Case Analysis Fuji Vs Kodak: Presented by Adarsh Sheth Purushottam Kalantry (-) IBS Mumbai 08 10

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CASE ANALYSIS

FUJI VS KODAK
PRESENTED BY
Adarsh Sheth
Purushottam Kalantry
IBS Mumbai (08-10)
Introduction to the Case

 Kodak’s revenues were down from $15.97 bn in 1996 to
$14.36 bn in 1997 and net earnings fell from $1.29 bn
to just $5 mn

 More than 5 percent points decline in the US marketshare


(from 80.1% to 74.7%)

 Analysts felt that Kodak had underestimated its
competitors especially Fuji Photo Film

 Fuji entered the market in the mid- 1990s with 10%
marketshare and increased it to 17% in 1990s

 Aggressive marketing by Fuji brought down prices
significantly

Contd…
 In the late 1990s, the rivalry between Kodak and Fuji
further intensified

 Analysts felt that Kodak should not take its home market
for granted as Fuji had become the world’s second
largest manufacturer of photographic film and paper
after Kodak

 Fuji was not just winning over cost-conscious consumers


but also steadily eroding Kodak’s lead in the
professional photography market
Background

 George Eastman founded Eastman Kodak Company in


Waterville, New York

 Existing photography methods were cumbersome


 Photographic images were made on heavy, fragile glass


plates that had to be coated with a wet emulsion just
before picture was taken

 Pioneered and patented the dry plate process


About FUJI

 Founded in 1934, with its headquarter at Tokyo, Japan


 Entered the US market in 1964 as a supplier of private


label films

 Focused on providing quality and innovative products at


cheap price

 Was the market leader in Japan, world’s second largest


market for photography products
Reasons for Success
 Built a reputation for quality and innovative products

 Gained market share by offering products at prices lower


than that of Kodak’s

 Consumers viewed the company as Customer-oriented


 Regular introduction of new products, promotions and


slashing of prices

 Kodak’s defensive strategy vs. Fuji’s offensive strategy



FUJI STRATEGY

 Fuji appears to price its product much higher in the


domestic market
 Gives Fuji cash flows
 Allows them to price low in the export market

Fuji’s Strategy
 Established a Production plant in US
ü Cost Efficiency

 Reactive Follower

 Customer & Quality were the prime focus


üCLV & CRM

 Distribution Strategies

 Compatibility with Kodak Cameras & Films


 Aggressive Marketing

FUJI’S PROS

Fuji’s chances for future growth-


 Fuji is attacking market leader by out innovating


Kodak in almost every sphere.
 Fuji looks to be more in line with customer needs
and have a great distributor network.
 The high spending on R&D has reaped results in the
past and might do the same in future.
 Digital technology seems to be the future of
photography. Fuji will do well to concentrate on
this.

FUJI’S CONS

 Fuji has to overcome following disadvantages


 They have concentrated on long term strategy and


their profits are low as of now.
 Their market share might stagnate because of counter
offense by Kodak with much higher profits.
 Might result in low performance in the eyes of
stakeholders
 It is still not seen at par with Kodak in US market.


KODAK

 1884- Roll of film


 1887- Manufacturing cameras and started operations in


London

 Mid 1890-Company owned distribution outlets


 1900-Entered Japan and set up its first distribution


outlet in 1905

 1924-Eastmen retired and became the Chairman of the Board


of Directors

 Decreased Brand Loyalty in the early 1970s. Growth rate
slowed by 2%-4% for Kodak

 1981-Sony Launched Mavica, a filmless electronic camera


which would display pictures on a TV screen

 Kodak reduced the price of its films


 In 1980s, Japanese players developed 35 mm autofocus


cameras. In response Kodak launched small disk cameras,
which used film disks instead of film rolls.
Kodak in Japan

 Kodak entered Japan in 1905


 Never took market seriously

 1977
 Strengthened distribution and marketing system
 Joint venture (Kodak – Nagase)
 Created Subsidiary (Kodak – Japan)
 Increase employee from 12 to 4500

 Access to camera stores went up – 30k to 60k


Kodak in Japan

 Large no of Fuji Exclusive stores


 Late 1970s
 Joint venture Bandai (Toy Mfg) – single use camera
 Setup own R&D and support center
 Kodak Symposium

 Improved Kodak image



Kodak in Japan

 1980’s
 Concept of Minilabs
 Got advantage over Fuji
 Introduced “Panoramic Disposable Camera”
 Increase control on S & D system
 Bought Kusuda Business Machines

 Controlled 150 labs against 250 by Fuji

Kodak in Japan

 Late 80’s
 Advertised heavily
 Introduced waterproof disposable camera
 Introduced Print film – Ektar

 In all company spent around $500 million


 Despite, Company failed to attract consumer



Kodak in Japan

 1994
 Introduced single use Camera – Falcon
 Advertised this product unconventionally

 Became one of the best photographic product of the year


in Japan
KODAK DIVERSIFICATION

 Kodak is more diversified than Fuji


 Revenue% and ROS per segments


 Revenue ROS
 87-89 90-92 87-90
90-92
 Imaging 40.0% 36.9% 16.9% 15.3%
 Information 23.5% 20.8% 1.9% -6.9%
 Chemicals 18.7% 19.2% 17.6% 14.5%
 Health 17.8% 24.5% 16.3% 1.5%

 Has Diversification been a good thing for


Kodak?
DISTRIBUTION NETWORK
 JAPAN
 In 1977 KODAK tied up with the distributor Nagase & co
in Japan

 Increased its workforce from 12 to 4500


 Neglected the Japanese market earlier


 JV with Bandai a leading Japanese toy manufacturer - co


branding agreement


 Conducted annual Kodak symposiumpsin which the audience


included university professors & researchers,
customers & its partners

 This was done to project itself as a technology intensive


company

 In 1980 introduced the concept of “minilabs” at certain


retail outlets where the film can be processed much
faster than other labs


 Fuji products were sold through 216000 retail outlets


 15% of them gave 75% of the total sales.


 Fuji owned a controlling interest in 3 of the 5 major


wholesalers

 In response kodak bought Ksuda Business Machines a local


distrubutor there

DISTRIBUTION STRATEGY
DIFFERENCE IN
DISTRIBUTION

 In US manufacturers sold directly to retailers &
photofinishers

 In Japan distributors acted as intermediaries


 Fuji had strong ties 4 main distributors Asanuma, Misuzu,


Kashimura and Ohmiya

 Whereas Kodak had only 1 distributor – Nagase


 Kodak claimed that the tie up of fuji with major


distributors prevented other brands entry

 Japanese government was supporting such monopolistic


distribution set up

 Fuji gave high commission to the distributors



FINANCIALS

SALES FELL 21 . 5 % IN 3 YEARS


ppliers to provide quality products at competitive p
THE DISPUTE
ü
ü Higher market share of Fuji in US but lower market
share of Kodak in Japan

ü Kodak alleged Japanese government of favoring Fuji


ü Kodak filed a petition under Sec 301 referring to


unfair trade practices

ü Allegations were
 - Price fixing, bribing retailers and
wholesalers (Huge rebates), association with
photo labs.
FUJI’S STAND

ü Kodak was unsuccessful majorly because of its


 - Poor marketing
 - Negligence
 - Bad management
 - Short term vision and priorities

ü It talked of not being involved in any kind of unfair


trade practices
ROLE OF WORLD TRADE
ORGANISATION

ü
ü US favored Kodak in WTO by saying that punitive action
should be taken against Japan and stated “ Its not just
Kodak but it can crate problems for any foreign player
and the ultimate losers would be Japanese consumers”

ü In 1997 WTO ruled out all allegations by Kodak in absence


of substantial proof.
ü
ü Challenge faced by historical business model due to
transformational change in the technology, i.e. Theory
of Disruptive technology.

ü Kodak has experienced a nearly 80% decline in its


workforce, loss of market share, a tumbling stock price,
and significant internal turmoil as a result of its
failure to take advantage of this new technology.

ü Integration of market and nonmarket strategies in a


setting, involving market competition and international
trade policy where governments serve as bargaining
agents for firms.
ü
CHANGING TRENDS
ü Changing customer
 - More accepting towards foreign brands
 - Found a bona fide competitor in fuji
 - Changing landscape for retail

ü The New Players
 - Especially Non Traditional competitor like Sony,
HP, Casio

ü Global Market share Battles
ü
ü US Market share Battles
ü
ü Price wars
 - Initiated by Fuji, but no after effects
from Kodak

ü Sponsorship Battles
 - Fuji, the Event Sponsor while Kodak, the
Broadcast Sponsor (80’s)

ü Court Battles
 - Had to go ahead because of weak Trade &
Investment Ombudsman (Japan)


VARIOUS MODELS OR STEPS

ü Market Model incorporates structure of the market,


demand & supply

ü Enforcement of International Trade Agreement, i.e.


Sustainable Concessions

ü Preference based bargaining


ü Non Market Model e.g. Common Agency


 Kodak can anticipate market changes faster

 Steps Kodak can take to protect its strategic advantage


are -
 Full line strategy – Kodak should devote resources
for digital cameras and film processing.
 It is currently following counteroffensive defense.
It can try flank defense where it can use revenues
from high end products to attack low end products.
 Mobile defense – Kodak can look for new emerging
markets.
 Since photo processing forms the largest chunk of
revenues, Kodak might do well concentrating on
this segment besides high growth OTUCs.    

THANK YOU…!!

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