Perceiving Threats to the Alliance out
to 2030
NATO is the most successful military alliance in human history,

having brought peace and freedom to two continents over six
decades. The global security environment we now face is changing
rapidly, and demands that we understand and evaluate how the
Alliance will be challenged and
threatened in the future. We can reach
this understanding only through
coherent and structured strategic
dialogue. The intellectual rigour that
supports this dialogue can facilitate an
organisational recognition of the factors
that define such challenges and threats.
The Multiple Futures Project (MFP)

creates a basis for such a strategic
dialogue by focusing on the fundamental
question: In 2030, what are the threats
and challenges that will pose the greatest
risk to the interests, values and
populations of the Alliance? The goal was
to keep this study open, transparent, and
inclusive, in order to process objectively
and comprehensively the widest
available spectrum of inputs. To this end,
Allied Command Transformation (ACT)
conducted 21 workshops and strategic

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Introduction
engagements, and solicited the direct involvement of

representatives from 45 nations and more than 60 institutions to
exploit their political, military, civil and economic expertise.
Working with a combination of NATO, national and diverse

international organisations, the MFP developed an Intellectual
Framework (IF) that produced a set of Security and Military
Implications, and corresponding Recommendations. The Intellectual
Framework is the process that was developed and applied to obtain
the analytical results. It connects the drivers, futures, and
implications of the study via two processes by which the futures are
built and the implications deduced (Figure 2).
Figure 2: MFP Intellectual Framework
The result of the IF process is the identification of specific Security

and Military Implications. These are associated with specific Risk
Conditions and Threatening Actions which may materialise within
any or all of the considered futures, including the assessment of the
strategic surprises.

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Chapter 1
Chapter 1
Drivers for Change
BUILDING A COMMON PERCEPTION THROUGHOUT THE

ALLIANCE
Building a common perception of the relevant drivers was a
precondition for the development of the futures and consequent
assessment of the possible implications. The MFP study of drivers
started with an analysis of 19 national studies on the future security
environment and the existing ACT body of work on drivers, futures,
and challenges.1
Using the results of 21 workshops, nine drivers (Figure 3) with a high
degree of commonality were identified as most relevant to the
Alliance. Some of them have been influential forces throughout
history, and are designated in this study as ‘structural drivers’ of
change. In the very long term (centuries, not just decades) it is our
assessment that three of these drivers remain historically constant:
friction, integration, and asymmetry. A look at the interrelation of
these three highlights six key and deterministic drivers that will have
the greatest impact on security in the coming decades. They are:
changing state capacity, resources (allocation), climate change, use
of technology, demographics, and competing ideologies and world
views.
1
Three studies comprise the SACT body of work: 1) The 2007 SACT Future Security
Environment (FSE) Study: An examination of trend analyses available from nations
and the broader trans-Atlantic community involving industry and academia; 2) The
2006 SACT Long Term Requirements Study (LTRS): This considered plausible future
worlds and future NATOs to support capability analysis; and 3) Emerging Strategic
Issues: A continuous examination of the future security environment and NATO
strategic guidance to identify emerging issues and their impact on possible future
military missions and capabilities.

Figure 3: Evolution of MFP Drivers

STRUCTURAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE
FRICTION (DISTRIBUTION OF POWER) is the degree of ease

with which decisions are made at the international level,
functions in essence as a relative power meter, ranging
from cooperation to confrontation.
INTEGRATION (ECONOMIC/GLOBALISATION) is the degree to

which national and regional economies trade, and their
level of functional integration.
ASYMMETRY (STATES/POLITICAL ENTITIES) is the relative

discrepancy between states in terms of wealth and power,
and influences international relations in terms of both
development and security.

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT - Chapter 1
DETERMINISTIC DRIVERS
STATE CAPACITY reflects the distribution and management of power

at the state level.
RESOURCES (ALLOCATION) encompasses the availability and

affordability of, access to, and competition for essential resources,
including energy, water, food and other indispensable commodities.
CLIMATE CHANGE is any long-term significant change in the ‘average

weather’ that may have an impact on international relations.
USE OF TECHNOLOGY denotes the evolution and availability of

technology up to 2030.
DEMOGRAPHICS (INCLUDING MIGRATION & URBANISATION) reflect

domestic population trends related to birth, death, age, income,
ethnicity, and the other characteristics of a state’s population. It
includes migration, urbanisation, and other external factors.
COMPETING IDEOLOGIES AND WORLDVIEWS deal with alienation and

confrontation based on different values, religion, and historic
geopolitical perspectives.
These drivers represent the building blocks for the multiple futures.
The intersection of the relevant drivers shapes the landscape where
plausible futures and the effect of strategic surprises can be studied.
The following chapter discusses how the drivers and futures were
constructed and analysed.

Chapter 2
The Multiple Futures
The multiple futures are only the means, not the end, of this project.
They tell a story about plausible worlds in 2030. The future is not
predictable, but that does not mean we should not plan for it. From
that perspective, the four futures provide a common ground for
structured discussion and debate
regarding the risks and vulnerabilities
that endanger the populations of the
Alliance. Constructed from a series of
relevant drivers, each of the futures
provides a backdrop for conceptual
analysis – a canvas on which to assess
the potential risks, threats, strategic
surprises, implications, and, of course,
opportunities. The study yields a
comprehensive set of risk conditions
from which security and military
implications can be deduced. From
implications, we gain strategic insight
and better understand the potential
choices the Alliance faces as it addresses the challenges and
opportunities of the coming decades.
The future security environment will not develop exactly as

described in the four futures. Nevertheless, they are useful as a
framework to guide discussion regarding specific Risk Conditions.
These conditions will influence decision-making within the Alliance.
Risk Conditions refer to vulnerabilities and characteristics that
endanger people, territorial integrity, and/or values and ideas:

PEOPLE refer to the security and safety of a state’s

domestic population, both local and abroad.
TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY includes the protection of

national borders, domestic property, property
abroad, as well as national resources claimed by the
state. In a more modern sense, this could be
expanded to include communication / computer
networks and assets in space.
VALUES AND IDEAS include the preservation and

promotion of Western culture, the heritage of social
norms, ethical values, traditional customs, and
political systems that form the basis for Western
civilization.

People, goods and territory tend to be indisputable core

responsibilities for the state to protect and defend. Increasingly, in a
world of computers and networks, the intellectual property of
‘values and ideas,’ too, will require vigorous protection by
governments. As the Alliance prepares for the future, it is worth
noting that as nations improve their ability to protect their people,
goods, and territory, then the implications, risks, and opportunities
inherent in doing so will become increasingly important.
FUTURE ONE – DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY

The relevant drivers in Future One, DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY, are
climate change, resource allocation, economic integration, and
competing ideologies and worldviews. The Dark Side of Exclusivity
describes how globalisation, climate change, and the misallocation
of resources significantly affect the capacity of states to maintain
sovereignty. Weak and failed states generate instability in areas of
interest, and present the states of the developed world with
strategic choices regarding how to react. This first future
concentrates on the friction between the developed or “market”
states and the developing states. This future is complicated by
nationalism, the misallocation of resources, poverty, frustration,
demographic pressure, and deteriorating environmental conditions.
In this future, the following Risk Conditions have been identified:
 Failed Governance
 Proliferation of Radical Ideologies
 Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, ideological conflict
 Vulnerability of strategic chokepoints and infrastructures in
ungoverned spaces
 Potential disputes over previously uninhabited and
resource-rich territories
 Consequences from environmental catastrophes/changes
 Proliferation of WMD/WME
 Spread of radical ideologies

 Challenges to state authority

 Uncontrolled migration
 Shifts in population mix
FUTURE TWO – DECEPTIVE STABILITY
The relevant drivers for Future Two – DECEPTIVE STABILITY are

asymmetry, demographics, resource allocation, and competing
ideologies and worldviews. Deceptive Stability highlights the
requirement to manage the demographic shift resulting from aging
populations and young migrants. Additionally, resource allocation is
both effective and efficient as the resource-rich parts of the world
become part of the dominant system. However, a wide range of
problems still persist in the less developed regions of the world that
are resource-poor. This dichotomy is further exacerbated by the
lack of intervention by liberal democracies absorbed with domestic
priorities. Ensuing tensions and poor economic and cultural
integration worsen pre-existing domestic and transnational security
issues such as crime and terrorism. The overarching theme of this
future is preoccupation with domestic concerns in the developed
states, which leaves them less able to react to instability and
geopolitical risk.
 Inability to anticipate, sense, and shape external security

environment
 Transnational criminal movements
 Strategic inattention
 Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological
conflict
 Systemic inability to respond quickly to external effects
 Uncontrolled migration

FUTURE THREE – CLASH OF MODERNITIES

The relevant drivers in Future Three – CLASH OF MODERNITIES are
competing ideologies and worldviews, demographics, and the use of
technology. Clash of Modernities sketches a world where a strong
belief in rationalism coupled with technological innovation has
enabled advanced-network societies to connect virtually across the
globe. Continued globalisation and technological advances have
helped drive urban centres in the developed world to become mega-
hubs of wealth and culture. The governance of this developed sector
is diffuse, multi-layered, and network-centric where problems are
solved, and created, by virtual networks in real time. The
disconnected, segregated, and disassociated frontier areas suffer
the greatest tension. Further destabilising these regions are
organised criminal elements that engage in human and black-
market trafficking, intellectual and technological piracy, and illegal
arms trading. Authorities within developed states are focussed
primarily on keeping these disruptive forces at bay by managing
flows of trade, information, resources, and the recruitment of
workers that traverse the borders between the urban cores and
outlying areas.
 Complex interdependent computer networks

 Internal tension between technocratic efficiency and civil
liberties
 High dependency on constant flow of vital resources
 Extremism of marginalised groups
 Territorial and extra-territorial border disputes
 Technological exploitation by criminal/rogue elements
 Vulnerability of complex interdependent systems and
infrastructures
 Conflict between incompatible belief systems
 Shifting loyalties (state vs. non-state actors)
 Alliances of authoritarian states
 Potential spill-over of ethnic, religious, and ideological
conflict

FUTURE FOUR – NEW POWER POLITICS
The relevant drivers of Future Four – NEW POWER POLITICS are friction
in international decision-making; competing ideologies and
worldviews; conflict over resource allocation; and a lack of
economic integration. New Power Politics describes a growing
absolute wealth, accompanied by the widespread proliferation of
WMD/E. This future is characterized by power politics, but in a truly
multi-polar world that is dominated by competing regional powers.
These powers have established a fragile balance in which
globalisation and international rules and norms are challenged by
competition for resources and influence. These states may not have
a global reach, but regionally they play a significant role in shaping
world politics by promoting their strategic interests and competitive
advantage. Competition and demand for resources, particularly in
ungoverned spaces, continues unabated as the most powerful states
continuously strive to improve their economies and protect their
populations.
 Shifting spheres of influence

 Competition for ideological supremacy
 Competition for resources
 Proliferation of nuclear and other WME capabilities
 Ungoverned spaces
 Inter-state rivalry
 Inability of the international system to handle large power
fluctuations
 Shifting state alliances

STRATEGIC SURPRISES – THE CHALLENGE OF DISRUPTIONS
Futures studies often have trouble dealing with non-linear

developments such as large-scale, unpredictable shocks. For each of
the four futures, two shocks are applied systematically in order to
illuminate structural vulnerabilities and tensions. The two shocks
considered in this study are a global pandemic and a WMD/E attack
against a large city, posed to have taken place between now and
2030.
GLOBAL PANDEMIC: A global pandemic with hundreds of millions of

casualties will cause state failures in undeveloped or weak states and
severely damage economies in affected developed states. Radical
ideologies will spread and grow further in failed states.
Governments in developed
countries will have to focus on
ensuring the survival and
prosperity of their populations,
while overlooking the needs of
those with fewer resources.
Wealthy countries affected by
the pandemic will use their
significant resources to develop
vaccines; availability, however,
will be limited. There will be an
exponential increase in global demand for vaccines that cannot be
satisfied through increased production. However, the increase in
demand for vaccines will be relatively short lived, while the demand
for palliative medicines and clean food and water will last much
longer. Organised crime will fill the void to their profit and
empowerment. Interstate rivalry will increase as states struggle for
medicines in the attempt to protect and defend their populations.
The risk for interstate war will increase and may reach
unprecedented levels.

IMPACT ON IDENTIFIED RISK CONDITIONS
FUTURE 1 – DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY: A pandemic on the scale of

the 1918 Spanish influenza outbreak will exacerbate internal
instability in already weak states and likely lead to a significant
increase in the number of failed states. Rich and stable countries will
focus their attention and concentrate resources on alleviating the
effects of the pandemic on their own populations, and will likely
reduce stabilisation efforts abroad. Critical infrastructures located
abroad in areas heavily affected by the pandemic will require
increased protection to ensure the parent country has continued
access to those resources. This will be especially true in failed or
failing states that have suffered a very high number of casualties.
Organizations based on radical ideologies will exploit the pandemic
by promising to care for the sick, and will be rewarded by a surge in
followers. Individual national health care systems will be incapable
of dealing with the situation or providing sufficient vaccines or
palliative care, likely resulting in massive uncontrolled migration.
FUTURE 2 – DECEPTIVE STABILITY: A large-scale pandemic will further

increase the preoccupation with internal affairs in many developed
nations. Due to the immense demand for medicines and health care,
legislatures will be pressed to shift more resources towards the
prevention and mitigation of future pandemics, which will put more
pressure on defence budgets. The market for vaccines will become
very attractive to organised crime. In addition, the short notice
scarcity of many vaccines in a global high demand situation will lead
to significant internal and external tension.
FUTURE 3 – CLASH OF MODERNITIES: The complexity and

interconnectivity of infrastructure (health, transport, energy,
security, etc.) will lessen the impact of a pandemic in nations that
have an integrated system of advanced healthcare. The loss of
employees and resources will have a significant negative impact on
a state’s economy, and increase the likelihood of civil unrest. In such
a chaotic situation, large segments of society may shift loyalties

from the state to a non-state actor capable of supplying vaccines

and basic life support
FUTURE 4 – NEW POWER POLITICS: With large populations affected

by the pandemic, there will be a sharply increased demand for
vaccines on the global market. Powerful nations will use all
instruments of power to ensure survival of the state’s population.
Interstate rivalry will increase, and existing alliances will suffer from
and have to respond to increased competition. The security
environment will become more volatile as nations consume existing
resources to mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic on
individual economies. The risk of interstate war will rise as friction
between key states increases, heightening old rivalries and
exacerbating cultural differences.
WMD/E ATTACK ON A CRITICAL NODE: There are many critical logistic

nodes within the Alliance and a WMD/E attack on any of them would
have significant impact on the Alliance. The selected
strategic shock, however, describes the situation if a
major European city is targeted. A WMD/E attack
destroying a major European city will cause extreme
environmental degradation with immense consequences.
Mitigating the effects of a single WMD will exceed one
nation’s capability and require multinational assistance.
The WMD attack will have significant negative economic
effects and the community of European states will take
decades to recover. Synchronised WMD attacks on
several major cities throughout the Alliance will cause an
economic and social crisis of unprecedented scale.
Membership in a credible defence and/or security
organisation will be seen as increasingly important. On
the one hand, the Alliance will be expected to show
resolve and wisdom in responding to the attack, and efficient and
successful action will increase Alliance cohesion. On the other hand,

failure to respond or a weak response will break the bonds and

splinter the Alliance. Obviously, technical preparations, deterrence
and defensive regimes, consequence management capabilities, and
strong Alliance ethical foundations will be essential factors.
IMPACT ON IDENTIFIED RISK CONDITIONS
FUTURE 1 – DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY: A WMD attack will destroy a

major European logistical hub and surrounding area. Internal
migration and intense pressures on the health care system stress
societal infrastructure beyond the breaking point. Europe will
recover, but in the aftermath the radical actors behind the attack
will have earned a strategic victory which will motivate them and
increase the number of recruits joining those radical groups.
FUTURE 2 – DECEPTIVE STABILITY: In Future 2 a WMD attack is a

logical consequence of the strategic inattention and overemphasis
on internal affairs. The likely public demand for an adequate
response to the attack will lead to a rejection of current government
policies. The importance of being a member of a credible Alliance
will return to the agenda and likely lead to increased efforts to
enhance the ability of the Alliance to protect and defend its
members. Even though the economic impact of the attack will be
immense, a single WMD attack will be insufficient to destroy
Europe. The developed nations, led by the Alliance, will combine all
available resources to speed recovery and increase security
measures at an unprecedented level
FUTURE 3 – CLASH OF MODERNITIES: A single critical blow to a major

alliance seaport will significantly harm regional economies due to
their economic complexity and interdependence. Reduced civil
liberties and an increasingly invasive security force will be a
consequence of the recovery. Determining the identification and
location of specific perpetrators will be a very sensitive and difficult
task, making effective retaliation extremely problematic. The
nation under attack in most cases will not have sufficient military
forces for retribution by itself, and will make a strong demand for an

Article 5 response by the Alliance. Failure to respond rapidly and

appropriately will split the Alliance.
FUTURE 4 – NEW POWER POLITICS: In case of a major European

seaport being targeted, the impact of the attack will change the
balance of power. European power will decrease in the short term,
but a measured retaliatory response and a comprehensive recovery
plan supported by a unified Alliance will in the long term strengthen
the region and the Alliance.

Chapter 3
Security Implications from Future Risks
SOURCES OF THREAT
The Risk Conditions discussed in Chapter 2 are most relevant when

linked with a corresponding Source of Threat. During the workshops
and roundtables, the Sources of Threat were grouped into six
categories:
1. SUPER-EMPOWERED INDIVIDUALS: individuals who have

overcome constraints, conventions, and rules to wield unique
political, economic, intellectual, or cultural influence over people
and events.2
2. EXTREMIST NON-STATE ACTORS: non-sovereign entities

expressing extremist values and ideas that exercise significant
economic, political, or social power and influence at a national, and
in some cases international, level.3
3. ORGANISED CRIME: a structured group of three or more

persons, existing for a period of time, who act in concert with the
aim of committing serious crimes or offenses in order to obtain,
directly or indirectly, a financial or other material benefit.4
2
United States National Intelligence Council Conference Report, “Nonstate Actors:
Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States”, August 2007.
3
United States National Intelligence Council Conference Report, “Nonstate Actors:
Impact on International Relations and Implications for the United States”, August 2007.
4
“A Growing Threat to Human Security and Human Rights: Transnational Organised
Crime”, NATO Defence College 7 December 2007.

4. ROGUE STATES: states that act without respect for

other states or global norms and rules.
5. CONFRONTATIONAL POWERS: those powers that

are quick to resort to force or threaten the use of force
disproportionately to what is at stake and how it affects
their vital interests.5
6. NATURE: the manner in which the physical world

exists and changes of its own accord, such as weather and
geology, and the physical forces that shape the world.
5
Frankel, Benjamin. Realism: Restatements and Renewal. New York: Frank Cass &
Co. Ltd, 1996, p. 312.

THREATENING ACTIONS/EVENTS
From the Sources of Threat, we can project Threatening Actions or

Events that might emerge from an entity that possesses the will as
well as the capability to harm or violate the people, territorial
integrity or values and ideas of the state. Note, ‘Events’ also cover
natural or man-made environmental disasters. An aggregated list is
presented below in Figure 4.
 DISRUPTION OF ACCESS TO CRITICAL RESOURCES  RISE OF NEW AND UNKNOWN ADVERSARIES

 DISRUPTION OF FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES  UNDERMINING OF DEFENCE PREPAREDNESS
 HUMAN TRAFFICKING  UNANTICIPATED LARGE SCALE TERRORIST ATTACKS
 HUMAN SECURITY, ETHNIC CLEANSING, GENOCIDE  PIRACY
 VIOLATION OF PERSONAL LIBERTIES  STRESS ON SOCIETAL STRUCTURES AND RULE OF LAW
 ATTACK ON COMPUTER NETWORKS  ETHNIC TENSIONS
 ATTACK ON POPULATION OR INFRASTRUCTURE  ABUSE OF PANOPTICAL SURVEILLANCE
 SUBVERSION  ATTACK BY CIVIL LIBERTY GROUPS
 TERRORISM  ESPIONAGE
 VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY  ATTACK THROUGH ELECTROMAGNETIC SPECTRUM
 NATURAL DISASTERS  TENSION AND INSTABILITY WITHIN AND BETWEEN
 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION DIFFERENT POLITICAL SYSTEMS FUELLED BY
 ATTACK WITH WMD/WME CHALLENGING BELIEF SYSTEMS
 CIVIL UNREST  INFORMATION OPERATIONS BY NETWORKS WITH
 CONTESTED POLITICAL LEGITIMACY STRONG NON-STATE IDENTITY
 STRESS ON SOCIETAL STRUCTURES AND RULE OF LAW  INCREASED RELIANCE ON PRIVATE MILITARY
 ETHNIC TENSIONS COMPANIES (PMC)
 MASS WELFARE AND HEALTH STRESS  PEOPLE OF THE STATE INTERESTED IN RETURNING TO
 CHALLENGING VALUES & WORLDVIEWS PREVIOUS SPHERE OF INFLUENCE OVER STATE’S
 UNASSIMILATED POPULATION WISHES
 DRUG TRAFFICKING  GLOBAL AND REGIONAL SECURITY INSTABILITY AND
 SPILL-OVER FROM UNANTICIPATED HUMANITARIAN CHALLENGES TO STANDARDS OF INTERACTION
CATASTROPHES & REGIONAL WARS  NATION STATE SWITCHING ALLIANCE
Figure 4: Aggregate Threatening Actions/Events

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
The MFP analyzed each of the four futures and associated Risk
Conditions to find the Security Implications that would be generated
when exploited by the Sources of Threat and the execution of a
Threatening Action. The Security Implications test the fundamental
questions of NATO interests: “So what?” and “Why should NATO
care?” Overall, the study derived 33 Security Implications that
correspond to the four futures portrayed in Figure 5.
DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY DECEPTIVE STABILITY CLASH OF MODERNITIES NEW POWER POLITICS
• NEGATIVE IMPACT ON • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON  LARGE-SCALE WARFARE

ECONOMY ECONOMY CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE  NEGATIVE IMPACT ON
• ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION • DANGER TO CITIZENS • OVEREMPHASISED SECURITY ECONOMY
• HUMAN EXPLOITATION • SOCIAL DISORDER VERSUS PERSONAL LIBERTIES  NEGATIVE IMPACT ON
• ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION • HUMAN EXPLOITATION TENSION CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE
TO INTERVENE • ORGANISED CRIME • DANGER TO CITIZENS  DANGER TO CITIZENS
• DANGER TO CITIZENS • VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON  VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL
• VIOLATION OF TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY ECONOMY INTEGRITY
INTEGRITY • LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC • LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC  LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC
• LIBERAL-DEMOCRATIC VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK
VALUES AND IDEAS AT RISK • ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION • EXPLOITATION OF  ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION
• NEGATIVE IMPACT ON TO INTERVENE CORPORATE & STATE  HUMAN EXPLOITATION
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE • ILLEGAL IMMIGRATION SECRETS
 ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION
• DIFFUSION OF NATIONAL • NEGATIVE IMPACT ON • CHALLENGED STATE TO INTERVENE
IDENTITY CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE MONOPOLY ON THE USE OF
 DEVASTATION CAUSED BY
• DESTABILISATION OF • REDUCED WILL TO USE FORCE (PMC)
WMD/WME
PREVIOUSLY STABLE MILITARY POWER • ERODED STATE-SOCIETY
 REDUCED ABILITY OF
GOVERNMENTS • REDUCED SELF-DEFENCE COHESION
INDIVIDUAL NATIONS OR IOS
• INCREASING NUMBER OF POSTURE • EXPLOITATION OF
TO INFLUENCE OR MANAGE
POTENTIALLY HOSTILE COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
CRISIS/EVENTS
STATES • LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS
• CHALLENGES TO DOMINANT SYSTEMS
 ASYMMETRIC SECURITY
ENVIRONMENT
VALUES • DECISIONS BY
• UNDERMINING NATIONAL AND MULTINATIONAL INDUSTRIES
 DISRUPTION OF VITAL
RESOURCE FLOWS
INTERNATIONAL LAW CHALLENGE INTERNATIONAL
• POPULATION HOSTILITY AND ORDER  ERODED COHESION OF
UNREST • DISRUPTION OF VITAL EXISTING ALLIANCES
• DOMESTIC DISORDER RESOURCE FLOWS
• DECISIONS BY • UNCERTAIN ALLEGIANCE OF
MULTINATIONAL INDUSTRY PMCS
CHALLENGES INTERNATIONAL
ORDER
• ASYMMETRIC SECURITY ENV
Figure 5: Security Implications

These Security Implications were presented and discussed at

workshops and roundtables. Participants were asked to rate each
Security Implication for both likelihood and impact on a scale of 1 to
4 (4 being the higher likelihood and greater impact). The resulting
importance indicator for each Security Implication was determined
by multiplying the average likelihood by the average impact. In
addition to that, participants rated each Security Implication with
regard to transformational difficulty, adding a third aspect to
analysis. These were given scores for ranking and plurality, which
were then summed to determine final scores. This resulted in the
identification of the Top 5 Security Implications that resonated with
the participating audience:
TOP SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
1. ASYMMETRIC SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

2. DISRUPTION OF VITAL RESOURCE FLOWS
3. NEGATIVE IMPACT ON ECONOMY
4. EXPLOITATION OF COMMUNICATION SYSTEMS
5. ISSUE OF RIGHT/OBLIGATION TO INTERVENE

SECURITY IMPLICATIONS INSIGHTS AND RESULTING CONSEQUENCES
Security implications point to four broad insights:
INSIGHT 1: THE EVOLVING NATURE OF RISKS AND THREATS TO VITAL INTERESTS WILL
CHALLENGE THE STRATEGIC UNITY, AND SOLIDARITY WITHIN THE ALLIANCE AS WELL THE
COMMON UNDERSTANDING OF WHAT CONSTITUTES AN ARTICLE 5 ATTACK.
Consequences
 In an increasingly complex security environment, the nature

of risks and threats will continue to evolve, and so will the
understanding of collective defence. This will complicate the
Alliance’s ability to reach a timely decision regarding when,
where and how to respond.
 Alliance solidarity will be threatened by competing values
and ideas from actors who promote alternatives to
democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Maintaining
solidarity in the face of shared threats must remain the
Alliance’s highest priority.
 Risks and threats to the Alliance’s territories, populations
and forces will be hybrid in nature: an interconnected,
unpredictable mix of traditional warfare, irregular warfare,
terrorism and organised crime.
 The Alliance may face attacks that do not fit the traditional
interpretation of Article 5. These attacks will have a direct
effect on the Alliance through, for instance, massive
communications disruption, pandemics, or cyber attacks on
economic or social infrastructure. These attacks may
emanate from states, or from non-state actors, who by
definition are individuals and/or small groups that are
difficult to identify, highly adaptable and willing to operate
outside internationally accepted laws, values, norms and
conventions.

 Some nations with different ideologies and worldviews will

rise as economic, technological, and military powers. While
a few will cooperate, others will reject or try to reshape the
international system. These nations will generate
competition for influence, values, and ideas in areas of
strategic interest for the Alliance.
 Shifting demographics and corresponding value systems will
make it much more difficult to achieve a unified response to
diffuse and complex threats.
 Changing interpretations of national identity, softening
allegiances, eroding social cohesion, and demographic shifts
will influence member nations’ perceptions of threat and
their preparedness to use military force.
 Nations will face recruitment and sustainment problems,
and substantially less national support for the defence
sector as a whole.

INSIGHT 2: INCREASED INTERACTION WITH NON-NATO NATIONS AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL

ACTORS WILL CREATE OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE ALLIANCE TO EXTEND ITS ROLE IN ENHANCING
SECURITY AND STABILITY OUTSIDE TRADITIONAL AREAS OF ENGAGEMENT.
Consequences
 The Alliance will have to transform itself from a

predominantly defence-based military alliance into a
comprehensive political and military security community.
 The network of global governance designed to meet 21st
century challenges will continuously adapt to demands that
derive from the evolving threats discussed in previous
insights. This includes the establishment of new governing
bodies; adapting roles, responsibilities, and authorities
within the present governing structure; and the
corresponding changes in international law.
 The trends point to a multi-polar world where numerous
actors will take an increasing role in global governance. Each
of these changes will affect the Alliance. NATO will need to
continuously review the governance landscape to ensure
clarity in its supported/supporting roles; in its
responsibilities related to defence/security, civil/military,
and public/private partnerships; and in relationships with
other nations.
 The Alliance may have to decide whether to act outside the
traditional NATO roles due to growing competition in
ungoverned areas such as the Arctic; denial of access to
resources and the maritime, air, space, and cyberspace
commons; and spill-over from regional conflicts where one
or more of the actors have nuclear weapons. Likewise,
NATO will be threatened by radical nations and non-state
actors who are willing to use nuclear and tailored biological
weapons, or are ready to create chaos to destabilize fragile
governments.
 The destabilisation of, or absence of governance in,
strategically significant areas may require NATO to

intervene to protect vital Alliance interests or avoid further

regional instability; mitigate the proliferation of WMD/E;
prevent the disruption of vital resources; and address large-
scale migration, regional wars, ethnic cleansing or genocide.
 The legitimacy that underlies NATO actions will need to be
reinforced to deter opportunistic actors through a clear and
credible threat of military force.
 Alliance nations must forge new, or strengthen existing,
relationships with government agencies -- notably law
enforcement, border protection services, judiciaries, and
public health authorities. This action will help form a
comprehensive approach to crisis resolution.
 NATO will also need to adapt its internal organisational
structures, authorities, composition and decision-making
process to new conditions, and revise its policies for sharing
information and cooperating with non-NATO bodies.
 The Alliance must strengthen its ability to fulfil its mandate
in increasingly complex crisis areas, such as hybrid warfare
and support to humanitarian relief operations. NATO will
increasingly find itself working alongside various
international organisations in an effort to establish a safe
and secure environment.
 The Alliance needs a comprehensive partnership policy that
will engage its full expertise in the fields of Security Sector
Reform (SSR), Education, Training, and Exercises, to
increase cultural awareness and improve interoperability
through the use of the NATO education and training
centres.
 The Alliance will need to clarify its supported/supporting
roles and responsibilities as it finds enduring solutions in
failed states, i.e., institution-building, security assistance,
police training, security for ungoverned areas, infrastructure
and energy security, non-proliferation of WMD, and
associated consequence management. Additionally, the
delineation of roles, in cooperation with the EU, will be
essential when addressing security threats involving hybrid
warfare.

INSIGHT 3: DETERMINED ADVERSARIES ENABLED BY READILY AVAILABLE TECHNOLOGIES WILL

ATTACK ALLIANCE VULNERABILITIES IN UNEXPECTED WAYS REQUIRING THE ALLIANCE TO
CONSIDER CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER OF MILITARY OPERATIONS AND WARFARE.
Consequences
 The ready availability of advanced technology and WMD/E

proliferation will enable adversaries like never before.
Alliance nations must therefore maintain and secure their
technological advantage.
 The enemy will focus his efforts against perceived Alliance
weaknesses, which will magnify and compound uncertainty,
ambiguity and surprise. The combination of information
networks, miniaturisation, robotics, swarming, precision,
and nanotechnology will pose new and unexpected
challenges to conventional warfare. Easily developed,
concealed, and transported disruptive and destructive
capabilities will render individuals and small groups more
effective and lethal.
 Adversaries can and will take the initiative, in any domain, to
attack Alliance populations, territories, or interests. Threats
will come through a hybrid form of warfare, in which
conventional, irregular, and criminal capabilities are
integrated operationally and tactically at the lowest level
possible in urban environments, and in locations where the
Alliance lacks established support systems.
 NATO’s military posture must not be geared to a single
preclusive vision or doctrine of future warfare. The Alliance
will need to build sufficient responsive and sustainable
conventional and nuclear capabilities to deter and defeat
those who threaten Alliance security. These capabilities will
need to be flexible and adaptable in the face of surprise and
the threat of hybrid warfare.
 Future risks and threats demand appropriate new concepts
and doctrines from the Alliance. Areas for study include
maritime security, the use of space and the protection of

space assets, and the continued expansion of cyber defence

capabilities.
 The nature of future operations will emphasise the
importance of multinational, joint, and expeditionary
capabilities able to succeed in extreme landscapes and
climates. As such, efficient military operations will require
flexible, adaptive, deployable forces with a clear
understanding of how enemies may use technology against
them, and the ethical and moral grounding to work in
populated settings.
 NATO’s level of ambition must ensure the Alliance’s ability
to conduct the full range of its operations and missions
concurrently, from collective defence and a greater number
of demanding stabilisation and reconstruction operations to
large-scale high-intensity operations.
 Success in the future demands that the Alliance educate and
train its forces, especially the military and civilian leadership
to be knowledgeable and capable of strategic foresight, and
well-grounded in the history of past, present, and future
warfare.

INSIGHT 4: INCREASED INTERACTION WITH OTHER INTERNATIONAL ACTORS WILL PROVIDE NATO
THE OPPORTUNITY TO POSITIVELY SHAPE AND INFLUENCE IDEAS, VALUES AND EVENTS IN A
GLOBALISED WORLD.
Consequences
 The Alliance must ensure that it can anticipate, sense, and

shape the security environment; achieve a common
understanding of perceived risks and threats; and
effectively share these perceptions with the Alliance
populations.
 A credible defence posture and corresponding military
capabilities will continue to be imperative. The lack of a
well-defined and unifying adversary, and increased pressure
from domestic non-security concerns, can weaken concern
for and attention to matters of defence.
 Enhanced strategic communications, both internal and
external to the Alliance, will promote public understanding
of the Alliance’s positive contributions to peace and
stability. They are necessary to ensure that NATO can
maintain a credible defence posture with the proper mix of
military capabilities.
 NATO will need to communicate at the strategic level both
the inter-relationship between security and defence, and
NATO’s role in both Alliance and non-Alliance governance
bodies.
MAKING CHOICES – MITIGATION OF SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
One of the clear messages of this Multiple Futures study is that

NATO’s security environment will continue to evolve. It will be
subject to a variety of unforeseeable and dynamic political, social,
technological, and military developments. This evolution will not
occur in a vacuum. Conversely, these developments will present

NATO with unprecedented opportunities: to positively influence

ideas, values, and events in a globalised world; while at the same
time it maintains and improves its agility and flexibility to respond to
unpredictable and complex challenges.
The Alliance must consider the consequences of these challenges as

it works toward a consensus on how to redefine many of the
assumptions and strategies that NATO has been operating under for
the last decade. These consequences highlight several key issues
that need to be considered in the ongoing strategic dialogue:
 There is a strong need for a clear, pragmatic discussion and

debate regarding NATO’s future roles, missions and
direction.
 The Alliance will maintain collective defence at its core;
however, the nature of the challenges that could prompt an
Article 5 response will continue to evolve.
 NATO must develop new concepts to deal with the hybrid
threats that increasingly will dominate the operational
environment.
 A Comprehensive Approach will form the foundation for
NATO’s success. Only improved partnerships can enable the
Alliance to meet the complex threats of a rapidly changing
security landscape.
 The Alliance will have to transform itself from a
predominantly defence-based military Alliance into a
comprehensive political and military security community.
The Alliance has to determine to what extent it is willing to broaden

its range of tasks and its cooperation with other international actors.
How the Alliance evolves will have a fundamental impact on its
nature and role in 2030. Functionally, NATO will need to evaluate its
roles in both defence and security, and create balanced tools to deal
with both. The endeavour will at times be contentious and
worrisome; it is nevertheless paramount that the leadership of the
Alliance find this balance and adjust the supporting structure and
processes accordingly. While the future may create new

responsibilities, the Alliance must be careful not to dilute its ability

to carry out both functions effectively. Simultaneously, Nations
need to understand that Military Implications correspond to and
flow from the mitigation of the Security Implications. How the
military forces of the Alliance prepare for these challenges is
addressed in the next chapter.

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT-Chapter 4
Chapter 4
Military Implications Preparing Alliance
Military Forces for 2030
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
The final step in the futures process spotlights Military
Implications by asking the overarching question: “How
and for what should the militaries of the Alliance prepare
in the future?” These Implications result directly from the
Risk Conditions and Security Implications discussed in
Chapter 3.
Twenty-six Military Implications were deduced and

further refined using the analytic principles of the ‘Five
Operational Functions’: Command, Sense, Act, Shield,
and Sustain (CSASS)6. Twenty-one workshops helped
develop and analyse the Implications, with the goal to
better understand each Implication and its relative effects
on the Alliance. Specifically, the process clarified what
may need to change militarily in the Alliance as we look
towards 2030, as well as potential new areas of
engagement that would have particular consequence for
military operations. Figure 6 shows how the Military
Implications connect to the four futures.
6
Canadian Army Operational Functions

DARK SIDE OF EXCLUSIVITY DECEPTIVE STABILITY CLASH OF MODERNITIES NEW POWER POLITICS
 CONDUCT DETERRENCE • IDENTIFY EMERGING FOREIGN  PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS AND  CONDUCT DETERRENCE
OPERATIONS SECURITY THREATS MILITARY NETWORKS OPERATIONS
 CONDUCT EXPEDITIONARY • PROVIDE AID TO CIVIL 
OPERATIONS TO PROTECT
PREVENT THE DISRUPTION OF  PROTECT CRITICAL
AUTHORITIES FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES INFRASTRUCTURE
LINES OF COMMUNICATIONS
• CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL  CONDUCT EXP OPS TO 
 PREVENT THE DISRUPTION OF SUPPORT COUNTER-
FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES SPECTRUM DEFENCE PROTECT LINES OF PROLIFERATION EFFORTS
 SUPPORT COUNTER- OPERATIONS COMMUNICATIONS  CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL
PROLIFERATION EFFORTS • CONDUCT DETERRENCE  PROTECT CRITICAL SPECTRUM DEFENCE
 PROTECT CRITICAL OPERATIONS INFRASTRUCTURE OPERATIONS
INFRASTRUCTURE • CONDUCT EXP OPS IN 
 CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL
CONDUCT DETERRENCE  CONDUCT EXP OPS IN
SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN OPERATIONS
SPECTRUM DEFENCE SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN
OPERATIONS
ASSISTANCE  CONDUCT COLLECTIVE FULL ASSISTANCE
• SUPPORT SHAPING OF
 CONDUCT EXP OPS IN SPECTRUM DEFENCE  CONDUCT EXP OPS TO
SUPPORT OF HUMANITARIAN SECURITY ENVIRONMENT
OPERATIONS PROTECT LINES OF
ASSISTANCE • ADAPT RECRUITMENT  MITIGATE NEGATIVE IMPACT COMMUNICATIONS
 PROVIDE AID TO CIVIL PROCESSES
OF DISRUPTIVE  PREVENT THE DISRUPTION OF
AUTHORITIES • ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE TECHNOLOGIES FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES
 ENHANCE CIVIL-MILITARY USE OF NON-LETHAL FORCE
OPERATIONS
 PROTECT AGAINST  PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS AND
• SUPPORT & COOPERATE WITH
 ADDRESS THE PRESENCE OF MULTIPLE ACTORS IN MULTI-
ASYMMETRIC THREATS MILITARY NETWORKS
PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES  PROTECT ELECTROMAGNETIC  MITIGATE NEGATIVE IMPACT
NATIONAL RESPONSE
 PROTECT AGAINST SPECTRUM OF DISRUPTIVE
EFFORTS TO NATURAL
ASYMMETRIC THREATS  TRAIN INDIGENOUS FORCES TECHNOLOGIES
 CONDUCT MILITARY DISASTERS

• PROVIDE MILITARY LOGISTIC
ADEQUATELY ADDRESS THE  PROTECT ELECTROMAGNETIC
OPERATIONS AGAINST NON-
PRESENCE OF PRIVATE SPECTRUM
STATE ACTORS SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN
 CONDUCT COHERENT ACTIVITIES
MILITARY COMPANIES  PROTECT AGAINST
INFORMATION OPERATIONS  CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN A ASYMMETRIC THREATS
 CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN COHERENT COMPREHENSIVE  TRAIN INDIGENOUS FORCES
COHERENT COMPREHENSIVE FRAMEWORK  CONDUCT OPERATIONS IN A
FRAMEWORK
COHERENT COMPREHENSIVE
 CLARIFYING ROE IN
FRAMEWORK
ALLIANCE OPERATIONS
 INTERVENE TO PREVENT  INTERVENE TO PREVENT
ESCALATION (FORCE ESCALATION (FORCE
PROJECTION) PROJECTION)
 PROVIDE MILITARY LOGISTIC  PROVIDE MILITARY LOGISTIC
SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN SUPPORT TO HUMANITARIAN
ACTIVITIES
ACTIVITIES
 TRAIN INDIGENOUS FORCES
 SUPPORT & COOPERATE WITH
MULTIPLE ACTORS IN MULTI-
NATIONAL RESPONSE
EFFORTS TO NATURAL
DISASTERS
Figure 6: Military Implications

At the workshops, quantitative data were collected to support

analysis of the individual implications. Participants were asked to
rate each Military Implication for likelihood and impact on a scale of
1 to 4 (4 being the higher likelihood and greater impact). The
resulting indicator for each Implication was determined by
multiplying the average likelihood by the average impact. In
addition to that, participants rated each Implication with regards to
transformational difficulty, adding a third variable to the analysis.
These were given scores for ranking and plurality, which were then
summed to determine final scores, resulting in the identification of
the Top 5 Military Implications that resonated most strongly with
the audience:
TOP MILITARY IMPLICATIONS
1. PROTECT AGAINST ASYMMETRIC THREATS

2. CONDUCT MILITARY OPERATIONS AGAINST NON-STATE ACTORS
3. PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS AND MILITARY NETWORKS
4. PREVENT THE DISRUPTION AND FLOW OF VITAL RESOURCES
5. ENHANCE CIVIL-MILITARY COOPERATION
The primary concern among all national subject-matter-experts who

participated in the MFP was protecting the populations of the
Alliance, especially their interests and values. Future adversaries
intent on destroying our societies and values will be innovative in
exploiting advanced technologies as they confront the Alliance in
ways that will seem asymmetric to us. In response, the Alliance will
have to adjust quickly to the specific nature of these asymmetric
attacks.
The ability of the Alliance to conduct military operations against

non-state actors was a significant concern. The ability of adversaries
to co-opt non-combatants into conducting attacks will make it

extremely difficult for militaries to distinguish enemy combatants,

especially on urban battlefields.
Significant advances in technology will cut both ways, increasing the

capabilities of the Alliance, while also improving the enemy’s ability
to attack NATO systems and networks. NATO forces will have to
operate in every medium – air, land, sea, space, and cyberspace– to
defend command, control, communications, and computer (C4)
systems and networks. Protecting these networks ranked
consistently high as a priority amongst the participants of our
workshops.
Another significant concern was how to prevent the disruption of

the flow of resources across the commons. The continuous
movement of indispensable resources such as oil, food, water, and
minerals is vital to the basics of life and commerce. Military assets
may be called upon for ISR to support situational awareness or to
deploy (by air, land and sea) to areas where the flow of these vital
resources is compromised as a result of natural disaster, instability,
or sabotage.
Rounding out the Top 5 was a call to enhance civil-military

cooperation. International and non-governmental organisations will
in the coming years increase their level of involvement in areas of
tension, crisis and conflict. Accordingly, the military will be required
to increase its civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) efforts, especially its
ability to plan and liaison/coordinate with IOs and NGOs at the
operational level.

MILITARY IMPLICATIONS (TOP 5) ANALYSIS
From the analysis, it is clear that the distinctions between civil and
military operations, types of warfare, and organisational structure
need to be better defined and organised to create the operational
flexibility required of our forces in the future operating environment.
Figure 7 below highlights new areas of potential Alliance
engagement with military consequences.
MILITARY
ANALYSIS
IMPLICATIONS
• Develop adaptable command structures that can quickly respond to a variety of modes
of warfare and support civilian authorities
• Anticipate vulnerabilities and potential threats through continuous, effective
intelligence information-sharing with all who may be called on to act
PROTECT AGAINST • Promote awareness of potential threats among populations, and pro-active measures
ASYMMETRIC THREATS through training and experimentation
• Be prepared to both support and lead according to the magnitude of attacks and the
effectiveness of civilian responses
• Prepare responses that are unrestricted across the full spectrum of warfare and stability
operations.
• Develop a well defined Commanders’ intent and clearly established common Rules of
CONDUCT MILITARY
Engagement (ROE) for all forces involved
OPERATIONS AGAINST
• Interact with local population to gain cultural and situational awareness and
NON-STATE ACTORS
build/maintain support for the mission
• Develop a strategic concept for Cyber Defence
• Leverage technological advances to both develop and improve capabilities to detect,
PROTECT C4 SYSTEMS
identify, locate & engage source(s) of cyber attacks
AND NETWORKS
• Develop offensive cyber capabilities (Counter-Cyber Attack)
• Avoid development or reliance on single point of failure systems and networks.
• Identify resources and corresponding infrastructures that are deemed vital to the
Alliance and its member nations
• Develop a concept and legal framework to ensure the Alliance has the ability and
PREVENT DISRUPTIONS
resources to respond to threats aimed at preventing the flow of vital resources. The
TO THE FLOW OF VITAL
location and type of resources and infrastructure will be the key drivers that define
RESOURCES
needed capabilities
• Establish communication and coordination with civil authorities to assist in crisis
planning if access to resources has been disturbed.
ENHANCE CIVIL-MILITARY • Prepare for increased involvement of NGOs in areas of tension, crisis and conflict
COOPERATION • Develop framework for comprehensive planning and liaison with NGOs
Figure 7: Military Implications Analysis

As mentioned previously, the Military Implications were deduced

from the individual Security Implications, where they had a direct
and traceable link to the four insights and conclusions. Accordingly,
there were continuity and coherence between a political debate on
Security Implications and a strategic military debate on Military
Implications. The insights and consequences of the interim report
answered the “so what?” question for Security Implications, and
formed a basis for specific actionable political issues. To elicit the
best military advice and support subsequent discussions regarding
NATO, the Military Implications were segregated into seven focus
areas in which NATO may have a role.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS FOCUS AREAS
1. Adapting to the Demands of Hybrid Threats. Throughout

history, the “paradox of war” reveals that thinking adversaries avoid
strengths and gravitate towards areas of perceived weaknesses. In
this tradition, enemies will avoid conventional military operations in
which they are unprepared to confront NATO forces. Instead they
will attack in ways NATO might consider irregular or asymmetric,
but are anything but asymmetric to them. The security environment
will include conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal elements
in mixed modes of operations. Adversaries show no respect for
distinctions drawn between civil and military operations, and exploit
them to threaten the Alliance’s territories, populations and forces.
The Alliance needs to develop those training, doctrine, education
and capabilities necessary to confront an opponent that uses these
elements at the strategic, operational and tactical levels.
2. Operating with Others and Building Institutions. Cooperation

and collaboration with non-NATO nations and other international
actors are necessary to create opportunities for the Alliance to
enhance security and stability. Focusing on Security Sector Reform
as a tool of conflict prevention will strengthen cultural awareness,

and improve interoperability. Over time, doing so may decrease the

need for military intervention.
3. Conflict Prevention, Resolution and Consequence

Management. Nations must establish and maintain relationships
by encouraging government agencies to develop a comprehensive
approach to conflict management. At the international level, the
Alliance has to fulfil its mandate in increasingly complex areas of
conflict alongside a varied mix of international actors. It can succeed
only by forming strategic partnerships that are transparent,
informed, and mutually respected and understood.
4. Counter Proliferation. Alienated state and non-state actors will

increasingly create, sell, acquire, and use WMD/WME. In addition,
the failure (or structural weakness) of a nuclear state will also pose a
significant risk to Alliance security.
5. Expeditionary and Combat Capability in Austere

Environments. The nature of future operations will emphasize the
ability of multinational, joint and expeditionary forces and
capabilities to succeed in demanding geographical and climatic
environments.
6. Strategic Communications and Winning the Battle of the
Narrative. The continuous demands for information will require that
the Alliance compete vigorously, both nationally and internationally,
to communicate effectively and build support for its core mission,
purpose and operations.
7. Organisational and Force Development Issues. Future risks and

threats will challenge the Alliance’s ability to achieve strategic unity,
maintain solidarity, and reach a common understanding of
collective defence and the threats that could trigger an Article 5
response. Shifting demographics within the Alliance and differing
perceptions of threat and security will influence national force
generation, readiness and capabilities. The Alliance therefore needs

to adapt its internal organisational structures and decision-making

processes to meet these realities.
The executable elements of the Military Implications are reflected in

actionable military issues for each of the focus areas. The focus
areas indicate relationships between groups of Military Implications.
They are not prioritised as those decisions are left to Nations. With
this in mind, these areas are classified as either potential roles for
NATO in 2030, or as essential enablers (Figure 8).
POTENTIAL ROLES FOR NATO ESSENTIAL ENABLERS
 ADAPTING TO THE DEMANDS OF  STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND

HYBRID THREATS WINNING THE BATTLE OF THE
NARRATIVE
 OPERATING WITH OTHERS & BUILDING
INSTITUTIONS  ORGANISATIONAL AND FORCE
DEVELOPMENT ISSUES
 CONFLICT PREVENTION, RESOLUTION
AND CONSEQUENCE MANAGEMENT
 COUNTER PROLIFERATION
 EXPEDITIONARY AND COMBAT

CAPABILITY IN AUSTERE
ENVIRONMENTS
Figure 8: Military Implications Focus Areas
The potential roles are those areas in the future which the Alliance
must commit to action by either establishing a new role or adapting
an existing one. With such a commitment, the essential enablers
help to define the manner in which these roles should be supported

via internal and external communication, and through organisations

that improve the effectiveness of the Alliance.
As noted in the Insights from Chapter 3, the future security

environment will provide numerous opportunities for NATO and will
place greater demands on the military capabilities of the Alliance.
Decisions on future roles and missions largely will determine the size
and types of forces, capabilities, and command and control
structures needed by NATO. Doing so will ensure that it is properly
organised to adapt to the demands of hybrid threats, while also
maintaining its conventional and nuclear capability. The following
chapter expands on the seven focus areas in further detail, and
provides findings and recommendations to support the strategic
dialogue on how NATO needs to operate and partner in the future.

Chapter 5
Findings and Recommendations
The MFP is meant to inform and support strategic dialogue on

challenges the Alliance will face and the corresponding security and
military implications. It does not predict the future or presume
political decisions that will determine future Alliance roles and
required capabilities. Rather, it provides Alliance leaders with a
broad set of ideas and information with which to plan for the future
security environment.
The basis for the strategic dialogue is the fundamental question:

What are the future threats and challenges that could pose risk to the
interests, values and populations of
the Alliance? In responding to this
question, we created an analytical
framework, developed four futures,
and deduced 33 Security and 26
Military Implications. The analytical
framework stands as an enduring
product of the MFP. It is simple
enough to understand and use, yet
sophisticated enough to capture the
complexity of the task. As the drivers
of change evolve, and the impact of
events and trends become better known, the framework can be
used to revisit the multiple futures and reassess implications for the
Alliance.
The implications deduced for 2030 will support both political and
military debates regarding the future of the Alliance and how to
prepare it for forthcoming challenges. The analysis of the Security

Implications yielded broad insights as well as detailed

recommendations. These recommendations are meant to stimulate
the ongoing debate, while recognizing that capability-related
decisions result from political guidance and reside within the agreed
defence planning processes.
The future roles and missions that NATO adopts will largely
determine the nature of its force structure and command and
control infrastructure. These must be configured to assure that
NATO will be ready to confront hybrid threats while maintaining its
nuclear and conventional strengths.
From the Insights we derive consequences, followed by

recommendations for changes in concepts and doctrine as well as
capability enhancements. The recommendations constitute SACT’s
military advice, which can be used to inform strategic dialogue,
policy considerations, and subsequent guidance to Alliance planning
disciplines.
THE EVOLVING NATURE OF RISKS AND THREATS

The security agenda of nations will continue to include the
consequences of failed states, poverty, famine and expulsion;
amidst this turmoil, however, new state and non-state adversaries
will emerge, empowered by the rapid development and
incorporation of easily accessible and innovative technologies. The
Alliance will face rivals for strategic influence, values and ideas; its
vulnerabilities will be exploited on and beyond Alliance territory; and
its populations and forces attacked in unexpected ways. The
common understanding of what constitutes an attack on the
Alliance and how the Alliance responds, will be questioned and
potentially altered. In this environment, the Alliance must maintain
collective defence at its core, acknowledging that challenges that
prompt a response under Article 5 will continue to evolve.

Maintaining strategic unity, solidarity, commitment and a strong

transatlantic link in the face of a range of risks and threats must
remain the Alliance’s highest priority. This understanding will
impact directly the priorities regarding defence planning, capability
development, resource allocation, burden-sharing, operational
engagement, and the sharing of risk.
The indivisibility of Alliance security and the ability to support each
other fully will remain both the glue that binds the Alliance, and the
fundamental precondition of collective defence. Fulfilling this
commitment requires the development and maintenance of
necessary capabilities and a sovereign decision to make them
available when called upon. This commitment remains the
cornerstone of NATO’s defence planning process and the
foundation upon which Alliance solidarity is built.
The collective boundaries of the Alliance are well defined by the
external borders of Allied nations. The maritime spaces surrounding
these borders and encompassing the vital economic interests of the
Alliance are vast; ranging from the Arctic Ocean in the North to the
coastal seas of Africa in the South and from the Pacific Ocean in the
West and through the Atlantic Ocean and Mediterranean to the
Black Sea. Maintaining this awareness among Allies strengthens
the understanding of the challenges each region poses.
It is more likely the Alliance will be threatened by instability and the
weakness of others, than by invading conventional forces. Interstate
conflicts in different regions of the world will remain likely: while
they may not threaten NATO directly, the consequences of such
conflicts may have a significant impact on the security of the
Alliance.

INTERACTION WITH NON-NATO NATIONS AND OTHER

INTERNATIONAL ACTORS
The trends point to an international system of governance at a
crossroads. In this evolving world, numerous actors will take a role in
global governance. Each of these changes will affect the Alliance,
and it will need to review continuously its role in international
governance. Doing so will ensure clarity concerning the roles of
NATO, and its responsibilities related to defence/security,
civil/military relations, public/private partnerships, and relationships
with other nations.
The importance of other international actors will increase, and
NATO’s members will have to rely heavily on the successful
implementation of a comprehensive, cooperative approach to
security operations. Increasingly, NATO will be responsible for the
planning and execution of operations alongside other international
organisations. An early decision concerning with whom and under
what arrangements the Alliance will cooperate in the global
environment could ease the burden of maintaining international
security. Strategic partnerships with other international
organisations, most notably the EU and UN, could help optimize the
use of resources and capabilities. The use of Security Sector Reform,
enhanced training, and exercise tools to strengthen defence reforms
could potentially reduce the need to deploy military forces.
The Alliance may have to decide whether to act outside the
traditional Alliance areas of engagement, in response to growing
resource competition; the increased exploitation of space,
cyberspace, and the maritime commons; as well as the spill-over of
regional conflicts. Threats to NATO may also stem from radical
nations and non-state actors who are willing to use nuclear and
biological weapons.
The common members of NATO and the EU have a single set of
limited resources and capabilities, which allow for neither
duplication nor institutional competition with regard to force
generation and capability development. Interoperability,

transparency of information and decision-making will be crucial in

the face of a common threat, as will common standards and
definitions, the identification and elimination of gaps in capability
development, cooperation on research and technology, and the
development of mutually reinforcing capabilities.
ALLIANCE VULNERABILITIES AND CHANGES IN THE CHARACTER OF

MILITARY OPERATIONS AND WARFARE
Adversaries will focus their efforts against perceived vulnerabilities
within the Alliance. To prepare, the Alliance will need to face the
emerging challenges associated with energy, cyberspace, space and
maritime security, as well as regional instability and potential
conflict in areas such as the Caucuses, the Greater Middle East, the
Mediterranean and the High North. To succeed in a range of
demanding landscapes and climates, future operations will
emphasise the importance of multinational, joint and expeditionary
capabilities.
In parallel, the combination of advanced networks, miniaturization,
robotics, swarming, precision, and nanotechnology will pose new
and unexpected challenges to conventional warfare. Individuals and
small groups will be more mobile, lethal and effective using
commercially developed, and easily concealed and transported,
disruptive and destructive capabilities. Threats will come in hybrid
form, as adversaries integrate conventional, irregular, terrorist, and
criminal assets operationally and tactically at the lowest possible
level. These threats will dominate urban environments and locations
where the Alliance lacks established systems of support.
SHAPING AND INFLUENCING IDEAS, VALUES AND EVENTS IN A

GLOBALISED WORLD
Advocating the values and ideas on which the Alliance is founded,
defending basic human rights that grew out of the Enlightenment,
and engaging in the battle of the narrative may be some of the most

effective tools to counter those who may oppose the Alliance. In a

future of greater integration, cooperation and globalisation, the
Alliance will have unprecedented opportunities to counter disruptive
forces through its promotion of values and ideas that are respected
widely.
The continuous demand for information will require that the
Alliance compete vigorously, both nationally and internationally, to
communicate effectively and build support for its core mission,
purpose and operations. A strong understanding of the threat
amongst Alliance populations and governments will be crucial to
prevent substantial erosion of national support for the defence
sector in general and national capability development in particular.
NATO will need to communicate effectively the inter-relationship
between security and defence, which includes the role of NATO in
relation to other governance bodies, both internal and external to
the Alliance.
MILITARY IMPLICATIONS – FOCUS AREAS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As noted in the Insights, the future security environment will both
provide numerous opportunities for NATO and place greater
demands on the military capabilities of the Alliance. Decisions on
future roles and missions will have significant implications for the
size and types of forces, capabilities and command and control
structures needed to address effectively hybrid threats, while
maintaining the conventional and nuclear prowess of NATO.
The Military Implications that derive from the Security Implications
point to seven broad focus areas, each of which is followed in this
Report by recommendations concerning changes in concepts and
doctrine as well as capability enhancements. The recommendations
reflect SACT’s military advice, which the Alliance can use to inform
the strategic dialogue, policy considerations, and subsequent
guidance to Alliance planning disciplines.

ADAPTING TO THE DEMANDS OF HYBRID THREATS

Concepts and doctrine recommendations
 Enhance, and where required develop, both offensive and defensive
concepts, strategies and legal frameworks to deter, respond to and
counter an attack in ungoverned areas and in sensitive mission areas
such as the space, cyberspace, maritime and information domains.
Strengthen cooperation with partners and other international
organisations to protect critical infrastructure, and guarantee the
flow of vital resources, including in the electromagnetic spectrum.
 Re-evaluate the ability of the Alliance to collect, share and fuse all
sources of intelligence among nations, international organisations,
and partners in order to detect, track, identify, target and engage
threats.
 Develop a comprehensive concept and strategy that strengthens
the Alliance’s strategic partnership with industry and shortens the
time that elapses between the emergence and use of a
technological innovation.
Capability enhancement recommendations
 Develop a culture where leaders and capabilities are well suited for
irregular warfare or the hybrid threat, while simultaneously
maintaining NATO’s conventional and nuclear competency. This is
not an either/or proposition: forces must be flexible and adaptable
enough to operate across the spectrum of conflict. Train forces to
improvise on the battlefield to make up for any failure to anticipate
the actions of a sophisticated adversary.
 Re-examine the combination of conventional and nuclear
capabilities to ensure the Alliance can present a credible threat of
force to deter and effectively respond to potential adversaries in the
areas of space, cyberspace, land, sea and air. Deterrence should
include the development, maintenance and adaptation of
appropriate capabilities, and a regular show of force through
exercises.

 Institutionalise a robust and effective lessons learned capability that

effectively and responsively identifies and shares both lessons
identified and lessons learned across the Alliance and with partners.
 Retain the technological advantage. Develop the ability to rapidly
assess rapidly emerging technologies and their potential use against
the Alliance. The development of capabilities to detect, identify,
locate and engage sources of cyber attacks and for cyber counter-
attack are necessary to assure access to the flow of critical
information. Ensure C2 systems are agile, configurable and push
decision making to the lowest appropriate level.
 Develop advanced Joint Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance (JISR) capabilities to protect the force. This will
require improvements in human intelligence and the Alliance’s
ability to detect and engage over the horizon. Strengthen NATO’s
Network-Enabled Capabilities so that nations may better share
information, enhance situational awareness and improve Alliance
command and control down to the lowest tactical level.
OPERATING WITH OTHERS AND BUILDING INSTITUTIONS

 Establish a working group with other international actors to

examine areas of cooperation and clarify roles. Plan for the
exchange of liaison officers with government and international
organisations to improve planning and execution, and minimise
duplication of efforts and capabilities in stabilisation, reconstruction
and nation-building.
 Implement fully the Comprehensive Approach. Significantly

strengthen the areas of good governance by mentoring and advising
other nations; conducting integrated civil-military relations;
enhancing information-sharing procedures and practices; and
improving role integration, comprehensive planning and operational
support.

 Re-evaluate the Alliance’s various partnership mechanisms to

ensure that partners are more involved in NATO’s defence policy
initiatives, especially with regard to the Mediterranean Dialogue and
Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, as well as in partnerships across the
globe. Particular emphasis needs to be placed on the transformation
of national security postures and the management of non-
conventional threats and risks, interagency cooperation,
coordination of reforms across national security systems and the
development of relevant capabilities.
 Implement fully the UN-NATO Joint Declaration and expand

cooperation between the two organisations at all levels. Strengthen
UN-NATO planning, information sharing, lessons learned and early-
warning cooperation.
 Use the lessons learned in Afghanistan and other engagements to
develop an Alliance concept and doctrine on mentoring and advising
indigenous forces in order to support the stabilisation,
democratisation, and self-sufficiency of a nation’s security sectors.
 Determine whether the Alliance would be willing and able to
outsource aspects of security, stabilisation or reconstruction to
private military companies (PMC), and if so, which aspects. This will
require NATO to develop a comprehensive policy on the Alliance’s
engagement with and relationship to PMCs.
 Develop Alliance standards and procedures, along with national

capabilities, to conduct security assistance missions and security
sector reform, and to ensure cultural awareness among the forces of
the Alliance.
 Enhance the ability to partner with non-military organisations;

support the establishment of a military police force; enhance the
CIMIC capability; and train and equip construction engineers and
military medical personnel to provide public security, temporary

governance and essential services in a conflict zone. Expand

situational awareness in order to reduce casualties, fratricide and
the collateral damage that may occur as non-military organizations,
including private military companies, engage in the same theatre of
operations as NATO forces.
 Strengthen the strategic relationship between NATO, the EU, and
the UN by adapting the communications, training and
interoperability standards necessary to support a flexible command
structure.
 Develop an ability to rapidly assess how opposing forces might
leverage operational lessons learned, commercial off-the-shelf
technology and emerging technologies to attack gaps and
vulnerabilities within the Alliance. This would include a robust
evaluation mechanism that translates new technological
developments into solutions for NATO.
CONFLICT PREVENTION, RESOLUTION AND CONSEQUENCE

MANAGEMENT
 Adapt Alliance organisational structures, authorities and decision-

making processes to successfully implement a comprehensive
approach to conflict resolution, stabilization and reconstruction. To
this end, nations will have to establish and maintain an
interconnected web of government agencies, e.g., law enforcement,
border protection services, judiciaries and public health authorities
that can work alongside and in support of Alliance missions.
 Develop a legal framework and policy for the use of non-lethal force,
as well as common standards regarding the use of non-lethal force
in support of law enforcement and security operations.
 Implement fully NATO’s partnership with the EU at the strategic,
operational and tactical levels. Improve the NATO-EU partnership

on issues of non-proliferation and consequence management, with

agreed terms of reference that delineate the role of each
organisation in a crisis.
 Establish an agreed NATO-EU framework for comprehensive

planning and liaison with civilian actors, especially humanitarian
relief organisations and NGOs. In this regard, make full use of the
NATO-EU working groups to evaluate and prepare
recommendations for how military forces will plan, prepare and
exercise alongside their civilian counterparts.

 Adapt Headquarters and command and control structures, including
rapid reaction capabilities, for a comprehensive approach that
would include the integration of personnel from other government
agencies, the EU, the UN and other international organisations.
 Adapt NATO’s force structure and planning processes to emphasise
non-combat missions, such as humanitarian relief, maritime
security, infrastructure protection and support for multinational
responses to natural disasters.
COUNTER PROLIFERATION
 Enhance the preparedness of armed forces to support national civil

authorities through the harmonisation of command, control and
information systems. This will help mitigate the vulnerabilities that
result from risks and threats to populations and vital infrastructure,
and the potential use of WMD/E weapons in terrorist attacks.


 In collaboration with other IOs and national organisations, analyse
and develop the capability to detect, track, identify and target state
and non-state actors who are engaged in the illicit development,
diversion, storage, or transport of WMD/E.
 Develop a robust consequence-management capability in
collaboration with other IOs and national organisations.
 Enhance the capability (equipment and training) of NATO and the

nations to aid first responders and recovery efforts, as well as to
survive and fight a war conducted with WMD/E.
EXPEDITIONARY AND COMBAT CAPABILITY IN AUSTERE

ENVIRONMENTS
 Review policy guidance to improve coordination between defence

and operational planning, and by doing so better align defence
planning capabilities with evolving political-military requirements.
 Develop a comprehensive maritime strategy to address the threats

to Alliance security on the maritime commons presented by
demographic shifts, energy scarcity, organised crime, technology-
savvy adversaries, terrorism and the proliferation of WMD.

 Maintain the ability to conduct the full range of operations and
missions concurrently, ranging from collective defence operations
and demanding stabilisation and reconstruction operations to large-
scale high-intensity combat operations.
 Develop the capability to conduct expeditionary operations in a

flexible manner, with the ability to switch seamlessly between lead

and supporting roles when working with IOs and NGOs acting in the
same area.
 Improve operational planning to account for the increasing
complexity of Rules of Engagement.
 Prepare to deploy mobile, credible, interoperable and sustainable
forces to remote locations on short notice in response to
humanitarian contingencies.
 Deliver modern, capable air-mobility for rapid response and

transport in urban environments. Ensure the protection of air assets,
especially with regard to control of the electromagnetic spectrum.
 Explore a sea-basing capability to improve operational
responsiveness, reduce exposure to land-based and missile threats,
enhance medical evacuation capabilities and reduce host nation
support requirements.
STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS AND WINNING THE BATTLE OF THE

NARRATIVE
 The Alliance will need to develop coherent messages and an

engagement strategy that both reflect its strategic goals and
support its core values, ideas, missions and operations. This strategy
will help foster broad public and governmental understanding of
NATO’s roles and why it needs to develop, manage and deploy
robust civil and military capabilities.
 Improve strategic communications in an area of engagement by

broadening cooperation within the international community,
especially the UN, EU, AU and NGOs. The capability must include
ongoing engagement on the Alliance narrative.

 Develop a systematic long-term process to communicate NATO’s

purpose and operational commitments, both domestically and
internationally.
 Improve communications support for Alliance operations and
objectives, and better use the profusion of new media supported by
instantaneous transmission capabilities. Doing so will require an
increase to the number of fully trained Public Affairs and
Information Operations personnel.
ORGANISATIONAL AND FORCE DEVELOPMENT ISSUES

 Ensure concepts and doctrine support the requirement for flexible

command and balanced force structures that can respond to the
evolving nature of risks and threats to the vital interests of the
Alliance.
 There is a clear need for general purpose forces that can operate in a
disaggregated fashion when confronting those who use methods
that appear asymmetric. Flexible, adaptive organizational structures
and training requirements will empower these high-performing
small units. To prepare forces for the new realities, the Alliance
should use distributed training with enhanced modelling and
simulation capabilities that replicate the fast-paced, chaotic
conditions of future battlefields in the training environment.
 Formulate plans that allow NATO’s command structure to respond
quickly to a variety of warfare models, ranging from high-end
operations to the conduct of security assistance missions, to an
advisory role in support of civilian authorities. Adapt command
structures to be flexible and culturally aware in response to hybrid
threats.

 Adapt the force structures of NATO and its nations, including non-
military capabilities, to support Security Assistance missions.
 Encourage nations to adapt recruitment processes, identify
recruitment opportunities, and develop key messages that will
encourage both non-traditionally and traditionally willing groups
within the society to serve. Share best practices amongst nations.
 Establish training and education standards that promote the

development of highly educated, culturally aware forces, capable of
operating within the rapidly changing tactical, operational and
strategic environments.

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT –Concluding Remarks
Concluding Remarks
The Multiple Futures Project examined common perceived threats
to the populations of the Alliance, and found that the
unpredictability and complexity of the future security environment
will strain the Alliance’s most powerful tools: strategic unity of
values and ideas, solidarity among Allies, burden-sharing, and
commitment to its decisions. No nation can meet the challenges
alone, and the credibility and capability of the Alliance depend on
every nation doing its part.
It is, therefore, essential that the Alliance continue to demonstrate
its strength and resolve, which is rooted in solidarity. These qualities
sustain the Alliance as we work to keep
societies informed about the methods of
potential adversaries, to remain vigilant, and
to lead in conflict management. We must be
tireless as we work together to build support
for an Alliance that continues to espouse the
values and ideas upon which it was founded.
To do this, the Alliance must maintain a
common understanding of what constitutes an
attack and how the Alliance would respond,
thus sending a clear signal of deterrence. That
signal is in essence the clarion’s call, showing
that there will be strength behind the response
to any attack, whether territorial or not.
A comprehensive approach, developed in concert with other
international organisations like the EU and UN, is fundamental to
the security of a diverse Alliance. It goes without saying that the
more comprehensive our approach, the more our engagements will
be affected by actions outside of our geographic boundaries. To be
effective in this environment, we must develop better partnerships,
leverage relationships and work with other international
organisations to improve the transparency of information and

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT - Concluding Remarks
decision-making. Success will depend on our ability to manage

conflict effectively and mitigate the consequences that spring from
subversive activity. Burgeoning technological developments will
contribute both to the breadth of Alliance vulnerabilities and to the
ingenuity of potential adversaries who will use technology to disrupt
our society. The use of technology, especially the technology of
WMD/E, therefore will demand increasing vigilance and positive
control, and highlights the need for the Alliance to consult closely
with our partners to protect our technological advantage.
Anticipation is crucial to NATO’s preparation for the future.
Investment in long-term awareness and long-term analysis will give
NATO a significant role to play as it works with national
governments to discern forthcoming challenges. This includes the
need to develop early warning systems, especially with regard to the
proliferation of WMD. A maneuverist stance can help NATO become
a catalyst for identifying problems and analysing solutions, thereby
outthinking potential adversaries. Intelligence processes must
adapt and improve, and our leaders must be both well-versed in
current trends and grounded in history in order to make informed
decisions. To respond effectively in this environment of surprise, the
capabilities of the Alliance, not solely military but across the range
of comprehensive responses, will always need to be flexible and
adaptable.
Historically, every military that has transformed successfully has
done so by clearly identifying specific military problems that need to
be addressed. To this end, the Alliance will have to maintain and
improve existing capabilities, and in some cases develop new ones,
to address emerging security challenges. The insights and
recommendations in this report are the basis of SACT’s military
advice, and are meant to stimulate dialogue and inform decisions on
what needs to change. Furthermore, the findings may support the
development of political guidance that will address NATO’s role in
the future security environment.

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT –Concluding Remarks
Exploration of the future is always risky, as trends change in

magnitude and direction. By scanning the horizon periodically and
reviewing our assessments, we increase our ability to adapt and
respond. The goal is not to be perfectly right in this exploration.
However, it is vital that the Alliance gets it sufficiently right, so that
it has the fewest regrets when Alliance leaders are faced with the
surprises that inevitably accompany conflict. Ultimately, the men
and women who make up the force embody the Alliance’s greatest
operational strength. It is they who give NATO the ability to
improvise rapidly to unexpected situations. It is incumbent on NATO
and the nations to ensure that these men and women receive the
doctrine, training, education, and material they need to succeed in
their mission.

Insights Focus Areas Concepts & Doctrine Recommendations Capability Enhancement Recommendations
 Develop culture suited to countering hybrid threats.

Insight 1: The evolving  Enhance/develop offensive and defensive concepts,  Maintain conventional and nuclear competency.
nature of risks and threats strategies and legal frameworks to deter, respond to  Operate across the spectrum of conflict.
to vital interests will and counter attacks in ungoverned/sensitive mission  Present credible force to deter in all domains.
Adapting to the areas.  Retain technological advantage - rapidly assess emerging
challenge strategic unity
Demands of  Re-evaluate the ability to collect, share, and fuse all technologies.
and solidarity within the sources of intelligence.
Hybrid Threats  Detect, identify, locate, and engage cyber attackers.
Alliance, as well as the  Develop a comprehensive concept/strategy to  Ensure C2 systems are agile, configurable, with decision
common understanding of strengthen partnerships with industry and shorten making at lowest appropriate level
what constitutes an Article acquisition time for new technologies.  Develop advanced Joint ISR capabilities.
5 attack.  Strengthen NATO Network Enabled Capabilities (NNEC).
 Examine cooperation, roles and exchange of liaison

officers with non-NATO actors.  Develop standards for security assistance missions, security
Insight 2: Increased  Implement fully the Comprehensive Approach. sector reform, and the force’s cultural awareness.
Operating with  Strengthen support to good governance; mentor and  Enhance capability to partner with non-NATO actors.
interaction with non-NATO
Others & advise other nations.  Strengthen the strategic relationship between NATO, the EU,
nations and other
Building  Ensure partner involvement in operational planning. and the UN.
international actors will
Institutions  Implement fully the UN-NATO Joint Declaration.  Rapidly assess opposing forces’ use of technology.
create opportunities for the  Implement policy to mentor and advise indigenous  Create an aggressive capability to translate new
Alliance to extend its role forces. technological developments into solutions.
in enhancing security and  Understand and evaluate outsourcing of security.
stability outside traditional  Adapt organisational structures, authorities and
areas of engagement. Conflict decision-making processes.
 Adapt Headquarters C2 Structures for Comprehensive
Prevention,  Legal framework, doctrine for non-lethal force.
Approach, including integration of Governmental and
Resolution and  Implement fully NATO’s partnership with the EU.
International Organisations.
 Improve the NATO-EU partnership on non-
Consequence  Adapt force structure and planning to include newer
Insight 3: Determined proliferation and consequence management.
Management missions, and response to natural disasters.
 Establish framework for NATO –EU comprehensive
adversaries enabled by
planning and liaison.
readily available
 Develop, with GO & IO, capability to detect, track, identify,
technologies, will attack  Enhance force preparedness to better support target, & engage WMD/E actors.
Alliance vulnerabilities in Counter
national civil authorities.  Develop robust consequence management with GO/IO.
unexpected ways, Proliferation
 Harmonise C2 and information systems.  Develop the capability to aid first responders and recovery
requiring the Alliance to efforts, and to survive and fight a WMD/E war.
consider changes in the  Maintain the ability to conduct the full range of operations and
 Ensure better coordination between defence and missions concurrently.
character of military operational planning.
Expeditionary &  Switch seamlessly between lead and supporting roles.
operations and warfare.  Better align defence planning capabilities with
Combat  Improve operational planning to take into account the
Capability in evolving political-military requirements.
increasing complexity of Rules of Engagement.
 Develop a comprehensive maritime strategy to
Austere  Deploy mobile, credible, interoperable and sustainable forces
address the threats presented by population shifts,
Environments to remote locations on short notice.
Insight 4: Increased energy scarcity, organised crime, technology savvy
adversaries, terrorism and WMD proliferation.  Deliver modern, capable air-mobility for rapid response and
interaction with other transport in urban environments.
international actors will  Broaden cooperation to deliver the Alliance narrative.
Strat Comms &  Develop coherent messages and an engagement
provide NATO the  Communicate NATO’s purpose and operational
Winning Battle of strategy that reflects strategic goals and supports
opportunity to positively commitments, both domestically and internationally.
Narrative core values, ideas, missions and operations.
shape and influence ideas,  Improve communications support to operations.
values and events in a  Develop distributed training with enhanced modelling and
globalised world. Organisational & simulation capabilities.
 Ensure concepts and doctrine support the
Force  Adapt C2 for improved responsiveness, flexibility.
requirement for flexible command and balanced force
 Adapt force structure for Security Assistance missions.
Development structures, to respond to the evolving nature of risks
and threats to Alliance vital interests.  Adapt recruitment processes and share best practices.
Issues
 Establish education & training standards to develop highly
educated, culturally aware forces.

MFP Finalrep

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FINAL REPORT – APRIL2009

"WANT OF FORESIGHT, UNWILLINGNESS TO ACT

LACK OF CLEAR THINKING, CONFUSION OF COUNSEL

UNTIL THE EMERGENCY COMES, UNTIL SELF-

PRESERVATION STRIKES ITS JARRING GONG—THESE

ARE THE FEATURES WHICH CONSTITUTE THE

ENDLESS REPETITION OF HISTORY."

House of Commons, May 2, 1935

The Security Implications and resulting recommendations contained in this report

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 ii

Executive Summary ........................................................................................................ 3

Chapter 4 Military Implications Preparing Alliance Military Forces for

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 2

“SECURING, STABILISING AND PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IS OUR CORE BUSINESS AND

NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer,

In the world of 2030, the inability to react with expediency and

To be open, transparent, inclusive and able to process the widest

3 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

representatives from 45 nations and more than 60 institutions

The MFP starts with a fundamental analysis of the drivers of change

The multiple futures yield some 40 Risk Conditions, ranging from

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 4

USE OF TECHNOLOGY and innovation

Figure 1: Drivers of Change, Plausible Futures

The Security Implications point to four broad insights and associated

5 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

influence values, ideas, and events in an increasingly globalised

Military Implications point to seven broad focus areas. Five of the

Overall, the implications derived from the multiple futures reveal

SECURITY AND DEFENCE CHALLENGES

Despite potential interstate conflicts in the Middle East, the

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 6

Burgeoning technology also will increase both the breadth of

Adversaries will focus less on external attack and more on a

Whether the motives of our adversaries are based on religious

7 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

NAVIGATING TOWARDS 2030

It is essential that the Alliance continues to demonstrate its strength

The Alliance must maintain flexible, adaptable, well-trained, well-

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 8

structure that is able to integrate and work effectively with other

Developing the necessary capabilities and generating the required

Urbanisation also will present challenges to the effective conduct of

9 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 10

NATO is the most successful military alliance in human history,

The Multiple Futures Project (MFP)

11 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

engagements, and solicited the direct involvement of

Working with a combination of NATO, national and diverse

Figure 2: MFP Intellectual Framework

The result of the IF process is the identification of specific Security

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 12

BUILDING A COMMON PERCEPTION THROUGHOUT THE

13 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

Figure 3: Evolution of MFP Drivers

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 14

STRUCTURAL DRIVERS OF CHANGE

FRICTION (DISTRIBUTION OF POWER) is the degree of ease

INTEGRATION (ECONOMIC/GLOBALISATION) is the degree to

ASYMMETRY (STATES/POLITICAL ENTITIES) is the relative

15 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

STATE CAPACITY reflects the distribution and management of power

RESOURCES (ALLOCATION) encompasses the availability and

CLIMATE CHANGE is any long-term significant change in the ‘average

USE OF TECHNOLOGY denotes the evolution and availability of

DEMOGRAPHICS (INCLUDING MIGRATION & URBANISATION) reflect

COMPETING IDEOLOGIES AND WORLDVIEWS deal with alienation and

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 16

The future security environment will not develop exactly as

17 MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030

PEOPLE refer to the security and safety of a state’s

TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY includes the protection of

VALUES AND IDEAS include the preservation and

MULTIPLE FUTURES PROJECT – Navigating towards 2030 18

People, goods and territory tend to be indisputable core