The Presuppositional

Apologetic of Francis Schaeffer

1. INTRODUCTION
1,1. In this article I analyze and criti-
cize the apologetic of Francis A. Schaef-
fer, D. D., president of L'Abri Fellowship
Foundation (Switzerland) and a minister
in both the Reformed Presbyterian
Church, Evangelical Synod (USA) and
the International Presbyterian Church.
Dr. Schaeffer, who 'attended Westminster
Theological Seminary and was graduated
from Faith Theological Seminary (1938),
is the author of numerous books and
articles which relate evangelical Chris-
tianity and modern culture. His most
important work to date on Christian
apologetics is The God Who Is There.1
1,2. I am concerned in this essay with
the logical structure and conceptual
content of Schaeffer's apologetic. In view
of this, it will not be possible to discuss
his many historical observations on
philosophy, art, science and culture.
2
Even his theology will not come under
scrutiny except in the possible
terms.
1,3. My plan is straightforward: (a)
present Schaeffer's aI:gument for Chris-
tianity, and (b) criticize that argument.
10
E. R. Geehan
2. THE RUIN OF "RATIONALISM";
THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF
CHRISTIANITY
2,1. The aim of a Christian apologetic
is two-fold according to Schaeffer. First,
an apologetic must demonstratethatthere
are but two, mutually exclusive, world
views: " ... on the one side nihilism (God
is dead, man is dead, and meaning is
dead); on the other side, the answer of
the historic and Reformed Christian
position which states that there is a
personal God, that man is made in his
image, that he has communicated to
his creatures by a propositional, verbal-
ized revelation ... (which) is able to be
considered by the whole man."8 Second,
an apologetic must show the inadequacy
of nihilism as a viable world-view.
2,2. The method of such an apologetic,
Schaeffer maintains, must be "presuppo-
sitional." Schaeffer means by this that
the absolute truth of Christianty can
only be demonstrated after the presuppo-
sition which is common to all non-Chris-
tian thought has been disproved. Chris-
tian apologetics must, therefore, have
a "downward" (destructive) direction
prior to any "upward" (constructive)
direction.
4
The destructive aspect of a defense of
the Christian Faith disproves this secular
presupposition (which Schaeffer identi-
fies as "rationalism") by showing that
the only explanations of certain specific
aspects of reality which are consistent
with this assumption cannot meet the
commonly accepted criteria of truth.
5
The constructive aspect, the demon-
stration of the truth of the Christian
system, proceeds upon the assumption
of the negation of the secular presuppo-
sition. The explanations of the aspects
of reality in question as found in the
Christian system of truth, which is itself
consistent with the negation of the non-
Christian assumption, are then assessed
in terms of the same criteria of truth.
They are found to pass the criteria
summa cum laude.
6
Christianity, there-
fore, is true.
Only such a "presuppositional" method
as this, Schaeffer claims, is adequate to
the defense of Christianity. The older,
classical forms of Christian apology
failed because they did not see the
necessity of the "downward" movement.
To the extent that these older apologies
did succeed, they did so only in so far
as the non-Christian was inconsistent
with his own presupposition.7
I turn now to a working out of
Schaeffer's "presuppositional" method in
detail.
2,3. Two pre-conditions of both the
"downward" and the "upward" move-
ments i,n Schaeffer's apologetic are (a)
agreement concerning the criteria of
proof and (b) agreement concerning what
aspects of reality are to be explained.
2,4. Proof, says Schaeffer, whether in
science, philosophy or religion, consists
of the same "two steps: (A) The theory
must be non-contradictory and must give
an answer to the phenomena in question;
(B). We must be able to live consistently
with our theory."s
2,5. Schaeffer makes concrete his gen-
eral apologetic challenge ("Do your
presuppositions-your gods, your philo-
sophy, your natural science-really
explain what is?"9 by isolating the two
basic aspects of reality which, he claims,
the true world-view must be able to
explain: ", .. the external world and its
form, and man's 'manishness' . . ." 10
Apologetics . must start here, according
to Schaeffer, because every man
". . . knows something of the external
world. and he knows something of
himself,"l1 so that "no matter what a
man may believe, he cannot change the
reality of what is,''12 "The truth that We
let in first is not a dogmatic statement of
the truth of Scripture but the truth of the
external world and the truth of what
man himself is.''13
2,6. These two aspects of reality are
referred to in four specific apologetic
questions which both the non-Christian
and Christian must answer. The answers
to the questions ,amount to explanations
of the phenomena to which the questions
refer. The four questions are:
(a) W1;ly is the:se something rather than
nothing? .
(b) Why is that something orderly?
(c) Why is man personal?
(d) Why is man in a moral dilemma?
Regarding the first two questions (a, b)
which have to do with the "external
world and its form," Schaeffer observes:
"Jean-Paul Sartre has said that the basic
philosophical question of all questions
is this: Why is it that something is there
rather than nothing? He is correct . . .
However, it is not only that something
chaotic is there but that something
orderly is there. "14
Regarding the latter two questions
(c, d) concerning "man and his 'man-
ishness,'" Schaeffer understands ques-
tion c as asking why man has " ... hope
of purpose and significance; love,
notions of morality and rationality,
11
beauty and verbal communication;" 15
and question d as asking why "man is
able both to rise to great heights and to
sink to great depths of cruelty and
tragedy. "16
2,7. With agreement in these two
areas, the criteria of truth and the
questions which every man must answer,
Schaeffer's apologetic "stage" is set. He
must now identify the presupposition
which is common to all secular thought
and check the answers to the apologetic
questions which this presupposition
necessitates against the agreed criteria
of proof. In the following sections (2,8-
,14) I give a detailed statement of
Schaeffer's analysis and criticism of
secular thought.
2,8. Schaeffer identifies the fundamen-
tal presupposition of non-Christian
thought as "rationalism": the view that
man alone is the ultimate "integration
point"17 and autonomous origin
18
of "all
knowledge meaning and value."19 This
fundamental has been
joined, in the history of secular thought,
with two additional, and conflicting, sets
of presuppositions regarding "the nature
of truth and the 'method of attaining
truth."20 One school of rationalists he
calls "optimists" and the other school
"pessimists. "
2,9. The optimistic rationalists, who,
according to Schaeffer, flourished prior
to the present century, believed in
absolute truth (their presupposition re-
garding the "nature of truth") and in
man's ability to produce that absolute
truth on his own (their presupposition
regarding the "method of attaining
truth"). The optimists believed, com-
ments Schaeffer, that man was able, of
himself, to ". . . draw a circle which
would encompass all thougths of life,
and life itself .. , They thought that on
their own, rationalistically, finite men
could find a 'unity in the total diver-
sity. "21
12
2,10. The pessimistic rationalists, who
dominate philosophy throughout the
world today,22 were born "out of desper-
ation" when the optimists' enterprise
failed.
23
Seeing that man is not a
sufficient point of reference to produce
a unifying world-view, they gave up
". . . all hope of achieving a -rational
unified answer to knowledge and life."24
Surrendering the notion of absolute
truth, tliey introduced a new under-
standing of the "nature of truth." "True"
now means "having pragmatic value."
Truth, therefore, for the pessimist is
relative to particular cultures and
historical periods.
25
With this alteration of their concept of
truth,26 they altered their "method of
attaining truth" also. "Truth" is no
longer found, as it was by the optimist,
in terms of empirical and rational proof,
but solely in terms of heuristic consider-
ations. These new pragmatic "truths"
are found by empirical investigation in
the natural sciences, but they are found
by a "non-logical leap of faith" in
religion and morality.27
When optimism failed, says Schaeffer,
rationalism was clearly in danger. It
could only be saved by a rejection of the
optimists' understanding of it. Whereas
the optimists sought a rational unity to
"all knowledge, meaning and value,"
the peSSimists sought only a pragmatic
unity determined by the relative needs
of man. When, therefore, the pessimists
saved rationalism, they surrendered their
rationalfty.28
2,11. Pessihlism, observes Schaeffer, is
certainly correct in seeing that ra tionalism
is an inadequate base for a rational
unification of "all knowledge, meaning
and value." It has seen that " ... if
rationalistic man wants to deal with the
real things of human life (such as
purpose, significance, the validity of
love) he must discard rational thought
about them and make a gigantic, non-
rational leap of faith."29 Pessimism has
seen where rationalism does not go. But
rather than ask where it does lead, the
pessimist simply chooses, irrationally, an
answer which could not have been
rationally supplied by the optimist before
him. The apologist cannot permit the
rationalist the use of this way out. No
meaningful discussion is possible if one
of the parties refuses to be consistent
with his presupposition.
30
The Christian
must insist on rational discussion
because it is only in terms of the'
consistent outcome of the rationalistic
presupposition that the 'Christian can
show the non-Christian the antithesis
between his presupposition and the real
world.
31
2,12. What answers to the four
apologetic questions are, therefore, neces-
sitated by rationalism? Schaeffer main-
tains that there are but two which are
used again and again to answer each of
the four questions: "chance" and
"nihilism." Schaeffer develops and
criticizes these two most fully
in terms of apologetic question c: Why
is man personal?
2,13. The first, and most often propos-
ed; answer to "Why is man personal?"
is chance, i. e. " ... we are the natural
products of the impersonal, plus time
and chance ... "32
Schaeffer maintains that this is,
contrary to' appearances, just another
"leap-of-faith"33 answer, because the
proposal is clearly "against all experi-
ence.',34 "No one has presented an idea,
let alone demonstrated it to be feasible,
to explain how the impersonal begin-
ning, plus time, plus chance, can give
personality. "35
The second proposal, hardly ever
advanced, is that of nihilism, i.. e. that
there are no phenomena to be explained
because personality is an "illusion," a
"kind of sick joke. "36
Against this Schaeffer objects that
"although man may 'say he is no more
than a machine, his whole life denies it,
"he ... simply cannot live as though he
were a machine."37
2,14. When faced with the apologetic
questions, therefore, the rationalist is on
the horns of a dilemma. Either he admits
that the phenomena in question are ones '
for which he cannot provide an
explanation (they are the products of
"chance") and thus fails to meet criterion
of proof A (cf. 2,4); or, he is consistent
with his rationalism and adopts nihilism,
thus failing to meet criterion B.
Schaeffer concludes from these consid-
erations that nihilism is the only
rationally consistent expression of ra-
tionalism and that nihilism is false. If it
were true, he says, a man could not
". . . consistently communicate even
with himself."38 If nihilism is false, then
rationalism is also false; for rationalism
succeeds only in separating man " ... not
only from the real world, but from the
real self that he is. "39
From these conclusions it follows, says
Schaeffer, that . .lll of man's knowledge is
in spite of and not because of his basic
presupposition. Non-Christian man has
no foundation for the knowledge which
he has.
40
2,15. This then is the end of the
"downward" (destructive) movement in
Schaeffer's apologetic. Its basic thrust
was a disproof of rationalism. Neverthe-
less, I think it is apparent throughout
Schaeffer's "downward" writings that he
considers this effort to have a construc-
tive aspect which is foundational to the
"upward" movement which is to follow.
I want to make clear that constructive
aspect before I outline Schaeffer's
apologetic in favor of Christianity.
2,16. Non-Christians, in Schaeffer's
scheme, are rationalistic. They insist on
thinking up unifying world views for
themselves.
41
They think that they can
13
build a "bridge toward ultimate truth"42
and that, if they cannot, there is no
absolute truth. On the other hand "the
Christian is not rationalistic, he does not
tryio begin from himself autonomously
and work out a system from there on."43
These two views can be set over against
each other as the affirmation and denial,
respectively, of this proposition: A
rationally adequate (cf. 2.4) explanation
of reality is possible if and only if man
can construct it by himself.
Schaeffer realizes that if the proposi-
tion is demonstrably false, then its nega-
tion is demonstrably true. Its nega-
tion reads: A rationally adequate expla-
nation of reality is possible if and only
if man cannot construct it by himself.
Therefore, a disproof of rationalism is a
proof of this second proposition. It,
therefore, supplies a very formidable
foundation upon which to construct an
argument for Christianity. It demon-
strates the explanatory necessity of an
infinite, personal and self-revealing God.
This sort of argument is not, however,
a theistic proof. The difference between
a theistic proof aI!d an a:rgument such
as Schaeffer's can be seen by an il-
lustration.
Imagine a man standing before a huge
pile of lumber; he desires to build a
house. He sets out to the task. After
several weeks he realizes that he has
neither the knowledge nor ability to
build a house. In seeing his own disabil-
ity, he has also seen what sort of person
could do the job. Seeing disabilities and
requisite abilities are two sides of the
same coin. This would-be house builder,
however, cannot conclude from his
disability that there is an adequate
housebuilder somewhere. He only knows
what an adequate builder must be like
and that unless such a builder does exist
his house will never be built.
Schaeffer's disproof of rationalism
brings the non-Christian to an analogous
14
point. The non-Christian (a) knows a
great deal about himself and the world;
(b) he has criteria of proof which any
proposed explanation of what he knows
must meet; and (c) he knows that the
only adequate explanation must come
from a person, other than man, who is
"in a position" to supply such a world-
view.
2,17. In terms of the house-builder
illustration, the "upward" task of the
Christian apologist is to show that there
is, somewhere, a house. If there is a
house, there is a builder. The apologist
must demonstrate that there is a non-
contradictory, factually accurate, world-
view from the only person in a position
to know such things. Immediately,
therefore, says Schaeffer, the apologist
must turn to a consideration of Chris-
tianity as a whole.
44
2,18. The non-Christian is challenged,
in Schaeffer's "upward" apologetic, to
consider Christianity on two factual
levels. First, in terms of the apologetic
questions (cf. 2.6). Does the Bible complete
and explain what is the case, especially
" ... what was obvious before, though
vyithout an explanation-that is, that the
eniverse and the 'mannishness' of man
are not j.llst a chance configuration of
the printer's scrambled type. "45 Schaeffer
is confident that the secular man will see
that it does. Clearly " ... the Bible an-
swers the problem of the universe and
man and nothing else does."46 "With the
propositional communication from the
personal God before us, not only the
things of the cosmOs and history match
up but everything on the upper and
lower storeys matches too: grace and
nature; a moral absolute and morals; the
universal point of reference and the
particulars, and the emotional and
aesthetic realities of man as well. "47
Second, since this revelation has come
to man in history, it is confirmable at the
historical level. "Having set the revela-
tion in history," Schaeffer observes,
"what sense then would it make for God
to give us a revelation in which the
history was wrong?"4B Of special impor-
tance in this connection is miracle. Not
only is the Bible verifiable in terms of the
world now,49 but it is verifiable in terms
of "space-time proofs."
Schaeffer makes three points about
miracles. "Firstly, these are space-time
proofs in written form, and consequently
capable of careful consideration. Then,
secondly, these proofs are of such a
nature as to give good and sufficient
evidence that Christ is the Messiah as
prophesied in the Old Testament, and
also that he is the Son of God. So that,
thirdly, we are not asked to believe until
we have faced the question as to whether
this is true on the basis of the space-time
evidence. "50
2,19. Schaeffer is confident that if
anyone will check the Bible out after
seeing the ruin of rationalism, he will
conclude that, "in cohstrast to non-
Christian answers . . .; if the scope of
the phenomena under consideration is
large enough (that is if it includes the
existence of the universe and its form,
and the 'mannishness' of man as he now
is) Christianity, beginning with the
existence of an infinite, personal God,
man's creation in his image and a space-
time Fall, constitutes a non-contradic-
tory answer that does explain the
p h e n o ~ e n and which can be lived with,
both ili. life and in scholarly pursuits. "51
2,20. Summary. Schaeffer's apologetic
method is "presuppositional. " He asks,
"Whose presupposition, that of the non-
Christian or the Christian, provides an
adequate base for explanations of 'the
external world and its form and the
"mannishness" of man' which meet the
commonly accepted criteria of proof?"
He then attempts to show that no ex-
planation of the phenomena in question
(as expressly formulated in the apologet-
ic questions) which is consistent with
"rationalism" (the presupposition of non
Christian thought) can meet the criteria.
Therefore "rationalism" is false.
This refutation of "rationalism"
bestows on the Christian system an
immediate prima facie reasonabilityfor
it presupposes the falsehood of "ration-
alism." The whole of the Christian
system, its explanations of the pheno-
mena in questions, its historical claims
and its conceptual content, is then
carefully tested by the same criteria. It
meets the agreed criteria of truth.
Therefore, the Christian religion is true.
52
Is this argument sound?
3 .. CRITICISM
3,1. Dr. Schaeffer has not yet finished
writing on the subject of apologetic
method. He plans for a work to appear
in early 1972, He Is There and He Is Not
Silent, in which he further develops and
clarifies his apologetic. In that work he
also plans to answer some of his critics.
A final assess"inent of his method of
defending Christianity is, therefore, not
possible.
3,2. Nevertheless, the value of this
essay would be significantly diminished
if I left the reader with no critical
perspective with which to interact. I,
therefore, propose to provide this
perspective by putting to Dr. Schaeffer
some questions which I have about what
he does say and by expressing to him
some disappointments which I feel about
what he does not say.
3,3. What Dr. Schaeffer does say can
be divided into five sections: (a) the
criteria of proof, in 2,4; (b) the apolo-
getic questions which refer to the aspects
of reality: in 2,5-6; (c) the identification
of the basic secular presupposition, in
2,8; (d) the "downward" (destructive)
15
argument, in 2,9-14; and (e) the
"upward" (constructive) argument, in 2,
15-19. I have the following questions
about these sections.
3',4. Dr. Schaeffer, if a non-Christian
agreed with your argument as it develops
in a-d, would it be logically necessary
for him to agree with your assessment of
Christianity as found in e, or might he
conclude that some other revelation-de-
pendent religion, and not Christianity, .or
that no now existing revelation-dependent
religion, meets the criteria of proof?
Might a non-Christian agree with a-d
and yet agree with Michael Scriven's
assessment of the Christian doctrine of
creation? He says,
A creation "explanation" of the Universe is
hopeless since such a creation has to be more
than a rearrangement of previously existing
materials by a previously existing entity. We have
to pay the excessive price for this explanation of
introducing a Being whose own origin is exactly
as unexplained as that of the first material object
and whose nature and creative procedures are
additional unfathomables. In short, the act or
process of divine creation, rather than being an
explanation, not only is itself unobservable and
incomprehensible, with no observable effects
that distinguish its pro'duct from a naturally but
spontaneously originated Universe. It is also
supposed to be performed by an entity whose own
origin simply reintroduces, the mystery which
it was his function to eliminate. .
... instead of seeing that the introduction of
a ',God simply substitutes two mysteries for one
(the mystery of his own origin and of the way
he creates matter, for the mystery of the origin
of matter), we think it actually explains where
the Universe came from. It is about as explan-
atory as telling a child who asks where the
rainbow comes from that the light elves weave
it. y v ~ cannot avoid the questions: "How do they
do this?" "Where do they come from?"53
3,5. "Dr. Schaeffer, in section d you
maintain that 'rationalism' is not an
adequate logical base for 'optimism' and
you point to the historical shift from
, 'optimism' to 'pessimism' to support this.
However, in spite of your lengthy discus-
sions of this shift, the precise logical
16
relationship between 'rationalism' and
'pessimism' remains unclear to me.
Would you give me cl purely logical
argument which shows that the only
consistent form of 'rationalism' is
'pessimism'? Precisely how does the
assumption that man must be the source
of all 'lmowledge, meaning and value'
entail that he has never uncovered, nor
will ever, of himself uncover the absolute
truth about all things?"
3,6. "Dr. Schaeffer, in section c you
maintain that the basic presupposition
of secular thought is 'rationalism'. How
did you arrive at this identification?
How would you defend it if a non-
Christian should deny that he assumes
this? Can you refer me to any non-
Christian who has ever rejected Chris-
tianity for this reason? .
3,7. "Dr. Schaeffer, in section b I refer
to the four basic apologetic questions
which it seems to me you propose. Can
you tell me why it is these phenomena,
as opposed to others which might be
suggested, e.g., the 'evolution of the horse,
the age of the solar system which runs
into billions of years, or the physio-
chemical base of all human thoughts and
emotions, which are in such great need
of explanation? Do you expect the non-
Christian to accept each of your ques-
tions precisely as you put them? How
would you answer, for example, an
argument against your first question
such as that expressed in this dialogue
between Kai Nielsen' and Paul Tillich?
Kai Nielsen: ... When we ask Tillich's ques
tion "Why is there something rather than nothing
at all?" we are asking what is the reason for
there being something rather than nothing. But
it seems to me that there is no possible answer
to this question that does not itself generate the
same type of question . . . If nothing could
conceivably answer Tillich's basic philosophical
question or problem, in what sense is it literally
a question or problem? A question or problem
without a conceivable answer seems to me no
question or no problem at all.
TilZich: There is no doubt that the question,
"Why is there something, why not nothing?" is
not a question in the proper logical sense of the
word. There is no answer to it. as I myself have
indicated by referring to Kant's mythical God
who asks this question with respect to himself
and cannot answer it.54
3,8. "Dr. Schaeffer, in section a you
adopt certain criteria of proof or truth.
Do you understand these criteria to be
infallible guides to what is,with absolute
certainty, the case? It seems to me that
your view of truth needs criteria which
fill this bil1.
55
It seems to me, however,
that your criteria are not adequate to this
task. I say this because it seems
conceivable to me that a non-Christian
might agree with your entire argument
a-e and yet say that not only Chris-
tianity but many other revelation-de-
pendent religions (Mormonism?) are
thoroughly consistent and adequate to
all the facts as their adherents see them!
If this is possible, what additional
criteria arguments would you introduce
to help a non-Christian to decide be-
tween Christianity and the competing
truth claims of other revelation-depend-
ent religions?"
3,9. My disappointments about what
Dr. Schaeffer does not say fall into two
categories: (a) the conceptual problems
within the Christian scheme itself, and
(b) the relationship of many Reformed
doctrines to apologetic method.
3,10. "Dr. Schaeffer, you use biblical
doctrin!ls to answer your apologetic ques-
tions,56 yet you nowhere mention that
these doctrines (creation, the'sovereignty
of God, the Fall and responsibility of
man, the Trinity, the deity, and humanity
of Christ, the 'personality' and 'rationality'
of God) are conceptually elusive, having
long histories as recalcitrant puzzles
within Christian theology. I hope this
situation will be remedied in the future.
You would do Christian apologetics a
genuine service by acknowledging these
difficulties, offering your own solutions
to them and, most importantly, justifying
your use of these theological concepts
(which include in a fundamental fashion
the biblical notion of "mystery") as
rationally and scientifically sound "ex-
planations. "
As things now stand, I cannot help but
feel that your use of theology borders on
the cavalier and that you are insensitive
to the theoretical struggles which many
Christians, both past and present, go
through in an effort to understand and
hold on to their personal faith.
3,11. "Dr. Schaeffer, after reading all
your works I am still very much in the
dark about your own personal synthesis
of theology and apologetics. I do not
understand how you view the relationship
between the two. Where does the
regenerating work of the Holy Spirit fit
into your apologetic method? In what
sense is this divine work necessary?57
Of what import to apologetics is the
doctrine of the Fall? How is fallen man
different from finite man, noetically
speaking?58 Ho}'\' does the doctrine of
election fit into a thoroughly rational
apologetic for the Christian faith? I look
forward to reading some stimulating
discussion of these crucial matters in
your future work on epistemology."
3,12. These are not all, nor e v e ~
perhaps, the most significant questions
which I or readers of this essay might
have. Nevertheless, I hope that raising
them has set the reader's mind to jog
along certain apologetic tracks and
created in him some concrete expecta-
tions regarding the content of Dr.
Schaeffer's forthcoming book, He Is
There and He Is Not Silent. I personally
look forward to reading it. Then, perhaps
at some future time, I can return to
provide a yet clearer picture of Francis
Schaeffet's "presuppositional" apologet-
ic.
17
NOTES
1 Dr. Schaeffer's five books to date are:
Escqpe from Reason (London: Inter-Varsity. 1968);
The God Who Is There (London: Hodder and
Stoughton. 1968); Death in the City (London:
Inter-Varsity Press. 1969); Pollution and the
Death of Man: The Christian View of Ecology
(London: Hodder and Stoughton. 1970); and The
Church at the End of the Twentieth Century
(London: Norfolk. 1970). These works are
referred to in the footnotes by their significant
initials; thus Escape from Reason is ER.
2 I refer interested readers to Colin Brown's
Philosophy and the Christian Faith for a per-
spective of the history of philosophy (London:
Tyndale. 1969) which differs at important points
from Dr. Schaeffers.
3 GTI79-80. In this manner I shall indicate
page references. I must add at this early point in
the essay that I am aware that a paper such as
this. is. in some important ways. a "distortion."
I! forces a structure upon a work that is not so
structured. I! uses words with a precision not
found in the author's work. Sometimes this means
quoting certain passages which. while being truly
representative of his thought. are. in context. only
applications of that thought. At other times it
means not using Schaeffer's exact words to get
through to his ideas (cf. note 20). I have
attempted. in the footnotes. to supply the interest-
ed reader with cross references so that he might
be able to have a brdader base upon which to
judge Schaeffer's work.
4 GT/14. cf. 4 2 ~
5 GT/llO-1l2.
6 GT/1l2.
GT/14.
GT/llO.
9 DC/90.
10 GT/121.
11 GT1122.
12 GT/121.
13 GT/128.
14 DC/89; cf. CETCI16. 55.
15. GT/88.
16 GT/99.
17 GT116.
18 ER/34-3!i. 88; GT/16. 21. 46. 92.
19 GT/16.
20 GT/125. I might here mention some of the
verbal difficulties that one encounters in
Schaeffer's style. When Schaeffer refers to
someone's .. presuppositions .. it is usually not
clear whether he is talking about the presupposi-
tion of rationalism. rationalistic optimism or
rationalistic pessimism. At times he even implies
18
that there are others beside these (GT/120).
Sometimes he uses "truth" to refer to absolute
truth. i. e. the true world-view. while at other
times he means simply true as opposed to false.
Often it is not clear which. "Pes.simism" is
sometimes used for the opposites of "optimism"
(the way I use it in this paper). while at other
times it means the same as "nihilism" or the
logically consistent form of pessimistic rational-
ism.
21 GTI16.
22 GT/27.
23 ER/41. cf. GT/16-17. 21.
24 GT/27; cf. GT/I4-15. 21.92.
25 GTI18.
26 GT1142.
27 GT/21; cL GT/SI-54; ER/46 ff.
28 ER/41. 42. 45.
29 GT/21; cf. GT/46. 92; ER/89; CETC/22-23.
30 GTI79-80; cf. GT/13. 47-48.
31 GT/llB-130.
32 ER/87.
33 GT/ll1.
34 GT/111.
35 GT/87.
36 GT/87; cf. GTI100; 111.
37 GT/ll1.
38 GT/121.
39 GT/121.
40 GT/12S.
41 GT/llO.
42 ER/88.
43 GT/1l4.
44 GT/86.
45 GT/llO.
46 GT/1l2; cf. CETC/S5.
47 GT/llO.
48 GT/91.
49 DC/79-96.
50 GT/140.
51 GT/1l2.
52 Readers familiar with other American
apologists will recognize the similarity between
Schaeffer's structure and that first put forward by
Edward J. Camell in his An Introduction to
Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 1st e&.
1948). '
53 M. Scriven. Primary Philosophy (New York:
McGraw-Hill. 1966). pp. 119-120.
54 Sydney and Beatrice Rome, eds . Philosophi-
cal Interrogations (New York: Holt, Rinehart &
Winston, 1964), p. 403.
55 GT/142; cf. CETC/102: "Truth, in the classic
sense of that which accurately represents what
is real for all time and all places ... "
56GT/86-108.
57 Cf. GT/142 with ER/93.
58 Cf ER/89 with ER/ll.