Gpo Conan Rev 2014

112th Congress DOCUMENT
! SENATE "
2nd Session No. 112–9
THE CONSTITUTION
of the
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION
Centennial Edition
INTERIM EDITION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED

BY THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
TO JULY 1, 2014
PREPARED BY THE
CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS
KENNETH R. THOMAS
EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
LARRY M. EIG
MANAGING EDITOR
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
39–309 WASHINGTON : 2014
Online Version: www.gpo.gov/constitutionannotated
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To Johnny Killian
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(1938–2008)
Special thanks to
Shirley Loo
for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this document
III
AUTHORIZATION
PUBLIC LAW 91–589, 84 STAT. 1585, 2 U.S.C. § 168
JOINT RESOLUTION Authorizing the preparation and printing of a revised
edition of the Constitution of the United States of America—Analysis and
Interpretation, of decennial revised editions thereof, and of biennial cu-
mulative supplements to such revised editions.
Whereas the Constitution of the United States of America—
Analysis and Interpretation, published in 1964 as Senate Docu-
ment Numbered 39, Eighty-eighth Congress, serves a very
useful purpose by supplying essential information, not only
to the Members of Congress but also to the public at large;
Whereas such document contains annotations of cases decided
by the Supreme Court of the United States to June 22, 1964;
Whereas many cases bearing significantly upon the analysis and
interpretation of the Constitution have been decided by the
Supreme Court since June 22, 1964;
Whereas the Congress, in recognition of the usefulness of this
type of document, has in the last half century since 1913,
ordered the preparation and printing of revised editions of
such a document on six occasions at intervals of from ten
to fourteen years; and
Whereas the continuing usefulness and importance of such a docu-
ment will be greatly enhanced by revision at shorter inter-
vals on a regular schedule and thus made more readily avail-
able to Members and Committees by means of pocket-part
supplements: Now, therefore, be it
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled, That the Librar-
ian of Congress shall have prepared—
(1) a hardbound revised edition of the Constitution of the United
States of America—Analysis and Interpretation, published
as Senate Document Numbered 39, Eighty-eighth Congress
(referred to hereinafter as the “Constitution Annotated”), which
shall contain annotations of decisions of the Supreme Court
of the United States through the end of the October 1971
term of the Supreme Court, construing provisions of the Con-
stitution;
(2) upon the completion of each of the October 1973, October
1975, October 1977, and October 1979 terms of the Su-
V
VI AUTHORIZATION
preme Court, a cumulative pocket-part supplement to the

hardbound revised edition of the Constitution Annotated pre-
pared pursuant to clause (1), which shall contain cumula-
tive annotations of all such decisions rendered by the Su-
preme Court after the end of the October 1971 term;
(3) upon the completion of the October 1981 term of the Su-
preme Court, and upon the completion of each tenth Octo-
ber term of the Supreme Court thereafter, a hardbound de-
cennial revised edition of the Constitution Annotated, which
shall contain annotations of all decisions theretofore ren-
dered by the Supreme Court construing provisions of the Con-
stitution; and
(4) upon the completion of the October 1983 term of the Su-
preme Court, and upon the completion of each subsequent
October term of the Supreme Court beginning in an odd-
numbered year (the final digit of which is not a 1), a cumu-
lative pocket-part supplement to the most recent hard-
bound decennial revised edition of the Constitution Annotated,
which shall contain cumulative annotations of all such deci-
sions rendered by the Supreme Court which were not in-
cluded in that hardbound decennial revised edition of the
Constitution Annotated.
Sec. 2. All hardbound revised editions and all cumulative pocket-
part supplements shall be printed as Senate documents.
Sec. 3. There shall be printed four thousand eight hundred and
seventy additional copies of the hardbound revised editions
prepared pursuant to clause (1) of the first section and of
all cumulative pocket-part supplements thereto, of which two
thousands six hundred and thirty-four copies shall be for
the use of the House of Representatives, one thousand two
hundred and thirty-six copies shall be for the use of the Sen-
ate, and one thousand copies shall be for the use of the Joint
Committee on Printing. All Members of the Congress, Vice
Presidents of the United States, and Delegates and Resi-
dent Commissioners, newly elected subsequent to the issu-
ance of the hardbound revised edition prepared pursuant to
such clause and prior to the first hardbound decennial re-
vised edition, who did not receive a copy of the edition pre-
pared pursuant to such clause, shall, upon timely request,
receive one copy of such edition and the then current cumu-
lative pocket-part supplement and any further supplements
thereto. All Members of the Congress, Vice Presidents of the
United States, and Delegates and Resident Commissioners,
AUTHORIZATION VII
no longer serving after the issuance of the hardbound re-

vised edition prepared pursuant to such clause and who re-
ceived such edition, may receive one copy of each cumula-
tive pocket-part supplement thereto upon timely request.
Sec. 4. Additional copies of each hardbound decennial revised
edition and of the cumulative pocket-part supplements thereto
shall be printed and distributed in accordance with the pro-
visions of any concurrent resolution hereafter adopted with
respect thereto.
Sec. 5. There are authorized to be appropriated such sums, to
remain available until expended, as may be necessary to carry
out the provisions of this joint resolution.
Approved December 24, 1970.
INTRODUCTION TO THE 2012 CENTENNIAL
EDITION
The need for a comprehensive treatise on the Constitution was apparent to Congress from
early in the 20th century. In 1911, the Senate Manual (a compilation of the Senate’s parliamen-
tary procedures) included the United States Constitution and amendments with citations to U.S.
Supreme Court constitutional decisions. A century later, the field of constitutional law has ex-
panded exponentially. As a result, this present iteration of that early publication exceeds 2300
hundred pages, and references almost 6000 cases. Consistent with its publication in the 21st
Century, this volume is available at the website of the Government Printing Office
(www.gpo.gov/constitutionannotated) and will be updated regularly as Supreme Court cases are
decided.
Sixty years ago, Professor Edward S. Corwin wrote an introduction to this treatise that
broadly explored then existent trends of constitutional adjudication. In some respects—the law
of federalism, the withdrawal of judicial supervision of economic regulation, the continued ex-
pansion of presidential power and the consequent overshadowing of Congress—he has been con-
firmed in his evaluations. But, in other respects, entire new vistas of fundamental law of which
he was largely unaware have opened up. Brown v. Board of Education was but two Terms of
the Court away, and the revolution in race relations brought about by all three branches of the
Federal Government could have been only dimly perceived. The apportionment-districting deci-
sions were still blanketed in time; abortion as a constitutionally protected liberty was unher-
alded. The Supreme Court’s application of many provisions of the Bill of Rights to the States
was then nascent, and few could anticipate that the expanded meaning and application of these
Amendments would prove revolutionary. Sixty years has also exposed the ebb and flow of consti-
tutional law, from the liberal activism of the 1960s and 1970s to a more recent posture of judi-
cial restraint or even conservative activism. Throughout this period of change, however, certain
movements, notably expansion of the protection of speech and press, continued apace despite
ideological shifts.
This brief survey is primarily a suggestive review of the Court’s treatment of the doctrines
of constitutional law over the last sixty years, with a closer focus on issues that have arisen
since the last volume of this treatise was published ten years ago. For instance, in previous
editions we noted the rise of federalism concerns, but only in the last two decade has the strength
of the Court’s deference toward states become apparent. Conversely, in this treatise as well as
in previous ones, we note the rise of the equal protection clause as a central concept of constitu-
tional jurisprudence in the period 1952–1982. Although that rise has somewhat abated in re-
cent years, the clause remains one of the predominant sources of constitutional constraints upon
the Federal Government and the States. Similarly, the due process clauses of the Fifth and
Fourteenth Amendments, recently slowed in their expansion, remain significant both in terms
of procedural protections for civil and criminal litigants and in terms of the application of sub-
stantive due process to personal liberties.
SECTION I
Issues relating to national federalism as a doctrine have proved to be far more pervasive
and encompassing than it was possible to anticipate in 1952. In some respects, of course, later
cases only confirmed those decisions already on the books. The foremost example of this confir-
mation has been the enlargement of congressional power under the commerce clause. The expan-
sive reading of that clause’s authorization to Congress to reach many local incidents of business
and production was already apparent by 1952. Despite the abundance of new legislation under
this power during the 1960s to 1980s, the doctrine itself was scarcely enlarged beyond the lim-
its of that earlier period. Under the commerce clause, Congress can assert legislative jurisdic-
tion on the basis of movement over a state boundary, whether antecedent or subsequent to the
point of regulation; can regulate other elements touching upon those transactions, such as in-
IX
X INTRODUCTION
struments of transportation; or can legislate solely upon the premise that certain transactions
by their nature alone or as part of a class sufficiently affect interstate commerce as to warrant
national regulation. Civil rights laws touching public accommodations and housing, environmen-
tal laws affecting land use regulation, criminal laws, and employment regulations touching health
and safety are only the leading examples of enhanced federal activity under this authority.
Over the last two decades, however, the Court has established limits on the seemingly irre-
vocable expansion of the commerce power. While the Court has declined to overrule even its
most expansive rulings regarding “affects” on commerce, it has limited the exercise of this au-
thority to the regulation of activities which were both economic in nature and which had a non-
trivial or “substantial” affect on commerce (although regulation of non-economic activity would
still be allowed if they were an essential part of a larger economic regulatory scheme). The
Court also seems far less likely to defer to Congressional findings of the existence of an eco-
nomic effect. The relevant cases arose in an area of traditional state concern—the regulation of
criminal activity—and the new doctrine resulted in the invalidation of recently-passed federal
laws, including a ban on gun possession in schools and the provision of civil remedies to com-
pensate gender-motivated violence. The Court has most recently found chronological limits to
commercial regulation, holding that the prospect of a future activity—seeking health care—
could not justify requiring the present purchase of health insurance by individuals.
The exercise of authority over commerce by the states, on the other hand, has over the last
sixty years been greatly restricted by federal statutes and a broad doctrine of federal preemp-
tion, increasingly resulting in the setting of national standards. Only under Chief Justice Burger
and Chief Justice Rehnquist was the Court not so readily prepared to favor preemption, espe-
cially in the area of labor-management relations. The Court did briefly inhibit federal regula-
tion with respect to the States’ own employees under the Tenth Amendment, but this decision
failed to secure a stable place in the doctrine of federalism, being overruled in less than a de-
cade. Also noteworthy has been a rather strict application of the negative aspect of the com-
merce clause to restrain state actions that either discriminate against or overly inhibit inter-
state commerce.
Much of the same trend towards national standards has resulted from application of the
Bill of Rights to the States through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a
matter dealt with in greater detail below. The Court has again and again held that when a
provision of the Bill of Rights is applied, it means the same whether a State or the Federal
Government is the challenged party (although a small but consistent minority has argued oth-
erwise). Some flexibility, however, has been afforded the States by the judicial loosening of the
standards of some of these provisions, as in the characteristics of the jury trial requirement.
Adoption of the exclusionary rule in Fourth Amendment and other cases also looked to a na-
tional standard, but the more recent disparagement of the rule by majorities of the Court has
relaxed its application to both States and Nation.
While the Tenth Amendment would appear to represent one of the most clear statements of
a federalist principle in the Constitution, it has historically had a relatively insignificant inde-
pendent role in limiting federal powers. Although the Court briefly interpreted the Tenth Amend-
ment in the 1970s substantively to protect certain “core” state functions from generally appli-
cable laws, this distinction soon proved unworkable, and was overruled a decade late. More recently,
the Court reserved the question as to whether a law regulating only state activities would be
constitutionally suspect, although a workable test for this distinction has not yet been articu-
lated. However, limits on the process by which the Federal Government regulates the states,
developed over the most recent decade, have proved more resilient. This becomes important when
the Congress is unsatisfied with the most common methods of influencing state regulations—
grant conditions or conditional imposition of federal regulations (states being given the opportu-
nity to avoid such regulation by effectuating their own regulatory schemes). Only in those cases
where the Congress attempts to directly “commandeer” state legislatures or executive branch
officials, i.e. ordering states to legislate or execute federal laws, has the Tenth Amendment served
as an effective bar.
INTRODUCTION XI
The concept of state sovereign immunity from citizen suits has also been infused with new
potency over the last decade, while exposing deep theoretical differences among the Justices. To
a minority of the Justices, state sovereign immunity is limited to the textual restriction articu-
lated in the Eleventh Amendment, which prevents citizens of one state from bringing a federal
suit against another state. To a majority of the Justices, however, the Eleventh Amendment
was merely a technical correction made by Congress after an erroneous approval by the Court
of a citizen-state diversity suit in Chisholm v. Georgia. These justices prefer the reasoning of
the post-Eleventh Amendment case of Hans v. Louisiana, which, using non-textual precepts of
federalism, dismissed a constitutionally based suit against a state by its own citizens. The true
significance of this latter case was not realized until 1992 in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,
where the Court made clear that suits by citizens against states brought under federal statutes
also could not stand, at least if the statutes were based on Congress’s Article I powers. The
“fundamental postulate” of deference to the “dignity” of state sovereignty was also the basis for
the Court’s recent decisions to prohibit federal claims by citizens against states in either a state’s
own courts or federal agencies.
The Court has ruled, however, that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity under
the Bankruptcy Clause and section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Nevertheless, the Court
has also shown a significant lack of deference to Congress regarding its Civil War era power,
requiring a showing of “congruence and proportionality” between the alleged harm to constitu-
tional rights and the legislative remedy. Thus, states have been found to remain immune from
federal damage suits for such issues as disability discrimination or patent infringement, while
the Congress has been found to be without any power to protect religious institutions from the
application of generally applicable state laws. Further, where Congress attempted to create a
federal private right of action for victims of gender-related violence, alleging discriminatory treat-
ment of these cases by the state, the Court also found that Congress exceeded its mandate, as
the enforcement power of the 14th Amendment can only be applied against state discrimina-
tion. In all these case, the Court found that Congress had not sufficiently identified patterns of
unconstitutional conduct by the States.
The Spending Clause, long seen as one of the last bedrocks of congressional authority, has
also come under the Court’s increasing scrutiny. While the Court had opined on the limits of
the authority of Congress to impose “voluntary” grant conditions on states, it was not until Con-
gress required states to adopt a broad expansion of Medicaid or leave that program that the
Court found such legislation to be overly “coercive.” The impact of the decision, however, was
diminished not only by the Court severing only the enforcement mechanism (making the states’
decision to participate voluntary), but by indications (both in reasoning and dicta) that the stan-
dard set by the splintered Court would be easily met by most Spending Clause regulation.
The overriding view of the present Court is that where it has discretion, even absent consti-
tutional mandate, it will apply federalism concerns to limit federal powers. For instance, the
equity powers of the federal courts to interfere in ongoing state court proceedings and to review
state court criminal convictions under habeas corpus have been curtailed, invoking a doctrine of
comity and prudential restraint. But the critical fact, the scope of congressional power to regu-
late private activity, remains: the limits on congressional power under the commerce clause and
other Article I powers, as well as under the power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments,
remain principally those of congressional self-restraint.
SECTION II
For much of the latter half of the 20th century, aggregation of national power in the presi-
dency continued unabated. The trend was not much resisted by congressional majorities, which,
indeed, continued to delegate power to the Executive Branch and to the independent agencies
at least to the same degree or greater than before. The President himself assumed the exis-
tence of a substantial reservoir of inherent power to effectuate his policies, most notably in the
field of foreign affairs and national defense. Only in the wake of the Watergate affair did Con-
gress move to assert itself and attempt to claim some form of partnership with the President.
XII INTRODUCTION
This is most notable with respect to war powers and the declaration of national emergencies,
but is also true for domestic presidential concerns, as in the controversy over the power of the
President to impound appropriated funds.
Perhaps coincidentally, the Supreme Court during the same period effected a strong judi-
cial interest in the adjudication of separation-of-powers controversies. Previously, despite its use
of separation-of-power language, the Court did little to involve itself in actual controversies,
save perhaps the Myers and Humphrey litigations over the President’s power to remove execu-
tive branch officials. But that restraint evaporated in 1976. Since then there have been several
Court decisions in this area, although in Buckley v. Valeo and subsequent cases the Court ap-
peared to cast the judicial perspective favorably upon presidential prerogative. In other cases
statutory construction was utilized to preserve the President’s discretion. Only very recently
has the Court evolved an arguably consistent standard in this area, a two-pronged standard of
aggrandizement and impairment, but the results still are cast in terms of executive preemi-
nence.
The larger conflict has been political, and the Court resisted many efforts to involve it in
litigation over the use of troops in Vietnam. In the context of treaty termination, the Court
came close to declaring the resurgence of the political question doctrine to all such executive-
congressional disputes. While a significant congressional interest in achieving a new and differ-
ent balance between the political branches appeared to have survived cessation of the Vietnam
conflict, such efforts largely diminished after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. While
Congressional assertion of such interest may well involve the judiciary to a greater extent in
the future, the congressional branch is not without effective weapons of its own in this regard.
SECTION III
The Court’s practice of overturning economic legislation under principles of substantive due
process in order to protect “property” was already in sharp decline when Professor Corwin wrote
his introduction in the 1950s. In a few isolated cases, however, especially regarding the obliga-
tion of contracts clause and perhaps the expansion of the regulatory takings doctrine, the Court
demonstrated that some life is left in the old doctrines. On the other hand, the word “liberty” in
the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment has been seized upon by the
Court to harness substantive due process to the protection of certain personal and familial pri-
vacy rights, most controversially in the abortion cases.
Although the decision in Roe v. Wade seemed to foreshadow broad constitutional protec-
tions for personal activities, this did not occur immediately, as much due to conceptual difficul-
ties as to ideological resistance. Early iterations of a right to “privacy” or “to be let alone” seemed
to involve both the notion that certain information should be “private” and the idea that certain
personal “activities” should only be lightly regulated. Then, for a time, the privacy cases ap-
peared to be limited to certain areas of personal concern: marriage, procreation, contraception,
family relationships, medical decision making and child rearing. Most recently, however, the
Court has brought the outer limits of the doctrine into question again by overturning a sodomy
law directed at homosexuals without attempting to show that such behavior was in fact histori-
cally condoned. This raises the question as to what limiting principles remain available in evalu-
ating future arguments based on personal autonomy.
Whereas much of the Bill of Rights is directed toward prescribing the process of how gov-
ernments may permissibly deprive one of life, liberty, or property—for example by judgment of
a jury of one’s peers or with evidence seized through reasonable searches—the First Amend-
ment is by its terms both substantive and absolute. While the application of the First Amend-
ment has never been presumed to be so absolute, the effect has often been indistinguishable.
Thus, the trend over the years has been to withdraw more and more speech and “speech-plus”
from the regulatory and prohibitive hand of government and to free not only speech directed to
political ends but speech that is totally unrelated to any political purpose.
The constitutionalization of the law of defamation, narrowing the possibility of recovery for
damage caused by libelous and slanderous criticism of public officials, political candidates, and
public figures, epitomizes this trend. In addition, the government’s right to proscribe the advo-
INTRODUCTION XIII
cacy of violence or unlawful activity has become more restricted. Obscenity abstractly remains
outside the protective confines of the First Amendment, but the Court’s changing definitional
approach to what may be constitutionally denominated obscenity has closely confined most gov-
ernmental action taken against the verbal and pictorial representation of matters dealing with
sex. Commercial speech, long the outcast of the First Amendment, now enjoys a protected if
subordinate place in free speech jurisprudence. Freedom to picket, to broadcast leaflets, and to
engage in physical activity representative of one’s political, social, economic, or other views, en-
joys wide though not unlimited protection. False statements, long derided as being of little First
Amendment value, were brought within the ambit of free speech, although the standard of pro-
tection afforded to such a law—here, lying about one’s military record—remains unsettled.
While First Amendment doctrine remains sensitive to the make-up of the Court, the trend
for many years has been a substantial though uneven expansion. In particular, the association
of the right to spend for political purposes with the right to associate together for political activ-
ity has meant that much governmental regulation of campaign finance and of limitations upon
the political activities of citizens and public employees had become suspect if not impermissible.
For example, during the last decade, confronted with renewed attempts by Congress to level
the playing field between differing voices with disparate economic resources, the Court first ac-
cepted, and then rejected these new regulations. In the process, corporations, long barred from
direct political advocacy, were given even greater access to the political arena.
SECTION IV
Unremarked by scholars of some sixty years ago was the place of the equal protection clause
in constitutional jurisprudence—simply because at that time Holmes’ pithy characterization of
it as a “last resort” argument was generally true. Subsequently, however, especially during the
Warren era, equal protection litigation occupied a position of almost predominant character in
each Term’s output. The rational basis standard of review of different treatments of individuals,
businesses, or subjects remained of little concern to the Justices. Rather, the clause blossomed
after Brown v. Board of Education, as the Court confronted state and local laws and ordinances
drawn on the basis of race. This aspect of the doctrinal use of the clause is still very evident on
the Court’s docket, though in ever new and interesting forms.
Of worthy attention has been the application of equal protection, now in a three-tier or
multi-tier set of standards of review, to legislation and other governmental action classifying on
the basis of sex, illegitimacy, and alienage. Of equal importance was the elaboration of the con-
cept of “fundamental” rights, so that when the government restricts one of these rights, it must
show not merely a reasonable basis for its actions but a justification based upon compelling
necessity. Wealth distinctions in the criminal process, for instance, were viewed with hostility
and generally invalidated. The right to vote, nowhere expressly guaranteed in the Constitution
(but protected against abridgment on certain grounds in the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-
sixth Amendments) nonetheless was found to require the invalidation of all but the most simple
voter qualifications; most barriers to ballot access by individuals and parties; and the practice
of apportionment of state legislatures on any basis other than population. In the controversial
decision of Bush v. Gore, the Court relied on the right to vote in effectively ending the disputed
2000 presidential election, noting that the Florida Supreme Court had allowed the use of non-
unified standards to evaluate challenged ballots. Although the Court’s decision was of real politi-
cal import, it was so limited by its own terms that it carries no doctrinal significance.
In other respects, the reconstituted Court has made some tentative rearrangements of equal
protection doctrinal developments. The suspicion-of-wealth classification was largely though not
entirely limited to the criminal process. Governmental discretion in the political process was
enlarged a small degree. But the record generally is one of consolidation and maintenance of
the doctrines, a refusal to go forward much but also a disinclination to retreat much. Only re-
cently has the Court, in decisional law largely cast in remedial terms, begun to dismantle some
of the structure of equal protection constraints on institutions, such as schools, prisons, state
hospitals, and the like. Now, we see the beginnings of a sea change in the Court’s perspective
XIV INTRODUCTION
on legislative and executive remedial action, affecting affirmative action and race conscious steps
in the electoral process, with the equal protection clause being used to cabin political discretion.
SECTION V
Criminal law and criminal procedure during the 1960s and 1970s has been doctrinally un-
stable. The story of the 1960s was largely one of the imposition of constitutional constraint upon
federal and state criminal justice systems. Application of the Bill of Rights to the States was
but one aspect of this story, as the Court also constructed new teeth for these guarantees. For
example, the privilege against self-incrimination was given new and effective meaning by requir-
ing that it be observed at the police interrogation stage and furthermore that criminal suspects
be informed of their rights under it. The right was also expanded, as was the Sixth Amendment
guarantee of counsel, by requiring the furnishing of counsel or at least the opportunity to con-
sult counsel at “critical” stages of the criminal process—interrogation, preliminary hearing, and
the like—rather than only at and proximate to trial. An expanded exclusionary rule was ap-
plied to keep material obtained in violation of the suspect’s search and seizure, self-
incrimination, and other rights out of evidence.
In sentencing, substantive as well as procedural guarantees have come in and out of favor.
The law of capital punishment, for instance, has followed a course of meandering development,
with the Court almost doing away with it and then approving its revival by the States. More
recently, awakened legislative interest in the sentencing process, such as providing enhanced
sentences for “hate crimes,” has faltered on holdings that increasing the maximum sentence for
a crime can only be based on facts submitted to a jury, not a judge, and that such facts must be
proved beyond a reasonable doubt.
During the last two decades, however, the Court has also redrawn some of these lines. The
self-incrimination and right-to-counsel doctrines have been eroded in part (although in no re-
spect has the Court returned to the constitutional jurisprudence prevailing before the 1960s).
The exclusionary rule has been cabined and redefined in several limiting ways. Search and sei-
zure doctrine has been revised to enlarge police powers, and the exception for “special needs”
has allowed such practices as suspicionless, random drug-testing in the workplace and at schools.
But, a reformation of the requirements for confronting witnesses at trial has, in some cases,
increased the complexity and effectiveness of prosecutions. Further, a realist view of modern
criminal process led to a willingness to consider the adequacy of defense counsel beyond repre-
sentation at trial.
An expansion of the use of habeas corpus powers of the federal courts undergirded the 1960s
procedural and substantive development, thus sweeping away many jurisdictional restrictions
previously imposed upon the exercise of review of state criminal convictions. Concomitantly with
the narrowing of the precedents of the 1950s and 1960s Court, however, came a retraction of
federal habeas powers, both by the Court and through federal legislation.
SECTION VI
The past decade saw the Court’s most extensive examination of gun rights under the Sec-
ond Amendment, with five Justices holding that, at a minimum, the amendment constitution-
ally enshrines an individual’s right to possess an operational handgun in one’s home for self
protection. This finding mostly was regarded as unremarkable: it largely comported with the
expectations and realities of gun ownership in the U.S. and was not expected to lead to whole-
sale loosening of government regulation, or even to weigh heavily in political debate. Most ini-
tial scholarly interest focused more on the Court’s interpretational methodology.
“Originalism”—the notion that the meaning of constitutional text is fixed at the time it is
proposed and ratified—found favor as an interpretational method in the nineteenth century, fell
out of favor beginning in the Progressive era, but regained some currency in the 1980s. The
paucity of judicial precedent on constitutionally protected gun rights made “originalism” appear
a particularly apt approach as the Court considered the Second Amendment during its 2007–
2008 term. The result was a thorough airing of the merits and variations in originalist analy-
sis. Is the “plain meaning” of the words of the original text as it would have been understood at
INTRODUCTION XV
the time it was drafted paramount, or should the intent and expectations of the drafters pre-
vail? This distinction can lead to different opinions on whether the Second Amendment protects
individual or collective rights. Is “originalism” more “objective” and “faithful” than “living Con-
stitution” analysis? Some commentators asserted that “originalism” is both unduly rigid in lim-
iting analysis to contemporaneous sources and malleable in presenting the interpreter with a
range of often contradictory historical materials. In any event, a constitutional case in the twenty-
first century without a line of probative judicial precedent to guide decision-making is rare, and
contemporary constitutional analysis is more typically informed by a combination of earlier Court
decisions, traditional practices, a desire to sustain foundational principles in an evolving soci-
ety, and pragmatic considerations.
SECTION VII
The last six decades were among the most significant in the Court’s history. They saw some
of the most sustained efforts to change the Court or its decisions or both with respect to a sub-
stantial number of issues. On only a few past occasions was the Court so centrally a subject of
political debate and controversy in national life or an object of contention in presidential elec-
tions. One can doubt that the public any longer perceives the Court as an institution above
political dispute, any longer believes that the answers to difficult issues in litigation before the
Justices may be found solely in the text of the document entrusted to their keeping. While the
Court has historically enjoyed the respect of the bar and the public, a sense has arisen that the
institution is not immune from the partisan politics affecting other branches. Its decisions, how-
ever, are generally accorded uncoerced acquiescence, and its pronouncements are accepted as
authoritative, binding constructions of the constitutional instrument.
Indeed, it can be argued that the disappearance of the myth of the absence of judicial choice
strengthens the Court as an institution to the degree that it explains and justifies the exercise
of discretion in those areas of controversy in which the Constitution does not speak clearly or
in which different sections lead to different answers. The public attitude thus established is
then better enabled to understand division within the Court and within the legal profession
generally, and all sides are therefore seen to be entitled to the respect accorded the search for
answers. Although the Court’s workload has declined of late, a significant proportion of its cases
are still “hard” cases; while hard cases need not make bad law they do in fact lead to division
among the Justices and public controversy. Increased sophistication, then, about the Court’s role
and its methods can only redound to its benefit.
HISTORICAL NOTE ON FORMATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION
In June 1774, the Virginia and Massachusetts assemblies independently
proposed an intercolonial meeting of delegates from the several colonies to
restore union and harmony between Great Britain and her American Colo-
nies. Pursuant to these calls there met in Philadelphia in September of that
year the first Continental Congress, composed of delegates from 12 colonies.
On October 14, 1774, the assembly adopted what has become to be known
as the Declaration and Resolves of the First Continental Congress. In that
instrument, addressed to his Majesty and to the people of Great Britain, there
was embodied a statement of rights and principles, many of which were later
to be incorporated in the Declaration of Independence and the Federal Con-
stitution.1
This Congress adjourned in October with a recommendation that an-
other Congress be held in Philadelphia the following May. Before its succes-
sor met, the battle of Lexington had been fought. In Massachusetts the colo-
nists had organized their own government in defiance of the royal governor
and the Crown. Hence, by general necessity and by common consent, the sec-
ond Continental Congress assumed control of the “Twelve United Colonies,”
soon to become the “Thirteen United Colonies” by the cooperation of Geor-
gia. It became a de facto government; it called upon the other colonies to
assist in the defense of Massachusetts; it issued bills of credit; it took steps
to organize a military force, and appointed George Washington commander
in chief of the Army.
While the declaration of the causes and necessities of taking up arms of
July 6, 1775,2 expressed a “wish” to see the union between Great Britain
and the colonies “restored,” sentiment for independence was growing. Fi-
nally, on May 15, 1776, Virginia instructed her delegates to the Continental
Congress to have that body “declare the united colonies free and indepen-
1 The colonists, for example, claimed the right “to life, liberty, and property,” “the rights,
liberties, and immunities of free and natural-born subjects within the realm of England”; the
right to participate in legislative councils; “the great and inestimable privilege of being tried by
their peers of the vicinage, according to the course of [the common law of England]”; “the immu-
nities and privileges granted and confirmed to them by royal charters, or secured by their sev-
eral codes of provincial laws”; “a right peaceably to assemble, consider of their grievances, and
petition the king.” They further declared that the keeping of a standing army in the colonies in
time of peace without the consent of the colony in which the army was kept was “against law”;
that it was “indispensably necessary to good government, and rendered essential by the Eng-
lish constitution, that the constituent branches of the legislature be independent of each other”;
that certain acts of Parliament in contravention of the foregoing principles were “infringement
and violations of the rights of the colonists.” Text in C. Tansill (ed.), Documents Illustrative of
the Formation of the Union of the American States, H. Doc. No. 358, 69th Congress, 1st sess.
(1927), 1. See also H. Commager (ed.), Documents of American History (New York; 8th ed. 1964),
82.
2 Text in Tansill, op. cit., 10.
XVII
XVIII HISTORICAL NOTE
dent States.” 3 Accordingly on June 7 a resolution was introduced in Con-

gress declaring the union with Great Britain dissolved, proposing the forma-
tion of foreign alliances, and suggesting the drafting of a plan of confederation
to be submitted to the respective colonies.4 Some delegates argued for confed-
eration first and declaration afterwards. This counsel did not prevail. Inde-
pendence was declared on July 4, 1776; the preparation of a plan of confed-
eration was postponed. It was not until November 17, 1777, that the Congress
was able to agree on a form of government which stood some chance of be-
ing approved by the separate States. The Articles of Confederation were then
submitted to the several States, and on July 9, 1778, were finally approved
by a sufficient number to become operative.
Weaknesses inherent in the Articles of Confederation became apparent
before the Revolution out of which that instrument was born had been con-
cluded. Even before the thirteenth State (Maryland) conditionally joined the
“firm league of friendship” on March 1, 1781, the need for a revenue amend-
ment was widely conceded. Congress under the Articles lacked authority to
levy taxes. She could only request the States to contribute their fair share to
the common treasury, but the requested amounts were not forthcoming. To
remedy this defect, Congress applied to the States for power to lay duties
and secure the public debts. Twelve States agreed to such an amendment,
but Rhode Island refused her consent, thereby defeating the proposal.
Thus was emphasized a second weakness in the Articles of Confedera-
tion, namely, the liberum veto which each State possessed whenever amend-
ments to that instrument were proposed. Not only did all amendments have
to be ratified by each of the 13 States, but all important legislation needed
the approval of 9 States. With several delegations often absent, one or two
States were able to defeat legislative proposals of major importance.
Other imperfections in the Articles of Confederation also proved embar-
rassing. Congress could, for example, negotiate treaties with foreign powers,
but all treaties had to be ratified by the several States. Even when a treaty
was approved, Congress lacked authority to secure obedience to its stipula-
tions. Congress could not act directly upon the States or upon individuals.
Under such circumstances foreign nations doubted the value of a treaty with
the new Republic.
Furthermore, Congress had no authority to regulate foreign or inter-
state commerce. Legislation in this field, subject to unimportant exceptions,
was left to the individual States. Disputes between States with common in-
terests in the navigation of certain rivers and bays were inevitable. Discrimi-
natory regulations were followed by reprisals.
Virginia, recognizing the need for an agreement with Maryland respect-
ing the navigation and jurisdiction of the Potomac River, appointed in June
1784, four commissioners to “frame such liberal and equitable regulations
3 Id. at 19.
4 Id. at 21.
HISTORICAL NOTE XIX
concerning the said river as may be mutually advantageous to the two States.”
Maryland in January 1785 responded to the Virginia resolution by appoint-
ing a like number of commissioners 5 “for the purpose of settling the naviga-
tion and jurisdiction over that part of the bay of Chesapeake which lies within
the limits of Virginia, and over the rivers Potomac and Pocomoke” with full
power on behalf of Maryland “to adjudge and settle the jurisdiction to be
exercised by the said State, respectively, over the waters and navigations of
the same.”
At the invitation of Washington the commissioners met at Mount Ver-
non, in March 1785, and drafted a compact which, in many of its details
relative to the navigation and jurisdiction of the Potomac, is still in force.6
What is more important, the commissioners submitted to their respective States
a report in favor of a convention of all the States “to take into consideration
the trade and commerce” of the Confederation. Virginia, in January 1786,
advocated such a convention, authorizing its commissioners to meet with those
of other States, at a time and place to be agreed on, “to take into consider-
ation the trade of the United States; to examine the relative situations and
trade of the said State; to consider how far a uniform system in their com-
mercial regulations may be necessary to their common interest and their per-
manent harmony; and to report to the several State, such an act relative to
this great object, as when unanimously ratified by them, will enable the United
States in Congress, effectually to provide for the same.” 7
This proposal for a general trade convention seemingly met with gen-
eral approval; nine States appointed commissioners. Under the leadership of
the Virginia delegation, which included Randolph and Madison, Annapolis
was accepted as the place and the first Monday in September 1786 as the
time for the convention. The attendance at Annapolis proved disappointing.
Only five States—Virginia, Pennsylvania, Delaware, New Jersey, and New
York—were represented; delegates from Massachusetts, New Hampshire, North
Carolina, and Rhode Island failed to attend. Because of the small represen-
tation, the Annapolis convention did not deem “it advisable to proceed on
the business of their mission.” After an exchange of views, the Annapolis del-
egates unanimously submitted to their respective States a report in which
they suggested that a convention of representatives from all the States meet
at Philadelphia on the second Monday in May 1787 to examine the defects
in the existing system of government and formulate “a plan for supplying
such defects as may be discovered.” 8
5 George Mason, Edmund Randolph, James Madison, and Alexander Henderson were ap-
pointed commissioners for Virginia; Thomas Johnson, Thomas Stone, Samuel Chase, and Dan-
iel of St. Thomas Jenifer for Maryland.
6 Text of the resolution and details of the compact may be found in Wheaton v. Wise, 153
U.S. 155 (1894).

7 Transill, op. cit., 38.
8 Id. at 39.
XX HISTORICAL NOTE
The Virginia legislature acted promptly upon this recommendation and

appointed a delegation to go to Philadelphia. Within a few weeks New Jer-
sey, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Delaware, and Georgia also made appoint-
ments. New York and several other States hesitated on the ground that, with-
out the consent of the Continental Congress, the work of the convention would
be extra-legal; that Congress alone could propose amendments to the Ar-
ticles of Confederation. Washington was quite unwilling to attend an irregu-
lar convention. Congressional approval of the proposed convention became,
therefore, highly important. After some hesitancy Congress approved the sug-
gestion for a convention at Philadelphia “for the sole and express purpose of
revising the Articles of Confederation and reporting to Congress and the sev-
eral legislatures such alterations and provisions therein as shall when agreed
to in Congress and confirmed by the States render the Federal Constitution
adequate to the exigencies of Government and the preservation of the Union.”
Thereupon, the remaining States, Rhode Island alone excepted, ap-
pointed in due course delegates to the Convention, and Washington accepted
membership on the Virginia delegation.
Although scheduled to convene on May 14, 1787, it was not until May
25 that enough delegates were present to proceed with the organization of
the Convention. Washington was elected as presiding officer. It was agreed
that the sessions were to be strictly secret.
On May 29 Randolph, on behalf of the Virginia delegation, submitted to
the convention 15 propositions as a plan of government. Despite the fact that
the delegates were limited by their instructions to a revision of the Articles,
Virginia had really recommended a new instrument of government. For ex-
ample, provision was made in the Virginia plan for the separation of the three
branches of government; under the Articles executive, legislative, and judi-
cial powers were vested in the Congress. Furthermore the legislature was to
consist of two houses rather than one.
On May 30 the Convention went into a committee of the whole to con-
sider the 15 propositions of the Virginia plan seriatim. These discussion con-
tinued until June 13, when the Virginia resolutions in amended form were
reported out of committee. They provided for proportional representation in
both houses. The small States were dissatisfied. Therefore, on June 14 when
the Convention was ready to consider the report on the Virginia plan, Paterson
of New Jersey requested an adjournment to allow certain delegations more
time to prepare a substitute plan. The request was granted, and on the next
day Paterson submitted nine resolutions embodying important changes in the
Articles of Confederation, but strictly amendatory in nature. Vigorous de-
bate followed. On June 19 the States rejected the New Jersey plan and voted
to proceed with a discussion of the Virginia plan. The small States became
more and more discontented; there were threats of withdrawal. On July 2,
HISTORICAL NOTE XXI
the Convention was deadlocked over giving each State an equal vote in the
upper house—five States in the affirmative, five in the negative, one di-
vided.9
The problem was referred to a committee of 11, there being 1 delegate
from each State, to effect a compromise. On July 5 the committee submitted
its report, which became the basis for the “great compromise” of the Conven-
tion. It was recommended that in the upper house each State should have
an equal vote, that in the lower branch each State should have one represen-
tative for every 40,000 inhabitants, counting three-fifths of the slaves, that
money bills should originate in the lower house (not subject to amendment
by the upper chamber). When on July 12 the motion of Gouverneur Morris
of Pennsylvania that direct taxation should also be in proportion to represen-
tation was adopted, a crisis had been successfully surmounted. A compro-
mise spirit began to prevail. The small States were not willing to support a
strong national government.
Debates on the Virginia resolutions continued. The 15 original resolu-
tions had been expanded into 23. Since these resolutions were largely decla-
rations of principles, on July 24 a committee of five 10 was elected to draft a
detailed constitution embodying the fundamental principles which had thus
far been approved. The Convention adjourned from July 26 to August 6 to
await the report of its committee of detail. This committee, in preparing its
draft of a Constitution, turned for assistance to the State constitutions, to
the Articles of Confederation, to the various plans which had been submit-
ted to the Convention and other available material. On the whole the report
of the committee conformed to the resolutions adopted by the Convention,
though on many clauses the members of the committee left the imprint of
their individual and collective judgments. In a few instances the committee
avowedly exercised considerable discretion.
From August 6 to September 10 the report of the committee of detail
was discussed, section by section, clause by clause. Details were attended to,
further compromises were effected. Toward the close of these discussions, on
September 8, another committee of five 11 was appointed “to revise the style
of and arrange the articles which had been agreed to by the house.”
On Wednesday, September 12, the report of the committee of style was
ordered printed for the convenience of the delegates. The Convention for 3
days compared this report with the proceedings of the Convention. The Con-
stitution was ordered engrossed on Saturday, September 15.
The Convention met on Monday, September 17, for its final session. Sev-
eral of the delegates were disappointed in the result. A few deemed the new
9 The New Hampshire delegation did not arrive until July 23, 1787.
10 Rutledge of South Carolina, Randolph of Virginia, Gorham of Massachusetts, Ellsworth
of Connecticut, and Wilson of Pennsylvania.
11 William Samuel Johnson of Connecticut, Alexander Hamilton of New York, Gouverneur
Morris of Pennsylvania, James Madison of Virginia, and Rufus King of Massachusetts.

XXII HISTORICAL NOTE
Constitution a mere makeshift, a series of unfortunate compromises. The ad-

vocates of the Constitution, realizing the impending difficulty of obtaining
the consent of the States to the new instrument of Government, were anx-
ious to obtain the unanimous support of the delegations from each State. It
was feared that many of the delegates would refuse to give their individual
assent to the Constitution. Therefore, in order that the action of the Conven-
tion would appear to be unanimous, Gouverneur Morris devised the formula
“Done in Convention, by the unanimous consent of the States present the
17th of September . . . In witness whereof we have hereunto subscribed our
names.” Thirty-nine of the forty-two delegates present thereupon “sub-
scribed” to the document.12
The convention had been called to revise the Articles of Confederation.
Instead, it reported to the Continental Congress a new Constitution. Further-
more, while the Articles specified that no amendments should be effective
until approved by the legislatures of all the States, the Philadelphia Conven-
tion suggested that the new Constitution should supplant the Articles of Con-
federation when ratified by conventions in nine States. For these reasons, it
was feared that the new Constitution might arouse opposition in Congress.
Three members of the Convention—Madison, Gorham, and King—were
also Members of Congress. They proceeded at once to New York, where Con-
gress was in session, to placate the expected opposition. Aware of their van-
ishing authority, Congress on September 28, after some debate, decided to
submit the Constitution to the States for action. It made no recommenda-
tion for or against adoption.
Two parties soon developed, one in opposition and one in support of the
Constitution, and the Constitution was debated, criticized, and expounded
clause by clause. Hamilton, Madison, and Jay wrote a series of commentar-
ies, now known as the Federalist Papers, in support of the new instrument
of government.13 The closeness and bitterness of the struggle over ratifica-
tion and the conferring of additional powers on the central government can
scarcely be exaggerated. In some States ratification was effected only after a
bitter struggle in the State convention itself.
Delaware, on December 7, 1787, became the first State to ratify the new
Constitution, the vote being unanimous. Pennsylvania ratified on December
12, 1787, by a vote of 46 to 23, a vote scarcely indicative of the struggle
which had taken place in that State. New Jersey ratified on December 19,
1787, and Georgia on January 2, 1788, the vote in both States being unani-
mous. Connecticut ratified on January 9, 1788; yeas 128, nays 40. On Febru-
ary 6, 1788, Massachusetts, by a narrow margin of 19 votes in a convention
12 At least 65 persons had received appointments as delegates to the Convention; 55 actu-
ally attended at different times during the course of the proceedings; 39 signed the document.
It has been estimated that generally fewer than 30 delegates attended the daily sessions.
13 These commentaries on the Constitution, written during the struggle for ratification, have
been frequently cited by the Supreme Court as an authoritative contemporary interpretation of

the meaning of its provisions.
HISTORICAL NOTE XXIII
with a membership of 355, endorsed the new Constitution, but recom-

mended that a bill of rights be added to protect the States from federal en-
croachment on individual liberties. Maryland ratified on April 28, 1788; yeas
63, nays 11. South Carolina ratified on May 23, 1788; yeas 149, nays 73. On
June 21, 1788, by a vote of 57 to 46, New Hampshire became the ninth State
to ratify, but like Massachusetts she suggested a bill of rights.
By the terms of the Constitution nine States were sufficient for its estab-
lishment among the States so ratifying. The advocates of the new Constitu-
tion realized, however, that the new Government could not succeed without
the addition of New York and Virginia, neither of which had ratified. Madi-
son, Marshall, and Randolph led the struggle for ratification in Virginia. On
June 25, 1788, by a narrow margin of 10 votes in a convention of 168 mem-
bers, that State ratified over the objection of such delegates as George Ma-
son and Patrick Henry. In New York an attempt to attach conditions to rati-
fication almost succeeded. But on July 26, 1788, New York ratified, with a
recommendation that a bill of rights be appended. The vote was close—yeas
30, nays 27.
Eleven States having thus ratified the Constitution,14 the Continental
Congress—which still functioned at irregular intervals—passed a resolution
on September 13, 1788, to put the new Constitution into operation. The first
Wednesday of January 1789 was fixed as the day for choosing presidential
electors, the first Wednesday of February for the meeting of electors, and
the first Wednesday of March (i.e. March 4, 1789) for the opening session of
the new Congress. Owing to various delays, Congress was late in assem-
bling, and it was not until April 30, 1789, that George Washington was inau-
gurated as the first President of the United States.
14 North Carolina added her ratification on November 21, 1789; yeas 184, nays 77. Rhode
Island did not ratify until May 29, 1790; yeas 34, nays 32.
CONTENTS
(For contents in detail, see separate table of contents at beginning of each Article and
Amendment)
Page
Public Law 91–589 .................................................................................................................... v
Introduction to the 2012 Centennial Edition .......................................................................... ix
Historical note on formation of the Constitution .................................................................... xvii
Text of the Constitution (literal print) ..................................................................................... 1
Text of the amendments (literal print) .................................................................................... 23
Proposed amendments not ratified by the States ................................................................... 47
The Constitution with Analysis ................................................................................................ 53
Preamble ..................................................................................................................................... 55
Article I—Legislative Department ........................................................................................... 57
Article II—Executive Department ............................................................................................ 427
Article III—Judicial Department ............................................................................................. 633
Article IV—States’ Relations .................................................................................................... 897
Article V—Mode of Amendment ............................................................................................... 963
Article VI—Prior Debts, National Supremacy, and Oaths of Office ...................................... 983
Article VII—Ratification ........................................................................................................... 1043
Amendments to the Constitution ............................................................................................. 1045
First Amendment—Religion and Free Expression ................................................................. 1059
Second Amendment—Bearing Arms ........................................................................................ 1361
Third Amendment—Quartering Soldiers ................................................................................. 1367
Fourth Amendment—Search and Seizure ............................................................................... 1369
Fifth Amendment—Rights of Persons ..................................................................................... 1461
Sixth Amendment—Rights of Accused in Criminal Prosecutions ......................................... 1601
Seventh Amendment—Civil Trials ........................................................................................... 1675
Eighth Amendment—Further Guarantees in Criminal Cases .............................................. 1693
Ninth Amendment—Unenumerated Rights ............................................................................ 1745
Tenth Amendment—Reserved Powers ..................................................................................... 1749
Eleventh Amendment—Suits Against States .......................................................................... 1763
Twelfth Amendment—Election of President ........................................................................... 1795
Thirteenth Amendment—Slavery and Involuntary Servitude ............................................... 1797
Fourteenth Amendment—Rights Guaranteed ......................................................................... 1807
Fifteenth Amendment—Right of Citizens to Vote .................................................................. 2219
Sixteenth Amendment—Income Tax ........................................................................................ 2235
Seventeenth Amendment—Popular Election of Senators ...................................................... 2249
Eighteenth Amendment—Prohibition of Intoxicating Liquors .............................................. 2251
Nineteenth Amendment—Women’s Suffrage Rights .............................................................. 2255
Twentieth Amendment—Commencement of the Terms of Office .......................................... 2257
Twenty-First Amendment—Repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment ...................................... 2261
Twenty-Second Amendment—Presidential Tenure ................................................................. 2273
Twenty-Third Amendment—Presidential Electors for D. C. .................................................. 2275
Twenty-Fourth Amendment—Abolition of the Poll Tax ......................................................... 2277
Twenty-Fifth Amendment—Presidential Vacancy and Disability ......................................... 2279
Twenty-Sixth Amendment—Reduction of Voting Age ............................................................. 2283
Twenty-Seventh Amendment—Congressional Pay Limitation .............................................. 2285
Acts of Congress held unconstitutional in whole or in part by the Supreme Court of the
United States .......................................................................................................................... 2287
XXV
XXVI CONTENTS
State constitutional and statutory provisions and municipal ordinances held unconstitu-
tional or held to be preempted by federal law .................................................................... 2337
Supreme Court decisions overruled by subsequent decision ................................................. 2581
Table of cases ............................................................................................................................. 2597
Index ........................................................................................................................................... 2767
THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA
LITERAL PRINT
1
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more

perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, pro-
vide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.
Article I.
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested
in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Sen-
ate and House of Representatives.
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed

of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the sev-
eral States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Quali-
fications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of
the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have at-
tained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a
Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected,
be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among
the several States which may be included within this Union, ac-
cording to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined
by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those
bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not
taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration
shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the
Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term
3
4 CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The

Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty
Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representa-
tive; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New
Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight,
Rhode Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five,
New York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware
one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Caro-
lina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State,
the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to
fill such Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and
other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be com-
posed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legisla-
ture thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence
of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be
into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class
shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the sec-
ond Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and the third
Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may
be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resig-
nation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any
State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appoint-
ments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then
fill such Vacancies.
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained
to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 5
United States and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabit-

ant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President
of the Senate but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally di-
vided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a Presi-
dent pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when
he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeach-
ments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or
Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried
the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be con-
victed without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members
present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend fur-
ther than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold
and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and
subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, accord-
ing to Law.
Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-

tions for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in
each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at
any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and
such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless
they shall by Law appoint a different Day.
Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,

Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority
of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller
Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized
to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner,
and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, pun-
ish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concur-
rence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from
time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in
their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the
Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire
of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, with-
out the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days,
nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall
be sitting.
Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive

a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and
paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all
Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privi-
leged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their
respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same;
and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be
questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which
he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Author-
ity of the United States, which shall have been created, or the
Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time;

and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall
be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in

the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or
concur with amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Represen-
tatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a law, be pre-
sented to the President of the United States: If he approve he
shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to
that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter
the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to recon-
sider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House
shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the
Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be re-
considered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall
become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses
shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the Names of the
Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the
Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be re-
turned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) af-
ter it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a
Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress
by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall
not be a Law
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence
of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary
(except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the
President of the United States; and before the Same shall take
Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,

shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Rep-
resentatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed
in the Case of a Bill.
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-

lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and
provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United
States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform
throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the
several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uni-
form Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United
States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign
Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securi-
ties and current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by se-
curing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive
Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on
the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money

to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws
of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Mi-
litia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed
in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States re-
spectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of
training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Con-
gress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over
such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Ces-
sion of Particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, be-
come the seat of the Government of the United States, and to
exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Con-
sent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be,
for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and
other needful Buildings;—And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Pow-
ers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.
Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as

any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall
not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thou-
sand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be im-
posed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases or Rebellion or Invasion the pub-
lic Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in
the Proportion to the Census of Enumeration herein before di-
rected to be taken.
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any
State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Com-
merce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of an-
other: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged
to enter, clear or pay Duties in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Conse-
quence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular State-
ment and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all pub-
lic Money shall be published from time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States:
and no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them,
shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any pres-
ent, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any
King, Prince, or foreign State.
Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,

or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin
Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and sil-
ver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attain-
der, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-

tracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any
Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be
absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection Laws: and the
net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Im-
ports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United
States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and
Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace,
enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with
a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or
in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
Article II.
Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a Presi-
dent of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office
during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice Presi-
dent, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legisla-
ture thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole
Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may
be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative,
or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United
States, shall be appointed an Elector.
The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote
by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an
Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall
make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of
Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and trans-
mit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States,

directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Sen-
ate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Represen-
tatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be
counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall
be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole
Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one
who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by
Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Major-
ity, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall
in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the Presi-
dent, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representatives
from each State having one Vote; a quorum for this Purpose shall
consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States,
and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice.
In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person hav-
ing the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the
Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have
equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice
President.
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Elec-
tors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which
Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the
United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution,
shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any per-
son be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the
Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within
the United States.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of

his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and
Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on the Vice
President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case
of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the Presi-
dent and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act
as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Ser-
vices, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor di-
minished during the Period for which he shall have been elected,
and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolu-
ment from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take
the following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or af-
firm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the
United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, pro-
tect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of

the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of
the several States, when called into the actual Service of the
United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the
principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any
Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he
shall have Power to Grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences
against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent
of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Sena-
tors present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassa-

dors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the su-
preme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that
may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Com-
missions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress

Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement be-
tween them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may
adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commis-
sion all the Officers of the United States.
Section 4. The President, Vice President and all Civil Offi-

cers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.
Article III.
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be
vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in

Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of
the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and mari-
time Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States
shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—
between a State and Citizens of another State;— between Citi-
zens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claim-
ing Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers
and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the su-
preme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other
Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appel-
late Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment,
shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where
the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not com-
mitted within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places
as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist

only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their En-
emies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be con-
victed of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to

the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment
of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption
of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person at-
tainted.
Article IV.
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State
to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man-
ner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.
Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all

Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other
Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State,
shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from
which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State hav-
ing Jurisdiction of the Crime.
No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under
the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence
of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Ser-
vice or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party
to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into

this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within
the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by
the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without

the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well
as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all
needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Con-
stitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the
United States, or of any particular State.
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State

in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall pro-
tect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.
Article V.
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the sev-
eral States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Pur-
poses, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legisla-
tures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions
in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratifi-
cation may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amend-
ment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight
hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth
Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no
State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suf-
frage in the Senate.
Article VI.
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before
the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the
United States under this Constitution, as under the Confedera-
tion.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which
shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any state to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the
Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and
judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several
States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this
Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a
Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.
Article VII.
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying the same.
The Word, “the,” being inter- done in Convention by the Unanimous

lined between the seventh and
eighth Lines of the first Page, Consent of the States present the Sev-
The Word “Thirty” being partly
written on an Erazure in the fif- enteenth Day of September in the Year
teenth Line of the first Page, The
Words “is tried” being inter- of our Lord one thousand seven hun-
lined between the thirty second
and thirty third Lines of the first
dred and Eighty seven and of the
Page and the Word “the” being Independance of the United States of
interlined between the forty third
and forty fourth Lines of the sec- America the Twelfth. In witness whereof
ond Page.
We have hereunto subscribed our Names,
Attest WILLIAM JACKSON
Secretary
Go. WASHINGTON—Presidt.
and deputy from Virginia
New Hampshire JOHN LANGDON

NICHOLAS GILMAN
Massachusetts NATHANIEL GORHAM
RUFUS KING
Connecticut Wm SAMl JOHNSON

ROGER SHERMAN
New York . . . . ALEXANDER HAMILTON

New Jersey WIL: LIVINGSTON
DAVID BREARLEY.
Wm PATTERSON.
JONA: DAYTON
Pennsylvania B FRANKLIN
THOMAS MIFFLIN
ROBt MORRIS
GEO. CLYMER
THOs FITZSIMONS
JARED INGERSOL
JAMES WILSON
GOUV MORRIS
Delaware GEO: READ

GUNNING BEDFORD JUN
JOHN DICKINSON
RICHARD BASSETT
JACO: BROOM
Maryland JAMES McHENRY
DAN OF St THOs JENIFER
DANl CARROLL
Virginia JOHN BLAIR—

JAMES MADISON JR.
North Carolina Wm BLOUNT
RICHd DOBBS SPAIGHT
HU WILLIAMSON
South Carolina J. RUTLEDGE
CHARLES COTESWORTH PINCKNEY
CHARLES PINCKNEY
PIERCE BUTLER
Georgia WILLIAM FEW

ABR BALDWIN
In Convention Monday, September 17th 1787.

Present
The States of
New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Mr Hamilton from
New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Vir-
ginia, North Carolina, South Carolina and Georgia.
Resolved,
That the preceeding Constitution be laid before the United
States in Congress assembled, and that it is the Opinion of this
Convention, that it should afterwards be submitted to a Conven-
tion of Delegates, chosen in each State by the People thereof,
under the Recommendation of its Legislature, for their Assent
and Ratification; and that each Convention assenting to, and rati-
fying the Same, should give Notice thereof to the United States
in Congress assembled. Resolved, That it is the Opinion of this
Convention, that as soon as the Conventions of nine States shall
have ratified this Constitution, the United States in Congress
assembled should fix a Day on which Electors should be ap-
pointed by the States which shall have ratified the same, and a
Day on which the Electors should assemble to vote for the Presi-
dent, and the Time and Place for commencing Proceedings un-
der this Constitution. That after such Publication the Electors
should be appointed, and the Senators and Representatives elected:
That the Electors should meet on the Day fixed for the Election
of the President, and should transmit their Votes certified, signed,
sealed and directed, as the Constitution requires, to the Secre-
tary of the United States in Congress assembled, that the Sena-
tors and Representatives should convene at the Time and Place
assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the

Senate, for the sole Purpose of receiving, opening and counting
the Votes for President; and, that after he shall be chosen, the
Congress, together with the President, should, without Delay,
proceed to execute this Constitution.
By the Unanimous Order of the Convention
Go: WASHINGTON—Presidt.
W. JACKSON Secretary.
AMENDMENTS
TO THE

OF AMERICA
23
ARTICLES IN ADDITION TO, AND AMENDMENT OF,
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, PROPOSED BY CONGRESS, AND RATI-
FIED BY THE SEVERAL STATES, PURSUANT TO THE
FIFTH ARTICLE OF THE ORIGINAL CONSTITUTION 1
AMENDMENT [I.] 2
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
1 In Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368 (1921), the Supreme Court stated that it would take judi-
cial notice of the date on which a State ratified a proposed constitutional amendment. Accord-
ingly the Court consulted the State journals to determine the dates on which each house of the
legislature of certain States ratified the Eighteenth Amendment. It, therefore, follows that the
date on which the governor approved the ratification, or the date on which the secretary of
state of a given State certified the ratification, or the date on which the Secretary of State of
the United States received a copy of said certificate, or the date on which he proclaimed that
the amendment had been ratified are not controlling. Hence, the ratification date given in the
following notes is the date on which the legislature of a given State approved the particular
amendment (signature by the speaker or presiding officers of both houses being considered a
part of the ratification of the “legislature”). When that date is not available, the date given is
that on which it was approved by the governor or certified by the secretary of state of the par-
ticular State. In each case such fact has been noted. Except as otherwise indicated information
as to ratification is based on data supplied by the Department of State.
2 Brackets enclosing an amendment number indicate that the number was not specifically
assigned in the resolution proposing the amendment. It will be seen, accordingly, that only the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Sixteenth Amendments were thus technically ratified by
number. The first ten amendments along with two others that were not ratified were proposed
by Congress on September 25, 1789, when they passed the Senate, having previously passed
the House on September 24 (1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 88, 913). They appear officially in 1 Stat. 97.
Ratification was completed on December 15, 1791, when the eleventh State (Virginia) approved
these amendments, there being then 14 States in the Union.
The several state legislatures ratified the first ten amendments to the Constitution on the
following dates: New Jersey, November 20, 1789; Maryland, December 19, 1789; North Caro-
lina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; New Hampshire, January 25, 1790;
Delaware, January 28, 1790; New York, February 27, 1790; Pennsylvania, March 10, 1790; Rhode
Island, June 7, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia, December 15, 1791. The two amend-
ments that then failed of ratification prescribed the ratio of representation to population in the
House, and specified that no law varying the compensation of members of Congress should be
effective until after an intervening election of Representatives. The first was ratified by ten States
(one short of the requisite number) and the second, by six States; subsequently, this second
proposal was taken up by the States in the period 1980–1992 and was proclaimed as ratified as
of May 7, 1992. Connecticut, Georgia, and Massachusetts ratified the first ten amendments in
1939.
25
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-

ably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress
of grievances.
AMENDMENT [II.]
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free state, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall
not be infringed.
AMENDMENT [III.]
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
AMENDMENT [IV.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and par-
ticularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to be seized.
AMENDMENT [V.]
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or other-
wise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of
a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces,
or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or pub-
lic danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offense
to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be com-
pelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor
be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of
law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.
AMENDMENT [VI.]
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State
and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which
district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to
be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be con-
fronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory pro-
cess for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assis-
tance of Counsel for his defense.
AMENDMENT [VII.]
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be pre-
served, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-
examined in any Court of the United States, than according to
the rules of the common law.
AMENDMENT [VIII.]
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines im-
posed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.
AMENDMENT [IX.]
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall
not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.
AMENDMENT [X.]
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Con-
stitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people.
AMENDMENT [XI.] 3
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be con-
strued to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or pros-
ecuted against one on the United States by Citizens of another
State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.
AMENDMENT [XII.] 4
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote
by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least,
shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves;
they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as Presi-
3 The Eleventh Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 4, 1794, when it passed
the House, 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 477, 478, having previously passed the Senate on January 14,
Id., 30, 31. It appears officially in 1 Stat. 402. Ratification was completed on February 7, 1795,
when the twelfth State (North Carolina) approved the amendment, there being then 15 States
in the Union. Official announcement of ratification was not made until January 8, 1798, when
President John Adams in a message to Congress stated that the Eleventh Amendment had been
adopted by three-fourths of the States and that it “may now be deemed to be a part of the
Constitution.” In the interim South Carolina had ratified, and Tennessee had been admitted
into the Union as the sixteenth State.
The several state legislatures ratified the Eleventh Amendment on the following dates: New
York, March 27, 1794; Rhode Island, March 31, 1794; Connecticut, May 8, 1794; New Hamp-
shire, June 16, 1794; Massachusetts, June 26, 1794; Vermont, between October 9 and Novem-
ber 9, 1794; Virginia, November 18, 1794; Georgia, November 29, 1794; Kentucky, December 7,
1794; Maryland, December 26, 1794; Delaware, January 23, 1795; North Carolina, February 7,
1795; South Carolina, December 4, 1797.
4 The Twelfth Amendment was proposed by Congress on December 9, 1803, when it passed
the House, 13 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 775, 776, having previously passed the Senate on December
2. Id., 209. It was not signed by the presiding officers of the House and Senate until December
12. It appears officially in 2 Stat. 306. Ratification was probably completed on June 15, 1804,
when the legislature of the thirteenth State (New Hampshire) approved the amendment, there
being then 17 States in the Union. The Governor of New Hampshire, however, vetoed this act
of the legislature on June 20, and the act failed to pass again by two-thirds vote then required
by the state constitution. Inasmuch as Article V of the Federal Constitution specifies that amend-
ments shall become effective “when ratified by legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
or by conventions in three-fourths thereof,” it has been generally believed that an approval or
veto by a governor is without significance. If the ratification by New Hampshire be deemed
ineffective, then the amendment became operative by Tennessee’s ratification on July 27, 1804.
On September 25, 1804, in a circular letter to the Governors of the several States, Secretary of
State Madison declared the amendment ratified by three-fourths of the States.
The several state legislatures ratified the Twelfth Amendment on the following dates: North
Carolina, December 22, 1803; Maryland, December 24, 1803; Kentucky, December 27, 1803; Ohio,
between December 5 and December 30, 1803; Virginia, between December 20, 1803 and Febru-
ary 3, 1804; Pennsylvania, January 5, 1804; Vermont, January 30, 1804; New York, February
10, 1804; New Jersey, February 22, 1804; Rhode Island, between February 27 and March 12,
1804; South Carolina, May 15, 1804; Georgia, May 19, 1804; New Hampshire, June 15, 1804;
and Tennessee, July 27, 1804. The amendment was rejected by Delaware on January 18, 1804,
and by Connecticut at its session begun May 10, 1804. Massachusetts ratified this amendment
in 1961.
dent, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-

President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted
for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President,
and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign
and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government
of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—
The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate
and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the
votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest
Number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such
number be a majority of the whole number of Electors ap-
pointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the per-
sons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list
of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives
shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choos-
ing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the repre-
sentation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this
purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds
of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary
to a choice. And if the House of Representatives shall not choose
a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them,
before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-
President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or
other constitutional disability of the President—The person hav-
ing the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the
Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole num-
ber of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then
from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose
the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-
thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the

whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person con-
stitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible
to that of Vice-President of the United States.
AMENDMENT XIII.5
SECTION 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been
duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place
subject to their jurisdiction.
SECTION 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article

by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT XIV.6
SECTION 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United
5 The Thirteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on January 31, 1865, when it passed
the House, CONG. GLOBE (38th Cong., 2d Sess.) 531, having previously passed the Senate on April
8, 1864. Id., (38th cong., 1st Sess.), 1940. It appears officially in 13 Stat. 567 under the date of
February 1, 1865. Ratification was completed on December 6, 1865, when the legislature of the
twenty-seventh State (Georgia) approved the amendment, there being then 36 States in the Union.
On December 18, 1865, Secretary of State Seward certified that the Thirteenth Amendment had
become a part of the Constitution, 13 Stat. 774.
The several state legislatures ratified the Thirteenth Amendment on the following dates:
Illinois, February 1, 1865; Rhode Island, February 2, 1865; Michigan, February 2, 1865; Mary-
land, February 3, 1865; New York, February 3, 1865; West Virginia, February 3, 1865; Mis-
souri, February 6, 1865; Maine, February 7, 1865; Kansas, February 7, 1865; Massachusetts,
February 7, 1865; Pennsylvania, February 8, 1865; Virginia, February 9, 1865; Ohio, February
10, 1865; Louisiana, February 15 or 16, 1865; Indiana, February 16, 1865; Nevada, February
16, 1865; Minnesota, February 23, 1865; Wisconsin, February 24, 1865; Vermont, March 9, 1865
(date on which it was “approved” by Governor); Tennessee, April 7, 1865; Arkansas, April 14,
1865; Connecticut, May 4, 1865; New Hampshire, June 30, 1865; South Carolina, November 13,
1865; Alabama, December 2, 1865 (date on which it was “approved” by Provisional Governor);
North Carolina, December 4, 1865; Georgia, December 6, 1865; Oregon, December 11, 1865; Cali-
fornia, December 15, 1865; Florida, December 28, 1865 (Florida again ratified this amendment
on June 9, 1868, upon its adoption of a new constitution); Iowa, January 17, 1866; New Jersey,
January 23, 1866 (after having rejected the amendment on March 16, 1865); Texas, February
17, 1870; Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after having rejected the amendment of February 8,
1865). The amendment was rejected by Kentucky on February 24, 1865, and by Mississippi on
December 2, 1865.
6 The Fourteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 13, 1866, when it passed
the House, CONG. GLOBE (39th Cong., 1st Sess.) 3148, 3149, having previously passed the Senate
on June 8. Id., 3042. It appears officially in 14 Stat. 358 under date of June 16, 1866. Ratifica-
tion was probably completed on July 9, 1868, when the legislature of the twenty-eighth State
States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make
or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immu-
nities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due pro-
cess of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the
equal protection of the laws.
SECTION 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the
several States according to their respective numbers, counting
the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians
not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the
choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United
States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial
(South Carolina or Louisiana) approved the amendment, there being then 37 States in the Union.
However, Ohio and New Jersey had prior to that date “withdrawn” their earlier assent to this
amendment. Accordingly, Secretary of State Seward on July 20, 1868, certified that the amend-
ment had become a part of the Constitution if the said withdrawals were ineffective. 15 Stat.
706–707. Congress on July 21, 1868, passed a joint resolution declaring the amendment a part
of the Constitution and directing the Secretary to promulgate it as such. On July 28, 1868,
Secretary Seward certified without reservation that the amendment was a part of the Constitu-
tion. In the interim, two other States, Alabama on July 13 and Georgia on July 21, 1868, had
added their ratifications.
The several state legislatures ratified the Fourteenth Amendment on the following dates:
Connecticut, June 30, 1866; New Hampshire, July 7, 1866; Tennessee, July 9, 1866; New Jer-
sey, September 11, 1866 (the New Jersey Legislature on February 20, 1868 “withdrew” its con-
sent to the ratification; the Governor vetoed that bill on March 5, 1868; and it was repassed
over his veto on March 24, 1868); Oregon, September 19, 1866 (Oregon “withdrew” its consent
on October 15, 1868); Vermont, October 30, 1866; New York, January 10, 1867; Ohio, January
11, 1867 (Ohio “withdrew” its consent on January 15, 1868); Illinois, January 15, 1867; West
Virginia, January 16, 1867; Michigan, January 16, 1867; Kansas, January 17, 1867; Minnesota,
January 17, 1867; Maine, January 19, 1867; Nevada, January 22, 1867; Indiana, January 23,
1867; Missouri, January 26, 1867 (date on which it was certified by the Missouri secretary of
state); Rhode Island, February 7, 1867; Pennsylvania, February 12, 1867; Wisconsin, February
13, 1867 (actually passed February 7, but was not signed by legislative officers until February
13); Massachusetts, March 20, 1867; Nebraska, June 15, 1867; Iowa, March 9, 1868; Arkansas,
April 6, 1868; Florida, June 9, 1868; North Carolina, July 2, 1868 (after having rejected the
amendment on December 13, 1866); Louisiana, July 9, 1868 (after having rejected the amend-
ment on February 6, 1867); South Carolina, July 8, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment
on December 20, 1866); Alabama, July 13, 1868 (date on which it was “approved” by the Gover-
nor); Georgia, July 21, 1868 (after having rejected the amendment on November 9, 1866—
Georgia ratified again on February 2, 1870); Virginia, October 8, 1869 (after having rejected the
amendment on January 9, 1867); Mississippi, January 17, 1870; Texas, February 18, 1870 (af-
ter having rejected the amendment on October 27, 1866); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (after
having rejected the amendment February 7, 1867). The amendment was rejected (and not sub-
sequently ratified) by Kentucky on January 8, 1867. Maryland and California ratified this amend-
ment in 1959.
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is

denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-
one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime,
the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the pro-
portion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to
the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in
such State.
SECTION 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative
in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold
any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under
any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member
of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a mem-
ber of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer
of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States,
shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same,
or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress
may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disabil-
ity.
SECTION 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States,

authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pen-
sions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or
rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States
nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation in-
curred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States,
or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all
such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
SECTION 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by ap-

propriate legislation, the provisions of this article.
AMENDMENT XV.7
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any
State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servi-
tude.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this ar-
ticle by appropriate legislation.
7 The Fifteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on February 26, 1869, when it passed
the Senate, CONG. GLOBE (40th Cong., 3rd Sess.) 1641, having previously passed the House on
February 25. Id., 1563, 1564. It appears officially in 15 Stat. 346 under the date of February 27,
1869. Ratification was probably completed on February 3, 1870, when the legislature of the twenty-
eighth State (Iowa) approved the amendment, there being then 37 States in the Union. How-
ever, New York had prior to that date “withdrawn” its earlier assent to this amendment. Even
if this withdrawal were effective, Nebraska’s ratification on February 17, 1870, authorized Sec-
retary of State Fish’s certification of March 30, 1870, that the Fifteenth Amendment had be-
come a part of the Constitution. 16 Stat. 1131.
The several state legislatures ratified the Fifteenth Amendment on the following dates: Ne-
vada, March 1, 1869; West Virginia, March 3, 1869; North Carolina, March 5, 1869; Louisiana,
March 5, 1869 (date on which it was “approved” by the Governor); Illinois, March 5, 1869; Michi-
gan, March 5, 1869; Wisconsin, March 5, 1869; Maine, March 11, 1869; Massachusetts, March
12, 1869; South Carolina, March 15, 1869; Arkansas, March 15, 1869; Pennsylvania, March 25,
1869; New York, April 14, 1869 (New York “withdrew” its consent to the ratification on January
5, 1870); Indiana, March 14, 1869; Connecticut, May 19, 1869; Florida, June 14, 1869; New
Hampshire, July 1, 1869; Virginia, October 8, 1869; Vermont, October 20, 1869; Alabama, No-
vember 16, 1869; Missouri, January 7, 1870 (Missouri had ratified the first section of the 15th
Amendment on March 1, 1869; it failed to include in its ratification the second section of the
amendment); Minnesota, January 13, 1870; Mississippi, January 17, 1870; Rhode Island, Janu-
ary 18, 1870; Kansas, January 19, 1870 (Kansas had by a defectively worded resolution previ-
ously ratified this amendment on February 27, 1869); Ohio, January 27, 1870 (after having re-
jected the amendment on May 4, 1869); Georgia, February 2, 1870; Iowa, February 3, 1870;
Nebraska, February 17, 1870; Texas, February 18, 1870; New Jersey, February 15, 1871 (after
having rejected the amendment on February 7, 1870); Delaware, February 12, 1901 (date on
which approved by Governor; Delaware had previously rejected the amendment on March 18,
1869). The amendment was rejected (and was not subsequently ratified) by Kentucky, Mary-
land, and Tennessee. California ratified this amendment in 1962 and Oregon in 1959.
AMENDMENT XVI.8
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on
incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment
among the several States, and without regard to any census of
enumeration.
AMENDMENT [XVII.] 9
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two
Senators from each state, elected by the people thereof, for six
8 The Sixteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on July 12, 1909, when it passed
the House, 44 CONG. REC. (61st Cong., 1st Sess.) 4390, 4440, 4441, having previously passed the
Senate on July 5. Id., 4121. It appears officially in 36 Stat. 184. Ratification was completed on
February 3, 1913, when the legislature of the thirty-sixth State (Delaware, Wyoming, or New
Mexico) approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On February 25,
1913, Secretary of State Knox certified that this amendment had become a part of the Constitu-
tion. 37 Stat. 1785.
The several state legislatures ratified the Sixteenth Amendment on the following dates: Ala-
bama, August 10, 1909; Kentucky, February 8, 1910; South Carolina, February 19, 1910; Illi-
nois, March 1, 1910; Mississippi, March 7, 1910; Oklahoma, March 10, 1910; Maryland, April 8,
1910; Georgia, August 3, 1910; Texas, August 16, 1910; Ohio, January 19, 1911; Idaho, January
20, 1911; Oregon, January 23, 1911; Washington, January 26, 1911; Montana, January 27, 1911;
Indiana, January 30, 1911; California, January 31, 1911; Nevada, January 31, 1911; South Da-
kota, February 1, 1911; Nebraska, February 9, 1911; North Carolina, February 11, 1911; Colo-
rado, February 15, 1911; North Dakota, February 17, 1911; Michigan, February 23, 1911; Iowa,
February 24, 1911; Kansas, March 2, 1911; Missouri, March 16, 1911; Maine, March 31, 1911;
Tennessee, April 7, 1911; Arkansas, April 22, 1911 (after having rejected the amendment at the
session begun January 9, 1911); Wisconsin, May 16, 1911; New York, July 12, 1911; Arizona,
April 3, 1912; Minnesota, June 11, 1912; Louisiana, June 28, 1912; West Virginia, January 31,
1913; Delaware, February 3, 1913; Wyoming, February 3, 1913; New Mexico, February 3, 1913;
New Jersey, February 4, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; Massachusetts, March 4, 1913; New
Hampshire, March 7, 1913 (after having rejected the amendment on March 2, 1911). The amend-
ment was rejected (and not subsequently ratified) by Connecticut, Rhode Island, and Utah.
9 The Seventeenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on May 13, 1912, when it passed
the House, 48 CONG. REC. (62d Cong., 2d Sess.) 6367, having previously passed the Senate on
June 12, 1911. 47 CONG. REC. (62d Cong., 1st Sess.) 1925. It appears officially in 37 Stat. 646.
Ratification was completed on April 8, 1913, when the thirty-sixth State (Connecticut) approved
the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On May 31, 1913, Secretary of State
Bryan certified that it had become a part of the Constitution. 38 Stat. 2049.
The several state legislatures ratified the Seventeenth Amendment on the following dates:
Massachusetts, May 22, 1912; Arizona, June 3, 1912; Minnesota, June 10, 1912; New York, Janu-
ary 15, 1913; Kansas, January 17, 1913; Oregon, January 23, 1913; North Carolina, January
25, 1913; California, January 28, 1913; Michigan, January 28, 1913; Iowa, January 30, 1913;
Montana, January 30, 1913; Idaho, January 31, 1913; West Virginia, February 4, 1913; Colo-
rado, February 5, 1913; Nevada, February 6, 1913; Texas, February 7, 1913; Washington, Feb-
ruary 7, 1913; Wyoming, February 8, 1913; Arkansas, February 11, 1913; Illinois, February 13,
1913; North Dakota, February 14, 1913; Wisconsin, February 18, 1913; Indiana, February 19,
1913; New Hampshire, February 19, 1913; Vermont, February 19, 1913; South Dakota, Febru-
ary 19, 1913; Maine, February 20, 1913; Oklahoma, February 24, 1913; Ohio, February 25, 1913;
Missouri, March 7, 1913; New Mexico, March 13, 1913; Nebraska, March 14, 193; New Jersey,
March 17, 1913; Tennessee, April 1, 193; Pennsylvania, April 2, 1913; Connecticut, April 8, 1913;
Louisiana, June 5, 1914. The amendment was rejected by Utah on February 26, 1913.
years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each
State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the
most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State
in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue
writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legis-
lature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make
temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by
election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the
election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid
as part of the Constitution.
AMENDMENT [XVIII.] 10
SECTION 1. After one year from the ratification of this article
the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors
within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof
10 The Eighteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on December 18, 1917, when it
passed the Senate, CONG. REC. (65th Cong. 2d Sess.) 478, having previously passed the House
on December 17. Id., 470. It appears officially in 40 Stat. 1059. Ratification was completed on
January 16, 1919, when the thirty-sixth State approved the amendment, there being then 48
States in the Union. On January 29, 1919, Acting Secretary of State Polk certified that this
amendment had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 40 Stat. 1941. By its terms
this amendment did not become effective until 1 year after ratification.
The several state legislatures ratified the Eighteenth Amendment on the following dates:
Mississippi, January 8, 1918; Virginia, January 11, 1918; Kentucky, January 14, 1918; North
Dakota, January 28, 1918 (date on which approved by Governor); South Carolina, January 29,
1918; Maryland, February 13, 1918; Montana, February 19, 1918; Texas, March 4, 1918; Dela-
ware, March 18, 1918; South Dakota, March 20, 1918; Massachusetts, April 2, 1918; Arizona,
May 24, 1918; Georgia, June 26, 1918; Louisiana, August 9, 1918 (date on which approved by
Governor); Florida, November 27, 1918; Michigan, January 2, 1919; Ohio, January 7, 1919; Okla-
homa, January 7, 1919; Idaho, January 8, 1919; Maine, January 8, 1919; West Virginia, Janu-
ary 9, 1919; California, January 13, 1919; Tennessee, January 13, 1919; Washington, January
13, 1919; Arkansas, January 14, 1919; Kansas, January 14, 1919; Illinois, January 14, 1919;
Indiana, January 14, 1919; Alabama, January 15, 1919; Colorado, January 15, 1919; Iowa, Janu-
ary 15, 1919; New Hampshire, January 15, 1919; Oregon, January 15, 1919; Nebraska, Janu-
ary 16, 1919; North Carolina, January 16, 1919; Utah, January 16, 1919; Missouri, January 16,
1919; Wyoming, January 16, 1919; Minnesota, January 17, 1919; Wisconsin, January 17, 1919;
New Mexico, January 20, 1919; Nevada, January 21, 1919; Pennsylvania, February 25, 1919;
New Jersey, March 9, 1922; New York, January 29, 1919; Vermont, January 29, 1919.
from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdic-
tion thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
SECTION 2. The Congress and the several States shall have

concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legisla-
tion.
SECTION 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall
have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the
legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitu-
tion, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof
to the States by the Congress.
AMENDMENT [XIX.] 11
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not
be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on
account of sex.
11 The Nineteenth Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 4, 1919, when it passed
the Senate, CONG. REC. (66th Cong., 1st Sess.) 635, having previously passed the house on May
21. Id., 94. It appears officially in 41 Stat. 362. Ratification was completed on August 18, 1920,
when the thirty-sixth State (Tennessee) approved the amendment, there being then 48 States
in the Union. On August 26, 1920, Secretary of Colby certified that it had become a part of the
Constitution. 41 Stat. 1823.
The several state legislatures ratified the Nineteenth Amendment on the following dates:
Illinois, June 10, 1919 (readopted June 17, 1919); Michigan, June 10, 1919; Wisconsin, June 10,
1919; Kansas, June 16, 1919; New York, June 16, 1919; Ohio, June 16, 1919; Pennsylvania,
June 24, 1919; Massachusetts, June 25, 1919; Texas, June 28, 1919; Iowa, July 2, 1919 (date on
which approved by Governor); Missouri, July 3, 1919; Arkansas, July 28, 1919; Montana, Au-
gust 2, 1919 (date on which approved by governor); Nebraska, August 2. 1919; Minnesota, Sep-
tember 8, 1919; New Hampshire, September 10, 1919 (date on which approved by Governor);
Utah, October 2, 1919; California, November 1, 1919; Maine, November 5, 1919; North Dakota,
December 1, 1919; South Dakota, December 4, 1919 (date on which certified); Colorado, Decem-
ber 15, 1919 (date on which approved by Governor); Kentucky, January 6, 1920; Rhode Island,
January 6, 1920; Oregon, January 13, 1920; Indiana, January 16, 1920; Wyoming, January 27,
1920; Nevada, February 7, 1920; New Jersey, February 9, 1920; Idaho, February 11, 1920; Ari-
zona, February 12, 1920; New Mexico, February 21, 1920 (date on which approved by govrnor);
Oklahoma, February 28, 1920; West Virginia, March 10, 1920 (confirmed September 21, 1920);
Washington, March 22, 1920; Tennessee, August 18, 1920; Vermont, February 8, 1921. The amend-
ment was rejected by Georgia on July 24, 1919; by Alabama, on September 22, 1919; by South
Carolina on January 29, 1920; by Virginia on February 12, 1920; by Maryland on February 24,
1920; by Mississippi on March 29, 1920; by Louisiana on July 1, 1920. This amendment was
subsequently ratified by Virginia in 1952, Alabama in 1953, Florida in 1969, and Georgia and
Louisiana in 1970.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appro-

priate legislation.
AMENDMENT [XX.] 12
SECTION 1. The terms of the President and Vice President
shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of
Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of Janu-
ary, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this
article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors
shall then begin.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in ev-

ery year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of
January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
SECTION 3. If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term
of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice
President elect shall become President. If a President shall not
have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his
term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then
12 The Twentieth Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 2, 1932, when it passed
the Senate, CONG. REC. (72d Cong., 1st Sess.) 5086, having previously passed the House on March
1. Id., 5027. It appears officially in 47 Stat. 745. Ratification was completed on January 23,
1933, when the thirty-sixth State approved the amendment, there being then 48 States in the
Union. On February 6, 1933, Secretary of State Stimson certified that it had become a part of
the Constitution. 47 Stat. 2569.
The several state legislatures ratified the Twentieth Amendment on the following dates:
Virginia, March 4, 1932; New York, March 11, 1932; Mississippi, March 16, 1932; Arkansas March
17, 1932; Kentucky, March 17, 1932; New Jersey, March 21, 1932; South Carolina, March 25,
1932; Michigan, March 31, 1932; Maine, April 1, 1932; Rhode Island, April 14, 1932; Illinois,
April 21, 1932; Louisiana, June 22, 1932; West Virginia, July 30, 1932; Pennsylvania, August
11, 1932; Indiana, August 15, 1932; Texas, September 7, 1932; Alabama, September 13, 1932;
California, January 3, 1933; North Carolina, January 5, 1933; North Dakota, January 9, 1933;
Minnesota, January 12, 1933; Arizona, January 13, 1933; Montana, January 13, 1933; Ne-
braska, January 13, 1933; Oklahoma, January 13, 1933; Kansas, January 16, 1933; Oregon,
January 16, 1933; Delaware, January 19, 1933; Washington, January 19, 1933; Wyoming, Janu-
ary 19, 1933; Iowa, January 20, 1933; South Dakota, January 20, 1933; Tennessee, January 20,
1933; Idaho, January 21, 1933; New Mexico, January 21, 1933; Georgia, January 23, 1933; Mis-
souri, January 23, 1933; Ohio, January 23, 1933; Utah, January 23, 1933; Colorado, January
24, 1933; Massachusetts, January 24, 1933; Wisconsin, January 24, 1933; Nevada, January 26,
1933; Connecticut, January 27, 1933; New Hampshire, January 31, 1933; Vermont, February 2,
1933; Maryland, March 24, 1933; Florida, April 26, 1933.
the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President

shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for
the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President
elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as Presi-
dent, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be se-
lected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President
or Vice President shall have qualified.
SECTION 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of

the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Repre-
sentatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice
shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of
any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice
President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon
them.
SECTION 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day

of October following the ratification of this article.

legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission.
AMENDMENT [XXI.] 13
SECTION 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Con-
stitution of the United State is hereby repealed.
13 The Twenty-first Amendment was proposed by Congress on February 20, 1933, when it
passed the House, CONG. REC. (72d Cong., 2d Sess.) 4516, having previously passed the Senate
on February 16. Id., 4231. It appears officially in 47 Stat. 1625. Ratification was completed on
December 5, 1933, when the thirty-sixth State (Utah) approved the amendment, there being
then 48 States in the Union. On December 5, 1933, Acting Secretary of State Phillips certified
that it had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 48 Stat. 1749.
The several state conventions ratified the Twenty-first Amendment on the following dates:
Michigan, April 10, 1933; Wisconsin, April 25, 1933; Rhode Island, May 8, 1933; Wyoming, May
25, 1933; New Jersey, June 1, 1933; Delaware, June 24, 1933; Indiana, June 26, 1933; Massa-
SECTION 2. The transportation or importation into any State,

territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use
therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof,
is hereby prohibited.

have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by con-
ventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution,
within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to
the States by the Congress.
AMENDMENT [XXII.] 14
SECTION 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the Presi-
dent more than twice, and no person who has held the office of
chusetts, June 26, 1933; New York, June 27, 1933; Illinois, July 10, 1933; Iowa, July 10, 1933;
Connecticut, July 11, 1933; New Hampshire, July 11, 1933; California, July 24, 1933; West Vir-
ginia, July 25, 1933; Arkansas, August 1, 1933; Oregon, August 7, 1933; Alabama, August 8,
1933; Tennessee, August 11, 1933; Missouri, August 29, 1933; Arizona, September 5, 1933; Ne-
vada, September 5, 1933; Vermont, September 23, 1933; Colorado, September 26, 1933; Wash-
ington, October 3, 1933; Minnesota, October 10, 1933; Idaho, October 17, 1933; Maryland, Octo-
ber 18, 1933; Virginia, October 25, 1933; New Mexico, November 2, 1933; Florida, November
14, 1933; Texas, November 24, 1933; Kentucky, November 27, 1933; Ohio, December 5, 1933;
Pennsylvania, December 5, 1933; Utah, December 5, 1933; Maine, December 6, 1933; Montana,
August 6, 1934. The amendment was rejected by a convention in the State of South Carolina,
on December 4, 1933. The electorate of the State of North Carolina voted against holding a
convention at a general election held on November 7, 1933.
14 The Twenty-second Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 24, 1947, having
passed the House on March 21, 1947, CONG. REC. (80th Cong., 1st Sess.) 2392, and having previ-
ously passed the Senate on March 12, 1947. Id., 1978. It appears officially in 61 Stat. 959. Rati-
fication was completed on February 27, 1951, when the thirty-sixth State (Minnesota) approved
the amendment, there being then 48 States in the Union. On March 1, 1951, Jess Larson, Ad-
ministrator of General Services, certified that it had been adopted by the requisite number of
States. 16 FED. REG. 2019.
A total of 41 state legislatures ratified the Twenty-second Amendment on the following dates:
Maine, March 31, 1947; Michigan, March 31, 1947; Iowa, April 1, 1947; Kansas, April 1, 1947;
New Hampshire, April 1, 1947; Delaware, April 2, 1947; Illinois, April 3, 1947; Oregon, April 3,
1947; Colorado, April 12, 1947; California, April 15, 1947; New Jersey, April 15, 1947; Vermont,
April 15, 1947; Ohio, April 16, 1947; Wisconsin, April 16, 1947; Pennsylvania, April 29, 1947;
Connecticut, May 21, 1947; Missouri, May 22, 1947; Nebraska, May 23, 1947; Virginia, January
28, 1948; Mississippi, February 12, 1948; New York, March 9, 1948; South Dakota, January 21,
1949; North Dakota, February 25, 1949; Louisiana, May 17, 1950; Montana, January 25, 1951;
Indiana, January 29, 1951; Idaho, January 30, 1951; New Mexico, February 12, 1951; Wyo-
ming, February 12, 1951; Arkansas, February 15, 1951; Georgia, February 17, 1915; Tennessee,
February 20, 1951; Texas, February 22, 1951; Utah, February 26, 1951; Nevada, February 26,
1951; Minnesota, February 27, 1951; North Carolina, February 28, 1951; South Carolina, March
13, 1951; Maryland, March 14, 1951; Florida, April 16, 1951; and Alabama, May 4, 1951.
President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a

term to which some other person was elected President shall be
elected to the office of the President more than once. But this
Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of Presi-
dent, when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall
not prevent any person who may be holding the office of Presi-
dent, or acting as President, during the term within which this
Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or
acting as President during the remainder of such term.

legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven
years from the date of its submission to the States by the Con-
gress.
AMENDMENT [XXIII.] 15
SECTION 1. The District constituting the seat of Government
of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Con-
gress may direct:
15 The Twenty-third Amendment was proposed by Congress on June 16, 1960, when it passed
the Senate, CONG. REC. (86th Cong., 2d Sess.) 12858, having previously passed the House on
June 14. Id., 12571. It appears officially in 74 Stat. 1057. Ratification was completed on March
29, 1961, when the thirty-eighth State (Ohio) approved the amendment, there being then 50
States in the Union. On April 3, 1961, John L. Moore, Administrator of General Services, certi-
fied that it had been adopted by the requisite number of States. 26 FED. REG. 2808.
The several state legislatures ratified the Twenty-third Amendment on the following dates:
Hawaii, June 23, 1960; Massachusetts, August 22, 1960; New Jersey, December 19, 1960; New
York, January 17, 1961; California, January 19, 1961; Oregon, January 27, 1961; Maryland,
January 30, 1961; Idaho, January 31, 1961; Maine, January 31, 1961; Minnesota, January 31,
1961; New Mexico, February 1, 1961; Nevada, February 2, 1961; Montana, February 6, 1961;
Colorado, February 8, 1961; Washington, February 9, 1961; West Virginia, February 1961; Alaska,
February 10, 1961; Wyoming, February 13, 1961; South Dakota, February 14, 1961; Delaware,
February 20, 1961; Utah, February 21, 1961; Wisconsin, February 21, 1961; Pennsylvania, Feb-
ruary 28, 1961; Indiana, March 3, 1961; North Dakota, March 3, 1961; Tennessee, March 6,
1961; Michigan, March 8, 1961; Connecticut, March 9, 1961; Arizona, March 10, 1961; Illinois,
March 14, 1961; Nebraska, March 15, 1961; Vermont, March 15, 1961; Iowa, March 16, 1961;
Missouri, March 20, 1961; Oklahoma, March 21, 1961; Rhode Island, March 22, 1961; Kansas,
March 29, 1961; Ohio, March 29, 1961; and New Hampshire, March 30, 1961.
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal

to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Con-
gress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State,
but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall
be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall
be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and
Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall
meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the
twelfth article of amendment.

AMENDMENT [XXIV.] 16
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote
in any primary or other election for President or Vice Presi-
dent, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator
or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay
any poll tax or other tax.
16 The Twenty-fourth Amendment was proposed by Congress on September 14, 1962, hav-
ing passed the House on August 27, 1962. CONG. REC. (87th Cong., 2d Sess.) 17670 and having
previously passed the Senate on March 27, 1962. Id., 5105. It appears officially in 76 Stat. 1259.
Ratification was completed on January 23, 1964, when the thirty-eighth State (South Dakota)
approved the Amendment, there being then 50 States in the Union. On February 4, 1964, Ber-
nard L. Boutin, Administrator of General Services, certified that it had been adopted by the
requisite number of States. 25 FED. REG. 1717. President Lyndon B. Johnson signed this certifi-
cate.
Thirty-eight state legislatures ratified the Twenty-fourth Amendment on the following dates:
Illinois, November 14, 1962; New Jersey, December 3, 1962; Oregon, January 25, 1963; Mon-
tana, January 28, 1963; West Virginia, February 1, 1963; New York, February 4, 1963; Mary-
land, February 6, 1963; California, February 7, 1963; Alaska, February 11, 1963; Rhode Island,
February 14, 1963; Indiana, February 19, 1963; Michigan, February 20, 1963; Utah, February
20, 1963; Colorado, February 21, 1963; Minnesota, February 27, 1963; Ohio, February 27, 1963;
New Mexico, March 5, 1963; Hawaii, March 6, 1963; North Dakota, March 7, 1963; Idaho, March
8, 1963; Washington, March 14, 1963; Vermont, March 15, 1963; Nevada, March 19, 1963; Con-
necticut, March 20, 1963; Tennessee, March 21, 1963; Pennsylvania, March 25, 1963; Wiscon-
sin, March 26, 1963; Kansas, March 28, 1963; Massachusetts, March 28, 1963; Nebraska, April
4, 1963; Florida, April 18, 1963; Iowa, April 24, 1963; Delaware, May 1, 1963; Missouri, May
13, 1963; New Hampshire, June 16, 1963; Kentucky, June 27, 1963; Maine, January 16, 1964;
South Dakota, January 23, 1964.

AMENDMENT [XXV.] 17
SECTION 1. In case of the removal of the President from of-
fice or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall be-
come President.
SECTION 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the

Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of
both Houses of Congress.
SECTION 3. Whenever the President transmits to the Presi-

dent pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of
Representatives has written declaration that he is unable to dis-
charge the powers and duties of his office, and until he trans-
17 This Amendment was proposed by the Eighty-ninth Congress by Senate Joint Resolution
No. 1, which was approved by the Senate on February 19, 1965, and by the House of Represen-
tatives, in amended form, on April 13, 1965. The House of Representatives agreed to a Confer-
ence Report on June 30, 1965, and the Senate agreed to the Conference Report on July 6, 1965.
It was declared by the Administrator of General Services, on February 23, 1967, to have been
ratified.
This Amendment was ratified by the following States:
Nebraska, July 12, 1965; Wisconsin, July 13, 1965; Oklahoma, July 16, 1965; Massachu-
setts, August 9, 1965; Pennsylvania, August 18, 1965; Kentucky, September 15, 1965; Arizona,
September 22, 1965; Michigan, October 5, 1965; Indiana, October 20, 1965; California, October
21, 1965; Arkansas, November 4, 1965; New Jersey, November 29, 1965; Delaware, December 7,
1965; Utah, January 17, 1966; West Virginia, January 20, 1966; Maine, January 24, 1966; Rhode
Island, January 28, 1966; Colorado, February 3, 1966; New Mexico, February 3, 1966; Kansas,
February 8, 1966; Vermont, February 10, 1966; Alaska, February 18, 1966; Idaho, March 2, 1966;
Hawaii, March 3, 1966; Virginia, March 8, 1966; Mississippi, March 10, 1966; New York, March
14, 1966; Maryland, March 23, 1966; Missouri, March 30, 1966; New Hampshire, June 13, 1966;
Louisiana, July 5, 1966; Tennessee, January 12, 1967, Wyoming, January 25, 1967; Washing-
ton, January 26, 1967; Iowa, January 26, 1967; Oregon, February 2, 1967; Minnesota, February
10, 1967; Nevada, February 10, 1967; Connecticut, February 14, 1967; Montana, February 15,
1967; South Dakota, March 6, 1967; Ohio, March 7, 1967; Alabama, March 14, 1967; North
Carolina, March 22, 1967 Illinois, March 22, 1967; Texas, April 25, 1967; Florida, May 25, 1967.
Publication of the certifying statement of the Administrator of General Services that the
Amendment had become valid was made on February 25, 1967, F.R. Doc 67–2208, 32 FED. REG.
3287.
mits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers

and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting
President.
SECTION 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of
either the principal officers of the executive departments or of
such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to
the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives their written declaration that the Presi-
dent is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office,
the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and du-
ties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President
pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Rep-
resentatives has written declaration that no inability exists, he
shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice
President and a majority of either the principal officers of the
executive department or of such other body as Congress may by
law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tem-
pore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representa-
tives their written declaration that the President is unable to
discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Con-
gress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours
for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-
one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Con-
gress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress
is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both
Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and
duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to dis-
charge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President

shall resume the powers and duties of his office.
AMENDMENT [XXVI.] 18
SECTION 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who
are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or
abridged by the United States or any State on account of age.
SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce this

article by appropriate legislation.
AMENDMENT [XXVII.] 19
No law varying the compensation for the services of the Sena-
tors and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of
Representatives shall have intervened.
18 The Twenty-sixth Amendment was proposed by Congress on March 23, 1971, upon pas-
sage by the House of Representatives, the Senate having previously passed an identical resolu-
tion on March 10, 1971. It appears officially in 85 Stat. 825. Ratification was completed on July
1, 1971, when action by the legislature of the 38th State, North Carolina, was concluded, and
the Administrator of the General Services Administration officially certified it to have been duly
ratified on July 5, 1971. 36 FED. REG. 12725.
As of the publication of this volume, 42 States had ratified this Amendment:
Connecticut, March 23, 1971; Delaware, March 23, 1971; Minnesota, March 23, 1971; Ten-
nessee, March 23, 1971; Washington, March 23, 1971; Hawaii, March 24, 1971; Massachusetts,
March 24, 1971; Montana, March 29, 1971; Arkansas, March 30, 1971; Idaho, March 30, 1971;
Iowa, March 30, 1971; Nebraska, April 2, 1971; New Jersey, April 3, 1971; Kansas, April 7,
1971; Michigan, April 7, 1971; Alaska, April 8, 1971; Maryland, April 8, 1971; Indiana, April 8,
1971; Maine, April 9, 1971; Vermont, April 16, 1971; Louisiana, April 17, 1971; California, April
19, 1971; Colorado, April 27, 1971; Pennsylvania, April 27, 1971; Texas, April 27, 1971; South
Carolina, April 28, 1971; West Virginia, April 28, 1971; New Hampshire, May 13, 1971; Ari-
zona, May 14, 1971; Rhode Island, May 27, 1971; New York, June 2, 1971; Oregon, June 4,
1971; Missouri, June 14, 1971; Wisconsin, June 22, 1971; Illinois, June 29, 1971; Alabama, June
30, 1971; Ohio, June 30, 1971; North Carolina, July 1, 1971; Oklahoma, July 1, 1971; Virginia,
July 8, 1971; Wyoming, July 8, 1971; Georgia, October 4, 1971.
19 This purported amendment was proposed by Congress on September 25, 1789, when it
passed the Senate, having previously passed the House on September 24. (1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS
88, 913). It appears officially in 1 Stat. 97. Having received in 1789–1791 only six state ratifica-
tions, the proposal then failed of ratification while ten of the 12 sent to the States by Congress
were ratified and proclaimed and became the Bill of Rights. The provision was proclaimed as
having been ratified and having become the 27th Amendment, when Michigan ratified on May
7, 1992, there being 50 States in the Union. Proclamation was by the Archivist of the United
States, pursuant to 1 U.S.C. § 106b, on May 19, 1992. F.R.Doc. 92–11951, 57 FED. REG. 21187. It
was also proclaimed by votes of the Senate and House of Representatives. 138 CONG. REC. (DAILY
ED) S 6948–49, H 3505–06.
The several state legislatures ratified the proposal on the following dates: Maryland, Decem-
ber 19, 1789; North Carolina, December 22, 1789; South Carolina, January 19, 1790; Delaware,
January 28, 1790; Vermont, November 3, 1791; Virginia, December 15, 1791; Ohio, May 6, 1873;
Wyoming, March 6, 1978; Maine, April 27, 1983; Colorado, April 22, 1984; South Dakota, Febru-
ary 1985; New Hampshire, March 7, 1985; Arizona, April 3, 1985; Tennessee, May 28, 1985;
Oklahoma, July 10, 1985; New Mexico, February 14, 1986; Indiana, February 24, 1986; Utah,
February 25, 1986; Arkansas, March 13, 1987; Montana, March 17, 1987; Connecticut, May 13,
1987; Wisconsin, July 15, 1987; Georgia, February 2, 1988; West Virginia, March 10, 1988; Loui-
siana, July 7, 1988; Iowa, February 9, 1989; Idaho, March 23, 1989; Nevada, May 25, 1989;
Kansas, April 5, 1990; Florida, May 31, 1990; North Dakota, Mary 25, 1991; Alabama, May 5,
1992; Missouri, May 5, 1992; Michigan, May 7, 1992. New Jersey subsequently ratified on May
7, 1992.
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS NOT RATIFIED
BY THE STATES
47
PROPOSED AMENDMENTS NOT RATIFIED BY THE
STATES
During the course of our history, in addition to the 27 amendments which
have been ratified by the required three-fourths of the States, six other amend-
ments have been submitted to the States but have not been ratified by them.
Beginning with the proposed Eighteenth Amendment, Congress has cus-
tomarily included a provision requiring ratification within seven years from
the time of the submission to the States. The Supreme Court in Coleman v.
Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939), declared that the question of the reasonableness
of the time within which a sufficient number of States must act is a political
question to be determined by the Congress.
In 1789, at the time of the submission of the Bill of Rights, twelve pro-
posed amendments were submitted to the States. Of these, Articles III–XII
were ratified and became the first ten amendments to the Constitution. Pro-
posed Articles I and II were not ratified with these ten, but, in 1992, Article
II was proclaimed as ratified, 203 years later. The following is the text of
proposed Article I:
ARTICLE I. After the first enumeration required by the first article of the Constitu-
tion, there shall be one Representative for every thirty thousand, until the number shall
amount to one hundred, after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress,
that there shall be not less than one hundred Representatives, nor less than one Rep-
resentative for every forty thousand persons, until the number of Representatives shall
amount to two hundred; after which the proportion shall be so regulated by Congress,
that there shall not be less than two hundred Representatives, nor more than one Rep-
resentative for every fifty thousand persons.
Thereafter, in the 2d session of the 11th Congress, the Congress pro-

posed the following amendment to the Constitution relating to acceptance
by citizens of the United States of titles of nobility from any foreign govern-
ment.
The proposed amendment which was not ratified by three-fourths of the
States reads as follows:
Resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America
in Congress assembled (two-thirds of both Houses concurring), That the following sec-
tion be submitted to the legislatures of the several states, which, when ratified by the
legislatures of three fourths of the states, shall be valid and binding, as a part of the
constitution of the United States.
If any citizen of the United States shall accept, claim, receive or retain any title of
nobility or honour, or shall, without the consent of Congress, accept and retain any
present, pension, office or emolument of any kind whatever, from any emperor, king,
prince or foreign power, such person shall cease to be a citizen of the United States,
and shall be incapable of holding any office of trust or profit under them, or either of
them.
49
During the second session of the 36th Congress on March 2, 1861, the
following proposed amendment to the Constitution relating to slavery was
signed by the President. This amendment and the proposed Thirteenth Amend-
ment were the only amendents to the Constitution signed by the President.
The President’s signature is considered unnecessary because of the constitu-
tional provision that upon the concurrence of two-thirds of both Houses of
Congress the proposal shall be submitted to the States and shall be ratified
by three-fourths of the States.
in Congress assembled, That the following article be proposed to the Legislatures of the
several States as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which, when
ratified by three-fourths of said Legislatures, shall be valid, to all intents and pur-
poses, as part of the said Constitution, viz:
“ARTICLE THIRTEEN
“No amendment shall be made to the Constitution which will authorize or give to
Congress the power to abolish or interfere, within any State, with the domestic institu-
tions thereof, including that of persons held to labor or service by the laws of said State.’’
In more recent times, only three proposed amendments have not been
ratified by three-fourths of the States. The first is the proposed child-labor
amendment, which was submitted to the States during the 1st session of the
68th Congress in June 1924, as follows:
JOINT RESOLUTION PROPOSING AN AMENDMENT TO THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the follow-
ing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
when ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States, shall be valid to
all intents and purposes as a part of the Constitution:
ARTICLE———
SECTION 1. The Congress shall have power to limit, regulate, and prohibit the labor
of persons under 18 years of age.
SECTION 2. The power of the several States is unimpaired by this article except that
the operation of State laws shall be suspended to the extent necessary to give effect to
legislation enacted by the Congress.
The second proposed amendment to have failed of ratification is the equal

rights amendment, which formally died on June 30, 1982, after a disputed
congressional extension of the original seven-year period for ratification.
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 208
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the United States relative to equal
rights for men and women.
in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That
The following article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United
States, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when
ratified by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years
from the date of its submission by the Congress:
“SECTION 1. Equality of rights under the law shall not be denied or abridged by the
United States or by any State on account of sex.
“SECTION 2. The Congress shall have the power to enforce, by appropriate legisla-
tion, the provisions of this article.
“SECTION 3. This amendment shall take effect two years after the date of ratifica-
tion.’’
The third proposed amendment relating to representation in Congress

for the District of Columbia failed of ratification, 16 States having ratified
as of the 1985 expiration date for the ratification period.
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION 554
in Congress assembled (two-thirds of each House concurring therein), That the follow-
ing article is proposed as an amendment to the Constitution of the United States, which
shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part of the Constitution when ratified by
the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date
of its submission by the Congress:
“ARTICLE
“SECTION 1. For purposes of representation in the Congress, election of the Presi-
dent and Vice President, and article V of this Constitution, the District constituting
the seat of government of the United States shall be treated as though it were a State.
“SEC. 2. The exercise of the rights and powers conferred under this article shall be
by the people of the District constituting the seat of government, and as shall be pro-
vided by the Congress.
“SEC. 3. The twenty-third article of amendment to the Constitution of the United
States is hereby repealed.
“SEC. 4. This article shall be inoperative, unless it shall have been ratified as an
amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States
within seven years from the date of its submission.’’
THE
OF AMERICA
WITH ANALYSIS
53
THE PREAMBLE
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more
perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, pro-
vide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and
secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity,
do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States
of America.
PURPOSE AND EFFECT OF THE PREAMBLE
Although the preamble is not a source of power for any depart-
ment of the Federal Government,1 the Supreme Court has often re-
ferred to it as evidence of the origin, scope, and purpose of the Con-
stitution.2 “Its true office,” wrote Joseph Story in his Commentaries,
“is to expound the nature and extent and application of the powers
actually conferred by the Constitution, and not substantively to cre-
ate them. For example, the preamble declares one object to be, ‘pro-
vide for the common defense.’ No one can doubt that this does not
enlarge the powers of Congress to pass any measures which they
deem useful for the common defence. But suppose the terms of a
given power admit of two constructions, the one more restrictive,
the other more liberal, and each of them is consistent with the words,
but is, and ought to be, governed by the intent of the power; if one
could promote and the other defeat the common defence, ought not
the former, upon the soundest principles of interpretation, to be ad-
opted?” 3
1 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905).

2 E.g., the Court has read the preamble as bearing witness to the fact that the
Constitution emanated from the people and was not the act of sovereign and inde-
pendent States. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819) Chisholm v.
Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.)
304 (1816), and that it was made for, and is binding only in, the United States of
America. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453, 464 (1891).
3 1 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (Boston: 1833),
462. For a lengthy exegesis of the preamble phrase by phrase, see M. ADLER & W.
GORMAN, THE AMERICAN TESTAMENT (New York: 1975), 63–118.
55
ARTICLE I
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
CONTENTS
Page
Section 1. Legislative Powers ................................................................................................... 63
Separation of Powers and Checks and Balances ............................................................. 63
Theory and Implementation ....................................................................................... 63
Judicial Enforcement .................................................................................................. 65
Bicameralism ...................................................................................................................... 71
Enumerated, Implied, Resulting, and Inherent Powers ................................................. 71
Delegation of Legislative Power ........................................................................................ 74
Overview of the Doctrine of Nondelegability ............................................................ 74
The Nature and Scope of Permissible Delegations .................................................. 78
Filling Up the Details .......................................................................................... 79
Contingent Legislation ........................................................................................ 80
Standards .............................................................................................................. 81
Conflict Between State or Federal Statutes and Delegated Authority ........... 86
Delegations to the President in Areas of Shared Authority .................................... 87
Delegations to States and to Private Entities .......................................................... 88
Particular Subjects or Concerns—Closer Scrutiny or Uniform Standard? ............ 91
Crime and Punishment ....................................................................................... 92
Delegation and Individual Liberties ................................................................... 93
Congressional Investigations ............................................................................................. 94
Source of the Power to Investigate ............................................................................ 94
Investigations of Conduct of Executive Department ................................................ 96
Investigations of Members of Congress ..................................................................... 97
Investigations in Aid of Legislation ........................................................................... 98
Purpose ................................................................................................................. 98
Protection of Witnesses; Pertinency and Related Matters ............................... 100
Protection of Witnesses; Constitutional Guarantees ......................................... 105
Sanctions of the Investigatory Power: Contempt ..................................................... 107
Section 2. The House of Representatives ................................................................................ 109
Clause 1. Congressional Districting .................................................................................. 109
Voter (elector) Qualifications ...................................................................................... 113
Clause 2. Qualifications of Members of Congress ........................................................... 114
When the Qualifications Must Be Possessed ............................................................ 114
Exclusivity of Constitutional Qualifications ............................................................. 115
Congressional Additions ...................................................................................... 115
State Additions ..................................................................................................... 117
Clause 3. Apportionment of Seats In the House ............................................................. 119
The Census Requirement ........................................................................................... 120
Clause 4. Vacancies ............................................................................................................ 123
In General .................................................................................................................... 123
Clause 5. Officers and Powers of Impeachment .............................................................. 123
In General .................................................................................................................... 123
Section 3. The Senate ................................................................................................................ 123
Clauses 1 and 2. Composition and Election ..................................................................... 123
57
58 ART. I—LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 3. The Senate—Continued

Clauses 1 and 2. Composition and Election—Continued
In General .................................................................................................................... 123
Clauses 3–5. Qualifications, Vice-President, Officers ...................................................... 124
In General .................................................................................................................... 124
Clauses 6 and 7. Trial and Judgment On Impeachment ................................................ 124
In General .................................................................................................................... 124
Section 4. Elections ................................................................................................................... 124
Clause 1. Congressional Power to Regulate ..................................................................... 124
Legislation Protecting Electoral Process ................................................................... 125
Clause 2. Time of Assembling ........................................................................................... 129
In General .................................................................................................................... 129
Section 5. Powers and Duties of the Houses ........................................................................... 129
Clauses 1–4. Judging Elections, Quorum, Rules, Discipline, Journal, Adjournment ... 129
Powers and Duties of the Houses .............................................................................. 130
Power To Judge Elections .................................................................................... 130
“A Quorum To Do Business” ............................................................................... 130
Rules of Proceedings ............................................................................................ 131
Punishment and Expulsion of Members ............................................................ 132
Duty To Keep a Journal ...................................................................................... 133
Section 6. Rights and Disabilities of Members ....................................................................... 134
Clause 1. Compensation and Immunities of Members ................................................... 134
Congressional Pay ....................................................................................................... 134
Privilege From Arrest ................................................................................................. 135
Privilege of Speech or Debate .................................................................................... 136
Members ................................................................................................................ 136
Congressional Employees .................................................................................... 140
Clause 2. Disabilities of Members .................................................................................... 142
Appointment to Executive Office ............................................................................... 142
Incompatible Offices .................................................................................................... 144
Section 7. Legislative Process ................................................................................................... 144
Clauses 1–3. The Legislative Process ............................................................................... 144
Origination of Revenue Bills ...................................................................................... 145
Approval by the President .......................................................................................... 147
The Veto Power ............................................................................................................ 147
Presentation of Resolutions ........................................................................................ 150
The Legislative Veto ............................................................................................ 151
The Line Item Veto .............................................................................................. 154
Section 8. Powers of Congress .................................................................................................. 155
Clause 1. Power to Tax ...................................................................................................... 155
Scope of the Taxing Power ......................................................................................... 155
Limits on Federal Taxation of States and Their Interests .............................. 156
Current Scope of State Immunity from Federal Taxation ............................... 158
Uniformity Requirement ..................................................................................... 160
Regulation by Taxation ............................................................................................... 161
Spending For the General Welfare ............................................................................ 164
Scope of the Power ............................................................................................... 164
Conditional Grants-in-Aid ................................................................................... 168
Clause 2. Borrowing Power ............................................................................................... 173
Clause 3. Power to Regulate Commerce ........................................................................... 174
Federal Power and State Limitation ......................................................................... 174
Definition of Terms ...................................................................................................... 175
Commerce ............................................................................................................. 175
ART. I—LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT 59
Section 8. Powers of Congress—Continued

Clause 3. Power to Regulate Commerce—Continued
To Regulate ........................................................................................................... 178
With Foreign Nations .......................................................................................... 180
Among the Several States ................................................................................... 181
And With the Indian Tribes ................................................................................ 182
Overview of Congressional Power .............................................................................. 187
Channels of Commerce ........................................................................................ 188
Instrumentalities, Persons or Things ................................................................. 189
Affecting Commerce ............................................................................................. 191
Limitations on the Commerce Clause ....................................................................... 194
Requirement that Regulation be Economic ....................................................... 194
Activity Versus Inactivity .................................................................................... 198
Specific Applications .................................................................................................... 199
Historical Background ......................................................................................... 199
Congressional Regulation of Waterways ............................................................ 200
Navigation ..................................................................................................... 200
Water Flow .................................................................................................... 203
Congressional Regulation of Land Transportation ........................................... 205
Development of Highways and Railroads ................................................... 205
Interstate and Intrastate Rate Regulation ................................................. 206
Congressional Regulation of Labor in Interstate Rail Transportation .... 209
Congressional Regulation of Other Methods of Conveyance .................... 210
Congressional Regulation of the Commercial Exchange of Goods .................. 211
Limiting the Federal Sphere: The Sugar Trust Case ................................ 211
The Expansive “Current of Commerce” Doctrine: The Swift Case .......... 214
Stockyards and Grain Futures Acts: The Swift Case Applied .................. 215
Congressional Regulation of Production and Labor: Antidepression Legislation . 217
National Industrial Recovery Act and Agriculture Adjustment Act ......... 218
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act ............................................................. 219
Railroad Retirement Act ............................................................................... 220
National Labor Relations Act ...................................................................... 221
Fair Labor Standards Act ............................................................................ 223
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act ...................................................... 225
Congressional Prohibitions on Foreign Commerce ........................................... 227
Jefferson’s Embargo ...................................................................................... 227
Banned Articles and Protective Tariffs ....................................................... 228
Congressional Prohibitions on Interstate Commerce ........................................ 229
Background .................................................................................................... 229
The Lottery Case .......................................................................................... 230
The Darby Case ............................................................................................ 232
Congressional Regulation of Civil Rights .......................................................... 233
Congressional Regulation of Criminal Misconduct .......................................... 235
The Commerce Clause As a Restraint On State Powers ......................................... 236
Doctrinal Background .......................................................................................... 236
The State Proprietary Activity (Market Participant) Exception .............. 242
The Congressional Authorization Exception ............................................... 243
“Dormant” Commerce Clause: The Old Law ..................................................... 247
Taxation ......................................................................................................... 247
Regulation ...................................................................................................... 250
“Dormant Commerce Clause”: The Modern Law .............................................. 254
Taxation ......................................................................................................... 254
Regulation ...................................................................................................... 262

Clause 3. Power to Regulate Commerce—Continued
Foreign Commerce and State Powers ................................................................ 271
Clause 4. Naturalization and Bankruptcy ....................................................................... 274
Naturalization and Citizenship .................................................................................. 275
Nature and Scope of Congress’ Power ................................................................ 275
Categories of Citizens: Birth and Naturalization ............................................. 277
The Naturalization of Aliens ............................................................................... 278
Rights of Naturalized Persons ............................................................................ 280
Expatriation: Loss of Citizenship ....................................................................... 283
Aliens ............................................................................................................................ 286
Admission .............................................................................................................. 286
Deportation ........................................................................................................... 291
Bankruptcy .................................................................................................................. 292
Persons Who May Be Released From Debt ....................................................... 292
Liberalization of Relief Granted and Expansion of the Rights of the
Trustee ............................................................................................................... 293
Constitutional Limitations on the Bankruptcy Power ...................................... 294
Constitutional Status of State Insolvency Laws: Preemption ......................... 295
Clauses 5 and 6. Money ..................................................................................................... 298
Fiscal and Monetary Powers of Congress ................................................................. 298
Coinage, Weights, and Measures ........................................................................ 298
Punishment of Counterfeiting ............................................................................. 299
Borrowing Power Versus Fiscal Power .............................................................. 299
Clause 7. Post Office .......................................................................................................... 300
Postal Power ................................................................................................................ 300
“Establish” ............................................................................................................ 300
Power To Protect the Mails ................................................................................. 301
Power To Prevent Harmful Use of the Postal Facilities .................................. 302
Exclusive Power as an Adjunct to Other Powers .............................................. 303
State Regulations Affecting the Mails ................................................................ 304
Clause 8. Copyrights and Patents .................................................................................... 305
Origins and Scope of the Power ................................................................................. 305
Patentable Discoveries ................................................................................................ 307
Procedure in Issuing Patents ..................................................................................... 310
Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright ............................................ 310
Power of Congress Over Patents and Copyrights .................................................... 312
Copyright and the First Amendment ........................................................................ 313
State Power Affecting Patents and Copyrights ........................................................ 314
Trade-Marks and Advertisements .............................................................................. 316
Clause 9. Creation of Courts ............................................................................................. 316
In General .................................................................................................................... 316
Clause 10. Maritime Crimes ............................................................................................. 316
Piracies, Felonies, and Offenses Against the Law of Nations ................................. 316
Origin of the Clause ............................................................................................. 316
Definition of Offenses ........................................................................................... 317
Extraterritorial Reach of the Power ................................................................... 318
Clauses 11–14. The War Power ......................................................................................... 319
Source and Scope ......................................................................................................... 319
Three Theories ...................................................................................................... 319
An Inherent Power ............................................................................................... 320
A Complexus of Granted Powers ........................................................................ 320
Declaration of War ...................................................................................................... 321

Clauses 11–14. The War Power—Continued
The Power to Raise and Maintain Armed Forces .................................................... 325
Purpose of Specific Grants .................................................................................. 325
Time Limit on Appropriations for the Army ...................................................... 325
Conscription .......................................................................................................... 326
Care of the Armed Forces .................................................................................... 327
Trial and Punishment of Offenses: Servicemen, Civilian Employees, and
Dependents ........................................................................................................ 329
Servicemen .................................................................................................... 330
Civilians and Dependents ............................................................................ 332
War Legislation ........................................................................................................... 333
War Powers in Peacetime .................................................................................... 333
Delegation of Legislative Power in Wartime ..................................................... 336
Constitutional Rights In Wartime ............................................................................. 337
Constitution and the Advance of the Flag ......................................................... 337
Theater of Military Operations .................................................................... 337
Enemy Country ............................................................................................. 338
Enemy Property ............................................................................................ 339
Prizes of War ................................................................................................. 339
The Constitution at Home in Wartime .............................................................. 340
Personal Liberty ............................................................................................ 340
Enemy Aliens ................................................................................................ 342
Eminent Domain ........................................................................................... 343
Rent and Price Controls ............................................................................... 344
Clauses 15 and 16. The Militia ......................................................................................... 345
The Militia Clauses ..................................................................................................... 345
Calling Out the Militia ........................................................................................ 345
Regulation of the Militia ..................................................................................... 346
Clause 17. District of Columbia; Federal Property ......................................................... 347
Seat of the Government .............................................................................................. 347
Authority Over Places Purchased .............................................................................. 351
“Places” .................................................................................................................. 351
Duration of Federal Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 352
Reservation of Jurisdiction by States ................................................................. 353
Clause 18. Necessary and Proper Clause ......................................................................... 353
Scope and Operation ................................................................................................... 353
Definition of Punishment and Crimes ....................................................................... 355
Chartering of Banks .................................................................................................... 357
Currency Regulations .................................................................................................. 357
Power to Charter Corporations .................................................................................. 358
Courts and Judicial Proceedings ................................................................................ 358
Special Acts Concerning Claims ................................................................................ 359
Maritime Law .............................................................................................................. 359
Section 9. Powers Denied to Congress ..................................................................................... 359
Clause 1. Importation of Slaves ........................................................................................ 359
In General .................................................................................................................... 359
Clause 2. Habeas Corpus Suspension .............................................................................. 360
In General .................................................................................................................... 360
Clause 3. Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws ..................................................... 362
Bills of Attainder ......................................................................................................... 362
Ex Post Facto Laws .................................................................................................... 366
Definition .............................................................................................................. 366
Section 9. Powers Denied to Congress—Continued

Clause 3. Bills of Attainder and Ex Post Facto Laws—Continued
What Constitutes Punishment ............................................................................ 366
Change in Place or Mode of Trial ....................................................................... 368
Clause 4. Taxes ................................................................................................................... 368
Direct Taxes ................................................................................................................. 368
The Hylton Case .................................................................................................. 368
From the Hylton to the Pollock Case ................................................................. 369
Restriction of the Pollock Decision ..................................................................... 370
Miscellaneous ....................................................................................................... 371
Clause 5. Duties On Exports From States ....................................................................... 372
Taxes On Exports ........................................................................................................ 372
Stamp Taxes ......................................................................................................... 373
Clause 6. Preference to Ports ............................................................................................ 374
The No Preference Clause .......................................................................................... 374
Clause 7. Appropriations and Accounting of Public Money ............................................ 375
Appropriations ............................................................................................................. 375
Payment of Claims ...................................................................................................... 376
Clause 8. Titles of Nobility; Presents ............................................................................... 376
In General .................................................................................................................... 376
Section 10. Powers Denied to the States ................................................................................. 377
Clause 1. Treaties, Coining Money, Impairing Contracts, Etc. ...................................... 377
Clause 2. Duties On Exports and Imports ....................................................................... 417
Duties On Exports or Imports ................................................................................... 417
Scope ..................................................................................................................... 417
Privilege Taxes ..................................................................................................... 419
Property Taxes ...................................................................................................... 419
Inspection Laws .................................................................................................... 420
Clause 3. Tonnage Duties and Interstate Compacts ....................................................... 421
Tonnage Duties ............................................................................................................ 421
Keeping Troops ............................................................................................................ 422
Interstate Compacts .................................................................................................... 422
Background of Clause .......................................................................................... 422
Subject Matter of Interstate Compacts .............................................................. 424
Consent of Congress ............................................................................................. 425
Grants of Franchise to Corporations by Two States ......................................... 425
Legal Effect of Interstate Compacts ................................................................... 426
LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT
ARTICLE I
SECTION 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested

in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Sen-
ate and House of Representatives.
SEPARATION OF POWERS AND CHECKS AND
BALANCES
Theory and Implementation

The Constitution grants three broad powers—legislative, execu-
tive, and judicial—but it does not contain an express requirement
that the boundaries between these powers be preserved, nor does
it expressly mandate a requirement for a system of checks and bal-
ances. Yet the three powers are expressly granted to three separate
branches, and the Constitution provides throughout the means by
which each of the branches can resist the blandishments and incur-
sions of the others. The Framers drew up our basic charter of gov-
ernment against a background rich in the theorizing of scholars and
statesmen. The goal of these thinkers, and of the Founders, was to
establish a governmental system which confers sufficient power to
govern while withholding the ability to abridge liberties.1
When the colonies separated from Great Britain following the
Revolution, the framers of their constitutions were imbued with the
profound tradition of separation of powers, and they freely and ex-
pressly embodied the principle in their charters.2 Because of the
colonial experience with royal governors and judges representing the
interests of the British Crown, however, the theory of checks and
balances on legislatures was less favored. As a consequence, viola-
1 Among the best historical treatments are M. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPA-
RATION OF POWERS (1967), and W. GWYN, THE MEANING OF THE SEPARATION OF POWERS (1965).
2 Thus the Constitution of Virginia of 1776 provided: “The legislative, executive,
and judiciary department shall be separate and distinct, so that neither exercise
the powers properly belonging to the other; nor shall any person exercise the pow-
ers of more than one of them, at the same time[.]” Reprinted in 10 SOURCES AND DOCU-
MENTS OF UNITED STATES CONSTITUTIONS 52 (W. S. Windler ed., 1979). See also 5 id. at
96. Art. XXX of Part First, Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 provided that: “In
the government of this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exer-
cise the executive and judicial powers, or either of them; the executive shall never
exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them; the judicial shall never
exercise the legislative and executive powers, or either of them; to the end it may
be a government of laws, and not of men.”
63
Sec. 1—The Congress Legislative Powers
tion of the separation-of-powers doctrine by the legislatures of the

states was commonplace prior to the convening of the Constitu-
tional Convention.3 Ultimately, it was both theory and experience
which guided the Framers in the summer of 1787.4
The implementation of the doctrine of separation of powers in
the Constitution was premised on several generally held principles:
the separation of government into three branches; the concept that
each branch performs unique and identifiable functions that are ap-
propriate to each; and the limitation of the personnel of each branch
to that branch, so that no one person or group should be able to
serve in more than one branch simultaneously. Although the Con-
stitution to a great extent effectuated these principles, contempora-
neous critics objected to what they regarded as the curious inter-
mixture of functions, including, for example, the veto power of the
President over legislation and the role of the Senate both in the
appointment of executive officers and judges and in the treaty-
making process. In a powerful series of essays, James Madison ad-
dressed objections to these checks and balances.5
To disprove these critics, Madison relied on the writings of “the
celebrated” Montesquieu, the “oracle who is always consulted” in
these matters. Although “this essential precaution in favor of lib-
erty,” that is, the separation of the three great functions of govern-
ment, had been achieved by the drafting of the Constitution, Madi-
son argued that the doctrine did not demand rigid separation.
Montesquieu and other theorists “did not mean that these depart-
ments ought to have no partial agency in, or control over, the acts
of each other,” but rather that liberty was most endangered “where
the whole power of one department is exercised by the same hands
which possess the whole power of another department.” 6 In prac-
tice, the doctrine did not demand absolute separation, and neither
closely drawn demarcations of institutional boundaries nor appeals
to the electorate were appropriate to achieve its proper function-
ing.7 Instead, security against concentration of powers “consists in
giving to those who administer each department the necessary con-
3 “In republican government the legislative authority, necessarily, predomi-
nates.” THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, 350 (Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See also id. at No.
48, 332–334. This theme continues today to influence the Court’s evaluation of con-
gressional initiatives. E.g., Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for
the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 273–74, 277 (1991). But compare id.
at 286 n. 3 (Justice White dissenting).
4 The intellectual history through the state period and the Convention proceed-
ings is detailed in G. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787 (1969)
(see index entries under “separation of powers”).
5 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 47–51, 323–353 (Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
6 Id. at No. 47, 325–326 (emphasis in original).
7 Id. at Nos. 47–49, 325–343.
stitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of

the others.” Thus, “[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambi-
tion. The interest of the man must be connected with the constitu-
tional rights of the place.” 8
Institutional devices to achieve these principles pervade the Con-
stitution. Bicameralism reduces legislative predominance, while the
presidential veto gives to the President a means of defending his
priorities and preventing congressional overreaching. The Senate’s
role in appointments and treaties checks the President. The courts
are assured independence through good-behavior tenure and secu-
rity of compensation, and the judges through judicial review will
check the other two branches. The impeachment power gives to Con-
gress the authority to root out corruption and abuse of power in
the other two branches. And so on.
Judicial Enforcement
The difficulty for the Court in policing the separation of powers
lies in its efforts to maintain the theoretical separation of branches
while also accommodating the practical need for some intermixture
of governmental functions.9 Further, since the power of the Court
itself is subject to the dictates of the doctrine, the role of the Su-
preme Court has been problematic at best. In fact, throughout much
of our history, most notable political disputes over separation of power
arose between the elected “political branches” and were resolved with-
out judicial intervention. It is only in recent decades that cases in-
volving the doctrine have been regularly decided by the Court.
For many years, judicial construction of the doctrine arose only
in relation to particular clauses of the Constitution. For instance,
the nondelegation doctrine—that Congress may not delegate its Ar-
ticle I legislative authority—was from the beginning suffused with
a separation-of-powers premise.10 However, the almost immediate
demise of judicial enforcement of the doctrine was a reflection of
the Court’s inability to give any meaningful content to its separation-
of-powers concerns.11 On the other hand, the Court has periodically
8 Id. at No. 51, 349.

9 “While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also con-
templates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable govern-
ment. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but
reciprocity.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jus-
tice Jackson concurring).
10 E.g., Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825).

11 See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 415–16 (1989) (Justice Scalia
dissenting).
taken a strong protective position on behalf of the President’s pow-

ers, but such posture has been maintained with only varying de-
grees of success.12
Following this lengthy period of relative inattention to separation-
of-powers issues, the Court since 1976 13 has relied on the doctrine
in numerous cases, with the result being a substantial curtailing of
congressional discretion to structure the National Government. In
short order, the Court found constitutional barriers to: a congressio-
nal scheme to provide for automatic deficit-reduction based on the
critical involvement of an officer with significant legislative ties; 14
the practice set out in more than 200 laws of allowing a congressio-
nal veto of executive actions; 15 and the vesting of broad judicial pow-
ers to handle bankruptcy cases in officers not possessing security
of tenure and salary.16 On the other hand, the Court upheld the
highly debated establishment by Congress of a process by which in-
dependent special prosecutors could be appointed to investigate and
prosecute cases of alleged corruption in the Executive Branch. This
last opinion presaged a judicial approach more accepting of the blend-
ing of governmental functions at the federal level.17
Important as the results were in this series of cases, it was the
development of two separate and inconsistent analytical ap-
proaches that has occasioned the greatest amount of commentary.
The existence of the two approaches, either of which can appar-
ently be employed at the discretion of the Justices, makes it diffi-
cult to predict the outcomes of cases involving alternative fashions
of implementing governmental policy. Historically, it appears that
the Court most often uses a more strict analysis in cases in which
infringements of executive powers are alleged and a less strict analy-
sis when the powers of the other two branches are concerned. The
special prosecutor decision, however, followed by a decision sustain-
ing the appointment of judges to the United States Sentencing Com-
mission, may ultimately signal the adoption of the less strict analy-
12 The principal example is Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926), written
by Chief Justice Taft, himself a former President. The breadth of the holding was
modified in considerable degree in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 295 U.S.
602 (1935), and the premise of the decision itself was recast and largely softened in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
13 Beginning with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109–43 (1976), a relatively easy
case, in which Congress had attempted to reserve to itself the power to appoint cer-
tain officers charged with enforcement of a law.
14 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
15 INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
16 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
17 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). See also Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361 (1989).

sis for all separation of power cases or it may turn out to be but an
exception to the Court’s dual approach.18
Although the two analytical approaches have been character-
ized in various ways, the names generally attached to them have
been “formalist” (applied to the more strict line of cases) and “func-
tional” (applied to the less strict). The formalist approach empha-
sizes the necessity of maintaining three distinct branches of govern-
ment by drawing bright lines demarcating them and distinguishing
among them based on their respective roles.19 The functional ap-
proach emphasizes the core functions of each branch and asks whether
the challenged action threatens the essential attributes of such branch’s
functions. Under this approach, there is considerable flexibility af-
forded the moving branch—usually Congress acting to make struc-
tural or institutional change—if there is little significant risk of im-
pairment of a core function or if there is a compelling reason for
the action.20
18 The tenor of a later case, Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens
for the Abatement of Airport Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991), was decidedly formalistic,
but it involved a factual situation and a doctrinal predicate easily rationalized by
the principles of Morrison and Mistretta, aggrandizement of its powers by Congress.
Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989), reasserted the fundamental
status of Marathon, again in a bankruptcy courts context, although the issue was
the right to a jury trial under the Seventh Amendment rather than, strictly speak-
ing, a separation-of-powers question. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991),
pursued a straightforward appointments-clause analysis, informed by a separation-
of-powers analysis but not governed by it. Finally, in Public Citizen v. U.S. Depart-
ment of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467 (1989) (concurring), Justice Kennedy would have
followed the formalist approach, but he explicitly grounded it on the distinction be-
tween an express constitutional vesting of power as against implicit vestings. Sepa-
rately, the Court has for some time viewed the standing requirement for access to
judicial review as reflecting a separation-of-powers component—confining the courts
to their proper sphere – Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984), but that view
seemed largely superfluous to the conceptualization of standing rules. However, in
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992), the Court imported the
take-care clause, obligating the President to see to the faithful execution of the laws,
into standing analysis, creating a substantial barrier to congressional decisions to
provide for judicial review of executive actions. It is not at all clear, however, that
the effort, by Justice Scalia, enjoys the support of a majority of the Court. Id. at
579–81 (Justices Kennedy and Souter concurring). The cited cases seem to demon-
strate that a strongly formalistic wing of the Court continues to exist.
19 “The hydraulic pressure inherent within each of the separate Branches to ex-
ceed the outer limits of its power . . . must be resisted. Although not ‘hermetically’
sealed from one another, the powers delegated to the three Branches are function-
ally identifiable.” INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). See id. at 944–51; North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64–66 (1982) (plu-
rality opinion); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 721–727 (1986).
20 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prod-
ucts Co., 473 U.S. 568, 587, 589–93 (1985). The Court had first formulated this analy-
sis in cases challenging alleged infringements on presidential powers, United States
v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974); Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433
U.S. 425, 442–43 (1977), but it had subsequently turned to the more strict test. Schor
and Thomas both involved provisions challenged as infringing judicial powers.
In INS v. Chadha the Court used the formalist approach to in-

validate a legislative veto device by which Congress could set aside
a statutorily authorized suspension by the Attorney General of the
deportation of an alien. Central to the decision were two concep-
tual premises. First, the action Congress had taken was found to
be legislative—because it had the purpose and effect of altering the
legal rights, duties, and relations of persons outside the legislative
branch—mandating that Congress comply with the bicameralism and
presentment requirements of the Constitution.21 Second, the Attor-
ney General was performing an executive function in implement-
ing the delegation from Congress, so that the legislative veto was
an impermissible interference in the execution of the laws. The Court
noted that, rather than using a veto, Congress could act only by
legislating, thus changing the terms of its delegation.22 Then, in
Bowsher v. Synar, the Court held that Congress could not vest even
part of the execution of the laws in an officer, the Comptroller Gen-
eral, who was subject to removal by Congress, because to do so would
enable Congress to play a role in the execution of the laws. Again,
Congress could act only by passing other laws.23
On that same day that Bowsher was decided through a formal-
ist analysis, however, the Court in CFTC v. Schor 24 used the less
strict, functional approach in upholding the power of a regulatory
agency to adjudicate a state common-law issue. Of even more con-
cern was that such power previously had been denied to a non-
Article III bankruptcy court in Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., a formalist plurality opinion with a limiting
concurrence.25 Sustaining the agency’s power, the Court in Schor
emphasized “the principle that ‘practical attention to substance rather
than doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform appli-
cation of Article III.’ ” 26 It further held that in evaluating such a
separation-of-powers challenge, the Court had to consider the ex-
tent to which the “essential attributes of judicial power” were re-
served to Article III courts. Conversely, the Court had to evaluate
the extent to which the non-Article III entity exercised the jurisdic-
21 462 U.S. at 952.
22 462 U.S. at 952.
23 478 U.S. at 726–727.
24 478 U.S. 833 (1986)
25 Although the agency in Schor was an independent regulatory commission and
the bankruptcy court in Northern Pipeline was either an Article I court or an ad-
junct to an Article III court, the characterization of the entity is irrelevant, and, in
fact, the Court made nothing of the difference. The issue in each case was whether
the judicial power of the United States could be conferred on an entity that was not
an Article III court.
26 478 U.S.at 848 (quoting Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473
U.S. 568, 587 (1985)).

tion and powers normally vested only in Article III courts; the ori-
gin and importance of the rights to be adjudicated; and the con-
cerns that drove Congress to depart from the requirements of Article
III.27 Bowsher, the Court said, was not contrary, because, “[u]nlike
Bowsher, this case raises no question of the aggrandizement of con-
gressional power at the expense of a coordinate branch.” 28 The test
was a balancing one—whether Congress had impermissibly under-
mined the role of another branch without appreciable expansion of
its own power.
Although the Court has never directly indicated its standards
for choosing one analysis over the other, it has implied that the for-
malist approach was proper when the Constitution clearly commit-
ted a function or duty to a particular branch and the functional
approach was proper when the constitutional text was indetermi-
nate and a decision must be made on the basis of the likelihood of
impairment of the essential powers of a branch. Still, the overall
result has been to offer a strenuous protection of executive powers
and a concomitant relaxed view of incursions into the powers of the
other branches. It was thus a surprise when, in Morrison v. Olson,
the independent counsel case, the Court, again without stating why
it chose that analysis, used the functional standard to sustain the
creation of the independent counsel and that officer’s exercise of
prosecutorial authority 29
The independent-counsel statute, the Court emphasized, was not
an attempt by Congress to increase its own power at the expense
of the executive nor did it constitute a judicial usurpation of execu-
tive power. Moreover, the Court stated, the law did not “impermis-
sibly undermine” the powers of the Executive Branch nor did it “dis-
rupt the proper balance between the coordinate branches [by]
prevent[ing] the Executive Branch from accomplishing its constitu-
tionally assigned functions.” 30 The Court acknowledged that the stat-
ute undeniably reduced executive control over what it had previ-
ously identified as a core executive function—the execution of the
laws through criminal prosecution—through its appointment provi-
27 Schor, 478 U.S. at 851.
28 478 U.S. at 856.
29 487 U.S. 654 (1988). To be sure, the Appointments Clause (Article II, § 2) spe-
cifically provides that Congress may vest in the courts the power to appoint inferior
officers, 487 U.S. at 670–677),, making possible the contention that, unlike Chadha
and Bowsher, Morrison is a textual commitment case. But the Court’s separate evalu-
ation of the separation-of-powers issue does not appear to turn on that distinction.
Id. at 685–96. Nevertheless, the existence of this possible distinction should make
one wary about lightly reading Morrison as a rejection of formalism when executive
powers are litigated.
30 487 U.S. at 695 (quoting, respectively, Schor, 478 U.S. at 856, and Nixon v.
Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. at 443).

sions and its limitation of removal to a “good cause” standard. The

Court nonetheless noted the circumscribed nature of the reduction,
the discretion of the Attorney General to initiate appointment, the
limited jurisdiction of the counsel, and the power of the Attorney
General to ensure that the laws are faithfully executed by the coun-
sel. This balancing, the Court thought, left the President with suf-
ficient control to ensure that he is able to perform his constitution-
ally assigned functions.
A notably more pragmatic, functional analysis suffused the opin-
ion of the Court when it upheld the constitutionality of the Sentenc-
ing Commission in Mistretta v. United States.31 Charged with pro-
mulgating guidelines binding on federal judges in sentencing convicted
offenders, the seven-member Commission, three members of which
had to be Article III judges, was made an independent entity in
the judicial branch. The President appointed all seven members, choos-
ing the judges from a list compiled by the Judicial Conference, and
he could remove from the Commission any member for cause. Ac-
cording to the Court, its separation-of-powers jurisprudence is al-
ways animated by the concerns of encroachment and aggrandize-
ment. “Accordingly, we have not hesitated to strike down provisions
of law that either accrete to a single Branch powers more appropri-
ately diffused among separate Branches or that undermine the au-
thority and independence of one or another coordinate Branch.” 32
Thus, to each of the discrete questions, the placement of the Com-
mission, the appointment of the members, especially the service of
federal judges, and the removal power, the Court carefully ana-
lyzed whether one branch had been given power it could not exer-
cise or had enlarged its powers impermissibly and whether any branch
would have its institutional integrity threatened by the structural
arrangement.
Although it is possible, even likely, that Morrison and Mistretta
represent a decision by the Court to adopt the functional analysis
for all separation-of-powers cases, the history of adjudication since
1976 and the shift of approach between Myers and Humphrey’s Ex-
ecutor suggest caution. Recurrences of the formalist approach have
been noted. Additional decisions must be forthcoming before it can
be decided that the Court has finally settled on the functional ap-
proach.
31 488 U.S. 361 (1989). Significantly, the Court acknowledged reservations with
respect to the placement of the Commission as an independent entity in the judicial

branch. Id. at 384, 397, 407–08. As in Morrison, Justice Scalia was the lone dis-
senter, arguing for a fairly rigorous application of separation-of-powers principles.
Id. at 413, 422–27.
32 488 U.S. at 382.
BICAMERALISM
For the Framers, historical and contemporary examples of both
unicameral and bicameral legislatures abounded. Following the Revo-
lution, a number of state legislatures were created unicameral, and
the Continental Congress, limited in power as it was, consisted of
one house. On the other hand, some of the ancient republics, upon
whose example the Framers often relied, had two-house legisla-
tures. Or, of direct historical relevance, the Parliament of Great Brit-
ain had two houses based on two social orders, the hereditary aris-
tocracy represented in the House of Lords and the freeholders of
the land represented in the House of Commons.
From the beginning of the Convention, a two-house Congress
was called for in the Virginia Plan. The Great Compromise, one of
the critical decisions leading to a successful completion of the Con-
vention, resolved the dispute about the national legislature by pro-
viding for a House of Representatives apportioned on population and
a Senate in which the states were equally represented. The first
function served, thus, was federalism.33 Coextensively important, how-
ever, was the separation-of-powers principle served. The legislative
power, the Framers both knew and feared, was predominant in a
society dependent upon the suffrage of the people, and it was impor-
tant to have a precaution against the triumph of transient majori-
ties. Hence the Constitution’s requirement—that before lawmaking
could be carried out bills must be deliberated in two houses, their
Members beholden to different constituencies—was in pursuit of this
observation from experience.34
Events since 1787, of course, have altered both the separation-
of-powers and the federalism bases of bicameralism, in particular
the adoption of the Seventeenth Amendment resulting in the popu-
lar election of Senators, so that the differences between the two cham-
bers are today less pronounced.
ENUMERATED, IMPLIED, RESULTING, AND INHERENT

POWERS
Two important doctrines of constitutional law—that the Fed-
eral Government is one of enumerated powers and that legislative
powers may not be delegated—are derived in part from this sec-
tion. The classic statement of the former is by Chief Justice Mar-
shall in McCulloch v. Maryland: “This government is acknowl-
33 THE FEDERALIST, No. 51, 250–257 (Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
34 Id. at No. 51, 347–353 (Madison). The assurance of the safeguard is built
into the presentment clause. Article I, § 7, cl. 2; see also id. at cl. 3. The structure is
not often the subject of case law, but it was a foundational matter in INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919, 944–951 (1983).
edged by all, to be one of enumerated powers. The principle, that it

can exercise only the powers granted to it, would seem too appar-
ent, to have required to be enforced by all those arguments, which
its enlightened friends, while it was depending before the people,
found it necessary to urge; that principle is now universally admit-
ted.” 35
Early in the history of the Constitution, however, Alexander Ham-
ilton asserted that the “executive power,” textually committed to the
President, is not confined to those items expressly enumerated in
Article II.36 A similarly broad conception of “the judicial power of
the United States,” as vested in the courts, is seen in Justice Brew-
er’s opinion for the Court in Kansas v. Colorado.37 But, even the
more narrowly worded delegation to Congress of “legislative pow-
ers herein granted” is severely strained by Chief Justice Marshall’s
broad conception of some of these powers. In McCulloch v. Mary-
land, the Chief Justice asserted that “[t]he sword and the purse,
all the external relations, and no inconsiderable portion of the in-
dustry of the nation, are intrusted to its government”; 38 he charac-
terizes “the power of making war, or levying taxes, or of regulating
commerce” as “great substantive and independent power[s]”; 39 and
he declares that the power conferred by the “necessary and proper”
clause embraces all legislative “means which are appropriate” to carry
out the legitimate ends of the Constitution, unless inconsistent “with
the letter and spirit of the constitution.” 40
Nine years later, Marshall introduced what Story in his Com-
mentaries labels the concept of “resulting powers,” which are those
that “result from the whole mass of the powers of the National Gov-
ernment, and from the nature of political society, [rather] than [as]
a consequence or incident of the powers specially enumerated.” 41
Story references Marshall’s opinion in American Ins. Co. v. Can-
ter,42 which states that “the constitution confers absolutely on the
government of the Union, the powers of making war, and of mak-
ing treaties; consequently, that government possesses the power of
acquiring territory, either by conquest or by treaty.” 43 And from the
35 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 405 (1819).
36 See discussion under Article II, § 1, cl. 1, Executive Power: Theory of the Presi-
dential Office, infra. This assertion has since found support from decisions of the
Court.
37 206 U.S. 46, 82 (1907).
38 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 407.
39 17 U.S. at 411.
40 17 U.S. at 421.
41 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1256 (1833).
See also id. at 1286 and 1330.

42 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
43 26 U.S. at 542.
power to acquire territory, Marshall continues, arises, as “the inevi-

table consequence,” the right to govern it.44
Subsequently, the Court has repeatedly ascribed powers to the
National Government on grounds that ill accord with the doctrine
of enumerated powers: the power to legislate in effectuation of the
“rights expressly given, and duties expressly enjoined” by the Con-
stitution; 45 the power to impart to the paper currency of the gov-
ernment the quality of legal tender in the payment of debts; 46 the
power to acquire territory by discovery; 47 the power to legislate for
the Indian tribes wherever situated in the United States; 48 the power
to exclude and deport aliens; 49 and to require that those who are
admitted be registered and fingerprinted; 50 and finally the com-
plete powers of sovereignty, both those of war and peace, in the con-
duct of foreign relations. Thus, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Export Corp.,51 decided in 1936, Justice Sutherland asserted the di-
chotomy of domestic and foreign powers, with the former limited
under the enumerated powers doctrine and the latter virtually free
of any such restraint. That doctrine has been the source of much
scholarly and judicial controversy, but although limited, it has not
been repudiated.
Yet as Justice Sutherland pointed out, these holdings do not di-
rectly affect “the internal affairs” of the nation, but instead relate
principally to its peripheral relations. The most serious inroads on
the doctrine of enumerated powers are, in fact, those that have taken
place under cover of the other doctrines. These would include the
vast expansion in recent years of the national legislative power un-
der the authority to regulate interstate commerce and the power to
provide for the expenditure of the national revenues. Still, some of
the groundwork for these later doctrinal developments can be seen
in Justice Marshall’s language, as quoted above from McCulloch.
44 26 U.S. at 543.
45 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 616, 618–19 (1842).
46 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449–450 (1884). See also Justice Brad-
ley’s concurring opinion in Knox v. Lee, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 565 (1871).
47 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883).
48 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
49 Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698 (1893).
50 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
51 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER
Overview of the Doctrine of Nondelegability

The Supreme Court has sometimes declared categorically that
“the legislative power of Congress cannot be delegated.” 52 On other
occasions, however, it has recognized more forthrightly, as did Chief
Justice Marshall in 1825, that while Congress may not delegate pow-
ers that “are strictly and exclusively legislative,” it can delegate cer-
tain “powers which [it] may [have] rightfully exercise[d] itself.” 53
In reality, a categorical limitation on legislative delegation has never
been literally true, as evidenced by the Court having upheld the
delegation at issue in the very case in which the statement was
made.54 The reason is that the Court has long recognized that ad-
ministration of the law requires exercise of discretion 55 and that,
“in our increasingly complex society, replete with ever changing and
more technical problems, Congress simply cannot do its job absent
an ability to delegate power under broad general directives.” 56 The
real issue is where to draw the line.
Chief Justice Marshall recognized “that there is some difficulty
in discerning the exact limits,” and that “the precise boundary of
this power is a subject of delicate and difficult inquiry, into which a
court will not enter unnecessarily.” 57 Accordingly, the Court’s solu-
tion has been to reject delegation challenges in all but the most
extreme cases, and to accept delegations of vast powers to the Presi-
dent or to administrative agencies. With the exception of a brief
period in the 1930s when the Court was striking down New Deal
legislation on a variety of grounds, the Court has consistently up-
held grants of authority that have been challenged as invalid del-
egations of legislative power.
52 United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77, 85 (1932).
See also Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892).

53 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41 (1825) (Marshall, C.J.).
54 The Court in Shreveport Grain & Elevator upheld a delegation of authority
to the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to allow reasonable variations, toler-
ances, and exemptions from misbranding prohibitions that were backed by criminal
penalties. It was “not open to reasonable dispute” that such a delegation was permis-
sible to fill in details “impracticable for Congress to prescribe.”
55 J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928) (“In de-
termining what [Congress] may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the
extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense
and the inherent necessities of the government co-ordination”).
56 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989). See also Sunshine An-
thracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 398 (1940) (“Delegation by Congress has
long been recognized as necessary in order that the exertion of legislative power
does not become a futility”).
57 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 42. For particularly useful dis-
cussions of delegations, see 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE Ch. 3 (2d ed., 1978);
L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION ch. 2 (1965).
The modern doctrine may be traced to the 1928 case, J. W.

Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, in which the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Taft, upheld Congress’ delegation to the Presi-
dent of the authority to set tariff rates that would equalize produc-
tion costs in the United States and competing countries.58 Al-
though formally invoking the theory that Congress had merely
established a contingency upon which the law became effective,59
the Court’s opinion also looked forward, emphasizing that in seek-
ing the cooperation of another branch Congress was restrained only
according to “common sense and the inherent necessities” of the situ-
ation.60 This vague statement was elaborated somewhat in the state-
ment that the Court would sustain delegations whenever Congress
provided an “intelligible principle” to which the President or an agency
must conform.61
In 1935, the Court struck down what it characterized as broad
and unprecedented delegations in Panama Refining v. Ryan 62 and
A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States.63 Both cases in-
volved provisions of the National Industrial Recovery Act. At issue
in Panama Refining was a delegation to the President of authority
to prohibit interstate transportation of what was known as “hot oil”—
oil produced in excess of quotas set by state law. The problem was
that the act provided no guidance to the President in determining
whether or when to exercise this authority, and required no finding
by the President as a condition of exercise of the authority. Con-
gress “declared no policy, . . . established no standard, [and] laid
down no rule,” but rather “left the matter to the President without
standard or rule, to be dealt with as he pleased.” 64
At issue in Schechter was a delegation to the President of au-
thority to promulgate codes of fair competition that could be drawn
up by industry groups or prescribed by the President on his own
initiative. The codes were required to implement the policies of the
act, but those policies were so general as to be nothing more than
58 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
59 The Court noted it had upheld a similar law in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649
(1892), because the President “was the mere agent of the lawmaking department to
ascertain and declare the event upon which its expressed will was to take effect.”
276 U.S. at 410–411.
60 276 U.S. at 406.
61 276 U.S. at 409. The “intelligible principle” test of Hampton is the same as
the “legislative standards” test found in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United

States, 295 U.S. 495, 530 (1935), and Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388,
421 (1935).
62 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
63 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
64 293 U.S. at 430, 418, respectively. Similarly, the executive order exercising
the authority contained no finding or other explanation by which the legality of the
action could be tested. Id. at 431–33.
an endorsement of whatever might be thought to promote the recov-

ery and expansion of the particular trade or industry. The Presi-
dent’s authority to approve, condition, or adopt codes on his own
initiative was similarly devoid of meaningful standards, and “virtu-
ally unfettered.” 65 This broad delegation was “without precedent.”
The act supplied “no standards” for any trade or industry group,
and, unlike other broad delegations that had been upheld, did not
set policies that could be implemented by an administrative agency
required to follow “appropriate administrative procedure.” “Instead
of prescribing rules of conduct, [the act] authorize[d] the making of
codes to prescribe them.” 66
Since 1935, however, the Court has not struck down a delega-
tion to an administrative agency.67 Rather, the Court has approved,
“without deviation, Congress’ ability to delegate power under broad
standards.” 68 The Court has upheld, for example, delegations to ad-
ministrative agencies to determine “excessive profits” during war-
time; 69 to determine “unfair and inequitable distribution of voting
power” among securities holders; 70 to fix “fair and equitable” com-
modities prices; 71 to determine “just and reasonable” rates; 72 and
to regulate broadcast licensing as the “public interest, convenience,
or necessity require.” 73 During all this time the Court “has not seen
fit . . . to enlarge in the slightest [the] relatively narrow holdings”
of Panama Refining and Schechter.74 Again and again, the Court
has distinguished the two cases, sometimes by finding adequate stan-
dards in the challenged statute,75 sometimes by contrasting the vast
scope of the power delegated by the National Industrial Recovery
Act (NIRA),76 and sometimes by pointing to required administra-
65 295 U.S. at 542.

66 295 U.S. at 541. Other concerns were that the industrial codes were backed
by criminal sanction, and that regulatory power was delegated to private individu-
als. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 n.7 (1989).
67 A year later, the Court invalidated the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act on
delegation grounds, but that delegation was to private entities. Carter v. Carter Coal
Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
68 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373 (1989).
69 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
70 American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
71 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
72 FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944).
73 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
74 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 122 (1976) (Justice Rehnquist, dis-
senting).
75 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373–79 (1989).
76 See, e.g., Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (contrasting the delega-
tion to deal with “unprecedented economic problems of varied industries” with the
delegation of authority to deal with problems of the banking industry, where there
was “accumulated experience” derived from long regulation and close supervision);
tive findings and procedures that were absent in the NIRA.77 The
Court has also relied on the constitutional doubt principle of statu-
tory construction to narrow interpretations of statutes that, inter-
preted broadly, might have presented delegation issues.78
Concerns in the scholarly literature with respect to the scope
of the delegation doctrine 79 have been reflected in the opinions of
some of the Justices.80 Nonetheless, the Court’s decisions continue
to approve very broad delegations,81 and the practice will likely re-
main settled. The fact that the Court has gone so long without hold-
ing a statute to be an invalid delegation, however, does not mean
that the nondelegation doctrine is a dead letter. The long list of re-
Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001) (the NIRA “con-
ferred authority to regulate the entire economy on the basis of no more precise a
standard than stimulating the economy by assuring ‘fair competition’ ”).
77 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944) (Schechter in-
volved delegation “not to a public official . . . but to private individuals”; it suffices

if Congress has sufficiently marked the field within which an administrator may act
“so it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legisla-
tive will.”).
78 See, e.g., Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607,
645–46 (1980) (plurality opinion) (invalidating an occupational safety and health regu-
lation, and observing that the statute should not be interpreted to authorize enforce-
ment of a standard that is not based on an “understandable” quantification of risk);
National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974) (“hurdles
revealed in [Schechter and J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States] lead us to
read the Act narrowly to avoid constitutional problems”).
79 E.g., A Symposium on Administrative Law: Part I—Delegation of Powers to
Administrative Agencies, 36 AMER. U. L. REV. 295 (1987); Schoenbrod, The Delegation

Doctrine: Could the Court Give It Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223 (1985); Aranson,
Gellhorn & Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORN. L. REV. 1 (1982).
80 American Textile Mfrs. Inst. v. Donovan, 452 U.S. 490, 543 (1981) (Chief Jus-
tice Burger dissenting); Industrial Union Dep’t v. American Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S.
607, 671 (1980) (then-Justice Rehnquist concurring). See also United States v. Mid-
west Video Corp., 406 U.S. 649, 675, 677 (1972) (Chief Justice Burger concurring,
Justice Douglas dissenting); Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 625–26 (1963) (Jus-
tice Harlan dissenting in part). Occasionally, statutes are narrowly construed, pur-
portedly to avoid constitutional problems with delegations. E.g., Industrial Union
Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 645–46 (plurality opinion); National Cable Television Ass’n v. United
States, 415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974).
81 E.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371–79 (1989). See also Skin-
ner v. Mid-America Pipeline Co., 490 U.S. 212, 220–24 (1989); Touby v. United States,
500 U.S. 160, 164–68 (1991); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 547
(2001). While expressing considerable reservations about the scope of delegations,
Justice Scalia, in Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 415–16, conceded both the inevitability of
delegations and the inability of the courts to police them.
Notice Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998), in which the Court
struck down the Line Item Veto Act, intended by Congress to be a delegation to the
President, finding that the authority conferred on the President was legislative power,
not executive power, which failed because the presentment clause had not and could
not have been complied with. The dissenting Justices argued that the law was prop-
erly treated as a delegation and was clearly constitutional. Id. at 453 (Justice Scalia
concurring in part and dissenting in part), 469 (Justice Breyer dissenting).
jected challenges does suggest, however, that the doctrine applies

only to standardless delegations of the most sweeping nature.
The Nature and Scope of Permissible Delegations

The early Court suggested alternative theories to justify sustain-
ing delegations. The first theory is that Congress may legislate con-
tingently, leaving to others the task of ascertaining the facts that
bring its declared policy into operation.82 Chief Justice Marshall al-
luded to a second theory in Wayman v. Southard.83 There, he dis-
tinguished between “important” subjects, “which must be entirely
regulated by the legislature itself,” and subjects “of less interest, in
which a general provision may be made, and power given to those
who are to act under such general provisions, to fill up the details.”
While this latter distinction may now be lost, the theory of the power
“to fill up the details” remains current.
Two distinct constitutional concerns have contributed to the de-
velopment of the nondelegation doctrine: separation of powers and
due process. In J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,84 Chief
Justice Taft explained the importance of separation of powers to
nondelegation. “The Federal Constitution . . . divide[s] the govern-
mental power into three branches. . . . [I]n carrying out that con-
stitutional division into three branches it is a breach of the Na-
tional fundamental law if Congress gives up its legislative power
and transfers it to the President, or to the Judicial branch, or if by
law it attempts to invest itself or its members with either execu-
tive power or judicial power. This is not to say that the three branches
are not co-ordinate parts of one government and that each in the
field of its duties may not invoke the action of the two other branches
in so far as the action invoked shall not be an assumption of the
constitutional field of action of another branch. In determining what
it may do in seeking assistance from another branch, the extent
and character of that assistance must be fixed according to com-
mon sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co-
ordination.” 85
A rigid application of separation of powers, however, would pre-
vent the lawmaking branch from effectively utilizing the resources
and expertise of the other branches. Thus, for instance, the doc-
82 The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 382 (1813).
83 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1, 41 (1825).
84 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
85 276 U.S. at 406. Chief Justice Taft traced the separation-of-powers doctrine
to the maxim, Delegata potestas non potest delegari (a delegated power may not be
further delegated), 276 U.S. at 405, but the maxim does not help differentiate be-
tween permissible and impermissible delegations, and Court has not repeated this
reference in later delegation cases.
trine has not been so rigidly applied as to prevent conferral of sig-

nificant authority on the Executive Branch.86 In Loving v. United
States,87 the Court distinguished between its usual separation-of-
powers doctrine—emphasizing arrogation of power by a branch and
impairment of another branch’s ability to carry out its functions—
and the delegation doctrine, “another branch of our separation of
powers jurisdiction,” which is informed not by arrogation and im-
pairment analyses but solely by whether appropriate standards have
been established by which delegations are to be exercised.88 This
confirmed what had long been evident—that the delegation doc-
trine is unmoored from traditional separation-of-powers principles.
The second principle underlying delegation law is due process.
Under this doctrine, a delegation can be so arbitrary as to interfere
with personal liberty and private property. Since federal separation-
of-powers doctrine is not applicable to delegations to non-federal ac-
tors,89 it is the Due Process Clause alone to which federal courts
must look when reviewing delegations to states or private enti-
ties.90 Under a due process analysis, the Court will be more defer-
ential when power is delegated to a rule-making entity, such as a
public agency, because an agency is typically required to follow es-
tablished procedures to build a public record and to explain its de-
cisions. This enables a reviewing court to determine whether the
agency has stayed within its ambit and complied with its legisla-
tive mandate.91 This is less likely to occur with delegations to pri-
vate entities, which typically are not required to utilize such proce-
dural safeguards as are expected when regulatory authority is
exercised.92
Filling Up the Details.—In finding a power to “fill up the de-
tails,” the Court in Wayman v. Southard 93 rejected the contention
that Congress had unconstitutionally delegated power to the fed-
eral courts to establish their own rules of practice.94 Chief Justice
Marshall agreed that the rulemaking power was a legislative func-
tion and that Congress could have formulated the rules itself, but,
based on the character of that power, he suggested that the delega-
tion of the authority to the judiciary was not impermissible. Since
86 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 692 (1892); Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 1, 42 (1825).
87 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
88 517 U.S. at 758–59.
89 See, e.g., Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 83–84 (1902).
90 See, e.g., Eubank v. City of Richmond, 226 U.S. 137 (1912); Embree v. Kansas
City Road Dist., 240 U.S. 242 (1916).

91 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944).
92 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 310–12 (1936).
93 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
94 Act of May 8, 1792, § 2, 1 Stat. 275, 276.
then, of course, Congress has authorized the Supreme Court to pre-

scribe rules of procedure for the lower federal courts.95
Filling up the details of statutes has long been standard prac-
tice. For example, the Court upheld a statute requiring the manu-
facturers of oleomargarine to have their packages “marked, stamped
and branded as the Commissioner of Internal Revenue . . . shall
prescribe,” rejecting a contention that the prosecution was not for
violation of law but for violation of a regulation.96 “The criminal
offence,” said Chief Justice Fuller, “is fully and completely defined
by the act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particu-
lar marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail.” 97
Kollock was not the first such case,98 and it was followed by a mul-
titude of delegations that the Court sustained.99
Contingent Legislation.—An entirely different problem arises
when, instead of directing another department of government to ap-
ply a general statute to individual cases, or to supplement it by de-
tailed regulation, Congress passes contingent legislation. Under such
legislation, Congress commands that upon the finding of certain facts
by an executive or administrative officer, a previously enacted stat-
ute be revived, suspended, or modified, or that a new rule be put
into operation. Since the delegated function in such cases is not that
of “filling up the details” of a statute, authority for it must be sought
under some other theory.
Contingent delegation was approved in an early case, The Brig
Aurora,100 where the Court upheld the revival of a law by the issu-
ance of a presidential proclamation. After previous restraints on Brit-
ish shipping had lapsed, Congress passed a new law stating that
those restrictions should be renewed in the event the President found
and proclaimed that France had abandoned certain practices that
95 The power to promulgate rules of civil procedure was conferred by the Act of
June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064; the power to promulgate rules of criminal procedure
was conferred by the Act of June 29, 1940, 54 Stat. 688. These authorities are now
subsumed under 28 U.S.C. § 2072. In both instances Congress provided for submis-
sion of the rules to it, presumably reserving the power to change or to veto the rules.
Additionally, Congress has occasionally legislated rules itself. See, e.g., 82 Stat. 197
(1968), 18 U.S.C. §§ 3501–02 (admissibility of confessions in federal courts).
96 In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897).
97 165 U.S. at 533.
98 United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 238 (1835); Caha v. United States,
152 U.S. 211 (1894).

99 In one such case, for example, the Court upheld an act directing the Secre-
tary of the Treasury to promulgate minimum standards of quality and purity for
tea imported into the United States. Buttfield v. Stranahan, 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
See also United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911) (upholding act authorizing
executive officials to make rules governing use of forest reservations); ICC v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912) (upholding delegation to prescribe methods of ac-
counting for carriers in interstate commerce).
100 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 382 (1813).
violated the neutral commerce of the United States. To the objec-

tion that this was an invalid delegation of legislative power, the Court
answered briefly that “we can see no sufficient reason, why the leg-
islature should not exercise its discretion in reviving the act of March
1st, 1809, either expressly or conditionally, as their judgment should
direct.” 101
The theory was used again in Field v. Clark,102 where the Tar-
iff Act of 1890 was assailed as unconstitutional because it directed
the President to suspend the free importation of enumerated com-
modities “for such time as he shall deem just” if he found that an-
other country imposed duties or other exactions upon agricultural
or other products of the United States that he deemed “reciprocally
unequal and unjust.” In sustaining this statute, the Court relied
heavily upon two factors: (1) legislative precedents, which demon-
strated that “in the judgment of the legislative branch of the gov-
ernment, it is often desirable, if not essential, . . . to invest the Presi-
dent with large discretion in matters arising out of the execution of
statutes relating to trade and commerce with other nations,” 103 and
(2) that the act did “not, in any real sense, invest the President
with the power of legislation. . . . Congress itself prescribed, in ad-
vance, the duties to be levied, . . . while the suspension lasted. Noth-
ing involving the expediency or the just operation of such legisla-
tion was left to the determination of the President. . . . He had no
discretion in the premises except in respect to the duration of the
suspension so ordered.” 104 By similar reasoning, the Court sus-
tained the flexible provisions of the Tariff Act of 1922, whereby du-
ties were increased or decreased to reflect differences in the cost of
production at home and abroad, as such differences were ascer-
tained and proclaimed by the President.105
Standards.—Implicit in the concept of filling in the details is
the idea that there is some intelligible guiding principle or frame-
work to apply. Indeed, the requirement that Congress set forth “in-
telligible principles” or “standards” to guide as well as limit the agency
or official in the performance of his assigned task has been critical
to the Court’s acceptance of legislative delegations. In theory, the
requirement of standards serves two purposes: “it insures that the
fundamental policy decisions in our society will be made not by an
appointed official but by the body immediately responsible to the
people . . . , [and] it prevents judicial review from becoming merely
101 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) at 388.
102 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
103 143 U.S. at 691.
104 143 U.S. at 692, 693.
105 J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928).
an exercise at large by providing the courts with some measure against

which to judge the official action that has been challenged.” 106
The only two instances in which the Court has found an uncon-
stitutional delegation to a public entity have involved grants of dis-
cretion that the Court found to be unbounded, hence standardless.
Thus, in Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,107 as discussed previously,
the President was authorized to prohibit the shipment in inter-
state commerce of “hot oil”—oil produced in excess of state quotas.
Nowhere—not in the language conferring the authority, nor in the
“declaration of policy,” nor in any other provision—did the statute
specify a policy to guide the President in determining when and
under what circumstances to exercise the power.108 Although the
scope of granted authority in Panama Refining was narrow, the grant
in A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States 109 was sweep-
ing. The NIRA devolved on the Executive Branch the power to for-
mulate codes of “fair competition” for all industry in order to pro-
mote “the policy of this title.” The policy was “to eliminate unfair
competitive practices, to promote the fullest possible utilization of
the present productive capacity of industries, . . . and otherwise to
rehabilitate industry. . . .” 110 Though much of the opinion is writ-
ten in terms of the failure of these policy statements to provide mean-
ingful standards, the Court was also concerned with the delega-
tion’s vast scope—the “virtually unfettered” discretion conferred on
the President of “enacting laws for the government of trade and in-
dustry throughout the country.” 111
106 Arizona v. California, 373 U.S. 546, 626 (1963) (Justice Harlan, dissenting).
107 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
108 The Court, in the view of many observers, was influenced heavily by the fact
that the President’s orders were nowhere published and notice of regulations bear-
ing criminal penalties for their violations was spotty at best. Cf. E. CORWIN, THE PRESI-
DENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957 394–95 (4th ed. 1958). The result of the govern-
ment’s discomfiture in Court was the enactment of the Federal Register Act, 49 Stat.
500 (1935), 44 U.S.C. § 301, providing for publication of executive orders and agency
regulations in the daily Federal Register.
109 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
110 48 Stat. 195 (1933), Tit. I, § 1.
111 295 U.S. at 542. A delegation of narrower scope led to a different result in
Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947), the Court finding explicit standards
unnecessary because “[t]he provisions are regulatory” and deal with but one enter-
prise, banking, the problems of which are well known and the authorized remedies
as equally well known. “A discretion to make regulations to guide supervisory ac-
tion in such matters may be constitutionally permissible while it might not be allow-
able to authorize creation of new crimes in uncharted fields.” The Court has re-
cently explained that “the degree of agency discretion that is acceptable varies according
to the scope of the power congressionally conferred.” Whitman v. American Trucking
Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001) (Congress need not provide “any direction” to EPA
in defining “country elevators,” but “must provide substantial guidance on setting
air standards that affect the entire national economy”).
Typically the Court looks to the entire statute to determine

whether there is an intelligible standard to guide administrators,
and a statute’s declaration of policies or statement of purposes can
provide the necessary guidance. If a statute’s declared policies are
not open-ended, then a delegation of authority to implement those
policies can be upheld. For example, in United States v. Rock Royal
Co-operative, Inc.,112 the Court contrasted the NIRA’s statement of
policy, “couched in most general terms” and found lacking in Schechter,
with the narrower policy that an agricultural marketing law di-
rected the Secretary of Agriculture to implement.113 Similarly, the
Court found ascertainable standards in the Emergency Price Con-
trol Act’s conferral of authority to set prices for commodities if their
prices had risen in a manner “inconsistent with the purposes of this
Act.” 114
The Court has been notably successful in finding standards that
are constitutionally adequate. Standards have been ascertained to
exist in such formulations as “just and reasonable,” 115 “public inter-
est,” 116 “public convenience, interest, or necessity,” 117 “unfair meth-
ods of competition,” 118 and “requisite to protect the public health
[with] an adequate margin of safety.” 119 Thus, in National Broad-
casting Co. v. United States,120 the Court found that the discretion
conferred on the Federal Communications Commission to license broad-
casting stations to promote the “public interest, convenience, or ne-
cessity” conveyed a standard “as complete as the complicated fac-
tors for judgment in such a field of delegated authority permit.” 121
Yet the regulations upheld were directed to the contractual rela-
tions between networks and stations and were designed to reduce
the effect of monopoly in the industry, a policy on which the stat-
ute was silent.122
112 307 U.S. 533 (1939).
113 307 U.S. at 575. Other guidance in the marketing law limited the terms of
implementing orders and specified the covered commodities.
114 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (the principal purpose was to
control wartime inflation, and the administrator was directed to give “due consider-
ation” to a specified pre-war base period).
115 Tagg Bros. & Moorhead v. United States, 280 U.S. 420 (1930).
116 New York Central Securities Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12 (1932).
117 Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266
(1933).
118 FTC v. Gratz, 253 U.S. 421 (1920).
119 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 547 (2001).
120 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
121 319 U.S. at 216.
122 Similarly, the promulgation by the FCC of rules creating a “fairness doc-
trine” and a “right to reply” rule has been sustained, Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v.
FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969), as well as a rule requiring the carrying of anti-smoking
commercials. Banzhaf v. FCC, 405 F.2d 1082 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied sub nom.
Tobacco Institute v. FCC, 396 U.S. 842 (1969).
When, in the Economic Stabilization Act of 1970, Congress au-

thorized the President “to issue such orders and regulations as he
may deem appropriate to stabilize prices, rents, wages, and sala-
ries,” and the President responded by imposing broad national con-
trols, the lower court decision sustaining the action was not even
appealed to the Supreme Court.123 Explicit standards are not even
required in all situations, the Court having found standards reason-
ably implicit in a delegation to the Federal Home Loan Bank Board
to regulate banking associations.124 Even in “sweeping regulatory
schemes” that affect the entire economy, the Court has “never de-
manded . . . that statutes provide a ‘determinate criterion’ for say-
ing ‘how much [of the regulated harm] is too much.’ ” 125 Thus Con-
gress need not quantify how “imminent” is too imminent, how
“necessary” is necessary enough, how “hazardous” is too hazardous,
or how much profit is “excess.” Rather, discretion to make such de-
terminations may be conferred on administrative agencies.126
For a time, the Court appeared to have approved a bootstrap
theory under which administrative implementation of a congressio-
nal enactment could provide the intelligible standard necessary to
uphold a delegation. The Court’s decision in Lichter v. United States 127
relied on an administrative interpretation of the term “excessive prof-
its” as applied to the performance of certain wartime government
contracts, and was applied to profits earned prior to Congress’ in-
corporation into the statute of the administrative interpretation.128
The Court, however, subsequently rejected the idea in Whitman v.
American Trucking Associations.129 In Whitman, the Court as-
serted that Lichter mentioned agency regulations only “because a
subsequent Congress had incorporated the regulations into a re-
vised version of the statute.” 130 “We have never suggested that an
123 Amalgamated Meat Cutters & Butcher Workmen v. Connally, 337 F. Supp.
737 (D.D.C. 1971). The three-judge court relied principally on Yakus.

124 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 250 (1947) (the Court explained that both
the problems of the banking industry and the authorized remedies were well known).
125 Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 475 (2001).
126 Whitman, 531 U.S. at 475–76.
127 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
128 In upholding the delegation as applied to the pre-incorporation administra-
tive definition, the Court explained that “[t]he statutory term ‘excessive profits,’ in
its context, was a sufficient expression of legislative policy and standards to render
it constitutional.” 334 U.S. at 783. The “excessive profits” standard, prior to defini-
tion, was contained in Title 8 of the Act of October 21, 1942, 56 Stat. 798, 982. The
administrative definition was added by Title 7 of the Act of February 25, 1944, 58
Stat. 21, 78.
129 531 U.S. 547 (2001).
130 531 U.S. at 472.
agency can cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopt-

ing in its discretion a limiting construction of the statute,” 131 the
Court concluded.
Although Congress must ordinarily provide some guidance that
indicates broad policy objectives, there is no general prohibition on
delegating authority that includes the exercise of policy judgment.
In Mistretta v. United States,132 the Court approved congressional
delegations to the United States Sentencing Commission, an inde-
pendent agency in the judicial branch, to develop and promulgate
guidelines binding federal judges and cabining their discretion in
sentencing criminal defendants. Although the Court enumerated the
standards Congress had provided, it admitted that significant dis-
cretion existed with respect to making policy judgments about the
relative severity of different crimes and the relative weight of the
characteristics of offenders that are to be considered, and stated forth-
rightly that delegations may carry with them “the need to exercise
judgment on matters of policy.” 133 A number of cases illustrate the
point. For example, the Court has upheld complex economic regula-
tions of industries in instances in which the agencies had first de-
nied possession of such power, had unsuccessfully sought authoriza-
tion from Congress, and had finally acted without the requested
congressional guidance.134 The Court has also recognized that, when
Administrations change, new officials may have sufficient discre-
tion under governing statutes to change or even reverse agency poli-
cies.135
It seems therefore reasonably clear that the Court does not re-
quire much in the way of standards from Congress. The minimum
upon which the Court usually insists is that Congress use a delega-
tion that “sufficiently marks the field within which the Administra-
tor is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it
in compliance with the legislative will.” 136 Where the congressional
standards are combined with requirements of notice and hearing
and statements of findings and considerations by the administra-
tors, so that judicial review under due process standards is pos-
131 531 U.S. at 472.
132 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
133 488 U.S. at 378.
134 E.g., Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747 (1968); American Truck-
ing Ass’ns v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry., 387 U.S. 397 (1967).
135 Chevron, U.S.A. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–45, 865–66 (1984) “[A]n agency
to which Congress has delegated policymaking responsibilities may, within the lim-
its of that delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views of
wise policy to inform its judgments.” Id. at 865. See also Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n
v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42–44, 46–48, 51–57 (1983) (recognizing
agency could have reversed its policy but finding reasons not supported on record).
136 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
sible, the constitutional requirements of delegation have been ful-

filled.137 This requirement may be met through the provisions of
the Administrative Procedure Act (ARA),138 but where that act is
inapplicable or where the Court sees the necessity for exceeding its
provisions, due process can supply the safeguards of required hear-
ing, notice, supporting statements, and the like.139
Conflict Between State or Federal Statutes and Delegated
Authority.— A rule or regulation properly promulgated under au-
thority received from Congress is treated as law, and under the Su-
premacy Clause of the Constitution can preempt state law.140 Fur-
ther, in exercising a delegated power, the President or another officer
may effectively suspend or rescind a law passed by Congress. Early
cases sustained contingency legislation giving the President power,
upon the finding of certain facts, to revive or suspend a law,141 and
the President’s power to raise or lower tariff rates equipped him to
alter statutory law.142 The Court in Opp Cotton Mills v. Administra-
tor 143 upheld Congress’ decision to delegate to the Wage and Hour
Administrator of the Labor Department the authority to establish
a minimum wage in particular industries greater than the statu-
tory minimum but no higher than a prescribed figure. Congress has
not often expressly addressed the issue of repeals or supersessions,
but in authorizing the Supreme Court to promulgate rules of civil
137 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 426; Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline
Co., 490 U.S. 212, 218 (1989); American Light & Power Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90,
107, 108 (1946); Opp Cotton Mills v. Administrator, 312 U.S. 126, 144 (1941). It should
be remembered that the Court has renounced strict review of economic regulation
wholly through legislative enactment, forsaking substantive due process, so that re-
view of the exercise of delegated power by the same relaxed standard forwards a
consistent policy. E.g., Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726 (1963); Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955).
138 Act of June 11, 1946, 60 Stat. 237, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559. In NLRB v. Wyman-
Gordon Co., 394 U.S. 759 (1969), six Justices agreed that a Board proceeding had
been in fact rule-making and not adjudication and that the APA should have been
complied with. The Board won the particular case, however, because of a coales-
cence of divergent views of the Justices, but the Board has since reversed a policy
of not resorting to formal rule-making.
139 E.g., Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400
U.S. 433 (1971).

140 City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1988); Louisiana PSC v. FCC,
476 U.S. 355, 368–69 (1986); Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta,
458 U.S. 141, 153–54 (1982).
141 E.g., The Brig Aurora, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 382 (1813).
142 E.g., J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394 (1928); Field v.
Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892).

143 312 U.S. 126 (1941).
and criminal procedure and of evidence it directed that such rules

supersede previously enacted statutes with which they conflict.144
Delegations to the President in Areas of Shared Authority

It was asserted in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corpora-
tion 145 that the delegation of discretion in dealing with foreign re-
lations stands upon a different footing than the transfer of author-
ity to regulate domestic concerns. There, the Court upheld a joint
resolution of Congress making it unlawful to sell arms to certain
warring countries upon certain findings by the President, a typi-
cally contingent type of delegation. But Justice Sutherland for the
Court proclaimed that the President is largely free of the constitu-
tional constraints imposed by the nondelegation doctrine when he
acts in foreign affairs.146 Whether or not the President is the “sole
organ of the nation” in its foreign relations, as asserted in Curtiss-
Wright,147 a lesser standard of delegation is applied in foreign af-
fairs and other areas of power shared by the President and Con-
gress.
Sixty years later, the Court, relying on Curtiss-Wright, rein-
forced such a distinction in a case involving the President’s author-
ity over military justice.148 The Court in Loving v. United States 149
approved a virtually standardless delegation to the President. Ar-
ticle 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) 150 pro-
vides for the death penalty for premeditated murder and felony mur-
der, but the statute does not comport with the Court’s capital
punishment jurisprudence. Generally, application of the death sen-
tence must be cabined by standards that require the sentencing au-
thority to narrow the class of convicted persons to be so sentenced
144 See 28 U.S.C. § 2072. In Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233, 241 (1973),
the Court referred in passing to the supersession of statutes without evincing any
doubts about the validity of the results. When Congress amended the Rules En-
abling Acts in the 100th Congress, Pub. L. 100–702, 102 Stat. 4642, 4648, amend-
ing 28 U.S.C. § 2072, the House would have altered supersession, but the Senate
disagreed, the House acquiesced, and the old provision remained. See H.R. 4807, H.
REP. NO. 100–889, 100th Cong., 2d sess. (1988), 27–29; 134 CONG. REC. 23573–84 (1988),
id. at 31051–52 (Sen. Heflin); id. at 31872 (Rep. Kastenmeier).
145 299 U.S. 304, 319–29 (1936).
146 299 U.S. at 319–22. For a particularly strong, more recent assertion of the
point, see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 291–92 (1981). This view also informs the
Court’s analysis in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981). See also United
States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926) (Trading With Enemy Act delega-
tion to dispose of seized enemy property).
147 299 U.S. at 319.
148 Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 772–73 (1996).
149 517 U.S. 748 (1996).
150 10 U.S.C. §§ 918(1), (4).
and justify the individual imposition of the sentence.151 In 1984, the

President promulgated standards that purported to supply the con-
stitutional validity the UCMJ needed.152
The Court in Loving held that Congress could delegate to the
President the authority to prescribe standards for the imposition of
the death penalty under military law—Congress’ power under Ar-
ticle I, § 8, cl. 14, is not exclusive–and that Congress had done so
in the UCMJ by providing that the punishment imposed by a court-
martial may not exceed “such limits as the President may pre-
scribe.” 153 Acknowledging that a delegation must contain some “in-
telligible principle” to guide the recipient of the delegation, the Court
nonetheless held this not to be true when the delegation was made
to the President in his role as Commander in Chief. “The same limi-
tations on delegation do not apply” if the entity authorized to exer-
cise delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over
the subject matter. The President’s responsibilities as Commander
in Chief require him to superintend the military, including the courts-
martial, and thus the delegated duty is interlinked with duties al-
ready assigned the President by the Constitution.154
Delegations to States and to Private Entities

Beginning in the nation’s early years, Congress has enacted hun-
dreds of statutes that contained provisions authorizing state offi-
cers to enforce and execute federal laws.155 Challenges to the prac-
tice have been uniformly rejected. Although the Court early expressed
its doubt that Congress could compel state officers to act, it enter-
tained no such thoughts about the propriety of authorizing them to
act if they chose.156 When, in the Selective Draft Law Cases,157 the
contention was made that the 1917 statute authorizing a military
draft was invalid because of its delegations of duties to state offi-
151 The Court assumed the applicability of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972),
and its progeny, to the military, 517 U.S. at 755–56, a point on which Justice Thomas
disagreed, id. at 777.
152 Rule for Courts-Martial; see 517 U.S. at 754.
153 10 U.S.C. §§ 818, 836(a), 856.
154 517 U.S. at 771–74. See also United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556–57
(1974) (limits on delegation are “less stringent” when delegation is made to an In-
dian tribe that can exercise independent sovereign authority over the subject mat-
ter).
155 See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV.
545 (1925); Holcomb, The States as Agents of the Nation, 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1187 (1938).
156 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842) (duty to deliver fugitive
slave); Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861) (holding that Congress
could not compel a governor to extradite a fugitive). Doubts over Congress’ power to
compel extradition were not definitively removed until Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483
U.S. 219 (1987), in which the Court overruled Dennison.
157 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918).
cers, the argument was rejected as “too wanting in merit to require

further notice.” Congress continues to empower state officers to act.158
Presidents who have objected have done so not on delegation grounds,
but rather on the basis of the Appointments Clause.159
The Court has upheld statutory delegations to private persons
in the form of contingency legislation. It has upheld, for example,
statutes providing that restrictions upon the production or market-
ing of agricultural commodities are to become operative only upon
a favorable vote by a prescribed majority of those persons af-
fected.160 The Court’s rationale has been that such a provision does
not involve any delegation of legislative authority, because Con-
gress has merely placed a restriction upon its own regulation by
withholding its operation unless it is approved in a referendum.161
The Court has also upheld statutes that give private entities
actual regulatory power, rather than merely make regulation con-
tingent on such entities’ approval. The Court, for example, upheld
a statute that delegated to the American Railway Association, a trade
group, the authority to determine the standard height of draw bars 162
for freight cars and to certify the figure to the Interstate Com-
merce Commission, which was required to accept it.163 The Court
simply cited Buttfield v. Stranahan,164 in which it had sustained a
delegation to the Secretary of the Treasury to promulgate mini-
mum standards of quality and purity for imported tea, as a case
“completely in point” that resolved the issue without need of fur-
ther consideration.165 Similarly, the Court had enforced statutes that
gave legal effect to local customs of miners with respect to claims
on public lands.166
The Court has also struck down delegations to private entities,
but not solely because they were to private entities. In Schechter,
158 E.g., Pub. L. 94–435, Title III, 90 Stat. 1394, 15 U.S.C. § 15c (state attor-
neys general may bring antitrust parens patriae actions); Medical Waste Tracking
Act, Pub. L. 100–582, 102 Stat. 2955, 42 U.S.C. § 6992f (states may impose civil
and possibly criminal penalties against violators of the law).
159 See 24 Weekly Comp. of Pres. Docs. 1418 (1988) (President Reagan). The only
judicial challenge to such a practice resulted in a rebuff to the presidential argu-

ment. Seattle Master Builders Ass’n v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power Council, 786 F.2d
1359 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1059 (1987).
160 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); United States v. Rock Royal Co-
operative, Inc., 307 U.S. 533, 577 (1939); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 115–116
(1942); United States v. Frame, 885 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S.
1094 (1990).
161 Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1, 15, 16 (1939).
162 A draw bar is the coupling between a hauling vehicle and its load.
163 St. Louis, Iron Mt. & So. Ry. v. Taylor, 210 U.S. 281 (1908).
164 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
165 210 U.S. at 287.
166 Jackson v. Roby, 109 U.S. 440 (1883); Erhardt v. Boaro, 113 U.S. 527 (1885);
Butte City Water Co. v. Baker, 196 U.S. 119 (1905).

it condemned the involvement of private trade groups in the draw-

ing up of binding codes of competition in conjunction with govern-
mental agencies, but the Court’s principal objection was to the stat-
ute’s lack of adequate standards.167 In Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,168
the Court struck down the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act in
part because the statute penalized persons who failed to observe
minimum wage and maximum hour regulations drawn up by pre-
scribed majorities of coal producers and coal employees. But the prob-
lem for the Court apparently was not so much that the statute del-
egated to private entities as that it delegated to private entities whose
interests were adverse to the interests of those regulated, thereby
denying the latter due process.169 And several later cases have up-
held delegations to private entities.170
Even though the Court has upheld some delegations to private
entities by reference to cases involving delegations to public agen-
cies, some uncertainty remains as to whether identical standards
apply in the two situations. Schechter contrasted the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act’s broad and virtually standardless delegation
to the President, assisted by private trade groups,171 with other broad
delegations of authority to administrative agencies, characterized
by the Court as bodies of experts “required to act upon notice and
hearing,” and further limited by the requirement that binding or-
ders must be “supported by findings of fact which in turn are sus-
tained by evidence.” 172 The absence of these procedural protec-
tions, designed to ensure fairness—as well as the possible absence
of impartiality identified in Carter Coal—could be cited to support
167 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 537 (1935).
In two subsequent cases, the Court referred to Schechter as having struck down a
delegation for its lack of standards. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 373
n.7 (1989); Whitman v. American Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 474 (2001).
168 298 U.S. 238 (1936). But compare Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins,
310 U.S. 381 (1940) (upholding a delegation in the Bituminous Coal Act of 1937).
169 “One person may not be entrusted with the power to regulate the business
of another, and especially of a competitor.” 298 U.S. at 311.

170 See, e.g., Schweiker v. McClure, 456 U.S. 188 (1992) (adjudication of Medi-
care claims, without right of appeal, by hearing officer appointed by private insur-
ance carrier upheld under due process challenge); Association of Amer. Physicians
& Surgeons v. Weinberger, 395 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Ill.) (three-judge court) (delega-
tion to Professional Standards Review Organization), aff’d per curiam, 423 U.S. 975
(1975); Noblecraft Industries v. Secretary of Labor, 614 F.2d 199 (9th Cir. 1980) (Sec-
retary authorized to adopt interim Occupational Safety and Health Administration
standards produced by private organization). Executive Branch objections to these
kinds of delegations have involved appointments clause arguments rather than del-
egation issues per se.
171 The act conferred authority on the President to approve the codes of compe-
tition, either as proposed by the appropriate trade group or with conditions that he
added. Thus the principal delegation was to the President, with the private trade
groups being delegated only recommendatory authority. 295 U.S. at 538–39.
172 295 U.S. at 539.
closer scrutiny of private delegations. Although the Court has em-

phasized the importance of administrative procedures in upholding
broad delegations to administrative agencies,173 it has not, since
Schechter and Carter Coal, relied on the distinction to strike down
a private delegation.
Particular Subjects or Concerns—Closer Scrutiny or

Uniform Standard?
The Court has strongly implied that the same principles gov-
ern the validity of a delegation regardless of the subject matter of
the delegation. “[A] constitutional power implies a power of delega-
tion of authority under it sufficient to effect its purposes.” 174 Hold-
ing that “the delegation of discretionary authority under Congress’
taxing power is subject to no constitutional scrutiny greater than
that we have applied to other nondelegation challenges,” the Court
explained in Skinner v. Mid-America Pipeline Company 175 that there
was “nothing in the placement of the Taxing Clause” in Article I,
§ 8 that would distinguish it, for purposes of delegation, from the
other powers enumerated in that clause.176 Thus, the test in the
taxing area is the same as for other areas—whether the statute has
provided the administrative agency with standards to guide its ac-
tions in such a way that a court can determine whether the congres-
sional policy has been followed.
This does not mean that Congress may delegate its power to
determine whether taxes should be imposed. What was upheld in
Skinner was delegation of authority to the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to collect “pipeline safety user fees” for users of natural gas
and hazardous liquid pipelines. “Multiple restrictions” placed on the
Secretary’s discretion left no doubt that the constitutional require-
173 See, e.g., Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944).
174 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 778–79 (1948).
175 490 U.S. 212, 223 (1989). In National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States,
415 U.S. 336, 342 (1974), and FPC v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974),
the Court had appeared to suggest that delegation of the taxing power would be
fraught with constitutional difficulties. It is difficult to discern how this view could
have been held after the many cases sustaining delegations to fix tariff rates, which
are in fact and in law taxes. J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394 (1928); Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); see also FEA v. Algonquin SNG, Inc.,
426 U.S. 548 (1976) (delegation to President to raise license “fees” on imports when
necessary to protect national security). Nor should doubt exist respecting the appro-
priations power. See Synar v. United States, 626 F. Supp. 1374, 1385–86 (D.D.C.)
(three-judge court), aff’d on other grounds sub nom. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714
(1986).
176 490 U.S. at 221. Nor is there basis for distinguishing the other powers enu-
merated in section 8. See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996). But see
Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991) (it is “unclear” whether a higher
standard applies to delegations of authority to issue regulations that contemplate
criminal sanctions), discussed in the next section.
ment of an intelligible standard had been met. Cases involving the

power to impose criminal penalties, described below, further illus-
trate the difference between delegating the underlying power to set
basic policy—whether it be the decision to impose taxes or the de-
cision to declare that certain activities are crimes—and the author-
ity to exercise discretion in implementing the policy.
Crime and Punishment.—The Court has confessed that its
“cases are not entirely clear as to whether more specific guidance
is in fact required” for delegations relating to the imposition of crimi-
nal sanctions.177 It is clear, however, that some essence of the power
to define crimes and set a range of punishments is not delegable,
but must be exercised by Congress. This conclusion derives in part
from the time-honored principle that penal statutes are to be strictly
construed, and that no one should be “subjected to a penalty un-
less the words of the statute plainly impose it.” 178 Both Schechter 179
and Panama Refining 180—the only two cases in which the Court
has invalidated delegations—involved broad delegations of power to
“make federal crimes of acts that never had been such before.” 181
Thus, Congress must provide by statute that violation of the stat-
ute’s terms—or of valid regulations issued pursuant thereto—shall
constitute a crime, and the statute must also specify a permissible
range of penalties. Punishment in addition to that authorized in
the statute may not be imposed by administrative action.182
However, once Congress has exercised its power to declare cer-
tain acts criminal, and has set a range of punishment for viola-
tions, authority to flesh out the details may be delegated. Congress
may provide that violation of valid administrative regulations shall
be punished as a crime.183 For example, the Court has upheld a
delegation of authority to classify drugs as “controlled substances,”
177 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166 (1991).

178 Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 410 (1873).
179 A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
180 Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935).
181 Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S. 245, 249 (1947).
182 L. P. Steuart & Bro. v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 398, 404 (1944) (“[I]t is for Congress
to prescribe the penalties for the laws which it writes. It would transcend both the
judicial and the administrative function to make additions to those which Congress
has placed behind a statute”).
183 United States v. Grimaud, 220 U.S. 506 (1911). The Forest Reserve Act at
issue in Grimaud clearly provided for punishment for violation of “rules and regula-
tions of the Secretary.” The Court in Grimaud distinguished United States v. Eaton,
144 U.S. 677 (1892), which had held that authority to punish for violation of a regu-
lation was lacking in more general language authorizing punishment for failure to
do what was “required by law.” 220 U.S. at 519. Extension of the principle that pe-
nal statutes should be strictly construed requires that the prohibited acts be clearly
identified in the regulation. M. Kraus & Bros. v. United States, 327 U.S. 614, 621
and thereby to trigger imposition of criminal penalties, set by stat-

ute, that vary according to the level of a drug’s classification by the
Attorney General.184
Congress may also confer authority on administrators to pre-
scribe criteria for ascertaining an appropriate sentence within the
range between the maximum and minimum penalties that are set
by statute. The Court upheld Congress’ conferral of “significant dis-
cretion” on the Sentencing Commission to set binding sentencing
guidelines establishing a range of determinate sentences for all cat-
egories of federal offenses and defendants.185 Although the Commis-
sion was given significant discretionary authority “to determine the
relative severity of federal crimes, . . . assess the relative weight of
the offender characteristics listed by Congress, . . . to determine which
crimes have been punished too leniently and which too severely, [and]
which types of criminals are to be considered similar,” Congress also
gave the Commission extensive guidance in the act, and did not con-
fer authority to create new crimes or to enact a federal death pen-
alty for any offense.186
Delegation and Individual Liberties.—Some Justices have
argued that delegations by Congress of power to affect the exercise
of “fundamental freedoms” by citizens must be closely scrutinized
to require the exercise of a congressional judgment about meaning-
ful standards.187 The only pronouncement in a majority opinion, how-
ever, is that, even with regard to the regulation of liberty, the stan-
dards of the delegation “must be adequate to pass scrutiny by the
accepted tests.” 188 The standard practice of the Court has been to
interpret the delegation narrowly so as to avoid constitutional prob-
lems.189
(1946). The Court summarized these cases in Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748
(1996), drawing the conclusion that “there is no absolute rule . . . against Congress’
delegation of authority to define criminal punishments.”
184 Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160 (1991).
185 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361 (1989).
186 488 U.S. at 377–78. “As for every other offense within the Commission’s ju-
risdiction, the Commission could include the death penalty within the guidelines only
if that punishment was authorized in the first instance by Congress and only if such
inclusion comported with the substantial guidance Congress gave the Commission
in fulfilling its assignments.” Id. at 378 n.11.
187 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269 (1967) (Justice Brennan concur-
ring). The view was specifically rejected by Justices White and Harlan in dissent,
id. at 288–89, and ignored by the majority.
188 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
189 Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968);
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474, 506–08 (1959) (Court will not follow traditional
principles of congressional acquiescence in administrative interpretation to infer a
delegation of authority to impose an industrial security clearance program that lacks
the safeguards of due process). More recently, the Court has eschewed even this lim-
ited mode of construction. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981).
Perhaps refining the delegation doctrine, at least in cases where

Fifth Amendment due process interests are implicated, the Court
held that a government agency charged with the efficient adminis-
tration of the Executive Branch could not assert the broader inter-
ests that Congress or the President might have in barring lawfully
resident aliens from government employment. The agency could as-
sert only those interests Congress charged it with promoting, and
if the action could be justified by other interests, the office with re-
sponsibility for promoting those interests must take the action.190
CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS
Source of the Power to Investigate

No provision of the Constitution expressly authorizes either house
of Congress to pursue investigations and compel testimony in order
to exercise its legislative functions. But such a power was fre-
quently exercised by both the British Parliament and the American
colonial assemblies prior to the adoption of the Constitution.191 In-
deed, it was asserted by the House of Representatives as early as
1792, when it appointed a committee to investigate the defeat of
General St. Clair and his army by the Indians in the Northwest
and empowered it to “call for such persons, papers, and records, as
may be necessary to assist their inquiries.” 192
The Court has long since established that because such investi-
gatory power is so essential to the legislative function it is to be
implied from the general vesting of legislative power in Congress.
“We are of the opinion,” wrote Justice Van Devanter for a unani-
mous Court, “that the power of inquiry—with process to enforce it—is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative func-
tion. . . . A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in
the absence of information respecting the conditions which the leg-
islation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative
body does not itself possess the requisite information—which not
infrequently is true—recourse must be had to others who possess
it. Experience has taught that mere requests for such information
often are unavailing, and also that information which is volun-
teered is not always accurate or complete; so some means of com-
190 Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976) (5-to-4 decision). The regula-
tion was reissued by the President, Exec. Order No. 11935, 3 C.F.R. 146 (1976), re-
printed in 5 U.S.C. § 3301 (app.), and sustained in Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d
1281 (7th Cir. 1978).
191 Landis, Constitutional Limitations on the Congressional Power of Investiga-
tion, 40 HARV. L. REV. 153, 159–166 (1926); M. DIMOCK, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATING COM-
MITTEES ch. 2 (1929).
192 3 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 490–494 (1792); 3 A. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES 1725 (1907).

pulsion are essential to obtain what is needed. All this was true
before and when the Constitution was framed and adopted. In that
period the power of inquiry—with enforcing process—was regarded
and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power
to legislate—indeed, was treated as inhering in it. Thus there is
ample warrant for thinking, as we do, that the constitutional provi-
sions which commit the legislative function to the two houses are
intended to include this attribute to the end that the function may
be effectively exercised.” 193
Even a 1957 opinion by Chief Justice Warren which was gener-
ally hostile to the exercise of the investigatory power in the post-
World War II years did not question this basic power. “The power
of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legisla-
tive process. That power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concern-
ing the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or pos-
sibly needed statutes. It includes surveys of defects in our social,
economic or political system for the purpose of enabling Congress
to remedy them. It comprehends probes into departments of the Fed-
eral Government to expose corruption, inefficiency or waste.” 194 Jus-
tice Harlan summarized the matter in 1959: “The power of inquiry
has been employed by Congress throughout our history, over the
whole range of the national interests concerning which Congress
might legislate or decide upon due investigation not to legislate; it
has similarly been utilized in determining what to appropriate from
the national purse, or whether to appropriate. The scope of the power
of inquiry, in short, is as penetrating and far-reaching as the poten-
tial power to enact and appropriate under the Constitution.” 195
Broad as the power of inquiry is, it is not unlimited. The power
of investigation may properly be employed only “in aid of the legis-
lative function.” 196 Its outermost boundaries are marked, then, by
the outermost boundaries of the power to legislate. In principle, the
Court is clear on the limitations, clear “that neither house of Con-
gress possesses a ‘general power of making inquiry into the private
affairs of the citizen’; that the power actually possessed is limited
to inquiries relating to matters of which the particular house ‘has
jurisdiction’ and in respect of which it rightfully may take other ac-
tion; that if the inquiry relates to ‘a matter wherein relief or re-
dress could be had only by a judicial proceeding’ it is not within
the range of this power, but must be left to the courts, conformably
193 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174–175 (1927).
194 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957).
195 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959). See also Eastland v.
United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503–07 (1975).

196 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 189 (1881).
to the constitutional separation of governmental powers; and that

for the purpose of determining the essential character of the in-
quiry recourse must be had to the resolution or order under which
it is made.” 197
In practice, much of the litigated dispute has been about the
reach of the power to inquire into the activities of private citizens.
Inquiry into the administration of laws and departmental corrup-
tion, while of substantial political consequence, has given rise to
fewer judicial precedents.
Investigations of Conduct of Executive Department

For many years the investigating function of Congress was lim-
ited to inquiries into the administration of the Executive Depart-
ment or of instrumentalities of the government. Until the adminis-
tration of Andrew Jackson, this power was not seriously challenged.198
During a controversy over renewal of the charter of the Bank of
the United States, John Quincy Adams contended that an unlim-
ited inquiry into the operations of the bank would be beyond the
power of the House.199 Four years later the legislative power of in-
vestigation was challenged by the President. A committee ap-
pointed by the House of Representatives “with power to send for
persons and papers, and with instructions to inquire into the condi-
tion of the various executive departments, the ability and integrity
with which they have been conducted, . . . ” 200 called upon the Presi-
dent and the heads of departments for lists of persons appointed
without the consent of the Senate and the amounts paid to them.
Resentful of this attempt “to invade the just rights of the Execu-
tive Departments,” the President refused to comply and the major-
ity of the committee acquiesced.201
Nevertheless, congressional investigations of Executive Depart-
ments have continued to the present day. Shortly before the Civil
War, contempt proceedings against a witness who refused to testify
in an investigation of John Brown’s raid upon the arsenal at Harp-
er’s Ferry occasioned a thorough consideration by the Senate of the
basis of this power. After a protracted debate, which cut sharply
across sectional and party lines, the Senate voted overwhelmingly
197 McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 170 (1927). The internal quotations are
from Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 190, 193 (1881).

198 In 1800, Secretary of the Treasury, Oliver Wolcott, Jr., addressed a letter to
the House of Representatives advising the body of his resignation from office and
inviting an investigation of his office. Such an inquiry was made. 10 ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 786–788 (1800).
199 8 CONG. DEB. 2160 (1832).
200 13 CONG. DEB. 1057–1067 (1836).
201 H.R. REP. NO. 194, 24th Congress, 2d sess., 1, 12, 31 (1837).
to imprison the contumacious witness.202 Notwithstanding this firmly

established legislative practice, the Supreme Court took a narrow
view of the power in Kilbourn v. Thompson.203 In Kilbourn, it held
that the House of Representatives had overstepped its jurisdiction
when it instituted an investigation of losses suffered by the United
States as a creditor of Jay Cooke and Company, whose estate was
being administered in bankruptcy by a federal court.204 But nearly
half a century later, in McGrain v. Daugherty,205 the Court ratified
in sweeping terms the power of Congress to inquire into the admin-
istration of an executive department and to sift charges of malfea-
sance in such administration.206
Investigations of Members of Congress

When either House exercises a judicial function, as in judging
of elections or determining whether a Member should be expelled,
it is clearly entitled to compel the attendance of witnesses with knowl-
edge of the facts upon which its action are to be based. Thus, the
Court held that since a House had a right to expel a Member for
any offense which it deemed incompatible with his trust and duty
as a member, it was entitled to investigate such conduct and to sum-
mon private individuals to give testimony concerning it.207 The de-
cision in Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham 208 sanctioned
the exercise of a similar power in investigating a senatorial elec-
tion.
202 CONG. GLOBE, 36th Congress, 1st sess., 1100–1109 (1860).

203 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
204 The Court held that inasmuch as the entire proceedings arising out of the
bankruptcy were pending in court; as the authorizing resolution contained no sug-

gestion of contemplated legislation; as in fact no valid legislation could be enacted
on the subject; and as the only relief which the United States could seek was judi-
cial relief in the bankruptcy proceeding, the House had exceeded its powers in au-
thorizing the inquiry. But see Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962).
205 273 U.S. 135, 177, 178 (1927).
206 The topic of executive privilege, the claimed right of the President and at
least some of his executive branch officers to withhold from Congress information
desired by it or by one of its committees, is addressed in Article II, The Presidential
Aegis: Demands for Papers. Although the issue has been one of contention between
the two branches of government since Washington’s refusal in 1796 to submit cer-
tain correspondence to the House of Representatives relating to treaty negotiations,
it has only relatively recently become a judicial issue.
207 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
208 279 U.S. 597 (1929).
Investigations in Aid of Legislation

Purpose.—Beginning with a resolution adopted by the House
of Representatives in 1827,209 the two houses, when necessary to
enlighten their judgment on proposed legislation, have asserted the
right to collect information from private persons as well as from
governmental agencies. The first case to review this assertion estab-
lished a narrow view of the power, with the Court holding that the
inquiry’s purpose was to pry improperly into private affairs with-
out any possibility of legislating on the basis of what might be learned.
The Court held further that the inquiry overstepped the bounds of
legislative jurisdiction and invaded the provinces of the judi-
ciary.210
Subsequent cases, however, have afforded Congress the presump-
tion that the object of an investigation is legitimate and related to
the possible enactment of legislation. Shortly after Kilbourn, the Court
declared that, for an inquiry to be a lawful exercise of power, “it
was certainly not necessary that the resolution should declare in
advance what the Senate meditated doing when the investigation
was concluded.” 211 Similarly, in McGrain v. Daugherty,212 the inves-
tigation was presumed to have been undertaken in good faith to
aid the Senate in legislating. Then, in Sinclair v. United States,213
on its facts presenting a close parallel to Kilbourn, the Court af-
firmed the right of the Senate to carry out investigations of fraudu-
lent leases of government property after suit for recovery had been
instituted.
In Sinclair, the president of a lessee corporation had refused to
testify on the ground that the inquiry was not actually in aid of
legislation, but was related to his private affairs and to matters cog-
nizable only in the courts in which they were pending, The Senate
had prudently directed the investigating committee to ascertain what,
if any, legislation might be advisable. Conceding “that Congress is
without authority to compel disclosures for the purpose of aiding
the prosecution of pending suits,” the Court declared that the au-
thority “to require pertinent disclosures in aid of its own constitu-
tional power is not abridged because the information sought to be
elicited may also be of use in such suits.” 214
209 This resolution vested the Committee on Manufactures “with the power to
send for persons and papers with a view to ascertain and report to this House in
relation to a revision of the tariff duties on imported goods.” 4 CONG. DEB. 862, 868,
888, 889 (1827).
210 Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
211 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670 (1897).
212 273 U.S. 135, 178 (1927).
213 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
214 279 U.S. at 295.
Although Sinclair and McGrain involved inquiries into the ac-

tivities and dealings of private persons, these activities and deal-
ings were in connection with property belonging to the U.S. govern-
ment, so that it could hardly be said that the inquiries concerned
the merely personal or private affairs of any individual.215 But, where
the business and the conduct of individuals are subject to congres-
sional regulation, there exists the power of inquiry,216 and in prac-
tice the areas of any individual’s life immune from inquiry are prob-
ably fairly limited. “In the decade following World War II, there
appeared a new kind of congressional inquiry unknown in prior pe-
riods of American history. Principally this was the result of the vari-
ous investigations into the threat of subversion of the United States
Government, but other subjects of congressional interest also con-
tributed to the changed scene. This new phase of legislative in-
quiry involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of
private citizens.” 217
Because Congress clearly has the power to legislate to protect
the nation and its citizens from subversion, espionage, and sedi-
tion,218 it also has the power to inquire into the existence of the
dangers of domestic or foreign-based subversive activities in many
areas of American life, including education,219 labor and indus-
try,220 and political activity.221 Because its powers to regulate inter-
state commerce afford Congress the power to regulate corruption
in labor-management relations, congressional committees may in-
quire into the extent of corruption in labor unions.222 Because of
its powers to legislate to protect the civil rights of its citizens, Con-
gress may investigate organizations which allegedly act to deny those
civil rights.223 It is difficult in fact to conceive of areas into which
congressional inquiry might not be carried, which is not the same,
of course, as saying that the exercise of the power is unlimited.
215 279 U.S. at 294.
216 The first case so holding is ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894), which as-
serts that, because Congress could itself have made the inquiry to appraise its regu-
latory activities, it could delegate the power of inquiry to the agency to which it had
delegated the regulatory function.
218 See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Barenblatt v. United States,
360 U.S. 109, 127 (1959); American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382
(1950).
219 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 129–132 (1959); Deutch v. United
States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961); cf. Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957) (state
inquiry).
220 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Flaxer v. United States, 358
U.S. 147 (1958); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961).
221 McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
222 Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962).
223 Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 1024 (1969).

One limitation on the power of inquiry that the has been dis-
cussed in various cases is the contention that congressional investi-
gations often have no legislative purpose, but rather are aimed at
achieving results through “exposure” of disapproved persons and ac-
tivities: “We have no doubt,” wrote Chief Justice Warren, “that there
is no congressional power to expose for the sake of exposure.” 224
Although some Justices, always in dissent, have attempted to as-
sert limitations in practice based upon this concept, the majority of
Justices have adhered to the traditional precept that courts will not
inquire into legislators’ motives, but will look 225 only to the ques-
tion of power.226 “So long as Congress acts in pursuance of its con-
stitutional power, the Judiciary lacks authority to intervene on the
basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that power.” 227
Protection of Witnesses; Pertinency and Related Mat-
ters.—A witness appearing before a congressional committee is en-
titled to the establishment of the commitees’s authority to inquire
into his activities and a showing that the questions asked of him
are pertinent to the committee’s area of inquiry. In this regard, a
congressional committee possesses only those powers delegated to
224 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957). The Chief Justice, how-
ever, noted: “We are not concerned with the power of the Congress to inquire into
and publicize corruption, maladministration or inefficiency in agencies of the Govern-
ment. That was the only kind of activity described by Woodrow Wilson in Congres-
sional Government when he wrote: ‘The informing function of Congress should be
preferred even to its legislative function.’ Id. at 303. From the earliest times in its
history, the Congress has assiduously performed an ‘informing function’ of this na-
ture.” Id. at 200 n.33.
In his book, Wilson continued, following the sentence quoted by the Chief Jus-
tice: “The argument is not only that discussed and interrogated administration is
the only pure and efficient administration, but, more than that, that the only really
self-governing people is that people which discusses and interrogates its administra-
tion. . . . It would be hard to conceive of there being too much talk about the prac-
tical concerns . . . of government.” W. WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL GOVERNMENT (1885), 303–
304. For contrasting views of the reach of this statement, compare United States v.
Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953), with Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 777–
778 (1962) (Justice Douglas dissenting).
225 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 153–162, 166 (1959); Wilkinson v.
United States, 365 U.S. 399, 415, 423 (1961); Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431,
446 (1961); but see DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825
(1966) (a state investigative case).
226 “Legislative committees have been charged with losing sight of their duty of
disinterestedness. In times of political passion, dishonest or vindictive motives are

readily attributable to legislative conduct and as readily believed. Courts are not
the place for such controversies.” Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 377–378 (1951).
For a statement of the traditional unwillingness to inquire into congressional mo-
tives in the judging of legislation, see United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382–
386 (1968). But note that in Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411 (1969), in which
the legislation establishing a state crime investigating commission clearly autho-
rized the commission to designate individuals as law violators, due process was vio-
lated by denying witnesses the rights existing in adversary criminal proceedings.
227 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132 (1959).
it by its parent body. The enabling resolution that gives it life also
contains the grant and limitations of the committee’s power.228 In
Watkins v. United States,229 Chief Justice Warren cautioned that
“[b]roadly drafted and loosely worded . . . resolutions can leave tre-
mendous latitude to the discretion of the investigators. The more
vague the committee’s charter is, the greater becomes the possibil-
ity that the committee’s specific actions are not in conformity with
the will of the parent house of Congress.” Speaking directly of the
authorizing resolution that created the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee,230 the Chief Justice thought it “difficult to imagine
a less explicit authorizing resolution.” 231
But the far-reaching implications of these remarks were circum-
scribed by Barenblatt v. United States,232 in which the Court, “[g]rant-
ing the vagueness of the Rule,” noted that Congress had long since
put upon it a persuasive gloss of legislative history through prac-
tice and interpretation, which, read with the enabling resolution,
showed that “the House has clothed the Un-American Activities Com-
mittee with pervasive authority to investigate Communist activi-
ties in this country.” 233 “[W]e must conclude that [the Committee’s]
authority to conduct the inquiry presently under consideration is
unassailable, and that . . . the Rule cannot be said to be constitu-
tionally infirm on the score of vagueness.” 234
Because of the usual precision with which authorizing resolu-
tions have generally been drafted, few controversies have arisen about
whether a committee has projected its inquiry into an area not sanc-
tioned by the parent body.235 But in United States v. Rumely,236 the
Court held that the House of Representatives, in authorizing a se-
lect committee to investigate lobbying activities devoted to the pro-
motion or defeat of legislation, did not thereby intend to empower
the committee to probe activities of a lobbyist that were uncon-
nected with his representations directly to Congress but rather de-
signed to influence public opinion by distribution of literature. Con-
sequently the committee was without authority to compel the
228 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 44 (1953).
229 354 U.S. 178, 201 (1957).
230 The Committee has since been abolished.
232 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
233 360 U.S. at 117–18.
234 360 U.S. at 122–23. But note that in Stamler v. Willis, 415 F.2d 1365 (7th
Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970), the court ordered to trial a civil suit
contesting the constitutionality of the rule establishing the committee on allega-
tions of overbreadth and overbroad application, holding that Barenblatt did not fore-
close the contention.
235 But see Tobin v. United States, 306 F.2d 270 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
371 U.S. 902 (1962).

236 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
representative of a private organization to disclose the names of all

who had purchased such literature in quantity.237 Still another ex-
ample of lack of proper authority is Gojack v. United States,238 in
which the Court reversed a contempt citation because there was no
showing that the parent committee had delegated to the subcommit-
tee before whom the witness had appeared the authority to make
the inquiry and neither had the full committee specified the area
of inquiry.
Watkins v. United States,239 remains the leading case on perti-
nency, although it has not had the influence on congressional inves-
tigations that some hoped and some feared in the wake of its an-
nouncement. When questioned by a subcommittee of the House Un-
American Activities Committee, Watkins refused to supply the names
of past associates, who, to his knowledge, had terminated their mem-
bership in the Communist Party. He supported his noncompliance
by, inter alia, contending that the questions were unrelated to the
work of the committee. Sustaining the witness, the Court empha-
sized that inasmuch as a witness by his refusal exposes himself to
a criminal prosecution for contempt, he is entitled to be informed
of the relation of the question to the subject of the investigation
with the same precision as the Due Process Clause requires of stat-
utes defining crimes.240
For ascertainment of the subject matter of an investigation, noted
the Court, the witness might look to several sources, including (1)
the authorizing resolution, (2) the resolution by which the full com-
mittee authorized the subcommittee to proceed, (3) the introduc-
tory remarks of the chairman or other members, (4) the nature of
the proceedings, and (5) the chairman’s response to the witness when
the witness objects to the line of question on grounds of perti-
nency.241 Whether a precise delineation of the subject matter of the
investigation in but one of these sources would satisfy the require-
ments of due process was left unresolved, since the Court ruled that
in this case all of them were deficient in providing Watkins with
the guidance to which he was entitled. The sources had informed
Watkins that the questions were asked in a course of investigation
of something that ranged from a narrow inquiry into Communist
237 The Court intimated that if the authorizing resolution did confer such power
upon the committee, the validity of the resolution would be subject to doubt on First
Amendment principles. Justices Black and Douglas would have construed the reso-
lution as granting the authority and would have voided it under the First Amend-
ment. 345 U.S. at 48 (concurring opinion).
238 384 U.S. 702 (1966).
239 354 U.S. 178 (1957).
240 354 U.S. at 208–09.
241 354 U.S. at 209–15.
infiltration into the labor movement to a vague and unlimited in-

quiry into “subversion and subversive propaganda.” 242
Although subsequent cases involving the Un-American Activi-
ties Committee did result in the reversal of several contempt cita-
tions on narrow grounds, the holdings by and large showed that
the implications of Watkins with regard to pertinency were held in
check, so that, without amending its rules or its authorizing resolu-
tion, the committee was successful in convincing a majority of the
Court that its subsequent investigations were authorized and that
the questions asked of recalcitrant witnesses were pertinent to the
inquiries.243 Thus, in Barenblatt v. United States,244 the Court con-
cluded that the history of the Un-American Activities Committee’s
activities, viewed in conjunction with the rule establishing it, evinced
clear investigatory authority to inquire into Communist infiltration
242 Id. See also Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576 (1958), a per curiam rever-
sal of a contempt conviction on the ground that the questions did not relate to a
subject “within the subcommittee’s scope of inquiry,” arising out of a hearing pertain-
ing to a recantation of testimony by a witness in which the inquiry drifted into a
discussion of legislation barring Communists from practice at the federal bar, the
unanswered questions being asked then; and Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147
(1958), a reversal for refusal to produce membership lists because of an ambiguity
in the committee’s ruling on the time of performance; and Scull v. Virginia ex rel.
Committee, 359 U.S. 344 (1959), a reversal on a contempt citation before a state
legislative investigating committee on pertinency grounds.
243 Notice should be taken, however, of two cases that, though decided four and
five years after Watkins, involved persons who were witnesses before the Un-
American Activities Committee either shortly prior to or shortly following Watkins’
appearance and who were cited for contempt before the Supreme Court decided Watkins.
In Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456 (1961), involving an otherwise coopera-
tive witness who had refused to identify certain persons with whom he had been
associated at Cornell University in Communist Party activities, the Court agreed
that Deutch had refused on grounds of moral scruples to answer the questions and
had not challenged them as not pertinent to the inquiry, but the majority ruled that
the government had failed to establish at trial the pertinency of the questions, thus
vitiating the conviction. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and Whittaker dis-
sented, arguing that any argument on pertinency had been waived but in any event
thinking it had been established. Id. at 472, 475.
In Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962), the Court struck down con-
tempt convictions for insufficiency of the indictments. Indictments, which merely set
forth the offense in the words of the contempt statute, the Court asserted, in alleg-
ing that the unanswered questions were pertinent to the subject under inquiry but
not identifying the subject in detail, are defective because they do not inform defen-
dants of what they must be prepared to meet and do not enable courts to decide
whether the facts alleged are sufficient to support convictions. Justice Stewart for
the Court noted that the indicia of subject matter under inquiry were varied and
contradictory, thus necessitating a precise governmental statement of particulars.
Justices Harlan and Clark in dissent contended that it was sufficient for the govern-
ment to establish pertinency at trial, and noted that no objections relating to perti-
nency had been made at the hearings. Id. at 781, 789–793. Russell was cited in the
per curiam reversals in Grumman v. United States, 370 U.S. 288 (1962), and Silber
v. United States, 370 U.S. 717 (1962).
244 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
in the field of education, an authority with which the witness had

shown familiarity. Additionally, the opening statement of the chair-
man had pinpointed that subject as the nature of the inquiry that
day, and the opening witness had testified on the subject and named
Barenblatt as a member of the Communist Party at the University
of Michigan. Thus, pertinency and the witness’s knowledge of the
pertinency of the questions asked him were shown.
Similarly, in Wilkinson v. United States,245 the Court held that,
when the witness was apprised at the hearing that the committee
was empowered to investigate Communist infiltration of the textile
industry in the South; that it was gathering information with a view
to ascertaining the manner of administration and need to amend
various laws directed at subversive activities; that Congress hith-
erto had enacted many of its recommendations in this field; and
that it possessed information about his Party membership, he was
notified effectively that a question about that affiliation was rel-
evant to a valid inquiry. A companion case was held to be con-
trolled by Wilkinson,246 and in both cases the majority rejected the
contention that the committee inquiry was invalid because both
Wilkinson and Braden, when they were called, were engaged in or-
ganizing activities against the committee.247
Related to the cases discussed in this section are cases requir-
ing that congressional committees observe strictly their own rules.
Thus, in Yellin v. United States,248 a contempt conviction was re-
versed because the committee had failed to observe its rule provid-
ing for a closed session if a majority of the committee believed that
a witness’s appearance in public session might unjustly injure his
reputation. The Court ruled that the committee had ignored the rule
when it subpoenaed the witness for a public hearing and then failed
245 365 U.S. 399 (1961).

246 Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431 (1961).
247 The majority denied that the witness’s participation in a lawful and pro-
tected course of action, such as petitioning Congress to abolish the committee, lim-
ited the committee’s right of inquiry. “[W]e cannot say that, simply because the peti-
tioner at the moment may have been engaged in lawful conduct, his Communist
activities in connection therewith could not be investigated. The subcommittee had
reasonable ground to suppose that the petitioner was an active Communist Party
member, and that as such he possessed information that would substantially aid it
in its legislative investigation. As Barenblatt makes clear, it is the nature of the
Communist activity involved, whether the momentary conduct is legitimate or ille-
gitimate politically, that establishes the government’s overbalancing interest.” Wilkinson
v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 414 (1961). In both cases, the dissenters, Chief Jus-
tice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan argued that the committee
action was invalid because it was intended to harass persons who had publicly criti-
cized committee activities. Id. at 415, 423, 429.
248 374 U.S. 109 (1963).
to consider as a committee his request for a closed session.249 As

regard rules of quorum, the Court has blown hot and cold on the
issue, and no firm statement of a rule is possible, although it seems
probable that no quorum is ordinarily necessary.250
Protection of Witnesses; Constitutional Guarantees.—Just
as the Constitution places limitations on Congress’ power to legis-
late, so it limits the power to investigate. “[T]he Congress, in com-
mon with all branches of the Government, must exercise its pow-
ers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case,
the relevant limitations of the Bill of Rights.” 251 The most exten-
sive amount of litigation in this area has involved the privilege against
self-incrimination guaranteed against governmental abridgment by
the Fifth Amendment. Observance of the privilege by congressional
committees has been so uniform that no court has ever held that it
must be observed, though dicta are plentiful.252 Thus, the cases have
explored not the issue of the right to rely on the privilege but rather
the manner and extent of its application.
There is no prescribed form in which one must plead the privi-
lege. When a witness refused to answer a question about Commu-
nist Party affiliations and based his refusal upon the assertion by
a prior witness of “the first amendment supplemented by the fifth,”
the Court held that he had sufficiently invoked the privilege, at least
in the absence of committee inquiry seeking to force him to adopt a
more precise stand.253 If the committee suspected that the witness
was being purposely vague, in order perhaps to avoid the stigma
attached to a forthright claim of the privilege, it should have re-
quested him to state specifically the ground of his refusal to testify.
Another witness, who was threatened with prosecution for his Com-
munist activities, could claim the privilege even to some questions
249 Failure to follow its own rules was again an issue in Gojack v. United States,
384 U.S. 702 (1966), in which the Court noted that, although a committee rule re-
quired the approval of a majority of the committee before a “major” investigation
was initiated, such approval had not been sought before a subcommittee proceeded.
250 In Christoffel v. United States, 338 U.S. 84 (1949), the Court held that a
witness can be found guilty of perjury only where a quorum of the committee is
present at the time the perjury is committed; it is not enough to prove that a quo-
rum was present when the hearing began. But, in United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S.
323 (1950), the Court ruled that a quorum was not required under the statute pun-
ishing refusal to honor a valid subpoena issued by an authorized committee.
252 360 U.S. at 126; Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 196 (1957); Quinn
v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955). The privilege against self-incrimination
is not available, however, as a defense to an organizational officer who refuses to
turn over organization documents and records to an investigating committee. McPhaul
253 Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
the answers to which he might have been able to explain away as

unrelated to criminal conduct; if an answer might tend to be incrimi-
natory, the witness is not deprived of the privilege merely because
he might have been able to refute inferences of guilt.254 In still an-
other case, the Court held that the committee had not clearly over-
ruled the claim of privilege and directed an answer.255
In Hutcheson v. United States,256 the Court rejected a chal-
lenge to a Senate committee inquiry into union corruption on the
part of a witness who was under indictment in state court on charges
relating to the same matters about which the committee sought to
interrogate him. The witness did not plead his privilege against self-
incrimination but contended that, by questioning him about mat-
ters that would aid the state prosecutor, the committee had denied
him due process. The plurality opinion of the Court rejected his ground
for refusing to answer, noting that, if the committee’s public hear-
ings rendered the witness’s state trial unfair, then he could prop-
erly raise that issue on review of his state conviction.257
Claims relating to the First Amendment have been frequently
asserted and as frequently denied. It is not that the First Amend-
ment is inapplicable to congressional investigations, it is that, un-
der the prevailing Court interpretation, the First Amendment does
not bar all legislative restrictions of the rights guaranteed by it.258
“[T]he protections of the First Amendment, unlike a proper claim
of the privilege against self-incrimination under the Fifth Amend-
ment, do not afford a witness the right to resist inquiry in all cir-
cumstances. Where First Amendment rights are asserted to bar gov-
254 Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955).
255 Bart v. United States, 349 U.S. 219 (1955).
256 369 U.S. 599 (1962).
257 Justice Harlan wrote the opinion of the Court, which Justices Clark and Stew-
art joined. Justice Brennan concurred solely because the witness had not claimed
the privilege against self-incrimination, but he would have voted to reverse the con-
viction had there been a claim. Chief Justice Warren and Justice Douglas dissented
on due process grounds. Justices Black, Frankfurter, and White did not participate.
At the time of the decision, the Self-incrimination Clause did not restrain the states
through the Fourteenth Amendment, so that it was no violation of the clause for
either the Federal Government or the states to compel testimony which would in-
criminate the witness in the other jurisdiction. Cf. United States v. Murdock, 284
U.S. 141 (1931); Knapp v. Schweitzer, 357 U.S. 371 (1958). The Court has since re-
versed itself, Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm’n,
378 U.S. 52 (1964), thus leaving the vitality of Hutcheson doubtful.
258 The matter is discussed fully in the section on the First Amendment but a
good statement of the balancing rule may be found in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37, 51 (1971), by Justice Black, supposedly an absolutist on the subject: “Where a
statute does not directly abridge free speech, but—while regulating a subject within
the State’s power—tends to have the incidental effect of inhibiting First Amend-
ment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the effect on speech
is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of alternative
means for doing so.”
ernmental interrogation, resolution of the issue always involves a

balancing by the courts of the competing private and public inter-
ests at stake in the particular circumstances shown.” 259
Thus, the Court has declined to rule that, under the circum-
stances of particular cases, investigating committees were pre-
cluded from making inquiries simply because the subject area was
education 260 or because the witnesses at the time they were called
were engaged in protected activities such as petitioning Congress
to abolish the inquiring committee.261 However, in an earlier case,
the Court intimated that it was taking a narrow view of the com-
mittee’s authority because a determination that authority existed
would raise a serious First Amendment issue.262 And in a state leg-
islative investigating committee case, the majority of the Court held
that an inquiry seeking the membership lists of the National Asso-
ciation for the Advancement of Colored People was so lacking in a
“nexus” between the organization and the Communist Party that
the inquiry infringed the First Amendment.263
Dicta in the Court’s opinions acknowledge that the Fourth Amend-
ment guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures are
applicable to congressional committees.264 The issue would most of-
ten arise in the context of subpoenas, inasmuch as that procedure
is the usual way by which committees obtain documentary mate-
rial and inasmuch as Fourth Amendment standards apply to sub-
poenas as well as to search warrants.265 But there are no cases in
which a holding turns on this issue.266 Other constitutional rights
of witnesses have been asserted at various times, but without suc-
cess or even substantial minority support.
Sanctions of the Investigatory Power: Contempt

Explicit judicial recognition of the right of either house of Con-
gress to commit for contempt a witness who ignores its summons
or refuses to answer its inquiries dates from McGrain v. Daugherty.267
But the principle has its roots in an early case, Anderson v. Dunn,268
260 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
261 Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 (1961).

262 United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
263 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
See also DeGregory v. Attorney General, 383 U.S. 825 (1966).

265 See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946), and cases
cited.
266 Cf. McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
267 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
268 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
which stated in broad terms the right of either branch of the legis-
lature to attach and punish a person (other than a Member) for
contempt of its authority.269 The right to punish a contumacious wit-
ness was conceded in Marshall v. Gordon,270 although the Court there
held that the implied power to deal with contempt did not extend
to the arrest of a person who published matter defamatory of the
House.
The cases emphasize that the power to punish for contempt rests
upon the right of self-preservation. That is, in the words of Chief
Justice White, “the right to prevent acts which in and of them-
selves inherently obstruct or prevent the discharge of legislative duty
or the refusal to do that which there is inherent legislative power
to compel in order that legislative functions may be performed” ne-
cessitates the contempt power. 271 Thus, in Jurney v. Mac-
Cracken,272 the Court turned aside an argument that the Senate
had no power to punish a witness who, having been commanded to
produce papers, destroyed them after service of the subpoena. The
punishment would not be efficacious in obtaining the papers in this
particular case, but the power to punish for a past contempt is an
appropriate means of vindicating “the established and essential privi-
lege of requiring the production of evidence.” 273
Under the rule laid down by Anderson v. Dunn,274 imprison-
ment by one of the houses of Congress could not extend beyond the
adjournment of the body which ordered it. Because of this limita-
tion and because contempt trials before the bar of the House charg-
ing were time-consuming, in 1857 Congress enacted a statute pro-
viding for criminal process in the federal courts with prescribed
penalties for contempt of Congress.275 The Supreme Court has held
that the purpose of this statute is merely supplementary of the power
retained by Congress, and all constitutional objections to it were
overruled. “We grant that Congress could not divest itself, or either
269 The contempt consisted of an alleged attempt to bribe a Member of the House
for his assistance in passing a claims bill. The case was a civil suit brought by An-
derson against the Sergeant at Arms of the House for assault and battery and false
imprisonment. Cf. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168 (1881). The power of a legis-
lative body to punish for contempt one who disrupts legislative business was reaf-
firmed in Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972), but a unanimous Court there held
that due process required a legislative body to give a contemnor notice and an op-
portunity to be heard prior to conviction and sentencing. Although this case dealt
with a state legislature, there is no question it would apply to Congress as well.
270 243 U.S. 521 (1917).
271 243 U.S. at 542.
272 294 U.S. 125 (1935).
273 294 U.S. at 150.
274 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
275 Act of January 24, 1857, 11 Stat. 155. With minor modification, this statute
is now 2 U.S.C. § 192.

Sec. 2—House of Representatives Cl. 1—Congressional Districting
of its Houses, of the essential and inherent power to punish for con-
tempt, in cases to which the power of either House properly ex-
tended; but because Congress, by the Act of 1857, sought to aid each
of the Houses in the discharge of its constitutional functions, it does
not follow that any delegation of the power in each to punish for
contempt was involved.” 276
Because Congress has invoked the aid of the federal judicial sys-
tem to protect itself against contumacious conduct, the Court has
asserted that the federal courts have the duty to accord a person
prosecuted for this statutory offense every safeguard available in
other federal criminal cases.277 The discussion in previous sections
of many reversals of contempt convictions bears witness to this as-
sertion. What constitutional protections ordinarily necessitated by
due process are required in a contempt trial before the bar of one
House or the other—such as notice, right to counsel, confrontation,
and the like—is an open question.278
It has long been settled that the courts may not intervene di-
rectly to restrain the carrying out of an investigation or the man-
ner of an investigation, and that a witness who believes the in-
quiry to be illegal or otherwise invalid in order to raise the issue
must place himself in contempt and raise his beliefs as affirmative
defenses on his criminal prosecution. This understanding was sharply
reinforced when the Court held that the speech-or-debate clause ut-
terly foreclosed judicial interference with the conduct of a congres-
sional investigation, through review of the propriety of subpoenas
or otherwise.279 It is only with regard to the trial of contempts that
the courts may review the carrying out of congressional investiga-
tions and may impose constitutional and other constraints.
SECTION 2. Clause 1. The House of Representatives shall be

composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People
of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have
276 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 671–672 (1897).
277 Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263, 296–297 (1929); Watkins v. United
States, 354 U.S. 178, 207 (1957); Sacher v. United States, 356 U.S. 576, 577 (1958);
Flaxer v. United States, 358 U.S. 147, 151 (1958); Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S.
456, 471 (1961); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 755 (1962). Protesting the
Court’s reversal of several contempt convictions over a period of years, Justice Clark
was moved to suggest that “[t]his continued frustration of the Congress in the use
of the judicial process to punish those who are contemptuous of its committees indi-
cates to me that the time may have come for Congress to revert to ‘its original prac-
tice of utilizing the coercive sanction of contempt proceedings at the bar of the House
[affected].’ ” Id. at 781; Watkins, 354 U.S. at 225.
278 Cf. Groppi v. Leslie, 404 U.S. 496 (1972).
279 Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous

Branch of the State Legislature.
CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING
A major innovation in constitutional law in recent years has been
the requirement that election districts in each state be structured
so that each elected representative represents substantially equal
populations.280 Although this requirement has generally been rooted
in the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,281
the Court held in Wesberry v. Sanders 282 that “construed in its his-
torical context, the command of Art. I, § 2, that Representatives be
chosen ‘by the People of the several States’ means that as nearly
as is practicable one man’s vote in a congressional election is to be
worth as much as another’s.” 283
Court involvement in this issue developed slowly. In our early
history, state congressional delegations were generally elected at-
large instead of by districts. Congress subsequently imposed a re-
quirement for single-Member districting 284 and later added a provi-
sion for equally populated districts.285 Voters seeking relief for failure
of a state to comply with these laws, however, generally sought re-
lief from the House through its authority to refuse to seat a Member-
elects.286 The first series of cases did not reach the Supreme Court
until the states began redistricting after the 1930 Census, and these
cases were resolved without reaching constitutional issues and in-
deed without resolving the issue whether such voter complaints were
280 The phrase “one person, one vote” might well seem to refer to election dis-
tricts drawn to contain equal numbers of voters rather than equal numbers of per-
sons. But it seems clear from a consideration of all the Court’s opinions and the
results of its rulings that the statement in the text accurately reflects the constitu-
tional requirement. The case expressly holding that total population, or the exclu-
sion only of transients, is the standard is Burns v. Richardson, 384 U.S. 73 (1966), a
legislative apportionment case. Notice that considerable population disparities exist
from state to state, as a result of the requirement that each state receive at least
one Member and the fact that state lines cannot be crossed in districting. At least
under present circumstances, these disparities do not violate the Constitution. U.S.
Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
281 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964) (legislative apportionment and district-
ing); Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (local governmental units).
See discussion Fourteenth Amendment, Apportionment and Districting, infra.
282 376 U.S. 1 (1964). See also Martin v. Bush, 376 U.S. 222 (1964).
283 376 U.S. at 7–8.
284 Act of June 25, 1842, 5 Stat. 491.
285 Act of February 2, 1872, 17 Stat. 28.
286 The House uniformly refused to grant any such relief. 1 A. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS
OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 310 (1907). See L. SCHMECKEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL APPOR-

TIONMENT 135–138 (1941).
justiciable at all.287 Then, in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the
Court used the “political question” doctrine to decline to adjudicate
districting and apportionment suits. This position, however, was later
changed by Baker v. Carr.288
For the Court in Wesberry,289 Justice Black argued that a read-
ing of the debates of the Constitutional Convention conclusively dem-
onstrated that the Framers had meant, in using the phrase “by the
People,” to guarantee equality of representation in the election of
Members of the House of Representatives.290 Justice Harlan, in dis-
sent, argued that the statements on which the majority relied had
uniformly been in the context of the Great Compromise—Senate rep-
resentation of the states with Members elected by the state legisla-
tures, House representation according to the population of the states,
qualified by the guarantee of at least one Member per state and
the counting of slaves as three-fifths of persons—and not at all in
the context of intrastate districting. Further, he thought the Con-
vention debates clear to the effect that Article I, § 4, had vested
exclusive control over state districting practices in Congress, and
that the Court action overrode a congressional decision not to re-
quire equally populated districts.291
The most important issue, of course, was how strict a standard
of equality the Court would adhere to. At first, the Justices seemed
inclined to some form of de minimis rule with a requirement that
the State present a principled justification for the deviations from
equality which any districting plan presented.292 But in Kirkpatrick
v. Preisler,293 a sharply divided Court announced the rule that a
state must make a “good-faith effort to achieve precise mathemati-
cal equality.” 294 Therefore, “[u]nless population variances among con-
gressional districts are shown to have resulted despite such [good-
faith] effort [to achieve precise mathematical equality], the state must
justify each variance, no matter how small.” 295
The strictness of the test was revealed not only by the phras-
ing of the test but by the fact that the majority rejected every prof-
287 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932);
Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932); Mahan v.
Hume, 287 U.S. 575 (1932).
288 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
289 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
290 376 U.S. at 7–18.
291 376 U.S. at 20–49.
292 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 385 U.S. 450 (1967), and Duddleston v. Grills, 385
U.S. 455 (1967), relying on the rule set out in Swann v. Adams, 385 U.S. 440 (1967),
a state legislative case.
293 394 U.S. 526 (1969). See also Wells v. Rockefeller, 394 U.S. 542 (1969).
294 Kirkpatrick v. Preisler, 394 U.S. 526, 530 (1969).
295 394 U.S. at 531.
fer of a justification which the state had made and which could likely
be made. Thus, it was not an adequate justification that deviations
resulted from (1) an effort to draw districts to maintain intact ar-
eas with distinct economic and social interests,296 (2) the require-
ments of legislative compromise,297 (3) a desire to maintain the in-
tegrity of political subdivision lines,298 (4) the exclusion from total
population figures of certain military personnel and students not
residents of the areas in which they were found,299 (5) an attempt
to compensate for population shifts since the last census,300 or (6)
an effort to achieve geographical compactness.301
Illustrating the strictness of the standard, the Court upheld a
lower court voiding of a Texas congressional districting plan in which
the population difference between the most and least populous dis-
tricts was 19,275 persons and the average deviation from the ide-
ally populated district was 3,421 persons.302 Adhering to the prin-
ciple of strict population equality in a subsequent case, the Court
refused to find a plan valid simply because the variations were smaller
than the estimated census undercount. Rejecting the plan, the dif-
ference in population between the most and least populous dis-
tricts being 3,674 people, in a state in which the average district
population was 526,059 people, the Court opined that, given rapid
advances in computer technology, it is now “relatively simple to draw
contiguous districts of equal population and at the same time . . .
further whatever secondary goals the State has.” 303
Attacks on partisan gerrymandering have proceeded under equal-
protection analysis, and, although the Court has held claims of de-
296 394 U.S. at 533. People vote as individuals, Justice Brennan said for the
Court, and it is the equality of individual voters that is protected.

297 Id. Political “practicality” may not interfere with a rule of “practicable” equal-
ity.
298 394 U.S. at 533–34. The argument is not “legally acceptable.”
299 394 U.S. at 534–35. Justice Brennan questioned whether anything less than
a total population basis was permissible but noted that the legislature in any event
had made no consistent application of the rationale.
300 394 U.S. at 535. This justification would be acceptable if an attempt to estab-
lish shifts with reasonable accuracy had been made.

301 394 U.S. at 536. Justifications based upon “the unaesthetic appearance” of
the map will not be accepted.

302 White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783 (1973). The Court did set aside the district
court’s own plan for districting, instructing that court to adhere more closely to the
legislature’s own plan insofar as it reflected permissible goals of the legislators, re-
flecting, to the extent possible, an ongoing deference to legislatures in this area.
303 Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 733 (1983). Illustrating the point about
computer-generated plans containing absolute population equality is Hastert v. State

Bd. of Elections, 777 F. Supp. 634 (N.D. Ill. 1991) (three-judge court), in which the
court adopted a congressional-districting plan where 18 of the 20 districts had 571,530
people each and each of the other two had 571,531 people.
nial of effective representation to be justiciable, the standards are

so high that neither voters nor minority parties have yet benefitted
from the development.304
VOTER (ELECTOR) QUALIFICATIONS

It was the original constitutional scheme to vest the determina-
tion of qualifications for voters or “electors” in congressional elec-
tions 305 solely in the discretion of the states, save only for the ex-
press requirement that the states could prescribe no qualifications
other than those provided for voters for the more numerous branch
of the legislature.306 This language has never been expressly changed,
but the discretion of the states—and not only with regard to the
qualifications of congressional electors—has long been circum-
scribed by express constitutional limitations found in various con-
stitutional amendments 307 and by the Equal Protection Clause.308
And, since the right to vote for United States Representatives is
conceptually derived from the Federal Constitution,309 Congress has
the power under Article I, § 4, to legislate to protect that right against
both official 310 and private denial.311
304 The principal case was Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986), a legislative
apportionment case, but congressional districting is also covered. See Badham v. Eu,
694 F. Supp. 664 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (three-judge court) (adjudicating partisan gerry-
mandering claim as to congressional districts but deciding against plaintiffs on mer-
its), aff’d, 488 U.S. 1024 (1988); Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992)
(three-judge court) (same), aff’d, 506 U.S. 801 (1992); Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S.
267 (2004) (same); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399
(2006) (same). Additional discussion of this issue appears under Amendment 14, The
New Equal Protection, Apportionment and Districting.
305 The clause refers only to elections to the House of Representatives, of course,
and, inasmuch as Senators were originally chosen by state legislatures and presiden-
tial electors were chosen as the states directed, it was only the qualifications of vot-
ers for the House with which the Constitution was originally concerned.
306 Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 171 (1875); Breedlove v. Suttles,
302 U.S. 277, 283 (1937). See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 576–585 (1833).
307 The Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments lim-
ited the states in the setting of qualifications in terms of race, sex, payment of poll
taxes, and age.
308 E.g., Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89 (1965) (member of the armed services
who entered service while residing in a different state); Kramer v. Union Free School
Dist., 395 U.S. 621 (1969) (requirement that individual own or rent taxable real prop-
erty within a school district, be a spouse of a property owner or lessor, or be the
parent or guardian of a child attending a public school in the district); City of Phoe-
nix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970) (real property owners).
309 “The right to vote for members of the Congress of the United States is not de-
rived merely from the constitution and laws of the state in which they are chosen, but
has its foundation in the Constitution of the United States.” Ex parte Yarbrough, 110
U.S. 651, 663 (1884). See also Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 62 (1900); Swafford v. Templeton,
185 U.S. 487, 492 (1902); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315, 321 (1941).
310 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
311 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315 (1941).
Further, beyond the limitation of discretion on the part of the

states, Congress has assumed the power, with judicial acquies-
cence, to legislate to provide qualifications at least with regard to
some elections.312 Thus, in the Voting Rights Act of 1965,313 Con-
gress legislated changes of a limited nature in the literacy laws of
some of the states.314 Then, in the Voting Rights Act Amendments
of 1970,315 Congress successfully lowered the minimum voting age
in federal elections 316 and prescribed residency qualifications for presi-
dential elections.317 On the other hand, a requirement that states
lower the minimum voting age for state elections was struck down.318
These developments greatly limited the discretion granted in Ar-
ticle I, § 2, cl. 1, and are more fully dealt with in the treatment of
§ 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Clause 2. No person shall be a Representative who shall not

have attained to the Age of twenty-five Years, and been seven
Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when
elected, be an inhabitant of the State in which he shall be cho-
sen.
QUALIFICATIONS OF MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
When the Qualifications Must Be Possessed

A question much disputed but now seemingly settled is whether
a condition of eligibility to serve in Congress must exist at the time
of the election or whether it is sufficient that eligibility exist when
the Member-elect presents himself to take the oath of office. Al-
though the language of the clause expressly makes residency in the
state a requirement at the time of election, it now appears estab-
lished in congressional practice that the other qualifications, age
and citizenship, need be met only when the Member-elect is to be
sworn.319 Thus, persons elected to either the House of Representa-
312 The power has been held to exist under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966); Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970);
City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156 (1980).
313 § 4(e), 79 Stat. 437, 439, 42 U.S.C. § 1973b(e), as amended.
314 Upheld in Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
315 Titles 2 and 3, 84 Stat. 314, 42 U.S.C. § 1973bb.
316 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119–131, 135–144, 239–281 (1970).
317 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134, 147–150, 236–239, 285–292 (1970).
318 Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 119–131, 152–213, 293–296 (1970).
319 See S. REP. NO. 904, 74th Congress, 1st sess. (1935), reprinted in 79 CONG.
REC. 9651–9653 (1935).

Sec. 2—House of Representatives Cl. 2—Qualifications
tives or the Senate before attaining the required age or term of citi-
zenship have been admitted as soon as they became qualified.320
Exclusivity of Constitutional Qualifications

Congressional Additions.—Writing in The Federalist with ref-
erence to the election of Members of Congress, Hamilton firmly stated
that “[t]he qualifications of the persons who may . . . be chosen . . .
are defined and fixed in the constitution; and are unalterable by
the legislature.” 321 Until the Civil War, the issue was not raised,
as actions taken by either house conformed to the idea that the quali-
fications for membership could not be enlarged by statute or prac-
tice.322 But in the passions aroused by the fratricidal conflict, Con-
gress enacted a law requiring its Members to take an oath that they
had never been disloyal to the National Government.323 Several per-
sons were refused seats by both houses because of charges of disloy-
alty,324 and thereafter House practice, and Senate practice as well,
was erratic.325
But years later, in Powell v. McCormack,326 it was conclusively
established that the qualifications listed in Art. I, § 2, cl. 2 are ex-
320 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 418 (1907); 79 CONG. REC.
9841–9842 (1935); cf. HINDS’ PRECEDENTS, supra § 429.

321 No. 60 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 409. See also 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CON-
STITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 623–627 (1833) (relating to the power of the states
to add qualifications).
322 All the instances appear to be, however, cases in which the contest arose out
of a claimed additional state qualification.

323 Act of July 2, 1862, 12 Stat. 502. Note also the disqualification written into
§ 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment.

324 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 451, 449, 457 (1907).
325 In 1870, the House excluded a Member-elect who had been reelected after
resigning earlier in the same Congress when expulsion proceedings were instituted
against him for selling appointments to the Military Academy. Id. at § 464. A Member-
elect was excluded in 1899 because of his practice of polygamy, id. at 474–80, but
the Senate refused, after adopting a rule requiring a two-thirds vote, to exclude a
Member-elect on those grounds. Id. at §§ 481–483. The House twice excluded a so-
cialist Member-elect in the wake of World War I on allegations of disloyalty. 6 CAN-
NON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 56–58 (1935). See also S. REP. NO.
1010, 77th Congress, 2d sess. (1942), and R. Hupman, Senate Election, Expulsion
and Censure Cases From 1789 to 1960, S. DOC. NO. 71, 87th Congress, 2d sess. (1962),
140 (dealing with the effort to exclude Senator Langer of North Dakota).
326 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court divided eight to one, Justice Stewart dissent-
ing on the ground that the case was moot. Powell’s continuing validity was aff irmed
in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995), both by the Court, hold-
ing that the qualifications set out in the Constitution are exclusive and may not be
added to by either Congress or the states, id. at 787–98, and by the dissenters, who
held that Congress, for different reasons could not add to qualifications, although
the states could. Id. at 875–76.
clusive 327 and that Congress could not add to them by excluding
Members-elect not meeting additional qualifications.328 Powell was
excluded from the 90th Congress on the grounds that he had as-
serted an unwarranted privilege and immunity from the process of
a state court; that he had wrongfully diverted House funds for his
own uses; and that he had made false reports on the expenditures
of foreign currency.329 The Court’s determination that Powell had
been wrongfully excluded was based in the main on the Court’s analy-
sis of the Convention debates and historical developments.
The Court found that English parliamentary practice and colo-
nial legislative practice at the time of the drafting of the Constitu-
tion had, after some earlier deviations, settled into a policy whereby
exclusion was a power exercisable only when a Member-elect failed
to meet a standing qualification.330 Then, in the Constitutional Con-
vention, the Framers had defeated provisions allowing Congress by
statute either to create property qualifications or to create addi-
tional qualifications without limitation.331 Further, both Hamilton
and Madison had strongly urged in the Federalist Papers (and Ham-
ilton in the New York ratifying convention) that the Constitution
prescribed exclusive qualifications for Members of Congress.332 In
addition, the Court observed that the early practice of Congress,
with many of the Framers serving, was consistently limited to the
view that exclusion could be exercised only with regard to a Member-
elect’s failure to meet a qualification expressly prescribed in the Con-
stitution. Not until the Civil War did contrary precedents appear,
and practice after this was mixed.333
Finally, said the Court, even were the intent of the Framers less
clear, it would still be compelled to interpret the power to exclude
narrowly. “A fundamental principle of our representative democ-
racy is, in Hamilton’s words, ‘that the people should choose whom
they please to govern them.’ 2 Elliot’s Debates 257. As Madison pointed
out at the Convention, this principle is undermined as much by lim-
iting whom the people can select as by limiting the franchise itself.
In apparent agreement with this basic philosophy, the Convention
327 The Court declined to reach the question whether the Constitution in fact
does impose other qualifications. 395 U.S. at 520 n.41 (possibly Article I, § 3, cl. 7,
disqualifying persons impeached, Article I, § 6, cl. 2, incompatible offices, and § 3 of
the Fourteenth Amendment). It is also possible that the oath provision of Article VI,
cl. 3, could be considered a qualification. See Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 129–131
(1966).
328 395 U.S. at 550.
329 H. REP. NO. 27, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967); 395 U.S. at 489–493.
330 395 U.S. at 522–31.
331 395 U.S. at 532–39.
332 395 U.S. at 539–41.
333 395 U.S. at 541–47.
adopted his suggestion limiting the power to expel. To allow essen-

tially that same power to be exercised under the guise of judging
qualifications, would be to ignore Madison’s warning, borne out in
the Wilkes case and some of Congress’ own post-Civil War exclu-
sion cases, against ‘vesting an improper and dangerous power in
the Legislature.’ 2 Farrand 249.” 334 Thus, the Court appears to say,
to allow the House to exclude Powell on this basis of qualifications
of its own choosing would impinge on the interests of his constitu-
ents in effective participation in the electoral process, an interest
which could be protected by a narrow interpretation of congressio-
nal power.335 These factors led the Court to conclude that Con-
gress’ power under Article I, § 5, cl. 1 to judge the qualifications of
its Members was limited to ascertaining the presence or absence of
the standing qualifications prescribed in Article I, § 2, cl. 2, and per-
haps in other express provisions of the Constitution.336
The result in Powell had been foreshadowed when the Court
had earlier held that the exclusion of a Member-elect by a state
legislature because of objections he had uttered to certain national
policies constituted a violation of the First Amendment and was void.337
In the course of that decision, the Court denied state legislators the
power to look behind the willingness of any legislator to take the
oath to support the Constitution of the United States, prescribed
by Article VI, cl. 3, to test his sincerity in taking it.338 The unani-
mous Court noted the views of Madison and Hamilton on the exclu-
sivity of the qualifications set out in the Constitution and alluded
to Madison’s view that the unfettered discretion of the legislative
branch to exclude members could be abused in behalf of political,
religious or other orthodoxies.339 The First Amendment holding and
the holding with regard to testing the sincerity with which the oath
of office is taken are no doubt as applicable to the United States
Congress as to state legislatures.
State Additions.—However much Congress may have devi-
ated from the principle that the qualifications listed in the Consti-
334 395 U.S. at 547–48.
335 The protection of the voters’ interest in being represented by the person of
their choice is thus analogized to their constitutionally secured right to cast a ballot
and have it counted in general elections, Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884),
and in primary elections, United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), to cast a
ballot undiluted in strength because of unequally populated districts, Wesberry v.
Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964), and to cast a vote for candidates of their choice unfet-
tered by onerous restrictions on candidate qualification for the ballot. Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
336 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 518–47 (1969).
337 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
338 385 U.S. at 129–31, 132, 135.
339 385 U.S. at 135 n.13.
tution are exclusive when the issue has been congressional enlarge-
ment of those qualifications, it has been uniform in rejecting efforts
by the states to enlarge the qualifications. Thus, the House in 1807
seated a Member-elect who was challenged as not being in compli-
ance with a state law imposing a twelve-month residency require-
ment in the district, rather than the federal requirement of being
an inhabitant of the state at the time of election; the state require-
ment, the House resolved, was unconstitutional.340 Similarly, both
the House and Senate have seated other Members-elect who did not
meet additional state qualifications or who suffered particular state
disqualifications on eligibility, such as running for Congress while
holding particular state offices.
The Supreme Court reached the same conclusion as to state power,
albeit by a surprisingly close 5–4 vote, in U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v.
Thornton.341 Arkansas, along with twenty-two other states, all but
two by citizen initiatives, had limited the number of terms that Mem-
bers of Congress may serve. In striking down the Arkansas term
limits, the Court determined that the Constitution’s qualifications
clauses 342 establish exclusive qualifications for Members that may
not be added to either by Congress or the states.343 Six years later,
the Court relied on Thornton to invalidate a Missouri law requir-
ing that labels be placed on ballots alongside the names of congres-
sional candidates who had “disregarded voters’ instruction on term
limits” or declined to pledge support for term limits.344
Both majority and dissenting opinions in Thornton were richly
embellished with disputatious arguments about the text of the Con-
stitution, the history of its drafting and ratification, and the prac-
tices of Congress and the states in the nation’s early years.345 These
differences over text, creation, and practice derived from disagree-
ment about the fundamental principle underlying the Constitu-
tion’s adoption. In the dissent’s view, the Constitution was the re-
340 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 414 (1907).
341 514 U.S. 779 (1995). The majority was composed of Justice Stevens (writing
the opinion of the Court) and Justices Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer. Dis-
senting were Justice Thomas (writing the opinion) and Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justices O’Connor and Scalia. Id. at 845.
342 Article I, § 2, cl. 2, provides that a person may qualify as a Representative if
he or she is at least 25 years old, has been a United States citizen for at least 7
years, and is an inhabitant, at the time of the election, of the state in which she is
chosen. The qualifications established for Senators, Article I, § 3, cl. 3, are an age of
30 years, nine years’ citizenship, and being an inhabitant of the state at the time of
election.
343 The four-Justice dissent argued that while Congress has no power to in-
crease qualifications, the states do. 514 U.S. at 845.

344 Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
345 See Sullivan, Dueling Sovereignties: U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 109
HARV. L. REV. 78 (1995).

Sec. 2—House of Representatives Cl. 3—Apportionment
sult of the resolution of the peoples of the separate states to create

the National Government. The conclusion to be drawn from this was
that the peoples in the states agreed to surrender only those pow-
ers expressly forbidden them and those limited powers that they
had delegated to the Federal Government expressly or by neces-
sary implication. They retained all other powers and still retain them.
Thus, “[w]here the Constitution is silent about the exercise of a par-
ticular power—that is, where the Constitution does not speak ei-
ther expressly or by necessary implication—the Federal Govern-
ment lacks that power and the States enjoy it.” 346 The Constitution’s
silence as to authority to impose additional qualifications meant that
this power resides in the states.
The majority’s views were radically different. After the adop-
tion of the Constitution, the states had two kinds of powers: re-
served powers that they had before the founding and that were not
surrendered to the Federal Government, and those powers del-
egated to them by the Constitution. It followed that the states could
have no reserved powers with respect to the Federal Government.
“As Justice Story recognized, ‘the states can exercise no powers what-
soever, which exclusively spring out of the existence of the national
government, which the constitution does not delegate to them. . . .
No state can say, that it has reserved, what it never pos-
sessed.’ ” 347 The states could not before the founding have pos-
sessed powers to legislate respecting the Federal Government, and,
because the Constitution did not delegate to the states the power
to prescribe qualifications for Members of Congress, the states did
not have any such power.348
Evidently, the opinions in this case reflect more than a decision
on this particular dispute. They rather represent conflicting philoso-
phies within the Court respecting the scope of national power in
relation to the states, an issue at the core of many controversies
today.
Clause 3. [Representatives and direct Taxes shall be appor-

tioned among the several States which may be included within
346 514 U.S. at 848 (Justice Thomas dissenting). See generally id. at 846–65.
347 514 U.S. at 802.
348 514 U.S. at 798–805. See also id. at 838–45 (Justice Kennedy concurring).
The Court applied similar reasoning in Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510, 522–23 (2001),
invalidating ballot labels identifying congressional candidates who had not pledged
to support term limits. Because congressional offices arise from the Constitution, the
Court explained, no authority to regulate these offices could have preceded the Con-
stitution and been reserved to the states, and the ballot labels were not valid exer-
cise of the power granted by Article I, § 4 to regulate the “manner” of holding elec-
tions. See discussion under Legislation Protecting Electoral Process, infra.
this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall

be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons,
including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and exclud-
ing Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons].349 The
actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the
first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within
every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they
shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not
exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have
at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall
be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse
three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode Island and Providence Plan-
tations one, Connecticut, five, New York six, New Jersey four,
Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten,
North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
APPORTIONMENT OF SEATS IN THE HOUSE
The Census Requirement

The Census Clause “reflects several important constitutional de-
terminations: that comparative state political power in the House
would reflect comparative population, not comparative wealth; that
comparative power would shift every 10 years to reflect population
changes; that federal tax authority would rest upon the same base;
and that Congress, not the states, would determine the manner of
conducting the census.” 350 These determinations “all suggest a strong
constitutional interest in accuracy.” 351 The language employed—
“actual enumeration”—requires an actual count, but gives Con-
gress wide discretion in determining the methodology of that count.
The word “enumeration” refers to a counting process without de-
scribing the count’s methodological details. The word “actual” merely
refers to the enumeration to be used for apportioning the Third Con-
349 The part of this clause relating to the mode of apportionment of representa-
tives among the several States was changed by the Fourteenth Amendment, § 2 and
as to taxes on incomes without apportionment, by the Sixteenth Amendment.
350 Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452, 476 (2002).
351 Id.
gress, and thereby distinguishes “a deliberately taken count” from

the conjectural approach that had been used for the First Con-
gress.
Finally, the conferral of authority on Congress to “direct” the
“manner” of enumeration underscores “the breadth of congressio-
nal methodological authority.” Thus, the Court held in Utah v. Ev-
ans, “hot deck imputation,” a method used to fill in missing data
by imputing to an address the number of persons found at a nearby
address or unit of the same type, does not run afoul of the “actual
enumeration” requirement.352 The Court distinguished imputation
from statistical sampling, and indicated that its holding was rela-
tively narrow. Imputation was permissible “where all efforts have
been made to reach every household, where the methods used con-
sist not of statistical sampling but of inference, where that infer-
ence involves a tiny percent of the population, where the alterna-
tive is to make a far less accurate assessment of the population,
and where consequently manipulation of the method is highly un-
likely.” 353
Although the Census Clause expressly provides for an enumera-
tion of persons, Congress has expanded the scope of the census by
including not only the free persons in the states, but also those in
the territories, and by requiring all persons over eighteen years of
age to answer an ever-lengthening list of inquiries concerning their
personal and economic affairs. This extended scope of the census
has received the implied approval of the Supreme Court,354 and is
one of the methods whereby the national legislature exercises its
inherent power to obtain the information necessary for intelligent
legislative action.
Although taking an enlarged view of its census power, Con-
gress has not always complied with its positive mandate to reappor-
352 Utah v. Evans, 536 U.S. 452 (2002).

353 See also Wisconsin v. City of New York, 517 U.S. 1 (1996), in which the Court
held that the decision of the Secretary of Commerce not to conduct a post-
enumeration survey and statistical adjustment for an undercount in the 1990 Cen-
sus was reasonable and within the bounds of discretion conferred by the Constitu-
tion and statute; and Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), upholding the
practice of the Secretary of Commerce in allocating overseas federal employees and
military personnel to the states of last residence. The mandate of an enumeration
of “their respective numbers” was complied with, it having been the practice since
the first enumeration to allocate persons to the place of their “usual residence,” and
to construe both this term and the word “inhabitant” broadly to include people tem-
porarily absent.
354 Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 536 (1971) (“Who
questions the power to do this?”).

tion representatives among the states after the census is taken.355

It failed to make such a reapportionment after the census of 1920,
being unable to reach agreement for allotting representation with-
out further increasing the size of the House. Ultimately, by the act
of June 18, 1929,356 it provided that the membership of the House
of Representatives should henceforth be restricted to 435 Mem-
bers, to be distributed among the states by the so-called “method of
major fractions,” which had been earlier employed in the apportion-
ment of 1911, and which has now been replaced with the “method
of equal proportions.” 357
Following the 1990 census, a state that had lost a House seat
as a result of the use of this latter formula sued, alleging a viola-
tion of the “one person, one vote” rule derived from Article I, § 2.
Exhibiting considerable deference to Congress and a stated appre-
ciation of the difficulties in achieving interstate equalities, the Court
upheld the formula and the resultant apportionment.358 The goal
of absolute population equality among districts “is realistic and ap-
propriate” within a single state, but the constitutional guarantee of
one Representative for each state constrains application to districts
in different states, and makes the goal “illusory for the Nation as a
whole.” 359
Although requiring the election of Representatives by districts,
Congress has left it to the states to draw district boundaries. This
has occasioned a number of disputes. In Ohio ex rel. Davis v.
Hildebrant,360 a requirement that a redistricting law be submitted
to a popular referendum was challenged and sustained. After the
reapportionment made pursuant to the 1930 census, deadlocks be-
tween the governor and legislature in several states produced a se-
ries of cases in which the right of the governor to veto a reappor-
tionment bill was questioned. Contrasting this function with other
duties committed to state legislatures by the Constitution, the Court
decided that it was legislative in character and subject to guberna-
torial veto to the same extent as ordinary legislation under the terms
of the state constitution.361
355 For an extensive history of the subject, see L. SCHMECKEBIER, CONGRESSIONAL AP-
PORTIONMENT (1941).
356 46 Stat. 26,22, as amended by 55 Stat. 761 (1941), 2 U.S.C. § 2a.
357 See U.S Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442, 450–51 (1992)
(describing history and various methods of apportionment).
358 U.S. Department of Commerce v. Montana, 503 U.S. 442 (1992).
359 503 U.S. at 463 (“[T]he need to allocate a fixed number of indivisible Repre-
sentatives among 50 States of varying populations makes it virtually impossible to

have the same size district in any pair of States, let alone in all 50”).
360 241 U.S. 565 (1916).
361 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932);
Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932).

Sec. 3—Senate Cls. 1–2—Composition and Election
Clause 4. When vacancies happen in the Representation from

any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of
Election to fill such Vacancies.
IN GENERAL
The Supreme Court has not interpreted this clause.
Clause 5. The House of Representatives shall chuse their

Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Im-
peachment.
IN GENERAL
See analysis of Impeachment under Article II, section 4.
SECTION 3. Clause 1. [The Senate of the United States shall

be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the leg-
islature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one
vote].362
Clause 2. Immediately after they shall be assembled in Con-
sequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally
as may be into three classes. The Seats of the Senators of the
first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year,
of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of
the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one
third may be chosen every second Year,363 [and if Vacancies hap-
pen by Resignation or otherwise, during the Recess of the Leg-
islature of any State, the Executive thereof may make tempo-
rary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which
shall then fill such Vacancies].364
IN GENERAL
Clause 1 has been completely superseded by the Seventeenth
Amendment, and Clause 2 has been partially superseded.
362 See Seventeenth Amendment.
Sec. 3—Senate Cls. 3–5—Qualifications, Vice-President, Officers
Clause 3. No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have

attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citi-
zen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be
an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
Clause 4. The Vice President of the United States shall be
President of the Senate but shall have no Vote, unless they be
equally divided.
Clause 5. The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and
also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice Presi-
dent, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the
United States.
IN GENERAL
The Supreme Court has not interpreted these clauses.
Clause 6. The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on
Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States
is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be
convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Mem-
bers present.
Clause 7. Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not ex-
tend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification
to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the
United States; but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be li-
able and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punish-
ment, according to Law.
IN GENERAL
See analysis of impeachment under Article II, sec. 4.
SECTION 4. Clause 1. The Times, Places and Manner of hold-

ing Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be pre-
Sec. 4—Elections Cl. 1—Times, Places, and Manner
scribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but Congress

may at any time make or alter such Regulations, except as to
the Place of chusing Senators.
LEGISLATION PROTECTING ELECTORAL PROCESS

By its terms, Art. I, § 4, cl. 1 empowers both Congress and state
legislatures to regulate the “times, places and manner of holding
elections for Senators and Representatives.” Not until 1842, when
it passed a law requiring the election of Representatives by dis-
tricts,365 did Congress undertake to exercise this power. In subse-
quent years, Congress expanded on the requirements, successively
adding contiguity, compactness, and substantial equality of popula-
tion to the districting requirements.366 However, no challenge to the
seating of Members-elect selected in violation of these require-
ments was ever successful,367 and Congress deleted the standards
from the 1929 apportionment act.368 In 1866, Congress was more
successful in legislating to remedy a situation under which dead-
locks in state legislatures over the election of Senators were creat-
ing vacancies in the office. The act required the two houses of each
legislature to meet in joint session on a specified day and to meet
every day thereafter until a Senator was selected.369
The first comprehensive federal statute dealing with elections
was adopted in 1870 as a means of enforcing the Fifteenth Amend-
ment’s guarantee against racial discrimination in granting suffrage
365 5 Stat. 491 (1842). The requirement was omitted in 1850, 9 Stat. 428, but
was adopted again in 1862. 12 Stat. 572.

366 The 1872 Act, 17 Stat. 28, provided that districts should contain “as nearly
as practicable” equal numbers of inhabitants, a provision thereafter retained. In 1901,

31 Stat. 733, a requirement that districts be composed of “compact territory” was
added. These provisions were repeated in the next act, 37 Stat. 13 (1911), there was
no apportionment following the 1920 Census, and the permanent 1929 Act omitted
the requirements. 46 Stat. 13. Cf. Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. 1 (1932).
367 The first challenge was made in 1843. The committee appointed to inquire
into the matter divided, the majority resolving that Congress had no power to bind
the states in regard to their manner of districting, the minority contending to the
contrary. H. REP. NO. 60, 28th Congress, 1st sess. (1843). The basis of the majority
view was that while Article I, § 4 might give Congress the power to create the dis-
tricts itself, the clause did not authorize Congress to tell the state legislatures how
to do it if the legislatures were left the task of drawing the lines. L. SCHMECKEBIER,
CONGRESSIONAL APPORTIONMENT 135–138 (1941). This argument would not appear to be
maintainable in light of the language in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 383–86 (1880).
368 46 Stat. 13 (1929). In 1967, Congress restored the single-Member district re-
quirement. 81 Stat. 581, 2 U.S.C. § 2c.

369 14 Stat. 243 (1866). Still another such regulation was the congressional speci-
fication of a common day for the election of Representatives in all the states. 17
Stat. 28 (1872), 2 U.S.C. § 7.
rights.370 Under the Enforcement Act of 1870 and subsequent laws,

false registration, bribery, voting without legal right, making false
returns of votes cast, interference in any manner with officers of
election, and the neglect by any such officer of any duty required of
him by state or federal law were made federal offenses.371 Provi-
sion was made for the appointment by federal judges of persons to
attend at places of registration and at elections with authority to
challenge any person proposing to register or vote unlawfully, to wit-
ness the counting of votes, and to identify by their signatures the
registration of voters and election tally sheets.372
When the Democratic Party regained control of Congress, these
pieces of Reconstruction legislation dealing specifically with elec-
tions were repealed,373 but other statutes prohibiting interference
with civil rights generally were retained and these were used in
later years. More recently, Congress in 1957, 1960, 1964, 1965, 1968,
1970, 1975, 1980, 1982, 1992 and 2006 enacted legislation to pro-
tect the right to vote in all elections, whether federal, state or lo-
cal, through the assignment of federal registrars and poll watch-
ers, suspension of literacy and other tests, and the broad proscription
of intimidation and reprisal, whether with or without state ac-
tion.374
Another chapter in regulation of elections was begun in 1907
when Congress passed the Tillman Act, prohibiting national banks
370 Article I, § 4, and the Fifteenth Amendment have had quite different appli-
cations. The Court insisted that under the latter, while Congress could legislate to
protect the suffrage in all elections, it could do so only against state interference
based on race, color, or previous condition of servitude, James v. Bowman, 190 U.S.
127 (1903); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876). Under the former it could
also legislate against private interference for whatever motive, but only in federal
elections. Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651
(1884).
371 The Enforcement Act of May 31, 1870, 16 Stat. 140; The Force Act of Febru-
ary 28, 1871, 16 Stat. 433; The Ku Klux Klan Act of April 20, 1871, 17 Stat. 13. The
text of these and other laws and the history of the enactments and subsequent de-
velopments are set out in R. CARR, FEDERAL PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS: QUEST FOR A
SWORD (1947).
372 The constitutionality of sections pertaining to federal elections was sus-
tained in Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880), and Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S.
651 (1884). The legislation pertaining to all elections was struck down as going be-
yond Congress’ power to enforce the Fifteenth Amendment. United States v. Reese,
92 U.S. 214 (1876).
373 28 Stat. 144 (1894).
374 Pub. L. 85–315, Part IV, § 131, 71 Stat. 634, 637 (1957); Pub. L. 86–449,
Title III, § 301, Title VI, 601, 74 Stat. 86, 88, 90 (1960); Pub. L. 88–352, Title I,
§ 101, 78 Stat. 241 (1964); Pub. L. 89–110, 79 Stat. 437 (1965); Pub. L. 90–284, Title
I, § 101, 82 Stat. 73 (1968); Pub. L. 91–285, 84 Stat. 314 (1970); Pub. L. 94–73, 89
Stat. 400 (1975); Pub. L. 97–205, 96 Stat. 131 (1982); Pub. L. 102–344, 106 Stat.
921; Pub. L. 109–246, 120 Stat. 577 (2006). Most of these statutes are codified in 42
U.S.C. §§ 1971 et seq. The penal statutes are in 18 U.S.C. §§ 241–245.
and corporations from making contributions in federal elections.375

The Corrupt Practices Act, first enacted in 1910 and replaced by
another law in 1925, extended federal regulation of campaign con-
tributions and expenditures in federal elections,376 and other acts
have similarly provided other regulations.377 Because of the close
relationship between political spending and political speech, these
laws have come under First Amendment scrutiny by the Court.378
As noted above, although § 2, cl. 1, of this Article vests in the
states the responsibility, now limited, to establish voter qualifica-
tions for congressional elections, the Court has held that the right
to vote for Members of Congress is derived from the Federal Con-
stitution,379 and that Congress therefore may legislate under this
section of the Article to protect the integrity of this right. Thus, the
right to cast a ballot and to have it counted honestly 380 and the
right to be free from personal violence and intimidation may be se-
cured.381 The integrity of the process may also be safeguarded against
a failure to count ballots lawfully cast 382 or against the dilution of
their value by the stuffing of the ballot box with fraudulent bal-
lots.383 Under this power, Congress may protect the right of suf-
frage against both official and private abridgment,384 so that the
right to vote in a primary election, an integral part of the proce-
dure of choice, is subject to congressional protection.385 But the brib-
ery of voters, although within reach of congressional power under
other clauses of the Constitution, is not an interference with the
rights guaranteed by this section to other qualified voters.386
375 Act of January 26, 1907, 34 Stat. 864, repealed by Pub. L. 94–283, Title II,
§ 201(a), 90 Stat. 496 (1976). Current law on the subject is codified at 2 U.S.C. § 441b.
376 Act of February 28, 1925, 43 Stat. 1070, 2 U.S.C. §§ 241–256. Comprehen-
sive regulation is now provided by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86
Stat. 3, and the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263,
as amended, 90 Stat. 475, found in titles 2, 5, 18, and 26 of the U.S. Code. See
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
377 E.g., the Hatch Act, relating principally to federal employees and state and
local governmental employees engaged in programs at least partially financed with

federal funds, 5 U.S.C. §§ 7324–7327.
378 See First Amendment, Government as Regulator of the Electoral Process: Elec-
tions and Referendums, supra.

379 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 314–15 (1941), and cases cited.
380 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915); United States v. Saylor, 322
U.S. 385, 387 (1944).

381 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
382 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
383 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944).
384 313 U.S. at 315; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 13 n.16 (1976).
385 United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 315–321 (1941). The authority of Newberry
v. United States, 256 U.S. 232 (1921), to the contrary has been vitiated. Cf. United
States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396 (1930).
386 United States v. Bathgate, 246 U.S. 220 (1918); United States v. Gradwell,
243 U.S. 476 (1917).

To accomplish the ends under this clause, Congress may adopt

the statutes of the states and enforce them by its own sanctions.387
It may punish a state election officer for violating his duty under a
state law governing congressional elections.388 It may, in short, use
its power under this clause, combined with the Necessary and Proper
Clause, to regulate the times, places, and manner of electing Mem-
bers of Congress so as to fully safeguard the integrity of the pro-
cess. It may not, however, under this clause, provide different quali-
fications for electors than those provided by the states.389
State authority to regulate the “times, places, and manner” of
holding congressional elections has also been tested, and has been
described by the Court as “embrac[ing] authority to provide a com-
plete code for congressional elections . . . ; in short, to enact the
numerous requirements as to procedure and safeguards which ex-
perience shows are necessary in order to enforce the fundamental
right involved.” 390 The Court has upheld a variety of state laws de-
signed to ensure that elections—including federal elections—are fair
and honest and orderly.391 But the Court distinguished state laws
that go beyond “protection of the integrity and regularity of the elec-
tion process,” and instead operate to disadvantage a particular class
of candidates.392 Term limits, viewed as serving the dual purposes
of “disadvantaging a particular class of candidates and evading the
dictates of the Qualifications Clause,” crossed this line,393 as did bal-
lot labels identifying candidates who disregarded voters’ instruc-
tions on term limits or declined to pledge support for them.394 “[T]he
Framers understood the Elections Clause as a grant of authority to
issue procedural regulations, and not as a source of power to dic-
387 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1880);
United States v. Gale, 109 U.S. 65 (1883); In re Coy, 127 U.S. 731 (1888).
388 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
389 In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), however, Justice Black grounded
his vote to uphold the age reduction in federal elections and the presidential voting
residency provision sections of the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 on this
clause. Id. at 119–35. Four Justices specifically rejected this construction, id. at 209–
12, 288–92, and the other four implicitly rejected it by relying on totally different
sections of the Constitution in coming to the same conclusions as did Justice Black.
390 Smiley v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355, 366 (1932).
391 See, e.g., Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974) (restrictions on independent
candidacies requiring early commitment prior to party primaries); Roudebush v. Hartke,

405 U.S. 15, 25 (1972) (recount for senatorial election); and Munro v. Socialist Work-
ers Party, 479 U.S. 189 (1986) (requirement that minor party candidate demon-
strate substantial support—1% of votes cast in the primary election—before being
placed on ballot for general election).
392 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 835 (1995).
393 U.S. Term Limits, Inc. v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779 (1995).
394 Cook v. Gralike, 531 U.S. 510 (2001).
Sec. 5—Powers and Duties of the Houses Cls. 1–4—Judging Elections
tate electoral outcomes, to favor or disfavor a class of candidates,

or to evade important constitutional restraints.” 395
Clause 2. [The Congress shall assemble at least once in ev-

ery Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in De-
cember, unless they shall by law appoint a different Day].396
IN GENERAL
This Clause was superseded by the Twentieth Amendment.
SECTION 5. Clause 1. Each House shall be the Judge of the

Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and
a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business;
but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may
be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in
such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may pro-
vide.
Clause 2. Each House may determine the Rules of its Pro-
ceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with
the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Clause 3. Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceed-
ings and from time to time publish the same, excepting such
Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas
and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall,
at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the
Journal.
Clause 4. Neither House, during the Session of Congress,
shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than
three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two
Houses shall be sitting.
395 Thornton, 514 U.S. at 833–34.
396 See Twentieth Amendment.
POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE HOUSES
Power To Judge Elections

Each House, when judging elections under this clause, acts as
a judicial tribunal, with broad power to compel attendance of wit-
nesses. For instance, in the exercise of its discretion, it may issue a
warrant for the arrest of a witness to procure his testimony even if
the witness was not previously subpoenaed, if there is good reason
to believe that otherwise such witness would not be forthcoming.397
It may investigate expenditures made to influence nominations at
a primary election,398 and it may punish perjury committed in tes-
timony regarding a contested election, even if such testimony is be-
fore a notary public.399 The Senate was allowed to inquire into the
legality of an election despite having denied the person in question
the ability to take the oath of office; 400 and such refusal did not
unlawfully deprive the state that elected such person its equal suf-
frage in the Senate.401
“A Quorum To Do Business”
For many years the view prevailed in the House of Representa-
tives that it was necessary for a majority of the Members to vote
on any proposition submitted to the House in order to satisfy the
constitutional requirement for a quorum. Consequently, it was a com-
mon practice for the opposition to break a quorum by refusing to
vote. This was changed in 1890 in a ruling made by Speaker Reed
and later embodied in Rule XV of the House, that Members pres-
ent in the chamber but not voting would be counted in determining
the presence of a quorum.402 The Supreme Court upheld this rule
in United States v. Ballin,403 saying that the capacity of the House
to transact business is “created by the mere presence of a major-
ity,” and that since the Constitution does not prescribe any method
for determining the presence of such majority, “it is therefore within
the competency of the House to prescribe any method which shall
be reasonably certain to ascertain the fact.” 404 The rules of the Sen-
397 Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 616 (1929).
398 6 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 72–74, 180 (1936).
Cf. Newberry v. United States, 256 U.S. 232, 258 (1921).
399 In re Loney, 134 U.S. 372 (1890).
400 Barry v. United States ex rel. Cunningham, 279 U.S. 597, 614 (1929).
401 279 U.S. at 615. The existence of this power in both houses of Congress does
not prevent a state from conducting a recount of ballots cast in such an election any
more than it prevents the initial counting by a state. Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S.
15 (1972).
402 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 2895–2905 (1907).
403 144 U.S. 1 (1892).
404 144 U.S. at 5–6.
ate provide for the ascertainment of a quorum only by a roll call,405

but in a few cases it has held that if a quorum is present, a propo-
sition can be determined by the vote of a lesser number of Mem-
bers.406
Rules of Proceedings
In the exercise of their constitutional power to determine their
rules of proceedings, the houses of Congress may not “ignore consti-
tutional restraints or violate fundamental rights, and there should
be a reasonable relation between the mode or method of proceeding
established by the rule and the result which is sought to be at-
tained. But within these limitations all matters of method are open
to the determination of the house. . . . The power to make rules is
not one which once exercised is exhausted. It is a continuous power,
always subject to be exercised by the house, and within the limita-
tions suggested, absolute and beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal.” 407 If a rule affects private rights, however, its construc-
tion becomes a judicial question.
In United States v. Smith,408 the Court held that the Senate’s
reconsideration of a presidential nominee for chairman of the Fed-
eral Power Commission, after it had confirmed him and he had taken
the oath of office, was not warranted by its rules and did not de-
prive the appointee of his title to the office. In Christoffel v. United
States,409 a sharply divided Court upset a conviction for perjury in
a federal district court of a witness who, under oath before a House
committee, denied any affiliation with Communist programs. The
reversal was on the ground that, because a quorum of the commit-
tee, although present at the outset, was not present at the time of
the alleged perjury, testimony before it was not before a “compe-
tent tribunal” within the sense of the District of Columbia Code.410
Four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Jackson, dissented, arguing
that, under the rules and practices of the House, “a quorum once
established is presumed to continue unless and until a point of no
quorum is raised” and that the Court was, in effect, invalidating
405 Rule V.
406 4 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 2910–2915 (1907); 6
CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 645, 646 (1936).
407 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 5 (1892). The Senate is “a continuing
body.” McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 181–82 (1927). Hence its rules remain
in force from Congress to Congress except as they are changed from time to time,
whereas those of the House are readopted at the outset of each new Congress.
408 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
409 338 U.S. 84 (1949).
410 338 U.S. at 87–90.
this rule, thereby invalidating at the same time the rule of self-
limitation observed by courts “where such an issue is tendered.” 411
The procedure by which appointments are made has been a point
of controversy. The Appointments Clause provides that the Presi-
dent “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of
the Senate, shall appoint . . . Judges of the supreme Court, and all
other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein
otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law. . . .” 412
The Constitution provides that “Each House may determine the Rules
of its Proceedings,” 413 and the Senate has enacted a cloture rule 414
requiring a supermajority vote (60 votes) to close debate on any mat-
ter pending before the Senate. Absent the invocation of cloture or
some other means of ending debate, matters can remain before the
Senate indefinitely. The practice of preventing cloture is known as
a filibuster.
Although no provision of the Constitution expressly requires that
the Senate or House act by majority vote in enacting legislation or
in exercising its other constitutional powers, the framers of the Con-
stitution were committed to majority rule as a general principle.415
These facts have given rise to disagreement as to the constitution-
ality of the filibuster as applied to judicial nominees—disagree-
ment over whether the “Advice and Consent” of the Senate means
the majority of the Senate and not a supermajority. The constitu-
tionality of the filibuster has twice been challenged in court, but
both times the challenge was dismissed for lack of standing.416 More
recently, the Senate established a new precedent by which it rein-
terpreted its rules to require only a simple majority to invoke clo-
ture on most nominations.417
Punishment and Expulsion of Members
Congress has broad authority to judge the conduct of its Mem-
bers. For instance, Congress has the authority to make it an of-
411 338 U.S. at 92–95.
412 Art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
413 Art. I, § 5, cl. 2.
414 Rule XXII, par. 2.
415 See, e.g., Federalist No. 58, p. 397 (Cooke ed.; Wesleyan Univ. Press: 1961)
(Madison, responding to objections that the Constitution should have required “more
than a majority . . . for a quorum, and in particular cases, if not in all, more than a
majority of a quorum for a decision,” asserted that such requirements would be in-
consistent with majority rule, which is “the fundamental principle of free govern-
ment”); id., No. 22, p. 138–39 (Hamilton observed that “equal suffrage among the
States under the Articles of Confederation contradicts that fundamental maxim of
republican government which requires that the sense of the majority should pre-
vail”).
416 Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Senate, 340 F. Supp. 2d 26 (D.D.C. 2004); Page
v. Shelby, 995 F. Supp. 23 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 172 F.3d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
417 159 CONG. REC. S8416–S8418 (daily ed. Nov. 21, 2013).
fense against the United States for a Member, during his time in
office, to receive compensation for services before a government de-
partment in relation to proceedings in which the United States is
interested. Such a statute was found not to interfere with the legiti-
mate authority of the Senate or House over its own Members.418 In
upholding the power of the Senate to investigate charges that some
Senators had been speculating in sugar stocks during the consider-
ation of a tariff bill, the Supreme Court asserted that “the right to
expel extends to all cases where the offence is such as in the judg-
ment of the Senate is inconsistent with the trust and duty of a Mem-
ber.” 419 It cited with apparent approval the action of the Senate in
expelling William Blount in 1797 for attempting to seduce from his
duty a United States agent working as an interpreter among the
Indians and for negotiating for services among the Indians on be-
half of the British Government—conduct which was not a “statut-
able offense” and which was not committed in his official character
nor during the session of Congress, nor at the seat of govern-
ment.420
The power of Congress over its Members, however, does not ex-
tend to excluding a Member for misconduct before they have been
seated. In Powell v. McCormack,421 a suit challenging the exclusion
of a Member-elect from the House of Representatives, it was ar-
gued that, because the vote to exclude was actually in excess of two-
thirds of the Members, it should be treated simply as an expulsion.
The Court rejected this argument, noting that House precedents es-
tablished that the House had no power to expel for misconduct oc-
curring prior to Congress in which the expulsion was proposed, as
was the case of Mr. Powell’s alleged misconduct. The Court based
its rejection on its inability to conclude that if the Members of the
House had been voting to expel, they would still have cast an affir-
mative vote in excess of two-thirds.422
Duty To Keep a Journal

The object of the clause requiring the keeping of a Journal is
“to insure publicity to the proceedings of the legislature, and a cor-
respondent responsibility of the members to their respective con-
stituents.” 423 When the Journal of either House is put in evidence
418 Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344 (1906).
419 In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
420 166 U.S. at 669–70. See 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES § 836 (1833).

421 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
422 395 U.S. at 506–12.
423 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 840 (1833),
quoted with approval in Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649, 670 (1892).
for the purpose of determining whether the yeas and nays were or-
dered, and what the vote was on any particular question, the Jour-
nal must be presumed to show the truth, and a statement therein
that a quorum was present, though not disclosed by the yeas and
nays, is final.424 But when an enrolled bill, which has been signed
by the Speaker of the House and by the President of the Senate, in
open session receives the approval of the President and is depos-
ited in the Department of State (or in modern times, the National
Archives), its authentication as a bill that has passed Congress is
complete and unimpeachable, and it is not competent to show from
the Journals of either House that an act so authenticated, ap-
proved, and deposited in fact omitted one section actually passed
by both houses of Congress.425
SECTION 6. Clause 1. The Senators and Representatives shall

receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by
Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They
shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace,
be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Ses-
sion of their respective Houses and in going to and returning
from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House,
they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
COMPENSATION AND IMMUNITIES OF MEMBERS
Congressional Pay
With the surprise ratification of the Twenty-Seventh Amend-
ment,426 it is now the rule that congressional legislation “varying”—
decreasing or increasing—the level of legislators’ pay may not take
effect until an intervening election has occurred. The only real con-
troversy likely to arise in the interpretation of the new rule is whether
pay increases that result from automatic alterations in pay are sub-
ject to the same requirement or whether it is only the initial enact-
ment of the automatic device that is covered. That is, from the found-
424 United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1, 4 (1892).
425 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107,
143 (1911). See the dispute in the Court with regard to the application of Field in
an origination clause dispute. United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 391 n.4
(1990), and id. at 408 (Justice Scalia concurring in the judgment). A parallel rule
holds in the case of a duly authenticated official notice to the Secretary of State
that a state legislature has ratified a proposed amendment to the Constitution. Leser
v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922); see also Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
426 See discussion under Twenty-Seventh Amendment, infra.
Sec. 6—Rights and Disabilities of Members Cl. 1—Compensation and Immunities
ing to 1967, congressional pay was determined directly by Congress

in specific legislation setting specific rates of pay. In 1967, a law
was passed that created a quadrennial commission with the respon-
sibility to propose to the President salary levels for top officials of
the government, including Members of Congress.427
In 1975, Congress legislated to bring Members of Congress within
a separate commission system authorizing the President to recom-
mend annual increases for civil servants to maintain pay compara-
bility with private-sector employees.428 These devices were at-
tacked by dissenting Members of Congress as violating the mandate
of clause 1 that compensation be “ascertained by Law.” However,
these challenges were rejected.429 Thereafter, prior to ratification of
the amendment, Congress, in the Ethics Reform Act of 1989,430 al-
tered both the pay-increase and the cost-of-living-increase provi-
sions of law, making quadrennial pay increases effective only after
an intervening congressional election and making cost-of-living in-
creases dependent upon a specific congressional vote. A federal court
of appeals panel ruled that the cost-of-living-increase provision did
not violate the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, and that a challenge
to the quadrennial pay raise provision was not ripe.431
Privilege From Arrest

The clause immunizing Members from arrest is practically ob-
solete. It applies only to arrests in civil suits, which were still com-
mon in this country at the time the Constitution was adopted.432 It
does not apply to service of process in either civil 433 or criminal
cases.434 Nor does it apply to arrest in any criminal case. The phrase
“treason, felony or breach of the peace” is interpreted to withdraw
all criminal offenses from the operation of the privilege.435
427 Pub. L. 90–206, § 225, 81 Stat. 642 (1967), as amended, Pub. L. 95–19, § 401,
91 Stat. 45 (1977), as amended, Pub. L. 99–190, § 135(e), 99 Stat. 1322 (1985).

428 Pub. L. 94–82, § 204(a), 89 Stat. 421.
429 Pressler v. Simon, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-judge court), aff’d
summarily, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978); Humphrey v. Baker, 848 F.2d 211 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 488 U.S. 966 (1988).
430 Pub. L. 101–194, 103 Stat. 1716, 2 U.S.C. § 31(2), 5 U.S.C. § 5318 note, and
2 U.S.C. §§ 351–363.
431 Boehner v. Anderson, 30 F.3d 156, 163 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
432 Long v. Ansell, 293 U.S. 76 (1934).
433 293 U.S. at 83.
434 United States v. Cooper, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 341 (C.C. Pa. 1800).
435 Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 446 (1908).
Privilege of Speech or Debate

Members.—The text of the Speech or Debate Clause traces back
to a clause in the English Bill of Rights of 1689,436 but its history
traces back almost to the beginning of the development of the Eng-
lish Parliament as a political force independant of the monarchy.437
The Speech or Debate clause represents “the culmination of a long
struggle for parliamentary supremacy. Behind these simple phrases
lies a history of conflict between the Commons and the Tudor and
Stuart monarchs during which successive monarchs utilized the crimi-
nal and civil law to suppress and intimidate critical legislators. Since
the Glorious Revolution in Britain, and throughout United States
history, the privilege has been recognized as an important protec-
tion of the independence and integrity of the legislature.” 438 “In the
American governmental structure the clause serves the additional
function of reinforcing the separation of powers so deliberately es-
tablished by the Founders.” 439 “The immunities of the Speech or
Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the
personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect
the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the indepen-
dence of individual legislators.” 440
The protection of this clause is not limited to words spoken in
debate. “Committee reports, resolutions, and the act of voting are
equally covered, as are ‘things generally done in a session of the
House by one of its members in relation to the business before it.’ ” 441
Thus, so long as legislators are “acting in the sphere of legitimate
legislative activity,” they are “protected not only from the conse-
quence of litigation’s results but also from the burden of defending
themselves.” 442 But the scope of the meaning of “legislative activ-
ity” has its limits. “The heart of the clause is speech or debate in
either House, and insofar as the clause is construed to reach other
matters, they must be an integral part of the deliberative and com-
municative processes by which Members participate in committee
436 “That the Freedom of Speech, and Debates or Proceedings in Parliament, ought
not to be impeached or questioned in any Court or Place out of Parliament.” 1 W. &

M., Sess. 2, c. 2.
437 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 177–79, 180–83 (1966); Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969).

438 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
439 United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 178 (1966).
440 United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 507 (1972). This rationale was ap-
provingly quoted from Coffin v. Coffin, 4 Mass. 1, 28 (1808), in Kilbourn v. Thomp-

son, 103 U.S. 168, 203 (1881).
441 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 502 (1969), quoting Kilbourn v. Thomp-
son, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881).

442 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376–377 (1972); Dombrowski v. Eastland,
387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967); Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 505 (1969); Eastland v.
United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975).
and House proceedings with respect to the consideration and pas-

sage or rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other mat-
ters which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either
House.” 443
In Kilbourn v. Thompson,444 Members of the House of Represen-
tatives were held immune in a suit for false imprisonment based
on a plaintiff ’s arrest and detainment. Becasue the actions were pur-
suant to a resolution charging contempt of one of its committees,
the Members were held protected even though the Court found the
contempt resolution was wrongly voted. Kilbourn was subse-
quently relied on in Powell v. McCormack,445 in which Adam Clay-
ton Powell, Jr. was not allowed to maintain an action for declara-
tory judgment against certain Members of the House of Representatives
to challenge his exclusion by a vote of the entire House.
Congressional investigations are also protected from interfer-
ence under this clause. The Court held that, because the power of
inquiry is so vital to performance of the legislative function, a suit
against the chairman and members of a Senate subcommittee and
staff personnel to enjoin enforcement of a subpoena directed to a
third party (a bank) to obtain the financial records of the suing or-
ganization was precluded. The investigation was a proper exercise
of Congress’ power of inquiry, the subpoena was a legitimate part
of the inquiry, and the clause therefore was an absolute bar to judi-
cial review of the subcommittee’s actions prior to the possible insti-
tution of contempt actions in the courts.446 And in Dombrowski v.
Eastland,447 the Court affirmed the dismissal of an action against
the chairman of a Senate committee brought on allegations that he
wrongfully conspired with state officials to violate the civil rights
of the plaintiff.
443 Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972). The critical nature of the
clause is shown by the holding in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 235 n.11 (1979),
that when a Member is sued under the Fifth Amendment for employment discrimi-
nation on the basis of gender, only the clause could shield such an employment de-
cision, and not the separation-of-powers doctrine or emanations from it. Whether
the clause would be a shield the Court had no occasion to decide, and the case was
settled on remand without a decision being reached.
444 103 U.S. 168 (1881). But see Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 618–19
(1972).
445 395 U.S. 486 (1969). The Court found sufficient the presence of other defen-
dants to enable it to review Powell’s exclusion but reserved the question whether in
the absence of someone the clause would still preclude suit. Id. at 506 n.26. See also
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1881).
446 Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975).
447 387 U.S. 82 (1967). But see the reinterpretation of this case in Gravel v. United
States, 408 U.S. 606, 619–20 (1972). See also McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, sub nom. McAdams
v. McSurely, 438 U.S. 189 (1978).
The Court in more recent cases appears to have narrowed the

concept of what constitutes a “legislative act” somewhat. For in-
stance, the Court has held that the clause did not defeat a suit to
enjoin the public dissemination of legislative materials outside the
halls of Congress.448 A committee had conducted an authorized in-
vestigation into conditions in the schools of the District of Colum-
bia and had issued a report that the House of Representatives rou-
tinely ordered printed. In the report, named students were dealt
with in an allegedly defamatory manner. Their parents sued vari-
ous committee Members and staff and other personnel, including
the Superintendent of Documents and the Public Printer, for dam-
ages, and sought to restrain further publication, dissemination, and
distribution of the report until the objectionable material was de-
leted. The Court held that the Members of Congress and the staff
employees had been properly dismissed from the suit, inasmuch as
their actions—conducting the hearings, preparing the report, and
authorizing its publication—were protected by the clause.
The Superintendent of Documents and the Public Printer were
held, however, to have been properly named, because, as congressio-
nal employees, they had no broader immunity than Members of Con-
gress would have. At this point, the Court distinguished between
those legislative acts, such as voting, speaking on the floor or in
committee, issuing reports, which are within the protection of the
clause, and those acts which enjoy no such protection. Public dis-
semination of materials outside the halls of Congress is not pro-
tected, the Court held, because it is unnecessary to the perfor-
mance of official legislative actions. In other words, dissemination
of the report within the body was protected, whereas dissemination
in normal channels outside it was not.449
Bifurcation of the legislative process in this way resulted in hold-
ing unprotected the republication in newsletters and press releases
of allegedly defamatory remarks initially made in the Senate.450 The
clause protects more than speech or debate in either House, the Court
affirmed, but in order for the other matters to be covered “they must
be an integral part of the deliberative and communicative pro-
cesses by which Members participate in committee and House pro-
448 Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
449 It is difficult to assess the effect of the decision because the Justices in the
majority adopted mutually inconsistent stands, 412 U.S. at 325 (concurring opin-
ion), and four Justices dissented. Id. at 331, 332, 338. The case also leaves unre-
solved the propriety of injunctive relief. Compare id. at 330 (Justice Douglas concur-
ring), with id. at 343–45 (three dissenters arguing that separation-of-powers doctrine
forbade injunctive relief). And compare Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245, 246
n.24 (1979), with id. at 250–51 (Chief Justice Burger dissenting).
450 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
ceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or rejection

of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters which the
Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either House.” 451 Press
releases and newsletters are “[v]aluable and desirable” in “inform-
[ing] the public and other Members,” but neither are essential to
the deliberations of the legislative body nor part of the deliberative
process.452
Applying this distinction between protected “legislative activ-
ity” and unprotected activity in the criminal context, the Court in
Gravel v. United States 453 held that a grand jury could validly in-
quire into the processes by which the Member obtained classified
government documents and into the arrangements for subsequent
private republication of these documents, since neither action in-
volved protected conduct. “While the Speech or Debate Clause rec-
ognizes speech, voting and other legislative acts as exempt from li-
ability that might otherwise attach, it does not privilege either Senator
or aide to violate an otherwise valid criminal law in preparing for
or implementing legislative acts.” 454
A similar distinction may be discerned when the application
of a criminal statute calls into question the legislative conduct
and motivation of a Member. Thus, in United States v. John-
son, 455 the Court voided the conviction of a Member for con-
spiracy to impair lawful governmental functions. The Member
had, in the course of seeking to divert a governmental inquiry
into alleged wrongdoing by a savings and loans association, ac-
cepted a bribe to make a speech on the floor of the House of
Representatives. The speech was charged as being part of the
conspiracy and extensive evidence concerning it was introduced
at a trial. It was this examination into the context of the
451 443 U.S. at 126, quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 625 (1972).
452 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 130, 132–33 (1979). The Court distin-
guished between the more important “informing” function of Congress, that is, its
efforts to inform itself in order to exercise its legislative powers, and the less impor-
tant “informing” function of acquainting the public about its activities. The latter
function the Court did not find an integral part of the legislative process. See also
Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306, 314–17 (1973). But compare id. at 325 (concurring).
For consideration of the “informing” function in its different guises in the context of
legislative investigations, see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957);
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 43 (1953); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S.
749, 777–78 (1962) (Justice Douglas dissenting).
453 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
454 408 U.S. at 626.
455 383 U.S. 169 (1966).
speech—its authorship, motivation, and content—that the Court

found foreclosed by the Speech or Debate Clause.456
However, in United States v. Brewster,457 while continuing to
assert that the clause “must be read broadly to effectuate its pur-
pose of protecting the independence of the legislative branch,” 458
the Court substantially reduced the scope of the coverage of the clause.
In Brewster, the Court upheld the validity of an indictment which
charged that a Member had accepted a bribe to be “influenced in
his performance of official acts in respect to his action, vote, and
decision” on legislation. The Court drew a distinction between a pros-
ecution that caused an inquiry into the motivation for the perfor-
mance of legislative acts and a prosecution for taking or agreeing
to take money for a promise to perform such acts. The former is
proscribed, the latter is not.
“Taking a bribe is, obviously, no part of the legislative process
or function; it is not a legislative act. It is not, by any conceivable
interpretation, an act performed as a part of or even incidental to
the role of a legislator. . . . Nor is inquiry into a legislative act or
the motivation for a legislative act necessary to a prosecution un-
der this statute or this indictment. When a bribe is taken, it does
not matter whether the promise for which the bribe was given was
for the performance of a legislative act as here or, as in Johnson,
for use of a Congressman’s influence with the Executive Branch.” 459
In other words, it is the fact of having taken a bribe, not the act
the bribe is intended to influence, which is the subject of the pros-
ecution, and the Speech or Debate Clause interposes no obstacle to
this type of prosecution.460
Congressional Employees.—Until recently, the Court distin-
guished between Members of Congress, who were immune from suit
arising out of their legislative activities, and legislative employees
456 Reserved was the question whether a prosecution that entailed inquiry into
legislative acts or motivation could be founded upon “a narrowly drawn statute passed
by Congress in the exercise of its legislative power to regulate the conduct of its
members.” 383 U.S. at 185. The question was similarly reserved in United States v.
Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 529 n.18 (1972), although Justices Brennan and Douglas
would have answered in the negative. Id. at 529, 540.
457 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
458 408 U.S. at 516.
459 408 U.S. at 526.
460 The holding was reaffirmed in United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477 (1979).
On the other hand, the Court did hold that the protection of the clause is so funda-
mental that, assuming a Member may waive it, a waiver could be found only after
explicit and unequivocal renunciation, rather than by failure to assert it at any par-
ticular point. Similarly, Helstoski v. Meanor, 442 U.S. 500 (1979), held that since
the clause properly applied is intended to protect a Member from even having to
defend himself, he may appeal immediately from a judicial ruling of nonapplicabil-
ity rather than wait to appeal after conviction.
who participated in the same activities under the direction of a Mem-

ber.461 Thus, in Kilbourn v. Thompson,462 the sergeant at arms of
the House was held liable for false imprisonment because he ex-
ecuted a resolution ordering Kilbourn arrested and imprisoned.
Dombrowski v. Eastland 463 held that a subcommittee counsel might
be liable in damages for actions as to which the chairman of the
committee was immune. And, in Powell v. McCormack,464 the Court
held that the presence of House of Representatives employees as
defendants in a suit for declaratory judgment gave the federal courts
jurisdiction to review the propriety of the plaintiff ’s exclusion from
office by vote of the House.
Upon full consideration of the question, however, the Court in
Gravel v. United States 465 accepted an argument urged upon it not
only by the individual Senator but by the Senate itself appearing
by counsel as amicus. This included the contentions that “it is liter-
ally impossible, in view of the complexities of the modern legisla-
tive process, with Congress almost constantly in session and mat-
ters of legislative concern constantly proliferating, for Members of
Congress to perform their legislative tasks without the help of aides
and assistants; that the day-to-day work of such aides is so critical
to the Members’ performance that they must be treated as the lat-
ter’s alter ego; and that if they are not so recognized, the central
role of the Speech or Debate Clause . . . will inevitably be dimin-
ished and frustrated.” 466 Therefore, the Court held “that the Speech
or Debate Clause applies not only to a Member but also to his aides
insofar as the conduct of the latter would be a protected legislative
act if performed by the Member himself.” 467
The Gravel holding, however, while extending congressional im-
munity to employees, also narrowed the actual immunity available
to both aides and Members in important respects. Thus, the Court
said, the legislators in Kilbourn who had been found to be immune
were protected because adoption of a resolution ordering arrest and
461 Language in some of the Court’s earlier opinions had indicated that the privi-
lege “is less absolute, although applicable,” when a legislative aide is sued, without
elaboration of what was meant. Dombrowski v. Eastland, 387 U.S. 82, 85 (1967);
Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951). In Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S.
647 (1963), the Court had imposed substantial obstacles to the possibility of recov-
ery in appropriate situations by holding that a federal cause of action was lacking
and remitting litigants to state courts and state law grounds. The case is probably
no longer viable, however, after Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971).
462 103 U.S. 168 (1881).
463 387 U.S. 82 (1967).
464 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
465 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
466 408 U.S. at 616–17.
467 408 U.S. at 618.
detention was clearly a legislative act. The execution of the resolu-

tion, however, was not a legislative act immune from liability, so
that the House officer was in fact liable as would have been any
Member who had executed it.468 Dombrowski was interpreted as hav-
ing held that no evidence implicated the Senator involved, whereas
the committee counsel had been accused of “conspiring to violate
the constitutional rights of private parties. Unlawful conduct of this
kind the Speech or Debate Clause simply did not immunize.” 469 And
Powell was interpreted as simply holding that voting to exclude plain-
tiff, which was all the House defendants had done, was a legisla-
tive act immune from Member liability but not from judicial in-
quiry.
“None of these three cases adopted the simple proposition that
immunity was unavailable to House or committee employees be-
cause they were not Representatives or Senators; rather, immunity
was unavailable because they engaged in illegal conduct that was
not entitled to Speech or Debate Clause protection. . . . [N]o prior
case has held that Members of Congress would be immune if they
executed an invalid resolution by themselves carrying out an ille-
gal arrest, or if, in order to secure information for a hearing, them-
selves seized the property or invaded the privacy of a citizen. Nei-
ther they nor their aides should be immune from liability or
questioning in such circumstances.” 470
Clause 2. No Senator or Representative shall, during the

Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office
under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been
created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased
during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the
United States, shall be a Member of either House during his
Continuance in Office.
DISABILITIES OF MEMBERS
Appointment to Executive Office

As might be expected, there is no judicial interpretation of the
language of this clause, sometimes referred to as the “Emoluments
Clause,” and indeed it has seldom surfaced as an issue. “The rea-
468 408 U.S. at 618–19.
469 408 U.S. at 619–20.
470 408 U.S. at 620–21.
Sec. 6—Rights and Disabilities of Members Cl. 2—Disabilities of Members
sons for excluding persons from offices, who have been concerned
in creating them, or increasing their emoluments, are to take away,
as far as possible, any improper bias in the vote of the representa-
tive, and to secure to the constituents some solemn pledge of his
disinterestedness. The actual provision, however, does not go to the
extent of the principle; for his appointment is restricted only ‘dur-
ing the time, for which he was elected’; thus leaving in full force
every influence upon his mind, if the period of his election is short,
or the duration of it is approaching its natural termination.” 471
In 1909, after having increased the salary of the Secretary of
State,472 Congress reduced it to the former figure so that a Mem-
ber of the Senate at the time the increase was voted would be eli-
gible for that office.473 The clause became a subject of discussion in
1937, when Justice Black was appointed to the Court, because Con-
gress had recently increased the amount of pension available to Jus-
tices retiring at seventy and Black’s Senate term had still some time
to run. The appointment was defended, however, with the argu-
ment that, because Black was only fifty-one at the time, he would
be ineligible for the “increased emolument” for nineteen years and
it was not as to him an increased emolument.474 In 1969, it was
briefly questioned whether a Member of the House of Representa-
tives could be appointed Secretary of Defense because, under a sal-
ary bill enacted in the previous Congress, the President would pro-
pose a salary increase, including that of cabinet officers, early in
the new Congress, which would take effect if Congress did not dis-
approve it. The Attorney General ruled that, as the clause would
not apply if the increase were proposed and approved subsequent
to the appointment, it similarly would not apply in a situation in
which it was uncertain whether the increase would be approved.475
471 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 864 (1833).
472 34 Stat. 948 (1907).
473 35 Stat. 626 (1909). Congress followed this precedent when the President
wished to appoint a Senator as Attorney General and the salary had been increased
pursuant to a process under which Congress did not need to vote to approve but
could vote to disapprove. The salary was temporarily reduced to its previous level.
87 Stat. 697 (1973). See also 89 Stat. 1108 (1975) (reducing the salary of a member
of the Federal Maritime Commission in order to qualify a Representative). For a
discussion of other examples where salaries of offices were reduced to avoid the stric-
tures of the clause, see J. O’Connor, The Emoluments Clause: An Anti-Federalist
Intruder in the Federalist Constitution, 24 Hofstra L. Rev. 89 (1995).
474 The matter gave rise to a case, Ex parte Albert Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937),
in which the Court declined to pass upon the validity of Justice Black’s appoint-
ment. The Court denied the complainant standing, but strangely it did not advert
to the fact that it was being asked to assume original jurisdiction contrary to Marbury
v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
475 42 Op. Atty. Gen. 381 (Jan. 3, 1969).
Sec. 6—Rights and Disabilities of Members Cl. 2—Disabilities of Members
Incompatible Offices
This second part of the second clause, prohibiting the holding
of an office of the United States during membership in Congress,
elicited little discussion at the Convention and was universally un-
derstood to be a safeguard against executive influence on Members
of Congress and the prevention of the corruption of the separation
of powers.476 Congress has at various times confronted the issue in
regard to seating or expelling persons who have or obtain office in
another branch. Thus, it has determined that visitors to acad-
emies, regents, directors, and trustees of public institutions, and mem-
bers of temporary commissions who receive no compensation as mem-
bers are not officers within the constitutional inhibition.477 Government
contractors and federal officers who resign before presenting their
credentials may be seated as Members of Congress.478
One of the more recurrent problems which Congress has had
with this clause is the compatibility of congressional office with ser-
vice as an officer of some military organization—militia, reserves,
and the like.479 Members have been unseated for accepting appoint-
ment to military office during their terms of congressional office,480
but there are apparently no instances in which a Member-elect has
been excluded for this reason. Because of the difficulty of success-
fully claiming standing, the issue has never been a litigable mat-
ter.481
SECTION 7. Clause 1. All Bills for raising Revenue shall origi-

nate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may pro-
pose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
Clause 2. Every Bill which shall have passed the House of
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law,
be presented to the President of the United States; If he ap-
proves he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his
Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who
476 THE FEDERALIST, No. 76 (Hamilton) (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 514; 2 J. STORY, COM-
MENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 866–869 (1833).
477 1 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 493 (1907); 6 CANNON’S
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 63–64 (1936).
478 HINDS’, supra §§ 496–499.
479 Cf. RIGHT OF A REPRESENTATIVE IN CONGRESS TO HOLD COMMISSION IN NATIONAL GUARD,
H. REP. NO. 885, 64th Cong., 1st sess. (1916).

480 HINDS’, supra §§ 486–492, 494; CANNON’S, supra §§ 60–62.
481 An effort to sustain standing was rebuffed in Schlesinger v. Reservists Com-
mittee to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).

Sec. 7—Bills and Resolutions Cls. 1–3—Legislative Process
shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and pro-

ceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of
that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, to-
gether with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall
likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that
House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes
of both Houses shall be determined by Yeas and Nays, and the
Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be
entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill
shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sun-
days excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the
Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, un-
less the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return in
which Case it shall not be a Law.
Clause 3. Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Con-
currence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be nec-
essary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented
to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall
take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by
him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House
of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitation pre-
scribed in the Case of a Bill.
THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS
Origination of Revenue Bills

The drafting of the first clause was another of the devices sanc-
tioned by the Framers to preserve and enforce the separation of pow-
ers.482 It is limited to bills that levy taxes; bills for other purposes,
which incidentally create revenue, are not included.483 Thus, a Senate-
482 THE FEDERALIST, No. 58 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 392–395 (Madison). See United
States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385, 393–395 (1990).

483 2 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 880 (1833).
initiated bill that provided for a monetary “special assessment” to

pay into a crime victims fund did not violate the clause, because it
was a statute that created and raised revenue to support a particu-
lar governmental program and was not a law raising revenue to
support government generally.484 An act providing a national cur-
rency secured by a pledge of bonds of the United States, which, “in
the furtherance of that object, and also to meet the expenses attend-
ing the execution of the act,” imposed a tax on the circulating notes
of national banks was held not to be a revenue measure which must
originate in the House of Representatives.485 Nor was a bill that
provided that the District of Columbia should raise by taxation and
pay to designated railroad companies a specified sum for the elimi-
nation of grade crossings and the construction of a railway sta-
tion.486
The clause is not limited to bills that would increase the taxes
collected by the United States, but applies to all tax bills. In Armstrong
v. U.S.,487 the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
upheld the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982
(TEFRA),488 where the House passed a bill that provided for a net
loss in revenue, but the Senate amended the bill to provide a rev-
enue increase of more than $98 billion over three years. The argu-
ment was made that the origination clause encompasses only those
enactments that increase taxes, so that TEFRA was not a “bill for
raising revenue” when it was in the House, but only became one
when it was amended in the Senate. The court, however, found that
the clause applies to both bills that raise and lower taxes. Other
courts that have considered such challenges did not reach the mer-
its, but dismissed the suits based on political question, standing,
and other doctrines.489
The power of the Senate to amend revenue bills extends to pro-
viding for taxes of a different character than those proposed by the
House. Thus, the substitution of a corporation tax for an inheri-
tance tax,490 and the addition of a section imposing an excise tax
upon the use of foreign-built pleasure yachts,491 have been held to
be within the Senate’s constitutional power.
484 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).

485 Twin City Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897).
486 Millard v. Roberts, 202 U.S. 429 (1906).
487 759 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1985).
488 96 Stat. 324.
489 E.g., Texas Ass’n of Concerned Taxpayers v. United States, 772 F.2d 163 (5th
Cir. 1985); Moore v. U.S. House of Representatives, 733 F.2d 946 (D.C. Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985).
490 Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107, 143 (1911).
491 Rainey v. United States, 232 U.S. 310 (1914).
Approval by the President

The President is not restrictedby the second clause to signing a
bill on a day when Congress is in session.492 He may sign within
ten days (Sundays excepted) after the bill is presented to him, even
if that period extends beyond the date of the final adjournment of
Congress.493 His duty in case of approval of a measure is merely to
sign it. He need not write on the bill the word “approved,” nor the
date. If no date appears on the face of the roll, the Court may as-
certain the fact by resort to any source of information capable of
furnishing a satisfactory answer.494 A bill becomes a law on the date
of its approval by the President.495 When no time is fixed by the
act, it is effective from the date of its approval,496 which usually is
taken to be the first moment of the day, fractions of a day being
disregarded.497
The Veto Power

The veto provisions of the Constitution, the Supreme Court has
told us, serve two functions. On the one hand, they ensure that “the
President shall have suitable opportunity to consider the bills pre-
sented to him. . . . It is to safeguard the President’s opportunity
that Paragraph 2 of § 7 of Article I provides that bills which he does
not approve shall not become law if the adjournment of the Con-
gress prevents their return.” 498 At the same time, the sections en-
sure “that the Congress shall have suitable opportunity to consider
his objections to bills and on such consideration to pass them over
his veto provided there are the requisite votes.” 499 The Court as-
serted that “[w]e should not adopt a construction which would frus-
trate either of these purposes.” 500
In one major respect, however, the President’s actual desires may
be frustrated by the presentation to him of omnibus bills or of bills
containing extraneous riders. During the 1980s, on several occa-
sions, Congress lumped all the appropriations for the operation of
the government into one gargantuan bill. In these situations, the
President must sign or veto the entire bill; doing the former, how-
492 La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453 (1899).
493 Edwards v. United States, 286 U.S. 482 (1932). On one occasion in 1936, de-
lay in presentation of a bill enabled the President to sign it 23 days after the ad-
journment of Congress. Schmeckebier, Approval of Bills After Adjournment of Con-
gress, 33 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 52–53 (1939).
494 Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868).
495 73 U.S. at 504. See also Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 383 (1878).
496 Matthews v. Zane, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat.) 164, 211 (1822).
497 Lapeyre v. United States, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 191, 198 (1873).
498 Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
499 302 U.S. at 596.
500 302 U.S. at 596.
ever, may mean he has to accept provisions he would not sign stand-
ing alone, while doing the latter may have other adverse conse-
quences. Numerous Presidents from Grant on have unsuccessfully
sought by constitutional amendment a “line-item veto” by which in-
dividual items in an appropriations bill or a substantive bill could
be extracted and vetoed. More recently, beginning in the Frankling
D. Roosevelt Administration, it was debated whether Congress could
by statute authorize a form of the line-item veto.501 When Con-
gress did so in 1996, however, the law was invalidated by the Su-
preme Court as a violation of the Presentment Clause.502
A review of the only two Supreme Court decisions construing
the veto power shows that the interpretation of the provisions has
not been entirely consistent. In The Pocket Veto Case,503 the Court
held that the return of a bill to the Senate, where it originated,
had been prevented when Congress adjourned its first session sine
die (“without day” or without a specified date to reconvene) fewer
than ten days after presenting the bill to the President. The word
“adjournment” was seen to have been used in the Constitution not
in the sense of final adjournments but to refer to any occasion on
which a house of Congress is not in session. “We think that under
the constitutional provision the determinative question in refer-
ence to an ‘adjournment’ is not whether it is a final adjournment of
Congress or an interim adjournment, such as an adjournment of
the first session, but whether it is one that ‘prevents’ the President
from returning the bill to the House in which it originated within
the time allowed.” 504 Because neither house was in session to re-
ceive the bill, the President was prevented from returning it. It had
been argued to the Court that the return may be validly accom-
plished to a proper agent of the house of origin for consideration
when that body convenes. After first noting that Congress had never
authorized an agent to receive bills during adjournment, the Court
opined that “delivery of the bill to such officer or agent, even if au-
thorized by Congress itself, would not comply with the constitu-
tional mandate.” 505
501 See Line Item Veto: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on Rules and Ad-
ministration, 99th Cong., 1st sess. (1985), esp. 10–20 (Congressional Research Ser-
vice memoranda detailing the issues). In a strained intepretation, some have ar-
gued that the President already possesses line-item veto power, as evidenced by related
efforts under clause 3 (the ORV clause, dicussed below) to prevent Congress from
subverting the veto power. No President, however, has endeavored to test this theory.
See Pork Barrels and Principles: The Politics of the Presidential Veto (National Le-
gal Center for the Public Interest, 1988) (essays).
502 See The Line Item Veto, infra.
503 279 U.S. 655 (1929).
504 279 U.S. at 680.
505 279 U.S. at 684.
However, in Wright v. United States,506 the Court held that the

President’s return of a bill to the Secretary of the Senate on the
tenth day after presentment, during a three-day adjournment by
the originating House only, was an effective return. In the first place,
the Court thought, the pocket veto clause referred only to an ad-
journment of “the Congress,” and here only the Senate, the originat-
ing body, had adjourned. The President can return the bill to the
originating House if that body be in an intrasession adjournment,
because there is no “practical difficulty” in effectuating the return.
“The organization of the Senate continued and was intact. The Sec-
retary of the Senate was functioning and was able to receive, and
did receive the bill.” 507 Such a procedure complied with the consti-
tutional provisions. “The Constitution does not define what shall con-
stitute a return of a bill or deny the use of appropriate agencies in
effecting the return.” 508 The concerns activating the Court in The
Pocket Veto Case were not present. There was no indefinite period
in which a bill was in a state of suspended animation with public
uncertainty over the outcome. “When there is nothing but such a
temporary recess the organization of the House and its appropriate
officers continue to function without interruption, the bill is prop-
erly safeguarded for a very limited time and is promptly reported
and may be reconsidered immediately after the short recess is over.” 509
Even though at a certain level of generality the cases are con-
sistent because of factual differences, the Supreme Court has not
had occasion to review the issue again and resolve the tension be-
tween them. But, in Kennedy v. Sampson,510 an appellate court held
that a return is not prevented by an intra-session adjournment of
any length by one or both houses of Congress, so long as the origi-
nating house arranged for receipt of veto messages. The court stressed
506 302 U.S. 583 (1938).
507 302 U.S. at 589–90.
508 302 U.S. at 589.
509 302 U.S. at 595.
510 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). The Administration declined to appeal the case
to the Supreme Court. The adjournment here was for five days. Subsequently, the
President attempted to pocket veto two other bills, one during a 32-day recess and
one during the period in which Congress had adjourned sine die from the first to
the second session of the 93d Congress. After renewed litigation, the Administration
entered its consent to a judgment that both bills had become law, Kennedy v. Jones,
412 F. Supp. 353 (D.D.C., decree entered April 13, 1976), and it was announced that
President Ford “will use the return veto rather than the pocket veto during intra-
session and intersession recesses and adjournments of the Congress,” provided that
the House to which the bill must be returned has authorized an officer to receive
vetoes during the period it is not in session. President Reagan repudiated this agree-
ment and vetoed a bill during an intersession adjournment. Although the lower court
applied Kennedy v. Sampson to strike down the exercise of the power, the case was
mooted prior to Supreme Court review. Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
vacated and remanded to dismiss sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987).
that the absence of the evils deemed to bottom the Court’s prem-
ises in The Pocket Veto Case—long delay and public uncertainty—
made possible the result.
The two-thirds vote of each House required to pass a bill over
a veto means two-thirds of a quorum.511 After a bill becomes law, of
course, the President has no authority to repeal it. Asserting this
truism, the Court in The Confiscation Cases 512 held that the immu-
nity proclamation issued by the President in 1868 did not require
reversal of a decree condemning property seized under the Confis-
cation Act of 1862.513
Presentation of Resolutions
The purpose of clause 3, the Orders, Resolutions, and Votes Clause
(ORV Clause), is not readily apparent. For years it was assumed
that the Framers inserted the clause to prevent Congress from evad-
ing the veto clause by designating as something other than a bill
measures intended to take effect as laws.514 Why a separate clause
was needed for this purpose has not been explained. Recent schol-
arship presents a different possible explanation for the ORV Clause—
that it was designed to authorize delegation of lawmaking power to
a single House, subject to presentment, veto, and possible two-
House veto override.515
If construed literally, the clause could have bogged down the
intermediate stages of the legislative process, so Congress made prac-
tical adjustments. At the request of the Senate, the Judiciary Com-
mittee in 1897 published a comprehensive report detailing how the
clause had been interpreted over the years. Briefly, it was shown
that the word “necessary” in the clause had come to refer to the
necessity for law-making; that is, any “order, resolution, or vote”
must be submitted if it is to have the force of law. But “votes” taken
in either House preliminary to the final passage of legislation need
not be submitted to the other House or to the President, nor must
concurrent resolutions merely expressing the views or “sense” of Con-
gress.516
511 Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919).
512 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874).
513 12 Stat. 589 (1862).
514 See 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (rev. ed.
1937), 301–302, 304–305; 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES § 889, at 335 (1833).
515 Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Art. I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why
Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly
Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2005).
516 S. REP. NO. 1335, 54th Congress, 2d Sess.; 4 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES § 3483 (1907).

Although the ORV Clause excepts only adjournment resolu-

tions and makes no explicit reference to resolutions proposing con-
stitutional amendments, the practice and understanding, begin-
ning with the Bill of Rights, has been that resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments need not be presented to the President
for veto or approval. Hollingsworth v. Virginia,517 in which the Court
rejected a challenge to the validity of the Eleventh Amendment based
on the assertion that it had not been presented to the President, is
usually cited for the proposition that presentation of constitutional
amendment resolutions is not required.518
The Legislative Veto.—Beginning in the 1930s, the concur-
rent resolution (as well as the simple resolution) was put to a new
use—serving as an instrument to terminate powers delegated to the
Chief Executive or to disapprove particular exercises of power by
him or his agents. The “legislative veto” or “congressional veto” was
first developed in context of the delegation of power to the Execu-
tive to reorganize governmental agencies,519 and was furthered by
the necessities of providing for the President national security and
foreign affairs powers immediately prior to and during World War
II.520 The proliferation of “congressional veto” provisions in legisla-
tion over the years raised a series of interrelated constitutional ques-
tions.521 Congress until relatively recently had applied the veto pro-
visions to some action taken by the President or another executive
officer—such as a reorganization of an agency, the lowering or rais-
517 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798).
518 Although Hollingsworth did not necessarily so hold (see Tillman, supra), the
Court has reaffirmed this interpretation. See Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 229
(1920) (in Hollingsworth “this court settled that the submission of a constitutional
amendment did not require the action of the President”); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S.
919, 955 n.21 (1983) (in Hollingsworth the Court “held Presidential approval was
unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment”).
519 Act of June 30, 1932, § 407, 47 Stat. 414.
520 See e.g., Lend Lease Act of March 11, 1941, 55 Stat. 31; First War Powers
Act of December 18, 1941, 55 Stat. 838; Emergency Price Control Act of January 30,
1942, 56 Stat. 23; Stabilization Act of October 2, 1942, 56 Stat. 765; War Labor Dis-
putes Act of June 25, 1943, 57 Stat. 163, all providing that the powers granted to
the President should come to an end upon adoption of concurrent resolutions to that
effect.
521 From 1932 to 1983, by one count, nearly 300 separate provisions giving Con-
gress power to halt or overturn executive action had been passed in nearly 200 acts;
substantially more than half of these had been enacted since 1970. A partial listing
was included in The Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual and Rules of the House of Rep-
resentatives, H. Doc. No. 96–398, 96th Congress, 2d Sess. (1981), 731–922. A more
up-to-date listing, in light of the Supreme Court’s ruling, is contained in H. Doc.
No. 101–256, 101st Cong., 2d sess. (1991), 907–1054. Justice White’s dissent in INS
v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 968–974, 1003–1013 (1983), describes and lists many kinds
of such vetoes. The types of provisions varied widely. Many required congressional
approval before an executive action took effect, but more commonly they provided
for a negation of executive action, by concurrent resolution of both houses, by reso-
lution of only one house, or even by a committee of one house.
ing of tariff rates, the disposal of federal property—then began ex-

panding the device to give itself authority to negate regulations is-
sued by executive branch agencies. Proposals were also made to give
Congress the power to negate all regulations issued by indepen-
dent agencies.522
In INS v. Chadha,523 however, the Court held a one-House con-
gressional veto to be unconstitutional as violating both the bicam-
eralism principles reflected in Art. I, §§ 1 and 7, and the present-
ment provisions of § 7, cl. 2 and 3. The provision in question was
§ 244(c)(2) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which autho-
rized either house of Congress by resolution to veto the decision of
the Attorney General to allow a particular deportable alien to re-
main in the country. The Court’s analysis of the presentment issue
made clear, however, that two-house veto provisions (despite their
compliance with bicameralism) and committee veto provisions suf-
fer the same constitutional infirmity.524 In the words of dissenting
Justice White, the Court in Chadha “sound[ed] the death knell for
nearly 200 other statutory provisions in which Congress has re-
served a ‘legislative veto.’ ” 525
In determining that a veto of the Attorney General’s decision to
suspend a deportation was a legislative action requiring present-
ment to the President for approval or veto, the Court set forth the
general standard. “Whether actions taken by either House are, in
law and in fact, an exercise of legislative power depends not on their
form but upon ‘whether they contain matter which is properly to
be regarded as legislative in its character and effect.’ [T]he action
522 A bill providing for this failed to receive the two-thirds vote required to pass
under suspension of the rules by only three votes in the 94th Congress. H.R. 12048,
94th Congress, 2d sess. See H. REP. NO. 94–1014, 94th Congress, 2d sess. (1976),
and 122 CONG. REC. 31615–641, 31668. Considered extensively in the 95th and 96th
Congresses, similar bills were not adopted. See Regulatory Reform and Congressio-
nal Review of Agency Rules: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Rules of the House
of the House Rules Committee, 96th Congress, 1st sess. (1979); Regulatory Reform
Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, 96th
Congress, 1st sess. (1979).
523 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
524 Shortly after deciding Chadha, the Court removed any doubts on this score
with summary affirmance of an appeals court’s invalidation of a two-House veto in

Consumers Union v. FTC, 691 F.2d 575 (D.C. Cir. 1982), aff’d sub nom. Process Gas
Consumers Group v. Consumer Energy Council, 463 U.S. 1216 (1983). Prior to Chadha,
an appellate court in AFGE v. Pierce, 697 F.2d 303 (D.C. Cir. 1982), had voided a
form of committee veto, a provision prohibiting the availability of certain funds for
a particular purpose without the prior approval of the Committees on Appropria-
tions.
525 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 967. Justice Powell concurred separately, asserting that
Congress had violated separation-of-powers principles by assuming a judicial func-

tion in determining that a particular individual should be deported. Justice Powell
therefore found it unnecessary to express his view on “the broader question of whether
legislative vetoes are invalid under the Presentment Clauses.” Id. at 959.
taken here . . . was essentially legislative,” the Court concluded, be-

cause “it had the purpose and effect of altering the legal rights, du-
ties and relations of persons, including the Attorney General, Ex-
ecutive Branch officials and Chadha, all outside the legislative
branch.” 526
The other major component of the Court’s reasoning in Chadha
stemmed from its reading of the Constitution as making only “ex-
plicit and unambiguous” exceptions to the bicameralism and pre-
sentment requirements. Thus the House alone was given power of
impeachment, and the Senate alone was given power to convict upon
impeachment, to advise and consent to executive appointments, and
to advise and consent to treaties. Similarly, Congress may propose
a constitutional amendment without the President’s approval, and
each house is given autonomy over certain “internal matters,” e.g.,
judging the qualifications of its members. By implication then, ex-
ercises of legislative power not falling within any of these “narrow,
explicit, and separately justified” exceptions must conform to the
prescribed procedures: “passage by a majority of both Houses and
presentment to the President.” 527
The breadth of the Court’s ruling in Chadha was evidenced in
its 1986 decision in Bowsher v. Synar.528 Among that case’s ratio-
nales for holding the Deficit Control Act unconstitutional was that
Congress had, in effect, retained control over executive action in a
manner resembling a congressional veto. “[A]s Chadha makes clear,
once Congress makes its choice in enacting legislation, its partici-
pation ends. Congress can thereafter control the execution of its en-
actment only indirectly—by passing new legislation.” 529 Congress
had offended this principle by retaining removal authority over the
Comptroller General, charged with executing important aspects of
the Budget Act.
Despite Chadha, Congress had continued to pass laws contain-
ing legislative vetoes, often in the context of appropriations.530 Other
methods of post-enactment legislative control which do not appear
to offend the Presentment Clause are also available. For instance,
526 462 U.S. at 952 (citation omitted).
527 462 U.S. at 955–56.
528 478 U.S. 714 (1986). See also Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citi-
zens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
529 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 733 (1986). This position was developed at
greater length in the concurring opinion of Justice Stevens. Id. at 736.

530 See, e.g., Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropria-
tions Act 2001, Pub. L. 106–346, Appendix, Title I, 114 Stat. 1356A–2 (limit on pro-
gram assessments for the Transportation Administrative Service Center “unless no-
tice of such assessments and the basis therefore are presented to the House and
Senate Committees on Appropriations and are approved by such Committees”).
Congress has established various “report and wait” provisions,531 and

it has also established requirements for consultative steps that must
be taken by the executive in order to achieve expedited legislative
consideration.532 But the Chadha decision continues to deny Con-
gress a direct method of reviewing and voiding Executive Branch
actions and rules made under powers that Congress has delegated
to the Executive Branch.
The Line Item Veto.—For more than a century, United States
Presidents had sought the authority to strike out of appropriations
bills particular items—to veto “line items” of money bills and some-
times legislative measures as well. Finally, in 1996, Congress ap-
proved and the President signed the Line Item Veto Act.533 The law
empowered the President, within five days of signing a bill, to “can-
cel in whole” spending items and targeted, defined tax benefits. In
acting on this authority, the President was to determine that the
cancellation of each item would “(I) reduce the Federal budget defi-
cit; (ii) not impair any essential Government functions; and (iii) not
harm the national interest.” 534 In Clinton v. City of New York,535
the Court held the act unconstitutional because it did not comply
with the Presentment Clause.
Although Congress in passing the act considered itself to have
been delegating power,536 and although the dissenting Justices would
have upheld the act as a valid delegation,537 the Court instead ana-
lyzed the statute under the Presentment Clause. In the Court’s view,
the two bills from which the President subsequently struck items
became law the moment the President signed them. His cancella-
tions thus amended and in part repealed the two federal laws. Un-
der its most immediate precedent, the Court continued, statutory
repeals must conform to the Presentment Clause’s “single, finely
wrought and exhaustively considered, procedure” for enacting or re-
pealing a law.538 In no respect did the procedures in the act comply
531 See, e.g., Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs
Appropriations Act, 2012, Pub. L. 112–74, Division I, §7015(b), 125 Stat. 1200–1201
(limiting transferring funds between appropriations accounts beyond a certain mon-
etary level unless the Committees on Appropriations are notified 15 days in ad-
vance of such reprogramming of funds).
532 See, e.g.,Trade Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107–210, § 2105, 116 Stat. 1013–14 (trade
agreement will receive expedited –“fast track”– consideration if the President com-
plies with specified congressional notification deadlines).
533 Pub. L. 104–130, 110 Stat. 1200, codified in part at 2 U.S.C. §§ 691–92.
534 Id. at § 691(a)(A).
535 524 U.S. 417(1998).
536 E.g., H.R. CONF. REP. NO. 104–491, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1996) (stating
that the proposed law “delegates limited authority to the President”).

537 524 U.S. at 453 (Justice Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in part);
id. at 469 (Justice Breyer dissenting).

538 524 U.S. at 438–39 (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983)).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 1—Power To Tax and Spend
with that clause, and in no way could they. The President was act-
ing in a legislative capacity, altering a law in the manner pre-
scribed, and legislation must, in the way Congress acted, be bicam-
eral and be presented to the President after Congress acted. Nothing
in the Constitution authorized the President to amend or repeal a
statute unilaterally, and the Court could construe both constitu-
tional silence and the historical practice over 200 years as “an ex-
press prohibition” of the President’s action.539
SECTION 8. Clause 1. The Congress shall have Power to lay

and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts
and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the
United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uni-
form throughout the United States.
POWER TO TAX
Scope of the Taxing Power

Article I, § 8, cl. 1 grants Congress the broad authority “to lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises. . .”. The Court has
often emphasized the sweeping character of congress’ taxing power
by saying, from time to time, that it “reaches every subject,” 540 that
it is “exhaustive,” 541 or that it “embraces every conceivable power
of taxation.” 542 The power would appear to be textually limited by
only one exception and two qualifications: articles exported from any
state may not be taxed at all,543 direct taxes must be levied by the
rule of apportionment,544 and indirect taxes are governed by the rule
of uniformity.545
As explored below, this power was for a time curtailed by judi-
cial decisions based on the subject matter of the taxation. For in-
stance, the Supreme Court was initially inclined to find limits on
the taxing power arising from other portions of the Constitution.
Thus, in Evans v. Gore 546 and Miles v. Graham,547 the Court found
that imposing an income tax on the salaries of federal judges vio-
lated the constitutional mandate that the compensation of such judges
539 524 U.S. at 439.
540 License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867).
541 Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
542 240 U.S. at 12.
543 Art. I, § 9, cl. 5. See Taxes on Exports, supra.
544 Art. I, § 2, cl. 3: Art. I, § 9, cl. 4. See Direct Taxes, supra.
545 Art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
546 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
547 268 U.S. 501 (1925).
should not be diminished during their continuance in office, even if

the tax at issue was applied generally.548 These cases, however, were
subsequently repudiated in O’Malley v. Woodrough.549 Other theo-
ries suggesting limits on the taxing power have also proven to be
of only limited duration or effect.
Limits on Federal Taxation of States and Their Interests.—
Federalism concerns, most often found in the regulatory arena, have
also arisen in the context of the power to tax. Beginning with the
seminal decision of McCulloch v. Maryland,550 the Court has consis-
tently found limits on the power of states to tax federal operations
or instrumentalities. However, the converse question—whether Con-
gress can use its power under Article 1, § 8 to tax the states and
their interests—has not been so easily resolved.
Early on, the Court found that the Constitution contained sig-
nificant restrictions on federal taxation of the states. For example,
in an 1871 decision, Collector v. Day,551 the Court held that the sal-
ary of a state officer was immune from federal income taxation. This
case was decided while the country was still in the throes of Recon-
struction and, as later noted by Chief Justice Stone, the Court had
not yet determined how far the Civil War Amendments had broad-
ened federal power at the expense of the states. The fact that the
taxing power had recently been used with destructive effect upon
notes issued by state banks,552 however, suggested the possibility
of a similar attack by the federal government upon the existence of
the states themselves.553 Two years later, the Court took the next
logical step of holding that the federal income tax could not be im-
posed on income received by a municipal corporation from its invest-
ments.554
Twenty-two years after that, a far-reaching extension of this im-
munity to non-governmental actors was granted in Pollock v. Farm-
ers’ Loan & Trust Co., where interest received by a private investor
on state or municipal bonds was held to be exempt from federal
taxation.555 However, as the apprehension of the Reconstruction era
subsided, the doctrine of these cases was pushed into the back-
ground. Only once since the turn of the 20th century has the na-
tional taxing power been further narrowed in the name of federal-
ism. In 1931 the Court held that a federal excise tax was inapplicable
548 Art. III, § 1.
549 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
550 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
551 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1871).
552 Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
553 Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405, 414 n.4 (1938).
554 United States v. Railroad Co., 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 322 (1873).
555 157 U.S. 429 (1895).
to the manufacture and sale to a municipal corporation of equip-

ment for its police force.556 Justices Stone and Brandeis, however,
dissented from this decision, and it is doubtful whether it would be
followed today.557
In the interim between these cases, the Court began to rou-
tinely uphold federal taxation of state interests. In 1903 a succes-
sion tax upon a bequest to a municipality for public purposes was
upheld on the ground that the tax was payable out of the estate
before distribution to the legatee. Looking to form and not to sub-
stance, a closely divided Court declined to “regard it as a tax upon
the municipality, though it might operate incidentally to reduce the
bequest by the amount of the tax.” 558 When South Carolina em-
barked upon the business of dispensing alcoholic beverages, its agents
were held to be subject to the national internal revenue tax, the
ground of the holding being that in 1787 such a business was not
regarded as one of the ordinary functions of government.559
Another decision marking a clear departure from the logic of
Collector v. Day was Flint v. Stone Tracy Co.,560 in which the Court
sustained an act of Congress taxing the privilege of doing business
as a corporation, the tax being measured by the income. The argu-
ment that the tax imposed an unconstitutional burden on the exer-
cise by a state of its reserved power to create corporate franchises
was rejected, partly because of the principle of national supremacy,
and partly on the ground that the corporate franchises were pri-
vate property. This case also qualified Pollock to the extent that it
allowed interest on state bonds to be included in measuring the tax
on the corporation.
Subsequent cases sustained an estate tax on the net estate of a
decedent, including state bonds 561 and excise taxes on the transpor-
tation of merchandise in performance of a contract to sell and de-
liver it to a county; 562 on the importation of scientific apparatus by
a state university; 563 on admissions to athletic contests sponsored
by a state institution, the net proceeds of which were used to fur-
ther its educational program; 564 and on admissions to recreational
facilities operated on a nonprofit basis by a municipal corpora-
556 Indian Motorcycle v. United States, 283 U.S. 570 (1931).
557 Cf. Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
558 Snyder v. Bettman, 190 U.S. 249, 254 (1903).
559 South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905). See also Ohio v. Helver-
ing, 292 U.S. 360 (1934).

560 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
561 Greiner v. Lewellyn, 258 U.S. 384 (1922).
562 Wheeler Lumber Co. v. United States, 281 U.S. 572 (1930).
563 Board of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
564 Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
tion.565 Similarly, income derived by independent engineering con-

tractors from the performance of state functions; 566 the compensa-
tion of trustees appointed to manage a street railway taken over
and operated by a state; 567 and profits derived from the sale of state
bonds 568 or from oil produced by lessees of state lands; 569 have all
been held to be subject to federal taxation despite a possible eco-
nomic burden on the state.
In the 1988 decision which finally overruled this aspect of Pol-
lock, the Court stated that the rule on which Pollock had been based—
that the federal and state governments could not tax income de-
rived from a contract with another government—had already been
rejected in numerous decisions involving intergovernmental immu-
nity.570 “We see no constitutional reason for treating persons who
receive interest on government bonds differently than persons who
receive income from other types of contracts with the government,
and no tenable rationale for distinguishing the costs imposed on States
by a tax on state bond interest from the costs imposed by a tax on
the income from any other state contract.” 571
Current Scope of State Immunity from Federal Taxation.—
While the specific ruling of Collector v. Day has been overruled, the
principle underlying that decision—that Congress may not lay a tax
that would impair the sovereignty of the states—is still recognized
as retaining some vitality. Although there have been sharp differ-
ences of opinion among members of the Supreme Court in cases deal-
ing with the tax immunity of state functions and instrumentalities,
the Court has stated that “all agree that not all of the former im-
munity is gone.” 572
Twice, the Court has made an effort to express its new point of
view in a statement of general principles by which the right to such
immunity shall be determined. In Helvering v. Gerhardt,573 where,
without overruling Collector v. Day, it narrowed the immunity of
salaries of state officers from federal income taxation, the Court an-
nounced “two guiding principles of limitation for holding the tax im-
munity of state instrumentalities to its proper function. The one,
dependent upon the nature of the function being performed by the
565 Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949).
566 Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926).
567 Helvering v. Powers, 293 U.S. 214 (1934).
568 Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216 (1931).
569 Helvering v. Producers Corp., 303 U.S. 376 (1938), overruling Burnet v. Coronado
Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393 (1932).

570 South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 517 (1988).
571 485 U.S. at 524–25.
572 New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 584 (1946) (concurring opinion of
Justice Rutledge).
573 304 U.S. 405 (1938).
state or in its behalf, excludes from the immunity activities thought

not to be essential to the preservation of state governments even
though the tax be collected from the state treasury. . . . The other
principle, exemplified by those cases where the tax laid upon indi-
viduals affects the state only as the burden is passed on to it by
the taxpayer, forbids recognition of the immunity when the burden
on the state is so speculative and uncertain that if allowed it would
restrict the federal taxing power without affording any correspond-
ing tangible protection to the state government; even though the
function be thought important enough to demand immunity from a
tax upon the state itself, it is not necessarily protected from a tax
which well may be substantially or entirely absorbed by private per-
sons.” 574
The second attempt to formulate a general doctrine was made
in New York v. United States,575 although the failure to muster a
majority to concur with any single opinion leaves the standard in
doubt. In New York, on review of a judgment affirming the right of
the United States to tax the sale of mineral waters taken from prop-
erty owned and operated by the State of New York, the Court recon-
sidered the right of Congress to tax business enterprises carried on
by the states. Justice Frankfurter, speaking for himself and Justice
Rutledge, made the question of discrimination vel non against state
activities the test of the validity of such a tax. They found “no re-
striction upon Congress to include the States in levying a tax ex-
acted equally from private persons upon the same subject mat-
ter.” 576 In a concurring opinion in which Justices Reed, Murphy, and
Burton joined, Chief Justice Stone rejected the criterion of discrimi-
nation. He repeated what he had said in an earlier case to the ef-
fect that “the limitation upon the taxing power of each, so far as it
affects the other, must receive a practical construction which per-
mits both to function with the minimum of interference each with
the other; and that limitation cannot be so varied or extended as
seriously to impair either the taxing power of the government im-
posing the tax . . . or the appropriate exercise of the functions of
the government affected by it.” 577
Justices Douglas and Black dissented in an opinion written by
the former on the ground that the decision disregarded the Tenth
Amendment, placed “the sovereign States on the same plane as pri-
vate citizens,” and made them “pay the Federal Government for the
privilege of exercising powers of sovereignty guaranteed them by
574 304 U.S. at 419–20.
575 326 U.S. 572 (1946).
576 326 U.S. at 584.
577 326 U.S. at 589–90.
the Constitution.” 578 In a later case dealing with state immunity

the Court sustained the tax on the second ground mentioned in Helver-
ing v. Gerhardt—that the burden of the tax was borne by private
persons—and did not consider whether the function was one which
the Federal Government might have taxed if the municipality had
borne the burden of the exaction.579
Articulation of the current approach may be found in South Caro-
lina v. Baker.580 The rules are “essentially the same” for federal im-
munity from state taxation and for state immunity from federal taxa-
tion, except that some state activities may be subject to direct federal
taxation, while states may “never” tax the United States directly.
Either government may tax private parties doing business with the
other government, “even though the financial burden falls on the
[other government], as long as the tax does not discriminate against
the [other government] or those with which it deals.” 581 Thus, “the
issue whether a nondiscriminatory federal tax might nonetheless
violate state tax immunity does not even arise unless the Federal
Government seeks to collect the tax directly from a State.” 582
Uniformity Requirement.—Under Article 1, § 8, clause 1, “all
Duties, Imposts and Excises “ must be imposed uniformly through-
out the United States.583 These types of taxes are commonly re-
ferred to as “indirect taxes,” and they are distinguished from “di-
rect taxes,” which must be apportioned among the states according
to the census taken pursuant to Article I, § 2.584 The rule of unifor-
mity for indirect taxes is generally easy to obey. It requires only
that the subject matter of a levy be taxed at the same rate wher-
ever found in the United States; or, as it is sometimes phrased, the
uniformity required is “geographical,” not “intrinsic.” 585 Even the
geographical limitation appears to be a loose one. In United States
v. Ptasynski,586 the Court upheld an exemption from a crude-oil
578 326 U.S. at 596.
579 Wilmette Park Dist. v. Campbell, 338 U.S. 411 (1949). Cf. Massachusetts v.
United States, 435 U.S. 444 (1978).
580 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
581 485 U.S. at 523.
582 485 U.S. at 524 n.14.
583 The term “United States” in this clause refers only to the states of the Union,
the District of Columbia, and incorporated territories. Congress is not bound by the
rule of uniformity in framing tax measures for unincorporated territories. See Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486 (1904).
584 See also Article I, § 9, cl. 4. For constitutional purposes, all taxes are charac-
terized as either being direct or indirect. See Thomas v. United States, 192 U.S. 363,
370 (1904) (“And these two classes, [direct taxes], and ‘duties, imposts and excises,”
apparently embrace all forms of taxation contemplated by the Constitution.”).
585 LaBelle Iron Works v. United States, 256 U.S. 377 (1921); Brushaber v. Union
Pac. R.R. Co., 240 U.S. 1 (1916); Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580 (1884).
586 462 U.S. 74 (1983).
windfall-profits tax of “Alaskan oil,” defined geographically to in-

clude oil produced in Alaska (or elsewhere) north of the Arctic Circle.
What is prohibited, the Court said, is favoritism to particular states
in the absence of valid bases of classification. Because Congress could
have achieved the same result, allowing for severe climactic difficul-
ties, through a classification tailored to the “disproportionate costs
and difficulties . . . associated with extracting oil from this re-
gion,” 587 the fact that Congress described the exemption in geo-
graphic terms did not condemn the provision.
The Uniformity Clause therefore places no obstacle in the way
of legislative classification for the purpose of taxation, nor in the
way of what is called progressive taxation.588 Furthermore, a tax-
ing statute does not fail of the prescribed uniformity because its
operation and incidence may be affected by differences in state laws.589
For example, a federal estate tax law that permitted deduction for
a like tax paid to a state was not rendered invalid by the fact that
one state levied no such tax.590
Regulation by Taxation
Congress has broad discretion in methods of taxation, and may,
under the Necessary and Proper Clause, regulate business within
a state in order to tax it more effectively. For instance, the Court
has sustained regulations regarding the packaging of taxed articles
such as tobacco 591 and oleomargarine,592 ostensibly designed to pre-
vent fraud in the collection of the tax. It has also upheld measures
taxing drugs 593 and firearms,594 which prescribed rigorous restric-
tions under which such articles could be sold or transferred, and
imposed heavy penalties upon persons dealing with them in any
other way. These regulations were sustained as conducive to the ef-
ficient collection of the tax though, in some respects, they clearly
transcended this ground of justification.
Even where a tax is coupled with regulations that have no pos-
sible relation to the efficient collection of the tax, and no other pur-
pose appears on the face of the statute, the Court has refused to
inquire into the motives of lawmakers and has sustained the tax
587 462 U.S. at 85.
588 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
589 Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945); Riggs v. Del Drago, 317 U.S. 95
(1942); Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931); Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101,
117 (1930).
590 Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927).
591 Felsenheld v. United States, 186 U.S. 126 (1902).
592 In re Kollock, 165 U.S. 526 (1897).
593 United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919). Cf. Nigro v. United States,
276 U.S. 332 (1928).

594 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506 (1937).
despite its prohibitive proportions.595 “It is beyond serious question

that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates,
discourages, or even definitely deters the activities taxed. . . . The
principle applies even though the revenue obtained is obviously neg-
ligible . . . or the revenue purpose of the tax may be second-
ary. . . . Nor does a tax statute necessarily fall because it touches
on activities which Congress might not otherwise regulate. As was
pointed out in Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 47 (1934):
‘From the beginning of our government, the courts have sustained
taxes although imposed with the collateral intent of effecting ulte-
rior ends which, considered apart, were beyond the constitutional
power of the lawmakers to realize by legislation directly addressed
to their accomplishment.’ ” 596
In some cases, however, the structure of a taxation scheme is
such as to suggest that Congress actually intends to regulate un-
der a separate constitutional authority. As long as such separate
authority is available to Congress, the imposition of a tax as a pen-
alty for such regulation is valid.597 On the other hand, where Con-
gress had levied a heavy tax upon liquor dealers who operated in
violation of state law, the Court held that this tax was unenforce-
able after the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment, because the Na-
tional Government had no power to impose an additional penalty
for infractions of state law.598
595 McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904).

596 United States v. Sanchez, 340 U.S. 42, 45 (1950). See also Sonzinsky v. United
States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937).The earliest examples of taxes levied with a
view to promoting desired economic objectives in addition to raising revenue were
import duties. See, e.g., 1 Stat. 24 (1789) (the second statute adopted by the first
Congress was a tariff act reciting that “it is necessary for the support of govern-
ment, for the discharge of the debts of the United States, and the encouragement
and protection of manufactures, that duties be laid on goods, wares and merchan-
dise imported”). After being debated for nearly a century and a half, the constitution-
ality of protective tariffs was finally settled by the Supreme Court’s unanimous de-
cision in J. W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 411 (1928).. Chief
Justice Taft, writing for the Court, observed that the first Congress in 1789, which
included many members of the Constitutional Convention, had enacted a protective
tariff. “This Court has repeatedly laid down the principle that a contemporaneous
legislative exposition of the Constitution when the founders of our Government and
framers of our Constitution were actively participating in public affairs, long acqui-
esced in, fixes the construction to be given its provisions. . . . Whatever we may
think of the wisdom of a protection policy, we cannot hold it unconstitutional. So
long as the motive of Congress and the effect of its legislative action are to secure
revenue for the benefit of the general government, the existence of other motives in
the selection of the subjects of taxes cannot invalidate Congressional action.” 276
U.S. at 412.
597 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 393 (1940). See also
Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 596 (1884).

598 United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935).
Discerning whether Congress, in passing a regulation that pur-

ports to be under the taxing authority, intends to exercise a sepa-
rate constitutional authority, requires evaluation of a number of fac-
tors.599 Under the Child Labor Tax Case,600 decided in 1922, the
Court, which had previously rejected a federal prohibition of child
labor laws as being outside of the Commerce Clause,601 also re-
jected a tax on companies using such labor. First, the Court noted
that the law in question set forth a specific and detailed regulatory
scheme—including the ages, industry, and number of hours allowed—
establishing when employment of underage youth would incur taxa-
tion. Second, the taxation in question functioned as a penalty, in
that it was set at one-tenth of net income per year, regardless of
the nature or degree of the infraction. Third, the tax had a scienter
requirement, so that the employer had to know that the child was
below a specified age in order to incur taxation. Fourth, the statute
made the businesses subject to inspection by officers of the Secre-
tary of Labor, positions not traditionally charged with the enforce-
ment and collection of taxes.
More recently, however, in National Federation of Independent
Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius,602 the Court upheld as an exercise of
the taxing authority a requirement under the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act (ACA) 603 that certain individuals maintain a
minimum level of health insurance. Failure to purchase health in-
surance may subject a person to a monetary penalty, administered
through the tax code. Chief Justice Roberts, in a majority hold-
ing,604 found that the use of the term “penalty” in the ACA 605 to
describe the enforcement mechanism for the individual mandate was
not determinative, and used a functional approach in evaluating the
authority for the requirement. The Court found that the latter three
factors identified in the Child Labor Tax Case (penal intent, scienter,
enforcement by regulatory agency) were not present with respect
to the individual mandate. Unlike the child labor taxation scheme,
the tax level under the ACA is established based on traditional tax
variables such as taxable income, number of dependents and joint
filing status; there is no requirement of a knowing violation; and
the tax is collected by the Internal Revenue Service.
599 Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922); Helwig v. United States, 188 U.S. 605
(1903).
600 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
601 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
602 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–393, slip op. (2012).
603 Pub. L. 111–148, as amended.
604 For this portion of the opinion, Justice Roberts was joined by Justices Ginsburg,
Breyer, Sotomayor and Kagan.

605 26 U.S.C. §§ 5000A(c), (g)(1).
The majority, however, did not appear to address the first Child
Labor Tax Case factor: whether the ACA set forth a specific and
detailed course of conduct and imposed an exaction on those who
transgress its standard. The Court did note that the law did not
bear characteristics of a regulatory penalty, as the cost of the tax
was far outweighed by the cost of obtaining health insurance, mak-
ing the payment of the tax a reasonable financial decision.606 Still,
the majority’s discussion suggests that, for constitutional purposes,
the prominence of regulatory motivations for tax provisions may be-
come less important than the nature of the exactions imposed and
the manner in which they are administered.
In those areas where activities are subject to both taxation and
regulation, the taxing authority is not limited from reaching activi-
ties otherwise prohibited. For instance, Congress may tax an activ-
ity, such as the business of accepting wagers,607 even if it is prohib-
ited by the laws of the United States or by those of a state.608 However,
congress’ authority to regulate using the taxing power “reaches only
existing subjects.” 609 Thus, so-called federal “licenses,” so far as they
relate to topics outside congress’ constitutional authority, merely ex-
press “the purpose of the government not to interfere . . . with the
trade nominally licensed, if the required taxes are paid.” In those
instances, whether the “licensed” trade shall be permitted at all is
a question that remains a decision by the state.610
SPENDING FOR THE GENERAL WELFARE
Scope of the Power

The grant of power to “provide for the . . . general Welfare of
the United States” raises a two-fold question: what is the “general
Welfare” and how may Congress “provide” for it? The Federalist it-
self discloses a sharp divergence of views between its two principal
606 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–393, slip op. at 35–36 (2012).
607 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953). Dissenting, Justice Frank-
furter maintained that this was not a bona fide tax, but was essentially an effort to
check, if not stamp out, professional gambling, an activity left to the responsibility
of the states. Justices Jackson and Douglas noted partial agreement with this con-
clusion. See also Lewis v. United States, 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
608 United States v. Yuginovich, 256 U.S. 450 (1921) (federal tax on sale of li-
quor during Prohibtion); United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287, 293 (1935) (state
taxes on sales of liquor and lottery tickets by unlicensed businesses). Without cast-
ing doubt on the ability of Congress to regulate or punish through its taxing power,
the Court has overruled Kahriger, Lewis, Doremus, Sonzinsky, and similar cases on
the ground that the statutory scheme compelled self-incrimination through registra-
tion. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); Grosso v. United States, 390
U.S. 62 (1968); Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968); Leary v. United States,
395 U.S. 6 (1969).
609 License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 462, 471 (1867).
610 License Tax Cases, 72 U.S. at 471 (1867).
authors as to the meaning of “general Welfare.” Alexander Hamil-

ton’s essays adopted a literal, broad meaning of the clause,611 and
he suggested elsewhere that “[t]he phrase is as comprehensive as
any that could have been used . . . .” 612 James Madison, on the other
hand, contended that the powers of taxation and appropriation of
the proposed government should be regarded as merely instrumen-
tal to its enumerated powers; in other words, the phrase repre-
sented little more than a power of self-support to government func-
tions.613
From early times, however, Congress has acted upon Hamil-
ton’s interpretation. Beginning in the Administrations of Washing-
ton and Jefferson,614 Congress provided appropriations for subsi-
dies to industry 615 and for an ever-increasing variety of “internal
improvements” 616 constructed by the Federal Government. And, since
1914, federal grants-in-aid, which are sums of money apportioned
among the states for particular uses, have become commonplace.
The grants are often conditioned upon compliance with stipulated
restrictions, such as the state making like contributions to the pro-
gram or project.
The second half of the question, as to how Congress may “pro-
vide” for the general welfare, was addressed by Thomas Jefferson
in his opinion to George Washington on the constitutionality of the
National Bank. “[T]he laying of taxes is the power, and the general
welfare the purpose for which the power is to be exercised. They
[Congress] are not to lay taxes ad libitum for any purpose they please;
but only to pay the debts or provide for the welfare of the Union.
In like manner, they are not to do anything they please to provide
for the general welfare, but only to lay taxes for that purpose.” 617
The general welfare clause, in short, is not an independent grant
of legislative power, but is instead a qualification of the power to
tax and, impliedly, to spend. Although a broader view has been oc-
611 THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 30 and 34, 187–193, 209–215 (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
612 Alexander Hamilton, Report on Manufactures reprinted in 10 THE PAPERS OF
ALEXANDER HAMILTON 302 (H. Syrett ed.,1962).
613 Id. at No. 41, 268–78.
614 In an advisory opinion, which it rendered for President Monroe at his re-
quest on the power of Congress to appropriate funds for public improvements, the
Court answered that such appropriations might be properly made under the war
and postal powers. See Albertsworth, Advisory Functions in the Supreme Court, 23
GEO. L. J. 643, 644–647 (1935). Monroe himself ultimately adopted the broadest view
of the spending power, from which, however, he carefully excluded any element of
regulatory or police power. See his Views of the President of the United States on the
Subject of Internal Improvements, of May 4, 1822, 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESI-
DENTS 713–752 (Richardson ed., 1906).
615 1 Stat. 229 (1792) (fishing industry).
616 2 Stat. 357 (1806) (building a road from Cumberland, Maryland to Ohio).
617 3 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 147–149 (Library Edition, 1904).
casionally asserted,618 Congress has not acted upon it and the Court
has had no occasion to adjudicate the point.
The scope of the national spending power came before the Su-
preme Court at least five times prior to 1936, but the Court dis-
posed of four of those suits without construing the “general wel-
fare” clause. In the Pacific Railway Cases 619 and Smith v. Kansas
City Title & Trust Co.,620 the Court affirmed the power of Congress
to construct internal improvements and to charter and purchase the
capital stock of federal land banks, but it did so by reference to its
powers over commerce, post roads, and fiscal operations and to its
war powers. Decisions on the merits were withheld in two other
cases, Massachusetts v. Mellon and Frothingham v. Mellon,621 on
the ground that neither a state nor an individual citizen is entitled
to a remedy in the courts against an alleged unconstitutional appro-
priation of national funds. In United States v. Gettysburg Electric
Ry.,622 on the other hand, the Court did invoke “the great power of
taxation to be exercised for the common defence and general wel-
fare” 623 to sustain the right of the Federal Government to acquire
land within a state for use as a national park.
Finally, in United States v. Butler,624 the Court gave its unquali-
fied endorsement to Hamilton’s views on the taxing power. Justice
Owen Roberts wrote for the Court:
Since the foundation of the Nation sharp differences of opinion have
persisted as to the true interpretation of the phrase. Madison asserted it
amounted to no more than a reference to the other powers enumerated in
the subsequent clauses of the same section; that, as the United States is a
government of limited and enumerated powers, the grant of power to tax
and spend for the general national welfare must be confined to the enumer-
ated legislative fields committed to the Congress. In this view the phrase is
mere tautology, for taxation and appropriation are or may be necessary in-
cidents of the exercise of any of the enumerated legislative powers. Hamil-
ton, on the other hand, maintained the clause confers a power separate and
distinct from those later enumerated, is not restricted in meaning by the
grant of them, and Congress consequently has a substantive power to tax
and to appropriate, limited only by the requirement that it shall be exer-
cised to provide for the general welfare of the United States. Each conten-
tion has had the support of those whose views are entitled to weight. This
court has noticed the question, but has never found it necessary to decide
which is the true construction. Mr. Justice Story, in his Commentaries, es-
618 See W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES (1953).
619 California v. Pacific R.R., 127 U.S. 1 (1888).
620 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
621 262 U.S. 447 (1923). See also Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
These cases were limited by Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968).

622 160 U.S. 668 (1896).
623 160 U.S. at 681.
624 297 U.S. 1 (1936). See also Cleveland v. United States, 323 U.S. 329 (1945).
pouses the Hamiltonian position. We shall not review the writings of public
men and commentators or discuss the legislative practice. Study of all these
leads us to conclude that the reading advocated by Mr. Justice Story is the
correct one. While, therefore, the power to tax is not unlimited, its confines
are set in the clause which confers it, and not in those of § 8 which bestow
and define the legislative powers of the Congress. It results that the power
of Congress to authorize expenditure of public moneys for public purposes
is not limited by the direct grants of legislative power found in the Consti-
tution.625
By and large, it is for Congress to determine what constitutes
the “general Welfare” 626 and “the Debts” of the United States. The
Court accords great deference to Congress’ decision that a spending
program advances the general welfare,627 and has even questioned
whether the restriction is judicially enforceable.628 The purpose of
taxation need not be national in character, the Court having found
that directing revenue from a federal processing tax on Philippine-
produced coconut oil into the Philippine Treasury did not preclude
a finding that the tax was for the general welfare.629 Or, in Helver-
ing v. Davis,630 the Court upheld an excise tax on employers—the
proceeds of which were not earmarked but were intended to pro-
vide funds for payments to retired workers—to be in the general
welfare, the Tenth Amendment notwithstanding. Similarly, the power
to pay the debts of the United States is broad enough to include
claims of citizens arising based solely on obligations of rights and
justice.631
As with its other powers, Congress may enact legislation “nec-
essary and proper” to effectuate its purposes in taxing and spend-
ing. For instance, in upholding a law making it a crime to bribe
state and local officials who administer programs that receive fed-
eral funds, the Court declared that Congress has authority “to see
to it that taxpayer dollars . . . are in fact spent for the general wel-
fare, and not frittered away in graft or on projects undermined when
funds are siphoned off or corrupt public officers are derelict about
625 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 65–66 (1936).
626 So settled had the issue become that by the 1970s, attacks on federal grants-
in-aid omitted any challenge on the broad level and relied instead on specific prohi-
bitions, i.e., the religion clauses of the First Amendment. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S.
83 (1968); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
627 Id. at 207 (citing Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619, 640, 645 (1937)).
628 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–91 (1976); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S.
203, 207 n.2 (1987).

629 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937).
630 301 U.S. 619 (1937).
631 United States v. Realty Co., 163 U.S. 427 (1896); Pope v. United States, 323
U.S. 1, 9 (1944). For instance, the Court found that depositing tax revenue derived
from a tax on the production of coconut oil in the Philippines in the Philippine Trea-
sury was in pursuance of a moral obligation to protect and promote the welfare of
the people of the islands. Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308 (1937).
demanding value for dollars.” 632 Congress’ failure to require proof

of a direct connection between the bribery and the federal funds
was permissible, the Court concluded, because “corruption does not
have to be that limited to affect the federal interest. Money is fun-
gible, bribed officials are untrustworthy stewards of federal funds,
and corrupt contractors do not deliver dollar-for-dollar value.” 633
Curiously enough, the Necessary and Proper Clause has also
been invoked to assist the United States to collect a debt due to it.
In United States v. Fisher,634 the Supreme Court sustained a stat-
ute that gave the Federal Government priority in the distribution
of the estates of its insolvent debtors. The debtor in that case was
the endorser of a foreign bill of exchange that apparently had been
purchased by the United States. Invoking the power to pay the pub-
lic debt and the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice Mar-
shall deduced the power to collect a debt from the power to pay its
obligations by the following reasoning: “The government is to pay
the debt of the Union, and must be authorized to use the means
which appear to itself most eligible to effect that object. It has, con-
sequently, a right to make remittances by bills or otherwise, and to
take those precautions which will render the transaction safe.” 635
Conditional Grants-in-Aid
Although the Court in Butler held that the spending power is
not limited by the specific grants of power contained in Article I,
§ 8, the Court found, nevertheless, that the power was qualified by
the Tenth Amendment.636 On this ground, the Court ruled that Con-
gress could not use federal moneys to “purchase compliance” with
regulations “of matters of state concern with respect to which Con-
gress has no authority to interfere.” 637 Within little more than a
year this decision was narrowed by Steward Machine Co. v. Da-
vis,638 which sustained a provision of the Social Security Act 639 im-
posing a tax on employers to provide unemployment benefits, while
also allowing a tax credit to be taken for similar taxes paid to a
632 Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 605 (2004).
633 541 U.S. at 606.
634 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 358 (1805).
635 6 U.S. at 396.
636 In Butler, the Court struck down the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May
12, 1933, 48 Stat. 31, a statute that utilized a combination of subsidies and taxes
toward the end of stabilizing the agricultural commodities market.
637 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 70 (1936). Justice Stone, speaking for
himself and two other Justices, dissented on the ground that Congress was entitled
when spending the national revenues for the general welfare to see to it that the
country got its money’s worth, and that the challenged provisions served that end.
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 84–86 (1936).
638 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
639 Pub. L. 74–271, 49 Stat. 620.
state. To the argument that the tax and credit in combination were
“weapons of coercion, destroying or impairing the autonomy of the
states,” the Court replied that relief of unemployment was a legiti-
mate object of federal expenditure under the “general welfare” clause.
The Court further held that the act represented a legitimate at-
tempt to solve the problem by the cooperation of state governments
and the Federal Government. The credit allowed for state taxes bore
a reasonable relation “to the fiscal need subserved by the tax in its
normal operation” 640 because state unemployment compensation pay-
ments would relieve the burden for direct relief borne by the na-
tional treasury. The Court reserved judgment as to the validity of a
tax “if it is laid upon the condition that a state may escape its op-
eration through the adoption of a statute unrelated in subject mat-
ter to activities fairly within the scope of national policy and power.” 641
It was not until 1947 that the right of Congress to impose con-
ditions upon grants-in-aid over the objection of a state was squarely
presented.642 The Court upheld Congress’ power to do so in Okla-
homa v. Civil Service Commission.643 The state objected to the en-
forcement of a provision of the Hatch Act that reduced its allot-
ment of federal highway funds because of its failure to remove from
office a member of the State Highway Commission of Oklahoma found
to have taken an active part in party politics while in office. The
Court denied relief on the ground that “[w]hile the United States
is not concerned with, and has no power to regulate local political
activities as such of state officials, it does have power to fix the terms
upon which its money allotments to states shall be disbursed. . . .
The end sought by Congress through the Hatch Act is better public
service by requiring those who administer funds for national needs
to abstain from active political partisanship. So even though the
action taken by Congress does have effect upon certain activities
within the state, it has never been thought that such effect made
the federal act invalid.” 644
640 301 U.S. at 586, 591.

641 301 U.S. at 590. See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 90–92 (1976); Fullilove
v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473–475 (1980); Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
642 In Steward Machine Company v. Davis, it was a taxpayer who complained
of the invasion of state sovereignty, and the Court put great emphasis on the fact
that the state was a willing partner in the plan of cooperation embodied in the So-
cial Security Act. 301 U.S. 548, 589, 590 (1937).
643 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
644 330 U.S. 127, 143 (1947). This is not to say that Congress may police the
effectiveness of its spending only by means of attaching conditions to grants; Con-

gress may also rely on criminal sanctions to penalize graft and corruption that may
impede its purposes in spending programs. Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004).
The basic principle that grants to states and individuals may

be conditioned is now firmly established. “Congress has frequently
employed the Spending Power to further broad policy objectives by
conditioning receipt of federal moneys upon compliance by the re-
cipient with federal statutory and administrative directives. This
Court has repeatedly upheld against constitutional challenge the use
of this technique to induce governments and private parties to co-
operate voluntarily with federal policy.” 645 In South Dakota v. Dole,
however, the Court set forth several standards purporting to chan-
nel Congress’ discretion in attaching these conditions.646 While only
one statute, discussed below, has been struck down as violating these
standards, several statutes have been interpreted so as to conform
to the guiding principles.
First, the conditions, like the spending itself, must advance the
general welfare, but the determination of what constitutes the gen-
eral welfare rests largely if not wholly with Congress.647 Second,
because a grant is “much in the nature of a contract” offer that the
states may accept or reject,648 Congress must set out the conditions
unambiguously, so that the states may make an informed deci-
sion.649 Third, the Court continues to state that the conditions must
be related to the federal interest for which the funds are ex-
pended,650 but it has never found a spending condition deficient un-
645 Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 474 (1980) (Chief Justice Burger’s opin-
ion for the Court cited five cases to document the assertion: California Bankers Ass’n
v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Oklahoma v. Civil
Service Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); and
Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937).
646 See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207–12 (1987).
647 483 U.S. at 207 (1987). See discussion under Scope of the Power, supra.
648 Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 186 (2002) (holding that neither the Ameri-
cans with Disabilities Act of 1990 nor section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
subjected states to punitive damages in private actions).
649 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207. The requirement appeared in Pen-
nhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 (1981). See also Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 246 (1985) (Rehabilitation Act does not clearly
signal states that participation in programs funded by the act constitutes waiver of
immunity from suit in federal court); Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273 (2002) (no
private right of action was created by the Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act); Arlington Central School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Murphy, 548 U.S. 291 (2006)
(because the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), which was enacted
pursuant to the Spending Clause, does not furnish clear notice to states that prevail-
ing parents may recover fees for services rendered by experts in IDEA actions, it
does not authorize recovery of such fees).
650 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08. See Steward Machine Co. v. Da-
vis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275,
295 (1958).
der this part of the test.651 Fourth, the power to condition funds
may not be used to induce the states to engage in activities that
would themselves be unconstitutional.652 Fifth, the Court has sug-
gested that in some circumstances the financial inducement offered
by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at which “pres-
sure turns into compulsion.” 653 Certain federalism restraints on other
federal powers, however, were deemed not relevant to spending con-
ditions.654
When the Court did ultimately strike down a grant condition,
it purported to do so under the “pressure turns to compulsion” stan-
dard, but the issue of relatedness also seemed to permeate the opin-
ion. In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act (ACA),655 which established a comprehensive health
care system for the United States. As part of this new system, the
act expanded which persons were eligible for Medicaid, a program
which is financed jointly by the federal and state governments. Fail-
ure of a state to implement such expansion could, in theory, have
resulted in the withholding of all Medicaid reimbursements, includ-
ing payments for persons previously covered by the Medicaid pro-
gram. In National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB) v.
Sebelius,656 seven Justices (in two separate opinions) held that the
requirement that states either comply with the requirements of the
Medicaid expansion under the ACA or lose all Medicaid funds vio-
lated the Tenth Amendment.657 The Court held, however, that with-
holding of just the funds associated with that expansion raised no
significant constitutional concerns, essentially making the Medic-
aid expansion voluntary.
651 The relationship in South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09, in which Con-
gress conditioned access to certain highway funds on establishing a 21-years-of-age

drinking qualification was that the purpose of both funds and condition was safe
interstate travel. The federal interest in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U.S.
127, 143 (1947), as we have noted, was assuring proper administration of federal
highway funds.
652 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210–11.
653 Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 589–90 (1937); South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211–12. See North Carolina ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F.
Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (three-judge court), aff’d 435 U.S. 962 (1978).
654 South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. at 210 (referring to the Tenth Amendment:
“the ‘independent constitutional bar’ limitation on the spending power is not . . . a

prohibition on the indirect achievement of objectives which Congress is not empow-
ered to achieve directly”).
655 Pub. L. 111–148, as amended.
656 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–393, slip op. (2012).
657 Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion was joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan on
this point, while Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, and Alito made a similar point
in a joint dissenting opinion. The authoring Justices of the two opinions, however,
did not join in either the reasoning or judgment of the other opinion.
Chief Justice Roberts’ controlling opinion 658 in NFIB held that

the ACA Medicaid expansion created a “new” and “independent” pro-
gram.659 Noting that congress’ power to direct state activities un-
der the Spending Clause is in the nature of a contract, the Chief
Justice’s opinion suggests that the only changes that could be made
to Medicaid would be those that could be reasonably anticipated by
the states as they entered the original program, when only four cat-
egories of persons in financial need were covered: the disabled, the
blind, the elderly, and needy families with dependent children. The
Medicaid expansion arguably changed the nature of the program
by requiring recipient states, as part of a universal health care sys-
tem, to meet the health care needs of the entire nonelderly popula-
tion with income below 133 percent of the poverty level.660 Thus,
the Medicaid expansion “accomplishe[d] a shift in kind, not merely
degree.” 661
Once the Chief Justice established that the Medicaid expan-
sion was a “new” and “independent” program, he then turned to
whether withdrawal of existing Medicaid funds for failure to imple-
ment the expansion was coercive. He noted that the threatened loss
of Medicaid funds was “over 10 percent of most States’ total rev-
enue,” which he characterized as a form of “economic dragooning”
which put a “gun to the head” of the states.662 He then contrasted
this amount with the amount of federal transportation funds threat-
658 “When a fragmented Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining
the result enjoys the assent of five Justices, ‘the holding of the Court may be viewed
as that position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds.’ ” Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (citation omit-
ted). Justice Roberts’ opinion is arguably narrower than the dissent, because, as dis-
cussed below, his opinion found a constitutional violation based on the presence of
both a “new” “independent” program and a coercive loss of funds, while the dissent-
ing opinion would have found the coercive loss of funds sufficient. NFIB, 567 U.S.
___, slip op. at 38–42 (Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito dissenting).
659 567 U.S. ___, slip op. at 50, 53–54. It might be argued that the Roberts opin-
ion, with its emphasis on “new” and “independent” programs, is implicitly address-
ing the “relatedness” inquiry of South Dakota v. Dole. Justice Roberts’ opinion, how-
ever, does not explicitly discuss the issue, and an argument can be made that there
is a significant difference between the two inquiries. As noted, the “relatedness in-
quiry” in Dole was identified as a limitation on the Spending Clause, while the NFIB
discussion of “new” and “independent programs” emphasized the concerns of the Tenth
Amendment. Second, under Dole, the “relatedness” and “coercion” inquiries appear
to be disjunctive, in that failure to comply with either of these factors would mean
that the statute was unconstitutional. Under NFIB, however, the “new” and “inde-
pendent” program inquiry and the “coercion” inquiry appear to be conjunctive, so
that a grant condition must apparently fail both tests to be found unconstitutional.
660 Justice Roberts also noted that Congress created a separate funding provi-
sion to cover the costs of providing services to any person made newly eligible by
the expansion, and mandated that newly eligible persons would receive a level of
coverage that is less comprehensive than the traditional Medicaid benefit package.
661 567 U.S. ___, slip op. at 53.
662 567 U.S. ___, slip op. at 10, 51–52.
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 2—Borrowing Power
ened to be withheld from South Dakota in Dole, which he charac-

terized as less than half of one percent of South Dakota’s budget.
How courts are to consider grant withdrawals between 10 percent
and one-half of 1 percent, however, is not addressed by the Roberts
opinion, and the Chief Justice declined to speculate where such a
line would be drawn.
In those cases where a state accepts federal funds on condi-
tions and then fails to follow the requirements, the usual remedy
is federal administrative action to terminate the funding and to re-
coup funds the state has already received.663 Although the Court
has allowed beneficiaries of conditional grant programs to sue to
compel states to comply with the federal conditions,664 more re-
cently the Court has required that any such susceptibility to suit
be clearly spelled out so that states will be informed of potential
consequences of accepting aid. Finally, it should be noted that Con-
gress has enacted a range of laws forbidding discrimination in fed-
eral assistance programs,665 and some of these laws are enforce-
able against the states.666
Clause 2. The Congress shall have Power * * * To borrow

Money on the credit of the United States.
BORROWING POWER
The most significant attribute of this clause may not be the scope
of Congress’ power to borrow, but rather the limits it sets on the
ability of Congress to abrogate its debt obligations. The Court has
found that when Congress borrows money “on the credit of the United
States,” it creates a binding obligation to pay the debt as stipu-
lated and cannot thereafter vary the terms of its agreement. When
Congress passed a law that declared contractual provisions requir-
ing payment in gold coin to be against public policy, the application
663 Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S. 773 (1983); Bennett v. New Jersey, 470 U.S.
632 (1985); Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Education, 470 U.S. 656 (1985).
664 E.g., King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968); Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397
(1970); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979).
Suits may be brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, see Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1
(1980), although in some instances the statutory conferral of rights may be too im-
precise or vague for judicial enforcement. Compare Suter v. Artist M., 503 U.S. 347
(1992), with Wright v. Roanoke Redevelopment & Housing Auth., 479 U.S. 418 (1987).
665 E.g., Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; Title IX of
the Educational Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. § 1681; Title V of the Rehabilita-

tion Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794.
666 Here the principal constraint is the Eleventh Amendment. See, e.g., Board of
Trustees of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (the Americans with Disabili-
ties Act of 1990 exceeds congressional power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment,
and violates the Eleventh Amendment by subjecting states to suits brought by state
employees in federal courts to collect money damages).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 2—Borrowing Power
of this law to abrogate such a clause in a government bonds con-

tract was held to contravene the borrowing power.667
The clause has also been cited in relation to the authority of
Congress to issue paper or “fiat” money.668 The original draft of the
Constitution reported to the convention by its Committee of Detail
empowered Congress to both “borrow money and emit bills on the
credit of the United States.” 669 When this section was reached in
the debates, Gouverneur Morris moved to strike out the clause “and
emit bills on the credit of the United States.” Madison suggested
that it might be sufficient “to prohibit the making them a tender.”
After a spirited exchange of views on the subject of paper money,
the convention voted, nine states to two, to delete the words “and
emit bills.” 670 Despite the clear ambivalence of the founders to-
wards the issuance of a federal currency, in 1870, the Court relied
in part upon this clause in holding that Congress had authority to
issue Treasury notes and to make them legal tender in satisfaction
of antecedent debts.671
Clause 3. The Congress shall have Power * * * To regulate

Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States,
and with the Indian Tribes.
POWER TO REGULATE COMMERCE
Federal Power and State Limitation

The Commerce Clause has been found by the Court to serve a
two-fold purpose: to empower the Federal Government and to limit
the states. As to the former, addressed in this section, it is the di-
rect source of the most important powers that the Federal Govern-
ment exercises in peacetime. Under it, Congress can facilitate, regu-
late, or prohibit commerce, and also, by operation of the Supremacy
Clause, limit states’ ability to do the same. However, even absent
conflicting federal legislation, the Commerce Clause, as addressed
667 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 350–51 (1935). The Court did deny the
plaintiff remedy, finding an absence of actual damage from receiving payment in

currency. Id. at 358. See also Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934).
668 Modern United States money is “fiat” currency, because, since 1971, it is no
longer redeemable against the United States for specified weights of precious met-
als. Under federal law, however, the currency must be accepted as legal tender for
all debts, fees, and taxes. 31 U.S.C. § 5103.
669 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 144, 308–309
(rev. ed. 1937).

670 Id. at 310.
671 Knox v. Lee (Legal Tender Cases), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871), overruling
Hepburn v. Griswold, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 603 (1870).

Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 3—Power to Regulate Commerce
in the subsequent section, has been interpreted to be one of the most

important limitations imposed by the Constitution on the exercise
of state power.
This latter, restrictive operation of the clause, termed the “dor-
mant” Commerce Clause, was long the more important one from
the point of view of the constitutional lawyer. Of the approximately
1,400 cases that reached the Supreme Court under the clause prior
to 1900, the overwhelming proportion stemmed from state legisla-
tion that wase challenged as imposing undue burdens on com-
merce.672 The result was that the guiding lines in construction of
the clause were initially laid down in the context of curbing state
power rather than in its operation as a source of national power.
An understanding of these related but distinct doctrines re-
quires an examination of how particular terms of the clause have
been interpreted, what types of federal or state regulation have been
allowed, and the way in which the dual doctrines have been ap-
plied in particular issue areas. Because of the early emphasis on
the limitations of the “dormant” commerce clause, the meaning of
the word “commerce” was initially of most concern, with the signifi-
cance of Congress’ power to “regulate” remaining in the back-
ground. The so-called “constitutional revolution” of the 1930s, how-
ever, which reinvigorated the exercise of federal authority, brought
the latter term to its present prominence.
Definition of Terms
Commerce.—The etymology of the word “commerce” 673 sug-
gests a primary meaning of traffic, i.e., the commercial exchange of
goods. This potentially narrow construction of the term was re-
jected early on by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden,674
which remains one of the seminal cases dealing with the Constitu-
tion. That case arose when Ogden, authorized to operate steam-
propelled vessels on New York waters under a monopoly granted
by the New York legislature, filed a complaint against Gibbons, who
transported passengers from New Jersey to New York under the
authority of an act of Congress.675 The New York monopoly was not
in conflict with the congressional regulation of commerce, argued
the monopolists, because Gibbons’ vessels carried only passengers
672 E. PRENTICE & J. EGAN, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 14
(1898).
673 Oxford English Dictionary (2nd ed.): “com– together, with, + merx, merci-
merchandise, ware.”
674 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
675 Act of February 18, 1793, 1 Stat. 305, entitled “An Act for enrolling and li-
censing ships or vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for
regulating the same.”
between the two states and were thus not engaged in traffic or “com-
merce” in the constitutional sense.
“The subject to be regulated is commerce,” the Chief Justice wrote.
“The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and
selling, or the interchange of commodities, and do not admit that it
comprehends navigation. This would restrict a general term, appli-
cable to many objects, to one of its significations. Commerce, un-
doubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more—it is intercourse.” 676
The term, therefore, included navigation, a conclusion that Mar-
shall also supported by appeal to the general understanding of the
term; by reference to the use of the term in Article I, § 9, which
prohibits preference being given “by any regulation of commerce or
revenue, to the ports of one State over those of another”; and to
the admitted and demonstrated power of Congress to impose embar-
goes with other countries.677
In Gibbons, Marshall did qualify the word “intercourse” with
the word “commercial,” thus retaining the element of monetary trans-
actions.678 But, today, “commerce” in the constitutional sense, and
hence “interstate commerce,” covers every species of movement of
persons and things, whether for profit or not, across state lines; 679
every species of communication or transmission of intelligence, whether
for commercial purposes or otherwise; 680 and every species of com-
mercial negotiation that will involve sooner or later either transporot
of persons or things, or the flow of services or power, across state
lines.681
There was a long period in the Court’s history when a majority
of Justices, seeking to curb the regulatory powers of the Federal
Government, held that certain things were not encompassed by the
Commerce Clause because they were neither interstate commerce
nor bore a sufficient nexus to interstate commerce. Thus, for in-
stance, the Court held that mining or manufacturing, even when
the product thereof would move in interstate commerce, was not
676 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824).

677 22 U.S. at 190–94.
678 22 U.S. at 193.
679 As we will see, however, in many later formulations the crossing of state
lines is no longer the sine qua non; wholly intrastate transactions with substantial
effects on interstate commerce may suffice.
680 E.g., United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465 (1920); Caminetti v. United States,
242 U.S. 470 (1917).

681 “Not only, then, may transactions be commerce though non-commercial; they
may be commerce though illegal and sporadic, and though they do not utilize com-
mon carriers or concern the flow of anything more tangible than electrons and infor-
mation.” United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 549–50
(1944).
reachable under the Commerce Clause.682 The Court also held that
neither insurance transactions carried on across state lines 683 nor
exhibitions of baseball between professional teams that travel from
state to state were in commerce.684 Similarly, it held that the Com-
merce Clause was applicable neither to the making of contracts for
the insertion of advertisements in periodicals in another state 685
nor to the making of contracts for personal services to be rendered
in another state.686
Later decisions have either overturned or undermined all of these
holdings. Now, for instance, gathering of news by a press associa-
tion and transmitting it to client newspapers have been found to
be interstate commerce.687 The activities of Group Health Associa-
tion, Inc., which serves only its own members, are “trade,” and ca-
pable of becoming interstate commerce; 688 and the business of in-
surance when transacted between an insurer and an insured in a
different state is interstate commerce.689 But most important of all
was the development of, or more accurately the return to,690 the
682 Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1 (1888); Oliver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172
(1923); United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); see also Carter v. Carter
Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
683 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869); see also the cases to this effect
cited in United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533, 543–545,
567–568, 578 (1944).
684 Federal Baseball League v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs,
259 U.S. 200 (1922). When called on to reconsider its decision, the Court declined,
noting that Congress had not seen fit to bring the business under the antitrust laws
by legislation having prospective effect and that the business had developed under
the understanding that it was not subject to these laws, a reversal of which would
have retroactive effect. Toolson v. New York Yankees, 346 U.S. 356 (1953). In Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972), the Court recognized these decisions as aberrations,
but it thought the doctrine entitled to the benefits of stare decisis, as Congress was
free to change it at any time. The same considerations not being present, the Court
has held that businesses conducted on a multistate basis, but built around local ex-
hibitions, are in commerce and subject to, inter alia, the antitrust laws, in the in-
stance of professional football, Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445
(1957), professional boxing, United States v. International Boxing Club, 348 U.S. 236
(1955), and legitimate theatrical productions. United States v. Shubert, 348 U.S. 222
(1955).
685 Blumenstock Bros. v. Curtis Pub. Co., 252 U.S. 436 (1920).
686 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270 (1900). See also Diamond Glue Co. v. United
States Glue Co., 187 U.S. 611 (1903); Browning v. City of Waycross, 233 U.S. 16
(1914); General Railway Signal Co. v. Virginia, 246 U.S. 500 (1918). But see York
Manufacturing Co. v. Colley, 247 U.S. 21 (1918).
687 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
688 American Medical Ass’n v. United States, 317 U.S. 519 (1943). Cf. United
States v. Oregon Medical Society, 343 U.S. 326 (1952).

689 United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass’n, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
690 “It has been truly said, that commerce, as the word is used in the constitu-
tion, is a unit, every part of which is indicated by the term.” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194 (1824). See also id. at 195–196.
rationale by which manufacturing,691 mining,692 business transac-

tions,693 and the like are conceived to be part of an integrated com-
mercial whole and therefore subject to the reach of the commerce
power.
Entire categories of federal legislation, such as prohibitions on
criminal activities, are based primarily on the concept that cross-
ing a state line creates federal jurisdiction.694 This power also al-
lows Congress to regulate or prohibit obstructions or impediments
to such movement. In United States v. Ferger,695 the defendants had
been indicted for issuing a false bill of lading to cover a fictitious
shipment in interstate commerce. In response to the argument that
Congress had no power to exercise criminal jurisdiction over the
defendants, Chief Justice White wrote: “But this mistakenly as-
sumes that the power of Congress is to be necessarily tested by the
intrinsic existence of commerce in the particular subject dealt with,
instead of by the relation of that subject to commerce and its effect
upon it. We say mistakenly assumes, because we think it clear that
if the proposition were sustained it would destroy the power of Con-
gress to regulate, as obviously that power, if it is to exist, must in-
clude the authority to deal with obstructions to interstate com-
merce . . . and with a host of other acts which, because of their
relation to and influence upon interstate commerce, come within the
power of Congress to regulate, although they are not interstate com-
merce in and of themselves.” 696
To Regulate.— “We are now arrived at the inquiry—what is
this power?” wrote the Chief Justice expansively in Gibbons. “It is
the power to regulate; that is, to prescribe the rule by which com-
merce is to be governed. This power, like all others vested in con-
gress, is complete in itself, may be exercised to its utmost extent,
691 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
692 Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co. v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381 (1940). See also Hodel
v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 275–283 (1981); Mulford v.
Smith, 307 U.S. 38 (1939) (agricultural production).
693 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
694 E.g., Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308 (1913) (transportation of women
for purposes of prostitution); Gooch v. United States, 297 U.S. 124 (1936) (transpor-
tation of kidnap victims); Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432 (1925) (transporta-
tion of stolen autos). For example, in Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563
(1977), the Court upheld a conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon upon a
mere showing that the gun had sometime previously traveled in interstate com-
merce, and in Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976), upheld a conviction for
receipt of a firearm on the same showing. The Court does require Congress in these
cases to speak plainly in order to reach such activity, inasmuch as historical state
police powers are involved. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
695 250 U.S. 199 (1919).
696 250 U.S. at 203.
and acknowledges no limitations, other than are prescribed in the

constitution . . . If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty
of congress, though limited to specified objects, is plenary as to those
objects, the power over commerce with foreign nations, and among
the several states, is vested in Congress as absolutely as it would
be in a single government, having in its constitution the same re-
strictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitu-
tion of the United States.” 697
Of course, the power to regulate commerce includes the power
to prescribe conditions and rules for the carrying-on of commercial
transactions, the keeping-free of channels of commerce, and the regu-
lating of prices and terms of sale. By adding an element of com-
merce to other types of legislation, however, the power has also been
vastly extended to such ends as enforcing majority conceptions of
morality,698 banning racial discrimination in public accommoda-
tions,699 and protecting the public against evils both natural and
contrived by people.700 “Congress can certainly regulate interstate
commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use of such
commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty, or the
spread of any evil or harm to the people of other states from the
state of origin. In doing this, it is merely exercising the police power,
for the benefit of the public, within the field of interstate com-
merce.” 701
Thus, for instance, the Court upheld a federal statute prohibit-
ing the shipment in interstate commerce of goods made with child
labor, not because the goods were intrinsically harmful but in or-
der to extirpate child labor. There, the Court said: “It is no objec-
tion to the assertion of the power to regulate commerce that its ex-
ercise is attended by the same incidents which attend the exercise
of the police power of the states.” 702 The power to regulate inter-
state commerce is, therefore, rightly regarded as the most potent
grant of authority in section 8.
697 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196–197 (1824).

698 E.g., Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917) (transportation of fe-
male across state line for noncommercial sexual purposes); Cleveland v. United States,
329 U.S. 14 (1946) (transportation of plural wives across state lines by Mormons);
United States v. Simpson, 252 U.S. 465 (1920) (transportation of five quarts of whis-
key across state line for personal consumption).
699 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
700 E.g., Reid v. Colorado, 187 U.S. 137 (1902) (transportation of diseased live-
stock across state line); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971) (prohibition of
all loan-sharking).
701 Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436–37 (1925).
702 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
With Foreign Nations.—There are certain dicta urging or sug-

gesting that Congress’ power to regulate interstate commerce restric-
tively is less than its analogous power over foreign commerce, the
argument being that whereas the latter is a branch of the nation’s
unlimited power over foreign relations, the former was conferred
upon the National Government primarily in order to protect free-
dom of commerce from state interference. The four dissenting Jus-
tices in the Lottery Case endorsed this view in the following words:
“[T]he power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and the power
to regulate interstate commerce, are to be taken diverso intuitu, for
the latter was intended to secure equality and freedom in commer-
cial intercourse as between the States, not to permit the creation
of impediments to such intercourse; while the former clothed Con-
gress with that power over international commerce, pertaining to a
sovereign nation in its intercourse with foreign nations, and sub-
ject, generally speaking, to no implied or reserved power in the States.
The laws which would be necessary and proper in the one case, would
not be necessary or proper in the other.” 703
Twelve years later, Chief Justice White, speaking for the Court,
expressed the same view: “In the argument reference is made to
decisions of this court dealing with the subject of the power of Con-
gress to regulate interstate commerce, but the very postulate upon
which the authority of Congress to absolutely prohibit foreign im-
portations as expounded by the decisions of this court rests is the
broad distinction which exists between the two powers, and there-
fore the cases cited, and many more which might be cited announc-
ing the principles which they uphold, have obviously no relation to
the question in hand.” 704
But dicta to the contrary are much more numerous and span a
far longer period of time. Thus Chief Justice Taney wrote in 1847:
“The power to regulate commerce among the several States is granted
to Congress in the same clause, and by the same words, as the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and is coextensive with
it.” 705 And nearly fifty years later, Justice Field, speaking for the
Court, said: “The power to regulate commerce among the several
States was granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power
to regulate commerce with foreign nations.” 706 Today it is firmly
703 Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321, 373 (1903).
704 Brolan v. United States, 236 U.S. 216, 222 (1915). The most recent dicta to
this effect appears in Japan Line v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 448–51
(1979), a “dormant” commerce clause case involving state taxation with an impact
on foreign commerce. In context, the distinction seems unexceptionable, but the lan-
guage extends beyond context.
705 License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 578 (1847).
706 Pittsburg & Southern Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895).
established that the power to regulate commerce, whether with for-

eign nations or among the several states, comprises the power to
restrain or prohibit it at all times for the welfare of the public, pro-
vided only that the specific limitations imposed upon Congress’ pow-
ers, as by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment, are not
transgressed.707
Among the Several States.—In Gibbons v. Ogden, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall observed that the phrase “among the several States”
was “not one which would probably have been selected to indicate
the completely interior traffic of a state.” It must therefore have
been selected to exclude “the exclusively internal commerce of a state.”
Although, of course, the phrase “may very properly be restricted to
that commerce which concerns more states than one,” it is obvious
that “[c]ommerce among the states, cannot stop at the external bound-
ary line of each state, but may be introduced into the interior.” The
Chief Justice then succinctly stated the rule, which, though re-
stricted in some periods, continues to govern the interpretation of
the clause. “The genius and character of the whole government seem
to be, that its action is to be applied to all the external concerns of
the nation, and to those internal concerns which affect the states
generally; but not to those which are completely within a particu-
lar state, which do not affect other states, and with which it is not
necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the gen-
eral powers of the government.” 708
Recognition of an “exclusively internal” commerce of a state, or
“intrastate commerce” in today’s terms, was regarded as setting out
an area of state concern that Congress was precluded from reach-
ing.709 Although these cases seemingly visualized Congress’ power
arising only when there was an actual crossing of state boundar-
ies, this view ignored Marshall’s equation of intrastate commerce
that affects other states or with which it is necessary to interfere
in order to effectuate congressional power with those actions which
are purely interstate. This equation came back into its own, both
with the later finding that the “current of commerce” brings each
element in the current within Congress’ regulatory power 710 and
with the emphasis on the interrelationships of industrial produc-
707 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 147–148 (1938).
708 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 194, 195 (1824).
709 New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837); License Cases, 46 U.S. (5
How.) 504 (1847); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849); Patterson v. Ken-
tucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1879); Trade-Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879); Kidd v. Pearson,
128 U.S. 1 (1888); Illinois Central R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906); Keller v.
United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918); Oli-
ver Iron Co. v. Lord, 262 U.S. 172 (1923).
710 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375 (1905); Stafford v. Wallace, 258
U.S. 495 (1922); Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen, 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
tion to interstate commerce.711 Perhaps its logical conclusion is reached

with the Court’s finding that even minor transactions have an ef-
fect on interstate commerce 712 and that the cumulative effect of many
minor transactions with no separate effect on interstate commerce,
when they are viewed as a class, may be sufficient to merit congres-
sional regulation.713 “Commerce among the states must, of neces-
sity, be commerce with[in] the states. . . . The power of congress,
then, whatever it may be, must be exercised within the territorial
jurisdiction of the several states.” 714
And With the Indian Tribes.—Congress’ power to regulate com-
merce “with the Indian tribes,” once almost rendered superfluous
by Court decision,715 has now been resurrected and made largely
the basis for informing judicial judgment with respect to controver-
sies concerning the rights and obligations of Native Americans. Al-
though Congress in 1871 forbade the further making of treaties with
Indian tribes,716 cases regarding application of the old treaties, es-
pecially their effects upon attempted state taxation and regulation
of on-reservation activities, continue to be a staple of the Court’s
711 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
712 NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601 (1939); Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S.
517 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); Wickard v.
Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Co., 371 U.S. 224 (1963);
Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968);
McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232, 241–243 (1980); Hodel v.
Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
713 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United
States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968); Perez v. United
States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971); Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858 (1985); Summit
Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991).
714 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824). Commerce “among the
several States” does not comprise commerce of the District of Columbia or the terri-
tories of the United States. Congress’ power over their commerce is an incident of
its general power over them. Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889); Atlan-
tic Cleaners & Dyers v. United States, 286 U.S. 427 (1932); In re Bryant, 4 Fed.
Cas. 514 (No. 2067) (D. Oreg. 1865). Transportation between two points in the same
state, when a part of the route is a loop outside the state, is interstate commerce.
Hanley v. Kansas City Southern Ry. Co., 187 U.S. 617 (1903); Western Union Tel.
Co. v. Speight, 254 U.S. 17 (1920). But such a deviation cannot be solely for the
purpose of evading a tax or regulation in order to be exempt from the state’s reach.
Greyhound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653, 660 (1948); Eichholz v. Public Service Comm’n,
306 U.S. 268, 274 (1939). Red cap services performed at a transfer point within the
state of departure but in conjunction with an interstate trip are reachable. New York,
N.H. & H. R.R. v. Nothnagle, 346 U.S. 128 (1953).
715 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). Rejecting the Commerce Clause
as a basis for congressional enactment of a system of criminal laws for Indians liv-
ing on reservations, the Court nevertheless sustained the act on the ground that
the Federal Government had the obligation and thus the power to protect a weak
and dependent people. Cf. United States v. Holiday, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 407 (1866);
United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913). This special fiduciary responsibility
can also be created by statute. E.g., United States v. Mitchell, 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
716 16 Stat. 544, 566, 25 U.S.C. § 71.
docket.717 But this clause is also one of the two bases now found to
empower Federal Government authority over Native Americans. “The
source of federal authority over Indian matters has been the sub-
ject of some confusion, but it is now generally recognized that the
power derives from federal responsibility for regulating commerce
with Indian tribes and for treaty making.” 718
In general, the Court has established the preemption doctrine
as the analytical framework within which to judge the permissibil-
ity of assertions of state jurisdiction over Indians. However, the “semi-
autonomous status” of Indian tribes erects an “independent but re-
lated” barrier to the exercise of state authority over commercial activity
on an Indian reservation.719 Thus, the question of preemption is not
governed by the standards of preemption developed in other areas.
“Instead, the traditional notions of tribal sovereignty, and the rec-
ognition and encouragement of this sovereignty in congressional Acts
promoting tribal independence and economic development, inform
the pre-emption analysis that governs this inquiry. . . . As a re-
sult, ambiguities in federal law should be construed generously, and
federal pre-emption is not limited to those situations where Con-
gress has explicitly announced an intention to pre-empt state activ-
ity.” 720 A corollary is that the preemption doctrine will not be ap-
plied strictly to prevent states from aiding Native Americans.721
However, the protective rule is inapplicable to state regulation of
liquor transactions, because there has been no tradition of tribal
sovereignty with respect to that subject.722
717 E.g., Puyallup Tribe v. Washington Game Dep’t, 433 U.S. 165 (1977); Wash-
ington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S.
658 (1979); Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981).
718 McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 172 n.7 (1973). See also
Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 551–553 (1974); United States v. Mazurie, 419
U.S. 544, 553–56 (1974); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 376 n.2 (1976); White
Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142 (1980); Ramah Navajo School
Bd. v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 837 (1982); United States v.
Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200 (2004).
719 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142–143 (1980); Ramah
Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832, 837–838
(1982). “The two barriers are independent because either, standing alone, can be a
sufficient basis for holding state law inapplicable to activity undertaken on the res-
ervation or by tribal members.” Id. at 837 (quoting White Mountain, 448 U.S. at
143).
720 Ramah Navajo School Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S.
832, 838 (1982). See also New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
721 Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 467 U.S. 138 (1984) (upholding
state-court jurisdiction to hear claims of Native Americans against non-Indians in-

volving transactions that occurred in Indian country). However, attempts by states
to retrocede jurisdiction favorable to Native Americans may be held to be pre-
empted. Three Affiliated Tribes v. Wold Engineering, 476 U.S. 877 (1986).
722 Rice v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713 (1983).
The scope of state taxing powers—the conflict of “the plenary power

of the States over residents within their borders with the semi-
autonomous status of Indians living on tribal reservations” 723—has
been often litigated. Absent cession of jurisdiction or other congres-
sional consent, states possess no power to tax Indian reservation lands
or Indian income from activities carried on within the boundaries of
the reservation.724 Off-reservation Indian activities require an ex-
press federal exemption to deny state taxing power.725 Subjection to
taxation of non-Indians doing business with Indians on a reserva-
tion involves a close analysis of the federal statutory framework, al-
though the operating premise was for many years to deny state power
because of its burdens upon the development of tribal self-
sufficiency as promoted through federal law and its interference with
tribes’ ability to exercise their sovereign functions.726
That operating premise, however, seems to have been eroded. For
example, in Cotton Petroleum Corp. v. New Mexico,727 the Court held
that, despite the existence of multiple taxation occasioned by a state
oil and gas severance tax applied to on-reservation operations by non-
Indians, which were already taxed by the tribe,728 the impairment of
tribal sovereignty was “too indirect and too insubstantial” to war-
rant a finding of preemption. The fact that the state provided signifi-
cant services to the oil and gas lessees justified state taxation and also
distinguished earlier cases in which the state had “asserted no legiti-
mate regulatory interest that might justify the tax.” 729 Still further
erosion, or relaxation, of the principle of construction may be found
in a later case, in which the Court, confronted with arguments that
the imposition of particular state taxes on Indian property on the res-
ervation was inconsistent with self-determination and self-
723 McClanahan v. Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164, 165 (1973).
724 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148 (1973); McClanahan v.
Arizona Tax Comm’n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973); Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai
Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373 (1976); Washing-
ton v. Confederated Colville Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Montana v. Blackfeet Tribe,
471 U.S. 759 (1985). See also Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band Potawatomi
Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505 (1991). A discernable easing of the reluctance to find con-
gressional cession is reflected in more recent cases. See County of Yakima v. Confed-
erated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251 (1992).
725 Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148–149 (1973).
726 White Mountain Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136 (1980); Central Ma-
chinery Co. v. Arizona State Tax Comm’n, 448 U.S. 160 (1980); Ramah Navajo School
Board v. Bureau of Revenue of New Mexico, 458 U.S. 832 (1982).
727 490 U.S. 163 (1989).
728 Held permissible in Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
729 490 U.S. at 185 (distinguishing Bracker and Ramah Navaho School Bd).
governance, denominated these as “policy” arguments properly pre-

sented to Congress rather than the Court.730
Since Worcester v. Georgia,731 the Court has recognized that In-
dian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sover-
eignty over both their members and their territory.732 They are, of course,
no longer possessed of the full attributes of sovereignty,733 having re-
linquished some part of it by their incorporation within the territory
of the United States and their acceptance of its protection. By spe-
cific treaty provision, they yielded up other sovereign powers, and Con-
gress has removed still others. “The sovereignty that the Indian tribes
retain is of a unique and limited character. It exists only at the suf-
730 County of Yakima v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Na-
tion, 502 U.S. 251, 265 (1992). To be sure, this response was in the context of the
reading of statutory texts and giving effect to them, but the unqualified designation
is suggestive. For recent tax controversies, see Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Sac & Fox
Nation, 508 U.S. 114 (1993); Department of Taxation & Finance v. Milhelm Attea &
Bros., 512 U.S. 61 (1994); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Chickasaw Nation, 515 U.S.
450 (1995).
731 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). See also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 1 (1831). Under this doctrine, tribes possess sovereign immunity from suit in
the same way that the United States and the states do. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Mar-
tinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978); United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 309 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1940). The Court has repeatedly rejected arguments to
abolish tribal sovereign immunity or at least to curtail it. Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v.
Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe, 498 U.S. 505, 510 (1991).
732 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978) (inherent sovereign power to
punish tribal offenders). Compare California v. Cabazon Band of Mission Indians,

480 U.S. 202 (1987) (state regulation of on-reservation bingo is preempted as basi-
cally civil/regulatory rather than criminal/prohibitory), with Brendale v. Confeder-
ated Tribes & Bands of the Yakima Indian Nation, 492 U.S. 408 (1989) (extensive
ownership of land within “open areas” of reservation by nonmembers of tribe pre-
cludes application of tribal zoning within such areas). See also Hagen v. Utah, 510
U.S. 399 (1994). Among the fundamental attributes of sovereignty which a tribe pos-
sesses unless divested of it by federal law is the power to tax non-Indians entering
the reservation to engage in economic activities. Washington v. Confederated Colville
Tribes, 447 U.S. 134 (1980); Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982).
733 United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381 (1886); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978).

ferance of Congress and is subject to complete defeasance.” 734 Still,

the impact on tribal sovereignty is a prime determinant of relative state
and tribal regulatory authority.735
In a case of major import for the settlement of Indian land claims,
the Court ruled in County of Oneida v. Oneida Indian Nation,736
that an Indian tribe may obtain damages for wrongful possession
of land conveyed in 1795 without the federal approval required by
the Nonintercourse Act.737 The act reflected the accepted principle
that extinguishment of the title to land by Native Americans re-
quired the consent of the United States and left intact a tribe’s
common-law remedies to protect possessory rights. The Court reit-
erated the accepted rule that enactments are construed liberally in
favor of Native Americans and that Congress may abrogate Indian
treaty rights or extinguish aboriginal land title only if it does so
clearly and unambiguously. Consequently, federal approval of land-
conveyance treaties containing references to earlier conveyances that
had violated the Nonintercourse Act did not constitute ratification
of the invalid conveyances.738 Similarly, the Court refused to apply
the general rule for borrowing a state statute of limitations for the
federal common-law action, and it rejected the dissent’s view that,
given “the extraordinary passage of time,” the doctrine of laches should
have been applied to bar the claim.739
Although the power of Congress over Indian affairs is broad, it
is not limitless.740 The Court has promulgated a standard of review
that defers to the legislative judgment “[a]s long as the special treat-
ment can be tied rationally to the fulfillment of Congress’ unique
734 United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978). See South Dakota v.
Bourland, 508 U.S. 679 (1993) (abrogation of Indian treaty rights and reduction of
sovereignty). Congress may also remove restrictions on tribal sovereignty. The Court
has held that, absent authority from federal statute or treaty, tribes possess no crimi-
nal authority over non-Indians. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191
(1978). The Court also held, in Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), that a tribe has
no criminal jurisdiction over nontribal Indians who commit crimes on the reserva-
tion; jurisdiction over members rests on consent of the self-governed, and absence of
consent defeats jurisdiction. Congress, however, quickly enacted a statute recogniz-
ing inherent authority of tribal governments to exercise criminal jurisdiction over
nonmember Indians, and the Court upheld congressional authority to do so in United
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
735 E.g., New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324 (1983).
736 470 U.S. 226 (1985).
737 1 Stat. 379 (1793).
738 470 U.S. at 246–48.
739 470 U.S. at 255, 257 (Justice Stevens).
740 “The power of Congress over Indian affairs may be of a plenary nature; but
it is not absolute.” United States v. Alcea Bank of Tillamooks, 329 U.S. 40, 54 (1946)
(plurality opinion) (quoted with approval in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks,
430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977)).
obligation toward the Indians . . . ” 741 A more searching review is

warranted when it is alleged that the Federal Government’s behav-
ior toward Indians has been in contravention of its obligation, and
that it has in fact taken property from a tribe which it had hereto-
fore guaranteed to the tribe, without either compensating the tribe
or otherwise giving the Indians the full value of the land.742
Overview of Congressional Power

As explored in detail in below,743 prior to reconsideration of the
federal commerce power in the 1930s, the Court in effect followed a
doctrine of “dual federalism.” Under this doctrine, states’ police power
to impose regulations on commerce is restricted by the dormant Com-
merce Clause, while Congress’ power to regulate was limited to where
it had a “direct” rather than an “indirect” effect on interstate com-
merce. When this latter restrictive interpretation was swept away
during and after the New Deal, the question of federalism limits
respecting congressional regulation of private activities became moot.
The next logical question, however, was whether states en-
gaged in commercial activities could be regulated by federal legisla-
tion as if the enterprise were privately owned. In general, the Court
easily sustained application of federal law to state proprietary ac-
tivities.744 It was only when Congress began to extend such regula-
tion to states’ core governing activities that there was an inconsis-
tent judicial response, wavering between protection of state interests
and deference to federal authority.745 At the present time, the rule
is that Congress lacks authority under the Commerce Clause to regu-
late “states as states” in only certain narrow circumstances, namely,
741 Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 555 (1974). The Court applied the stan-
dard to uphold a statutory classification that favored Indians over non-Indians. But
in Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73 (1977), the same stan-
dard was used to sustain a classification that disfavored, although inadvertently, one
group of Indians as compared to other groups. While Indian tribes are uncon-
strained by federal or state constitutional provisions, Congress has legislated a “bill
of rights” statute covering them. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49
(1978).
742 United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980). See also Solem v. Bartlett,
465 U.S. 463, 472 (1984) (there must be “substantial and compelling evidence of con-
gressional intention to diminish Indian lands” before the Court will hold that a stat-
ute removed land from a reservation).
743 See Specific Applications, supra.
744 E.g., California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944); California v. Taylor,
353 U.S. 553 (1957).

745 For example, federal regulation of the wages and hours of certain state and
local governmental employees has alternatively been upheld and invalidated. See
Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), overruled in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth.,
469 U.S. 528 (1985).
when a federal statutory provision “commandeers” a state’s legisla-

tive or executive authority in order to implement a regulatory pro-
gram.746
There appear to be several reasons for the development of a ro-
bust federal authority in this area. Not only has there been legisla-
tive advancement and judicial acquiescence in Commerce Clause ju-
risprudence, but the melding of the nation into one economic union
has been more than a little responsible for the reach of Congress’
power. “The volume of interstate commerce and the range of com-
monly accepted objects of government regulation have . . . ex-
panded considerably in the last 200 years, and the regulatory au-
thority of Congress has expanded along with them. As interstate
commerce has become ubiquitous, activities once considered purely
local have come to have effects on the national economy, and have
accordingly come within the scope of Congress’ commerce power.” 747
Congress’ commerce power has been characterized as having three
separate but interrelated principles of decision, some old, some of
recent vintage. The Court in 1995 described “three broad catego-
ries of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce. Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect
the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things
in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come only from
intrastate activities. Finally, Congress’ commerce authority in-
cludes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial
relation to interstate commerce, i.e., those activities that substan-
tially affect interstate commerce.” 748
Channels of Commerce.—This category concerns congress’ au-
thority to regulate obstructions or restraints on channels of com-
merce. For instance, Congress has validly legislated to protect inter-
state travelers from harm; to prevent such travelers from being
deterred in the exercise of interstate traveling; and to prevent them
from being burdened. Many of the laws prohibiting discrimination
in public accommodations were premised on the theory that the larger
of these establishments often served interstate travelers, and that
refusing to serve persons based on their race limits them in their
ability to travel. Even small stores, restaurants, and the like may
746 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521
U.S. 898 (1997). For elaboration, see the discussions under the Supremacy Clause
and under the Tenth Amendment.
747 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 158 (1992).
748 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995) (citations omitted).
on occasion serve interstate travelers, and therefore it is permis-

sible to impose regulations that prevent or deter racial discrimina-
tion.749
An example of how expansive this category can be is seen in Pierce
County v. Guillen.750 In Pierce County, the Court considered a pro-
gram adopted by Congress to provide state and local governments fund-
ing to improve the most dangerous sections of their roads. In order to
facilitate information-gathering by the states, congress prohibited the
introduction of highway data collected for such programs, such as ac-
cident rates and locations, into evidence in state or federal court pro-
ceedings. The Court found that “Congress could reasonably believe that
adopting a measure eliminating an unforeseen side effect of the information-
gathering requirement . . . would result in more diligent efforts [by
states] to collect the relevant information” and thus would lead to “greater
safety on our Nation’s roads.”
Instrumentalities, Persons or Things.—The second cat-
egory, relating to instrumentalities of commerce 751 and persons or
things traveling in commerce, is implied in Marshall’s opinion in
Gibbons v. Ogden,752 where the regulation of passenger ferries on
the waters of New York was found to be within Congress’ authority
over interstate commerce. The same opinion recognizes that in “the
progress of things,” new and other instruments of commerce will
make their appearance and be amenable to regulation under this
clause. For instance, the Court saw no difference in Congress’ tra-
ditional regulation of sailing vessels and the regulation of vessels
powered by steam.753
A little over half a century later the principle embodied in this
holding was given its classic expression in the opinion of Chief Jus-
tice Waite in Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph
Co.,754 a case closely paralleling Gibbons v. Ogden: 755
749 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964); Katzenbach v.
McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).
750 537 U.S. 129, 147 (2003).
751 Examples of laws addressing instrumentalities of commerce include prohibi-
tions on the destruction of an aircraft, 18 U.S.C. § 32, or on theft from interstate

shipments. Accord Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971).
752 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 217, 221 (1824).
753 When the law at issue in Gibbons, the Licensing Act of 1793, was passed,
the only craft to which it could apply were sailing vessels. But, the statute and the
power by which it was enacted were, Marshall asserted, indifferent to the “prin-
ciple” by which vessels were moved. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 218.
754 96 U.S. 1 (1878). See also Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S.
460 (1882).
755 96 U.S. at 9. “Commerce embraces appliances necessarily employed in carry-
ing on transportation by land and water.” Railroad Co. v. Fuller, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.)
560, 568 (1873).
The powers thus granted are not confined to the instrumentalities of

commerce, or the postal service known or in use when the Constitution was
adopted, but they keep pace with the progress of the country, and adapt
themselves to the new developments of times and circumstances. They ex-
tend from the horse with its rider to the stage-coach, from the sailing-
vessel to the steamboat, from the coach and the steamboat to the railroad,
and from the railroad to the telegraph, as these new agencies are succes-
sively brought into use to meet the demands of increasing population and
wealth. They were intended for the government of the business to which
they relate, at all times and under all circumstances. As they were in-
trusted to the general government for the good of the nation, it is not only
the right, but the duty, of Congress to see to it that intercourse among the
States and the transmission of intelligence are not obstructed or unneces-
sarily encumbered by State legislation.
Thus, when modern means of communication became avail-

able, there seemed little question that Congress could regulate them.
The Radio Act of 1927 756 whereby “all forms of interstate and for-
eign radio transmissions within the United States, its Territories
and possessions” were brought under national control, affords such
an illustration. Based on the forward-looking doctrine as stated in
Pensacola Telegraph Co., the measure met no serious constitu-
tional challenge either on the floors of Congress or in the courts.757
Regulation of objects or persons that cross state lines is not lim-
ited to those actively crossing, but can extend to an object or per-
son that has already crossed state lines or will do so in the future.
In United States v. Sullivan,758 the Court sustained a conviction of
misbranding under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. Sul-
livan, a Columbus, Georgia druggist, had bought a properly labeled
1,000-tablet bottle of sulfathiazole from an Atlanta wholesaler. The
bottle had been shipped to the Atlanta wholesaler by a Chicago sup-
plier six months earlier. Three months after Sullivan received the
bottle, he made two retail sales of 12 tablets each, placing the tab-
lets in boxes not labeled in strict accordance with the law. Uphold-
ing the conviction, the Court concluded that there was no question
of “the constitutional power of Congress under the Commerce Clause
to regulate the branding of articles that have completed an inter-
state shipment and are being held for future sales in purely local
or intrastate commerce.” 759
756 Act of March 28, 1927, 45 Stat. 373, superseded by the Communications Act
of 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.

757 “No question is presented as to the power of the Congress, in its regulation
of interstate commerce, to regulate radio communication.” Chief Justice Hughes speak-

ing for the Court in Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nelson Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co.,
289 U.S. 266, 279 (1933). See also Fisher’s Blend Station v. Tax Comm’n, 297 U.S.
650, 654–55 (1936).
758 332 U.S. 689 (1948).
759 332 U.S. at 698–99.
Because regulations may be premised on the presence of per-

sons or objects that have or will cross state lines, this also appears
to allow the regulation of purely intrastate activity. For instance,
prohibitions of discrimination in public accommodations, discussed
previously as regulation of channels of commerce, can also be justi-
fied based on receipt and sale of food or other items that have moved
across states lines.760 Or, Congress has validly penalized convicted
felons who had no other connection to interstate commerce for the
possession or receipt of firearms which had been previously trans-
ported in interstate commerce. This was allowed even though the
predicate transportation had been done independently of any activ-
ity by the two felons.761
Affecting Commerce.—Under this third and most expansive
category, Congress’ power reaches not only transactions or actions
that occasion the crossing of state or national boundaries, but ex-
tends as well to activities that, though local, “affect” commerce. This
power derives from the Commerce Clause enhanced by the Neces-
sary and Proper Clause, § 8, cl. 18, which authorizes Congress “[t]o
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying
into Execution the foregoing powers.” Chief Justice Marshall al-
luded to the commerce power being enhanced by this clause when
he said that the regulatory power did not reach “those internal con-
cerns [of a state] . . . with which it is not necessary to interfere,
for the purpose of executing some of the general powers of the gov-
ernment.” 762 There are, however, numerous cases permitting Con-
gress to reach “purely” intrastate activities on the theory that it is
necessary to regulate them in order that the regulation of inter-
state activities might be fully effectuated.763 In other cases, the Nec-
760 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 298, 300–02 (1964); Daniel v. Paul,
395 U.S. 298, 305 (1969).

761 Scarborough v. United States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); Barrett v. United States,
423 U.S. 212 (1976). However, because such laws reach far into the traditional po-
lice powers of the states, the Court insists that Congress clearly speak to its intent
to cover such local activities. United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971). See also
Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971); United States v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396
(1973). A similar tenet of construction has appeared in the Court’s recent treatment
of federal prosecutions of state officers for official corruption under criminal laws of
general applicability. E.g., McCormick v. United States, 500 U.S. 257 (1991); McNally
v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987). Congress has overturned the latter case. 102
Stat. 4508, § 7603, 18 U.S.C. § 1346.
763 E.g., Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States, 234 U.S. 342 (1914) (necessary
for ICC to regulate rates of an intrastate train in order to effectuate its rate setting
for a competing interstate train); Wisconsin R.R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,
257 U.S. 563 (1922) (same); Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911) (up-
holding requirement of same safety equipment on intrastate as interstate trains).
See also Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Wrightwood Dairy
Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
essary and Proper Clause may not have been directly cited, but the
dictates of Chief Justice Marshall have been used to justify more
expansive applications of the commerce power.764
The seminal case in this category is, of course, Wickard v.
Filburn,765 where the Court sustained federal regulation of a crop
of wheat grown on a farm and intended solely for home consump-
tion. The premise was that even if the wheat was never marketed,
it still supplied a need which otherwise could only be satisfied in
the market, and that if prices rose it might be induced onto the
market. “Even activity that is purely intrastate in character may
be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like
conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the
States or with foreign nations.” 766 Coverage under federal labor and
wage-and-hour laws after the 1930s showed the reality of this doc-
trine.767
In upholding federal regulation of strip mining, the Court dem-
onstrated the breadth of the “affects” standard. One case dealt with
statutory provisions designed to preserve “prime farmland.” The trial
court had determined that the amount of such land disturbed annu-
ally amounted to 0.006% of the total prime farmland acreage in the
nation and thus that the impact on commerce was “infinitesimal”
or “trivial.” Disagreeing, the Court said: “A court may invalidate
legislation enacted under the Commerce Clause only if it is clear
that there is no rational basis for a congressional finding that the
regulated activity affects interstate commerce, or that there is no
reasonable connection between the regulatory means selected and
the asserted ends.” 768 Moreover, “[t]he pertinent inquiry therefore
is not how much commerce is involved but whether Congress could
rationally conclude that the regulated activity affects interstate com-
merce.” 769
In a companion case, the Court reiterated that “[t]he denomina-
tion of an activity as a ‘local’ or ‘intrastate’ activity does not resolve
the question whether Congress may regulate it under the Com-
merce Clause. As previously noted, the commerce power ‘extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or
the exertion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regula-
tion of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate
end, the effective execution of the granted power to regulate inter-
764 See, e.g., United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115–16 (1941).
765 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
766 Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
767 See Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 188–93 (1968).
768 Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 323–24 (1981).
769 452 U.S. at 324.
state commerce.’ ” 770 Judicial review is narrow. Congress’ determi-

nation of an “effect” must be deferred to if it is rational, and Con-
gress must have acted reasonably in choosing the means.771
Sometimes considered a fourth category, a still more potent en-
gine of regulation has been the expansion of the class-of-activities
standard, which began in the “affecting commerce” cases. In Perez
v. United States,772 the Court sustained the application of a federal
“loan-sharking” law to a local culprit. The Court held that, al-
though individual loan-sharking activities might be intrastate in na-
ture, Congress has the power to determine that the activity was
within a class which did affect interstate commerce, thus affording
Congress the opportunity to regulate the entire class. Although the
Perez Court and the congressional findings emphasized that loan-
sharking was generally part of organized crime operating on a na-
tional scale and that loan-sharking was commonly used to finance
organized crime’s national operations, subsequent cases do not de-
pend upon a defensible assumption of relatedness in the class.
Thus, the Court applied the federal arson statute to the at-
tempted “torching” of a defendant’s two-unit apartment building. The
Court merely pointed to the fact that the rental of real estate “un-
questionably” affects interstate commerce, and that “the local rental
of an apartment unit is merely an element of a much broader com-
mercial market in real estate.” 773 The apparent test of whether ag-
gregation of local activity can be said to affect commerce was made
clear next in an antitrust context.774
In a case allowing the continuation of an antitrust suit challeng-
ing a hospital’s exclusion of a surgeon from practice in the hospi-
tal, the Court observed that in order to establish the required juris-
dictional nexus with commerce, the appropriate focus is not on the
actual effects of the conspiracy, but instead is on the possible conse-
quences for the affected market if the conspiracy is successful. The
770 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981) (quoting
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942)).
771 452 U.S. at 276, 277. The scope of review is restated in Preseault v. ICC,
494 U.S. 1, 17 (1990). Then-Justice Rehnquist, concurring in the two Hodel cases,
objected that the Court was making it appear that no constitutional limits existed
under the Commerce Clause, whereas in fact it was necessary that a regulated ac-
tivity must have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, not just some effect.
He thought it a close case that the statutory provisions here met those tests. 452
U.S. at 307–13.
772 402 U.S. 146 (1971).
773 Russell v. United States, 471 U.S. 858, 862 (1985). In a later case the Court
avoided the constitutional issue by holding the statute inapplicable to the arson of
an owner-occupied private residence.
774 Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991). See also Jones v. United
States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000) (an owner-occupied building is not “used” in interstate
commerce within the meaning of the federal arson statute).
required nexus in this case was sufficient because competitive sig-

nificance is to be measured by a general evaluation of the impact
of the restraint on other participants and potential participants in
the market from which the surgeon was being excluded.775
Limitations on the Commerce Clause

The Court has several times expressly noted that Congress’ ex-
ercise of power under the Commerce Clause is akin to the police
power exercised by the states.776 It should follow, therefore, that Con-
gress may achieve results unrelated to purely commercial aspects
of commerce, and this result in fact has often been accomplished.
Paralleling and contributing to this movement is the virtual disap-
pearance of the distinction between interstate and intrastate com-
merce. Yet there remain cases where legislation lacking a sufficient
nexus to commerce has been struck down as beyond Congress’ power.
Requirement that Regulation be Economic.—In United States
v. Lopez 777 the Court, for the first time in almost sixty years,778
invalidated a federal law as exceeding Congress’ authority under
the Commerce Clause. The statute made it a federal offense to pos-
sess a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school.779 The Court reviewed
the doctrinal development of the Commerce Clause, especially the
effects and aggregation tests, and reaffirmed that it is the Court’s
responsibility to decide whether a rational basis exists for conclud-
ing that a regulated activity sufficiently affects interstate com-
merce when a law is challenged.780 As noted previously, the Court
evaluation started with a consideration of whether the legislation
fell within the three broad categories of activity that Congress may
regulate or protect under its commerce power: (1) use of the chan-
775 500 U.S. at 330–32. The decision was 5-to-4, with the dissenters of the view
that, although Congress could reach the activity, it had not done so.
776 E.g., Brooks v. United States, 267 U.S. 432, 436–437 (1925); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941). See Cushman, The National Police Power Under
the Commerce Clause, 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 62 (1938).
777 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court was divided 5-to-4, with Chief Justice Rehnquist
writing the opinion of the Court, joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, with dissents by Justices Stevens, Souter, Breyer, and Ginsburg.
778 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (striking down regulation of
mining industry as outside of Commerce Clause).

779 18 U.S.C. § 922(q)(1)(A). Congress subsequently amended the section to make
the offense jurisdictionally to turn on possession of “a firearm that has moved in or

that otherwise affects interstate or foreign commerce.” Pub. L. 104–208, 110 Stat.
3009–370.
780 514 U.S. at 556–57, 559.
nels of interstate commerce, (2) the use of instrumentalities of in-

terstate commerce, or (3) activities that substantially affect inter-
state commerce.781
Clearly, the Court said, the criminalized activity did not impli-
cate the first two categories.782 As for the third, the Court found an
insufficient connection. First, a wide variety of regulations of “intra-
state economic activity” has been sustained where an activity sub-
stantially affects interstate commerce. But the statute being chal-
lenged, the Court continued, was a criminal law that had nothing
to do with “commerce” or with “any sort of economic enterprise.”
Therefore, it could not be sustained under precedents “upholding
regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with a
commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substan-
tially affects interstate commerce.” 783 The provision did not con-
tain a “jurisdictional element which would ensure, through case-by-
case inquiry, that the firearm possession in question affects interstate
commerce.” 784 The existence of such a section, the Court implied,
would have saved the constitutionality of the provision by requir-
ing a showing of some connection to commerce in each particular
case.
Finally, the Court rejected the arguments of the government and
of the dissent that there existed a sufficient connection between the
offense and interstate commerce.785 At base, the Court’s concern was
that accepting the attenuated connection arguments presented would
result in the evisceration of federalism. “Under the theories that
the government presents . . . it is difficult to perceive any limita-
tion on federal power, even in areas such as criminal law enforce-
ment or education where States historically have been sovereign.
Thus, if we were to accept the Government’s arguments, we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is with-
out power to regulate.” 786
Whether Lopez bespoke a Court determination to police more
closely Congress’ exercise of its commerce power, so that it would
781 514 U.S. at 558–59. For an example of regulation of persons or things in
interstate commerce, see Reno v. London, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (information about
motor vehicles and owners, regulated pursuant to the Driver’s Privacy Protection
Act, and sold by states and others, is an article of commerce)
782 514 U.S. at 559.
783 514 U.S. at 559–61.
784 514 U.S. at 561.
785 514 U.S. at 563–68.
786 514 U.S. at 564.
be a noteworthy case,787 or whether it was rather a “warning shot”

across the bow of Congress, urging more restraint in the exercise
of power or more care in the drafting of laws, was not immediately
clear. The Court’s decision five years later in United States v. Mor-
rison,788 however, suggests that stricter scrutiny of Congress’ com-
merce power exercises is the chosen path, at least for legislation
that falls outside the area of economic regulation.789 The Court will
no longer defer, via rational basis review, to every congressional find-
ing of substantial effects on interstate commerce, but instead will
examine the nature of the asserted nexus to commerce, and will
also consider whether a holding of constitutionality is consistent with
its view of the commerce power as being a limited power that can-
not be allowed to displace all exercise of state police powers.
In Morrison the Court applied Lopez principles to invalidate a
provision of the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) that created
a federal cause of action for victims of gender-motivated violence.
Gender-motivated crimes of violence “are not, in any sense of the
phrase, economic activity,” 790 the Court explained, and there was
allegedly no precedent for upholding commerce-power regulation of
intrastate activity that was not economic in nature. The provision,
like the invalidated provision of the Gun-Free School Zones Act, con-
tained no jurisdictional element tying the regulated violence to in-
terstate commerce. Unlike the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the VAWA
did contain “numerous” congressional findings about the serious ef-
fects of gender-motivated crimes,791 but the Court rejected reliance
on these findings. “The existence of congressional findings is not suf-
ficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
787 “Not every epochal case has come in epochal trappings.” 514 U.S. at 615 (Jus-
tice Souter dissenting) (wondering whether the case is only a misapplication of es-
tablished standards or is a veering in a new direction).
788 529 U.S. 598 (2000). Once again, the Justices were split 5–4, with Chief Jus-
tice Rehnquist’s opinion of the Court being joined by Justices O’Connor, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Thomas, and with Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissent-
ing.
789 For an expansive interpretation in the area of economic regulation, decided
during the same Term as Lopez, see Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S.
265 (1995). Lopez did not “purport to announce a new rule governing Congress’ Com-
merce Clause power over concededly economic activity.” Citizens Bank v. Alafabco,
Inc., 539 U.S. 52, 58 (2003).
790 529 U.S. at 613.
791 Dissenting Justice Souter pointed to a “mountain of data” assembled by Con-
gress to show the effects of domestic violence on interstate commerce. 529 U.S. at
628–30. The Court has evidenced a similar willingness to look behind congressional
findings purporting to justify exercise of enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment. See discussion under Fourteenth Amendment, Enforcement, infra. In
Morrison itself, the Court determined that congressional findings were insufficient
to justify the VAWA as an exercise of Fourteenth Amendment power. 529 U.S. at
619–20.
legislation. . . . [The issue of constitutionality] is ultimately a judi-

cial rather than a legislative question, and can be settled finally
only by this Court.” 792
The problem with the VAWA findings was that they “relied heav-
ily” on the reasoning rejected in Lopez—the “but-for causal chain
from the initial occurrence of crime . . . to every attenuated effect
upon interstate commerce.” As the Court had explained in Lopez,
acceptance of this reasoning would eliminate the distinction be-
tween what is truly national and what is truly local, and would al-
low Congress to regulate virtually any activity, and basically any
crime.793 Accordingly, the Court “reject[ed] the argument that Con-
gress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely
on that conduct’s aggregate effect on interstate commerce.” Resur-
recting the dual federalism dichotomy, the Court could find “no bet-
ter example of the police power, which the Founders denied the Na-
tional Government and reposed in the States, than the suppression
of violent crime and vindication of its victims.” 794
Yet the ultimate impact of these cases on Congress’ power over
commerce may be limited. In Gonzales v. Raich,795 the Court reaf-
firmed an expansive application of Wickard v. Filburn, and sig-
naled that its jurisprudence is unlikely to threaten the enforce-
ment of broad regulatory schemes based on the Commerce Clause.
In Raich, the Court considered whether the cultivation, distribu-
tion, or possession of marijuana for personal medical purposes pur-
suant to the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996 could be pros-
ecuted under the federal Controlled Substances Act (CSA).796 The
respondents argued that this class of activities should be consid-
ered as separate and distinct from the drug-trafficking that was the
focus of the CSA, and that regulation of this limited noncommer-
cial use of marijuana should be evaluated separately.
In Raich, the Court declined the invitation to apply Lopez and
Morrison to select applications of a statute, holding that the Court
would defer to Congress if there was a rational basis to believe that
regulation of home-consumed marijuana would affect the market for
marijuana generally. The Court found that there was a “rational
792 529 U.S. at 614.
793 529 U.S. at 615–16. Applying the principle of constitutional doubt, the Court
in Jones v. United States, 529 U.S. 848 (2000), interpreted the federal arson statute
as inapplicable to the arson of a private, owner-occupied residence. Were the statute
interpreted to apply to such residences, the Court noted, “hardly a building in the
land would fall outside [its] domain,” and the statute’s validity under Lopez would
be squarely raised. 529 U.S. at 857.
794 529 U.S. at 618.
795 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
796 84 Stat. 1242, 21 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq.
basis” to believe that diversion of medicinal marijuana into the ille-

gal market would depress the price on the latter market.797 The
Court also had little trouble finding that, even in application to me-
dicinal marijuana, the CSA was an economic regulation. Noting that
the definition of “economics” includes “the production, distribution,
and consumption of commodities,” 798 the Court found that prohibit-
ing the intrastate possession or manufacture of an article of com-
merce is a rational and commonly used means of regulating com-
merce in that product.
The Court’s decision also contained an intertwined but poten-
tially separate argument that Congress had ample authority under
the Necessary and Proper Clause to regulate the intrastate manu-
facture and possession of controlled substances, because failure to
regulate these activities would undercut the ability of the govern-
ment to enforce the CSA generally.799 The Court quoted language
from Lopez that appears to authorize the regulation of such activi-
ties on the basis that they are an essential part of a regulatory
scheme.800 Justice Scalia, in concurrence, suggested that this latter
category of activities could be regulated under the Necessary and
Proper Clause regardless of whether the activity in question was
economic or substantially affected interstate commerce.801
Activity Versus Inactivity.—In a case with overtones of sub-
stantive due process, the Court in National Federation of Indepen-
dent Business (NFIB) v. Sebelius 802 held that Congress did not have
the authority under the Commerce Clause to compel individuals to
maintain a minimum level of health insurance (although, as dis-
cussed previously, the Court found such power to exist under the
taxing power).803 Under this “individual mandate,” failure to pur-
chase health insurance may subject a person to a monetary pen-
alty, administered through the tax code.804 By requiring that indi-
viduals purchase health insurance, the mandate prevents cost-
797 545 U.S. at 19.
798 545 U.S. at 25, quoting Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 720
(1966).
799 545 U.S. at 18, 22.
800 545 U.S. at 23–25.
801 545 U.S. at 34–35 (Scalia, J., concurring).
802 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–393, slip op. (2012).
803 See Power to Tax, Regulation by Taxation, supra.
804 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), Pub. L. 111–148, as amended.
This mandate was necessitated by the act’s “guaranteed-issue” and “community-

rating” provisions, under which insurance companies are prohibited from denying
coverage to those with such conditions or charging unhealthy individuals higher pre-
miums than healthy individuals. Id. at §§ 300gg, 300gg–1, 300gg–3, 300gg–4. As these
requirements provide an incentive for individuals to delay purchasing health insur-
ance until they become sick, this would impose new costs on insurers, leading them
to significantly increase premiums on everyone.
shifting by those who would otherwise go without it. In addition,

the mandate forces healthy individuals into the insurance risk pool,
thus allowing insurers to subsidize the costs of covering the un-
healthy individuals they are now required to accept.
Chief Justice Roberts, in a controlling opinion,805 suggested that
Congress’ authority to regulate interstate commerce presupposes the
existence of a commercial activity to regulate. Further, his opinion
noted that the commerce power had been uniformly described in
previous cases as involving the regulation of an “activity.” 806 The
individual mandate, on the other hand, compels an individual to
become active in commerce on the theory that the individual’s inac-
tivity affects interstate commerce. Justice Roberts suggested that
regulation of individuals because they are doing nothing would re-
sult in an unprecedented expansion of congressional authority with
few discernable limitations. While recognizing that most people are
likely to seek health care at some point in their lives, Justice Rob-
erts noted that there was no precedent for the argument that indi-
viduals who might engage in a commercial activity in the future
could, on that basis, be regulated today.807 The Chief Justice simi-
larly rejected the argument that the Necessary and Proper Clause
could provide this additional authority. Rather than serving as an
“incidental” adjunct to the Commerce Clause, reliance on the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause in this instance would, according to the
Chief Justice, create a substantial expansion of federal authority to
regulate persons not otherwise subject to such regulation.808
SPECIFIC APPLICATIONS
Historical Background
As note previously, toward the end of the 19th century through
the New Deal, the Court in effect followed a doctrine of “dual feder-
alism,” finding that the Tenth Amendment limited the authority of
the Congress to regulate the internal activities of a state. Under
this doctrine, Congress’ power to regulate was limited to where it
had a “direct” rather than an “indirect” effect on interstate com-
805 Although no other Justice joined Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion, four dissent-
ing Justices reached similar conclusions regarding the Commerce Clause and the
Necessary and Proper Clause. NFIB, 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–393, slip op. at 4–16 (joint
opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas and Alito, dissenting).
806 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 573 (“Where economic activity substantially af-
fects interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained”).

807 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–393, slip op. at 20, 26.
808 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–393, slip op. at 30.
merce.809 A counterweight to this limiting principle, however, was

the idea that Congress could regulate “streams” or “currents” of com-
merce. Using this latter theory, the Court found that congressional
authority to regulate was available for some industries or commer-
cial activities, but not others. For instance, federal regulation of the
waterways or the railroads was approved of by the Court early on,
while regulation of manufacturing was not. However, as the na-
tional economy became more interrelated and federal regulation more
comprehensive, these distinctions became increasingly difficult to po-
lice. Ultimately, the Court’s acceptance of vast new federal regula-
tions enacted in response to the Great Depression led to the ero-
sion of the “direct”—“indirect” distinction.
Congressional Regulation of Waterways

Navigation.—Early on, keeping navigable waterways clear of
impediments was found by the Court to be integral to trade be-
tween the states. In Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge
Co.,810 the Court granted an injunction requiring that a bridge erected
over the Ohio River under a charter from the State of Virginia ei-
ther be altered so as allow of free navigation of the river or else be
removed. The decision was justified based on both the dormant Com-
merce Clause and on a compact between Virginia and Kentucky,
under which both states had agreed to keep the Ohio River “free
and common to the citizens of the United States.” The injunction
was promptly rendered inoperative by an act of Congress declaring
the bridge to be “a lawful structure” and requiring all vessels navi-
gating the Ohio to be so regulated as not to interfere with it.811
This congressional act was sustained by the Court as within Con-
gress’ power under the Commerce Clause, saying: “So far . . . as
this bridge created an obstruction to the free navigation of the river,
in view of the previous acts of Congress, they are to be regarded as
modified by this subsequent legislation; and, although it still may
be an obstruction in fact, [it] is not so in the contemplation of law. . . .
[Congress] having in the exercise of this power, regulated the navi-
gation consistent with its preservation and continuation, the author-
ity to maintain it would seem to be complete. That authority com-
bines the concurrent powers of both governments, State and federal,
which, if not sufficient, certainly none can be found in our system
809 E.g., United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895); Hammer v. Dagenhart,
247 U.S. 251 (1918). Of course, there existed much of this time a parallel doctrine
under which federal power was not so limited. E.g., Houston & Texas Ry. v. United
States (The Shreveport Rate Case), 234 U.S. 342 (1914).
810 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852).
811 Ch. 111, § 6, 10 Stat 112 (1852).
of government.” 812 In short, it is Congress, and not the Court, which

is authorized by the Constitution to regulate commerce.813
The law and doctrine of the earlier cases with respect to the
fostering and protection of navigation are well summed up in a fre-
quently cited passage from the Court’s opinion in Gilman v. Phila-
delphia.814 “Commerce includes navigation. The power to regulate
commerce comprehends the control for that purpose, and to the ex-
tent necessary, of all the navigable waters of the United States which
are accessible from a State other than those in which they lie. For
this purpose they are the public property of the nation, and subject
to all requisite legislation by Congress. This necessarily includes
the power to keep them open and free from any obstruction to their
navigation, interposed by the States or otherwise; to remove such
obstructions when they exist; and to provide, by such sanctions as
they may deem proper, against the occurrence of the evil and for
the punishment of offenders. For these purposes, Congress pos-
sesses all the powers which existed in the States before the adop-
tion of the national Constitution, and which have always existed in
the Parliament in England.” 815
Thus, Congress was within its powers in vesting the Secretary
of War with power to determine whether a structure of any nature
in or over a navigable stream is an obstruction to navigation and
to order its abatement if he so finds.816 Nor is the United States
required to compensate the owners of such structures for their loss,
since they were always subject to the servitude represented by Con-
812 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 430
(1856). “It is Congress, and not the Judicial Department, to which the Constitution
has given the power to regulate commerce with foreign nations and among the sev-
eral States. The courts can never take the initiative on this subject.” Transportation
Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 701 (1883). See also Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benja-
min, 328 U.S. 408 (1946); Robertson v. California, 328 U.S. 440 (1946).
813 But see In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895), in which the Court held that in the
absence of legislative authorization the Executive had power to seek and federal courts
to grant injunctive relief to remove obstructions to interstate commerce and the free
flow of the mail.
814 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 713 (1866).
815 70 U.S. at 724–25.
816 Union Bridge Co. v. United States, 204 U.S. 364 (1907). See also Monongahela
Bridge Co. v. United States, 216 U.S. 177 (1910); Wisconsin v. Illinois, 278 U.S. 367
(1929). The United States may seek injunctive or declaratory relief requiring the
removal of obstructions to commerce by those negligently responsible for them or it
may itself remove the obstructions and proceed against the responsible party for
costs. United States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960); Wyandotte Trans-
portation Co. v. United States, 389 U.S. 191 (1967). Congress’ power in this area is
newly demonstrated by legislation aimed at pollution and environmental degrada-
tion. In confirming the title of the states to certain waters under the Submerged
Lands Act, 67 Stat. 29 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq., Congress was careful to
retain authority over the waters for purposes of commerce, navigation, and the like.
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121, 127 (1967).
gress’ powers over commerce, and the same is true of the property
of riparian owners that is damaged.817 And while it was formerly
held that lands adjoining nonnavigable streams were not subject to
the above-mentioned servitude,818 this rule has been impaired by
recent decisions; 819 and at any rate it would not apply to a stream
rendered navigable by improvements.820
In exercising its power to foster and protect navigation, Con-
gress legislates primarily on things external to the act of naviga-
tion. But that act itself and the instrumentalities by which it is ac-
complished are also subject to Congress’ power if and when they
enter into or form a part of “commerce among the several States.”
When does this happen? Words quoted above from the Court’s opin-
ion in the Gilman case answered this question to some extent, but
the decisive answer to it was returned five years later in the case
of The Daniel Ball.821 Here the question at issue was whether an
act of Congress, passed in 1838 and amended in 1852, which re-
quired that steam vessels engaged in transporting passengers or mer-
chandise upon the “bays, lakes, rivers, or other navigable waters of
the United States,” applied to the case of a vessel that navigated
only the waters of the Grand River, a stream lying entirely in the
State of Michigan.
In The Daniel Ball, the Court ruled: “In this case it is admitted
that the steamer was engaged in shipping and transporting down
Grand River, goods destined and marked for other States than Michi-
gan, and in receiving and transporting up the river goods brought
within the State from without its limits; . . . So far as she was em-
ployed in transporting goods destined for other States, or goods brought
from without the limits of Michigan and destined to places within
that State, she was engaged in commerce between the States, and
however limited that commerce may have been, she was, so far as
it went, subject to the legislation of Congress. She was employed
as an instrument of that commerce; for whenever a commodity has
817 Gibson v. United States, 166 U.S. 269 (1897). See also Bridge Co. v. United
States, 105 U.S. 470 (1882); United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S.
690 (1899); United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co., 229 U.S. 53 (1913); Seattle v.
Oregon & W.R.R., 255 U.S. 56, 63 (1921); Economy Light Co. v. United States, 256
U.S. 113 (1921); United States v. River Rouge Co., 269 U.S. 411, 419 (1926); Ford &
Son v. Little Falls Co., 280 U.S. 369 (1930); United States v. Commodore Park, Inc.,
324 U.S. 386 (1945); United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S. 222 (1956);
United States v. Rands, 389 U.S. 121 (1967).
818 United States v. Cress, 243 U.S. 316 (1917).
819 United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 312 U.S. 592, 597 (1941); United
States v. Willow River Power Co., 324 U.S. 499 (1945).

820 United States v. Rio Grande Irrigation Co., 174 U.S. 690 (1899).
821 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
begun to move as an article of trade from one State to another, com-

merce in that commodity between the States has commenced.” 822
Counsel had suggested that if the vessel was in commerce be-
cause it was part of a stream of commerce, then all transportation
within a state was commerce. Turning to this point, the Court added:
“We answer that the present case relates to transportation on the
navigable waters of the United States, and we are not called upon
to express an opinion upon the power of Congress over interstate
commerce when carried on by land transportation. And we answer
further, that we are unable to draw any clear and distinct line be-
tween the authority of Congress to regulate an agency employed in
commerce between the States, when the agency extends through two
or more States, and when it is confined in its action entirely within
the limits of a single State. If its authority does not extend to an
agency in such commerce, when that agency is confined within the
limits of a State, its entire authority over interstate commerce may
be defeated. Several agencies combining, each taking up the com-
modity transported at the boundary line at one end of a State, and
leaving it at the boundary line at the other end, the Federal juris-
diction would be entirely ousted, and the constitutional provision
would become a dead letter.” 823 In short, it was admitted, inferen-
tially, that the principle of the decision would apply to land trans-
portation, but the actual demonstration of the fact still awaited some
years.824
Water Flow.—As a consequence, in part, of its power to forbid
or remove obstructions to navigation in the navigable waters of the
822 77 U.S. at 565.

823 77 U.S. at 566. “The regulation of commerce implies as much control, as far-
reaching power, over an artificial as over a natural highway.” Justice Brewer for the
Court in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 342 (1893).
824 Congress had the right to confer upon the Interstate Commerce Commission
the power to regulate interstate ferry rates, N.Y. Central R.R. v. Hudson County,
227 U.S. 248 (1913), and to authorize the commission to govern the towing of ves-
sels between points in the same state but partly through waters of an adjoining
state. Cornell Steamboat Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 634 (1944). Congress’ power
over navigation extends to persons furnishing wharfage, dock, warehouse, and other
terminal facilities to a common carrier by water. Hence an order of the United States
Maritime Commission banning certain allegedly “unreasonable practices” by termi-
nals in the Port of San Francisco, and prescribing schedules of maximum free time
periods and of minimum charges was constitutional. California v. United States, 320
U.S. 577 (1944). The same power also comprises regulation of the registry enroll-
ment, license, and nationality of ships and vessels, the method of recording bills of
sale and mortgages thereon, the rights and duties of seamen, the limitations of the
responsibility of shipowners for the negligence and misconduct of their captains and
crews, and many other things of a character truly maritime. See The Lottawanna,
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 577 (1875); Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109
U.S. 578, 589 (1883); The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907); O’Donnell v. Great Lakes
Dredge & Dock Co., 318 U.S. 36 (1943).
United States, Congress has acquired the right to develop hydroelec-

tric power and the ancillary right to sell it to all takers. By a long-
standing doctrine of constitutional law, the states possess dominion
over the beds of all navigable streams within their borders.825 Be-
cause of the servitude that Congress’ power to regulate commerce
imposes upon such streams, however, the states are unable to use
their prerogative for power-development purposes without the as-
sent of Congress. Expressing no doubt that controlling power to this
end must be attributed to some government in the United States
and that “in such matters there can be no divided empire,” 826 the
Court held in United States v. Chandler-Dunbar Co.,827 that in con-
structing works for the improvement of the navigability of a stream,
Congress was entitled, as part of a general plan, to authorize the
lease or sale of such excess water power as might result from the
conservation of the flow of the stream. “If the primary purpose is
legitimate,” it said, “we can see no sound objection to leasing any
excess of power over the needs of the Government. The practice is
not unusual in respect to similar public works constructed by State
governments.” 828
Since the Chandler-Dunbar case, the Court has come, in effect,
to hold that it will sustain any act of Congress that purports to be
for the improvement of navigation whatever other purposes it may
also embody, nor does the stream involved have to be one “navi-
gable in its natural state.” Such, at least, seems to be the sum of
its holdings in Arizona v. California,829 and United States v. Appa-
lachian Power Co.830 In the former, the Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Brandeis, said that it was not free to inquire into the motives
“which induced members of Congress to enact the Boulder Canyon
Project Act,” adding: “As the river is navigable and the means which
the Act provides are not unrelated to the control of navigation . . .
the erection and maintenance of such dam and reservoir are clearly
within the powers conferred upon Congress. Whether the particu-
lar structures proposed are reasonably necessary, is not for this Court
to determine. . . . And the fact that purposes other than naviga-
tion will also be served could not invalidate the exercise of the au-
825 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1
(1894).
826 Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Patten Paper Co., 172 U.S. 58, 80 (1898).
827 229 U.S. 53 (1913).
828 229 U.S. at 73, citing Kaukauna Water Power Co. v. Green Bay & Miss. Ca-
nal Co., 142 U.S. 254 (1891).

829 283 U.S. 423 (1931).
830 311 U.S. 377 (1940).
thority conferred, even if those other purposes would not alone have
justified an exercise of congressional power.” 831
And, in the Appalachian Power case, the Court, abandoning pre-
vious holdings laying down the doctrine that to be subject to Con-
gress’ power to regulate commerce a stream must be “navigable in
fact,” said: “A waterway, otherwise suitable for navigation, is not
barred from that classification merely because artificial aids must
make the highway suitable for use before commercial navigation may
be undertaken,” provided there must be a “balance between cost and
need at a time when the improvement would be useful. . . . Nor is
it necessary that the improvements should be actually completed
or even authorized. The power of Congress over commerce is not to
be hampered because of the necessity for reasonable improvements
to make an interstate waterway available for traffic. . . . Nor is it
necessary for navigability that the use should be continuous. . . .
Even absence of use over long periods of years, because of changed
conditions, . . . does not affect the navigability of rivers in the con-
stitutional sense.” 832
Furthermore, the Court defined the purposes for which Con-
gress may regulate navigation in the broadest terms. “It cannot prop-
erly be said that the constitutional power of the United States over
its waters is limited to control for navigation. . . . That authority
is as broad as the needs of commerce. . . . Flood protection, water-
shed development, recovery of the cost of improvements through uti-
lization of power are likewise parts of commerce control.” 833 These
views the Court has since reiterated.834 Nor is it by virtue of Con-
gress’ power over navigation alone that the National Government
may develop water power. Its war powers and powers of expendi-
ture in furtherance of the common defense and the general welfare
supplement its powers over commerce in this respect.835
Congressional Regulation of Land Transportation

Development of Highways and Railroads.—The settlement
of the interior of the country led Congress to seek to facilitate ac-
cess by first encouraging the construction of highways. In succes-
sive acts, it authorized construction of the Cumberland and the Na-
tional Road from the Potomac across the Alleghenies to the Ohio,
reserving certain public lands and revenues from land sales for con-
831 283 U.S. at 455–56. See also United States v. Twin City Power Co., 350 U.S.
222, 224 (1956).

832 311 U.S. at 407, 409–10.
833 311 U.S. at 426.
834 Oklahoma v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508, 523–33 (1941).
835 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
struction of public roads to new states granted statehood.836 Acqui-

sition and settlement of California stimulated interest in railway
lines to the West, but it was not until the Civil War that Congress
voted for aid in the construction of a line from the Missouri River
to the Pacific; four years later, it chartered the Union Pacific Com-
pany.837
The litigation growing out of these and subsequent activities settled
several propositions. First, Congress may provide highways and rail-
ways for interstate transportation; 838 second, it may charter pri-
vate corporations for that purpose; third, it may vest such corpora-
tions with the power of eminent domain in the states; and fourth,
it may exempt their franchises from state taxation.839
Congressional regulation of railroads may be said to have be-
gun in 1866. By the Garfield Act, Congress authorized all railroad
companies operating by steam to interconnect with each other “so
as to form continuous lines for the transportation of passengers, freight,
troops, governmental supplies, and mails, to their destination.” 840
An act of the same year provided federal chartering and protection
from conflicting state regulations to companies formed to construct
and operate telegraph lines.841 Another act regulated the transpor-
tation by railroad of livestock so as to preserve the health and safety
of the animals.842
Interstate and Intrastate Rate Regulation.—Congress’ en-
try into the rate regulation field was preceded by state attempts to
curb the abuses of the rail lines in the Middle West, which culmi-
nated in the “Granger Movement.” Because the businesses were lo-
cally owned, the Court at first upheld state laws as not constitut-
ing a burden on interstate commerce; 843 but after the various business
panics of the 1870s and 1880s drove numerous small companies into
bankruptcy and led to consolidation, there emerged great inter-
state systems. Thus in 1886, the Court held that a state may not
set charges for carriage even within its own boundaries of goods
836 Cf. Indiana v. United States, 148 U.S. 148 (1893).
837 12 Stat. 489 (1862); 13 Stat. 356 (1864); 14 Stat. 79 (1866).
838 The result then as well as now might have followed from Congress’ power of
spending, independently of the Commerce Clause, as well as from its war and postal
powers, which were also invoked by the Court in this connection.
839 Thomson v. Pacific R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579 (1870); California v. Pacific
R.R. Co. (Pacific Ry. Cases), 127 U.S. 1 (1888); Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas
Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890); Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894).
840 14 Stat. 66 (1866).
841 14 Stat. 221 (1866).
842 17 Stat. 353 (1873).
843 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877); Chicago B. & Q. R. Co. v. Iowa, 94 U.S.
155 (1877); Peik v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877); Pickard v. Pullman South-
ern Car Co., 117 U.S. 34 (1886).
brought from without the state or destined to points outside it, as

that power lay exclusively with Congress.844
In the following year, Congress passed the original Interstate
Commerce Act.845 The Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) was
authorized to pass upon the “reasonableness” of all rates by rail-
roads for the transportation of goods or persons in interstate com-
merce and to order the discontinuance of all charges found to be
“unreasonable.” In ICC v. Brimson,846 the Court upheld the act as
“necessary and proper” for the enforcement of the Commerce Clause,
and also sustained the commission’s power to go to court to secure
compliance with its orders. Later decisions circumscribed some-
what the ICC’s power.847
Expansion of the commission’s authority came in the Hepburn
Act of 1906 848 and the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910.849 By the former,
the commission was explicitly empowered, after a full hearing on a
complaint, “to determine and prescribe just and reasonable” maxi-
mum rates; by the latter, it was authorized to set rates on its own
initiative and empowered to suspend any increase in rates by a car-
rier until it reviewed the change. At the same time, the commis-
sion’s jurisdiction was extended to telegraphs, telephones, and cables.850
By the Motor Carrier Act of 1935,851 the ICC was authorized to regu-
late the transportation of persons and property by motor vehicle
common carriers.
The modern powers of the commission were largely defined by
the Transportation Acts of 1920 852 and 1940.853 The jurisdiction of
the commission covers not only the characteristics of the rail, mo-
tor, and water carriers in commerce among the states but also the
844 Wabash, St. L. & P. Ry. Co. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). A variety of state
regulations have been struck down on the burdening-of-commerce rationale. E.g.,

Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945) (train length);
Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926) (locomotive accessories); Penn-
sylvania R.R. v. Public Service Comm’n, 250 U.S. 566 (1919). But the Court has largely
exempted regulations with a safety purpose, even a questionable one. Brotherhood
of Firemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
845 24 Stat. 379 (1887).
846 154 U.S. 447, 470 (1894).
847 ICC v. Alabama Midland Ry., 168 U.S. 144 (1897); Cincinnati, N.O. & Texas
Pacific Ry. v. ICC, 162 U.S. 184 (1896).

848 34 Stat. 584.
849 36 Stat. 539.
850 These regulatory powers are now vested, of course, in the Federal Communi-
cations Commission.
851 49 Stat. 543 (1935).
852 41 Stat. 474.
853 54 Stat. 898, U.S.C. §§ 1 et seq. The two acts were “intended . . . to provide
a completely integrated interstate regulatory system over motor, railroad, and wa-
ter carriers.” United States v. Pennsylvania R.R., 323 U.S. 612, 618–19 (1945). The
ICC’s powers include authority to determine the reasonableness of a joint through
issuance of securities by them and all consolidations of existing com-

panies or lines.854 Further, the commission was charged with regu-
lating so as to foster and promote the meeting of the transporta-
tion needs of the country. Thus, from a regulatory exercise originally
begun as a method of restraint there has emerged a policy of en-
couraging a consistent national transportation policy.855 For in-
stance, although its statutory jurisdiction did not explicitly apply
to intrastate rate systems, the commission early asserted the right
to review intrastate rates, set by states, which gave intrastate lines
competitive advantages over interstate lines whose rates had been
set by the commission.
This power was challenged in Houston & Texas Ry. v. United
States (The Shreveport Rate Cases), which involved a line operat-
ing wholly intrastate in Texas but which paralleled an interstate
line operating between Louisiana and Texas. The case arose be-
cause a Texas rate body had fixed the rates of the intrastate line
substantially lower than the rate fixed by the ICC on the inter-
state line. In upholding the ICC order to raise those intrastate rates,
the Court held that: “[w]herever the interstate and intrastate trans-
actions of carriers are so related that the government of the one
involves the control of the other, it is Congress, and not the State,
that is entitled to prescribe the final and dominant rule, for other-
wise Congress would be denied the exercise of its constitutional au-
thority and the States and not the Nation, would be supreme in
the national field.” 856 This holding, referred to as the Shreveport
international rate covering transportation in the United States and abroad and to
order domestic carriers to pay reparations in the amount by which the rate is unrea-
sonable. Canada Packers v. Atchison, T. & S. F. Ry., 385 U.S. 182 (1966), and cases
cited.
854 Disputes between the ICC and other government agencies over mergers have
occupied a good deal of the Court’s time. Cf. United States v. ICC, 396 U.S. 491
(1970). See also County of Marin v. United States, 356 U.S. 412 (1958); McLean Truck-
ing Co. v. United States, 321 U.S. 67 (1944); Penn-Central Merger & N & W Inclu-
sion Cases, 389 U.S. 486 (1968).
855 Among the various provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act which have
been upheld are: a section penalizing shippers for obtaining transportation at less
than published rates, Armour Packing Co. v. United States, 209 U.S. 56 (1908); a
section construed as prohibiting the hauling of commodities in which the carrier had
at the time of haul a proprietary interest, United States v. Delaware & Hudson Co.,
213 U.S. 366 (1909); a section abrogating life passes, Louisville & Nashville R.R. v.
Mottley, 219 U.S. 467 (1911); a section authorizing the ICC to regulate the entire
bookkeeping system of interstate carriers, including intrastate accounts, ICC v. Goodrich
Transit Co., 224 U.S. 194 (1912); a clause affecting the charging of rates different
for long and short hauls. Intermountain Rate Cases, 234 U.S. 476 (1914).
856 Houston & Texas Ry. v. United States (The Shreveport Rate Cases), 234 U.S.
342, 351–352 (1914). See also, American Express Co. v. Caldwell, 244 U.S. 617 (1917);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 297 U.S. 403 (1936); Weiss v. United States,
308 U.S. 321 (1939); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Board, 330 U.S. 767 (1947); United
States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947).
doctrine, was later expanded to allow the ICC to set rates not just
where interstate and intrastate carriers ran parallel lines, but, also
where the competing carrier’s lines originated from different places,
as long as the disparity in rates burdened the commerce of one state
over another.857
Congressional Regulation of Labor in Interstate Rail Trans-
portation.—Federal entry into the field of protective labor legisla-
tion and the protection of organization efforts of workers began in
connection with the railroads. The Safety Appliance Act of 1893,858
applying only to cars and locomotives engaged in moving interstate
traffic, was amended in 1903 so as to embrace much of the intra-
state rail systems on which there was any connection with inter-
state commerce.859 The Court sustained this extension in language
much like that it would use in the Shreveport case three years later.860
These laws were followed by the Hours of Service Act of 1907,861
which prescribed maximum hours of employment for rail workers
in interstate or foreign commerce. The Court sustained the regula-
tion as a reasonable means of protecting workers and the public
from the hazards which could develop from long, tiring hours of la-
bor.862 Other legislation and litigation dealing with the organiza-
tional rights of rail employees are considered below.863
Most far-reaching of these regulatory measures were the Fed-
eral Employers Liability Acts (FELAs) of 1906 864 and 1908.865 These
laws were intended to modify the common-law rules with regard to
the liability of employers for injuries suffered by their employees in
the course of their employment, under which employers were gen-
erally not liable. Rejecting the argument that regulation of such re-
lationships between employers and employees was a reserved state
power, the Court adopted the argument of the United States that
857 See Wisconsin R.R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 257 U.S. 563 (1922).
Cf. Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153 (1926), upholding an ICC order direct-
ing abandonment of an intrastate branch of an interstate railroad. But see North
Carolina v. United States, 325 U.S. 507 (1945), setting aside an ICC disallowance of
intrastate rates set by a state commission as unsupported by the evidence and find-
ings.
858 27 Stat. 531, 45 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
859 32 Stat. 943, 45 U.S.C. §§ 8–10.
860 Southern Ry. v. United States, 222 U.S. 20 (1911). See also Texas & Pacific
Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916); United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936);
United States v. Seaboard Air Line R.R., 361 U.S. 78 (1959).
861 34 Stat. 1415, 45 U.S.C. §§ 61–64.
862 Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. ICC, 221 U.S. 612 (1911).
863 See discussion under Railroad Retirement Act and National Labor Relations
Act, infra.
864 34 Stat. 232, held unconstitutional in part in the Employers’ Liability Cases,
207 U.S. 463 (1908).

865 35 Stat. 65, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60.
Congress was empowered to do anything it might deem appropri-

ate to save interstate commerce from interruption or burdening. In-
asmuch as the labor of employees was necessary for the function of
commerce, Congress could certainly act to ameliorate conditions that
made labor less efficient, less economical, and less reliable. Assur-
ance of compensation for injuries growing out of negligence in the
course of employment was such a permissible regulation.866
Congressional Regulation of Other Methods of Convey-
ance.—In 1914, the Court affirmed the power of Congress to regu-
late the transportation of oil and gas in pipelines from one state to
another, and held that this power applied to the transportation even
though the oil or gas was the property of the lines.867 Subse-
quently, the Court struck down state regulation of rates of electric
current generated within that state and sold to a distributor in an-
other state as a burden on interstate commerce.868 Proceeding on
the assumption that the ruling meant the Federal Government had
the power, Congress in the Federal Power Act of 1935 conferred on
the Federal Power Commission authority to regulate the wholesale
distribution of electricity in interstate commerce,869 and three years
later vested the FPC with like authority over natural gas moving
in interstate commerce.870
Thereafter, the Court sustained the power of the commission to
set the prices at which gas originating in one state and trans-
ported into another should be sold to distributors wholesale in the
latter state.871 “The sale of natural gas originating in the State and
its transportation and delivery to distributors in any other State
constitutes interstate commerce, which is subject to regulation by
Congress . . . . The authority of Congress to regulate the prices of
commodities in interstate commerce is at least as great under the
866 The Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912). For a longer pe-
riod, a Court majority reviewed a surprising large number of FELA cases, almost
uniformly expanding the scope of recovery under the statute. Cf. Rogers v. Missouri
Pacific R.R., 352 U.S. 500 (1957). This practice was criticized both within and with-
out the Court, cf. Ferguson v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 352 U.S. 521, 524 (1957)
(Justice Frankfurter dissenting); Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, 73
HARV. L. REV. 84, 96–98 (1959), and has been discontinued.
867 The Pipe Line Cases, 234 U.S. 548 (1914). See also State Comm’n v. Wichita
Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561 (1934); Eureka Pipe Line Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 265 (1921);
United Fuel Gas Co. v. Hallanan, 257 U.S. 277 (1921); Pennsylvania v. West Vir-
ginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298
(1924).
868 Public Utilities Comm’n v. Attleboro Co., 273 U.S. 83 (1927). See also Utah
Power & Light Co. v. Pfost, 286 U.S. 165 (1932); Pennsylvania Power Co. v. FPC,
343 U.S. 414 (1952).
869 49 Stat. 863, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a–825u.
870 52 Stat. 821, 15 U.S.C. §§ 717–717w.
871 FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575 (1942).
Fifth Amendment as is that of the States under the Fourteenth to

regulate the prices of commodities in intrastate commerce.” 872
Other acts regulating commerce and communication originat-
ing in this period have evoked no basic constitutional challenge. These
include the Federal Communications Act of 1934, providing for the
regulation of interstate and foreign communication by wire and ra-
dio,873 and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938, providing for the regu-
lation of all phases of airborne commerce, foreign and interstate.874
Congressional Regulation of the Commercial Exchange of

Goods
Limiting the Federal Sphere: The Sugar Trust Case.—
Congress’ early efforts to regulate commerce in the primary sense
of “traffic”—the commercial exchange of goods—is embodied in the
Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890. The opening section of that act de-
clares “every contract, combination in the form of trust or other-
wise,” or “conspiracy in restraint of trade and commerce among the
several States, or with foreign nations” to be “illegal,” while the sec-
ond section makes it a misdemeanor for anyone to “monopolize or
attempt to monopolize any part of such commerce.” 875 The act was
passed to curb the growing tendency of companies to form indus-
trial combinations, and the first case to reach the Court under it
was the famous 1895 case of Sugar Trust Case, United States v. E.
C. Knight Co.876 Here the government asked for the cancellation of
certain agreements, whereby the American Sugar Refining Com-
pany, had “acquired,” it was conceded, “nearly complete control of
the manufacture of refined sugar in the United States.”
The question of the validity of the act was not expressly dis-
cussed by the Court, but was subordinated to that of its proper con-
struction. The following passage early in Chief Justice Fuller’s opin-
872 315 U.S. at 582. Sales to distributors by a wholesaler of natural gas deliv-
ered to it from out-of-state sources are subject to FPC jurisdiction. Colorado-

Wyoming Co. v. FPC, 324 U.S. 626 (1945). See also Illinois Gas Co. v. Public Service
Co., 314 U.S. 498 (1942); FPC v. East Ohio Gas Co., 338 U.S. 464 (1950). In Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954), the Court ruled that an indepen-
dent company engaged in one state in production, gathering, and processing of natu-
ral gas, which it thereafter sells in the same state to pipelines that transport and
sell the gas in other states is subject to FPC jurisdiction. See also California v. Lo-
Vaca Gathering Co., 379 U.S. 366 (1965).
873 48 Stat. 1064, 47 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. Cf. United States v. Southwestern
Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), on the regulation of community antenna television
systems (CATVs).
874 52 Stat. 973, as amended. The Civil Aeronautics Board has now been abol-
ished, and its functions are exercised by the Federal Aviation Administration, 49
U.S.C. § 106, as part of the Department of Transportation.
875 26 Stat. 209 (1890); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–7.
876 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
ion for the Court, however, sets forth the conception of the federal
system that controlled the decision: “It is vital that the indepen-
dence of the commercial power and of the police power, and the
delimination between them, however sometimes perplexing, should
always be recognized and observed, for while the one furnishes the
strongest bond of union, the other is essential to the preservation
of the autonomy of the States as required by our dual form of gov-
ernment; and acknowledged evils, however grave and urgent they
may appear to be, had better be borne, than the risk be run, in the
effort to suppress them, of more serious consequences by resort to
expedients of even doubtful constitutionality.” 877 Thus the Court,
in pursuance of the doctrines of “dual federalism” then dominant,
turned the act from its intended purpose and destroyed its effective-
ness for several years, just as the Interstate Commerce Act was be-
ing contemporaneously impaired.
In short, what was needed, the Court felt, was a hard and fast
line between the two spheres of power. In a series of propositions,
the Court endeavored to lay down such a line: (1) production is al-
ways local, and under the exclusive domain of the states; (2) com-
merce among the states does not begin until goods “commence their
final movement from their State of origin to that of their destina-
tion;” (3) the sale of a product is merely an incident of its produc-
tion and, while capable of “bringing the operation of commerce into
play,” affects it only incidentally; (4) such restraint as would reach
commerce, as above defined, in consequence of combinations to con-
trol production “in all its forms,” would be “indirect, however inevi-
table and whatever its extent,” and as such beyond the purview of
the Act.878 Applying this reasoning to the case before it, the Court
proceeded: “The object [of the combination] was manifestly private
gain in the manufacture of the commodity, but not through the con-
trol of interstate or foreign commerce. It is true that the bill al-
leged that the products of these refineries were sold and distrib-
uted among the several States, and that all the companies were
engaged in trade or commerce with the several States and with for-
eign nations; but this was no more than to say that trade and com-
merce served manufacture to fulfill its function.”
“Sugar was refined for sale, and sales were probably made at
Philadelphia for consumption, and undoubtedly for resale by the first
purchasers throughout Pennsylvania and other States, and refined
sugar was also forwarded by the companies to other States for sale.
Nevertheless it does not follow that an attempt to monopolize, or
the actual monopoly of, the manufacture was an attempt, whether
877 156 U.S. at 13.
878 156 U.S. at 13–16.
executory or consummated, to monopolize commerce, even though,

in order to dispose of the product, the instrumentality of commerce
was necessarily invoked. There was nothing in the proofs to indi-
cate any intention to put a restraint upon trade or commerce, and
the fact, as we have seen, that trade or commerce might be indi-
rectly affected was not enough to entitle complainants to a de-
cree.” 879
Soon thereafter, however, the Court did find a legitimate appli-
cation for the Sherman Act in Addyston Pipe and Steel Co. v. United
States,880 in which the act was successfully applied to an industrial
combination for the first time. The agreements in the case, the par-
ties to which were manufacturing concerns, effected a division of
territory among them, and so involved, it was held, a “direct” re-
straint on the distribution and hence of the transportation of the
products of the contracting firms. The holding, however, did not ques-
tion the doctrine of the earlier case, which in fact continued sub-
stantially undisturbed until 1905, when Swift & Co. v. United States 881
was decided.
879 156 U.S. at 17. The doctrine of the case boiled down to the proposition that
commerce was transportation only, a doctrine Justice Harlan undertook to refute in

his notable dissenting opinion. “Interstate commerce does not, therefore, consist in
transportation simply. It includes the purchase and sale of articles that are in-
tended to be transported from one State to another—every species of commercial
intercourse among the States and with foreign nations.” 156 U.S. at 22. “Any combi-
nation, therefore, that disturbs or unreasonably obstructs freedom in buying and
selling articles manufactured to be sold to persons in other States or to be carried
to other States—a freedom that cannot exist if the right to buy and sell is fettered
by unlawful restraints that crush out competition—affects, not incidentally, but di-
rectly, the people of all the States; and the remedy for such an evil is found only in
the exercise of powers confided to a government which, this court has said, was the
government of all, exercising powers delegated by all, representing all, acting for
all. McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 405.” 156 U.S. at 33.
880 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
881 196 U.S. 375 (1905). The Sherman Act was applied to break up combina-
tions of interstate carriers in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S.
290 (1897); United States v. Joint-Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898); and Northern
Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 (1904).
In Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 229–39
(1948), Justice Rutledge, for the Court, critically reviewed the jurisprudence of the
limitations on the act and the deconstruction of the judicial constraints. In recent
years, the Court’s decisions have permitted the reach of the Sherman Act to expand
along with the expanding notions of congressional power. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Copp Pav-
ing Co., 419 U.S. 186 (1974); Hospital Building Co. v. Rex Hospital Trustees, 425
U.S. 738 (1976); McLain v. Real Estate Bd. of New Orleans, 444 U.S. 232 (1980);
Summit Health, Ltd. v. Pinhas, 500 U.S. 322 (1991). The Court, however, does in-
sist that plaintiffs alleging that an intrastate activity violates the act prove the re-
lationship to interstate commerce set forth in the act. Gulf Oil Corp, 419 U.S. at
194–99.
The Expansive “Current of Commerce” Doctrine: The Swift

Case.—Defendants in Swift were some thirty firms engaged in Chi-
cago and other cities in the business of buying livestock in their
stockyards, converting it at their packing houses into fresh meat,
and selling and shipping such fresh meat to purchasers in other
states. The charge against them was that they had entered into a
combination to refrain from bidding against each other in the local
markets, to fix the prices at which they would sell, to restrict ship-
ments of meat, and to do other forbidden acts. The case was ap-
pealed to the Supreme Court on defendants’ contention that cer-
tain of the acts complained of were not acts of interstate commerce
and so did not fall within a valid reading of the Sherman Act. The
Court, however, sustained the government on the ground that the
“scheme as a whole” came within the act, and that the local activi-
ties alleged were simply part and parcel of this general scheme.882
Referring to the purchase of livestock at the stockyards, the Court,
speaking by Justice Holmes, said: “Commerce among the States is
not a technical legal conception, but a practical one, drawn from
the course of business. When cattle are sent for sale from a place
in one State, with the expectation that they will end their transit,
after purchase, in another, and when in effect they do so, with only
the interruption necessary to find a purchaser at the stockyards,
and when this is a typical, constantly recurring course, the current
thus existing is a current of commerce among the States, and the
purchase of the cattle is a part and incident of such commerce.” 883
Likewise the sales alleged of fresh meat at the slaughtering places
fell within the general design. Even if they imported a technical
passing of title at the slaughtering places, they also imported that
the sales were to persons in other states, and that shipments to
such states were part of the transaction.884 Thus, sales of the type
that in the Sugar Trust case, that had been thrust to one side as
immaterial from the point of view of the law because they merely
enabled the manufacturer “to fulfill its function,” were here treated
as merged in an interstate commerce stream.
Thus, the concept of commerce as trade, that is, as traffic, again
entered the constitutional law picture, with the result that condi-
tions directly affecting interstate trade could not be dismissed on
the ground that they affected interstate commerce, in the sense of
interstate transportation, only “indirectly.” Lastly, the Court added
these significant words: “But we do not mean to imply that the rule
which marks the point at which state taxation or regulation be-
882 Swift & Co. v. United States, 196 U.S. 375, 396 (1905).
883 196 U.S. at 398–99.
884 196 U.S. at 399–401.
comes permissible necessarily is beyond the scope of interference

by Congress in cases where such interference is deemed necessary
for the protection of commerce among the States.” 885 That is to say,
the line that confines state power from one side does not always
confine national power from the other. Even though the line accu-
rately divides the subject matter of the complementary spheres, na-
tional power is always entitled to take on the additional extension
that is requisite to guarantee its effective exercise and is further-
more supreme.
In this respect, the Swift case only stated what the Shreveport
case, discussed previously, was to later declare more explicitly re-
garding regulation of land transportation. This may also be said about
a line of cases started by the Danbury Hatters Case,886 in which a
union was found to violate the Sherman Act when, after failing to
organize employees of a manufacturer of hats, it called for a nation-
wide boycott of the company’s products. In these cases, combina-
tions of employees engaged in such intrastate activities as manufac-
turing, mining, building, construction, and the distribution of poultry
were subjected to the penalties of the Sherman Act because of the
effect or intended effect of their activities on interstate commerce.
Stockyards and Grain Futures Acts: The Swift Case Ap-
plied.— In 1921, Congress passed the Packers and Stockyards Act,887
whereby the business of commission men and livestock dealers in
the chief stockyards of the country was brought under national su-
pervision. In the year following, Congress passed the Grain Fu-
tures Act,888 whereby exchanges dealing in grain futures were sub-
jected to control. The decisions of the Court sustaining these measures
were built directly upon the Swift case.
In Stafford v. Wallace,889 which involved the former act, Chief
Justice Taft, speaking for the Court, said: “The object to be secured
by the act is the free and unburdened flow of livestock from the
ranges and farms of the West and Southwest through the great stock-
yards and slaughtering centers on the borders of that region, and
thence in the form of meat products to the consuming cities of the
885 196 U.S. at 400.
886 Loewe v. Lawlor (The Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274 (1908); Duplex
Printing Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921); Coronado Co. v. United Mine
Workers, 268 U.S. 295 (1925); United States v. Bruins, 272 U.S. 549 (1926); Bedford
Co. v. Stone Cutters Ass’n, 274 U.S. 37 (1927); Local 167 v. United States, 291 U.S.
293 (1934); Allen Bradley Co. v. Union, 325 U.S. 797 (1945); United States v. Em-
ploying Plasterers Ass’n, 347 U.S. 186 (1954); United States v. Green, 350 U.S. 415
(1956); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587 (1961).
887 42 Stat. 159, 7 U.S.C. §§ 171–183, 191–195, 201–203.
888 42 Stat. 998 (1922), 7 U.S.C. §§ 1–9, 10a-17.
889 258 U.S. 495 (1922).
country in the Middle West and East, or, still as livestock, to the
feeding places and fattening farms in the Middle West or East for
further preparation for the market.” 890 The stockyards, therefore,
were “not a place of rest or final destination.” They were “but a
throat through which the current flows,” and the sales there were
not “merely local transactions. . . . [T]hey do not stop the flow . . .
but, on the contrary, [are] indispensable to its continuity.” 891
In Chicago Board of Trade v. Olsen,892 involving the Grain Fu-
tures Act, the same course of reasoning was repeated. Speaking of
Swift, Chief Justice Taft remarked: “That case was a milestone in
the interpretation of the commerce clause of the Constitution. It rec-
ognized the great changes and development in the business of this
vast country and drew again the dividing line between interstate
and intrastate commerce where the Constitution intended it to be.
It refused to permit local incidents of a great interstate movement,
which taken alone are intrastate, to characterize the movement as
such.” 893
Of special significance, however, is the part of the opinion de-
voted to showing the relation between future sales and cash sales,
and hence the effect of the former upon the interstate grain trade.
The test, said the Chief Justice, was furnished by the question of
price. “The question of price dominates trade between the States.
Sales of an article which affect the country-wide price of the article
directly affect the country-wide commerce in it.” 894 Thus, a prac-
tice that demonstrably affects prices would also affect interstate trade
“directly,” and so, even though local in itself, would fall within the
regulatory power of Congress. In the following passage, indeed, Chief
Justice Taft whittled down, in both cases, the “direct-indirect” for-
mula to the vanishing point: “Whatever amounts to more or less
constant practice, and threatens to obstruct or unduly to burden
the freedom of interstate commerce is within the regulatory power
of Congress under the commerce clause, and it is primarily for Con-
gress to consider and decide the fact of the danger to meet it. This
court will certainly not substitute its judgment for that of Congress
in such a matter unless the relation of the subject to interstate com-
merce and its effect upon it are clearly nonexistent.” 895
890258 U.S. at 514.

891258 U.S. at 515–16. See also Lemke v. Farmers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922);
Minnesota v. Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933).
892 262 U.S. 1 (1923).
893 262 U.S. at 35.
894 262 U.S. at 40.
895 262 U.S. at 37, quoting Stafford v. Wallace, 258 U.S. 495, 521 (1922).
Congressional Regulation of Production and Labor:

Antidepression Legislation
In the words of Chief Justice Hughes, spoken in a case decided
a few days after President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first inaugura-
tion in 1933, the problem then confronting the new Administration
was clearly set forth. “When industry is grievously hurt, when pro-
ducing concerns fail, when unemployment mounts and communi-
ties dependent upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells
of commerce go dry.” 896 In the years immediately following, Con-
gress and the President, relying on the Swift doctrine, set to work
to combat the Depression. But, in fact, much of the legislation en-
acted at this time marked a wide advance upon the measures which
had previously been challenged and upheld. The new laws did not
stop with regulating traffic among the states and the instrumentali-
ties thereof, but attempted to govern production and industrial re-
lations. Confronted with this expansive exercise of Congress’ power,
the Court again deemed itself called upon to define a limit to the
commerce power that would save to the states their historical sphere,
and especially their customary monopoly of legislative power in re-
lation to industry and labor management.
Not all antidepression legislation, however, was of this new ap-
proach. For instance, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 897 and
the Public Utility Company Act (also known as the “Wheeler-
Rayburn Act”) of 1935 898 were not. The former created the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission, authorized it to lay down regula-
tions designed to keep dealing in securities honest and aboveboard,
and closed the channels of interstate commerce and the mail to deal-
ers refusing to register under the act. The latter required the com-
panies governed by it to register with the Securities and Exchange
Commission and to inform it concerning their business, organiza-
tion, and financial structure. Failure to do so would result in a pro-
hibition on the use of facilities of interstate commerce and the mail.
Section 11 of the same act, the so-called “death sentence” clause,
would close the channels of interstate communication after a cer-
tain date to certain types of public utility companies whose opera-
tions, Congress found, were calculated chiefly to exploit the invest-
ing and consuming public. All of these provisions were sustained,899
with the Court relying principally on Gibbons v. Ogden.
896 Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372 (1933).
897 48 Stat. 881, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77b et seq.
898 49 Stat. 803, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79–79z-6.
899 Electric Bond Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938); North American Co. v. SEC,
327 U.S. 686 (1946); American Power & Light Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90 (1946).
National Industrial Recovery Act and Agriculture Adjust-

ment Act.—The initial effort of Congress to deal with this situa-
tion was embodied in the National Industrial Recovery Act (NIRA)
of June 16, 1933.900 The opening section of the act asserted the ex-
istence of “a national emergency productive of widespread unem-
ployment and disorganization of industry which” burdened “inter-
state and foreign commerce,” affected “the public welfare,” and
undermined “the standards of living of the American people.” To af-
fect the removal of these conditions, the President was authorized,
upon the application of industrial or trade groups, to approve “codes
of fair competition” or to prescribe the same in cases where such
applications were not duly forthcoming. Among other things, such
codes, of which eventually more than 700 were promulgated, were
required to lay down rules of fair dealing with customers and to
furnish labor certain guarantees respecting hours, wages, and col-
lective bargaining. For the time being, business and industry were
to be cartelized on a national scale.
In A. L. A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,901 one of
these codes, the Live Poultry Code, was pronounced unconstitu-
tional. Although it was conceded that practically all poultry handled
by the Schechters came from outside the state, and hence via inter-
state commerce, the Court held, nevertheless, that once the chick-
ens came to rest in the Schechters’ wholesale market, interstate com-
merce in them ceased. The act, however, also purported to govern
business activities which “affected” interstate commerce. This, Chief
Justice Hughes held, must be taken to mean “directly” affect such
commerce: “the distinction between direct and indirect effects of in-
trastate transactions upon interstate commerce must be recognized
as a fundamental one, essential to the maintenance of our constitu-
tional system. Otherwise, . . . there would be virtually no limit to
the federal power and for all practical purposes we should have a
completely centralized government.” 902 In short, the case was gov-
erned by the ideology of the Sugar Trust case, although that case
was not mentioned in the Court’s opinion.903
900 48 Stat. 195.

901 295 U.S. 495 (1935).
902 295 U.S. at 548. See also id. at 546.
903 In United States v. Sullivan, 332 U.S. 689 (1948), the Court interpreted the
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 as applying to the sale by a retailer
of drugs purchased from his wholesaler within the state nine months after their
interstate shipment had been completed. The Court, speaking by Justice Black, cited
United States v. Walsh, 331 U.S. 432 (1947); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942);
United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110 (1942); United States v. Darby,
312 U.S. 100 (1941). Justice Frankfurter dissented on the basis of FTC v. Bunte
Bros., 312 U.S. 349 (1941). It is apparent that the Schechter case has been thor-
Congress’ second attempt to combat the Depression was the Ag-

ricultural Adjustment Act of 1933.904 As discussed elsewhere,905 the
measure was set aside as an attempt to regulate production, a sub-
ject held to be “prohibited” to the United States by the Tenth Amend-
ment.906
Bituminous Coal Conservation Act.—The third measure to
be disallowed was the Guffey-Snyder Bituminous Coal Conserva-
tion Act of 1935.907 The statute created a mechanism for the regu-
lation of the price of soft coal, both that sold in interstate com-
merce and that sold “locally,” and also provided for mechanisms to
regulate hours of labor and wages in mines. The clauses of the act
dealing with these two different matters were declared by the act
itself to be separable so that the invalidity of the one set would not
affect the validity of the other. This strategy, however, was ineffec-
tual. A majority of the Court, speaking by Justice Sutherland, held
that the act constituted one connected scheme of regulation, which,
because it invaded the reserved powers of the states over condi-
tions of employment in productive industry, violated the Constitu-
tion.908
Justice Sutherland’s opinion started from Chief Justice Hughes’
assertion in the Schechter case of the “fundamental” character of
the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects—that is to say,
from the doctrine of the Sugar Trust case. It then proceeded:
Much stress is put upon the evils which come from the struggle be-
tween employers and employees over the matter of wages, working condi-
tions, the right of collective bargaining, etc., and the resulting strikes, cur-
tailment and irregularity of production and effect on prices; and it is insisted
that interstate commerce is greatly affected thereby. But . . . the conclusive
answer is that the evils are all local evils over which the Federal Govern-
ment has no legislative control. The relation of employer and employee is a
local relation. At common law, it is one of the domestic relations. The wages
are paid for the doing of local work. Working conditions are obviously local
conditions. The employees are not engaged in or about commerce, but exclu-
oughly repudiated so far as the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects is
concerned. Cf. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). See also McDermott v.
Wisconsin, 228 U.S. 115 (1913), which preceded Schechter by more than two de-
cades.
The NIRA, however, was found to have several other constitutional infirmities
besides its disregard, as illustrated by the Live Poultry Code, of the “fundamental”
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects, namely, the delegation of standard-
less legislative power, the absence of any administrative procedural safeguards, the
absence of judicial review, and the dominant role played by private groups in the
general scheme of regulation.
904 48 Stat. 31.
905 See Spending for the General Welfare, Conditional Grants-in-Aid, supra.
906 United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 63–64, 68 (1936).
907 49 Stat. 991.
908 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
sively in producing a commodity. And the controversies and evils, which it

is the object of the act to regulate and minimize, are local controversies and
evils affecting local work undertaken to accomplish that local result. Such
effect as they may have upon commerce, however extensive it may be, is
secondary and indirect. An increase in the greatness of the effect adds to
its importance. It does not alter its character.909
Railroad Retirement Act.—Still pursuing the idea of protect-
ing commerce and the labor engaged in it, Congress passed the Rail-
road Retirement Act of June 27, 1934 910 which provided for the com-
pulsory retirement of superannuated employees of interstate carriers,
and provided that they be paid pensions out of a fund consisting of
compulsory contributions from the carriers and their present and
future employees. In Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R.,911 how-
ever, a closely divided Court held this legislation to be in excess of
Congress’ power to regulate commerce and contrary to the Due Pro-
cess Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Justice Roberts wrote for the
majority: “We feel bound to hold that a pension plan thus imposed
is in no proper sense a regulation of the activity of interstate trans-
portation. It is an attempt for social ends to impose by sheer fiat
noncontractual incidents upon the relation of employer and em-
ployee, not as a rule or regulation of commerce and transportation
between the States, but as a means of assuring a particular class
of employees against old age dependency. This is neither a neces-
sary nor an appropriate rule or regulation affecting the due fulfill-
ment of the railroads’ duty to serve the public in interstate trans-
portation.” 912
Chief Justice Hughes, speaking for the dissenters, contended,
on the contrary, that “the morale of the employees [had] an impor-
tant bearing upon the efficiency of the transportation service.” He
added: “The fundamental consideration which supports this type of
legislation is that industry should take care of its human wastage,
whether that is due to accident or age. That view cannot be dis-
missed as arbitrary or capricious. It is a reasoned conviction based
upon abundant experience. The expression of that conviction in law
is regulation. When expressed in the government of interstate car-
riers, with respect to their employees likewise engaged in inter-
state commerce, it is a regulation of that commerce. As such, so far
as the subject matter is concerned, the commerce clause should be
held applicable.” 913
909 298 U.S. at 308–09.

910 48 Stat. 1283.
911 295 U.S. 330 (1935).
912 295 U.S. at 374.
913 295 U.S. at 379, 384.
Under subsequent legislation, an excise was levied on inter-

state carriers and their employees, while by separate but parallel
legislation a fund was created in the Treasury out of which pen-
sions were paid along the lines of the original plan. The constitu-
tionality of this scheme appears to have been taken for granted in
Railroad Retirement Board v. Duquesne Warehouse Co.914
National Labor Relations Act.—The case in which the Court
reduced the distinction between “direct” and “indirect” effects to the
vanishing point and thereby placed Congress in the position to regu-
late productive industry and labor relations in these industries was
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation.915 Here the statute
involved was the National Labor Relations Act of 1935,916 which de-
clared the right of workers to organize, forbade unlawful employer
interference with this right, established procedures by which work-
ers could choose exclusive bargaining representatives with which
employers were required to bargain, and created a board to over-
see all these processes.917
The Court, speaking through Chief Justice Hughes, upheld the
act and found the corporation to be subject to the act. “The close
914 326 U.S. 446 (1946). Indeed, in a case decided in June 1948, Justice Rutledge,
speaking for a majority of the Court, listed the Alton case as one “foredoomed to
reversal,” though the formal reversal has never taken place. See Mandeville Island
Farms v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 230 (1948). Cf. Usery v. Turner
Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1, 19 (1976).
915 301 U.S. 1 (1937). A major political event had intervened between this deci-
sion and those described in the preceding pages. President Roosevelt, angered at
the Court’s invalidation of much of his Depression program, proposed a “reorganiza-
tion” of the Court by which he would have been enabled to name one new Justice
for each Justice on the Court who was more than 70 years old, in the name of “judi-
cial efficiency.” The plan was defeated in the Senate, in part, perhaps, because in
such cases as Jones & Laughlin a Court majority began to demonstrate sufficient
“judicial efficiency.” See Leuchtenberg, The Origins of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Court-
Packing’ Plan,” 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 347 (P. Kurland ed.); Mason, Harlan Fiske Stone
and FDR’s Court Plan, 61 YALE L. J. 791 (1952); 2 M. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
759–765 (1951).
916 49 Stat. 449, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
917 The NLRA was enacted against the backdrop of Depression, although obvi-
ously it went far beyond being a mere antidepression measure, and Congress could
find precedent in railway labor legislation. In 1898, Congress passed the Erdman
Act, 30 Stat. 424, which attempted to influence the unionization of railroad workers
and facilitate negotiations with employers through mediation. The statute fell largely
into disuse because the railroads refused to mediate. Additionally, in Adair v. United
States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the Court struck down a section of the law outlawing
“yellow-dog contracts,” by which employers exacted promises of workers to quit or
not to join unions as a condition of employment. The Court held the section not to
be a regulation of commerce, there being no connection between an employee’s mem-
bership in a union and the carrying on of interstate commerce. Cf. Coppage v. Kan-
sas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
In Wilson v. New, 243 U.S. 332 (1917), the Court did uphold a congressional
settlement of a threatened rail strike through the enactment of an eight-hour day
and time-and-a-half pay for overtime for all interstate railway employees. The na-
and intimate effect,” he said, “which brings the subject within the
reach of federal power may be due to activities in relation to pro-
ductive industry although the industry when separately viewed is
local.” Nor will it do to say that such effect is “indirect.” Consider-
ing defendant’s “far-flung activities,” the effect of strife between it
and its employees “would be immediate and [it] might be cata-
strophic. We are asked to shut our eyes to the plainest facts of our
national life and to deal with the question of direct and indirect
effects in an intellectual vacuum. . . . When industries organize them-
selves on a national scale, making their relation to interstate com-
merce the dominant factor in their activities, how can it be main-
tained that their industrial labor relations constitute a forbidden
field into which Congress may not enter when it is necessary to
protect interstate commerce from the paralyzing consequences of in-
dustrial war? We have often said that interstate commerce itself is
a practical conception. It is equally true that interferences with that
commerce must be appraised by a judgment that does not ignore
actual experience.” 918
While the act was thus held to be within the constitutional pow-
ers of Congress in relation to a productive concern because the in-
terruption of its business by strike “might be catastrophic,” the de-
cision was forthwith held to apply also to two relatively minor
businesses.919 In a later case, the Court stated specifically that the
smallness of the volume of commerce affected in any particular case
is not a material consideration.920 Subsequently, the act was de-
clared to be applicable to a local retail auto dealer on the ground
that he was an integral part of the manufacturer’s national distri-
bution system 921 and to a labor dispute arising during alteration of
tional emergency confronting the nation was cited by the Court, but with the impli-
cation that the power existed in more normal times, suggesting that Congress’ pow-
ers were not as limited as some judicial decisions had indicated.
Congress’ enactment of the Railway Labor Act in 1926, 44 Stat. 577, as amended,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq., was sustained by a Court decision admitting the connection
between interstate commerce and union membership as a substantial one. Texas &
N.L.R. Co. v. Brotherhood of Railway Clerks, 281 U.S. 548 (1930). A subsequent de-
cision sustained the application of the act to “back shop” employees of an interstate
carrier who engaged in making heavy repairs on locomotives and cars withdrawn
from service for long periods, the Court finding that the activities of these employ-
ees were related to interstate commerce. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40,
300 U.S. 515 (1937).
918 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 38, 41–42 (1937).
919 NLRB v. Fruehauf Trailer Co., 301 U.S. 49 (1937); NLRB v. Friedman-Harry
Marks Clothing Co., 301 U.S. 58 (1937).

920 NLRB v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 606 (1939).
921 Howell Chevrolet Co. v. NLRB, 346 U.S. 482 (1953).
a county courthouse because one-half of the cost—$225,000—was

attributable to materials shipped from out of state.922
The act was even applied to a retail distributor of fuel oil, all
of whose sales were local, but who obtained the oil from a whole-
saler who imported it from another state.923 Indeed, “[t]his Court
has consistently declared that in passing the National Labor Rela-
tions Act, Congress intended to and did vest in the Board the full-
est jurisdictional breadth constitutionally permissible under the Com-
merce Clause.” 924 Thus, the Board formulated jurisdictional standards
which assumed the requisite effect on interstate commerce from a
prescribed dollar volume of business and these standards have been
implicitly approved by the Court.925
Fair Labor Standards Act.—In 1938, Congress enacted the
Fair Labor Standards Act. The measure prohibited not only the ship-
ment in interstate commerce of goods manufactured by employees
whose wages are less than the prescribed maximum but also the
employment of workers in the production of goods for such com-
merce at other than the prescribed wages and hours. Interstate com-
merce was defined by the act to mean “trade, commerce, transpor-
tation, transmission, or communication among the several States
or from any State to any place outside thereof.” It was further pro-
vided that “for the purposes of this act an employee shall be deemed
to have been engaged in the production of goods [that is, for inter-
state commerce] if such employee was employed . . . in any process
or occupation directly essential to the production thereof in any
State.” 926
Sustaining an indictment under the act, a unanimous Court,
speaking through Chief Justice Stone, said: “The motive and pur-
pose of the present regulation are plainly to make effective the con-
922 Journeymen Plumbers’ Union v. County of Door, 359 U.S. 354 (1959).
923 NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Co., 371 U.S. 224 (1963).
924 371 U.S. at 226. See also Guss v. Utah Labor Bd., 353 U.S. 1, 3 (1957); NLRB
v. Fainblatt, 306 U.S. 601, 607 (1939).

925 NLRB v. Reliance Fuel Oil Co., 371 U.S. 224, 225 n.2 (1963); Liner v. Jafco,
375 U.S. 301, 303 n.2 (1964).

926 52 Stat. 1060, as amended, 63 Stat. 910 (1949). The 1949 amendment substi-
tuted the phrase “in any process or occupation directly essential to the production
thereof in any State” for the original phrase “in any process or occupation necessary
to the production thereof in any State.” In Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S.
310, 317 (1960), the Court noted that the change “manifests the view of Congress
that on occasion courts . . . had found activities to be covered, which . . . [Congress
now] deemed too remote from commerce or too incidental to it.” The 1961 amend-
ments to the act, 75 Stat. 65, departed from previous practices of extending cover-
age to employees individually connected to interstate commerce to cover all employ-
ees of any “enterprise” engaged in commerce or production of commerce; thus, there
was an expansion of employees covered but not, of course, of employers, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 201 et seq. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r), 203(s), 206(a), 207(a).
gressional conception of public policy that interstate commerce should

not be made the instrument of competition in the distribution of
goods produced under substandard labor conditions, which competi-
tion is injurious to the commerce and to the States from and to which
the commerce flows.” 927 In support of the decision, the Court in-
voked Chief Justice Marshall’s reading of the Necessary and Proper
Clause in McCulloch v. Maryland and his reading of the Commerce
Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden.928 Objections based on the Tenth Amend-
ment were met with the same point of view: “Our conclusion is un-
affected by the Tenth Amendment which provides: ‘The powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited
by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the
people.’ The amendment states but a truism that all is retained which
has not been surrendered. There is nothing in the history of its adop-
tion to suggest that it was more than declaratory of the relation-
ship between the national and State governments as it had been
established by the Constitution before the amendment or that its
purpose was other than to allay fears that the new National Gov-
ernment might seek to exercise powers not granted, and that the
States might not be able to exercise fully their reserved pow-
ers.” 929
Subsequent decisions of the Court took a very broad view of which
employees should be covered by the act,930 and in 1949 Congress to
some degree narrowed the permissible range of coverage and disap-
proved some of the Court’s decisions.931 But, in 1961,932 with exten-
sions in 1966,933 Congress itself expanded by several million per-
sons the coverage of the act, introducing the “enterprise” concept
by which all employees in a business producing anything in com-
927 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 115 (1941).
928 312 U.S. at 113, 114, 118.
929 312 U.S. at 123–24.
930 E.g., Kirschbaum v. Walling, 316 U.S. 517 (1942) (operating and mainte-
nance employees of building, part of which was rented to business producing goods
for interstate commerce); Walton v. Southern Package Corp., 320 U.S. 540 (1944)
(night watchman in a plant the substantial portion of the production of which was
shipped in interstate commerce); Armour & Co. v. Wantock, 323 U.S. 126 (1944) (em-
ployees on standby auxiliary firefighting service of an employer engaged in inter-
state commerce); Borden Co. v. Borella, 325 U.S. 679 (1945) (maintenance employ-
ees in building housing company’s central offices where management was located
though the production of interstate commerce was elsewhere); Martino v. Michigan
Window Cleaning Co., 327 U.S. 173 (1946) (employees of a window-cleaning com-
pany, the principal business of which was performed on windows of industrial plants
producing goods for interstate commerce); Mitchell v. Lublin, McGaughy & Associ-
ates, 358 U.S. 207 (1959) (nonprofessional employees of architectural firm working
on plans for construction of air bases, bus terminals, and radio facilities).
931 Cf. Mitchell v. H.B. Zachry Co., 362 U.S. 310, 316–318 (1960).
932 75 Stat. 65.
933 80 Stat. 830.
merce or affecting commerce were brought within the protection of

the minimum wage-maximum hours standards.934 The “enterprise
concept” was sustained by the Court in Maryland v. Wirtz.935 Jus-
tice Harlan for a unanimous Court on this issue found the exten-
sion entirely proper on the basis of two theories: one, a business’s
competitive position in commerce is determined in part by all its
significant labor costs, and not just those costs attributable to its
employees engaged in production in interstate commerce, and, two,
labor peace and thus smooth functioning of interstate commerce were
facilitated by the termination of substandard labor conditions affect-
ing all employees, and not just those actually engaged in interstate
commerce.936
Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act.—After its initial frus-
trations, Congress returned to the task of bolstering agriculture by
passing the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of June 3, 1937,937
authorizing the Secretary of Agriculture to fix the minimum prices
of certain agricultural products, when the handling of such prod-
ucts occurs “in the current of interstate or foreign commerce or . . .
directly burdens, obstructs or affects interstate or foreign com-
merce in such commodity or product thereof.” In United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co.,938 the Court sustained an order of the Sec-
retary of Agriculture fixing the minimum prices to be paid to pro-
ducers of milk in the Chicago “marketing area.” The dairy com-
pany demurred to the regulation on the ground it applied to milk
produced and sold intrastate. Sustaining the order, the Court said:
Congress plainly has power to regulate the price of milk distributed through
the medium of interstate commerce . . . and it possesses every power needed
to make that regulation effective. The commerce power is not confined in
its exercise to the regulation of commerce among the States. It extends to
those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce, or the exer-
tion of the power of Congress over it, as to make regulation of them appro-
priate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the effective execution
of the granted power to regulate interstate commerce. The power of Con-
gress over interstate commerce is plenary and complete in itself, may be
exercised to its utmost extent, and acknowledges no limitations other than
are prescribed in the Constitution. . . . It follows that no form of State ac-
tivity can constitutionally thwart the regulatory power granted by the com-
934 29 U.S.C. §§ 203(r), 203(s).

935 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
936 Another aspect of this case was overruled in National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), which itself was overruled in Garcia v. San Antonio Met-
ropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
937 50 Stat. 246, 7 U.S.C. §§ 601 et seq.
938 315 U.S. 110 (1942). The Court had previously upheld other legislation that
regulated agricultural production through limitations on sales in or affecting inter-

state commerce. Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Mulford v. Smith, 307 U.S. 38
(1939).
merce clause to Congress. Hence the reach of that power extends to those
intrastate activities which in a substantial way interfere with or obstruct
the exercise of the granted power.939
In Wickard v. Filburn,940 the Court sustained a still deeper pen-

etration by Congress into the field of production. As amended by
the act of 1941, the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 941 regu-
lated production even when not intended for commerce but wholly
for consumption on the producer’s farm. Sustaining this extension
of the act, the Court pointed out that the effect of the statute was
to support the market. “It can hardly be denied that a factor of such
volume and variability as home-consumed wheat would have a sub-
stantial influence on price and market conditions. This may arise
because being in marketable condition such wheat overhangs the
market and, if induced by rising prices, tends to flow into the mar-
ket and check price increases. But if we assume that it is never
marketed, it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would
otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market. Home-
grown wheat in this sense competes with wheat in commerce. The
stimulation of commerce is a use of the regulatory function quite
as definitely as prohibitions or restrictions thereon. This record leaves
us in no doubt that Congress may properly have considered that
wheat consumed on the farm grown, if wholly outside the scheme
of regulation, would have a substantial effect in defeating and ob-
structing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at increased prices.” 942
And, it elsewhere stated “that questions of the power of Congress
are not to be decided by reference to any formula which would give
controlling force to nomenclature such as ‘production’ and ‘indirect’
and foreclose consideration of the actual effects of the activity in
question upon interstate commerce. . . . The Court’s recognition of
the relevance of the economic effects in the application of the Com-
merce Clause . . . has made the mechanical application of legal for-
mulas no longer feasible.” 943
939 315 U.S. at 118–19.

940 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
941 52 Stat. 31, 7 U.S.C. §§ 612c, 1281–1282 et seq.
942 317 U.S. at 128–29.
943 317 U.S. at 120, 123–24. In United States v. Rock Royal Co-operative, Inc.,
307 U.S. 533 (1939), the Court sustained an order under the Agricultural Market-
ing Agreement Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 246, regulating the price of milk in certain in-
stances. Justice Reed wrote for the majority of the Court: “The challenge is to the
regulation ‘of the price to be paid upon the sale by a dairy farmer who delivers his
milk to some country plant.’ It is urged that the sale, a local transaction, is fully
completed before any interstate commerce begins and that the attempt to fix the
price or other elements of that incident violates the Tenth Amendment. But where
commodities are bought for use beyond state lines, the sale is a part of interstate
commerce. We have likewise held that where sales for interstate transportation were
commingled with intrastate transactions, the existence of the local activity did not
Congressional Prohibitions on Foreign Commerce

Jefferson’s Embargo.—“Jefferson’s Embargo” of 1807–1808, which
cut off all trade with Europe, was attacked on the ground that the
power to regulate commerce was the power to preserve it, not the
power to destroy it. This argument was rejected by Judge Davis of
the United States District Court for Massachusetts in the following
words:
A national sovereignty is created [by the Constitution]. Not an unlim-
ited sovereignty, but a sovereignty, as to the objects surrendered and speci-
fied, limited only by the qualification and restrictions, expressed in the Con-
stitution. Commerce is one of those objects. The care, protection, management
and control, of this great national concern, is, in my opinion, vested by the
Constitution, in the Congress of the United States; and their power is sov-
ereign, relative to commercial intercourse, qualified by the limitations and
restrictions, expressed in that instrument, and by the treaty making power
of the President and Senate. . . . Power to regulate, it is said, cannot be
understood to give a power to annihilate. To this it may be replied, that the
acts under consideration, though of very ample extent, do not operate as a
prohibition of all foreign commerce. It will be admitted that partial prohibi-
tions are authorized by the expression; and how shall the degree, or extent,
of the prohibition be adjusted, but by the discretion of the National Govern-
ment, to whom the subject appears to be committed? . . . The term does
not necessarily include shipping or navigation; much less does it include
the fisheries. Yet it never has contended, that they are not the proper ob-
jects of national regulation; and several acts of Congress have been made
respecting them. . . . [Furthermore] if it be admitted that national regula-
tions relative to commerce, may apply it as an instrument, and are not nec-
essarily confined to its direct aid and advancement, the sphere of legisla-
tive discretion is, of course, more widely extended; and, in time of war, or
of great impending peril, it must take a still more expanded range.
Congress has power to declare war. It, of course, has power to prepare
for war; and the time, the manner, and the measure, in the application of
constitutional means, seem to be left to its wisdom and discretion. . . . Un-
der the Confederation, . . . we find an express reservation to the State leg-
islatures of the power to pass prohibitory commercial laws, and, as respects
exportations, without any limitations. Some of them exercised this power. . . .
Unless Congress, by the Constitution, possess the power in question, it still
exists in the State legislatures—but this has never been claimed or pre-
tended, since the adoption of the Federal Constitution; and the exercise of
such a power by the States, would be manifestly inconsistent with the power,
vested by the people in Congress, ‘to regulate commerce.’ Hence I infer, that
the power, reserved to the States by the articles of Confederation, is surren-
interfere with the federal power to regulate inspection of the whole. Activities con-
ducted within state lines do not by this fact alone escape the sweep of the Com-
merce Clause. Interstate commerce may be dependent upon them. Power to estab-
lish quotas for interstate marketing gives power to name quotas for that which is to
be left within the state of production. Where local and foreign milk alike are drawn
into a general plan for protecting the interstate commerce in the commodity from
the interferences, burdens and obstructions, arising from excessive surplus and the
social and sanitary evils of low values, the power of the Congress extends also to
the local sales.” Id. at 568–69.
dered to Congress, by the Constitution; unless we suppose, that, by some

strange process, it has been merged or extinguished, and now exists no-
where.944
Banned Articles and Protective Tariffs.—The forerunners of

more recent acts excluding objectionable commodities from inter-
state commerce are the laws forbidding the importation of like com-
modities from abroad. Congress has exercised this power since 1842,
when it forbade the importation of obscene literature or pictures
from abroad.945 Six years, later it passed an act “to prevent the im-
portation of spurious and adulterated drugs” and to provide a sys-
tem of inspection to make the prohibition effective.946 Such legisla-
tion guarding against the importation of noxiously adulterated foods,
drugs, or liquor has been on the statute books ever since. In 1887,
the importation by Chinese nationals of opium was prohibited,947
and subsequent statutes passed in 1909 and 1914 made it unlaw-
ful for anyone to import it.948 In 1897, Congress forbade the impor-
tation of any tea “inferior in purity, quality, and fitness for consump-
tion” as compared with a legal standard.949 The act was sustained
in 1904, in Buttfield v. Stranahan.950 In “The Abby Dodge” an act
excluding sponges taken by means of diving or diving apparatus
from the waters of the Gulf of Mexico or Straits of Florida was sus-
tained but construed as not applying to sponges taken from the ter-
ritorial water of a state.951
In Weber v. Freed,952 the Court upheld an act prohibiting the
importation and interstate transportation of prize-fight films or of
pictorial representation of prize fights. Chief Justice White grounded
his opinion for a unanimous Court on the complete and total con-
trol over foreign commerce possessed by Congress, in contrast im-
plicitly to its lesser power over interstate commerce.953 And, in Brolan
v. United States,954 the Court rejected as wholly inappropriate the
citation of cases dealing with interstate commerce on the question
of Congress’ power to prohibit foreign commerce. It has been ear-
944 United States v. The William, 28 Fed. Cas. 614, 620–623 (No. 16,700) (D.
Mass. 1808). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 191 (1824); United
States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560 (1850).
945 Ch. 270, § 28, 5 Stat. 566.
946 9 Stat. 237 (1848).
947 24 Stat. 409.
948 35 Stat. 614; 38 Stat. 275.
949 29 Stat. 605.
950 192 U.S. 470 (1904).
951 223 U.S. 166 (1912); cf. United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
952 239 U.S. 325 (1915).
953 239 U.S. at 329.
954 236 U.S. 216 (1915).
lier noted, however, that the purported distinction is one that the
Court both previously to and subsequent to these opinions has re-
jected.
Tariff laws have customarily contained prohibitory provisions,
and such provisions have been sustained by the Court under Con-
gress’ revenue powers and under its power to regulate foreign com-
merce. For the Court in Board of Trustees v. United States,955 in
1933, Chief Justice Hughes said: “The Congress may determine what
articles may be imported into this country and the terms upon which
importation is permitted. No one can be said to have a vested right
to carry on foreign commerce with the United States. . . . It is true
that the taxing power is a distinct power; that it is distinct from
the power to regulate commerce. . . . It is also true that the taxing
power embraces the power to lay duties. Art. I, § 8, par. 1. But be-
cause the taxing power is a distinct power and embraces the power
to lay duties, it does not follow that duties may not be imposed in
the exercise of the power to regulate commerce. The contrary is well
established. Gibbons v. Ogden, supra, p. 202. ‘Under the power to
regulate foreign commerce Congress imposed duties on importa-
tions, gives drawbacks, passes embargo and non-intercourse laws,
and makes all other regulations necessary to navigation, to the safety
of passengers, and the protection of property.’ Groves v. Slaughter,
15 Pet. 449, 505. The laying of duties is ‘a common means of execut-
ing the power.’ 2 Story on the Constitution, 1088.” 956
Congressional Prohibitions on Interstate Commerce

Background.—The question whether Congress’ power to regu-
late commerce “among the several States” embraced the power to
prohibit it furnished the topic of one of the most protracted de-
bates in the entire history of the Constitution’s interpretation. The
issue was put forward by Henry Clay as early as 1841 when, in an
argument before the Court, he raised the specter of an act of Con-
gress forbidding the interstate slave trade.957 Development of rel-
evant case law is set forth in the majority and dissenting opinions
in Hammer v. Dagenhart,958 where, in a five-to-four decision, the
Court held that only products such as diseased cattle or lottery tick-
ets—which were considered inherently harmful—could be prohib-
ited from interstate commerce. Goods made from child labor, on the
other hand, could not be banned based solely on their means of pro-
duction, since Congress’ power was to regulate commerce, not to pro-
955 289 U.S. 48 (1933).
956 289 U.S. at 57, 58.
957 Groves v. Slaughter, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 449, 488–89 (1841).
958 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
hibit it. The debate was concluded in 1941 by the decision in United
States v. Darby,959 which sustained a prohibition on the shipping of
goods produced in violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act.960 The
final resolution of this debate in favor of congressional power is an
event of first importance for the future of American federalism.
The earliest acts prohibiting commerce were in the nature of
quarantine regulations and usually dealt solely with interstate trans-
portation. In 1884, the exportation or shipment in interstate com-
merce of livestock having any infectious disease was forbidden.961
In 1903, power was conferred upon the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish regulations to prevent the spread of such diseases through
foreign or interstate commerce.962 In 1905, the same official was au-
thorized to lay an absolute embargo or quarantine upon all ship-
ments of cattle from one state to another when the public necessity
might demand it.963 A statute passed in 1905 forbade the transpor-
tation in foreign and interstate commerce and the mails of certain
varieties of moths, plant lice, and other insect pests injurious to
plant crops, trees, and other vegetation.964 In 1912, a similar exclu-
sion of diseased nursery stock was decreed,965 while by the same
act and again by an act of 1917,966 the Secretary of Agriculture was
invested with powers of quarantine, similar to those for animals
described above, for the protection of plant life from disease. Al-
though the Supreme Court originally held federal quarantine regu-
lations of this sort to be constitutionally inapplicable to intrastate
shipments of livestock, on the ground that federal authority ex-
tends only to foreign and interstate commerce,967 this view has to-
day been abandoned.
The Lottery Case.—The first case to come before the Court in
which the issues discussed above were canvassed at all thoroughly
was Champion v. Ames,968 involving the act of 1895 “for the sup-
pression of lotteries.” 969 An earlier act excluding lottery tickets from
959 312 U.S. 100 (1941).

960 312 U.S. 100, 112–24 (1941), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart. See also Corwin,
The Power of Congress to Prohibit Commerce, 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW 103 (1938).
961 23 Stat. 31.
962 32 Stat. 791.
963 33 Stat. 1264.
964 33 Stat. 1269.
965 37 Stat. 315.
966 39 Stat. 1165.
967 Illinois Central R.R. v. McKendree, 203 U.S. 514 (1906). See also United States
v. DeWitt, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 41 (1870).

968 Lottery Case (Champion v. Ames), 188 U.S. 321 (1903).
969 28 Stat. 963.
the mail had been upheld in the case In re Rapier,970 on the propo-
sition that Congress clearly had the power to see that the very fa-
cilities furnished by it were not put to bad use. But in the case of
commerce, the facilities are not ordinarily furnished by the Na-
tional Government, and the right to engage in foreign and inter-
state commerce comes from the Constitution itself or precedes it.
How difficult the Court found the question produced by the act
of 1895, forbidding any person to bring within the United States or
to cause to be “carried from one State to another” any lottery ticket,
or an equivalent thereof, “for the purpose of disposing of the same,”
was shown by the fact that the case was argued three times before
the Court and the fact that the Court’s decision finally sustaining
the act was a five-to-four decision. The opinion of the Court, on the
other hand, prepared by Justice Harlan, marked an almost unquali-
fied triumph at the time for the view that Congress’ power to regu-
late commerce among the states included the power to prohibit it,
especially to supplement and support state legislation enacted un-
der the police power. Early in the opinion, extensive quotation is
made from Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Gibbons v. Ogden,971
with special stress upon the definition there given of the phrase “to
regulate.” Justice Johnson’s assertion on the same occasion is also
given: “The power of a sovereign State over commerce, . . . amounts
to nothing more than a power to limit and restrain it at pleasure.”
Further along is quoted with evident approval Justice Bradley’s state-
ment in Brown v. Houston,972 that “[t]he power to regulate com-
merce among the several States is granted to Congress in terms as
absolute as is the power to regulate commerce with foreign na-
tions.”
Following the wake of the Lottery Case, Congress repeatedly
brought its prohibitory powers over interstate commerce and com-
munications to the support of certain local policies of the states,
thereby aiding them in the repression of a variety of acts and deeds
objectionable to public morality. The conception of the federal sys-
tem on which the Court based its validation of this legislation was
stated by it in 1913 in sustaining the Mann “White Slave” Act in
the following words: “Our dual form of government has its perplexi-
ties, State and Nation having different spheres of jurisdiction . . .
but it must be kept in mind that we are one people; and the pow-
ers reserved to the States and those conferred on the Nation are
adapted to be exercised, whether independently or concurrently, to
970 143 U.S. 110 (1892).

971 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 227 (1824).
972 114 U.S. 622, 630 (1885).
promote the general welfare, material, and moral.” 973 At the same
time, the Court made it plain that in prohibiting commerce among
the states, Congress was equally free to support state legislative
policy or to devise a policy of its own. “Congress,” it said, “may ex-
ercise this authority in aid of the policy of the State, if it sees fit to
do so. It is equally clear that the policy of Congress acting indepen-
dently of the States may induce legislation without reference to the
particular policy or law of any given State. Acting within the au-
thority conferred by the Constitution it is for Congress to deter-
mine what legislation will attain its purpose. The control of Con-
gress over interstate commerce is not to be limited by State laws.” 974
In Brooks v. United States,975 the Court sustained the National
Motor Vehicle Theft Act 976 as a measure protective of owners of au-
tomobiles—that is, of interests in “the State of origin.” The statute
was designed to repress automobile thefts, notwithstanding that such
thefts antedate the interstate transportation of the article stolen.
Speaking for the Court, Chief Justice Taft, at the outset, stated the
general proposition that “Congress can certainly regulate inter-
state commerce to the extent of forbidding and punishing the use
of such commerce as an agency to promote immorality, dishonesty,
or the spread of any evil or harm to the people of other States from
the State of origin.” Noting “the radical change in transportation”
brought about by the automobile, and the rise of “[e]laborately or-
ganized conspiracies for the theft of automobiles . . . and their sale
or other disposition” in another jurisdiction from the owner’s, the
Court concluded that such activity “is a gross misuse of interstate
commerce. Congress may properly punish such interstate transpor-
tation by anyone with knowledge of the theft, because of its harm-
ful result and its defeat of the property rights of those whose ma-
chines against their will are taken into other jurisdictions.” The fact
that stolen vehicles were “harmless” and did not spread harm to
persons in other states on this occasion was not deemed to present
any obstacle to the exercise of the regulatory power of Congress.977
The Darby Case.—In sustaining the Fair Labor Standards Act 978
in 1941,979 the Court expressly overruled Hammer v. Dagenhart.980
“The distinction on which the [latter case] . . . was rested that Con-
973 Hoke v. United States, 227 U.S. 308, 322 (1913).
974 United States v. Hill, 248 U.S. 420, 425 (1919).
975 267 U.S. 432 (1925).
976 41 Stat. 324 (1919), 18 U.S.C., §§ 2311–2313.
977 267 U.S. at 436–39. See also Kentucky Whip & Collar Co. v. Ill. Cent. R.R.,
299 U.S. 334 (1937).

978 29 U.S.C. §§ 201–219.
979 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
980 247 U.S. 251 (1918).
gressional power to prohibit interstate commerce is limited to ar-

ticles which in themselves have some harmful or deleterious prop-
erty—a distinction which was novel when made and unsupported
by any provision of the Constitution—has long since been aban-
doned. . . . The thesis of the opinion that the motive of the prohibi-
tion or its effect to control in some measure the use or production
within the States of the article thus excluded from the commerce
can operate to deprive the regulation of its constitutional authority
has long since ceased to have force. . . . The conclusion is inescap-
able that Hammer v. Dagenhart, was a departure from the prin-
ciples which have prevailed in the interpretation of the Commerce
Clause both before and since the decision and that such vitality, as
a precedent, as it then had has long since been exhausted. It should
be and now is overruled.” 981
Congressional Regulation of Civil Rights

It had been generally established some time ago that Congress
had power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit racial discrimi-
nation in the use of the channels of commerce.982 The power under
the clause to forbid discrimination within the states was firmly and
unanimously sustained by the Court when Congress in 1964 en-
acted a comprehensive measure outlawing discrimination because
of race or color in access to public accommodations with a requisite
connection to interstate commerce.983 Hotels and motels were de-
clared covered—that is, declared to “affect commerce”—if they pro-
vided lodging to transient guests; restaurants, cafeterias, and the
like, were covered only if they served or offered to serve interstate
travelers or if a substantial portion of the food they served had moved
in commerce.984 The Court sustained the act as applied to a down-
town Atlanta motel that did serve interstate travelers,985 to an out-
of-the-way restaurant in Birmingham that catered to a local clien-
tele but had spent 46 percent of its previous year’s out-go on meat
from a local supplier who had procured it from out of state,986 and
to a rural amusement area operating a snack bar and other facili-
981 312 U.S. at 116–17.

982 Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960); Henderson v. United States, 339
U.S. 816 (1950); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941); Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373 (1946).
983 Civil Rights Act of 1964, Title II, 78 Stat. 241, 243, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a et
seq.
984 42 U.S.C. § 2000a(b).
985 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
986 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
ties, which advertised in a manner likely to attract an interstate

clientele and which served food a substantial portion of which came
from outside the state.987
Writing for the Court in Heart of Atlanta Motel and McClung,
Justice Clark denied that Congress was disabled from regulating
the operations of motels or restaurants because those operations may
be, or may appear to be, “local” in character. “[T]he power of Con-
gress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regu-
late the local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the
States of origin and destination, which might have a substantial
and harmful effect upon that commerce.” 988
But, it was objected, Congress was regulating on the basis of
moral judgments and not to facilitate commercial intercourse. “That
Congress [may legislate] . . . against moral wrongs . . . rendered
its enactments no less valid. In framing Title II of this Act Con-
gress was also dealing with what it considered a moral problem.
But that fact does not detract from the overwhelming evidence of
the disruptive effect that racial discrimination has had on commer-
cial intercourse. It was this burden which empowered Congress to
enact appropriate legislation, and, given this basis for the exercise
of its power, Congress was not restricted by the fact that the par-
ticular obstruction to interstate commerce with which it was deal-
ing was also deemed a moral and social wrong.” 989 The evidence
did, in fact, noted the Justice, support Congress’ conclusion that ra-
cial discrimination impeded interstate travel by more than 20 mil-
lion black citizens, which was an impairment Congress could legis-
late to remove.990
The Commerce Clause basis for civil rights legislation prohibit-
ing private discrimination was important because of the understand-
ing that Congress’ power to act under the Fourteenth and Fif-
teenth Amendments was limited to official discrimination.991 The
987 Daniel v. Paul, 395 U.S. 298 (1969).

988 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258 (1964); Katzenbach
v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 301–04 (1964).
989 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 257 (1964).
990 379 U.S. at 252–53; Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 299–301 (1964).
991 Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214
(1876); Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951).

Court’s subsequent determination that Congress is not necessarily

so limited in its power reduces the importance of the Commerce
Clause in this area.992
Congressional Regulation of Criminal Misconduct

Federal criminal jurisdiction based on the commerce power, and
frequently combined with the postal power, has historically been an
auxiliary criminal jurisdiction. That is, Congress has made federal
crimes of acts that constitute state crimes on the basis of some con-
tact, however tangential, with a matter subject to congressional regu-
lation even though the federal interest in the acts may be mini-
mal.993 Examples of this type of federal criminal statute abound,
including the Mann Act, designed to outlaw interstate white slav-
ery,994 the Dyer Act, punishing interstate transportation of stolen
automobiles,995 and the Lindbergh Law, punishing interstate trans-
portation of kidnaped persons.996 But, just as in other areas, Con-
gress has gone beyond a proscription of the use of interstate facili-
ties in the commission of a crime, it has expanded the scope of its
jurisdiction in the criminal law area. Typical of this expansion is a
statute making it a federal offense to “in any way or degree ob-
struct . . . delay . . . or affect . . . commerce . . . by robbery or ex-
tortion . . . .” 997 With the expansion of the scope of the reach of
“commerce” the statute potentially could reach crimes involving prac-
tically all business concerns, although it appears to be used princi-
pally against organized crime.
The most far-reaching measure the Court has sustained is the
“loan-sharking” prohibition of the Consumer Credit Protection Act.998
The title affirmatively finds that extortionate credit transactions af-
fect interstate commerce because loan sharks are in a class largely
controlled by organized crime with a substantially adverse effect on
interstate commerce. Upholding the statute, the Court found that
though individual loan-sharking activities may be intrastate in na-
ture, it is still within Congress’ power to determine that it was within
992 The Fair Housing Act (Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968), 82 Stat.
73, 81, 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq., was based on the Commerce Clause, but in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court held that legislation that
prohibited discrimination in housing could be based on the Thirteenth Amendment
and made operative against private parties.
993 E.g., Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55 (1980); McElroy v.
994 18 U.S.C. § 2421.
995 18 U.S.C. § 2312.
996 18 U.S.C. § 1201.
997 18 U.S.C. § 1951. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1952.
998 Title II, 82 Stat. 159 (1968), 18 U.S.C. §§ 891 et seq.
a class the activities of which did affect interstate commerce, thus

affording Congress the power to regulate the entire class.999
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AS A RESTRAINT ON STATE

POWERS
Doctrinal Background
The grant of power to Congress over commerce, unlike other
powers such as levying customs duties or raising armies, does not
explicitly contain a correlative restriction on state power.1000 This
circumstance does not, however, necessarily signify that the states
were expected to participate in the power thus granted Congress,
subject only to the operation of the Supremacy Clause. As Alexan-
der Hamilton pointed out in The Federalist,1001 while some of the
powers that are vested in the National Government admit of their
“concurrent” exercise by the states, others are of their very nature
“exclusive,” and hence render the notion of a like power in the states
“contradictory and repugnant.” As an example of the latter kind of
power, Hamilton mentioned the power of Congress to pass a uni-
form naturalization law. Was the same principle expected to apply
to the power over foreign and interstate commerce?
Unquestionably, one of the great advantages anticipated from
the grant to Congress of power over commerce was that state inter-
ferences with trade, which had become a source of sharp discon-
tent under the Articles of Confederation, would thereby be brought
to an end. As Webster stated in his argument for appellant in Gib-
bons v. Ogden: “The prevailing motive was to regulate commerce;
to rescue it from the embarrassing and destructive consequences,
resulting from the legislation of so many different States, and to
999 Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146 (1971). See also Russell v. United States,
471 U.S. 858 (1985).

1000 Thus, by Article I, § 10, cl. 2, States are denied the power to “lay any Im-
posts or Duties on Imports or Exports” except by the consent of Congress. The clause
applies only to goods imported from or exported to another country, not from or to
another State. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869). This prevents its
application to interstate commerce, although Chief Justice Marshall thought to the
contrary,, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827)Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.)
419, 449 (1827), and the contrary has been strongly argued. W. CROSSKEY, POLITICS
AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 295–323 (1953).
1001 THE FEDERALIST No. 32 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 199–203. Note that in connection
with the discussion that follows, Hamilton avowed that the taxing power of the states,
save for imposts or duties on imports or exports, “remains undiminished.” Id. at 201.
The states “retain [the taxing] authority in the most absolute and unqualified sense[.]”
Id. at 199.
place it under the protection of a uniform law.” 1002 In other words,

the constitutional grant was itself a regulation of commerce in the
interest of uniformity.1003
That the Commerce Clause, unimplemented by congressional leg-
islation, took from the states any and all power over foreign and
interstate commerce was by no means conceded and was, indeed,
counterintuitive, considering the extent of state regulation that ex-
isted before the Constitution.1004 Moreover, legislation by Congress
that regulated any particular phase of commerce would raise the
question whether the states were entitled to fill the remaining gaps,
if not by virtue of a “concurrent” power over interstate and foreign
commerce, then by virtue of “that immense mass of legislation” as
Marshall termed it, “which embraces everything within the terri-
tory of a State, not surrendered to the general government” 1005—in
a word, the “police power.”
The text and drafting record of the Commerce Clause fail, there-
fore, to settle the question of what power is left to the states to
adopt legislation regulating foreign or interstate commerce in greater
or lesser measure. To be sure, in cases of flat conflict between an
act or acts of Congress that regulate such commerce and a state
legislative act or acts, the act of Congress is today recognized, and
was recognized by Marshall, as enjoying an unquestionable su-
1002 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 11 (1824). Justice Johnson’s assertion, concurring, was
to the same effect. Id. at 226. Late in life, James Madison stated that the power
had been granted Congress mainly as “a negative and preventive provision against
injustice among the States.” 4 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 14–15
(1865).
1003 It was evident from THE FEDERALIST that the principal aim of the Commerce
Clause was the protection of the national market from the oppressive power of indi-
vidual States acting to stifle or curb commerce. Id. at No. 7, 39–41 (Hamilton); No.
11, 65–73 (Hamilton); No. 22, 135–137 (Hamilton); No. 42, 283–284 (Madison); No.
53, 362–364 (Madison). See H. P. Hood & Sons v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949).
For a comprehensive history of the adoption of the Commerce Clause, which does
not indicate a definitive answer to the question posed, see Abel, The Commerce Clause
in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV.
432 (1941). Professor Abel discovered only nine references in the Convention re-
cords to the Commerce Clause, all directed to the dangers of interstate rivalry and
retaliation. Id. at 470–71 & nn. 169–75.
1004 The strongest suggestion of exclusivity found in the Convention debates is
a remark by Madison. “Whether the States are now restrained from laying tonnage
duties depends on the extent of the power ‘to regulate commerce.’ These terms are
vague but seem to exclude this power of the States.” 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF
THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 625 (rev. ed. 1937). However, the statement is re-
corded during debate on the clause, Art. I, § 10, cl. 3, prohibiting states from laying
tonnage duties. That the Convention adopted this clause, when tonnage duties would
certainly be one facet of regulating interstate and foreign commerce, casts doubt on
the assumption that the commerce power itself was intended to be exclusive.
premacy.1006 But suppose, first, that Congress has passed no act, or

second, that its legislation does not clearly cover the ground tra-
versed by previously enacted state legislation. What rules then ap-
ply? Since Gibbons v. Ogden, both of these situations have con-
fronted the Court, especially as regards interstate commerce, hundreds
of times, and in meeting them the Court has, first, determined that
it has power to decide when state power is validly exercised, and,
second, it has coined or given currency to numerous formulas, some
of which still guide, even when they do not govern, its judg-
ment.1007
Thus, it has been judicially established that the Commerce Clause
is not only a “positive” grant of power to Congress, but also a “nega-
tive” constraint upon the states. This aspect of the Commerce Clause,
sometimes called the “dormant” commerce clause, means that the
courts may measure state legislation against Commerce Clause val-
ues even in the absence of congressional regulation, i.e., when Con-
gress’ exercise of its power is dormant.
Daniel Webster, in Gibbons, argued that a state grant of a mo-
nopoly to operate steamships between New York and New Jersey
not only contravened federal navigation laws but violated the Com-
merce Clause as well, because that clause conferred an exclusive
power upon Congress to make the rules for national commerce. He
did concede that the grant to regulate interstate commerce was so
broad as to reach much that the states had formerly had jurisdic-
tion over, so the courts must be reasonable in interpretation.1008 But
Chief Justice Marshall, because he thought the state law was in
conflict with the federal legislation, was not compelled to pass on
Webster’s arguments, although in dicta he indicated his consider-
able sympathy with them and suggested that the power to regulate
commerce between the states might be an exclusively federal power.1009
1006 22 U.S. at 210–11.

1007 The writings detailing the history are voluminous. See, e.g., F. FRANKFURTER,
THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WHITE (1937); B. GAVIT, THE COM-
MERCE CLAUSE OF THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION (1932) (usefully containing appendi-
ces cataloguing every Commerce Clause decision of the Supreme Court to that time);
Sholleys, The Negative Implications of the Commerce Clause, 3 U. CHI. L. REV. 556
(1936). Among more recent writings, see Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as
a Restriction on State Regulation and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitu-
tional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV. 885 (1985) (a disputed conceptualization arguing
the Court followed a consistent line over the years), and articles cited, id. at 887
n.4.
1008 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 13–14, 16.
1009 22 U.S. at 17–18, 209. In Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122,
193–96 (1819), Chief Justice Marshall denied that the grant of the bankruptcy power
to Congress was exclusive. See also Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820)
(militia).
Chief Justice Marshall originated the concept of the “dormant

commerce clause” in Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,1010 al-
though again in dicta. The case arose from a challenge to a state
law authorizing the building of a dam across a navigable creek, where
it was claimed the law was in conflict with the federal power to
regulate interstate commerce. Rejecting the challenge, Marshall said
that the state act could not be “considered as repugnant to the [fed-
eral] power to regulate commerce in its dormant state . . . .” Re-
turning to the subject in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Phila-
delphia,1011 the Court, upholding a state law that required ships to
engage a local pilot when entering or leaving the port of Philadel-
phia, enunciated a doctrine of partial federal exclusivity. According
to Justice Curtis’ opinion, the state act was valid on the basis of a
distinction between those subjects of commerce that “imperatively
demand a single uniform rule” operating throughout the country
and those that “as imperatively” demand “that diversity which alone
can meet the local necessities of navigation,” that is to say, of com-
merce. As to the former, the Court held Congress’ power to be “ex-
clusive”; as to the latter, it held that the states enjoyed a power of
“concurrent legislation.” 1012 The Philadelphia pilotage requirement
was of the latter kind.
Thus, the contention that the federal power to regulate inter-
state commerce was exclusive of state power yielded to a rule of
partial exclusivity. Among the welter of such cases, the first actu-
ally to strike down a state law solely 1013 on Commerce Clause grounds
was the State Freight Tax Case.1014 The question before the Court
was the validity of a nondiscriminatory statute that required every
1010 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829).
1011 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1851). The issue of exclusive federal power and the
separate issue of the dormant commerce clause were present in the License Cases,
46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847), and the Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849),
but, despite the fact that much ink was shed in multiple opinions discussing the
questions, nothing definitive emerged. Chief Justice Taney, in contrast to Marshall,
viewed the clause only as a grant of power to Congress, containing no constraint
upon the states, and the Court’s role was to void state laws in contravention of fed-
eral legislation. 46 U.S. (5 How.) at 573; 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 464.
1012 48 U.S. at 317–20. Although Chief Justice Taney had formerly taken the
strong position that Congress’ power over commerce was not exclusive, he acqui-
esced silently in the Cooley opinion. For a modern discussion of Cooley, see Goldstein
v. California, 412 U.S. 546, 552–60 (1973), in which, in the context of the Copyright
Clause, the Court, approving Cooley for Commerce Clause purposes, refused to find
the Copyright Clause either fully or partially exclusive.
1013 Just a few years earlier, the Court, in an opinion that merged Commerce
Clause and Import-Export Clause analyses, had seemed to suggest that it was a
discriminatory tax or law that violates the Commerce Clause and not simply a tax
on interstate commerce. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869).
1014 Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873). For cases in
which the Commerce Clause basis was intermixed with other express or implied pow-
ers, see Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868); Steamship Co. v. Portwardens,
company transporting freight within the state, with certain excep-

tions, to pay a tax at specified rates on each ton of freight carried.
Opining that a tax upon freight, or any other article of commerce,
transported from state to state is a regulation of commerce among
the states and, further, that the transportation of merchandise or
passengers through a state or from state to state was a subject that
required uniform regulation, the Court held the tax in issue to be
repugnant to the Commerce Clause.
Whether exclusive or partially exclusive, however, the Com-
merce Clause as a restraint upon state exercises of power even ab-
sent congressional action received no sustained justification or ex-
planation. Often, as in Cooley and in later cases, the Court stated
or implied that the rule was imposed by the Commerce Clause.1015
In Welton v. Missouri,1016 the Court attempted to suggest a some-
what different justification. The case involved a challenge to a state
statute that required a “peddler’s” license for merchants selling goods
that came from other states, but that required no license if the goods
were produced in the state. Declaring that uniformity of commer-
cial regulation is necessary to protect articles of commerce from hos-
tile legislation and that the power asserted by the state belonged
exclusively to Congress, the Court observed that “[t]he fact that Con-
gress has not seen fit to prescribe any specific rules to govern inter-
State commerce does not affect the question. Its inaction on this
subject . . . is equivalent to a declaration that inter-State com-
merce shall be free and untrammeled.” 1017
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867); Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1868). Chief
Justice Marshall, in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 488–89 (1827),
indicated, in dicta, that a state tax might violate the Commerce Clause.
1015 “Where the subject matter requires a uniform system as between the States,
the power controlling it is vested exclusively in Congress, and cannot be encroached

upon by the States.” Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100, 108–09 (1890). The Commerce
Clause “remains in the Constitution as a grant of power to Congress . . . and as a
diminution pro tanto of absolute state sovereignty over the same subject matter.”
Carter v. Virginia, 321 U.S. 131, 137 (1944). The Commerce Clause, the Court has
said, “does not say what the states may or may not do in the absence of congressio-
nal action, nor how to draw the line between what is and what is not commerce
among the states. Perhaps even more than by interpretation of its written word,
this Court has advanced the solidarity and prosperity of this Nation by the mean-
ing it has given these great silences of the Constitution.” H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v.
Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 534–35 (1949). Subsequently, the Court stated that the Com-
merce Clause “has long been recognized as a self-executing limitation on the power
of the States to enact laws imposing substantial burdens on such commerce.” Den-
nis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447 (1991) (quoting South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v.
Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 87 (1984) (emphasis added)).
1016 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
1017 91 U.S. at 282. In Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 33
(1867), the Court suggested that congressional silence with regard to matters of “lo-
cal” concern may in some circumstances signify a willingness that the states regu-
late. These principles were further explained by Chief Justice Stone, writing for the
It has been evidently of little importance to the Court to ex-

plain. “Whether or not this long recognized distribution of power
between the national and state governments is predicated upon the
implications of the commerce clause itself . . . or upon the pre-
sumed intention of Congress, where Congress has not spoken . . .
the result is the same.” 1018 Thus, “[f]or a hundred years it has been
accepted constitutional doctrine . . . that . . . where Congress has
not acted, this Court, and not the state legislature, is under the
commerce clause the final arbiter of the competing demands of state
and national interests.” 1019
Various justifications can be found throughout the Court’s deci-
sions, but they do not explain why the Court is empowered under
this textual grant of power to Congress to police state regulatory
and taxing decisions. For instance, it has been frequently noted that
the Commerce Clause was motivated by the Framers’ apprehen-
sions about state protectionism.1020 But in Welton v. Missouri,1021
although the statute under review was clearly discriminatory as be-
tween in-state and interstate commerce, this point was not sharply
drawn as the constitutional fault of the law. A different theme has
been that the Framers desired to create a national area of free trade,
so that any unreasonable burdens on interstate commerce violate
the clause in and of themselves.1022
Nonetheless, the power of the Court under the “dormant” Com-
merce Clause is well established and freely exercised. No reserva-
Court in Graves v. New York ex rel. O’Keefe, 306 U.S. 466, 479 n.1 (1939). “The
failure of Congress to regulate interstate commerce has generally been taken to sig-
nify a Congressional purpose to leave undisturbed the authority of the states to make
regulations affecting the commerce in matters of peculiarly local concern, but to with-
hold from them authority to make regulations affecting those phases of it which,
because of the need of a national uniformity, demand that their regulation, if any,
be prescribed by a single authority.” The fullest development of the “silence” ratio-
nale was not by the Court but by a renowned academic, Professor Dowling. Inter-
state Commerce and State Power, 29 VA. L. REV. 1 (1940); Interstate Commerce and
State Power: Revisited Version, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 546 (1947).
1018 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768 (1945).
1019 325 U.S. at 769. See also California v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725, 728 (1949).
1020 91 U.S. at 280–81; Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 446 (1827)
(Chief Justice Marshall); Guy v. City of Baltimore, 100 U.S. 434, 440 (1879); Baldwin
v. G.A.F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U.S. 550, 552 (1935); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,
754 (1981).
1021 91 U.S. 275, 277, 278, 279, 280, 281, 282 (1876).
1022 E.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 440 (1939);
McLeod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 330–31 (1944); Freeman v. Hewit, 329
U.S. 249, 252, 256 (1946); H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 538,
539 (1949); Dennis v. Higgins, 498 U.S. 439, 447–50 (1991). “[W]e have steadfastly
adhered to the central tenet that the Commerce Clause ‘by its own force created an
area of trade free from interference by the States.’ ” American Trucking Ass’ns v.
Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 280 (1987) (quoting Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n,
429 U.S. 318, 328 (1977)).
tions about this power can be discerned in the opinions for the
Court,1023 although individual Justices, to be sure, have urged re-
nunciation of the power and remission to Congress for relief sought
by litigants.1024 This, however, has not been the course that has been
followed.
The State Proprietary Activity (Market Participant) Ex-
ception.—The “dormant” commerce clause is not, however, with-
out exceptions. In a case of first impression, the Court held that a
Maryland bounty scheme by which the state paid scrap processors
for each “hulk” automobile destroyed is “the kind of action with which
the Commerce Clause is not concerned.” 1025 As first enacted, the
bounty plan did not distinguish between in-state and out-of-state
processors, but it was amended in a manner that substantially dis-
advantaged out-of-state processors. The Court held “that entry by
the State itself into the market itself as a purchaser, in effect, of a
potential article of interstate commerce [does not] create[ ] a bur-
1023 E.g., Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michigan Natural Resources Dep’t,
504 U.S. 353, 359 (1992); Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992); Wyo-
ming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 455 (1992). Indeed, the Court, in Dennis v. Hig-
gins, 498 U.S. 439, 447–50 (1991), broadened its construction of the clause, holding
that it confers a “right” upon individuals and companies to engage in interstate trade.
With respect to the exercise of the power, the Court has recognized Congress’ greater
expertise to act and noted its hesitancy to impose uniformity on state taxation. Moor-
man Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 280 (1978). Cf. Quill Corp., 504 U.S. at 318.
1024 In McCarroll v. Dixie Lines, 309 U.S. 176, 183 (1940), Justice Black, for
himself and Justices Frankfurter and Douglas, dissented, taking precisely this view.
See also Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316 (1938) (Justice Black dissent-
ing in part); Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434, 442 (1939) (Jus-
tice Black dissenting); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 784 (1945) (Jus-
tice Black dissenting); id. at 795 (Justice Douglas dissenting). Justices Douglas and
Frankfurter subsequently wrote and joined opinions applying the dormant com-
merce clause. In Michigan-Wisconsin Pipe Line Co. v. Calvert, 347 U.S. 157, 166
(1954), the Court rejected the urging that it uphold all not-patently discriminatory
taxes and let Congress deal with conflicts. More recently, Justice Scalia has taken
the view that, as a matter of original intent, a “dormant” or “negative” commerce
power cannot be justified in either taxation or regulation cases, but, yielding to the
force of precedent, he will vote to strike down state actions that discriminate against
interstate commerce or that are governed by the Court’s precedents, without extend-
ing any of those precedents. CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69,
94 (1987) (concurring); Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washington State Dep’t of Revenue, 483
U.S. 232, 259 (1987) (concurring in part and dissenting in part); Bendix Autolite
Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (concurring in judgment);
American Trucking Assn’s v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990) (concurring); Itel Contain-
ers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 78 (1993) (Justice Scalia concurring) (re-
iterating view); Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc.., 514 U.S. 175, 200–01
(1995) (Justice Scalia, with Justice Thomas joining) (same). Justice Thomas has writ-
ten an extensive opinion rejecting both the historical and jurisprudential basis of
the dormant commerce clause and expressing a preference for reliance on the imports-
exports clause. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
609 (1997) (dissenting; joined by Justice Scalia entirely and by Chief Justice Rehnquist
as to the Commerce Clause but not the Imports-Exports Clause).
1025 Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 805 (1976).
den upon that commerce if the State restricts its trade to its own
citizens or businesses within the State.” 1026
Affirming and extending this precedent, the Court held that a
state operating a cement plant could in times of shortage (and pre-
sumably at any time) confine the sale of cement by the plant to
residents of the state.1027 “[T]he Commerce Clause responds princi-
pally to state taxes and regulatory measures impeding free private
trade in the national marketplace. . . . There is no indication of a
constitutional plan to limit the ability of the States themselves to
operate freely in the free market.” 1028 It is yet unclear how far this
concept of the state as market participant rather than market regu-
lator will be extended.1029
The Congressional Authorization Exception.—The Su-
preme Court has heeded the lesson that was administered to it by
the Act of Congress of August 31, 1852,1030 which pronounced the
Wheeling Bridge “a lawful structure,” thereby setting aside the Court’s
determination to the contrary earlier the same year.1031 The lesson,
subsequently observed the Court, is that “[i]t is Congress, and not
the Judicial Department, to which the Constitution has given the
power to regulate commerce.” 1032 Similarly, when in the late 1880s
and the early 1890s statewide alcohol prohibition laws began mak-
ing their appearance, Congress again authorized state laws that the
Court had held to violate the dormant commerce clause.
For instance, although the Court had held that a state was en-
titled to prohibit the manufacture and sale of intoxicants within its
boundaries,1033 it contemporaneously laid down the rule, that, so
1026 426 U.S. at 808.
1027 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980).
1028 447 U.S. at 436–37.
1029 See also White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S.
204 (1983) (city may favor its own residents in construction projects paid for with
city funds); South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (illus-
trating the deep divisions in the Court respecting the scope of the exception).
1030 Ch. 111, 10 Stat. 112, § 6.
1031 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518 (1852),
statute sustained in Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18
How.) 421 (1856). The latter decision seemed facially contrary to a dictum of Justice
Curtis in Cooley v. Board of Wardens of Port of Philadelphia, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299,
318 (1851), and cf. Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Washington State Dept. of Revenue,
483 U.S. 232, 263 n.4 (1987) (Justice Scalia concurring in part and dissenting in
part), but if indeed the Court is interpreting the silence of Congress as a bar to
action under the dormant commerce clause, then when Congress speaks it is enact-
ing a regulatory authorization for the states to act.
1032 Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg, 107 U.S. 691, 701 (1883).
1033 Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623 (1887). Relying on the distinction between
manufacture and commerce, the Court soon applied this ruling to authorize states
to prohibit manufacture of liquor for an out-of-state market. Kidd v. Pearson, 128
U.S. 1 (1888).
long as Congress remained silent in the matter, a state lacked the

power to prevent the importation of liquor from a sister state, even
as part and parcel of a statewide prohibition.1034 This holding was
soon clarified by another to the effect that, so long as Congress re-
mained silent, a state had no power to prevent the sale in the “origi-
nal package” of liquors introduced from another state.1035 Congress
soon attempted to overcome the effect of the latter decision by en-
acting the Wilson Act,1036 which empowered states to regulate im-
ported liquor on the same terms as domestically produced liquor,
but the Court interpreted the law narrowly as subjecting imported
liquor to local authority only after its resale.1037 Congress did not
fully nullify the Bowman case until 1913, when enactment of the
Webb-Kenyon Act 1038 clearly authorized states to regulate direct ship-
ments for personal use.
National Prohibition, imposed by the Eighteenth Amendment,
temporarily mooted these conflicts, but they reemerged with repeal
of Prohibition by the Twenty-first Amendment. Section 2 of the Twenty-
first Amendment prohibits “the importation into any State . . . for
delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the
laws thereof.” Initially the Court interpreted this language to au-
thorize states to discriminate against imported liquor in favor of
that produced in-state, but the modern Court has rejected this in-
terpretation, holding instead that “state regulation of alcohol is lim-
ited by the nondiscrimination principle of the Commerce Clause.” 1039
Less than a year after the ruling in United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Ass’n 1040 that insurance transactions across
state lines constituted interstate commerce, thereby establishing their
immunity from discriminatory state taxation, Congress passed the
1034 Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry. Co.125 U.S. 465 (1888).
1035 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). The Court had developed the “original
package” doctrine to restrict application of a state tax on imports from a foreign
country in Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 449 (1827). Although Chief
Justice Marshall had indicated in dictum in Brown that the same rule would apply
to imports from sister states, the Court had refused to follow that dictum in Wood-
ruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123 (1869).
1036 Ch. 728, 26 Stat. 313 (1890), upheld in In re Rahrer, 140 U.S. 545 (1891).
1037 Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U.S. 412 (1898).
1038 Ch. 90, 37 Stat. 699 (1913), sustained in Clark-Distilling Co. v. Western Md.
Ry., 242 U.S. 311 (1917). See also Department of Revenue v. Beam Distillers, 377
U.S. 341 (1964).
1039 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 487 (2005). See also Bacchus Imports Ltd.
v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State Li-
quor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986); Healy v. The Beer Institute, 491 U.S. 324 (1989),
and the analysis of section 2 under Discrimination Between Domestic and Imported
Products.
1040 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
McCarran-Ferguson Act,1041 authorizing state regulation and taxa-

tion of the insurance business. Based on this act, the Court in Pru-
dential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin 1042 sustained a South Carolina statute
that imposed on foreign insurance companies an annual tax of three
percent of premiums from business done in South Carolina, while
imposing no similar tax on local corporations. “Obviously,” said Jus-
tice Rutledge for the Court, “Congress’ purpose was broadly to give
support to the existing and future state systems for regulating and
taxing the business of insurance. This was done in two ways. One
was by removing obstructions which might be thought to flow from
its own power, whether dormant or exercised, except as otherwise
expressly provided in the Act itself or in future legislation. The other
was by declaring expressly and affirmatively that continued state
regulation and taxation of this business is in the public interest and
that the business and all who engage in it ‘shall be subject to’ the
laws of the several states in these respects.” 1043
Justice Rutledge continued: “The power of Congress over com-
merce exercised entirely without reference to coordinated action of
the states is not restricted, except as the Constitution expressly pro-
vides, by any limitation which forbids it to discriminate against in-
terstate commerce and in favor of local trade. Its plenary scope en-
ables Congress not only to promote but also to prohibit interstate
commerce, as it has done frequently and for a great variety of rea-
sons. . . . This broad authority Congress may exercise alone, sub-
ject to those limitations, or in conjunction with coordinated action
by the states, in which case limitations imposed for the preserva-
tion of their powers become inoperative and only those designed to
forbid action altogether by any power or combination of powers in
our governmental system remain effective.” 1044
1041 59 Stat. 33, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–15.

1042 328 U.S. 408 (1946).
1043 328 U.S. at 429–30.
1044 328 U.S. at 434–35. The act restored state taxing and regulatory powers
over the insurance business to their scope prior to South-Eastern Underwriters. Dis-
criminatory state taxation otherwise cognizable under the Commerce Clause must,
therefore, be challenged under other provisions of the Constitution. See Western &
Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648 (1981). An equal
protection challenge was successful in Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Ward, 470 U.S.
869 (1985), invalidating a discriminatory tax and stating that a favoring of local
industries “constitutes the very sort of parochial discrimination that the Equal Pro-
tection Clause was intended to prevent.” Id. at 878. In Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v.
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 472 U.S. 159, 176–78 (1985),
the Court declined to follow Ward where state statutes did not, as in Ward, favor
local corporations at the expense of out-of-state corporations, but instead “favor[ed]
out-of-state corporations domiciled within the New England region over out-of-state
corporations from other parts of the country.” The Court noted that the statutes in
Northeast Bancorp were concerned with “preserv[ing] a close relationship between
Thus, it is now well-established that “[w]hen Congress so chooses,

state actions which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to consti-
tutional attack under the Commerce Clause.” 1045 But the Court re-
quires congressional intent to permit otherwise impermissible state
actions to “be unmistakably clear.” 1046 Thus, for instance, the fact
that federal statutes and regulations had restricted commerce in
timber harvested from national forest lands in Alaska was “insuffi-
cient indicium” that Congress intended to authorize the state to ap-
ply a similar policy for timber harvested from state lands. The rule
requiring clear congressional approval for state burdens on com-
merce was said to be necessary in order to strengthen the likeli-
hood that decisions favoring one section of the country over an-
other are in fact “collective decisions” made by Congress rather than
unilateral choices imposed on unrepresented out-of-state interests
by individual states.1047 And Congress must be plain as well when
the issue is not whether it has exempted a state action from the
Commerce Clause but whether it has taken the less direct form of
reduction in the level of scrutiny.1048
those in the community who need credit and those who provide credit,” and with
protecting “the independence of local banking institutions”; they did not, like the
statutes in Ward, discriminate against “nonresident corporations solely because they
were nonresidents.”
1045 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve Sys-
tem, 472 U.S. 159, 174 (1985) (interpreting a provision of the Bank Holding Com-
pany Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d), permitting regional interstate bank acquisitions ex-
pressly approved by the state in which the acquired bank is located, as authorizing
state laws that allow only banks within the particular region to acquire an in-state
bank, on a reciprocal basis, since what the states could do entirely they can do in
part).
1046 South-Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 90 (1984).
1047 467 U.S. at 92. See also Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59 (2003)
(authorization of state laws regulating milk solids does not authorize milk pricing
and pooling laws). Earlier cases had required express statutory sanction of state bur-
dens on commerce but under circumstances arguably less suggestive of congressio-
nal approval. E.g., Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas, 458 U.S. 941, 958–60 (1982)
(congressional deference to state water law in 37 statutes and numerous interstate
compacts did not indicate congressional sanction for invalid state laws imposing a
burden on commerce); New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331,
341 (1982) (disclaimer in Federal Power Act of intent to deprive a state of “lawful
authority” over interstate transmissions held not to evince a congressional intent
“to alter the limits of state power otherwise imposed by the Commerce Clause”).
But see White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers, 460 U.S. 204
(1983) (Congress held to have sanctioned municipality’s favoritism of city residents
through funding statute under which construction funds were received).
1048 Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (holding that Lacey Act’s reinforce-
ment of state bans on importation of fish and wildlife neither authorizes state law
otherwise invalid under the Clause nor shifts analysis from the presumption of in-
validity for discriminatory laws to the balancing test for state laws that burden com-
merce only incidentally).
“Dormant” Commerce Clause: The Old Law

In 1959, the Supreme Court acknowledged that “over three hun-
dred full-dress opinions” had resulted, not in “consistent or reconcil-
able” “dormant” Commerce Clause doctrine, but rather in some-
thing more resembling a “quagmire.” 1049 Justice Frankfurter was
similarly skeptical of any definitive statements regarding the then-
current state of the doctrine. “To attempt to harmonize all that has
been said in the past would neither clarify what has gone before
nor guide the future. Suffice it to say that especially in this field
opinions must be read in the setting of the particular cases and as
the product of preoccupation with their special facts.” 1050 The com-
ments in these cases dealt with state taxation, but they could just
as well have included state regulation of commerce. Although many
of the principles still applicable in constitutional law may be found
in the older cases, the Court has worked a revolution in this area,
though it did so at different times for taxation than it did for regu-
lation. Thus, in this section we summarize the “old” law and then
deal more fully with the “modern” law of the negative commerce
clause.
The difficultly with preventing burdens to “commerce among the
States” is that such commerce begins in the interior of states, by
persons and corporations that are ordinarily also engaged in local
business. Its usual incidents are acts that, if unconnected with com-
merce among the states, would fall within the state’s powers of po-
lice and taxation, while the things it deals in and the instruments
by which it is carried on comprise the most ordinary subject mat-
ter of state power. In this field, the Court consequently was unable
to rely upon sweeping solutions. To the contrary, its judgments have
often been fluctuating and tentative, even contradictory, and this
was particularly the case with respect to the infringement of inter-
state commerce by the state taxing power.1051 By comparison, the
task of drawing the line between state power and foreign com-
merce proved a comparatively simple one, the two things being in
great part territorially distinct.1052
Taxation.—The leading case dealing with the relation of the
states’ taxing power to interstate commerce—the case in which the
1049 Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457–58
(1959) (quoting Miller Bros. Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344 (1954)).
1050 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 251–52 (1946).
1051 In addition to the sources previously cited, see J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HEL-
LERSTEIN (8th ed.), ch. 5, supra. For a succinct description of the history, see Hel-
lerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Centuries of Con-
stitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37 (1987).
1052 See J. HELLERSTEIN & W. HELLERSTEIN, STATE AND LOCAL TAXATION: CASES AND MA-
TERIALS (8th ed. 2005), ch. 5.

Court first struck down a state tax as violating the Commerce Clause—
was the State Freight Tax Case.1053 Before the Court was the valid-
ity of a Pennsylvania statute that required every company trans-
porting freight within the state, with certain exceptions, to pay a
tax at specified rates on each ton of freight carried by it. The Court’s
reasoning was forthright. Transportation of freight constitutes com-
merce.1054 A tax upon freight transported from one state to another
effects a regulation of interstate commerce.1055 Under the Cooley doc-
trine, whenever the subject of a regulation of commerce is in its
nature of national interest or admits of one uniform system or plan
of regulation, that subject is within the exclusive regulating con-
trol of Congress.1056 Transportation of passengers or merchandise
through a state, or from one state to another, is of this nature.1057
Hence a state law imposing a tax upon freight, taken up within
the state and transported out of it or taken up outside the state
and transported into it, violates the Commerce Clause.1058
The principle thus asserted, that a state may not tax interstate
commerce, confronted the principle that a state may tax all purely
domestic business within its borders and all property “within its
jurisdiction.” Inasmuch as most large concerns engage in both an
interstate and a domestic business, while the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and the pecuniary returns from such com-
merce are ordinarily property within the jurisdiction of some state
or other, the task before the Court was to determine where to draw
the line between the immunity claimed by interstate business, on
the one hand, and the prerogatives claimed by local power on the
other. In the State Tax on Railway Gross Receipts Case,1059 decided
the same day as the State Freight Tax Case, the issue was a tax
upon gross receipts of all railroads chartered by the state, part of
the receipts having been derived from interstate transportation of
the same freight that had been held immune from tax in the first
case. If the latter tax were regarded as a tax on interstate com-
merce, it too would fall. But to the Court, the tax on gross receipts
of an interstate transportation company was not a tax on com-
merce. “[I]t is not everything that affects commerce that amounts
to a regulation of it, within the meaning of the Constitution.” 1060 A
gross receipts tax upon a railroad company, which concededly af-
1053 Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 232 (1873).
1054 82 U.S. at 275.
1055 82 U.S. at 275–76, 279.
1056 82 U.S. at 279–80.
1057 82 U.S. at 280.
1058 82 U.S. at 281–82.
1059 Reading R.R. v. Pennsylvania, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 284 (1872).
1060 82 U.S. at 293.
fected commerce, was not a regulation “directly. Very manifestly it

is a tax upon the railroad company. . . . That its ultimate effect may
be to increase the cost of transportation must be admitted. . . . Still
it is not a tax upon transportation, or upon commerce. . . .” 1061
Insofar as it drew a distinction between these two cases, the
Court did so in part on the basis of Cooley, in that some subjects
embraced within the meaning of commerce demand uniform, na-
tional regulation, whereas other similar subjects permit of diver-
sity of treatment, until Congress acts. The Court also based its de-
cision on the concept of a “direct” tax on interstate commerce, which
was impermissible, and an “indirect” tax, which was permissible un-
til Congress acted.1062 Confusingly, the two concepts were some-
times conflated and sometimes treated separately.
In any event, the Court itself was clear that interstate com-
merce could not be taxed at all, even if the tax was a nondiscrimi-
natory levy applied alike to local commerce.1063 “Thus, the States
cannot tax interstate commerce, either by laying the tax upon the
business which constitutes such commerce or the privilege of engag-
ing in it, or upon the receipts, as such, derived from it . . . ; or
upon persons or property in transit in interstate commerce.” 1064 Some
taxes, however, were sustained because they impose only an “indi-
rect” burden. These included both generally applicable property taxes
and taxes in lieu of property taxes, even if they were imposed on
corporations operating instrumentalities of interstate com-
merce.1065 A good rule of thumb in these cases is that taxation was
sustained if the tax was imposed on some local, rather than an in-
terstate, activity, or if the tax was exacted before interstate move-
ment had begun or after it had ended.
An independent basis for invalidation was that the tax was dis-
criminatory, in that its impact was intentionally or unintentionally
felt by interstate commerce and not by local commerce, perhaps in
pursuit of parochial interests. Many of the early cases actually in-
volving discriminatory taxation were decided on the basis of the im-
1061 82 U.S. at 294. This case was overruled 14 years later, when the Court voided
substantially the same tax in Philadelphia Steamship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S.
326 (1887).
1062 See The Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 398–
412 (1913) (reviewing and summarizing at length both taxation and regulation cases).
See also Missouri ex rel. Barrett v. Kansas Natural Gas Co., 265 U.S. 298, 307 (1924).
1063 Robbins v. Shelby County Taxing Dist., 120 U.S. 489, 497 (1887); Leloup v.
Port of Mobile, 127 U.S. 640, 648 (1888).

1064 The Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 400–401 (1913).
1065 The Delaware R.R. Tax, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206, 232 (1873). See Cleveland,
Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Backus, 154 U.S. 439 (1894); Postal Tele-
graph Cable Co. v. Adams, 155 U.S. 688 (1895). See cases cited in J. HELLERSTEIN &
W. HELLERSTEIN (8th ed.), supra, at 195 et seq.
permissibility of taxing interstate commerce at all. The category, how-

ever, was soon clearly delineated as a separate ground for invalidation
(and one of the most important today).1066
Following the Great Depression and under the leadership of Jus-
tice, and later Chief Justice, Stone, the Court attempted to move
away from the principle that interstate commerce may not be taxed
and any reliance on the direct-indirect distinction. Instead, a state
or local levy would be voided only if in the opinion of the Court it
created a risk of multiple taxation for interstate commerce not felt
by local commerce.1067 It became much more important to the valid-
ity of a tax that it be apportioned to an interstate company’s activi-
ties within the taxing state, so as to reduce the risk of multiple
taxation.1068 But, just as the Court had achieved constancy in the
area of regulation, it reverted to the older doctrines in the taxation
area and reiterated that interstate commerce may not be taxed at
all, even by a properly apportioned levy, and reasserted the direct-
indirect distinction.1069 The stage was set, following a series of cases
in which through formalistic reasoning the states were permitted
to evade the Court’s precedents,1070 for the formulation of a more
realistic doctrine.
Regulation.—Much more diverse were the cases dealing with
regulation of commerce by the state and local governments. Taxa-
tion was one thing, the myriad approaches and purposes of regula-
tions another. Generally speaking, if the state action was perceived
by the Court to be a regulation of interstate commerce itself, it was
deemed to impose a “direct” burden on interstate commerce and be
1066 E.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1875); Robbins v. Shelby County Tax-
ing District, 120 U.S. 489 (1887); Darnell & Son Co. v. City of Memphis, 208 U.S.
113 (1908); Bethlehem Motors Co. v. Flynt, 256 U.S. 421 (1921).
1067 Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250 (1938); McGoldrick
v. Berwind-White Coal Mining Co., 309 U.S. 33 (1940); International Harvester Co.
v. Department of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340 (1944); International Harvester Co. v. Evatt,
329 U.S. 416 (1947).
1068 E.g., Gwin, White & Prince, Inc. v. Henneford, 305 U.S. 434 (1939); Joseph
v. Carter & Weekes Stevedoring Co., 330 U.S. 422 (1947); Central Greyhound Lines
v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948). Notice the Court’s distinguishing of Central Grey-
hound in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, 514 U.S. 175, 188–91 (1995).
1069 Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249 (1946); Spector Motor Serv. v. O’Connor,
340 U.S. 602 (1951).

1070 Thus, the states carefully phrased tax laws so as to impose on interstate
companies not a license tax for doing business in the state, which was not permit-
ted, Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 347 U.S. 359 (1954), but as a franchise tax
on intangible property or the privilege of doing business in a corporate form, which
was permissible. Railway Express Agency v. Virginia, 358 U.S. 434 (1959); Colonial
Pipeline Co. v. Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975). Also, the Court increasingly found the
tax to be imposed on a local activity in instances it would previously have seen to
be an interstate activity. E.g., Memphis Natural Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80 (1948);
General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964); Standard Pressed Steel
Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
impermissible. If the Court saw it as something other than a regu-

lation of interstate commerce, it was considered only to “affect” in-
terstate commerce or to impose only an “indirect” burden on it in
the proper exercise of the police powers of the states.1071 But the
distinction between “direct” and “indirect” burdens was often per-
ceptible only to the Court.1072
A corporation’s status as a foreign entity did not immunize it
from state requirements to obtain a local license, to furnish rel-
evant information, and to pay a reasonable fee.1073 But no registra-
tion was permitted by an out-of-state corporation that engaged in
only interstate business in the host state.1074 Neither did the Court
permit a state to exclude from its courts a corporation engaging solely
in interstate commerce because of a failure to register and to qualify
to do business in that state.1075
Interstate transportation brought forth hundreds of cases. State
regulation of trains operating across state lines resulted in diver-
gent rulings. It was early held improper for states to prescribe charges
for transportation of persons and freight on the basis that the regu-
lation must be uniform and thus could not be left to the states.1076
The Court deemed “reasonable” and therefore constitutional many
state regulations requiring a fair and adequate service for its inhab-
itants by railway companies conducting interstate service within its
borders, as long as there was no unnecessary burden on com-
1071 Sedler, The Negative Commerce Clause as a Restriction on State Regulation
and Taxation: An Analysis in Terms of Constitutional Structure, 31 WAYNE L. REV.

885, 924–925 (1985). In addition to the sources already cited, see the Court’s summa-
ries in The Minnesota Rate Cases (Simpson v. Shepard), 230 U.S. 352, 398–412 (1913),
and Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 766–70 (1945). In the latter case,
Chief Justice Stone was reconceptualizing the standards under the clause, but the
summary represents a faithful recitation of the law.
1072 See Di Santo v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34 (1927) (Justice Stone dissenting).
The dissent was the precursor to Chief Justice Stone’s reformulation of the stan-
dard in 1945. DiSanto was overruled in California v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941).
1073 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839); Hanover Fire Ins.
Co. v. Harding, 272 U.S. 494 (1926); Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202
(1944).
1074 Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891); International Textbook Co. v. Pigg,
217 U.S. 91 (1910).

1075 Dahnke-Walker Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U.S. 282 (1921); Allenberg Cotton Co.
v. Pittman, 419 U.S. 20 (1974). But see Eli Lilly & Co. v. Sav-on Drugs, 366 U.S.
276 (1961).
1076 Wabash, S. L. & P. Ry. v. Illinois, 118 U.S. 557 (1886). The power of the
states generally to set rates had been approved in Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Iowa, 94
U.S. 155 (1877), and Peik v. Chicago & N.W. Ry., 94 U.S. 164 (1877). After the Wabash
decision, states retained power to set rates for passengers and freight taken up and
put down within their borders. Wisconsin R.R. Comm’n v. Chicago, B. & Q. R.R.,
257 U.S. 563 (1922).
merce.1077 A marked tolerance for a class of regulations that argu-

ably furthered public safety was long exhibited by the Court,1078 even
in instances in which the safety connection was tenuous.1079 Of par-
ticular controversy were “full-crew” laws, represented as safety mea-
sures, that were attacked by the companies as “feather-bedding”
rules.1080
Similarly, motor vehicle regulations met mixed fates. Basically,
it has always been recognized that states, in the interest of public
safety and conservation of public highways, may enact and enforce
comprehensive licensing and regulation of motor vehicles using state
facilities.1081 Indeed, states were permitted to regulate many of the
local activities of interstate firms and thus interstate operations, in
pursuit of these interests.1082 Here, too, safety concerns became over-
1077 Generally, the Court drew the line at regulations that provided for ad-
equate service, not any and all service. Thus, one class of cases dealt with require-
ments that trains stop at designated cities and towns. The regulations were upheld
in such cases as Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427 (1897), and Lake Shore & Mich.
South. Ry. v. Ohio, 173 U.S. 285 (1899), and invalidated in Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illi-
nois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896). See Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Wisconsin R.R. Comm’n, 237
U.S. 220, 226 (1915); St. Louis & S. F. Ry. v. Public Service Comm’n, 254 U.S. 535,
536–537 (1921). The cases were extremely fact-specific.
1078 E.g., Smith v. Alabama, 124 U.S. 465 (1888) (required locomotive engineers
to be examined and licensed by the state, until Congress should deem otherwise);
New York, N.H. & H. R.R. v. New York, 165 U.S. 628 (1897) (forbidding heating of
passenger cars by stoves); Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911)
(requiring three brakemen on freight trains of more than 25 cars).
1079 E.g., Terminal Ass’n v. Trainmen, 318 U.S. 1 (1943) (requiring railroad to
provide caboose cars for its employees); Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U.S. 299 (1896)
(forbidding freight trains to run on Sundays). But see Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. Blackwell,
244 U.S. 310 (1917) (voiding as too onerous on interstate transportation a law requir-
ing trains to come to almost a complete stop at all grade crossings, when there were
124 highway crossings at grade in 123 miles, doubling the running time).
1080 Four cases over a lengthy period sustained the laws. Chicago, R.I. & Pac.
Ry. Co. v. Arkansas, 219 U.S. 453 (1911); St. Louis, I. Mt. & So. Ry. v. Arkansas, 240
U.S. 518 (1916); Missouri Pacific R.R. v. Norwood, 283 U.S. 249 (1931); Brotherhood
of Locomotive Firemen & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. R.R., 382 U.S. 423 (1966).
In the last case, the Court noted the extensive and conflicting record with regard to
safety, but it then ruled that with the issue in so much doubt it was peculiarly a
legislative choice.
1081 Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610 (1915); Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S.
160 (1916).
1082 E.g., Bradley v. Public Utility Comm’n, 289 U.S. 92 (1933) (state could deny
an interstate firm a necessary certificate of convenience to operate as a common car-

rier on the basis that the route was overcrowded); Welch Co. v. New Hampshire,
306 U.S. 79 (1939) (maximum hours for drivers of motor vehicles); Eichholz v. Pub-
lic Service Comm’n, 306 U.S. 268 (1939) (reasonable regulations of traffic). But com-
pare Michigan Comm’n v. Duke, 266 U.S. 570 (1925) (state may not impose common-
carrier responsibilities on a business operating between states that did not assume
them); Buck v. Kuykendall, 267 U.S. 307 (1925) (denial of certificate of convenience
under circumstances was a ban on competition).
riding objects of deference, even in doubtful cases.1083 In regard to

navigation, which had given rise to Gibbons v. Ogden and Cooley,
the Court generally upheld much state regulation on the basis that
the activities were local and did not demand uniform rules.1084
As a general rule, although the Court during this time did not
permit states to regulate a purely interstate activity or prescribe
prices for purely interstate transactions,1085 it did sustain a great
deal of price and other regulation imposed prior to or subsequent
to the travel in interstate commerce of goods produced for such com-
merce or received from such commerce. For example, decisions late
in the period upheld state price-fixing schemes applied to goods in-
tended for interstate commerce.1086
However, the states always had an obligation to act nondiscriminatorily.
Just as in the taxing area, regulation that was parochially ori-
ented, to protect local producers or industries, for instance, was not
evaluated under ordinary standards but subjected to practically per
se invalidation. The mirror image of Welton v. Missouri,1087 the tax
case, was Minnesota v. Barber,1088 in which the Court invalidated a
facially neutral law that in its practical effect discriminated against
interstate commerce and in favor of local commerce. The law re-
quired fresh meat sold in the state to have been inspected by its
own inspectors with 24 hours of slaughter. Thus, meat slaughtered
in other states was excluded from the Minnesota market.
The principle of the Barber case has a long pedigree of applica-
tion.1089 State protectionist regulation on behalf of local milk pro-
1083 E.g., Mauer v. Hamilton, 309 U.S. 598 (1940) (ban on operation of any mo-
tor vehicle carrying any other vehicle above the head of the operator). By far, the
example of the greatest deference is South Carolina Highway. Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros.,
303 U.S. 177 (1938), in which the Court upheld, in a surprising Stone opinion, truck
weight and width restrictions prescribed by practically no other state (in terms of
the width, no other).
1084 E.g., Transportation Co. v. City of Chicago, 99 U.S. 635 (1879); Willamette
Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1 (1888). See Kelly v. Washington, 302 U.S. 1
(1937) (upholding state inspection and regulation of tugs operating in navigable wa-
ters, in absence of federal law).
1085 E.g., Western Union Tel Co. v. Foster, 247 U.S. 105 (1918); Lemke v. Farm-
ers Grain Co., 258 U.S. 50 (1922); State Comm’n v. Wichita Gas Co., 290 U.S. 561
(1934).
1086 Milk Control Board v. Eisenberg Co., 306 U.S. 346 (1939) (milk); Parker v.
Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943) (raisins).

1087 91 U.S. 275 (1875).
1088 136 U.S. 313 (1890).
1089 E.g., Brimmer v. Rebman, 138 U.S. 78 (1891) (law requiring postslaughter
inspection in each county of meat transported over 100 miles from the place of slaugh-
ter); Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (city ordinance prevent-
ing selling of milk as pasteurized unless it had been processed and bottled at an
approved plant within a radius of five miles from the central square of Madison). As
the latter case demonstrates, it is constitutionally irrelevant that other Wisconsin
ducers, for instance, has occasioned judicial censure. In Baldwin v.

G.A.F. Seelig.,1090 the Court had before it a complex state price-
fixing scheme for milk, in which the state, in order to keep the price
of milk artificially high within the state, required milk dealers buy-
ing out-of-state to pay producers, wherever they were, what the deal-
ers had to pay within the state, and, thus, in-state producers were
protected. And, in H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond,1091 the Court
struck down a state refusal to grant an out-of-state milk distribu-
tor a license to operate a milk receiving station within the state on
the basis that the additional diversion of local milk to the other
state would impair the supply for the in-state market.1092
“Dormant Commerce Clause”: The Modern Law

Transition from the old law to the modern standard occurred
relatively smoothly in the field of regulation,1093 but in the area of
taxation the passage was choppy and often witnessed retreats and
advances.1094 In any event, both taxation and regulation now are
evaluated under a judicial balancing formula comparing the bur-
den on interstate commerce with the importance of the state inter-
est, save for discriminatory state action that cannot be justified at
all.
Taxation.—During the 1940s and 1950s, there was conflict within
the Court between the view that interstate commerce could not be
taxed at all, at least “directly,” and the view that the negative com-
producers were also disadvantaged by the law. For a modern application of the prin-
ciple of these cases, see Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Nat. Res. Dep’t,
504 U.S. 353 (1992) (forbidding landfills from accepting out-of-county wastes). See
also C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 391 (1994) (discrimi-
nation against interstate commerce not preserved because local businesses also suf-
fer).
1090 294 U.S. 511 (1935). See also Polar Ice Cream & Creamery Co. v. Andrews,
375 U.S. 361 (1964). With regard to products originating within the state, the Court
had no difficulty with price fixing. Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
1091 336 U.S. 525 (1949). For the most recent case in this saga, see West Lynn
Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994).

1092 Not only is a state forbidden to bar an interstate market to protect local
interests, a state may not combat discrimination against its own products by admit-
ting only products (here, again, milk) from states that have reciprocity agreements
with it. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976).
1093 Formulation of a balancing test was achieved in Southern Pacific Co. v. Ari-
zona, 325 U.S. 761 (1945), and was thereafter maintained more or less consistently.
The Court’s current phrasing of the test was in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S.
137 (1970).
1094 Indeed, scholars dispute just when the modern standard was firmly ad-
opted. The conventional view is that it was articulated in Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), but there also seems little doubt that the founda-
tion of the present law was laid in Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Min-
nesota, 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
merce clause protected only against the risk of double taxation.1095

In Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota,1096 the
Court reasserted the principle expressed earlier in Western Live Stock,
that the Framers did not intend to immunize interstate commerce
from its just share of the state tax burden even though it increased
the cost of doing business.1097 Northwestern States held that a state
could constitutionally impose a nondiscriminatory, fairly appor-
tioned net income tax on an out-of-state corporation engaged exclu-
sively in interstate commerce in the taxing state. Thus, “[f]or the
first time outside the context of property taxation, the Court explic-
itly recognized that an exclusively interstate business could be sub-
jected to the states’ taxing powers.” 1098 In Northwestern States, where
a foreign corporation maintained a sales office and employed sales
staff in the taxing state for solicitation of orders for its merchan-
dise, where an order was accepted at a home office in another juris-
diction, and where merchandise was shipped to customers in the
taxing state, the corporation could be liable to pay the state’s in-
come tax on that portion of the net income of its interstate busi-
ness as was attributable to such solicitation.
Yet the following years saw inconsistent rulings that turned al-
most completely upon the use of or failure to use “magic words” by
legislative drafters. That is, it was constitutional for the states to
tax a corporation’s net income, properly apportioned to the taxing
state, as in Northwestern States, but no state could levy a tax on a
foreign corporation for the privilege of doing business in the state,
both taxes being alike in all other respects.1099 In Complete Auto
Transit, Inc. v. Brady,1100 however, the Court overruled the cases
embodying this distinction and articulated a standard that has gov-
erned the cases since.
The tax in Brady was imposed on the privilege of doing busi-
ness as applied to a corporation engaged in interstate transporta-
1095 Compare Freeman v. Hewit, 329 U.S. 249, 252–256 (1946), with Western
Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S. 250, 258, 260 (1938).
1096 358 U.S. 450 (1959).
1097 358 U.S. at 461–62. See Western Live Stock v. Bureau of Revenue, 303 U.S.
250, 254 (1938). For recent reiterations of the principle, see Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 310 n.5 (1992) (citing cases).
1098 Hellerstein, State Taxation of Interstate Business: Perspectives on Two Cen-
turies of Constitutional Adjudication, 41 TAX LAW. 37, 54 (1987).

1099 Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. O’Connor, 340 U.S. 602 (1951). The attenu-
ated nature of the purported distinction was evidenced in Colonial Pipeline Co. v.
Traigle, 421 U.S. 100 (1975), in which the Court sustained a nondiscriminatory, fairly
apportioned franchise tax that was measured by the taxpayer’s capital stock, im-
posed on a pipeline company doing an exclusively interstate business in the taxing
state, on the basis that it was a tax imposed on the privilege of conducting business
in the corporate form.
1100 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
tion services in the taxing state; it was measured by the corpora-

tion’s gross receipts from the service. The appropriate concern, the
Court wrote, was to pay attention to “economic realities” and to “ad-
dress the problems with which the commerce clause is con-
cerned.” 1101 The standard, a set of four factors that was distilled
from precedent but newly applied, was firmly set out. A tax on in-
terstate commerce will be sustained “when the tax is applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing State, is fairly
apportioned, does not discriminate against interstate commerce, and
is fairly related to the services provided by the State.” 1102 All sub-
sequent cases have been decided in this framework.
Nexus.—“The Commerce Clause and the Due Process Clause im-
pose distinct but parallel limitations on a State’s power to tax out-
of-state activities. The Due Process Clause demands that there ex-
ist some definite link, some minimum connection, between a state
and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax, as well as a
rational relationship between the tax and the values connected with
the taxing State. The Commerce Clause forbids the States to levy
taxes that discriminate against interstate commerce or that bur-
den it by subjecting activities to multiple or unfairly apportioned
taxation.” 1103 “The broad inquiry subsumed in both constitutional
requirements is whether the taxing power exerted by the state bears
fiscal relation to protection, opportunities and benefits given by the
state—that is, whether the state has given anything for which it
can ask return.” 1104
1101 430 U.S. at 279, 288. “In reviewing Commerce Clause challenges to state
taxes, our goal has instead been to ‘establish a consistent and rational method of
inquiry’ focusing on ‘the practical effect of a challenged tax.’ ” Commonwealth Edison
Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 615 (1981) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Commissioner
of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425, 443 (1980)).
1102 430 U.S. at 279. The rationale of these four parts of the test is set out in
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 312–13 (1992). A recent
application of the four-part Complete Auto Transit test is Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v.
Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995).
1103 Meadwestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 128 S. Ct. 1498, 1505 (2008)
(citations and internal quotation marks omitted). “[T]he due process nexus analysis
requires that we ask whether an individual’s connections with a State are substan-
tial enough to legitimate the State’s exercise of power over him. . . . In contrast,
the Commerce Clause and its nexus requirement are informed not so much by con-
cerns about fairness for the individual defendant as by structural concerns about
the effects of state regulation on the national economy.” Quill Corp. v. North Dakota
ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992).
1104 128 S. Ct. at 1505 (internal quotation marks omitted). It had been thought,
prior to the decision in Quill Corp. v. North Dakota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298,
305 (1992), that the tests for nexus under the Commerce Clause and the Due Pro-
cess Clause were identical, but the Court in that case, although stating that the
two tests “are closely related” (citing National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue
of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967)), held that they “differ fundamentally” and found
a state tax to satisfy the Due Process Clause but to violate the Commerce Clause.
The question of the presence of a substantial nexus often arises

when a state imposes on out-of-state vendors an obligation to col-
lect use taxes on goods sold in the taxing state, and a determina-
tive factor is whether the vendor is physically present in the state.
The Court has sustained such an imposition on mail order sellers
with retail outlets, solicitors, or property within the taxing state,1105
but it has denied the power to a state to tax a seller whose “only
connection with customers in the State is by common carrier or the
United States mail.” 1106
The validity of general business taxes on interstate enterprises
may also be determined by the nexus standard. However, again, only
a minimal contact is necessary.1107 Thus, maintenance of one full-
time employee within the state (plus occasional visits by non-
resident engineers) to make possible the realization and continu-
ance of contractual relations seemed to the Court to make almost
frivolous a claim of lack of sufficient nexus.1108 The application of a
state business-and-occupation tax on the gross receipts from a large
wholesale volume of pipe and drainage products in the state was
sustained, even though the company maintained no office, owned
no property, and had no employees in the state, its marketing ac-
tivities being carried out by an in-state independent contractor.1109
The Court also upheld a state’s application of a use tax to aviation
Compare Quill at 325–28 (Justice White concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, the requirement for “some definite link, some minimum connection, be-
tween a state and the person, property or transaction it seeks to tax” probably sur-
vives the bifurcation of the tests in Quill. National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dept. of Rev-
enue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 756 (1967) (Commerce Clause), quoting Miller Bros.
Co. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340, 344–45 (1954) (Due Process Clause).
1105 Scripto v. Carson, 362 U.S. 207 (1960); National Geographic Soc’y v. Califor-
nia Bd. of Equalization, 430 U.S. 551 (1977). In Scripto, the vendor’s agents that
were in the state imposing the tax were independent contractors, rather than em-
ployees, but this distinction was irrelevant. See also Tyler Pipe Indus. v. Washing-
ton State Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249–50 (1987) (reaffirming Scripto on this
point). See also D. H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24 (1988) (upholding im-
position of use tax on catalogs, printed outside state at direction of an in-state cor-
poration and shipped to prospective customers within the state).
1106 National Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dept. of Revenue of Illinois, 386 U.S. 753, 758
(1967), reaffirmed with respect to the Commerce Clause in Quill Corp. v. North Da-
kota ex rel. Heitkamp, 504 U.S. 298 (1992).
1107 Reacting to Northwestern States, Congress enacted Pub. L. 86–272, 15 U.S.C.
§ 381, providing that mere solicitation by a company acting outside the state did
not support imposition of a state income tax on a company’s proceeds. See Heublein,
Inc. v. South Carolina Tax Comm’n, 409 U.S. 275 (1972).
1108 Standard Pressed Steel Co. v. Department of Revenue, 419 U.S. 560 (1975).
See also General Motors Corp. v. Washington, 377 U.S. 436 (1964).
1109 Tyler Pipe Industries v. Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 249–51 (1987). The
Court agreed with the state court’s holding that “the crucial factor governing nexus
is whether the activities performed in this state on behalf of the taxpayer are signifi-
cantly associated with the taxpayer’s ability to establish and maintain a market in
this state for the sales.” Id. at 250.
fuel stored temporarily in the state prior to loading on aircraft for

consumption in interstate flights.1110
When “there is no dispute that the taxpayer has done some busi-
ness in the taxing State, the inquiry shifts from whether the State
may tax to what it may tax. To answer that question, [the Court
has] developed the unitary business principle. Under that prin-
ciple, a State need not isolate the intrastate income-producing ac-
tivities from the rest of the business but may tax an apportioned
sum of the corporation’s multistate business if the business is uni-
tary. The court must determine whether intrastate and extrastate
activities formed part of a single unitary business, or whether the
out-of-state values that the State seeks to tax derive[d] from unre-
lated business activity which constitutes a discrete business enter-
prise. . . . If the value the State wishe[s] to tax derive[s] from a
‘unitary business’ operated within and without the State, the State
[may] tax an apportioned share of the value of that business in-
stead of isolating the value attributable to the operation of the busi-
ness within the State. Conversely, if the value the State wished to
tax derived from a discrete business enterprise, then the State could
not tax even an apportioned share of that value.” 1111 But, even when
there is a unitary business, “[t]he Due Process and Commerce Clauses
of the Constitution do not allow a State to tax income arising out
of interstate activities—even on a proportional basis—unless there
is a ‘minimal connection’ or ‘nexus’ between the interstate activi-
ties and the taxing State and ‘a rational relationship between the
income attributed to the State and the intrastate values of the en-
terprise.’ ” 1112
Apportionment.—This requirement is of long standing,1113 but
its importance has broadened as the scope of the states’ taxing pow-
ers has enlarged. It is concerned with what formulas the states must
use to claim a share of a multistate business’s tax base for the tax-
ing state, when the business carries on a single integrated enter-
prise both within and without the state. A state may not exact from
1110 United Air Lines v. Mahin, 410 U.S. 623 (1973).
1111 Meadwestvaco Corp. v. Illinois Dept. of Revenue, 128 S. Ct. 1498, 1505–06
(2008) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). The holding of this case
was that the concept of “operational function,” which the Court had introduced in
prior cases, was “not intended to modify the unitary business principle by adding a
new ground for apportionment.” Id. at 1507–08. In other words, the Court declined
to adopt a basis upon which a state could tax a non-unitary business.
1112 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Bd., 463 U.S. 159, 165–66 (1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n,
458 U.S. 307, 316–17 (1982); Hunt-Wesson, Inc. v. Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal., 528
U.S. 58 (2000) (interest deduction not properly apportioned between unitary and non-
unitary business).
1113 E.g., Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18, 26 (1891); Maine
v. Grand Trunk Ry., 142 U.S. 217, 278 (1891).

interstate commerce more than the state’s fair share. Avoidance of

multiple taxation, or the risk of multiple taxation, is the test of an
apportionment formula. Generally speaking, this factor is both a Com-
merce Clause and a due process requisite, and it necessitates a ra-
tional relationship between the income attributed to the state and
the intrastate values of the enterprise.1114 The Court has declined
to impose any particular formula on the states, reasoning that to
do so would be to require the Court to engage in “extensive judicial
lawmaking,” for which it was ill-suited and for which Congress had
ample power and ability to legislate.1115
“Instead,” the Court wrote, “we determine whether a tax is fairly
apportioned by examining whether it is internally and externally
consistent. To be internally consistent, a tax must be structured so
that if every State were to impose an identical tax, multiple taxa-
tion would not result. Thus, the internal consistency test focuses
on the text of the challenged statute and hypothesizes a situation
where other States have passed an identical statute. . . . The exter-
nal consistency test asks whether the State has taxed only that por-
tion of the revenues from the interstate activity which reasonably
reflects the in-state component of the activity being taxed. We thus
examine the in-state business activity which triggers the taxable
event and the practical or economic effect of the tax on that inter-
state activity.” 1116
In Goldberg v. Sweet, the Court upheld as properly apportioned
a state tax on the gross charge of any telephone call originated or
terminated in the state and charged to an in-state service address,
regardless of where the telephone call was billed or paid.1117 A com-
plex state tax imposed on trucks displays the operation of the test.
There, a state registration tax met the internal consistency test be-
cause every state honored every other states’ tax, and a motor fuel
tax similarly was sustained because it was apportioned to mileage
traveled in the state. On the other hand, lump-sum annual taxes,
an axle tax and an identification marker fee, being unapportioned
1114 See Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267 (1978); Mobil Oil Corp. v. Com-
missioner of Taxes, 445 U.S. 425 (1980); Exxon Corp. v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Revenue,
447 U.S. 207 (1980); ASARCO Inc. v. Idaho State Tax Comm’n, 458 U.S. 307 (1982);
F. W. Woolworth Co. v. New Mexico Taxation & Revenue Dep’t, 458 U.S. 354 (1982);
Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983); Tyler Pipe
Industries v. Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 251 (1987); Allied-Signal, Inc. v. Direc-
tor, Div. of Taxation, 504 U.S. 768 (1992). Cf. American Trucking Ass’ns Inc. v. Scheiner,
483 U.S. 266 (1987).
1115 Moorman Mfg. Co. v. Bair, 437 U.S. 267, 278–80 (1978).
1116 Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252, 261, 262 (1989) (citations omitted).
1117 488 U.S. 252 (1989). The tax law provided a credit for any taxpayer who
was taxed by another state on the same call. Actual multiple taxation could thus be
avoided, the risk of other multiple taxation was small, and it was impracticable to
keep track of the taxable transactions.
flat taxes imposed for the use of the state’s roads, were voided, un-
der the internal consistency test, because if every state imposed them,
the burden on interstate commerce would be great.1118
Deference to state taxing authority was evident in a case in which
the Court sustained a state sales tax on the price of a bus ticket
for travel that originated in the state but terminated in another
state. The tax was unapportioned to reflect the intrastate travel and
the interstate travel.1119 The tax in this case was different from the
tax upheld in Central Greyhound, the Court held. The previous tax
constituted a levy on gross receipts, payable by the seller, whereas
the present tax was a sales tax, also assessed on gross receipts, but
payable by the buyer. The Oklahoma tax, the Court continued, was
internally consistent, because if every state imposed a tax on ticket
sales within the state for travel originating there, no sale would be
subject to more than one tax. The tax was also externally consis-
tent, the Court held, because it was a tax on the sale of a service
that took place in the state, not a tax on the travel.1120 However,
the Court has found discriminatory and thus invalid a state intan-
gibles tax on a fraction of the value of corporate stock owned by
state residents inversely proportional to the corporation’s exposure
to the state income tax.1121
Discrimination.—The “fundamental principle” governing this fac-
tor is simple. “ ‘No State may, consistent with the Commerce Clause,
impose a tax which discriminates against interstate commerce . . .
by providing a direct commercial advantage to local business.’ ” 1122
That is, a tax that by its terms or operation imposes greater bur-
dens on out-of-state goods or activities than on competing in-state
goods or activities will be struck down as discriminatory under the
1118 American Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987).

1119 Indeed, there seemed to be a precedent squarely on point: Central Grey-
hound Lines v. Mealey, 334 U.S. 653 (1948). The Court in that case struck down a
state statute that failed to apportion its taxation of interstate bus ticket sales to
reflect the distance traveled within the state.
1120 Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (1995). In-
deed, the Court analogized the tax to that in Goldberg v. Sweet, 488 U.S. 252 (1989),
a tax on interstate telephone services that originated in or terminated in the state
and that were billed to an in-state address.
1121 Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996). The state had defended on
the basis that the tax was a “compensatory” one designed to make interstate com-
merce bear a burden already borne by intrastate commerce. The Court recognized
the legitimacy of the defense, but it found the tax to meet none of the three criteria
for classification as a valid compensatory tax. Id. at 333–44. See also South Central
Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) (tax not justified as compensatory).
1122 Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 329 (1977) (quot-
ing Northwestern States Portland Cement Co. v. Minnesota, 358 U.S. 450, 457 (1959)).
The principle, as we have observed above, is a long-standing one under the Com-
merce Clause. E.g., Welton v. Missouri, 91 U.S. 275 (1876).
Commerce Clause.1123 In Armco, Inc. v. Hardesty,1124 the Court voided

as discriminatory the imposition on an out-of-state wholesaler of a
state tax that was levied on manufacturing and wholesaling but that
relieved manufacturers subject to the manufacturing tax of liabil-
ity for paying the wholesaling tax. Even though the former tax was
higher than the latter, the Court found that the imposition discrimi-
nated against the interstate wholesaler.1125 A state excise tax on whole-
sale liquor sales, which exempted sales of specified local products,
was held to violate the Commerce Clause.1126 A state statute that
granted a tax credit for ethanol fuel if the ethanol was produced in
the state, or if it was produced in another state that granted a simi-
lar credit to the state’s ethanol fuel, was found discriminatory in
violation of the clause.1127
Expanding, although neither unexpectedly nor exceptionally, its
dormant commerce jurisprudence, the Court in Camps Newfound/Owatonna,
Inc. v. Town of Harrison 1128 applied its nondiscrimination element
of the doctrine to invalidate the state’s charitable property tax ex-
emption statute, which applied to nonprofit firms performing benevo-
lent and charitable functions, but which excluded entities serving
primarily out-of-state residents. The claimant here operated a church
camp for children, most of whom resided out of state. The discrimi-
natory tax would easily have fallen had it been applied to profit-
making firms, and the Court saw no reason to make an exception
for nonprofits. The tax scheme was designed to encourage entities
1123 Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 753–760 (1981). But see Common-
wealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617–619 (1981). See also Oregon Waste
Systems, Inc. v. Department of Environmental Quality, 511 U.S. 93 (1994) (sur-
charge on in-state disposal of solid wastes that discriminates against companies dis-
posing of waste generated in other states invalid).
1124 467 U.S. 638 (1984).
1125 The Court applied the “internal consistency” test here, too, in order to deter-
mine the existence of discrimination. 467 U.S. at 644–45. Thus the wholesaler did
not have to demonstrate it had paid a like tax to another state, only that if other
states imposed like taxes it would be subject to discriminatory taxation. See also
Tyler Pipe Industries v. Dept. of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232 (1987); American Trucking
Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266 (1987); Amerada Hess Corp. v. Director, New
Jersey Taxation Div., 490 U.S. 66 (1989); Kraft Gen. Foods v. Iowa Dep’t of Rev-
enue, 505 U.S. 71 (1992).
1126 Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984).
1127 New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988). Compare Fulton
Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 325 (1996) (state intangibles tax on a fraction of the
value of corporate stock owned by in-state residents inversely proportional to the
corporation’s exposure to the state income tax violated dormant commerce clause),
with General Motors Corp. v. Tracy, 519 U.S. 278 (1997) (state imposition of sales
and use tax on all sales of natural gas except sales by regulated public utilities, all
of which were in-state companies, but covering all other sellers that were out-of-
state companies did not violate dormant commerce clause because regulated and un-
regulated companies were not similarly situated).
1128 520 U.S. 564 (1997). The decision was 5-to-4 with a strong dissent by Jus-
tice Scalia, id. at 595, and a philosophical departure by Justice Thomas. Id. at 609.
to care for local populations and to discourage attention to out-of-

state individuals and groups. “For purposes of Commerce Clause
analysis, any categorical distinction between the activities of profit-
making enterprises and not-for-profit entities is therefore wholly il-
lusory. Entities in both categories are major participants in inter-
state markets. And, although the summer camp involved in this case
may have a relatively insignificant impact on the commerce of the
entire Nation, the interstate commercial activities of nonprofit enti-
ties as a class are unquestionably significant.” 1129
Benefit Relationship.—Although, in all the modern cases, the Court
has stated that a necessary factor to sustain state taxes having an
interstate impact is that the levy be fairly related to benefits pro-
vided by the taxing state, it has declined to be drawn into any con-
sideration of the amount of the tax or the value of the benefits be-
stowed. The test rather is whether, as a matter of the first factor,
the business has the requisite nexus with the state; if it does, then
the tax meets the fourth factor simply because the business has en-
joyed the opportunities and protections that the state has afforded
it.1130
Regulation.—The modern standard of Commerce Clause re-
view of state regulation of, or having an impact on, interstate com-
merce was presaged in a series of opinions, mostly dissents, by Chief
Justice Stone.1131 It was first adopted, however, in Southern Pacific
Co. v. Arizona.1132 Southern Pacific tested the validity of a state train-
length law, justified as a safety measure. Revising a hundred years
of doctrine, the Chief Justice wrote that whether a state or local
regulation was valid depended upon a “reconciliation of the conflict-
ing claims of state and national power [that] is to be attained only
by some appraisal and accommodation of the competing demands
of the state and national interests involved.” 1133 Save in those few
cases in which Congress has acted, “this Court, and not the state
1129 520 U.S. at 586.
1130 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 620–29 (1981). Two
state taxes imposing flat rates on truckers, because they did not vary directly with
miles traveled or with some other proxy for value obtained from the state, were found
to violate this standard in American Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266,
291 (1987). But see American Trucking Ass’ns v. Michigan Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 545
U.S. 429 (2005), upholding imposition of a flat annual fee on all trucks engaged in
intrastate hauling (including trucks engaged in interstate hauling that “top off ” loads
with intrastate pickups and deliveries) and concluding that levying the fee on a per-
truck rather than per-mile basis was permissible in view of the objectives of defray-
ing costs administering various size, weight, safety, and insurance requirements.
1131 E.g., DiSanto v. Pennsylvania, 273 U.S. 34, 43 (1927) (dissenting); Califor-
nia v. Thompson, 313 U.S. 109 (1941); Duckworth v. Arkansas, 314 U.S. 390 (1941);
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 362–68 (1943) (alternative holding).
1132 325 U.S. 761 (1945).
1133 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 768–69 (1941).
legislature, is under the commerce clause the final arbiter of the

competing demands of state and national interests.” 1134
The Chief Justice made clear at length that the test to be ap-
plied was a balancing one, stating that, in order to determine whether
the challenged regulation was permissible, “matters for ultimate de-
termination are the nature and extent of the burden which the state
regulation of interstate trains, adopted as a safety measure, im-
poses on interstate commerce, and whether the relative weights of
the state and national interests involved are such as to make inap-
plicable the rule, generally observed, that the free flow of inter-
state commerce and its freedom from local restraints in matters re-
quiring uniformity of regulation are interests safeguarded by the
commerce clause from state interference.” 1135
The test today continues to be the Stone articulation, although
the more frequently quoted encapsulation of it is from Pike v. Bruce
Church, Inc.: “Where the statute regulates evenhandedly to effectu-
ate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on interstate
commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden
imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then
the question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden
that will be tolerated will of course depend on the nature of the
local interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well
with a lesser impact on interstate activities.” 1136
Obviously, the test requires “evenhanded[ness].” Discrimination
in regulation is another matter altogether. When on its face or in
its effect a regulation betrays “economic protectionism”—an intent
to benefit in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-state
interests—then no balancing is required. “When a state statute clearly
discriminates against interstate commerce, it will be struck down
. . . unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid
factor unrelated to economic protectionism, . . . . Indeed, when the
state statute amounts to simple economic protectionism, a ‘virtu-
ally per se rule of invalidity’ has applied.” 1137 Thus, an Oklahoma
1134 325 U.S. at 769.
1135 325 U.S. at 770–71.
1136 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970) (citation omitted).
1137 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 454 (1992) (quoting City of Philadel-
phia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978)). See also Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 579 (1986). In Maine v. Taylor,
477 U.S. 131 (1986), the Court upheld a protectionist law, finding a valid justifica-
tion aside from economic protectionism. The state barred the importation of out-of-
state baitfish, and the Court credited lower-court findings that legitimate ecological
concerns existed about the possible presence of parasites and nonnative species in
baitfish shipments.
law that required coal-fired electric utilities in the state, producing

power for sale in the state, to burn a mixture of coal containing at
least 10% Oklahoma-mined coal was invalidated at the behest of a
state that had previously provided virtually 100% of the coal used
by the Oklahoma utilities.1138 Similarly, the Court invalidated a state
law that permitted interdiction of export of the hydroelectric power
from the state to neighboring states, when in the opinion of regula-
tory authorities the energy was required for use in the state; a state
may not prefer its own citizens over out-of-state residents in access
to resources within the state.1139
States may certainly promote local economic interests and fa-
vor local consumers, but they may not do so by adversely regulat-
ing out-of-state producers or consumers. In Hunt v. Washington State
Apple Advertising Comm’n,1140 the Court confronted a North Caro-
lina requirement that closed containers of apples offered for sale or
shipped into North Carolina carry no grade other than the appli-
cable U.S. grade. Washington State mandated that all apples pro-
duced in and shipped in interstate commerce pass a much more rig-
orous inspection than that mandated by the United States. The
inability to display the recognized state grade in North Carolina
impeded marketing of Washington apples. The Court obviously sus-
pected that the impact was intended, but, rather than strike down
the state requirement as purposeful, it held that the regulation had
the practical effect of discriminating, and, as no defense based on
possible consumer protection could be presented, the Court invali-
1138 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437 (1992). See also Maryland v. Louisi-
ana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981) (a tax case, invalidating a state first-use tax, which, be-
cause of exceptions and credits, imposed a tax only on natural gas moving out of
state, because of impermissible discrimination).
1139 New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331 (1982). See also
Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979) (voiding a ban on transporting minnows
caught in the state for sale outside the state); Sporhase v. Nebraska, 458 U.S. 941
(1982) (invalidating a ban on the withdrawal of ground water from any well in the
state intended for use in another state). These cases largely eviscerated a line of
older cases recognizing a strong state interest in the protection of animals and re-
sources. See Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896). New England Power had rather
old antecedents. E.g., West v. Kansas Gas Co., 221 U.S. 229 (1911); Pennsylvania v.
West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923).
1140 432 U.S. 333 (1977). Other cases in which a state was attempting to pro-
mote and enhance local products and businesses include Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.,
397 U.S. 137 (1970) (state required producer of high-quality cantaloupes to pack them
in the state, rather than in an adjacent state at considerably less expense, in order
that the produce be identified with the producing state); Foster-Fountain Packing
Co. v. Haydel, 278 U.S. 1 (1928) (state banned export of shrimp from state until
hulls and heads were removed and processed, in order to favor canning and manu-
facture within the state).
dated the state law.1141 State actions to promote local products and
producers, of everything from milk 1142 to alcohol,1143 may not be
achieved through protectionism.
Even garbage transportation and disposition are covered by the
negative commerce clause. A New Jersey statute that banned the
importation of most solid or liquid wastes that originated outside
the state was struck down as “an obvious effort to saddle those out-
side the State with the entire burden of slowing the flow of refuse
into New Jersey’s remaining landfill sites”; the state could not jus-
tify the statute as a quarantine law designed to protect the public
health because New Jersey left its landfills open to domestic waste.1144
Further extending the application of the negative commerce clause
to waste disposal,1145 the Court, in C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of
Clarkstown,1146 invalidated as discriminating against interstate com-
merce a local “flow control” ordinance that required all solid waste
within the town to be processed at a designated transfer station
before leaving the municipality. Underlying the restriction was the
town’s decision to have a solid waste transfer station built by a pri-
vate contractor, rather than with public funds. To make the arrange-
ment appealing to the contractor, the town guaranteed it a mini-
mum waste flow, which the town ensured by requiring that all solid
waste generated within the town be processed at the contractor’s
station.
1141 That discriminatory effects will result in invalidation, as well as purposeful
discrimination, is also drawn from Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349
(1951).
1142 E.g., H. P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525 (1949). See also
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cottrell, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (state effort to com-
bat discrimination by other states against its milk through reciprocity provisions).
In West Lynn Creamery, Inc. v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994), the Court held invalidly
discriminatory against interstate commerce a state milk pricing order, which im-
posed an assessment on all milk sold by dealers to in-state retailers, the entire as-
sessment being distributed to in-state dairy farmers despite the fact that about two-
thirds of the assessed milk was produced out of state. The avowed purpose and
undisputed effect of the provision was to enable higher-cost in-state dairy farmers
to compete with lower-cost dairy farmers in other states.
1143 Healy v. Beer Institute, Inc., 491 U.S. 324 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers
Corp. v. New York State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573 (1986). See also Bacchus Im-
ports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (a tax case). But cf. Pharmaceutical Re-
search and Mfrs. of America v. Walsh, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (state prescription drug
program providing rebates to participating companies does not regulate prices of out-
of-state transactions and does not favor in-state over out-of-state companies).
1144 City of Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 629 (1978), reaffirmed and
applied in Chemical Waste Management, Inc. v. Hunt, 504 U.S. 334 (1992), and Fort
Gratiot Sanitary Landfill v. Michigan Natural Resources Dept., 504 U.S. 353 (1992).
1145 See also Oregon Waste Systems, Inc. v. Department of Envtl. Quality, 511
U.S. 93 (1994) (discriminatory tax).

1146 511 U.S. 383 (1994).
The Court saw the ordinance as a form of economic protection-

ism, in that it “hoard[ed] solid waste, and the demand to get rid of
it, for the benefit of the preferred processing facility.” 1147 The Court
found that the town could not “justify the flow control ordinance as
a way to steer solid waste away from out-of-town disposal sites that
it might deem harmful to the environment. To do so would extend
the town’s police power beyond its jurisdictional bounds. States and
localities may not attach restrictions to exports or imports in order
to control commerce in other states.” 1148 The Court also found that
the town’s goal of “revenue generation is not a local interest that
can justify discrimination against interstate commerce. Otherwise
States could impose discriminatory taxes against solid waste origi-
nating outside the State.” 1149 Moreover, the town had other means
to raise revenue, such as subsidizing the facility through general
taxes or municipal bonds.1150 The Court did not deal with—indeed,
did not notice—the fact that the local law conferred a governmen-
tally granted monopoly—an exclusive franchise, indistinguishable
from a host of local monopolies at the state and local level.1151
In United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste
Management Authority,1152 the Court declined to apply Carbone where
haulers were required to bring waste to facilities owned and oper-
ated by a state-created public benefit corporation instead of to a
private processing facility, as was the case in Carbone. The Court
found this difference constitutionally significant because “[d]ispos-
ing of trash has been a traditional government activity for years,
and laws that favor the government in such areas—but treat every
private business, whether in-state or out-of-state, exactly the same—do
not discriminate against interstate commerce for purposes of the
Commerce Clause. Applying the Commerce Clause test reserved for
regulations that do not discriminate against interstate commerce,
1147 511 U.S. at 392. The Court added: “Discrimination against interstate com-
merce in favor of local business or investment is per se invalid, save in a narrow

class of cases in which the municipality can demonstrate, under rigorous scrutiny,
that it has no other means to advance a legitimate state interest.” Id.
1148 511 U.S. at 393.
1149 511 U.S. at 393–94.
1150 511 U.S. at 394.
1151 See The Supreme Court, Leading Cases, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139,
149–59 (1994). Weight was given to this consideration by Justice O’Connor, 511 U.S.
at 401 (concurring) (local law an excessive burden on interstate commerce), and by
Justice Souter, id. at 410 (dissenting).
1152 550 U.S. 330 (2007).
we uphold these ordinances because any incidental burden they may

have on interstate commerce does not outweigh the benefits they
confer . . . .” 1153
In Department of Revenue of Kentucky v. Davis,1154 the Court
considered a challenge to the long-standing state practice of issu-
ing bonds for public purposes while exempting interest on the bonds
from state taxation.1155 In Davis, a challenge was brought against
Kentucky for such a tax exemption because it applied only to gov-
ernment bonds that Kentucky issued, and not to government bonds
issued by other states. The Court, however, recognizing the long pedi-
gree of such taxation schemes, applied the logic of United Haulers
Ass’n, Inc., noting that the issuance of debt securities to pay for
public projects is a “quintessentially public function,” and that Ken-
tucky’s differential tax scheme should not be treated like one that
discriminated between privately issued bonds.1156 In what may por-
tend a significant change in dormant commerce clause doctrine, how-
ever, the Court declined to evaluate the governmental benefits of
Kentucky’s tax scheme versus the economic burdens it imposed, hold-
ing that, at least in this instance, the “Judicial Branch is not insti-
tutionally suited to draw reliable conclusions.” 1157
Drawing the line between regulations that are facially discrimi-
natory and regulations that necessitate balancing is not an easy task.
Not every claim of unconstitutional protectionism has been ac-
cepted. Thus, in Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co.,1158 the Court
upheld a state law banning the retail sale of milk products in plas-
1153 550 U.S. at 334. The Commerce Clause test referred to is the test set forth
in Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970). “Under the Pike test, we will
uphold a nondiscriminatory statute . . . ‘unless the burden imposed on [interstate]
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.’ ” Id. at 1797
(quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142). The fact that a state is seeking to protect itself
from economic or other difficulties, is not, by itself, sufficient to justify barriers to
interstate commerce. Edwards v. California, 314 U.S. 160 (1941) (striking down Cali-
fornia effort to bar “Okies”—persons fleeing the Great Plains dust bowl during the
Depression). Cf. Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1867) (without tying it to
any particular provision of the Constitution, the Court finds a protected right of in-
terstate movement). The right of travel is now an aspect of equal protection jurispru-
dence.
1154 128 S. Ct. 1801 (2008).
1155 This exemption from state taxes is also generally made available to bonds
issued by local governmental entities within a state.

1156 128 S. Ct. at 1810–11. The Court noted that “[t]here is no forbidden discrimi-
nation because Kentucky, as a public entity, does not have to treat itself as being
‘substantially similar’ to the other bond issuers in the market.” Id. at 1811. Three
members of the Court would have also found this taxation scheme constitutional
under the “market participant” doctrine, despite the argument that the state, in this
instance, was acting as a market regulator, not as a market participant. Id. at 1812–14
(Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Breyer).
1157 128 S. Ct. at 1817.
1158 449 U.S. 456, 470–74 (1981).
tic, nonreturnable containers but permitting sales in other nonre-

turnable, nonrefillable containers, such as paperboard cartons. The
Court found no discrimination against interstate commerce, be-
cause both in-state and out-of-state interests could not use plastic
containers, and it refused to credit a lower, state-court finding that
the measure was intended to benefit the local pulpwood industry.
In Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland,1159 the Court upheld a stat-
ute that prohibited producers or refiners of petroleum products from
operating retail service stations in Maryland. The statute did not
on its face discriminate against out-of-state companies, but, as there
were no producers or refiners in Maryland, “the burden of the dives-
titure requirements” fell solely on such companies.1160 The Court
found, however, that “this fact does not lead, either logically or as
a practical matter, to a conclusion that the State is discriminating
against interstate commerce at the retail level,” 1161 as the statute
does not “distinguish between in-state and out-of-state companies
in the retail market.” 1162
Still, a model example of balancing is Chief Justice Stone’s opin-
ion in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona.1163 At issue was the validity
of Arizona’s law barring the operation within the state of trains of
more than 14 passenger cars (no other state had a figure this low)
or 70 freight cars (only one other state had a cap this low). First,
the Court observed that the law substantially burdened interstate
commerce. Enforcement of the law in Arizona, while train lengths
went unregulated or were regulated by varying standards in other
states, meant that interstate trains of a length lawful in other states
had to be broken up before entering Arizona. As it was not practi-
cable to break up trains at the border, that act had to be done at
train yards quite removed, with the result that the Arizona limita-
tion controlled train lengths as far east as El Paso, Texas, and as
far west as Los Angeles. Nearly 95 percent of the rail traffic in Ari-
zona was interstate. The other alternative was to operate in other
states with the lowest cap, Arizona’s, with the result that Arizona’s
1159 437 U.S. 117 (1978).
1160 437 U.S. at 125.
1161 437 U.S. at 125.
1162 437 U.S. at 126.
1163 325 U.S. 761 (1945). Interestingly, Justice Stone had written the opinion
for the Court in South Carolina State Highway Dep’t v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S.
177 (1938), in which, in a similar case involving regulation of interstate transporta-
tion and proffered safety reasons, he had eschewed balancing and deferred overwhelm-
ingly to the state legislature. Barnwell Bros. involved a state law that prohibited
use on state highways of trucks that were over 90 inches wide or that had a gross
weight over 20,000 pounds, with from 85% to 90% of the nation’s trucks exceeding
these limits. This deference and refusal to evaluate evidence resurfaced in a case
involving an attack on railroad “full-crew” laws. Brotherhood of Locomotive Fire-
men & Enginemen v. Chicago, R.I. & P. Railroad Co., 393 U.S. 129 (1968).
law controlled the railroads’ operations over a wide area.1164 If other

states began regulating at different lengths, as they would be per-
mitted to do, the burden on the railroads would burgeon. Moreover,
the additional number of trains needed to comply with the cap just
within Arizona was costly, and delays were occasioned by the need
to break up and remake lengthy trains.1165
Conversely, the Court found that, as a safety measure, the state
cap had “at most slight and dubious advantage, if any, over unregu-
lated train lengths.” That is, although there were safety problems
with longer trains, the shorter trains mandated by state law re-
quired increases in the numbers of trains and train operations and
a consequent increase in accidents generally more severe than those
attributable to longer trains. In short, the evidence did not show
that the cap lessened rather than increased the danger of acci-
dents.1166
Conflicting state regulations appeared in Bibb v. Navajo Freight
Lines.1167 There, Illinois required the use of contour mudguards on
trucks and trailers operating on the state’s highways, while nearby
Arkansas required the use of straight mudguards and banned con-
toured ones. At least 45 states authorized straight mudguards. The
Court sifted the evidence and found it conflicting on the compara-
tive safety advantages of contoured and straight mudguards. But,
admitting that if that were all that was involved the Court would
have to sustain the costs and burdens of outfitting with the re-
quired mudguards, the Court invalidated the Illinois law, because
of the massive burden on interstate commerce occasioned by the
necessity of truckers to shift cargoes to differently designed ve-
hicles at the state’s borders.
Arguably, the Court in more recent years has continued to stiffen
the scrutiny with which it reviews state regulation of interstate car-
riers purportedly for safety reasons.1168 Difficulty attends any evalu-
ation of the possible developing approach because the Court has spo-
ken with several voices. A close reading, however, indicates that
although the Court is most reluctant to invalidate regulations that
touch upon safety and that if safety justifications are not illusory it
1164 The concern about the impact of one state’s regulation upon the laws of other
states is in part a reflection of the Cooley national uniformity interest and partly a
hesitation about the autonomy of other states. E.g., CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of
America, 481 U.S. 69, 88–89 (1987); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. New York State
Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 583–84 (1986).
1165 Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 771–75 (1945).
1166 325 U.S. at 775–79, 781–84.
1167 359 U.S. 520 (1959).
1168 Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978); Kassel v. Consoli-
dated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981).

will not second-guess legislative judgments, the Court nonetheless

will not accept, without more, state assertions of safety motiva-
tions. “Regulations designed for that salutary purpose nevertheless
may further the purpose so marginally, and interfere with com-
merce so substantially, as to be invalid under the Commerce Clause.”
Rather, the asserted safety purpose must be weighed against the
degree of interference with interstate commerce. “This ‘weighing’ . . .
requires . . . a sensitive consideration of the weight and nature of
the state regulatory concern in light of the extent of the burden
imposed on the course of interstate commerce.” 1169
Balancing has been used in other than transportation-industry
cases. Indeed, the modern restatement of the standard was in such
a case.1170 There, the state required cantaloupes grown in the state
to be packed there, rather than in an adjacent state, so that in-
state packers’ names would be associated with a superior product.
Promotion of a local industry was legitimate, the Court said, but it
did not justify the substantial expense the company would have to
incur to comply. State efforts to protect local markets, concerns, or
consumers against outside companies have largely been unsuccess-
ful. Thus, a state law that prohibited ownership of local investment-
advisory businesses by out-of-state banks, bank holding companies,
and trust companies was invalidated.1171 The Court plainly thought
the statute was protectionist, but instead of voiding it for that rea-
son it held that the legitimate interests the state might have did
not justify the burdens placed on out-of-state companies and that
the state could pursue the accomplishment of legitimate ends through
some intermediate form of regulation.
In Edgar v. MITE Corp.,1172 an Illinois regulation of take-over
attempts of companies that had specified business contacts with the
state, as applied to an attempted take-over of a Delaware corpora-
tion with its principal place of business in Connecticut, was found
to constitute an undue burden, with special emphasis upon the ex-
traterritorial effect of the law and the dangers of disuniformity. These
problems were found lacking in the next case, in which the state
statute regulated the manner in which purchasers of corporations
chartered within the state and with a specified percentage of in-
state shareholders could proceed with their take-over efforts. The
Court emphasized that the state was regulating only its own corpo-
1169 Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670–71 (1981), (quot-
ing Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429, 441, 443 (1978)). Both cases in-
validated state prohibitions of the use of 65-foot single-trailer trucks on state high-
ways.
1170 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
1171 Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, Inc., 447 U.S. 27 (1980).
1172 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (plurality opinion).
rations, which it was empowered to do, and that no matter how

many other states adopted such laws there would be no conflict.
The burdens on interstate commerce, and the Court was not that
clear that the effects of the law were burdensome in the appropri-
ate context, were justified by the state’s interests in regulating its
corporations and resident shareholders.1173
In other areas, although the Court repeats balancing language,
it has not applied it with any appreciable bite,1174 but in most re-
spects the state regulations involved are at most problematic in the
context of the concerns of the Commerce Clause.
Foreign Commerce and State Powers

State taxation and regulation of commerce from abroad are also
subject to negative commerce clause constraints. In the seminal case
of Brown v. Maryland,1175 which struck down a state statute requir-
ing “all importers of foreign articles or commodities,” preparatory
to selling the goods, to take out a license, Chief Justice Marshall
developed a lengthy exegesis explaining why the law was void un-
der both the Import-Export Clause 1176 and the Commerce Clause.
According to the Chief Justice, an inseparable part of the right to
import was the right to sell, and a tax on the sale of an article is a
tax on the article itself. Thus, the taxing power of the states did
not extend in any form to imports from abroad so long as they re-
main “the property of the importer, in his warehouse, in the origi-
nal form or package” in which they were imported. This is the fa-
mous “original package” doctrine. Only when the importer parts with
his importations or mixes them into his general property by break-
ing up the packages may the state treat them as taxable property.
Obviously, to the extent that the Import-Export Clause was
construed to impose a complete ban on taxation of imports so
long as they were in their original packages, there was little oc-
casion to develop a Commerce Clause analysis that would have
reached only discriminatory taxes or taxes upon goods in tran-
1173 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987).

1174 E.g., Northwest Central Pipeline Corp. v. Kansas Corp. Comm’n, 489 U.S.
493, 525–26 (1989); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 472–74
(1981); Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Maryland, 437 U.S. 117, 127–28 (1978). But see
Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enterprises, Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988).
1175 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419 (1827).
1176 Article I, § 10, cl. 2. This aspect of the doctrine of the case was considerably
expanded in Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872), and subsequent cases, to
bar states from levying nondiscriminatory, ad valorem property taxes upon goods
that are no longer in import transit. This line of cases was overruled in Michelin
Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976).
sit.1177 In other respects, however, the Court has applied the for-
eign commerce aspect of the clause more stringently against
state taxation. Thus, in Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Ange-
les,1178 the Court held that, in addition to satisfying the four re-
quirements that govern the permissibility of state taxation of in-
terstate commerce, 11 7 9 “When a State seeks to tax the
instrumentalities of foreign commerce, two additional consider-
ations . . . come into play. The first is the enhanced risk of mul-
tiple taxation . . . . Second, a state tax on the instrumentalities
of foreign commerce may impair federal uniformity in an area
where federal uniformity is essential.” 1180 Multiple taxation is to
be avoided with respect to interstate commerce by apportionment
so that no jurisdiction may tax all the property of a multistate
business, and the rule of apportionment is enforced by the Su-
preme Court with jurisdiction over all the states. However, the
Court is unable to enforce such a rule against another country,
and the country of the domicile of the business may impose a
tax on full value. Uniformity could be frustrated by disputes over
multiple taxation, and trade disputes could result.
Applying both of these concerns, the Court invalidated a state
tax, a nondiscriminatory, ad valorem property tax, on foreign-
owned instrumentalities, i.e., cargo containers, of international com-
merce. The containers were used exclusively in international com-
merce and were based in Japan, which did in fact tax them on full
value. Thus there was not only the risk, but the actuality, of mul-
tiple taxation. National uniformity was endangered, because, al-
though California taxed the Japanese containers, Japan did not tax
American containers, and disputes resulted.1181
1177 See, e.g., Halliburton Oil Well Co. v. Reily, 373 U.S. 64 (1963); Minnesota v.
Blasius, 290 U.S. 1 (1933). After the holding in Michelin Tire, the two clauses are
now congruent. The Court has observed that the two clauses are animated by the
same policies. Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 449–50 n.14
(1979).
1178 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
1179 Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 279 (1977). A state tax
failed to pass the nondiscrimination standard in Kraft General Foods, Inc. v. Iowa
Dept. of Revenue and Finance, 505 U.S. 71 (1992). Iowa imposed an income tax on
a unitary business operating throughout the United States and in several foreign
countries. It taxed the dividends that a corporation received from its foreign subsid-
iaries, but not the dividends it received from its domestic subsidiaries. Therefore,
there was a facial distinction between foreign and domestic commerce.
1180 441 U.S. at 446, 448. See also Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507
U.S. 60 (1993) (sustaining state sales tax as applied to lease of containers delivered
within the state and used in foreign commerce).
1181 441 U.S. at 451–57. For income taxes, the test is more lenient, accepting
not only the risk but the actuality of some double taxation as something simply in-
herent in accounting devices. Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board,
463 U.S. 159, 187–192 (1983).
On the other hand, the Court has upheld a state tax on all avia-
tion fuel sold within the state as applied to a foreign airline operat-
ing charters to and from the United States. The Court found the
Complete Auto standards met, and it similarly decided that the two
standards specifically raised in foreign commerce cases were not vio-
lated. First, there was no danger of double taxation because the tax
was imposed upon a discrete transaction—the sale of fuel—that oc-
curred within only one jurisdiction. Second, the one-voice standard
was satisfied, because the United States had never entered into any
compact with a foreign nation precluding such state taxation, hav-
ing only signed agreements with others, which had no force of law,
aspiring to eliminate taxation that constituted impediments to air
travel.1182 Also, a state unitary-tax scheme that used a worldwide-
combined reporting formula was upheld as applied to the taxing of
the income of a domestic-based corporate group with extensive for-
eign operations.1183
Extending Container Corp., the Court in Barclays Bank v. Fran-
chise Tax Bd. of California, 1184 upheld the state’s worldwide-
combined reporting method of determining the corporate franchise
tax owed by unitary multinational corporations, as applied to a for-
eign corporation. The Court determined that the tax easily satis-
fied three of the four-part Complete Auto test—nexus, apportion-
ment, and relation to state’s services—and concluded that the
nondiscrimination principle—perhaps violated by the letter of the
law—could be met by the discretion accorded state officials. As for
the two additional factors, as outlined in Japan Lines, the Court
pronounced itself satisfied. Multiple taxation was not the inevi-
table result of the tax, and that risk would not be avoided by the
use of any reasonable alternative. The tax, it was found, did not
impair federal uniformity or prevent the Federal Government from
speaking with one voice in international trade, in view of the fact
that Congress had rejected proposals that would have preempted
California’s practice.1185 The result of the case, perhaps intended,
1182 Wardair Canada v. Florida Dep’t of Revenue, 477 U.S. 1, 10 (1986).

1183 Container Corp. of America v. Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. 159 (1983).
The validity of the formula as applied to domestic corporations with foreign parents
or to foreign corporations with foreign parents or foreign subsidiaries, so that some
of the income earned abroad would be taxed within the taxing state, is a question of
some considerable dispute.
1184 512 U.S. 298 (1994).
1185 Reliance could not be placed on Executive statements, the Court explained,
because “the Constitution expressly grants Congress, not the President, the power
to ‘regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.’ ” 512 U.S. at 329. “Executive Branch
communications that express federal policy but lack the force of law cannot render
unconstitutional California’s otherwise valid, congressionally condoned, use of world-
is that foreign corporations have less protection under the negative

commerce clause.1186
The power to regulate foreign commerce was always broader than
the states’ power to tax it, an exercise of the “police power” recog-
nized by Chief Justice Marshall in Brown v. Maryland.1187 That this
power was constrained by notions of the national interest and pre-
emption principles was evidenced in the cases striking down state
efforts to curb and regulate the actions of shippers bringing per-
sons into their ports.1188 On the other hand, quarantine legislation
to protect the states’ residents from disease and other hazards was
commonly upheld though it regulated international commerce.1189
A state game-season law applied to criminalize the possession of a
dead grouse imported from Russia was upheld because of the prac-
tical necessities of enforcement of domestic law.1190
Nowadays, state regulation of foreign commerce is likely to be
judged by the extra factors set out in Japan Line.1191 Thus, the ap-
plication of a state civil rights law to a corporation transporting pas-
sengers outside the state to an island in a foreign province was sus-
tained in an opinion emphasizing that, because of the particularistic
geographic situation the foreign commerce involved was more con-
ceptual than actual, there was only a remote hazard of conflict be-
tween state law and the law of the other country and little if any
prospect of burdening foreign commerce.
Clause 4. The Congress shall have Power * * * To establish

an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the sub-
ject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States.
wide combined reporting.” Id. at 330. Dissenting Justice Scalia noted that, although
the Court’s ruling correctly restored preemptive power to Congress, “it permits the
authority to be exercised by silence. Id. at 332.”
1186 The Supreme Court, Leading Cases, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139, 139–49
(1993).
1187 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 443–44 (1827).
1188 New York City v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837) (upholding reporting
requirements imposed on ships’ masters), overruled by Henderson v. Mayor of New

York, 92 U.S. 259 (1876); Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1849)(1849); Chy
Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275 (1876).
1189 Campagnie Francaise De Navigation a Vapeur v. Louisiana State Bd. of Health,
186 U.S. 380 (1902); Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900); Morgan v. Louisiana,
118 U.S. 455 (1886).
1190 New York ex rel. Silz v. Hesterberg, 211 U.S. 31 (1908).
1191 Japan Line, Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 456 n.20 (1979)
(construing Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. Michigan, 333 U.S. 28 (1948)).

Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 4—Naturalization and Bankruptcies
NATURALIZATION AND CITIZENSHIP
Nature and Scope of Congress’ Power

Naturalization has been defined by the Supreme Court as “the
act of adopting a foreigner, and clothing him with the privileges of
a native citizen.” 1192 In the Dred Scott case,1193 the Court asserted
that the power of Congress under this clause applies only to “per-
sons born in a foreign country, under a foreign Government.” 1194
These dicta are much too narrow to describe the power that Con-
gress has actually exercised on the subject. The competence of Con-
gress in this field merges, in fact, with its indefinite, inherent pow-
ers in the field of foreign relations. “As a government, the United
States is invested with all the attributes of sovereignty. As it has
the character of nationality it has the powers of nationality, espe-
cially those which concern its relations and intercourse with other
countries.” 1195
Congress’ power over naturalization is an exclusive power; no
state has the independent power to constitute a foreign subject a
citizen of the United States.1196 But power to naturalize aliens un-
der federal standards may be, and was early, devolved by Congress
upon state courts of record.1197 And though the states may not pre-
scribe requirements for citizenship, they may confer rights, includ-
ing political rights, to resident aliens. At one time, it was not un-
common for states to confer the right of suffrage upon resident aliens,
especially upon those who had declared their intention to become
citizens, and several states continued to do so until well into the
twentieth century.1198
Citizenship by naturalization is a privilege to be given or with-
held as Congress may determine: “It is not within the province of
the courts to make bargains with those who seek naturalization.
They must accept the grant and take the oath in accordance with
the terms fixed by the law, or forego the privilege of citizenship.
1192 Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 162 (1892).
1193 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
1194 60 U.S. at 417.
1195 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 311 (1915).
1196 Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259, 269 (1817); United States v. Wong
Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 701 (1898).

1197 The first naturalization act, 1 Stat. 103 (1790), so provided. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1421. In Holmgren v. United States, 217 U.S. 509 (1910), the Court held that Con-
gress may provide for the punishment of false swearing in the proceedings in state
courts.
1198 Rosberg, Aliens and Equal Protection: Why Not the Right to Vote?, 75 MICH.
L. REV. 1092 (1977). See Spragins v. Houghton, 3 Ill. 377 (1840); Stewart v. Foster, 2
Binn. (Pa.) 110 (1809). See also K. PORTER, A HISTORY OF SUFFRAGE IN THE UNITED STATES
ch. 5 (1918).
There is no middle choice.” 1199 This interpretation makes of the natu-

ralization power the only power granted in § 8 of Article I that is
unrestrained by constitutional limitations on its exercise. Thus, the
first naturalization act enacted by the first Congress restricted natu-
ralization to “free white person[s],” 1200 which was expanded in 1870
so that persons of “African nativity and . . . descent” were entitled
to be naturalized.1201 “Chinese laborers” were specifically excluded
from eligibility in 1882,1202 and the courts enforced these provi-
sions without any indication that constitutional issues were thereby
raised.1203 These exclusions are no longer law. Present naturaliza-
tion statutes continue to require loyalty and good moral character
and generally bar subversives, terrorists, and criminals, among oth-
ers, from citizenship.1204
Although the usual form of naturalization is through indi-
vidual application and official response on the basis of general con-
gressional rules, naturalization is not so limited. Citizenship can
be conferred by special act of Congress,1205 it can be conferred col-
lectively either through congressional action, such as the natural-
1199 United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). See also Fong Yue Ting v.
United States, 149 U.S. 698, 707–08 (1893). Though Congress broadly controls the
path to naturalization in the United States, it is restricted in conditioning the reten-
tion of citizenship so conferred. The Fourteenth Amendment declares persons born
or naturalized in the United States to be citizens, and Congress may not distin-
guish among classes of “Fourteenth Amendment” citizens in setting rules for expa-
triation (assuming the absence of fraud in obtaining naturalization). Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964). By contrast, Congress controls by statute who born abroad
becomes a U.S. citizen at birth (based generally on the citizenship status of the par-
ents), at times has conditioned this “statutory” citizenship on subsequent periodic
residence in the United States, and has had relinquishment of citizenship for fail-
ure to meet this condition subsequent upheld by the Court. Rogers v. Bellei, 401
U.S. 815 (1971).
1200 1 Stat. 103 (1790).
1201 Act of July 14, 1870, § 7, 16 Stat. 254, 256.
1202 Act of May 6, 1882, § 1, 22 Stat. 58. The statute defined “Chinese laborers”
to mean “both skilled and unskilled laborers and Chinese employed in mining.” 22
Stat. 61.
1203 Cf. Ozawa v. United States, 260 U.S. 178 (1922); United States v. Bhagat
Singh Thind, 261 U.S. 204 (1923); Toyota v. United States, 268 U.S. 402 (1925); Mor-
rison v. California, 291 U.S. 82 (1934). The Court refused to review the only case in
which the constitutional issue was raised and rejected. Kharaiti Ram Samras v. United
States, 125 F.2d 879 (9th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 634 (1942).
1204 The Alien and Sedition Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 570, empowered the President
to deport any alien he found dangerous to the peace and safety of the Nation. In
1903, Congress provided for denial of naturalization and for deportation for mere
belief in certain doctrines, i.e., anarchy. Act of March 3, 1903, 32 Stat. 1214. See
United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904). The range of forbid-
den views was broadened in 1918 (Act of October 15, 1918, § 1, 40 Stat. 1012) and
periodically thereafter. The present law is discussed in The Naturalization of Aliens,
infra.
1205 E.g., 77 Stat. 5 (1963) (making Sir Winston Churchill an “honorary citizen
of the United States”).

ization of all residents of an annexed territory or of a territory made

a state,1206 or through treaty provision.1207
Categories of Citizens: Birth and Naturalization

The first sentence of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment contem-
plates two sources of citizenship and two only: birth and naturaliza-
tion.1208 This contemplation is given statutory expression in § 301
of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,1209 which itemizes
those categories of persons who are citizens of the United States at
birth; all other persons in order to become citizens must pass through
the naturalization process. The first category merely tracks the lan-
guage of the first sentence of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment in
declaring that all persons born in the United States and subject to
the jurisdiction thereof are citizens by birth.1210 But there are six
other categories of citizens by birth. They are: (2) a person born in
the United States to a member of an Indian, Eskimo, Aleutian, or
other aboriginal tribe, (3) a person born outside the United States
of citizen parents one of whom has been resident in the United States,
(4) a person born outside the United States of one citizen parent
who has been continuously resident in the United States for one
year prior to the birth and of a parent who is a national but not a
citizen, (5) a person born in an outlying possession of the United
States of one citizen parent who has been continuously resident in
the United States or an outlying possession for one year prior to
the birth, (6) a person of unknown parentage found in the United
States while under the age of five unless prior to his twenty-first
birthday he is shown not to have been born in the United States,
and (7) a person born outside the United States of an alien parent
and a citizen parent who has been resident in the United States
for a period of ten years, provided the person is to lose his citizen-
ship unless he resides continuously in the United States for a pe-
riod of five years between his fourteenth and twenty-eighth birth-
days.
Subsection (7) citizens must satisfy the condition subsequent of
five years continuous residence within the United States between
the ages of fourteen and twenty-eight, a requirement held to be con-
stitutional,1211 which means in effect that for constitutional pur-
poses, according to the prevailing interpretation, there is a differ-
1206 Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135 (1892); Contzen v. United
States, 179 U.S. 191 (1900).

1207 Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 164, 168–69 (1892).
1208 United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702 (1898).
1209 66 Stat. 235, 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
1210 § 301(a)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(1).
1211 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
ence between persons born or naturalized in, that is, within, the
United States and persons born outside the confines of the United
States who are statutorily made citizens.1212 The principal differ-
ence is that the former persons may not be involuntarily expatri-
ated whereas the latter may be, subject only to due process protec-
tions.1213
The Naturalization of Aliens

Although, as has been noted, throughout most of our history
there were significant racial and ethnic limitations upon eligibility
for naturalization, the present law prohibits any such discrimina-
tion.
“The right of a person to become a naturalized citizen of the
United States shall not be denied or abridged because of race or
sex or because such person is married.” 1214 However, any person
“who advocates or teaches, or who is a member of or affiliated with
any organization that advocates or teaches . . . opposition to all or-
ganized government,” or “who advocates or teaches or who is a mem-
ber of or affiliated with any organization that advocates or teaches
the overthrow by force or violence or other unconstitutional means
of the Government of the United States” or who is a member of or
affiliated with the Communist Party, or other communist organiza-
tions, or other totalitarian organizations is ineligible.1215 These pro-
visions moreover are “applicable to any applicant for naturaliza-
tion who at any time within a period of ten years immediately
preceding the filing of the petition for naturalization or after such
filing and before taking the final oath of citizenship is, or has been
found to be, within any of the classes enumerated within this sec-
tion, notwithstanding that at the time the petition is filed he may
not be included within such classes.” 1216
1212 Compare Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S.
253 (1967). It will be noted that in practically all cases persons statutorily made
citizens at birth will be dual nationals, having the citizenship of the country where
they were born. Congress has never required a citizen having dual nationality to
elect at some point one and forsake the other but it has enacted several restrictive
statutes limiting the actions of dual nationals which have occasioned much litiga-
tion. E.g., Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S. 491 (1950); Kawakita v. United States,
343 U.S. 717 (1952); Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Schneider
v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964); Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
1213 Cf. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 836 (1971); Kennedy v. Mendoza-
Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44, 58–62 (1958).
1214 § 311, 66 Stat. 239 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1422.
1215 § 313(a), 66 Stat. 240 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1424(a). Whether “mere” member-
ship is sufficient to constitute grounds for ineligibility is unclear. Compare Galvan v.

Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954), with Berenyi v. Immigration Director, 385 U.S. 630 (1967).
1216 § 313(c), 66 Stat. 241 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1424(c).
Other limitations on eligibility are also imposed. Eligibility may

turn upon the decision of the responsible officials whether the peti-
tioner is of “good moral character.” 1217 The immigration and nation-
ality laws themselves include a number of specific congressional de-
terminations that certain persons do not possess “good moral
character,” including persons who are “habitual drunkards,” 1218 adul-
terers,1219 polygamists or advocates of polygamy,1220 gamblers,1221
convicted felons,1222 and homosexuals.1223 In order to petition for
naturalization, an alien must have been resident for at least five
years and to have possessed “good moral character” for all of that
period.
The process of naturalization culminates in the taking in open
court of an oath “(1) to support the Constitution of the United States;
(2) to renounce and abjure absolutely and entirely all allegiance and
fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty of whom
or which the petitioner was before a subject or citizen; (3) to sup-
port and defend the Constitution and the laws of the United States
against all enemies, foreign and domestic; (4) to bear true faith and
allegiance to the same; and (5) (A) to bear arms on behalf of the
United States when required by the law, or (B) to perform noncom-
batant service in the Armed Forces of the United States when re-
quired by the law, or (C) to perform work of national importance
under civilian direction when required by law.” 1224
Any naturalized person who takes this oath with mental reser-
vations or conceals or misrepresents beliefs, affiliations, and con-
duct, which under the law disqualify one for naturalization, is sub-
ject, upon these facts being shown in a proceeding brought for the
1217 § 316(a)(3), 66 Stat. 242, 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a)(3).

1218 § 101(f)(1), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(1).
1219 § 101(f)(2), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(2).
1220 § 212(a)(11), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(11).
1221 § 101(f)(4) and (5), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(4) and (5).
1222 § 101(f)(7) and (8), 66 Stat. 172, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(f)(7) and (8).
1223 § 212(a)(4), 66 Stat. 182, 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4), barring aliens afflicted with
“psychopathic personality,” “a term of art intended to exclude homosexuals from en-

try into the United States.” Boutilier v. Immigration and Naturalization Service, 387
U.S. 118, 119 (1967).
1224 § 337(a), 66 Stat. 258 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1448(a). In United States v. Schwim-
mer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929), and United States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931), a
divided Court held that clauses (3) and (4) of the oath, as then prescribed, required
the candidate for naturalization to be willing to bear arms for the United States,
thus disqualifying conscientious objectors. These cases were overturned, purely as a
matter of statutory interpretation by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946),
and Congress codified the result, 64 Stat. 1017 (1950), as it now appears in the cited
statute.
purpose, to have his certificate of naturalization cancelled.1225 More-

over, if within a year of his naturalization a person joins an organi-
zation or becomes in any way affiliated with one which was a dis-
qualification for naturalization if he had been a member at the time,
the fact is made prima facie evidence of his bad faith in taking the
oath and grounds for instituting proceedings to revoke his admis-
sion to citizenship.1226
Rights of Naturalized Persons

Chief Justice Marshall early stated in dictum that “[a] natural-
ized citizen . . . becomes a member of the society, possessing all the
rights of a native citizen, and standing, in the view of the Constitu-
tion, on the footing of a native. The Constitution does not autho-
rize Congress to enlarge or abridge those rights. The simple power
of the national legislature is, to prescribe a uniform rule of natural-
ization, and the exercise of this power exhausts it, so far as re-
spects the individual.” 1227 A similar idea was expressed in Knauer
v. United States.1228 “Citizenship obtained through naturalization
is not a second-class citizenship. . . . [It] carries with it the privi-
lege of full participation in the affairs of our society, including the
right to speak freely, to criticize officials and administrators, and to
promote changes in our laws including the very Charter of our Gov-
ernment.”
1225 § 340(a), 66 Stat. 260 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(a). See Kungys v. United States,
485 U.S. 759 (1988) (badly fractured Court opinion dealing with the statutory re-
quirements in a denaturalization proceeding under this section). See also Johannes-
sen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912). Congress has imposed no time bar appli-
cable to proceedings to revoke citizenship, so that many years after naturalization
has taken place a naturalized citizen remains subject to divestment upon proof of
fraud. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961); Polites v. United States, 364
U.S. 426 (1960); Knauer v. United States, 328 U.S. 654 (1946); Fedorenko v. United
States, 449 U.S. 490 (1981).
1226 340(c), 66 Stat. 261 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c). The time period had previ-
ously been five years.

1227 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 827 (1824).
One must be aware, however, that this language does not appear in any case hav-
ing to do with citizenship or naturalization or the rights of naturalized citizens and
its force may be therefore questioned. Compare Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253, 261
(1967) (Justice Black for the Court: “a mature and well-considered dictum . . . ”),
with id. at 275–76 (Justice Harlan dissenting: the dictum, “cannot have been in-
tended to reach the question of citizenship”). The issue in Osborn was the right of
the Bank to sue in federal court. Osborn had argued that the fact that the bank
was chartered under the laws of the United States did not make any legal issue
involving the bank one arising under the laws of the United States for jurisdictional
purposes; to argue the contrary, Osborn contended, was like suggesting that the fact
that persons were naturalized under the laws of Congress meant such persons had
an automatic right to sue in federal courts, unlike natural-born citizens. The quoted
language of Marshall’s rejects this attempted analogy.
1228 328 U.S. 654, 658 (1946).
Despite these dicta, it is clear that particularly in the past but

currently as well a naturalized citizen has been and is subject to
requirements not imposed on native-born citizens. Thus, as we have
noted above, a naturalized citizen is subject at any time to have
his good faith in taking the oath of allegiance to the United States
inquired into and to lose his citizenship if lack of such faith is shown
in proper proceedings.1229 And the naturalized citizen within a year
of his naturalization will join a questionable organization at his
peril.1230 In Luria v. United States,1231 the Court sustained a stat-
ute making prima facie evidence of bad faith a naturalized citizen’s
assumption of residence in a foreign country within five years after
the issuance of a certificate of naturalization. But in Schneider v.
Rusk,1232 the Court voided a statute that provided that a natural-
ized citizen should lose his United States citizenship if following
naturalization he resided continuously for three years in his for-
mer homeland. “We start,” Justice Douglas wrote for the Court, “from
the premise that the rights of citizenship of the native-born and of
the naturalized person are of the same dignity and are coextensive.
The only difference drawn by the Constitution is that only the ‘natu-
ral born’ citizen is eligible to be President.” 1233 The failure of the
statute, the Court held, was that it impermissibly distinguished be-
tween native-born and naturalized citizens, denying the latter the
equal protection of the laws.1234 “This statute proceeds on the im-
permissible assumption that naturalized citizens as a class are less
reliable and bear less allegiance to this country than do the native-
born. This is an assumption that is impossible for us to make. . . .
A native-born citizen is free to reside abroad indefinitely without
suffering loss of citizenship. The discrimination aimed at natural-
ized citizens drastically limits their rights to live and work abroad
in a way that other citizens may. It creates indeed a second-class
citizenship. Living abroad, whether the citizen be naturalized or native-
1229 Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912); Knauer v. United States,
328 U.S. 654 (1946); Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 (1961).
1230 See 8 U.S.C. § 1451(c).
1231 231 U.S. 9 (1913). The provision has been modified to reduce the period to
one year. 8 U.S.C. § 1451(d).

1232 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
1233 377 U.S. at 165.
1234 Although there is no equal protection clause specifically applicable to the
Federal Government, it is established that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment forbids discrimination in much the same manner as the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment. In fact, “[e]qual protection analysis in the Fifth Amend-
ment area is the same as that under the Fourteenth Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 93 (1976).
born, is no badge of lack of allegiance and in no way evidences a

voluntary renunciation of nationality and allegiance.” 1235
The Schneider equal protection rationale was abandoned in the
next case in which the Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment
forbade involuntary expatriation of naturalized persons.1236 But in
Rogers v. Bellei,1237 the Court refused to extend this holding to per-
sons statutorily naturalized at birth abroad because one of their par-
ents was a citizen and similarly refused to apply Schneider. Thus,
one who failed to honor a condition subsequent had his citizenship
revoked. “Neither are we persuaded that a condition subsequent in
this area impresses one with ‘second-class citizenship.’ That cliché
is too handy and too easy, and, like most clichés, can be mislead-
ing. That the condition subsequent may be beneficial is apparent
in the light of the conceded fact that citizenship was fully deniable.
The proper emphasis is on what the statute permits him to gain
from the possible starting point of noncitizenship, not on what he
claims to lose from the possible starting point of full citizenship to
which he has no constitutional right in the first place. His citizen-
ship, while it lasts, although conditional, is not ‘second-class.’ ” 1238
It is not clear where the progression of cases has left us in this
area. Clearly, naturalized citizens are fully entitled to all the rights
and privileges of those who are citizens because of their birth here.
But it seems equally clear that with regard to retention of citizen-
ship, naturalized citizens are not in the secure position of citizens
born here.1239
On another point, the Court has held that, absent a treaty or
statute to the contrary, a child born in the United States who is
taken during minority to the country of his parents’ origin, where
his parents resume their former allegiance, does not thereby lose
his American citizenship and that it is not necessary for him to make
an election and return to the United States.1240 On still another
point, it has been held that naturalization is so far retroactive as
1235 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168–69 (1964).

1236 Afroyim v. Rusk, 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
1237 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
1238 401 U.S. at 835–36.
1239 At least, there is a difference so long as Afroyim prevents Congress from
making expatriation the consequence of certain acts when done by natural born citi-
zens as well.
1240 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939). The qualifying phrase “absent a treaty
or statute . . . ” is error now, so long as Afroyim remains in effect. But note Rogers
v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815, 832–833 (1971).
to validate an acquisition of land prior to naturalization as to which

the alien was under a disability.1241
Expatriation: Loss of Citizenship

The history of the right of expatriation, voluntarily on the part
of the citizen or involuntarily under duress of statute, is shadowy
in United States constitutional law. Justice Story, in the course of
an opinion,1242 and Chancellor Kent, in his writings,1243 accepted
the ancient English doctrine of perpetual and unchangeable alle-
giance to the government of one’s birth, a citizen being precluded
from renouncing his allegiance without permission of that govern-
ment. The pre-Civil War record on the issue is so vague because
there was wide disagreement on the basis of national citizenship in
the first place, with some contending that national citizenship was
derivative from state citizenship, which would place the power of
providing for expatriation in the state legislatures, and with others
contending for the primacy of national citizenship, which would place
the power in Congress.1244 The citizenship basis was settled by the
first sentence of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but expatria-
tion continued to be a muddled topic. An 1868 statute specifically
recognized “the right of expatriation” by individuals, but it was di-
rected to affirming the right of foreign nationals to expatriate them-
selves and to become naturalized United States citizens.1245 An 1865
law provided for the forfeiture of the “rights of citizenship” of draft-
dodgers and deserters, but whether the statute meant to deprive
such persons of citizenship or of their civil rights is unclear.1246 Be-
ginning in 1940, however, Congress did enact laws designed to strip
1241 Governeur v. Robertson, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 332 (1826); Osterman v. Baldwin,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 116 (1867); Manuel v. Wulff, 152 U.S. 505 (1894).
1242 Shanks v. DuPont, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 242, 246 (1830).
1243 2 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES 49–50 (1827).
1244 J. TENBROEK, ANTI-SLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 71–94 (1951);
see generally J. ROCHE, THE EARLY DEVELOPMENT OF UNITED STATES CITIZENSHIP (1949).
1245 Act of July 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 223. While the Act’s preamble rhetorically
proclaims the “natural and inherent right of all people” to expatriate themselves, its
title is “An Act concerning the Rights of American Citizens in foreign States” and
its operative parts are concerned with that subject. It has long been taken, however,
as a general proclamation of United States recognition of the right of United States
citizens to expatriate themselves. Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 309 (1915); Mandoli
v. Acheson, 344 U.S. 133, 135–36 (1952). Cf. Savorgnan v. United States, 338 U.S.
491, 498 n.11 (1950).
1246 The Enrollment Act of March 3, 1865, § 21, 13 Stat. 487, 490. The language
of the section appears more consistent with a deprivation of civil rights than of citi-
zenship. Note also that § 14 of the Wade-Davis Bill, pocket-vetoed by President Lin-
coln, specifically provided that any person holding office in the Confederate Govern-
ment “is hereby declared not to be a citizen of the United States.” 6 J. RICHARDSON,
MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 223 (1899).
of their citizenship persons who committed treason,1247 deserted the

armed forces in wartime,1248 left the country to evade the draft,1249
or attempted to overthrow the government by force or violence.1250
In 1907, Congress provided that female citizens who married for-
eign citizens were to have their citizenship held “in abeyance” while
they remained wedded but to be entitled to reclaim it when the mar-
riage was dissolved.1251
About the simplest form of expatriation, the renunciation of citi-
zenship by a person, there is no constitutional difficulty. “Expatria-
tion is the voluntary renunciation or abandonment of nationality
and allegiance.” 1252 But while the Court has hitherto insisted on
the voluntary character of the renunciation, it has sustained the
power of Congress to prescribe conditions and circumstances the vol-
untary entering into of which constitutes renunciation; the person
need not intend to renounce so long as he intended to do what he
did in fact do.1253
The Court first encountered the constitutional issue of forced
expatriation in the rather anomalous form of the statute,1254 which
placed in limbo the citizenship of any American female who mar-
ried a foreigner. Sustaining the statute, the Court relied on the con-
gressional foreign relations power exercised in order to prevent the
development of situations that might entangle the United States in
embarrassing or hostile relationships with a foreign country. Not-
ing too the fictional merging of identity of husband and wife, the
Court thought it well within congressional power to attach certain
consequences to these actions, despite the woman’s contrary intent
and understanding at the time she entered the relationship.1255
Beginning in 1958, the Court had a running encounter with the
provisions of the 1952 Immigration and Nationality Act, which pre-
scribed expatriation for a lengthy series of actions.1256 In 1958, a
1247 Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1169.
1248 Id.
1249 58 Stat. 746 (1944).
1250 68 Stat. 1146 (1954).
1251 34 Stat. 1228 (1907), repealed by 42 Stat. 1021 (1922).
1252 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 334 (1939).
1253 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299, 309, 311–12 (1915); Savorgnan v. United
States, 338 U.S. 491, 506 (1950).

1254 34 Stat. 1228 (1907).
1255 Mackenzie v. Hare, 239 U.S. 299 (1915).
1256 See generally 8 U.S.C. §§ 1481–1489. Among the acts for which loss of citi-
zenship is prescribed are (1) obtaining naturalization in a foreign state, (2) taking
an oath of allegiance to a foreign state, (3) serving in the armed forces of a foreign
state without authorization and with consequent acquisition of foreign nationality,
(4) assuming public office under the government of a foreign state for which only
nationals of that state are eligible, (5) voting in an election in a foreign state, (6)
formally renouncing citizenship before a United States foreign service officer abroad,
five-to-four decision sustained the power to divest a dual national

of his United States citizenship because he had voted in an elec-
tion in the other country of which he was a citizen.1257 But at the
same time, another five-to-four decision, in which a majority ratio-
nale was lacking, struck down punitive expatriation visited on per-
sons convicted by court-martial of desertion from the armed forces
in wartime.1258 In the next case, the Court struck down another pu-
nitive expatriation visited on persons who, in time of war or emer-
gency, leave or remain outside the country in order to evade mili-
tary service. 1259 And, in the following year, the Court held
unconstitutional a section of the law that expatriated a naturalized
citizen who returned to his native land and resided there continu-
ously for a period of three years.1260
The cases up to this point had lacked a common rationale and
would have seemed to permit even punitive expatriation under the
proper circumstances. But, in Afroyim v. Rusk,1261 a five-to-four ma-
(7) formally renewing citizenship within the United States in time of war, subject to
approval of the Attorney General, (8) being convicted and discharged from the armed
services for desertion in wartime, (9) being convicted of treason or of an attempt to
overthrow forcibly the Government of the United States, (10) fleeing or remaining
outside the United States in wartime or a proclaimed emergency in order to evade
military service, and (11) residing abroad if a naturalized citizen, subject to certain
exceptions, for three years in the country of his birth or in which he was formerly a
national or for five years in any other foreign state. Several of these sections have
been declared unconstitutional, as explained in the text.
1257 Perez v. Brownell, 356 U.S. 44 (1958). For the Court, Justice Frankfurter
sustained expatriation as a necessary exercise of the congressional power to regu-

late the foreign relations of the United States to prevent the embarrassment and
potential for trouble inherent in our nationals voting in foreign elections. Justice
Whittaker dissented because he saw no problem of embarrassment or potential trouble
if the foreign state permitted aliens or dual nationals to vote. Chief Justice Warren
and Justices Black and Douglas denied that expatriation is within Congress’ power
to prescribe for an act, like voting, which is not necessarily a sign of intention to
relinquish citizenship.
1258 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958). Chief Justice Warren for himself and
three Justices held that expatriation for desertion was a cruel and unusual punish-
ment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. Justice Brennan concurred on the ground
of a lack of the requisite relationship between the statute and Congress’ war pow-
ers. For the four dissenters, Justice Frankfurter argued that Congress had power to
impose loss of citizenship for certain activity and that there was a rational nexus
between refusal to perform a duty of citizenship and deprivation of citizenship. Jus-
tice Frankfurter denied that the penalty was cruel and unusual punishment and
denied that it was punishment at all “in any valid constitutional sense.” Id. at 124.
1259 Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963). For the Court Justice
Goldberg held that penal expatriation effectuated solely by administrative determi-

nation violated due process because of the absence of procedural safeguards. Jus-
tices Black and Douglas continued to insist Congress could not deprive a citizen of
his nationality at all. Justice Harlan for the dissenters thought the statute a valid
exercise of Congress’ war powers but the four dissenters divided two-to-two on the
validity of a presumption spelled out in the statute.
1260 Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163 (1964).
1261 387 U.S. 253 (1967).
jority overruled the 1958 decision permitting expatriation for vot-

ing in a foreign election and announced a constitutional rule against
all but purely voluntary renunciation of United States citizenship.
The majority ruled that the first sentence of § 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment constitutionally vested citizenship in every person “born
or naturalized in the United States” and that Congress was power-
less to take that citizenship away.1262 The continuing vitality of this
decision was called into question by another five-to-four decision in
1971, which technically distinguished Afroyim in upholding a con-
gressionally prescribed loss of citizenship visited upon a person who
was statutorily naturalized “outside” the United States, and held
not within the protection of the first sentence of § 1 of the Four-
teenth Amendment.1263 Thus, although Afroyim was distinguished,
the tenor of the majority opinion was hostile to its holding, and it
may be that a future case will overrule it.
The issue, then, of the constitutionality of congressionally pre-
scribed expatriation is unsettled.
ALIENS
Admission
The power of Congress “to exclude aliens from the United States
and to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they come in”
is absolute, being an attribute of the United States as a sovereign
nation. “That the government of the United States, through the ac-
tion of the legislative department, can exclude aliens from its terri-
tory is a proposition which we do not think open to controversy.
Jurisdiction over its own territory to that extent is an incident of
every independent nation. It is a part of its independence. If it could
not exclude aliens, it would be to that extent subject to the control
of another power. . . . The United States, in their relation to for-
eign countries and their subjects or citizens, are one nation, in-
vested with powers which belong to independent nations, the exer-
1262 Justice Harlan, for himself and Justices Clark, Stewart, and White, argued
in dissent that there was no evidence that the drafters of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment had at all the intention ascribed to them by the majority. He would have found
in Afroyim’s voluntary act of voting in a foreign election a voluntary renunciation of
United States citizenship. 387 U.S. at 268.
1263 Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971). The three remaining Afroyim dissent-
ers plus Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun made up the majority, the three
remaining Justices of the Afroyim majority plus Justice Marshall made up the dis-
senters. The continuing vitality of Afroyim was assumed in Vance v. Terrazas, 444
U.S. 252 (1980), in which a divided Court upheld a congressionally imposed stan-
dard of proof, preponderance of evidence, by which to determine whether one had
by his actions renounced his citizenship.
cise of which can be invoked for the maintenance of its absolute

independence and security throughout its entire territory.” 1264
Except for the Alien Act of 1798,1265 Congress went almost a
century without enacting laws regulating immigration into the United
States. The first such statute, in 1875, barred convicts and prosti-
tutes 1266 and was followed by a series of exclusions based on health,
1264 Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581,
603, 604 (1889); see also Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 705 (1893);
The Japanese Immigrant Case (Yamataya v. Fisher), 189 U.S. 86 (1903); United States
ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279 (1904); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585
(1913); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S.
753 (1972). In Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 530–531 (1954), Justice Frankfurter
for the Court wrote: “[M]uch could be said for the view, were we writing on a clean
slate, that the Due Process Clause qualifies the scope of political discretion hereto-
fore recognized as belonging to Congress in regulating the entry and deportation of
aliens. . . . But the slate is not clean. As to the extent of the power of Congress
under review, there is not merely ‘a page of history,’ . . . but a whole volume. . . .
[T]hat the formulation of these policies is entrusted exclusively to Congress has be-
come about as firmly imbedded in the legislative and judicial tissues of our body
politic as any aspect of our government.” Although the issue of racial discrimination
was before the Court in Jean v. Nelson, 472 U.S. 846 (1985), in the context of parole
for undocumented aliens, the Court avoided it, holding that statutes and regula-
tions precluded INS considerations of race or national origin. Justices Marshall and
Brennan, in dissent, argued for reconsideration of the long line of precedents and
for constitutional restrictions on the government. Id. at 858. That there exists some
limitation upon exclusion of aliens is one permissible interpretation of Reagan v.
Abourezk, 484 U.S. 1 (1987), aff’g by an equally divided Court, 785 F.2d 1043 (D.C.
Cir. 1986), holding that mere membership in the Communist Party could not be used
to exclude an alien on the ground that his activities might be prejudicial to the in-
terests of the United States.
The power of Congress to prescribe the rules for exclusion or expulsion of aliens
is a “fundamental sovereign attribute” which is “of a political character and there-
fore subject only to narrow judicial review.” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S.
88, 101 n.21 (1976); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 81–82 (1976); Fiallo v. Bell, 430
U.S. 787, 792 (1977). Although aliens are “an identifiable class of persons,” who aside
from the classification at issue “are already subject to disadvantages not shared by
the remainder of the community,” Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 102, Con-
gress may treat them in ways that would violate the Equal Protection Clause if a
state should do it. Diaz (residency requirement for welfare benefits); Fiallo (sex and
illegitimacy classifications). Nonetheless in Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. at 103, the Court
observed that when the Federal Government asserts an overriding national interest
as justification for a discriminatory rule that would violate the Equal Protection Clause
if adopted by a state, due process requires that it be shown that the rule was actu-
ally intended to serve that interest. The case struck down a classification that the
Court thought justified by the interest asserted but that had not been imposed by a
body charged with effectuating that interest. See Vergara v. Hampton, 581 F.2d 1281
(7th Cir. 1978). See Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, 509 U.S. 155 (1993) (construing
statutes and treaty provisions restrictively to affirm presidential power to interdict
and seize fleeing aliens on high seas to prevent them from entering U.S. waters).
1265 Act of June 25, 1798, 1 Stat. 570. The Act was part of the Alien and Sedi-
tion Laws and authorized the expulsion of any alien the President deemed danger-
ous.
1266 Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 477.
criminal, moral, economic, and subversion considerations.1267 An-

other important phase was begun with passage of the Chinese Ex-
clusion Act in 1882,1268 which was not repealed until 1943.1269 In
1924, Congress enacted into law a national origins quota formula
which based the proportion of admittable aliens on the nationality
breakdown of the 1920 census, which, of course, was heavily weighted
in favor of English and northern European ancestry.1270 This na-
tional origins quota system was in effect until it was repealed in
1965.1271 The basic law remains the Immigration and Nationality
Act of 1952,1272 which retains its essential structure while undergo-
ing several significant revisions. These revisions have included a
temporary legalization program for certain unauthorized aliens, em-
ployer sanctions, a general expansion and tightening of rules for
removal, changes in categories of aliens who may enter temporar-
ily, and more express provisions on federal-state cooperation in im-
migration enforcement.
Numerous cases underscore the sweeping nature of the powers
of the Federal Government to exclude aliens and to deport aliens
by administrative process. For example, in United States ex rel. Knauff
v. Shaughnessy,1273 an order of the Attorney General excluding, on
the basis of confidential information he would not disclose, a war-
time bride, who was prima facie entitled to enter the United States,1274
was held to be unreviewable by the courts. Nor were regulations
on which the order was based invalid as an undue delegation of
legislative power. “Normally Congress supplies the conditions of the
privilege of entry into the United States. But because the power of
1267 22 Stat. 214 (1882) (excluding idiots, lunatics, convicts, and persons likely
to become public charges); 23 Stat. 332 (1885), and 24 Stat. 414 (1887) (regulating
importing cheap foreign labor); 26 Stat. 1084 (1891) (persons suffering from certain
diseases, those convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude, paupers, and polyga-
mists); 32 Stat. 1213 (1903) (epileptics, insane persons, professional beggars, and
anarchists); 34 Stat. 898 (1907) (feeble-minded, children unaccompanied by parents,
persons suffering with tuberculosis, and women coming to the United States for pros-
titution or other immoral purposes).
1268 Act of May 6, 1882, 22 Stat. 58.
1269 Act of December 17, 1943, 57 Stat. 600.
1270 Act of May 26, 1924, 43 Stat. 153.
1271 Act of October 3, 1965, Pub. L. 89–236, 79 Stat. 911.
1272 Act of June 27, 1952, Pub. L. 82–414, 66 Stat. 163, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101 et seq.
as amended.
1273 338 U.S. 537 (1950). See also Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei,
345 U.S. 206 (1953), in which the Court majority upheld the Government’s power to
exclude on the basis of information it would not disclose a permanent resident who
had gone abroad for about nineteen months and was seeking to return on a new
visa. But the Court will frequently read the applicable statutes and regulations strictly
against the government for the benefit of persons sought to be excluded. Cf. Delgadillo
v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388 (1947); Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590 (1953);
Rosenburg v. Fleuti, 374 U.S. 449 (1963).
1274 Under the War Brides Act of 1945, 59 Stat. 659.
exclusion of aliens is also inherent in the executive department of

the sovereign, Congress may in broad terms authorize the execu-
tive to exercise the power, e.g., as was done here, for the best inter-
ests of the country during a time of national emergency. Executive
officers may be entrusted with the duty of specifying the proce-
dures for carrying out the congressional intent.” 1275 However, when
Congress has spelled out the basis for exclusion or deportation, the
Court remains free to interpret the statute and review the admin-
istration of it and to apply it, often in a manner to mitigate the
effects of the law on aliens.1276
Congress’ power to admit aliens under whatever conditions it
lays down is exclusive of state regulation. The states “can neither
add to nor take from the conditions lawfully imposed by Congress
upon admission, naturalization and residence of aliens in the United
States or the several states. State laws which impose discrimina-
tory burdens upon the entrance or residence of aliens lawfully within
the United States conflict with this constitutionally derived federal
power to regulate immigration, and have accordingly been held in-
valid.” 1277 This principle, however, has not precluded all state regu-
lations dealing with aliens.1278 The power of Congress to legislate
with respect to the conduct of alien residents is a concomitant of
its power to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may
enter the United States, to establish regulations for sending out of
the country such aliens as have entered in violation of law, and to
commit the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to execu-
tive officers. It is not a power to lay down a special code of conduct
for alien residents or to govern their private relations.1279
Yet Congress is empowered to assert a considerable degree of
control over aliens after their admission to the country. By the Alien
Registration Act of 1940, Congress provided that all aliens in the
United States, fourteen years of age and over, should submit to reg-
1275 338 U.S. at 543.
1276 E.g., Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Errico, 385 U.S. 214 (1966).
1277 Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948); De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 358 n.6 (1976); Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1982). See
also Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S.
365, 376–380 (1971).
1278 E.g., Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915); Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach,
274 U.S. 392 (1927); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 646–49 (1973); De Canas
v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982). See also
Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ___, No. 09–115,
slip op. (2011).
1279 Purporting to enforce this distinction, the Court voided a statute, which, in
prohibiting the importation of “any alien woman or girl for the purpose of prostitu-
tion,” provided that whoever should keep for the purpose of prostitution “any alien
woman or girl within three years after she shall have entered the United States”
should be deemed guilty of a felony. Keller v. United States, 213 U.S. 138 (1909).
istration and finger printing and willful failure to comply was made
a criminal offense against the United States.1280 This Act, taken in
conjunction with other laws regulating immigration and naturaliza-
tion, has constituted a comprehensive and uniform system for the
regulation of all aliens.1281
An important benefit of this comprehensive, uniform regulation
accruing to the alien is that it generally has precluded state regu-
lation that may well be more severe and burdensome.1282 For ex-
ample, in Hines v. Davidowitz,1283 the Court voided a Pennsylvania
law requiring the annual registration and fingerprinting of aliens
but going beyond the subsequently enacted federal law to require
acquisition of an alien identification card that had to be carried at
all times and to be exhibited to any police officer upon demand and
to other licensing officers upon applications for such things as driv-
ers’ licenses.1284
Another decision voided a Pennsylvania law limiting those eli-
gible to welfare assistance to citizens and an Arizona law prescrib-
1280 54 Stat. 670, 8 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1306.
1281 See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 69–70 (1941).
1282 In the 1990s, Congress began giving the states a larger role in the enforce-
ment of federal immigration law. During this period, Congress also broadened the
states’ authority to deny aliens state benefits. Still, in the 2000s, states increasingly
asserted greater independent authority to deter the presence of illegal aliens within
their borders, both through curtailing benefits and assuming a more active role in
direct immigration enforcement. Most of these efforts foundered under court chal-
lenge, but some did not, resulting, in at least one instance, in the imposition of more
severe consequences under state law than under federal law for similar immigra-
tion violations. See Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S.
___, No. 09–115, slip op. (2011). Nevertheless, the Whiting Court found a textual
basis in federal statute for the state sanctions imposed there. Absent text-based au-
thority for separate state penalties for federal immigration violations, those state
penalties likely will fail on preemption grounds. Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S.
___, No. 11–182, slip op. (2012) (invalidating state sanctions on unauthorized aliens
seeking work in violation of federal law and striking state penalties for violations of
federal alien registration requirements). It would further appear that states must
ground their efforts to detect, arrest, and remove unauthorized aliens in authority
delegated by Congress. Id.
1283 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
1284 312 U.S. at 68. The Court did not squarely hold the state incapable of hav-
ing such a law in the absence of federal law but appeared to lean in that direction.
State sanctions for violating federal alien registration laws were overturned in Ari-
zona v. United States, at least in part because the state penalties were greater than
those under federal law for the same violation. But see De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S.
351 (1976), in which the Court, ten years prior to enactment of federal employer
sanctions, upheld a state law prohibiting an employer from hiring aliens not en-
titled to lawful residence in the United States. The Court wrote that states may
enact legislation touching upon aliens coexistent with federal laws, under regular
preemption standards, unless the nature of the regulated subject matter precludes
the conclusion or unless Congress has unmistakably ordained the impermissibility
of state law. For examples of state sanctions against unauthorized aliens that have
been struck on preemption grounds, see Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. ___, No.
11–182, slip op. (2012).
ing a fifteen-year durational residency period before an alien could

be eligible for welfare assistance.1285 Congress had provided, Jus-
tice Blackmun wrote for a unanimous Court, that persons who were
likely to become public charges could not be admitted to the United
States and that any alien who became a public charge within five
years of his admission was to be deported unless he could show that
the causes of his economic situation arose after his entry.1286 Thus,
in effect Congress had declared that lawfully admitted resident aliens
who became public charges for causes arising after their entry were
entitled to the full and equal benefit of all laws for the security of
persons and property and the states were disabled from denying
aliens these benefits.1287
Deportation
Unlike the exclusion proceedings,1288 deportation proceedings af-
ford the alien a number of constitutional rights: a right against self-
incrimination,1289 protection against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures,1290 guarantees against ex post facto laws, bills of attainder,
and cruel and unusual punishment,1291 a right to bail,1292 a right
to procedural due process,1293 a right to counsel,1294 a right to no-
tice of charges and hearing,1295 and a right to cross-examine.1296
Notwithstanding these guarantees, the Supreme Court has up-
held a number of statutory deportation measures as not unconstitu-
tional. The Internal Security Act of 1950, in authorizing the Attor-
ney General to hold in custody, without bail, aliens who are members
of the Communist Party of the United States, pending determina-
1285 Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). See also Sugarman v. Dougall,
413 U.S. 634 (1973); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Cabell v. Chavez-Salido,
454 U.S. 432 (1982).
1286 8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(8), 1182(a)(15), 1251(a)(8).
1287 See 42 U.S.C. § 1981, applied in Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334
U.S. 410, 419 n.7 (1948).

1288 See United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 544 (1950),
where the Court noted that “[w]hatever the procedure authorized by Congress is, it
is due process as far as an alien denied entry is concerned.”
1289 Kimm v. Rosenberg, 363 U.S. 405 (1960).
1290 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 229 (1960).
1291 Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955).
1292 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 540 (1952).
1293 Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 49 (1950). See discussion of aliens’
due process rights under the Fifth Amendment, Aliens: Entry and Deportation.
1294 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(2).
1295 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(1).
1296 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(3).
tion as to their deportability, is not unconstitutional.1297 Nor was it

unconstitutional to deport under the Alien Registration Act of 1940 1298
a legally resident alien because of membership in the Communist
Party, although such membership ended before the enactment of the
Act. Such application of the Act did not make it ex post facto, being
but an exercise of the power of the United States to terminate its
hospitality ad libitum.1299 And a statutory provision 1300 making it
a felony for an alien against whom a specified order of deportation
is outstanding “to willfully fail or refuse to make timely application
for travel or other documents necessary to his departure” was not
on its face void for “vagueness.” 1301 An alien unlawfully in the coun-
try “has no constitutional right to assert selective enforcement as a
defense against his deportation.” 1302
BANKRUPTCY
Persons Who May Be Released From Debt

In an early case on circuit, Justice Livingston suggested that
inasmuch as the English statutes on the subject of bankruptcy from
the time of Henry VIII down had applied only to traders it might
“well be doubted, whether an act of Congress subjecting to such a
law every description of persons within the United States, would
comport with the spirit of the powers vested in them in relation to
this subject.” 1303 Neither Congress nor the Supreme Court has ever
accepted this limited view. The first bankruptcy law, passed in 1800,
departed from the English practice to the extent of including bank-
ers, brokers, factors, and underwriters as well as traders.1304 Assert-
ing that the narrow scope of the English statutes was a mere mat-
ter of policy, which by no means entered into the nature of such
laws, Justice Story defined bankruptcy legislation in the sense of
the Constitution as a law making provisions for cases of persons
failing to pay their debts.1305
1297 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952). In Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292
(1993), the Court upheld an INS regulation providing for the ongoing detention of
juveniles apprehended on suspicion of being deportable, unless parents, close rela-
tives, or legal guardians were available to accept release, as against a substantive
due process attack.
1298 54 Stat. 670. For existing statutory provisions as to deportation, see 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1251 et seq.
1299 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524 (1952).
1300 8 U.S.C. § 1252(e).
1301 United States v. Spector, 343 U.S. 169 (1952).
1302 Reno v. American-Arab Anti-Discrimination Comm., 525 U.S. 471, 488 (1999).
1303 Adams v. Storey, 1 Fed. Cas. 141, 142 (No. 66) (C.C.D.N.Y. 1817).
1304 2 Stat. 19 (1800).
This interpretation has been ratified by the Supreme Court. In

Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,1306 it held valid the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898, which provided that persons other than traders might
become bankrupts and that this might be done on voluntary peti-
tion. The Court has given tacit approval to the extension of the bank-
ruptcy laws to cover practically all classes of persons and corpora-
tions,1307 including even municipal corporations 1308 and wage-
earning individuals. The Bankruptcy Act has, in fact been amended
to provide a wage-earners’ extension plan to deal with the unique
problems of debtors who derive their livelihood primarily from sala-
ries or commissions. In furthering the implementation of this plan,
the Supreme Court has held that a wage earner may make use of
it, notwithstanding the fact he has been previously discharged in
bankruptcy within the last six years.1309
Liberalization of Relief Granted and Expansion of the

Rights of the Trustee
As the coverage of the bankruptcy laws has been expanded, the
scope of the relief afforded to debtors has been correspondingly en-
larged. The act of 1800, like its English antecedents, was designed
primarily for the benefit of creditors. Beginning with the act of 1841,
which opened the door to voluntary petitions, rehabilitation of the
debtor has become an object of increasing concern to Congress. An
adjudication in bankruptcy is no longer requisite to the exercise of
bankruptcy jurisdiction. In 1867, the debtor for the first time was
permitted, either before or after adjudication of bankruptcy, to pro-
pose terms of composition that would become binding upon accep-
tance by a designated majority of his creditors and confirmation by
a bankruptcy court. This measure was held constitutional,1310 as were
later acts, which provided for the reorganization of corporations that
are insolvent or unable to meet their debts as they mature,1311 and
for the composition and extension of debts in proceedings for the
relief of individual farmer debtors.1312
Nor is the power of Congress limited to adjustment of the rights
of creditors. The Supreme Court has also ruled that the rights of a
purchaser at a judicial sale of the debtor’s property are within reach
1306 186 U.S. 181 (1902).
1307 Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 670 (1935).
1308 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938), distinguishing Ashton v. Cam-
eron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936).

1309 Perry v. Commerce Loan Co., 383 U.S. 392 (1966).
1310 In re Reiman, 20 Fed. Cas. 490 (No. 11,673) (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1874), cited with
approval in Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648, 672 (1935).
1311 Continental Bank v. Rock Island Ry., 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
1312 Wright v. Vinton Branch, 300 U.S. 440 (1937); Adair v. Bank of America
Ass’n, 303 U.S. 350 (1938).

of the bankruptcy power, and may be modified by a reasonable ex-

tension of the period for redemption from such sale.1313 Moreover,
the Court expanded the bankruptcy court’s power over the prop-
erty of the estate by affording the trustee affirmative relief on coun-
terclaim against a creditor filing a claim against the estate.1314
Underlying most Court decisions and statutes in this area is
the desire to achieve equity and fairness in the distribution of the
bankrupt’s funds.1315 United States v. Speers,1316 codified by an amend-
ment to the Bankruptcy Act,1317 furthered this objective by strength-
ening the position of the trustee as regards the priority of a federal
tax lien unrecorded at the time of bankruptcy.1318 The Supreme Court
has held, in other cases dealing with the priority of various credi-
tors’ claims, that claims arising from the tort of the receiver is an
“actual and necessary” cost of administration,1319 that benefits un-
der a nonparticipating annuity plan are not wages and are there-
fore not given priority,1320 and that when taxes are allowed against
a bankrupt’s estate, penalties due because of the trustee’s failure
to pay the taxes incurred while operating a bankrupt business are
also allowable.1321 The Court’s attitude with regard to these and other
developments is perhaps best summarized in the opinion in Conti-
nental Bank v. Rock Island Ry.,1322 where Justice Sutherland wrote,
on behalf of a unanimous court: “[T]hese acts, far-reaching though
they may be, have not gone beyond the limit of Congressional power;
but rather have constituted extensions into a field whose boundar-
ies may not yet be fully revealed.” 1323
Constitutional Limitations on the Bankruptcy Power

In the exercise of its bankruptcy powers, Congress must not trans-
gress the Fifth and Tenth Amendments. The Bankruptcy Act pro-
vides that use immunity may be granted “for persons required to
submit to examination, to testify, or to provide information” in a
bankruptcy case.1324 Congress may not take from a creditor specific
property previously acquired from a debtor, nor circumscribe the credi-
tor’s right to such an unreasonable extent as to deny him due pro-
1313 Wright v. Union Central Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 502 (1938).
1314 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323 (1966).
1315 Bank of Marin v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103 (1966).
1316 382 U.S. 266 (1965). Cf. United States v. Vermont, 337 U.S. 351 (1964).
1317 Act of July 5, 1966, 80 Stat. 269, 11 U.S.C. § 501, repealed.
1318 382 U.S. at 271–72.
1319 Reading Co. v. Brown, 391 U.S. 471 (1968).
1320 Joint Industrial Bd. v. United States, 391 U.S. 224 (1968).
1321 Nicholas v. United States, 384 U.S. 678 (1966).
1322 294 U.S. 648 (1935).
1323 294 U.S. at 671.
1324 11 U.S.C. § 344.
cess of law; 1325 this principle, however, is subject to the Supreme

Court’s finding that a bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction
for ordering the surrender of voidable preferences when the trustee
successfully counterclaims to a claim filed by the creditor receiving
such preferences.1326
Because Congress may not supersede the power of a state to
determine how a corporation shall be formed, supervised, and dis-
solved, a corporation that has been dissolved by a decree of a state
court may not file a petition for reorganization under the Bank-
ruptcy Act.1327 But Congress may impair the obligation of a con-
tract and may extend the provisions of the bankruptcy laws to con-
tracts already entered into at the time of their passage.1328 Although
it may not subject the fiscal affairs of a political subdivision of a
state to the control of a federal bankruptcy court,1329 Congress may
empower such courts to entertain petitions by taxing agencies or
instrumentalities for a composition of their indebtedness where the
state has consented to the proceeding and the federal court is not
authorized to interfere with the fiscal or governmental affairs of such
petitioners.1330 Congress may recognize the laws of the state relat-
ing to dower, exemption, the validity of mortgages, priorities of pay-
ment and similar matters, even though such recognition leads to
different results from state to state; 1331 for, although bankruptcy
legislation must be uniform, the uniformity required is geographic,
not personal.
The power of Congress to vest the adjudication of bankruptcy
claims in entities not having the constitutional status of Article III
federal courts is unsettled. At least, it may not give to non-Article
III courts the authority to hear state law claims made subject to
federal jurisdiction only because of their relevance to a bankruptcy
proceeding.1332
Constitutional Status of State Insolvency Laws: Preemption
Prior to 1898, Congress exercised the power to establish “uni-
form laws on the subject of bankruptcy” only intermittently. The
1325 Louisville Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555, 589, 602 (1935).
1326 Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327–40 (1966).
1327 Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Wilcox Bldg. Corp., 302 U.S. 120 (1937).
1328 In re Klein, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 277 (1843); Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,
186 U.S. 181 (1902).

1329 Ashton v. Cameron County Dist., 298 U.S. 513 (1936). See also United States
v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).

1330 United States v. Bekins, 304 U.S. 27 (1938).
1331 Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605 (1918); Hanover National Bank v. Moyses,
186 U.S. 181, 190 (1902).

1332 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
See also Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33 (1989) (Seventh Amendment
right to jury trial in bankruptcy cases).
first national bankruptcy law was not enacted until 1800 and was
repealed in 1803; the second was passed in 1841 and was repealed
two years later; a third was enacted in 1867 and repealed in 1878.1333
Thus, during the first eighty-nine years under the Constitution, a
national bankruptcy law was in existence only sixteen years alto-
gether. Consequently, the most important issue of interpretation that
arose during that period concerned the effect of the clause on state
law.
The Supreme Court ruled at an early date that, in the absence
of congressional action, the states may enact insolvency laws, be-
cause it is not the mere existence of the power but rather its exer-
cise that is incompatible with the exercise of the same power by
the states.1334 Later cases settled further that the enactment of a
national bankruptcy law does not invalidate state laws in conflict
therewith but serves only to relegate them to a state of suspended
animation with the result that upon repeal of the national statute
they again come into operation without re-enactment.1335
A state, of course, has no power to enforce any law governing
bankruptcies that impairs the obligation of contracts,1336 extends
to persons or property outside its jurisdiction,1337 or conflicts with
the national bankruptcy laws.1338 Giving effect to the policy of the
federal statute, the Court has held that a state statute regulating
this distribution of property of an insolvent was suspended by that
law,1339 and that a state court was without power to proceed with
pending foreclosure proceedings after a farmer-debtor had filed a
petition in federal bankruptcy court for a composition or extension
of time to pay his debts.1340 A state court injunction ordering a de-
fendant to clean up a waste-disposal site was held to be a “liability
on a claim” subject to discharge under the bankruptcy law, after
the state had appointed a receiver to take charge of the defen-
1333 Hanover National Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181, 184 (1902).
1334 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 199 (1819); Ogden v. Saunders,
25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 368 (1827).
1335 Tua v. Carriere, 117 U.S. 201 (1886); Butler v. Goreley, 146 U.S. 303, 314
(1892).
1336 Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
1337 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 368 (1827); Denny v. Bennett,
128 U.S. 489, 498 (1888); Brown v. Smart, 145 U.S. 454 (1892).
1338 In re Watts and Sachs, 190 U.S. 1, 27 (1903); International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus,
278 U.S. 261, 264 (1929).

1339 International Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
1340 Kalb v. Feurerstein, 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
dant’s property and comply with the injunction.1341 A state law gov-
erning fraudulent transfers was found to be compatible with the
federal law.1342
Substantial disagreement has marked the actions of the Jus-
tices in one area, however, resulting in three five-to-four decisions
first upholding and then voiding state laws providing that a dis-
charge in bankruptcy was not to relieve a judgment arising out of
an automobile accident upon pain of suffering suspension of his driv-
er’s license.1343 The state statutes were all similar enactments of
the Uniform Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, which autho-
rizes the suspension of the license of any driver who fails to satisfy
a judgment against himself growing out of a traffic accident; a sec-
tion of the law specifically provides that a discharge in bankruptcy
will not relieve the debtor of the obligation to pay and the conse-
quence of license suspension for failure to pay. In the first two deci-
sions, the Court majorities decided that the object of the state law
was not to see that such judgments were paid but was rather a
device to protect the public against irresponsible driving.1344 The
last case rejected this view and held that the Act’s sole emphasis
was one of providing leverage for the collection of damages from
drivers and as such was in fact intended to and did frustrate the
purpose of the federal bankruptcy law, the giving of a fresh start
unhampered by debt.1345
If a state desires to participate in the assets of a bankruptcy, it
must submit to the appropriate requirements of the bankruptcy court
with respect to the filing of claims by a designated date. It cannot
assert a claim for taxes by filing a demand at a later date.1346
1341 Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274 (1985). Compare Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S.
36 (1986) (restitution obligations imposed as conditions of probation in state crimi-

nal actions are nondischargeable in proceedings under chapter 7), with Pennsylva-
nia Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Davenport, 495 U.S. 552 (1990) (restitution obliga-
tions imposed as condition of probation in state criminal actions are dischargeable
in proceedings under chapter 13).
1342 Stellwagon v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 615 (1918).
1343 Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33 (1941); Kesler v. Department of Pub. Safety,
369 U.S. 153 (1962); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971).
1344 Reitz v. Mealey, 314 U.S. 33, 37 (1941); Kesler v. Department of Public Safety,
369 U.S. 153, 169–74 (1962).

1345 Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 644–48, 651–54 (1971). The dissenters, Jus-
tice Blackmun for himself and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Stew-
art, argued, in line with the Reitz and Kesler majorities, that the provision at issue
was merely an attempt to assure driving competence and care on the part of its
citizens and had only tangential effect upon bankruptcy.
1346 New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329 (1933).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cls. 5 and 6—Money
Clauses 5 and 6. The Congress shall have Power * * * To

coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and
fix the Standard of Weights and Measures.
* * * To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the
Securities and current Coin of the United States.
FISCAL AND MONETARY POWERS OF CONGRESS
Coinage, Weights, and Measures

The power “to coin money” and “regulate the value thereof ” has
been broadly construed to authorize regulation of every phase of
the subject of currency. Congress may charter banks and endow them
with the right to issue circulating notes,1347 and it may restrain the
circulation of notes not issued under its own authority.1348 To this
end it may impose a prohibitive tax upon the circulation of the notes
of state banks 1349 or of municipal corporations.1350 It may require
the surrender of gold coin and of gold certificates in exchange for
other currency not redeemable in gold. A plaintiff who sought pay-
ment for the gold coin and certificates thus surrendered in an amount
measured by the higher market value of gold was denied recovery
on the ground that he had not proved that he would suffer any ac-
tual loss by being compelled to accept an equivalent amount of other
currency.1351 Inasmuch as “every contract for the payment of money,
simply, is necessarily subject to the constitutional power of the gov-
ernment over the currency, whatever that power may be, and the
obligation of the parties is, therefore, assumed with reference to that
power,” 1352 the Supreme Court sustained the power of Congress to
make Treasury notes legal tender in satisfaction of antecedent debts,1353
and, many years later, to abrogate the clauses in private contracts
calling for payment in gold coin, even though such contracts were
executed before the legislation was passed.1354 The power to coin
money also imports authority to maintain such coinage as a me-
dium of exchange at home, and to forbid its diversion to other uses
by defacement, melting or exportation.1355
1347 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
1349 75 U.S. at 548.
1350 National Bank v. United States, 101 U.S. 1 (1880).
1351 Nortz v. United States, 249 U.S. 317 (1935).
1352 Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 549 (1871); Juil-
liard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449 (1884).

1353 Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).
1354 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935).
1355 Ling Su Fan v. United States, 218 U.S. 302 (1910).
Punishment of Counterfeiting
In its affirmative aspect, this clause has been given a narrow
interpretation; it has been held not to cover the circulation of coun-
terfeit coin or the possession of equipment susceptible of use for
making counterfeit coin.1356 At the same time, the Supreme Court
has rebuffed attempts to read into this provision a limitation upon
either the power of the States or upon the powers of Congress un-
der the preceding clause. It has ruled that a state may punish the
issuance of forged coins.1357 On the ground that the power of Con-
gress to coin money imports “the correspondent and necessary power
and obligation to protect and to preserve in its purity this constitu-
tional currency for the benefit of the nation,” 1358 it has sustained
federal statutes penalizing the importation or circulation of counter-
feit coin,1359 or the willing and conscious possession of dies in the
likeness of those used for making coins of the United States.1360 In
short, the above clause is entirely superfluous. Congress would have
had the power it purports to confer under the Necessary and Proper
Clause; and the same is the case with the other enumerated crimes
it is authorized to punish. The enumeration was unnecessary and
is not exclusive.1361
Borrowing Power Versus Fiscal Power

Usually the aggregate of the fiscal and monetary powers of the
National Government—to lay and collect taxes, to borrow money
and to coin money and regulate the value thereof—have reinforced
each other, and, cemented by the necessary and proper clause, have
provided a secure foundation for acts of Congress chartering banks
and other financial institutions,1362 or making its treasury notes le-
gal tender in the payment of antecedent debts.1363 But, in 1935, the
opposite situation arose—one in which the power to regulate the
value of money collided with the obligation incurred in the exercise
of the power to borrow money. By a vote of eight-to-one the Su-
preme Court held that the obligation assumed by the exercise of
the latter was paramount, and could not be repudiated to effectu-
1356 United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.), 560, 568 (1850).

1357 Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847).
1358 United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 568 (1850).
1359 Id.
1360 Baender v. Barnett, 255 U.S. 224 (1921).
1361 Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 536 (1871).
1362 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819); Osborn v. Bank
of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 737, 861 (1824); Farmers’ & Mechanics’
Nat. Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33 (1875); Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255
U.S. 180, 208 (1921).
1363 Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 540–47 (1871).
ate the monetary policies of Congress.1364 In a concurring opinion,

Justice Stone declined to join with the majority in suggesting that
“the exercise of the sovereign power to borrow money on credit, which
does not override the sovereign immunity from suit, may neverthe-
less preclude or impede the exercise of another sovereign power, to
regulate the value of money; or to suggest that although there is
and can be no present cause of action upon the repudiated gold clause,
its obligation is nevertheless, in some manner and to some extent,
not stated, superior to the power to regulate the currency which
we now hold to be superior to the obligation of the bonds.” 1365 How-
ever, with a view to inducing purchase of savings bonds, the sale of
which is essential to successful management of the national debt,
Congress is competent to authorize issuance of regulations creating
a right of survivorship in such bonds registered in co-ownership form,
and such regulations preempt provisions of state law prohibiting
married couples from using the survivorship privilege whenever bonds
are paid out of community property.1366
Clause 7. The Congress shall have Power * * * To establish

Post Offices and post roads.
POSTAL POWER
“Establish”
The great question raised in the early days with reference to
the postal clause concerned the meaning to be given to the word
“establish”—did it confer upon Congress the power to construct post
offices and post roads, or only the power to designate from existing
places and routes those that should serve as post offices and post
roads? As late as 1855, Justice McLean stated that this power “has
generally been considered as exhausted in the designation of roads
on which the mails are to be transported,” and concluded that nei-
ther under the commerce power nor the power to establish post roads
could Congress construct a bridge over a navigable water.1367 A de-
cade earlier, however, the Court, without passing upon the validity
of the original construction of the Cumberland Road, held that be-
ing “charged . . . with the transportation of the mails,” Congress
could enter a valid compact with the State of Pennsylvania regard-
1364 Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330, 353 (1935).

1365 294 U.S. at 361.
1366 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
1367 United States v. Railroad Bridge Co., 27 Fed. Cas. 686 (No. 16,114) (C.C.N.D.
Ill. 1855).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 7—Post Office
ing the use and upkeep of the portion of the road lying in the state.1368
The debate on the question was terminated in 1876 by the decision
in Kohl v. United States,1369 sustaining a proceeding by the United
States to appropriate a parcel of land in Cincinnati as a site for a
post office and courthouse.
Power To Protect the Mails

The postal powers of Congress embrace all measures necessary
to insure the safe and speedy transit and prompt delivery of the
mails.1370 And not only are the mails under the protection of the
National Government, they are in contemplation of law its prop-
erty. This principle was recognized by the Supreme Court in 1845
in holding that wagons carrying United States mail were not sub-
ject to a state toll tax imposed for use of the Cumberland Road pur-
suant to a compact with the United States.1371 Half a century later
it was availed of as one of the grounds on which the national execu-
tive was conceded the right to enter the national courts and de-
mand an injunction against the authors of any widespread disor-
der interfering with interstate commerce and the transmission of
the mails.1372
Prompted by the efforts of Northern anti-slavery elements to dis-
seminate their propaganda in the Southern states through the mails,
President Jackson, in his annual message to Congress in 1835, sug-
gested “the propriety of passing such a law as will prohibit, under
severe penalties, the circulation in the Southern States, through the
mail, of incendiary publications intended to instigate the slaves to
insurrection.” In the Senate, John C. Calhoun resisted this recom-
mendation, taking the position that it belonged to the States and
not to Congress to determine what is and what is not calculated to
disturb their security. He expressed the fear that if Congress might
determine what papers were incendiary, and as such prohibit their
circulation through the mail, it might also determine what were not
incendiary and enforce their circulation.1373 On this point his rea-
soning would appear to be vindicated by such decisions as those
1368 Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 166 (1845).

1369 91 U.S. 367 (1876).
1370 Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 732 (1878). See United States Postal Serv. v.
Council of Greenburgh Civic Assn’s, 453 U.S. 114 (1981), in which the Court sus-
tained the constitutionality of a law making it unlawful for persons to use, without
payment of a fee (postage), a letterbox which has been designated an “authorized
depository” of the mail by the Postal Service.
1371 Searight v. Stokes, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 151, 169 (1845).
1372 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).
1373 Cong. Globe, 24th Cong., 1st Sess., 3, 10, 298 (1835).
denying the right of the states to prevent the importation of alco-

holic beverages from other states.1374
Power To Prevent Harmful Use of the Postal Facilities

In 1872, Congress passed the first of a series of acts to exclude
from the mails publications designed to defraud the public or cor-
rupt its morals. In the pioneer case of Ex parte Jackson,1375 the Court
sustained the exclusion of circulars relating to lotteries on the gen-
eral ground that “the right to designate what shall be carried nec-
essarily involves the right to determine what shall be ex-
cluded.” 1376 The leading fraud order case, decided in 1904, held to
the same effect.1377 Pointing out that it is “an indispensable ad-
junct to a civil government,” to supply postal facilities, the Court
restated its premise that the “legislative body in thus establishing
a postal service may annex such conditions . . . as it chooses.” 1378
Later cases first qualified these sweeping assertions and then
overturned them, holding government operation of the mails to be
subject to constitutional limitations. In upholding requirements that
publishers of newspapers and periodicals seeking second-class mail-
ing privileges file complete information regarding ownership, indebt-
edness, and circulation and that all paid advertisements in the pub-
lications be marked as such, the Court emphasized that these
provisions were reasonably designed to safeguard the second-class
privilege from exploitation by mere advertising publications.1379 Chief
Justice White warned that the Court by no means intended to im-
ply that it endorsed the Government’s “broad contentions concern-
ing . . . the classification of the mails, or by the way of condition
. . . .” 1380 Again, when the Court sustained an order of the Postmas-
ter General excluding from the second-class privilege a newspaper
he had found to have published material in contravention of the
Espionage Act of 1917, the claim of absolute power in Congress to
withhold the privilege was sedulously avoided.1381
1374 Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888); Leisy v. Hardin, 135
U.S. 100 (1890).

1375 96 U.S. 727 (1878).
1376 96 U.S. at 732.
1377 Public Clearing House v. Coyne, 194 U.S. 497 (1904), followed in Donaldson
v. Read Magazine, 333 U.S. 178 (1948).

1378 194 U.S. at 506.
1379 Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288 (1913).
1380 229 U.S. at 316.
1381 United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson,
255 U.S. 407 (1921). See also Hannegan v. Esquire, 327 U.S. 146 (1946), denying
the Post Office the right to exclude Esquire Magazine from the mails on grounds of
the poor taste and vulgarity of its contents.
A unanimous Court transformed these reservations into a hold-

ing in Lamont v. Postmaster General,1382 in which it struck down a
statute authorizing the Post Office to detain mail it determined to
be “communist political propaganda” and to forward it to the ad-
dressee only if he notified the Post Office he wanted to see it. Not-
ing that Congress was not bound to operate a postal service, the
Court observed that while it did, it was bound to observe constitu-
tional guarantees.1383 The statute violated the First Amendment be-
cause it inhibited the right of persons to receive any information
that they wished to receive.1384
On the other hand, a statute authorizing persons to place their
names on a list in order to reject receipt of obscene or sexually sug-
gestive materials is constitutional, because no sender has a right
to foist his material on any unwilling receiver.1385 But, as in other
areas, postal censorship systems must contain procedural guaran-
tees sufficient to ensure prompt resolution of disputes about the char-
acter of allegedly objectionable material consistently with the First
Amendment.1386
Exclusive Power as an Adjunct to Other Powers

The cases just reviewed involved attempts to close the mails to
communication that were deemed to be harmful. A much broader
power of exclusion was asserted in the Public Utility Holding Com-
pany Act of 1935.1387 To induce compliance with the regulatory re-
quirements of that act, Congress denied the privilege of using the
mails for any purpose to holding companies that failed to obey that
law, irrespective of the character of the material to be carried. View-
ing the matter realistically, the Supreme Court treated this provi-
1382 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
1383 381 U.S. at 305, quoting Justice Holmes in United States ex rel. Milwau-
kee Social Democratic Pub. Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407, 437 (1921) (dissenting
opinion): “The United States may give up the Post Office when it sees fit, but while
it carries it on the use of the mails is almost as much a part of free speech as the
right to use our tongues. . . .” See also Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 416 (1971)
(quoting same language). But for a different perspective on the meaning and appli-
cation of Holmes’ language, see United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh
Civic Assn’s, 453 U.S. 114, 127 n.5 (1981), although there too the Court observed
that the postal power may not be used in a manner that abridges freedom of speech
or press. Id. at 126. Notice, too, that first-class mail is protected against opening
and inspection, except in accordance with the Fourth Amendment. Ex parte Jack-
son, 96 U.S. 727, 733 (1878); United States v. van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249 (1970).
But see United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606 (1977) (border search).
1384 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 306–07 (1965). See also id. at
308 (concurring opinion). This was the first federal statute ever voided for being in
conflict with the First Amendment.
1385 Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970).
1386 Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971).
1387 49 Stat. 803, 812, 813, 15 U.S.C. §§ 79d, 79e.
sion as a penalty. Although it held this statute constitutional be-

cause the regulations whose infractions were thus penalized were
themselves valid,1388 it declared that “Congress may not exercise
its control over the mails to enforce a requirement which lies out-
side its constitutional province. . . .” 1389
State Regulations Affecting the Mails

In determining the extent to which state laws may impinge upon
persons or corporations whose services are used by Congress in ex-
ecuting its postal powers, the task of the Supreme Court has been
to determine whether particular measures are consistent with the
general policies indicated by Congress. Broadly speaking, the Court
has approved regulations having a trivial or remote relation to the
operation of the postal service, while disallowing those constituting
a serious impediment to it. Thus, a state statute, which granted to
one company an exclusive right to operate a telegraph business in
the state, was found to be incompatible with a federal law, which,
in granting to any telegraph company the right to construct its lines
upon post roads, was interpreted as a prohibition of state monopo-
lies in a field Congress was entitled to regulate in the exercise of
its combined power over commerce and post roads.1390
An Illinois statute that, as construed by the state courts, re-
quired an interstate mail train to make a detour of seven miles in
order to stop at a designated station, also was held to be an uncon-
stitutional interference with the power of Congress under this
clause.1391 But a Minnesota statute requiring intrastate trains to
stop at county seats was found to be unobjectionable.1392
Local laws classifying postal workers with railroad employees
for the purpose of determining a railroad’s liability for personal in-
juries,1393 or subjecting a union of railway mail clerks to a general
law forbidding any “labor organization” to deny any person member-
ship because of his race, color or creed,1394 have been held not to
conflict with national legislation or policy in this field. Despite the
interference pro tanto with the performance of a federal function, a
state may arrest a postal employee charged with murder while he
is engaged in carrying out his official duties,1395 but it cannot pun-
1388 Electric Bond & Share Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938).
1389 303 U.S. at 442.
1390 Pensacola Tel. Co. v. Western Union Tel. Co., 96 U.S. 1 (1878).
1391 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 163 U.S. 142 (1896).
1392 Gladson v. Minnesota, 166 U.S. 427 (1897).
1393 Price v. Pennsylvania R.R., 113 U.S. 218 (1895); Martin v. Pittsburgh & Lake
Erie R.R., 203 U.S. 284 (1906).

1394 Railway Mail Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945).
1395 United States v. Kirby, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 482 (1869).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 8—Copyrights and Patents
ish a person for operating a mail truck over its highways without
procuring a driver’s license from state authorities.1396
Clause 8. The Congress shall have Power * * * To promote

the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their re-
spective Writings and Discoveries.
COPYRIGHTS AND PATENTS
Origins and Scope of the Power

This clause is the foundation upon which the national patent
and copyright laws rest, although it uses neither of those terms. As
to patents, modern legislation harks back to the Statute of Monopo-
lies of 1624, whereby Parliament endowed inventors with the sole
right to their inventions for fourteen years.1397 Copyright law, in
turn, traces back to the Statute of Anne of 1710, which secured to
authors of books sole publication rights for designated periods.1398
These English statutes curtailed the royal prerogative to bestow mo-
nopolies to Crown favorites over works and products they did not
create and many of which had long been enjoyed by the public.1399
Informed by these precedents and colonial practice, the Framers re-
stricted the power to confer monopolies over the use of intellectual
property through the Copyright and Patent Clause. For example,
the “exclusive Right” conferred to the writings of authors and the
discoveries of inventors must be time limited. Another fundamen-
tal limitation inheres in the phrase “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts”: To merit copyright protection, a work must
exhibit originality, embody some creative expression; 1400 to merit
patent protection, an invention must be an innovative advance-
1396 Johnson v. Maryland, 254 U.S. 51 (1920).

1397 Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1, 17, 18 (1829).
1398 Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 656, 658 (1834).
1399 Cf. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5, 9 (1966). See also Golan v.
Holder, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–545, slip op. at 3 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
1400 Feist Publications v. Rural Telephone Service Co., 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (pub-
lisher of telephone directory, consisting of white pages and yellow pages, not en-
titled to copyright in white pages, which are only compilations). “To qualify for copy-
right protection, a work must be original to the author. . . . Originality, as the term
is used in copyright, means only that the work was independently created by the
author (as opposed to copied from other works), and that it possesses some minimal
degree of creativity. . . . To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low;
even a slight amount will suffice.” Id. at 345. First clearly articulated in The Trade-
Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82 (1879), and Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111
ment, “push back the frontiers.” 1401 Also deriving from the phrase
“promotion of science and the arts” is the issue of whether Con-
gress may only provide for grants of protection that broaden the
availability of new materials.1402
Acting within these strictures, Congress has broad leeway to de-
termine how best to promote creativity and utility through tempo-
rary monopolies. “It is Congress that has been assigned the task of
defining the scope of the limited monopoly that should be granted
to authors,” the Court has said.1403 “Satisfied” in Eldred v. Ashcroft
that the Copyright Term Extension Act did not violate the “limited
times” prescription, the Court saw the only remaining question to
be whether the enactment was “a rational exercise of the legisla-
tive authority conferred by the Copyright Clause.” 1404 The Act, the
Court concluded, “reflects judgments of a kind Congress typically
makes, judgments we cannot dismiss as outside the Legislature’s
domain.” 1405 Moreover, the duration of copyrights and patents may
be prolonged and, even then, the limits may not be easily enforced.
The protection period may extend well beyond the life of the au-
U.S. 53, 58–60 (1884), the requirement is expressed in nearly every copyright opin-
ion, but its forceful iteration in Feist was noteworthy, because originality is a statu-
tory requirement as well, 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), and it was unnecessary to discuss the
concept in constitutional terms.
1401 A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). In a
concurring opinion, Justice Douglas wrote, for himself and Justice Black: “Every pat-
ent is the grant of a privilege of exacting tolls from the public. The Framers plainly
did not want those monopolies freely granted. . . . It is not enough that an article
is new and useful. The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Pat-
ents serve a higher end—the advancement of science. An invention need not be as
startling as an atomic bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and
distinction that masters of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an
advance.” 340 U.S. at 154–55 (Justice Douglas concurring).
1402 Kendall v. Winsor, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 322, 328 (1859) (“[T]he inventor who
designedly, and with the view of applying it indefinitely and exclusively for his own
profit, withholds his invention from the public, comes not within the policy or ob-
jects of the Constitution or acts of Congress.”).
In Golan v. Holder, publishers and musicians challenged a law that allowed for
copyright protection of certain foreign works theretofore in the public domain, in
conformance with international practice. Plaintiffs alleged the provision was invalid
because, inter alia, it failed to give incentives for creating new works. Though this
view found support in Justice Breyer’s dissent, the majority held the Copyright Clause
does not require that every provision of copyright law be designed to encourage new
works. Rather, Congress has broad discretion to determine the intellectual property
regime that, in its judgment, best serves the overall purposes of the Clause, includ-
ing broader dissemination of existing and future American works. 565 U.S. ___, No.
10–545, slip op. at 21 (2012).
1403 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 205 (2003) (quoting Sony Corp. of America
v. Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)).

1404 537 U.S. at 204.
1405 537 U.S. at 205.
thor or inventor.1406 Also, in extending the duration of existing copy-

rights and patents, Congress may protect the rights of purchasers
and assignees.1407
The copyright and patent laws do not, of their own force, have
any extraterritorial operation.1408
Patentable Discoveries
The protection traditionally afforded by acts of Congress under
this clause has been limited to new and useful inventions,1409 and,
although a patentable invention is a mental achievement,1410 for an
idea to be patentable it must have first taken physical form.1411 De-
spite the fact that the Constitution uses the term “discovery” rather
than “invention,” a patent may not be issued for the discovery of a
previously unknown phenomenon of nature. “If there is to be inven-
tion from such a discovery, it must come from the application of
1406 The Court in Eldred upheld extension of the term of existing copyrights from
life of the author plus 50 years to life of the author plus 70 years. Although the
more general issue was not raised, the Court opined that this length of time, extend-
able by Congress, was “clearly” not a regime of “perpetual” copyrights. The only two
dissenting Justices, Stevens and Breyer, challenged this assertion.
1407 Evans v. Jordan, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 199 (1815); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S.
(14 How.) 539, 548 (1852); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 340, 350 (1864);
Eunson v. Dodge, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 414, 416 (1873).
1408 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183, 195 (1857); see also Deepsouth
Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 531 (1972) (“Our patent system makes
no claim to extraterritorial effect . . . .”); Quality King Distrib., Inc. v. L’Anza Re-
search Int’l, Inc., 523 U.S. 135, 154 (1998) (Justice Ginsburg concurring) (“Copy-
right protection is territorial”); Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T, 550 U.S. 437, 454–55 (2007)
(“The presumption that United States law governs domestically but does not rule
the world applies with particualr force in patent law.”). It is, however, the ultimate
objective of many nations, including the United States, to develop a system of pat-
ent issuance and enforcement which transcends national boundaries; it has been rec-
ommended, therefore, that United States policy should be to harmonize its patent
system with that of foreign countries so long as such measures do not diminish the
quality of the United States patent standards. President’s Commission on the Pat-
ent System, To Promote the Progress of Useful Arts, Report to the Senate Judiciary
Committee, S. Doc. No. 5, 90th Cong., 1st sess. (1967), recommendation XXXV. Ef-
fectuation of this goal of transnational protection of intellectual property was begun
with the United States agreement to the Berne Convention (the Convention for the
Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886), and Congress’ conditional
implementation of the Convention through legislation. The Berne Convention Imple-
mentation Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–568, 102 Stat. 2853, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 and notes.
1409 Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 516, 549 (1871). Cf. Collar Company
v. Van Dusen, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 530, 563 (1875); Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S.
347, 356 (1876).
1410 Smith v. Nichols, 89 U.S. (21 Wall.) 112, 118 (1875).
1411 Rubber-Tip Pencil Co. v. Howard, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 498, 507 (1874); Clark
Thread Co. v. Willimantic Linen Co., 140 U.S. 481, 489 (1891).
the law of nature to a new and useful end.” 1412 In addition to refus-
ing to allow patents for natural phenomena and laws of nature, the
Court has held that abstract ideas and mathematical formulas may
not be patented,1413 for these are the “basic tools of scientific and
technological work” 1414 that should be “free to all men and re-
served to none.” 1415
As for the mental processes that traditionally must be evi-
denced, the Court has held that an invention must display “more
ingenuity . . . than the work of a mechanic skilled in the art;” 1416
and, though combination patents have been at times sustained,1417
the accumulation of old devices is patentable “only when the whole
in some way exceeds the sum of its parts.” 1418 Though “inventive
genius” and slightly varying language have been appearing in judi-
1412 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948); Diamond v. Diehr,
450 U.S. 175, 187 (1981) (“[A]n application of a law of nature or mathematical for-
mula to a known structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”)
(emphasis in original). Cf. Dow Co. v. Halliburton Co., 324 U.S. 320 (1945); Cuno
Corp. v. Automatic Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 89 (1941).
1413 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63 (1972); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. ___,
No. 08–964, slip op. (2010); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Laboratories,
Inc., 566 U.S. ___, No. 10–1150, slip op. (2012).
1414 Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972).
1415 Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948).
1416 Sinclair Co. v. Interchemical Corp., 325 U.S. 327, 330 (1945); Marconi Wire-
less Co. v. United States, 320 U.S. 1 (1943).

1417 Keystone Mfg. Co. v. Adams, 151 U.S. 139 (1894); Diamond Rubber Co. v.
Consol. Tire Co., 220 U.S. 428 (1911).

1418 A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950). An
interesting concurring opinion was filed by Justice Douglas for himself and Justice
Black: “It is not enough,” says Justice Douglas, “that an article is new and useful.
The Constitution never sanctioned the patenting of gadgets. Patents serve a higher
end—the advancement of science. An invention need not be as startling as an atomic
bomb to be patentable. But it has to be of such quality and distinction that masters
of the scientific field in which it falls will recognize it as an advance.” Id. at 154–
155. He then quotes the following from an opinion of Justice Bradley’s given 70 years
earlier:
“It was never the object of those laws to grant a monopoly for every trifling
device, every shadow of a shade of an idea, which would naturally and spontane-
ously occur to any skilled mechanic or operator in the ordinary progress of manufac-
turers. Such an indiscriminate creation of exclusive privileges tends rather to ob-
struct than to stimulate invention. It creates a class of speculative schemers who
make it their business to watch the advancing wave of improvement, and gather its
foam in the form of patented monopolies, which enable them to lay a heavy tax upon
the industry of the country, without contributing anything to the real advancement
of the arts. It embarrasses the honest pursuit of business with fears and apprehen-
sions of concealed liens and unknown liabilities to lawsuits and vexatious account-
ings for profits made in good faith. (Atlantic Works v. Brady, 107 U.S. 192, 200 (1882)).”
Id. at 155.
The opinion concludes: “The attempts through the years to get a broader, looser
conception of patents than the Constitution contemplates have been persistent. The
Patent Office, like most administrative agencies, has looked with favor on the oppor-
tunity which the exercise of discretion affords to expand its own jurisdiction. And so
it has placed a host of gadgets under the armour of patents—gadgets that obviously
cial decisions for over a century,1419 “novelty and utility” has been
the primary statutory test since the Patent Act of 1793.1420 Section
103 of the Patent Act of 1952, however, required that an innova-
tion be of a “nonobvious” nature; that is, it must not be an improve-
ment that would be obvious to a person having ordinary skill in
the pertinent art.1421 This alteration of the standard of patentabil-
ity was perceived by some as overruling previous Supreme Court
cases requiring perhaps a higher standard for obtaining a pat-
ent,1422 but, in Graham v. John Deere Co.,1423 the Court inter-
preted the provision as having codified its earlier holding in Hotchkiss
v. Greenwood.1424 The Court in Graham said: “Innovation, advance-
ment, and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional com-
mand must ‘promote the Progress of . . . useful Arts.’ This is the
standard expressed in the Constitution and it may not be ig-
nored.” 1425 Congressional requirements on patentability, then, are
conditions and tests that must fall within the constitutional stan-
dard. Underlying the constitutional tests and congressional condi-
tions for patentability is the balancing of two interests—the inter-
est of the public in being protected against monopolies and in having
ready access to and use of new items versus the interest of the coun-
try, as a whole, in encouraging invention by rewarding creative per-
sons for their innovations. By declaring a constitutional standard
of patentability, however, the Court, rather than Congress, will be
doing the ultimate weighing. As for the clarity of the patentability
standard, the three-fold test of utility, novelty and advancement seems
have had no place in the constitutional scheme of advancing scientific knowledge. A

few that have reached this Court show the pressure to extend monopoly to the sim-
plest of devices: [listing instances].” Id. at 156–58.
1419 “Inventive genius”—Justice Hunt in Reckendorfer v. Faber, 92 U.S. 347, 357
(1875); “Genius or invention”—Chief Justice Fuller in Smith v. Whitman Saddle Co.,

148 U.S. 674, 681 (1893); “Intuitive genius”—Justice Brown in Potts v. Creager, 155
U.S. 597, 607 (1895); “Inventive genius”—Justice Stone in Concrete Appliances Co.
v. Gomery, 269 U.S. 177, 185 (1925); “Inventive genius”—Justice Roberts in Mantle
Lamp Co. v. Aluminum Co., 301 U.S. 544, 546 (1937); “the flash of creative genius,
not merely the skill of the calling”—Justice Douglas in Cuno Corp. v. Automatic De-
vices Corp., 314 U.S. 84, 91 (1941).
1420 Act of February 21, 1793, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 318. See Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 3–4, 10 (1966).

1421 35 U.S.C. § 103.
1422 E.g., A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950);
Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560 (1949); and Cuno Corp. v. Automatic
Devices Corp., 314 U.S. 84 (1941).
1423 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
1424 52 U.S. (11 How.) 248 (1850).
1425 383 U.S. at 6 (first emphasis added, second emphasis by Court). For a thor-
ough discussion, see Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141,
146–52 (1989).
to have been made less clear by the Supreme Court’s rejuvenation

of “invention” as a standard of patentability.1426
Procedure in Issuing Patents

The standard of patentability is a constitutional standard, and
the question of the validity of a patent is a question of law.1427 Con-
gress may authorize the issuance of a patent for an invention by a
special, as well as by general, law, provided the question as to whether
the patentee’s device is in truth an invention is left open to investi-
gation under the general law.1428 The function of the Commissioner
of Patents in issuing letters patent is deemed to be quasi-judicial
in character. Hence an act granting a right of appeal from the Com-
mission to the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia is not
unconstitutional as conferring executive power upon a judicial body.1429
The primary responsibility, however, for weeding out unpatentable
devices rests in the Patent Office.1430 The present system of “de novo”
hearings before the Court of Appeals allows the applicant to pres-
ent new evidence that the Patent Office has not heard,1431 thus mak-
ing somewhat amorphous the central responsibility.
Nature and Scope of the Right Secured for Copyright

The leading case on the nature of the rights that Congress is
authorized to “secure” under the Copyright and Patent Clause is
Wheaton v. Peters.1432 Wheaton was the official reporter for the Su-
preme Court from 1816 to 1827, and Peters was his successor in
that role. Wheaton charged Peters with having infringed his copy-
right in the twelve volumes of “Wheaton’s Reports” by reprinting
material from Wheaton’s first volume in “a volume called ‘Con-
1426 Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co., 396 U.S. 57 (1969).
“The question of invention must turn on whether the combination supplied the key
requirement.” Id. at 60. But the Court also appeared to apply the test of nonobvious-
ness in the same decision: “We conclude that the combination was reasonably obvi-
ous to one with ordinary skill in the art.” Id. See also McClain v. Ortmayer, 141
U.S. 419, 427 (1891), where, speaking of the use of “invention” as a standard of pat-
entability the Court said: “The truth is the word cannot be defined in such manner
as to afford any substantial aid in determining whether a particular device involves
an exercise of the inventive faculty or not.”
1427 A. & P. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equipment Corp., 340 U.S. 147 (1950); Mahn
v. Harwood, 112 U.S. 354, 358 (1884). In Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
517 U.S. 348 (1996), the Court held that the interpretation of terms in a patent
claim is a matter of law reserved entirely for the courts. The Seventh Amendment
does not require that such issues be tried to a jury.
1428 Evans v. Eaton, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 454, 512 (1818).
1429 United States v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 586–89 (1899). See also Butterworth
v. United States ex rel. Hoe, 112 U.S. 50 (1884).

1430 Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 18 (1966).
1431 In Jennings v. Brenner, 255 F. Supp. 410, 412 (D.D.C. 1966), District Judge
Holtzoff suggested that a system of remand be adopted.

1432 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591 (1834).
densed Reports of Cases in the Supreme Court of the United

States’ ”; 1433 Wheaton based his claim on both common law and a
1790 act of Congress. On the statutory claim, the Court remanded
to the trial court for a determination of whether Wheaton had com-
plied with all the requirements of the act.1434 On the common law
claim, the Court held for Peters, finding that, under common law,
publication divests an author of copyright protection.1435 Wheaton
argued that the Constitution should be held to protect his common
law copyright, because “the word secure . . . clearly indicates an in-
tention, not to originate a right, but to protect one already in exis-
tence.” 1436 The Court found, however, that “the word secure, as used
in the constitution, could not mean the protection of an acknowl-
edged legal right,” but was used “in reference to a future right.” 1437
Thus, the exclusive right that the Constitution authorizes Con-
gress to “secure” to authors and inventors owes its existence solely
to acts of Congress that secure it, from which it follows that the
rights granted by a patent or copyright are subject to such qualifi-
cations and limitations as Congress sees fit to impose. The Court’s
“reluctance to expand [copyright] protection without explicit legisla-
tive guidance” controlled its decision in Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios,1438 which held that the manufacture and sale of video tape
(or cassette) recorders for home use do not constitute “contribu-
tory” infringement of the copyright in television programs. Copy-
right protection, the Court reiterated, is “wholly statutory,” and courts
should be “circumspect” in extending protections to new technology.
The Court refused to hold that contributory infringement could oc-
cur simply through the supplying of the devices with which some-
one else could infringe, especially in view of the fact that VCRs are
capable of substantial noninfringing “fair use,” e.g., time-shifting of
television viewing.
1433 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 595.

1434 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 657–58. The Court noted that the same principle applies
to “an individual who has invented a most useful and valuable machine. . . . [I]t
has never been pretended that the latter could hold, by the common law, any prop-
erty in his invention, after he shall have sold it publicly.” Id.
1435 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 667.
1436 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 661; Holmes v. Hurst, 174 U.S. 82 (1899). The doctrine
of common-law copyright was long statutorily preserved for unpublished works, but
the 1976 revision of the federal copyright law abrogated the distinction between pub-
lished and unpublished works, substituting a single federal system for that existing
since the first copyright law in 1790. 17 U.S.C. § 301.
1437 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) at 661.
1438 464 U.S. 417, 431 (1984). Cf. Metro-Goldwin-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster,
Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (active encouragement of infringement by distribution of

software for sharing of copyrighted music and video files can constitute infringe-
ment).
Congress was within its powers in giving to authors the exclu-

sive right to dramatize any of their works. Even as applied to pan-
tomime dramatization by means of silent motion pictures, the act
was sustained against the objection that it extended the copyright
to ideas rather than to the words in which they were clothed.1439
But the copyright of the description of an art in a book was held
not to lay a foundation for an exclusive claim to the art itself. The
latter can be protected, if at all, only by letters patent.1440 Because
copyright is a species of property distinct from the ownership of the
equipment used in making copies of the matter copyrighted, the sale
of a copperplate under execution did not pass any right to print
and publish the map which the copperplate was designed to pro-
duce.1441 A patent right may, however, be subjected, by bill in eq-
uity, to payment of a judgment debt of the patentee.1442
Power of Congress Over Patents and Copyrights

Letters patent for a new invention or discovery in the arts con-
fer upon the patentee an exclusive property in the patented inven-
tion that cannot be appropriated or used by the government with-
out just compensation.1443 Congress may, however, modify rights under
an existing patent, provided vested property rights are not thereby
impaired,1444 but it does not follow that it may authorize an inven-
tor to recall rights that he has granted to others or reinvest in him
rights of property that he had previously conveyed for a valuable
and fair consideration.1445 Furthermore, the rights the present stat-
utes confer are subject to the antitrust laws, though it can hardly
be said that the cases in which the Court has endeavored to draw
the line between the rights claimable by patentees and the kind of
1439 Kalem Co. v. Harper Bros., 222 U.S. 55 (1911). For other problems arising
because of technological and electronic advancement, see, e.g., Fortnightly Corp. v.

United Artists Television, Inc., 392 U.S. 390 (1968); Sony Corp. v. Universal City
Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
1440 Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 105 (1880).
1441 Stevens v. Gladding, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 447 (1855).
1442 Ager v. Murray, 105 U.S. 126 (1882).
1443 James v. Campbell, 104 U.S. 356, 358 (1882). See also United States v. Burns,
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 246, 252 (1871); Cammeyer v. Newton, 94 U.S. 225, 234 (1877);
Hollister v. Benedict Mfg. Co., 113 U.S. 59, 67 (1885); United States v. Palmer, 128
U.S. 262, 271 (1888); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10, 16 (1896).
1444 McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202, 206 (1843).
1445 Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 539, 553 (1852).
monopolistic privileges that are forbidden by those acts are en-

tirely consistent in their holdings.1446
Congress has the power to pass copyright laws that, in its po-
litical judgment, will serve the ends of the Copyright Clause. Con-
gress may “promote the Progress of Science” (i.e., the creation and
dissemination of knowledge and learning) not only by providing in-
centives for new works, but also by conferring copyright protection
to works in the public domain.1447 The Copyright Clause also broadly
empowers Congress to extend the terms of existing copyrights, so
long as the extended terms are for determinable periods.1448
Copyright and the First Amendment

The Copyright Clause nominally restricts free speech by allow-
ing for an author’s monopoly to market his original work. The Court
has “recognized that some restriction on expression is the inherent
and intended effect of every grant of copyright.” 1449 However, that
the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment were adopted close
in time reflects the Framers’ belief that “copyright’s limited monopo-
lies are compatible with free speech principles.” 1450 “[T]he Framers
intended copyright itself to be the engine of free expression. By es-
tablishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copy-
right supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate
ideas.” 1451
The Court has noted on several occasions that the copyright law
contains two important First Amendment safeguards: (1) limiting
copyright protection to an author’s creative expression of ideas, but
prohibiting protection of ideas in and of themselves; and (2) permit-
ting fair use of a copyrighted work in certain circumstances, includ-
ing for purposes of criticism, teaching, comment, news reporting,
and parody. These traditional contours of copyright protection have
foreclosed heightened First Amendmebnt scrutiny of copyright laws.1452
1446 See Motion Picture Co. v. Universal Film Co., 243 U.S. 502 (1917); Morton
Salt Co. v. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942); United States v. Masonite Corp., 316
U.S. 265 (1942); United States v. New Wrinkle, Inc., 342 U.S. 371 (1952), where the
Justices divided 6 to 3 as to the significance for the case of certain leading prec-
edents; and Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172
(1965).
1447 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–545, slip op. (2012).
1448 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003).
1449 Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–545, slip op. (2012).
1450 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 219 (2003).
1451 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enterprises, 471 U.S. 539, 558
(1985).
1452 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Golan v. Holder, 565 U.S. ___, No.
10–545, slip op. (2012).

State Power Affecting Patents and Copyrights

Displacement of state police or taxing powers by federal patent
or copyright has been a source of considerable dispute. Ordinarily,
rights secured to inventors must be enjoyed in subordination to the
general authority of the states over all property within their limits.
A state statute requiring the condemnation of illuminating oils in-
flammable at less than 130 degrees Fahrenheit was held not to in-
terfere with any right secured by the patent laws, although the oil
for which the patent was issued could not be made to comply with
state specifications.1453 In the absence of federal legislation, a state
may prescribe reasonable regulations for the transfer of patent rights,
so as to protect its citizens from fraud. Hence, a requirement of state
law that the words “given for a patent right” appear on the face of
notes given in payment for such right is not unconstitutional.1454
Royalties received from patents or copyrights are subject to nondis-
criminatory state income taxes, a holding to the contrary being over-
ruled.1455
State power to protect things not patented or copyrighted un-
der federal law has been buffeted under changing Court doctrinal
views. In two major cases, the Court held that a state could not
use unfair competition laws to prevent or punish the copying of prod-
ucts not entitled to a patent. Emphasizing the necessity for a uni-
form national policy and adverting to the monopolistic effects of the
state protection, the Court inferred that, because Congress had not
extended the patent laws to the material at issue, federal policy
was to promote free access when the materials were thus in the
public domain.1456 But, in Goldstein v. California,1457 the Court dis-
tinguished the two prior cases and held that the determination whether
a state “tape piracy” statute conflicted with the federal copyright
statute depended upon the existence of a specific congressional in-
tent to forbid state protection of the “writing” there involved. Its
consideration of the statute and of its legislative history convinced
the Court that Congress in protecting certain “writings” and in not
1453 Patterson v. Kentucky, 97 U.S. 501 (1879).
1454 Allen v. Riley, 203 U.S. 347 (1906); John Woods & Sons v. Carl, 203 U.S.
358 (1906); Ozan Lumber Co. v. Union County Bank, 207 U.S. 251 (1907).
1455 Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal, 286 U.S. 123 (1932), overruling Long v. Rockwood,
277 U.S. 142 (1928).

1456 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225 (1964); Compco Corp. v.
Day-Brite Lighting, Inc., 376 U.S. 234 (1964).

1457 412 U.S. 546 (1973). Informing the decisions were different judicial atti-
tudes with respect to the preclusion of the states from acting in fields covered by
the Copyright Clause, whether Congress had or had not acted. The latter case rec-
ognized permissible state interests, id. at 552–560, whereas the former intimated
that congressional power was exclusive. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S.
225, 228–31 (1964).
protecting others bespoke no intention that federally unprotected

materials should enjoy no state protection, only that Congress “has
left the area unattended.” 1458 Similar analysis was used to sustain
the application of a state trade secret law to protect a chemical pro-
cess, that was patentable but not patented, from use by a commer-
cial rival, which had obtained the process from former employees
of the company, all of whom had signed agreements not to reveal
the process. The Court determined that protection of the process
by state law was not incompatible with the federal patent policy of
encouraging invention and public use of patented inventions, inas-
much as the trade secret law serves other interests not similarly
served by the patent law and where it protects matter clearly pat-
entable it is not likely to deter applications for patents.1459
Returning to the Sears and Compco emphasis, the Court unani-
mously, in Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc.,1460 reas-
serted that “efficient operation of the federal patent system de-
pends upon substantially free trade in publicly known, unpatented
design and utilitarian conceptions.” 1461 At the same time, however,
the Court attempted to harmonize Goldstein, Kewanee, and other
decisions: there is room for state regulation of the use of unpatented
designs if those regulations are “necessary to promote goals out-
side the contemplation of the federal patent scheme.” 1462 What states
are forbidden to do is to “offer patent-like protection to intellectual
creations which would otherwise remain unprotected as a matter
of federal law.” 1463 A state law “aimed directly at preventing the
exploitation of the [unpatented] design” is invalid as impinging on
an area of pervasive federal regulation.1464
1458 In the 1976 revision of the copyright law, Congress broadly preempted, with
narrow exceptions, all state laws bearing on material subject to copyright. 17 U.S.C.
§ 301. The legislative history makes clear Congress’ intention to overturn Goldstein
and “to preempt and abolish any rights under the common law or statutes of a state
that are equivalent to copyright and that extend to works coming within the scope
of the federal copyright law.” H. REP. NO. 94–1476, 94th Congress, 2d Sess. (1976),
130. The statute preserves state tape piracy and similar laws as to sound record-
ings fixed before February 15, 1972, until February 15, 2067. (Pub. L. 105–298 (1998),
§ 102, extended this date from February 15, 2047.)
1459 Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470 (1974). See also Aronson v.
Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257 (1979).

1460 489 U.S. 141 (1989).
1461 489 U.S. at 156.
1462 489 U.S. at 166. As examples of state regulation that might be permissible,
the Court referred to unfair competition, trademark, trade dress, and trade secrets
laws. Perhaps by way of distinguishing Sears and Compco, both of which invali-
dated use of unfair competition laws, the Court suggested that prevention of “con-
sumer confusion” is a permissible state goal that can be served in some instances
by application of such laws. Id. at 154.
1463 489 U.S. at 156 (emphasis added).
1464 489 U.S. at 158.
Trade-Marks and Advertisements

In the famous Trade-Mark Cases,1465 decided in 1879, the Su-
preme Court held void acts of Congress that, in apparent reliance
upon this clause, extended the protection of the law to trademarks
registered in the Patent Office. “The ordinary trade mark,” Justice
Miller wrote for the Court, “has no necessary relation to invention
or discovery”; nor is it to be classified “under the head of writings
of authors.” It does not “depend upon novelty, invention, discovery,
or any work of the brain.” 1466 Not many years later, the Court, again
speaking through Justice Miller, ruled that a photograph may be
constitutionally copyrighted,1467 and still later the Court held a cir-
cus poster to be entitled to the same protection. In answer to the
objection of the circuit court that a lithograph that “has no other
use than that of a mere advertisement” would not be within the
meaning of the Constitution, Justice Holmes summoned forth the
shades of Velasquez, Whistler, Rembrandt, Ruskin, Degas, and oth-
ers in support of the proposition that it is not for the courts to at-
tempt to judge the worth of pictorial illustrations outside the nar-
rowest and most obvious limits.1468
Clause 9. The Congress shall have Power * * * To consti-

tute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court; (see Article III).
IN GENERAL
See discussion “The Power of Congress to Control the Federal
Courts” under Article III, § 2, cl. 2, infra.
Clause 10. The Congress shall have Power * * * To define

and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas,
and Offences against the Law of Nations.
PIRACIES, FELONIES, AND OFFENSES AGAINST THE
LAW OF NATIONS
Origin of the Clause

“When the United States ceased to be a part of the British em-
pire, and assumed the character of an independent nation, they be-
came subject to that system of rules which reason, morality, and
custom had established among civilized nations of Europe, as their
1465 100 U.S. 82 (1879).
1466 100 U.S. at 94.
1467 Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Saroney, 111 U.S. 53 (1884).
1468 Bleisten v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 252 (1903).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 10—Maritime Crimes
public law. . . . The faithful observance of this law is essential to

national character. . . .” 1469 These words of the Chancellor Kent ex-
pressed the view of the binding character of international law that
was generally accepted at the time the Constitution was adopted.
During the Revolutionary War, Congress took cognizance of all mat-
ters arising under the law of nations and professed obedience to
that law.1470 Under the Articles of Confederation, it was given ex-
clusive power to appoint courts for the trial of piracies and felonies
committed on the high seas, but no provision was made for dealing
with offenses against the law of nations.1471 The draft of the Consti-
tution submitted to the Convention of 1787 by its Committee of De-
tail empowered Congress “to declare the law and punishment of pi-
racies and felonies committed on the high seas, and the punishment
of counterfeiting the coin of the United States, and of offences against
the law of nations.” 1472 In the debate on the floor of the Conven-
tion, the discussion turned on the question as to whether the terms,
“felonies” and the “law of nations,” were sufficiently precise to be
generally understood. The view that these terms were often so vague
and indefinite as to require definition eventually prevailed and Con-
gress was authorized to define as well as punish piracies, felonies,
and offenses against the law of nations.1473
Definition of Offenses
The fact that the Constitutional Convention considered it nec-
essary to give Congress authority to define offenses against the law
of nations does not mean that in every case Congress must under-
take to codify that law or mark its precise boundaries before pre-
scribing punishments for infractions thereof. An act punishing “the
crime of piracy, as defined by the law of nations punishing the” was
held to be an appropriate exercise of the constitutional authority to
“define and punish” the offense, since it adopted by reference the
sufficiently precise definition of International Law.1474 Similarly, in
Ex parte Quirin,1475 the Court found that by the reference in the
Fifteenth Article of War to “offenders or offenses that . . . by the
law of war may be triable by such military commissions . . . ,” Con-
1469 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 1 (1826).
1470 19 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 315, 361 (1912); 20 id. at 762; 21
id. at 1136–37, 1158.
1471 Article IX.
1472 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 168, 182 (Rev.
ed. 1937).
1473 Id. at 316.
1474 United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160, 162 (1820). See also
The Marianna Flora, 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 1, 40–41 (1826); United States v. Brig Malek
Abhel, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210, 232 (1844).
1475 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 10—Maritime Crimes
gress had “exercised its authority to define and punish offenses against
the law of nations by sanctioning, within constitutional limitations,
the jurisdiction of military commissions to try persons for offenses
which, according to the rules and precepts of the law of nations,
and more particularly the law of war, are cognizable by such tribu-
nals.” 1476 Where, conversely, Congress defines with particularity a
crime which is “an offense against the law of nations,” the law is
valid, even if it contains no recital disclosing that it was enacted
pursuant to this clause. Thus, the duty which the law of nations
casts upon every government to prevent a wrong being done within
its own dominion to another nation with which it is at peace, or to
the people thereof, was found to furnish a sufficient justification for
the punishment of the counterfeiting within the United States, of
notes, bonds, and other securities of foreign governments.1477
Extraterritorial Reach of the Power

Since this clause contains the only specific grant of power to be
found in the Constitution for the punishment of offenses outside the
territorial limits of the United States, a lower federal court held in
1932 1478 that the general grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion by Article III, § 2, could not be construed as extending either
the legislative or judicial power of the United States to cover of-
fenses committed on vessels outside the United States but not on
the high seas. Reversing that decision, the Supreme Court held that
this provision “cannot be deemed to be a limitation on the powers,
either legislative or judicial, conferred on the National Government
by Article III, § 2. The two clauses are the result of separate steps
independently taken in the Convention, by which the jurisdiction
in admiralty, previously divided between the Confederation and the
states, was transferred to the National Government. It would be a
surprising result, and one plainly not anticipated by the framers or
justified by principles which ought to govern the interpretation of a
constitution devoted to the redistribution of governmental powers,
if part of them were lost in the process of transfer. To construe the
one clause as limiting rather than supplementing the other would
be to ignore their history, and without effecting any discernible pur-
pose of their enactment, to deny to both the states and the Na-
tional Government powers which were common attributes of sover-
eignty before the adoption of the Constitution. The result would be
to deny to both the power to define and punish crimes of less grav-
ity than felonies committed on vessels of the United States while
1476 317 U.S. at 28.
1477 United States v. Arjona, 120 U.S. 479, 487, 488 (1887).
1478 United States v. Flores, 3 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Pa. 1932).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cls. 11, 12, 13, and 14—War; Military Establishment
on the high seas, and crimes of every grade committed on them while
in foreign territorial waters.” 1479 Within the meaning of this sec-
tion, an offense is committed on the high seas even when the ves-
sel on which it occurs is lying at anchor on the road in the territo-
rial waters of another country.1480
Clauses 11, 12, 13, and 14. The Congress shall have power
* * *;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and
make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money
to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years.
To provide and maintain a Navy.
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the
land and naval Forces.
THE WAR POWER
Source and Scope

Three Theories.—Three different views regarding the source
of the war power found expression in the early years of the Consti-
tution and continued to vie for supremacy for nearly a century and
a half. Writing in The Federalist,1481 Hamilton elaborated the theory
that the war power is an aggregate of the particular powers granted
by Article I, § 8. Not many years later, in 1795, the argument was
advanced that the war power of the National Government is an at-
tribute of sovereignty and hence not dependent upon the affirma-
tive grants of the written Constitution.1482 Chief Justice Marshall
appears to have taken a still different view, namely that the power
to wage war is implied from the power to declare it. In McCulloch
v. Maryland,1483 he listed the power “to declare and conduct a war” 1484
as one of the “enumerated powers” from which the authority to char-
ter the Bank of the United States was deduced. During the era of
the Civil War, the two latter theories were both given countenance
by the Supreme Court. Speaking for four Justices in Ex parte Mil-
1479 United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137, 149–50 (1933).
1480 United States v. Furlong, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 184, 200 (1820).
1481 THE FEDERALIST, No. 23 (J. Cooke ed. 1937), 146–51.
1482 Penhallow v. Doane, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 53 (1795).
1483 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
1484 17 U.S. at 407. (emphasis supplied).
ligan, Chief Justice Chase described the power to declare war as

“necessarily” extending “to all legislation essential to the prosecu-
tion of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with
the command of the forces and conduct of campaigns.” 1485 In an-
other case, adopting the terminology used by Lincoln in his Mes-
sage to Congress on July 4, 1861,1486 the Court referred to “the war
power” as a single unified power.1487
An Inherent Power.—Thereafter, we find the phrase, “the war
power,” being used by both Chief Justice White 1488 and Chief Jus-
tice Hughes,1489 the former declaring the power to be “complete and
undivided.” 1490 Not until 1936, however, did the Court explain the
logical basis for imputing such an inherent power to the Federal
Government. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp.,1491 the rea-
sons for this conclusion were stated by Justice Sutherland as fol-
lows: “As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colo-
nies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America.
Even before the Declaration, the colonies were a unit in foreign af-
fairs, acting through a common agency—namely, the Continental Con-
gress, composed of delegates from the thirteen colonies. That agency
exercised the powers of war and peace, raised an army, created a
navy, and finally adopted the Declaration of Independence. . . . It
results that the investment of the Federal Government with the pow-
ers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirmative grants
of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war, to con-
clude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic relations with
other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in the Con-
stitution, would have vested in the Federal Government as neces-
sary concomitants of nationality.” 1492
A Complexus of Granted Powers.—In Lichter v. United
States,1493 on the other hand, the Court speaks of the “war powers”
of Congress. Upholding the Renegotiation Act, it declared that: “In
view of this power ‘To raise and support Armies, . . . and the power
1485 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) (dissenting opinion); see
also Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305 (1871); and United States v.
MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 622 (1931).
1486 CONG. GLOBE, 37th Congress, 1st Sess., App. 1 (1861).
1487 Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73, 86 (1875).
1488 Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250 U.S. 135, 149 (1919).
1489 Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
1490 Northern Pac. Ry. v. North Dakota ex rel. Langer, 250 U.S. 135, 149 (1919).
1491 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
1492 299 U.S. at 316, 318. On the controversy respecting Curtiss-Wright, see The
Curtiss-Wright Case, infra.

1493 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
granted in the same Article of the Constitution ‘to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers’, . . . the only question remaining is whether the
Renegotiation Act was a law ‘necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution’ the war powers of Congress and especially its power to
support armies.” 1494 In a footnote, it listed the Preamble, the Nec-
essary and Proper Clause, the provisions authorizing Congress to
lay taxes and provide for the common defense, to declare war, and
to provide and maintain a navy, together with the clause designat-
ing the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,
as being “among the many other provisions implementing the Con-
gress and the President with powers to meet the varied demands
of war. . . .” 1495
Declaration of War
In the early draft of the Constitution presented to the Conven-
tion by its Committee of Detail, Congress was empowered “to make
war.” 1496 Although there were solitary suggestions that the power
should better be vested in the President alone,1497 in the Senate
alone,1498 or in the President and the Senate,1499 the sentiment of
the Convention, as best we can determine from the limited notes of
the proceedings, was that the potentially momentous consequences
of initiating armed hostilities should be called up only by the con-
currence of the President and both Houses of Congress.1500 In con-
trast to the English system, the Framers did not want the wealth
and blood of the Nation committed by the decision of a single indi-
1494 334 U.S. at 757–58.
1495 334 U.S. at 755 n.3.
1496 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 313 (rev. ed.
1937).
1497 Mr. Butler favored “vesting the power in the President, who will have all
the requisite qualities, and will not make war but when the Nation will support it.”
Id. at 318.
1498 Mr. Pinkney thought the House was too numerous for such deliberations
but that the Senate would be more capable of a proper resolution and more ac-
quainted with foreign affairs. Additionally, with the states equally represented in
the Senate, the interests of all would be safeguarded. Id.
1499 Hamilton’s plan provided that the President was “to make war or peace,
with the advice of the senate . . . .” 1 id. at 300.

1500 2 id., 318–319. In THE FEDERALIST, No. 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 465, Hamilton
notes: “[T]he President is to be commander-in-chief of the army and navy of the United
States. In this respect his authority would be nominally the same with that of the
king of Great Britain, but in substance much inferior to it. It would amount to noth-
ing more than the supreme command and direction of the military and naval forces,
as first General and admiral of the confederacy; while that of the British king ex-
tends to the declaring of war and to the raising and regulating of fleets and armies,—
all which, by the Constitution under consideration, would appertain to the legisla-
ture.” (Emphasis in original). See also id. at No. 26, 164–171. Cf. C. BERDAHL, WAR
POWERS OF THE EXECUTIVE IN THE UNITED STATES ch. V (1921).
vidual; 1501 in contrast to the Articles of Confederation, they did not

wish to forego entirely the advantages of executive efficiency nor to
entrust the matter solely to a branch so close to popular pas-
sions.1502
The result of these conflicting considerations was that the Con-
vention amended the clause so as to give Congress the power to
“declare war.” 1503 Although this change could be read to give Con-
gress the mere formal function of recognizing a state of hostilities,
in the context of the Convention proceedings it appears more likely
the change was intended to insure that the President was empow-
ered to repel sudden attacks 1504 without awaiting congressional ac-
tion and to make clear that the conduct of war was vested exclu-
sively in the President.1505
An early controversy revolved about the issue of the Presi-
dent’s powers and the necessity of congressional action when hos-
tilities are initiated against us rather than the Nation instituting
armed conflict. The Bey of Tripoli, in the course of attempting to
extort payment for not molesting United States shipping, declared
war upon the United States, and a debate began whether Congress
had to enact a formal declaration of war to create a legal status of
war. President Jefferson sent a squadron of frigates to the Mediter-
ranean to protect our ships but limited its mission to defense in
the narrowest sense of the term. Attacked by a Tripolitan cruiser,
one of the frigates subdued it, disarmed it, and, pursuant to instruc-
tions, released it. Jefferson in a message to Congress announced
his actions as in compliance with constitutional limitations on his
authority in the absence of a declaration of war.1506 Hamilton es-
1501 THE FEDERALIST, No. 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 464–465, 470. During the Con-
vention, Gerry remarked that he “never expected to hear in a republic a motion to

empower the Executive alone to declare war.” 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FED-
ERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318 (rev. ed. 1937).
1502 The Articles of Confederation vested powers with regard to foreign rela-
tions in the Congress.

1503 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 318–319 (rev.
ed. 1937).
1504 Jointly introducing the amendment to substitute “declare” for “make,” Madi-
son and Gerry noted the change would “leav[e] to the Executive the power to repel
sudden attacks.” Id. at 318.
1505 Connecticut originally voted against the amendment to substitute “declare”
for “make” but “on the remark by Mr. King that ‘make’ war might be understood to
‘conduct’ it which was an Executive function, Mr. Ellsworth gave up his opposition,
and the vote of Connecticut was changed. . . .” Id. at 319. The contemporary and
subsequent judicial interpretation was to the understanding set out in the text. Cf.
Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. ()1 Cr., 1, 28 (1801) (Chief Justice Marshall: “The whole
powers of war being, by the Constitution of the United States, vested in congress,
the acts of that body alone can be resorted to as our guides in this inquiry.”); Ex
parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866).
1506 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 326, 327 (J. Richardson ed., 1896).
poused a different interpretation, contending that the Constitution

vested in Congress the power to initiate war but that when an-
other nation made war upon the United States we were already in
a state of war and no declaration by Congress was needed.1507 Con-
gress thereafter enacted a statute authorizing the President to in-
struct the commanders of armed vessels of the United States to seize
all vessels and goods of the Bey of Tripoli “and also to cause to be
done all such other acts of precaution or hostility as the state of
war will justify . . . .” 1508 But no formal declaration of war was passed,
Congress apparently accepting Hamilton’s view.1509
Sixty years later, the Supreme Court sustained the blockade of
the Southern ports instituted by Lincoln in April 1861 at a time
when Congress was not in session.1510 Congress had subsequently
ratified Lincoln’s action,1511 so that it was unnecessary for the Court
to consider the constitutional basis of the President’s action in the
absence of congressional authorization, but the Court nonetheless
approved, five-to-four, the blockade order as an exercise of Presiden-
tial power alone, on the ground that a state of war was a fact. “The
President was bound to meet it in the shape it presented itself, with-
out waiting for Congress to baptize it with a name; and no name
given to it by him or them could change the fact.” 1512 The minority
challenged this doctrine on the ground that while the President could
unquestionably adopt such measures as the laws permitted for the
enforcement of order against insurgency, Congress alone could stamp
an insurrection with the character of war and thereby authorize the
legal consequences ensuing from a state of war.1513
The view of the majority was proclaimed by a unanimous Court
a few years later when it became necessary to ascertain the exact
dates on which the war began and ended. The Court, the Chief Jus-
tice said, must “refer to some public act of the political depart-
ments of the government to fix the dates; and, for obvious reasons,
those of the executive department, which may be, and, in fact, was,
at the commencement of hostilities, obliged to act during the recess
of Congress, must be taken. The proclamation of intended blockade
1507 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 746–747 (J. Hamilton ed., 1851).

1508 2 Stat. 129, 130 (1802) (emphasis supplied).
1509 Of course, Congress need not declare war in the all-out sense; it may pro-
vide for a limited war which, it may be, the 1802 statute recognized. Cf. Bas v. Tingy,
4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800).
1510 Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 635 (1863).
1511 12 Stat. 326 (1861).
1512 Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 635, 669 (1863).
1513 67 U.S. at 682.
by the President may therefore be assumed as marking the first of

these dates, and the proclamation that the war had closed, as mark-
ing the second.” 1514
These cases settled the issue whether a state of war could exist
without formal declaration by Congress. When hostile action is taken
against the Nation, or against its citizens or commerce, the appro-
priate response by order of the President may be resort to force.
But the issue so much a source of controversy in the era of the Cold
War and so divisive politically in the context of United States in-
volvement in the Vietnam War has been whether the President is
empowered to commit troops abroad to further national interests
in the absence of a declaration of war or specific congressional au-
thorization short of such a declaration.1515 The Supreme Court stu-
diously refused to consider the issue in any of the forms in which
it was presented,1516 and the lower courts generally refused, on “po-
litical question” grounds, to adjudicate the matter.1517 In the ab-
sence of judicial elucidation, congressand the President have been
1514 The Protector, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 700, 702 (1872).

1515 The controversy, not susceptible of definitive resolution in any event, was
stilled for the moment, when in 1973 Congress set a cut-off date for United States
military activities in Indochina, Pub. L. 93–52, 108, 87 Stat. 134, and subsequently,
over the President’s veto, Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution, providing a
framework for the assertion of congressional and presidential powers in the use of
military force. Pub. L. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548.
1516 In Atlee v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 911 (1973), aff ’g 347 F. Supp. 689 (E.D.
Pa., 1982), the Court summarily affirmed a three-judge court’s dismissal of a suit
challenging the constitutionality of United States activities in Vietnam on political
question grounds. The action constituted approval on the merits of the dismissal,
but it did not necessarily approve the lower court’s grounds. See also Massachusetts
v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 414 U.S. 1304, 1316, 1321
(1973) (actions of individual justices on motions for stays). The Court simply denied
certiorari in all cases on its discretionary docket.
1517 E.g., Velvel v. Johnson, 287 F. Supp. 846 (D. Kan. 1968), aff’d sub nom. Velvel
v. Nixon, 415 F.2d 236 (10th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1042 (1970); Luftig v.
McNamara, 252 F. Supp. 819 (D.D.C. 1966), aff’d 373 F.2d 664 (D.C. Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 945 (1968); Mora v. McNamara, 387 F.2d 862 (D.C., 1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 934 (1968); Orlando v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 1013 (E.D.N.Y. 1970),
and Berk v. Laird, 317 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1970), consolidated and aff’d, 443
F.2d 1039 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 869 (1971); Massachusetts v. Laird,
451 F.2d 26 (1st Cir. 1971); Holtzman v. Schlesinger, 484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
During the 1980s, the courts were no more receptive to suits, many by Mem-
bers of Congress, seeking to obtain a declaration of the President’s powers. The po-
litical question doctrine as well as certain discretionary authorities were relied on.
See, e.g., Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982) (military aid to El Sal-
vador), aff’d, 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1251 (1984); Cony-
ers v. Reagan, 578 F. Supp. 324 (D.D.C. 1984) (invasion of Grenada), dismissed as
moot, 765 F.2d 1124 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Lowry v. Reagan, 676 F. Supp. 333 (D.D.C.
1987) (reflagging and military escort operation in Persian Gulf), aff’d. No. 87–5426
(D.C. Cir. 1988); Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990) (U.S. Saudia
Arabia/Persian Gulf deployment).
required to accommodate themselves in the controversy to accept

from each other less than each has been willing to accept but more
than either has been willing to grant.1518
THE POWER TO RAISE AND MAINTAIN ARMED

FORCES
Purpose of Specific Grants

The clauses of the Constitution, which give Congress authority
to raise and support armies, and so forth, were not inserted to en-
dow the national government rather than the States with the power
to do these things but to designate the department of the Federal
Government, which would exercise the powers. As we have noted
above, the English king was endowed with the power not only to
initiate war but the power to raise and maintain armies and na-
vies.1519 Aware historically that these powers had been used to the
detriment of the liberties and well-being of Englishmen and aware
that in the English Declaration of Rights of 1688 it was insisted
that standing armies could not be maintained without the consent
of Parliament, the Framers vested these basic powers in Con-
gress.1520
Time Limit on Appropriations for the Army

Prompted by the fear of standing armies to which Story al-
luded, the framers inserted the limitation that “no appropriation of
money to that use shall be for a longer term than two years.” In
1904, the question arose whether this provision would be violated
if the government contracted to pay a royalty for use of a patent in
constructing guns and other equipment where the payments are likely
to continue for more than two years. Solicitor-General Hoyt ruled
that such a contract would be lawful; that the appropriations lim-
ited by the Constitution “are those only which are to raise and sup-
port armies in the strict sense of the word ‘support,’ and that the
inhibition of that clause does not extend to appropriations for the
various means which an army may use in military operations, or
which are deemed necessary for the common defense. . . .” 1521 Re-
lying on this earlier opinion, Attorney General Clark ruled in 1948
that there was “no legal objection to a request to the Congress to
1518 For further discussion, see section on President’s commander-in-chief pow-

ers.
1519 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 263 (St. G. Tucker ed., 1803).
1521 25 Ops. Atty. Gen. 105, 108 (1904).
appropriate funds to the Air Force for the procurement of aircraft

and aeronautical equipment to remain available until ex-
pended.” 1522
Conscription
The constitutions adopted during the Revolutionary War by at
least nine of the States sanctioned compulsory military service.1523
Towards the end of the War of 1812, conscription of men for the
army was proposed by James Monroe, then Secretary of War, but
opposition developed and peace came before the bill could be en-
acted.1524 In 1863, a compulsory draft law was adopted and put into
operation without being challenged in the federal courts.1525 Not so
the Selective Service Act of 1917.1526 This measure was attacked
on the grounds that it tended to deprive the States of the right to
“a well-regulated militia,” that the only power of Congress to exact
compulsory service was the power to provide for calling forth the
militia for the three purposes specified in the Constitution, which
did not comprehend service abroad, and finally that the compul-
sory draft imposed involuntary servitude in violation of the Thir-
teenth Amendment. The Supreme Court rejected all of these conten-
tions. It held that the powers of the States with respect to the militia
were exercised in subordination to the paramount power of the Na-
tional Government to raise and support armies, and that the power
of Congress to mobilize an army was distinct from its authority to
provide for calling the militia and was not qualified or in any wise
limited thereby.1527
Before the United States entered the first World War, the Court
had anticipated the objection that compulsory military service would
violate the Thirteenth Amendment and had answered it in the fol-
lowing words: “It introduced no novel doctrine with respect of ser-
vices always treated as exceptional, and certainly was not intended
to interdict enforcement of those duties which individuals owe to
the State, such as services in the army, militia, on the jury, etc.
The great purpose in view was liberty under the protection of effec-
tive government, not the destruction of the latter by depriving it of
1522 40 Ops. Atty. Gen. 555 (1948).

1523 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 380 (1918); Cox v. Wood, 247 U.S.
3 (1918).
1524 245 U.S. at 385.
1525 245 U.S. at 386–88. The measure was upheld by a state court. Kneedler v.
Lane, 45 Pa. St. 238 (1863).

1526 Act of May 18, 1917, 40 Stat. 76.
1527 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 381, 382 (1918).
essential powers.” 1528 Accordingly, in the Selective Draft Law Cases,1529

it dismissed the objection under that amendment as a contention
that was “refuted by its mere statement.” 1530
Although the Supreme Court has so far formally declined to pass
on the question of the “peacetime” draft,1531 its opinions leave no
doubt of the constitutional validity of the act. In United States v.
O’Brien,1532 upholding a statute prohibiting the destruction of selec-
tive service registration certificates, the Court, speaking through Chief
Justice Warren, thought “[t]he power of Congress to classify and
conscript manpower for military service is ‘beyond question.’ ” 1533
In noting Congress’ “broad constitutional power” to raise and regu-
late armies and navies,1534 the Court has specifically observed that
the conscription act was passed “pursuant to” the grant of author-
ity to Congress in clauses 12–14.1535
Care of the Armed Forces

Scope of the congressional and executive authority to prescribe
the rules for the governance of the military is broad and subject to
great deference by the judiciary. The Court recognizes “that the mili-
tary is, by necessity, a specialized society separate from civilian so-
ciety,” that “[t]he military constitutes a specialized community gov-
erned by a separate discipline from that of the civilian,” and that
“Congress is permitted to legislate both with greater breadth and
with greater flexibility when prescribing the rules by which [mili-
tary society] shall be governed than it is when prescribing rules for
[civilian society].” 1536 Denying that Congress or military authori-
1528 Butler v. Perry, 240 U.S. 328, 333 (1916) (upholding state law requiring able-
bodied men to work on the roads).

1529 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
1530 245 U.S. at 390.
1531 Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451–473. Actual conscription was precluded as of July 1, 1973,

Pub. L. 92–129, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U.S.C. App. § 467(c), and registration was discon-
tinued on March 29, 1975. Pres. Proc. No. 4360, 3 C.F.R. 462 (1971–1975 Compila-
tion), 50 U.S.C. App. § 453 note. Registration, but not conscription, was reactivated
in the wake of the invasion of Afghanistan. Pub. L. 96–282, 94 Stat. 552 (1980).
1532 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
1533 391 U.S. at 377, quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 756 (1948).
1534 Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498, 510 (1975).
1535 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 59 (1981). See id. at 64–65. See also Selec-
tive Service System v. Minnesota Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984)
(upholding denial of federal financial assistance under Title IV of the Higher Educa-
tion Act to young men who fail to register for the draft).
1536 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 743–52 (1974). See also Orloff v. Willoughby,
345 U.S. 83, 93–94 (1953); Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S. 738, 746–48 (1975);
Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837–38 (1976); Middendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 45–46
(1976); Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 353–58 (1980); Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S.
57, 64–68 (1981).
ties are free to disregard the Constitution when acting in this area,1537
the Court nonetheless operates with “a healthy deference to legisla-
tive and executive judgments” about military affairs,1538 so that, while
constitutional guarantees apply, “the different character of the mili-
tary community and of the military mission requires a different ap-
plication of those protections.” 1539
In reliance upon this deference to congressional judgment about
the roles of the sexes in combat and the necessities of military mo-
bilization, coupled with express congressional consideration of the
precise questions, the Court sustained as constitutional the legisla-
tive judgment to provide for registration of males only for possible
future conscription.1540 Emphasizing the unique, separate status of
the military, the necessity to indoctrinate men in obedience and dis-
cipline, the tradition of military neutrality in political affairs, and
the need to protect troop morale, the Court upheld the validity of
military post regulations, backed by congressional enactments, ban-
ning speeches and demonstrations of a partisan political nature and
the distribution of literature without prior approval of post head-
quarters, with the commander authorized to keep out only those
materials that would clearly endanger the loyalty, discipline, or mo-
rale of troops on the base.1541 On the same basis, the Court re-
jected challenges on constitutional and statutory grounds to mili-
tary regulations requiring servicemen to obtain approval from their
commanders before circulating petitions on base, in the context of
circulations of petitions for presentation to Congress.1542 And the
statements of a military officer urging disobedience to certain or-
ders could be punished under provisions that would have been of
questionable validity in a civilian context.1543 Reciting the consider-
1537 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).

1538 453 U.S. at 66. “[P]erhaps in no other area has the Court accorded Con-
gress greater deference.” Id. at 64–65. See also Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10
(1973).
1539 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758 (1974). “[T]he tests and limitations [of
the Constitution] to be applied may differ because of the military context.” Rostker
v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981).
1540 Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981). Compare Frontiero v. Richardson,
411 U.S. 677 (1973), with Schlesinger v. Ballard, 419 U.S. 498 (1975).
1541 Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), limiting Flower v. United States, 407
U.S. 197 (1972).

1542 Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348 (1980); Secretary of the Navy v. Huff, 444
U.S. 453 (1980). The statutory challenge was based on 10 U.S.C. § 1034, which pro-
tects the right of members of the armed forces to communicate with a Member of
Congress, but which the Court interpreted narrowly.
1543 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
ations previously detailed, the Court has refused to allow enlisted

men and officers to sue to challenge or set aside military decisions
and actions.1544
Congress has a plenary and exclusive power to determine the
age at which a soldier or seaman shall serve, the compensation he
shall be allowed, and the service to which he shall be assigned. This
power may be exerted to supersede parents’ control of minor sons
who are needed for military service. Where the statute requiring
the consent of parents for enlistment of a minor son did not permit
such consent to be qualified, their attempt to impose a condition
that the son carry war risk insurance for the benefit of his mother
was not binding on the government.1545 Because the possession of
government insurance payable to the person of his choice is calcu-
lated to enhance the morale of the serviceman, Congress may per-
mit him to designate any beneficiary he desires, irrespective of state
law, and may exempt the proceeds from the claims of creditors.1546
Likewise, Congress may bar a state from taxing the tangible, per-
sonal property of a soldier, assigned for duty in the state, but domi-
ciled elsewhere.1547 To safeguard the health and welfare of the armed
forces, Congress may authorize the suppression of bordellos in the
vicinity of the places where forces are stationed.1548
Trial and Punishment of Offenses: Servicemen, Civilian

Employees, and Dependents
Under its power to make rules for the government and regula-
tion of the armed forces, Congress has set up a system of criminal
1544 Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (enlisted men charging racial dis-
crimination by their superiors in duty assignments and performance evaluations could

not bring constitutional tort suits); United States v. Stanley, 483 U.S. 669 (1987)
(officer who had been an unwitting, unconsenting subject of an Army experiment to
test the effects of LSD on human subjects could not bring a constitutional tort ac-
tion for damages). These considerations are also the basis of the Court’s construc-
tion of the Federal Tort Claims Act as not reaching injuries arising incident to mili-
tary service. Feres v. United States, 340 U.S. 135 (1950). In United States v. Johnson,
481 U.S. 681 (1987), four Justices urged reconsideration of Feres, but that has not
occurred.
1545 United States v. Williams, 302 U.S. 46 (1937). See also In re Grimley, 137
U.S. 147, 153 (1890); In re Morrissey, 137 U.S. 157 (1890).

1546 Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950); Ridgway v. Ridgway, 454 U.S. 46
(1981). In the absence of express congressional language, like that found in Wissner,
the Court nonetheless held that a state court division under its community property
system of an officer’s military retirement benefits conflicted with the federal pro-
gram and could not stand. McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210 (1981). See also Por-
ter v. Aetna Casualty Co., 370 U.S. 159 (1962) (exemption from creditors’ claims of
disability benefits deposited by a veteran’s guardian in a savings and loan associa-
tion).
1547 Dameron v. Brodhead, 345 U.S. 322 (1953). See also California v. Buzard,
382 U.S. 386 (1966); Sullivan v. United States, 395 U.S. 169 (1969).
1548 McKinley v. United States, 249 U.S. 397 (1919).
law binding on all servicemen, with its own substantive laws, its
own courts and procedures, and its own appeals procedure.1549 The
drafters of these congressional enactments conceived of a military
justice system with application to all servicemen wherever they are,
to reservists while on inactive duty training, and to certain civil-
ians in special relationships to the military. In recent years, all these
conceptions have been restricted.
Servicemen.—Although there had been extensive disagree-
ment about the practice of court-martial trial of servicemen for non-
military offenses,1550 the matter never was raised in substantial de-
gree until the Cold War period when the United States found it
essential to maintain both at home and abroad a large standing
army in which great numbers of servicemen were draftees. In
O’Callahan v. Parker,1551 the Court held that court-martial jurisdic-
tion was lacking to try servicemen charged with a crime that was
not “service connected.” The Court did not define “service connec-
tion,” but among the factors it found relevant were that the crime
in question was committed against a civilian in peacetime in the
United States off-base while the serviceman was lawfully off duty.1552
O’Callahan was overruled in Solorio v. United States,1553 the Court
holding that “the requirements of the Constitution are not violated
where . . . a court-martial is convened to try a serviceman who was
a member of the armed services at the time of the offense charged.” 1554
Chief Justice Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court insisted that
O’Callahan had been based on erroneous readings of English and
American history, and that “the service connection approach . . . has
proved confusing and difficult for military courts to apply.” 1555
It is not clear what provisions of the Bill of Rights and other
constitutional guarantees apply to court-martial trials. The Fifth
Amendment expressly excepts “[c]ases arising in the land and na-
1549 The Uniform Code of Military Justice of 1950, 64 Stat. 107, as amended by
the Military Justice Act of 1968, 82 Stat. 1335, 10 U.S.C. §§ 801 et seq. For prior
acts, see 12 Stat. 736 (1863); 39 Stat. 650 (1916). See Loving v. United States, 517
U.S. 748 (1996) (in context of the death penalty under the UCMJ).
1550 Compare Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 441–47 (1987) (majority opin-
ion), with id. at 456–61 (dissenting opinion), and O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258,
268–72 (1969) (majority opinion), with id. at 276–80 (Justice Harlan dissenting). See
Duke & Vogel, The Constitution and the Standing Army: Another Problem of Court-
Martial Jurisdiction, 13 VAND. L. REV. 435 (1960).
1551 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
1552 395 U.S. at 273–74. See also Relford v. Commandant, 401 U.S. 355 (1971);
Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665 (1973).

1553 483 U.S. 435 (1987).
1554 483 U.S. at 450–51.
1555 483 U.S. at 448. Although the Court of Military Appeals had affirmed Solorio’s
military-court conviction on the basis that the service-connection test had been met,
the Court elected to reconsider and overrule O’Callahan altogether.
val forces” from its grand jury provision, and there is an implica-
tion that these cases are also excepted from the Sixth Amend-
ment.1556 The double jeopardy provision of the Fifth Amendment
appears to apply.1557 The Court of Military Appeals now holds that
servicemen are entitled to all constitutional rights except those ex-
pressly or by implication inapplicable to the military.1558 The Uni-
form Code of Military Justice, supplemented by the Manual for Courts-
Martial, affirmatively grants due process rights roughly comparable
to civilian procedures, so it is unlikely that many issues necessitat-
ing constitutional will arise.1559 However, the Code leaves intact much
of the criticized traditional structure of courts-martial, including the
pervasive possibilities of command influence,1560 and the Court of
Military Appeals is limited on the scope of its review,1561 thus cre-
ating areas in which constitutional challenges are likely.
Upholding Articles 133 and 134 of the Uniform Code of Mili-
tary Justice, the Court stressed the special status of military soci-
ety.1562 This difference has resulted in a military Code regulating
aspects of the conduct of members of the military that in the civil-
ian sphere would go unregulated, but on the other hand the penal-
ties imposed range from the severe to well below the threshold of
that possible in civilian life. Because of these factors, the Court,
while agreeing that constitutional limitations applied to military jus-
tice, was of the view that the standards of constitutional guaran-
tees were significantly different in the military than in civilian life.
Thus, the vagueness challenge to the Articles was held to be gov-
erned by the standard applied to criminal statutes regulating eco-
nomic affairs, the most lenient of vagueness standards.1563 Nor did
1556 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 123, 138–39 (1866); Ex parte Quirin,
317 U.S. 1, 40 (1942). The matter was raised but left unresolved in Middendorf v.
Henry, 425 U.S. 25 (1976).
1557 See Wade v. Hunter, 336 U.S. 684 (1949). Cf. Grafton v. United States, 206
U.S. 333 (1907).

1558 United States v. Jacoby, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 428, 29 C.M.R. 244 (1960); United
States v. Tempia, 16 U.S.C.M.A. 629, 37 C.M.R. 249 (1967). This conclusion by the
Court of Military Appeals is at least questioned and perhaps disapproved in Mid-
dendorf v. Henry, 425 U.S. 25, 43–48 (1976), in the course of overturning a CMA
rule that counsel was required in summary court-martial. For the CMA’s response
to the holding, see United States v. Booker, 5 M. J. 238 (C.M.A. 1977), rev’d in part
on reh., 5 M. J. 246 (C.M.A. 1978).
1559 The UCMJ guarantees counsel, protection from self-incrimination and double
jeopardy, and warnings of rights prior to interrogation, to name a few.

1560 Cf. O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 263–64 (1969).
1561 10 U.S.C. § 867.
1562 Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974). Article 133 punishes a commissioned
officer for “conduct unbecoming an officer and gentleman,” and Article 134 punishes
any person subject to the Code for “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of
good order and discipline in the armed forces.”
1563 417 U.S. at 756.
application of the Articles to conduct essentially composed of speech

necessitate a voiding of the conviction, as the speech was unpro-
tected, and, even though it might reach protected speech, the offi-
cer here was unable to raise that issue.1564
Military courts are not Article III courts, but are agencies estab-
lished pursuant to Article I.1565 In the 19th century, the Court es-
tablished that the civil courts have no power to interfere with courts-
martial and that court-martial decisions are not subject to civil court
review.1566 Until August 1, 1984, the Supreme Court had no juris-
diction to review by writ of certiorari the proceedings of a military
commission, but as of that date Congress conferred appellate juris-
diction of decisions of the Court of Military Appeals.1567 Prior to that
time, civil court review of court-martial decisions was possible through
habeas corpus jurisdiction,1568 an avenue that continues to exist, but
the Court severely limited the scope of such review, restricting it to
the issue whether the court-martial has jurisdiction over the per-
son tried and the offense charged.1569 In Burns v. Wilson,1570 how-
ever, at least seven Justices appeared to reject the traditional view
and adopt the position that civil courts on habeas corpus could re-
view claims of denials of due process rights to which the military
had not given full and fair consideration. Since Burns, the Court
has thrown little light on the range of issues cognizable by a fed-
eral court in such litigation 1571 and the lower federal courts have
divided several possible ways.1572
Civilians and Dependents.—In recent years, the Court re-
jected the view of the drafters of the Code of Military Justice with
regard to the persons Congress may constitutionally reach under
1564 417 U.S. at 757–61.
1565 Kurtz v. Moffitt, 115 U.S. 487 (1885); Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65
(1858). Judges of Article I courts do not have the independence conferred by secu-
rity of tenure and of compensation.
1566 Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65 (1857).
1567 Military Justice Act of 1983, Pub. L. 98–209, 97 Stat. 1393, 28 U.S.C. § 1259.
1568 Cf. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866); Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 85 (1869); Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879). While federal courts have juris-
diction to intervene in military court proceedings prior to judgment, as a matter of
equity, following the standards applicable to federal court intervention in state crimi-
nal proceedings, they should act when the petitioner has not exhausted his military
remedies only in extraordinary circumstances. Schlesinger v. Councilman, 420 U.S.
738 (1975).
1569 Ex parte Reed, 100 U.S. 13 (1879); Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553
(1897); Carter v. Roberts, 177 U.S. 496 (1900); Hiatt v. Brown, 339 U.S. 103 (1950).
1570 346 U.S. 137 (1953).
1571 Cf. Fowler v. Wilkinson, 353 U.S. 583 (1957); United States v. Augenblick,
393 U.S. 348, 350 n.3, 351 (1969); Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733 (1974); Secretary of
the Navy v. Avrech, 418 U.S. 676 (1974).
1572 E.g., Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th Cir., 1975) (en banc), cert. de-
nied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976).

its clause 14 powers. Thus, it held that an honorably discharged

former soldier, charged with having committed murder during mili-
tary service in Korea, could not be tried by court-martial but must
be charged in federal court, if at all.1573 After first leaning the other
way,1574 the Court on rehearing found court-martial jurisdiction lack-
ing, at least in peacetime, to try civilian dependents of service per-
sonnel for capital crimes committed outside the United States.1575
Subsequently, the Court extended its ruling to civilian dependents
overseas charged with noncapital crimes 1576 and to civilian employ-
ees of the military charged with either capital or noncapital crimes.1577
WAR LEGISLATION
War Powers in Peacetime

To some indeterminate extent, the power to wage war em-
braces the power to prepare for it and the power to deal with the
problems of adjustment following its cessation. Justice Story empha-
sized that “[i]t is important also to consider, that the surest means
of avoiding war is to be prepared for it in peace. . . . How could a
readiness for war in time of peace be safely prohibited, unless we
could in like manner prohibit the preparations and establishments
of every hostile nation? . . . It will be in vain to oppose constitu-
tional barriers to the impulse of self-preservation.” 1578 Authorita-
tive judicial recognition of the power is found in Ashwander v. TVA,1579
upholding the power of the Federal Government to construct and
operate a dam and power plant, pursuant to the National Defense
Act of June 3, 1916.1580 The Court noted that the assurance of an
abundant supply of electrical energy and of nitrates, which would
1573 United States ex rel. Toth v. Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). See also Lee v.
Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959).

1574 Kinsella v. Krueger, 351 U.S. 470 (1956); Reid v. Covert, 351 U.S. 487 (1956).
1575 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (voiding court-martial convictions of two
women for murdering their soldier husbands stationed in Japan). Chief Justice War-
ren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Brennan were of the opinion Congress’ power
under clause 14 could not reach civilians. Justices Frankfurter and Harlan con-
curred, limited to capital cases. Justices Clark and Burton dissented.
1576 Kinsella v. United States, 361 U.S. 234 (1960) (voiding court-martial convic-
tion for noncapital crime committed overseas by civilian wife of soldier). The major-
ity could see no reason for distinguishing between capital and noncapital crimes.
Justices Harlan and Frankfurter dissented on the ground that in capital cases greater
constitutional protection, available in civil courts, was required.
1577 Grisham v. Hagan, 361 U.S. 278 (1960); McElroy v. United States ex rel.
Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960).

1579 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
1580 39 Stat. 166 (1916).
be produced at the site, “constitute national defense assets,” and

the project was justifiable under the war powers.1581
Perhaps the most significant example of legislation adopted pur-
suant to the war powers when no actual “shooting war” was in prog-
ress was the Atomic Energy Act of 1946, establishing a body to over-
see and further the research into and development of atomic energy
for both military and civil purposes.1582 Congress has also autho-
rized a vast amount of highway construction, pursuant to its con-
ception of their “primary importance to the national defense,” 1583
and the first extensive program of federal financial assistance in
the field of education was the National Defense Education Act.1584
These measures, of course, might also be upheld under the power
to spend for the “common defense.” 1585 The post-World War II years,
though nominally peacetime, constituted the era of the Cold War
and the occasions for several armed conflicts, notably in Korea and
Indochina, in which congressenacted much legislation designed to
strengthen national security, including an apparently permanent
draft,1586 authorization of extensive space exploration,1587 authori-
zation for wage and price controls,1588 and continued extension of
the Renegotiation Act to recapture excess profits on defense con-
tracts.1589 Additionally, the period saw extensive regulation of mat-
ter affecting individual rights, such as loyalty-security pro-
grams,1590 passport controls,1591 and limitations on members of the
Communist Party and associated organizations,1592 all of which are
dealt with in other sections.
1581 297 U.S. at 327–28.
1582 60 Stat. 755 (1946), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1801 et seq.
1583 108(a), 70 Stat. 374, 378 (1956), 23 U.S.C. § 101(b), naming the Interstate
System the “National System of Interstate and Defense Highways.”

1584 72 Stat. 1580 (1958), as amended, codified to various sections of Titles 20
and 42.
1585 Article I, § 8, cl.1.
1586 Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 604, as amended,
50 U.S.C. App. §§ 451–473. Actual conscription has been precluded as of July 1, 1973,
Pub. L. 92–129, 85 Stat. 353, 50 U.S.C. App. § 467(c), although registration for pos-
sible conscription is in effect. Pub. L. 96–282, 94 Stat. 552 (1980).
1587 National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 426, as amended, codi-
fied in various sections of Titles 5, 18, and 50.

1588 Title II of the Defense Production Act Amendments of 1970, 84 Stat. 799,
as amended, provided temporary authority for wage and price controls, a power which
the President subsequently exercised. E.O. 11615, 36 Fed Reg. 15727 (August 16,
1971). Subsequent legislation expanded the President’s authority. 85 Stat. 743, 12
U.S.C. § 1904 note.
1589 Renegotiation Act of 1951, 65 Stat. 7, as amended, 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1211
et seq.
1590 E.g., Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961); Pe-
ters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955).

1591 Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1 (1965); United States v. Laub, 385 U.S. 475 (1967).
1592 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); United States v. Brown, 381
U.S. 437 (1965).

Other legislation is designed to effect a transition from war to

peace. The war power “is not limited to victories in the field. . . .
It carries with it inherently the power to guard against the imme-
diate renewal of the conflict, and to remedy the evils which have
arisen from its rise and progress.” 1593 This principle was given a
much broader application after the First World War in Hamilton v.
Kentucky Distilleries, Co.,1594 where the War Time Prohibition Act 1595
adopted after the signing of the Armistice was upheld as an appro-
priate measure for increasing war efficiency. The Court was unable
to conclude that the war emergency had passed with the cessation
of hostilities.1596 But in 1924, it held that a rent control law for the
District of Columbia, which had been previously upheld,1597 had ceased
to operate because the emergency which justified it had come to an
end.1598
A similar issue was presented after World War II, and the Court
held that the authority of Congress to regulate rents by virtue of
the war power did not end with the presidential proclamation ter-
minating hostilities on December 31, 1946.1599 However, the Court
cautioned that “[w]e recognize the force of the argument that the
effects of war under modern conditions may be felt in the economy
for years and years, and that if the war power can be used in days
of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our society, it
may not only swallow up all other powers of Congress but largely
obliterate the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as well. There are no
such implications in today’s decision.” 1600
In the same year, the Court sustained by only a five-to-four vote
the Government’s contention that the power which Congress had
conferred upon the President to deport enemy aliens in times of a
declared war was not exhausted when the shooting stopped.1601 “It
is not for us to question,” said Justice Frankfurter for the Court, “a
belief by the President that enemy aliens who were justifiably deemed
fit subjects for internment during active hostilites [sic] do not lose
their potency for mischief during the period of confusion and con-
1593 Stewart v. Kahn, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 493, 507 (1871) (upholding a federal
statute that tolled the limitations period for state causes of action for the period
during which the Civil War prevented the bringing of an action). See also Mayfield
v. Richards, 115 U.S. 137 (1885).
1594 251 U.S. 146 (1919). See also Ruppert v. Caffey, 251 U.S. 264 (1920).
1595 Act of November 21, 1918, 40 Stat. 1046.
1596 251 U.S. at 163.
1597 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
1598 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924).
1599 Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948). See also Fleming v. Mo-
hawk Wrecking & Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947).

1600 333 U.S. at 143–44.
1601 Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
flict which is characteristic of a state of war even when the guns

are silent but the peace of Peace has not come.” 1602
Delegation of Legislative Power in Wartime

During wartime, Congress has been prone to delegate more pow-
ers to the President than at other times.1603 The Court, however,
has insisted that, “[i]n peace or war it is essential that the Consti-
tution be scrupulously obeyed, and particularly that as in times of
peace the respective branches of the government keep within the
power assigned to each by the Constitution. On the other hand, . . .
[i]n time of crisis nothing could be more tragic and less expressive
of the intent of the people than so to construe their Constitution
that by its own terms it would substantially hinder rather than help
them in defending its national safety.” 1604 Few cases, however, ac-
tually discuss when a wartime delegation of legislative power might
be excessive.1605 Two theories have been advanced at times when
the delegation doctrine carried more force than it has in recent years.
First, has been suggested that, because the war power is inherent
in the Federal Government, and one shared by the Legislative and
Executive Branches, Congress does not really delegate legislative
power when it authorizes the President to exercise the war power
in a prescribed manner. But this view overlooks the fact that the
Constitution expressly vests the war power as a legislative power
in Congress. Second, it has been suggested that Congress’ power to
delegate in wartime is as limited as in other situations, but that
the existence of a state of war is a factor weighing in favor of the
validity of the delegation.
The first theory was fully stated by Justice Bradley in Hamil-
ton v. Dillin,1606 upholding a levy imposed by the Secretary of the
Treasury pursuant to an act of Congress. To the argument that the
levy was a tax the fixing of which Congress could not delegate, Jus-
tice Bradley noted that the power exercised “does not belong to the
1602 335 U.S. at 170.

1603 For an extensive consideration of this subject in the context of the Presi-
dent’s redelegation of it, see N. GRUNDSTEIN, PRESIDENTIAL DELEGATION OF AUTHORITY IN
WARTIME (1961).
1604 Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742, 779–80 (1948).
1605 In the Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918), a “contention
that an act [was] void as a delegation of federal power to state officials” was dis-
missed as “too wanting in merit to require further notice.” Likewise, “the contention
that . . . vesting administrative officers with legislative discretion [is unconstitu-
tional] has been so completely adversely settled as to require reference only to some
of the decided cases.” Id. (citing three cases). A wartime delegation was upheld by
reference to peacetime precedents in Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424 (1944).
1606 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73 (1875).
same category as the power to levy and collect taxes, duties, and
excises. It belongs to the war powers of the Government. . . .” 1607
Both theories found expression in different passages of Chief Jus-
tice Stone’s opinion in Hirabayashi v. United States,1608 upholding
executive imposition of a curfew on Japanese-Americans pursuant
to legislative delegation. On the one hand, he spoke to Congress
and the Executive, “acting in cooperation,” to impose the cur-
few,1609 while, on the other hand, he noted that a delegation in which
Congress has determined the policy and the rule of conduct, leav-
ing to the Executive the carrying-out of the policy, is permissible
delegation.1610
A similar ambiguity is found in Lichter v. United States,1611 up-
holding the Renegotiation Act, but taken as a whole the Court there
espoused the second theory. “The power [of delegation] is especially
significant in connection with constitutional war powers under which
the exercise of broad discretion as to methods to be employed may
be essential to an effective use of its war powers by Congress. The
degree to which Congress must specify its policies and standards
in order that the administrative authority granted may not be an
unconstitutional delegation of its own legislative power is not ca-
pable of precise definition. . . . Thus, while the constitutional struc-
ture and controls of our Government are our guides equally in war
and in peace, they must be read with the realistic purposes of the
entire instrument fully in mind.” 1612 The Court then examined the
exigencies of war and concluded that the delegation was valid.1613
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS IN WARTIME
Constitution and the Advance of the Flag

Theater of Military Operations.—Military law to the exclu-
sion of constitutional limitations otherwise applicable is the rule in
the areas in which military operations are taking place. This view
was assumed by all members of the Court in Ex parte Milligan,1614
in which the trial by a military commission of a civilian charged
with disloyalty in a part of the country remote from the theater of
military operations was held invalid. Although unanimous in the
result, the Court divided five-to-four on the ground of decision. The
1607 88 U.S. at 96–97. Cf. United States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926).
1608 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
1609 320 U.S. at 91–92, 104.
1610 320 U.S. at 104.
1611 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
1612 334 U.S. at 778–79, 782.
1613 334 U.S. at 778–83.
1614 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
point of disagreement was over which department of the govern-

ment had authority to say with finality what regions lie within the
theater of military operations. The majority claimed this function
for the courts and asserted that an area in which the civil courts
were open and functioning, and in which there were no hostilities,
does not qualify.1615 The minority argued that the question was for
Congress’ determination.1616 The entire Court rejected the Govern-
ment’s contention that the President’s determination was conclu-
sive in the absence of restraining legislation.1617
Similarly, in Duncan v. Kahanamoku,1618 the Court declared that
the authority granted by Congress to the territorial governor of Ha-
waii to declare martial law under certain circumstances, which he
exercised in the aftermath of the attack on Pearl Harbor, did not
warrant the supplanting of civil courts with military tribunals and
the trial of civilians for civilian crimes in these military tribunals
at a time when no obstacle stood in the way of the operation of the
civil courts, except, of course, the governor’s order.
Enemy Country.—It has seemed reasonably clear that the Con-
stitution does not follow the advancing troops into conquered terri-
tory. Persons in such territory have been held entirely beyond the
reach of constitutional limitations and subject to the laws of war
as interpreted and applied by congressand the President.1619 “What
is the law which governs an army invading an enemy’s country?”
the Court asked in Dow v. Johnson.1620 “It is not the civil law of
the invaded country; it is not the civil law of the conquering coun-
try; it is military law—the law of war—and its supremacy for the
protection of the officers and soldiers of the army, when in service
in the field in the enemy’s country, is as essential to the efficiency
of the army as the supremacy of the civil law at home, and, in time
of peace, is essential to the preservation of liberty.”
These conclusions follow not only from the usual necessities of
war but also from the Court’s doctrine that the Constitution is not
automatically applicable in all territories acquired by the United
States. The question turns upon whether Congress has made the
area “incorporated” or “unincorporated” territory.1621 In Reid v. Co-
1615 71 U.S. at 127.
1616 71 U.S. at 132, 138.
1617 71 U.S. at 121, 139–42.
1618 327 U.S. 304 (1946).
1619 New Orleans v. The Steamship Co., 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 387 (1874); Santiago
v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909); Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952).
1620 100 U.S. 158, 170 (1880).
1621 De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S.
222 (1901); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138 (1904).
vert,1622 however, Justice Black asserted in a plurality opinion that

wherever the United States acts it must do so only “in accordance
with all the limitations imposed by the Constitution. . . . [C]onsti-
tutional protections for the individual were designed to restrict the
United States Government when it acts outside of this country, as
well as at home.” 1623 The case, however, involved the trial of a United
States citizen abroad and the language quoted was not subscribed
to by a majority of the Court; thus, it must be regarded as a ques-
tionable rejection of the previous line of cases.1624
Enemy Property.—In Brown v. United States,1625 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall dealt definitively with the legal position of enemy prop-
erty during wartime. He held that the mere declaration of war by
Congress does not effect a confiscation of enemy property situated
within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, but the right
of Congress by further action to subject such property to confisca-
tion was asserted in the most positive terms. As an exercise of the
war power, such confiscation was held not subject to the restric-
tions of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. Since such confiscation
is unrelated to the personal guilt of the owner, it is immaterial whether
the property belongs to an alien, a neutral, or even to a citizen.
The whole doctrine of confiscation is built upon the foundation that
it is an instrument of coercion, which, by depriving an enemy of
property within his reach, whether within his territory or outside
it, impairs his ability to resist the confiscating government and at
the same furnishes to that government means for carrying on the
war.1626
Prizes of War.—The power of Congress with respect to prizes
is plenary; no one can have any interest in prizes captured except
by permission of Congress.1627 Nevertheless, since international law
is a part of our law, the Court will administer it so long as it has
not been modified by treaty or by legislative or executive action.
Thus, during the Civil War, the Court found that the Confiscation
Act of 1861, and the Supplementary Act of 1863, which, in autho-
rizing the condemnation of vessels, made provision for the protec-
1622 354 U.S. 1 (1957).
1623 354 U.S. at 6, 7.
1624 For a comprehensive treatment, preceding Reid v. Covert, of the matter in
the context of the post-War war crimes trials, see Fairman, Some New Problems of
the Constitution Following the Flag, 1 STAN. L. REV. 587 (1949).
1625 12 U.S. (8 Cr.) 110 (1814). See also Conrad v. Waples, 96 U.S. 279 (1878).
1626 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268 (1871); Steehr v. Wallace,
255 U.S. 239 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554 (1921); United
States v. Chemical Foundation, 272 U.S. 1 (1926); Silesian-American Corp. v. Clark,
332 U.S. 469 (1947); Cities Service Co. v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 330 (1952); Handelsbureau
La Mola v. Kennedy, 370 U.S. 940 (1962); cf. Honda v. Clark, 386 U.S. 484 (1967).
1627 The Siren, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 389 (1871).
tion of interests of loyal citizens, merely created a municipal forfei-

ture and did not override or displace the law of prize. It decided,
therefore, that when a vessel was liable to condemnation under ei-
ther law, the government was at liberty to proceed under the most
stringent rules of international law, with the result that the citizen
would be deprived of the benefit of the protective provisions of the
statute.1628 Similarly, when Cuban ports were blockaded during the
Spanish-American War, the Court held, over the vigorous dissent
of three of its members, that the rule of international law exempt-
ing unarmed fishing vessels from capture was applicable in the ab-
sence of any treaty provision, or other public act of the government
in relation to the subject.1629
The Constitution at Home in Wartime

Personal Liberty.—“The Constitution of the United States is
a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and cov-
ers with the shield of its protection all classes of men, at all times,
and under all circumstances. No doctrine, involving more perni-
cious consequences, was ever invented by the wit of man than that
any of its provisions can be suspended during any of the great exi-
gencies of government. Such a doctrine leads directly to anarchy or
despotism, but the theory of necessity on which it is based is false;
for the government, within the Constitution, has all the powers granted
to it, which are necessary to preserve its existence; as has been hap-
pily proved by the result of the great effort to throw off its just au-
thority.” 1630
Ex parte Milligan, from which these words are quoted, is justly
deemed one of the great cases undergirding civil liberty in this coun-
try in times of war or other great crisis. The Court held that, ex-
cept in areas in which armed hostilities have made enforcement of
civil law impossible, constitutional rights may not be suspended and
civilians subjected to the vagaries of military justice. Yet the words
were uttered after the cessation of hostilities, and the Justices them-
selves recognized that with the end of the shooting there arose the
greater likelihood that constitutional rights could be and would be
observed and that the Court would require the observance.1631 This
pattern recurs with each critical period.
1628 The Hampton, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 372, 376 (1867).

1629 The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700, 711 (1900).
1630 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 120–21 (1866).
1631 “During the late wicked Rebellion, the temper of the times did not allow
that calmness in deliberation and discussion so necessary to a correct conclusion of

a purely judicial question. Then, considerations of safety were mingled with the ex-
ercise of power; and feelings and interests prevailed which were happily termi-
That the power of Congress to punish seditious utterances in

wartime is limited by the First Amendment was assumed by the
Court in a series of cases,1632 in which it nonetheless affirmed con-
viction for violations of the Espionage Act of 1917.1633 The Court
also upheld a state law making it an offense for persons to advo-
cate that citizens of the state should refuse to assist in prosecuting
war against enemies of the United States.1634 Justice Holmes matter-
of-factly stated the essence of the pattern that we have mentioned:
“When a nation is at war many things that might be said in time
of peace are such a hindrance to its effort that their utterance will
not be endured so long as men fight and that no Court could re-
gard them as protected by any constitutional right.” 1635
By far, the most dramatic restraint of personal liberty imposed
during World War II was the detention and relocation of the Japa-
nese residents of the Western states, including those who were native-
born citizens of the United States. When various phases of this pro-
gram were challenged, the Court held that, in order to prevent
espionage and sabotage, the authorities could restrict the move-
ment of these persons by a curfew order 1636 and even exclude them
from defined areas by regulation,1637 but that a citizen of Japanese
ancestry whose loyalty was conceded could not continue to be de-
tained in a relocation camp.1638
A mixed pattern emerges from an examination of the Cold War
period. Legislation designed to regulate and punish the organiza-
tional activities of the Communist Party and its adherents was at
first upheld,1639 and then in a series of cases was practically viti-
nated. Now that the public safety is assured, this question, as well as all others,
can be discussed and decided without passion or the admixture of any element not
required to form a legal judgment.” 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 109 (emphasis by Court).
1632 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249
U.S. 211 (1919); Sugarman v. United States, 249 U.S. 182 (1919); Frohwerk v. United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
1633 40 Stat. 217 (1917), as amended by 40 Stat. 553 (1918).
1634 Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
1635 Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
1636 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
1637 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). The five-Justice majority
opinion in Korematsuwas careful to state that it was ruling on exclusion only, and
not on compelled reporting to and remaining in an assembly center or relocation
camp, which were the highly likely consequences of obeying the exclusion order un-
der the regulation. 323 U.S. at 222–23.
1638 Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944). The Endo Court expressly avoided a
direct constitutional ruling, holding instead that continued detention could not be
supported by the statute and executive orders that underlay the detention program.
323 U.S. at 297–300.
1639 E.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951); Communist Party v. Sub-
versive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961); American Communications Asso-
ciation v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
ated.1640 Against a contention that Congress’ war powers had been

used to achieve the result, the Court struck down for the second
time in history a congressional statute as an infringement of the
First Amendment.1641 It voided a law making it illegal for any mem-
ber of a “communist-action organization” to work in a defense facil-
ity.1642 The majority reasoned that the law overbroadly required a
person to choose between his First Amendment-protected right of
association and his right to hold a job, without attempting to distin-
guish between those persons who constituted a threat and those who
did not.1643
On the other hand, in New York Times Co. v. United States,1644
a majority of the Court agreed that in appropriate circumstances
the First Amendment would not preclude a prior restraint of publi-
cation of information that might result in a sufficient degree of harm
to the national interest, although a different majority concurred in
denying the government’s request for an injunction in that case.1645
Enemy Aliens.—The Alien Enemy Act of 1798 authorized the
President to deport any alien or to license him to reside within the
United States at any place to be designated by the President.1646
Though critical of the measure, many persons conceded its constitu-
tionality on the theory that Congress’ power to declare war carried
with it the power to treat the citizens of a foreign power against
which war has been declared as enemies entitled to summary jus-
tice.1647 A similar statute was enacted during World War I 1648 and
was held valid in Ludecke v. Watkins.1649
During World War II, in Ex parte Quirin, the Court unani-
mously upheld the power of the President to order to trial before a
military tribunal German saboteurs captured within the United
1640 E.g., Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Albertson v. Subversive
Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70 (1965); United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437
(1965).
1641 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); cf. Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964). See also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
1642 Section 5(a)(1)(D) of the Subversive Control Act of 1950, 64 Stat 992, 50
U.S.C. § 784(a)(1)(D).
1643 389 U.S. at 264–66. Justices Harlan and White dissented, contending that
the right of association should have been balanced against the public interest and
finding the weight of the latter the greater. Id. at 282.
1644 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
1645 The result in the case was reached by a six-to-three majority. The three
dissenters, Chief Justice Burger, 403 U.S. at 748, Justice Harlan, id. at 752, and
Justice Blackmun, id. at 759, would have granted an injunction in the case; Jus-
tices Stewart and White, id. at 727, 730, would not in that case but could conceive
of cases in which they would.
1646 1 Stat. 577 (1798).
1647 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 360–361 (G. Hunt ed., 1904).
1648 40 Stat. 531 (1918), 50 U.S.C. § 21.
1649 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
States.1650 Chief Justice Stone found that enemy combatants, who

without uniforms come secretly through the lines during time of war,
for the purpose of committing hostile acts, are not entitled to the
status of prisoners of war but are unlawful combatants punishable
by military tribunals. Because this use of military tribunals was
sanctioned by Congress, the Court has found it unnecessary to de-
cide whether “the President may constitutionally convene military
commissions ‘without the sanction of Congress’ in cases of ‘control-
ling necessity.’ ” 1651
Eminent Domain.—An oft-cited dictum uttered shortly after
the Mexican War asserted the right of an owner to compensation
for property destroyed to prevent its falling into the hands of the
enemy, or for that taken for public use.1652 In United States v. Rus-
sell, decided following the Civil War, a similar conclusion was based
squarely on the Fifth Amendment, although the case did not neces-
sarily involve the point. Finally, in United States v. Pacific Rail-
road,1653 also a Civil War case, the Court held that the United States
was not responsible for the injury or destruction of private prop-
erty by military operations, but added that it did not have in mind
claims for property of loyal citizens taken for the use of the na-
tional forces. “In such cases,” the Court said, “it has been the prac-
tice of the government to make compensation for the property
taken. . . . although the seizure and appropriation of private prop-
erty under such circumstances by the military authorities may not
be within the terms of the constitutional clauses.” 1654
Meanwhile, however, in 1874, a committee of the House of Rep-
resentatives, in an elaborate report on war claims growing out of
the Civil War, had voiced the opinion that the Fifth Amendment
embodies the distinction between a taking of property in the course
of military operations or other urgent military necessity, and other
takings for war purposes, and required compensation of owners in
the latter class of cases.1655 In determining what constitutes just
compensation for property requisitioned for war purposes during World
War II, the Court has assumed that the Fifth Amendment is appli-
1650 317 U.S. 1 (1942).

1651 Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006). But see, id. at 591 (“Exi-
gency alone, of course, will not justify the establishment and use of penal tribunals
not contemplated by Article I, § 8, and Article III, § 1, of the Constitution unless
some other part of that document authorizes a response to the felt need.”).
1652 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115, 134 (1852).
1653 120 U.S. 227 (1887).
1654 120 U.S. at 239.
1655 H.R. REP. NO. 262, 43d Cong., 1st Sess. (1874), 39–40.
cable to such takings.1656 But as to property seized and destroyed

to prevent its use by the enemy, it has relied on the principle enun-
ciated in United States v. Pacific Railroad as justification for the
conclusion that owners thereof are not entitled to compensa-
tion.1657
Rent and Price Controls.—Even at a time when the Court
was using substantive due process to void economic regulations, it
generally sustained such regulations in wartime. Thus, shortly fol-
lowing the end of World War I, it sustained, by a narrow margin, a
rent control law for the District of Columbia, which not only lim-
ited permissible rent increases but also permitted existing tenants
to continue in occupancy provided they paid rent and observed other
stipulated conditions.1658 Justice Holmes for the majority conceded
in effect that in the absence of a war emergency the legislation might
transcend constitutional limitations,1659 but noted that “a public exi-
gency will justify the legislature in restricting property rights in
land to a certain extent without compensation.” 1660
During World War II and thereafter, economic controls were uni-
formly sustained.1661 An apartment house owner who complained
that he was not allowed a “fair return” on the property was dis-
missed with the observation that “a nation which can demand the
lives of its men and women in the waging of . . . war is under no
constitutional necessity of providing a system of price control . . .
which will assure each landlord a ‘fair return’ on his property.” 1662
The Court also held that rental ceilings could be established with-
out a prior hearing when the exigencies of national security pre-
cluded the delay which would ensue.1663
But, in another World War I case, the Court struck down a stat-
ute that penalized the making of “any unjust or unreasonable rate
1656 United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121 (1950); United
States v. Toronto Navigation Co., 338 U.S. 396 (1949); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United
States, 338 U.S. 1 (1949); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325 (1949); United States
v. Felin & Co., 334 U.S. 624 (1948); United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372
(1946); United States v. General Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373 (1945).
1657 United States v. Caltex, Inc., 344 U.S. 149, 154 (1952). Justices Douglas
and Black dissented.

1658 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135 (1921).
1659 But quaere in the light of Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), Olsen v.
Nebraska ex rel. Western Reference and Bond Ass’n, 313 U.S. 236 (1941), and their
progeny.
1660 Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 156 (1921).
1661 Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944); Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S.
503 (1944); Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943); Fleming v. Mohawk Wrecking
& Lumber Co., 331 U.S. 111 (1947); Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742 (1948).
1662 Bowles v. Willingham, 321 U.S. 503, 519 (1944).
1663 321 U.S. at 521. The Court stressed, however, that Congress had provided
for judicial review after the regulations and orders were made effective.
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cls. 15 and 16—The Militia
or charge in handling . . . any necessaries” 1664 as repugnant to the

Fifth and Sixth Amendments in that it was so vague and indefinite
that it denied due process and failed to give adequate notice of what
acts would violate it.1665
Clause 15. The Congress shall have Power * * * To provide

for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union,
suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.
Clause 16. The Congress shall have Power * * * To provide
for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for gov-
erning such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of
the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Ap-
pointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Mi-
litia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress.
THE MILITIA CLAUSES
Calling Out the Militia

The states as well as Congress may prescribe penalties for fail-
ure to obey the President’s call of the militia. They also have a con-
current power to aid the National Government by calls under their
own authority, and in emergencies may use the militia to put down
armed insurrection.1666 The Federal Government may call out the
militia in case of civil war; its authority to suppress rebellion is
found in the power to suppress insurrection and to carry on war.1667
The act of February 28, 1795,1668 which delegated to the President
the power to call out the militia, was held constitutional.1669 A mi-
litiaman who refused to obey such a call was not “employed in the
service of the United States so as to be subject to the article of war,”
but was liable to be tried for disobedience of the act of 1795.1670
1664 Act of October 22, 1919, 2, 41 Stat. 297.

1665 United States v. L. Cohen Grocery Co., 255 U.S. 81 (1921).
1666 Moore v. Houston, 3 S. & R. (Pa.) 169 (1817), aff’d, Houston v. Moore, 18
U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820).

1667 Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869); Tyler v. Defrees, 78 U.S. (11
Wall.) 331 (1871).

1668 1 Stat. 424 (1795), 10 U.S.C. § 332.
1669 Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32 (1827).
1670 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1 (1820); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12
Wheat.) 19 (1827).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cls. 15 and 16—The Militia
Regulation of the Militia

The power of Congress over the militia “being unlimited, ex-
cept in the two particulars of officering and training them . . . it
may be exercised to any extent that may be deemed necessary by
Congress. . . . The power of the state government to legislate on
the same subjects, having existed prior to the formation of the Con-
stitution, and not having been prohibited by that instrument, it re-
mains with the States, subordinate nevertheless to the paramount
law of the General Government. . . .” 1671 Under the National De-
fense Act of 1916,1672 the militia, which had been an almost purely
state institution, was brought under the control of the National Gov-
ernment. The term “militia of the United States” was defined to com-
prehend “all able-bodied male citizens of the United States and all
other able-bodied males who have . . . declared their intention to
become citizens of the United States,” between the ages of eighteen
and forty-five. The act reorganized the National Guard, determined
its size in proportion to the population of the several States, re-
quired that all enlistments be for “three years in service and three
years in reserve,” limited the appointment of officers to those who
“shall have successfully passed such tests as to . . . physical, moral
and professional fitness as the President shall prescribe,” and au-
thorized the President in certain emergencies to “draft into the mili-
tary service of the United States to serve therein for the period of
the war unless sooner discharged, any or all members of the Na-
tional Guard and National Guard Reserve,” who thereupon should
“stand discharged from the militia.” 1673
The militia clauses do not constrain Congress in raising and sup-
porting a national army. The Court has approved the system of “dual
enlistment,” under which persons enlisted in state militia (Na-
tional Guard) units simultaneously enlist in the National Guard of
the United States, and, when called to active duty in the federal
service, are relieved of their status in the state militia. Conse-
quently, the restrictions in the first militia clause have no applica-
tion to the federalized National Guard; there is no constitutional
requirement that state governors hold a veto power over federal duty
1671 Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 16 (1820). Organizing and provid-
ing for the militia being constitutionally committed to Congress and statutorily shared
with the Executive, the judiciary is precluded from exercising oversight over the pro-
cess, Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973), although wrongs committed by troops
are subject to judicial relief in damages. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 233 (1974).
1672 39 Stat. 166, 197, 198, 200, 202, 211 (1916), codified in sections of Titles 10
& 32. See Wiener, The Militia Clause of the Constitution, 54 HARV. L. REV. 181 (1940).
1673 Military and civilian personnel of the National Guard are state, rather than
federal, employees and the Federal Government is thus not liable under the Fed-
eral Tort Claims Act for their negligence. Maryland v. United States, 381 U.S. 41
(1965).
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 17—District of Columbia; Federal Property
training conducted outside the United States or that a national emer-

gency be declared before such training may take place.1674
Clause 17. Congress shall have power * * * To exercise ex-

clusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District
(not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particu-
lar States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of
Government of the United States, and to exercise like Author-
ity over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature
of the State in which the same shall be, for the Erection of Forts,
Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings.
SEAT OF THE GOVERNMENT

The Convention was moved to provide for the creation of a site
in which to locate the Capital of the Nation, completely removed
from the control of any state, because of the humiliation suffered
by the Continental Congress on June 21, 1783. Some eighty sol-
diers, unpaid and weary, marched on congresssitting in Philadel-
phia, physically threatened and verbally abused the members, and
caused congressto flee the City when neither municipal nor state
authorities would take action to protect the members.1675 Thus, Madi-
son noted that “[t]he indispensable necessity of complete authority
at the seat of government, carries its own evidence with it. . . . With-
out it, not only the public authority might be insulted and its pro-
ceedings interrupted with impunity, but a dependence of the mem-
bers of the general government on the State comprehending the seat
of government, for protection in the exercise of their duty, might
bring on the national council an imputation of awe or influence, equally
dishonorable to the government and dissatisfactory to the other mem-
bers of the confederacy.” 1676
The actual site was selected by compromise, Northerners accept-
ing the Southern-favored site on the Potomac in return for South-
ern support for a Northern aspiration, assumption of Revolution-
ary War debts by the National Government.1677 Maryland and Virginia
1674 Perpich v. Department of Defense, 496 U.S. 434 (1990).

1675 J. FISKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD OF AMERICAN HISTORY, 1783–1789 112–113 (1888);
W. TINDALL, THE ORIGIN AND GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 31–36 (1903).
1676 THE FEDERALIST, No. 43 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 288–289. See also 3 J. STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1213, 1214 (1833).

1677 W. TINDALL, THE ORIGIN AND GOVERNMENT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 5–30 (1903).
both authorized the cession of territory 1678 and Congress ac-

cepted.1679 Congress divided the District into two counties, Washing-
ton and Alexandria, and provided that the local laws of the two states
should continue in effect.1680 It also established a circuit court and
provided for the appointment of judicial and law enforcement offi-
cials.1681
There seems to have been no consideration, at least none re-
corded, given at the Convention or in the ratifying conventions to
the question of the governance of the citizens of the District.1682 Madi-
son in The Federalist did assume that the inhabitants “will have
had their voice in the election of the government which is to exer-
cise authority over them, as a municipal legislature for all local pur-
poses, derived from their own suffrages, will of course be allowed
them. . . .” 1683 Although there was some dispute about the consti-
tutional propriety of permitting local residents a measure of “home
rule,” to use the recent term,1684 almost from the first there were
local elections provided for. In 1802, the District was divided into
five divisions, in some of which the governing officials were elected;
an elected mayor was provided in 1820. District residents elected
some of those who governed them until this form of government
was swept away in the aftermath of financial scandals in 1874 1685
1678 Maryland Laws 1798, ch. 2, p. 46; 13 Laws of Virginia 43 (Hening 1789).
1679 Act of July 16, 1790, 1 Stat. 130. In 1846, Congress authorized a referen-
dum in Alexandria County on the question of retroceding that portion to Virginia.
The voters approved and the area again became part of Virginia. Laws of Virginia
1845–46, ch. 64, p. 50; Act of July 9, 1846, 9 Stat. 35; Proclamation of September 7,
1846; 9 Stat. 1000. Constitutional questions were raised about the retrocession but
suit did not reach the Supreme Court until some 40 years later and the Court held
that the passage of time precluded the raising of the question. Phillips v. Payne, 92
U.S. 130 (1875).
1680 Act of February 27, 1801, 2 Stat. 103. The declaration of the continuing
effect of state law meant that law in the District was frozen as of the date of ces-
sion, unless Congress should change it, which it seldom did. For some of the prob-
lems, see Tayloe v. Thompson, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 358 (1831); Ex parte Watkins, 32 U.S.
(7 Pet.) 568 (1833); Stelle v. Carroll, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 201 (1838); Van Ness v. United
States Bank, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 17 (1839); United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
291 (1842).
1681 Act of March 3, 1801, 2 Stat. 115.
1682 The objections raised in the ratifying conventions and elsewhere seemed to
have consisted of prediction of the perils to the Nation of setting up the National
Government in such a place. 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES 1215, 1216 (1833).
1683 THE FEDERALIST, No. 43 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 289.
1684 Such a contention was cited and rebutted in 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1218 (1833).

1685 Act of May 3, 1802, 2 Stat. 195; Act of May 15, 1820, 3 Stat. 583; Act of
February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 419; Act of June 20, 1874, 18 Stat. 116. The engrossing
story of the postwar changes in the government is related in W. WHYTE, THE UNCIVIL
WAR: WASHINGTON DURING THE RECONSTRUCTION (1958).
and replaced with a presidentially appointed Commission in 1878.1686

The Commission lasted until 1967 when it was replaced by an ap-
pointed Mayor-Commissioner and an appointed city council.1687 In
recent years, Congress provided for a limited form of self-
government in the District, with the major offices filled by elec-
tion. 1688 District residents vote for President and Vice Presi-
dent 1689 and elect a nonvoting delegate to Congress.1690 An effort
by constitutional amendment to confer voting representation in the
House and Senate failed of ratification.1691
Constitutionally, it appears that Congress is neither required
to provide for a locally elected government 1692 nor precluded from
delegating its powers over the District to an elective local govern-
ment.1693 The Court has indicated that the “exclusive” jurisdiction
granted was meant to exclude any question of state power over the
area and was not intended to require Congress to exercise all pow-
ers itself.1694
Chief Justice Marshall for the Court held in Hepburn v. Ellzey 1695
that the District of Columbia was not a state within the meaning
of the diversity jurisdiction clause of Article III. This view, adhered
to for nearly a century and a half,1696 was overturned in 1949, the
Court upholding the constitutionality of a 1940 statute authorizing
federal courts to take jurisdiction of nonfederal controversies be-
tween residents of the District of Columbia and the citizens of a
state.1697 The decision was by a five to four division, but the five in
the majority disagreed among themselves on the reasons. Three
1686 Act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 103.
1687 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1967, 32 Fed. Reg. 11699, reprinted as appen-
dix to District of Columbia Code, Title I.
1688 District of Columbia Self-Government and Governmental Reorganization Act,
Pub. L. 93–198, 87 Stat. 774.

1689 Twenty-third Amendment.
1690 Pub. L. 91–405, 84 Stat. 848, D.C. Code, § 1–291.
1691 H.J. Res. 554, 95th Congress, passed the House on March 2, 1978, and the
Senate on August 22, 1978, but only 16 states had ratified before the expiration of
the proposal after seven years.
1692 Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820); Heald v. District of
Columbia, 259 U.S. 114 (1922).

1693 District of Columbia v. John R. Thompson Co., 346 U.S. 100 (1953). The
case upheld the validity of ordinances enacted by the District governing bodies in
1872 and 1873 prohibiting racial discrimination in places of public accommodations.
1694 346 U.S. at 109–10. See also Thompson v. Lessee of Carroll, 63 U.S. (22
How.) 422 (1860); Stoutenburgh v. Hennick, 129 U.S. 141 (1889).

1695 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 445 (1805); see also Sere v. Pitot, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 332 (1810);
New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 91 (1816). The District was held to be a
state within the terms of a treaty. Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890).
1696 Barney v. City of Baltimore, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 280 (1868); Hooe v. Jamieson,
166 U.S. 395 (1897); Hooe v. Werner, 166 U.S. 399 (1897).
1697 National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949).
thought the statute to be an appropriate exercise of the power of

Congress to legislate for the District of Columbia pursuant to this
clause without regard to Article III.1698 Two others thought that
Hepburn v. Ellzey had been erroneously decided and would have
overruled it.1699 But six Justices rejected the former rationale and
seven Justices rejected the latter one; since five Justices agreed, how-
ever, that the statute was constitutional, it was sustained.
It is not disputed that the District is a part of the United States
and that its residents are entitled to all the guarantees of the United
States Constitution including the privilege of trial by jury 1700 and
of presentment by a grand jury.1701 Legislation restrictive of liberty
and property in the District must find justification in facts ad-
equate to support like legislation by a state in the exercise of its
police power.1702
Congress possesses over the District of Columbia the blended
powers of a local and national legislature.1703 This fact means that
in some respects ordinary constitutional restrictions do not oper-
ate; thus, for example, in creating local courts of local jurisdiction
in the District, Congress acts pursuant to its legislative powers un-
der clause 17 and need not create courts that comply with Article
III court requirements.1704 And when legislating for the District Con-
1698 337 U.S. at 588–600 (Justices Jackson, Black and Burton).

1699 337 U.S. at 604 (Justices Rutledge and Murphy). The dissents were by Chief
Justice Vinson, id. at 626, joined by Justice Douglas, and by Justice Frankfurter, id.
at 646, joined by Justice Reed.
1700 Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540 (1888); Capital Traction Co. v. Hof, 174 U.S.
1 (1899).
1701 United States v. Moreland, 258 U.S. 433 (1922).
1702 Wright v. Davidson, 181 U.S. 371, 384 (1901); cf. Adkins v. Children’s Hos-
pital, 261 U.S. 525 (1923), overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S.
379 (1937).
1703 Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 619 (1838);
Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 300 (1893); Atlantic Cleaners & Dyers v.
United States, 286 U.S. 427, 435 (1932); O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516,
518 (1933).
1704 In the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, Pub. L. 91–358, 111, 84 Stat. 475, D.C. Code, § 11–101, Congress specifically
declared it was acting pursuant to Article I in creating the Superior Court and the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals and pursuant to Article III in continuing the
United States District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia. The Article I courts were sustained in Palmore v. United States, 411
U.S. 389 (1973). See also Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977). The latter, federal
courts, while Article III courts, traditionally have had some non-Article III func-
tions imposed on them, under the “hybrid” theory announced in O’Donoghue v. United
States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933). E.g., Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967),
appeal dismissed, 393 U.S. 801 (1968) (power then vested in District Court to ap-
point school board members). See also Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923);
Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883).
gress remains the legislature of the Union, so that it may give its
enactments nationwide operation to the extent necessary to make
them locally effective.1705
AUTHORITY OVER PLACES PURCHASED
“Places”
This clause has been broadly construed to cover all structures
necessary for carrying on the business of the National Govern-
ment.1706 It includes post offices,1707 a hospital and a hotel located
in a national park,1708 and locks and dams for the improvement of
navigation.1709 But it does not cover lands acquired for forests, parks,
ranges, wild life sanctuaries or flood control.1710 Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has held that a state may convey, and congressmay
accept, either exclusive or qualified jurisdiction over property ac-
quired within the geographical limits of a state, for purposes other
than those enumerated in clause 17.1711
After exclusive jurisdiction over lands within a state has been
ceded to the United States, Congress alone has the power to pun-
ish crimes committed within the ceded territory.1712 Private prop-
erty located thereon is not subject to taxation by the state,1713 nor
can state statutes enacted subsequent to the transfer have any op-
eration therein.1714 But the local laws in force at the date of ces-
sion that are protective of private rights continue in force until ab-
rogated by Congress.1715 Moreover, as long as there is no interference
1705 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 428 (1821).

1706 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 143 (1937).
1707 Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908).
1708 Arlington Hotel v. Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929).
1710 Collins v. Yosemite Park Co., 304 U.S. 518, 530 (1938).
1711 304 U.S. at 528.
1712 Battle v. United States, 209 U.S. 36 (1908); Johnson v. Yellow Cab Co., 321
U.S. 383 (1944); Bowen v. Johnston, 306 U.S. 19 (1939).

1713 Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647 (1930).
1714 Western Union Tel. Co. v. Chiles, 214 U.S. 274 (1909); Arlington Hotel v.
Fant, 278 U.S. 439 (1929); Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318
U.S. 285 (1943). The Assimilative Crimes Act of 1948, 18 U.S.C. § 13, making appli-
cable to a federal enclave a subsequently enacted criminal law of the state in which
the enclave is situated entails no invalid delegation of legislative power to the state.
United States v. Sharpnack, 355 U.S. 286, 294, 296–97 (1958).
1715 Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. McGlinn, 114 U.S. 542, 545 (1885); Stewart & Co.
v. Sadrakula, 309 U.S. 94 (1940).

with the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, an area sub-

ject to such jurisdiction may be annexed by a municipality.1716
Duration of Federal Jurisdiction

A state may qualify its cession of territory by a condition that
jurisdiction shall be retained by the United States only so long as
the place is used for specified purposes.1717 Such a provision oper-
ates prospectively and does not except from the grant that portion
of a described tract which is then used as a railroad right of way.1718
In 1892, the Court upheld the jurisdiction of the United States to
try a person charged with murder on a military reservation, over
the objection that the state had ceded jurisdiction only over such
portions of the area as were used for military purposes and that
the particular place on which the murder was committed was used
solely for farming. The Court held that the character and purpose
of the occupation having been officially established by the political
department of the government, it was not open to the Court to in-
quire into the actual uses to which any portion of the area was tem-
porarily put.1719 A few years later, however, it ruled that the lease
to a city, for use as a market, of a portion of an area which had
been ceded to the United States for a particular purpose, sus-
pended the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States.1720
The question arose whether the United States retains jurisdic-
tion over a place that was ceded to it unconditionally, after it has
abandoned the use of the property for governmental purposes and
entered into a contract for sale to private persons. Minnesota as-
serted the right to tax the equitable interest of the purchaser in
such land, and the Supreme Court upheld its right to do so. The
majority assumed that “the Government’s unrestricted transfer of
property to nonfederal hands is a relinquishment of the exclusive
legislative power.” 1721 In separate concurring opinions, Chief Jus-
tice Stone and Justice Frankfurter reserved judgment on the ques-
tion of territorial jurisdiction.1722
1716 Howard v. Commissioners, 344 U.S. 624 (1953). As Howard recognized, such
areas of federal property do not cease to be part of the state in which they are lo-
cated and the residents of the areas are for most purposes residents of the state.
Thus, a state may not constitutionally exclude such residents from the privileges of
suffrage if they are otherwise qualified. Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419 (1970).
1717 Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399 (1896).
1718 United States v. Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138 (1930).
1719 Benson v. United States, 146 U.S. 325, 331 (1892).
1720 Palmer v. Barrett, 162 U.S. 399 (1896).
1721 S.R.A., Inc. v. Minnesota, 327 U.S. 558, 564 (1946).
1722 327 U.S. at 570, 571.
Sec. 8—Powers of Congress Cl. 18—Necessary and Proper Clause
Reservation of Jurisdiction by States

For more than a century the Supreme Court kept alive, by re-
peated dicta,1723 the doubt expressed by Justice Story “whether Con-
gress are by the terms of the Constitution, at liberty to purchase
lands for forts, dockyards, etc., with the consent of a State legisla-
ture, where such consent is so qualified that it will not justify the
‘exclusive legislation’ of Congress there. It may well be doubted if
such consent be not utterly void.” 1724 But when the issue was squarely
presented in 1937, the Court ruled that, when the United States
purchases property within a state with the consent of the latter, it
is valid for the state to convey, and for the United States to accept,
“concurrent jurisdiction” over such land, the state reserving to it-
self the right to execute process “and such other jurisdiction and
authority over the same as is not inconsistent with the jurisdiction
ceded to the United States.” 1725 The holding logically renders the
second half of clause 17 superfluous. In a companion case, the Court
ruled further that even if a general state statute purports to cede
exclusive jurisdiction, such jurisdiction does not pass unless the United
States accepts it.1726
Clause 18. The Congress shall have Power * * * To make

all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by
the Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in
any Department or Officer thereof.
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE
Scope and Operation

The Necessary and Proper Clause, sometimes called the “coeffi-
cient” or “elastic” clause, is an enlargement, not a constriction, of
the powers expressly granted to Congress. Chief Justice Marshall’s
classic opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland 1727 set the standard in
words that reverberate to this day. “Let the end be legitimate,” he
wrote, “let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means
which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which
1723 Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 532 (1885); United States v.
Unzeuta, 281 U.S. 138, 142 (1930); Surplus Trading Co. v. Cook, 281 U.S. 647, 652
(1930).
1724 United States v. Cornell, 25 Fed. Cas. 646, 649 (No. 14,867) (C.C.D.R.I. 1819).
1726 Mason Co. v. Tax Comm’n, 302 U.S. 186 (1937). See also Atkinson v. Tax
Comm’n, 303 U.S. 20 (1938).

1727 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the
Constitution, are constitutional.” 1728 Moreover, the provision gives
Congress a share in the responsibilities lodged in other depart-
ments, by virtue of its right to enact legislation necessary to carry
into execution all powers vested in the National Government. Con-
versely, where necessary for the efficient execution of its own pow-
ers, Congress may delegate some measure of legislative power to
other departments.1729
Practically every power of the National Government has been
expanded in some degree by the Necessary and Proper Clause. Un-
der the authority granted it by that clause, Congress has adopted
measures requisite to discharge the treaty obligations of the na-
tion,1730 has organized the federal judicial system, and has enacted
a large body of law defining and punishing crimes. Effective control
of the national economy has been made possible by the authority
to regulate the internal commerce of a state to the extent neces-
sary to protect and promote interstate commerce.1731 The right of
Congress to use all known and appropriate means for collecting rev-
enue, including the distraint of property for federal taxes,1732 and
to exercise the power of eminent domain to acquire property for pub-
lic use,1733 have greatly extended the range of national power. But
the widest application of the Necessary and Proper Clause has oc-
curred in the field of monetary and fiscal controls. Because the vari-
ous specific powers granted by Article I, § 8, do not add up to a
general legislative power over such matters, the Court has relied
heavily upon this clause to sustain the comprehensive control that
Congress has asserted over this subject.1734
1728 17 U.S. at 420. This decision had been clearly foreshadowed fourteen years
earlier by Marshall’s opinion in United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 358, 396 (1805).
Upholding an act which gave priority to claims of the United States against the
estate of a bankrupt he wrote: “The government is to pay the debt of the Union,
and must be authorized to use the means which appear to itself most eligible to
effect that object. It has, consequently, a right to make remittance, by bills or other-
wise, and to take those precautions which will render the transaction safe.”
1729 See “Delegation of Legislative Power,” supra.
1730 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901). See also Missouri v. Holland,
252 U.S. 416 (1920).

1731 See discussion of “Necessary and Proper Clause” under the commerce power,
supra.
1732 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272, 281 (1856). Congress may also legislate to protect its spending power. Sabri v.
United States, 541 U.S. 600 (2004) (upholding imposition of criminal penalties for
bribery of state and local officials administering programs receiving federal funds).
1733 Kohl v. United States, 91 U.S. 367, 373 (1876); United States v. Fox, 95
U.S. 670 (1878).

1734 See “Fiscal and Monetary Powers of Congress,” supra.
Definition of Punishment and Crimes

Although the only crimes which Congress is expressly autho-
rized to punish are piracies, felonies on the high seas, offenses against
the law of nations, treason and counterfeiting of the securities and
current coin of the United States, its power to create, define, and
punish crimes and offenses whenever necessary to effectuate the ob-
jects of the Federal Government is universally conceded.1735 Illus-
trative of the offenses which have been punished under this power
are the alteration of registered bonds,1736 the bringing of counter-
feit bonds into the country,1737 conspiracy to injure prisoners in cus-
tody of a United States marshal,1738 impersonation of a federal offi-
cer with intent to defraud,1739 conspiracy to injure a citizen in the
free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States,1740 the receipt by govern-
ment officials of contributions from government employees for politi-
cal purposes,1741 and advocating the overthrow of the government
by force.1742 Part I of Title 18 of the United States Code comprises
more than 500 sections defining penal offenses against the United
States.1743
One of the most expansive interpretations of the Necessary and
Proper Clause arose in the context of the administration of the fed-
eral penal system. In United States v. Comstock,1744 the Court evalu-
ated a federal statute which allowed for the civil commitment of a
1735 United States v. Fox, 95 U.S. 670, 672 (1878); United States v. Hall, 98 U.S.
343, 357 (1879); United States v. Worrall, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 384, 394 (1798); Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). That this power has been freely
exercised is attested by the pages of the United States Code devoted to Title 18,
entitled “Criminal Code and Criminal Procedure.” In addition, numerous regulatory
measures in other titles prescribe criminal penalties.
1736 Ex parte Carll, 106 U.S. 521 (1883).
1737 United States v. Marigold, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 560, 567 (1850).
1738 Logan v. United States, 144 U.S. 263 (1892).
1739 United States v. Barnow, 239 U.S. 74 (1915).
1740 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S.
76 (1884); In re Quarles and Butler, 158 U.S. 532, 537 (1895); Motes v. United States,
178 U.S. 458 (1900); United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915). See also Rakes v.
1741 Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882).
1742 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
1743 See National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws, Final Re-
port (Washington: 1970); National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws,

Working Papers (Washington: 1970), 2 vols.
1744 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–1224, slip op. (May 17, 2010). Breyer wrote the opin-
ion of the Court, joined by Justices Roberts, Stevens, Ginsburg and Sotomayor. Jus-
tices Kennedy and Alito concurred in the judgement, while Justices Thomas and Scalia
dissented.
federal prisoner past the term of his imprisonment 1745 if that pris-
oner would have serious difficulty in refraining from sexually vio-
lent conduct or child molestation. The statute contained no require-
ment that the threatened future conduct would fall under federal
jurisdiction, raising the question of what constitutional basis could
be cited for its enforcement. The majority opinion in Comstock up-
held the statute after considering five factors: (1) the historic breadth
of the Necessary and Proper Clause; (2) the history of federal in-
volvement in this area; (3) the reason for the statute’s enactment;
(4) the statute’s accommodation of state interests; and (5) whether
the scope of statute was too attenuated from Article I powers.1746
In evaluating these factors, the Court noted that previous fed-
eral involvement in the area included not only the civil commit-
ment of defendants who were incompetent to stand trial or who be-
came insane during the course of their imprisonment, but, starting
in 1949, the continued confinement of those adjudged incompetent
or insane past the end of their prison term. In upholding the sex
offender statute, the Court found that protection of the public and
the probability that such prisoners would not be committed by the
state represented a “rational basis” for the passage of such legisla-
tion.1747 The Court further found that state interests were pro-
tected by the legislation, as the statute provided for transfer of the
committed individuals to state authorities willing to accept them.
Finally, the Court found that the statute was not too attenuated
from the Article I powers underlying the criminal laws which had
been the basis for incarceration, as it related to the responsible ad-
ministration of the United States prison system.
1745 Where an ex-convict is still subject to legal requirements related to his pre-
vious conviction, the Court has found little difficultly in those requirements being
varied after his release. In United States v. Kebodeaux, 570 U.S. ___, No. 12–418,
slip op. (2013), the Court found that a sex offender, convicted by the Air Force in a
special court-martial, had, upon his release, been subject to state sex offender regis-
tration laws, violation of which was prohibited under the Jacob Wetterling Crimes
Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, Pub. L. No., 103–
322, 108 Stat. 2038–2042. When he was later convicted of failing to register under
the “very similar” provisions of the later-enacted Sex Offender Registration and No-
tification Act (SORNA), Public Law 109–24, Title I, 120 Stat. 590, 42 U.S.C. §16901
et seq., the Court found congresswas well within its authority under the Necessary
and Proper Clause to have modified the registration requirements.
1746 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–1224, slip op. at 22.
1747 Justice Kennedy, in concurrence, expressed concern that whether a statute
is “rationally related” to the implementation of a power, see Williamson v. Lee Opti-

cal Co., 348 U.S. 483, 487–88 (1955) (Due Process Clause), is too deferential a stan-
dard to be used as regards the Necessary and Proper Clause. Justice Kennedy would
use a more rigorous “rational basis” standard, found in Commerce Clause cases, where
there must be shown a “demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstra-
tion.” See Comstock, 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–1224, slip op. at 3 (Kennedy, J., concur-
ring).
Chartering of Banks
As an appropriate means for executing “the great powers, to lay
and collect taxes; to borrow money; to regulate commerce; to de-
clare and conduct a war; and to raise and support armies . . . ,”
Congress may incorporate banks and kindred institutions.1748 More-
over, it may confer upon them private powers, which, standing alone,
have no relation to the functions of the Federal Government, if those
privileges are essential to the effective operation of such corpora-
tions.1749 Where necessary to meet the competition of state banks,
Congress may authorize national banks to perform fiduciary func-
tions, even though, apart from the competitive situation, federal in-
strumentalities might not be permitted to engage in such busi-
ness.1750 The Court will not undertake to assess the relative importance
of the public and private functions of a financial institution Con-
gress has seen fit to create. It sustained the act setting up the Fed-
eral Farm Loan Banks to provide funds for mortgage loans on agri-
cultural land against the contention that the right of the Secretary
of the Treasury, which he had not exercised, to use these banks as
depositories of public funds, was merely a pretext for chartering those
banks for private purposes.1751
Currency Regulations
Reinforced by the necessary and proper clause, the powers “ ‘to
lay and collect taxes, to pay the debts and provide for the common
defence and general welfare of the United States,’ and ‘to borrow
money on the credit of the United States and to coin money and
regulate the value thereon . . . ,’ ” 1752 have been held to give Con-
gress virtually complete control over money and currency. A prohibi-
tive tax on the notes of state banks,1753 the issuance of treasury
notes impressed with the quality of legal tender in payment of pri-
vate debts 1754 and the abrogation of clauses in private contracts,
which called for payment in gold coin,1755 were sustained as appro-
priate measures for carrying into effect some or all of the foregoing
powers.
1748 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).

1749 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 862 (1824).
See also Pittman v. Home Owners’ Corp., 308 U.S. 21 (1939).
1750 First National Bank v. Follows ex rel. Union Trust Co., 244 U.S. 416 (1917);
Missouri ex rel. Burnes Nat’l Bank v. Duncan, 265 U.S. 17 (1924).

1751 Smith v. Kansas City Title Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
1752 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 449 (1884).
1754 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421 (1884). See also Legal Tender Cases
(Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457 (1871).

1755 Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240, 303 (1935).
Power to Charter Corporations

In addition to the creation of banks, Congress has been held to
have authority to charter a railroad corporation,1756 or a corpora-
tion to construct an interstate bridge,1757 as instrumentalities for
promoting commerce among the states, and to create corporations
to manufacture aircraft 1758 or merchant vessels 1759 as incidental to
the war power.
Courts and Judicial Proceedings

Because the Constitution “delineated only the great outlines of
the judicial power . . . , leaving the details to Congress, . . . [t]he
distribution and appropriate exercise of the judicial power must . . .
be made by laws passed by Congress. . . .” 1760 As a necessary and
proper provision for the exercise of the jurisdiction conferred by Ar-
ticle III, § 2, Congress may direct the removal from a state to a
federal court of a criminal prosecution against a federal officer for
acts done under color of federal law,1761 may require the tolling of
a state statute of limitations while a state cause of action that is
supplemental to a federal claim is pending in federal court,1762 and
may authorize the removal before trial of civil cases arising under
the laws of the United States.1763 It may prescribe the effect to be
given to judicial proceedings of the federal courts 1764 and may make
all laws necessary for carrying into execution the judgments of fed-
eral courts.1765 When a territory is admitted as a state, Congress
may designate the court to which the records of the territorial courts
shall be transferred and may prescribe the mode for enforcement
and review of judgments rendered by those courts.1766 In the exer-
cise of other powers conferred by the Constitution, apart from Ar-
ticle III, Congress may create legislative courts and “clothe them
with functions deemed essential or helpful in carrying those pow-
ers into execution.” 1767
1756 Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); California v. Pacific R.R., 127
U.S. 1, 39 (1888).
1757 Luxton v. North River Bridge Co., 153 U.S. 525 (1894).
1758 Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923).
1759 Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549 (1922).
1760 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
1761 Tennessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257, 263 (1880).
1762 Jinks v. Richland County, 538 U.S. 456 (2003).
1763 Railway Company v. Whitton, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270, 287 (1872).
1764 Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3 (1883).
1765 Bank of the United States v. Halstead, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 51, 53 (1825).
1766 Express Co. v. Kountze Bros., 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 342, 350 (1869).
1767 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 449 (1929). But see Northern Pipe-
line Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 67–69 (1982).
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 1—Importation of Slaves
Special Acts Concerning Claims

The Necessary and Proper Clause enables Congress to pass spe-
cial laws to require other departments of the government to pros-
ecute or adjudicate particular claims, whether asserted by the gov-
ernment itself or by private persons. In 1924,1768 Congress adopted
a Joint Resolution directing the President to cause suit to be insti-
tuted for the cancellation of certain oil leases alleged to have been
obtained from the government by fraud and to prosecute such other
actions and proceedings, civil and criminal, as were warranted by
the facts. This resolution also authorized the appointment of spe-
cial counsel to have charge of such litigation. Private acts provid-
ing for a review of an order for compensation under the Longshore
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act,1769 or conferring jurisdic-
tion upon the Court of Claims, after it had denied recovery, to hear
and determine certain claims of a contractor against the govern-
ment, have been held constitutional.1770
Maritime Law
Congress may implement the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion conferred upon the federal courts by revising and amending
the maritime law that existed at the time the Constitution was ad-
opted, but in so doing, it cannot go beyond the reach of that juris-
diction.1771 This power cannot be delegated to the states; hence, acts
of Congress that purported to make state workers’ compensation laws
applicable to maritime cases were held unconstitutional.1772
SECTION 9. Clause 1. The Migration or Importation of such

Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year
one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may
be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for
each Person.
IN GENERAL
This sanction for the importation of slaves by the states for twenty
years after the adoption of the Constitution, when considered with
176843 Stat. 5 (1924). See Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 (1929).
1769Paramino Co. v. Marshall, 309 U.S. 370 (1940).
1770 Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1 (1944).
1771 Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21 (1934).
1772 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149 (1920); Washington v. Dawson
& Co., 264 U.S. 219 (1924).

Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 1—Importation of Slaves
the section requiring escaped slaves to be returned to their mas-

ters, Art. IV, § 1, cl. 3, was held by Chief Justice Taney in Scott v.
Sandford,1773 to show conclusively that such persons and their de-
scendants were not embraced within the term “citizen” as used in
the Constitution. Today this ruling is interesting only as an histori-
cal curiosity.
Clause 2. The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall

not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Inva-
sion the public Safety may require it.
IN GENERAL
This clause is the only place in the Constitution in which the
Great Writ is mentioned, a strange fact in the context of the re-
gard with which the right was held at the time the Constitution
was written 1774 and stranger in the context of the role the right
has come to play in the Supreme Court’s efforts to constitutionalize
federal and state criminal procedure.1775
Only the Federal Government and not the states, it has been
held obliquely, is limited by the clause.1776 The issue that has al-
ways excited critical attention is the authority in which the clause
places the power to determine whether the circumstances warrant
suspension of the privilege of the Writ.1777 The clause itself does
not specify, and although most of the clauses of § 9 are directed at
Congress not all of them are.1778 At the Convention, the first pro-
posal of a suspending authority expressly vested “in the legisla-
1773 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 411 (1857).

1774 R. WALKER, THE AMERICAN RECEPTION OF THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1961).
1775 See discussion under Article III, Habeas Corpus: Scope of Writ.
1776 Gasquet v. Lapeyre, 242 U.S. 367, 369 (1917).
1777 In form, of course, clause 2 is a limitation of power, not a grant of power,
and is in addition placed in a section of limitations. It might be argued, therefore,

that the power to suspend lies elsewhere and that this clause limits that authority.
This argument is opposed by the little authority there is on the subject. 3 M. FAR-
RAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 213 (Luther Martin ed., 1937);
Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144, 148 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md. 1861); but cf. 3 J.
ELLIOT, THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 464 (Edmund Randolph, 2d ed. 1836). At the Convention, Gouverneur
Morris proposed the language of the present clause: the first section of the clause,
down to “unless” was adopted unanimously, but the second part, qualifying the pro-
hibition on suspension was adopted over the opposition of three states. 2 M. FAR-
RAND, op. cit., 438. It would hardly have been meaningful for those states opposing
any power to suspend to vote against this language if the power to suspend were
conferred elsewhere.
1778 Cf. Clauses 7, 8.
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 2—Habeas Corpus Suspension
ture” the suspending power,1779 but the author of this proposal did
not retain this language when the matter was taken up,1780 the pres-
ent language then being adopted.1781 Nevertheless, Congress’ power
to suspend was assumed in early commentary 1782 and stated in dic-
tum by the Court.1783 President Lincoln suspended the privilege on
his own motion in the early Civil War period,1784 but this met with
such opposition 1785 that he sought and received congressional au-
thorization.1786 Three other suspensions were subsequently ordered
on the basis of more or less express authorizations from Con-
gress.1787
When suspension operates, what is suspended? In Ex parte Mil-
ligan,1788 the Court asserted that the Writ is not suspended but only
the privilege, so that the Writ would issue and the issuing court on
its return would determine whether the person applying can pro-
ceed, thereby passing on the constitutionality of the suspension and
whether the petitioner is within the terms of the suspension.
Restrictions on habeas corpus placed in the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immi-
gration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) have pro-
vided occasion for further analysis of the scope of the Suspension
Clause. AEDPA’s restrictions on successive petitions from state pris-
oners are “well within the compass” of an evolving body of prin-
ciples restraining “abuse of the writ,” and hence do not amount to
a suspension of the writ within the meaning of the Clause.1789 In-
terpreting IIRIRA so as to avoid what it viewed as a serious consti-
1937).
1780 Id. at 438.
1781 Id.
1783 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 101 (1807).
1784 Cf. J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 118–139 (rev. ed. 1951).
1785 Including a finding by Chief Justice Taney on circuit that the President’s
action was invalid. Ex parte Merryman, 17 Fed. Cas. 144 (No. 9487) (C.C.D. Md.
1861).
1786 Act of March 3, 1863, 1, 12 Stat. 755. See Sellery, Lincoln’s Suspension of
Habeas Corpus as Viewed by Congress, 1 U. WIS. HISTORY BULL. 213 (1907).

1787 The privilege of the Writ was suspended in nine counties in South Carolina
in order to combat the Ku Klux Klan, pursuant to Act of April 20, 1871, 4, 17 Stat.
14. It was suspended in the Philippines in 1905, pursuant to the Act of July 1, 1902,
5, 32 Stat. 692. Cf. Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174 (1906). Finally, it was suspended
in Hawaii during World War II, pursuant to a section of the Hawaiian Organic Act,
67, 31 Stat. 153 (1900). Cf. Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946). For the
problem of de facto suspension through manipulation of the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral courts, see infra discussion under Article III, The Theory of Plenary Congressio-
nal Control.
1788 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 130–131 (1866).
1789 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 2—Habeas Corpus Suspension
tutional problem, the Court in another case held that Congress had
not evidenced clear intent to eliminate federal court habeas corpus
jurisdiction to determine whether the Attorney General retained dis-
cretionary authority to waive deportation for a limited category of
resident aliens who had entered guilty pleas before IIRIRA re-
pealed the waiver authority.1790 “[At] the absolute minimum,” the
Court wrote, “the Suspension Clause protects the writ as it existed
in 1789. At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served
as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it
is in that context that its protections have been strongest.” 1791
Clause 3. No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be

passed.
BILLS OF ATTAINDER
“Bills of attainder . . . are such special acts of the legislature,
as inflict capital punishments upon persons supposed to be guilty
of high offences, such as treason and felony, without any conviction
in the ordinary course of judicial proceedings. If an act inflicts a
milder degree of punishment than death, it is called a bill of pains
and penalties. . . . In such cases, the legislature assumes judicial
magistracy, pronouncing upon the guilt of the party without any of
the common forms and guards of trial, and satisfying itself with
proofs, when such proofs are within its reach, whether they are con-
formable to the rules of evidence, or not. In short, in all such cases,
the legislature exercises the highest power of sovereignty, and what
may be properly deemed an irresponsible despotic discretion, being
governed solely by what it deems political necessity or expediency,
and too often under the influence of unreasonable fears, or un-
founded suspicions.” 1792 The phrase “bill of attainder,” as used in
this clause and in clause 1 of § 10, applies to bills of pains and pen-
alties as well as to the traditional bills of attainder.1793
The prohibition embodied in this clause is not to be narrowly
construed in the context of traditional forms but is to be inter-
preted in accordance with the designs of the framers so as to pre-
clude trial by legislature, which would violate the separation of pow-
1790 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289 (2001).

1791 533 U.S. at 301 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
1793 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); cf. United States
v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 441–442 (1965).

Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 3—Bills of Attainder
ers.1794 The clause thus prohibits all legislative acts, “no matter what
their form, that apply either to named individuals or to easily as-
certainable members of a group in such a way as to inflict punish-
ment on them without a judicial trial. . . .” 1795 That the Court has
applied the clause dynamically is revealed by a consideration of the
three cases in which acts of Congress have been struck down as
violating it.1796 In Ex parte Garland,1797 the Court struck down a
statute that required attorneys to take an oath that they had taken
no part in the Confederate rebellion against the United States be-
fore they could practice in federal courts. The statute, and a state
constitutional amendment requiring a similar oath of persons be-
fore they could practice certain professions,1798 were struck down
as legislative acts inflicting punishment on a specific group the mem-
bers of which had taken part in the rebellion and therefore could
not truthfully take the oath. The clause then lay unused until 1946
when the Court used it to strike down a rider to an appropriations
bill forbidding the use of money appropriated in the bill to pay the
salaries of three named persons whom the House of Representa-
tives wished discharged because they were deemed to be “subver-
sive.” 1799
Then, in United States v. Brown,1800 a sharply divided Court
held void as a bill of attainder a statute making it a crime for a
member of the Communist Party to serve as an officer or as an em-
ployee of a labor union. Congress could, Chief Justice Warren wrote
for the majority, under its commerce power, protect the economy from
harm by enacting a prohibition generally applicable to any person
who commits certain acts or possesses certain characteristics mak-
ing him likely in Congress’ view to initiate political strikes or other
harmful deeds and leaving it to the courts to determine whether a
particular person committed the specified acts or possessed the speci-
fied characteristics. It was impermissible, however, for Congress to
designate a class of persons—members of the Communist Party—as
being forbidden to hold union office.1801 The dissenters viewed the
1794 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 442–46 (1965). Four dissenting Jus-
tices, however, denied that any separation of powers concept underlay the clause.
Id. at 472–73.
1795 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 315 (1946).
1796 For a rejection of the Court’s approach and a plea to adhere to the tradi-
tional concept, see id. at 318 (Justice Frankfurter concurring).

1797 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
1798 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867).
1799 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
1800 381 U.S. 437 (1965).
1801 The Court of Appeals had voided the statute as an infringement of First
Amendment expression and association rights, but the Court majority did not rely
upon this ground. 334 F.2d 488 (9th Cir. 1964). However, in United States v. Robel,
statute as merely expressing in shorthand the characteristics of those

persons who were likely to utilize union responsibilities to accom-
plish harmful acts; Congress could validly conclude that all mem-
bers of the Communist Party possessed those characteristics.1802
The majority’s decision in Brown cast in doubt certain statutes
and certain statutory formulations that had been held not to consti-
tute bills of attainder. For example, a predecessor of the statute struck
down in Brown, which had conditioned a union’s access to the NLRB
upon the filing of affidavits by all of the union’s officers attesting
that they were not members of or affiliated with the Communist
Party, had been upheld,1803 and although Chief Justice Warren dis-
tinguished the previous case from Brown on the basis that the Court
in the previous decision had found the statute to be preventive rather
than punitive,1804 he then proceeded to reject the contention that
the punishment necessary for a bill of attainder had to be punitive
or retributive rather than preventive,1805 thus undermining the prior
decision. Of much greater significance was the effect of the Brown
decision on “conflict-of-interest” legislation typified by that upheld
in Board of Governors v. Agnew.1806 The statute there forbade any
partner or employee of a firm primarily engaged in underwriting
securities from being a director of a national bank.1807 Chief Jus-
tice Warren distinguished the prior decision and the statute on three
grounds from the statute then under consideration. First, the union
statute inflicted its deprivation upon the members of a suspect po-
litical group in typical bill-of-attainder fashion, unlike the statute
in Agnew. Second, in the Agnew statute, Congress did not express
a judgment upon certain men or members of a particular group; it
rather concluded that any man placed in the two positions would
suffer a temptation any man might yield to. Third, Congress estab-
lished in the Agnew statute an objective standard of conduct ex-
pressed in shorthand which precluded persons from holding the two
positions.
Apparently withdrawing from the Brown analysis in upholding
a statute providing for governmental custody of documents and re-
389 U.S. 258 (1967), a very similar statute making it unlawful for any member of a
“Communist-action organization” to be employed in a defense facility was struck down
on First Amendment grounds and the bill of attainder argument was ignored.
1802 United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437, 462 (1965) (Justices White, Clark,
Harlan, and Stewart dissenting).

1803 American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
1804 Douds, 339 U.S. at 413, 414, cited in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S. 437,
457–458 (1965).
1805 Brown, 381 U.S. at 458–61.
1806 329 U.S. 441 (1947).
1807 12 U.S.C. § 78.
cordings accumulated during the tenure of former President Nixon,1808

the Court set out a rather different formula for deciding bill of at-
tainder cases.1809 The law specifically applied only to President Nixon
and directed an executive agency to assume control over the mate-
rials and prepare regulations providing for ultimate public dissemi-
nation of at least some of them; the act assumed that it did not
deprive the former President of property rights but authorized the
award of just compensation if it should be judicially determined that
there was a taking. First, the Court denied that the clause denies
the power to Congress to burden some persons or groups while not
so treating all other plausible individuals or groups; even the pres-
ent law’s specificity in referring to the former President by name
and applying only to him did not condemn the act because he “con-
stituted a legitimate class of one” on whom Congress could “fairly
and rationally” focus.1810 Second, even if the statute’s specificity did
bring it within the prohibition of the clause, the lodging of Mr. Nixon’s
materials with the GSA did not inflict punishment within the mean-
ing of the clause. This analysis was a three-pronged one: 1) the law
imposed no punishment traditionally judged to be prohibited by the
clause; 2) the law, viewed functionally in terms of the type and se-
verity of burdens imposed, could rationally be said to further nonpuni-
tive legislative purposes; and 3) the law had no legislative record
evincing a congressional intent to punish.1811 That is, the Court, look-
ing “to its terms, to the intent expressed by Members of Congress
who voted its passage, and to the existence or nonexistence of legiti-
mate explanations for its apparent effect,” concluded that the stat-
ute served to further legitimate policies of preserving the availabil-
ity of evidence for criminal trials and the functioning of the adversary
legal system and in promoting the preservation of records of histori-
cal value, all in a way that did not and was not intended to punish
the former President.
The clause protects individual persons and groups who are vul-
nerable to nonjudicial determinations of guilt and does not apply
1808 The Presidential Recordings and Materials Preservation Act, Pub. L. 93–
526, 88 Stat. 1695 (1974), note following 44 U.S.C. § 2107. For an application of this
statute, see Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978).
1809 Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425, 468–84 (1977).
Justice Stevens’ concurrence is more specifically directed to the facts behind the stat-
ute than is the opinion of the Court, id. at 484, and Justice White, author of the
dissent in Brown, merely noted he found the act nonpunitive. Id. at 487. Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 504, 536–45. Adding to the im-
pression of a departure from Brown is the quotation in the opinion of the Court at
several points of the Brown dissent, id. at 470 n.31, 471 n.34, while the dissent quoted
and relied on the opinion of the Court in Brown. Id. at 538, 542.
1810 433 U.S. at 472. Justice Stevens carried the thought further, although in
the process he severely limited the precedential value of the decision. Id. at 484.
1811 433 U.S. at 473–84.
to a state; nor does a state have standing to invoke the clause for
its citizens against the Federal Government.1812
EX POST FACTO LAWS
Definition
Both federal and state governments are prohibited from enact-
ing ex post facto laws,1813 and the Court applies the same analysis
whether the law in question is a federal or a state enactment. When
these prohibitions were adopted as part of the original Constitu-
tion, many persons understood the term ex post facto laws to “em-
brace all retrospective laws, or laws governing or controlling past
transactions, whether . . . of a civil or a criminal nature.” 1814 But
in the early case of Calder v. Bull,1815 the Supreme Court decided
that the phrase, as used in the Constitution, was a term of art that
applied only to penal and criminal statutes. But, although it is in-
applicable to retroactive legislation of any other kind,1816 the consti-
tutional prohibition may not be evaded by giving a civil form to a
measure that is essentially criminal.1817 Every law that makes crimi-
nal an act that was innocent when done, or that inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed, is
an ex post facto law within the prohibition of the Constitution.1818
A prosecution under a temporary statute that was extended before
the date originally set for its expiration does not offend this provi-
sion even though it is instituted subsequent to the extension of the
statute’s duration for a violation committed prior thereto.1819 Be-
cause this provision does not apply to crimes committed outside the
jurisdiction of the United States against the laws of a foreign coun-
try, it is immaterial in extradition proceedings whether the foreign
law is ex post facto or not.1820
What Constitutes Punishment

The issue of whether a law is civil or punitive in nature is es-
sentially the same for ex post facto and for double jeopardy analy-
1812 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
1813 The prohibition on state ex post facto legislation appears in Art. I, § 10, cl.
1.
18143 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1339 (1833).
18153 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 393 (1798).
1816 Bankers Trust Co. v. Blodgett, 260 U.S. 647, 652 (1923).
1817 Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878).
1818 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 333, 377 (1867); Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381, 384 (1878).
1819 United States v. Powers, 307 U.S. 214 (1939).
1820 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 123 (1901). Cf. In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1,
26 (1946) (dissenting opinion of Justice Murphy); Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S. 197,
199 (1948) (concurring opinion of Justice Douglas).
sis.1821 “A court must ascertain whether the legislature intended the

statute to establish civil proceedings. A court will reject the legisla-
ture’s manifest intent only where a party challenging the Act pro-
vides the clearest proof that the statutory scheme is so punitive in
either purpose or effect as to negate the State’s intention.” 1822 A
statute that has been held to be civil and not criminal in nature
cannot be deemed punitive “as applied” to a single individual.1823
A variety of federal laws have been challenged as ex post facto.
A statute that prescribed as a qualification for practice before the
federal courts an oath that the attorney had not participated in the
Rebellion was found unconstitutional because it operated as a pun-
ishment for past acts.1824 But a statute that denied to polygamists
the right to vote in a territorial election was upheld even as ap-
plied to one who had not contracted a polygamous marriage and
had not cohabited with more than one woman since the act was
passed, because the law did not operate as an additional penalty
for the offense of polygamy but merely defined it as a disqualifica-
tion of a voter.1825 A deportation law authorizing the Secretary of
Labor to expel aliens for criminal acts committed before its pas-
sage is not ex post facto because deportation is not a punish-
ment.1826 For this reason, a statute terminating payment of old-age
benefits to an alien deported for Communist affiliation also is not
ex post facto, for the denial of a non-contractual benefit to a de-
ported alien is not a penalty but a regulation designed to relieve
the Social Security System of administrative problems of supervi-
sion and enforcement likely to arise from disbursements to benefi-
ciaries residing abroad.1827 Likewise, an act permitting the cancel-
lation of naturalization certificates obtained by fraud prior to the
1821 Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346 (1997); Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250
(2001).
1822 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. 250, 261 (2001) (interpreting Art. I, § 10).
1823 Seling v. Young, 531 U.S. at 263 (2001).
1824 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
1825 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
1826 Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32 (1924); Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585 (1913);
Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302 (1955). Justices Black and Douglas, reiterating in
Lehman v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690–91 (1957), their dissent
from the premise that the ex post facto clause is directed solely to penal legislation,
disapproved a holding that an immigration law, enacted in 1952, 8 U.S.C. § 1251,
which authorized deportation of an alien who, in 1945, had acquired a status of
nondeportability under pre-existing law is valid. In their opinion, to banish, in 1957,
an alien who had lived in the United States for almost 40 years, for an offense com-
mitted in 1936, and for which he already had served a term in prison, was to retro-
spectively subject him to a new punishment.
1827 Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
passage of the law was held not to impose a punishment, but in-
stead simply to deprive the alien of his ill-gotten privileges.1828
Change in Place or Mode of Trial

A change of the place of trial of an alleged offense after its com-
mission is not an ex post facto law. If no place of trial was provided
when the offense was committed, Congress may designate the place
of trial thereafter.1829 A law that alters the rule of evidence to per-
mit a person to be convicted upon less or different evidence than
was required when the offense was committed is invalid,1830 but a
statute that simply enlarges the class of persons who may be com-
petent to testify in criminal cases is not ex post facto as applied to
a prosecution for a crime committed prior to its passage.1831
Clause 4. No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid,

unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein be-
fore directed to be taken.
DIRECT TAXES
The Hylton Case

The crucial problem under clause 4 is to distinguish “direct” from
other taxes. In its opinion in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,
the Court declared: “It is apparent . . . that the distinction be-
tween direct and indirect taxation was well understood by the fram-
ers of the Constitution and those who adopted it.” 1832 Against this
confident dictum may be set the following brief excerpt from Madi-
son’s Notes on the Convention: “Mr. King asked what was the pre-
cise meaning of direct taxation? No one answered.” 1833 The first case
to come before the Court on this issue was Hylton v. United States,1834
which was decided early in 1796. Congress has levied, according to
the rule of uniformity, a specific tax upon all carriages, for the con-
veyance of persons, which were to be kept by, or for any person, for
his own use, or to be let out for hire, or for the conveying of passen-
gers. In a fictitious statement of facts, it was stipulated that the
carriages involved in the case were kept exclusively for the per-
sonal use of the owner and not for hire. The principal argument for
1828 Johannessen v. United States, 225 U.S. 227 (1912).
1829 Cook v. United States, 138 U.S. 157, 183 (1891).
1830 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
1831 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574, 589 (1884).
1832 157 U.S. 429, 573 (1895).
1833 J. MADISON, THE DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 435 (G. Hunt &
J. Scott eds., Greenwood Press ed. 1970).

1834 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796).
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 4—Taxes
the constitutionality of the measure was made by Hamilton, who

treated it as an “excise tax,” 1835 whereas Madison, both on the floor
of Congress and in correspondence, attacked it as “direct” and there-
fore void, because it was levied without apportionment.1836 The Court,
taking the position that the direct tax clause constituted in practi-
cal operation an exception to the general taxing powers of Con-
gress, held that no tax ought to be classified as “direct” that could
not be conveniently apportioned, and on this basis sustained the
tax on carriages as one on their “use” and therefore an “excise.”
Moreover, each of the judges advanced the opinion that the direct
tax clause should be restricted to capitation taxes and taxes on land,
or that, at most, it might cover a general tax on the aggregate or
mass of things that generally pervade all the states, especially if
an assessment should intervene, while Justice Paterson, who had
been a member of the Federal Convention, testified to his recollec-
tion that the principal purpose of the provision had been to allay
the fear of the Southern states that their Negroes and land should
be subjected to a specific tax.1837
From the Hylton to the Pollock Case

The result of the Hylton case was not challenged until after the
Civil War. A number of the taxes imposed to meet the demands of
that war were assailed during the postwar period as direct taxes,
but without result. The Court sustained successively, as “excises”
or “duties,” a tax on an insurance company’s receipts for premiums
and assessments,1838 a tax on the circulating notes of state banks,1839
an inheritance tax on real estate,1840 and finally a general tax on
incomes.1841 In the last case, the Court took pains to state that it
regarded the term “direct taxes” as having acquired a definite and
fixed meaning, to wit, capitation taxes, and taxes on land.1842 Then,
almost one hundred years after the Hylton case, the famous case of
Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.1843 arose under the Income
Tax Act of 1894.1844 Undertaking to correct “a century of error,” the
1835 THE WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 845 (J. Hamilton ed., 1851). “If the mean-
ing of the word excise is to be sought in the British statutes, it will be found to
include the duty on carriages, which is there considered as an excise, and then must
necessarily be uniform and liable to apportionment; consequently, not a direct tax.”
1836 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730 (1794); 2 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADI-
SON 14 (1865).
1837 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171, 177 (1796).
1838 Pacific Ins. Co. v. Soule, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 433 (1869).
1840 Scholey v. Rew, 90 U.S. (23 Wall.) 331 (1875).
1841 Springer v. United States, 102 U.S. 586 (1881).
1842 102 U.S. at 602.
1843 157 U.S. 429 (1895); 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
1844 28 Stat. 509, 553 (1894).
Court held, by a vote of five-to-four, that a tax on income from prop-

erty was a direct tax within the meaning of the Constitution and
hence void because not apportioned according to the census.
Restriction of the Pollock Decision

The Pollock decision encouraged taxpayers to challenge the right
of Congress to levy by the rule of uniformity numerous taxes that
had always been reckoned to be excises. But the Court evinced a
strong reluctance to extend the doctrine to such exactions. Purport-
ing to distinguish taxes levied “because of ownership” or “upon prop-
erty as such” from those laid upon “privileges,” 1845 it sustained as
“excises” a tax on sales on business exchanges,1846 a succession tax
which was construed to fall on the recipients of the property trans-
mitted rather than on the estate of the decedent,1847 and a tax on
manufactured tobacco in the hands of a dealer, after an excise tax
had been paid by the manufacturer.1848 Again, in Thomas v. United
States,1849 the validity of a stamp tax on sales of stock certificates
was sustained on the basis of a definition of “duties, imposts and
excises.” These terms, according to the Chief Justice, “were used
comprehensively to cover customs and excise duties imposed on im-
portation, consumption, manufacture and sale of certain commodi-
ties, privileges, particular business transactions, vocations, occupa-
tions and the like.” 1850 On the same day, in Spreckels Sugar Refining
Co. v. McClain,1851 it ruled that an exaction, denominated a special
excise tax, that was imposed on the business of refining sugar and
measured by the gross receipts thereof, was in truth an excise and
hence properly levied by the rule of uniformity. The lesson of Flint
v. Stone Tracy Co.1852 was the same. In Flint, what was in form an
income tax was sustained as a tax on the privilege of doing busi-
ness as a corporation, the value of the privilege being measured by
the income, including income from investments. Similarly, in Stanton
v. Baltic Mining Co.,1853 a tax on the annual production of mines
was held to be “independently of the effect of the operation of the
Sixteenth Amendment . . . not a tax upon property as such be-
1845 Stanton v. Baltic Mining Co., 240 U.S. 103 (1916); Knowlton v. Moore, 178
U.S. 41, 80 (1900).

1846 Nicol v. Ames, 173 U.S. 509 (1899).
1847 Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S. 41 (1900).
1848 Patton v. Brady, 184 U.S. 608 (1902).
1849 192 U.S. 363 (1904).
1850 192 U.S. at 370.
1851 192 U.S. 397 (1904).
1852 220 U.S. 107 (1911).
1853 240 U.S. 103 (1916).
cause of its ownership, but a true excise levied on the results of

the business of carrying on mining operations.” 1854
A convincing demonstration of the extent to which the Pollock
decision had been whittled down by the time the Sixteenth Amend-
ment was adopted is found in Billings v. United States.1855 In chal-
lenging an annual tax assessed for the year 1909 on the use of for-
eign built yachts—a levy not distinguishable in substance from the
carriage tax involved in the Hylton case as construed by the Su-
preme Court—counsel did not even suggest that the tax should be
classed as a direct tax. Instead, he based his argument that the
exaction constituted a taking of property without due process of law
upon the premise that it was an excise, and the Supreme Court
disposed of the case upon the same assumption.
In 1921, the Court cast aside the distinction drawn in Knowlton
v. Moore between the right to transmit property on the one hand
and the privilege of receiving it on the other, and sustained an es-
tate tax as an excise. “Upon this point,” wrote Justice Holmes for a
unanimous Court, “a page of history is worth a volume of logic.” 1856
Having established this proposition, the Court had no difficulty in
deciding that the inclusion in the computation of the estate tax of
property held as joint tenants,1857 or as tenants by the entirety,1858
or the entire value of community property owned by husband and
wife,1859 or the proceeds of insurance upon the life of the dece-
dent,1860 did not amount to direct taxation of such property. Simi-
larly, it upheld a graduated tax on gifts as an excise, saying that it
was “a tax laid only upon the exercise of a single one of those pow-
ers incident to ownership, the power to give the property owned to
another.” 1861 Justice Sutherland, speaking for himself and two as-
sociates, urged that “the right to give away one’s property is as fun-
damental as the right to sell it or, indeed, to possess it.” 1862
Miscellaneous
The power of Congress to levy direct taxes is not confined to
the states represented in that body. Such a tax may be levied in
1854 240 U.S. at 114.
1855 232 U.S. 261 (1914).
1856 New York Trust Co. v. Eisner, 256 U.S. 345, 349 (1921).
1857 Phillips v. Dime Trust & S.D. Co., 284 U.S. 160 (1931).
1858 Tyler v. United States, 281 U.S. 497 (1930).
1859 Fernandez v. Wiener, 326 U.S. 340 (1945).
1860 Chase Nat’l Bank v. United States, 278 U.S. 327 (1929); United States v.
Manufacturers Nat’l Bank, 363 U.S. 194, 198–201 (1960).

1861 Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 136 (1929). See also Helvering v. Bul-
lard, 303 U.S. 297 (1938).

1862 Bromley v. McCaughn, 280 U.S. 124, 140 (1929).
proportion to population in the District of Columbia.1863 A penalty

imposed for nonpayment of a direct tax is not a part of the tax it-
self and hence is not subject to the rule of apportionment. Accord-
ingly, the Supreme Court sustained the penalty of fifty percent, which
Congress exacted for default in the payment of the direct tax on
land in the aggregate amount of twenty million dollars that was
levied and apportioned among the states during the Civil War.1864
Clause 5. No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported

from any State.
TAXES ON EXPORTS
The prohibition on excise taxes applies only to the imposition
of duties on goods by reason of exportation.1865 The word “export”
signifies goods exported to a foreign country, not to an unincorpo-
rated territory of the United States.1866 A general tax laid on all
property alike, including that intended for export, is not within the
prohibition, if it is not levied on goods in course of exportation nor
because of their intended exportation.1867
Continuing its refusal to modify its export clause jurispru-
dence,1868 the Court held unconstitutional the Harbor Maintenance
Tax (HMT) under the export clause insofar as the tax was applied
to goods loaded at United States ports for export. The HMT re-
quired shippers to pay a uniform charge on commercial cargo shipped
through the Nation’s ports. The clause, said the Court, “categori-
cally bars Congress from imposing any tax on exports.” 1869 How-
ever, the clause does not interdict a “user fee,” which is a charge
that lacks the attributes of a generally applicable tax or duty and
is designed to compensate for government supplied services, facili-
ties, or benefits; and it was that defense to which the government
repaired once it failed to obtain a modification of the rules under
the clause. But the HMT bore the indicia of a tax. It was titled as
a tax, described as a tax in the law, and codified in the Internal
Revenue Code. Aside from labels, however, courts must look to how
things operate, and the HMT did not qualify as a user fee. It did
not represent compensation for services rendered. The value of ex-
1863 Loughborough v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820).
1864 De Treville v. Smalls, 98 U.S. 517, 527 (1879).
1865 Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 507 (1886). Cf. Almy v. California, 65 U.S.
(24 How.) 169, 174 (1861).

1866 Dooley v. United States, 183 U.S. 151, 154 (1901).
1867 Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 428 (1904); Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504,
507 (1886).
1868 See United States v. IBM, 517 U.S. 843, 850–61 (1996).
1869 United States v. United States Shoe Corp., 523 U.S. 360, 363 (1998).
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 5—Export Duties
port cargo did not correspond reliably with the federal harbor ser-
vices used or usable by the exporter. Instead, the extent and man-
ner of port use depended on such factors as size and tonnage of a
vessel and the length of time it spent in port.1870 The HMT was
thus a tax, and therefore invalid.
Where the sale to a commission merchant for a foreign con-
signee was consummated by delivery of the goods to an exporting
carrier, the sale was held to be a step in the exportation and hence
exempt from a general tax on sales of such commodity.1871 The giv-
ing of a bond for exportation of distilled liquor was not the com-
mencement of exportation so as to exempt from an excise tax spir-
its that were not exported pursuant to such bond.1872 A tax on the
income of a corporation derived from its export trade was not a tax
on “articles exported” within the meaning of the Constitution.1873
In United States v. IBM Corp.,1874 the Court rejected the gov-
ernment’s argument that it should refine its export-tax-clause juris-
prudence. Rather than read the clause as a bar on any tax that
applies to a good in the export stream, the government contended
that the Court should bring this clause in line with the Import-
Export Clause 1875 and with dormant-commerce-clause doctrine. In
that view, the Court should distinguish between discriminatory and
nondiscriminatory taxes on exports. But the Court held that suffi-
cient differences existed between the export clause and the other
two clauses, so that its bar should continue to apply to any and all
taxes on goods in the course of exportation.
Stamp Taxes
A stamp tax imposed on foreign bills of lading,1876 charter par-
ties,1877 or marine insurance policies,1878 was in effect a tax or duty
upon exports, and so void; but an act requiring the stamping of all
1870 523 U.S. at 367–69.

1871 Spalding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66 (1923).
1872 Thompson v. United States, 142 U.S. 471 (1892).
1873 Peck & Co. v. Lowe, 247 U.S. 165 (1918); National Paper Co. v. Bowers, 266
U.S. 373 (1924).

1874 517 U.S. 843 (1996).
1875 Article I, § 10, cl. 2, applying to the states.
1876 Fairbank v. United States, 181 U.S. 283 (1901).
1877 United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1 (1915).
1878 Thames & Mersey Inc. v. United States, 237 U.S. 19 (1915). In United States
v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843 (1996), the Court adhered to Thames & Mersey, and
held unconstitutional a federal excise tax upon insurance policies issued by foreign
countries as applied to coverage for exported products. The Court admitted that one
could question the earlier case’s equating of a tax on the insurance of exported goods
with a tax on the goods themselves, but it observed that the government had cho-
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 5—Export Duties
packages of tobacco intended for export in order to prevent fraud

was held not to be forbidden as a tax on exports.1879
Clause 6. No Preference shall be given by any Regulation

of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of
another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged
to enter, clear, or pay duties in another.
THE “NO PREFERENCE” CLAUSE

The no-preference clause was designed to prevent preferences
between ports because of their location in different states. Discrimi-
nations between individual ports are not prohibited. Acting under
the Commerce Clause, Congress may do many things that benefit
particular ports and that incidentally result to the disadvantage of
other ports in the same or neighboring states. It may establish ports
of entry, erect and operate lighthouses, improve rivers and harbors,
and provide structures for the convenient and economical handling
of traffic.1880 A rate order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
that allowed an additional charge to be made for ferrying traffic
across the Mississippi to cities on the east bank of the river was
sustained over the objection that it gave an unconstitutional prefer-
ence to ports in Texas.1881 Although there were a few early intima-
tions that this clause was applicable to the states as well as to Con-
gress,1882 the Supreme Court declared emphatically in 1886 that state
legislation was unaffected by it.1883 After more than a century, the
Court confirmed, over the objection that this clause was offended,
sen not to present that argument. Principles of stare decisis thus cautioned obser-
vance of the earlier case. Id. at 854–55. The dissenters argued that the issue had
been presented and should be decided by overruling the earlier case. Id. at 863 (Jus-
tices Kennedy and Ginsburg dissenting).
1879 Pace v. Burgess, 92 U.S. 372 (1876); Turpin v. Burgess, 117 U.S. 504, 505
(1886).
1880 Louisiana PSC v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 284 U.S. 125, 131 (1931); Pennsylva-
nia v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421, 433 (1856); South
Carolina v. Georgia, 93 U.S. 4 (1876). In Williams v. United States, 255 U.S. 336
(1921), the argument that an act of Congress which prohibited interstate transpor-
tation of liquor into states whose laws prohibited manufacture or sale of liquor for
beverage purposes was repugnant to this clause was rejected.
1881 Louisiana PSC v. Texas & N.O. R.R., 284 U.S. 125, 132 (1931).
1882 Passenger Cases (Smith v. Turner), 48 U.S. (7 How.) 282, 414 (1849) (opin-
ion of Justice Wayne); cf. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 314
(1851).
1883 Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455, 467 (1886). See also Munn v. Illinois, 94
U.S. 113, 135 (1877); Johnson v. Chicago & Pacific Elevator Co., 119 U.S. 388, 400
(1886).
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 7—Public Money Appropriations
the power that the First Congress had exercised 1884 in sanctioning
the continued supervision and regulation of pilots by the states.1885
Clause 7. No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury but

in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular
Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all
public Money shall be published from time to time.
APPROPRIATIONS
The restriction on drawing money from the Treasury “was in-
tended as a restriction upon the disbursing authority of the Execu-
tive department,” and “means simply that no money can be paid
out of the Treasury unless it has been appropriated by an act of
Congress.” 1886 Congress may recognize and pay a claim of an equi-
table, moral, or honorary nature. When it directs a specific sum to
be paid to a certain person, neither the Secretary of the Treasury
nor any court has discretion to determine whether the person is
entitled to receive it.1887 In making appropriations to pay claims
arising out of the Civil War, Congress could, the Court held, pro-
vide that certain persons, i.e., those who had participated in the
rebellion, should not be paid out of the funds made available by
the general appropriation, but that such persons should seek relief
from Congress.1888
The Court has also recognized that Congress has wide discre-
tion with regard to the extent to which it may prescribe details of
expenditures for which it appropriates funds, and has approved the
frequent practice of making “lump sum” appropriations, i.e., gen-
eral appropriations of large amounts to be allotted and expended
as directed by designated government agencies. As an example, the
Court cited the act of June 17, 1902,1889 “where all moneys re-
ceived from the sale and disposal of public lands in a large number
of states and territories [were] set aside as a special fund to be ex-
pended for the reclamation of arid and semi-arid lands within those
states and territories,” and “[t]he expenditures [were] to be made
under the direction of the Secretary of the Interior upon such proj-
ects as he determined to be practicable and advisable.” The Court
1884 1 Stat. 53, 54, § 4 (1789).
1885 Thompson v. Darden, 198 U.S. 310 (1905).
1886 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 321 (1937); Knote v.
United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877).

1887 United States v. Price, 116 U.S. 43 (1885); United States v. Realty Co., 163
U.S. 427, 439 (1896); Allen v. Smith, 173 U.S. 389, 393 (1899).
1888 Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886).
1889 32 Stat. 388 (1902).
Sec. 9—Powers Denied to Congress Cl. 7—Public Money Appropriations
declared: “The constitutionality of this delegation of authority has

never been seriously questioned.” 1890
PAYMENT OF CLAIMS
No officer of the Federal Government is authorized to pay a debt
due from the United States, whether reduced to judgment or not,
without an appropriation for that purpose.1891 Nor may a govern-
ment employee, by erroneous advice to a claimant, bind the United
States through equitable estoppel principles to pay a claim for which
an appropriation has not been made.1892
After the Civil War, a number of controversies arose out of at-
tempts by Congress to restrict the payment of the claims of per-
sons who had aided the Rebellion but had thereafter received a par-
don from the President. The Supreme Court held that Congress could
not prescribe the evidentiary effect of a pardon in a proceeding in
the Court of Claims for property confiscated during the Civil War,1893
but that where the confiscated property had been sold and the pro-
ceeds paid into the Treasury, a pardon did not of its own force au-
thorize the restoration of such proceeds.1894 It was within the com-
petence of Congress to declare that the amount due to persons thus
pardoned should not be paid out of the Treasury and that no gen-
eral appropriation should extend to their claims.1895
Clause 8. No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United

States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust un-
der them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress accept of
any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever,
from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
IN GENERAL
In 1871 the Attorney General of the United States ruled that:
“A minister of the United States abroad is not prohibited by the
Constitution from rendering a friendly service to a foreign power,
even that of negotiating a treaty for it, provided he does not be-
come an officer of that power . . . but the acceptance of a formal
commission, as minister plenipotentiary, creates an official relation
1890 Cincinnati Soap Co. v. United States, 301 U.S. 308, 322 (1937).
1891 Reeside v. Walker, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 272 (1851).
1892 OPM v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990).
1893 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
1894 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 154 (1877); Austin v. United States,
155 U.S. 417, 427 (1894).

1895 Hart v. United States, 118 U.S. 62, 67 (1886).
Sec. 10—Powers Denied to the States Cl. 1—Treaties, Coining Money, Etc.
between the individual thus commissioned and the government which

in this way accredits him as its representative,” which is prohib-
ited by this clause of the Constitution.1896
SECTION 10. Clause 1. No State shall enter into any Treaty,

Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Repri-
sal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold
and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of
Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation
of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
Treaties, Alliances, or Confederations
At the time of the Civil War, the Court relied on the prohibi-
tion on treaties, alliances, or confederations in holding that the Con-
federation formed by the seceding states could not be recognized as
having any legal existence.1897 Today, the prohibition’s practical sig-
nificance lies in the limitations that it implies upon the power of
the states to deal with matters having a bearing upon interna-
tional relations.
In the early case of Holmes v. Jennison,1898 Chief Justice Taney
invoked it as a reason for holding that a state had no power to de-
liver up a fugitive from justice to a foreign state. More recently,
the kindred idea that the responsibility for the conduct of foreign
relations rests exclusively with the Federal Government prompted
the Court to hold that, because the oil under the three-mile mar-
ginal belt along the California coast might well become the subject
of international dispute, and because the ocean, including this three-
mile belt, is of vital consequence to the nation in its desire to en-
gage in commerce and to live in peace with the world, the Federal
Government has paramount rights in and power over that belt, in-
cluding full dominion over the resources of the soil under the wa-
ter area.1899 In Skiriotes v. Florida,1900 the Court, on the other hand,
ruled that this clause did not disable Florida from regulating the
manner in which its own citizens may engage in sponge fishing out-
side its territorial waters. Speaking for a unanimous Court, Chief
Justice Hughes declared, “When its action does not conflict with fed-
eral legislation, the sovereign authority of the State over the con-
1896 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 538 (1871).
1897 Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 183 (1878).
1898 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
1899 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
1900 313 U.S. 69 (1941).
duct of its citizens upon the high seas is analogous to the sovereign
authority of the United States over its citizens in like circum-
stances.” 1901
Bills of Credit
Within the sense of the Constitution, bills of credit signify a pa-
per medium of exchange, intended to circulate between individu-
als, and between the government and individuals, for the ordinary
purposes of society. It is immaterial whether the quality of legal
tender is imparted to such paper. Interest-bearing certificates, in
denominations not exceeding ten dollars, that were issued by loan
offices established by the state of Missouri and made receivable in
payment of taxes or other moneys due to the state, and in payment
of the fees and salaries of state officers, were held to be bills of credit
whose issuance was banned by this section.1902 The states are not
forbidden, however, to issue coupons receivable for taxes,1903 nor to
execute instruments binding themselves to pay money at a future
day for services rendered or money borrowed.1904 Bills issued by state
banks are not bills of credit; 1905 it is immaterial that the state is
the sole stockholder of the bank,1906 that the officers of the bank
were elected by the state legislature,1907 or that the capital of the
bank was raised by the sale of state bonds.1908
Legal Tender 1909

Relying on this clause, which applies only to the states and not
to the Federal Government, the Supreme Court has held that, where
the marshal of a state court received state bank notes in payment
and discharge of an execution, the creditor was entitled to demand
payment in gold or silver.1910 Because, however, there is nothing in
the Constitution prohibiting a bank depositor from consenting when
he draws a check that payment may be made by draft, a state law
1901 313 U.S. at 78–79.

1902 Craig v. Missouri, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 410, 425 (1830); Byrne v. Missouri, 33
U.S. (8 Pet.) 40 (1834).
1903 Virginia Coupon Cases (Poindexter v. Greenhow), 114 U.S. 270 (1885); Chaf-
fin v. Taylor, 116 U.S. 567 (1886).

1904 Houston & Texas Central R.R. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66 (1900).
1905 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
1906 Darrington v. Bank of Alabama, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 12, 15 (1851); Curran v.
Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304, 317 (1854).

1907 Briscoe v. Bank of Kentucky, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 257 (1837).
1908 Woodruff v. Trapnall, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 190, 205 (1851).
1909 Juilliard v. Greenman, 110 U.S. 421, 446 (1884).
1910 Gwin v. Breedlove, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 29, 38 (1844). See also Griffin v. Thomp-
son, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 244 (1844).

providing that checks drawn on local banks should, at the option of

the bank, be payable in exchange drafts, was held valid.1911
Bills of Attainder
Statutes passed after the Civil War with the intent and result
of excluding persons who had aided the Confederacy from following
certain callings, by the device of requiring them to take an oath
that they had never given such aid, were held invalid as being bills
of attainder, as well as ex post facto laws.1912
Other attempts to raise bill-of-attainder claims have been un-
successful. A Court majority denied that a municipal ordinance that
required all employees to execute oaths that they had never been
affiliated with Communist or similar organizations, violated the clause,
on the grounds that the ordinance merely provided standards of quali-
fications and eligibility for employment.1913 A law that prohibited
any person convicted of a felony and not subsequently pardoned from
holding office in a waterfront union was not a bill of attainder be-
cause the “distinguishing feature of a bill of attainder is the substi-
tution of a legislative for a judicial determination of guilt” and the
prohibition “embodies no further implications of appellant’s guilt than
are contained in his 1920 judicial conviction.” 1914
Ex Post Facto Laws

Scope of the Provision.—The prohibition against state ex post
facto laws, like the cognate restriction imposed on the Federal Gov-
ernment by § 9, relates only to penal and criminal legislation and
not to civil laws that affect private rights adversely.1915 Distinguish-
ing between civil and penal laws was at the heart of the Court’s
decision in Smith v. Doe 1916 upholding application of Alaska’s “Me-
gan’s Law” to sex offenders who were convicted before the law’s en-
1911 Farmers & Merchants Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 262 U.S. 649, 659
(1923).
1912 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867); Klinger v. Mis-
souri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257 (1872); Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234, 239
(1873).
1913 Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722–723 (1951). Cf. Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 47 n.9 (1961).

1914 De Veau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960). Presumably, United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965), does not qualify this decision.
1915 Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798); Watson v. Mercer, 33 U.S. (8
Pet.) 88, 110 (1834); Baltimore and Susquehanna R.R. v. Nesbit, 51 U.S. (10 How.)
395, 401 (1850); Carpenter v. Pennsylvania, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 456, 463 (1855); Loche
v. New Orleans, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 172 (1867); Orr v. Gilman, 183 U.S. 278, 285 (1902);
Kentucky Union Co. v. Kentucky, 219 U.S. 140 (1911). In Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 538 (1998) (concurring), Justice Thomas indicated a willingness
to reconsider Calder to determine whether the clause should apply to civil legisla-
tion.
1916 538 U.S. 84 (2003).
actment. The Alaska law requires released sex offenders to register

with local police and also provides for public notification via the In-
ternet. The Court accords “considerable deference” to legislative in-
tent; if the legislature’s purpose was to enact a civil regulatory scheme,
then the law can be ex post facto only if there is “the clearest proof ”
of punitive effect.1917 Here, the Court determined, the legislative in-
tent was civil and non-punitive—to promote public safety by “pro-
tecting the public from sex offenders.” The Court then identified sev-
eral “useful guideposts” to aid analysis of whether a law intended
to be non-punitive nonetheless has punitive effect. Registration and
public notification of sex offenders are of recent origin, and are not
viewed as a “traditional means of punishment.” 1918 The Act does
not subject the registrants to an “affirmative disability or re-
straint”; there is no physical restraint or occupational disbarment,
and there is no restraint or supervision of living conditions, as there
can be under conditions of probation. The fact that the law might
deter future crimes does not make it punitive. All that is required,
the Court explained, is a rational connection to a non-punitive pur-
pose, and the statute need not be narrowly tailored to that end.1919
Nor is the act “excessive” in relation to its regulatory purpose.1920
Rather, the “means chosen are reasonable in light of the [state’s]
non-punitive objective” of promoting public safety by giving its citi-
zens information about former sex offenders, who, as a group, have
an alarmingly high rate of recidivism.1921
There are three categories of ex post facto laws: those “which
punish[ ] as a crime an act previously committed, which was inno-
cent when done; which make[ ] more burdensome the punishment
for a crime, after its commission; or which deprive[ ] one charged
with crime of any defense available according to law at the time
1917 538 U.S. at 92.

1918 The law’s requirements do not closely resemble punishments of public dis-
grace imposed in colonial times; the stigma of Megan’s Law results not from public
shaming but from the dissemination of information about a criminal record, most of
which is already public. 538 U.S. at 98.
1919 538 U.S. at 102.
1920 Excessiveness was alleged to stem both from the law’s duration (15 years of
notification by those convicted of less serious offenses; lifetime registration by seri-

ous offenders) and in terms of the widespread (Internet) distribution of the informa-
tion.
1921 538 U.S. at 105. Unlike involuntary civil commitment, where “the magni-
tude of restraint [makes] individual assessment appropriate,” the state may make
“reasonable categorical judgments,” and need not provide individualized determina-
tions of dangerousness. Id. at 103.
when the act was committed.” 1922 The bar is directed only against
legislative action and does not touch erroneous or inconsistent deci-
sions by the courts.1923
The fact that a law is ex post facto and invalid as to crimes
committed prior to its enactment does not affect its validity as to
subsequent offenses.1924 A statute that mitigates the rigor of the law
in force at the time the crime was committed,1925 or merely penal-
izes the continuance of conduct lawfully begun before its passage,
is not ex post facto. Thus, measures penalizing the failure of a rail-
road to cut drains through existing embankments 1926 or making il-
legal the continued possession of intoxicating liquors which were
lawfully acquired 1927 have been held valid.
Denial of Future Privileges to Past Offenders.—The right
to practice a profession may be denied to one who was convicted of
an offense before the statute was enacted if the offense reasonably
may be regarded as a continuing disqualification for the profession.
Without offending the Constitution, statutes barring a person from
practicing medicine after conviction of a felony,1928 or excluding con-
victed felons from waterfront union offices unless pardoned or in
receipt of a parole board’s good conduct certificate,1929 may be en-
forced against a person convicted before the measures were passed.
But the test oath prescribed after the Civil War, under which office
holders, attorneys, teachers, clergymen, and others were required
to swear that they had not participated in the rebellion or ex-
pressed sympathy for it, was held invalid on the ground that it had
no reasonable relation to fitness to perform official or professional
1922 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990) (quoting Beazell v. Ohio, 269
U.S. 167, 169–70 (1925)). Alternatively, the Court described the reach of the clause
as extending to laws that “alter the definition of crimes or increase the punishment
for criminal acts.” Id. at 43. Justice Chase’s oft-cited formulation has a fourth cat-
egory: “every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when
committed.” Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798), cited in, e.g., Carmell v.
Texas, 529 U.S. 513, 522 (2000).
1923 Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 344 (1915); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150,
161 (1913). However, an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of a criminal statute so

as to encompass conduct not covered on the face of the statute operates like an ex
post facto law if it is applied retroactively and violates due process in that event.
Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964). See Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977) (applying Bouie in context of § 9, cl. 3). But see Splawn v. Califor-
nia, 431 U.S. 595 (1977) (rejecting application of Bouie). The Court itself has not
always adhered to this standard. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463 (1966).
1924 Jaehne v. New York, 128 U.S. 189, 194 (1888).
1925 Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 325 (1905).
1926 Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915).
1927 Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U.S. 188 (1925).
1928 Hawker v. New York, 170 U.S. 189, 190 (1898). See also Reetz v. Michigan,
188 U.S. 505, 509 (1903); Lehmann v. State Board of Public Accountancy, 263 U.S.
394 (1923).
1929 DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 160 (1960).
duties, but rather was a punishment for past offenses.1930 A similar

oath required of suitors in the courts also was held void.1931
Changes in Punishment.—Justice Chase in Calder v. Bull gave
an alternative description of the four categories of ex post facto laws,
two of which related to punishment. One such category was laws
that inflict punishment “where the party was not, by law, liable to
any punishment”; the other was laws that inflict greater punish-
ment than was authorized when the crime was committed.1932
Illustrative of the first of these punishment categories is “a law
enacted after expiration of a previously applicable statute of limita-
tions period [as] applied to revive a previously time-barred prosecu-
tion.” Such a law, the Court ruled in Stogner v. California,1933 is
prohibited as ex post facto. Courts that had upheld extension of un-
expired statutes of limitation had been careful to distinguish situa-
tions in which the limitations periods have expired. The Court viewed
revival of criminal liability after the law had granted a person “ef-
fective amnesty” as being “unfair” in the sense addressed by the
Ex Post Facto Clause.
Illustrative of the second punishment category are statutes, all
applicable to offenses committed prior to their enactment, that changed
an indeterminate sentence law to require a judge to impose the maxi-
mum sentence,1934 that required solitary confinement for prisoners
previously sentenced to death,1935 and that allowed a warden to fix,
within limits of one week, and keep secret the time of execu-
tion.1936 Because it made more onerous the punishment for crimes
committed before its enactment, a law that altered sentencing guide-
lines to make it more likely that the sentencing authority would
impose on a defendant a more severe sentence than was previously
likely and making it impossible for the defendant to challenge the
sentence was ex post facto as to one who had committed the offense
prior to the change.1937 The Court adopted similar reasoning as re-
gards changes in the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines: even though the
1930 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 316 (1867).
1931 Pierce v. Carskadon, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234, 237–39 (1873).
1932 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 389 (1798).
1933 539 U.S. 607, 632–33 (2003) (invalidating application of California’s law to
revive child abuse charges 22 years after the limitations period had run for the al-
leged crimes).
1934 Lindsey v. Washington, 301 U.S. 397 (1937). But note the limitation of Lind-
sey in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 298–301 (1977).

1935 Holden v. Minnesota, 137 U.S. 483, 491 (1890).
1936 Medley, Petitioner, 134 U.S. 160, 171 (1890).
1937 Miller v. Florida, 482 U.S. 423 (1987). But see California Dep’t of Correc-
tions v. Morales, 514 U.S. 499 (1995) (a law amending parole procedures to decrease
frequency of parole-suitability hearings is not ex post facto as applied to prisoners
who committed offenses before enactment). The opinion modifies previous opinions
that had held some laws impermissible because they operated to the disadvantage
Guidelines are advisory only, an increase in the applicable sentenc-

ing range is ex post facto if applied to a previously committed crime
because of a significant risk of a lengthier sentence being im-
posed.1938 But laws providing heavier penalties for new crimes there-
after committed by habitual criminals; 1939 “prescrib[ing] electrocu-
tion as the method of producing death instead of hanging, fix[ing]
the place therefor within the penitentiary, and permitt[ing] the pres-
ence of more invited witnesses that had theretofore been al-
lowed”; 1940 or providing for close confinement of six to nine months
in the penitentiary, in lieu of three to six months in jail prior to
execution, and substituting the warden for the sheriff as hangman,
have been sustained.1941
In Dobbert v. Florida,1942 the Court may have formulated a new
test for determining when the punishment provided by a criminal
statute is ex post facto. The defendant murdered two of his chil-
dren at a time when Florida law provided the death penalty upon
conviction for certain takings of life. Subsequently, the Supreme Court
held capital sentencing laws similar to Florida’s unconstitutional,
although convictions obtained under the statutes were not to be over-
turned,1943 and the Florida Supreme Court voided its death pen-
alty statutes on the authority of the High Court decision. The Florida
legislature then enacted a new capital punishment law, which was
sustained. Dobbert was convicted and sentenced to death under the
new law, which had been enacted after the commission of his of-
fenses. The Court rejected the ex post facto challenge to the sen-
tence on the basis that whether or not the old statute was constitu-
tional, “it clearly indicated Florida’s view of the severity of murder
and of the degree of punishment which the legislature wished to
impose upon murderers. The statute was intended to provide maxi-
mum deterrence, and its existence on the statute books provided
fair warning as to the degree of culpability which the State as-
of covered offenders. Henceforth, “the focus of ex post facto inquiry is . . . whether

any such change alters the definition of criminal conduct or increases the penalty
by which a crime is punishable.” Id. at 506 n.3. Accord, Garner v. Jones, 529 U.S.
244 (2000) (evidence insufficient to determine whether change in frequency of pa-
role hearings significantly increases the likelihood of prolonging incarceration). But
see Lynce v. Mathis, 519 U.S. 433 (1997) (cancellation of release credits already earned
and used, resulting in reincarceration, violates the Clause).
1938 Peugh v. United States, 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–62, slip op. (2013).
1939 Gryger v. Burke, 334 U.S. 728 (1948); McDonald v. Massachusetts, 180 U.S.
311 (1901); Graham v. West Virginia, 224 U.S. 616 (1912).

1940 Malloy v. South Carolina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915).
1941 Rooney v. North Dakota, 196 U.S. 319, 324 (1905).
1942 432 U.S. 282, 297–98 (1977).
1943 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). The new law was sustained in Prof-
fitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976).

cribed to the act of murder.” 1944 Whether the “fair warning” stan-
dard is to have any prominent place in ex post facto jurisprudence
may be an interesting question, but it is problematical whether the
fact situation will occur often enough to make the principle appli-
cable in many cases.
Changes in Procedure.—An accused person does not have a
right to be tried in all respects in accordance with the law in force
when the crime charged was committed.1945 Laws shifting the place
of trial from one county to another,1946 increasing the number of
appellate judges and dividing the appellate court into divisions,1947
granting a right of appeal to the state,1948 changing the method of
selecting and summoning jurors,1949 making separate trials for per-
sons jointly indicted a matter of discretion for the trial court rather
than a matter of right,1950 and allowing a comparison of handwrit-
ing experts,1951 have been sustained over the objection that they
were ex post facto. It was suggested in a number of these cases,
and two decisions were rendered precisely on the basis, that the
mode of procedure might be changed only so long as the “substan-
tial” rights of the accused were not curtailed.1952 The Court has now
disavowed this position.1953 All that the language of most of these
cases meant was that a legislature might not evade the ex post facto
clause by labeling changes as alteration of “procedure.” If a change
labeled “procedural” effects a substantive change in the definition
of a crime or increases punishment or denies a defense, the clause
is invoked; however, if a law changes the procedures by which a
1944 432 U.S. at 297.

1945 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 590 (1896).
1946 Gut v. Minnesota, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 35, 37 (1870).
1947 Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377 (1894).
1948 Mallett v. North Carolina, 181 U.S. 589, 593 (1901).
1949 Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565, 588 (1896).
1950 Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167 (1925).
1951 Thompson v. Missouri, 171 U.S. 380, 381 (1898).
1952 E.g., Duncan v. Missouri, 152 U.S. 377, 382 (1894); Malloy v. South Caro-
lina, 237 U.S. 180, 183 (1915); Beazell v. Ohio, 269 U.S. 167, 171 (1925). The two
cases decided on the basis of the distinction were Thompson v. Utah, 170 U.S. 343
(1898) (application to felony trial for offense committed before enactment of change
from twelve-person jury to an eight-person jury void under clause), and Kring v. Mis-
souri, 107 U.S. 221 (1883) (as applied to a case arising before change, a law abolish-
ing a rule under which a guilty plea functioned as a acquittal of a more serious
offense, so that defendant could be tried on the more serious charge, a violation of
the clause).
1953 Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 44–52 (1990). In so doing, the Court over-
ruled Kring and Thompson v. Utah.

criminal case is adjudicated, the clause is not implicated, regard-

less of the increase in the burden on a defendant.1954
Changes in evidentiary rules that allow conviction on less evi-
dence than was required at the time the crime was committed can
also run afoul of the ex post facto clause. This principle was ap-
plied in the Court’s invalidation of retroactive application of a Texas
law that eliminated the requirement that the testimony of a sexual
assault victim age 14 or older must be corroborated by two other
witnesses, and allowed conviction on the victim’s testimony alone.1955
Obligation of Contracts
“Law” Defined.—The Contract Clause provides that no state
may pass a “Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts,” and a “law”
in this context may be a statute, constitutional provision,1956 mu-
nicipal ordinance,1957 or administrative regulation having the force
and operation of a statute.1958 But are judicial decisions within the
clause? The abstract principle of the separation of powers, at least
until recently, forbade the idea that the courts “make” law and the
word “pass” in the above clause seemed to confine it to the formal
and acknowledged methods of exercise of the law-making function.
Accordingly, the Court has frequently said that the clause does not
cover judicial decisions, however erroneous, or whatever their ef-
fect on existing contract rights.1959 Nevertheless, there are impor-
tant exceptions to this rule that are set forth below.
Status of Judicial Decisions.—Although the highest state court
usually has final authority in determining the construction as well
as the validity of contracts entered into under the laws of the state,
1954 497 U.S. at 44, 52. Youngblood upheld a Texas statute, as applied to a per-
son committing an offense and tried before passage of the law, that authorized crimi-
nal courts to reform an improper verdict assessing a punishment not authorized by
law, which had the effect of denying defendant a new trial to which he would have
been previously entitled.
1955 Carmell v. Texas, 529 U.S. 513 (2000).
1956 Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 331 (1856); Ohio & M. R.R. v. McClure,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 511 (1871); New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S.
650 (1885); Bier v. McGehee, 148 U.S. 137, 140 (1893).
1957 New Orleans Water-Works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U.S. 674 (1885); City of Walla
Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1 (1898); City of Vicksburg v. Waterworks
Co., 202 U.S. 453 (1906); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548 (1914);
Cuyahoga Power Co. v. City of Akron, 240 U.S. 462 (1916).
1958 Id. See also Grand Trunk Ry. v. Indiana R.R. Comm’n, 221 U.S. 400 (1911);
Appleby v. Delaney, 271 U.S. 403 (1926).

1959 Central Land Co. v. Laidley, 159 U.S. 103 (1895). See also New Orleans Water-
Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Co., 125 U.S. 18 (1888); Hanford v. Davies, 163 U.S.
273 (1896); Ross v. Oregon, 227 U.S. 150 (1913); Detroit United Ry. v. Michigan, 242
U.S. 238 (1916); Long Sault Development Co. v. Call, 242 U.S. 272 (1916); McCoy v.
Union Elevated R. Co., 247 U.S. 354 (1918); Columbia Ry., Gas & Electric Co. v.
South Carolina, 261 U.S. 236 (1923); Tidal Oil Co. v. Flannagan, 263 U.S. 444 (1924).
and federal courts will be bound by decisions of the highest state

court on such matters, this rule does not hold when the contract is
one whose obligation is alleged to have been impaired by state law.1960
Otherwise, the challenged state authority could be vindicated through
the simple device of a modification or outright nullification by the
state court of the contract rights in issue. Similarly, the highest state
court usually has final authority in construing state statutes and
determining their validity in relation to the state constitution. But
this rule too has had to bend to some extent to the Supreme Court’s
interpretation of the Contract Clause.1961
Suppose the following situation: (1) a municipality, acting un-
der authority conferred by a state statute, has issued bonds in aid
of a railway company; (2) the validity of this statute has been sus-
tained by the highest state court; (3) later the state legislature re-
peals certain taxes to be used to pay off the bonds when they be-
come due; (4) the repeal is sustained by a decision of the highest
state court holding that the statute authorizing the bonds was un-
constitutional ab initio. In such a case the Supreme Court would
take an appeal from the state court and would reverse the latter’s
decision of unconstitutionality because of its effect in rendering op-
erative the repeal of the tax.1962
Suppose, however, that the state court has held the statute au-
thorizing the bonds unconstitutional ab initio in a suit by a credi-
tor for payment without the state legislature’s having repealed the
taxes. In this situation, the Supreme Court would still afford relief
if the case were one between citizens of different states, which reached
it via a lower federal court.1963 This is because in cases of this na-
1960 Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Bl.) 436, 443 (1862); Bridge Pro-
prietors v. Hoboken Co., 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 116, 145 (1863); Wright v. Nagle, 101 U.S.
791, 793 (1880); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662, 667 (1890); Scott v. McNeal,
154 U.S. 34, 35 (1894); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 232–33 (1900); Coombes
v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 441 (1932); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Phillips, 332 U.S. 168,
170 (1947).
1961 McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898); Houston & Texas Central Rd.
Co. v. Texas, 177 U.S. 66, 76, 77 (1900); Hubert v. New Orleans, 215 U.S. 170, 175
(1909); Carondelet Canal Co. v. Louisiana, 233 U.S. 362, 376 (1914); Louisiana Ry.
& Nav. Co. v. New Orleans, 235 U.S. 164, 171 (1914).
1962 State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854) (discussed be-
low), and Ohio Life Ins. and Trust Co. v. Debolt, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 416 (1854), are
the leading cases. See also Jefferson Branch Bank v. Skelly, 66 U.S. (1 Bl.) 436 (1862);
Louisiana v. Pilsbury, 105 U.S. 278 (1882); McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890);
Mobile & Ohio R.R. v. Tennessee, 153 U.S. 486 (1894); Bacon v. Texas, 163 U.S. 207
(1896); McCullough v. Virginia, 172 U.S. 102 (1898).
1963 Gelpcke v. City of Debuque, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 175, 206 (1865); Havemayer v.
Iowa County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 294 (1866); Thomson v. Lee County, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.)
327 (1866); The City v. Lamson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 477 (1870); Olcott v. The Supervi-
sors, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 678 (1873); Taylor v. Ypsilanti, 105 U.S. 60 (1882); Anderson
v. Santa Anna, 116 U.S. 356 (1886); Wilkes County v. Coler, 180 U.S. 506 (1901).
ture the Court formerly felt free to determine questions of funda-

mental justice for itself. Indeed, in such a case, the Court in the
past has apparently regarded itself as free to pass upon the consti-
tutionality of the state law authorizing the bonds even though there
had been no prior decision by the highest state court sustaining them,
the idea being that contracts entered into simply on the faith of
the presumed constitutionality of a state statute are entitled to this
protection.1964
In other words, in cases in which it has jurisdiction because of
diversity of citizenship, the Court has held that the obligation of
contracts is capable of impairment by subsequent judicial decisions
no less than by subsequent statutes, and that it is able to prevent
such impairment. In cases, on the other hand, of which it obtains
jurisdiction only on the constitutional ground and by appeal from a
state court, it has always adhered in terms to the doctrine that the
word “laws” as used in Article I, § 10, does not include judicial de-
cisions. Yet even in these cases, it will intervene to protect con-
tracts entered into on the faith of existing decisions from an impair-
ment that is the direct result of a reversal of such decisions, but
there must be in the offing, as it were, a statute of some kind—one
possibly many years older than the contract rights involved—on which
to pin its decision.1965
In 1922, Congress, through an amendment to the Judicial Code,
endeavored to extend the reviewing power of the Supreme Court to
“any suit involving the validity of a contract wherein it is claimed
that a change in the rule of law or construction of statutes by the
highest court of a State applicable to such contract would be repug-
nant to the Constitution of the United States . . . .” 1966 This ap-
peared to be an invitation to the Court to say frankly that the obli-
gation of a contract can be impaired by a subsequent court decision.
The Court, however, declined the invitation in an opinion by Chief
Justice Taft that reviewed many of the cases covered in the preced-
ing paragraphs.
Dealing with Gelpcke and subsequent decisions, Chief Justice
Taft said: “These cases were not writs of error to the Supreme Court
of a State. They were appeals or writs of error to federal courts
where recovery was sought upon municipal or county bonds or some
other form of contracts, the validity of which had been sustained
by decisions of the Supreme Court of a State prior to their execu-
tion, and had been denied by the same court after their issue or
1964 Great Southern Hotel Co. v. Jones, 193 U.S. 532, 548 (1904).
1965 Sauer v. New York, 206 U.S. 536 (1907); Muhlker v. New York & Harlem
R.R., 197 U.S. 544, 570 (1905).
1966 42 Stat. 366.
making. In such cases the federal courts exercising jurisdiction be-

tween citizens of different States held themselves free to decide what
the state law was, and to enforce it as laid down by the State Su-
preme Court before the contracts were made rather than in later
decisions. They did not base this conclusion on Article I, § 10, of
the Federal Constitution, but on the state law as they determined
it, which, in diverse citizenship cases, under the third Article of the
Federal Constitution they were empowered to do. Burgess v. Selig-
man, 107 U.S. 20 [1883].” 1967 Although doubtless this was an avail-
able explanation in 1924, the decision in 1938, in Erie Railroad Co.
v. Tompkins,1968 so cut down the power of the federal courts to de-
cide diversity of citizenship cases according to their own notions of
“general principles of common law” as to raise the question whether
the Court will not be required eventually to put Gelpcke and its
companions and descendants squarely on the Contract Clause or
else abandon them.
“Obligation” Defined.—A contract is analyzable into two ele-
ments: the agreement, which comes from the parties, and the obli-
gation, which comes from the law and makes the agreement bind-
ing on the parties. The concept of obligation is an importation from
the civil law and its appearance in the Contract Clause is sup-
posed to have been due to James Wilson, a graduate of Scottish
universities and a civilian. Actually, the term as used in the Con-
tract Clause has been rendered more or less superfluous by the doc-
trine that “[t]he laws which exist at the time and place of the mak-
ing of a contract, and where it is to be performed, enter into and
form a part of it.” 1969 Hence, the Court sometimes recognizes the
term in its decisions applying the clause, and sometimes ignores it.
In Sturges v. Crowninshield,1970 Chief Justice Marshall defined “ob-
ligation of contract” as the law that binds a party “to perform his
undertaking,” but a little later the same year, in Dartmouth Col-
lege v. Woodward, he set forth the points presented for consider-
ation to be: “1. Is this contract protected by the constitution of the
United States? 2. Is it impaired by the acts under which the defen-
dant holds?” 1971 The word “obligation” undoubtedly implies that the
Constitution was intended to protect only executory contracts—i.e.,
1967 Tidal Oil Co. v. Flannagan, 263 U.S. 444, 452 (1924).
1968 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1969 Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 314, 317 (1873); Wood v. Lovett,
313 U.S. 362, 370 (1941).

1970 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819); see also Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15
How.) 304 (1854).

1971 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 627 (1819).
contracts still awaiting performance—but this implication was re-

jected early on for a certain class of contracts, with immensely im-
portant result for the clause.
“Impair” Defined.—“The obligations of a contract,” said Chief
Justice Hughes for the Court in Home Building & Loan Ass’n v.
Blaisdell,1972 “are impaired by a law which renders them invalid,
or releases or extinguishes them . . . , and impairment . . . has been
predicated upon laws which without destroying contracts derogate
from substantial contractual rights.” 1973 But he adds: “Not only are
existing laws read into contracts in order to fix obligations as be-
tween the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sov-
ereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal
order. The policy of protecting contracts against impairment presup-
poses the maintenance of a government by virtue of which contrac-
tual relations are worthwhile,—a government which retains ad-
equate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. This
principle of harmonizing the constitutional prohibition with the nec-
essary residuum of state power has had progressive recognition in
the decisions of this Court.” 1974 In short, the law from which the
obligation stems must be understood to include constitutional law
and, moreover a “progressive” constitutional law.1975
Vested Rights Not Included.—The term “contracts” is used in
the Contract Clause in its popular sense of an agreement of minds.
The clause therefore does not protect vested rights that are not re-
ferable to such an agreement between the state and an individual,
such as the right of recovery under a judgment. The individual in
question may have a case under the Fourteenth Amendment, but
not one under Article I, § 10.1976
Public Grants That Are Not “Contracts”.—Not all grants by
a state constitute “contracts” within the sense of Article I, § 10. In
his Dartmouth College decision, Chief Justice Marshall conceded that
“if the act of incorporation be a grant of political power, if it cre-
ates a civil institution, to be employed in the administration of the
1972 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
1973 290 U.S. at 431.
1974 290 U.S. at 435. See also City of El Paso v. Simmons, 379 U.S. 497 (1965).
1975 “The Blaisdell decision represented a realistic appreciation of the fact that
ours is an evolving society and that the general words of the contract clause were
not intended to reduce the legislative branch of government to helpless impotency.”
Justice Black, in Wood v. Lovett, 313 U.S. 362, 383 (1941).
1976 Crane v. Hahlo, 258 U.S. 142, 145–46 (1922); Louisiana ex rel. Folsom v.
Mayor of New Orleans, 109 U.S. 285, 288 (1883); Morley v. Lake Shore Ry., 146
U.S. 162, 169 (1892). That the Contract Clause did not protect vested rights merely
as such was stated by the Court as early as Satterlee v. Matthewson, 27 U.S. (2
Pet.) 380, 413 (1829); and again in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S.
(11 Pet.) 420, 539–40 (1837).
government . . . the subject is one in which the legislature of the

State may act according to its own judgment,” unrestrained by the
Constitution 1977—thereby drawing a line between “public” and “pri-
vate” corporations that remained undisturbed for more than half a
century.1978
It has been subsequently held many times that municipal cor-
porations are mere instrumentalities of the state for the more con-
venient administration of local governments, whose powers may be
enlarged, abridged, or entirely withdrawn at the pleasure of the leg-
islature.1979 The same principle applies, moreover, to the property
rights that the municipality derives either directly or indirectly from
the state. This was first held as to the grant of a franchise to a
municipality to operate a ferry and has since then been recognized
as the universal rule.1980 It was stated in a case decided in 1923
that the distinction between the municipality as an agent of the
state for governmental purposes and as an organization to care for
local needs in a private or proprietary capacity, though it limited
the legal liability of municipalities for the negligent acts or omis-
sions of its officers or agents, did not, however, furnish ground for
the application of constitutional restraints against the state in fa-
vor of its own municipalities.1981 Thus, no contract rights were im-
paired by a statute relocating a county seat, even though the for-
mer location was by law to be “permanent” and the citizens of the
community had donated land and furnished bonds for the erection
of public buildings.1982 Similarly, a statute changing the boundar-
ies of a school district, giving to the new district the property within
its limits that had belonged to the former district, and requiring
the new district to assume the debts of the old district, did not im-
pair the obligation of contracts.1983 Nor was the Contract Clause
violated by state legislation authorizing state control over insol-
vent communities through a Municipal Finance Commission.1984
1977 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629 (1819).
1978 In Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113 (1877), a category of “business affected with
a public interest” and whose property is “impressed with a public use” was recog-
nized. A corporation engaged in such a business becomes a “quasi-public” corpora-
tion, and the power of the state to regulate it is larger than in the case of a purely
private corporation. Because most corporations receiving public franchises are of this
character, the final result of Munn was to enlarge the police power of the state in
the case of the most important beneficiaries of the Dartmouth College decision.
1979 Meriwether v. Garrett, 102 U.S. 472 (1880); Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U.S.
231 (1899); Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).

1980 East Hartford v. Hartford Bridge Co., 51 U.S. (10 How.) 511 (1851); Hunter
v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161 (1907).

1981 City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 191 (1923).
1982 Newton v. Commissioners, 100 U.S. 548 (1880).
1983 Michigan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233 (1905).
1984 Faitoute Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502 (1942).
On the same ground of public agency, neither appointment nor

election to public office creates a contract in the sense of Article I,
§ 10, whether as to tenure, or salary, or duties, all of which re-
main, so far as the Constitution of the United States is concerned,
subject to legislative modification or outright repeal.1985 Indeed, there
can be no such thing in this country as property in office, although
the common law sustained a different view sometimes reflected in
early cases.1986 When, however, services have once been rendered,
there arises an implied contract that they shall be compensated at
the rate in force at the time they were rendered.1987 Also, an ex-
press contract between the state and an individual for the perfor-
mance of specific services falls within the protection of the Consti-
tution. Thus, a contract made by the governor pursuant to a statute
authorizing the appointment of a commissioner to conduct, over a
period of years, a geological, mineralogical, and agricultural survey
of the state, for which a definite sum had been authorized, was held
to have been impaired by repeal of the statute.1988 But a resolution
of a local board of education reducing teachers’ salaries for the school
year 1933–1934, pursuant to an act of the legislature authorizing
such action, was held not to impair the contract of a teacher who,
having served three years, was by earlier legislation exempt from
having his salary reduced except for inefficiency or misconduct.1989
Similarly, the Court held that an Illinois statute that reduced the
annuity payable to retired teachers under an earlier act did not vio-
late the Contract Clause, because it had not been the intention of
the earlier act to propose a contract but only to put into effect a
general policy.1990 On the other hand, the right a teacher whose po-
sition had become “permanent” under the Indiana Teachers Tenure
Act of 1927, to continued employment was held to be contractual
and to have been impaired by the repeal in 1933 of the earlier act.1991
Tax Exemptions: When Not “Contracts”.—From a different
point of view, the Court has sought to distinguish between grants
of privileges, whether to individuals or to corporations, which are
1985 Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 402 (1850); Fisk v. Jefferson Po-
lice Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885); Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937);
Mississippi ex rel. Robertson v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174 (1928).
1986 Butler v. Pennsylvania, 51 U.S. (10 How.) 420 (1850). Cf. Marbury v. Madi-
son, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803) Hoke v. Henderson, 154 N.C. (4 Dev.) 1 (1833). See
also United States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143 (1883); United States v. Mitchell, 109
U.S. 146 (1883); Crenshaw v. United States, 134 U.S. 99 (1890).
1987 Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885); Mississippi ex rel. Robert-
son v. Miller, 276 U.S. 174 (1928).

1988 Hall v. Wisconsin, 103 U.S. 5 (1880). Cf. Higginbotham v. City of Baton Rouge,
306 U.S. 535 (1930).

1989 Phelps v. Board of Education, 300 U.S. 319 (1937).
1990 Dodge v. Board of Education, 302 U.S. 74 (1937).
1991 Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
contracts and those which are mere revocable licenses, although on

account of the doctrine of presumed consideration mentioned ear-
lier, this has not always been easy to do. In pursuance of the prec-
edent set in New Jersey v. Wilson,1992 the legislature of a state “may
exempt particular parcels of property or the property of particular
persons or corporations from taxation, either for a specified period
or perpetually, or may limit the amount or rate of taxation, to which
such property shall be subjected,” and such an exemption is fre-
quently a contract within the sense of the Constitution. Indeed this
is always so when the immunity is conferred upon a corporation by
the clear terms of its charter.1993 When, on the other hand, an im-
munity of this sort springs from general law, its precise nature is
more open to doubt, as a comparison of decisions will serve to illus-
trate.
In State Bank of Ohio v. Knoop,1994 a closely divided Court held
that a general banking law of Ohio, which provided that compa-
nies complying therewith and their stockholders should be exempt
from all but certain taxes, was, as to a bank organized under it
and its stockholders, a contract within the meaning of Article I, § 10.
The provision was not, the Court said, “a legislative command nor
a rule of taxation until changed, but a contract stipulating against
any change, from the nature of the language used and the circum-
stances under which it was adopted.” 1995 When, however, the State
of Michigan pledged itself, by a general legislative act, not to tax
any corporation, company, or individual undertaking to manufac-
ture salt in the state from water there obtained by boring on prop-
erty used for this purpose and, furthermore, to pay a bounty on
the salt so manufactured, it was held not to have engaged itself
within the constitutional sense. “General encouragements,” the Court
wrote, “held out to all persons indiscriminately, to engage in a par-
ticular trade or manufacture, whether such encouragement be in
the shape of bounties or drawbacks, or other advantage, are al-
ways under the legislative control, and may be discontinued at any
time.” 1996 So far as exemption from taxation is concerned the differ-
1992 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812).
1993 The Delaware Railroad Tax, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 206, 225 (1874); Pacific R.R.
v. Maguire, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 36, 43 (1874); Humphrey v. Pegues, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
244, 249 (1873); Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430, 438 (1869).
1994 57 U.S. (16 How.) 369 (1854).
1995 57 U.S. at 383.
1996 Salt Company v. East Saginaw, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 373, 379 (1872). See also
Welch v. Cook, 97 U.S. 541 (1879); Grand Lodge v. New Orleans, 166 U.S. 143 (1897);
Wisconsin & Michigan Ry. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903). Cf. Ettor v. Tacoma, 228
U.S. 148 (1913), in which it was held that the repeal of a statute providing for con-
sequential damages caused by changes of grades of streets could not constitution-
ally affect an already accrued right to compensation.
ence between these two cases is obviously slight, but the later one
is unquestionable authority for the proposition that legislative boun-
ties are repealable at will.
Furthermore, exemptions from taxation have in certain cases
been treated as gratuities repealable at will, even when conferred
by specific legislative enactments. This would seem always to be
the case when the beneficiaries were already in existence when the
exemption was created and did nothing of a more positive nature
to qualify for it than to continue in existence.1997 Yet the cases are
not always easy to explain in relation to each other, except in light
of the fact that the Court’s point of view has altered from time to
time.1998
“Contracts” Include Public Contracts and Corporate Char-
ters.—The question, which was settled very early, was whether the
clause was intended to be applied solely in protection of private con-
tracts or in the protection also of public grants, or, more broadly, in
protection of public contracts, in short, those to which a state is a
party.1999 Support for the affirmative answer accorded this question
could be derived from the following sources. For one thing, the clause
departed from the comparable provision in the Northwest Ordi-
nance (1787) in two respects: first, in the presence of the word “ob-
ligation;” secondly, in the absence of the word “private.” There is
good reason for believing that James Wilson may have been respon-
sible for both alterations, as two years earlier he had denounced a
current proposal to repeal the Bank of North America’s Pennsylva-
nia charter in the following words: “If the act for incorporating the
subscribers to the Bank of North America shall be repealed in this
manner, every precedent will be established for repealing, in the
same manner, every other legislative charter in Pennsylvania. A pre-
1997 See Rector of Christ Church v. County of Philadelphia, 65 U.S. (24 How.)
300, 302 (1861); Seton Hall College v. South Orange, 242 U.S. 100 (1916).
1998 Compare the above cases with Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8
Wall.) 430, 437 (1869); Illinois Cent, R.R. v. Decatur, 147 U.S. 190 (1893), with Wis-
consin & Michigan Ry. Co. v. Powers, 191 U.S. 379 (1903).
1999 According to Benjamin F. Wright, throughout the first century of govern-
ment under the Constitution “the contract clause had been considered in almost forty
per cent of all cases involving the validity of State legislation,” and of these the vast
proportion involved legislative grants of one type or other, the most important cat-
egory being charters of incorporation. However, the numerical prominence of such
grants in the cases does not overrate their relative importance from the point of
view of public interest. B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 95 (1938).
Madison explained the clause by allusion to what had occurred “in the internal
administration of the States” in the years preceding the Constitutional Convention,
in regard to private debts. Violations of contracts had become familiar in the form
of depreciated paper made legal tender, of property substituted for money, of install-
ment laws, and of the occlusions of the courts of justice. 3 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 at 548 (rev. ed. 1937); THE FEDERALIST, No. 44 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961), 301–302.
tence, as specious as any that can be alleged on this occasion, will

never be wanting on any future occasion. Those acts of the state,
which have hitherto been considered as the sure anchors of privi-
lege and of property, will become the sport of every varying gust of
politicks, and will float wildly backwards and forwards on the ir-
regular and impetuous tides of party and faction.” 2000
Furthermore, in its first important constitutional case, Chisholm
v. Georgia,2001 the Court ruled that its original jurisdiction ex-
tended to an action in assumpsit brought by a citizen of South Caro-
lina against the State of Georgia. This construction of the federal
judicial power was, to be sure, promptly repealed by the Eleventh
Amendment, but without affecting the implication that the con-
tracts protected by the Constitution included public contracts.
One important source of this diversity of opinion is to be found
in that ever welling spring of constitutional doctrine in early days,
the prevalence of natural law notions and the resulting vague sig-
nificance of the term “law.” In Sturges v. Crowninshield, Chief Jus-
tice Marshall defined the obligation of contract as the law that binds
a party “to perform his undertaking.” 2002 Whence, however, comes
this law? If it comes from the state alone, which Marshall was later
to deny even as to private contracts,2003 then it is hardly possible
to hold that the states’ own contracts are covered by the clause,
which manifestly does not create an obligation for contracts but only
protects such obligation as already exists. But, if, on the other hand,
the law furnishing the obligation of contracts comprises natural law
and kindred principles, as well as law that springs from state au-
thority, then, as the state itself is presumably bound by such prin-
ciples, the state’s own obligations, so far as harmonious with them,
are covered by the clause.
Fletcher v. Peck 2004 has the double claim to fame that it was
the first case in which the Supreme Court held a state enactment
to be in conflict with the Constitution, and also the first case to
hold that the Contract Clause protected public grants. By an act
passed on January 7, 1795, the Georgia Legislature directed the sale
to four land companies of public lands comprising most of what are
now the States of Alabama and Mississippi. As soon became known,
the passage of the measure had been secured by open and whole-
2000 2 THE WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 834 (R. McCloskey ed., 1967).
2001 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
2002 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122, 197 (1819).
2003 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 338 (1827).
2004 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810).
sale bribery. So when a new legislature took over in the winter of

1795–1796, almost its first act was to revoke the sale made the pre-
vious year.
Meantime, however, the land companies had disposed of sev-
eral millions of acres of their holdings to speculators and prospec-
tive settlers, and following the rescinding act some of these took
counsel with Alexander Hamilton as to their rights. In an opinion
which was undoubtedly known to the Court when it decided Fletcher
v. Peck, Hamilton characterized the repeal as contravening “the first
principles of natural justice and social policy,” especially so far as
it was made “to the prejudice . . . of third persons . . . innocent of
the alleged fraud or corruption; . . . moreover,” he added, “the Con-
stitution of the United States, article first, section tenth, declares
that no State shall pass a law impairing the obligations of con-
tract. This must be equivalent to saying no State shall pass a law
revoking, invalidating, or altering a contract. Every grant from one
to another, whether the grantor be a State or an individual, is vir-
tually a contract that the grantee shall hold and enjoy the thing
granted against the grantor, and his representatives. It, therefore,
appears to me that taking the terms of the Constitution in their
large sense, and giving them effect according to the general spirit
and policy of the provisions, the revocation of the grant by the act
of the legislature of Georgia may justly be considered as contrary
to the Constitution of the United States, and, therefore null. And
that the courts of the United States, in cases within their jurisdic-
tion, will be likely to pronounce it so.” 2005 Hamilton’s views were
quoted frequently in the congressional debate over the “Yazoo Land
Frauds,” as they were contemporaneously known.
So far as it invoked the Contract Clause, Marshall’s opinion in
Fletcher v. Peck performed two creative acts. It recognized that an
obligatory contract was one still to be performed—in other words,
was an executory contract, also that a grant of land was an ex-
ecuted contract—a conveyance. But, Marshall asserted, every grant
is attended by “an implied contract” on the part of the grantor not
to claim again the thing granted. Thus, grants are brought within
the category of contracts having continuing obligation and so within
Article I, § 10. But the question still remained of the nature of this
obligation. Marshall’s answer to this can only be inferred from his
statement at the end of his opinion. The State of Georgia, he says,
“was restrained” from the passing of the rescinding act “either by
2005 B. WRIGHT, THE CONTRACT CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION 22 (1938). Professor Wright
dates Hamilton’s pamphlet as from 1796.

general principles which are common to our free institutions, or by

particular provisions of the Constitution of the United States.” 2006
The protection thus thrown about land grants was presently ex-
tended, in the case of New Jersey v. Wilson,2007 to a grant of immu-
nity from taxation that the State of New Jersey had accorded cer-
tain Indian lands, and several years after that, in Dartmouth
College,2008 to the charter privileges of an eleemosynary corpora-
tion.
In City of El Paso v. Simmons,2009 the Court held, over a vigor-
ous dissent by Justice Black, that Texas had not violated this clause
when it amended its laws governing the sale of public lands so as
to restrict the previously unlimited right of a delinquent to rein-
state himself upon forfeited land by a single payment of all past
interest due.
Corporate Charters: Different Ways of Regarding.—There
are three ways in which the charter of a corporation may be re-
garded. In the first place, it may be thought of simply as a license
terminable at will by the state, like a liquor-seller’s license or an
auctioneer’s license, but affording the incorporators, so long as it
remains in force, the privileges and advantages of doing business
in the form of a corporation. Nowadays, indeed, when corporate char-
ters are usually issued to all legally qualified applicants by an ad-
ministrative officer who acts under a general statute, this would
probably seem to be the natural way of regarding them were it not
for the Dartmouth College decision. But, in 1819 charters were granted
directly by the state legislatures in the form of special acts and there
were very few profit-taking corporations in the country. The later
extension of the benefits of the Dartmouth College decision to corpo-
rations organized under general law took place without discussion.
Secondly, a corporate charter may be regarded as a franchise
constituting a vested or property interest in the hands of the hold-
ers, and therefore as forfeitable only for abuse or in accordance with
its own terms. This is the way in which some of the early state
2006 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87, 139 (1810). Justice Johnson, in his concurring opinion,
relied exclusively on general principles. “I do not hesitate to declare, that a State

does not possess the power of revoking its own grants. But I do it, on a general
principle, on the reason and nature of things; a principle which will impose laws
even on the Deity.” Id. at 143.
2007 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 164 (1812). The exemption from taxation which was involved
in this case was held in 1886 to have lapsed through the acquiescence for sixty years
by the owners of the lands in the imposition of taxes upon these. Given v. Wright,
117 U.S. 648 (1886).
2008 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
2009 379 U.S. 497 (1965). See also Thorpe v. Housing Authority, 393 U.S. 268,
278–79 (1969).
courts did regard them at the outset.2010 It is also the way in which
Blackstone regarded them in relation to the royal prerogative, al-
though not in relation to the sovereignty of Parliament, and the
same point of view found expression in Story’s concurring opinion
in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, as it did also in Webster’s argu-
ment in that case.2011
The third view is the one formulated by Chief Justice Marshall
in his controlling opinion in Dartmouth College v. Woodward.2012 This
is that the charter of Dartmouth College, a purely private institu-
tion, was the outcome and partial record of a contract between the
donors of the college, on the one hand, and the British Crown, on
the other, and the contract still continued in force between the State
of New Hampshire, as the successor to the Crown and Government
of Great Britain, and the trustees, as successors to the donors. The
charter, in other words, was not simply a grant—rather it was the
documentary record of a still existent agreement between still exis-
tent parties.2013 Taking this view, which he developed with great
ingenuity and persuasiveness, Marshall was able to appeal to the
Contract Clause directly, and without further use of his fiction in
Fletcher v. Peck of an executory contract accompanying the grant.
A difficulty still remained, however, in the requirement that a
contract, before it can have obligation, must import consideration,
that is to say, must be shown not to have been entirely gratuitous
on either side. Moreover, the consideration, which induced the Crown
to grant a charter to Dartmouth College, was not merely a specula-
tive one. It consisted of the donations of the donors to the impor-
tant public interest of education. Fortunately or unfortunately, in
dealing with this phase of the case, Marshall used more sweeping
terms than were needed. “The objects for which a corporation is cre-
ated,” he wrote, “are universally such as the government wishes to
promote. They are deemed beneficial to the country; and this ben-
efit constitutes the consideration, and in most cases, the sole con-
sideration of the grant.” In other words, the simple fact of the char-
2010 In 1806, Chief Justice Parsons of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachu-
setts, without mentioning the Contract Clause, declared that rights legally vested
in a corporation cannot be “controlled of destroyed by a subsequent statute, unless
a power [for that purpose] be reserved to the legislature in the act of incorporation,”
Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 142 (1806). See also Stoughton v. Baker, 4 Mass. 521 (1808)
to like effect; cf. Locke v. Dane, 9 Mass. 360 (1812), in which it is said that the
purpose of the Contract Clause was to provide against paper money and insolvent
laws. Together these holdings add up to the conclusion that the reliance of the Mas-
sachusetts court was on “fundamental principles,” rather than the Contract Clause.
2011 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 577–95 (Webster’s argument); id. at 666 (Story’s opin-
ion). See also Story’s opinion for the Court in Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 43
(1815).
2012 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518 (1819).
2013 17 U.S. at 627.
ter having been granted imports consideration from the point of view
of the state.2014 With this doctrine before it, the Court in Provi-
dence Bank v. Billings,2015 and again in Charles River Bridge v. War-
ren Bridge,2016 admitted, without discussion of the point, the appli-
cability of the Dartmouth College decision to purely business concerns.
Reservation of Right to Alter or Repeal Corporate Char-
ters.—There are four principles or doctrines by which the Court has
broken down the force of the Dartmouth College decision in great
measure in favor of state legislative power. By the logic of Dartmouth
College itself, the state may reserve in a corporate charter the right
to “amend, alter, and repeal” the same, and such reservation be-
comes a part of the contract between the state and the incorpora-
tors, the obligation of which is accordingly not impaired by the ex-
ercise of the right.2017 Later decisions recognize that the state may
reserve the right to amend, alter, and repeal by general law, with
the result of incorporating the reservation in all charters of subse-
quent date.2018 There is, however, a difference between a reserva-
tion by a statute and one by constitutional provision. Although the
former may be repealed as to a subsequent charter by the specific
terms thereof, the latter may not.2019
Is the right reserved by a state to “amend” or “alter” a charter
without restriction? When it is accompanied, as it generally is, by
the right to “repeal,” one would suppose that the answer to this
question was self-evident. Nonetheless, there is judicial dicta to the
effect that this power is not without limit, that it must be exer-
cised reasonably and in good faith, and that the alterations made
must be consistent with the scope and object of the grant.2020 Yet
2014 17 U.S. at 637; see also Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
430, 437 (1869).

2015 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
2016 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
2017 Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 712 (1819) (Jus-
tice Story).
2018 Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430, 438 (1869); Pennsyl-
vania College Cases, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 190, 213 (1872); Miller v. New York, 82 U.S.
(15 Wall.) 478 (1873); Murray v. Charleston, 96 U.S. 432 (1878); Greenwood v. Freight
Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1882); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. v. Miller, 114 U.S. 176 (1885); Lou-
isville Water Company v. Clark, 143 U.S. 1 (1892).
2019 New Jersey v. Yard, 95 U.S. 104, 111 (1877).
2020 See Holyoke Company v. Lyman, 82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 500, 520 (1873), See also
Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S. 319 (1877); Fair Haven R.R. v. New Haven, 203 U.S. 379
(1906); Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45 (1908). Also Lothrop v. Stedman, 15
Fed. Cas. 922 (No. 8519) (C.C.D. Conn. 1875), where the principles of natural jus-
tice are thought to set a limit to the power.
although some state courts have applied tests of this nature to the
disallowance of legislation, the U.S. Supreme Court has apparently
never done so.2021
It is quite different with respect to the distinction that some
cases point out between, on the one hand, the franchises and privi-
leges that a corporation derives from its charter, and, on the other
hand, the rights of property and contract that accrue to it in the
course of its existence. Even the outright repeal of the former does
not wipe out the latter or cause them to escheat to the state. The
primary heirs of the defunct organization are its creditors, but what-
ever of value remains after their valid claims are met goes to the
former shareholders.2022 By the earlier weight of authority, how-
ever, persons who contract with companies whose charters are sub-
ject to legislative amendment or repeal do so at their own risk; any
“such contracts made between individuals and the corporation do
not vary or in any manner change or modify the relation between
the State and the corporation in respect to the right of the State to
alter, modify, or amend such a charter . . . .” 2023 But later holdings
becloud this rule.2024
Corporation Subject to the Law and Police Power.—But sup-
pose that the state neglects to reserve the right to amend, alter, or
repeal. Is it, then, without power to control its corporate creatures?
By no means. Private corporations, like other private persons, are
always presumed to be subject to the legislative power of the state,
from which it follows that immunities conferred by charter are to
be treated as exceptions to an otherwise controlling rule. This prin-
ciple was recognized by Chief Justice Marshall in Providence Bank
v. Billings,2025 which held that, in the absence of express stipula-
tion or reasonable implication to the contrary in its charter, the bank
was subject to the state’s taxing power, notwithstanding that the
power to tax is the power to destroy.
And of course the same principle is equally applicable to the
exercise by the state of its police powers. Thus, in what was per-
haps the leading case before the Civil War, the Supreme Court of
2021 See in this connection the cases cited by Justice Sutherland in his opinion
for the Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Jenkins, 297 U.S. 629 (1936).
2022 Curran v. Arkansas, 56 U.S. (15 How.) 304 (1853); Shields v. Ohio, 95 U.S.
319 (1877); Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105 U.S. 13 (1882); Adirondack Ry. v. New
York, 176 U.S. 335 (1900); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900); Chicago, M.
& St. P. R.R. v. Wisconsin, 238 U.S. 491 (1915); Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932).
2023 Pennsylvania College Cases, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 190, 218 (1872). See also Calder
v. Michigan, 218 U.S. 591 (1910).

2024 Lake Shore & Mich. So. Ry. v. Smith, 173 U.S. 684, 690 (1899); Coombes v.
Getz, 285 U.S. 434 (1932). Both these decisions cite Greenwood v. Freight Co., 105
U.S. 13, 17 (1882), but without apparent justification.
2025 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 514 (1830).
Vermont held that the legislature of that state had the right, in
furtherance of the public safety, to require chartered companies op-
erating railways to fence in their tracks and provide cattle guards.
In a matter of this nature, said the court, corporations are on a
level with individuals engaged in the same business, unless, from
their charter, they can prove the contrary.2026 Since then the rule
has been applied many times in justification of state regulation of
railroads,2027 and even of the application of a state prohibition law
to a company that had been chartered expressly to manufacture
beer.2028
Strict Construction of Charters, Tax Exemptions.—Long be-
fore the cases last cited were decided, the principle that they illus-
trate had come to be powerfully reinforced by two others, the first
of which is that all charter privileges and immunities are to be strictly
construed as against the claims of the state, or as it is otherwise
often phrased, “nothing passes by implication in a public grant.”
The leading case was Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge,2029
which was decided by a substantially new Court shortly after Chief
Justice Marshall’s death. The question at issue was whether the
charter of the complaining company, which authorized it to operate
a toll bridge, stood in the way of the state’s permitting another com-
pany of later date to operate a free bridge in the immediate vicin-
ity. Because the first company could point to no clause in its char-
ter specifically vesting it with an exclusive right, the Court held
2026 Thorpe v. Rutland & Burlington R.R., 27 Vt. 140 (1854).
2027 Thus a railroad may be required, at its own expense and irrespective of ben-
efits to itself, to eliminate grade crossings in the interest of the public safety, New
York & N.E. R.R. v. Bristol, 151 U.S. 556 (1894), to make highway crossings reason-
ably safe and convenient for public use, Great Northern Ry. v. Minnesota ex rel.
Clara City, 246 U.S. 434 (1918), to repair viaducts, Northern Pacific Railway v. Duluth,
208 U.S. 583 (1908), and to fence its right of way, Minneapolis & St. Louis Ry. v.
Emmons, 149 U.S. 364 (1893). Though a railroad company owns the right of way
along a street, the city may require it to lay tracks to conform to the established
grade; to fill in tracks at street intersections; and to remove tracks from a busy street
intersection, when the attendant disadvantage and expense are small and the safety
of the public appreciably enhanced Denver & R.G. R.R. v. Denver, 250 U.S. 241 (1919).
Likewise the state, in the public interest, may require a railroad to reestablish
an abandoned station, even though the railroad commission had previously autho-
rized its abandonment on condition that another station be established elsewhere, a
condition which had been complied with. Railroad Co. v. Hamersley, 104 U.S. 1 (1881).
It may impose upon a railroad liability for fire communicated by its locomotives,
even though the state had previously authorized the company to use said type of
locomotive power, St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Mathews, 165 U.S. 1, 5 (1897), and it may
penalize the failure to cut drains through embankments so as to prevent flooding of
adjacent lands. Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915).
2028 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878). See also Fertilizing Co. v. Hyde
Park, 97 U.S. 659 (1878); Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 345
(1909).
2029 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 420 (1837).
the charter of the second company to be valid on the principle just

stated. Justice Story presented a vigorous dissent in which he ar-
gued cogently, but unavailingly, that the monopoly claimed by the
Charles River Bridge Company was fully as reasonable an implica-
tion from the terms of its charter and the circumstances surround-
ing its concession as perpetuity had been from the terms of the
Dartmouth College charter and the ensuing transaction.
The Court was in fact making new law, because it was looking
at things from a new point of view. This was the period when judi-
cial recognition of the police power began to take on a doctrinal char-
acter. It was also the period when the railroad business was just
beginning. Chief Justice Taney’s opinion evinces the influence of both
these developments. The power of the state to provide for its own
internal happiness and prosperity was not, he asserted, to be pared
away by mere legal intendments, nor was its ability to avail itself
of the lights of modern science to be frustrated by obsolete inter-
ests such as those of the old turnpike companies, the charter privi-
leges of which, he apprehended, might easily become a bar to the
development of transportation along new lines.2030
The Court has reiterated the rule of strict construction many
times. In Blair v. City of Chicago,2031 decided nearly seventy years
after Charles River Bridge, the Court said: “Legislative grants of
this character should be in such unequivocal form of expression that
the legislative mind may be distinctly impressed with their charac-
ter and import, in order that the privileges may be intelligently granted
or purposely withheld. It is a matter of common knowledge that
grants of this character are usually prepared by those interested in
them, and submitted to the legislature with a view to obtain from
such bodies the most liberal grant of privileges which they are will-
ing to give. This is one among many reasons why they are to be
strictly construed. . . . The principle is this, that all rights which
are asserted against the State must be clearly defined, and not raised
by inference or presumption; and if the charter is silent about a
power, it does not exist. If, on a fair reading of the instrument, rea-
sonable doubts arise as to the proper interpretation to be given to
it, those doubts are to be solved in favor of the State; and where it
is susceptible of two meanings, the one restricting and the other
extending the powers of the corporation, that construction is to be
adopted which works the least harm to the State.” 2032
2030 36 U.S. at 548–53.

2031 201 U.S. 400 (1906).
2032 201 U.S. at 471, 472, quoting The Binghamton Bridge, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 51,
75 (1866).
An excellent illustration of the operation of the rule in relation

to tax exemptions was furnished by the derivative doctrine that an
immunity of this character must be deemed as intended solely for
the benefit of the corporation receiving it and hence, in the absence
of express permission by the state, may not be passed on to a suc-
cessor.2033 Thus, where two companies, each exempt from taxation,
were permitted by the legislature to consolidate, the new corpora-
tion was held to be subject to taxation.2034 Again, a statute that
granted a corporation all “the rights and privileges” of an earlier
corporation was held not to confer the latter’s “immunity” from taxa-
tion.2035 Yet again, a legislative authorization of the transfer by one
corporation to another of the former’s “estate, property, right, privi-
leges, and franchises” was held not to clothe the later company with
the earlier one’s exemption from taxation.2036
Furthermore, an exemption from taxation is to be strictly con-
strued even in the hands of one clearly entitled to it. Thus, the ex-
emption conferred by its charter on a railway company was held
not to extend to branch roads it constructed pursuant to a later
statute.2037 Also, a general exemption of the property of a corpora-
tion from taxation was held to refer only to the property actually
employed in its business.2038 And, the charter exemption of the capi-
tal stock of a railroad from taxation “for ten years after completion
of the said road” was held not to become operative until the comple-
tion of the road.2039 So also the exemption of the campus and en-
dowment fund of a college was held to leave other lands of the col-
lege, though a part of its endowment, subject to taxation.2040 Provisions
in a statute that bonds of the state and its political subdivisions
were not to be taxed and should not be taxed were held not to ex-
empt interest on them from taxation as income of the owners.2041
Strict Construction and the Police Power.—The police power,
too, has frequently benefitted from the doctrine of strict construc-
2033 Memphis & L.R. R.R. v. Comm’rs, 112 U.S. 609, 617 (1884). See also Mor-
gan v. Louisiana, 93 U.S. 217 (1876); Wilson v. Gaines, 103 U.S. 417 (1881); Louis-
ville & Nashville R.R. v. Palmes, 109 U.S. 244, 251 (1883); Norfolk & Western R.R.
v. Pendleton, 156 U.S. 667, 673 (1895); Picard v. East Tennessee, V. & G. R.R., 130
U.S. 637, 641 (1889).
2034 Atlantic & Gulf R.R. v. Georgia, 98 U.S. 359, 365 (1879).
2035 Phoenix F. & M. Ins. Co. v. Tennessee, 161 U.S. 174 (1896).
2036 Rochester Ry. v. Rochester, 205 U.S. 236 (1907); followed in Wright v. Geor-
gia R.R. & Banking Co., 216 U.S. 420 (1910); Rapid Transit Corp. v. New York, 303
U.S. 573 (1938). Cf. Tennessee v. Whitworth, 117 U.S. 139 (1886), the authority of
which is respected in the preceding case.
2037 Chicago, B. & K.C. R.R. v. Guffey, 120 U.S. 569 (1887).
2038 Ford v. Delta and Pine Land Company, 164 U.S. 662 (1897).
2039 Vicksburg, S. & P. R.R. v. Dennis, 116 U.S. 665 (1886).
2040 Millsaps College v. City of Jackson, 275 U.S. 129 (1927).
2041 Hale v. State Board, 302 U.S. 95 (1937).
tion, although this recourse is today seldom, if ever, necessary in

this connection. Some of the more striking cases may be briefly sum-
marized. The provision in the charter of a railway company permit-
ting it to set reasonable charges still left the legislature free to de-
termine what charges were reasonable.2042 However, when a railway
agreed to accept certain rates for a specified period, it thereby fore-
closed the question of the reasonableness of such rates.2043 The grant
to a company of the right to supply a city with water for twenty-
five years was held not to prevent a similar concession to another
company by the same city.2044 The promise by a city in the charter
of a water company not to make a similar grant to any other per-
son or corporation was held not to prevent the city itself from en-
gaging in the business.2045 A municipal concession to a water com-
pany to run for thirty years, and accompanied by the provision that
the “said company shall charge the following rates,” was held not
to prevent the city from reducing such rates.2046 But more broadly,
the grant to a municipality of the power to regulate the charges of
public service companies was held not to bestow the right to con-
tract away this power.2047 Indeed, any claim by a private corpora-
tion that it received the ratemaking power from a municipality must
survive a two-fold challenge: first, as to the right of the municipal-
ity under its charter to make such a grant, secondly, as to whether
it has actually done so, and in both respects an affirmative answer
must be based on express words and not on implication.2048
Doctrine of Inalienability as Applied to Eminent Domain,
Taxing, and Police Powers.—The second of the doctrines men-
tioned above, whereby the principle of the subordination of all per-
2042 Railroad Comm’n Cases (Stone v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.), 116 U.S. 307,
330 (1886), extended in Southern Pacific Co. v. Campbell, 230 U.S. 537 (1913) to
cases in which the word “reasonable” does not appear to qualify the company’s right
to prescribe tolls. See also American Bridge Co. v. Railroad Comm’n, 307 U.S. 486
(1939).
2043 Georgia Ry. v. Town of Decatur, 262 U.S. 432 (1923). See also Southern Iowa
Elec. Co. v. City of Chariton, 255 U.S. 539 (1921).

2044 City of Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 15 (1898).
2045 Skaneateles Water Co. v. Skaneateles, 184 U.S. 354 (1902); Water Co. v. City
of Knoxville, 200 U.S. 22 (1906); Madera Water Works v. City of Madera, 228 U.S.
454 (1913).
2046 Rogers Park Water Co. v. Fergus, 180 U.S. 624 (1901).
2047 Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908); Wyandotte
Gas Co. v. Kansas, 231 U.S. 622 (1914).

2048 See also Puget Sound Traction Co. v. Reynolds, 244 U.S. 574 (1917). “Before
we can find impairment of a contract we must find an obligation of the contract

which has been impaired. Since the contract here relied upon is one between a po-
litical subdivision of a state and private individuals, settled principles of construc-
tion require that the obligation alleged to have been impaired be clearly and un-
equivocally expressed.” Justice Black for the Court in Keefe v. Clark, 322 U.S. 393,
396–397 (1944).
sons, corporate and individual alike, to the legislative power of the

state has been fortified, is the doctrine that certain of the state’s
powers are inalienable, and that any attempt by a state to alienate
them, upon any consideration whatsoever, is ipso facto void and hence
incapable to producing a “contract” within the meaning of Article I,
§ 10. One of the earliest cases to assert this principle was decided
in New York in 1826. The corporation of the City of New York, hav-
ing conveyed certain lands for the purposes of a church and cem-
etery together with a covenant for quiet enjoyment, later passed a
by-law forbidding their use as a cemetery. In denying an action against
the city for breach of covenant, the state court said the defendants
“had no power as a party, [to the covenant] to make a contract which
should control or embarrass their legislative powers and du-
ties.” 2049
The Supreme Court first applied similar doctrine in 1848 in a
case involving a grant of exclusive right to construct a bridge at a
specified locality. Sustaining the right of the State of Vermont to
make a new grant to a competing company, the Court held that the
obligation of the earlier exclusive grant was sufficiently recognized
in making just compensation for it; and that corporate franchises,
like all other forms of property, are subject to the overruling power
of eminent domain.2050 This reasoning was reinforced by an appeal
to the theory of state sovereignty, which was held to involve the
corollary of the inalienability of all the principal powers of a state.
The subordination of all charter rights and privileges to the power
of eminent domain has been maintained by the Court ever since;
not even an explicit agreement by the state to forego the exercise
of the power will avail against it.2051 Conversely, the state may re-
voke an improvident grant of public property without recourse to
the power of eminent domain, such a grant being inherently be-
yond the power of the state to make. Thus, when the legislature of
Illinois in 1869 devised to the Illinois Central Railroad Company,
its successors and assigns, the state’s right and title to nearly a
thousand acres of submerged land under Lake Michigan along the
harbor front of Chicago, and four years later sought to repeal the
grant, the Court, a four-to-three decision, sustained an action by
the state to recover the lands in question. Justice Field wrote for
the majority: “Such abdication is not consistent with the exercise
of that trust which requires the government of the State to pre-
2049 Brick Presbyterian Church v. New York, 5 Cow. (N.Y.) 538, 540 (1826).
2050 West River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848). See also Backus
v. Lebanon, 11 N.H. 19 (1840); White River Turnpike Co. v. Vermont Cent. R. Co.,
21 Vt. 590 (1849); and Bonaparte v. Camden & A.R. Co., 3 Fed. Cas. 821 (No. 1617)
(C.C.D.N.J. 1830).
2051 Pennsylvania Hospital v. City of Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917).
serve such waters for the use of public. The trust devolving upon
the State for the public, and which can only be discharged by the
management and control of property in which the public has an in-
terest, cannot be relinquished by a transfer of the property. . . . Any
grant of the kind is necessarily revocable, and the exercise of the
trust by which the property was held by the State can be resumed
at any time.” 2052
On the other hand, repeated endeavors to subject tax exemp-
tions to the doctrine of inalienability, though at times supported by
powerful minorities on the Bench, have failed.2053 As recently as Janu-
ary 1952, the Court ruled that the Georgia Railway Company was
entitled to seek an injunction in the federal courts against an at-
tempt by Georgia’s Revenue Commission to compel it to pay ad va-
lorem taxes contrary to the terms of its special charter issued in
1833. In answer to the argument that this was a suit contrary to
the Eleventh Amendment, the Court declared that the immunity
from federal jurisdiction created by the Amendment “does not ex-
tend to individuals who act as officers without constitutional author-
ity.” 2054
The leading case involving the police power is Stone v. Missis-
sippi.2055 In 1867, the legislature of Mississippi chartered a com-
pany to which it expressly granted the power to conduct a lottery.
Two years later, the state adopted a new Constitution which con-
tained a provision forbidding lotteries, and a year later the legisla-
ture passed an act to put this provision into effect. In upholding
this act and the constitutional provision on which it was based, the
Court said: “The power of governing is a trust committed by the
people to the government, no part of which can be granted away.
The people, in their sovereign capacity, have established their agen-
cies for the preservation of the public health and the public mor-
als, and the protection of public and private rights,” and these agen-
cies can neither give away nor sell their discretion. All that one can
get by a charter permitting the business of conducting a lottery “is
suspension of certain governmental rights in his favor, subject to
withdrawal at will.” 2056
2052 Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387, 453, 455 (1892).
2053 See especially Home of the Friendless v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 430 (1869),
and The Washington University v. Rouse, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 439 (1869).
2054 Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Redwine, 342 U.S. 299, 305–06 (1952). The
Court distinguished In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887) on the ground that the action
there was barred “as one in substance directed at the State merely to obtain specific
performance of a contract with the State.” 342 U.S. at 305.
2055 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
2056 101 U.S. at 820–21.
The Court shortly afterward applied the same reasoning in a

case challenging the right of Louisiana to invade the exclusive privi-
lege of a corporation engaged in the slaughter of cattle in New Or-
leans by granting another company the right to engage in the same
business. Although the state did not offer to compensate the older
company for the lost monopoly, its action was sustained on the ground
that it had been taken in the interest of the public health.2057 When,
however, the City of New Orleans, in reliance on this precedent,
sought to repeal an exclusive franchise which it had granted a com-
pany for fifty years to supply gas to its inhabitants, the Court inter-
posed its veto, explaining that in this instance neither the public
health, the public morals, nor the public safety was involved.2058
Later decisions, nonetheless, apply the principle of inalienabil-
ity broadly. To quote from one: “It is settled that neither the ‘con-
tract’ clause nor the ‘due process’ clause has the effect of overriding
the power to the State to establish all regulations that are reason-
ably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort, or
general welfare of the community; that this power can neither be
abdicated nor bargained away, and is inalienable even by express
grant; and all contract and property rights are held subject to its
fair exercise.” 2059
It would scarcely suffice today for a company to rely upon its
charter privileges or upon special concessions from a state in resist-
ing the application to it of measures alleged to have been enacted
under the police power thereof; if this claim is sustained, the obli-
gation of the contract clause will not avail, and if it is not, the due
process of law clause of the Fourteenth Amendment will furnish a
sufficient reliance. That is to say, the discrepancy that once existed
between the Court’s theory of an overriding police power in these
two adjoining fields of constitutional law is today apparently at an
end. Indeed, there is usually no sound reason why rights based on
public grant should be regarded as more sacrosanct than rights that
involve the same subject matter but are of different provenance.
Private Contracts.—The term “private contract” is, naturally,
not all-inclusive. A judgment, though granted in favor of a creditor,
2057 Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House and Live-Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent
City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co., 111 U.S. 746 (1884).
2058 New Orleans Gas Co. v. Louisiana Light Co., 115 U.S. 650 (1885).
2059 Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. City of Goldsboro, 232 U.S. 548, 558 (1914). See
also Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Tranbarger, 238 U.S. 67 (1915); Pennsylvania Hospital
v. Philadelphia, 245 U.S. 20 (1917); where the police power and eminent domain are
treated on the same basis in respect of inalienability; Wabash R.R. v. Defiance, 167
U.S. 88, 97 (1897); Home Tel. & Tel. Co. v. City of Los Angeles, 211 U.S. 265 (1908).
is not a contract in the sense of the Constitution,2060 nor is mar-

riage.2061 And whether a particular agreement is a valid contract is
a question for the courts, and finally for the Supreme Court, when
the protection of the contract clause is invoked.2062
The question of the nature and source of the obligation of a con-
tract, which went by default in Fletcher v. Peck and the Dartmouth
College case, with such vastly important consequences, had eventu-
ally to be met and answered by the Court in connection with pri-
vate contracts. The first case involving such a contract to reach the
Supreme Court was Sturges v. Crowninshield,2063 in which a debtor
sought escape behind a state insolvency act of later date than his
note. The act was held inoperative, but whether this was because
of its retroactivity in this particular case or for the broader reason
that it assumed to excuse debtors from their promises was not at
the time made clear. As noted earlier, Chief Justice Marshall’s defi-
nition on this occasion of the obligation of a contract as the law
that binds the parties to perform their undertakings was not free
from ambiguity, owing to the uncertain connotation of the term
“law.” 2064
These obscurities were finally cleared up for most cases in Ogden
v. Saunders,2065 in which the temporal relation of the statute and
the contract involved was exactly reversed—the former antedating
the latter. Chief Justice Marshall contended unsuccessfully that the
statute was void because it purported to release the debtor from
that original, intrinsic obligation that always attaches under natu-
ral law to the acts of free agents. “When,” he wrote, “we advert to
the course of reading generally pursued by American statesmen in
early life, we must suppose that the framers of our Constitution
were intimately acquainted with the writings of those wise and learned
men whose treatises on the laws of nature and nations have guided
public opinion on the subjects of obligation and contracts,” and that
2060 Morley v. Lake Shore Ry., 146 U.S. 162 (1892); New Orleans v. New Or-
leans Water-Works Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891); Missouri & Ark. L. & M. Co. v. Sebastian
County, 249 U.S. 170 (1919). But cf. Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.)
469, 549 (1833); and Garrison v. New York, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 196, 203 (1875), sug-
gesting that a different view was earlier entertained in the case of judgments in
actions of debt.
2061 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190 (1888); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 629 (1819). Cf. Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). The
question whether a wife’s rights in the community property under the laws of Cali-
fornia were of a contractual nature was raised but not determined in Moffit v. Kelly,
218 U.S. 400 (1910).
2062 New Orleans v. New Orleans Water-Works Co., 142 U.S. 79 (1891); Zane v.
Hamilton County, 189 U.S. 370, 381 (1903).

2063 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819).
2064 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 197.
2065 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213 (1827).
they took their views on these subjects from those sources. He also
posed the question of what would happen to the Contract Clause if
states might pass acts declaring that all contracts made subse-
quently thereto should be subject to legislative control.2066
For the first and only time, a majority of the Court abandoned
the Chief Justice’s leadership. Speaking by Justice Washington, it
held that the obligation of private contracts is derived from the mu-
nicipal law—state statutes and judicial decisions—and that the in-
hibition of Article I, § 10, is confined to legislative acts made after
the contracts affected by them, subject to the following exception.
By a curiously complicated line of reasoning, the Court also held in
the same case that, when the creditor is a nonresident, then a state
by an insolvency law may not alter the former’s rights under a con-
tract, albeit one of later date.
With the proposition established that the obligation of a pri-
vate contract comes from the municipal law in existence when the
contract is made, a further question presents itself, namely, what
part of the municipal law is referred to? No doubt, the law which
determines the validity of the contract itself is a part of such law.
Also part of such law is the law which interprets the terms used in
the contract, or which supplies certain terms when others are used,
as for instance, constitutional provisions or statutes which deter-
mine what is “legal tender” for the payment of debts, or judicial
decisions which construe the term “for value received” as used in a
promissory note, and so on. In short, any law which at the time of
the making of a contract goes to measure the rights and duties of
the parties to it in relation to each other enters into its obligation.
Remedy a Part of the Private Obligation.—Suppose, how-
ever, that one of the parties to a contract fails to live up to his ob-
ligation as thus determined. The contract itself may now be re-
garded as at an end, but the injured party, nevertheless, has a new
set of rights in its stead, those which are furnished him by the re-
medial law, including the law of procedure. In the case of a mort-
gage, he may foreclose; in the case of a promissory note, he may
sue; and in certain cases, he may demand specific performance. Hence
the further question arises, whether this remedial law is to be con-
sidered a part of the law supplying the obligation of contracts. Origi-
nally, the predominating opinion was negative, since as we have just
seen, this law does not really come into operation until the con-
tract has been broken. Yet it is obvious that the sanction which this
law lends to contracts is extremely important—indeed, indispens-
able. In due course it became the accepted doctrine that part of the
2066 25 U.S. at 353–54.
law which supplies one party to a contract with a remedy if the

other party does not live up to his agreement, as authoritatively
interpreted, entered into the “obligation of contracts” in the consti-
tutional sense of this term, and so might not be altered to the ma-
terial weakening of existing contracts. In the Court’s own words:
“Nothing can be more material to the obligation than the means of
enforcement. Without the remedy the contract may, indeed, in the
sense of the law, be said not to exist, and its obligation to fall within
the class of those moral and social duties which depend for their
fulfillment wholly upon the will of the individual. The ideas of va-
lidity and remedy are inseparable. . . .” 2067
This rule was first definitely announced in 1843 in Bronson v.
Kinzie.2068 Here, an Illinois mortgage giving the mortgagee an un-
restricted power of sale in case of the mortgagor’s default was in-
volved, along with a later act of the legislature that required mort-
gaged premises to be sold for not less than two-thirds of the appraised
value and allowed the mortgagor a year after the sale to redeem
them. It was held that the statute, in altering the pre-existing rem-
edies to such an extent, violated the constitutional prohibition and
hence was void. The year following a like ruling was made in Mc-
Cracken v. Hayward,2069 as to a statutory provision that personal
property should not be sold under execution for less than two-
thirds of its appraised value.
But the rule illustrated by these cases does not signify that a
state may make no changes in its remedial or procedural law that
affect existing contracts. “Provided,” the Court has said, “a substan-
tial or efficacious remedy remains or is given, by means of which a
party can enforce his rights under the contract, the Legislature may
modify or change existing remedies or prescribe new modes of pro-
cedure.” 2070 Thus, states are constantly remodelling their judicial
systems and modes of practice unembarrassed by the Contract
Clause.2071 The right of a state to abolish imprisonment for debt
was early asserted.2072 Again, the right of a state to shorten the
time for the bringing of actions has been affirmed even as to exist-
ing causes of action, but with the proviso added that a reasonable
time must be left for the bringing of such actions.2073 On the other
2067 United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 552 (1867).
2068 42 U.S. (1 How.) 311 (1843).
2069 43 U.S. (2 How.) 608 (1844).
2070 Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437, 439 (1903); City & Lake
R.R. v. New Orleans, 157 U.S. 219 (1895).

2071 Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769 (1883).
2072 The right was upheld in Mason v. Haile, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 370 (1827),
and again in Penniman’s Case, 103 U.S. 714 (1881).

2073 McGahey v. Virginia, 135 U.S. 662 (1890).
hand, a statute which withdrew the judicial power to enforce satis-

faction of a certain class of judgments by mandamus was held in-
valid.2074 In the words of the Court: “Every case must be deter-
mined upon its own circumstances”; 2075 and it later added: “In all
such cases the question becomes . . . one of reasonableness, and of
that the legislature is primarily the judge.” 2076
Contracts involving municipal bonds merit special mention. While
a city is from one point of view but an emanation from the govern-
ment’s sovereignty and an agent thereof, when it borrows money it
is held to be acting in a corporate or private capacity and so to be
suable on its contracts. Furthermore, as was held in the leading
case of United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy,2077 “where a
State has authorized a municipal corporation to contract and to ex-
ercise the power of local taxation to the extent necessary to meet
its engagements, the power thus given cannot be withdrawn until
the contract is satisfied.” In this case the Court issued a manda-
mus compelling the city officials to levy taxes for the satisfaction of
a judgment on its bonds in accordance with the law as it stood when
the bonds were issued.2078 Nor may a state by dividing an indebted
municipality among others enable it to escape its obligations. The
debt follows the territory and the duty of assessing and collecting
taxes to satisfy it devolves upon the succeeding corporations and
2074 Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S. 203 (1880).

2075 United States ex rel. Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 554 (1867).
2076 Antoni v. Greenhow, 107 U.S. 769, 775 (1883). Illustrations of changes in
remedies, which have been sustained, may be seen in the following cases: Jackson
v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830); Hawkins v. Barney’s Lessee, 30 U.S. (5
Pet.) 457 (1831); Crawford v. Branch Bank of Mobile, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 279 (1849);
Curtis v. Whitney, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 68 (1872); Railroad Co. v. Hecht, 95 U.S. 168
(1877); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U.S. 628 (1877); Tennessee v. Sneed, 96 U.S. 69 (1877);
South Carolina v. Gaillard, 101 U.S. 433 (1880); Louisiana v. New Orleans, 102 U.S.
203 (1880); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Cushman, 108 U.S. 51 (1883); Vance v.
Vance, 108 U.S. 514 (1883); Gilfillan v. Union Canal Co., 109 U.S. 401 (1883); Hill v.
Merchant’s Ins. Co., 134 U.S. 515 (1890); City & Lake R.R. v. New Orleans, 157
U.S. 219 (1895); Red River Valley Bank v. Craig, 181 U.S. 548 (1901); Wilson v. Standefer,
184 U.S. 399 (1902); Oshkosh Waterworks Co. v. Oshkosh, 187 U.S. 437 (1903); Wag-
goner v. Flack, 188 U.S. 595 (1903); Bernheimer v. Converse, 206 U.S. 516 (1907);
Henley v. Myers, 215 U.S. 373 (1910); Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U.S. 652 (1914); Secu-
rity Bank v. California, 263 U.S. 282 (1923); United States Mortgage Co. v. Mat-
thews, 293 U.S. 232 (1934); McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Compare the following cases, where changes in remedies were deemed to be of
such character as to interfere with substantial rights: Wilmington & Weldon R.R. v.
King, 91 U.S. 3 (1875); Memphis v. United States, 97 U.S. 293 (1878); Virginia Cou-
pon Cases (Poindexter v. Greenhow), 114 U.S. 270, 298, 299 (1885); Effinger v. Ken-
ney, 115 U.S. 566 (1885); Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U.S. 131 (1885); Bradley
v. Lightcap, 195 U.S. 1 (1904); Bank of Minden v. Clement, 256 U.S. 126 (1921).
2077 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 535, 554–55 (1867).
2078 See also Nelson v. St. Martin’s Parish, 111 U.S. 716 (1884).
their officers.2079 But where a municipal organization has ceased prac-

tically to exist through the vacation of its offices, and the govern-
ment’s function is exercised once more by the state directly, the Court
has thus far found itself powerless to frustrate a program of repu-
diation.2080 However, there is no reason why the state should enact
the role of particeps criminis in an attempt to relieve its municipali-
ties of the obligation to meet their honest debts. Thus, in 1931, dur-
ing the Great Depression, New Jersey created a Municipal Finance
Commission with power to assume control over its insolvent munici-
palities. To the complaint of certain bondholders that this legisla-
tion impaired the contract obligations of their debtors, the Court,
speaking by Justice Frankfurter, pointed out that the practical value
of an unsecured claim against a city is “the effectiveness of the city’s
taxing power,” which the legislation under review was designed to
conserve.2081
Private Contracts and the Police Power.—The increasing sub-
jection of public grants to the police power of the states has been
previously pointed out. That purely private contracts should be in
any stronger situation in this respect obviously would be anoma-
lous in the extreme. In point of fact, the ability of private parties
to curtail governmental authority by the easy device of contracting
with one another is, with an exception to be noted, even less than
that of the state to tie its own hands by contracting away its own
powers. So, when it was contended in an early Pennsylvania case
that an act prohibiting the issuance of notes by unincorporated bank-
ing associations violated the Contract Clause because of its effect
upon certain existing contracts of members of such association, the
state Supreme Court answered: “But it is said, that the members
had formed a contract between themselves, which would be dis-
solved by the stoppage of their business. And what then? Is that
such a violation of contracts as is prohibited by the Constitution of
the United States? Consider to what such a construction would lead.
Let us suppose, that in one of the States there is no law against
2079 Mobile v. Watson, 116 U.S. 289 (1886); Graham v. Folsom, 200 U.S. 248 (1906).
2080 Heine v. Levee Commissioners, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 655 (1874). Cf. Virginia v.
West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565 (1918).
2081 Faitoute Co. v. City of Asbury Park, 316 U.S. 502, 510 (1942). Alluding to
the ineffectiveness of purely judicial remedies against defaulting municipalities, Jus-

tice Frankfurter says: “For there is no remedy when resort is had to ‘devices and
contrivances’ to nullify the taxing power which can be carried out only through au-
thorized officials. See Rees v. City of Watertown, 19 Wall. [86 U.S.] 107, 124 [1874].
And so we have had the spectacle of taxing officials resigning from office in order to
frustrate tax levies through mandamus, and officials running on a platform of will-
ingness to go to jail rather than to enforce a tax levy (see Raymond, State and Mu-
nicipal Bonds, 342–343), and evasion of service by tax collectors, thus making impo-
tent a court’s mandate. Yost v. Dallas County, 236 U.S. 50, 57 [1915].” Id. at 511.
gaming, cock-fighting, horse-racing or public masquerades, and that

companies should be formed for the purpose of carrying on these
practices. . . .” Would the legislature then be powerless to prohibit
them? The answer returned, of course, was no.2082
The prevailing doctrine was stated by the U.S. Supreme Court:
“It is the settled law of this court that the interdiction of statutes
impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from
exercising such powers as are vested in it for the promotion of the
common weal, or are necessary for the general good of the public,
though contracts previously entered into between individuals may
thereby be affected. . . . In other words, that parties by entering
into contracts may not estop the legislature from enacting laws in-
tended for the public good.” 2083
So, in an early case, we find a state recording act upheld as
applying to deeds dated before the passage of the act.2084 Later cases
have brought the police power in its more customary phases into
contact with private as well as with public contracts. Lottery tick-
ets, valid when issued, were necessarily invalidated by legislation
prohibiting the lottery business; 2085 contracts for the sale of beer,
valid when entered into, were similarly nullified by a state prohibi-
tion law; 2086 and contracts of employment were modified by later
laws regarding the liability of employers and workmen’s compensa-
tion.2087 Likewise, a contract between plaintiff and defendant did
not prevent the state from making the latter a concession that ren-
dered the contract worthless; 2088 nor did a contract as to rates be-
tween two railway companies prevent the state from imposing dif-
ferent rates; 2089 nor did a contract between a public utility company
and a customer protect the rates agreed upon from being super-
seded by those fixed by the state.2090 Similarly, a contract for the
conveyance of water beyond the limits of a state did not prevent
the state from prohibiting such conveyance.2091
2082 Myers v. Irwin, 2 S. & R. (Pa.) 367, 372 (1816); see, to the same effect,
Lindenmuller v. The People, 33 Barb. (N.Y.) 548 (1861); Brown v. Penobscot Bank, 8
Mass. 445 (1812).
2083 Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473, 480 (1905).
2084 Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 280 (1830). See also Phalen v. Vir-
ginia, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 163 (1850).

2085 Stone v. Mississippi, 101 U.S. 814 (1880).
2086 Beer Co. v. Massachusetts, 97 U.S. 25 (1878).
2087 New York Cent. R.R. v. White, 243 U.S. 188 (1917). In this and the preced-
ing two cases the legislative act involved did not except from its operation existing
contracts.
2088 Manigault v. Springs, 199 U.S. 473 (1905).
2089 Portland Ry. v. Oregon R.R. Comm’n, 229 U.S. 397 (1913).
2090 Midland Co. v. Kansas City Power Co., 300 U.S. 109 (1937).
2091 Hudson Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
But the most striking exertions of the police power touching pri-
vate contracts, as well as other private interests within recent years,
have been evoked by war and economic depression. Thus, in World
War I, the State of New York enacted a statute which, declaring
that a public emergency existed, forbade the enforcement of cov-
enants for the surrender of the possession of premises on the expi-
ration of leases, and wholly deprived for a period owners of dwell-
ings, including apartment and tenement houses, within the City of
New York and contiguous counties, of possessory remedies for the
eviction from their premises of tenants in possession when the law
took effect, providing the latter were able and willing to pay a rea-
sonable rent. In answer to objections leveled against this legisla-
tion on the basis of the Contract Clause, the Court said: “But con-
tracts are made subject to this exercise of the power of the State
when otherwise justified, as we have held this to be.” 2092 In a sub-
sequent case, however, the Court added that, although the declara-
tion by the legislature of a justifying emergency was entitled to great
respect, it was not conclusive; a law “depending upon the existence
of an emergency or other certain state of facts to uphold it may
cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change,” and
whether they have changed was always open to judicial inquiry.2093
Summing up the result of the cases referred to above, Chief Jus-
tice Hughes, speaking for the Court in Home Building & Loan Ass’n
v. Blaisdell,2094 remarked in 1934: “It is manifest from this review
of our decisions that there has been a growing appreciation of pub-
lic needs and of the necessity of finding ground for a rational com-
promise between individual rights and public welfare. The settle-
ment and consequent contraction of the public domain, the pressure
of a constantly increasing density of population, the interrelation
of the activities of our people and the complexity of our economic
interests, have inevitably led to an increased use of the organiza-
tion of society in order to protect the very bases of individual oppor-
tunity. Where, in earlier days, it was thought that only the con-
cerns of individuals or of classes were involved, and that those of
the State itself were touched only remotely, it has later been found
that the fundamental interests of the State are directly affected;
and that the question is no longer merely that of one party to a
contract as against another, but of the use of reasonable means to
safeguard the economic structure upon which the good of all de-
pends. . . . The principle of this development is . . . that the reser-
2092 Marcus Brown Co. v. Feldman, 256 U.S. 170, 198 (1921), followed in Levy
Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242 (1922).

2093 Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 547–48 (1924).
2094 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
vation of the reasonable exercise of the protective power of the States

is read into all contracts . . . .” 2095
Evaluation of the Clause Today.—It should not be inferred
that the Contract Clause is today totally moribund. Even prior to
the most recent decisions, it still furnished the basis for some de-
gree of judicial review as to the substantiality of the factual justifi-
cation of a professed exercise by a state legislature of its police power,
and in the case of legislation affecting the remedial rights of credi-
tors, it still affords a solid and palpable barrier against legislative
erosion. Nor is this surprising in view of the fact that, as we have
seen, such rights were foremost in the minds of the framers of the
clause. The Court’s attitude toward insolvency laws, redemption laws,
exemption laws, appraisement laws and the like, has always been
that they may not be given retroactive operation,2096 and the gen-
eral lesson of these earlier cases is confirmed by the Court’s deci-
sions between 1934 and 1945 in certain cases involving state mora-
torium statutes. In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,2097
the leading case, a closely divided Court sustained the Minnesota
Moratorium Act of April 18, 1933, which, reciting the existence of a
severe financial and economic depression for several years and the
frequent occurrence of mortgage foreclosure sales for inadequate prices,
and asserting that these conditions had created an economic emer-
gency calling for the exercise of the State’s police power, authorized
its courts to extend the period for redemption from foreclosure sales
for such additional time as they might deem just and equitable, al-
though in no event beyond May 1, 1935.
The act also left the mortgagor in possession during the period
of extension, subject to the requirement that he pay a reasonable
rental for the property as fixed by the court. Contemporaneously,
however, less carefully drawn statutes from Missouri and Arkan-
sas, acts that were not as considerate of creditor’s rights, were set
aside as violating the Contract Clause.2098 “A State is free to regu-
late the procedure in its courts even with reference to contracts al-
2095 290 U.S. at 442, 444. See also Veix v. Sixth Ward Ass’n, 310 U.S. 32 (1940),
in which was sustained a New Jersey statute amending in view of the Depression
the law governing building and loan associations. The authority of the state to safe-
guard the vital interests of the people, said Justice Reed, “extends to economic needs
as well.” Id. at 39. In Lincoln Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal
Co., 335 U.S. 525, 531–32 (1949), the Court dismissed out-of-hand a suggestion that
a state law outlawing union security agreements was an invalid impairment of ex-
isting contracts, citing Blaisdell and Veix.
2096 See Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U.S. 595 (1878); Barnitz v. Beverly, 163 U.S.
118 (1896).
2097 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
2098 W. B. Worthen Co. v. Thomas, 292 U.S. 426 (1934); W. B. Worthen Co. v.
Kavanaugh, 295 U.S. 56 (1935).

ready made,” said Justice Cardozo for the Court, “and moderate ex-
tensions of the time for pleading or for trial will ordinarily fall within
the power so reserved. A different situation is presented when ex-
tensions are so piled up as to make the remedy a shadow. . . . What
controls our judgment at such times is the underlying reality rather
than the form or label. The changes of remedy now challenged as
invalid are to be viewed in combination, with the cumulative signifi-
cance that each imparts to all. So viewed they are seen to be an
oppressive and unnecessary destruction of nearly all the incidents
that give attractiveness and value to collateral security.” 2099 On the
other hand, in the most recent of this category of cases, the Court
gave its approval to an extension by the State of New York of its
moratorium legislation. While recognizing that business conditions
had improved, the Court found reason to believe that “the sudden
termination of the legislation which has dammed up normal liqui-
dation of these mortgages for more than eight years might well re-
sult in an emergency more acute than that which the original leg-
islation was intended to alleviate.” 2100
In the meantime, the Court had sustained New York State leg-
islation under which a mortgagee of real property was denied a de-
ficiency judgment in a foreclosure suit where the state court found
that the value of the property purchased by the mortgagee at the
foreclosure sale was equal to the debt secured by the mortgage.2101
“Mortgagees,” the Court said, “are constitutionally entitled to no more
than payment in full. . . . To hold that mortgagees are entitled un-
der the contract clause to retain the advantages of a forced sale
would be to dignify into a constitutionally protected property right
their chance to get more than the amount of their contracts. . . .
The contract clause does not protect such a strategical, procedural
advantage.” 2102
More important, the Court has been at pains most recently to
reassert the vitality of the clause, although one may wonder whether
application of the clause will be more than episodic.
“[T]he Contract Clause remains a part of our written Constitu-
tion.” 2103 So saying, the Court struck down state legislation in two
2099 295 U.S. at 62.
2100 East New York Bank v. Hahn, 326 U.S. 230, 235 (1945), quoting New York
Legislative Document (1942), No. 45, p. 25.
2101 Honeyman v. Jacobs, 306 U.S. 539 (1939). See also Gelfert v. National City
Bank, 313 U.S. 221 (1941).

2102 313 U.S. at 233–34.
2103 United States Trust Co. v. New Jersey, 431 U.S. 1, 16 (1977). “It is not a
dead letter.” Allied Structural Steel Co. v. Spannaus, 438 U.S. 234, 241 (1978). A
majority of the Court seems fully committed to using the clause. Only Justices Bren-
nan, White, and Marshall dissented in both cases. Chief Justice Burger and Jus-
instances, one law involving the government’s own contractual obli-

gation and the other affecting private contracts.2104 A finding that
a contract has been “impaired” in some way is merely the prelimi-
nary step in evaluating the validity of the state action.2105 But in
both cases the Court applied a stricter-than-usual scrutiny to the
statutory action, in the public contracts case precisely because it
was its own obligation that the State was attempting to avoid and
in the private contract case, apparently, because the legislation was
in aid of a “narrow class.” 2106
The approach in any event is one of balancing. “The severity of
the impairment measures the height of the hurdle the state legisla-
tion must clear. Minimal alteration of contractual obligations may
end the inquiry at its first stage. Severe impairment, on the other
hand, will push the inquiry to a careful examination of the nature
and purpose of the state legislation.” 2107 Having determined that a
severe impairment had resulted in both cases,2108 the Court moved
on to assess the justification for the state action.
In United States Trust, the Court ruled that an impairment would
be upheld only if it were “necessary” and “reasonable” to serve an
important public purpose. But the two terms were given restrictive
meanings. Necessity is shown only when the state’s objectives could
not have been achieved through less dramatic modifications of the
contract; reasonableness is a function of the extent to which altera-
tion of the contract was prompted by circumstances unforeseen at
tices Rehnquist and Stevens joined both opinions of the Court. Of the three remain-
ing Justices, who did not participate in one or the other case, Justice Blackmun
wrote the opinion in United States Trust while Justice Stewart wrote the opinion in
Spannaus and Justice Powell joined it.
2104 United States Trust involved a repeal of a covenant statutorily enacted to
encourage persons to purchase New York-New Jersey Port Authority bonds by limit-
ing the Authority’s ability to subsidize rail passenger transportation. Spannaus in-
volved a statute requiring prescribed employers who had a qualified pension plan to
provide funds sufficient to cover full pensions for all employees who had worked at
least 10 years if the employer either terminated the plan or closed his offices in the
state, a law that greatly altered the company’s liabilities under its contractual pen-
sion plan.
2105 431 U.S. at 21; 438 U.S. at 244.
2106 431 U.S. at 22–26; 438 U.S. at 248.
2107 438 U.S. at 245.
2108 431 U.S. at 17–21 (the Court was unsure of the value of the interest im-
paired but deemed it “an important security provision”); 438 U.S. 244–47 (statute
mandated company to recalculate, and in one lump sum, contributions previously
adequate).
Sec. 10—Powers Denied to the States Cl. 2—Duties on Exports and Imports
the time of its formation. The repeal of the covenant in issue was
found to fail both prongs of the test.2109
In Spannaus, the Court drew from its prior cases four stan-
dards: did the law deal with a broad generalized economic or social
problem, did it operate in an area already subject to state regula-
tion at the time the contractual obligations were entered into, did
it effect simply a temporary alteration of the contractual relation-
ship, and did the law operate upon a broad class of affected indi-
viduals or concerns. The Court found that the challenged law did
not possess any of these attributes and thus struck it down.2110
Whether these two cases portend an active judicial review of
economic regulatory activities, in contrast to the extreme deference
shown such legislation under the due process and equal protection
clauses, is problematical. Both cases contain language emphasizing
the breadth of the police powers of government that may be used
to further the public interest and admitting limited judicial scru-
tiny. Nevertheless, “[i]f the Contract Clause is to retain any mean-
ing at all . . . it must be understood to impose some limits upon
the power of a State to abridge existing contractual relationships,
even in the exercise of its otherwise legitimate police power.” 2111
Clause 2. No State shall, without the Consent of the Con-
gress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing it’s inspection
Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by
any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Trea-
sury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to
the Revision and Control of the Congress.
DUTIES ON EXPORTS OR IMPORTS
Scope
Only articles imported from or exported to a foreign country, or
“a place over which the Constitution has not extended its com-
2109 431 U.S. at 25–32 (state could have modified the impairment to achieve its
purposes without totally abandoning the covenant, though the Court reserved judg-
ment whether lesser impairments would have been constitutional, id. at 30 n.28,
and it had alternate means to achieve its purposes; the need for mass transporta-
tion was obvious when covenant was enacted and state could not claim that unfore-
seen circumstances had arisen.)
2110 438 U.S. at 244–51. See also Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983)
(emphasizing the first but relying on all but the third of these tests in upholding a
prohibition on pass-through of an oil and gas severance tax).
2111 438 U.S. at 242 (emphasis by Court).
mands with respect to imports and their taxation,” are compre-

hended by the terms “imports” and “exports.” 2112 With respect to
exports, the exemption from taxation “attaches to the export and
not to the article before its exportation,” 2113 requiring an essen-
tially factual inquiry into whether there have been acts of move-
ment toward a final destination constituting sufficient entrance into
the export stream as to invoke the protection of the clause.2114 To
determine how long imported wares remain under the protection of
this clause, the Supreme Court enunciated the original package doc-
trine in the leading case of Brown v. Maryland. “When the im-
porter has so acted upon the thing imported,” wrote Chief Justice
Marshall, “that it has become incorporated and mixed up with the
mass of property in the country, it has, perhaps, lost its distinctive
character as an import, and has become subject to the taxing power
of the State; but while remaining the property of the importer, in
his warehouse, in the original form or package in which it was im-
ported, a tax upon it is too plainly a duty on imports, to escape the
prohibition in the Constitution.” 2115 A box, case, or bale in which
separate parcels of goods have been placed by the foreign seller is
regarded as the original package, and upon the opening of such con-
tainer for the purpose of using the separate parcels, or of exposing
them for sale, each loses its character as an import and becomes
subject to taxation as a part of the general mass of property in the
state.2116 Imports for manufacture cease to be such when the in-
tended processing takes place,2117 or when the original packages are
broken.2118 Where a manufacturer imports merchandise and stores
it in his warehouse in the original packages, that merchandise does
not lose its quality as an import, at least so long as it is not re-
quired to meet such immediate needs.2119 The purchaser of im-
ported goods is deemed to be the importer if he was the efficient
2112 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 673 (1945). Goods brought from
another State are not within the clause. Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123
(1869). Justice Thomas has called recently for reconsideration of Woodruff and the
possible application of the clause to interstate imports and exports. Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 609, 621 (1997) (dis-
senting).
2113 Cornell v. Coyne, 192 U.S. 418, 427 (1904).
2114 Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946); Em-
press Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154 (1947); Kosydar v. National Cash
Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974).
2115 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 441–42 (1827).
2116 May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S. 496, 502 (1900).
2117 178 U.S. at 501; Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928);
McGoldrick v. Gulf Oil Corp., 309 U.S. 414 (1940).

2118 Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872); May v. New Orleans, 178 U.S.
496 (1900).
2119 Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S. 652, 667 (1945). But see Limbach v.
Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984) (overruling the earlier decision).
cause of the importation, whether the title to the goods vested in

him at the time of shipment, or after its arrival in this country.2120
A state franchise tax measured by properly apportioned gross re-
ceipts may be imposed upon a railroad company in respect of the
company’s receipts for services in handling imports and exports at
its marine terminal.2121
Privilege Taxes
A state law requiring importers to take out a license to sell im-
ported goods amounts to an indirect tax on imports and hence is
unconstitutional.2122 Likewise, a franchise tax upon foreign corpora-
tions engaged in importing nitrate and selling it in the original pack-
ages,2123 a tax on sales by brokers 2124 and auctioneers 2125 of im-
ported merchandise in original packages, and a tax on the sale of
goods in foreign commerce consisting of an annual license fee plus
a percentage of gross sales,2126 have been held invalid. On the other
hand, pilotage fees,2127 a tax upon the gross sales of a purchaser
from the importer,2128 a license tax upon dealing in fish which, through
processing, handling, and sale, have lost their distinctive character
as imports,2129 an annual license fee imposed on persons engaged
in buying and selling foreign bills of exchange,2130 and a tax upon
the right of an alien to receive property as heir, legatee, or donee
of a deceased person 2131 have been held not to be duties on im-
ports or exports.
Property Taxes
Overruling a line of prior decisions that it thought misinter-
preted the language of Brown v. Maryland, the Court now holds
that the clause does not prevent a state from levying a nondiscrimi-
natory, ad valorem property tax upon goods that are no longer in
2120 324 U.S. at 664.

2121 Canton R.R. v. Regan, 340 U.S. 511 (1951).
2122 Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 447 (1827).
2123 Anglo-Chilean Corp. v. Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933).
2124 Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29, 33 (1872).
2125 Cook v. Pennsylvania, 97 U.S. 566, 573 (1878).
2126 Crew Levick Co. v. Pennsylvania, 245 U.S. 292 (1917).
2127 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 313 (1851).
2128 Waring v. The Mayor, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 110, 122 (1869). See also Pervear v.
Massachusetts. 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475, 478 (1867); Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania,

171 U.S. 1, 24 (1898).
2129 Gulf Fisheries Co. v. MacInerney, 276 U.S. 124 (1928).
2130 Nathan v. Louisiana, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 73, 81 (1850).
2131 Mager v. Grima, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 490 (1850).
import transit.2132 Thus, a company’s inventory of imported tires main-

tained at its whole distribution warehouse could be included in the
state’s tax upon the entire inventory. The clause does not prohibit
every “tax” with some impact upon imports or exports but reaches
rather exactions directed only at imports or exports or commercial
activity therein as such.2133
Inspection Laws
Inspection laws “are confined to such particulars as, in the esti-
mation of the legislature and according to the customs of trade, are
deemed necessary to fit the inspected article for the market, by giv-
ing the purchaser public assurance that the article is in that condi-
tion, and of that quality, which makes it merchantable and fit for
use or consumption.” 2134 In Turner v. Maryland,2135 the Court listed
as recognized elements of inspection laws, the “quality of the ar-
ticle, form, capacity, dimensions, and weight of package, mode of
putting up, and marking and branding of various kinds . . . ” 2136
It sustained as an inspection law a charge for storage and inspec-
tion imposed upon every hogshead of tobacco grown in the state and
intended for export, which the law required to be brought to a state
warehouse to be inspected and branded. The Court has cited this
section as a recognition of a general right of the states to pass in-
spection laws, and to bring within their reach articles of interstate,
as well as of foreign, commerce.2137 But on the ground that, “it has
never been regarded as within the legitimate scope of inspection
laws to forbid trade in respect to any known article of commerce,
irrespective of its condition and quality, merely on account of its
intrinsic nature and the injurious consequence of its use or abuse,”
2132 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), overruling Low v. Aus-
tin, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 29 (1872), expressly, and, necessarily, Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945), among others. The latter case was expressly overruled
in Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984), involving the same tax
and the same parties. In Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 534
(1959), property taxes were sustained on the basis that the materials taxed had lost
their character as imports. On exports, see Selliger v. Kentucky, 213 U.S. 200 (1909)
(property tax levied on warehouse receipts for whiskey exported to Germany in-
valid). See also Itel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. 60, 76–78 (1993),
and see id. at 81–82 (Justice Scalia concurring).
2133 Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 290–94 (1976). Accord, R. J.
Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130 (1986) (tax on imported to-
bacco stored for aging in customs-bonded warehouse and destined for domestic manu-
facture and sale); but cf. Xerox Corp. v. County of Harris, 459 U.S. 145, 154 (1982)
(similar tax on goods stored in customs-bonded warehouse is preempted “by Con-
gress’ comprehensive regulation of customs duties;” case, however, dealt with goods
stored for export).
2134 Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465, 488 (1888).
2135 107 U.S. 38 (1883).
2136 107 U.S. at 55.
2137 Patapsco Guano Co. v. North Carolina, 171 U.S. 345, 361 (1898).
Sec. 10—Powers Denied to the States Cl. 3—Tonnage Duties and Interstate Compacts
it held that a state law forbidding the importation of intoxicating

liquors into the state could not be sustained as an inspection law.2138
Clause 3. No State shall, without the Consent of Congress,

lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time
of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State,
or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually in-
vaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.
TONNAGE DUTIES
The purpose of the Tonnage Clause is “to ‘restrai[n] the states
themselves from the exercise’ of the taxing power ‘injuriously to the
interests of each other.’ . . . In writing the Tonnage Clause, the Fram-
ers recognized that, if ‘the states had been left free to tax the privi-
lege of access by vessels to their harbors the prohibition [in Article
I, § 10, clause 2] against duties on imports and exports could have
been nullified by taxing the vessels transporting the merchan-
dise.’ ” 2139 The prohibition against tonnage duties embraces all taxes
and duties, regardless of their name or form, whether measured by
the tonnage of the vessel or not, that, in effect, are charges for the
privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.2140 The Tonnage
Clause, however, does not ban all “taxes which fall on vessels that
use a State’s port, harbor, or other waterways. Such a radical propo-
sition would transform the Tonnage Clause from one that protects
vessels, and their owners, from discrimination by seaboard States,
to one that gives vessels preferential treatment vis-à-vis all other
property, and its owners, in a seaboard State.” 2141 But it does not
extend to charges made by state authority, even if graduated accord-
2138 Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry., 125 U.S. 465 (1888). The Twenty-first Amend-
ment has had no effect on this principle. Department of Revenue v. Beam Distillers,
377 U.S. 341 (1964).
2139 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska, 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–310, slip
op. at 3, 4 (2009).
2140 Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama, 296 U.S. 261, 265 (1935); Cannon v. City
of New Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577, 581 (1874); Transportation Co. v. Wheeling,
99 U.S. 273, 283 (1879); Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska, 557 U.S. ___,
No. 08–310 (2009).
2141 Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, Alaska, 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–310, slip
op. at 6 (2009) (citation omitted).

ing to tonnage,2142 for services rendered to the vessel, such as pilot-

age, towage, charges for loading and unloading cargoes, wharfage,
or storage.2143
For the purpose of determining wharfage charges, it is immate-
rial whether the wharf was built by the state, a municipal corpora-
tion, or an individual. Where the wharf was owned by a city, the
fact that the city realized a profit beyond the amount expended did
not render the toll objectionable.2144 The services of harbor masters
for which fees are allowed must be actually rendered, and a law
permitting harbor masters or port wardens to impose a fee in all
cases is void.2145 A state may not levy a tonnage duty to defray the
expenses of its quarantine system,2146 but it may exact a fixed fee
for examination of all vessels passing quarantine.2147 A state li-
cense fee for ferrying on a navigable river is not a tonnage tax but
rather is a proper exercise of the police power and the fact that a
vessel is enrolled under federal law does not exempt it.2148 In the
State Tonnage Tax Cases,2149 an annual tax on steamboats mea-
sured by their registered tonnage was held invalid despite the con-
tention that it was a valid tax on the steamboat as property.
KEEPING TROOPS
This provision contemplates the use of the state’s military power
to put down an armed insurrection too strong to be controlled by
civil authority,2150 and the organization and maintenance of an ac-
tive state militia is not a keeping of troops in time of peace within
the prohibition of this clause.2151
INTERSTATE COMPACTS
Background of Clause
Except for the single limitation that the consent of Congress must
be obtained, the original inherent sovereign rights of the states to
2142 Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80 (1877); Transportation Co. v. Parkersburg,
107 U.S. 691 (1883); Ouachita Packet Co. v. Aiken, 121 U.S. 444 (1887).
2143 Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299, 314 (1851); Ex parte
McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872); Inman Steamship Co. v. Tinker, 94 U.S. 238,
243 (1877); Packet Co. v. St. Louis, 100 U.S. 423 (1880); City of Vicksburg v. Tobin,
100 U.S. 430 (1880); Packet Co. v. Catlettsburg, 105 U.S. 559 (1882).
2144 Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543, 549 (1886).
2145 Steamship Co. v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31 (1867).
2146 Peete v. Morgan, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 581 (1874).
2147 Morgan v. Louisiana, 118 U.S. 455, 462 (1886).
2148 Wiggins Ferry Co. v. City of East St. Louis, 107 U.S. 365 (1883). See also
Gloucester Ferry Co. v. Pennsylvania, 114 U.S. 196, 212 (1885); Philadelphia Steam-
ship Co. v. Pennsylvania, 122 U.S. 326, 338 (1887); Osborne v. City of Mobile, 83
U.S. (16 Wall.) 479, 481 (1873).
2149 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 217 (1871).
2150 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 45 (1849).
2151 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252 (1886).
make compacts with each other was not surrendered under the Con-
stitution.2152 “The Compact,” as the Supreme Court has put it, “adapts
to our Union of sovereign States the age-old treaty-making power
of independent sovereign nations.” 2153 In American history, the com-
pact technique can be traced back to the numerous controversies
that arose over the ill-defined boundaries of the original colonies.
These disputes were usually resolved by negotiation, with the re-
sulting agreement subject to approval by the Crown.2154 When the
political ties with Britain were broken, the Articles of Confedera-
tion provided for appeal to Congress in all disputes between two or
more states over boundaries or “any cause whatever” 2155 and re-
quired the approval of Congress for any “treaty confederation or al-
liance” to which a state should be a party.2156
The Framers of the Constitution went further. By the first clause
of this section they laid down an unqualified prohibition against “any
treaty, alliance or confederation,” and by the third clause they re-
quired the consent of Congress for “any agreement or compact.” The
significance of this distinction was pointed out by Chief Justice Taney
in Holmes v. Jennison: 2157 “[A]s these words [‘agreement’ and ‘com-
pact’] could not have been idly or superfluously used by the fram-
ers of the constitution, they cannot be construed to mean the same
thing with the word treaty. They evidently mean something more,
and were designed to make the prohibition more comprehen-
sive. . . . The word ‘agreement,’ does not necessarily import any di-
rect and express stipulation; nor is it necessary that it should be in
writing. If there is a verbal understanding, to which both parties
have assented, and upon which both are acting, it is an ‘agree-
ment.’ And the use of all of these terms, ‘treaty,’ ‘agreement,’ ‘com-
pact,’ show that it was the intention of the framers of the constitu-
tion to use the broadest and most comprehensive terms; and that
they anxiously desired to cut off all connection or communication
between a state and a foreign power; and we shall fail to execute
that evident intention, unless we give to the word ‘agreement’ its
most extended signification; and so apply it as to prohibit every agree-
ment, written or verbal, formal or informal[,] positive or implied,
by the mutual understanding of the parties.” 2158 But, in Virginia v.
2152 Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837).

2153 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104
(1938).
2154 Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685, 691 (1925).

2155 Article IX.
2156 Article VI.
2157 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540 (1840).
2158 39 U.S. at 571, 572.
Tennessee,2159 decided more than a half century later, the Court shifted
position, holding that the unqualified prohibition of compacts and
agreements between states without the consent of Congress did not
apply to agreements concerning such minor matters as adjust-
ments of boundaries, which have no tendency to increase the politi-
cal powers of the contracting states or to encroach upon the just
supremacy of the United States. Adhering to this later understand-
ing of the clause, the Court found no enhancement of state power
in relation to the Federal Government through entry into the
Multistate Tax Compact, and thus sustained the agreement among
participating states without congressional consent.2160
Subject Matter of Interstate Compacts

For many years after the Constitution was adopted, boundary
disputes continued to predominate as the subject matter of agree-
ments among the states. Since the turn of the twentieth century,
however, the interstate compact has been used to an increasing ex-
tent as an instrument for state cooperation in carrying out affirma-
tive programs for solving common problems.2161 The execution of
vast public undertakings, such as the development of the Port of
New York by the Port Authority created by compact between New
York and New Jersey, flood control, the prevention of pollution, and
the conservation and allocation of water supplied by interstate streams,
are among the objectives accomplished by this means. Another im-
portant use of this device was recognized by Congress in the act of
June 6, 1934,2162 whereby it consented in advance to agreements
for the control of crime. The first response to this stimulus was the
Crime Compact of 1934, providing for the supervision of parolees
and probationers, to which most of the states have given adher-
ence.2163 Subsequently, Congress has authorized, on varying condi-
tions, compacts touching the production of tobacco, the conserva-
tion of natural gas, the regulation of fishing in inland waters, the
furtherance of flood and pollution control, and other matters. More-
over, many states have set up permanent commissions for inter-
state cooperation, which have led to the formation of a Council of
State Governments, the creation of special commissions for the study
2159 148 U.S. 503, 518 (1893). See also Stearns v. Minnesota, 179 U.S. 223, 244
(1900).
2160 United States Steel Corp. v. Multistate Tax Comm’n, 434 U.S. 452 (1978).
See also New Hampshire v. Maine, 426 U.S. 363 (1976).

2161 Frankfurter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution: A Study
in Interstate Adjustments, 34 YALE L.J. 685 (1925); F. ZIMMERMAN AND M. WENDELL, IN-
TERSTATE COMPACTS SINCE 1925 (1951); F. ZIMMERMAN AND M. WENDELL, THE LAW AND USE
OF INTERSTATE COMPACTS (1961).
2162 48 Stat. 909 (1934).
2163 F. ZIMMERMAN AND M. WENDELL, INTERSTATE COMPACTS SINCE 1925 91 (1951).
of the crime problem, the problem of highway safety, the trailer prob-
lem, problems created by social security legislation, and the fram-
ing of uniform state legislation for dealing with some of these.2164
Consent of Congress
The Constitution makes no provision with regard to the time
when the consent of Congress shall be given or the mode or form
by which it shall be signified.2165 While the consent will usually pre-
cede the compact or agreement, it may be given subsequently where
the agreement relates to a matter which could not be well consid-
ered until its nature is fully developed.2166 The required consent is
not necessarily an expressed consent; it may be inferred from cir-
cumstances.2167 It is sufficiently indicated, when not necessary to
be made in advance, by the approval of proceedings taken under
it.2168 The consent of Congress may be granted conditionally “upon
terms appropriate to the subject and transgressing no constitu-
tional limitations.” 2169 Congress does not, by giving its consent to a
compact, relinquish or restrict its own powers, as for example, its
power to regulate interstate commerce.2170
Grants of Franchise to Corporations by Two States

It is competent for a railroad corporation organized under the
laws of one state, when authorized so to do by the consent of the
state that created it, to accept authority from another state to ex-
tend its railroad into such state and to receive a grant of powers to
own and control, by lease or purchase, railroads therein and to sub-
ject itself to such rules and regulations as may be prescribed by
the second state. Such legislation on the part of two or more states
is not, in the absence of inhibitory legislation by Congress, re-
garded as within the constitutional prohibition of agreements or com-
pacts between states.2171
2164 7 U.S.C. § 515; 15 U.S.C. § 717j; 16 U.S.C. § 552; 33 U.S.C. §§ 11, 567–
567b.
2165 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 85 (1823).
2166 Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U.S. 503 (1893).
2167 Virginia v. West Virginia, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 39 (1871).
2168 Wharton v. Wise, 153 U.S. 155, 173 (1894).
2169 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134 (1937). See also Arizona v.
California, 292 U.S. 341, 345 (1934). When it approved the New York-New Jersey
Waterfront Compact, 67 Stat. 541, Congress, for the first time, expressly gave its
consent to the subsequent adoption of implementing legislation by the participating
states. DeVeau v. Braisted, 363 U.S. 144, 145 (1960).
2170 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.) 421,
433 (1856).
2171 St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545, 562 (1896).
Legal Effect of Interstate Compacts

Whenever, by the agreement of the states concerned and the
consent of Congress, an interstate compact comes into operation, it
has the same effect as a treaty between sovereign powers. Bound-
aries established by such compacts become binding upon all citi-
zens of the signatory states and are conclusive as to their rights.2172
Private rights may be affected by agreements for the equitable ap-
portionment of the water of an interstate stream, without a judi-
cial determination of existing rights.2173 Valid interstate compacts
are within the protection of the Contract Clause,2174 and a “sue and
be sued” provision therein operates as a waiver of immunity from
suit in federal courts otherwise afforded by the Eleventh Amend-
ment.2175 The Supreme Court in the exercise of its original jurisdic-
tion may enforce interstate compacts following principles of gen-
eral contract law.2176 Congress also has authority to compel compliance
with such compacts.2177 Nor may a state read herself out of a com-
pact which she has ratified and to which Congress has consented
by pleading that under the state’s constitution as interpreted by the
highest state court she had lacked power to enter into such an agree-
ment and was without power to meet certain obligations thereun-
der. The final construction of the state constitution in such a case
rests with the Supreme Court.2178
2172 Poole v. Fleeger, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 185, 209 (1837); Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 725 (1838).

2173 Hinderlider v. La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 104,
106 (1938).
2174 Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 13 (1823); Virginia v. West Virginia,
246 U.S. 565 (1918). See also Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54
U.S. (13 How.) 518, 566 (1852); Olin v. Kitzmiller, 259 U.S. 260 (1922).
2175 Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm’n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959).
2176 Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124 (1987). If the compact makes no provi-
sion for resolving impasse, then the Court may exercise its jurisdiction to apportion
waters of interstate streams. In doing so, however, the Court will not rewrite the
compact by ordering appointment of a third voting commissioner to serve as a tie-
breaker; rather, the Court will attempt to apply the compact to the extent that its
provisions govern the controversy. Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554 (1983).
2177 Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S. 565, 601 (1918).
2178 Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22 (1951).
ARTICLE II
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
CONTENTS
Page
Section 1. The President ........................................................................................................... 431
Clause 1. Powers and Term of the President ................................................................... 431
Nature and Scope of Presidential Power .................................................................. 431
Creation of the Presidency .................................................................................. 431
Executive Power: Theory of the Presidential Office .......................................... 433
Hamilton and Madison ................................................................................. 434
The Myers Case ............................................................................................ 436
The Curtiss-Wright Case .............................................................................. 436
The Youngstown Case ................................................................................... 438
The Practice in the Presidential Office ....................................................... 439
Executive Power: Separation-of-Powers Judicial Protection ............................ 440
Tenure ........................................................................................................................... 445
Clauses 2–4. Election ......................................................................................................... 446
Electoral College .......................................................................................................... 447
“Appoint” ............................................................................................................... 447
State Discretion in Choosing Electors ................................................................ 448
Constitutional Status of Electors ........................................................................ 450
Electors as Free Agents ....................................................................................... 451
Clause 5. Qualifications ..................................................................................................... 453
Clause 6. Presidential Succession ..................................................................................... 454
Clause 7. Compensation and Emoluments ....................................................................... 455
Clause 8. Oath of Office ..................................................................................................... 455
Section 2. Powers and Duties of the President ....................................................................... 456
Clause 1. Commander-In-Chiefship; Presidential Advisers; Pardons ............................ 456
Commander-In-Chief ................................................................................................... 457
Development of the Concept ............................................................................... 457
The Limited View .......................................................................................... 457
The Prize Cases ............................................................................................ 458
Impact of the Prize Cases on World Wars I and II ................................... 459
Presidential Theory of the Commander-in-Chiefship in World War II—And
Beyond ............................................................................................................... 460
Presidential War Agencies ............................................................................ 461
Constitutional Status of Presidential Agencies .......................................... 461
Evacuation of the West Coast Japanese ..................................................... 462
Presidential Government of Labor Regulations ......................................... 463
Sanctions Implementing Presidential Directives ....................................... 464
The Postwar Period ...................................................................................... 465
The Cold War and After: Presidential Power To Use Troops Overseas With-
out Congressional Authorization ..................................................................... 467
The Historic Use of Force Abroad ............................................................... 468
The Theory of Presidential Power ............................................................... 470
The Power of Congress to Control the President’s Discretion .................. 471
The President as Commander of the Armed Forces ......................................... 474
427
428 ART. II—EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
Section 2. Powers and Duties of the President—Continued

Clause 1. Commander-In-Chiefship; Presidential Advisers; Pardons—Continued
The Commander-in-Chief a Civilian Officer ............................................... 476
Martial Law and Constitutional Limitations .................................................... 477
Martial Law in Hawaii ................................................................................. 479
Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs ........................................................... 480
Articles of War: World War II Crimes ......................................................... 482
Articles of War: Response to the Attacks of September 11, 2001 ............. 482
Martial Law and Domestic Disorder ........................................................... 484
Presidential Advisers .................................................................................................. 485
The Cabinet .......................................................................................................... 485
Pardons and Reprieves ............................................................................................... 486
The Legal Nature of a Pardon ............................................................................ 486
Scope of the Power ............................................................................................... 488
Offenses Against the United States: Contempt of Court .......................... 489
Effects of a Pardon: Ex parte Garland ........................................................ 490
Limits to the Efficacy of a Pardon ............................................................... 491
Congress and Amnesty ........................................................................................ 492
Clause 2. Treaties and Appointment of Officers .............................................................. 492
The Treaty-Making Power .......................................................................................... 493
President and Senate ........................................................................................... 493
Negotiation, a Presidential Monopoly ......................................................... 493
Treaties as Law of the Land ............................................................................... 494
Origin of the Conception .............................................................................. 497
Treaties and the States ................................................................................ 497
Treaties and Congress .................................................................................. 500
Congressional Repeal of Treaties ................................................................ 502
Treaties Versus Prior Acts of Congress ....................................................... 503
When Is a Treaty Self-Executing ................................................................. 504
Treaties and the Necessary and Proper Clause ......................................... 505
Constitutional Limitations on the Treaty Power .............................................. 507
Interpretation and Termination of Treaties as International Compacts ........ 512
Termination of Treaties by Notice ............................................................... 512
Determination Whether a Treaty Has Lapsed ........................................... 516
Status of a Treaty a Political Question ....................................................... 516
Indian Treaties ..................................................................................................... 517
Present Status of Indian Treaties ............................................................... 518
International Agreements Without Senate Approval ............................................... 519
Executive Agreements by Authorization of Congress ....................................... 520
Reciprocal Trade Agreements ...................................................................... 521
The Constitutionality of Trade Agreements ............................................... 521
The Lend-Lease Act ...................................................................................... 522
International Organizations ......................................................................... 523
Executive Agreements Authorized by Treaties .................................................. 523
Arbitration Agreements ................................................................................ 523
Agreements Under the United Nations Charter ........................................ 523
Status of Forces Agreements ....................................................................... 524
Executive Agreements on the Sole Constitutional Authority of the
President ........................................................................................................... 525
The Litvinov Agreement ............................................................................... 527
The Hull-Lothian Agreement ....................................................................... 528
The Post-War Years ...................................................................................... 528
The Domestic Obligation of Executive Agreements .......................................... 529
ART. II—EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT 429
Section 2. Powers and Duties of the President—Continued

Clause 2. Treaties and Appointment of Officers—Continued
State Laws Affecting Foreign Relations—Dormant Federal Power and
Preemption ........................................................................................................ 532
The Executive Establishment .................................................................................... 535
Office ...................................................................................................................... 535
Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers .................................................. 535
Presidential Diplomatic Agents ................................................................... 537
Appointments and Congressional Regulation of Offices ................................... 539
Congressional Regulation of Conduct in Office .......................................... 544
The Loyalty Issue ......................................................................................... 546
Financial Disclosure and Limitations ......................................................... 547
Legislation Increasing Duties of an Officer ................................................ 547
Stages of Appointment Process ........................................................................... 548
Nomination .................................................................................................... 548
Senate Approval ............................................................................................ 548
When Senate Consent Is Complete ............................................................. 548
The Removal Power ............................................................................................. 549
The Myers Case ............................................................................................ 549
The Humphrey Case ..................................................................................... 552
The Wiener Case ........................................................................................... 553
The Watergate Controversy ......................................................................... 553
The Removal Power Rationalized ................................................................ 554
Inferior Officers ............................................................................................. 558
The Presidential Aegis: Demands for Papers .................................................... 559
Private Access to Government Information ................................................ 561
Prosecutorial and Grand Jury Access to Presidential Documents ........... 563
Congressional Access to Executive Branch Information ........................... 566
Clause 3. Vacancies During Recess of Senate .................................................................. 567
Recess Appointments .................................................................................................. 567
Judicial Appointments ......................................................................................... 572
Ad Interim Designations ..................................................................................... 573
Section 3. Legislative, Diplomatic, and Law Enforcement Duties of the President ............ 573
Legislative Role of the President ...................................................................................... 573
The Conduct of Foreign Relations .................................................................................... 574
The Right of Reception: Scope of the Power ............................................................. 574
The Presidential Monopoly ......................................................................................... 574
The Logan Act ...................................................................................................... 575
A Formal or a Formative Power ......................................................................... 576
The President’s Diplomatic Role ......................................................................... 576
Jefferson’s Real Position ...................................................................................... 577
The Power of Recognition ........................................................................................... 577
The Case of Cuba ................................................................................................. 578
The Power of Nonrecognition .............................................................................. 580
Congressional Implementation of Presidential Policies ........................................... 580
The Doctrine of Political Questions ........................................................................... 582
Recent Statements of the Doctrine ..................................................................... 583
The President As Law Enforcer ........................................................................................ 586
Powers Derived From The “Take Care” Duty ........................................................... 586
Impoundment of Appropriated Funds ....................................................................... 589
Power and Duty of the President in Relation to Subordinate Executive
Officers ...................................................................................................................... 592
Administrative Decentralization Versus Jacksonian Centralism .................... 593
Section 3. Legislative, Diplomatic, and Law Enforcement Duties of the President—Continued

The President As Law Enforcer—Continued
Congressional Power Versus Presidential Duty to the Law ............................ 594
Myers Versus Morrison ........................................................................................ 595
Power of the President to Guide Enforcement of the Penal Law .................... 596
The President as Law Interpreter ............................................................................. 597
Military Power in Law Enforcement: The Posse Comitatus ................................... 598
Suspension of Habeas Corpus by the President ....................................................... 599
Preventive Martial Law .............................................................................................. 600
The Debs Case ...................................................................................................... 600
Present Status of the Debs Case ........................................................................ 601
The President’s Duty in Cases of Domestic Violence in the States ........................ 602
The President as Executor of the Law of Nations ................................................... 602
Protection of American Rights of Person and Property Abroad ..................................... 603
Congress and the President versus Foreign Expropriation .................................... 604
Presidential Action In the Domain of Congress: the Steel Seizure Case ...................... 605
The Doctrine of the Opinion of the Court ................................................................. 606
The Doctrine Considered ............................................................................................ 606
Power Denied by Congress ......................................................................................... 609
Presidential Immunity From Judicial Direction ............................................................. 611
Unofficial Conduct ....................................................................................................... 615
The President’s Subordinates ..................................................................................... 616
Commissioning Officers ...................................................................................................... 617
Section 4. Impeachment ............................................................................................................ 618
Impeachment ...................................................................................................................... 618
Persons Subject to Impeachment ............................................................................... 619
Judges ................................................................................................................... 619
Judgment—Removal and Disqualification ................................................................ 621
Impeachable Offenses ................................................................................................. 622
The Chase Impeachment ............................................................................................ 624
Other Impeachments of Judges ................................................................................. 624
The Johnson Impeachment ........................................................................................ 625
The Nixon Impeachment Proceedings ....................................................................... 626
The Clinton Impeachment .......................................................................................... 628
Judicial Review of Impeachments ............................................................................. 631
EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT
ARTICLE II
SECTION 1. Clause 1. The executive Power shall be vested in

a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his
Office during the Term of four Years and, together with the Vice
President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows:
NATURE AND SCOPE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
Creation of the Presidency

Of all the issues confronting the members of the Philadelphia
Convention, the nature of the presidency ranks among the most im-
portant and the resolution of the question one of the most signifi-
cant steps taken.1 The immediate source of Article II was the New
York constitution, in which the governor was elected by the people
and was thus independent of the legislature, his term was three
years and he was indefinitely re-eligible, his decisions except with
regard to appointments and vetoes were unencumbered with a coun-
cil, he was in charge of the militia, he possessed the pardoning power,
and he was charged to take care that the laws were faithfully ex-
ecuted.2 But, from when the Convention assembled and almost to
its closing days, there was no assurance that the executive depart-
ment would not be headed by plural administrators, would not be
unalterably tied to the legislature, and would not be devoid of many
of the powers normally associated with an executive.
Debate in the Convention proceeded against a background of
many things, but most certainly uppermost in the delegates’ minds
was the experience of the states and of the national government
under the Articles of Confederation. Reacting to the exercise of pow-
ers by the royal governors, the framers of the state constitutions
had generally created weak executives and strong legislatures, though
1 The background and the action of the Convention is comprehensively exam-
ined in C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789 (1923). A review of the
Constitution’s provisions being put into operation is J. HART, THE AMERICAN PRESI-
DENCY IN ACTION 1789 (1948).
2 Hamilton observed the similarities and differences between the President and
the New York Governor in THE FEDERALIST, No. 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 462–470. On
the text, see New York Constitution of 1777, Articles XVII–XIX, in 5 F. Thorpe, The
Federal and State Constitutions, H. DOC. NO. 357, 59th Congress, 2d sess. (1909),
2632–2633.
431
Sec. 1—The President Clause 1—Powers and Term of the President
not in all instances. The Articles of Confederation vested all pow-

ers in a unicameral congress. Experience had demonstrated that harm
was to be feared as much from an unfettered legislature as from
an uncurbed executive and that many advantages of a reasonably
strong executive could not be conferred on the legislative body.3
Nevertheless, the Virginia Plan, which formed the basis of dis-
cussion, offered in somewhat vague language a weak executive. Se-
lection was to be by the legislature, and that body was to deter-
mine the major part of executive competency. The executive’s salary
was, however, to be fixed and not subject to change by the legisla-
tive branch during the term of the executive, and he was ineligible
for re-election so that he need not defer overly to the legislature. A
council of revision was provided, of which the executive was a part,
with power to negative national and state legislation. The execu-
tive power was said to be the power to “execute the national laws”
and to “enjoy the Executive rights vested in Congress by the Con-
federation.” The Plan did not provide for a single or plural execu-
tive, leaving that issue open.4
When the executive portion of the Plan was taken up on June
1, James Wilson immediately moved that the executive should con-
sist of a single person.5 In the course of his remarks, Wilson dem-
onstrated his belief in a strong executive, advocating election by the
people, which would free the executive of dependence on the na-
tional legislature and on the states, proposing indefinite re-
eligibility, and preferring an absolute negative though in concur-
rence with a council of revision.6 The vote on Wilson’s motion was
put over until the questions of method of selection, term, mode of
removal, and powers to be conferred had been considered; subse-
quently, the motion carried,7 and the possibility of the development
of a strong President was made real.
Only slightly less important was the decision finally arrived at
not to provide for an executive council, which would participate not
only in the executive’s exercise of the veto power but also in the
exercise of all his executive duties, notably appointments and treaty
making. Despite strong support for such a council, the Convention
3 C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789 chs. 1–3 (1923).

4 The plans offered and the debate is reviewed in C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE
PRESIDENCY 1775–1789 ch. 4 (1923). The text of the Virginia Plan may be found in 1
M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 21 (rev. ed. 1937).
5 Id. at 65.
6 Id. at 65, 66, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73.
7 Id. at 93.
ultimately rejected the proposal and adopted language vesting in

the Senate the power to “advise and consent” with regard to these
matters.8
Finally, the designation of the executive as the “President of the
United States” was made in a tentative draft reported by the Com-
mittee on Detail 9 and accepted by the Convention without discus-
sion.10 The same clause had provided that the President’s title was
to be “His Excellency,” 11 and, while this language was also ac-
cepted without discussion,12 it was subsequently omitted by the Com-
mittee on Style and Arrangement 13 with no statement of the rea-
son and no comment in the Convention.
Executive Power: Theory of the Presidential Office

The most obvious meaning of the language of Article II, § 1, is
to confirm that the executive power is vested in a single person,
but almost from the beginning it has been contended that the words
mean much more than this simple designation of locus. Indeed, con-
tention with regard to this language reflects the much larger de-
bate about the nature of the Presidency. With Justice Jackson, we
“may be surprised at the poverty of really useful and unambiguous
authority applicable to concrete problems of executive power as they
actually present themselves. Just what our forefathers did envi-
sion, or would have envisioned had they foreseen modern condi-
tions, must be divined from materials almost as enigmatic as the
dreams Joseph was called upon to interpret for Pharaoh. A century
and a half of partisan debate and scholarly speculation yields no
net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from re-
spected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel
each other.” 14 At the least, it is no doubt true that the “loose and
general expressions” by which the powers and duties of the execu-
tive branch are denominated 15 place the President in a position in
which he, as Professor Woodrow Wilson noted, “has the right, in
law and conscience, to be as big a man as he can” and in which
“only his capacity will set the limit.” 16
8 The last proposal for a council was voted down on September 7. 2 id. at 542.
9 Id. at 185.
10 Id. at 401.
11 Id. at 185.
12 Id. at 401.
13 Id. at 597.
14 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 634–635 (1952) (con-
curring opinion).
15 A. UPSHUR, A BRIEF ENQUIRY INTO THE TRUE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF OUR FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT 116 (1840).

16 W. WILSON, CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE UNITED STATES 202, 205 (1908).
Hamilton and Madison.—Hamilton’s defense of President Wash-

ington’s issuance of a neutrality proclamation upon the outbreak of
war between France and Great Britain contains not only the lines
but most of the content of the argument that Article II vests signifi-
cant powers in the President as possessor of executive powers not
enumerated in subsequent sections of Article II.17 Hamilton wrote:
“The second article of the Constitution of the United States, sec-
tion first, establishes this general proposition, that ‘the Executive
Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.’
The same article, in a succeeding section, proceeds to delineate par-
ticular cases of executive power. It declares, among other things,
that the president shall be commander in chief of the army and
navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several states,
when called into the actual service of the United States; that he
shall have power, by and with the advice and consent of the sen-
ate, to make treaties; that it shall be his duty to receive ambassa-
dors and other public ministers, and to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed. It would not consist with the rules of sound con-
struction, to consider this enumeration of particular authorities as
derogating from the more comprehensive grant in the general clause,
further than as it may be coupled with express restrictions or limi-
tations; as in regard to the co-operation of the senate in the appoint-
ment of officers, and the making of treaties; which are plainly quali-
fications of the general executive powers of appointing officers and
making treaties.”
“The difficulty of a complete enumeration of all the cases of ex-
ecutive authority, would naturally dictate the use of general terms,
and would render it improbable that a specification of certain par-
ticulars was designed as a substitute for those terms, when ante-
cedently used. The different mode of expression employed in the con-
stitution, in regard to the two powers, the legislative and the executive,
serves to confirm this inference. In the article which gives the leg-
islative powers of the government, the expressions are, ‘All legisla-
tive powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States.’ In that which grants the executive power, the expressions
are, ‘The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United
States.’ The enumeration ought therefore to be considered, as in-
tended merely to specify the principal articles implied in the defini-
tion of executive power; leaving the rest to flow from the general
grant of that power, interpreted in conformity with other parts of
the Constitution, and with the principles of free government. The
general doctrine of our Constitution then is, that the executive power
17 32 WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 430 (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1939). See C. THOMAS,
AMERICAN NEUTRALITY IN 1793: A STUDY IN CABINET GOVERNMENT (1931).

of the nation is vested in the President; subject only to the excep-

tions and qualifications, which are expressed in the instrument.” 18
Madison’s reply to Hamilton, in five closely reasoned articles,19
was almost exclusively directed to Hamilton’s development of the
contention from the quoted language that the conduct of foreign re-
lations was in its nature an executive function and that the powers
vested in Congress which bore on this function, such as the power
to declare war, did not diminish the discretion of the President in
the exercise of his powers. Madison’s principal reliance was on the
vesting of the power to declare war in Congress, thus making it a
legislative function rather than an executive one, combined with the
argument that possession of the exclusive power carried with it the
exclusive right to judgment about the obligations to go to war or to
stay at peace, negating the power of the President to proclaim the
nation’s neutrality. Implicit in the argument was the rejection of
the view that the first section of Article II bestowed powers not vested
in subsequent sections. “Were it once established that the powers
of war and treaty are in their nature executive; that so far as they
are not by strict construction transferred to the legislature, they
actually belong to the executive; that of course all powers not less
executive in their nature than those powers, if not granted to the
legislature, may be claimed by the executive; if granted, are to be
taken strictly, with a residuary right in the executive; or . . . per-
haps claimed as a concurrent right by the executive; and no citizen
could any longer guess at the character of the government under
which he lives; the most penetrating jurist would be unable to scan
the extent of constructive prerogative.” 20 The arguments are today
pursued with as great fervor, as great learning, and with two hun-
dred years experience, but the constitutional part of the contentious-
ness still settles upon the reading of the vesting clauses of Articles
I, II, and III.21
18 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 80–81 (J. C. Hamilton ed., 1851) (empha-
sis in original).
19 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 611–654 (1865).
20 Id. at 621. In the congressional debates on the President’s power to remove
executive officeholders, cf. C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789 ch. 6
(1923), Madison had urged contentions quite similar to Hamilton’s, finding in the
first section of Article II and in the obligation to execute the laws a vesting of execu-
tive powers sufficient to contain the power solely on his behalf to remove subordi-
nates. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 496–497. Madison’s language here was to be heavily
relied on by Chief Justice Taft on this point in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
115–126 (1926), but compare, Corwin, The President’s Removal Power Under the Con-
stitution, in 4 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1467, 1474–1483, 1485–1486 (1938).
21 Compare Calabresi & Rhodes, The Structural Constitution: Unitary Execu-
tive, Plural Judiciary, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1155 (1992), with Froomkin, The Imperial
Presidency’s New Vestments, 88 NW. U. L. REV. 1346 (1994), and responses by Calabresi,
Rhodes and Froomkin, id. at 1377, 1406, 1420.
The Myers Case.—However much the two arguments are still

subject to dispute, Chief Justice Taft, himself a former President,
appears in Myers v. United States 22 to have carried a majority of
the Court with him in establishing the Hamiltonian conception as
official doctrine. That case confirmed one reading of the “Decision
of 1789” in holding the removal power to be constitutionally vested
in the President.23 But its importance here lies in its interpreta-
tion of the first section of Article II. That language was read, with
extensive quotation from Hamilton and from Madison on the re-
moval power, as vesting all executive power in the President, the
subsequent language was read as merely particularizing some of
this power, and consequently the powers vested in Congress were
read as exceptions which must be strictly construed in favor of pow-
ers retained by the President.24 Myers remains the fountainhead of
the latitudinarian constructionists of presidential power, but its dicta,
with regard to the removal power, were first circumscribed in Hum-
phrey’s Executor v. United States,25 and then considerably altered
in Morrison v. Olson; 26 with regard to the President’s “inherent”
powers, the Myers dicta were called into considerable question by
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.27
The Curtiss-Wright Case.—Further Court support of the Hamiltonian
view was advanced in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,28
in which Justice Sutherland posited the doctrine that the power of the
National Government in foreign relations is not one of enumerated pow-
ers, but rather is inherent. The doctrine was then combined with Ham-
ilton’s contention that control of foreign relations is exclusively an ex-
ecutive function with obvious implications for the power of the President.
The case arose as a challenge to the delegation of power from Con-
gress to the President with regard to a foreign relations matter. Jus-
tice Sutherland denied that the limitations on delegation in the do-
mestic field were at all relevant in foreign affairs:
22 272 U.S. 52 (1926). See Corwin, The President’s Removal Power Under the
Constitution, in 4 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1467 (1938).

23 C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789, ch. 6 (1923).
24 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 163–164 (1926). Professor Taft had held
different views. “The true view of the executive functions is, as I conceive it, that
the president can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably traced to
some specific grant of power or justly implied and included within such express grant
as proper and necessary in its exercise. Such specific grant must be either in the
federal constitution or in an act of Congress passed in pursuance thereof. There is
no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because it seems to him to
be in the public interest. . . .” W. TAFT, OUR CHIEF MAGISTRATE AND HIS POWERS 139–
140 (1916).
25 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
26 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988).
27 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
28 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
“The broad statement that the Federal Government can exer-

cise no powers except those specifically enumerated in the Consti-
tution, and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry
into effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in re-
spect of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of
the Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative
powers then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought
desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those not in-
cluded in the enumeration still in the states. . . . That this doc-
trine applies only to powers which the states had, is self evident.
And since the states severally never possessed international pow-
ers, such powers could not have been carved from the mass of state
powers but obviously were transmitted to the United States from
some other source. . . .”
“As a result of the separation from Great Britain by the colo-
nies acting as a unit, the powers of external sovereignty passed from
the Crown not to the colonies severally, but to the colonies in their
collective and corporate capacity as the United States of America. . . .”
“It results that the investment of the Federal Government with
the powers of external sovereignty did not depend upon the affirma-
tive grants of the Constitution. The powers to declare and wage war,
to conclude peace, to make treaties, to maintain diplomatic rela-
tions with other sovereignties, if they had never been mentioned in
the Constitution, would have been vested in the Federal Govern-
ment as necessary concomitants of nationality. . . .”
“Not only . . . is the federal power over external affairs in ori-
gin and essential character different from that over internal af-
fairs, but participation in the exercise of power is significantly lim-
ited. In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the power
to speak or listen as a representative of the nation.” 29
Scholarly criticism of Justice Sutherland’s reasoning has dem-
onstrated that his essential postulate, the passing of sovereignty in
external affairs directly from the British Crown to the colonies as a
collective unit, is in error.30 Dicta in later cases controvert the con-
clusions drawn in Curtiss-Wright about the foreign relations power
being inherent rather than subject to the limitations of the del-
29 299 U.S. at 315–16, 318, 319.
30 Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s
Theory, 55 YALE L. J. 467 (1946); Patterson, In re United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 22 TEXAS L. REV. 286, 445 (1944); Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Cor-
poration: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L. J. 1 (1973), reprinted in C. LOFGREN,
GOVERNMENT FROM REFLECTION AND CHOICE: CONSTITUTIONAL ESSAYS ON WAR, FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS, AND FEDERALISM 167 (1986).
egated powers doctrine.31 The holding in Kent v. Dulles 32 that del-

egation to the Executive of discretion in the issuance of passports
must be measured by the usual standards applied in domestic del-
egations appeared to circumscribe Justice Sutherland’s more expan-
sive view, but the subsequent limitation of that decision, though for-
mally reasoned within its analytical framework, coupled with language
addressed to the President’s authority in foreign affairs, leaves clouded
the vitality of that decision.33 The case nonetheless remains with
Myers v. United States the source and support of those contending
for broad inherent executive powers.34
The Youngstown Case.—The only modern case that has exten-
sively considered the “inherent” powers of the President or the issue
of what executive powers are vested by the first section of Article II 35
31 E.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (Chief Justice Stone); Reid v. Co-
vert, 354 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1957) (plurality opinion, per Justice Black).
32 357 U.S. 116, 129 (1958).
33 Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981). For the reliance on Curtiss-Wright, see id.
at 291, 293–94 & n.24, 307–08. But see Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
659–62 (1981), qualified by id. at 678. Compare Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988)
(construing National Security Act as not precluding judicial review of constitutional
challenges to CIA Director’s dismissal of employee, over dissent relying in part on
Curtiss-Wright as interpretive force counseling denial of judicial review), with De-
partment of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518 (1988) (denying Merit Systems Protec-
tion Board authority to review the substance of an underlying security-clearance de-
termination in reviewing an adverse action and noticing favorably President’s inherent
power to protect information without any explicit legislative grant). In Loving v. United
States, 517 U.S. 748 (1996), the Court recurred to the original setting of Curtiss-
Wright, a delegation to the President without standards. Congress, the Court found,
had delegated to the President authority to structure the death penalty provisions
of military law so as to bring the procedures, relating to aggravating and mitigating
factors, into line with constitutional requirements, but Congress had provided no
standards to guide the presidential exercise of the authority. Standards were not
required, held the Court, because his role as Commander-in-Chief gave him respon-
sibility to superintend the military establishment and Congress and the President
had interlinked authorities with respect to the military. Where the entity exercising
the delegated authority itself possesses independent authority over the subject mat-
ter, the familiar limitations on delegation do not apply. Id. at 771–74.
34 That the opinion “remains authoritative doctrine” is stated in L. HENKIN, FOR-
EIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 25–26 (1972). It is used as an interpretive prec-
edent in AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE LAW, THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES see, e.g., §§ 1, 204, 339 (1987). The Restatement is
circumspect, however, about the reach of the opinion in controversies between presi-
dential and congressional powers.
35 The issue is implicit in several of the opinions of the Justices in New York
Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). See id. at 727, 728–30 (Justice Stew-
art concurring), 752, 756–59 (Justice Harlan dissenting). Assertions of inherent power
to sustain presidential action were made in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654
(1981), but the Court studiously avoided these arguments in favor of a somewhat
facile statutory analysis. Separation-of-powers analysis informed the Court’s deci-
sions in United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), Nixon v. Administrator of Gen-
eral Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977),Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), and Har-
low v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). Although perhaps somewhat latitudinarian
in some respect of the President’s powers, the analysis looks away from inherent
is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer,36 and its multiple opin-
ions make it difficult to evaluate the matter. During the Korean War,
President Truman seized the steel industry, then in the throes of a strike.
No statute authorized the seizure, and the Solicitor General de-
fended the action as an exercise of the President’s executive powers
that were conveyed by the first section of Article II, by the obligation
to enforce the laws, and by the vesting of the function of commander-
in-chief. By vote of six-to-three, the Court rejected this argument and
held the seizure void. But the doctrinal problem is complicated by the
fact that Congress had expressly rejected seizure proposals in consid-
ering labor legislation and had authorized procedures not followed by
the President that did not include seizure. Thus, four of the majority
Justices 37 appear to have been decisively influenced by the fact that
Congress had denied the power claimed and that this in an area in
which the Constitution vested the power to decide at least concur-
rently if not exclusively in Congress. Three and perhaps four Jus-
tices 38 appear to have rejected the government’s argument on the mer-
its while three 39 accepted it in large measure. Despite the inconclusiveness
of the opinions, it seems clear that the result was a substantial re-
treat from the proclamation of vast presidential powers made in My-
ers and Curtiss-Wright.40
The Practice in the Presidential Office.—However con-
tested the theory of expansive presidential powers, the practice in
fact has been one of expansion of those powers, an expansion that
a number of “weak” Presidents and the temporary ascendancy of
powers. But see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280 (1981), in which the statutory and con-
gressional ratification analyses is informed with a view of a range of presidential
foreign affairs discretion combined with judicial deference according the President
de facto much of the theoretically-based authority spelled out in Curtiss-Wright.
36 343 U.S. 579 (1952). See Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick
Without Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953). A case similar to Youngstown is AFL–

CIO v. Kahn, 618 F.2d 784 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 443 U.S. 915 (1979),
which, on the basis of statutory interpretation of certain congressional delegations,
sustained a presidential order denying government contracts to companies that failed
to comply with certain voluntary wage and price guidelines.
37 343 U.S. 593, 597–602 (Justice Frankfurter concurring, though he also noted
he expressly joined Justice Black’s opinion as well), 634, 635–40 (Justice Jackson
concurring), 655, 657 (Justice Burton concurring), 660 (Justice Clark concurring).
38 343 U.S. at 582 (Justice Black delivering the opinion of the Court), 629 (Jus-
tice Douglas concurring, but note his use of the Fifth Amendment just compensa-
tion argument), 634 (Justice Jackson concurring), 655 (Justice Burton concurring).
39 343 U.S. at 667 (Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton dissent-
ing).
40 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); United States v. Curtiss-Wright
Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936). In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 659–62, 668–69
(1981), the Court turned to Youngstown as embodying “much relevant analysis” on
an issue of presidential power. And, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23
(2006), the Court cited Youngstown with approval, as did Justice Kennedy, in a con-
curring opinion joined by three other Justices, id. at 638.
Congress in the wake of the Civil War has not stemmed. Perhaps
the point of no return in this area was reached in 1801 when the
Jefferson-Madison “strict constructionists” came to power and, in-
stead of diminishing executive power and federal power in general,
acted rather to enlarge both, notably by the latitudinarian construc-
tion of implied federal powers to justify the Louisiana Purchase.41
After a brief lapse into Cabinet government, the executive in the
hands of Andrew Jackson stamped upon the presidency the outstand-
ing features of its final character, thereby reviving, in the opinion
of Henry Jones Ford, “the oldest political institution of the race,
the elective Kingship.” 42 Although the modern theory of presiden-
tial power was conceived primarily by Alexander Hamilton, the mod-
ern conception of the presidential office was the contribution primar-
ily of Andrew Jackson.43
Executive Power: Separation-of-Powers Judicial Protection

In recent cases, the Supreme Court has pronouncedly protected
the Executive Branch, applying separation-of-powers principles to
invalidate what it perceived to be congressional usurpation of execu-
tive power, but its mode of analysis has lately shifted to permit Con-
gress a greater degree of discretion.44
Significant change in the position of the Executive Branch re-
specting its position on separation of powers may be discerned in
two briefs of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel,
which may spell some measure of judicial modification of the for-
malist doctrine of separation and adoption of the functionalist ap-
proach to the doctrine.45 The two opinions withdraw from the De-
41 For the debates on the constitutionality of the Purchase, see E. BROWN, THE
CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE LOUISIANA PURCHASE, 1803–1812 (1920). The differences

and similarities between the Jeffersonians and the Federalists can be seen by com-
paring L. WHITE, THE JEFFERSONIANS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY 1801–1829 (1951),
with L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY (1948). That the re-
sponsibilities of office did not turn the Jeffersonians into Hamiltonians may be gleaned
from Madison’s veto of an internal improvements bill. 2 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE
PRESIDENTS 569 (J. Richardson comp., 1897).
42 H. FORD, THE RISE AND GROWTH OF AMERICAN POLITICS 293 (1898).
43 E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS 1787–1957, ch. 1 (4th ed. 1957).
44 Some cases also did so prior to the present period. See Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926). But a hallmark of previous disputes between President and Con-
gress has been the use of political combat to resolve them, rather than a resort to
the courts. The beginning of the present period was Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,
109–43 (1976).
45 Memorandum for John Schmidt, Associate Attorney General, from Assistant
Attorney General Walter Dellinger, re: Constitutional Limitations on Federal Gov-

ernment Participation in Binding Arbitration (Sept. 7, 1995); Memorandum for the
General Counsels of the Federal Government, from Assistant Attorney General Wal-
ter Dellinger, re: The Constitutional Separation of Powers Between the President
and Congress (May 7, 1996). The principles laid down in the memoranda depart
partment’s earlier contention, following Buckley v. Valeo, that the

execution of the laws is an executive function that may be carried
out only by persons appointed pursuant to the Appointments Clause,
thus precluding delegations to state and local officers and to pri-
vate parties (as in qui tam actions), as well as providing glosses on
the Take Care Clause (Article II, § 3) and other provisions of the
Constitution. Whether these memoranda signal long-term change
depends on several factors, including whether they are adhered to
by subsequent administrations.
In striking down the congressional veto as circumventing Ar-
ticle I’s bicameralism and presentment requirements attending the
exercise of legislative power, the Court also suggested in INS v.
Chadha 46 that the particular provision in question, involving veto
of the Attorney General’s decision to suspend deportation of an alien,
in effect allowed Congress impermissible participation in execution
of the laws.47 And, in Bowsher v. Synar,48 the Court held that Con-
gress had invalidly vested executive functions in a legislative branch
official. Underlying both decisions was the premise, stated in Chief
Justice Burger’s opinion of the Court in Chadha, that “the powers
delegated to the three Branches are functionally identifiable,” dis-
tinct, and definable.49 In a standing-to-sue case, Justice Scalia for
the Court denied that Congress could by statute confer standing on
citizens not suffering particularized injuries to sue the Federal Gov-
ernment to compel it to carry out a duty imposed by Congress, ar-
guing that to permit this course would be to allow Congress to di-
vest the President of his obligation under the Take Care Clause and
significantly from previous positions of the Department of Justice. For conflicting

versions of the two approaches, see Constitutional Implications of the Chemical Weap-
ons Convention: Hearings on the Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights Be-
fore the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee, 104th Cong., 2d Sess. (1996), 11–26, 107–10
(Professor John C. Woo), 80–106 (Deputy Assistant Attorney General Richard L. Shif-
frin).
46 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
47 Although Chief Justice Burger’s opinion of the Court described the veto deci-
sion as legislative in character, it also seemingly alluded to the executive nature of

the decision to countermand the Attorney General’s application of delegated power
to a particular individual. “Disagreement with the Attorney General’s decision on
Chadha’s deportation . . . involves determinations of policy that Congress can imple-
ment in only one way . . . . Congress must abide by its delegation of authority until
that delegation is legislatively altered or revoked.” 462 U.S. at 954–55. The Court’s
uncertainty is explicitly spelled out in Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v.
Citizens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
48 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
49 462 U.S. at 951.
to delegate the power to the judiciary.50 On the other hand, in the

independent counsel case, although acknowledging that the con-
tested statute restricted a constitutionally delegated function (law
enforcement), the Court upheld the statute, using a flexible analy-
sis that emphasized that neither the legislative nor the judicial branch
had aggrandized its power and that the incursion into executive power
did not impermissibly interfere with the President’s constitution-
ally assigned functions.51
At issue in Synar were the responsibilities vested in the Comp-
troller General by the “Gramm-Rudman-Hollings” Deficit Control Act,52
which set maximum deficit amounts for federal spending for fiscal
years 1986 through 1991, and which directed across-the-board cuts
in spending when projected deficits would exceed the target defi-
cits. The Comptroller was to prepare a report for each fiscal year
containing detailed estimates of projected federal revenues and ex-
penditures, and specifying the reductions, if any, necessary to meet
the statutory target. The President was required to implement the
reductions specified in the Comptroller’s report. The Court viewed
these functions of the Comptroller “as plainly entailing execution
of the law in constitutional terms. Interpreting a law . . . to imple-
ment the legislative mandate is the very essence of ‘execution’ of
the law,” especially where “exercise [of] judgment” is called for, and
where the President is required to implement the interpretation.53
Because Congress by earlier enactment had retained authority to
remove the Comptroller General from office, the Court held, execu-
tive powers may not be delegated to him. “By placing the responsi-
bility for execution of the [Act] in the hands of an officer who is
50 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–78 (1992). Evidently, how-
ever, although Justices Kennedy and Souter joined this part of the opinion, id. at
579 (concurring in part and concurring in the judgment), they do not fully subscribe
to the apparent full reach of Justice Scalia’s doctrinal position, leaving the position,
if that be true, supported in full only by a plurality.
51 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988). The opinion by Chief Justice Rehnquist
was joined by seven of the eight participating Justices. Only Justice Scalia dis-
sented. In Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 390–91 (1989), the Court, ap-
proving the placement of the Sentencing Commission in the judicial branch, denied
that executive powers were diminished because of the historic judicial responsibility
to determine what sentence to impose on a convicted offender. Earlier, in Young v.
United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787 (1987), the Court, in upholding the power
of federal judges to appoint private counsel to prosecute contempt of court actions,
rejected the assertion that the judiciary usurped executive power in appointing such
counsel.
52 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L. 99–
177, 99 Stat. 1038.

53 478 U.S. at 732–33.
subject to removal only by itself, Congress in effect has retained

control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the ex-
ecutive function.” 54
The Court in Chadha and Synar ignored or rejected assertions
that its formalistic approach to separation of powers may bring into
question the validity of delegations of legislative authority to the
modern administrative state, sometimes called the “fourth branch.”
As Justice White asserted in dissent in Chadha, “by virtue of con-
gressional delegation, legislative power can be exercised by indepen-
dent agencies and Executive departments . . . . There is no ques-
tion but that agency rulemaking is lawmaking in any functional or
realistic sense of the term.” 55 Moreover, Justice White noted, “rules
and adjudications by the agencies meet the Court’s own definition
of legislative action . . . .” 56 Justice Stevens, concurring in Synar,
sounded the same chord in suggesting that the Court’s holding should
not depend on classification of “chameleon-like” powers as execu-
tive, legislative, or judicial.57 The Court answered these assertions
on two levels: that the bicameral protection “is not necessary” when
legislative power has been delegated to another branch confined to
implementing statutory standards set by Congress, and that “the
Constitution does not so require.” 58 In the same context, the Court
acknowledged without disapproval that it had described some agency
action as resembling lawmaking.59 Thus Chadha may not be read
as requiring that all “legislative power” as the Court defined it must
be exercised by Congress, and Synar may not be read as requiring
that all “executive power” as the Court defined it must be exer-
cised by the executive. A more limited reading is that when Con-
gress elects to exercise legislative power itself rather than delegate
it, it must follow the prescribed bicameralism and presentment pro-
cedures, and when Congress elects to delegate legislative power or
assign executive functions to the executive branch, it may not con-
trol exercise of those functions by itself exercising removal (or ap-
pointment) powers.
A more flexible approach was followed in the independent coun-
sel case. Here, there was no doubt that the statute limited the Presi-
dent’s law enforcement powers. Upon a determination by the Attor-
ney General that reasonable grounds exist for investigation or
prosecution of certain high ranking government officials, he must
notify a special, Article III court which appoints a special counsel.
54 478 U.S. at 734.
55 462 U.S. at 985–86.
56 462 U.S. at 989.
57 478 U.S. at 736, 750.
58 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
59 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.
The counsel is assured full power and independent authority to in-

vestigate and, if warranted, to prosecute. Such counsel may be re-
moved from office by the Attorney General only for cause as pre-
scribed in the statute.60 The independent counsel was assuredly more
free from executive supervision than other federal prosecutors. In-
stead of striking down the law, however, the Court carefully as-
sessed the degree to which executive power was invaded and the
degree to which the President retained sufficient powers to carry
out his constitutionally assigned duties. The Court also considered
whether in enacting the statute Congress had attempted to aggran-
dize itself or had attempted to enlarge the judicial power at the
expense of the executive.61
In the course of deciding that the President’s action in approv-
ing the closure of a military base, pursuant to statutory authority,
was not subject to judicial review, the Court enunciated a principle
that may mean a great deal, constitutionally speaking, or that may
not mean much of anything.62 The lower court had held that, al-
though review of presidential decisions on statutory grounds might
be precluded, his decisions were reviewable for constitutionality; in
that court’s view, whenever the President acts in excess of his statu-
tory authority, he also violates the Constitution’s separation-of-
powers doctrine. The Supreme Court found this analysis flawed. “Our
cases do not support the proposition that every action by the Presi-
dent, or by another executive official, in excess of his statutory au-
thority is ipso facto in violation of the Constitution. On the con-
trary, we have often distinguished between claims of constitutional
violations and claims that an official has acted in excess of his statu-
tory authority.” 63 Thus, the Court distinguished between executive
action undertaken without even the purported warrant of statutory
authorization and executive action in excess of statutory authority.
The former may violate separation of powers, but the latter will
not.64
60 Pub. L. 95–521, title VI, 92 Stat. 1867, as amended by Pub. L. 97–409, 96
Stat. 2039, and Pub. L. 100–191, 101 Stat. 1293, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 et seq.
61 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 693–96. See also Mistretta v. United States,
488 U.S. 361, 380–84, 390–91, 408–11 (1989).

62 Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
63 511 U.S. at 472.
64 See The Supreme Court, Leading Cases, 1993 Term, 108 HARV. L. REV. 139,
300–10 (1994).
Doctrinally, the distinction is important and subject to unfortu-

nate application.65 Whether the brief, unilluminating discussion in
Dalton will bear fruit in constitutional jurisprudence, however, is
problematic.
TENURE
Formerly, the term of four years during which the President “shall
hold office” was reckoned from March 4 of the alternate odd years
beginning with 1789. This came about from the circumstance that
under the act of September 13, 1788, of “the Old Congress,” the
first Wednesday in March, which was March 4, 1789, was fixed as
the time for commencing proceedings under the Constitution. Al-
though as a matter of fact Washington was not inaugurated until
April 30 of that year, by an act approved March 1, 1792, it was
provided that the presidential term should be reckoned from the
fourth day of March next succeeding the date of election. And so
things stood until the adoption of the Twentieth Amendment, by
which the terms of President and Vice-President end at noon on
the 20th of January.66
The prevailing sentiment of the Philadelphia Convention fa-
vored the indefinite eligibility of the President. It was Jefferson who
raised the objection that indefinite eligibility would in fact be for
life and degenerate into an inheritance. Prior to 1940, the idea that
no President should hold office for more than two terms was gener-
ally thought to be a fixed tradition, although some quibbles had been
raised as to the meaning of the word “term.” The voters’ departure
from the tradition in electing President Franklin D. Roosevelt to
third and fourth terms led to the proposal by Congress on March
24, 1947, of an amendment to the Constitution to embody the tra-
dition in the Constitutional Document. The proposal became a part
of the Constitution on February 27, 1951, in consequence of its adop-
tion by the necessary thirty-sixth state, which was Minnesota.67
65 “As a matter of constitutional logic, the executive branch must have some war-
rant, either statutory or constitutional, for its actions. The source of all Federal Gov-
ernmental authority is the Constitution and, because the Constitution contemplates
that Congress may delegate a measure of its power to officials in the executive branch,
statutes. The principle of separation of powers is a direct consequence of this scheme.
Absent statutory authorization, it is unlawful for the President to exercise the pow-
ers of the other branches because the Constitution does not vest those powers in
the President. The absence of statutory authorization is not merely a statutory de-
fect; it is a constitutional defect as well.” 108 HARV. L. REV. at 305–06 (footnote cita-
tions omitted).
66 As to the meaning of “the fourth day of March,” see Warren, Political Practice
and the Constitution, 89 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1941).

67 E. Corwin, supra at 34–38, 331–339.
Sec. 1—The President Cls. 2–4—Election
Clause 2. Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the

Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to
the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the
State may be entitled in the Congress; but no Senator or Repre-
sentative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under
the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
Clause 3. The Electors shall meet in their respective States
and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall
not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And
they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the
Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and cer-
tify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of Government of the United
States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of
the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of
Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall
then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes
shall be the President, if such Number be a majority of the whole
Number of Electors appointed: and if there be more than one
who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes,
then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by
Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Major-
ity, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall
in like manner chuse the President. But in chusing the Presi-
dent, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from
each State having one Vote; A quorum for this purpose shall con-
sist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and
a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In
every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person hav-
ing the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the
Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have
equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice
President.
Clause 4. The Congress may determine the Time of chusing
the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes;
which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
ELECTORAL COLLEGE
The electoral college was one of the compromises by which the
delegates were able to agree on the document finally produced. “This
subject,” said James Wilson, referring to the issue of the manner
in which the President was to be selected, “has greatly divided the
House, and will also divide people out of doors. It is in truth the
most difficult of all on which we have had to decide.” 68 Adoption of
the electoral college plan came late in the Convention, which had
previously adopted on four occasions provisions for election of the
executive by the Congress and had twice defeated proposals for elec-
tion by the people directly.69 Itself the product of compromise, the
electoral college probably did not work as any member of the Con-
vention could have foreseen, because the development of political
parties and nomination of presidential candidates through them and
designation of electors by the parties soon reduced the concept of
the elector as an independent force to the vanishing point in prac-
tice if not in theory.70 But the college remains despite numerous
efforts to adopt another method, a relic perhaps but still a signifi-
cant one. Clause 3 has, of course, been superceded by the Twelfth
Amendment.
“Appoint”
The word “appoint” as used in Clause 2 confers on state legisla-
tures “the broadest power of determination.” 71 Upholding a state
law providing for selection of electors by popular vote from dis-
68 2 M. Farrand, supra, p. 501.
69 1 id. at 21, 68–69, 80–81, 175–76, 230, 244; 2 id. at 29–32, 57–59, 63–64, 95,
99–106, 108–15, 118–21, 196–97, 401–04, 497, 499–502, 511–15, 522–29.
70 See J. CEASER, PRESIDENTIAL SELECTION: THEORY AND DEVELOPMENT (1979); N. PIERCE,
THE PEOPLES PRESIDENT: THE ELECTORAL COLLEGE IN AMERICAN HISTORY AND THE DIRECT-VOTE
ALTERNATIVE (1968). The second presidential election, in 1792, saw the first party in-
fluence on the electors, with the Federalists and the Jeffersonians organizing to con-
trol the selection of the Vice-President. Justice Jackson once noted: “As an institu-
tion the Electoral College suffered atrophy almost indistinguishable from rigor mortis.”
Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 214, 232 (1952). But, of course, the electors still do actually
elect the President and Vice President.
71 McPherson v. Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892).
tricts rather than statewide, the Court described the variety of per-
missible methods. “Therefore, on reference to contemporaneous and
subsequent action under the clause, we should expect to find, as
we do, that various modes of choosing the electors were pursued,
as, by the legislature itself on joint ballot; by the legislature through
a concurrent vote of the two houses; by vote of the people for a gen-
eral ticket; by vote of the people in districts; by choice partly by
the people voting in districts and partly by the legislature; by choice
by the legislature from candidates voted for by the people in dis-
tricts; and in other ways, as, notably, by North Carolina in 1792,
and Tennessee in 1796 and 1800. No question was raised as to the
power of the State to appoint, in any mode its legislature saw fit to
adopt, and none that a single method, applicable without excep-
tion, must be pursued in the absence of an amendment to the Con-
stitution. The district system was largely considered the most equi-
table, and Madison wrote that it was that system which was
contemplated by the framers of the Constitution, although it was
soon seen that its adoption by some States might place them at a
disadvantage by a division of their strength, and that a uniform
rule was preferable.” 72
State Discretion in Choosing Electors

Although Clause 2 seemingly vests complete discretion in the
states, certain older cases had recognized a federal interest in pro-
tecting the integrity of the process. Thus, the Court upheld the power
of Congress to protect the right of all citizens who are entitled to
vote to lend aid and support in any legal manner to the election of
any legally qualified person as a presidential elector.73 Its power to
protect the choice of electors from fraud or corruption was sus-
tained.74 “If this government is anything more than a mere aggre-
gation of delegated agents of other States and governments, each
of which is superior to the general government, it must have the
power to protect the elections on which its existence depends from
violence and corruption. If it has not this power it is helpless be-
fore the two great natural and historical enemies of all republics,
open violence and insidious corruption.” 75
More recently, substantial curbs on state discretion have been
instituted by both the Court and the Congress. In Williams v. Rhodes,76
the Court struck down a complex state system that effectively lim-
72146 U.S. at 28–29.
73Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
74 Burroughs & Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).
75 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 657–58 (1884) (quoted in Burroughs and
Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 546 (1934)).

76 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
ited access to the ballot to the electors of the two major parties. In
the Court’s view, the system violated the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment because it favored some and disfa-
vored others and burdened both the right of individuals to associ-
ate together to advance political beliefs and the right of qualified
voters to cast ballots for electors of their choice. For the Court, Jus-
tice Black denied that the language of Clause 2 immunized such
state practices from judicial scrutiny.77 Then, in Oregon v. Mitch-
ell,78 the Court upheld the power of Congress to reduce the voting
age in presidential elections 79 and to set a thirty-day durational
residency period as a qualification for voting in presidential elec-
tions.80 Although the Justices were divided on the reasons, the ra-
tionale emerging from this case, considered with Williams v. Rhodes,81
is that the Fourteenth Amendment limits state discretion in pre-
scribing the manner of selecting electors and that Congress in en-
forcing the Fourteenth Amendment 82 may override state practices
that violate that Amendment and may substitute standards of its
own.
Whether state enactments implementing the authority to ap-
point electors are subject to the ordinary processes of judicial re-
view within a state, or whether placement of the appointment au-
thority in state legislatures somehow limits the role of state judicial
review, became an issue during the controversy over the Florida re-
count and the outcome of the 2000 presidential election. The Su-
preme Court did not resolve this issue, but in a remand to the Florida
Supreme Court, suggested that the role of state courts in applying
77 “There, of course, can be no question but that this section does grant exten-
sive power to the States to pass laws regulating the selection of electors. But the
Constitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States specific power
to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers are always subject to the limita-
tion that they may not be exercised in a way that violates other specific provisions
of the Constitution . . . . [It cannot be] thought that the power to select electors
could be exercised in such a way as to violate express constitutional commands that
specifically bar States from passing certain kinds of laws. [citing the Fifteenth, Nine-
teenth, and Twenty-fourth Amendments]. . . . Obviously we must reject the notion
that Art. II, § 1, gives the States power to impose burdens on the right to vote, where
such burdens are expressly prohibited in other constitutional provisions.” 393 U.S.
at 29.
78 400 U.S. 112 (1970).
79 The Court divided five-to-four on this issue. Of the majority, four relied on
Congress’s power under the Fourteenth Amendment, and Justice Black relied on im-
plied and inherent congressional powers to create and maintain a national govern-
ment. 400 U.S. at 119–24 (Justice Black announcing opinion of the Court).
80 The Court divided eight-to-one on this issue. Of the majority, seven relied on
Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, and Justice Black on im-
plied and inherent powers.
81 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
82 Cf. Fourteenth Amendment, § 5.
state constitutions may be constrained by operation of Clause 2.83

Three Justices elaborated on this view in Bush v. Gore,84 but the
Court ended the litigation—and the recount—on the basis of an equal
protection interpretation, without ruling on the Article II argu-
ment.
Constitutional Status of Electors

Dealing with the question of the constitutional status of the elec-
tors, the Court said in 1890: “The sole function of the presidential
electors is to cast, certify and transmit the vote of the State for Presi-
dent and Vice President of the nation. Although the electors are ap-
pointed and act under and pursuant to the Constitution of the United
States, they are no more officers or agents of the United States than
are the members of the state legislatures when acting as electors
of federal senators, or the people of the States when acting as elec-
tors of representatives in Congress. . . . In accord with the provi-
sions of the Constitution, Congress has determined the time as of
which the number of electors shall be ascertained, and the days on
which they shall be appointed and shall meet and vote in the States,
and on which their votes shall be counted in Congress; has pro-
vided for the filling by each State, in such manner as its legisla-
ture may prescribe, of vacancies in its college of electors; and has
regulated the manner of certifying and transmitting their votes to
the seat of the national government, and the course of proceeding
in their opening and counting them.” 85 The truth of the matter is
that the electors are not “officers” at all, by the usual tests of of-
fice.86 They have neither tenure nor salary, and having performed
their single function they cease to exist as electors.
This function is, moreover, “a federal function,” 87 because elec-
tors’ capacity to perform results from no power which was origi-
nally resident in the states, but instead springs directly from the
Constitution of the United States.88
83 Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70, 78 (2000) (per curiam)
(remanding for clarification as to whether the Florida Supreme Court “saw the Florida
Constitution as circumscribing the legislature’s authority under Art. II, § 1, cl. 2”).
84 Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 111 (2000) (opinion of Chief Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas). Relying in part on dictum in McPherson v.

Blacker, 146 U.S. 1, 27 (1892), the three Justices reasoned that, because Article II
confers the authority on a particular branch of state government (the legislature)
rather than on a state generally, the customary rule requiring deference to state
court interpretations of state law is not fully operative, and the Supreme Court “must
ensure that postelection state-court actions do not frustrate” the legislature’s policy
as expressed in the applicable statute. 531 U.S. at 113.
85 In re Green, 134 U.S. 377, 379–80 (1890).
86 United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1868).
87 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221 (1920).
88 Burroughs and Cannon v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 535 (1934).
In the face of the proposition that electors are state officers, the
Court has upheld the power of Congress to act to protect the integ-
rity of the process by which they are chosen.89 But, in Ray v. Blair,90
the Court reasserted the conception of electors as state officers, with
some significant consequences.
Electors as Free Agents

“No one faithful to our history can deny that the plan origi-
nally contemplated, what is implicit in its text, that electors would
be free agents, to exercise an independent and nonpartisan judg-
ment as to the men best qualified for the Nation’s highest of-
fices.” 91 Writing in 1826, Senator Thomas Hart Benton admitted
that the framers had intended electors to be men of “superior dis-
cernment, virtue, and information,” who would select the President
“according to their own will” and without reference to the immedi-
ate wishes of the people. “That this invention has failed of its objec-
tive in every election is a fact of such universal notoriety, that no
one can dispute it. That it ought to have failed is equally uncontest-
able; for such independence in the electors was wholly incompat-
ible with the safety of the people. [It] was, in fact, a chimerical and
impractical idea in any community.” 92
Electors constitutionally remain free to cast their ballots for any
person they wish and occasionally they have done so.93 In 1968, for
example, a Republican elector in North Carolina chose to cast his
vote not for Richard M. Nixon, who had won a plurality in the state,
but for George Wallace, the independent candidate who had won
the second greatest number of votes. Members of both the House of
Representatives and of the Senate objected to counting that vote
for Mr. Wallace and insisted that it should be counted for Mr. Nixon,
but both bodies decided to count the vote as cast.94
The power either of Congress 95 or of the states to enact legisla-
tion binding electors to vote for the candidate of the party on the
89 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884); Burroughs and Cannon v. United
States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934).

90 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
91 343 U.S. at 232 (Justice Jackson dissenting). See THE FEDERALIST, No. 68 (J.
Cooke ed. 1961), 458 (Hamilton); 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES 1457 (1833).
92 S. REP. NO. 22, 19th Cong., 1st Sess. 4 (1826).
93 All but the most recent instances are summarized in N. Pierce, supra, 122–
124.
94 115 CONG. REC. 9–11, 145–171, 197–246 (1969).
95 Congress has so provided in the case of electors of the District of Columbia,
75 Stat. 818 (1961), D.C. Code § 1–1108(g), but the reference in the text is to the
power of Congress to bind the electors of the states.
ticket of which they run has been the subject of much debate.96 It
remains unsettled and the Supreme Court has touched on the is-
sue only once and then tangentially. In Ray v. Blair,97 the Court
upheld, against a challenge of invalidity under the Twelfth Amend-
ment, a rule of the Democratic Party of Alabama, acting under del-
egated power of the legislature, that required each candidate for
the office of presidential elector to take a pledge to support the nomi-
nees of the party’s convention for President and Vice President. The
state court had determined that the Twelfth Amendment, following
language of Clause 3, required that electors be absolutely free to
vote for anyone of their choice. Justice Reed wrote for the Court:
“It is true that the Amendment says the electors shall vote by
ballot. But it is also true that the Amendment does not prohibit an
elector’s announcing his choice beforehand, pledging himself. The
suggestion that in the early elections candidates for electors—
contemporaries of the Founders—would have hesitated, because of
constitutional limitations, to pledge themselves to support party nomi-
nees in the event of their selection as electors is impossible to ac-
cept. History teaches that the electors were expected to support the
party nominees. Experts in the history of government recognize the
longstanding practice. Indeed, more than twenty states do not print
the names of the candidates for electors on the general election bal-
lot. Instead, in one form or another, they allow a vote for the presi-
dential candidate of the national conventions to be counted as a vote
for his party’s nominees for the electoral college. This long-
continued practical interpretation of the constitutional propriety of
an implied or oral pledge of his ballot by a candidate for elector as
to his vote in the electoral college weighs heavily in considering the
constitutionality of a pledge, such as the one here required, in the
primary.”
“However, even if such promises of candidates for the electoral
college are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed
constitutional freedom of the elector under the Constitution, Art.
II, § 1, to vote as he may choose in the electoral college, it would
not follow that the requirement of a pledge in the primary is uncon-
stitutional. A candidacy in the primary is a voluntary act of the ap-
plicant. He is not barred, discriminatorily, from participating but
must comply with the rules of the party. Surely one may volun-
tarily assume obligations to vote for a certain candidate. The state
offers him opportunity to become a candidate for elector on his own
terms, although he must file his declaration before the primary. Ala.
96 At least thirteen states have statutes binding their electors, but none has been
tested in the courts.

97 343 U.S. 214 (1952).
Sec. 1—The President Cl. 5—Qualifications
Code, Tit. 17, § 145. Even though the victory of an independent can-
didate for elector in Alabama cannot be anticipated, the state does
offer the opportunity for the development of other strong political
organizations where the need is felt for them by a sizable block of
voters. Such parties may leave their electors to their own choice.”
“We conclude that the Twelfth Amendment does not bar a politi-
cal party from requiring the pledge to support the nominees of the
National Convention. Where a state authorizes a party to choose
its nominees for elector in a party primary and to fix the qualifica-
tions for the candidates, we see no federal constitutional objection
to the requirement of this pledge.” 98 Justice Jackson, with Justice
Douglas, dissented: “It may be admitted that this law does no more
than to make a legal obligation of what has been a voluntary gen-
eral practice. If custom were sufficient authority for amendment of
the Constitution by Court decree, the decision in this matter would
be warranted. Usage may sometimes impart changed content to con-
stitutional generalities, such as ‘due process of law,’ ‘equal protec-
tion,’ or ‘commerce among the states.’ But I do not think powers or
discretions granted to federal officials by the Federal Constitution
can be forfeited by the Court for disuse. A political practice which
has its origin in custom must rely upon custom for its sanctions.” 99
Clause 5. No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citi-

zen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Con-
stitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall
any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have at-
tained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been Fourteen Years
a Resident within the United States.
QUALIFICATIONS
All Presidents from Martin Van Buren on were born in the United
States subsequent to the Declaration of Independence. The princi-
pal issue with regard to the qualifications set out in this clause is
whether a child born abroad of American parents is “a natural born
citizen” in the sense of the clause. Such a child is a citizen as a
consequence of statute.100 Whatever the term “natural born” means,
it no doubt does not include a person who is “naturalized.” Thus,
the answer to the question might be seen to turn on the interpreta-
tion of the first sentence of the first section of the Fourteenth Amend-
98 343 U.S. at 228–31.
99 343 U.S. at 233.
100 8 U.S.C. § 1401.
Sec. 1—The President Cl. 5—Qualifications
ment, providing that “[a]ll persons born or naturalized in the United

States” are citizens.101 Significantly, however, Congress, in which a
number of Framers sat, provided in the Naturalization act of 1790
that “the children of citizens of the United States, that may be born
beyond the sea, . . . shall be considered as natural born citizens
. . . .” 102 This phrasing followed the literal terms of British stat-
utes, beginning in 1350, under which persons born abroad, whose
parents were both British subjects, would enjoy the same rights of
inheritance as those born in England; beginning with laws in 1709
and 1731, these statutes expressly provided that such persons were
natural-born subjects of the crown.103 There is reason to believe,
therefore, that the phrase includes persons who become citizens at
birth by statute because of their status in being born abroad of Ameri-
can citizens.104 Whether the Supreme Court would decide the issue
should it ever arise in a “case or controversy”—as well as how it
might decide it—can only be speculated about.
Clause 6. In Case of the Removal of the President from Of-

fice, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the
Powers and Duties of the said Office, the Same shall devolve on
the Vice President, and the Congress may by law provide for
the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the
President and Vice President declaring what Officer shall then
101 Reliance on the provision of an Amendment adopted subsequent to the con-
stitutional provision being interpreted is not precluded by but is strongly militated

against by the language in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 886–87 (1991),
in which the Court declined to be bound by the language of the 25th Amendment in
determining the meaning of “Heads of Departments” in the Appointments Clause.
See also id. at 917 (Justice Scalia concurring). If the Fourteenth Amendment is rel-
evant and the language is exclusive, that is, if it describes the only means by which
persons can become citizens, then, anyone born outside the United States would have
to be considered naturalized in order to be a citizen, and a child born abroad of
American parents is to be considered “naturalized” by being statutorily made a citi-
zen at birth. Although dictum in certain cases supports this exclusive interpretation
of the Fourteenth Amendment, United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 702–03
(1898); cf. Montana v. Kennedy, 366 U.S. 308, 312 (1961), the most recent case in
its holding and language rejects it. Rogers v. Bellei, 401 U.S. 815 (1971).
102 Act of March 26, 1790, 1 Stat. 103, 104 (emphasis supplied). See Weedin v.
Chin Bow, 274 U.S. 657, 661–666 (1927); United States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S.
649, 672–675 (1898). With minor variations, this language remained law in subse-
quent reenactments until an 1802 Act, which omitted the italicized words for rea-
sons not discernable. See Act of Feb. 10, 1855, 10 Stat. 604 (enacting same provi-
sion, for offspring of American-citizen fathers, but omitting the italicized phrase).
103 25 Edw. 3, Stat. 2 (1350); 7 Anne, ch. 5, § 3 (1709); 4 Geo. 2, ch. 21 (1731).
104 See, e.g., Gordon, Who Can Be President of the United States: The Unre-
solved Enigma, 28 MD. L. REV. 1 (1968).

Sec. 1—The President Cl. 8—Oath of Office
act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly until the
Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
PRESIDENTIAL SUCCESSION
When the President is disabled or is removed or has died, to
what does the Vice President succeed: to the “powers and duties of
the said office,” or to the office itself? There is a reasonable amount
of evidence from the proceedings of the convention from which to
conclude that the Framers intended the Vice President to remain
Vice President and to exercise the powers of the President until, in
the words of the final clause, “a President shall be elected.” None-
theless, when President Harrison died in 1841, Vice President Ty-
ler, after initial hesitation, took the position that he was automati-
cally President,105 a precedent which has been followed subsequently
and which is now permanently settled by section 1 of the Twenty-
fifth Amendment. That Amendment also settles a number of other
pressing questions with regard to presidential inability and succes-
sion.
Clause 7. The President shall, at stated Times, receive for

his Services, a Compensation which shall neither be encreased
nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been
elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other
Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
COMPENSATION AND EMOLUMENTS
Clause 7 may be advantageously considered in the light of the
rulings and learning arising out of parallel provision regarding ju-
dicial salaries.106
Clause 8. Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he

shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemly swear
(or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President
of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, pre-
serve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
105 E. Corwin, supra at 53–59, 344 n.46.
106 Cf. 13 Ops. Atty. Gen. 161 (1869), holding that a specific tax by the United
States upon the salary of an officer, to be deducted from the amount which other-
wise would by law be payable as such salary, is a diminution of the compensation to
be paid to him which, in the case of the President, would be unconstitutional if the
act of Congress levying the tax was passed during his official term.
Sec. 1—The President Cl. 8—Oath of Office
OATH OF OFFICE
What is the time relationship between a President’s assump-
tion of office and his taking the oath? Apparently, the former comes
first, this answer appearing to be the assumption of the language
of the clause. The Second Congress assumed that President Wash-
ington took office on March 4, 1789,107 although he did not take
the oath until the following April 30.
That the oath the President is required to take might be consid-
ered to add anything to the powers of the President, because of his
obligation to “preserve, protect and defend the Constitution,” might
appear to be rather a fanciful idea. But in President Jackson’s mes-
sage announcing his veto of the act renewing the Bank of the United
States there is language which suggests that the President has the
right to refuse to enforce both statutes and judicial decisions based
on his own independent decision that they were unwarranted by
the Constitution.108 The idea next turned up in a message by Presi-
dent Lincoln justifying his suspension of the writ of habeas corpus
without obtaining congressional authorization.109 And counsel to Presi-
dent Johnson during his impeachment trial adverted to the theory,
but only in passing.110 Beyond these isolated instances, it does not
appear to be seriously contended that the oath adds anything to
the President’s powers.
SECTION 2. Clause 1. The President shall be Commander in

Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the
Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Ser-
vice of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writ-
ing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Depart-
ments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective
Office, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons
for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Im-
peachment.
107 Act of March 1, 1792, 1 Stat. 239, § 12.

108 2 J. Richardson, supra, at 576. Chief Justice Taney, who as a member of
Jackson’s Cabinet had drafted the message, later repudiated this possible reading
of the message. 2 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 223–224
(1926).
109 6 J. Richardson, supra, at 25.
110 2 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON 200, 293, 296 (1868).
Sec. 2—Powers, Duties of the President Cl. 1—Commander-In-Chiefship
COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF
Development of the Concept

Surprisingly little discussion of the Commander-in-Chief Clause
is found in the Convention or in the ratifying debates. From the
evidence available, it appears that the Framers vested the duty in
the President because experience in the Continental Congress had
disclosed the inexpediency of vesting command in a group and be-
cause the lesson of English history was that danger lurked in vest-
ing command in a person separate from the responsible political lead-
ers.111 But the principal concern here is the nature of the power
granted by the clause.
The Limited View.—The purely military aspects of the
Commander-in-Chiefship were those that were originally stressed.
Hamilton said the office “would amount to nothing more than the
supreme command and direction of the Military and naval forces,
as first general and admiral of the confederacy.” 112 Story wrote in
his Commentaries: “The propriety of admitting the president to be
commander in chief, so far as to give orders, and have a general
superintendency, was admitted. But it was urged, that it would be
dangerous to let him command in person, without any restraint, as
he might make a bad use of it. The consent of both houses of Con-
gress ought, therefore, to be required, before he should take the ac-
tual command. The answer then given was, that though the presi-
dent might, there was no necessity that he should, take the command
in person; and there was no probability that he would do so, except
in extraordinary emergencies, and when he was possessed of supe-
rior military talents.” 113 In 1850, Chief Justice Taney, for the Court,
wrote: “His duty and his power are purely military. As commander-
in-chief, he is authorized to direct the movements of the naval and
military forces placed by law at his command, and to employ them
in the manner he may deem most effectual to harass and conquer
and subdue the enemy. He may invade the hostile country, and sub-
111 May, The President Shall Be Commander in Chief, in THE ULTIMATE DECISION:
THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF (E. May ed., 1960), 1. In the Virginia ratifying
convention, Madison, replying to Patrick Henry’s objection that danger lurked in giv-
ing the President control of the military, said: “Would the honorable member say
that the sword ought to be put in the hands of the representatives of the people, or
in other hands independent of the government altogether?” 3 J. ELLIOT, THE DEBATES
IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 393 (1836).
In the North Carolina convention, Iredell said: “From the nature of the thing, the
command of armies ought to be delegated to one person only. The secrecy, dispatch,
and decision, which are necessary in military operations can only be expected from
one person.” 4 id. at 107.
112 THE FEDERALIST, No. 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 465.
ject it to the sovereignty and authority of the United States. But

his conquests do not enlarge the boundaries of this Union, nor ex-
tend the operation of our institutions and laws beyond the limits
before assigned to them by the legislative power. . . .”
“But in the distribution of political power between the great de-
partments of government, there is such a wide difference between
the power conferred on the President of the United States, and the
authority and sovereignty which belong to the English crown, that
it would be altogether unsafe to reason from any supposed resem-
blance between them, either as regards conquest in war, or any other
subject where the rights and powers of the executive arm of the
government are brought into question.” 114 Even after the Civil War,
a powerful minority of the Court described the role of President as
Commander-in-Chief simply as “the command of the forces and the
conduct of campaigns.” 115
The Prize Cases.—The basis for a broader conception was laid
in certain early acts of Congress authorizing the President to em-
ploy military force in the execution of the laws.116 In his famous
message to Congress of July 4, 1861,117 Lincoln advanced the claim
that the “war power” was his for the purpose of suppressing rebel-
lion, and in the Prize Cases 118 of 1863 a divided Court sustained
this theory. The immediate issue was the validity of the blockade
that the President, following the attack on Fort Sumter, had pro-
claimed of the Southern ports.119 The argument was advanced that
a blockade to be valid must be an incident of a “public war” validly
declared, and that only Congress could, by virtue of its power “to
declare war,” constitutionally impart to a military situation this char-
acter and scope. Speaking for the majority of the Court, Justice Grier
answered: “If a war be made by invasion of a foreign nation, the
President is not only authorized but bound to resist force by force.
He does not initiate the war, but is bound to accept the challenge
without waiting for any special legislative authority. And whether
the hostile party be a foreign invader, or States organized in rebel-
lion, it is none the less a war, although the declaration of it be ‘uni-
lateral.’ Lord Stowell (1 Dodson, 247) observes, ‘It is not the less a
war on that account, for war may exist without a declaration on
114 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615, 618 (1850).
115 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866).
116 1 Stat. 424 (1795): 2 Stat. 443 (1807), now 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–334. See also
Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 32–33 (1827), asserting the finality of the
President’s judgment of the existence of a state of facts requiring his exercise of the
powers conferred by the act of 1795.
117 7 J. Richardson, supra, at 3221, 3232.
118 67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 635 (1863).
119 7 J. Richardson, supra, at 3215, 3216, 3481.
either side. It is so laid down by the best writers of the law of na-
tions. A declaration of war by one country only, is not a mere chal-
lenge to be accepted or refused at pleasure by the other.’ ”
“The battles of Palo Alto and Resaca de la Palma had been fought
before the passage of the act of Congress of May 13, 1846, which
recognized ‘a state of war as existing by the act of the Republic of
Mexico.’ This act not only provided for the future prosecution of the
war, but was itself a vindication and ratification of the Act of the
President in accepting the challenge without a previous formal dec-
laration of war by Congress.”
“This greatest of civil wars was not gradually developed by popu-
lar commotion, tumultuous assemblies, or local unorganized insur-
rections. However long may have been its previous conception, it
nevertheless sprung forth suddenly from the parent brain, a Minerva
in the full panoply of war. The President was bound to meet it in
the shape it presented itself, without waiting for Congress to bap-
tize it with a name; and no name given to it by him or them could
change the fact. . . .”
“Whether the President in fulfilling his duties, as Commander
in-chief, in suppressing an insurrection, has met with such armed
hostile resistance, and a civil war of such alarming proportions as
will compel him to accord to them the character of belligerents, is
a question to be decided by him, and this Court must be governed
by the decisions and acts of the political department of the govern-
ment to which this power was entrusted. ‘He must determine what
degree of force the crisis demands.’ The proclamation of blockade is
itself official and conclusive evidence to the Court that a state of
war existed which demanded and authorized a recourse to such a
measure, under the circumstances peculiar to the case.” 120
Impact of the Prize Cases on World Wars I and II.—In brief,
the powers that may be claimed for the President under the
Commander-in-Chief Clause at a time of widespread insurrection
were equated with his powers under the clause at a time when the
United States is engaged in a formally declared foreign war.121 And,
because, especially in the early months of the Civil War, Lincoln
performed various acts, such as increasing the Army and Navy, that
admittedly fell within Congress’s constitutional province, it seems
to have been assumed during World Wars I and II that the position
of Commander-in-Chief carried with it the power to exercise like
powers practically at discretion, not merely in wartime but even at
a time when war became a strong possibility. No attention was given
120 67 U.S. (2 Bl.) at 668–70.
121 See generally, E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION (1946).
the fact that Lincoln had asked Congress to ratify and confirm his
acts, which Congress promptly had,122 with the exception of his sus-
pension of habeas corpus, a power that many attributed to the Presi-
dent in the situation then existing, by virtue of his duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.123 Nor was this the only
respect in which war or the approach of war was deemed to oper-
ate to enlarge the scope of power claimable by the President as
Commander-in-Chief in wartime.124
Presidential Theory of the Commander-in-Chiefship in

World War II—And Beyond
In his message to Congress of September 7, 1942, in which he
demanded that Congress forthwith repeal certain provisions of the
Emergency Price Control Act of the previous January 30th,125 Presi-
dent Roosevelt formulated his conception of his powers as “Com-
mander in Chief in wartime” as follows:
“I ask the Congress to take this action by the first of October.
Inaction on your part by that date will leave me with an inescap-
able responsibility to the people of this country to see to it that the
war effort is no longer imperiled by threat of economic chaos.”
“In the event that the Congress should fail to act, and act ad-
equately, I shall accept the responsibility, and I will act.”
“At the same time that farm prices are stabilized, wages can
and will be stabilized also. This I will do.”
“The President has the powers, under the Constitution and un-
der Congressional acts, to take measures necessary to avert a disas-
ter which would interfere with the winning of the war.”
122 12 Stat. 326 (1861).

123 J. RANDALL, CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS UNDER LINCOLN 118–139 (rev. ed. 1951).
124 E.g., Attorney General Biddle’s justification of seizure of a plant during World
War II: “As Chief Executive and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy, the
President possesses an aggregate of powers that are derived from the Constitution
and from various statutes enacted by the Congress for the purpose of carrying on
the war. . . . In time of war when the existence of the nation is at stake, this aggre-
gate of powers includes authority to take reasonable steps to prevent nation-wide
labor disturbances that threaten to interfere seriously with the conduct of the war.
The fact that the initial impact of these disturbances is on the production or distri-
bution of essential civilian goods is not a reason for denying the Chief Executive
and the Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy the power to take steps to pro-
tect the nation’s war effort.” 40 Ops. Atty. Gen. 312, 319–320 (1944). Prior to the
actual beginning of hostilities, Attorney General Jackson asserted the same justifi-
cation upon seizure of an aviation plant. E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION
47–48 (1946).
125 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
“I have given the most thoughtful consideration to meeting this

issue without further reference to the Congress. I have deter-
mined, however, on this vital matter to consult with the Con-
gress. . . .”
“The American people can be sure that I will use my powers
with a full sense of my responsibility to the Constitution and to my
country. The American people can also be sure that I shall not hesi-
tate to use every power vested in me to accomplish the defeat of
our enemies in any part of the world where our own safety de-
mands such defeat.”
“When the war is won, the powers under which I act automati-
cally revert to the people—to whom they belong.” 126
Presidential War Agencies.—While congressional compliance
with the President’s demand rendered unnecessary an effort on his
part to amend the Price Control Act, there were other matters as
to which he repeatedly took action within the normal field of con-
gressional powers, not only during the war, but in some instances
prior to it. Thus, in exercising both the powers which he claimed
as Commander-in-Chief and those which Congress conferred upon
him to meet the emergency, Mr. Roosevelt employed new emer-
gency agencies, created by himself and responsible directly to him,
rather than the established departments or existing independent regu-
latory agencies.127
Constitutional Status of Presidential Agencies.—The ques-
tion of the legal status of the presidential agencies was dealt with
judicially but once. This was in the decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in Employers Group
v. National War Labor Board,128 which was a suit to annul and en-
join a “directive order” of the War Labor Board. The Court refused
the injunction on the ground that the time when the directive was
issued any action of the Board was “informatory,” “at most advi-
sory.” In support of this view the Court quoted approvingly a state-
ment by the chairman of the Board itself: “These orders are in re-
ality mere declarations of the equities of each industrial dispute,
as determined by a tripartite body in which industry, labor, and the
public share equal responsibility; and the appeal of the Board is to
the moral obligation of employers and workers to abide by the
126 88 CONG. REC. 7044 (1942). Congress promptly complied, 56 Stat. 765 (1942),
so that the President was not required to act on his own. But see E. Corwin, supra,
65–66.
127 For a listing of the agencies and an account of their creation to the close of
1942, see Vanderbilt, War Powers and Their Administration, in 1942 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAW 106 (New York Univ.).
128 143 F.2d 145 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
nonstrike, no-lock-out agreement and . . . to carry out the direc-

tives of the tribunal created under that agreement by the Com-
mander in Chief.” 129 Nor, the Court continued, had the later War
Labor Disputes Act vested War Labor Board orders with any greater
authority, with the result that they were still judicially unenforce-
able and unreviewable. Following this theory, the War Labor Board
was not an office wielding power, but a purely advisory body, such
as Presidents have frequently created in the past without the aid
or consent of Congress. Congress itself, nevertheless, both in its ap-
propriation acts and in other legislation, treated the presidential
agencies as in all respects offices.130
Evacuation of the West Coast Japanese.—On February 19,
1942, President Roosevelt issued an executive order, “by virtue of
the authority vested in me as President of the United States, and
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy,” providing, as a safe-
guard against subversion and sabotage, power for his military com-
manders to designate areas from which “any person” could be ex-
cluded or removed and to set up facilities for such persons elsewhere.131
Pursuant to this order, more than 112,000 residents of the Western
states, all of Japanese descent and more than two out of every three
of whom were natural-born citizens, were removed from their homes
and herded into temporary camps and later into “relocation cen-
ters” in several states.
It was apparently the original intention of the Administration
to rely on the general principle of military necessity and the power
of the Commander-in-Chief in wartime as authority for the reloca-
tions. But before any action of importance was taken under the or-
der, Congress ratified and adopted it by the Act of March 21, 1942,132
by which it was made a misdemeanor to knowingly enter, remain
in, or leave prescribed military areas contrary to the orders of the
Secretary of War or of the commanding officer of the area. The cases
which subsequently arose in consequence of the order were decided
under the order plus the Act. The question at issue, said Chief Jus-
tice Stone for the Court, “is not one of Congressional power to del-
egate to the President the promulgation of the Executive Order, but
whether, acting in cooperation, Congress and the Executive have
constitutional . . . [power] to impose the curfew restriction here com-
129 143 F.2d at 149.

130 E. Corwin, supra at 244, 245, 459.
131 E.O. 9066, 7 FED. REG. 1407 (1942).
132 56 Stat. 173 (1942).
plained of.” 133 This question was answered in the affirmative, as

was the similar question later raised by an exclusion order.134
Presidential Government of Labor Regulations.—The most
important segment of the home front regulated by what were in
effect presidential edicts was the field of labor relations. Exactly six
months before Pearl Harbor, on June 7, 1941, Mr. Roosevelt, citing
his proclamation thirteen days earlier of an unlimited national emer-
gency, issued an Executive Order seizing the North American Avia-
tion Plant at Inglewood, California, where, on account of a strike,
production was at a standstill.135 Attorney General Jackson justi-
fied the seizure as growing out of the “duty constitutionally and in-
herently rested upon the President to exert his civil and military
as well as his moral authority to keep the defense efforts of the
United States a going concern,” as well as “to obtain supplies for
which Congress has appropriated the money, and which it has di-
rected the President to obtain.” 136 Other seizures followed, and on
January 12, 1942, Mr. Roosevelt, by Executive Order 9017, created
the National War Labor Board. “Whereas,” the order read in part,
“by reason of the state of war declared to exist by joint resolutions
of Congress, . . . the national interest demands that there shall be
no interruption of any work which contributes to the effective pros-
ecution of the war; and Whereas as a result of a conference of rep-
resentatives of labor and industry which met at the call of the Presi-
dent on December 17, 1941, it has been agreed that for the duration
of the war there shall be no strikes or lockouts, and that all labor
disputes shall be settled by peaceful means, and that a National
War Labor Board be established for a peaceful adjustment of such
disputes. Now, therefore, by virtue of the authority vested in me by
the Constitution and the statutes of the United States, it is hereby
ordered: 1. There is hereby created in the Office for Emergency Man-
agement a National War Labor Board . . . .” 137 In this field, too,
133 Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 91–92 (1943).

134 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). Long afterward, in 1984, a
federal court granted a writ of coram nobis and overturned Korematsu’s conviction,
Korematsu v. United States, 584 F. Supp. 1406 (N.D.Cal. 1984), and in 1986, a fed-
eral court vacated Hirabayashi’s conviction for failing to register for evacuation but
let stand the conviction for curfew violations. Hirabayashi v. United States, 627 F.
Supp. 1445 (W.D.Wash. 1986). Other cases were pending, but Congress then imple-
mented the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Intern-
ment of Civilians by acknowledging “the fundamental injustice of the evacuation,
relocation and internment,” and apologizing on behalf of the people of the United
States. Pub. L. 100–383, 102 Stat. 903 (1988), 50 U.S.C. App. §§ 1989 et seq. Repa-
rations were approved, and each living survivor of the internment was to be compen-
sated in an amount roughly approximating $20,000.
135 E.O. 8773, 6 Fed. Reg. 2777 (1941).
136 E. CORWIN, TOTAL WAR AND THE CONSTITUTION 47–48 (1946).
137 7 Fed. Reg. 237 (1942).
Congress intervened by means of the War Labor Disputes Act of

June 25, 1943,138 which, however, still left ample basis for presiden-
tial activity of a legislative character.139
Sanctions Implementing Presidential Directives.—To imple-
ment his directives as Commander-in-Chief in wartime, and espe-
cially those which he issued in governing labor disputes, President
Roosevelt often resorted to “sanctions,” which may be described as
penalties lacking statutory authorization. Ultimately, the President
sought to put sanctions in this field on a systematic basis. The or-
der empowered the Director of Economic Stabilization, on receiving
a report from the National War Labor Board that someone was not
complying with its orders, to issue “directives” to the appropriate
department or agency requiring that privileges, benefits, rights, or
preferences enjoyed by the noncomplying party be withdrawn.140
Sanctions were also occasionally employed by statutory agen-
cies, such as OPA, to supplement the penal provisions of the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942.141 In Steuart & Bro.
v. Bowles,142 the Supreme Court had the opportunity to regularize
this type of executive emergency legislation. Here, a retail dealer
in fuel oil was charged with having violated a rationing order of
OPA by obtaining large quantities of oil from its supplier without
surrendering ration coupons, by delivering many thousands of gal-
lons of fuel oil without requiring ration coupons, and so on, and
was prohibited by the agency from receiving oil for resale or trans-
fer for the ensuing year. The offender conceded the validity of the
rationing order in support of which the suspension order was is-
sued but challenged the validity of the latter as imposing a penalty
that Congress had not enacted and asked the district court to en-
join it.
The court refused to do so and was sustained by the Supreme
Court in its position. Justice Douglas wrote for the Court: “[W]ith-
out rationing, the fuel tanks of a few would be full; the fuel tanks
of many would be empty. Some localities would have plenty; com-
munities less favorably situated would suffer. Allocation or ration-
ing is designed to eliminate such inequalities and to treat all alike
who are similarly situated. . . . But middlemen—wholesalers and
retailers—bent on defying the rationing system could raise havoc
with it. . . . These middlemen are the chief if not the only conduits
138 57 Stat. 163 (1943).
139 See Vanderbilt, War Powers and their Administration, in 1945 ANNUAL SURVEY
OF AMERICAN LAW 254, 271–273 (N.Y. Univ.).
140 E.O. 9370, 8 Fed. Reg. 11463 (1943).
141 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
142 322 U.S. 398 (1944).
between the source of limited supplies and the consumers. From

the viewpoint of a rationing system a middleman who distributes
the product in violation and disregard of the prescribed quotas is
an inefficient and wasteful conduit. . . . Certainly we could not say
that the President would lack the power under this Act to take away
from a wasteful factory and route to an efficient one a precious sup-
ply of material needed for the manufacture of articles of war. . . .
From the point of view of the factory owner from whom the materi-
als were diverted the action would be harsh. . . . But in times of
war the national interest cannot wait on individual claims to pref-
erence. . . . Yet if the President has the power to channel raw ma-
terials into the most efficient industrial units and thus save scarce
materials from wastage it is difficult to see why the same principle
is not applicable to the distribution of fuel oil.” 143 Sanctions were,
therefore, constitutional when the deprivations they wrought were
a reasonably implied amplification of the substantive power which
they supported and were directly conservative of the interests which
this power was created to protect and advance. It is certain, how-
ever, that sanctions not uncommonly exceeded this pattern.144
The Postwar Period.—The end of active hostilities did not ter-
minate either the emergency or the Federal Government’s response
to it. President Truman proclaimed the termination of hostilities on
December 31, 1946,145 and, in July 1947, Congress enacted a joint
resolution that repealed a great variety of wartime statutes and set
termination dates for others.146 Signing the resolution, the Presi-
dent said that the emergencies declared in 1939 and 1940 contin-
ued to exist and that it was “not possible at this time to provide
for terminating all war and emergency powers.” 147 The hot war was
giving way to the Cold War.
Congress thereafter enacted a new Housing and Rent Act to con-
tinue the controls begun in 1942 148 and continued the military draft.149
With the outbreak of the Korean War, legislation was enacted estab-
lishing general presidential control over the economy again,150 and
by executive order the President created agencies to exercise the
power.151 The Court continued to assume the existence of a state of
wartime emergency prior to Korea, but with misgivings. In Woods
143 322 U.S. at 405–06.
144 E. Corwin, supra, at 249–250.
145 Proc. 2714, 12 Fed. Reg. 1 (1947).
146 S.J. Res. 123, 61 Stat. 449 (1947).
147 Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138, 140 n.3 (1948).
148 61 Stat. 193 (1947).
149 62 Stat. 604 (1948).
150 Defense Production Act of 1950, 64 Stat. 798.
151 E.O. 10161, 15 Fed. Reg. 6105 (1950).
v. Cloyd W. Miller Co.,152 the Court held constitutional the new rent
control law on the ground that cessation of hostilities did not end
the government’s war power, but that the power continued to rem-
edy the evil arising out of the emergency. Yet, Justice Douglas noted
for the Court, “We recognize the force of the argument that the ef-
fects of war under modern conditions may be felt in the economy
for years and years, and that if the war power can be used in days
of peace to treat all the wounds which war inflicts on our society, it
may not only swallow up all other powers of Congress but largely
obliterate the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as well. There are no
such implications in today’s decision.” 153 Justice Jackson, though
concurring, noted that he found the war power “the most danger-
ous one to free government in the whole catalogue of powers” and
cautioned that its exercise “be scrutinized with care.” 154 And, in
Ludecke v. Watkins,155 four dissenting Justices were prepared to hold
that the presumption in the statute under review of continued war
with Germany was “a pure fiction” and not to be used.
But the postwar period was a time of reaction against the war-
time exercise of power by President Roosevelt, and President Tru-
man was not permitted the same liberties. The Twenty-second Amend-
ment, writing into permanent law the two-term custom, the “Great
Debate” about our participation in NATO, the attempt to limit the
treaty-making power, and other actions, bespoke the reaction.156 The
Supreme Court signalized this reaction when it struck down the
President’s action in seizing the steel industry while it was struck
during the Korean War.157
Nonetheless, the long period of the Cold War and of active hos-
tilities in Korea and Indochina, in addition to the issue of the use
of troops in the absence of congressional authorization, further cre-
ated conditions for consolidation of powers in the President. In par-
ticular, a string of declarations of national emergencies, most, in
whole or part, under the Trading with the Enemy Act,158 under-
girded the exercise of much presidential power. In the storm of re-
sponse to the Vietnamese conflict, here, too, Congress reasserted leg-
islative power to curtail what it viewed as excessive executive power,
repealing the Trading with the Enemy Act and enacting in its place
152 333 U.S. 138 (1948).

153 333 U.S. at 143–44.
154 333 U.S. at 146–47.
155 335 U.S. 160, 175 (1948).
156 See A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVEL-
OPMENT, ch. 31 (4th ed. 1970).

157 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
158 § 301(1), 55 Stat. 838, 839–840 (1941).
the International Emergency Economic Powers Act,159 which did not

alter most of the range of powers delegated to the President but
which did change the scope of the power delegated to declare na-
tional emergencies.160 Congress also passed the National Emergen-
cies Act, prescribing procedures for the declaration of national emer-
gencies, for their termination, and for presidential reporting to
Congress in connection with national emergencies. To end the prac-
tice of declaring national emergencies for an indefinite duration, Con-
gress provided that any emergency not otherwise terminated would
expire one year after its declaration unless the President published
in the Federal Register and transmitted to Congress a notice that
the emergency would continue in effect.161
The Cold War and After: Presidential Power To Use Troops

Overseas Without Congressional Authorization
Reaction after World War II did not persist, but soon ran its
course, and the necessities, real and perceived, of the United States’
role as world power and chief guarantor of the peace operated to
expand the powers of the President and to diminish congressional
powers in the foreign relations arena. President Truman did not seek
congressional authorization before sending troops to Korea, and sub-
sequent Presidents similarly acted on their own in putting troops
into many foreign countries, including the Dominican Republic, Leba-
non, Grenada, Panama, and the Persian Gulf, and most notably In-
dochina.162 Eventually, public opposition precipitated another con-
stitutional debate whether the President had the authority to commit
troops to foreign combat without the approval of Congress, a de-
bate that went on inconclusively between Congress and Execu-
tive 163 and one which the courts were content generally to consign
to the exclusive consideration of those two bodies. The substance of
the debate concerns many facets of the President’s powers and re-
sponsibilities, including his obligations to protect the lives and prop-
erty of United States citizens abroad, to execute the treaty obliga-
tions of the Nation, to further the national security interests of the
Nation, and to deal with aggression and threats of aggression as
159 91 Stat. 1626, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706.
160 Congress authorized the declaration of a national emergency based only on
“any unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in whole or substantial
part outside the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, or the economy
of the United States . . . .” 50 U.S.C. § 1701.
161 Pub. L. 94–412, 90 Stat. 1255 (1976).
162 See the discussion in NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESOLUTION, REPORT OF THE SENATE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, S. REP. NO. 91–129, 91st Congress, 1st sess. (1969);
U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967) at 16–19 (Professor Bartlett).
163 See discussion under Article I, § 8, cls. 11–14.
they confront him. Defying neat summarization, the considerations

nevertheless merit at least an historical survey and an attempted
categorization of the arguments.
The Historic Use of Force Abroad.—In 1912, the Depart-
ment of State published a memorandum prepared by its Solicitor
which set out to justify the Right to Protect Citizens in Foreign Coun-
tries by Landing Forces.164 In addition to the justification, the memo-
randum summarized 47 instances in which force had been used, in
most of them without any congressional authorization. Twice re-
vised and reissued, the memorandum was joined by a 1928 indepen-
dent study and a 1945 work by a former government official in sup-
porting conclusions that drifted away from the original justification
of the use of United States forces abroad to the use of such forces
at the discretion of the President and free from control by Con-
gress.165
New lists and revised arguments were published to support the
actions of President Truman in sending troops to Korea and of Presi-
dents Kennedy and Johnson in sending troops first to Vietnam and
then to Indochina generally, 166 and new lists have been pro-
164 J. Clark, Memorandum by the Solicitor for the Department of State, in RIGHT
TO PROTECT CITIZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES (1912).

165 Id. (Washington: 1929; 1934); M. OFFUTT, THE PROTECTION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY
THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1928); J. ROGERS, WORLD POLICING AND THE CON-
STITUTION (1945). The burden of the last cited volume was to establish that the Presi-
dent was empowered to participate in United Nations peacekeeping actions without
having to seek congressional authorization on each occasion; it may be said to be
one of the earliest, if not the earliest, propoundings of the doctrine of inherent presi-
dential powers to use troops abroad outside the narrow compass traditionally ac-
corded those powers.
166 E.g., H. REP. NO. 127, 82d Congress, 1st Sess. (1951), 55–62; Corwin, Who
Has the Power to Make War? NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (July 31, 1949), 11; Authority
of the President to Repel the Attack in Korea, 23 DEPT. STATE BULL. 173 (1950); Depart-
ment of State, Historical Studies Division, Armed Actions Taken by the United States
Without a Declaration of War, 1789–1967 (Res. Proj. No. 806A (Washington: 1967)).
That the compilation of such lists was more than a defense against public criticism
can be gleaned from a revealing discussion in Secretary of State Acheson’s memoirs
detailing why the President did not seek congressional sanction for sending troops
to Korea. “There has never, I believe, been any serious doubt—in the sense of non-
politically inspired doubt—of the President’s constitutional authority to do what he
did. The basis for this conclusion in legal theory and historical precedent was fully
set out in the State Department’s memorandum of July 3, 1950, extensively pub-
lished. But the wisdom of the decision not to ask for congressional approval has
been doubted. . . .”
After discussing several reasons establishing the wisdom of the decision, the Sec-
retary continued: “The President agreed, moved also, I think, by another passion-
ately held conviction. His great office was to him a sacred and temporary trust, which
he was determined to pass on unimpaired by the slightest loss of power or prestige.
This attitude would incline him strongly against any attempt to divert criticism from
himself by action that might establish a precedent in derogation of presidential power
pounded.167 The great majority of the instances cited involved fights

with pirates, landings of small naval contingents on barbarous or
semibarbarous coasts to protect commerce, the dispatch of small bod-
ies of troops to chase bandits across the Mexican border, and the
like, and some incidents supposedly without authorization from Con-
gress did in fact have underlying statutory or other legislative au-
thorization. Some instances, e.g., President Polk’s use of troops to
precipitate war with Mexico in 1846, President Grant’s attempt to
annex the Dominican Republic, President McKinley’s dispatch of troops
into China during the Boxer Rebellion, involved considerable exer-
cises of presidential power, but in general purposes were limited
and congressional authority was sought for the use of troops against
a sovereign state or in such a way as to constitute war. The early
years of this century saw the expansion in the Caribbean and Latin
America both of the use of troops for the furthering of what was
perceived to be our national interests and of the power of the Presi-
dent to deploy the military force of the United States without con-
gressional authorization.168
The pre-war actions of Presidents Wilson and Franklin Roosevelt
advanced in substantial degrees the fact of presidential initiative,
although the theory did not begin to catch up with the fact until
the “Great Debate” over the commitment of troops by the United
States to Europe under the Atlantic Pact. While congressional au-
thorization was obtained, that debate, the debate over the United
Nations charter, and the debate over Article 5 of the North Atlantic
Treaty of 1949, declaring that “armed attack” against one signa-
tory was to be considered as “an attack” against all signatories, pro-
vided the occasion for the formulation of a theory of independent
presidential power to use the armed forces in the national interest
to send our forces into battle. The memorandum that we prepared listed eighty-
seven instances in the past century in which his predecessors had done this. And
thus yet another decision was made.” D. ACHESON, PRESENT AT THE CREATION 414, 415
(1969).
167 War Powers Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations Com-
mittee, 92d Congress, 1st Sess. (1971), 347, 354–355, 359–379 (Senator Goldwater);
Emerson, War Powers Legislation, 74 W. VA. L. REV. 53 (1972). The most complete
list as of the time prepared is Collier, Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces
Abroad, 1798–1989, CONG. RES. SERV. (1989), which was cited for its numerical total
in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 273 (1990). For an effort to
reconstruct the development and continuation of the listings, see F. WORMUTH & E.
FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR 142–145 (2d ed. 1989).
168 Of course, considerable debate continues with respect to the meaning of the
historical record. For reflections of the narrow reading, see NATIONAL COMMITMENTS RESO-
LUTION, Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, S. REP. NO. 91–129,
1st Sess. (1969); J. ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND
ITS AFTERMATH (1993). On the broader reading and finding great presidential power,
see A. SOFAER, WAR, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND CONSTITUTIONAL POWER: THE ORIGINS (1976); Em-
erson, Making War Without a Declaration, 17 J. LEGIS. 23 (1990).
at his discretion.169 Thus, Secretary of State Acheson told Con-

gress: “Not only has the President the authority to use the armed
forces in carrying out the broad foreign policy of the United States
implementing treaties, but it is equally clear that this authority may
not be interfered with by the Congress in the exercise of powers
which it has under the Constitution.” 170
The Theory of Presidential Power.—The fullest expression
of the presidential power proponents has been in defense of the course
followed in Indochina. Thus, the Legal Adviser of the State Depart-
ment, in a widely circulated document, contended: “Under the Con-
stitution, the President, in addition to being Chief Executive, is Com-
mander in Chief of the Army and Navy. He holds the prime
responsibility for the conduct of United States foreign relations. These
duties carry very broad powers, including the power to deploy Ameri-
can forces abroad and commit them to military operations when the
President deems such action necessary to maintain the security and
defense of the United States. . . .”
“In 1787 the world was a far larger place, and the framers prob-
ably had in mind attacks upon the United States. In the 20th cen-
tury, the world has grown much smaller. An attack on a country
far from our shores can impinge directly on the nation’s security.
In the SEATO treaty, for example, it is formally declared that an
armed attack against Viet Nam would endanger the peace and se-
curity of the United States.”
“Under our Constitution it is the President who must decide when
an armed attack has occurred. He has also the constitutional respon-
sibility for determining what measures of defense are required when
the peace and safety of the United States are endangered. If he con-
siders that deployment of U.S. forces to South Viet Nam is re-
quired, and that military measures against the source of Commu-
169 For some popular defenses of presidential power during the “Great Debate,”
see Corwin, Who Has the Power to Make War? NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE (July 31,
1949), 11; Commager, Presidential Power: The Issue Analyzed, NEW YORK TIMES MAGA-
ZINE (January 14, 1951), 11. Cf. Douglas, The Constitutional and Legal Basis for the
President’s Action in Using Armed Forces to Repel the Invasion of South Korea, 96
CONG. REC. 9647 (1950). President Truman and Secretary Acheson utilized the argu-
ment from the U.N. Charter in defending the United States actions in Korea, and
the Charter defense has been made much of since. See, e.g., Stromseth, Rethinking
War Powers: Congress, the President, and the United Nations, 81 GEO. L. J. 597 (1993).
170 Assignment of Ground Forces of the United States to Duty in the European
Area: Hearings Before the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Commit-
tees, 82d Congress, 1st Sess. (1951), 92.
nist aggression in North Viet Nam are necessary, he is constitutionally

empowered to take those measures.” 171
Opponents of such expanded presidential powers have con-
tended, however, that the authority to initiate war was not divided
between the Executive and Congress but was vested exclusively in
Congress. The President had the duty and the power to repeal sud-
den attacks and act in other emergencies, and in his role as Com-
mander in Chief he was empowered to direct the armed forces for
any purpose specified by Congress.172 Though Congress asserted it-
self in some respects, it never really managed to confront the Presi-
dent’s power with any sort of effective limitation, until recently.
The Power of Congress to Control the President’s Discre-
tion.—Over the President’s veto, Congress enacted the War Pow-
ers Resolution,173 designed to redistribute the war powers between
the President and Congress. Although ambiguous in some respects,
the Resolution appears to define restrictively the President’s pow-
ers, to require him to report fully to Congress upon the introduc-
tion of troops into foreign areas, to specify a maximum time limita-
tion on the engagement of hostilities absent affirmative congressional
action, and to provide a means for Congress to require cessation of
hostilities in advance of the time set.
The Resolution states that the President’s power to commit United
States troops into hostilities, or into situations of imminent involve-
171 Meeker, The Legality of United States Participation in the Defense of Viet
Nam, 54 DEPT. STATE BULL. 474, 484–485 (1966). See also Moore, The National Execu-
tive and the Use of the Armed Forces Abroad, 21 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE REV. 28 (1969);
Wright, The Power of the Executive to Use Military Forces Abroad, 10 VA. J. INT. L.
43 (1969); Documents Relating to the War Powers of Congress, The President’s Au-
thority as Commander-in-Chief and the War in Indochina, Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 91st Congress, 2d sess. (Comm. Print) (1970), 1 (Under Secretary of
State Katzenbach), 90 (J. Stevenson, Legal Adviser, Department of State), 120 (Pro-
fessor Moore), 175 (Assistant Attorney General Rehnquist).
172 E.g., F. WORMUTH & E. FIRMAGE, TO CHAIN THE DOG OF WAR (2d ed. 1989), F.; J.
ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993);
U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on For-
eign Relations, 90th Congress, 1st sess. (1967), 9 (Professor Bartlett); War Powers
Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 92d Cong.,
1st sess. (1971), 7 (Professor Commager), 75 (Professor Morris), 251 (Professor Ma-
son).
173 Pub. L. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555, 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548. For the congressional
intent and explanation, see H. REP. NO. 93–287, S. REP. NO. 93–220, and H. REP. NO.
93–547 (Conference Report), all 93d Congress, 1st sess. (1973). The President’s veto
message is H. Doc. No. 93–171, 93d Congress. 1st Sess. (1973). All this material is
collected in The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Documents, Reports, Correspon-
dence, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (Comm. Print) (GPO:
1994), 1–46. For a narrative account of passage and an assessment of the disputed
compliance to date, from the congressional point of view, see The War Powers Reso-
lution, A Special Study of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 102d Cong., 2d
Sess. (Comm. Print) (GPO: 1982).
ment in hostilities, is limited to instances of (1) a declaration of

war, (2) a specific statutory authorization, or (3) a national emer-
gency created by an attack on the United States, its territories or
possessions, or its armed forces.174 In the absence of a declaration
of war, a President must within 48 hours report to Congress when-
ever he introduces troops (1) into hostilities or situations of immi-
nent hostilities, (2) into a foreign nation while equipped for com-
bat, except in certain nonhostile situations, or (3) in numbers which
substantially enlarge United States troops equipped for combat al-
ready located in a foreign nation.175 If the President introduces troops
in the first of these three situations, then he must terminate the
use of troops within 60 days after his report was submitted or was
required to be submitted to Congress, unless Congress (1) has de-
clared war, (2) has extended the period, or (3) is unable to meet as
a result of an attack on the United States, but the period can be
extended another 30 days by the President’s certification to Con-
gress of unavoidable military necessity respecting the safety of the
troops.176 Congress may through the passage of a concurrent reso-
lution require the President to remove the troops sooner.177 The Reso-
lution further states that no legislation, whether enacted prior to
or subsequent to passage of the Resolution will be taken to em-
power the President to use troops abroad unless the legislation spe-
cifically does so and that no treaty may so empower the President
unless it is supplemented by implementing legislation specifically
addressed to the issue.178
Aside from its use as a rhetorical device, the War Powers Reso-
lution has been of little worth in reordering presidential-
congressional relations in the years since its enactment. All Presi-
dents operating under it have expressly or implicitly considered it
to be an unconstitutional infringement on presidential powers, and
on each occasion of use abroad of United States troops the Presi-
dent in reporting to Congress has done so “consistent[ly] with” the
reporting section but not pursuant to the provision.179 Upon the in-
vasion of Kuwait by Iraqi troops in 1990, President Bush sought
174 87 Stat. 554, 2(c), 50 U.S.C. § 1541(c).
175 50 U.S.C. § 1543(a).
176 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b).
177 Id. at § 1544(c). It is the general consensus that, following INS v. Chadha,
462 U.S. 919 (1983), this provision of the Resolution is unconstitutional.

178 50 U.S.C. § 1547(a).
179 See the text of the reports in The War Powers Resolution: Relevant Docu-
ments, Reports, Correspondence, supra at 47 (Pres. Ford on transport of refugees

from Danang), 55 (Pres. Carter on attempted rescue of Iranian hostages), 73 (Pres.
Reagan on use of troops in Lebanon), 113 (Pres. Reagan on Grenada), 144 (Pres.
Bush on Panama), 147, 149 (Pres. Bush on Persian Gulf), 189 (Pres. Bush on Soma-
lia), 262 (Pres. Clinton on Haiti).
not congressional authorization but a United Nations Security Coun-

cil resolution authorizing the use of force by member Nations. Only
at the last moment did the President seek authorization from Con-
gress, he and his officials contending that he had the power to act
unilaterally.180 After intensive debate, Congress voted, 250 to 183
in the House of Representatives and 53 to 46 in the Senate, to au-
thorize the President to use United States troops pursuant to the
U.N. resolution and purporting to bring the act within the context
of the War Powers Resolution.181
By contrast, President George W. Bush sought a resolution from
Congress in 2002 to approve the eventual invasion of Iraq before
seeking a U.N. Security Council resolution, all the while denying
that express authorization from Congress, or for that matter, the
U.N. Security Council, was necessary to renew hostilities in Iraq.
Prior to adjourning for its midterm elections, Congress passed the
Authorization for Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution of
2002,182 which it styled as “specific statutory authorization within
the meaning of section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.” On sign-
ing the measure, the President noted that he had sought “an addi-
tional resolution of support” from Congress, and expressed appre-
ciation for receiving that support, but stated, “my request for it did
not, and my signing this resolution does not, constitute any change
in the long-standing positions of the executive branch on either the
President’s constitutional authority to use force to deter, prevent,
or respond to aggression or other threats to U.S. interests or on
the constitutionality of the War Powers Resolution.” 183 In the Bush
administration’s view, the primary benefit of receiving authoriza-
tion from Congress seems to have been the message of political unity
it conveyed to the rest of the world rather than the fulfillment of
any constitutional requirements.
Although there is recurrent talk within Congress and without
as to amending the War Powers Resolution to strengthen it, no con-
180 See Crisis in the Persian Gulf Region: U.S. Policy Options and Implications:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990),
701 (Secretary Cheney) (President did not require “any additional authorization from
the Congress” before attacking Iraq). On the day following his request for support-
ing legislation from Congress, President Bush, in answer to a question about the
requested action, stated: “I don’t think I need it. . . . I feel that I have the author-
ity to fully implement the United Nations resolutions.” 27 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC.
25 (Jan. 8, 1991).
181 Pub. L. 102–1, 105 Stat. 3 (1991).
182 Pub. L. 107–243; 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). The House approved the resolution
by a vote of 296–133. The Senate passed the House version of H.J. Res. 114 by a
vote of 77–23.
183 See President’s Statement on Signing H.J. Res. 114, Oct. 16, 2002, available
at [http://usinfo.state.gov/dhr/Archive/2003/Oct/09–906028.html].
sensus has emerged, and there is little evidence that there exists
within Congress the resolve to exercise the responsibility concomi-
tant with strengthening it.184
The President as Commander of the Armed Forces

While the President customarily delegates supreme command
of the forces in active service, there is no constitutional reason why
he should do so, and he has been known to resolve personally im-
portant questions of military policy. Lincoln early in 1862 issued
orders for a general advance in the hopes of stimulating McClellan
to action; Wilson in 1918 settled the question of an independent Ameri-
can command on the Western Front; Truman in 1945 ordered that
the bomb be dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki.185 As against an
enemy in the field, the President possesses all the powers which
are accorded by international law to any supreme commander. “He
may invade the hostile country, and subject it to the sovereignty
and authority of the United States.” 186 In the absence of attempts
by Congress to limit his power, he may establish and prescribe the
jurisdiction and procedure of military commissions, and of tribu-
nals in the nature of such commissions, in territory occupied by Armed
Forces of the United States, and his authority to do this sometimes
survives cessation of hostilities.187 He may employ secret agents to
enter the enemy’s lines and obtain information as to its strength,
resources, and movements.188 He may, at least with the assent of
Congress, authorize commercial intercourse with the enemy.189 He
may also requisition property and compel services from American
citizens and friendly aliens who are situated within the theater of
military operations when necessity requires, thereby incurring for
the United States the obligation to render “just compensation.” 190
By the same warrant, he may bring hostilities to a conclusion by
arranging an armistice, stipulating conditions that may determine
184 See, on proposals to amend and on congressional responsibility, J. ELY, WAR
AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993).

185 For a review of how several wartime Presidents have operated in this sphere,
see THE ULTIMATE DECISION: THE PRESIDENT AS COMMANDER IN CHIEF (E. May ed., 1960).
186 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
187 Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341, 348 (1952). See also Johnson v. Eisentrager,
339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).

188 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876).
189 Hamilton v. Dillin, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 73 (1875); Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9
Wall.) 32 (1869).
190 Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115 (1852); United States v. Russell,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 623 (1871); Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1876); 40 Ops.
Atty. Gen. 250, 253 (1942).
to a great extent the ensuing peace.191 He may not, however, effect

a permanent acquisition of territory,192 though he may govern re-
cently acquired territory until Congress sets up a more permanent
regime.193
The President is the ultimate tribunal for the enforcement of
the rules and regulations that Congress adopts for the government
of the forces, and that are enforced through courts-martial.194 In-
deed, until 1830, courts-martial were convened solely on the Presi-
dent’s authority as Commander in Chief.195 Such rules and regula-
tions are, moreover, it seems, subject in wartime to his amendment
at discretion.196 Similarly, the power of Congress to “make rules for
the government and regulation of the land and naval forces” (Art.
I, § 8, cl. 14) did not prevent President Lincoln from promulgating,
in April, 1863, a code of rules to govern the conduct in the field of
the armies of the United States, which was prepared at his in-
stance by a commission headed by Francis Lieber and which later
became the basis of all similar codifications both here and abroad.197
One important power that the President lacks is that of choosing
his subordinates, whose grades and qualifications are determined
by Congress and whose appointment is ordinarily made by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, though undoubtedly Con-
gress could if it wished vest their appointment in “the President
alone.” 198 Also, the President’s power to dismiss an officer from the
service, once unlimited, is today confined by statute in time of peace
to dismissal “in pursuance of the sentence of a general court-
martial or in mitigation thereof.” 199 But the provision is not re-
garded by the Court as preventing the President from displacing
an officer of the Army or Navy by appointing with the advice and
191 Cf. the Protocol of August 12, 1898, which largely foreshadowed the Peace of
Paris, 30 Stat. 1742 and President Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which were incorpo-
rated in the Armistice of November 11, 1918.
192 Fleming v. Page, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 603, 615 (1850).
193 Santiago v. Nogueras, 214 U.S. 260 (1909). As to temporarily occupied terri-
tory, see Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222, 230–31 (1901).
194 Swaim v. United States, 165 U.S. 553 (1897); and cases there reviewed. See
also Givens v. Zerbst, 255 U.S. 11 (1921).

195 15 Ops. Atty. Gen. 297, n; cf. 1 Ops. Atty. Gen. 233, 234, where the contrary
view is stated by Attorney General Wirt.

196 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 28–29 (1942).
197 General Orders, No. 100, Official Records, War Rebellion, ser. III, vol. III;
April 24, 1863.

198 See, e.g., Mimmack v. United States, 97 U.S. 426, 437 (1878); United States
v. Corson, 114 U.S. 619 (1885).

199 10 U.S.C. § 804.
consent of the Senate another person in his place.200 The Presi-

dent’s power of dismissal in time of war Congress has never at-
tempted to limit.
The Commander-in-Chief a Civilian Officer.—Is the
Commander-in-Chiefship a military or a civilian office in the con-
templation of the Constitution? Unquestionably the latter. An opin-
ion by a New York surrogate deals adequately, though not authori-
tatively, with the subject: “The President receives his compensation
for his services, rendered as Chief Executive of the Nation, not for
the individual parts of his duties. No part of his compensation is
paid from sums appropriated for the military or naval forces; and
it is equally clear under the Constitution that the President’s du-
ties as Commander in Chief represent only a part of duties ex offi-
cio as Chief Executive [Article II, sections 2 and 3 of the Constitu-
tion] and that the latter’s office is a civil office. [Article II, section 1
of the Constitution . . . .] The President does not enlist in, and he
is not inducted or drafted into, the armed forces. Nor, is he subject
to court-martial or other military discipline. On the contrary, Ar-
ticle II, section 4 of the Constitution provides that ‘The President,
[Vice President] and All Civil Officers of the United States shall be
removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of Trea-
son, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.’ . . . The last
two War Presidents, President Wilson and President Roosevelt, both
clearly recognized the civilian nature of the President’s position as
Commander in Chief. President Roosevelt, in his Navy Day Cam-
paign speech at Shibe Park, Philadelphia, on October 27, 1944, pro-
nounced this principle as follows:–‘It was due to no accident and no
oversight that the framers of our Constitution put the command of
our armed forces under civilian authority. It is the duty of the Com-
mander in Chief to appoint the Secretaries of War and Navy and
the Chiefs of Staff.’ It is also to be noted that the Secretary of War,
who is the regularly constituted organ of the President for the ad-
ministration of the military establishment of the Nation, has been
held by the Supreme Court of the United States to be merely a ci-
vilian officer, not in military service. (United States v. Burns, 79 U.S.
(12 Wall.) 246 (1871)). On the general principle of civilian su-
premacy over the military, by virtue of the Constitution, it has re-
200 Mullan v. United States, 140 U.S. 240 (1891); Wallace v. United States, 257
U.S. 541 (1922).

cently been said: ‘The supremacy of the civil over the military is
one of our great heritages.’ Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,
325 (1945).” 201
Martial Law and Constitutional Limitations

Two theories of martial law are reflected in decisions of the Su-
preme Court. The first, which stems from the Petition of Right, 1628,
provides that the common law knows no such thing as martial law; 202
that is to say, martial law is not established by official authority of
any sort, but arises from the nature of things, being the law of para-
mount necessity, leaving the civil courts to be the final judges of
necessity.203 By the second theory, martial law can be validly and
constitutionally established by supreme political authority in war-
time. In the early years of the Supreme Court, the American judi-
ciary embraced the latter theory as it held in Luther v. Borden 204
that state declarations of martial law were conclusive and there-
fore not subject to judicial review.205 In this case, the Court found
that the Rhode Island legislature had been within its rights in re-
sorting to the rights and usages of war in combating insurrection
in that state. The decision in the Prize Cases,206 although not deal-
ing directly with the subject of martial law, gave national scope to
the same general principle in 1863.
The Civil War being safely over, however, a divided Court, in
the elaborately argued Milligan case,207 reverting to the older doc-
trine, pronounced President Lincoln’s action void, following his sus-
pension of the writ of habeas corpus in September, 1863, in order-
ing the trial by military commission of persons held in custody as
“spies” and “abettors of the enemy.” The salient passage of the Court’s
opinion bearing on this point is the following: “If, in foreign inva-
sion or civil war, the courts are actually closed, and it is impossible
to administer criminal justice according to law, then, on the the-
ater of active military operations, where war really prevails, there
is a necessity to furnish a substitute for the civil authority, thus
201 Surrogate’s Court, Duchess County, New York, ruling July 25, 1950, that the
estate of Franklin D. Roosevelt was not entitled to tax benefits under sections 421
and 939 of the Internal Revenue Code, which extends certain tax benefits to per-
sons dying in the military services of the United States. New York Times, July 26,
1950, p. 27, col. 1.
202 C. FAIRMAN, THE LAW OF MARTIAL RULE 20–22 (1930); A. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO
THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 283, 290 (5th ed. 1923).
203 Id. at 539–44.
204 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19,
32–33 (1827).
205 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 45.
206 67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 635 (1863).
207 Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866).
overthrown, to preserve the safety of the army and society; and as

no power is left but the military, it is allowed to govern by martial
rule until the laws can have their free course. As necessity creates
the rule, so it limits its duration; for, if this government is contin-
ued after the courts are reinstated, it is a gross usurpation of power.
Martial rule can never exist where the courts are open, and in proper
and unobstructed exercise of their jurisdiction. It is also confined
to the locality of actual war.” 208 Four Justices, speaking by Chief
Justice Chase, while holding Milligan’s trial to have been void be-
cause it violated the Act of March 3, 1863, governing the custody
and trial of persons who had been deprived of the habeas corpus
privilege, declared their belief that Congress could have authorized
Milligan’s trial. The Chief Justice wrote: “Congress has the power
not only to raise and support and govern armies but to declare war.
It has, therefore, the power to provide by law for carrying on war.
This power necessarily extends to all legislation essential to the pros-
ecution of war with vigor and success, except such as interferes with
the command of the forces and the conduct of campaigns. That power
and duty belong to the President as commander-in-chief. Both these
powers are derived from the Constitution, but neither is defined by
that instrument. Their extent must be determined by their nature,
and by the principles of our institutions. . . .”
“We by no means assert that Congress can establish and apply
the laws of war where no war has been declared or exists.”
“Where peace exists the laws of peace must prevail. What we
do maintain is, that when the nation is involved in war, and some
portions of the country are invaded, and all are exposed to inva-
sion, it is within the power of Congress to determine in what states
or districts such great and imminent public danger exists as justi-
fies the authorization of military tribunals for the trial of crimes
and offences against the discipline or security of the army or against
the public safety.” 209 In short, only Congress can authorize the sub-
stitution of military tribunals for civil tribunals for the trial of of-
fenses; and Congress can do so only in wartime.
Early in the 20th century, however, the Court appeared to re-
treat from its stand in Milligan insofar as it held in Moyer v.
Peabody 210 that “the Governor’s declaration that a state of insurrec-
tion existed is conclusive of that fact. . . . [T]he plaintiff ’s position
208 71 U.S. at 127.
209 71 U.S. at 139–40. In Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243 (1864),
the Court had held, while war was still flagrant, that it had no power to review by
certiorari the proceedings of a military commission ordered by a general officer of
the Army, commanding a military department.
210 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
is that he has been deprived of his liberty without due process of

law. But it is familiar that what is due process of law depends on
circumstances. . . . So long as such arrests are made in good faith
and in honest belief that they are needed in order to head the in-
surrection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be sub-
jected to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he
had not reasonable ground for his belief.” 211 The “good faith” test
of Moyer, however, was superseded by the “direct relation” test of
Sterling v. Constantin,212 where the Court made it very clear that
“[i]t does not follow . . . that every sort of action the Governor may
take, no matter how justified by the exigency or subversive of pri-
vate right and the jurisdiction of the courts, otherwise available, is
conclusively supported by mere executive fiat. . . . What are the al-
lowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have
been overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.” 213
Martial Law in Hawaii.—The question of the constitutional
status of martial law was raised again in World War II by the proc-
lamation of Governor Poindexter of Hawaii, on December 7, 1941,
suspending the writ of habeas corpus and conferring on the local
commanding General of the Army all his own powers as governor
and also “all of the powers normally exercised by the judicial offi-
cers . . . of this territory . . . during the present emergency and
until the danger of invasion is removed.” Two days later the Gover-
nor’s action was approved by President Roosevelt. The regime which
the proclamation set up continued with certain abatements until
October 24, 1944.
By section 67 of the Organic Act of April 30, 1900,214 the Terri-
torial Governor was authorized “in case of rebellion or invasion, or
imminent danger thereof, when the public safety requires it, [to]
suspend the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, or place the Ter-
ritory, or any part thereof, under martial law until communication
can be had with the President and his decision thereon made known.”
211 212 U.S. at 83–85.

212 287 U.S. 378 (1932). “The nature of the power also necessarily implies that
there is a permitted range of honest judgment as to the measures to be taken in
meeting force with force, in suppressing violence and restoring order, for without
such liberty to make immediate decision, the power itself would be useless. Such
measures, conceived in good faith, in the face of the emergency and directly related
to the quelling of the disorder or the prevention of its continuance, fall within the
discretion of the Executive in the exercise of his authority to maintain peace.” Id. at
399–400.
213 287 U.S. at 400–01. This holding has been ignored by states on numerous
occasions. E.g., Allen v. Oklahoma City, 175 Okla. 421, 52 P.2d 1054 (1935); Hearon
v. Calus, 178 S.C. 381, 183 S.E. 13 (1935); and Joyner v. Browning, 30 F. Supp. 512
(W.D. Tenn. 1939).
214 31 Stat. 141, 153 (1900).
By section 5 of the Organic Act, “the Constitution . . . shall have

the same force and effect within the said Territory as elsewhere in
the United States.” In a brace of cases which reached it in Febru-
ary 1945, but which it contrived to postpone deciding till February
1946,215 the Court, speaking by Justice Black, held that the term
“martial law” as employed in the Organic Act, “while intended to
authorize the military to act vigorously for the maintenance of an
orderly civil government and for the defense of the Islands against
actual or threatened rebellion or invasion, was not intended to au-
thorize the supplanting of courts by military tribunals.” 216
The Court relied on the majority opinion in Ex parte Milligan.
Chief Justice Stone concurred in the result. “I assume also,” he said,
“that there could be circumstances in which the public safety re-
quires, and the Constitution permits, substitution of trials by mili-
tary tribunals for trials in the civil courts,” 217 but added that the
military authorities themselves had failed to show justifying facts
in this instance. Justice Burton, speaking for himself and Justice
Frankfurter, dissented. He stressed the importance of Hawaii as a
military outpost and its constant exposure to the danger of fresh
invasion. He warned that “courts must guard themselves with spe-
cial care against judging past military action too closely by the in-
applicable standards of judicial, or even military, hindsight.” 218
Articles of War: The Nazi Saboteurs.—In 1942 eight youths,
seven Germans and one an American, all of whom had received train-
ing in sabotage in Berlin, were brought to this country aboard two
German submarines and put ashore, one group on the Florida coast,
the other on Long Island, with the idea that they would proceed
forthwith to practice their art on American factories, military equip-
ment, and installations. Making their way inland, the saboteurs were
soon picked up by the FBI, some in New York, others in Chicago,
and turned over to the Provost Marshal of the District of Colum-
bia. On July 2, the President appointed a military commission to
try them for violation of the laws of war, to wit: for not wearing
fixed emblems to indicate their combatant status. In the midst of
the trial, the accused petitioned the Supreme Court and the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia for leave to bring
habeas corpus proceedings. Their argument embraced the conten-
tions: (1) that the offense charged against them was not known to
the laws of the United States; (2) that it was not one arising in the
215 Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304 (1946).

216 327 U.S. at 324.
217 327 U.S. at 336.
218 327 U.S. at 343.
land and naval forces; and (3) that the tribunal trying them had
not been constituted in accordance with the requirements of the Ar-
ticles of War.
The first argument the Court met as follows: The act of Con-
gress in providing for the trial before military tribunals of offenses
against the law of war is sufficiently definite, although Congress
has not undertaken to codify or mark the precise boundaries of the
law of war, or to enumerate or define by statute all the acts which
that law condemns. “. . . [T]hose who during time of war pass sur-
reptitiously from enemy territory into . . . [that of the United States],
discarding their uniforms upon entry, for the commission of hostile
acts involving destruction of life or property, have the status of un-
lawful combatants punishable as such by military commission.” 219
The second argument it disposed of by showing that petitioners’ case
was of a kind that was never deemed to be within the terms of the
Fifth and Sixth Amendments, citing in confirmation of this position
the trial of Major Andre.220 The third contention the Court over-
ruled by declining to draw the line between the powers of Congress
and the President in the premises,221 thereby, in effect, attributing
to the President the right to amend the Articles of War in a case of
the kind before the Court ad libitum.
The decision might well have rested on the ground that the Con-
stitution is without restrictive force in wartime in a situation of this
sort. The saboteurs were invaders; their penetration of the bound-
ary of the country, projected from units of a hostile fleet, was essen-
tially a military operation, their capture was a continuation of that
operation. Punishment of the saboteurs was therefore within the
President’s purely martial powers as Commander in Chief. More-
over, seven of the petitioners were enemy aliens, and so, strictly
speaking, without constitutional status. Even had they been civil-
ians properly domiciled in the United States at the outbreak of the
war, they would have been subject under the statutes to restraint
and other disciplinary action by the President without appeals to
the courts. In any event, the Court rejected the jurisdictional chal-
lenge by one of the saboteurs on the basis of his claim to U.S. citi-
zenship, finding U.S. citizenship wholly irrelevant to the determina-
tion of whether a wartime captive is an “enemy belligerent” within
the meaning of the law of war.222
219 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 29–30, 35 (1942).

220 317 U.S. at 41–42.
221 317 U.S. at 28–29.
222 Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 37–38 (1942) (“Citizens who associate them-
selves with the military arm of the enemy government, and with its aid, guidance
and direction enter this country bent on hostile acts, are enemy belligerents within
Articles of War: World War II Crimes.—As a matter of fact,

in General Yamashita’s case,223 which was brought after the termi-
nation of hostilities for alleged “war crimes,” the Court abandoned
its restrictive conception altogether. In the words of Justice Rutledge’s
dissenting opinion in this case: “The difference between the Court’s
view of this proceeding and my own comes down in the end to the
view, on the one hand, that there is no law restrictive upon these
proceedings other than whatever rules and regulations may be pre-
scribed for their government by the executive authority or the mili-
tary and, on the other hand, that the provisions of the Articles of
War, of the Geneva Convention and the Fifth Amendment ap-
ply.” 224 And the adherence of the United States to the Charter of
London in August 1945, under which the Nazi leaders were brought
to trial, is explicable by the same theory. These individuals were
charged with the crime of instigating aggressive war, which at the
time of its commission was not a crime either under international
law or under the laws of the prosecuting governments. It must be
presumed that the President is not in his capacity as Supreme Com-
mander bound by the prohibition in the Constitution of ex post facto
laws, nor does international law forbid ex post facto laws.225
Articles of War: Response to the Attacks of September 11,
2001.—In response to the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks on
New York City’s World Trade Center and the Pentagon in Washing-
ton, D.C., Congress passed the “Authorization for Use of Military
Force,” 226 which provided that the President may use “all neces-
sary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or
persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the
terrorist attacks [or] harbored such organizations or persons.” Dur-
ing a military action in Afghanistan pursuant to this authoriza-
tion, a United States citizen, Yaser Hamdi, was taken prisoner. The
Executive Branch argued that it had plenary authority under Ar-
ticle II to hold such an “enemy combatant” for the duration of hos-
tilities, and to deny him meaningful recourse to the federal courts.
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, the Court agreed that the President was
authorized to detain a United States citizen seized in Afghanistan,
although a majority of the Court appeared to reject the notion that
such power was inherent in the Presidency, relying instead on statu-
the meaning of the Hague Convention and the law of war.”). See also Colepaugh v.
Looney, 235 F.2d 429, 432 (10th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 1014 (1957) (“[T]he
petitioner’s citizenship in the United States does not . . . confer upon him any con-
stitutional rights not accorded any other belligerent under the laws of war.”).
223 In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946).
224 327 U.S. at 81.
225 See Gross, The Criminality of Aggressive War, 41 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 205 (1947).
226 Pub. L. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001).
tory grounds.227 However, the Court did find that the government
may not detain the petitioner indefinitely for purposes of interroga-
tion, and must afford him the opportunity to offer evidence that he
is not an enemy combatant.228
In Rasul v. Bush,229 the Court rejected an Executive Branch ar-
gument that foreign prisoners being held at Guantanamo Bay were
outside of federal court jurisdiction. The Court distinguished ear-
lier case law arising during World War II that denied habeas cor-
pus petitions from German citizens who had been captured and tried
overseas by United States military tribunals.230 In Rasul, the Court
noted that the Guantanamo petitioners were not citizens of a coun-
try at war with the United States,231 had not been afforded any
form of tribunal, and were being held in a territory over which the
United States exercised exclusive jurisdiction and control.232 In ad-
dition, the Court found that statutory grounds existed for the exten-
sion of habeas corpus to these prisoners.233
In response to Rasul, Congress amended the habeas statute to
eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction over detainees, whether its
227 542 U.S. 507 (2004). There was no opinion of the Court. Justice O’Connor,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Kennedy and Justice Breyer, avoided rul-
ing on the Executive Branch argument that such detentions could be authorized by
its Article II powers alone, and relied instead on the “Authorization for Use of Mili-
tary Force” passed by Congress. Justice Thomas also found that the Executive Branch
had the power to detain the petitioner, although his dissenting opinion found that
such detentions were authorized by Article II. Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsberg,
rejected the argument that the Congress had authorized such detentions, while Jus-
tice Scalia, joined with Justice Stevens, denied that such congressional authoriza-
tion was possible without a suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.
228 At a minimum, the petitioner must be given notice of the asserted factual
basis for holding him, must be given a fair chance to rebut that evidence before a
neutral decisionmaker, and must be allowed to consult an attorney. 542 U.S. at 533,
539.
229 542 U.S. 466 (2004).
230 Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950).
231 The petitioners were Australians and Kuwaitis.
232 Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. at 467.
233 The Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which had previously been con-
strued to require the presence of a petitioner in a district court’s jurisdiction, was

now satisfied by the presence of a jailor-custodian. See Braden v. 30th Judicial Cir-
cuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973). Another “enemy combatant” case, this one involv-
ing an American citizen arrested on American soil, was remanded after the Court
found that a federal court’s habeas jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 was limited
to jurisdiction over the immediate custodian of a petitioner. Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542
U.S. 426 (2004) (federal court’s jurisdiction over Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld not
sufficient to satisfy presence requirement under 28 U.S.C. § 2241). In Munaf v. Geren,
128 S. Ct. 2207 (2008), the Court held that the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2241, applied to American citizens held by the Multinational Force—Iraq, an inter-
national coalition force operating in Iraq and composed of 26 different nations, in-
cluding the United States. The Court concluded that the habeas statute extends to
American citizens held overseas by American forces operating subject to an Ameri-
can chain of command, even when those forces are acting as part of a multinational
coalition.
basis was statutory or constitutional.234 This amendment was chal-

lenged in Boumediene v. Bush,235 as a violation of the Suspension
Clause.236 Although the historical record did not contain significant
common-law applications of the writ to foreign nationals who were
apprehended and detained overseas, the Court did not find this con-
clusive in evaluating whether habeas applied in this case.237 Em-
phasizing a “functional” approach to the issue,238 the Court consid-
ered (1) the citizenship and status of the detainee and the adequacy
of the process through which the status determination was made;
(2) the nature of the sites where apprehension and detention took
place; and (3) any practical obstacles inherent in resolving the pris-
oner’s entitlement to the writ. As in Rasul, the Court distinguished
previous case law, noting that the instant detainees disputed their
enemy status, that their ability to dispute their status had been
limited, that they were held in a location (Guantanamo Bay, Cuba)
under the de facto jurisdiction of the United States, and that com-
plying with the demands of habeas petitions would not interfere with
the government’s military mission. Thus, the Court concluded that
the Suspension Clause was in full effect regarding these detainees.
Martial Law and Domestic Disorder.—President Washing-
ton himself took command of state militia called into federal ser-
vice to quell the Whiskey Rebellion, but there were not too many
occasions subsequently in which federal troops or state militia called
234 Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. 109–148, § 1005(e)(1) (providing that
“no court . . . shall have jurisdiction to hear or consider . . . an application for a

writ of habeas corpus filed by . . . an alien detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay”). Af-
ter the Court decided, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006), that this lan-
guage of the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to detainees whose cases were
pending at the time of enactment, the language was amended by the Military Com-
missions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–366, to also apply to pending cases where a de-
tainee had been determined to be an enemy combatant.
235 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
236 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 9, cl. 2 provides: “The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the
public Safety may require it.” In Boumediene, the government argued only that the
Suspension Clause did not apply to the detainees; it did not argue that Congress
had acted to suspend habeas.
237 “[G]iven the unique status of Guantanamo Bay and the particular dangers
of terrorism in the modern age, the common-law courts simply may not have con-
fronted cases with close parallels to this one. We decline, therefore, to infer too much,
one way or the other, from the lack of historical evidence on this point.” 553 U.S. at
752.
238 553 U.S. at 764. “[Q]uestions of extraterritoriality turn on objective factors
and practical concerns, not formalism.” Id.

into federal service were required.239 Since World War II, however,
the President, by virtue of his own powers and the authority vested
in him by Congress,240 has used federal troops on a number of occa-
sions, five of them involving resistance to desegregation decrees in
the South.241 In 1957, Governor Faubus employed the Arkansas Na-
tional Guard to resist court-ordered desegregation in Little Rock,
and President Eisenhower dispatched federal soldiers and brought
the Guard under federal authority.242 In 1962, President Kennedy
dispatched federal troops to Oxford, Mississippi, when federal mar-
shals were unable to control with rioting that broke out upon the
admission of an African American student to the University of Mis-
sissippi.243 In June and September of 1964, President Johnson sent
troops into Alabama to enforce court decrees opening schools to
blacks.244 And, in 1965, the President used federal troops and fed-
eralized local Guardsmen to protect participants in a civil rights
march. The President justified his action on the ground that there
was a substantial likelihood of domestic violence because state au-
thorities were refusing to protect the marchers.245
PRESIDENTIAL ADVISERS
The Cabinet
The authority in Article II, § 2, cl. 1 to require the written opin-
ion of the heads of executive departments is the meager residue
from a persistent effort in the Federal Convention to impose a coun-
239 United States Adjutant-General, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances 1787–
1903, S. Doc. No. 209, 57th Congress, 2d sess. (1903); Pollitt, Presidential Use of
Troops to Enforce Federal Laws: A Brief History, 36 N.C. L. REV. 117 (1958). United
States Marshals were also used on approximately 30 occasions. United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights, Law Enforcement: A Report on Equal Protection in the South
(Washington: 1965), 155–159.
240 10 U.S.C. §§ 331–334, 3500, 8500, deriving from laws of 1795, 1 Stat. 424;
1861, 12 Stat. 281; and 1871, 17 Stat. 14.

241 The other instances were in domestic disturbances at the request of state
governors.
242 Proc. No. 3204, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628 (1957); E.O. 10730, 22 Fed. Reg. 7628.
See 41 Ops. Atty. Gen. 313 (1957); see also, Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958); Aaron
v. McKinley, 173 F. Supp. 944 (E.D. Ark. 1959), aff’d sub nom Faubus v. Aaron, 361
U.S. 197 (1959); Faubus v. United States, 254 F.2d 797 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. denied,
358 U.S. 829 (1958).
243 Proc. No. 3497, 27 Fed. Reg. 9681 (1962); E.O. 11053, 27 Fed. Reg. 9693 (1962).
See United States v. Barnett, 346 F.2d 99 (5th Cir. 1965).

244 Proc. 3542, 28 Fed. Reg. 5707 (1963); E.O. 11111, 28 Fed. Reg. 5709 (1963);
Proc. No. 3554, 28 Fed. Reg. 9861; E.O. 11118, 28 Fed. Reg. 9863 (1963). See Ala-
bama v. United States, 373 U.S. 545 (1963).
245 Proc. No. 3645, 30 Fed. Reg. 3739 (1965); E.O. 11207, 30 Fed. Reg. 2743 (1965).
See Williams v. Wallace, 240 F. Supp. 100 (M.D. Ala. 1965).

cil on the President.246 The idea ultimately failed, partly because of

the diversity of ideas concerning the council’s make-up. One mem-
ber wished it to consist of “members of the two houses,” another
wished it to comprise two representatives from each of three sec-
tions, “with a rotation and duration of office similar to those of the
Senate.” The proposal with the strongest backing was that it should
consist of the heads of departments and the Chief Justice, who should
preside when the President was absent. Of this proposal the only
part to survive was the above cited provision. The consultative re-
lation here contemplated is an entirely one-sided affair, is to be con-
ducted with each principal officer separately and in writing, and is
to relate only to the duties of their respective offices.247 The Cabi-
net, as we know it today, that is to say, the Cabinet meeting, was
brought about solely on the initiative of the first President,248 and
may be dispensed with on presidential initiative at any time, being
totally unknown to the Constitution. Several Presidents have in fact
reduced the Cabinet meeting to little more than a ceremony with
social trimmings.249
PARDONS AND REPRIEVES
The Legal Nature of a Pardon

In the first case to be decided concerning the pardoning power,
Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for the Court, said: “As this power
had been exercised from time immemorial by the executive of that
nation whose language is our language, and to whose judicial insti-
tution ours bear a close resemblance; we adopt their principles re-
specting the operation and effect of a pardon, and look into their
books for the rules prescribing the manner in which it is to be used
by the person who would avail himself of it. A pardon is an act of
grace, proceeding from the power entrusted with the execution of
the laws, which exempts the individual, on whom it is bestowed,
from the punishment the law inflicts for a crime he has committed.
It is the private, though official act of the executive magistrate, de-
livered to the individual for whose benefit it is intended, and not
communicated officially to the Court. . . . A pardon is a deed, to the
validity of which delivery is essential, and delivery is not complete
without acceptance. It may then be rejected by the person to whom
246 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 70, 97, 110 (rev.
ed. 1937); 2 id. at 285, 328, 335–37, 367, 537–42. Debate on the issue in the Conven-
tion is reviewed in C. THACH, THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY 1775–1789 82, 83, 84,
85, 109, 126 (1923).
247 E. Corwin, supra at 82.
248 L. WHITE, THE FEDERALISTS: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE HISTORY ch. 4 (1948).
249 E. Corwin, supra at 19, 61, 79–85, 211, 295–99, 312, 320–23, 490–93.
it is tendered; and if it be rejected, we have discovered no power in

a court to force it on him.” Marshall continued to hold that to be
noticed judicially this deed must be pleaded, like any private instru-
ment.250
In Burdick v. United States,251 Marshall’s doctrine was put to a
test that seems to have overtaxed it, perhaps fatally. Burdick, hav-
ing declined to testify before a federal grand jury on the ground
that his testimony would tend to incriminate him, was proffered by
President Wilson “a full and unconditional pardon for all offenses
against the United States,” which he might have committed or par-
ticipated in in connection with the matter he had been questioned
about. Burdick, nevertheless, refused to accept the pardon and per-
sisted in his contumacy with the unanimous support of the Su-
preme Court. “The grace of a pardon,” remarked Justice McKenna
sententiously, “may be only a pretense . . . involving consequences
of even greater disgrace than those from which it purports to re-
lieve. Circumstances may be made to bring innocence under the pen-
alties of the law. If so brought, escape by confession of guilt im-
plied in the acceptance of a pardon may be rejected . . . .” 252 Nor
did the Court give any attention to the fact that the President had
accompanied his proffer to Burdick with a proclamation, although
a similar procedure had been held to bring President Johnson’s am-
nesties to the Court’s notice.253 In 1927, however, in sustaining the
right of the President to commute a sentence of death to one of life
imprisonment, against the will of the prisoner, the Court aban-
doned this view. “A pardon in our days,” it said, “is not a private
act of grace from an individual happening to possess power. It is a
part of the constitutional scheme. When granted it is the determi-
nation of the ultimate authority that the public welfare will be bet-
ter served by inflicting less than what the judgment fixed.” 254 Whether
these words sound the death knell of the acceptance doctrine is per-
haps doubtful.255 They seem clearly to indicate that by substituting
a commutation order for a deed of pardon, a President can always
250 United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 160–61 (1833).

251 236 U.S. 79, 86 (1915).
252 236 U.S. at 90–91.
253 Armstrong v. United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154, 156 (1872). In Brown v.
Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896), the Court had said: “It is almost a necessary corollary
of the above propositions that, if the witness has already received a pardon, he can-
not longer set up his privilege, since he stands with respect to such offence as if it
had never been committed.” Id. at 599, citing British cases.
254 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927).
255 Cf. W. HUMBERT, THE PARDONING POWER OF THE PRESIDENT 73 (1941).
have his way in such matters, provided the substituted penalty is

authorized by law and does not in common understanding exceed
the original penalty.256
Scope of the Power

The pardon power embraces all “offences against the United
States,” except cases of impeachment, and includes the power to re-
mit fines, penalties, and forfeitures, except as to money covered into
the Treasury or paid an informer,257 the power to pardon abso-
lutely or conditionally, and the power to commute sentences, which,
as seen above, is effective without the convict’s consent.258 It has
been held, moreover, in face of earlier English practice, that indefi-
nite suspension of sentence by a court of the United States is an
invasion of the presidential prerogative, amounting as it does to a
condonation of the offense.259 It was early assumed that the power
included the power to pardon specified classes or communities whole-
sale, in short, the power to amnesty, which is usually exercised by
proclamation. General amnesties were issued by Washington in 1795,
by Adams in 1800, by Madison in 1815, by Lincoln in 1863, by John-
son in 1865, 1867, and 1868, and by Theodore Roosevelt—to
Aguinaldo’s followers—in 1902.260 Not until after the Civil War, how-
ever, was the point adjudicated, when it was decided in favor of
presidential prerogative.261
256 Biddle v. Perovich, 274 U.S. 480, 486 (1927). In Schick v. Reed, 419 U.S. 256
(1976), the Court upheld the presidential commutation of a death sentence to impris-
onment for life with no possibility of parole, the foreclosure of parole being contrary
to the scheme of the Code of Military Justice. “The conclusion is inescapable that
the pardoning power was intended to include the power to commute sentences on
conditions which do not in themselves offend the Constitution, but which are not
specifically provided for by statute.” Id. at 264.
257 23 Ops. Atty. Gen. 360, 363 (1901); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S.
92 (1890).
258 Ex parte William Wells, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 307 (1856). For the contrary view,
see some early opinions of the Attorney General, 1 Ops. Atty. Gen. 341 (1820); 2
Ops. Atty. Gen. 275 (1829); 5 Ops. Atty. Gen. 687 (1795); cf. 4 Ops. Atty. Gen. 458
(1845); United States v. Wilson, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 150, 161 (1833).
259 Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 27 (1916). Amendment of sentence, how-
ever, within the same term of court, by shortening the term of imprisonment, al-
though defendant had already been committed, is a judicial act and no infringement
of the pardoning power. United States v. Benz, 282 U.S. 304 (1931).
260 See 1 J. Richardson, supra, at 173, 293; 2 id. at 543; 7 id. at 3414, 3508; 8
id. at 3853; 14 id. at 6690.

261 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872). See also United
States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 531 (1870).

The President cannot pardon by anticipation, or he would be

invested with the power to dispense with the laws, King James II’s
claim to which was the principal cause of his forced abdication.262
Offenses Against the United States: Contempt of Court.—
The President may pardon criminal but not civil contempts of court.
The Court “point[ed] out that it is not the fact of punishment but
rather its character and purpose that makes the difference be-
tween the two kinds of contempts. For civil contempts, the punish-
ment is remedial and for the benefit of the complainant, and a par-
don cannot stop it. For criminal contempts the sentence is punitive
in the public interest to vindicate the authority of the court and to
deter other like derelictions.” 263 In upholding the President’s power
to pardon criminal contempt, Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the
Court, resorted once more to English conceptions as being authori-
tative in construing this clause of the Constitution. He wrote: “The
King of England before our Revolution, in the exercise of his pre-
rogative, had always exercised the power to pardon contempts of
court, just as he did ordinary crimes and misdemeanors and as he
has done to the present day. In the mind of a common law lawyer
of the eighteenth century the word pardon included within its scope
the ending by the King’s grace of the punishment of such derelic-
tions, whether it was imposed by the court without a jury or upon
indictment, for both forms of trial for contempts were had. [Citing
cases.] These cases also show that, long before our Constitution, a
distinction had been recognized at common law between the effect
of the King’s pardon to wipe out the effect of a sentence for con-
tempt in so far as it had been imposed to punish the contemnor for
violating the dignity of the court and the King, in the public inter-
est, and its inefficacy to halt or interfere with the remedial part of
the court’s order necessary to secure the rights of the injured suitor.
Blackstone IV, 285, 397, 398; Hawkins Pleas of the Crown, 6th Ed.
(1787), Vol. 2, 553. The same distinction, nowadays referred to as
the difference between civil and criminal contempts, is still main-
tained in English law.” 264 Nor was any new or special danger to be
apprehended from this view of the pardoning power. “If,” the Chief
262 F. MAITLAND, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF ENGLAND 302–306 (W.S. Hein 2006) (1908);
1 Ops. Atty. Gen. 342 (1820). That is, the pardon may not be in anticipation of the
commission of the offense. “A pardon may be exercised at any time after its commis-
sion, either before legal proceedings are taken, or during their pendency, or after
conviction and judgment.” Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 380 (1867), as
indeed President Ford’s pardon of former President Nixon preceded institution of
any action. On the Nixon pardon controversy, see Pardon of Richard M. Nixon and
Related Matters: Hearings Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Jus-
tice, 93d Congress, 2d Sess. (1974).
263 Ex parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87, 113 (1925).
264 267 U.S. at 110–11.
Justice asked, “we could conjure up in our minds a President will-

ing to paralyze courts by pardoning all criminal contempts, why not
a President ordering a general jail delivery?” Although, he added,
“[t]he power of a court to protect itself and its usefulness by punish-
ing contemnors is of course necessary,” in light of the fact that a
court exercises this power “without the restraining influence of a
jury and without many of the guaranties [sic] which the bill of rights
offers[,] . . . [m]ay it not be fairly said that in order to avoid pos-
sible mistake, undue prejudice or needless severity, the chance of
pardon should exist at least as much in favor of a person convicted
by a judge without a jury as in favor of one convicted in a jury
trial?” 265
Effects of a Pardon: Ex parte Garland.—The leading case
on this subject is Ex parte Garland,266 which was decided shortly
after the Civil War. By an act passed in 1865, Congress had pre-
scribed that, before any person should be permitted to practice in a
federal court, he must take oath asserting that he had “never vol-
untarily borne arms against the United States,” had never given
aid or encouragement “to persons engaged in armed hostilities” against
the United States, and so forth.267 Garland, who had “taken part
in the Rebellion against the United States, by being in the Con-
gress of the so-called Confederate States,” and so was unable to take
the oath, had, however, received from President Johnson “a full par-
don ‘for all offences by him committed, arising from participation,
direct or implied, in the Rebellion,’ ” 268 The question before the Court
was whether, armed with this pardon, Garland was entitled to prac-
tice in the federal courts despite the act of Congress just men-
tioned. Justice Field wrote for a divided Court: “[T]he inquiry arises
as to the effect and operation of a pardon, and on this point all the
authorities concur. A pardon reaches both the punishment pre-
scribed for the offence and the guilt of the offender; and when the
pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of exis-
tence the guilt, so that in the eye of the law the offender is as inno-
cent as if he had never committed the offence. If granted before con-
viction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities consequent
upon conviction from attaching; if granted after conviction, it re-
moves the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all his civil
rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new
credit and capacity.” 269
265 267 U.S. at 121, 122.

266 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
267 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 334–35.
268 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) at 336, 375.
269 71 U.S. at 380–81.
Justice Miller, speaking for the minority, protested that the act
of Congress involved was not penal in character, but merely laid
down an appropriate test of fitness to practice law. “The man who,
by counterfeiting, by theft, by murder, or by treason, is rendered
unfit to exercise the functions of an attorney or counselor-at-law,
may be saved by the executive pardon from the penitentiary or the
gallows, but he is not thereby restored to the qualifications which
are essential to admission to the bar.” 270 Justice Field’s language
must today be regarded as too sweeping in light of the 1914 deci-
sion in Carlesi v. New York.271 Carlesi had been convicted several
years before of committing a federal offense. In the instant case, he
was being tried for a subsequent offense committed in New York.
He was convicted as a second offender, although the President had
pardoned him for the earlier federal offense. In other words, the
fact of prior conviction by a federal court was considered in deter-
mining the punishment for a subsequent state offense. This convic-
tion and sentence were upheld by the Supreme Court. Although this
case involved offenses against different sovereignties, the Court de-
clared in dictum that its decision “must not be understood as in
the slightest degree intimating that a pardon would operate to limit
the power of the United States in punishing crimes against its au-
thority to provide for taking into consideration past offenses com-
mitted by the accused as a circumstance of aggravation even al-
though for such past offenses there had been a pardon granted.” 272
Limits to the Efficacy of a Pardon.—But Justice Field’s lati-
tudinarian view of the effect of a pardon undoubtedly still applies
ordinarily where the pardon is issued before conviction. He is also
correct in saying that a full pardon restores a convict to his “civil
rights,” and this is so even though simple completion of the con-
vict’s sentence would not have had that effect. One such right is
the right to testify in court, and in Boyd v. United States, the Court
held that “[t]he disability to testify being a consequence, according
to the principles of the common law, of the judgment of conviction,
the pardon obliterated that effect.” 273 But a pardon “does not make
amends for the past. It affords no relief for what has been suffered
by the offender in his person by imprisonment, forced labor, or oth-
erwise; it does not give compensation for what has been done or
suffered, nor does it impose upon the government any obligation to
give it. The offence being established by judicial proceedings, that
which has been done or suffered while they were in force is pre-
270 71 U.S. at 397.

271 233 U.S. 51 (1914).
272 233 U.S. at 59.
273 142 U.S. 450, 453–54 (1892).
sumed to have been rightfully done and justly suffered, and no sat-
isfaction for it can be required. Neither does the pardon affect any
rights which have vested in others directly by the execution of the
judgment for the offence, or which have been acquired by others
whilst that judgment was in force. If, for example, by the judgment
a sale of the offender’s property has been had, the purchaser will
hold the property notwithstanding the subsequent pardon. And if
the proceeds of the sale have been paid to a party to whom the law
has assigned them, they cannot be subsequently reached and recov-
ered by the offender. The rights of the parties have become vested,
and are as complete as if they were acquired in any other legal way.
So, also, if the proceeds have been paid into the treasury, the right
to them has so far become vested in the United States that they
can only be secured to the former owner of the property through
an act of Congress. Moneys once in the treasury can only be with-
drawn by an appropriation by law.” 274
Congress and Amnesty
Congress cannot limit the effects of a presidential amnesty. Thus
the act of July 12, 1870, making proof of loyalty necessary to re-
cover property abandoned and sold by the government during the
Civil War, notwithstanding any executive proclamation, pardon, am-
nesty, or other act of condonation or oblivion, was pronounced void.
Chief Justice Chase wrote for the majority: “[T]he legislature can-
not change the effect of such a pardon any more than the executive
can change a law. Yet this is attempted by the provision under con-
sideration. The Court is required to receive special pardons as evi-
dence of guilt and to treat them as null and void. It is required to
disregard pardons granted by proclamation on condition, though the
condition has been fulfilled, and to deny them their legal effect. This
certainly impairs the executive authority and directs the Court to
be instrumental to that end.” 275 On the other hand, Congress it-
self, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, may enact amnesty
laws remitting penalties incurred under the national statutes.276
Clause 2. He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and
Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of
the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and
with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Am-
bassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the su-
274 Knote v. United States, 95 U.S. 149, 153–54 (1877).
275 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 143, 148 (1872).
276 The Laura, 114 U.S. 411 (1885).
Sec. 2—Powers, Duties of the President Cl. 2—Treaties and Appointment of Officers
preme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which
shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest
the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper,
in the President alone, in the Court of Law, or in the Heads of
Departments.
THE TREATY-MAKING POWER
President and Senate

The plan that the Committee of Detail reported to the Federal
Convention on August 6, 1787 provided that “the Senate of the United
States shall have power to make treaties, and to appoint Ambassa-
dors, and Judges of the Supreme Court.” 277 Not until September 7,
ten days before the Convention’s final adjournment, was the Presi-
dent made a participant in these powers.278 The constitutional clause
evidently assumes that the President and Senate will be associated
throughout the entire process of making a treaty, although Jay, writ-
ing in The Federalist, foresaw that the initiative must often be seized
by the President without benefit of senatorial counsel.279 Yet, so late
as 1818 Rufus King, Senator from New York, who had been a mem-
ber of the Convention, declared on the floor of the Senate: “In these
concerns the Senate are the Constitutional and the only respon-
sible counselors of the President. And in this capacity the Senate
may, and ought to, look into and watch over every branch of the
foreign affairs of the nation; they may, therefore, at any time call
for full and exact information respecting the foreign affairs, and ex-
press their opinion and advice to the President respecting the same,
when, and under whatever other circumstances, they may think such
advice expedient.” 280
Negotiation, a Presidential Monopoly.—Actually, the nego-
tiation of treaties had long since been taken over by the President;
the Senate’s role in relation to treaties is today essentially legisla-
tive in character.281 “He alone negotiates. Into the field of negotia-
tion, the Senate cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to
1937).
278 Id. at 538–39.
279 No. 64 (J. Cooke ed., 1961), 435–436.
280 31 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 106 (1818).
281 Washington sought to use the Senate as a council, but the effort proved fu-
tile, principally because the Senate balked. For the details see E. Corwin, supra, at
207–217.
invade it,” declared Justice Sutherland for the Court in 1936.282 The
Senate must, moreover, content itself with such information as the
President chooses to furnish it.283 In performing the function that
remains to it, however, it has several options. It may consent uncon-
ditionally to a proposed treaty, it may refuse its consent, or it may
stipulate conditions in the form of amendments to the treaty, of res-
ervations to the act of ratification, or of statements of understand-
ing or other declarations, the formal difference between the first two
and the third being that amendments and reservations, if accepted
by the President must be communicated to the other parties to the
treaty, and, at least with respect to amendments and often reserva-
tions as well, require reopening negotiations and changes, whereas
the other actions may have more problematic results.284 The act of
ratification for the United States is the President’s act, but it may
not be forthcoming unless the Senate has consented to it by the
required two-thirds of the Senators present, which signifies two-
thirds of a quorum, otherwise the consent rendered would not be
that of the Senate as organized under the Constitution to do busi-
ness.285 Conversely, the President may, if dissatisfied with amend-
ments which have been affixed by the Senate to a proposed treaty
or with the conditions stipulated by it to ratification, decide to aban-
don the negotiation, which he is entirely free to do.286
Treaties as Law of the Land
Treaty commitments of the United States are of two kinds. As
Chief Justice Marshall wrote in 1829: “A treaty is, in its nature, a
contract between two nations, not a legislative act. It does not gen-
erally effect, of itself, the object to be accomplished; especially, so
far as its operation is infra-territorial; but is carried into execution
by the sovereign power of the respective parties to the instrument.
In the United States, a different principle is established. Our con-
stitution declares a treaty to be the law of the land. It is, conse-
quently, to be regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act
of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of
282 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
283 E. Corwin, supra, at 428–429.
284 Treaties and Other International Agreements: The Role of the United States
Senate, A Study Prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations by the
Congressional Research Service, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. (Comm. Print) (1993), 96–98
(hereinafter CRS Study); see also AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE
LAW, THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 314 (hereinafter Restatement,
Foreign Relations) (1987). See Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United States, 183 U.S.
176, 183 (1901).
285 Cf. Art. I, § 5, cl. 1; see also Missouri Pacific Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276,
283–84 (1919).
286 For instance, see S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT 53 (2d
ed. 1916); CRS Study, supra, 109–120.

any legislative provision. But when the terms of the stipulation im-
port a contract—when either of the parties engages to perform a
particular act, the treaty addresses itself to the political, not the
judicial department; and the legislature must execute the contract,
before it can become a rule for the court.” 287
To the same effect, but more accurate, is Justice Miller’s lan-
guage for the Court a half century later, in the Head Money Cases:
“A treaty is primarily a compact between independent nations. It
depends for the enforcement of its provisions on the interest and
the honor of the governments which are parties of it. . . . But a
treaty may also contain provisions which confer certain rights upon
the citizens or subjects of one of the nations residing in the territo-
rial limits of the other, which partake of the nature of municipal
law, and which are capable of enforcement as between private par-
ties in the courts of the country.” 288
The meaning of treaties, as of statutes, is determined by the
courts. “If treaties are to be given effect as federal law under our
legal system, determining their meaning as a matter of federal law
‘is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department,’
headed by the ‘one supreme Court’ established by the Constitu-
tion.” 289 Yet, “[w]hile courts interpret treaties for themselves, the
meaning given them by the departments of government particu-
larly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is given great
weight.” 290 Decisions of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in-
287 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 313–14 (1829). See THE FEDERALIST No.
75 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 504–505.

288 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (quoted with approval in Medellin v. Texas, 128 S.
Ct. 1346, 1357, 1358–59 (2008)). For treaty provisions operative as “law of the land”
(self-executing), see S. Crandall, supra, at 36–42, 49–62, 151, 153–163, 179, 238–
239, 286, 321, 338, 345–346. For treaty provisions of an “executory” character, see
id. at 162–63, 232, 236, 238, 493, 497, 532, 570, 589. See also CRS Study, supra, at
41–68; Restatement, Foreign Relations, supra, §§ 111–115.
289 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 353–54 (2006), quoting Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 177 (1803). In Sanchez-Llamas, two foreign nationals
were arrested in the United States, and, in violation of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations, their nations’ consuls were not notified that they
had been detained by authorities in a foreign country (the U.S.). The foreign nation-
als were convicted in Oregon and Virginia state courts, respectively, and cited the
violations of Article 36 in challenging their convictions. The Court did not decide
whether Article 36 grants rights that may be invoked by individuals in a judicial
proceeding (four justices would have held that it did grant such rights). The reason
that the Court did not decide whether Article 36 grants rights to defendants was
that it held, by a 6-to-3 vote, that, even if Article 36 does grant rights, the defen-
dants in the two cases before it were not entitled to relief on their claims. It found,
specifically, that “suppression of evidence is [not] a proper remedy for a violation of
Article 36,” and that “an Article 36 claim may be deemed forfeited under state pro-
cedural rules because a defendant failed to raise the claim at trial.” Id. at 342.
290 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. at 355, quoting Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366
U.S. 187, 194 (1961).

terpreting treaties, however, have “no binding force except between

the parties and in respect of that particular case.” 291 ICJ decisions
“are therefore entitled only to the ‘respectful consideration’ due an
interpretation of an international agreement by an international
court.” 292
Even when an ICJ decision has binding force as between the
governments of two nations, it is not necessarily enforceable by the
individuals affected. If, for example, the ICJ finds that the United
States violated a particular defendant’s rights under international
law, and such a decision “constitutes an international law obliga-
tion on the part of the United States,” it does not necessarily “con-
stitute binding federal law enforceable in United States courts. . . .
[W]hile treaties may comprise international commitments . . . they
are not domestic law unless Congress has either enacted implement-
ing statutes or the treaty itself conveys an intention that it be self-
executing and is ratified on these terms.” 293 A memorandum from
the President of the United States directing that the United States
would “discharge its international obligations” under an ICJ deci-
sion interpreting a non-self-executing treaty, “by having State courts
give effect to the decision,” is not sufficient to make the decision
binding on state courts, unless the President’s action is authorized
by Congress.294
291 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. at 354, quoting Statute of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, Art. 59, 59 Stat. 1062, T.S. No. 933 (1945) (emphasis added
by the Court).
292 Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. at 355, quoting Breard v. Greene, 523
U.S. 371, 375 (1998) (per curiam).

293 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008) (emphasis in the original,
internal quotation marks omitted). As in the case of the foreign nationals in Sanchez-
Llamas, Medellin’s nation’s consul had not been notified that he had been detained
in the United States. Unlike the foreign nationals in Sanchez-Llamas, however, Medel-
lin was named in an ICJ decision that found a violation of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention.
294 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1353 (2008). “[T]he non-self-executing char-
acter of a treaty constrains the President’s ability to comply with treaty commit-
ments by unilaterally making the treaty binding on domestic courts.” Id. at 1371.
The majority opinion in Medellin was written by Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Ste-
vens, concurring, noted that, even though the ICJ decision “is not ‘the supreme Law
of the Land,’ U.S. Const., Art VI, cl. 2,” it constitutes an international law obliga-
tion not only on the part of the United States, but on the part of the State of Texas.
Id. at 1374. This, of course, does not make it enforceable against Texas, but Justice
Stevens found that “[t]he cost to Texas of complying with [the ICJ decision] would
be minimal.” Id. at 1375. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Souter and Ginsburg,
dissented, writing that “the consent of the United States to the ICJ’s jurisdiction[ ]
bind[s] the courts no less than would ‘an act of the [federal] legislature.’ ” Id. at 1376.
The dissent believed that, to find treaties non-self-executing “can threaten the appli-
cation of provisions in many existing commercial and other treaties and make it
more difficult to negotiate new ones.” Id. at 1381–82. Moreover, Justice Breyer wrote,
the Court’s decision “place[s] the fate of an international promise made by the United
States in the hands of a single State. . . . And that is precisely the situation that
Origin of the Conception.—How did this distinctive feature

of the Constitution come about, by virtue of which the treaty-
making authority is enabled to stamp upon its promises the qual-
ity of municipal law, thereby rendering them enforceable by the courts
without further action? The short answer is that Article VI, para-
graph 2, makes treaties the supreme law of the land on the same
footing with acts of Congress. The clause was a direct result of one
of the major weaknesses of the Articles of Confederation. Although
the Articles entrusted the treaty-making power to Congress, fulfill-
ment of Congress’s promises was dependent on the state legisla-
tures.295 Particularly with regard to provisions of the Treaty of Peace
of 1783,296 in which Congress stipulated to protect the property rights
of British creditors of American citizens and of the former Loyal-
ists,297 the promises were not only ignored but were deliberately
flouted by many legislatures.298 Upon repeated British protests, John
Jay, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, suggested to Congress that
it request state legislatures to repeal all legislation repugnant to
the Treaty of Peace and to authorize their courts to carry the treaty
into effect.299 Although seven states did comply to some extent, the
impotency of Congress to effectuate its treaty guarantees was obvi-
ous to the Framers who devised Article VI, paragraph 2, to take
care of the situation.300
Treaties and the States.—As it so happened, the first case in
which the Supreme Court dealt with the question of the effect of
treaties on state laws involved the same issue that had prompted
the drafting of Article VI, paragraph 2. During the Revolutionary
the Framers sought to prevent by enacting the Supremacy Clause.” Id. at 1384. On
August 5, 2008, the U.S. Supreme Court denied Medellin a stay of execution, Medel-
lin v. Texas, 129 S. Ct. 360 (2008) (Justices Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer
dissenting), and Texas executed him the same day.
295 S. CRANDALL, TREATIES, THEIR MAKING AND ENFORCEMENT ch. 3 (2d ed. 1916).
296 Id. at 30–32. For the text of the Treaty, see 1 Treaties, Conventions, Interna-
tional Acts, Protocols and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other
Powers (1776–1909), 586 S. DOC. NO. 357, 61st Congress, 2d Sess. (W. Malloy ed.,
1910).
297 Id. at 588.
298 R. MORRIS, JOHN JAY, THE NATION, AND THE COURT 73–84 (1967).
299 S. Crandall, supra, at 36–40.
300 The Convention at first leaned toward giving Congress a negative over state
laws which were contrary to federal statutes or treaties, 1 M. Farrand, supra, at 47,
54, and then adopted the Paterson Plan which made treaties the supreme law of
the land, binding on state judges, and authorized the Executive to use force to com-
pel observance when such treaties were resisted. Id. at 245, 316, 2 id. at 27–29. In
the draft reported by the Committee on Detail, the language thus adopted was close
to the present Supremacy Clause; the draft omitted the authorization of force from
the clause, id. at 183, but in another clause the legislative branch was authorized to
call out the militia to, inter alia, “enforce treaties.” Id. at 182. The two words were
struck subsequently “as being superfluous” in view of the Supremacy Clause. Id. at
389–90.
War, the Virginia legislature provided that the Commonwealth’s pa-

per money, which was depreciating rapidly, was to be legal cur-
rency for the payment of debts and to confound creditors who would
not accept the currency provided that Virginia citizens could pay
into the state treasury debts owed by them to subjects of Great Brit-
ain, which money was to be used to prosecute the war, and that
the auditor would give the debtor a certificate of payment which
would discharge the debtor of all future obligations to the credi-
tor.301 The Virginia scheme directly contradicted the assurances in
the peace treaty that no bars to collection by British creditors would
be raised, and in Ware v. Hylton 302 the Court struck down the state
law as violating the treaty that Article VI, paragraph 2, made supe-
rior. Justice Chase wrote: “A treaty cannot be the supreme law of
the land, that is, of all the United States, if any act of a state leg-
islature can stand in its way. If the constitution of a state . . . must
give way to a treaty, and fall before it; can it be questioned, whether
the less power, an act of the state legislature, must not be pros-
trate? It is the declared will of the people of the United States, that
every treaty made by the authority of the United States, shall be
superior to the constitution and laws of any individual state; and
their will alone is to decide.” 303
In Hopkirk v. Bell,304 the Court further held that this same treaty
provision prevented the operation of a Virginia statute of limita-
tions to bar collection of antecedent debts. In numerous subse-
quent cases, the Court invariably ruled that treaty provisions su-
perseded inconsistent state laws governing the right of aliens to inherit
real estate.305 An example is Hauenstein v. Lynham,306 in which the
Court upheld the right of a citizen of the Swiss Republic, under
301 9 W. HENING, STATUTES OF VIRGINIA 377–380 (1821).

302 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
303 3 U.S. at 236–37.
304 7 U.S. (3 Cr.) 454 (1806).
305 See the discussion and cases cited in Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,
489–90 (1880).
306 100 U.S. 483 (1880). In Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 197–98 (1961), the
International Monetary Fund (Bretton Woods) Agreement of 1945, to which the United
States and Yugoslavia were parties, and an Agreement of 1948 between these two
nations, coupled with continued American observance of an 1881 treaty granting re-
ciprocal rights of inheritance to Yugoslavian and American nations, were held to pre-
clude Oregon from denying Yugoslavian aliens their treaty rights because of a fear
that Yugoslavian currency laws implementing such Agreements prevented American
nationals from withdrawing the proceeds from the sale of property inherited in the
latter country.
the treaty of 1850 with that country, to recover the estate of a rela-
tive dying intestate in Virginia, to sell the same, and to export the
proceeds of the sale.307
Certain more recent cases stem from California legislation, most
of it directed against Japanese immigrants. A statute that excluded
aliens ineligible for American citizenship from owning real estate
was upheld in 1923 on the ground that the treaty in question did
not secure the rights claimed.308 But, in Oyama v. California,309 a
majority of the Court opined that this legislation conflicted with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a view that
has since been endorsed by the California Supreme Court by a nar-
row majority.310 Meantime, California was informed that the rights
of German nationals, under the Treaty of December 8, 1923, be-
tween the United States and the Reich, to whom real property in
the United States had descended or been devised, to dispose of it,
had survived the recent war and certain war legislation, and accord-
ingly prevailed over conflicting state legislation.311
307 See also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258 (1890); Sullivan v. Kidd, 254 U.S.
433 (1921); Nielsen v. Johnson, 279 U.S. 47 (1929); Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187
(1961). But a right under treaty to acquire and dispose of property does not except
aliens from the operation of a state statute prohibiting conveyances of homestead
property by any instrument not executed by both husband and wife. Todok v. Union
State Bank, 281 U.S. 449 (1930). Nor was a treaty stipulation guaranteeing to the
citizens of each country, in the territory of the other, equality with the natives of
rights and privileges in respect to protection and security of person and property,
violated by a state statute which denied to a non-resident alien wife of a person
killed within the State, the right to sue for wrongful death. Such right was afforded
to native resident relatives. Maiorano v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 213 U.S. 268 (1909).
The treaty in question having been amended in view of this decision, the question
arose whether the new provision covered the case of death without fault or negli-
gence in which, by the Pennsylvania Workmen’s Compensation Act, compensation
was expressly limited to resident parents; the Supreme Court held that it did not.
Liberato v. Royer, 270 U.S. 535 (1926).
308 Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923).
309 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm’n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948), in which a California statute prohibiting the issuance of fishing licenses
to persons ineligible to citizenship was disallowed, both on the basis of the Four-
teenth Amendment and on the ground that the statute invaded a field of power re-
served to the National Government, namely, the determination of the conditions on
which aliens may be admitted, naturalized, and permitted to reside in the United
States. For the latter proposition, Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 66 (1941), was
relied upon.
310 This occurred in the much advertised case of Sei Fujii v. State, 38 Cal.2d
718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952). A lower California court had held that the legislation in-
volved was void under the United Nations Charter, but the California Supreme Court
was unanimous in rejecting this view. The Charter provisions invoked in this connec-
tion [Arts. 1, 55 and 56], said Chief Justice Gibson, “[w]e are satisfied . . . were not
intended to supersede domestic legislation.” That is, the Charter provisions were
not self-executing. RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, supra, § 701, Reporters’ Note 5,
pp. 155–56.
311 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947). See also Kolovrat v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
187 (1961).
Treaties and Congress.—In the Convention, a proposal to re-

quire the adoption of treaties through enactment of a law before
they should be binding was rejected.312 But the years since have
seen numerous controversies with regard to the duties and obliga-
tions of Congress, the necessity for congressional action, and the
effects of statutes, in connection with the treaty power. For pur-
poses of this section, the question is whether entry into and ratifi-
cation of a treaty is sufficient in all cases to make the treaty provi-
sions the “law of the land” or whether there are some types of treaty
provisions that only a subsequent act of Congress can put into ef-
fect. The language quoted above 313 from Foster v. Neilson 314 early
established that not all treaties are self-executing, for, as Marshall
said in that decision, a treaty is “to be regarded in courts of justice
as equivalent to an act of the legislature, whenever it operates of
itself, without the aid of any legislative provision.” 315
Leaving aside the question of when a treaty is and is not self-
executing,316 the issue of the necessity of congressional implemen-
tation and the obligation to implement has frequently roiled con-
gressional debates. The matter arose initially in 1796 in connection
with the Jay Treaty,317 certain provisions of which required appro-
priations to carry them into effect. In view of Article I, § 9, clause
7, which says that “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury,
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . ,” it seems
to have been universally conceded that Congress must be applied
to if the treaty provisions were to be executed.318 A bill was intro-
duced in the House to appropriate the needed funds, and its sup-
porters, within and without Congress, argued that, because the treaty
was the law of the land, the legislative branch was bound to enact
the bill without further ado; opponents led by Madison and Albert
Gallatin contended that the House had complete discretion whether
312 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 392–394 (rev.
ed. 1937).
313 “Treaties as Law of the Land,” supra.
314 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829).
315 Cf. Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888): “When the stipulations
are not self-executing they can only be enforced pursuant to legislation to carry them
into effect . . . . If the treaty contains stipulations which are self-executing that is,
require no legislation to make them operative, to that extent they have the force
and effect of a legislative enactment.” See S. Crandall, supra, chs. 11–15.
316 See infra, “When Is a Treaty Self-Executing.”
317 8 Stat. 116 (1794).
318 The story is told in numerous sources, including S. Crandall, supra, at 165–
171. For Washington’s message refusing to submit papers relating to the treaty to
the House, see J. Richardson, supra, at 123.
or not to carry into effect treaty provisions.319 At the conclusion of

the debate, the House voted not only the money but a resolution
offered by Madison stating that it did not claim any agency in the
treaty-making process, “but that when a treaty stipulates regula-
tions on any of the subjects submitted by the Constitution to the
power of Congress, it must depend for its execution as to such stipu-
lations on a law or laws to be passed by Congress, and it is the
constitutional right and duty of the House of Representatives in all
such cases to deliberate on the expediency or inexpediency of carry-
ing such treaty into effect, and to determine and act thereon as in
their judgment may be most conducive to the public good.” 320 This
early precedent with regard to appropriations has apparently been
uniformly adhered to.321
Similarly, with regard to treaties that modify commercial tar-
iff arrangements, the practice has been that the House always
insisted on and the Senate acquiesced in legislation to carry into
effect the provisions of such treaties.322 The earliest congressio-
nal dispute came over an 1815 Convention with Great Britain,323
which provided for reciprocal reduction of duties. President Madi-
son thereupon recommended to Congress such legislation as the
convention might require for effectuation. The Senate and some
members of the House believed that no implementing legislation
was necessary because of a statute that already permitted the
President to reduce duties on goods of nations that did not dis-
criminate against United States goods; the House majority felt
otherwise and compromise legislation was finally enacted accept-
able to both points of view.324 But subsequent cases have seen
legislation enacted; 325 the Senate once refused to ratify a treaty
319 Debate in the House ran for more than a month. It was excerpted from the
ANNALS separately published as DEBATES IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED

STATES, DURING THE FIRST SESSION OF THE FOURTH CONGRESS UPON THE CONSTITUTIONAL POW-
ERS OF THE HOUSE WITH RESPECT TO TREATIES (1796). A source of much valuable informa-
tion on the views of the Framers and those who came after them on the treaty power,
the debates are analyzed in detail in E. BYRD, TREATIES AND EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS IN
THE UNITED STATES 35–59 (1960). Gallatin served in the United States Senate for two
months in 1793–1794, the House of Representatives from 1795–1801, and as Secre-
tary of the Treasury from 1801–1814.
320 5 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 771, 782 (1796). The House adopted a similar resolu-
tion in 1871. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Congress, 1st sess. (1871), 835.
321 S. Crandall, supra, at 171–182; 1 W. WILLOUGHBY, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF
THE UNITED STATES 549–552 (2d ed. 1929); but see RESTATEMENT, FOREIGN RELATIONS, su-
pra, § 111, Reporters’ Note 7, p. 57. See also H. REP. 4177, 49th Congress, 2d Sess.
(1887). Cf. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 198 (1901).
323 8 Stat. 228.
324 3 Stat. 255 (1816). See S. Crandall, supra, at 184–188.
325 S. Crandall, supra, at 188–195; 1 W. Willoughby, supra, at 555–560.
that purported to reduce statutorily determined duties,326 and

congressional enactment of authority for the President to negoti-
ate reciprocal trade agreements all seem to point to the necessity
of some form of congressional implementation.
What other treaty provisions need congressional implementa-
tion is debatable. A 1907 memorandum approved by the Secre-
tary of State stated that the limitations on the treaty power that
necessitate legislative implementation may “be found in the pro-
visions of the Constitution which expressly confide in Congress
or in other branches of the Federal Government the exercise of
certain of the delegated powers. . . .” 327 The same thought has
been expressed in Congress 328 and by commentators.329 Resolu-
tion of the issue seems to be for legislative and executive
branches rather than for the courts.
Congressional Repeal of Treaties.—Madison contended that,
when Congress is asked to carry a treaty into effect, it has the con-
stitutional right, and indeed the duty, to determine the matter ac-
cording to its own ideas of what is expedient.330 Developments have
vindicated Madison in this regard. This is seen in the answer that
the Court gave to the question: What happens when a treaty provi-
sion and an act of Congress conflict? The answer is that neither
has any intrinsic superiority over the other and therefore the later
one will prevail. In short, the treaty commitments of the United
States do not diminish Congress’s constitutional powers. To be sure,
legislative repeal of a treaty as law of the land may amount to its
violation as an international contract. In such case, as the Court
said, “its infraction becomes the subject of international negotia-
327 Anderson, The Extent and Limitations of the Treaty-Making Power, 1 AM. J.
INT’L L. 636, 641 (1907).
328 At the conclusion of the 1815 debate, the Senate conferees noted in their
report that some treaties might need legislative implementation, which Congress was
bound to provide, but did not indicate what in their opinion made some treaties
self-executing and others not. 29 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 160 (1816). The House confer-
ees observed that they thought, and that in their opinion the Senate conferees agreed,
that legislative implementation was necessary to carry into effect all treaties which
contained “stipulations requiring appropriations, or which might bind the nation to
lay taxes, to raise armies, to support navies, to grant subsidies, to create States, or
to cede territory. . . .” Id. at 1019. Much the same language was included in a later
report, H. REP. NO. 37, 40th Congress, 2d Sess. (1868). Controversy with respect to
the sufficiency of Senate ratification of the Panama Canal treaties to dispose of United
States property therein to Panama was extensive. A divided Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia reached the question and held that Senate approval of the
treaty alone was sufficient. Edwards v. Carter, 580 F.2d 1055 (D.C. Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 436 U.S. 907 (1978).
329 T. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 175 (3d ed. 1898); Q. WRIGHT,
THE CONTROL OF AMERICAN FOREIGN RELATIONS 353–356 (1922).

330 See, e.g., 5 Annals of Congress 493 (1796).
tions and reclamations, so far as the injured party chooses to seek

redress, which may in the end be enforced by actual war. It is obvi-
ous that with all this the judicial courts have nothing to do and
can give no redress.” 331
Treaties Versus Prior Acts of Congress.—The Court has en-
forced numerous statutory provisions that it recognized as supersed-
ing prior treaty engagements. Chief Justice Marshall asserted that
the converse would be true as well 332—that a treaty that is self-
executing is the law of the land and prevails over an earlier incon-
sistent statute—and this proposition has been repeated many times
in dicta.333 But there is dispute whether in fact a treaty has ever
been held to have repealed or superseded an inconsistent statute.
Willoughby, for example, writes: “In fact, however, there have been
few (the writer is not certain that there has been any) instances in
which a treaty inconsistent with a prior act of Congress has been
given full force and effect as law in this country without the assent
of Congress. There may indeed have been cases in which, by treaty,
certain action has been taken without reference to existing Federal
laws, as, for example, where by treaty certain populations have been
collectively naturalized, but such treaty action has not operated to
repeal or annul the existing law upon the subject.” 334
331 Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884). The repealability of treaties by
act of Congress was first asserted in an opinion of the Attorney General in 1854. 6
Ops. Atty. Gen. 291. The year following the doctrine was adopted judicially in a lengthy
and cogently argued opinion of Justice Curtis, speaking for a United States circuit
court in Taylor v. Morton, 23 Fed. Cas. 784 (No. 13,799) (C.C.D. Mass 1855). See
also The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871); United States v. Forty-
Three Gallons of Whiskey, 108 U.S. 491, 496 (1883); Botiller v. Dominguez, 130 U.S.
238 (1889); The Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 600 (1889); Whitney v. Rob-
ertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 721
(1893). “Congress by legislation, and so far as the people and authorities of the United
States are concerned, could abrogate a treaty made between this country and an-
other country which had been negotiated by the President and approved by the Sen-
ate.” La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 460 (1899). Cf. Reichart
v. Felps, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 160, 165–66 (1868), which states in dictum that “Con-
gress is bound to regard the public treaties, and it had no power . . . to nullify [In-
dian] titles confirmed many years before by the authorized agents of the govern-
ment.”
332 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829). In a later case, it was
determined in a different situation that by its terms the treaty in issue, which had
been assumed to be executory in the earlier case, was self-executing. United States
v. Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833).
333 E.g., United States v. Lee Yen Tai, 185 U.S. 213, 220–21 (1902); The Chero-
kee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871); Johnson v. Browne, 205 U.S. 309,
320–21 (1907); Whitney v. Roberston, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
334 1 W. Willoughby, supra, at 555.
The one instance that may be an exception 335 is Cook v. United

States,336 in which a divided Court held that a 1924 treaty with
Great Britain that allowed the inspection of British vessels for con-
traband liquor and seizure if any was found had superseded the
authority conferred by a section of the Tariff Act of 1922 337 The
difficulty with this case is that the Tariff Act provision had been
reenacted in 1930,338 so that a simple application of the rule that
the later enactment governs should have caused a different result.
It may be suspected that the low estate to which Prohibition had
fallen and a desire to avoid a diplomatic controversy should the sei-
zure at issue have been upheld influenced the Court’s decision.
When Is a Treaty Self-Executing.—Several references have
been made above to a distinction between treaties as self-executing
and as merely executory, in which case they are enforceable only
after the enactment of “legislation to carry them into effect.” 339 But
what is it about a treaty that makes it the law of the land and
gives a private litigant the right to rely on it in a court of law? As
early as 1801, the Supreme Court took notice of a treaty, and, find-
ing it applicable to the situation before it, gave judgment for the
petitioner based on it.340 In Foster v. Neilson,341 Chief Justice Mar-
shall explained that a treaty is to be regarded “as equivalent to an
act of the legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid
of any legislative provision.” A treaty will not be self-executing, how-
ever, “when the terms of the [treaty] stipulation import a contract—
when either of the parties engages to perform a particular act. . . .”
When this is the case, “the treaty addresses itself to the political,
not the judicial department; and the legislature must execute the
contract, before it can become a rule for the court.” 342
335 Other cases, which are cited in some sources, appear distinguishable. United
States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 103 (1801), applied a treaty entered into
subsequent to enactment of a statute abrogating all treaties then in effect between
the United States and France, so that it is inaccurate to refer to the treaty as super-
seding a prior statute. In United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S.
188 (1876), the treaty with an Indian tribe in which the tribe ceded certain terri-
tory, later included in a state, provided that a federal law restricting the sale of
liquor on the reservation would continue in effect in the territory ceded; the Court
found the stipulation an appropriate subject for settlement by treaty and the provi-
sion binding. See also Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
336 288 U.S. 102 (1933).
337 42 Stat. 858, 979, § 581.
338 46 Stat. 590, 747, § 581.
339 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008), quoting Whitney v. Robert-
son, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).

340 United States v. Schooner Peggy, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 103 (1801).
341 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
342 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 314. Generally, qualifications may have been inserted in
treaties out of a belief in their constitutional necessity or because of some policy

reason. In regard to the former, it has always apparently been the practice to insert
Sometimes the nature of a treaty will determine whether it re-

quires legislative execution or “conveys an intention that it be ‘self-
executing’ and is ratified on these terms.” 343 One authority states
that whether a treaty is self-executing “depends upon whether the
obligation is imposed on private individuals or on public authori-
ties. . . .”
“Treaty provisions which define the rights and obligations of pri-
vate individuals and lay down general principles for the guidance
of military, naval or administrative officials in relation thereto are
usually considered self-executing. Thus treaty provisions assuring
aliens equal civil rights with citizens, defining the limits of na-
tional jurisdiction, and prescribing rules of prize, war and neutral-
ity, have been so considered . . . .”
“On the other hand certain treaty obligations are addressed solely
to public authorities, of which may be mentioned those requiring
the payment of money, the cession of territory, the guarantee of ter-
ritory or independence, the conclusion of subsequent treaties on de-
scribed subjects, the participation in international organizations, the
collection and supplying of information, and direction of postal, tele-
graphic or other services, the construction of buildings, bridges, light-
houses, etc.” 344 It may well be that these two characteristics merge
with each other at many points and the language of the Court is
not always helpful in distinguishing them.345
Treaties and the Necessary and Proper Clause.—What power,
or powers, does Congress exercise when it enacts legislation for the
purpose of carrying treaties of the United States into effect? When
the subject matter of the treaty falls within the ambit of Con-
gress’s enumerated powers, then it is these powers that it exercises
in carrying the treaty into effect. But if the treaty deals with a sub-
ject that falls within the national jurisdiction because of its interna-
tional character, then recourse is had to the Necessary and Proper
in treaties affecting the revenue laws of the United States a proviso that they should
not be deemed effective until the necessary laws to carry them into operation should
be enacted by Congress. 1 W. Willoughby, supra, at 558. Perhaps of the same nature
was a qualification that cession of certain property in the Canal Zone should be de-
pendent upon action by Congress inserted in Article V of the 1955 Treaty with Panama.
TIAS 3297, 6 U.S.T. 2273, 2278. In regard to the latter, it may be noted that Article
V of the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, 8 Stat. 572, 575 (1842), providing for the trans-
fer to Canada of land in Maine and Massachusetts was conditioned upon assent by
the two states and payment to them of compensation. S. Crandall, supra, at 222–
224.
343 Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1356 (2008), quoting Ingartua-De La Rosa
v. United States, 417 F.3d 145, 150 (1st Cir. 2005) (en banc).
344 Q. Wright, supra, at 207–208. See also L. HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CON-
STITUTION 156–162 (1972).

345 Compare Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314–15 (1829), with Cook v.
United States, 288 U.S. 102, 118–19 (1933).

Clause. Thus, of itself, Congress would have had no power to con-

fer judicial powers upon foreign consuls in the United States, but
the treaty-power can do this and has done it repeatedly and Con-
gress has supplemented these treaties by appropriate legisla-
tion.346 Congress could not confer judicial power upon American con-
suls abroad to be exercised over American citizens abroad, but the
treaty-power can and has, and Congress has passed legislation per-
fecting such agreements, and the Supreme Court has upheld such
legislation.347
Again, Congress of itself could not provide for the extradition
of fugitives from justice, but the treaty-power can and has done so
scores of times, and Congress has passed legislation carrying our
extradition treaties into effect.348 And Congress could not ordinar-
ily penalize private acts of violence within a state, but it can pun-
ish such acts if they deprive aliens of their rights under a treaty.349
Referring to such legislation, the Court has said: “The power of Con-
gress to make all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execu-
tion as well the powers enumerated in section 8 of Article I of the
Constitution, as all others vested in the Government of the United
States, or in any Department or the officers thereof, includes the
power to enact such legislation as is appropriate to give efficacy to
any stipulations which it is competent for the President by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate to insert in a treaty with for-
eign power.” 350 In a word, the treaty-power cannot purport to amend
the Constitution by adding to the list of Congress’s enumerated pow-
ers, but having acted, the consequence will often be that it has pro-
vided Congress with an opportunity to enact measures that inde-
346 Acts of March 2, 1829, 4 Stat. 359 and of February 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 614.
347 See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891), where the treaty provisions involved are
given. The supplementary legislation, later reenacted at Rev. Stat. 4083–4091, was
repealed by the Joint Res. of August 1, 1956, 70 Stat. 774. The validity of the Ross
case was subsequently questioned. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 12, 64, 75 (1957).
348 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181–3195.
349 Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678, 683 (1887).
350 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109, 121 (1901). A different theory is offered by
Justice Story in his opinion for the court in Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539 (1842): “Treaties made between the United States and foreign powers, often con-
tain special provisions, which do not execute themselves, but require the interposi-
tion of Congress to carry them into effect, and Congress has constantly, in such cases,
legislated on the subject; yet, although the power is given to the executive, with the
consent of the senate, to make treaties, the power is nowhere in positive terms con-
ferred upon Congress to make laws to carry the stipulations of treaties into effect.
It has been supposed to result from the duty of the national government to fulfill all
the obligations of treaties.” Id. at 619. Story was here in quest of arguments to prove
that Congress had power to enact a fugitive slave law, which he based on its power
“to carry into effect rights expressly given and duties expressly enjoined” by the Con-
stitution. Id. at 618–19. However, the treaty-making power is neither a right nor a
duty, but one of the powers “vested by this Constitution in the Government of the
United States.” Art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
pendently of a treaty Congress could not enact; the only question

that can be raised as to such measures is whether they are “neces-
sary and proper” for the carrying of the treaty in question into op-
eration.
The foremost example of this interpretation is Missouri v. Hol-
land.351 There, the United States and Great Britain had entered
into a treaty for the protection of migratory birds,352 and Congress
had enacted legislation pursuant to the treaty to effectuate it.353
Missouri objected that such regulation was reserved to the states
by the Tenth Amendment and that the statute infringed on this res-
ervation, pointing to lower court decisions voiding an earlier act not
based on a treaty.354 Noting that treaties “are declared the su-
preme law of the land,” Justice Holmes for the Court said: “If the
treaty is valid there can be no dispute about the validity of the stat-
ute under Article I, § 8, as a necessary and proper means to ex-
ecute the powers of the Government.” 355 “It is obvious,” he contin-
ued, “that there may be matters of the sharpest exigency for the
national well being that an act of Congress could not deal with but
that a treaty followed by such an act could, and it is not lightly to
be assumed that, in matters requiring national action, ‘a power which
must belong to and somewhere reside in every civilized govern-
ment’ is not to be found.” 356 Because the treaty and thus the stat-
ute dealt with a matter of national and international concern, the
treaty was proper and the statute was “necessary and proper” to
effectuate the treaty.
Constitutional Limitations on the Treaty Power

A question growing out of the discussion above is whether the
treaty power is bounded by constitutional limitations. By the Su-
premacy Clause, both statutes and treaties “are declared . . . to be
the supreme law of the land, and no superior efficacy is given to
either over the other.” 357 As statutes may be held void because they
contravene the Constitution, it should follow that treaties may be
351 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
352 39 Stat. 1702 (1916).
353 40 Stat. 755 (1918).
354 United States v. Shauver, 214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914); United States v. Mc-
Cullagh, 221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915). The Court did not purport to decide whether
those cases were correctly decided. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920).
Today, there seems no doubt that Congress’s power under the commerce clause would
be deemed more than adequate, but at that time a majority of the Court had a very
restrictive view of the commerce power. Cf. Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251
(1918).
355 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 432 (1920).
356 252 U.S. at 433. The internal quotation is from Andrews v. Andrews, 188
U.S. 14, 33 (1903).

357 Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888).
held void, the Constitution being superior to both. And indeed the
Court has numerous times so stated.358 It does not appear that the
Court has ever held a treaty unconstitutional,359 although there are
cases in which the decision seemed to be compelled by constitu-
tional considerations.360 In fact, there would be little argument with
regard to the general point were it not for dicta in Justice Holmes’
opinion in Missouri v. Holland.361 “Acts of Congress,” he said, “are
the supreme law of the land only when made in pursuance of the
Constitution, while treaties are declared to be so when made under
the authority of the United States. It is open to question whether
the authority of the United States means more than the formal acts
prescribed to make the convention.” Although he immediately fol-
lowed this passage with a cautionary “[w]e do not mean to imply
that there are no qualifications to the treaty-making power . . . ,” 362
the Justice’s language and the holding by which it appeared that
the reserved rights of the states could be invaded through the treaty
power led in the 1950s to an abortive effort to amend the Constitu-
tion to restrict the treaty power.363
358 “The treaty is . . . a law made by the proper authority, and the courts of
justice have no right to annul or disregard any of its provisions, unless they violate
the Constitution of the United States.” Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656
(1853). “It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitution or be
held valid if it be in violation of that instrument.” The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S.
(11 Wall.), 616, 620 (1871). See also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890); United
States v. Wong Kim Ark, 169 U.S. 649, 700 (1898); Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265
U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
359 1 W. Willoughby, supra, at 561; L. Henkin, supra, at 137. In Power Author-
ity of New York v. FPC, 247 F.2d 538 (2d Cir. 1957), a reservation attached by the
Senate to a 1950 treaty with Canada was held invalid. The court observed that the
reservation was properly not a part of the treaty but that if it were it would still be
void as an attempt to circumvent constitutional procedures for enacting amend-
ments to existing federal laws. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment on moot-
ness grounds. 355 U.S. 64 (1957). In United States v. Guy W. Capps, Inc., 204 F.2d
655 (4th Cir. 1953), an executive agreement with Canada was held void as conflict-
ing with existing legislation. The Supreme Court affirmed on nonconstitutional grounds.
348 U.S. 296 (1955).
360 Cf. City of New Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836); Rocca
v. Thompson, 223 U.S. 317 (1912).

361 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
362 252 U.S. at 433. Subsequently, he also observed: “The treaty in question does
not contravene any prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution.” Id.

363 The attempt, the so-called “Bricker Amendment,” was aimed at the expan-
sion into reserved state powers through treaties as well as executive agreements.
The key provision read: “A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United
States only through legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.” S.J.
Res. 43, 82d Congress, 1st Sess. (1953), § 2. See also S.J. Res. 1, 84th Congress, 1st
Sess. (1955), § 2. Extensive hearings developed the issues thoroughly but not al-
ways clearly. Hearings on S.J. Res. 130: Before a Subcommittee of the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, 82d Congress, 2d Sess. (1952). Hearings on S.J. Res. 1 & 43: Be-
fore a Subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83d Congress, 1st Sess. (1953).
Controversy over Holmes’ language apparently led Justice Black

in Reid v. Covert 364 to deny that the difference in language of the
Supremacy Clause with regard to statutes and with regard to trea-
ties was relevant to the status of treaties as inferior to the Consti-
tution. “There is nothing in this language which intimates that trea-
ties do not have to comply with the provisions of the Constitution.
Nor is there anything in the debates which accompanied the draft-
ing and ratification of the Constitution which even suggests such a
result. These debates as well as the history that surrounds the adop-
tion of the treaty provision in Article VI make it clear that the rea-
son treaties were not limited to those made in ‘pursuance’ of the
Constitution was so that agreements made by the United States
under the Articles of Confederation, including the important trea-
ties which concluded the Revolutionary War, would remain in ef-
fect. It would be manifestly contrary to the objectives of those who
created the Constitution, as well as those who were responsible for
the Bill of Rights—let alone alien to our entire constitutional his-
tory and tradition—to construe Article VI as permitting the United
States to exercise power under an international agreement without
observing constitutional prohibitions. In effect, such construction would
permit amendment of that document in a manner not sanctioned
by Article V.” 365
Establishment of the general principle, however, is but the be-
ginning; there is no readily agreed-upon standard for determining
what the limitations are. The most persistently urged proposition
in limitation has been that the treaty power must not invade the
reserved powers of the states. In view of the sweeping language of
the Supremacy Clause, it is hardly surprising that this argument
has not prevailed.366 Nevertheless, the issue, in the context of Con-
gress’s power under the Necessary and Proper Clause to effectuate
a treaty dealing with a subject arguably within the domain of the
364 354 U.S. 1 (1957) (plurality opinion).
365 354 U.S. at 16–17. For discussions of the issue, see Restatement, Foreign
Relations, § 302; Nowak & Rotunda, A Comment on the Creation and Resolution of
a “Non-Problem”: Dames & Moore v. Regan, the Foreign Affairs Power, and the Role
of the Courts, 29 UCLA L. REV. 1129 (1982); L. Henkin, supra, at 137–156.
366 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Fairfax’s Devisee v. Hunter’s Les-
see, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 603 (1813); Chirac v. Chirac, 15 U.S. (2 Wheat.) 259 (1817);
Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483 (1880). Jefferson, in his list of exceptions to
the treaty power, thought the Constitution “must have meant to except out of these
the rights reserved to the States, for surely the President and Senate cannot do by
treaty what the whole Government is interdicted from doing in any way.” Jeffer-
son’s Manual of Parliamentary Practice, § 594, reprinted in THE RULES AND MANUAL OF
THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, H. Doc. 102–405, 102d Congress, 2d Sess. (1993), 298–
299. But this view has always been the minority one. Q. Wright, supra, at 92 n.97.
The nearest the Court ever came to supporting this argument appears to be Frederickson
v. Louisiana, 64 U.S. (23 How.) 445, 448 (1860).
states, was presented as recently as 1920, when the Court upheld

a treaty and implementing statute providing for the protection of
migratory birds.367 “The treaty in question does not contravene any
prohibitory words to be found in the Constitution. The only ques-
tion is whether it is forbidden by some invisible radiation from the
general terms of the Tenth Amendment.” 368 The gist of the holding
followed. “Here a national interest of very nearly the first magni-
tude is involved. It can be protected only by national action in con-
cert with that of another power. The subject-matter is only transitorily
within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. But for the
treaty and the statute there soon might be no birds for any powers
to deal with. We see nothing in the Constitution that compels the
government to sit by while a food supply is cut off and the protec-
tors of our forests and our crops are destroyed.” 369
The doctrine that seems to follow from this case and others is
“that in all that properly relates to matters of international rights
and obligations, whether these rights and obligations rest upon the
general principles of international law or have been conventionally
created by specific treaties, the United States possesses all the pow-
ers of a constitutionally centralized sovereign State; and, therefore,
that when the necessity from the international standpoint arises
the treaty power may be exercised, even though thereby the rights
ordinarily reserved to the States are invaded.” 370 It is not, in other
words, the treaty power that enlarges either the federal power or
the congressional power, but the international character of the in-
terest concerned that might be acted upon.
Dicta in some of the cases lend support to the argument that
the treaty power is limited by the delegation of powers among the
branches of the National Government 371 and especially by the del-
egated powers of Congress, although it is not clear what the limita-
tion means. If it is meant that no international agreement could be
constitutionally entered into by the United States within the sphere
of such powers, the practice from the beginning has been to the con-
trary; 372 if it is meant that treaty provisions dealing with matters
delegated to Congress must, in order to become the law of the land,
367 Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416 (1920).
368 252 U.S. at 433–34.
369 252 U.S. at 435.
370 1 W. Willoughby, supra, at 569. See also L. Henkin, supra, at 143–148; Re-
statement, Foreign Relations, § 302, Comment d, & Reporters’ Note 3, pp. 154–157.
371 E.g., Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 266–267 (1890); Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S.
(17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872). Jefferson listed as an exception from the treaty power
“those subjects of legislation in which [the Constitution] gave a participation to the
House of Representatives,” although he admitted “that it would leave very little mat-
ter for the treaty power to work on.” Jefferson’s Manual, supra, at 299.
372 Q. Wright, supra, at 101–103. See also, L. Henkin, supra, at 148–151.
receive the assent of Congress through implementing legislation, it

states not a limitation on the power of making treaties as interna-
tional conventions but rather a necessary procedure before certain
conventions are cognizable by the courts in the enforcement of rights
under them.
It has also been suggested that the prohibitions against govern-
mental action contained in the Constitution, and the Bill of Rights
in particular, limit the exercise of the treaty power. No doubt this
is true, though again there are no cases which so hold.373
One other limitation of sorts may be contained in the language
of certain court decisions that seem to say that only matters of “in-
ternational concern” may be the subject of treaty negotiations.374
Although this may appear to be a limitation, it does not take ac-
count of the elasticity of the concept of “international concern” by
which the subject matter of treaties has constantly expanded over
the years.375 At best, any attempted resolution of the issue of limi-
tations must be an uneasy one.376
In brief, the fact that all the foreign relations power is vested
in the National Government and that no formal restriction is im-
posed on the treaty-making power in the international context 377
373 Cf. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957). See also Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S.
258, 267 (1890).

374 “[I]t must be assumed that the framers of the Constitution intended that
[the treaty power] should extend to all those objects which in the intercourse of na-
tions had usually been regarded as the proper subjects of negotiation and treaty. . . .”
Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 243 (1872). With the exceptions noted, “it is
not perceived that there is any limit to the questions which can be adjusted touch-
ing any matter which is properly the subject of negotiation with a foreign country.”
Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890). “The treatymaking power of the United
States . . . does extend to all proper subjects of negotiation between our govern-
ment and other nations.” Asakura v. City of Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 341 (1924).
375 Cf. L. Henkin, supra, at 151–56.
376 Other reservations have been expressed. One contention has been that the
territory of a state may not be ceded without such state’s consent. Geofroy v. Riggs,
133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890), citing Fort Leavenworth R.R. v. Lowe, 114 U.S. 525, 541
(1885). Cf. the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, Article V, 8 Stat. 572, 575. But see S. Crandall,
supra, at 220–229; 1 W. Willoughby, supra, at 572–576.
A further contention is that, although foreign territory may be annexed to the
United States by the treaty power, it may not be incorporated with the United States
except with the consent of Congress. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 310–344 (1901)
(four Justices dissenting). This argument appears to be a variation of the one in
regard to the correct procedure to give domestic effect to treaties.
Another argument grew out the XII Hague Convention of 1907, proposing an
International Prize Court with appellate jurisdiction from national courts in prize
cases. President Taft objected that no treaty could transfer to a tribunal not known
to the Constitution any part of the judicial power of the United States, and a com-
promise was arranged. Q. Wright, supra, at 117–118; H. REP. NO. 1569, 68th Con-
gress, 2d Sess. (1925).
377 Cf. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936);
Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575–576 (1840).

leaves little room for the notion of a limited treaty-making power

with regard to the reserved rights of the states or in regard to the
choice of matters concerning which the Federal Government may
treat with other nations; protected individual rights appear to be
sheltered by specific constitutional guarantees from the domestic ef-
fects of treaties, and the separation of powers at the federal level
may require legislative action to give municipal effect to interna-
tional agreements.
Interpretation and Termination of Treaties as International

Compacts
The repeal by Congress of the “self-executing” clauses of a treaty
as “law of the land” does not of itself terminate the treaty as an
international contract, although it may very well provoke the other
party to the treaty to do so. Hence, the questions arise where the
Constitution lodges this power and where it lodges the power to
interpret the contractual provisions of treaties. The first case of out-
right abrogation of a treaty by the United States occurred in 1798,
when Congress by the Act of July 7 of that year, pronounced the
United States freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the Trea-
ties of 1778 with France.378 This act was followed two days later
by one authorizing limited hostilities against the same country; in
Bas v. Tingy,379 the Supreme Court treated the act of abrogation as
simply one of a bundle of acts declaring “public war” upon the French
Republic.
Termination of Treaties by Notice.—Typically, a treaty pro-
vides for its termination by notice of one of the parties, usually af-
ter a prescribed time from the date of notice. Of course, treaties
may also be terminated by agreement of the parties, or by breach
by one of the parties, or by some other means. But it is in the in-
stance of termination by notice that the issue has frequently been
raised: where in the Government of the United States does the Con-
stitution lodge the power to unmake treaties? 380 Reasonable argu-
378 1 Stat. 578 (1798).
379 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). See also Gray v. United States, 21 Ct. Cl. 340
(1886), with respect to claims arising out of this situation.
380 The matter was most extensively canvassed in the debate with respect to
President Carter’s termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty of 1954 with the Re-
public of China (Taiwan). See, e.g., the various views argued in Treaty Termination:
Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Sess.
(1979). On the issue generally, see Restatement, Foreign Relations, § 339; CRS Study,
supra, 158–167; L. Henkin, supra, at 167–171; Bestor, Respective Roles of Senate
and President in the Making and Abrogation of Treaties: The Original Intent of the
Framers of the Constitution Historically Examined, 55 WASH. L. REV. 1 (1979); Berger,
The President’s Unilateral Termination of the Taiwan Treaty, 75 NW. U. L. REV. 577
(1980).
ments may be made locating the power in the President alone, in

the President and Senate, or in the Congress. Presidents generally
have asserted the foreign relations power reposed in them under
Article II and the inherent powers argument made in Curtiss-
Wright. Because the Constitution requires the consent of the Sen-
ate for making a treaty, one can logically argue that its consent is
also required for terminating it. Finally, because treaties are, like
statutes, the supreme law of the land, it may well be argued that,
again like statutes, they may be undone only through law-making
by the entire Congress; additionally, since Congress may be re-
quired to implement treaties and may displace them through legis-
lation, this argument is reenforced.
Definitive resolution of this argument appears only remotely pos-
sible. Historical practice provides support for all three arguments
and the judicial branch seems unlikely to essay any answer.
Although abrogation of the French treaty, mentioned above, is
apparently the only example of termination by Congress through a
public law, many instances may be cited of congressional actions
mandating terminations by notice of the President or changing the
legal environment so that the President is required to terminate.
The initial precedent in the instance of termination by notice pur-
suant to congressional action appears to have occurred in 1846,381
when by joint resolution Congress authorized the President at his
discretion to notify the British government of the abrogation of the
Convention of August 6, 1827, relative to the joint occupation of the
Oregon Territory. As the President himself had requested the reso-
lution, the episode is often cited to support the theory that interna-
tional conventions to which the United States is a party, even those
terminable on notice, are terminable only through action of Con-
gress.382 Subsequently, Congress has often passed resolutions de-
nouncing treaties or treaty provisions, which by their own terms
were terminable on notice, and Presidents have usually, though not
invariably, carried out such resolutions.383 By the La Follette-
Furuseth Seaman’s Act,384 President Wilson was directed, “within
ninety days after the passage of the act, to give notice to foreign
governments that so much of any treaties as might be in conflict
with the provisions of the act would terminate on the expiration of
381 Compare the different views of the 1846 action in Treaty Termination: Hear-
ings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. (1979),
160–162 (memorandum of Hon. Herbert Hansell, Legal Advisor, Department of State),
and in Taiwan: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th
Congress, 1st Sess. (1979), 300 (memorandum of Senator Goldwater).
383 Id. at 459–62; Q. Wright, supra, at 258.
384 38 Stat. 1164 (1915).
the periods of notice provided for in such treaties,” and the re-
quired notice was given.385 When, however, by section 34 of the Jones
Merchant Marine Act of 1920, the same President was authorized
and directed within ninety days to give notice to the other parties
to certain treaties, with which the Act was not in conflict but which
might restrict Congress in the future from enacting discriminatory
tonnage duties, President Wilson refused to comply, asserting that
he “did not deem the direction contained in section 34 . . . an exer-
cise of any constitutional power possessed by Congress.” 386 The same
attitude toward section 34 was continued by Presidents Harding and
Coolidge.387
Very few precedents exist in which the President terminated a
treaty after obtaining the approval of the Senate alone. The first
occurred in 1854–1855, when President Pierce requested and re-
ceived Senate approval to terminate a treaty with Denmark.388 When
the validity of this action was questioned in the Senate, the Com-
mittee on Foreign Relations reported that the procedure was cor-
rect, that prior full-Congress actions were incorrect, and that the
right to terminate resides in the treaty-making authorities, the Presi-
dent and the Senate.389
Examples of treaty terminations in which the President acted
alone are much disputed with respect both to facts and to the un-
385 S. Crandall, supra, at 460. See Van der Weyde v. Ocean Transp. Co., 297
U.S. 114 (1936).

386 41 Stat. 1007. See Reeves, The Jones Act and the Denunciation of Treaties,
15 AM. J. INT’L. L. 33 (1921). In 1879, Congress passed a resolution requiring the

President to abrogate a treaty with China, but President Hayes vetoed it, partly on
the ground that Congress as an entity had no role to play in ending treaties, only
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. 9 J. Richardson, supra, at
4466, 4470–4471. For the views of President Taft on the matter, see W. TAFT, THE
PRESIDENCY, ITS DUTIES, ITS POWERS, ITS OPPORTUNITIES AND ITS LIMITATIONS 112–113 (1916).
387 Since this time, very few instances appear in which Congress has requested
or directed termination by notice, but they have resulted in compliance. E.g., 65 Stat.
72 (1951) (directing termination of most-favored-nation provisions with certain Com-
munist countries in commercial treaties); 70 Stat. 773 (1956) (requesting renuncia-
tion of treaty rights of extraterritoriality in Morroco). The most recent example ap-
pears to be § 313 of the Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which required the Secretary of
State to terminate immediately, in accordance with its terms, the tax treaty and
protocol with South Africa that had been concluded on December 13, 1946. Pub. L.
99–440, 100 Stat. 3515 (1986), 22 U.S.C. § 5063.
388 5 J. Richardson, supra, at 279, 334.
389 S. REP. NO. 97, 34th Congress, 1st Sess. (1856), 6–7. The other instance was
President Wilson’s request, which the Senate endorsed, for termination of the Inter-
national Sanitary Convention of 1903. See 61 CONG. REC. 1793–1794 (1921). See CRS
Study, supra at 161–62.
derlying legal circumstances.390 Apparently, President Lincoln was

the first to give notice of termination in the absence of prior con-
gressional authorization or direction, and Congress shortly thereaf-
ter by joint resolution ratified his action.391 The first such action by
the President, with no such subsequent congressional action, ap-
pears to be that of President McKinley in 1899, in terminating an
1850 treaty with Switzerland, but the action may be explainable as
the treaty being inconsistent with a subsequently enacted law.392
Other such renunciations by the President acting on his own have
been similarly explained and similarly the explanations have been
controverted. Although the Department of State, in setting forth le-
gal justification for President Carter’s notice of termination of the
treaty with Taiwan, cited many examples of a President’s acting alone,
many of these are ambiguous and may be explained away by, for
example, conflicts with later statutes, changed circumstances, or the
like.393
No such ambiguity accompanied President Carter’s action on the
Taiwan treaty,394 and a somewhat lengthy Senate debate was pro-
voked. In the end, the Senate on a preliminary vote approved a “sense
of the Senate” resolution claiming for itself a consenting role in the
termination of treaties, but no final vote was ever taken and the
Senate thus did not place itself in conflict with the President.395
However, several Members of Congress went to court to contest the
termination, apparently the first time a judicial resolution of the
question had been sought. A divided Court of Appeals, on the mer-
its, held that presidential action was sufficient by itself to termi-
390 Compare, e.g., Treaty Termination: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on
Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. (1979), 156–191 (memorandum of Hon.
Herbert Hansell, Legal Advisor, Department of State), with Taiwan: Hearings Be-
fore the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. (1979), 300–
307 (memorandum of Senator Goldwater). See CRS Study, supra at 164–66.
391 13 Stat. 568 (1865).
392 The treaty, see 11 C. BEVANS, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 894 (1970), was probably at odds with the Tariff Act of
1897. 30 Stat. 151.
393 Compare the views expressed in the Hansell and Goldwater memoranda, su-
pra. For expressions of views preceding the immediate controversy, see, e.g., Riesenfeld,
The Power of Congress and the President in International Relations, 25 CALIF. L. REV.
643, 658–665 (1937); Nelson, The Termination of Treaties and Executive Agreements
by the United States, 42 MINN. L. REV. 879 (1958).
394 Note that the President terminated the treaty in the face of an expression of
the sense of Congress that prior consultation between President and Congress should
occur. 92 Stat. 730, 746 (1978).
395 Originally, S. Res. 15 had disapproved presidential action alone, but it was
amended and reported by the Foreign Relations Committee to recognize at least 14

bases of presidential termination. S. REP. NO. 119, 96th Congress, 1st Sess. (1979).
In turn, this resolution was amended to state the described sense of the Senate view,
but the matter was never brought to final action. See 125 CONG. REC. 13672, 13696,
13711, 15209, 15859 (1979).
nate treaties, but the Supreme Court, no majority agreeing on a

common ground, vacated that decision and instructed the trial court
to dismiss the suit.396 Although no Court opinion bars future litiga-
tion, it appears that the political question doctrine or some other
rule of judicial restraint will leave such disputes to the contending
forces of the political branches.397
Determination Whether a Treaty Has Lapsed.—There is clear
judicial recognition that the President may without consulting Con-
gress validly determine the question whether specific treaty provi-
sions have lapsed. The following passage from Justice Lurton’s opin-
ion in Charlton v. Kelly 398 is pertinent: “If the attitude of Italy was,
as contended, a violation of the obligation of the treaty, which, in
international law, would have justified the United States in denounc-
ing the treaty as no longer obligatory, it did not automatically have
that effect. If the United States elected not to declare its abroga-
tion, or come to a rupture, the treaty would remain in force. It was
only voidable, not void; and if the United States should prefer, it
might waive any breach which in its judgment had occurred and
conform to its own obligation as if there had been no such breach. . . .
That the political branch of the government recognizes the treaty
obligation as still existing is evidenced by its action in this case. . . .
The executive department having thus elected to waive any right
to free itself from the obligation to deliver up its own citizens, it is
the plain duty of this court to recognize the obligation to surrender
the appellant as one imposed by the treaty as the supreme law of
the land as affording authority for the warrant of extradition.” 399
So also it is primarily for the political departments to determine
whether certain provisions of a treaty have survived a war in which
the other contracting state ceased to exist as a member of the inter-
national community.400
Status of a Treaty a Political Question.—It is clear that many
questions which arise concerning a treaty are of a political nature
and will not be decided by the courts. In the words of Justice Cur-
tis in Taylor v. Morton: 401 It is not “a judicial question, whether a
treaty with a foreign sovereign has been violated by him; whether
396 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated and
remanded, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). Four Justices found the case nonjusticiable because
of the political question doctrine, id. at 1002, but one other Justice in the majority
and one in dissent rejected this analysis. Id. at 998 (Justice Powell), 1006 (Justice
Brennan). The remaining three Justices were silent on the doctrine.
397 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–13, 217 (1962).
398 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
399 229 U.S. at 473–76.
400 Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
401 23 Fed. Cas. 784 (No. 13,799) (C.C.D. Mass. 1855).
the consideration of a particular stipulation in a treaty, has been

voluntarily withdrawn by one party, so that it is no longer obliga-
tory on the other; whether the views and acts of a foreign sover-
eign, manifested through his representative have given just occa-
sion to the political departments of our government to withhold the
execution of a promise contained in a treaty, or to act in direct con-
travention of such promise. . . . These powers have not been con-
fided by the people to the judiciary, which has no suitable means to
exercise them; but to the executive and the legislative departments
of our government. They belong to diplomacy and legislation, and
not to the administration of existing laws and it necessarily follows
that if they are denied to Congress and the Executive, in the exer-
cise of their legislative power, they can be found nowhere, in our
system of government.” Chief Justice Marshall’s language in Foster
v. Neilson 402 is to the same effect.
Indian Treaties
In the early cases of Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,403 and Worces-
ter v. Georgia,404 the Court, speaking by Chief Justice Marshall, held,
first, that the Cherokee Nation was not a sovereign state within
the meaning of that clause of the Constitution that extends the ju-
dicial power of the United States to controversies “between a State
or the citizens thereof and foreign states, citizens or subjects.” Sec-
ond, it held: “The Constitution, by declaring treaties already made,
as well as those to be made, to be the supreme law of the land,
had adopted and sanctioned the previous treaties with the Indian
nations, and consequently admits their rank among those powers
who are capable of making treaties. The words ‘treaty’ and ‘nation’
are words of our own language, selected in our diplomatic and leg-
islative proceedings, by ourselves, having each a definite and well
understood meaning. We have applied them to Indians, as we have
applied them to the other nations of the earth. They are applied to
all in the same sense.” 405
Later cases established that the power to make treaties with
the Indian tribes was coextensive with the power to make treaties
402 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 309 (1829). Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), quali-
fies this certainty considerably, and Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), pro-
longs the uncertainty. See L. Henkin, supra at 208–16; Restatement, Foreign Rela-
tions, § 326.
403 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
404 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
405 31 U.S. at 558.
with foreign nations,406 that the states were incompetent to inter-

fere with rights created by such treaties,407 that as long as the United
States recognized the national character of a tribe, its members were
under the protection of treaties and of the laws of Congress and
their property immune from taxation by a state,408 that a stipula-
tion in an Indian treaty that laws forbidding the introduction, of
liquors into Indian territory was operative without legislation, and
binding on the courts although the territory was within an orga-
nized county of a state,409 and that an act of Congress contrary to
a prior Indian treaty repealed it.410
Present Status of Indian Treaties.—Today, the subject of In-
dian treaties is a closed account in the constitutional law ledger.
By a rider inserted in the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871,
it was provided “That hereafter no Indian nation or tribe within
the territory of the United States shall be acknowledged or recog-
nized as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United
States may contract by treaty: Provided, further, that nothing herein
contained shall be construed to invalidate or impair the obligation
of any treaty heretofore lawfully made and ratified with any such
Indian nation or tribe.” 411 Subsequently, the power of Congress to
withdraw or modify tribal rights previously granted by treaty has
been invariably upheld.412 Statutes modifying rights of members in
tribal lands,413 granting a right of way for a railroad through lands
ceded by treaty to an Indian tribe,414 or extending the application
of revenue laws respecting liquor and tobacco over Indian territo-
ries, despite an earlier treaty exemption,415 have been sustained.
When, on the other hand, definite property rights have been con-
ferred upon individual Native Americans, whether by treaty or un-
der an act of Congress, they are protected by the Constitution to
the same extent and in the same way as the private rights of other
residents or citizens of the United States. Hence, the Court held
that certain Indian allottees, under an agreement according to which,
in part consideration of their relinquishment of all their claim to
406 Holden v. Joy, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 211, 242 (1872); United States v. Forty-
Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 192 (1876); Dick v. United States, 208 U.S.
340, 355–56 (1908).
407 The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761 (1867).
408 The Kansas Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737, 757 (1867).
409 United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196 (1876).
410 The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616 (1871). See also Ward v. Race
Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 511 (1896); Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264, 270 (1898).
411 16 Stat. 566; Rev. Stat. § 2079, now contained in 25 U.S.C. § 71.
412 Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896).
413 Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903).
414 Cherokee Nation v. Southern Kansas Ry., 135 U.S. 641 (1890).
415 The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 616, 621 (1871).
tribal property, they were to receive in severalty allotments of lands

that were to be nontaxable for a specified period, acquired vested
rights of exemption from state taxation that were protected by the
Fifth Amendment against abrogation by Congress.416
A regular staple of each Term’s docket of the Court is one or
two cases calling for an interpretation of the rights of Native Ameri-
cans under some treaty arrangement vis-a-vis the Federal Govern-
ment or the states. Thus, though no treaties have been negotiated
for decades and none presumably ever will again, litigation concern-
ing old treaties seemingly will go on.
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS WITHOUT SENATE

APPROVAL
The capacity of the United States to enter into agreements with
other nations is not exhausted in the treaty-making power. The Con-
stitution recognizes a distinction between “treaties” and “agree-
ments” or “compacts” but does not indicate what the difference is.417
The differences, which once may have been clearer, have been seri-
ously blurred in practice within recent decades. Once a stepchild in
the family in which treaties were the preferred offspring, the execu-
tive agreement has surpassed in number and perhaps in interna-
tional influence the treaty formally signed, submitted for ratifica-
tion to the Senate, and proclaimed upon ratification.
During the first half-century of its independence, the United States
was party to sixty treaties but to only twenty-seven published ex-
ecutive agreements. By the beginning of World War II, there had
been concluded approximately 800 treaties and 1,200 executive agree-
ments. In the period 1940–1989, the Nation entered into 759 trea-
ties and into 13,016 published executive agreements. Cumulatively,
in 1989, the United States was a party to 890 treaties and 5,117
executive agreements. To phrase it comparatively, in the first 50 years
of its history, the United States concluded twice as many treaties
as executive agreements. In the 50-year period from 1839 to 1889,
a few more executive agreements than treaties were entered into.
From 1889 to 1939, almost twice as many executive agreements as
416 Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665, 677–78 (1912); Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1
(1899). See also Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987) (section of law providing for
escheat to tribe of fractionated interests in land representing less than 2% of a tract’s
total acreage violates Fifth Amendment’s taking clause by completely abrogating rights
of intestacy and devise).
417 Compare Article II, § 2, cl. 2, and Article VI, cl. 2, with Article I, 10, cls. 1
and 3. Cf. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570–72 (1840). And note the
discussion in Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 28–32 (1982).
treaties were concluded. Between 1939 and 1993, executive agree-

ments comprised more than 90% of the international agreements
concluded.418
One must, of course, interpret the raw figures carefully. Only a
very small minority of all the executive agreements entered into
were based solely on the powers of the President as Commander in
Chief and organ of foreign relations; the remainder were autho-
rized in advance by Congress by statute or by treaty provisions rati-
fied by the Senate.419 Thus, consideration of the constitutional sig-
nificance of executive agreements must begin with a differentiation
among the kinds of agreements which are classed under this single
heading.420
Executive Agreements by Authorization of Congress

Congress early authorized officers of the executive branch to en-
ter into negotiations and to conclude agreements with foreign gov-
ernments, authorizing the borrowing of money from foreign coun-
tries 421 and appropriating money to pay off the government of Algiers
to prevent pirate attacks on United States shipping.422 Perhaps the
first formal authorization in advance of an executive agreement was
enactment of a statute that permitted the Postmaster General to
“make arrangements with the Postmasters in any foreign country
for the reciprocal receipt and delivery of letters and packets, through
418 CRS Study, xxxiv-xxxv, supra, 13–16. Not all such agreements, of course, are
published, either because of national-security/secrecy considerations or because the

subject matter is trivial. In a 1953 hearing exchange, Secretary of State Dulles esti-
mated that about 10,000 executive agreements had been entered into in connection
with the NATO treaty. “Every time we open a new privy, we have to have an execu-
tive agreement.” Hearing on S.J. Res. 1 and S.J. Res. 43: Before a Subcommittee of
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 83d Congress, 1st Sess. (1953), 877.
419 One authority concluded that of the executive agreements entered into be-
tween 1938 and 1957, only 5.9 percent were based exclusively on the President’s
constitutional authority. McLaughlin, The Scope of the Treaty Power in the United
States—II, 43 MINN. L. REV. 651, 721 (1959). Another, somewhat overlapping study
found that in the period 1946–1972, 88.3% of executive agreements were based at
least in part on statutory authority; 6.2% were based on treaties, and 5.5% were
based solely on executive authority. International Agreements: An Analysis of Execu-
tive Regulations and Practices, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th Cong.,
1st Sess. (Comm. Print) (1977), 22 (prepared by CRS).
420 “[T]he distinction between so-called ‘executive agreements’ and ‘treaties’ is
purely a constitutional one and has no international significance.” Harvard Re-

search in International Law, Draft Convention on the Law of Treaties, 29 AMER. J.
INT. L. 697 (Supp.) (1935). See E. Byrd, supra at 148–151. Many scholars have ag-
gressively promoted the use of executive agreements, in contrast to treaties, as a
means of enhancing the role of the United States, especially the role of the Presi-
dent, in the international system. See McDougal & Lans, Treaties and Congressional-
Executive or Presidential Agreements: Interchangeable Instruments of National Policy
(Pts. I & II), 54 YALE L. J. 181, 534 (1945).
421 1 Stat. 138 (1790). See E. Byrd, supra at 53 n.146.
422 W. MCCLURE, INTERNATIONAL EXECUTIVE AGREEMENTS 41 (1941).
the post offices.” 423 Congress has also approved, usually by resolu-
tion, other executive agreements, such as the annexing of Texas and
Hawaii and the acquisition of Samoa.424 A prolific source of execu-
tive agreements has been the authorization of reciprocal arrange-
ments between the United States and other countries for the secur-
ing of protection for patents, copyrights, and trademarks.425
Reciprocal Trade Agreements.—The most copious source of
executive agreements has been legislation which provided author-
ity for entering into reciprocal trade agreements with other na-
tions.426 Such agreements in the form of treaties providing for the
reciprocal reduction of duties subject to implementation by Con-
gress were frequently entered into,427 but beginning with the Tariff
Act of 1890,428 Congress began to insert provisions authorizing the
Executive to bargain over reciprocity with no necessity of subse-
quent legislative action. The authority was widened in successive
acts.429 Then, in the Reciprocal Trade Agreements Act of 1934,430
Congress authorized the President to enter into agreements with
other nations for reductions of tariffs and other impediments to in-
ternational trade and to put the reductions into effect through proc-
lamation.431
The Constitutionality of Trade Agreements.—In Field v.
Clark,432 legislation conferring authority on the President to con-
clude trade agreements was sustained against the objection that it
attempted an unconstitutional delegation “of both legislative and treaty-
making powers.” The Court met the first objection with an exten-
sive review of similar legislation from the inauguration of govern-
ment under the Constitution. The second objection it met with a
curt rejection: “What has been said is equally applicable to the ob-
jection that the third section of the act invests the President with
treaty-making power. The Court is of opinion that the third section
of the act of October 1, 1890, is not liable to the objection that it
423 Id. at 38–40. The statute was 1 Stat. 232, 239, 26 (1792).
424 McClure at 62–70.
425 Id. at 78–81; S. Crandall, supra at 127–31; see CRS Study, supra at 52–55.
426 Id. at 121–27; W. McClure, supra at 83–92, 173–89.
427 Id. at 8, 59–60.
428 § 3, 26 Stat. 567, 612.
429 Tariff Act of 1897, § 3, 30 Stat. 15, 203; Tariff Act of 1909, 36 Stat. 11, 82.
430 48 Stat. 943, § 350(a), 19 U.S.C. §§ 1351–1354.
431 See the continued expansion of the authority. Trade Expansion Act of 1962,
76 Stat. 872, § 201, 19 U.S.C. § 1821; Trade Act of 1974, 88 Stat. 1982, as amended,
19 U.S.C. §§ 2111, 2115, 2131(b), 2435. Congress has, with respect to the authoriza-
tion to the President to negotiate multilateral trade agreements under the auspices
of GATT, constrained itself in considering implementing legislation, creating a “fast-
track” procedure under which legislation is brought up under a tight timetable and
without the possibility of amendment. 19 U.S.C. §§ 2191–2194.
432 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
transfers legislative and treaty-making power to the President.” 433

Although two Justices disagreed, the question has never been re-
vived. However, in B. Altman & Co. v. United States,434 decided twenty
years later, a collateral question was passed upon. This was whether
an act of Congress that gave the federal circuit courts of appeal
jurisdiction of cases in which “the validity or construction of any
treaty . . . was drawn in question” embraced a case involving a trade
agreement which had been made under the sanction of the Tariff
Act of 1897. The Court answered: “While it may be true that this
commercial agreement, made under authority of the Tariff Act of
1897, § 3, was not a treaty possessing the dignity of one requiring
ratification by the Senate of the United States, it was an interna-
tional compact, negotiated between the representatives of two sov-
ereign nations and made in the name and on behalf of the contract-
ing countries, and dealing with important commercial relations between
the two countries, and was proclaimed by the President. If not tech-
nically a treaty requiring ratification, nevertheless, it was a com-
pact authorized by the Congress of the United States, negotiated
and proclaimed under the authority of its President. We think such
a compact is a treaty under the Circuit Court of Appeals Act, and,
where its construction is directly involved, as it is here, there is a
right of review by direct appeal to this court.” 435
The Lend-Lease Act.—The most extensive delegation of author-
ity ever made by Congress to the President to enter into executive
agreements occurred within the field of the cognate powers of the
two departments, the field of foreign relations, and took place at a
time when war appeared to be in the offing and was in fact only a
few months away. The legislation referred to is the Lend-Lease Act
of March 11, 1941,436 by which the President was empowered for
over two years—and subsequently for additional periods whenever
he deemed it in the interest of the national defense to do so—to
authorize “the Secretary of War, the Secretary of the Navy, or the
head of any other department or agency of the Government,” to manu-
facture in the government arsenals, factories, and shipyards, or “oth-
erwise procure,” to the extent that available funds made possible,
“defense articles”—later amended to include foodstuffs and indus-
433 143 U.S. at 694. See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981), in
which the Court sustained a series of implementing actions by the President pursu-
ant to executive agreements with Iran in order to settle the hostage crisis. The Court
found that Congress had delegated to the President certain economic powers under-
lying the agreements and that his suspension of claims powers had been implicitly
ratified over time by Congress’s failure to set aside the asserted power. Also see
Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S. 25, 29–30 n.6 (1982).
434 224 U.S. 583 (1912).
435 224 U.S. at 601.
436 55 Stat. 31.
trial products—and “sell, transfer title to, exchange, lease, lend, or

otherwise dispose of,” the same to the “government of any country
whose defense the President deems vital to the defense of the United
States,” and on any terms that he “deems satisfactory.” Under this
authorization the United States entered into Mutual Aid Agree-
ments under which the government furnished its allies in World
War II with 40 billion dollars’ worth of munitions of war and other
supplies.
International Organizations.—Overlapping of the treaty-
making power through congressional-executive cooperation in inter-
national agreements is also demonstrated by the use of resolutions
approving the United States joining of international organiza-
tions 437 and participating in international conventions.438
Executive Agreements Authorized by Treaties
Arbitration Agreements.—In 1904 and 1905, Secretary of State
John Hay negotiated a series of treaties providing for the general
arbitration of international disputes. Article II of the treaty with
Great Britain, for example, provided as follows: “In each individual
case the High Contracting Parties, before appealing to the Perma-
nent Court of Arbitration, shall conclude a special Agreement defin-
ing clearly the matter in dispute and the scope of the powers of the
Arbitrators, and fixing the periods for the formation of the Arbitral
Tribunal and the several stages of the procedure.” 439 The Senate
approved the British treaty by the constitutional majority having,
however, first amended it by substituting the word “treaty” for “agree-
ment.” President Theodore Roosevelt, characterizing the “ratifica-
tion” as equivalent to rejection, sent the treaties to repose in the
archives. “As a matter of historical practice,” Dr. McClure com-
ments, “the compromise under which disputes have been arbi-
trated include both treaties and executive agreements in goodly num-
bers,” 440 a statement supported by both Willoughby and Moore.441
Agreements Under the United Nations Charter.—Article 43
of the United Nations Charter provides: “1. All Members of the United
Nations, in order to contribute to the maintenance of international
peace and security, undertake to make available to the Security Coun-
cil, on its call and in accordance with a special agreement or agree-
ments, armed forces, assistance, and facilities, including rights of
passage, necessary for the purpose of maintaining international peace
437 E.g., 48 Stat. 1182 (1934), authorizing the President to accept membership
for the United States in the International Labor Organization.

438 See E. Corwin, supra at 216.
439 W. McClure, supra at 13–14.
440 Id. at 14.
441 1 W. Willoughby, supra at 543.
and security. 2. Such agreement or agreements shall govern the num-

bers and types of forces, their degree of readiness and general loca-
tion, and the nature of the facilities and assistance to be provided.
3. The agreement or agreements shall be negotiated as soon as pos-
sible on the initiative of the Security Council. They shall be con-
cluded between the Security Council and Members or between the
Security Council and groups of Members and shall be subject to rati-
fication by the signatory states in accordance with their respective
constitutional processes.” 442 This time the Senate did not boggle over
the word “agreement.”
The United Nations Participation Act of December 20, 1945, imple-
ments these provisions as follows: “The President is authorized to
negotiate a special agreement or agreements with the Security Coun-
cil which shall be subject to the approval of the Congress by appro-
priate Act or joint resolution, providing for the numbers and types
of armed forces, their degree of readiness and general location, and
the nature of facilities and assistance, including rights of passage,
to be made available to the Security Council on its call for the pur-
pose of maintaining international peace and security in accordance
with article 43 of said Charter. The President shall not be deemed
to require the authorization of the Congress to make available to
the Security Council on its call in order to take action under ar-
ticle 42 of said Charter and pursuant to such special agreement or
agreements the armed forces, facilities, or assistance provided for
therein: Provided, That nothing herein contained shall be con-
strued as an authorization to the President by the Congress to make
available to the Security Council for such purpose armed forces, fa-
cilities, or assistance in addition to the forces, facilities, and assis-
tance provided for in such special agreement or agreements.” 443
Status of Forces Agreements.—Status of Forces Agreements,
negotiated pursuant to authorizations contained in treaties be-
tween the United States and foreign nations in the territory of which
American troops and their dependents are stationed, afford the United
States a qualified privilege, which may be waived, of trying by court
martial soldiers and their dependents charged with commission of
offenses normally within the exclusive criminal jurisdiction of the
foreign signatory power. When the United States, in conformity with
the waiver clause in such an Agreement, consented to the trial in a
Japanese court of a soldier charged with causing the death of a Japa-
nese woman on a firing range in that country, the Court could “find
442 A Decade of American Foreign Policy, S. Doc. No. 123, 81st Cong., 1st Sess.,
126 (1950).
443 Id. at 158.
no constitutional barrier” to such action.444 However, at least five

of the Supreme Court Justices were persuaded to reject at length
the contention that such Agreements could sustain, as necessary and
proper for their effectuation, implementing legislation subse-
quently found by the Court to contravene constitutional guaranties
set forth in the Bill of Rights.445
Executive Agreements on the Sole Constitutional Authority

of the President
Many types of executive agreements comprise the ordinary daily
grist of the diplomatic mill. Among these are such as apply to mi-
nor territorial adjustments, boundary rectifications, the policing of
boundaries, the regulation of fishing rights, private pecuniary claims
against another government or its nationals, in Story’s words, “the
mere private rights of sovereignty.” 446 Crandall lists scores of such
agreements entered into with other governments by the authoriza-
tion of the President.447 Such agreements were ordinarily directed
to particular and comparatively trivial disputes and by the settle-
ment they effect of these cease ipso facto to be operative. Also, there
are such time-honored diplomatic devices as the “protocol” which
marks a stage in the negotiation of a treaty, and the modus vi-
vendi, which is designed to serve as a temporary substitute for one.
Executive agreements become of constitutional significance when they
constitute a determinative factor of future foreign policy and hence
of the country’s destiny. In consequence particularly of our partici-
pation in World War II and our immersion in the conditions of in-
ternational tension which prevailed both before and after the war,
Presidents have entered into agreements with other governments
some of which have approximated temporary alliances. It cannot
be justly said, however, that in so doing they have acted without
considerable support from precedent.
An early instance of executive treaty-making was the agree-
ment by which President Monroe in 1817 defined the limits of ar-
maments on the Great Lakes. The arrangement was effected by an
exchange of notes, which nearly a year later were laid before the
Senate with a query as to whether it was within the President’s
power, or whether advice and consent of the Senate was required.
The Senate approved the agreement by the required two-thirds vote,
and it was forthwith proclaimed by the President without there hav-
444 Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524 (1957).
445 Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 16–17 (1957) (plurality opinion); id. at 66 (Justice
Harlan concurring).
447 S. Crandall, supra, ch. 8; see also W. McClure, supra, chs. 1, 2.
ing been a formal exchange of ratifications.448 Of a kindred type,

and owing much to the President’s capacity as Commander in Chief,
was a series of agreements entered into with Mexico between 1882
and 1896 according each country the right to pursue marauding In-
dians across the common border.449 Commenting on such an agree-
ment, the Court remarked, a bit uncertainly: “While no act of Con-
gress authorizes the executive department to permit the introduction
of foreign troops, the power to give such permission without legisla-
tive assent was probably assumed to exist from the authority of the
President as commander in chief of the military and naval forces of
the United States. It may be doubted, however, whether such power
could be extended to the apprehension of deserters [from foreign
vessels] in the absence of positive legislation to that effect.” 450 Jus-
tice Gray and three other Justices believed that such action by the
President must rest upon express treaty or statute.451
Notable expansion of presidential power in this field first be-
came manifest in the administration of President McKinley. At the
outset of war with Spain, the President proclaimed that the United
States would consider itself bound for the duration by the last three
principles of the Declaration of Paris, a course which, as Professor
Wright observes, “would doubtless go far toward establishing these
three principles as international law obligatory upon the United States
in future wars.” 452 Hostilities with Spain were brought to an end
in August, 1898, by an armistice the conditions of which largely de-
termined the succeeding treaty of peace,453 just as did the Armi-
stice of November 11, 1918, determine in great measure the condi-
tions of the final peace with Germany in 1918. It was also President
McKinley who in 1900, relying on his own sole authority as Com-
mander in Chief, contributed a land force of 5,000 men and a na-
val force to cooperate with similar contingents from other Powers
to rescue the legations in Peking from the Boxers; a year later, again
without consulting either Congress or the Senate, he accepted for
the United States the Boxer Indemnity Protocol between China and
the intervening Powers.454 Commenting on the Peking protocol, Wil-
loughby quotes with approval the following remark: “This case is
interesting, because it shows how the force of circumstances com-
448 Id. at 49–50.

449 Id. at 81–82.
450 Tucker v. Alexandroff, 183 U.S. 424, 435 (1902).
451 Id. at 467. The first of these conventions, signed July 29, 1882, had asserted
its constitutionality in very positive terms. Q. Wright, supra at 239 (quoting Watts
v. United States, 1 Wash. Terr. 288, 294 (1870)).
452 Id. at 245.
453 S. Crandall, supra at 103–04.
454 Id. at 104.
pelled us to adopt the European practice with reference to an inter-

national agreement, which, aside from the indemnity question, was
almost entirely political in character . . . purely political treaties
are, under constitutional practice in Europe, usually made by the
executive alone. The situation in China, however, abundantly justi-
fied President McKinley in not submitting the protocol to the Sen-
ate. The remoteness of Peking, the jealousies between the allies,
and the shifting evasive tactics of the Chinese Government, would
have made impossible anything but an agreement on the spot.” 455
It was also during this period that John Hay, as McKinley’s Sec-
retary of State, initiated his “Open Door” policy, by notes to Great
Britain, Germany, and Russia, which were soon followed by similar
notes to France, Italy and Japan. These in substance asked the re-
cipients to declare formally that they would not seek to enlarge their
respective interests in China at the expense of any of the others;
and all responded favorably.456 Then, in 1905, the first Roosevelt,
seeking to arrive at a diplomatic understanding with Japan, insti-
gated an exchange of opinions between Secretary of War Taft, then
in the Far East, and Count Katsura, amounting to a secret treaty,
by which the Roosevelt administration assented to the establish-
ment by Japan of a military protectorate in Korea.457 Three years
later, Secretary of State Root and the Japanese ambassador at Wash-
ington entered into the Root-Takahira Agreement to uphold the sta-
tus quo in the Pacific and maintain the principle of equal opportu-
nity for commerce and industry in China.458 Meantime, in 1907, by
a “Gentleman’s Agreement,” the Mikado’s government had agreed
to curb the emigration of Japanese subjects to the United States,
thereby relieving the Washington government from the necessity of
taking action that would have cost Japan loss of face. The final re-
sult of this series of executive agreements touching American rela-
tions in and with the Far East was the product of President Wil-
son’s diplomacy. This was the Lansing-Ishii Agreement, embodied
in an exchange of letters dated November 2, 1917, by which the
United States recognized Japan’s “special interests” in China, and
Japan assented to the principle of the Open Door in that coun-
try.459
The Litvinov Agreement.—The executive agreement attained
its modern development as an instrument of foreign policy under
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, at times threatening to replace the
456 W. McClure, supra at 98.
457 Id. at 96–97.
458 Id. at 98–99.
459 Id. at 99–100.
treaty-making power, not formally but in effect, as a determinative

element in the field of foreign policy. The President’s first impor-
tant utilization of the executive agreement device took the form of
an exchange of notes on November 16, 1933, with Maxim M. Litvinov,
the USSR Commissar for Foreign Affairs, whereby American recog-
nition was extended to the Soviet Union and certain pledges made
by each official.460
The Hull-Lothian Agreement.—With the fall of France in June,
1940, President Roosevelt entered into two executive agreements the
total effect of which was to transform the role of the United States
from one of strict neutrality toward the European war to one of semi-
belligerency. The first agreement was with Canada and provided for
the creation of a Permanent Joint Board on Defense which would
“consider in the broad sense the defense of the north half of the
Western Hemisphere.” 461 Second, and more important than the first,
was the Hull-Lothian Agreement of September 2, 1940, under which,
in return for the lease for ninety-nine years of certain sites for na-
val bases in the British West Atlantic, the United States handed
over to the British Government fifty over-age destroyers which had
been reconditioned and recommissioned.462 And on April 9, 1941,
the State Department, in consideration of the just-completed Ger-
man occupation of Denmark, entered into an executive agreement
with the Danish minister in Washington, whereby the United States
acquired the right to occupy Greenland for purposes of defense.463
The Post-War Years.—Post-war diplomacy of the United States
was greatly influenced by the executive agreements entered into at
Cairo, Teheran, Yalta, and Potsdam.464 For a period, the formal
treaty—the signing of the United Nations Charter and the entry
into the multinational defense pacts, like NATO, SEATO, CENTRO,
and the like—re-established itself, but soon the executive agree-
ment, as an adjunct of treaty arrangement or solely through presi-
dential initiative, again became the principal instrument of United
States foreign policy, so that it became apparent in the 1960s that
the Nation was committed in one way or another to assisting over
460 Id. at 140–44.

461 Id. at 391.
462 Id. at 391–93. Attorney General Jackson’s defense of the presidential power
to enter into the arrangement placed great reliance on the President’s “inherent”
powers under the Commander-in-Chief clause and as sole organ of foreign relations
but ultimately found adequate statutory authority to take the steps deemed desir-
able. 39 Ops. Atty. Gen. 484 (1940).
463 4 Dept. State Bull. 443 (1941).
464 See A Decade of American Foreign Policy, Basic Documents 1941–1949, S.
Doc. No. 123, 81st Congress, 1st Sess. (1950), pt. 1.

half the countries of the world protect themselves.465 Congressional

disquietude did not result in anything more substantial than pas-
sage of a “sense of the Senate” resolution expressing a desire that
“national commitments” be made more solemnly in the future than
in the past.466
The Domestic Obligation of Executive Agreements

When the President enters into an executive agreement, what
sort of obligation does it impose on the United States? That it may
impose international obligations of potentially serious conse-
quences is obvious and that such obligations may linger for long
periods of time is equally obvious.467 Not so obvious is the nature
of the domestic obligations imposed by executive agreements. Do
treaties and executive agreements have the same domestic ef-
fect? 468 Treaties preempt state law through operation of the Su-
premacy Clause. Although it may be that executive agreements en-
tered into pursuant to congressional authorization or treaty obligation
also derive preemptive force from the Supremacy Clause, that tex-
tual basis for preemption is arguably lacking for executive agree-
ments resting solely on the President’s constitutional powers.
Initially, it was the view of most judges and scholars that execu-
tive agreements based solely on presidential power did not become
the “law of the land” pursuant to the Supremacy Clause because
such agreements are not “treaties” ratified by the Senate.469 The
Supreme Court, however, found another basis for holding state laws
to be preempted by executive agreements, ultimately relying on the
Constitution’s vesting of foreign relations power in the national gov-
ernment.
465 For a congressional attempt to evaluate the extent of such commitments, see
United States Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad: Hearings Before a Sub-
committee of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 91st Congress, 1st Sess. (1969),
10 pts.; see also U.S. Commitments to Foreign Powers: Hearings on S. Res. 151 Be-
fore the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 90th Congress, 1st Sess. (1967).
466 The “National Commitments Resolution,” S. Res. 85, 91st Congress, 1st Sess.,
passed by the Senate June 25, 1969. See also S. REP. NO. 797, 90th Congress, 1st
sess. (1967). See the discussion of these years in CRS study, supra at 169–202.
467 In 1918, Secretary of State Lansing assured the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the Lansing-Ishii Agreement had no binding force on the United
States, that it was simply a declaration of American policy so long as the President
and State Department might choose to continue it. 1 W. Willoughby, supra at 547.
In fact, it took the Washington Conference of 1921, two formal treaties, and an ex-
change of notes to eradicate it, while the “Gentlemen’s Agreement” was finally ended
after 17 years only by an act of Congress. W. McClure, supra at 97, 100.
468 See E. Byrd, supra at 151–57.
469 E.g., United States v. One Bag of Paradise Feathers, 256 F. 301, 306 (2d Cir.
1919); 1 W. Willoughby, supra at 589. The State Department held the same view. G.
HACKWORTH, 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 426 (1944).
A different view seemed to underlie the Supreme Court deci-

sion in United States v. Belmont,470 giving domestic effect to the
Litvinov Assignment. The Court’s opinion by Justice Sutherland built
on his Curtiss-Wright 471 opinion. A lower court had erred, the Court
ruled, in dismissing an action by the United States, as assignee of
the Soviet Union, for certain moneys which had once been the prop-
erty of a Russian metal corporation the assets of which had been
appropriated by the Soviet government. The President’s act in rec-
ognizing the Soviet government, and the accompanying agree-
ments, constituted, said the Justice, an international compact which
the President, “as the sole organ” of international relations for the
United States, was authorized to enter upon without consulting the
Senate. Nor did state laws and policies make any difference in such
a situation; while the supremacy of treaties is established by the
Constitution in express terms, the same rule holds “in the case of
all international compacts and agreements from the very fact that
complete power over international affairs is in the National Govern-
ment and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or inter-
ference on the part of the several States.” 472
The Court elaborated on these principles five years later in United
States v. Pink,473 another case involving the Litvinov Assignment
and recognition of the Soviet Government. The question presented
was whether the United States was entitled to recover the assets
of the New York branch of a Russian insurance company. The com-
pany argued that the Soviet Government’s decrees of confiscation
did not apply to its property in New York and could not apply con-
sistently with the Constitution of the United States and that of New
York. The Court, speaking by Justice Douglas, brushed these argu-
ments aside. An official declaration of the Russian government it-
self settled the question of the extraterritorial operation of the Rus-
sian decree of nationalization and was binding on American courts.
The power to remove such obstacles to full recognition as settle-
ment of claims of our nationals was “a modest implied power of the
President who is the ‘sole organ of the Federal Government in the
field of international relations’. . . . It was the judgment of the po-
litical department that full recognition of the Soviet Government
required the settlement of outstanding problems including the claims
of our nationals. . . . We would usurp the executive function if we
held that the decision was not final and conclusive on the courts. . . .”
470 301 U.S. 324 (1937). In B. Altman & Co. v. United States, 224 U.S. 583 (1912),
the Court had recognized that a jurisdictional statute’s reference to a “treaty” encom-
passed an executive agreement.
471 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
472 301 U.S. at 330–31.
473 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
“It is, of course, true that even treaties with foreign nations will
be carefully construed so as not to derogate from the authority and
jurisdiction of the States of this nation unless clearly necessary to
effectuate the national policy. . . . But state law must yield when
it is inconsistent with, or impairs the policy or provisions of, a treaty
or of an international compact or agreement. . . . Then, the power
of a State to refuse enforcement of rights based on foreign law which
runs counter to the public policy of the forum . . . must give way
before the superior Federal policy evidenced by a treaty or interna-
tional compact or agreement. . . .”
“The action of New York in this case amounts in substance to a
rejection of a part of the policy underlying recognition by this na-
tion of Soviet Russia. Such power is not accorded a State in our
constitutional system. To permit it would be to sanction a danger-
ous invasion of Federal authority. For it would ‘imperil the ami-
cable relations between governments and vex the peace of nations.’
. . . It would tend to disturb that equilibrium in our foreign rela-
tions which the political departments of our national government
has diligently endeavored to establish. . . .”
“No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own
domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the
States; it is vested in the national government exclusively. It need
not be so exercised as to conform to state laws or state policies,
whether they be expressed in constitutions, statutes, or judicial de-
crees. And the policies of the States become wholly irrelevant to ju-
dicial inquiry when the United States, acting within its constitu-
tional sphere, seeks enforcement of its foreign policy in the courts.” 474
This recognition of the preemptive reach of executive agree-
ments was an element in the movement for a constitutional amend-
ment in the 1950s to limit the President’s powers in this field, but
that movement failed.475
474 315 U.S. at 229–31, 233–34.

475 There were numerous variations in language for the Bricker Amendment,
but typical was § 3 of S.J. Res. 1, as reported by the Senate Judiciary Committee,
83d Congress, 1st Sess. (1953), which provided: “Congress shall have power to regu-
late all executive and other agreements with any foreign power or international or-
ganization. All such agreements shall be subject to the limitations imposed on trea-
ties by this article.” The limitation relevant on this point was in § 2, which provided:
“A treaty shall become effective as internal law in the United States only through
legislation which would be valid in the absence of treaty.”
Belmont and Pink were reinforced in American Ins. Ass’n v.

Garamendi.476 In holding that California’s Holocaust Victim Insur-
ance Relief Act was preempted as interfering with the Federal Gov-
ernment’s conduct of foreign relations, as expressed in executive agree-
ments, the Court reiterated that “valid executive agreements are
fit to preempt state law, just as treaties are.” 477 The preemptive
reach of executive agreements stems from “the Constitution’s allo-
cation of the foreign relations power to the National Govern-
ment.” 478 Because there was a “clear conflict” between the Califor-
nia law and policies adopted through the valid exercise of federal
executive authority (settlement of Holocaust-era insurance claims
being “well within the Executive’s responsibility for foreign af-
fairs”), the state law was preempted.479
State Laws Affecting Foreign Relations—Dormant Federal

Power and Preemption
If the foreign relations power is truly an exclusive federal power,
with no role for the states, a logical consequence, the Supreme Court
has held, is that some state laws impinging on foreign relations are
invalid even in the absence of a relevant federal policy. There is, in
effect, a “dormant” foreign relations power. The scope of this power
remains undefined, however, and its constitutional basis is debated
by scholars.
The exclusive nature of the federal foreign relations power has
long been asserted by the Supreme Court. In 1840, for example,
the Court declared that “it was one of the main objects of the con-
stitution to make us, so far as regarded our foreign relations, one
people, and one nation; and to cut off all communications between
foreign governments, and the several state authorities.” 480 A hun-
dred years later the Court remained emphatic about federal exclu-
476 539 U.S. 396 (2003). The Court’s opinion in Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981), was rich in learning on many topics involving executive agree-
ments, but the preemptive force of agreements resting solely on presidential power
was not at issue, the Court concluding that Congress had either authorized various
presidential actions or had long acquiesced in others.
477 539 U.S. at 416.
478 539 U.S. at 413.
479 539 U.S. at 420.
480 Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 575–76 (1840). See also United
States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) (“The external powers of the United
States are to be exercised without regard to state laws or policies. . . . [I]n respect
of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear”); The Chinese Exclusion Case,
130 U.S. 581, 606 (1889) (“For local interests the several States of the Union exist;
but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but
one people, one nation, one power”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941)
(“Our system of government . . . requires that federal power in the field affecting
foreign relations be left entirely free from local interference”).
sivity. “No State can rewrite our foreign policy to conform to its own
domestic policies. Power over external affairs is not shared by the
States; it is vested in the national government exclusively. It need
not be so exercised as to conform to state laws or state policies,
whether they be expressed in constitutions, statutes, or judicial de-
crees. And the policies of the States become wholly irrelevant to ju-
dicial inquiry when the United States, acting within its constitu-
tional sphere, seeks enforcement of its foreign policy in the courts.” 481
It was not until 1968, however, that the Court applied the gen-
eral principle to invalidate a state law for impinging on the na-
tion’s foreign policy interests in the absence of an established fed-
eral policy. In Zschernig v. Miller 482 the Court invalidated an Oregon
escheat law that operated to prevent inheritance by citizens of Com-
munist countries. The law conditioned inheritance by nonresident
aliens on a showing that U.S. citizens would be allowed to inherit
estates in the alien’s country, and that the alien heir would be al-
lowed to receive payments from the Oregon estate “without confis-
cation.” 483 Although a Justice Department amicus brief asserted that
application of the Oregon law in this one case would not cause any
“undu[e] interfer[ence] with the United States’ conduct of foreign
relations,” the Court saw a “persistent and subtle” effect on inter-
national relations stemming from the “notorious” practice of state
probate courts in denying payments to persons from Communist coun-
tries.484 Regulation of descent and distribution of estates is an area
traditionally regulated by states, but such “state regulations must
give way if they impair the effective exercise of the Nation’s foreign
policy.” If there are to be travel, probate, or other restraints on citi-
zens of Communist countries, the Court concluded, such restraints
“must be provided by the Federal Government.” 485
Zschernig lay dormant for some time, and, although it has been
addressed recently by the Court, it remains the only holding in which
the Court has applied a dormant foreign relations power to strike
down state law. There was renewed academic interest in Zschernig
in the 1990s, as some state and local governments sought ways to
express dissatisfaction with human rights policies of foreign govern-
481 United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233–34 (1942). Chief Justice Stone and
Justice Roberts dissented.

482 389 U.S. 429 (1968).
483 In Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947), the Court had upheld a simple reci-
procity requirement that did not have the additional requirement relating to confis-
cation.
484 389 U.S. at 440.
485 389 U.S. at 440, 441.
ments or to curtail trade with out-of-favor countries.486 In 1999, the

Court struck down Massachusetts’ Burma sanctions law on the ba-
sis of statutory preemption, and declined to address the appeals court’s
alternative holding applying Zschernig.487 Similarly, in 2003, the Court
held that California’s Holocaust Victim Insurance Relief Act was pre-
empted as interfering with federal foreign policy reflected in execu-
tive agreements, and, although the Court discussed Zschernig at some
length, it saw no need to resolve issues relating to its scope.488
Dictum in Garamendi recognizes some of the questions that can
be raised about Zschernig. The Zschernig Court did not identify what
language in the Constitution mandates preemption, and commenta-
tors have observed that a respectable argument can be made that
the Constitution does not require a general foreign affairs preemp-
tion not tied to the Supremacy Clause, and broader than and inde-
pendent of the Constitution’s specific prohibitions 489 and grants of
power.490 The Garamendi Court raised “a fair question whether re-
spect for the executive foreign relations power requires a categori-
cal choice between the contrasting theories of field and conflict pre-
emption evident in the Zschernig opinions.” Instead, Justice Souter
suggested for the Court, field preemption may be appropriate if a
state legislates “simply to take a position on a matter of foreign
policy with no serious claim to be addressing a traditional state re-
sponsibility,” and conflict preemption may be appropriate if a state
legislates within an area of traditional responsibility, “but in a way
486 See, e.g., Michael D. Ramsey, The Power of the States in Foreign Affairs: The
Original Understanding of Foreign Policy Federalism, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 341

(1999); Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Whither Zschernig?, 46 VILL. L. REV. 1259 (2001);
Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
1617 (1997); Peter J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223
(1999). See also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE CONSTITUTION 149–69 (2d ed.
1996).
487 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2000). For
the appeals court’s application of Zschernig, see National Foreign Trade Council v.
Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 49–61 (1st Cir. 1999).
488 American Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. at 419 & n.11 (2003).
489 It is contended, for example, that Article I, § 10‘s specific prohibitions against
states engaging in war, making treaties, keeping troops in peacetime, and issuing
letters of marque and reprisal would have been unnecessary if a more general, dor-
mant foreign relations power had been intended. Similarly, there would have been
no need to declare treaties to be the supreme law of the land if a more generalized
foreign affairs preemptive power existed outside of the Supremacy Clause. See Ramsey,
supra.
490 Arguably, part of the “executive power” vested in the President by Art. II,
§ 1 is a power to conduct foreign relations.

that affects foreign relations.” 491 We must await further litigation

to see whether the Court employs this distinction.492
THE EXECUTIVE ESTABLISHMENT
Office
“An office is a public station, or employment, conferred by the
appointment of government. The term embraces the ideas of ten-
ure, duration, emolument, and duties.” 493
Ambassadors and Other Public Ministers.—The term “am-
bassadors and other public ministers,” comprehends “all officers hav-
ing diplomatic functions, whatever their title or designation.” 494 It
was originally assumed that such offices were established by the
Constitution itself, by reference to the Law of Nations, with the con-
sequence that appointments might be made to them whenever the
appointing authority—the President and Senate—deemed desir-
able.495 During the first sixty-five years of the Government, Con-
gress passed no act purporting to create any diplomatic rank, the
entire question of grades being left with the President. Indeed, dur-
ing the administrations of Washington, Adams and Jefferson, and
the first term of Madison, no mention occurs in any appropriation,
even of ministers of a specified rank at this or that place, but the
provision for the diplomatic corps consisted of so much money “for
the expenses of foreign intercourse,” to be expended at the discre-
tion of the President. In Madison’s second term, the practice was
introduced of allocating special sums to the several foreign mis-
sions maintained by the Government, but even then the legislative
provisions did not purport to curtail the discretion of the President
in any way in the choice of diplomatic agents.
In 1814, however, when President Madison appointed, during a
recess of the Senate, the Commissioners who negotiated the Treaty
of Ghent, the theory on which the above legislation was based was
drawn into question. Inasmuch, it was argued, as these offices had
491 539 U.S. at 419 n.11.
492 Justice Ginsburg’s dissent in Garamendi, joined by the other three Justices,
suggested limiting Zschernig in a manner generally consistent with Justice Souter’s
distinction. Zschernig preemption, Justice Ginsburg asserted, “resonates most audi-
bly when a state action ‘reflects a state policy critical of foreign governments and
involve[s] sitting in judgment on them.’ ” 539 U.S. at 439 (quoting Henkin, supra, at
164). But Justice Ginsburg also voiced more general misgivings about judges’ becom-
ing “the expositors of the Nation’s foreign policy.” Id. at 442. In this context, see
Goldsmith, supra, at 1631, describing Zschernig preemption as “a form of the fed-
eral common law of foreign relations.”
493 United States v. Hartwell, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 385, 393 (1868).
494 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 168 (1855).
495 It was so assumed by Senator William Maclay. THE JOURNAL OF WILLIAM MACLAY
109–10 (E. Maclay ed., 1890).

never been established by law, no vacancy existed to which the Presi-

dent could constitutionally make a recess appointment. To this ar-
gument, it was answered that the Constitution recognizes “two de-
scriptions of offices altogether different in their nature, authorized
by the constitution—one to be created by law, and the other depend-
ing for their existence and continuance upon contingencies. Of the
first kind, are judicial, revenue, and similar offices. Of the second,
are Ambassadors, other public Ministers, and Consuls. The first de-
scriptions organize the government and give it efficacy. They form
the internal system, and are susceptible of precise enumeration. When
and how they are created, and when and how they become vacant,
may always be ascertained with perfect precision. Not so with the
second description. They depend for their original existence upon
the law, but are the offspring of the state of our relations with for-
eign nations, and must necessarily be governed by distinct rules.
As an independent power, the United States have relations with
all other independent powers; and the management of those rela-
tions is vested in the Executive.” 496
By the opening section of the act of March 1, 1855, it was pro-
vided that “from and after the thirtieth day of June next, the Presi-
dent of the United States shall, by and with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate, appoint representatives of the grade of envoys
extraordinary and ministers plenipotentiary,” with a specified an-
nual compensation for each, “to the following countries. . . .” In the
body of the act was also this provision: “The President shall ap-
point no other than citizens of the United States, who are resi-
dents thereof, or who shall be abroad in the employment of the gov-
ernment at the time of their appointment. . . .” 497 The question of
the interpretation of the act having been referred to Attorney Gen-
eral Cushing, he ruled that its total effect, aside from its salary
provisions, was recommendatory only. It was “to say, that if, and
whenever, the President shall, by and with the advice and consent
of the Senate, appoint an envoy extraordinary and minister pleni-
potentiary to Great Britain, or to Sweden, the compensation of that
minister shall be so much and no more.” 498
This line of reasoning is only partially descriptive of the facts.
The Foreign Service Act of 1946,499 pertaining to the organization
of the foreign service, diplomatic as well as consular, contains de-
tailed provisions as to grades, salaries, promotions, and, in part, as
496 26 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 694–722 (1814) (quotation appearing at 699); 4 LET-
TERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 350–353 (1865).
497 10 Stat. 619, 623.
4987 Ops. Atty. Gen. 186, 220 (1855).
49960 Stat. 999, superseded by the Foreign Service Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–465,
94 Stat. 2071, 22 U.S.C. §§ 3901 et seq.
to duties. Under the terms thereof the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate, appoints ambassadors, ministers,
foreign service officers, and consuls, but in practice the vast propor-
tion of the selections are made in conformance to recommendations
of a Board of the Foreign Service.
Presidential Diplomatic Agents.—What the President may
have lost in consequence of the intervention of Congress in this field
of diplomatic appointments, he has made good through his early
conceded right to employ, in the discharge of his diplomatic func-
tion, so-called “special,” “personal,” or “secret” agents without con-
sulting the Senate. When President Jackson’s right to resort to this
practice was challenged in the Senate in 1831, it was defended by
Edward Livingston, Senator from Louisiana, to such good purpose
that Jackson made him Secretary of State. “The practice of appoint-
ing secret agents,” said Livingston, “is coeval with our existence as
a nation, and goes beyond our acknowledgment as such by other
powers. All those great men who have figured in the history of our
diplomacy, began their career, and performed some of their most
important services in the capacity of secret agents, with full pow-
ers. Franklin, Adams, Lee, were only commissioners; and in negoti-
ating a treaty with the Emperor of Morocco, the selection of the
secret agent was left to the Ministers appointed to make the treaty;
and, accordingly, in the year 1785, Mr. Adams and Mr. Jefferson
appointed Thomas Barclay, who went to Morocco and made a treaty,
which was ratified by the Ministers at Paris.”
“These instances show that, even prior to the establishment of
the Federal Government, secret plenipotentiaries were known, as
well in the practice of our own country as in the general law of
nations: and that these secret agents were not on a level with mes-
sengers, letter carriers, or spies, to whom it has been found neces-
sary in argument to assimilate them. On the 30th March, 1795, in
the recess of the Senate, by letters patent under the great broad
seal of the United States, and the signature of their President, (that
President being George Washington,) countersigned by the Secre-
tary of State, David Humphreys was appointed commissioner pleni-
potentiary for negotiating a treaty of peace with Algiers. By instruc-
tions from the President, he was afterwards authorized to employ
Joseph Donaldson as agent in that business. In May, of the same
year, he did appoint Donaldson, who went to Algiers, and in Sep-
tember of the same year concluded a treaty with the Dey and Di-
van, which was confirmed by Humphreys, at Lisbon, on the 28th
November in the same year, and afterwards ratified by the Senate,
and an act passed both Houses on 6th May, 1796, appropriating a

large sum, twenty-five thousand dollars annually, for carrying it into
effect.” 500
The precedent afforded by Humphreys’ appointment without ref-
erence to the Senate has since been multiplied many times,501 as
witness the mission of A. Dudley Mann to Hanover and other Ger-
man states in 1846, of the same gentleman to Hungary in 1849, of
Nicholas Trist to Mexico in 1848, of Commodore Perry to Japan in
1852, of J. H. Blount to Hawaii in 1893. The last named case is
perhaps the most extreme of all. Blount, who was appointed while
the Senate was in session but without its advice and consent, was
given “paramount authority” over the American resident minister
at Hawaii and was further empowered to employ the military and
naval forces of the United States, if necessary to protect American
lives and interests. His mission raised a vigorous storm of protest
in the Senate, but the majority report of the committee which was
created to investigate the constitutional question vindicated the Presi-
dent in the following terms: “A question has been made as to the
right of the President of the United States to dispatch Mr. Blount
to Hawaii as his personal representative for the purpose of seeking
the further information which the President believed was neces-
sary in order to arrive at a just conclusion regarding the state of
affairs in Hawaii. Many precedents could be quoted to show that
such power has been exercised by the President on various occa-
sions, without dissent on the part of Congress or the people of the
United States. . . . These precedents also show that the Senate of
the United States, though in session, need not be consulted as to
the appointment of such agents, . . . .” 502 The continued vitality of
the practice is attested by such names as Colonel House, the late
Norman H. Davis, who filled the role of “ambassador at large” for a
succession of administrations of both parties, Professor Philip Jes-
sup, Mr. Averell Harriman, and other “ambassadors at large” of the
Truman Administration, and Professor Henry Kissinger of the Nixon
Administration.
How is the practice to be squared with the express words of
the Constitution? Apparently, by stressing the fact that such appoint-
ments or designations are ordinarily merely temporary and for spe-
cial tasks, and hence do not fulfill the tests of “office” in the strict
500 11 T. BENTON, ABRIDGEMENT OF THE DEBATES OF CONGRESS 221 (1860).
501 S. Misc. Doc, 109, 50th Congress, 1st Sess. (1888), 104.
502 S. REP. NO. 227, 53d Congress, 2d Sess. (1894), 25. At the outset of our en-
trance into World War I President Wilson dispatched a mission to “Petrograd,” as it

was then called, without nominating the Members of it to the Senate. It was headed
by Mr. Elihu Root, with “the rank of ambassador,” while some of his associates bore
“the rank of envoy extraordinary.”
sense. In the same way the not infrequent practice of Presidents of

appointing Members of Congress as commissioners to negotiate trea-
ties and agreements with foreign governments may be regularized,
notwithstanding the provision of Article I, § 6, clause 2 of the Con-
stitution, which provides that “no Senator or Representative shall
. . . be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United
States, which shall have been created,” during his term; and no of-
ficer of the United States, “shall be a Member of either House dur-
ing his Continuance in Office.” 503 The Treaty of Peace with Spain,
the treaty to settle the Bering Sea controversy, the treaty establish-
ing the boundary line between Canada and Alaska, were negoti-
ated by commissions containing Senators and Representatives.
Appointments and Congressional Regulation of Offices

It has never been questioned that the Constitution distin-
guishes between the creation of an office and appointment thereto.
The former is by law and takes place by virtue of Congress’s power
to pass all laws necessary and proper for carrying into execution
the powers which the Constitution confers upon the government of
the United States and its departments and officers.504 As an inci-
dent to the establishment of an office, Congress has also the power
to determine the qualifications of the officer and in so doing neces-
sarily limits the range of choice of the appointing power. First and
last, it has laid down a great variety of qualifications, depending
on citizenship, residence, professional attainments, occupational ex-
perience, age, race, property, sound habits, and so on. It has re-
quired that appointees be representative of a political party, of an
industry, of a geographic region, or of a particular branch of the
Government. It has confined the President’s selection to a small num-
ber of persons to be named by others.505 Indeed, it has contrived at
503 See 2 G. HOAR, AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF SEVENTY YEARS 48–51 (1903).
504 However, “Congress’s power . . . is inevitably bounded by the express lan-
guage of Article II, cl. 2, and unless the method it provides comports with the latter,
the holders of those offices will not be ‘Officers of the United States.’ ” Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138–39 (1976) (quoted in Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868,
883 (1991)). The designation or appointment of military judges, who are “officers of
the United States,” does not violate the Appointments Clause. The judges are se-
lected by the Judge Advocate General of their respective branch of the Armed Forces.
These military judges, however, were already commissioned officers who had been
appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, so that their
designation simply and permissibly was an assignment to them of additional duties
that did not need a second formal appointment. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S.
163 (1994). However, the appointment of civilian judges to the Coast Guard Court
of Military Review was impermissible and their actions were not salvageable under
the de facto officer doctrine. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
505 See Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 264–74 (1926) (Justice Brandeis
dissenting). Chief Justice Taft in the opinion of the Court in Myers readily recog-
nized the legislative power of Congress to establish offices, determine their func-
times to designate a definite eligibility, thereby virtually usurping

the appointing power.506 Despite the record of the past, however, it
is not at all clear that Congress may cabin the President’s discre-
tion, at least for offices that he considers important, by, for ex-
ample, requiring him to choose from lists compiled by others. To be
sure, there are examples, but they are not free of ambiguity.507
But when Congress contrived actually to participate in the ap-
pointment and administrative process and provided for selection of
the members of the Federal Election Commission, two by the Presi-
dent, two by the Senate, and two by the House, with confirmation
of all six members vested in both the House and the Senate, the
Court unanimously held the scheme to violate the Appointments
Clause and the principle of separation of powers. The term “officers
of the United States” is a substantive one requiring that any appoin-
tions and jurisdiction, fix the terms of office, and prescribe reasonable and relevant
qualifications and rules of eligibility of appointees, always provided “that the quali-
fications do not so limit selection and so trench upon executive choice as to be in
effect legislative designation.” Id. at 128–29. For reiteration of Congress’s general
powers, see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 134–35 (1976); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 673–77 (1988). See also United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 51 (1851).
506 See data in E. Corwin, supra at 363–65. Congress has repeatedly designated
individuals, sometimes by name, more frequently by reference to a particular office,

for the performance of specified acts or for posts of a nongovernmental character;
e.g., to paint a picture (Johnathan Trumbull), to lay out a town, to act as Regents of
Smithsonian Institution, to be managers of Howard Institute, to select a site for a
post office or a prison, to restore the manuscript of the Declaration of Independence,
to erect a monument at Yorktown, to erect a statue of Hamilton, and so on and so
forth. Note, Power of Appointment to Public Office under the Federal Constitution,
42 HARV. L. REV. 426, 430–31 (1929). In his message of April 13, 1822, President Mon-
roe stated that, “as a general principle, . . . Congress have [sic] no right under the
Constitution to impose any restraint by law on the power granted to the President
so as to prevent his making a free selection of proper persons for these [newly cre-
ated] offices from the whole body of his fellow-citizens.” 2 J. Richardson supra at
698, 701. The statement is ambiguous, but its apparent intention is to claim for the
President unrestricted power in determining who are proper persons to fill newly
created offices. See the distinction drawn in Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52,
128–29 (1926), quoted supra. And note that in Public Citizen v. U.S. Department of
Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 482–89 (1989) (concurring), Justice Kennedy suggested the
President has sole and unconfined discretion in appointing).
507 The Sentencing Commission, upheld in Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361 (1989), numbered among its members three federal judges; the President was
to select them “after considering a list of six judges recommended to the President
by the Judicial Conference of the United States.” Id. at 397 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 991(a)).
The Comptroller General is nominated by the President from a list of three individu-
als recommended by the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the President
pro tempore of the Senate. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 727 (1986) (citing 31
U.S.C. § 703(a)(2)). In Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the
Abatement of Airport Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 268–69 (1991), the Court carefully distin-
guished these examples from the particular situation before it that it condemned,
but see id. at 288 (Justice White dissenting), and in any event it never actually passed
on the list devices in Mistretta and Synar. The fault in Airports Authority was not
the validity of lists generally, the Court condemning the device there as giving Con-
gress control of the process, in violation of Buckley v. Valeo.
tee exercising significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United

States be appointed in the manner prescribed by the Appointments
Clause.508 The Court did hold, however, that the Commission so ap-
pointed and confirmed could be delegated the powers Congress it-
self could exercise, that is, those investigative and informative func-
tions that congressional committees carry out were properly vested
in this body.
Congress is authorized by the Appointments Clause to vest the
appointment of “inferior Officers,” at its discretion, “in the Presi-
dent alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”
The principal questions arising under this portion of the clause are
“Who are ‘inferior officers,’ ” and “what are the ‘Departments’ ” whose
heads may be given appointing power? 509 “[A]ny appointee exercis-
ing significant authority pursuant to the laws of the United States
is an ‘Officer of the United States,’ and must, therefore, be ap-
pointed in the manner prescribed by § 2, cl. 2, of [Article II].” 510
“The Constitution for purposes of appointment very clearly divides
all its officers into two classes. The primary class requires a nomi-
nation by the President and confirmation by the Senate. But fore-
seeing that when offices became numerous, and sudden removals
necessary, this mode might be inconvenient, it was provided that,
in regard to officers inferior to those specially mentioned, Congress
might by law vest their appointment in the President alone, in the
courts of law, or in the heads of departments. That all persons who
can be said to hold an office under the government about to be es-
tablished under the Constitution were intended to be included within
one or the other of these modes of appointment there can be but
little doubt.” 511
508 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109–143 (1976). The Court took pains to ob-
serve that the clause was violated not only by the appointing process but by the
confirming process, inclusion of the House of Representatives, as well. Id. at 137.
See also Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citizens for the Abatement of
Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252 (1991).
509 Concurrently, of course, although it may seem odd, the question of what is a
“Court[] of Law” for purposes of the Appointments Clause is unsettled. See Freytag
v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991) (Court divides 5-to-4 whether an Article I court
is a court of law under the clause).
510 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.868, 881 (1991) (quoting Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 126 (1976)).

511 United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509–510 (1879) (quoted in Buckley
v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 125 (1976)). The constitutional definition of an “inferior” officer
is wondrously imprecise. See Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 880–882 (1991);
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670–73 (1988). See also United States v. Eaton,
169 U.S. 331 (1898). There is another category, of course, employees, but these are
lesser functionaries subordinate to officers of the United States. Ordinarily, the term
“employee” denotes one who stands in a contractual relationship to her employer,
but here it signifies all subordinate officials of the Federal Government receiving
their appointments at the hands of officials who are not specifically recognized by
In Edmond v. United States,512 the Court reviewed its pronounce-

ments regarding the definition of “inferior officer” and, disregard-
ing some implications of its prior decisions, seemingly settled, unani-
mously, on a pragmatic characterization. Thus, the importance of
the responsibilities assigned an officer, the fact that duties were lim-
ited, that jurisdiction was narrow, and that tenure was limited, are
only factors but are not definitive.513 “Generally speaking, the term
‘inferior officer’ connotes a relationship with some higher ranking
officer or officers below the President: Whether one is an ‘inferior’
officer depends on whether he has a superior. It is not enough that
other officers may be identified who formally maintain a higher rank,
or possess responsibilities of a greater magnitude. If that were the
intention, the Constitution might have used the phrase ‘lesser offi-
cer.’ Rather, in the context of a Clause designed to preserve politi-
cal accountability relative to important Government assignments,
we think it evident that ‘inferior officers’ are officers whose work is
directed and supervised at some level by others who were ap-
pointed by Presidential nomination with the advice and consent of
the Senate.” 514
Thus, officers who are not “inferior Officers” are principal offi-
cers who must be appointed by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate in order to make sure that all the business
of the Executive will be conducted under the supervision of officers
appointed by the President with Senate approval.515 Further, the
Framers intended to limit the “diffusion” of the appointing power
the Constitution as capable of being vested by Congress with the appointing power.
Auffmordt v. Hedden, 137 U.S. 310, 327 (1890). See Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United
States, 282 U.S. 344, 352–53 (1931); Burnap v. United States, 252 U.S. 512, 516–17
(1920); Germaine, 99 U.S. at 511–12.
512 520 U.S. 651 (1997).
513 520 U.S. at 661–62.
514 520 U.S. at 662–63. The case concerned whether the Secretary of Transpor-
tation, a presidential appointee with the advice and consent of the Senate, could
appoint judges of the Coast Guard Court of Military Appeals; necessarily, the judges
had to be “inferior” officers. In related cases, the Court held that designation or ap-
pointment of military judges, who are “officers of the United States,” does not vio-
late the Appointments Clause. The judges are selected by the Judge Advocate Gen-
eral of their respective branch of the Armed Forces. These military judges, however,
were already commissioned officers who had been appointed by the President with
the advice and consent of the Senate, so that their designation simply and permissi-
bly was an assignment to them of additional duties that did not need a second for-
mal appointment. Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163 (1994). However, the appoint-
ment of civilian judges to the Coast Guard Court of Military Review by the same
method was impermissible; they had either to be appointed by an officer who could
exercise appointment-clause authority or by the President, and their actions were
not salvageable under the de facto officer doctrine. Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S.
177 (1995).
515 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 919 (1991) (Justice Scalia concur-
ring).
with respect to inferior officers in order to promote accountability.

“The Framers understood . . . that by limiting the appointment power,
they could ensure that those who wielded it were accountable to
political force and the will of the people. . . . The Appointments Clause
prevents Congress from distributing power too widely by limiting
the actors in whom Congress may vest the power to appoint. The
Clause reflects our Framers’ conclusion that widely distributed ap-
pointment power subverts democratic government. Given the inexo-
rable presence of the administrative state, a holding that every or-
gan in the executive Branch is a department would multiply the
number of actors eligible to appoint.” 516
Yet, even agreed on the principle, the Freytag Court split 5-to-4
on the reason for the permissibility of the Chief Judge of the Tax
Court to appoint special trial judges. The entire Court agreed that
the Tax Court had to be either a “department” or a “court of law”
in order for the authority to be exercised by the Chief Judge, and
it unanimously agreed that the statutory provision was constitu-
tional. But there agreement ended. The majority was of the opin-
ion that the Tax Court could not be a department, but it was un-
clear what those Justices thought a department comprehended.
Seemingly, it started from the premise that departments were those
parts of the executive establishment called departments and headed
by a cabinet officer.517 Yet, the Court continued immediately to say:
“Confining the term ‘Heads of Departments’ in the Appointments
Clause to executive divisions like the Cabinet-level departments con-
strains the distribution of the appointment power just as the [IRS]
Commissioner’s interpretation, in contrast, would diffuse it. The
Cabinet-level departments are limited in number and easily identi-
fied. The heads are subject to the exercise of political oversight and
share the President’s accountability to the people.” 518 The use of
the word “like” in this passage suggests that it is not just Cabinet-
headed departments that are departments but also entities that are
similar to them in some way, and its reservation of the validity of
investing appointing power in the heads of some unnamed entities,
as well as its observation that the term “Heads of Departments”
does not embrace “inferior commissioners and bureau officers” all
contribute to an amorphous conception of the term.519 In the end,
the Court sustained the challenged provision by holding that the
516 Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 884–85 (1991).
517 501 U.S. at 886 (citing Germaine and Burnap, the Opinion Clause (Article
II, § 2), and the 25th Amendment, which, in its § 4, referred to “executive depart-
ments” in a manner that reached only cabinet-level entities). But compare id. at 915–22
(Justice Scalia concurring).
518 501 U.S. at 886 (emphasis added).
519 501 U.S. at 886–88. Compare id. at 915–19 (Justice Scalia concurring).
Tax Court as an Article I court was a “Court of Law” within the

meaning of the Appointments Clause.520 The other four Justices con-
cluded that the Tax Court, as an independent establishment in the
executive branch, was a “department” for purposes of the Appoint-
ments Clause. In their view, in the context of text and practice, the
term meant, not Cabinet-level departments, but “all independent
executive establishments,” so that “ ‘Heads of Departments’ in-
cludes the heads of all agencies immediately below the President
in the organizational structure of the Executive Branch.” 521
The Freytag decision must be considered a tentative rather than
a settled construction.522
As noted, the Appointments Clause also authorizes Congress to
vest the power in “Courts of Law.” Must the power to appoint when
lodged in courts be limited to those officers acting in the judicial
branch, as the Court first suggested? 523 No, the Court said subse-
quently. In Ex parte Siebold,524 the Court sustained Congress’s de-
cision to vest in courts the appointment of federal election supervi-
sors, charged with preventing fraud and rights violations in
congressional elections in the South, and disavowed any thought
that interbranch appointments could not be authorized under the
clause. A special judicial division was authorized to appoint indepen-
dent counsels to investigate and, if necessary, prosecute charges of
corruption in the executive, and the Court, in near unanimity, sus-
tained the law, denying that interbranch appointments, in and of
themselves, and leaving aside more precise separation-of-powers claims,
were improper under the clause.525
Congressional Regulation of Conduct in Office.—Congress
has very broad powers in regulating the conduct in office of officers
and employees of the United States, and this authority extends to
regulation of political activities. By an act passed in 1876, it prohib-
ited “all executive officers or employees of the United States not ap-
pointed by the President, with the advice and consent of the Sen-
520 501 U.S. at 888–92. This holding was vigorously controverted by the other
four Justices. Id. at 901–14 (Justice Scalia concurring).

521 501 U.S. at 918, 919 (Justice Scalia concurring).
522 As the text suggested, Freytag seemed to be a tentative decision, and Edmond
v. United States, 520 U.S. 651 (1997), a unanimous decision written by Justice Scalia,
whose concurring opinion in Freytag challenged the Court’s analysis, may easily be
read as retreating considerably from it.
523 In re Hennen, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 230 (1839). The suggestion was that inferior
officers are intended to be subordinate to those in whom their appointment is vested.

Id. at 257–58; United States v. Germaine, 99 U.S. 508, 509 (1879).
524 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
525 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 673–77 (1988). See also Young v. United
States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787 (1987) (appointment of private attorneys to act
as prosecutors for judicial contempt judgments); Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S.
868, 888–92 (1991) (appointment of special judges by Chief Judge of Tax Court).
ate, . . . from requesting, giving to, or receiving from, any other officer
or employee of the Government, any money or property or other
thing of value for political purposes.” 526 The validity of this mea-
sure having been sustained,527 the substance of it, with some elabo-
rations, was incorporated in the Civil Service Act of 1883.528 The
Lloyd-La Follette Act in 1912 began the process of protecting civil
servants from unwarranted or abusive removal by codifying “just
cause” standards previously embodied in presidential orders, defin-
ing “just causes” as those that would promote the “efficiency of the
service.” 529 Substantial changes in the civil service system were in-
stituted by the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which abolished
the Civil Service Commission and delegated its responsibilities, its
management, and its administrative duties to the Office of Person-
nel Management and its review and protective functions to the Merit
Systems Protection Board.530
Until 1993, § 9(a) of the Hatch Act 531 prohibited any person in
the executive branch, or any executive branch department or agency,
except the President and the Vice President and certain “policy de-
termining” officers, to “take an active part in political management
or political campaigns,” although employees had been permitted to
“express their opinions on all political subjects and candidates.” In
United Public Workers v. Mitchell,532 these provisions were upheld
as “reasonable” against objections based on the First, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Amendments. The Hatch Act Reform Amendments of 1993,
526 19 Stat. 143, 169 (1876).

527 Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371 (1882). Chief Justice Waite’s opinion exten-
sively reviews early congressional legislation regulative of conduct in office. Id. at
372–73.
528 22 Stat. 403 (the Pendleton Act). On this law and subsequent enactments
that created the civil service as a professional cadre of bureaucrats insulated from
politics, see Developments in the Law: Public Employment, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1611,
1619–1676 (1984).
529 Act of Aug. 24, 1912, § 6, 37 Stat. 539, 555, codified as amended at 5 U.S.C.
§ 7513. The protection was circumscribed by the limited enforcement mechanisms

under the Civil Service Commission, which were gradually strengthened. See Devel-
opments, supra, 97 HARV. L. REV., 1630–31.
530 92 Stat. 1111 (codified in scattered sections of titles 5, 10, 15, 28, 31, 38, 39,
and 42 U.S.C.). For the long development, see, Developments, supra, 97 HARV. L. REV.
at 1632–1650.
531 53 Stat. 1147, 1148 (1939), then 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a). The 1940 law, § 12(a), 54
Stat. 767–768, applied the same broad ban to employees of federally funded state
and local agencies, but this provision was amended in 1974 to restrict state and
local government employees in only one respect: running for public office in partisan
elections. Act of Oct. 15, 1974, Pub. L. 93–443, § 401(a), 88 Stat. 1290, 5 U.S.C. § 1502.
532 330 U.S. 75 (1947). See also Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter
Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), in which the constitutional attack was renewed, in
large part based on the Court’s expanding free speech jurisprudence, but the act
was again sustained. A “little Hatch Act” of a state, applying to its employees, was
sustained in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
however, substantially liberalized the rules for political activities dur-

ing off-duty hours for most executive branch employees, subject to
certain limitations on off-duty hours activities and express prohibi-
tions against on-the-job partisan political activities.533
The Loyalty Issue.—By section 9A of the Hatch Act of 1939, a
federal employee was disqualified from accepting or holding any po-
sition in the Federal Government or the District of Columbia if he
belonged to an organization that he knew advocated the overthrow
of our constitutional form of government.534 The 79th Congress fol-
lowed up this provision with a rider to its appropriation acts forbid-
ding the use of any appropriated funds to pay the salary of any
person who advocated, or belonged to an organization which advo-
cated the overthrow of the government by force, or of any person
who engaged in a strike or who belonged to an organization which
asserted the right to strike against the government.535 These provi-
sos ultimately wound up in permanent law requiring all govern-
ment employees to take oaths disclaiming either disloyalty or strikes
as a device for dealing with the government as an employer.536 Along
with the loyalty-security programs initiated by President Tru-
man 537 and carried forward by President Eisenhower,538 these mea-
sures reflected the Cold War era and the fear of subversion and es-
pionage following the disclosures of several such instances here and
abroad.539
533 Pub. L. 103–94, § 2(a), 107 Stat. 1001 (1993), 5 U.S.C. §§ 7321–7326. Execu-
tive branch employees (except those appointed by the President, by and with the
advice and consent of the Senate) who are listed in § 7323(b)(2), which generally
include those employed by agencies involved in law enforcement or national secu-
rity, remain under restrictions similar to the those in the old Hatch Act on taking
an active part in political management or political campaigns.
534 53 Stat. 1147, 5 U.S.C. § 7311.
535 See Report of the Special Committee on The Federal Loyalty-Security Pro-
gram, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (New York: 1956), 60.
536 5 U.S.C. § 3333. The loyalty disclaimer oath was declared unconstitutional
in Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969), and the did not appeal.
The strike disclaimer oath was voided in National Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Blount,
305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969); after noting probable jurisdiction, 397 U.S. 1062
(1970), the Court dismissed the appeal on the government’s motion. 400 U.S. 801
(1970). The actual prohibition on strikes, however, has been sustained. United Fed’n
of Postal Clerks v. Blount, 325 F. Supp. 879 (D.D.C. 1971), aff ’d per curiam, 404
U.S. 802 (1971).
537 E.O. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947).
538 E.O. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953).
539 See generally, Report of the Special Committee on The Federal Loyalty-
Security Program, The Association of the Bar of the City of New York (New York:
1956).
Financial Disclosure and Limitations.—The Ethics in Gov-

ernment Act of 1978 540 requires high-level federal personnel to make
detailed, annual disclosures of their personal financial affairs.541 The
aims of the legislation are to enhance public confidence in govern-
ment, to demonstrate the high level of integrity of government em-
ployees, to deter and detect conflicts of interest, to discourage indi-
viduals with questionable sources of income from entering government,
and to facilitate public appraisal of government employees’ perfor-
mance in light of their personal financial interests.542 Despite asser-
tions that employee privacy interests are needlessly invaded by the
breadth of disclosures, to date judicial challenges have been unsuc-
cessful, with one exception.543 The one provision that was invali-
dated was section 501(b),544 which prohibits Members of Congress
and officers or employees of the government, regardless of salary
level, from receiving any “honorarium,” which the statute defines
as “a payment of money or any thing of value for an appearance,
speech or article (including a series of appearances, speeches, or ar-
ticles if the subject matter is directly related to the individual’s of-
ficial duties or the payment is made because of the individual’s sta-
tus with the Government) . . . .” 545 The Supreme Court held that
this prohibition, even interpreted in accordance with the standards
applicable to speech restrictions on government employees, was over-
broad, as “[t]he speculative benefits the honoraria ban may provide
the government are not sufficient to justify this crudely crafted bur-
den of respondents’ freedom to engage in expressive activities.” 546
Legislation Increasing Duties of an Officer.—Finally, “Con-
gress may increase the powers and duties of an existing office with-
out thereby rendering it necessary that the incumbent should be
540 Pub. L. 95–521, tits. I–III, 92 Stat. 1824–1861. The Act was originally codi-
fied in three different titles, 2, 5, and 28, corresponding to legislative, executive, and
judicial branch personnel, but by Pub. L. 101–194, title II, 103 Stat. 1725 (1989),
one comprehensive title, as amended, applying to all covered federal personnel was
enacted. 5 U.S.C. App. §§ 101–111.
541 See Developments, supra, 97 HARV. L. REV. at 1660–1669.
542 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 1661 (citing S. REP. 170, 95th Cong., 2d sess. (1978), 21–
22).
543 97 Harv. L. Rev. at 1664–69. The Ethics in Government Act also expanded
restrictions on post-employment by imposing bans on employment, varying from a

brief period to an out-and-out lifetime ban in certain cases. Id. at 1669–76. The 1989
revision enlarged and expanded on these provisions. 103 Stat. 1716–1724, amend-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 207.
544 92 Stat. 1864 (1978), as amended, 103 Stat. 1760 (1989), as amended, 5 U.S.C.
App. § 501(b).
545 5 U.S.C. App. § 505(3).
546 United States v. NTEU, 513 U.S. 454, 477 (1995).
again nominated and appointed.” 547 Such legislation does not con-
stitute an attempt by Congress to seize the appointing power.
Stages of Appointment Process
Nomination.—The Constitution appears to distinguish three
stages in appointments by the President with the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. The first is the “nomination” of the candidate
by the President alone; the second is the assent of the Senate to
the candidate’s “appointment;” and the third is the final appoint-
ment and commissioning of the appointee, by the President.548
Senate Approval.—The fact that the power of nomination be-
longs to the President alone prevents the Senate from attaching con-
ditions to its approval of an appointment, such as it may do to its
approval of a treaty. In the words of an early opinion of the Attor-
ney General: “The Senate cannot originate an appointment. Its con-
stitutional action is confined to the simple affirmation or rejection
of the President’s nominations, and such nominations fail when-
ever it rejects them. The Senate may suggest conditions and limita-
tions to the President, but it cannot vary those submitted by him,
for no appointment can be made except on his nomination, agreed
to without qualifications or alteration.” 549 This view is borne out
by early opinion,550 as well as by the record of practice under the
Constitution.
When Senate Consent Is Complete.—Early in January, 1931,
the Senate requested President Hoover to return its resolution no-
tifying him that it advised and consented to certain nominations to
the Federal Power Commission. In support of its action the Senate
invoked a long-standing rule permitting a motion to reconsider a
resolution confirming a nomination within “the next two days of ac-
tual executive session of the Senate” and the recall of the notifica-
tion to the President of the confirmation. The nominees involved
having meantime taken the oath of office and entered upon the dis-
charge of their duties, the President responded with a refusal, say-
ing: “I cannot admit the power in the Senate to encroach upon the
executive functions by removal of a duly appointed executive officer
547 Shoemaker v. United States, 147 U.S. 282, 301 (1893). The Court noted that
the additional duties at issue were “germane to the offices.” Id.

548 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 155–56 (1803) (Chief Justice Mar-
shall). Marshall’s statement that the appointment “is the act of the President,” con-
flicts with the more generally held and sensible view that when an appointment is
made with its consent, the Senate shares the appointing power. 3 J. STORY, COMMEN-
TARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1525 (1833); In re Hennen, 38 U.S.
(13 Pet.) 230, 259 (1839).
549 3 Ops. Atty. Gen. 188 (1837).
550 3 J. Story, supra at 1525–26; 5 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161–62 (P. Ford
ed., 1904); 9 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 111–13 (G. Hunt ed., 1910).
under the guise of reconsideration of his nomination.” The Senate

thereupon voted to reconsider the nominations in question, again
approving two of the nominees, but rejecting the third, against whom
it instructed the District Attorney of the District of Columbia to in-
stitute quo warranto proceedings in the Supreme Court of the Dis-
trict. In United States v. Smith,551 the Supreme Court overruled the
proceedings on the ground that the Senate had never before at-
tempted to apply its rule in the case of an appointee who had al-
ready been installed in office on the faith of the Senate’s initial con-
sent and notification to the President. In 1939, President Roosevelt
rejected a similar demand by the Senate, an action that went un-
challenged.552
The Removal Power

The Myers Case.—Save for the provision which it makes for a
power of impeachment of “civil officers of the United States,” the
Constitution contains no reference to a power to remove from of-
fice, and until its decision in Myers v. United States,553 on October
25, 1926, the Supreme Court had contrived to sidestep every occa-
sion for a decisive pronouncement regarding the removal power, its
extent, and location. The point immediately at issue in the Myers
case was the effectiveness of an order of the Postmaster General,
acting by direction of the President, to remove from office a first-
class postmaster, in the face of the following provision of an act of
Congress passed in 1876: “Postmasters of the first, second, and third
classes shall be appointed and may be removed by the President
by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, and shall hold
their offices for four years unless sooner removed or suspended ac-
cording to law.” 554
A divided Court, speaking through Chief Justice Taft, held the
order of removal valid and the statutory provision just quoted void.
The Chief Justice’s relied mainly on the so-called “decision of 1789,”
which referred to Congress’s that year inserting in the act establish-
ing the Department of State a proviso that was meant to imply rec-
ognition that the Secretary would be removable by the President
at will. The proviso was especially urged by Madison, who invoked
in support of it the opening words of Article II and the President’s
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.”
Succeeding passages of the Chief Justice’s opinion erected on
this basis a highly selective account of doctrine and practice regard-
551 286 U.S. 6 (1932).
552 E. Corwin, supra at 77.
553 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
554 19 Stat. 78, 80.
ing the removal power down to the Civil War, which was held to
yield the following results: “Article II grants to the President the
executive power of the Government, i.e., the general administra-
tive control of those executing the laws, including the power of ap-
pointment and removal of executive officers—a conclusion con-
firmed by his obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully
executed; that Article II excludes the exercise of legislative power
by Congress to provide for appointments and removals, except only
as granted therein to Congress in the matter of inferior offices; that
Congress is only given power to provide for appointments and re-
movals of inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition that
it does vest, their appointment in other authority than the Presi-
dent with the Senate’s consent; that the provisions of the second
section of Article II, which blend action by the legislative branch,
or by part of it, in the work of the executive, are limitations to be
strictly construed and not to be extended by implication; that the
President’s power of removal is further established as an incident
to his specifically enumerated function of appointment by and with
the advice of the Senate, but that such incident does not by impli-
cation extend to removals the Senate’s power of checking appoint-
ments; and finally that to hold otherwise would make it impossible
for the President, in case of political or other differences with the
Senate or Congress, to take care that the laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted.” 555
The holding in Myers boils down to the proposition that the Con-
stitution endows the President with an illimitable power to remove
all officers in whose appointment he has participated, with the ex-
ception of federal judges. The motivation of the holding was not, it
may be assumed, any ambition on the Chief Justice’s part to set
history aright—or awry.556 Rather, it was the concern that he voiced
555 272 U.S. at 163–64.

556 The reticence of the Constitution respecting removal left room for four possi-
bilities: first, the one suggested by the common law doctrine of “estate in office,”
from which the conclusion followed that the impeachment power was the only power
of removal intended by the Constitution; second, that the power of removal was an
incident of the power of appointment and hence belonged, at any rate in the ab-
sence of legal or other provision to the contrary, to the appointing authority; third,
that Congress could, by virtue of its power “to make all laws which shall be neces-
sary and proper,” etc., determine the location of the removal power; fourth, that the
President by virtue of his “executive power” and his duty “to take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,” possesses the power of removal over all officers of the
United States except judges. In the course of the debate on the act to establish a
Department of Foreign Affairs (later changed to Department of State) all of these
views were put forward, with the final result that a clause was incorporated in the
measure that implied, as pointed out above, that the head of the department would
be removable by the President at his discretion. Contemporaneously, and indeed un-
til after the Civil War, this action by Congress, in other words “the decision of 1789,”
in the following passage in his opinion: “There is nothing in the

Constitution which permits a distinction between the removal of the
head of a department or a bureau, when he discharges a political
duty of the President or exercises his discretion, and the removal
of executive officers engaged in the discharge of their other normal
duties. The imperative reasons requiring an unrestricted power to
remove the most important of his subordinates in their most impor-
tant duties must, therefore, control the interpretation of the Consti-
tution as to all appointed by him.” 557
Thus spoke the former President Taft, and the result of his
prepossession was a rule that, as was immediately pointed out,
exposed the so-called “independent agencies”—the Interstate
Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
like—to presidential domination. Unfortunately, the Chief Jus-
tice, while professing to follow Madison’s leadership, had omitted
to weigh properly the very important observation that the latter
had made at the time regarding the office of Comptroller of the
Treasury. “The Committee,” said Madison, “has gone through the
bill without making any provision respecting the tenure by
which the comptroller is to hold his office. I think it is a point
worthy of consideration, and shall, therefore, submit a few obser-
vations upon it. It will be necessary to consider the nature of
this office, to enable us to come to a right decision on the sub-
ject; in analyzing its properties, we shall easily discover they are
of a judiciary quality as well as the executive; perhaps the latter
obtains in the greatest degree. The principal duty seems to be
deciding upon the lawfulness and justice of the claims and ac-
counts subsisting between the United States and particular citi-
zens: this partakes strongly of the judicial character, and there
may be strong reasons why an officer of this kind should not
hold his office at the pleasure of the executive branch of the gov-
was interpreted as establishing “a practical construction of the Constitution” with

respect to executive officers appointed without stated terms. However, in the domi-
nant opinion of those best authorized to speak on the subject, the “correct interpre-
tation” of the Constitution was that the power of removal was always an incident of
the power of appointment, and that therefore in the case of officers appointed by
the President with the advice and consent of the Senate the removal power was
exercisable by the President only with the advice and consent of the Senate. For an
extensive review of the issue at the time of Myers, see Corwin, The President’s Re-
moval Power Under the Constitution, in 4 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1467
(1938).
557 272 U.S. at 134. Note the parallelism of the arguments from separation-of-
powers and the President’s ability to enforce the laws in the decision rendered on
Congress’s effort to obtain a role in the actual appointment of executive officers in
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109–43 (1976), and in many of the subsequent separation-
of-powers decisions.
ernment.” 558 In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States, 559 the

Court seized upon “the nature of the office” concept and applied
it as a corrective to the overbroad Myers holding.
The Humphrey Case.—The material element of Humphrey’s
Executor was that Humphrey, a member of the Federal Trade Com-
mission, was on October 7, 1933, notified by President Roosevelt
that he was “removed” from office, the reason being their divergent
views of public policy. In due course, Humphrey sued for salary. Dis-
tinguishing the Myers case, Justice Sutherland, speaking for the unani-
mous Court, said: “A postmaster is an executive officer restricted to
the performance of executive functions. He is charged with no duty
at all related to either the legislative or judicial power. The actual
decision in the Myers case finds support in the theory that such an
office is merely one of the units in the executive department and,
hence, inherently subject to the exclusive and illimitable power of
removal by the Chief Executive, whose subordinate and aide he is. . . .
It goes no farther; much less does it include an officer who occupies
no place in the executive department and who exercises no part of
the executive power vested by the Constitution in the President.”
“The Federal Trade Commission is an administrative body cre-
ated by Congress to carry into effect legislative policies embodied
in the statute. . . . Such a body cannot in any proper sense be char-
acterized as an arm or eye of the executive. Its duties are per-
formed without executive leave and, in the contemplation of the stat-
ute, must be free from executive control. . . . We think it plain under
the Constitution that illimitable power of removal is not possessed
by the President in respect of officers of the character of those just
named, [the Interstate Commerce Commission, the Federal Trade
Commission, the Court of Claims]. The authority of Congress, in
creating quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial agencies, to require them
to act in discharge of their duties independently of executive con-
trol cannot well be doubted; and that authority includes, as an ap-
propriate incident, power to fix the period during which they shall
continue in office, and to forbid their removal except for cause in
the meantime. For it is quite evident that one who holds his office
558 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 611–612 (1789).

559 295 U.S. 602 (1935). The case is also styled Rathbun, Executor v. United States,
Humphrey having, like Myers before him, died in the course of his suit for salary.
Proponents of strong presidential powers long argued that Humphrey’s Executor, like
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935), both cases
argued and decided contemporaneously, reflected the anti-New Deal views of a con-
servative Court and wrongfully departed from Myers. See Scalia, Historical Anoma-
lies in Administrative Law, 1985 YEARBOOK OF THE SUPREME COURT HISTORICAL SOCIETY
103, 106–10. Now-Justice Scalia continues to adhere to his views and to Myers. Mor-
rison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697, 707–11, 723–27 (1988) (dissenting).
only during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to

maintain an attitude of independence against the latter’s will. . . .”
“The result of what we now have said is this: Whether the power
of the President to remove an officer shall prevail over the author-
ity of Congress to condition the power by fixing a definite term and
precluding a removal except for cause, will depend upon the char-
acter of the office; the Myers decision, affirming the power of the
President alone to make the removal, is confined to purely execu-
tive officers; and as to officers of the kind here under consideration,
we hold that no removal can be made during the prescribed term
for which the officer is appointed, except for one or more of the causes
named in the applicable statute.” 560
The Wiener Case.—Curtailment of the President’s power of re-
moval, so liberally delineated in the Myers decision, was not to end
with the Humphrey case. Unresolved by the latter was the ques-
tion whether the President, absent a provision expressly delimiting
his authority in the statute creating an agency endowed with quasi-
judicial functions, remained competent to remove members serving
thereon. To this query the Court supplied a negative answer in Wie-
ner v. United States.561 Emphasizing that the duties of the War Claims
Commission were wholly adjudicatory and its determinations, final
and exempt from review by any other official or judicial body, the
Court unanimously concluded that inasmuch as the President was
unable to supervise its activities, he lacked the power, indepen-
dently of statutory authorization, to remove a commissioner whose
term expired with the life of that agency.
The Watergate Controversy.—A dispute arose regarding the
discharge of the Special Prosecutor appointed to investigate and pros-
ecute violations of law in the Watergate matter. Congress vested in
the Attorney General the power to conduct the criminal litigation
of the Federal Government,562 and it further authorized him to ap-
point subordinate officers to assist him in the discharge of his du-
ties.563 Pursuant to presidential direction, the Attorney General des-
ignated a Watergate Special Prosecutor with broad power to investigate
560 295 U.S. at 627–29, 631–32. Justice Sutherland’s statement, quoted above,
that a Federal Trade Commissioner “occupies no place in the executive department”

was not necessary to the decision of the case, was altogether out of line with the
same Justice’s reasoning in Springer v. Philippine Islands, 277 U.S. 189, 201–202
(1928), and seems later to have caused the author of it much perplexity. See R. CUSH-
MAN, THE INDEPENDENT REGULATORY COMMISSION 447–48 (1941). As Professor Cushman
adds: “Every officer and agency created by Congress to carry laws into effect is an
arm of Congress. . . . The term may be a synonym; it is not an argument.” Id. at
451.
561 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
562 28 U.S.C. § 516.
563 28 U.S.C. §§ 509, 510, 515, 533.
and prosecute offenses arising out of the Watergate break-in, the

1972 presidential election, and allegations involving the President,
members of the White House staff, or presidential appointees. He
was to remain in office until a date mutually agreed upon between
the Attorney General and himself, and the regulations provided that
the Special Prosecutor “will not be removed from his duties except
for extraordinary improprieties on his part.” 564 On October 20, fol-
lowing the resignations of the Attorney General and the Deputy At-
torney General, the Solicitor General as Acting Attorney General
formally dismissed the Special Prosecutor 565 and three days later
rescinded the regulation establishing the office.566 In subsequent liti-
gation, a federal district court held that the firing by the Acting
Attorney General had violated the regulations, which were in force
at the time and which had to be followed until they were re-
scinded.567 The Supreme Court in United States v. Nixon 568 seemed
to confirm this analysis by the district court in upholding the au-
thority of the new Special Prosecutor to take the President to court
to obtain evidence in the President’s possession. Left unsettled were
two questions, the power of the President himself to go over the
heads of his subordinates and to fire the Special Prosecutor him-
self, whatever the regulations said, and the power of Congress to
enact legislation establishing an Office of Special Prosecutor free
from direction and control of the President.569 When Congress acted
to create an office, first called the Special Prosecutor and then the
Independent Counsel, resolution of the question became necessary.
The Removal Power Rationalized.—The tension that had long
been noticed between Myers and Humphrey’s Executor, at least in
terms of the language used in those cases but also to some extent
in their holdings, appears to have been ameliorated by two deci-
sions, which purport to reconcile the cases but, more important, pur-
564 38 Fed. Reg. 14688 (1973). The Special Prosecutor’s status and duties were
the subject of negotiation between the Administration and the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee. Nomination of Elliot L. Richardson to be Attorney General: Hearings Before
the Senate Judiciary Committee, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. (1973), 143 passim.
565 The formal documents effectuating the result are set out in 9 Weekly Comp.
Pres. Doc. 1271–1272 (1973).

566 38 Fed. Reg. 29466 (1973). The Office was shortly recreated and a new Spe-
cial Prosecutor appointed. 38 Fed. Reg. 30739, as amended by 38 Fed. Reg. 32805.
See Nomination of William B. Saxbe to be Attorney General: Hearings Before the Sen-
ate Judiciary Committee, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. (1973).
567 Nader v. Bork, 366 F. Supp. 104 (D.D.C. 1973).
568 418 U.S. 683, 692–97 (1974).
569 The first question remained unstated, but the second issue was extensively
debated in Special Prosecutor: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 93d
Congress, 1st Sess. (1973); Special Prosecutor and Watergate Grand Jury Legisla-
tion: Hearings Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, 93d
Congress, 1st Sess. (1973).
port to establish, in the latter case, a mode of analysis for resolv-

ing separation-of-powers disputes respecting the removal of persons
appointed under the Appointments Clause.570 Myers actually struck
down only a law involving the Senate in the removal of postmas-
ters, but the broad-ranging opinion had long stood for the proposi-
tion that inherent in the President’s obligation to see to the faith-
ful execution of the laws was his right to remove any executive officer
as a means of discipline. Humphrey’s Executor had qualified this
proposition by upholding “for cause” removal restrictions for mem-
bers of independent regulatory agencies, at least in part on the as-
sertion that they exercised “quasi-” legislative and adjudicative func-
tions as well as some form of executive function. Maintaining the
holding of the latter case was essential to retaining the indepen-
dent agencies, but the emphasis upon the execution of the laws as
a core executive function in recent cases had cast considerable doubt
on the continuing validity of Humphrey’s Executor.
In Bowsher v. Synar,571 the Court held that when Congress it-
self retains the power to remove an official it could not vest him
with the exercise of executive power. Invalidated in Synar were pro-
visions of the 1985 “Gramm-Rudman-Hollings” Deficit Control Act 572
vesting in the Comptroller General authority to prepare a detailed
report on projected federal revenue and expenditures and to deter-
mine mandatory across-the-board cuts in federal expenditures nec-
essary to reduce the projected budget deficit by statutory targets.
By a 1921 statute, the Comptroller General was removable by joint
congressional resolution for, inter alia, “inefficiency,” “neglect of duty,”
or “malfeasance.” “These terms are very broad,” the Court noted,
and “could sustain removal of a Comptroller General for any num-
ber of actual or perceived transgressions of the legislative will.” Con-
sequently, the Court determined, “the removal powers over the Comp-
troller General’s office dictate that he will be subservient to
Congress.” 573
570 Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
This is not to say that the language and analytical approach of Synar are not in
conflict with that of Morrison; it is to say that the results are consistent and the
analytical basis of the latter case does resolve the ambiguity present in some of the
reservations in Synar.
571 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
572 The Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, Pub. L.
99–177, 99 Stat. 1038.

573 478 U.S. at 729, 730. “By placing the responsibility for execution of the . . .
Act in the hands of an officer who is subject to removal only by itself, Congress in
effect has retained control over the execution of the Act and has intruded into the
executive function.” Id. at 734. Because the Act contained contingency procedures
for implementing the budget reductions in the event that the primary mechanism
was invalidated, the Court rejected the suggestion that it should invalidate the 1921
Relying expressly upon Myers, the Court concluded that “Con-

gress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer
charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment.” 574
But Humphrey’s Executor was also cited with approval, and to the
contention that invalidation of this law would cast doubt on the sta-
tus of the independent agencies the Court rejoined that the statu-
tory measure of the independence of those agencies was the assur-
ance of “for cause” removal by the President rather than congressional
involvement as in the instance of the Comptroller General.575 This
reconciliation of Myers and Humphrey’s Executor was made clear
and express in Morrison v. Olson.576
That case sustained the independent counsel statute.577 Under
that law, the independent counsel, appointed by a special court upon
application by the Attorney General, may be removed by the Attor-
ney General “only for good cause, physical disability, mental inca-
pacity, or any other condition that substantially impairs the perfor-
mance of such independent counsel’s duties.” Because the counsel
was clearly exercising “purely” executive duties, in the sense that
term was used in Myers, it was urged that Myers governed and re-
quired the invalidation of the statute. The Court, however, said that
Myers stood only for the proposition that Congress could not in-
volve itself in the removal of executive officers. Its broad dicta that
the President must be able to remove at will officers performing
“purely” executive functions had not survived Humphrey’s Execu-
tor.
It was true, the Court admitted, that, in the latter case, it had
distinguished between “purely” executive officers and officers who
exercise “quasi-legislative” and “quasi-judicial” powers in marking
the line between officials who may be presidentially removed at will
and officials who can be protected through some form of good cause
removal limits. “[B]ut our present considered view is that the deter-
mination of whether the Constitution allows Congress to impose a
‘good cause’-type restriction on the President’s power to remove an
official cannot be made to turn on whether or not that official is
classified as ‘purely executive.’ The analysis contained in our re-
moval cases is designed not to define rigid categories of those offi-
cials who may or may not be removed at will by the President, but
removal provision rather than the Deficit Act’s conferral of executive power in the
Comptroller General. To do so would frustrate congressional intention and signifi-
cantly alter the Comptroller General’s office. Id. at 734–36.
574 478 U.S. at 726.
575 478 U.S. at 725 n.4.
576 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
577 Pub. L. 95–521, title VI, 92 Stat. 1867, as amended by Pub. L. 97–409, 96
Stat. 2039, and Pub. L. 100–191, 101 Stat. 1293, 28 U.S.C. §§ 49, 591 et seq.
to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s ex-
ercise of the ‘executive power’ and his constitutionally appointed duty
to ‘take care that the laws be faithfully executed’ under Article II.
Myers was undoubtedly correct in its holding, and in its broader
suggestion that there are some ‘purely executive’ officials who must
be removable by the President at will if he is to be able to accom-
plish his constitutional role. . . . At the other end of the spectrum
from Myers, the characterization of the agencies in Humphrey’s Ex-
ecutor and Wiener as ‘quasi-legislative’ or ‘quasi-judicial’ in large part
reflected our judgment that it was not essential to the President’s
proper execution of his Article II powers that these agencies be headed
up by individuals who were removable at will. We do not mean to
suggest that an analysis of the functions served by the officials at
issue is irrelevant. But the real question is whether the removal
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s
ability to perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the
officials in question must be analyzed in that light.” 578
The Court discerned no compelling reason to find the good cause
limit to interfere with the President’s performance of his duties. The
independent counsel did exercise executive, law-enforcement func-
tions, but the jurisdiction and tenure of each counsel were limited
in scope and policymaking, or significant administrative authority
was lacking. On the other hand, the removal authority did afford
the President through the Attorney General power to ensure the
“faithful execution” of the laws by assuring that the counsel is com-
petently performing the statutory duties of the office.
It is now thus reaffirmed that Congress may not involve itself
in the removal of officials performing executive functions. It is also
established that, in creating offices in the executive branch and in
creating independent agencies, Congress has considerable discre-
tion in statutorily limiting the power to remove of the President or
another appointing authority. It is evident on the face of the opin-
ion that the discretion is not unbounded, that there are offices which
may be essential to the President’s performance of his constitution-
ally assigned powers and duties, so that limits on removal would
be impermissible. There are no bright lines marking off one office
from the other, but decision requires close analysis.579
578 487 U.S. at 689–91.
579 But notice the analysis followed by three Justices in Public Citizen v. Depart-
ment of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 467, 482–89 (1989) (concurring), and consider the
possible meaning of the recurrence to formalist reasoning in Granfinanciera, S.A. v.
Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, (1989). See also Justice Scalia’s use of the Take Care Clause
in pronouncing limits on Congress’s constitutional power to confer citizen standing
in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 505 U.S. 555, 576–78 (1992), although it is not
clear that he had a majority of the Court with him.
As a result of these cases, the long-running controversy with

respect to the legitimacy of the independent agencies appears to have
been settled,580 although it appears likely that the controversies with
respect to congressional-presidential assertions of power in execu-
tive agency matters are only beginning.
Inferior Officers.—In the case of inferior officers, Congress may
“limit and restrict the power of removal as it deems best for the
public interest,” 581 and when Congress has vested the power to ap-
point these officers in heads of departments, it is ordinarily the de-
partment head, rather than the President, who enjoys the power of
removal. However, in the case of Free Enterprise Fund v. Public Com-
pany Accounting Oversight Bd.,582 the Court considered whether an
inferior officer can be twice insulated from the President’s removal
authority—in other words, can a principal officer whom Congress
has protected from at will removal by the President in turn have
his or her power to remove an inferior officer restricted? 583 The Court
held that such multilevel protection from removal is contrary to the
President’s executive authority. First, even if the President deter-
mines that the inferior officer is neglecting his duties or discharg-
ing them improperly, the President does not have the power to re-
move that officer. Then, if the President seeks to have the principal
officer remove the inferior officer, the principal officer may not agree
with the President’s determination, and the President generally can-
not remove the principal officer simply because of this disagree-
ment.584
In the absence of specific legislative provision to the contrary,
the President may at his discretion remove an inferior officer whose
term is limited by statute,585 or one appointed with the consent of
580 Indeed, the Court explicitly analogized the civil enforcement powers of the
independent agencies to the prosecutorial powers wielded by the independent coun-

sel. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 692 n.31 (1988).
581 United States v. Perkins, 116 U.S. 483 (1886), cited with approval in Myers
v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161–163, 164 (1926), and Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654, 689 n.27 (1988).
582 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–861, slip op. (2010).
583 The case involved the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, a pri-
vate non-profit entity with a five-member board, that has significant authority over
accounting firms that participate in auditing public companies. The board members
are appointed to staggered 5-year terms by the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion, and can only be removed for “good cause shown,” which requires a finding of
either a violation of securities laws or board rules, willful abuse of power, or failure
to enforce compliance with the rules governing registered public accounting firms.
15 U.S.C. § 7217(d)(3). The members of the Commission, in turn, can only be re-
moved by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.
584 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–861, slip op. at 14–15 (2010).
585 Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897).
the Senate.586 He may remove an officer of the army or navy at

any time by nominating to the Senate the officer’s successor, pro-
vided the Senate approves the nomination.587 In 1940, the Presi-
dent was sustained in removing Dr. E. A. Morgan from the chair-
manship of TVA for refusal to produce evidence in substantiation
of charges which he had leveled at his fellow directors.588 Although
no such cause of removal by the President was stated in the act
creating TVA, the President’s action, being reasonably required to
promote the smooth functioning of TVA, was held to be within his
duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” So inter-
preted, the removal did not violate the principle of administrative
independence.
The Presidential Aegis: Demands for Papers

Presidents have more than once had occasion to stand in a pro-
tective relation to their subordinates, assuming their defense in liti-
gation brought against them 589 or pressing litigation in their be-
half,590 refusing a congressional call for papers which might be used,
in their absence from the seat of government, to their disadvan-
tage,591 challenging the constitutional validity of legislation deemed
detrimental to their interests.592 Presidents throughout our history
have attempted to spread their own official immunity to their sub-
ordinates by resisting actions of the courts or of congressional com-
mittees to require subordinates to divulge communications from or
to the President that Presidents choose to regard as confidential.
Only recently, however, has the focus of the controversy shifted from
protection of presidential or executive interests to protection of the
President himself, and the locus of the dispute shifted to the courts.
Following years in which claims of executive privilege were re-
solved in primarily interbranch disputes on the basis of the politi-
cal strengths of the parties, the issue finally became subject to ju-
dicial elaboration. The doctrine of executive privilege was at once
recognized as existing and having a constitutional foundation while
at the same time it was definitely bounded in its assertion by the
principle of judicial review. Because of these cases, because of the
intensified congressional-presidential dispute, and especially be-
586 Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311 (1903).
587 Blake v. United States, 103 U.S. 227 (1881); Quackenbush v. United States,
177 U.S. 20 (1900); Wallace v. United States, 257 U.S. 541 (1922).
588 Morgan v. TVA, 28 F. Supp. 732 (E.D. Tenn. 1939), aff’d, 115 F.2d 990 (6th
Cir. 1940), cert. denied, 312 U.S. 701 (1941).

589 E.g., 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 220 (1853); In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
590 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946).
591 E.g., 2 J. Richardson, supra at 847.
592 United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 313 (1946).
cause of the introduction of the issue into an impeachment proceed-

ing, a somewhat lengthy treatment of the doctrine is called for.
Conceptually, the doctrine of executive privilege may well re-
flect different considerations in different factual situations. Con-
gress may seek information within the possession of the President,
either in effectuation of its investigatory powers to oversee the con-
duct of officials of the Executive Branch or in effectuation of its power
to impeach the President, Vice President, or civil officers of the Gov-
ernment. Private parties may seek information in the possession of
the President either in civil litigation with the Government or in a
criminal proceeding brought by government prosecutors. Generally,
the categories of executive privilege have been the same whether it
is Congress or a private individual seeking the information, but it
is possible that the congressional assertion of need may over-
balance the presidential claim to a greater degree than that of a
private individual. The judicial precedents are so meager that it is
not yet possible so to state, however.
The doctrine of executive privilege defines the authority of the
President to withhold documents or information in his possession
or in the possession of the executive branch from compulsory pro-
cess of the legislative or judicial branch of the government. The Con-
stitution does not expressly confer upon the Executive Branch any
such privilege, but it has been claimed that the privilege derives
from the constitutional provision of separation of powers and from
a necessary and proper concept respecting the carrying out of the
duties of the presidency imposed by the Constitution. Historically,
assertion of the doctrine has been largely confined to the areas of
foreign relations, military affairs, pending investigations, and
intragovernmental discussions.593 During the Nixon Administra-
593 For a good statement of the basis of the doctrine, the areas in which it is
asserted, and historical examples, see Executive Privilege: The Withholding of Infor-
mation by the Executive: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Sepa-
ration of Powers, 92d Congress, 1st Sess. (1971), 420–43, (then-Assistant Attorney
General Rehnquist). Former Attorney General Rogers, in stating the position of the
Eisenhower Administration, identified five categories of executive privilege: (1) mili-
tary and diplomatic secrets and foreign affairs, (2) information made confidential by
statute, (3) information relating to pending litigation, and investigative files and re-
ports, (4) information relating to internal government affairs privileged from disclo-
sure in the public interest, and (5) records incidental to the making of policy, includ-
ing interdepartmental memoranda, advisory opinions, recommendations of subordinates,
and informal working papers. The Power of the President To Withhold Information
from the Congress, Memorandum of the Attorney General, Senate Judiciary Subcom-
mittee on Constitutional Rights, 85th Congress, 2d Sess. (Comm. Print) (1958), re-
printed as Rogers, Constitutional Law: The Papers of the Executive Branch, 44 A.B.A.J.
941 (1958). In the most expansive version of the doctrine, Attorney General Kleindienst
argued that the President could assert the privilege as to any employee of the Fed-
eral Government to keep secret any information at all. Executive Privilege, Secrecy
tion, the litigation involved, of course, the claim of confidentiality

of conversations between the President and his aides.
Private Access to Government Information.—Private par-
ties may seek to obtain information from the government either to
assist in defense to criminal charges brought by the government or
in civil cases to use in either a plaintiff ’s or defendant’s capacity in
suits with the government or between private parties.594 In crimi-
nal cases, a defendant is guaranteed compulsory process to obtain
witnesses by the Sixth Amendment and by the due process clause
is guaranteed access to relevant exculpatory information in the pos-
session of the prosecution.595 Generally speaking, when the prosecu-
tion is confronted with a judicial order to turn over to a defendant
information that it does not wish to make available, the prosecu-
tion has the option of dropping the prosecution and thus avoiding
disclosure.596 But that alternative may not always be available; in
the Watergate prosecution, only by revoking the authority of the
Special Prosecutor and bringing the cases back into the confines of
the Department of Justice could this possibility have been real-
ized.597
In civil cases the government may invoke the state secrets privi-
lege against revealing military or other secrets. In United States v.
Reynolds,598 a tort claim brought against the United States for com-
in Government, Freedom of Information: Hearings Before the Senate Government Op-
erations Subcommittee on Intergovernmental Relations, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. (1973),
I:18 passim. For a strong argument that the doctrine lacks any constitutional or
other legal basis, see R. BERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH (1974).
The book, however, precedes the Court decision in Nixon.
594 There are also, of course, instances of claimed access for other purposes, for
which the Freedom of Information Act, 80 Stat. 383 (1966), 5 U.S.C. § 552, provides
generally for public access to governmental documents. In 522(b), however, nine types
of information are exempted from coverage, several of which relate to the types as
to which executive privilege has been asserted, such as matter classified pursuant
to executive order, interagency or intra-agency memoranda or letters, and law en-
forcement investigatory files. See, e.g., EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973); FTC v. Grolier,
Inc., 462 U.S. 19 (1983); CIA v. Sims, 471 U.S. 159 (1985); John Doe Agency v. John
Doe Corp., 493 U.S. 146 (1989); Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820 (D.C. Cir. 1973),
cert. denied, 415 U.S. 977 (1974).
595 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), and Rule 16, Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. The earliest judicial dispute involving what later became known
as executive privilege arose in United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30 and 187 (C.C.D.
Va. 1807), in which defendant sought certain exculpatory material from President
Jefferson. Dispute continues with regard to the extent of presidential compliance,
but it appears that the President was in substantial compliance with outstanding
orders if not in full compliance.
596 E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1968).
597 Thus, defendant in United States v. Ehrlichman, 376 F. Supp. 29 (D.D.C.
1974), was held entitled to access to material in the custody of the President wherein
the President’s decision to dismiss the prosecution would probably have been unavail-
ing.
598 345 U.S. 1 (1953).
pensation for the deaths of civilians in the crash of an Air Force

plane testing secret electronics equipment, plaintiffs sought discov-
ery of the Air Force’s investigation report on the accident, and the
government resisted on a claim of privilege as to the nondisclosure
of military secrets. The Court accepted the Government’s claim, hold-
ing that courts must determine whether under the circumstances
the claim of privilege was appropriate without going so far as to
force disclosure of the thing the privilege is designed to protect. The
private litigant’s showing of necessity for the information should gov-
ern in each case how far the trial court should probe. Where the
necessity is strong, the court should require a strong showing of
the appropriateness of the privilege claim, but once the court is sat-
isfied of the appropriateness the privilege must prevail no matter
how compelling the need.599
Reynolds dealt with an evidentiary privilege. There are other
circumstances, however, in which cases must be “dismissed on the
pleadings without ever reaching the question of evidence.” 600 In hold-
ing that federal courts should refuse to entertain a breach of con-
tract action seeking enforcement of an agreement to compensate some-
one who performed espionage services during the Civil War, the Court
in Totten v. United States declared that “public policy forbids the
maintenance of any suit in a court of justice, the trial of which would
inevitably lead to the disclosure of matters which the law itself re-
gards as confidential.” 601
599 345 U.S. at 7–8, 9–10, 11. Withholding of information relating to governmen-
tal employees’ clearances, disciplines, or discharges often raises claims of such privi-
lege. E.g., Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988); Department of the Navy v. Egan,
484 U.S. 518 (1988). After the Court approved a governmental secrecy agreement
imposed on CIA employees, Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980), the govern-
ment expanded its secrecy program with respect to classified and “classifiable” infor-
mation. When Congress sought to curb this policy, the Reagan Administration con-
vinced a federal district judge to declare the restrictions void as invasive of the
President’s constitutional power to manage the executive. National Fed’n of Fed. Em-
ployees v. United States, 688 F. Supp. 671 (D.D.C. 1988), vacated and remanded sub
nom. American Foreign Service Ass’n v. Garfinkel, 490 U.S. 153 (1989). For similar
assertions in the context of plaintiffs suing the government for interference with their
civil and political rights during the protests against the Vietnam War, in which the
plaintiffs were generally denied the information in the possession of the govern-
ment under the state-secrets privilege, see Halkin v. Helms, 598 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.
1978); Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51 (D.C. Cir. 1983). For review and analysis,
see Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 875–80 (1984).
600 Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 11, n.26.
601 92 U.S. 105, 107 (1875). See also Tenet v. Doe, 544 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (reiterat-
ing and applying Totten’s “broader holding that lawsuits premised on alleged espio-
nage agreements are altogether forbidden”). The Court in Tenet distinguished Webster
v. Doe on the basis of “an obvious difference . . . between a suit brought by an ac-
knowledged (though covert) employee of the CIA and one filed by an alleged former
spy.” Id. at 10.
Prosecutorial and Grand Jury Access to Presidential Docu-

ments.—Rarely will there be situations when federal prosecutors
or grand juries seek information under the control of the Presi-
dent, since he has ultimate direction of federal prosecuting agen-
cies, but the Watergate Special Prosecutor, being in a unique legal
situation, was held able to take the President to court to enforce
subpoenas for tape recordings of presidential conversations and other
documents relating to the commission of criminal actions.602 While
holding that the subpoenas were valid and should be obeyed, the
Supreme Court recognized the constitutional status of executive privi-
lege, insofar as the assertion of that privilege relates to presiden-
tial conversations and indirectly to other areas as well.
Presidential communications, the Court said, have “a presump-
tive privilege.” “The privilege is fundamental to the operation of gov-
ernment and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under
the Constitution.” The operation of government is furthered by the
protection accorded communications between high government offi-
cials and those who advise and assist them in the performance of
their duties. “A President and those who assist him must be free to
explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making
decisions and to do so in a way many would be unwilling to ex-
press except privately.” The separation of powers basis derives from
the conferral upon each of the branches of the Federal Government
of powers to be exercised by each of them in great measure indepen-
dent of the other branches. The confidentiality of presidential con-
versations flows then from the effectuation of enumerated pow-
ers.603
However, the Court continued, the privilege is not absolute. The
federal courts have the power to construe and delineate claims aris-
ing under express and implied powers. Deference is owed the con-
stitutional decisions of the other branches, but it is the function of
the courts to exercise the judicial power, “to say what the law is.”
The Judicial Branch has the obligation to do justice in criminal pros-
ecutions, which involves the employment of an adversary system of
criminal justice in which all the probative facts, save those clearly
602 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 692–97 (1974).
603 418 U.S. at 707–08. Presumably, the opinion recognizes a similar power in
the federal courts to preserve the confidentiality of judicial deliberations, cf. New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 752 n.3 (1971) (Chief Justice Burger
dissenting), and in each house of Congress to treat many of its papers and docu-
ments as privileged. Cf. Soucie v. David, 448 F.2d 1067, 1080, 1081–1982 (C.A.D.C.
1971) (Judge Wilkey concurring); Military Cold War Escalation and Speech Review
Policies: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 87th Congress,
2d Sess. (1962), 512 (Senator Stennis). See Calley v. Callaway, 519 F.2d 184 (5th
Cir. 1975) (en banc), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 911 (1976); United States v. Ehrlichman,
389 F. Supp. 95 (D.D.C. 1974).
privileged, are to be made available. Thus, although the Presi-

dent’s claim of privilege is entitled to deference, the courts must
balance two sets of interests when the claim depends solely on a
broad, undifferentiated claim of confidentiality.
“In this case we must weigh the importance of the general privi-
lege of confidentiality of presidential communications in perfor-
mance of his responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege
on the fair administration of criminal justice. The interest in pre-
serving confidentiality is weighty indeed and entitled to great re-
spect. However we cannot conclude that advisers will be moved to
temper the candor of their remarks by the infrequent occasions of
disclosure because of the possibility that such conversations will be
called for in the context of a criminal prosecution.”
“On the other hand, the allowance of the privilege to withhold
evidence that is demonstrably relevant in a criminal trial would cut
deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair
the basic function of the courts. A President’s acknowledged need
for confidentiality in the communications of his office is general in
nature, whereas the constitutional need for production of relevant
evidence in a criminal proceeding is specific and central to the fair
adjudication of a particular criminal case in the administration of
justice. . . .”
“We conclude that when the ground for asserting privilege as
to subpoenaed materials sought for use in a criminal trial is based
only on the generalized interest in confidentiality, it cannot prevail
over the fundamental demands of due process of law in the fair ad-
ministration of criminal justice.” 604
Obviously, United States v. Nixon left much unresolved. It did
recognize the constitutional status of executive privilege as a doc-
trine. It did affirm the power of the courts to resolve disputes over
claims of the privilege. But it left unsettled just how much power
the courts have to review claims of privilege to protect what are
claimed to be military, diplomatic, or sensitive national security se-
crets. It did not indicate what the status of the claim of confidenti-
ality of conversations is when it is raised in civil cases, nor did it
touch upon denial of information to Congress, or public disclosure
of information.
604 418 U.S. 683, 711–13. Essentially the same decision had been arrived at in
the context of subpoenas of tapes and documentary evidence for use before a grand
jury in Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The Court’s decision in Nixon v. Administrator of General Ser-

vices 605 did not elucidate any of these questions to any great de-
gree. In upholding the Presidential Recordings and Materials Pres-
ervation Act, which directed the government to take custody of former
President Nixon’s records so that they could be screened, cata-
logued, and processed by professional archivists in GSA, the Court
viewed the assertion of privilege as directed only to the facial valid-
ity of the requirement of screening by executive branch profession-
als, and not at all related to the possible public disclosure of some
of the records. The decision did recognize “adequate justifications”
for enactment of the law, and termed them cumulatively “compa-
rable” to those held to justify in camera inspection in United States
v. Nixon.606 Congress’s purposes cited by the Court included the pres-
ervation of the materials for legitimate historical and governmen-
tal purposes, the rationalization of preservation and access to pub-
lic needs as well as each President’s wishes, the preservation of the
materials as a source for facilitating a full airing of the events lead-
ing to the former President’s resignation for public and congressio-
nal understanding, and preservation for the light shed upon issues
in civil or criminal litigation. Although interestingly instructive, the
decision may be so attuned to the narrow factual circumstances that
led to the Act’s passage as to leave the case of little precedential
value.
Public disclosure was at issue in 2004 when the Court weighed
a claim of executive privilege asserted as a bar to discovery orders
for information disclosing the identities of individuals who served
on an energy task force chaired by the Vice President.607 Although
the case was remanded on narrow technical grounds, the Court dis-
tinguished United States v. Nixon,608 and, in instructing the ap-
605 433 U.S. 425, 446–55 (1977). See id. at 504, 545 (Chief Justice Burger and
Justice Rehnquist dissenting). The decision does resolve one outstanding question:
assertion of the privilege is not limited to incumbent Presidents. Id. at 447–49. Sub-
sequently, a court held that former-President Nixon had had such a property expec-
tancy in his papers that he was entitled to compensation for their seizure under the
Act. Nixon v. United States, 978 F.2d 1269 (D.C. Cir. 1992).
606 433 U.S. at 452.
607 Cheney v. United States District Court, 542 U.S. 367 (2004).
608 Although the information sought in Nixon was important to “the constitu-
tional need for production of relevant evidence in a criminal proceeding,” the suit
against the Vice President was civil, and withholding the information “does not ham-
per another branch’s ability to perform its ‘essential functions.’ ” 542 U.S. at 383,
384.
peals court on how to proceed, emphasized the importance of confi-

dentiality for advice tendered the President.609
Congressional Access to Executive Branch Information.—
Presidents and Congresses have engaged in protracted disputes over
provision of information from the former to the latter, but the basic
thing to know is that most congressional requests for information
are complied with. The disputes, however, have been colorful and
varied.610 The basic premise of the concept of executive privilege,
as it is applied to resist requests for information from Congress as
from private parties with or without the assistance of the courts, is
found in the doctrine of separation of powers, the prerogative of each
coequal branch to operate within its own sphere independent of con-
trol or direction of the other branches. In this context, the Presi-
dent then asserts that phase of the claim of privilege relevant to
the moment, such as confidentiality of communications, protection
of diplomatic and military secrets, or preservation of investigative
records. Counterposed against this assertion of presidential privi-
lege is the power of Congress to obtain information upon which to
legislate, to oversee the carrying out of its legislation, to check and
root out corruption and wrongdoing in the Executive Branch, involv-
ing both the legislating and appropriating function of Congress, and
in the final analysis to impeach the President, the Vice President,
and all civil officers of the Federal Government.
Until quite recently, all disputes between the President and Con-
gress with regard to requests for information were settled in the
political arena, with the result that few if any lasting precedents
were created and only disputed claims were left to future argu-
ment. The Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Ac-
tivities, however, elected to seek a declaratory judgment in the courts
with respect to the President’s obligations to obey its subpoenas.
The Committee lost its case, but the courts based their rulings upon
prudential considerations rather than upon questions of basic power,
inasmuch as by the time the case was considered impeachment pro-
ceedings were pending in the House of Representatives.611 The House
Judiciary Committee subpoenas were similarly rejected by the Presi-
dent, but instead of going to the courts for enforcement, the Com-
609 The Court recognized “the paramount necessity of protecting the Executive
Branch from vexatious litigation that might distract it from the energetic perfor-
mance of its constitutional duties.” 542 U.S. at 382. But cf. Clinton v. Jones, 520
U.S. 681, 702 (1997).
610 See the extensive discussion in Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation
in a Government of Laws: The Case of Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress,

71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987).
611 Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 370
F. Supp. 521 (D.D.C.), aff’d, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
Sec. 2—Powers, Duties of the President Cl. 3—Vacancies During Recess of Senate
mittee adopted as one of its Articles of Impeachment the refusal of

the President to honor its subpoenas.612 Congress has considered
bills by which Congress would authorize congressional committees
to go to court to enforce their subpoenas; the bills did not purport
to define executive privilege, although some indicate a standard by
which the federal court is to determine whether the material sought
is lawfully being withheld from Congress.613 The controversy gives
little indication at the present time of abating, and it may be as-
sumed that whenever the Executive and Congress are controlled by
different political parties there will be persistent conflicts. One may
similarly assume that the alteration of this situation would only
reduce but not remove the disagreements.
Clause 3. The President shall have Power to fill up all Va-

cancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by
granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next
Session.
RECESS APPOINTMENTS
The Recess Appointments Clause was adopted by the Constitu-
tional Convention without dissent and without debate regarding the
intent and scope of its terms. In Federalist No. 67, Alexander Ham-
ilton refers to the recess appointment power as “nothing more than
a supplement . . . for the purpose of establishing an auxiliary method
of appointment, in cases to which the general method was inad-
equate.” It is generally accepted that the clause was designed to
enable the President to ensure the unfettered operation of the gov-
ernment during periods when the Senate was not in session and
therefore unable to perform its advice and consent function. In ad-
dition to fostering administrative continuity, Presidents have exer-
cised authority under the Recess Appointments Clause for political
purposes, appointing officials who might have difficulty securing Sen-
ate confirmation.
612 President Nixon’s position was set out in a June 9, 1974, letter to the Chair-
man of the House Judiciary Committee. 10 Wkly. Comp. Pres. Docs. 592 (1974). The
impeachment article and supporting material are set out in H. REP. NO. 93–1305,
93d Cong., 2d Sess. (1974).
613 For consideration of various proposals by which Congress might proceed, see
Hamilton & Grabow, A Legislative Proposal for Resolving Executive Privilege Dis-
putes Precipitated by Congressional Subpoenas, 21 HARV. J. LEGIS. 145 (1984); Brand
& Connelly, Constitutional Confrontations: Preserving a Prompt and Orderly Means
by Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch
Officials, 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 71 (1986); Note, The Conflict Between Executive Privi-
lege and Congressional Oversight: The Gorsuch Controversy, 1983 DUKE L. J. 1333.
Two fundamental textual issues arise in interpreting the Re-

cess Appointments Clause. The first is what constitutes a vacancy
that “may happen” during the recess of the Senate. If the words
“may happen” are interpreted to refer only to vacancies that occur
during a recess, then the President would lack authority to make a
recess appointment to a vacancy that already existed before the re-
cess began. The second fundamental textual issue is the meaning
of the phrase “the Recess of the Senate.” As the Senate may recess
both between and during its annual sessions, the time periods dur-
ing which the President may make a recess is textually unclear.
The Supreme Court did not address either of these issues for well
over two centuries,614 leaving the validity of numerous recess ap-
pointments subject to lower court opinions and historical practice.
If the words “may happen” are construed broadly to encompass
all vacancies that exist during a recess irrespective of whether the
position became vacant prior to or during a recess, then the Presi-
dent would be empowered to make a recess appointment to any va-
cant position. Although this issue was a source of controversy in
the late 18th and early 19th centuries, a long line of Attorney Gen-
eral opinions and judicial decisions adopted the broader interpreta-
tion of the clause. Attorney General William Wirt, serving under
President Monroe, concluded that the phrase encompassed all va-
cancies that happen to exist during a recess, declaring that “[t]his
seems to me the only construction of the Constitution which is com-
patible with its spirit, reason, and purpose.” 615 This interpretation
was first adopted by a federal court in 1880 in In re Farrow,616 and
was followed by subsequent judicial opinions.617
614 See NLRB v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 9 (2014).
615 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 631, 633–34 (1823). Subsequent Attorney General opinions
that concurred include 2:525 (1832), 3:673 (1841), 4:523 (1846), 10:356 (1862), 11:179
(1865), 12:32 (1866), 12:455 (1868), 14:563 (1875), 15:207 (1877), 16:523 (1880), 18:28
(1884), 19:261 (1889), 26:234 (1907), 30:314 (1914), and 33:20 (1921). In 4 Ops. Atty.
Gen. 361, 363 (1845), the general doctrine was held not to apply to a yet unfilled
office that was created during the previous session of Congress, but this distinction
was rejected in the following Attorney General opinions: 12:455 (1868), 18:28 (1884),
and 19:261 (1889). For the early practice with reference to recess appointments, see
2 G. HAYNES, THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES 772–78 (1938).
616 3 Fed. 112 (C.C.N.D. Ga 1880).
617 Subsequent cases concurring in this interpretation include United States v.
Allocco, 305 F.2d 704, 712 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963) (a con-
trary interpretation “would create executive paralysis and do violence to the orderly
functioning of our complex government”); United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008,
1012 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986) (a contrary inter-
pretation would “lead to the absurd result that all offices vacant on the day the Sen-
ate recesses would have to remain vacant at least until the Senate reconvenes”);
Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1226–27 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S.
942 (2005) (“interpreting the phrase to prohibit the President from filling a vacancy
that comes into being on the last day of a Session but to empower the President to
Although the Supreme Court ultimately adopted the broader in-

terpretation, it did so with a pronounced lack of unanimity. In NLRB
v. Noel Canning,618 four Justices, in an opinion by Justice Scalia
concurring in judgment, would have held the plain meaning of the
phrase “[v]acancies that may happen during the Recess of the Sen-
ate” to mean vacancies that “arose” during such recess.619 Justice
Scalia’s narrow interpretation was based in part on the subordi-
nate role of the recess appointments to the principal method of ap-
pointment—advise and consent—the latter being a vital check on
the Executive Branch.620 The majority, however, finding ambiguity
in the phrase,621 held that the broader definition was most consis-
tent with the clause’s purpose 622 and historical practice.623
Similar ambiguity surrounds the phrase “the Recess of the Sen-
ate.” In an opinion issued by Attorney General Knox in 1901, he
concluded that the phrase applied only to adjournments between
sessions of Congress (commonly referred to as “intersession” re-
cesses).624 In reaching this determination, Knox placed significant
weight on the use of the definite article “the” in the Recess Appoint-
ments Clause, which suggests reference to the one “intersession”
recess. He further concluded that, if recess appointments were al-
lowed during periods other than an intersession recess, nothing would
prevent an appointment from being made “during any adjourn-
ment, as from Thursday or Friday until the following Monday.” This
fill a vacancy that arises immediately thereafter (on the first day of a recess) contra-
dicts what we understand to be the purpose of the Recess Appointments Clause: to
keep important offices filled and the government functioning”).
618 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. (2014).
619 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 27 (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment). Justice Scalia quoted the majority for this proposition, which had noted that
“the most natural meaning of ‘happens’ as applied to a ‘vacancy’ . . . is that the
vacancy ‘happens’ when it initially occurs.” Id. quoting slip op. at 22.
620 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 28–29 (Scalia, J., concurring in judg-
ment). The majority agreed with the assessment of the recess appointment power
as subordinate to advise and consent. 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 6. Jus-
tice Scalia went on to observe that the President, by filling all pre-existing vacan-
cies during a recess and then reappointing these same officials upon the termina-
tion of their commission at the end of the following Senate session, could effectively
evade the advice and consent requirements. Id. at 29.
621 The Court noted that even Thomas Jefferson thought the phrase in question
could point to both vacancies that “may happen to be” during a recess as well as
those that “may happen to fall” during a recess. 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op.
at 22.
622 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 26 (“[W]e believe the narrower inter-
pretation risks undermining constitutionally conferred powers [in that] . . . [i]t would
prevent the President from making any recess appointment that arose before a re-
cess, no matter who the official, no matter how dire the need, no matter how
uncontroversial the appointment, and no matter how late in the session the office
fell vacant”).
623 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 26.
624 23 Op. Atty. Gen. 599 (1901).
position was abandoned in 1921 in an opinion issued by Attorney

General Daugherty that declared that an appointment made dur-
ing a 29-day recess was constitutional.
Daugherty’s opinion focused on the practical aspects of the re-
cess appointment dynamic, stating that, “[i]f the President’s power
of appointment is to be defeated because the Senate takes an ad-
journment to a specified date, the painful and inevitable result will
be measurably to prevent the exercise of governmental func-
tions.” 625 Further emphasizing this functional approach, Daugherty’s
opinion rejected the notion that this broader interpretation would
authorize intrasession appointments during brief adjournments, de-
claring that “an adjournment for 5 or even 10 days can [not] be
said to constitute the recess intended by the Constitution.” 626 The
opinion concluded by emphasizing that, although “[e]very presump-
tion is to be indulged in favor of the validity of whatever action
[the President] may take . . . , there is a point, necessarily hard of
definition, where palpable abuse of discretion might subject his ap-
pointment to review.” 627 Subsequent Attorney General and Depart-
ment of Justice Office of Legal Counsel opinions continued to sup-
port the constitutionality of intrasession recess appointments, although
it remained clear that a Senate “recess” did not include holidays,
or very brief temporary adjournments.628
The Supreme Court, again in Noel Canning, confirmed this func-
tional approach to the recess appointment power. The Court found
nothing in dictionary definitions or common usage contemporane-
ous to the Constitution that would suggest that an intrasession re-
cess was not a recess. The Court noted that, while the phrase “the
Recess” might suggest limiting recess appointments to the single
break between session of Congress, the word “the” can also be used
“generically or universally,” 629 and that there were examples of “the
Recess” being used in the broader manner at the time of the found-
625 33 Op. Att’y Gen. 20, 23 (1921). The reference to “an adjournment to a speci-
fied date” refers to the practice of the Senate (and the House) to announce an interses-
sion recess by approving a resolution stating that it will adjourn “sine die,” i.e., with-
out specifying a date to return, in which case Congress will reconvene when the
next formal session is scheduled to begin. Currently, that date is set under the Twen-
tieth Amendment U.S. Const. Amend. XX, § 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at least
once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January,
unless they shall by law appoint a different day”).
626 33 Op. Att’y Gen. at 25.
627 33 Op. Att’y Gen. at 25.
628 23 Op. Att’y Gen. 599 (1901); 22 Op. Att’y Gen. 82 (1898). A “recess,” in ad-
dition, may be merely “constructive,” as when a regular session succeeds immedi-

ately upon a special session. It was this kind of situation that gave rise to the once
famous Crum incident. See 3 W. Willoughby, supra, at 1508–1509.
629 For instance, the Constitution directs the Senate to choose a President pro
tempore “in the Absence of the Vice- President.” Art. I, §3, cl. 5.
ing.630 The Court found that as, as with the issue of vacancies, a
broader interpretation of the term “the Recess” was consistent with
both the purpose of the clause 631 and historical practice.632 Histori-
cal practice also informed the Court’s holding that a recess of more
than 3 days 633 but less than 10 days is presumptively too short to
fall within the Clause.634
The preceding discussion may, however, remain of predomi-
nantly academic interest with the advent of “pro forma” sessions,
where the Senate convenes briefly every few days, not to transact
business, but in order to prevent recess appointments. Deferring to
the authority of Congress to “determine the Rules of its Proceed-
ings,” 635 the Court in Noel Canning considered whether the Sen-
ate, in a “pro forma” session, had the capacity to act legislatively
and thus could give “advice and consent” to an appointment. Be-
cause the Journal of the Senate (and the Congressional Record) de-
clared the Senate in session during those periods, and because the
Senate could, under its rules, have conducted business under unani-
mous consent (a quorum being presumed), the Court found that the
Senate was indeed in session. The Court declined to consider whether
Senators were in fact engaged in Senate business on the floor, whether
the Senate could meaningfully act upon Presidential messages, or
whether attendance was, for practical purposes, required.636
It should be noted that, by an act of Congress, if the vacancy
existed when the Senate was in session, the ad interim appointee,
630 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 9–11.
631 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 11. “The Clause gives the President
authority to make appointments during ‘the recess of the Senate’ so that the Presi-
dent can ensure the continued functioning of the Federal Government when the Sen-
ate is away. The Senate is equally away during both an inter-session and an intra-
session recess, and its capacity to participate in the appointments process has nothing
to do with the words it uses to signal its departure.” Id.
632 The Court note that Presidents have made “thousands” of intrasession re-
cess appointments, and that Presidential legal advisors had been nearly unanimous
in determining that the clause allowed these appointments. 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–
1281, slip op. at 11.
633 The Court held that, considering the Adjournments Clause, Art. I, §5, cl. 4
(“Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the
other, adjourn for more than three days.”), a 3-day recess was not a significant inter-
ruption of legislative business, and thus was too short a period for the President to
make a recess appointment. 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 20.
634 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 21. The Court left open the possibility
that some very unusual circumstance, such as a national catastrophe that renders
the Senate unavailable, could require the exercise of the recess-appointment power
during a shorter break.
635 U.S. Const. Art. I, § 5, cl. 2. The Court noted that it generally takes the Sen-
ate’s own report of its actions at face value. See, e.g., United States v. Ballin, 144
U.S. 1, 9 (1892). (Court will not question indication in the Journal of the Senate
that a quorum was present when a bill was passed).
636 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1281, slip op. at 38.
subject to certain exceptions, may receive no salary until he has

been confirmed by the Senate.637 This and other provisions govern-
ing recess appointments are designed to protect the Senate’s advice
and consent function by confining the recess appointment power of
the President. By targeting the compensation of appointees as op-
posed to the President’s recess appointment power itself, these limi-
tations act as indirect controls on recess appointments, and their
constitutionality has not been adjudicated. A federal district court
noted that “if any and all restrictions on the President’s recess ap-
pointment power, however limited, are prohibited by the Constitu-
tion, 5 U.S.C. § 5503 . . . might . . . be invalid.” 638 Additional con-
stitutional concerns might arise from the application of these provisions
to judicial recess appointees.639
Judicial Appointments
Federal judges clearly fall within the terms of the Recess Ap-
pointments Clause. But, unlike with other offices, a problem exists.
Article III judges are appointed “during good behavior,” subject only
to removal through impeachment. A judge, however, who is given a
recess appointment may be “removed” by the Senate’s failure to ad-
vise and consent to his appointment; moreover, on the bench, prior
to Senate confirmation, he or she may be subject to influence not
felt by other judges. Nonetheless, a constitutional attack upon the
status of a federal district judge, given a recess appointment and
then withdrawn as a nominee, was rejected by a federal court.640
637 5 U.S.C. § 5503. The provision has been on the books in some form since 12
Stat. 646 (1863).

638 Staebler v. Carter, 464 F. Supp. 585, 596 n.24 (D.D.C. 1979).
639 See Evans v. Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220, 1224 n.6 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. de-
nied, 544 U.S. 942 (2005) (“To our knowledge, Congress has never attempted to di-
minish the pay of a recess-appointed judge while he was in office. Whether such an
attempt would be constitutional is itself an open question.”).
640 United States v. Woodley, 751 F.2d 1008, 1012 (9th Cir. 1985) (en banc), cert.
denied, 475 U.S. 1048 (1986). The opinions in the court of appeals provide a wealth
of data on the historical practice of giving recess appointments to judges, including
the developments in the Eisenhower Administration, when three Justices, Warren,
Brennan, and Stewart, were so appointed and later confirmed after participation on
the Court. The Senate in 1960 adopted a “sense of the Senate” resolution suggest-
ing that the practice was not a good idea. 106 CONG. REC. 18130–18145 (1960). Other
cases holding that the President’s power under the Recess Appointments Clause ex-
tends to filling judicial vacancies in Article III courts include United States v. Al-
locco, 305 F.2d 704 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 964 (1963), and Evans v.
Stephens, 387 F.3d 1220 (11th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 942 (2005). In the
latter case, however, Justice Stevens, although concurring in the denial of the peti-
tion of certiorari, wrote that “it would be a mistake to assume that our disposition
of this petition constitutes a decision on the merits of whether the President has
the constitutional authority to fill future Article III vacancies, such as vacancies on
this Court, with appointments made absent consent of the Senate during short intrases-
sion ‘recesses.’ ” 544 U.S. at 943.
Sec. 3—Legislative, Diplomatic, and Law Enforcement Duties of the President
Ad Interim Designations
To be distinguished from the power to make recess appoint-
ments is the power of the President to make temporary or ad in-
terim designations of officials to perform the duties of other absent
officials. Usually such a situation is provided for in advance by a
statute that designates the inferior officer who is to act in place of
his immediate superior. But, in the absence of such a provision, both
theory and practice concede the President the power to make the
designation.641
SECTION 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress

Information on the State of the Union, and recommend to their
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and
expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both
Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement be-
tween them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may
adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall
receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take
Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commis-
sion all the Officers of the United States.
LEGISLATIVE ROLE OF THE PRESIDENT

The clause directing the President to report to the Congress on
the state of the union imposes a duty rather than confers a power,
and is the formal basis of the President’s legislative leadership. The
President’s legislative role has attained great proportions since 1900.
This development, however, represents the play of political and so-
cial forces rather than any pronounced change in constitutional in-
terpretation. Especially is it the result of the rise of parties and
the accompanying recognition of the President as party leader, of
the appearance of the National Nominating Convention and the Party
Platform, and of the introduction of the Spoils System, an ever pres-
ent help to Presidents in times of troubled relations with Con-
gress.642 It is true that certain pre-Civil War Presidents, mostly of
Whig extraction, professed to entertain nice scruples on the score
641 See the following Ops. Att’y Gen.: 6:358 (1854); 12:32, 41 (1866); 25:258 (1904);
28:95 (1909); 38:298 (1935).

642 N. SMALL, SOME PRESIDENTIAL INTERPRETATIONS OF THE PRESIDENCY (1932); W. BINKLEY,
THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS (2d ed. 1962); E. Corwin, supra, chs. 1, 7.
of “usurping” legislative powers,643 but still earlier ones, Washing-

ton, Jefferson, and Jackson among them, took a very different line,
albeit less boldly and persistently than their later imitators.644 To-
day, there is no subject on which the President may not appropri-
ately communicate to Congress, in as precise terms as he chooses,
his conception of its duty. Conversely, the President is not obliged
by this clause to impart information which, in his judgment, should
in the public interest be withheld.645 The President has frequently
summoned both Houses into “extra” or “special sessions” for legisla-
tive purposes, and the Senate alone for the consideration of nomi-
nations and treaties. His power to adjourn the Houses has never
been exercised.
THE CONDUCT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
The Right of Reception: Scope of the Power

“Ambassadors and other public ministers” embraces not only “all
possible diplomatic agents which any foreign power may accredit
to the United States,” 646 but also, as a practical construction of the
Constitution, all foreign consular agents, who therefore may not ex-
ercise their functions in the United States without an exequatur from
the President.647 The power to “receive” ambassadors, et cetera, in-
cludes, moreover, the right to refuse to receive them, to request their
recall, to dismiss them, and to determine their eligibility under our
laws.648 Furthermore, this power makes the President the sole mouth-
piece of the nation in its dealing with other nations.
The Presidential Monopoly

Wrote Jefferson in 1790: “The transaction of business with for-
eign nations is executive altogether. It belongs, then, to the head of
that department, except as to such portions of it as are specially
submitted to the Senate. Exceptions are to be construed strictly.” 649
So when Citizen Genet, envoy to the United States from the first
French Republic, sought an exequatur for a consul whose commis-
sion was addressed to the Congress of the United States, Jefferson
643 The first Harrison, Polk, Taylor, and Fillmore all fathered sentiments to this
general effect. See 4 J. Richardson, supra at 1860, 1864; 6 id. at 2513–19, 2561–62,
2608, 2615.
644 See sources cited supra.
645 Warren, Presidential Declarations of Independence, 10 B.U.L. REV. 1 (1930);
3 W. Willoughby, supra at 1488–1492.

646 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 186, 209 (1855).
647 5 J. MOORE, INTERNATIONAL LAW DIGEST 15–19 (1906).
648 Id. at 4:473–548; 5:19–32.
649 Opinion on the Question Whether the Senate Has the Right to Negative the
Grade of Persons Appointed by the Executive to Fill Foreign Missions, April 24, 1790,
5 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 161, 162 (P. Ford ed., 1895).
informed him that “as the President was the only channel of com-
munication between the United States and foreign nations, it was
from him alone ‘that foreign nations or their agents are to learn
what is or has been the will of the nation’; that whatever he com-
municated as such, they had a right and were bound to consider
‘as the expression of the nation’; and that no foreign agent could be
‘allowed to question it,’ or ‘to interpose between him and any other
branch of government, under the pretext of either’s transgressing
their functions.’ Mr. Jefferson therefore declined to enter into any
discussion of the question as to whether it belonged to the Presi-
dent under the Constitution to admit or exclude foreign agents. ‘I
inform you of the fact,’ he said, ‘by authority from the President.’
Mr. Jefferson returned the consul’s commission and declared that
the President would issue no exequatur to a consul except upon a
commission correctly addressed.” 650
The Logan Act.—When in 1798 a Philadelphia Quaker named
Logan went to Paris on his own to undertake a negotiation with
the French Government with a view to averting war between France
and the United States, his enterprise stimulated Congress to pass
“An Act to Prevent Usurpation of Executive Functions,” 651 which,
“more honored in the breach than the observance,” still survives on
the statute books.652 The year following, John Marshall, then a Mem-
ber of the House of Representatives, defended President John Adams
for delivering a fugitive from justice to Great Britain under the 27th
article of the Jay Treaty, instead of leaving the business to the courts.
He said: “The President is the sole organ of the nation in its exter-
nal relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations. Of
consequence, the demand of a foreign nation can only be made on
him. He possesses the whole Executive power. He holds and directs
the force of the nation. Of consequence, any act to be performed by
the force of the nation is to be performed through him.” 653 Ninety-
650 4 J. Moore, supra at 680–81.

651 This measure is now contained in 18 U.S.C. § 953.
652 See Memorandum on the History and Scope of the Law Prohibiting Correspon-
dence with a Foreign Government, S. Doc. No. 696, 64th Congress, 2d Sess. (1917).
The author was Mr. Charles Warren, then Assistant Attorney General. Further de-
tails concerning the observance of the “Logan Act” are given in E. Corwin, supra at
183–84, 430–31.
653 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 596, 613–14 (1800). Marshall’s statement is often cited,
e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318, 319 (1936), as
if he were claiming sole or inherent executive power in foreign relations, but Mar-
shall carefully propounded the view that Congress could provide the rules underly-
ing the President’s duty to extradite. When, in 1848, Congress did enact such a stat-
ute, the Court sustained it. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893).
nine years later, a Senate Foreign Relations Committee took occa-

sion to reiterate Marshall’s doctrine with elaboration.654
A Formal or a Formative Power.—In his attack, instigated
by Jefferson, upon Washington’s Proclamation of Neutrality in 1793
at the outbreak of war between France and Great Britain, Madison
advanced the argument that all large questions of foreign policy fell
within the ambit of Congress, by virtue of its power “to declare war”
In support of this proposition he disparaged the presidential func-
tion of reception: “I shall not undertake to examine, what would be
the precise extent and effect of this function in various cases which
fancy may suggest, or which time may produce. It will be more proper
to observe, in general, and every candid reader will second the ob-
servation, that little, if anything, more was intended by the clause,
than to provide for a particular mode of communication, almost grown
into a right among modern nations; by pointing out the depart-
ment of the government, most proper for the ceremony of admit-
ting public ministers, of examining their credentials, and of authen-
ticating their title to the privileges annexed to their character by
the law of nations. This being the apparent design of the constitu-
tion, it would be highly improper to magnify the function into an
important prerogative, even when no rights of other departments
could be affected by it.” 655
The President’s Diplomatic Role.—Hamilton, although he had
expressed substantially the same view in The Federalist regarding
the power of reception,656 adopted a very different conception of it
in defense of Washington’s proclamation. Writing under the pseud-
onym, “Pacificus,” he said: “The right of the executive to receive am-
bassadors and other public ministers, may serve to illustrate the
relative duties of the executive and legislative departments. This
right includes that of judging, in the case of a revolution of govern-
ment in a foreign country, whether the new rulers are competent
organs of the national will, and ought to be recognized, or not; which,
where a treaty antecedently exists between the United States and
such nation, involves the power of continuing or suspending its op-
eration. For until the new government is acknowledged, the trea-
ties between the nations, so far at least as regards public rights,
are of course suspended. This power of determining virtually upon
the operation of national treaties, as a consequence of the power to
receive public ministers, is an important instance of the right of
the executive, to decide upon the obligations of the country with
regard to foreign nations. To apply it to the case of France, if there
654 S. Doc. No. 56, 54th Congress, 2d Sess. (1897).
655 1 LETTERS AND OTHER WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 611 (1865).
656 No. 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 468.
had been a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, between the

United States and that country, the unqualified acknowledgment of
the new government would have put the United States in a condi-
tion to become as an associate in the war with France, and would
have laid the legislature under an obligation, if required, and there
was otherwise no valid excuse, of exercising its power of declaring
war. This serves as an example of the right of the executive, in cer-
tain cases, to determine the condition of the nation, though it may,
in its consequences, affect the exercise of the power of the legisla-
ture to declare war. Nevertheless, the executive cannot thereby con-
trol the exercise of that power. The legislature is still free to per-
form its duties, according to its own sense of them; though the
executive, in the exercise of its constitutional powers, may estab-
lish an antecedent state of things, which ought to weigh in the leg-
islative decision. The division of the executive power in the Consti-
tution, creates a concurrent authority in the cases to which it
relates.” 657
Jefferson’s Real Position.—Nor did Jefferson himself offi-
cially support Madison’s point of view, as the following extract from
his “minutes of a Conversation,” which took place July 10, 1793,
between himself and Citizen Genet, show: “He asked if they [Con-
gress] were not the sovereign. I told him no, they were sovereign
in making laws only, the executive was sovereign in executing them,
and the judiciary in construing them where they related to their
department. ‘But,’ said he, ‘at least, Congress are bound to see that
the treaties are observed.’ I told him no; there were very few cases
indeed arising out of treaties, which they could take notice of; that
the President is to see that treaties are observed. ‘If he decides against
the treaty, to whom is a nation to appeal?’ I told him the Constitu-
tion had made the President the last appeal. He made me a bow,
and said, that indeed he would not make me his compliments on
such a Constitution, expressed the utmost astonishment at it, and
seemed never before to have had such an idea.” 658
The Power of Recognition

In his endeavor in 1793 to minimize the importance of the Presi-
dent’s power of reception, Madison denied that it involved cogni-
zance of the question, whether those exercising the government of
the accrediting state had the right along with the possession. He
said: “This belongs to the nation, and to the nation alone, on whom
the government operates. . . . It is evident, therefore, that if the
657 Letter of Pacificus, No. 1, 7 WORKS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 76, 82–83 (J. Ham-
ilton ed., 1851).
658 4 J. Moore, supra at 680–81.
executive has a right to reject a public minister, it must be founded

on some other consideration than a change in the government, or
the newness of the government; and consequently a right to refuse
to acknowledge a new government cannot be implied by the right
to refuse a public minister. It is not denied that there may be cases
in which a respect to the general principles of liberty, the essential
rights of the people, or the overruling sentiments of humanity, might
require a government, whether new or old, to be treated as an ille-
gitimate despotism. Such are in fact discussed and admitted by the
most approved authorities. But they are great and extraordinary
cases, by no means submitted to so limited an organ of the na-
tional will as the executive of the United States; and certainly not
to be brought by any torture of words, within the right to receive
ambassadors.” 659
Hamilton, with the case of Genet before him, had taken the con-
trary position, which history has ratified. In consequence of his power
to receive and dispatch diplomatic agents, but more especially the
former, the President possesses the power to recognize new states,
communities claiming the status of belligerency, and changes of gov-
ernment in established states; also, by the same token, the power
to decline recognition, and thereby decline diplomatic relations with
such new states or governments. The affirmative precedents down
to 1906 are succinctly summarized by John Bassett Moore in his
famous Digest, as follows: “In the preceding review of the recogni-
tion, respectively, of the new states, new governments, and belliger-
ency, there has been made in each case a precise statement of facts,
showing how and by whom the recognition was accorded. In every
case, as it appears, of a new government and of belligerency, the
question of recognition was determined solely by the Executive. In
the case of the Spanish-American republics, of Texas, of Hayti, and
of Liberia, the President, before recognizing the new state, invoked
the judgment and cooperation of Congress; and in each of these cases
provision was made for the appointment of a minister, which, when
made in due form, constitutes, as has been seen, according to the
rules of international law, a formal recognition. In numerous other
cases, the recognition was given by the Executive solely on his own
responsibility.” 660
The Case of Cuba.—The question of Congress’s right also to
recognize new states was prominently raised in connection with Cu-
ba’s successful struggle for independence. Beset by numerous legis-
lative proposals of a more or less mandatory character, urging rec-
ognition upon the President, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
659 Letters of Helvidius, 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 133 (G. Hunt ed., 1905).
660 1 J. Moore, supra, 243–44. See Restatement, Foreign Relations §§ 204, 205.
in 1897, made an elaborate investigation of the whole subject and

came to the following conclusions as to this power: “The ‘recogni-
tion’ of independence or belligerency of a foreign power, technically
speaking, is distinctly a diplomatic matter. It is properly evidenced
either by sending a public minister to the government thus recog-
nized, or by receiving a public minister therefrom. The latter is the
usual and proper course. Diplomatic relations with a new power are
properly, and customarily inaugurated at the request of that power,
expressed through an envoy sent for the purpose. The reception of
this envoy, as pointed out, is the act of the President alone. The
next step, that of sending a public minister to the nation thus rec-
ognized, is primarily the act of the President. The Senate can take
no part in it at all, until the President has sent in a nomination.
Then it acts in its executive capacity, and, customarily, in ‘execu-
tive session.’ The legislative branch of the government can exercise
no influence over this step except, very indirectly, by withholding
appropriations. . . . Nor can the legislative branch of the govern-
ment hold any communications with foreign nations. The executive
branch is the sole mouthpiece of the nation in communication with
foreign sovereignties.”
“Foreign nations communicate only through their respective ex-
ecutive departments. Resolutions of their legislative departments upon
diplomatic matters have no status in international law. In the de-
partment of international law, therefore, properly speaking, a Con-
gressional recognition of belligerency or independence would be a
nullity. . . . Congress can help the Cuban insurgents by legislation
in many ways, but it cannot help them legitimately by mere decla-
rations, or by attempts to engage in diplomatic negotiations, if our
interpretation of the Constitution is correct. That it is correct . . .
[is] shown by the opinions of jurists and statesmen of the past.” 661
Congress was able ultimately to bundle a clause recognizing the in-
dependence of Cuba, as distinguished from its government, into the
declaration of war of April 11, 1898, against Spain. For the most
part, the sponsors of the clause defended it by the following line of
reasoning. Diplomacy, they said, was now at an end, and the Presi-
dent himself had appealed to Congress to provide a solution for the
Cuban situation. In response, Congress was about to exercise its
constitutional power of declaring war, and it has consequently the
right to state the purpose of the war which it was about to de-
661 S. Doc. No. 56, 54th Congress, 2d Sess. (1897), 20–22.

clare.662 The recognition of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

in 1933 was an exclusively presidential act.
The Power of Nonrecognition.—The potentialities of nonrec-
ognition were conspicuously illustrated by President Woodrow Wil-
son when he refused, early in 1913, to recognize Provisional Presi-
dent Huerta as the de facto government of Mexico, thereby contributing
materially to Huerta’s downfall the year following. At the same time,
Wilson announced a general policy of nonrecognition in the case of
any government founded on acts of violence, and while he observed
this rule with considerable discretion, he consistently refused to rec-
ognize the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and his successors
prior to President Franklin D. Roosevelt did the same. The refusal
of the Hoover administration to recognize the independence of the
Japanese puppet state of Manchukuo early in 1932 was based on
kindred grounds. Similarly, the nonrecognition of the Chinese Com-
munist Government from the Truman Administration to President
Nixon’s de facto recognition through a visit in 1972—not long after
the People’s Republic of China was admitted to the United Nations
and Taiwan excluded—proved to be an important part of American
foreign policy during the Cold War.663
Congressional Implementation of Presidential Policies

No President was ever more jealous of his prerogative in the
realm of foreign relations than Woodrow Wilson. When, however,
strong pressure was brought to bear upon him by Great Britain re-
specting his Mexican Policy, he was constrained to go before Con-
gress and ask for a modification of the Panama Tolls Act of 1911,
which had also aroused British ire. Addressing Congress, he said,
“I ask this of you in support of the foreign policy of the Administra-
tion. I shall not know how to deal with other matters of even greater
delicacy and nearer consequence if you do not grant it to me in un-
grudging measure.” 664
The fact is, of course, that Congress has enormous powers that
are indispensable to any foreign policy. In the long run, Congress
662 Senator Nelson of Minnesota said: “The President has asked us to give him
the right to make war to expel the Spaniards from Cuba. He has asked us to put
that power in his hands; and when we are asked to grant that power—the highest
power given under the Constitution—we have the right, the intrinsic right, vested
in us by the Constitution, to say how and under what conditions and with what
allies that war-making power shall be exercised.” 31 CONG. REC. 3984 (1898).
663 President Carter’s termination of the Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan,
which precipitated a constitutional and political debate, was perhaps an example of

nonrecognition or more appropriately derecognition. On recognition and nonrecogni-
tion policies in the post-World War II era, see Restatement, Foreign Relations, §§ 202,
203.
664 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON 58 (A. Shaw ed., 1924).
is the body that lays and collects taxes for the common defense,
that creates armies and maintains navies, although it does not di-
rect them, that pledges the public credit, that declares war, that
defines offenses against the law of nations, that regulates foreign
commerce; and it has the further power “to make all laws which
shall be necessary and proper”—that is, which it deems to be such—
for carrying into execution not only its own powers but all the pow-
ers “of the government of the United States and of any department
or officer thereof.” Moreover, its laws made “in pursuance” of these
powers are “supreme law of the land,” and the President is bound
constitutionally to “take Care that” they “be faithfully executed.”
In point of fact, congressional legislation has operated to augment
presidential powers in the foreign field much more frequently than
it has to curtail them. The Lend-Lease Act of March 11, 1941 665 is
the classic example, although it only brought to culmination a whole
series of enactments with which Congress had aided and abetted
the administration’s foreign policy in the years between 1934 and
1941.666 Disillusionment with presidential policies in the context of
the Vietnamese conflict led Congress to legislate restrictions, not
only with respect to the discretion of the President to use troops
abroad in the absence of a declaration of war, but also limiting his
economic and political powers through curbs on his authority to de-
clare national emergencies.667 The lesson of history, however, ap-
pears to be that congressional efforts to regain what is deemed to
have been lost to the President are intermittent, whereas the presi-
dential exercise of power in today’s world is unremitting.668
665 55 Stat. 31 (1941).

666 E. Corwin, supra at 184–93, 423–25, 435–36.
667 Legislation includes the War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. 93–148, 87 Stat. 555
(1953), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1548; the National Emergencies Act, Pub. L. 94–412, 90

Stat. 1255 (1976), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1651 (establishing procedures for presidential
declaration and continuation of national emergencies and providing for a bicameral
congressional veto); the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, Pub. L. 95–
223, 91 Stat. 1626 (1977), 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701–1706 (limiting the great economic pow-
ers conferred on the President by the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917, 40 Stat.
415, 50 U.S.C. App. § 5(b), to times of declared war, and providing new and more
limited powers, with procedural restraints, for nonwartime emergencies); see also
the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–583, 90 Stat. 2891, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1602–1611 (removing from executive control decisions concerning the
liability of foreign sovereigns to suit).
668 “We may say that power to legislate for emergencies belongs in the hands of
Congress, but only Congress itself can prevent power from slipping through its fin-
gers.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 654 (1952) (Justice
Jackson concurring). For an account of how the President usually prevails, see H.
KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIRS
(1990).
The Doctrine of Political Questions

It is not within the province of the courts to inquire into the
policy underlying action taken by the “political departments”—
Congress and the President—in the exercise of their conceded pow-
ers. This commonplace maxim is, however, sometimes given an en-
larged application, so as to embrace questions as to the existence
of facts and even questions of law, that the Court would normally
regard as falling within its jurisdiction. Such questions are termed
“political questions,” and are especially common in the field of for-
eign relations. The leading case is Foster v. Neilson,669 where the
matter in dispute was the validity of a grant made by the Spanish
Government in 1804 of land lying to the east of the Mississippi River,
and in which there was also raised the question whether the re-
gion between the Perdido and Mississippi Rivers belonged in 1804
to Spain or the United States.
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion for the Court held that the Court
was bound by the action of the political departments, the President
and Congress, in claiming the land for the United States. He wrote:
“If those departments which are intrusted with the foreign inter-
course of the nation, which assert and maintain its interests against
foreign powers, have unequivocally asserted its right of dominion
over a country of which it is in possession, and which it claims un-
der a treaty; if the legislature has acted on the construction thus
asserted, it is not in its own courts that this construction is to be
denied. A question like this, respecting the boundaries of nations,
is, as has been truly said, more a political than a legal question,
and in its discussion, the courts of every country must respect the
pronounced will of the legislature.” 670
The doctrine thus clearly stated is further exemplified, with par-
ticular reference to presidential action, by Williams v. Suffolk Ins.
Co.671 In this case the underwriters of a vessel which had been con-
fiscated by the Argentine Government for catching seals off the Falk-
land Islands, contrary to that Government’s orders, sought to es-
cape liability by showing that the Argentinian Government was the
sovereign over these islands and that, accordingly, the vessel had
been condemned for willful disregard of legitimate authority. The
Court decided against the company on the ground that the Presi-
dent had taken the position that the Falkland Islands were not a
part of Argentina. “[C]an there be any doubt, that when the execu-
tive branch of the government, which is charged with our foreign
669 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
670 27 U.S. at 309.
671 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
relations, shall, in its correspondence with a foreign nation, as-

sume a fact in regard to the sovereignty of any island or country, it
is conclusive on the judicial department? And in this view, it is not
material to inquire, nor is it the province of the court to determine,
whether the executive be right or wrong. It is enough to know, that
in the exercise of his constitutional functions, he had decided the
question. Having done this, under the responsibilities which belong
to him, it is obligatory on the people and government of the Union.”
“If this were not the rule, cases might often arise, in which, on
most important questions of foreign jurisdiction, there would be an
irreconcilable difference between the executive and judicial depart-
ments. By one of these departments, a foreign island or country might
be considered as at peace with the United States; whilst the other
would consider it in a state of war. No well-regulated government
has ever sanctioned a principle so unwise, and so destructive of na-
tional character.” 672 Thus, the right to determine the boundaries of
the country is a political function,673 as is also the right to deter-
mine what country is sovereign of a particular region,674 to deter-
mine whether a community is entitled under international law to
be considered a belligerent or an independent state,675 to deter-
mine whether the other party has duly ratified a treaty,676 to deter-
mine who is the de jure or de facto ruler of a country,677 to deter-
mine whether a particular person is a duly accredited diplomatic
agent to the United States,678 to determine how long a military oc-
cupation shall continue in fulfillment of the terms of a treaty,679 to
determine whether a treaty is in effect or not, although doubtless
an extinguished treaty could be constitutionally renewed by tacit
consent.680
Recent Statements of the Doctrine.—The assumption under-
lying the refusal of courts to intervene in cases involving conduct
of foreign relations is well stated in Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Wa-
terman S.S. Corp.681 Here, the Court refused to review orders of
the Civil Aeronautics Board granting or denying applications by citi-
zen carriers to engage in overseas and foreign air transportation,
which by the terms of the Civil Aeronautics Act were subject to ap-
672 38 U.S. at 420.
673 Foster v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
674 Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
675 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818).
676 Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 657 (1853).
677 Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918).

678 In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403 (1890).
679 Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901).
680 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
681 333 U.S. 103 (1948).
proval by the President and therefore impliedly beyond those provi-

sions of the act authorizing judicial review of board orders. Elabo-
rating on the necessity of judicial abstinence in the conduct of foreign
relations, Justice Jackson declared for the Court: “The President,
both as Commander in Chief and as the Nation’s organ for foreign
affairs, has available intelligence services whose reports are not and
ought not be published to the world. It would be intolerable that
courts, without the relevant information, should review and per-
haps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly
held secret. Nor can courts sit in camera in order to be taken into
executive confidences. But even if courts could require full disclo-
sure, the very nature of executive decisions as to foreign policy is
political, not judicial. Such decisions are wholly confided by our Con-
stitution on the political departments of the government, Executive
and Legislative. They are delicate, complex, and involve large ele-
ments of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those
directly responsible to the people whose welfare they advance or
imperil. They are decisions of a kind for which the Judiciary has
neither aptitude, facilities nor responsibility and which has long been
held to belong in the domain of political power not subject to judi-
cial intrusion or inquiry.” 682
To the same effect are the Court’s holding and opinion in Ludecke
v. Watkins,683 where the question at issue was the power of the Presi-
dent to order the deportation under the Alien Enemy Act of 1798 of
682 333 U.S. at 111. See also Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918);
Ricaud v. American Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304 (1918). Analogous to and arising out of
the same considerations as the political question doctrine is the “act of state” doc-
trine under which United States courts will not examine the validity of the public
acts of foreign governments done within their own territory, typically, but not al-
ways, in disputes arising out of nationalizations. E.g., Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); First
National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Alfred Dunhill
of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976). For succinct analysis of
this amorphous doctrine, see Restatement, Foreign Relations, §§ 443–44. Congress
has limited the reach of the doctrine in foreign expropriation cases by the Hickenlooper
Amendments. 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2). Consider, also, Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453
U.S. 654 (1981). Similar, also, is the doctrine of sovereign immunity of foreign states
in United States courts, under which jurisdiction over the foreign state, at least af-
ter 1952, turned upon the suggestion of the Department of State as to the applica-
bility of the doctrine. See Alfred Dunhill of London v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. at
698–706 (plurality opinion), but see id. at 725–28 (Justice Marshall dissenting). For
the period prior to 1952, see Z. & F. Assets Corp. v. Hull, 311 U.S. 470, 487 (1941).
Congress in the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–583, 90 Stat.
2891, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1332(a)(2)(3)(4), 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602–1611, provided for
judicial determination of applicability of the doctrine but did adopt the executive
position with respect to no applicability for commercial actions of a foreign state.
E.g., Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480 (1983); Argentine Re-
public v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428 (1989). See Restatement, For-
eign Relations, §§ 451–63 (including Introductory Note, pp. 390–396).
683 335 U.S. 160 (1948).
a German alien enemy after the cessation of hostilities with Ger-

many. Said Justice Frankfurter for the Court: “War does not cease
with a cease-fire order, and power to be exercised by the President
such as that conferred by the Act of 1798 is a process which begins
when war is declared but is not exhausted when the shooting
stops. . . . The Court would be assuming the functions of the politi-
cal agencies of the government to yield to the suggestion that the
unconditional surrender of Germany and the disintegration of the
Nazi Reich have left Germany without a government capable of ne-
gotiating a treaty of peace. It is not for us to question a belief by
the President that enemy aliens who were justifiably deemed fit sub-
ject for internment during active hostilities do not lose their po-
tency for mischief during the period of confusion and conflict which
is characteristic of a state of war even when the guns are silent
but the peace of Peace has not come. These are matters of political
judgment for which judges have neither technical competence nor
official responsibility.” 684
The Court reviewed the political question doctrine in Baker v.
Carr.685 There, Justice Brennan noted and elaborated the factors
which go into making a question political and inappropriate for ju-
dicial decision.686 On the matter at hand, he said: “There are sweep-
ing statements to the effect that all questions touching foreign rela-
tions are political questions. Not only does resolution of such issues
684 335 U.S. at 167, 170. Four Justices dissented, by Justice Black, who said:
“The Court . . . holds, as I understand its opinion, that the Attorney General can
deport him whether he is dangerous or not. The effect of this holding is that any
unnaturalized person, good or bad, loyal or disloyal to this country, if he was a citi-
zen of Germany before coming here, can be summarily seized, interned and de-
ported from the United States by the Attorney General, and that no court of the
United States has any power whatever to review, modify, vacate, reverse, or in any
manner affect the Attorney General’s deportation order. . . . I think the idea that
we are still at war with Germany in the sense contemplated by the statute control-
ling here is a pure fiction. Furthermore, I think there is no act of Congress which
lends the slightest basis to the claim that after hostilities with a foreign country
have ended the President or the Attorney General, one or both, can deport aliens
without a fair hearing reviewable in the courts. On the contrary, when this very
question came before Congress after World War I in the interval between the Armi-
stice and the conclusion of formal peace with Germany, Congress unequivocally re-
quired that enemy aliens be given a fair hearing before they could be deported.” Id.
at 174–75. See also Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948), where the
continuation of rent control under the Housing and Rent Act of 1947, enacted after
the termination of hostilities, was unanimously held to be a valid exercise of the
war power, but the constitutional question raised was asserted to be a proper one
for the Court. Said Justice Jackson, in a concurring opinion: “Particularly when the
war power is invoked to do things to the liberties of people, or to their property or
economy that only indirectly affect conduct of the war and do not relate to the man-
agement of the war itself, the constitutional basis should be scrutinized with care.”
Id. at 146–47.
685 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
686 369 U.S. at 217.
frequently turn on standards that defy judicial application, or in-

volve the exercise of a discretion demonstrably committed to the
executive or legislature; but many such questions uniquely de-
mand single-voiced statement of the Government’s views. Yet it is
error to suppose that every case or controversy which touches for-
eign relations lies beyond judicial cognizance. Our cases in this field
seem invariably to show a discriminating analysis of the particular
question posed, in terms of the history of its management by the
political branches, of its susceptibility to judicial handling in the
light of its nature and posture in the specific case, and of the pos-
sible consequences of judicial action.” 687 However, the Court came
within one vote of creating a broad application of the political ques-
tion doctrine in foreign relations disputes, at least in the context of
a dispute between Congress and the President with respect to a proper
allocation of constitutional powers.688 In any event, the Court, in
adjudicating on the merits disputes in which the foreign relations
powers are called into question, follows a policy of such deference
to executive and congressional expertise that the result may not be
dissimilar to a broad application of the political question doc-
trine.689
THE PRESIDENT AS LAW ENFORCER
Powers Derived From The “Take Care” Duty

The Constitution does not say that the President shall execute
the laws, but that “he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed,” i.e., by others, who are commonly, but not always with
687 369 U.S. at 211–12. A case involving “a purely legal question of statutory
interpretation” is not a political question simply because the issues have significant
political and foreign relations overtones. Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean
Society, 478 U.S. 221, 229–30 (1986) (Fisherman’s Protective Act does not com-
pletely remove Secretary of Commerce’s discretion in certifying that foreign nation-
als are “diminishing the effectiveness of ” an international agreement by taking whales
in violation of quotas set pursuant to the agreement).
688 Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002–06 (Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and
Stevens and Chief Justice Burger). The doctrine was applied in just such a dispute
in Dole v. Carter, 569 F.2d 1109 (10th Cir. 1977).
689 “Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely
proper subjects for judicial intervention.” Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981).
See also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 688 (1981); Rostker v. Goldberg,
453 U.S. 57, 64–68 (1981); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 837–838 (1976); Parker v.
Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 756, 758 (1974); Harisiades v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 589
(1952). Neither may private claimants seek judicial review of executive actions de-
nying constitutional rights “in such sensitive areas as national security and foreign
policy” in suits for damages against offending officials, inasmuch as the President is
absolutely immune, Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982), and the Court has strongly
hinted that in these areas the immunity of presidential aides and other executive
officials “entrusted with discretionary authority” will be held to be absolute rather
than qualified. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812–13 (1982).
strict accuracy, termed his subordinates. What powers are implied

from this duty? In this connection, five categories of executive power
should be distinguished: first, there is that executive power which
the Constitution confers directly upon the President by the open-
ing clause of article II and, in more specific terms, by succeeding
clauses of the same article; secondly, there is the sum total of the
powers which acts of Congress at any particular time confer upon
the President; thirdly, there is the sum total of discretionary pow-
ers which acts of Congress at any particular time confer upon heads
of departments and other executive (“administrative”) agencies of
the National Government; fourthly, there is the power which stems
from the duty to enforce the criminal statutes of the United States;
finally, there are so-called “ministerial duties” which admit of no
discretion as to the occasion or the manner of their discharge. Three
principal questions arise: first, how does the President exercise the
powers which the Constitution or the statutes confer upon him; sec-
ond, in what relation does he stand by virtue of the Take Care Clause
to the powers of other executive or administrative agencies; third,
in what relation does he stand to the enforcement of the criminal
laws of the United States? 690
Whereas the British monarch is constitutionally under the ne-
cessity of acting always through agents if his acts are to receive
legal recognition, the President is presumed to exercise certain of
his constitutional powers personally. In the words of an opinion by
Attorney General Cushing in 1855: “It may be presumed that he,
the man discharging the presidential office, and he alone, grants
reprieves and pardons for offenses against the United States. . . .
So he, and he alone, is the supreme commander in chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the militia of the several
States when called into the actual service of the United States. That
is a power constitutionally inherent in the person of the President.
No act of Congress, no act even of the President himself, can, by
constitutional possibility, authorize or create any military officer not
subordinate to the President.” 691 Moreover, the obligation to act per-
sonally may be sometimes enlarged by statute, as, for example, by
the act organizing the President with other designated officials into
“an Establishment by name of the Smithsonian Institute.” Here, says
the Attorney General, “the President’s name of office is designatio
690 In Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 576–78 (1992), the Court
purported to draw from the Take Care Clause the principle that Congress could not
authorize citizens with only generalized grievances to sue to compel governmental
compliance with the law, inasmuch as permitting that would be “to permit Congress
to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief Executive’s most important
constitutional duty, to ‘take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’ ” Id. at 577.
691 7 Ops. Atty. Gen. 453, 464–65 (1855).
personae.” He was also of opinion that expenditures from the “se-

cret service” fund, in order to be valid, must be vouched for by the
President personally.692 On like grounds the Supreme Court once
held void a decree of a court martial, because, though it has been
confirmed by the Secretary of War, it was not specifically stated to
have received the sanction of the President as required by the 65th
Article of War.693 This case has, however, been virtually overruled,
and at any rate such cases are exceptional.694
The general rule, as stated by the Court, is that when any duty
is cast by law upon the President, it may be exercised by him through
the head of the appropriate department, whose acts, if performed
within the law, thus become the President’s acts.695 Williams v. United
States 696 involved an act of Congress that prohibited the advance
of public money in any case whatever to disbursing officers of the
United States, except under special direction by the President.697
The Supreme Court held that the act did not require the personal
performance by the President of this duty. Such a practice, said the
Court, if it were possible, would absorb the duties of the various
departments of the government in the personal acts of one chief
executive officer, and be fraught with mischief to the public service.
The President’s duty in general requires his superintendence of the
administration; yet he cannot be required to become the adminis-
trative officer of every department and bureau, or to perform in per-
son the numerous details incident to services which, nevertheless,
he is, in a correct sense, by the Constitution and laws required and
expected to perform.698 As a matter of administrative practice, in
fact, most orders and instructions emanating from the heads of the
692 Cf. 2 Stat. 78. The provision has long since dropped out of the statute book.
693 Runkle v. United States, 122 U.S. 543 (1887).
694 Cf. In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 670–671 (1897), where it was held that
presumptions in favor of official action “preclude collateral attack on the sentences

of courts-martial.” See also United States v. Fletcher, 148 U.S. 84, 88–89 (1893);
Bishop v. United States, 197 U.S. 334, 341–42 (1905), both of which in effect repudi-
ate Runkle.
695 The President, in the exercise of his executive power under the Constitu-
tion, “speaks and acts through the heads of the several departments in relation to
subjects which appertain to their respective duties.” The heads of the departments
are his authorized assistants in the performance of his executive duties, and their
official acts, promulgated in the regular course of business, are presumptively his
acts. Wilcox v. McConnel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 513 (1839). See also United States
v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291 (1842); Williams v. United States, 42 U.S. (1 How.)
290, 297 (1843); United States v. Jones, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 92, 95 (1856); The Confis-
cation Cases, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 92 (1874); United States v. Farden, 99 U.S. 10 (1879);
Wolsey v. Chapman, 101 U.S. 755 (1880).
696 42 U.S. (1 How.) 290 (1843).
697 3 Stat. 723 (1823), now covered in 31 U.S.C. § 3324.
698 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 297–98.
departments, even though in pursuance of powers conferred by stat-

ute on the President, do not even refer to the President.699
Impoundment of Appropriated Funds

In his Third Annual Message to Congress, President Jefferson
established the first faint outline of what years later became a ma-
jor controversy. Reporting that $50,000 in funds which Congress had
appropriated for fifteen gunboats on the Mississippi remained
unexpended, the President stated that a “favorable and peaceful turn
of affairs on the Mississippi rendered an immediate execution of the
law unnecessary. . . .” But he was not refusing to expend the money,
only delaying action to obtain improved gunboats; a year later, he
told Congress that the money was being spent and gunboats were
being obtained.700 A few other instances of deferrals or refusals to
spend occurred in the Nineteenth and early Twentieth Centuries,
but it was only with the Administration of President Franklin
Roosevelt that a President refused to spend moneys for the pur-
poses appropriated. Succeeding Presidents expanded upon these prec-
edents, and in the Nixon Administration a well-formulated plan of
impoundments was executed in order to reduce public spending and
to negate programs established by congressional legislation.701
Impoundment 702 was defended by Administration spokesmen as
being a power derived from the President’s executive powers and
particularly from his obligation to see to the faithful execution of
699 38 Ops. Atty. Gen. 457, 458 (1936). And, of course, if the President exercises
his duty through subordinates, he must appoint them or appoint the officers who
appoint them, Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 109–143 (1976), and he must have the
power to discharge those officers in the Executive Branch, Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52 (1926), although the Court has now greatly qualified Myers to permit
congressional limits on the removal of some officers. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S.
654 (1988).
700 1 J. Richardson, supra at 348, 360.
701 History and law is much discussed in Executive Impoundment of Appropri-
ated Funds: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Separation of

Powers, 92d Congress, 1st Sess. (1971); Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the
President: Hearings Before the Senate Government Operations Ad Hoc Subcommittee
on Impoundment of Funds, 93d Congress, 1st Sess. (1973). The most thorough study
of the legal and constitutional issues, informed through historical analysis, is Abas-
cal & Kramer, Presidential Impoundment Part I: Historical Genesis and Constitu-
tional Framework, 62 GEO. L. J. 1549 (1974); Abascal & Kramer, Presidential Im-
poundment Part II: Judicial and Legislative Response, 63, id. at 149 (1974). See generally
L. FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL SPENDING POWER (1975).
702 There is no satisfactory definition of impoundment. Legislation enacted by
Congress uses the phrase “deferral of budget authority” which is defined to include:
“(A) withholding or delaying the obligation or expenditure of budget authority (whether
by establishing reserves or otherwise) provided for projects or activities; or (B) any
other type of Executive action or inaction which effectively precludes the obligation
or expenditure of budget authority, including authority to obligate by contract in
advance of appropriations as specifically authorized by law.” 2 U.S.C. § 682(1).
the laws, i.e., his discretion in the manner of execution. The Presi-
dent, the argument went, is responsible for deciding when two con-
flicting goals of Congress can be harmonized and when one must
give way, when, for example, congressional desire to spend certain
moneys must yield to congressional wishes to see price and wage
stability. In some respects, impoundment was said or implied to flow
from certain inherent executive powers that repose in any Presi-
dent. Finally, statutory support was sought; certain laws were said
to confer discretion to withhold spending, and it was argued that
congressional spending programs are discretionary rather than man-
datory.703
On the other hand, it was argued that Congress’s powers un-
der Article I, § 8, were fully adequate to support its decision to au-
thorize certain programs, to determine the amount of funds to be
spent on them, and to mandate the Executive to execute the laws.
Permitting the President to impound appropriated funds allowed him
the power of item veto, which he does not have, and denied Con-
gress the opportunity to override his veto of bills enacted by Con-
gress. In particular, the power of Congress to compel the President
to spend appropriated moneys was said to derive from Congress’s
power “to make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for
carrying into Execution” the enumerated powers of Congress and
“all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or in any Department or officer thereof.” 704
The President’s decision to impound large amounts of appropri-
ated funds led to two approaches to curtail the power. First, many
persons and organizations, with a reasonable expectation of receipt
of the impounded funds upon their release, brought large numbers
of suits; with a few exceptions, these suits resulted in decisions de-
nying the President either constitutional or statutory power to de-
cline to spend or obligate funds, and the Supreme Court, presented
with only statutory arguments by the Administration, held that no
discretion existed under the particular statute to withhold allot-
ments of funds to the states.705 Second, Congress in the course of
revising its own manner of appropriating funds in accordance with
703 Impoundment of Appropriated Funds by the President: Hearings Before the
Senate Government Operations Ad Hoc Subcommittee on Impoundment of Funds, 93d

Congress, 1st Sess. (1973), 358 (then-Deputy Attorney General Sneed).
704 Id. at 1–6 (Senator Ervin). Of course, it was long ago established that Con-
gress could direct the expenditure of at least some moneys from the Treasury, even
over the opposition of the President. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
705 Train v. City of New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975); Train v. Campaign Clean Wa-
ter, 420 U.S. 136 (1975). See also State Highway Comm’n of Missouri v. Volpe, 479
F.2d 1099 (8th Cir. 1973); Pennsylvania v. Lynn, 501 F.2d 848 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (the
latter case finding statutory discretion not to spend).
budgetary responsibility provided for mandatory reporting of im-

poundments to Congress, for congressional disapproval of impound-
ments, and for court actions by the Comptroller General to compel
spending or obligation of funds.706
Generally speaking, the law recognized two types of impound-
ments: “routine” or “programmatic” reservations of budget author-
ity to provide for the inevitable contingencies that arise in adminis-
tering congressionally-funded programs and “policy” decisions that
are ordinarily intended to advance the broader fiscal or other policy
objectives of the executive branch contrary to congressional wishes
in appropriating funds in the first place.
Routine reservations were to come under the terms of a revised
Anti-Deficiency Act.707 Prior to its amendment, this law had permit-
ted the President to “apportion” funds “to provide for contingen-
cies, or to effect savings whenever savings are made possible by or
through changes in requirements, greater efficiency of operations,
or other developments subsequent to the date on which such appro-
priation was made available.” President Nixon had relied on this
“other developments” language as authorization to impound, for what
in essence were policy reasons.708 Congress deleted the contro-
verted clause and retained the other language to authorize reserva-
tions to maintain funds for contingencies and to effect savings made
possible in carrying out the program; it added a clause permitting
reserves “as specifically provided by law.” 709
“Policy” impoundments were to be reported to Congress by the
President as permanent rescissions and, perhaps, as temporary de-
ferrals.710 Rescissions are merely recommendations or proposals of
the President and must be authorized by a bill or joint resolution,
or, after 45 days from the presidential message, the funds must be
made available for obligation.711 Temporary deferrals of budget au-
thority for less than a full fiscal year, as provided in the 1974 law,
were to be effective unless either the House of Representatives or
706 Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act, Pub. L. 93–344, title
X, §§ 1001–1017, 88 Stat. 332 (1974), as amended, 2 U.S.C. §§ 681–88.

707 Originally passed as the Act of Feb. 27, 1906, ch. 510, § 3, 34 Stat. 27, 48.
The provisions as described in the text were added in the General Appropriations
Act of 1951, ch. 896, § 1211(c)(2), 64 Stat. 595, 765. The amendments made by the
Impoundment Control Act, were § 1002, 88 Stat. 332, 31 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1512. On
the Anti-Deficiency Act generally, see Stith, Congress’s Power of the Purse, 97 YALE
L. J. 1343, 1370–1377 (1988).
708 L. Fisher, supra at 154–57.
709 31 U.S.C. § 1512(c)(1) (present version). Congressional intent was to prohibit
the use of apportionment as an instrument of policymaking. 120 CONG. REC. 7658

(1974) (Senator Muskie); id. at 20472–20473 (Senators Ervin and McClellan).
710 §§ 1011(1), 1012, 1013, 88 Stat. 333–34, 2 U.S.C. §§ 628(1), 683, 684.
711 2 U.S.C. § 683.
the Senate passed a resolution of disapproval.712 With the decision

in INS v. Chadha,713 voiding as unconstitutional the one-House leg-
islative veto, it was evident that the veto provision in the deferral
section of the Impoundment Control Act was no longer viable. An
Administration effort to utilize the section, minus the veto device,
was thwarted by court action, in which, applying established sever-
ability analysis, the court held that Congress would not have en-
acted the deferral provision in the absence of power to police its
exercise through the veto.714 Thus, the entire deferral section was
inoperative. Congress, in 1987, enacted a more restricted authority,
limited to deferrals only for those purposes set out in the Anti-
Deficiency Act.715
With passage of the Act, the constitutional issues faded into the
background; Presidents regularly reported rescission proposals, and
Congress responded by enacting its own rescissions, usually top-
ping the Presidents’. The entire field was, of course, confounded by
the application of the other part of the 1974 law, the Budget Act,
which restructured how budgets were received and acted on in Con-
gress, and by the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control
Act of 1985.716 This latter law was designed as a deficit-reduction
forcing mechanism, so that unless President and Congress cooper-
ate each year to reduce the deficit by prescribed amounts, a “seques-
tration” order would reduce funds down to a mandated figure.717
Dissatisfaction with the amount of deficit reduction continues to stimu-
late discussion of other means, such as “expedited” rescission and
the line-item veto, many of which may raise some constitutional is-
sues.
Power and Duty of the President in Relation to

Subordinate Executive Officers
If the law casts a duty upon a head of department eo nomine,
does the President thereupon become entitled by virtue of his duty
to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed,” to substitute
his own judgment for that of the principal officer regarding the dis-
712 § 1013, 88 Stat. 334. Because the Act was a compromise between the House
of Representatives and the Senate, numerous questions were left unresolved; one
important one was whether the President could use the deferral avenue as a means
of effectuating policy impoundments or whether rescission proposals were the sole
means. The subsequent events described in the text mooted that argument.
713 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
714 City of New Haven v. United States, 809 F.2d 900 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
715 Pub. L. 100–119, title II, § 206(a), 101 Stat. 785, 2 U.S.C. § 684.
716 Pub. L. 99–177, 99 Stat. 1037, codified as amended in titles 2, 31, and 42
U.S.C., with the relevant portions to this discussion at 2 U.S.C. §§ 901 et seq.
717 See Stith, Rewriting the Fiscal Constitution: The Case of Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 593 (1988).

charge of such duty? In the debate in the House in 1789 on the

location of the removal power, Madison argued that it ought to be
attributed to the President alone because it was “the intention of
the Constitution, expressed especially in the faithful execution clause,
that the first magistrate should be responsible for the executive de-
partment,” and this responsibility, he held, carried with it the power
to “inspect and control” the conduct of subordinate executive offi-
cers. “Vest,” said he, “the power [of removal] in the Senate jointly
with the President, and you abolish at once the great principle of
unity and responsibility in the executive department, which was in-
tended for the security of liberty and the public good.” 718
But this was said with respect to the office of the Secretary of
State, and when shortly afterward the question arose as to the power
of Congress to regulate the tenure of the Comptroller of the Trea-
sury, Madison assumed a very different attitude, conceding in ef-
fect that this office was to be an arm of certain of Congress’s own
powers and should therefore be protected against the removal power.719
And in Marbury v. Madison,720 Chief Justice Marshall traced a par-
allel distinction between the duties of the Secretary of State under
the original act which had created a “Department of Foreign Af-
fairs” and those which had been added by the later act changing
the designation of the department to its present one. The former
were, he pointed out, entirely in the “political field,” and hence for
their discharge the Secretary was left responsible absolutely to the
President. The latter, on the other hand, were exclusively of statu-
tory origin and sprang from the powers of Congress. For these, there-
fore, the Secretary was “an officer of the law” and “amenable to the
law for his conduct.” 721
Administrative Decentralization Versus Jacksonian Cen-
tralism.—An opinion rendered by Attorney General Wirt in 1823
asserted the proposition that the President’s duty under the Take
Care Clause required of him scarcely more than that he should bring
a criminally negligent official to book for his derelictions, either by
removing him or by setting in motion against him the processes of
impeachment or of criminal prosecutions.722 The opinion entirely over-
looked the important question of the location of the power to inter-
pret the law, which is inevitably involved in any effort to enforce it.
The diametrically opposed theory that Congress is unable to vest
any head of an executive department, even within the field of Con-
718 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 495, 499 (1789).
719 Id. at 611–612.
720 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
721 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) at 165–66.
722 1 Ops. Atty. Gen. 624 (1823).
gress’s specifically delegated powers, with any legal discretion which

the President is not entitled to control was first asserted in unam-
biguous terms in President Jackson’s Protest Message of April 15,
1834,723 defending his removal of Duane as Secretary of the Trea-
sury, because of the latter’s refusal to remove the deposits from the
Bank of the United States. Here it is asserted “that the entire ex-
ecutive power is vested in the President;” that the power to remove
those officers who are to aid him in the execution of the laws is an
incident of that power; that the Secretary of the Treasury was such
an officer; that the custody of the public property and money was
an executive function exercised through the Secretary of the Trea-
sury and his subordinates; that in the performance of these duties
the Secretary was subject to the supervision and control of the Presi-
dent; and finally that the act establishing the Bank of the United
States “did not, as it could not change the relation between the Presi-
dent and Secretary—did not release the former from his obligation
to see the law faithfully executed nor the latter from the Presi-
dent’s supervision and control.” 724 In short, the President’s re-
moval power, in this case unqualified, was the sanction provided
by the Constitution for his power and duty to control his “subordi-
nates” in all their official actions of public consequence.
Congressional Power Versus Presidential Duty to the Law.—
The Court’s 1838 decision in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,725
shed more light on congressional power to mandate actions by ex-
ecutive branch officials. The United States owed Stokes money, and
when Postmaster General Kendall, at Jackson’s instigation, re-
fused to pay it, Congress passed a special act ordering payment.
Kendall, however, still proved noncompliant, whereupon Stokes sought
and obtained a mandamus in the United States circuit court for
the District of Columbia, and on appeal this decision was affirmed
by the Supreme Court. Although Kendall, like Marbury v. Madi-
son, involved the question of the responsibility of a head of a depart-
ment for the performance of a ministerial duty, the discussion by
counsel before the Court and the Court’s own opinion covered the
entire subject of the relation of the President to his subordinates
in the performance by them of statutory duties. The lower court
had asserted that the duty of the President under the faithful ex-
ecution clause gave him no other control over the officer than to
see that he acts honestly, with proper motives, but no power to con-
strue the law and see that the executive action conforms to it. Coun-
sel for Kendall attacked this position vigorously, relying largely upon
723 3 J. Richardson, supra at 1288.
724 Id. at 1304.
725 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
statements by Hamilton, Marshall, James Wilson, and Story hav-

ing to do with the President’s power in the field of foreign rela-
tions.
The Court rejected the implication with emphasis. There are, it
pointed out, “certain political duties imposed upon many officers in
the executive department, the discharge of which is under the direc-
tion of the President. But it would be an alarming doctrine, that
Congress cannot impose upon any executive officer any duty they
may think proper, which is not repugnant to any rights secured and
protected by the Constitution; and in such cases the duty and re-
sponsibility grow out of and are subject to the control of the law,
and not to the direction of the President. And this is emphatically
the case, where the duty enjoined is of a mere ministerial charac-
ter.” 726 In short, the Court recognized the underlying question of
the case to be whether the President’s duty to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed” made it constitutionally impossible for
Congress ever to entrust the construction of its statutes to anybody
but the President, and it answered this in the negative.
Myers Versus Morrison.—How does this issue stand today? The
answer to this question, so far as there is one, is to be sought in a
comparison of the Court’s decision in Myers, on the one hand, and
its decision in Morrison, on the other.727 The first decision is still
valid to support the President’s right to remove, and hence to con-
trol the decisions of, all officials through whom he exercises the great
political powers which he derives from the Constitution, and also
to remove many but not all officials—usually heads of departments—
through whom he exercises powers conferred upon him by statute.
Morrison, however, recasts Myers to be about the constitutional in-
ability of Congress to participate in removal decisions. It permits
Congress to limit the removal power of the President, and those
acting for him, by imposition of a “good cause” standard, subject to
a balancing test. That is, the Court now regards the critical issue
not as what officials do, whether they perform “purely executive”
functions or “quasi” legislative or judicial functions, though the du-
ties and functions must be considered. Rather, the Courts must “en-
sure that Congress does not interfere with the President’s exercise
of the ‘executive power’ ” and his constitutionally appointed duty un-
der Article II to take care that the laws be faithfully executed.728
Thus, the Court continued, Myers was correct in its holding and in
its suggestion that there are some executive officials who must be
726 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) at 610.
727 Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988).
728 Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. at 689–90.
removable by the President if he is to perform his duties.729 On the

other hand, Congress may believe that it is necessary to protect the
tenure of some officials, and if it has good reasons not limited to
invasion of presidential prerogatives, it will be sustained, provided
the removal restrictions are not of such a nature as to impede the
President’s ability to perform his constitutional duties.730 The offi-
cer in Morrison, the independent counsel, had investigative and
prosecutorial functions, purely executive ones, but there were good
reasons for Congress to secure her tenure and no showing that the
restriction “unduly trammels” presidential powers.731
The “bright-line” rule previously observed no longer holds. Now,
Congress has a great deal more leeway in regulating executive offi-
cials, but it must articulate its reasons carefully and observe the
fuzzy lines set by the Court.
Power of the President to Guide Enforcement of the Pe-
nal Law.—This matter also came to a head in “the reign of An-
drew Jackson,” preceding, and indeed foreshadowing, the Duane epi-
sode by some months. “At that epoch,” Wyman relates in his Principles
of Administrative Law, “the first amendment of the doctrine of cen-
tralism in its entirety was set forth in an obscure opinion upon an
unimportant matter—The Jewels of the Princess of Orange, 2 Opin.
482 (1831). These jewels . . . were stolen from the Princess by one
Polari and were seized by the officers of the United States Customs
in the hands of the thief. Representations were made to the Presi-
dent of the United States by the Minister of the Netherlands of the
facts in the matter, which were followed by a request for return of
the jewels. In the meantime the District Attorney was prosecuting
condemnation proceedings in behalf of the United States which he
showed no disposition to abandon. The President felt himself in a
dilemma, whether if it was by statute the duty of the District Attor-
ney to prosecute or not, the President could interfere and direct
whether to proceed or not. The opinion was written by Taney, then
Attorney General; it is full of pertinent illustrations as to the neces-
sity in an administration of full power in the chief executive as the
concomitant of his full responsibility. It concludes: If it should be
said that, the District Attorney having the power to discontinue the
prosecution, there is no necessity for inferring a right in the Presi-
dent to direct him to exercise it—I answer that the direction of the
President is not required to communicate any new authority to the
District Attorney, but to direct him in the execution of a power he
is admitted to possess. The most valuable and proper measure may
729 487 U.S. at 690–91.
730 487 U.S. at 691.
731 487 U.S. at 691–92.
often be for the President to order the District Attorney to discon-

tinue prosecution. The District Attorney might refuse to obey the
President’s order; and if he did refuse, the prosecution, while he
remained in office, would still go on; because the President himself
could give no order to the court or to the clerk to make any particu-
lar entry. He could only act through his subordinate officer, the Dis-
trict Attorney, who is responsible to him and who holds his office at
his pleasure. And if that officer still continues a prosecution which
the President is satisfied ought not to continue, the removal of the
disobedient officer and the substitution of one more worthy in his
place would enable the President through him faithfully to execute
the law. And it is for this among other reasons that the power of
removing the District Attorney resides in the President.” 732
The President as Law Interpreter

The power accruing to the President from his function of law
interpretation preparatory to law enforcement is daily illustrated
in relation to such statutes as the Anti-Trust Acts, the Taft-Hartley
Act, the Internal Security Act, and many lesser statutes. Nor is this
the whole story. Not only do all presidential regulations and orders
based on statutes that vest power in him or on his own constitu-
tional powers have the force of law, provided they do not trans-
gress the Court’s reading of such statutes or of the Constitution,733
but he sometimes makes law in a more special sense. In the fa-
mous Neagle case,734 an order of the Attorney General to a United
States marshal to protect a Justice of the Supreme Court whose
life has been threatened by a suitor was attributed to the Presi-
dent and held to be “a law of the United States” in the sense of
section 753 of the Revised Statutes, and as such to afford basis for
a writ of habeas corpus transferring the marshal, who had killed
the attacker, from state to national custody. Speaking for the Court,
Justice Miller inquired: “Is this duty [the duty of the President to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed] limited to the enforce-
ment of acts of Congress or of treaties of the United States accord-
ing to their express terms, or does it include the rights, duties and
obligations growing out of the Constitution itself, our international
relations, and all the protection implied by the nature of the gov-
732 B. WYMAN, THE PRINCIPLES OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW GOVERNING THE RELATIONS OF
PUBLIC OFFICERS 231–32 (1903).

733 United States v. Eliason, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 291, 301–02 (1842); Kurtz v. Mof-
fitt, 115 U.S. 487, 503 (1885); Smith v. Whitney, 116 U.S. 167, 180–81 (1886). For
an analysis of the approach to determining the validity of presidential, or other ex-
ecutive, regulations and orders under purported congressional delegations or im-
plied executive power, see Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 301–16 (1979).
734 In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1 (1890).
ernment under the Constitution?” 735 Obviously, an affirmative an-

swer is assumed to the second branch of this inquiry, an assump-
tion that is borne out by numerous precedents. And, in United States
v. Midwest Oil Co.,736 the Court ruled that the President had, by
dint of repeated assertion of it from an early date, acquired the right
to withdraw, via the Land Department, public lands, both mineral
and non-mineral, from private acquisition, Congress having never
repudiated the practice.
Military Power in Law Enforcement: The Posse Comitatus

“Whenever the President considers that unlawful obstructions,
combinations, or assemblages, or rebellion against the authority of
the United States, make it impracticable to enforce the laws of the
United States in any State or Territory by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings, he may call into Federal service such of the
militia of any State, and use such of the armed forces, as he consid-
ers necessary to enforce those laws or to suppress the rebellion.”
“The President, by using the militia or the armed forces, or both
. . . shall take such measures as he considers necessary to sup-
press, in a State, any insurrection, domestic violence, unlawful com-
bination, or conspiracy, if it—(1) so hinders the execution of the laws
of that State, and of the United States within the State, that any
part or class of its people is deprived of a right, privilege, immu-
nity, or protection named in the Constitution and secured by law
. . . .” 737
These quoted provisions of the United States Code consolidate
a course of legislation that began at the time of the Whiskey Rebel-
735 135 U.S. at 64. The phrase, “a law of the United States,” came from the Act
of March 2, 1833 (4 Stat. 632). However, in the Act of June 25, 1948, 62 Stat. 965,
28 U.S.C. § 2241(c)(2), the phrase is replaced by the term, “an act of Congress,” thereby
eliminating the basis of the holding in Neagle.
736 236 U.S. 459 (1915). See also Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545 (1923).
737 10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 333. The provisions were invoked by President Eisenhower
when he dispatched troops to Little Rock, Arkansas, in 1957 to counter resistance

to Federal district court orders pertaining to desegregation of certain public schools
in the Little Rock School District. Although the validity of his action was never ex-
pressly reviewed, the Court, in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 4, 18–19 (1958), re-
jected a contention advanced by critics of the legality of his conduct, namely, that
the President’s constitutional duty to see to the faithful execution of the laws, as
implemented by the provisions quoted above, does not permit the use of troops to
enforce decrees of federal courts, because the latter are not statutory enactments,
which alone are comprehended within the phrase, “laws of the United States.” Ac-
cording to the Court, a judicial decision interpreting a constitutional provision, spe-
cifically “the interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment enunciated by this Court
in the Brown case [Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)] is the su-
preme law of the land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect on
the States . . . .”
lion of 1792.738 In Martin v. Mott,739 which arose out of the War of

1812, the Court held that the authority to decide whether the exi-
gency had arisen belonged exclusively to the President.740 Even be-
fore that time, Jefferson had, in 1808, in the course of his efforts to
enforce the Embargo Acts, issued a proclamation ordering “all offi-
cers having authority, civil or military, who shall be found in the
vicinity” of an unruly combination, to aid and assist “by all means
in their power, by force of arms or otherwise” the suppression of
such combination.741 Forty-six years later, Attorney General Cush-
ing advised President Pierce that in enforcing the Fugitive Slave
Act of 1850, marshals of the United States had authority when op-
posed by unlawful combinations to summon to their aid not only
bystanders and citizens generally, but armed forces within their pre-
cincts, both state militia and United States officers, soldiers, sail-
ors, and marines,742 a doctrine that Pierce himself improved upon
two years later by asserting, with reference to the civil war then
raging in Kansas, that it lay within his obligation to take care that
the laws be faithfully executed to place the forces of the United States
in Kansas at the disposal of the marshal there, to be used as a por-
tion of the posse comitatus. Lincoln’s call of April 15, 1861, for 75,000
volunteers was, on the other hand, a fresh invocation, though of
course on a vastly magnified scale, of Jefferson’s conception of a posse
comitatus subject to presidential call.743 The provisions above ex-
tracted from the United States Code ratified this conception with
regard to the state militias and the national forces.
Suspension of Habeas Corpus by the President

See Article I, § 9.
738 1 Stat. 264 (1792); 1 Stat. 424 (1794); 2 Stat. 443 (1807); 12 Stat. 281 (1861);
now covered by 10 U.S.C. §§ 332–334.

739 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
740 25 U.S. at 31–32.
741 Wilson, Federal Aid in Domestic Disturbances, S. DOC. NO. 209, 57th Con-
gress, 2d Sess. (1907), 51.

742 6 Ops. Atty. Gen. 446 (1854). By the Posse Comitatus Act of 1878, 20 Stat.
152, 18 U.S.C. § 1385, it was provided that “it shall not be lawful to employ any
part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the
purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances
as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution
or by act of Congress. . . .” The effect of this prohibition, however, was largely nul-
lified by a ruling of the Attorney General “that by Revised Statutes 5298 and 5300
[10 U.S.C. §§ 332, 334] the military forces, under the direction of the President, could
be used to assist a marshal. 16 Ops. Atty. Gen. 162.” B. RICH, THE PRESIDENTS AND
CIVIL DISORDER 196 n.21 (1941).
743 12 Stat. (app.) 1258.
Preventive Martial Law

The question of executive power in the presence of civil disor-
der is dealt with in modern terms in Moyer v. Peabody,744 to which
the Debs case 745 may be regarded as an addendum. Moyer, a labor
leader, sued Peabody for having ordered his arrest during a labor
dispute that had occurred while Peabody was governor of Colorado.
Speaking for a unanimous Court (with one Justice absent), Justice
Holmes said: “Of course the plaintiff ’s position is that he has been
deprived of his liberty without due process of law. But it is familiar
that what is due process of law depends on circumstances. It var-
ies with the subject-matter and the necessities of the situa-
tion. . . . The facts that we are to assume are that a state of insur-
rection existed and that the Governor, without sufficient reason but
in good faith, in the course of putting the insurrection down held
the plaintiff until he thought that he safely could release him.”
“. . . In such a situation we must assume that he had a right
under the state constitution and laws to call out troops, as was held
by the Supreme Court of the State. . . . That means that he shall
make the ordinary use of the soldiers to that end; that he may kill
persons who resist and, of course, that he may use the milder mea-
sure of seizing the bodies of those whom he considers to stand in
the way of restoring peace. Such arrests are not necessarily for pun-
ishment, but are by way of precaution to prevent the exercise of
hostile power. So long as such arrests are made in good faith and
in the honest belief that they are needed in order to head the insur-
rection off, the Governor is the final judge and cannot be subjected
to an action after he is out of office on the ground that he had not
reasonable ground for his belief.”
“. . . When it comes to a decision by the head of the State upon
a matter involving its life, the ordinary rights of individuals must
yield to what he deems the necessities of the moment. Public dan-
ger warrants the substitution of executive process for judicial pro-
cess.” 746
The Debs Case.—The Debs case of 1895 arose out of a railway
strike which had caused the President to dispatch troops to Chi-
cago the previous year. Coincidentally with this move, the United
States district attorney stationed there, acting upon orders from Wash-
ington, obtained an injunction from the United States circuit court
forbidding the strike because of its interference with the mails and
744 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
745 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).
746 212 U.S. at 84–85. See also Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378 (1932), which
endorses Moyer v. Peabody, while emphasizing the fact that it applies only to a con-
dition of disorder.
with interstate commerce. The question before the Supreme Court

was whether this injunction, for violation of which Debs had been
jailed for contempt of court, had been granted with jurisdiction. Con-
ceding, in effect, that there was no statutory warrant for the injunc-
tion, the Court nevertheless validated it on the ground that the gov-
ernment was entitled thus to protect its property in the mails, and
on a much broader ground which is stated in the following passage
of Justice Brewer’s opinion for the Court: “Every government, en-
trusted, by the very terms of its being, with powers and duties to
be exercised and discharged for the general welfare, has a right to
apply to its own courts for any proper assistance in the exercise of
the one and the discharge of the other. . . . While it is not the prov-
ince of the government to interfere in any mere matter of private
controversy between individuals, or to use its granted powers to en-
force the rights of one against another, yet, whenever the wrongs
complained of are such as affect the public at large, and are in re-
spect of matters which by the Constitution are entrusted to the care
of the Nation and concerning which the Nation owes the duty to
all the citizens of securing to them their common rights, then the
mere fact that the government has no pecuniary interest in the con-
troversy is not sufficient to exclude it from the courts, or prevent it
from taking measures therein to fully discharge those constitu-
tional duties.” 747
Present Status of the Debs Case.—Insofar as the use of in-
junctive relief in labor disputes is concerned, enactment of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act 748 placed substantial restrictions on the power of fed-
eral courts to issue injunctions in such situations. Though, in United
States v. UMW,749 the Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act
did not apply where the government brought suit as operator of mines,
language in the opinion appeared to go a good way toward repudi-
ating the present viability of Debs, though more in terms of congres-
747 158 U.S., 584, 586. Some years earlier, in United States v. San Jacinto Tin
Co., 125 U.S. 273, 279 (1888), the Court sustained the right of the Attorney General
and his assistants to institute suits simply by virtue of their general official powers.
“If,” the Court said, “the United States in any particular case has a just cause for
calling upon the judiciary of the country, in any of its courts, for relief . . . the ques-
tion of appealing to them must primarily be decided by the Attorney General . . .
and if restrictions are to be placed upon the exercise of this authority it is for Con-
gress to enact them.” Cf. Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), in which the
Court rejected Attorney General Randolph’s contention that he had the right ex offi-
cio to move for a writ of mandamus ordering the United States circuit court for Penn-
sylvania to put the Invalid Pension Act into effect.
748 47 Stat. 170 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115.
749 330 U.S. 258 (1947). In reaching the result, Chief Justice Vinson invoked
the “rule that statutes which in general terms divest preexisting rights or privileges
will not be applied to the sovereign without express words to that effect.” Id. at 272.
sional limitations than of revised judicial opinion.750 It should be

noted that in 1947 Congress authorized the President to seek in-
junctive relief in “national emergency” labor disputes, which would
seem to imply absence of authority to act in situations not meeting
the statutory definition.751
With regard to the power of the President to seek injunctive
relief in other situations without statutory authority, there is no clear
precedent. In New York Times Co. v. United States,752 the govern-
ment sought to enjoin two newspapers from publishing classified
material given to them by a dissident former governmental em-
ployee. Though the Supreme Court rejected the Government’s claim,
five of the six majority Justices relied on First Amendment grounds,
apparently assuming basic power to bring the action in the first
place, and three dissenters were willing to uphold the constitution-
ality of the Government’s action and its basic power on the prem-
ise that the President was authorized to protect the secrecy of gov-
ernmental documents. Only one Justice denied expressly that power
was lacking altogether to sue.753
The President’s Duty in Cases of Domestic Violence in the

States
See Article IV, § 4, Guarantee of Republican Form of Govern-
ment, and discussion of “Martial Law and Domestic Disorder” un-
der Article II, § 2, cl. 1.
The President as Executor of the Law of Nations

Illustrative of the President’s duty to discharge the responsibili-
ties of the United States in international law with a view to avoid-
ing difficulties with other governments was the action of President
Wilson in closing the Marconi Wireless Station at Siasconset, Mas-
sachusetts, on the outbreak of the European War in 1914, the com-
pany having refused assurance that it would comply with naval cen-
sorship regulations. Justifying this drastic invasion of private rights,
Attorney General Gregory said: “The President of the United States
750 Thus, the Chief Justice noted that “we agree” that the debates on Norris-
LaGuardia “indicate that Congress, in passing the Act, did not intend to permit the
United States to continue to intervene by injunction in purely private labor dis-
putes.” Of course, he continued, “whether Congress so intended or not is a question
different from the one before us now.” 330 U.S. at 278.
751 61 Stat. 136, 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 176–180. Cf. Youngstown Sheet & Tube
Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), with regard to the exclusivity of proceeding.
752 403 U.S. 713 (1971).
753 On Justice Marshall’s view on the lack of authorization, see 403 U.S. at 740–48
(concurring opinion); for the dissenters on this issue, see id. at 752, 755–59 (Justice
Harlan, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined); see also id.
at 727, 729–30 (Justice Stewart, joined by Justice White, concurring).
is at the head of one of the three great coordinate departments of

the Government. He is Commander in Chief of the Army and the
Navy. . . . If the President is of the opinion that the relations of
this country with foreign nations are, or are likely to be endan-
gered, by action deemed by him inconsistent with a due neutrality,
it is his right and duty to protect such relations; and in doing so,
in the absence of any statutory restrictions, he may act through such
executive office or department as appears best adapted to effectu-
ate the desired end. . . . I do not hesitate, in view of the extraordi-
nary conditions existing, to advise that the President, through the
Secretary of the Navy or any appropriate department, close down,
or take charge of and operate, the plant . . . should he deem it nec-
essary in securing obedience to his proclamation of neutrality.” 754
PROTECTION OF AMERICAN RIGHTS OF PERSON

AND PROPERTY ABROAD
In 1854, one Lieutenant Hollins, in command of a United States
warship, bombarded the town of Greytown, Nicaragua because of
the refusal of local authorities to pay reparations for an attack by
a mob on the United States consul.755 Upon his return to the United
States, Hollins was sued in a federal court by Durand for the value
of certain property which was alleged to have been destroyed in the
bombardment. His defense was based upon the orders of the Presi-
dent and Secretary of the Navy and was sustained by Justice Nel-
son, on circuit.756 “As the Executive head of the nation, the Presi-
dent is made the only legitimate organ of the General Government,
to open and carry on correspondence or negotiations with foreign
nations, in matters concerning the interests of the country or of its
citizens. It is to him, also, the citizens abroad must look for protec-
tion of person and of property, and for the faithful execution of the
laws existing and intended for their protection. For this purpose,
the whole Executive power of the country is placed in his hands,
under the Constitution, and the laws passed in pursuance thereof;
and different Departments of government have been organized, through
which this power may be most conveniently executed, whether by
negotiation or by force—a Department of State and a Department
of the Navy.”
“Now, as it respects the interposition of the Executive abroad,
for the protection of the lives or property of the citizen, the duty
must, of necessity, rest in the discretion of the President. Acts of
lawless violence, or of threatened violence to the citizen or his prop-
754 30 Ops. Atty. Gen. 291 (1914).
755 7 J. MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 346–54 (1906).
756 Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. 111 (No. 4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
erty, cannot be anticipated and provided for; and the protection, to

be effectual or of any avail, may, not unfrequently, require the most
prompt and decided action. Under our system of Government, the
citizen abroad is as much entitled to protection as the citizen at
home. The great object and duty of Government is the protection of
the lives, liberty, and property of the people composing it, whether
abroad or at home; and any Government failing in the accomplish-
ment of the object, or the performance of the duty, is not worth pre-
serving.” 757
This incident and this case were but two items in the 19th cen-
tury advance of the concept that the President had the duty and
the responsibility to protect American lives and property abroad
through the use of armed forces if deemed necessary.758 The duty
could be said to grow out of the inherent powers of the Chief Execu-
tive 759 or perhaps out of his obligation to “take Care that the Laws
be faithfully executed.” 760 Although there were efforts made at times
to limit this presidential power narrowly to the protection of per-
sons and property rather than to the promotion of broader national
interests,761 no such distinction was observed in practice and so grew
the concepts which have become the source of serious national con-
troversy in the 1960s and 1970s, the power of the President to use
troops abroad to observe national commitments and protect the na-
tional interest without seeking prior approval from Congress.
Congress and the President versus Foreign Expropriation

Congress has asserted itself in one area of protection of United
States property abroad, making provision against uncompensated
expropriation of property belonging to United States citizens and
corporations. The problem of expropriation of foreign property and
the compensation to be paid therefor remains an unsettled area of
international law, of increasing importance because of the changes
and unsettled conditions following World War II.762 It has been the
position of the Executive Branch that just compensation is owed
all United States property owners dispossessed in foreign countries
and the many pre-World War II disputes were carried on between
the President and the Department of State and the nation in-
757 8 Fed. Cas. at 112.
758 See UNITED STATES SOLICITOR OF THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE, RIGHT TO PROTECT CITI-
ZENS IN FOREIGN COUNTRIES BY LANDING FORCES (3d rev. ed. 1934); M. OFFUTT, THE PROTEC-
TION OF CITIZENS ABROAD BY THE ARMED FORCES OF THE UNITED STATES (1928).
759 Durand v. Hollins, 8 Fed. Cas. 111 (No. 4186) (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1860).
760 M. Offutt, supra at 5.
761 E. Corwin, supra at 198–201.
762 Cf. Metzger, Property in International Law, 50 VA. L. REV. 594 (1964); Vaughn,
Finding the Law of Expropriation: Traditional v. Quantitative Research, 2 TEXAS INTL.

L. FORUM 189 (1966).
volved. But commencing with the Marshall Plan in 1948, Congress

has enacted programs of guaranties to American investors in speci-
fied foreign countries.763 More relevant to discussion here is that
Congress has attached to United States foreign assistance pro-
grams various amendments requiring the termination of assistance
and imposing other economic inducements where uncompensated ex-
propriations have been instituted.764 And when the Supreme Court
in 1964 applied the “act of state” doctrine so as not to examine the
validity of a taking of property by a foreign government recognized
by the United States but to defer to the decision of the foreign gov-
ernment,765 Congress reacted by attaching another amendment to
the foreign assistance act reversing the Court’s application of the
doctrine, except in certain circumstances, a reversal which was ap-
plied on remand of the case.766
PRESIDENTIAL ACTION IN THE DOMAIN OF

CONGRESS: THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE
To avert a nationwide strike of steel workers that he believed
would jeopardize the national defense, President Truman, on April
8, 1952, issued an executive order directing the Secretary of Com-
merce to seize and operate most of the steel industry of the coun-
try.767 The order cited no specific statutory authorization but in-
voked generally the powers vested in the President by the Constitution
and laws of the United States. The Secretary issued the appropri-
ate orders to steel executives. The President promptly reported his
action to Congress, conceding Congress’s power to supersede his or-
der, but Congress did not do so, either then or a few days later when
the President sent up a special message.768 The steel companies sued,
a federal district court enjoined the seizure,769 and the Supreme Court
brought the case up prior to decision by the court of appeals.770 Six-
to-three, the Court affirmed the district court order, each member
of the majority, however, contributing an individual opinion as well
763 62 Stat. 143 (1948), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2191 et seq. See also 22 U.S.C.
§ 1621 et seq.
764 76 Stat. 260 (1962), 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(1).
765 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
766 78 Stat. 1013 (1964), as amended, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2), applied on remand
in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), aff’d 383 F.2d
166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968).
767 E.O. 10340, 17 Fed. Reg. 3139 (1952).
768 H. Doc. No. 422, 82d Congress, 2d sess. (1952), 98 CONG. REC. 3912 (1952);
H. Doc. No. 496, 82d Congress, 2d sess. (1952), 98 CONG. REC. 6929 (1952).
769 103 F. Supp. 569 (D.D.C. 1952).
770 The court of appeals had stayed the district court’s injunction pending ap-
peal. 197 F.2d 582 (D.C. Cir. 1952). The Supreme Court decision bringing the action
up is at 343 U.S. 937 (1952). Justices Frankfurter and Burton dissented.
as joining in some degree the opinion of the Court by Justice Black.771

The holding and the multiple opinions represent a setback for the
adherents of “inherent” executive powers,772 but they raise difficult
conceptual and practical problems with regard to presidential pow-
ers.
The Doctrine of the Opinion of the Court

The chief points urged in the Black opinion are the following:
There was no statute that expressly or impliedly authorized the Presi-
dent to take possession of the property involved. On the contrary,
in its consideration of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, Congress re-
fused to authorize governmental seizures of property as a method
of preventing work stoppages and settling labor disputes. Author-
ity to issue such an order in the circumstances of the case was not
deducible from the aggregate of the President’s executive powers
under Article II of the Constitution; nor was the order maintain-
able as an exercise of the President’s powers as Commander in Chief
of the Armed Forces. The power sought to be exercised was the law-
making power, which the Constitution vests in the Congress alone.
Even if it were true that other Presidents have taken possession of
private business enterprises without congressional authority in or-
der to settle labor disputes, Congress was not thereby divested of
its exclusive constitutional authority to make the laws necessary
and proper to carry out all powers vested by the Constitution “in
the Government of the United States, or any Department or Offi-
cer thereof.” 773
The Doctrine Considered

The pivotal proposition of the opinion of the Court is that, inas-
much as Congress could have directed the seizure of the steel mills,
the President had no power to do so without prior congressional
authorization. To this reasoning, not only the dissenters but Jus-
tice Clark, in a concurring opinion, would not concur, and in fact
they stated baldly that the reasoning was contradicted by prec-
771 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In the major-
ity with Justice Black were Justices Frankfurter, Douglas, Jackson, Burton, and Clark.
Dissenting were Chief Justice Vinson and Justices Reed and Minton. For critical
consideration of the case, see Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick With-
out Straw, 53 COLUM. L. REV. 53 (1953); Roche, Executive Power and Domestic Emer-
gency: The Quest for Prerogative, 5 WEST. POL. Q. 592 (1952). For a comprehensive
account, see M. MARCUS, TRUMAN AND THE STEEL SEIZURE CASE: THE LIMITS OF PRESIDENTIAL
POWER (1977).
772 Indeed, the breadth of the Government’s arguments in the district court may
well have contributed to the defeat, despite the much more measured contentions
set out in the Supreme Court. See A. WESTIN, THE ANATOMY OF A CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
CASE 56–65 (1958) (argument in district court).
773 343 U.S. at 585–89.
edent, both judicial and presidential and congressional practice. One

of the earliest pronouncements on presidential power in this area
was that of Chief Justice Marshall in Little v. Barreme.774 There, a
United States vessel under orders from the President had seized a
United States merchant ship bound from a French port allegedly
carrying contraband material; Congress had, however, provided for
seizure only of such vessels bound to French ports.775 The Chief Jus-
tice wrote: “It is by no means clear, that the President of the United
States, whose high duty it is to ‘take care that the laws be faith-
fully executed,’ and who is commander-in-chief of the armies and
navies of the United States, might not, without any special author-
ity for that purpose, in the then existing state of things, have em-
powered the officers commanding the armed vessels of the United
States, to seize and send into port for adjudication, American ves-
sels which were forfeited, by being engaged in this illicit com-
merce. But when it is observed, that [an act of Congress] . . . gives
a special authority to seize on the high seas, and limits that author-
ity to the seizure of vessels bound, or sailing to, a French port, the
legislature seems to have prescribed that the manner in which this
law shall be carried into execution, was to exclude a seizure of any
vessel not bound to a French port.” 776
Other examples are at hand. In 1799, President Adams, in or-
der to execute the extradition provisions of the Jay Treaty, issued a
warrant for the arrest of one Robbins, and the action was chal-
lenged in Congress on the ground that no statutory authority ex-
isted by which the President could act; John Marshall defended the
action in the House of Representatives, the practice continued, and
it was not until 1848 that Congress enacted a statute governing
this subject.777 Again, in 1793, President Washington issued a neu-
trality proclamation; the following year, Congress enacted the first
neutrality statute and since then proclamations of neutrality have
been based on acts of Congress.778 Repeatedly, acts of the President
have been in areas in which Congress could act as well.779
Justice Frankfurter’s concurring opinion 780 listed 18 statutory
authorizations for seizures of industrial property, all but one of which
774 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804).
775 1 Stat. 613 (1799).
776 Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170, 177–78 (1804).
777 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 596, 613–14 (1800). The argument was endorsed in Fong
Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 714 (1893). The presence of a treaty, of
which this provision was self-executing, is sufficient to distinguish this example from
the steel seizure situation.
778 Cf. E. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT’S CONTROL OF FOREIGN RELATIONS ch. 1 (1916).
779 E. Corwin, The Steel Seizure Case: A Judicial Brick Without Straw, 53 COLUM.
L. REV. 53, 58–59 (1953).

780 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 593 (1952).
were enacted between 1916 and 1951, and summaries of seizures

of industrial plants and facilities by Presidents without definite statu-
tory warrant, eight of which occurred during World War I—
justified in presidential orders as being done pursuant to “the Con-
stitution and laws” generally—and eleven of which occurred in World
War II.781 The first such seizure in this period had been justified
by then Attorney General Jackson as being based upon an “aggre-
gate” of presidential powers stemming from his duty to see the laws
faithfully executed, his commander-in-chiefship, and his general ex-
ecutive powers.782 Chief Justice Vinson’s dissent dwelt liberally upon
this opinion,783 which reliance drew a disclaimer from Justice Jack-
son, concurring.784
The dissent was also fortunate in that the steel companies’ chief
counsel, John W. Davis, a former Solicitor General of the United
States, had filed a brief in 1914 in defense of Presidential action,
which had taken precisely the view that the dissent now pre-
sented.785 “Ours,” the brief read, “is a self-sufficient Government within
its sphere. (Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371, 395; in re Debs, 158
U.S. 564, 578.) ‘Its means are adequate to its ends’ (McCulloch v.
Maryland, 4 Wheat., 316, 424), and it is rational to assume that
its active forces will be found equal in most things to the emergen-
cies that confront it. While perfect flexibility is not to be expected
in a Government of divided powers, and while division of power is
one of the principal features of the Constitution, it is the plain duty
of those who are called upon to draw the dividing lines to ascertain
the essential, recognize the practical, and avoid a slavish formal-
ism which can only serve to ossify the government and reduce its
efficiency without any compensating good. The function of making
laws is peculiar to Congress, and the Executive can not exercise
that function to any degree. But this is not to say that all of the
subjects concerning which laws might be made are perforce re-
moved from the possibility of Executive influence. The Executive may
act upon things and upon men in many relations which have not,
though they might have, been actually regulated by Congress. In
781 343 U.S. at 611–13, 620.
782 89 CONG. REC. 3992 (1943).
783 343 U.S. at 695–96 (dissenting opinion).
784 Thus, Justice Jackson noted of the earlier seizure, that “[i]ts superficial simi-
larities with the present case, upon analysis, yield to distinctions so decisive that it
cannot be regarded as even a precedent, much less an authority for the present sei-
zure.” 343 U.S. at 648–49 (concurring opinion). His opinion opens with the sen-
tence: “That comprehensive and undefined presidential powers hold both practical
advantages and grave dangers for the country will impress anyone who has served
as legal adviser to a President in time of transition and public anxiety.” Id. at 634.
785 Brief for the United States at 11, 75–77, United States v. Midwest Oil Co.,
236 U.S. 459 (1915).

other words, just as there are fields which are peculiar to Congress
and fields which are peculiar to the Executive, so there are fields
which are common to both, in the sense that the Executive may
move within them until they shall have been occupied by legisla-
tive action. These are not the fields of legislative prerogative, but
fields within which the lawmaking power may enter and dominate
whenever it chooses. This situation results from the fact that the
President is the active agent, not of Congress, but of the Nation.
As such he performs the duties which the Constitution lays upon
him immediately, and as such, also, he executes the laws and regu-
lations adopted by Congress. He is the agent of the people of the
United States, deriving all his powers from them and responsible
directly to them. In no sense is he the agent of Congress. He obeys
and executes the laws of Congress, not because Congress is en-
throned in authority over him, but because the Constitution directs
him to do so.”
“Therefore it follows that in ways short of making laws or dis-
obeying them, the Executive may be under a grave constitutional
duty to act for the national protection in situations not covered by
the acts of Congress, and in which, even, it may not be said that
his action is the direct expression of any particular one of the inde-
pendent powers which are granted to him specifically by the Consti-
tution. Instances wherein the President has felt and fulfilled such
a duty have not been rare in our history, though, being for the pub-
lic benefit and approved by all, his acts have seldom been chal-
lenged in the courts.” 786
Power Denied by Congress

Justice Black’s opinion of the Court in Youngstown Sheet and
Tube Co. v. Sawyer notes that Congress had refused to give the Presi-
dent seizure authority and had authorized other actions, which had
not been taken.787 This statement led him to conclude merely that,
since the power claimed did not stem from Congress, it had to be
found in the Constitution. But four of the concurring Justices made
considerably more of the fact that Congress had considered seizure
and had refused to authorize it. Justice Frankfurter stated: “We must
. . . put to one side consideration of what powers the President would
have had if there had been no legislation whatever bearing on the
authority asserted by the seizure, or if the seizure had been only
for a short, explicitly temporary period, to be terminated automati-
786 Quoted in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 689–91
(1952) (dissenting opinion).

787 343 U.S. at 585–87.
cally unless Congressional approval were given.” 788 He then re-

viewed the proceedings of Congress that attended the enactment of
the Taft-Hartley Act and concluded that “Congress has expressed
its will to withhold this power [of seizure] from the President as
though it had said so in so many words.” 789
Justice Jackson attempted a schematic representation of presi-
dential powers, which “are not fixed but fluctuate, depending upon
their disjunction or conjunction with those of Congress.” Thus, there
are essentially three possibilities. “1. When the President acts pur-
suant to an express or implied authorization of Congress, his au-
thority is at its maximum, for it includes all that he possess in his
own right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . . 2. When the Presi-
dent acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of au-
thority, he can only rely upon his own independent powers, but there
is a zone of twilight in which he and Congress may have concur-
rent authority, or in which its distribution is uncertain. . . . 3. When
the President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or
implied will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he
can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any consti-
tutional powers of Congress over the matter. Courts can sustain ex-
clusive presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Con-
gress from acting upon the subject.” 790 The seizure in question was
placed in the third category “because Congress has not left seizure
of private property an open field but has covered it by three statu-
tory policies inconsistent with this seizure.” Therefore, “we can sus-
tain the President only by holding that seizure of such strike-
bound industries is within his domain and beyond control by
Congress.” 791 That holding was not possible.
Justice Burton, referring to the Taft-Hartley Act, said that “the
most significant feature of that Act is its omission of authority to
seize,” citing debate on the measure to show that the omission was
a conscious decision.792 Justice Clark relied on Little v. Barreme,793
788 343 U.S. at 597.

789 343 U.S. at 602.
790 343 U.S. at 635–38. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 638 (2006), Jus-
tice Kennedy, in a concurring opinion joined by three other Justices, endorsed “the
three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson” as “[t]he proper framework for assess-
ing whether Executive actions are authorized.” The Court in this case found “that
the military commission convened [by the President, in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba] to
try Hamdan lacks power to proceed because its structure and procedures violate [the
Uniform Code of Military Justice].” Id. at 567. Thus, as Justice Kennedy noted, “the
President has acted in a field with a history of congressional participation and regu-
lation.” Id. at 638.
791 343 U.S. at 639, 640.
792 343 U.S. at 657.
793 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804).
in that Congress had laid down specific procedures for the Presi-
dent to follow, which he had declined to follow.794
Despite the opinion of the Court, therefore, it seems clear that
four of the six Justices in the majority were more moved by the
fact that the President had acted in a manner considered and re-
jected by Congress in a field in which Congress was empowered to
establish the rules—rules the President is to see faithfully executed—
than with the fact that the President’s action was a form of “law-
making” in a field committed to the province of Congress. The opin-
ion of the Court, therefore, and its doctrinal implications must be
considered with care, as it is doubtful that the opinion lays down a
constitutional rule. Whatever the implications of the opinions of the
individual Justices for the doctrine of “inherent” presidential powers—
and they are significant—the implications for the area here under
consideration are cloudy and have remained so from the time of the
decision.795
PRESIDENTIAL IMMUNITY FROM JUDICIAL

DIRECTION
In Mississippi v. Johnson,796 in 1867, the Court placed the Presi-
dent beyond the reach of judicial direction, either affirmative or re-
straining, in the exercise of his powers, whether constitutional or
statutory, political or otherwise, save perhaps for what must be a
small class of powers that are purely ministerial.797 An application
for an injunction to forbid President Johnson to enforce the Recon-
struction Acts, on the ground of their unconstitutionality, was an-
swered by Attorney General Stanberg, who argued, inter alia, the
absolute immunity of the President from judicial process.798 The Court
refused to permit the filing, using language construable as mean-
794 343 U.S. at 662, 663.
795 In Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668–69 (1981), the Court re-
curred to the Youngstown analysis for resolution of the presented questions, but one
must observe that it did so saying that “the parties and the lower courts . . . have
all agreed that much relevant analysis is contained in” Youngstown. See also id. at
661–62, quoting Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence, “which both parties agree
brings together as much combination of analysis and common sense as there is in
this area.”
796 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867).
797 The Court declined to express an opinion “whether, in any case, the Presi-
dent of the United States may be required, by the process of this court, to perform a
purely ministerial act under a positive law, or may be held amenable, in any case,
otherwise than by impeachment for crime.” 71 U.S. at 498. See Franklin v. Massa-
chusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 825–28 (1992) (Justice Scalia concurring). In NTEU v. Nixon,
492 F.2d 587 (D.C. Cir. 1974), the court held that a writ of mandamus could issue to
compel the President to perform a ministerial act, although it said that if any other
officer were available to whom the writ could run it should be applied to him.
798 Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475, 484–85 (1867) (argument of
counsel).
ing that the President was not reachable by judicial process but which
more fully paraded the horrible consequences were the Court to act.
First noting the limited meaning of the term “ministerial,” the Court
observed that “[v]ery different is the duty of the President in the
exercise of the power to see that the laws are faithfully executed,
and among these laws the acts named in the bill. . . . The duty
thus imposed on the President is in no just sense ministerial. It is
purely executive and political.”
“An attempt on the part of the judicial department of the gov-
ernment to enforce the performance of such duties by the Presi-
dent might be justly characterized, in the language of Chief Justice
Marshall, as ‘an absurd and excessive extravagance.’ ”
“It is true that in the instance before us the interposition of
the court is not sought to enforce action by the Executive under
constitutional legislation, but to restrain such action under legisla-
tion alleged to be unconstitutional. But we are unable to perceive
that this circumstance takes the case out of the general principles
which forbid judicial interference with the exercise of Executive dis-
cretion.” . . .
“The Congress is the legislative department of the government;
the President is the executive department. Neither can be re-
strained in its action by the judicial department; though the acts of
both, when performed, are, in proper cases, subject to its cogni-
zance.”
“The impropriety of such interference will be clearly seen upon
consideration of its possible consequences.”
“Suppose the bill filed and the injunction prayed for allowed. If
the President refuse obedience, it is needless to observe that the
court is without power to enforce its process. If, on the other hand,
the President complies with the order of the court and refuses to
execute the acts of Congress, is it not clear that a collision may
occur between the executive and legislative departments of the gov-
ernment? May not the House of Representatives impeach the Presi-
dent for such refusal? And in that case could this court interfere,
in behalf of the President, thus endangered by compliance with its
mandate, and restrain by injunction the Senate of the United States
from sitting as a court of impeachment? Would the strange spec-
tacle be offered to the public world of an attempt by this court to
arrest proceedings in that court?” 799
799 71 U.S. at 499, 500–01. One must be aware that the case was decided in the
context of congressional predominance following the Civil War. The Court’s restraint
was pronounced when it denied an effort to file a bill of injunction to enjoin enforce-
ment of the same acts directed to cabinet officers. Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6
Rare has been the opportunity for the Court to elucidate its opin-
ion in Mississippi v. Johnson, and, in the Watergate tapes case,800
it held the President amenable to subpoena to produce evidence for
use in a criminal case without dealing, except obliquely, with its
prior opinion. The President’s counsel had argued the President was
immune to judicial process, claiming “that the independence of the
Executive Branch within its own sphere . . . insulates a President
from a judicial subpoena in an ongoing criminal prosecution, and
thereby protects confidential Presidential communications.” 801 How-
ever, the Court held, “neither the doctrine of separation of powers,
nor the need for confidentiality of high-level communications, with-
out more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privi-
lege of immunity from judicial process under all circumstances.” 802
The primary constitutional duty of the courts “to do justice in crimi-
nal prosecutions” was a critical counterbalance to the claim of presi-
dential immunity, and to accept the President’s argument would dis-
turb the separation-of-powers function of achieving “a workable
government” as well as “gravely impair the role of the courts under
Art. III.” 803
Present throughout the Watergate crisis, and unresolved by it,
was the question of the amenability of the President to criminal
prosecution prior to conviction upon impeachment.804 It was ar-
Wall.) 50 (1867). Before and since, however, the device to obtain review of the Presi-
dent’s actions has been to bring suit against the subordinate officer charged with
carrying out the President’s wishes. Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 524 (1838); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). Congress has not provided pro-
cess against the President. In Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788 (1992), resolv-
ing a long-running dispute, the Court held that the President is not subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act and his actions, therefore, are not reviewable in suits
under the Act. Inasmuch as some agency action, the acts of the Secretary of Com-
merce in this case, is preliminary to presidential action, the agency action is not
“final” for purposes of APA review. Constitutional claims would still be brought, how-
ever. See also, following Franklin, Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462 (1994).
800 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
801 418 U.S. at 706.
802 Id.
803 418 U.S. at 706–07. The issue was considered more fully by the lower courts.
In re Grand Jury Subpoena to Richard M. Nixon, 360 F. Supp. 1, 6–10 (D.D.C. 1973)
(Judge Sirica), aff’d sub nom., Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 708–712 (D.C. Cir. 1973)
(en banc) (refusing to find President immune from process). Present throughout was
the conflicting assessment of the result of the subpoena of President Jefferson in
the Burr trial. United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187 (No. 14,694) (C.C.D.Va. 1807).
For the history, see Freund, Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, The Supreme Court,
1973 Term, 88 HARV. L. REV. 13, 23–30 (1974).
804 The Impeachment Clause, Article I, § 3, cl. 7, provides that the party con-
victed upon impeachment shall nonetheless be liable to criminal proceedings. Mor-

ris in the Convention, 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
500 (rev. ed. 1937), and Hamilton in THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 65, 69 (J. Cooke ed. 1961),
442, 463, asserted that criminal trial would follow a successful impeachment.
gued that the Impeachment Clause necessarily required indict-

ment and trial in a criminal proceeding to follow a successful im-
peachment and that a President in any event was uniquely immune
from indictment, and these arguments were advanced as one ground
to deny enforcement of the subpoenas running to the President.805
Assertion of the same argument by Vice President Agnew was con-
troverted by the government, through the Solicitor General, but, as
to the President, it was argued that for a number of constitutional
and practical reasons he was not subject to ordinary criminal pro-
cess.806
Finally, most recently, the Court has definitively resolved one
of the intertwined issues of presidential accountability. The Presi-
dent is absolutely immune in actions for civil damages for all acts
within the “outer perimeter” of his official duties.807 The Court’s close
decision was premised on the President’s “unique position in the
constitutional scheme,” that is, it was derived from the Court’s in-
quiry of a “kind of ‘public policy’ analysis” of the “policies and prin-
ciples that may be considered implicit in the nature of the Presi-
dent’s office in a system structured to achieve effective government
under a constitutionally mandated separation of powers.” 808 Al-
though the Constitution expressly afforded Members of Congress im-
munity in matters arising from “speech or debate,” and although it
was silent with respect to presidential immunity, the Court none-
theless considered such immunity “a functionally mandated inci-
dent of the President’s unique office, rooted in the constitutional tra-
dition of the separation of powers and supported by our history.” 809
Although the Court relied in part upon its previous practice of find-
ing immunity for officers, such as judges, as to whom the Constitu-
tion is silent, although a long common-law history exists, and in
part upon historical evidence, which it admitted was fragmentary
and ambiguous,810 the Court’s principal focus was upon the fact that
the President was distinguishable from all other executive officials.
He is charged with a long list of “supervisory and policy responsi-
805 Brief for the Respondent, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974), 95–
122; Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700, 756–58 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (en banc) (Judge MacKin-
non dissenting). The Court had accepted the President’s petition to review the pro-
priety of the grand jury’s naming him as an unindicted coconspirator, but it dismissed
that petition without reaching the question. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 687
n.2.
806 Memorandum for the United States, Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Civil No.
73–965 (D.Md., filed October 5, 1973).

807 Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731 (1982).
808 457 U.S. at 748.
809 457 U.S. at 749.
810 457 U.S. at 750–52 n.31.
bilities of utmost discretion and sensitivity,” 811 and diversion of his

energies by concerns with private lawsuits would “raise unique risks
to the effective functioning of government.” 812 Moreover, the presi-
dential privilege is rooted in the separation-of-powers doctrine, coun-
seling courts to tread carefully before intruding. Some interests are
important enough to require judicial action; “merely private suit[s]
for damages based on a President’s official acts” do not serve this
“broad public interest” necessitating the courts to act.813 Finally, quali-
fied immunity would not adequately protect the President, because
judicial inquiry into a functional analysis of his actions would bring
with it the evil immunity was to prevent; absolute immunity was
required.814
Unofficial Conduct
In Clinton v. Jones,815 the Court, in a case of first impression,
held that the President did not have qualified immunity from civil
suit for conduct alleged to have taken place prior to his election,
and therefore denied the President’s request to delay both the trial
and discovery. The Court held that its precedents affording the Presi-
dent immunity from suit for his official conduct—primarily on the
basis that he should be enabled to perform his duties effectively
without fear that a particular decision might give rise to personal
liability—were inapplicable in this kind of case. Moreover, the
separation-of-powers doctrine did not require a stay of all private
actions against the President. Separation of powers is preserved by
guarding against the encroachment or aggrandizement of one of the
coequal branches of the government at the expense of another. How-
ever, a federal trial court tending to a civil suit in which the Presi-
dent is a party performs only its judicial function, not a function of
another branch. No decision by a trial court could curtail the scope
of the President’s powers. The trial court, the Supreme Court ob-
served, had sufficient powers to accommodate the President’s sched-
ule and his workload, so as not to impede the President’s perfor-
mance of his duties. Finally, the Court stated its belief that allowing
such suits to proceed would not generate a large volume of politi-
811 457 U.S. at 750.
812 457 U.S. at 751.
813 457 U.S. at 754.
814 457 U.S. at 755–57. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dis-
sented. The Court reserved decision whether Congress could expressly create a dam-
ages action against the President and abrogate the immunity, id. at 748–49 n.27,
thus appearing to disclaim that the decision is mandated by the Constitution; Chief
Justice Burger disagreed with the implication of this footnote, id. at 763–64 n.7 (con-
curring opinion), and the dissenters noted their agreement on this point with the
Chief Justice. Id. at 770 & n.4.
815 520 U.S. 681 (1997).
cally motivated harassing and frivolous litigation. Congress has the

power, the Court advised, if it should think necessary to legislate,
to afford the President protection.816
The President’s Subordinates

While the courts may be unable to compel the President to act
or to prevent him from acting, his acts, when performed, are in proper
cases subject to judicial review and disallowance. Typically, the sub-
ordinates through whom he acts may be sued, in a form of legal
fiction, to enjoin the commission of acts which might lead to irrepa-
rable damage 817 or to compel by writ of mandamus the perfor-
mance of a duty definitely required by law.818 Such suits are usu-
ally brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Columbia.819 In suits under the common law, a subordinate execu-
tive officer may be held personally liable in damages for any act
done in excess of authority,820 although immunity exists for any-
thing, even malicious wrongdoing, done in the course of his du-
ties.821
816 The Court observed at one point that it doubted that defending the suit would
much preoccupy the President, that his time and energy would not be much taken
up by it. “If the past is any indicator, it seems unlikely that a deluge of such litiga-
tion will ever engulf the Presidency.” 520 U.S. at 702.
817 E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (suit to
enjoin Secretary of Commerce to return steel mills seized on President’s order); Dames
& Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (suit against Secretary of Treasury to nullify
presidential orders on Iranian assets). See also Noble v. Union River Logging Rail-
road, 147 U.S. 165 (1893); Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912).
818 E.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803) (suit against Secretary of
State to compel delivery of commissions of office); Kendall v. United States ex rel.

Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (suit against Postmaster General to compel pay-
ment of money owed under act of Congress); Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.)
497 (1840) (suit to compel Secretary of Navy to pay a pension).
819 This was originally on the theory that the Supreme Court of the District of
Columbia had inherited, via the common law of Maryland, the jurisdiction of the
King’s Bench “over inferior jurisdictions and officers.” Kendall v. United States ex
rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524, 614, 620–21 (1838). Congress has now authorized
federal district courts outside the District of Columbia also to entertain such suits.
76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
820 E.g., Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 170 (1804); Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204
(1877); United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Virginia Coupon Cases (Poindexter
v. Greenhow), 114 U.S. 269 (1885); Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10 (1896).
821 Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896); Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
See Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) (action must be discretionary in nature
as well as being within the scope of employment, before federal official is entitled to
absolute immunity). Following the Westfall decision, Congress enacted the Federal
Employees Liability Reform and Tort Compensation Act of 1988 (the Westfall Act),
which authorized the Attorney General to certify that an employee was acting within
the scope of his office or employment at the time of the incident out of which a suit
arose; upon certification, the employee is dismissed from the action, and the United
States is substituted, the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) then governing the ac-
tion, which means that sometimes the action must be dismissed against the govern-
Different rules prevail when such an official is sued for a “con-

stitutional tort” for wrongs allegedly in violation of our basic char-
ter,822 although the Court has hinted that in some “sensitive” areas
officials acting in the “outer perimeter” of their duties may be ac-
corded an absolute immunity from liability.823 Jurisdiction to reach
such officers for acts for which they can be held responsible must
be under the general “federal question” jurisdictional statute, which,
as recently amended, requires no jurisdictional amount.824
COMMISSIONING OFFICERS
The power to commission officers, as applied in practice, does
not mean that the President is under constitutional obligation to
commission those whose appointments have reached that stage, but
merely that it is he and no one else who has the power to commis-
sion them, and that he may do so at his discretion. Under the doc-
trine of Marbury v. Madison, the sealing and delivery of the com-
mission is a purely ministerial act which has been lodged by statute
with the Secretary of State, and which may be compelled by man-
damus unless the appointee has been in the meantime validly re-
ment because the FTCA has not waived sovereign immunity. United States v. Smith,
499 U.S. 160 (1991) (Westfall Act bars suit against federal employee even when an
exception in the FTCA bars suit against the government). Cognizant of the tempta-
tion of the government to immunize both itself and its employee, the Court in Gutier-
rez de Martinez v. Lamagno, 515 U.S. 417 (1995), held that the Attorney General’s
certification is subject to judicial review.
822 An implied cause of action against officers accused of constitutional viola-
tions was recognized in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Federal Bu-
reau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978), a
Bivens action, the Court distinguished between common-law torts and constitu-
tional torts and denied high federal officials, including cabinet secretaries, absolute
immunity, in favor of the qualified immunity previously accorded high state officials
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the Court de-
nied presidential aides derivative absolute presidential immunity, but it modified the
rules of qualified immunity, making it more difficult to hold such aides, other fed-
eral officials, and indeed state and local officials, liable for constitutional torts. In
Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985), the Court extended qualified immunity to
the Attorney General for authorizing a warrantless wiretap in a case involving do-
mestic national security. Although the Court later held such warrantless wiretaps
violated the Fourth Amendment, at the time of the Attorney General’s authorization
this interpretation was not “clearly established,” and the Harlow immunity pro-
tected officials exercising discretion on such open questions. See also Anderson v.
Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (in an exceedingly opaque opinion, the Court ex-
tended similar qualified immunity to FBI agents who conducted a warrantless search).
823 Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 812 (1982).
824 See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. On deleting the jurisdictional amount, see Pub. L. 94–
574, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976), and Pub. L. 96–486, 94 Stat. 2369 (1980). If such suits
are brought in state courts, they can be removed to federal district courts. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1442(a).
moved.825 By an opinion of the Attorney General many years later,

however, the President, even after he has signed a commission, still
has a locus poenitentiae and may withhold it; nor is the appointee
in office till he has this commission.826 This is probably the correct
doctrine.827
SECTION 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Offi-

cers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Im-
peachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high
Crimes and Misdemeanors.
IMPEACHMENT
The impeachment provisions of the Constitution 828 were de-
rived from English practice, but there are important differences. In
England, impeachment had a far broader scope. While impeach-
ment was a device to remove from office one who abused his office
or misbehaved but who was protected by the Crown, it could be
used against anyone—office holder or not—and was penal in na-
ture, with possible penalties of fines, imprisonment, or even death.829
By contrast, the American impeachment process is remedial, not pe-
825 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 157–58, 173 (1803). The doctrine
applies to presidential appointments regardless of whether Senate confirmation is

required.
826 12 Ops. Atty. Gen. 306 (1867).
827 For various reasons, Marbury got neither commission nor office. The case
assumes, in fact, the necessity of possession of his commission by the appointee.

828 Impeachment is the subject of several other provisions of the Constitution.
Article I, § 2, cl. 5, gives to the House of Representatives “the sole power of impeach-
ment.” Article I, § 3, cl. 6, gives to the Senate “the sole power to try all impeach-
ments,” requires that Senators be under oath or affirmation when sitting for that
purpose, stipulates that the Chief Justice of the United States is to preside when
the President of the United States is tried, and provides for conviction on the vote
of two-thirds of the members present. Article I, § 3, cl. 7, limits the judgment after
impeachment to removal from office and disqualification from future federal office
holding, but it allows criminal trial following conviction upon impeachment. Article
II, § 2, cl. 1, deprives the President of the power to grant pardons or reprieves in
cases of impeachment. Article III,§ 2, cl. 3, excepts impeachment cases from the jury
trial requirement.
Although the word “impeachment” is sometimes used to refer to the process by
which any member of the House may “impeach” an officer of the United States un-
der a question of constitutional privilege (see 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2398 (impeachment of President John Tyler
by a member) and 2469 (impeachment of Judge John Swayne by a member) (1907),
the word as used in Article II, § 4 refers to impeachment by vote of the House, the
consequence of which is that the Senate may then try the impeached officer.
829 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF ENGLISH COURTS 379–85 (7th ed. 1956); Clarke,
The Origin of Impeachment, in OXFORD ESSAYS IN MEDIEVAL HISTORY, PRESENTED TO HER-

BERT EDWARD SALTER 164 (1934); Alex Simpson, Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA.
L. REV. 651 (1916).
Sec. 4—Impeachment
nal: it is limited to office holders, and judgments are limited to no

more than removal from office and disqualification to hold future
office.
Impeachment was a device that figured from the first in the plans
proposed to the Convention; discussion addressed such questions as
what body was to try impeachments and what grounds were to be
stated as warranting impeachment.830 The attention of the Fram-
ers was for the most part fixed on the President and his removal,
and the results of this narrow frame of reference are reflected in
the questions unresolved by the language of the Constitution.
Persons Subject to Impeachment

During the debate in the First Congress on the “removal” con-
troversy, it was contended by some members that impeachment was
the exclusive way to remove any officer of the government from his
post,831 but Madison and others contended that this position was
destructive of sound governmental practice,832 and the view did not
prevail. Impeachment, said Madison, was to be used to reach a bad
officer sheltered by the President and to remove him “even against
the will of the President; so that the declaration in the Constitu-
tion was intended as a supplementary security for the good behav-
ior of the public officers.” 833 While the language of section 4 covers
any “civil officer” in the executive branch,834 and covers judges as
well,835 it excludes military officers,836 and the precedent was early
established that it does not apply to members of Congress.837
Judges.—Article III, section 1 specifically provides judges with
“good behavior” tenure, but the Constitution nowhere expressly vests
the power to remove upon bad behavior, and it has been assumed
that judges are made subject to the impeachment power through
830 Alex Simpson, Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REV.at 653–67 (1916).
831 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 457, 473, 536 (1789).
832 Id. at 375, 480, 496–97, 562.
833 Id. at 372.
834 The term “civil officers of the United States” is not defined in the Constitu-
tion, although there may be a parallel with “officers of the United States” under the
Appointments Clause, Art. II, § 2, cl. 2, and it may be assumed that not all execu-
tive branch employees are “officers.” For precedents relating to the definition, see 3
HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 1785, 2022,
2486, 2493, and 2515 (1907). See also Ronald D. Rotunda, An Essay on the Constitu-
tional Parameters of Federal Impeachment, 76 KY. L. REV. 707, 715–18 (1988).
835 See the following section on Judges.
837 This point was established by a vote of the Senate holding a plea to this
effect good in the impeachment trial of Senator William Blount in 1797. 3 HINDS’
PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2294–2318 (1907);
F. WHARTON, STATE TRIALS OF THE UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHING-
TON AND ADAMS 200–321 (1849); BUCKNER F. MELTON, JR., THE FIRST IMPEACHMENT: THE
CONSTITUTION’S FRAMERS AND THE CASE OF SENATOR WILLIAM BLOUNT (1998).
being labeled “civil officers.” 838 The records in the Convention make
this a plausible though not necessary interpretation.839 And, in fact,
eleven of the fifteen impeachments reaching trial in the Senate have
been directed at federal judges, and all seven of those convicted in
impeachment trials have been judges.840 So settled apparently is
838 See NATIONAL COMM’N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL, REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMM’N ON JUDICIAL DISCIPLINE & REMOVAL 9–11 (1993). The Commission was charged
by Congress with investigating and studying problems and issues relating to disci-
pline and removal of federal judges, to evaluate the advisability of developing alter-
natives to impeachment, and to report to the three Government Branches. Pub. L.
101–650, 104 Stat. 5124. The report and the research papers produced for it contain
a wealth of information on the subject.
839 For practically the entire Convention, the plans presented and adopted pro-
vided that the Supreme Court was to try impeachments. 1 M. Farrand, supra, at
22, 244, 223–24, 231; 2 id. at 186. On August 27, it was successfully moved that the
provision in the draft of the Committee on Detail giving the Supreme Court jurisdic-
tion of trials of impeachment be postponed, id. at 430, 431, which was one of the
issues committed to the Committee of Eleven. Id. at 481. That Committee reported
the provision giving the Senate power to try all impeachments, id. at 497, which
the Convention thereafter approved. Id. at 551. It may be assumed that so long as
trial was in the Supreme Court, the Framers did not intend that the Justices, at
least, were to be subject to the process.
The Committee of Five on August 20 was directed to report “a mode for trying
the supreme Judges in cases of impeachment,” id. at 337, and it returned a provi-
sion making Supreme Court Justices triable by the Senate on impeachment by the
House. Id. at 367. Consideration of this report was postponed. On August 27, it was
proposed that all federal judges should be removable by the executive upon the ap-
plication of both houses of Congress, but the motion was rejected. Id. at 428–29.
The matter was not resolved by the report of the Committee on Style, which left in
the “good behavior” tenure but contained nothing about removal. Id. at 575. There-
fore, unless judges were included in the term “civil officers,” which had been added
without comment on September 8 to the impeachment clause, id. at 552, they were
not made removable.
840 The following judges faced impeachment trials in the Senate: John Picker-
ing, District Judge, 1803 (convicted), 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2319–2341 (1907); Justice Samuel Chase, 1804 (acquit-
ted), id. at §§ 2342–2363; James H. Peck, District Judge, 1830 (acquitted), id. at 2364–
2384; West H. Humphreys, District Judge, 1862 (convicted), id. at §§ 2385–2397; Charles
Swayne, District Judge, 1904 (acquitted), id. at §§ 2469–2485; Robert W. Archbald,
Judge of Commerce Court, 1912 (convicted), 6 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 498–512 (1936); Harold Louderback, District
Judge, 1932 (acquitted), id. at §§ 513–524; Halsted L. Ritter, District Judge, 1936
(convicted), Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Trial of Impeachment of
Halsted L. Ritter, S. Doc. No. 200, 74th Congress, 2d Sess. (1936); Harry Claiborne,
District Judge, 1986 (convicted), Proceedings of the United States Senate in the Im-
peachment Trial of Harry E. Claiborne, S. Doc. 99–48, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986);
Alcee Hastings, District Judge, 1989 (convicted), Proceedings of the United States
Senate in the Impeachment Trial of Alcee L. Hastings, S. Doc. 101–18, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989); Walter Nixon, District Judge, 1989 (convicted), Proceedings of the
United States Senate in the Impeachment Trial of Walter L. Nixon, Jr., S. Doc. 101–
22, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989). In addition, impeachment proceedings against dis-
trict judge George W. English were dismissed in 1926 following his resignation six
days prior to the scheduled start of his Senate trial. 68 CONG. REC. 344, 348 (1926).
See also ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachments Since
1903, 23 MINN. L. REV. 185, 194–96 (1939). The others who have faced impeachment
trials in the Senate are Senator William Blount (acquitted); Secretary of War Wil-
this interpretation that the major arguments, scholarly and politi-

cal, have concerned the question of whether judges, as well as oth-
ers, are subject to impeachment for conduct that does not consti-
tute an indictable offense, and the question of whether impeachment
is the exclusive removal device for judges.841
Judgment—Removal and Disqualification
Article II, section 4 provides that officers impeached and con-
victed “shall be removed from office”; Article I, section 3, clause 7
provides further that “judgment in cases of impeachment shall not
extend further than to removal from office, and disqualification to
hold and enjoy any office of honor, trust or profit under the United
States.” These restrictions on judgment, both of which relate to ca-
pacity to hold public office, emphasize the non-penal nature of im-
peachment, and help to distinguish American impeachment from the
open-ended English practice under which criminal penalties could
be imposed.842
The plain language of section 4 seems to require removal from
office upon conviction, and in fact the Senate has removed those
liam Belknap (acquitted); President Andrew Johnson (acquitted); and President Wil-
liam J. Clinton (acquitted). For summary and discussion of the earlier cases, see
CONSTITUTIONAL ASPECTS OF WATERGATE: DOCUMENTS AND MATERIALS (A. Boyan ed., 1976);
and Paul S. Fenton, The Scope of the Impeachment Power, 65 NW. U. L. REV. 719
(1970) (appendix), reprinted in Staff of the House Committee on the Judiciary, 105th
Cong., Impeachment: Selected Materials 1818 (Comm. Print. 1998).
841 It has been argued that the impeachment clause of Article II is a limitation
on the power of Congress to remove judges and that Article III is a limitation on
the executive power of removal, but that it is open to Congress to define “good be-
havior” and establish a mechanism by which judges may be judicially removed. Shartel,
Federal Judges—Appointment, Supervision, and Removal—Some Possibilities Under
the Constitution, 28 MICH. L. REV. 485, 723, 870 (1930). Proposals to this effect were
considered in Congress in the 1930s and 1940s and revived in the late 1960s, stimu-
lating much controversy in scholarly circles. E.g., Kramer & Barron, The Constitu-
tionality of Removal and Mandatory Retirement Procedures for the Federal Judi-
ciary: The Meaning of “During Good Behavior,” 35 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 455 (1967);
Ziskind, Judicial Tenure in the American Constitution: English and American Prec-
edents, 1969 SUP. CT. REV. 135; Berger, Impeachment of Judges and “Good Behavior”
Tenure, 79 YALE L. J. 1475 (1970). Congress did in the Judicial Conduct and Disabil-
ity Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–458, 94 Stat. 2035, 28 U.S.C. § 1 note, 331, 332, 372,
604, provide for disciplinary powers over federal judges, but it specifically denied
any removal power. The National Commission, supra at 17–26, found impeachment
to be the exclusive means of removal and recommended against adoption of an alter-
native. Congress repealed 28 U.S.C. § 372 in the Judicial Improvements Act of 2002,
Pub. L. 107–273 and created a new chapter (28 U.S.C. §§ 351–64) dealing with judi-
cial discipline short of removal for Article III judges, and authorizing discipline in-
cluding removal for magistrate judges. The issue was obliquely before the Court as
a result of a judicial conference action disciplining a district judge, but it was not
reached, Chandler v. Judicial Council, 382 U.S. 1003 (1966); 398 U.S. 74 (1970), ex-
cept by Justices Black and Douglas in dissent, who argued that impeachment was
the exclusive power.
842 See discussion supra of the differences between English and American im-
peachment.
persons whom it has convicted. In the 1936 trial of Judge Ritter,

the Senate determined that removal is automatic upon conviction,
and does not require a separate vote.843 This practice has contin-
ued. Because conviction requires a two-thirds vote, this means that
removal can occur only as a result of a two-thirds vote. Unlike re-
moval, disqualification from office is a discretionary judgment, and
there is no explicit constitutional linkage to the two-thirds vote on
conviction. Although an argument can be made that disqualifica-
tion should nonetheless require a two-thirds vote,844 the Senate has
determined that disqualification may be accomplished by a simple
majority vote.845
Impeachable Offenses
The Convention came to its choice of words describing the grounds
for impeachment after much deliberation, but the phrasing derived
directly from the English practice. On June 2, 1787, the framers
adopted a provision that the executive should “be removable on im-
peachment & conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty.” 846 The
Committee of Detail reported as grounds “Treason (or) Bribery or
Corruption.” 847 And the Committee of Eleven reduced the phrase
to “Treason, or bribery.” 848 On September 8, Mason objected to this
limitation, observing that the term did not encompass all the con-
duct that should be grounds for removal; he therefore proposed to
add “or maladministration” following “bribery.” Upon Madison’s ob-
jection that “[s]o vague a term will be equivalent to a tenure dur-
ing pleasure of the Senate,” Mason suggested “other high crimes &
misdemeanors,” which was adopted without further recorded de-
bate.849
The phrase “high crimes and misdemeanors” in the context of
impeachments has an ancient English history, first turning up in
843 3 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ch. 14,
§ 13.9.
844 See MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL
AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 77–79 (2d ed. 2000).

845 The Senate imposed disqualification twice, on Judges Humphreys and Archbald.
In the Humphreys trial the Senate determined that the issues of removal and dis-
qualification are divisible, 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 2397
(1907), and in the Archbald trial the Senate imposed judgment of disqualification by
vote of 39 to 35. 6 CANNON’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES § 512 (1936).
During the 1936 trial of Judge Ritter, a parliamentary inquiry as to whether a two-
thirds vote or a simple majority vote is required for disqualification was answered
by reference to the simple majority vote in the Archbald trial. 3 DESCHLER’S PREC-
EDENTS ch. 14, § 13.10. The Senate then rejected disqualification of Judge Ritter by
vote of 76–0. 80 CONG. REC. 5607 (1936).
846 1 M. Farrand, supra, at 88.
847 2 M. Farrand at 172, 186.
848 Id. at 499.
849 Id. at 550.
the impeachment of the Earl of Suffolk in 1388.850 Treason is de-

fined in the Constitution.851 Bribery is not, but it had a clear com-
mon law meaning and is now well covered by statute.852 “High crimes
and misdemeanors,” however, is an undefined and indefinite phrase,
which, in England, had comprehended conduct not constituting in-
dictable offenses.853 Use of the word “other” to link “high crimes
and misdemeanors” with “treason” and “bribery” is arguably indica-
tive of the types and seriousness of conduct encompassed by “high
crimes and misdemeanors.” Similarly, the word “high” apparently
carried with it a restrictive meaning.854
Debate prior to adoption of the phrase 855 and comments there-
after in the ratifying conventions 856 were to the effect that the Presi-
dent (all the debate was in terms of the President) should be remov-
able by impeachment for commissions or omissions in office which
were not criminally cognizable. And in the First Congress’s “re-
moval” debate, Madison maintained that the wanton dismissal of
meritorious officers would be an act of maladministration which would
render the President subject to impeachment.857 Other comments,
especially in the ratifying conventions, tend toward a limitation of
the term to criminal, perhaps gross criminal, behavior.858 The scope
of the power has been the subject of continuing debate.859
850 1 T. HOWELL, STATE TRIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FOR HIGH TREASON AND OTHER CRIMES
AND MISDEMEANORS FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE PRESENT TIMES 90, 91 (1809); A. SIMPSON,
TREATISE ON FEDERAL IMPEACHMENTS 86 (1916).
851 Article III, § 3.
852 The use of a technical term known in the common law would require resort
to the common law for its meaning, United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
610, 630 (1818) (per Chief Justice Marshall); United States v. Jones, 26 Fed. Cas.
653, 655 (No. 15,494) (C.C.Pa. 1813) (per Justice Washington), leaving aside the is-
sue of the cognizability of common law crimes in federal courts. See Act of April 30,
1790, § 21, 1 Stat. 117.
853 Berger, Impeachment for “High Crimes and Misdemeanors,” 44 S. CAL. L. REV.
395, 400–415 (1971).

854 The extradition provision reported by the Committee on Detail had provided
for the delivering up of persons charged with “Treason[,] Felony or high Misdemean-
ors.” 2 M. Farrand, supra, at 174. But the phrase “high Misdemeanors” was re-
placed with “other crimes” “in order to comprehend all proper cases: it being doubt-
ful whether ‘high misdemeanor’ had not a technical meaning too limited.” Id. at 443.
855 See id. at 64–69, 550–51.
856 E.g., 3 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON ADOPTION OF THE
CONSTITUTION 341, 498, 500, 528 (1836) (Madison); 4 id. at 276, 281 ©. C. Pinckney:
Rutledge): 3 id. at 516 (Corbin): 4 id. at 263 (Pendleton). Cf. THE FEDERALIST, No. 65
(J. Cooke ed. 1961), 439–45 (Hamilton).
857 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 372–73 (1789).
858 4 J. Elliot, supra at 126 (Iredell); 2 id. at 478 (Wilson). For a good account of
the debate at the Constitutional Convention and in the ratifying conventions, see
Alex Simpson, Jr., Federal Impeachments, 64 U. PA. L. REV. 651, 676–95 (1916)
859 See generally CHARLES L. BLACK, IMPEACHMENT: A HANDBOOK (1974); RAOUL BERGER,
IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973); MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL

IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2000); PETER CHARLES
The Chase Impeachment

The issue of the scope of impeachable offenses was early joined
as a consequence of the Jefferson Administration’s efforts to rid it-
self of some of the Federalist judges who were propagandizing the
country through grand jury charges and other means. The theory
of extreme latitude was enunciated by Senator Giles of Virginia dur-
ing the impeachment trial of Justice Chase. “The power of impeach-
ment was given without limitation to the House of Representa-
tives; and the power of trying impeachments was given equally without
limitation to the Senate. . . . A trial and removal of a judge upon
impeachment need not imply any criminality or corruption in him
. . . [but] nothing more than a declaration of Congress to this ef-
fect: You hold dangerous opinions, and if you are suffered to carry
them into effect you will work the destruction of the nation. We want
your offices, for the purpose of giving them to men who will fill them
better.” 860 Chase’s counsel responded that to be impeachable, con-
duct must constitute an indictable offense.861 The issue was left un-
resolved, Chase’s acquittal owing more to the political divisions in
the Senate than to the merits of the arguments.862
Other Impeachments of Judges

The 1803 impeachment and conviction of Judge Pickering as well
as several successful 20th century impeachments of judges appear
to establish that judges may be removed for seriously questionable
conduct that does not violate a criminal statute.863 The articles on
HOFFER AND N.E.H. HULL, IMPEACHMENT IN AMERICA, 1635–1805 (1984); JOHN R. LABOVITZ,
PRESIDENTIAL IMPEACHMENT (1978); 3 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTA-
TIVES, ch. 14, § 3 “Grounds for Impeachments,” H.R. Doc. No. 661, 94th Cong. 2d
Sess. (1977); Charles Doyle, Impeachment Grounds: A Collection of Selected Materi-
als, CRS Report for Congress 98–882A (1998); and Elizabeth B. Bazan, Impeach-
ment: An Overview of Constitutional Provisions, Procedure, and Practice, CRS Re-
port for Congress 98–186A (1998).
860 1 J. Q. ADAMS, MEMOIRS 322 (1874). See also 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE UNITED STATES §§ 2356–2362 (1907).

861 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS at § 2361.
862 The full record is TRIAL OF SAMUEL CHASE, AN ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (S. Smith & T. Lloyd eds., 1805). For analysis of the trial
and acquittal, see Lillich, The Chase Impeachment, 4 AMER. J. LEGAL HIST. 49 (1960);
and WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL
CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHNSON (1992). The proceedings against Presidents Ty-
ler and Johnson and the investigation of Justice Douglas are also generally viewed
as precedents that restrict the use of impeachment as a political weapon.
863 Some have argued that the constitutional requirement of “good behavior” and
“high crimes and misdemeanors” conjoin to allow the removal of judges who have
engaged in non-criminal conduct inconsistent with their responsibilities, or that the
standard of “good behavior”—not that of “high crimes and misdemeanors”—should
govern impeachment of judges. See 3 DESCHLER’S PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESEN-
TATIVES, ch. 14, §§ 3.10 and 3.13, H.R. Doc. No. 661, 94th Cong. 2d Sess. (1977) (sum-
marizing arguments made during the impeachment investigation of Justice William
which Judge Pickering was impeached and convicted focused on al-

legations of mishandling a case before him and appearing on the
bench in an intemperate and intoxicated state.864 Both Judge Archbald
and Judge Ritter were convicted on articles of impeachment that
charged questionable conduct probably not amounting to indictable
offenses.865
Of the three most recent judicial impeachments, Judges Claiborne
and Nixon had previously been convicted of criminal offenses, and
Judge Hastings had been acquitted of criminal charges after trial.
The impeachment articles against Judge Hastings charged both the
conduct for which he had been indicted and trial conduct. A sepa-
rate question was what effect the court acquittal should have had.866
Although the language of the Constitution makes no such dis-
tinction, some argue that, because of the different nature of their
responsibilities and because of different tenure, different standards
should govern impeachment of judges and impeachment of execu-
tive officers.867
The Johnson Impeachment

President Andrew Johnson was impeached by the House on the
ground that he had violated the “Tenure of Office” Act 868 by dismiss-
ing a Cabinet chief. The theory of the proponents of impeachment
was succinctly put by Representative Butler, one of the managers
of the impeachment in the Senate trial. “An impeachable high crime
or misdemeanor is one in its nature or consequences subversive of
O. Douglas in 1970). For a critique of these views, see Paul S. Fenton, The Scope of
the Impeachment Power, 65 NW. U. L. REV.719 (1970), reprinted in Staff of the House
Committee on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Impeachment: Selected Materials 1801–03
(Comm. Print. 1998).
864 See 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES §§ 2319–2341 (1907)
865 Ten Broek, Partisan Politics and Federal Judgeship Impeachments Since 1903,
23 MINN. L. REV. 185 (1939). Judge Ritter was acquitted on six of the seven articles
brought against him, but convicted on a seventh charge that summarized the first
six articles and charged that the consequence of that conduct was “to bring his court
into scandal and disrepute, to the prejudice of said court and public confidence in
the Federal judiciary, and to render him unfit to continue to serve as such judge.”
This seventh charge was challenged unsuccessfully on a point of order, but was ruled
to be a separate charge of “general misbehavior.”
866 Warren S. Grimes, Hundred-Ton-Gun Control: Preserving Impeachment as the
Exclusive Removal Mechanism for Federal Judges, 38 UCLA L. REV. 1209, 1229–
1233 (1991).
867 See, e.g., Frank O. Bowman, III and Stephen L. Sepinuck, “High Crimes and
Misdemeanors”: Defining the Constitutional Limits on Presidential Impeachment, 72

S. CAL. L. REV. 1517, 1534–38 (1999). Congressional practice may reflect this view.
Judges Ritter and Claiborne were convicted on charges of income tax evasion, while
the House Judiciary Committee voted not to press such charges against President
Nixon. So too, the convictions of Judges Hastings and Nixon on perjury charges may
be contrasted with President Clinton’s acquittal on a perjury charge.
868 Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 154, 14 Stat. 430.
some fundamental or essential principle of government or highly

prejudicial to the public interest, and this may consist of a viola-
tion of the Constitution, of law, of an official oath, or of duty, by an
act committed or omitted, or, without violating a positive law, by
the abuse of discretionary powers from improper motives or for an
improper purpose.” 869 Former Justice Benjamin Curtis contro-
verted this argument, saying: “My first position is, that when the
Constitution speaks of ‘treason, bribery, and other high crimes and
misdemeanors,’ it refers to, and includes only, high criminal of-
fences against the United States, made so by some law of the United
States existing when the acts complained of were done, and I say
that this is plainly to be inferred from each and every provision of
the Constitution on the subject of impeachment.” 870 The Presi-
dent’s acquittal by a single vote was no doubt not the result of a
choice between the two theories, but the result may be said to have
placed a gloss on the impeachment language approximating the theory
of the defense.871
The Nixon Impeachment Proceedings

For the first time in more than a hundred years,872 Congress
moved to impeach the President of the United States, a move fore-
stalled only by the resignation of President Nixon on August 9, 1974.873
Three articles of impeachment were approved by the House Judi-
869 1 TRIAL OF ANDREW JOHNSON, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES ON IMPEACHMENT 88,
147 (1868).
870 Id. at 409.
871 For an account of the Johnson proceedings, see WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, GRAND
INQUESTS: THE HISTORIC IMPEACHMENTS OF JUSTICE SAMUEL CHASE AND PRESIDENT ANDREW JOHN-
SON (1992).
872 The only occasion before the Johnson impeachment when impeachment of a
President had come to a House vote was the House’s rejection in 1843 of an impeach-
ment resolution against President John Tyler. The resolution, which listed nine sepa-
rate counts and which was proposed by a member rather than by a committee, was
defeated by vote of 127 to 84. See 3 HINDS’ PRECEDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
§ 2398 (1907); CONG. GLOBE, 27th Cong. 3d Sess. 144–46 (1843).
873 The President’s resignation did not necessarily require dismissal of the im-
peachment charges. Judgment upon conviction can include disqualification as well

as removal. Art. I, § 3, cl. 7. Precedent from the 1876 impeachment of Secretary of
War William Belknap, who had resigned prior to his impeachment by the House,
suggests that impeachment can proceed even after a resignation. See 3 HINDS’ PREC-
EDENTS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, § 2445 (1907). The Belknap precedent may be
somewhat weakened, however, by the fact that his acquittal was based in part on
the views of some Senators that impeachment should not be applied to someone no
longer in office, id. at § 2467, although the Senate had earlier rejected (by majority
vote of 37–29) a resolution disclaiming jurisdiction, and had adopted by vote of 35–22
a resolution affirming that result See id. at § 2007 for an extensive summary of the
Senate’s consideration of the issue. See also id, § 2317 (it had been conceded during
the 1797 proceedings against Senator William Blount, who had been sequestered
from his seat in the Senate, that an impeached officer could not escape punishment
by resignation).
ciary Committee, charging obstruction of the investigation of the

“Watergate” burglary inquiry, misuse of law enforcement and intel-
ligence agencies for political purposes, and refusal to comply with
the Judiciary Committee’s subpoenas.874 Following President Nixon’s
resignation, the House adopted a resolution to “accept” the House
Judiciary Committee’s report recommending impeachment,875 but there
was no vote adopting the articles and thereby impeaching the for-
mer President, and consequently there was no Senate trial.
In the course of the proceedings, there was strenuous argu-
ment about the nature of an impeachable offense, whether only
criminally-indictable actions qualify for that status or whether the
definition is broader.876 The three articles approved by the Judi-
ciary Committee were all premised on abuse of power, although the
first article, involving obstruction of justice, also involved a crimi-
nal violation.877 A second issue arose that apparently had not been
considered before: whether persons subject to impeachment could
be indicted and tried prior to impeachment and conviction or whether
indictment could occur only after removal from office. In fact, the
argument was really directed only to the status of the President,
as it was argued that he embodied the Executive Branch itself, while
lesser executive officials and judges were not of that calibre.878 That
874 H.R. REP. NO. 93–1305.

875 120 CONG. REC. 29361–62 (1974).
876 Analyses of the issue from different points of view are contained in Impeach-
ment Inquiry Staff, House Judiciary Committee, 93d Cong., Constitutional Grounds
for Presidential Impeachments, (Comm. Print 1974); J. St. Clair, et al., Legal Staff
of the President, Analysis of the Constitutional Standard for Presidential Impeach-
ment (Washington: 1974); Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, Legal As-
pects of Impeachment: An Overview, and Appendix I (Washington: 1974). See also
RAOUL BERGER, IMPEACHMENT: THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEMS (1973), which preceded the
instant controversy; and MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS: A
CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 103–06 (2d ed. 2000).
877 Indeed, the Committee voted not to recommend impeachment for alleged in-
come tax fraud, an essentially private crime not amounting to an abuse of power.
878 The question first arose during the grand jury investigation of former Vice
President Agnew, during which the United States, through the Solicitor General,
argued that the Vice President and all civil officers were not immune from the judi-
cial process and could be indicted prior to removal, but that the President for a num-
ber of constitutional and practical reasons was not subject to the ordinary criminal
process. Memorandum for the United States, Application of Spiro T. Agnew, Civil
No. 73–965 (D.Md., filed October 5, 1973). Courts have held that a federal judge
was indictable and could be convicted prior to removal from office. United States v.
Claiborne, 727 F.2d 842, 847–848 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 829 (1984); United
States v. Hastings, 681 F.2d 706, 710–711 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1203
(1983); United States v. Isaacs, 493 F.2d 1124 (7th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Kerner
issue also remained unsettled, the Supreme Court declining to pro-

vide guidance in the course of deciding a case on executive privi-
lege.879
The Clinton Impeachment

President Clinton was impeached by the House, but acquitted
by vote of the Senate. The House approved two articles of impeach-
ment against the President stemming from the President’s re-
sponse to a sexual harassment civil lawsuit and to a subsequent
grand jury investigation instigated by an Independent Counsel. The
first article charged the President with committing perjury in testi-
fying before the grand jury about his sexual relationship with a White
House intern and his efforts to cover it up; 880 the second article
charged the President with obstruction of justice relating both to
the civil lawsuit and to the grand jury proceedings.881 Two addi-
tional articles of impeachment had been approved by the House Ju-
diciary Committee but were rejected by the full House.882 The Sen-
ate trial resulted in acquittal on both articles.883
A number of legal issues surfaced during congressional consid-
eration of the Clinton impeachment.884 Although the congressional
879 The grand jury had named the President as an unindicted coconspirator in
the case of United States v. Mitchell, et al., No. 74–110 (D.D.C. 1974), apparently in
the belief that he was not actually indictable while in office. The Supreme Court
agreed to hear the President’s claim that the grand jury acted outside its authority,
but finding that resolution of the issue was unnecessary to decision of the executive
privilege claim it dismissed as improvidently granted the President’s petition for cer-
tiorari. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 687 n.2 (1974).
880 Approved by a vote of 228–206. 144 CONG. REC. H12,040 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
1998).
881 Approved by a vote of 221–212. 144 CONG. REC. H12,041 (daily ed. Dec. 19,
1998).
882 An article charging the President with perjury in the civil sexual harass-
ment suit brought against him was defeated by a vote of 229–205; another article
charging him with abuse of office by false responses to the House Judiciary Commit-
tee’s written request for factual admissions was defeated by vote of 285 to 148. 144
CONG. REC. H12,042 (daily ed. Dec. 19, 1998).
883 The vote for acquittal was 55 to 45 on the grand jury perjury charge, and 50
to 50 on the obstruction of justice charge. 145 CONG. REC. S1458–59 (daily ed. Feb.
12, 1999).
884 For analysis and different perspectives on the Clinton impeachment, see Back-
ground and History of Impeachment: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitu-
tion of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess. (1998); and Staff of
the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., Impeachment: Selected Materials
(Comm. Print 1998). See also MICHAEL J. GERHARDT, THE FEDERAL IMPEACHMENT PROCESS:
A CONSTITUTIONAL AND HISTORICAL ANALYSIS (2d ed. 2000); RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFFAIR OF
STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999); LAURENCE
H. TRIBE, 1 AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 181–202 (3d ed. 2000); and Michael Stokes
Paulsen, Impeachment (Update), 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1340–43
(2d ed. 2000). Much of the documentation can be found in Impeachment of William
Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States, H.R. REP. NO. 105–380 (1998); Staff
of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong., 2d Sess., Impeachment Inquiry:
votes on the different impeachment articles were not neatly di-

vided between legal and factual matters and therefore cannot be
said to have resolved the legal issues,885 several aspects of the pro-
ceedings merit consideration for possible precedential significance.
The House’s acceptance of the grand jury perjury charge and its
rejection of the civil deposition perjury charge may reflect a belief
among some members that perjury in the criminal context is more
serious than perjury in the civil context. Acceptance of the obstruc-
tion of justice charge may also have been based in part on an as-
sessment of the seriousness of the charge. On the other hand, the
House’s rejection of the article relating to President Clinton’s al-
leged non-cooperation with the Judiciary Committee’s interrogato-
ries can be contrasted with the House’s 1974 “acceptance” of the
Judiciary Committee’s report recommending 886 a similar type of charge
against President Nixon, and raises the issue of whether the differ-
ent circumstances (e.g., the relative importance of the information
sought, and the nature and extent of the responses) may account
for the different approaches. So too, the acquittal of President Clin-
ton on the perjury charge can be contrasted with convictions of Judges
Hastings and Nixon on perjury charges, and presents the issue of
whether different standards should govern Presidents and judges.
The role of the Independent Counsel in complying with a statutory
mandate to refer to the House “any substantial and credible infor-
mation . . . that may constitute grounds for an impeachment” occa-
sioned commentary.887 The relationship of censure to impeachment
was another issue that arose. Some members advocated censure of
President Clinton as an alternative to impeachment, as an alterna-
tive to trial, or as a post-trial means for those Senators who voted
to acquit to register their disapproval of the President’s conduct,
but there was no vote on censure.888
William Jefferson Clinton, President of the United States; Consideration of Articles

of Impeachment (Comm. Print 1998); and Impeachment of President William Jeffer-
son Clinton: The Evidentiary Record Pursuant to S. Res. 16, S. Doc. No. 106–3 (1999)
(21-volume set).
885 Following the trial, a number of Senators placed statements in the record
explaining their votes. See 145 CONG. REC. S1462–1637 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999).
886 Note that the Judiciary Committee deleted from the article a charge based
on President Clinton’s allegedly frivolous assertions of executive privilege in re-

sponse to subpoenas from the Office of Independent Counsel. Similarly, the Commit-
tee in 1974 distinguished between President Nixon’s refusal to respond to congres-
sional subpoenas and his refusal to respond to those of the special prosecutor; only
the refusal to provide information to the impeachment inquiry was cited as an im-
peachable abuse of power.
887 The requirement was contained in the Ethics in Government Act, since lapsed,
and codified at 28 U.S.C. § 595(c). For commentary, see Ken Gormley, Impeachment
and the Independent Counsel: A Dysfunctional Union, 51 STAN. L. REV. 309 (1999).
888 For analysis of the issue, see Jack Maskell, Censure of the President by Con-
gress, CRS Report for Congress 98–843.

Finally, the Clinton impeachment raised the issue of what the

threshold is for “high crimes and misdemeanors.” While the Nixon
charges were premised on the assumption that an abuse of power
need not be a criminal offense to be an impeachable offense,889 the
Clinton proceedings—or at least the perjury charge—raised the is-
sue of whether criminal offenses that do not rise to the level of an
abuse of power may nonetheless be impeachable offenses.890 The
House’s vote to impeach President Clinton arguably amounted to
an affirmative answer,891 but the Senate’s acquittal leaves the mat-
ter somewhat unsettled.892 There appeared to be broad consensus
in the Senate that some private crimes not involving an abuse of
power (e.g., murder for personal reasons) are so outrageous as to
constitute grounds for removal,893 but there was no consensus on
where the threshold for outrageousness lies, and there was no con-
sensus that the perjury and obstruction of justice with which Presi-
889 According to one scholar, the three articles of impeachment against Presi-
dent Nixon epitomized the “paradigm” for presidential impeachment—abuse of power

in which there is “not only serious injury to the constitutional order but also a nexus
between the misconduct of an impeachable official and the official’s formal duties.”
Michael J. Gerhardt, The Lessons of Impeachment History, 67 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
603, 617 (1999).
890 Although committing perjury in a judicial proceeding—regardless of purpose
or subject matter—impedes the proper functioning of the judiciary both by frustrat-

ing the search for truth and by breeding disrespect for courts, and consequently may
be viewed as an (impeachable) “offense against the state” (see 145 CONG. REC. S1556
(daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen. Thompson)), such perjury arguably con-
stitutes an abuse of power only if the purpose or subject matter of the perjury re-
lates to official duties or to aggrandizement of power. Note that one of the charges
against President Clinton recommended by the House Judiciary Committee but re-
jected by the full House—providing false responses to the Committee’s interrogatories—
was squarely premised on an abuse of power.
891 The House vote can be viewed as rejecting the views of a number of law
professors, presented in a letter to the Speaker entered into the Congressional Re-
cord, arguing that high crimes and misdemeanors must involve “grossly derelict ex-
ercise of official power.” 144 CONG. REC. H9649 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1998).
892 Some Senators who explained their acquittal votes rejected the idea that the
particular crimes that President Clinton was alleged to have committed amounted
to impeachable offenses (see, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S1560 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999)
(statement of Sen. Moynihan); id. at 1601 (statement of Sen. Lieberman)), some al-
leged failure of proof (see, e.g., id. at 1539 (statement of Sen. Specter); id. at 1581
(statement of Sen. Akaka)), and some cited both grounds (see, e.g., id. at S1578–91
(statement of Sen. Leahy), and id. at S1627 (statement of Sen. Hollings)).
893 See, e.g., 145 CONG. REC. S1525 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999) (statement of Sen.
Cleland) (accepting the proposition that murder and other crimes would qualify for
impeachment and removal, but contending that “the current case does not reach the
necessary high standard”); id. at S1533 (statement of Sen. Kyl) (impeachment can-
not be limited to wrongful official conduct, but must include murder); and id. at S1592
(statement of Sen. Leahy) (acknowledging that “heinous” crimes such as murder would
warrant removal). This idea, incidentally, was not new; one Senator in the First Con-
gress apparently assumed that impeachment would be the first recourse if a Presi-
dent were to commit a murder. IX DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE FIRST FEDERAL CON-
GRESS, 1789–1790, THE DIARY OF WILLIAM MACLAY AND OTHER NOTES ON SENATE DEBATES
168 (Kenneth R. Bowling and Helen E. Veit, eds. 1988).
dent Clinton was charged were so outrageous as to impair his abil-

ity to govern, and hence to justify removal.894 Similarly, the almost
evenly divided Senate vote to acquit meant that there was no con-
sensus that removal was justified on the alternative theory that the
alleged perjury and obstruction of justice so damaged the judiciary
as to constitute an impeachable “offense against the state.” 895
Judicial Review of Impeachments

It was long assumed that no judicial review of the impeach-
ment process was possible, that impeachment presents a true “po-
litical question” case, i.e., that the Constitution’s conferral on the
Senate of the “sole” power to try impeachments is a textually de-
monstrable constitutional commitment of trial procedures to the Sen-
ate to decide without court review. That assumption was not con-
tested until very recently, when Judges Nixon and Hastings challenged
their Senate convictions.896
In the Judge Nixon case, the Court held that a claim to judi-
cial review of an issue arising in an impeachment trial in the Sen-
ate presents a nonjusticiable “political question.” 897 Specifically, the
Court rejected a claim that the Senate had departed from the mean-
ing of the word “try” in the impeachment clause by relying on a
special committee to take evidence, including testimony. But the Court’s
894 One commentator, analogizing to the impeachment and conviction of Judge
Claiborne for income tax evasion, viewed the basic issue in the Clinton case as whether
his alleged misconduct was so outrageous as to “effectively rob[ ] him of the requi-
site moral authority to continue to function as President.” Gerhardt, supra n.817, at
619. Under this view, the Claiborne conviction established that income tax evasion
by a judge, although unrelated to official duties, reveals the judge as lacking the
unquestioned integrity and moral authority necessary to preside over criminal tri-
als, especially those involving tax evasion.
895 Senator Thompson propounded this theory in arguing that “abuse of power”
is too narrow a category to encompass all forms of subversion of government that

should be grounds for removal. 145 CONG. REC. S1556 (daily ed. Feb. 12, 1999).
896 Both judges challenged the use under Rule XI of a trial committee to hear
the evidence and report to the full Senate, which would then carry out the trial.
The rule was adopted in the aftermath of an embarrassingly sparse attendance at
the trial of Judge Louderback in 1935. National Comm. Report, supra at 50–53, 54–
57; Grimes, supra at 1233–37. In the Nixon case, the lower courts held the issue to
be non-justiciable (Nixon v. United States, 744 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C. 1990), aff’d, 938
F.2d 239 (D.C. Cir. 1991), but a year later a district court initially ruled in Judge
Hastings’ favor. Hastings v. United States, 802 F. Supp. 490 (D.D.C. 1992), vacated,
988 F.2d 1280 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
897 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). Nixon at the time of his convic-
tion and removal from office was a federal district judge in Mississippi.
“political question” analysis has broader application, and appears

to place the whole impeachment process off limits to judicial re-
view.898
898 The Court listed “reasons why the Judiciary, and the Supreme Court in par-
ticular, were not chosen to have any role in impeachments,” and elsewhere agreed
with the appeals court that “opening the door of judicial review to the procedures
used by the Senate in trying impeachments would expose the political life of the
country to months, or perhaps years, of chaos.” 506 U.S. at 234, 236.
ARTICLE III
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
CONTENTS
Page
Section 1. Judicial Power, Courts, Judges ............................................................................... 637
Organization of Courts, Tenure, and Compensation of Judges ...................................... 637
One Supreme Court .................................................................................................... 638
Inferior Courts ............................................................................................................. 639
Abolition of Courts ............................................................................................... 640
Compensation .............................................................................................................. 641
Diminution of Salaries ......................................................................................... 641
Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction ............................................................................. 642
Legislative Courts ....................................................................................................... 644
Power of Congress Over Legislative Courts ...................................................... 646
Review of Legislative Courts by Supreme Court .............................................. 647
The “Public Rights” Distinction .......................................................................... 647
Constitutional Status of the Court of Claims and the Courts of Customs and
Patent Appeals .................................................................................................. 651
Status of Courts of the District of Columbia ..................................................... 652
Bankruptcy Courts ............................................................................................... 654
Agency Adjudication ............................................................................................. 657
Noncourt Entities in the Judicial Branch ................................................................. 659
Judicial Power .................................................................................................................... 659
Characteristics and Attributes of Judicial Power .................................................... 659
“Shall Be Vested” ................................................................................................. 661
Finality of Judgment as an Attribute of Judicial Power ......................................... 662
Award of Execution .............................................................................................. 664
Judicial Immunity from Suit ...................................................................................... 666
Ancillary Powers of Federal Courts .................................................................................. 667
The Contempt Power .................................................................................................. 667
Categories of Contempt ....................................................................................... 667
The Act of 1789 .................................................................................................... 670
An Inherent Power ............................................................................................... 670
First Amendment Limitations on the Contempt Power ................................... 672
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to Notice and to a Hear-
ing Versus Summary Punishment .................................................................. 674
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to Jury Trial ................. 675
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Powers: Impartial Tribunal ............... 676
Contempt by Disobedience of Orders ................................................................. 678
Contempt Power in Aid of Administrative Power ............................................. 679
Sanctions Other Than Contempt ............................................................................... 680
Power to Issue Writs: The Act of 1789 ...................................................................... 681
Common Law Powers of District of Columbia Courts ...................................... 682
Habeas Corpus: Congressional and Judicial Control ........................................ 683
Habeas Corpus: The Process of the Writ ........................................................... 686
Congressional Limitation of the Injunctive Power ................................................... 688
Injunctions Under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 .......................... 691
633
634 ART. III—JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. Judicial Power, Courts, Judges—Continued

Ancillary Powers of Federal Courts—Continued
The Rule-Making Power and Powers Over Process ................................................. 692
Limitations to The Rule Making Power ............................................................. 693
Appointment of Referees, Masters, and Special Aids .............................................. 694
Power to Admit and Disbar Attorneys ...................................................................... 694
Section 2. Judicial Power and Jurisdiction ............................................................................. 695
Clause 1. Cases and Controversies; Grants of Jurisdiction ........................................... 695
Judicial Power and Jurisdiction-Cases and Controversies ...................................... 696
The Two Classes of Cases and Controversies .................................................... 697
Adverse Litigants ................................................................................................. 699
Collusive and Feigned Suits ........................................................................ 700
Stockholder Suits .......................................................................................... 702
Substantial Interest: Standing ............................................................................ 702
Generalized or Widespread Injuries ............................................................ 704
Taxpayer Suits .............................................................................................. 705
Constitutional Standards: Injury in Fact, Causation, and
Redressability ............................................................................................ 708
Prudential Standing Rules ........................................................................... 715
Standing to Assert the Rights of Others .................................................... 717
Organizational Standing .............................................................................. 720
Standing of States to Represent Their Citizens ........................................ 721
Standing of Members of Congress ............................................................... 722
Standing to Challenge Lawfulness of Governmental Action .................... 724
The Requirement of a Real Interest ................................................................... 727
Advisory Opinions ......................................................................................... 728
Declaratory Judgments ................................................................................ 730
Ripeness ......................................................................................................... 733
Mootness ........................................................................................................ 736
Retroactivity Versus Prospectivity .............................................................. 741
Political Questions ............................................................................................... 746
Origins and Development ............................................................................. 747
The Doctrine Before Baker v. Carr ............................................................. 749
Baker v. Carr ................................................................................................. 752
Powell v. McCormack .................................................................................... 753
The Doctrine Reappears ............................................................................... 755
Judicial Review ............................................................................................................ 758
The Establishment of Judicial Review ............................................................... 758
Marbury v. Madison ...................................................................................... 761
Judicial Review and National Supremacy .................................................. 763
Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Review ................................................ 765
Constitutional Interpretation ....................................................................... 765
Prudential Considerations ............................................................................ 766
The Doctrine of “Strict Necessity” ............................................................... 768
The Doctrine of Clear Mistake .................................................................... 768
Exclusion of Extra-Constitutional Tests ..................................................... 769
Presumption of Constitutionality ................................................................ 770
Disallowance by Statutory Interpretation .................................................. 770
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law ........................................................... 771
Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 773
Jurisdiction of Supreme Court and Inferior Federal Courts ................................... 774
Cases Arising Under the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties of the
United States .................................................................................................... 774
ART. III—JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT 635
Section 2. Judicial Power and Jurisdiction—Continued

Clause 1. Cases and Controversies; Grants of Jurisdiction—Continued
Development of Federal Question Jurisdiction .......................................... 774
When a Case Arises Under .......................................................................... 775
Removal From State Court to Federal Court ............................................. 776
Corporations Chartered by Congress .......................................................... 778
Federal Questions Resulting from Special Jurisdictional Grants ............ 779
Civil Rights Act Jurisdiction ........................................................................ 780
Pendent Jurisdiction ..................................................................................... 781
Protective Jurisdiction .................................................................................. 783
Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions ...................................... 784
Suits Affecting Ambassadors, Other Public Ministers, and Consuls ............... 787
Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction ................................................. 788
Power of Congress To Modify Maritime Law ............................................. 790
Admiralty and Maritime Cases ................................................................... 792
Admiralty Proceedings ................................................................................. 796
Territorial Extent of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction ...................... 797
Admiralty and Federalism ........................................................................... 798
Cases to Which the United States Is a Party ................................................... 804
Right of the United States to Sue ............................................................... 804
Suits Against States ..................................................................................... 806
Immunity of the United States From Suit ................................................. 807
Suits Against United States Officials .......................................................... 809
Suits Against Government Corporations .................................................... 812
Suits Between Two or More States .................................................................... 812
Boundary Disputes: The Law Applied ........................................................ 813
Modern Types of Suits Between States ...................................................... 814
Cases of Which the Court Has Declined Jurisdiction ............................... 816
The Problem of Enforcement: Virginia v. West Virginia ........................... 817
Controversies Between a State and Citizens of Another State ....................... 818
Jurisdiction Confined to Civil Cases ........................................................... 819
The State’s Real Interest .............................................................................. 819
The State as Parens Patriae ........................................................................ 820
Controversies Between Citizens of Different States ......................................... 822
The Meaning of “State” and the District of Columbia Problem ............... 823
Citizenship of Natural Persons .................................................................... 824
Citizenship of Corporations .......................................................................... 825
Manufactured Diversity ............................................................................... 827
The Law Applied in Diversity Cases ........................................................... 828
Controversies Between Citizens of the Same State Claiming Land Under Grants
of Different States ............................................................................................ 836
Controversies Between a State, or the Citizens Thereof, and Foreign States,
Citizens, or Subjects ......................................................................................... 836
Suits by Foreign States ................................................................................ 837
Indian Tribes ................................................................................................. 838
Narrow Construction of the Jurisdiction .................................................... 838
Clause 2. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction ................................................................. 838
The Original Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court ..................................................... 839
Power of Congress to Control the Federal Courts ................................................... 841
The Theory of Plenary Congressional Control .................................................. 841
Appellate Jurisdiction ................................................................................... 842
Jurisdiction of the Inferior Federal Courts ................................................ 844
Congressional Control Over Writs and Processes ...................................... 847
Section 2. Judicial Power and Jurisdiction—Continued

Clause 2. Original and Appellate Jurisdiction—Continued
The Theory Reconsidered .................................................................................... 848
Express Constitutional Restrictions on Congress ...................................... 853
Conclusion ..................................................................................................... 854
Federal-State Court Relations ................................................................................... 854
Problems Raised by Concurrency ....................................................................... 854
The Autonomy of State Courts ........................................................................... 856
Noncompliance With and Disobedience of Supreme Court Orders by State
Courts ......................................................................................................... 856
Use of State Courts in Enforcement of Federal Law ................................ 858
State Interference with Federal Jurisdiction ............................................. 860
Conflicts of Jurisdiction: Rules of Accommodation ........................................... 860
Comity ............................................................................................................ 861
Abstention ...................................................................................................... 861
Exhaustion of State Remedies ..................................................................... 863
Anti-Injunction Statute ................................................................................ 864
Res Judicata .................................................................................................. 865
Three-Judge Court Act ................................................................................. 866
Conflicts of Jurisdiction: Federal Court Interference with State Courts ........ 867
Federal Restraint of State Courts by Injunctions ...................................... 868
Habeas Corpus: Scope of the Writ ............................................................... 873
Removal ......................................................................................................... 885
Clause 3. Trial By Jury ...................................................................................................... 887
In General .................................................................................................................... 887
Section 3. Treason ...................................................................................................................... 887
Clause 1. Definition and Limitations ............................................................................... 887
Treason ......................................................................................................................... 887
Levying War .......................................................................................................... 889
The Burr Trial ............................................................................................... 889
Aid and Comfort to the Enemy ........................................................................... 890
The Cramer Case .......................................................................................... 890
The Haupt Case ............................................................................................ 891
The Kawakita Case ...................................................................................... 892
Doubtful State of the Law of Treason Today ..................................................... 893
Clause 2. Punishment ........................................................................................................ 894
Corruption of the Blood and Forfeiture .................................................................... 894
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
ARTICLE III
SECTION 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be

vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the
Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges,
both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices
during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for
their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished
during their Continuance in Office.
ORGANIZATION OF COURTS, TENURE, AND
COMPENSATION OF JUDGES
The Constitution is almost completely silent concerning the or-
ganization of the federal judiciary. “That there should be a national
judiciary was readily accepted by all.” 1 But whether it was to con-
sist of one high court at the apex of a federal judicial system or a
high court exercising appellate jurisdiction over state courts that
would initially hear all but a minor fraction of cases raising na-
tional issues was a matter of considerable controversy.2 The Vir-
ginia Plan provided for a “National judiciary [to] be established to
consist of one or more supreme tribunals, and of inferior tribunals
to be chosen by the National Legislature . . . .” 3 In the Committee
of the Whole, the proposition “that a national judiciary be estab-
lished” was unanimously adopted,4 but the clause “to consist of One
supreme tribunal, and of one or more inferior tribunals” 5 was first
agreed to, then reconsidered. The provision for inferior tribunals was
ultimately stricken out, it being argued that state courts could ad-
equately adjudicate all necessary matters while the supreme tribu-
nal would protect the national interest and assure uniformity.6 Wil-
1 M. FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 79 (1913).
2 The most complete account of the Convention’s consideration of the judiciary
is J. GOEBEL, ANTECEDENTS AND BEGINNINGS TO 1801, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES, VOL. 1 ch. 5 (1971).
3 1 M. Farrand, supra at 21–22. It is possible that this version may not be an
accurate copy, see 3 id. at 593–94.

4 1 id. at 95, 104.
5 Id. at 95, 105. The words “One or more” were deleted the following day with-
out recorded debate. Id. at 116, 119.

6 Id. at 124–25.
637
Sec. 1—Judicial Power, Courts, Judges
son and Madison thereupon moved to authorize Congress “to appoint

inferior tribunals,” 7 which carried the implication that Congress could
in its discretion either designate the state courts to hear federal
cases or create federal courts. The word “appoint” was then ad-
opted, but over the course of the Convention the phrasing was changed
again so as to suggest somewhat more of an obligation to vest such
powers in inferior federal courts.8
The requirement that judges hold their Officer during “good be-
havior” excited no controversy during the Convention,9 although the
lack of an enforcement mechanism for this provision resulted in im-
peachment under Article II becoming the primary mechanism for
removal of a federal judge.10 And finally, the only substantial dis-
pute that arose regarding the denial to Congress of the power to
reduce judicial salaries (a power which could be used to intimidate
judges) came on Madison’s motion to bar increases as well as de-
creases.11
One Supreme Court

While the Convention specified that the Chief Justice of the Su-
preme Court would preside over any Presidential impeachment trial
in the Senate,12 decisions on the size and composition of the Su-
preme Court, the time and place for sitting, its internal organiza-
tion, and other matters were left to the Congress. The Congress soon
provided these details in the Judiciary Act of 1789, one of the semi-
7 Madison’s notes use the word “institute” in place of “appoint,” id. at 125, but
the latter appears in the Convention Journal, id. at 118, and in Yates’ notes, id. at
127, and when the Convention took up the draft reported by the Committee of the
Whole “appoint” is used even in Madison’s notes. 2 id. at 38, 45.
8 On offering their motion, Wilson and Madison “observed that there was a dis-
tinction between establishing such tribunals absolutely, and giving a discretion to

the Legislature to establish or not establish them.” 1 id. at 125. The Committee on
Detail provided for the vesting of judicial power in one Supreme Court “and in such
inferior Courts as shall, when necessary, from time to time, be constituted by the
legislature of the United States.” 2 id. at 186. Its draft also authorized Congress
“[t]o constitute tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court.” Id. at 182. No debate is
recorded when the Convention approved these two clauses, Id. at 315, 422–23, 428–
30. The Committee on Style left the clause empowering Congress to “constitute” in-
ferior tribunals as was, but it deleted “as shall, when necessary” from the Judiciary
article, so that the judicial power was vested “in such inferior courts as Congress
may from time to time”—and here deleted “constitute” and substituted the more force-
ful—“ordain and establish.” Id. at 600.
9 The provision was in the Virginia Plan and was approved throughout, 1 id. at
21.
10 See Article II, Judges, supra.
11 Id. at 121; 2 id. at 44–45, 429–430.
12 Article I, § 3, cl. 6.
nal statutes of the United States.13 Originally, the Court consisted

of a Chief Justice and five Associate Justices.14 The number was
gradually increased until it reached a total of ten under the act of
March 3, 1863.15 As one of the Reconstruction Congress’s restric-
tions on President Andrew Johnson, the number was reduced to seven
as vacancies should occur.16 The number actually never fell below
eight before the end of Johnson’s term, and Congress thereupon made
the number nine.17
Proposals have been made at various times for an organization
of the Court into sections or divisions. No authoritative judicial ex-
pression is available, but Chief Justice Hughes, in a letter to Sena-
tor Wheeler in 1937, expressed doubts concerning the validity of
such a device and stated that “the Constitution does not appear to
authorize two or more Supreme Courts functioning in effect as sepa-
rate courts.” 18 Congress has also determined the time and place of
sessions of the Court. It exercised this power once to change the
Court’s term to forestall a constitutional attack on the repeal of the
Judiciary Act of 1801, with the result that the Court did not con-
vene for fourteen months.19
Inferior Courts
Congress also provided in the Judiciary Act of 1789 for the cre-
ation of courts inferior to the Supreme Court. Thirteen district courts
were constituted to have four sessions annually,20 and three circuit
courts were established. The circuit courts were to consist of two
Supreme Court justices each and one of the district judges of such
districts, and were to meet twice annually in the various districts
comprising the circuit.21 This system had substantial faults in op-
eration, not the least of which was the burden imposed on the Jus-
tices, who were required to travel thousands of miles each year un-
13 Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73. The authoritative works on the Act
and its working and amendments are FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES LANDIS, THE BUSI-
NESS OF THE SUPREME COURT (1928); Charles Warren, New Light on the History of the
Federal Judicial Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923); see also J. Goebel, supra at
ch. 11.
14 Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, § 1.
15 12 Stat. 794, § 1.
16 Act of July 23, 1866, 14 Stat. 209, § 1.
17 Act of April 10, 1869, 16 Stat. 44.
18 Reorganization of the Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, 75th Congress, 1st Sess. (1937), pt. 3, 491. For earlier proposals to
have the Court sit in divisions, see F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra at 74–85.
19 1 CHARLES WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 222–224 (rev.
ed. 1926).
20 Act of September 24, 1789, 1 Stat. 73, §§ 2–3.
21 Id. at 74, §§ 4–5
der bad conditions.22 Despite numerous efforts to change this system,

it persisted, except for one brief period, until 1891.23 Since then,
the federal judicial system has consisted of district courts with origi-
nal jurisdiction, intermediate appellate courts, and the Supreme Court.
Abolition of Courts.—That Congress “may from time to time
ordain and establish” inferior courts would seem to imply that the
system may be reoriented from time to time and that Congress is
not restricted to the status quo but may expand and contract the
units of the system. But if the judges are to have life tenure, what
is to be done with them when the system is contracted? Unfortu-
nately, the first exercise of the power occurred in a highly politi-
cized situation, and no definite answer emerged. By the Judiciary
Act of February 13, 1801,24 passed in the closing weeks of the Adams
Administration, the districts were reorganized, and six circuit courts
consisting of three circuit judges each were created. Although Adams
appointed deserving Federalists to these so-called “midnight judge”
positions just before the change in administration, the Jef-
fersonians soon set in motion plans to repeal the Act, which were
carried out.25 No provision was made for the displaced judges, how-
ever, apparently under the theory that if there were no courts there
could be no judges to sit on them.26 The validity of the repeal was
questioned on related grounds in Stuart v. Laird,27 but Justice Paterson
rejected the challenge without directly addressing the issue of the
displaced judges.
22 Cf.Frankfurter & Landis, supra at chs. 1–3; J. Goebel, supra at 554–560, 565–
569. Upon receipt of a letter from President Washington soliciting suggestions re-
garding the judicial system, WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON, (J. Fitzpatrick ed., 1943),
31, Chief Justice Jay prepared a letter for the approval of the other Justices, declin-
ing to comment on the policy questions but raising several issues of constitutional-
ity, that the same man should not be appointed to two offices, that the offices were
incompatible, and that the act invaded the prerogatives of the President and Sen-
ate. 2 G. MCREE, LIFE AND CORRESPONDENCE OF JAMES IREDELL 293–296 (1858). The letter
was apparently never forwarded to the President. Writings of Washington, supra at
31–32 n.58. When the constitutional issue was raised in Stuart v. Laird, 5 U.S. (1
Cr.) 299, 309 (1803), it was passed over with the observation that the practice was
too established to be questioned.
23 Act of March 3, 1891, 26 Stat. 826. The temporary relief came in the Act of
February 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89, which was repealed by the Act of March 8, 1802, 2
Stat. 132.
24 Act of February 13, 1801, 2 Stat. 89.
25 Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. Frankfurter & Landis, supra at 25–32; 1
C. Warren, supra at 185–215.

26 This was the theory of John Taylor of Caroline, upon whom the Jeffersonians
in Congress relied. W. CARPENTER, JUDICIAL TENURE IN THE UNITED STATES 63–64 (1918).
The controversy is recounted fully in id. at 58–78.
27 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 299 (1803) (sustaining both the transfer of suits between cir-
cuits and the sitting of Supreme Court Justices on circuit courts without confirma-
tion to those courts).
Not until 1913 did Congress again exercise its power to abolish
a federal court, this time the unfortunate Commerce Court, which
had disappointed the expectations of most of its friends.28 But this
time Congress provided for the redistribution of the Commerce Court
judges among the circuit courts as well as a transfer of its jurisdic-
tion to the district courts.
Compensation
Diminution of Salaries.—“The Compensation Clause has its
roots in the longstanding Anglo-American tradition of an indepen-
dent Judiciary. A Judiciary free from control by the Executive and
the Legislature is essential if there is a right to have claims de-
cided by judges who are free from potential domination by other
branches of government.” 29 Thus, once a salary figure has gone into
effect, Congress may not reduce it nor rescind any part of an in-
crease, although prior to the time of its effectiveness Congress may
repeal a promised increase. This latter holding was rendered in the
context of a statutory salary plan for all federal officers and employ-
ees under which increases went automatically into effect on a speci-
fied date. Four years running, Congress interdicted the pay in-
creases, but in two instances the increases had become effective,
raising the barrier of this clause.30
Also implicating this clause was a Depression-era appropria-
tions act reducing “the salaries and retired pay of all judges (ex-
cept judges whose compensation may not, under the Constitution,
be diminished during their continuance in office),” by a fixed amount.
Although this provision presented no constitutional questions, it re-
quired an interpretation as to which judges were excepted. Judges
in the District of Columbia were held protected by Article III,31 but
the salaries of the judges of the Court of Claims, a legislative court,
were held subject to the reduction.32
28 The Court was created by the Act of June 18, 1910, 36 Stat. 539, and re-
pealed by the Act of October 22, 1913, 38 Stat. 208, 219. See Frankfurter & Landis,
supra at 153–174; W. Carpenter, supra at 78–94.
29 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 217–18 (1980). Hamilton, writing in THE
FEDERALIST, No. 79 (J. Cooke ed., 1961), 531, emphasized that “[i]n the general course
of human nature, a power over a man’s subsistence amounts to a power over his
will.”
30 United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 224–30 (1980). In one year, the increase
took effect on October 1, although the President signed the bill reducing the amount
during the day of October 1. The Court held that the increase had gone into effect
by the time the reduction was signed. Will is also authority for the proposition that
a general, nondiscriminatory reduction, affecting judges but not aimed solely at them,
is covered by the clause. Id. at 226.
31 O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
32 Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933). But see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,
370 U.S. 530 (1962).

In Evans v. Gore,33 the Court invalidated the application of a

1919 income tax law to a sitting federal judge, over the strong dis-
sent of Justice Holmes, joined by Justice Brandeis. This ruling was
extended in Miles v. Graham 34 to exempt the salary of a judge of
the Court of Claims appointed subsequent to the enactment of the
taxing act. Evans v. Gore was disapproved and Miles v. Graham
was in effect overruled in O’Malley v. Woodrough,35 where the Court
upheld section 22 of the Revenue Act of 1932, which extended the
application of the income tax to salaries of judges taking office af-
ter June 6, 1932. Such a tax was regarded neither as an unconsti-
tutional diminution of the compensation of judges nor as an encroach-
ment on the independence of the judiciary.36 To subject judges who
take office after a stipulated date to a nondiscriminatory tax laid
generally on an income, said the Court, “is merely to recognize that
judges are also citizens, and that their particular function in gov-
ernment does not generate an immunity from sharing with their
fellow citizens the material burden of the government whose Con-
stitution and laws they are charged with administering.” 37
Formally overruling Evans v. Gore, the Court in United States
v. Hatter reaffirmed the principle that judges should “share the tax
burdens borne by all citizens.” 38 “[T]he potential threats to judicial
independence that underlie [the Compensation Clause] cannot jus-
tify a special judicial exemption from a commonly shared tax.” 39
The Medicare tax, extended to all federal employees in 1982, is such
a non-discriminatory tax that may be applied to federal judges, the
Court held. The 1983 extension of a Social Security tax to then-
sitting judges was “a different matter,” however, because the judges
were required to participate while almost all other federal employ-
ees were given a choice about participation.40 Congress had not cured
the constitutional violation by a subsequent enactment that raised
judges’ salaries by an amount greater than the amount of Social
Security taxes that they were required to pay.41
Courts of Specialized Jurisdiction

By virtue of its power “to ordain and establish” courts, Con-
gress has occasionally created courts under Article III to exercise a
33 253 U.S. 245 (1920).
34 268 U.S. 501 (1925).
35 307 U.S. 277 (1939).
36 307 U.S. at 278–82.
37 307 U.S. at 282.
38 532 U.S. 557, 571 (2001).
39 532 U.S. at 571.
40 532 U.S. at 572.
41 532 U.S. at 578–81.
specialized jurisdiction. These tribunals are like other Article III courts
in that they exercise “the judicial power of the United States,” and
only that power, that their judges must be appointed by the Presi-
dent and the Senate and must hold office during good behavior sub-
ject to removal by impeachment only, and that the compensation of
their judges cannot be diminished during their continuance in of-
fice. One example of such a court was the Commerce Court created
by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910,42 which was given exclusive juris-
diction to enforce, inter alia, orders of the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (except those involving money penalties and criminal pun-
ishment). This court actually functioned for less than three years,
being abolished in 1913.
Another court of specialized jurisdiction, but created for a lim-
ited time only, was the Emergency Court of Appeals organized by
the Emergency Price Control Act of January 30, 1942.43 By the terms
of the statute, this court consisted of three or more judges desig-
nated by the Chief Justice from the judges of the United States dis-
trict courts and circuit courts of appeal. The Court was vested with
jurisdiction and the powers of a district court to hear appeals filed
within thirty days against denials of protests by the Price Adminis-
trator. The Court had exclusive jurisdiction to set aside regula-
tions, orders, or price schedules, in whole or in part, or to remand
the proceeding, but the court was tightly constrained in its treat-
ment of regulations. There was interplay with the district courts,
which were charged with authority to enforce orders issued under
the Act, although only the Emergency Court had jurisdiction to de-
termine the validity of such orders.44
Other specialized courts are the Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit, which is in many respects like the geographic circuits.
42 Ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539.

43 56 Stat. 23, §§ 31–33.
44 In Lockerty v. Phillips, 319 U.S. 182 (1943), the limitations on the use of in-
junctions, except the prohibition against interlocutory decrees, was unanimously sus-
tained.
A similar court was created to be used in the enforcement of the economic con-
trols imposed by President Nixon in 1971. Pub. L. 92–210, 85 Stat. 743, 211(b). Al-
though controls ended in 1974, see 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note, Congress continued the
Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals and gave it new jurisdiction. Emergency
Petroleum Allocation Act of 1973, Pub. L. 93–159, 87 Stat. 633, 15 U.S.C. § 754,
incorporating judicial review provisions of the Economic Stabilization Act. The Court
was abolished, effective March 29, 1993, by Pub. L. 102–572, 106 Stat. 4506.
Another similar specialized court was created by § 209 of the Regional Rail Re-
organization Act, Pub. L. 93–226, 87 Stat. 999, 45 U.S.C. § 719, to review the final
system plan under the Act. Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases (Blanchette v.
Connecticut Gen. Ins. Corp.), 419 U.S. 102 (1974).
Created in 1982,45 this court has exclusive jurisdiction to hear ap-

peals from the United States Court of Federal Claims, from the Fed-
eral Merit System Protection Board, the Court of International Trade,
the Patent Office in patent and trademark cases, and in various
contract and tort cases. One of those courts, the Court of Interna-
tional Trade, began life as the Board of General Appraisers, be-
came the United States Customs Court in 1926, was declared an
Article III court in 1956, and came to its present form and name in
1980.46 Finally, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation, staffed
by federal judges from other courts, is authorized to transfer ac-
tions pending in different districts to a single district for trial.47
To facilitate the gathering of foreign intelligence information,
through electronic surveillance, search and seizure, as well as other
means, Congress in 1978 authorized a special court, composed of
seven regular federal judges appointed by the Chief Justice, to re-
ceive applications from the United States and to issue warrants for
intelligence activities.48 Even greater specialization was provided by
the special court created by the Ethics in Government Act; 49 the
court was charged, upon the request of the Attorney General, with
appointing an independent counsel to investigate and prosecute charges
of illegality in the Executive Branch. The court also had certain su-
pervisory powers over the independent counsel.
Legislative Courts
Legislative courts, so-called because they are created by Con-
gress pursuant to its general legislative powers, have comprised a
significant part of the federal judiciary.50 The distinction between
constitutional courts and legislative courts was first made in Ameri-
can Ins. Co. v. Canter,51 which involved the question of the admi-
ralty jurisdiction of the territorial court of Florida, the judges of
45 By the Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. 97–164, 96 Stat. 37,
28 U.S.C. § 1295. Among other things, this Court assumed the appellate jurisdiction
of the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals.
46 Pub. L. 96–417, 94 Stat. 1727.
47 28 U.S.C. § 1407.
48 Pub. L. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1788, 50 U.S.C. § 1803.
49 Ethics in Government Act, Title VI, Pub. L. 95–521, 92 Stat. 1867, as amended,
28 U.S.C. §§ 591–599. The court is a “Special Division” of the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia; composed of three regular federal judges,
only one of whom may be from the D. C. Circuit, who are designated by the Chief
Justice. 28 U.S.C. § 49. The constitutionality of the Special Division was upheld in
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670–85 (1988). Authority for the court expired in
1999 under a sunset provision. Pub. L. 103–270, § 2, 108 Stat. 732 (1994).
50 In Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868 (1991), the Court held Article I courts
to be “Courts of Law” for purposes of the appointments clause. Art. II, § 2, cl. 2. See
id. at 888–892 (majority opinion), and 901–914 (Justice Scalia dissenting).
51 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511 (1828).
which were limited to a four-year term in office. Chief Justice Mar-

shall wrote for the Court: “These courts, then, are not constitu-
tional courts, in which the judicial power conferred by the constitu-
tion on the general government, can be deposited. They are incapable
of receiving it. They are legislative courts, created in virtue of the
general right of sovereignty which exists in the government, or in
virtue of that clause which enables Congress to make all needful
rules and regulations, respecting the territory belonging to the United
States. The jurisdiction with which they are invested, is not a part
of that judicial power which is defined in the 3d article of the con-
stitution, but is conferred by congress, in the execution of those gen-
eral powers which that body possesses over the territories of the
United States.” 52 The Court went on to hold that admiralty juris-
diction can be exercised in the states only in those courts that are
established pursuant to Article III, but that the same limitation does
not apply to the territorial courts, for in legislating for them “Con-
gress exercises the combined powers of the general, and of a state
government.” 53
Canter postulated a simple proposition: “Constitutional courts
exercise the judicial power described in Art. III of the Constitution;
legislative courts do not and cannot.” 54 A two-fold difficulty at-
tended this proposition, however. Admiralty jurisdiction is included
within the “judicial power of the United States” specifically in Ar-
ticle III, requiring an explanation how this territorial court could
receive and exercise it. Second, if territorial courts could not exer-
cise Article III power, how might their decisions be subjected to ap-
pellate review in the Supreme Court, or indeed in other Article III
courts, which could exercise only Article III judicial power? 55 More-
over, if in fact some “judicial power” may be devolved upon courts
not having the constitutional security of tenure and salary, what
prevents Congress from undermining those values intended to be
52 26 U.S. at 546.
53 26 U.S. at 546. In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 544–45 (1962), Jus-
tice Harlan asserted that Chief Justice Marshall in Canter “did not mean to imply
that the case heard by the Key West court was not one of admiralty jurisdiction
otherwise properly justiciable in a Federal District Court sitting in one of the States. . . .
All the Chief Justice meant . . . is that in the territories cases and controversies
falling within the enumeration of Article III may be heard and decided in courts
constituted without regard to the limitations of that article. . . .”
54 Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 106
(1982) (Justice White dissenting).

55 That the Supreme Court could review the judgments of territorial courts was
established in Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 307 (1810). See also Benner
v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 235, 243 (1850); Clinton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
434 (1872); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922).
protected by Article III’s guarantees by giving jurisdiction to unpro-

tected entities that, being subjected to influence, would be bent to
the popular will?
Attempts to explain or to rationalize the predicament or to pro-
vide a principled limiting point have resulted from Canter to the
present in “frequently arcane distinctions and confusing prec-
edents” spelled out in cases comprising “landmarks on a judicial ‘dark-
ling plain’ where ignorant armies have clashed by night, as Justice
White apparently believes them to be.” 56 Nonetheless, Article I courts
are quite common entities in our judicial system.57
Power of Congress Over Legislative Courts.—In creating leg-
islative courts, Congress is not limited by the restrictions imposed
in Article III concerning tenure during good behavior and the pro-
hibition against diminution of salaries. Congress may limit tenure
to a term of years, as it has done in acts creating territorial courts
and the Tax Court; it may subject the judges of legislative courts
to removal by the President; 58 and it may reduce their salaries dur-
ing their terms.59 Similarly, it follows that Congress can vest in leg-
islative courts nonjudicial functions of a legislative or advisory na-
ture and deprive their judgments of finality. Thus, in Gordon v. United
States,60 there was no objection to the power of the Secretary of
the Treasury and Congress to revise or suspend the early judg-
ments of the Court of Claims. Likewise, in United States v. Fer-
reira,61 the Court sustained the act conferring powers on the Florida
territorial court to examine claims rising under the Spanish treaty
and to report its decisions and the evidence on which they were
based to the Secretary of the Treasury for subsequent action. “A
power of this description,” the Court said, “may constitutionally be
56 Northern Pipeline Const. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 90, 91
(1982) (Justice Rehnquist concurring).

57 In addition to the local courts of the District of Columbia, the bankruptcy
courts, and the U.S. Court of Federal Claims, considered infra, these include the
United States Tax Court, formerly an independent agency in the Treasury Depart-
ment, but by the Tax Reform Act of 1969, § 951, 83 Stat. 730, 26 U.S.C. § 7441,
made an Article I court of record, the Court of Veterans Appeals, Act of Nov. 18,
1988, 102 Stat. 4105, 38 U.S.C. § 4051, and the courts of the territories of the United
States. Magistrate judges are adjuncts of the District Courts, see infra, and perform
a large number of functions, usually requiring the consent of the litigants. See Gomez
v. United States, 490 U.S. 858 (1989); Peretz v. United States, 501 U.S. 923 (1991).
The U.S. Court of Military Appeals, strictly speaking, is not part of the judiciary
but is a military tribunal, 10 U.S.C. § 867, although Congress designated it an Ar-
ticle I tribunal and has given the Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction over its de-
cisions.
58 McAllister v. United States, 141 U.S. 174 (1891).
59 United States v. Fisher, 109 U.S. 143 (1883); Williams v. United States, 289
U.S. 553 (1933).

60 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864).
61 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).
conferred on a Secretary as well as on a commissioner. But [it] is

not judicial in either case, in the sense in which judicial power is
granted by the Constitution to the courts of the United States.” 62
Review of Legislative Courts by Supreme Court.—Chief Jus-
tice Taney’s view, which would have been expressed in Gordon,63
that the judgments of legislative courts could never be reviewed by
the Supreme Court, was tacitly rejected in De Groot v. United States,64
in which the Court took jurisdiction from a final judgment of the
Court of Claims. Since the decision in this case, the authority of
the Court to exercise appellate jurisdiction over legislative courts
has turned not upon the nature or status of such courts but rather
upon the nature of the proceeding before the lower court and the
finality of its judgment. The Supreme Court will neither review the
administrative proceedings of legislative courts nor entertain ap-
peals from the advisory or interlocutory decrees of such a body.65
But, in proceedings before a legislative court that are judicial in
nature, admit of a final judgment, and involve the performance of
judicial functions and therefore the exercise of judicial power, the
Court may be vested with appellate jurisdiction.66
The “Public Rights” Distinction.—A major delineation of the
distinction between Article I courts and Article III courts appears
in Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co.67 At issue
was a summary procedure, without benefit of the courts, for the col-
lection by the United States of moneys claimed to be due from one
of its own customs collectors. It was argued that the assessment
and collection was a judicial act carried out by nonjudicial officers
and was thus invalid under Article III. Accepting that the acts com-
plained of were judicial, the Court nonetheless sustained the act
by distinguishing between any act, “which, from its nature, is the
subject of a suit at the common law, or in equity, or admiralty,” which,
62 54 U.S. at 48.
63 The opinion in Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1864), had
originally been prepared by Chief Justice Taney, but, following his death and reargu-
ment of the case, the Court issued the cited opinion. The Court later directed the
publishing of Taney’s original opinion at 117 U.S. 697. See also United States v. Jones,
119 U.S. 477, 478 (1886), in which the Court noted that the official report of Chief
Justice Chase’s Gordon opinion and the Court’s own record showed differences and
quoted the record.
64 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867). See also United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477
(1886).
65 E.g., Postum Cereal Co. v. California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927); Fed-
eral Radio Comm’n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930); D. C. Court of Appeals
v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). See Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 576, 577–
579 (1962).
66 Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 14 (1944); D. C. Court of Appeals v. Feld-
man, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).

67 59 U.S. (18 How.) 272 (1856).
in other words, is inherently judicial, and other acts that Congress

may vest in courts or in other agencies. “[T]here are matters, involv-
ing public rights, which may be presented in such form that the
judicial power is capable of acting on them, and which are suscep-
tible of judicial determination, but which Congress may or may not
bring within the cognizance of the courts of the United States, as
it may deem proper.” 68
In essence, the Court distinguished between those acts that his-
torically had been determined by courts and those that had both
been historically resolved by executive or legislative acts and com-
prehended matters that arose between the government and others.
Thus, Article I courts “may be created as special tribunals to exam-
ine and determine various matters, arising between the govern-
ment and others, which from their nature do not require judicial
determination and yet are susceptible of it. The mode of determin-
ing matters of this class is completely within congressional con-
trol.” 69 Among the matters susceptible of judicial determination, but
not requiring it, are claims against the United States,70 the dis-
posal of public lands and claims arising therefrom,71 questions con-
cerning membership in the Indian tribes,72 and questions arising
out of the administration of the customs and internal revenue laws.73
Other courts similar to territorial courts, such as consular courts
and military courts martial, may be justified on like grounds.74
The impact of the “public rights” distinction, however, has var-
ied dramatically over time. In Crowell v. Benson,75 the Court ap-
proved an administrative scheme for determining, subject to judi-
cial review, maritime employee compensation claims, although it
acknowledged that the case involved “one of private right, that is,
of the liability of one individual to another under the law as de-
68 59 U.S. at 284.
69 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438, 451 (1929).
70 Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1864) (published 1885); McElrath v.
United States, 102 U.S. 426 (1880); Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933).
On the status of the then-existing Court of Claims, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370
U.S. 530 (1962).
71 United States v. Coe, 155 U.S. 76 (1894) (Court of Private Land Claims).
72 Wallace v. Adams, 204 U.S. 415 (1907); Stephens v. Cherokee Nation, 174 U.S.
445 (1899) (Choctaw and Chickasaw Citizenship Court).

73 Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716 (1929); Ex parte Bake-
lite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929).

74 See In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (consular courts in foreign countries). Mili-
tary courts may, on the other hand, be a separate entity of the military having no
connection to Article III. Dynes v. Hoover, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 65, 79 (1858).
75 285 U.S. 22 (1932).
fined.” 76 This scheme was permissible, the Court said, because in

cases arising out of congressional statutes, an administrative tribu-
nal could make findings of fact and render an initial decision on
legal and constitutional questions, as long as there is adequate re-
view in a constitutional court.77 The “essential attributes” of deci-
sions must remain in an Article III court, but so long as it does,
Congress may use administrative decisionmakers in those private
rights cases that arise in the context of a comprehensive federal
statutory scheme.78 In Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon
Pipe Line Co., discussed infra, the Court reasserted that the distinc-
tion between “public rights” and “private rights” was still impor-
tant in determining which matters could be assigned to legislative
courts and administrative agencies and those that could not be, but
there was much the Court plurality did not explain.79
The Court continued to waver with respect to the importance
of the public rights/private rights distinction. In two cases follow-
ing Marathon, it rejected the distinction as “a bright line test,” and
instead focused on “substance”—i.e., on the extent to which the par-
ticular grant of jurisdiction to an Article I court threatened judicial
integrity and separation of powers principles.80 Nonetheless, the Court
indicated that the distinction may be an appropriate starting point
for analysis. Thus, the fact that private rights traditionally at the
core of Article III jurisdiction are at stake leads the Court to a “search-
76 285 U.S. at 51. On the constitutional problems of assignment to an adminis-
trative agency, see Atlas Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 430 U.S. 442 (1977); NLRB v. Jones
& Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 48 (1937).
77 301 U.S. at 51–65.
78 301 U.S. at 50, 51, 58–63. Thus, Article III concerns were satisfied by a re-
view of the agency fact finding upon the administrative record. Id. at 63–65. The
plurality opinion denied the validity of this approach in Northern Pipeline Constr.
Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 86 n.39 (1982), although Justice White
in dissent accepted it. Id. at 115. The plurality, rather, rationalized Crowell and sub-
sequent cases on an analysis seeking to ascertain whether agencies or Article I tri-
bunals were “adjuncts” of Article III courts, that is, whether Article III courts were
sufficiently in charge to protect constitutional values. Id. at 76–87.
79 458 U.S. 50, 67–70 (1982) (plurality opinion). Thus, Justice Brennan ob-
serves that “a matter of public rights must at a minimum arise ‘between the govern-
ment and others,’ ” but “that the presence of the United States as a proper party to
the proceeding is a necessary but not sufficient means of distinguishing ‘private rights’
from ‘public rights.’ ” Id. at 69 & n.23. Crowell v. Benson, however, remained an em-
barrassing presence.
80 Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985); CFTC v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986). The cases also abandoned the principle that the Federal
Government must be a party for the case to fall into the “public rights” category.
Thomas, 473 U.S. at 586; see also id. at 596–99 (Justice Brennan concurring).
ing” inquiry as to whether Congress is encroaching inordinately on

judicial functions, whereas the concern is not so great where “pub-
lic” rights are involved.81
However, in a subsequent case, Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg,
the distinction was pronounced determinative not only of the issue
whether a matter could be referred to a non-Article III tribunal,
but whether Congress could dispense with civil jury trials.82 In so
doing, however, the Court vitiated much of the core content of “pri-
vate” rights as a concept and left resolution of the central issue to
a balancing test. That is, “public” rights are, strictly speaking, those
in which the cause of action inheres in or lies against the Federal
Government in its sovereign capacity, the understanding since Mur-
ray’s Lessee. However, to accommodate Crowell v. Benson, Atlas Roof-
ing, and similar cases, seemingly private causes of action between
private parties will also be deemed “public” rights when Congress,
acting for a valid legislative purpose pursuant to its Article I pow-
ers, fashions a cause of action that is analogous to a common-law
claim and integrates it so closely into a public regulatory scheme
that it becomes a matter appropriate for agency resolution with lim-
ited involvement by the Article III judiciary.83 Nonetheless, despite
its fixing by Congress as a “core proceeding” suitable for an Article
I bankruptcy court adjudication, the Court held the particular cause
of action at issue (fraudulent conveyance) was a private issue as to
which the parties were entitled to a civil jury trial, necessarily sug-
81 “In essence, the public rights doctrine reflects simply a pragmatic understand-
ing that when Congress selects a quasi-judicial method of resolving matters that
‘could be conclusively determined by the Executive and Legislative Branches,’ the
danger of encroaching on the judicial powers is reduced.” Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Products Co., 473 U.S. 568, 589 (1985) (quoting Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S.
at 68 (plurality opinion)).
82 492 U.S. 33, 51–55 (1989). A Seventh Amendment jury-trial case, the decision
is critical to the Article III issue as well, because, as the Court makes clear what
was implicit before, whether Congress can submit a legal issue to an Article I tribu-
nal and whether it can dispense with a civil jury on that legal issue must be an-
swered by the same analysis. “[T]he question whether the Seventh Amendment per-
mits Congress to assign its adjudication to a tribunal that does not employ juries as
factfinders requires the same answer as the question whether Article III allows Con-
gress to assign adjudication of that cause of action to a non-Article III tribunal . . . .”
Id. at 52–53.
83 492 U.S. at 52–54. The Court reiterated that the government need not be a
party as a prerequisite to a matter being of “public right.” Id. at 54. Concurring,

Justice Scalia argued that public rights historically were and should remain only
those matters to which the Federal Government is a party. Id. at 65. See also Stern
v. Marshall, 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–179, slip op. at 25 (2011) (“[W]hat makes a right
‘public’ rather than private is that the right is integrally related to particular Fed-
eral Government action”).
gesting that Congress could not commit the action to an Article I

tribunal, save perhaps through the consent of the parties.84
Constitutional Status of the Court of Claims and the Courts
of Customs and Patent Appeals.—Although the Supreme Court
long accepted the Court of Claims as an Article III court,85 it later
ruled that court to be an Article I court and its judges without con-
stitutional protection of tenure and salary.86 Then, in the 1950s, Con-
gress statutorily declared that the Court of Claims, the Customs
Court, and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals were Article
III courts,87 a questionable act under the standards the Court had
used to determine whether courts were legislative or constitu-
tional.88 In Glidden Co. v. Zdanok,89 however, five of seven partici-
pating Justices united to find that indeed the Court of Claims and
the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals, at least, were constitu-
tional courts and their judges eligible to participate in judicial busi-
ness in other constitutional courts. Three Justices would have over-
ruled Bakelite and Williams and would have held that the courts
in question were constitutional courts.90 Whether a court is an Ar-
ticle III tribunal depends largely upon whether legislation establish-
ing it is in harmony with the limitations of that Article, specifi-
cally, “whether . . . its business is the federal business there specified
and its judges and judgments are allowed the independence there
expressly or impliedly made requisite.” When a court is created “to
carry into effect [federal] powers . . . over subject matter . . . and
84 492 U.S. at 55–64. The Court reserved the question whether, a jury trial be-
ing required, a non-Article III bankruptcy judge could oversee such a jury trial. Id.
at 64. That question remains unresolved, both as a matter, first, of whether there is
statutory authorization for bankruptcy judges to conduct jury trials, and, second, if
there is, whether they may constitutionally do so. E.g., In re Ben Cooper, Inc., 896
F.2d 1394 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. granted, 497 U.S. 1023, vacated and remanded for
consideration of a jurisdictional issue, 498 U.S. 964 (1990), reinstated, 924 F.2d 36
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928 (1991); In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152 (7th
Cir. 1991), pet. for reh. en banc den., 976 F.2d 1126 (7th Cir. 1992).
85 De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1866); United States v. Union
Pacific Co., 98 U.S. 569, 603 (1878); Miles v. Graham, 268 U.S. 501 (1925).
86 Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553 (1933); cf. Ex parte Bakelite Corp.,
279 U.S. 438, 450–455 (1929).

87 67 Stat. 226, § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 171 (Court of Claims); 70 Stat. 532. § 1, 28 U.S.C.
§ 251 (Customs Court); 72 Stat. 848, § 1, 28 U.S.C. § 211 (Court of Customs and
Patent Appeals).
88 In Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438. 459 (1929), Justice Van Devanter
refused to give any weight to the fact that Congress had bestowed life tenure on the
judges of the Court of Customs Appeals because that line of thought “mistakenly
assumes that whether a court is of one class or the other depends on the intention
of Congress, whereas the true test lies in the power under which the court was cre-
ated and in the jurisdiction conferred.”
89 370 U.S. 530 (1962).
90 Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 531 (1962) (Justices Harlan, Brennan,
and Stewart).
not over localities,” a presumption arises that the status of such a

tribunal is constitutional rather than legislative.91 The other four
Justices expressly declared that Bakelite and Williams should not
be overruled,92 but two of them thought that the two courts had
attained constitutional status by virtue of the clear manifestation
of congressional intent expressed in the legislation.93 Two Justices
maintained that both courts remained legislative tribunals.94 Al-
though the result is clear, no standard for pronouncing a court leg-
islative rather than constitutional obtained the adherence of a ma-
jority of the Court.95
Status of Courts of the District of Columbia.—Through a
long course of decisions, the courts of the District of Columbia were
regarded as legislative courts upon which Congress could impose
nonjudicial functions. In Butterworth v. United States ex rel. Hoe,96
the Court sustained an act of Congress which conferred revisory
powers upon the Supreme Court of the District in patent appeals
and made its decisions binding only upon the Commissioner of Pat-
ents. Similarly, the Court later sustained the authority of Congress
to vest revisory powers in the same court over rates fixed by a pub-
lic utilities commission.97 Not long after this the same rule was ap-
plied to the revisory powers of the District Supreme Court over or-
ders of the Federal Radio Commission.98 These rulings were based
on the assumption, express or implied, that the courts of the Dis-
trict were legislative courts, created by Congress pursuant to its
plenary power to govern the District of Columbia. In dictum in Ex
parte Bakelite Corp.,99 while reviewing the history and analyzing
the nature of the legislative courts, the Court stated that the courts
of the District were legislative courts.
91 370 U.S. at 548, 552.

92 370 U.S. at 585 (Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren concurring), 589 (Jus-
tices Douglas and Black dissenting).
93 370 U.S. at 585 (Justice Clark and Chief Justice Warren).
94 370 U.S. at 589 (Justices Douglas and Black). The concurrence thought that
the rationale of Bakelite and Williams was based on a significant advisory and refer-
ence business of the two courts, which the two Justices now thought insignificant,
but what there was of it they thought nonjudicial and the courts should not enter-
tain it. Justice Harlan left that question open. Id. at 583.
95 Aside from doctrinal matters, Congress in 1982 created the United States Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, giving it, inter alia, the appellate jurisdiction of
the Court of Claims and the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals. 96 Stat. 25, title
1, 28 U.S.C. § 41. At the same time Congress created the United States Claims Court,
now the United States Court of Federal Claims, as an Article I tribunal, with the
trial jurisdiction of the old Court of Claims. 96 Stat. 26, as amended, § 902(a)(1),
106 Stat. 4516, 28 U.S.C. §§ 171–180.
96 112 U.S. 50 (1884).
97 Keller v. Potomac Elec. Co., 261 U.S. 428 (1923).
98 Federal Radio Comm’n v. General Elec. Co., 281 U.S. 464 (1930).
99 279 U.S. 438, 450–455 (1929).
In 1933, nevertheless, the Court abandoned all previous dicta

on the subject and found the courts of the District of Columbia to
be constitutional courts exercising the judicial power of the United
States,100 with the result that it assumed the task of reconciling
the performance of nonjudicial functions by such courts with the
rule that constitutional courts can exercise only the judicial power
of the United States. This task was accomplished by the argument
that, in establishing courts for the District, Congress performs dual
functions pursuant to two distinct powers: the power to constitute
tribunals inferior to the Supreme Court, and its plenary and exclu-
sive power to legislate for the District of Columbia. However, Ar-
ticle III, § 1, limits this latter power with respect to tenure and com-
pensation, but not with respect to vesting legislative and administrative
powers in such courts. Subject to the guarantees of personal liberty
in the Constitution, “Congress has as much power to vest courts of
the District with a variety of jurisdiction and powers as a state leg-
islature has in conferring jurisdiction on its courts.” 101
In 1970, Congress formally recognized two sets of courts in the
District: federal courts (the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Columbia and the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia, created pursuant to Article III), and courts
equivalent to state and territorial courts (including the District of
Columbia Court of Appeals), created pursuant to Article I.102 Con-
gress’s action was sustained in Palmore v. United States.103 When
legislating for the District, the Court held, Congress has the power
of a local legislature and may, pursuant to Article I, § 8, cl. 17, vest
jurisdiction to hear matters of local law and local concerns in courts
not having Article III characteristics. The defendant’s claim that he
was denied his constitutional right to be tried before an Article III
judge was denied on the basis that it was not absolutely necessary
that every proceeding in which a charge, claim, or defense based
on an act of Congress or a law made under its authority need be
conducted in an Article III court. State courts, after all, could hear
cases involving federal law as could territorial and military courts.
“[T]he requirements of Art. III, which are applicable where laws of
national applicability and affairs of national concern are at stake,
must in proper circumstances give way to accommodate plenary grants
100 O’Donoghue v. United States, 289 U.S. 516 (1933).
101 289 U.S. at 545. Chief Justice Hughes in dissent argued that Congress’s power
over the District was complete in itself and the power to create courts there did not
derive at all from Article III. Id. at 551. See the discussion of this point of O’Donoghue
in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949). Cf. Hobson
v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (D.D.C. 1967) (three-judge court).
102 Pub. L. 91–358, 84 Stat. 475, D.C. Code § 11–101.
103 411 U.S. 389 (1973).
of power to Congress to legislate with respect to specialized areas

having particularized needs and warranting distinctive treat-
ment.” 104
Bankruptcy Courts.—After extended and lengthy debate, Con-
gress in 1978 revised the bankruptcy act and created a bankruptcy
court as an “adjunct” of the district courts. The court was com-
posed of judges vested with practically all the judicial power of the
United States, serving for 14-year terms, subject to removal for cause
by the judicial councils of the circuits, and with salaries subject to
statutory change.105 The bankruptcy courts were given jurisdiction
over not only civil proceedings arising under the bankruptcy code,
but all other proceedings arising in or related to bankruptcy cases,
with review in Article III courts under a clearly erroneous stan-
dard.
This broad grant of jurisdiction, however, brought into question
what kinds of cases could be heard by an Article I court. In North-
ern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., a case in which
a company petitioning for reorganization made a claim against an-
other company for breaches of contract and warranty—purely state
law claims—the Court held that the conferral of jurisdiction upon
Article I judges to hear state claims regarding traditional common
law actions such as existed at the time of the drafting of the Con-
stitution was unconstitutional.106 Although the holding was ex-
tremely narrow, a plurality of the Court sought to rationalize and
limit the Court’s jurisprudence of Article I courts.
According to the plurality, a fundamental principle of separa-
tion of powers requires the judicial power of the United States to
be exercised by courts having the attributes prescribed in Article
III. Congress may not evade the constitutional order by allocating
this judicial power to courts whose judges lack security of tenure
and compensation. Only in three narrowly circumscribed instances
may judicial power be distributed outside the Article III frame-
104 411 U.S. at 407–08. See also Pernell v. Southall Realty Co., 416 U.S. 363,
365–365 (1974); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59
(1978). Under Swain, provision for hearing of motions for post-judgement relief by
convicted persons in the District, the present equivalent of habeas for federal con-
victs, is placed in Article I courts. That there are limits to Congress’s discretion is
asserted in dictum in Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 201–202, 204 (1977).
105 Bankruptcy Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95–598, 92 Stat. 2549, codified in titles 11,
28. The bankruptcy courts were made “adjuncts” of the district courts by § 201(a),
28 U.S.C. § 151(a). For citation to the debate with respect to Article III versus Ar-
ticle I status for these courts, see Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 61 n.12 (1982) (plurality opinion).
106 The statement of the holding is that of the two concurring Justices, 458 U.S.
at 89 (Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor), with which the plurality agreed “at the
least,” while desiring to go further. Id. at 87 n.40.
work: in territories and the District of Columbia, that is, geographi-

cal areas in which no state operated as sovereign and Congress ex-
ercised the general powers of government; courts martial, that is,
the establishment of courts under a constitutional grant of power
historically understood as giving the political branches extraordi-
nary control over the precise subject matter; and the adjudication
of “public rights,” that is, the litigation of certain matters that his-
torically were reserved to the political branches of government and
that were between the government and the individual.107 In bank-
ruptcy legislation and litigation not involving any of these excep-
tions, the plurality would have held, the judicial power to process
bankruptcy cases could not be assigned to the tribunals created by
the act.108
The dissent argued that, although on its face Article III pro-
vided that judicial power could only be assigned to Article III enti-
ties, the history since Canter belied that simplicity. Rather, the prec-
edents clearly indicated that there is no difference in principle between
the work that Congress may assign to an Article I court and that
which must be given to an Article III court. Despite this, the dis-
sent contended that Congress did not possess plenary discretion in
choosing between the two systems; rather, in evaluating whether
jurisdiction was properly reposed in an Article I court, the Su-
preme Court must balance the values of Article III against both the
strength of the interest Congress sought to further by its Article I
investiture and the extent to which Article III values were under-
mined by the congressional action. This balancing would afford the
Court, the dissent believed, the power to prevent Congress, were it
moved to do so, from transferring jurisdiction in order to emascu-
late the constitutional courts of the United States.109
No majority could be marshaled behind a principled discussion
of the reasons for and the limitation upon the creation of legisla-
tive courts, not that a majority opinion, or even a unanimous one,
107 458 U.S. at 63–76 (Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun,
and Stevens).
108 The plurality also rejected an alternative basis, a contention that as “ad-
juncts” of the district courts, the bankruptcy courts were like United States magis-
trates or like those agencies approved in Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22 (1932), to
which could be assigned fact-finding functions subject to review in Article III courts,
the fount of the administrative agency system. Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Mara-
thon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 76–86 (1982). According to the plurality, the act
vested too much judicial power in the bankruptcy courts to treat them like agen-
cies, and it limited the review of Article III courts too much.
109 458 U.S. at 92, 105–13, 113–16 (Justice White, joined by Chief Justice Burger
and Justice Powell).

would necessarily presage the settling of the law.110 But the breadth
of the various opinions not only left unclear the degree of discre-
tion left in Congress to restructure the bankruptcy courts, but also
placed in issue the constitutionality of other legislative efforts to
establish adjudicative systems outside a scheme involving the cre-
ation of life-tenured judges.111
Congress responded to Marathon by enactment of the Bank-
ruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984.112 Bank-
ruptcy courts were maintained as Article I entities, and overall their
powers as courts were not notably diminished. However, Congress
did establish a division between “core proceedings,” which could be
heard and determined by bankruptcy courts, subject to lenient re-
view, and other proceedings, which, though initially heard and de-
cided by bankruptcy courts, could be reviewed de novo in the dis-
trict court at the behest of any party, unless the parties had consented
to bankruptcy-court jurisdiction in the same manner as core pro-
ceedings. A safety valve was included, permitting the district court
to withdraw any proceeding from the bankruptcy court on cause
shown.113
Notice, however, that in Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg 114 the
Court, evaluating the related issue of when a jury trial is required
under the Seventh Amendment,115 found that a cause of action to
avoid a fraudulent money transfer was founded on state law, and,
although denominated a core proceeding by Congress, was actually
a private right. Similarly, the Court in Stern v. Marshall 116 held
that a counterclaim of tortuous interference with a gift, although
made during a bankruptcy proceeding and statutorily deemed a core
proceeding, was a state common law claim that did not fall under
any of the public rights exceptions.117
110 Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279 U.S. 438 (1929), was, after all, a unanimous
opinion and did not long survive.

111 In particular, the Federal Magistrates Act of 1968, under which judges may
refer certain pretrial motions and the trial of certain matters to persons appointed
to a specific term, was threatened. Pub. L. 90–578, 82 Stat. 1108, as amended, 28
U.S.C. §§ 631–639. See United States v. Radios, 447 U.S. 667 (1980); Mathews v.
Weber, 423 U.S. 261 (1976).
112 Pub. L. 98–353, 98 Stat. 333, judiciary provisions at 28 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq.
113 See 28 U.S.C. § 157.
114 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
115 See Seventh Amendment, Cases at Common law, infra.
116 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–179, slip op. (2011).
117 The Court noted that the claim “. . . is not a matter that can be pursued
only by grace of the other branches . . . or one that ‘historically could have been
determined exclusively by’ those branches . . . . It does not ‘depend[] on the will of
Congress’s . . . ; Congress has nothing to do with it. [It] . . . does not flow from a
federal statutory scheme . . . . [And it] is not ‘completely dependent upon’ adjudica-
tion of a claim created by federal law . . . . ” 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–179, slip op. at
Agency Adjudication.—In two decisions subsequent to Mara-

thon involving legislative courts, Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric.
Products Co.118 and CFTC v. Schor,119 the Court clearly suggested
that the majority was now closer to the balancing approach of the
Marathon dissenters than to the Marathon plurality’s position that
Congress may confer judicial power on legislative courts only in very
limited circumstances. Subsequently, however, Granfinanciera, S.A.
v. Nordberg,120 a reversion to the fundamentality of Marathon, with
an opinion by the same author, Justice Brennan, cast some doubt
on this proposition.
In Union Carbide, the Court upheld a provision of a pesticide
law which required binding arbitration, with limited judicial re-
view, of compensation due one registrant by another for mandatory
sharing of registration information pursuant to federal statutory law.
And in Schor, the Court upheld conferral on the agency of author-
ity, in a reparations adjudication under the Act, to also adjudicate
“counterclaims” arising out of the same transaction, including those
arising under state common law. Neither the fact that the pesticide
case involved a dispute between two private parties nor the fact
that the CFTC was empowered to decide claims traditionally adju-
dicated under state law proved decisive to the Court’s analysis.
In rejecting a “formalistic” approach and analyzing the “sub-
stance” of the provision at issue in Union Carbide, Justice O’Connor‘s
opinion for the Court pointed to several considerations.121 The right
to compensation was not a purely private right, but “bears many of
the characteristics of a ‘public’ right,” because Congress was “autho-
riz[ing] an agency administering a complex regulatory scheme to
allocate costs and benefits among voluntary participants in the pro-
gram. . . .” 122 Also deemed important was not “unduly constrict-
[ing] Congress’s ability to take needed and innovative action pursu-
ant to its Article I powers”; 123 arbitration seen as “a pragmatic solution
to [a] difficult problem.” 124 The limited nature of judicial review was
seen as a plus in the sense that “no unwilling defendant is sub-
jected to judicial enforcement power.” On the other hand, availabil-
27 (2011) (citations omitted). The Court also noted that filing of a claim in bank-
ruptcy court (here, a defamation claim) did not constitute consent to a counter-
claim, as the claimant had nowhere else to go to obtain recovery. Id.
118 473 U.S. 568 (1985).
119 478 U.S. 833 (1986).
120 492 U.S. 33 (1989).
121 Contrast the Court’s approach to Article III separation of powers issues with
the more rigid approach enunciated in INS v. Chadha and Bowsher v. Synar, involv-
ing congressional incursions on executive power.
122 473 U.S. at 589.
123 CFTC v. Schor, 478 U.S. at 851 (summarizing the Thomas rule).
124 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 590.
ity of limited judicial review of the arbitrator’s findings and deter-

mination for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation, and for due
process violations, preserved the “ ‘appropriate exercise of the judi-
cial function.’ ” 125 Thus, the Court concluded, Congress in exercise
of Article I powers “may create a seemingly ‘private’ right that is
so closely integrated into a public regulatory scheme as to be a mat-
ter appropriate for agency resolution with limited involvement by
the Article III judiciary.” 126
In Schor, the Court described Art. III, § 1 as serving a dual pur-
pose: to protect the role of an independent judiciary and to safe-
guard the right of litigants to have claims decided by judges free
from potential domination by the other branches of government. A
litigant’s Article III right is not absolute, the Court determined, but
may be waived. This the litigant had done by submitting to the ad-
ministrative law judge’s jurisdiction rather than independently seek-
ing relief as he was entitled to and then objecting only after ad-
verse rulings on the merits. But the institutional integrity claim,
not being personal, could not be waived, and the Court reached the
merits. The threat to institutional independence was “weighed” by
reference to “a number of factors.” The conferral on the CFTC of
pendent jurisdiction over common law counterclaims was seen as
more narrowly confined than was the grant to bankruptcy courts
at issue in Marathon, and as more closely resembling the “model”
approved in Crowell v. Benson. The CFTC’s jurisdiction, unlike that
of bankruptcy courts, was said to be confined to “a particularized
area of the law;” the agency’s orders were enforceable only by order
of a district court,127 and reviewable under a less deferential stan-
dard, with legal rulings being subject to de novo review; and the
agency was not empowered, as had been the bankruptcy courts, to
exercise “all ordinary powers of district courts.”
Granfinanciera followed analysis different from that in Schor,
although it preserved Union Carbide through its concept of “public
rights.” State law and other legal claims founded on private rights
could not be remitted to non-Article III tribunals for adjudication
unless Congress, in creating an integrated public regulatory scheme,
has so taken up the right as to transform it. It may not simply re-
label a private right and place it into the regulatory scheme. The
Court is hazy with respect to whether the right itself must be a
125 Thomas, 473 U.S. at 591, 592 (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 54
(1932)).
126473 U.S. at 594.
127Cf. Union Carbide, 473 U.S. at 591 (fact that “FIFRA arbitration scheme in-
corporates its own system of internal sanctions and relies only tangentially, if at all,
on the Judicial Branch for enforcement” cited as lessening danger of encroachment
on “Article III judicial powers”).
creature of federal statutory action. The general descriptive lan-

guage suggests that, but the Court seemingly goes beyond this point
in its determination whether the right at issue in the case, the re-
covery of preferential or fraudulent transfers in the context of a bank-
ruptcy proceeding, is a “private right” that carries with it a right
to jury trial. Though a statutory interest, the actions were identi-
cal to state-law contract claims brought by a bankrupt corporation
to augment the estate.128 Schor was distinguished solely on the waiver
part of the decision, relating to the individual interest, without con-
sidering the part of the opinion deciding the institutional interest
on the merits and utilizing a balancing test.129 Thus, although the
Court has made some progress in reconciling its growing line of dis-
parate cases, doctrinal harmony has not yet been achieved.
Noncourt Entities in the Judicial Branch
Passing on the constitutionality of the establishment of the Sen-
tencing Commission as an “independent” body in the judicial branch,
the Court acknowledged that the Commission is not a court and
does not exercise judicial power. Rather, its function is to promul-
gate binding sentencing guidelines for federal courts. It acts, there-
fore, legislatively, and its membership of seven is composed of three
judges and three nonjudges. But the standard of constitutionality,
the Court held, is whether the entity exercises powers that are more
appropriately performed by another branch or that undermine the
integrity of the judiciary. Because the imposition of sentences is a
function traditionally exercised within congressionally prescribed lim-
its by federal judges, the Court found the functions of the Commis-
sion could be located in the judicial branch. Nor did performance of
its functions contribute, in any meaningful way, to a weakening of
the judiciary or an aggrandizement of power, the Court ob-
served.130
JUDICIAL POWER
Characteristics and Attributes of Judicial Power
Judicial power is the power “of a court to decide and pronounce
a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who
128 Granfinanciera, 492 U.S. at 51–55, 55–60.
129 492 U.S. at 59 n.14.
130 Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 384–97 (1989). Clearly, some of the
powers vested in the Special Division of the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit under the Ethics in Government Act in respect to the
independent counsel were administrative, but because the major nonjudicial power,
the appointment of the independent counsel, was specifically authorized in the ap-
pointments clause, the additional powers were miscellaneous and could be lodged
there by Congress. Implicit in the Court’s analysis was the principle that a line ex-
ists that Congress may not cross. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 677–685 (1988).
bring a case before it for decision.” 131 It is “the right to determine

actual controversies arising between diverse litigants, duly insti-
tuted in courts of proper jurisdiction.” 132 The terms “judicial power”
and “jurisdiction” are frequently used interchangeably, with “juris-
diction” defined as the power to hear and determine the subject mat-
ter in controversy between parties to a suit 133 or as the “power to
entertain the suit, consider the merits and render a binding deci-
sion thereon.” 134 The cases and commentary however, support, in-
deed require, a distinction between the two concepts.
Jurisdiction is the authority of a court to exercise judicial power
in a specific case and is, of course, a prerequisite to the exercise of
judicial power, which is the totality of powers a court exercises when
it assumes jurisdiction and hears and decides a case.135 Judicial power
confers on federal courts the power to decide a case and to render
a judgment that conclusively resolves a case. Included within the
general judicial power are the ancillary powers of courts to punish
for contempt of their authority,136 to issue writs in aid of jurisdic-
tion when authorized by statute,137 to make rules governing their
process in the absence of statutory authorizations or prohibi-
tions,138 to order their own process so as to prevent abuse, oppres-
sion, and injustice, and to protect their own jurisdiction and offi-
cers in the protection of property in custody of law,139 to appoint
masters in chancery, referees, auditors, and other investigators,140
and to admit and disbar attorneys.141
As judicial power is the authority to render dispositive judg-
ments, Congress violates the separation of powers when it pur-
ports to alter final judgments of Article III courts.142 Once such in-
131 JUSTICE SAMUEL MILLER, ON THE CONSTITUTION 314 (1891).
132 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911).
133 United States v. Arrendondo, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 691 (1832).
134 General Investment Co. v. New York Central R.R., 271 U.S. 228, 230 (1926).
135 Williams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 566 (1933); Yakus v. United States,
321 U.S. 414, 467–68 (1944) (Justice Rutledge dissenting).

136 Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
137 McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 504 (1813); Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.)
75 (1807).
138 Wayman v. Southard, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
139 Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (1888).
140 Ex parte Peterson, 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
141 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 378 (1867).
142 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995). The Court was
careful to delineate the difference between attempting to alter a final judgment, one
rendered by a court and either not appealed or affirmed on appeal, and legislatively
amending a statute so as to change the law as it existed at the time a court issued
a decision that was on appeal or otherwise still alive at the time a federal court
reviewed the determination below. A court must apply the law as revised when it
considers the prior interpretation. Id. at 226–27. Article III creates or authorizes
Congress to create not a collection of unconnected courts, but a judicial department
stance arose when the Court unexpectedly recognized a statute of

limitations for certain securities actions that was shorter than what
had been recognized in many jurisdictions, resulting in the dis-
missal of several suits, which then become final because they were
not appealed. Congress subsequently enacted a statute that, though
not changing the limitations period prospectively, retroactively ex-
tended the time for suits that had been dismissed and provided for
the reopening of these final judgments. In Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm,
Inc.,143 the Court invalidated the statute, holding it impermissible
for Congress to disturb a final judgment. “Having achieved finality,
. . . a judicial decision becomes the last word of the judicial depart-
ment with regard to a particular case or controversy, and Congress
may not declare by retroactive legislation that the law applicable
to that very case was something other than what the courts said it
was.” 144 In Miller v. French,145 by contrast, the Court ruled that
the Prison Litigation Reform Act’s automatic stay of ongoing injunc-
tions remedying violations of prisoners’ rights did not amount to
an unconstitutional legislative revision of a final judgment. Rather,
the automatic stay merely altered “the prospective effect” of injunc-
tions, and it is well established that such prospective relief “re-
mains subject to alteration due to changes in the underlying law.” 146
“Shall Be Vested”.—The distinction between judicial power and
jurisdiction is especially pertinent to the meaning of the words “shall
be vested” in § 1. Whereas all the judicial power of the United States
is vested in the Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts cre-
ated by Congress, neither has ever been vested with all the juris-
diction which could be granted and, Justice Story to the con-
trary,147 the Constitution has not been read to require that Congress
confer the entire jurisdiction it might.148 Thus, except for the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, which flows directly from the
Constitution, two prerequisites to jurisdiction must be present: first,
the Constitution must have given the courts the capacity to receive
composed of “inferior courts” and “one Supreme Court.” “Within that hierarchy, the
decision of an inferior court is not (unless the time for appeal has expired) the final
word of the department as a whole.” Id. at 227.
143 514 U.S. 211 (1995).
144 514 U.S. at 227 (emphasis supplied by Court).
145 530 U.S. 327 (2000).
146 530 U.S. at 344.
147 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 328–331 (1816). See also
3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES (1833) 1584–1590.

148 See, e.g., Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799) (Jus-
tice Chase). A recent, sophisticated attempt to resurrect the core of Justice Story’s
argument appears in Amar, A Neo-Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B. U. L. REV. 205 (1985); see also Amar, Meltzer,
and Redish, Symposium: Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789, 138 U. PA. L.
REV. 1499 (1990). Professor Amar argues from the text of Article III, § 2, cl. 1, that
it,149 and, second, an act of Congress must have conferred it.150 The
fact that federal courts are of limited jurisdiction means that liti-
gants in them must affirmatively establish that jurisdiction exists
and may not confer nonexistent jurisdiction by consent or con-
duct.151
Finality of Judgment as an Attribute of Judicial Power

Since 1792, the federal courts have emphasized finality of judg-
ment as an essential attribute of judicial power. In that year, Con-
gress authorized Revolutionary War veterans to file pension claims
in circuit courts of the United States, directed the judges to certify
to the Secretary of War the degree of a claimant’s disability and
their opinion with regard to the proper percentage of monthly pay
to be awarded, but empowered the Secretary to withhold judicially
certified claimants from the pension list if he suspected “imposition
or mistake.” 152 The Justices then on circuit almost immediately for-
warded objections to the President, contending that the statute was
unconstitutional because the judicial power was constitutionally com-
mitted to the judicial department, the duties imposed by the act
were not judicial, and the subjection of a court’s opinions to revi-
sion or control by an officer of the executive or the legislature was
not authorized by the Constitution.153
the use of the word “all” in each of the federal question, admiralty, and public am-
bassador subclauses means that Congress must confer the entire judicial power to
cases involving those issues, whereas it has more discretion in the other six catego-
ries.
149 Which was, of course, the point of Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137
(1803), once the power of the Court to hold legislation unconstitutional was estab-
lished.
150 The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 252 (1868); Cary v. Curtis, 44
U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845); Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850); United States
v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 32, 33 (1812); Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260
U.S. 226 (1922). Some judges, however, have expressed the opinion that Congress’s
authority is limited by provisions of the Constitution such as the Due Process Clause,
so that a limitation on jurisdiction that denied a litigant access to any remedy might
be unconstitutional. Cf. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 965–966 (D.C. Cir.
1949), rev’d on other grounds sub nom, Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950);
Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254, 257 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948); Petersen v. Clark, 285 F. Supp. 700, 703 n.5 (N.D. Calif. 1968);
Murray v. Vaughn, 300 F. Supp. 688, 694–695 (D.R.I. 1969). The Supreme Court
has had no occasion to consider the question.
151 Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799); Bingham v. Cabot,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798); Jackson v. Ashton, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 148 (1834); Mitchell
v. Maurer, 293 U.S. 237 (1934).
152 Act of March 23, 1792, 1 Stat. 243.
153 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: MISCELLANEOUS DOCUMENTS, LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE,
OF THE CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES 49, 51, 52 (1832). President Washington trans-
mitted the remonstrances to Congress. 1 MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 123,
133 (J. Richardson comp., 1897). The objections are also appended to the order of
the Court in Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 (1792). Note that some of the
Attorney General Randolph, upon the refusal of the circuit courts

to act under the new statute, filed a motion for mandamus in the
Supreme Court to direct the Circuit Court in Pennsylvania to pro-
ceed on a petition filed by one Hayburn seeking a pension. Al-
though the Court heard argument, it put off decision until the next
term, presumably because Congress was already acting to delete the
objectionable features of the act. Upon enactment of the new law,
the Court dismissed the action.154 Although the Court’s opinion con-
tained little analysis, Hayburn’s Case has since been cited by the
Court to reject efforts to give it and the lower federal courts juris-
diction over cases in which judgment would be subject to executive
or legislative revision.155 Thus, in a 1948 case, the Court held that
an order of the Civil Aeronautics Board denying to a citizen air car-
rier a certificate of convenience and necessity for an overseas and
foreign air route was, despite statutory language to the contrary,
not reviewable by the courts. Because Congress had also deemed
such an order subject to discretionary review and revision by the
President, the lower court found, and the Supreme Court affirmed,
that the courts did not have the authority to review the President’s
decision. While the lower Court had then attempted to reconcile the
statutory scheme by permitting presidential review of the order af-
ter judicial review, the Court rejected this interpretation. “[I]f the
President may completely disregard the judgment of the court, it
would be only because it is one the courts were not authorized to
render. Judgments within the powers vested in courts by the Judi-
ciary Article of the Constitution may not lawfully be revised, over-
turned or refused faith and credit by another Department of Gov-
Justices declared their willingness to perform under the act as commissioners rather
than as judges. Cf. United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40, 52–53 (1852).
The assumption by judges that they could act in some positions as individuals while
remaining judges, an assumption many times acted upon, was approved in Mistretta
v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397–408 (1989).
154 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792). The new pension law was the
Act of February 28, 1793, 1 Stat. 324. The reason for the Court’s inaction may, on
the other hand, have been doubt about the proper role of the Attorney General in
the matter, an issue raised in the opinion. See Marcus & Teir, Hayburn’s Case: A
Misinterpretation of Precedent, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 4; Bloch, The Early Role of the At-
torney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There was Pragma-
tism, 1989 DUKE L. J. 561, 590–618. Notice the Court’s discussion in Plaut v. Spend-
thrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218, 225–26 (1995).
155 See United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852); Gordon v. United
States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865); In re Sanborn, 148 U.S. 222 (1893); cf. McGrath
v. Kritensen, 340 U.S. 162, 167–168 (1950).
ernment.” 156 More recently, the Court avoided a similar situation

by a close construction of a statute.157
Award of Execution.—The adherence of the Court to this propo-
sition, however, has not extended to a rigid rule formulated by Chief
Justice Taney, given its fullest expression in a posthumously pub-
lished opinion.158 In Gordon v. United States,159 the Court refused
to hear an appeal from a decision of the Court of Claims; the act
establishing the Court of Claims provided for appeals to the Su-
preme Court, after which judgments in favor of claimants were to
be referred to the Secretary of the Treasury for payments out of
the general appropriation for payment of private claims. But the
act also provided that no funds should be paid out of the Treasury
for any claims “till after an appropriation therefor shall be esti-
mated for by the Secretary of the Treasury.” 160 The opinion of the
Court merely stated that the implication of power in the executive
officer and in Congress to revise all decisions of the Court of Claims
requiring payment of money denied that court the judicial power
from the exercise of which “alone” appeals could be taken to the
Supreme Court.161
In his posthumously published opinion, Chief Justice Taney, be-
cause the judgment of the Court of Claims and the Supreme Court
depended for execution upon future action of the Secretary and of
Congress, regarded any such judgment as nothing more than a cer-
156 Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
157 Connor v. Johnson, 402 U.S. 690 (1971). Under § 5 of the Voting Rights Act
of 1965, 79 Stat. 437, 42 U.S.C. § 1973e, no state may “enact or seek to administer”
any change in election law or practice different from that in effect on a particular
date without obtaining the approval of the Attorney General or the district court in
the District of Columbia, a requirement interpreted to reach reapportionment and
redistricting. Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544 (1969); Perkins v. Mat-
thews, 400 U.S. 379 (1971). The issue in Connor was whether a districting plan drawn
up and ordered into effect by a federal district court, after it had rejected a legisla-
tively drawn plan, must be submitted for approval. Unanimously, on the papers with-
out oral argument, the Court ruled that, despite the statute’s inclusive language, it
did not apply to court-drawn plans.
158 Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1865) (published 1885). See United
States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886). The Chief Justice’s initial effort was in United
States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).
159 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865).
160 Act of February 24, 1855, 10 Stat. 612, as amended, Act of March 3, 1963,
12 Stat. 737, as paraphrased in Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. at 698.

161 Gordon v. United States, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 561 (1865). Following repeal of
the objectionable section, Act of March 17, 1866, 14 Stat. 9, the Court accepted ap-
pellate jurisdiction. United States v. Jones, 119 U.S. 477 (1886); De Groot v. United
States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419 (1867). But note that execution of the judgments was
still dependent upon congressional appropriations. On the effect of the requirement
for appropriations at a time when appropriations had to be made for judgments over
$100,000, see Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568–571 (1962). Cf. Regional Rail
Reorganization Act Cases (Blanchette v. Connecticut General Ins. Corp.), 419 U.S.
102, 148–149 & n.35 (1974).
tificate of opinion and in no sense a judicial judgment. Congress

could not therefore authorize appeals to the Supreme Court in a
case where its judicial power could not be exercised, where its judg-
ment would not be final and conclusive upon the parties, and where
processes of execution were not awarded to carry it into effect. Taney
then enunciated a rule that was rigorously applied until 1933: the
award of execution is an essential part of every judgment passed
by a court exercising judicial powers and no decision is a legal judg-
ment without an award of execution.162 The rule was most signifi-
cant in barring the lower federal courts from hearing proceedings
for declaratory judgments 163 and in denying appellate jurisdiction
in the Supreme Court from declaratory proceedings in state courts.164
But, in 1927, the Court began backing away from its absolute insis-
tence upon an award of execution. Unanimously holding that a de-
claratory judgment in a state court was res judicata in a subse-
quent proceeding in federal court, the Court admitted that, “[w]hile
ordinarily a case or judicial controversy results in a judgment re-
quiring award of process of execution to carry it into effect, such
relief is not an indispensable adjunct to the exercise of the judicial
function.” 165 Then, in 1933, the Court interred the award-of-
execution rule in its rigid form and accepted an appeal from a state
court in a declaratory proceeding.166 Finality of judgment, however,
remains the rule in determining what is judicial power, without re-
gard to the demise of Chief Justice Taney’s formulation.
162 Gordon v. United States, 117 U.S. 697 (1865) (published 1885). Subsequent
cases accepted the doctrine that an award of execution as distinguished from final-
ity of judgment was an essential attribute of judicial power. See In re Sanborn, 148
U.S. 122, 226 (1893); ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 483 (1894); La Abra Silver Min-
ing Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 457 (1899); Frasch v. Moore, 211 U.S. 1 (1908);
Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 355, 361–362 (1911); Postum Cereal Co. v.
California Fig Nut Co., 272 U.S. 693 (1927).
163 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70 (1927).
164 Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Burley Growers’ Coop. Marketing Ass’n, 276 U.S.
71 (1928).
165 Fidelity Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123, 132 (1927).
166 Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1933). The decisions in
Swope and Wallace removed all constitutional doubts previously shrouding a pro-
posed federal declaratory judgment act, which was enacted in 1934, 48 Stat. 955, 28
U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202, and unanimously sustained in Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth,
300 U.S. 227 (1937). Wallace and Haworth were cited with approval in Medimmune,
Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007) (“Article III’s limitation of federal
courts’ jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ reflected in the ‘actual controversy’
requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a), [does not] re-
quire[ ] a patent licensee to terminate or be in breach of its license agreement be-
fore it can seek a declaratory judgment that the underlying patent is invalid, unen-
forceable, or not infringed,” id. at 120–21).
Judicial Immunity from Suit

Under common law—the Supreme Court has not elevated judi-
cial immunity from suit to a constitutional principle—judges “are
responsible to the people alone for the manner in which they per-
form their duties. If faithless, if corrupt, if dishonest, if partial, if
oppressive or arbitrary, they may be called to account by impeach-
ment, and removed from office. . . . But responsible they are not to
private parties in civil actions for the judicial acts, however injuri-
ous may be those acts, and however much they may deserve con-
demnation, unless perhaps where the acts are palpably in excess of
the jurisdiction of the judges, and are done maliciously or cor-
ruptly.” 167 Three years later, the Court qualified this exception to
judges’ immunity: the phrase beginning “unless, perhaps,” the Court
wrote, was “not necessary to a correct statement of the law, and
. . . judges . . . are not liable to civil actions for their judicial acts,
even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction, and are al-
leged to have been done maliciously or corruptly. A distinction must
be here observed between excess of jurisdiction and the clear ab-
sence of all jurisdiction over the subject-matter,” with judges sub-
ject to liability only in the latter instance.168
In Stump v. Sparkman, the Court upheld the immunity of a
judge who approved a petition from the mother of a 15-year-old girl
to have the girl sterilized without her knowledge (she was told that
she was to have her appendix removed).169 In a 5-to-3 opinion, the
Court found that there was not the “clear absence of all jurisdic-
tion” that is required to hold a judge civilly liable. The judge had
jurisdiction “in all cases at law and in equity whatsoever,” except
where exclusive jurisdiction is “conferred by law upon some other
court, board, or officer,” and no statute or case law prohibited the
judge from considering a petition for sterilization.170 The Court also
167 Randall v. Brigham, 74 U.S. 523, 537 (1869). Judicial immunity “is a gen-
eral principle of the highest importance to the proper administration of justice . . . .

Liability . . . would destroy that independence without which no judiciary can be
either respectable or useful. . . . Nor can this exemption of the judges from civil
liability be affected by the motives with which their judicial acts are performed.”
Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1872).
168 Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 351 (1872). The Court offered a hypothetical
example of the distinction. A judge of a probate court who held a criminal trial would
act in clear absence of all jurisdiction over the subject matter, whereas a judge of a
criminal court who held a criminal trial for an offense that was not illegal would
act merely in excess of his jurisdiction. Id. at 352.
169 435 U.S. 349 (1978).
170 435 U.S. at 357, 358. The defendant was an Indiana state court judge, but
the suit was in federal court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court noted that it had
held in Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), that there was no indication that, in
enacting this statute, Congress had intended to abolish the principle of judicial im-
munity established in Bradley v. Fisher, supra.
rejected the argument that the judge’s approving the petition had
not constituted a “judicial” act. The Court found “that the factors
determining whether an act by a judge is a ‘judicial’ one relate to
the nature of the act itself, i.e., whether it is a function normally
performed by a judge, and to the expectations of the parties, i.e.,
whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity. . . . Judge
Stump performed the type of act normally performed only by judges
and . . . he did so in his capacity as a [judge].” 171
Although judges are generally immune from suits for damages,
the Court has held that a judge may be enjoined from enforcing a
court rule, such as a restriction on lawyer advertising that violates
the First Amendment.172 Similarly, a state court magistrate may be
enjoined from “imposing bail on persons arrested for nonjailable of-
fenses under Virginia law and . . . incarcerating those persons if
they could not meet the bail. . . .” 173 But what if the prevailing party,
as it did in these two cases, seeks an award of attorneys’ fees un-
der the Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976? 174 The Court
found that “Congress intended to permit attorney’s fees awards in
cases in which prospective relief was properly awarded against de-
fendants who would be immune from damage awards.” 175 In fact,
“Congress’s intent could hardly be more plain. Judicial immunity is
no bar to the award of attorney’s fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988.” 176
ANCILLARY POWERS OF FEDERAL COURTS
The Contempt Power

Categories of Contempt.—Crucial to an understanding of the
history of the law governing the courts’ powers of contempt is an
awareness of the various kinds of contempt. With a few notable ex-
171 435 U.S. at 362. Justice Stewart’s dissent, joined by Justices Marshall and
Powell, concluded that what Judge Stump did “was beyond the pale of anything that
could sensibly be called a judicial act.” Id. at 365. Indiana law, Justice Stewart wrote,
provided for administrative proceedings for the sterilization of certain people who
were institutionalized (which the girl in this case was not), and what Judge Stump
did “was in no way an act ‘normally performed by a judge.’ ” Id. at 367.
172 Supreme Court of Virginia v. Consumers Union of the United States, 446
U.S. 719 (1980).

173 Pulliam v. Allen, 466 U.S. 522, 524–25 (1984).
174 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). Under this statute, “suits brought against individual of-
ficers for injunctive relief are for all practical purposes suits against the State it-
self,” and, therefore, the state must “bear the burden of the counsel fees award.”
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 700 (1978).
175 Consumers Union, 446 U.S. at 738–39. This is not the case, however, when
judges are sued in their legislative capacity for having issued a rule. Id. at 734.
176 Pulliam, 466 U.S. at 544. In 1996, Public Law 104–317, § 309, amended § 1988(b)
to preclude the award of attorneys’ fees in a suit against a judicial officer unless the
officer’s action “was clearly in excess of such officer’s jurisdiction.”
ceptions,177 the Court has consistently distinguished between crimi-

nal and civil contempt, the former being a vindication of the author-
ity of the courts and latter being the preservation and enforcement
of the rights of the parties. A civil contempt has been traditionally
viewed as the refusal of a person in a civil case to obey a manda-
tory order. It is incomplete in nature, may be purged by obedience
to the court order, and does not involve a sentence for a definite
period of time. The classic criminal contempt is one where the act
of contempt has been completed, punishment is imposed to vindi-
cate the authority of the court, and a person cannot by subsequent
action purge himself of such contempt.178
The issue of whether a certain contempt is civil or criminal can
be of great importance. For instance, criminal contempt, unlike civil
contempt, implicates procedural rights attendant to prosecu-
tions.179 Or, in Ex parte Grossman,180 while holding that the Presi-
dent may pardon a criminal contempt, Chief Justice Taft noted in
dicta that such pardon power did not extend to civil contempt. Not-
withstanding the importance of distinguishing between the two, there
have been instances where defendants have been charged with both
civil and criminal contempt for the same act.181
Long-standing doctrine regarding how courts should distin-
guish between civil and criminal contempt remains influential. In
Shillitani v. United States,182 defendants were sentenced by their
respective District Courts to two years imprisonment for contempt
of court, but the sentences contained a purge clause providing for
the unconditional release of the contemnors upon agreeing to tes-
177 E.g., United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947).
178 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 441–443 (1911); Ex parte
Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925). See also Bessette v. W.B. Conkey Co., 194 U.S. 324,
327–328 (1904).
179 In Robertson v. United States ex rel. Watson, the Court had granted certio-
rari to consider a District of Columbia law that allowed a private individual to bring
a criminal contempt action in the congressionally established D.C. courts based on
a violation of a civil protective order. 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–6261, slip op. (2010). The
Court subsequently issued a per curiam order dismissing the writ of certiorari as
having been improvidently granted, but four Justices dissented. Writing in dissent,
Chief Justice Roberts thought it imperative to make clear that “[t]he terrifying force
of the criminal justice system may only be brought to bear against an individual by
society as a whole, through a prosecution brought of behalf of the government.” 560
U.S. ___, No. 08–6261, slip op. at 1 (2010) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). Of particular
concern was how various protections in the Bill of Rights against government action
would play out in a privately brought action. Id. at 5–6.
180 267 U.S. 87, 119–120 (1925). In an analogous case, the Court was emphatic
in a dictum that Congress cannot require a jury trial where the contemnor has failed
to perform a positive act for the relief of private parties, Michaelson v. United States
ex rel. Chicago, S.P., M. & Ry. Co., 266 U.S. 42, 65–66 (1924). But see Bloom v. Illi-
nois, 391 U.S. 194, 202 (1968).
181 See United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 299 (1947).
182 384 U.S. 364 (1966).
tify before a grand jury. On appeal, the Supreme Court held that
the defendants were in civil contempt, notwithstanding their sen-
tence for a definite period of time, on the grounds that the test for
determining whether the contempt is civil or criminal is what the
court primarily seeks to accomplish by imposing sentence.183 Here,
the purpose was to obtain answers to the questions for the grand
jury, and the court provided for the defendants’ release upon com-
pliance; whereas, “a criminal contempt proceeding would be charac-
terized by the imposition of an unconditional sentence for punish-
ment or deterence.” 184
In International Union, UMW v. Bagwell,185 however, the Court
formulated a new test for drawing the distinction between civil and
criminal contempt in certain cases. Henceforth, the imposition of
non-compensatory contempt fines for the violation of any complex
injunction will require criminal proceedings. This case, as have so
many, involved the imposition of large fines (here, $52 million) upon
a union in a strike situation for violations of an elaborate court in-
junction restraining union activity during the strike. The Court was
vague with regard to the standards for determining when a court
order is “complex” and thus requires the protection of criminal pro-
ceedings.186
The Court has also recognized a second, but more subtle distinc-
tion between types of contempt, and that is the difference between
direct and indirect contempt. Direct contempt results when the con-
tumacious act is committed “in the presence of the Court or so near
thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,” 187 while indi-
rect contempt is behavior that the Court did not itself witness.188
The nature of the contumacious act, i.e., whether it is direct or in-
direct, is important because it determines the appropriate proce-
dure for charging the contemnor. As will be seen in the following
discussion, the history of the contempt powers of the American ju-
diciary is marked by two trends: a shrinking of the court’s power
183 384 U.S. at 370.

184 384 U.S. at 370 n.6. See Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624 (1988) (remanding for
determination whether payment of child support arrearages would purge a determi-
nate sentence, the proper characterization critical to decision on a due process claim).
185 512 U.S. 821 (1994).
186 512 U.S. at 832–38. Relevant is the fact that the alleged contempts did not
occur in the presence of the court and that determinations of violations require elabo-
rate and reliable fact-finding. See esp. id. at 837–38.
187 Act of March 2, 1831, ch. 99, § 1, 4 Stat. 488. Cf. Rule 42(a), FRCrP, which
provides, “A criminal contempt may be punished summarily if the judge certifies

that he saw or heard the conduct constituting the contempt and that it was commit-
ted in the actual presence of the court.” See also Beale, Contempt of Court, Civil
and Criminal, 21 HARV. L. REV. 161, 171–172 (1908).
188 See Fox, The Nature of Contempt of Court, 37 L.Q. REV. 191 (1921).
to punish a person summarily and a multiplying of the due process

requirements that must otherwise be met when finding an indi-
vidual to be in contempt.189
The Act of 1789.—The summary power of the courts of the United
States to punish contempts of their authority had its origin in the
law and practice of England where disobedience of court orders was
regarded as contempt of the King himself and attachment was a
prerogative process derived from presumed contempt of the sover-
eign.190 By the latter part of the eighteenth century, summary power
to punish was extended to all contempts whether committed in or
out of court.191 In the United States, the Judiciary Act of 1789 192
conferred power on all courts of the United States “to punish by
fine or imprisonment, at the discretion of said courts, all contempts
of authority in any cause or hearing before the same.” The only limi-
tation placed on this power was that summary attachment was made
a negation of all other modes of punishment. The abuse of this ex-
tensive power led, following the unsuccessful impeachment of Judge
James H. Peck of the Federal District Court of Missouri, to the pas-
sage of the Act of 1831 limiting the power of the federal courts to
punish contempts to misbehavior in the presence of the courts, “or
so near thereto as to obstruct the administration of justice,” to the
misbehavior of officers of courts in their official capacity, and to dis-
obedience or resistance to any lawful writ, process or order of the
court.193
An Inherent Power.—The nature of the contempt power was
described Justice Field, writing for the Court in Ex parte Robin-
son,194 sustaining the act of 1831: “The power to punish for contempts
is inherent in all courts; its existence is essential to the preserva-
tion of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of the
189 Many of the limitations placed on the inferior federal courts have been is-
sued on the basis of the Supreme Court’s supervisory power over them rather than
upon a constitutional foundation, while, of course, the limitations imposed on state
courts necessarily are on constitutional dimensions. Indeed, it is often the case that
a limitation, which is applied to an inferior federal court as a superintending mea-
sure, is then transformed into a constitutional limitation and applied to state courts.
Compare Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 373 (1966), with Bloom v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 194 (1968). In the latter stage, the limitations then bind both federal and state
courts alike. Therefore, in this section, Supreme Court constitutional limitations on
state court contempt powers are cited without restriction for equal application to
federal courts.
190 Fox, The King v. Almon, 24 L.Q. REV. 184, 194–195 (1908).
191 Fox, The Summary Power to Punish Contempt, 25 L.Q. REV. 238, 252 (1909).
192 1 Stat. 83, § 17 (1789).
193 18 U.S.C. § 401. For a summary of the Peck impeachment and the back-
ground of the act of 1831, see Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Pro-
cedure in Criminal Contempts in ‘Inferior’ Federal Courts: A Study in Separation of
Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1024–1028 (1924).
194 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505 (1874).
judgments, orders, and writs of the courts, and consequently to the

due administration of justice. The moment the courts of the United
States were called into existence and invested with jurisdiction over
any subject, they became possessed of this power.” Expressing doubts
concerning the validity of the act as to the Supreme Court, he de-
clared, however, that there could be no question of its validity as
applied to the lower courts on the ground that they are created by
Congress and that their “powers and duties depend upon the act
calling them into existence, or subsequent acts extending or limit-
ing their jurisdiction.” 195 With the passage of time, later adjudica-
tions, especially after 1890, came to place more emphasis on the
inherent power of courts to punish contempts than upon the power
of Congress to regulate summary attachment.
By 1911, the Court was saying that the contempt power must
be exercised by a court without referring the issues of fact or law
to another tribunal or to a jury in the same tribunal.196 In Michaelson
v. United States,197 the Court intentionally placed a narrow inter-
pretation upon those sections of the Clayton Act 198 relating to pun-
ishment for contempt of court by disobedience of injunctions in la-
bor disputes. The sections in question provided for a jury upon the
demand of the accused in contempt cases in which the acts commit-
ted in violation of district court orders also constituted a crime un-
der the laws of the United States or of those of the state where
they were committed. Although Justice Sutherland reaffirmed ear-
lier rulings establishing the authority of Congress to regulate the
contempt power, he went on to qualify this authority and declared
that “the attributes which inhere in the power [to punish con-
tempt] and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor
rendered practically inoperative.” The Court mentioned specifically
“the power to deal summarily with contempt committed in the pres-
ence of the courts or so near thereto as to obstruct the administra-
tion of justice,” and the power to enforce mandatory decrees by co-
ercive means.199 This latter power, to enforce, the Court has held,
includes the authority to appoint private counsel to prosecute a crimi-
nal contempt.200 Although the contempt power may be inherent, it
195 86 U.S. at 505–11.
196 Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 450 (1911). See also In
re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595 (1895).
197 266 U.S. 42 (1924).
198 38 Stat. 730, 738 (1914).
199 266 U.S. at 65–66. See Frankfurter and Landis, Power of Congress Over Pro-
cedure in Criminal Contempts in ‘Inferior’ Federal Courts: A Study in Separation of

Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1924).
200 Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton, 481 U.S. 787, 793–801 (1987). How-
ever, the Court, invoking its supervisory power, instructed the lower federal courts
first to request the United States Attorney to prosecute a criminal contempt and
is not unlimited. In Spallone v. United States,201 the Court held that

a district court had abused its discretion by imposing contempt sanc-
tions on individual members of a city council for refusing to vote to
implement a consent decree remedying housing discrimination by
the city. The proper remedy, the Court indicated, was to proceed
first with contempt sanctions against the city, and only if that course
failed should it proceed against the council members individually.
First Amendment Limitations on the Contempt Power.—
The phrase, “in the presence of the Court or so near thereto as to
obstruct the administration of justice,” was interpreted so broadly
in Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United States 202 as to uphold the ac-
tion of a district court judge in punishing a newspaper for con-
tempt for publishing spirited editorials and cartoons issues raised
in an action challenging a street railway’s rates. A majority of the
Court held that the test to be applied in determining the obstruc-
tion of the administration of justice is not the actual obstruction
resulting from an act, but “the character of the act done and its
direct tendency to prevent and obstruct the discharge of judicial duty.”
Similarly, the test whether a particular act is an attempt to influ-
ence or intimidate a court is not the influence exerted upon the mind
of a particular judge but “the reasonable tendency of the acts done
to influence or bring about the baleful result . . . without reference
to the consideration of how far they may have been without influ-
ence in a particular case.” 203 In Craig v. Hecht,204 these criteria were
applied to sustain the imprisonment of the comptroller of New York
City for writing and publishing a letter to a public service commis-
sioner criticizing the action of a United States district judge in re-
ceivership proceedings.
The decision in Toledo Newspaper, however, did not follow ear-
lier decisions interpreting the act of 1831 and was grounded on his-
torical error. For these reasons, it was reversed in Nye v. United
only if refused should they appoint a private lawyer. Id. at 801–802. Still using its
supervisory power, the Court held that the district court had erred in appointing
counsel for a party that was the beneficiary of the court order; disinterested counsel
had to be appointed. Id. at 802–08. Justice Scalia contended that the power to pros-
ecute is not comprehended within Article III judicial power and that federal judges
had no power, inherent or otherwise, to initiate a prosecution for contempt or to
appoint counsel to pursue it. Id. at 815. See also United States v. Providence Jour-
nal Co., 485 U.S. 693 (1988), which involved the appointment of a disinterested pri-
vate attorney. The Supreme Court dismissed the writ of certiorari after granting it,
however, holding that only the Solicitor General representing the United States could
bring the petition to the Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 518.
201 493 U.S. 265 (1990). The decision was an exercise of the Court’s supervisory
power. Id. at 276. Four Justices dissented. Id. at 281.

202 247 U.S. 402 (1918).
203 247 U.S. at 418–21.
204 263 U.S. 255 (1923).
States,205 and the theory of constructive contempt based on the “rea-

sonable tendency” rule was rejected. The defendants in the civil suit,
by persuasion and the use of liquor, had induced a plaintiff feeble
in mind and body to ask for dismissal of the suit he had brought
against them. The events in the episode occurred more than 100
miles from where the court was sitting and were held not to put
the persons responsible for them in contempt of court. Although Nye
v. United States was exclusively a case of statutory construction, it
was significant from a constitutional point of view because its rea-
soning was contrary to that of earlier cases narrowly construing the
act of 1831 and asserting broad inherent powers of courts to pun-
ish contempts independently of, and contrary to, congressional regu-
lation of this power. Bridges v. California 206 was noteworthy for the
dictum of the majority that the contempt power of all courts, fed-
eral as well as state, is limited by the guaranty of the First Amend-
ment against interference with freedom of speech or of the press.207
A series of cases involving highly publicized trials and much news
media attention and exploitation,208 however, caused the Court to
suggest that the contempt and other powers of trial courts should
be used to stem the flow of publicity before it can taint a trial. Thus,
Justice Clark, speaking for the majority in Sheppard v. Maxwell,209
wrote, “If publicity during the proceedings threatens the fairness of
the trial, a new trial should be ordered. But we must remember
that reversals are but palliatives; the cure lies in those remedial
measures that will prevent the prejudice at its inception. . . . Nei-
ther prosecutors, counsel for defense, the accused, witness, court staff
nor law enforcement officers coming under the jurisdiction of the
court should be permitted to frustrate its function. Collaboration
between counsel and the press as to information affecting the fair-
ness of a criminal trial is not only subject to regulation, but is highly
censurable and worthy of disciplinary measures.” Though the regu-
205 313 U.S. 33, 47–53 (1941).
206 314 U.S. 252, 260 (1941).
207 See also Wood v. Georgia, 370 U.S. 375 (1962), further clarifying the limita-
tions imposed by the First Amendment upon this judicial power and delineating the
requisite serious degree of harm to the administration of law necessary to justify
exercise of the contempt power to punish the publisher of an out-of-court statement
attacking a charge to the grand jury, absent any showing of actual interference with
the activities of the grand jury.
It is now clearly established that courtroom conduct to be punishable as con-
tempt “must constitute an imminent, not merely a likely, threat to the administra-
tion of justice. The danger must not be remote or even probable; it must immedi-
ately imperil.” Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947); In re Little, 404 U.S. 553,
555 (1972).
208 E.g., Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532 (1965); Marshall v. United States, 360 U.S.
310 (1959); Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966).

209 384 U.S. 333, 363 (1966).
lation the Justice had in mind was presumably to be of the parties

and related persons rather than of the press, the potential for con-
flict with the First Amendment is obvious, as well as is the neces-
sity for protection of the equally important right to a fair trial.210
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to No-
tice and to a Hearing Versus Summary Punishment.—
Misbehavior in the course of a trial may be punished summarily by
the trial judge. In Ex parte Terry,211 the Court denied habeas cor-
pus relief to a litigant who had been jailed for assaulting a United
States marshal in the presence of the court. In Cooke v. United
States,212 however, the Court remanded for further proceedings a
judgment jailing an attorney and his client for presenting the judge
a letter which impugned his impartiality with respect to their case,
still pending before him. Distinguishing the case from that of Terry,
Chief Justice Taft, speaking for the unanimous Court, said: “The
important distinction . . . is that this contempt was not in open
court. . . . To preserve order in the court room for the proper con-
duct of business, the court must act instantly to suppress distur-
bance or violence or physical obstruction or disrespect to the court
when occurring in open court. There is no need of evidence or assis-
tance of counsel before punishment, because the court has seen the
offense. Such summary vindication of the court’s dignity and author-
ity is necessary. It has always been so in the courts of the common
law and the punishment imposed is due process of law.” 213
As to the timeliness of summary punishment, the Court, in Sacher
v. United States,214 at first construed Rule 42(a) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure, which was designed to afford judges clearer
guidelines as to the exercise of their contempt power, to allow “the
trial judge, upon the occurrence in his presence of a contempt, im-
mediately and summarily to punish it, if, in his opinion, delay will
prejudice the trial. We hold, on the other hand, that if he believes
the exigencies of the trial require that he defer judgment until its
completion he may do so without extinguishing his power.” 215 Sub-
sequently, however, interpreting the Due Process Clause and thus
binding both federal and state courts, the Court held that, al-
though the trial judge may summarily and without notice or hear-
ing punish contemptuous conduct committed in his presence and
observed by him, if he does choose to wait until the conclusion of
210 For another approach, bar rules regulating the speech of counsel and the
First Amendment standard, see Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991).
211 128 U.S. 289 (1888).
212 267 U.S. 517 (1925).
213 267 U.S. at 535, 534.
214 343 U.S. 1 (1952).
215 343 U.S. at 11.
the proceeding, he must afford the alleged contemnor at least rea-

sonable notice of the specific charge and opportunity to be heard in
his own defense. Apparently, a “full scale trial” is not contem-
plated.216
Curbing the judge’s power to consider conduct as occurring in
his presence, the Court, in Harris v. United States,217 held that sum-
mary contempt proceedings in aid of a grand jury probe, achieved
through swearing the witness and repeating the grand jury’s ques-
tions in the presence of the judge, did not constitute contempt “in
the actual presence of the court” for purposes of Rule 42(a); rather,
the absence of a disturbance in the court’s proceedings or of the
need to immediately vindicate the court’s authority makes the wit-
ness’ refusal to testify an offense punishable only after notice and a
hearing.218 Moreover, when it is not clear that the judge was fully
aware of the contemptuous behavior when it occurred, notwithstand-
ing the fact that it occurred during the trial, “a fair hearing would
entail the opportunity to show that the version of the event related
to the judge was inaccurate, misleading, or incomplete.” 219
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to Jury
Trial.—Originally, the right to a jury trial was not available in crimi-
nal contempt cases.220 But the Court held in Cheff v. Schnackenberg,221
that a defendant is entitled to trial by jury when the punishment
in a criminal contempt case in federal court is more than the sen-
tence for a petty offense, traditionally six months. Although the rul-
ing was made pursuant to the Supreme Court’s supervisory powers
and was thus inapplicable to state courts and presumably subject
to legislative revision, two years later the Court held that the Con-
stitution also requires jury trials in criminal contempt cases in which
216 Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974). In a companion case, the Court ob-
served that, although its rule conceivably encourages a trial judge to proceed imme-
diately rather than awaiting a calmer moment, “[s]ummary convictions during tri-
als that are unwarranted by the facts will not be invulnerable to appellate review.”
Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506, 517 (1974).
217 382 U.S. 162 (1965), overruling Brown v. United States, 359 U.S. 41 (1959).
218 But see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958) (noncompliance with or-
der directing defendants to surrender to marshal for execution of their sentence is

an offense punishable summarily as a criminal contempt); Reina v. United States,
364 U.S. 507 (1960).
219 Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212, 215 (1971) (citing In re Oliver, 333 U.S.
257, 275–276 (1948)).

220 See Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165 (1958); United States v. Barnett,
376 U.S. 681 (1964), and cases cited. The dissents of Justices Black and Douglas in
those cases prepared the ground for the Court’s later reversal. On the issue, see Frank-
furter and Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in ‘In-
ferior’ Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010, 1042–
1048 (1924).
221 384 U.S. 373 (1966).
the offense was more than a petty one.222 Whether an offense is

petty or not is determined by the maximum sentence authorized by
the legislature or, in the absence of a statute, by the sentence actu-
ally imposed. Again the Court drew the line between petty offenses
and more serious ones at six months’ imprisonment. Although this
case involved an indirect criminal contempt (willful petitioning to
admit to probate a will known to be falsely prepared) the majority
in dictum indicated that even in cases of direct contempt a jury will
be required in appropriate instances. “When a serious contempt is
at issue, considerations of efficiency must give way to the more fun-
damental interest of ensuring the even-handed exercise of judicial
power.” 223 Presumably, there is no equivalent right to a jury trial
in civil contempt cases,224 although one could spend much more time
in jail pursuant to a judgment of civil contempt than one could for
most criminal contempts.225 The Court has, however, expanded the
right to jury trials in federal civil cases on nonconstitutional grounds.226
Due Process Limitations on Contempt Powers: Impartial
Tribunal.—In Cooke v. United States,227 Chief Justice Taft uttered
some cautionary words to guide trial judges in the use of their con-
tempt powers. “The power of contempt which a judge must have
and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administration of jus-
tice and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the court is
most important and indispensable. But its exercise is a delicate one
and care is needed to avoid arbitrary or oppressive conclusions. This
rule of caution is more mandatory where the contempt charged has
in it the element of personal criticism or attack upon the judge. The
judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but
222 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194 (1968). See also International Union, UMW v.
Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821 (1994) (refining the test for when contempt citations are crimi-
nal and thus require jury trials).
223 391 U.S. at 209. In Codispoti v. Pennsylvania, 418 U.S. 506 (1974), the Court
held a jury trial to be required when the trial judge awaits the conclusion of the
proceeding and then imposes separate contempt sentences in which the total aggre-
gated more than six months even though no sentence for more than six months was
imposed for any single act of contempt. For a tentative essay at defining a petty
offense when a fine is levied, see Muniz v. Hoffman, 422 U.S. 454, 475–77 (1975). In
International Union, UMW v. Bagwell, 512 U.S. 821, 837 n.5 (1994), the Court con-
tinued to reserve the question of the distinction between petty and serious con-
tempt fines, because of the size of the fine in that case.
224 The Sixth Amendment is applicable only to criminal cases and the Seventh
to suits at common law, but the due process clause is available if needed.
225 Note that under 28 U.S.C. § 1826 a recalcitrant witness before a grand jury
may be imprisoned for the term of the grand jury, which can be 36 months. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3331(a).
226 E.g., Beacon Theatres v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959); Dairy Queen v. Wood,
369 U.S. 469 (1962); Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970). However, the Court’s
expansion of jury trial rights may have halted with McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403
U.S. 528 (1971).
227 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925).
he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court
by too great leniency. The substitution of another judge would avoid
either tendency but it is not always possible. Of course where acts
of contempt are palpably aggravated by a personal attack upon the
judge in order to drive the judge out of the case for ulterior rea-
sons, the scheme should not be permitted to succeed. But attempts
of this kind are rare. All of such cases, however, present difficult
questions for the judge. All we can say upon the whole matter is
that where conditions do not make it impracticable, or where the
delay may not injure public or private right, a judge called upon to
act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, may, with-
out flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his fellow judges
take his place. Cornish v. The United States, 299 Fed. 283, 285; To-
ledo Company v. The United States, 237 Fed. 986, 988. The case
before us is one in which the issue between the judge and the par-
ties had come to involve marked personal feeling that did not make
for an impartial and calm judicial consideration and conclusion, as
the statement of the proceedings abundantly shows.” 228
Sacher v. United States 229 grew out of a tempestuous trial of
eleven Communist Party leaders in which Sacher and others were
counsel for the defense. Upon the conviction of the defendants, the
trial judge at once found counsel guilty of criminal contempt and
imposed jail terms of up to six months. At issue directly was whether
the contempt charged was one that the judge was authorized to de-
termine for himself or whether it was one that under Rule 42(b)
could be passed upon only by another judge and only after notice
and hearing, but behind this issue loomed the applicability and na-
ture of due process requirements, in particular whether the de-
fense attorneys were constitutionally entitled to trial before a differ-
ent judge. A divided Court affirmed most of the convictions, set aside
others, and denied that due process required a hearing before a dif-
ferent judge. “We hold that Rule 42 allows the trial judge, upon
the occurrence in his presence of a contempt, immediately and sum-
marily to punish it, if, in his opinion, delay will prejudice the trial.
We hold, on the other hand, that if he believes the exigencies of
the trial require that he defer judgment until its completion, he may
do so without extinguishing his power. . . . We are not unaware or
unconcerned that persons identified with unpopular causes may find
it difficult to enlist the counsel of their choice. But we think it must
be ascribed to causes quite apart from fear of being held in con-
tempt, for we think few effective lawyers would regard the tactics
228 The Toledo Company case that the Court cited was affirmed in Toledo News-
paper Co. v. United States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).

229 343 U.S. 1 (1952). See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
condemned here as either necessary or helpful to a successful de-

fense. That such clients seem to have thought these tactics neces-
sary is likely to contribute to the bar’s reluctance to appear for them
rather more than fear of contempt. But that there may be no mis-
understanding, we make clear that this Court, if its aid be needed,
will unhesitatingly protect counsel in fearless, vigorous and effec-
tive performance of every duty pertaining to the office of the advo-
cate on behalf of any person whatsoever. But it will not equate con-
tempt with courage or insults with independence. It will also protect
the processes of orderly trial, which is the supreme object of the
lawyer’s calling.” 230
In Offutt v. United States,231 acting under its supervisory pow-
ers over the lower federal courts, the Court set aside a criminal
contempt conviction imposed on a lawyer after a trial marked by
highly personal recriminations between the trial judge and the law-
yer. In a situation in which the record revealed that the contuma-
cious conduct was the product of both lack of self-restraint on the
part of the contemnor and a reaction to the excessive zeal and per-
sonal animosity of the trial judge, the majority felt that any con-
tempt trial must be held before another judge. This holding, that
when a judge becomes personally embroiled in the controversy with
an accused he must defer trial of his contempt citation to another
judge, which was founded on the Court’s supervisory powers, was
constitutionalized in Mayberry v. Pennsylvania,232 in which a defen-
dant acting as his own counsel engaged in quite personal abuse of
the trial judge. The Court appeared to leave open the option of the
trial judge to act immediately and summarily to quell contempt by
citing and convicting an offender, thus empowering the judge to keep
the trial going,233 but if he should wait until the conclusion of the
trial he must defer to another judge.
Contempt by Disobedience of Orders.—Disobedience of in-
junctive orders, particularly in labor disputes, has been a fruitful
source of cases dealing with contempt of court. In United States v.
230 343 U.S. at 11, 13–14.

231 348 U.S. 11 (1954).
232 400 U.S. 455 (1971). See also Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971);
Holt v. Virginia, 381 U.S. 131 (1965). Even in the absence of a personal attack on a
judge that would tend to impair his detachment, the judge may still be required to
excuse himself and turn a citation for contempt over to another judge if the re-
sponse to the alleged misconduct in his courtroom partakes of the character of “marked
personal feelings” being abraded on both sides, so that it is likely the judge has felt
a “sting” sufficient to impair his objectivity. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974).
233 400 U.S. at 463. See Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337 (1970), in which the Court
affirmed that summary contempt or expulsion may be used to keep a trial going.
United Mine Workers,234 the Court held, first, that disobedience of

a temporary restraining order issued for the purpose of maintain-
ing existing conditions, pending the determination of the court’s ju-
risdiction, is punishable as criminal contempt where the issue is
not frivolous, but substantial.235 Second, the Court held that an or-
der issued by a court with jurisdiction over the subject matter and
person must be obeyed by the parties until it is reversed by orderly
and proper proceedings, even though the statute under which the
order is issued is unconstitutional.236 Third, on the basis of United
States v. Shipp,237 the Court held that violations of a court’s order
are punishable as criminal contempt, even if the order is set aside
on appeal as in excess of the court’s jurisdiction and even if the
basic action has become moot.238 Finally, the Court held that con-
duct can amount to both civil and criminal contempt, and the same
acts may justify a court in resorting to coercive and punitive mea-
sures, which may be imposed in a single proceeding.239
Contempt Power in Aid of Administrative Power.—
Proceedings to enforce the orders of administrative agencies and sub-
poenas issued by them to appear and produce testimony have be-
come increasingly common since the leading case of ICC v. Brimson,240
which held that the contempt power of the courts might by statu-
tory authorization be used to aid the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion in enforcing compliance with its orders. In 1947 a proceeding
to enforce a subpoena duces tecum issued by the Securities and Ex-
change Commission during the course of an investigation was ruled
to be civil in character on the ground that the only sanction was a
penalty designed to compel obedience. The Court then enunciated
the principle that, where a fine or imprisonment imposed on the
contemnor is designed to coerce him to do what he has refused to
do, the proceeding is one for civil contempt.241 Notwithstanding the
power of administrative agencies to cite an individual for con-
234 330 U.S. 258 (1947). See also International Union, UMW v. Bagwell, 512 U.S.
821 (1994).
235 330 U.S. at 292–93.
236 330 U.S. at 293. See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967).
237 203 U.S. 563 (1906).
238 330 U.S. at 290–92.
239 330 U.S. at 299. But see Cheff v. Schnackenberg, 384 U.S. 273 (1966), and
“Due Process Limitations on Contempt Power: Right to Jury Trial,” supra.

240 154 U.S. 447 (1894).
241 Penfield Co. v. SEC, 330 U.S. 585 (1947). Note the dissent of Justice Frank-
furter. For delegations of the subpoena power to administrative agencies and the
use of judicial process to enforce them, see also McCrone v. United States, 307 U.S.
61 (1939); Endicott Johnson Corp. v. Perkins, 317 U.S. 501 (1943); Oklahoma Press
Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
tempt, however, such bodies must be acting within the authority

that has been lawfully delegated to them.242
Sanctions Other Than Contempt

Long recognized by the courts as inherent powers are those au-
thorities that are necessary to the administration of the judicial sys-
tem itself, of which the contempt power just discussed is only the
most controversial.243 Courts, as elements of an independent and
coequal branch of government, once they are created and their ju-
risdiction established, have the authority to do what courts have
traditionally done in order to accomplish their assigned tasks.244 Of
course, these inherent powers may be limited by statutes and by
rules,245 but, just as noted above in the discussion of the same is-
sue with respect to contempt, the Court asserts both the power to
act in areas not covered by statutes and rules and the power to act
unless Congress has not only provided regulation of the exercise of
the power, but also has unmistakably enunciated its intention to
limit the courts’ inherent powers.246
Thus, in Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., the Court upheld the impo-
sition of monetary sanctions against a litigant and his attorney for
bad-faith litigation conduct in a diversity case. Some of the conduct
was covered by a federal statute and several sanction provisions of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, but some was not, and the
Court held that, absent a showing that Congress had intended to
limit the courts, they could use their inherent powers to impose sanc-
tions for the entire course of conduct, including shifting attorneys’
fees, which is ordinarily against the common-law American rule.247
In another case, a party failed to comply with discovery orders and
a court order concerning a schedule for filing briefs. The Supreme
Court held that the attorneys’ fees statute did not allow assess-
242 Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966). See also Sanctions of the Inves-
tigatory Power: Contempt, supra, for a discussion of Congress’s power to cite an in-
dividual for contempt by virtue of its investigatory duties, which is applicable, at
least by analogy, to administrative agencies.
243 “Certain implied powers must necessarily result to our courts of justice, from
the nature of their institution. . . . To fine for contempt, imprison for contumacy,
enforce the observance of order, &c., are powers which cannot be dispensed with in
a court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others: and so far our courts,
no doubt, possess powers not immediately derived from statute . . . .” United States
v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 32, 34 (1812).
244 See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); Ex parte Robin-
son, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874); Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626, 630–631
(1962); Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43–46 (1991); and id. at 58 (Justice
Scalia dissenting), 60, 62–67 (Justice Kennedy dissenting).
245 Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. at 47.
246 501 U.S. at 46–51. But see id. at 62–67 (Justice Kennedy dissenting).
247 501 U.S. at 49–51. On the implications of the fact that this was a diversity
case, see id. at 51–55.

ment of such fees in that situation, but it remanded for consider-

ation of sanctions under both a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and
the trial court’s inherent powers, subject to a finding of bad faith.248
But bad faith is not always required for the exercise of some inher-
ent powers. Thus, courts may dismiss an action for an unexplained
failure of the moving party to prosecute it.249
Power to Issue Writs: The Act of 1789

From the beginning of government under the Constitution of
1789, Congress has assumed, under the Necessary and Proper Clause,
its power to establish inferior courts, its power to regulate the ju-
risdiction of federal courts, and its power to regulate the issuance
of writs.250 Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 authorized the
Supreme Court “to issue writs of prohibition to the district courts,
when proceeding as courts of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,
and writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by the principles and
usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding office,
under the authority of the United States.” 251 Section 14 provided
that all “courts of the United States shall have power to issue writs
of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs not specially pro-
vided for by statute, which may be necessary for the exercise of their
respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the principles and usages
of law.” 252
Although the Act of 1789 left the power over writs subject largely
to the common law, it is significant as a reflection of the belief, in
which the courts have on the whole concurred, that an act of Con-
gress is necessary to confer judicial power to issue writs.253 Whether
Article III itself is an independent source of the power of federal
courts to fashion equitable remedies for constitutional violations or
whether such remedies must fit within congressionally authorized
248 Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764 (1980).
249 Link v. Wabash R.R., 370 U.S. 626 (1962).
250 Frankfurter & Landis, Power of Congress Over Procedure in Criminal Contempts
in ‘Inferior’ Federal Courts—A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010,

1016–1023 (1924).
251 1 Stat. 73, 81. “Section 13 was a provision unique to the Court, granting
the power of prohibition as to district courts in admiralty and maritime cases . . . .”

WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION 2D § 4005, p.
98 (1996). See also R. FALLON, ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM (6th ed. 2009), Ch. III, p. 268 (hereinafter Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.))
252 1 Stat. 73, 81–82. See also United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954),
holding that the All Writs section of the Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), gives
federal courts the power to employ the ancient writ of coram nobis.
253 This proposition was recently reasserted in Pennsylvania Bureau of Correc-
tion v. United States Marshals Service, 474 U.S. 34 (1985) (holding that a federal
district court lacked authority to order U.S. marshals to transport state prisoners,
such authority not being granted by the relevant statutes).
writs or procedures is often left unexplored. In Missouri v. Jen-

kins,254 for example, the Court, rejecting a claim that a federal court
exceeded judicial power under Article III by ordering local authori-
ties to increase taxes to pay for desegregation remedies, declared
that “a court order directing a local government body to levy its
own taxes” is plainly a judicial act within the power of a federal
court.255 In the same case, the Court refused to rule on “the diffi-
cult constitutional issues” presented by the state’s claim that the
district court had exceeded its constitutional powers in a prior or-
der directly raising taxes, instead ruling that this order had vio-
lated principles of comity.256
Common Law Powers of District of Columbia Courts.—
The portion of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 that authorized the
Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction was held invalid in Marbury v. Madison,257 as
an unconstitutional enlargement of the Supreme Court’s original ju-
risdiction. After two more futile efforts to obtain a writ of manda-
mus, in cases in which the Court found that power to issue the writ
had not been vested by statute in the courts of the United States
except in aid of already existing jurisdiction,258 a litigant was suc-
cessful in Kendall v. United States ex rel. Stokes,259 in finding a court
that would take jurisdiction in a mandamus proceeding. This was
the circuit court of the United States for the District of Columbia,
which was held to have jurisdiction, on the theory that the com-
mon law, in force in Maryland when the cession of that part of the
state that became the District of Columbia was made to the United
States, remained in force in the District. At an early time, there-
fore, the federal courts established the rule that mandamus can be
issued only when authorized by a constitutional statute and within
the limits imposed by the common law and the separation of pow-
ers.260
254 495 U.S. 33 (1990).

255 495 U.S. at 55, citing Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U.S.
218, 233–34 (1964) (an order that local officials “exercise the power that is theirs” to
levy taxes in order to open and operate a desegregated school system “is within the
court’s power if required to assure . . . petitioners that their constitutional rights
will no longer be denied them”).
256 495 U.S. at 50–52.
257 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803). Cf. Wiscart v. D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
258 McIntire v. Wood, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 504 (1813); McClung v. Silliman, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 598 (1821).

259 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
260 In 1962, Congress conferred upon all federal district courts the same power
to issue writs of mandamus as was exercisable by federal courts in the District of

Columbia. 76 Stat. 744, 28 U.S.C. § 1361.
Habeas Corpus: Congressional and Judicial Control.—

The writ of habeas corpus 261 has a special status because its sus-
pension is forbidden, except in narrow circumstances, by Article I,
§ 9, cl. 2. The writ also has a venerable common law tradition, long
antedating its recognition by the first Congress in the Judiciary Act
of 1789,262 as a means “to relieve detention by executive authori-
ties without judicial trial.” 263 Nowhere in the Constitution, how-
ever, is the power to issue the writ vested in the federal courts,
which raises the question of whether Congress could suspend the
writ de facto by declining to authorize its issuance. In other words,
is a statute needed to make the writ available or does the right to
habeas corpus stem by implication from the Suspension Clause or
from the grant of judicial power? 264
Since Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Ex parte Bollman,265
it was generally 266 accepted that “the power to award the writ by
any of the courts of the United States, must be given by written
law.” 267 As Marshall explained, however, the suspension clause was
an “injunction,” an “obligation” to provide “efficient means by which
this great constitutional privilege should receive life and activity;
for if the means be not in existence, the privilege itself would be
lost, although no law for its suspension should be enacted.” 268 And
261 Reference to the “writ of habeas corpus” is to the “Great Writ,” habeas cor-
pus ad subjiciendum, by which a court would inquire into the lawfulness of a deten-
tion of the petitioner. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 95 (1807). For other uses,
see Carbo v. United States, 364 U.S. 611 (1961); Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S. 266
(1948). Technically, federal prisoners no longer utilize the writ of habeas corpus in
seeking post-conviction relief, now the largest office of the writ, but proceed under
28 U.S.C. § 2255, on a motion to vacate judgment. Intimating that if § 2255 af-
forded prisoners a less adequate remedy than they would have under habeas cor-
pus, it would be unconstitutional, the Court in United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S.
205 (1952), held the two remedies to be equivalent. Cf. Sanders v. United States,
373 U.S. 1, 14 (1963). The claims cognizable under one are cognizable under the
other. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217 (1969). Therefore, the term habeas
corpus is used here to include the § 2255 remedy. There is a plethora of writings
about the writ. See, e.g., Hart & Wechsler (6th ed), supra at 1153–1310; Develop-
ments in the Law: Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARV. L. REV. 1038 (1970).
262 Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 82.
263 INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001), quoted in Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S.
466, 474 (2004).

264 Professor Chafee contended that by the time of the Constitutional Conven-
tion the right to habeas corpus was so well established no affirmative authorization
was needed. The Most Important Human Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REV.
143, 146 (1952). But compare Collins, Habeas Corpus for Convicts: Constitutional
Right or Legislative Grace?, 40 CALIF. L. REV. 335, 344–345 (1952).
265 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
266 8 U.S. at 94. See also Ex parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845).
267 8 U.S. at 64.
268 8 U.S. at 95. In quoting the clause, Marshall renders “shall not be sus-
pended” as “should not be suspended.”

so it has been understood since,269 with only a few judicial voices

raised to suggest that what Congress could not do directly (by sus-
pension) it could not do by omission (by failing to provide for ha-
beas).270 But, because statutory authority had always existed autho-
rizing the federal courts to grant the relief they deemed necessary
under habeas corpus, the Court did not need to face the ques-
tion.271
Having determined in Bollman that a statute was necessary be-
fore the federal courts had power to issue writs of habeas corpus,
Chief Justice Marshall pointed to § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789
as containing the necessary authority.272 As the Chief Justice read
it, the authorization was limited to persons imprisoned under fed-
eral authority. It was not until 1867, with two small exceptions,273
that legislation specifically empowered federal courts to inquire into
the imprisonment of persons under state authority.274 Pursuant to
this authorization, the Court then expanded the use of the writ into
a major instrument to reform procedural criminal law in both fed-
eral and state jurisdictions.
However, the question then arose as to what aspects of this broader
habeas are protected against suspension. Noting that the statutory
writ of habeas corpus has been expanded dramatically since the First
Congress, the Court has written that it “assume[s] . . . that the Sus-
pension Clause of the Constitution refers to the writ as it exists
269 See Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). Cf. Carbo v. United
States, 364 U.S. 611, 614 (1961).

270 E.g., Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C. Cir. 1949), revd. on
other grounds sub nom., Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that
habeas exists as an inherent common law right); see also Justice Black’s dissent, id.
at 791, 798: “Habeas corpus, as an instrument to protect against illegal imprison-
ment, is written into the Constitution. Its use by courts cannot in my judgment be
constitutionally abridged by Executive or by Congress.” And, in Jones v. Cun-
ningham, 371 U.S. 236, 238 (1963), the Court said: “The habeas corpus jurisdic-
tional statute implements the constitutional command that the writ of habeas cor-
pus be made available.” (Emphasis added).
271 Cf. Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869).
272 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 94 (1807). See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 409 (1963).

273 Act of March 2, 1833, § 7, 4 Stat. 634 (federal officials imprisoned for enforc-
ing federal law); Act of August 29, 1842, 5 Stat. 539 (foreign nationals detained by a
state in violation of a treaty). See also Bankruptcy Act of April 4, 1800,§ 38, 2 Stat.
19, 32 (habeas corpus for imprisoned debtor discharged in bankruptcy), repealed by
Act of December 19, 1803, 2 Stat. 248.
274 The act of February 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385, conveyed power to federal courts
“to grant writs of habeas corpus in all cases where any person may be restrained of
his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of any treaty or law of the United
States. . . .” On the law with respect to state prisoners prior to this statute, see Ex
parte Dorr, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 103 (1845); cf. Elkison v. Deliesseline, 8 Fed. Cas. 493
(No. 4366) (C.C.D.S.C. 1823) (Justice Johnson); Ex parte Cabrera, 4 Fed. Cas. 964
(No. 2278) (C.C.D. Pa. 1805) (Justice Washington).
today, rather than as it existed in 1789.” 275 This statement, how-

ever, appears to be in tension with the theory of congressionally
defined habeas found in Bollman, unless one assumes that a ha-
beas right, once created, cannot be diminished. The Court, how-
ever, in reviewing provisions of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death
Penalty Act 276 that limited habeas, passed up an opportunity to de-
lineate Congress’s permissive authority over habeas, finding that none
of the limitations to the writ in that statute raised questions of con-
stitutional import.277
For practical purposes, the issue appears to have been resolved
by Boumediene v. Bush,278 in which the Court held that Congress’s
attempt to eliminate all federal habeas jurisdiction over “enemy com-
batant” detainees held at Guantanamo Bay 279 violated the Suspen-
sion Clause. Although the Court did not explicitly identify whether
the underlying right to habeas that was at issue arose from stat-
ute, common law, or the Constitution itself, it did decline to infer
“too much” from the lack of historical examples of habeas being ex-
tended to enemy aliens held overseas.280 In Boumediene, the Court
instead emphasized a “functional” approach that considered the citi-
zenship and status of the detainee, the adequacy of the process through
which the status determination was made, the nature of the sites
where apprehension and detention took place, and any practical ob-
stacles inherent in resolving the prisoner’s entitlement to the writ.281
In further determining that the procedures afforded to the de-
tainees to challenge their detention in court were not adequate sub-
stitutes for habeas, the Court noted the heightened due process con-
cerns when a detention is based principally on Executive Branch
275 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 663–64 (1996). See INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S.
289, 300–01 (2001) (leaving open the question of whether post-1789 legal develop-
ments are protected); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977) (finding “no occasion”
to define the contours of constitutional limits on congressional modification of the
writ).
276 Pub. L. 104–132, §§ 101–08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217–26, amending, inter alia,
28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2253, 2254, 2255, and Fed. R. App. P. 22.

277 Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
278 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
279 In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004), the Court found that 28 U.S.C. § 2241,
the federal habeas statute, applied to these detainees. Congress then removed all
court jurisdiction over these detainees under the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005,
Pub. L. 109–148, § 1005(e)(1) (providing that “no court . . . shall have jurisdiction
to hear or consider . . . an application for . . . habeas corpus filed by . . . an alien
detained . . . at Guantanamo Bay).” After the Court decided in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,
548 U.S. 557 (2006), that the Detainee Treatment Act did not apply to detainees
whose cases were pending at the time of enactment, it was amended by the Mili-
tary Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. 109–366, to also apply to pending cases where
a detainee had been determined to be an enemy combatant.
280 128 S. Ct. at 2251.
281 128 S. Ct. at 2258, 2259.
proceedings—here, Combatant Status Review Tribunals or (CSRTs)—

rather than proceedings before a court of law.282 The Court also ex-
pressed concern that the detentions had, in some cases, lasted as
long as six years without significant judicial oversight.283 The Court
further noted the limitations at the CSRT stage on a detainee’s abil-
ity to find and present evidence to challenge the government’s case,
the unavailability of assistance of counsel, the inability of a de-
tainee to access certain classified government records which could
contain critical allegations against him, and the admission of hear-
say evidence. While reserving judgment as to whether the CSRT
process itself comports with due process, the Court found that the
appeals process for these decisions, assigned to the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, did not contain the
means necessary to correct errors occurring in the CSRT pro-
cess.284
Habeas Corpus: The Process of the Writ.—A petition for a
writ of habeas corpus is filed by or on behalf of a person in “cus-
tody,” a concept which has been expanded so much that it is no lon-
ger restricted to actual physical detention in jail or prison.285 The
writ acts upon the custodian, not the prisoner, so the issue under
the jurisdictional statute is whether the custodian is within the dis-
trict court’s jurisdiction.286 Traditionally, the proceeding could not
be used to secure an adjudication of a question which if deter-
mined in the petitioner’s favor would not result in his immediate
282 Under the Detainee Treatment Act, Pub. L. 109–148, Title X, Congress granted
only a limited appeal right to determination made by the Executive Branch as to

“(I) whether the status determination of [a] Combatant Status Review Tribunal . . .
was consistent with the standards and procedures specified by the Secretary of De-
fense . . . and (ii) to the extent the Constitution and laws of the United States are
applicable, whether the use of such standards and procedures to make the determi-
nation is consistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States.” § 1005(e)(2)(C).
283 128 S. Ct. at 2263, 2275.
284 The Court focused in particular on the inability of the reviewing court to
admit and consider relevant exculpatory evidence that was not introduced in the
prior proceeding. The Court also listed other potential constitutional infirmities in
the review process, including the absence of provisions empowering the D.C. Circuit
to order release from detention, and not permitting petitioners to challenge the Presi-
dent’s authority to detain them indefinitely.
285 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241(c), 2254(a). “Custody” does not mean one must be con-
fined; a person on parole or probation is in custody. Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S.

236 (1963). A person on bail or on his own recognizance is in custody, Justices of
Boston Mun. Court v. Lydon, 466 U.S. 294, 300–301 (1984); Lefkowitz v. Newsome,
420 U.S. 283, 291 n.8 (1975); Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973), and
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484 (1973), held that an inmate of
an Alabama prison was also sufficiently in the custody of Kentucky authorities who
had lodged a detainer with Alabama to obtain the prisoner upon his release.
286 Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1973) (issue is
whether “the custodian can be reached by service of process”). See also Rasul v. Bush,
542 U.S. 466 (2004) (federal district court for District of Columbia had jurisdiction
of habeas petitions from prisoners held at U.S. Naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba);
release, since a discharge from custody was the only function of the
writ,287 but this restraint too the Court has abandoned in an em-
phasis upon the statutory language directing the habeas court to
“dispose of the matter as law and justice require.” 288 Thus, even if
a prisoner has been released from jail, the presence of collateral
consequences flowing from his conviction gives the court jurisdic-
tion to determine the constitutional validity of the conviction.289
Petitioners seeking federal habeas relief must first exhaust their
state remedies, a limitation long settled in the case law and codi-
fied in 1948.290 Prisoners are required to present their claims in
state court only once, either on appeal or collateral attack, and they
need not return time and again to raise their issues before coming
to federal court.291 In addition, “[w]hen a state court declines to re-
view the merits of a petitioner’s claim on the ground that it has
done so already, it creates no bar to federal habeas review. . . . A
claim is procedurally barred when it has not been fairly presented
to the state courts for their initial consideration—not when the claim
has been presented more than once.” 292
Although they were once required to petition the Supreme Court
on certiorari to review directly their state convictions, prisoners have
been relieved of this largely pointless exercise,293 but, if the Su-
preme Court has taken and decided a case, then its judgment is
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (federal district court in New York lacks
jurisdiction over prisoner being held in a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina;
the commander of the brig, not the Secretary of Defense, is the immediate custo-
dian and proper respondent).
287 McNally v. Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934); Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S. 574 (1960).
288 28 U.S.C. § 2243. See Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968). See also Maleng v.
Cook, 490 U.S. 488 (1989).

289 Carafas v. LaVallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968), overruling Parker v. Ellis, 362 U.S.
574 (1960). In Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968), the Court overruled McNally v.
Hill, 293 U.S. 131 (1934), and held that a prisoner may attack on habeas the second
of two consecutive sentences while still serving the first. See also Walker v. Wain-
wright, 390 U.S. 335 (1968) (prisoner may attack the first of two consecutive sen-
tences although the only effect of a successful attack would be immediate confine-
ment on the second sentence). Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484
(1973), held that one sufficiently in custody of a state could use habeas to challenge
the state’s failure to bring him to trial on pending charges.
290 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b). See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 490–497 (1973),
and id. at 500, 512–24 (Justice Brennan dissenting); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509,
515–21 (1982). If a prisoner submits a petition with both exhausted and unexhausted
claims, the habeas court must dismiss the entire petition. Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S.
at 518–519. Exhaustion first developed in cases brought by persons in state custody
prior to any judgment. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886); Urquhart v. Brown,
205 U.S. 179 (1907).
291 Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 447–450 (1953); id. at 502 (Justice Frank-
furter concurring); Castille v. Peoples, 489 U.S. 346, 350 (1989).

292 Cone v. Bell, 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–1114, slip op. at 17, 18 (2009).
293 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963), overruling Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S.
200 (1950).
conclusive in habeas on all issues of fact or law actually adjudi-

cated.294 A federal prisoner in a § 2255 proceeding will file his mo-
tion in the court that sentenced him; 295 a state prisoner in a fed-
eral habeas action may file either in the district of the court in which
he was sentenced or in the district in which he is in custody.296
Habeas corpus is not a substitute for an appeal.297 It is not a
method to test ordinary procedural errors at trial or violations of
state law but only to challenge alleged errors which if established
would go to make the entire detention unlawful under federal law.298
If, after appropriate proceedings, the habeas court finds that on the
facts discovered and the law applied the prisoner is entitled to re-
lief, it must grant it, ordinarily ordering the government to release
the prisoner unless he is retried within a certain period.299
Congressional Limitation of the Injunctive Power

Although some judicial dicta 300 support the idea of an inherent
power of the federal courts sitting in equity to issue injunctions in-
dependently of statutory limitations, neither the course taken by
Congress nor the specific rulings of the Supreme Court support any
such principle. Congress has repeatedly exercised its power to limit
the use of the injunction in federal courts. The first limitation on
the equity jurisdiction of the federal courts is to be found in § 16 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, which provided that no equity suit should
294 28 U.S.C. § 2244(c). But an affirmance of a conviction by an equally divided
Court is not an adjudication on the merits. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188 (1972).
295 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
296 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d). Cf. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410 U.S. 484
(1973), overruling Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U.S. 188 (1948), and holding that a peti-
tioner may file in the district in which his custodian is located even though the pris-
oner may be located elsewhere.
297 Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420, 428 (1912); Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U.S. 333,
335 (1923); Eagles v. United States ex rel. Samuels, 329 U.S. 304, 311 (1946). But
compare Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 558–560 (1953) (Justice Frankfurter dissent-
ing in part).
298 Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62 (1991); Lewis v. Jeffers, 497 U.S. 764, 780
(1990); Pulley v. Harris, 465 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1984).

299 8 U.S.C. § 2244(b). See Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 569 (1971); Irvin
v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717, 729 (1961).

300 In United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 339 (1906),
Justice Brewer, speaking for the Court, approached a theory of inherent equity ju-
risdiction when he declared: “The principles of equity exist independently of and an-
terior to all Congressional legislation, and the statutes are either enunciations of
those principles or limitations upon their application in particular cases.” It should
be emphasized, however, that the Court made no suggestion that it could apply pre-
existing principles of equity without jurisdiction over the subject matter. Indeed, the
inference is to the contrary. In a dissenting opinion in which Justices McKenna and
Van Devanter joined, in Paine Lumber Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 475 (1917), Justice
Pitney contended that Article III, § 2, “had the effect of adopting equitable remedies
in all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United States where such
remedies are appropriate.”
be maintained where there was a full and adequate remedy at law.

Although this provision did no more than declare a pre-existing rule
long applied in chancery courts,301 it did assert the power of Con-
gress to regulate the equity powers of the federal courts. The Act of
March 2, 1793,302 prohibited the issuance of any injunction by any
court of the United States to stay proceedings in state courts ex-
cept where such injunctions may be authorized by any law relating
to bankruptcy proceedings. In subsequent statutes, Congress pro-
hibited the issuance of injunctions in the federal courts to restrain
the collection of taxes,303 provided for a three-judge court as a pre-
requisite to the issuance of injunctions to restrain the enforcement
of state statutes for unconstitutionality,304 for enjoining federal stat-
utes for unconstitutionality,305 and for enjoining orders of the Inter-
state Commerce Commission,306 limited the power to issue injunc-
tions restraining rate orders of state public utility commissions,307
and the use of injunctions in labor disputes,308 and placed a very
rigid restriction on the power to enjoin orders of the Administrator
under the Emergency Price Control Act.309
Perhaps pressing its powers further than prior legislation, Con-
gress has enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996.310 Es-
sentially, the law imposes a series of restrictions on judicial rem-
edies in prison-conditions cases. Thus, courts may not issue prospective
relief that extends beyond that necessary to correct the violation of
a federal right that they have found, that is narrowly drawn, is the
least intrusive, and that does not give attention to the adverse im-
pact on public safety. Preliminary injunctive relief is limited by the
same standards. Consent decrees may not be approved unless they
are subject to the same conditions, meaning that the court must
conduct a trial and find violations, thus cutting off consent decrees.
301 Boyce’s Executors v. Grundy, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 210 (1830).
302 1 Stat. 333, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
303 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a).
304 This provision was repealed in 1976, save for apportionment and districting
suits and when otherwise required by an Act of Congress. Pub. L. 94–381, § 1, 90

Stat. 1119, and § 3, 28 U.S.C. § 2284. Congress occasionally provides for such courts,
as in the Voting Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973c.
305 Repealed by Pub. L. 94–381, § 2, 90 Stat. 1119 (1976). Congress occasionally
provides for such courts now, in order to expedite Supreme Court consideration of
constitutional challenges to critical federal laws. See Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714,
719–721 (1986) (3-judge court and direct appeal to Supreme Court in the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985).
306 Repealed by Pub. L. 93–584, § 7, 88 Stat. 1918.
307 28 U.S.C. § 1342.
308 29 U.S.C. §§ 52, 101–110.
309 56 Stat. 31, 204 (1942).
310 The statute was part of an Omnibus Appropriations Act signed by the Presi-
dent on April 26, 1996. Pub. L. 104–134, §§ 801–10, 110 Stat. 1321–66—1321–77,
amending 18 U.S.C. § 3626.
If a decree was previously issued without regard to the standards

now imposed, the defendant or intervenor is entitled to move to va-
cate it. No prospective relief is to last longer than two years if any
party or intervenor so moves. Finally, a previously issued decree
that does not conform to the new standards imposed by the Act is
subject to termination upon the motion of the defendant or an in-
tervenor. After a short period (30 or 60 days, depending on whether
there is “good cause” for a 30-day extension), such a motion oper-
ates as an automatic stay of the prior decree pending the court’s
decision on the merits. The Court upheld the termination and auto-
matic stay provisions in Miller v. French,311 rejecting the conten-
tion that the automatic stay provision offends separation of powers
principles by legislative revision of a final judgment. Rather, Con-
gress merely established new standards for the enforcement of pro-
spective relief, and the automatic stay provision “helps to imple-
ment the change in the law.” 312 A number of constitutional challenges
can be expected respecting Congress’s power to limit federal judi-
cial authority to remedy constitutional violations.
All of these restrictions have been sustained by the Supreme
Court as constitutional and applied with varying degrees of thor-
oughness. The Court has made exceptions to the application of the
prohibition against the stay of proceedings in state courts,313 but it
has on the whole adhered to the statute. The exceptions raise no
constitutional issues, and the tendency has been alternately to con-
tract and to expand the scope of the exceptions.314
In Duplex Printing Press Co. v. Deering,315 the Supreme Court
placed a narrow construction upon the labor provisions of the Clay-
ton Act and thereby contributed in part to the more extensive re-
striction by Congress on the use of injunctions in labor disputes in
the Norris-LaGuardia Act of 1932, which has not only been de-
clared constitutional 316 but has been applied liberally 317 and in such
a manner as to repudiate the notion of an inherent power to issue
injunctions contrary to statutory provisions.
311 530 U.S. 327 (2000).

312 530 U.S. at 348.
313 Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861); Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U.S.
10 (1876); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

314 See, Anti-Injunction Statute, infra.
315 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
316 Lauf v. E. G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323 (1938); New Negro Alliance v.
Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938).

317 In addition to Lauf and New Negro Alliance, see Drivers’ Union v. Valley Co.,
311 U.S. 91, 100–103 (1940), and compare Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson, 370
U.S. 195 (1962), with Boys Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
Injunctions Under the Emergency Price Control Act of

1942.—Lockerty v. Phillips 318 justifies the same conclusion. Here
the validity of the special appeals procedure of the Emergency Price
Control Act of 1942 was sustained. This act provided for a special
Emergency Court of Appeals, which, subject to review by the Su-
preme Court, was given exclusive jurisdiction to determine the va-
lidity of regulations, orders, and price schedules issued by the Of-
fice of Price Administration. The Emergency Court and the Emergency
Court alone was permitted to enjoin regulations or orders of OPA,
and even it could enjoin such orders only after finding that the or-
der was not in accordance with law or was arbitrary or capricious.
The Emergency Court was expressly denied power to issue tempo-
rary restraining orders or interlocutory decrees, and in addition the
effectiveness of any permanent injunction it might issue was to be
postponed for thirty days. If review was sought in the Supreme Court
by certiorari, effectiveness was to be postponed until final disposi-
tion. A unanimous Court, speaking through Chief Justice Stone, de-
clared that there “is nothing in the Constitution which requires Con-
gress to confer equity jurisdiction on any particular inferior federal
court.” All federal courts, other than the Supreme Court, it was as-
serted, derive their jurisdiction solely from the exercise of the au-
thority to ordain and establish inferior courts conferred on Con-
gress by Article III, § 1, of the Constitution. This power, which Congress
is left free to exercise or not, was held to include the power “ ‘of
investing them with jurisdiction either limited, concurrent, or exclu-
sive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in the exact de-
grees and character which to Congress may seem proper for the pub-
lic good.’ ” 319 Although the Court avoided passing upon the
constitutionality of the prohibition against interlocutory decrees, the
language of the Court was otherwise broad enough to support it,
as was the language of Yakus v. United States,320 which sustained
a different phase of the special procedure for appeals under the Emer-
gency Price Control Act.321
318 319 U.S. 182 (1943).

319 319 U.S. at 187 (quoting Cary v. Curtis, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236, 245 (1845).
See South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331–332 (1966), upholding a provi-
sion of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 that made the district court for the District of
Columbia the only avenue of relief for States seeking to remove the coverage of the
Act.
320 321 U.S. 414 (1944). But compare Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434
U.S. 275 (1978) (construing statute in way to avoid the constitutional issue raised
in Yakus). In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987), the Court held
that, when judicial review of a deportation order had been precluded, due process
required that the alien be allowed to make a collateral challenge to the use of that
proceeding as an element of a subsequent criminal proceeding.
321 Ch. 26, 56 Stat. 31, § 204 (1942).
The Rule-Making Power and Powers Over Process

Among the incidental powers of courts is that of making all nec-
essary rules governing their process and practice and for the or-
derly conduct of their business.322 However, this power too is de-
rived from the statutes and cannot go beyond them. The landmark
case is Wayman v. Southard,323 which sustained the validity of the
Process Acts of 1789 and 1792 as a valid exercise of authority un-
der the necessary and proper clause. Although Chief Justice Mar-
shall regarded the rule-making power as essentially legislative in
nature, he ruled that Congress could delegate to the courts the power
to vary minor regulations in the outlines marked out by the stat-
ute. Fifty-seven years later, in Fink v. O’Neil,324 in which the United
States sought to enforce by summary process the payment of a debt,
the Supreme Court ruled that under the process acts the law of
Wisconsin was the law of the United States, and hence the govern-
ment was required to bring a suit, obtain a judgment, and cause
execution to issue. Justice Matthews for a unanimous Court de-
clared that the courts have “no inherent authority to take any one
of these steps, except as it may have been conferred by the legisla-
tive department; for they can exercise no jurisdiction, except as the
law confers and limits it.” 325 Conceding, in 1934, the limited com-
petence of legislative bodies to establish a comprehensive system of
court procedure, and acknowledging the inherent power of courts
to regulate the conduct of their business, Congress authorized the
Supreme Court to prescribe rules for the lower federal courts not
inconsistent with the Constitution and statutes.326 Their operation
being restricted, in conformity with the proviso attached to the con-
gressional authorization, to matters of pleading and practice, the
322 Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & P.S.B.C. Co., 263 U.S. 629 (1924).
323 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 1 (1825).
324 106 U.S. 272, 280 (1882).
325 See Miner v. Atlass, 363 U.S. 641 (1960), holding that a federal district court,
sitting in admiralty, has no inherent power, independent of any statute or the Su-
preme Court’s Admiralty Rules, to order the taking of deposition for the purpose of
discovery. See also Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286 (1969), in which the Court found
statutory authority in the “All Writs Statute” for a habeas corpus court to propound
interrogatories.
326 In the Act of June 19, 1934, 48 Stat. 1064, and contained in 28 U.S.C. § 2072,
Congress, in authorizing promulgation of rules of civil procedure, reserved the power

to examine and override or amend rules proposed pursuant to the act which it found
to be contrary to its legislative policy. See Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14–16 (1941).
Congress also has authorized promulgation of rules of criminal procedure, habeas,
evidence, admiralty, bankruptcy, and appellate procedure. See Hart & Wechsler (6th
ed.), supra at 533–543 (discussing development of rules and citing secondary author-
ity). Congress in the 1970s disagreed with the direction of proposed rules of evi-
dence and of habeas practice, and, first postponing their effectiveness, enacted re-
vised rules. Pub. L. 93–505, 88 Stat. 1926 (1974); Pub. L. 94–426, 90 Stat. 1334
(1976). On this and other actions, see Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra.
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure thus judicially promulgated nei-

ther affect the substantive rights of litigants 327 nor alter the juris-
diction 328 of federal courts and the venue of actions therein 329 and,
thus circumscribed, have been upheld as valid.
Limitations to The Rule Making Power.—The principal func-
tion of court rules is that of regulating the practice of courts as re-
gards forms, the operation and effect of process, and the mode and
time of proceedings. However, rules are sometimes employed to state
in convenient form principles of substantive law previously estab-
lished by statutes or decisions. But no such rule “can enlarge or
restrict jurisdiction. Nor can a rule abrogate or modify the substan-
tive law.” This rule is applicable equally to courts of law, equity,
and admiralty, to rules prescribed by the Supreme Court for the
guidance of lower courts, and to rules “which lower courts make
for their own guidance under authority conferred.” 330 As incident
to the judicial power, courts of the United States possess inherent
authority to supervise the conduct of their officers, parties, wit-
nesses, counsel, and jurors by self-preserving rules for the protec-
tion of the rights of litigants and the orderly administration of jus-
tice.331
The courts of the United States possess inherent equitable pow-
ers over their process to prevent abuse, oppression, and injustice,
and to protect their jurisdiction and officers in the protection of prop-
erty in the custody of law.332 Such powers are said to be essential
to and inherent in the organization of courts of justice.333 The courts
of the United States also possess inherent power to amend their
327 However, the abolition of old rights and the creation of new ones in the course
of litigation conducted in conformance with these judicially prescribed federal rules

has been sustained as against the contention of a violation of substantive rights.
Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941).
328 Cf. United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 589–590 (1941).
329 Mississippi Pub. Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U.S. 438 (1946).
330 Washington-Southern Nav. Co. v. Baltimore & P.S.B.C. Co., 263 U.S. 629, 635,
636 (1924). It is not for the Supreme Court to prescribe how the discretion vested in
a Court of Appeals should be exercised. As long as the latter court keeps within the
bounds of judicial discretion, its action is not reviewable. In re Burwell, 350 U.S.
521 (1956).
331 McDonald v. Pless, 238 U.S. 264, 266 (1915); Griffin v. Thompson, 43 U.S. (2
How.) 244, 257 (1844). See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985) (court of appeal rule
conditioning appeal on having filed with the district court timely objections to a mas-
ter’s report). In Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214, 218 (1956), the Court, citing
McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), asserted that this supervisory power
extends to policing the requirements of the Court’s rules with respect to the law
enforcement practices of federal agents. But compare United States v. Payner, 447
U.S. 727 (1980).
332 Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131 (1888); Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884);
Buck v. Colbath, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 334 (1866).

333 Eberly v. Moore, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 147 (1861); Arkadelphia Co. v. St. Louis
S.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 134 (1919).

records, correct the errors of the clerk or other court officers, and
to rectify defects or omissions in their records even after the lapse
of a term, subject, however, to the qualification that the power to
amend records conveys no power to create a record or re-create one
of which no evidence exists.334
Appointment of Referees, Masters, and Special Aids

The administration of insolvent enterprises, investigations into
the reasonableness of public utility rates, and the performance of
other judicial functions often require the special services of mas-
ters in chancery, referees, auditors, and other special aids. The prac-
tice of referring pending actions to a referee was held in Heckers v.
Fowler 335 to be coequal with the organization of the federal courts.
In the leading case of Ex parte Peterson,336 a United States district
court appointed an auditor with power to compel the attendance of
witnesses and the production of testimony. The court authorized him
to conduct a preliminary investigation of facts and file a report thereon
for the purpose of simplifying the issues for the jury. This action
was neither authorized nor prohibited by statute. In sustaining the
action of the district judge, Justice Brandeis, speaking for the Court,
declared: “Courts have (at least in the absence of legislation to the
contrary) inherent power to provide themselves with appropriate in-
struments required for the performance of their duties. . . . This
power includes authority to appoint persons unconnected with the
court to aid judges in the performance of specific judicial duties, as
they may arise in the progress of a cause.” 337 The power to appoint
auditors by federal courts sitting in equity has been exercised from
their very beginning, and here it was held that this power is the
same whether the court sits in law or equity.
Power to Admit and Disbar Attorneys

Subject to general statutory qualifications for attorneys, the power
of the federal courts to admit and disbar attorneys rests on the com-
mon law from which it was originally derived. According to Chief
Justice Taney, it was well settled by the common law that “it rests
exclusively with the Court to determine who is qualified to become
one of its officers, as an attorney and counselor, and for what cause
he ought to be removed.” Such power, he made clear, however, “is
not an arbitrary and despotic one, to be exercised at the pleasure
of the Court, or from passion, prejudice, or personal hostility; but
334 Gagnon v. United States, 193 U.S. 451, 458 (1904).
335 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 123, 128–129 (1864).
336 253 U.S. 300 (1920).
337 253 U.S. at 312.
Sec. 2—Judicial Power and Jurisdiction Cl. 1—Cases and Controversies
it is the duty of the Court to exercise and regulate it by a sound

and just judicial discretion, whereby the rights and independence
of the bar may be as scrupulously guarded and maintained by the
Court, as the right and dignity of the Court itself.” 338 The Test-
Oath Act of July 2, 1862, which purported to exclude former Con-
federates from the practice of law in the federal courts, was invali-
dated in Ex parte Garland.339 In the course of his opinion for the
Court, Justice Field discussed generally the power to admit and dis-
bar attorneys. The exercise of such a power, he declared, is judicial
power. The attorney is an officer of the court, and though Congress
may prescribe qualifications for the practice of law in the federal
courts, it may not do so in such a way as to inflict punishment con-
trary to the Constitution or to deprive a pardon of the President of
its legal effect.340
SECTION 2. Clause 1. The Judicial Power shall extend to all

Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall
be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambas-
sadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of ad-
miralty and maritime Jurisdiction; to Controversies to which the
United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two
or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State;
338 Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 9, 13 (1857). In Frazier v. Heebe, 482
U.S. 641 (1987), the Court exercised its supervisory power to invalidate a district
court rule respecting the admission of attorneys. See In re Sawyer, 360 U.S. 622
(1959), with reference to the extent to which counsel of record during a pending
case may attribute error to the judiciary without being subject to professional disci-
pline.
339 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1867).
340 71 U.S. at 378–80. Although a lawyer is admitted to practice in a federal
court by way of admission to practice in a state court, he is not automatically sent

out of the federal court by the same route, when “principles of right and justice”
require otherwise. A determination of a state court that an accused practitioner should
be disbarred is not conclusively binding on the federal courts. Theard v. United States,
354 U.S. 278 (1957), citing Selling v. Radford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917). Cf. In re Isser-
man, 345 U.S. 286, 288 (1953), where it was acknowledged that upon disbarment
by a state court, Rule 2, par. 5 of the Rules of the Supreme Court imposes upon the
attorney the burden of showing cause why he should not be disbarred in the latter,
and upon his failure to meet that burden, the Supreme Court will “follow the find-
ing of the state that the character requisite for membership in the bar is lacking.”
In 348 U.S. 1 (1954), Isserman’s disbarment was set aside for reason of noncompli-
ance with Rule 8 requiring concurrence of a majority of the Justices participating in
order to sustain a disbarment. See also In re Disbarment of Crow, 359 U.S. 1007
(1959). For an extensive treatment of disbarment and American and English prec-
edents thereon, see Ex parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265 (1883).
between Citizens of different States,—between Citizens of the

same State claiming Land under Grants of different States, and
between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citi-
zens or Subjects.
JUDICIAL POWER AND JURISDICTION-CASES AND

CONTROVERSIES
The potential for abuse of judicial power was of concern to the
Founding Fathers, leading them to establish limits on the circum-
stance in which the courts could consider cases. When, late in the
Convention, a delegate proposed to extend the judicial power be-
yond the consideration of laws and treaties to include cases arising
under the Constitution, Madison’s notes captured these concerns.
“Mr. Madison doubted whether it was not going too far to extend
the jurisdiction of the Court generally to cases arising under the
Constitution, and whether it ought not to be limited to cases of a
Judiciary Nature. The right of expounding the Constitution in cases
not of this nature ought not to be given to that Department.” Con-
sequently, “[t]he motion of Docr. Johnson was agreed to nem : con :
it being generally supposed that the jurisdiction given was construc-
tively limited to cases of a Judiciary nature—.” 341
This passage, and the language of Article III, § 2, makes clear
that the Framers did not intend for federal judges to roam at large
in construing the Constitution and laws of the United States, but
rather preferred and provided for resolution of disputes arising in
a “judicial” manner. This interpretation is reenforced by the refusal
of the Convention to assign the judges the extra-judicial functions
which some members of the Convention—Madison and Wilson no-
tably—conceived for them. Thus, for instance, the Convention four
times voted down proposals for judges, along with executive branch
officials, to sit on a council of revision with the power to veto laws
passed by Congress.342 A similar fate befell suggestions that the Chief
Justice be a member of a privy council to assist the President 343
and that the President or either House of Congress be able to re-
quest advisory opinions of the Supreme Court.344 The intent of the
Framers in rejecting the latter proposal was early effectuated when
341 2 M. Farrand, supra at 430.
342 The proposal was contained in the Virginia Plan. 1 id. at 21. For the four
rejections, see id. at 97–104, 108–10, 138–40, 2 id. at 73–80, 298.
343 Id. at 328–29, 342–44. Although a truncated version of the proposal was re-
ported by the Committee on Detail, id. at 367, the Convention never took it up.
344 Id. at 340–41. The proposal was referred to the Committee on Detail and
never heard of again.

the Justices declined a request of President Washington to tender

him advice respecting legal issues growing out of United States neu-
trality between England and France in 1793.345 Moreover, the re-
fusal of the Justices to participate in a congressional plan for award-
ing veterans’ pensions 346 bespoke a similar adherence to the restricted
role of courts. These restrictions have been encapsulated in a se-
ries of principles or doctrines, the application of which determines
whether an issue is met for judicial resolution and whether the par-
ties raising it are entitled to have it judicially resolved. Constitu-
tional restrictions are intertwined with prudential considerations in
the expression of these principles and doctrines, and it is seldom
easy to separate out the two strands.347
The Two Classes of Cases and Controversies

By the terms of the foregoing section, the judicial power ex-
tends to nine classes of cases and controversies, which fall into two
general groups. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall in Cohens
v. Virginia: 348 “In the first, jurisdiction depends on the character of
the cause, whoever may be the parties. This class comprehends ‘all
cases in law and equity arising under this constitution, the laws of
the United States, and treaties made, or which shall be made, un-
der their authority.’ This cause extends the jurisdiction of the court
to all the cases described, without making in its terms any excep-
tion whatever, and without any regard to the condition of the party.
If there be any exception, it is to be implied, against the express
words of the article. In the second class, the jurisdiction depends
entirely on the character of the parties. In this are comprehended
‘controversies between two or more states, between a state and citi-
zens of another state,’ and ‘between a state and foreign states, citi-
zens or subjects.’ If these be the parties, it is entirely unimportant,
what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what it may, these
parties have a constitutional right to come into the courts of the
Union.” 349
Judicial power is “the power of a court to decide and pronounce
a judgment and carry it into effect between persons and parties who
345 1 C. Warren, supra at 108–111; 3 CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN
JAY 633–635 (H. Johnston ed., 1893); Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 50–52.
346 Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), discussed “Finality of Judgment
as an Attribute of Judicial Power,” supra.

347 See, e.g., Justice Brandeis dissenting in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
341, 345–348 (1936). Cf. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968); Rescue Army v. Mu-
nicipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568–575 (1947).
348 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
349 19 U.S. at 378.
bring a case before it for decision.” 350 The meaning attached to the
terms “cases” and “controversies” 351 determines therefore the ex-
tent of the judicial power as well as the capacity of the federal courts
to receive jurisdiction. According to Chief Justice Marshall, judicial
power is capable of acting only when the subject is submitted in a
case and a case arises only when a party asserts his rights “in a
form prescribed by law.” 352 “By cases and controversies are in-
tended the claims of litigants brought before the courts for determi-
nation by such regular proceedings as are established by law or cus-
tom for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the prevention,
redress, or punishment of wrongs. Whenever the claim of a party
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States takes
such a form that the judicial power is capable of acting upon it,
then it has become a case. The term implies the existence of pres-
ent or possible adverse parties whose contentions are submitted to
the Court for adjudication.” 353
Chief Justice Hughes once essayed a definition, which, how-
ever, presents a substantial problem of labels. “A ‘controversy’ in
this sense must be one that is appropriate for judicial determina-
tion. A justiciable controversy is thus distinguished from a differ-
ence or dispute of a hypothetical character; from one that is aca-
demic or moot. The controversy must be definite and concrete, touching
the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. It must
be a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief
through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from
an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state
of facts.” 354 Of the “case” and “controversy” requirement, Chief Jus-
tice Warren admitted that “those two words have an iceberg qual-
ity, containing beneath their surface simplicity submerged complexi-
ties which go to the very heart of our constitutional form of
government. Embodied in the words ‘cases’ and ‘controversies’ are
two complementary but somewhat different limitations. In part those
words limit the business of federal courts to questions presented in
an adversary context and in a form historically viewed as capable
of resolution through the judicial process. And in part those words
define the role assigned to the judiciary in a tripartite allocation of
350 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 356 (1911).
351 The two terms may be used interchangeably, inasmuch as a “controversy,” if
distinguishable from a “case” at all, is so only because it is a less comprehensive
word and includes only suits of a civil nature. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300
U.S. 227, 239 (1937).
352 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
353 In re Pacific Ry. Comm’n, 32 F. 241, 255 (C.C. Calif. 1887) (Justice Field).
See also Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 173–174 (1889).

354 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 229, 240–241 (1937). Cf. Public Ser-
vice Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 242 (1952).

power to assure that the federal courts will not intrude into areas
committed to the other branches of government. Justiciability is the
term of art employed to give expression to this dual limitation placed
upon federal courts by the case and controversy doctrine.” 355 Jus-
tice Frankfurter perhaps best captured the flavor of the “case” and
“controversy” requirement by noting that it takes the “expert feel
of lawyers” often to note it.356
From these quotations may be isolated several factors which,
in one degree or another, go to make up a “case” and “controversy.”
Adverse Litigants
The presence of adverse litigants with real interests to contend
for is a standard which has been stressed in numerous cases,357 and
the requirement implicates a number of complementary factors mak-
ing up a justiciable suit. The requirement was one of the decisive
factors, if not the decisive one, in Muskrat v. United States,358 in
which the Court struck down a statute authorizing certain named
Indians to bring a test suit against the United States to determine
the validity of a law affecting the allocation of Indian lands. Attor-
ney’s fees of both sides were to be paid out of tribal funds depos-
ited in the United States Treasury. “The judicial power,” said the
Court, “. . . is the right to determine actual controversies arising
between adverse litigants, duly instituted in courts of proper juris-
diction. . . . It is true the United States is made a defendant to
this action, but it has no interest adverse to the claimants. The ob-
ject is not to assert a property right as against the government, or
to demand compensation for alleged wrongs because of action upon
its part. The whole purpose of the law is to determine the constitu-
tional validity of this class of legislation, in a suit not arising be-
tween parties concerning a property right necessarily involved in
the decision in question, but in a proceeding against the govern-
355 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1968).

356 “The jurisdiction of the federal courts can be invoked only under circum-
stances which to the expert feel of lawyers constitute a ‘case or controversy.’ ” Joint
Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149, 150 (1951).
357 Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850); Chicago & Grand Trunk Ry. v.
Wellman, 143 U.S. 339 (1892); South Spring Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Amador Medean
Gold Mining Co., 145 U.S. 300 (1892); California v. San Pablo & T.R.R., 149 U.S.
308 (1893); Tregea v. Modesto Irrigation District, 164 U.S. 179 (1896); Lampasas v.
Bell, 180 U.S. 276 (1901); Smith v. Indiana, 191 U.S. 138 (1903); Braxton County
Court v. West Virginia, 208 U.S. 192 (1908); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346
(1911); United States v. Johnson, 319 U.S. 302 (1943); Moore v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 47 (1971).
358 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
ment in its sovereign capacity, and concerning which the only judg-
ment required is to settle the doubtful character of the legislation
in question.” 359
Concerns regarding adversity are also raised when the Execu-
tive Branch chooses to enforce, but not defend, federal statutes which
it has concluded are unconstitutional. In United States v. Wind-
sor,360 the Court considered the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA),
which excludes same-sex partners from the definition of “spouse”
as used in federal statutes.361 DOMA was challenged by the surviv-
ing member of a same-sex couple (married in Canada) who was seek-
ing to claim a spousal federal estate tax exemption. Although the
Executive Branch continued to deny the exemption, it also declined
to defend the statute based on doubts as to whether it would sur-
vive scrutiny under the equal protection component of the Fifth Amend-
ment. Consequently, the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group of the House
of Representatives (BLAG) 362 intervened to defend the statute. The
Court noted that despite the decision not to defend, the failure of
the United States to provide a refund to the taxpayer consituted
an injury sufficient to establish standing, leaving only “prudential”
limitations on judicial review at issue.363 Here, the Court found that
the “prudential” concerns were outweighed by the presence of BLAG
to offer an adversarial presentation of the issue, the legal uncer-
tainty that would be caused by dismissing the case, and concern
that the Executive Branch would otherwise be given a route to evade
review of allegedly unconstitutional statutes by the Court.
Collusive and Feigned Suits.—Adverse litigants are lacking
in those suits in which two parties have gotten together to bring a
friendly suit to settle a question of interest to them. Thus, in Lord
v. Veazie,364 the latter had executed a deed to the former warrant-
ing that he had certain rights claimed by a third person, and suit
359 219 U.S. at 361–62. The Indians obtained the sought-after decision the fol-
lowing year by the simple expedient of suing to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior
from enforcing the disputed statute. Gritts v. Fisher, 224 U.S. 640 (1912). Other cases
have involved similar problems, but they resulted in decisions on the merits. E.g.,
Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906); La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United
States, 175 U.S. 423, 455–463 (1899); South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301,
335 (1966); but see id. at 357 (Justice Black dissenting). The principal effect of Musk-
rat was to put in doubt for several years the validity of any sort of declaratory judg-
ment provision in federal law.
360 570 U.S. ___, No. 12–307, slip op. (2013).
361 Pub. L. 104–199 § 3, 110 Stat. 2419, 1 U.S.C. § 7.
362 The Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group is a standing body of the House, cre-
ated by rule, consisting of members of the House Leadership and authorized to di-
rect the House Office of the General Counsel to file suit on its behalf in state or
federal court.
363 570 U.S. ___, No. 12–307, slip op. at 6–7.
364 49 U.S. (8 How.) 251 (1850).
was instituted to decide the “dispute.” Declaring that “the whole

proceeding was in contempt of the court, and highly reprehen-
sible,” the Court observed: “The contract set out in the pleadings
was made for the purpose of instituting this suit. . . . The plaintiff
and defendant are attempting to procure the opinion of this court
upon a question of law, in the decision of which they have a com-
mon interest opposed to that of other persons, who are not parties
to the suit. . . . And their conduct is the more objectionable, be-
cause they have brought up the question upon a statement of facts
agreed upon between themselves . . . and upon a judgment pro forma
entered by their mutual consent, without any actual judicial deci-
sion. . . .” 365 “Whenever,” said the Court in another case, “in pur-
suance of an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights by
one individual against another, there is presented a question involv-
ing the validity of any act of any legislature, State or federal, and
the decision necessarily rests on the competency of the legislature
to so enact, the court must . . . determine whether the act be con-
stitutional or not; but such an exercise of power is the ultimate and
supreme function of courts. It is legitimate only in the last resort,
and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest and vital
controversy between individuals. It never was the thought that, by
means of a friendly suit, a party beaten in the legislature could trans-
fer to the courts an inquiry as to the constitutionality of the legis-
lative act.” 366 Yet several widely known constitutional decisions have
been rendered in cases in which friendly parties contrived to have
the actions brought and in which the suits were supervised and fi-
nanced by one side.367 There are also instances in which there may
not be in fact an adverse party at certain stages; that is, instances
when the parties do not actually disagree, but where the Supreme
Court and the lower courts are empowered to adjudicate.368
365 49 U.S. at 254–55.

366 Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892).
367 E.g., Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796); Fletcher v. Peck,
10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810); Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857); cf. 1 C.
Warren, supra at 147, 392–95; 2 id. at 279–82. In Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514
(1968), the Court adjudicated on the merits a challenge to the constitutionality of
criminal treatment of chronic alcoholics although the findings of the trial court, agreed
to by the parties, appeared rather to be “the premises of a syllogism transparently
designed to bring this case” within the confines of an earlier enunciated constitu-
tional principle. But adversity arguably still existed.
368 Examples are naturalization cases, Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568 (1926),
entry of judgment by default or on a plea of guilty, In re Metropolitan Ry. Receiver-

ship, 208 U.S. 90 (1908), and consideration by the Court of cases in which the Solici-
tor General confesses error below. Cf. Young v. United States, 315 U.S. 257, 258–
259 (1942); Casey v. United States, 343 U.S. 808 (1952); Rosengart v. Laird, 404
U.S. 908 (1972) (Justice White dissenting). See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S.
40, 58–59 (1968).
Stockholder Suits.—Moreover, adversity in parties has often

been found in suits by stockholders against their corporation in which
the constitutionality of a statute or a government action is drawn
in question, even though one may suspect that the interests of plain-
tiffs and defendant are not all that dissimilar. Thus, in Pollock v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.,369 the Court sustained the jurisdiction
of a district court which had enjoined the company from paying an
income tax even though the suit was brought by a stockholder against
the company, thereby circumventing a statute which forbade the main-
tenance in any court of a suit to restrain the collection of any tax.370
Subsequently, the Court sustained jurisdiction in cases brought by
a stockholder to restrain a company from investing its funds in farm
loan bonds issued by federal land banks 371 and by preferred stock-
holders against a utility company and the TVA to enjoin the perfor-
mance of contracts between the company and TVA on the ground
that the statute creating it was unconstitutional.372 Perhaps most
notorious was Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,373 in which the president
of the company brought suit against the company and its officials,
among whom was Carter’s father, a vice president of the company,
and in which the Court entertained the suit and decided the case
on the merits.374
Substantial Interest: Standing
Perhaps the most important element of the requirement of ad-
verse parties may be found in the “complexities and vagaries” of
the standing doctrine. “The fundamental aspect of standing is that
it focuses on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal
court and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated.” 375 The
“gist of the question of standing” is whether the party seeking re-
lief has “alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
369 157 U.S. 429 (1895). The first injunction suit by a stockholder to restrain a
corporation from paying a tax was apparently Dodge v. Woolsey, 59 U.S. (18 How.)
331 (1856). See also Brushaber v. Union Pac. R.R., 240 U.S. 1 (1916).
370 Cf. Cheatham v. United States, 92 U.S. 85 (1875); Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S.
189 (1883).
371 Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180 (1921).
372 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936). See id. at 341 (Justice Brandeis dis-
senting in part).
373 298 U.S. 238 (1936).
374 Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 59 HARV. L. REV. 645,
667–668 (1948) (detailing the framing of the suit).

375 Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968). This characterization is not the view
of the present Court; see Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750, 752, 755–56, 759–61
(1984). In taxpayer suits, it is appropriate to look to the substantive issues to deter-
mine whether there is a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim
sought to be adjudicated. Id. at 102; United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 174–75
(1974); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 78–79 (1978).
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for

illumination of difficult constitutional questions.” 376 This practical
conception of standing has now given way to a primary emphasis
upon separation of powers as the guide. “[T]he ‘case or controversy’
requirement defines with respect to the Judicial Branch the idea of
separation of powers on which the Federal Government is founded.
The several doctrines that have grown up to elaborate that require-
ment are ‘founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—
role of the courts in a democratic society.’ ” 377
Standing as a doctrine is composed of both constitutional and
prudential restraints on the power of the federal courts to render
decisions,378 and is almost exclusively concerned with such public
law questions as determinations of constitutionality and review of
administrative or other governmental action.379 As such, it is often
interpreted according to the prevailing philosophies of judicial activ-
ism and restraint, and narrowly or broadly in terms of the viewed
desirability of access to the courts by persons seeking to challenge
legislation or other governmental action. The trend in the 1960s was
to broaden access; in the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, it was to narrow
access by stiffening the requirements of standing, although Court
majorities were not entirely consistent. The major difficulty in set-
ting forth the standards is that the Court’s generalizations and the
results it achieves are often at variance.380
376 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962). That persons or organizations have
a personal, ideological interest sufficiently strong to create adverseness is not alone

enough to confer standing; rather, the adverseness is the consequence of one being
able to satisfy the Article III requisite of injury in fact. Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 482–486 (1982); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225–226 (1974). Nor is the fact that, if plain-
tiffs have no standing to sue, no one would have standing, a sufficient basis for find-
ing standing. Id. at 227.
377 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S.
490, 498 (1975)). All the standards relating to whether a plaintiff is entitled to adju-
dication of his claims must be evaluated “by reference to the Art. III notion that
federal courts may exercise power only ‘in the last resort, and as a necessity,’ . . .
and only when adjudication is ‘consistent with a system of separated powers and
[the dispute is one] traditionally thought to be capable of resolution through the
judicial process.’ ” Id. at 752 (quoting, respectively, Chicago & G.T. Ry. v. Wellman,
143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892), and Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 97 (1968)). For the strength-
ening of the separation-of-powers barrier to standing, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wild-
life, 504 U.S. 555, 559–60, 571–78 (1992).
378 E.g., Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 471–
476 (1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–751 (1984).

379 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 60 (4th ed. 1983).
380 “[T]he concept of ‘Art. III standing’ has not been defined with complete con-
sistency in all of the various cases decided by this Court . . . [and] this very fact is
probably proof that the concept cannot be reduced to a one-sentence or one-
paragraph definition.” Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S.
The standing rules apply to actions brought in federal courts,

and they have no direct application to actions brought in state
courts.381
Generalized or Widespread Injuries.—Persons do not have
standing to sue in federal court when all they can claim is that
they have an interest or have suffered an injury that is shared by
all members of the public. Thus, a group of persons suing as citi-
zens to litigate a contention that membership of Members of Con-
gress in the military reserves constituted a violation of Article I,
§ 6, cl. 2, was denied standing.382 “The only interest all citizens share
in the claim advanced by respondents is one which presents injury
in the abstract. . . . [The] claimed nonobservance [of the clause],
standing alone, would adversely affect only the generalized interest
of all citizens in constitutional governance.” 383
It is unclear, however, whether this rule against airing “gener-
alized grievances” through the courts has a constitutional or a pru-
dential basis 384 and thus can be modified by statute. And, despite
the general rule that injury’s shared by all citizens share is insuffi-
cient to confer standing, where a plaintiff alleges that the defen-
dant’s action injures him in “a concrete and personal way,” “it does
not matter how many [other] persons have [also] been injured. . . .
[W]here a harm is concrete, though widely shared, the Court has
found injury in fact.” 385
464, 475 (1982). “Generalizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such.”
Association of Data Processing Service Orgs. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970). For
extensive consideration of the doctrine, see Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 100–
183.
381 Thus, state courts could adjudicate a case brought by a person who had no
standing in the federal sense. If the plaintiff lost, he would have no recourse in the
U.S. Supreme Court, because of his lack of standing, Tileston v. Ullman, 318 U.S.
44 (1943); Doremus v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 429 (1952), but if plaintiff pre-
vailed, the losing defendant might be able to appeal, because he might be able to
assert sufficient injury to his federal interests. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S.
605 (1989).
382 Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
383 418 U.S. at 217. See also United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 176–77
(1974); Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 483 (1982);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 754 (1984); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990);
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 573–77 (1992); Lance v. Coffman, 549
U.S. 437, 441 (2007) (per curiam). Cf. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937); Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972).
384 Compare Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499–500 (1975) (prudential), with
Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 485, 490 (1982)
(apparently constitutional). In Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984), it is again
prudential.
385 Massachusetts v. Environmental Protection Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 517, 522
(2007) (internal quotation marks omitted). In this case, “EPA maintain[ed] that be-
cause greenhouse gas emissions inflict widespread harm, the doctrine of standing
Taxpayer Suits.—Save for a narrow exception, standing is also

lacking when a litigant attempts to sue to contest governmental ac-
tion that he claims injures him as a taxpayer. In Frothingham v.
Mellon,386 the Court denied standing to a taxpayer suing to re-
strain disbursements of federal money to those states that chose to
participate in a program to reduce maternal and infant mortality;
her claim was that Congress lacked power to appropriate funds for
those purposes and that the appropriations would increase her taxes
in future years in an unconstitutional manner. Noting that a fed-
eral taxpayer’s “interest in the moneys of the Treasury . . . is com-
paratively minute and indeterminate” and that “the effect upon fu-
ture taxation, of any payment out of the funds . . . [is] remote,
fluctuating and uncertain,” the Court ruled that plaintiff had failed
to allege the type of “direct injury” necessary to confer standing.387
Taxpayers were found to have standing, however, in Flast v.
Cohen,388 to contest the expenditure of federal moneys to assist
religious-affiliated organizations. The Court asserted that the an-
swer to the question whether taxpayers have standing depends on
whether the circumstances of each case demonstrate that there is
a logical nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought
to be adjudicated. First, there must be a logical link between the
status of taxpayer and the type of legislative enactment attacked;
this means that a taxpayer must allege the unconstitutionality only
of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending
clause of Article I, § 8, rather than also of incidental expenditure of
funds in the administration of an essentially regulatory statute. Sec-
ond, there must be a logical nexus between the status of taxpayer
and the precise nature of the constitutional infringement alleged;
this means that the taxpayer must show that the challenged enact-
ment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the
exercise of the taxing and spending power, rather than simply argu-
ing that the enactment is generally beyond the powers delegated to
Congress. Both Frothingham and Flast met the first test, because
they attacked a spending program. Flast met the second test, be-
cause the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment operates
as a specific limitation upon the exercise of the taxing and spend-
presents an insuperable jurisdictional obstacle.” The Court, however, found that “EPA’s
steadfast refusal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions presents a risk of harm to
Massachusetts that is both ‘actual’ and ‘imminent.’ ” Id. at 517, 521.
386 Usually cited as Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the two suits
having been consolidated.

387 262 U.S. at 487, 488. In Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc.,
127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007), the Court added that, “if every federal taxpayer could
sue to challenge any Government expenditure, the federal courts would cease to func-
tion as courts of law and would be cast in the role of general complaint bureaus.”
388 392 U.S. 83 (1968).
ing power, but Frothingham did not, having alleged only that the
Tenth Amendment had been exceeded. The Court reserved the ques-
tion whether other specific limitations constrain the Taxing and Spend-
ing Clause in the same manner as the Establishment Clause.389
Since Flast, the Court has refused to expand taxpayer stand-
ing. Litigants seeking standing as taxpayers to challenge legisla-
tion permitting the CIA to withhold from the public detailed infor-
mation about its expenditures as a violation of Article I, § 9, cl. 7,
and to challenge certain Members of Congress from holding commis-
sions in the reserves as a violation of Article I, § 6, cl. 2, were de-
nied standing, in the former cases because their challenge was not
to an exercise of the taxing and spending power and in the latter
because their challenge was not to legislation enacted under Ar-
ticle I, § 8, but rather was to executive action in permitting Mem-
bers to maintain their reserve status.390 An organization promoting
church-state separation was denied standing to challenge an execu-
tive decision to donate surplus federal property to a church-related
college, both because the contest was to executive action under valid
legislation and because the property transfer was not pursuant to
a Taxing and Spending Clause exercise but was taken under the
Property Clause of Article IV, § 3, cl. 2.391 The Court also refused
to create an exception for Commerce Clause violations to the gen-
eral prohibition on taxpayer standing.392
Most recently, a Court plurality held that, even in Establish-
ment Clause cases, there is no taxpayer standing where the expen-
diture of funds that is challenged was not specifically authorized
by Congress, but came from general executive branch appropria-
389 392 U.S. at 105.

390 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974); Schlesinger v. Reservists
Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 227–28 (1974). Richardson in its generalized
grievance constriction does not apply when Congress confers standing on litigants.
FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11 (1998). When Congress confers standing on “any person
aggrieved” by the denial of information required to be furnished them, it matters
not that most people will be entitled and will thus suffer a “generalized grievance,”
the statutory entitlement is sufficient. Id. at 21–25.
391 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464 (1982). In
Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3 (1996), the Court played down the “serious
and adversarial treatment” prong of standing and strongly reasserted the separation-
of-powers value of keeping courts within traditional bounds. The Court again took
this approach in Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553,
2569 (2007), finding that “Flast itself gave too little weight to [separation-of-powers]
concerns.”
392 DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 347–49 (2006) (standing de-
nied to taxpayer claim that state tax credit given to vehicle manufacturer violated
the Commerce Clause).
tions.393 Where expenditures “were not expressly authorized or man-

dated by any specific congressional enactment,” a lawsuit challeng-
ing them “is not directed at an exercise of congressional power and
thus lacks the requisite ‘logical nexus’ between taxpayer status ‘and
the type of legislative enactment attacked.’ ” 394
Local taxpayers attacking local expenditures have generally been
permitted more leeway than federal taxpayers insofar as standing
is concerned. Thus, in Everson v. Board of Education,395 a munici-
pal taxpayer was found to have standing to challenge the use of
public funds for transportation of pupils to parochial schools.396 But,
in Doremus v. Board of Education,397 the Court refused an appeal
from a state court for lack of standing of a taxpayer challenging
Bible reading in the classroom. The taxpayer’s action in Doremus,
the Court wrote, “is not a direct dollars-and-cents injury but is a
religious difference.” 398 This rationale was similar to the spending
program-regulatory program distinction of Flast. But, even a dollar-
and-cents injury resulting from a state spending program will ap-
parently not constitute a direct dollars-and-cents injury. The Court
in Doremus wrote that a taxpayer challenging either a federal or a
state statute “must be able to show not only that the statute is in-
valid but that he has sustained or is in immediate danger of sus-
393 Hein v. Freedom From Religion Foundation, Inc., 127 S. Ct. 2553, 2559 (2007).
This decision does not affect Establishment Clause cases in which the plaintiff can
allege a personal injury. A plaintiff who challenges a government display of a reli-
gious object, for example, need not sue as a taxpayer but may have standing “by
alleging that he has undertaken a ‘special burden’ or has altered his behavior to
avoid the object that gives him offense. . . . [I]t is enough for standing purposes that
a plaintiff allege that he ‘must come into direct and unwelcome contact with the
religious display to participate fully as [a] citizen[ ] . . . and to fulfill . . . legal obli-
gations.’ ” Books v. Elkhart County, 401 F.3d 857, 861 (7th Cir. 2005). In Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 682 (2005), the Court, without mentioning standing, noted
that the plaintiff “has encountered the Ten Commandments monument during his
frequent visits to the [Texas State] Capitol grounds. His visits are typically for the
purpose of using the law library in the Supreme Court building, which is located
just northwest of the Capitol building.”
394 127 S. Ct. at 2568 (citations omitted). Justices Scalia and Thomas concurred
in the judgment but would have overruled Flast. Justice Souter, joined by three other
justices, dissented because he saw no logic in the distinction the plurality drew, as
the plurality did not and could not have suggested that the taxpayers in Hein “have
any less stake in the outcome than the taxpayers in Flast.” Id. at 2584.
395 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 349 (2006),
the Court held that a plaintiff ’s status as a municipal taxpayer does not give him
standing to challenge a state tax credit.
396 See Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291, 295 (1899); Crampton v. Zabriskie,
101 U.S. 601 (1880); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175 (1915). See also Illinois ex rel.
McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S.
306 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (plaintiffs suing as parents and tax-
payers).
397 342 U.S. 429 (1952). Compare Alder v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
See also Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24 (1974).

398 342 U.S. at 434.
taining some direct injury as a result of its enforcement, and not

merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people
generally.” 399
Constitutional Standards: Injury in Fact, Causation, and
Redressability.—Although the Court has been inconsistent, it has
now settled upon the rule that “at an irreducible minimum” the con-
stitutional requisites under Article III for the existence of standing
are that the plaintiff must personally have: 1) suffered some actual
or threatened injury; 2) that injury can fairly be traced to the chal-
lenged action of the defendant; and 3) that the injury is likely to
be redressed by a favorable decision.400 For a time, the actual or
threatened injury prong included an additional requirement that such
injury be the product of “a wrong which directly results in the vio-
lation of a legal right” 401 such as “one of property, one arising out
of contract, one protected against tortuous invasion, or one founded
in a statute which confers a privilege.” 402 It became apparent, how-
ever, that the “legal right” language was “demonstrably circular: if
the plaintiff is given standing to assert his claims, his interest is
legally protected; if he is denied standing, his interest is not le-
gally protected.” 403 Further, the observable tendency of the Court
was to find standing in cases which were grounded in injuries far
removed from property rights.404
In any event, the “legal rights” requirement has now been dis-
pensed with. Rejection of this doctrine occurred in two administra-
tive law cases in which the Court announced that parties had stand-
ing when they suffered “injury in fact” to some interest, “economic
399 342 U.S. at 434, quoting Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923);
quoted with approval in DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 345 (2006).
400 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982);
Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560–61 (1992); Monsanto Co. v. Geerston Seed Farms, 561 U.S. ___, No. 09–
475, slip op. (2010). But see United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388
(1980). In Geraghty, the Court appears to adopt a broader, more flexible notion of
what a redressable “personal stake” is in class actions in which the lead plaintiff ’s
merits claim has become moot. Id. at 404 n.11, reserving full consideration of the
dissent’s argument at 401 n.1, 420–21.
401 Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464, 479 (1938). Cf. Joint Anti-Fascist
Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 151–152 (1951) (Justice Frankfurter
concurring). But see Frost v. Corporation Comm’n, 278 U.S. 515 (1929); City of Chi-
cago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958).
402 Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137–138 (1939).
403 C. Wright, supra at 65–66.
404 E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951)
(indirect injury to organization and members by governmental maintenance of list

of subversive organizations); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(same); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9 (1963) (parents and
school children challenging school prayers); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
430–431 (1961) (merchants challenging Sunday closing laws); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 204–208 (1962) (voting rights).
or otherwise,” that was arguably within the zone of interest to be

protected or regulated by the statute or constitutional provision in
question.405 Political,406 environmental, aesthetic, and social inter-
ests, when impaired, now afford a basis for making constitutional
attacks upon governmental action.407 “But deprivation of a proce-
dural right without some concrete interest that is affected by the
deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to create
Article III standing.” 408
The breadth of the “injury-in-fact” concept may be discerned in
a series of cases involving the right of private parties to bring ac-
tions under the Fair Housing Act to challenge alleged discrimina-
tory practices, even where discriminatory action was not directed
against parties to a suit. These cases held that the subjective and
intangible interests of enjoying the benefits of living in integrated
communities were sufficient to permit them to attack actions that
threatened or harmed those interests.409 Or, there is the important
case of FEC v. Akins,410 which addresses the ability of Congress to
confer standing and to remove prudential constraints on judicial re-
view. Congress had afforded persons access to Commission informa-
tion and had authorized “any person aggrieved” by the actions of
the FEC to sue. The Court found “injury-in-fact” present where plain-
tiff voters alleged that the Federal Election Commission had de-
405 Ass’n of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). The “zone of interest” test is a prudential rather
than constitutional standard. The Court sometimes uses other language to charac-
terize this test. Thus, in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992),
the Court refers to injury in fact as “an invasion of a legally protected interest,” but
in context, here and in the cases cited, it is clear the reference is to any interest
that the Court finds protectable under the Constitution, statutes, or regulations.
406 Department of Commerce v. United States House of Representatives, 525 U.S.
316 (1999).
407 E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 563 (1992); Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885 (1991); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina
Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72–74 (1978); Village of Arlington Heights
v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 261–263 (1977); Singleton v. Wulff,
428 U.S. 106, 112–113 (1976); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498–499 (1975); O’Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493–494 (1974); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614,
617–618 (1973).
408 Summers v. Earth Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (environmen-
tal group that was denied the opportunity to file comments with the United States
Forest Service regarding a Forest Service action denied standing for lack of con-
crete injury). On the other hand, where a party has successfully established a legal
right, a threat to the enforcement of that legal right gives rise to a separate legal
injury. Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. ___, No. 08–472, slip op. at 8 (2010) (plurality
opinion) (“A party that obtains a judgment in its favor acquires a ‘judicially cogni-
zable’ interest in ensuring compliance with that judgment”).
409 Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Gladstone Re-
altors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman,
455 U.S. 363 (1982).
410 524 U.S. 11 (1998).
nied them information respecting an organization that might or might

not be a political action committee.411 Another area where the Court
has interpreted this term liberally is injury to the interests of indi-
viduals and associations of individuals who use the environment,
affording them standing to challenge actions that threatened those
environmental conditions.412
Even citizens who bring qui tam actions under the False Claims
Act—actions that entitle the plaintiff (“relator”) to a percentage of
any civil penalty assessed for violation—have been held to have stand-
ing, on the theory that the government has assigned a portion of
its damages claim to the plaintiff, and the assignee of a claim has
standing to assert the injury in fact suffered by the assignor.413 Cit-
ing this holding and historical precedent, the Court upheld the stand-
ing of an assignee who had promised to remit the proceeds of the
litigation to the assignor.414 The Court noted that “federal courts
routinely entertain suits which will result in relief for parties that
are not themselves directly bringing suit. Trustees bring suits to
benefit their trusts; guardians at litem bring suits to benefit their
wards; receivers bring suit to benefit their receiverships; assignees
in bankruptcy bring suit to benefit bankrupt estates; and so forth.” 415
The Court has, however, indicated that for plaintiffs to have stand-
ing based on an injury to others, that there must be an element of
411 That the injury was widely shared did not make the claimed injury a “gener-
alized grievance,” the Court held, but rather in this case, as in others, the denial of
the statutory right was found to be a concrete harm to each member of the class.
412 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 735 (1972); United States v. SCRAP,
412 U.S. 669, 687–88 (1973); Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group,
438 U.S. 59, 72–74 (1978). But the Court has refused to credit general allegations of
injury untied to specific governmental actions. E.g., Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). SCRAP
in particular is disfavored as too broad. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. at
566. Moreover, unlike the situation in taxpayer suits, there is no requirement of a
nexus between the injuries claimed and the constitutional rights asserted. In Duke
Power, 438 U.S. at 78–81, claimed environmental and health injuries grew out of
construction and operation of nuclear power plants but were not directly related to
the governmental action challenged, the limitation of liability and indemnification
in cases of nuclear accident. See also Metropolitan Washington Airports Auth. v. Citi-
zens for the Abatement of Aircraft Noise, 501 U.S. 252, 264–65 (1991); Friends of
the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167 (2000).
413 Vermont Agency of Nat. Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765
(2000). The Court confirmed its conclusion by reference to the long tradition of qui
tam actions, since the Constitution’s restriction of judicial power to “cases” and “con-
troversies” has been interpreted to mean “cases and controversies of the sort tradi-
tionally amenable to, and resolved by, the judicial process.” Id. at 774.
414 Sprint Communications Co., L.P. v. APCC Services, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 2531 (2008)
(payphone operators had assigned claims against long-distance carriers to “aggrega-

tors” to sue on their behalf). Chief Justice Roberts, in a dissent joined by Justices
Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, stated that the aggregators lacked standing because they
“have nothing to gain from their lawsuit.” Id. at 2549.
415 128 S. Ct. at 2543.
agency to the relationship. In Hollingsworth v. Perry,416 the Court

considered the question of whether the official proponents of Propo-
sition 8,417 a state proposition which amended the California Con-
stitution to define marriage as a union between a man and a woman,
had standing to defend the constitutionality of the provision. Al-
though the proponents were authorized by California law to defend
the proposition,418 the Court found that this authorization, by it-
self, was insufficient to create standing. The concern, according to
the Court, was that, despite the state’s provision of such authority
to the proponents, the proponents were still acting as private indi-
viduals, not as state officials 419 or as agents of the state.420 Be-
cause the proponents had no official role in enforcing of California
law, the Court held that they had no “personal stake” that was dis-
tinguishable from the general interest of every citizen of Califor-
nia.421
In a number of cases, the Court has denied standing appar-
ently in the belief that the assertion of harm is too speculative or
too remote to credit.422 This limitation seems particularly challeng-
416 570 U.S. ___, No. 12–144, slip op. (2013).

417 Under Cal. Elec. Code Ann. §342, “[p]roponents of an initiative or referen-
dum measure’ means . . . the elector or electors who submit the text of a proposed
initiative or referendum to the Attorney General . . . ; or . . . the person or persons
who publish a notice or intention to circulate petitions, or, where publication is not
required, who file petitions with the elections official or legislative body.”
418 California’s governor and state and local officials declined to defend Proposi-
tion 8 in federal district court, so the proponents were allowed to intervene. After
the district court held the proposition unconstitutional, the government officials elected
not to appeal, so the proponents did. The federal court of appeals certified a ques-
tion to the California Supreme Court as to whether the official proponents of the
proposition had the authority to assert the state’s interest in defending the constitu-
tionality of Proposition 8, which the was answered in the affirmative.
419 See Karcher v. May, 484 U.S. 72 (1987) (holding that New Jersey state legis-
lators, as authorized by state law, could intervene in a suit to defend the constitu-
tionality of a New Jersey law).
420 The Court noted that an essential feature of agency is the principal’s right
to control the agent’s actions. Here, the proponents “decided what arguments to make
and how to make them.” Hollingsworth, 570 U.S. ___, No. 12–144, slip op. at 15.
The Court also noted that the proponents were not elected to their position, took no
oath, had no fiduciary duty to the people of California, and were not subject to re-
moval. Id.
421 As noted previously, the Court has been wary of granting standing to per-
sons who alleged threats or harm to interests that they share with members of the
community at large. See “Generalized or Widespread Injuries,” supra.
422 E.g., Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1 (1972) (“allegations of a subjective ‘chill’ are
not an adequate substitute for a claim of specific present objective harm or a threat
of specific future harm.”). See also O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 497 (1974) (no
“sufficient immediacy and reality” to allegations of future injury that rested on the
likelihood that plaintiffs will again be subjected to racially discriminatory enforce-
ment and administration of criminal justice); California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416
U.S. 21, 73 (1974) (plaintiffs allege that they intend to engage in currency transac-
tions that the Secretary of the Treasury’s regulations will require them to report,
ing in certain contexts, such as national security, where the extent

of harm may be unknown to the party affected.423 In Clapper v. Am-
nesty International USA, the Court insisted that plaintiffs show that
the threatened injury—monitoring their international communica-
tions illegally—was “certainly impending”; showing that there was
an “objectively reasonable likelihood” of prospective injury was in-
sufficient.424 Also, plaintiffs were not allowed, absent “certainly im-
pending” harm, to bypass the imminence requirement by arguing
that they had incurred costs (e.g., travel expenses to conduct in per-
son conversations abroad in lieu of conducting less costly electronic
communications that might be more susceptible to surveillance) to
guard against “reasonably possible” future harm.
The standard for precluding future implementation may not be
as rigorous when national security is not at issue or when there is
a history of prior enforcement. Plaintiffs in Susan B. Anthony List
v. Driehaus,425 objected to prospective enforcement of an Ohio law
that prohibited making false statements about a candidate or a can-
but make no additional allegation that any of the information required by the Sec-
retary will tend to incriminate them); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 372 (1976) (“in-
dividual respondents’ claim to ‘real and immediate’ injury rests not upon what the
named petitioners might do to them in the future—such as set bond on the basis of
race [as was alleged in O’Shea, supra]—but upon what one of a small, unnamed
minority of policemen might do to them in the future because of that unknown po-
liceman’s perception of departmental disciplinary procedures”); Summers v. Earth
Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009) (“deprivation of a procedural right [the
right to comment on federal agency proposed action] without some concrete interest
that is affected by the deprivation—a procedural right in vacuo—is insufficient to
create Article III standing”). In City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95 (1983), the
Court held that victim of a police choke hold seeking injunctive relief was unable to
show sufficient likelihood of recurrence as to him. But see Davis v. Federal Election
Commission, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2769 (2008), in which the Court held that “the injury
required for standing need not be actualized. A party facing prospective injury has
standing to sue where the threatened injury is real, immediate, and direct.” In this
case, a statute provided that, if a political candidate declares that he will “self-
finance,” then his opponent, if he qualifies, may receive individual contributions be-
yond the normal limit. A self-financing candidate challenged the statute after he had
declared himself to be self-financing, but before his opponent had qualified for the
higher contribution limit; the Court found that the self-financing candidate faced “a
realistic and impending threat of direct injury” adequate for standing. Id.
423 See Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–1025, slip
op. (2013). In Clapper, when defense attorneys, human rights organizations, and oth-
ers challenged prospective, surreptitious surveillance of the communications of cer-
tain foreigners abroad under the new FISA Amendments Act, the Court found a lack
of standing because the plaintiffs failed to show, inter alia, what the government’s
targeting practices would be, what legal authority the government would use to moni-
tor any of the plaintiffs’ overseas clients or contacts, whether any approved surveil-
lance would be successful, and whether the plaintiffs’ own communications from within
the United States would incidentally be acquired.
424 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–1025, slip op. at 10–11 (2013). In adopting a “certainly
impending” standard, the five-Justice majority conceded that the cases had not uni-
formly required literal certainty. Id at 15 n.5.
425 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–193, slip op. (2014)
didate’s record during a political campaign. A candidate for Con-

gress had filed an administrative complaint under the law against
one of the plaintiffs; a panel of the elections commission made an
adverse finding; but the complaint was subsequently withdrawn. Mean-
while, the plaintiffs had filed suit in federal court, and they sought
to maintain the suit even after the complaint was withdrawn, cit-
ing the prospect of enforcement in other elections. A unanimous Court
found that the plaintiffs faced a sufficiently imminent threat of in-
jury to proceed. Drawing on a footnote in Clapper, Justice Thomas
wrote that an allegation of future injury may suffice if the injury is
“ ‘certainly impending’ or there is a ‘substantial risk’ that the harm
may occur.” 426
Of increasing importance are causation and redressability, the
second and third elements of standing, recently developed and held
to be of constitutional requisite. Under the former, there must be a
causal connection between the injury and the conduct complained
of; that is, the Court insists that the plaintiff show that “but for”
the action, she would not have been injured. Under the latter, the
Court has insisted that there must be a “substantial likelihood” that
the relief sought from the court if granted would remedy the harm.427
These two requirements are often inter-related. Thus, low-income
persons seeking the invalidation of a town’s restrictive zoning ordi-
nance were held to lack standing, because they had failed to allege
with sufficient particularity that the complained-of injury—
inability to obtain adequate housing within their means—was fairly
attributable to the ordinance instead of to other factors, so that void-
ing of the ordinance might not have any effect upon their ability to
find affordable housing.428
Other examples of these two elements include a holding that
poor people who had been denied service at certain hospitals lacked
426 Slip op. at 8 (internal quotation mark omitted).
427 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 595 (1992); Allen v. Wright, 468
U.S. 737, 751 (1984). See also ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 612–617 (1989)
(plurality opinion). Although the two tests were initially articulated as two facets of
a single requirement, the Court now insists they are separate inquiries. Id. at 753
n.19. To the extent there is a difference, it is that the former examines a causal
connection between the assertedly unlawful conduct and the alleged injury, whereas
the latter examines the causal connection between the alleged injury and the judi-
cial relief requested. Id. In Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S.
83 (1998), the Court denied standing because of the absence of redressability. An
environmental group sued the company for failing to file timely reports required by
statute; by the time the complaint was filed, the company was in full compliance.
Acknowledging that the entity had suffered injury in fact, the Court found that no
judicial action would afford it a remedy.
428 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975). In Village of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1974), however, a person who al-
leged he was seeking housing in the community and that he would qualify if the
standing to challenge IRS policy of extending tax benefits to hospi-

tals that did not serve indigents, because they could not show that
alteration of the tax policy would cause the hospitals to alter their
policies and treat them.429 Similarly, the link between fully inte-
grated public schools and allegedly lax administration of tax policy
permitting benefits to discriminatory private schools was deemed
too tenuous, the harm flowing from private actors not before the
courts and the speculative possibility that directing denial of ben-
efits would result in any minority child being admitted to a school.430
But the Court did permit plaintiffs to attack the constitutional-
ity of a law limiting the liability of private utilities in the event of
nuclear accidents and providing for indemnification, on a showing
that “but for” the passage of the law there was a “substantial like-
lihood,” based upon industry testimony and other material in the
legislative history, that the nuclear power plants would not be con-
structed and that therefore the environmental and aesthetic harm
alleged by plaintiffs would not occur; a voiding of the law would
likely relieve the plaintiffs of the complained of injuries.431 Thus,
operation of the requirements of causation and redressability makes
difficult but not impossible the establishment of standing by per-
organizational plaintiff were not inhibited by allegedly racially discriminatory zon-

ing laws from constructing housing for low-income persons like himself was held to
have shown a “substantial probability” that voiding of the ordinance would benefit
him.
429 Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976). See also
Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973) (mother of illegitimate child lacked
standing to contest prosecutorial policy of using child support laws to coerce sup-
port of legitimate children only, as it was “only speculative” that prosecution of fa-
ther would result in support rather than jailing). However, in Summers v. Earth
Island Institute, 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1151 (2009), the Court noted in dicta that, if a
plaintiff is denied a procedural right, the fact that the right had been accorded by
Congress “can loosen the strictures of the redressability prong of our standing in-
quiry.” Thus, standing may exist even though a court’s enforcing a procedural right
accorded by Congress, such as the right to comment on a proposed federal agency
action, will not guarantee the plaintiff success in persuading the agency to adopt
the plaintiff ’s point of view.
430 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984). But see Heckler v. Mathews, 465 U.S.
728 (1984), where persons denied equal treatment in conferral of benefits were held
to have standing to challenge the treatment, although a judicial order could only
have terminated benefits to the favored class. In that event, members would have
secured relief in the form of equal treatment, even if they did not receive benefits.
See also Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987); Orr v. Orr,
440 U.S. 268, 271–273 (1979).
431 Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 72–78
1978). The likelihood of relief in some cases appears to be rather speculative at best.
E.g., Bryant v. Yellen, 447 U.S. 352, 366–368 (1980); Watt v. Energy Action Educa-
tional Foundation, 454 U.S. 151, 160–162 (1981).
sons indirectly injured by governmental action, that is, action taken

as to third parties that is alleged to have injured the claimants as
a consequence.432
In a case permitting a plaintiff contractors’ association to chal-
lenge an affirmative-action, set-aside program, the Court seemed to
depart from several restrictive standing decisions in which it had
held that the claims of attempted litigants were too “speculative”
or too “contingent.” 433 The association had sued, alleging that many
of its members “regularly bid on and perform construction work”
for the city and that they would have bid on the set-aside contracts
but for the restrictions. The Court found the association had stand-
ing, because certain prior cases under the Equal Protection Clause
established a relevant proposition. “When the government erects a
barrier that makes it more difficult for members of one group to
obtain a benefit than it is for members of another group, a member
of the former group seeking to challenge the barrier need not al-
lege that he would have obtained the benefit but for the barrier in
order to establish standing. The ‘injury in fact’ in an equal protec-
tion case of this variety is the denial of equal treatment resulting
from the imposition of the barrier, not the ultimate inability to ob-
tain the benefit.” 434 The association, therefore, established stand-
ing by alleging that its members were able and ready to bid on con-
tracts but that a discriminatory policy prevented them from doing
so on an equal basis.435
Redressability can be present in an environmental “citizen suit”
even when the remedy is civil penalties payable to the govern-
ment. The civil penalties, the Court explained, “carried with them
a deterrent effect that made it likely, as opposed to merely specula-
tive, that the penalties would redress [plaintiffs’] injuries by abat-
ing current violations and preventing future ones.” 436
Prudential Standing Rules.—Even when Article III constitu-
tional standing rules have been satisfied, the Court has held that
432 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 505 (1975); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737,
756–761 (1984).
433 Thus, it appears that had the Court applied its standard in the current case,
the results would have been different in such cases as Linda R. S. v. Richard D.,
410 U.S. 614 (1973); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); Simon v. Eastern Ken-
tucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26 (1976); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737 (1984).
434 Northeastern Fla. Ch. of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jackson-
ville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993). The Court derived the proposition from another set
of cases. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346 (1970); Clements v. Fashing, 457 U.S. 957
(1982); Regents of the Univ. of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 281 n.14 (1978).
435 508 U.S. at 666. But see, in the context of ripeness, Reno v. Catholic Social
Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993), in which the Court, over the dissent’s reliance on
Jacksonville, 509 U.S. at 81–82, denied the relevance of its distinction between en-
titlement to a benefit and equal treatment. Id. at 58 n.19.
436 Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 187 (2000).
principles of prudence may counsel the judiciary to refuse to adju-

dicate some claims.437 The rule is “not meant to be especially de-
manding,” 438 and it is clear that the Court feels free to disregard
any of these prudential rules when it sees fit.439 Congress is also
free to legislate away prudential restraints and confer standing to
the extent permitted by Article III.440 The Court has identified three
rules as prudential ones,441 only one of which has been a signifi-
cant factor in the jurisprudence of standing. The first two rules are
that the plaintiff ’s interest, to which she asserts an injury, must
come within the “zone of interest” arguably protected by the consti-
tutional provision or statute in question 442 and that plaintiffs may
not air “generalized grievances” shared by all or a large class of
437 Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99–100 (1979) (“a plain-
tiff may still lack standing under the prudential principles by which the judiciary
seeks to avoid deciding questions of broad social import where no individual rights
would be vindicated and to limit access to the federal courts to those litigants best
suited to assert a particular claim”).
438 Match-E-Be-Nash-She-Wish Band Of Pottawatomi Indians v. Patchak, 567
U.S. ___, No. 11–246, slip op. at 15 (2010).

439 Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500–501 (1975); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190,
193–194 (1976).
440 “Congress may grant an express right of action to persons who otherwise
would be barred by prudential standing rules. Of course, Art. III’s requirement re-
mains: the plaintiff still must allege a distinct and palpable injury to himself, even
if it is an injury shared by a large class of other possible litigants.” Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 501 (1975). That is, the actual or threatened injury required may ex-
ist solely by virtue of “statutes creating legal rights, the invasion of which creates
standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.” Linda R.S. v. Rich-
ard D., 410 U.S. 614, 617 n. 3 (1973); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 493 n.2
(1974). Examples include United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973); Trafficante
v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 409 U.S. 205 (1972); Gladstone Realtors v. Village of
Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91 (1979). See also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 8 n.4, 11–12
(1976). For a good example of the congressionally created interest and the injury to
it, see Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 373–75 (1982) (Fair Housing
Act created right to truthful information on availability of housing; black tester’s
right injured through false information, but white tester not injured because he re-
ceived truthful information). It is clear, however, that the Court will impose separation-
of-powers restraints on the power of Congress to create interests to which injury
would give standing. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 571–78 (1992).
Justice Scalia, who wrote the opinion in Lujan, reiterated the separation-of-powers
objection to congressional conferral of standing in FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 29, 36
(1998) (alleged infringement of President’s “take care” obligation), but this time in
dissent; the Court did not advert to this objection in finding that Congress had pro-
vided for standing based on denial of information to which the plaintiffs, as voters,
were entitled.
441 Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 474–75
(1982); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984).

442 Ass’n of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970);
Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39 n.19 (1976); Valley
Forge Christian College v. Americans United, 454 U.S. 464, 475 (1982); Clarke v.
Securities Industry Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987). See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S.
154 (1997).
citizens.443 The important rule concerns the ability of a plaintiff to

represent the constitutional rights of third parties not before the
court.
Standing to Assert the Rights of Others.—Usually, one may
assert only one’s interest in the litigation and not challenge the con-
stitutionality of a statute or a governmental action because it in-
fringes the protectable rights of someone else.444 In Tileston v. Ull-
man,445 an early round in the attack on a state anti-contraceptive
law, a doctor sued, charging that he was prevented from giving his
patients needed birth control advice. The Court held that he had
no standing; no right of his was infringed, and he could not repre-
sent the interests of his patients. There are several exceptions to
the general rule, however, that make generalization misleading.
For instance, under circumstances where injured parties would
be likely to be unable to assert their rights, many cases allow stand-
ing to third parties who can demonstrate a requisite degree of in-
jury to themselves. Thus, in Barrows v. Jackson,446 a white defen-
dant who was being sued for damages for breach of a restrictive
covenant directed against African Americans—and therefore able to
show injury in liability for damages—was held to have standing to
assert the rights of the class of persons whose constitutional rights
were infringed.447 Similarly, the Court has permitted defendants who
have been convicted under state law—giving them the requisite in-
jury—to assert the rights of those persons not before the Court whose
rights would be adversely affected through enforcement of the law
443 United States v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166, 173, 174–76 (1974); Duke Power
Co. v. Carolina Environmental Study Group, 438 U.S. 59, 80 (1978); Allen v. Wright,
468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984). In United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 687–88 (1973),
a congressional conferral case, the Court agreed that the interest asserted was one
shared by all, but the Court has disparaged SCRAP, asserting that it “surely went
to the very outer limit of the law,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 159 (1990).
444 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21–23 (1960); Yazoo & M.V.R.R. v. Jack-
son Vinegar Co., 226 U.S. 217 (1912). Cf. Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist.,
475 U.S. 534 (1986).
445 318 U.S. 44 (1943). See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508–510 (1975) (chal-
lenged law did not adversely affect plaintiffs and did not adversely affect a relation-
ship between them and persons they sought to represent).
446 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
447 See also Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917) (white plaintiff suing for
specific performance of a contract to convey property to a black had standing to con-

test constitutionality of ordinance barring sale of property to “colored” people, inas-
much as black defendant was relying on ordinance as his defense); Sullivan v. Little
Hunting Park, 396 U.S. 229 (1969) (white assignor of membership in discriminatory
private club could raise rights of black assignee in seeking injunction against expul-
sion from club).
in question.448 In fact, the Court has permitted persons who would

be subject to future prosecution or future legal action—thus satisfy-
ing the injury requirement—to represent the rights of third parties
with whom the challenged law has interfered with a relation-
ship.449
It is also possible, of course, that one’s own rights can be af-
fected by action directed at someone from another group.450 A sub-
stantial dispute arose in Singleton v. Wulff 451 over whether doctors
who were denied Medicaid funds for the performance of abortions
not “medically indicated” could assert the rights of absent women.
All the Justices thought the Court should be hesitant to resolve a
controversy on the basis of the rights of third parties, but they di-
vided with respect to the standards exceptions. Four Justices fa-
vored a lenient standard, permitting third party representation when
there is a close, perhaps confidential, relationship between the liti-
gant and the third parties and when there is some genuine ob-
stacle to third party assertion of their rights; four Justices would
have permitted a litigant to assert the rights of third parties only
when government directly interdicted the relationship between the
448 E.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (persons convicted of pre-
scribing contraceptives for married persons and as accessories to crime of using con-
traceptives have standing to raise constitutional rights of patients with whom they
had a professional relationship; although use of contraceptives was a crime, it was
doubtful any married couple would be prosecuted so that they could challenge the
statute); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (advocate of contraception con-
victed of giving device to unmarried woman had standing to assert rights of unmar-
ried persons denied access; unmarried persons were not subject to prosecution and
were thus impaired in their ability to gain a forum to assert their rights).
449 E.g., Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188–189 (1973) (doctors have standing to
challenge abortion statute since it operates directly against them and they should
not have to await criminal prosecution to challenge it); Planned Parenthood v. Danforth,
428 U.S. 52, 62 (1976) (same); Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 192–197 (1976) (li-
censed beer distributor could contest sex discriminatory alcohol laws because it op-
erated on him, he suffered injury in fact, and was “obvious claimant” to raise issue);
Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 682–84 (1977) (vendor of contracep-
tives had standing to bring action to challenge law limiting distribution). Older cases
support the proposition. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
450 Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474 (1990) (white defendant had standing to raise
a Sixth Amendment challenge to exclusion of blacks from his jury, since defendant
had a right to a jury comprised of a fair cross section of the community). The Court
has expanded the rights of non-minority defendants to challenge the exclusion of
minorities from petit and grand juries, both on the basis of the injury-in-fact to de-
fendants and because the standards for being able to assert the rights of third par-
ties were met. Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Campbell v. Louisiana, 523 U.S.
392 (1998).
451 428 U.S. 106 (1976).
litigant and the third parties through the criminal process and when
litigation by the third parties is in all practicable terms impos-
sible.452
Following Wulff, the Court, emphasizing the closeness of the
attorney-client relationship, held that a lawyer had standing to as-
sert his client’s Sixth Amendment right to counsel in challenging
application of a drug-forfeiture law to deprive the client of the means
of paying counsel.453 However, a “next friend” whose stake in the
outcome is only speculative must establish that the real party in
interest is unable to litigate his own cause because of mental inca-
pacity, lack of access to courts, or other disability.454
A variant of the general rule is that one may not assert the
unconstitutionality of a statute in other respects when the statute
is constitutional as to him.455 Again, the exceptions may be more
important than the rule. Thus, an overly broad statute, especially
one that regulates speech and press, may be considered on its face
rather than as applied, and a defendant to whom the statute con-
stitutionally applies may thereby be enabled to assert its unconsti-
tutionality.456
Legal challenges based upon the allocation of governmental au-
thority under the Constitution, e.g., separation of powers and feder-
alism, are generally based on a showing of injury to the disadvan-
taged governmental institution. The prohibition on litigating the
injuries of others, however, does not appear to bar individuals from
bringing these suits. For instance, injured private parties routinely
452 Compare 428 U.S. at 112–18 (Justices Blackmun, Brennan, White, and Mar-
shall), with id. at 123–31 (Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist, and Chief Jus-
tice Burger). Justice Stevens concurred with the former four Justices on narrower
grounds limited to this case.
453 Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623–624 n.3 (1989). Caplin
& Drysdale was distinguished in Kowalski v. Tesmer, 543 U.S. 123, 131 (2004), the
Court’s finding that attorneys seeking to represent hypothetical indigent clients in
challenging procedures for appointing appellate counsel had “no relationship at all”
with such potential clients, let alone a “close” relationship.
454 Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149 (1990) (death row inmate’s challenge to
death penalty imposed on a fellow inmate who knowingly, intelligently, and volun-
tarily chose not to appeal cannot be pursued).
455 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21–24 (1960).
456 Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306 U.S. 451 (1939); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88 (1940); Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479, 486–487 (1965); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Lewis v. City of
New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974). The Court has narrowed its overbreadth doc-
trine, though not consistently, in recent years. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601
(1973); Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 59–60 (1976), and id. at 73
(Justice Powell concurring); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 771–773 (1982). But
the exception as stated in the text remains strong. E.g., Secretary of State v. Joseph
H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984); Virginia v. American Booksellers Ass’n, 484
U.S. 383 (1988).
bring separation-of-powers challenges,457 even though one could ar-

gue that the injury in question is actually upon the authority of
the affected branch of government. Then, in Bond v. United States,458
the Court considered whether a criminal defendant could raise fed-
eralism arguments based on state prerogatives under the Tenth
Amendment.459 There, the Court held that individuals could raise
Tenth Amendment challenges, because states are not the “sole in-
tended beneficiaries of federalism,” and an individual has a “direct
interest in objecting to laws that upset the constitutional balance
between the National Government and the States . . . .” 460
Organizational Standing.—Organizations do not have stand-
ing as such to represent their particular concept of the public inter-
est,461 but organizations have been permitted to assert the rights
of their members.462 In Hunt v. Washington State Apple Advertis-
ing Comm’n,463 the Court promulgated elaborate standards, hold-
ing that an organization or association “has standing to bring suit
on behalf of its members when: (a) its members would otherwise
have standing to sue in their own right; (b) the interests it seeks to
protect are germane to the organization’s purpose; and (c) neither
the claim asserted, nor the relief requested, requires the participa-
tion of individual members in the lawsuit.” Similar considerations
arise in the context of class actions, in which the Court holds that
a named representative with a justiciable claim for relief is neces-
457 See, e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S.
714 (1986);Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).

458 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–1227, slip op. (2011).
459 The defendant, in an attempt to harass a woman who had become impreg-
nated by the defendant’s husband, had placed caustic substances on objects the woman
was likely to touch. The defendant was convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 229, a broad
prohibition against the use of harmful chemicals, enacted as part of the implemen-
tation of the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production,
Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction. The specifics of
the defendant’s Tenth Amendment argument was not before the Court.
460 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–1227, slip op. at 10.
461 Sierra Club v. Morton, 401 U.S. 727 (1972). An organization may, of course,
sue to redress injuries to itself. See Havens Realty Co. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363,
378–379 (1982).
462 E.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951);
NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371
U.S. 415 (1963); Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964);
United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); United Trans-
portation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
463 432 U.S. 333, 343 (1977). The organization here was not a voluntary mem-
bership entity but a state agency charged with furthering the interests of apple grow-
ers who were assessed annual sums to support the Commission. Id. at 341–45. See
also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 510–17 (1975); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Wel-
fare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 39–40 (1976); Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro-
politan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263–264 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S.
297, 321 (1980); International Union, UAW v. Brock, 477 U.S. 274 (1986).
sary when the action is filed, but that afterwards there need be only
a live controversy with the class, provided the adequacy of the rep-
resentation is sufficient.464
Standing of States to Represent Their Citizens.—The right
of a state to sue as parens patriae, in behalf of its citizens, has long
been recognized.465 No state, however, may be parens patriae of its
citizens “as against the Federal Government.” 466 But a state may
sue to protect the its citizens from environmental harm,467 and to
enjoin other states and private parties from engaging in actions harm-
ful to the economic or other well-being of it citizens.468 The state
must be more than a nominal party without a real interest of its
own, merely representing the interests of particular citizens who
cannot represent themselves; 469 it must articulate an interest apart
from those of private parties that partakes of a “quasi-sovereign in-
terest” in the health and well-being, both physical and economic, of
its residents in general, although there are suggestions that the re-
strictive definition grows out of the Court’s wish to constrain its
original jurisdiction and may not fit such suits brought in the lower
federal courts.470
464 United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388 (1980). Geraghty
was a mootness case.

465 Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900) (recognizing the propriety of parens
patriae suits but denying it in this particular suit).

466 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485–486 (1923). But see South Caro-
lina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966) (denying such standing to raise two consti-
tutional claims against the United States but deciding a third); Oregon v. Mitchell,
400 U.S. 112, 117 n.1 (1970) (no question raised about standing or jurisdiction; claims
adjudicated).
467 Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208 (1901); Kansas v. Colorado, 206 U.S. 46
(1907); Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230 (1907); New York v. New Jer-
sey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923); North
Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365 (1923).
468 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439 (1945) (antitrust); Maryland v.
Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737–739 (1981) (discriminatory state taxation of natural
gas shipped to out-of-state customers); Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel.
Barez, 458 U.S. 592 (1982) (discrimination by growers against Puerto Rican mi-
grant workers and denial of Commonwealth’s opportunity to participate in federal
employment service laws).
469 New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883); Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson
v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 277 (1911);
North Dakota v. Minnesota, 263 U.S. 365, 376 (1923); Pennsylvania v. New Jersey,
426 U.S. 660 (1976).
470 Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607–08
(1982). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, ar-
gued that the Court’s standards should apply only in original actions and not in
actions filed in federal district courts, where, they contended, the prerogative of a
state to bring suit on behalf of its citizens should be commensurate with the ability
of private organizations to do so. Id. at 610. The Court admitted that different con-
siderations might apply between original actions and district court suits. Id. at 603
n.12.
Standing of Members of Congress.—The lower federal courts,

principally the D.C. Circuit, developed a body of law governing the
standing of Members of Congress, as Members, to bring court ac-
tions, usually to challenge actions of the executive branch.471 When
the Supreme Court finally addressed the issue on the merits in 1997,
however, it severely curtailed Member standing.472 All agree that a
legislator “receives no special consideration in the standing in-
quiry,” 473 and that he, along with every other person attempting to
invoke the aid of a federal court, must show “injury in fact” as a
predicate to standing. What that injury in fact may consist of, how-
ever, is the basis of the controversy.
A suit by Members for an injunction against continued prosecu-
tion of the Indochina war was held maintainable on the theory that
if the court found the President’s actions to be beyond his constitu-
tional authority, the holding would have a distinct and significant
bearing upon the Members’ duties to vote appropriations and other
supportive legislation and to consider impeachment.474 The breadth
of this rationale was disapproved in subsequent cases. The leading
decision, issued by the D.C. Circuit, is Kennedy v. Sampson,475 in
which a Member was held to have standing to contest the alleged
improper use of a pocket veto to prevent from becoming law a bill
the Senator had voted for. Thus, Congressmen were held to have a
471 Member standing has not fared well in other Circuits. Holtzman v. Schlesinger,
484 F.2d 1307 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974); Harrington v. Schlesinger,
528 F.2d 455 (4th Cir. 1975).
472 Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811 (1997). In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 438
(1939), the Court had recognized that legislators can in some instances suffer an
injury in respect to the effectiveness of their votes that will confer standing. In Pressler
v. Blumenthal, 434 U.S. 1028 (1978), affg, 428 F. Supp. 302 (D.D.C. 1976) (three-
judge court), the Court affirmed a decision in which the lower court had found Mem-
ber standing but had then decided against the Member on the merits. The “unexplicated
affirmance” could have reflected disagreement with the lower court on standing or
agreement with it on the merits. Note Justice Rehnquist’s appended statement. Id.
In Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979), the Court vacated a decision, in which
the lower Court had found Member standing, and directed dismissal, but none of
the Justices who addressed the question of standing. The opportunity to consider
Member standing was strongly pressed in Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361 (1987), but
the expiration of the law in issue mooted the case.
473 Reuss v. Balles, 584 F.2d 461, 466 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
997 (1978).
474 Mitchell v. Laird, 488 F.2d 611 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
475 511 F.2d 430 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Barnes v. Kline, 759 F.2d 21 (D.C. Cir. 1985),
the court again found standing by Members challenging a pocket veto, but the Su-
preme Court dismissed the appeal as moot. Sub nom. Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S.
361 (1987). Whether the injury was the nullification of the past vote on passage
only or whether it was also the nullification of an opportunity to vote to override
the veto has divided the Circuit, with the majority favoring the broader interpreta-
tion. Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702 n.12 (D.C. Cir. 1979), and id. at 711–12
(Judge Wright), vacated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996
(1979)
derivative rather than direct interest in protecting their votes, which

was sufficient for standing purposes, when some “legislative disen-
franchisement” occurred.476
In a comprehensive assessment of its position, the Circuit dis-
tinguished between (1) a diminution in congressional influence re-
sulting from executive action that nullifies a specific congressional
vote or opportunity to vote in an objectively verifiable manner, which
will constitute injury in fact, and (2) a diminution in a legislator’s
effectiveness, subjectively judged by him, resulting from executive
action, such a failing to obey a statute, where the plaintiff legisla-
tor has power to act through the legislative process, in which in-
jury in fact does not exist.477 Having thus established a fairly broad
concept of Member standing, the Circuit then proceeded to curtail
it by holding that the equitable discretion of the court to deny re-
lief should be exercised in many cases in which a Member had stand-
ing but in which issues of separation of powers, political questions,
and other justiciability considerations counseled restraint.478 The sta-
tus of this issue thus remains in confusion.
Member or legislator standing has been severely curtailed, al-
though not quite abolished, in Raines v. Byrd.479 Several Members
of Congress, who had voted against passage of the Line Item Veto
Act, sued in their official capacities as Members of Congress to in-
validate the law, alleging standing based on the theory that the stat-
ute adversely affected their constitutionally prescribed lawmaking
power.480 Emphasizing its use of standing doctrine to maintain
separation-of-powers principles, the Court adhered to its holdings
that, in order to possess the requisite standing, a person must es-
476 Kennedy v. Sampson, 511 F.2d 430, 435–436 (D.C. Cir. 1974). See Har-
rington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 199 n.41 (D.C. Cir. 1977). Harrington found no stand-
ing in a Member’s suit challenging CIA failure to report certain actions to Congress,
in order that Members could intelligently vote on certain issues. See also Reuss v.
Balles, 584 F.2d 461 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 997 (1978).
477 Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 702, 703 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), va-
cated and remanded with instructions to dismiss, 444 U.S. 996 (1979). The failure
of the Justices to remark on standing is somewhat puzzling, since it has been stated
that courts “turn initially, although not invariably, to the question of standing to
sue.” Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 215 (1974).
But see Harrington v. Bush, 553 F.2d 190, 207 (D.C. Cir. 1977). In any event, the
Supreme Court’s decision vacating Goldwater deprives the Circuit’s language of
precedential effect. United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36, 39–40 (1950); O’Connor
v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 577 n.12 (1975).
478 Riegle v. FOMC, 656 F.2d 873 (D.C. Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1082
(1981).
479 521 U.S. 811 (1997).
480 The Act itself provided that “[a]ny Member of Congress or any individual
adversely affected” could sue to challenge the law. 2 U.S.C. § 692(a)(1). After failure
of this litigation, the Court in the following Term, on suits brought by claimants
adversely affected by the exercise of the veto, held the statute unconstitutional. Clin-
ton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998).
tablish that he has a “personal stake” in the dispute and that the
alleged injury suffered is particularized as to him.481 Neither require-
ment, the Court held, was met by these legislators. First, the Mem-
bers did not suffer a particularized loss that distinguished them from
their colleagues or from Congress as an entity. Second, the Mem-
bers did not claim that they had been deprived of anything to which
they were personally entitled. “[A]ppellees’ claim of standing is based
on loss of political power, not loss of any private right, which would
make the injury more concrete. . . . If one of the Members were to
retire tomorrow, he would no longer have a claim; the claim would
be possessed by his successor instead. The claimed injury thus runs
(in a sense) with the Member’s seat, a seat which the Member holds
. . . as trustee for his constituents, not as a prerogative of personal
power.” 482
So, there is no such thing as Member standing? Not necessar-
ily so, because the Court turned immediately to preserving (at least
a truncated version of) Coleman v. Miller,483 in which the Court had
found that 20 of the 40 members of a state legislature had stand-
ing to sue to challenge the loss of the effectiveness of their votes as
a result of a tie-breaker by the lieutenant governor. Although there
are several possible explanations for the result in that case, the Court
in Raines chose to fasten on a particularly narrow point. “[O]ur hold-
ing in Coleman stands (at most . . .) for the proposition that legis-
lators whose votes would have been sufficient to defeat (or enact) a
specific legislative Act have standing to sue if that legislative ac-
tion goes into effect (or does not go into effect), on the ground that
their votes have been completely nullified.” 484 Because these Mem-
bers could still pass or reject appropriations bills, vote to repeal the
Act, or exempt any appropriations bill from presidential cancella-
tion, the Act did not nullify their votes and thus give them stand-
ing.485
It may be observed that the Court’s two holdings do not cohere.
If legislators have standing only to allege personal injuries suffered
in their personal capacities, how can they have standing to assert
official-capacity injury in being totally deprived of the effectiveness
of their votes?
Standing to Challenge Lawfulness of Governmental Ac-
tion.—Standing to challenge governmental action on statutory or
other non-constitutional grounds has a constitutional content to the
481 521 U.S. at 819.
482 521 U.S. at 821.
483 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
484 521 U.S. at 823.
485 521 U.S. at 824–26.
degree that Article III requires a “case” or “controversy,” necessitat-

ing a litigant who has sustained or will sustain an injury so that
he will be moved to present the issue “in an adversary context and
in a form historically viewed as capable of judicial resolution.” 486
Liberalization of standing in the administrative law field has been
notable.
The “old law” required that in order to sue to contest the law-
fulness of agency administrative action, one must have suffered a
“legal wrong,” that is, “the right invaded must be a legal right,” 487
requiring some resolution of the merits preliminarily. An injury-in-
fact was insufficient. A “legal right” could be established in one of
two ways. It could be a common-law right, such that if the injury
were administered by a private party, one could sue on it; 488 or it
could be a right created by the Constitution or a statute.489 The
statutory right most relied on was the judicial review section of the
Administrative Procedure Act, which provided that “[a] person suf-
fering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected
or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant stat-
ute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.” 490 Early decisions under
this statute interpreted the language as adopting the “legal inter-
est” and “legal wrong” standard then prevailing as constitutional
486 Ass’n of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151–152 (1970),
citing Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 101 (1968). “But where a dispute is otherwise
justiciable, the question whether the litigant is a ‘proper party to request an adjudi-
cation of a particular issue,’ [quoting Flast, supra, at 100], is one within the power
of Congress to determine.” Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 732 n.3 (1972).
487 Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137–138 (1939). See also
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310
U.S. 113 (1940).
488 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951)
(Justice Frankfurter concurring). This was apparently the point of the definition of
“legal right” as “one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected against
tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which confers a privilege.” Tennessee
Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137–138 (1939).
489 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 152 (1951)
(Justice Frankfurter concurring). The Court approached this concept in two interre-
lated ways. (1) It might be that a plaintiff had an interest that it was one of the
purposes of the statute in question to protect in some degree. Chicago Junction Case,
264 U.S. 258 (1924); Alexander Sprunt & Son v. United States, 281 U.S. 249 (1930);
Alton R.R. v. United States, 315 U.S. 15 (1942). Thus, in Hardin v. Kentucky Utili-
ties Co., 390 U.S. 1 (1968), a private utility was held to have standing to contest
allegedly illegal competition by TVA on the ground that the statute was meant to
give private utilities some protection from certain forms of TVA competition. (2) It
might be that a plaintiff was a “person aggrieved” within the terms of a judicial
review section of an administrative or regulatory statute. Injury to an economic in-
terest was sufficient to “aggrieve” a litigant. FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Sta-
tion, 309 U.S. 470 (1940); Associated Industries v. Ickes, 134 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1943),
cert. dismissed as moot, 320 U.S. 707 (1943).
490 5 U.S.C. § 702. See also 47 U.S.C. § 202(b)(6) (FCC); 15 U.S.C. § 77i(a) (SEC);
16 U.S.C. § 825a(b) (FPC).

requirements of standing, which generally had the effect of limit-

ing the type of injury cognizable in federal court to economic ones.491
In 1970, however, the Court promulgated a two-pronged stand-
ing test: if the litigant (1) has suffered injury-in-fact and if he (2)
shows that the interest he seeks to protect is arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated by the statutory guar-
antee in question, he has standing.492 Of even greater importance
was the expansion of the nature of the cognizable injury beyond
economic injury to encompass “aesthetic, conservational, and recre-
ational” interests as well.493 “Aesthetic and environmental well-
being, like economic well-being, are important ingredients of the qual-
ity of life in our society, and the fact that particular environmental
interests are shared by the many rather than the few does not make
them less deserving of legal protection through the judicial pro-
cess.” 494 Thus, plaintiffs who pleaded that they used the natural
resources of the Washington area, that rail freight rates would de-
ter the recycling of used goods, and that their use of natural re-
491 FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 477 (1940); City of
Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 357 U.S. 77, 83 (1958); Hardin v. Kentucky
Utilities Co., 390 U.S. 1, 7 (1968).
492 Ass’n of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970); Barlow
v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970). Justices Brennan and White argued that only injury-
in-fact should be requisite for standing. Id. at 167. In Clarke v. Securities Industry
Ass’n, 479 U.S. 388 (1987), the Court applied a liberalized zone-of-interest test. But
see Lujan v. National Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 885–889 (1990); Air Courier
Conf. v. American Postal Workers Union, 498 U.S. 517 (1991). In applying these stan-
dards, the Court, once it determined that the litigant’s interests were “arguably pro-
tected” by the statute in question, proceeded to the merits without thereafter paus-
ing to inquire whether in fact the interests asserted were among those protected.
Arnold Tours v. Camp, 400 U.S. 45 (1970); Investment Company Institute v. Camp,
401 U.S. 617 (1971); Boston Stock Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318,
320 n.3 (1977). Almost contemporaneously, the Court also liberalized the ripeness
requirement in review of administrative actions. Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc.,
387 U.S. 167 (1967); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). See also
National Credit Union Administration v. First National Bank & Trust Co., 522 U.S.
479 (1998), in which the Court found that a bank had standing to challenge an agency
ruling expanding the role of employer credit unions to include multi-employer credit
unions, despite a statutory limit that any such union could be of groups having a
common bond of occupation or association. The Court held that a plaintiff did not
have to show it was the congressional purpose to protect its interests. It is sufficient
if the interest asserted is “arguably within the zone of interests to be protected . . .
by the statute.” Id. at 492 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). But the
Court divided 5-to-4 in applying the test. See also Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154
(1997).
493 Ass’n of Data Processing Service Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 154 (1970).
494 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 734 (1972), Moreover, said the Court,
once a person establishes that he has standing to seek judicial review of an action
because of particularized injury to him, he may argue the public interest as a “rep-
resentative of the public interest,” as a “private attorney general,” so that he may
contest not only the action which injures him but the entire complex of actions of
which his injury-inducing action is a part. Id. at 737–738, noting Scripps-Howard
Radio v. FCC, 316 U.S. 4 (1942); FCC v. Sanders Brothers Radio Station, 309 U.S.
sources would be disturbed by the adverse environmental impact

caused by the nonuse of recyclable goods, had standing as “persons
aggrieved” to challenge the rates set. Neither the large numbers of
persons allegedly injured nor the indirect and less perceptible harm
to the environment was justification to deny standing. The Court
granted that the plaintiffs might never be able to establish the “at-
tenuated line of causation” from rate setting to injury, but that was
a matter for proof at trial, not for resolution on the pleadings.495
Much debate has occurred in recent years with respect to the
validity of “citizen suit” provisions in the environmental laws, espe-
cially in light of the Court’s retrenchment in constitutional stand-
ing cases. The Court in insisting on injury in fact as well as causa-
tion and redressability has curbed access to citizen suits,496 but that
Congress may expansively confer substantial degrees of standing
through statutory creations of interests remains true.
The Requirement of a Real Interest

Almost inseparable from the requirements of adverse parties and
substantial enough interests to confer standing is the requirement
that a real issue be presented, as contrasted with speculative, ab-
stract, hypothetical, or moot issues. It has long been the Court’s
“considered practice not to decide abstract, hypothetical or contin-
gent questions.” 497 A party cannot maintain a suit “for a mere dec-
laration in the air.” 498 In Texas v. ICC,499 the State attempted to
enjoin the enforcement of the Transportation Act of 1920 on the ground
that it invaded the reserved rights of the State. The Court dis-
missed the complaint as presenting no case or controversy, declar-
ing: “It is only where rights, in themselves appropriate subjects of
judicial cognizance, are being, or about to be, affected prejudicially
by the application or enforcement of a statute that its validity may
be called in question by a suitor and determined by an exertion of
(1940). See also Gladstone Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 103 n. (1979);
Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman, 455 U.S. 363, 376 n.16 (1982) (noting ability of
such party to represent interests of third parties).
495 United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 683–690 (1973). As was noted above,
this case has been disparaged by the later Court. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
504 U.S. 555, 566–67 (1992); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 158–160 (1990).
496 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992); Lujan v. National
Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871 (1990). But see Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154
(1997) (fact that citizen suit provision of Endangered Species Act is directed at em-
powering suits to further environmental concerns does not mean that suitor who
alleges economic harm from enforcement of Act lacks standing); FEC v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11 (1998) (expansion of standing based on denial of access to information).
497 Alabama State Fed’n of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945).
498 Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486 (1903).
499 258 U.S. 158 (1922).
the judicial power.” 500 And in Ashwander v. TVA,501 the Court re-
fused to decide any issue save that of the validity of the contracts
between the Authority and the Company. “The pronouncements, poli-
cies and program of the Tennessee Valley Authority and its direc-
tors, their motives and desires, did not give rise to a justiciable con-
troversy save as they had fruition in action of a definite and concrete
character constituting an actual or threatened interference with the
rights of the person complaining.” 502
Concepts of real interest and abstract questions appeared promi-
nently in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,503 an omnibus attack
on the constitutionality of the Hatch Act prohibitions on political
activities by governmental employees. With one exception, none of
the plaintiffs had violated the Act, though they stated they desired
to engage in forbidden political actions. The Court found no justi-
ciable controversy except in regard to the one, calling for “concrete
legal issues, presented in actual cases, not abstractions,” and see-
ing the suit as really an attack on the political expediency of the
Act.504
Advisory Opinions.—In 1793, the Court unanimously refused
to grant the request of President Washington and Secretary of State
Jefferson to construe the treaties and laws of the United States per-
taining to questions of international law arising out of the wars of
the French Revolution.505 Noting the constitutional separation of pow-
ers and functions in his reply, Chief Justice Jay said: “These being
in certain respects checks upon each other, and our being Judges
of a Court in the last resort, are considerations which afford strong
arguments against the propriety of our extra-judicially deciding the
questions alluded to, especially as the power given by the Constitu-
tion to the President, of calling on the heads of departments for
500 258 U.S. at 162.
501 297 U.S. 288 (1936).
502 297 U.S. at 324. Chief Justice Hughes cited New York v. Illinois, 274 U.S.
488 (1927), in which the Court dismissed as presenting abstract questions a suit
about the possible effects of the diversion of water from Lake Michigan upon hypo-
thetical water power developments in the indefinite future, and Arizona v. Califor-
nia, 283 U.S. 423 (1931), in which it was held that claims based merely upon as-
sumed potential invasions of rights were insufficient to warrant judicial intervention.
See also Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 484–485 (1923); New Jersey v. Sargent,
269 U.S. 328, 338–340 (1926); Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50, 76 (1867).
503 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
504 330 U.S. at 89–91. Justices Black and Douglas dissented, contending that
the controversy was justiciable. Justice Douglas could not agree that the plaintiffs
should have to violate the act and lose their jobs in order to test their rights. In
CSC v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973), the concerns ex-
pressed in Mitchell were largely ignored as the Court reached the merits in an an-
ticipatory attack on the Act. Compare Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
505 1 C. Warren, supra at 108–111. The full text of the exchange appears in 3
CORRESPONDENCE AND PUBLIC PAPERS OF JOHN JAY 486–489 (H. Johnston ed., 1893).
opinions, seem to have been purposely as well as expressly united

to the Executive departments.” 506 Although the Court has gener-
ally adhered to its refusal, Justice Jackson was not quite correct
when he termed the policy a “firm and unvarying practice. . . .” 507
The Justices in response to a letter calling for suggestions on im-
provements in the operation of the courts drafted a letter suggest-
ing that circuit duty for the Justices was unconstitutional, but they
apparently never sent it; 508 Justice Johnson communicated to Presi-
dent Monroe, apparently with the knowledge and approval of the
other Justices, the views of the Justices on the constitutionality of
internal improvements legislation; 509 and Chief Justice Hughes in
a letter to Senator Wheeler on President Roosevelt’s Court Plan ques-
tioned the constitutionality of a proposal to increase the member-
ship and have the Court sit in divisions.510 Other Justices have in-
dividually served as advisers and confidants of Presidents in one
degree or another.511
Nonetheless, the Court has generally adhered to the early prec-
edent and would no doubt have developed the rule in any event, as
a logical application of the case and controversy doctrine. As Jus-
tice Jackson wrote when the Court refused to review an order of
the Civil Aeronautics Board, which in effect was a mere recommen-
dation to the President for his final action: “To revise or review an
administrative decision which has only the force of a recommenda-
tion to the President would be to render an advisory opinion in its
most obnoxious form—advice that the President has not asked, ten-
dered at the demand of a private litigant, on a subject concededly
within the President’s exclusive, ultimate control. This Court early
and wisely determined that it would not give advisory opinions even
when asked by the Chief Executive. It has also been the firm and
unvarying practice of Constitutional Courts to render no judg-
ments not binding and conclusive on the parties and none that are
506 Jay Papers at 488.

507 Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113 (1948).
508 See supra.
509 1 C. Warren, supra at 595–597.
510 Reorganization of the Judiciary: Hearings on S. 1392 Before the Senate Judi-
ciary Committee, 75th Congress, 1st Sess. (1937), pt. 3, 491. See also Chief Justice
Taney’s private advisory opinion to the Secretary of the Treasury that a tax levied
on the salaries of federal judges violated the Constitution. S. TYLER, MEMOIRS OF ROGER
B. TANEY 432–435 (1876).
511 E.g., Acheson, Removing the Shadow Cast on the Courts, 55 A.B.A.J. 919 (1969);
Jaffe, Professors and Judges as Advisors to Government: Reflections on the Roosevelt-

Frankfurter Relationship, 83 HARV. L. REV. 366 (1969). The issue earned the atten-
tion of the Supreme Court, Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 397–408 (1989)
(citing examples and detailed secondary sources), when it upheld the congressio-
nally authorized service of federal judges on the Sentencing Commission.
subject to later review or alteration by administrative action.” 512

The Court’s early refusal to render advisory opinions has discour-
aged direct requests for advice so that the advisory opinion has ap-
peared only collaterally in cases where there was a lack of adverse
parties,513 or where the judgment of the Court was subject to later
review or action by the executive or legislative branches of govern-
ment,514 or where the issues involved were abstract or contin-
gent.515
Declaratory Judgments.—Rigid emphasis upon such ele-
ments of judicial power as finality of judgment and award of execu-
tion coupled with equally rigid emphasis upon adverse parties and
real interests as essential elements of a case and controversy cre-
ated serious doubts about the validity of any federal declaratory judg-
ment procedure.516 These doubts were largely dispelled by Court de-
cisions in the late 1920s and early 1930s,517 and Congress quickly
responded with the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934.518
Quickly tested, the Act was unanimously sustained.519 “The prin-
ciple involved in this form of procedure,” the House report said, “is
to confer upon the courts the power to exercise in some instances
preventive relief; a function now performed rather clumsily by our
equitable proceedings and inadequately by the law courts.” 520 The
Senate report stated: “The declaratory judgment differs in no essen-
tial respect from any other judgment except that it is not followed
by a decree for damages, injunction, specific performance, or other
immediately coercive decree. It declares conclusively and finally the
rights of parties in litigations over a contested issue, a form of re-
lief which often suffices to settle controversies and fully administer
justice.” 521
512 Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 113–114 (1948).
513 Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911).
514 United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 40 (1852).
515 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
516 Cf. Willing v. Chicago Auditorium Ass’n, 277 U.S. 274 (1928).
517 Fidelity National Bank & Trust Co. v. Swope, 274 U.S. 123 (1927); Nash-
ville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Wallace, 288 U.S. 249 (1963). Wallace was cited with ap-
proval in Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007) (“Article
III’s limitation of federal courts’ jurisdiction to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies,’ reflected
in the ‘actual controversy’ requirement of the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2201(a), [does not] require[ ] a patent licensee to terminate or be in breach of its
license agreement before it can seek a declaratory judgment that the underlying pat-
ent is invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed,” id. at 120–21).
518 48 Stat. 955, as amended, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201–2202.
519 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937) (cited with approval in
Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 126 (2007)).

520 H. REP. NO. 1264, 73d Congress, 2d Sess. (1934), 2.
521 S. REP. NO. 1005, 73d Congress, 2d Sess. (1934), 2.
The 1934 Act provided that “[i]n cases of actual controversy”

federal courts could “declare rights and other legal relations of any
interested party petitioning for such declaration, whether or not fur-
ther relief is or could be prayed. . . .” 522 Upholding the Act, the Court
wrote: “The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to
‘cases of actual controversy,’ manifestly has regard to the constitu-
tional provision and is operative only in respect to controversies which
are such in the constitutional sense. The word ‘actual’ is one of em-
phasis rather than of definition. Thus the operation of the Declara-
tory Judgment Act is procedural only. In providing remedies and
defining procedure in relation to cases and controversies in the con-
stitutional sense the Congress is acting within its delegated power
over the jurisdiction of the federal courts which the Congress is au-
thorized to establish.” 523 Finding that the case presented a definite
and concrete controversy, the Court held that a declaration should
have been issued.524
The Court has insisted that “the requirements for a justiciable
case or controversy are no less strict in a declaratory judgment pro-
ceeding than in any other type of suit.” 525 As Justice Douglas wrote:
“The difference between an abstract question and a ‘controversy’ con-
templated by the Declaratory Judgment Act is necessarily one of
degree, and it would be difficult, if it would be possible, to fashion
a precise test for determining in every case whether there is such
a controversy. Basically, the question in each case is whether the
facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a sub-
stantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal inter-
ests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of
a declaratory judgment.” 526 It remains, therefore, for the courts to
determine in each case the degree of controversy necessary to estab-
lish a case for purposes of jurisdiction. Even then, however, the Court
is under no compulsion to exercise its jurisdiction.527 Use of declara-
tory judgments to settle disputes and identify rights in many pri-
vate areas, like insurance and patents in particular but extending
into all areas of civil litigation, except taxes,528 is common. The Court
522 48 Stat. 955. The language remains quite similar. 28 U.S.C. § 2201.
523 Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 239–240 (1937).
524 300 U.S. at 242–44.
525 Alabama State Federation of Labor v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450, 461 (1945).
526 Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941).
527 Brillhart v. Excess Ins. Co. of America, 316 U.S. 491, 494 (1942); Public Ser-
vice Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237, 243 (1952); Public Affairs Associates v. Rickover,
369 U.S. 111, 112 (1962). See also Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277 (1995).
528 An exception “with respect to Federal taxes” was added in 1935. 49 Stat.
1027. The Tax Injunction Act of 1937, 50 Stat. 738, U.S.C. § 1341, prohibited federal
injunctive relief directed at state taxes but said nothing about declaratory relief. It
was held to apply, however, in California v. Grace Brethren Church, 457 U.S. 393
has, however, at various times demonstrated a substantial reluc-

tance to have important questions of public law, especially regard-
ing the validity of legislation, resolved by such a procedure.529 In
part, this has been accomplished by a strict insistence upon con-
creteness, ripeness, and the like.530 Nonetheless, even at such times,
several noteworthy constitutional decisions were rendered in declara-
tory judgment actions.531
As part of the 1960s hospitality to greater access to courts, the
Court exhibited a greater receptivity to declaratory judgments in
constitutional litigation, especially cases involving civil liberties is-
sues.532 The doctrinal underpinnings of this hospitality were sketched
out by Justice Brennan in his opinion for the Court in Zwickler v.
Koota,533 in which the relevance to declaratory judgments of the
Dombrowski v. Pfister 534 line of cases involving federal injunctive
relief against the enforcement of state criminal statutes was in is-
sue. First, it was held that the vesting of “federal question” jurisdic-
tion in the federal courts by Congress following the Civil War, as
well as the enactment of more specific civil rights jurisdictional stat-
utes, “imposed the duty upon all levels of the federal judiciary to
give due respect to a suitor’s choice of a federal forum for the hear-
ing and decision of his federal constitutional claims.” 535 Escape from
that duty might be found only in “narrow circumstances,” such as
an appropriate application of the abstention doctrine, which was not
proper where a statute affecting civil liberties was so broad as to
reach protected activities as well as unprotected activities.
Second, the judicially developed doctrine that a litigant must
show “special circumstances” to justify the issuance of a federal in-
junction against the enforcement of state criminal laws is not appli-
(1982). Earlier, in Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943),
the Court had reserved the issue but held that considerations of comity should pre-
clude federal courts from giving declaratory relief in such cases. Cf. Fair Assess-
ment in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981).
529 E.g., Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Electric Bond Co. v. SEC, 303
U.S. 419 (1938); United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Eccles v.
Peoples Bank, 333 U.S. 426 (1948); Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549,
572–573 (1947).
530 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497 (1961); Altvater v. Freeman, 319 U.S. 359 (1943); International Longshore-
men’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954); Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344
U.S. 237 (1952).
531 E.g., Currin v. Wallace, 306 U.S. 1 (1939); Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939);
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288 (1936); Evers v. Dwyer, 358 U.S. 202 (1958).
532 E.g., Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Turner v. City of Memphis, 369 U.S. 350 (1962); Powell v. Mc-
Cormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). But see Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
533 389 U.S. 241 (1967).
534 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
535 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
cable to requests for federal declaratory relief: “a federal district

court has the duty to decide the appropriateness and the merits of
the declaratory request irrespective of its conclusion as to the pro-
priety of the issuance of the injunction.” 536 This language was quali-
fied subsequently, so that declaratory and injunctive relief were equated
in cases in which a criminal prosecution is pending in state court
at the time the federal action is filed 537 or is begun in state court
after the filing of the federal action but before any proceedings of
substance have taken place in federal court,538 and federal courts
were instructed not to issue declaratory judgments in the absence
of the factors permitting issuance of injunctions under the same cir-
cumstances. But in the absence of a pending state action or the sub-
sequent and timely filing of one, a request for a declaratory judg-
ment that a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional does not have
to meet the stricter requirements justifying the issuance of an in-
junction.539
Ripeness.—Just as standing historically has concerned who may
bring an action in federal court, the ripeness doctrine concerns when
it may be brought. Formerly, it was a wholly constitutional prin-
ciple requiring a determination that the events bearing on the sub-
stantive issue have happened or are sufficiently certain to occur so
as to make adjudication necessary and so as to assure that the is-
sues are sufficiently defined to permit intelligent resolution. The fo-
cus was on the harm to the rights claimed rather than on the harm
to the plaintiff that gave him standing to bring the action,540 al-
though, to be sure, in most cases the harm is the same. But in lib-
eralizing the doctrine of ripeness in recent years the Court subdi-
536 Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 254 (1967).

537 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The case and its companion, Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), substantially undercut much of the Dombrowski lan-
guage and much of Zwickler was downgraded.
538 Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332, 349 (1975).
539 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974). In cases covered by Steffel, the fed-
eral court may issue preliminary or permanent injunctions to protect its judgments,
without satisfying the Younger tests. Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 930–931
(1975); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 712 (1977).
540 United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947); International Long-
shoremen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954). For recent examples of lack of ripe-
ness, see Ohio Forestry Ass’n v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726 (1998); Texas v. United
States, 523 U.S. 296 (1998).
vided it into constitutional and prudential parts 541 and conflated

standing and ripeness considerations.542
The early cases generally required potential plaintiffs to expose
themselves to possibly irreparable injury in order to invoke federal
judicial review. Thus, in United Public Workers v. Mitchell,543 gov-
ernment employees alleged that they wished to engage in various
political activities and that they were deterred from their desires
by the Hatch Act prohibitions on political activities. As to all but
one plaintiff, who had himself actually engaged in forbidden activ-
ity, the Court held itself unable to adjudicate because the plaintiffs
were not threatened with “actual interference” with their interests.
The Justices viewed the threat to plaintiffs’ rights as hypothetical
and refused to speculate about the kinds of political activity they
might engage in or the Government’s response to it. “No threat of
interference by the Commission with rights of these appellants ap-
pears beyond that implied by the existence of the law and the regu-
lations.” 544 Similarly, resident aliens planning to work in the Terri-
tory of Alaska for the summer and then return to the United States
were denied a request for an interpretation of the immigration laws
that they would not be treated on their return as excludable aliens
entering the United States for the first time, or alternatively, for a
ruling that the laws so interpreted would be unconstitutional. The
resident aliens had not left the country and attempted to return,
although other alien workers had gone and been denied reentry, and
the immigration authorities were on record as intending to enforce
the laws as they construed them.545 Of course, the Court was not
entirely consistent in applying the doctrine.546
541 Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138–148 (1974) (cer-
tainty of injury a constitutional limitation, factual adequacy element a prudential

one).
(1978) (that plaintiffs suffer injury-in-fact and such injury would be redressed by
granting requested relief satisfies Article III ripeness requirement; prudential ele-
ment satisfied by determination that Court would not be better prepared to render
a decision later than now). But compare Renne v. Geary, 501 U.S. 312 (1991).
543 330 U.S. 75 (1947).
544 330 U.S. at 90. In CSC v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548
(1973), without discussing ripeness, the Court decided on the merits anticipatory
attacks on the Hatch Act. Plaintiffs had, however, alleged a variety of more concrete
infringements upon their desires and intentions than the UPW plaintiffs had.
545 International Longshoremen’s Union v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222 (1954). See also
Electric Bond Co. v. SEC, 303 U.S. 419 (1938); Alabama State Federation of Labor
v. McAdory, 325 U.S. 450 (1945); Public Service Comm’n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237
(1952); Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583 (1972).
546 In Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952), without discussing ripeness,
the Court decided on the merits a suit about a state law requiring dismissal of teach-
ers advocating violent overthrow of the government, over a strong dissent arguing
the case was indistinguishable from Mitchell. Id. at 504 (Justice Frankfurter dissent-
It remains good general law that pre-enforcement challenges to

criminal and regulatory legislation will often be unripe for judicial
consideration because of uncertainty of enforcement,547 because the
plaintiffs can allege only a subjective feeling of inhibition or fear
arising from the legislation or from enforcement of it,548 or because
the courts need before them the details of a concrete factual situa-
tion arising from enforcement in order to engage in a reasoned bal-
ancing of individual rights and governmental interests.549 But one
who challenges a statute or possible administrative action need dem-
onstrate only a realistic danger of sustaining an injury to his rights
as a result of the statute’s operation and enforcement and need not
await the consummation of the threatened injury in order to ob-
tain preventive relief, such as exposing himself to actual arrest or
prosecution. When one alleges an intention to engage in conduct
arguably affected with a constitutional interest but proscribed by
statute and there exists a credible threat of prosecution thereun-
der, he may bring an action for declaratory or injunctive relief.550
Similarly, the reasonable certainty of the occurrence of the per-
ing). In Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961), a state employee
was permitted to attack a non-Communist oath, although he alleged he believed he
could take the oath in good faith and could prevail if prosecuted, because the oath
was so vague as to subject plaintiff to the “risk of unfair prosecution and the poten-
tial deterrence of constitutionally protected conduct.” Id. at 283–84. See also Bag-
gett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589
(1967).
547 E.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961) (no adjudication of challenge to law
barring use of contraceptives because in 80 years of the statute’s existence the state
had never instituted a prosecution). But compare Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97
(1987) (merits reached in absence of enforcement and fair indication state would
not enforce it); Vance v. Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (reaching merits, al-
though state asserted law would not be used, although local prosecutor had so threat-
ened; no discussion of ripeness, but dissent relied on Poe, id. at 317–18).
548 E.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 41–42 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S.
77 (1971); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488
(1974); Spomer v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 514 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
In the context of the ripeness to challenge of agency regulations, as to which there
is a presumption of available judicial remedies, the Court has long insisted that fed-
eral courts should be reluctant to review such regulations unless the effects of ad-
ministrative action challenged have been felt in a concrete way by the challenging
parties, i.e., unless the controversy is “ripe.” See, of the older cases, Abbott Labora-
tories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
158 (1967); Gardner v. Toilet Goods Ass’n, Inc., 387 U.S. 167 (1967). More recent
cases include Reno v. Catholic Social Services, Inc., 509 U.S. 43 (1993); Lujan v. Na-
tional Wildlife Federation, 497 U.S. 871, 891 (1990).
549 E.g., California Bankers Ass’n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Hodel v. Vir-
ginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 294–297 (1981); Renne v. Geary,
501 U.S. 312, 320–323 (1991).
550 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705,
707–708, 710 (1977); Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289, 297–305 (1979)
(finding some claims ripe, others not). Compare Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 188–
189 (1973), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 127–128 (1973). See also Planned Par-
enthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979).
ceived threat to a constitutional interest is sufficient to afford a ba-

sis for bringing a challenge, provided the court has sufficient facts
before it to enable it to intelligently adjudicate the issues.551
Of considerable uncertainty in the law of ripeness is Duke Power,
in which the Court held ripe for decision on the merits a challenge
to a federal law limiting liability for nuclear accidents at nuclear
power plants, on the basis that, because the plaintiffs had sus-
tained an injury-in-fact and had standing, the Article III requisite
of ripeness was satisfied and no additional facts arising out of the
occurrence of the claimed harm would enable the court better to
decide the issues.552 Should this analysis prevail, ripeness as a limi-
tation on justiciability will decline in importance.
Mootness.—A case initially presenting all the attributes neces-
sary for federal court litigation may at some point lose some attri-
bute of justiciability and become “moot.” The usual rule is that an
actual controversy must exist at all stages of trial and appellate
consideration and not simply at the date the action is initiated.553
“Under Article III of the Constitution, federal courts may adjudi-
cate only actual, ongoing cases or controversies. . . . Article III de-
551 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 113–118 (1976); Regional Rail Reorganization
Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 138–148 (1974) (holding some but not all the claims ripe).
See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997 (Justice Powell concurring) (parties
had not put themselves in opposition).
(1978). The injury giving standing to plaintiffs was the environmental harm arising
from the plant’s routine operation; the injury to their legal rights was alleged to be
the harm caused by the limitation of liability in the event of a nuclear accident. The
standing injury had occurred, the ripeness injury was conjectural and speculative
and might never occur. See id. at 102 (Justice Stevens concurring in the result). It
is evident on the face of the opinion and expressly stated by the objecting Justices
that the Court used its standing/ripeness analyses in order to reach the merits, so
as to remove the constitutional cloud cast upon the federal law by the district court
decision. Id. at 95, 103 (Justices Rehnquist and Stevens concurring in the result).
553 E.g., United States v. Munsingwear, 340 U.S. 36 (1950); Golden v. Zwickler,
394 U.S. 103, 108 (1969); SEC v. Medical Committee for Human Rights, 404 U.S.
403 (1972); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 125 (1973); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393,
398–399 (1975) (special rule for class actions); United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty,
445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980) (special rule for class actions), and id. at 411 (Justice Pow-
ell dissenting); Burke v. Barnes, 479 U.S. 361, 363 (1987); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S.
305, 317 (1988); Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–478 (1990);
Camreta v. Greene, 563 U.S. ___, No. 09–1954, slip op. (2011); United States v. Ju-
venile Male, 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–940, slip op. at 4 (2011). Munsingwear has long
stood for the proposition that the appropriate practice of the Court in a civil case
that had become moot while on the way to the Court or after certiorari had been
granted was to vacate or reverse and remand with directions to dismiss. In U.S.
Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (1994), however, the
Court held that when mootness occurs because the parties have reached a settle-
ment, vacatur of the judgment below is ordinarily not the best practice; instead, eq-
uitable principles should be applied so as to preserve a presumptively correct and
valuable precedent, unless a court concludes that the public interest would be served
by vacatur.
nies federal courts the power ‘to decide questions that cannot affect
the rights of litigants in the case before them,’ . . . and confines
them to resolving ‘real and substantial controvers[ies] admitting of
specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distin-
guished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a
hypothetical state of facts.’ This case-or-controversy requirement sub-
sists through all stages of federal judicial proceedings, trial and ap-
pellate. To sustain our jurisdiction in the present case, it is not enough
that a dispute was very much alive when suit was filed, or when
review was obtained in the Court of Appeals. . . . The parties must
continue to have a ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of the law-
suit.” 554 Because, with the advent of declaratory judgments, it is
open to the federal courts to “declare the rights and other legal re-
lations” of the parties with res judicata effect,555 the question in
cases alleged to be moot now seems largely if not exclusively to be
decided in terms of whether an actual controversy continues to ex-
ist between the parties rather than in terms of any additional older
concepts.556 So long as concrete, adverse legal interests between the
parties continue, a case is not made moot by intervening actions
that cast doubt on the practical enforceability of a final judicial or-
der.557
554 Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 477–78 (1990) (internal cita-
tions omitted). The Court’s emphasis upon mootness as a constitutional limitation

mandated by Article III is long stated in the cases. E.g., Liner v. Jafco, 375 U.S.
301, 306 n.3 (1964); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 316 (1974); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 317 (1988), and id. at
332 (Justice Scalia dissenting). But compare Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424
U.S. 747, 756 n.8 (1976) (referring to mootness as presenting policy rather than con-
stitutional considerations). If this foundation exists, it is hard to explain the excep-
tions, which partake of practical reasoning. In any event, Chief Justice Rehnquist
has argued that the mootness doctrine is not constitutionally based, or not suffi-
ciently based only on Article III, so that the Court should not dismiss cases that
have become moot after the Court has taken them for review. Id. at 329 (concur-
ring). Consider the impact of Cardinal Chemical Co. v. Morton Int’l, Inc., 508 U.S.
83 (1993).
555 But see Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 470–72 (1974); id. at 477 (Justice
White concurring), 482 n.3 (Justice Rehnquist concurring) (on res judicata effect in
state court in subsequent prosecution). In any event, the statute authorizes the fed-
eral court to grant “[f]urther necessary or proper relief,” which could include enjoin-
ing state prosecutions.
556 Award of process and execution are no longer essential to the concept of ju-
dicial power. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
557 Chafin v. Chafin, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–1347, slip op. (2013) (appeal of dis-
trict court order returning custody of a child to her mother in Scotland not made
moot by physical return of child to Scotland and subsequent ruling of Scottish court
in favor of the mother continuing to have custody).
Cases may become moot because of a change in the law,558 or

in the status of the parties,559 or because of some act of one of the
parties which dissolves the controversy.560 But the Court has devel-
oped several exceptions. Thus, in criminal cases, although the sen-
tence of the convicted appellant has been served, the case “is moot
only if it is shown that there is no possibility that any collateral
legal consequences will be imposed on the basis of the challenged
conviction.” 561 The “mere possibility” of such a consequence, even a
“remote” one, is enough to find that one who has served his sen-
tence has retained the requisite personal stake giving his case “an
adversary cast and making it justiciable.” 562 This exception has its
558 E.g., Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518
(1852); United States v. Alaska Steamship Co., 253 U.S. 113 (1920); Hall v. Beals,
396 U.S. 45 (1969); Sanks v. Georgia, 401 U.S. 144 (1971); Richardson v. Wright,
405 U.S. 208 (1972); Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404 U.S. 412 (1972);
Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 481 (1990). But compare Decker v. North-
west Environmental Defense Center, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–338, slip op. (2013) (ac-
tion to enforce penalty under former regulation not mooted by change in regulation
where violation occurred before regulation was changed). See also City of Mesquite
v. Aladdin’s Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288–289 (1982) (case not mooted by repeal of
ordinance, since City made clear its intention to reenact it if free from lower court
judgment). Following Aladdin’s Castle, the Court in Northeastern Fla. Ch. of the
Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 660–63 (1993),
held that when a municipal ordinance is repealed but replaced by one sufficiently
similar so that the challenged action in effect continues, the case is not moot. But
see id. at 669 (Justice O’Connor dissenting) (modification of ordinance more signifi-
cant and case is mooted).
559 Atherton Mills v. Johnston, 259 U.S. 13 (1922) (in challenge to laws regulat-
ing labor of youths 14 to 16, Court held case two-and-one-half years after argument
and dismissed as moot since certainly none of the challengers was now in the age
bracket); Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S.
312 (1974); Dove v. United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976); Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S.
624 (1982). Compare County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), with Vitek
v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480 (1980). In Arizonans For Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S.
43 (1997), a state employee attacking an English-only work requirement had stand-
ing at the time she brought the suit, but she resigned following a decision in the
trial court, thus mooting the case before it was taken to the appellate court, which
should not have acted to hear and decide it.
560 E.g., Commercial Cable Co. v. Burleson, 250 U.S. 360 (1919); Oil Workers
Local 8–6 v. Missouri, 361 U.S. 363 (1960); A.L. Mechling Barge Lines v. United
States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961); Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395 (1975); County of Los
Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); Alvarez v. Smith, 558 U.S. ___, No. 08–351
(2009).
561 Sibron v. New York, 395 U.S. 40, 50–58 (1968). But compare Spencer v. Kemna,
523 U.S. 1 (1998).

562 Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 790–791 (1969). The cases have pro-
gressed from leaning toward mootness to leaning strongly against. E.g., St. Pierre v.
United States, 319 U.S. 41 (1943); Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211 (1946);
United States v. Morgan, 346 U.S. 502 (1954); Pollard v. United States, 352 U.S.
354 (1957); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 633–634 n.2 (1968); Sibron v. New
York, 392 U.S. 40, 49–58 (1968). But see Lane v. Williams, 455 U.S. 624 (1982);United
States v. Juvenile Male, 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–940, slip op. at 6 (2011) (per curiam)
(rejecting as too indirect a benefit that favorable resolution of a case might serve as
beneficial precedent for a future case involving the plaintiff). The exception permits
counterpart in civil litigation in which a lower court judgment may

still have certain present or future adverse effects on the challeng-
ing party.563
A second exception, the “voluntary cessation” doctrine, focuses
on the likelihood of discontinued conduct recurring or a superseded
statute being renewed.564 Cessation of a challenged activity by vol-
untary choice, especially of an activity the actor claims was proper,
will moot a case only if it can be said with assurance “that ‘there is
no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be repeated.’ ” 565 A
person asserting mootness through voluntary cessation bears the
“formidable burden” of showing with absolute clarity that there is
no reasonable prospect of renewed activity.566 Otherwise, “[t]he de-
fendant is free to return to his old ways” and this fact would be
enough to prevent mootness because of the “public interest in hav-
ing the legality of the practices settled.” 567
Still a third exception concerns the ability to challenge short-
term conduct which may recur in the future, which has been de-
nominated as disputes “capable of repetition, yet evading re-
view.” 568 Thus, in cases in which (1) the challenged action is too
short in its duration to be fully litigated prior to its cessation or
expiration, and (2) there is a reasonable expectation that the same
review at the instance of the prosecution as well as defendant. Pennsylvania v. Mimms,
434 U.S. 106 (1977). When a convicted defendant dies while his case is on direct
review, the Court’s present practice is to dismiss the petition for certiorari. Dove v.
United States, 423 U.S. 325 (1976), overruling Durham v. United States, 401 U.S.
481 (1971).
563 Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 433, 452 (1911); Carroll v.
President & Commr’s of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). See Super Tire Engi-
neering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115 (1974) (holding that expiration of strike did
not moot employer challenge to state regulations entitling strikers to state welfare
assistance since the consequences of the regulations would continue).
564 United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. 290 (1897); Walling
v. Helmerich & Payne, 323 U.S. 37 (1944); Porter v. Lee, 328 U.S. 246 (1946); United
States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629 (1953); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963);
United States v. Concentrated Phosphate Export Ass’n, 393 U.S. 199, 202–04 (1969);
DeFunis v. Odegaard, 416 U.S. 312, 318 (1974); County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440
U.S. 625, 631–34 (1979), and id. at 641–46 (Justice Powell dissenting); Vitek v. Jones,
445 U.S. 480, 486–487 (1980), and id. at 500–01 (Justice Stewart dissenting); Princ-
eton University v. Schmidt, 455 U.S. 100 (1982); City of Mesquite v. Aladdin’s Castle,
Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 288–289 (1982).
565 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953) (quoting United
States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 148 F.2d 416, 448 (2d. Cir. 1945)).
566 Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–982, slip op. at 4 (2013)
(trademark holder seeking to moot invalidation claim against it: assessing the effect
of the holder’s dismissal of its trademark infringement claim against rival and sub-
mittal of a covenant not to sue), citing Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs.,
528 U.S. 167, 190 (2000)
567 United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 632 (1953). But see A.L. Mechling
Barge Lines v. United States, 368 U.S. 324 (1961).

568 Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515 (1911).
complaining party would be subjected to the same action again, moot-

ness will not be found when the complained-of conduct ends.569 The
imposition of short sentences in criminal cases,570 the issuance of
injunctions to expire in a brief period,571 and the short-term fac-
tual context of certain events, such as elections 572 or pregnan-
cies,573 are all instances in which this exception is frequently in-
voked.
An interesting and potentially significant liberalization of the
law of mootness, perhaps as part of a continuing circumstances ex-
ception, began in the 1970s in the context of class action litigation.
It was established that, when the controversy becomes moot as to
the plaintiff in a certified class action, it still remains alive for the
class he represents so long as an adversary relationship sufficient
to constitute a live controversy between the class members and the
other party exists.574 The Court was more closely divided in a 1980
case, United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, in which a denial
to certify a class was on appeal when the personal claim of the named
plaitiff became moot. The Court held that in the class action set-
ting there are two aspects of the Article III mootness question, the
existence of a live controversy and the existence of a “personal stake”
in the outcome for the named class representative.575 Finding a live
controversy remained for at least some class members, the Court
determined that the named plaintiff retained a distinct interest in
representing the class sufficient to satisfy the “imperatives of a dis-
569 Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147, 149 (1975); Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S.
478, 482 (1982). See Super Tire Engineering Co. v. McCorkle, 416 U.S. 115, 125–26
(1974), and id. at 130–32 (Justice Stewart dissenting), Friends of the Earth v. Laidlaw
Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 189–91 (2000),. The degree of expectation or likelihood
that the issue will recur has frequently divided the Court. Compare Murphy v. Hunt,
with Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976); compare Honig v. Doe,
484 U.S. 305, 318–23 (1988), with id. at 332 (Justice Scalia dissenting).
570 Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 49–58 (1968). See Gerstein v. Pugh, 420
U.S. 103 (1975).

571 Carroll v. President & Commr’s of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968). See
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (short-term court order restrict-
ing press coverage).
572 E.g., Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814, 816 (1969); Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410
U.S. 752, 756 n.5 (1973); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 737 n.8 (1974). Compare
Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651 (1895); Ray v. Blair, 343 U.S. 154 (1952).
573 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 124–125 (1973).
574 Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975); Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 424 U.S.
747, 752–757 (1976). A suit which proceeds as a class action but without formal cer-
tification may not receive the benefits of this rule. Board of School Commr’s v. Ja-
cobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1975). See also Weinstein v. Bradford, 423 U.S. 147 (1975); Pasa-
dena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler, 427 U.S. 424, 430 (1976). But see the characterization
of these cases in United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 400 n.7
(1980). Mootness is not necessarily avoided in properly certified cases, but the stan-
dards of determination are unclear. See Kremens v. Bartley, 431 U.S. 119 (1977).
575 United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 396 (1980).
pute capable of judicial resolution”; that is, his continuing interest

adequately assures that “sharply presented issues” are placed be-
fore the court “in a concrete factual setting” with “self-interested
parties vigorously advocating opposing positions.” 576
The immediate effect of these cases was that litigation in which
class actions are properly certified or in which they should have
been certified would rarely be mooted if the named plaintiff (or in
effect his attorney) chose to pursue the matter, even though the named
plaintiff could no longer obtain any personal relief from the deci-
sion sought.577 The cases further raised the prospect of a possible
weakening of the “personal stake” requirement in other areas, such
as the representation of third-party claims in non-class actions and
the initiation of some litigation in the form of a “private attorneys
general” pursuit of adjudication.578 In Genesis Healthcare Corp. v.
Symczyk,579 however, the Court appeared to cabin a more flexible
concept of mootness to class actions. 580
Retroactivity Versus Prospectivity.—One of the distinguish-
ing features of an advisory opinion is that it lays down a rule to be
applied to future cases, much as does legislation generally. It should
therefore follow that an Article III court could not decide purely pro-
spective cases, cases which do not govern the rights and disabili-
576 445 U.S. at 403. Justices Powell, Stewart, Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger
dissented, id. at 409, arguing there could be no Article III personal stake in a proce-
dural decision separate from the outcome of the case. In Deposit Guaranty Nat’l
Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326 (1980), in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, the Court
held that a class action was not mooted when defendant tendered to the named plain-
tiffs the full amount of recovery they had individually asked for and could hope to
retain. Plaintiffs’ interest in shifting part of the share of costs of litigation to those
who would share in its benefits if the class were certified was deemed to be a suffi-
cient, continuing “personal stake,” although the value of this interest was at best
speculative. Compare Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. ___, No. 11–
1059, slip op. (2013).
577 The named plaintiff must still satisfy the class action requirement of ad-
equacy of representation. United States Parole Comm’n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388,
405–407 (1980). On the implications of Geraghty, which the Court has not returned
to, see Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 194–198.
578 Geraghty, 445 U.S. at 404 & n.11; see also 445 U.S. at 419–24 (Justice Pow-
ell dissenting).
579 569 U.S. ___, No. 11–1059, slip op. (2013).
580 In Genesis Healthcare Corp., the plaintiff sought damages under a provision
of the Fair Labor Standards Act that authorized her to file on behalf of herself and
“other employees similarly situated.” The plaintiff ’s individual claim was assumed
to have been made moot by the defendant’s subsequent offer of a full settlement to
her, with the consequence, according to the five-Justice majority, that plaintiff’s collective-
action allegations no longer were justiciable in the absence of additional claimants
opting in. Unlike a class in a class action, the catch-all of “other employees simi-
larly situated” has no independent legal status under a collective-action suit apart
from those filing written consent with the court.
ties of the parties to the cases.581 The Court asserted that this prin-
ciple is true, while applying it only to give retroactive effect to the
parties to the immediate case.582 Yet, occasionally, the Court did not
apply its holding to the parties before it,583 and in a series of cases
beginning in the mid-1960s it became embroiled in attempts to limit
the retroactive effect of its—primarily but not exclusively 584—
constitutional-criminal law decisions. The results have been confus-
ing and unpredictable.585
Prior to 1965, “both the common law and our own decisions rec-
ognized a general rule of retrospective effect for the constitutional
decisions of this Court . . . subject to [certain] limited excep-
tions.” 586 Statutory and judge-made law have consequences, at least
to the extent that people must rely on them in making decisions
and shaping their conduct. Therefore, the Court was moved to rec-
ognize that there should be a reconciling of constitutional interests
reflected in a new rule of law with reliance interests founded upon
the old.587 In both criminal and civil cases, however, the Court’s dis-
cretion to do so has been constrained by later decisions.
In the 1960s, when the Court began its expansion of the Bill of
Rights and applied its rulings to the states, it became necessary to
determine the application of the rulings to criminal defendants who
had exhausted all direct appeals but who could still resort to ha-
beas corpus, to those who had been convicted but still were on di-
rect appeal, and to those who had allegedly engaged in conduct but
581 For a masterful discussion of the issue in both criminal and civil contexts,
see Fallon & Meltzer, New Law, Non-Retroactivity, and Constitutional Remedies, 104
HARV. L. REV. 1731 (1991).
582 Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 301 (1967).
583 England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 422 (1964);
James v. United States, 366 U.S. 213 (1961). See also Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 490 (1972).
584 Noncriminal constitutional cases included Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192
(1973); City of Phoenix v. Kolodziejski, 399 U.S. 204 (1970); Cipriano v. City of Houma,
395 U.S. 701 (1969). Indeed, in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976), and Northern
Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50 (1982), the Court post-
poned the effectiveness of its decision for a period during which Congress could re-
pair the flaws in the statute. Noncriminal, nonconstitutional cases include Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Allen v. State Board of Elections, 393 U.S. 544
(1969); Hanover Shoe v. United Shoe Machinery Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968); Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
585 Because of shifting coalitions of Justices, Justice Harlan complained, the course
of retroactivity decisions “became almost as difficult to follow as the tracks made by

a beast of prey in search of its intended victim.” Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S.
667, 676 (1971) (separate opinion).
586 Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 507 (1973). The older rule of retroactivity
derived from the Blackstonian notion “that the duty of the court was not to ‘pro-
nounce a new law, but to maintain and expound the old one.’ ” Linkletter v. Walker,
381 U.S. 618, 622–23 (1965) (quoting 1 W. Blackstone, Commentaries *69).
587 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411 U.S. 192, 198–99 (1973).
who had not gone to trial. At first, the Court drew the line at cases
in which judgments of conviction were not yet final, so that all per-
sons in those situations obtained retrospective use of decisions,588
but the Court later promulgated standards for a balancing process
that resulted in different degrees of retroactivity in different cases.589
Generally, in cases in which the Court declared a rule that was “a
clear break with the past,” it denied retroactivity to all defendants,
with the sometime exception of the appellant himself.590 With re-
spect to certain cases in which a new rule was intended to over-
come an impairment of the truth-finding function of a criminal trial 591
or to cases in which the Court found that a constitutional doctrine
barred the conviction or punishment of someone,592 full retroactiv-
ity, even to habeas claimants, was the rule. Justice Harlan strongly
argued that the Court should sweep away its confusing balancing
rules and hold that all defendants whose cases are still pending on
direct appeal at the time of a law-changing decision should be en-
titled to invoke the new rule, but that no habeas claimant should
be entitled to benefit.593
The Court later drew a sharp distinction between criminal cases
pending on direct review and cases pending on collateral review.
For cases on direct review, “a new rule for the conduct of criminal
prosecutions is to be applied retroactively to all cases, state or fed-
eral, pending on direct review or not yet final, with no exception
for cases in which the new rule constitutes a ‘clear break’ with the
past.” 594 Justice Harlan’s habeas approach was first adopted by a
plurality in Teague v. Lane 595 and then by the Court in Penry v.
588 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965); Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott,
382 U.S. 406 (1966).

589 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967); Adams v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 278 (1972).

590 Desist v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 248 (1969); United States v. Peltier,
422 U.S. 531 (1975); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 335–36 (1980) (plurality opin-
ion); Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 55 (1973); United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S.
537, 549–50, 551–52 (1982).
591 Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646, 653 (1971) (plurality opinion); Brown
v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 328–30 (1980) (plurality opinion); Hankerson v. North
Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 243 (1977).
592 United States v. United States Coin & Currency, 401 U.S. 715, 724 (1971);
Moore v. Illinois, 408 U.S. 786, 800 (1972); Robinson v. Neil, 409 U.S. 505, 509 (1973).
593 Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 675 (1971) (separate opinion); Desist
v. United States, 394 U.S. 244, 256 (1969) (dissenting). Justice Powell has also strongly
supported the proposed rule. Hankerson v. North Carolina, 432 U.S. 233, 246–248
(1977) (concurring in judgment); Brown v. Louisiana, 447 U.S. 323, 337 (1980) (con-
curring in judgment).
594 Griffith v. Kentucky, 479 U.S. 314, 328 (1987) (cited with approval in Whorton
v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007)).

595 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
Lynaugh.596 Thus, for collateral review in federal courts of state court

criminal convictions, the general rule is that “new rules” of consti-
tutional interpretation—those “not ‘dictated by precedent existing
at the time the defendant’s conviction became final’ ” 597—will not
be applied.598 “A new rule applies retroactively in a collateral pro-
ceeding only if (1) the rule is substantive or (2) the rule is a ‘water-
shed rul[e] of criminal procedure’ implicating the fundamental fair-
ness and accuracy of the criminal proceeding.” 599
What the rule is to be, and indeed if there is to be a rule, in
civil cases has been disputed to a rough draw in recent cases. As
was noted above, there is a line of civil cases, constitutional and
nonconstitutional, in which the Court has declined to apply new rules,
the result often of overruling older cases, retrospectively, some-
times even to the prevailing party in the case.600 As in criminal cases,
596 492 U.S. 302 (1989).

597 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). Put another way, it is not
enough that a decision is “within the ‘logical compass’ of an earlier decision, or in-
deed that it is ‘controlled’ by a prior decision.” A decision announces a “new rule” if
its result “was susceptible to debate among reasonable minds” and if it was not “an
illogical or even a grudging application” of the prior decision. Butler v. McKellar,
494 U.S. 407, 412–415 (1990). For additional elaboration on “new law,” see O’Dell v.
Netherland, 521 U.S. 151 (1997); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997); Gray
v. Netherland, 518 U.S. 152 (1996). But compare Bousley v. Brooks, 523 U.S. 614
(1998).
598 The approach in state collateral review proceedings, however, may be differ-
ent. The Court has indicated that the general rule regarding denial of retroactive
application of “new rules” in federal collateral proceeding was principally based on
an interpretation of federal statutory law. State collateral review of cases brought
under state law may be more generous to the defendant. Danforth v. Minnesota,
552 U.S. 264 (2008).
For an example of the application of the Teague rule in federal collateral review
of a federal court conviction, see Chaidez v. United States, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–
820, slip op. (2013).
599 Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007). Put another way, a new rule
will be applied in a collateral proceeding only if it places certain kinds of conduct

“beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to prescribe” or constitutes
a “new procedure[ ] without which the likelihood of an accurate conviction is seri-
ously diminished.” Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 307, 311–313 (1989) (plurality opin-
ion); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 415–416 (1990). Under the second exception
it is “not enough under Teague to say that a new rule is aimed at improving the
accuracy of a trial. More is required. A rule that qualifies under this exception must
not only improve accuracy, but also ‘alter our understanding of the bedrock proce-
dural elements’ essential to the fairness of a proceeding.” Sawyer v. Smith, 497 U.S.
227, 242 (1990) (emphasis in original, internal quotation marks omitted). For recent
application of the principles, see Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004) (require-
ment that aggravating factors justifying death penalty be found by the jury was a
new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively).
600 The standard that has been applied was enunciated in Chevron Oil Co. v.
Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971). Briefly, the question of retroactivity or prospectivity was
to be determined by a balancing of the equities. To be limited to prospectivity, a
decision must have established a new principle of law, either by overruling clear
past precedent on which reliance has been had or by deciding an issue of first im-
the creation of new law, through overrulings or otherwise, may re-

sult in retroactivity in all instances, in pure prospectivity, or in par-
tial prospectivity in which the prevailing party obtains the results
of the new rule but no one else does. In two cases raising the ques-
tion when states are required to refund taxes collected under a stat-
ute that is subsequently ruled unconstitutional, the Court revealed
itself to be deeply divided.601 The question in Beam was whether
the company could claim a tax refund under an earlier ruling hold-
ing unconstitutional the imposition of certain taxes upon its prod-
ucts. The holding of a fractionated Court was that it could seek a
refund, because in the earlier ruling the Court had applied the hold-
ing to the contesting company, and, once a new rule has been ap-
plied retroactively to the litigants in a civil case, considerations of
equality and stare decisis compel application to all.602 Although par-
tial or selective prospectivity is thus ruled out, neither pure retro-
activity nor pure prospectivity is either required or forbidden.
Four Justices adhered to the principle that new rules, as de-
fined above, may be applied purely prospectively, without violating
any tenet of Article III or any other constitutional value.603 Three
Justices argued that all prospectivity, whether partial or total, vio-
lates Article III by expanding the jurisdiction of the federal courts
beyond true cases and controversies.604 Apparently, the Court now
has resolved this dispute, although the principal decision was by a
five-to-four vote. In Harper v. Virginia Dep’t of Taxation,605 the Court
adopted the principle of the Griffith decision in criminal cases and
disregarded the Chevron Oil approach in civil cases. Henceforth, in
pression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. The courts must look to
the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retro-
spective operation will further or retard its operation. Then, the courts must look to
see whether a decision to apply retroactively a decision will produce substantial in-
equitable results. Id. at 106–07. American Trucking Assn’s v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167,
179–86 (1990) (plurality opinion).
601 James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991); American Truck-
ing Assn’s, Inc. v. Smith, 496 U.S. 167 (1990).

602 The holding described in the text is expressly that of only a two-Justice plu-
rality. 501 U.S. at 534–44 (Justices Souter and Stevens). Justice White, Justice
Blackmun, and Justice Scalia (with Justice Marshall joining the latter Justices) con-
curred, id. at 544, 547, 548 (respectively), but on other, and in the instance of the
three latter Justices, and broader justifications. Justices O’Connor and Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 549.
603 501 U.S. at 549 (dissenting opinion of Justices O’Connor and Kennedy and
Chief Justice Rehnquist), and id. at 544 (Justice White concurring). See also Smith,
496 U.S. at 171 (plurality opinion of Justices O’Connor, White, Kennedy, and Chief
Justice Rehnquist).
604 501 U.S. at 547, 548 (Justices Blackmun, Scalia, and Marshall concurring).
In Smith, 496 U.S. at 205, these three Justices had joined the dissenting opinion of
Justice Stevens arguing that constitutional decisions must be given retroactive ef-
fect.
605 509 U.S. 86 (1993).
civil cases, the rule is: “When this Court applies a rule of federal
law to the parties before it, that rule is the controlling interpreta-
tion of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect in all
cases open on direct review and as to all events, regardless of whether
such events predate or postdate our announcement of the rule.” 606
Four Justices continued to adhere to Chevron Oil, however,607 so
that with one Justice each retired from the different sides one may
not regard the issue as definitively settled.608 Future cases must,
therefore, be awaited for resolution of this issue.
Political Questions
In some cases, a court will refuse to adjudicate a case despite
the fact that it presents all the qualifications that we have consid-
ered to make it a justiciable controversy; it is in its jurisdiction,
presented by parties with standing, and it is a case in which ad-
verseness and ripeness exist. Such are cases that present a “politi-
cal question.” Although the Court has referred to the political ques-
tion doctrine as “one of the rules basic to the federal system and
this Court’s appropriate place within that structure,” 609 it has also
been remarked that “[i]t is, measured by any of the normal respon-
sibilities of a phrase of definition, one of the least satisfactory terms
606 509 U.S. at 97. Although the conditional language in this passage might sug-
gest that the Court was leaving open the possibility that in some cases it might
rule purely prospectively, and not even apply its decision to the parties before it,
other language belies that possibility. “This rule extends Griffith’s ban against ‘selec-
tive application of new rules.’ ” (Citing Griffith, 479 U.S. at 323.) Because Griffith
rested in part on the principle that “the nature of judicial review requires that [the
Court] adjudicate specific cases,” 479 U.S. at 322, deriving from Article III’s case or
controversy requirement for federal courts and forbidding federal courts from acting
legislatively, “ ‘the Court has no more constitutional authority in civil cases than in
criminal cases to disregard current law or to treat similarly situated litigants differ-
ently.’ ” 509 U.S. at 97 (quoting Smith, 496 U.S. at 214 (Justice Stevens dissent-
ing)). The point is made more clearly in Justice Scalia’s concurrence, in which he
denounces all forms of nonretroactivity as “the handmaid of judicial activism.” Id.
at 105.
607 509 U.S. at 110 (Justice Kennedy, with Justice White, concurring); 113 (Jus-
tice O’Connor, with Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting). However, these Justices dis-
agreed in this case about the proper application of Chevron Oil.
608 But see Reynoldsville Casket Co. v. Hyde, 514 U.S. 749 (1995) (setting aside
a state court refusal to give retroactive effect to a U.S. Supreme Court invalidation
of that state’s statute of limitations in certain suits, in an opinion by Justice Breyer,
Justice Blackmun’s successor); Ryder v. United States, 515 U.S. 177, 184–85 (1995)
(“whatever the continuing validity of Chevron Oil after” Harper and Reynoldsville
Casket).
609 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 570 (1947); cf. Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 278 (1962) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting). The most successful ef-
fort at conceptualization of the doctrine is Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Politi-
cal Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YALE L.J. 517 (1966). See Hart & Wechsler
(6th ed.), supra at 222–248.
known to the law. The origin, scope, and purpose of the concept have
eluded all attempts at precise statements.” 610
It has been suggested that it may be more useful to itemize the
categories of questions that have been labeled political rather than
to attempt to isolate the factors that a court will consider to iden-
tify such cases.611 The Court has to some extent agreed, noting that
the criteria applied by the Court in political questions cases can
vary depending on the issue involved.612 Regardless of which ap-
proach is taken, however, the Court’s narrowing of the rationale for
political questions in Baker v. Carr,613 discussed below, appears to
have changed the nature of the inquiry radically.
Origins and Development.—In the first decade after ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, the Court in Ware v. Hylton 614 refused to
pass on the question whether a treaty had been broken, and in Mar-
tin v. Mott,615 the Court held that the President acting under con-
gressional authorization had exclusive and unreviewable power to
determine when the militia should be called out. But the roots of
the doctrine are most clearly seen in Marbury v. Madison,616 where
Chief Justice Marshall stated: “The province of the court is, solely,
to decide on the rights of individuals, not to inquire how the execu-
tive, or executive officers, perform duties in which they have a dis-
cretion. Questions in their nature political, or which are, by the con-
stitution and laws, submitted to the executive can never be made
in this court.” 617
In Luther v. Borden,618 however, the Court made clear that the
doctrine went beyond considerations of interference with executive
functions. This case, arising from the Dorr Rebellion (a period of
610 Frank, Political Questions, in SUPREME COURT AND SUPREME LAW (E. Cahn, ed.,
1954), at 36.
611 The concept of political question is “more amenable to description by infinite
itemization than by generalization” Id.

612 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
613 369 U.S. at 208–232.
614 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
615 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827).
616 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
617 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) at 170. In Decatur v. Paulding, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 497, 516 (1840),
the Court, refusing an effort by mandamus to compel the Secretary of the Navy to
pay a pension, said: “The interference of the courts with the performance of the or-
dinary duties of the executive departments of the government, would be productive
of nothing but mischief; and we are quite satisfied, that such a power was never
intended to be given to them.” It therefore follows that mandamus will lie against
an executive official only to compel the performance of a ministerial duty, which ad-
mits of no discretion, and may not be invoked to control executive or political duties
which admit of discretion. See Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); Mis-
sissippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1867); Kendall v. United States ex rel.
Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
618 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
political unrest in Rhode Island), considered the claims of two com-

peting factions vying to be declared the lawful government of Rhode
Island.619 Chief Justice Taney, for the Court, began by saying that
the answer was primarily a matter of state law that had been de-
cided in favor of one faction by the state courts.620 Insofar as the
Federal Constitution had anything to say on the subject, the Chief
Justice continued, that was embodied in the clause empowering the
United States to guarantee to every state a republican form of gov-
ernment,621 and this clause committed the determination of that is-
sue to Congress.
“Under this article of the Constitution it rests with Congress to
decide what government is the established one in a State. For as
the United States guarantee to each State a republican govern-
ment, Congress must necessarily decide what government is estab-
lished in the State before it can determine whether it is republican
or not. And when the senators and representatives of a State are
admitted into the councils of the Union, the authority of the govern-
ment under which they are appointed, as well as its republican char-
acter, is recognized by the proper constitutional authority. And its
decision is binding on every other department of the government,
and could not be questioned in a judicial tribunal.” 622 Here, the con-
test had not proceeded to a point where Congress had made a deci-
sion, “[y]et the right to decide is placed there, and not in the courts.” 623
Moreover, in effectuating the provision in the same clause that
the United States should protect states against domestic violence,
Congress had vested discretion in the President to use troops to pro-
tect a state government upon the application of the legislature or
the governor. Before he could act upon the application of a legisla-
ture or a governor, the President “must determine what body of men
constitute the legislature, and who is the governor . . . .” No court
could review the President’s exercise of discretion in this respect;
no court could recognize as legitimate a group vying against the
group recognized by the President as the lawful government.624 Al-
though the President had not actually called out the militia in Rhode
Island, he had pledged support to one of the competing govern-
ments, and this pledge of military assistance if it were needed had
619 Cf. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 218–22 (1962); id. at 292–97 (Justice Frank-
furter dissenting).
620 Luther, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 40.
621 48 U.S. at 42 (citing Article IV, § 4).
622 48 U.S. at 42.
623 Id.
624 48 U.S. at 43.
in fact led to the capitulation of the other faction, thus making an

effectual and authoritative determination not reviewable by the
Court.625
The Doctrine Before Baker v. Carr.—Over the years, the po-
litical question doctrine has been applied to preclude adjudication
of a variety of other issues. In particular, prior to Baker v. Carr,626
cases challenging the distribution of political power through appor-
tionment and districting,627 weighted voting,628 and restrictions on
political action 629 were held to present nonjusticiable political ques-
tions. Certain factors appear more or less consistently through most
of the cases decided before Baker, and it is perhaps best to indicate
the cases and issues deemed political before attempting to isolate
these factors.
1. Republican Form of Government. By far the most consistent
application of the doctrine has been in cases in which litigants as-
serted claims under the republican form of government clause.630
The attacks were generally either on the government of the state
itself 631 or involved a challenge regarding the manner in which it
had acted.632 There have, however, been cases involving this clause
in which the Court has reached the merits.633
2. Recognition of Foreign States. Although there is language in
the cases that would, if applied, serve to make all cases touching
625 48 U.S. at 44.
626 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
627 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804
(1947).
628 South v. Peters, 339 U.S. 276 (1950) (county unit system for election of state-
wide officers with vote heavily weighted in favor of rural, lightly populated coun-
ties).
629 MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281 (1948) (signatures on nominating peti-
tions must be spread among counties of unequal population).

630 Article IV, § 4.
631 As it was on the established government of Rhode Island in Luther v. Borden,
48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849). See also Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1869);
Taylor v. Beckham, 178 U.S. 548 (1900).
632 Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912) (challenging tax initia-
tive); Kiernan v. City of Portland, 223 U.S. 151 (1912) (attacks on initiative and
referendum); Marshall v. Dye, 231 U.S. 250 (1913) (state constitutional amendment
procedure); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915) (delegation to court to form drain-
age districts); Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U.S. 565 (1916) (submission of
legislation to referendum); Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U.S. 219 (1917)
(workmen’s compensation); Ohio ex rel. Bryant v. Akron Metropolitan Park District,
281 U.S. 74 (1930) (concurrence of all but one justice of state high court required to
invalidate statute); Highland Farms Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937) (delega-
tion of legislative powers).
633 All the cases, however, predate the application of the doctrine in Pacific States
Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912). See Attorney General of the State of Michi-
gan ex rel. Kies v. Lowrey, 199 U.S. 233, 239 (1905) (legislative creation and altera-
tion of school districts “compatible” with a republican form of government); Forsyth
v. City of Hammond, 166 U.S. 506, 519 (1897) (delegation of power to court to deter-
on foreign affairs and foreign policy political questions,634 whether

the courts can adjudicate a dispute in this area has often depended
on the context in which it arises. Thus, the determination by the
President whether to recognize the government of a foreign state 635
or who is the de jure or de facto ruler of a foreign state 636 is conclu-
sive on the courts. In the absence of a definitive executive action,
however, the courts will review the record to determine whether the
United States has accorded a sufficient degree of recognition to al-
low the courts to take judicial notice of the existence of the state.637
Moreover, the courts have often determined for themselves what ef-
fect, if any, should be accorded the acts of foreign powers, recog-
nized or unrecognized.638
3. Treaties. Similarly, the Court, when dealing with treaties and
the treaty power, has treated as political questions whether the for-
eign party had constitutional authority to assume a particular obli-
gation 639 and whether a treaty has lapsed because of the foreign
state’s loss of independence 640 or because of changes in the territo-
rial sovereignty of the foreign state.641 On the other hand, the Court
will not only interpret the domestic effects of treaties,642 but it will
at times interpret the effects bearing on international matters.643
The Court has generally deferred to the President and Congress with
mine municipal boundaries does not infringe republican form of government); Minor
v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 175–176 (1875) (denial of suffrage to women
no violation of republican form of government).
634 Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302 (1918); Chicago & S. Air
Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948).

635 United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 610 (1818); Kennett v. Cham-
bers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852).

636 Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co.,
246 U.S. 297 (1918). See Ex parte Hitz, 111 U.S. 766 (1884).
637 United States v. The Three Friends, 166 U.S. 1 (1897); In re Baiz, 135 U.S.
403 (1890). Cf. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
638 United States v. Reynes, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 127 (1850); Garcia v. Lee, 37 U.S.
(12 Pet.) 511 (1838); Keene v. McDonough, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 308 (1834). See also Wil-
liams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250 (1897). But see United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324 (1937). On the “act
of state” doctrine, compare Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964),
with First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). See
also First National City Bank v. Banco Para el Comercio de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611
(1983); W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Environmental Tectronics Corp., U.S. 400 (1990).
639 Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635 (1853).
640 Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Clark v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947).
641 Kennett v. Chambers, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 38 (1852). On the effect of a viola-
tion by a foreign state on the continuing effectiveness of the treaty, see Ware v. Hylton,
3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796); Charlton v. Kelly, 229 U.S. 447 (1913).
642 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796). Cf. Chinese Exclusion Case (Chae
Chan Ping v. United States), 130 U.S. 581 (1889) (conflict of treaty with federal law).
On the modern formulation, see Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society,
478 U.S. 221, 229–230 (1986).
643 Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325 (1939); United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407
(1886).
regard to the existence of a state of war and the dates of the begin-
ning and ending and of states of belligerency between foreign pow-
ers, but the deference has sometimes been forced.644
4. Enactment or Ratification of Laws. Ordinarily, the Court will
not look behind the fact of certification as to whether the stan-
dards requisite for the enactment of legislation 645 or ratification of
a constitutional amendment 646 have in fact been met, although it
will interpret the Constitution to determine what the basic stan-
dards are.647 Further, the Court will decide certain questions if the
political branches are in disagreement.648
From this limited review of the principal areas in which the
political question doctrine seemed most established, it is possible
to extract some factors that seemingly convinced the courts that the
issues presented went beyond the judicial responsibility. These fac-
tors, stated baldly, would appear to be the lack of requisite informa-
tion and the difficulty of obtaining it,649 the necessity for unifor-
mity of decision and deference to the wider responsibilities of the
political departments,650 and the lack of adequate standards to re-
solve a dispute.651 But present in all the political cases was (and
644 Commercial Trust Co v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51 (1923); Woods v. Cloyd W. Miller
Co., 333 U.S. 138 (1948); Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543 (1924); Ludecke
v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948); Lee v. Madigan, 358 U.S. 228 (1959); The Divina
Pastora, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 52 (1819). The cases involving the status of Indian tribes
as foreign states usually but not always have presented political questions. The Chero-
kee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S.
28 (1913); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
645 Field v. Clark, 143 U.S. 649 (1892); Harwood v. Wentworth, 162 U.S. 547
(1896); cf. Gardner v. The Collector, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 499 (1868). See, for the mod-
ern formulation, United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
646 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939) (Congress’s discretion to determine
what passage of time will cause an amendment to lapse, and effect of previous rejec-
tion by legislature).
647 Missouri Pac. Ry. v. Kansas, 248 U.S. 276 (1919); Rainey v. United States,
232 U.S. 310 (1914); Flint v. Stone Tracy Co., 220 U.S. 107 (1911); Twin City Na-
tional Bank v. Nebeker, 167 U.S. 196 (1897); Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894);
United States v. Ballin, 144 U.S. 1 (1892) (statutes); United States v. Sprague, 282
U.S. 716 (1931); Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922); Dillon v. Gloss, 256 U.S. 368
(1921); Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221 (1920); National Prohibition Cases,
253 U.S. 350 (1920); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798) (constitu-
tional amendments).
648 Pocket Veto Case, 279 U.S. 655 (1929); Wright v. United States, 302 U.S. 583
(1938).
649 See, e.g., Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103,
111 (1948); Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453, (1939).

650 See, e.g., Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415, 420 (1839). Simi-
lar considerations underlay the opinion in Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849),
in which Chief Justice Taney wondered how a court decision in favor of one faction
would be received with Congress seating the representatives of the other faction and
the President supporting that faction with military force.
651 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217, 226 (1962) (opinion of the Court); id. at
268, 287, 295 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting)

is) the most important factor: a “prudential” attitude about the ex-
ercise of judicial review, which emphasizes that courts should be
wary of deciding on the merits any issue in which claims of prin-
ciple as to the issue and of expediency as to the power and prestige
of courts are in sharp conflict. The political question doctrine was
(and is) thus a way of avoiding a principled decision damaging to
the Court or an expedient decision damaging to the principle.652
Baker v. Carr.—In Baker v. Carr,653 the Court undertook a ma-
jor reformulation and rationalization of the political question doc-
trine, which has considerably narrowed its application. Following
Baker, the whole of the apportionment-districting-election restric-
tion controversy previously immune to federal-court adjudication was
considered and decided on the merits,654 and the Court’s subse-
quent rejection of the doctrine in other cases disclosed narrowing
in other areas as well.655
According to Justice Brennan, who delivered the opinion of the
Court, “it is the relationship between the judiciary and the coordi-
nate branches of the Federal Government, and not the federal judi-
ciary’s relationship to the States, which gives rise to the ‘political
question.’ ” 656 Thus, the “nonjusticiability of a political question is
primarily a function of the separation of powers.” 657 “Deciding whether
a matter has in any measure been committed by the Constitution
to another branch of government, or whether the action of that branch
exceeds whatever authority has been committed, is itself a delicate
652 For a statement of the “prudential” view, see generally A. BICKEL, THE LEAST
DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS (1962), but see esp. 23–
28, 69–71, 183–198. See also Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 267 (1962) (Justice Frank-
furter dissenting.) The opposing view, which has been called the “classicist” view, is
that courts are duty bound to decide all cases properly before them. Cohens v. Vir-
ginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821). See also H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS,
AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW: SELECTED ESSAYS 11–15 (1961).
653 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
654 Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964);
Hadley v. Junior College District, 397 U.S. 50 (1970) (apportionment and district-
ing, congressional, legislative, and local); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963) (county
unit system weighing statewide elections); Moore v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 814 (1969) (geo-
graphic dispersion of persons signing nominating petitions).
655 See, e.g., Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969). Nonetheless, the doc-
trine continues to be sighted.

656 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 210 (1962). This formulation fails to explain
cases like Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78 (1909), in which the conclusion of the gov-
ernor of a state that insurrection existed or was imminent justifying suspension of
constitutional rights was deemed binding on the Court. Cf. Sterling v. Constantin,
287 U.S. 378 (1932). The political question doctrine was applied in cases challeng-
ing the regularity of enactments of territorial legislatures. Harwood v. Wentworth,
162 U.S. 547 (1896); Lyons v. Woods, 153 U.S. 649 (1894); Clough v. Curtis, 134
U.S. 361 (1890). See also In re Sawyer, 124 U.S. 200 (1888); Walton v. House of
Representatives, 265 U.S. 487 (1924).
657 369 U.S. at 210.
exercise in constitutional interpretation, and is a responsibility of

this Court as ultimate interpreter of the Constitution.” 658 Follow-
ing a discussion of several areas in which the doctrine had been
used, Justice Brennan continued: “It is apparent that several for-
mulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which
the questions arise may describe a political question, although each
has one or more elements which identify it as essentially a func-
tion of the separation of powers.”
The Justice went on to list a variety of factors to be considered,
noting that “[p]rominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitu-
tional commitment of the issue to a coordinate political depart-
ment; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an
initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent reso-
lution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to
a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrass-
ment from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on
one question.” 659
Powell v. McCormack.—Because Baker had apparently re-
stricted the political question doctrine to intrafederal issues, there
was no discussion of the doctrine when the Court held that it had
power to review and overturn a state legislature’s refusal to seat a
member-elect because of his expressed views.660 But in Powell v.
McCormack,661 the Court was confronted with a challenge to the
exclusion of a member-elect by the United States House of Repre-
sentatives. Its determination that the political question doctrine did
658 369 U.S. at 211.

659 369 U.S. at 217. It remains unclear after Baker whether the political ques-
tion doctrine is applicable solely to intrafederal issues or only primarily, so that the
existence of one or more of these factors in a case involving, say, a state, might still
give rise to nonjusticiability. At one point, id. at 210, Justice Brennan says that
nonjusticiability of a political question is “primarily” a function of separation of pow-
ers but in the immediately preceding paragraph he states that “it is” the intrafederal
aspect “and not the federal judiciary’s relationship to the States” that raises politi-
cal questions. But subsequently, id. at 226, he balances the present case, which in-
volves a state and not a branch of the Federal Government, against each of the fac-
tors listed in the instant quotation and notes that none apply. His discussion of why
Guarantee Clause cases are political presents much the same difficulty, id. at 222–
26, because he joins the conclusion that the clause commits resolution of such is-
sues to Congress with the assertion that the clause contains no “criteria by which a
court could determine which form of government was republican,” id. at 222, a fac-
tor not present when the Equal Protection Clause is relied on. Id. at 226.
660 Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
661 395 U.S. 486 (1969).
not bar its review of the challenge indicates the narrowness of ap-
plication of the doctrine in its present state. Taking Justice Bren-
nan’s formulation in Baker of the factors that go to make up a po-
litical question,662 Chief Justice Warren determined that the only
critical one in this case was whether there was a “textually demon-
strable constitutional commitment” to the House to determine in
its sole discretion the qualifications of members.663
In order to determine whether there was a textual commit-
ment, the Court reviewed the Constitution, the Convention proceed-
ings, and English and United States legislative practice to ascer-
tain what power had been conferred on the House to judge the
qualifications of its members; finding that the Constitution vested
the House with power only to look at the qualifications of age, resi-
dency, and citizenship, the Court thus decided that in passing on
Powell’s conduct and character the House had exceeded the powers
committed to it and thus judicial review was not barred by this fac-
tor of the political question doctrine.664 Although this approach ac-
cords with the “classicist” theory of judicial review,665 it circum-
scribes the political question doctrine severely, inasmuch as all
constitutional questions turn on whether a governmental body has
exceeded its specified powers, a determination the Court tradition-
ally makes, whereas traditionally the doctrine precluded the Court
from inquiring whether the governmental body had exceeded its pow-
ers. In short, the political question consideration may now be one
on the merits rather than a decision not to decide.
Chief Justice Warren disposed of the other factors present in
political question cases in slightly more than a page. Because reso-
lution of the question turned on an interpretation of the Constitu-
tion, a judicial function which must sometimes be exercised “at vari-
ance with the construction given the document by another branch,”
there was no lack of respect shown another branch. Nor, because
the Court is the “ultimate interpreter of the Constitution,” will there
be “multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one ques-
662 Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
663 395 U.S. at 319.
664 395 U.S. at 519–47. The Court noted, however, that even if this conclusion
had not been reached from unambiguous evidence, the result would have followed
from other considerations. Id. at 547–48.
665 See H. Wechsler, supra at 11–12. Professor Wechsler believed that congres-
sional decisions about seating members were immune to review. Id. Chief Justice
Warren noted that “federal courts might still be barred by the political question doc-
trine from reviewing the House’s factual determination that a member did not meet
one of the standing qualifications. This is an issue not presented in this case and
we express no view as to its resolution.” Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 521
n.42 (1969). See also id. at 507 n.27 (reservation on limitations that might exist on
Congress’s power to expel or otherwise punish a sitting member).
tion,” nor, since the Court is merely interpreting the Constitution,

is there an “initial policy determination” not suitable for courts. Fi-
nally, “judicially . . . manageable standards” are present in the text
of the Constitution.666 The effect of Powell was to discard all the
Baker factors inhering in a political question, with the exception of
the textual commitment factor, and that was interpreted in such a
manner as seldom if ever to preclude a judicial decision on the mer-
its.
The Doctrine Reappears.—Despite the apparent narrowing of
the doctrine in Baker and Powell, the Court has not abandoned it.
Reversing a lower federal court ruling subjecting the training and
discipline of National Guard troops to court review and supervi-
sion, the Court held that under Article I, § 8, cl. 16, the organizing,
arming, and disciplining of such troops are committed to Congress
and by congressional enactment to the Executive Branch. “It would
be difficult to think of a clearer example of the type of governmen-
tal action that was intended by the Constitution to be left to the
political branches, directly responsible—as the Judicial Branch is
not—to the elective process. Moreover, it is difficult to conceive of
an area of governmental activity in which the courts have less com-
petence. The complex, subtle, and professional decisions as to the
composition, training, equipping, and control of a military force are
essentially professional military judgments, subject always to civil-
ian control of the Legislative and Executive Branches.” 667
The suggestion of the infirmity of the political question doc-
trine was rejected, since “because this doctrine has been held inap-
plicable to certain carefully delineated situations, it is no reason
for federal courts to assume its demise.” 668 In staying a grant of
remedial relief in another case, the Court strongly suggested that
the actions of political parties in national nominating conventions
may also present issues not meet for judicial resolution.669 A chal-
lenge to the Senate’s interpretation of and exercise of its impeach-
666 395 U.S. at 548–549. With the formulation of Chief Justice Warren, compare
that of then-Judge Burger in the lower court. 395 F.2d 577, 591–96 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
667 Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1, 10 (1973). Similar prudential concerns seem
to underlay, though they did not provide the formal basis for, the decisions in O’Shea
v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974), and Mayor of Philadelphia v. Educational Equality
League, 415 U.S. 605 (1974).
668 413 U.S. at 11. Other considerations of justiciability, however, id. at 10, pre-
clude using the case as square precedent on political questions. Notice that in Scheuer
v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 249 (1974), the Court denied that the Gilligan v. Morgan
holding barred adjudication of damage actions brought against state officials by the
estates of students killed in the course of the conduct that gave rise to both cases.
669 O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1 (1972) (granting stay). The issue was mooted
by the passage of time and was not thereafter considered on the merits by the Court.
Id. at 816 (remanding to dismiss as moot). It was also not before the Court in Cous-
ins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975), but it was alluded to there. See id. at 483 n.4,
ment powers was held to be nonjusticiable; there was a textually

demonstrable commitment of the issue to the Senate, and there was
a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for re-
solving the issue.670
Despite the occasional resort to the doctrine, the Court contin-
ues to reject its application in language that confines its scope. Thus,
when parties challenged the actions of the Secretary of Commerce
in declining to certify, as required by statute, that Japanese whal-
ing practices undermined the effectiveness of international conven-
tions, the Court rejected the Government’s argument that the politi-
cal question doctrine precluded decision on the merits. The Court’s
prime responsibility, it said, is to interpret statutes, treaties, and
executive agreements; the interplay of the statutes and the agree-
ments in this case implicated the foreign relations of the Nation.
“But under the Constitution, one of the Judiciary’s characteristic
roles is to interpret statutes, and we cannot shirk this responsibil-
ity merely because our decision may have significant political over-
tones.” 671
After requesting argument on the issue, the Court held that a
challenge to a statute on the ground that it did not originate in the
House of Representatives as required by the Origination Clause was
justiciable.672 Turning back reliance on the various factors set out
in Baker, in much the same tone as in Powell v. McCormack, the
Court continued to evidence the view that only questions textually
committed to another branch are political questions. Invalidation
of a statute because it did not originate in the right House would
not demonstrate a “lack of respect” for the House that passed the
bill. “[D]isrespect,” in the sense of rejecting Congress’s reading of
the Constitution, “cannot be sufficient to create a political question.
If it were every judicial resolution of a constitutional challenge to a
congressional enactment would be impermissible.” 673 That the House
of Representatives has the power and incentives to protect its pre-
rogatives by not passing a bill violating the Origination Clause did
and id. at 491 (Justice Rehnquist concurring). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S.
996, 1002 (1979) (Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, and Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger
using political question analysis to dismiss a challenge to presidential action). But
see id. at 997, 998 (Justice Powell rejecting analysis for this type of case).
670 Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224 (1993). The Court pronounced its deci-
sion as perfectly consonant with Powell v. McCormack. Id. at 236–38.

671 Japan Whaling Ass’n v. American Cetacean Society, 478 U.S. 221, 230 (1986).
See also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986) (challenge to political gerrymander-
ing is justiciable). But see Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267 (2004) (no workable stan-
dard has been found for measuring burdens on representational rights imposed by
political gerrymandering).
672 United States v. Munoz-Flores, 495 U.S. 385 (1990).
673 495 U.S. at 390 (emphasis in original).
not make this case nonjusticiable. “[T]he fact that one institution
of Government has mechanisms available to guard against incur-
sions into its power by other governmental institutions does not re-
quire that the Judiciary remove itself from the controversy by label-
ing the issue a political question.” 674
The Court also rejected the contention that, because the case
did not involve a matter of individual rights, it ought not be adju-
dicated. Political questions are not restricted to one kind of claim,
but the Court frequently has decided separation-of-power cases brought
by people in their individual capacities. Moreover, the allocation of
powers within a branch, just as the separation of powers among
branches, is designed to safeguard liberty.675 Finally, the Court was
sanguine that it could develop “judicially manageable standards” for
disposing of Origination Clause cases, and, thus, it did not view the
issue as political in that context.676
In Zivotosky v. Clinton,677 the Court declined to find a political
question where a citizen born in Jerusalem sought, pursuant to fed-
eral statute, to have “Israel” listed on his passport as his place of
birth, the Executive Branch having declined to recognize Israeli sov-
ereignly over that city. Justice Roberts, for the Court, failed to even
acknowledge the numerous factors set forth in Justice Brennan’s
Baker opinion save two—whether there is a textually demon-
strable commitment of the issue to another department or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it.678
The Court noted that while the decision as whether or not to recog-
nized Jerusalem as the capital of Israel might be exclusively the
province of the Executive Branch, there is “no exclusive commit-
ment to the Executive of the power to determine the constitutional-
ity of a statute,” 679 such as whether Congress is encroaching on Presi-
dential powers. Similarly, this latter question, while perhaps a difficult
one, is amenable to the type of separation of powers “standards”
used by the Court in other separation of powers cases.
In short, the political question doctrine may not be moribund,
but it does seem applicable to a very narrow class of cases. Signifi-
cantly, the Court made no mention of the doctrine when it resolved
issues arising from Florida’s recount of votes in the closely con-
674 495 U.S. at 393.

675 495 U.S. at 393–95.
676 495 U.S. at 395–96.
677 566 U.S. ___, No. 10–699, slip op. (2010).
678 This left it to Justice Sotomayor and Justice Breyer to raise and address the
other considerations, respectively, in concurrence and dissent.

679 566 U.S. ___, No. 10–699, slip op. at 8.
tested 2000 presidential election,680 despite the fact that the Consti-
tution vests in Congress the authority to count electoral votes, and
further provides for selection of the President by the House of Rep-
resentatives if no candidate receives a majority of electoral votes.681
JUDICIAL REVIEW
The Establishment of Judicial Review

Judicial review is one of the distinctive features of United States
constitutional law. It is no small wonder, then, to find that the power
of the federal courts to test federal and state legislative enact-
ments and other actions by the standards of what the Constitution
grants and withholds is nowhere expressly conveyed. But it is hardly
noteworthy that its legitimacy has been challenged from the first,
and, while now accepted generally, it still has detractors and its
supporters disagree about its doctrinal basis and its application.682
Although it was first asserted in Marbury v. Madison 683 to strike
down an act of Congress as inconsistent with the Constitution, ju-
dicial review did not spring full-blown from the brain of Chief Jus-
tice Marshall. The concept had been long known, having been uti-
lized in a much more limited form by Privy Council review of colonial
legislation and its validity under the colonial charters,684 and there
were several instances known to the Framers of state court invali-
dation of state legislation as inconsistent with state constitu-
tions.685
Practically all of the framers who expressed an opinion on the
issue in the Convention appear to have assumed and welcomed the
680 See Bush v. Palm Beach County Canvassing Bd., 531 U.S. 70 (2000); and
Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).

681 12th Amendment.
682 See the richly detailed summary and citations to authority in G. GUNTHER,
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1–38 (12th ed. 1991); For expositions on the legitimacy of judicial
review, see L. HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958); H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAW:SELECTED ESSAYS 1–15 (1961); A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH:
THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 1–33 (1962); R. BERGER, CONGRESS V. THE SU-
PREME COURT (1969). For an extensive historical attack on judicial review, see 2 W.
CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES chs. 27–29
(1953), with which compare Hart, Book Review, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1456 (1954). A brief
review of the ongoing debate on the subject, in a work that now is a classic attack
on judicial review, is Westin, Introduction: Charles Beard and American Debate over
Judicial Review, 1790–1961, in C. BEARD, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 1–34
(1962 reissue of 1938 ed.), and bibliography at 133–149. While much of the debate
focuses on judicial review of acts of Congress, the similar review of state acts has
occasioned much controversy as well.
683 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803). A state act was held inconsistent with a treaty in
Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).

684 J. Goebel, supra at 60–95.
685 Id. at 96–142.
existence of court review of the constitutionality of legislation,686
686 M. Farrand, supra at 97–98 (Gerry), 109 (King), 2 id. at 28 (Morris and per-
haps Sherman). 73 (Wilson), 75 (Strong, but the remark is ambiguous). 76 (Martin),

78 (Mason), 79 (Gorham, but ambiguous), 80 (Rutledge), 92–93 (Madison), 248
(Pinckney), 299 (Morris), 376 (Williamson), 391 (Wilson), 428 (Rutledge), 430 (Madi-
son), 440 (Madison), 589 (Madison); 3 id. at 220 (Martin). The only expressed oppo-
sition to judicial review came from Mercer with a weak seconding from Dickinson.
“Mr. Mercer . . . disapproved of the Doctrine that the Judges as expositors of the
Constitution should have authority to declare a law void. He thought laws ought to
be well and cautiously made, and then to be uncontroulable.” 2 id. at 298. “Mr. Dickinson
was strongly impressed with the remark of Mr. Mercer as to the power of the Judges
to set aside the law. He thought no such power ought to exist. He was at the same
time at a loss what expedient to substitute.” Id. at 299. Of course, the debates in
the Convention were not available when the state ratifying conventions acted, so
that the delegates could not have known these views about judicial review in order
to have acted knowingly about them. Views, were, however, expressed in the ratify-
ing conventions recognizing judicial review, some of them being uttered by Framers.
2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION (1836). 131 (Samuel Adams, Massachusetts), 196–197 (Ellsworth, Con-
necticut). 348, 362 (Hamilton, New York): 445–446. 478 (Wilson, Pennsylvania), 3
id. at 324–25, 539, 541 (Henry, Virginia), 480 (Mason, Virginia), 532 (Madison, Vir-
ginia), 570 (Randolph, Virginia); 4 id. at 71 (Steele, North Carolina), 156–157 (Davie,
North Carolina). In the Virginia convention, John Marshall observed if Congress “were
to make a law not warranted by any of the powers enumerated, it would be consid-
ered by the judge as an infringement of the Constitution which they are to guard
. . . They would declare it void . . . . To what quarter will you look for protection
from an infringement on the constitution, if you will not give the power to the judi-
ciary? There is no other body that can afford such a protection.” 3 id. at 553–54.
Both Madison and Hamilton similarly asserted the power of judicial review in their
campaign for ratification. THE FEDERALIST (J. Cooke ed. 1961). See Nos. 39 and 44, at
256, 305 (Madison), Nos. 78 and 81, at 524–530, 541–552 (Hamilton). The persons
supporting or at least indicating they thought judicial review existed did not consti-
tute a majority of the Framers, but the absence of controverting statements, with
the exception of the Mercer-Dickinson comments, indicates at least acquiescence if
not agreements by the other Framers.
To be sure, subsequent comments of some of the Framers indicate an understand-
ing contrary to those cited in the convention. See, e.g., Charles Pinckney in 1799:
“On no subject am I more convinced, than that it is an unsafe and dangerous doc-
trine in a republic, ever to suppose that a judge ought to possess the right of ques-
tioning or deciding upon the constitutionality of treaties, laws, or any act of the leg-
islature. It is placing the opinion of an individual, or of two or three, above that of
both branches of Congress, a doctrine which is not warranted by the Constitution,
and will not, I hope, long have many advocates in this country.” STATE TRIALS OF THE
UNITED STATES DURING THE ADMINISTRATIONS OF WASHINGTON AND ADAMS 412 (F. Wharton
ed., 1849).
Madison’s subsequent changes of position are striking. His remarks in the Phila-
delphia Convention, in the Virginia ratifying convention, and in The Federalist, cited
above, all unequivocally favor the existence of judicial review. And in Congress argu-
ing in support of the constitutional amendments providing a bill of rights, he ob-
served: “If they are incorporated into the Constitution, independent tribunals of jus-
tice will consider themselves in a peculiar manner the guardians of those rights;
they will be an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of power in the Leg-
islature or Executive; they will be naturally led to resist every encroachment upon
rights expressly stipulated for in the Constitution by the declaration of rights,” 1
ANNALS OF CONGRESS 457 (1789); 5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 385 (G. Hunt ed., 1904).
Yet, in a private letter in 1788, he wrote: “In the state constitutions and indeed in
the federal one also, no provision is made for the case of a disagreement in expound-
and prior to Marbury the power seems very generally to have been
assumed to exist by the Justices themselves.687 In enacting the Ju-
diciary Act of 1789, Congress explicitly provided for the exercise of
the power,688 and in other debates questions of constitutionality and
of judicial review were prominent.689 Nonetheless, although judi-
cial review is consistent with several provisions of the Constitution
and the argument for its existence may be derived from them, these
provisions do not compel the conclusion that the Framers intended
judicial review nor that it must exist. It was Chief Justice Mar-
ing them; and as the courts are generally the last in making the decision, it results
to them by refusing or not refusing to execute a law, to stamp it with the final char-
acter. This makes the Judiciary Department paramount in fact to the legislature,
which was never intended and can never be proper.” Id. at 294. At the height of the
dispute over the Alien and Sedition Acts, Madison authored a resolution ultimately
passed by the Virginia legislature which, though milder, and more restrained than
one authored by Jefferson and passed by the Kentucky legislature, asserted the power
of the states, though not of one state or of the state legislatures alone, to “inter-
pose” themselves to halt the application of an unconstitutional law. 3 I. BRANT, JAMES
MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800 460–464, 467–471 (1950); Report on
the Resolutions of 1798, 6 Writings of James Madison, op. cit., 341–406. Embar-
rassed by the claim of the nullificationists in later years that his resolution sup-
ported their position, Madison distinguished his and their positions and again as-
serted his belief in judicial review. 6 I. Brant, supra, 481–485, 488–489.
The various statements made and positions taken by the Framers have been
culled and categorized and argued over many times. For a recent compilation review-
ing the previous efforts, see R. Berger, supra, chs. 3–4.
687 Thus, the Justices on circuit refused to administer a pension act on the grounds
of its unconstitutionally, see Hayburn’s Case, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409 (1792), and “Final-
ity of Judgment as an Attribute of Judicial Power,” supra. Chief Justice Jay and
other Justices wrote that the imposition of circuit duty on Justices was unconstitu-
tional, although they never mailed the letter, supra, in Hylton v. United States, 3
U.S. (3 Dall.) 171 (1796), a feigned suit, the constitutionality of a federal law was
argued before the Justices and upheld on the merits, in Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3
Dall.) 199 (1797), a state law was overturned, and dicta in several opinions asserted
the principle. See Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 399 (1798) (Justice Iredell),
and several Justices on circuit, quoted in J. Goebel, supra, at 589–592.
688 In enacting the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, Congress chose not to vest
“federal question” jurisdiction in the federal courts but to leave to the state courts
the enforcement of claims under the Constitution and federal laws. In § 25, 1 Stat.
85, Congress provided for review by the Supreme Court of final judgments in state
courts (1) “. . . where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or
an authority exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their
validity;” (2) “. . . where is drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an au-
thority exercised under any State, on the ground of their being repugnant to the
constitution, treaties or laws of the United States, and the decision is in favor of
their validity;” or (3) “. . . where is drawn in question the construction of any clause
of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held under the United
States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption specially
set up or claimed” thereunder. The ruling below was to be “re-examined and re-
versed or affirmed in the Supreme Court . . . .”
689 See in particular the debate on the President’s removal powers, discussed
supra, “The Removal Power” with statements excerpted in R. Berger, supra at 144–
150. Debates on the Alien and Sedition Acts and on the power of Congress to repeal
the Judiciary Act of 1801 similarly saw recognition of judicial review of acts of Con-
gress. C. Warren, supra at 107–124.
shall’s achievement that, in doubtful circumstances and an awk-

ward position, he carried the day for the device, which, though ques-
tioned, has expanded and become solidified at the core of constitutional
jurisprudence.
Marbury v. Madison.—Chief Justice Marshall’s argument for
judicial review of congressional acts in Marbury v. Madison 690 had
been largely anticipated by Hamilton.691 Hamilton had written, for
example: “The interpretation of the laws is the proper and peculiar
province of the courts. A constitution, is, in fact, and must be re-
garded by the judges, as a fundamental law. It therefore belongs to
them to ascertain its meaning, as well as the meaning of any par-
ticular act proceeding from the legislative body. If there should hap-
pen to be an irreconcilable variance between two, that which has
the superior obligation and validity ought, of course, to be pre-
ferred; or, in other words, the constitution ought to be preferred to
the statute, the intention of the people to the intention of their
agents.” 692
At the time of the change of administration from Adams to Jef-
ferson, several commissions of appointment to office had been signed
but not delivered and were withheld on Jefferson’s express instruc-
tion. Marbury sought to compel the delivery of his commission by
seeking a writ of mandamus in the Supreme Court in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction against Secretary of State Madison. Ju-
risdiction was based on § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,693 which
Marbury, and ultimately the Supreme Court, interpreted to autho-
rize the Court to issue writs of mandamus in suits in its original
jurisdiction.694 Though deciding all the other issues in Marbury’s
favor, the Chief Justice wound up concluding that the § 13 authori-
690 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).

691 THE FEDERALIST, Nos. 78 and 81 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 521–530, 541–552.
692 Id., No. at 78, 525.
693 1 Stat. 73, 80.
694 The section first denominated the original jurisdiction of the Court and then
described the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Following and indeed attached to the
sentence on appellate jurisdiction, being separated by a semicolon, is the language
saying “and shall have power to issue . . . writs of mandamus, in cases warranted
by the principles and usages of law, to any courts appointed, or persons holding of-
fice, under the authority of the United States.” The Chief Justice could easily have
interpreted the authority to have been granted only in cases under appellate juris-
diction or as authority conferred in cases under both original and appellate jurisdic-
tion when the cases are otherwise appropriate for one jurisdiction or the other. Tex-
tually, the section does not compel a reading that Congress was conferring on the
Court an original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus per se.
zation was an attempt by Congress to expand the Court’s original

jurisdiction beyond the constitutional prescription and was there-
fore void.695
“The question, whether an act, repugnant to the constitution,
can become the law of the land, is a question deeply interesting to
the United States,” Marshall began his discussion of this final phase
of the case, “but, happily, not of an intricacy proportioned to its in-
terest.” 696 First, Marshall recognized certain fundamental prin-
ciples. The people had come together to establish a government. They
provided for its organization and assigned to its various depart-
ments their powers and established certain limits not to be trans-
gressed by those departments. The limits were expressed in a writ-
ten constitution, which would serve no purpose “if these limits may,
at any time, be passed by those intended to be restrained.” Be-
cause the Constitution is “a superior paramount law, unchangeable
by ordinary means, . . . a legislative act contrary to the constitu-
tion is not law.” 697 “If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the
constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its invalidity, bind the
courts, and oblige them to give it effect?” The answer, thought the
Chief Justice, was obvious. “It is emphatically the province and duty
of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply
the rule to particular cases, must of necessity expound and inter-
pret that rule. If two laws conflict with each other, the courts must
decide on the operation of each.” 698
“So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if both the law
and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court
must either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding
the constitution; or conformably to the constitution, disregarding the
law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules gov-
erns the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty.” 699
“If, then, the courts are to regard the constitution, and the con-
stitution is superior to any ordinary act of the legislature, the con-
stitution, and not such ordinary act, must govern the case to which
695 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 173–180 (1803). For a classic treat-
ment of Marbury, see Van Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969
DUKE L. J. 1.
696 5 U.S. at 176. One critic has written that by this question Marshall “had
already begged the question-in-chief, which was not whether an act repugnant to
the Constitution could stand, but who should be empowered to decide that the act
is repugnant.” A. Bickel, supra at 3. Marshall, however, soon reached this question,
though more by way of assertion than argument. 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) at 177–78.
697 5 U.S. at 176–77.
698 5 U.S. at 177.
699 5 U.S. at 178.
they both apply.” 700 To declare otherwise, Chief Justice Marshall

said, would be to permit the legislature to “pass[ ] at pleasure” the
limits imposed on its powers by the Constitution.701
The Chief Justice then turned from the philosophical justifica-
tion for judicial review as arising from the very concept of a writ-
ten constitution, to specific clauses of the Constitution. The judicial
power, he observed, was extended to “all cases arising under the
constitution.” 702 It was “too extravagant to be maintained that the
Framers had intended that a case arising under the constitution
should be decided without examining the instrument under which
it arises.” 703 Suppose, he said, that Congress laid a duty on an ar-
ticle exported from a state or passed a bill of attainder or an ex
post facto law or provided that treason should be proved by the tes-
timony of one witness. Would the courts enforce such a law in the
face of an express constitutional provision? They would not, he con-
tinued, because their oath required by the Constitution obligated
them to support the Constitution and to enforce such laws would
violate the oath.704 Finally, the Chief Justice noted that the Su-
premacy Clause (Art. VI, cl. 2) gave the Constitution precedence
over laws and treaties, providing that only laws “which shall be made
in pursuance of the constitution” shall be the supreme law of the
land.705
The decision in Marbury v. Madison has never been disturbed,
although it has been criticized and has had opponents throughout
our history. It not only carried the day in the federal courts, but
from its announcement judicial review by state courts of local legis-
lation under local constitutions made rapid progress and was se-
curely established in all states by 1850.706
Judicial Review and National Supremacy.—Even many per-
sons who have criticized the concept of judicial review of congressio-
nal acts by the federal courts have thought that review of state acts
under federal constitutional standards is soundly based in the Su-
700 5 U.S. at 177–78.
701 5 U.S. at 178.
702 5 U.S. at 178. The reference is, of course, to the first part of clause 1, § 2,
Art. III: “The judicial power shall extend to all Cases . . . arising under this Consti-
tution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under their Authority. . . .” Compare A. Bickel, supra at 5–6, with R. Berger, supra
at 189–222.
703 5 U.S. at 179.
704 5 U.S. at 179–80. The oath provision is contained in Art. VI, cl. 3. Compare
A. Bickel, supra at 7–8, with R. Berger, supra at 237–244.

705 5 U.S. at 180. Compare A. Bickel, supra at 8–12, with R. Berger, supra at
223–284.
706 E. CORWIN, THE DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 75–78 (1914); Nelson, Changing
Conceptions of Judicial Review: The Evolution of Constitution Theory in the State,

1790–1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166 (1972).
premacy Clause, which makes the Constitution, laws enacted pur-

suant to the Constitution, and treaties the supreme law of the land,707
and which Congress effectuated by enacting § 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789.708 Five years before Marbury v. Madison, the Court
held invalid a state law as conflicting with the terms of a treaty,709
and seven years after Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion it voided a
state law as conflicting with the Constitution.710
Virginia provided a states’ rights challenge to a broad reading
of the Supremacy Clause and to the validity of § 25 in Martin v.
Hunter’s Lessee 711 and in Cohens v. Virginia.712 In both cases, it
was argued that while the courts of Virginia were constitutionally
obliged to prefer “the supreme law of the land,” as set out in the
Supremacy Clause, over conflicting state constitutional provisions
and laws, it was only by their own interpretation of the supreme
law that they as courts of a sovereign state were bound. Further-
more, it was contended that cases did not “arise” under the Consti-
tution unless they were brought in the first instance by someone
claiming such a right, from which it followed that “the judicial power
of the United States” did not “extend” to such cases unless they
were brought in the first instance in the courts of the United States.
But Chief Justice Marshall rejected this narrow interpretation: “A
case in law or equity consists of the right of the one party, as well
as of the other, and may truly be said to arise under the Constitu-
tion or a law of the United States, whenever its correct decision
depends upon the construction of either.” 713 Passing on to the power
of the Supreme Court to review such decisions of the state courts,
he said: “Let the nature and objects of our Union be considered: let
the great fundamental principles on which the fabric stands, be ex-
amined: and we think, the result must be, that there is nothing so
extravagantly absurd, in giving to the Court of the nation the power
of revising the decisions of local tribunals, on questions which af-
707 2 W. Crosskey, supra at 989. See the famous remark of Holmes: “I do not
think the United States would come to an end if we lost our power to declare an Act
of Congress void. I do think the Union would be imperiled if we could not make
that declaration as the laws of the several States.” O. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PA-
PERS 295–296 (1921).
708 1 Stat. 73, 85, quoted supra.
709 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 190 (1796).
710 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87 (1810). The case came to the Court by
appeal from a circuit court and not from a state court under § 25. Famous early
cases coming to the Court under § 25 in which state laws were voided included Sturges
v. Crowninshield, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 122 (1819); and McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.
(4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
711 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
712 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
713 19 U.S. at 379.
fect the nation, as to require that words which import this power
should be restricted by a forced construction.” 714
Limitations on the Exercise of Judicial Review

Constitutional Interpretation.—Under a written constitu-
tion, which is law and is binding on government, the practice of
judicial review raises questions of the relationship between consti-
tutional interpretation and the Constitution—the law that is con-
strued. The legitimacy of construction by an unelected entity in a
republican or democratic system becomes an issue whenever the con-
struction is controversial, as it frequently is. Full consideration would
carry us far afield, in view of the immense corpus of writing with
respect to the proper mode of interpretation during this period.
Scholarly writing has identified six forms of constitutional argu-
ment or construction that may be used by courts or others in decid-
ing a constitutional issue.715 These are (1) historical, (2) textual, (3)
structural, (4) doctrinal, (5) ethical, and (6) prudential. The histori-
cal argument is largely, though not exclusively, associated with the
theory of original intent or original understanding, under which con-
stitutional and legal interpretation is limited to attempting to dis-
cern the original meaning of the words being construed as that mean-
ing is revealed in the intentions of those who created the law or
the constitutional provision in question. The textual argument, closely
associated in many ways to the doctrine of original intent, con-
cerns whether the judiciary or another is bound by the text of the
Constitution and the intentions revealed by that language, or whether
it may go beyond the four corners of the constitutional document to
ascertain the meaning, a dispute encumbered by the awkward con-
714 19 U.S. at 422–23. Justice Story traversed much of the same ground in Mar-
tin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). In Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 506 (1859), the Wisconsin Supreme Court had declared an act of Congress
invalid and disregarded a writ of error from the Supreme Court, raising again the
Virginia arguments. Chief Justice Taney emphatically rebuked the assertions on grounds
both of dual sovereignty and national supremacy. His emphasis on the indispensabil-
ity of the federal judicial power to maintain national supremacy, to protect the states
from national encroachments, and to make the Constitution and laws of the United
States uniform all combine to enhance the federal judicial power to a degree per-
haps beyond that envisaged even by Story and Marshall. As late as Williams v. Bruffy,
102 U.S. 248 (1880), the concepts were again thrashed out with the refusal of a
Virginia court to enforce a mandate of the Supreme Court. See also Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1 (1958).
715 The six forms, or “modalities” as he refers to them, are drawn from P. BOB-
BITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); P. BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL

INTERPRETATION (1991). Of course, other scholars may have different categories, but
these largely overlap these six forms. E.g., Fallon, A Constructivist Coherence Theory
of Constitutional Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189 (1987); Post, Theories of Con-
stitutional Interpretation, in LAW AND THE ORDER OF CULTURE 13–41 (R. Post ed., 1991).
structions, interpretivism and noninterpretivism.716 Using a struc-

tural argument, one seeks to infer structural rules from the rela-
tionships that the Constitution mandates.717 The remaining three
modes are not necessarily tied to original intent, text, or structure,
though they may have some relationship. Doctrinal arguments pro-
ceed from the application of precedents. Prudential arguments seek
to balance the costs and benefits of a particular rule. Ethical argu-
ments derive rules from those moral commitments of the American
ethos that are reflected in the Constitution.
Although the scholarly writing ranges widely, a much more nar-
row scope is seen in the actual political-judicial debate. Rare is the
judge who will proclaim a devotion to ethical guidelines, such, for
example, as natural-law precepts. The usual debate ranges from those
adherents of strict construction and original intent to those with
loose construction and adaptation of text to modern-day condi-
tions.718 However, it is with regard to more general rules of pru-
dence and self-restraint that one usually finds the enunciation and
application of limitations on the exercise of constitutional judicial
review.
Prudential Considerations.—Implicit in the argument of
Marbury v. Madison 719 is the thought that the Court is obligated
to take and decide cases meeting jurisdictional standards. Chief Jus-
tice Marshall spelled this out in Cohens v. Virginia: 720 “It is most
true that this Court will not take jurisdiction if it should not: but
it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The
judiciary cannot, as the legislature may, avoid a measure because
it approaches the confines of the constitution. We cannot pass it by
because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever diffi-
culties, a case may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought
716 Among the vast writing, see, e.g., R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA (1990); J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); L. TRIBE & M. DORF,
ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (1991); H. WELLINGTON, INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION (1990);
Symposium, Constitutional Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N. Y. U. L. REV.
259 (1981); Symposium, Judicial Review and the Constitution: The Text and Be-
yond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 43 (1983); Symposium, Judicial Review Versus Democracy,
42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); Symposium, Democracy and Distrust: Ten Years Later, 77
VA. L. REV. 631 (1991). See also Farber, The Originalism Debate: A Guide for the
Perplexed, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 1085 (1989).
717 This mode is most strongly association with C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATION-
SHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969).

718 E.g., Meese, The Attorney General’s View of the Supreme Court: Toward a
Jurisprudence of Original Intention, 45 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 701 (1985); Addresses: Con-
struing the Constitution, 19 U. C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1985), containing addresses by
Justice Brennan, id. at 2, Justice Stevens, id. at 15, and Attorney General Meese.
Id. at 22. See also Rehnquist, The Notion of a Living Constitution, 54 TEX. L. REV.
693 (1976).
719 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
720 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404, (1821).
before us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdic-

tion which is given, than to usurp that which is not given. The one
or the other would be treason to the constitution.” As the comment
recognizes, because judicial review grows out of the fiction that courts
only declare what the law is in specific cases 721 and are without
will or discretion,722 its exercise is surrounded by the inherent limi-
tations of the judicial process, most basically, of course, by the ne-
cessity of a case or controversy and the strands of the doctrine com-
prising the concept of justiciability.723 But, although there are hints
of Chief Justice Marshall’s activism in some modern cases,724 the
Court has always adhered, at times more strictly than at other times,
to several discretionary rules or concepts of restraint in the exer-
cise of judicial review, the practice of which is very much contrary
to the quoted dicta from Cohens. These rules, it should be noted,
are in addition to the vast discretionary power which the Supreme
Court has to grant or deny review of judgements in lower courts, a
discretion fully authorized with certiorari jurisdiction but in effect
in practice as well with regard to what remains of appeals.725
721 See, e.g., Justice Sutherland in Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261 U.S. 525,
544 (1923), and Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62 (1936).
722 “Judicial power, as contradistinguished from the powers of the law, has no
existence. Courts are the mere instruments of the law, and can will nothing.” Osborn
v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 866 (1824) (Chief Justice Mar-
shall). See also Justice Roberts in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 62–63 (1936).
723 The political question doctrine is another limitation arising in part out of
inherent restrictions and in part from prudential considerations. For a discussion of

limitations utilizing both stands, see Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346–56 (1936)
(Justice Brandeis concurring).
724 Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 548–49 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186, 211 (1962); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 248 (1967).
725 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254–1257. See F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra at ch. 7. “The
Supreme Court is not, and never has been, primarily concerned with the correction
of errors in lower court decisions. In almost all cases within the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction, the petitioner has already received one appellate review of his case . . . .
If we took every case in which an interesting legal question is raised, or our prima
facie impression is that the decision below is erroneous, we could not fulfill the Con-
stitutional and statutory responsibilities placed upon the Court. To remain effective,
the Supreme Court must continue to decide only those cases which present ques-
tions whose resolution will have immediate importance far beyond the particular
facts and parties involved.” Chief Justice Vinson, Address on the Work of the Fed-
eral Court, in 69 Sup. Ct. v, vi. It “is only accurate to a degree to say that our juris-
diction in cases on appeal is obligatory as distinguished from discretionary on certio-
rari.” Chief Justice Warren, quoted in Wiener, The Supreme Court’s New Rules, 68
HARV. L. REV. 20, 51 (1954).
At various times, the Court has followed more strictly than other
times the prudential theorems for avoidance of decisionmaking when
it deemed restraint to be more desirable than activism.726
The Doctrine of “Strict Necessity”.—The Court has repeat-
edly declared that it will decide constitutional issues only if strict
necessity compels it to do so. Thus, constitutional questions will not
be decided in broader terms than are required by the precise state
of facts to which the ruling is to be applied, nor if the record pres-
ents some other ground upon which to decide the case, nor at the
instance of one who has availed himself of the benefit of a statute
or who fails to show he is injured by its operation, nor if a construc-
tion of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be
fairly avoided.727
Speaking of the policy of avoiding the decision of constitutional
issues except when necessary, Justice Rutledge wrote: “The policy’s
ultimate foundations, some if not all of which also sustain the juris-
dictional limitation, lie in all that goes to make up the unique place
and character, in our scheme, of judicial review of governmental ac-
tion for constitutionality. They are found in the delicacy of that func-
tion, particularly in view of possible consequences for others stem-
ming also from constitutional roots; the comparative finality of those
consequences; the consideration due to the judgment of other reposi-
tories of constitutional power concerning the scope of their author-
ity; the necessity, if government is to function constitutionally, for
each to keep within its power, including the courts; the inherent
limitations of the judicial process, arising especially from its largely
negative character and limited resources of enforcement; withal in
the paramount importance of constitutional adjudication in our sys-
tem.” 728
The Doctrine of Clear Mistake.—A precautionary rule early
formulated and at the base of the traditional concept of judicial re-
straint was expressed by Professor James Bradley Thayer to the
effect that a statute could be voided as unconstitutional only “when
those who have the right to make laws have not merely made a
726 See Justice Brandeis’ concurring opinion in Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288,
346 (1936). And contrast A. Bickel, supra at 111–198, with Gunther, The Subtle Vices
of the “Passive Virtues”: A Comment on Principle and Expediency in Judicial Re-
view, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1964).
727 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 568–75 (1947). See also Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, 53 (1908); Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 213
U.S. 175, 191 (1909); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 325 (1936); Coffman
v. Breeze Corp., 323 U.S. 316, 324–325 (1945); Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin,
323 U.S. 101, 105 (1944); Alma Motor v. Timken Co., 329 U.S. 129 (1946). Judicial
restraint as well as considerations of comity underlie the Court’s abstention doc-
trine when the constitutionality of state laws is challenged.
728 Rescue Army v. Municipal Court, 331 U.S. 549, 571 (1947).
mistake, but have made a very clear one,—so clear that it is not
open to rational question.” 729 Whether phrased this way or phrased
so that a statute is not to be voided unless it is unconstitutional
beyond all reasonable doubt, the rule is of ancient origin 730 and of
modern adherence.731 In operation, however, the rule is subject to
two influences, which seriously impair its efficacy as a limitation.
First, the conclusion that there has been a clear mistake or that
there is no reasonable doubt is that drawn by five Justices if a full
Court sits. If five Justices of learning and detachment to the Con-
stitution are convinced that a statute is invalid and if four others
of equal learning and attachment are convinced it is valid, the con-
victions of the five prevail over the convictions or doubts of the four.
Second, the Court has at times made exceptions to the rule in cer-
tain categories of cases. Statutory interferences with “liberty of con-
tract” were once presumed to be unconstitutional until proved to
be valid; 732 more recently, presumptions of invalidity have ex-
pressly or impliedly been applied against statutes alleged to inter-
fere with freedom of expression and of religious freedom, which have
been said to occupy a “preferred position” in the constitutional scheme
of things.733
Exclusion of Extra-Constitutional Tests.—Another maxim of
constitutional interpretation is that courts are concerned only with
the constitutionality of legislation and not with its motives, policy,
or wisdom,734 or with its concurrence with natural justice, funda-
mental principles of government, or the spirit of the Constitu-
729 The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, in J.
THAYER, LEGAL ESSAYS 1, 21 (1908).

730 See Justices Chase and Iredell in Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 395,
399 (1798).
731 E.g., Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611 (1960).
732 “But freedom of contract is, nevertheless, the general rule and restraint the
exception; and the exercise of legislative authority to abridge it can be justified only
by the existence of exceptional circumstances.” Adkins v. Children’s Hospital, 261
U.S. 525, 546 (1923).
733 Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949). Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence,
id. at 89–97, is a lengthy critique and review of the “preferred position” cases up to
that time. The Court has not used the expression in recent years but the worth it
attributes to the values of free expression probably approaches the same result. To-
day, the Court’s insistence on a “compelling state interest” to justify a governmental
decision to classify persons by “suspect” categories, such as race, Loving v. Virginia,
388 U.S. 1 (1967), or to restrict the exercise of a “fundamental” interest, such as the
right to vote, Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621 (1969), or the right
to travel, Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), clearly imports presumption of
unconstitutionality.
734 “We fully understand . . . the powerful argument that can be made against
the wisdom of this legislation, but on that point we have no concern.” Noble State
Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 104 (1911) (Justice Holmes for the Court). See also Trop
v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 120 (1958) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
tion.735 In various forms this maxim has been repeated to such an

extent that it has become trite, and has increasingly come to be
incorporated in cases in which a finding of unconstitutionality has
been made as a reassurance of the Court’s limited review. And it
should be noted that at times the Court has absorbed natural rights
doctrines into the text of the Constitution, so that it was able to
reject natural law per se and still partake of its fruits and the same
thing is true of the laissez faire principles incorporated in judicial
decisions from about 1890 to 1937.736
Presumption of Constitutionality.—“It is but a decent re-
spect to the wisdom, integrity, and patriotism of the legislative body,
by which any law is passed,” wrote Justice Bushrod Washington,
“to presume in favor of its validity, until its violation of the Consti-
tution is proved beyond a reasonable doubt.” 737 A corollary of this
maxim is that if the constitutional question turns upon circum-
stances, courts will presume the existence of a state of facts which
would justify the legislation that is challenged.738 It seems appar-
ent, however, that with regard to laws which trench upon First Amend-
ment freedoms and perhaps other rights guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights such deference is far less than it would be toward statutory
regulation of economic matters.739
Disallowance by Statutory Interpretation.—If it is possible
to construe a statute so that its validity can be sustained against a
A supposedly hallowed tenet is that the Court will not look to the motives of
legislators in determining the validity of a statute. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.)
87 (1810); United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); Palmer v. Thompson, 403
U.S. 217 (1971). Yet an intent to discriminate is a requisite to finding at least some
equal protection violations, Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Village of Ar-
lington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977), and a secu-
lar or religious purpose is one of the parts of the tripartite test under the Establish-
ment Clause. Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 653 (1980), and id. at 665 (dissent). Other constitutional decisions have also
turned upon the Court’s assessment of purpose or motive. E.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960); Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 20 (1922).
735 Cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 522 (1965) (Justice Black dissent-
ing). But note above the reference to the ethical mode of constitutional argument.
736 E.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); United States v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1 (1936).
737 Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213, 270 (1827). See also Fletcher v.
Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 87, 128 (1810); Legal Tender Cases (Knox v. Lee), 79 U.S. (12
Wall.) 457, 531 (1871).
738 Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 132 (1877); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas
Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78–79 (1911); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580,
584 (1935).
739 E.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967). But see McGowan v. Maryland, 366
U.S. 420, 426 (1961). The development of the “compelling state interest” test in cer-
tain areas of equal protection litigation also bespeaks less deference to the legisla-
tive judgment.
constitutional attack, a rule of prudence is that it should be so con-

strued,740 even though in some instances this “constitutional doubt”
maxim has caused the Court to read a statute in a manner that
defeats or impairs the legislative purpose.741 Of course, the Court
stresses that “[w]e cannot press statutory construction ‘to the point
of disingenuous evasion’ even to avoid a constitutional ques-
tion.” 742 The maxim is not followed if the provision would survive
constitutional attack or if the text is clear.743 Closely related to this
principle is the maxim that, when part of a statute is valid and
part is void, the courts will separate the valid from the invalid and
save as much as possible.744 Statutes today ordinarily expressly pro-
vide for separability, but it remains for the courts in the last resort
to determine whether the provisions are separable.745
Stare Decisis in Constitutional Law.—Adherence to prec-
edent ordinarily limits and shapes the approach of courts to deci-
sion of a presented question. “Stare decisis is usually the wise policy,
because in most matters it is more important that the applicable
rule of law be settled than that it be settled right . . . . This is com-
monly true even where the error is a matter of serious concern, pro-
vided correction can be had by legislation. But in cases involving
the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative ac-
tion is practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its ear-
lier decisions. The Court bows to the lessons of experience and the
force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and
error, so fruitful in the physical sciences, is appropriate also in the
740 United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 69 (1994); Rust v. Sul-
livan, 500 U.S. 173, 190–91 (1991); Public Citizen v. Department of Justice, 491 U.S.
440, 465–67 (1989) (quoting Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 62 (1932)); Edward J.
DeBartolo Corp. v. Florida Gulf Coast Building & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S.
568, 575 (1988); Bond v. United States, 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–158, slip op. (2014).
741 E.g., Michaelson v. United States, 266 U.S. 42 (1924) (narrow construction
of Clayton Act contempt provisions to avoid constitutional questions); United States

v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954) (lobbying act); United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163
(1965): Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (both involving conscientious
objection statute).
742 United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84, 96 (1984) (quoting Moore Ice Cream Co.
v. Rose, 289 U.S. 373, 379 (1933)).

743 Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 191 (1991); but compare id. at 204–07 (Jus-
tice Blackmun dissenting), and 223–225 (Justice O’Connor dissenting). See also Peretz
v. United States, 501 U.S. 923, 929–930 (1991).
744 Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 678, 684 (1987); Pollock v. Farmers’
Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601, 635 (1895); but see Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S.
678, 685 (1887), now repudiated. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 104 (1971). In
Kimbrough v. United States, 128 S. Ct. 558, 577 (2007), Justice Thomas, dissenting,
referred to “our longstanding presumption of the severability of unconstitutional ap-
plications of statutory provisions.”
745 Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 312–16 (1936). See also, id. at 321–24
(Chief Justice Hughes dissenting).

judicial function.” 746 Stare decisis is a principle of policy, not a me-

chanical formula of adherence to the latest decision “however re-
cent and questionable, when such adherence involves collision with
a prior doctrine more embracing in its scope, intrinsically sounder,
and verified by experience.” 747 The limitation of stare decisis seems
to have been progressively weakened since the Court proceeded to
correct “a century of error” in Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co.748
Since then, more than 200 decisions have been overturned,749 and
the merits of stare decisis seem more often celebrated in dissents
746 Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406–408 (1932) (Justice
Brandeis dissenting). For recent arguments with respect to overruling or not over-
ruling previous decisions, see the self-consciously elaborate opinion for a plurality
in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 854–69 (1992) (Justices O’Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter) (acknowledging that as an original matter they would not have
decided Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), as the Court did and that they might
consider it wrongly decided, but nonetheless applying the principles of stare decisis—
they stressed the workability of the case’s holding, the fact that no other line of
precedent had undermined Roe, the vitality of that case’s factual underpinnings, the
reliance on the precedent in society, and the effect upon the Court’s legitimacy of
maintaining or overruling the case). See id. at 953–66 (Chief Justice Rehnquist con-
curring in part and dissenting in part), 993–1001 (Justice Scalia concurring in part
and dissenting in part). See also Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827–30 (1991)
(suggesting, inter alia, that reliance is relevant in contract and property cases), and
id. at 835, 842–44 (Justice Souter concurring), 844, 848–56 (Justice Marshall dissent-
ing).
747 Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 110 (1940) (Justice Frankfurter for Court).
See also Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 22 (1970) (Chief Justice Burger dissent-
ing). But see id. at 19 (Justice Harlan concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 117–119 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring in part
and dissenting in part). Recent discussions of and both applications of and refusals
to apply stare decisis may be found in Hohn v. United States, 524 U.S. 236, 251–52
(1998), and id. at 260–63 (Justice Scalia dissenting); State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S.
3, 20–2 (1997); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 235–36 (1997), and id. at 523–54
(Justice Souter dissenting); United States v. IBM Corp., 517 U.S. 843, 854–56 (1996)
(noting principles of following precedent and declining to consider overturning an
old precedent when parties have not advanced arguments on the point), with which
compare id. at 863 (Justice Kennedy dissenting) (arguing that the United States had
presented the point and that the old case ought to be overturned); Adarand Construc-
tors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (plurality opinion) (discussing stare decisis,
citing past instances of overrulings, and overruling 1990 decision), with which com-
pare the dissents, id. at 242, 264, 271; Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S.
44, 61–73 (1996) (discussing policy of stare decisis, why it should not be followed
with respect to a 1989 decision, and overruling that precedent), with which compare
the dissents, id. at 76, 100. Justices Scalia and Thomas have argued for various
departures from precedent. E.g., Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514
U.S. 175, 200–01 (1995) (Justice Scalia concurring) (negative commerce jurispru-
dence); Colorado Republican Campaign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604, 631 (1996) (Jus-
tice Thomas concurring in part and dissenting in part) (rejecting framework of Buckley
v. Valeo and calling for overruling of part of case). Compare id. at 626 (Court notes
those issues not raised or argued).
748 157 U.S. 429, 574–579 (1895).
749 See Appendix. The list encompasses both constitutional and statutory inter-
pretation decisions. The Court adheres, at least formally, to the principle that stare
decisis is a stricter rule for statutory interpretation, Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
than in majority opinions.750 Of lesser formal effect than outright

overruling but with roughly the same result is a Court practice of
“distinguishing” precedents, which often leads to an overturning of
the principle enunciated in a case while leaving the actual case more
or less alive.751
Conclusion.—The common denominator of all these maxims of
prudence is the concept of judicial restraint. “We do not sit,” said
Justice Frankfurter, “like a kadi under a tree dispensing justice ac-
cording to considerations of individual expediency.” 752 “[A] jurist is
not to innovate at pleasure,” wrote Justice Cardozo. “He is not a
knight-errant, roaming at will in pursuit of his own ideal of beauty
or of goodness. He is to draw his inspiration from consecrated prin-
ciples. He is not to yield to spasmodic sentiment, to vague and un-
regulated benevolence. He is to exercise a discretion informed by
tradition, methodized by analogy, disciplined by system, and subor-
dinated to the primordial necessity of order in the social life.” 753
All Justices will, of course, claim adherence to proper restraint,754
but in some cases at least, such as Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in
the Flag Salute Case,755 the practice can be readily observed. The
degree of restraint, however, the degree to which legislative enact-
ments should be subjected to judicial scrutiny, is a matter of uncer-
tain and shifting opinion
491 U.S. 164, 171–175 (1989), at least in part since Congress may much more eas-
ily revise those decisions, but compare id. at 175 n.1, with id. at 190–205 (Justice
Brennan concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part). See also Flood
v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258 (1972).
750 E.g., United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 86 (1950) (Justice Frank-
furter dissenting); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 339–340 (1962) (Justice Harlan dis-
senting); Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 383 (1963) (Justice Harlan dissenting). But
see Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 195 (1958) (Justice Black dissenting). Com-
pare Justice Harlan’s views in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (dissenting), with
Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962) (opinion of the Court).
751 Note that, in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), while the
Court purported to uphold and retain the “central meaning” of Roe v. Wade, it over-
ruled several aspects of that case’s requirements. See also, e.g., the Court’s treat-
ment of Pope v. Williams, 193 U.S. 621 (1904), in Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
337, n.7 (1972). See also id. at 361 (Justice Blackmun concurring.)
752 Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 11 (1949) (dissenting).
753 B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 141 (1921).
754 Compare Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965) (Justice Doug-
las), with id. at 507 (Justice Black).

755 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (dis-
senting).
JURISDICTION OF SUPREME COURT AND INFERIOR

FEDERAL COURTS
Cases Arising Under the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties

of the United States
Cases arising under the Constitution are cases that require an
interpretation of the Constitution for their correct decision.756 They
arise when a litigant claims an actual or threatened invasion of his
constitutional rights by the enforcement of some act of public au-
thority, usually an act of Congress or of a state legislature, and asks
for judicial relief. The clause furnishes the principal textual basis
for the implied power of judicial review of the constitutionality of
legislation and other official acts.
Development of Federal Question Jurisdiction.—Almost from
the beginning, the Convention demonstrated an intent to create “fed-
eral question” jurisdiction in the federal courts with regard to fed-
eral laws; 757 such cases involving the Constitution and treaties were
added fairly late in the Convention as floor amendments.758 But when
Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, it did not confer gen-
eral federal question jurisdiction on the inferior federal courts, but
left litigants to remedies in state courts with appeals to the United
States Supreme Court if judgment went against federal constitu-
tional claims.759 Although there were a few jurisdictional provi-
sions enacted in the early years,760 it was not until the period fol-
lowing the Civil War that Congress, in order to protect newly created
federal civil rights and in the flush of nationalist sentiment, first
created federal jurisdiction in civil rights cases,761 and then in 1875
conferred general federal question jurisdiction on the lower federal
courts.762 Since that time, the trend generally has been toward con-
756 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 378 (1821).

757 M. Farrand, supra at 22, 211–212, 220, 244; 2 id. at 146–47, 186–87.
758 Id. at 423–24, 430, 431.
759 1 Stat. 73. The district courts were given cognizance of “suits for penalties
and forfeitures incurred, under the laws of the United States” and “of all causes
where an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States . . . .” Id. at 77. Plenary federal question jurisdiction was con-
ferred by the Act of February 13, 1801,§ 11, 2 Stat. 92, but this law was repealed by
the Act of March 8, 1802, 2 Stat. 132. On § 25 of the 1789 Act, providing for appeals
to the Supreme Court from state court constitutional decisions, see supra.
760 Act of April 10, 1790, § 5, 1 Stat. 111, as amended, Act of February 21, 1793,
§ 6, 1 Stat. 322 (suits relating to patents). Limited removal provisions were also en-
acted.
761 Act of April 9, 1866, § 3, 14 Stat, 27; Act of May 31, 1870, § 8, 16 Stat. 142;
Act of February 28, 1871,§ 15, 16 Stat. 438; Act of April 20, 1871, §§ 2, 6, 17 Stat.
14, 15.
762 Act of March 3, 1875, § 1, 18 Stat. 470, now 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). The classic
treatment of the subject and its history is F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra.
ferral of ever-increasing grants of jurisdiction to enforce the guar-

antees recognized and enacted by Congress.763
When a Case Arises Under.—The 1875 statute and its pres-
ent form both speak of civil suits “arising under the Constitution,
laws, or treaties of the United States,” 764 the language of the Con-
stitution. Thus, many of the early cases relied heavily upon Chief
Justice Marshall’s construction of the constitutional language to in-
terpret the statutory language.765 The result was probably to ac-
cept more jurisdiction than Congress had intended to convey.766 Later
cases take a somewhat more restrictive course.
Determination whether there is federal question jurisdiction is
made on the basis of the plaintiff ’s pleadings and not upon the re-
sponse or the facts as they may develop.767 Plaintiffs seeking ac-
cess to federal courts on this ground must set out a federal claim
which is “well-pleaded” and the claim must be real and substantial
and may not be without color of merit.768 Plaintiffs may not antici-
pate that defendants will raise a federal question in answer to the
action.769 But what exactly must be pleaded to establish a federal
question is a matter of considerable uncertainty in many cases. It
is no longer the rule that, when federal law is an ingredient of the
claim, there is a federal question.770
763 For a brief summary, see Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 743–748.
764 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a). The original Act was worded slightly differently.
765 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See also
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 379 (1821).

766 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 17 (4th ed. 1983).
767 See generally Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804
(1986); Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
768 Newburyport Water Co. v. City of Newburyport, 193 U.S. 561, 576 (1904);
Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933); Binderup v. Pathe
Exchange, 263 U.S. 291, 305–308 (1923). If the complaint states a case arising un-
der the Constitution or federal law, then federal jurisdiction exists even though on
the merits the party may have no federal right. In such a case, the proper course
for the court is to dismiss for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted
rather than for want of jurisdiction. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946). Of course,
dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is proper if the federal claim is frivolous or obvi-
ously insubstantial. Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933).
769 Louisville & N.R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149 (1908). See Skelly Oil Co. v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 339 U.S. 667 (1950); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Texaco, Inc.,
415 U.S. 125 (1974).
770 Such was the rule derived from Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S.
(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824). See Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1 (1983); Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S.
804 (1986).
Many suits will present federal questions because a federal law

creates the action.771 Perhaps Justice Cardozo presented the most
understandable line of definition, while cautioning that “[t]o define
broadly and in the abstract ‘a case arising under the Constitution
or laws of the United States’ has hazards [approaching futility].” 772
How and when a case arises ‘under the Constitution or laws of the
United States’ has been much considered in the books. Some tests
are well established. To bring a case within the statute, a right or
immunity created by the Constitution or laws of the United States
must be an element, and an essential one, of the plaintiff ’s cause
of action. . . . The right or immunity must be such that it will be
supported if the Constitution or laws of the United States are given
one construction or effect, and defeated if they receive another. . . .
A genuine and present controversy, not merely a possible or conjec-
tural one, must exist with reference thereto. . . . 773
It was long evident, though the courts were not very specific
about it, that the federal question jurisdictional statute is and al-
ways was narrower than the constitutional “arising under” jurisdic-
tional standard.774 Chief Justice Marshall in Osborn was interpret-
ing the Article III language to its utmost extent, but the courts
sometimes construed the statute equivalently, with doubtful re-
sults.775
Removal From State Court to Federal Court.—A limited right
to “remove” certain cases from state courts to federal courts was
granted to defendants in the Judiciary Act of 1789,776 and from then
to 1872 Congress enacted several specific removal statutes, most of
them prompted by instances of state resistance to the enforcement
of federal laws through harassment of federal officers.777 The 1875
Act conferring general federal question jurisdiction on the federal
771 American Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916).
Compare Albright v. Teas, 106 U.S. 613 (1883), and People of Puerto Rico v. Russell
& Co., 288 U.S. 476 (1933), with Feibelman v. Packard, 109 U.S. 421 (1883), and
The Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co., 228 U.S. 22 (1913).
772 Gully v. First National Bank in Meridian, 299 U.S. 109, 117 (1936).
773 299 U.S. at 112–13. Compare Wheeldin v. Wheeler, 373 U.S. 647 (1963), with
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See also J. I. Case Co.
v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964); Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255 U.S. 180
(1921).
774 For an express acknowledgment, see Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nige-
ria, 461 U.S. 480, 495 (1983). See also Shoshone Mining Co. v. Rutter, 177 U.S. 505
(1900); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 379 n.51 (1959).
775 E.g., Pacific R.R. Removal Cases, 115 U.S. 1 (1885); see also id. at 24 (Chief
Justice Waite dissenting).

776 § 12, 1 Stat. 79.
777 The first was the Act of February 4, 1815, § 8, 3 Stat. 198. The series of
statutes is briefly reviewed in Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402, 405–406 (1969),
and in Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 396–398. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442, 1442a.
courts provided for removal of such cases by either party, subject

only to the jurisdictional amount limitation.778 The present statute
provides for the removal by a defendant of any civil action which
could have been brought originally in a federal district court, with
no diversity of citizenship required in “federal question” cases.779 A
special civil rights removal statute permits removal of any civil or
criminal action by a defendant who is denied or cannot enforce in
the state court a right under any law providing for equal civil rights
of persons or who is being proceeded against for any act under color
of authority derived from any law providing for equal rights.780
The constitutionality of removal statutes was challenged and read-
ily sustained. Justice Story analogized removal to a form of exer-
cise of appellate jurisdiction,781 and a later Court saw it as an indi-
rect mode of exercising original jurisdiction and upheld its
constitutionality.782 In Tennessee v. Davis,783 which involved a state
attempt to prosecute a federal internal revenue agent who had killed
a man while seeking to seize an illicit distilling apparatus, the Court
invoked the right of the national government to defend itself against
state harassment and restraint. The power to provide for removal
was discerned in the Necessary and Proper Clause authorization to
Congress to pass laws to carry into execution the powers vested in
any other department or officer, here the judiciary.784 The judicial
power of the United States, said the Court, embraces alike civil and
criminal cases arising under the Constitution and laws and the power
asserted in civil cases may be asserted in criminal cases. A case
arising under the Constitution and laws “is not merely one where
a party comes into court to demand something conferred upon him
by the Constitution or by a law or treaty. A case consists of the
right of one party as well as the other, and may truly be said to
arise under the Constitution or a law or a treaty of the United States
whenever its correct decision depends upon the construction of ei-
ther. Cases arising under the laws of the United States are such as
grow out of the legislation of Congress, whether they constitute the
778 Act of March 3, 1875, § 2, 18 Stat. 471. The present pattern of removal juris-
diction was established by the Act of March 3, 1887, 24 Stat. 552, as amended, 25
Stat. 433.
779 28 U.S.C. § 1441.
780 28 U.S.C. § 1443.
781 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 347–351 (1816). Story
was not here concerned with the constitutionality of removal but with the constitu-
tionality of Supreme Court review of state judgments.
782 Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Whitton’s Administrator, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1872).
Removal here was based on diversity of citizenship. See also The Moses Taylor, 71
U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 429–430 (1867); The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247 (1868).
783 100 U.S. 257 (1880).
784 100 U.S. at 263–64.
right or privilege, or claim or protection, or defense of the party, in

whole or in part, by whom they are asserted. . . .”
“The constitutional right of Congress to authorize the removal
before trial of civil cases arising under the laws of the United States
has long since passed beyond doubt. It was exercised almost con-
temporaneously with the adoption of the Constitution, and the power
has been in constant use ever since. The Judiciary Act of Septem-
ber 24, 1789, was passed by the first Congress, many members of
which had assisted in framing the Constitution; and though some
doubts were soon after suggested whether cases could be removed
from state courts before trial, those doubts soon disappeared.” 785
The Court has broadly construed the modern version of the re-
moval statute at issue in this case so that it covers all cases where
federal officers can raise a colorable defense arising out of their duty
to enforce federal law.786 Other removal statutes, notably the civil
rights removal statute, have not been so broadly interpreted.787
Corporations Chartered by Congress.—In Osborn v. Bank of
the United States,788 Chief Justice Marshall seized upon the autho-
rization for the Bank to sue and be sued as a grant by Congress to
the federal courts of jurisdiction in all cases to which the bank was
a party.789 Consequently, upon enactment of the 1875 law, the door
was open to other federally chartered corporations to seek relief in
federal courts. This opportunity was made actual when the Court
in the Pacific R.R. Removal Cases 790 held that tort actions against
railroads with federal charters could be removed to federal courts
solely on the basis of federal incorporation. In a series of acts, Con-
gress deprived national banks of the right to sue in federal court
785 100 U.S. at 264–65.

786 Willingham v. Morgan, 395 U.S. 402 (1969). See also Maryland v. Soper, 270
U.S. 9 (1926). Removal by a federal officer must be predicated on the allegation of a
colorable federal defense. Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121 (1989). However, a fed-
eral agency is not permitted to remove under the statute’s plain meaning. Interna-
tional Primate Protection League v. Tulane Educ. Fund, 500 U.S. 72 (1991).
787 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966); Johnson v. Mississippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975).

788 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
789 The First Bank could not sue because it was not so authorized. Bank of the
United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 61 (1809). The language, which Marshall
interpreted as conveying jurisdiction, was long construed simply to give a party the
right to sue and be sued without itself creating jurisdiction, Bankers Trust Co. v.
Texas & P. Ry., 241 U.S. 295 (1916), but, in American National Red Cross v. S. G.,
505 U.S. 247 (1992), a 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that, when a federal statutory
charter expressly mentions the federal courts in its “sue and be sued” provision, the
charter creates original federal-question jurisdiction as well, although a general au-
thorization to sue and be sued in courts of general jurisdiction, including federal
courts, without expressly mentioning them, does not confer jurisdiction.
790 115 U.S. 1 (1885).
solely on the basis of federal incorporation in 1882,791 deprived rail-

roads holding federal charters of this right in 1915,792 and finally
in 1925 removed from federal jurisdiction all suits brought by fed-
erally chartered corporations on the sole basis of such incorpora-
tion, except where the United States holds at least half of the stock.793
Federal Questions Resulting from Special Jurisdictional
Grants.—In the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, Con-
gress authorized federal courts to entertain suits for violation of col-
lective bargaining agreements without respect to the amount in con-
troversy or the citizenship of the parties.794 Although it is likely that
Congress meant no more than that labor unions could be suable in
law or equity, in distinction from the usual rule, the Court con-
strued the grant of jurisdiction to be more than procedural and to
empower federal courts to apply substantive federal law, divined and
fashioned from the policy of national labor laws, in such suits.795
State courts are not disabled from hearing actions brought under
the section,796 but they must apply federal law.797 Developments un-
der this section illustrate the substantive importance of many juris-
dictional grants and indicate how the workload of the federal courts
may be increased by unexpected interpretations of such grants.798
791 § 4, 22 Stat. 162.

792 § 5, 38 Stat. 803.
793 See 28 U.S.C. § 1349.
794 § 301, 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185.
795 Textile Workers of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). Earlier the
Court had given the section a restricted reading in Association of Employees v.

Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1955), at least in part because of consti-
tutional doubts that § 301 cases in the absence of diversity of citizenship presented
a federal question sufficient for federal jurisdiction. Id. at 449–52, 459–61 (opinion
of Justice Frankfurter). In Lincoln Mills, the Court resolved this difficulty by ruling
that federal law was at issue in § 301 suits and thus cases arising under § 301 pre-
sented federal questions. 353 U.S. at 457. The particular holding of Westinghouse,
that no jurisdiction exists under § 301 for suits to enforce personal rights of employ-
ees claiming unpaid wages, was overturned in Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371
U.S. 195 (1962).
796 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962).
797 Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962). State law is not, however,
to be totally disregarded. “State law, if compatible with the purpose of § 301, may
be resorted to in order to find the rule that will best effectuate the federal policy
. . . . Any state law applied, however, will be absorbed as federal law and will not
be an independent source of private rights.” Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448, 457 (1957).
798 For example, when federal regulatory statutes create new duties without ex-
plicitly creating private federal remedies for their violation, the readiness or unreadi-
ness of the federal courts to infer private causes of action is highly significant. Al-
though inference is an acceptable means of judicial enforcement of statutes, e.g., Texas
& Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33 (1916), the Court began broadly to construe
statutes to infer private actions only with J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964).
See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975). More recently, influenced by a separation of
powers critique of implication by Justice Powell, the Court drew back and asserted
Civil Rights Act Jurisdiction.—Perhaps the most important

of the special federal question jurisdictional statutes is that confer-
ring jurisdiction on federal district courts to hear suits challenging
the deprivation under color of state law or custom of any right, privi-
lege, or immunity secured by the Constitution or by any act of Con-
gress providing for equal rights.799 Because it contains no jurisdic-
that it will infer an action only in instances of fairly clear congressional intent. Can-
non v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979); California v. Sierra Club, 451
U.S. 287 (1981); Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Ass’n,
453 U.S. 1 (1981); Merrill, Lynch v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353 (1982); Thompson v. Thomp-
son, 484 U.S. 174 (1988); Karahalios v. National Fed’n of Fed. Employees, 489 U.S.
527 (1989).
The Court appeared more ready to infer private causes of action for constitu-
tional violations, Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971); Davis
v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979); Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980), but it has
retreated here as well, refusing to apply Bivens when “any alternative, existing pro-
cess for protecting the interest” that is threatened exists, or when “any special fac-
tors counseling hesitation” are present. Wilkie v. Robbins, 551 U.S. 537, 550 (2007).
Accord Minneci v. Pollard, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–1104, slip op. (2012) (state tort law
provided alternative, if not wholly congruent, process for protecting constitutional
interests of a prisoner allegedly abused by private prison guards). See also Chappell
v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 298 (1983); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983); Schweiker
v. Chilicki, 487 U.S. 412 (1988); FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994); Correctional
Services Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61 (2001).
“Federal common law” may exist in a number of areas where federal interests
are involved and federal courts may take cognizance of such suits under their “aris-
ing under” jurisdiction. E.g., Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Inter-
national Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987). See also County of Oneida v.
Oneida Indian Nation, 470 U.S. 226, 236–240 (1985); National Farmers Union Ins.
Cos. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845 (1985). The Court is, however, somewhat wary of
finding “federal common law” in the absence of some congressional authorization to
formulate substantive rules, Texas Industries v. Radcliff Materials, 451 U.S. 630 (1981),
and Congress may always statutorily displace the judicially created law. City of Mil-
waukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304 (1981). Finally, federal courts have federal question
jurisdiction of claims created by state law if there exists an important necessity for
an interpretation of an act of Congress. Smith v. Kansas City Title & Trust Co., 255
U.S. 180 (1921).
799 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3). The cause of action to which this jurisdictional grant
applies is 42 U.S.C. § 1983, making liable and subject to other redress any person
who, acting under color of state law, deprives any person of any rights, privileges,
or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States. For dis-
cussion of the history and development of these two statutes, see Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. 167 (1961); Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538 (1972); Monell
v. New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978); Chapman v. Houston
Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600 (1979); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
Although the two statutes originally had the same wording in respect to “the Con-
stitution and laws of the United States,” when the substantive and jurisdictional
aspects were separated and codified, § 1983 retained the all-inclusive “laws” provi-
sion, while § 1343(3) read “any Act of Congress providing for equal rights.” The Court
has interpreted the language of the two statutes literally, so that while claims un-
der laws of the United States need not relate to equal rights but may encompass
welfare and regulatory laws, Maine v. Thiboutot; but see Middlesex County Sewer-
age Auth. v. National Sea Clammers Assn., 453 U.S. 1 (1981), such suits if they do
tional amount provision 800 (while the general federal question statute
at one time did) 801 and because the Court has held inapplicable the
judicially created requirement that a litigant exhaust his state rem-
edies before bringing federal action,802 the statute has been heavily
used, resulting in a formidable caseload, by plaintiffs attacking ra-
cial discrimination, malapportionment and suffrage restrictions, il-
legal and unconstitutional police practices, state restrictions on ac-
cess to welfare and other public assistance, and a variety of other
state and local governmental practices.803 Congress has encour-
aged use of the two statutes by providing for attorneys’ fees under
§ 1983,804 and by enacting related and specialized complementary
statutes.805 The Court in recent years has generally interpreted § 1983
and its jurisdictional statute broadly, but it has also sought to re-
strict the kinds of claims that may be brought in federal courts.806
Note that § 1983 and § 1343(3) need not always go together, as § 1983
actions may be brought in state courts.807
Pendent Jurisdiction.—Once jurisdiction has been acquired
through allegation of a federal question not plainly wanting in sub-
stance,808 a federal court may decide any issue necessary to the dis-
not spring from an act providing for equal rights may not be brought under § 1343(3).
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., supra. This was important when there
was a jurisdictional amount provision in the federal question statute but is of little
significance today.
800 See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Following Hague, it was argued that
only cases involving personal rights, that could not be valued in dollars, could be
brought under § 1343(3), and that cases involving property rights, which could be so
valued, had to be brought under the federal question statute. This attempted distinc-
tion was rejected in Lynch v. Household Finance Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 546–48 (1972).
On the valuation of constitutional rights, see Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
See also Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986) (compen-
satory damages must be based on injury to the plaintiff, not on some abstract valu-
ation of constitutional rights).
801 28 U.S.C. § 1331 was amended in 1976 and 1980 to eliminate the jurisdic-
tional amount requirement. Pub. L. 94–574, 90 Stat. 2721; Pub. L. 96–486, 94 Stat.
2369.
802 Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). This had been the
rule since at least McNeese v. Cahokia Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963). See also
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (state notice of claim statute, requiring notice
and waiting period before bringing suit in state court under § 1983, is preempted).
803 Thus, such notable cases as Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954),
and Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), arose under the statutes.
804 Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. 94–559, 90 Stat.
2641, amending 42 U.S.C. § 1988. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978); Maine
v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
805 E.g., Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. 96–247, 94 Stat.
349 (1980), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1997 et seq.

806 E.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977).
807 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
808 Levering & Garrigues Co. v. Morrin, 289 U.S. 103, 105 (1933); Hagans v.
Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 534–543 (1974).

position of a case, notwithstanding that other non-federal ques-

tions of fact and law may be involved therein.809 “Pendent jurisdiction,”
as this form is commonly called, exists whenever the state and fed-
eral claims “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact” and
are such that a plaintiff “would ordinarily be expected to try them
all in one judicial proceeding.” 810 Ordinarily, it is a rule of pru-
dence that federal courts should not pass on federal constitutional
claims if they may avoid it and should rest their conclusions upon
principles of state law where possible.811 But the federal court has
discretion whether to hear the pendent state claims in the proper
case. Thus, the trial court should look to “considerations of judicial
economy, convenience and fairness to litigants” in exercising its dis-
cretion and should avoid needless decisions of state law. If the fed-
eral claim, though substantial enough to confer jurisdiction, was dis-
missed before trial, or if the state claim substantially predominated,
the court would be justified in dismissing the state claim.812
A variant of pendent jurisdiction, sometimes called “ancillary
jurisdiction,” is the doctrine allowing federal courts to acquire juris-
diction entirely of a case presenting two federal issues, although it
might properly not have had jurisdiction of one of the issues if it
had been independently presented.813 Thus, in an action under a
federal statute, a compulsory counterclaim not involving a federal
question is properly before the court and should be decided.814 The
concept has been applied to a claim otherwise cognizable only in
admiralty when joined with a related claim on the law side of the
federal court, and in this way to give an injured seaman a right to
jury trial on all of his claims when ordinarily the claim cognizable
809 Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738, 822–28 (1824);
Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Hurn v. Oursler, 289
U.S. 238 (1933); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
810 Osborn v. Bank, 22 U.S. at 725. This test replaced a difficult-to-apply test of
Hurn v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238, 245–46 (1933). See also Kokkonen v. Guardian Life
Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375 (1994); Peacock v. Thomas, 516 U.S. 349 (1996) (both cases
using the new vernacular of “ancillary jurisdiction”).
811 Siler v. Louisville & Nashville R. Co., 213 U.S. 175 (1909); Greene v. Louis-
ville & Interurban R.R., 244 U.S. 499 (1917); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 546–
550 (1974). In fact, it may be an abuse of discretion for a federal court to fail to
decide on an available state law ground instead of reaching the federal constitu-
tional question. Schmidt v. Oakland Unified School Dist., 457 U.S. 594 (1982) (per
curiam). However, narrowing previous law, the Court held in Pennhurst State School
& Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), held that, when a pendent claim of state
law involves a claim that is against a state for purposes of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, federal courts may not adjudicate it.
812 United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726–27 (1966).
813 The initial decision was Freeman v. Howe, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (1861), in
which federal jurisdiction was founded on diversity of citizenship.

814 Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange, 270 U.S. 593 (1926).
only in admiralty would be tried without a jury.815 And a colorable

constitutional claim has been held to support jurisdiction over a fed-
eral statutory claim arguably not within federal jurisdiction.816
Still another variant is the doctrine of “pendent parties,” under
which a federal court could take jurisdiction of a state claim against
one party if it were related closely enough to a federal claim against
another party, even though there was no independent jurisdic-
tional base for the state claim.817 Although the Supreme Court at
first tentatively found some merit in the idea,818 in Finley v. United
States,819 by a 5-to-4 vote the Court firmly disapproved of the pen-
dent party concept and cast considerable doubt on the other prongs
of pendent jurisdiction as well. Pendent party jurisdiction, Justice
Scalia wrote for the Court, was within the constitutional grant of
judicial power, but to be operable it must be affirmatively granted
by congressional enactment.820 Within the year, Congress supplied
the affirmative grant, adopting not only pendent party jurisdiction
but also codifying pendent jurisdiction and ancillary jurisdiction un-
der the name of “supplemental jurisdiction.” 821
Thus, these interrelated doctrinal standards now seem well-
grounded.
Protective Jurisdiction.—A conceptually difficult doctrine, which
approaches the verge of a serious constitutional gap, is the concept
of protective jurisdiction. Under this doctrine, it is argued that in
instances in which Congress has legislative jurisdiction, it can con-
fer federal jurisdiction, with the jurisdictional statute itself being
the “law of the United States” within the meaning of Article III,
even though Congress has enacted no substantive rule of decision
and state law is to be applied. Put forward in controversial cases,822
the doctrine has neither been rejected nor accepted by the Su-
815 Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 380–81 (1959);
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963).

816 Rosado v. Wyman, 397 U.S. 397, 400–05 (1970).
817 Judge Friendly originated the concept in Astor-Honor, Inc. v. Grosset & Dunlap,
Inc., 441 F.2d 627 (2d Cir. 1971); Leather’s Best, Inc. v. S. S. Mormaclynx, 451 F.2d
800 (2d Cir. 1971).
818 Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976).
819 490 U.S. 545 (1989).
820 490 U.S. at 553, 556.
821 Act of Dec. 1, 1990, Pub. L. 101–650, 104 Stat. 5089, § 310, 28 U.S.C. § 1367.
In City of Chicago v. International College of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156 (1998), the
Court, despite the absence of language making § 1367 applicable, held that the stat-
ute gave district courts jurisdiction over state-law claims in cases originating in state
court and then removed to federal court.
822 National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582 (1949); Tex-
tile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); see also the bankruptcy cases,
Schumacher v. Beeler, 293 U.S. 367 (1934), and Williams v. Austrian, 331 U.S. 642
(1947).
preme Court. In Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,823 the

Court reviewed a congressional grant of jurisdiction to federal courts
to hear suits by an alien against a foreign state, jurisdiction not
within the “arising under” provision of article III. Federal substan-
tive law was not applicable, that resting either on state or interna-
tional law. Refusing to consider protective jurisdiction, the Court
found that the statute regulated foreign commerce by promulgat-
ing rules governing sovereign immunity from suit and was a law
requiring interpretation as a federal-question matter. That the doc-
trine does raise constitutional doubts is perhaps grounds enough to
avoid reaching it.824
Supreme Court Review of State Court Decisions.—In addi-
tion to the constitutional issues presented by § 25 of the Judiciary
Act of 1789 and subsequent enactments,825 questions have contin-
ued to arise concerning review of state court judgments which go
directly to the nature and extent of the Supreme Court’s appellate
jurisdiction. Because of the sensitivity of federal-state relations and
the delicate nature of the matters presented in litigation touching
upon them, jurisdiction to review decisions of a state court is depen-
dent in its exercise not only upon ascertainment of the existence of
a federal question but upon a showing of exhaustion of state rem-
edies and of the finality of the state judgment. Because the applica-
tion of these standards to concrete facts is neither mechanical nor
nondiscretionary, the Justices have often been divided over whether
these requisites to the exercise of jurisdiction have been met in spe-
cific cases submitted for review by the Court.
The Court is empowered to review the judgments of “the high-
est court of a State in which a decision could be had.” 826 This will
ordinarily be the state’s court of last resort, but it could well be an
823 461 U.S. 480 (1983).

824 E.g., Mesa v. California, 489 U.S. 121, 136–37 (1989) (would present grave
constitutional problems).
825 On § 25, see “Judicial Review and National Supremacy,” supra. The present
statute is 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a), which provides that review by writ of certiorari is

available where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in
question or where the validity of a statute of any state is drawn in question on the
ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United
States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed
under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or au-
thority exercised under, the United States. Prior to 1988, there was a right to man-
datory appeal in cases in which a state court had found invalid a federal statute or
treaty or in which a state court had upheld a state statute contested under the Con-
stitution, a treaty, or a statute of the United States. See the Act of June 25, 1948,
62 Stat. 929. The distinction between certiorari and appeal was abolished by the
Act of June 27, 1988, Pub. L. 100–352, § 3, 102 Stat. 662.
826 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a). See R. STERN & E. GRESSMAN, SUPREME COURT PRACTICE ch.
3 (6th ed. 1986).

intermediate appellate court or even a trial court if its judgment is

final under state law and cannot be reviewed by any state appel-
late court.827 The review is of a final judgment below. “It must be
subject to no further review or correction in any other state tribu-
nal; it must also be final as an effective determination of the litiga-
tion and not of merely interlocutory or intermediate steps therein.
It must be the final word of a final court.”T 828 The object of this
rule is to avoid piecemeal interference with state court proceed-
ings; it promotes harmony by preventing federal assumption of a
role in a controversy until the state court efforts are finally re-
solved.829 For similar reasons, the Court requires that a party seek-
ing to litigate a federal constitutional issue on appeal of a state court
judgment must have raised that issue with sufficient precision to
have enabled the state court to have considered it and she must
have raised the issue at the appropriate time below.830
When the judgment of a state court rests on an adequate, inde-
pendent determination of state law, the Court will not review the
resolution of the federal questions decided, even though the resolu-
tion may be in error.831 “The reason is so obvious that it has rarely
been thought to warrant statement. It is found in the partitioning
of power between the state and Federal judicial systems and in the
limitations of our own jurisdiction. Our only power over state judg-
ments is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly ad-
judge federal rights. And our power is to correct wrong judgments,
not to revise opinions. We are not permitted to render an advisory
opinion, and if the same judgment would be rendered by the state
827 Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U.S. 45, 47 (1935); Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 62 (1960); Thompson v. City of Louisville, 362 U.S. 199, 202 (1960); Metlakatla
Indian Community v. Egan, 363 U.S. 555 (1960); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 516,
517 (1968); Koon v. Aiken, 480 U.S. 943 (1987). In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821), the judgment reviewed was that of the Quarterly Session Court
for the Borough of Norfolk, Virginia.
828 Market Street Ry. v. Railroad Comm’n, 324 U.S. 548, 551 (1945). See also
San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. City of San Diego, 450 U.S. 621 (1981); Flynt v.
Ohio, 451 U.S. 619 (1981); Minnick v. California Dep’t of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105
(1981); Florida v. Thomas, 532 U.S. 774 (2001). The Court has developed a series of
exceptions permitting review when the federal issue in the case has been finally
determined but there are still proceedings to come in the lower state courts. Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 476–487 (1975). See also Fort Wayne Books,
Inc. v. Indiana, 489 U.S. 46 (1989); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299,
304 (1989); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907 n.42 (1982).
829 Republic Natural Gas Co. v. Oklahoma, 334 U.S. 62, 67–69 (1948); Radio Sta-
tion WOW v. Johnson, 326 U.S. 120, 123–24 (1945).

830 New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 67 (1928); See also Bank-
ers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 77 (1988); Webb v. Webb, 451
U.S. 493, 501 (1981). The same rule applies on habeas corpus petitions. E.g., Picard
v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270 (1972).
831 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874); Black v. Cutter
Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc., 355 U.S. 597 (1958).
court after we corrected its views of Federal laws, our review could
amount to nothing more than an advisory opinion.” 832 The Court is
faced with two interrelated decisions: whether the state court judg-
ment is based upon a nonfederal ground and whether the nonfederal
ground is adequate to support the state court judgment. It is, of
course, the responsibility of the Court to determine for itself the
answer to both questions.833
The first question, whether there is a nonfederal ground, may
be raised by several factual situations. A state court may have based
its decision on two grounds, one federal, one nonfederal.834 It may
have based its decision solely on a nonfederal ground but the fed-
eral ground may have been clearly raised.835 Both federal and
nonfederal grounds may have been raised but the state court judg-
ment is ambiguous or is without written opinion stating the ground
relied on.836 Or the state court may have decided the federal ques-
tion although it could have based its ruling on an adequate, inde-
pendent non-federal ground.837 In any event, it is essential for pur-
poses of review by the Supreme Court that it appear from the record
that a federal question was presented, that the disposition of that
question was necessary to the determination of the case, that the
federal question was actually decided or that the judgment could
not have been rendered without deciding it.838
Several factors affect the answer to the second question, whether
the nonfederal ground is adequate. In order to preclude Supreme
832 Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125–26 (1945).
833 E.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 366 (1990); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 455 (1958).
834 Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207 (1935); Cramp v. Board of Public In-
struction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961).

835 Wood v. Chesborough, 228 U.S. 672, 676–80 (1913).
836 Lynch v. New York ex rel. Pierson, 293 U.S. 52, 54–55 (1934); Williams v.
Kaiser, 323 U.S. 471, 477 (1945); Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 281 (1956); Klinger
v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257, 263 (1872); cf. Department of Mental Hygiene v.
Kirchner, 380 U.S. 194 (1965).
837 Poafpybitty v. Skelly Oil Co., 390 U.S. 365, 375–376 (1968).
838 Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Oklahoma, 303 U.S. 206 (1938); Raley v. Ohio,
360 U.S. 423, 434–437 (1959). When there is uncertainty about what the state court
did, the usual practice was to remand for clarification. Minnesota v. National Tea
Co., 309 U.S. 551 (1940); California v. Krivda, 409 U.S. 33 (1972). See California
Dept. of Motor Vehicles v. Rios, 410 U.S. 425 (1973). Now, however, in a controver-
sial decision, the Court has adopted a presumption that when a state court decision
fairly appears to rest on federal law or to be interwoven with federal law, and when
the adequacy and independence of any possible state law ground is not clear from
the face of the opinion the Court will accept as the most reasonable explanation
that the state court decided the case as it did because it believed that federal law
required it to do so. If the state court wishes to avoid the presumption it must make
clear by a plain statement in its judgment or opinion that discussed federal law did
not compel the result, that state law was dispositive. Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032 (1983). See Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 261 n.7 (1989) (collecting cases); Cole-
man v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (applying the rule in a habeas case).
Court review, the nonfederal ground must be broad enough, with-

out reference to the federal question, to sustain the state court judg-
ment; 839 it must be independent of the federal question; 840 and it
must be tenable.841 Rejection of a litigant’s federal claim by the state
court on state procedural grounds, such as failure to tender the is-
sue at the appropriate time, will ordinarily preclude Supreme Court
review as an adequate independent state ground,842 so long as the
local procedure does not discriminate against the raising of federal
claims and has not been used to stifle a federal claim or to evade
vindication of federal rights.843
Suits Affecting Ambassadors, Other Public Ministers, and
Consuls
The earliest interpretation of the grant of original jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court came in the Judiciary Act of 1789, which con-
ferred on the federal district courts jurisdiction of suits to which a
consul might be a party. This legislative interpretation was sus-
tained in 1793 in a circuit court case in which the judges held the
Congress might vest concurrent jurisdiction involving consuls in the
inferior courts and sustained an indictment against a consul.844 Many
years later, the Supreme Court held that consuls could be sued in
federal court,845 and in another case in the same year declared sweep-
ingly that Congress could grant concurrent jurisdiction to the infe-
rior courts in cases where Supreme Court has been invested with
original jurisdiction.846 Nor does the grant of original jurisdiction
to the Supreme Court in cases affecting ambassadors and consuls
839 Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 636 (1874). A new state
rule cannot be invented for the occasion in order to defeat the federal claim. E.g.,
Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 420–425 (1991).
840 Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers’ Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164
(1917); Ivanhoe Irrigation Dist. v. McCracken, 357 U.S. 275, 290 (1958).
841 Enterprise Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers’ Mutual Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164
(1917); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 22 (1920); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355
U.S. 313 (1958).
842 Beard v. Kindler, 558 U.S. ___, No. 08–992, slip op. (2009) (firmly estab-
lished procedural rule adequate state ground even though rule is discretionary). Ac-
cord, Walker v. Martin, 562 ___, No. 09–996, slip op. (2010). See also Nickel v. Cole,
256 U.S. 222, 225 (1921); Wolfe v. North Carolina, 364 U.S. 177, 195 (1960). But see
Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923); Brown v. Western Ry. of Alabama, 338 U.S.
294 (1949).
843 Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24–25 (1923); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Pat-
terson, 357 U.S. 449, 455–458 (1958); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 146, 149
(1964). This rationale probably explains Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
See also in the criminal area, Edelman v. California, 344 U.S. 357, 362 (1953) (dis-
senting opinion); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 554 (1953) (dissenting opinion); Wil-
liams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 383 (1955); Monger v. Florida, 405 U.S. 958 (1972)
(dissenting opinion).
844 United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C. Pa. 1793).
845 Bors v. Preston, 111 U.S. 252 (1884).
846 Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449, 469 (1884).
of itself preclude suits in state courts against consular officials. The

leading case is Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler,847 in which a Ruma-
nian vice-consul contested an Ohio judgment against him for di-
vorce and alimony.
A number of incidental questions arise in connection with the
phrase “affecting ambassadors and consuls.” Does the ambassador
or consul to be affected have to be a party in interest, or is a mere
indirect interest in the outcome of the proceeding sufficient? In United
States v. Ortega,848 the Court ruled that a prosecution of a person
for violating international law and the laws of the United States
by offering violence to the person of a foreign minister was not a
suit “affecting” the minister but a public prosecution for vindica-
tion of the laws of nations and the United States. Another question
concerns the official status of a person claiming to be an ambassa-
dor or consul.
The Court has refused to review the decision of the Executive
with respect to the public character of a person claiming to be a
public minister and has laid down the rule that it has the right to
accept a certificate from the Department of State on such a ques-
tion.849 A third question was whether the clause included ambassa-
dors and consuls accredited by the United States to foreign govern-
ments. The Court held that it includes only persons accredited to
the United States by foreign governments.850 However, in matters
of especial delicacy, such as suits against ambassadors and public
ministers or their servants, where the law of nations permits such
suits, and in all controversies of a civil nature in which a state is a
party, Congress until recently made the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court exclusive of that of other courts.851 By its compli-
ance with the congressional distribution of exclusive and concur-
rent original jurisdiction, the Court has tacitly sanctioned the power
of Congress to make such jurisdiction exclusive or concurrent as it
may choose.
Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction

The admiralty and maritime jurisdiction of the federal courts
had its origins in the jurisdiction vested in the courts of the Admi-
ral of the English Navy. Prior to independence, vice-admiralty courts
were created in the Colonies by commissions from the English High
847 280 U.S. 379, 383, 384 (1930). Now precluded by 28 U.S.C. § 1351.
848 24 U.S. (11 Wheat.) 467 (1826).
849 In re Baiz, 135 U.S. 403, 432 (1890).
850 Ex parte Gruber, 269 U.S. 302 (1925).
851 1 Stat. 80–81 (1789). Jurisdiction in the Supreme Court since 1978 has been
original but not exclusive. Pub. L. 95–393, § 8(b), 92 Stat. 810, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(1).
Court of Admiralty. After independence, the states established ad-

miralty courts, from which at a later date appeals could be taken
to a court of appeals set up by Congress under the Articles of Con-
federation.852 Since one of the objectives of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion was the promotion of commerce through removal of obstacles
occasioned by the diverse local rules of the states, it was only logi-
cal that it should contribute to the development of a uniform body
of maritime law by establishing a system of federal courts and grant-
ing to these tribunals jurisdiction over admiralty and maritime cases.853
The Constitution uses the terms “admiralty and maritime juris-
diction” without defining them. Though closely related, the words
are not synonyms. In England the word “maritime” referred to the
cases arising upon the high seas, whereas “admiralty” meant pri-
marily cases of a local nature involving police regulations of ship-
ping, harbors, fishing, and the like. A long struggle between the ad-
miralty and common law courts had, however, in the course of time
resulted in a considerable curtailment of English admiralty jurisdic-
tion. A much broader conception of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion existed in the United States at the time of the framing of the
Constitution than in the Mother Country.854 At the very beginning
of government under the Constitution, Congress conferred on the
federal district courts exclusive original cognizance “of all civil causes
of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, including all seizures un-
der laws of impost, navigation or trade of the United States, where
the seizures are made, on waters which are navigable from the sea
by vessels of ten or more tons burthen, within their respective dis-
tricts as well as upon the high seas; saving to suitors, in all cases,
the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is com-
petent to give it . . . .” 855 This broad legislative interpretation of
admiralty and maritime jurisdiction soon won the approval of the
federal circuit courts, which ruled that the extent of admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction was not to be determined by English law but
852 G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY ch. 1 (1957).
853 The records of the Convention do not shed light on the Framers’ views about
admiralty. The present clause was contained in the draft of the Committee on De-
tail. 2 M. Farrand, supra at 186–187. None of the plans presented to the Conven-
tion, with the exception of an apparently authentic Charles Pinckney plan, 3 id. at
601–04, 608, had mentioned an admiralty jurisdiction in national courts. See Putnam,
How the Federal Courts Were Given Admiralty Jurisdiction, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 460 (1925).
854 G. Gilmore & C. Black, supra at ch. 1. In DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418
(No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass 1815), Justice Story delivered a powerful historical and jur-
isprudential argument against the then-restrictive English system. See also Waring
v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441, 451–59 (1847); New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v.
Merchants’ Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 34, 385–390 (1848).
855 § 9, 1 Stat. 77 (1789), now 28 U.S.C. § 1333 in only slightly changed form.
For the classic exposition, see Black, Admiralty Jurisdiction: Critique and Sugges-
tions, 50 COLUM. L. REV. 259 (1950).
by the principles of maritime law as respected by maritime courts

of all nations and adopted by most, if not by all, of them on the
continent of Europe.856
Although a number of Supreme Court decisions had earlier sus-
tained the broader admiralty jurisdiction on specific issues,857 it was
not until 1848 that the Court ruled squarely in its favor, which it
did by declaring that “whatever may have been the doubt, origi-
nally, as to the true construction of the grant, whether it had refer-
ence to the jurisdiction in England, or to the more enlarged one
that existed in other maritime countries, the question has become
settled by legislative and judicial interpretation, which ought not
now to be disturbed.” 858 The Court thereupon proceeded to hold that
admiralty had jurisdiction in personam as well as in rem over con-
troversies arising out of contracts of affreightment between New York
and Providence.
Power of Congress To Modify Maritime Law.—The Consti-
tution does not identify the source of the substantive law to be ap-
plied in the federal courts in cases of admiralty and maritime juris-
diction. Nevertheless, the grant of power to the federal courts in
Article III necessarily implies the existence of a substantive mari-
time law which, if they are required to do so, the federal courts
can fashion for themselves.859 But what of the power of Congress
in this area? In The Lottawanna,860 Justice Bradley undertook a
definitive exposition of the subject. No doubt, the opinion of the Court
notes, there exists “a great mass of maritime law which is the same
in all commercial countries,” still “the maritime law is only so far
operative as law in any country as it is adopted by the laws and
856 E.g., DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Jus-
tice Story); The Seneca, 21 Fed. Cas. 1801 (No. 12670) C.C.E.D. Pa. 1829) (Justice
Washington).
857 The Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); The Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2
Cr.) 406 (1805); The Schooner Betsy, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 443 (1808); The Samuel, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) 9 (1816); The Octavig, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 20 (1816).
858 New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 334, 386 (1848); see also Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).
859 Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 690,
691 (1950); Halcyon Lines v. Haenn Ship Ceiling & Refitting Corp., 342 U.S. 282,
285 (1952); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 360–61
(1959). For a recent example, see Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970);
United States v. Reliable Transfer Co., 421 U.S. 397 (1975). Compare The Lot-
tawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 576–77 (1875) (“But we must always remember
that the court cannot make the law, it can only declare it. If, within its proper scope,
any change is desired in its rules, other than those of procedure, it must be made
by the legislative department”). States can no more override rules of judicial origin
than they can override acts of Congress. Wilburn Boat Co. v. Firemen’s Fund Ins.
Co., 348 U.S. 310, 314 (1955).
860 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558 (1875).
usages of that country.” 861 “The general system of maritime law which
was familiar to the lawyers and statesmen of the country when the
Constitution was adopted, was most certainly intended and re-
ferred to when it was declared in that instrument that the judicial
power of the United States shall extend ‘to all cases of admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction.’ But by what criterion are we to ascer-
tain the precise limits of the law thus adopted? The Constitution
does not define it . . . .”
“One thing, however, is unquestionable; the Constitution must
have referred to a system of law coextensive with, and operating
uniformly in, the whole country. It certainly could not have been
the intention to place the rules and limits of maritime law under
the disposal and regulation of the several States, as that would have
defeated the uniformity and consistency at which the Constitution
aimed on all subjects of a commercial character affecting the inter-
course of the States with each other or with foreign states.” 862
“It cannot be supposed that the framers of the Constitution con-
templated that the law should forever remain unalterable. Con-
gress undoubtedly has authority under the commercial power, if no
other, to introduce such changes as are likely to be needed.” 863 That
Congress’s power to enact substantive maritime law was conferred
by the Commerce Clause was assumed in numerous opinions,864 but
later opinions by Justice Bradley firmly established that the source
of power was the admiralty grant itself, as supplemented by the
second prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause.865 Thus, “[a]s the
Constitution extends the judicial power of the United States to ‘all
cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction,’ and as this jurisdic-
tion is held to be exclusive, the power of legislation on the same
subject must necessarily be in the national legislature and not in
the state legislatures.” 866 Rejecting an attack on a maritime stat-
ute as an infringement of intrastate commerce, Justice Bradley wrote:
“It is unnecessary to invoke the power given the Congress to regu-
late commerce in order to find authority to pass the law in ques-
tion. The act was passed in amendment of the maritime law of the
861 88 U.S. at 572.
862 88 U.S. at 574–75.
863 88 U.S. at 577.
864 E.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 564 (1871); Moore v. American
Transp. Co., 65 U.S. (24 How.) 1, 39 (1861); Providence & N.Y. S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg.
Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
865 Butler v. Boston & S. S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527 (1889); In re Garnett, 141 U.S.
1 (1891). The second prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause is the authorization
to Congress to enact laws to carry into execution the powers vested in other depart-
ments of the Federal Government. See Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum,
293 U.S. 21, 42 (1934).
866 Butler v. Boston & S. S.S. Co., 130 U.S. 527, 557 (1889).
country, and the power to make such amendments is coextensive

with that law. It is not confined to the boundaries or class of sub-
jects which limit and characterize the power to regulate commerce;
but, in maritime matters, it extends to all matters and places to
which the maritime law extends.” 867
The law administered by federal courts in admiralty is there-
fore an amalgam of the general maritime law insofar as it is accept-
able to the courts, modifications of that law by congressional amend-
ment, the common law of torts and contracts as modified to the extent
constitutionally possible by state legislation, and international prize
law. This body of law is at all times subject to modification by the
paramount authority of Congress acting in pursuance of its powers
under the Admiralty and Maritime Clause and the Necessary and
Proper Clause and, no doubt, the Commerce Clause, now that the
Court’s interpretation of that clause has become so expansive. Of
this power there has been uniform agreement among the Justices
of the Court.868
Admiralty and Maritime Cases.—Admiralty and maritime ju-
risdiction comprises two types of cases: (1) those involving acts com-
867 In re Garnett, 141 U.S. 1, 12 (1891). See also Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen,
244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917); Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920);
Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 55 (1932). The Jones Act, under which injured sea-
men may maintain an action at law for damages, has been reviewed as an exercise
of legislative power deducible from the Admiralty Clause. Panama R.R. v. Johnson,
264 U.S. 375, 386, 388, 391 (1924); Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 360–361 (1959). On the limits to the congressional power, see Panama
R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. at 386–87; Detroit Trust Co. v. The Thomas Barlum, 293
U.S. 21, 43–44 (1934).
868 Thus, Justice McReynolds’ assertion of the paramountcy of congressional power
in Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917), was not disputed by the
four dissenters in that case and is confirmed in subsequent cases critical of Jensen
which in effect invite congressional modification of maritime law. E.g., Davis v. De-
partment of Labor and Industries, 317 U.S. 249 (1942). The nature of maritime law
has excited some relevant controversy. In American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1
Pet.) 516, 545 (1828), Chief Justice Marshall declared that admiralty cases do not
“arise under the Constitution or laws of the United States” but “are as old as navi-
gation itself; and the law, admiralty and maritime as it has existed for ages, is ap-
plied by our Courts to the cases as they arise.” In Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959), the plaintiff sought a jury trial in federal court
on a seaman’s suit for personal injury on an admiralty claim, contending that cases
arising under the general maritime law are “civil actions” that arise “under the Con-
stitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Five Justices in
an opinion by Justice Frankfurter disagreed. Maritime cases do not arise under the
Constitution or laws of the United States for federal question purposes and must,
absent diversity, be instituted in admiralty where there is no jury trial. The dissent-
ing four, Justice Brennan for himself and Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black
and Douglas, contended that maritime law, although originally derived from interna-
tional sources, is operative within the United States only by virtue of having been
accepted and adopted pursuant to Article III, and accordingly judicially originated
rules formulated under authority derived from that Article are “laws” of the United
States to the same extent as those enacted by Congress.
mitted on the high seas or other navigable waters, and (2) those
involving contracts and transactions connected with shipping em-
ployed on the seas or navigable waters. In the first category, which
includes prize cases and torts, injuries, and crimes committed on
the high seas, jurisdiction is determined by the locality of the act,
while in the second category subject matter is the primary determi-
native factor.869 Specifically, contract cases include suits by seamen
for wages,870 cases arising out of marine insurance policies,871 ac-
tions for towage 872 or pilotage 873 charges, actions on bottomry or
respondentia bonds,874 actions for repairs on a vessel already used
in navigation,875 contracts of affreightment,876 compensation for tem-
869 DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Justice
Story); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 441 (1847).

870 Sheppard v. Taylor, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 675, 710 (1831). A seaman employed by
the government making a claim for wages cannot proceed in admiralty but must
bring his action under the Tucker Act in the Court of Claims or in the district court
if his claim does not exceed $10,000. Amell v. United States, 384 U.S. 158 (1966). In
Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961), an oral agreement between a sea-
man and a shipowner whereby the latter in consideration of the seaman’s forbear-
ance to press his maritime right to maintenance and cure promised to assume the
consequences of improper treatment of the seaman at a Public Health Service Hos-
pital was held to be a maritime contract. See also Archawski v. Hanioti, 350 U.S.
532 (1956).
871 Insurance Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 31 (1871); Wilburn Boat Co.
v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955). Whether admiralty jurisdiction ex-
ists if the vessel is not engaged in navigation or commerce when the insurance claim
arises is open to question. Jeffcott v. Aetna Ins. Co., 129 F.2d 582 (2d Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 317 U.S. 663 (1942). Contracts and agreements to procure marine insur-
ance are outside the admiralty jurisdiction. Compagnie Francaise De Navigation A
Vapeur v. Bonnasse, 19 F.2d 777 (2d Cir. 1927).
872 Knapp, Stout & Co. v. McCaffrey, 177 U.S. 638 (1900). For recent Court dif-
ficulties with exculpatory features of such contracts, see Bisso v. Inland Waterways
Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955); Boston Metals Co. v. The Winding Gulf, 349 U.S. 122
(1955); United States v. Nielson, 349 U.S. 129 (1955); Southwestern Sugar & Molas-
ses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411 (1959); Dixilyn Drilling Corp. v. Cres-
cent Towage & Salvage Co., 372 U.S. 697 (1963).
873 Atlee v. Packet Co., 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 389 (1875); Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S.
(13 Wall.) 236 (1872). See also Sun Oil v. Dalzell Towing Co., 287 U.S. 291 (1932).
874 The Grapeshot, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 129 (1870); O’Brien v. Miller, 168 U.S. 287
(1897); The Aurora, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 94 (1816); Delaware Mut. Safety Ins. Co. v.
Gossler, 96 U.S. 645 (1877). But ordinary mortgages even though the securing prop-
erty is a vessel, its gear, or cargo are not considered maritime contracts. Bogart v.
The Steamboat John Jay, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 399 (1854); Detroit Trust Co. v. The
Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 32 (1934).
875 New Bedford Dry Dock Co. v. Purdy, 258 U.S. 96 (1922); The General Smith,
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819). There is admiralty jurisdiction even though the re-
pairs are not to be made in navigable waters but, perhaps, in dry dock. North Pa-
cific SS. Co. v. Hall Brothers Marine R. & S. Co., 249 U.S. 119 (1919). But contracts
and agreements pertaining to the original construction of vessels are not within ad-
miralty jurisdiction. Peoples Ferry Co. v. Joseph Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393 (1858);
North Pacific S.S. Co., 249 U.S. at 127.
876 New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank of Boston, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 344 (1848).

porary wharfage,877 agreements of consortship between the mas-

ters of two vessels engaged in wrecking,878 and surveys of damaged
vessels.879 That is, admiralty jurisdiction “extends to all contracts,
claims and services essentially maritime.” 880 But the courts have
never enunciated an unambiguous test which would enable one to
determine in advance whether or not a given case is maritime.881
“The boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction over contracts—as op-
posed to torts or crimes—being conceptual rather than spatial, have
always been difficult to draw. Precedent and usage are helpful inso-
far as they exclude or include certain common types of con-
tract. . . .” 882
Maritime torts include injuries to persons,883 damages to prop-
erty arising out of collisions or other negligent acts,884 and violent
dispossession of property.885 The Court has expressed a willingness
to “recogniz[e] products liability, including strict liability, as part of
the general maritime law.” 886 Unlike contract cases, maritime tort
jurisdiction historically depended exclusively upon the commission
of the wrongful act upon navigable waters, regardless of any con-
nection or lack of connection with shipping or commerce.887 The Court
has now held, however, that in addition to the requisite situs a sig-
nificant relationship to traditional maritime activity must exist in
order for the admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts to be in-
877 Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68 (1877).
878 Andrews v. Wall, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 568 (1845).
879 Janney v. Columbia Ins. Co., 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 411, 412, 415, 418 (1825);
The Tilton, 23 Fed. Cas. 1277 (No. 14054) (C.C.D. Mass. 1830) (Justice Story).
880 Ex parte Easton, 95 U.S. 68, 72 (1877). See, for a clearing away of some con-
ceptual obstructions to the principle, Exxon Corp. v. Central Gulf Lines, Inc., 500
U.S. 603 (1991).
881 E.g., DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815)
(Justice Story); The Steamboat Orleans v. Phoebus, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 175, 183 (1837);
The People’s Ferry Co. v. Joseph Beers, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 393, 401 (1858); New Eng-
land Marine Ins. Co. v. Dunham, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 1, 26 (1870); Detroit Trust Co. v.
The Thomas Barlum, 293 U.S. 21, 48 (1934).
882 Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731, 735 (1961).
883 The City of Panama, 101 U.S. 453 (1880). Reversing a long-standing rule,
the Court allowed recovery under general maritime law for the wrongful death of a
seaman. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970); Miles v. Apex Marine
Corp., 498 U.S. 19 (1991).
884 The Raithmoor, 241 U.S. 166 (1916); Erie R.R. v. Erie Transportation Co.,
204 U.S. 220 (1907).

885 L’Invincible, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 238 (1816); In re Fassett, 142 U.S. 479 (1892).
886 East River Steamship Corp. v. Transamerica Delaval, 476 U.S. 858 (1986)
(holding, however, that there is no products liability action in admiralty for purely
economic injury to the product itself, unaccompanied by personal injury, and that
such actions should be based on the contract law of warranty).
887 DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed. Cas. 418, 444 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815) (Justice
Story); Philadelphia, W. & B. R.R. v. Philadelphia & Havre De Grace Steam Tow-
boat Co., 64 U.S. (23 How.) 209, 215 (1859); The Plymouth, 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20,
33–34 (1865); Grant-Smith-Porter Ship Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469, 476 (1922).
voked.888 Both the Court and Congress have created exceptions to

the situs test for maritime tort jurisdiction to extend landward the
occasions for certain connected persons or events to come within
admiralty, not without a little controversy.889
From the earliest days of the Republic, the federal courts sit-
ting in admiralty have been held to have exclusive jurisdiction of
prize cases.890 Also, in contrast to other phases of admiralty juris-
diction, prize law as applied by the British courts continued to pro-
vide the basis of American law so far as practicable,891 and so far
as it was not modified by subsequent legislation, treaties, or execu-
tive proclamations. Finally, admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in-
888 Executive Jet Aviation v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249 (1972) (plane crash
in which plane landed wholly fortuitously in navigable waters off the airport run-
way not in admiralty jurisdiction). However, so long as there is maritime activity
and a general maritime commercial nexus, admiralty jurisdiction exists. Foremost
Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668 (1982) (collision of two pleasure boats on navi-
gable waters is within admiralty jurisdiction); Sisson v. Ruby, 497 U.S. 358 (1990)
(fire on pleasure boat docked at marina on navigable water). See also Grubart v.
Great Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527 (1995), a tort claim arising out of
damages allegedly caused by negligently driving piles from a barge into the river-
bed, which weakened a freight tunnel that allowed flooding of the tunnel and the
basements of numerous buildings along the Chicago River. The Court found that
admiralty jurisdiction could be invoked. The location test was satisfied, because the
barge, even though fastened to the river bottom, was a “vessel” for admiralty tort
purposes; the two-part connection test was also satisfied, inasmuch as the incident
had a potential to disrupt maritime commerce and the conduct giving rise to the
incident had a substantial relationship to traditional maritime activity.
889 Thus, the courts have enforced seamen’s claims for maintenance and cure
for injuries incurred on land. O’Donnell v. Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. 36, 41–42 (1943).
The Court has applied the doctrine of seaworthiness to permit claims by longshore-
men injured on land because of some condition of the vessel or its cargo. Gutierrez
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S.
85 (1946); Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). But see Victory Carri-
ers v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971). In the Jones Act, 41 Stat. 1007, 46 U.S.C. § 688,
Congress gave seamen, or their personal representatives, the right to seek compen-
sation from their employers for personal injuries arising out of their maritime em-
ployment. Respecting who is a seaman for Jones Act purposes, see Southwest Ma-
rine, Inc. v. Gizoni, 502 U.S. 81 (1991); McDermott International, Inc. v. Wilander,
498 U.S. 337 (1991). The rights exist even if the injury occurred on land. O’Donnell
v. Great Lakes Co., 318 U.S. at 43; Swanson v. Mara Brothers, 328 U.S. 1, 4 (1946).
In the Extension of Admiralty Jurisdiction Act, 62 Stat. 496, 46 U.S.C. § 740, Con-
gress provided an avenue of relief for persons injured in themselves or their prop-
erty by action of a vessel on navigable water which is consummated on land, as by
the collision of a ship with a bridge. By the 1972 amendments to the Longshore-
men’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, 86 Stat. 1251, amending 33 U.S.C.
§§ 901–950, Congress broadened the definition of “navigable waters” to include in
certain cases adjoining piers, wharfs, etc., and modified the definition of “employee”
to mean any worker “engaged in maritime employment” within the prescribed mean-
ings, thus extending the Act shoreward and changing the test of eligibility from “si-
tus” alone to the “situs” of the injury and the “status” of the injured.
890 Jennings v. Carson, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 2 (1807); Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.)
583 (1858).
891 Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 191 (1815); The Siren,
80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 389, 393 (1871).

cludes the seizure and forfeiture of vessels engaged in activities in

violation of the laws of nations or municipal law, such as illicit trade,892
infraction of revenue laws,893 and the like. 894
Admiralty Proceedings.—Procedure in admiralty jurisdiction
differs in few respects from procedure in actions at law, but the dif-
ferences that do exist are significant.895 Suits in admiralty tradition-
ally took the form of a proceeding in rem against the vessel, and,
with exceptions to be noted, such proceedings in rem are confined
exclusively to federal admiralty courts, because the grant of exclu-
sive jurisdiction to the federal courts by the Judiciary Act of 1789
has been interpreted as referring to the traditional admiralty ac-
tion, the in rem action, which was unknown to the common law.896
The savings clause in that Act under which a state court may en-
tertain actions by suitors seeking a common-law remedy preserves
to the state tribunals the right to hear actions at law where a common-
law remedy or a new remedy analogous to a common-law remedy
exists.897 Concurrent jurisdiction thus exists for the adjudication of
in personam maritime causes of action against the owner of the ves-
sel, and a plaintiff may ordinarily choose whether to bring his ac-
tion in a state court or a federal court.
Forfeiture to the crown for violation of the laws of the sover-
eign was in English law an exception to the rule that admiralty
has exclusive jurisdiction over in rem maritime actions and was thus
considered a common-law remedy. Although the Supreme Court some-
times has used language that would confine all proceedings in rem
892 Hudson v. Guestier, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 293 (1808).

893 The Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); Church v. Hubbard, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.)
187 (1804); The Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 406 (1805).
894 The Brig Ann, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 289 (1815); The Sarah, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 391
(1823); Maul v. United States, 274 U.S. 501 (1927).

895 Gilmore & Black, supra at 30–33. There are no longer separate rules of pro-
cedure governing admiralty, unification of civil admiralty procedures being achieved

in 1966. 7 A J. Moore’s Federal Practice §§ .01 et seq (New York: 1971).
896 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411 (1866); The Hine v. Trevor, 71 U.S.
(4 Wall.) 555 (1867). But see Taylor v. Carryl, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 583 (1858). In Madruga
v. Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556 (1954), the jurisdiction of a state court over a parti-
tion suit at the instance of the majority shipowners was upheld on the ground that
the cause of action affected only the interest of the defendant minority shipowners
and therefore was in personam. Justice Frankfurter’s dissent argued: “If this is not
an action against the thing, in the sense which that has meaning in the law, then
the concepts of a res and an in rem proceeding have an esoteric meaning that I do
not understand.” Id. at 564.
897 After conferring “exclusive” jurisdiction in admiralty and maritime cases on
the federal courts, § 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 77, added “saving to suit-
ors, in all cases the right of a common law remedy, where the common law is com-
petent to give it. . . .” Fixing the concurrent federal-state line has frequently been a
source of conflict within the Court. Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
to admiralty courts,898 such actions in state courts have been sus-

tained in cases of forfeiture arising out of violations of state law.899
Perhaps the most significant admiralty court difference in pro-
cedure from civil courts is the absence of a jury trial in admiralty
actions, with the admiralty judge trying issues of fact as well as of
law.900 Indeed, the absence of a jury in admiralty proceedings ap-
pears to have been one of the principal reasons why the English
government vested a broad admiralty jurisdiction in the colonial vice-
admiralty courts, since they provided a forum where the English
authorities could enforce the Navigation Laws without “the obsti-
nate resistance of American juries.” 901
Territorial Extent of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction.—
Although he was a vigorous exponent of the expansion of admi-
ralty jurisdiction, Justice Story for the Court in The Steamboat Thomas
Jefferson 902 adopted a restrictive English rule confining admiralty
jurisdiction to the high seas and upon rivers as far as the ebb and
flow of the tide extended.903 The demands of commerce on western
waters led Congress to enact a statute extending admiralty jurisdic-
tion over the Great Lakes and connecting waters,904 and in The Genes-
see Chief v. Fitzhugh 905 Chief Justice Taney overruled The Thomas
Jefferson and dropped the tidal ebb and flow requirement. This rul-
ing laid the basis for subsequent judicial extension of jurisdiction
over all waters, salt or fresh, tidal or not, which are navigable in
fact.906 Some of the older cases contain language limiting jurisdic-
898 The Moses Taylor, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 411, 431 (1867).
899 C. J. Henry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133 (1943).
900 The Vengeance, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 297 (1796); The Schooner Sally, 6 U.S. (2
Cr.) 406 (1805); The Schooner Betsy, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 443 (1808); The Whelan, 11 U.S.
(7 Cr.) 112 (1812); The Samuel, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 9 (1816). If diversity of citizen-
ship and the requisite jurisdictional amounts are present, a suitor may sue on the
“law side” of the federal court and obtain a jury. Romero v. International Terminal
Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 362–363 (1959). Jones Act claims, 41 Stat. 1007 (1920),
46 U.S.C. § 688, may be brought on the “law side” with a jury, Panama R.R. Co. v.
Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924), and other admiralty claims joined with a Jones Act
claim may be submitted to a jury. Romero, supra; Fitzgerald v. United States Lines
Co., 374 U.S. 16 (1963). There is no constitutional barrier to congressional provision
of jury trials in admiralty. Genessee Chief v. Fitzhugh, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851);
Fitzgerald v. United States Lines Co., 374 U.S. 16, 20 (1963).
901 C. J. Henry Co. v. Moore, 318 U.S. 133, 141 (1943).
902 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 428 (1825). On the political background of this decision,
see 1 C. Warren, supra at 633–35.

903 The tidal ebb and flow limitation was strained in some of its applications.
Peyroux v. Howard, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 324 (1833); Waring v. Clarke, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
441 (1847).
904 5 Stat. 726 (1845).
905 53 U.S. (12 How.) 443 (1851).
906 Some of the early cases include The Magnolia, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 296 (1857);
The Eagle, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 15 (1868); The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557 (1871).
The fact that the body of water is artificial presents no barrier to admiralty jurisdic-
tion to navigable waters which form some link in an interstate or

international waterway or some link in commerce,907 but these date
from the time when it was thought the commerce power furnished
the support for congressional legislation in this field.
Admiralty and Federalism.—Extension of admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction to navigable waters within a state does not, how-
ever, of its own force include general or political powers of govern-
ment. Thus, in the absence of legislation by Congress, the states
through their courts may punish offenses upon their navigable wa-
ters and upon the sea within one marine league of the shore.908
Determination of the boundaries of admiralty jurisdiction is a
judicial function, and “no State law can enlarge it, nor can an act
of Congress or a rule of court make it broader than the judicial power
may determine to be its true limits.” 909 But, as with other jurisdic-
tions of the federal courts, admiralty jurisdiction can only be exer-
cised under acts of Congress vesting it in federal courts.910
The boundaries of federal and state competence, both legisla-
tive and judicial, in this area remain imprecise, and federal judi-
cial determinations have notably failed to supply definiteness. Dur-
ing the last century, the Supreme Court generally permitted two
overlapping systems of law to coexist in an uneasy relationship. The
federal courts in admiralty applied the general maritime law,911 supple-
mented in some instances by state law which created and defined
certain causes of action.912 Because the Judiciary Act of 1789 saved
to suitors common-law remedies, persons suing in state courts or
in federal courts in diversity of citizenship actions could look to
common-law and statutory doctrines for relief in maritime-related
tion. Ex parte Boyer, 109 U.S. 629 (1884); The Robert W. Parsons, 191 U.S. 17 (1903).
In United States v. Appalachian Power Co., 311 U.S. 377 (1940), it was made clear
that maritime jurisdiction extends to include waterways which by reasonable im-
provement can be made navigable. “It has long been settled that the admiralty and
maritime jurisdiction of the United States includes all navigable waters within the
country.” Southern S.S. Co. v. NLRB, 316 U.S. 31, 41 (1942).
907 E.g., The Daniel Ball, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 557, 563 (1870); The Montello, 87
U.S. (20 Wall.) 430, 441–42 (1874).

908 United States v. Bevans, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 336 (1818); Manchester v. Mas-
sachusetts, 139 U.S. 240 (1891).

909 The Steamer St. Lawrence, 66 U.S. (1 Bl.) 522, 527 (1862).
910 Janney v. Columbia Ins. Co., 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 411, 418 (1825); The Lot-
tawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 576 (1875).

911 E.g., New Jersey Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants’ Bank of Boston, 47 U.S.
(6 How.) 344 (1848); The Steamboat New York v. Rea, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 223 (1856);
The China, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 53 (1868); Ex parte McNiel, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 236 (1872);
La Bourgogne, 210 U.S. 95 (1908).
912 The General Smith, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 438 (1819); The Lottawanna, 88 U.S.
(21 Wall.) 558 (1875) (enforcing state laws giving suppliers and repairmen liens on
ships supplied and repaired). Another example concerns state-created wrongful death
actions. The Hamilton, 207 U.S. 398 (1907).
cases in which the actions were noticeable.913 In Southern Pacific

Co. v. Jensen,914 a sharply divided Court held that New York could
not constitutionally apply its workmen’s compensation system to em-
ployees injured or killed on navigable waters. For the Court, Jus-
tice McReynolds reasoned “that the general maritime law, as ac-
cepted by the federal courts, constituted part of our national law,
applicable to matters within the admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion.” 915 Recognizing that “it would be difficult, if not impossible,
to define with exactness just how far the general maritime law may
be changed, modified or affected by state legislation,” still it was
certain that “no such legislation is valid if it works material preju-
dice to the characteristic features of the general maritime law, or
interferes with the proper harmony or uniformity of that law in its
international and interstate relations.” 916 The “savings to suitors”
clause was unavailing because the workmen’s compensation stat-
ute created a remedy “of a character wholly unknown to the com-
mon law, incapable of enforcement by the ordinary processes of any
court and is not saved to suitors from the grant of exclusive juris-
diction.” 917
Congress required three opportunities to legislate to meet the
problem created by the decision, the lack of remedy for maritime
workers to recover for injuries resulting from the negligence of their
employers. First, Congress enacted a statute saving to claimants
their rights and remedies under state workmen’s compensation laws.918
The Court invalidated it as an unconstitutional delegation of legis-
lative power to the states. “The Constitution itself adopted and es-
tablished, as part of the laws of the United States, approved rules
913 E.g., Hazard’s Administrator v. New England Marine Ins. Co., 33 U.S. (8 Pet.)
557 (1834); The Belfast, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 624 (1869); American Steamboat Co. v.
Chase, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 522 (1872); Quebec Steamship Co. v. Merchant, 133 U.S.
375 (1890); Belden v. Chase, 150 U.S. 674 (1893); Homer Ramsdell Transp. Co. v. La
Compagnie Gen. Transatlantique, 182 U.S. 406 (1901).
914 244 U.S. 205 (1917). The worker here had been killed, but the same result
was reached in a case of nonfatal injury. Clyde S.S. Co. v. Walker, 244 U.S. 255
(1917). In Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918), the Jensen holding
was applied to preclude recovery in a negligence action against the injured party’s
employer under state law. Under The Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903), the employee
had a maritime right to wages, maintenance, and cure.
915 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 215 (1917).
916 244 U.S. at 216.
917 244 U.S. at 218. There were four dissenters: Justices Holmes, Pitney, Brandeis,
and Clarke. The Jensen dissent featured such Holmesian epigrams as: “[J]udges do
and must legislate, but they can do so only interstitially; they are confined from
molar to molecular motions,” id. at 221, and the famous statement supporting the
assertion that supplementation of maritime law had to come from state law because
“[t]he common law is not a brooding omnipresence in the sky but the articulate voice
of some sovereign or quasi-sovereign that can be identified. . . . It always is the law
of some State. . . .” Id. at 222.
918 40 Stat. 395 (1917).
of the general maritime law and empowered Congress to legislate

in respect of them and other matters within the admiralty and mari-
time jurisdiction. Moreover, it took from the states all power, by leg-
islation or judicial decision, to contravene the essential purposes of,
or to work material injury to, characteristic features of such law or
to interfere with its proper harmony and uniformity in its interna-
tional and interstate relations.” 919 Second, Congress reenacted the
law but excluded masters and crew members of vessels from those
who might claim compensation for maritime injuries.920
The Court found this effort unconstitutional as well, because “the
manifest purpose [of the statute] was to permit any State to alter
the maritime law and thereby introduce conflicting require-
ments.” 921 Finally, in 1927, Congress passed the Longshoremen’s and
Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, which provided accident com-
pensation for injuries, including those resulting in death, sustained
on navigable waters by employees, other than members of the crew,
whenever “recovery . . . may not validly be provided by State law.” 922
With certain exceptions,923 the federal-state conflict since Jensen
has taken place with regard to three areas: (1) the interpretation
of federal and state bases of relief for injuries and death as af-
fected by the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation
Act; (2) the interpretation of federal and state bases of relief for
personal injuries by maritime workers as affected by the Jones Act;
and (3) the application of state law to permit recovery in maritime
wrongful death cases in which until recently there was no federal
maritime right to recover.924
919 Knickerbocker Ice Co. v. Stewart, 253 U.S. 149, 160 (1920). The decision was
again 5-to-4 with the same dissenters.

920 42 Stat. 634 (1922).
921 Washington v. Dawson & Co., 264 U.S. 219, 228 (1924). Holmes and Brandeis
remained of the four dissenters and again dissented.

922 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950. In 1984, the stat-
ute was renamed the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. Pub. L.
98–426.
923 E.g., Maryland Casualty Co. v. Cushing, 347 U.S. 409 (1954) (state direct
action statute applies against insurers implicated in a marine accident); Wilburn

Boat Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., 348 U.S. 310 (1955) (state statute determines
effect of breach of warranty in marine insurance contract); Southwestern Sugar &
Molasses Co. v. River Terminals Corp., 360 U.S. 411 (1959); Bisso v. Inland Water-
ways Corp., 349 U.S. 85 (1955) (federal rather than state law determines effect of
exculpatory provisions in towage contracts); Kossick v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S.
731 (1961) (state statute of frauds inapplicable to oral contract for medical care be-
tween seaman and employer).
924 Jensen, though much criticized, is still the touchstone of the decisional pro-
cess in this area with its emphasis on the general maritime law. E.g., Pope & Talbot
v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique,
358 U.S. 625 (1959). In Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325, 337–44
(1973), the Court, in holding that the states may constitutionally exercise their po-
(1) The principal difficulty here was that after Jensen the Su-
preme Court did not maintain the line between permissible and im-
permissible state-authorized recovery at the water’s edge, but cre-
ated a “maritime but local” exception, by which some injuries incurred
in or on navigable waters could be compensated under state work-
men’s compensation laws or state negligence laws.925 “The applica-
tion of the State Workmen’s Compensation Acts has been sustained
where the work of the employee has been deemed to have no direct
relation to navigation or commerce and the operation of the local
law ‘would work no material prejudice to the essential features of
the general maritime law.’ ” 926 Because Congress provided in the
Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act for recov-
ery under the Act “if recovery . . . may not validly be provided by
State law,” 927 it was held that the “maritime but local” exception
had been statutorily perpetuated,928 thus creating the danger for
injured workers or their survivors that they might choose to seek
relief by the wrong avenue to their prejudice. This danger was sub-
sequently removed by the Court when it recognized that there was
a “twilight zone,” a “shadowy area,” in which recovery under either
the federal law or a state law could be justified, and held that in
such a “twilight zone” the injured party should be enabled to re-
cover under either.929 Then, in Calbeck v. Travelers Ins. Co.,930 the
Court virtually read out of the Act its inapplicability when compen-
sation would be afforded by state law and held that Congress’s in-
tent in enacting the statute was to extend coverage to all workers
who sustain injuries while on navigable waters of the United States
lice powers respecting maritime activities concurrently with the Federal Govern-
ment, such as by providing for liability for oil spill damages, noted that Jensen and
its progeny, although still possessing vitality, have been confined to their facts; thus,
it is only with regard “to suits relating to the relationship of vessels, plying the high
seas and our navigable waters, and to their crews” that state law is proscribed. Id.
at 344. See also Sun Ship v. Pennsylvania, 447 U.S. 715 (1980).
925 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Grant-Smith-Porter Ship
Co. v. Rohde, 257 U.S. 469 (1922); State Industrial Comm’n v. Nordenholt Corp.,
259 U.S. 263 (1922); Miller’s Indemnity Underwriters v. Braud, 270 U.S. 59 (1926).
The exception continued to be applied following enactment of the Longshoremen’s
and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act. See cases cited in Davis v. Department of
Labor and Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 253–254 (1942).
926 Crowell v. Benson, 285 U.S. 22, 39 n.3 (1932). The internal quotation is from
Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233, 242 (1921).

927 § 3(a), 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), 33 U.S.C. § 903(a).
928 Crowell v. Benson, 284 U.S. 22, 39, (1932); Davis v. Department of Labor
and Industries, 317 U.S. 249, 252–53 (1942).

929 Davis v. Dept of Labor and Industries, 317 U.S. 249 (1942). The quoted phrases
appear at id. at 253, 256. See also Hahn v. Ross Island Sand & Gravel Co., 358 U.S.
272 (1959).
930 370 U.S. 114 (1962). In the 1972 amendments, § 2, 86 Stat. 1251, amending
33 U.S.C. § 903(a), Congress ratified Calbeck by striking out “if recovery . . . may
not validly be provided by State law.”
whether or not a particular injury was also within the constitu-

tional reach of a state workmen’s compensation law or other law.
By the 1972 amendments to the LHWCA, Congress extended the
law shoreward by refining the tests of “employee” and “navigable
waters,” so as to reach piers, wharfs, and the like in certain circum-
stances.931
(2) The passage of the Jones Act 932 gave seamen a statutory
right of recovery for negligently inflicted injuries on which they could
sue in state or federal courts. Because injured parties could obtain
a jury trial in Jones Act suits, there was little attempted recourse
under the savings clause 933 to state law claims and thus no need
to explore the line between applicable and inapplicable state law.
But in the 1940s personal injury actions based on unseaworthi-
ness 934 were given new life by Court decisions for seamen; 935 and
the right was soon extended to longshoremen who were injured while
on board ship or while working on the dock if the injury could be
attributed either to the ship’s gear or its cargo.936 While these ac-
tions could have been brought in state court, federal law sup-
planted state law even with regard to injuries sustained in state
territorial waters.937 The 1972 LHWCA amendments, however, elimi-
931 86 Stat. 1251, § 2, amending 33 U.S.C. § 902. The Court had narrowly turned
back an effort to achieve this result through construction in Nacirema Operating

Co. v. Johnson, 396 U.S. 212 (1969). See also Victory Carriers v. Law, 404 U.S. 202
(1971). On the interpretation of the amendments, see Northeast Marine Terminal
Co. v. Caputo, 432 U.S. 249 (1977); Director, Office of Workers Compensation Pro-
grams v. Perini, 459 U.S. 297 (1983).
932 41 Stat. 1007 (1920), 46 U.S.C. § 688. For the prior-Jones Act law, see The
Osceola, 189 U.S. 158 (1903).

933 “Cases of Admiralty and Maritime Jurisdiction,” supra.
934 Unseaworthiness “is essentially a species of liability without fault, analo-
gous to other well known instances in our law. Derived from and shaped to meet
the hazards which performing the service imposes, the liability is neither limited by
conceptions of negligence nor contractual in character. . . . [T]he owner’s duty to fur-
nish a seaworthy ship is absolute and completely independent of his duty under the
Jones Act to exercise reasonable care.” Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, 362 U.S. 539, 549
(1960).
935 Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944). See also Mitchell v. Trawler
Racer, 362 U.S. 539 (1960); Michalic v. Cleveland Tankers, 364 U.S. 325 (1960); Waldron
v. Moore-McCormack Lines, 386 U.S. 724 (1967).
936 Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946); Pope & Talbot v. Hawn,
346 U.S. 406 (1953); Alaska S.S. Co. v. Patterson, 347 U.S. 396 (1954); Gutierrez v.
Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); But see Usner v. Luckenback Overseas
Corp., 400 U.S. 494 (1971); Victory Carriers v. Law, 404 U.S. 202 (1971).
937 Garrett v. Moore-McCormack Co., 317 U.S. 239 (1942); McAllister v. Magno-
lia Petroleum Co., 357 U.S. 221 (1958); Kermarec v. Compagnie Generale
Transatlantique, 358 U.S. 625 (1959).
nated unseaworthiness recoveries by persons covered by the Act and

substituted a recovery under the LHWCA itself for injuries caused
by negligence.938
(3) In The Harrisburg,939 the Court held that maritime law did
not afford an action for wrongful death, a position to which the Court
adhered until 1970.940 The Jones Act,941 the Death on the High Seas
Act,942 and the Longshoremen’s and Harbor Workers’ Compensa-
tion Act 943 created causes of action for wrongful death, but for cases
not falling within one of these laws the federal courts looked to state
wrongful death and survival statutes.944 Thus, in The Tungus v.
Skovgaard,945 the Court held that a state wrongful death statute
encompassed claims both for negligence and unseaworthiness in the
instance of a land-based worker killed when on board ship in navi-
gable water; the Court divided five-to-four, however, in holding that
the standards of the duties to furnish a seaworthy vessel and to
use due care were created by the state law as well and not fur-
nished by general maritime concepts.946 And, in Hess v. United
938 86 Stat. 1263, § 18, amending 33 U.S.C. § 905. On the negligence standards
under the amendment, see Scindia Steam Navigation Co., v. De Los Santos, 451 U.S.
156 (1981).
939 119 U.S. 199 (1886). Subsequent cases are collected in Moragne v. States Ma-
rine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).

940 Moragne v. States Marine Lines, 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
941 41 Stat. 1007 (1920). 46 U.S.C. § 688. Recovery could be had if death re-
sulted from injuries because of negligence but not from unseaworthiness.

942 41 Stat. 537 (1920), 46 U.S.C. §§ 761 et seq. The Act applies to deaths caused
by negligence occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of
any state. In Rodrique v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 395 U.S. 352 (1969), a unani-
mous Court held that this Act did not apply in cases of deaths on the artificial is-
lands created on the continental shelf for oil drilling purposes but that the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act, 67 Stat. 462 (1953), 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331 et seq., incorpo-
rated the laws of the adjacent state, so that Louisiana law governed. See also Chev-
ron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 (1971); Gulf Offshore Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453
U.S. 473 (1981). However, in Offshore Logistics, Inc. v. Tallentire, 477 U.S. 207 (1986),
the Court held that the Act is the exclusive wrongful death remedy in the case of
OCS platform workers killed in a helicopter crash 35 miles off shore en route to
shore from a platform.
943 44 Stat. 1424 (1927), as amended, 33 U.S.C. §§ 901–950.
944 Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 U.S. 233 (1921); Just v. Chambers, 312 U.S.
383 (1941); Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648 (1953).

945 358 U.S. 588 (1959).
946 Justice Brennan, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black and Doug-
las, argued that the extent of the duties owed the decedent while on board ship
should be governed by federal maritime law, though the cause of action originated
in a state statute, just as would have been the result had decedent survived his
injuries. See also United N.Y. & N.J. Sandy Hooks Pilot Ass’n v. Halecki, 358 U.S.
613 (1959).
States,947 a suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act for recovery for
a death by drowning in a navigable Oregon river of an employee of
a contractor engaged in repairing the federally owned Bonneville
Dam, a divided Court held that liability was to be measured by the
standard of care expressed in state law, notwithstanding that the
standard was higher than that required by maritime law. One area
existed, however, in which beneficiaries of a deceased seaman were
denied recovery.
The Jones Act provided a remedy for wrongful death resulting
from negligence, but not for one caused by unseaworthiness alone;
in Gillespie v. United States Steel Corp.,948 the Court held that the
survivors of a seaman drowned while working on a ship docked in
an Ohio port could not recover under the state wrongful death stat-
ute even though the act recognized unseaworthiness as a basis for
recovery, the Jones Act having superseded state laws.
Thus did matters stand until 1970, when the Court, in a unani-
mous opinion in Moragne v. States Marine Lines,949 overruled its
earlier cases and held that a right of recovery for wrongful death is
sanctioned by general maritime law and that no statute is needed
to bring the right into being. The Court was careful to note that
the cause of action created in Moragne would not, like the state
wrongful death statutes in Gillespie, be held precluded by the Jones
Act, so that the survivor of a seaman killed in navigable waters
within a state would have a cause of action for negligence under
the Jones Act or for unseaworthiness under the general maritime
law.950
Cases to Which the United States Is a Party

Right of the United States to Sue.—In the first edition of his
Treatise, Justice Story noted that while “an express power is no where
947 361 U.S. 314 (1960). The four Tungus dissenters joined two of the Tungus
majority solely “under compulsion” of the Tungus ruling; the other three majority
Justices dissented on the ground that application of the state statute unacceptably
disrupted the uniformity of maritime law.
948 379 U.S. 148 (1964). The decision was based on dictum in Lindgren v. United
States, 281 U.S. 38 (1930), to the effect that the Jones Act remedy was exclusive.
949 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
950 398 U.S. at 396 n.12. For development of the law under Moragne, see Sea-
Land Services v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974); Miles v. Apex Marine Corp., 498 U.S.
19 (1990); and Norfolk Shipbuilding and Drydock Co. v. Garris, 532 U.S. 811 (2001)
(maritime cause of action for death caused by violation of the duty of seaworthiness
is equally applicable to death resulting from negligence). But, in Yamaha Motor Corp.
v. Calhoun, 516 U.S. 199 (1996), a case involving a death in territorial waters from
a jet ski accident, the Court held that Moragne does not provide the exclusive rem-
edy in cases involving the death in territorial waters of a “nonseafarer”—a person
who is neither a seaman covered by the Jones Act nor a longshore worker covered
by the LHWCA.
given in the constitution,” the right of the United States to sue in

its own courts “is clearly implied in that part respecting the judi-
cial power. . . . Indeed, all the usual incidents appertaining to a
personal sovereign, in relation to contracts, and suing, and enforc-
ing rights, so far as they are within the scope of the powers of the
government, belong to the United States, as they do to other sover-
eigns.” 951 As early as 1818, the Supreme Court ruled that the United
States could sue in its own name in all cases of contract without
congressional authorization of such suits.952 Later, this rule was ex-
tended to other types of actions. In the absence of statutory provi-
sions to the contrary, such suits are initiated by the Attorney Gen-
eral in the name of the United States.953
By the Judiciary Act of 1789, and subsequent amendments to
it, Congress has vested in the federal district courts jurisdiction to
hear all suits of a civil nature at law or in equity brought by the
United States as party plaintiff.954 As in other judicial proceedings,
the United States, like any party plaintiff, must have an interest
in the subject matter and a legal right to the remedy sought.955 Un-
der the long-settled principle that the courts have the power to abate
public nuisances at the suit of the government, the provision in § 208(2)
of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1949, authorizing fed-
eral courts to enjoin strikes that imperil national health or safety
was upheld on the grounds that the statute entrusts the courts with
the determination of a “case or controversy” on which the judicial
power can operate and does not impose any legislative, executive,
or non-judicial function. Moreover, the fact that the rights sought
to be protected were those of the public in unimpeded production
951 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 1274 (1833),
(emphasis in original).
952 Dugan v. United States, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 172 (1818).
953 United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888); United States v.
Beebe, 127 U.S. 338 (1888); United States v. Bell Telephone Co., 128 U.S. 315 (1888).
Whether without statutory authorization the United States may sue to protect the
constitutional rights of its citizens has occasioned conflict. Compare United States v.
Brand Jewelers, 318 F. Supp. 1293 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), and United States v. Brittain,
319 F. Supp. 1658 (S.D.Ala. 1970), with United States v. Mattson, 600 F.2d 1295
(9th Cir. 1979), and United States v. Solomon, 563 F.2d 1121 (4th Cir. 1977). The
result in Mattson and Solomon was altered by specific authorization in the Civil
Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act, Pub. L. 96–247, 94 Stat. 349 (1980), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1997 et seq. See also United States v. City of Philadelphia, 644 F.2d 187 (3d Cir.
1980) (no standing to sue to correct allegedly unconstitutional police practices).
954 28 U.S.C. § 1345. By virtue of the fact that the original jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court extends only to those cases enumerated in the Constitution, jurisdic-
tion over suits brought by the United States against persons or corporations is vested
in the lower federal courts. Suits by the United States against a state may be brought
in the Supreme Court under its original jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(b)(2), al-
though such suits may also be brought in the district courts. Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92, 97 (1946).
955 United States v. San Jacinto Tin Co., 125 U.S. 273 (1888).
in industries vital to public health, as distinguished from the pri-

vate rights of labor and management, was held not to alter the ad-
versary (“case or controversy”) nature of the litigation instituted by
the United States as the guardian of the aforementioned rights.956
Also, by reason of the highest public interest in the fulfillment of
all constitutional guarantees, “including those that bear . . . di-
rectly on private rights, . . . it [is] perfectly competent for Con-
gress to authorize the United States to be the guardian of that pub-
lic interest in a suit for injunctive relief.” 957
Suits Against States.—Controversies to which the United States
is a party include suits brought against states as party defendants.
The first such suit occurred in United States v. North Carolina,958
which was an action by the United States to recover upon bonds
issued by North Carolina. Although no question of jurisdiction was
raised, in deciding the case on its merits in favor of the state, the
Court tacitly assumed that it had jurisdiction of such cases. The
issue of jurisdiction was directly raised by Texas a few years later
in a bill in equity brought by the United States to determine the
boundary between Texas and the Territory of Oklahoma, and the
Court sustained its jurisdiction over strong arguments by Texas to
the effect that it could not be sued by the United States without its
consent and that the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction did not
extend to cases to which the United States is a party.959 Stressing
the inclusion within the judicial power of cases to which the United
States and a state are parties, the elder Justice Harlan pointed out
that the Constitution made no exception of suits brought by the United
States. In effect, therefore, consent to be sued by the United States
“was given by Texas when admitted to the Union upon an equal
footing in all respects with the other States.” 960
Suits brought by the United States have, however, been infre-
quent. All of them have arisen since 1889, and they have become
somewhat more common since 1926. That year the Supreme Court
decided a dispute between the United States and Minnesota over
956 United Steelworkers v. United States, 361 U.S. 39, 43–44 (1960), citing In re
Debs, 158 U.S. 564 (1895).

957 United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960), upholding jurisdiction of the
federal court over an action to enjoin state officials from discriminating against African-
American citizens seeking to vote in state elections. See also Oregon v. Mitchell, 400
U.S. 112 (1970), in which two of the four cases considered were actions by the United
States to enjoin state compliance with the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970.
958 136 U.S. 211 (1890).
959 United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621 (1892).
960 143 U.S. at 642–46. This suit, it may be noted, was specifically authorized
by the Act of Congress of May 2, 1890, providing for a temporary government for
the Oklahoma territory to determine the ownership of Greer County. 26 Stat. 81,
92, § 25. See also United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699, 701–02 (1950).
land patents issued to the state by the United States in breach of

its trust obligations to the Indian.961 In United States v. West Vir-
ginia,962 the Court refused to take jurisdiction of a suit in equity
brought by the United States to determine the navigability of the
New and Kanawha Rivers on the ground that the jurisdiction in
such suits is limited to cases and controversies and does not ex-
tend to the adjudication of mere differences of opinion between the
officials of the two governments. A few years earlier, however, it had
taken jurisdiction of a suit by the United States against Utah to
quiet title to land forming the beds of certain sections of the Colo-
rado River and its tributaries with the states.963 Similarly, it took
jurisdiction of a suit brought by the United States against Califor-
nia to determine the ownership of and paramount rights over the
submerged land and the oil and gas thereunder off the coast of Cali-
fornia between the low-water mark and the three-mile limit.964 Like
suits were decided against Louisiana and Texas in 1950.965
Immunity of the United States From Suit.—Pursuant to the
general rule that a sovereign cannot be sued in its own courts, the
judicial power does not extend to suits against the United States
unless Congress by statute consents to such suits. This rule first
emanated in embryonic form in an obiter dictum by Chief Justice
Jay in Chisholm v. Georgia, where he indicated that a suit would
not lie against the United States because “there is no power which
the courts can call to their aid.” 966 In Cohens v. Virginia,967 also in
dictum, Chief Justice Marshall asserted, “the universally received
opinion is that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted against the
United States.” The issue was more directly in question in United
States v. Clarke,968 where Chief Justice Marshall stated that, as the
United States is “not suable of common right, the party who insti-
tutes such suit must bring his case within the authority of some
act of Congress, or the court cannot exercise jurisdiction over it.”
He thereupon ruled that the act of May 26, 1830, for the final settle-
ment of land claims in Florida condoned the suit. The doctrine of
the exemption of the United States from suit was repeated in vari-
961 United States v. Minnesota, 270 U.S. 181 (1926). For an earlier suit against
a state by the United States, see United States v. Michigan, 190 U.S. 379 (1903).
962 295 U.S. 463 (1935).
963 United States v. Utah, 283 U.S. 64 (1931).
964 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19 (1947).
965 United States v. Louisiana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950); United States v. Texas, 339
U.S. 707 (1950). See also United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975).
966 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 478 (1793).
967 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 412 (1821).
968 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 436, 444 (1834).
ous subsequent cases, without discussion or examination.969 In-

deed, it was not until United States v. Lee 970 that the Court exam-
ined the rule and the reasons for it, and limited its application
accordingly.
Because suits against the United States can be maintained only
by congressional consent, it follows that they can be brought only
in the manner prescribed by Congress and subject to the restric-
tions imposed.971 As only Congress may waive the immunity of the
United States from liability, officers of the United States are power-
less either to waive such immunity or to confer jurisdiction on a
federal court.972 Even when authorized, suits may be brought only
969 United States v. McLemore, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 286 (1846); Hill v. United States,
50 U.S. (9 How.) 386, 389 (1850); De Groot v. United States, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 419,
431 (1867); United States v. Eckford, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 484, 488 (1868); The Siren,
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 152, 154 (1869); Nichols v. United States, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 122,
126 (1869); The Davis, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 15, 20 (1870); Carr v. United States, 98
U.S. 433, 437–439 (1879). It is also clear that the Federal Government, in the ab-
sence of its consent, is not liable in tort for the negligence of its agents or employ-
ees. Gibbons v. United States, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 269, 275 (1869); Peabody v. United
States, 231 U.S. 530, 539 (1913); Koekuk & Hamilton Bridge Co. v. United States,
260 U.S. 125, 127 (1922). The reason for such immunity, as stated by Justice Holmes
in Kawananakoa v. Polyblank, 205 U.S. 349, 353 (1907), is that “there can be no
legal right as against the authority that makes the law on which the right de-
pends.” See also The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419, 433 (1922). As the Housing Act
does not purport to authorize suits against the United States as such, the question
is whether the Authority—which is clearly an agency of the United States—
partakes of this sovereign immunity. The answer must be sought in the intention of
the Congress. Sloan Shipyards v. United States Fleet Corp., 258 U.S. 549, 570 (1922);
Federal Land Bank v. Priddy, 295 U.S. 229, 231 (1935). This involves a consider-
ation of the extent to which other government-owned corporations have been held
liable for their wrongful acts. 39 Ops. Atty. Gen. 559, 562 (1938).
970 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
971 Lonergan v. United States, 303 U.S. 33 (1938). Waivers of immunity must
be express. Library of Congress v. Shaw, 461 U.S. 273 (1983) (Civil Rights Act pro-
vision that “the United States shall be liable for costs the same as a private person”
insufficient to waive immunity from awards of interest). The result in Shaw was
overturned by a specific waiver. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. 102–166, 106 Stat.
1079, § 113, amending 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–16. Immunity was waived, with limita-
tions, for contracts and takings claims in the Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a)(2). Im-
munity of the United States for the negligence of its employees was waived, again
with limitations, in the Federal Tort Claims Act. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680.
Other waivers of sovereign immunity include Pub. L. 94–574, § 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976),
amending 5 U.S.C. § 702 (waiver for nonstatutory review in all cases save for suits
for money damages); Pub. L. 87–748, § 1(a), 76 Stat. 744 (1962), 28 U.S.C. § 1361
(giving district courts jurisdiction of mandamus actions to compel an officer or em-
ployee of the United States to perform a duty owed to plaintiff); Westfall Act, 102
Stat. 4563, 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (torts of federal employees acting officially), and the
Equal Access to Justice Act, 5 U.S.C. § 504, 28 U.S.C. § 2412 (making United States
liable for awards of attorneys’ fees in some instances when it loses an administra-
tive proceeding or a lawsuit). See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (FSLIC’s “sue-
and-be-sued” clause waives sovereign immunity, but a Bivens implied cause of ac-
tion for constitutional torts cannot be used directly against FSLIC).
972 United States v. New York Rayon Co., 329 U.S. 654 (1947).
in designated courts,973 and this rule applies equally to suits by states

against the United States.974 Congress may also grant or withhold
immunity from suit on behalf of government corporations.975
Suits Against United States Officials.—United States v. Lee,
a 5-to-4 decision, qualified earlier holdings that a judgment affect-
ing the property of the United States was in effect against the United
States, by ruling that title to the Arlington estate of the Lee fam-
ily, then being used as a national cemetery, was not legally vested
in the United States but was being held illegally by army officers
under an unlawful order of the President. In its examination of the
sources and application of the rule of sovereign immunity, the Court
concluded that the rule “if not absolutely limited to cases in which
the United States are made defendants by name, is not permitted
to interfere with the judicial enforcement of the rights of plaintiff
when the United States is not a defendant or a necessary party to
the suit.” 976 Except, nevertheless, for an occasional case like Kan-
sas v. United States,977 which held that a state cannot sue the United
States, most of the cases involving sovereign immunity from suit
since 1883 have been cases against officers, agencies, or corpora-
tions of the United States where the United States has not been
named as a party defendant. Thus, it has been held that a suit against
the Secretary of the Treasury to review his decision on the rate of
duty to be exacted on imported sugar would disturb the whole rev-
enue system of the government and would in effect be a suit against
the United States.978 Even more significant is Stanley v. Schwalby,979
holding that an action of trespass against an army officer to try
title in a parcel of land occupied by the United States as a military
reservation was a suit against the United States because a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiffs would have been a judgment against
the United States.
Subsequent cases reaffirm the rule of United States v. Lee that,
where the right to possession or enjoyment of property under gen-
973 United States v. Shaw, 309 U.S. 495 (1940). Any consent to be sued will not
be held to embrace action in the federal courts unless the language giving consent
is clear. Great Northern Life Ins. Co. v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944).
974 Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S. 382 (1939). The United States was held
here to be an indispensable party defendant in a condemnation proceeding brought

by a state to acquire a right of way over lands owned by the United States and held
in trust for Indian allottees. See also Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273 (1983).
975 Brady v. Roosevelt S.S. Co., 317 U.S. 575 (1943).
976 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196, 207–208 (1882). The Tucker Act, 20 U.S.C.
§ 1346(a)(2), now displaces the specific rule of the case, as it provides jurisdiction
against the United States for takings claims.
977 204 U.S. 331 (1907).
978 Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627, 628 (1914).
979 162 U.S. 255 (1896). Justice Gray endeavored to distinguish between this
case and Lee. Id. at 271. It was Justice Gray who spoke for the dissenters in Lee.
eral law is in issue, the fact that defendants claim the property as
officers or agents of the United States does not make the action one
against the United States until it is determined that they were act-
ing within the scope of their lawful authority.980 On the other hand,
the rule that a suit in which the judgment would affect the United
States or its property is a suit against the United States has also
been repeatedly approved and reaffirmed.981 But, as the Court has
pointed out, it is not “an easy matter to reconcile all of the deci-
sions of the court in this class of cases,” 982 and, as Justice Frank-
furter quite justifiably stated in a dissent, “the subject is not free
from casuistry.” 983 Justice Douglas’ characterization of Land v. Dol-
lar, “this is the type of case where the question of jurisdiction is
dependent on decision of the merits,” 984 is frequently applicable.
Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp.,985 illuminates these obscu-
rities somewhat. A private company sought to enjoin the Adminis-
trator of the War Assets in his official capacity from selling surplus
coal to others than the plaintiff who had originally bought the coal,
only to have the sale cancelled by the Administrator because of the
company’s failure to make an advance payment. Chief Justice Vinson
and a majority of the Court looked upon the suit as one brought
against the Administrator in his official capacity, acting under a valid
statute and therefore a suit against the United States. It held that,
although an officer in such a situation is not immune from suits for
his own torts, his official action, though tortious, cannot be en-
joined or diverted, because it is also the action of the sovereign.986
The Court then proceeded to repeat the rule that “the action of an
officer of the sovereign (be it holding, taking, or otherwise legally
affecting the plaintiff ’s property) can be regarded as so individual
only if it is not within the officer’s statutory powers, or, if within
those powers, only if the powers or their exercise in the particular
980 Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731, 737 (1947).

981 Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906); Louisiana v. Garfield, 211 U.S. 70
(1908); New Mexico v. Lane, 243 U.S. 52 (1917); Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918);
Morrison v. Work, 266 U.S. 481 (1925); Minnesota v. United States, 305 U.S.. 382
(1939); Mine Safety Co. v. Forrestal, 326 U.S. 371 (1945). See also Minnesota v. Hitchcock,
185 U.S. 373 (1902).
982 Cunningham v. Macon & Brunswick R.R., 109 U.S. 446, 451 (1883), quoted
by Chief Justice Vinson in the opinion of the Court in Larson v. Domestic & Foreign
Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
983 Larson, 337 U.S. at 708. Justice Frankfurter’s dissent also contains a useful
classification of immunity cases and an appendix listing them.

984 330 U.S. 731, 735 (1947) (emphasis added).
985 337 U.S. 682 (1949).
986 337 U.S. at 689–97.
case, are constitutionally void.” 987 The Court rejected the conten-
tion that the doctrine of sovereign immunity should be relaxed as
inapplicable to suits for specific relief as distinguished from dam-
age suits, saying: “The Government, as representative of the com-
munity as a whole, cannot be stopped in its tracks by any plaintiff
who presents a disputed question of property or contract right.” 988
Suits against officers involving the doctrine of sovereign immu-
nity have been classified into four general groups by Justice Frank-
furter. First, there are those cases in which the plaintiff seeks an
interest in property which belongs to the government or calls “for
an assertion of what is unquestionably official authority.” 989 Such
suits, of course, cannot be maintained.990 Second, cases in which
action adverse to the interests of a plaintiff is taken under an un-
constitutional statute or one alleged to be so. In general these suits
987 337 U.S. at 701–02. This rule was applied in Goldberg v. Daniels, 231 U.S.
218 (1913), which also involved a sale of government surplus property. After the Sec-
retary of the Navy rejected the highest bid, plaintiff sought mandamus to compel
delivery. This suit was held to be against the United States. See also Perkins v. Lukens
Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), which held that prospective bidders for contracts de-
rive no enforceable rights against a federal official for an alleged misinterpretation
of his government’s authority on the ground that an agent is answerable only to his
principal for misconstruction of instructions, given for the sole benefit of the princi-
pal. In Larson, the Court not only refused to follow Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536
(1926), but in effect overruled it. Goltra involved an attempt of the government to
repossess barges which it had leased under a contract reserving the right to repos-
sess in certain circumstances. A suit to enjoin repossession was held not to be a suit
against the United States on the ground that the actions were personal and in the
nature of a trespass. Also decided in harmony with the Larson decision are the fol-
lowing, wherein the suit was barred as being against the United States: (1) Malone
v. Bowdoin, 369 U.S. 643 (1962), a suit to eject a Forest Service Officer from land
occupied by him in his official capacity under a claim of title from the United States;
and (2) Hawaii v. Gordon, 373 U.S. 57 (1963), an original action by Hawaii against
the Director of the Budget for an order directing him to determine whether a parcel
of federal land could be conveyed to that state. In Dugan v. Rank, 372 U.S. 609
(1963), the Court ruled that inasmuch as the storing and diverting of water at the
Friant Dam resulted, not in a trespass, but in a partial, although a casual day-by-
day, taking of water rights of claimants along the San Joaquin River below the dam,
a suit to enjoin such diversion by Federal Bureau of Reclamation officers was an
action against the United States, for grant of the remedy sought would force aban-
donment of a portion of a project authorized and financed by Congress, and would
prevent fulfillment of contracts between the United States and local Water Utility
Districts. Damages were recoverable in a suit under the Tucker Act. 28 U.S.C. § 1346(a).
988 337 U.S. at 703–04. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting, would have applied the
rule of the Lee case. See Pub. L. 94–574, 1, 90 Stat. 2721 (1976), amending 5 U.S.C.
§ 702 (action seeking relief, except for money damages, against officer, employee, or
agency not to be dismissed as action against United States).
989 Larson v. Domestic & Foreign Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 709–710 (1949) (dissent-
ing opinion).
990 Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906); Louisiana v. McAdoo, 234 U.S. 627
(1914); Wells v. Roper, 246 U.S. 335 (1918). See also Belknap v. Schild, 161 U.S. 10
(1896); International Postal Supply Co. v. Bruce, 194 U.S. 601 (1904).
are maintainable.991 Third, cases involving injury to a plaintiff be-

cause the official has exceeded his statutory authority. In general
these suits are maintainable.992 Fourth, cases in which an officer
seeks immunity behind statutory authority or some other sover-
eign command for the commission of a common law tort.993 This
category of cases presents the greatest difficulties because these suits
can as readily be classified as falling into the first group if the ac-
tion directly or indirectly is one for specific performance or if the
judgment would affect the United States.
Suits Against Government Corporations.—The multiplica-
tion of government corporations during periods of war and depres-
sion has provided one motivation for limiting the doctrine of sover-
eign immunity. In Keifer & Keifer v. RFC,994 the Court held that
the government does not become a conduit of its immunity in suits
against its agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its
work. Nor does the creation of a government corporation confer upon
it legal immunity. Whether Congress endows a public corporation
with governmental immunity in a specific instance is a matter of
ascertaining the congressional will. Moreover, it has been held that
waivers of governmental immunity in the case of federal instrumen-
talities and corporations should be construed liberally.995 On the other
hand, Indian nations are exempt from suit without further congres-
sional authorization; it is as though their former immunity as sov-
ereigns passed to the United States for their benefit, as did their
tribal properties.996
Suits Between Two or More States

The extension of federal judicial power to controversies be-
tween states and the vesting of original jurisdiction in the Su-
991 Rickert Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1936); Tennessee Electric Power
Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939) (holding that one threatened with direct and special
injury by the act of an agent of the government under a statute may challenge the
constitutionality of the statute in a suit against the agent).
992 Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912); Waite v. Macy, 246 U.S.
606 (1918).
993 United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Goltra v. Weeks, 271 U.S. 536
(1926); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S. 82 (1937); Land v. Dollar, 330 U.S. 731 (1947). See
also Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). An
emerging variant is the constitutional tort case, which springs from Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), and which involves different stan-
dards of immunity for officers. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478 (1978); Carlson v.
Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
994 306 U.S. 381 (1939).
995 FHA v. Burr, 309 U.S. 242 (1940). Nonetheless, the Court held that a con-
gressional waiver of immunity in the case of a governmental corporation did not

mean that funds or property of the United States can be levied on to pay a judg-
ment obtained against such a corporation as the result of waiver of immunity.
996 United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (1940).
preme Court of suits to which a state is a party had its origin in

experience. Prior to independence, disputes between colonies claim-
ing charter rights to territory were settled by the Privy Council.
Under the Articles of Confederation, Congress was made “the last
resort on appeal” to resolve “all disputes and differences . . . be-
tween two or more States concerning boundary, jurisdiction, or any
other cause whatever,” and to constitute what in effect were ad hoc
arbitral courts for determining such disputes and rendering a final
judgment therein. When the Philadelphia Convention met in 1787,
serious disputes over boundaries, lands, and river rights involved
ten states.997 It is hardly surprising, therefore, that during its first
60 years the only state disputes coming to the Supreme Court were
boundary disputes 998 or that such disputes constitute the largest
single number of suits between states. Since 1900, however, as the
result of the increasing mobility of population and wealth and the
effects of technology and industrialization, other types of cases have
occurred with increasing frequency.
Boundary Disputes: The Law Applied.—Of the earlier ex-
amples of suits between states, that between New Jersey and New
York 999 is significant for the application of the rule laid down ear-
lier in Chisholm v. Georgia that the Supreme Court may proceed
ex parte if a state refuses to appear when duly summoned. The long
drawn out litigation between Rhode Island and Massachusetts is of
even greater significance for its rulings, after the case had been pend-
ing for seven years, that though the Constitution does not extend
the judicial power to all controversies between states, yet it does
not exclude any,1000 that a boundary dispute is a justiciable and not
a political question,1001 and that a prescribed rule of decision is un-
necessary in such cases. On the last point, Justice Baldwin stated:
“The submission by the sovereigns, or states, to a court of law or
equity, of a controversy between them, without prescribing any rule
of decision, gives power to decide according to the appropriate law
of the case (11 Ves. 294); which depends on the subject-matter, the
source and nature of the claims of the parties, and the law which
governs them. From the time of such submission, the question ceases
to be a political one, to be decided by the sic volo, sic jubeo, of po-
997 Warren, The Supreme Court and Disputes Between States, 34 BULL. OF WIL-
LIAM AND MARY, NO. 4 (1940), 7–11. For a more comprehensive treatment of back-
ground as well as the general subject, see C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE
SOVEREIGN STATES (1924).
998 Id. at 13. However, only three such suits were brought in this period, 1789–
1849. During the next 90 years, 1849–1939, at least twenty-nine such suits were
brought. Id. at 13, 14.
999 New Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 284 (1931).
1000 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721 (1838).
1001 37 U.S. at 736–37.
litical power; it comes to the court, to be decided by its judgment,

legal discretion and solemn consideration of the rules of law appro-
priate to its nature as a judicial question, depending on the exer-
cise of judicial power; as it is bound to act by known and settled
principles of national or municipal jurisprudence, as the case re-
quires.” 1002
Modern Types of Suits Between States.—Beginning with Mis-
souri v. Illinois & Chicago District,1003 which sustained jurisdiction
to entertain an injunction suit to restrain the discharge of sewage
into the Mississippi River, water rights, the use of water resources,
and the like, have become an increasing source of suits between
states. Such suits have been especially frequent in the western
states,1004 where water is even more of a treasure than elsewhere,
but they have not been confined to any one region. In Kansas v.
Colorado,1005 the Court established the principle of the equitable
division of river or water resources between conflicting state inter-
ests. In New Jersey v. New York,1006 where New Jersey sought to
enjoin the diversion of waters into the Hudson River watershed for
New York in such a way as to diminish the flow of the Delaware
River in New Jersey, injure its shad fisheries, and increase harm-
fully the saline contents of the Delaware, Justice Holmes stated for
the Court: “A river is more than an amenity, it is a treasure. It
offers a necessity of life that must be rationed among those who
have power over it. New York has the physical power to cut off all
the water within its jurisdiction. But clearly the exercise of such a
power to the destruction of the interest of lower States could not
be tolerated. And on the other hand equally little could New Jersey
be permitted to require New York to give up its power altogether
in order that the River might come down to it undiminished. Both
1002 37 U.S. at 737. Chief Justice Taney dissented because of his belief that the
issue was not one of property in the soil, but of sovereignty and jurisdiction, and
hence political. Id. at 752–53. For different reasons, it should be noted, a suit be-
tween private parties respecting soil or jurisdiction of two states, to which neither
state is a party, does not come within the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
Fowler v. Lindsey, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 411 (1799). For recent boundary cases, see United
States v. Maine (Rhode Island and New York Boundary Case), 469 U.S. 504 (1985);
United States v. Louisiana (Alabama and Mississippi Boundary Case), 470 U.S. 93
(1985); United States v. Maine, 475 U.S. 89 (1986); Georgia v. South Carolina, 497
U.S. 336 (1990); Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506 U.S. 73 (1992).
1003 180 U.S. 208 (1901).
1004 E.g. Montana v. Wyoming, 563 U.S. ___, No. 137, Orig., slip op. (2011).
1005 206 U.S. 46 (1907). See also Idaho ex rel. Evans v. Oregon and Washington,
444 U.S. 380 (1980).

1006 283 U.S. 336 (1931).
States have real and substantial interests in the River that must
be reconciled as best they may be.” 1007
Other types of interstate disputes of which the Court has taken
jurisdiction include suits by a state as the donee of the bonds of
another to collect thereon,1008 by Virginia against West Virginia to
determine the proportion of the public debt of the original State of
Virginia which the latter owed the former,1009 by Arkansas to en-
join Texas from interfering with the performance of a contract by a
Texas foundation to contribute to the construction of a new hospi-
tal in the medical center of the University of Arkansas,1010 of one
state against another to enforce a contract between the two,1011 of
a suit in equity between states for the determination of a dece-
dent’s domicile for inheritance tax purposes,1012 and of a suit by two
states to restrain a third from enforcing a natural gas measure that
purported to restrict the interstate flow of natural gas from the state
in the event of a shortage.1013
In Texas v. New Jersey,1014 the Court adjudicated a multistate
dispute about which state should be allowed to escheat intangible
property consisting of uncollected small debts held by a corpora-
tion. Emphasizing that the states could not constitutionally pro-
vide a rule of settlement and that no federal statute governed the
1007 283 U.S. at 342. See also Nebraska v. Wyoming, 325 U.S. 589 (1945); Idaho
ex rel. Evans v. Oregon, 462 U.S. 1017 (1983). In Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp.,
401 U.S. 493 (1971), the Court held it had jurisdiction of a suit by a state against
citizens of other states to abate a nuisance allegedly caused by the dumping of mer-
cury into streams that ultimately run into Lake Erie, but it declined to permit the
filing because the presence of complex scientific issues made the case more appropri-
ate for first resolution in a district court. See also Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S.
554 (1983); Nevada v. United States, 463 U.S. 110 (1983).
1008 South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
1009 Virginia v. West Virginia, 220 U.S. 1 (1911).
1010 Arkansas v. Texas, 346 U.S. 368 (1953).
1011 Kentucky v. Indiana, 281 U.S. 163 (1930).
1012 Texas v. Florida, 306 U.S. 398 (1939). In California v. Texas, 437 U.S. 601
(1978), the Court denied a state leave to file an original action against another state
to determine the contested domicile of a decedent for death tax purposes, with sev-
eral Justices of the view that Texas v. Florida had either been wrongly decided or
was questionable. But, after determining that an interpleader action by the admin-
istrator of the estate for a determination of domicile was barred by the Eleventh
Amendment, Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982), the Court over dissent permitted
filing of the original action. California v. Texas, 457 U.S. 164 (1982).
1013 Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U.S. 553 (1923). The Court, in Mary-
land v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725 (1981), over strong dissent, relied on this case in
permitting suit contesting a tax imposed on natural gas, the incidence of which fell
on the suing state’s consuming citizens. And, in Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S.
437 (1992), the Court permitted a state to sue another to contest a law requiring
that all in-state utilities burn a mixture containing at least 10% in-state coal, the
plaintiff state having previously supplied 100% of the coal to those utilities and thus
suffering a loss of coal-severance tax revenues.
1014 379 U.S. 674 (1965). See also Pennsylvania v. New York, 406 U.S. 206 (1972).
matter, the Court evaluated the possible rules and chose the one
easiest to apply and least likely to lead to continuing disputes.
In general, in taking jurisdiction of these suits, along with those
involving boundaries and the diversion or pollution of water re-
sources, the Supreme Court proceeded upon the liberal construc-
tion of the term “controversies between two or more States” enun-
ciated in Rhode Island v. Massachusetts,1015 and fortified by Chief
Justice Marshall’s dictum in Cohens v. Virginia,1016 concerning ju-
risdiction because of the parties to a case, that “it is entirely unim-
portant, what may be the subject of controversy. Be it what it may,
these parties have a constitutional right to come into the Courts of
the Union.” 1017
Cases of Which the Court Has Declined Jurisdiction.—In
other cases, however, the Court, centering its attention upon the
elements of a case or controversy, has declined jurisdiction. In Ala-
bama v. Arizona,1018 where Alabama sought to enjoin nineteen states
from regulating or prohibiting the sale of convict-made goods, the
Court went far beyond holding that it had no jurisdiction, and indi-
cated that jurisdiction of suits between states will be exercised only
when absolutely necessary, that the equity requirements in a suit
between states are more exacting than in a suit between private
persons, that the threatened injury to a plaintiff state must be of
great magnitude and imminent, and that the burden on the plain-
tiff state to establish all the elements of a case is greater than the
burden generally required by a petitioner seeking an injunction in
cases between private parties.
Pursuing a similar line of reasoning, the Court declined to take
jurisdiction of a suit brought by Massachusetts against Missouri and
certain of its citizens to prevent Missouri from levying inheritance
taxes upon intangibles held in trust in Missouri by resident trust-
ees. In holding that the complaint presented no justiciable contro-
versy, the Court declared that to constitute such a controversy, the
1015 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838).
1016 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
1017 19 U.S. at 378. See Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71,
79–80 (1961); Texas v. New Jersey, 379 U.S. 674, 677 (1965); Pennsylvania v. New
York, 407 U.S. 206 (1972).
1018 291 U.S. 286 (1934). The Court in recent years, with a significant caseload
problem, has been loath to permit filings of original actions where the parties might
be able to resolve their disputes in other courts, even in cases in which the jurisdic-
tion over the particular dispute is exclusively original. Arizona v. New Mexico, 425
U.S. 794 (1976) (dispute subject of state court case brought by private parties); Cali-
fornia v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027 (1981). But in Mississippi v. Louisiana, 506
U.S. 73 (1992), the Court’s reluctance to exercise original jurisdiction ran afoul of
the “uncompromising language” of 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a) giving the Court “original and
exclusive jurisdiction” of these kinds of suits.
complainant state must show that it “has suffered a wrong through

the action of the other State, furnishing ground for judicial re-
dress, or is asserting a right against the other State which is sus-
ceptible of judicial enforcement according to . . . the common law
or equity systems of jurisprudence.” 1019 The fact that the trust prop-
erty was sufficient to satisfy the claims of both states and that re-
covery by either would not impair any rights of the other distin-
guished the case from Texas v. Florida,1020 where the contrary situation
obtained. Furthermore, the Missouri statute providing for recipro-
cal privileges in levying inheritance taxes did not confer upon Mas-
sachusetts any contractual right. The Court then proceeded to reit-
erate its earlier rule that a state may not invoke the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court for the benefit of its residents or
to enforce the individual rights of its citizens.1021 Moreover, Massa-
chusetts could not invoke the original jurisdiction of the Court by
the expedient of making citizens of Missouri parties to a suit not
otherwise maintainable.1022 Accordingly, Massachusetts was held not
to be without an adequate remedy in Missouri’s courts or in a fed-
eral district court in Missouri.
The Problem of Enforcement: Virginia v. West Vir-
ginia.—A very important issue in interstate litigation is the enforce-
ment of the Court’s decree, once it has been entered. In some types
of suits, this issue may not arise, and if it does, it may be easily
met. Thus, a judgment putting a state in possession of disputed ter-
ritory is ordinarily self-executing. But if the losing state should op-
pose execution, refractory state officials, as individuals, would be
liable to civil suits or criminal prosecutions in the federal courts.
Likewise an injunction may be enforced against state officials as
individuals by civil or criminal proceedings. Those judgments, on
the other hand, that require a state in its governmental capacity to
perform some positive act present the issue of enforcement in more
serious form. The issue arose directly in the long and much liti-
gated case between Virginia and West Virginia over the proportion
of the state debt of original Virginia owed by West Virginia after
its separate admission to the Union under a compact which pro-
vided that West Virginia assume a share of the debt.
1019 Massachusetts v. Missouri, 308 U.S. 1, 15–16, (1939), citing Florida v. Mel-
lon, 273 U.S. 12 (1927).

1020 306 U.S. 398 (1939).
1021 308 U.S. at 17, citing Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 220 U.S. 277,
286 (1911), and Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387, 394 (1938). See
also New Hampshire v. Louisiana and New York v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883),
which held that a state cannot bring a suit on behalf of its citizens to collect on
bonds issued by another state, and Louisiana v. Texas, 176 U.S. 1 (1900), which held
that a state cannot sue another to prevent maladministration of quarantine laws.
1022 308 U.S. at 17, 19.
The suit was begun in 1906, and a judgment was rendered against
West Virginia in 1915. Finally, in 1917, Virginia filed a suit against
West Virginia to show cause why, in default of payment of the judg-
ment, an order should not be entered directing the West Virginia
legislature to levy a tax for payment of the judgment.1023 Starting
with the rule that the judicial power essentially involves the right
to enforce the results of its exertion,1024 the Court proceeded to hold
that it applied with the same force to states as to other liti-
gants 1025 and to consider appropriate remedies for the enforcement
of its authority. In this connection, Chief Justice White declared:
“As the powers to render the judgment and to enforce it arise from
the grant in the Constitution on that subject, looked at from a ge-
neric point of view, both are federal powers and, comprehensively
considered, are sustained by every authority of the Federal Govern-
ment, judicial, legislative, or executive, which may be appropri-
ately exercised.” 1026 The Court, however, left open the question of
its power to enforce the judgment under existing legislation and sched-
uled the case for reargument at the next term. Before that could
occur, West Virginia accepted the Court’s judgment and entered into
an agreement with Virginia to pay it.1027
Controversies Between a State and Citizens of Another

State
The decision in Chisholm v. Georgia 1028 that cases “between a
state and citizens of another state” included those where a state
was a party defendant provoked the proposal and ratification of the
Eleventh Amendment, and since then controversies between a state
and citizens of another state have included only those cases where
the state has been a party plaintiff or has consented to be sued.1029
As a party plaintiff, a state may bring actions against citizens of
other states to protect its legal rights or in some instances as parens
patriae to protect the health and welfare of its citizens. In general,
the Court has tended to construe strictly this grant of judicial power,
which simultaneously comes within its original jurisdiction, by per-
haps an even more rigorous application of the concepts of cases and
1023 The various decisions in Virginia v. West Virginia are found at 206 U.S.
290 (1907); 209 U.S. 514 (1908); 220 U.S. 1 (1911); 222 U.S. 17 (1911); 231 U.S. 89
(1913); 234 U.S. 117 (1914); 238 U.S. 202 (1915); 241 U.S. 531 (1916); 246 U.S. 565
(1918).
1024 246 U.S. at 591.
1025 246 U.S. at 600.
1026 246 U.S. at 601.
1027 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT AND SOVEREIGN STATES 78–79 (1924).
1028 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
1029 See the discussion under the Eleventh Amendment.
controversies than that in cases between private parties.1030 This it

does by holding rigorously to the rule that all the party defendants
be citizens of other states 1031 and by adhering to congressional dis-
tribution of its original jurisdiction concurrently with that of other
federal courts.1032
Jurisdiction Confined to Civil Cases.—In Cohens v. Vir-
ginia,1033 there is a dictum to the effect that the original jurisdic-
tion of the Supreme Court does not include suits between a state
and its own citizens. Long afterwards, the Supreme Court dis-
missed an action for want of jurisdiction because the record did not
show that the corporation against which the suit was brought was
chartered in another state.1034 Subsequently, the Court has ruled
that it will not entertain an action by a state to which its citizens
are either parties of record or would have to be joined because of
the effect of a judgment upon them.1035 In his dictum in Cohens v.
Virginia, Chief Justice Marshall also indicated that perhaps no ju-
risdiction existed over suits by states to enforce their penal laws.1036
Sixty-seven years later, the Court wrote this dictum into law in Wis-
consin v. Pelican Ins. Co.1037 Wisconsin sued a Louisiana corpora-
tion to recover a judgment rendered in its favor by one of its own
courts. Relying partly on the rule of international law that the courts
of no country execute the penal laws of another, partly upon the
13th section of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which vested the Su-
preme Court with exclusive jurisdiction of controversies of a civil
nature where a state is a party, and partly on Justice Iredell’s dis-
sent in Chisholm v. Georgia,1038 where he confined the term “contro-
versies” to civil suits, Justice Gray ruled for the Court that for pur-
poses of original jurisdiction, “controversies between a State and
citizens of another State” are confined to civil suits.1039
The State’s Real Interest.—Ordinarily, a state may not sue
in its name unless it is the real party in interest with real inter-
1030 Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Florida v. Mellon, 273 U.S.
12 (1927); New Jersey v. Sargent, 269 U.S. 328 (1926).

1031 Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Co., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 553 (1871); California v.
Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229 (1895); Minnesota v. Northern Securities Co., 184
U.S. 199 (1902).
1032 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
1033 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 398–99 (1821).
1034 Pennsylvania v. Quicksilver Mining Co., 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 553 (1871).
1035 California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229 (1895); Minnesota v. North-
ern Securities Co., 184 U.S. 199 (1902).

1036 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 398–99.
1037 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
1038 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431–32 (1793).
1039 127 U.S. at 289–300.
ests. It can sue to protect its own property interests,1040 and if it

sues for its own interest as owner of another state’s bonds, rather
than as an assignee for collection, jurisdiction exists.1041 Where a
state, in order to avoid the limitation of the Eleventh Amendment,
provided by statute for suit in the name of the state to collect on
the bonds of another state held by one of its citizens, it was re-
fused the right to sue.1042 Nor can a state sue the citizens of other
states on behalf of its own citizens to collect claims.1043
The State as Parens Patriae.—The distinction between suits
brought by states to protect the welfare of their citizens as a whole
and suits to protect the private interests of individual citizens is
not easily drawn. Thus, in Oklahoma v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry.,1044
the state was refused permission to sue to enjoin unreasonable rate
charges by a railroad on the shipment of specified commodities, be-
cause the state was not engaged in shipping these commodities and
had no proprietary interest in them. But, in Georgia v. Pennsylva-
nia R.Co.,1045 a closely divided Court accepted a suit by the state,
suing as parens patriae and in its proprietary capacity—the latter
being treated by the Court as something of a makeweight—seeking
injunctive relief against 20 railroads on allegations that the rates
were discriminatory against the state and its citizens and their eco-
nomic interests and that the rates had been fixed through coercive
action by the northern roads against the southern lines in violation
of the Clayton Antitrust Act. For the Court, Justice Douglas ob-
served that the interests of a state for purposes of invoking the origi-
nal jurisdiction of the Court were not to be confined to those which
are proprietary but rather “embrace the so called ‘quasi-sovereign’
interests which . . . are ‘independent of and behind the titles of its
citizens, in all the earth and air within its domain.’ ” 1046
Discriminatory freight rates, the Justice continued, may cause
a blight no less serious than noxious gases in that they may arrest
the development of a state and put it at a competitive disadvan-
1040 Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & B. Bridge Co., 54 U.S. (13 How.) 518, 559 (1852);
Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938); Georgia v. Evans, 316 U.S.
159 (1942).
1041 South Dakota v. North Carolina, 192 U.S. 286 (1904).
1042 New Hampshire v. Louisiana, 108 U.S. 76 (1883).
1043 Oklahoma ex rel. Johnson v. Cook, 304 U.S. 387 (1938).
1044 220 U.S. 277 (1911).
1045 324 U.S. 439 (1945).
1046 324 U.S. at 447–48 (quoting from Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S.
230, 237 (1907), in which the state was permitted to sue as parens patriae to enjoin
the defendant from emitting noxious gases from its works in Tennessee which caused
substantial damage in nearby areas of Georgia). In Alfred L. Snapp & Son v. Puerto
Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 607–08 (1982), the Court attempted to enunciate
the standards by which to recognize permissible parens patriae assertions. See also
Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 737–39 (1981).
tage. “Georgia as a representative of the public is complaining of a

wrong which, if proven, limits the opportunities of her people, shack-
les her industries, retards her development, and relegates her to
an inferior economic position among her sister States. These are
matters of grave public concern in which Georgia has an interest
apart from that of particular individuals who may be affected. Geor-
gia’s interest is not remote; it is immediate. If we denied Georgia
as parens patriae the right to invoke the original jurisdiction of the
Court in a matter of that gravity, we would whittle the concept of
justiciability down to the stature of minor or conventional contro-
versies. There is no warrant for such a restriction.” 1047
The continuing vitality of this case is in some doubt, as the Court
has limited it in a similar case.1048 But the ability of states to act
as parens patriae for their citizens in environmental pollution cases
seems established, although as a matter of the Supreme Court’s origi-
nal jurisdiction such suits are not in favor.1049
One clear limitation had seemed to be solidly established until
later litigation cast doubt on its foundation. It is no part of a state’s
“duty or power,” said the Court in Massachusetts v. Mellon,1050 “to
enforce [its citizens’] rights in respect to their relations with the
Federal Government. In that field, it is the United States and not
the state that represents them as parens patriae when such repre-
sentation becomes appropriate; and to the former, and not to the
latter, they must look for such protective measures as flow from that
1047 Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 468 (1945). Chief Justice Stone
and Justices Roberts, Frankfurter, and Jackson dissented.

1048 In Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251 (1972), the Court, five-to-two,
held that the state could not maintain an action for damages parens patriae under
the Clayton Act and limited the previous case to instances in which injunctive relief
is sought. Hawaii had brought its action in federal district court. The result in Ha-
waii was altered by Pub. L. 94–435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976), 15 U.S.C. §§ 15c et seq.,
but the decision in Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977), reduced the
significance of the law.
1049 Most of the cases, but see Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U.S. 230
(1907), concern suits by one state against another. Missouri v. Illinois, 180 U.S. 208
(1901); New York v. New Jersey, 256 U.S. 296 (1921); North Dakota v. Minnesota,
263 U.S. 365 (1923). Although recognizing that original jurisdiction exists when a
state sues a political subdivision of another state or a private party as parens patriae
for its citizens and on its own proprietary interests to abate environmental pollu-
tion, the Court has held that, because of the technical complexities of the issues
and the inconvenience of adjudicating them on its original docket, the cases should
be brought in federal district court under federal question jurisdiction founded on
the federal common law. Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972); Washing-
ton v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972). The Court had earlier thought the
cases must be brought in state court. Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S.
493 (1971).
1050 262 U.S. 447, 486 (1923).
status.” But, in South Carolina v. Katzenbach,1051 while holding that

the state lacked standing under Massachusetts v. Mellon to attack
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 1052 under the
Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause and under the Bill of Attain-
der Clause of Article I,1053 the Court decided on the merits the state’s
claim that Congress had exceeded its powers under the Fifteenth
Amendment.1054 Was the Court here sub silentio permitting it to
assert its interest in the execution of its own laws, rather than those
enacted by Congress, or its interest in having Congress enact only
constitutional laws for application to its citizens, an assertion that
is contrary to a number of supposedly venerated cases? 1055 Either
possibility would be significant in a number of respects.1056
Controversies Between Citizens of Different States

The records of the Federal Convention are silent on why the
Framers included controversies between citizens of different states
among the judicial power of the United States,1057 but Congress has
1051 383 U.S. 301 (1966). The state sued the Attorney General of the United States
as a citizen of New Jersey, thus creating the requisite jurisdiction, and avoiding the
problem that the States may not sue the United States without its consent. Minne-
sota v. Hitchcock, 185 U.S. 373 (1902); Oregon v. Hitchcock, 202 U.S. 60 (1906); Kan-
sas v. United States, 204 U.S. 331 (1907). The expedient is, of course, the same de-
vice as is used to avoid the Eleventh Amendment prohibition against suing a state
by suing its officers. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
1052 79 Stat. 437 (1965), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973 et seq.
1053 The Court first held that neither of these provisions were restraints on what
the Federal Government might do with regard to a state. It then added: “Nor does a
State have standing as the parent of its citizens to invoke these constitutional pro-
visions against the Federal Government, the ultimate parents patriae of every Ameri-
can citizen.” South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 324 (1966).
1054 The Court did not indicate on what basis South Carolina could raise the
issue. At the beginning of its opinion, the Court noted that “[o]riginal jurisdiction is
founded on the presence of a controversy between a State and a citizen of another
State under Art. III, § 2, of the Constitution. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co.,
324 U.S. 439.” 383 U.S. at 307. But surely this did not refer to that case’s parens
patriae holding.
1055 See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923); Florida v. Mellon, 273
U.S. 12 (1927); Jones ex rel. Louisiana v. Bowles, 322 U.S. 707 (1944). See especially
Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867); Mississippi v. Johnson, 71 U.S. (4
Wall.) 475 (1867). In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), four original actions
were consolidated and decided. Two were actions by the United States against States,
but the other two were suits by States against the Attorney General, as a citizen of
New York, seeking to have the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970 voided as
unconstitutional. South Carolina v. Katzenbach was uniformly relied on by all par-
ties as decisive of the jurisdictional question, and in announcing the judgment of
the Court Justice Black simply noted that no one raised jurisdictional or justiciabil-
ity questions. Id. at 117 n.1. See also id. at 152 n.1 (Justice Harlan concurring in
part and dissenting in part); South Carolina v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505 (1988); South
Carolina v. Regan, 465 U.S. 367 (1984).
1056 Bickel, The Voting Rights Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 80–93.
1057 Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483
(1928).
given “diversity jurisdiction” in one form or another to the federal

courts since the Judiciary Act of 1789.1058 The traditional explana-
tion remains that offered by Chief Justice Marshall. “However true
the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer jus-
tice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every descrip-
tion, it is not less true that the Constitution itself either entertains
apprehensions on this subject, or views with such indulgence the
possible fears and apprehensions of suitors, that it has established
national tribunals for the decision of controversies between aliens
and a citizen, or between citizens of different states.” 1059 Other ex-
planations have been offered and controverted,1060 but diversity cases
constitute a large bulk of cases on the dockets of the federal courts
today, though serious proposals for restricting access to federal courts
in such cases have been before Congress for some time.1061 The es-
sential difficulty with this type of jurisdiction is that it requires fed-
eral judges to decide issues of local import on the basis of their read-
ing of how state judges would decide them, an oftentimes laborious
process, which detracts from the time and labor needed to resolve
issues of federal import.
The Meaning of “State” and the District of Columbia Prob-
lem.—In Hepburn v. Ellzey,1062 Chief Justice Marshall for the Court
confined the meaning of the word “state” as used in the Constitu-
tion to “the members of the American confederacy” and ruled that
a citizen of the District of Columbia could not sue a citizen of Vir-
ginia on the basis of diversity of citizenship. Marshall noted that it
1058 1 Stat. 78, 11. The statute also created alienage jurisdiction of suits be-
tween a citizen of a state and an alien. See Holt, The Origins of Alienage Jurisdic-
tion, 14 OKLA. CITY L. REV. 547 (1989). Early versions of the statute conferred diver-
sity jurisdiction only when the suit was between a citizen of the state in which the
suit was brought and a citizen of another state. The Act of March 3, 1875, § 1. 18
Stat. 470, first established the language in the present statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1),
merely requiring diverse citizenship, so that a citizen of Maryland could sue a citi-
zen of Delaware in federal court in New Jersey. The statute also sets a threshold
amount at controversy for jurisdiction to attach; the jurisdictional amount was as
low as $3,000 in 1958, but set at $75,000 in 1996. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Snyder v.
Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), held that in a class action in diversity the individual
claims could not be aggregated to meet the jurisdictional amount. Zahn v. Interna-
tional Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1974), extended Snyder in holding that even though
the named plaintiffs had claims of more than $10,000, the extant jurisdictional amount,
they could not represent a class in which many of the members had claims for less
than $10,000. A separate provision on diversity and class actions sets the jurisdic-
tional amount at $5 million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
1059 Bank of the United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 61, 87 (1809).
1060 Summarized and discussed in C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 23 (4th ed. 1983); AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION
BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 99–110, 458–464 (1969).
1061 The principal proposals are those of the American Law Institute. Id. at 123–
34.
1062 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 445 (1805).
was “extraordinary that the courts of the United States, which are
open to aliens, and to the citizens of every state in the union, should
be closed upon them. But this is a subject for legislative, not for
judicial consideration.” 1063 The same rule was subsequently ap-
plied to citizens of the territories of the United States.1064
Whether the Chief Justice had in mind a constitutional amend-
ment or a statute when he spoke of legislative consideration re-
mains unclear. Not until 1940, however, did Congress attempt to
meet the problem by statutorily conferring on federal district courts
jurisdiction of civil actions, not involving federal questions, “be-
tween citizens of different States, or citizens of the District of Co-
lumbia, the Territory of Hawaii, or Alaska and any State or Terri-
tory.” 1065 In National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co.,1066
this act was upheld in a five-to-four decision but for widely diver-
gent reasons by a coalition of Justices. Two Justices thought that
Chief Justice Marshall’s 1804 decision should be overruled, but the
other seven Justices disagreed; however, three of the seven thought
the statute could be sustained under Congress’s power to enact leg-
islation for the inhabitants of the District of Columbia, but the re-
maining four plus the other two rejected this theory. The statute
was upheld because a total of five Justices voted to sustain it, al-
though of the two theories relied on, seven Justices rejected one
and six the other. The result, attributable to “conflicting minorities
in combination,” 1067 means that Hepburn v. Ellzey is still good law
insofar as it holds that the District of Columbia is not a state, but
is overruled insofar as it holds that District citizens may not use
federal diversity jurisdiction.1068
Citizenship of Natural Persons.—For purposes of diversity
jurisdiction, state citizenship is determined by the concept of domi-
cile 1069 rather than of mere residence.1070 That is, while the Court’s
definition has varied throughout the cases,1071 a person is a citizen
of the state in which he has his true, fixed, and permanent home
1063 6 U.S. at 453.

1064 City of New Orleans v. Winter, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 91 (1816).
1065 54 Stat. 143 (1940), as revised, 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d).
1066 337 U.S. 582 (1948).
1067 337 U.S. at 655 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting).
1068 The statute’s provision allowing citizens of Puerto Rico to sue in diversity
was sustained in Americana of Puerto Rico v. Kaplus, 368 F.2d 431 (3d Cir. 1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 943 (1967), under Congress’s power to make rules and regula-
tions for United States territories. Cf. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 580–597 (1976) (discussing congressional acts with respect to Puerto Rico).
1069 Chicago & N.W.R.R. v. Ohle, 117 U.S. 123 (1886).
1070 Sun Printing & Pub. Ass’n v. Edwards, 194 U.S. 377 (1904).
1071 Knox v. Greenleaf, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 360 (1802); Shelton v. Tiffin, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 163 (1848); Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914).

and principal establishment and to which he intends to return when-

ever he is absent from it.1072 Acts may disclose intention more clearly
and decisively than declarations.1073 One may change his domicile
in an instant by taking up residence in the new place and by intend-
ing to remain there indefinitely and one may obtain the benefit of
diversity jurisdiction by so changing for that reason alone,1074 pro-
vided the change is more than a temporary expedient.1075
If the plaintiff and the defendant are citizens of different states,
diversity jurisdiction exists regardless of the state in which suit is
brought.1076 Chief Justice Marshall early established that in multi-
party litigation, there must be complete diversity, that is, that no
party on one side could be a citizen of any state of which any party
on the other side was a citizen.1077 It has now apparently been de-
cided that this requirement flows from the statute on diversity rather
than from the constitutional grant and that therefore minimal di-
versity is sufficient.1078 The Court has also placed some issues be-
yond litigation in federal courts in diversity cases, apparently solely
on policy grounds.1079
Citizenship of Corporations.—In Bank of the United States
v. Deveaux,1080 Chief Justice Marshall declared: “That invisible, in-
tangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a corporation
aggregate, is certainly not a citizen; and consequently cannot sue
or be sued in the courts of the United States, unless the rights of
1072 Stine v. Moore, 213 F.2d 446, 448 (5th Cir. 1954).
1073 Shelton v. Tiffin, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 163 (1848).
1074 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914).
1075 Jones v. League, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 76 (1855).
1076 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1).
1077 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cr.) 267 (1806).
1078 In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 530–31 (1967),
holding that congressional provision in the interpleader statute of minimal diver-

sity, 28 U.S.C. § 1335(a)(1), was valid, the Court said of Strawbridge, “Chief Justice
Marshall there purported to construe only ‘The words of the act of Congress,’ not
the Constitution itself. And in a variety of contexts this Court and the lower courts
have concluded that Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of fed-
eral jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not
co-citizens.” Of course, the diversity jurisdictional statute not having been changed,
complete diversity of citizenship, outside the interpleader situation, is still required.
In class actions, only the citizenship of the named representatives is considered and
other members of the class can be citizens of the same state as one or more of the
parties on the other side. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356 (1921);
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969).
1079 In domestic relations cases and probate matters, the federal courts will not
act, though diversity exists. Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1858); Ex parte
Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890); In re Broderick’s Will, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 503 (1875).
These cases merely enunciated the rule, without justifying it; when the Court squarely
faced the issue quite recently, it adhered to the rule, citing justifications. Ankenbrandt
v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689 (1992).
1080 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 61, 86 (1809).
the members, in this respect, can be exercised in their corporate

name.” Nevertheless, the Court upheld diversity jurisdiction in the
case because the members of the bank as a corporation were citi-
zens of one state and Deveaux was a citizen of another. The hold-
ing that corporations were citizens of the states where their stock-
holders lived was reaffirmed a generation later,1081 but pressures
were building for change. While corporations were assuming an ever
more prominent economic role, the Strawbridge rule, which fore-
closed diversity suits if any plaintiff had common citizenship with
any defendant,1082 was working to close the doors of the federal courts
to corporations with stockholders in many states.
Deveaux was overruled in 1844, when, after elaborate argu-
ment, a divided Court held that “a corporation created by and do-
ing business in a particular state, is to be deemed to all intents
and purposes as a person, although an artificial person, an inhabit-
ant of the same state, for the purposes of its incorporation, capable
of being treated as a citizen of that state, as much as a natural
person.” 1083 Ten years later, the Court abandoned this rationale, but
it achieved the same result by “indulg[ing] in the fiction that, al-
though a corporation was not itself a citizen for diversity purposes,
its shareholders would be conclusively presumed citizens of the in-
corporating State.” 1084 “State of incorporation” remained the guid-
ing rule for determining the place of corporate citizenship until Con-
gress amended the jurisdictional statute in 1958. Concern over growing
dockets and companies incorporating in states of convenience then
led to a dual citizenship rule whereby “a corporation shall be deemed
to be a citizen of any State by which it has been incorporated and
of the State where it has its principal place of business.” 1085 The
1081 Commercial & Railroad Bank v. Slocomb, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 60 (1840).
1082 Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cr.) 267 (1806).
1083 Louisville, C. & C.R.R. v. Letson, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 497, 558 (1844).
1084 United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145, 148 (1965), citing
Marshall v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 57 U.S. (16 How.) 314 (1854). See Muller v. Dows,
94 U.S. 444 (1877); St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. James, 161 U.S. 545 (1896); Carden v.
Arkoma Associates, 494 U.S. 185, 189 (1990).
1085 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). In Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. ___, No. 08–1107,
slip op. (2010), the Court recounted the development of the rules on corporate juris-
dictional citizenship in deciding that a corporation’s “principal place of business” un-
der the statute is its “nerve center,” the place where the corporation’s officers direct,
control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities.
The jurisdictional statute additionally deems the place of an insured’s citizen-
ship as an additional place of citizenship of an insurer being sued in a direct action
case.
right of foreign corporations to resort to federal courts in diversity

is not one that the states may condition as a qualification for doing
business in the state.1086
Unincorporated associations, such as partnerships, joint stock
companies, labor unions, governing boards of institutions, and the
like, do not enjoy the same privilege as a corporation; the actual
citizenship of each of its members must be considered in determin-
ing whether diversity exists.1087
Manufactured Diversity.—A litigant who, because of diver-
sity of citizenship, can choose whether to sue in state or federal
court, will properly consider where the advantages and disadvan-
tages balance, and if diversity is lacking, a litigant who perceives
the balance to favor the federal forum will sometimes attempt to
create diversity. In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress exempted
from diversity jurisdiction suits on choses of action in favor of an
assignee unless the suit could have been brought in federal court if
no assignment had been made.1088 One could create diversity by a
bona fide change of domicile even with the sole motive of creating
domicile.1089 Similarly, one could create diversity, or defeat it, by
choosing a personal representative of the requisite citizenship.1090
Most attempts to manufacture or create diversity have involved cor-
porations. A corporation cannot get into federal court by transfer-
ring its claim to a subsidiary incorporated in another state,1091 and
for a time the Supreme Court tended to look askance at collusory
incorporations and the creation of dummy corporations for pur-
poses of creating diversity.1092 But, in Black & White Taxicab & Trans-
1086 In Terral v. Burke Constr. Co., 257 U.S. 529 (1922), the Court resolved two
conflicting lines of cases and voided a state statute that required the cancellation of
the license of a foreign corporation to do business in the state upon notice that the
corporation had removed a case to a federal court.
1087 Chapman v. Barney, 129 U.S. 677 (1889); Great Southern Fire Proof Hotel
Co. v. Jones, 177 U.S. 449 (1900); Thomas v. Board of Trustees, 195 U.S. 207 (1904);
United Steelworkers v. R.H. Bouligny, Inc., 382 U.S. 145 (1965); Carden v. Arkoma
Associates, 494 U.S. 185 (1990). But compare People of Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co.,
288 U.S. 476 (1933), distinguished in Carden, 494 U.S. at 189–190, and Navarro
Savings Ass’n v. Lee, 446 U.S. 458 (1980), distinguished in Carden, 494 U.S. at 191–
192.
1088 Ch. XIX, § 11, 1 Stat. 78, sustained in Turner v. Bank of North America, 4
U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799), and Sheldon v. Sill, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850). The present
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1359, provides that no jurisdiction exists in a civil action “in
which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or collusively made
or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.” See Kramer v. Caribbean Mills,
394 U.S. 823 (1969).
1089 Williamson v. Osenton, 232 U.S. 619 (1914); Morris v. Gilmer, 129 U.S. 315
(1889).
1090 Mecom v. Fitzsimmons Drilling Co., 284 U.S. 183 (1931).
1091 Miller & Lux v. East Side Canal & Irrigation Co., 211 U.S. 293 (1908).
1092 E.g., Southern Realty Co. v. Walker, 211 U.S. 603 (1909).
fer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,1093 it became
highly important to the plaintiff company to bring its suit in fed-
eral court rather than in a state court. Thus, Black & White, a Ken-
tucky corporation, dissolved itself and obtained a charter as a Ten-
nessee corporation; the only change made was the state of
incorporation, the name, officers, shareholders, and location of the
business remaining the same. A majority of the Court, over a strong
dissent by Justice Holmes,1094 saw no collusion and upheld diver-
sity, meaning that the company won whereas it would have lost had
it sued in the state court. Black & White Taxicab probably more
than anything led to a reexamination of the decision on the choice
of law to be applied in diversity litigation.
The Law Applied in Diversity Cases.—By virtue of § 34 of
the Judiciary Act of 1789,1095 state law expressed in constitutional
and statutory form was regularly applied in federal courts in diver-
sity actions to govern the disposition of such cases. But, in Swift v.
Tyson,1096 Justice Story for the Court ruled that state court deci-
sions were not laws within the meaning of § 34 and though en-
titled to respect were not binding on federal judges, except with re-
gard to matters of a “local nature,” such as statutes and interpretations
thereof pertaining to real estate and other immovables, in contrast
to questions of general commercial law as to which the answers were
dependent not on “the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the
general principles and doctrines of commercial jurisprudence.” 1097
1093 276 U.S. 518 (1928).

1094 276 U.S. at 532 (joined by Justices Brandeis and Stone). Justice Holmes
here presented his view that Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842), had been
wrongly decided, but he preferred not to overrule it, merely “not allow it to spread
. . . into new fields.” 276 U.S. at 535.
1095 The section provided that “the laws of the several states, except where the
constitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States shall otherwise require or pro-
vide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in trials at common law in the courts of
the United States in cases where they apply.” 1 Stat. 92. With only insubstantial
changes, the section now appears as 28 U.S.C. § 1652. For a concise review of the
entire issue, see C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS ch. 9 (4th ed.
1983).
1096 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842). The issue in the case was whether a pre-existing
debt was good consideration for an indorsement of a bill of exchange so that the
endorsee would be a holder in due course.
1097 41 U.S. at 19. The Justice concluded this portion of the opinion: “The law
respecting negotiable instruments may be truly declared in the language of Cicero,

adopted by Lord Mansfield in Luke v. Lyde, 2 Burr. R. 883, 887, to be in great mea-
sure, not the law of a single country only, but of the commercial world. Nun erit
alia lex Romae, alia Athenis; alia munc, alia posthac, sed et apud omnes gentes, et
omni tempore una eademque lex obtenebit.” Id. The thought that the same law should
prevail in Rome as in Athens was used by Justice Story in DeLovio v. Boit, 7 Fed.
Cas. 418, 443 (No. 3776) (C.C.D. Mass. 1815). For a modern use, see United States
v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d 836 (5th Cir. 1966); 380 F.2d 385, 398
(5th Cir. 1967) (dissenting opinion).
The course of decision over the period of almost one hundred years
was toward an expansion of the areas in which federal judges were
free to construct a federal common law and a concomitant contrac-
tion of the definition of “local” laws.1098 Although dissatisfaction with
Swift v. Tyson was almost always present, within and without the
Court,1099 it was the Court’s decision in Black & White Taxicab &
Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.1100 that brought
1098 The expansions included Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 464 (1845) (wills);
City of Chicago v. Robbins, 67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 418 (1862), and Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v.
Baugh, 149 U.S. 368 (1893) (torts); Yates v. City of Milwaukee, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.)
497 (1870) (real estate titles and rights of riparian owners); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910) (mineral conveyances); Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
134 (1847) (contracts); Lake Shore & M.S. Ry. v. Prentice, 147 U.S. 101 (1893). It
was strongly contended that uniformity, the goal of Justice Story’s formulation, was
not being achieved, in great part because state courts followed their own rules of
decision even when prior federal decisions were contrary. Frankfurter, Distribution
of Judicial Power Between Federal and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 499, 529 n.150
(1928). Moreover, the Court held that, although state court interpretations of state
statutes or constitutions were to be followed, federal courts could ignore them if they
conflicted with earlier federal constructions of the same statute or constitutional pro-
vision, Rowan v. Runnels, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 134 (1847), or if they had been rendered
after the case had been tried in federal court, Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U.S. 20 (1883),
thus promoting lack of uniformity. See also Gelpcke v. City of Debuque, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 175 (1865); Williamson v. Berry, 49 U.S. (8 How.) 495 (1850); Pease v. Peck,
59 U.S. (18 How.) 595 (1856); Watson v. Tarpley, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 517 (1856).
1099 Extensions of the scope of Tyson frequently were rendered by a divided Court
over the strong protests of dissenters. E.g., Gelpcke v. City of Debuque, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 175 (1865); Lane v. Vick, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 463 (1845); Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U.S. 349 (1910). In Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Baugh, 149 U.S. 368, 401–04
(1893), Justice Field dissented in an opinion in which he expressed the view that
Supreme Court disregarding of state court decisions was unconstitutional, a view
endorsed by Justice Holmes in Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown &
Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co., 276 U.S. 518, 533 (1928) (dissenting opinion), and
adopted by the Court in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Numer-
ous proposals were introduced in Congress to change the rule.
1100 276 U.S. 518 (1928). B. & W. had contracted with a railroad to provide ex-
clusive taxi service at its station. B. & Y. began operating taxis at the same station
and B. & W. wanted to enjoin the operation, but it was a settled rule by judicial
decision in Kentucky courts that such exclusive contracts were contrary to public
policy and were unenforceable in court. Therefore, B. & W. dissolved itself in Ken-
tucky and reincorporated in Tennessee, solely in order to create diversity of citizen-
ship and enable itself to sue in federal court. It was successful and the Supreme
Court ruled that diversity was present and that the injunction should issue. In Mu-
tual Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 293 U.S. 335 (1934), the Court, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Cardozo, appeared to retreat somewhat from its extensions of Tyson, holding
that state law should be applied, through a “benign and prudent comity,” in a case
“balanced with doubt,” a concept first used by Justice Bradley in Burgess v. Selig-
man, 107 U.S. 20 (1883).
disagreement to the strongest point and perhaps precipitated the

overruling of Swift v. Tyson in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins.1101
“It is impossible to overstate the importance of the Erie deci-
sion. It announces no technical doctrine of procedure or jurisdic-
tion, but goes to the heart of the relations between the Federal Gov-
ernment and the states, and returns to the states a power that had
for nearly a century been exercised by the federal government.” 1102
Erie was remarkable in a number of ways aside from the doctrine
it announced. It reversed a 96-year-old precedent, which counsel had
specifically not questioned; it reached a constitutional decision when
a statutory interpretation was available though perhaps less desir-
able; and it marked the only time in United States constitutional
history when the Court has held that it had undertaken an uncon-
stitutional action.1103
Tompkins was injured by defendant’s train while he was walk-
ing along the tracks. He was a citizen of Pennsylvania, and the rail-
road was incorporated in New York. Had he sued in a Pennsylva-
nia court, state decisional law was to the effect that, because he
was a trespasser, the defendant owned him only a duty not to in-
jure him through wanton or willful misconduct; 1104 the general fed-
eral law treated him as a licensee who could recover for negli-
gence. Tompkins sued and recovered in federal court in New York
and the railroad presented the issue to the Supreme Court as one
covered by “local” law within the meaning of Swift v. Tyson. Jus-
tice Brandeis for himself and four other Justices, however, chose to
overrule the early case.
First, it was argued that Tyson had failed to bring about unifor-
mity of decision and that its application discriminated against citi-
zens of a state by noncitizens. Justice Brandeis cited recent re-
searches 1105 indicating that § 34 of the 1789 Act included court
decisions in the phrase “laws of the several States.” “If only a ques-
1101 304 U.S. 64 (1938). Judge Friendly has written: “Having served as the Jus-
tice’s [Brandeis’] law clerk the year Black & White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown
& Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co. came before the Court, I have little doubt he was
waiting for an opportunity to give Swift v. Tyson the happy dispatch he thought it
deserved.” H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 20 (1967).
1102 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 355 (4th ed. 1983). See
Judge Friendly’s exposition, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law,
in H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 155 (1967).
1103 304 U.S. at 157–64, 171 n.71.
1104 This result was obtained in retrial in federal court on the basis of Pennsyl-
vania law. Tompkins v. Erie Railroad Co., 98 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1938), cert. denied, 305
U.S. 637 (1938).
1105 Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 72–73 (1938), citing Warren,
New Light on the History of the Federal Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49
84–88 (1923). See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 353 (4th ed.
1983).
tion of statutory construction were involved we should not be pre-

pared to abandon a doctrine so widely applied throughout nearly a
century. But the unconstitutionality of the course pursued has now
been made clear, and compels us to do so.” 1106 For a number of rea-
sons, it would not have been wise to have overruled Tyson on the
basis of arguable new discoveries.1107
Second, the decision turned on the lack of power vested in Con-
gress to prescribe rules for federal courts in state cases. “There is
no federal general common law. Congress has no power to declare
substantive rules of common law applicable in a State whether they
be local in their nature or ‘general,’ be they commercial law or a
part of the law of torts. No clause in the Constitution purports to
confer such a power upon the federal courts.” 1108 But having said
this, Justice Brandeis made it clear that the unconstitutional as-
sumption of power had been made not by Congress but by the Court
itself. “[W]e do not hold unconstitutional § 34 of the Federal Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 or any other Act of Congress. We merely declare
1106 304 U.S. at 77–78 (footnote citations omitted).

1107 Congress had re-enacted § 34 as § 721 of the Revised Statutes, citing Swift
v. Tyson in its annotation, thus presumably accepting the gloss placed on the words
by that ruling. But note that Justice Brandeis did not think even the re-enacted
statute was unconstitutional. 304 U.S. at 79–80. See H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 161–
163 (1967). Perhaps a more compelling reason of policy was that stated by Justice
Frankfurter rejecting for the Court a claim that the general grant of federal ques-
tion jurisdiction to the federal courts in 1875 made maritime suits cognizable on the
law side of the federal courts. “Petitioner now asks us to hold that no student of the
jurisdiction of the federal courts or of admiralty, no judge, and none of the learned
and alert members of the admiralty bar were able, for seventy-five years, to discern
the drastic change now asserted to have been contrived in admiralty jurisdiction by
the Act of 1875. In light of such impressive testimony from the past the claim of a
sudden discovery of a hidden latent meaning in an old technical phrase is surely
suspect.”
“The history of archeology is replete with the unearthing of riches buried for
centuries. Our legal history does not, however, offer a single archeological discovery
of new, revolutionary meaning in reading an old judiciary enactment. [Here, the Jus-
tice footnotes: ‘For reasons that would take us too far afield to discuss, Erie Rail-
road Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, is no exception.’] The presumption is powerful
that such a far-reaching, dislocating construction as petitioner would now have us
find in the Act of 1875 was not uncovered by judges, lawyers or scholars for seventy-
five years because it is not there.” Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co.,
358 U.S. 354, 370–371 (1959).
1108 304 U.S. at 78. Justice Brandeis does not argue the constitutional issue and
does not cite either provisions of the Constitution or precedent beyond the views of
Justices Holmes and Field. Id. at 78–79. Justice Reed thought that Article III and
the Necessary and Proper Clause might contain authority. Id. at 91–92 (Justice Reed
concurring in the result). For a formulation of the constitutional argument in favor
of the Brandeis position, see H. FRIENDLY, BENCHMARKS 167–171 (1967). See also Bernhardt
v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 202, 208 (1956); Hanna v. Plumer, 380
U.S. 460, 471–472 (1965).
that in applying the doctrine this Court and the lower courts have
invaded rights which in our opinion are reserved by the Constitu-
tion to the several States.” 1109
Third, the rule of Erie replacing Tyson is that “[e]xcept in mat-
ters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress,
the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. Whether
the law of the State shall be declared by its Legislature in a stat-
ute or by its highest court in a decision is not a matter of federal
concern.” 1110
Since 1938, the effect of Erie has first increased and then dimin-
ished, as the nature of the problems presented changed. Thus, the
Court at first indicated that not only were the decisions of the high-
est court of a state binding on a federal diversity court, but also
decisions of intermediate appellate courts 1111 and courts of first in-
stance,1112 even where the decisions bound no other state judge ex-
cept as they were persuasive on their merits. It has now retreated
from this position, concluding that federal judges are to give care-
ful consideration to lower state court decisions and to old, perhaps
outmoded decisions, but that they must find for themselves the state
law if the state’s highest court has not spoken definitively within a
period that would raise no questions about the continued viability
of the decision.1113 In the event of a state supreme court reversal of
an earlier decision, the federal courts are, of course, bound by the
later decision, and a judgment of a federal district court, correct
when rendered, must be reversed on appeal if the state’s highest
court in the meantime has changed the applicable law.1114 In diver-
sity cases that present conflicts of law problems, the Court has re-
iterated that the district court is to apply the law of the state in
which it sits, so that in a case in State A in which the law of State
1109 304 U.S. at 79–80.

1110 304 U.S. at 78. Erie applies in equity as well as in law. Ruhlin v. New York
Life Ins. Co., 304 U.S. 202 (1938).
1111 West v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Six Companies of
California v. Joint Highway District, 311 U.S. 180 (1940); Stoner v. New York Life
Ins. Co., 311 U.S. 464 (1940).
1112 Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169 (1940).
1113 King v. Order of Commercial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948);
Bernhardt v. Polygraphic Co. of America, 350 U.S. 198, 205 (1956) (1910 decision
must be followed in absence of confusion in state decisions since there were “no de-
veloping line of authorities that cast a shadow over established ones, no dicta, doubts
or ambiguities . . . , no legislative development that promises to undermine the ju-
dicial rule”). See also Commissioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
1114 Vanderbark v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 311 U.S. 538 (1941); Huddleston v.
Dwyer, 322 U.S. 232 (1944); Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
B is applicable, perhaps because a contract was made there or a

tort was committed there, the federal court is to apply State A’s
conception of State B’s law.1115
The greatest difficulty in applying the Erie doctrine has been
in cases in which issues of procedure were important.1116 The pro-
cess was initiated in 1945 when the Court held that a state statute
of limitations, which would have barred suit in state court, would
bar it in federal court, although as a matter of federal law the case
still could have been brought in federal court.1117 The Court re-
garded the substance-procedure distinction as immaterial. “[S]ince
a federal court adjudicating a state-created right solely because of
the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that purpose, in ef-
fect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the
right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substan-
tially affect the enforcement of the right as given by the State.” 1118
The standard to be applied was compelled by the “intent” of Erie,
which “was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is ex-
ercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of
the parties, the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should
be substantially the same, so far as legal rules determine the out-
come of a litigation, as it would be if tried in a State court.” 1119
The Court’s application of this standard created substantial doubt
that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure had any validity in diver-
sity cases.1120
1115 Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Manufacturing Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Griffin v. Mc-
Coach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953);
Nolan v. Transocean Air Lines, 365 U.S. 293 (1961).
1116 Interestingly enough, 1938 marked what seemed to be a switching of posi-
tions vis-a-vis federal and state courts of substantive law and procedural law. Un-
der Tyson, federal courts in diversity actions were free to formulate a federal com-
mon law, while they were required by the Conformity Act, § 5, 17 Stat. 196 (1872),
to conform their procedure to that of the state in which the court sat. Erie then
ruled that state substantive law was to control in federal court diversity actions,
while by implication matters of procedure in federal court were subject to congres-
sional governance. Congress authorized the Court to promulgate rules of civil proce-
dure, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934), which it did in 1938, a few months after Erie was de-
cided. 302 U.S. 783.
1117 Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
1118 326 U.S. at 108–09.
1119 326 U.S. at 109.
1120 Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949) (state rule
making unsuccessful plaintiffs liable for all expenses and requiring security for such
expenses as a condition of proceeding applicable in federal court); Woods v. Inter-
state Realty Co., 337 U.S. 535 (1949) (state statute barring foreign corporation not
qualified to do business in the state applies in federal court); Ragan v. Merchants
Transfer & Warehouse Co., 337 U.S. 530 (1949) (state rule determinative when an
action is begun for purposes of statute of limitations applicable in federal court al-
though a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure states a different rule).
But, in two later cases, the Court contracted the application of

Erie in matters governed by the Federal Rules. Thus, in the earlier
case, the Court said that “outcome” was no longer the sole determi-
nant and countervailing considerations expressed in federal policy
on the conduct of federal trials should be considered; a state rule
making it a question for the judge rather than a jury of a particu-
lar defense in a tort action had to yield to a federal policy enunci-
ated through the Seventh Amendment of favoring juries.1121 Some
confusion has been injected into consideration of which law to apply—
state or federal—in the absence of a federal statute or a Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure.1122 In an action for damages, the federal
courts were faced with the issue of the application either of a state
statute, which gave the appellate division of the state courts the
authority to determine if an award is excessive or inadequate if it
deviates materially from what would be reasonable compensation,
or of a federal judicially created practice of review of awards as so
exorbitant that it shocked the conscience of the court. The Court
determined that the state statute was both substantive and proce-
dural, which would result in substantial variations between state
and federal damage awards depending whether the state or the fed-
eral approach was applied; it then followed the mode of analysis
exemplified by those cases emphasizing the importance of federal
courts reaching the same outcome as would the state courts,1123 rather
than what had been the prevailing standard, in which the Court
balanced state and federal interests to determine which law to ap-
ply.1124 Emphasis upon either approach to considerations of apply-
ing state or federal law reflects a continuing difficulty of accommo-
dating “the constitutional power of the states to regulate the relations
among their citizens . . . [and] the constitutional power of the Fed-
eral Government to determine how its courts are to be oper-
ated.” 1125 Additional decisions will be required to determine which
approach, if either, prevails. The latter ruling simplified the matter
greatly. Erie is not to be the proper test when the question is the
application of one of the Rules of Civil Procedure; if the rule is valid
when measured against the Enabling Act and the Constitution, it
is to be applied regardless of state law to the contrary.1126
1121 Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
1122 Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415 (1996). The decision
was five-to-four, so that the precedent may or may not be stable for future applica-
tion.
1123 E.g., Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
1124 E.g., Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Elec. Coop., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
1125 19 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4511,
at 311 (2d ed. 1996).

1126 Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
Although it seems clear that Erie applies in nondiversity cases

in which the source of the right sued upon is state law,1127 it is
equally clear that Erie is not applicable always in diversity cases
whether the nature of the issue be substantive or procedural. Thus,
it may be that there is an overriding federal interest which com-
pels national uniformity of rules, such as a case in which the issue
is the appropriate rule for determining the liability of a bank which
had guaranteed a forged federal check,1128 in which the issue is the
appropriate rule for determining whether a tortfeasor is liable to
the United States for hospitalization of a soldier and loss of his ser-
vices 1129 and in which the issue is the appropriate rule for deter-
mining the validity of a defense raised by a federal officer sued for
having libeled one in the course of his official duties.1130 In such
cases, when the issue is found to be controlled by federal law, com-
mon or otherwise, the result is binding on state courts as well as
on federal.1131 Despite, then, Justice Brandeis’ assurance that there
is no “federal general common law,” there is a common law existing
and developing in the federal courts, even in diversity cases, which
will sometimes control decision.1132
1127 Maternally Yours v. Your Maternity Shop, 234 F.2d 538, 540 n.1 (2d Cir.
1956). The contrary view was implied in Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U.S. 648, 651
(1953), and by Justice Jackson in D’Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447,
466–67, 471–72 (1942) (concurring opinion). See Wichita Royalty Co. v. City Na-
tional Bank, 306 U.S. 103 (1939).
1128 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). See also Na-
tional Metropolitan Bank v. United States, 323 U.S. 454 (1945); D’Oench, Duhme &
Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942); United States v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106
(1944); United States v. Acri, 348 U.S. 211 (1955); Ivanhoe Irrigation District v. Mc-
Cracken, 357 U.S. 275 (1958); Bank of America Nat’l Trust & Savings Ass’n v. Parnell,
352 U.S. 29 (1956). But see United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966). But see
O’Melveny & Myers v. FDIC, 512 U.S. 79 (1994).
1129 United States v. Standard Oil Co., 332 U.S. 301 (1947). Federal law applies
in maritime tort cases brought on the “law side” of the federal courts in diversity
cases. Pope & Talbot v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 406 (1953).
1130 Howard v. Lyons, 360 U.S. 593 (1959). Matters concerned with our foreign
relations also are governed by federal law in diversity. Banco Nacional de Cuba v.
Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). Federal common law also governs a government con-
tractor defense in certain cases. Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500
(1988).
1131 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
1132 The quoted Brandeis phrase is in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S.
64, 78 (1938). On the same day Erie was decided, the Court, in an opinion by Jus-
tice Brandeis, held that the issue of apportionment of the waters of an interstate
stream between two states “is a question of ‘federal common law.’ ” Hinderlider v.
La Plata River & Cherry Creek Ditch Co., 304 U.S. 92, 110 (1938). On the matter,
see Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
Controversies Between Citizens of the Same State Claiming

Land Under Grants of Different States
The genesis of this clause was in the report of the Committee
of Detail which vested the power to resolve such land disputes in
the Senate,1133 but this proposal was defeated in the Conven-
tion,1134 which then added this clause to the jurisdiction of the fed-
eral judiciary without reported debate.1135 The motivation for this
clause was the existence of boundary disputes affecting ten sates
at the time the Convention met. With the adoption of the North-
west Ordinance of 1787, the ultimate settlement of the boundary
disputes, and the passing of land grants by the states, this clause,
never productive of many cases, became obsolete.1136
Controversies Between a State, or the Citizens Thereof,

and Foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects
The scope of this jurisdiction has been limited both by judicial
decisions and the Eleventh Amendment. By judicial application of
the law of nations, a foreign state is immune from suit in the fed-
eral courts without its consent,1137 an immunity which extends to
suits brought by states of the American Union.1138 Conversely, the
Eleventh Amendment has been construed to bar suits by foreign
states against a state of the United States.1139 Consequently, the
jurisdiction conferred by this clause comprehends only suits brought
by a state against citizens or subjects of foreign states, by foreign
states against American citizens, citizens of a state against the citi-
zens or subjects of a foreign state, and by aliens against citizens of
a state.1140
1133 2 M. Farrand, supra at 162, 171, 184.

1134 Id. at 400–401.
1135 Id. at 431.
1136 See Pawlet v. Clark, 13 U.S. (9 Cr.) 292 (1815). Cf. City of Trenton v. New
Jersey, 262 U.S. 182 (1923).

1137 The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 116 (1812); Berizzi Bros.
Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926); Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303
U.S. 68 (1938); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938).
1138 Principality of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 330 (1934).
1139 292 U.S. at 330.
1140 But, in the absence of a federal question, there is no basis for jurisdiction
between the subjects of a foreign state. Romero v. International Terminal Operating

Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L.
94–538, 90 Stat. 2891, amending various sections of title 28 U.S.C., comprehen-
sively provided jurisdictional bases for suits by and against foreign states and ap-
pears as well to comprehend suits by an alien against a foreign state which would
be beyond the constitutional grant. However, in the only case in which that matter
has been an issue before it, the Court has construed the Act as creating a species of
federal question jurisdiction. Verlinden B. V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S.
480 (1983).
Suits by Foreign States.—The privilege of a recognized for-

eign state to sue in the courts of another state upon the principle
of comity is recognized by both international law and American con-
stitutional law.1141 To deny a sovereign this privilege “would mani-
fest a want of comity and friendly feeling.” 1142 Although national
sovereignty is continuous, a suit in behalf of a national sovereign
can be maintained in the courts of the United States only by a gov-
ernment which has been recognized by the political branches of our
own government as the authorized government of the foreign state.1143
As the responsible agency for the conduct of foreign affairs, the State
Department is the normal means of suggesting to the courts that a
sovereign be granted immunity from a particular suit.1144 Once a
foreign government avails itself of the privilege of suing in the courts
of the United States, it subjects itself to the procedure and rules of
decision governing those courts and accepts whatever liabilities the
court may decide to be a reasonable incident of bringing the suit.1145
The rule that a foreign nation instituting a suit in a federal dis-
trict court cannot invoke sovereign immunity as a defense to a coun-
terclaim growing out of the same transaction has been extended to
deny a claim of immunity as a defense to a counterclaim extrinsic
to the subject matter of the suit but limited to the amount of the
sovereign’s claim.1146 Moreover, certain of the benefits extending to
a domestic sovereign do not extend to a foreign sovereign suing in
the courts of the United States. A foreign state does not receive the
benefit of the rule which exempts the United States and its mem-
ber states from the operation of the statute of limitations, because
1141 The Sapphire, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 164, 167 (1871).

1142 78 U.S. at 167. This case also held that a change in the person of the sover-
eign does not affect the continuity or rights of national sovereignty, including the
right to bring suit or to continue one that has been brought.
1143 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938), citing Jones
v. United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890); Matter of Lehigh Valley R.R., 265 U.S.
573 (1924). Whether a government is to be regarded as the legal representative of a
foreign state is, of course, a political question.
1144 Ex parte Peru, 318 U.S. 578, 589 (1943), distinguishing Compania Espanola
v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938), which held that where the Executive Depart-
ment neither recognizes nor disallows the claim of immunity, the court is free to
examine that question for itself. Under the latter circumstances, however, a claim
that a foreign vessel is a public ship and immune from suit must be substantiated
to the satisfaction of the federal court.
1145 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 134 (1938). Among other
benefits which the Court cited as not extending to foreign states as litigant included
exemption from costs and from giving discovery. Decisions were also cited to the
effect that a sovereign plaintiff “should so far as the thing can be done, be put in
the same position as a body corporate.”
1146 National Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 361 (1955), citing 26 Dept.
State Bull. 984 (1952), in which the Department “pronounced broadly against recog-
nizing sovereign immunity for the commercial operations of a foreign government.”
those considerations of public policy back of the rule are regarded

as absent in the case of the foreign sovereign.1147
Indian Tribes.—Within the terms of Article III, an Indian tribe
is not a foreign state and hence cannot sue in the courts of the United
States. This rule was applied in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,1148 where
Chief Justice Marshall conceded that the Cherokee Nation was a
state, but not a foreign state, being a part of the United States and
dependent upon it. Other passages of the opinion specify the ele-
ments essential of a foreign state for purposes of jurisdiction, such
as sovereignty and independence.
Narrow Construction of the Jurisdiction.—As in cases of di-
versity jurisdiction, suits brought to the federal courts under this
category must clearly state in the record the nature of the parties.
As early as 1809, the Supreme Court ruled that a federal court could
not take jurisdiction of a cause where the defendants were de-
scribed in the record as “late of the district of Maryland,” but were
not designated as citizens of Maryland, and plaintiffs were de-
scribed as aliens and subjects of the United Kingdom.1149 The me-
ticulous care manifested in this case appeared twenty years later
when the Court narrowly construed § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
vesting the federal courts with jurisdiction when an alien was a party,
in order to keep it within the limits of this clause. The judicial power
was further held not to extend to private suits in which an alien is
a party, unless a citizen is the adverse party.1150 This interpreta-
tion was extended in 1870 by a holding that if there is more than
one plaintiff or defendant, each plaintiff or defendant must be com-
petent to sue or liable to suit.1151 These rules, however, do not pre-
clude a suit between citizens of the same state if the plaintiffs are
merely nominal parties and are suing on behalf of an alien.1152
Clause 2. In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public

Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a
Party, the Supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all
1147 Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 135, 137 (1938), citing
precedents to the effect that a sovereign plaintiff “should be put in the same posi-
tion as a body corporate.”
1148 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16–20 (1831).
1149 Hodgson & Thompson v. Bowerbank, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 303 (1809).
1150 Jackson v. Twentyman, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 136 (1829); Romero v. International
Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959).

1151 Coal Co. v. Blatchford, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 172 (1871). See, however,Lacas-
sagne v. Chapuis, 144 U.S. 119 (1892), which held that a lower federal court had
jurisdiction over a proceeding to impeach its former decree, although the parties were
new and were both aliens.
1152 Browne v. Strode, 9 U.S. (5 Cr.) 303 (1809).
Sec. 2—Judicial Power and Jurisdiction Cl. 2—Original and Appellate Jurisdiction
other Cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have ap-
pellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Excep-
tions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
THE ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT
From the beginning, the Supreme Court has assumed that its
original jurisdiction flows directly from the Constitution and is there-
fore self-executing without further action by Congress.1153 In Chisholm
v. Georgia,1154 the Court entertained an action of assumpsit against
Georgia by a citizen of another state. Congress in § 3 of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 1155 purported to invest the Court with original
jurisdiction in suits between a state and citizens of another state,
but it did not authorize actions of assumpsit in such cases nor did
it prescribe forms of process for the exercise of original jurisdiction.
Over the dissent of Justice Iredell, the Court, in opinions by Chief
Justice Jay and Justices Blair, Wilson, and Cushing, sustained its
jurisdiction and its power to provide forms of process and rules of
procedure in the absence of congressional enactments. The back-
lash of state sovereignty sentiment resulted in the proposal and rati-
fication of the Eleventh Amendment, which did not, however, affect
the direct flow of original jurisdiction to the Court, although those
cases to which states were parties were now limited to states as
party plaintiffs, to two or more states disputing, or to United States
suits against states.1156
By 1861, Chief Justice Taney could confidently enunciate, after
review of the precedents, that in all cases where original jurisdic-
tion is given by the Constitution, the Supreme Court has authority
“to exercise it without further act of Congress to regulate its pow-
ers or confer jurisdiction, and that the court may regulate and mould
the process it uses in such manner as in its judgment will best pro-
mote the purposes of justice.” 1157
Although Chief Justice Marshall apparently assumed the Court
had exclusive jurisdiction of cases within its original jurisdic-
tion,1158 Congress from 1789 on gave the inferior federal courts con-
1153 But, in § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 80, Congress did so pur-
port to convey the jurisdiction and the statutory conveyance exists today. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1251. It does not, however, exhaust the listing of the Constitution.
1154 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). In an earlier case, the point of jurisdiction was
not raised. Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402 (1792).

1155 1 Stat. 80.
1156 On the Eleventh Amendment, see infra.
1157 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 98 (1861).
1158 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137, 174 (1803).
current jurisdiction in some classes of such cases.1159 Sustained in

the early years on circuit,1160 this concurrent jurisdiction was fi-
nally approved by the Court itself.1161 The Court has also relied on
the first Congress’s interpretation of the meaning of Article III in
declining original jurisdiction of an action by a state to enforce a
judgment for a pecuniary penalty awarded by one of its own courts.1162
Noting that § 13 of the Judiciary Act had referred to “controversies
of a civil nature,” Justice Gray declared that it “was passed by the
first Congress assembled under the Constitution, many of whose mem-
bers had taken part in framing that instrument, and is contempo-
raneous and weighty evidence of its true meaning.” 1163
However, another clause of § 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789 was
not accorded the same presumption by Chief Justice Marshall, who,
interpreting it to give the Court power to issue a writ of manda-
mus on an original proceeding, declared that, as Congress could not
restrict the original jurisdiction, neither could it enlarge it, and he
pronounced the clause void.1164 Although the Chief Justice’s inter-
pretation of the meaning of the clause may be questioned, no one
has questioned the constitutional principle it proclaimed. Although
the rule deprives Congress of power to expand or contract the juris-
diction, it allows a considerable latitude of interpretation to the Court
itself. In some cases, such as Missouri v. Holland,1165 the Court has
manifested a tendency toward a liberal construction of its original
jurisdiction, but the more usual view is that “our original jurisdic-
tion should be invoked sparingly.” 1166 Original jurisdiction “is lim-
1159 In § 3 of the 1789 Act. The present division is in 28 U.S.C. § 1251.
1160 United States v. Ravara, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 297 (C.C.Pa. 1793).
1161 Rhode Island v. Massachusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657 (1838); Bors v. Pres-
ton, 111 U.S. 252 (1884); Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449 (1884). Such
suits could be brought and maintained in state courts as well. Plaquemines Tropical
Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S. 511 (1898); Ohio ex rel. Popovici v. Agler, 280 U.S.
379 (1930).
1162 Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).
1163 127 U.S. at 297. See also the dictum in Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.)
264, 398–99 (1821); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 431–32 (1793).
1164 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803). The Chief Justice declared
that “a negative or exclusive sense” had to be given to the affirmative enunciation

of the cases to which original jurisdiction extends. Id. at 174. This exclusive inter-
pretation has been since followed. Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807); New
Jersey v. New York, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 284 (1831); Ex parte Barry, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 65
(1844); Ex parte Vallandigham, 68 U.S. (1 Wall.) 243, 252 (1864); Ex parte Yerger,
75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85, 98 (1869). In the curious case of Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633
(1937), the Court was asked to unseat Justice Black on the ground that his appoint-
ment violated Article I. § 6, cl. 2. Although it rejected petitioner’s application, the
Court did not point out that it was being asked to assume original jurisdiction in
violation of Marbury v. Madison.
1165 252 U.S. 416 (1920). See also South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301
(1966), and Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970).

1166 Utah v. United States, 394 U.S. 89, 95 (1968).
ited and manifestly to be sparingly exercised, and should not be

expanded by construction.” 1167 Exercise of its original jurisdiction
is not obligatory on the Court but discretionary, to be determined
on a case-by-case basis on grounds of practical necessity.1168 It is to
be honored “only in appropriate cases. And the question of what is
appropriate concerns of course the seriousness and dignity of the
claim; yet beyond that it necessarily involves the availability of an-
other forum where there is jurisdiction over the named parties, where
the issues tendered may be litigated, and where appropriate relief
may be had. We incline to a sparing use of our original jurisdiction
so that our increasing duties with the appellate docket will not suf-
fer.” 1169 But where claims are of sufficient “seriousness and dig-
nity,” in which resolution by the judiciary is of substantial concern,
the Court will hear them.1170
POWER OF CONGRESS TO CONTROL THE FEDERAL
COURTS
The Theory of Plenary Congressional Control

Unlike its original jurisdiction, the appellate jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court is subject to “exceptions and regulations” pre-
scribed by Congress, and the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts
is subject to congressional prescription. Additionally, Congress has
power to regulate modes and practices of proceeding on the part of
the inferior federal courts. Whether there are limitations to the ex-
ercise of these congressional powers, and what the limitations may
be, are matters that have vexed scholarly and judicial interpreta-
1167 California v. Southern Pacific Co., 157 U.S. 229, 261 (1895). Indeed, the use
of the word “sparingly” in this context is all but ubiquitous. E.g., Wyoming v. Okla-
homa, 502 U.S. 437, 450 (1992); Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 739 (1981);
United States v. Nevada, 412 U.S. 534, 538 (1973).
1168 Texas v. New Mexico, 462 U.S. 554, 570 (1983).
1169 Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 93–94 (1972). In this case, and in
Washington v. General Motors Corp., 406 U.S. 109 (1972), and Ohio v. Wyandotte
Chemicals Corp., 401 U.S. 493 (1971), the Court declined to permit adjudication of
environmental pollution cases manifestly within its original jurisdiction because the
nature of the cases required the resolution of complex, novel, and technical factual
questions not suitable for resolution at the Court’s level as a matter of initial deci-
sion, but which could be brought in the lower federal courts. Not all such cases,
however, were barred. Vermont v. New York, 406 U.S. 186 (1972) (granting leave to
file complaint). In other instances, notably involving “political questions,” cf. Massa-
chusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), the Court has simply refused permission
for parties to file bills of complaint without hearing them on the issue or producing
an opinion. E.g., Massachusetts v. Laird, 400 U.S. 886 (1970) (constitutionality of
United States action in Indochina); Delaware v. New York, 385 U.S. 895 (1966) (con-
stitutionality of electoral college under one-man, one-vote rule).
1170 Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 451 (1982). The principles are the same
whether the Court’s jurisdiction is exclusive or concurrent. Texas v. New Mexico,

462 U.S. 554 (1983); California v. West Virginia, 454 U.S. 1027 (1981); Arizona v.
New Mexico, 425 U.S. 794 (1976).
tion over the years, inasmuch as congressional displeasure with ju-

dicial decisions has sometimes led to successful efforts to “curb” the
courts and more frequently to proposed but unsuccessful curbs.1171
Supreme Court holdings establish clearly the breadth of congressio-
nal power, and numerous dicta assert an even broader power, but
that Congress may through the exercise of its powers vitiate and
overturn constitutional decisions and restrain the exercise of consti-
tutional rights is an assertion often made but not sustained by any
decision of the Court.
Appellate Jurisdiction.—In Wiscart v. D’Auchy,1172 the issue
was whether the statutory authorization for the Supreme Court to
review on writ of error circuit court decisions in “civil actions” gave
it power to review admiralty cases.1173 A majority of the Court de-
cided that admiralty cases were “civil actions” and thus review-
able; in the course of decision, it was said that “[i]f Congress had
provided no rule to regulate our proceedings, we cannot exercise
an appellate jurisdiction; and if the rule is provided, we cannot de-
part from it.” 1174 Much the same thought was soon to be expressed
by Chief Justice Marshall, although he seems to have felt that in
the absence of congressional authorization, the Court’s appellate ju-
risdiction would have been measured by the constitutional grant.
“Had the judicial act created the supreme court, without defining
or limiting its jurisdiction, it must have been considered as possess-
ing all the jurisdiction which the constitution assigns to it. The leg-
islature would have exercised the power it possessed of creating a
supreme court, as ordained by the constitution; and in omitting to
exercise the right of excepting from its constitutional powers, would
have necessarily left those powers undiminished.”
“The appellate powers of this court are not given by the judi-
cial act. They are given by the constitution. But they are limited
and regulated by the judicial act, and by such other acts as have
1171 A classic but now dated study is Warren, Legislative and Judicial Attacks
on the Supreme Court of the United States: A History of the Twenty-Fifth Section of
the Judiciary Act, 47 AM. L. REV. 1, 161 (1913). The most comprehensive consider-
ation of the constitutional issue is Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Juris-
diction of Federal Courts: An Exercise in Dialectic, 66 HARV, L. REV. 1362 (1953). See
Hart & Wechsler (6h ed.), supra at 287–305.
1172 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321 (1796).
1173 Judiciary Act of 1789, § 22, 1 Stat. 84.
1174 Wiscart v. D’Auchy, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 321, 327 (1796). The dissent thought
that admiralty cases were not “civil actions” and thus that there was no appellate
review. Id. at 326–27. See also Clarke v. Bazadone, 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 212 (1803); Turner
v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
been passed on the subject.” 1175 Later Justices viewed the matter
differently from Marshall. “By the constitution of the United States,”
it was said in one opinion, “the Supreme Court possesses no appel-
late power in any case, unless conferred upon it by act of Con-
gress.” 1176 In order for a case to come within its appellate jurisdic-
tion, the Court has said, “two things must concur: the Constitution
must give the capacity to take it, and an act of Congress must sup-
ply the requisite authority.” Moreover, “it is for Congress to deter-
mine how far, within the limits of the capacity of this court to take,
appellate jurisdiction shall be given, and when conferred, it can be
exercised only to the extent and in the manner prescribed by law.
In these respects it is wholly the creature of legislation.” 1177
This congressional power, conferred by the language of Article
III, § 2, cl. 2, which provides that all jurisdiction not original is to
be appellate, “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations
as the Congress shall make,” has been utilized to forestall a deci-
sion which the congressional majority assumed would be adverse
to its course of action. In Ex parte McCardle,1178 the Court ac-
cepted review on certiorari of a denial of a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus by the circuit court; the petition was by a civilian
convicted by a military commission of acts obstructing Reconstruc-
tion. Anticipating that the Court might void, or at least under-
mine, congressional reconstruction of the Confederate States, Con-
gress enacted over the President’s veto a provision repealing the
act which authorized the appeal McCardle had taken.1179 Although
the Court had already heard argument on the merits, it then dis-
1175 Durousseau v. United States, 10 U.S. (6 Cr.) 307, 313–314 (1810). “Courts
which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by written law,
cannot transcend that jurisdiction.” Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 93 (1807)
(Chief Justice Marshall). Marshall had earlier expressed his Durousseau thoughts
in United States v. More, 7 U.S. (3 Cr.) 159 (1805).
1176 Barry v. Mercein, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 103, 119 (1847) (case held nonreviewable
because minimum jurisdictional amount not alleged).

1177 Daniels v. Railroad Co., 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 250, 254 (1865) (case held nonreview-
able because certificate of division in circuit did not set forth questions in dispute
as provided by statute).
1178 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 318 (1868). That Congress’s apprehensions might have had
a basis in fact, see C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
VOL. VI, PT. I: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION 1864–88 493–495 (1971). McCardle is fully
reviewed at pp. 433–514.
1179 By the Act of February 5, 1867, § 1, 14 Stat. 386, Congress had authorized
appeals to the Supreme Court from circuit court decisions denying habeas corpus.
Previous to this statute, the Court’s jurisdiction to review habeas corpus decisions,
based in § 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 81, was somewhat fuzzily con-
ceived. Compare United States v. Hamilton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 17 (1795), and Ex parte
Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cr.) 448 (1806), with Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
The repealing statute was the Act of March 27, 1868, 15 Stat. 44. The repealed act
was reenacted March 3, 1885. 23 Stat. 437.
missed for want of jurisdiction.1180 “We are not at liberty to inquire

into the motives of the legislature. We can only examine into its
power under the Constitution; and the power to make exceptions
to the appellate jurisdiction of this court is given by express words.”
“What, then, is the effect of the repealing act upon the case be-
fore us? We cannot doubt as to this. Without jurisdiction the court
cannot proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare
the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to
the court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the cause.” 1181
Although McCardle grew out of the stresses of Reconstruction, the
principle it applied has been applied in later cases.1182
Jurisdiction of the Inferior Federal Courts.—The Framers,
as we have seen,1183 divided with regard to the necessity of courts
inferior to the Supreme Court, simply authorized Congress to cre-
ate such courts, in which, then, judicial power “shall be vested” and
1180 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1869). In the course of the opin-
ion, Chief Justice Chase speculated about the Court’s power in the absence of any
legislation in tones reminiscent of Marshall’s comments. Id. at 513.
1181 74 U.S. at 514.
1182 See, e.g., Justice Frankfurter’s remarks in National Mutual Ins. Co. v. Tide-
water Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 655 (1948) (dissenting): “Congress need not give
this Court any appellate power; it may withdraw appellate jurisdiction once con-
ferred and it may do so even while a case is sub judice.” In The Francis Wright, 105
U.S. 381, 385–386 (1882), upholding Congress’s power to confine Supreme Court re-
view in admiralty cases to questions of law, the Court said: “[W]hile the appellate
power of this court under the Constitution extends to all cases within the judicial
power of the United States, actual jurisdiction under the power is confined within
such limits as Congress sees fit to prescribe. . . . What those powers shall be, and
to what extent they shall be exercised, are, and always have been, proper subjects
of legislative control. Authority to limit the jurisdiction necessarily carries with it
authority to limit the use of the jurisdiction. Not only may whole classes of cases be
kept out of the jurisdiction altogether, but particular classes of questions may be
subjected to reexamination and review, while others are not.” See also Luckenbuch
S. S. Co. v. United States, 272 U.S. 533, 537 (1926); American Construction Co. v.
Jacksonville, T. & K.W. Ry., 148 U.S. 372, 378 (1893); United States v. Bitty, 208
U.S. 393 (1908); United States v. Young, 94 U.S. 258 (1876). Numerous restrictions
on the exercise of appellate jurisdiction have been upheld. E.g., Congress for a hun-
dred years did not provide for a right of appeal to the Supreme Court in criminal
cases, except upon a certification of division by the circuit court: at first appeal was
provided in capital cases and then in others. F. Frankfurter & J. Landis, supra at
79, 109–120. Other limitations noted heretofore include minimum jurisdictional amounts,
restrictions of review to questions of law and to questions certified from the circuits,
and the scope of review of state court decisions of federal constitutional questions.
See Walker v. Taylor, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 64 (1847). Though McCardle is the only case
in which Congress successfully forestalled an expected decision by shutting off juris-
diction, other cases have been cut off while pending on appeal, either inadvertently,
Insurance Co. v. Ritchie, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 541 (1866), or intentionally, Railroad Co.
v. Grant, 98 U.S. 398 (1878), by raising the requirements for jurisdiction without a
reservation for pending cases. See also Bruner v. United States, 343 U.S. 112 (1952);
District of Columbia v. Eslin, 183 U.S. 62 (1901).
1183 Supra, “One Supreme Court” and “Inferior Courts”.
to which nine classes of cases and controversies “shall extend.” 1184

While Justice Story deemed it imperative of Congress to create in-
ferior federal courts and, when they had been created, to vest them
with all the jurisdiction they were capable of receiving,1185 the First
Congress acted upon a wholly different theory. Inferior courts were
created, but jurisdiction generally over cases involving the Consti-
tution, laws, and treaties of the United States was not given them,
diversity jurisdiction was limited by a minimal jurisdictional amount
requirement and by a prohibition on creation of diversity through
assignments, equity jurisdiction was limited to those cases where a
“plain, adequate, and complete remedy” could not be had at law.1186
This care for detail in conferring jurisdiction upon the inferior fed-
eral courts bespoke a conviction by Members of Congress that it
was within their power to confer or to withhold jurisdiction at their
discretion. The cases have generally sustained this view.
Thus, in Turner v. Bank of North America,1187 the issue was the
jurisdiction of the federal courts in a suit to recover on a promis-
sory note between two citizens of the same state but in which the
note had been assigned to a citizen of a second state so that suit
could be brought in federal court under its diversity jurisdiction, a
course of action prohibited by § 11 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.1188
Counsel for the bank argued that the grant of judicial power by
the Constitution was a direct grant of jurisdiction, provoking from
Chief Justice Ellsworth a considered doubt 1189 and from Justice Chase
a firm rejection. “The notion has frequently been entertained, that
the federal courts derive their judicial power immediately from the
constitution: but the political truth is, that the disposal of the judi-
cial power (except in a few specified instances) belongs to Con-
gress. If Congress has given the power to this Court, we possess it,
not otherwise: and if Congress has not given the power to us, or to
any other Court, it still remains at the legislative disposal. Be-
1184 Article III, § 1, 2.
1185 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 374 (1816). For an effort
to reframe Justice Story’s position in modern analytical terms, see the writings of
Professors Amar and Clinton, supra and infra.
1186 Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73. See Warren, New Light on the History of
the Judiciary Act of 1789, 37 HARV. L. REV. 49 (1923). A modern study of the first
Judiciary Act that demonstrates the congressional belief in discretion to structure
jurisdiction is Casto, The First Congress’s Understanding of Its Authority over the
Federal Courts’ Jurisdiction, 26 B. C. L. REV. 1101 (1985).
1187 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8 (1799).
1188 “[N]or shall any district or circuit court have cognizance of any suit to re-
cover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favour of an
assignee, unless a suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said
contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of ex-
change.” 1 Stat. 79.
1189 Turner v. Bank of North America, 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 8, 10 (1799).
sides, Congress is not bound, and it would, perhaps, be inexpedi-

ent, to enlarge the jurisdiction of the federal courts, to every sub-
ject, in every form, which the constitution might warrant.” 1190 Applying
§ 11, the Court held that the circuit court had lacked jurisdiction.
Chief Justice Marshall himself soon made similar asser-
tions,1191 and the early decisions of the Court continued to be sprinkled
with assumptions that the power of Congress to create inferior fed-
eral courts necessarily implied “the power to limit jurisdiction of
those Courts to particular objects.” 1192 In Cary v. Curtis,1193 a stat-
ute making final the decision of the Secretary of the Treasury in
certain tax disputes was challenged as an unconstitutional depriva-
tion of the judicial power of the courts. The Court decided other-
wise. “[T]he judicial power of the United States, although it has its
origin in the Constitution, is (except in enumerated instances appli-
cable exclusively to this court), dependent for its distribution and
organization, and for the modes of its exercise, entirely upon the
action of Congress, who possess the sole power of creating tribu-
nals (inferior to the Supreme Court), for the exercise of the judicial
power, and of investing them with jurisdiction either limited, con-
current, or exclusive, and of withholding jurisdiction from them in
the exact degrees and character which to Congress may seem proper
for the public good.” 1194 Five years later, the validity of the as-
signee clause of the Judiciary Act of 1789 1195 was placed in issue
in Sheldon v. Sill,1196 in which diversity of citizenship had been cre-
ated by assignment of a negotiable instrument. It was argued that,
because the right of a citizen of any state to sue citizens of another
flowed directly from Article III, Congress could not restrict that right.
Unanimously, the Court rejected this contention and held that be-
cause the Constitution did not create inferior federal courts but rather
authorized Congress to create them, Congress was also empowered
to define their jurisdiction and to withhold jurisdiction of any of the
1190 4 U.S. at 10.
1191 In Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 93 (1807), Marshall observed that
“courts which are created by written law, and whose jurisdiction is defined by writ-
ten law, cannot transcend that jurisdiction.”
1192 United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 32, 33 (1812). Justice
Johnson continued: “All other Courts [besides the Supreme Court] created by the
general government possess no jurisdiction but what is given them by the power
that creates them, and can be vested with none but what the power ceded to the
general government will authorize them to confer.” See also Rhode Island v. Massa-
chusetts, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 657, 721–722 (1838).
1193 44 U.S. (3 How.) 236 (1845).
1194 44 U.S. at 244–45. Justices McLean and Story dissented, arguing that the
right to construe the law in all matters of controversy is of the essence of judicial
power. Id. at 264.
1195 Supra.
1196 49 U.S. (8 How.) 441 (1850).
enumerated cases and controversies in Article III. The case and the
principle have been cited and reaffirmed numerous times,1197 includ-
ing in a case under the Voting Rights Act of 1965.1198
Congressional Control Over Writs and Processes.—The Ju-
diciary Act of 1789 contained numerous provisions relating to the
times and places for holding court, even of the Supreme Court, to
times of adjournment, appointment of officers, issuance of writs, ci-
tations for contempt, and many other matters which it might be
supposed courts had some authority of their own to regulate.1199 The
power to enjoin governmental and private action has frequently been
curbed by Congress, especially as the action has involved the power
of taxation at either the federal or state level.1200 Though the courts
have variously interpreted these restrictions,1201 they have not de-
nied the power to impose them.
Reacting to judicial abuse of injunctions in labor disputes,1202
Congress in 1932 enacted the Norris-La Guardia Act which forbade
the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes except through compli-
ance with a lengthy hearing and fact-finding process which re-
quired the district judge to determine that only through the injunc-
tive process could irremediable harm through illegal conduct be
1197 E.g., Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 233–234 (1922); Ladew v.
Tennessee Copper Co., 218 U.S. 357, 358 (1910); Venner v. Great Northern R. Co.,
209 U.S. 24, 35 (1908); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1, 24 (1906); Stevenson v. Fain,
195 U.S. 165, 167 (1904); Plaquemines Tropical Fruit Co. v. Henderson, 170 U.S.
511, 513–521 (1898); The Mayor v. Cooper, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 247, 251–252 (1868).
1198 By the Voting Rights Act of 1965, Congress required covered states that wished
to be relieved of coverage to bring actions to this effect in the District Court of the
District of Columbia. In South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 331 (1966),
Chief Justice Warren for the Court said: “Despite South Carolina’s argument to the
contrary, Congress might appropriately limit litigation under this provision to a single
court in the District of Columbia, pursuant to its constitutional power under Art.
III, § 1, to ‘ordain and establish’ inferior federal tribunals.” See also Palmore v. United
States, 411 U.S. 389, 400–02 (1973); Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977); Taylor
v. St. Vincent’s Hosp., 369 F. Supp. 948 (D. Mont. 1973), aff’d, 523 F.2d 75 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied, 424 U.S. 948 (1976).
1199 1 Stat. 73. For a comprehensive discussion with itemization, see Frank-
furter & Landis, Power of Congress over Procedure in Criminal Contempts in ‘Infe-
rior’ Federal Courts: A Study in Separation of Powers, 37 HARV. L. REV. 1010 (1924).
1200 The Act of March 2, 1867, 10, 14 Stat. 475, as amended, now 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421 (federal taxes): Act of August 21, 1937, 50 Stat. 738, 28 U.S.C. § 1341 (state
taxes). See also Act of May 14, 1934, 48 Stat. 775, 28 U.S.C. § 1342 (state rate-
making).
1201 Compare Snyder v. Marks, 109 U.S. 189 (1883), with Dodge v. Brady, 240
U.S. 122 (1916), with Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938).
1202 F. FRANKFURTER & I. GREENE, THE LABOR INJUNCTION (1930).
prevented.1203 The Court seemed to experience no difficulty in up-

holding the Act,1204 and it has liberally applied it through the years.1205
Congress’s power to confer, withhold, and restrict jurisdiction
is clearly revealed in the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 1206
and in the cases arising from it. Fearful that the price control pro-
gram might be nullified by injunctions, Congress provided for a spe-
cial court in which persons could challenge the validity of price regu-
lations issued by the government with appeal from the Emergency
Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. The basic constitutionality
of the Act was sustained in Lockerty v. Phillips.1207 In Yakus v. United
States,1208 the Court upheld the provision of the Act which con-
ferred exclusive jurisdiction on the special court to hear challenges
to any order or regulation and foreclosed a plea of invalidity of any
such regulation or order as a defense to a criminal proceeding un-
der the Act in the regular district courts. Although Justice Rutledge
protested in dissent that this provision conferred jurisdiction on dis-
trict courts from which essential elements of the judicial power had
been abstracted,1209 Chief Justice Stone for the Court declared that
the provision presented no novel constitutional issue.
The Theory Reconsidered

Despite the breadth of the language of many of the previously
cited cases, the actual holdings constitute something less than an
affirmance of plenary congressional power to do anything it desires
by manipulation of jurisdiction, and, indeed, the cases reflect cer-
tain limitations. Setting to one side various formulations that lack
textual and subsequent judicial support, such as mandatory vest-
1203 47 Stat. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101–115.

1204 In Lauf v. E.G. Shinner & Co., 303 U.S. 323, 330 (1938), the Court simply
declared: “There can be no question of the power of Congress thus to define and
limit the jurisdiction of the inferior courts of the United States.”
1205 E.g., New Negro Alliance v. Sanitary Grocery Co., 303 U.S. 552 (1938); Broth-
erhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Chicago River & I. R.R., 353 U.S. 30 (1957); Boys
Markets v. Retail Clerks Union, 398 U.S. 235 (1970).
1206 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
1207 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
1208 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
1209 321 U.S. at 468. In United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987),
purportedly in reliance on Yakus and other cases, the Court held that a collateral
challenge must be permitted to the use of a deportation proceeding as an element of
a criminal offense where effective judicial review of the deportation order had been
denied. A statutory scheme similar to that in Yakus was before the Court in Adamo
Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978), but statutory construction en-
abled the Court to pass by constitutional issues that were not perceived to be insig-
nificant. See esp. id. at 289 (Justice Powell concurring). See also Harrison v. PPG
Industries, 446 U.S. 578 (1980), and id. at 594 (Justice Powell concurring).
ing of jurisdiction,1210 inherent judicial power,1211 and a theory, vari-

ously expressed, that the Supreme Court has “essential constitu-
tional functions” of judicial review that Congress may not impair
through jurisdictional limitations,1212 one can nonetheless see the
possibilities of restrictions on congressional power flowing from such
basic constitutional underpinnings as express prohibitions, separa-
tion of powers, and the nature of the judicial function.1213 Whether
because of the plethora of scholarly writing contesting the exis-
tence of unlimited congressional power or because of another rea-
son, the Court of late has taken to noting constitutional reserva-
1210 This was Justice Story’s theory propounded in Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee,
14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 329–336 (1816). Nevertheless, Story apparently did not be-
lieve that the constitutional bestowal of jurisdiction was self-executing and accepted
the necessity of statutory conferral. White v. Fenner, 29 Fed. Cas. 1015 (No. 17,
547) (C.C.D.R.I. 1818) (Justice Story). In the present day, it has been argued that
the presence in the jurisdictional-grant provisions of Article III of the word “all” be-
fore the subject-matter grants—federal question, admiralty, public ambassadors –man-
dates federal court review at some level of these cases, whereas congressional discre-
tion exists with respect to party-defined jurisdiction, such as diversity. Amar, A Neo-
Federalist View of Article III: Separating the Two-Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65
B.U. L. REV. 205 (1985); Amar, The Two-Tiered Structure of the Judiciary Act of 1789,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 1499 (1990). Rebuttal articles include Meltzer, The History and
Structure of Article III, id. at 1569; Redish, Text, Structure, and Common Sense in
the Interpretation of Article III, id. at 1633; and a response by Amar, id. at 1651.
An approach similar to Professor Amar’s is Clinton, A Mandatory View of Federal
Jurisdiction: A Guided Quest for the Original Understanding of Article III, 132 U.
PA. L. REV. 741 (1984); Clinton, Early Implementation and Departures from the Con-
stitutional Plan, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1515 (1986). Though perhaps persuasive as an
original interpretation, both theories confront a large number of holdings and dicta
as well as the understandings of the early Congresses revealed in their actions. See
Casto, The First Congress’s Understanding of its Authority over the Federal Court’s
Jurisdiction, 26 B.C. L. REV. 1101 (1985).
1211 Justice Brewer in his opinion for the Court in United States v. Detroit Tim-
ber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 339 (1906), came close to asserting an indepen-
dent, inherent power of the federal courts, at least in equity. See also Paine Lumber
Co. v. Neal, 244 U.S. 459, 473, 475–476 (1917) (Justice Pitney dissenting). The ac-
ceptance by the Court of the limitations of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, among other
decisions, contradicts these assertions.
1212 The theory was apparently first developed in Ratner, Congressional Power
Over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960).
See also Ratner, Majoritarian Constraints on Judicial Review: Congressional Con-
trol of Supreme Court Jurisdiction, 27 VILL. L. REV. 929 (1981–82). The theory was
endorsed by Attorney General William French Smith as the view of the Department
of Justice. 128 CONG. REC. 9093–9097 (1982) (Letter to Hon. Strom Thurmond).
1213 An extraordinary amount of writing has been addressed to the issue, only a
fraction of which is touched on here. See Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 275–
324.
tions about legislative denials of jurisdiction for judicial review of

constitutional issues and construing statutes so as not to deny ju-
risdiction.1214
Ex parte McCardle 1215 marks the farthest advance of congres-
sional imposition of its will on the federal courts, and it is signifi-
cant because the curb related to the availability of the writ of ha-
beas corpus, which is marked out with special recognition by the
Constitution.1216
But how far did McCardle actually reach? In concluding its opin-
ion, the Court carefully observed: “Counsel seem to have supposed,
if effect be given to the repealing act in question, that the whole
appellate power of the court, in cases of habeas corpus, is denied.
But this is an error. The act of 1868 does not exempt from that
jurisdiction any cases but appeals from Circuit Courts under the
act of 1867. It does not affect the jurisdiction which was previously
exercised.” 1217 A year later, in Ex parte Yerger,1218 the Court held
that it did have authority under the Judiciary Act of 1789 to re-
view on certiorari a denial by a circuit court of a petition for writ
of habeas corpus on behalf of one held by the military in the South.
It thus remains unclear whether the Court would have followed its
language suggesting plenary congressional control if the effect had
been to deny absolutely an appeal from a denial of a writ of habeas
corpus.1219
1214 Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–367 (1974); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422
U.S. 749, 762 (1975); Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S.
667, 681 n.12 (1986); Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988). In the last cited
case, Justice Scalia attacked the reservation and argued for nearly complete congres-
sional discretion. Id. at 611–15 (concurring).
1215 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506 (1869). For the definitive analysis of the case, see Van
Alstyne, A Critical Guide to Ex Parte McCardle, 15 ARIZ. L. REV. 229 (1973).

1216 Article I, § 9, cl. 2.
1217 Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 515 (1869). A restrained reading
of McCardle is strongly suggested by Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651 (1996). A 1996
congressional statute giving to federal courts of appeal a “gate-keeping” function over
the filing of second or successive habeas petitions limited further review, including
denying the Supreme Court appellate review of circuit court denials of motions to
file second or successive habeas petitions. Pub. L. 104–132, § 106, 110 Stat. 1214,
1220, amending 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). Upholding the limitation, which was nearly iden-
tical to the congressional action at issue in McCardle and Yerger, the Court held
that its jurisdiction to hear appellate cases had been denied, but, just as in Yerger,
the statute did not annul the Court’s jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions filed as
original matters in the Supreme Court. No constitutional issue was thus presented.
1218 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869). Yerger is fully reviewed in C. FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF
THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES: VOL. VI, PT. I: RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION,
1864–88 (New York: 1971), 558–618.
1219 Cf. Eisentrager v. Forrestal, 174 F.2d 961, 966 (D.C.Cir. 1949), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950). Justice Douglas, with
whom Justice Black joined, said in Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 605 n.11
(1962) (dissenting opinion): “There is a serious question whether the McCardle case
Another Reconstruction Congress attempt to curb the judiciary

failed in United States v. Klein,1220 in which the Court voided a stat-
ute, couched in jurisdictional terms, which attempted to set aside
both the effect of a presidential pardon and the judicial effectua-
tion of such a pardon.1221 The statute declared that no pardon was
to be admissible in evidence in support of any claim against the
United States in the Court of Claims for the return of confiscated
property of Confederates nor, if already put in evidence in a pend-
ing case, should it be considered on behalf of the claimant by the
Court of Claims or by the Supreme Court on appeal. Proof of loy-
alty was required to be made according to provisions of certain con-
gressional enactments, and when judgment had already been ren-
dered on other proof of loyalty the Supreme Court on appeal should
have no further jurisdiction and should dismiss for want of jurisdic-
tion. Moreover, it was provided that the recitation in any pardon
which had been received that the claimant had taken part in the
rebellion was to be taken as conclusive evidence that the claimant
had been disloyal and was not entitled to regain his property.
The Court began by reaffirming that Congress controlled the ex-
istence of the inferior federal courts and the jurisdiction vested in
them and the appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. “But the
language of this provision shows plainly that it does not intend to
withhold appellate jurisdiction except as a means to an end. . . . It
is evident . . . that the denial of jurisdiction to this court, as well
as to the Court of Claims, is founded solely on the application of a
rule of decision, in causes pending, prescribed by Congress. The Court
has jurisdiction of the cause to a given point; but when it ascer-
could command a majority view today.” Justice Harlan, however, cited McCardle with
apparent approval of its holding, id. at 567–68, while noting that Congress’s “author-
ity is not, of course, unlimited.” Id. at 568. McCardle was cited approvingly in Bruner
v. United States, 343 U.S. 112, 117 n.8 (1952), as illustrating the rule “that when a
law conferring jurisdiction is repealed without any reservation as to pending cases,
all cases fall with the law. . . .”
1220 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872). See C. Fairman, supra at 558–618. The semi-
nal discussion of Klein may be found in Young, Congressional Regulation of Federal

Courts’ Jurisdiction and Processes: United States v. Klein Revisited, 1981 WISC. L.
REV. 1189. While he granted that Klein is limited insofar as its bearing on jurisdic-
tional limitation per se is concerned, he cited an ambiguous holding in Armstrong v.
United States, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 154 (1872), as in fact a judicial invalidation of a
jurisdictional limitation. Young, id. at 1222–23 n.179.
1221 Congress by the Act of July 17, 1862, §§ 5, 13, authorized the confiscation
of property of those persons in rebellion and authorized the President to issue par-
dons on such conditions as he deemed expedient, the latter provision being unneces-
sary in light of Article II, § 2, cl. 1. The President’s pardons all provided for restora-
tion of property, except slaves, and in United States v. Padelford, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.)
531 (1870), the Court held the claimant entitled to the return of his property on the
basis of his pardon. Congress thereupon enacted the legislation in question. 16 Stat.
235 (1870).
tains that a certain state of things exists, its jurisdiction is to cease

and it is required to dismiss the cause for want of jurisdiction.”
“It seems to us that this is not an exercise of the acknowledged
power of Congress to make exceptions and prescribe regulations to
the appellate power.” 1222 The statute was void for two reasons; it
“infring[ed] the constitutional power of the Executive,” 1223 and it
“prescrib[ed] a rule for the decision of a cause in a particular way.” 1224
Klein thus stands for the proposition that Congress may not vio-
late the principle of separation of powers 1225 and that it may not
accomplish certain forbidden substantive acts by casting them in
jurisdictional terms.1226
Other restraints on congressional power over the federal courts
may be gleaned from the opinion in the much-disputed Crowell v.
Benson.1227 In an 1856 case, the Court distinguished between mat-
ters of private right which from their nature were the subject of a
suit at the common law, equity, or admiralty and which cannot be
withdrawn from judicial cognizance, and those matters of public right
which, though susceptible of judicial determination, did not require
it and which might or might not be brought within judicial cogni-
zance.1228 What this might mean was elaborated in Crowell v.
Benson,1229 involving the finality to be accorded administrative find-
ings of jurisdictional facts in compensation cases. In holding that
an employer was entitled to a trial de novo of the constitutional
jurisdictional facts of the matter of the employer-employee relation-
ship and of the occurrence of the injury in interstate commerce, Chief
Justice Hughes fused the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amend-
ment and Article III but emphasized that the issue ultimately was
“rather a question of the appropriate maintenance of the Federal
1222 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 145–46 (1872).
1223 80 U.S. at 147.
1224 80 U.S. at 146.
1225 80 U.S. at 147. For an extensive discussion of Klein, see United States v.
Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 391–405 (1980), and id. at 424, 427–34 (Justice Rehnquist
dissenting). See also Pope v. United States, 323 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1944); Glidden Co. v.
Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 568 (1962) (Justice Harlan). In Robertson v. Seattle Audubon
Society, 503 U.S. 429 (1992), the Ninth Circuit had held unconstitutional under Klein
a statute that it construed to deny the federal courts power to construe the law, but
the Supreme Court held that Congress had changed the law that the courts were to
apply. The Court declined to consider whether Klein was properly to be read as void-
ing a law “because it directed decisions in pending cases without amending any law.”
Id. at 441.
1226 United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147 (1872).
1227 285 U.S. 22 (1932). See also Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276 (1922);
Ohio Valley Water Co. v. Ben Avon Borough, 253 U.S. 287 (1920); St. Joseph Stock
Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
1228 Murray’s Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 59 U.S. (18 How.)
272 (1856).
1229 285 U.S. 22 (1932). Justices Brandeis, Stone, and Roberts dissented.
judicial power” and “whether the Congress may substitute for con-
stitutional courts, in which the judicial power of the United States
is vested, an administrative agency . . . for the final determination
of the existence of the facts upon which the enforcement of the con-
stitutional rights of the citizen depend.” The answer was stated broadly.
“In cases brought to enforce constitutional rights, the judicial power
of the United States necessarily extends to the independent deter-
mination of all questions, both of fact and law, necessary to the per-
formance of that supreme function. . . . We think that the essen-
tial independence of the exercise of the judicial power of the United
States in the enforcement of constitutional rights requires that the
Federal court should determine such an issue upon its own record
and the facts elicited before it.” 1230
It is not at all clear that, in this respect, Crowell v. Benson re-
mains good law. It has never been overruled, and it has been cited
by several Justices approvingly,1231 but the Court has never ap-
plied the principle to control another case.1232
Express Constitutional Restrictions on Congress.—“[T]he Con-
stitution is filled with provisions that grant Congress or the States
specific power to legislate in certain areas; these granted powers
are always subject to the limitations that they may not be exer-
cised in a way that violates other specific provisions of the Consti-
tution.” 1233 The Supreme Court has had no occasion to deal with
this principle in the context of Congress’s power over its jurisdic-
tion and the jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts, but the pas-
sage of the Portal-to-Portal Act 1234 presented the lower courts such
an opportunity. The Act extinguished back-pay claims growing out
1230 285 U.S. at 56, 60, 64.
1231 See Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50
(1982) (plurality opinion), and id. at 100–03, 109–11 (Justice White dissenting) (dis-
cussing the due process/Article III basis of Crowell). Both the plurality and the dis-
sent agreed that later cases had “undermined” the constitutional/jurisdictional fact
analysis. Id. at 82, n.34; 110 n.12. For other discussions, see Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378
U.S. 184, 190 (1964) (Justice Brennan announcing judgment of the Court, joined by
Justice Goldberg); Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563, 578–79 (1968); Agosto
v. INS, 436 U.S. 748, 753 (1978); United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 682–84
(1980), and id. at 707–12 (Justice Marshall dissenting).
1232 Compare Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 767, 792 (1968);
Cordillo v. Liberty Mutual Ins. Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); South Chicago Coal & Dock
Co. v. Bassett, 309 U.S. 251 (1940). Justice Frankfurter was extremely critical of
Crowell. Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 142 (1946); City of Yonkers v. United
States, 320 U.S. 685 (1944).
1233 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 29 (1968). The elder Justice Harlan per-
haps had the same thought in mind when he said that, with regard to Congress’s
power over jurisdiction, “What such exceptions and regulations should be it is for
Congress, in its wisdom, to establish, having of course due regard to all the provi-
sions of the Constitution.” United States v. Bitty, 208 U.S. 393, 399–400 (1908).
1234 52 Stat. 1060, 29 U.S.C. § 201.
of several Supreme Court interpretations of the Fair Labor Stan-

dards Act; it also provided that no court should have jurisdiction to
enforce any claim arising from these decisions. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit sustained the Act.1235 The
court noted that the withdrawal of jurisdiction would be ineffective
if the extinguishment of the claims as a substantive matter were
invalid. “We think . . . that the exercise by Congress of its control
over jurisdiction is subject to compliance with at least the require-
ments of the Fifth Amendment. That is to say, while Congress has
the undoubted power to give, withhold, and restrict the jurisdiction
of the courts other than the Supreme Court, it must not so exercise
that power as to deprive any person of life, liberty, or property with-
out due process of law or to take private property without just com-
pensation.” 1236 The Court, however, found that the Portal-to-Portal
Act “did not violate the Fifth Amendment in so far as it may have
withdrawn from private individuals . . . any rights . . . which rested
upon private contracts they had made. Nor is the Portal-to-Portal
Act a violation of Article III of the Constitution or an encroach-
ment upon the separate power of the judiciary.” 1237
Conclusion.—There thus remains a measure of doubt that Con-
gress’s power over the federal courts is as plenary as some of the
Court’s language suggests it is. Congress has a vast amount of dis-
cretion in conferring and withdrawing and structuring the original
and appellate jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts and the ap-
pellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court; so much is clear from the
practice since 1789 and the holdings of many Court decisions. That
its power extends to accomplishing by means of its control over ju-
risdiction actions which it could not do directly by substantive en-
actment is by no means clear from the text of the Constitution or
from the cases.
FEDERAL-STATE COURT RELATIONS
Problems Raised by Concurrency

The Constitution established a system of government in which
total power, sovereignty, was not unequivocally lodged in one level
1235 Battaglia v. General Motors Corp., 169 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied,
335 U.S. 887 (1948). See also Seese v. Bethlehem Steel Co., 168 F.2d 58, 65 (4th Cir.
1948). For later dicta, see Johnson v. Robison, 415 U.S. 361, 366–67 (1974); Weinberger
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 761–62 (1975); Territory of Guam v. Olsen, 431 U.S. 195, 201–
02, 204 (1977); Adamo Wrecking Co. v. United States, 434 U.S. 275 (1978); Bowen v.
Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 681 n.12 (1986); Webster v.
Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 603 (1988); but see id. at 611–15 (Justice Scalia dissenting). Note
the relevance of United States v. Mendoza-Lopez, 481 U.S. 828 (1987).
1236 169 F.2d at 257.
1237 169 F.2d at 261–62.
of government. In Chief Justice Marshall’s words, “our complex sys-

tem [presents] the rare and difficult scheme of one general govern-
ment, whose actions extend over the whole, but which possesses only
certain enumerated powers, and of numerous state governments,
which retain and exercise all powers not delegated to the Union. . . .”
Naturally, in such a system, “contests respecting power must arise.” 1238
Contests respecting power may frequently arise in a federal system
with dual structures of courts exercising concurrent jurisdiction in
a number of classes of cases. Too, the possibilities of frictions grow
out of the facts that one set of courts may interfere directly or indi-
rectly with the other through injunctive and declaratory processes,
through the use of habeas corpus and removal to release persons
from the custody of the other set, and through the refusal by state
courts to be bound by decisions of the United States Supreme Court.
The relations between federal and state courts are governed in part
by constitutional law, with respect, say, to state court interference
with federal courts and state court refusal to comply with the judg-
ments of federal tribunals; in part by statutes, with respect to the
federal law generally enjoining federal court interference with pend-
ing state court proceedings; and in part by self-imposed rules of co-
mity and restraint, such as the abstention doctrine, all applied to
avoid unseemly conflicts, which, however, have at times occurred.
Subject to congressional provision to the contrary, state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction over all the classes of cases and contro-
versies enumerated in Article III, except suits between states, those
to which the United States is a party, those to which a foreign state
is a party, and those within the traditional admiralty jurisdic-
tion.1239 Even within this last category, however, state courts, though
unable to prejudice the harmonious operation and uniformity of gen-
eral maritime law,1240 have concurrent jurisdiction over cases that
occur within the maritime jurisdiction when such litigation as-
1238 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 204–05 (1824).

1239 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1251, 1331 et seq. Indeed, the presumption is that state
courts enjoy concurrent jurisdiction, and Congress must explicitly or implicitly con-
fine jurisdiction to the federal courts to oust the state courts. See Gulf Offshore Co.
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 453 U.S. 473, 477–84 (1981); Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455 (1990);
Yellow Freight System, Inc. v. Donnelly, 494 U.S. 820 (1990). Federal courts have
exclusive jurisdiction of the federal antitrust laws, even though Congress has not
spoken expressly or impliedly. See General Investment Co. v. Lake Shore & Michi-
gan Southern Ry., 260 U.S. 261, 287 (1922). Justice Scalia has argued that, inas-
much as state courts have jurisdiction generally because federal law is law for them,
Congress can provide exclusive federal jurisdiction only by explicit and affirmative
statement in the text of the statute, Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. at 469, but as can be
seen that is not now the rule.
1240 Southern Pacific Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917).
sumes the form of a suit at common law.1241 Review of state court

decisions by the United States Supreme Court is intended to pro-
tect the federal interest and promote uniformity of law and deci-
sion relating to the federal interest.1242 The first category of con-
flict surfaces here. The second broader category arises from the fact
that state interests, actions, and wishes, all of which may at times
be effectuated through state courts, are variously subject to re-
straint by federal courts. Although the possibility always ex-
isted,1243 it became much more significant and likely when, in the
wake of the Civil War, Congress bestowed general federal question
jurisdiction on the federal courts,1244 enacted a series of civil rights
statutes and conferred jurisdiction on the federal courts to enforce
them,1245 and most important proposed and saw to the ratification
of the three constitutional amendments, especially the Fourteenth,
which made an ever-increasing number of state actions subject to
federal scrutiny.1246
The Autonomy of State Courts
Noncompliance With and Disobedience of Supreme Court
Orders by State Courts.—The United States Supreme Court when
deciding cases on review from the state courts usually remands the
case to the state court when it reverses for “proceedings not incon-
sistent” with the Court’s opinion. This disposition leaves open the
possibility that unresolved issues of state law will be decided ad-
versely to the party prevailing in the Supreme Court or that the
state court will so interpret the facts or the Court’s opinion to the
detriment of the party prevailing in the Supreme Court.1247 When
it is alleged that the state court has deviated from the Supreme
1241 Through the “saving to suitors” clause, 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1). See Madruga v.
Superior Court, 346 U.S. 556, 560–61 (1954).

1242 See “Organization of Courts, Tenure, and Compensation of Judges” and
“Marbury v. Madison,” supra. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257.

1243 E.g., by a suit against a state by a citizen of another state directly in the
Supreme Court, Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), which was over-
turned by the Eleventh Amendment; by suits in diversity or removal from state courts
where diversity existed, 1 Stat. 78, 79; by suits by aliens on treaties, 1 Stat. 77,
and, subsequently, by removal from state courts of certain actions. 3 Stat. 198. And
for some unknown reason, Congress passed in 1793 a statute prohibiting federal
court injunctions against state court proceedings. See Toucey v. New York Life Ins.
Co., 314 U.S. 118, 120–32 (1941).
1244 Act of March 3, 1875, 18 Stat. 470.
1245 Civil Rights Act of 1871, § 1, 17 Stat. 13. The authorization for equitable
relief is now 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while jurisdiction is granted by 28 U.S.C. § 1343.

1246 See H. WECHSLER, THE NATIONALIZATION OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND CIVIL RIGHTS (1969).
1247 Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 431–531. Notable examples include Mar-
tin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264 (1821); Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859). For studies,
see Note, Final Disposition of State Court Decisions Reversed and Remanded by the
Supreme Court, October Term 1931 to October Term 1940, 55 HARV. L. REV. 1357 (1942);
Court’s mandate, the party losing below may appeal again 1248 or
she may presumably apply for mandamus to compel compli-
ance.1249 Statutorily, the Court may attempt to overcome state re-
calcitrance by a variety of specific forms of judgment.1250 If, how-
ever, the state courts simply defy the mandate of the Court, difficult
problems face the Court, extending to the possibility of contempt
citations.1251
The most spectacular disobedience of federal authority arose out
of the conflict between the Cherokees and the State of Georgia, which
was seeking to remove them and seize their lands with the active
support of President Jackson.1252 In the first instance, after the Court
had issued a writ of error to the Georgia Supreme Court to review
the murder conviction of a Cherokee, Corn Tassel, and after the writ
was served, Corn Tassel was executed on the day set for the hear-
ing, contrary to the federal law that a writ of error superseded sen-
tence until the appeal was decided.1253 Two years later, Georgia again
defied the Court, when, in Worcester v. Georgia,1254 it set aside the
conviction of two missionaries for residing among the Indians with-
Note, Evasion of Supreme Court Mandates in Cases Remanded to State Courts Since
1941, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1251 (1954); Schneider, State Court Evasion of United States
Supreme Court Mandates: A Reconsideration of the Evidence, 7 VALP. U. L. REV. 191
(1973).
1248 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). See 2 W. CROSSKEY,
POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES 785–817 (1953); 1 C.
WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 442–453 (1926). For recent ex-
amples, see NAACP v. Alabama, 360 U.S. 240, 245 (1959); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964), after remand, 277 Ala. 89, 167 So.2d 171 (1964);
Stanton v. Stanton, 429 U.S. 501 (1977); General Atomic Co. v. Felter, 436 U.S. 493
(1978).
1249 It does not appear that mandamus has ever actually issued. See In re Blake,
175 U.S. 114 (1899); Ex parte Texas, 315 U.S. 8 (1942); Fisher v. Hurst, 333 U.S.
147 (1948); Lavender v. Clark, 329 U.S. 674 (1946); General Atomic Co. v. Felter,
436 U.S. 493 (1978).
1250 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); McCulloch v. Mary-
land, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 437 (1819); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1,
239 (1824); Williams v. Bruffy, 102 U.S. 248 (1880) (entry of judgment); Tyler v. Maguire,
84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 253 (1873) (award of execution); Stanley v. Schwalby, 162 U.S.
255 (1896); Virginia Coupon Cases (Poindexter v. Greenhow), 114 U.S. 270 (1885)
(remand with direction to enter a specific judgment). See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1651(a), 2106.
1251 See 18 U.S.C. § 401. In United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563 (1906), 214
U.S. 386 (1909); 215 U.S. 580 (1909), on action by the Attorney General, the Court
appointed a commissioner to take testimony, rendered judgment of conviction, and
imposed sentence on a state sheriff who had conspired with others to cause the lynch-
ing of a prisoner in his custody after the Court had allowed an appeal from a circuit
court’s denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. A question whether a probate
judge was guilty of contempt of an order of the Court in failing to place certain
candidates on the ballot was certified to the district court, over the objections of
Justices Douglas and Harlan, who wished to follow the Shipp practice. In re Herndon,
394 U.S. 399 (1969). See In re Herndon, 325 F. Supp. 779 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
1252 1 C. Warren, supra at 729–79.
1253 Id. at 732–36.
1254 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
out a license. Despite the issuance of a special mandate to a local

court to discharge the missionaries, they were not released, and the
state’s governor loudly proclaimed resistance. Consequently, the two
remained in jail until they agreed to abandon further efforts for their
discharge by federal authority and to leave the state, whereupon
the governor pardoned them.
Use of State Courts in Enforcement of Federal Law.—
Although the states’ rights proponents in the Convention and in the
First Congress wished to leave to the state courts the enforcement
of federal law and rights rather than to create inferior federal
courts,1255 it was not long before they or their successors began to
argue that state courts could not be required to adjudicate cases
based on federal law. The practice in the early years was to make
the jurisdiction of federal courts generally concurrent with that of
state courts,1256 and early Congresses imposed positive duties on
state courts to enforce federal laws.1257 Reaction set in out of hostil-
ity to the Embargo Acts, the Fugitive Slave Law, and other mea-
sures,1258 and, in Prigg v. Pennsylvania,1259 involving the Fugitive
Slave Law, the Court indicated that the states could not be com-
pelled to enforce federal law. After a long period, however, Con-
gress resumed its former practice, 1260 which the Court sus-
tained,1261 and it went even further in the Federal Employers’ Liability
Act by not only giving state courts concurrent jurisdiction but also
by prohibiting the removal of cases begun in state courts to the fed-
eral courts.1262
When Connecticut courts refused to enforce an FELA claim on
the ground that to do so was contrary to the public policy of the
state, the Court held on the basis of the Supremacy Clause that,
1255 See “Organization of Courts, Tenure, and Compensation of Judges,” supra.
1256 Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 9, 11, 1 Stat. 76, 78; see also id. at § 25, 1 Stat. 85.
1257 E.g., Carriage Tax Act, 1 Stat. 373 (1794); License Tax on Wine & Spirits
Act, 1 Stat. 376 (1794); Fugitive Slave Act, 1 Stat. 302 (1794); Naturalization Act of
1795, 1 Stat. 414; Alien Enemies Act of 1798, 1 Stat. 577. State courts in 1799 were
vested with jurisdiction to try criminal offenses against the postal laws. 1 Stat. 733,
28. The Act of March 3, 1815, 3 Stat. 244, vested state courts with jurisdiction of
complaints, suits, and prosecutions for taxes, duties, fines, penalties, and forfei-
tures. See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV. 545,
577–581 (1925).
1258 Embargo Acts, 2 Stat. 453, 473, 499, 506, 528, 550, 605, 707 (1808–1812); 3
Stat. 88 (1813); Fugitive Slave Act, 1 Stat. 302 (1793).

1259 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 615 (1842). See also Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5
Wheat.) 1, 69 (1820) (Justice Story dissenting); United States v. Bailey, 34 U.S. (9

Pet.) 238, 259 (1835) (Justice McLean dissenting). However, the Court held that states
could exercise concurrent jurisdiction if they wished. Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S.
130 (1876), and cases cited.
1260 E.g., Act of June 8, 1872, 17 Stat. 323.
1261 Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130 (1876).
1262 35 Stat. 65 (1908), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 51–60.
when Congress enacts a law and declares a national policy, that

policy is as much Connecticut’s and every other state’s as it is of
the collective United States.1263 The Court’s suggestion that the act
could be enforced “as of right, in the courts of the States when their
jurisdiction, as prescribed by local laws, is adequate to the occa-
sion,” 1264 leaving the impression that state practice might in some
instances preclude enforcement in state courts, was given body when
the Court upheld New York’s refusal to adjudicate an FELA claim
that fell in a class of cases in which claims under state law would
not be entertained.1265 “[T]here is nothing in the Act of Congress
that purports to force a duty upon such Courts as against an other-
wise valid excuse.” 1266 However, “[a]n excuse that is inconsistent
with or violates federal law is not a valid excuse: The Supremacy
Clause forbids state courts to dissociate themselves from federal law
because of disagreement with its content or a refusal to recognize
the superior authority of its source.” 1267
The fact that a state statute divests its courts of jurisdiction
not only over a disfavored federal claim, but also over an identical
state claim, does not ensure that the “state law will be deemed a
neutral rule of judicial administration and therefore a valid excuse
for refusing to entertain a federal cause of action.” 1268 “Although
the absence of discrimination [in its treatment of federal and state
law] is necessary to our finding a state law neutral, it is not suffi-
cient. A jurisdictional rule cannot be used as a device to undermine
federal law, no matter how evenhanded it may appear.” 1269
In Testa v. Katt,1270 the Court unanimously held that state courts,
at least with regard to claims and cases analogous to claims and
cases enforceable in those courts under state law, are required to
1263 Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912).
1264 223 U.S. at 59.
1265 Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
1266 279 U.S. at 388. For what constitutes a valid excuse, compare Missouri ex
rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950), with McKnett v. St. Louis & S.F.
Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934). It appears that generally state procedure must yield to
federal when it would make a difference in outcome. Compare Brown v. Western Ry.
of Alabama, 338 U.S. 294 (1949), and Dice v. Akron, C. & Y. R.R., 342 U.S. 359
(1952), with Minneapolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
1267 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 371 (1990). See also Felder v. Casey, 487
U.S. 131 (1988).

1268 Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–10374, slip op. at 8–9 (2009) (strik-
ing down New York statute that gave the state’s supreme courts—its trial courts of
general jurisdiction—jurisdiction over suits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, except
in the case of suits seeking money damages from corrections officers, whether brought
under federal or state law).
1269 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–10374, slip op. at 9 (New York statute found, “con-
trary to Congress’s judgment [in 42 U.S.C. § 1983,] that all persons who violate fed-
eral rights while acting under color of state law shall be held liable for damages”).
1270 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
enforce “penal” laws of the United States; the statute at issue in

the case provided “that a buyer of goods at above the prescribed
ceiling price may sue the seller ‘in any court of competent jurisdic-
tion.’ ” 1271 Respecting Rhode Island’s claim that one sovereign can-
not enforce the penal laws of another, Justice Black observed that
the assumption underlying this claim flew “in the face of the fact
that the States of the Union constitute a nation” and the fact of
the existence of the Supremacy Clause.1272
State Interference with Federal Jurisdiction.—It seems
settled, though not without dissent, that state courts have no power
to enjoin proceedings 1273 or effectuation of judgments 1274 of the fed-
eral courts, with the exception of cases in which a state court has
custody of property in proceedings in rem or quasi in rem, where
the state court has exclusive jurisdiction to proceed and may en-
join parties from further action in federal court.1275
Conflicts of Jurisdiction: Rules of Accommodation

Federal courts primarily interfere with state courts in three ways:
by enjoining proceedings in them, by issuing writs of habeas cor-
pus to set aside convictions obtained in them, and by adjudicating
1271 330 U.S. at 387.

1272 330 U.S. at 389. See, for a discussion as well as an extension of Testa, FERC
v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982). Cases since Testa requiring state court enforce-
ment of federal rights have generally concerned federal remedial laws. E.g., Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
396 U.S. 229 (1969). The Court has approved state court adjudication under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983, Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 3 n.1 (1980), but, curiously, in Martinez v.
California, 444 U.S. 277, 283 n.7 (1980) (emphasis by Court), it noted that it has
“never considered . . . the question whether a State must entertain a claim under
1983.” See also Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 234 n.7
(1987) (continuing to reserve question). But, with Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988),
and Howlett by Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990), it seems dubious that state
courts could refuse. Enforcement is not limited to federal statutory law; federal com-
mon law must similarly be enforced. Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
1273 Donovan v. City of Dallas, 377 U.S. 408 (1964), and cases cited. Justices
Harlan, Clark, and Stewart dissented, arguing that a state should have power to
enjoin vexatious, duplicative litigation which would have the effect of thwarting a
state-court judgment already entered. See also Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Kepner,
314 U.S. 44, 56 (1941) (Justice Frankfurter dissenting). In Riggs v. Johnson County,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1868), the general rule was attributed to the complete inde-
pendence of state and federal courts in their spheres of action, but federal courts, of
course may under certain circumstances enjoin actions in state courts.
1274 McKim v. Voorhies, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 279 (1812); Riggs v. Johnson County, 73
U.S. (6 Wall.) 166 (1868).

1275 Princess Lida v. Thompson, 305 U.S. 456 (1939). Nor do state courts have
any power to release by habeas corpus persons in custody pursuant to federal author-
ity. Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Tarble’s Case, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.)
397 (1872).
cases removed from them. Federal courts and Congress have devel-
oped rules to guide these and other avenues of jurisdictional fric-
tion with the States.
Comity.—“[T]he notion of ‘comity,’ ” Justice Black asserted, is
composed of “a proper respect for state functions, a recognition of
the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate
state governments, and a continuance of the belief that the Na-
tional Government will fare best if the States and their institu-
tions are left free to perform their separate functions in their sepa-
rate ways. This, perhaps for lack of a better and clearer way to describe
it, is referred to by many as ‘Our Federalism’. . . .” 1276 Comity is a
self-imposed rule of judicial restraint whereby independent tribu-
nals of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction act to moderate the
stresses of coexistence and to avoid collisions of authority. It is not
a rule of law but “one of practice, convenience, and expediency,” 1277
which persuades but does not command.
Abstention.—The abstention doctrine manifests the concept of
comity. The doctrine instructs federal courts to refrain from exercis-
ing jurisdiction in certain cases when the same matter is before a
state court. Abstention may apply when the applicable state law,
which would be dispositive of the controversy, is unclear and a state
court interpretation of the state law question might obviate the need
to decide a federal constitutional issue.1278 Abstention is not proper,
1276 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971). Compare Fair Assessment in Real
Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981), with id. at 119–25 (Justice Brennan
concurring, joined by three other Justices).
1277 Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Manufacturing Co., 177 U.S. 458, 488 (1900).
Recent decisions emphasize comity as the primary reason for restraint in federal
court actions tending to interfere with state courts. E.g., O’Shea v. Littleton, 414
U.S. 488, 499–504 (1974); Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592, 599–603 (1975);
Trainor v. Hernandez, 431 U.S. 434, 441 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415, 430
(1979). The Court has also cited comity as a reason to restrict access to federal ha-
beas corpus. Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 541 and n.31 (1976); Wainwright
v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 83, 88, 90 (1977); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128–29 (1982).
See also Rosewell v. LaSalle National Bank, 450 U.S. 503 (1981); Fair Assessment
in Real Estate Ass’n v. McNary, 454 U.S. 100 (1981) (comity limits federal court
interference with state tax systems); Levin v. Commerce Energy, Inc., 560 U.S. ___,
No. 09–223, slip op. (2010) (comity has particular force in cases challenging consti-
tutionality of state taxation of commercial activities). And see Missouri v. Jenkins,
495 U.S. 33 (1990).
1278 C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS 13 (4th ed. 1983). The
basic doctrine was formulated by Justice Frankfurter for the Court in Railroad Comm’n
v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941). Other strands of the doctrine are that a federal
court should refrain from exercising jurisdiction in order to avoid needless conflict
with a state’s administration of its own affairs, Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315
(1943); Alabama Public Service Comm’n v. Southern Ry., 341 U.S. 341 (1951); Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943); Martin v. Creasy, 360
U.S. 219 (1959); Moses H. Cone Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1 (1983);
New Orleans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of the City of New Orleans, 491 U.S.
however, where the relevant state law is settled,1279 or where it is

clear that the state statute or action challenged is unconstitutional
no matter how the state court construes state law.1280 Federal juris-
diction is not ousted by abstention; rather it is postponed.1281 Ab-
stention ameliorates tensions by deferring to state courts as ad-
equate protectors of constitutional liberties in cases that potentially
may be resolved on independent state law grounds. It also dimin-
ishes the likelihood that state programs are thwarted by federal in-
tercession. Federal courts benefit, so the rationale goes, by saving
time and effort making unnecessary constitutional decisions.1282
During the 1960s, the abstention doctrine was in disfavor with
the Supreme Court, suffering rejection in numerous cases, most of
350 (1989) (carefully reviewing the scope of the doctrine), especially where state law
is unsettled. Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228 (1943); County of Al-
legheny v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959). See also Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd.,
363 U.S. 207 (1960). Also, although pendency of an action in state court will not
ordinarily cause a federal court to abstain, there are “exceptional” circumstances in
which it should. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S.
800 (1976); Will v. Calvert Fire Insurance Co., 437 U.S. 655 (1978); Arizona v. San
Carlos Apache Tribe, 463 U.S. 545 (1983). But, in Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co.,
517 U.S. 706 (1996), an exercise in Burford abstention, the Court held that federal
courts have power to dismiss or remand cases based on abstention principles only
where relief being sought is equitable or otherwise discretionary but may not do so
in common-law actions for damages.
1279 City of Chicago v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 357 U.S. 77 (1958); Zwickler v.
Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 249–51 (1967). See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l. Union,
442 U.S. 289, 306 (1979) (quoting Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1965)).
1280 Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528, 534–35 (1965); Babbitt v. United Farm
Workers Nat’l., 442 U.S. 289, 305–12 (1979). Abstention is not proper simply to af-
ford a state court the opportunity to hold that a state law violates the federal Con-
stitution. Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434
U.S. 374, 379 n.5 (1978); Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 271 n.4
(1977); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (“A federal court may not prop-
erly ask a state court if it would care in effect to rewrite a statute”). But if the
statute is clear and there is a reasonable possibility that the state court would find
it in violation of a distinct or specialized state constitutional provision, abstention
may be proper, Harris County Comm’rs Court v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77 (1975); Reetz v.
Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970), although not if the state and federal constitutional
provisions are alike. Examining Bd. v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572, 598 (1976).
1281 American Trial Lawyers Ass’n v. New Jersey Supreme Court, 409 U.S. 467,
469 (1973); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). Dismissal may be necessary if
the state court will not accept jurisdiction while the case is pending in federal court.
Harris County Comm’rs v. Moore, 420 U.S. 77, 88 n.14 (1975).
1282 E.g., Spector Motor Service v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S. 101 (1944); Louisiana
Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP,
360 U.S. 167 (1959).
them civil rights and civil liberties cases.1283 Time-consuming de-

lays 1284 and piecemeal resolution of important questions 1285 were
cited as a too-costly consequence of the doctrine. Actions brought
under the civil rights statutes seem not to have been wholly sub-
ject to the doctrine,1286 and for a while cases involving First Amend-
ment expression guarantees seemed to be sheltered as well, but this
is no longer the rule.1287
Abstention developed robustly with Younger v. Harris 1288 and
its progeny, which delineate types of cases requiring abstention and
disavow a broad rule warranting abstention whenever important state
interests are at stake. The cases are discussed in more detail be-
low in the context of federal injunctions of state courts.
Exhaustion of State Remedies.—A complainant will ordinar-
ily be required, as a matter of comity, to exhaust all available state
legislative and administrative remedies before seeking relief in fed-
eral court.1289 To do so may make unnecessary federal-court adjudi-
cation. The complainant will ordinarily not be required, however,
to exhaust his state judicial remedies, inasmuch as it is a litigant’s
choice to proceed in either state or federal courts when the alterna-
1283 McNeese v. Cahokia Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Griffin v. School Board,
377 U.S. 218 (1964); Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324
(1964); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Davis v. Mann, 377 U.S. 678 (1964);
Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965); Harman v. Forssenius, 380 U.S. 528
(1965); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Wisconsin v. Constanineau, 400 U.S.
433 (1971).
1284 England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 426 (1964)
(Justice Douglas concurring). See C. WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS
305 (4th ed. 1983).
1285 Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 378–379 (1964). Both consequences may be
alleviated substantially by state adoption of procedures by which federal courts may

certify to the state’s highest court questions of unsettled state law which would be
dispositive of the federal court action. The Supreme Court has actively encouraged
resort to certification where it exists. Clay v. Sun Insurance Office Ltd., 363 U.S.
207 (1960); Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386 (1974); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132, 151 (1976).
1286 Compare Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959), with McNeese v. Cahokia
Bd. of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963).

1287 Compare Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964), and Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479 (1965), with Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), and Samuels v.
Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). See Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289,
305–312 (1979).
1288 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (declining to federally enjoin state criminal prosecution
in absence of bad faith, harassment, or patently invalid state statute). There is room
to argue whether the Younger line of cases represents the abstention doctrine at all,
but the Court continues to refer to it in those terms. E.g., Sprint Communications,
Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. ___, No. 12–815, slip op. (2013); Ankenbrandt v. Richards,
504 U.S. 689, 705 (1992).
1289 The rule was formulated in Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210
(1908), and Bacon v. Rutland R.R., 232 U.S. 134 (1914).

tives exist and a question for judicial adjudication is present.1290

But when a litigant is suing for protection of federally guaranteed
civil rights, he need not exhaust any kind of state remedy.1291
Anti-Injunction Statute.—For reasons unknown,1292 Con-
gress in 1793 enacted a statute to prohibit the issuance of injunc-
tions by federal courts to stay state court proceedings.1293 Over time,
a long list of exceptions to the statutory bar was created by judicial
decision,1294 but in Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co.,1295 the Court
in a lengthy opinion by Justice Frankfurter announced a very lib-
eral interpretation of the anti-injunction statute so as to do away
with practically all the exceptions that had been created. Con-
gress’s response was to redraft the statute and to indicate that it
was restoring the pre-Toucey interpretation.1296 Considerable dis-
agreement exists over the application of the statute, however, espe-
cially with regard to the exceptions it permits. The present ten-
dency appears to be to read the law expansively and the exceptions
restrictively in the interest of preventing conflict with state courts.1297
Nonetheless, some exceptions exist, either expressly or implicitly
1290 City Bank Farmers’ Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U.S. 24 (1934); Lane v. Wil-
son, 307 U.S. 268 (1939). But see Alabama Public Service Comm’n v. Southern Ry.,
341 U.S. 341 (1951). Exhaustion of state court remedies is required in habeas cor-
pus cases and usually in suits to restrain state court proceedings.
1291 Patsy v. Florida Board of Regents, 457 U.S. 496 (1982). Where there are
pending administrative proceedings that fall within the Younger rule, a litigant must
exhaust. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), as explicated in Ohio Civil Rights
Comm’n v. Dayton Christian School, Inc., 477 U.S. 619, 627 n.2 (1986). Under title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, barring employment discrimination on racial
and other specified grounds, the EEOC may not consider a claim until a state agency
having jurisdiction over employment discrimination complaints has had at least 60
days to resolve the matter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–5(c). See Love v. Pullman Co., 404
U.S. 522 (1972). The Civil Rights of Institutionalized Persons Act contains “a spe-
cific, limited exhaustion requirement for adult prisoners bringing actions pursuant
to § 1983.” Patsy, 457 U.S. at 508.
1292 Toucey v. New York Life Ins. Co., 314 U.S. 118, 130–32 (1941).
1293 “[N]or shall a writ of injunction be granted to stay proceedings in any court
of a state . . . .” Ch. XXII, § 5, 1 Stat. 335 (1793), now, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 2283.
1294 Durfee & Sloss, Federal Injunctions Against Proceedings in State Courts:
The Life History of a Statute, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1145 (1932).

1295 314 U.S. 118 (1941).
1296 “A court of the United States may not grant an injunction to stay proceed-
ings in a State court except as expressly authorized by Act of Congress, or where

necessary in aid of its jurisdiction, or to protect or effectuate its judgments.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2283. The Reviser’s Note is appended to the statute, stating intent.
1297 Amalgamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511 (1955); At-
lantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281 (1970).
See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER ch.
10 (1980).
in statutory language,1298 or through Court interpretation.1299 The

Court’s general policy of application, however, seems to a consider-
able degree to effectuate what is now at least the major rationale
of the statute, deference to state court adjudication of issues pre-
sented to them for decision.1300
Res Judicata.—Both the Constitution and a contemporane-
ously enacted statute require federal courts to give “full faith and
credit” to state court judgments, to give, that is, preclusive effect to
state court judgments when those judgments would be given preclu-
sive effect by the courts of that state.1301 The present Court views
the interpretation of “full faith and credit” in the overall context of
deference to state courts running throughout this section. “Thus,
res judicata and collateral estoppel not only reduce unnecessary liti-
gation and foster reliance on adjudication, but also promote the co-
mity between state and federal courts that has been recognized as
a bulwark of the federal system.” 1302 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is not an
1298 The greatest difficulty is with the “expressly authorized by Act of Congress”
exception. No other Act of Congress expressly refers to § 2283 and the Court has
indicated that no such reference is necessary to create a statutory exception. Amal-
gamated Clothing Workers v. Richman Bros., 348 U.S. 511, 516 (1955). Compare Capi-
tal Service, Inc. v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 501 (1954). Rather, “in order to qualify as an
‘expressly authorized’ exception to the anti-injunction statute, an Act of Congress
must have created a specific and uniquely federal right or remedy, enforceable in a
federal court of equity, that could be frustrated if the federal court were not empow-
ered to enjoin a state court proceeding.” Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 237 (1972).
Applying this test, the Court in Mitchum held that a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit is an
exception to § 2283 and that persons suing under this authority may, if they satisfy
the requirements of comity, obtain an injunction against state court proceedings. The
exception is, of course, highly constrained by the comity principle. On the difficulty
of applying the test, see Vendo Co. v. Lektco-Vend Corp., 433 U.S. 623 (1977) (frag-
mented Court on whether Clayton Act authorization of private suits for injunctive
relief is an “expressly authorized” exception to § 2283).
On the interpretation of the § 2283 exception for injunctions to protect or effec-
tuate a federal-court judgment, see Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp., 486 U.S. 140
(1988).
1299 Thus, the Act bars federal court restraint of pending state court proceed-
ings but not restraint of the institution of such proceedings. Dombrowski v. Pfister,
380 U.S. 479, 484 n.2 (1965). Restraint is not barred if sought by the United States
or an officer or agency of the United States. Leiter Minerals v. United States, 352
U.S. 220 (1957); NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138 (1971). Restraint is not barred
if the state court proceeding is not judicial but rather administrative. Prentis v. At-
lantic Coast Line Co., 211 U.S. 210 (1908); Roudebush v. Hartke, 405 U.S. 15 (1972).
Compare Hill v. Martin, 296 U.S. 393, 403 (1935), with Lynch v. Household Finance
Corp., 405 U.S. 538, 552–56 (1972).
1300 The statute is to be applied “to prevent needless friction between state and
federal courts.” Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas & Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4,
9 (1940); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S.
281, 285–86 (1970).
1301 Article IV, § 1, of the Constitution; 28 U.S.C. § 1738.
1302 Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 95–96 (1980).
exception to the mandate of the res judicata statute.1303 An excep-

tion to § 1738 “will not be recognized unless a later statute con-
tains an express or implied partial repeal.” 1304 Thus, a claimant who
pursued his employment discrimination remedies through state ad-
ministrative procedures, as the federal law requires her to do (within
limits), and then appealed an adverse state agency decision to state
court will be precluded from bringing her federal claim to federal
court, since the federal court is obligated to give the state court de-
cision “full faith and credit.” 1305
Closely related is the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, holding that fed-
eral subject-matter jurisdiction of federal district courts does not
extend to review of state court judgments.1306 The Supreme Court,
not federal district courts, has such appellate jurisdiction. The doc-
trine thus prevents losers in state court from obtaining district court
review, but “does not otherwise override or supplant preclusion doc-
trine or augment the circumscribed doctrines that allow federal courts
to stay or dismiss proceedings in deference to state-court ac-
tions.” 1307
Three-Judge Court Act.—When the Court in Ex parte Young 1308
held that federal courts were not precluded by the Eleventh Amend-
ment from restraining state officers from enforcing state laws deter-
mined to be in violation of the federal Constitution, serious efforts
were made in Congress to take away the authority thus asserted,
but the result instead was legislation providing that suits in which
an interlocutory injunction was sought against the enforcement of
state statutes by state officers were to be heard by a panel of three
federal judges, rather than by a single district judge, with appeal
direct to the Supreme Court.1309 The provision was designed to as-
suage state feeling by vesting such determinations in a court more
prestigious than a single-judge district court, to ensure a more au-
thoritative determination, and to prevent the assertion of indi-
1303 449 U.S. at 96–105. In England v. Louisiana Bd. of Medical Examiners, 375
U.S. 411 (1964), the Court held that, when parties are compelled to go to state court
under Pullman abstention, either party may reserve the federal issue and thus be
enabled to return to federal court without being barred by res judicata.
1304 Kramer v. Chemical Construction Corp., 456 U.S. 461, 468 (1982).
1305 456 U.S. 468–76. There were four dissents. Id. at 486 (Justices Blackmun,
Brennan, and Marshall), 508 (Stevens).

1306 The doctrine derives its name from Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S.
413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983).
1307 Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Industries Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)
(Rooker-Feldman has no application when federal court proceedings have been initi-
ated prior to state court proceedings; preclusion law governs in that situation).
1308 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
1309 36 Stat. 557 (1910). The statute was amended in 1925 to apply to requests
for permanent injunctions, 43 Stat. 936, and again in 1937 to apply to constitu-
tional attacks on federal statutes. 50 Stat. 752.
vidual predilections in sensitive and emotional areas.1310 Because,

however, of the heavy burden placed on the district courts and the
Supreme Court, Congress repealed the provisions for three-judge courts
in 1976, save in cases “when otherwise required by an Act of Con-
gress” 1311 or in cases involving state legislative or congressional district-
ing.1312
Conflicts of Jurisdiction: Federal Court Interference with

State Courts
One challenging the constitutionality, under the United
States Constitution, of state actions, statutory or otherwise,
could, of course, bring suit in state court; indeed, in the time be-
fore conferral of federal-question jurisdiction on lower federal
courts plaintiffs had to bring actions in state courts, and on
some occasions since, this has been done. 1313 But the usual
course is to sue in federal court for either an injunction or a de-
claratory judgment or both. In an era in which landmark deci-
sions of the Supreme Court and of inferior federal courts have
been handed down voiding racial segregation requirements, legis-
lative apportionment and congressional districting, abortion regu-
lations, and many other state laws and policies, it is difficult to
imagine a situation in which it might be impossible to obtain
such rulings because no one required as a defendant could be
sued. Yet, the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment in 1798 re-
sulted in the immunity of the state,1314 and the immunity of
state officers if the action upon which they were being sued was
state action,1315 from suit without the state’s consent. Ex parte
1310 Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111, 119 (1965); Ex parte Collins, 277
U.S. 565, 567 (1928).

1311 These now are primarily limited to suits under the Voting Rights Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 1973b(a), 1973c, 1973h(c), and to certain suits by the Attorney General
under public accommodations and equal employment provisions of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a–5(b), 2000e–6(b).
1312 Pub. L. 94–381, 90 Stat. 1119, 28 U.S.C. § 2284. In actions still required to
be heard by three-judge courts, direct appeals are still available to the Supreme Court.
28 U.S.C. § 1253.
1313 For example, one of the cases decided in Brown v. Board of Education, 347
U.S. 483 (1954), came from the Supreme Court of Delaware. In Scott v. Germano,
381 U.S. 407 (1965), the Court set aside an order of the district court refusing to
defer to the state court which was hearing an apportionment suit and said: “The
power of the judiciary of a State to require valid reapportionment or to formulate a
valid redistricting plan has not only been recognized by this Court but appropriate
action by the States has been specifically encouraged.” See also Scranton v. Drew,
379 U.S. 40 (1964).
1314 By its terms, the Eleventh Amendment bars only suits against a state by
citizens of other states, but, in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890), the Court deemed
it to embody principles of sovereign immunity that applied to unconsented suits by
its own citizens.
1315 In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
Young 1316 is a seminal case in American constitutional law be-

cause it created a fiction by which the validity of state statutes
and other actions could be challenged by suits against state offi-
cers as individuals.1317
Conflict between federal and state courts is inevitable when the
federal courts are open to persons complaining about unconstitu-
tional or unlawful state action which could as well be brought in
the state courts and perhaps is so brought by other persons, but
the various rules of restraint flowing from the concept of comity re-
duce federal interference here some considerable degree. It is rather
in three fairly well defined areas that institutional conflict is most
pronounced.
Federal Restraint of State Courts by Injunctions.—Even
where the federal anti-injunction law is inapplicable, or where the
question of application is not reached,1318 those seeking to enjoin
state court proceedings must overcome twin prudential barriers, the
abstention doctrine 1319 and the equity doctrine that suits in equity
“shall not be sustained in . . . the courts of the United States, in
any case where plain, adequate and complete remedy may be had
at law.” 1320 The application of this latter principle has been most
pronounced in the reluctance of federal courts to interfere with a
state’s good faith enforcement of its criminal law. Here, the Court
at times has required a litigant seeking to bar threatened state pros-
ecution to show not only the prospect of great, immediate, and ir-
reparable injury, but also an inability to defend his constitutional
rights in the state proceeding. Certain types of injury, such as the
cost, anxiety, and inconvenience of having to defend against a single
criminal prosecution, have been insufficient to be considered irrepa-
rable in this sense. Even if a state criminal statute is unconstitu-
tional, a person charged under it usually had an adequate remedy
1316 209 U.S. 123 (1908).

1317 The fiction is that while the official is a state actor for purposes of suit against
him, the claim that his action is unconstitutional removes the imprimatur of the
state that would shield him under the Eleventh Amendment. 209 U.S. at 159–60.
1318 28 U.S.C. § 2283 may be inapplicable because no state court proceeding is
pending or because the action is brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Its application
may never be reached because a court may decide that equitable principles do not
justify injunctive relief. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 54 (1971).
1319 See “Abstention,” supra.
1320 The quoted phrase setting out the general principle is from the Judiciary
Act of 1789, § 16, 1 Stat. 82.

at law by raising his constitutional defense in the state trial.1321

But again, this policy disfavoring federal injunctions was never stated
as an absolute.1322
In Dombrowski v. Pfister,1323 the Court appeared to change the
policy somewhat. The case on its face contained allegations and of-
fers of proof that may have been sufficient alone to establish the
“irreparable injury” justifying federal injunctive relief.1324 But the
formulation of standards by Justice Brennan for the majority placed
great emphasis upon the fact that the state criminal statute in is-
sue regulated expression. Any criminal prosecution under a statute
regulating expression might of itself inhibit the exercise of First
Amendment rights, he said, and prosecution under an overbroad
statute,1325 such as the one in this case, might critically impair ex-
ercise of those rights. The mere threat of prosecution under such
an overbroad statute “may deter . . . almost as potently as the ac-
tual application of sanctions. . . .” 1326
In such cases, courts could no longer embrace “[t]he assump-
tion that defense of a criminal prosecution will generally assure ample
vindication of constitutional rights,” because either the mere threat
of prosecution or the long wait between prosecution and final vindi-
cation could result in a “chilling effect upon the exercise of First
1321 The older cases are Fenner v. Boykin, 271 U.S. 240 (1926); Spielman Motor
Sales Co. v. Dodge, 295 U.S. 89 (1935); Beal v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 312 U.S. 45 (1941);
Watson v. Buck, 313 U.S. 387 (1941); Williams v. Miller, 317 U.S. 599 (1942); Doug-
las v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943). There is a stricter rule against federal
restraint of the use of evidence in state criminal trials. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342
U.S. 117 (1951); Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458 (1961). The Court reaffirmed the
rule in Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971). State officers may not be enjoined
from testifying or using evidence gathered in violation of federal constitutional re-
strictions, Cleary v. Bolger, 371 U.S. 392 (1963), but the rule is unclear with regard
to federal officers and state trials. Compare Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956),
with Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961).
1322 E.g., Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163–164 (1943); Stefanelli
v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951). See also Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197,
214 (1923), Future criminal proceedings were sometimes enjoined. E.g., Hague v.
CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
1323 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Grand jury indictments had been returned after the
district court had dissolved a preliminary injunction, erroneously in the Supreme

Court’s view, so that it took the view that no state proceedings were pending as of
the appropriate time. For a detailed analysis of the case, see Fiss, Dombrowski, 86
YALE L. J. 1103 (1977).
1324 “[T]he allegations in this complaint depict a situation in which defense of
the State’s criminal prosecution will not assure adequate vindication of constitu-
tional rights. They suggest that a substantial loss of or impairment of freedoms of
expression will occur if appellants must await the state court’s disposition and ulti-
mate review in this Court of any adverse determination. These allegations, if true,
clearly show irreparable injury.” 380 U.S. at 485–86.
1325 That is, a statute that reaches both protected and unprotected expression
and conduct.
1326 380 U.S. at 486.
Amendment rights.” 1327 The principle apparently established by the

Court was two-phased: a federal court should not abstain when there
is a facially unconstitutional statute infringing upon speech and ap-
plication of that statute discourages protected activities, and the court
should further enjoin the state proceedings when there is prosecu-
tion or threat of prosecution under an overbroad statute regulating
expression if the prosecution or threat of prosecution chills the ex-
ercise of freedom of expression.1328 These formulations were reaf-
firmed in Zwickler v. Koota,1329 in which a declaratory judgment was
sought with regard to a statute prohibiting anonymous election lit-
erature. The Court deemed abstention improper,1330 and further held
that adjudication for purposes of declaratory judgment is not hemmed
in by considerations attendant upon injunctive relief.1331
The aftermath of Dombrowski and Zwickler was a considerable
expansion of federal-court adjudication of constitutional attack through
requests for injunctive and declaratory relief, which gradually spread
out from First Amendment areas to other constitutionally pro-
tected activities.1332 However, these developments were highly con-
troversial. In 1971, the Court receded from its position in a series
of cases and circumscribed the discretion of the lower federal courts
to a considerable and ever-tightening degree.1333 An important dif-
ference between the 1971 cases and the Dombrowski-Zwickler line
was that prosecutions were already underway, and not merely threat-
ened. Nevertheless, the care with which Justice Black for the ma-
jority in the 1971 cases undertook to distinguish Dombrowski signi-
fied a limitation of its doctrine.
In the lead case of Younger v. Harris,1334 Justice Black re-
viewed and reaffirmed the traditional rule of reluctance to inter-
fere with state court proceedings except in extraordinary circum-
stances. The holding in Dombrowski, as distinguished from some of
its language, did not change the general rule, because extraordi-
1327 380 U.S. at 486, 487.
1328 See Cameron v. Johnson, 381 U.S. 741 (1965); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S.
611 (1968).
1329 389 U.S. 241 (1967). The state criminal conviction had been reversed by a
state court on state law grounds and no new charge had been instituted.
1330 It was clear that the statute could not be construed by a state court to ren-
der unnecessary a federal constitutional decision. 389 U.S. at 248–52.

1331 389 U.S. at 254.
1332 Maraist, Federal Injunctive Relief Against State Court Proceedings: The Sig-
nificance of Dombrowski, 48 TEX. L. REV. 535 (1970).

1333 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971);
Boyle v. Landry, 401 U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v.
Stein, 401 U.S. 200 (1971); Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). Justice Black
wrote the majority opinion in the first four of these cases; the other two were per
curiam opinions.
1334 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
nary circumstances had existed. Thus, Justice Black, with consider-

able support from the other Justices,1335 went on to affirm that, where
a criminal proceeding is already pending in a state court, if there
is no allegation that the prosecution was brought in bad faith or
that it was one of a series of repeated prosecutions that would be
brought, and if the defendant may put in issue his federal-
constitutional defense at the trial, then federal injunctive relief is
improper, even if it is alleged that the statute on which the prosecu-
tion was based regulated expression and was overbroad.
Many statutes regulating expression were valid and some over-
broad statutes could be validly applied, Justice Black explained, so
findings of facial unconstitutionality abstracted from concrete fac-
tual situations was not a sound judicial method. “It is sufficient for
purposes of the present case to hold, as we do, that the possible
unconstitutionality of a statute ‘on its face’ does not in itself justify
an injunction against good-faith attempts to enforce it, and that ap-
pellee Harris has failed to make any showing of bad faith, harass-
ment, or any other unusual circumstance that would call for equi-
table relief.” 1336
The reason for the principle, said Justice Black, flows from “Our
Federalism,” which requires federal courts to defer to state courts
when there are proceedings pending in them.1337
Moreover, in a companion case, the Court held that, when pros-
ecutions are pending in state court, the propriety of injunctive and
declaratory relief should ordinarily be judged by the same stan-
dards.1338 A declaratory judgment is as likely to interfere with state
proceedings as an injunction, whether the federal decision be treated
as res judicata or viewed as a strong precedent guiding the state
court. Additionally, “the Declaratory Judgment Act provides that af-
ter a declaratory judgment is issued the district court may enforce
it by granting ‘[f]urther necessary or proper relief,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2202,
and therefore a declaratory judgment issued while state proceed-
ings are pending might serve as the basis for a subsequent injunc-
tion against those proceedings to ‘protect or effectuate’ the declara-
1335 Only Justice Douglas dissented. 401 U.S. at 58. Justices Brennan, White,
and Marshall generally concurred in a restrained fashion. Id. at 56, 75, 93.
1336 401 U.S. at 54. On bad faith enforcement, see id. at 56 (Justices Stewart
and Harlan concurring); 97 (Justices Brennan, White, and Marshall concurring in

part and dissenting in part). For an example, see Universal Amusement Co. v. Vance,
559 F.2d 1286, 1293–1301 (5th Cir. 1977), aff’d per curiam sub nom. Dexter v. But-
ler, 587 F.2d 176 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 442 U.S. 929 (1979).
1337 401 U.S. at 44.
1338 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971). The holding was in line with Great
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S. 293 (1943).
tory judgment, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, and thus result in a clearly improper

interference with the state proceedings.” 1339
When, however, there is no pending state prosecution, the Court
is clear that “Our Federalism” is not offended if a plaintiff in a fed-
eral court is able to demonstrate a genuine threat of enforcement
of a disputed criminal statute, whether the statute is attacked on
its face or as applied, and becomes entitled to a federal declaratory
judgment.1340 And, in fact, when no state prosecution is pending, a
federal plaintiff need not always demonstrate the existence of the
Younger factors—great danger of immediate, irreparable loss and
inadequate opportunity to vindicate protected rights in defending
against a prosecution—to justify the issuance of a preliminary or
permanent injunction in aid of declaratory relief.1341
On the other hand, the Court has extended Younger‘s directive
not to interfere with ongoing state prosecutions to also bar federal
court interference with pending state civil cases that are akin to
criminal prosecutions.1342 The Court also applied Younger‘s prin-
ciples to bar federal court interference with state administrative pro-
ceedings of a judicial nature, in which important state interest were
at stake.1343 More systemically, a state clearly has an important in-
terest, for Younger purposes, in maintaining the legal processes for
enforcing civil judgments issued by its courts, even in proceedings
which are entirely between private parties.1344
1339 Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66, 72 (1971).

1340 Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
1341 Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922 (1975) (preliminary injunction may issue
to preserve status quo while court considers whether to grant declaratory relief);
Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (when declaratory relief is given, perma-
nent injunction may be issued if necessary to protect constitutional rights). How-
ever, it may not be easy to discern when state proceedings will be deemed to have
been instituted prior to the federal proceeding. E.g., Hicks v. Miranda, 422 U.S. 332
(1975); Huffman v. Pursue. Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975); see also Hawaii Housing Auth.
v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
1342 Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975) (state action to close adult
theater under the state’s nuisance statute and to seize and sell personsal property
used in the theater’s operations); Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327 (1977); Trainor v. Her-
nandez, 431 U.S. 434 (1977); Moore v. Sims, 442 U.S. 415 (1979); Middlesex County
Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982).
1343 Ohio Civil Rights Comm’n v. Dayton Christian Schools, Inc., 477 U.S. 619
(1986). The “judicial in nature” requirement is more fully explicated in New Or-
leans Public Service, Inc. v. Council of City of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 366–373
(1989).
1344 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1 (1987) (holding that abstention was
warranted in a federal court challenge to the use of the state’s “lien and bond” au-
thority by a judgment creditor pending exhaustion of state appeals). It was “the State’s
[particular] interest in protecting ‘the authority of the judicial system, so that its
orders and judgments are not rendered nugatory’ ” that merited abstention, and not
merely a general state interest in protecting ongoing civil proceedings from federal
interference. 481 U.S. at 14 n.12 (quoting Judice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 336 n.12 (1977)).
As more types of state processes were shielded from federal in-

terference, some questioned whether Younger could now be general-
ized as two complementary principles: Absent ongoing state proceed-
ings that afford the parties adequate opportunity to raise federal
constitutional challenges, Younger abstention is inapplicable, but af-
ter a state proceeding implicating important state interests is un-
derway, equity concerns and comity favor abstention, absent extraor-
dinary circumstances. In Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs,1345
however, the Court reasserted as paramount the principle that ab-
stention is only in order when the parallel, pending state proceed-
ing itself presents an “exceptional” circumstance. The obligation of
a federal court to hear and decide each case within its juridiction
is “virtually unflagging,” the Court explained.1346 The types of cases
found to merit abstention under the Younger line—criminal prosecu-
tions, civil enforcement proceedings akin to prosecution, and civil
proceedings involving orders critical to the functioning of the courts—
define Younger‘s scope, and do not merely exemplify it.1347
Habeas Corpus: Scope of the Writ.—At the English common
law, habeas corpus was available to attack pretrial detention and
confinement by executive order; it could not be used to question the
conviction of a person pursuant to the judgment of a court with ju-
risdiction over the person. That common law meaning was applied
in the federal courts.1348 Expansion began after the Civil War through
more liberal court interpretation of “jurisdiction.” Thus, one who had
already completed one sentence on a conviction was released from
custody on a second sentence on the ground that the court had lost
jurisdiction upon completion of the first sentence.1349 Then, the Court
held that the constitutionality of the statute upon which a charge
was based could be examined on habeas, because an unconstitu-
tional statute was said to deprive the trial court of its jurisdic-
tion. 1350 Other cases expanded the want-of-jurisdiction ratio-
1345 571 U.S. ___, No. 12–815, slip op. (2013)

1346 Id., slip op. at 6 (quoting Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United
States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
1347 571 U.S. ___, No. 12–815, slip op. (2013)
1348 Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 193 (1830) (Chief Justice Marshall); cf.
Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876). But see Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 404–415 (1963).
The expansive language used when Congress in 1867 extended the habeas power of
federal courts to state prisoners “restrained of . . . liberty in violation of the consti-
tution, or of any treaty or law of the United States . . . ,” 14 Stat. 385, could have
encouraged an expansion of the writ to persons convicted after trial.
1349 Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163 (1874).
1350 Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880); Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886);
Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86 (1890); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
nale.1351 But the modern status of the writ of habeas corpus may
be said to have been started in its development in Frank v.
Mangum,1352 in which the Court reviewed on habeas a murder con-
viction in a trial in which there was substantial evidence of mob
domination of the judicial process. This issue had been considered
and rejected by the state appeals court. The Supreme Court indi-
cated that, though it might initially have had jurisdiction, the trial
court could have lost it if mob domination rendered the proceed-
ings lacking in due process.
Further, in order to determine if there had been a denial of due
process, a habeas court should examine the totality of the process,
including the appellate proceedings. Because Frank’s claim of mob
domination was reviewed fully and rejected by the state appellate
court, he had been afforded an adequate corrective process for any
denial of rights, and his custody did not violate the Constitution.
Then, eight years later, in Moore v. Dempsey,1353 involving another
conviction in a trial in which the court was alleged to have been
influenced by a mob and in which the state appellate court had heard
and rejected Moore’s contentions, the Court directed that the fed-
eral district judge himself determine the merits of the petitioner’s
allegations.
Moreover, the Court shortly abandoned its emphasis upon want
of jurisdiction and held that the writ was available to consider con-
stitutional claims as well as questions of jurisdiction.1354 The land-
mark case was Brown v. Allen,1355 in which the Court laid down
1351 Ex parte Wilson, 114 U.S. 417 (1885); In re Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176 (1889); In
re Snow, 120 U.S. 274 (1887); but see Ex parte Parks, 93 U.S. 18 (1876); Ex parte
Bigelow, 113 U.S. 328 (1885). It is possible that the Court expanded the office of the
writ because its reviewing power over federal convictions was closely limited. F. Frank-
furter & J. Landis, supra. Once such review was granted, the Court began to re-
strict the use of the writ. E.g., Glasgow v. Moyer, 225 U.S. 420 (1912); In re Lincoln,
202 U.S. 178 (1906); In re Morgan, 203 U.S. 96 (1906).
1352 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
1353 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
1354 Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). See also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304
U.S. 458 (1938); Walker v. Johnston, 312 U.S. 275 (1941). The way one reads the
history of the developments is inevitably a product of the philosophy one brings to
the subject. In addition to the recitations cited in other notes, compare Wright v.
West, 505 U.S. 277, 285–87 & n.3 (1992) (Justice Thomas for a plurality of the Court),
with id. at 297–301 (Justice O’Connor concurring).
1355 344 U.S. 443 (1953). Brown is commonly thought to rest on the assumption
that federal constitutional rights cannot be adequately protected only by direct Su-
preme Court review of state court judgments but that independent review, on ha-
beas, must rest with federal judges. It is, of course, true that Brown coincided with
the extension of most of the Bill of Rights to the states by way of incorporation and
expansive interpretation of federal constitutional rights; previously, there was not a
substantial corpus of federal rights to protect through habeas. See Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277, 297–99 (1992) (Justice O’Connor concurring). In Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391 (1963), Justice Brennan, for the Court, and Justice Harlan, in dissent, engaged
several principles of statutory construction of the habeas statute.

First, all federal constitutional questions raised by state prisoners
are cognizable in federal habeas. Second, a federal court is not bound
by state court judgments on federal questions, even though the state
courts may have fully and fairly considered the issues. Third, a fed-
eral habeas court may inquire into issues of fact as well as of law,
although the federal court may defer to the state court if the pris-
oner received an adequate hearing. Fourth, new evidentiary hear-
ings must be held when there are unusual circumstances, when there
is a “vital flaw” in the state proceedings, or when the state court
record is incomplete or otherwise inadequate.
Almost plenary federal habeas review of state court convictions
was authorized and rationalized in the Court’s famous “1963 tril-
ogy.” 1356 First, the Court dealt with the established principle that
a federal habeas court is empowered, where a prisoner alleges facts
which if proved would entitle him to relief, to relitigate facts, to
receive evidence and try the facts anew, and sought to lay down
broad guidelines as to when district courts must hold a hearing and
find facts.1357 “Where the facts are in dispute, the federal court in
habeas corpus must hold an evidentiary hearing if the habeas ap-
plicant did not receive a full and fair evidentiary hearing in a state
in a lengthy, informed historical debate about the legitimacy of Brown and its prem-
ises. Compare id. at 401–24, with id. at 450–61. See the material gathered and cited
in Hart & Wechsler (6th ed.), supra at 1220–1248.
1356 Sanders v. United States, 373 U.S. 1 (1963); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963);
Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963). These cases dealt, respectively, with the treat-
ment to be accorded a habeas petition in the three principal categories in which
they come to the federal court: when a state court has rejected petitioner’s claims
on the merits, when a state court has refused to hear petitioner’s claims on the mer-
its because she has failed properly or timely to present them, or when the petition
is a second or later petition raising either old or new, or mixed, claims. Of course,
as will be demonstrated infra, these cases have now been largely drained of their
force.
1357 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 310–12 (1963). If the district judge con-
cluded that the habeas applicant was afforded a full and fair hearing by the state
court resulting in reliable findings, the Court said, he may, and ordinarily should,
defer to the state factfinding. Id. at 318. Under the 1966 statutory revision, a ha-
beas court must generally presume correct a state court’s written findings of fact
from a hearing to which the petitioner was a party. A state finding cannot be set
aside merely on a preponderance of the evidence and the federal court granting the
writ must include in its opinion the reason it found the state findings not fairly
supported by the record or the existence of one or more listed factors justifying dis-
regard of the factfinding. Pub. L. 89–711, 80 Stat. 1105, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). See
Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539 (1981); Sumner v. Mata, 455 U.S. 591 (1982); Mar-
shall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983); Patton v. Yount, 467 U.S. 1025 (1984); Parker
v. Dugger, 498 U.S. 308 (1991); Burden v. Zant, 498 U.S. 433 (1991). The presump-
tion of correctness does not apply to questions of law or to mixed questions of law
and fact. Miller v. Fenton, 474 U.S. 104, 110–16 (1985). However, in Wright v. West,
505 U.S. 277 (1992), the Justices argued inconclusively whether deferential review
of questions of law or especially of law and fact should be adopted.
court, either at the time of the trial or in a collateral proceed-

ing.” 1358 To “particularize” this general test, the Court went on to
hold that an evidentiary hearing must take place when (1) the mer-
its of the factual dispute were not resolved in the state hearing; (2)
the state factual determination is not fairly supported by the re-
cord as a whole; (3) the fact finding procedure employed was not
adequate to afford a full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial
allegation of newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were
not adequately developed at the state hearing; or (6) for any rea-
son it appears that the state trier of fact did not afford the habeas
applicant a full and fair fact hearing.1359
Second, Sanders v. United States 1360 dealt with two interre-
lated questions: the effects to be given successive petitions for the
writ, when the second or subsequent application presented grounds
previously asserted or grounds not theretofore raised. Emphasizing
that “[c]onventional notions of finality of litigation have no place
where life or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional
rights is alleged,” 1361 the Court set out generous standards for con-
sideration of successive claims. As to previously asserted grounds,
the Court held that controlling weight may be given to a prior de-
nial of relief if (1) the same ground presented was determined ad-
versely to the applicant before, (2) the prior determination was on
the merits, and (3) the ends of justice would not be served by reach-
ing the merits of the subsequent application, so that the habeas court
might but was not obligated to deny relief without considering the
1358 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963). The Court was unanimous on
the statement, but it divided 5 to 4 on application.

1359 372 U.S. at 313–18. Congress in 1966 codified the factors in somewhat dif-
ferent form but essentially codified Townsend. Pub. L. 89–711, 80 Stat. 1105, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254. The Court believes that Congress neither codified Townsend nor precluded
the Court from altering the Townsend standards. Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S.
1, 10, n.5 (1992). Compare id. at 20–21 (Justice O’Connor dissenting). Keeney for-
mally overruled part of Townsend. Id. at 5.
1360 373 U.S. 1 (1963). Sanders was a § 2255 case, a federal prisoner petitioning
for postconviction relief. The Court applied the same liberal rules with respect to
federal prisoners as it did for state. See Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217
(1969). As such, the case has also been eroded by subsequent cases. E.g., Davis v.
United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973); United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152 (1982).
1361 373 U.S. at 8. The statement accorded with the established view that prin-
ciples of res judicata were not applicable in habeas. E.g., Price v. Johnston, 334 U.S.
266 (1948); Wong Doo v. United States, 265 U.S. 239 (1924); Salinger v. Loisel, 265
U.S. 224 (1924). Congress in 1948 had appeared to adopt some limited version of
res judicata for federal prisoners but not for state prisoners, Act of June 25, 1948,
62 Stat. 965, 967, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244, 2255, but the Court in Sanders held the same
standards applicable and denied the statute changed existing caselaw. 373 U.S. at
11–14. But see id. at 27–28 (Justice Harlan dissenting).
claim on the merits.1362 With respect to grounds not previously as-

serted, a federal court considering a successive petition could re-
fuse to hear the new claim only if it decided the petitioner had de-
liberately bypassed the opportunity in the prior proceeding to raise
it; if not, “[n]o matter how many prior applications for federal col-
lateral relief a prisoner has made,” the court must consider the mer-
its of the new claim.1363
Third, the most controversial of the 1963 cases, Fay v. Noia,1364
dealt with the important issue of state defaults, of, that is, what
the effect on habeas is when a defendant in a state criminal trial
has failed to raise in a manner in accordance with state procedure
a claim which he subsequently wants to raise on habeas. If, for ex-
ample, a defendant fails to object to the admission of certain evi-
dence on federal constitutional grounds in accordance with state pro-
cedure and within state time constraints, the state courts may
therefore simply refuse to address the merits of the claim, and the
state’s “independent and adequate state ground” bars direct federal
review of the claim.1365 Whether a similar result prevailed upon ha-
beas divided the Court in Brown v. Allen,1366 in which the majority
held that a prisoner, refused consideration of his appeal in state
court because his papers had been filed a day late, could not be
heard on habeas because of his state procedural default. The result
was changed in Fay v. Noia, in which the Court held that the ad-
equate and independent state ground doctrine was a limitation only
upon the Court’s appellate review, but that it had no place in ha-
beas. A federal court has power to consider any claim that has been
procedurally defaulted in state courts.1367
Still, the Court recognized that the states had legitimate inter-
ests that were served by their procedural rules, and that it was im-
portant that state courts have the opportunity to afford a claimant
relief to which he might be entitled. Thus, a federal court had dis-
cretion to deny a habeas petitioner relief if it found that he had
1362 373 U.S. at 15. In codifying the Sanders standards in 1966, Pub. L. 89–711,
80 Stat. 1104, 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), Congress omitted the “ends of justice” language.
Although it was long thought that the omission probably had no substantive effect,
this may not be the case. Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
1363 373 U.S. at 17–19.
1364 372 U.S. 391 (1963). Fay was largely obliterated over the years, beginning
with Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973), a federal-prisoner post-conviction
relief case, and Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977), but it was not formally
overruled until Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744–51 (1991).
1365 E.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945). In the habeas context, the procedural-bar rules are
ultimately a function of the requirement that petitioners first exhaust state av-
enues of relief before coming to federal court.
1366 344 U.S. 443 (1953).
1367 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424–34 (1963).
deliberately bypassed state procedure; the discretion could be exer-

cised only if the court found that the prisoner had intentionally waived
his right to pursue his state remedy.1368
Liberalization of the writ thus made it possible for convicted
persons who had fully litigated their claims at state trials and on
appeal, who had because of some procedural default been denied
the opportunity to have their claims reviewed, or who had been at
least once heard on federal habeas, to have the chance to present
their grounds for relief to a federal habeas judge. In addition to op-
portunities to relitigate the facts and the law relating to their con-
victions, prisoners could also take advantage of new constitutional
decisions that were retroactive. The filings in federal courts in-
creased year by year, but the numbers of prisoners who in fact ob-
tained either release or retrial remained quite small. A major ef-
fect, however, was to exacerbate the feelings of state judges and state
law enforcement officials and to stimulate many efforts in Congress
to enact restrictive habeas amendments.1369 Although the efforts were
unsuccessful, complaints were received more sympathetically in a
newly constituted Supreme Court and more restrictive rulings en-
sued.
The discretion afforded the Court was sounded by Justice
Rehnquist, who, after reviewing the case law on the 1867 statute,
remarked that the history “illustrates this Court’s historic willing-
ness to overturn or modify its earlier views of the scope of the writ,
even where the statutory language authorizing judicial action has
remained unchanged.” 1370 The emphasis from early on has been upon
the equitable nature of the habeas remedy and the judiciary’s re-
sponsibility to guide the exercise of that remedy in accordance with
1368 372 U.S. at 438–40.
1369 In 1961, state prisoner habeas filings totaled 1,020, in 1965, 4,845, in 1970,
a high (to date) of 9,063, in 1975, 7,843 in 1980, 8,534 in 1985, 9,045 in 1986. On
relief afforded, no reliable figures are available, but estimates indicate that at most
4 percent of the filings result in either release or retrial. C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER, & E.
COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE (1988 & supps.), § 4261, at 284–91.
1370 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 81 (1977). The present Court’s emphasis
in habeas cases is, of course, quite different from that of the Court in the 1963 tril-
ogy. Now, the Court favors decisions that promote finality, comity, judicial economy,
and channeling the resolution of claims into the most appropriate forum. Keeney v.
Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1, 8–10 (1992). Overall, federalism concerns are critical. See
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991) (“This is a case about federalism.”
First sentence of opinion). The seminal opinion on which subsequent cases have drawn
is Justice Powell’s concurrence in Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 250 (1973).
He suggested that habeas courts should entertain only those claims that go to the
integrity of the fact-finding process, thus raising questions of the value of a guilty
verdict, or, more radically, that only those prisoners able to make a credible show-
ing of “factual innocence” could be heard on habeas. Id. at 256–58, 274–75. As will
be evident infra, some form of innocence standard now is pervasive in much of the
Court’s habeas jurisprudence.
equitable principles; thus, the Court time and again underscores that
the federal courts have plenary power under the statute to imple-
ment it to the fullest while the Court’s decisions may deny them
the discretion to exercise the power.1371
Change has occurred in several respects in regard to access to
and the scope of the writ. It is sufficient to say that the more re-
cent rulings have eviscerated the content of the 1963 trilogy and
that Brown v. Allen itself is threatened with extinction.
First, the Court in search and seizure cases has returned to the
standard of Frank v. Mangum, holding that where the state courts
afford a criminal defendant the opportunity for a full and adequate
hearing on his Fourth Amendment claim, his only avenue of relief
in the federal courts is to petition the Supreme Court for review
and that he cannot raise those claims again in a habeas peti-
tion.1372 Grounded as it is in the Court’s dissatisfaction with the
exclusionary rule, the case has not since been extended to other con-
stitutional grounds,1373 but the rationale of the opinion suggests the
likelihood of reaching other exclusion questions.1374
Second, the Court has formulated a “new rule” exception to ha-
beas cognizance. That is, subject to two exceptions,1375 a case de-
cided after a petitioner’s conviction and sentence became final may
1371 433 U.S. at 83; Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 495 n.37 (1976); Francis v.
Henderson, 425 U.S. 536, 538 (1976); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963). The
dichotomy between power and discretion goes all the way back to the case imposing
the rule of exhaustion of state remedies. Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 251 (1886).
1372 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The decision is based as much on the
Court’s dissatisfaction with the exclusionary rule as with its desire to curb habeas.
Holding that the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to deter unconstitutional searches
and seizures rather than to redress individual injuries, the Court reasoned that no
deterrent purpose was advanced by applying the rule on habeas, except to encour-
age state courts to give claimants a full and fair hearing. Id. at 493–95.
1373 Stone does not apply to a Sixth Amendment claim of ineffective assistance
of counsel in litigating a search and seizure claim. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S.
365, 382–383 (1986). See also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (racial discrimi-
nation in selection of grand jury foreman); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979)
(insufficient evidence to satisfy reasonable doubt standard).
1374 Issues of admissibility of confessions (Miranda violations) and eyewitness
identifications are obvious candidates. See, e.g., Duckworth v. Eagan, 492 U.S. 195,
205 (1989) (Justice O’Connor concurring); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 413–14
(1977) (Justice Powell concurring), and id. at 415 (Chief Justice Burger dissenting);
Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 87 n.11 (1977) (reserving Miranda).
1375 The first exception permits the retroactive application on habeas of a new
rule if the rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the state to
proscribe or addresses a substantive categorical guarantee accorded by the Constitu-
tion. The rule must, to say it differently, either decriminalize a class of conduct or
prohibit the imposition of a particular punishment on a particular class of persons.
The second exception would permit the application of “watershed rules of criminal
procedure” implicating the fundamental fairness and accuracy of the criminal pro-
ceeding. Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 494–95 (1990) (citing cases); Sawyer v. Smith,
497 U.S. 227, 241–45 (1990).
not be the predicate for federal habeas relief if the case announces
or applies a “new rule.” 1376 A decision announces a new rule “if the
result was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defen-
dant’s conviction became final.” 1377 If a rule “was susceptible to de-
bate among reasonable minds,” it could not have been dictated by
precedent, and therefore it must be classified as a “new rule.” 1378
Third, the Court has largely maintained the standards of Townsend
v. Sain, as embodied in somewhat modified form in statute, with
respect to when federal judges must conduct an evidentiary hear-
ing. However, one Townsend factor, not expressly set out in the stat-
ute, has been overturned in order to bring the case law into line
with other decisions. Townsend had held that a hearing was re-
quired if the material facts were not adequately developed at the
state-court hearing. If the defendant had failed to develop the ma-
terial facts in the state court, however, the Court held that, unless
he had “deliberately bypass[ed]” that procedural outlet, he was still
entitled to the hearing.1379 The Court overruled that point and sub-
stituted a much stricter “cause-and-prejudice” standard.1380
Fourth, the Court has significantly stiffened the standards gov-
erning when a federal habeas court should entertain a second or
successive petition filed by a state prisoner—a question with which
Sanders v. United States dealt.1381 A successive petition may be dis-
missed if the same ground was determined adversely to petitioner
previously, the prior determination was on the merits, and “the ends
of justice” would not be served by reconsideration. It is with the
latter element that the Court has become more restrictive. A plural-
ity in Kuhlmann v. Wilson 1382 argued that the “ends of justice” stan-
dard would be met only if a petitioner supplemented her constitu-
tional claim with a colorable showing of factual innocence. While
the Court has not expressly adopted this standard, a later capital
case utilized it, holding that a petitioner sentenced to death could
1376 Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989) (plurality opinion); Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 313–19 (1989).

1377 Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 412 (1990) (quoting Penry v. Lynaugh,
492 U.S. 302, 314 (1989), which was quoting Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 314 (1989).
This sentence was quoted again in Whorton v. Bockting, 549 U.S. 406, 416 (2007)).
1378 494 U.S. at 415. See also Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222, 228–29 (1992).
This latter case found that two decisions relied on by petitioner merely drew on ex-
isting precedent and so did not establish a new rule. See also O’Dell v. Netherland,
521 U.S. 151 (1997); Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518 (1997); Gray v. Netherland,
518 U.S. 152 (1996). But compare Bousley v. Brooks, 523 U.S. 614 (1998).
1379 Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313, 317 (1963), imported the “deliberate
bypass” standard from Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 438 (1963).
1380 Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 504 U.S. 1 (1992). This standard is imported from
the cases abandoning Fay v. Noia and is discussed infra.

1381 373 U.S. 1, 15–18 (1963). The standards are embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).
1382 477 U.S. 436 (1986).
escape the bar on successive petitions by demonstrating “actual in-

nocence” of the death penalty by showing by clear and convincing
evidence that no reasonable juror would have found the prisoner
eligible for the death penalty under applicable state law.1383
Even if the subsequent petition alleges new and different grounds,
a habeas court may dismiss the petition if the prisoner’s failure to
assert those grounds in the prior, or first, petition constitutes “an
abuse of the writ.” 1384 Following the 1963 trilogy and especially Sand-
ers, the federal courts had generally followed a rule excusing the
failure to raise claims in earlier petitions unless the failure was a
result of “inexcusable neglect” or of deliberate relinquishment. In
McClesky v. Zant,1385 the Court construed the “abuse of the writ”
language to require a showing of both “cause and prejudice” before
a petitioner may allege in a second or later petition a ground or
grounds not alleged in the first. In other words, to avoid subse-
quent dismissal, a petitioner must allege in his first application all
the grounds he may have, unless he can show cause, some external
impediment, for his failure and some actual prejudice from the er-
ror alleged. If he cannot show cause and prejudice, the petitioner
may be heard only if she shows that a “fundamental miscarriage of
justice” will occur, which means she must make a “colorable show-
ing of factual innocence.” 1386
Fifth, the Court abandoned the rules of Fay v. Noia, although
it was not until 1991 that it expressly overruled the case.1387 Fay,
it will be recalled, dealt with so-called procedural-bar circum-
stances; that is, if a defendant fails to assert a claim at the proper
time or in accordance with proper procedure under valid state rules,
and if the state then refuses to reach the merits of his claim and
rules against him solely because of the noncompliance with state
procedure, when may a petitioner present the claim in federal ha-
beas? The answer in Fay was that the federal court always had power
to review the claim but that it had discretion to deny relief to a
habeas claimant if it found that the prisoner had intentionally waived
his right to pursue his state remedy through a “deliberate bypass”
of state procedure.
1383 Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992). Language in the opinion suggests
that the standard is not limited to capital cases. Id. at 339.

1384 The standard is in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b), along with the standard that, if a
petitioner “deliberately withheld” a claim, the petition can be dismissed. See also 28
U.S.C. § 2254 Rule 9(b) (judge may dismiss successive petition raising new claims if
failure to assert them previously was an abuse of the writ).
1385 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
1386 499 U.S. at 489–97. The “actual innocence” element runs through the cases
under all the headings.

1387 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 744–51 (1991).
That is no longer the law. “In all cases in which a state pris-
oner has defaulted his federal claims in state court pursuant to an
independent and adequate state procedural rule, federal habeas re-
view of the claims is barred unless the prisoner can demonstrate
cause for the default and actual prejudice as a result of the alleged
violation of federal law, or demonstrate that failure to consider the
claims will result in a fundamental miscarriage of justice. Fay was
based on a conception of federal/state relations that undervalued
the importance of state procedural rules.” 1388 The “miscarriage-of-
justice” element is probably limited to cases in which actual inno-
cence or actual impairment of a guilty verdict can be shown.1389 The
concept of “cause” excusing failure to observe a state rule is ex-
tremely narrow; “the existence of cause for procedural default must
ordinarily turn on whether the prisoner can show that some objec-
tive factor external to the defense impeded counsel’s efforts to com-
ply with the State’s procedural rule.” 1390 As for the “prejudice” fac-
tor, it is an undeveloped concept, but the Court’s only case establishes
a high barrier.1391
The Court continues, with some modest exceptions, to construe
habeas jurisdiction quite restrictively, but it has now been joined
by new congressional legislation that is also restrictive. In Herrera
1388 Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 750 (1991). The standard has been
developed in a long line of cases. Davis v. United States, 411 U.S. 233 (1973) (under
federal rules); Francis v. Henderson, 425 U.S. 536 (1976); Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S.
107 (1982); Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. 478 (1986); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255
(1989). Coleman arose because the defendant’s attorney had filed his appeal in state
court three days late. Wainwright v. Sykes involved the failure of defendant to ob-
ject to the admission of inculpatory statements at the time of trial. Engle v. Isaac
involved a failure to object at trial to jury instructions.
1389 E.g., Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 538–39 (1986); Murray v. Carrier, 477
U.S. 478, 496 (1986). In Bousley v. Brooks, 523 U.S. 614 (1998), a federal post-
conviction relief case, petitioner had pled guilty to a federal firearms offense. Subse-
quently, the Supreme Court interpreted more narrowly the elements of the offense
than had the trial court in Bousley’s case. The Court held that Bousley by his plea
had defaulted, but that he might be able to demonstrate “actual innocence” so as to
excuse the default if he could show on remand that it was more likely than not that
no reasonable juror would have convicted him of the offense, properly defined.
1390 Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S. at 488. This case held that ineffective assis-
tance of counsel is not “cause” unless it rises to the level of a Sixth Amendment
violation. See also Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752–57 (1991) (because peti-
tioner had no right to counsel in state postconviction proceeding where error oc-
curred, he could not claim constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel). The ac-
tual novelty of a constitutional claim at the time of the state court proceeding is
“cause” excusing the petitioner’s failure to raise it then, Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1
(1984), although the failure of counsel to anticipate a line of constitutional argu-
ment then foreshadowed in Supreme Court precedent is insufficient “cause.” Engle
v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982).
1391 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 169 (1982) (under federal rules) (with
respect to erroneous jury instruction, inquiring whether the error “so infected the
entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process”).
v. Collins,1392 the Court appeared, though ambiguously, to take the

position that, although it requires a showing of actual innocence to
permit a claimant to bring a successive or abusive petition, a claim
of innocence is not alone sufficient to enable a claimant to obtain
review of his conviction on habeas. Petitioners are entitled in fed-
eral habeas courts to show that they are imprisoned in violation of
the Constitution, not to seek to correct errors of fact. But a claim
of innocence does not bear on the constitutionality of one’s convic-
tion or detention, and the execution of a person claiming actual in-
nocence would not, by this reasoning, violate the Constitution.1393
In a subsequent part of the opinion, however, the Court assumed
for the sake of argument that “a truly persuasive demonstration of
‘actual innocence’ made after trial would render the execution of a
defendant unconstitutional,” and it imposed a high standard for mak-
ing this showing.1394 Then, in In re Troy Anthony Davis,1395 the Court
found a death-row convict with a claim of actual innocence to be
entitled to a District Court determination of his habeas petition.
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion joined by Justices Ginsburg
and Breyer, noted that the fact that seven of the state’s key wit-
nesses had recanted their trial testimony, and that several people
had implicated the state’s principal witness as the shooter, made
the case “exceptional.” 1396
In Schlup v. Delo,1397 the Court adopted the plurality opinion
of Kuhlmann v. Wilson and held that, absent a sufficient showing
of “cause and prejudice,” a claimant filing a successive or abusive
petition must, as an initial matter, make a showing of “actual inno-
cence” so as to fall within the narrow class of cases implicating a
fundamental miscarriage of justice. The Court divided, however, with
1392 506 U.S. 390 (1993).
1393 506 U.S. at 398–417.
1394 506 U.S. at 417–419. Justices Scalia and Thomas would have unequivocally
held that “[t]here is no basis in text, tradition, or even in contemporary practice

. . . for finding in the Constitution a right to demand judicial consideration of newly
discovered evidence of innocence brought forward after conviction.” Id. at 427–28
(concurring). However, it is not at all clear that all the Justices joining the Court
believe innocence to be nondispositive on habeas. Id. at 419 (Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy concurring), 429 (Justice White concurring). In House v. Bell, 547 U.S. 518,
554–55 (2006), the Court declined to resolve the issue that in Herrera it had as-
sumed without deciding: that “a truly persuasive demonstration of ‘actual inno-
cence’ made after trial would render the execution of a defendant unconstitutional.”
See Amendment 8, Limitations on Habeas Corpus Review of Capital Sentences.
1395 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–1443 (2009).
1396 Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, dissented, writing, “This Court has
never held that the Constitution forbids the execution of a convicted defendant who
has had a full and fair trial but is later able to convince a habeas court that he is
‘actually’ innocent.” He also wrote that the defendant’s “claim is a sure loser” and
that the Supreme Court was sending the District Court “on a fool’s errand.”
1397 513 U.S. 298 (1995).
respect to the showing a claimant must make. One standard, found

in some of the cases, was championed by the dissenters; “to show
‘actual innocence’ one must show by clear and convincing evidence
that but for a constitutional error, no reasonable juror would have
found the petitioner eligible for the death penalty.” 1398 The Court
adopted a second standard, under which the petitioner must dem-
onstrate that “a constitutional violation has probably resulted in the
conviction of one who is actually innocent.” To meet this burden, a
claimant “must show that it is more likely than not that no reason-
able juror would have convicted him in the light of the new evi-
dence.” 1399
In the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(AEDPA),1400 Congress imposed tight new restrictions on succes-
sive or abusive petitions, including making the circuit courts “gate
keepers” in permitting or denying the filing of such petitions, with
bars to appellate review of these decisions, provisions that in part
were upheld in Felker v. Turpin.1401 One important restriction in
AEDPA bars a federal habeas court from granting a writ to any per-
son in custody under a judgment of a state court “with respect to
any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed-
ings unless the adjudication of the claim—(1) resulted in a decision
that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of,
clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court
of the United States.” 1402 The Court has made the significance of
this restriction plain: Instead of assessing whether federal law was
correctly applied de novo, as would be the course under direct re-
view of a federal district court decision, the proper approach for fed-
eral habeas relief under AEDPA is the more deferential one of de-
termining whether the Court has established clear precedent on the
issue contested and, if so, whether the state’s application of the prec-
1398 513 U.S. at 334 (Chief Justice Rehnquist dissenting, with Justices Kennedy
and Thomas), 342 (Justice Scalia dissenting, with Justice Thomas). This standard
was drawn from Sawyer v. Whitley, 505 U.S. 333 (1992).
1399 513 U.S. at 327. This standard was drawn from Murray v. Carrier, 477 U.S.
478 (1986).
1400 Pub. L. 104–132, Title I, 110 Stat. 1217–21, amending 28 U.S.C. §§ 2244,
2253, 2254, and Rule 22 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

1401 518 U.S. 651 (1996).
1402 The amended 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (emphasis added). The provision was ap-
plied in Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002). See also Renico v. Lett, 559 U.S. ___, No.
09–338, slip op. 9–12 (2010). For analysis of its constitutionality, see the various opin-
ions in Lindh v. Murphy, 96 F.3d 856 (7th Cir. 1996) (en banc), rev’d on other grounds,
521 U.S. 320 (1997); Drinkard v. Johnson, 97 F.3d 751 (5th Cir. 1996), cert. denied,
520 U.S. 1107 (1997); Hall v. Washington, 106 F.3d 742 (7th Cir. 1997); O’Brien v.
Dubois, 145 F.3d 16 (1st Cir. 1998); Green v. French, 143 F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 1998),
cert. denied, 525 U.S. 1090 (1999).
edent was reasonable, i.e., no fairminded jurist could find that the
state acted in accord with the Court’s established precedent.1403
For the future, barring changes in Court membership, other cur-
tailing of habeas jurisdiction can be expected. Perhaps the Court
will impose some form of showing of innocence as a predicate to
obtaining a hearing. More far-reaching would be an overturning of
Brown v. Allen itself and the renunciation of any oversight, save
for the extremely limited direct review of state court convictions in
the Supreme Court. The Court continues to emphasize broad feder-
alism concerns, rather than simply comity and respect for state courts.
Removal.—In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress provided that
civil actions commenced in the state courts which could have been
brought in the original jurisdiction of the inferior federal courts could
be removed by the defendant from the state court to the federal
court.1404 Generally, as Congress expanded the original jurisdiction
of the inferior federal courts, it similarly expanded removal jurisdic-
tion.1405 Although there is potentiality for intra-court conflict here,
of course, in the implied mistrust of state courts’ willingness or abil-
ity to protect federal interests, it is rather with regard to the lim-
ited areas of removal that do not correspond to federal court origi-
nal jurisdiction that the greatest amount of conflict is likely to arise.
If a federal officer is sued or prosecuted in a state court for acts
done under color of law 1406 or if a federal employee is sued for a
wrongful or negligent act that the Attorney General certifies was
1403 Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. ___, No. 09–587, slip op. at 10–14 (2011)
(overturning Ninth Circuit’s grant of relief, which was based on ineffective assis-
tance of counsel); accord Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. ___, No. 09–658, slip op. (2011)
(same) and Cullen v. Pinholster, No. 09–1088, slip op. (2011) (same).
1404 § 12, 1 Stat. 79. The removal provision contained the same jurisdictional
amount requirement as the original jurisdictional statute. It applied in the main to

aliens and defendants not residents of the state in which suit was brought.
1405 Thus the Act of March 3, 1875, § 2, 18 Stat. 470, conferring federal ques-
tion jurisdiction on the inferior federal courts, provided for removal of such actions.
The constitutionality of congressional authorization for removal is well-established.
Chicago & N.W. Ry. v. Whitton’s Administrator, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871); Ten-
nessee v. Davis, 100 U.S. 257 (1880); Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U.S. 449
(1884). See City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 833 (1966).
1406 See 28 U.S.C. § 1442. This statute had its origins in the Act of February 4,
1815, § 8, 3 Stat. 198 (removal of civil and criminal actions against federal customs
officers for official acts), and the Act of March 2, 1833, § 3, 4 Stat. 633 (removal of
civil and criminal actions against federal officers on account of acts done under the
revenue laws), both of which grew out of disputes arising when certain states at-
tempted to nullify federal laws, and the Act of March 3, 1863, § 5, 12 Stat. 756 (re-
moval of civil and criminal actions against federal officers for acts done during the
existence of the Civil War under color of federal authority). In Mesa v. California,
489 U.S. 121 (1989), the Court held that the statute authorized federal officer re-
moval only when the defendant avers a federal defense. See Willingham v. Morgan,
395 U.S. 402 (1969).
done while she was acting within the scope of her employment,1407
the actions may be removed. But the statute most open to federal-
state court dispute is the civil rights removal law, which authorizes
removal of any action, civil or criminal, which is commenced in a
state court “[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot enforce
in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the
equal civil rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons
within the jurisdiction thereof.” 1408 In the years after enactment of
this statute, however, the court narrowly construed the removal privi-
lege granted,1409 and recent decisions for the most part confirm this
restrictive interpretation,1410 so that instances of successful resort
to the statute are fairly rare.
Thus, the Court’s position holds, one may not obtain removal
simply by an assertion that he is being denied equal rights or that
he cannot enforce the law granting equal rights. Because the re-
moval statute requires the denial to be “in the courts of such State,”
the pretrial conduct of police and prosecutors was deemed irrel-
evant, because it afforded no basis for predicting that state courts
would not vindicate the federal rights of defendants.1411 Moreover,
in predicting a denial of rights, only an assertion founded on a fa-
cially unconstitutional state statute denying the right in question
would suffice. From the existence of such a law, it could be pre-
dicted that defendant’s rights would be denied.1412 Furthermore, the
1407 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d), enacted after Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988).
1408 28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). Subsection (2) provides for the removal of state court
actions “[f]or any act under color of authority derived from any law providing for
equal rights, or for refusing to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsis-
tent with such law.” This subsection “is available only to federal officers and to per-
sons assisting such officers in the performance of their official duties.” City of Green-
wood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 815 (1966).
1409 Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S.
313 (1880); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Bush v. Kentucky, 107 U.S. 110
(1883); Gibson v. Mississippi, 162 U.S. 565 (1896); Smith v. Mississippi, 162 U.S.
592 (1896); Murray v. Louisiana, 163 U.S. 101 (1896); Williams v. Mississippi, 170
U.S. 213 (1898); Kentucky v. Powers, 201 U.S. 1 (1906).
1410 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384
U.S. 808 (1966). There was a hiatus of cases reviewing removal from 1906 to 1966
because from 1887 to 1964 there was no provision for an appeal of an order of a
federal court remanding a removed case to the state courts. § 901 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, 78 Stat. 266, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d).
1411 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 803 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Peacock,
384 U.S. 808, 827 (1966). Justice Douglas in dissent, joined by Justices Black, Fortas,
and Chief Justice Warren, argued that “in the courts of such State” modified only
“cannot enforce,” so that one could be denied rights prior to as well as during a trial
and police and prosecutorial conduct would be relevant. Alternately, he argued that
state courts could be implicated in the denial prior to trial by certain actions. Id. at
844–55.
1412 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 797–802 (1966). Thus, in Strauder v. West
Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880), African-Americans were excluded by statute from ser-
vice on grand and petit juries, and it was held that a black defendant’s criminal
Sec. 3—Treason Cl. 1—Definition and Limitations
removal statute’s reference to “any law providing for . . . equal rights”

covered only laws “providing for specific civil rights stated in terms
of racial equality.” 1413 Thus, apparently federal constitutional pro-
visions and many general federal laws do not qualify as a basis for
such removal.1414
Clause 3. The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeach-

ment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State
where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not
committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or
Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.1415
IN GENERAL
See analysis under the Sixth Amendment.
SECTION 3. Clause 1. Treason against the United States, shall

consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their
Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be con-
victed of Treason unless on the testimony of two Witnesses to
the same overt Act, or on Confession in open court.
TREASON
The Treason Clause is a product of the awareness of the Fram-
ers of the “numerous and dangerous excrescences” which had disfig-
ured the English law of treason and was therefore intended to put
it beyond the power of Congress to “extend the crime and punish-
indictment should have been removed because federal law secured nondiscrimina-
tory jury service and it could be predicted that he would be denied his rights before
a discriminatorily selected state jury. In Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880), there
was no state statute, but there was exclusion of Negroes from juries pursuant to
custom and removal was denied. In Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1880), the state
provision authorizing discrimination in jury selection had been held invalid under
federal law by a state court, and a similar situation existed in Bush v. Kentucky,
107 U.S. 110 (1882). Removal was denied in both cases. The dissenters in City of
Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 848–52 (1966), argued that federal courts should
consider facially valid statutes which might be applied unconstitutionally and state
court enforcement of custom as well in evaluating whether a removal petitioner could
enforce his federal rights in state court.
1413 Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S. 780, 788–94 (1966); City of Greenwood v. Pea-
cock, 384 U.S. 808, 824–27 (1966), See also id. at 847–48 (Justice Douglas dissent-
ing).
1414 City of Greenwood v. Peacock, 384 U.S. at 824–27. See also Johnson v. Mis-
sissippi, 421 U.S. 213 (1975).

1415 See the Sixth Amendment.
ment of treason.” 1416 The debate in the Convention, remarks in the

ratifying conventions, and contemporaneous public comment make
clear that a restrictive concept of the crime was imposed and that
ordinary partisan divisions within political society were not to be
escalated by the stronger into capital charges of treason, as so of-
ten had happened in England.1417
Thus, the Framers adopted two of the three formulations and

the phraseology of the English Statute of Treason enacted in 1350,1418
but they conspicuously omitted the phrase defining as treason the
“compass[ing] or imagin[ing] the death of our lord the King,” 1419
under which most of the English law of “constructive treason” had
been developed.1420 Beyond limiting the power of Congress to de-
fine treason,1421 the clause also prescribes limitations upon Con-
gress’s ability to make proof of the offense easy to establish 1422 and
its ability to define punishment.1423
1416 2 J. ELLIOT, DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON ADOPTION OF THE CON-
STITUTION 469 (1836) (James Wilson). Wilson was apparently the author of the clause
in the Committee of Detail and had some first hand knowledge of the abuse of trea-
son charges. J. HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: SELECTED ESSAYS 90–
91, 129–136 (1971).
1417 2 M. Farrand, supra at 345–50; 2 J. Elliot, supra at 469, 487 (James Wil-
son); 3 id. at 102–103, 447, 451, 466; 4 id. at 209, 219, 220; THE FEDERALIST No. 43
(J. Cooke ed. 1961), 290 (Madison); id. at No. 84, 576–577 (Hamilton); THE WORKS OF
JAMES WILSON 663–69 (R. McCloskey ed. 1967). The matter is comprehensively stud-
ied in J. Hurst, supra at chs. 3, 4.
1418 25 Edward III, Stat. 5, ch. 2, See J. Hurst, supra at ch 2.
1419 Id. at 15, 31–37, 41–49, 51–55.
1420 Id. “[T]he record does suggest that the clause was intended to guarantee
nonviolent political processes against prosecution under any theory or charge, the
burden of which was the allegedly seditious character of the conduct in question.
The most obviously restrictive feature of the constitutional definition is its omission
of any provision analogous to that branch of the Statute of Edward III which pun-
ished treason by compassing the death of the king. In a narrow sense, this provi-
sion perhaps had no proper analogue in a republic. However, to interpret the si-
lence of the Treason Clause in this way alone does justice neither to the technical
proficiency of the Philadelphia draftsmen nor to the practical statecraft and knowl-
edge of English political history among the Framers and proponents of the Constitu-
tion. The charge of compassing the king’s death had been the principal instrument
by which ‘treason’ had been used to suppress a wide range of political opposition,
from acts obviously dangerous to order and likely in fact to lead to the king’s death
to the mere speaking or writing of views restrictive of the royal authority.” Id. at
152–53.
1421 The clause does not, however, prevent Congress from specifying other crimes
of a subversive nature and prescribing punishment, so long as Congress is not merely

attempting to evade the restrictions of the Treason Clause. E.g., Ex parte Bollman,
8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75, 126 (1807); Wimmer v. United States, 264 Fed. 11, 12–13 (6th Cir.
1920), cert. denied, 253 U.S. 494 (1920).
1422 By the requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act or a confession
in open court.
1423 Cl. 2, infra, “Corruption of the Blood and Forfeiture”.
Levying War
Early judicial interpretation of the meaning of treason in terms
of levying war was conditioned by the partisan struggles of the early
nineteenth century, which involved the treason trials of Aaron Burr
and his associates. In Ex parte Bollman,1424 which involved two of
Burr’s confederates, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for himself and
three other Justices, confined the meaning of levying war to the
actual waging of war. “However flagitious may be the crime of con-
spiring to subvert by force the government of our country, such con-
spiracy is not treason. To conspire to levy war, and actually to levy
war, are distinct offences. The first must be brought into open ac-
tion by the assemblage of men for a purpose treasonable in itself,
or the fact of levying war cannot have been committed. So far has
this principle been carried, that . . . it has been determined that
the actual enlistment of men to serve against the government does
not amount to levying war.” Chief Justice Marshall was careful, how-
ever, to state that the Court did not mean that no person could be
guilty of this crime who had not appeared in arms against the coun-
try. “On the contrary, if war be actually levied, that is, if a body of
men be actually assembled for the purpose of effecting by force a
treasonable purpose, all those who perform any part, however min-
ute, or however remote from the scene of action, and who are actu-
ally leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be considered as trai-
tors. But there must be an actual assembling of men, for the
treasonable purpose, to constitute a levying of war.” 1425
On the basis of these considerations and because no part of the
crime charged had been committed in the District of Columbia, the
Court held that Bollman and Swartwout could not be tried in the
District, and ordered their discharge. Marshall continued by saying
that “the crime of treason should not be extended by construction
to doubtful cases” and concluded that no conspiracy for overturn-
ing the Government and “no enlisting of men to effect it, would be
an actual levying of war.” 1426
The Burr Trial.—Not long afterward, the Chief Justice went
to Richmond to preside over the trial of Aaron Burr. His ruling 1427
denying a motion to introduce certain collateral evidence bearing
on Burr’s activities is significant both for rendering the latter’s ac-
quittal inevitable and for the qualifications and exceptions made to
the Bollman decision. In brief, this ruling held that Burr, who had
not been present at the assemblage on Blennerhassett’s Island, could
1424 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
1425 8 U.S. at 126.
1426 8 U.S. at 127.
1427 United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 469, Appx. (1807).
be convicted of advising or procuring a levying of war only upon

the testimony of two witnesses to his having procured the assem-
blage. This operation having been covert, such testimony was natu-
rally unobtainable. The net effect of Marshall’s pronouncements was
to make it extremely difficult to convict one of levying war against
the United States short of the conduct of or personal participation
in actual hostilities.1428
Aid and Comfort to the Enemy

The Cramer Case.—Since Bollman, the few treason cases that
have reached the Supreme Court were outgrowths of World War II
and have charged adherence to enemies of the United States and
the giving of aid and comfort. In the first of these, Cramer v. United
States,1429 the issue was whether the “overt act” had to be “openly
manifest treason” or if it was enough if, when supported by the proper
evidence, it showed the required treasonable intention.1430 The Court,
in a five-to-four opinion by Justice Jackson, in effect took the for-
mer view holding that “the two-witness principle” interdicted “im-
putation of incriminating acts to the accused by circumstantial evi-
dence or by the testimony of a single witness,” 1431 even though the
single witness in question was the accused himself. “Every act, move-
ment, deed, and word of the defendant charged to constitute trea-
1428 There have been lower court cases in which convictions were obtained. As a
result of the Whiskey Rebellion, convictions of treason were obtained on the basis of
the ruling that forcible resistance to the enforcement of the revenue laws was a con-
structive levying of war. United States v. Vigol, 29 Fed. Cas. 376 (No. 16621) (C.C.D.
Pa. 1795); United States v. Mitchell, 26 Fed. Cas. 1277 (No. 15788) (C.C.D. Pa. 1795).
After conviction, the defendants were pardoned. See also for the same ruling in a
different situation the Case of Fries, 9 Fed. Cas. 826, 924 (Nos. 5126, 5127) (C.C.D.
Pa. 1799, 1800). The defendant was again pardoned after conviction. About a half
century later participation in forcible resistance to the Fugitive Slave Law was held
not to be a constructive levying of war. United States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. 105
(No. 15299) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1851). Although the United States Government regarded
the activities of the Confederate States as a levying of war, the President by Am-
nesty Proclamation of December 25, 1868, pardoned all those who had participated
on the southern side in the Civil War. In applying the Captured and Abandoned
Property Act of 1863 (12 Stat. 820) in a civil proceeding, the Court declared that the
foundation of the Confederacy was treason against the United States. Sprott v. United
States, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 459 (1875). See also Hanauer v. Doane, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.)
342 (1871); Thorington v. Smith, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 1 (1869); Young v. United States,
97 U.S. 39 (1878). These four cases bring in the concept of adhering to the enemy
and giving him aid and comfort, but these are not criminal cases and deal with at-
tempts to recover property under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act by per-
sons who claimed that they had given no aid or comfort to the enemy. These cases
are not, therefore, an interpretation of the Constitution.
1429 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
1430 89 Law. Ed. 1443–1444 (Argument of Counsel).
1431 325 U.S. at 35.
son must be supported by the testimony of two witnesses,” 1432 Jus-

tice Jackson asserted. Justice Douglas in a dissent, in which Chief
Justice Stone and Justices Black and Reed concurred, contended that
Cramer’s treasonable intention was sufficiently shown by overt acts
as attested to by two witnesses each, plus statements made by Cramer
on the witness stand.
The Haupt Case.—The Supreme Court sustained a conviction
of treason, for the first time in its history, in 1947 in Haupt v. United
States.1433 Here it was held that although the overt acts relied upon
to support the charge of treason—defendant’s harboring and shel-
tering in his home his son who was an enemy spy and saboteur,
assisting him in purchasing an automobile, and in obtaining employ-
ment in a defense plant—were all acts which a father would natu-
rally perform for a son, this fact did not necessarily relieve them of
the treasonable purpose of giving aid and comfort to the enemy. Speak-
ing for the Court, Justice Jackson said: “No matter whether young
Haupt’s mission was benign or traitorous, known or unknown to
the defendant, these acts were aid and comfort to him. In the light
of this mission and his instructions, they were more than casually
useful; they were aids in steps essential to his design for treason.
If proof be added that the defendant knew of his son’s instruction,
preparation and plans, the purpose to aid and comfort the enemy
becomes clear.” 1434
The Court held that conversation and occurrences long prior to
the indictment were admissible evidence on the question of defen-
dant’s intent. And more important, it held that the constitutional
requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act or confession in
open court does not operate to exclude confessions or admissions
made out of court, where a legal basis for the conviction has been
laid by the testimony of two witnesses of which such confessions or
admissions are merely corroborative. This relaxation of restrictions
surrounding the definition of treason evoked obvious satisfaction from
Justice Douglas, who saw in Haupt a vindication of his position in
Cramer. His concurring opinion contains what may be called a re-
statement of the law of treason and merits quotation at length:
1432 325 U.S. at 34–35. Earlier, Justice Jackson had declared that this phase of
treason consists of two elements: “adherence to the enemy; and rendering him aid
and comfort.” A citizen, it was said, may take actions “which do aid and comfort the
enemy . . . but if there is no adherence to the enemy in this, if there is no intent to
betray, there is no treason.” Id. at 29. Justice Jackson states erroneously that the
requirement of two witnesses to the same overt act was an original invention of the
Convention of 1787. Actually it comes from the British Treason Trials Act of 1695. 7
Wm. III, c.3.
1433 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
1434 330 U.S. at 635–36.
“As the Cramer case makes plain, the overt act and the intent
with which it is done are separate and distinct elements of the crime.
Intent need not be proved by two witnesses but may be inferred
from all the circumstances surrounding the overt act. But if two
witnesses are not required to prove treasonable intent, two wit-
nesses need not be required to show the treasonable character of
the overt act. For proof of treasonable intent in the doing of the
overt act necessarily involves proof that the accused committed the
overt act with the knowledge or understanding of its treasonable
character.”
“The requirement of an overt act is to make certain a treason-
able project has moved from the realm of thought into the realm of
action. That requirement is undeniably met in the present case, as
it was in the case of Cramer.”
“The Cramer case departed from those rules when it held that
‘The two-witness principle is to interdict imputation of incriminat-
ing acts to the accused by circumstantial evidence or by the testi-
mony of a single witness.’ 325 U.S. p. 35. The present decision is
truer to the constitutional definition of treason when it forsakes that
test and holds that an act, quite innocent on its face, does not need
two witnesses to be transformed into a incriminating one.” 1435
The Kawakita Case.—Kawakita v. United States 1436 was de-
cided on June 2, 1952. The facts are sufficiently stated in the follow-
ing headnote: “At petitioner’s trial for treason, it appeared that origi-
nally he was a native-born citizen of the United States and also a
national of Japan by reason of Japanese parentage and law. While
a minor, he took the oath of allegiance to the United States; went
to Japan for a visit on an American passport; and was prevented
by the outbreak of war from returning to this country. During the
war, he reached his majority in Japan; changed his registration from
American to Japanese, showed sympathy with Japan and hostility
to the United States; served as a civilian employee of a private cor-
poration producing war materials for Japan; and brutally abused
American prisoners of war who were forced to work there. After Ja-
pan’s surrender, he registered as an American citizen; swore that
he was an American citizen and had not done various acts amount-
1435 330 U.S. at 645–46. Justice Douglas cites no cases for these propositions.
Justice Murphy in a solitary dissent stated: “But the act of providing shelter was of
the type that might naturally arise out of petitioner’s relationship to his son, as the
Court recognizes. By its very nature, therefore, it is a non-treasonous act. That is
true even when the act is viewed in light of all the surrounding circumstances. All
that can be said is that the problem of whether it was motivated by treasonous or
non-treasonous factors is left in doubt. It is therefore not an overt act of treason,
regardless of how unlawful it might otherwise be.” Id. at 649.
1436 343 U.S. 717 (1952).
ing to expatriation; and returned to this country on an American

passport.” The question whether, on this record, Kawakita had in-
tended to renounce American citizenship, said the Court, in sustain-
ing conviction, was peculiarly one for the jury and their verdict that
he had not so intended was based on sufficient evidence. An Ameri-
can citizen, it continued, owes allegiance to the United States wher-
ever he may reside, and dual nationality does not alter the situa-
tion.1437
Doubtful State of the Law of Treason Today

The vacillation of Chief Justice Marshall between the Boll-
man 1438 and Burr 1439 cases and the vacillation of the Court in the
Cramer 1440 and Haupt 1441 cases leave the law of treason in a some-
what doubtful condition. The difficulties created by Burr have been
obviated to a considerable extent through the punishment of acts
ordinarily treasonable in nature under a different label,1442 within
a formula provided by Chief Justice Marshall himself in Bollman.
The passage reads: “Crimes so atrocious as those which have for
their object the subversion by violence of those laws and those in-
stitutions which have been ordained in order to secure the peace
and happiness of society, are not to escape punishment, because they
have not ripened into treason. The wisdom of the legislature is com-
petent to provide for the case; and the framers of our Constitution
. . . must have conceived it more safe that punishment in such cases
should be ordained by general laws, formed upon deliberation, un-
der the influence of no resentments, and without knowing on whom
they were to operate, than that it should be inflicted under the in-
fluence of those passions which the occasion seldom fails to excite,
and which a flexible definition of the crime, or a construction which
would render it flexible, might bring into operation.” 1443
1437 343 U.S. at 732. For citations in the subject of dual nationality, see id. at
723 n.2. Three dissenters asserted that Kawakita’s conduct in Japan clearly showed
he was consistently demonstrating his allegiance to Japan. “As a matter of law, he
expatriated himself as well as that can be done.” Id. at 746.
1438 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 75 (1807).
1439 United States v. Burr, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 469 (1807).
1440 Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945).
1441 Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631 (1947).
1442 Cf. United States v. Rosenberg, 195 F.2d 583 (2d. Cir. 1952), cert denied,
344 U.S. 889 (1952), holding that in a prosecution under the Espionage Act for giv-
ing aid to a country, not an enemy, an offense distinct from treason, neither the
two-witness rule nor the requirement as to the overt act is applicable.
1443 Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cr.) 126, 127 (1807). Justice Frankfurter ap-
pended to his opinion in Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1, 25 n.38 (1945), a list
taken from the government’s brief of all the cases prior to Cramer in which construc-
tion of the Treason Clause was involved. The same list, updated, appears in J. Hurst,
supra at 260–67. Professor Hurst was responsible for the historical research under-
lying the government’s brief in Cramer.
Sec. 3—Treason Cl. 2—Punishment
Clause 2. The Congress shall have Power to declare the Pun-

ishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Cor-
ruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Per-
son attainted.
CORRUPTION OF THE BLOOD AND FORFEITURE

The Confiscation Act of 1862 “to suppress Insurrection, to pun-
ish Treason and Rebellion, to seize and confiscate the Property of
Rebels” 1444 raised issues under Article III, § 3, cl. 2. Because of the
constitutional doubts of the President, the act was accompanied by
an explanatory joint resolution which stipulated that only a life es-
tate terminating with the death of the offender could be sold and
that at his death his children could take the fee simple by descent
as his heirs without deriving any title from the United States. In
applying this act, passed pursuant to the war power and not the
power to punish treason,1445 the Court in one case 1446 quoted with
approval the English distinction between a disability absolute and
perpetual and one personal or temporary. Corruption of blood as a
result of attainder of treason was cited as an example of the for-
mer and was defined as the disability of any of the posterity of the
attained person “to claim any inheritance in fee simple, either as
heir to him, or to any ancestor above him.” 1447
1444 12 Stat. 589. This act incidentally did not designate rebellion as treason.
1445 Miller v. United States, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 268, 305 (1871).
1446 Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 213 (1876).
1447 Lord de la Warre’s Case, 11 Coke Rept. 1a, 77 Eng. Rept. 1145 (1597). A
number of cases dealt with the effect of a full pardon by the President of owners of
property confiscated under this act. They held that a full pardon relieved the owner
of forfeiture as far as the government was concerned but did not divide the interest
acquired by third persons from the government during the lifetime of the offender.
Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Bosworth, 133 U.S. 92, 101 (1890); Knote v. United States, 95
U.S. 149 (1877); Wallach v. Van Riswick, 92 U.S. 202, 203 (1876); Armstrong’s Foundry,
73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 766, 769 (1868). There is no direct ruling on the question of whether
only citizens can commit treason. In Carlisle v. United States, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
147, 154–155 (1873), the Court declared that aliens while domiciled in this country
owe a temporary allegiance to it and may be punished for treason equally with a
native-born citizen in the absence of a treaty stipulation to the contrary. This case
involved the attempt of certain British subjects to recover claims for property seized
under the Captured and Abandoned Property Act, 12 Stat. 820 (1863), which pro-
vided for the recovery of property or its value in suits in the Court of Claims by
persons who had not rendered aid and comfort to the enemy. Earlier, in United States
v. Wiltberger, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 76, 97 (1820), which involved a conviction for man-
slaughter under an act punishing manslaughter and treason on the high seas, Chief
Justice Marshall going beyond the necessities of the case stated that treason “is a
breach of allegiance, and can be committed by him only who owes allegiance either
perpetual or temporary.” However, see In re Shinohara, Court Martial Orders, No.
19, September 8, 1949, p. 4, Office of the Judge Advocate General of the Navy, re-
ported in 17 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 283 (1949). In this case, an enemy alien resident in
Sec. 3—Treason Cl. 2—Punishment
United States territory (Guam) was found guilty of treason for acts done while the
enemy nation of which he was a citizen occupied such territory. Under English prec-
edents, an alien residing in British territory is open to conviction for high treason
on the theory that his allegiance to the Crown is not suspended by foreign occupa-
tion of the territory. DeJager v. Attorney General of Natal (1907), A.C., 96 L.T.R.
857. See also 18 U.S.C. § 2381.
ARTICLE IV
STATES’ RELATIONS
CONTENTS
Page
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit .............................................................................................. 899
Sources and Effect of Full Faith and Credit .................................................................... 899
Private International Law .......................................................................................... 899
Judgments: Effect to Be Given In Forum State .............................................................. 900
In General .................................................................................................................... 900
Jurisdiction: A Prerequisite to Enforcement of Judgments ..................................... 904
Judgments in Personam ...................................................................................... 905
Service on Foreign Corporations ......................................................................... 906
Service on Nonresident Motor Vehicle Owners ................................................. 907
Judgments in Rem ............................................................................................... 907
Divorce Decrees: Domicile as the Jurisdictional Prerequisite ................................. 908
Divorce Suit: In Rem or in Personam; Judicial Indecision .............................. 908
Williams I and Williams II .................................................................................. 910
Cases Following Williams II ............................................................................... 912
Claims for Alimony or Property in Forum State .............................................. 914
Decrees Awarding Alimony, Custody of Children .............................................. 916
Status of the Law ................................................................................................. 918
Other Types of Decrees ............................................................................................... 919
Probate Decrees .................................................................................................... 919
Adoption Decrees .................................................................................................. 920
Garnishment Decrees .......................................................................................... 920
Penal Judgments: Types Entitled to Recognition ..................................................... 921
Fraud as a Defense to Suits on Foreign Judgments ................................................ 921
Recognition of Rights Based Upon Constitutions, Statutes, Common Law .................. 922
Development of the Modern Rule .............................................................................. 922
Transitory Actions: Death Statutes .................................................................... 924
Actions Upon Contract ........................................................................................ 924
Stockholder Corporation Relationship ................................................................ 925
Fraternal Benefit Society: Member Relationship .............................................. 926
Insurance Company, Building and Loan Association: Contractual
Relationships ..................................................................................................... 927
Workers’ Compensation Statutes ........................................................................ 929
Full Faith and Credit and Statutes of Limitation ............................................ 931
Full Faith and Credit: Miscellany .................................................................................... 931
Full Faith and Credit in Federal Courts .................................................................. 931
Evaluation Of Results Under Provision .................................................................... 932
Scope of Powers of Congress Under Provision ................................................................. 933
Judgments of Foreign States ............................................................................................. 934
Section 2. Interstate Comity ..................................................................................................... 934
Clause 1. State Citizenship: Privileges and Immunities ................................................ 934
Origin and Purpose ..................................................................................................... 934
How Implemented ....................................................................................................... 938
Citizens of Each State ................................................................................................ 938
897
898 ART. IV—STATES’ RELATIONS
Section 2. Interstate Comity—Continued

Clause 1. State Citizenship: Privileges and Immunities—Continued
Corporations ......................................................................................................... 939
All Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States ........................... 939
Discrimination in Private Rights ............................................................................... 942
Access to Courts .......................................................................................................... 943
Taxation ........................................................................................................................ 944
Clause 2. Interstate Rendition .......................................................................................... 946
Duty to Surrender Fugitives From Justice ............................................................... 946
Fugitive From Justice Defined ............................................................................ 947
Procedure for Removal ......................................................................................... 948
Trial of Fugitives After Removal ........................................................................ 948
Clause 3. Fugitives From Labor ....................................................................................... 949
Section 3. Admission of New States; Property of United States ........................................... 950
Clause 1. Admission of New States to Union .................................................................. 950
Doctrine of the Equality of States ............................................................................. 950
Judicial Proceedings Pending on Admission of New States ............................. 954
Property Rights of States to Soil Under Navigable Waters ............................. 955
Clause 2. Property of the United States .......................................................................... 956
Property and Territory: Powers of Congress ............................................................. 956
Methods of Disposing of Property ....................................................................... 956
Public Lands: Federal and State Powers Thereover ......................................... 957
Territories: Powers of Congress Thereover ........................................................ 959
Section 4. Obligations of United States to States .................................................................. 960
Guarantee of Republican Form of Government ............................................................... 960
STATES’ RELATIONS
ARTICLE IV
SECTION 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State

to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other
State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Man-
ner in which such Acts, Records, and Proceedings shall be proved,
and the Effect thereof.
SOURCES AND EFFECT OF FULL FAITH AND CREDIT
Private International Law

The historical background of the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is furnished by the branch of private law that is variously termed
“private international law,” “conflict of laws,” and “comity.” This branch
comprises a body of rules, based largely on the writings of jurists
and judicial decisions, in accordance with which the courts of one
country, or “jurisdiction,” will ordinarily, in the absence of a local
policy to the contrary, extend recognition and enforcement to rights
claimed by individuals by virtue of the laws or judicial decisions of
another country or “jurisdiction.” Most frequently applied examples
of these rules include the following: the rule that a marriage that
is good in the country where performed (lex loci) is good elsewhere;
the rule that contracts are to be interpreted in accordance with the
laws of the country where entered into (lex loci contractus) unless
the parties clearly intended otherwise; the rule that immovables may
be disposed of only in accordance with the law of the country where
situated (lex rei sitae); 1 the converse rule that chattels adhere to
the person of their owner and hence are disposable by him, even
when located elsewhere, in accordance with the law of his domicile
(lex domicilii); the rule that, regardless of where the cause arose,
the courts of any country where personal service of the defendant
can be effected will take jurisdiction of certain types of personal ac-
tions—hence termed “transitory”—and accord such remedy as the
lex fori affords. Still other rules, of first importance in the present
connection, determine the recognition that the judgments of the courts
of one country shall receive from those of another country.
1 Clark v. Graham, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 577 (1821), is an early case in which the
Supreme Court enforced this rule.
899
Sec. 1—Full Faith and Credit
So, even had the states of the Union remained in a mutual re-
lationship of entire independence, private claims originating in one
often would have been assured recognition and enforcement in the
others. The Framers felt, however, that the rules of private interna-
tional law should not be left among the states altogether on a basis
of comity and hence subject always to the overruling local policy of
the lex fori, but ought to be in some measure at least placed on the
higher plane of constitutional obligation. In fulfillment of this in-
tent, the Full Faith and Credit Clause was inserted, and Congress
was empowered to enact supplementary and enforcing legislation.2
JUDGMENTS: EFFECT TO BE GIVEN IN FORUM STATE
In General
Article IV, § 1, has had its principal operation in relation to judg-
ments. Embraced within the relevant discussions are two principal
classes of judgments. First, those in which the judgment involved
was offered as a basis of proceedings for its own enforcement out-
side the state where rendered, as for example, when an action for
debt is brought in the courts of State B on a judgment for money
damages rendered in State A; second, those in which the judgment
involved was offered, in conformance with the principle of res judicata,
in defense in a new or collateral proceeding growing out of the same
facts as the original suit, as for example, when a decree of divorce
granted in State A is offered as barring a suit for divorce by the
other party to the marriage in the courts of State B.
The English courts and the different state courts in the United
States, while recognizing “foreign judgments in personam,” which
were reducible to money terms as affording a basis for actions in
debt, originally accorded them generally only the status of prima
facie evidence in support thereof, so that the merits of the original
controversy could always be opened. When offered in defense, on
the other hand, “foreign judgments in personam” were regarded as
conclusive upon everybody on the theory that, as stated by Chief
Justice Marshall, “it is a proceeding in rem, to which all the world
are parties.” 3 The pioneer case was Mills v. Duryee,4 decided in 1813.
In an action brought in the circuit court of the District of Colum-
bia, the equivalent of a state court for this purpose, on a judgment
from a New York court, the defendant endeavored to reopen the whole
2 Congressional legislation under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, insofar as it
is pertinent to adjudication under the clause, is today embraced in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738–

1739. See also 28 U.S.C. §§ 1740–1742.
3 Mankin v. Chandler, 16 F. Cas. 625, 626 (No. 9030) (C.C.D. Va. 1823).
4 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 481 (1813). See also Everett v. Everett, 215 U.S. 203 (1909);
Insurance Company v. Harris, 97 U.S. 331 (1878).

ART. IV—STATES’ RELATIONS 901
question of the merits of the original case by a plea of “nil debet.”

It was answered in the words of the first implementing statute of
1790 5 that such records and proceedings were entitled in each state
to the same faith and credit as in the state of origin, and that, as
they were records of a court in the state of origin, and so conclu-
sive of the merits of the case there, they were equally so in the
forum state. The Court found that it had not been the intention of
the Constitution merely to reenact the common law—that is, the
principles of private international law—with regard to the recep-
tion of foreign judgments, but to amplify and fortify these.6 Some
years later, in Hampton v. McConnell,7 Chief Justice Marshall went
even further, using language that seems to show that he regarded
the judgment of a state court as constitutionally entitled to be ac-
corded in the courts of sister states not simply the faith and credit
on conclusive evidence but the validity of final judgment.
When, however, the next important case arose, the Court had
come under new influences. This case was McElmoyle v. Cohen,8 in
which the issue was whether a statute of limitations of the State of
Georgia, which applied only to judgments obtained in courts other
than those of Georgia, could constitutionally bar an action in Geor-
gia on a judgment rendered by a court of record of South Carolina.
Declining to follow Marshall’s lead in Hampton v. McConnell, the
Court held that the Constitution was not intended “materially to
interfere with the essential attributes of the lex fori,” that the act
of Congress only established a rule of evidence—of conclusive evi-
dence to be sure, but still of evidence only; and that it was neces-
5 Chap. XI, 1 Stat. 122 (“records and judicial proceedings authenticated as afore-
said, shall have such faith and credit given to them in every court within the United
States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from whence the said
records are or shall be taken”).
6 On the same basis, a judgment cannot be impeached either in or out of the
state by showing that it was based on a mistake of law. American Express Co. v.
Mullins, 212 U.S. 311, 312 (1909). Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908); Hartford
Life Ins. Co. v. Ibs, 237 U.S. 662 (1915); Hartford Life Ins. Co. v. Barber, 245 U.S.
146 (1917).
7 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818).
8 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 312 (1839). See also Townsend v. Jemison, 50 U.S. (9 How.)
407, 413–20 (1850); Bank of Alabama v. Dalton, 50 U.S. (9 How.) 522, 528 (1850);
Bacon v. Howard, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 22, 25 (1858); Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5
Wall.) 290, 301 (1866); Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 292 (1888); Great
Western Tel. Co. v. Purdy, 162 U.S. 329 (1896); Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345
U.S. 514, 516–18 (1953). Subsequently, the Court reconsidered and adhered to the
rule of these cases, although the Justices divided with respect to rationales. Sun Oil
Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 717 (1988). Acknowledging that in some areas it had treated
statutes of limitations as substantive rules, such as in diversity cases to insure uni-
formity with state law in federal courts, the Court ruled that such rules are proce-
dural for full-faith-and-credit purposes, since “[t]he purpose . . . of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause . . . is . . . to delimit spheres of state legislative competence.” Id.
at 727.
sary, in order to carry into effect in a state the judgment of a court

of a sister state, to institute a fresh action in the court of the for-
mer, in strict compliance with its laws; and that, consequently, when
remedies were sought in support of the rights accruing in another
jurisdiction, they were governed by the lex fori. In accord with this
holding, the Court further held that foreign judgments enjoy, not
the right of priority or privilege or lien that they have in the state
where they are pronounced but only what the lex fori gives them
by its own laws, in their character of foreign judgments.9 A judg-
ment of a state court, in a cause within its jurisdiction, and against
a defendant lawfully summoned, or against lawfully attached prop-
erty of an absent defendant, is entitled to as much force and effect
against the person summoned or the property attached, when the
question is presented for decision in a court in another state, as it
has in the state in which it was rendered.10
A judgment enforceable in the state where rendered must be
given effect in another state, notwithstanding that the modes of pro-
cedure to enforce its collection may not be the same in both states.11
If the initial court acquired jurisdiction, its judgment is entitled to
full faith and credit elsewhere even though the former, by reason
of the departure of the defendant with all his property, after hav-
ing been served, has lost its capacity to enforce it by execution in
the state of origin.12 “A cause of action on a judgment is different
from that upon which the judgment was entered. In a suit upon a
money judgment for a civil cause of action, the validity of the claim
upon which it was founded is not open to inquiry, whatever its gen-
esis. Regardless of the nature of the right which gave rise to it, the
judgment is an obligation to pay money in the nature of a debt upon
a specialty. Recovery upon it can be resisted only on the grounds
that the court which rendered it was without jurisdiction, . . . or
that it has ceased to be obligatory because of payment or other dis-
charge . . . or that it is a cause of action for which the State of the
forum has not provided a court.” 13
On the other hand, the clause is not violated when a judgment
is disregarded because it is not conclusive of the issues before a
court of the forum. Conversely, no greater effect can be given than
9 Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, 112 (1890). See also Stacy v. Thrasher, 47
U.S. (6 How.) 44, 61 (1848); Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
10 Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887); Hanley
v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1, 3 (1885). See also Green v. Van Buskirk, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.)
139, 140 (1869); Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Roche v.
McDonald, 275 U.S. 449 (1928); Ohio v. Chattanooga Boiler Co., 289 U.S. 439 (1933).
11 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1 (1910).
12 Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913). See also Fall v. Eastin, 215
U.S. 1 (1909).
13 Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 275–276 (1935).
is given in the state where rendered. Thus, an interlocutory judg-

ment may not be given the effect of a final judgment.14 Likewise,
when a federal court does not attempt to foreclose the state court
from hearing all matters of personal defense that landowners might
plead, a state court may refuse to accept the former’s judgment as
determinative of the landowners’ liabilities.15 Similarly, though a con-
fession of judgment upon a note, with a warrant of attorney an-
nexed, in favor of the holder, is in conformity with a state law and
usage as declared by the highest court of the state in which the
judgment is rendered, the judgement may be collaterally im-
peached upon the ground that the party in whose behalf it was ren-
dered was not in fact the holder.16 But a consent decree, which un-
der the law of the state has the same force and effect as a decree
in invitum, must be given the same effect in the courts of another
state.17
Subsequent to its departure from Hampton v. McConnell,18 the
Court does not appear to have formulated, as a substitute, any clear-
cut principles for disposing of the contention that a state need not
provide a forum for a particular type of judgment of a sister state.
Thus, in one case, it held that a New York statute forbidding for-
eign corporations doing a domestic business to sue on causes origi-
nating outside the state was constitutionally applicable to prevent
such a corporation from suing on a judgment obtained in a sister
state.19 But, in a later case, it ruled that a Mississippi statute for-
bidding contracts in cotton futures could not validly close the courts
of the state to an action on a judgment obtained in a sister state
on such a contract, although the contract in question had been en-
tered into in the forum state and between its citizens.20 Following
the later rather than the earlier precedent, subsequent cases 21 have
held: (1) that a state may adopt such system of courts and form of
remedy as it sees fit but cannot, under the guise of merely affect-
14 Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521 (1873); Rob-
ertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 610 (1883).

15 Kersh Lake Dist. v. Johnson, 309 U.S. 485 (1940). See also Texas & Pac. Ry.
v. Southern Pacific Co., 137 U.S. 48 (1890).

16 National Exchange Bank v. Wiley, 195 U.S. 257, 265 (1904). See also Grover
& Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890).

17 Harding v. Harding, 198 U.S. 317 (1905).
18 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818).
19 Anglo-American Provision Co. v. Davis Provision Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).
20 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908). Justice Holmes, who spoke for the
Court in both cases, asserted in his opinion in the latter that the New York statute
was “directed to jurisdiction,” the Mississippi statute to “merits,” but four Justices
could not grasp the distinction.
21 Kenney v. Supreme Lodge, 252 U.S. 411 (1920), and cases there cited. Holmes
again spoke for the Court. See also Cook, The Powers of Congress under the Full
Faith and Credit Clause, 28 YALE L.J. 421, 434 (1919).
ing the remedy, deny enforcement of claims otherwise within the

protection of the full faith and credit clause when its courts have
general jurisdiction of the subject matter and the parties; 22 (2) that,
accordingly, a forum state that has a shorter period of limitations
than the state in which a judgment was granted and later revived
erred in concluding that, whatever the effect of the revivor under
the law of the state of origin, it could refuse enforcement of the
revived judgment; 23 (3) that the courts of one state have no juris-
diction to enjoin the enforcement of judgments at law obtained in
another state, when the same reasons assigned for granting the re-
straining order were passed upon on a motion for new trial in the
action at law and the motion denied; 24 (4) that the constitutional
mandate requires credit to be given to a money judgment rendered
in a civil cause of action in another state, even though the forum
state would have been under no duty to entertain the suit on which
the judgment was founded, because a state cannot, by the adoption
of a particular rule of liability or of procedure, exclude from its courts
a suit on a judgment; 25 and (5) that, similarly, tort claimants in
State A who obtain a judgment against a foreign insurance com-
pany, notwithstanding that, prior to judgment, domiciliary State B
appointed a liquidator for the company, vested company assets in
him, and ordered suits against the company stayed, are entitled to
have such judgment recognized in State B for purposes of determin-
ing the amount of the claim, although not for determination of what
priority, if any, their claim should have.26
Jurisdiction: A Prerequisite to Enforcement of Judgments

The jurisdictional question arises both in connection with judg-
ments in personam against nonresident defendants to whom it is
alleged personal service was not obtained in the state originating
the judgment and in relation to judgments in rem against property
or a status alleged not to have been within the jurisdiction of the
22 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935), approved in Hughes v. Fetter, 341
U.S. 609 (1951).

23 Union Nat’l Bank v. Lamb, 337 U.S. 38 (1949); see also Roche v. McDonald,
275 U.S. 449 (1928).

24 Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 13 (1883).
25 Titus v. Wallick, 306 U.S. 282, 291–292 (1939).
26 Morris v. Jones, 329 U.S. 545 (1947). Moreover, there is no apparent reason
why Congress, acting on the implications of Marshall’s words in Hampton v. McCon-

nell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 234 (1818), should not clothe extrastate judgments of any
particular type with the full status of domestic judgments of the same type in the
several states. Thus, why should not a judgment for alimony be made directly en-
forceable in sister states instead of merely furnishing the basis of an action in debt?
court which handed down the original decree.27 Records and pro-
ceedings of courts wanting jurisdiction are not entitled to credit.28
Judgments in Personam.—When the subject matter of a suit
is merely the defendant’s liability, it is necessary that it should ap-
pear from the record that the defendant has been brought within
the jurisdiction of the court by personal service of process, or by
his voluntary appearance, or that he had in some manner autho-
rized the proceeding.29 Thus, when a state court endeavored to ac-
quire jurisdiction of a nonresident defendant by an attachment of
his property within the state and constructive notice to him, its judg-
ment was defective for want of jurisdiction and hence could not af-
ford the basis of an action against the defendant in the court of
another state, although it bound him so far as the property at-
tached by virtue of the inherent right of a state to assist its own
citizens in obtaining satisfaction of their just claims.30
The fact that a nonresident defendant was only temporarily in
the state when he was served in the original action does not vitiate
the judgment thus obtained and later relied upon as the basis of
an action in his home state.31 Also a judgment rendered in the state
of his domicile against a defendant who, pursuant to the statute
thereof providing for the service of process on absent defendants,
was personally served in another state is entitled to full faith and
credit.32 When the matter of fact or law on which jurisdiction de-
27 Cooper v. Reynolds, 77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 308 (1870); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). Full faith and credit extends to the issue of the
original court’s jurisdiction, when the second court’s inquiry discloses that the ques-
tion of jurisdiction had been fully and fairly litigated and finally decided in the court
which rendered the original judgment. Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Under-
writers Assur. Co. v. North Carolina Life Ins. Ass’n, 455 U.S. 691 (1982).
28 Board of Public Works v. Columbia College, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 521, 528 (1873).
See also Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291 (1888); Huntington v. At-
trill, 146 U.S. 657, 685 (1892); Brown v. Fletcher’s Estate, 210 U.S. 82 (1908); Bigelow
v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912); Spokane Inland R.R. v. Whitley,
237 U.S. 487 (1915). However, a denial of credit, founded upon a mere suggestion of
want of jurisdiction and unsupported by evidence, violates the clause. Rogers v. Ala-
bama, 192 U.S. 226, 231 (1904); Wells Fargo & Co. v. Ford, 238 U.S. 503 (1915).
29 Grover & Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287 (1890). See also Galpin
v. Page, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 350 (1874); Old Wayne Life Ass’n v. McDonough, 204 U.S.
8 (1907); Brown v. Fletcher’s Estate, 210 U.S. 82 (1908).
30 Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878). See, for a reformulation of this case’s
due process foundation,Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977).

31 Renaud v. Abbot, 116 U.S. 277 (1886); Jaster v. Currie, 198 U.S. 144 (1905);
Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254 (1891).

32 Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940). In the pioneer case of D’Arcy v.
Ketchum, 52 U.S. (1 How.) 165 (1851), the question presented was whether a judg-
ment rendered by a New York court, under a statute which provided that, when
joint debtors were sued and one of them was brought into court on a process, a judg-
ment in favor of the plaintiff would entitle him to execute against all, must be ac-
corded full faith and credit in Louisiana when offered as a basis of an action in debt
pends was not litigated in the original suit, it is a matter to be

adjudicated in the suit founded upon the judgment.33
Because the principle of res judicata applies only to proceed-
ings between the same parties and privies, the plea by defendant
in an action based on a judgment that he was not party or privy to
the original action raises the question of jurisdiction; although a
judgment against a corporation in one state may validly bind a stock-
holder in another state to the extent of the par value of his hold-
ings,34 an administrator acting under a grant of administration in
one state stands in no sort of relation of privity to an administra-
tor of the same estate in another state.35 But where a judgment of
dismissal was entered in a federal court in an action against one of
two joint tortfeasors, in a state in which such a judgment would
constitute an estoppel in another action in the same state against
the other tortfeasor, such judgment is not entitled to full faith and
credit in an action brought against the tortfeasor in another state.36
Service on Foreign Corporations.—In 1856, the Court de-
cided Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French,37 a pioneer case in its general
class. It held that, where a corporation chartered by the State of
Indiana was allowed by a law of Ohio to transact business in the
latter state upon the condition that service of process upon the agent
of the corporation should be considered as service upon the corpora-
tion itself, a judgment obtained against the corporation by means
of such process ought to receive in Indiana the same faith and credit
as it was entitled to in Ohio.38 Later cases establish under both
the Fourteenth Amendment and Article IV, § 1, that the cause of
action must have arisen within the state obtaining service in this
way,39 that service on an officer of a corporation, not its resident
agent and not present in the state in an official capacity, will not
against a resident of that state who had not been served by process in the New
York action. The Court ruled that the original implementing statute, 1 Stat. 122
(1790), did not reach this type of case, and hence the New York judgment was not
enforceable in Louisiana against defendant. Had the Louisiana defendant thereafter
ventured to New York, however, he could, as the Constitution then stood, have been
subjected to the judgment to the same extent as the New York defendant who had
been personally served. Subsequently, the disparity between operation of personal
judgment in the home state has been eliminated, because of the adoption of the Four-
teenth Amendment. In divorce cases, however, it still persists in some measure. See
infra.
33 Adam v. Saenger, 303 U.S. 59, 62 (1938).
34 Hancock Nat’l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900).
35 Stacy v. Thrasher, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 44, 58 (1848).
36 Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Co., 225 U.S. 111 (1912).
37 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1856).
38 To the same effect is Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spratley, 172 U.S. 602
(1899).
39 Simon v. Southern Ry., 236 U.S. 115 (1915).
confer jurisdiction over the corporation,40 that the question whether

the corporation was actually “doing business” in the state may be
raised.41 On the other hand, the fact that the business was inter-
state is no objection.42
Service on Nonresident Motor Vehicle Owners.—By anal-
ogy to the above cases, it has been held that a state may require
nonresident owners of motor vehicles to designate an official within
the state as an agent upon whom process may be served in any
legal proceedings growing out of their operation of a motor vehicle
within the state.43 Although these cases arose under the Four-
teenth Amendment alone, unquestionably a judgment validly ob-
tained upon this species of service could be enforced upon the owner
of a car through the courts of his home state.
Judgments in Rem.—In sustaining the challenge to jurisdic-
tion in cases involving judgments in personam, the Court in the main
was making only a somewhat more extended application of recog-
nized principles. In order to sustain the same kind of challenge in
cases involving judgments in rem it has had to make law outright.
The leading case is Thompson v. Whitman.44 Thompson, sheriff of
Monmouth County, New Jersey, acting under a New Jersey stat-
ute, had seized a sloop belonging to Whitman and by a proceeding
in rem had obtained its condemnation and forfeiture in a local court.
Later, Whitman, a citizen of New York, brought an action for tres-
pass against Thompson in the United States Circuit Court for the
Southern District of New York, and Thompson answered by produc-
ing a record of the proceedings before the New Jersey tribunal. Whit-
man thereupon set up the contention that the New Jersey court
had acted without jurisdiction, inasmuch as the sloop which was
the subject matter of the proceedings had been seized outside the
county to which, by the statute under which it had acted, its juris-
diction was confined.
As previously explained, the plea of lack of privity cannot be
set up in defense in a sister state against a judgment in rem. In a
proceeding in rem, however, the presence of the res within the court’s
jurisdiction is a prerequisite, and this, it was urged, had not been
the case in Thompson v. Whitman. Could, then, the Court consider
this challenge with respect to a judgment which was offered, not as
40 Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U.S. 518 (1895); Riverside Mills v. Menefee, 237
U.S. 189 (1915).

41 International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914); Riverside Mills v.
Menefee, 237 U.S. 189 (1915).

42 International Harvester v. Kentucky, 234 U.S. 579 (1914).
43 Kane v. New Jersey, 242 U.S. 160 (1916); Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927),
limited in Wuchter v. Pizzutti, 276 U.S. 13 (1928).

44 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457 (1874).
the basis for an action for enforcement through the courts of a sis-
ter state but merely as a defense in a collateral action? As the law
stood in 1873, it apparently could not.45 All difficulties, neverthe-
less, to its consideration of the challenge to jurisdiction in the case
were brushed aside by the Court. Whenever, it said, the record of a
judgment rendered in a state court is offered “in evidence” by ei-
ther of the parties to an action in another state, it may be contra-
dicted as to the facts necessary to sustain the former court’s juris-
diction; “and if it be shown that such facts did not exist, the record
will be a nullity, notwithstanding the claim that they did exist.” 46
Divorce Decrees: Domicile as the Jurisdictional

Prerequisite
This, however, was only the beginning of the Court’s lawmak-
ing in cases in rem. The most important class of such cases is that
in which the respondent to a suit for divorce offers in defense an
earlier decree from the courts of a sister state. By the almost uni-
versally accepted view prior to 1906, a proceeding in divorce was
one against the marriage status, i.e., in rem, and hence might be
validly brought by either party in any state where he or she was
bona fide domiciled; 47 and, conversely, when the plaintiff did not
have a bona fide domicile in the state, a court could not render a
decree binding in other states even if the nonresident defendant en-
tered a personal appearance.48
Divorce Suit: In Rem or in Personam; Judicial Indeci-
sion.—In 1906, however, by a vote of five to four, the Court de-
parted from its earlier ruling, rendered five years previously in
Atherton v. Atherton,49 and in Haddock v. Haddock,50 it announced
that a divorce proceeding might be viewed as one in personam. In
the former case it was held, in the latter case denied, that a di-
vorce granted a husband without personal service upon the wife,
who at the time was residing in another state, was entitled to rec-
45 1 H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 246 (1891).
46 See also Simmons v. Saul, 138 U.S. 439, 448 (1891). In other words, the chal-
lenge to jurisdiction is treated as equivalent to the plea nul tiel record, a plea that
was recognized even in Mills v. Duryee as available against an attempted invoca-
tion of the full faith and credit clause. What is not pointed out by the Court is that
it was also assumed in the earlier case that such a plea could always be rebutted by
producing a transcript, properly authenticated in accordance with the act of Con-
gress, of the judgment in the original case. See also Brown v. Fletcher’s Estate, 210
U.S. 82 (1908); German Savings Soc’y v. Dormitzer, 192 U.S. 125, 128 (1904); Gro-
ver & Baker Machine Co. v. Radcliffe, 137 U.S. 287, 294 (1890).
47 Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108 (1870).
48 Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903). See also German Savings Soc’y v.
Dormitzer, 192 U.S. 125 (1904).

49 181 U.S. 155, 162 (1901).
50 201 U.S. 562 (1906).
ognition under the full faith and credit clause and the acts of Con-
gress; the difference between the cases consisted solely in the fact
that in the Atherton case the husband had driven the wife from
their joint home by his conduct, while in the Haddock case he had
deserted her. The court that granted the divorce in Atherton v. Atherton
was held to have had jurisdiction of the marriage status, with the
result that the proceeding was one in rem and hence required only
service by publication upon the respondent. Haddock’s suit, on the
contrary, was held to be as to the wife in personam and so to re-
quire personal service upon her or her voluntary appearance, nei-
ther of which had been had; although, notwithstanding this, the de-
cree in the latter case was held to be valid in the state where obtained
because of the state’s inherent power to determine the status of its
own citizens. The upshot was a situation in which a man and a
woman, when both were in Connecticut, were divorced; when both
were in New York, were married; and when the one was in Connecti-
cut and the other in New York, the former was divorced and the
latter married. In Atherton v. Atherton the Court had earlier ac-
knowledged that “a husband without a wife, or a wife without a
husband, is unknown to the law.”
The practical difficulties and distresses likely to result from such
anomalies were pointed out by critics of the decision at the time.
In point of fact, they have been largely avoided, because most of
the state courts have continued to give judicial recognition and full
faith and credit to one another’s divorce proceedings on the basis
of the older idea that a divorce proceeding is one in rem, and that
if the applicant is bona fide domiciled in the state the court has
jurisdiction in this respect. Moreover, until the second of the Wil-
liams v. North Carolina cases 51 was decided in 1945, there had not
been manifested the slightest disposition to challenge judicially the
power of the states to determine what shall constitute domicile for
divorce purposes. A few years before, the Court in Davis v. Davis 52
rejected contentions adverse to the validity of a Virginia decree of
which enforcement was sought in the District of Columbia. In this
case, a husband, after having obtained in the District a decree of
separation subject to payment of alimony, established years later a
residence in Virginia and sued there for a divorce. Personally served
in the District, where she continued to reside, the wife filed a plea
denying that her husband was a resident of Virginia and averred
that he was guilty of a fraud on the court in seeking to establish a
residence for purposes of jurisdiction. In ruling that the Virginia
decree, granting to the husband an absolute divorce minus any ali-
51 317 U.S. 287 (1942) 325 U.S. 226 (1945).
52 305 U.S. 32 (1938).
mony payment, was enforceable in the District, the Court stated

that in view of the wife’s failure, while in Virginia litigating her
husband’s status to sue, to answer the husband’s charges of willful
desertion, it would be unreasonable to hold that the husband’s do-
micile in Virginia was not sufficient to entitle him to a divorce ef-
fective in the District. The finding of the Virginia court on domicile
and jurisdiction was declared to bind the wife. Davis v. Davis is
distinguishable from the Williams v. North Carolina decisions in that
in the former determination of the jurisdictional prerequisite of do-
micile was made in a contested proceeding whereas in the Wil-
liams cases it was not.
Williams I and Williams II.—In Williams I and Williams II,
the husband of one marriage and the wife of another left North Caro-
lina, obtained six-week divorce decrees in Nevada, married there,
and resumed their residence in North Carolina where both previ-
ously had been married and domiciled. Prosecuted for bigamy, the
defendants relied upon their Nevada decrees and won the prelimi-
nary round of this litigation, that is, in Williams I,53 when a major-
ity of the Justices, overruling Haddock v. Haddock, declaring that
in this case, the Court must assume that the petitioners for di-
vorce had a bona fide domicile in Nevada and not that their Ne-
vada domicile was a sham. “[E]ach State, by virtue of its command
over the domiciliaries and its large interest in the institution of mar-
riage, can alter within its own borders the marriage status of the
spouse domiciled there, even though the other spouse is absent. There
is no constitutional barrier if the form and nature of substituted
service meet the requirements of due process.” Accordingly, a de-
cree granted by Nevada to one, who, it is assumed, is at the time
bona fide domiciled therein, is binding upon the courts of other states,
including North Carolina in which the marriage was performed and
where the other party to the marriage is still domiciled when the
divorce was decreed. In view of its assumptions, which it justified
on the basis of an inadequate record, the Court did not here pass
upon the question whether North Carolina had the power to refuse
full faith and credit to a Nevada decree because it was based on
residence rather than domicile or because, contrary to the findings
of the Nevada court, North Carolina found that no bona fide domi-
cile had been acquired in Nevada.54
Presaging what ruling the Court would make when it did get
around to passing upon the latter question, Justice Jackson, dissent-
ing in Williams I, protested that “this decision repeals the divorce
laws of all the states and substitutes the law of Nevada as to all
53 317 U.S. 287, 298–99 (1942).
54 317 U.S. at 302.
marriages one of the parties to which can afford a short trip there. . . .
While a state can no doubt set up its own standards of domicile as
to its internal concerns, I do not think it can require us to accept
and in the name of the Constitution impose them on other states. . . .
The effect of the Court’s decision today—that we must give extra-
territorial effect to any judgment that a state honors for its own
purposes—is to deprive this Court of control over the operation of
the full faith and credit and the due process clauses of the Federal
Constitution in cases of contested jurisdiction and to vest it in the
first state to pass on the facts necessary to jurisdiction.” 55
Notwithstanding that one of the deserted spouses had died since
the initial trial and that another had remarried, North Carolina,
without calling into question the status of the latter marriage, be-
gan a new prosecution for bigamy; when the defendants appealed
the conviction resulting therefrom, the Supreme Court, in Williams
II,56 sustained the adjudication of guilt as not denying full faith and
credit to the Nevada divorce decree. Reiterating the doctrine that
jurisdiction to grant divorce is founded on domicile,57 the Court held
that a decree of divorce rendered in one state may be collaterally
impeached in another by proof that the court that rendered the de-
cree lacked jurisdiction (the parties not having been domiciled therein),
even though the record of proceedings in that court purports to show
jurisdiction.58
55 317 U.S. at 312, 321, 315.

56 325 U.S. 226, 229 (1945).
57 Bell v. Bell, 181 U.S. 175 (1901); Andrews v. Andrews, 188 U.S. 14 (1903).
58 Strong dissents were filed, which have influenced subsequent holdings. Among
these was that of Justice Rutledge, which attacked both the consequences of the
decision as well as the concept of jurisdictional domicile on which it was founded:
“Unless ‘matrimonial domicil,’ banished in Williams I [by the overruling of Had-
dock v. Haddock], has returned renamed [‘domicil of origin’] in Williams II, every
decree becomes vulnerable in every state. Every divorce, wherever granted . . . may
now be reexamined by every other state, upon the same or different evidence, to
redetermine the ‘jurisdiction fact,’ always the ultimate conclusion of ‘domicil.’ . . . ”
325 U.S. at 248.
“The Constitution does not mention domicil. Nowhere does it posit the powers
of the states or the nation upon that amorphous, highly variable common law con-
ception. . . . No legal conception, save possibly ‘jurisdiction’ . . . affords such possi-
bilities for uncertain application. . . . Apart from the necessity for travel, [to effect
a change of domicile, the latter] criterion comes down to a purely subjective mental
state, related to remaining for a length of time never yet defined with clarity. . . .
When what must be proved is a variable, the proof and the conclusion which follows
upon it inevitably take on that character. . . . [The majority has] not held that de-
nial of credit will be allowed, only if the evidence [as to the place of domicile] is
different or depending in any way upon the character or the weight of the differ-
ence. The test is not different evidence. It is evidence, whether the same or different
and, if different, without regard to the quality of the difference, from which an op-
posing set of inferences can be drawn by the trier of fact ‘not unreasonably.’ . . . But
[the Court] does not define ‘not unreasonably.’ It vaguely suggests a supervisory func-
Cases Following Williams II.—Fears registered by the dis-

senters in the second Williams case that it might undermine the
stability of all divorces and that the court of each forum state, by
its own independent determination of domicile, might refuse recog-
nition of foreign decrees, were temporarily set at rest by Sherrer v.
Sherrer,59 which required Massachusetts, a state of domiciliary ori-
gin, to accord full faith and credit to a 90-day Florida decree that
the husband had contested. The husband, upon receiving notice by
mail, retained Florida counsel who entered a general appearance
and denied all allegations in the complaint, including the wife’s resi-
dence. At the hearing, the husband, though present in person and
by counsel, did not offer evidence in rebuttal of the wife’s proof of
her Florida residence, and, when the Florida court ruled that she
was a bona fide resident, the husband did not appeal. Because the
findings of the requisite jurisdictional facts, unlike those in the sec-
ond Williams case, were made in proceedings in which the defen-
dant appeared and participated, the requirements of full faith and
credit were held to bar him from collaterally attacking such find-
ings in a suit instituted by him in his home state of Massachu-
setts, particularly in the absence of proof that the divorce decree
was subject to such collateral attack in a Florida court. Having failed
to take advantage of the opportunities afforded him by his appear-
ance in the Florida proceeding, the husband was thereafter pre-
cluded from relitigating in another state the issue of his wife’s do-
micile already passed upon by the Florida court.
In Coe v. Coe,60 embracing a similar set of facts, the Court ap-
plied like reasoning to reach a similar result. Massachusetts again
tion, to be exercised when the denial [of credit] strikes its sensibilities as wrong, by
some not stated standard. . . . There will be no ‘weighing’ [of evidence]. There will
be only examination for sufficiency, with the limits marked by ‘scintillas’ and the
like.” 325 U.S. at 255, 258, 259, 251.
No less disposed to prophesy undesirable results from this decision was Justice
Black whose dissenting opinion Justice Douglas joined:
“[T]oday, as to divorce decrees, [the Full Faith and Credit Clause] . . . has be-
come a nationally disruptive force. . . . [T]he Court has in effect [held] . . . that ‘the
full faith and credit clause does not apply to actions for divorce, and that the states
alone have the right to determine what effect shall be given to the decrees of other
states in this class of cases.’ . . . If the Court is today abandoning that principle
. . . that a marriage validly consummated under one state’s laws is valid in every
other state [, then a] . . . consequence is to subject people to criminal prosecutions
for adultery and bigamy merely because they exercise their constitutional right to
pass from a state in which they were validly married on to another state which
refuses to recognize their marriage. Such a consequence runs counter to the basic
guarantees of our federal union.” 325 U.S. at 264, 265.
59 334 U.S. 343 (1948).
60 334 U.S. 378 (1948). In a dissenting opinion filed in Sherrer v. Sherrer, but
applicable also to Coe v. Coe, Justice Frankfurter, with Justice Murphy concurring,
asserted his inability to accept the proposition advanced by the majority that “re-
was compelled to recognize the validity of a six-week Nevada de-

cree obtained by a husband who had left Massachusetts after a court
of that state had refused him a divorce and had granted his wife
separate support. In the Nevada proceeding, the wife appeared per-
sonally and by counsel filed a cross-complaint for divorce, admitted
the husband’s residence, and participated personally in the proceed-
ings. After finding that it had jurisdiction of the plaintiff, defen-
dant, and the subject matter involved, the Nevada court granted
the wife a divorce, which was valid, final, and not subject to collat-
eral attack under Nevada law. The husband married again, and on
his return to Massachusetts, his ex-wife petitioned the Massachu-
setts court to adjudge him in contempt for failing to make pay-
ments for her separate support under the earlier Massachusetts de-
cree. Inasmuch as there was no intimation that under Massachusetts
law a decree of separate support would survive a divorce, recogni-
tion of the Nevada decree as valid accordingly necessitated a rejec-
tion of the ex-wife’s contention.
Appearing to review Williams II, and significant for the social
consequences produced by the result it decreed, is Rice v. Rice.61 To
determine the widowhood status of the party litigants in relation
to inheritance of property of a husband who had deserted his first
wife in Connecticut, had obtained an ex parte divorce in Nevada,
and after remarriage, had died without ever returning to Connecti-
cut, the first wife, joining the second wife and the administrator of
his estate as defendants, petitioned a Connecticut court for a de-
claratory judgment. After having placed upon the first wife the bur-
den of proving that the decedent had not acquired a bona fide do-
micile in Nevada, and after giving proper weight to the claims of
power by the Nevada court, the Connecticut court concluded that
the evidence sustained the contentions of the first wife, and in so
gardless of how overwhelming the evidence may have been that the asserted domi-
cile in the State offering bargain-counter divorces was a sham, the home State of
the parties is not permitted to question the matter if the form of a controversy has
been gone through.” 334 U.S. at 377.
61 336 U.S. 674 (1949). Of four justices dissenting, Black, Douglas, Rutledge, and
Jackson, Justice Jackson alone filed a written opinion. To him the decision was “an
example of the manner in which, in the law of domestic relations, ‘confusion now
hath made his masterpiece,’ . . . I think that the judgment of the Connecticut court,
but for the first Williams case and its progeny, might properly have held that the
Rice divorce decree was void for every purpose because it was rendered by a state
court which never obtained jurisdiction of the nonresident defendant and which had
no power to reach into another state and summon her before it. But if we adhere to
the holdings that the Nevada court had power over her for the purpose of blasting
her marriage and opening the way to a successor, I do not see the justice of invent-
ing a compensating confusion in the device of divisible divorce by which the parties
are half-bound and half-free and which permits Rice to have a wife who cannot be-
come his widow and to leave a widow who was no longer his wife.” Id. at 676, 679–
680.
doing, it was upheld by the Supreme Court. Sherrer v. Sherrer and

Coe v. Coe, previously discussed, were declared not to be in point,
because no personal service had been made upon the first wife, nor
had she in any way participated in the Nevada proceedings. She
was not, therefore, precluded from challenging the findings of the
Nevada court that the decedent was, at the time of the divorce, do-
miciled in that state.62
Claims for Alimony or Property in Forum State.—In Esenwein
v. Commonwealth,63 decided on the same day as the second Wil-
liams case, the Supreme Court also sustained a Pennsylvania court
in its refusal to recognize an ex parte Nevada decree on the ground
that the husband who obtained it never acquired a bona fide domi-
cile in the latter state. In this instance, the husband and wife had
separated in Pennsylvania, where the wife was granted a support
order; after two unsuccessful attempts to win a divorce in that state,
the husband departed for Nevada. Upon the receipt of a Nevada
decree, the husband thereafter established a residence in Ohio and
filed an action in Pennsylvania for total relief from the support or-
der. In a concurring opinion, in which he was joined by Justice Black,
Justice Douglas stressed the “basic difference between the problem
of marital capacity and the problem of support,” and stated that it
was “not apparent that the spouse who obtained the decree can de-
feat an action for maintenance or support in another State by show-
ing that he was domiciled in the State which awarded him the di-
vorce decree,” unless the other spouse appeared or was personally
served. “The State where the deserted wife is domiciled has a deep
concern in the welfare of the family deserted by the head of the
household. If he is required to support his former wife, he is not
made a bigamist and the offspring of his second marriage are not
bastardized.” Or, as Justice Rutledge succinctly stated in a concur-
ring opinion, “the jurisdictional foundation for a decree in one state
62 Vermont violated the clause in sustaining a collateral attack on a Florida di-
vorce decree, the presumption of Florida’s jurisdiction over the cause and the par-
ties not having been overcome by extrinsic evidence or the record of the case. Cook
v. Cook, 342 U.S. 126 (1951). Sherrer and Coe were relied upon. There seems, there-
fore, to be no doubt of their continued vitality.
A Florida divorce decree was also at the bottom of another case in which the
daughter of a divorced man by his first wife and his legatee under his will sought to
attack his divorce in the New York courts and thereby indirectly his third marriage.
The Court held that, because the attack would not have been permitted in Florida
under the doctrine of res judicata, it was not permissible under the Full Faith and
Credit Clause in New York. On the whole, it appears that the principle of res judicata
is slowly winning out against the principle of domicile. Johnson v. Muelberger, 340
U.S. 581 (1951).
63 325 U.S. 279 (1945).
capable of foreclosing an action for maintenance or support in an-

other may be different from that required to alter the marital sta-
tus with extraterritorial effect.” 64
Three years later, but on this occasion speaking for a majority
of the Court, Justice Douglas reiterated these views in Estin v. Estin.65
In this case, a New York court had granted a wife a decree of sepa-
ration and awarded her alimony. Subsequently, in Nevada, her hus-
band obtained an ex parte divorce decree, which made no provision
for alimony. He ceased paying the New York-awarded alimony, and
the wife sued him in New York. The husband argued that the Ne-
vada decree had wiped out the alimony claim, but Justice Douglas
found that “Nevada had no power to adjudicate [the wife’s] rights
in the New York judgment, [and] New York need not give full faith
and credit to that phase of Nevada’s judgment. . . . . The result in
this situation is to make the divorce divisible—to give effect to the
Nevada decree insofar as it affects marital status and to make it
ineffective on the issue of alimony.” 66 Accordingly, the Nevada de-
cree could not prevent New York from applying its own rule of law
which, unlike that of Pennsylvania,67 does permit a support order
to survive a divorce decree.68
Such a result was justified as “accommodat[ing] the interests
of both Nevada and New York in this broken marriage by restrict-
ing each State to the matters of her dominant concern,” 69 the con-
cern of New York being that of protecting the abandoned wife against
impoverishment. In Simons v. Miami National Bank,70 the Court
held that a dower right in the deceased husband’s estate is extin-
guished even though a divorce decree was obtained in a proceeding
in which the nonresident wife was served by publication only and
64 325 U.S. at 281–83.

65 334 U.S. 541 (1948). See also the companion case of Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334
U.S. 555 (1948).
66 334 U.S. at 549.
67 Esenwein v. Commonwealth, 325 U.S. 279, 280 (1945).
68 Because the record, in his opinion, did not make it clear whether New York
“law” held that no “ex parte” divorce decree could terminate a prior New York sepa-
rate maintenance decree, or merely that no “ex parte” decree of divorce of another
State could, Justice Frankfurter dissented and recommended that the case be re-
manded for clarification. Justice Jackson dissented on the ground that under New
York law, a New York divorce would terminate the wife’s right to alimony, and if the
Nevada decree is good, it was entitled to no less effect in New York than a local
decree. However, for reasons stated in his dissent in the first Williams case, 317
U.S. 287, he would have preferred not to give standing to constructive service di-
vorces obtained on short residence. 334 U.S. 541, 549–54 (1948). These two Justices
filed similar dissents in the companion case of Kreiger v. Kreiger, 334 U.S. 555, 557
(1948).
69 334 U.S. at 549.
70 381 U.S. 81 (1965).
did not make a personal appearance.71 The Court found the prin-
ciple of Estin v. Estin 72 inapplicable. In Simons, the Court rejected
the contention that the forum court, in giving recognition to the for-
eign court’s separation decree providing for maintenance and sup-
port, has to allow for dower rights in the deceased husband’s estate
in the forum state.73 Full faith and credit is not denied to a sister
state’s separation decree, including an award of monthly alimony,
where nothing in the foreign state’s separation decree could be con-
strued as creating or preserving any interest in the nature of or in
lieu of dower in any property of the decedent, wherever located and
where the law of the forum state did not treat such a decree as
having such effect nor indicate such an effect irrespective of the ex-
istence of the foreign state’s decree.74
Decrees Awarding Alimony, Custody of Children.—A by-
product of divorce litigation are decrees for the payment of ali-
mony, judgments for accrued and unpaid installments of alimony,
and judicial awards of the custody of children, all of which necessi-
tate application of the Full Faith and Credit Clause when extrastate
enforcement is sought for them. Thus, a judgment in State A for
alimony in arrears and payable under a prior judgment of separa-
tion that is not by its terms conditional nor subject by the law of
State A to modification or recall, and on which execution was di-
rected to issue, is entitled to recognition in the forum state. Al-
though an obligation for accrued alimony could have been modified
or set aside in State A prior to its merger in the judgment, such a
judgment, by the law of State A, is not lacking in finality.75 As to
the finality of alimony decrees in general, the Court had previously
ruled that where such a decree is rendered, payable in future in-
stallments, the right to such installments becomes absolute and vested
on becoming due, provided no modification of the decree has been
made prior to the maturity of the installments.76 However, a judi-
cial order requiring the payment of arrearages in alimony, which
exceeded the alimony previously decreed, is invalid for want of due
process, the respondent having been given no opportunity to con-
test it.77 “A judgment obtained in violation of procedural due pro-
71 381 U.S. at 84–85.

72 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
73 381 U.S. at 84–85.
74 381 U.S. at 85.
75 Barber v. Barber, 323 U.S. 77, 84 (1944).
76 Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. 1, 11 (1910). See also Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S.
(21 How.) 582 (1859); Lynde v. Lynde, 181 U.S. 183, 186–187 (1901); Audubon v.
Shufeldt, 181 U.S. 575, 577 (1901); Bates v. Bodie, 245 U.S. 520 (1918); Yarborough
v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202 (1933); Loughran v. Loughran, 292 U.S. 216 (1934).
77 Griffin v. Griffin, 327 U.S. 220 (1946).
cess,” said Chief Justice Stone, “is not entitled to full faith and credit
when sued upon in another jurisdiction.” 78
An example of a custody case was one involving a Florida di-
vorce decree that was granted ex parte to a wife who had left her
husband in New York, where he was served by publication. The de-
cree carried with it an award of the exclusive custody of the child,
whom the day before the husband had secretly seized and brought
back to New York. The Court ruled that the decree was adequately
honored by a New York court when, in habeas corpus proceedings,
it gave the father rights of visitation and custody of the child dur-
ing stated periods and exacted a surety bond of the wife condi-
tioned on her delivery of the child to the father at the proper times,79
it having not been “shown that the New York court in modifying
the Florida decree exceeded the limits permitted under Florida laws.
There is therefore a failure of proof that the Florida decree re-
ceived less credit in New York than it had in Florida.”
Answering a question left open in the preceding holding as to
the binding effect of the ex parte award, the Court more recently
acknowledged that, in a proceeding challenging a mother’s right to
retain custody of her children, a state is not required to give effect
to the decree of another state’s court, which had never acquired per-
sonal jurisdiction over the mother of her children, and which awarded
custody to the father as the result of an ex parte divorce action in-
stituted by him.80 In Kovacs v. Brewer,81 however, the Court indi-
cated that a finding of changed circumstances rendering obser-
vance of an absentee foreign custody decree inimical to the best
interests of the child is essential to sustain the validity of the fo-
rum court’s refusal to enforce a foreign decree, rendered with juris-
diction over all the parties but the child, and revising an initial de-
78 327 U.S. at 228. An alimony case of a quite extraordinary pattern was that of
Sutton v. Leib, 342 U.S. 402 (1952). Because of the diverse citizenship of the par-
ties, who had once been husband and wife, the case was brought by the latter in a
federal court in Illinois. Her suit was to recover unpaid alimony that was to con-
tinue until her remarriage. To be sure, she had, as she confessed, remarried in Ne-
vada, but the marriage had been annulled in New York on the ground that the man
was already married, because his divorce from his previous wife was null and void,
she having neither entered a personal appearance nor been personally served. The
Court, speaking by Justice Reed, held that the New York annulment of the Nevada
marriage must be given full faith and credit in Illinois but left Illinois to decide for
itself the effect of the annulment upon the obligations of petitioner’s first husband.
79 Halvey v. Halvey, 330 U.S. 610, 615 (1947).
80 May v. Anderson, 345 U.S. 528 (1953). Justices Jackson, Reed, and Minton
dissented.
81 356 U.S. 604 (1958). Rejecting the implication that recognition must be ac-
corded unless the circumstances have changed, Justice Frankfurter dissented on the
ground that in determining what is best for the welfare of the child, the forum court
cannot be bound by an absentee, foreign custody decree, “irrespective of whether
changes in circumstances are objectively provable.”
cree by transferring custody from the paternal grandfather to the

mother. However, when, as is true in Virginia, agreements by par-
ents as to shared custody of a child do not bind the state’s courts,
the dismissal by a Virginia court of a habeas corpus petition insti-
tuted by a father to obtain custody was not res judicata in that state;
therefore, even if the Full Faith and Credit Clause were applicable
to child custody decrees, it would not require a South Carolina court,
in a custody suit instituted by the wife, to recognize a court order
not binding in Virginia.82
Status of the Law.—The doctrine of divisible divorce, as devel-
oped by Justice Douglas in Estin v. Estin,83 may have become the
prevailing standard for determining the enforceability of foreign di-
vorce decrees. If this is the case, then it may be that an ex parte
divorce, founded upon acquisition of domicile by one spouse in the
state that granted it, is effective to destroy the marital status of
both parties in the state of domiciliary origin and probably in all
other states. The effect is to preclude subsequent prosecutions for
bigamy but not to alter rights as to property, alimony, or custody of
children in the state of domiciliary origin of a spouse who neither
was served nor appeared personally.
In any event, the accuracy of these conclusions has not been
impaired by any decision of the Court since 1948. Thus, in Armstrong
v. Armstrong,84 an ex parte divorce decree obtained by the husband
in Florida was deemed to have been adequately recognized by an
Ohio court when, with both parties before it, it disposed of the wife’s
suit for divorce and alimony with a decree limited solely to an award
of alimony.85 Similarly, a New York court was held not bound by an
ex parte Nevada divorce decree, rendered without personal jurisdic-
tion over the wife, to the extent that it relieved the husband of all
marital obligations, and in an ex parte action for separation and
alimony instituted by the wife, it was competent to sequester the
husband’s property in New York to satisfy his obligations to the wife.86
82 Ford v. Ford, 371 U.S. 187, 192–94 (1962). As part of a law dealing with pa-
rental kidnaping, Congress, in Pub. L. 96–611, 8(a), 94 Stat. 3569, 28 U.S.C. § 1738A,
required states to give full faith and credit to state court custody decrees provided
the original court had jurisdiction and is the home state of the child.
83 334 U.S. 541 (1948).
84 350 U.S. 568 (1956).
85 Four Justices, Black, Douglas, Clark, and Chief Justice Warren, disputed the
Court’s contention that the Florida decree contained no ruling on the wife’s entitle-
ment to alimony and mentioned that for want of personal jurisdiction over the wife,
the Florida court was not competent to dispose of that issue. 350 U.S. at 575.
86 Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416 (1957). Two Justices dissented. Justice
Frankfurter was unable to perceive “why dissolution of the marital relation is not
so personal as to require personal jurisdiction over the absent spouse, while the de-
Other Types of Decrees

Probate Decrees.—Many judgments, enforcement of which has
given rise to litigation, embrace decrees of courts of probate respect-
ing the distribution of estates. In order that a court have jurisdic-
tion of such a proceeding, the decedent must have been domiciled
in the state, and the question whether he was so domiciled at the
time of his death may be raised in the court of a sister state.87 Thus,
when a court of State A, in probating a will and issuing letters, in
a proceeding to which all distributees were parties, expressly found
that the testator’s domicile at the time of death was in State A,
such adjudication of domicile was held not to bind one subse-
quently appointed as domiciliary administrator c.t.a. in State B, in
which he was liable to be called upon to deal with claims of local
creditors and that of the State itself for taxes, he having not been
a party to the proceeding in State A. In this situation, it was held,
a court of State C, when disposing of local assets claimed by both
personal representatives, was free to determine domicile in accor-
dance with the law of State C.88
Similarly, there is no such relation of privity between an execu-
tor appointed in one state and an administrator c.t.a. appointed in
another state as will make a decree against the latter binding upon
the former.89 On the other hand, judicial proceedings in one state,
under which inheritance taxes have been paid and the administra-
tion upon the estate has been closed, are denied full faith and credit
by the action of a probate court in another state in assuming juris-
diction and assessing inheritance taxes against the beneficiaries of
the estate, when under the law of the former state the order of the
probate court barring all creditors who had failed to bring in their
demand from any further claim against the executors was binding
upon all.90 What is more important, however, is that the res in such
a proceeding, that is, the estate, in order to entitle the judgment to
recognition under Article IV, 1, must have been located in the state
nial of alimony . . . is.” Justice Harlan maintained that, because the wife did not
become a domiciliary of New York until after the Nevada decree, she had no pre-
divorce rights in New York that the latter was obligated to protect.
87 Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907); Burbank v. Ernst, 232 U.S. 162 (1914).
88 Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343 (1942).
89 Brown v. Fletcher’s Estate, 210 U.S. 82, 90 (1908). See also Stacy v. Thrasher,
47 U.S. (6 How.) 44, 58 (1848); McLean v. Meek, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 16, 18 (1856).
90 Tilt v. Kelsey, 207 U.S. 43 (1907). In the case of Borer v. Chapman, 119 U.S.
587, 599 (1887), involving a complicated set of facts, it was held that a judgment in
a probate proceeding, which was merely ancillary to proceedings in another State
and which ordered the residue of the estate to be assigned to the legatee and dis-
charged the executor from further liability, did not prevent a creditor, who was not
a resident of the State in which the ancillary judgment was rendered, from setting
up his claim in the state probate court which had the primary administration of the
estate.
or legally attached to the person of the decedent. Such a judgment

is accordingly valid, generally speaking, to distribute the intan-
gible property of the decedent, though the evidences thereof were
actually located elsewhere.91 This is not so, on the other hand, as
to tangibles and realty. In order that the judgment of a probate court
distributing these be entitled to recognition under the Constitu-
tion, they must have been located in the state; as to tangibles and
realty outside the state, the decree of the probate court is entirely
at the mercy of the lex rei sitae.92 So, the probate of a will in one
state, while conclusive in that state, does not displace legal provi-
sions necessary to its validity as a will of real property in other
states.93
Adoption Decrees.—That a statute legitimizing children born
out of wedlock does not entitle them by the aid of the Full Faith
and Credit Clause to share in the property located in another state
is not surprising, in view of the general principle (to which there
are exceptions) that statutes do not have extraterritorial opera-
tion.94 For the same reason, adoption proceedings in one state are
not denied full faith and credit by the law of the sister state that
excludes children adopted by proceedings in other states from the
right to inherit land in the sister state.95
Garnishment Decrees.—Garnishment proceedings combine some
of the elements of both an in rem and an in personam action. Sup-
pose that A owes B and B owes C, and that the two former live in
a different state from C. A, while on a brief visit to C’s state, is
presented with a writ attaching his debt to B and also a summons
to appear in court on a named day. The result of the proceedings
thus instituted is that a judgment is entered in C’s favor against A
to the amount of his indebtedness to B. Subsequently A is sued by
B in their home state and offers the judgment, which he has in the
meantime paid, in defense. It was argued on behalf of B that A’s
debt to him had a situs in their home state and furthermore that C
could not have sued B in this same state without formally acquir-
ing a domicile there. Both propositions were, however, rejected by
91 Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1 (1928).

92 Kerr v. Moon, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 565 (1824); McCormick v. Sullivant, 23 U.S.
(10 Wheat.) 192 (1825); Clarke v. Clarke, 178 U.S. 186 (1900). The controlling prin-
ciple of these cases is not confined to proceedings in probate. A court of equity “not
having jurisdiction of the res cannot affect it by its decree nor by a deed made by a
master in accordance with the decree.” Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1, 11 (1909).
93 Robertson v. Pickrell, 109 U.S. 608, 611 (1883). See also Darby v. Mayer, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 465 (1825); Gasquet v. Fenner, 247 U.S. 16 (1918).
94 Olmstead v. Olmstead, 216 U.S. 386 (1910).
95 Hood v. McGehee, 237 U.S. 611 (1915).
the Court, which held that the judgment in the garnishment pro-
ceedings was entitled to full faith and credit as against B’s ac-
tion.96
Penal Judgments: Types Entitled to Recognition

The Full Faith and Credit Clause has been interpreted in the
light of the “incontrovertible maxim” that “the courts of no country
execute the penal laws of another.” 97 In the leading case of Hun-
tington v. Attrill,98 however, the Court so narrowly defined “penal”
in this connection as to make it substantially synonymous with “crimi-
nal” and on this basis held a judgment which had been recovered
under a state statute making the officers of a corporation who signed
and recorded a false certificate of the amount of its capital stock
liable for all of its debts to be entitled under Article IV, § 1, to rec-
ognition and enforcement in the courts of sister states. Nor, in gen-
eral, is a judgment for taxes to be denied full faith and credit in
state and federal courts merely because it is for taxes. In Nelson v.
George,99 in which a prisoner was tried in California and North Caro-
lina and convicted and sentenced in both states for various felo-
nies, the Court determined that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
did not require California to enforce a penal judgment handed down
by North Carolina; California was free to consider what effect if any
it would give to the North Carolina detainer.100 Until the obliga-
tion to extradite matured, the Full Faith and Credit Clause did not
require California to enforce the North Carolina penal judgment in
any way.
Fraud as a Defense to Suits on Foreign Judgments

With regard to whether recognition of a state judgment can be
refused by the forum state on other than jurisdictional grounds, there
are dicta to the effect that judgments for which extraterritorial op-
eration is demanded under Article IV, § 1 and acts of Congress are
“impeachable for manifest fraud.” But unless the fraud affected the
jurisdiction of the court, the vast weight of authority is against the
96 Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905). See also Chicago, R.I. & P. Ry. v. Sturm,
174 U.S. 710 (1899); King v. Cross, 175 U.S. 396, 399 (1899); Louisville & Nashville
Railroad v. Deer, 200 U.S. 176 (1906); Baltimore & Ohio R.R. v. Hostetter, 240 U.S.
620 (1916). Harris itself has not survived the due process reformulation of Shaffer
v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See Rush v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320 (1980).
97 The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66, 123 (1825). See also Wisconsin v. Peli-
can Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888).

98 146 U.S. 657 (1892). See also Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 (1881);
Moore v. Mitchell, 281 U.S. 18 (1930); Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268
(1935).
99 399 U.S. 224 (1970).
100 399 U.S. at 229.
proposition. Also, it is universally agreed that a judgment may not

be impeached for alleged error or irregularity,101 or as contrary to
the public policy of the state where recognition is sought for it un-
der the Full Faith and Credit Clause.102 Previously listed cases in-
dicate, however, that the Court in fact has permitted local policy to
determine the merits of a judgment under the pretext of regulating
jurisdiction.103 Thus, in Cole v. Cunningham,104 the Court sus-
tained a Massachusetts court in enjoining, in connection with insol-
vency proceedings instituted in that state, a Massachusetts credi-
tor from continuing in New York courts an action that had been
commenced there before the insolvency suit was brought. This was
done on the theory that a party within the jurisdiction of a court
may be restrained from doing something in another jurisdiction op-
posed to principles of equity, it having been shown that the credi-
tor was aware of the debtor’s embarrassed condition when the New
York action was instituted. The injunction unquestionably denied
full faith and credit and commanded the assent of only five Jus-
tices.
RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS BASED UPON

CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, COMMON LAW
Development of the Modern Rule

Although the language of section one suggests that the same
respect should be accorded to “public acts” that is accorded to “judi-
cial proceedings” (“full faith and credit shall be given in each State
to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other
State”), and the Court has occasionally relied on this parity of treat-
ment,105 the Court has usually differentiated “the credit owed to
laws (legislative measures and common law) and to judgments.” 106
101 Christmas v. Russell, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 290 (1866); Maxwell v. Stewart, 88
U.S. (21 Wall.) 71 (1875); Hanley v. Donoghue, 116 U.S. 1 (1885); Wisconsin v. Peli-
can Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265 (1888); Simmons v. Saul, 138 U.S. 439 (1891); American
Express Co. v. Mullins, 212 U.S. 311 (1909).
102 Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230 (1908).
103 Anglo-American Prov. Co. v. Davis Prov. Co., 191 U.S. 373 (1903).
104 133 U.S. 107 (1890).
105 See Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 119 U.S. 615, 622 (1887) (stat-
utes); and Smithsonian Institution v. St. John, 214 U.S. 19 (1909) (state constitu-
tional provision).
106 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 232 (1998), quoted in Fran-
chise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 494 (2003). Justice Nelson, in the Dred
Scott case, drew an analogy to international law, concluding that states, as well as
nations, judge for themselves the rules governing property and persons within their
territories. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 460 (1857). “One State cannot
exempt property from taxation in another,” the Court concluded in Bonaparte v. Tax
Court, 104 U.S. 592 (1882), holding that no provision of the Constitution, including
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, enabled a law exempting from taxation certain
The current understanding is that the Full Faith and Credit Clause
is “exacting” with respect to final judgments of courts, but “is less
demanding with respect to choice of laws.” 107
The Court has explained that, where a statute or policy of the
forum state is set up as a defense to a suit brought under the stat-
ute of another state or territory, or where a foreign statute is set
up as a defense to a suit or proceedings under a local statute, the
conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the Full
Faith and Credit Clause and thus compelling courts of each state
to subordinate their own statutes to those of others, but by weigh-
ing the governmental interests of each jurisdiction.108 That is, the
Full Faith and Credit Clause, in its design to transform the states
from independent sovereigns into a single unified nation, directs that
a state, when acting as the forum for litigation having multistate
aspects or implications, respect the legitimate interests of other states
and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty. But because the fo-
rum state is also a sovereign in its own right, in appropriate cases
it may attach paramount importance to its own legitimate inter-
ests.109 In order for a state’s substantive law to be selected in a
constitutionally permissible manner, that state must have a signifi-
cant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state in-
terests, such that choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor funda-
mentally unfair.110 Once that threshold is met, the Court will not
weigh the competing interests. “[T]he question of which sovereign
interest should be deemed more weighty is not one that can be eas-
ily answered,” the Court explained, “declin[ing] to embark on the
debts of the enacting state to prevent another state (the state in which the creditor
resided) from taxing the debts. See also Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.)
519, 589–96 (1839); Kryger v. Wilson, 242 U.S. 171 (1916); and Bond v. Hume, 243
U.S. 15 (1917).
107 Baker v. General Motors Corp., 522 U.S. at 232.
108 Alaska Packers Ass’n. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935);
Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932). When, in a state court, the valid-
ity of an act of the legislature of another state is not in question, and the contro-
versy turns merely upon its interpretation or construction, no question arises under
the Full Faith and Credit Clause. See also Western Life Indemnity Co. v. Rupp, 235
U.S. 261 (1914), citing Glenn v. Garth, 147 U.S. 360 (1893); Lloyd v. Matthews, 155
U.S. 222, 227 (1894); Banholzer v. New York Life Ins. Co., 178 U.S. 402 (1900); Al-
len v. Alleghany Co., 196 U.S. 458, 465 (1905); Texas & N.O.R.R. v. Miller, 221 U.S.
408 (1911). See also National Mut. B. & L. Ass’n v. Brahan, 193 U.S. 635 (1904);
Johnson v. New York Life Ins. Co., 187 U.S. 491, 495 (1903); Pennsylvania Fire Ins.
Co. v. Gold Issue Mining Co., 243 U.S. 93 (1917).
109 E.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981); Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410 (1979); Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S. 408 (1955); Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v.
Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939); Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Indus-
trial Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
110 Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 818 (1985), quoting Allstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312–13 (1981) (plurality opinion).
constitutional course of balancing coordinate States’ competing in-

terests to resolve conflicts of laws under the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.” 111
Transitory Actions: Death Statutes.—The initial effort in this
direction was made in connection with transitory actions based on
statute. Earlier, such actions had rested upon the common law, which
was fairly uniform throughout the states, so that there was usu-
ally little discrepancy between the law under which the plaintiff from
another jurisdiction brought his action (lex loci) and the law under
which the defendant responded (lex fori). In the late 1870s, how-
ever, the states, abandoning the common law rule on the subject,
began passing laws that authorized the representatives of a dece-
dent whose death had resulted from injury to bring an action for
damages.112 The question at once presented itself whether, if such
an action was brought in a state other than that in which the in-
jury occurred, it was governed by the statute under which it arose
or by the law of the forum state, which might be less favorable to
the defendant. Nor was it long before the same question presented
itself with respect to transitory action ex contractu, where the con-
tract involved had been made under laws peculiar to the state where
made, and with those laws in view.
Actions Upon Contract.—In Chicago & Alton R.R. v. Wiggins
Ferry Co.,113 the Court indicated that it was the law under which
the contract was made, not the law of the forum state, that should
govern. Its utterance on the point was, however, not merely dic-
tum, but was based on an error, namely, the false supposition that
the Constitution gives “acts” the same extraterritorial operation as
the Act of 1790 does “judicial records and proceedings.” Notwith-
standing which, this dictum is today the basis of “the settled rule”
111 Franchise Tax Bd. of Cal. v. Hyatt, 538 U.S. 488, 498, 499 (2003).
112 Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 (1881), was the first so-called “Death
Act” case to reach the Supreme Court. See also Stewart v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 168
U.S. 445 (1897). Even today the obligation of a state to furnish a forum for the de-
termination of death claims arising in another state under the laws thereof appears
to rest on a rather precarious basis. In Hughes v. Fetter, 341 U.S. 609 (1951), the
Court, by a narrow majority, held invalid under the full faith and credit clause a
statute of Wisconsin which, as locally interpreted, forbade its courts to entertain
suits of this nature; in First Nat’l Bank v. United Air Lines, 342 U.S. 396 (1952), a
like result was reached under an Illinois statute. More recently, the Court has ac-
knowledged that the Full Faith and Credit Clause does not compel the forum state,
in an action for wrongful death occurring in another jurisdiction, to apply a longer
period of limitations set out in the wrongful death statute of the state in which the
fatal injury was sustained. Wells v. Simonds Abrasive Co., 345 U.S. 514 (1953). Jus-
tices Jackson, Black, and Minton, in dissenting, advanced the contrary principle that
the clause requires that the law where the tort action arose should follow said ac-
tion in whatever forum it is pursued.
113 119 U.S. 615 (1887).
that the defendant in a transitory action is entitled to all the ben-

efits resulting from whatever material restrictions the statute un-
der which plaintiff ’s rights of action originated sets thereto, except
that courts of sister states cannot be thus prevented from taking
jurisdiction in such cases.114
However, the modern doctrine permits a forum state with suffi-
cient contacts with the parties or the matter in dispute to follow
its own law. In Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague,115 the decedent was a
Wisconsin resident who had died in an automobile accident within
Wisconsin near the Minnesota border in the course of his daily em-
ployment commute to Wisconsin. He had three automobile insur-
ance policies on three automobiles, each limited to $15,000. Follow-
ing his death, his widow and personal representative moved to
Minnesota, and she sued in that state. She sought to apply Minne-
sota law, under which she could “stack” or aggregate all three poli-
cies, permissible under Minnesota law but not allowed under Wis-
consin law, where the insurance contracts had been made. The Court,
in a divided opinion, permitted resort to Minnesota law, because of
the number of contacts the state had with the matter. On the other
hand, an earlier decision is in considerable conflict with Hague. There,
a life insurance policy was executed in New York, on a New York
insured, with a New York beneficiary. The insured died in New York,
and his beneficiary moved to Georgia and sued to recover on the
policy. The insurance company defended on the ground that the in-
sured, in the application for the policy, had made materially false
statements that rendered it void under New York law. The defense
was good under New York law, impermissible under Georgia law,
and Georgia’s decision to apply its own law was overturned, the Court
stressing the surprise to the parties of the resort to the law of an-
other state and the absence of any occurrence in Georgia to which
its law could apply.116
Stockholder Corporation Relationship.—The protections of
the Full Faith and Credit Clause extend beyond transitory actions.
Some legal relationships are so complex, the Court holds, that the
law under which they were formed ought always to govern them as
long as they persist.117 One such relationship is that of a stock-
holder and his corporation. Hence, if a question arises as to the li-
ability of the stockholders of a corporation, the courts of the forum
state are required by the Full Faith and Credit Clause to deter-
114 Northern Pacific R.R. v. Babcock, 154 U.S. 190 (1894); Atchison, T. & S.F.
Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55, 67 (1909).

115 449 U.S. 302 (1981). See also Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179 (1964).
116 John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Yates, 299 U.S. 178 (1936).
117 Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544 (1925).
mine the question in accordance with the constitution, laws and ju-
dicial decisions of the corporation’s home states.118 Illustrative ap-
plications of the latter rule are to be found in the following cases.
A New Jersey statute forbidding an action at law to enforce a stock-
holder’s liability arising under the laws of another state and provid-
ing that such liability may be enforced only in equity, and that in
such a case the corporation, its legal representatives, all its credi-
tors, and stockholders, should be necessary parties, was held not to
preclude an action at law in New Jersey by the New York superin-
tendent of banks against 557 New Jersey stockholders in an insol-
vent New York bank to recover assessments made under the laws
of New York.119 Also, in a suit to enforce double liability, brought in
Rhode Island against a stockholder in a Kansas trust company, the
courts of Rhode Island were held to be obligated to extend recogni-
tion to the statutes and court decisions of Kansas whereunder it is
established that a Kansas judgment recovered by a creditor against
the trust company is not only conclusive as to the liability of the
corporation but also an adjudication binding each stockholder therein.
The only defenses available to the stockholder are those which he
could make in a suit in Kansas.120
Fraternal Benefit Society: Member Relationship.—The same
principle applies to the relationship that is formed when one takes
out a policy in a “fraternal benefit society.” Thus, in Royal Arcanum
v. Green,121 in which a fraternal insurance association chartered un-
der the laws of Massachusetts had been sued in the courts of New
York by a citizen of the latter state on a contract of insurance made
in that state, the Court held that the defendant company was en-
titled under the full faith and credit clause to have the case deter-
mined in accordance with the laws of Massachusetts and its own
constitution and by-laws as these had been construed by the Mas-
sachusetts courts.
Nor has the Court manifested any disposition to depart from
this rule. In Sovereign Camp v. Bolin,122 it declared that a state in
which a certificate of life membership of a foreign fraternal benefit
association is issued, which construes and enforces the certificate
according to its own law rather than according to the law of the
state in which the association is domiciled, denies full faith and credit
118 Converse v. Hamilton, 224 U.S. 243 (1912); Selig v. Hamilton, 234 U.S. 652
(1914); Marin v. Augedahl, 247 U.S. 142 (1918).

119 Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935). See also Thormann v. Frame, 176
U.S. 350, 356 (1900); Reynolds v. Stockton, 140 U.S. 254, 264 (1891).
120 Hancock Nat’l Bank v. Farnum, 176 U.S. 640 (1900).
121 237 U.S. 531 (1915), followed in Modern Woodmen v. Mixer, 267 U.S. 544
(1925).
122 305 U.S. 66, 75, 79 (1938).
to the association’s charter embodied in the status of the domicili-

ary state as interpreted by the latter’s court. “The beneficiary cer-
tificate was not a mere contract to be construed and enforced accord-
ing to the laws of the State where it was delivered. Entry into
membership of an incorporated beneficiary society is more than a
contract; it is entering into a complex and abiding relation and the
rights of membership are governed by the law of the State of incor-
poration. [Hence] another State, wherein the certificate of member-
ship was issued, cannot attach to membership rights against the
society which are refused by the law of domicile.” Consistent with
that, the Court also held, in Order of Travelers v. Wolfe,123 that South
Dakota, in a suit brought therein by an Ohio citizen against an Ohio
benefit society, must give effect to a provision of the constitution of
the society prohibiting the bringing of an action on a claim more
than six months after disallowance by the society, notwithstanding
that South Dakota’s period of limitation was six years and that its
own statutes voided contract stipulations limiting the time within
which rights may be enforced. Objecting to these results, Justice
Black dissented on the ground that fraternal insurance companies
are not entitled, either by the language of the Constitution, or by
the nature of their enterprise, to such unique constitutional protec-
tion.
Insurance Company, Building and Loan Association: Con-
tractual Relationships.—Whether or not distinguishable by na-
ture of their enterprise, stock and mutual insurance companies and
mutual building and loan associations, unlike fraternal benefit soci-
eties, have not been accorded the same unique constitutional pro-
tection; with few exceptions,124 they have had controversies arising
out of their business relationships settled by application of the law
of the forum state. In National Mutual B. & L. Ass’n v. Brahan,125
the principle applicable to these three forms of business organiza-
tions was stated as follows: where a corporation has become local-
ized in a state and has accepted the laws of the state as a condi-
tion of doing business there, it cannot abrogate those laws by
attempting to make contract stipulations, and there is no violation
of the Full Faith and Credit Clause in instructing a jury to find
according to local law notwithstanding a clause in a contract that
it should be construed according to the laws of another state.
Thus, the Court held in Brahan, when a Mississippi borrower,
having repaid a mortgage loan to a New York building and loan
123331 U.S. 586, 588–89, 637 (1947).
124New York Life Ins. Co. v. Head, 234 U.S. 149 (1914); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Dunken, 266 U.S. 389 (1924).
125 193 U.S. 635 (1904).
association, sued in a Mississippi court to recover, as usurious, cer-

tain charges collected by the association, the usury law of Missis-
sippi rather than that of New York controlled. In this case, the loan
contract, which was negotiated in Mississippi subject to approval
by the New York office, did not expressly state that it was gov-
erned by New York law. Similarly, when the New York Life Insur-
ance Company, which had expressly stated in its application and
policy forms that they would be controlled by New York law, was
sued in Missouri on a policy sold to a resident thereof, the court of
that state was sustained in its application of Missouri, rather than
New York law.126 Also, in an action in a federal court in Texas to
collect the amount of a life insurance policy which had been made
in New York and later changed by instruments assigning beneficial
interest, it was held that questions (1) whether the contract re-
mained one governed by the law of New York with respect to rights
of assignees, rather than by the law of Texas, (2) whether the pub-
lic policy of Texas permits recovery by one named beneficiary who
has no beneficial interest in the life of the insured, and (3) whether
lack of insurable interest becomes material when the insurer ac-
knowledges liability and pays the money into court, were questions
of Texas law, to be decided according to Texas decisions.127 Simi-
larly, a state, by reason of its potential obligation to care for depen-
dents of persons injured or killed within its limits, is conceded to
have a substantial interest in insurance policies, wherever issued,
which may afford compensation for such losses; accordingly, it is com-
petent, by its own direct action statute, to grant the injured party
a direct cause of action against the insurer of the tortfeasor, and to
refuse to enforce the law of the state, in which the policy is issued
or delivered, which recognizes as binding a policy stipulation which
forbids direct actions until after the determination of the liability
of the insured tortfeasor.128
Consistent with the latter holding are the following two involv-
ing mutual insurance companies. In Pink v. A.A.A. Highway Ex-
126 New York Life Ins. Co. v. Cravens, 178 U.S. 389 (1900). See also American
Fire Ins. Co v. King Lumber Co., 250 U.S. 2 (1919).

127 Griffin v. McCoach, 313 U.S. 498 (1941).
128 Watson v. Employers Liability Corp., 348 U.S. 66 (1954). In Clay v. Sun Ins.
Office, 363 U.S. 207 (1960), three dissenters, Justices Black, and Douglas, and Chief
Justice Warren, would have resolved the constitutional issue which the Court avoided,
and would have sustained application of the forum state’s statute of limitations fix-
ing a period in excess of that set forth in the policy.
press,129 the New York insurance commissioner, as a statutory liq-

uidator of an insolvent auto mutual company organized in New York,
sued resident Georgia policyholders in a Georgia court to recover
assessments alleged to be due by virtue of their membership in it.
The Supreme Court held that, although by the law of the state of
incorporation, policyholders of a mutual insurance company be-
come members thereof and as such liable to pay assessments ad-
judged to be required in liquidation proceedings in that state, the
courts of another state are not required to enforce such liability against
local resident policyholders who did not appear and were not per-
sonally served in the foreign liquidation proceedings but are free to
decide according to local law the questions whether, by entering into
the policies, residents became members of the company. Again, in
State Farm Ins. Co. v. Duel,130 the Court ruled that an insurance
company chartered in State A, which does not treat membership
fees as part of premiums, cannot plead denial of full faith and credit
when State B, as a condition of entry, requires the company to main-
tain a reserve computed by including membership fees as well as
premiums received in all states. Were the company’s contention ac-
cepted, “no State,” the Court observed, “could impose stricter finan-
cial standards for foreign corporations doing business within its bor-
ders than were imposed by the State of incorporation.” It is not
apparent, the Court added, that State A has an interest superior to
that of State B in the financial soundness and stability of insur-
ance companies doing business in State B.
Workers’ Compensation Statutes.—Finally, the relationship of
employer and employee, insofar as the obligations of the one and
the rights of the other under worker’s compensation acts are con-
cerned, has been the subject of differing and confusing treatment.
In an early case, the injury occurred in New Hampshire, resulting
in death to a workman who had entered the defendant company’s
employ in Vermont, the home state of both parties. The Court re-
quired the New Hampshire courts to respect a Vermont statute which
precluded a worker from bringing a common-law action against his
employer for job related injuries where the employment relation was
formed in Vermont, prescribing a constitutional rule giving priority
to the place of the establishment of the employment relationship
129 314 U.S. 201, 206–08 (1941). However, a decree of a Montana Supreme Court,
insofar as it permitted judgment creditors of a dissolved Iowa surety company to

levy execution against local assets to satisfy judgment, as against title to such as-
sets of the Iowa insurance commissioner as statutory liquidator and successor to
the dissolved company, was held to deny full faith and credit to the statutes of Iowa.
Clark v. Williard, 292 U.S. 112 (1934).
130 324 U.S. 154, 159–60 (1945).
over the place of injury.131 The same result was achieved in a sub-
sequent case, but the Court promulgated a new rule, applied there-
after, which emphasized a balancing of the governmental interests
of each jurisdiction, rather than the mere application of the statu-
tory rule of one or another state under full faith and credit.132 Thus,
the Court held that the clause did not preclude California from dis-
regarding a Massachusetts’s workmen’s compensation statute, mak-
ing its law exclusive of any common law action or any law of any
other jurisdiction, and applying its own act in the case of an injury
suffered by a Massachusetts employee of a Massachusetts em-
ployer while in California in the course of his employment.133 It is
therefore settled that an injured worker may seek a compensation
award either in the state in which the injury occurred or in the
state in which the employee resided, his employer was principally
located, and the employment relation was formed, even if one stat-
ute or the other purported to confer an exclusive remedy on the
workman.134
Less settled is the question whether a second state, with inter-
ests in the matter, may supplement a workers’ compensation award
provided in the first state. At first, the Court ruled that a Louisi-
ana employee of a Louisiana employer, who was injured on the job
in Texas and who received an award under the Texas act, which
did not grant further recovery to an employee who received compen-
sation under the laws of another state, could not obtain additional
compensation under the Louisiana statute.135 Shortly, however, the
Court departed from this holding, permitting Wisconsin, the state
of the injury, to supplement an award pursuant to the laws of Illi-
nois, where the worker resided and where the employment con-
tract had been entered into.136 Although the second case could have
been factually distinguished from the first,137 the Court instead chose
to depart from the principle of the first, saying that only if the laws
of the first state making an award contained “unmistakable lan-
131 Bradford Elec. Co. v. Clapper, 286 U.S. 145 (1932).
132 Alaska Packers Ass’n v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 294 U.S. 532 (1935).
The state where the employment contract was made was permitted to apply its work-
men’s compensation law despite the provision in the law of the state of injury mak-
ing its law the exclusive remedy for injuries occurring there. See id. at 547 (stating
the balancing test).
133 Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493 (1939).
134 In addition to Alaska Packers and Pacific Ins., see Carroll v. Lanza, 349 U.S.
408 (1955); Cardillo v. Liberty Mutual Co., 330 U.S. 469 (1947); Crider v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 380 U.S. 39 (1965); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 421–24 (1979).
135 Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
136 Industrial Comm’n v. McCartin, 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
137 Employer and employee had entered into a contract of settlement under the
Illinois act, the contract expressly providing that it did not affect any rights the em-
ployee had under Wisconsin law. 330 U.S. at 624.
guage” to the effect that those laws were exclusive of any remedy
under the laws of any other state would supplementary awards be
precluded.138 Although the overwhelming number of state court de-
cisions since follow McCartin, and Magnolia has been little no-
ticed, all the Justices expressed dissatisfaction with the former case
as a rule of the Full Faith and Credit Clause, although a majority
of the Court followed it and permitted a supplementary award.139
Full Faith and Credit and Statutes of Limitation.—The Full
Faith and Credit Clause is not violated by a state statute provid-
ing that all suits upon foreign judgments shall be brought within
five years after such judgment shall have been obtained, where the
statute has been construed by the state courts as barring suits on
foreign judgments, only if the plaintiff could not revive his judg-
ment in the state where it was originally obtained.140
FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: MISCELLANY
Full Faith and Credit in Federal Courts

The rule of 28 U.S.C. §§ 1738–1739 pertains not merely to rec-
ognition by state courts of the records and judicial proceedings of
courts of sister states but to recognition by “every court within the
United States,” including recognition of the records and proceed-
ings of the courts of any territory or any country subject to the ju-
risdiction of the United States. The federal courts are bound to give
to the judgments of the state courts the same faith and credit that
the courts of one state are bound to give to the judgments of the
courts of her sister states.141 Where suits to enforce the laws of one
state are entertained in courts of another on principles of comity,
federal district courts sitting in that state may entertain them and
138 330 U.S. at 627–28, 630.
139 Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980). For the disap-
proval of McCartin, see id. at 269–72 (plurality opinion of four), 289 (concurring opin-
ion of three), 291 (dissenting opinion of two). But the four Justice plurality would
have instead overruled Magnolia, id. at 277–86, and adopted the rule of interest
balancing used in deciding which state may apply its laws in the first place. The
dissenting two Justices would have overruled McCartin and followed Magnolia. Id.
at 290. The other Justices considered Magnolia the sounder rule but decided to fol-
low McCurtin because it could be limited to workmen’s compensation cases, thus
requiring no evaluation of changes throughout the reach of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause. Id. at 286.
140 Watkins v. Conway, 385 U.S. 188, 190–91 (1965).
141 Cooper v. Newell, 173 U.S. 555, 567 (1899), See also Pennington v. Gibson,
57 U.S. (16 How.) 65, 81 (1854); Cheever v. Wilson, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 108, 123 (1870);
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 291 (1888); Swift v. McPherson, 232
U.S. 51 (1914); Baldwin v. Traveling Men’s Ass’n, 283 U.S. 522 (1931); American
Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156 (1932); Sanders v. Fertilizer Works, 292 U.S.
190 (1934); Durfee v. Duke, 375 U.S. 106 (1963); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90 (1980);
Kremer v. Chemical Const. Corp., 456 U.S. 461 (1982).
should, if they do not infringe federal law or policy.142 However, the

refusal of a territorial court in Hawaii, which had jurisdiction of
the action on a policy issued by a New York insurance company, to
admit evidence that an administrator had been appointed and a suit
brought by him on a bond in the federal court in New York in which
no judgment had been entered, did not violate this clause.143
The power to prescribe the effect to be given to the judicial pro-
ceedings of the courts of the United States is conferred by other
provisions of the Constitution, such as those that declare the ex-
tent of the judicial power of the United States, which authorize all
legislation necessary and proper for executing the powers vested by
the Constitution in the Government of the United States, and which
declare the supremacy of the authority of the National Govern-
ment within the limits of the Constitution. As part of its general
authority, the power to give effect to the judgment of its courts is
coextensive with its territorial jurisdiction.144
Evaluation Of Results Under Provision

The Court, after according an extrastate operation to statutes
and judicial decisions in favor of defendants in transitory actions,
proceeded next to confer the same protection upon certain classes
of defendants in local actions in which the plaintiff ’s claim was the
outgrowth of a relationship formed extraterritorially. But can the
Court stop at this point? If it is true, as Chief Justice Marshall once
remarked, that “the Constitution was not made for the benefit of
plaintiffs alone,” so also it is true that it was not made for the ben-
efit of defendants alone. The day may come when the Court will
approach the question of the relation of the Full Faith and Credit
Clause to the extrastate operation of laws from the same angle as
it today views the broader question of the scope of state legislative
power. When and if this day arrives, state statutes and judicial de-
cisions will be given such extraterritorial operation as seems rea-
sonable to the Court to give them. In short, the rule of the domi-
nance of legal policy of the forum state will be superseded by that
of judicial review.145
142 Milwaukee County v. White Co., 296 U.S. 268 (1935).
143 Equitable Life Assurance Society v. Brown, 187 U.S. 308 (1902). See also Gib-
son v. Lyon, 115 U.S. 439 (1885).
144 Embry v. Palmer, 107 U.S. 3, 9 (1883). See also Northern Assurance Co. v.
Grand View Ass’n, 203 U.S. 106 (1906); Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Stock Yards
Co., 212 U.S. 132 (1909); Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Sowers, 213 U.S. 55 (1909); West
Side R.R. v. Pittsburgh Const. Co., 219 U.S. 92 (1911); Knights of Pythias v. Meyer,
265 U.S. 30, 33 (1924).
145 Reviewing some of the cases treated in this section, a writer in 1926 said:
“It appears, then, that the Supreme Court has quite definitely committed itself to a
program of making itself, to some extent, a tribunal for bringing about uniformity
The question arises whether the application to date, not by the

Court alone but by Congress as well, of Article IV, § 1, can be said
to have met the expectations of its Framers. In the light of some
things said at the time of the framing of the clause, this may be
doubted. The protest was raised against the clause that, in vesting
Congress with power to declare the effect state laws should have
outside the enacting state, it enabled the new government to usurp
the powers of the states, but the objection went unheeded. The main
concern of the Convention, undoubtedly, was to render the judg-
ments of the state courts in civil cases effective throughout the Union.
Yet even this object has been by no means completely realized, ow-
ing to the doctrine of the Court, that before a judgment of a state
court can be enforced in a sister state, a new suit must be brought
on it in the courts of the latter, and the further doctrine that with
respect to such a suit, the judgment sued on is only evidence; the
logical deduction from this proposition is that the sister state is un-
der no constitutional compulsion to give it a forum. These doc-
trines were first clearly stated in McElmoyle and flowed directly from
the new states’ rights premises of the Court, but they are no longer
in harmony with the prevailing spirit of constitutional construction
nor with the needs of the times. Also, the clause seems always to
have been interpreted on the basis of the assumption that the term
“judicial proceedings” refers only to final judgments and does not
include intermediate processes and writs, but the assumption would
seem to be groundless, and if it is, then Congress has the power
under the clause to provide for the service and execution through-
out the United States of the judicial processes of the several states.
SCOPE OF POWERS OF CONGRESS UNDER
PROVISION
Under the present system, suit ordinarily must be brought where
the defendant, the alleged wrongdoer, resides, which means gener-
ally where no part of the transaction giving rise to the action took
place. What could be more irrational? “Granted that no state can
of its own volition make its process run beyond its borders . . . is it
unreasonable that the United States should by federal action be made
a unit in the manner suggested?” 146
Indeed, there are few clauses of the Constitution, the merely
literal possibilities of which have been so little developed as the Full
in the field of conflicts . . . although the precise circumstances under which it will
regard itself as having jurisdiction for this purpose are far from clear.” Dodd, The
Power of the Supreme Court to Review State Decisions in the Field of Conflict of
Laws, 39 HARV. L. REV. 533, 562 (1926). It can hardly be said that the law has been
subsequently clarified on this point.
146 Cook, The Power of Congress Under the Full Faith and Credit Clause, 28
YALE L.J. 421, 430 (1919).

Faith and Credit Clause. Congress has the power under the clause
to decree the effect that the statutes of one state shall have in other
states. This being so, it does not seem extravagant to argue that
Congress may under the clause describe a certain type of divorce
and say that it shall be granted recognition throughout the Union
and that no other kind shall. Or to speak in more general terms,
Congress has under the clause power to enact standards whereby
uniformity of state legislation may be secured as to almost any mat-
ter in connection with which interstate recognition of private rights
would be useful and valuable.
JUDGMENTS OF FOREIGN STATES

Doubtless Congress, by virtue of its powers in the field of for-
eign relations, might also lay down a mandatory rule regarding rec-
ognition of foreign judgments in every court of the United States.
At present the duty to recognize judgments even in national courts
rests only on comity and is qualified in the judgment of the Su-
preme Court, by a strict rule of parity.147
SECTION 2. Clause 1. The Citizens of each State shall be en-

titled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several
States.
STATE CITIZENSHIP: PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
Origin and Purpose

“The primary purpose of this clause, like the clauses between which
it is located . . . was to help fuse into one Nation a collection of inde-
pendent sovereign States.” 148 Precedent for this clause was a much
147 No right, privilege, or immunity is conferred by the Constitution in respect
to judgments of foreign states and nations. Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Tremblay, 223 U.S.
185 (1912). See also Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 234 (1895), where a French judg-
ment offered in defense was held not a bar to the suit. Four Justices dissented on
the ground that “the application of the doctrine of res judicata does not rest in dis-
cretion; and it is for the Government, and not for its courts, to adopt the principle
of retorsion, if deemed under any circumstances desirable or necessary.” At the same
sitting of the Court, an action in a United States circuit court on a Canadian judg-
ment was sustained on the same ground of reciprocity, Ritchie v. McMullen, 159 U.S.
235 (1895). See also Ingenohl v. Olsen & Co., 273 U.S. 541 (1927), where a decision
of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands was reversed for refusal to enforce a
judgment of the Supreme Court of the British colony of Hong Kong, which was ren-
dered “after a fair trial by a court having jurisdiction of the parties.” Another in-
stance of international cooperation in the judicial field is furnished by letters roga-
tory. See 28 U.S.C. § 1781. Several States have similar provisions, 2 J. MOORE, DIGEST
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 108–109 (1906).
148 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 395 (1948).
Sec. 2—Interstate Comity Cl. 1—State Citizenship: Privileges and Immunities
wordier and a somewhat unclear 149 clause of the Articles of Confed-

eration. “The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and
intercourse among the people of the different States in this Union, the
free inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds and fu-
gitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and im-
munities of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each
State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State,
and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, sub-
ject to the same duties, impositions and restrictions as the inhabit-
ants thereof respectively . . . .” 150 In the Convention, the present clause
was presented, reported by the Committee on Detail, and adopted all
in the language ultimately approved.151 Little commentary was ad-
dressed to it,152 and we may assume with Justice Miller that “[t]here
can be but little question that the purpose of both these provisions is
the same, and that the privileges and immunities intended are the same
in each. In the Articles of Confederation we have some of these spe-
cifically mentioned, and enough perhaps to give some general idea of
the class of civil rights meant by the phrase.” 153 At least four theo-
ries have been proffered regarding the purpose of this clause. First,
the clause is a guaranty of equal treatment by Congress to the citi-
zens of the different states; in other words, it is a species of equal pro-
tection clause binding on the National Government. Though it re-
ceived some recognition in the Dred Scott case,154 particularly the opinion
of Justice Catron,155 this theory is now obsolete.156 Second, the clause
149 THE FEDERALIST, No. 42 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 285–286 (Madison).
150 1 F. Thorpe ed., The Federal and State Constitutions, H. DOC. NO. 357, 59th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1909), 10.
151 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 173, 187, 443
(rev. ed. 1937).

152 “It may be esteemed the basis of the Union, that ‘the citizens of each State
shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States.’
And if it be a just principle that every government ought to possess the means of
executing its own provisions by its own authority, it will follow, that in order to the
inviolable maintenance of that equality of privileges and immunities to which the
citizens of the Union will be entitled, the national judiciary ought to preside in all
cases in which one State or its citizens are opposed to another State or its citizens.
To secure the full effect of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and sub-
terfuge, it is necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal
which, having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the differ-
ent States and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to the Union,
will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles on which its is
founded.” THE FEDERALIST, No. 80 (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 537–538 (Hamilton).
153 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 75 (1873).
155 60 U.S. at 518, 527–29.
156 Today, the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment imposes equal protec-
tion standards on the Federal Government. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954);
Schneider v. Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618,
641–42 (1969).
is a guaranty to the citizens of each state of the natural and funda-

mental rights inherent in the citizenship of persons in a free society,
the privileges and immunities of free citizens, which no state could deny
to citizens of other states, without regard to the manner in which it
treated its own citizens. This theory found some expression in a few
state cases 157 and best accords with the natural law-natural rights lan-
guage of Justice Washington in Corfield v. Coryell.158
If it had been accepted by the Court, this theory might well have
endowed the Supreme Court with a reviewing power over restric-
tive state legislation as broad as that which it later came to exer-
cise under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Four-
teenth Amendment, but it was firmly rejected by the Court.159 Third,
the clause guarantees to the citizen of any state the rights which
he enjoys as such even when he is sojourning in another state; that
is, it enables him to carry with him his rights of state citizenship
throughout the Union, unembarrassed by state lines. This theory,
too, the Court rejected.160 Fourth, the clause merely forbids any state
to discriminate against citizens of other states in favor of its own.
It is this narrow interpretation that has become the settled one. “It
was undoubtedly the object of the clause in question to place the
citizens of each State upon the same footing with citizens of other
States, so far as the advantages resulting from citizenship in those
States are concerned. It relieves them from the disabilities of alien-
age in other States; it inhibits discriminating legislation against them
by other States; it gives them the right of free ingress into other
157 Campbell v. Morris, 3 H. & McH. 288 (Md. 1797); Murray v. McCarty, 2 Munf.
373 (Va. 1811); Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. Case. 507 (N.Y. 1812); Douglas v.
Stephens, 1 Del. Ch. 465 (1821); Smith v. Moody, 26 Ind. 299 (1866).
158 6 Fed. Cas. 546, 550 (No. 3230) (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823). (Justice Washington on
circuit), quoted infra, “All Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several States.”
“At one time it was thought that this section recognized a group of rights which,
according to the jurisprudence of the day, were classed as ‘natural rights’; and that
the purpose of the section was to create rights of citizens of the United States by
guaranteeing the citizens of every State the recognition of this group of rights by
every other State. Such was the view of Justice Washington.” Hague v. CIO, 307
U.S. 496, 511 (1939) (Justice Roberts for the Court). This view of the clause was
asserted by Justices Field and Bradley, Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.)
97, 117–18 (1873) (dissenting opinions); Butchers’ Union Slaughter-House and Live-
Stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-House Co.,
111 U.S. 746, 760 (1884) (Justice Field concurring), but see infra, and was possibly
understood so by Chief Justice Taney. Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 423
(1857). See also id. at 580 (Justice Curtis dissenting). The natural rights concept of
privileges and immunities was strongly held by abolitionists and their congressional
allies who drafted the similar clause into 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment. Graham,
Our ‘Declaratory’ Fourteenth Amendment, reprinted in H. GRAHAM, EVERYMAN’S CONSTI-
TUTION: HISTORICAL ESSAYS ON THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT, THE CONSPIRACY THEORY, AND AMERI-
CAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 295 (1968).
159 McKane v. Durston, 153 U.S. 684, 687 (1894); see also cases cited infra.
160 City of Detroit v. Osborne, 135 U.S. 492 (1890).
States, and egress from them; it insures to them in other States

the same freedom possessed by the citizens of those States in the
acquisition and enjoyment of property and in the pursuit of happi-
ness; and it secures to them in other States the equal protection of
their laws.” 161
The cases continue to emphasize that this clause is tied to co-
mity and promoting the Union. “Some distinctions between resi-
dents and nonresidents merely reflect the fact that this is a Nation
composed of individual States, and are permitted; other distinc-
tions are prohibited because they hinder the formation, the pur-
pose, or the development of a single Union of those States. Only
with respect to those ‘privileges’ and ‘immunities’ bearing upon the
vitality of the Nation as a single entity must the State treat all
citizens, resident and nonresident, equally.” 162 In this regard, the
clause primarily “was intended to create a national economic union,”
but it also has been cited as protecting common noneconomic inter-
ests.163
Hostile discrimination against all nonresidents infringes the
clause,164 but controversies between a state and its own citizens are
not covered by the provision.165 However, a municipality’s discrimi-
nation, approved by the state, in favor of its own residents impli-
cates the clause as to out-of-state residents, even though the disfa-
vored class consists of in-state residents as well.166 The clause should
not be read so literally, the Court held, as to permit states to ex-
clude out-of-state residents from benefits through the simple expe-
161 Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 180 (1869) (Justice Field for the Court;
but see supra); see also Slaughter House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 77 (1873);
Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142 (1907); Whitfield v. Ohio, 297 U.S.
431 (1936).
162 Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978). See
also Austin v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656, 660–65 (1975) (clause “implicates not
only the individual’s right to nondiscriminatory treatment but also, perhaps more
so, the structural balance essential to the concept of federalism.” Id. at 662); Hicklin
v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 523–24 (1978).
163 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274, 281–82 (1985).
See also Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 200 (1973) (discrimination against out-of-state
residents seeking medical care violates clause).
164 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 246 (1898); Travis v. Yale & Towne Mfg.
Co., 252 U.S. 60 (1920).

165 Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130, 138 (1873); Cove v. Cunningham,
133 U.S. 107 (1890). But see Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 71 (1982) (Justice O’Connor
concurring).
166 United Building & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208
(1984).
diency of delegating authority to political subdivisions.167 A viola-

tion can occur whether or not a statute explicitly discriminates against
out-of-state interests.168
How Implemented
The Privileges and Immunities Clause is self-executory, that is
to say, its enforcement is dependent upon the judicial process. It
does not authorize penal legislation by Congress. Federal statutes
prohibiting conspiracies to deprive any person of rights or privi-
leges secured by state laws,169 or punishing infractions by individu-
als of the right of citizens to reside peacefully in the several states
and to have free ingress into and egress from such states,170 have
been held void.
Citizens of Each State

A question much mooted before the Civil War was whether the
term could be held to include free Negroes. In the Dred Scott case,171
the Court answered it in the negative. “Citizens of each State,” Chief
Justice Taney argued, meant citizens of the United States as under-
stood at the time the Constitution was adopted, and Negroes were
not then regarded as capable of citizenship. The only category of
national citizenship added under the Constitution comprised aliens,
naturalized in accordance with acts of Congress.172 In dissent, Jus-
tice Curtis not only denied the Chief Justice’s assertion that there
were no Negro citizens of states in 1789 but further argued that,
although Congress alone could determine what classes of aliens should
be naturalized, the states retained the right to extend citizenship
to classes of persons born within their borders who had not previ-
ously enjoyed citizenship and that one upon whom state citizen-
ship was thus conferred became a citizen of the state in the full
sense of the Constitution.173 So far as persons born in the United
167 465 U.S. at 217. The holding illustrates what the Court has referred to as
the “mutually reinforcing relationship” between the Commerce Clause and the Privi-
leges and Immunities Clause. Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S.
274, 280 n.8 (1985) (quoting Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 531 (1978)). See, e.g.,
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 424 U.S. 366 (1976) (city protectionist ordinance
that disadvantages both out-of-state producers and some in-state producers violates
the Commerce Clause).
168 “[A]bsence of an express statement . . . identifying out-of-state citizenship
as a basis for disparate treatment is not a sufficient basis for rejecting [a] claim.”
Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 539 U.S. 59, 67 (2003).
169 United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 643 (1883). See also Baldwin v. Franks,
120 U.S. 678 (1887).

170 United States v. Wheeler, 254 U.S. 281 (1920).
172 60 U.S. at 403–11.
173 60 U.S. at 572–90.
States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are concerned, the ques-
tion was put at rest by the Fourteenth Amendment.
Corporations.—At a comparatively early date, the claim was
made that a corporation chartered by a state and consisting of its
citizens was entitled to the benefits of the comity clause in the trans-
action of business in other states. It was argued that the Court was
bound to look beyond the act of incorporation and see who were
the incorporators. If it found these to consist solely of citizens of
the incorporating state, it was bound to permit them through the
agency of the corporation to exercise in other states such privileges
and immunities as the citizens thereof enjoyed. In Bank of Au-
gusta v. Earle,174 this view was rejected. The Court held that the
comity clause was never intended “to give to the citizens of each
State the privileges of citizens in the several States, and at the same
time to exempt them [under a corporate veil] from the liabilities
which the exercise of such privileges would bring upon individuals
who were citizens of the State. This would be to give the citizens of
other States far higher and greater privileges than are enjoyed by
the citizens of the State itself.” 175 A similar result was reached in
Paul v. Virginia.176 The Court there held that a corporation, in this
instance, an insurance company, was “the mere creation of local law”
and could “have no legal existence beyond the limits of the sover-
eignty” 177 which created it; even recognition of its existence by other
states rested exclusively in their discretion.178 By reason of its simi-
larity to the corporate form of organization, a Massachusetts trust
has been denied the protection of this clause.179
All Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the Several

States
The scope of “privileges and immunities” comprehended by the
comity clause is bound by the provision’s purpose. The classical ju-
dicial exposition of the meaning of the phrase is that of Justice Wash-
ington in Corfield v. Coryell,180 which was decided by him on cir-
cuit in 1823. The question at issue was the validity of a New Jersey
statute that prohibited “any person who is not, at the time, an ac-
tual inhabitant and resident in this State” from raking or gather-
174 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839).
175 38 U.S. at 586.
176 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168 (1869).
177 75 U.S. at 181.
178 Later cases held that this discretion is qualified by other provisions of the
Constitution notably the Commerce Clause and the Fourteenth Amendment. Crutcher
v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47 (1891).
179 Hemphill v. Orloff, 277 U.S. 537 (1928).
180 6 Fed. Cas. 546 (No. 3,230) (C.C.E.D. Pa., 1823).
ing “clams, oysters or shells” in any of the waters of the state, on

board any vessel “not wholly owned by some person, inhabitant of
and actually residing in this State. . . . The inquiry is,” wrote Jus-
tice Washington, “what are the privileges and immunities of citi-
zens in the several States? We feel no hesitation in confining these
expressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their
nature, fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several States which compose this Union . . . .” 181
He specified the following rights as answering this description: “Pro-
tection by the Government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with
the right to acquire and possess property of every kind, and to pur-
sue and obtain happiness and safety; subject nevertheless to such
restraints as the government must justly prescribe for the general
good of the whole. The right of a citizen of one State to pass through,
or to reside in any other State, for purposes of trade, agriculture,
professional pursuits, or otherwise; to claim the benefits of the writ
of habeas corpus; to institute and maintain actions of any kind in
the courts of the State; to take, hold and dispose of property, either
real or personal; and an exemption from higher taxes or imposi-
tions than are paid by the other citizens of the State . . . .” 182
After thus defining broadly the private and personal rights which
were protected, Justice Washington went on to distinguish them from
the right to a share in the public patrimony of the state. “[W]e can-
not accede” the opinion proceeds, “to the proposition . . . that, un-
der this provision of the Constitution, the citizens of the several
States are permitted to participate in all the rights which belong
exclusively to the citizens of any particular State, merely upon the
ground that they are enjoyed by those citizens; much less, that in
regulating the use of the common property of the citizens of such
State, the legislature is bound to extend to the citizens of all other
States the same advantages as are secured to their own citi-
zens.” 183 The right of a state to the fisheries within its borders he
then held to be in the nature of a property right, held by the state
“for the use of the citizens thereof ”; the state was under no obliga-
tion to grant “co-tenancy in the common property of the State, to
the citizens of all the other States.” 184 The holding of this case was
confirmed in McCready v. Virginia; 185 the logic of Geer v. Connecti-
181 6 Fed. Cas. at 551–52.

182 6 Fed. Cas. at 552.
183 6 Fed. Cas. at 552.
184 6 Fed. Cas. at 552.
185 94 U.S. 391 (1877).
cut 186 extended the same rule to wild game, and Hudson Water Co.
v. McCarter 187 applied it to the running water of a state. In Toomer
v. Witsell,188 however, the Court refused to apply this rule to free-
swimming fish caught in the three-mile belt off the coast of South
Carolina. It held instead that “commercial shrimping in the mar-
ginal sea, like other common callings, is within the purview of the
privileges and immunities clause” and that a severely discrimina-
tory license fee exacted from nonresidents was unconstitutional.189
As the state “public patrimony” theory of resource ownership
receded 190 into one of power to regulate and preserve, the essential
inquiry in resources cases became whether a state distinguished be-
tween residents and nonresidents 191 in regulating a “fundamental”
activity, that is, an activity the “interference with which would frus-
trate the purposes of the formation of the Union.” 192 Thus, recre-
ational hunting was found not to be a fundamental activity, be-
cause regulating it did not frustrate the ability of nonresidents to
work or travel within the state, nor was nondiscriminatory access
to sport hunting within the state otherwise basic to maintaining
the primacy of the Nation.193 Accessing public records through a state
freedom of information act also has been held not to be a “funda-
mental” activity, and a state may limit such access to its own citi-
zens.194
186 161 U.S. 519 (1896).

187 209 U.S. 349 (1908).
188 334 U.S. 385 (1948).
189 334 U.S. at 403. In Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415 (1952), an Alaska
statute providing for the licensing of commercial fishermen in territorial waters and
levying a license fee of $50.00 on nonresident and only $5.00 on resident fishermen
was held void under Art. IV, § 2 on the authority of Toomer v. Witsell.
190 The legal fiction of state ownership was eventually discredited as erecting
impermissible barriers to interstate commerce. See Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc.,

431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (dictum). Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519 (1896), was
overruled in Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979); Hudson Water Co. v. Mc-
Carter, 209 U.S. 349 (1908), was overruled in Sporhase v. Nebraska ex rel. Douglas,
458 U.S. 941 (1982).
191 Although the clause specifically refers to “citizens,” the Court treats the terms
“citizens” and “residents” as “essentially interchangeable.” Austin v. New Hamp-

shire, 420 U.S. 656, 662 n.8 (1975); Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518, 524 n.8 (1978).
192 Justice Washington’s opinion on Circuit in Coryell afforded the Court the stan-
dard. While recognizing that Justice Washington relied on notions of natural rights,
the Court thought he used the term “fundamental” in the modern sense as well.
193 Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 387 (1978) (uphold-
ing substantially higher hunting license fees for nonresidents).

194 McBurney v. Young, 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–17, slip op. (2013). The Court fur-
ther found that any incidental burden on a nonresident’s ability to earn a living,
own property, or exercise another “fundamemtal” activity could largely be amelio-
rated by using other available authorities. The Court also emphasized that the pri-
mary purpose of the state freedom of information act was to provide state citizens
with a means to obtain an accounting of their public officials.
Even if an activity is labeled “fundamental,” a state is not cat-

egorically barred from distinguishing between residents and non-
residents in regulating it: The Privileges and Immunities Clause is
not “an absolute.” 195 Be there a substantial reason for different treat-
ment and a substantial relationship between the means used and
the objective to be achieved, discrimination against nonresidents in
a fundamental activity can stand. This two-part test is not easily
met, however. An Alaska statute giving residents preference over
nonresidents in hiring for work on oil and gas pipelines within the
state failed both elements, because the state did not show that non-
residents constituted a peculiar source of the “evil,” high unemploy-
ment among Native Alaskans, at which the statute was aimed.196
Also failing the test were a New Hampshire rule that limited ad-
mission to the bar to state residents 197 and a Virgin Islands rule
that limited bar membership to attorneys residing in the territory
at least one year.198 The more mixed fate of privileges and immuni-
ties challenges to state tax laws is discussed below.
One area generally excepted from coverage is core political ac-
tivities. “A State may, by rule uniform in its operation as to citi-
zens of the several States, require residence within its limits for a
given time before a citizen of another State who becomes a resi-
dent thereof shall exercise the right of suffrage or become eligible
to office.” 199
Discrimination in Private Rights

Not only has judicial construction of the comity clause excluded
certain privileges of a public nature from its protection, but the courts
also have established the proposition that the purely private and
195 Toomer v. Witsell, 334 U.S. 385, 396 (1948).
196 Hicklin v. Orbeck, 437 U.S. 518 (1978). Activity relating to pursuit of an oc-
cupation or common calling, the Court recognized, had long been held to be pro-
tected by the clause. The burden of showing constitutional justification was clearly
placed on the state, id. at 526–28, rather than giving the statute the ordinary pre-
sumption of constitutionality. See Mullaney v. Anderson, 342 U.S. 415, 418 (1952).
197 Supreme Court of New Hampshire v. Piper, 470 U.S. 274 (1985).
198 Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546 (1989)(clause made applicable to the Vir-
gin Islands under the Revised Organic Act). The case was brought by nonresidents,
a subset of the disqualified class, and the Court did not address the durational re-
quirements that applied to the separate subset of new residents. Cf. United Build-
ing & Constr. Trades Council v. Mayor of Camden, 465 U.S. 208 (1984). See also
Supreme Court of Virginia v. Friedman, 487 U.S. 59 (1988) (striking down a Vir-
ginia rule that denied nonresident attorneys admission to the bar “on motion.”
199 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 256 (1898) (dictum). Of course as to suf-
frage, see Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330 (1972), but not as to candidacy, the prin-
ciple is now qualified under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm’n, 436 U.S. 371, 383 (1978) (citing
Kanapaux v. Ellisor, 419 U.S. 891 (1974); Chimento v. Stark, 353 F. Supp. 1211 (D.N.H.),
aff’d, 414 U.S. 802 (1973)).
personal rights to which the clause admittedly extends are not in

all cases beyond the reach of state legislation which differentiates
citizens and noncitizens. Broadly speaking, these rights are held sub-
ject to the reasonable exercise by a state of its police power, and
the Court has recognized that there are cases in which discrimina-
tion against nonresidents may be reasonably resorted to by a state
in aid of its own public health, safety and welfare. To that end a
state may reserve the right to sell insurance to persons who have
resided within the state for a prescribed period of time.200 It may
require a nonresident who does business within the state 201 or who
uses the highways of the state 202 to consent, expressly or by impli-
cation, to service of process on an agent within the state. Without
violating this section, a state may limit the dower rights of a non-
resident to lands of which the husband died seized while giving a
resident dower in all lands held during the marriage,203 or may leave
the rights of nonresident married persons in respect of property within
the state to be governed by the laws of their domicile, rather than
by the laws it promulgates for its own residents.204 But a state may
not give a preference to resident creditors in the administration of
the property of an insolvent foreign corporation.205 An act of the
Confederate Government, enforced by a state, to sequester a debt
owed by one of its residents to a citizen of another state was held
to be a flagrant violation of this clause.206
Access to Courts
The right to sue and defend in the courts is one of the highest
and most essential privileges of citizenship and must be allowed by
each state to the citizens of all other states to the same extent that
it is allowed to its own citizens.207 The constitutional requirement
is satisfied if the nonresident is given access to the courts of the
state upon terms that, in themselves, are reasonable and adequate
for the enforcing of any rights he may have, even though they may
not be technically the same as those accorded to resident citi-
zens.208 The Supreme Court upheld a state statute of limitations
that prevented a nonresident from suing in the state’s courts after
200 La Tourette v. McMaster, 248 U.S. 465 (1919).
201 Doherty & Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935).
202 Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352, 356 (1927).
203 Ferry v. Spokane, P. & S. Ry., 258 U.S. 314 (1922), followed in Ferry v. Corbett,
258 U.S. 609 (1922).

204 Conner v. Elliott, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 591, 593 (1856).
205 Blake v. McClung, 172 U.S. 239, 248 (1898).
206 Williams v. Bruffy, 96 U.S. 176, 184 (1878).
207 Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142, 148 (1907); McKnett v. St.
Louis & S.F. Ry., 292 U.S. 230, 233 (1934).

208 Canadian Northern Ry. v. Eggen, 252 U.S. 553 (1920).
expiration of the time for suit in the place where the cause of ac-
tion arose 209 and another such statute which that suspended its
operation as to resident plaintiffs, but not as to nonresidents, dur-
ing the period of the defendant’s absence from the state.210 A state
law making it discretionary with the courts to entertain an action
by a nonresident of the state against a foreign corporation doing
business in the state was sustained because it was applicable alike
to citizens and noncitizens residing out of the state.211 A statute per-
mitting a suit in the courts of the state for wrongful death occur-
ring outside the state, only if the decedent was a resident of the
state, was sustained, because it operated equally upon representa-
tives of the deceased whether citizens or noncitizens.212 Being pa-
tently nondiscriminatory, a Uniform Reciprocal State Law to se-
cure the attendance of witnesses from within or without a state in
criminal proceedings, whereunder an Illinois resident, while tempo-
rarily in Florida, was summoned to appear at a hearing for deter-
mination as to whether he should be surrendered to a New York
officer for testimony in the latter state, does not violate this clause.213
Taxation
In the exercise of its taxing power, a state may not discrimi-
nate substantially between residents and nonresidents. In Ward v.
Maryland,214 the Court set aside a state law that imposed specific
taxes upon nonresidents for the privilege of selling within the state
goods that were produced in other states. Also found to be incom-
patible with the comity clause was a Tennessee license tax, the amount
of which was dependent upon whether the person taxed had his
chief office within or without the state.215 In Travis v. Yale & Towne
Mfg. Co.,216 the Court, although sustaining the right of a state to
tax income accruing within its borders to nonresidents,217 held the
particular tax void because it denied to nonresidents exemptions which
were allowed to residents. The “terms ‘resident’ and ‘citizen’ are not
209 252 U.S. at 563.
210 Chemung Canal Bank v. Lowery, 93 U.S. 72, 76 (1876).
211 Douglas v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 279 U.S. 377 (1929).
212 Chambers v. Baltimore & O.R.R., 207 U.S. 142 (1907).
213 New York v. O’Neill, 359 U.S. 1 (1959). Justices Douglas and Black dis-
sented.
214 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 418, 424 (1871). See also Downham v. Alexandria Council,
77 U.S. (10 Wall.) 173, 175 (1870).

215 Chalker v. Birmingham & N.W. Ry., 249 U.S. 522 (1919).
216 252 U.S. 60 (1920).
217 252 U.S. at 62–64. See also Shaffer v. Carter, 252 U.S. 37 (1920). In Austin
v. New Hampshire, 420 U.S. 656 (1975), the Court held void a state commuter in-
come tax, inasmuch as the State imposed no income tax on its own residents and
thus the tax fell exclusively on nonresidents’ income and was not offset even approxi-
mately by other taxes imposed upon residents alone.
synonymous,” wrote Justice Pitney, “. . . but a general taxing scheme

. . . if it discriminates against all non-residents, has the necessary
effect of including in the discrimination those who are citizens of
other States . . . .” 218 Where there were no discriminations be-
tween citizens and noncitizens, a state statute taxing the business
of hiring persons within the state for labor outside the state was
sustained.219
The Court returned to the privileges-and-immunities restric-
tions upon disparate state taxation of residents and nonresidents
in Lunding v. New York Tax Appeals Tribunal.220 In this case, the
state denied nonresidents any deduction from taxable income for
alimony payments, although it permitted residents to deduct such
payments. Although it observed that approximate equality between
residents and nonresidents was required by the clause, the Court
acknowledged that precise equality was neither necessary nor in most
instances possible. But it was required of the challenged state that
it demonstrate a “substantial reason” for the disparity, and the dis-
crimination must bear a “substantial relationship” to that rea-
son.221 A state, under this analysis, may not deny nonresidents a
general tax exemption provided to residents that would reduce their
tax burdens, but it could limit specific expense deductions based on
some relationship between the expenses and their in-state property
or income. Here, the state flatly denied the exemption. Moreover,
the Court rejected various arguments that had been presented, find-
ing that most of those arguments, while they might support tar-
geted denials or partial denials, simply reiterated the state’s conten-
tion that it need not afford any exemptions at all. This section of
the Constitution does not prevent a territorial government, exercis-
ing powers delegated by Congress, from imposing a discriminatory
license tax on nonresident fishermen operating within its wa-
ters.222
However, what at first glance may appear to be a discrimina-
tion may turn out not to be when the entire system of taxation pre-
vailing in the enacting state is considered. On the basis of overall
fairness, the Court sustained a Connecticut statute that required
nonresident stockholders to pay a state tax measured by the full
market value of their stock while resident stockholders were sub-
ject to local taxation on the market value of that stock reduced by
218 252 U.S. 60, 78–79 (1920).

219 Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, 274 (1900).
220 522 U.S. 287 (1998).
221 522 U.S. at 298.
222 Haavik v. Alaska Packers Ass’n, 263 U.S. 510 (1924).
the value of the real estate owned by the corporation.223 Occasional

or accidental inequality to a nonresident taxpayer is not sufficient
to defeat a scheme of taxation whose operation is generally equi-
table.224 In an early case the Court brushed aside as frivolous the
contention that a state violated this clause by subjecting one of its
own citizens to a property tax on a debt due from a nonresident
secured by real estate situated where the debtor resided.225
Clause 2. A person charged in any State with Treason, Felony,

or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in an-
other State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the
State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the
State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
INTERSTATE RENDITION
Duty to Surrender Fugitives From Justice

Although this provision is not in its nature self-executing, and
there is no express grant to Congress of power to carry it into ef-
fect, that body passed a law shortly after the Constitution was ad-
opted, imposing upon the governor of each state the duty to deliver
up fugitives from justice found in such state.226 The Supreme Court
has accepted this contemporaneous construction as establishing the
validity of this legislation.227 The duty to surrender is not absolute
and unqualified; if the laws of the state to which the fugitive has
fled have been put in force against him, and he is imprisoned there,
223 Travellers’ Ins. Co. v. Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364, 371 (1902).
224 Maxwell v. Bugbee, 250 U.S. 525 (1919).
225 Kirtland v. Hotchkiss, 100 U.S. 491, 499 (1879). Cf. Colgate v. Harvey, 296
U.S. 404 (1935), in which discriminatory taxation of bank deposits outside the state
owned by a citizen of the state was held to infringe a privilege of national citizen-
ship, in contravention of the Fourteenth Amendment. Colgate v. Harvey was over-
ruled by Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 93 (1940).
226 1 Stat. 302 (1793), 18 U.S.C. § 3182. The Act requires rendition of fugitives
at the request of a demanding “Territory,” as well as of a State, thus extending be-

yond the terms of the clause. In New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham, 211 U.S. 468
(1909), the Court held that the legislative extension was permissible under the ter-
ritorial clause. See Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 229–230 (1987).
227 Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 94 (1885). See also Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S.
127 (1916). Justice Story wrote: “[T]he natural, if not the necessary conclusion is,
that the national government, in the absence of all positive provisions to the con-
trary, is bound, through its own proper departments, legislative, judicial, or execu-
tive, as the case may require, to carry into effect all the rights and duties imposed
upon it by the Constitution”; and again, “it has, on various occasions, exercised pow-
ers which were necessary and proper as means to carry into effect rights expressly
given, and duties expressly enjoined thereby.” Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.)
539, 616, 618–19 (1842).
Sec. 2—Interstate Comity Cl. 2—Interstate Rendition
the demands of those laws may be satisfied before the duty of obe-
dience to the requisition arises.228 But, in Kentucky v. Dennison,229
the Court held that this statute was merely declaratory of a moral
duty; that the Federal Government “has no power to impose on a
State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to per-
form it,” 230 and consequently that a federal court could not issue a
mandamus to compel the governor of one state to surrender a fugi-
tive to another. Long considered a constitutional derelict, Dennison
was finally formally overruled in 1987.231 Now, states and territo-
ries may invoke the power of federal courts to enforce against state
officers this and other rights created by federal statute, including
equitable relief to compel performance of federally imposed du-
ties.232
Fugitive From Justice Defined.—To be a fugitive from jus-
tice within the meaning of this clause, it is necessary that, in the
regular course of judicial proceedings, one have been charged with
a crime, but it is not necessary that one have left the state after
having been charged. It is sufficient that, having been charged with
a crime in one state, one is found in another state.233 And the mo-
tive that induced the departure is immaterial.234 Even if a fugitive
were brought involuntarily into the state where found by requisi-
tion from another state, he may be surrendered to a third state upon
an extradition warrant.235 A person indicted a second time for the
same offense is nonetheless a fugitive from justice by reason of the
fact that after dismissal of the first indictment, on which he was
originally indicted, he left the state with the knowledge of, or with-
out objection by, state authorities.236 But a defendant cannot be ex-
tradited if he was only constructively present in the demanding state
228 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 371 (1873).

229 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861); cf. Prigg v. Pennsylvania 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539,
612 (1842).
230 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107 (1861). Congress in 1934 plugged the loophole cre-
ated by this decision by making it unlawful for any person to flee from one state to
another for the purpose of avoiding prosecution in certain cases. 48 Stat. 782, 18
U.S.C. § 1073.
231 Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987). “Kentucky v. Dennison is the
product of another time. The conception of the relation between the States and the
Federal Government there announced is fundamentally incompatible with more than
a century of constitutional development.” Id. at 230.
232 483 U.S. at 230.
233 Roberts v. Reilly, 116 U.S. 80, 95 (1885). See also Strassheim v. Daily, 221
U.S. 280 (1911); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S. 222 (1906); Ex parte Reggel,
114 U.S. 642, 650 (1885).
234 Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432, 439 (1914).
235 Innes v. Tobin, 240 U.S. 127 (1916).
236 Bassing v. Cady, 208 U.S. 386 (1908).
Sec. 2—Interstate Comity Cl. 2—Interstate Rendition
at the time of the commission of the crime charged.237 For the pur-
pose of determining who is a fugitive from justice, the words “trea-
son, felony or other crime” embrace every act forbidden and made
punishable by a law of a state,238 including misdemeanors.239
Procedure for Removal.—Only after a person has been charged
with a crime in the regular course of judicial proceedings is the gov-
ernor of a state entitled to make demand for his return from an-
other state.240 The person demanded has no constitutional right to
be heard before the governor of the state in which he is found on
the question whether he has been substantially charged with crime
and is a fugitive from justice.241 The constitutionally required sur-
render is not to be interfered with by habeas corpus upon specula-
tions as to what ought to be the result of a trial.242 Nor is it proper
thereby to inquire into the motives controlling the actions of the
governors of the demanding and surrendering states.243 Matters of
defense, such as the running of the statute of limitations,244 or the
contention that continued confinement in the prison of the demand-
ing state would amount to cruel and unjust punishment,245 cannot
be heard on habeas corpus but should be tested in the courts of the
demanding state, where all parties may be heard, where all perti-
nent testimony will be readily available, and where suitable relief,
if any, may be fashioned. A defendant will, however, be discharged
on habeas corpus if he shows by clear and satisfactory evidence that
he was outside the demanding state at the time of the crime.246 If,
however, the evidence is conflicting, habeas corpus is not a proper
proceeding to try the question of alibi.247 The habeas court’s role is,
therefore, very limited.248
Trial of Fugitives After Removal.—There is nothing in the
Constitution or laws of the United States that exempts an offender,
237 Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903).
238 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 103 (1861).
239 Taylor v. Taintor, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 366, 375 (1873).
240 Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 104 (1861); Pierce v. Creecy,
210 U.S. 387 (1908). See also Matter of Strauss, 197 U.S. 324, 325 (1905); Marbles
v. Creecy, 215 U.S. 63 (1909); Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280 (1911).
241 Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364 (1905); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192
(1906).
242 Drew v. Thaw, 235 U.S. 432 (1914).
243 Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192 (1906).
244 Biddinger v. Commissioner of Police, 245 U.S. 128 (1917). See also Rodman
v. Pothier, 264 U.S. 399 (1924).

245 Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86 (1952).
246 Hyatt v. People ex rel. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691 (1903). See also South Caro-
lina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412 (1933).

247 Munsey v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 375 (1905).
248 Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289 (1978). In California v. Superior Court,
482 U.S. 400 (1987), the Court reiterated that extradition is a “summary proce-
dure.”
Sec. 2—Interstate Comity Cl. 3—Fugitives From Labor
brought before the courts of a state for an offense against its laws,
from trial and punishment, even though he was brought from an-
other state by unlawful violence,249 or by abuse of legal process,250
and a fugitive lawfully extradited from another state may be tried
for an offense other than that for which he was surrendered.251 The
rule is different, however, with respect to fugitives surrendered by
a foreign government, pursuant to treaty. In that case the offender
may be tried only “for the offense with which he is charged in the
proceedings for his extradition, until a reasonable time and oppor-
tunity have been given him, after his release or trial upon such charge,
to return to the country from whose asylum he had been forcibly
taken under those proceedings.” 252
Clause 3. No person held to Service or Labour in one State,

under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Conse-
quence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from
such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of
the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.
FUGITIVES FROM LABOR

This clause contemplated the existence of a positive unquali-
fied right on the part of the owner of a slave which no state law
could in any way regulate, control, or restrain. Consequently the
owner of a slave had the same right to seize and repossess him in
another state, as the local laws of his own state conferred upon him,
and a state law that penalized such seizure was held unconstitu-
tional.253 Congress had the power and the duty, which it exercised
by the Act of February 12, 1793,254 to carry into effect the rights
given by this section,255 and the states had no concurrent power to
legislate on the subject.256 However, a state statute providing a pen-
alty for harboring a fugitive slave was held not to conflict with this
clause because it did not affect the right or remedy either of the
249 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Mahon v. Justice, 127 U.S. 700, 707,
712, 714 (1888).

250 Cook v. Hart, 146 U.S. 183, 193 (1892); Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192,
215 (1906).
251 Lascelles v. Georgia, 148 U.S. 537, 543 (1893).
252 United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407, 430 (1886).
253 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 612 (1842).
254 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
255 Jones v. Van Zandt, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 215, 229 (1847); Ableman v. Booth, 62
U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859).

256 Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 625 (1842).
Sec. 2—Interstate Comity Cl. 3—Fugitives From Labor
master or the slave; by it the state simply prescribed a rule of con-

duct for its own citizens in the exercise of its police power.257
SECTION 3. Clause 1. New States may be admitted by the Con-

gress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected
within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed
by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, with-
out the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as
well as of the Congress.
DOCTRINE OF THE EQUALITY OF STATES
“Equality of constitutional right and power is the condition of
all the States of the Union, old and new.” 258 This doctrine, now a
truism of constitutional law, did not find favor in the Constitu-
tional Convention. That body struck out from this section, as re-
ported by the Committee on Detail, two sections to the effect that
“new States shall be admitted on the same terms with the original
States. But the Legislature may make conditions with the new States
concerning the public debt which shall be subsisting.” 259 Opposing
this action, Madison insisted that “the Western States neither would
nor ought to submit to a union which degraded them from an equal
rank with the other States.” 260 Nonetheless, after further expres-
sions of opinion pro and con, the Convention voted nine states to
two to delete the requirement of equality.261
Prior to this time, however, Georgia and Virginia had ceded to
the United States large territories held by them, upon condition that
new states should be formed therefrom and admitted to the Union
on an equal footing with the original states.262 Since the admission
of Tennessee in 1796, Congress has included in each state’s act of
257 Moore v. Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 17 (1853).
258 Escanaba Co. v. City of Chicago, 107 U.S. 678, 689 (1883).
1937).
260 Id.
261 Id. The present provision was then adopted as a substitute. Id. at 455.
262 Pollard v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 221 (1845). The Continental Con-
gress in responding in the Northwest Ordinance, on July 13, 1787, provided that
when each of the designated states in the territorial area achieved a population of
60,000 free inhabitants it was to be admitted “on an equal footing with the original
States, in all respects whatever.” An Ordinance for the Government of the Territory
of the United States Northwest of the River Ohio, Art. V, 5 JOURNALS OF CONGRESS 752–
754 (1823 ed.), reprinted in C. Tansill ed., Documents Illustrative of the Formation
of the Union of the American States, H. DOC. NO. 398, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1927),
47, 54.
Sec. 3—New States Cl. 1—Admission of New States to Union
admission a clause providing that the state enters the Union “on
an equal footing with the original States in all respects what-
ever.” 263 With the admission of Louisiana in 1812, the principle of
equality was extended to states created out of territory purchased
from a foreign power.264 By the Joint Resolution of December 29,
1845, Texas, then an independent Nation, “was admitted into the
Union on an equal footing with the original States in all respects
whatever.” 265
However, if the doctrine rested merely on construction of the
declarations in the admission acts, then the conditions and limita-
tions imposed by Congress and agreed to by the states in order to
be admitted would nonetheless govern, since they must be con-
strued along with the declarations. Again and again, however, in
adjudicating the rights and duties of states admitted after 1789,
the Supreme Court has referred to the condition of equality as if it
were an inherent attribute of the Federal Union.266 That the doc-
trine is of constitutional stature was made evident at least by the
time of the decision in Pollard’s Lessee, if not before.267 Pollard’s
Lessee involved conflicting claims by the United States and Ala-
bama of ownership of certain partially inundated lands on the shore
of the Gulf of Mexico in Alabama. The enabling act for Alabama
had contained both a declaration of equal footing and a reservation
to the United States of these lands.268 Rather than an issue of mere
land ownership, the Court saw the question as one concerning sov-
ereignty and jurisdiction of the states. Because the original states
retained sovereignty and jurisdiction over the navigable waters and
the soil beneath them within their boundaries, retention by the United
States of either title to or jurisdiction over common lands in the
new states would bring those states into the Union on less than an
equal footing with the original states. This, the Court would not
permit. “Alabama is, therefore, entitled to the sovereignty and ju-
risdiction over all the territory within her limits, subject to the com-
mon law, to the same extent that Georgia possessed it, before she
263 1 Stat. 491 (1796). Prior to Tennessee’s admission, Vermont and Kentucky
were admitted with different but conceptually similar terminology. 1 Stat. 191 (1791);
1 Stat. 189 (1791).
264 2 Stat. 701, 703 (1812).
265 Justice Harlan, speaking for the Court, in United States v. Texas, 143 U.S.
621, 634 (1892) (citing 9 Stat. 108).

266 Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845); McCabe v.
Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914); Illinois Cent. R.R. v. Illinois, 146 U.S.
387, 434 (1892); Knight v. U.S. Land Association, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891); Weber v.
Harbor Commissioners, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 57, 65 (1873).
267 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212 (1845). See Mayor of New
Orleans v. United States, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 662 (1836); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1
of New Orleans, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 588 (1845).
268 3 Stat. 489, 492 (1819).
ceded it to the United States. To maintain any other doctrine, is to

deny that Alabama has been admitted into the union on an equal
footing with the original states, the constitution, laws, and com-
pact, to the contrary notwithstanding. . . . [T]o Alabama belong the
navigable waters and soils under them, in controversy in this case,
subject to the rights surrendered by the Constitution to the United
States; and no compact that might be made between her and the
United States could diminish or enlarge these rights.” 269
Finally, in 1911, the Court invalidated a restriction on the change
of location of the state capital, which Congress had imposed as a
condition for the admission of Oklahoma, on the ground that Con-
gress may not embrace in an enabling act conditions relating wholly
to matters under state control.270 In an opinion, from which Jus-
tices Holmes and McKenna dissented, Justice Lurton argued: “The
power is to admit ‘new States into this Union,’ ‘This Union’ was
and is a union of States, equal in power, dignity and authority, each
competent to exert that residuum of sovereignty not delegated to
the United States by the Constitution itself. To maintain otherwise
would be to say that the Union, through the power of Congress to
admit new States, might come to be a union of States unequal in
power, as including States whose powers were restricted only by
the Constitution, with others whose powers had been further re-
stricted by an act of Congress accepted as a condition of admis-
sion.” 271
The equal footing doctrine is a limitation only upon the terms
by which Congress admits a state.272 That is, states must be admit-
ted on an equal footing in the sense that Congress may not exact
conditions solely as a tribute for admission, but it may, in the en-
abling or admitting acts or subsequently impose requirements that
would be or are valid and effectual if the subject of congressional
269 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 228–29 (1845) (emphasis
supplied). See also id. at 222–23. A unanimous Court explained the rule on state
ownership of navigable waters in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. ___, No.
10–218, slip op. (2012). Under the equal footing doctrine, a State, upon entering the
Union, gains title to the beds of waters then navigable or tidally influenced, subject
only to federal powers under the Constitution (e.g., the Commerce Clause). By con-
trast, the United States retains any title vested in it to lands beneath waters not
then navigable or tidally influenced. For the distinct purpose of the equal footing
doctrine, “navigable waters” are those waters used, or susceptible to use, for trade
and travel by customary means at the time of statehood. Furthermore, the “naviga-
bility” of rivers is determined on a segment-by-segment basis, and lands under por-
tions of a stream that were impassable at statehood were not conveyed by force of
the doctrine.
270 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559 (1911).
271 221 U.S. at 567.
272 South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 328–29 (1966). There is a broader
implication, however, in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 226 n.53 (1962).
legislation after admission.273 Thus, Congress may embrace in an

admitting act a regulation of commerce among the states or with
Indian tribes or rules for the care and disposition of the public lands
or reservations within a state. “[I]n every such case such legisla-
tion would derive its force not from any agreement or compact with
the proposed new State, nor by reason of its acceptance of such en-
actment as a term of admission, but solely because the power of
Congress extended to the subject, and, therefore, would not operate
to restrict the State’s legislative power in respect of any matter which
was not plainly within the regulating power of Congress.” 274
Until recently the requirement of equality has applied primar-
ily to political standing and sovereignty rather than to economic or
property rights.275 Broadly speaking, every new state is entitled to
exercise all the powers of government which belong to the original
states of the Union.276 It acquires general jurisdiction, civil and crimi-
nal, for the preservation of public order, and the protection of per-
sons and property throughout its limits even as to federal lands,
except where the Federal Government has reserved 277 or the state
has ceded some degree of jurisdiction to the United States, and, of
course, no state may enact a law that would conflict with the con-
stitutional powers of the United States. Consequently, it has juris-
diction to tax private activities carried on within the public domain
(although not to tax the Federal lands), if the tax does not consti-
tute an unconstitutional burden on the Federal Government.278 Stat-
utes applicable to territories, e.g., the Northwest Territory Ordi-
nance of 1787, cease to have any operative force when the territory,
or any part thereof, is admitted to the Union, except as adopted by
273 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 224–25, 229–30 (1845); Coyle
v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 573–74 (1911). See also Bolln v. Nebraska, 176 U.S. 83, 89
(1900); Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504, 514 (1895); Escanaba Co. v. City of Chi-
cago, 107 U.S. 678, 688 (1882); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84, 92 (1857).
274 Coyle v. Smith, 221 U.S. 559, 574 (1911). Examples include Stearns v. Min-
nesota, 179 U.S. 223 (1900) (congressional authority to dispose of and to make rules
and regulations respecting the property of the United States); United States v. Sandoval,
231 U.S. 28 (1913) (regulating Indian tribes and intercourse with them); United States
v. Chavez, 290 U.S. 357 (1933) (same); Willamette Iron Bridge Co. v. Hatch, 125
U.S. 1, 9–10 (1888) (prevention of interference with navigability of waterways un-
der Commerce Clause).
275 United States v. Texas, 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950); Stearns v. Minnesota, 179
U.S. 223, 245 (1900).

276 Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845); McCabe v. Atchison
T. & S.F. Ry., 235 U.S. 151 (1914).

277 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151, 167 (1886).
278 Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S. 474 (1946).
state law.279 When the enabling act contains no exclusion of juris-

diction as to crimes committed on Indian reservations by persons
other than Indians, state courts are vested with jurisdiction.280 But
the constitutional authority of Congress to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes is not inconsistent with the equality of new states,281
and conditions inserted in the New Mexico Enabling Act forbidding
the introduction of liquor into Indian territory were therefore valid.282
Similarly, Indian treaty rights to hunt, fish, and gather on lands
ceded to the Federal Government were not extinguished by state-
hood. These “usufructuary” rights were subject to reasonable state
regulation, and hence were not irreconcilable with state sover-
eignty over natural resources.283
Admission of a state on an equal footing with the original states
involves the adoption as citizens of the United States of those whom
Congress makes members of the political community and who are
recognized as such in the formation of the new state.284
Judicial Proceedings Pending on Admission of New States

Whenever a territory is admitted into the Union, the cases pend-
ing in the territorial court that are of exclusive federal cognizance
are transferred to the federal court having jurisdiction over the area;
cases not cognizable in the federal courts are transferred to the tri-
bunals of the new state, and those over which federal and state courts
have concurrent jurisdiction may be transferred either to the state
or federal courts by the party possessing the option under existing
law.285 Where Congress neglected to make provision for disposition
of certain pending cases in an enabling act for the admission of a
state to the Union, a subsequent act supplying the omission was
held valid.286 After a case, begun in a United States court of a ter-
ritory, is transferred to a state court under the operation of the en-
279 Permoli v. First Municipality, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845); Sands v. Manistee
River Imp. Co., 123 U.S. 288, 296 (1887); see also Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20
How.) 84, 92 (1858); Huse v. Glover, 119 U.S. 543 (1886); Willamette Iron Bridge
Co. v. Hatch, 125 U.S. 1, 9 (1888); Cincinnati v. Louisville & Nashville R.R., 223
U.S. 390 (1912).
280 Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896), following United States v.
McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882).

281 Dick v. United States, 208 U.S. 340 (1908); Ex parte Webb, 225 U.S. 663
(1912).
282 United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28 (1913).
283 Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 204 (1999)
(overruling Ward v. Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896)).

284 Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 170 (1892).
285 Baker v. Morton, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 150, 153 (1871).
286 Freeborn v. Smith, 69 U.S. (2 Wall.) 160 (1865).
abling act and the state constitution, the appellate procedure is gov-
erned by the state statutes and procedures.287
The new state, without the express or implied assent of Con-
gress, cannot enact that the records of the former territorial court
of appeals should become records of its own courts or provide by
law for proceedings based thereon.288
Property Rights of States to Soil Under Navigable Waters

The “equal footing” doctrine has had an important effect on the
property rights of new states to soil under navigable waters 289 and
tidally influenced waters.290 In Pollard’s Lessee v. Hagan,291 as was
observed above, the Court held that the original states had re-
served to themselves the ownership of the shores of navigable wa-
ters and the soils under them, and that under the principle of equal-
ity the title to the soils beneath navigable water passes to a new
state upon admission. The principle of this case, which also applies
to tidally influenced waters, supplies the rule of decision in many
property-claims cases.292
After refusing to extend the inland-water rule of Pollard’s Les-
see to the three mile marginal belt under the ocean along the coast,293
the Court applied the principle in reverse in United States v. Texas.294
Because the original states had been found not to own the soil un-
287 John v. Paullin, 231 U.S. 583 (1913).
288 Hunt v. Palao, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 589 (1846). Cf. Benner v. Porter, 50 U.S. (9
How.) 235, 246 (1850).
289 “Navigable waters,” for equal footing purposes, are those waters used, or sus-
ceptible to use, for trade and travel at the time of statehood. PPL Montana, LLC v.
Montana, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–218, slip op. at 11–13 (2012).
290 E.g., Knight v. U.S. Land Association, 142 U.S. 161, 183 (1891).
291 44 U.S. (3 How.) 212, 223 (1845). See also Martin v. Waddell, 41 U.S. (16
Pet.) 367, 410 (1842).

292 See PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–218, slip op. (2012)
(Montana not able to charge rent to hydroelectric facilities located on portions of

rivers that were impassable when Montana became a State); Phillips Petroleum Co.
v. Mississippi, 484 U.S. 469 (1988) (confirming language in earlier cases recognizing
state sovereignty over tidal but nonnavigable lands); Utah Division of State Lands
v. United States, 482 U.S. 193 (1987) (applying presumption against congressional
intent to defeat state title to find inadequate federal reservation of lake bed); Idaho
v. United States, 533 U.S. 262 (2001) (presumption rebutted by indications—some
occurring after statehood—that Congress intended to reserve certain submerged lands
for benefit of an Indian tribe); Oregon ex rel. State Land Bd. v. Corvallis Sand &
Gravel Co., 429 U.S. 363 (1977) (doctrine requires utilization of state common law
rather than federal to determine ownership of land underlying river that is navi-
gable but not an interstate boundary); Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1 (1894) (whether
Oregon or a pre-statehood grantee from the United States of riparian lands near
mouth of Columbia River owned soil below high-water mark).
293 United States v. California, 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947); United States v. Louisi-
ana, 339 U.S. 699 (1950).

294 339 U.S. 707, 716 (1950). See United States v. Maine, 420 U.S. 515 (1975)
(unanimously reaffirming the California, Louisiana, and Texas cases).

der the three mile belt, Texas, which concededly did own this soil
before its annexation to the United States, was held to have surren-
dered its dominion and sovereignty over it, upon entering the Union
on terms of equality with the existing states. To this extent, the
earlier rule that unless otherwise declared by Congress the title to
every species of property owned by a territory passes to the state
upon admission 295 has been qualified. However, when Congress,
through passage of the Submerged Lands Act of 1953,296 surren-
dered its paramount rights to natural resources in the marginal seas
to certain states, without any corresponding cession to all states,
the transfer was held to entail no abdication of national sover-
eignty over control and use of the oceans in a manner destructive
of the equality of the states.297
While the territorial status continues, the United States has power
to convey property rights, such as rights in soil below the high-
water mark along navigable waters,298 or the right to fish in desig-
nated waters,299 which will be binding on the state.
Clause 2. The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and

make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Terri-
tory or other Property belonging to the United States; and noth-
ing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice
any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
PROPERTY AND TERRITORY: POWERS OF CONGRESS
Methods of Disposing of Property

The Constitution is silent as to the methods of disposing of prop-
erty of the United States. In United States v. Gratiot,300 in which
the validity of a lease of lead mines on government lands was put
295 Brown v. Grant, 116 U.S. 207, 212 (1886).
296 67 Stat. 29, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–1315.
297 Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 274–77, 281 (1954). Justice Black and Doug-
las dissented.
298 Shively v. Bowlby, 152 U.S. 1, 47 (1894). See also Joy v. St. Louis, 201 U.S.
332 (1906).
299 United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 378 (1905); Seufert Bros. v. United
States, 249 U.S. 194 (1919). A fishing right granted by treaty to Indians does not
necessarily preclude the application to Indians of state game laws regulating the
time and manner of taking fish. New York ex rel. Kennedy v. Becker, 241 U.S. 556
(1916). See also Metlakatla Indians v. Egan, 369 U.S. 45, 54, 57–59 (1962); Kake
Village v. Egan, 369 U.S. 60, 64–65, 67–69, 75–76 (1962). But it has been held to be
violated by exacting a license fee that is both regulatory and revenue-producing. Tulee
v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681 (1942).
300 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 526 (1840).
Sec. 3—New States Cl. 2—Property of the United States
in issue, the contention was advanced that “disposal is not letting

or leasing,” and that Congress has no power “to give or authorize
leases.” The Court sustained the leases, saying “the disposal must
be left to the discretion of Congress.” 301 Nearly a century later this
power to dispose of public property was relied upon to uphold the
generation and sale of electricity by the Tennessee Valley Author-
ity. The reasoning of the Court ran thus: the potential electrical en-
ergy made available by the construction of a dam in the exercise of
its constitutional powers is property which the United States is en-
titled to reduce to possession; to that end it may install the equip-
ment necessary to generate such energy. In order to widen the mar-
ket and make a more advantageous disposition of the product, it
may construct transmission lines and may enter into a contract with
a private company for the interchange of electric energy.302
Public Lands: Federal and State Powers Thereover

No appropriation of public lands may be made for any purpose
except by authority of Congress.303 However, Congress was held to
have acquiesced in the long-continued practice of withdrawing land
from the public domain by Executive Orders.304 In 1976 Congress
enacted legislation that established procedures for withdrawals and
that explicitly disclaimed continued acquiescence in any implicit ex-
ecutive withdrawal authority.305 The comprehensive authority of Con-
gress over public lands includes the power to prescribe the times,
conditions, and mode of transfer thereof and to designate the per-
sons to whom the transfer shall be made,306 to declare the dignity
and effect of titles emanating from the United States,307 to deter-
mine the validity of grants which antedate the government’s acqui-
sition of the property,308 to exempt lands acquired under the home-
stead laws from previously contracted debts,309 to withdraw land
301 39 U.S. at 533, 538.
302 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 335–40 (1936). See also Alabama Power
Co. v. Ickes, 302 U.S. 464 (1938).
303 United States v. Fitzgerald, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 407, 421 (1841). See also Cali-
fornia v. Deseret Water, Oil & Irrigation Co., 243 U.S. 415 (1917); Utah Power &
Light Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 389 (1917).
304 Sioux Tribe v. United States, 316 U.S. 317 (1942); United States v. Midwest
Oil Co., 236 U.S. 459, 469 (1915).

305 Federal Land Policy and Management Act, Pub. L. 94–579, § 704(a); 90 Stat.
2792 (1976).
306 Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1872); see also Irvine v. Mar-
shall, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 558 (1858); Emblem v. Lincoln Land Co., 184 U.S. 660, 664
(1902).
307 Bagnell v. Broderick, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 436, 450 (1839). See also Field v. Seabury,
60 U.S. (19 How.) 323, 332 (1857).

308 Tameling v. United States Freehold & Immigration Co., 93 U.S. 644, 663 (1877).
See also Maxwell Land-Grant Case, 121 U.S. 325, 366 (1887).
309 Ruddy v. Rossi, 248 U.S. 104 (1918).
from settlement and to prohibit grazing thereon,310 to prevent un-

lawful occupation of public property and to declare what are nui-
sances, as affecting such property, and provide for their abate-
ment,311 and to prohibit the introduction of liquor on lands purchased
and used for an Indian colony.312 Congress may limit the disposi-
tion of the public domain to a manner consistent with its views of
public policy. A restriction inserted in a grant of public lands to a
municipality which prohibited the grantee from selling or leasing
to a private corporation the right to sell or sublet water or electric
energy supplied by the facilities constructed on such land was held
valid.313
Unanimously upholding a federal law to protect wild-roaming
horses and burros on federal lands, the Court restated the appli-
cable principles governing Congress’s power under this clause. It
empowers Congress to act as both proprietor and legislature over
the public domain; Congress has complete power to make those “need-
ful rules” which in its discretion it determines are necessary. When
Congress acts with respect to those lands covered by the clause, its
legislation overrides conflicting state laws.314 Absent action by Con-
gress, however, states may in some instances exercise some jurisdic-
tion over activities on federal lands.315
No state may tax public lands of the United States within its
borders,316 nor may state legislation interfere with the power of Con-
gress under this clause or embarrass its exercise.317 Thus, by vir-
tue of a Treaty of 1868, according self-government to Navajos liv-
ing on an Indian Reservation in Arizona, the tribal court, rather
than the courts of that state, had jurisdiction over a suit for a debt
owed by an Indian resident thereof to a non-Indian conducting a
store on the reservation under federal license.318 The question whether
title to land that has once been the property of the United States
has passed from it must be resolved by the laws of the United States;
after title has passed, “that property, like all other property in the
state, is subject to the state legislation; so far as that legislation is
310 Light v. United States, 220 U.S. 523 (1911). See also The Yosemite Valley Case,
82 U.S. (15 Wall.) 77 (1873).

311 Camfield v. United States, 167 U.S. 518, 525 (1897). See also Jourdan v. Bar-
rett, 45 U.S. (4 How.) 169 (1846); United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76 (1884).
312 United States v. McGowan, 302 U.S. 535 (1938).
313 United States v. City of San Francisco, 310 U.S. 16 (1940).
314 Kleppe v. New Mexico, 426 U.S. 529 (1976).
315 California Coastal Comm’n v. Granite Rock Co., 480 U.S. 572 (1987).
316 Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U.S. 151 (1886); cf. Wilson v. Cook, 327 U.S.
474 (1946).
317 Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 92, 99 (1872). See also Irvine v. Mar-
shall, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 558 (1858); Emblem v. Lincoln Land Co., 184 U.S. 660, 664
(1902).
318 Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
consistent with the admission that the title passed and vested ac-
cording to the laws of the United States.” 319 In construing a convey-
ance by the United States of land within a state, the settled and
reasonable rule of construction of the state affords a guide in deter-
mining what impliedly passes to the grantee as an incident to land
expressly granted.320 But a state statute enacted subsequently to a
federal grant cannot operate to vest in the state rights that either
remained in the United States or passed to its grantee.321
Territories: Powers of Congress Thereover

In the territories, Congress has the entire dominion and sover-
eignty, national and local, and has full legislative power over all
subjects upon which a state legislature might act.322 It may legis-
late directly with respect to the local affairs of a territory or it may
transfer that function to a legislature elected by the citizens thereof,323
which will then be invested with all legislative power except as lim-
ited by the Constitution of the United States and acts of Con-
gress.324 In 1886, Congress prohibited the enactment by territorial
legislatures of local or special laws on enumerated subjects.325 The
constitutional guarantees of private rights are applicable in territo-
ries which have been made a part of the United States by congres-
sional action 326 but not in unincorporated territories.327 Congress
319 Wilcox v. McConnel, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 498, 517 (1839).
320 Oklahoma v. Texas, 258 U.S. 574, 595 (1922).
321 United States v. Oregon, 295 U.S. 1, 28 (1935).
322 Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899). See also United States v. McMillan,
165 U.S. 504, 510 (1897); El Paso & N.E. Ry. v. Gutierrez, 215 U.S. 87 (1909); First
Nat’l Bank v. County of Yankton, 101 U.S. 129, 133 (1880).
323 Binns v. United States, 194 U.S. 486, 491 (1904). See also Sere v. Pitot, 10
U.S. (6 Cr.) 332, 336 (1810); Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15, 44 (1885).
324 Walker v. New Mexico & So. Pac. R.R., 165 U.S. 593, 604 (1897); Simms v.
Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 163 (1899); Wagoner v. Evans, 170 U.S. 588, 591 (1898).
325 24 Stat. 170 (1886).
326 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 271 (1901). See also Mormon Church v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1, 14 (1890); ICC v. United States ex rel. Humboldt Steam-
ship Co., 224 U.S. 474 (1912).
327 Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138
(1904); Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922) (collectively, the Insular Cases).
The guarantees of fundamental rights apply to persons in Puerto Rico, id. at 312–
13, but what these are and how they are to be determined, in light of Balzac’s hold-
ing that the right to a civil jury trial was not protected. The vitality of the Insular
Cases has been questioned by some Justices (Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957)
(plurality opinion); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465, 474, 475 (1979) (concurring
opinion of four Justices)), but there is no doubt that the Court adheres to it (United
States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 268 (1990); Harris v. Rosario, 446 U.S.
651 (1980)). Applying stateside rights in Puerto Rico are Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974) (procedural due process); Examining Bd. v.
Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976) (equal protection principles); Torres v. Puerto
Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979) (search and seizure); Harris v. Rosario, supra (same); Ro-
driguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1982) (equality of voting rights);
may establish, or may authorize the territorial legislature to cre-

ate, legislative courts whose jurisdiction is derived from statutes en-
acted pursuant to this section other than from Article III.328 Such
courts may exercise admiralty jurisdiction despite the fact that such
jurisdiction may be exercised in the states only by constitutional
courts.329
SECTION 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State

in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall pro-
tect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the
Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot
be convened) against domestic Violence.
GUARANTEE OF REPUBLICAN FORM OF

GOVERNMENT
The first clause of this section, in somewhat different language,
was contained in the Virginia Plan introduced in the Convention
and was obviously attributable to Madison.330 Through the various
permutations into its final form,331 the object of the clause seems
Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328, 331
n.1 (1986) (First Amendment speech). See also Califano v. Torres, 435 U.S. 1, 4 n.6
(1978) (right to travel assumed). Puerto Rico is, of course, not the only territory that
is the subject of the doctrine of the Insular Cases. E.g., Ocampo v. United States,
234 U.S. 91 (1914) (Philippines and Sixth Amendment jury trial); Hawaii v. Mankichi,
190 U.S. 197 (1903) (grand jury indictment and trial by jury).
328 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828). See also Clin-
ton v. Englebrecht, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 434, 447 (1872); Hornbuckle v. Toombs, 85
U.S. (18 Wall.) 648, 655 (1874); Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 154 (1879);
The “City of Panama,” 101 U.S. 453, 460 (1880); McAllister v. United States, 141
U.S. 174, 180 (1891); United States v. McMillan, 165 U.S. 504, 510 (1897); Romeu v.
Todd, 206 U.S. 358, 368 (1907).
329 American Ins. Co. v. Canter, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 545 (1828).
330 “Resd. that a Republican government . . . ought to be guaranteed by the United
States to each state.” 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787
22 (rev. ed. 1937). In a letter in April, 1787, to Randolph, who formally presented
the Virginia Plan to the Convention, Madison had suggested that “an article ought
to be inserted expressly guaranteeing the tranquility of the states against internal
as well as external danger. . . . Unless the Union be organized efficiently on repub-
lican principles innovations of a much more objectionable form may be obtruded.” 2
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 336 (G. Hunt ed., 1900). On the background of the clause,
see W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ch. 1 (1972).
331 Thus, on June 11, the language of the provision was on Madison’s motion
changed to: “Resolved that a republican constitution and its existing laws ought to
be guaranteed to each state by the United States.” 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 193–194, 206 (rev. ed. 1937). Then, on July 18, Gouverneur
Morris objected to this language on the ground that “[h]e should be very unwilling
that such laws as exist in R. Island ought to be guaranteed to each State of the
Union.” 2 id. at 47. Madison then suggested language “that the Constitutional au-
thority of the States shall be guaranteed to them respectively against domestic as
Sec. 4—Obligations of United States to States
clearly to have been more than an authorization for the Federal

Government to protect states against foreign invasion or internal
insurrection,332 a power seemingly already conferred in any case.333
No one can now resurrect the full meaning of the clause and intent
which moved the Framers to adopt it, but with the exception of the
reliance for a brief period during Reconstruction the authority con-
tained within the confines of the clause has been largely unex-
plored.334
In Luther v. Borden,335 the Supreme Court established the doc-
trine that questions arising under this section are political, not ju-
dicial, in character and that “it rests with Congress to decide what
government is the established one in a State . . . as well as its re-
publican character.” 336 Texas v. White 337 held that the action of the
President in setting up provisional governments at the conclusion
of the war was justified, if at all, only as an exercise of his powers
as Commander-in-Chief and that such governments were to be re-
garded merely as provisional regimes to perform the functions of
government pending action by Congress. On the ground that the
issues were not justiciable, the Court in the early part of this cen-
tury refused to pass on a number of challenges to state governmen-
tal reforms and thus made the clause in effect noncognizable by the
courts in any matter,338 a status from which the Court’s opinion in
well as foreign violence,” whereas Randolph wanted to add to this the language “and
that no State be at liberty to form any other than a Republican Govt.” Wilson then
moved, “as a better expression of the idea,” almost the present language of the sec-
tion, which was adopted. Id. at 47–49.
332 Thus, Randolph on June 11, supporting Madison’s version pending then, said
that “a republican government must be the basis of our national union; and no state
in it ought to have it in their power to change its government into a monarchy.” 1
id. at 206. Again, on July 18, when Wilson and Mason indicated their understand-
ing that the object of the proposal was “merely” to protect states against violence,
Randolph asserted: “The Resoln. has 2 Objects. 1. to secure Republican government.
2. to suppress domestic commotions. He urged the necessity of both these provi-
sions.” 2 id. at 47. Following speakers alluded to the dangers of monarchy being
created peacefully as necessitating the provision. Id. at 48. See W. WIECEK, THE GUAR-
ANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION ch. 2 (1972).
333 See Article I, § 8, cl. 15.
334 See generally W. WIECEK, THE GUARANTEE CLAUSE OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION (1972).
335 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
336 48 U.S. at 42.
337 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 729 (1869). In Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50
(1868), the state attempted to attack Reconstruction legislation on the premise that
it already had a republican form of government and that Congress was thus not
authorized to act. The Court viewed the congressional decision as determinative.
338 Pacific States Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118 (1912); Kiernan v. City of Port-
land, 223 U.S. 151 (1912); Davis v. Ohio, 241 U.S. 565 (1916); Ohio v. Akron Park
Dist., 281 U.S. 74 (1930); O’Neill v. Leamer, 239 U.S. 244 (1915); Highland Farms
Dairy v. Agnew, 300 U.S. 608 (1937). But in certain earlier cases the Court had dis-
posed of Guarantee Clause questions on the merits. Forsyth v. City of Hammond,
166 U.S. 506 (1897); Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162 (1875).
Sec. 4—Obligations of United States to States
Baker v. Carr,339 despite its substantial curbing of the political ques-

tion doctrine, did not release it.340
Similarly, in Luther v. Borden,341 the Court indicated that it rested
with Congress to determine the means proper to fulfill the guaran-
tee of protection to the states against domestic violence. Chief Jus-
tice Taney declared that Congress might have placed it in the power
of a court to decide when the contingency had happened that re-
quired the Federal Government to interfere, but that instead Con-
gress had by the act of February 28, 1795,342 authorized the Presi-
dent to call out the militia in case of insurrection against the
government of any state. It followed, said Taney, that the Presi-
dent “must, of necessity, decide which is the government, and which
party is unlawfully arrayed against it, before he can perform the
duty imposed upon him by the act of Congress,” 343 which determi-
nation was not subject to review by the courts.
In recent years, the authority of the United States to use troops
and other forces in the states has not generally been derived from
this clause and it has been of little importance.
339 369 U.S. 186, 218–32 (1962). In the Court’s view, Guarantee Clause ques-
tions were nonjusticiable because resolution of them had been committed to Con-
gress and not because they involved matters of state governmental structure.
340 Subsequently, the Court, speaking through Justice O’Connor, raised without
deciding the possibility that the Guarantee Clause is justiciable and is a constraint
upon Congress’s power to regulate the activities of the states. New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 183–85 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991).
The opinions draw support from a powerful argument for using the Guarantee Clause
as a judicially enforceable limit on federal power. Merritt, The Guarantee Clause
and State Autonomy: Federalism for a Third Century, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1 (1988).
341 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
342 1 Stat. 424.
343 Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1, 43 (1849).
ARTICLE V
MODE OF AMENDMENT
CONTENTS
Page
Amendment of the Constitution ............................................................................................... 965
Scope of the Amending Power ........................................................................................... 965
Proposing a Constitutional Amendment ........................................................................... 966
Proposals by Congress ................................................................................................ 967
The Convention Alternative ....................................................................................... 968
Ratification ................................................................................................................... 968
Authentication and Proclamation .............................................................................. 979
Judicial Review Under Article V ....................................................................................... 979
963
MODE OF AMENDMENT
ARTICLE V
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem
it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or,
on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the sev-
eral States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments,
which in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes,
as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures
of three fourths of the several States or by Conventions in three
fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may
be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which
may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and
eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in
the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, with-
out its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the
Senate.
AMENDMENT OF THE CONSTITUTION
Scope of the Amending Power

When Article V was before the Constitutional Convention, a mo-
tion to insert a provision that “no State shall without its consent
be affected in its internal policy” was made and rejected.1 A further
attempt to impose a substantive limitation on the amending power
was made in 1861, when Congress submitted to the states a pro-
posal to bar any future amendments which would authorize Con-
gress to “interfere, within any State, with the domestic institutions
thereof . . . .” 2 Three states ratified this article before the out-
break of the Civil War made it academic.3 Members of Congress
opposed passage by Congress of the Thirteenth Amendment on the
1 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 630 (rev. ed. 1937).
2 57 CONG. GLOBE 1263 (1861).
3 H. Ames, The Proposed Amendments to the Constitution of the United States
During the First Century of Its History, H. DOC. 353, pt. 2, 54th Congress, 2d Sess.
(1897), 363.
965
966 ART. V—MODE OF AMENDMENT
basis that the amending process could not be used to work such a
major change in the internal affairs of the states, but the protest
was in vain.4 Many years later the validity of both the Eighteenth
and Nineteenth Amendments was challenged because of their con-
tent. The arguments against the former took a wide range. Coun-
sel urged that the power of amendment is limited to the correction
of errors in the framing of the Constitution and that it does not
comprehend the adoption of additional or supplementary provi-
sions. They contended further that ordinary legislation cannot be
embodied in a constitutional amendment and that Congress cannot
constitutionally propose any amendment that involves the exercise
or relinquishment of the sovereign powers of a state.5 The Nine-
teenth Amendment was attacked on the narrower ground that a state
that had not ratified the amendment would be deprived of its equal
suffrage in the Senate because its representatives in that body would
be persons not of its choosing, i.e., persons chosen by voters whom
the state itself had not authorized to vote for Senators.6 Brushing
aside these arguments as unworthy of serious attention, the Su-
preme Court held both amendments valid.
Proposing a Constitutional Amendment

Thirty-three proposed amendments to the Constitution have been
submitted to the states pursuant to this Article, all of them upon
the vote of the requisite majorities in Congress and none by the
alternative convention method.7 In the Convention, much contro-
versy surrounded the issue of the process by which the document
then being drawn should be amended. At first, it was voted that
“provision ought to be made for the amendment [of the Constitu-
tion] whensoever it shall seem necessary” without the agency of Con-
gress being at all involved.8 Acting upon this instruction, the Com-
mittee on Detail submitted a section providing that upon the
application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states Congress
was to call a convention for purpose of amending the Constitution.9
Adopted,10 the section was soon reconsidered on the motion of Fram-
ers of quite different points of view. Some worried that the provi-
sion would allow two-thirds of the states to subvert the others,11
4 66 CONG. GLOBE 921, 1424–1425, 1444–1447, 1483–1488 (1864).
5 National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920).
6 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
7 A recent scholarly study of the amending process and the implications for our
polity is R. BERNSTEIN, AMENDING AMERICA (1993).

8 1 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (rev. ed. 1937),
22, 202–203, 237; 2 id. at 85.

9 Id. at 188.
10 Id. at 467–468.
11 Id. at 557–558 (Gerry).
ART. V—MODE OF AMENDMENT 967
and some thought that Congress would be the first to perceive the
need for amendment and that to leave the matter to the discretion
of the states would mean that no alterations but those increasing
the powers of the states would ever be proposed.12 Madison’s pro-
posal was adopted, empowering Congress to propose amendments
either on its own initiative or upon application by the legislatures
of two-thirds of the states.13 When this provision came back from
the Committee on Style, however, Gouverneur Morris and Gerry suc-
ceeded in inserting the language providing for a convention upon
the application of the legislatures of two-thirds of the states.14
Proposals by Congress.—Few difficulties of a constitutional na-
ture have arisen with regard to this method of initiating constitu-
tional change, the only method, as we noted above, so far success-
fully resorted to. When Madison submitted to the House of
Representatives the proposals from which the Bill of Rights evolved,
he contemplated that they should be incorporated in the text of the
original instrument.15 Instead, the House decided to propose them
as supplementary articles, a method followed since.16 It ignored a
suggestion that the two Houses should first resolve that amend-
ments are necessary before considering specific proposals.17 In the
National Prohibition Cases,18 the Court ruled that, in proposing an
amendment, the two Houses of Congress thereby indicated that they
deemed revision necessary. The same case also established the propo-
sition that the vote required to propose an amendment was a vote
of two thirds of the Members present—assuming the presence of a
quorum—and not a vote of two-thirds of the entire membership.19
The approval of the President is not necessary for a proposed amend-
ment.20
12 Id. at 558 (Hamilton).

13 Id. at 559
14 Id. at 629–630. “Mr. Madison did not see why Congress would not be as much
bound to propose amendments applied for by two-thirds of the state as to call a

Convention on the like application. He saw no objection however against providing
for a Convention for the purpose of amendments, except only that difficulties might
arise as to the form, the quorum etc. which in Constitutional regulations ought to
be as much as possible avoided.”
15 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433–436 (1789).
16 Id. at 717.
17 Id. at 430.
18 253 U.S. 350, 386 (1920).
19 253 U.S. at 386.
20 In Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378 (1798), the Court rejected a
challenge to the Eleventh Amendment based on the argument that it had not been
submitted to the President for approval or veto. The Court’ s brief opinion merely
determined that the Eleventh Amendment was “constitutionally adopted.” Id. at 382.
Apparently during oral argument, Justice Chase opined that “[t]he negative of the
President applies only to the ordinary cases of legislation: He has nothing to do with
the proposition, or adoption, of amendments to the Constitution.” Id. at 381. See
The Convention Alternative.—Because it has never success-

fully been invoked, the convention method of amendment is sur-
rounded by a lengthy list of questions.21 When and how is a conven-
tion to be convened? Must the applications of the requisite number
of states be identical or ask for substantially the same amendment,
or merely deal with the same subject matter? Must the requisite
number of petitions be contemporaneous with each other, substan-
tially contemporaneous, or strung out over several years? Could a
convention be limited to consideration of the amendment or the sub-
ject matter which it is called to consider? These are only a few of
the obvious questions, and others lurk to be revealed on deeper con-
sideration.22 This method has been close to being used several times.
Only one state was lacking when the Senate finally permitted pas-
sage of an amendment providing for the direct election of sena-
tors.23 Two states were lacking in a petition drive for a constitu-
tional limitation on income tax rates.24 The drive for an amendment
to limit the Supreme Court’s legislative apportionment decisions came
within one state of the required number, and a proposal for a bal-
anced budget amendment has been but two states short of the req-
uisite number for some time.25 Arguments existed in each instance
against counting all the petitions, but the political realities no doubt
are that if there is an authentic national movement underlying a
petitioning by two-thirds of the states there will be a response by
Congress.
Ratification.—In 1992, the nation apparently ratified a long-
quiescent 27th Amendment, to the surprise of just about everyone.
Whether the new Amendment has any effect in the area of its sub-
Seth Barrett Tillman, A Textualist Defense of Art. I, Section 7, Clause 3: Why

Hollingsworth v. Virginia was Rightly Decided, and Why INS v. Chadha was Wrongly
Reasoned, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1265 (2005), for extensive analysis of what Hollingsworth’s
delphic pronouncement could mean. Whatever the Court decided in Hollingsworth,
it has since treated the issue as settled. See Hawke v. Smith (No. 1), 253 U.S. 221,
229 (1920) (in Hollingsworth, “this court settled that the submission of a constitu-
tional amendment did not require the action of the President”); INS v. Chadha, 462
U.S. 919, 955 n.21 (1983) (in Hollingsworth, “the Court held Presidential approval
was unnecessary for a proposed constitutional amendment . . . ”).
21 The matter is treated comprehensively in C. Brickfield, Problems Relating to
a Federal Constitutional Convention, 85th Congress, 1st Sess. (Comm. Print; House
Judiciary Committee) (1957). A thorough and critical study of activity under the pe-
tition method can be found in R. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL CONVENTION (1988).
22 Id. See also Federal Constitutional Convention: Hearings Before the Senate Ju-
diciary Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, 90th Congress, 1st Sess. (1967).

23 C. Brickfield, Problems Relating to a Federal Constitutional Convention, 85th
Congress, 1st sess. (Comm. Print; House Judiciary Committee) (1957), 7, 89.
24 Id. at 8–9, 89.
25 R. CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRINKMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY NATIONAL
CONVENTION 73–78, 78–89 (1988).

ject matter, the effective date of congressional pay raises, the adop-
tion of this provision has unsettled much of the supposed learning
on the issue of the timeliness of pendency of constitutional amend-
ments.
It has been accepted that Congress may, in proposing an amend-
ment, set a reasonable time limit for its ratification. Beginning with
the Eighteenth Amendment, save for the Nineteenth, Congress has
included language in all proposals stating that the amendment should
be inoperative unless ratified within seven years.26 All the earlier
proposals had been silent on the question, and two amendments pro-
posed in 1789, one submitted in 1810 and another in 1861, and most
recently one in 1924 had gone to the states and had not been rati-
fied. In Coleman v. Miller,27 the Court refused to pass upon the ques-
tion whether the proposed child labor amendment, the one submit-
ted to the states in 1924, was open to ratification thirteen years
later. This it held to be a political question that Congress would
have to resolve in the event three-fourths of the states ever gave
their assent to the proposal.
In Dillon v. Gloss,28 the Court upheld Congress’s power to pre-
scribe time limitations for state ratifications and intimated that pro-
posals that were clearly out of date were no longer open for ratifi-
cation. Finding nothing express in Article V relating to time
constraints, the Court nevertheless found evidence that strongly sug-
gests that proposed amendments are not open to ratification for all
time or by states acting at widely separate times.29
Three related considerations were put forward. “First, proposal
and ratification are not treated as unrelated acts but as succeeding
steps in a single endeavor, the natural inference being that they
are not to be widely separated in time. Secondly, it is only when
there is deemed to be a necessity therefor that amendments are to
be proposed, the reasonable implication being that when proposed
they are to be considered and disposed of presently. Thirdly, as rati-
fication is but the expression of the approbation of the people and
is to be effective when had in three-fourths of the States, there is a
fair implication that it must be sufficiently contemporaneous in that
26 Seven-year periods were included in the texts of the proposals of the 18th,
20th, 21st, and 22d amendments. Apparently concluding in proposing the 23d that
putting the time limit in the text merely cluttered up the amendment, Congress in
it and in subsequent amendments included the time limits in the authorizing reso-
lution. After the extension debate over the Equal Rights proposal, Congress once
again inserted into the text of the amendment the time limit with respect to the
proposal of voting representation in Congress for the District of Columbia.
27 307 U.S. 433 (1939).
28 256 U.S. 368 (1921).
29 256 U.S. at 374.
number of States to reflect the will of the people in all sections at

relatively the same period, which of course ratification scattered
through a long series of years would not do.” 30
Continuing, the Court observed that this conclusion was the far
better one, because the consequence of the opposite view was that
the four amendments proposed long before, including the two sent
out to the states in 1789 “are still pending and in a situation where
their ratification in some of the States many years since by repre-
sentatives of generations now largely forgotten may be effectively
supplemented in enough more States to make three-fourths by rep-
resentatives of the present or some future generation. To that view
few would be able to subscribe, and in our opinion it is quite unten-
able.” 31
What seemed “untenable” to a unanimous Court in 1921 proved
quite acceptable to both executive and congressional branches in 1992.
After a campaign calling for the resurrection of the 1789 proposal,
which was originally transmitted to the states as one of the twelve
original amendments, enough additional states ratified to make up
a three-fourths majority, and the responsible executive official pro-
claimed the amendment as ratified as both Houses of Congress con-
curred in resolutions.32
That there existed a “reasonable” time limit for ratification was
strongly controverted.33 The Office of Legal Counsel of the Depart-
ment of Justice prepared for the White House counsel an elaborate
memorandum that disputed all aspects of the Dillon opinion.34 First,
Dillon’s discussion of contemporaneity was discounted as dictum.35
Second, the three “considerations” relied on in Dillon were deemed
unpersuasive. Thus, the Court simply assumes that, because pro-
30 256 U.S. at 374–75.
31 256 U.S. at 375. One must observe that all the quoted language is dicta, the
actual issue in Dillon being whether Congress could include a time limit in the text
of a proposed amendment. In Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 453–54 (1939), Chief
Justice Hughes, for a plurality, accepted the Dillon dictum, despite his opinion’s force-
ful argument for judicial abstinence on constitutional amendment issues. The other
four Justices in the Court majority thought Congress had complete and sole control
over the amending process, subject to no judicial review. Id. at 459.
32 Supra, “Congressional Pay”; infra, “Twenty-Seventh Amendment.”
33 Thus, Professor Tribe wrote: “Article V says an amendment ‘shall be valid to
all Intents and Purposes, as part of this Constitution’ when ‘ratified’ by three-
fourths of the states—not that it might face a veto for tardiness. Despite the Su-
preme Court’s suggestion, no speedy ratification rule may be extracted from Article
V’s text, structure or history.” Laurence H. Tribe, The 27th Amendment Joins the
Constitution, WALL STREET JOURNAL, May 13, 1992, A15.
34 16 Ops. of the Office of Legal Coun. 102 (1992) (prelim. pr.).
35 Id. at 109–110. Coleman’s endorsement of the dictum in the Hughes opinion
was similarly pronounced dictum. Id. at 110. Both characterizations, as noted above,
are correct.
posal and ratification are steps in a single process, the process must
be short rather than lengthy; the argument that an amendment should
reflect necessity says nothing about the length of time available, in
that the more recent ratifying states obviously thought the pay amend-
ment was necessary; and the fact that an amendment must reflect
consensus does not so much as intimate contemporaneous consen-
sus.36 Third, the OLC memorandum argued that the proper mode
of interpretation of Article V was to “provide a clear rule that is
capable of mechanical application, without any need to inquire into
the timeliness or substantive validity of the consensus achieved by
means of the ratification process. Accordingly, any interpretation that
would introduce confusion must be disfavored.” 37 The rule ought to
be, echoing Professor Tribe, that an amendment is ratified when
three-fourths of the states have approved it.38 The memorandum
vigorously pursues a “plain-meaning” rule of constitutional construc-
tion. Article V says nothing about time limits, and elsewhere in the
Constitution when the Framers wanted to include time limits they
did so. The absence of any time language means there is no require-
ment of contemporaneity or of a “reasonable” period.39
Now that the Amendment has been proclaimed and has been
accepted by Congress, where does this development leave the argu-
ment over the validity of proposals long distant in time? One may
assume that this precedent stands for the proposition that propos-
als remain viable forever. It may, on the one hand, stand for the
proposition that certain proposals, because they reflect concerns that
are as relevant today, or perhaps in some future time, as at the
time of transmission to the states, remain open to ratification. Cer-
tainly, the public concern with congressional pay made the Twenty-
seventh Amendment particularly pertinent. The other 1789 pro-
posal, relating to the number of representatives, might remain viable
under this standard, whereas the other proposals would not. On the
other hand, it is possible to argue that the precedent is an “aberra-
tion,” that its acceptance owed more to a political and philosophi-
cal argument between executive and legislative branches and to the
defensive posture of Congress in the political context of 1992 that
led to an uncritical acceptance of the Amendment. In that latter
light, the development is relevant to but not dispositive of the con-
troversy. And, barring some judicial interpretation, that is likely to
be where the situation rests.
36Id. at 111–112.
37Id. at 113.
38 Id. at 113–116.
39 Id. at 103–106. The OLC also referenced previous debates in Congress in which
Members had assumed this proposal and the others remained viable. Id.
Nothing in the status of the precedent created by the Twenty-

seventh Amendment suggests that Congress may not, when it pro-
poses an amendment, include a time limitation either in the text
or in the accompanying resolution, simply as an exercise of its nec-
essary and proper power.
Whether Congress may extend a ratification period without ne-
cessitating new action by states that have already ratified em-
broiled Congress, the states, and the courts in argument with re-
spect to the proposed Equal Rights Amendment.40 Proponents argued
and opponents doubted that the fixing of a time limit and the ex-
tending of it were powers committed exclusively to Congress under
the political question doctrine and that in any event Congress had
power to extend. It was argued that inasmuch as the fixing of a
reasonable time was within Congress’s power and that Congress could
fix the time either in advance or at some later point, based upon
its evaluation of the social and other bases of the necessities of the
amendment, Congress did not do violence to the Constitution when,
once having fixed the time, it subsequently extended the time. Pro-
ponents recognized that if the time limit was fixed in the text of
the amendment Congress could not alter it because the time limit
as well as the substantive provisions of the proposal had been sub-
ject to ratification by a number of states, making it unalterable by
Congress except through the amending process again. Opponents
argued that Congress, having by a two-thirds vote sent the amend-
ment and its authorizing resolution to the states, had put the mat-
ter beyond changing by passage of a simple resolution, that states
had either acted upon the entire package or at least that they had
or could have acted affirmatively upon the promise of Congress that
if the amendment had not been ratified within the prescribed pe-
riod it would expire and their assent would not be compelled for
longer than they had intended. Congress did pass a resolution ex-
tending by three years the period for ratification.41
Litigation followed and a federal district court, finding the is-
sue to be justiciable, held that Congress did not have the power to
extend, but before the Supreme Court could review the decision the
extended time period expired and mooted the matter.42
Also much disputed during consideration of the proposed Equal
Rights Amendment was the question whether, once a state had rati-
40 See Equal Rights Amendment Extension: Hearings Before the Senate Judi-
ciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. (1978); Equal Rights
Amendment Extension: Hearings Before the House Judiciary Subcommittee on Civil
and Constitutional Rights, 95th Congress, 1st/2d Sess. (1977–78).
41 H.J. Res. 638, 95th Congress, 2d Sess. (1978); 92 Stat. 3799.
42 Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107 (D. Idaho, 1981), prob. juris. noted, 455
U.S. 918 (1982), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
fied, it could thereafter withdraw or rescind its ratification, preclud-

ing Congress from counting that state toward completion of ratifi-
cation. Four states had rescinded their ratifications and a fifth had
declared that its ratification would be void unless the amendment
was ratified within the original time limit.43 The issue was not with-
out its history. The Fourteenth Amendment was ratified by the leg-
islatures of Ohio and New Jersey, both of which subsequently passed
rescinding resolutions. Contemporaneously, the legislatures of Geor-
gia, North Carolina, and South Carolina rejected ratification reso-
lutions. Pursuant to the Act of March 2, 1867,44 the governments
of those states were reconstituted and the new legislatures ratified.
Thus, there were presented both the question of the validity of a
withdrawal and the question of the validity of a ratification follow-
ing rejection. Congress requested the Secretary of State 45 to report
on the number of states ratifying the proposal, and the Secretary’s
response specifically noted the actions of the Ohio and New Jersey
legislatures. The Secretary then issued a proclamation reciting that
29 states, including the two that had rescinded and the three which
had ratified after first rejecting, had ratified, which was one more
than the necessary three-fourths. He noted the attempted with-
drawal of Ohio and New Jersey and observed that it was doubtful
whether such attempts were effectual in withdrawing consent.46 He
therefore certified the amendment to be in force if the rescissions
by Ohio and New Jersey were invalid. The next day Congress ad-
opted a resolution listing all 29 states, including Ohio and New Jer-
sey, as having ratified and concluded that the ratification process
was completed.47 The Secretary of State then proclaimed the Amend-
ment as part of the Constitution.
In Coleman v. Miller,48 the congressional action was inter-
preted as going directly to the merits of withdrawal after ratifica-
43 Nebraska (March 15, 1973), Tennessee (April 23, 1974), and Idaho (February
8, 1977) all passed rescission resolutions without dispute about the actual passage.
The Kentucky rescission was attached to another bill and was vetoed by the Lieu-
tenant Governor, acting as Governor, citing grounds that included a state constitu-
tional provision prohibiting the legislature from passing a law dealing with more
than one subject and a senate rule prohibiting the introduction of new bills within
the last ten days of a session. Both the resolution and the veto message were sent
by the Kentucky Secretary of State to the General Services Administration. South
Dakota was the fifth state.
44 14 Stat. 428.
45 The Secretary was then responsible for receiving notices of ratification and
proclaiming adoption.
46 15 Stat. 706, 707.
47 15 Stat. 709.
48 307 U.S. 433, 488–50 (1939) (plurality opinion). For an alternative construc-
tion of the precedent, see Corwin & Ramsey, The Constitutional Law of Constitu-
tional Amendment, 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 185, 201–204 (1951). The legislature of New
tion and of ratification after rejection. “Thus, the political depart-

ments of the Government dealt with the effect of previous rejection
and of attempted withdrawal and determined that both were inef-
fectual in the presence of an actual ratification.”
Although rescission was hotly debated with respect to the Equal
Rights Amendment, the failure of ratification meant that nothing
definitive emerged from the debate. The questions that must be re-
solved are whether the matter is justiciable, that is, whether under
the political question doctrine resolution of the issue is committed
exclusively to Congress, and whether there is judicial review of what
Congress’s power is in respect to deciding the matter of rescission.
The Fourteenth Amendment precedent and Coleman v. Miller com-
bine to suggest that resolution is a political question committed to
Congress, but the issue is not settled.
The Twenty-seventh Amendment precedent is relevant here. The
Archivist of the United States proclaimed the Amendment as hav-
ing been ratified a day previous to the time both Houses of Con-
gress adopted resolutions accepting ratification.49 There is no neces-
sary conflict, because the Archivist and Congress concurred in their
actions, but the Office of Legal Counsel of the Department of Jus-
tice opined that the Coleman precedent was not binding and that
the Fourteenth Amendment action by Congress was an “aberra-
tion.” 50 That is, the memorandum argued that the Coleman opin-
ion by Chief Justice Hughes was for only a plurality of the Court
and, moreover, was dictum, as it addressed an issue not before the
Court.51 On the merits, OLC argued that Article V gave Congress
no role other than to propose amendments and to specify the mode
of ratification. An amendment is valid when ratified by three-
fourths of the states, no further action being required. Although some-
one must determine when the requisite number have acted, OLC
argued that the executive officer charged with the function of certi-
fying, now the Archivist, has only the ministerial duty of counting
the notifications sent to him. Separation of powers and federalism
concerns also counseled against a congressional role, and past prac-
York attempted to withdraw its ratification of the 15th Amendment; although the
Secretary of State listed New York among the ratifying states, noted the with-
drawal resolution, there were ratifications from three-fourths of the states without
New York. 16 Stat. 1131.
49 F. R. Doc. 92–11951, 57 Fed. Reg. 21187; 138 CONG. REC. (daily ed.) S6948–49,
H3505–06.
50 16 Ops. of the Office of Legal Coun. 102, 125 (1992) (prelim. pr.).
51 Id. at 118–121.
tice, in which all but the Fourteenth Amendment were certified by

an executive officer, was noted as supporting a decision against a
congressional role.52
What would be the result of adopting one view over the other?
First, finding that resolution of the question is committed to Con-
gress merely locates the situs of the power and says nothing about
what the resolution should be. That Congress in the past has re-
fused to accept rescissions is but the starting point, because, un-
like courts, Congress operates under no principle of stare decisis so
that the decisions of one Congress on a subject do not bind future
Congresses. If Congress were to be faced with a decision about the
validity of rescission, to what standards should it look?
That a question of constitutional interpretation may be “politi-
cal” in the sense of being committed to one or to both of the “politi-
cal” branches is not, of course, a judgment that in its resolution
the political branch may decide without recourse to principle. Reso-
lution of political questions is not subject to judicial review, so the
decisionmaker need not be troubled with the prospect of being over-
ruled. But both legislators and executive are bound by oath to ob-
serve the Constitution,53 and consequently the search for an an-
swer must begin with the original document.
It may be, however, that the Constitution does not speak to the
issue. Generally, in the exercise of judicial review, courts view the
actions of the legislative and executive branches in terms not of the
wisdom or desirability or propriety of their actions but in terms of
the comportment of those actions with the constitutional grants of
power and constraints upon those powers; if an action is within a
granted power and violates no restriction, the courts will not inter-
fere. How the legislature or the executive decides to deal with a
question within the confines of the powers each constitutionally have
is beyond judicial control.
Therefore, if the Constitution commits decision on an issue to,
say, Congress, and imposes no standards to govern or control the
reaching of that decision, Congress may be free to make a determi-
nation solely as a policy matter, restrained only by its sense of pro-
priety or wisdom or desirability. The reason that these issues are
not justiciable is not only that they are committed to a branch for
decision without intervention by the courts but also that the Con-
stitution does not contain an answer. This interpretation, in the con-
52 Id. at 121–126.
53 Article VI, para. 3. “In the performance of assigned constitutional duties each
branch of the government must initially interpret the Constitution, and the interpre-
tation of its powers by any branch is due great respect from the others.” United
States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703 (1974).
text of amending the Constitution, may be what Chief Justice Hughes

was deciding for the plurality of the Court in Coleman.54
Article V may be read to contain a governing constitutional prin-
ciple, however. Thus, it can be argued that, as written, the provi-
sion contains only language respecting ratification and that, inexo-
rably, once a state acts favorably on a resolution of ratification it
has exhausted its jurisdiction over the subject and cannot re-
scind,55 nor can Congress even authorize a state to rescind.56 This
conclusion is premised on Madison’s argument that a state may not
ratify conditionally, that it must adopt “in toto and for ever.” 57 Al-
though the Madison principle may be unexceptionable in the con-
text in which it was stated, one may doubt that it transfers readily
to the significantly different issue of rescission.
A more pertinent principle seems to be that expressed in Dil-
lon v. Gloss.58 In that case, the action of Congress in fixing a seven-
year period within which ratification was to occur or the proposal
would expire was attacked as vitiating the amendment. The Court,
finding no express provision in Article V, nonetheless concluded that
the fair implication of Article V is “that the ratification must be
54 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450, 453 (1939) (plurality opinion). Thus,
considering the question of ratification after rejection, the Chief Justice found “no
basis in either Constitution or statute” to warrant the judiciary in restraining state
officers from notifying Congress of a state’s ratification, so that it could decide to
accept or reject. “Article 5, speaking solely of ratification, contains no provision as
to rejection.” And in considering whether the Court could specify a reasonable time
for an amendment to be before the state before it lost its validity as a proposal,
Chief Justice Hughes asked: “Where are to be found the criteria for such a judicial
determination? None are to be found in Constitution or statute.” His discussion of
what Congress could look to in fixing a reasonable time, id. at 453–54, is overwhelm-
ingly policy-oriented. On this approach generally, see Henkin, Is There a ‘Political
Question’ Doctrine?, 85 YALE L.J. 597 (1976).
55 See, e.g., the debate between Senator Conkling and Senator Davis on this point
in 89 CONG. GLOBE 1477–1481 (1870).

56 Constitutionality of Extending the Time Period for Ratification of the Pro-
posed Equal Rights Amendment, Memorandum of the Assistant Attorney General,

Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice, in Equal Rights Amendment Exten-
sion: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on the Constitution, 95th
Congress, 2d sess. (1978), 80, 91–99.
57 During the debate in New York on ratification of the Constitution, it was sug-
gested that the state approve the document on condition that certain amendments
the delegates thought necessary be adopted. Madison wrote: “The Constitution re-
quires an adoption in toto and for ever. It has been so adopted by the other states.
An adoption for a limited time would be as defective as an adoption of some of the
articles only. In short any condition whatever must vitiate the ratification.” 5 THE
PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 184 (H. Syrett ed., 1962).
58 256 U.S. 368 (1921). Of course, we recognize, as indicated at various points
above, that Dillon, and Coleman as well, insofar as they discuss points relied on
here, express dictum and are not binding precedent. They are discussed solely for
the persuasiveness of the views set out.
within some reasonable time after the proposal.” 59 Three reasons

underlay the Court’s finding of this implication and they are sug-
gestive on the question of rescission.60
Although addressing a different issue, the Court’s discussion of
the length of time an amendment may reasonably pend before los-
ing its viability is suggestive with respect to rescission. That is, first,
with proposal and ratification as successive steps in a single en-
deavor, second, with the necessity of amendment forming the basis
for adoption of the proposal, and, third, especially with the implica-
tion that an amendment’s adoption should be “sufficiently contem-
poraneous” in the requisite number of states “to reflect the will of
the people in all sections at relatively the same period,” it would
raise a large question were the ratification process to count one or
more states that were acting to withdraw their expression of judg-
ment that amendment was necessary at the same time other states
were acting affirmatively. The “decisive expression of the people’s
will” that is to bind all might well be found lacking in those or simi-
lar circumstances. But employment of this analysis would not nec-
essarily lead in specific circumstances to failures of ratification; the
particular facts surrounding the passage of rescission resolutions,
for example, might lead Congress to conclude that the requisite “con-
temporaneous” “expression of the people’s will” was not under-
mined by the action.
And employment of this analysis would still seem, under these
precedents, to leave to Congress the crucial determination of the
success or failure of ratification. At the same time it was positing
this analysis in the context of passing on the question of Con-
gress’s power to fix a time limit, the Court in Dillon v. Gloss ob-
served that Article V left to Congress the authority “to deal with
subsidiary matters of detail as the public interest and changing con-
ditions may require.” 61 And, in Coleman v. Miller, Chief Justice Hughes
went further in respect to these “matters of detail” being “within
the congressional province” in the resolution of which the decision
by Congress “would not be subject to review by the courts.” 62
59 256 U.S. at 375.

60 256 U.S. at 374–75, quoted supra.
61 256 U.S. at 375–76. It should be noted that the Court seemed to retain the
power for itself to pass on the congressional decision, saying “[o]f the power of Con-
gress, keeping within reasonable limits, to fix a definite period for the ratification
we entertain no doubt” and noting later than no question existed that the seven-
year period was reasonable. Id.
62 307 U.S. 433, 452–54 (1939) (plurality opinion). It is, as noted above, not en-
tirely clear to what extent the Hughes plurality exempted from judicial review con-
gressional determinations made in the amending process. Justice Black’s concur-
Thus, it may be that, if the Dillon v. Gloss construction is found

persuasive, Congress would have constitutional standards to guide
its decision on the validity of rescission. At the same time, if these
precedents reviewed above are adhered to and strictly applied, it
appears that the congressional determination to permit or to disal-
low rescission would not be subject to judicial review.
Adoption of the alternative view, that Congress has no role but
that the appropriate executive official has the sole responsibility, would
entail different consequences. That official, now the Archivist, ap-
pears to have no discretion but to certify once he receives state no-
tification.63 The official could, of course, request a Department of
Justice legal opinion on some issue, such as the validity of rescis-
sions. That is the course advocated by the executive branch, natu-
rally, but it is one a little difficult to square with the ministerial
responsibility of the Archivist.64 In any event, there would seem to
be no support for a political question preclusion of judicial review
under these circumstances. Whether the Archivist certifies on the
mere receipt of a ratification resolution or does so only after ascer-
taining the resolution’s validity, it would appear that it is action
subject to judicial review.65
Congress has complete freedom of choice between the two meth-
ods of ratification recognized by Article V: by the legislatures of the
states or by conventions in the states. In United States v. Sprague,66
counsel advanced the contention that the Tenth Amendment recog-
nized a distinction between powers reserved to the states and pow-
ers reserved to the people, and that state legislatures were compe-
tent to delegate only the former to the National Government;
rence thought the Court “treated the amending process of the Constitution in some
respects as subject to judicial review, in others as subject to the final authority of
Congress” and urged that the Dillon v. Gloss “reasonable time” construction be dis-
approved. Id. at 456, 458.
63 United States ex rel. Widenmann v. Colby, 265 F. 998, 999 (D.C. Cir. 1920),
aff’d mem. 257 U.S. 619 (1921); United States v. Sitka, 666 F. Supp. 19, 22 (D. Conn.
1987), aff’d, 845 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 827 (1988). See 96 CONG.
REC. 3250 (Message from President Truman accompanying Reorg. Plan No. 20 of
1950); 16 Ops. of the Office of Legal Coun. 102, 117 (1992) (prelim. pr.).
64 16 Ops. of the Office of Legal Coun. at 116–118. Thus, OLC says that the
statute “clearly requires that, before performing this ministerial function, the Archi-
vist must determine whether he has received ‘official notice’ that an amendment has
been adopted ‘according to the provisions of the Constitution.’ This is the question
of law that the Archivist may properly submit to the Attorney General for resolu-
tion.” Id. at 118. But if his duty is “ministerial,” it seems, the Archivist may only
notice the fact of receipt of a state resolution; if he may, in consultation with the
Attorney General, determine whether the resolution is valid, that is considerably
more than a “ministerial” function.
65 No doubt under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706, al-
though there may well be questions about one possible exception—the “committed
to agency discretion” provision. Id. at § 701(a)(2).
66 282 U.S. 716 (1931).
delegation of the latter required action of the people through con-

ventions in the several states. The Eighteenth Amendment being
of the latter character, the ratification by state legislatures, so the
argument ran, was invalid. The Supreme Court rejected the argu-
ment. It found the language of Article V too clear to admit of read-
ing any exception into it by implication.
The term “legislatures” as used in Article V means delibera-
tive, representative bodies of the type which in 1789 exercised the
legislative power in the several states. It does not comprehend the
popular referendum, which has subsequently become a part of the
legislative process in many of the states. A state may not validly
condition ratification of a proposed constitutional amendment on its
approval by such a referendum.67 In the words of the Court: “[T]he
function of a state legislature in ratifying a proposed amendment
to the Federal Constitution, like the function of Congress in propos-
ing the amendment, is a federal function derived from the Federal
Constitution; and it transcends any limitations sought to be im-
posed by the people of a State.” 68
Authentication and Proclamation.—Formerly, official notice
from a state legislature, duly authenticated, that it had ratified a
proposed amendment went to the Secretary of State, upon whom it
was binding, “being certified by his proclamation, [was] conclusive
upon the courts” as against any objection which might be subse-
quently raised as to the regularity of the legislative procedure by
which ratification was brought about.69 This function of the Secre-
tary was first transferred to a functionary called the Administrator
of General Services,70 and then to the Archivist of the United States.71
In Dillon v. Gloss,72 the Supreme Court held that the Eighteenth
Amendment became operative on the date of ratification by the thirty-
sixth state, rather than on the later date of the proclamation is-
sued by the Secretary of State, and doubtless the same rule holds
as to a similar proclamation by the Archivist.
Judicial Review Under Article V

Prior to 1939, the Supreme Court had taken cognizance of a
number of diverse objections to the validity of specific amend-
ments. Apart from holding that official notice of ratification by the
67 Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920).
68 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).
69 Act of April 20, 1818, § 2, 3 Stat. 439. The language quoted in the text is
from Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130, 137 (1922).

70 65 Stat. 710–711, § 2; Reorg. Plan No. 20 of 1950, § 1(c), 64 Stat. 1272.
71 National Archives and Records Administration Act of 1984, 98 Stat. 2291, 1
U.S.C. § 106b.
72 256 U.S. 368, 376 (1921).
several states was conclusive upon the courts,73 it had treated these
questions as justiciable, although it had uniformly rejected them
on the merits. In that year, however, the whole subject was thrown
into confusion by the inconclusive decision in Coleman v. Miller.74
This case came up on a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
Kansas to review the denial of a writ of mandamus to compel the
Secretary of the Kansas Senate to erase an endorsement on a reso-
lution ratifying the proposed child labor amendment to the Consti-
tution to the effect that it had been adopted by the Kansas Senate.
The attempted ratification was assailed on three grounds: (1) that
the amendment had been previously rejected by the state legisla-
ture; (2) that it was no longer open to ratification because an unrea-
sonable period of time, thirteen years, had elapsed since its submis-
sion to the states, and (3) that the lieutenant governor had no right
to cast the deciding vote in the Kansas Senate in favor of ratifica-
tion.
Four opinions were written in the Supreme Court, no one of
which commanded the support of more than four members of the
Court. The majority ruled that the plaintiffs, members of the Kan-
sas State Senate, had a sufficient interest in the controversy to give
the federal courts jurisdiction to review the case. Without agree-
ment on the grounds for their decision, a different majority af-
firmed the judgment of the Kansas court denying the relief sought.
Four members who concurred in the result had voted to dismiss
the writ on the ground that the amending process “is ‘political’ in
its entirety, from submission until an amendment becomes part of
the Constitution, and is not subject to judicial guidance, control or
interference at any point.” 75 In an opinion reported as “the opinion
of the Court,” but in which it appears that only two Justices joined
Chief Justice Hughes who wrote it, it was declared that the writ of
mandamus was properly denied, because the question whether a
reasonable time had elapsed since submission of the proposal was
a nonjusticiable political question, the kinds of considerations enter-
73 Leser v. Garnett, 258 U.S. 130 (1922).
74 307 U.S. 433 (1939). Cf. Fairchild v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126 (1922), in which
the Court held that a private citizen could not sue in the federal courts to secure an
indirect determination of the validity of a constitutional amendment about to be ad-
opted.
75 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 456, 459 (1939) (Justices Black, Roberts, Frank-
furter, and Douglas concurring). Because the four believed that the parties lacked
standing to bring the action, id. at 456, 460 (Justice Frankfurter dissenting on this
point, joined by the other three Justices), the further discussion of the applicability
of the political question doctrine is, strictly speaking, dicta. Justice Stevens, then a
circuit judge, also felt free to disregard the opinion because a majority of the Court
in Coleman “refused to accept that position.” Dyer v. Blair, 390 F. Supp. 1291, 1299–
1300 (N.D.Ill. 1975) (three-judge court). See also Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp.
1107, 1125–26 (D. Idaho, 1981), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
ing into deciding being fit for Congress to evaluate, and the ques-
tion of the effect of a previous rejection upon a ratification was simi-
larly nonjusticiable, because the 1868 Fourteenth Amendment
precedent of congressional determination “has been accepted.” 76 But
with respect to the contention that the lieutenant governor should
not have been permitted to cast the deciding vote in favor of ratifi-
cation, the Court found itself evenly divided, thus accepting the judg-
ment of the Kansas Supreme Court that the state officer had acted
validly.77 However, the unexplained decision by Chief Justice Hughes
and his two concurring Justices that the issue of the lieutenant gov-
ernor’s vote was justiciable indicates at the least that their posi-
tion was in disagreement with the view of the other four Justices
in the majority that all questions surrounding constitutional amend-
ments are nonjusticiable.78
However, Coleman does stand as authority for the proposition
that at least some decisions with respect to the proposal and ratifi-
cation of constitutional amendments are exclusively within the pur-
view of Congress, either because they are textually committed to
Congress or because the courts lack adequate criteria of determina-
tion to pass on them.79 But to what extent the political question
76 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 447–56 (1939) (Chief Justice Hughes joined
by Justices Stone and Reed).

77 Justices Black, Roberts, Frankfurter, and Douglas thought this issue was
nonjusticiable too. 307 U.S. at 456. Although all nine Justices joined the rest of the
decision, see id. at 470, 474 (Justice Butler, joined by Justice McReynolds, dissent-
ing), one Justice did not participate in deciding the issue of the lieutenant gover-
nor’s participation; apparently, Justice McReynolds was the absent Member. Note,
28 Geo. L. J. 199, 200 n.7 (1940). Thus, Chief Justice Hughes and Justices Stone,
Reed, and Butler would have been the four finding the issue justiciable.
78 The strongest argument to the effect that constitutional amendment ques-
tions are justiciable is Rees, Throwing Away the Key: The Unconstitutionality of the
Equal Rights Amendment Extension, 58 TEX. L. REV. 875, 886–901 (1980), and his
student note, Comment, Rescinding Ratification of Proposed Constitutional Amend-
ments: A Question for the Court, 37 LA. L. REV. 896 (1977). Two perspicacious schol-
ars of the Constitution have come to opposite conclusions on the issue. Compare Del-
linger, The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process,
97 HARV. L. REV. 386, 414–416 (1983) (there is judicial review), with Tribe, A Consti-
tution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 HARV. L. REV.
433, 435–436 (1983). Much of the scholarly argument, up to that time, is collected
in the ERA-time-extension hearings. Supra. The only recent judicial precedents di-
rectly on point found justiciability on at least some questions. Dyer v. Blair, 390 F.
Supp. 1291 (N.D.Ill., 1975) (three-judge court); Idaho v. Freeman, 529 F. Supp. 1107
(D. Idaho, 1981), vacated and remanded to dismiss, 459 U.S. 809 (1982).
79 In Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962), the Court, in explaining the politi-
cal question doctrine and categorizing cases, observed that Coleman “held that the
questions of how long a proposed amendment to the Federal Constitution remained
open to ratification, and what effect a prior rejection had on a subsequent ratifica-
tion, were committed to congressional resolution and involved criteria of decision
that necessarily escaped the judicial grasp.” Both characteristics were features that
the Court in Baker, 369 U.S. at 217, identified as elements of political questions,
doctrine encompasses the amendment process and what the stan-

dards may be to resolve that particular issue remain elusive.
e.g., “a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a coordi-

nate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable stan-
dards or resolving it.” Later formulations have adhered to this way of expressing
the matter. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969); O’Brien v. Brown, 409 U.S. 1
(1972); Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973). However, it could be argued that, what-
ever the Court may say, what it did, particularly in Powell but also in Baker, largely
drains the political question doctrine of its force. See Uhler v. AFL–CIO, 468 U.S.
1310 (1984) (Justice Rehnquist on Circuit) (doubting Coleman’s vitality in amend-
ment context). But see Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1002 (1979) (opinion of
Justices Rehnquist, Stewart, Stevens, and Chief Justice Burger) (relying heavily upon
Coleman to find an issue of treaty termination nonjusticiable). Compare id. at 1001
(Justice Powell concurring) (viewing Coleman as limited to its context).
ARTICLE VI
PRIOR DEBTS, NATIONAL SUPREMACY, AND OATHS OF

OFFICE
CONTENTS
Page
Clause 1. Validity of Prior Debts and Engagements .............................................................. 985
Prior Debts .......................................................................................................................... 985
Clause 2. Supremacy of the Constitution, Laws and Treaties .............................................. 985
National Supremacy ........................................................................................................... 985
Marshall’s Interpretation of the National Supremacy Clause ................................ 985
The General Issue: Preemption ................................................................................. 986
Preemption Standards ......................................................................................... 989
The Standards Applied ........................................................................................ 991
Specific Applications .................................................................................................... 1005
Federal Immunity Laws and State Courts ........................................................ 1005
Priority of National Claims Over State Claims ................................................ 1005
Federal Versus State Labor Laws ...................................................................... 1006
Obligation of State Courts Under the Supremacy Clause ....................................... 1012
Supremacy Clause Versus the Tenth Amendment ................................................... 1013
Federal Instrumentalities and Personnel and State Police Power ......................... 1023
The Doctrine of Federal Exemption From State Taxation ...................................... 1026
McCulloch v. Maryland ........................................................................................ 1026
Applicability of Doctrine to Federal Securities ................................................. 1026
Taxation of Government Contractors ................................................................. 1028
Taxation of Salaries of Federal Employees ........................................................ 1030
Ad Valorem Taxes Under the Doctrine .............................................................. 1031
Federal Property and Functions ......................................................................... 1033
Federally Chartered Finance Agencies: Statutory Exemptions ....................... 1034
Royalties ................................................................................................................ 1035
Immunity of Lessees of Indian Lands ................................................................ 1035
Summation and Evaluation ........................................................................................ 1036
Clause 3. Oath of Office ............................................................................................................ 1037
Oath of Office ...................................................................................................................... 1037
Power of Congress in Respect to Oaths .................................................................... 1037
National Duties of State Officers ............................................................................... 1037
983
PRIOR DEBTS, NATIONAL SUPREMACY, AND OATHS OF
OFFICE
ARTICLE VI
Clause 1. All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into,
before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against
the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confed-
eration.
PRIOR DEBTS
There have been no interpretations of this clause.
Clause 2. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States

which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made,
or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States,
shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
NATIONAL SUPREMACY
Marshall’s Interpretation of the National Supremacy Clause

The assertion of federal authority under the Supremacy Clause
is most often associated with Chief Justice John Marshall. Prior to
Marshall’s appointment, the Court had considered the clause and
had rendered a state statutory provision that was inconsistent with
a treaty executed by the Federal Government null and void.1 It was
left for Marshall, however, to develop the full significance of the clause
as applied to legislation. By his vigorous opinions in McCulloch v.
Maryland 2 and Gibbons v. Ogden,3 Marshall gave the principle a
vitality that survived despite a century of subsequent vacillation
under the doctrine of dual federalism. In the former case, he as-
serted broadly that “the states have no power, by taxation or other-
wise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control, the op-
erations of the constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into
1 Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199 (1796).
2 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
3 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
985
986 ART. VI—PRIOR DEBTS, SUPREMACY CLAUSE, ETC.
Cl. 2—Supremacy of the Constitution, Laws, and Treaties
execution the powers vested in the general government. This is, we

think, the unavoidable consequence of that supremacy which the
constitution has declared.” 4 From this he concluded that a state tax
upon notes issued by a branch of the Bank of the United States
was void.
In Gibbons v. Ogden, the Court held that certain New York stat-
utes that granted an exclusive right to use steam navigation on the
waters of the state were null and void insofar as they applied to
vessels licensed by the United States to engage in coastal trade.
Chief Justice Marshall wrote: “In argument, however, it has been
contended, that if a law passed by a state, in the exercise of its
acknowledged sovereignty, comes into conflict with a law passed by
Congress in pursuance of the constitution, they affect the subject,
and each other, like equal opposing powers. But the framers of our
constitution foresaw this state of things, and provided for it, by de-
claring the supremacy not only of itself, but of the laws made in
pursuance of it. The nullity of an act, inconsistent with the consti-
tution, is produced by the declaration, that the constitution is the
supreme law. The appropriate application of that part of the clause
which confers the same supremacy on laws and treaties, is to such
acts of the state legislatures as do not transcend their powers, but
though enacted in the execution of acknowledged state powers, in-
terfere with, or are contrary to, the laws of congress, made in pur-
suance of the constitution, or some treaty made under the author-
ity of the United States. In every such case, the act of congress, or
the treaty, is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in
the exercise of powers not controverted, must yield to it.” 5
The General Issue: Preemption

Since the turn of the 20th century, federal legislation has pen-
etrated deeper and deeper into areas once occupied by the regula-
tory power of the states. One result is that state laws on subjects
about which Congress has legislated have been more and more fre-
quently attacked as being incompatible with the acts of Congress
4 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 436.
5 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 210–11. A modern application of Gibbons v. Ogden is
Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265 (1977), in which the Court, relying
on the present version of the licensing statute used by Chief Justice Marshall, struck
down state laws curtailing the operations of federally licensed vessels. In the course
of the Douglas opinion, the Court observed that, “[a]lthough it is true that the Court’s
view in Gibbons of the intent of the Second Congress in passing the Enrollment and
Licensing Act is considered incorrect by commentators, its provisions have been re-
peatedly re-enacted in substantially the same form. We can safely assume that Con-
gress was aware of the holding, as well as the criticism, of a case so renowned as
Gibbons. We have no doubt that Congress has ratified the statutory interpretation
of Gibbons and its progeny.” Id. at 278–79.
ART. VI—PRIOR DEBTS, SUPREMACY CLAUSE, ETC. 987
and hence invalid under the supremacy clause. The cases consid-
ered below are overwhelmingly about federal legislation based on
the Commerce Clause, but the principles enunciated are identical
whatever source of power Congress uses.
The general principle of preemption is that conflicting state law
and policy must yield to the exercise of Congress’s delegated pow-
ers,6 The Supremacy Clause, however, operates whether the author-
ity of Congress is express or implied, and whether the power is solely
Congress’s or if it is conditional upon state acceptance. The latter
may be seen in a series of cases concerning the validity of state
legislation enacted to bring the states within the various programs
authorized by Congress pursuant to the Social Security Act.7 State
participation in the programs is voluntary, technically speaking, and
no state is compelled to enact legislation comporting with the re-
quirements of federal law. Once a state is participating, however,
any of its legislation that is contrary to federal requirements is void
under the Supremacy Clause.8
In applying the Supremacy Clause to subjects that have been
regulated by Congress, the Court’s primary task is to ascertain whether
a challenged state law is compatible with the policy expressed in
the federal statute.9 When Congress legislates with regard to a sub-
ject, the extent and nature of the legal consequences of the regula-
tion are federal questions, the answers to which are to be derived
6 Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 210–11 (1824). See also Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992); Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374 (1992); Mary-
land v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725, 746 (1981); Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 525 (1977).
7 By the Social Security Act of 1935, 49 Stat. 620, 42 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq., Con-
gress established a series of programs operative in those states that joined the sys-
tem and enacted the requisite complying legislation. Although participation is volun-
tary, the underlying federal tax program induces state participation. See Steward
Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–98 (1937).
8 On the operation of federal spending programs upon state laws, see South Da-
kota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (under highway funding programs). On the preemp-
tive effect of federal spending laws, see Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School
Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985). An early example of states being required to conform
their laws to the federal standards is King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309 (1968). Private
parties may compel state acquiescence in federal standards to which they have agreed
by participation in the programs through suits under a federal civil rights law (42
U.S.C. § 1983). Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980). The Court has imposed some
federalism constraints in this area by imposing a “clear statement” rule on Con-
gress when it seeks to impose new conditions on states. Pennhurst State School &
Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 11, 17–18 (1981).
9 Although preemption is basically constitutional in nature, deriving its forceful-
ness from the Supremacy Clause, it is much more like statutory decisionmaking, in
that it depends upon an interpretation of an act of Congress in determining whether
a state law is ousted. E.g., Douglas v. Seacoast Products, Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 271–72
(1977). See also Swift & Co. v. Wickham, 382 U.S. 111 (1965). “Any such pre-
emption or conflict claim is of course grounded in the Supremacy Clause of the Con-
from a consideration of the language and policy of the state. If Con-

gress expressly provides for exclusive federal dominion or if it ex-
pressly provides for concurrent federal-state jurisdiction, the Court’s
task is simplified, though, of course, there may still be doubtful ar-
eas in which interpretation will be necessary. Where Congress is
silent, however, the Court must itself decide whether the effect of
the federal legislation is to oust state jurisdiction.
“The constitutional principles of preemption, in whatever par-
ticular field of law they operate, are designed with a common end
in view: to avoid conflicting regulation of conduct by various official
bodies which might have some authority over the subject mat-
ter.” 10 As Justice Black once explained in a much quoted exposi-
tion of the matter: “There is not—and from the very nature of the
problem there cannot be—any rigid formula or rule which can be
used as a universal pattern to determine the meaning and purpose
of every act of Congress. This Court, in considering the validity of
state laws in the light of treaties or federal laws touching the same
subject, has made use of the following expressions: conflicting; con-
trary to; occupying the field; repugnance; difference; irreconcilabil-
ity; inconsistency; violation; curtailment; and interference. But none
of these expressions provides an infallible constitutional test or an
exclusive constitutional yardstick. In the final analysis, there can
be no one crystal clear distinctly marked formula. Our primary func-
tion is to determine whether, under the circumstances of this par-
ticular case, Pennsylvania’s law stands as an obstacle to the accom-
plishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of
Congress.” 11
Before setting out in their various forms the standards and can-
ons to which the Court formally adheres, one must still recognize
the highly subjective nature of their application. As an astute ob-
server long ago observed, “the use or non-use of particular tests, as
well as their content, is influenced more by judicial reaction to the
desirability of the state legislation brought into question than by
metaphorical sign-language of ‘occupation of the field.’ And it would
seem that this is largely unavoidable. The Court, in order to deter-
mine an unexpressed congressional intent, has undertaken the task
of making the independent judgment of social values that Congress
stitution: if a state measure conflicts with a federal requirement, the state provision
must give way. The basic question involved in these cases, however, is never one of
interpretation of the Federal Constitution but inevitably one of comparing two stat-
utes.” Id. at 120.
10 Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274, 285–86
(1971).
11 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941). This case arose under the immi-
gration power of clause 4.

has failed to make. In making this determination, the Court’s evalu-

ation of the desirability of overlapping regulatory schemes or over-
lapping criminal sanctions cannot but be a substantial factor.” 12
Preemption Standards.—Until roughly the New Deal, as re-
cited above, the Supreme Court applied a doctrine of “dual federal-
ism,” under which the Federal Government and the states were sepa-
rate sovereigns, each preeminent in its own fields but lacking authority
in the other’s. This conception affected preemption cases, with the
Court taking the view, largely, that any congressional regulation of
a subject effectively preempted the field and ousted the states.13 Thus,
when Congress entered the field of railroad regulation, the result
was invalidation of many previously enacted state measures. Even
here, however, safety measures tended to survive, and health and
safety legislation in other areas was protected from the effects of
federal regulatory actions.
In the 1940s, the Court began to develop modern standards, still
recited and relied on, for determining when preemption occurred.14
All modern cases recite some variation of the basic standards. “[T]he
question whether a certain state action is pre-empted by federal law
is one of congressional intent. The purpose of Congress is the ulti-
mate touchstone. To discern Congress’s intent we examine the ex-
plicit statutory language and the structure and purpose of the stat-
ute.” 15 Congress’s intent to supplant state authority in a particular
field may be “explicitly stated in the statute’s language or implic-
12 Cramton, Pennsylvania v. Nelson: A Case Study in Federal Preemption, 26 U.
CHI. L. REV. 85, 87–88 (1956). “The [Court] appears to use essentially the same rea-
soning process in a case nominally hinging on preemption as it has in past cases in
which the question was whether the state law regulated or burdened interstate com-
merce. [The] Court has adopted the same weighing of interests approach in preemp-
tion cases that it uses to determine whether a state law unjustifiably burdens inter-
state commerce. In a number of situations the Court has invalidated statutes on
the preemption ground when it appeared that the state laws sought to favor local
economic interests at the expense of the interstate market. On the other hand, when
the Court has been satisfied that valid local interests, such as those in safety or in
the reputable operation of local business, outweigh the restrictive effect on inter-
state commerce, the Court has rejected the preemption argument and allowed state
regulation to stand.” Note, Preemption as a Preferential Ground: A New Canon of
Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208, 217 (1959) (quoted approvingly as a “thoughtful
student comment” in G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 297 (12th ed. 1991)).
13 E.g., Charleston & W. Car. Ry. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 597, 604 (1915). But
see Corn Products Refining Co. v. Eddy, 249 U.S. 427, 438 (1919).
14 E.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941); Cloverleaf Butter v. Patterson,
315 U.S. 148 (1942); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218 (1947); Califor-
nia v. Zook, 336 U.S. 725 (1949).
15 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 96 (1992) (internal
quotation marks and case citations omitted). Recourse to legislative history as one
means of ascertaining congressional intent, although contested, is permissible. Wis-
consin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 606–12 & n.4 (1991). See also
Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–52, slip op. (2013) (provi-
itly contained in its structure and purpose.” 16 Because preemption

cases, when the statute contains no express provision, theoretically
turn on statutory construction, generalizations about them can carry
one only so far. Each case must construe a different federal statute
with a distinct legislative history. If the statute and the legislative
history are silent or unclear, the Supreme Court has developed gen-
eral criteria which it purports to use in determining the preemp-
tive reach.
“Absent explicit pre-emptive language, we have recognized at
least two types of implied pre-emption: field pre-emption, where the
scheme of federal regulation is so pervasive as to make reasonable
the inference that Congress left no room for the States to supple-
ment it, . . . and conflict pre-emption, where compliance with both
federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility, . . . or where
state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execu-
tion of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 17 However, “fed-
eral regulation of a field of commerce should not be deemed preemp-
tive of state regulatory power in the absence of persuasive reasons—
either that the nature of the regulated subject matters permits no
other conclusion, or that the Congress has unmistakably so or-
dained.” 18 At the same time, “[t]he relative importance to the State
sion of Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act of 1994 regulating activi-

ties of motor carriers “with respect to transportation of property” held not to pre-
empt state laws on the disposal of towed vehicles by towing companies).
16 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
498 U.S. 52 (1990); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 604–605
(1991).
17 Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992) (internal
quotation marks and case citations omitted). The same or similar language is used
throughout the preemption cases. E.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S.
504 (1992); id. at 532–33 (Justice Blackmun concurring and dissenting); id. at 545
(Justice Scalia concurring and dissenting); Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier,
501 U.S. 597, 604–05 (1991); English v. General Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72, 78–80
(1990); Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984); Pacific Gas & Elec.
Co. v. State Energy Resources Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190, 203–04 (1983); Fidelity Fed.
Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 153 (1982); Florida Lime &
Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S.
52, 67 (1941).
18 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 (1963); Chicago
& Northwestern Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 450 U.S. 311, 317 (1981). Where
Congress legislates in a field traditionally occupied by the States, courts should “start
with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were not to be
superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.” Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev.
Comm., 461 U.S. 190, 206 (1983) (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S.
218, 230 (1947)). Nonetheless, this assumption may go only so far. See, e.g., Pliva,
Inc. v. Mensing, 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–993, slip op. at 15 (2011) (Thomas, J., plural-
of its own law is not material when there is a conflict with a valid
federal law, for the Framers of our Constitution provided that the
federal law must prevail.” 19
In the final analysis, “the generalities” that may be drawn from
the cases do not decide them. Rather, “the fate of state legislation
in these cases has not been determined by these generalities but
by the weight of the circumstances and the practical and experi-
enced judgment in applying these generalities to the particular in-
stances.” 20
The Standards Applied.—As might be expected from the ca-
veat just quoted, any overview of the Court’s preemption decisions
can only make the field seem tangled, and to some extent it is. But
some threads may be extracted.
Express Preemption. Of course, it is possible for Congress to write
preemptive language that clearly and cleanly prescribes or does not
prescribe displacement of state laws in an area.21 Provisions govern-
ing preemption can be relatively interpretation free.22 For ex-
ample, a prohibition of state taxes on carriage of air passengers “or
ity opinion) (“[T]he text of the Clause—that federal law shall be supreme, ‘any Thing
in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding’—plainly
contemplates conflict pre-emption by describing federal law as effectively repealing
contrary state law.”).
19 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
20 Union Brokerage Co. v. Jensen, 322 U.S. 202, 211 (1944) (per Justice Frank-
furter).
21 Regulations as well as statutes can preempt. Agency regulations, when Con-
gress has expressly or implied empowered these bodies to preempt, are “the su-
preme law of the land” and can displace state law. E.g., Smiley v. Citibank, 517
U.S. 735 (1996); City of New York v. FCC, 486 U.S. 57, 63–64 (1988); Louisiana Pub-
lic Service Comm’n v. FCC, 476 U.S. 355 (1986); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691 (1984); Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S.
141 (1982). Federal common law, i.e., law applied by the courts in the absence of
explicit statutory directive, and respecting uniquely federal interests, can also dis-
place state law. See Boyle v. United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (Su-
preme Court promulgated common-law rule creating government-contractor defense
in tort liability suits, despite Congress’s having considered and failed to enact bills
doing precisely this); Westfall v. Erwin, 484 U.S. 292 (1988) (civil liability of federal
officials for actions taken in the course of their duty). Finally, ordinances of local
governments are subject to preemption under the same standards as state law.
Hillsborough County v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 471 U.S. 707 (1985).
22 Thus, § 408 of the Federal Meat Inspection Act, as amended by the Whole-
some Meat Act, 21 U.S.C. § 678, provides that “[m]arking, labeling, packaging, or
ingredient requirements in addition to, or different than, those made under this chap-
ter may not be imposed by any state . . . .” See Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S.
519, 528–32 (1977). See also National Meat Ass’n v. Harris, 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–
224, slip op. (2012) (broad preemption of all state laws on slaughterhouse activi-
ties). Similarly, much state action is saved by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a), which states that “[n]othing in this chapter shall affect the ju-
risdiction of the securities commissioner (or any agency or officer performing like
functions) of any State over any security or any person insofar as it does not con-
flict with the provisions of this chapter or the rules and regulations thereunder.”
on the gross receipts derived therefrom” was held to preempt a state

tax on airlines, described by the state as a personal property tax,
but based on a percentage of the airline’s gross income. “The man-
ner in which the state legislature has described and categorized [the
tax] cannot mask the fact that the purpose and effect of the provi-
sion are to impose a levy upon the gross receipts of airlines.” 23
But, more often than not, express preemptive language may be
ambiguous or at least not free from conflicting interpretation. Thus,
the Court was divided with respect to whether a provision of the
Airline Deregulation Act proscribing the states from having and en-
forcing laws “relating to rates, routes, or services of any air car-
rier” applied to displace state consumer-protection laws regulating
airline fare advertising.24 Delimiting the scope of an exception in
an express preemption provision can also present challenges. For
example, the Immigration Control and Reform Act of 1986 (IRCA),
which imposed the first comprehensive federal sanctions against em-
ploying aliens not authorized to work in the United States, pre-
empted “any State or local law imposing civil or criminal sanctions
(other than through licensing and similar laws) upon those who em-
ploy unauthorized aliens.” 25
In Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, a ma-
jority of the Court adopted a straightforward “plain meaning” ap-
proach to uphold a 2007 Arizona law that called for the suspension
or revocation of the business licenses (including articles of incorpo-
ration and like documents) of Arizona employers found to have know-
ingly hired an unauthorized alien.26 By contrast, two dissenting opin-
ions were troubled that the Arizona sanction was far more severe
than that authorized for similar violations under either federal law
or state laws in force prior to IRCA. The dissents interpreted IRCA’s
“licensing and similar laws” language narrowly to cover only busi-
nesses that primarily recruit or refer workers for employment, or
For examples of other express preemptive provisions, see Norfolk & Western Ry. v.
American Train Dispatchers’ Ass’n, 499 U.S. 117 (1991); Exxon Corp. v. Hunt, 475
U.S. 355 (1986). See also Department of Treasury v. Fabe, 508 U.S. 491 (1993).
23 Aloha Airlines v. Director of Taxation, 464 U.S. 7, 13–14 (1983).
24 Morales v. TWA, 504 U.S. 374 (1992). The section, 49 U.S.C. § 1305(a)(1), was
held to preempt state rules on advertising. See also American Airlines, Inc. v. Wolens,
513 U.S. 219 (1995). But see Dan’s City Used Cars, Inc. v. Pelkey, 569 U.S. ___, No.
12–52, slip op. (2013) (provision of Federal Aviation Administration Authorization
Act of 1994 preempting state law “related to a price, route, or service of any motor
carrier . . . with respect to the transportation of property” held not to preempt state
laws on the disposal of towed vehicles by towing companies).
25 8 U.S.C. § 1324a(h)(2).
26 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ___, No. 09–
115, slip op. (2011).

businesses that have been found by federal authorities to have vio-

lated federal sanctions, respectively..27
At issue in AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion 28 was a savings
provision of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) that made arbitra-
tion provisions in contracts “valid, irrevocable and enforceable, save
upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of
any contract.” 29 An arbitration provision in their cellular telephone
contract forbade plaintiffs from seeking arbitration of an allegedly
fraudulent practice by AT&T on a class basis. The Court closely di-
vided over whether the FAA saving clause made this anti-class ar-
bitration provision attackable under California law prohibiting class
action waivers in consumer contracts, or whether the savings clause
looked solely to grounds for revoking the cellular contract that had
nothing to do with the arbitration provision.30 Another case fo-
cused on a preemption clause that preempted certain laws of “a State
[or] political subdivision of a State” regulating motor carriers, but
excepted “[State] safely regulatory authority.” The Court inter-
preted the exception to allow a safety regulation adopted by a city:
“[a]bsent a clear statement to the contrary, Congress’s reference to
the ‘regulatory authority of a State’ should be read to preserve, not
preempt, the traditional prerogative of the States to delegate their
authority to their constituent parts.” 31
Perhaps the broadest preemption section ever enacted, § 514 of
the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA),
is so constructed that the Court has been moved to comment that
the provisions “are not a model of legislative drafting.” 32 The sec-
tion declares that the statute shall “supersede any and all State
laws insofar as they now or hereafter relate to any employee ben-
efit plan,” but saves to the States the power to enforce “any law
. . . which regulates insurance, banking, or securities,” except that
an employee benefit plan governed by ERISA shall not be “deemed”
an insurance company, an insurer, or engaged in the business of
insurance for purposes of state laws “purporting to regulate” insur-
27 Chamber of Commerce of the United States v. Whiting, 563 U.S. ___, No. 09–
115, slip op. (2011) (Breyer and Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting); id (Sotomayor, J., dissent-
ing).
28 563 U.S. ___, No. 09–893, slip op. (2011).
29 9 U.S.C. § 2.
30 Writing for the Court, Justice Scalia held, inter alia, that the saving clause
was not intended to open arbitration provisions themselves to possible scrutiny. 563
U.S. ___, No. 09–893, slip op. (2011). The four dissenting Justices interpreted the
saving clause as allowing use of the California law to attack the anti-class arbitra-
tion contract provision. Id. (Breyer, J. dissenting).
31 City of Columbus v. Ours Garage and Wrecker Serv., 536 U.S. 424, 429 (2002).
32 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 739 (1985), re-
peated in FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52, 58 (1991).

ance companies or insurance contracts.33 Interpretation of the pro-

visions has resulted in contentious and divided Court opinions.34
Also illustrative of the judicial difficulty with ambiguous pre-
emption language are the fractured opinions in Cipollone, in which
the Court had to decide whether sections of the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act, enacted in 1965 and 1969, pre-
empted state common-law actions against a cigarette company for
the alleged harm visited on a smoker.35 The 1965 provision barred
33 29 U.S.C. §§ 1144(a), 1144(b)(2)(A), 1144(b)(2)(B). The Court has described this
section as a “virtually unique pre-emption provision.” Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construc-

tion Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 24 n.26 (1983). See Ingersoll-Rand Co. v.
McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138–139 (1990); see also id. at 142–45 (describing and
applying another preemption provision of ERISA).
34 Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990) (ERISA preempts state
common-law claim of wrongful discharge to prevent employee attaining benefits un-

der plan covered by ERISA); FMC Corp. v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) (provision of
state motor-vehicle financial-responsibility law barring subrogation and reimburse-
ment from claimant’s tort recovery for benefits received from a self-insured health-
care plan preempted by ERISA); Fort Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987)
(state law requiring employers to provide a one-time severance payment to employ-
ees in the event of a plant closing held not preempted by 5–4 vote); Metropolitan
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (state law mandating that cer-
tain minimum mental-health-care benefits be provided to those insured under gen-
eral health-insurance policy or employee health-care plan is a law “which regulates
insurance” and is not preempted); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (state
law forbidding discrimination in employee benefit plans on the basis of pregnancy
not preempted, because of another saving provision in ERISA, and provision requir-
ing employers to pay sick-leave benefits to employees unable to work because of preg-
nancy not preempted under construction of coverage sections, but both laws “relate
to” employee benefit plans); Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504 (1981)
(state law prohibiting plans from reducing benefits by amount of workers’ compensa-
tion awards “relates to” employee benefit plan and is preempted); District of Colum-
bia v. Greater Washington Bd. of Trade, 506 U.S. 125 (1992) (law requiring employ-
ers to provide health insurance coverage, equivalent to existing coverage, for workers
receiving workers’ compensation benefits); John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Har-
ris Trust and Savings Bank, 510 U.S. 86 (1993) (ERISA’s fiduciary standards, not
conflicting state insurance laws, apply to insurance company’s handling of general
account assets derived from participating group annuity contract); New York State
Conf. of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v. Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645 (1995)
(no preemption of statute that required hospitals to collect surcharges from patients
covered by a commercial insurer but not from patients covered by Blue Cross/Blue
Shield plan); De Buono v. NYSA–ILA Medical and Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S.
806 (1997); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construc-
tion, Inc., 519 U.S. 316 (1997); Boggs v. Boggs, 520 U.S. 833 (1997) (decided not on
the basis of the express preemption language but instead by implied preemption analy-
sis); Aetna Health, Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200 (2004) (suit brought against HMO
under state health care liability act for failure to exercise ordinary care when deny-
ing benefits is preempted).
35 Cipollone v. Liggett Group, 505 U.S. 504 (1992). The decision relied on two
controversial rules of construction. First, the courts should interpret narrowly provi-
sions that purport to preempt state police-power regulations, and, second, that when
a law has express preemption language courts should look only to that language
and presume that when the preemptive reach of a law is defined Congress did not
intend to go beyond that reach, so that field and conflict preemption will not be found.
the requirement of any “statement” relating to smoking health, other

than what the federal law imposed, and the 1969 provision barred
the imposition of any “requirement or prohibition based on smok-
ing and health” by any “State law.” It was, thus, a fair question
whether common-law claims, based on design defect, failure to warn,
breach of express warranty, fraudulent misrepresentation, and con-
spiracy to defraud, were preempted or whether only positive state
enactments came within the scope of the clauses. Two groups of Jus-
tices concluded that the 1965 section reached only positive state law
and did not preempt common-law actions; 36 different alignments of
Justices concluded that the 1969 provisions did reach common-law
claims, as well as positive enactments, and did preempt some of
the claims insofar as they in fact constituted a requirement or pro-
hibition based on smoking health.37
Little clarification of the confusing Cipollone decision and opin-
ions resulted in the cases following, although it does seem evident
that the attempted distinction limiting courts to the particular lan-
guage of preemption when Congress has spoken has not prevailed.
At issue in Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr 38 was the Medical Device Amend-
ments (MDA) of 1976, which prohibited states from adopting or con-
tinuing in effect “with respect to a [medical] device” any “require-
ment” that is “different from, or in addition to” the applicable federal
requirement and that relates to the safety or effectiveness of the
device.39 The issue was whether a common-law tort obligation im-
posed a “requirement” that was different from or in addition to any
federal requirement. The device, a pacemaker lead, had come on
the market not pursuant to the rigorous FDA test but rather as
Id. at 517; and id. at 532–33 (Justice Blackmun concurring and dissenting). Both
parts of this canon are departures from established law. Narrow construction when
state police powers are involved has hitherto related to implied preemption, not ex-
press preemption, and courts generally have applied ordinary-meaning construction
to such statutory language; further, courts have not precluded the finding of conflict
preemption, though perhaps field preemption, because of the existence of some ex-
press preemptive language. See id. at 546–48 (Justice Scalia concurring and dissent-
ing).
36 505 U.S. at 518–19 (opinion of the court), 533–34 (Justice Blackmun concur-
ring).
37 505 U.S. at 520–30 (plurality opinion), 535–43 (Justice Blackmun concurring
and dissenting), 548–50 (Justice Scalia concurring and dissenting).

38 518 U.S. 470 (1996). See also CSX Transportation, Inc. v. Easterwood, 507
U.S. 658 (1993) (under Federal Railroad Safety Act, a state common-law claim alleg-
ing negligence for operating a train at excessive speed is preempted, but a second
claim alleging negligence for failure to maintain adequate warning devices at a grade
crossing is not preempted); Norfolk So. Ry. v. Shanklin, 529 U.S. 344 (2000) (apply-
ing Easterwood).
39 21 U.S.C. § 350k(a).
determined by the FDA to be “substantially equivalent” to a device

previously on the market, a situation of some import to at least some
of the Justices.
Unanimously, the Court determined that a defective design claim
was not preempted and that the MDA did not prevent states from
providing a damages remedy for violation of common-law duties that
paralleled federal requirements. But the Justices split 4–1–4 with
respect to preemption of various claims relating to manufacturing
and labeling. FDA regulations, which a majority deferred to, lim-
ited preemption to situations in which a particular state require-
ment threatens to interfere with a specific federal interest. More-
over, the common-law standards were not specifically developed to
govern medical devices and their generality removed them from the
category of requirements “with respect to” specific devices. How-
ever, five Justices did agree that common-law requirements could
be, just as statutory provisions, “requirements” that were pre-
empted, though they did not agree on the application of that view.40
Following Cipollone, the Court observed that, although it “need
not go beyond” the statutory preemption language, it did need to
“identify the domain expressly pre-empted” by the language, so that
“our interpretation of that language does not occur in a contextual
vacuum.” That is, it must be informed by two presumptions about
the nature of preemption: the presumption that Congress does not
cavalierly preempt common-law causes of action and the principle
that Congress’s purpose is the ultimate touchstone.41
The Court continued to struggle with application of express pre-
emption language to state common-law tort actions in Geier v. Ameri-
can Honda Motor Co.42 The National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety
Act contained both a preemption clause, prohibiting states from ap-
plying “any safety standard” different from an applicable federal stan-
dard, and a “saving clause,” providing that “compliance with” a fed-
eral safety standard “does not exempt any person from any liability
under common law.” The Court determined that the express preemp-
40 The dissent, by Justice O’Connor and three others, would have held pre-
empted the latter claims, 518 U.S. at 509, whereas Justice Breyer thought that common-
law claims would sometimes be preempted, but not here. Id. at 503 (concurring).
41 518 U.S. at 484–85. See also id. at 508 (Justice Breyer concurring); Freightliner
Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288–89 (1995); Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25,
31 (1996); California Div. of Labor Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construc-
tion, Inc., 519 U.S. 316, 334 (1997) (Justice Scalia concurring); Boggs v. Boggs, 520
U.S. 833 (1997) (using “stands as an obstacle” preemption analysis in an ERISA
case, having express preemptive language, but declining to decide when implied pre-
emption may be used despite express language), and id. at 854 (Justice Breyer dis-
senting) (analyzing the preemption issue under both express and implied stan-
dards).
42 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
tion clause was inapplicable, because the saving clause implied that
some number of state common law actions would be saved. How-
ever, despite the saving clause, the Court ruled that a common law
tort action seeking damages for failure to equip a car with a front
seat airbag, in addition to a seat belt, was preempted. According to
the Court, allowing the suit would frustrate the purpose of a Fed-
eral Motor Vehicle Safety Standard that specifically had intended
to give manufacturers a choice among a variety of “passive re-
straint” systems for the applicable model year.43 The Court’s hold-
ing makes clear, contrary to the suggestion in Cipollone, that exis-
tence of express preemption language does not foreclose the alternative
operation of conflict (in this case “frustration of purpose”) preemp-
tion.44
Field Preemption. Where the scheme of federal regulation is “so
pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left
no room for the States to supplement it,” states are ousted from
the field.45 Still a paradigmatic example of field preemption is Hines
v. Davidowitz,46 in which the Court held that a new federal law
requiring the registration of all aliens in the country precluded en-
forcement of a pre-existing state law mandating registration of aliens
within the state.47 Adverting to the supremacy of national power in
43 The Court focused on the word “exempt” to give the saving clause a narrow
application—as “simply bar[ring] a special kind of defense, . . . that compliance with

a federal safety standard automatically exempts a defendant from state law, whether
the Federal Government meant that standard to be an absolute requirement or only
a minimum one.” 529 U.S. at 869. But cf. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 537 U.S. 51
(2002) (interpreting preemption language and saving clause in Federal Boat Safety
Act as not precluding a state common law tort action).
44 Compare Williamson v. Mazda Motor of America, Inc., 562 U.S. ___, No. 08–
1314, slip op. (2011) (applying same statute as Geir, and later version of same regu-
lation, no conflict preemption found of common law suit based on rear seat belt type,
because giving manufacturers a choice on the type of rear seat belt to install was
not a “significant objective” of the statute or regulation). For a decision applying
express preemption language to a variety of state common law claims, see Bates v.
Dow Agrosciences LLC, 544 U.S. 431 (2005) (interpreting FIFRA, the federal law
governing pesticides).
45 Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that a fed-
eral system of regulating the operations of warehouses and the rates they charged
completely occupied the field and ousted state regulation). The case also is the source
of the oft-quoted maxim that when Congress legislates in a field traditionally occu-
pied by the states, courts should “start with the assumption that the historic police
powers of the States were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was
the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.” Id.
46 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
47 In Arizona v. United States, the Court struck down state penalties for violat-
ing federal alien registration requirements, emphasizing that “[w]here Congress oc-
cupies an entire field, . . . even complementary state regulation is impermissible.”
567 U.S. ___, No. 11–182, slip op. at 10 (2012) The same case also struck down on
preemption grounds state sanctions on unauthorized aliens who work or seek em-
ployment, id. at 12–15, and authority for state officers to make warrantless arrests
foreign relations and the sensitivity of the relationship between the

regulation of aliens and the conduct of foreign affairs, the Court
had little difficulty declaring the entire field to have been occupied
by federal law.48 Similarly, in Pennsylvania v. Nelson,49 the Court
invalidated as preempted a state law punishing sedition against the
National Government. The Court enunciated a three-part test: (1)
the pervasiveness of federal regulation, (2) federal occupation of the
field as necessitated by the need for national uniformity, and (3)
the danger of conflict between state and federal administration.50
Field preemption analysis often involves delimiting the subject
of federal regulation and determining whether a federal law has
regulated part of the field, however defined, or the whole area, so
that state law cannot even supplement the federal.51 Illustrative of
this point is the Court’s holding that the Atomic Energy Act’s pre-
emption of the safety aspects of nuclear power did not invalidate a
state law conditioning construction of nuclear power plants on a find-
ing by a state agency that adequate storage and disposal facilities
were available to treat nuclear wastes, because “economic” regula-
tion of power generation has traditionally been left to the states—an
based on possible deportability under federal immigration law. Id. By contrast, a

regime of state immigration status checks with federal authorities was found not to
be preempted on its face because the regime was supported by federal law facilitat-
ing federal-state cooperation in immigration enforcement.
48 The Court also said that courts must look to see whether under the circum-
stances of a particular case, the state law “stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” 312 U.S. at 67.
That standard is obviously drawn from conflict preemption, for the two standards
are frequently intermixed. See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. ___, No.
09–893, slip op. at 9–18 (2011) (Scalia, J.). Nonetheless, not all state regulation is
precluded. De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976) (upholding a state law penalizing
the employment of an illegal alien, the case arising before enactment of the federal
law doing the same thing).
49 350 U.S. 497 (1956).
50 350 U.S. at 502–05. Obviously, there is a noticeable blending into conflict pre-
emption.
51 See Kurns v. Railroad Friction Products Corp., 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–879, slip
op. (2012) (state suit by the estate of maintenance engineer alleging manufacturer’s
defective design of locomotive components and failure to warn of accompanying dan-
gers held preempted by the Locomotive Inspection Act; the subject of the Act held to
be the regulation of locomotive equipment generally, including its manufacture, and
not limited to regulating activities of locomotive operators or regulating locomotives
while in use for transporation). Compare Campbell v. Hussey, 368 U.S. 297 (1961)
(state law requiring tobacco of a certain type to be marked by white tags, ousted by
federal regulation that occupied the field and left no room for supplementation), with
Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963) (state law set-
ting minimum oil content for avocados certified as mature by federal regulation is
complementary to federal law, because federal standard was a minimum one, the
field having not been occupied). One should be wary of assuming that a state law
that has dual purposes and impacts will not, just for the duality, be held to be pre-
empted. See Gade v. National Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n, 505 U.S. 88 (1992); Perez
v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637 (1971) (under Bankruptcy Clause).
arrangement maintained by the Act—and because the state law could

be justified as an economic rather than a safety regulation.52
A city’s effort to enforce stiff penalties for ship pollution that
resulted from boilers approved by the Federal Government was held
not preempted, the field of boiler safety, but not boiler pollution,
having been occupied by federal regulation.53 A state liability scheme
imposing cleanup costs and strict, no-fault liability on shore facili-
ties and ships for any oil-spill damage was held to complement a
federal law concerned solely with recovery of actual cleanup costs
incurred by the Federal Government and which textually presup-
posed federal-state cooperation.54 On the other hand, a comprehen-
sive regulation of the design, size, and movement of oil tankers in
Puget Sound was found, save in one respect, to be either expressly
or implicitly preempted by federal law and regulations. Critical to
the determination was the Court’s conclusion that Congress, with-
out actually saying so, had intended to mandate exclusive stan-
dards and a single federal decisionmaker for safety purposes in ves-
sel regulation.55 Also, a closely divided Court voided a city ordinance
placing an 11 p.m. to 7 a.m. curfew on jet flights from the city air-
port where, despite the absence of preemptive language in federal
law, federal regulation of aircraft noise was of such a pervasive na-
ture as to leave no room for state or local regulation.56
52 Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Energy Resources Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983).
Neither does the same reservation of exclusive authority to regulate nuclear safety
preempt imposition of punitive damages under state tort law, even if based upon
the jury’s conclusion that a nuclear licensee failed to follow adequate safety precau-
tions. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238 (1984). See also English v. Gen-
eral Electric Co., 496 U.S. 72 (1990) (employee’s state-law claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress for her nuclear-plant employer’s actions retaliating for
her whistleblowing is not preempted as relating to nuclear safety).
53 Huron Portland Cement Co. v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
54 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, 411 U.S. 325 (1973).
55 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151 (1978). United States v. Locke, 529
U.S. 89 (2000) (applying Ray). See also Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton, 462 U.S. 176 (1983)
(preempting a state ban on pass-through of a severance tax on oil and gas, because
Congress has occupied the field of wholesale sales of natural gas in interstate com-
merce); Schneidewind v. ANR Pipeline Co., 485 U.S. 293 (1988) (Natural Gas Act
preempts state regulation of securities issuance by covered gas companies); Bonito
Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989) (under Patent Clause,
state law extending patent-like protection to unpatented designs invades an area of
pervasive federal regulation).
56 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
Congress may preempt state regulation without itself prescrib-

ing a federal standard; it may deregulate a field and thus occupy it
by opting for market regulation and precluding state or local regu-
lation.57
Conflict Preemption. Several possible situations will lead to a
holding that a state law is preempted as in conflict with federal
law. First, it may be that the two laws, federal and state, will actu-
ally conflict. Thus, in Rose v. Arkansas State Police,58 federal law
provided for death benefits for state law enforcement officers “in ad-
dition to” any other compensation, while the state law required a
reduction in state benefits by the amount received from other sources.
The Court, in a brief, per curiam opinion, had no difficulty finding
the state provision preempted.59
Second, conflict preemption may occur when it is practically im-
possible to comply with the terms of both laws. Thus, where a fed-
eral agency had authorized federal savings and loan associations to
include “due-on-sale” clauses in their loan instruments and where
the state had largely prevented inclusion of such clauses, while it
was literally possible for lenders to comply with both rules, the fed-
eral rule being permissive, the state regulation prevented the exer-
cise of the flexibility the federal agency had conferred and was pre-
empted.60
More problematic are circumstances in which a party has an
administrative avenue for seeking removal of impediments to dual
57 Transcontinental Gas Pipe Line Corp. v. Mississippi Oil & Gas Board, 474
U.S. 409 (1986); Puerto Rico Dept. of Consumer Affairs v. Isla Petroleum Corp., 485
U.S. 495 (1988).
58 479 U.S. 1 (1986).
59 See also Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School Dist., 469 U.S. 256 (1985)
(state law requiring local governments to distribute federal payments in lieu of taxes
in same manner as general state-tax revenues conflicts with federal law authorizing
local governments to use the payments for any governmental purpose); Southland
Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984) (state franchise law requiring judicial resolution
of claims preempted by federal arbitration law precluding adjudication in state or
federal courts of claims parties had contracted to submit to arbitration); Perry v.
Thomas, 482 U.S. 483 (1987) (federal arbitration law preempts state law providing
that court actions for collection of wages may be maintained without regard to agree-
ments to arbitrate); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265 (1995) (fed-
eral arbitration law preempts state law invalidating predispute arbitration agree-
ments that were not entered into in contemplation of substantial interstate activity);
Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (federal arbitration law
preempts state statute that conditioned enforceability of arbitration clause on com-
pliance with special notice requirement). See also Free v. Brand, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
60 Fidelity Fed. Savings & Loan Assn. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141 (1982). See
also Wos v. E.M.A., 568 U.S. ___, No. 12–98, slip op. (2013) (North Carolina statute
allowing the state, in certain circumstances, to collect one-third of the amount of a
tort settlement as reimbursement for state-paid medical expenses under Medicaid
held to effectively conflict with anti-lien provisions of the federal Medicaid statute
where settlement designated a lesser amount as medical expenses award).
compliance. In Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing,61 federal law required ge-

neric drugs to be labeled the same as the brand name counterpart,
while state tort law required drug labels to contain adequate warn-
ings to render use of the drug reasonably safe. There had been ac-
cumulating evidence that long-term use of the drug metoclopramide
carried a significant risk of severe neurological damage, but manu-
facturers of generic metoclopramide neither amended their warn-
ing labels nor sought to have the Food and Drug Administration
require the brand name manufacturer to include stronger label warn-
ings, which consequently would have led to stronger labeling of the
generic. Five Justices held that state tort law was preempted.62 It
was impossible to comply both with the state law duty to change
the label and the federal law duty to keep the label the same.63
The four dissenting Justices argued that inability to change the la-
bels unilaterally was insufficient, standing alone, to establish a de-
fense based on impossibility.64 Emphasizing the federal duty to moni-
tor the safety of their drugs, the dissenters would require that the
generic manufacturers also show some effort to effectuate a label-
ing change through the FDA.
In contrast to Pliva, Inc. v. Mensing, the Court found no preemp-
tion in Wyeth v. Levine,65 a state tort action against a brand-name
drug manufacturer based on inadequate labeling. A brand-name drug
manufacturer, unlike makers of generic drugs, could unilaterally
strengthen labeling under federal regulations, subject to subse-
quent FDA override, and thereby independently meet state tort law
requirements. In another case of alleged impossibility, it was held
possible for an employer to comply both with a state law mandat-
ing leave and reinstatement to pregnant employees and with a fed-
eral law prohibiting employment discrimination on the basis of preg-
nancy.66 Similarly, when faced with both federal and state standards
on the ripeness of avocados, the Court discerned that the federal
61 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–993, slip op. (2011).

62 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–993, slip op. (2011) (Thomas, J.).
63 Justice Thomas, joined on point by three others, characterized the Su-
premacy Clause phrase “any [state law] to the Contrary notwithstanding” as a non
obtstante provision that “suggests that federal law should be understood to impliedly
repeal conflicting state law” and indicates limits on the extent to which courts should
seek to reconcile federal and state law in preemption cases. 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–
993, slip op. at 15–17 (2011) (Thomas, J.).
64 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–993, slip op. (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
65 555 U.S. ___, No. 06–1249, slip op. (2009).
66 California Federal Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272 (1987). Com-
pare Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1942) (federal law preempts
more exacting state standards, even though both could be complied with and state
standards were harmonious with purposes of federal law).
standard was a “minimum” one rather than a “uniform” one and

decided that growers could comply with both.67
Third, a fruitful source of preemption is found when it is deter-
mined that the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplish-
ment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.68 Thus, de-
spite the inclusion of a saving clause preserving liability under common
law, the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle Safety Act nevertheless
was found to have preempted a state common law tort action based
on the failure of a car manufacturer to install front seat airbags:
Giving car manufacturers some leeway in developing and introduc-
ing passive safety restraint devices was, according to the Court, a
key congressional objective under the Act, one that would frus-
trated should a tort action be allowed to proceed.69
The Court also has voided a state requirement that the aver-
age net weight of a package of flour in a lot could not be less than
the net weight stated on the package. While applicable federal law
67 Florida Lime & Avocado Growers v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
68 The standard is drawn from Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1941), which
often is held out as a leading example of field preemption analysis. When “frustra-
tion of purpose” predominates in an opinion, it may be fairer to characterize the
issue as one of conflict preemption, rather than field preemption, for the possibility
of a limited state role would appear to be implicitly recognized. Arizona v. United
States, in which the Court found three of the four Arizona immigration provisions it
examined to be preempted, illustrates the continuum from field to conflict analysis.
In overturning state penalties for violations of federal alien registration require-
ments, the Court found the sweep and detail of the federal law to leave no room
whatsoever for state regulation. In overturning state sanctions against unauthor-
ized aliens seeking employment or working, the Court emphasized that the compre-
hensive system of federal employer sanctions eschewed employee sanctions, and al-
lowing states to impose them would upset the careful policy balance struck by Congress.
In overturning state authority to arrest individuals believed to be deportable on crimi-
nal grounds, the Court did not examine whether state officers have any inherent
arrest authority in deportation cases, but rather found that allowing states to en-
gage in such arrests as a general matter creates an obstacle to congressional objec-
tives. And finally, the Court declined to overturn on its face a state policy of check-
ing the immigration status of individuals stopped by the police for general law
enforcement purposes, finding that federal law facilitated status checks and only imple-
mentation of the status check policy would disclose whether federal enforcement policy
ultimately would be frustrated. 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–182, slip op. (2012).
See also Hillman v. Maretta, 569 U.S. ___, No. 11–1221, slip op. (2013) (state
law cause of action against ex-spouse for life insurance proceeds paid under a desgna-
tion of beneficiary in a federal employee policy held to be preempted by federal em-
ployee insurance statute giving employees the right to designate: beyond administra-
tive convenience, Congress intended that the proceeds actually belong to named
beneficiary); Barnett Bank of Marion County v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (federal
law empowering national banks in small towns to sell insurance preempts state law
prohibiting banks from dealing in insurance). Unsurprisingly, the Justices at times
disagree on what Congress’s primary objectives and purposes were in passing par-
ticular legislation, and such a disagreement can end with different conclusions about
whether state law has been preempted. See AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion, 563
U.S. ___, No. 09–893, slip op. (2011).
69 Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000).
permitted variations from stated weight caused by distribution losses,

such as through partial dehydration, the state allowed no such de-
viation. Although it was possible for a producer to satisfy the fed-
eral standard while satisfying the tougher state standard, the Court
discerned that to do so defeated one purpose of the federal require-
ment—the facilitating of value comparisons by shoppers. Because
different producers in different situations in order to comply with
the state standard may have to overpack flour to make up for dehy-
dration loss, consumers would not be comparing packages contain-
ing identical amounts of flour solids.70 And, in Felder v. Casey,71 a
state notice-of-claim statute was found to frustrate the remedial ob-
jectives of civil rights laws as applied to actions brought in state
court under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. A state law recognizing the validity
of an unrecorded oral sale of an aircraft was held preempted by
the Federal Aviation Act’s provision that unrecorded “instruments”
of transfer are invalid, since the congressional purpose evidenced
in the legislative history was to make information about an air-
craft’s title readily available by requiring that all transfers be docu-
mented and recorded.72
In Boggs v. Boggs,73 the Court, 5-to-4, applied the “stands as
an obstacle” test for conflict even though the statute (ERISA) con-
tains an express preemption section. The dispute arose in a
community-property state, in which heirs of a deceased wife claimed
property that involved pension-benefit assets that was left to them
by testamentary disposition, as against a surviving second wife. Two
ERISA provisions operated to prevent the descent of the property
to the heirs, but under community-property rules the property could
have been left to the heirs by their deceased mother. The Court did
not pause to analyze whether the ERISA preemption provision op-
erated to preclude the descent of the property, either because state
law “relate[d] to” a covered pension plan or because state law had
an impermissible “connection with” a plan, but it instead decided
that the operation of the state law insofar as it conflicted with the
purposes Congress had intended to achieve by ERISA and insofar
as it ran into the two noted provisions of ERISA stood as an ob-
stacle to the effectuation of the ERISA law. “We can begin, and in
this case end, the analysis by simply asking if state law conflicts
with the provisions of ERISA or operates to frustrate its objects.
We hold that there is a conflict, which suffices to resolve the case.
We need not inquire whether the statutory phrase ‘relate to’ pro-
70 Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 532–543 (1977).
71 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
72 Philco Aviation v. Shacket, 462 U.S. 406 (1983).
73 520 U.S. 833 (1997).
vides further and additional support for the pre-emption claim. Nor
need we consider the applicability of field pre-emption.” 74
Similarly, the Court found it unnecessary to consider field pre-
emption due to its holding that a Massachusetts law barring state
agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies doing
business with Burma imposed obstacles to the accomplishment of
Congress’s full objectives under the federal Burma sanctions law.75
The state law was said to undermine the federal law in several re-
spects that could have implicated field preemption—by limiting the
President’s effective discretion to control sanctions, and by frustrat-
ing the President’s ability to engage in effective diplomacy in devel-
oping a comprehensive multilateral strategy—but the Court “de-
cline[d] to speak to field preemption as a separate issue.” 76
Also, a state law making agricultural producers’ associations the
exclusive bargaining agents and requiring payment of service fees
by nonmember producers was held to counter a strong federal policy
protecting the right of farmers to join or not join such associa-
tions.77 And a state assertion of the right to set minimum stream-
flow requirements different from those established by FERC in its
licensing capacity was denied as being preempted under the Fed-
eral Power Act, despite language requiring deference to state laws
“relating to the control, appropriation, use, or distribution of wa-
ter.” 78
Contrarily, a comprehensive federal regulation of insecticides and
other such chemicals was held not to preempt a town ordinance that
required a permit for the spraying of pesticides, there being no con-
flict between requirements.79 The application of state antitrust laws
74 520 U.S. at 841. The dissent, id. at 854 (Justice Breyer), agreed that conflict
analysis was appropriate, but he did not find that the state law achieved any result
that ERISA required.
75 Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000).
76 530 U.S. at 374 n.8.
77 Michigan Canners & Freezers Ass’n v. Agricultural Marketing & Bargaining
Bd., 467 U.S. 461 (1984). See also Nantahala Power & Light Co. v. Thornburg, 476
U.S. 953 (1986) (state allocation of costs for purposes of setting retail electricity rates,
by disallowing costs permitted by FERC in setting wholesale rates, frustrated fed-
eral regulation by possibly preventing the utility from recovering in its sales the
costs of paying the FERC-approved wholesale rate); Capital Cities Cable, Inc. v. Crisp,
467 U.S. 691 (1984) (state ban on cable TV advertising frustrates federal policy in
the copyright law by which cable operators pay a royalty fee for the right to retrans-
mit distant broadcast signals upon agreement not to delete commercials); Interna-
tional Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481 (1987) (damage action based on common
law of downstream state frustrates Clean Water Act’s policies favoring permitting
state in interstate disputes and favoring predictability in permit process).
78 California v. FERC, 495 U.S. 490 (1990). The savings clause was found inap-
plicable on the basis of an earlier interpretation of the language in First Iowa Hydro-
Electric Cooperative v. FPC, 328 U.S. 152 (1946).
79 Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 614–16 (1991).
to authorize indirect purchasers to recover for all overcharges passed

on to them by direct purchasers was held to implicate no preemp-
tion concerns, because the federal antitrust laws had been inter-
preted to not permit indirect purchasers to recover under federal
law; the state law may have been inconsistent with federal law but
in no way did it frustrate federal objectives and policies.80 The ef-
fect of federal policy was not strong enough to warrant a holding of
preemption when a state authorized condemnation of abandoned rail-
road property after conclusion of an ICC proceeding permitting aban-
donment, although the railroad’s opportunity costs in the property
had been considered in the decision on abandonment.81
Specific Applications
Federal Immunity Laws and State Courts.—The operation
of federal immunity acts 82 to preclude the use in state courts of
incriminating statements and testimony given by a witness before
a committee of Congress or a federal grand jury 83 illustrates direct
federal preemption that is not contingent on state participation in
a federal program. Because Congress in pursuance of its para-
mount authority to provide for the national defense, as comple-
mented by the Necessary and Proper Clause, is competent to com-
pel testimony of persons that is needed in order to legislate, it is
competent to obtain such testimony over a witness’s self-
incrimination claim by immunizing him from prosecution on evi-
dence thus revealed not only in federal courts but in state courts
as well.84
Priority of National Claims Over State Claims.—
Anticipating his argument in McCulloch v. Maryland,85 Chief Jus-
tice Marshall in 1805 upheld an act of 1792 asserting for the United
States a priority of its claims over those of the states against a debtor
in bankruptcy.86 The principle was later extended to federal enact-
ments providing that taxes due to the United States by an insol-
80 California v. ARC America Corp., 490 U.S. 93 (1989).

81 Hayfield Northern Ry. v. Chicago & N.W. Transp. Co., 467 U.S. 622 (1984).
See also CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987) (federal law’s
broad purpose of protecting shareholders as a group is furthered by state anti-
takeover law); Rose v. Rose, 481 U.S. 619 (1987) (provision governing veterans’ dis-
ability benefits protects veterans’ families as well as veterans, hence state child-
support order resulting in payment out of benefits is not preempted).
82 Immunity laws operate to compel witnesses to testify even over self-
incrimination claims by giving them an equivalent immunity from prosecution.

83 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
84 Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 422, 434–436 (1956). See also Reina v.
United States, 364 U.S. 507, 510 (1960).

85 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
86 United States v. Fisher, 6 U.S. (2 Cr.) 358 (1805).
vent shall have priority in payment over taxes he owes to a state.87

Similarly, the Federal Government was held entitled to prevail over
a citizen enjoying a preference under state law as creditor of an
enemy alien bank in the process of liquidation by state authori-
ties.88 A federal law providing that when a veteran dies in a fed-
eral hospital without a will or heirs his personal property shall vest
in the United States as trustee for the General Post Fund was held
to operate automatically without prior agreement of the veteran with
the United States for such disposition and to take precedence over
a state claim founded on its escheat law.89
Federal Versus State Labor Laws.—One group of cases, which
has caused the Court much difficulty over the years, concerns the
effect of federal labor laws on state power to govern labor-
management relations. Although the Court some time ago reached
a settled rule, changes in membership on the Court re-opened the
issue and modified the rules.
With the enactment of the National Labor Relations Act and
subsequent amendments, Congress declared a national policy in labor-
management relations and established the NLRB to carry out that
policy.90 It became the Supreme Court’s responsibility to determine
what role state law on labor-management relations was to play. At
first, the Court applied a test of determination whether the state
regulation was in direct conflict with the national regulatory scheme.
87 Spokane County v. United States, 279 U.S. 80, 87 (1929). A state require-
ment that notice of a federal tax lien be filed in conformity with state law in a state
office in order to be accorded priority was held to be controlling only insofar as Con-
gress by law had made it so. Remedies for collection of federal taxes are indepen-
dent of legislative action of the states. United States v. Union Central Life Ins. Co.,
368 U.S. 291 (1961). See also United States v. Buffalo Savings Bank, 371 U.S. 228
(1963) (state may not avoid priority rules of a federal tax lien by providing that the
discharge of state tax liens are to be part of the expenses of a mortgage foreclosure
sale); United States v. Pioneer American Ins. Co., 374 U.S. 84 (1963) (Matter of fed-
eral law whether a lien created by state law has acquired sufficient substance and
has become so perfected as to defeat a later-arising or later-filed federal tax lien).
88 Brownell v. Singer, 347 U.S. 403 (1954).
89 United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961).
90 Throughout the ups and downs of federal labor-law preemption, it remains
the rule that the Board remains preeminent and almost exclusive. See, e.g., Wiscon-
sin Dep’t of Industry v. Gould, Inc., 475 U.S. 282 (1986) (states may not supplement
Board enforcement by debarring from state contracts persons or firms that have vio-
lated the NLRA); Golden Gate Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608
(1986) (city may not condition taxicab franchise on settlement of strike by set date,
because this intrudes into collective-bargaining process protected by NLRA). On the
other hand, the NLRA’s protection of associational rights is not so strong as to out-
weigh the Social Security Act’s policy permitting states to determine whether to award
unemployment benefits to persons voluntarily unemployed as the result of a labor
dispute. New York Tel. Co. v. New York Labor Dep’t, 440 U.S. 519 (1979); Ohio Bu-
reau of Employment Services v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471 (1977); Baker v. General Mo-
tors Corp., 478 U.S. 621 (1986).
Thus, in one early case, the Court held that an order by a state
board which commanded a union to desist from mass picketing of a
factory and from assorted personal threats was not in conflict with
the national law that had not been invoked and that did not touch
on some of the union conduct in question.91 A cease-and-desist or-
der of a state board implementing a state provision making it an
unfair labor practice for employees to conduct a slowdown or to oth-
erwise interfere with production while on the job was found not to
conflict with federal law,92 and another order of the board was also
sustained in its prohibition of the discharge of an employee under
a maintenance-of-membership clause inserted in a contract under
pressure from the War Labor Board and which violated state law.93
By contrast, a state statute requiring business agents of unions
operating in the state to file annual reports and to pay an annual
fee of one dollar was voided as in conflict with federal law.94 And
state statutes providing for mediation and outlawing public utility
strikes were similarly voided as being in specific conflict with fed-
eral law.95 A somewhat different approach was noted in several cases
in which the Court held that the federal act had so occupied the
field in certain areas as to preclude state regulation.96 The latter
approach was predominant through the 1950s, as the Court voided
91 Allen-Bradley Local No. 1111 v. WERB, 315 U.S. 740 (1942).

92 United Automobile Workers v. WERB, 336 U.S. 245 (1949), overruled by Ma-
chinists & Aerospace Workers v. WERC, 427 U.S. 132 (1976).
93 Algoma Plywood Co. v. WERB, 336 U.S. 301 (1949).
94 Hill v. Florida ex rel. Watson, 325 U.S. 538 (1945). More recently, the Court
has held that Hill’s premise that the NLRA grants an unqualified right to select
union officials has been removed by amendments prohibiting some convicted crimi-
nals from holding union office. Partly because the federal disqualification standard
was itself dependent upon application of state law, the Court ruled that more strin-
gent state disqualification provisions, also aimed at individuals who had been in-
volved in racketeering and other criminal conduct, were not inconsistent with fed-
eral law. Brown v. Hotel Employees, 468 U.S. 491 (1984).
95 United Automobile Workers v. O’Brien, 339 U.S. 454 (1950); Bus Employees
v. WERB, 340 U.S. 383 (1951). See also Bus Employees v. Missouri, 374 U.S. 74
(1963).
96 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955); Garner v. Teamsters Lo-
cal 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. New York Employment Rela-
tions Bd., 330 U.S. 767 (1947). See also Livadas v. Bradshaw, 512 U.S. 107 (1994)
(finding a practice of a state labor commissioner preempted because it stood as an
obstacle to the achievement of the purposes of NLRA). Of course, where Congress
clearly specifies, the Court has had no difficulty. Thus, in the NLRA, Congress pro-
vided, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b), that state laws on the subject could override the federal
law on union security arrangements and the Court sustained those laws. Lincoln
Federal Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron & Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); AFL v.
American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1949). When Congress in the Railway
Labor Act, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Eleventh, provided that the federal law on union secu-
rity was to override contrary state laws, the Court sustained that determination.
Railway Employes’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956). The Court has held that
state court action in enjoining 97 or awarding damages 98 for peace-

ful picketing, in awarding of relief by damages or otherwise for con-
duct that constituted an unfair labor practice under federal law,99
or in enforcing state antitrust laws so as to affect collective bargain-
ing agreements 100 or to bar a strike as a restraint of trade,101 even
with regard to disputes over which the NLRB declined to assert
jurisdiction because of the degree of effect on interstate commer ce.
In San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon,102 the Court
enunciated the rule, based on its previous decade of adjudication.
“When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the
States . . . must defer to the exclusive competence of the National
Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with na-
tional policy is to be averted.” 103
For much of the period since Garmon, the dispute in the Court
concerned the scope of the few exceptions permitted in the Garmon
principle. First, when picketing is not wholly peaceful but is at-
tended by intimidation, violence, and obstruction of the roads afford-
ing access to the struck establishment, state police powers have been
held not disabled to deal with the conduct and narrowly drawn in-
junctions directed against violence and mass picketing have been
permitted 104 as well as damages to compensate for harm growing
out of such activities.105
A 1958 case permitted a successful state court suit for reinstate-
ment and damages for lost pay because of a wrongful expulsion,
leading to discharge from employment, based on a theory that the
union constitution and by-laws constitute a contract between the
union and the members the terms of which can be enforced by state
state courts may adjudicate questions relating to the permissibility of particular types
of union security arrangements under state law even though the issue involves as
well an interpretation of federal law. Retail Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 375
U.S. 96 (1963).
97 Garner v. Teamsters Local 776, 346 U.S. 485 (1953); United Mine Workers v.
Arkansas Flooring Co., 351 U.S. 62 (1956); Meat Cutters v. Fairlawn Meats, 353
U.S. 20 (1957); Construction Laborers v. Curry, 371 U.S. 542 (1963).
98 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 353 U.S. 26 (1957).
99 Guss v. Utah Labor Board, 353 U.S. 1 (1957).
100 Teamsters Union v. Oliver, 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
101 Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468 (1955).
102 359 U.S. 236 (1959).
103 359 U.S. at 245. The rule is followed in, e.g., Radio & Television Technicians
v. Broadcast Service of Mobile, 380 U.S. 255 (1965); Hattiesburg Building & Trades
Council v. Broome, 377 U.S. 126 (1964); Longshoremen’s Local 1416 v. Ariane Ship-
ping Co., 397 U.S. 195 (1970); Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Employees v. Lockridge,
403 U.S. 274 (1971). Cf. Nash v. Florida Industrial Comm., 389 U.S. 235 (1967).
104 United Automobile Workers v. WERB, 351 U.S. 266 (1956); Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
355 U.S. 131 (1957).

105 United Automobile Workers v. Russell, 356 U.S. 634 (1958); United Construc-
tion Workers v. Laburnum Constr. Corp., 347 U.S. 656 (1954).

courts without the danger of a conflict between state and federal

law.106 The Court subsequently narrowed the interpretation of this
ruling by holding in two cases that members who alleged union in-
terference with their existing or prospective employment relations
could not sue for damages but must file unfair labor practice charges
with the NLRB.107 Gonzales was said to be limited to “purely inter-
nal union matters.” 108 Finally, Gonzales, was abandoned in a five-
to-four decision in which the Court held that a person who alleged
that his union had misinterpreted its constitution and its collective
bargaining agreement with the individual’s employer in expelling
him from the union and causing him to be discharged from his em-
ployment because he was late paying his dues had to pursue his
federal remedies.109 Justice Harlan wrote for the Court that, al-
though it was not likely that, in Gonzales, a state court resolution
of the scope of duty owed the member by the union would impli-
cate principles of federal law, state court resolution in this case in-
volved an interpretation of the contract’s union security clause, a
matter on which federal regulation is extensive.110
One other exception has been based, like the violence cases, on
the assumption that it concerns areas traditionally left to local law
into which Congress would not want to intrude. In Linn v. Plant
Guard Workers,111 the Court permitted a state court adjudication
of a defamation action arising out of a labor dispute. And, in Letter
Carriers v. Austin,112 the Court held that federal law preempts state
defamation laws in the context of labor disputes to the extent that
the state seeks to make actionable defamatory statements in labor
disputes published without knowledge of their falsity or in reckless
disregard of truth or falsity.
However, a state tort action for the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress occasioned through an alleged campaign of personal
abuse and harassment of a member of the union by the union and
its officials was held not preempted by federal labor law. Federal
law was not directed to the “outrageous conduct” alleged, and NLRB
resolution of the dispute would neither touch upon the claim of emo-
tional distress and physical injury nor award the plaintiff any com-
106 International Ass’n of Machinists v. Gonzales, 356 U.S. 617 (1958).
107 Journeymen & Plumbers’ Union 100 v. Borden, 373 U.S. 690 (1963); Iron Work-
ers Local 207 v. Perko, 373 U.S. 701 (1963). Applying Perko, the Court held that a
state court action by a supervisor alleging union interference with his contractual
relationship with his employer is preempted by the NLRA. Local 926, Int’l Union of
Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669 (1983).
108 373 U.S. at 697 (Borden), and 705 (Perko).
109 Amalgamated Ass’n of Street Employees v. Lockridge, 403 U.S. 274 (1971).
110 403 U.S. at 296.
111 383 U.S. 53 (1966).
112 418 U.S. 264 (1974).
pensation. But state court jurisdiction, in order that there not be

interference with the federal scheme, must be premised on tortu-
ous conduct either unrelated to employment discrimination or a func-
tion of the particularly abusive manner in which the discrimina-
tion is accomplished or threatened rather than a function of the actual
or threatened discrimination itself.113
A significant retrenchment of Garmon occurred in Sears, Roe-
buck & Co. v. Carpenters,114 in the context of state court assertion
of jurisdiction over trespassory picketing. Objecting to the compa-
ny’s use of nonunion work in one of its departments, the union pick-
eted the store, using the company’s property, the lot area surround-
ing the store, instead of the public sidewalks, to walk on. After the
union refused to move its pickets to the sidewalk, the company sought
and obtained a state court order enjoining the picketing on com-
pany property. Depending upon the union motivation for the picket-
ing, it was either arguably prohibited or arguably protected by fed-
eral law, the trespassory nature of the picketing being one factor
the NLRB would have looked to in determining at least the pro-
tected nature of the conduct. The Court held, however, that under
the circumstances, neither the arguably prohibited nor the argu-
ably protected rationale of Garmon was sufficient to deprive the state
court of jurisdiction.
First, as to conduct arguably prohibited by NLRA, the Court
seemingly expanded the Garmon exception recognizing state court
jurisdiction for conduct that touches interests “deeply rooted in lo-
cal feeling” 115 in holding that where there exists “a significant state
interest in protecting the citizens from the challenged conduct” and
there exists “little risk of interference with the regulatory jurisdic-
tion” of the NLRB, state law is not preempted. Here, there was ob-
viously a significant state interest in protecting the company from
trespass; the second, “critical inquiry” was whether the controversy
presented to the state court was identical to or different from that
which could have been presented to the Board. The Court con-
cluded that the controversy was different. The Board would have
been presented with determining the motivation of the picketing and
the location of the picketing would have been irrelevant; the moti-
113 Farmer v. Carpenters, 430 U.S. 290 (1977). Following this case, the Court
held that a state court action for misrepresentation and breach of contract, brought
by replacement workers promised permanent employment when hired during a strike,
was not preempted. The action for breach of contract by replacement workers hav-
ing no remedies under the NLRA was found to be deeply rooted in local law and of
only peripheral concern under the Act. Belknap, Inc. v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491 (1983).
See also Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n v. Davis, 476 U.S. 380 (1986).
114 436 U.S. 180 (1978).
115 San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 244 (1959).
vation was irrelevant to the state court and the situs of the picket-
ing was the sole inquiry. Thus, there was deemed to be no realistic
risk of state interference with Board jurisdiction.116
Second, in determining whether the picketing was protected, the
Board would have been concerned with the situs of the picketing,
since under federal labor laws the employer has no absolute right
to prohibit union activity on his property. Preemption of state court
jurisdiction was denied, nonetheless, in this case on two joined bases.
One, preemption is not required in those cases in which the party
who could have presented the protection issue to the Board has not
done so and the other party to the dispute has no acceptable means
of doing so. In this case, the union could have filed with the Board
when the company demanded removal of the pickets, but did not,
and the company could not file with the Board at all. Two, even if
the matter is not presented to the Board, preemption is called for
if there is a risk of erroneous state court adjudication of the protec-
tion issue that is unacceptable, so that one must look to the strength
of the argument that the activity is protected. While the state court
had to make an initial determination that the trespass was not pro-
tected under federal law, the same determination the Board would
have made, in the instance of trespassory conduct, the risk of erro-
neous determination is small, because experience shows that a tres-
pass is far more likely to be unprotected than protected.117
Introduction of these two balancing tests into the Garmon ratio-
nale substantially complicates determining when state courts do not
have jurisdiction, and will no doubt occasion much more litigation
in state courts than has previously existed.
Another series of cases involves not a Court-created exception
to the Garmon rule but the applicability and interpretation of § 301
of the Taft-Hartley Act,118 which authorizes suits in federal, and
state,119 courts to enforce collective bargaining agreements. The Court
has held that in enacting § 301, Congress authorized actions based
on conduct arguably subject to the NLRA, so that the Garmon pre-
emption doctrine does not preclude judicial enforcement of duties
and obligations which would otherwise be within the exclusive ju-
risdiction of the NLRB so long as those duties and obligations are
116 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. 180, 190–98 (1978).
117 436 U.S. at 199–207.
118 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a).
119 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962). The state courts
must, however, apply federal law. Local 174, Teamsters Union v. Lucas Flour Co.,
369 U.S. 95 (1962).
embodied in a collective-bargaining agreement, perhaps as inter-

preted in an arbitration proceeding.120
Here, too, the permissible role of state tort actions has been in
great dispute. Generally, a state tort action as an alternative to a
§ 301 arbitration or enforcement action is preempted if it is substan-
tially dependent upon analysis of the terms of a collective-
bargaining agreement.121 Thus, a state damage action for the bad-
faith handling of an insurance claim under a disability plan that
was part of a collective-bargaining agreement was preempted be-
cause it involved interpretation of that agreement and because state
enforcement would frustrate the policies of § 301 favoring uniform
federal-law interpretation of collective-bargaining agreements and
favoring arbitration as a predicate to adjudication.122
Finally, the Court has indicated that, with regard to some situ-
ations, Congress has intended to leave the parties to a labor dis-
pute free to engage in “self-help,” so that conduct not subject to fed-
eral law is nonetheless withdrawn from state control.123 However,
the NLRA is concerned primarily “with establishing an equitable
process for determining terms and conditions of employment, and
not with particular substantive terms of the bargain that is struck
when the parties are negotiating from relatively equal positions,”
so states are free to impose minimum labor standards.124
Obligation of State Courts Under the Supremacy Clause

The Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States are
as much a part of the law of every state as its own local laws and
constitution. Their obligation “is imperative upon the state judges,
in their official and not merely in their private capacities. From the
very nature of their judicial duties, they would be called upon to
120 Smith v. Evening News Ass’n, 371 U.S. 195 (1962); Humphrey v. Moore, 375
U.S. 335 (1964); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967).

121 See the analysis in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399
(1988) (state tort action for retaliatory discharge for exercising rights under a state
workers’ compensation law is not preempted by § 301, there being no required inter-
pretation of a collective-bargaining agreement).
122 Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985). See also Int’l Brother-
hood of Electric Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987) (state-law claim that union
breached duty to furnish employee a reasonably safe workplace preempted); United
Steelworkers of America v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990) (state-law claim that union
was negligent in inspecting a mine, the duty to inspect being created by the collective-
bargaining agreement preempted).
123 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Jacksonville Terminal Co., 394 U.S. 369 (1969);
Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. WERC, 427 U.S. 132 (1976); Golden Gate Tran-
sit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 475 U.S. 608 (1986). Cf. New York Telephone Co. v.
New York Labor Dept., 440 U.S. 519 (1979).
124 Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985) (upholding
a state requirement that health-care plans, including those resulting from collective
bargaining, provide minimum benefits for mental-health care).
pronounce the law applicable to the case in judgment. They were

not to decide merely according to the laws or Constitution of the
State, but according to the laws and treaties of the United States—
‘the supreme law of the land.’ ” 125 State courts are bound then to
give effect to federal law when it is applicable and to disregard state
law when there is a conflict; federal law includes, of course, not only
the Constitution and laws and treaties but also the interpretations
of their meanings by the United States Supreme Court.126 Al-
though states may not have to specially create courts competent to
hear federal claims or give courts authority specially,127 it violates
the Supremacy Clause for a state court to refuse to hear a category
of federal claims when the court entertains state law actions of a
similar nature,128 or sometimes even when it does not entertain state
law actions of a similar nature.129 The existence of inferior federal
courts sitting in the states and exercising often concurrent jurisdic-
tion of subjects has created problems with regard to the degree to
which state courts are bound by their rulings. Though the Su-
preme Court has directed and encouraged the lower federal courts
to create a corpus of federal common law,130 it has not spoken to
the effect of such lower court rulings on state courts.
Supremacy Clause Versus the Tenth Amendment
The logic of the Supremacy Clause would seem to require that
the powers of Congress be determined by the fair reading of the
express and implied grants contained in the Constitution itself, with-
out reference to the powers of the states. For a century after Mar-
125 Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 335 (1816). State courts
have both the power and the duty to enforce obligations arising under federal law,
unless Congress gives the federal courts exclusive jurisdiction. Claflin v. Houseman,
93 U.S. 130 (1876); Second Employers’ Liability Cases, 223 U.S. 1 (1912); Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
126 Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). State judges must defer to the arbitra-
tion process for resolving contract disputes under the Federal Arbitration Act even
though substantive state law applies. This is so despite allegations that arbitration
of a particular subject violates state public policy, that Supreme Court precedents
do not control, or that a specific state law should trump a general federal statute.
Nitro-Lift Technologies, L.L.C. v. Howard, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–1377, slip op. (2012);
Marmet Health Care Center, Inc. v. Brown, 565 U.S. ___, No. 11–391, slip op. (2012).
127 In Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–10374, slip op. at 10 (2009), the
Court noted, “this case does not require us to decide whether Congress may compel
a State to offer a forum, otherwise unavailable under state law, to hear suits brought
pursuant to [a federal statute].”
128 Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988).
The Court’s re-emphasis upon “dual federalism” has not altered this principle. See,
e.g., Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 905–10 (1997).
129 See Haywood v. Drown, 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–10374, slip op. (2009), dis-
cussed in Art. III, “Use of State Courts in Enforcement of Federal Law,” supra.
130 Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943); Textile Workers
of America v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957); Illinois v. City of Milwaukee, 406
U.S. 91 (1972).
shall’s death, however, the Court proceeded on the theory that the
Tenth Amendment had the effect of withdrawing various matters
of internal police from the reach of power expressly committed to
Congress. This point of view was originally put forward in New York
City v. Miln,131 which was first argued but not decided before Mar-
shall’s death. Miln involved a New York statute that required cap-
tains of vessels entering New York Harbor with aliens aboard to
make a report in writing to the Mayor of the City, giving certain
prescribed information. It might have been distinguished from Gib-
bons v. Ogden on the ground that the statute involved in the ear-
lier case conflicted with an act of Congress, whereas the Court found
that no such conflict existed in this case. But the Court was unwill-
ing to rest its decision on that distinction.
Speaking for the majority, Justice Barbour seized the opportu-
nity to proclaim a new doctrine. “But we do not place our opinion
on this ground. We choose rather to plant ourselves on what we
consider impregnable positions. They are these: That a state has
the same undeniable and unlimited jurisdiction over all persons and
things, within its territorial limits, as any foreign nation, where that
jurisdiction is not surrendered or restrained by the constitution of
the United States. That, by virtue of this, it is not only the right,
but the bounden and solemn duty of a state, to advance the safety,
happiness and prosperity of its people, and to provide for its gen-
eral welfare, by any and every act of legislation, which it may deem
to be conducive to these ends; where the power over the particular
subject, or the manner of its exercise is not surrendered or re-
strained, in the manner just stated. That all those powers which
relate to merely municipal legislation, or what may, perhaps, more
properly be called internal police, are not thus surrendered or re-
strained; and that, consequently, in relation to these, the authority
of a state is complete, unqualified, and exclusive.” 132 Justice Story,
in dissent, stated that Marshall had heard the previous argument
and reached the conclusion that the New York statute was uncon-
stitutional.133
The conception of a “complete, unqualified and exclusive” police
power residing in the states and limiting the powers of the na-
tional government was endorsed by Chief Justice Taney ten years
later in the License Cases.134 In upholding state laws requiring li-
censes for the sale of alcoholic beverages, including those imported
from other states or from foreign countries, he set up the Supreme
131 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837).
132 36 U.S. at 139.
133 36 U.S. at 161.
134 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504, 528 (1847).
Court as the final arbiter in drawing the line between the mutu-
ally exclusive, reciprocally limiting fields of power occupied by the
national and state governments.135
Until recently, it appeared that in fact and in theory the Court
had repudiated this doctrine,136 but, in National League of Cities v.
Usery,137 it revived part of this state police power limitation upon
the exercise of delegated federal power. However, the decision was
by a closely divided Court and subsequent interpretations closely
cabined the development and then overruled the case.
Following the demise of the “doctrine of dual federalism” in the
1930s, the Court confronted the question whether Congress had the
power to regulate state conduct and activities to the same extent,
primarily under the Commerce Clause, as it did to regulate private
conduct and activities to the exclusion of state law.138 In United States
v. California,139 upholding the validity of the application of a fed-
eral safety law to a state-owned railroad being operated as a non-
profit entity, the Court, speaking through Justice Stone, denied the
existence of an implied limitation upon Congress’s plenary power
to regulate commerce when a state instrumentality was involved.
“The state can no more deny the power if its exercise has been au-
thorized by Congress than can an individual.” 140 Although the state
in operating the railroad was acting as a sovereign and within the
powers reserved to the states, the Court said, its exercise was “in
subordination to the power to regulate interstate commerce, which
has been granted specifically to the national government. The sov-
ereign power of the states is necessarily diminished to the extent
of the grants of power to the Federal Government in the Constitu-
tion.” 141
A series of cases followed in which the Court refused to con-
struct any state immunity from regulation when Congress acted pur-
135 46 U.S. at 573–74.

136 Representative early cases include NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U.S. 1 (1937); Steward Machine Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937); Helvering v.
Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941). Among the
cases incompatible with the theory was Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968).
137 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
138 On the doctrine of “dual federalism,” see the commentary by the originator
of the phrase, Professor Corwin. E. CORWIN, THE TWILIGHT OF THE SUPREME COURT—A
HISTORY OF OUR CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 10–51 (1934); THE COMMERCE POWER VERSUS STATES
RIGHTS 115–172 (1936); A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 1–28 (1951).
139 297 U.S. 175 (1936).
140 297 U.S. at 185.
141 297 U.S. at 184.
suant to a delegated power.142 The culmination of this series had

been thought to be Maryland v. Wirtz,143 in which the Court up-
held the constitutionality of applying the federal wage and hour law
to nonprofessional employees of state-operated schools and hospi-
tals. In an opinion by Justice Harlan, the Court saw a clear connec-
tion between working conditions in these institutions and inter-
state commerce. Labor conditions in schools and hospitals affect
commerce; strikes and work stoppages involving such employees in-
terrupt and burden the flow across state lines of goods purchased
by state agencies, and the wages paid have a substantial effect. The
Commerce Clause being thus applicable, the Justice wrote, Con-
gress was not constitutionally required to “yield to state sover-
eignty in the performance of governmental functions. This argu-
ment simply is not tenable. There is no general doctrine implied in
the Federal Constitution that the two governments, national and
state, are each to exercise its powers so as not to interfere with the
free and full exercise of the powers of the other. . . . [I]t is clear
that the Federal Government, when acting within a delegated power,
may override countervailing state interests whether these be de-
scribed as ‘governmental’ or ‘proprietary’ in character. . . . [V]alid
general regulations of commerce do not cease to be regulations of
commerce because a State is involved. If a State is engaging in eco-
nomic activities that are validly regulated by the Federal Govern-
ment when engaged in by private persons, the State too may be
forced to conform its activities to federal regulation.” 144
Wirtz was specifically reaffirmed in Fry v. United States,145 in
which the Court upheld the constitutionality of presidentially im-
posed wage and salary controls, pursuant to congressional statute,
on all state governmental employees. In dissent, however, Justice
Rehnquist propounded a doctrine that was to obtain majority ap-
proval in League of Cities,146 in which he wrote for the Court: “[T]here
142 California v. United States, 320 U.S. 577 (1944) (federal regulation of ship-
ping terminal facilities owned by state); California v. Taylor, 353 U.S. 553 (1957)
(Railway Labor Act applies on state-owned railroad); Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92
(1946); Hubler v. Twin Falls County, 327 U.S. 103 (1946) (federal wartime price regu-
lations applied to state transactions; Congress’s power effectively to wage war); Board
of Trustees v. United States, 289 U.S. 48 (1933) (state university required to pay
federal customs duties on imported educational equipment); Oklahoma ex rel. Phil-
lips v. Atkinson Co., 313 U.S. 508 (1941) (federal condemnation of state lands for
flood control project); Sanitary Dist. v. United States, 206 U.S. 405 (1925) (prohibi-
tion of state from diverting water from Great Lakes).
143 392 U.S. 183 (1968). Justices Douglas and Stewart dissented. Id. at 201.
144 392 U.S. at 195–97 (internal quotation marks omitted).
145 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
146 421 U.S. at 549. Essentially, the Justice was required to establish an affir-
mative constitutional barrier to congressional action. Id. at 552–53. That is, if one
asserts only the absence of congressional authority, one’s chances of success are dim
are attributes of sovereignty attaching to every state government

which may not be impaired by Congress, not because Congress may
lack an affirmative grant of legislative authority to reach the mat-
ter, but because the Constitution prohibits it from exercising the
authority in that manner.” 147 The standard, apparently, in judging
between permissible and impermissible federal regulation, is whether
there is federal interference with “functions essential to separate
and independent existence.” 148 In the context of this case, state de-
cisions with respect to the pay of their employees and the hours to
be worked were essential aspects of their “freedom to structure in-
tegral operations in areas of traditional governmental func-
tions.” 149 The line of cases exemplified by United States v. Califor-
nia was distinguished and preserved on the basis that the state
activities there regulated were so unlike the traditional activities
of a state that Congress could reach them; 150 Case v. Bowles was
held distinguishable on the basis that Congress had acted pursu-
ant to its war powers and to have rejected the power would have
impaired national defense; 151 Fry was distinguished on the bases
that it upheld emergency legislation tailored to combat a serious
national emergency, the means were limited in time and effect, the
freeze did not displace state discretion in structuring operations or
force a restructuring, and the federal action “operated to reduce the
pressure upon state budgets rather than increase them.” 152 Wirtz
because of the breadth of the commerce power. But when he asserts that, say, the
First or Fifth Amendment bars congressional action concededly within its commerce
power, one interposes an affirmative constitutional defense that has a chance of suc-
cess. It was the Justice’s view that the state was “asserting an affirmative constitu-
tional right, inherent in its capacity as a State, to be free from such congressionally
asserted authority.” Id. at 553. But whence the affirmative barrier? “[I]t is not the
Tenth Amendment by its terms. . . .” Id. at 557 (emphasis supplied). Rather, the Amend-
ment was an example of the Framers’ understanding that the sovereignty of the
states imposed an implied affirmative barrier to the assertion of otherwise valid con-
gressional powers. Id. at 557–59. But the difficulty with this construction is that the
equivalence that Justice Rehnquist sought to establish lies not between an indi-
vidual asserting a constitutional limit on delegated powers and a state asserting
the same thing, but is rather between an individual asserting a lack of authority
and a state asserting a lack of authority; this equivalence is evident on the face of
the Tenth Amendment, which states that the powers not delegated to the United
States “are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.” (emphasis sup-
plied). The states are thereby accorded no greater interest in restraining the exer-
cise of nondelegated power than are the people. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262
U.S. 447 (1923).
147 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 845 (1976).
148 426 U.S. at 845.
149 426 U.S. at 852.
150 426 U.S. at 854.
151 426 U.S. at 854 n.18.
152 426 U.S. at 852–53.
was overruled; it permitted Congress to intrude into the conduct of

integral and traditional state governmental functions and could not
therefore stand.153
League of Cities did not prove to be much of a restriction upon
congressional power in subsequent decisions. First, its principle was
held not to reach to state regulation of private conduct that affects
interstate commerce, even as to such matters as state jurisdiction
over land within its borders.154 Second, it was held not to immu-
nize state conduct of a business operation, that is, proprietary ac-
tivity not like “traditional governmental activities.” 155 Third, it was
held not to preclude Congress from regulating the way states regu-
late private activities within the state—even though such state ac-
tivity is certainly traditional governmental action—on the theory
that, because Congress could displace or preempt state regulation,
it may require the states to regulate in a certain way if they wish
to continue to act in this field.156 Fourth, it was held not to limit
Congress when it acts in an emergency or pursuant to its war pow-
ers, so that Congress may indeed reach even traditional governmen-
tal activity.157 Fifth, it was held not to apply at all to Congress’s
enforcement powers under the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fif-
teenth Amendments.158 Sixth, it apparently was to have no applica-
tion to the exercise of Congress’s spending power with conditions
attached.159 Seventh, not because of the way the Court framed the
statement of its doctrinal position, which is absolutist, but because
of the way it accommodated precedent and because of Justice
Blackmun’s concurrence, it was always open to interpretation that
Congress was enabled to reach traditional governmental activities
not involving employer-employee relations or is enabled to reach even
these relations if the effect is “to reduce the pressures upon state
153 426 U.S. at 853–55.

154 Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Recl. Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
155 United Transp. Union v. Long Island R.R., 455 U.S. 678 (1982).
156 FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742 (1982).
157 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 854 n.18 (1976).
158 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976); City of Rome v. United States,
446 U.S. 156, 178–80 (1980).

159 In Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (1981),
the Court suggested rather ambiguously that League of Cities may restrict the fed-
eral spending power, citing its reservation of the cases in League of Cities, 426 U.S.
852 n.17, but citing also spending clause cases indicating a rational basis standard
of review of conditioned spending. Earlier, the Court had summarily affirmed a deci-
sion holding that the spending power was not affected by the case. North Carolina
ex rel. Morrow v. Califano, 445 F. Supp. 532 (E.D.N.C. 1977) (three-judge court),
aff’d, 435 U.S. 962 (1978). No hint of such a limitation is contained in more recent
decisions (to be sure, in the aftermath of League of Cities’ demise). New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 167, 171–72, 185 (1992); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203,
210–12 (1987).
budgets rather than increase them.” 160 In his concurrence, Justice

Blackmun suggested his lack of agreement with “certain possible
implications” of the opinion and recast it as a “balancing approach”
that “does not outlaw federal power in areas such as environmen-
tal protection, where the federal interest is demonstrably greater
and where state facility compliance with imposed federal stan-
dards would be essential.” 161
The Court overruled National League of Cities in Garcia v. San
Antonio Metropolitan Transit Authority,162 and seemingly returned
to the conception of federal supremacy embodied in Wirtz and Fry.
For the most part, the Court indicated, states must seek protection
from the impact of federal regulation in the political processes, and
not in any limitations imposed on the commerce power or found in
the Tenth Amendment. Justice Blackmun’s opinion for the Court in
Garcia concluded that the National League of Cities test for “inte-
gral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions” had
proven “both impractical and doctrinally barren.” 163 State au-
tonomy is both limited and protected by the terms of the Constitu-
tion itself, hence—ordinarily, at least—exercise of Congress’s enu-
merated powers is not to be limited by “a priori definitions of state
sovereignty.” 164 States retain a significant amount of sovereign au-
thority “only to the extent that the Constitution has not divested
them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the
Federal Government.” 165 There are direct limitations in Art. I, § 10;
and “Section 8 . . . works an equally sharp contraction of state sov-
ereignty by authorizing Congress to exercise a wide range of legis-
lative powers and (in conjunction with the Supremacy Clause of Ar-
ticle VI) to displace contrary state legislation.” 166 On the other hand,
the principal restraints on congressional exercise of the commerce
power are to be found not in the Tenth Amendment, in the Com-
merce Clause itself, or in “judicially created limitations on federal
power,” but in the structure of the Federal Government and in the
160 National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 846–51 (1976). The quota-
tion in the text is at 853 (one of the elements distinguishing the case from Fry).
161 426 U.S. at 856.
162 469 U.S. 528 (1985). The issue was again decided by a 5-to-4 vote, Justice
Blackmun’s qualified acceptance of the National League of Cities approach having

changed to complete rejection. Justice Blackmun’s opinion of the Court was joined
by Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens. Writing in dissent were Jus-
tices Powell (joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Rehnquist and O’Connor),
O’Connor (joined by Justices Powell and Rehnquist), and Rehnquist.
163 469 U.S. at 557.
164 469 U.S. at 548.
165 469 U.S. at 549.
166 469 U.S. at 548.
political processes.167 “[T]he fundamental limitation that the consti-

tutional scheme imposes on the Commerce Clause to protect the ‘States
as States’ is one of process rather than one of result.” 168 While con-
tinuing to recognize that “Congress’s authority under the Com-
merce Clause must reflect [the] position . . . that the States occupy
a special and specific position in our constitutional system,” the Court
held that application of Fair Labor Standards Act minimum wage
and overtime provisions to state employment does not require iden-
tification of these “affirmative limits.” 169 Thus, arguably, the Court
has not totally abandoned the National League of Cities premise
that there are limits on the extent to which federal regulation may
burden states as states. Rather, it has stipulated that any such lim-
its on exercise of federal power must be premised on a failure of
the political processes to protect state interests, and “must be tai-
lored to compensate for [such] failings . . . rather than to dictate a
‘sacred province of state autonomy.’ ” 170
Further indication of what must be alleged in order to estab-
lish affirmative limits to commerce power regulation was provided
in South Carolina v. Baker.171 The Court expansively interpreted
Garcia as meaning that there must be an allegation of “some ex-
traordinary defects in the national political process” before the Court
will intervene.172 A claim that Congress acted on incomplete infor-
mation will not suffice, the Court noting that South Carolina had
“not even alleged that it was deprived of any right to participate in
the national political process or that it was singled out in a way
that left it politically isolated and powerless.” 173 Thus, the general
rule is that “limits on Congress’s authority to regulate state activi-
ties . . . are structural, not substantive—i.e., that States must find
their protection from congressional regulation through the national
political process, not through judicially defined spheres of unregulable
state activity.” 174
Dissenting in Garcia, Justice Rehnquist predicted that the doc-
trine propounded by the dissenters and by those Justices in Na-
167 “Apart from the limitation on federal authority inherent in the delegated na-
ture of Congress’s Article I powers, the principal means chosen by the Framers to
ensure the role of the States in the federal system lies in the structure of the Fed-
eral Government itself.” 469 U.S. at 550. The Court cited as prime examples the
role of states in selecting the President, and the equal representation of states in
the Senate. Id. at 551.
168 469 U.S. at 554.
169 469 U.S. at 556.
170 469 U.S. at 554.
171 485 U.S. 505 (1988).
172 485 U.S. at 512.
173 485 U.S. at 513.
174 485 U.S. at 512.
tional League of Cities “will . . . in time again command the sup-

port of a majority of the Court.” 175 As the membership of the Court
changed, it appeared that the prediction was proving true.176 Con-
fronted with the opportunity in New York v. United States,177 to re-
examine Garcia, the Court instead distinguished it,178 striking down
a federal law on the basis that Congress could not “commandeer”
the legislative and administrative processes of state government to
compel the administration of federal programs.179 The line of analy-
sis pursued by the Court makes clear, however, what the result will
be when a Garcia kind of federal law is reviewed.
That is, because the dispute involved the division of authority
between federal and state governments, Justice O’Connor wrote for
the Court in New York, one could inquire whether Congress acted
under a delegated power or one could ask whether Congress had
invaded a state province protected by the Tenth Amendment. But,
the Justice wrote, “the two inquiries are mirror images of each other.
If a power is delegated to Congress in the Constitution, the Tenth
Amendment expressly disclaims any reservation of that power to
the States; if a power is an attribute of state sovereignty reserved
by the Tenth Amendment, it is necessarily a power the Constitu-
tion has not conferred on Congress.” 180
Powers delegated to the Nation, therefore, are subject to limita-
tions that reserve power to the states. This limitation is not found
in the text of the Tenth Amendment, which is, the Court stated,
“but a truism,” 181 but is a direct constraint on Article I powers when
an incident of state sovereignty is invaded.182 The “take title” pro-
vision was such an invasion. Both the Federal Government and the
175 Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579–80 (1985).
176 The shift was pronounced in Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), in which
the Court, cognizant of the constraints of Garcia, chose to apply a “plain statement”
rule to construction of a statute seen to be intruding into the heart of state au-
tonomy. Id. at 463. To do otherwise, said Justice O’Connor, was to confront “a poten-
tial constitutional problem” under the Tenth Amendment and the Guarantee Clause
of Article IV, § 4. Id. at 463–64.
177 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
178 The line of cases exemplified by Garcia was said to concern the authority of
Congress to subject state governments to generally applicable laws, those covering

private concerns as well as the states, necessitating no revisiting of those cases. 505
U.S. at 160.
179 Struck down was a provision of law providing for the disposal of radioactive
wastes generated in the United States by government and industry. Placing various
responsibilities on the states, the provision sought to compel performance by requir-
ing that any state that failed to provide for the permanent disposal of wastes gener-
ated within its borders must take title to, take possession of, and assume liability
for the wastes, 505 U.S. at 161, obviously a considerable burden.
180 505 U.S. at 156.
181 505 U.S. at 156 (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 124 (1941)).
182 505 U.S. at 156.
states owe political accountability to the people. When Congress en-

courages states to adopt and administer a federally prescribed pro-
gram, both governments maintain their accountability for their de-
cisions. When Congress compels the states to act, state officials will
bear the brunt of accountability that properly belongs at the na-
tional level.183 The “take title” provision, because it presented the
states with “an unavoidable command,” transformed state govern-
ments into “regional offices” or “administrative agencies” of the Fed-
eral Government, impermissibly undermined the accountability ow-
ing the people and was void.184 Whether viewed as lying outside
Congress’s enumerated powers or as infringing the core of state sov-
ereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, “the provision is incon-
sistent with the federal structure of our Government established
by the Constitution.” 185
Federal laws of general applicability, therefore, are surely sub-
ject to examination under the New York test rather than under the
Garcia structural standard.
Expanding upon its anti-commandeering rule, the Court in Printz
v. United States 186 established “categorically” the rule that “[t]he
Federal Government may not compel the States to enact or admin-
ister a federal regulatory program.” 187 At issue in Printz was a pro-
vision of the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act that re-
quired, pending the development by the Attorney General of a national
system by which criminal background checks on prospective fire-
arms purchasers could be conducted, the chief law enforcement of-
ficers of state and local governments to conduct background checks
to ascertain whether applicants were ineligible to purchase hand-
guns. Confronting the absence of any textual basis for a “categori-
cal” rule, the Court looked to history, which in its view demon-
strated a paucity of congressional efforts to impose affirmative duties
upon the states.188 More important, the Court relied on the “struc-
tural Constitution” to demonstrate that the Constitution of 1787 had
not taken from the states “a residuary and inviolable sover-
eignty,” 189 that it had, in fact and theory, retained a system of “dual
183 505 U.S. at 168–69.

184 505 U.S. at 175–77, 188.
185 505 U.S. at 177.
186 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
187 521 U.S. at 933 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting New York v. United
States, 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992)).

188 521 U.S. at 904–18. Notably, the Court expressly exempted from this rule
the continuing role of the state courts in the enforcement of federal law. Id. at 905–
08.
189 521 U.S. at 919 (quoting THE FEDERALIST, No. 39 (Madison)).
sovereignty” 190 reflected in many things but most notably in the

constitutional conferral “upon Congress of not all governmental pow-
ers, but only discrete, enumerated ones,” which was expressed in
the Tenth Amendment. Thus, although it had earlier rejected the
commandeering of legislative assistance, the Court now made clear
that administrative officers and resources were also fenced off from
federal power.
The scope of the rule thus expounded was unclear. Particularly,
Justice O’Connor in concurrence observed that Congress retained
the power to enlist the states through contractual arrangements and
on a voluntary basis. More pointedly, she stated that “the Court ap-
propriately refrains from deciding whether other purely ministerial
reporting requirements imposed by Congress on state and local au-
thorities pursuant to its Commerce Clause powers are similarly in-
valid.” 191
A partial answer was provided in Reno v. Condon,192 in which
the Court upheld the Driver’s Privacy Protection Act of 1994 against
a charge that it offended the anti-commandeering rule of New York
and Printz. The Act in general limits disclosure and resale without
a driver’s consent of personal information contained in the records
of state motor vehicle departments, and requires disclosure of that
information for specified government record-keeping purposes. While
conceding that the Act “will require time and effort on the part of
state employees,” the Court found this imposition permissible be-
cause the Act regulates state activities directly rather than requir-
ing states to regulate private activities.193
Federal Instrumentalities and Personnel and State Police

Power
Federal instrumentalities and agencies have never enjoyed the
same degree of immunity from state police regulation as from state
taxation. The Court has looked to the nature of each regulation to
determine whether it is compatible with the functions committed
by Congress to the federal agency. This problem has arisen most
often with reference to the applicability of state laws to the opera-
tion of national banks. Two correlative propositions have governed
the decisions in these cases. The first was stated by Justice Miller
190 521 U.S. at 918.

191 521 U.S. at 936 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 5779(a)) (requiring state and local law
enforcement agencies to report cases of missing children to the Department of Jus-
tice).
192 528 U.S. 141 (2000).
193 528 U.S. at 150–51.
in National Bank v. Commonwealth.194 “[National banks] are sub-

ject to the laws of the State, and are governed in their daily course
of business far more by the laws of the State than of the nation.
All their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. Their
acquisition and transfer of property, their right to collect their debts,
and their liability to be sued for debts, are all based on State law.
It is only when the State law incapacitates the banks from discharg-
ing their duties to the government that it becomes unconstitu-
tional.” 195 In Davis v. Elmira Savings Bank,196 the Court stated the
second proposition thus: “National banks are instrumentalities of
the Federal government, created for a public purpose, and as such
necessarily subject to the paramount authority of the United States.
It follows that an attempt, by a State, to define their duties or con-
trol the conduct of their affairs is absolutely void, wherever such
attempted exercise of authority expressly conflicts with the laws of
the United States, and either frustrates the purpose of the na-
tional legislation or impairs the efficiency of these agencies of the
Federal government to discharge the duties, for the performance of
which they were created.” 197
Similarly, a state law, insofar as it forbids national banks to
use the word “saving” or “savings” in their business and advertis-
ing, is void because it conflicts with the Federal Reserve Act’s au-
thorizing such banks to receive savings deposits.198 However, fed-
eral incorporation of a railroad company of itself does not operate
to exempt it from control by a state as to business consummated
wholly within the state.199 Also, Treasury Department regulations,
designed to implement the federal borrowing power (Art. I, § 8, cl.
2) by making United States Savings Bonds attractive to investors
and conferring exclusive title thereto upon a surviving joint owner,
override contrary state community property laws whereunder a one-
half interest in such property remains part of the estate of a dece-
dent co-owner.200 Similarly, the Patent Office’s having been granted
by Congress an unqualified authorization to license and regulate
the conduct throughout the United States of nonlawyers as patent
agents, a state, under the guise of prohibiting unauthorized prac-
tice of law, is preempted from enjoining such activities of a li-
censed agent as entail the rendering of legal opinions as to patent-
194 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 353 (1870).

195 76 U.S. at 362.
196 161 U.S. 275 (1896).
197 161 U.S. at 283.
198 Franklin Nat’l Bank v. New York, 347 U.S. 273 (1954).
199 Reagan v. Mercantile Trust Co., 154 U.S. 413 (1894).
200 Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
ability or infringement of patent rights and the preparation and

prosecution of application for patents.201
The extent to which states may regulate contractors who fur-
nish goods or services to the Federal Government is not as clearly
established as is the states’ right to tax such dealers. In 1943, a
closely divided Court sustained the refusal of the Pennsylvania Milk
Control Commission to renew the license of a milk dealer who, in
violation of state law, had sold milk to the United States for con-
sumption by troops at an army camp located on land belonging to
the state, at prices below the minimum established by the Commis-
sion.202 The majority was unable to find in congressional legisla-
tion, or in the Constitution, unaided by congressional enactment,
any immunity from such price fixing regulations. On the same day,
a different majority held that California could not penalize a milk
dealer for selling milk to the War Department at less than the mini-
mum price fixed by state law where the sales and deliveries were
made in a territory which had been ceded to the Federal Govern-
ment by the state and were subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of
the former.203 On the other hand, by virtue of its conflict with stan-
dards set forth in the Armed Services Procurement Act, 41 U.S.C.
§ 152, for determining the letting of contracts to responsible bid-
ders, a state law licensing contractors cannot be enforced against
one selected by federal authorities for work on an Air Force base.204
Most recently, the Court has done little to clarify the doctrinal
difficulties.205 The Court looked to a “functional” analysis of state
regulations, much like the rule covering state taxation. “A state regu-
lation is invalid only if it regulates the United States directly or
discriminates against the Federal Government or those with whom
it deals.” 206 In determining whether a regulation discriminates against
the Federal Government, “the entire regulatory system should be
analyzed.” 207
201 Sperry v. Florida, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
202 Penn Dairies v. Milk Control Comm’n, 318 U.S. 261 (1943).
203 Pacific Coast Dairy v. Department of Agriculture, 318 U.S. 285 (1943). See
also Paul v. United States, 371 U.S. 245 (1963).

204 Leslie Miller, Inc. v. Arkansas, 353 U.S. 187 (1956).
205 North Dakota v. United States, 495 U.S. 423 (1990). The difficulty is that
the case was five-to-four, with a single Justice concurring with a plurality of four to
reach the result. Id. at 444. Presumably, the concurrence agreed with the rationale
set forth here, disagreeing only in other respects.
206 495 U.S. at 435. Four dissenting Justices agreed with this principle, but they
also would invalidate a state law that “actually and substantially interferes with
specific federal programs.” Id. at 448, 451–52.
207 495 U.S. at 435. That is, only when the overall effect, when balanced against
other regulations applicable to similarly situated persons who do not deal with the
government, imposes a discriminatory burden will they be invalidated. Justice Scalia,
concurring, was doubtful of this standard. Id. at 444.
The Doctrine of Federal Exemption From State Taxation

McCulloch v. Maryland.—Five years after the decision in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland that a state may not tax an instrumentality
of the Federal Government, the Court was asked to and did reex-
amine the entire question in Osborn v. Bank of the United States.208
In that case counsel for the State of Ohio, whose attempt to tax
the Bank was challenged, put forward two arguments of great im-
portance. In the first place it was “contended, that, admitting Con-
gress to possess the power, this exemption ought to have been ex-
pressly asserted in the act of incorporation; and not being expressed,
ought not to be implied by the Court.” 209 To which Marshall re-
plied: “It is no unusual thing for an act of Congress to imply, with-
out expressing, this very exemption from state control, which is said
to be so objectionable in this instance.” 210 Secondly, the appellants
relied “greatly on the distinction between the bank and the public
institutions, such as the mint or the post office. The agents in those
offices are, it is said, officers of government. . . . Not so the direc-
tors of the bank. The connection of the government with the bank,
is likened to that with contractors.” 211 Marshall accepted this anal-
ogy but not to the advantage of the appellants. He simply indi-
cated that all contractors who dealt with the government were en-
titled to immunity from taxation upon such transactions.212 Thus,
not only was the decision of McCulloch v. Maryland reaffirmed but
the foundation was laid for the vast expansion of the principle of
immunity that was to follow in the succeeding decades.
Applicability of Doctrine to Federal Securities.—The first
significant extension of the doctrine of the immunity of federal in-
strumentalities from state taxation came in Weston v. Charles-
ton,213 where Chief Justice Marshall also found in the Supremacy
Clause a bar to state taxation of obligations of the United States.
During the Civil War, when Congress authorized the issuance of
legal tender notes, it explicitly declared that such notes, as well as
United States bonds and other securities, should be exempt from
state taxation.214 A modified version of this section remains on the
208 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).

209 22 U.S. at 865.
210 22 U.S. at 865.
211 22 U.S. at 866.
212 22 U.S. at 867.
213 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 449 (1829), followed in New York ex rel. Bank of Commerce
v. New York City, 67 U.S. (2 Bl.) 620 (1863).

214 Ch. 73, 37th Cong., 3d Sess., 12 Stat. 709, 710 (1863).
statute books today.215 The right of Congress to exempt legal ten-

der notes to the same extent as bonds was sustained in Bank v.
Supervisors,216 over the objection that such notes circulate as money
and should be taxable in the same way as coin. But a state tax on
checks issued by the Treasurer of the United States for interest ac-
crued upon government bonds was sustained since it did not in any
way affect the credit of the National Government.217 Similarly, the
assessment for an ad valorem property tax of an open account for
money due under a federal contract,218 and the inclusion of the value
of United States bonds owed by a decedent, in measuring an inheri-
tance tax,219 were held valid, since neither tax would substantially
embarrass the power of the United States to secure credit.220 A state
property tax levied on mutual savings banks and federal savings
and loan associations and measured by the amount of their capital,
surplus, or reserve and undivided profits, but without deduction of
the value of their United States securities, was voided as a tax on
obligations of the Federal Government. Apart from the fact that the
ownership interest of depositors in such institutions was different
from that of corporate stockholders, the tax was imposed on the banks
which were solely liable for payment thereof.221
Income from federal securities is also beyond the reach of the
state taxing power as the cases now stand.222 Nor can such a tax
be imposed indirectly upon the stockholders on such part of the cor-
porate dividends as corresponds to the part of the corporation’s in-
come which is not assessed, i.e., income from tax exempt bonds.223
A state may constitutionally levy an excise tax on corporations for
the privilege of doing business, and measure the tax by the prop-
erty of net income of the corporation, including tax exempt United
215 31 U.S.C. § 3124. The exemption under the statute is no broader than that
which the Constitution requires. First Nat’l Bank v. Bartow County Bd. of Tax As-
sessors, 470 U.S. 583 (1985). The relationship of this statute to another, 12 U.S.C.
§ 548, governing taxation of shares of national banking associations, has occasioned
no little difficulty. American Bank & Trust Co. v. Dallas County, 463 U.S. 855 (1983);
Memphis Bank & Trust Co. v. Garner, 459 U.S. 392 (1983).
216 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 26 (1868).
217 Hibernia Savings Society v. San Francisco, 200 U.S. 310, 315 (1906).
218 Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111 (1944).
219 Plummer v. Coler, 178 U.S. 115 (1900); Blodgett v. Silberman, 277 U.S. 1, 12
(1928).
220 Accord, Rockford Life Ins. Co. v. Illinois Dep’t of Revenue, 482 U.S. 182 (1987)
(tax including in an investor’s net assets the value of federally-backed securities (“Gin-
nie Maes”) upheld, as it would have no adverse effect on Federal Government’s bor-
rowing ability).
221 Society for Savings v. Bowers, 349 U.S. 143 (1955).
222 Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136, 140 (1927).
223 Miller v. Milwaukee, 272 U.S. 713 (1927).
States securities or the income derived therefrom.224 The designa-

tion of a tax is not controlling.225 Where a so-called “license tax”
upon insurance companies, measured by gross income, including in-
terest on government bonds, was, in effect, a commutation tax lev-
ied in lieu of other taxation upon the personal property of the tax-
payer, it was still held to amount to an unconstitutional tax on the
bonds themselves.226
Taxation of Government Contractors.—In the course of his
opinion in Osborn v. Bank of the United States,227 Chief Justice Mar-
shall posed the question: “Can a contractor for supplying a military
post with provisions, be restrained from making purchases within
any state, or from transporting the provisions to the place at which
the troops were stationed? Or could he be fined or taxed for doing
so? We have not yet heard these questions answered in the affirma-
tive.” 228
Today, the question insofar as taxation is concerned is an-
swered in the affirmative. Although the early cases looked toward
immunity,229 in James v. Dravo Contracting Co.,230 by a 5-to-4 vote,
the Court established the modern doctrine. Upholding a state tax
on the gross receipts of a contractor providing services to the Fed-
eral Government, the Court said that “ ‘[I]t is not necessary to cripple
[the state’s power to tax] by extending the constitutional exemp-
tion from taxation to those subjects which fall within the general
application of non-discriminatory laws, and where no direct burden
is laid upon the governmental instrumentality, and there is only a
remote, if any, influence upon the exercise of the functions of gov-
ernment.’ ” 231 A state-imposed sales tax upon the purchase of goods
by a private firm having a cost-plus contract with the Federal Gov-
ernment was sustained, it not being critical to the tax’s validity that
224 Provident Inst. v. Massachusetts, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 611 (1868); Society for
Savings v. Coite, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 594 (1868); Hamilton Company v. Massachusetts,

73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 632 (1868); Home Ins. Co. v. New York, 134 U.S. 594 (1890); Wer-
ner Machine Co. v. Director of Taxation, 350 U.S. 492 (1956).
225 Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts, 279 U.S. 620, 625 (1929).
226 Northwestern Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Wisconsin, 275 U.S. 136 (1927).
227 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
228 22 U.S. at 867.
229 The dissent in James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937),
observed that the Court was overruling “a century of precedents.” See, e.g., Pan-
handle Oil Co. v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928) (voiding a state privi-
lege tax on dealers in gasoline as applied to sales by a dealer to the Federal Govern-
ment for use by Coast Guard). It was in Panhandle that Justice Holmes uttered his
riposte to Chief Justice Marshall: “The power to tax is not the power to destroy while
this Court sits.” Id. at 223 (dissenting).
230 302 U.S. 134 (1937).
231 302 U.S. at 150 (quoting Willcuts v. Bunn, 282 U.S. 216, 225 (1931)).
it would be passed on to the government.232 Previously, it had sus-

tained a gross receipts tax levied in lieu of a property tax upon the
operator of an automobile stage line, who was engaged in carrying
the mails as an independent contractor 233 and an excise tax on gaso-
line sold to a contractor with the government and used to operate
machinery in the construction of levees on the Mississippi River.234
Although the decisions have not set an unwavering line,235 the Court
has hewed to a very restrictive doctrine of immunity. “[T]ax immu-
nity is appropriate in only one circumstance: when the levy falls on
the United States itself, or on an agency or instrumentality so closely
connected to the government that the two cannot realistically be
viewed as separate entities, at least insofar as the activity being
taxed is concerned.” 236 Thus, New Mexico sustained a state gross
receipts tax and a use tax imposed upon contractors with the Fed-
eral Government which operated on “advanced funding,” drawing
on federal deposits so that only federal funds were expended by the
contractors to meet their obligations.237 Of course, Congress may
statutorily provide for immunity from taxation of federal contrac-
tors generally or in particular programs.238
232 Alabama v. King & Boozer, 314 U.S. 1 (1941), overruling Panhandle Oil Co.
v. Mississippi ex rel. Knox, 277 U.S. 218 (1928), and Graves v. Texas Co., 298 U.S.
393 (1936). See also Curry v. United States, 314 U.S. 14 (1941). “The Constitution
. . . does not forbid a tax whose legal incidence is upon a contractor doing business
with the United States, even though the economic burden of the tax, by contract or
otherwise, is ultimately borne by the United States.” United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S.
39, 44 (1964) (sustaining sales and use taxes on contractors using tangible personal
property to carry out government cost-plus contract).
233 Alward v. Johnson, 282 U.S. 509 (1931).
234 Trinityfarm Const. Co. v. Grosjean, 291 U.S. 466 (1934).
235 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944) (voiding property tax
that included in assessment the value of federal machinery held by private party);
Kern-Limerick, Inc. v. Scurlock, 347 U.S. 110 (1954) (voiding gross receipts sales tax
applied to contractor purchasing article under agreement whereby he was to act as
agent for government and title to articles purchased passed directly from vendor to
United States).
236 United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 735 (1982). See South Carolina
v. Baker, 485 U.S. 505, 523 (1988).

237 “[I]mmunity may not be conferred simply because the tax has an effect on
the United States, or even because the Federal Government shoulders the entire
economic burden of the levy.” United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 734 (1982).
Arizona Dep’t of Revenue v. Blaze Constr. Co., 526 U.S. 32 (1999) (the same rule
applies when the contractual services are rendered on an Indian reservation).
238 James v. Dravo Contracting Co., 302 U.S. 134, 161 (1937); Carson v. Roane-
Anderson Co., 342 U.S. 232, 234 (1952); United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720,
737 (1982). Roane-Anderson held that a section of the Atomic Energy Act barred the
collection of state sales and use taxes in connection with sales to private companies
of personal property used by them in fulfilling their contracts with the AEC. There-
after, Congress repealed the section for the express purpose of placing AEC contrac-
tors on the same footing as other federal contractors, and the Court upheld imposi-
tion of the taxes. United States v. Boyd, 378 U.S. 39 (1964).
Taxation of Salaries of Federal Employees.—Of a piece with

James v. Dravo Contracting Co. was Graves v. New York ex rel.
O’Keefe,239 handed down two years later. Repudiating the theory “that
a tax on income is legally or economically a tax on its source,” the
Court held that a state could levy a nondiscriminatory income tax
upon the salary of an employee of a government corporation. In the
opinion of the Court, Justice Stone intimated that Congress could
not validly confer such an immunity upon federal employees. “The
burden, so far as it can be said to exist or to affect the government
in any indirect or incidental way, is one which the Constitution pre-
supposes; and hence it cannot rightly be deemed to be within an
implied restriction upon the taxing power of the national and state
governments which the Constitution has expressly granted to one
and has confirmed to the other. The immunity is not one to be im-
plied from the Constitution, because if allowed it would impose to
an inadmissible extent a restriction on the taxing power which the
Constitution has reserved to the state governments.” 240 Chief Jus-
tice Hughes concurred in the result without opinion. Justices But-
ler and McReynolds dissented and Justice Frankfurter wrote a con-
curring opinion in which he reserved judgment as to “whether Congress
may, by express legislation, relieve its functionaries from their civic
obligations to pay for the benefits of the State governments under
which they live.” 241
That question is academic, Congress’s having consented to state
taxation of its employees’ compensation as long as the taxation “does
not discriminate against the . . . employee, because of the source
of the . . . compensation.” 242 This principle, the Court has held, “is
239 306 U.S. 466 (1939), followed in State Comm’n v. Van Cott, 306 U.S. 511
(1939). This case was overruled by implication in Dobbins v. Erie County, 41 U.S.
(16 Pet.) 435 (1842), and New York ex rel. Rogers v. Graves, 299 U.S. 401 (1937),
which held the income of federal employees to be immune from state taxation.
240 306 U.S. at 487.
241 306 U.S. at 492.
242 4 U.S.C. § 111. The statute, part of the Public Salary Tax Act of 1939, was
considered and enacted contemporaneously with the alteration occurring in constitu-

tional law, exemplified by Graves. That is, in Helvering v. Gerhardt, 304 U.S. 405
(1938), the Court had overruled precedents and held that Congress could impose
nondiscriminatory taxes on the incomes of most state employees, and the 1939 Act
had as its primary purpose the imposition of federal income taxes on the salaries of
all state and local government employees. Feeling equity required it, Congress in-
cluded a provision authorizing nondiscriminatory state taxation of federal employ-
ees. Graves came down while the provision was pending in Congress. See Davis v.
Michigan Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 810–14 (1989). For application of the Act
to salaries of federal judges, see Jefferson County v. Acker, 527 U.S. 423 (1999) (up-
holding imposition of a local occupational tax).
coextensive with the prohibition against discriminatory taxes em-

bodied in the modern constitutional doctrine of intergovernmental
tax immunity.” 243
Ad Valorem Taxes Under the Doctrine.—Property owned by
a federally chartered corporation engaged in private business is sub-
ject to state and local ad valorem taxes. This was conceded in Mc-
Culloch v. Maryland 244 and confirmed a half century later with re-
spect to railroads incorporated by Congress.245 Similarly, a property
tax may be levied against the lands under water that are owned by
a person holding a license under the Federal Water Power Act.246
However, when privately owned property erected by lessees on tax-
exempt state lands is taxed by a county at less than full value, and
houses erected by contractors on land leased from a federal Air Force
base are taxed at full value, the latter tax, solely because it discrimi-
nates against the United States and its lessees, is void.247 Like-
wise, when, under state laws, a school district does not tax private
lessees of state and municipal realty, whose leases are subject to
termination at the lessor’s option in the event of sale, but does levy
a tax, measured by the entire value of the realty, on lessees of United
States property used for private purposes and whose leases are ter-
minable at the option of the United States in an emergency or upon
sale, the discrimination voided the tax collected from the latter. “A
state tax may not discriminate against the government or those with
whom it deals” in the absence of significant differences justifying
levy of higher taxes on lessees of federal property.248 Land con-
veyed by the United States to a corporation for dry dock purposes
was subject to a general property tax, despite a reservation in the
conveyance of a right to free use of the dry dock and a provision
for forfeiture in case of the continued unfitness of the dry dock for
use or the use of land for other purposes.249 Also, where equitable
243 Davis v. Michigan Dept. of the Treasury, 489 U.S. at 813. This case struck
down, as violative of the provision, a state tax imposed on federal retirement ben-
efits but exempting state retirement benefits. See also Barker v. Kansas, 503 U.S.
594 (1992) (similarly voiding a state tax on federal military retirement benefits but
not reaching state and local government retirees).
244 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 426 (1819).
245 Thomson v. Union Pac. R.R., 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 579, 588 (1870); Union Pacific
R.R. v. Peniston, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 5, 31 (1873).

246 Susquehanna Power Co. v. Tax Comm’n (No. 1), 283 U.S. 291 (1931).
247 Moses Lake Homes v. Grant County, 365 U.S. 744 (1961).
248 Phillips Chemical Co. v. Dumas School Dist., 361 U.S. 376, 383, 387 (1960).
In Offutt Housing Co. v. Sarpy County, 351 U.S. 253 (1956), a housing company
was held liable for county personal property taxes on the ground that the govern-
ment had consented to state taxation of the company’s interest as lessee. Upon its
completion of housing accommodations at an Air Force Base, the company had leased
the houses and the furniture therein from the Federal Government.
249 Baltimore Shipbuilding Co. v. Baltimore, 195 U.S. 375 (1904).
title has passed to the purchaser of land from the government, a

state may tax the equitable owner on the full value thereof, de-
spite retention of legal title; 250 but, in the case of reclamation en-
tries, the tax may not be collected until the equitable title passes.251
In the pioneer case of Van Brocklin v. Tennessee,252 the state was
denied the right to sell for taxes lands which the United States owned
at the time the taxes were levied, but in which it had ceased to
have any interest at the time of sale. Similarly, a state cannot as-
sess land in the hands of private owners for benefits from a road
improvement completed while it was owned by the United States.253
In 1944, with two dissents, the Court held that where the gov-
ernment purchased movable machinery and leased it to a private
contractor the lessee could not be taxed on the full value of the equip-
ment.254 Twelve years later, and with a like number of Justices dis-
senting, the Court upheld the following taxes imposed on federal
contractors: (1) a municipal tax levied pursuant to a state law which
stipulated that when tax exempt real property is used by a private
firm for profit, the latter is subject to taxation to the same extent
as if it owned the property, and based upon the value of real prop-
erty, a factory, owned by the United States and made available un-
der a lease permitting the contracting corporation to deduct such
taxes from rentals paid by it; the tax was collectible only by direct
action against the contractor for a debt owed, and was not appli-
cable to federal properties on which payments in lieu of taxes are
made; (2) a municipal tax, levied under the authority of the same
state law, based on the value of the realty owned by the United
States, and collected from a cost-plus-fixed-fee contractor, who paid
no rent but agreed not to include any part of the cost of the facili-
ties furnished by the government in the price of goods supplied un-
der the contract; (3) another municipal tax levied in the same state
against a federal subcontractor, and computed on the value of ma-
terials and work in process in his possession, notwithstanding that
title thereto had passed to the United States following his receipt
of installment payments.255
In sustaining the first tax, the Court held that it was imposed,
not on the government or on its property, but upon a private les-
250 Northern Pacific R.R. v. Myers, 172 U.S. 589 (1899); New Brunswick v. United
States, 276 U.S. 547 (1928).

251 Irwin v. Wright, 258 U.S. 219 (1922).
252 117 U.S. 151 (1886).
253 Lee v. Osceola Imp. Dist., 268 U.S. 643 (1925).
254 United States v. Allegheny County, 322 U.S. 174 (1944).
255 United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 466 (1958). The Court more re-
cently has stated that Allegheny County “in large part was overruled” by Detroit.
United States v. New Mexico, 455 U.S. 720, 732 (1982).
see, that it was computed by the value of the use to the contractor
of the federally leased property, and that it was nondiscriminatory;
that is, it was designed to equalize the tax burden carried by pri-
vate business using exempt property with that of similar busi-
nesses using taxed property. Distinguishing Allegheny County, the
Court maintained that in that older decision, the tax invalidated
was imposed directly on federal property and that the question of
the legality of a privilege on use and possession of such property
had been expressly reserved. Also, insofar as the economic inci-
dents of such tax on private use curtails the net rental accruing to
the government, such burden was viewed as insufficient to vitiate
the tax.256
Deeming the second and third taxes similar to the first, the Court
sustained them as taxes on the privilege of using federal property
in the conduct of private business for profit. With reference to the
second, the Court emphasized that the government had reserved
no right of control over the contractor and, hence, the latter could
not be viewed as an agent of the government entitled to the immu-
nity derivable from that status.257 As to the third tax, the Court
asserted that there was no difference between taxing a private party
for the privilege of using property he possesses, and taxing him for
possessing property which he uses; for, in both instances, the use
was private profit. Moreover, the economic burden thrust upon the
government was viewed as even more remote than in the adminis-
tration of the first two taxes.258
Federal Property and Functions.—Property owned by the
United States is, of course, wholly immune from state taxation.259
No state can regulate, by the imposition of an inspection fee, any
activity carried on by the United States directly through its own
256 United States v. City of Detroit, 355 U.S. 478, 482, 483 (1958). See also Cali-
fornia Bd. of Equalization v. Sierra Summit, 490 U.S. 844 (1989).

257 United States v. Township of Muskegon, 355 U.S. 484 (1958).
258 City of Detroit v. Murray Corp., 355 U.S. 489 (1958). In United States v.
County of Fresno, 429 U.S. 452 (1977), these cases were reaffirmed and applied to
sustain a tax imposed on the possessory interests of United States Forest Service
employees in housing located in national forests within the county and supplied to
the employees by the Forest Service as part of their compensation. A state or local
government may raise revenues on the basis of property owned by the United States
as long as it is in possession or use by the private citizen that is being taxed.
259 Clallam County v. United States, 263 U.S. 341 (1923). See also Cleveland v.
United States, 323 U.S. 329, 333 (1945); United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm’n,
412 U.S. 363 (1973); United States v. Mississippi Tax Comm’n, 421 U.S. 599 (1975).
agents and employees.260 An early case, the authority of which is

now uncertain, held invalid a flat rate tax on telegraphic mes-
sages, as applied to messages sent by public officers on official busi-
ness.261
Federally Chartered Finance Agencies: Statutory Exemp-
tions.—Fiscal institutions chartered by Congress, their shares and
their property, are taxable only with the consent of Congress and
only in conformity with the restrictions it has attached to its con-
sent.262 Immediately after the Supreme Court construed the stat-
ute authorizing the states to tax national bank shares as allowing
a tax on the preferred shares of such a bank held by the Reconstruc-
tion Finance Corporation,263 Congress enacted a law exempting such
shares from taxation. The Court upheld this measure, saying: “When
Congress authorized the states to impose such taxation, it did no
more than gratuitously grant them political power which they there-
tofore lacked. Its sovereign power to revoke the grant remained un-
impaired, the grant of the privilege being only a declaration of leg-
islative policy changeable at will.” 264 In Pittman v. Home Owners’
Corp.,265 the Court sustained the power of Congress under the nec-
essary and proper clause to immunize the activities of the Corpora-
tion from state taxation; and in Federal Land Bank v. Bismarck
Lumber Co.,266 the like result was reached with respect to an at-
tempt by the state to impose a retail sales tax on a sale of lumber
and other building materials to the bank for use in repairing and
improving property that had been acquired by foreclosure or mort-
gages.
The state’s principal argument proceeded thus: “Congress has
authority to extend immunity only to the governmental functions
of the federal land banks; the only governmental functions of the
land banks are those performed by acting as depositories and fiscal
agents for the Federal Government and providing a market for gov-
ernment bonds; all other functions of the land banks are private;
260 Mayo v. United States, 319 U.S. 441 (1943). A municipal tax on the privilege
of working within the city, levied at the rate of one percent of earnings, although
not deemed to be an income tax under state law, was sustained as such when col-
lected from employees of a naval ordinance plant by reason of federal assent to that
type of tax expressed in the Buck Act. 4 U.S.C. §§ 105–110. Howard v. Commission-
ers, 344 U.S. 624 (1953).
261 Telegraph Co. v. Texas, 105 U.S. 460, 464 (1882).
262 Des Moines Bank v. Fairweather, 263 U.S. 103, 106 (1923); Owensboro Nat’l
Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U.S. 664, 669 (1899); First Nat’l Bank v. Adams, 258 U.S.
362 (1922); Michigan Nat’l Bank v. Michigan, 365 U.S. 467 (1961).
263 Baltimore Nat’l Bank v. Tax Comm’n, 297 U.S. 209 (1936).
264 Maricopa County v. Valley Bank, 318 U.S. 357, 362, (1943).
265 308 U.S. 21 (1939).
266 314 U.S. 95 (1941).
petitioner here was engaged in an activity incidental to its busi-

ness of lending money, an essentially private function; therefore § 26
cannot operate to strike down a sales tax upon purchases made in
furtherance of petitioner’s lending functions.” 267 The Court re-
jected this argument and invalidated the tax, writing: “The argu-
ment that the lending functions of the federal land banks are pro-
prietary rather than governmental misconceives the nature of the
Federal Government with respect to every function which it per-
forms. The federal government is one of delegated powers, and from
that it necessarily follows that any constitutional exercise of its del-
egated powers is governmental. It also follows that, when Congress
constitutionally creates a corporation through which the federal gov-
ernment lawfully acts, the activities of such corporation are govern-
mental.” 268
Similarly, the lease by a federal land bank of oil and gas in a
mineral estate, which it had reserved in land originally acquired
through foreclosure and thereafter had conveyed to a third party,
was held immune from a state personal property tax levied on the
lease and on the royalties accruing thereunder. The fact that at the
time of the conveyance and lease, the bank had recouped its entire
loss resulting from the foreclosure did not operate to convert the
mineral estate and lease into a non-governmental activity no lon-
ger entitled to exemption.269 However, in the absence of federal leg-
islation, a state law laying a percentage tax on the users of safety
deposit services, measured by the bank’s charges therefore, was held
valid as applied to national banks. The tax, being on the user, did
not, the Court held, impose an intrinsically unconstitutional bur-
den on a federal instrumentality.270
Royalties.—In 1928, the Court went so far as to hold that a
state could not tax as income royalties for the use of a patent is-
sued by the United States.271 This proposition was soon overruled
in Fox Film Corp. v. Doyal,272 where a privilege tax based on gross
income and applicable to royalties from copyrights was upheld. Like-
wise a state may lay a franchise tax on corporations, measured by
the net income from all sources and applicable to income from copy-
right royalties.273
Immunity of Lessees of Indian Lands.—Another line of anoma-
lous decisions conferring tax immunity upon lessees of restricted
267 314 U.S. at 101.
268 314 U.S. at 102 (citations omitted).
269 Federal Land Bank v. Kiowa County, 368 U.S. 146 (1961).
270 Colorado Bank v. Bedford, 310 U.S. 41 (1940).
271 Long v. Rockwood, 277 U.S. 142 (1928).
272 286 U.S. 123 (1932).
273 Educational Films Corp. v. Ward, 282 U.S. 379 (1931).
Indian lands was overruled in 1949. The first of these cases, Choc-
taw & Gulf R.R. v. Harrison,274 held that a gross production tax on
oil, gas, and other minerals was an occupational tax, and, as ap-
plied to a lessee of restricted Indian lands, was an unconstitutional
burden on such lessee, who was deemed to be an instrumentality
of the United States. Next, the Court held the lease itself a federal
instrumentality immune from taxation.275 A modified gross produc-
tion tax imposed in lieu of all ad valorem taxes was invalidated in
two per curiam decisions.276 In Gillespie v. Oklahoma,277 a tax upon
net income of the lessee derived from sales of his share of oil pro-
duced from restricted lands also was condemned. Finally a petro-
leum excise tax upon every barrel of oil produced in the state was
held inapplicable to oil produced on restricted Indian lands.278 In
harmony with the trend to restricting immunity implied from the
Constitution to activities of the government itself, the Court over-
ruled all these decisions in Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Texas Co. and
held that a lessee of mineral rights in restricted Indian lands was
subject to nondiscriminatory gross production and excise taxes, so
long as Congress did not affirmatively grant him immunity.279
Summation and Evaluation

Although McCulloch v. Maryland and Gibbons v. Ogden were
expressions of a single thesis, the supremacy of the national govern-
ment, their development after Marshall’s death has been sharply
divergent. During the period when Gibbons v. Ogden was eclipsed
by the theory of dual federalism, the doctrine of McCulloch v. Mary-
land was not merely followed but greatly extended as a restraint
on state interference with federal instrumentalities. Conversely, the
Court’s recent return to Marshall’s conception of the powers of Con-
gress has coincided with a retreat from the more extreme positions
taken in reliance upon McCulloch v. Maryland. Today, the applica-
tion of the Supremacy Clause is becoming, to an ever increasing
274 235 U.S. 292 (1914).
275 Indian Oil Co. v. Oklahoma, 240 U.S. 522 (1916).
276 Howard v. Gipsy Oil Co., 247 U.S. 503 (1918); Large Oil Co. v. Howard, 248
U.S. 549 (1919).

277 257 U.S. 501 (1922).
278 Oklahoma v. Barnsdall Corp., 296 U.S. 521 (1936).
279 336 U.S. 342 (1949). Justice Rutledge, speaking for the Court, sketched the
history of the immunity lessees of Indian lands from state taxation, which he found
to stem from early rulings that tribal lands are themselves immune. The Kansas
Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 737 (1867); The New York Indians, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 761
(1867). One of the first steps taken to curtail the scope of the immunity was Shaw
v. Oil Corp., 276 U.S. 575 (1928), which held that lands outside a reservation, though
purchased with restricted Indian funds, were subject to state taxation. Congress soon
upset the decision, however, and its act was sustained in Board of County Comm’rs
v. Seber, 318 U.S. 705 (1943).
Cl. 3—Oath of Office
degree, a matter of statutory interpretation; a determination whether

state regulations can be reconciled with the language and policy of
federal enactments. In the field of taxation, the Court has all but
wiped out the private immunities previously implied from the Con-
stitution without explicit legislative command. Broadly speaking, the
immunity which remains is limited to activities of the government
itself, and to that which is explicitly created by statute, e.g., that
granted to federal securities and to fiscal institutions chartered by
Congress. But the term “activities” will be broadly construed.
Clause 3. The Senators and Representatives before men-

tioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and
all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and
of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to
support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be re-
quired as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the
United States.
OATH OF OFFICE
Power of Congress in Respect to Oaths

Congress may require no other oath of fidelity to the Constitu-
tion, but it may add to this oath such other oath of office as its
wisdom may require.280 It may not, however, prescribe a test oath
as a qualification for holding office, such an act being in effect an
ex post facto law,281 and the same rule holds in the case of the states.282
National Duties of State Officers

Commenting in The Federalist on the requirement that state
officers, as well as members of the state legislatures, shall be bound
by oath or affirmation to support the Constitution, Hamilton wrote:
“Thus the legislatures, courts, and magistrates, of the respective mem-
bers, will be incorporated into the operations of the national govern-
ment as far as its just and constitutional authority extends; and it
280 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 416 (1819).

281 Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333, 337 (1867).
282 Cummings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277, 323 (1867). See also Bond v.
Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), in which the Supreme Court held that antiwar state-
ments made by a newly elected member of the Georgia House of Representatives
were not inconsistent with the oath of office to support to the United States Consti-
tution.
will be rendered auxiliary to the enforcement of its laws.” 283 The

younger Pinckney had expressed the same idea on the floor of the
Philadelphia Convention: “They [the states] are the instruments upon
which the Union must frequently depend for the support and execu-
tion of their powers. . . .” 284 Indeed, the Constitution itself lays many
duties, both positive and negative, upon the different organs of state
government,285 and Congress may frequently add others, provided
it does not require the state authorities to act outside their normal
jurisdiction. Early congressional legislation contains many illustra-
tions of such action by Congress.
The Judiciary Act of 1789 286 not only left the state courts in
sole possession of a large part of the jurisdiction over controversies
between citizens of different states and in concurrent possession of
the rest, and by other sections state courts were authorized to en-
tertain proceedings by the United States itself to enforce penalties
and forfeitures under the revenue laws, examples of the principle
that federal law is law to be applied by the state courts, but also
any justice of the peace or other magistrates of any of the states
were authorized to cause any offender against the United States to
be arrested and imprisoned or bailed under the usual mode of pro-
cess. From the beginning, Congress enacted hundreds of statutes
that contained provisions authorizing state officers to enforce and
execute federal laws.287 Pursuant to the same idea of treating state
governmental organs as available to the national government for
administrative purposes, the act of 1793 entrusted the rendition of
fugitive slaves in part to national officials and in part to state offi-
cials and the rendition of fugitives from justice from one state to
another exclusively to the state executives.288
With the rise of the doctrine of states’ rights and of the equal
sovereignty of the states with the National Government, the avail-
ability of the former as instruments of the latter in the execution
283 No. 27, (J. Cooke ed. 1961), 175 (emphasis in original). See also, id. at No.
45, 312–313 (Madison).

1937).
285 See Article I, § 3, cl. 1; § 4, cl. 1; 10; Article II, § 1, cl. 2; Article III, 2, cl. 2;
Article IV, §§ 1, 2; Article V; Amendments 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 25, and 26.
286 1 Stat. 73 (1789).
287 See Warren, Federal Criminal Laws and the State Courts, 38 HARV. L. REV.
545 (1925); Holcomb, The States as Agents of the Nation, 3 SELECTED ESSAYS ON CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW 1187 (1938); Barnett, Cooperation Between the Federal and State Gov-
ernments, 7 ORE. L. REV. 267 (1928). See also J. CLARK, THE RISE OF A NEW FEDERALISM
(1938); E. CORWIN, COURT OVER CONSTITUTION 148–168 (1938).
288 1 Stat. 302 (1793).
of its power came to be questioned.289 In Prigg v. Pennsylvania,290

decided in 1842, the constitutionality of the provision of the act of
1793 making it the duty of state magistrates to act in the return of
fugitive slaves was challenged; and in Kentucky v. Dennison,291 de-
cided on the eve of the Civil War, similar objection was leveled against
the provision of the same act which made it “the duty” of the chief
executive of a state to render up a fugitive from justice upon the
demand of the chief executive of the state from which the fugitive
had fled. The Court sustained both provisions, but upon the theory
that the cooperation of the state authorities was purely voluntary.
In Prigg, the Court, speaking by Justice Story, said that “while a
difference of opinion has existed, and may exist still on the point,
in different states, whether state magistrates are bound to act un-
der it, none is entertained by this Court, that state magistrates may,
if they choose, exercise that authority, unless prohibited by state
legislation.” 292 Subsequent cases confirmed the point that Con-
gress could authorize willing state officers to perform such federal
duties.293 Indeed, when Congress in the Selective Service Act of 1917
authorized enforcement to a great extent through state employees,
the Court rejected “as too wanting in merit to require further no-
tice” the contention that the Act was invalid because of this delega-
tion.294 State officials were frequently employed in the enforcement
of the National Prohibition Act, and suits to abate nuisances as de-
fined by the statute were authorized to be brought, in the name of
the United States, not only by federal officials, but also by “any pros-
ecuting attorney of any State or any subdivision thereof.” 295
In Dennison, however, the Court held that, although Congress
could delegate, it could not require performance of an obligation.
289 For the development of opinion, especially on the part of state courts, ad-
verse to the validity of such legislation, see 1 J. KENT, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW
396–404 (1826).
290 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
291 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66 (1861).
292 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 622 (1842). See also Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24
How.) 66, 108 (1861). The word “magistrates” in this passage does not refer solely to
judicial officers but reflects the usage in that era in which officers generally were
denominated magistrates; the power thus upheld is not the related but separate is-
sue of the use of state courts to enforce federal law.
293 United States v. Jones, 109 U.S. 513, 519 (1883); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165
U.S. 275, 280 (1897); Dallemagne v. Moisan, 197 U.S. 169, 174 (1905); Holmgren v.
United States, 217 U.S. 509, 517 (1910); Parker v. Richard, 250 U.S. 235, 239 (1919).
294 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 389 (1918). The Act was 40 Stat.
76 (1917).
295 41 Stat. 314, § 22. In at least two States, the practice was approved by state
appellate courts. Carse v. Marsh, 189 Cal. 743, 210 Pac. 257 (1922); United States
v. Richards, 201 Wis. 130, 229 N.W. 675 (1930). On this and other issues under the
Act, see Hart, Some Legal Questions Growing Out of the President’s Executive Order
for Prohibition Enforcement, 13 VA. L. REV. 86 (1922).
The “duty” of state executives in the rendition of fugitives from jus-

tice was construed to be declaratory of a “moral duty.” Chief Jus-
tice Taney wrote for the Court: “The act does not provide any means
to compel the execution of this duty, nor inflict any punishment for
neglect or refusal on the part of the Executive of the State; nor is
there any clause or provision in the Constitution which arms the
Government of the United States with this power. Indeed, such a
power would place every State under the control and dominion of
the General Government, even in the administration of its internal
concerns and reserved rights. And we think it clear that the Fed-
eral Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose
on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to
perform it. . . . It is true,” the Chief Justice conceded, “that in the
early days of the Government, Congress relied with confidence upon
the co-operation and support of the States, when exercising the le-
gitimate powers of the General Government, and were accustomed
to receive it, [but this, he explained, was] upon principles of co-
mity, and from a sense of mutual and common interest, where no
such duty was imposed by the Constitution.” 296
Eighteen years later, in Ex parte Siebold,297 the Court sus-
tained the right of Congress, under Article I, § 4, paragraph 1 of
the Constitution, to impose duties upon state election officials in
connection with a congressional election and to prescribe addi-
tional penalties for the violation by such officials of their duties un-
der state law. Although the doctrine of the holding was expressly
confined to cases in which the National Government and the states
enjoy “a concurrent power over the same subject matter,” no at-
tempt was made to catalogue such cases. Moreover, the outlook of
Justice Bradley’s opinion for the Court was decidedly nationalistic
rather than dualistic, as is shown by the answer made to the con-
tention of counsel “that the nature of sovereignty is such as to pre-
clude the joint co-operation of two sovereigns, even in a matter in
which they are mutually concerned . . . .” 298 To this Justice Brad-
ley replied: “As a general rule, it is no doubt expedient and wise
that the operations of the State and national governments should,
as far as practicable, be conducted separately, in order to avoid un-
due jealousies and jars and conflicts of jurisdiction and power. But
there is no reason for laying this down as a rule of universal appli-
cation. It should never be made to override the plain and manifest
dictates of the Constitution itself. We cannot yield to such a tran-
scendental view of state sovereignty. The Constitution and laws of
296 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 107–08 (1861).
297 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
298 100 U.S. at 391.
the United States are the supreme law of the land, and to these
every citizen of every State owes obedience, whether in his indi-
vidual or official capacity.” 299
Conflict thus developed early between these two doctrinal lines.
But it was the Siebold line that prevailed. Enforcement of obliga-
tions upon state officials through mandamus or through injunc-
tions was readily available, even when the state itself was im-
mune, through the fiction of Ex parte Young,300 under which a state
official could be sued in his official capacity but without the immu-
nities attaching to his official capacity. Although the obligations were,
for a long period, in their origin based on the United States Consti-
tution, the capacity of Congress to enforce statutory obligations through
judicial action was little doubted.301 Nonetheless, it was only re-
cently that the Court squarely overruled Dennison. “If it seemed
clear to the Court in 1861, facing the looming shadow of a Civil
War, that ‘the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no
power to impose on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and
compel him to perform it,’ . . . basic constitutional principles now
point as clearly the other way.” 302 That case is doubly important,
because the Court spoke not only to the Extradition Clause and the
federal statute directly enforcing it, but it also enforced a purely
statutory right on behalf of a Territory that could not claim for it-
self rights under the clause.303
Even as the Court imposes new federalism limits upon Con-
gress’s powers to regulate the states as states, it has reaffirmed the
principle that Congress may authorize the federal courts to compel
state officials to comply with federal law, statutory as well as con-
stitutional. “[T]he Supremacy Clause makes federal law para-
mount over the contrary positions of state officials; the power of fed-
eral courts to enforce federal law thus presupposes some authority
to order state officials to comply.” 304
299 100 U.S. at 392.

300 209 U.S. 123 (1908). See also Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U.S. 531,
541 (1876).
301 Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
302 Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (Dennison “rests upon a
foundation with which time and the currents of constitutional change have dealt
much less favorably”).
303 In including territories in the statute, Congress acted under the Territorial
Clause rather than under the Extradition Clause. New York ex rel. Kopel v. Bingham,
211 U.S. 468 (1909).
304 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 179 (1992). See also FERC v. Mis-
sissippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761–765 (1982); Washington v. Washington State Commercial
Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass’n, 443 U.S. 658, 695 (1979); Illinois v. City of Milwau-
kee, 406 U.S. 91, 106–108 (1972).
No doubt, there is tension between the exercise of Congress’s

power to impose duties on state officials 305 and the developing doc-
trine under which the Court holds that Congress may not “comman-
deer” state legislative or administrative processes in the enforce-
ment of federal programs.306 However, the existence of the Supremacy
Clause and the federal oath of office, as well as a body of prec-
edent, indicates that coexistence of the two lines of principles will
be maintained.
305 The practice continues. See Pub. L. 94–435, title III, 90 Stat. 1394, 15 U.S.C.
§ 15c (authorizing state attorneys general to bring parens patriae antitrust actions
in the name of the state to secure monetary relief for damages to the citizens of the
state); Medical Waste Tracking Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100–582, 102 Stat. 2955, 42
U.S.C. § 6992f (authorizing states to impose civil and possibly criminal penalties for
violations of the Act); Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act, Pub. L. 103–159, tit.
I, 107 Stat. 1536, 18 U.S.C. § 922s (imposing on chief law enforcement officer of each
jurisdiction to ascertain whether prospective firearms purchaser his disqualifying re-
cord).
306 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
RATIFICATION
ARTICLE VII
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be
sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the
States so ratifying the Same.
IN GENERAL
In Owings v. Speed 1 the question at issue was whether the Con-
stitution operated upon an act of Virginia passed in 1788. The Court
held it did not, stating in part:
“The Conventions of nine States having adopted the Constitu-
tion, Congress, in September or October, 1788, passed a resolution
in conformity with the opinions expressed by the Convention, and
appointed the first Wednesday in March of the ensuing year as the
day, and the then seat of Congress as the place, ‘for commencing
proceedings under the Constitution.’ ”
“Both Governments could not be understood to exist at the same
time. The New Government did not commence until the old Govern-
ment expired. It is apparent that the government did not com-
mence on the Constitution being ratified by the ninth State; for these
ratifications were to be reported to Congress, whose continuing ex-
istence was recognized by the Convention, and who were requested
to continue to exercise their powers for the purpose of bringing the
new Government into operation. In fact, Congress did continue to
act as a Government until it dissolved on the 1st of November, by
the successive disappearance of its Members. It existed potentially
until the 2d of March, the day proceeding that on which the Mem-
bers of the new Congress were directed to assemble.”
“The resolution of the Convention might originally have sug-
gested a doubt, whether the government could be in operation for
every purpose before the choice of a President; but this doubt has
been long solved, and were it otherwise, its discussion would be use-
less, since it is apparent that its operation did not commence be-
fore the first Wednesday in March 1789 . . . .”
1 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 420, 422–23 (1820).
1043
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
FIRST THROUGH TENTH AMENDMENTS
1045
BILL OF RIGHTS
CONTENTS
Page
History ........................................................................................................................................ 1049
Formation and Adoption .................................................................................................... 1049
Bill of Rights and the States ............................................................................................. 1051
The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation .............................................................. 1051
1047
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION
BILL OF RIGHTS
First Through Tenth Amendments
On September 12, five days before the Convention adjourned,
Mason and Gerry raised the question of adding a bill of rights to
the Constitution. Mason said: “It would give great quiet to the people;
and with the aid of the State declarations, a bill might be prepared
in a few hours.” But the motion of Gerry and Mason to appoint a
committee for the purpose of drafting a bill of rights was rejected.1
Again, on September 14, Pinckney and Gerry sought to add a pro-
vision “that the liberty of the Press should be inviolably ob-
served—.” But after Sherman observed that such a declaration was
unnecessary, because “[t]he power of Congress does not extend to
the Press,” this suggestion too was rejected.2 It cannot be known
accurately why the Convention opposed these suggestions. Perhaps
the lateness of the Convention, perhaps the desire not to present
more opportunity for controversy when the document was for-
warded to the states, perhaps the belief, asserted by the defenders
of the Constitution when the absence of a bill of rights became criti-
cal, that no bill was needed because Congress was delegated none
of the powers which such a declaration would deny, perhaps all these
contributed to the rejection.3
In any event, the opponents of ratification soon made the ab-
sence of a bill of rights a major argument,4 and some friends of the
document, such as Jefferson,5 strongly urged amendment to in-
1 2 M. FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 587–88 (rev. ed.
1937).
2 Id. at 617–618.
3 The argument most used by proponents of the Constitution was that inas-
much as Congress was delegated no power to do those things which a bill of rights
would proscribe no bill of rights was necessary and that it might be dangerous be-
cause it would contain exceptions to powers not granted and might therefore afford
a basis for claiming more than was granted. THE FEDERALIST No. 84 at 555–67 (Alex-
ander Hamilton) (Modern Library ed. 1937).
4 Substantial excerpts from the debate in the country and in the ratifying con-
ventions are set out in 1 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 435–620 (B. Schwartz
ed., 1971); 2 id. at 627–980. The earlier portions of volume 1 trace the origins of the
various guarantees back to the Magna Carta.
5 In a letter to Madison, Jefferson indicated what he did not like about the pro-
posed Constitution. “First the omission of a bill of rights providing clearly and with-
out the aid of sophisms for freedom of religion, freedom of the press, protection against
standing armies, restriction against monopolies, the eternal and unremitting force
of the habeas corpus laws, and trials by jury in all matters of the fact triable by the
laws of the land and not by the law of Nations. . . . Let me add that a bill of rights
1049
1050 AMENDMENTS—RESTRICTING FEDERAL POWER
clude a declaration of rights.6 Several state conventions ratified while

urging that the new Congress to be convened propose such amend-
ments, 124 amendments in all being put forward by these states.7
Although some dispute has occurred with regard to the obligation
of the first Congress to propose amendments, Madison at least had
no doubts 8 and introduced a series of proposals,9 which he had dif-
ficulty claiming the interest of the rest of Congress in considering.
is what the people are entitled to against every government on earth, general or
particular, and what no just government should refuse, or rest on inference.” 12 THE
PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 438, 440 (J. Boyd ed., 1958). He suggested that nine States
should ratify and four withhold ratification until amendments adding a bill of rights
were adopted. Id. at 557, 570, 583. Jefferson still later endorsed the plan put for-
ward by Massachusetts to ratify and propose amendments. 14 id. at 649.
6 Thus, George Washington observed in letters that a ratified Constitution could
be amended but that making such amendments conditions for ratification was ill-
advised. 11 THE WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON 249 (W. Ford ed., 1891).
7 2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 627–980 (B. Schwartz ed., 1971).
See also H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO THE CONSTITUTION 19 (1896).

8 Madison began as a doubter, writing Jefferson that while “[m]y own opinion has
always been in favor of a bill of rights,” still “I have never thought the omission a ma-
terial defect, nor been anxious to supply it even by subsequent amendment. . . .” 5 THE
WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 269 (G. Hunt ed., 1904). His reasons were four. (1) The Fed-
eral Government was not granted the powers to do what a bill of rights would pro-
scribe. (2) There was reason “to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most es-
sential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the rights
of conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be narrowed much
more than they are likely ever to be by an assumed power.” (3) A greater security was
afforded by the jealousy of the States of the national government. (4) “[E]xperience proves
the inefficacy of a bill of rights on those occasions when its controul is most needed. Re-
peated violations of these parchment barriers have been committed by overbearing ma-
jorities in every State. . . . Wherever the real power in a Government lies, there is the
danger of oppression. In our Governments the real power lies in the majority of the Com-
munity, and the invasion of private rights is chiefly to be apprehended, not from acts
of Government contrary to the sense of its constituents, but from acts in which the gov-
ernment is the mere instrument of the major number of the Constituents. . . . Wher-
ever there is a interest and power to do wrong, wrong will generally be done, and not
less readily by a powerful & interested party than by a powerful and interested prince.”
Id. at 272–73. Jefferson’s response acknowledged the potency of Madison’s reserva-
tions and attempted to answer them, in the course of which he called Madison’s atten-
tion to an argument in favor not considered by Madison “which has great weight with
me, the legal check which it puts into the hands of the judiciary. This is a body, which
if rendered independent, and kept strictly to their own department merits great con-
fidence for their learning and integrity.” 14 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 659 (J. Boyd
ed., 1958). Madison was to assert this point when he introduced his proposals for a bill
of rights in the House of Representatives. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 439 (June 8, 1789).
In any event, following ratification, Madison in his successful campaign for a seat
in the House firmly endorsed the proposal of a bill of rights. “[I]t is my sincere opinion
that the Constitution ought to be revised, and that the first Congress meeting under
it ought to prepare and recommend to the States for ratification, the most satisfac-
tory provisions for all essential rights, particularly the rights of Conscience in the full-
est latitude, the freedom of the press, trials by jury, security against general warrants
& c.” 5 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 319 (G. Hunt ed., 1904).
9 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 424–50 (June 8, 1789). The proposals as introduced are
at pp. 433–36. The Members of the House were indisposed to moving on the propos-
als.
AMENDMENTS—RESTRICTING FEDERAL POWER 1051
At length, the House of Representatives adopted 17 proposals; the

Senate rejected two and reduced the remainder to twelve, which
were accepted by the House and sent on to the states 10 where ten
were ratified and the other two did not receive the requisite num-
ber of concurring states.11
Bill of Rights and the States.—One of the amendments that
the Senate refused to accept—declared by Madison to be “the most
valuable of the whole list” 12—read: “The equal rights of conscience,
the freedom of speech or of the press, and the right of trial by jury
in criminal cases shall not be infringed by any State.” 13 In spite of
this rejection, the contention that the Bill of Rights—or at least the
first eight amendments—was applicable to the states was repeat-
edly pressed upon the Supreme Court. By a long series of deci-
sions, beginning with the opinion of Chief Justice Marshall in Bar-
ron v. Baltimore, 14 the argument was consistently rejected.
Nevertheless, the enduring vitality of natural law concepts encour-
aged renewed appeals for judicial protection through application of
the Bill of Rights.15
The Fourteenth Amendment and Incorporation.—
Following the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, litigants
disadvantaged by state laws and policies first resorted unsuccess-
fully to the Privileges or Immunities Clause of § 1 for judicial pro-
tection.16 Then, claimants seized upon the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment as guaranteeing certain fundamental
and essential safeguards, without pressing the point of the applica-
10 Debate in the House began on July 21, 1789, and final passage was had on
August 24, 1789. 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 660–779. The Senate considered the propos-
als from September 2 to September 9, but no journal was kept. The final version
compromised between the House and Senate was adopted September 24 and 25. See
2 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 983–1167 (B. Schwartz ed., 1971).
11 The two not ratified dealt with the ratio of population to representatives and
with compensation of Members of Congress. H. AMES, THE PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO

THE CONSTITUTION 184, 185 (1896). The latter proposal was deemed ratified in 1992 as
the 27th Amendment.
12 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 755 (August 17, 1789).
13 Id.
14 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833). See also Livingston’s Lessee v. Moore, 32 U.S. (7
Pet.) 469 (1833); Permoli v. Municipality No. 1, 44 U.S. (3 How.) 589, 609 (1845);
Fox v. Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410 (1847); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71
(1855); Withers v. Buckley, 61 U.S. (20 How.) 84 (1858); Pervear v. Massachusetts,
72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 475 (1867); Twitchell v. Commonwealth, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 321 (1869).
15 Thus, Justice Miller for the Court in Loan Ass’n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.)
655, 662, 663 (1875): “It must be conceded that there are . . . rights in every free
government beyond the control of the State . . . There are limitations on [govern-
mental] power which grow out of the essential nature of all free governments. Im-
plied reservations of individual rights, without which the social compact could not
exist, and which are respected by all governments entitled to the name.”
16 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
bility of the Bill of Rights.17 It was not until 1887 that a litigant
contended that, although the Bill of Rights had not limited the states,
nonetheless, to the extent that they secured and recognized the fun-
damental rights of man, they were privileges and immunities of citi-
zens of the United States and were now protected against state abridg-
ment by the Fourteenth Amendment.18 This case the Court decided
on other grounds, but in a series of subsequent cases it confronted
the argument and rejected it,19 though over the dissent of the elder
Justice Harlan, who argued that the Fourteenth Amendment in ef-
fect incorporated the Bill of Rights and made them effective re-
straints on the states.20 Until 1947, this dissent made no headway,21
17 Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U.S. 90 (1876); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S.
542 (1876); Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S.
252 (1886). In Hurtado, in which the Court held that indictment by information rather
than by grand jury did not offend due process, the elder Justice Harlan entered a
long dissent arguing that due process preserved the fundamental rules of proce-
dural justice as they had existed in the past, but he made no reference to the possi-
bility that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause embodied the grand jury
indictment guarantee of the Fifth Amendment.
18 Spies v. Illinois, 123 U.S. 131 (1887).
19 In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890); McElvaine v. Brush, 142 U.S. 155 (1891);
O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323 (1892).

20 In O’Neil v. Vermont, 144 U.S. 323, 370 (1892), Justice Harlan, with Justice
Brewer concurring, argued “that since the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment,
no one of the fundamental rights of life, liberty or property, recognized and guaran-
teed by the Constitution of the United States, can be denied or abridged by a State
in respect to any person within its jurisdiction. These rights are, principally, enumer-
ated in the earlier Amendments of the Constitution.” Justice Field took the same
position. Id. at 337. Thus, he said: “While therefore, the ten Amendments, as limita-
tions on power, and so far as they accomplish their purpose and find their fruition
in such limitations, are applicable only to the Federal government and not to the
States, yet, so far as they declare or recognize the rights of persons, they are rights
belonging to them as citizens of the United States under the Constitution; and the
Fourteenth Amendment, as to all such rights, places a limit upon state power by
ordaining that no State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge them.”
Id. at 363. Justice Harlan reasserted this view in Maxwell v. Dow, 176 U.S. 581,
605 (1900) (dissenting opinion), and in Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78, 114 (1908)
(dissenting opinion). Justice Field was no longer on the Court and Justice Brewer
did not in either case join Justice Harlan as he had done in O’Neil.
21 Cf. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937), in which Justice Cardozo
for the Court, including Justice Black, said: “We have said that in appellant’s view
the Fourteenth Amendment is to be taken as embodying the prohibitions of the Fifth.
His thesis is even broader. Whatever would be a violation of the original bill of rights
(Amendments I to VIII) if done by the Federal Government is now equally unlawful
by force of the Fourteenth Amendment if done by a state. There is no such general
rule.” See Frankfurter, Memorandum on ‘Incorporation,’ of the Bill of Rights Into
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746 (1965).
According to Justice Douglas’ calculations, ten Justices had believed that the Four-
teenth Amendment incorporated the Bill of Rights, but a majority of the Court at
any one particular time had never been of that view. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335, 345–47 (1963) (concurring opinion). See also Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1,
4 n.2 (1964). It must be said, however, that many of these Justices were not consis-
tent in asserting this view. Justice Goldberg probably should be added to the list.
Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 410–14 (1965) (concurring opinion).
but in Adamson v. California 22 a minority of four Justices adopted

it. Justice Black, joined by three others, contended that his re-
searches into the history of the Fourteenth Amendment left him in
no doubt “that the language of the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible
for its submission to the people, and by those who opposed its sub-
mission, sufficiently explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state
could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill
of Rights.” 23 Scholarly research stimulated by Justice Black’s view
tended to discount the validity of much of the history recited by
him and to find in the debates in Congress and in the ratifying con-
ventions no support for his contention.24 Other scholars, going be-
yond the immediate debates, found in the pre- and post-Civil War
period a substantial body of abolitionist constitutional thought which
could be shown to have greatly influenced the principal architects,
and observed that all three formulations of § 1, privileges and im-
munities, due process, and equal protection, had long been in use
as shorthand descriptions for the principal provisions of the Bill of
Rights.25
Unresolved perhaps in theory, the controversy in fact has been
mostly mooted through the “selective incorporation” of a majority
of the provisions of the Bill of Rights.26 This process seems to have
22 332 U.S. 46 (1947).
23 Id. at 74, Justice Black’s contentions, id. at 68–123, were concurred in by Jus-
tice Douglas. Justices Murphy and Rutledge also joined this view but went further.
“I agree that the specific guarantees of the Bill of Rights should be carried over
intact into the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment. But I am not prepared to
say that the latter is entirely and necessarily limited by the Bill of Rights. Occa-
sions may arise where a proceeding falls so far short of conforming to fundamental
standards of procedure as to warrant constitutional condemnation in terms of a lack
of due process despite the absence of a specific provision in the Bill of Rights.” Id. at
124. Justice Black rejected this extension as an invocation of “natural law due pro-
cess.” For examples in which he and Justice Douglas split over the application of
nonspecified due process limitations, see, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479
(1965); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970).
24 The leading piece is Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate
the Bill of Rights? 2 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1949).

25 Graham, Early Antislavery Backgrounds of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1950
WISC. L. REV. 479, 610; Graham, Our ‘Declaratory’ Fourteenth Amendment, 7 STAN. L.
REV. 3 (1954); J. TENBROEK, EQUAL UNDER LAW (1965 enlarged ed.). The argument of
these scholars tends to support either a “selective incorporation” theory or a funda-
mental rights theory, but it emphasized the abolitionist stress on speech and press
as well as on jury trials as included in either construction.
26 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 130–32 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring in
part and dissenting in part). The language of this process is somewhat abstruse.
Justice Frankfurter objected strongly to “incorporation” but accepted other terms.
“The cases say the First [Amendment] is ‘made applicable’ by the Fourteenth or that
it is taken up into the Fourteenth by ‘absorption,’ but not that the Fourteenth ‘incor-
porates’ the First. This is not a quibble. The phrase ‘made applicable’ is a neutral
one. The concept of ‘absorption’ is a progressive one, i.e., over the course of time
had its beginnings in an 1897 case in which the Court, without men-
tioning the Just Compensation Clause of the Fifth Amendment, held
that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause forbade the
taking of private property without just compensation.27 Then, in Twin-
ing v. New Jersey 28 the Court observed that “it is possible that some
of the personal rights safeguarded by the first eight Amendments
against National action may also be safeguarded against state ac-
tion, because a denial of them would be a denial of due process of
law . . . . If this is so, it is not because those rights are enumer-
ated in the first eight Amendments, but because they are of such
nature that they are included in the conception of due process of
law.” And, in Gitlow v. New York,29 the Court in dictum said: “For
present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech
and of the press—which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgment by Congress—are among the fundamental personal rights
and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment from impairment by the States.” After quoting
the language set out above from Twining v. New Jersey, the Court
in 1932 said that “a consideration of the nature of the right and a
review of the expressions of this and other courts, makes it clear
that the right to the aid of counsel is of this fundamental charac-
ter.” 30 The doctrine of this period was best formulated by Justice
Cardozo, who observed that the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment might proscribe a certain state procedure, not
because the proscription was spelled out in one of the first eight
amendments, but because the procedure “offends some principle of
justice so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as
to be ranked as fundamental,” 31 because certain proscriptions were
“implicit in the concept of ordered ‘liberty.’ ” 32
something gets absorbed into something else. The sense of the word ‘incorporate’
implies simultaneity. One writes a document incorporating another by reference at
the time of the writing. The Court has used the first two forms of language, but
never the third.” Frankfurter, Memorandum on ‘Incorporation’ of the Bill of Rights
Into the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 78 HARV. L. REV. 746, 747–48
(1965). It remains true that no opinion of the Court has used “incorporation” to de-
scribe what it is doing, cf. Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 18 (1967); Benton v.
Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), though it has regularly been used by dissent-
ers. E.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 408 (1965) (Justice Harlan); Williams v.
Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 130 (1970) (Justice Harlan); Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at
143 (Justice Stewart).
27 Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
28 211 U.S. 78, 99 (1908).
29 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925).
30 Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 68 (1932).
31 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
32 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Justice Frankfurter was a strong
advocate of this approach to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause. E.g.,
Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 59
As late as 1958, Justice Harlan asserted in an opinion of the

Court that a certain state practice fell afoul of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment because “[i]t is beyond debate that freedom to engage in asso-
ciation for the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable
aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech . . . .” 33
But this process of “absorption” into due process, of rights that
happened also to be specifically named in the Bill of Rights, came
to be supplanted by a doctrine that had for a time co-existed with
it: the doctrine of “selective incorporation.” This doctrine holds that
the Due Process Clause incorporates the text of certain of the pro-
visions of the Bill of Rights. Thus, in Malloy v. Hogan,34 Justice
Brennan wrote: “We have held that the guarantees of the First Amend-
ment, the prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures of the
Fourth Amendment, and the right to counsel guaranteed by the Sixth
Amendment, are all to be enforced against the States under the Four-
teenth Amendment according to the same standards that protect
those personal rights against federal encroachment.” And Justice
Clark wrote: “First, this Court has decisively settled that the First
Amendment’s mandate that ‘Congress shall make no law respect-
ing an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof’
has been made wholly applicable to the States by the Fourteenth
(1947) (concurring opinion). Justice Harlan followed him in this regard. E.g., Benton
v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 801 (1969) (dissenting opinion); Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 117 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). For early applica-
tions of the principles to void state practices, see Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86
(1923); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927);
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103 (1935);
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936); Rochin v. California, supra.
33 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
34 378 U.S. 1, 10 (1964) (citations omitted). In Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S.
14, 18 (1967), Chief Justice Warren for the Court said that the Court has “increas-
ingly looked to the specific guarantees of the [Bill of Rights] to determine whether a
state criminal trial was conducted with due process of law.” And, in Benton v. Mary-
land, 395 U.S. 784, 794 (1969), Justice Marshall for the Court wrote: “[W]e today
find that the double jeopardy prohibition of the Fifth Amendment represents a fun-
damental ideal in our constitutional heritage, and that it should apply to the States
through the Fourteenth Amendment.” In this process, the Court has substantially
increased the burden carried by those who would defend a departure from the re-
quirement of the Bill of Rights of showing that a procedure is fundamentally fair.
That is, previously the Court had asked whether a civilized system of criminal jus-
tice could be imagined that did not accord the particular procedural safeguard. E.g.,
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The present approach is to ascertain
whether a particular guarantee is fundamental in the light of the system existent
in the United States; the use of this approach can make a substantial difference.
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 n.14 (1968). See also Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972); McDonald v. Chicago,
561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. (2010) (plurality opinion).
Amendment.” 35 Similar language asserting that particular provi-

sions of the Bill of Rights have been applied to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause may be found in
numerous cases.36 Most of the provisions have now been so ap-
plied.37
35 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 215 (1963). Similar formula-
tions for the speech and press clauses appeared early. E.g., West Virginia State Bd.
of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943); Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147,
160 (1939). In Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965), Justice Douglas stated
“that the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to the Federal Government, and,
in its bearing on the States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment, forbids” the
state practice at issue.
36 E.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S.
213 (1967); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S.
436 (1970); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970).
37 The following list does not attempt to distinguish between those Bill of Rights
provisions that have been held to have themselves been incorporated or absorbed by
the Fourteenth Amendment and those provisions that the Court indicated at the
time were applicable against the states because they were fundamental and not merely
because they were named in the Bill of Rights. Whichever formulation was origi-
nally used, the former is now the one used by the Court. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391
U.S. 145, 148 (1968).
First Amendment—
Religion—
Free exercise: Hamilton v. Regents, 293 U.S. 245, 262 (1934); Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 300, 303 (1940).
Establishment: Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 3, 7, 8 (1947); Illi-
nois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
Speech—Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 666 (1925); Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U.S. 380 (1927); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
Press—Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 701 (1931).
Assembly—DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937).
Petition—DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. at 364, 365; Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939); Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
Second Amendment
Right to keep and bear arms—McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521,
slip op. (2010).
Fourth Amendment—
Search and seizure—Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949); Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961).
Fifth Amendment—
Double jeopardy—Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969); Ashe v. Swenson,
397 U.S. 436 (1970) (collateral estoppel).
Self-incrimination—Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Griffin v. California, 380
U.S. 609 (1965).
Just compensation—Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. City of Chicago, 166 U.S. 226 (1897).
Sixth Amendment—
Speedy trial—Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967).
Public trial—In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Jury trial—Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
Impartial Jury—Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Turner v. Louisiana, 379
U.S. 466 (1965).
Notice of charges—In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948).
Aside from the theoretical and philosophical considerations raised

by the question whether the Bill of Rights is incorporated into the
Fourteenth Amendment or whether due process subsumes certain
fundamental rights that are named in the Bill of Rights, the prin-
cipal relevant controversy is whether, once a guarantee or a right
set out in the Bill of Rights is held to be a limitation on the states,
the same standards that restrict the Federal Government restrict
the states. The majority of the Court has consistently held that the
standards are identical, whether the Federal Government or a state
is involved,38 and “has rejected the notion that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment applies to the State only a ‘watered-down, subjective version
of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.’ ” 39 Those who
have argued for the application of a dual-standard test of due pro-
cess for the Federal Government and the states, most notably Jus-
tice Harlan,40 but including Justice Stewart,41 Justice Fortas,42 Jus-
Confrontation—Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); Douglas v. Alabama, 380

U.S. 415 (1965).
Compulsory process—Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967).
Counsel—Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S.
335 (1963).
Eighth Amendment—
Cruel and unusual punishment—Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459 (1947); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
Provisions not applied are:
Third Amendment—
Quartering troops in homes—No cases.
Fifth Amendment—
Grand Jury indictment—Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884).
Seventh Amendment—
Jury trial in civil cases in which value of controversy exceeds $20—Cf. Adamson
v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 64–65 (1947) (Justice Frankfurter concurring). See Minne-
apolis & St. L. R.R. v. Bombolis, 241 U.S. 211 (1916).
Eighth Amendment—
Bail—But see Schilb v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357, 365 (1971).
Excessive Fines—But see Tate v. Short, 401 U.S. 395 (1971) (using equal protec-
tion to prevent automatic jailing of indigents when others can pay a fine and avoid
jail).
38 Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963);
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1970);
Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978); First
Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.16 (1978) (specifically the First
Amendment speech and press clauses); Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978); Burch v.
Louisiana, 441 U S. 130 (1979).
39 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 106–107 (1970) (Justice Black concurring in
part and dissenting in part), quoting Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1, 10–11 (1964).
40 Justice Harlan first took this position in Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
496 (1957) (concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Ker v. California,
374 U.S. 23, 45–46 (1963) (concurring). His various opinions are collected in Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129–33 (1970) (concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
tice Powell,43 and Justice Rehnquist,44 have not only rejected

incorporation, but have also argued that, if the same standards are
to apply, the standards previously developed for the Federal Gov-
ernment would have to be diluted in order to give the states more
leeway in the operation of their criminal justice systems.45 The lat-
ter result seems to have been reached for application of the jury
trial guarantee of the Sixth Amendment.46
41 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 143–45 (1970) (concurring in part and dis-
senting in part); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173–83 (1968) (Justices Harlan
and Stewart dissenting). But see Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404, 414 (1972) (dis-
senting). See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28 (1978) (Justice Stewart writing opinion
of the Court).
42 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 211 (1968) (concurring).
43 Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 366 (1972) (concurring); Crist v. Bretz,
437 U.S. 28, 52–53 (1978) (dissenting, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist). But see First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 780 n.16
(1978) (rejecting theory in First Amendment context in opinion for the Court, joined
by Chief Justice Burger).
44 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 290 (1976) (concurring in part and dissenting in
part); First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 822 (1978) (dissenting).
See also Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 52–53 (1978) (joining Justice Powell’s dissent).
Justice Jackson also apparently held this view. Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250,
288 (1952) (dissenting).
45 E.g., Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 129–38 (1970) (Justice Harlan concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 213–215 (1968)
(Justice Fortas concurring). But see Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. at 106–08 (Justice
Black concurring in part and dissenting in part).
46 Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970); Apodaca v. Oregon, 406 U.S. 404 (1972).
But cf. Ballew v. Georgia, 435 U.S. 223 (1978).

FIRST AMENDMENT
RELIGION AND FREE EXPRESSION
CONTENTS
Page
Religion ....................................................................................................................................... 1063
An Overview ....................................................................................................................... 1063
Scholarly Commentary ................................................................................................ 1064
Court Tests Applied to Legislation Affecting Religion ............................................. 1066
Government Neutrality in Religious Disputes ......................................................... 1070
Establishment of Religion .................................................................................................. 1072
Financial Assistance to Church-Related Institutions ............................................... 1073
Governmental Encouragement of Religion in Public Schools: Released Time ...... 1093
Governmental Encouragement of Religion in Public Schools: Prayers and Bible
Reading ..................................................................................................................... 1094
Governmental Encouragement of Religion in Public Schools: Curriculum
Restriction ................................................................................................................ 1098
Access of Religious Groups to Public Property ......................................................... 1098
Tax Exemptions of Religious Property ...................................................................... 1101
Exemption of Religious Organizations from Generally Applicable Laws ............... 1102
Sunday Closing Laws .................................................................................................. 1103
Conscientious Objection .............................................................................................. 1104
Regulation of Religious Solicitation ........................................................................... 1105
Religion in Governmental Observances .................................................................... 1105
Religious Displays on Government Property ............................................................ 1107
Miscellaneous ............................................................................................................... 1111
Free Exercise of Religion ................................................................................................... 1112
Overview ...................................................................................................................... 1112
Interaction with the Establishment Clause .............................................................. 1115
The Mormon and Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases .......................................................... 1117
Oaths and Religious Disqualifications ....................................................................... 1120
General Governmental Requirements ....................................................................... 1121
Corporations ................................................................................................................. 1130
Freedom of Expression—Speech and Press ............................................................................. 1132
Adoption and the Common Law Background .................................................................. 1132
Freedom of Expression: The Philosophical Basis ............................................................ 1138
Freedom of Expression: Is There a Difference Between Speech and Press? ................ 1139
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint ........................................................................................ 1142
Injunctions and the Press in Fair Trial Cases ......................................................... 1145
Obscenity and Prior Restraint ................................................................................... 1147
Subsequent Punishment: Clear and Present Danger and Other Tests ......................... 1148
Clear and Present Danger .......................................................................................... 1150
The Adoption of Clear and Present Danger .............................................................. 1153
Contempt of Court and Clear and Present Danger ................................................. 1154
Clear and Present Danger Revised: Dennis .............................................................. 1157
Balancing ..................................................................................................................... 1158
The “Absolutist” View of the First Amendment, With a Note on “Preferred
Position” .................................................................................................................... 1162
1059
1060 AMENDMENT 1—RELIGION, FREE SPEECH, ETC.
Freedom of Expression—Speech and Press—Continued

Subsequent Punishment: Clear and Present Danger and Other Tests—Continued
Modern Tests and Standards: Vagueness, Overbreadth, Strict Scrutiny,
Intermediate Scrutiny, and Effectiveness of Speech Restrictions ....................... 1164
Is There a Present Test? ............................................................................................. 1169
Freedom of Belief ............................................................................................................... 1170
Flag Salutes and Other Compelled Speech .............................................................. 1171
Imposition of Consequences for Holding Certain Beliefs ........................................ 1174
Right of Association ............................................................................................................ 1176
Political Association .................................................................................................... 1181
Conflict Between Organization and Members .......................................................... 1186
Maintenance of National Security and the First Amendment ....................................... 1190
Punishment of Advocacy ............................................................................................. 1191
Compelled Registration of Communist Party ........................................................... 1193
Punishment for Membership in an Organization That Engages in Proscribed
Advocacy ................................................................................................................... 1194
Disabilities Attaching to Membership in Proscribed Organizations ....................... 1195
Employment Restrictions and Loyalty Oaths ........................................................... 1197
Legislative Investigations and the First Amendment .............................................. 1202
Interference With Vietnam War Effort ...................................................................... 1203
Suppression of Communist Propaganda in the Mails .............................................. 1204
Exclusion of Certain Aliens as a First Amendment Problem .................................. 1204
Material Support of Terrorist Organizations ................................................................... 1205
Particular Governmental Regulations That Restrict Expression ................................... 1206
Government as Employer: Political and Other Outside Activities ......................... 1206
Government as Employer: Free Expression Generally ............................................ 1209
Government as Educator ............................................................................................ 1217
Government as Regulator of the Electoral Process: Elections and Referendums . 1222
Government as Regulator of the Electoral Process: Lobbying ................................ 1239
Government as Regulator of Labor Relations .......................................................... 1240
Government as Investigator: Reporter’s Privilege ................................................... 1240
Government and the Conduct of Trials ..................................................................... 1243
Government as Administrator of Prisons .................................................................. 1246
Government and the Power of the Purse .................................................................. 1251
Governmental Regulation of Communications Industries .............................................. 1256
Commercial Speech ..................................................................................................... 1256
Taxation ........................................................................................................................ 1267
Labor Relations ........................................................................................................... 1269
Antitrust Laws ............................................................................................................ 1270
Broadcast Radio and Television ................................................................................. 1270
Governmentally Compelled Right of Reply to Newspapers ..................................... 1274
Cable Television .................................................................................................................. 1275
Government Restraint of Content of Expression ............................................................. 1277
Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel ........................................................................ 1282
Fighting Words and Other Threats to the Peace ..................................................... 1283
Threats of Violence Against Individuals ................................................................... 1285
Group Libel, Hate Speech .......................................................................................... 1287
Defamation ................................................................................................................... 1289
False Statements ......................................................................................................... 1298
Invasion of Privacy ...................................................................................................... 1299
Emotional Distress Tort Actions ................................................................................ 1301
“Right of Publicity” Tort Actions ................................................................................ 1302
Publication of Legally Confidential Information ...................................................... 1303
AMENDMENT 1—RELIGION, FREE SPEECH, ETC. 1061
Freedom of Expression—Speech and Press—Continued

Government Restraint of Content of Expression—Continued
Obscenity ...................................................................................................................... 1304
Child Pornography ...................................................................................................... 1314
Non-obscene But Sexually Explicit and Indecent Expression ................................. 1316
Speech Plus—The Constitutional Law of Leafleting, Picketing, and Demonstrating .. 1324
The Public Forum ........................................................................................................ 1324
Quasi-Public Places ..................................................................................................... 1333
Picketing and Boycotts by Labor Unions .................................................................. 1336
Public Issue Picketing and Parading ........................................................................ 1337
Leafleting, Handbilling, and the Like ....................................................................... 1346
Sound Trucks, Noise ................................................................................................... 1348
Door-to-Door Solicitation and Charitable Solicitation ............................................. 1349
The Problem of “Symbolic Speech” ............................................................................ 1351
Rights of Assembly and Petition .............................................................................................. 1355
Background and Development ........................................................................................... 1355
The Cruikshank Case ................................................................................................. 1357
The Hague Case .......................................................................................................... 1358
RELIGION AND FREE EXPRESSION
FIRST AMENDMENT
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of

religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-
ably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress
of grievances.
RELIGION
An Overview
Madison’s original proposal for a bill of rights provision concern-
ing religion read: “The civil rights of none shall be abridged on ac-
count of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion
be established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be
in any manner, or on any pretence, infringed.” 1 The language was
altered in the House to read: “Congress shall make no law estab-
lishing religion, or to prevent the free exercise thereof, or to in-
fringe the rights of conscience.” 2 In the Senate, the section adopted
read: “Congress shall make no law establishing articles of faith, or
a mode of worship, or prohibiting the free exercise of reli-
gion. . . .” 3 It was in the conference committee of the two bodies,
chaired by Madison, that the present language was written with
1 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (June 8, 1789).

2 The committee appointed to consider Madison’s proposals, and on which Madi-
son served, with Vining as chairman, had rewritten the religion section to read: “No
religion shall be established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be in-
fringed.” After some debate during which Madison suggested that the word “na-
tional” might be inserted before the word “religion” as “point[ing] the amendment
directly to the object it was intended to prevent,” the House adopted a substitute
reading: “Congress shall make no laws touching religion, or infringing the rights of
conscience.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 729–31 (August 15, 1789). On August 20, on mo-
tion of Fisher Ames, the language of the clause as quoted in the text was adopted.
Id. at 766. According to Madison’s biographer, “[t]here can be little doubt that this
was written by Madison.” I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787–
1800 at 271 (1950).
3 This text, taken from the Senate Journal of September 9, 1789, appears in 2
THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1153 (B. Schwartz ed., 1971). It was at
this point that the religion clauses were joined with the freedom of expression clauses.
1063
its somewhat more indefinite “respecting” phraseology.4 Debate in

Congress lends little assistance in interpreting the religion clauses;
Madison’s position, as well as that of Jefferson, who influenced him,
is fairly clear,5 but the intent, insofar as there was one, of the oth-
ers in Congress who voted for the language and those in the states
who voted to ratify is subject to speculation.
Scholarly Commentary.—The explication of the religion clauses
by scholars in the nineteenth century gave a restrained sense of
their meaning. Story, who thought that “the right of a society or
government to interfere in matters of religion will hardly be con-
tested by any persons, who believe that piety, religion, and moral-
ity are intimately connected with the well being of the state, and
indispensable to the administration of civil justice,” 6 looked upon
the prohibition simply as an exclusion from the Federal Govern-
ment of all power to act upon the subject. “The situation . . . of the
different states equally proclaimed the policy, as well as the neces-
sity of such an exclusion. In some of the states, episcopalians con-
stituted the predominant sect; in others presbyterians; in others,
congregationalists; in others, quakers; and in others again, there
was a close numerical rivalry among contending sects. It was im-
possible, that there should not arise perpetual strife and perpetual
jealousy on the subject of ecclesiastical ascendancy, if the national
government were left free to create a religious establishment. The
only security was in extirpating the power. But this alone would
have been an imperfect security, if it had not been followed up by a
4 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 913 (September 24, 1789). The Senate concurred the same
day. See I. BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787–1800 at 271–72
(1950).
5 During House debate, Madison told his fellow Members that “he apprehended
the meaning of the words to be, that Congress should not establish a religion, and
enforce the legal observation of it by law, nor compel men to worship God in any
Manner contrary to their conscience.” 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 730 (August 15, 1789).
That his conception of “establishment” was quite broad is revealed in his veto as
President in 1811 of a bill which in granting land reserved a parcel for a Baptist
Church in Salem, Mississippi; the action, explained President Madison, “comprises
a principle and precedent for the appropriation of funds of the United States for the
use and support of religious societies, contrary to the article of the Constitution which
declares that ‘Congress shall make no law respecting a religious establishment.’ ” 8
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON (G. Hunt, ed.) 132–33 (1904). Madison’s views were
no doubt influenced by the fight in the Virginia legislature in 1784–1785 in which
he successfully led the opposition to a tax to support teachers of religion in Virginia
and in the course of which he drafted his “Memorial and Remonstrance against Re-
ligious Assessments” setting forth his thoughts. Id. at 183–91; I. BRANT, JAMES MADI-
SON: THE NATIONALIST 1780–1787 at 343–55 (1948). Acting on the momentum of this
effort, Madison secured passage of Jefferson’s “Bill for Religious Liberty.” Id. at 354;
D. MALONE, JEFFERSON THE VIRGINIAN 274–280 (1948). The theme of the writings of both
was that it was wrong to offer public support of any religion in particular or of reli-
gion in general.
declaration of the right of the free exercise of religion, and a prohi-

bition (as we have seen) of all religious tests. Thus, the whole power
over the subject of religion is left exclusively to the state govern-
ments, to be acted upon according to their own sense of justice, and
the state constitutions; and the Catholic and the Protestant, the Cal-
vinist and the Arminian, the Jew and the Infidel, may sit down at
the common table of the national councils, without any inquisition
into their faith, or mode of worship.” 7
“Probably,” Story also wrote, “at the time of the adoption of the
constitution and of the amendment to it, now under consideration,
the general, if not the universal, sentiment in America was, that
Christianity ought to receive encouragement from the state, so far
as was not incompatible with the private rights of conscience, and
the freedom of religious worship. An attempt to level all religions,
and to make it a matter of state policy to hold all in utter indiffer-
ence, would have created universal disapprobation, if not universal
indignation.” 8 The object, then, of the religion clauses in this view
was not to prevent general governmental encouragement of reli-
gion, of Christianity, but to prevent religious persecution and to pre-
vent a national establishment.9
Not until the Supreme 10 Court held the religion clauses appli-
cable to the states in the 1940s did it have much opportunity to
interpret them. But it quickly gave them a broad construction. In
Everson v. Board of Education,11 the Court, without dissent on this
point, declared that the Establishment Clause forbids not only prac-
tices that “aid one religion” or “prefer one religion over another,”
but also those that “aid all religions.” With respect to the Free Ex-
ercise Clause, it asserted in Wisconsin v. Yoder 12 that “only those
interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.”
More recent decisions, however, evidence a narrower interpreta-
tion of the religion clauses. Indeed, in Employment Division, Or-
egon Department of Human Resources v. Smith 13 the Court aban-
doned its earlier view and held that the Free Exercise Clause never
“relieve[s] an individual of the obligation to comply with a ‘valid
7 Id. at 1873.
8 Id. at 1868.
9 For a late expounding of this view, see T. COOLEY, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTI-
TUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 224–25 (3d ed. 1898).

10 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (Free Exercise Clause); Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (Establishment Clause).

11 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947). Establishment Clause jurisprudence since, whatever
its twists and turns, maintains this view.

12 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
13 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990).
and neutral law of general applicability.’ ” On the Establishment Clause

the Court has not wholly repudiated its previous holdings, but re-
cent decisions have evidenced a greater sympathy for the view that
the clause bars “preferential” governmental promotion of some reli-
gions but allows governmental promotion of all religion in gen-
eral.14 Nonetheless, the Court remains sharply split on how to in-
terpret both clauses.
Court Tests Applied to Legislation Affecting Religion.—
Before considering in detail the development of the two religion clauses
by the Supreme Court, one should notice briefly the tests the Court
has articulated to adjudicate the religion cases. At the same time it
should be emphasized that the Court has noted that the language
of earlier cases “may have [contained] too sweeping utterances on
aspects of these clauses that seemed clear in relation to the particu-
lar cases but have limited meaning as general principles.” 15 While
later cases have relied on a series of well-defined, if difficult-to-
apply, tests, the Court has cautioned that “the purpose [of the reli-
gion clauses] was to state an objective, not to write a statute.” 16
In 1802, President Jefferson wrote a letter to a group of Bap-
tists in Danbury, Connecticut, in which he declared that it was the
purpose of the First Amendment to build “a wall of separation be-
tween Church and State.” 17 In Reynolds v. United States,18 Chief
Justice Waite for the Court characterized the phrase as “almost an
authoritative declaration of the scope and effect of the amend-
ment.” In its first encounters with religion-based challenges to state
programs, the Court looked to Jefferson’s metaphor for substantial
guidance.19 But a metaphor may obscure as well as illuminate, and
the Court soon began to emphasize neutrality and voluntarism as
14 See Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793
(2000); and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002). The fullest critique of
the Court’s broad interpretation of the Establishment Clause was given by then-
Justice Rehnquist in dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 91 (1985).
15 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970).
16 397 U.S. at 668.
17 16 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 281 (A. Libscomb ed., 1904).
18 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1879).
19 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947); Illinois ex rel. McCol-
lum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 211, 212 (1948); cf. Zorach v. Clauson, 343
U.S. 306, 317 (1952) (Justice Black dissenting). In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S.
602, 614 (1971), Chief Justice Burger remarked that “the line of separation, far from
being a ‘wall,’ is a blurred, indistinct and variable barrier depending on all the cir-
cumstances of a particular relationship.” In his opinion for the Court, the Chief Jus-
tice repeated similar observations in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984)
(the metaphor is not “wholly accurate”; the Constitution does not “require complete
separation of church and state [but] affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely
tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility toward any”).
the standard of restraint on governmental action.20 The concept of

neutrality itself is “a coat of many colors,” 21 and three standards
that seemingly could be stated in objective fashion emerged as tests
of Establishment Clause validity. The first two standards emerged
together. “The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose
and the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advance-
ment or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope
of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is
to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause
there must be a secular legislative purpose and a primary effect
that neither advances nor inhibits religion.” 22 The third test emerged
several years later and asks whether the governmental program re-
sults in “an excessive government entanglement with religion. The
test is inescapably one of degree . . . [T]he questions are whether
the involvement is excessive, and whether it is a continuing one
calling for official and continuing surveillance leading to an imper-
missible degree of entanglement.” 23 In 1971, these three tests were
combined and restated in Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman,24 and are frequently referred to by refer-
ence to that case name.
Although at one time accepted in principle by all the Jus-
tices,25 the tests have sometimes been difficult to apply,26 have re-
20 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 314 (1952); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421
(1962); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 305 (1963) (Justice Goldberg concurring); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 664, 694–97 (1970) (Justice Harlan concurring). In the opinion of the Court in
Walz, Chief Justice Burger wrote: “The course of constitutional neutrality in this
area cannot be an absolutely straight line; rigidity could well defeat the basic pur-
pose of these provisions, which is to insure that no religion be sponsored or favored,
none commanded, and none inhibited. The general principle deducible from the First
Amendment and all that has been said by the Court is this: that we will not toler-
ate either governmentally established religion or governmental interference with re-
ligion. Short of those expressly proscribed governmental acts there is room for play
in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which will permit religious exer-
cise to exist without sponsorship and without interference.” Id. at 669.
21 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 249 (1968) (Justice Harlan concur-
ring).
22 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
23 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 674–75 (1970).
24 403 U.S. 602, 612–13 (1971).
25 E.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646,
653 (1980), and id. at 665 (dissenting opinion); Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 40
(1980), and id. at 43 (dissenting opinion).
26 The tests provide “helpful signposts,” Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 741 (1973),
and are at best “guidelines” rather than a “constitutional caliper”; they must be used
to consider “the cumulative criteria developed over many years and applying to a
wide range of governmental action.” Inevitably, “no ‘bright line’ guidance is af-
forded.” Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 677–78 (1971). See also Committee for
cently come under direct attack by some Justices,27 and in several

instances the Court has not applied them at all.28 Nonetheless, the
Court employed the Lemon tests in several recent Establishment
Clause decisions,29 and those tests remain the primary standard of
Establishment Clause validity. Other tests, however, have also been
formulated and used. Justice Kennedy has proffered “coercion” as
an alternative test for violations of the Establishment Clause,30 and
the Court has used that test as the basis for decision from time to
time.31 But that test has been criticized on the grounds that it would
Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 761 & n.5, 773 n.31 (1973);
Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 662 (1980),
and id. at 663 (Justice Blackmun dissenting).
27 See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636–40 (1987) (Justice Scalia,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist, dissenting) (advocating abandonment of the “pur-

pose” test); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 108–12 (1985) (Justice Rehnquist dissent-
ing); Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402, 426–30 (1985) (Justice O’Connor, dissenting)
(addressing difficulties in applying the entanglement prong); Roemer v. Maryland
Bd. of Public Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768–69 (Justice White concurring in judgment)
(objecting to entanglement test). Justice Kennedy has also acknowledged criticisms
of the Lemon tests, while at the same time finding no need to reexamine them. See,
e.g., Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655–56 (1989). At
least with respect to public aid to religious schools, Justice Stevens would abandon
the tests and simply adopt a “no-aid” position. Committee for Public Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 671 (1980).
28 See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding legislative prayers
on the basis of historical practice); Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (reject-
ing a request to reconsider Lemon because the practice of invocations at public high
school graduations was invalid under established school prayer precedents). The Court
has also held that the tripartite test is not applicable when law grants a denomina-
tional preference, distinguishing between religions; rather, the distinction is to be
subjected to the strict scrutiny of a suspect classification. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S.
228, 244–46 (1982). See also Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1
(1993) (upholding provision of sign-language interpreter to deaf student attending
parochial school); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687 (1994)
(invalidating law creating special school district for village composed exclusively of
members of one religious sect); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819
(1995) (upholding the extension of a university subsidy of student publications to a
student religious publication).
29 Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203 (1997) (upholding under the Lemon tests the
provision of remedial educational services by public school teachers to sectarian el-

ementary and secondary schoolchildren on the premises of the sectarian schools);
Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000) (holding unconsti-
tutional under the Lemon tests as well as under the coercion and endorsement tests
a school district policy permitting high school students to decide by majority vote
whether to have a student offer a prayer over the public address system prior to
home football games); and Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000) (upholding under
the Lemon tests a federally funded program providing instructional materials and
equipment to public and private elementary and secondary schools, including sectar-
ian schools).
30 County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989)
(Justice Kennedy concurring in part and dissenting in part); and Lee v. Weisman,
505 U.S. 577 (1992).
31 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), and Santa Fe Independent School Dis-
trict v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).

eliminate a principal distinction between the Establishment Clause

and the Free Exercise Clause and make the former a “virtual nul-
lity.” 32 Justice O’Connor has suggested “endorsement” as a clarifi-
cation of the Lemon test; i.e., that the Establishment Clause is vio-
lated if the government intends its action to endorse or disapprove
of religion or if a “reasonable observer” would perceive the govern-
ment’s action as such an endorsement or disapproval.33 But others
have criticized that test as too amorphous to provide adequate guid-
ance.34 Justice O’Connor has also suggested that it may be inappro-
priate to try to shoehorn all Establishment Clause cases into one
test, and has called instead for recognition that different contexts
may call for different approaches.35 In two Establishment Clause
decisions, the Court employed all three tests in one decision 36 and
relied primarily on a modified version of the Lemon tests in the other.37
In interpreting and applying the Free Exercise Clause, the Court
has consistently held religious beliefs to be absolutely immune from
governmental interference.38 But it has used a number of stan-
dards to review government action restrictive of religiously moti-
vated conduct, ranging from formal neutrality 39 to clear and pres-
ent danger 40 to strict scrutiny.41 For cases of intentional governmental
discrimination against religion, the Court still employs strict scru-
tiny 42 But for most other free exercise cases it has now reverted to
a standard of formal neutrality. “[T]he right of free exercise,” it has
stated, “does not relieve an individual of the obligation to comply
32 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 621 (Souter, J., concurring). See also County
of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 623 (1989) (O’Connor, J.,
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).
33 Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (concurring); Allegheny County
v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 625 (1989) (concurring); Board of Educ.
of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (concurring).
34 County of Allegheny v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989)
(Justice Kennedy, concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part); and
Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 n.3 (1995) (Justice Scalia).
35 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 718–723 (1994)
(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment).

36 Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
37 Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
38 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1878); Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S.
520 (1993).
39 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. (8 Otto) 145 (1879); Braunfeld v. Brown,
366 U.S. 599 (1961).

40 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
41 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
42 Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
with a ‘valid and neutral law of general applicability on the ground

the law proscribes (or prescribes) conduct that his religion pre-
scribes (or proscribes).’ ” 43
Government Neutrality in Religious Disputes.—One value
that both religion clauses serve is to enforce governmental neutral-
ity in deciding controversies arising out of religious disputes. Schisms
sometimes develop within churches or between a local church and
the general church, resulting in secession or expulsion of one fac-
tion or of the local church. A dispute over which body is to control
the property of the church will then often be taken into the courts.
It is now established that both religion clauses prevent governmen-
tal inquiry into religious doctrine in settling such disputes, and in-
stead require courts simply to look to the decision-making body or
process in the church and to give effect to whatever decision is offi-
cially and properly made.
The first such case was Watson v. Jones,44 which was decided
on common-law grounds in a diversity action without explicit reli-
ance on the First Amendment. A constitutionalization of the rule
was made in Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral,45 in which the Court
held unconstitutional a state statute that recognized the autonomy
and authority of those North American branches of the Russian Or-
thodox Church that had declared their independence from the gen-
eral church. Recognizing that Watson v. Jones had been decided on
nonconstitutional grounds, the Court thought nonetheless that the
opinion “radiates . . . a spirit of freedom for religious organiza-
tions, and independence from secular control or manipulation—in
short, power to decide for themselves, free from state interference,
matters of church government as well as those of faith and doc-
trine.” 46 The power of civil courts to resolve church property dis-
putes was severely circumscribed, the Court held, because to per-
mit resolution of doctrinal disputes in court was to jeopardize First
Amendment values. What a court must do, it held, is to look at the
church rules: if the church is a hierarchical one that reposes deter-
mination of ecclesiastical issues in a certain body, the resolution by
that body is determinative, whereas if the church is a congrega-
tional one that prescribes action by a majority vote, that determina-
43 Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 879 (1990), quoting United States v.
Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263, n.3 (1982) (Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment).
44 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 679 (1872).
45 344 U.S. 94 (1952). Kedroff was grounded on the Free Exercise Clause. Id. at
116. But the subsequent cases used a collective “First Amendment” designation.
46 344 U.S. at 116. On remand, the state court adopted the same ruling on the
merits but relied on a common-law rule rather than the statute. This too was struck
down. Kreshik v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 363 U.S. 190 (1960).
tion will prevail.47 On the other hand, a court confronted with a

church property dispute could apply “neutral principles of law, de-
veloped for use in all property disputes,” when to do so would not
require resolution of doctrinal issues.48 In a 1976 case, the Court
elaborated on the limits of proper inquiry, holding that an argu-
ment over a matter of internal church government—the power to
reorganize the dioceses of a hierarchical church in this country—
was “at the core of ecclesiastical affairs” and a court could not inter-
pret the church constitution to make an independent determina-
tion of the power but must defer to the interpretation of the church
body authorized to decide.49
In Jones v. Wolf,50 however, a divided Court, while formally ad-
hering to these principles, appeared to depart in substance from their
application. A schism had developed in a local church that was a
member of a hierarchical church, and the majority voted to with-
draw from the general church. The proper authority of the general
church determined that the minority constituted the “true congre-
gation” of the local church and awarded them authority over it. But
rather than requiring deference to the decision of the church body,
the Court approved the approach of the state court in applying neu-
tral principles by examining the deeds to the church property, state
statutes, and provisions of the general church’s constitution concern-
ing ownership and control of church property in order to determine
that no language of trust in favor of the general church was con-
tained in any of them and that the property thus belonged to the
local congregational majority.51 Further, the Court held, the First
Amendment did not prevent the state court from applying a pre-
47 Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
447, 450–51 (1969); Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church
of God at Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367 (1970). For a similar rule of neutrality in an-
other context, see United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78 (1944) (denying defendant
charged with mail fraud through dissemination of purported religious literature the
right to present to the jury evidence of the truthfulness of the religious views he
urged).
48 Presbyterian Church v. Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449 (1969); Maryland and Virginia Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of
God of Sharpsburg, 396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970). See also id. at 368–70 (Justice Bren-
nan concurring).
49 The Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese v. Dionisije Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 697,
720–25 (1976). In Gonzalez v. Archbishop, 280 U.S. 1 (1929), the Court had permit-
ted limited inquiry into the legality of the actions taken under church rules. In Ser-
bian Eastern the Court disapproved of this inquiry with respect to concepts of “arbi-
trariness,” although it reserved decision on the “fraud” and “collusion” exceptions.
426 U.S. at 708–20.
50 443 U.S. 595 (1979). In the majority were Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Mar-
shall, Rehnquist, and Stevens. Dissenting were Justices Powell, Stewart, White, and
Chief Justice Burger.
51 443 U.S. at 602–06.
sumption of majority rule to award control to the majority of the

local congregation, provided that it permitted defeasance of the pre-
sumption upon a showing that the identity of the local church is to
be determined by some other means as expressed perhaps in the
general church charter.52 The dissent argued that to permit a court
narrowly to view only the church documents relating to property
ownership permitted it to ignore the fact that the dispute was over
ecclesiastical matters and that the general church had decided which
faction of the congregation was the local church.53
Thus, it is unclear where the Court is on this issue. Jones v.
Wolf restated the rule that it is improper to review an ecclesiasti-
cal dispute and that deference is required in those cases, but, by
approving a neutral principles inquiry which in effect can filter out
the doctrinal issues underlying a church dispute, the Court seems
to have approved at least an indirect limitation of the authority of
hierarchical churches.54
Establishment of Religion
“[F]or the men who wrote the Religion Clauses of the First Amend-
ment the ‘establishment’ of a religion connoted sponsorship, finan-
cial support, and active involvement of the sovereign in religious
activity.” 55 “[The] Court has long held that the First Amendment
reaches more than classic, 18th-century establishments.” 56 How-
ever, the Court’s reading of the clause has never resulted in the
barring of all assistance that aids, however incidentally, a religious
institution. Outside this area, the decisions generally have more rig-
orously prohibited what may be deemed governmental promotion
of religious doctrine.57
52 443 U.S. at 606–10. Because it was unclear whether the state court had ap-
plied such a rule and applied it properly, the Court remanded.

53 443 U.S. at 610.
54 The Court indicated that the general church could always expressly provide
in its charter or in deeds to property the proper disposition of disputed property.

But here the general church had decided which faction was the “true congregation,”
and this would appear to constitute as definitive a ruling as the Court’s suggested
alternatives. 443 U.S. at 606.
55 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970). “Two great drives are con-
stantly in motion to abridge, in the name of education, the complete division of reli-
gion and civil authority which our forefathers made. One is to introduce religious
education and observances into the public schools. The other, to obtain public funds
for the aid and support of various private religious schools . . . . In my opinion both
avenues were closed by the Constitution.” Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S.
1, 63 (1947) (Justice Rutledge dissenting).
56 Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 709 (1994)
(citing Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 492–95 (1961)).

57 For a discussion of standing to sue in Establishment Clause cases, see Article
III, Taxpayer Suits, supra.

Financial Assistance to Church-Related Institutions.—

The Court’s first opportunity to rule on the validity of governmen-
tal financial assistance to a religiously affiliated institution oc-
curred in 1899, the assistance being a federal grant for the construction
of a wing of a hospital owned and operated by a Roman Catholic
order that was to be devoted to the care of the poor. The Court viewed
the hospital primarily as a secular institution so chartered by Con-
gress and not as a religious or sectarian body, and thus avoided
the constitutional issue.58 But, when the right of local authorities
to provide free transportation for children attending parochial schools
reached the Court, it adopted a very broad view of the restrictions
imposed by the Establishment Clause. “The ‘establishment of reli-
gion’ clause of the First Amendment means at least this: Neither a
state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither can
pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one re-
ligion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person to go
to or to remain away from church against his will or force him to
profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be pun-
ished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount,
large or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or
institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they
may adopt to teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Fed-
eral Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the words
of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of religion by law was
intended to erect ‘a wall of separation between church and State.’ ” 59
But, despite this interpretation, the majority sustained the pro-
vision of transportation. Although recognizing that “it approaches
the verge” of the state’s constitutional power, Justice Black found
that the transportation was a form of “public welfare legislation”
that was being extended “to all its citizens without regard to their
religious belief.” 60 “It is undoubtedly true that children are helped
to get to church schools. There is even a possibility that some of
the children might not be sent to the church schools if the parents
were compelled to pay their children’s bus fares out of their own
58 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899). Cf. Abington School District v. Schempp,
374 U.S. 203, 246 (1963) (Justice Brennan concurring). In Cochran v. Louisiana Board
of Education, 281 U.S. 370 (1930), a state program furnishing textbooks to paro-
chial schools was sustained under a due process attack without reference to the First
Amendment. See also Quick Bear v. Leupp, 210 U.S. 50 (1908) (statutory limitation
on expenditures of public funds for sectarian education does not apply to treaty and
trust funds administered by the government for Indians).
59 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15–16 (1947).
60 330 U.S. at 16.
pockets when transportation to a public school would have been paid

for by the State.” 61 Transportation benefited the child, just as did
police protection at crossings, fire protection, connections for sew-
age disposal, public highways and sidewalks. Thus was born the
“child benefit” theory.62
The Court in 1968 relied on the “child benefit” theory to sus-
tain state loans of textbooks to parochial school students.63 Using
the secular purpose and effect tests,64 the Court determined that
the purpose of the loans was the “furtherance of the educational
opportunities available to the young,” while the effect was hardly
less secular. “The law merely makes available to all children the
benefits of a general program to lend school books free of charge.
Books are furnished at the request of the pupil and ownership re-
mains, at least technically, in the state. Thus no funds or books are
furnished to parochial schools, and the financial benefit is to par-
ents and children, not to schools. Perhaps free books make it more
likely that some children choose to attend a sectarian school, but
that was true of the state-paid bus fares in Everson and does not
alone demonstrate an unconstitutional degree of support for a reli-
gious institution.” 65
From these beginnings, the case law on the discretion of state
and federal governmental assistance to sectarian elementary and
secondary schools as well as other religious entities has multiplied.
Through the 1970s, at least, the law became as restrictive in fact
as the dicta in the early cases suggested, except for the provision
of some assistance to children under the “child benefit” theory. Since
that time, the Court has gradually adopted a more accommodating
approach. It has upheld direct aid programs that have been of only
marginal benefit to the religious mission of the recipient elemen-
tary and secondary schools, tax benefit and scholarship aid pro-
grams where the schools have received the assistance as the result
of the independent decisions of the parents or students who ini-
tially receive the aid, and in its most recent decisions direct aid
programs which substantially benefit the educational function of such
61 330 U.S. at 17. It was in Everson that the Court, without much discussion of
the matter, held that the Establishment Clause applied to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment and limited both national and state governments equally.
Id. at 8, 13, 14–16. The issue is discussed at some length by Justice Brennan in
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 253–58 (1963).
62 See also Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 312–13 (1952) (upholding program
allowing public schools to excuse students to attend religious instruction or exer-

cises).
63 Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
64 See discussion under “Court Tests Applied to Legislation Affecting Religion,”
supra.
65 392 U.S. at 243–44 (1968).
schools. Indeed, in its most recent decisions the Court has over-
turned several of the most restrictive school aid precedents from
its earlier jurisprudence. Throughout, the Court has allowed greater
discretion with respect to aid programs benefiting religiously affili-
ated colleges and social services agencies.
A secular purpose is the first requirement of the Lemon tripar-
tite test to sustain the validity of legislation touching upon reli-
gion, and upon this standard the Justices display little disagree-
ment. There are adequate legitimate, non-sectarian bases for legislation
to assist nonpublic, religious schools: preservation of a healthy and
safe educational environment for all school children, promotion of
pluralism and diversity among public and nonpublic schools, and
prevention of overburdening of the public school system that would
accompany the financial failure of private schools.66
The primary secular effect and no excessive entanglement as-
pects of the Lemon test, however, have proven much more divisive.
As a consequence, the Court’s applications of these tests have not
always been consistent, and the rules guiding their application have
not always been easy to decipher. Moreover, in its most recent deci-
sions the Court has substantially modified the strictures these tests
have previously imposed on public aid to pervasively sectarian en-
tities.
In applying the primary effect and excessive entanglement tests,
the Court has drawn a distinction between public aid programs that
directly aid sectarian entities and those that do so only indirectly.
Aid provided directly, the Court has said, must be limited to secu-
lar use lest it have a primary effect of advancing religion. The Es-
tablishment Clause “absolutely prohibit[s] government-financed or
government-sponsored indoctrination into the beliefs of a particu-
lar religious faith.” 67 The government may provide direct support
to the secular services and programs sponsored by religious enti-
ties, but it cannot directly subsidize such organizations’ religious
activities or proselytizing.68 Thus, the Court struck down as uncon-
stitutional a program providing grants for the maintenance and re-
pair of sectarian elementary and secondary school facilities, be-
cause the grants had no restrictions to prevent their use for such
purposes as defraying the costs of building or maintaining chapels
66 Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 773
(1973). See also id. at 805 (Chief Justice Burger dissenting), 812–13 (Justice Rehnquist
dissenting), 813 (Justice White dissenting). See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229,
240 (1977) (plurality opinion); Committee for Public Educ. and Religious Liberty v.
Regan, 444 U.S. 646, 653–54 (1980), and id. at 665 (Justice Blackmun dissenting).
67 Grand Rapids School District v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373, 385 (1985).
68 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971); Committee for Public Educ. & Reli-
gious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973); Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
or classrooms in which religion is taught.69 It also struck down a

program subsidizing field trip transportation for children attending
sectarian elementary and secondary schools, because field trips are
inevitably interwoven with the schools’ educational functions.70
But the Court has not imposed a secular use limitation on aid
programs that benefit sectarian entities only indirectly, i.e., as the
result of decisions by someone other than the government itself. The
initial beneficiaries of the public aid must be determined on the ba-
sis of religiously neutral criteria, and they must have a genuine choice
about whether to use the aid at sectarian or nonsectarian entities.
But, where those standards have been met, the Court has upheld
indirect aid programs even though the sectarian institutions that
ultimately benefit may use the aid for religious purposes. More-
over, the Court has gradually broadened its understanding of what
constitutes a genuine choice so that now most voucher or tax ben-
efit programs benefiting the parents of children attending sectar-
ian schools seem able to pass constitutional muster.
Thus, the Court initially struck down tax benefit and educa-
tional voucher programs where the initial beneficiaries were lim-
ited to the universe of parents of children attending sectarian schools
and where the aid, as a consequence, was virtually certain to go to
sectarian schools.71 Subsequently, however, it upheld a state pro-
gram that allowed taxpayers to take a deduction from their gross
income for educational expenses, including tuition, incurred in send-
ing their children to public or private schools, because the deduc-
tion was “available for educational expenses incurred by all par-
ents” and the aid became available to sectarian schools “only as a
result of numerous, private choices of individual parents of school-
age children.” 72 It upheld for the same reasons a vocational reha-
bilitation program that made a grant to a blind person for training
at a Bible college for a religious vocation 73 and another program
that provided a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student attend-
ing a sectarian secondary school.74 Most recently, it upheld as con-
stitutional a tuition voucher program made available to the par-
ents of children attending failing public schools, notwithstanding that
most of the private schools at which the vouchers could be used
69 Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
70 Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
71 Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973),
and Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973).

72 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397–399 (1983).
73 Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Social Services, 474 U.S. 481 (1986). In this
decision the Court also cited as important the factor that the program was not likely
to provide “any significant portion of the aid expended under the . . . program” for
religious education. Id. at 488.
74 Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
were sectarian in nature.75 Whether the parents had a genuine choice

among religious and secular options in using the vouchers, the Court
said, had to be evaluated on the basis not only of the private schools
where the vouchers could be redeemed but also by examining the
full range of educational options open to them, including various
public school options.
In applying the primary effect and excessive entanglement tests,
the Court has also, until recently, drawn a distinction between reli-
gious institutions that are pervasively sectarian and those that are
not. Organizations that are permeated by a religious purpose and
character in all that they do have often been held by the Court to
be constitutionally ineligible for direct public aid. Direct aid to religion-
dominated institutions inevitably violates the primary effect test,
the Court has said, because such aid generally cannot be limited to
secular use in such entities and, as a consequence, it has a pri-
mary effect of advancing religion.76 Moreover, any effort to limit the
use of public aid by such entities to secular use inevitably falls afoul
of the excessive entanglement test, according to the Court, because
the risk of diversion of the aid to religious use is so great that it
necessitates an intrusive government monitoring.77 But, direct aid
to religious entities that are not pervasively sectarian, the Court
held, is constitutionally permissible, because the secular functions
of such entities can be distinguished from their religious ones for
purposes of public aid and because the risk of diversion of the aid
to religious use is attenuated and does not require an intrusive gov-
ernment monitoring. As a practical matter, this distinction has had
its most serious consequences for programs providing aid directly
to sectarian elementary and secondary schools, because the Court
has, until recently, presumed such schools to be pervasively sectar-
ian and direct aid, as a consequence, to be severely limited.78 The
Court has presumed to the contrary with respect to religiously af-
75 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002).

76 See, e.g., Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756 (1973) (grants for the maintenance and repair of sectarian school facilities); Meek
v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349 (1975) (loan of secular instructional materials and equip-
ment); Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Bal, 473 U.S. 373 (1985) (hiring of parochial
school teachers to provide after-school instruction to the students attending such
schools).
77 See, e.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971) (subsidies for teachers of
secular subjects) and Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985) (provision of remedial
and enrichment services by public school teachers to eligible children attending sec-
tarian elementary and secondary schools on the premises of those schools).
78 See cases cited in the preceding two footnotes.
filiated colleges, hospitals, and social services providers; and as a

consequence it has found direct aid programs to such entities to be
permissible.79
In its most recent decisions the Court has modified both the pri-
mary effect and excessive entanglement prongs of the Lemon test
as they apply to aid programs directly benefiting sectarian elemen-
tary and secondary schools; and in so doing it has overturned sev-
eral prior decisions imposing tight constraints on aid to perva-
sively sectarian institutions. In Agostini v. Felton 80 the Court, in a
5–4 decision, abandoned the presumptions that public school teach-
ers giving instruction on the premises of sectarian elementary and
secondary schools will be so affected by the religiosity of the envi-
ronment that they will inculcate religion and that, consequently, an
excessively entangling monitoring of their services is constitution-
ally necessary. In Mitchell v. Helms,81 in turn, the Court aban-
doned the presumptions that such schools are so pervasively sectar-
ian that their secular educational functions cannot be differentiated
from their religious educational functions and that direct aid to their
educational functions, consequently, violates the Establishment Clause.
In reaching these conclusions and upholding the aid programs in
question, the Court overturned its prior decision in Aguilar v. Felton 82
and parts of its decisions in Meek v. Pittenger,83 Wolman v. Wal-
ter,84 and Grand Rapids School District v. Ball.85
Thus, the Court’s jurisprudence concerning public aid to sectar-
ian organizations has evolved, particularly as it concerns public aid
to sectarian elementary and secondary schools. That evolution has
given some uncertainty to the rules that apply to any given form of
aid; and in both Agostini v. Felton 86 and Mitchell v. Helms 87 the
Court left open the possibility of a further evolution in its think-
ing. Nonetheless, the cases give substantial guidance.
79 Bradfield v. Roberts, 175 U.S. 291 (1899) (public subsidy of the construction
of a wing of a Catholic hospital on condition that it be used to provide care for the
poor upheld); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (program of grants to col-
leges, including religiously affiliated ones, for the construction of academic buildings
upheld); Roemer v. Maryland Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976) (program of
general purpose grants to colleges in the state, including religiously affiliated ones,
upheld); and Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) (program of grants to public
and private nonprofit organizations, including religious ones, for the prevention of
adolescent pregnancies upheld).
80 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
81 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
82 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
83 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
84 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
85 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
86 521 U.S. 203 (1994).
87 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
State aid to church-connected schools was first found to have

gone over the “verge” 88 in Lemon v. Kurtzman.89 The Court struck
down two state statutes, one of which authorized the “purchase” of
secular educational services from nonpublic elementary and second-
ary schools, a form of reimbursement for the cost to religious schools
of the teaching of such things as mathematics, modern foreign lan-
guages, and physical sciences, and the other of which provided sal-
ary supplements to nonpublic school teachers who taught courses
similar to those found in public schools, used textbooks approved
for use in public schools, and agreed not to teach any classes in
religion. Accepting the secular purpose attached to both statutes by
the legislature, the Court did not pass on the secular effect test,
but found excessive entanglement. This entanglement arose be-
cause the legislature “has not, and could not, provide state aid on
the basis of a mere assumption that secular teachers under reli-
gious discipline can avoid conflicts. The State must be certain, given
the Religion Clauses, that subsidized teachers do not inculcate reli-
gion . . . .” 90 Because the schools concerned were religious schools,
because they were under the control of the church hierarchy, and
because the primary purpose of the schools was the propagation of
the faith, a “comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing state
surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that these restric-
tions [on religious use of aid] are obeyed and the First Amendment
otherwise respected.” 91 Moreover, the provision of public aid inevi-
tably will draw religious conflict into the public arena as the con-
test for adequate funding goes on. Thus, the Court held, both pro-
grams were unconstitutional because the state supervision necessary
to ensure a secular purpose and a secular effect inevitably involved
the state authorities too deeply in the religious affairs of the aided
institutions.92
Two programs of assistance through the provision of equipment
and services to private, including sectarian, schools were invali-
dated in Meek v. Pittenger.93 First, the loan of instructional mate-
rial and equipment directly to nonpublic elementary and secondary
schools was voided as constituting impermissible assistance to reli-
88 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
89 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
90 403 U.S. at 619.
91 403 U.S. at 619.
92 Only Justice White dissented. 403 U.S. at 661. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 411
U.S. 192 (1973), the Court held that a state could reimburse schools for expenses
incurred in reliance on the voided program up to the date the Supreme Court held
the statute unconstitutional. But see New York v. Cathedral Academy, 434 U.S. 125
(1977).
93 421 U.S. 349 (1975). Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and White
dissented. Id. at 385, 387.

gion. This holding was based on the fact that 75 percent of the quali-
fying schools were church-related or religiously affiliated educa-
tional institutions, and that the assistance was available without
regard to the degree of religious activity of the schools. The materi-
als and equipment loaned were religiously neutral, but the substan-
tial assistance necessarily constituted aid to the sectarian school en-
terprise as a whole and thus had a primary effect of advancing
religion.94 Second, the provision of auxiliary services—remedial and
accelerated instruction, guidance counseling and testing, speech and
hearing services—by public employees on nonpublic school prem-
ises was invalidated because the Court found that, even though the
teachers under this program—unlike those under one of the pro-
grams struck down in Lemon v. Kurtzman—were public employees
rather than employees of the religious schools, the continuing sur-
veillance necessary to ensure that the teachers remained reli-
giously neutral gave rise to a constitutionally intolerable degree of
entanglement between church and state.95
In two 1985 cases, the Court again struck down programs of
public subsidy of instructional services provided on the premises of
sectarian schools, and relied on the effects test as well as the en-
tanglement test. In Grand Rapids School District v. Ball,96 the Court
invalidated two programs conducted in leased private school class-
rooms, one taught during the regular school day by public school
teachers,97 and the other taught after regular school hours by part-
time “public” teachers otherwise employed as full-time teachers by
the sectarian school.98 Both programs, the Court held, had the ef-
fect of promoting religion in three distinct ways. The teachers might
be influenced by the “pervasively sectarian nature” of the environ-
ment and might “subtly or overtly indoctrinate the students in par-
ticular religious tenets at public expense”; use of the parochial school
classrooms “threatens to convey a message of state support for reli-
gion” through “the symbolic union of government and religion in
94 421 U.S. at 362–66. See also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 248–51 (1977).
The Court in Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S.
646, 661–62 (1980), held that Meek did not forbid all aid that benefited religiously
pervasive schools to some extent, so long as it was conferred in such a way as to
prevent any appreciable risk of being used to transmit or teach religious views. See
also Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. at 262 (Justice Powell concurring in part and dis-
senting in part).
95 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 367–72 (1975). But see Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 238–48 (1977).

96 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
97 The vote on this “Shared Time” program was 5–4, the opinion of the Court by
Justice Brennan being joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens.
The Chief Justice, and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor dissented.
98 The vote on this “Community Education” program was 7–2, Chief Justice Burger
and Justice O’Connor concurring with the “Shared Time” majority.

one sectarian enterprise”; and “the programs in effect subsidize the

religious functions of the parochial schools by taking over a substan-
tial portion of their responsibility for teaching secular subjects.” 99
In Aguilar v. Felton,100 the Court invalidated a program under which
public school employees provided instructional services on paro-
chial school premises to educationally deprived children. The pro-
gram differed from those at issue in Grand Rapids because the classes
were closely monitored for religious content. This “pervasive moni-
toring” did not save the program, however, because, by requiring
close cooperation and day-to-day contact between public and secu-
lar authorities, the monitoring “infringes precisely those Establish-
ment Clause values at the root of the prohibition of excessive en-
tanglement.” 101
A state program to reimburse nonpublic schools for a variety of
services mandated by state law was voided because the statute did
not distinguish between secular and potentially religious services,
the costs of which the state would reimburse.102 Similarly, a pro-
gram of direct monetary grants to nonpublic schools to be used for
the maintenance of school facilities and equipment failed to sur-
vive the primary effect test because it did not restrict payment to
those expenditures related to the upkeep of facilities used exclu-
sively for secular purposes and because “within the context of these
religion-oriented institutions” the Court could not see how such re-
strictions could effectively be imposed.103 But a plan of direct mon-
etary grants to nonpublic schools to reimburse them for the costs
of state-mandated record-keeping and of administering and grad-
ing state-prepared tests and that contained safeguards against reli-
99 473 U.S. at 397.

100 473 U.S. 402 (1985). This was another 5–4 decision, with Justice Brennan’s
opinion of the Court being joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Ste-
vens, and with Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Rehnquist, and O’Connor
dissenting.
101 473 U.S. at 413.
102 Levitt v. Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472 (1973).
Justice White dissented, id. at 482. The most expensive service to be reimbursed for
nonpublic schools was the “administration, grading and the compiling and reporting
of the results of tests and examinations.” Id. at 474–75. In New York v. Cathedral
Academy, 434 U.S. 125 (1977), the Court struck down a new statutory program en-
titling private schools to obtain reimbursement for expenses incurred during the school
year in which the prior program was voided in Levitt.
103 Committee for Pub. Educ. and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
774–80 (1973). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist concurred, id. at 798,
and Justice White dissented, id. at 820.
gious use of the tests was sustained even though the Court recog-
nized the incidental benefit to the schools.104
The “child benefit” theory, under which it is permissible for gov-
ernment to render ideologically neutral assistance and services to
pupils in sectarian schools without being deemed to be aiding the
religious mission of the schools, has not proved easy to apply. Sev-
eral different forms of assistance to students were at issue in Wol-
man v. Walter.105 The Court approved the following: standardized
tests and scoring services used in the public schools, with private
school personnel not involved in the test drafting and scoring; speech,
hearing, and psychological diagnostic services provided in the pri-
vate schools by public employees; and therapeutic, guidance, and
remedial services for students provided off the premises of the pri-
vate schools. In all these, the Court thought the program contained
adequate built-in protections against religious use. But, though the
Court adhered to its ruling permitting the states to lend secular
textbooks used in the public schools to pupils attending religious
schools,106 it declined to extend the precedent to permit the states
to lend to pupils or their parents instructional materials and equip-
ment, such as projectors, tape recorders, maps, globes and science
kits, even though the materials and equipment were identical to
104 Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 444 U.S. 646 (1980).
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented. Id. at 662, 671. The
dissenters thought that the authorization of direct reimbursement grants was distin-
guishable from previously approved plans that had merely relieved the private schools
of the costs of preparing and grading state-prepared tests. See Wolman v. Walter,
433 U.S. 229, 238–41 (1977).
105 433 U.S. 229 (1977). The Court deemed the situation in which these services
were performed and the nature of the services to occasion little danger of aiding
religious functions and thus requiring little supervision that would give rise to en-
tanglement. All the services fell “within that class of general welfare services for
children that may be provided by the States regardless of the incidental benefit that
accrues to church-related schools.” Id. at 243, quoting Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S.
349, 371 n.21 (1975). Justice Brennan would have voided all the programs because,
considered as a whole, the amount of assistance was so large as to constitute assis-
tance to the religious mission of the schools. 433 U.S. at 255. Justice Marshall would
have approved only the diagnostic services, id. at 256, while Justice Stevens would
generally approve closely administered public health services. Id. at 264.
106 Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 359–72 (1975); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S.
229, 236–38 (1977). Allen was explained as resting on “the unique presumption” that
“the educational content of textbooks is something that can be ascertained in ad-
vance and cannot be diverted to sectarian uses.” There was “a tension” between Ny-
quist, Meek, and Wolman, on the one hand, and Allen on the other; although Allen
was to be followed “as a matter of stare decisis,” the “presumption of neutrality”
embodied in Allen would not be extended to other similar assistance. Id. at 251 n.18.
A later Court majority revived the Allen presumption, however, applying it to up-
hold tax deductions for tuition and other school expenses in Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388 (1983). Justice Rehnquist wrote the Court’s opinion, joined by Justices White,
Powell, and O’Connor, and by Chief Justice Burger.
those used in the public schools.107 Nor was a state permitted to

pay the costs to religious schools of field trip transportation, such
as it did to public school students.108
The Court’s later decisions, however, rejected the reasoning and
overturned the results of several of these decisions. In two rulings,
the Court reversed course with respect to the constitutionality of
public school personnel’s providing educational services on the prem-
ises of pervasively sectarian schools. First, in Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District 109 the Court held that the public subsidy
of a sign-language interpreter for a deaf student attending a paro-
chial school created no primary effect or entanglement problems.
The payment did not relieve the school of an expense that it would
otherwise have borne, the Court stated, and the interpreter had no
role in selecting or editing the content of any of the lessons. Reviv-
ing the child benefit theory of its earlier cases, the Court wrote:
“The service at issue in this case is part of a general government
program that distributes benefits neutrally to any child qualifying
as ‘disabled’ under the IDEA, without regard to the ‘sectarian-
nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature’ of the school the child at-
tends.” 110
Second, and more pointedly, the Court in Agostini v. Felton 111
overturned its decision in Aguilar v. Felton,112 which had struck down
the Title I program as administered in New York City, as well as
the analogous parts of its decisions in Meek v. Pittenger 113 and Grand
Rapids School District v. Ball.114 The assumptions on which those
decisions had rested, the Court stated, had been “undermined” by
its more recent decisions. Decisions such as Zobrest and Witters v.
Washington Department of Social Services,115 it said, had repudi-
ated the notions that the placement of a public employee in a sec-
tarian school creates an “impermissible symbolic link” between gov-
ernment and religion, that “all government aid that directly aids
the educational function of religious schools” is constitutionally for-
bidden, that public teachers in a sectarian school necessarily pose
a serious risk of inculcating religion, and that “pervasive monitor-
ing of [such] teachers is required.” The proper criterion under the
107 433 U.S. at 248–51. See also id. at 263–64 (Justice Powell concurring in part
and dissenting in part).

108 433 U.S. at 252–55. Justice Powell joined the other three dissenters who would
have approved this expenditure. Id. at 264.

109 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
110 509 U.S. at 10.
111 521 U.S. 203 (1997).
112 473 U.S. 402 (1985).
113 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
114 473 U.S. 373 (1985).
115 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
primary effect prong of the Lemon test, the Court asserted, is reli-
gious neutrality, i.e., whether “aid is allocated on the basis of neu-
tral, secular criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion, and is
made available to both religious and secular beneficiaries on a non-
discriminatory basis.” 116 Finding the Title I program to meet that
test, the Court concluded that “accordingly, we must acknowledge
that Aguilar, as well as the portion of Ball addressing Grand Rap-
ids’ Shared Time program, are no longer good law.” 117
Later, in Mitchell v. Helms 118 the Court abandoned the presump-
tions that religious elementary and secondary schools are so perva-
sively sectarian that they are constitutionally ineligible to partici-
pate in public aid programs directly benefiting their educational
functions and that direct aid to such institutions must be subject
to an intrusive and constitutionally fatal monitoring. At issue in the
case was a federal program that distributed funds to local educa-
tional agencies to provide instructional materials and equipment,
such as computer hardware and software, library books, movie pro-
jectors, television sets, VCRs, laboratory equipment, maps, and cas-
sette recordings, to public and private elementary and secondary
schools. Virtually identical programs had previously been held un-
constitutional by the Court in Meek v. Pittenger 119 and Wolman v.
Walter.120 But in this case the Court overturned those decisions and
held the program to be constitutional.
Mitchell had no majority opinion. The opinions of Justice Thomas,
joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia and Ken-
nedy, and of Justice O’Connor, joined by Justice Breyer, found the
program constitutional. They agreed that to pass muster under the
primary effect prong of the Lemon test direct public aid has to be
secular in nature and distributed on the basis of religiously neu-
tral criteria. They also agreed, in contrast to past rulings, that sec-
tarian elementary and secondary schools should not be deemed con-
stitutionally ineligible for direct aid on the grounds that their secular
educational functions are “inextricably intertwined” with their reli-
116 In Agostini, the Court nominally eliminated entanglement as a separate prong
of the Lemon test. “[T]he factors we use to assess whether an entanglement is ‘ex-
cessive,’ ” the Court stated, “are similar to the factors we use to examine ‘effect.’ ”
“Thus,” it concluded, “it is simplest to recognize why entanglement is significant and
treat it—as we did in Walz—as an aspect of the inquiry into a statute’s effect.” 521
U.S. at 232, 233.
117 Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissented from the
Court’s ruling, contending that the Establishment Clause mandates a “flat ban on
[the] subsidization” of religion (521 U.S. at 243) and that the Court’s contention that
recent cases had undermined the reasoning of Aguilar was a “mistaken reading” of
the cases. Id. at 248. Justice Breyer joined in the second dissenting argument.
118 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
119 421 U.S. 349 (1975).
120 433 U.S. 229 (1977).
gious educational functions, i.e., that they are pervasively sectar-

ian. But their rationales for the program’s constitutionality then di-
verged. For Justice Thomas it was sufficient that the instructional
materials were secular in nature and were distributed according to
neutral criteria. It made no difference whether the schools used the
aid for purposes of religious indoctrination or not. But that was not
sufficient for Justice O’Connor. She adhered to the view that direct
public aid has to be limited to secular use by the recipient institu-
tions. She further asserted that a limitation to secular use could be
honored by the teachers in the sectarian schools and that the risk
that the aid would be used for religious purposes was not so great
as to require an intrusive and entangling government monitor-
ing.121
Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dis-
sented on the grounds that the Establishment Clause bars “aid sup-
porting a sectarian school’s religious exercise or the discharge of its
religious mission.” Adhering to the “substantive principle of no aid”
first articulated in Everson, he contended that direct aid to perva-
sively sectarian institutions inevitably results in the diversion of
the aid for purposes of religious indoctrination. He further argued
that the aid in this case had been so diverted.
As the opinion upholding the program’s constitutionality on the
narrowest grounds, Justice O’Connor’s provides the most current
guidance on the standards governing the constitutionality of aid pro-
grams directly benefiting sectarian elementary and secondary schools.
The Court has similarly loosened the constitutional restrictions
on public aid programs indirectly benefiting sectarian elementary
and secondary schools. Initially, the Court in 1973 struck down sub-
stantially similar programs in New York and Pennsylvania provid-
ing for tuition reimbursement to parents of religious school chil-
dren. New York’s program provided reimbursements out of general
tax revenues for tuition paid by low-income parents to send their
children to nonpublic elementary and secondary schools; the reim-
bursements were of fixed amounts but could not exceed 50 percent
of actual tuition paid. Pennsylvania provided fixed-sum reimburse-
ment for parents who sent their children to nonpublic elementary
and secondary schools, so long as the amount paid did not exceed
actual tuition, the funds to be derived from cigarette tax revenues.
121 Justice O’Connor also cited several other factors as “sufficient” to ensure the
program’s constitutionality, without saying whether they were “constitutionally nec-

essary”—that the aid supplemented rather than supplanted the school’s educational
functions, that no funds ever reached the coffers of the sectarian schools, and that
there were various administrative regulations in place providing for some degree of
monitoring of the schools’ use of the aid.
Both programs, it was held, constituted public financial assistance

to sectarian institutions with no attempt to segregate the benefits
so that religion was not advanced.122
New York had also enacted a separate program providing tax
relief for low-income parents who did not qualify for the tuition re-
imbursements; here relief was in the form of a deduction or credit
bearing no relationship to the amounts of tuition paid, but keyed
instead to adjusted gross income. This too was invalidated in Ny-
quist. “In practical terms there would appear to be little difference,
for purposes of determining whether such aid has the effect of ad-
vancing religion, between the tax benefit allowed here and the tu-
ition [reimbursement] grant. . . . The qualifying parent under ei-
ther program receives the same form of encouragement and reward
for sending his children to nonpublic schools. The only difference is
that one parent receives an actual cash payment while the other is
allowed to reduce by an arbitrary amount the sum he would other-
wise be obliged to pay over to the State. We see no answer to Judge
Hays’ dissenting statement below that ‘[i]n both instances the money
involved represents a charge made upon the state for the purpose
of religious education.’ ” 123 Some difficulty, however, was experi-
enced in distinguishing this program from the tax exemption ap-
proved in Walz.124
The Court rejected two subsidiary arguments in these cases. The
first, in the New York case, was that the tuition reimbursement pro-
gram promoted the free exercise of religion in that it permitted low-
income parents desiring to send their children to school in accor-
dance with their religious views to do so. The Court agreed that
“tension inevitably exists between the Free Exercise and the Estab-
lishment Clauses,” but explained that the tension is ordinarily re-
solved through application of the “neutrality” principle: govern-
ment may neither advance nor inhibit religion. The tuition program
inescapably advanced religion and thereby violated this prin-
122 Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
789–798 (1973) (New York); Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825 (1973) (Pennsylvania).
The Court distinguished Everson and Allen on the grounds that in those cases the
aid was given to all children and their parents and that the aid was in any event
religiously neutral, so that any assistance to religion was purely incidental. 413 U.S.
at 781–82. Chief Justice Burger thought that Everson and Allen were controlling.
Id. at 798.
123 Committee for Public Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
790–91 (1973).
124 413 U.S. at 791–94. Principally, Walz was said to be different because of the
longstanding nature of the property tax exemption it dealt with, because the Walz
exemption was granted in the spirit of neutrality whereas the tax credit under con-
sideration was not, and the fact that the Walz exemption promoted less entangle-
ment whereas the credit would promote more.
ciple.125 The second subsidiary argument that the Court rejected was
that, because the Pennsylvania program reimbursed parents who
sent their children to nonsectarian schools as well as to sectarian
ones, the portion respecting the former parents was valid and “par-
ents of children who attended sectarian schools are entitled to the
same aid as a matter of equal protection.” 126 The Court found the
argument “thoroughly spurious,” adding, “The Equal Protection Clause
has never been regarded as a bludgeon with which to compel a State
to violate other provisions of the Constitution.” 127
In 1983, the Court clarified the limits of the Nyquist holding.
In Mueller v. Allen,128 the Court upheld a Minnesota deduction from
state income tax available to parents of elementary and secondary
school children for expenses incurred in providing tuition, transpor-
tation, textbooks, and various other school supplies. Because the Min-
nesota deduction was available to parents of public and private school-
children alike, the Court termed it “vitally different from the scheme
struck down in Nyquist,” and more similar to the benefits upheld
in Everson and Allen as available to all schoolchildren.129 The Court
declined to look behind the “facial neutrality” of the law and con-
sider empirical evidence of its actual impact, citing a need for “cer-
tainty” and the lack of “principled standards” by which to evaluate
such evidence.130 Also important to the Court’s refusal to consider
125 413 U.S. at 788–89. But cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984) (Free
Exercise Clause “affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all

religions”).
126 Sloan v. Lemon, 413 U.S. 825, 834 (1973).
127 413 U.S. at 834. In any event, the Court sustained the district court’s re-
fusal to sever the program and save that portion as to children attending non-
sectarian schools on the basis that, because so large a portion of the children ben-
efited attended religious schools, it could not be assumed the legislature would have
itself enacted such a limited program.
In Wheeler v. Barrera, 417 U.S. 402 (1974), the Court held that states receiving
federal educational funds were required by federal law to provide “comparable” but
not equal services to both public and private school students within the restraints
imposed by state constitutional restrictions on aid to religious schools. In the ab-
sence of specific plans, the Court declined to review First Amendment limitations
on such services.
128 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
129 463 U.S. at 398. Nyquist had reserved the question of “whether the signifi-
cantly religious character of the statute’s beneficiaries might differentiate the pres-
ent cases from a case involving some form of public assistance (e.g., scholarships)
made available generally without regard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-
nonpublic nature of the institution benefitted.” 413 U.S. at 783 n.38.
130 463 U.S. at 401. Justice Marshall’s dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Bren-
nan, Blackmun, and Stevens, argued that the tuition component of the deduction,
unavailable to parents of most public schoolchildren, was by far the most signifi-
cant, and that the deduction as a whole “was little more that a subsidy of tuition
masquerading as a subsidy of general educational expenses.” 463 U.S. at 408–09.
Cf. Grand Rapids School Dist. v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), where the Court empha-
sized that 40 of 41 nonpublic schools at which publicly funded programs operated
the alleged disproportionate benefits to parents of parochial school

children was the assertion that, “whatever unequal effect may be
attributed to the statutory classification can fairly be regarded as a
rough return for the benefits . . . provided to the State and all tax-
payers by parents sending their children to parochial schools.” 131
A second factor important in Mueller, which had been present
but not controlling in Nyquist, was that the financial aid was pro-
vided to the parents of schoolchildren rather than to the school. In
the Court’s view, therefore, the aid was “attenuated” rather than
direct; because it was “available only as a result of decisions of in-
dividual parents,” there was no “imprimatur of state approval.” The
Court noted that, with the exception of Nyquist, “all . . . of our re-
cent cases invalidating state aid to parochial schools have involved
the direct transmission of assistance from the State to the schools
themselves.” 132 Thus, Mueller apparently stands for the proposi-
tion that state subsidies of tuition expenses at sectarian schools are
permissible if contained in a facially neutral scheme providing ben-
efits, at least nominally, to parents of public and private schoolchil-
dren alike.
The Court confirmed this proposition three years later in Wit-
ters v. Washington Department of Social Services for the Blind.133
At issue was the constitutionality of a grant made by a state voca-
tional rehabilitation program to a blind person who wanted to use
the grant to attend a religious school and train for a religious min-
istry. Again, the Court emphasized that, in the vocational rehabili-
tation program “any aid provided is ‘made available without re-
gard to the sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic nature of the
institution benefited’ ” and “ultimately flows to religious institu-
tions . . . only as a result of the genuinely independent and private
choices of aid recipients.” 134 The program, the Court stated, did not
have the purpose of providing support for nonpublic, sectarian in-
stitutions; created no financial incentive for students to undertake
religious education; and gave recipients “full opportunity to expend
vocational rehabiiltation aid on wholly secular education.” “In this
case,” the Court found, “the fact that the aid goes to individuals
means that the decision to support religious education is made by
were sectarian in nature; and Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 275 (1981), holding
that a college’s open forum policy had no primary effect of advancing religion “[a]t
least in the absence of evidence that religious groups will dominate [the] forum.”
But cf. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988), permitting religious institutions to
be recipients under a “facially neutral” direct grant program.
131 463 U.S. at 402.
132 463 U.S. at 399.
133 474 U.S. 481 (1986).
134 474 U.S. at 487.
the individual, not by the State.” Finally, the Court concluded, there
was no evidence that “any significant portion of the aid expended
under the Washington program as a whole will end up flowing to
religious education.” 135
In Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District 136 the Court re-
affirmed this line of reasoning. The case involved the provision of a
sign language interpreter pursuant to the Individuals with Disabili-
ties Education Act (IDEA) 137 to a deaf high school student who wanted
to attend a Catholic high school. In upholding the assistance as con-
stitutional, the Court emphasized that “[t]he service at issue in this
case is part of a general government program that distributes ben-
efits neutrally to any child qualifying as ‘disabled’ under the IDEA,
without regard to the ‘sectarian-nonsectarian, or public-nonpublic
nature’ of the school the child attends.” Thus, it held that the pres-
ence of the interpreter in the sectarian school resulted not from a
decision of the state but from the “private decision of individual par-
ents.” 138
Finally, in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris 139 the Court reinter-
preted the genuine private choice criterion in a manner that seems
to render most voucher programs constitutional. At issue was an
Ohio program that provided vouchers to the parents of children in
failing public schools in Cleveland for use at private schools in the
city. The Court upheld the program notwithstanding that, as in Ny-
quist, most of the schools at which the vouchers could be redeemed
were religious and most of the voucher students attended such schools.
But the Court found that the program nevertheless involved “true
private choice.” 140 “Cleveland schoolchildren,” the Court said, “en-
joy a range of educational choices: They may remain in public school
as before, remain in public school with publicly funded tutoring aid,
obtain a scholarship and choose a religious school, obtain a scholar-
ship and choose a nonreligious private school, enroll in a commu-
nity school, or enroll in a magnet school. That 46 of the 56 private
schools now participating in the program are religious schools does
not condemn it as a violation of the Establishment Clause. The Es-
tablishment Clause question is whether Ohio is coercing parents
into sending their children to religious schools, and that question
must be answered by evaluating all options Ohio provides Cleve-
135 474 U.S. at 488.

136 509 U.S. 1 (1993).
137 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400 et seq.
138 509 U.S. at 10.
139 536 U.S. at 639 (2002).
140 536 U.S. at 653.
land schoolchildren, only one of which is to obtain a program schol-

arship and then choose a religious school.” 141
In contrast to its rulings concerning direct aid to sectarian el-
ementary and secondary schools, the Court, although closely di-
vided at times, has from the start approved quite extensive public
assistance to institutions of higher learning. On the same day that
it first struck down an assistance program for elementary and sec-
ondary private schools, the Court sustained construction grants to
church-related colleges and universities.142 The specific grants in ques-
tion were for the construction of two library buildings, a science build-
ing, a music, drama, and arts building, and a language laboratory.
The law prohibited the financing of any facility for, or the use of
any federally financed building for, religious purposes, although the
restriction on use ran for only twenty years.143 The Court found that
the purpose and effect of the grants were secular and that, unlike
elementary and secondary schools, religious colleges were not so de-
voted to inculcating religion.144 The supervision required to ensure
conformance with the non-religious-use requirement was found not
to constitute “excessive entanglement,” inasmuch as a building is
nonideological in character, and the construction grants were one-
time rather than continuing.
Also sustained was a South Carolina program under which a
state authority would issue revenue bonds for construction projects
on campuses of private colleges and universities. The Court did not
decide whether this special form of assistance could be otherwise
sustained, because it concluded that religion was neither advanced
nor inhibited; nor was there any impermissible public entangle-
ment. “Aid normally may be thought to have a primary effect of
advancing religion when it flows to an institution in which religion
is so pervasive that a substantial portion of its functions are sub-
sumed in the religious mission or when it funds a specifically reli-
gious activity in an otherwise substantially secular setting.” 145 The
colleges involved, though affiliated with religious institutions, were
141 536 U.S. at 655–56.
142 Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971). This was a 5–4 decision.
143 Because such buildings would still have substantial value after twenty years,
the Court found that a religious use then would be an unconstitutional aid to reli-
gion, and it struck down the period of limitation. 403 U.S. at 682–84.
144 It was no doubt true, Chief Justice Burger conceded, that construction grants
to religious-related colleges did in some measure benefit religion, because the grants
freed money that the colleges would be required to spend on the facilities for which
the grants were made. Bus transportation, textbooks, and tax exemptions similarly
benefited religion and had been upheld. “The crucial question is not whether some
benefit accrues to a religious institution as a consequence of the legislative pro-
gram, but whether its principal or primary effect advances religion.” 403 U.S. at
679.
145 Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 743 (1973).
not shown to be too pervasively religious—no religious qualifica-

tions existed for faculty or student body, a substantial part of the
student body was not of the religion of the affiliation, and state rules
precluded the use of any state-financed project for religious activi-
ties.146
The kind of assistance permitted by Tilton and by Hunt v. McNair
seems to have been broadened when the Court sustained a Mary-
land program of annual subsidies to qualifying private institutions
of higher education; the grants were noncategorical but could not
be used for sectarian purposes, a limitation to be policed by the ad-
ministering agency.147 The plurality opinion found a secular pur-
pose; found that the limitation of funding to secular activities was
meaningful,148 since the religiously affiliated institutions were not
so pervasively sectarian that secular activities could not be sepa-
rated from sectarian ones; and determined that excessive entangle-
ment was improbable, given the fact that aided institutions were
not pervasively sectarian. The annual nature of the subsidy was
recognized as posing the danger of political entanglement, but the
plurality thought that the character of the aided institutions—
“capable of separating secular and religious functions”—was more
important.149
146 413 U.S. at 743–44. Justices Brennan, Douglas, and Marshall, dissenting,
rejected the distinction between elementary and secondary education and higher edu-
cation and foresaw a greater danger of entanglement than did the Court. Id. at 749.
147 Roemer v. Maryland Public Works Bd., 426 U.S. 736 (1976). Justice Blackmun’s
plurality opinion was joined only by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell. Jus-
tices White and Rehnquist concurred on the basis of secular purpose and no pri-
mary religious benefit, rejecting entanglement. Id. at 767. Four justices dissented.
148 426 U.S. at 755. In some of the schools mandatory religion courses were taught,
the significant factor in Justice Stewart’s view, id. at 773, but overweighed by other
factors in the plurality’s view.
149 426 U.S. at 755–66. The plurality also relied on the facts that the student
body was not local but diverse, and that large numbers of non-religiously affiliated
institutions received aid. A still further broadening of governmental power to ex-
tend aid affecting religious institutions of higher education occurred in several sub-
sequent decisions. First, the Court summarily affirmed two lower-court decisions up-
holding programs of assistance—scholarships and tuitions grants—to students at college
and university as well as vocational programs in both public and private—including
religious—institutions; one of the programs contained no secular use restriction at
all and in the other one the restriction seemed somewhat pro forma. Smith v. Board
of Governors of Univ. of North Carolina, 434 U.S. 803 (1977), aff ’g 429 F. Supp. 871
(W.D.N.C. 1977); Americans United v. Blanton, 434 U.S. 803 (1977), aff ’g 433 F. Supp.
97 (M.D. Tenn. 1977). Second, in Witters v. Washington Dep’t of Services for the
Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), the Court upheld use of a vocational rehabilitation schol-
arship at a religious college, emphasizing that the religious institution received the
public money as a result of the “genuinely independent and private choices of the
aid recipients,” and not as the result of any decision by the state to sponsor or sub-
sidize religion. Third, in Rosenberger v. The Rector and Visitors of the University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995), the Court held that a public university cannot ex-
Finally, in the first case since Bradfield v. Roberts 150 to chal-

lenge the constitutionality of public aid to non-educational reli-
gious institutions, the Court in Bowen v. Kendrick,151 by a 5–4 vote,
upheld the Adolescent Family Life Act (AFLA) 152 against facial chal-
lenge. The Act permits direct grants to religious organizations for
the provision of health care and for counseling of adolescents on
matters of pregnancy prevention and abortion alternatives, and re-
quires grantees to involve other community groups, including reli-
gious organizations, in the delivery of services. All the Justices agreed
that AFLA had valid secular purposes; their disagreement related
to application of the effects and entanglement tests. The Court re-
lied on analogy to the higher education cases rather than to the
cases involving aid to elementary and secondary schools.153 The case
presented conflicting factual considerations. On the one hand, the
class of beneficiaries was broad, with religious groups not predomi-
nant among the wide range of eligible community organizations. On
the other hand, there were analogies to the parochial school aid cases:
secular and religious teachings might easily be mixed, and the age
of the targeted group (adolescents) suggested susceptibility. The Court
resolved these conflicts by holding that AFLA is facially valid, there
being insufficient indication that a significant proportion of the AFLA
funds would be disbursed to “pervasively sectarian” institutions, but
by remanding to the district court to determine whether particular
grants to pervasively sectarian institutions were invalid. The Court
emphasized in both parts of its opinion that the fact that “views
espoused [during counseling] on matters of premarital sex, abor-
tion, and the like happen to coincide with the religious views of the
AFLA grantee would not be sufficient to show [an Establishment
Clause violation].” 154
At the time it was rendered, Bowen differed from the Court’s
decisions concerning direct aid to sectarian elementary and second-
ary schools primarily in that it refused to presume that religiously
affiliated social welfare entities are pervasively sectarian. That dif-
ference had the effect of giving greater constitutional latitude to pub-
lic aid to such entities than was afforded direct aid to religious el-
ementary and secondary schools. As noted above, the Court in its
clude a student religious publication from a program subsidizing the printing costs
of all other student publications. The Court said the fund was essentially a reli-
giously neutral subsidy promoting private student speech without regard to content.
150 175 U.S. 291 (1899).
151 487 U.S. 589 (1988).
152 Pub. L. 97–35, 95 Stat. 578 (1981), codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300z et seq.
153 The Court also noted that the 1899 case of Bradfield v. Roberts had estab-
lished that religious organizations may receive direct aid for support of secular social-
welfare cases.
154 487 U.S. at 621.
recent decisions eliminated the presumption that such religious schools

are pervasively sectarian and has extended the same constitutional
latitude to aid programs benefiting such schools as it gives to aid
programs benefiting religiously affiliated social welfare programs.
Governmental Encouragement of Religion in Public Schools:
Released Time.—Introduction of religious education into the pub-
lic schools, one of Justice Rutledge’s “great drives,” 155 has also oc-
casioned a substantial amount of litigation in the Court. In its first
two encounters, the Court voided one program and upheld another,
in which the similarities were at least as significant as the differ-
ences. Both cases involved “released time” programs, the establish-
ing of a period during which pupils in public schools were to be
allowed, upon parental request, to receive religious instruction. In
the first, the religious classes were conducted during regular school
hours in the school building by outside teachers furnished by a re-
ligious council representing the various faiths, subject to the ap-
proval or supervision of the superintendent of schools. Attendance
reports were kept and reported to the school authorities in the same
way as for other classes, and pupils not attending the religious in-
struction classes were required to continue their regular studies.
“The operation of the State’s compulsory education system thus as-
sists and is integrated with the program of religious instruction car-
ried on by separate religious sects. Pupils compelled by law to go
to school for secular education are released in part from their legal
duty upon the condition that they attend the religious classes. This
is beyond all question a utilization of the tax-established and tax-
supported public school system to aid religious groups to spread their
faith. And it falls squarely under the ban of the First Amendment
. . . .” 156 The case was also noteworthy because of the Court’s ex-
press rejection of the contention “that historically the First Amend-
ment was intended to forbid only government preference of one re-
ligion over another, not an impartial governmental assistance of all
religions.” 157
Four years later, the Court upheld a different released-time pro-
gram.158 In this one, schools released pupils during school hours,
on written request of their parents, so that they might leave the
school building and go to religious centers for religious instruction
or devotional exercises. The churches reported to the schools the
155 Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 63 (Justice Rutledge dissenting)
(quoted under “Establishment of Religion,” supra).

156 Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, 209–10 (1948).
157 333 U.S. at 211.
158 Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952). Justices Black, Frankfurter, and Jack-
son dissented. Id. at 315, 320, 323.

names of children released from the public schools who did not re-
port for religious instruction; children not released remained in the
classrooms for regular studies. The Court found the differences be-
tween this program and the program struck down in McCollum to
be constitutionally significant. Unlike McCollum, where “the class-
rooms were used for religious instruction and force of the public
school was used to promote that instruction,” religious instruction
was conducted off school premises and “the public schools do no more
than accommodate their schedules.” 159 “We are a religious people
whose institutions presuppose a Supreme Being,” Justice Douglas
wrote for the Court. “When the state encourages religious instruc-
tion or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the sched-
ule of public events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our
traditions. For it then respects the religious nature of our people
and accommodates the public service to their spiritual needs. To hold
that it may not would be to find in the Constitution a requirement
that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups.
That would be preferring those who believe in no religion over those
who do believe.”
Prayers and Bible Reading.—Upon recommendation of the state
governing board, a local New York school required each class to be-
gin each school day by reading aloud the following prayer in the
presence of the teacher: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our depen-
dence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents,
our teachers and our country.” Students who wished to do so could
remain silent or leave the room. The Court wrote: “We think that
by using its public school system to encourage recitation of the Re-
gents’ prayer, the State of New York has adopted a practice wholly
inconsistent with the Establishment Clause. There can, of course,
be no doubt that New York’s program of daily classroom invocation
of God’s blessings as prescribed in the Regents’ prayer is a reli-
gious activity. . . . [W]e think that the constitutional prohibition
against laws respecting an establishment of religion must at least
mean that in this country it is no part of the business of govern-
ment to compose official prayers for any group of the American people
to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by govern-
ment.” 160 “Neither the fact that the prayer may be denomination-
ally neutral nor the fact that its observance on the part of the stu-
159 343 U.S. at 315. See also Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,
261–63 (1963) (Justice Brennan concurring) (suggesting that the important distinc-
tion was that “the McCollum program placed the religious instruction in the public
school classroom in precisely the position of authority held by the regular teachers
of secular subjects, while the Zorach program did not”).
160 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424, 425 (1962).
dents is voluntary can serve to free it from the limitations of the

Establishment Clause, as it might from the Free Exercise Clause. . . .
The Establishment Clause . . . does not depend upon any showing
of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by the enact-
ment of laws which establish an official religion whether those laws
operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not.” 161
Following the prayer decision came two cases in which parents
and their school age children challenged the validity under the Es-
tablishment Clause of requirements that each school day begin with
readings of selections from the Bible. Scripture reading, like prayers,
the Court found, was a religious exercise. “Given that finding the
exercises and the law requiring them are in violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause.” 162 Rejected were contentions by the state that the
object of the programs was the promotion of secular purposes, such
as the expounding of moral values, the contradiction of the materi-
alistic trends of the times, the perpetuation of traditional institu-
tions, and the teaching of literature 163 and that to forbid the par-
ticular exercises was to choose a “religion of secularism” in their
place.164 Though the “place of religion in our society is an exalted
one,” the Establishment Clause, the Court continued, prescribed that
in “the relationship between man and religion,” the state must be
“firmly committed to a position of neutrality.” 165
161 370 U.S. at 430. Justice Black for the Court rejected the idea that the prohi-
bition of religious services in public schools evidenced “a hostility toward religion or

toward prayer.” Id. at 434. Rather, such an application of the First Amendment pro-
tected religion from the coercive hand of government and government from control
by a religious sect. Dissenting alone, Justice Stewart could not “see how an ‘official
religion’ is established by letting those who want to say a prayer say it. On the con-
trary, I think that to deny the wish of these school children to join in reciting this
prayer is to deny them the opportunity of sharing in the spiritual heritage of our
Nation.” Id. at 444, 445.
162 Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963). “[T]he States
are requiring the selection and reading at the opening of the school day of verses
from the Holy Bible and the recitation of the Lord’s Prayer by the students in uni-
son. These exercises are prescribed as part of the curricular activities of students
who are required by law to attend school. They are held in the school buildings un-
der the supervision and with the participation of teachers employed in those schools.
None of these factors, other than compulsory school attendance, was present in the
program upheld in Zorach v. Clausen.” Id.
163 374 U.S. at 223–24. The Court thought the exercises were clearly religious.
164 374 U.S. at 225. “We agree of course that the State may not establish a ‘re-
ligion of secularism’ in the sense of affirmatively opposing or showing hostility to

religion, thus ‘preferring those who believe in no religion over those who do be-
lieve.’ ” Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. at 314. “We do not agree, however, that this
decision in any sense has that effect.”
165 374 U.S. at 226. Justice Brennan contributed a lengthy concurrence in which
he attempted to rationalize the decisions of the Court on the religion clauses and to
delineate the principles applicable. He concluded that what the Establishment Clause
foreclosed “are those involvements of religious with secular institutions which (a)
serve the essentially religious activities of religious institutions; (b) employ the or-
In Wallace v. Jaffree,166 the Court held invalid an Alabama stat-

ute authorizing a 1-minute period of silence in all public schools
“for meditation or prayer.” Because the only evidence in the record
indicated that the words “or prayer” had been added to the exist-
ing statute by amendment for the sole purpose of returning volun-
tary prayer to the public schools, the Court found that the first prong
of the Lemon test had been violated, i.e., that the statute was in-
valid as being entirely motivated by a purpose of advancing reli-
gion. The Court characterized the legislative intent to return prayer
to the public schools as “quite different from merely protecting ev-
ery student’s right to engage in voluntary prayer during an appro-
priate moment of silence during the schoolday,” 167 and both Jus-
tices Powell and O’Connor in concurring opinions suggested that other
state statutes authorizing moments of silence might pass constitu-
tional muster.168
The school prayer decisions served as precedent for the Court’s
holding in Lee v. Weisman 169 that a school-sponsored invocation at
a high school commencement violated the Establishment Clause. The
Court rebuffed a request to reexamine the Lemon test, finding “[t]he
government involvement with religious activity in this case [to be]
pervasive, to the point of creating a state-sponsored and state-
directed religious exercise in a public school.” State officials not only
determined that an invocation and benediction should be given, but
also selected the religious participant and provided him with guide-
lines for the content of nonsectarian prayers. The Court, in an opin-
ion by Justice Kennedy, viewed this state participation as coercive
gans of government for essentially religious purposes; or (c) use essentially religious
means to serve governmental ends, where secular means would suffice.” Id. at 230,
295. Justice Stewart again dissented alone, feeling that the claims presented were
essentially free exercise contentions which were not supported by proof of coercion
or of punitive official action for nonparticipation.
While numerous efforts were made over the years to overturn these cases, through
constitutional amendment and through limitations on the Court’s jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court itself has had no occasion to review the area again. But see Stone v.
Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) (summarily reversing state court and invalidating stat-
ute requiring the posting of the Ten Commandments, purchased with private contri-
butions, on the wall of each public classroom, on the grounds the Ten Command-
ments are “undeniably a sacred text” and the “pre-eminent purpose” of the posting
requirement was “plainly religious in nature”).
166 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
167 472 U.S. at 59.
168 Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion is notable for its effort to synthesize
and refine the Court’s Establishment and Free Exercise tests (see also the Justice’s
concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly), and Justice Rehnquist’s dissent for its ef-
fort to redirect Establishment Clause analysis by abandoning the tripartite test, dis-
carding any requirement that government be neutral between religion and “irreli-
gion,” and confining the scope to a prohibition on establishing a national church or
otherwise favoring one religious group over another.
169 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
in the elementary and secondary school setting.170 The state “in ef-
fect required participation in a religious exercise,” since the option
of not attending “one of life’s most significant occasions” was no real
choice. “At a minimum,” the Court concluded, the Establishment
Clause “guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to sup-
port or participate in religion or its exercise.”
In Santa Fe Independent School District v. Doe 171 the Court held
a school district’s policy permitting high school students to vote on
whether to have an “invocation and/or prayer” delivered prior to home
football games by a student elected for that purpose to violate the
Establishment Clause. It found the policy to violate each of the tests
it has formulated for Establishment Clause cases. The preference
given for an “invocation” in the text of the school district’s policy,
the long history of pre-game prayer led by a student “chaplain” in
the school district, and the widespread perception that “the policy
is about prayer,” the Court said, made clear that its purpose was
not secular but was to preserve a popular state-sponsored religious
practice in violation of the first prong of the Lemon test. Moreover,
it said, the policy violated the coercion test by forcing unwilling stu-
dents into participating in a religious exercise. Some students—the
cheerleaders, the band, football players—had to attend, it noted, and
others were compelled to do so by peer pressure. “The constitu-
tional command will not permit the District ‘to exact religious con-
formity from a student as the price’ of joining her classmates at a
varsity football game,” the Court held.172 Finally, it said, the speech
sanctioned by the policy was not private speech but government-
sponsored speech that would be perceived as a government endorse-
ment of religion. The long history of pre-game prayer, the bias to-
ward religion in the policy itself, the fact that the message would
be “delivered to a large audience assembled as part of a regularly
scheduled, school-sponsored function conducted on school prop-
erty” 173 and over the school’s public address system, the Court as-
serted, all meant that the speech was not genuine private speech
170 The Court distinguished Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983), hold-
ing that the opening of a state legislative session with a prayer by a state-paid chap-
lain does not offend the Establishment Clause. The Marsh Court had distinguished
Abington on the basis that state legislators, as adults, are “presumably not readily
susceptible to ‘religious indoctrination’ or ‘peer pressure,’ ” and the Lee v. Weisman
Court reiterated this distinction. 505 U.S. at 596–97. An opportunity to flesh out
this distinction was lost when the Court dismissed for lack of standing an Establish-
ment Clause challenge to public school recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance with
the words “under God.” Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004).
171 530 U.S. 290 (2000).
172 530 U.S. at 312.
173 530 U.S. at 307.
but would be perceived as “stamped with [the] school’s seal of ap-

proval.” 174 The Court concluded that “[t]he policy is invalid on its
face because it establishes an improper majoritarian election on re-
ligion, and unquestionably has the purpose and creates the percep-
tion of encouraging the delivery of prayer at a series of important
school events.” 175
Curriculum Restriction.—In Epperson v. Arkansas,176 the Court
struck down a state statute that made it unlawful for any teacher
in any state-supported educational institution “to teach the theory
or doctrine that mankind ascended or descended from a lower or-
der of animals,” or “to adopt or use in any such institution a text-
book that teaches” this theory. Agreeing that control of the curricu-
lum of the public schools was largely in the control of local officials,
the Court nonetheless held that the motivation of the statute was
a fundamentalist belief in the literal reading of the Book of Gen-
esis and that this motivation and result required the voiding of the
law. “The law’s effort was confined to an attempt to blot out a par-
ticular theory because of its supposed conflict with the Biblical ac-
count, literally read. Plainly, the law is contrary to the mandate of
the First . . . Amendment to the Constitution.” 177
Similarly invalidated as having the improper purpose of advanc-
ing religion was a Louisiana statute mandating balanced treat-
ment of “creation-science” and “evolution-science” in the public schools.
“The preeminent purpose of the Louisiana legislature,” the Court
found in Edwards v. Aguillard, “was clearly to advance the reli-
gious viewpoint that a supernatural being created humankind.” 178
The Court viewed as a “sham” the stated purpose of protecting aca-
demic freedom, and concluded instead that the legislature’s pur-
pose was to narrow the science curriculum in order to discredit evo-
lution “by counterbalancing its teaching at every turn with the teaching
of creation science.” 179
Access of Religious Groups to Public Property.—Although
government may not promote religion through its educational facili-
ties, it may not bar student religious groups from meeting on pub-
lic school property if it makes its facilities available to nonreligious
174 530 U.S. at 308.
175 530 U.S. at 317.
176 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
177 393 U.S. at 109.
178 482 U.S. 578, 591 (1987).
179 482 U.S. at 589. The Court’s conclusion was premised on its finding that “the
term ‘creation science,’ as used by the legislature . . . embodies the religious belief
that a supernatural creator was responsible for the creation of humankind.” Id. at
592.
student groups. In Widmar v. Vincent,180 the Court held that allow-

ing student religious groups equal access to a public college’s facili-
ties would further a secular purpose, would not constitute an imper-
missible benefit to religion, and would pose little hazard of
entanglement. Subsequently, the Court held that these principles
apply to public secondary schools as well as to institutions of higher
learning. In 1990, in Westside Community Board of Education v.
Mergens,181 the Court upheld application of the Equal Access Act 182
to prevent a secondary school from denying access to school prem-
ises to a student religious club while granting access to such other
“noncurriculum” related student groups as a scuba diving club, a
chess club, and a service club.183 Justice O’Connor stated in a plu-
rality opinion that “there is a crucial difference between govern-
ment speech endorsing religion and private speech endorsing reli-
gion. We think that secondary school students are mature enough
and are likely to understand that a school does not endorse or sup-
port student speech that it merely permits on a nondiscriminatory
basis.” 184
Similarly, public schools may not rely on the Establishment Clause
as grounds to discriminate against religious groups in after-hours
use of school property otherwise available for non-religious social,
civic, and recreational purposes. In Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches
School District,185 the Court held that a school district could not,
consistent with the free speech clause, refuse to allow a religious
group to use school facilities to show a film series on family life
when the facilities were otherwise available for community use. “It
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint,” the Court ruled, “to per-
180 454 U.S. 263, 270–75 (1981).

181 496 U.S. 226 (1990). The Court had noted in Widmar that university stu-
dents “are less impressionable than younger students and should be able to appreci-
ate that the University’s policy is one of neutrality toward religion,” 454 U.S. at 274
n.14. The Mergens plurality ignored this distinction, suggesting that secondary school
students are also able to recognize that a school policy allowing student religious
groups to meet in school facilities is one of neutrality toward religion. 496 U.S. at
252.
182 Pub. L. 98–377, title VIII, 98 Stat. 1302 (1984); 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–74. The
Act requires secondary schools that receive federal financial assistance to allow stu-
dent religious groups to meet in school facilities during noncurricular time to the
same extent as other student groups and had been enacted by Congress in 1984 to
apply the Widmar principles to the secondary school setting.
183 There was no opinion of the Court on Establishment Clause issues, a plural-
ity of four led by Justice O’Connor applying the three-part Lemon test, and concur-
ring Justices Kennedy and Scalia proposing a less stringent test under which “neu-
tral” accommodations of religion would be permissible as long as they do not in effect
establish a state religion, and as long as there is no coercion of students to partici-
pate in a religious activity.
184 496 U.S. at 242.
185 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
mit school property to be used for the presentation of all views about
family issues and child-rearing except those dealing with the sub-
ject matter from a religious viewpoint.” In response to the school
district’s claim that the Establishment Clause required it to deny
use of its facilities to a religious group, the Court said that there
was “no realistic danger” in this instance that “the community would
think that the District was endorsing religion or any particular creed”
and that such permission would satisfy the requirements of the Lemon
test.186 Similarly, in Good News Club v. Milford Central School,187
the Court held the free speech clause to be violated by a school policy
that barred a religious children’s club from meeting on school prem-
ises after school. Given that other groups teaching morals and char-
acter development to young children were allowed to use the school’s
facilities, the exclusion, the Court said, “constitutes unconstitu-
tional viewpoint discrimination.” Moreover, it said, the school had
“no valid Establishment Clause interest” because permitting the re-
ligious club to meet would not show any favoritism toward religion
but would simply “ensure neutrality.”
Finally, the Court has made clear that public colleges may not
exclude student religious organizations from benefits otherwise pro-
vided to a full spectrum of student “news, information, opinion, en-
tertainment, or academic communications media groups.” In
Rosenberger v. Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia,188 the
Court struck down a university policy that afforded a school sub-
sidy to all student publications except religious ones. Once again,
the Court held the denial of the subsidy to constitute viewpoint dis-
crimination in violation of the free speech clause of the First Amend-
ment. In response to the University’s argument that the Establish-
ment Clause required it not to subsidize an enterprise that promotes
religion, the Court emphasized that the forum created by the Uni-
versity’s subsidy policy had neither the purpose nor the effect of
advancing religion and, because it was open to a variety of view-
points, was neutral toward religion.
These cases make clear that the Establishment Clause does not
necessarily trump the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of
speech. In regulating private speech in a public forum, government
186 508 U.S. at 395. Concurring opinions by Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas,
and by Justice Kennedy, criticized the Court’s reference to Lemon. Justice Scalia
lamented that “[l]ike some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon
stalks our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little chil-
dren and school attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.” Id. at
398. Justice White pointedly noted, however, that “Lemon . . . has not been over-
ruled.” Id at 395 n.7.
187 533 U.S. 98 (2001).
188 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
may not justify discrimination against religious viewpoints as nec-

essary to avoid creating an “establishment” of religion.
Tax Exemptions of Religious Property.—Every state and the
District of Columbia provide for tax exemptions for religious insti-
tutions, and the history of such exemptions goes back to the time
of our establishment as a polity. The only expression by a Supreme
Court Justice prior to 1970 was by Justice Brennan, who deemed
tax exemptions constitutional because the benefit conferred was in-
cidental to the religious character of the institutions concerned.189
Then, in 1970, a nearly unanimous Court sustained a state exemp-
tion from real or personal property taxation of “property used exclu-
sively for religious, educational or charitable purposes” owned by a
corporation or association which was conducted exclusively for one
or more of these purposes and did not operate for profit.190 The first
prong of a two-prong argument saw the Court adopting Justice Bren-
nan’s rationale. Using the secular purpose and effect test, Chief Jus-
tice Burger noted that the purpose of the exemption was not to single
out churches for special favor; instead, the exemption applied to a
broad category of associations having many common features and
all dedicated to social betterment. Thus, churches as well as muse-
ums, hospitals, libraries, charitable organizations, professional as-
sociations, and the like, all non-profit, and all having a beneficial
and stabilizing influence in community life, were to be encouraged
by being treated specially in the tax laws. The primary effect of the
exemptions was not to aid religion; the primary effect was secular
and any assistance to religion was merely incidental.191
For the second prong, the Court created a new test, the entangle-
ment test,192 by which to judge the program. There was some en-
tanglement whether there were exemptions or not, Chief Justice
Burger continued, but with exemptions there was minimal involve-
ment. But termination of exemptions would deeply involve govern-
ment in the internal affairs of religious bodies, because evaluation
of religious properties for tax purposes would be required and there
would be tax liens and foreclosures and litigation concerning such
matters.193
189 “If religious institutions benefit, it is in spite of rather than because of their
religious character. For religious institutions simply share benefits which govern-
ment makes generally available to educational, charitable, and eleemosynary groups.”
Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 301 (1963) (concurring opinion).
190 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Justice Douglas dissented.
191 397 U.S. at 672–74.
192 See discussion under “Court Tests Applied to Legislation Affecting Religion,”
supra.
193 397 U.S. at 674–76.
Although the general issue is now settled, it is to be expected

that variations of the exemption upheld in Walz will present the
Court with an opportunity to elaborate the field still further.194 For
example, the Court determined that a sales tax exemption appli-
cable only to religious publications constituted a violation of the Es-
tablishment Clause,195 and, on the other hand, that application of
a general sales and use tax provision to religious publications vio-
lates neither the Establishment Clause nor the Free Exercise Clause.196
Exemption of Religious Organizations from Generally Ap-
plicable Laws.—The Civil Rights Act’s exemption of religious or-
ganizations from the prohibition against religious discrimination in
employment 197 does not violate the Establishment Clause when ap-
plied to a religious organization’s secular, nonprofit activities. In Cor-
poration of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos,198 the Court held that a
church-run gymnasium operated as a nonprofit facility open to the
public could require that its employees be church members. Declar-
ing that “there is ample room for accommodation of religion under
the Establishment Clause,” 199 the Court identified a legitimate pur-
pose in freeing a religious organization from the burden of predict-
ing which of its activities a court will consider to be secular and
which religious. The rule applying across-the-board to nonprofit ac-
tivities and thereby “avoid[ing] . . . intrusive inquiry into religious
belief ” also serves to lessen entanglement of church and state.200
194 For example, the Court subsequently accepted for review a case concerning
property tax exemption for church property used as a commercial parking lot, but
state law was changed, denying exemption for purely commercial property and re-
quiring a pro rata exemption for mixed use, and the Court remanded so that the
change in the law could be considered. Diffenderfer v. Central Baptist Church, 404
U.S. 412 (1972).
195 Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989).
196 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378
(1990). Similarly, there is no constitutional impediment to straightforward applica-

tion of 26 U.S.C. § 170 to disallow a charitable contribution for payments to a church
found to represent a reciprocal exchange rather than a contribution or gift. Hernan-
dez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989).
197 Section 703 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2, makes it
unlawful for any employer to discriminate in employment practices on the basis of

an employee’s religion. Section 702, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–1, exempts from the prohibi-
tion “a religious corporation . . . with respect to the employment of individuals of a
particular religion to perform work connected with the carrying on by such corpora-
tion . . . of its activities.”
198 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
199 483 U.S. at 338.
200 483 U.S. at 339.
The exemption itself does not have a principal effect of advancing

religion, the Court concluded, but merely allows churches to ad-
vance religion.201
Sunday Closing Laws.—The history of Sunday Closing Laws
goes back into United States colonial history and far back into Eng-
lish history.202 Commonly, the laws require the observance of the
Christian Sabbath as a day of rest, although in recent years they
have tended to become honeycombed with exceptions. The Su-
preme Court rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to Sun-
day Closing Laws in McGowan v. Maryland.203 The Court acknowl-
edged that historically the laws had a religious motivation and were
designed to effectuate concepts of Christian theology. However, “[i]n
light of the evolution of our Sunday Closing Laws through the cen-
turies, and of their more or less recent emphasis upon secular con-
siderations, it is not difficult to discern that as presently written
and administered, most of them, at least, are of a secular rather
than of a religious character, and that presently they bear no rela-
tionship to establishment of religion. . . .” 204 “[T]he fact that this
[prescribed day of rest] is Sunday, a day of particular significance
for the dominant Christian sects, does not bar the State from achiev-
ing its secular goals. To say that the States cannot prescribe Sun-
day as a day of rest for these purposes solely because centuries ago
such laws had their genesis in religion would give a constitutional
interpretation of hostility to the public welfare rather than one of
mere separation of church and State.” 205 The choice of Sunday as
the day of rest, although originally religious, now reflected simple
legislative inertia or recognition that Sunday was a traditional day
for the choice.206 Valid secular reasons existed for not simply requir-
ing one day of rest and leaving to each individual to choose the day,
201 “For a law to have forbidden ‘effects’ . . . it must be fair to say that the gov-
ernment itself has advanced religion through its own activities and influence.” 483
U.S. at 337. Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion suggests that practically any ben-
efit to religion can be “recharacterized as simply ‘allowing’ a religion to better ad-
vance itself,” and that a “necessary second step is to separate those benefits to reli-
gion that constitutionally accommodate the free exercise of religion from those that
provide unjustifiable awards of assistance to religious organizations.” Id. at 347, 348.
202 The history is recited at length in the opinion of the Court in McGowan v.
Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431–40 (1961), and in Justice Frankfurter’s concurrence.
Id. at 459, 470–551 and appendix.
203 366 U.S. 420 (1961). Decision on the establishment question in this case also
controlled the similar decision on that question in Two Guys from Harrison-
Allentown v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1961), Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961),
and Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, 366 U.S. 617 (1961). On free exer-
cise in Sunday Closing cases, see “Free Exercise Exemption From General Govern-
mental Requirements,” infra.
204 McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444 (1961).
205 366 U.S. at 445.
206 366 U.S. at 449–52.
reasons of ease of enforcement and of assuring a common day in

the community for rest and leisure.207 Later, a state statute man-
dating that employers honor the Sabbath day of the employee’s choice
was held invalid as having the primary effect of promoting religion
by weighing the employee’s Sabbath choice over all other inter-
ests.208
Conscientious Objection.—Historically, Congress has pro-
vided for alternative service for men who had religious scruples against
participating in either combat activities or in all forms of military
activities; the fact that Congress chose to draw the line of exemp-
tion on the basis of religious belief confronted the Court with a dif-
ficult constitutional question, which, however, the Court chose to
avoid by a somewhat disingenuous interpretation of the statute.209
In Gillette v. United States,210 a further constitutional problem arose
in which the Court did squarely confront and validate the congres-
sional choice. Congress had restricted conscientious objection sta-
tus to those who objected to “war in any form” and the Court con-
ceded that there were religious or conscientious objectors who were
not opposed to all wars but only to particular wars based upon evalu-
ation of a number of factors by which the “justness” of any particu-
lar war could be judged; “properly construed,” the Court said, the
statute did draw a line relieving from military service some reli-
gious objectors while not relieving others.211 Purporting to apply the
secular purpose and effect test, the Court looked almost exclusively
to purpose and hardly at all to effect. Although it is not clear, the
Court seemed to require that a classification must be religiously based
“on its face” 212 or lack any “neutral, secular basis for the lines gov-
207 366 U.S. at 449–52. Justice Frankfurter, with whom Justice Harlan con-
curred, arrived at the same conclusions by a route that did not require approval of
Everson v. Board of Education, from which he had dissented.
208 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
209 In United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965), a unanimous Court con-
strued the language of the exemption limiting the status to those who by “religious
training and belief ” (that is, those who believed in a “Supreme Being”), to mean
that a person must have some belief which occupies in his life the place or role which
the traditional concept of God occupies in the orthodox believer. After the “Supreme
Being” clause was deleted, a plurality in Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970),
construed the religion requirement as inclusive of moral, ethical, or religious grounds.
Justice Harlan concurred on constitutional grounds, believing that the statute was
clear that Congress had intended to restrict conscientious objection status to those
persons who could demonstrate a traditional religious foundation for their beliefs
and that this was impermissible under the Establishment Clause. Id. at 344. The
dissent by Justices White and Stewart and Chief Justice Burger rejected both the
constitutional and the statutory basis. 398 U.S. at 367.
210 401 U.S. 437 (1971).
211 401 U.S. at 449.
212 401 U.S. at 450.
ernment has drawn” 213 in order that it be held to violate the Estab-
lishment Clause. The classification here was not religiously based
“on its face,” and served “a number of valid purposes having noth-
ing to do with a design to foster or favor any sect, religion, or clus-
ter of religions.” 214 These purposes, related to the difficulty in sepa-
rating sincere conscientious objectors to particular wars from others
with fraudulent claims, included the maintenance of a fair and effi-
cient selective service system and protection of the integrity of demo-
cratic decision-making.215
Regulation of Religious Solicitation.—Although the solicita-
tion cases have generally been decided under the free exercise or
free speech clauses,216 in one instance the Court, intertwining es-
tablishment and free exercise principles, voided a provision in a state
charitable solicitations law that required only those religious orga-
nizations that received less than half their total contributions from
members or affiliated organizations to comply with the registration
and reporting sections of the law.217 Applying strict scrutiny equal
protection principles, the Court held that, by distinguishing be-
tween older, well-established churches that had strong member-
ship financial support and newer bodies lacking a contributing con-
stituency or that may favor public solicitation over general reliance
on financial support from the members, the statute granted denomi-
national preference forbidden by the Establishment Clause.218
Religion in Governmental Observances.—The practice of open-
ing legislative sessions with prayers by paid chaplains was upheld
in Marsh v. Chambers,219 a case involving the Nebraska legisla-
ture. In Marsh, the Court’s analysis relied almost entirely on the
historical practice of Congress, which had paid a chaplain and opened
sessions with prayers for almost 200 years. The Court noted that
Congress had continued the practice after considering and reject-
ing Members’ constitutional objections, which was held to strengthen
rather than weaken the historical argument. The Court also found
213 401 U.S. at 452.
214 401 U.S. at 452.
215 401 U.S. at 452–60.
216 See discussion under “Door-to-Door Solicitation and Charitable Solicitation,”
infra.
217 Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982). Two Justices dissented on the mer-
its, id. at 258 (Justices White and Rehnquist), while two other Justices dissented on
a standing issue. Id. at 264 (Chief Justice Burger and Justice O’Connor).
218 456 U.S. at 246–51. Compare Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 652–53 (1981),
and id. at 659 n.3 (Justice Brennan, concurring in part and dissenting in part) (deal-
ing with a facially neutral solicitation rule distinguishing between religious groups
that have a religious tenet requiring peripatetic solicitation and those who do not).
219 463 U.S. 783 (1983). Marsh was a 6–3 decision, with Chief Justice Burger’s
opinion for the Court being joined by Justices White, Blackmun, Powell, Rehnquist,
and O’Connor, and with Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissenting.
that the practice was well-rooted historically in the Nebraska legis-

lature and in most other state legislatures, and that the First Amend-
ment had been drafted in the First Congress with an awareness of
the chaplaincy practice. The Court did not address the lower court’s
findings,220 amplified in Justice Brennan’s dissent, that each as-
pect of the Lemon v. Kurtzman tripartite test had been violated by
these prayers. Instead of constituting an application of the tests,
therefore, Marsh can be read as representing an exception to their
application.221
The Court has also shown itself to be reluctant to evaluate the
content of these prayers. In Town of Greece v. Galloway,222 the Court
considered whether such legislative prayers needed to be “ecumeni-
cal” (inclusive of all religions) or at least reflective of a diversity of
faiths. The challenge arose when the upstate New York town of Greece
recruited local clergy, who were almost exclusively Christian, to de-
liver prayers at monthly town board meetings. While some of these
prayers invoked civic themes, others were distinctly Christian in
nature.223 The Court noted, however, that both historical and mod-
ern practice in Congress included the delivery of distinctly sectar-
ian prayers.224 As to the lack of religious diversity, the Court found
that there was no overt discrimination against non-Christian reli-
gions, and that the town had made reasonable efforts to identify
the clergy of all congregations within its borders. A plurality also
went on to hold that the setting where the prayer occurred, in which
participants could arrive late or leave the room, resulted in no di-
minishment of the opportunity to seek allocation of governmental
220 Chambers v. Marsh, 675 F.2d 228 (8th Cir.1982).

221 School prayer cases were distinguished on the basis that legislators, as adults,
are presumably less susceptible than are schoolchildren to religious indoctrination
and peer pressure, 463 U.S. at 792, but there was no discussion of the tests them-
selves.
222 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–696, slip op. (2014). The opinion was written by Justice
Kennedy.
223 See, e.g., 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–696, slip op. at 3 (“Lord, God of all creation,
we give you thanks and praise for your presence and action in the world. We look
with anticipation to the celebration of Holy Week and Easter. It is in the solemn
events of next week that we find the very heart and center of our Christian faith.
We acknowledge the saving sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross. We draw strength,
vitality, and confidence from his resurrection at Easter . . . ”).
224 Although Christian prayers were initially the norm for prayers delivered be-
fore Congress, such prayers in recent times have included a diversity of religious
beliefs, including Buddhism, Judaism, and Hinduism. 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–696, slip
op. at 10–11. The Court did suggest that a pattern of prayers that over time “deni-
grate, proselytize, or betray an impermissible government purpose” could establish
a constitutional violation. Id. at 17.
benefits and burdens, and thus did not constitute coercion of par-
ticipants to engage in a religious exercise.225
Religious Displays on Government Property.—A different form
of governmentally sanctioned religious observance—inclusion of re-
ligious symbols in governmentally sponsored holiday displays—was
twice before the Court, with varying results. In 1984, in Lynch v.
Donnelly,226 the Court found that the Establishment Clause was not
violated by inclusion of a Nativity scene (creche) in a city’s Christ-
mas display; in 1989, in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh
ACLU,227 inclusion of a creche in a holiday display was found to
constitute a violation. Also at issue in Allegheny County was inclu-
sion of a menorah in a holiday display; here the Court found no
violation. The setting of each display was crucial to the different
results in these cases, the determinant being whether the Court ma-
jority believed that the overall effect of the display was to empha-
size the religious nature of the symbols, or whether instead the em-
phasis was primarily secular. Perhaps equally important for future
cases, however, was the fact that the four dissenters in Allegheny
County would have upheld both the creche and menorah displays
under a more relaxed, deferential standard.
Chief Justice Burger’s opinion for the Court in Lynch began by
expanding on the religious heritage theme exemplified by Marsh;
other evidence that “ ‘[w]e are a religious people whose institutions
presuppose a Supreme Being’ ” 228 was supplied by reference to the
national motto “In God We Trust,” the affirmation “one nation un-
der God” in the pledge of allegiance, and the recognition of both
Thanksgiving and Christmas as national holidays. Against that back-
ground, the Court then determined that the city’s inclusion of the
creche in its Christmas display had a legitimate secular purpose in
recognizing “the historical origins of this traditional event long rec-
ognized as a National Holiday,” 229 and that its primary effect was
225 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–696, slip op. at 10–11. This part of the opinion, written
by Justice Kennedy, was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito. Justice
Thomas, with Justice Scalia, having joined the rest of the majority opinion, rejected
the concept of coercion absent legal consequence. Justice Thomas also argued that
the Establishment Clause is not incorporated through the Fourteenth Amendment
to apply to the states. 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–696 slip op. at 10–11 (Thomas, J., con-
curring in judgment).
226 465 U.S. 668 (1984). Lynch was a 5–4 decision, with Justice Blackmun, who
voted with the majority in Marsh, joining the Marsh dissenters in this case. Again,
Chief Justice Burger wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by the other majority
Justices, and again Justice Brennan wrote a dissent, joined by the other dissenters.
A concurring opinion was added by Justice O’Connor, and a dissenting opinion was
added by Justice Blackmun.
227 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
228 465 U.S. at 675, quoting Zorach v. Clausen, 343 U.S. 306, 313 (1952).
229 465 U.S. at 680.
not to advance religion. The benefit to religion was called “indirect,

remote, and incidental,” and in any event no greater than the ben-
efit resulting from other actions that had been found to be permis-
sible, such as the provision of transportation and textbooks to paro-
chial school students, various assistance to church-supported colleges,
Sunday closing laws, and legislative prayers.230 The Court also re-
versed the lower court’s finding of entanglement based only on “po-
litical divisiveness.” 231
Allegheny County was also decided by a 5–4 vote, Justice
Blackmun writing the opinion of the Court on the creche issue, and
there being no opinion of the Court on the menorah issue.232 To the
majority, the setting of the creche was distinguishable from that in
Lynch. The creche stood alone on the center staircase of the county
courthouse, bore a sign identifying it as the donation of a Roman
Catholic group, and also had an angel holding a banner proclaim-
ing “Gloria in Exclesis Deo.” Nothing in the display “detract[ed] from
the creche’s religious message,” and the overall effect was to en-
dorse that religious message.233 The menorah, on the other hand,
was placed outside a government building alongside a Christmas
tree and a sign saluting liberty, and bore no religious messages. To
Justice Blackmun, this grouping merely recognized “that both Christ-
mas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season, which
has attained a secular status”; 234 to concurring Justice O’Connor,
the display’s “message of pluralism” did not endorse religion over
nonreligion even though Chanukah is primarily a religious holiday
and even though the menorah is a religious symbol.235 The dissent-
ers, critical of the endorsement test proposed by Justice O’Connor
and of the three-part Lemon test, would instead distill two prin-
ciples from the Establishment Clause: “government may not coerce
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and
it may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference,
give direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact ‘estab-
lishes a state religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.’ ” 236
230 465 U.S. at 681–82. Although the extent of benefit to religion was an impor-
tant factor in earlier cases, it was usually balanced against the secular effect of the
same practice rather than the religious effects of other practices.
231 465 U.S. at 683–84.
232 Justice O’Connor, who had concurred in Lynch, was the pivotal vote, joining
the Lynch dissenters to form the majority in Allegheny County. Justices Scalia and
Kennedy, not on the Court in 1984, replaced Chief Justice Burger and Justice Pow-
ell in voting to uphold the creche display; Justice Kennedy authored the dissenting
opinion, joined by the other three.
233 492 U.S. at 598, 600.
234 492 U.S. at 616.
235 492 U.S. at 635.
236 492 U.S. at 659.
In Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette,237 the Court distin-

guished privately sponsored from governmentally sponsored reli-
gious displays on public property. There the Court ruled that Ohio
violated free speech rights by refusing to allow the Ku Klux Klan
to display an unattended cross in a publicly owned plaza outside
the Ohio Statehouse. Because the plaza was a public forum in which
the state had allowed a broad range of speakers and a variety of
unattended displays, the state could regulate the expressive con-
tent of such speeches and displays only if the restriction was neces-
sary, and narrowly drawn, to serve a compelling state interest. The
Court recognized that compliance with the Establishment Clause
can be a sufficiently compelling reason to justify content-based re-
strictions on speech, but saw no need to apply this principle when
permission to display a religious symbol is granted through the same
procedures, and on the same terms, required of other private groups
seeking to convey non-religious messages.
Displays of the Ten Commandments on government property oc-
casioned two decisions in 2005. As in Allegheny County, a closely
divided Court determined that one display violated the Establish-
ment Clause and one did not. And again, context and imputed pur-
pose made the difference. The Court struck down display of the Ten
Commandments in courthouses in two Kentucky counties,238 but held
that a display on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol was per-
missible.239 The displays in the Kentucky courthouses originally “stood
alone, not part of an arguably secular display.” 240 Moreover, the his-
tory of the displays revealed “a predominantly religious purpose”
that had not been eliminated by steps taken to give the appear-
ance of secular objectives.241
237 515 U.S. 753 (1995). The Court was divided 7–2 on the merits of Pinette, a
vote that obscured continuing disagreement over analytical approach. The portions
of Justice Scalia’s opinion that formed the opinion of the Court were joined by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and by Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, Souter, Thomas, and Breyer.
A separate part of Justice Scalia’s opinion, joined only by the Chief Justice and by
Justices Kennedy and Thomas, disputed the assertions of Justices O’Connor, Souter,
and Breyer that the “endorsement” test should be applied. Dissenting Justice Ste-
vens thought that allowing the display on the Capitol grounds did carry “a clear
image of endorsement” (id. at 811), and Justice Ginsburg’s brief opinion seemingly
agreed with that conclusion.
238 McCreary County v. ACLU of Kentucky, 545 U.S. 844 (2005).
239 Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
240 545 U.S. at 868. The Court in its previous Ten Commandments case, Stone
v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 41 (1980) (invalidating display in public school classrooms)
had concluded that the Ten Commandments are “undeniably a sacred text,” and the
2005 Court accepted that characterization. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 859.
241 545 U.S. at 881. An “indisputable” religious purpose was evident in the reso-
lutions authorizing a second display, and the Court characterized statements of pur-
pose accompanying authorization of the third displays as “only . . . a litigating posi-
tion.” 545 U.S. at 870, 871.
There was no opinion of the Court in Van Orden. Justice Breyer,

the swing vote in the two cases,242 distinguished the Texas Capitol
grounds display from the Kentucky courthouse displays. In some
contexts, the Ten Commandments can convey a moral and histori-
cal message as well as a religious one, the Justice explained. Al-
though it was “a borderline case” turning on “a practical matter of
degree,” the capitol display served “a primarily nonreligious pur-
pose.” 243 The monument displaying the Ten Commandments was
one of 17 monuments and 21 historical markers on the Capitol
grounds; it was paid for by a private, civic, and primarily secular
organization; and it had been in place, unchallenged, for 40 years.
Under the circumstances, Justice Breyer thought that few would
be likely to understand the monument to represent an attempt by
government to favor religion.244
The Court has also considered an Establishment Clause chal-
lenge to the display of a Latin Cross—erected to honor American
soldiers who died in World War I—on federal land located in a re-
mote section of the Mojave Desert.245 The legal proceedings leading
up to the decision, however, were complicated by congressional at-
tempts to influence the final disposition of the case, including the
attempted transfer of the federal land in question to private hands.246
242 Only Justice Breyer voted to invalidate the courthouse displays and uphold
the capitol grounds display. The other eight Justices were split evenly, four (Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas) voting to uphold both
displays, and four (Justices Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, and Ginsburg) voting to in-
validate both.
243 545 U.S. at 700, 704, 703.
244 545 U.S. at 702. In Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125,
1140 (2009), Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice Thomas, wrote
that, “[e]ven accepting the narrowest reading of the narrowest opinion necessary to
the judgment in Van Orden,” he would find that a Ten Commandments monument
displayed in a Utah public park for 38 years amidst 15 permanent displays would
not violate the Establishment Clause, even though the monument constituted gov-
ernment speech. The majority opinion did not consider the question, but decided the
case on free-speech grounds. See The Public Forum, infra.
245 Salazar v. Buono, 559 U.S. ___, No. 08–472, slip op. (2010).
246 During the course of the litigation, Congress variously passed an appropria-
tions bill forbidding the use of governmental funds to remove the cross, designating
the cross and its adjoining land as a “national memorial,” prohibitng the spending
of governmental funds to remove the cross, and directing the Secretary of the Inte-
rior to transfer the land to the Veterans of Foreign Wars (VFW) as long as the prop-
erty was maintained as a memorial commemorating World War I veterans. A fed-
eral court of appeals ordered the removal of the cross, holding that a reasonable
observer would perceive a cross on federal land as governmental endorsement of re-
ligion, Buono v. Norton, 371 F.3d 543 (9th Cir. 2004), and the government did not
seek review of this decision. Subsequently, the court of appeals affirmed a lower court
injunction against the transfer of land to the VFW, holding that the underlying stat-
ute was an invalid attempt to keep the cross in its existing location. Buono v.
Kempthorne, 502 F.3d 1069 (9th Cir. 2007).
As a result, a splintered Court failed to reach the merits of the un-

derlying challenge, and instead remanded the case for further con-
sideration.247
Miscellaneous.—In Larkin v. Grendel’s Den,248 the Court held
that the Establishment Clause is violated by a delegation of govern-
mental decisionmaking to churches. At issue was a state statute
permitting any church or school to block issuance of a liquor li-
cense to any establishment located within 500 feet of the church or
school. Although the statute had a permissible secular purpose of
protecting churches and schools from the disruptions often associ-
ated with liquor establishments, the Court indicated that these pur-
poses could be accomplished by other means, e.g., an outright ban
on liquor outlets within a prescribed distance, or the vesting of dis-
cretionary authority in a governmental decisionmaker required to
consider the views of affected parties. However, the conferral of a
veto authority on churches had a primary effect of advancing reli-
gion both because the delegation was standardless (thereby permit-
ting a church to exercise the power to promote parochial interests),
and because “the mere appearance of a joint exercise of legislative
authority by Church and State provides a significant symbolic ben-
efit to religion in the minds of some.” 249 Moreover, the Court deter-
mined, because the veto “enmeshes churches in the exercise of sub-
stantial governmental powers,” it represented an entanglement
offensive to “the core rationale underlying the Establishment Clause
[—] preventing ‘a fusion of governmental and religious func-
tions.’ ” 250
247 Justice Kennedy, joined in full by Chief Justice Roberts and in part by Jus-
tice Alito, found that the plaintiff, based on the existing injunction, had standing to
challenge the land transfer. The case, however, was remanded to the district court
to consider the legitimate congressional interest in reconciling Establishment Clause
concerns with respect for the commemoration of military veterans, id. at 10–13, and
to evaluate whether the land transfer would lead a “reasonable observer” to per-
ceive government endorsement of religion. Id. at 16–17. Justice Alito would have
upheld the land transfer, suggesting that a reasonable observer deemed to be aware
of the history and all other pertinent facts relating to a challenged display would
not find the transfer to be an endorsement of religion. Id. at 6 (Alito, J., concurring
in part and in judgement). Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, held that the
plaintiff had no standing to seek the expansion of the existing injunction to the dis-
play of the cross on private lands. Id. at 3–6 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgement).
248 459 U.S. 116 (1982).
249 459 U.S. at 125–26. But cf. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983), involv-
ing no explicit consideration of the possible symbolic implication of opening legisla-

tive sessions with prayers by paid chaplains.
250 459 U.S. at 126, quoting Abington, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
Using somewhat similar reasoning, the Court in Board of Edu-

cation of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet,251 invalidated a New York
law creating a special school district for an incorporated village com-
posed exclusively of members of one small religious sect. The stat-
ute failed “the test of neutrality,” the Court concluded, since it del-
egated power “to an electorate defined by common religious belief
and practice, in a manner that fails to foreclose religious favorit-
ism.” It was the “anomalously case-specific nature of the legisla-
ture’s exercise of authority” that left the Court “without any direct
way to review such state action” for conformity with the neutrality
principle. Because the village did not receive its governmental au-
thority simply as one of many communities eligible under a gen-
eral law, the Court explained, there was no way of knowing whether
the legislature would grant similar benefits on an equal basis to
other religious and nonreligious groups.
Free Exercise of Religion

Overview.— “The Free Exercise Clause . . . withdraws from leg-
islative power, state and federal, the exertion of any restraint on
the free exercise of religion. Its purpose is to secure religious lib-
erty in the individual by prohibiting any invasions there by civil
authority.” 252 It bars “governmental regulation of religious beliefs
as such,” 253 prohibiting misuse of secular governmental programs
“to impede the observance of one or all religions or . . . to discrimi-
nate invidiously between religions . . . even though the burden may
be characterized as being only indirect.” 254 Freedom of conscience
is the basis of the Free Exercise Clause, and government may not
penalize or discriminate against an individual or a group of indi-
viduals because of their religious views nor may it compel persons
to affirm any particular beliefs.255
Complicating these broadly protective assertions is the fact that
exercise of religion usually entails ritual or other practices that con-
stitute “conduct” rather than pure “belief.” 256 While the Court has
acted to ensure the sanctity of religious beliefs, protection for reli-
251 512 U.S. 687 (1994). Only four Justices (Souter, Blackmun, Stevens, and
Ginsburg) thought that the Grendel’s Den principle applied; in their view the distinc-
tion that the delegation was to a village electorate rather than to a religious body
“lack[ed] constitutional significance” under the peculiar circumstances of the case.
252 Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222–23 (1963).
253 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S 398, 402 (1963) (emphasis in original).
254 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961).
255 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S.
488 (1961).
256 The Free Exercise Clause “embraces two concepts—freedom to believe and
freedom to act. The first is absolute, but in the nature of things, the second cannot
be.” Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 304 (1940).
giously motivated conduct has waxed and waned over the years.257
It has long been recognized that the Free Exercise Clause, in some
instances, allows the government to regulate an activity even if re-
ligious beliefs are implicated by the conduct in question.258 What
has varied most significantly over the years, though, is the extent
of the Court’s willingness to protect religiously motivated conduct
from generally applicable laws.
In its first free exercise case, Reynold v. United States,259 involv-
ing the power of government to prohibit polygamy, the Court in-
voked a hard distinction between conduct and belief, saying that
although laws “cannot interfere with mere religious beliefs and opin-
ions, they may with practices.” 260 The rule thus propounded pro-
tected only belief, so that religiously motivated action was to be sub-
jected to the police power of the state to the same extent as would
similar action springing from other motives. This no-protection for
conduct rule was then applied in a number of other early cases.261
257 Academics as well as the Justices grapple with the extent to which religious
practices as well as beliefs are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. For contrast-
ing academic views of the origins and purposes of the Free Exercise Clause, com-
pare McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exercise of Reli-
gion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1410 (1990) (concluding that constitutionally compelled exemptions
from generally applicable laws are consistent with the Clause’s origins in religious
pluralism) with Marshall, The Case Against the Constitutionally Compelled Free Ex-
ercise Exemption, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 357 (1989–90) (arguing that such exemp-
tions establish an invalid preference for religious beliefs over non-religious beliefs).
258 E.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); Jacobson v. Massachu-
setts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982); Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
259 98 U.S. 145 (1879).
260 98 U.S. at 166. “Crime is not the less odious because sanctioned by what
any particular sect may designate as ‘religion.’ ” Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 345
(1890). In another context, Justice Sutherland in United States v. Macintosh, 283
U.S. 605 (1931), suggested a plenary governmental power to regulate action regard-
less of religious motivation. Denying that recognition of conscientious objection to
military service was of a constitutional magnitude, Sutherland asserted that “un-
qualified allegiance to the Nation and submission and obedience to the laws of the
land, as well those made for war as those made for peace, are not inconsistent with
the will of God.” Id. at 625.
261 Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (compulsory vaccination); Prince
v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (child labor); Cleveland v. United States, 329
U.S. 14 (1946) (polygamy). In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963), Justice
Brennan asserted that the “conduct or activities so regulated [in the cited cases]
have invariably posed some substantial threat to public safety, peace or order.”
Later cases, however, established that religiously grounded con-

duct is not always outside the protection of the Free Exercise Clause.262
Instead, the Court began to balance the secular interest asserted
by the government against the claim of religious liberty asserted
by the person affected. Only if a governmental interest was found
to be “compelling” and if no alternative forms of regulation would
serve that interest was the claimant required to yield.263 Thus, al-
though freedom to engage in religious practices was not absolute,
legislation infringing on these practices were afford considerable pro-
tection under this “strict scrutiny” standard.
Then, the Court began a process of narrowing the application
of the compelling interest test, with a corresponding constriction of
the freedom to engage in religiously motivated conduct. First, the
Court purporting to apply strict scrutiny, would upheld the govern-
mental action anyhow.264 Next, the Court held that the strict scru-
tiny test was inappropriate in the contexts of military and prison
discipline.265 Finally, the Court ruled in Employment Division v. Smith
that “if prohibiting the exercise of religion . . . is not the object . . .
but merely the incidental effect of a generally applicable and other-
wise valid provision, the First Amendment has not been of-
fended.” 266
In Smith, the Court concluded, the Free Exercise Clause did
not prohibit a state from applying generally applicable criminal pen-
alties to the use of peyote in a religious ceremony, or from denying
262 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205
(1972); cf. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 607 (1961): “[I]f the State regulates
conduct by enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of which
is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect bur-
den on religious observance unless the State may accomplish its purpose by means
which do not impose such a burden.”
263 Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406–09 (1963). In Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205 (1972), the Court recognized compelling state interests in provision of
public education, but found insufficient evidence that those interests (preparing chil-
dren for citizenship and for self-reliance) would be furthered by requiring Amish chil-
dren to attend public schools beyond the eighth grade. Instead, the evidence showed
that the Amish system of vocational education prepared their children for life in
their self-sufficient communities.
264 United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (holding mandatory participation
in the Social Security system by an Amish employer religiously opposed to such so-
cial welfare benefits to be “indispensable” to the fiscal vitality of the system); Bob
Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 754 (1983) (holding government’s interest in
eradicating racial discrimination in education to outweigh the religious interest of a
private college whose racial discrimination was founded on religious beliefs); and
Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (holding that government has a
compelling interest in maintaining a uniform tax system “free of ‘myriad exceptions
flowing from a wide variety of religious beliefs’ ”)
265 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503 (1986); O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz,
482 U.S. 342 (1987).

266 494 U.S. 872, 878 (1990).
unemployment benefits to persons dismissed from their jobs be-

cause of religious ceremonial use of peyote. Accommodation of such
religious practices must be found in “the political process,” the Court
noted; statutory religious-practice exceptions are permissible, but
not “constitutionally required.” 267 The result is tantamount to a re-
turn to the Reynolds belief-conduct distinction. 268
Interaction with the Establishment Clause.—The relation-
ship between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses varies
with the expansiveness of interpretation of the two clauses. In a
general sense, both clauses proscribe governmental involvement with
and interference in religious matters. There is, however, a tension
between the requirement of governmental neutrality derived from
the Establishment Clause and the Free-Exercise-derived require-
ment that government accommodate some religious practices.269 So
far, the Court has harmonized its interpretations by finding that
accomodations mandated by the Free Exercise Clause do not create
Establishment Clause violations, while also upholding some other
legislative accommodations not mandated by free exercise require-
ments. “This Court has long recognized that government may (and
sometimes must) accommodate religious practices and that it may
do so without violating the Establishment Clause.” 270 “There is room
for play in the joints productive of a benevolent neutrality which
will permit religious exercise to exist without [governmental] spon-
sorship and without interference.” 271
In holding that a state could not deny unemployment benefits
to Sabbatarians (religious observants of the Sabbath) who were fired
for refusing to work on Saturday, for example, the Court in Sher-
bert v. Verner 272 denied that it was “fostering an ‘establishment’ of
the Seventh-Day Adventist religion. The Court found that the ex-
tension of unemployment benefits to Sabbatarians in common with
Sunday worshippers reflects nothing more than the governmental
obligation of neutrality in the face of religious differences, and does
not represent that involvement of religious with secular institu-
tions which it is the object of the Establishment Clause to fore-
267 494 U.S. at 890.
268 Employment Division v. Smith is discussed under “Free Exercise Exemption
From General Governmental Requirements,” infra, as is the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act, which was enacted in response to the case.
269 “The Court has struggled to find a neutral course between the two Religion
Clauses, both of which are cast in absolute terms, and either of which, if expanded
to a logical extreme, would tend to clash with the other.” Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397
U.S. 668–69 (1970).
270 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136, 144–45 (1987).
271 Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. at 669. See also Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712,
718 (2004); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).

272 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
stall.” 273 Other religious exemptions not required by the Free Exer-
cise Clause have been upheld against Establishment Clause
challenges,274 although it is also possible for legislation to go too
far in promoting free exercise.275 Government need not, however,
offer the same accommodations to secular entities that it extends
to religious practitioners in order to facilitate their religious exer-
cise; “[r]eligious accommodations . . . need not ‘come packaged with
benefits to secular entities.’ ” 276
“Play in the joints” can work both ways, the Court ruled in up-
holding a state’s exclusion of theology students from a college schol-
arship program.277 Although the state could have included theology
students in its scholarship program without offending the Establish-
ment Clause, its choice “not to fund” religious training did not of-
fend the Free Exercise Clause even though that choice singled out
273 374 U.S. at 409. Accord, Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719–20 (1981).
Dissenting in Thomas, Justice Rehnquist argued that Sherbert and Thomas created
unacceptable tensions between the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses, and
that requiring the states to accommodate persons like Sherbert and Thomas be-
cause of their religious beliefs ran the risk of “establishing” religion under the Court’s
existing tests. He argued further, however, that less expansive interpretations of both
clauses would eliminate this artificial tension. Thus, Justice Rehnquist would have
interpreted the Free Exercise Clause as not requiring government to grant exemp-
tions from general requirements that may burden religious exercise but that do not
prohibit religious practices outright, and would have interpreted the Establishment
Clause as not preventing government from voluntarily granting religious exemp-
tions. 450 U.S. at 720–27. By 1990 these views had apparently gained ascendancy,
Justice Scalia’s opinion for the Court in the “peyote” case suggesting that accommo-
dation should be left to the political process, i.e., that states could constitutionally
provide exceptions in their drug laws for sacramental peyote use, even though such
exceptions are not constitutionally required. Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
890 (1990).
274 See, e.g., Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664 (upholding property tax exemp-
tion for religious organizations); Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding Civil Rights Act exemption allowing religious institu-
tions to restrict hiring to members of religion); Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S.
437, 453–54 (1971) (interpreting conscientious objection exemption from military ser-
vice); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709 (2005) (upholding a provision of the Reli-
gious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 that prohibits govern-
ments from imposing a “substantial burden on the religious exercise” of an
institutionalized person unless the burden furthers a “compelling governmental in-
terest”).
275 See, e.g., Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S.
756, 788–89 (1973) (tuition reimbursement grants to parents of parochial school chil-
dren violate Establishment Clause in spite of New York State’s argument that pro-
gram was designed to promote free exercise by enabling low-income parents to send
children to church schools); Texas Monthly, Inc. v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1 (1989) (state
sales tax exemption for religious publications violates the Establishment Clause) (plu-
rality opinion); Board of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 706–07
(1994) (“accommodation is not a principle without limits;” one limit is that “neutral-
ity as among religions must be honored”).
276 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Corporation of the
Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987)).

277 Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
theology students for exclusion.278 Refusal to fund religious train-

ing, the Court observed, was “far milder” than restrictions on reli-
gious practices that have been held to offend the Free Exercise
Clause.279
The Mormon and Jehovah’s Witnesses Cases.—The Court’s
first encounter with free exercise claims occurred in a series of cases
in which the Federal Government and the territories moved against
the Mormons because of their practice of polygamy. Actual prosecu-
tions and convictions for bigamy presented little problem for the
Court, as it could distinguish between beliefs and acts.280 But the
presence of large numbers of Mormons in some of the territories
made convictions for bigamy difficult to obtain, and in 1882 Con-
gress enacted a statute that barred “bigamists,” “polygamists,” and
“any person cohabiting with more than one woman” from voting or
serving on juries. The Court sustained the law, even as applied to
persons entering the state prior to enactment of the original law
prohibiting bigamy and to persons as to whom the statute of limi-
tations had run.281
Subsequently, an act of a territorial legislature that required a
prospective voter not only to swear that he was not a bigamist or
polygamist but also that “I am not a member of any order, organi-
zation or association which teaches, advises, counsels or encour-
ages its members, devotees or any other person to commit the crime
of bigamy or polygamy . . . or which practices bigamy, polygamy or
plural or celestial marriage as a doctrinal rite of such organization;
that I do not and will not, publicly or privately, or in any manner
whatever teach, advise, counsel or encourage any person to commit
the crime of bigamy or polygamy . . . ,” was upheld in an opinion
that condemned plural marriage and its advocacy as equal evils.282
And, finally, the Court sustained the revocation of the charter of
278 540 U.S. at 720–21. Excluding theology students but not students training
for other professions was permissible, the Court explained, because “[t]raining some-
one to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor,” and the Constitu-
tion’s special treatment of religion finds “no counterpart with respect to other call-
ings or professions.” Id. at 721.
279 540 U.S. at 720–21 (distinguishing Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City
of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (law aimed at restricting ritual of a single religious
group); McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978) (law denying ministers the right to
serve as delegates to a constitutional convention); and Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398 (1963) (among the cases prohibiting denial of benefits to Sabbatarians)).
280 Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1879); cf. Cleveland v. United States,
329 U.S. 14 (1946) (no religious-belief defense to Mann Act prosecution for transport-
ing a woman across state line for the “immoral purpose” of polygamy).
281 Murphy v. Ramsey, 114 U.S. 15 (1885).
282 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890). “Bigamy and polygamy are crimes by
the laws of all civilized and Christian countries. . . . To call their advocacy a tenet
of religion is to offend the common sense of mankind. If they are crimes, then to
the Mormon Church and confiscation of all church property not ac-
tually used for religious worship or for burial. 283
In contrast to the Mormons, the sect known as Jehovah’s Wit-
nesses, in many ways as unsettling to the conventional as the Mor-
mons were,284 provoked from the Court a lengthy series of deci-
sions 285 expanding the rights of religious proselytizers and other
advocates to use the streets and parks to broadcast their ideas (though
the decisions may be based more squarely on the speech clause than
on the Free Exercise Clause). For instance, in Cantwell v. Connecti-
cut,286 three Jehovah’s Witnesses were convicted under a statute that
forbade the unlicensed soliciting of funds for religious or charitable
purposes, and also under a general charge of breach of the peace.
The solicitation count was voided as an infringement on reli-
gion because the issuing officer was authorized to inquire whether
the applicant’s cause was “a religious one” and to decline to issue a
license if he determined that it was not.287 Such power amounted
to a prior restraint upon the exercise of religion and was invalid,
the Court held.288 The breach of the peace count arose when the
three accosted two Catholics in a strongly Catholic neighborhood
and played them a phonograph record which grossly insulted the
Christian religion in general and the Catholic Church in particu-
lar. The Court voided this count under the clear-and-present dan-
teach, advise and counsel their practice is to aid in their commission, and such teach-
ing and counseling are themselves criminal and proper subjects of punishment, as
aiding and abetting crime are in all other cases.” Id. at 341–42.
283 The Late Corporation of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
United States, 136 U.S. 1 (1890). “[T]he property of the said corporation . . . [is to
be used to promote] the practice of polygamy—a crime against the laws, and abhor-
rent to the sentiments and feelings of the civilized world. . . . The organization of a
community for the spread and practice of polygamy is, in a measure, a return to
barbarism. It is contrary to the spirit of Christianity and of the civilization which
Christianity has produced in the Western world.” Id. at 48–49.
284 For later cases dealing with other religious groups discomfiting to the main-
stream, see Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (Hare Krishnas); Larson v. Valente,
456 U.S. 228 (1982) (Unification Church). Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v.
City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (Santeria faith).
285 Most of the cases are collected and categorized by Justice Frankfurter in
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (concurring opinion).

286 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
287 310 U.S. at 305.
288 310 U.S. at 307. “The freedom to act must have appropriate definition to
preserve the enforcement of that protection [of society]. In every case the power to
regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible end, unduly to in-
fringe the protected freedom. . . . [A] State may by general and non-discriminatory
legislation regulate the times, the places, and the manner of soliciting upon its streets,
and of holding meetings thereon; and may in other respects safeguard the peace,
good order and comfort of the community, without unconstitutionally invading the
liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 304.
ger test, finding that the interest sought to be upheld by the state
did not justify the suppression of religious views that simply an-
noyed listeners.289
A series of sometimes-conflicting decisions followed. At first, the
Court sustained the application of a non-discriminatory license fees
to vendors of religious books and pamphlets,290 but eleven months
later it vacated the decision and struck down such fees.291 A city
ordinance making it unlawful for anyone distributing literature to
ring a doorbell or otherwise summon the dwellers of a residence to
the door to receive such literature was held to violate the First Amend-
ment when applied to distributors of leaflets advertising a religious
meeting.292 A state child labor law, however, was held to be validly
applied to punish the guardian of a nine-year old child who permit-
ted her to engage in “preaching work” and the sale of religious pub-
lications after hours.293
The Court decided a number of cases involving meetings and
rallies in public parks and other public places by upholding licens-
ing and permit requirements which were premised on nondiscrimi-
natory “times, places, and manners” terms and which did not seek
to regulate the content of the religious message to be communi-
cated.294 In 2002, the Court struck down on free speech grounds a
town ordinance requiring door-to-door solicitors, including persons
seeking to proselytize about their faith, to register with the town
and obtain a solicitation permit.295 The Court stated that the re-
quirement was “offensive . . . to the very notion of a free society.”
289 310 U.S. at 307–11. “In the realm of religious faith, and in that of political
belief, sharp differences arise. In both fields the tenets of one man may seem the
rankest error to his neighbor. To persuade others to his own point of view, the pleader,
as we know, at times, resorts to exaggeration, to vilification of men who have been,
or are, prominent in church or state, and even to false statement. But the people of
this nation have ordained in the light of history, that, in spite of the probabilities of
excesses and abuses, these liberties are in the long view, essential to enlightened
opinion and right conduct on the part of the citizens of a democracy.” Id. at 310.
290 Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584 (1942).
291 Jones v. Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S.
105 (1943). See also Follett v. Town of McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944) (invalidating
a flat licensing fee for booksellers). Murdock and Follett were distinguished in Jimmy
Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 389 (1990), as
applying “only where a flat license fee operates as a prior restraint”; upheld in Swag-
gart was application of a general sales and use tax to sales of religious publications.
292 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943). But cf. Breard v. City of
Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951) (similar ordinance sustained in commercial solicita-
tion context).
293 Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
294 E.g., Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S.
290 (1951); Fowler v. Rhode Island, 345 U.S. 67 (1953); Poulos v. New Hampshire,
345 U.S. 395 (1953). See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (solicitation on
state fair ground by Unification Church members).
295 Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
Oaths and Religious Disqualifications.—In early cases the

Court sustained the power of a state to exclude from its schools
children who would not participate in the salute to the flag be-
cause of their religious beliefs,296 only to, within a short time, re-
verse itself and condemn such exclusions on speech grounds, rather
than religious.297 Also, the Court seemed to be clearly of the view
that the government could compel those persons religiously op-
posed to bearing arms to take an oath to do so or to receive train-
ing to do so,298 only in later cases to cast doubt on this resolution
by statutory interpretation,299 and still more recently to leave the
whole matter in some doubt.300
Although the Court has been divided in dealing with reli-
giously based conduct and governmental compulsion of action or nonac-
tion, it was unanimous in voiding a state constitutional provision
which required a notary public, as a condition of perfecting his ap-
pointment, to declare his belief in the existence of God. The First
Amendment, considered with the religious oath prohibition for fed-
eral officers in Article VI,301 makes it impossible “for government,
state or federal, to restore the historically and constitutionally dis-
credited policy of probing religious beliefs by test oaths or limiting
public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly, pro-
fess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious con-
cept.” 302
296 Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
297 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). On the
same day, the Court held that a state may not forbid the distribution of literature
urging and advising on religious grounds that citizens refrain from saluting the flag.
Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943). In 2004, the Court rejected for lack of
standing an Establishment Clause challenge to recitation of the Pledge of Alle-
giance in public schools. Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1
(2004).
298 See United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644 (1929); United States v. Ma-
cintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931); and United States v. Bland, 283 U.S. 636 (1931) (all
interpreting the naturalization law as denying citizenship to a conscientious objec-
tor who would not swear to bear arms in defense of the country), all three of which
were overruled by Girouard v. United States, 328 U.S. 61 (1946), on strictly statu-
tory grounds. See also Hamilton v. Board of Regents, 293 U.S. 245 (1934) (uphold-
ing expulsion from state university for a religiously based refusal to take a required
course in military training); In re Summers, 325 U.S. 561 (1945) (upholding refusal
to admit applicant to bar because as conscientious objector he could not take re-
quired oath).
299 United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965); see id. at 188 (Justice Douglas
concurring); Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970); see also id. at 344 (Justice
Harlan concurring).
300 Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437 (1971) (holding that secular consider-
ations overbalanced free exercise infringement of religious beliefs of objectors to par-

ticular wars).
301 U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 3 provides that “no religious Test shall ever be re-
quired as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.”
302 Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961).
Unanimously, but with great differences of approach, the Court

declared invalid a Tennessee statute barring ministers and priests
from service in a specially called state constitutional convention.303
The Court’s decision necessarily implied that the constitutional pro-
vision on which the statute was based, barring ministers and priests
from service as state legislators, was also invalid.
General Governmental Requirements.—Braunfeld v. Brown 304
held that the Free Exercise Clause did not mandate an exemption
from Sunday Closing Laws for an Orthodox Jewish merchant who
observed Saturday as the Sabbath and was thereby required to be
closed two days of the week rather than one. This requirement did
not prohibit any religious practices, the Court’s plurality pointed
out, but merely regulated secular activity in a manner making reli-
gious exercise more expensive.305 “If the State regulates conduct by
enacting a general law within its power, the purpose and effect of
which is to advance the State’s secular goals, the statute is valid
despite its indirect burden on religious observance unless the State
may accomplish its purpose by means which do not impose such a
burden.” 306
But, as discussed previously, within two years the Court in Sher-
bert v. Verner 307 reversed this line of analysis to require a religious
exemption from a secular, regulatory piece of economic legislation.
Sherbert was disqualified from receiving unemployment compensa-
tion because, as a Seventh Day Adventist, she would not accept Sat-
urday work; according to state officials, this meant she was not com-
plying with the statutory requirement to stand ready to accept suitable
employment. If this denial of benefits is to be upheld, the Court
said, “it must be either because her disqualification as a benefi-
303 McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618 (1978). The plurality opinion by Chief Jus-
tice Burger, joined by Justices Powell, Rehnquist, and Stevens, found the case gov-
erned by Sherbert v. Verner’s strict scrutiny test. The state had failed to show that
its view of the dangers of clergy participation in the political process had any valid-
ity; Torcaso v. Watkins was distinguished because the state was acting on the status
of being a clergyman rather than on one’s beliefs. Justice Brennan, joined by Jus-
tice Marshall, found Torcaso controlling because imposing a restriction upon one’s
status as a religious person did penalize his religious belief, his freedom to profess
or practice that belief. Id. at 629. Justice Stewart also found Torcaso dispositive, id.
at 642, and Justice White found an equal protection violation because of the re-
straint upon seeking political office. Id. at 643.
304 366 U.S. 599 (1961). See “Sunday Closing Laws,” supra, for application of
the Establishment Clause.

305 366 U.S. at 605–06.
306 366 U.S. at 607 (plurality opinion). The concurrence balanced the economic
disadvantage suffered by the Sabbatarians against the important interest of the state
in securing its day of rest regulation. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. at 512–22.
Three Justices dissented. Id. at 561 (Justice Douglas); Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S.
at 610 (Justice Brennan), 616 (Justice Stewart).
307 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
ciary represents no infringement by the State of her constitutional

rights of free exercise, or because any incidental burden on the free
exercise of appellant’s religions may be justified by a ‘compelling
state interest in the regulation of a subject within the State’s con-
stitutional power to regulate . . . .’ ” 308
First, the disqualification was held to impose a burden on the
free exercise of Sherbert’s religion; it was an indirect burden and it
did not impose a criminal sanction on a religious practice, but the
disqualification derived solely from her practice of her religion and
constituted a compulsion upon her to forgo that practice.309 Second,
there was no compelling interest demonstrated by the state. The
only interest asserted was the prevention of the possibility of fraudu-
lent claims, but that was merely a bare assertion. Even if there
was a showing of demonstrable danger, “it would plainly be incum-
bent upon the appellees to demonstrate that no alternative forms
of regulation would combat such abuses without infringing First
Amendment rights.” 310
Sherbert was reaffirmed and applied in subsequent cases involv-
ing denial of unemployment benefits. Thomas v. Review Board 311
involved a Jehovah’s Witness who quit his job when his employer
transferred him from a department making items for industrial use
to a department making parts for military equipment. While his
belief that his religion proscribed work on war materials was not
shared by all other Jehovah’s Witnesses, the Court held that it was
inappropriate to inquire into the validity of beliefs asserted to be
religious so long as the claims were made in good faith (and the
beliefs were at least arguably religious). The same result was reached
in a 1987 case, the fact that the employee’s religious conversion rather
than a job reassignment had created the conflict between work and
Sabbath observance not being considered material to the determi-
nation that free exercise rights had been burdened by the denial of
unemployment compensation.312 Also, a state may not deny unem-
ployment benefits solely because refusal to work on the Sabbath was
308 374 U.S. at 403, quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963).
309 374 U.S. at 403–06.
310 374 U.S. at 407. Braunfeld was distinguished because of “a countervailing
factor which finds no equivalent in the instant case—a strong state interest in pro-
viding one uniform day of rest for all workers.” That secular objective could be achieved,
the Court found, only by declaring Sunday to be that day of rest. Requiring exemp-
tions for Sabbatarians, while theoretically possible, appeared to present an adminis-
trative problem of such magnitude, or to afford the exempted class so great a com-
petitive advantage, that such a requirement would have rendered the entire statutory
scheme unworkable. Id. at 408–09. Other Justices thought that Sherbert overruled
Braunfeld. Id. at 413, 417 (Justice Stewart concurring), 418 (Justice Harlan and White
dissenting).
311 450 U.S. 707 (1981).
312 Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm’n, 480 U.S. 136 (1987).
based on sincere religious beliefs held independently of member-

ship in any established religious church or sect.313
The Court has applied the Sherbert balancing test in several
areas outside of unemployment compensation. The first two such
cases involved the Amish, whose religion requires them to lead a
simple life of labor and worship in a tight-knit and self-reliant com-
munity largely insulated from the materialism and other distrac-
tions of modern life. In the first, Wisconsin v. Yoder,314 the Court
held that a state compulsory attendance law, as applied to require
Amish children to attend ninth and tenth grades of public schools
in contravention of Amish religious beliefs, violated the Free Exer-
cise Clause.
The Court first determined that the beliefs of the Amish were
indeed religiously based and of great antiquity.315 Next, the Court
rejected the state’s arguments that the Free Exercise Clause ex-
tends no protection because the case involved “action” or “conduct”
rather than belief, and because the regulation, neutral on its face,
did not single out religion.316 Instead, the Court analyzed whether
a “compelling” governmental interest required such “grave interfer-
ence” with Amish belief and practices.317 The governmental inter-
est was not the general provision of education, as the state and the
Amish agreed as to education through the first eight grades and as
the Amish provided their children with additional education of a
primarily vocational nature. The state’s interest was really that of
providing two additional years of public schooling. Nothing in the
record, the Court found, showed that this interest outweighed the
great harm that it would do to traditional Amish religious beliefs
to impose the compulsory ninth and tenth grade attendance.318
But a subsequent decision involving the Amish reached a con-
trary conclusion. In United States v. Lee,319 the Court denied the
Amish exemption from compulsory participation in the Social Secu-
rity system. The objection was that payment of taxes by Amish em-
ployers and employees and the receipt of public financial assis-
tance were forbidden by their religious beliefs. Accepting that this
313 Frazee v. Illinois Dep’t of Employment Security, 489 U.S. 829 (1989). Cf. United
States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163 (1965) (interpreting the religious objection exemption
from military service as encompassing a broad range of formal and personal reli-
gious beliefs).
314 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
315 406 U.S. at 215–19. Why the Court felt impelled to make these points is
unclear, as it is settled that it is improper for courts to inquire into the interpreta-
tion of religious belief. E.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
316 406 U.S. at 219–21.
317 406 U.S. at 221.
318 406 U.S. at 221–29.
319 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
was true, the Court nonetheless held that the governmental inter-
est was compelling and therefore sufficient to justify the burdening
of religious beliefs.320 Compulsory payment of taxes was necessary
for the vitality of the system; either voluntary participation or a
pattern of exceptions would undermine its soundness and make the
program difficult to administer.
“A compelling governmental interest” was also found to out-
weigh free exercise interests in Bob Jones University v. United
States,321 in which the Court upheld the I.R.S.’s denial of tax exemp-
tions to church-run colleges whose racially discriminatory admis-
sions policies derived from religious beliefs. The Federal Govern-
ment’s “fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating racial
discrimination in education”—found to be encompassed in common
law standards of “charity” underlying conferral of the tax exemp-
tion on “charitable” institutions—“substantially outweighs” the bur-
den on free exercise. Nor could the schools’ free exercise interests
be accommodated by less restrictive means.322
In other cases, the Court found reasons not to apply compelling
interest analysis. Religiously motivated speech, like other speech,
can be subjected to reasonable time, place, or manner regulation
serving a “substantial” rather than “compelling” governmental in-
terest.323 Sherbert’s threshold test, inquiring “whether government
has placed a substantial burden on the observation of a central re-
ligious belief or practice,” 324 eliminates other issues. As long as a
particular religion does not proscribe the payment of taxes (as was
the case with the Amish in Lee), the Court has denied that there is
any constitutionally significant burden resulting from “imposition
of a generally applicable tax [that] merely decreases the amount of
money [adherents] have to spend on [their] religious activities.” 325
The one caveat the Court left—that a generally applicable tax might
320 The Court’s formulation was whether the limitation on religious exercise was
“essential to accomplish an overriding governmental interest.” 455 U.S. at 257–58.

Accord, Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699–700 (1989) (any burden on
free exercise imposed by disallowance of a tax deduction was “justified by the ‘broad
public interest in maintaining a sound tax system’ free of ‘myriad exceptions flow-
ing from a wide variety of religious beliefs’ ”).
321 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
322 461 U.S. at 604.
323 Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640 (1981). Requiring Krishnas to solicit at
fixed booth sites on county fair grounds is a valid time, place, and manner regula-
tion, although, as the Court acknowledged, id. at 652, peripatetic solicitation was
an element of Krishna religious rites.
324 As restated in Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680, 699 (1989).
325 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. California Bd. of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378,
391 (1990). See also Tony and Susan Alamo Found. v. Secretary of Labor, 471 U.S.
290 (1985) (the Court failing to perceive how application of minimum wage and over-
time requirements would burden free exercise rights of employees of a religious foun-
dation, there being no assertion that the amount of compensation was a matter of
be so onerous as to “effectively choke off an adherent’s religious prac-

tices” 326—may be a moot point in light of the Court’s general rul-
ing in Employment Division v. Smith, discussed below.
The Court also drew a distinction between governmental regu-
lation of individual conduct, on the one hand, and restraint of gov-
ernmental conduct as a result of individuals’ religious beliefs, on
the other. Sherbert’s compelling interest test has been held inappli-
cable in cases viewed as involving attempts by individuals to alter
governmental actions rather than attempts by government to re-
strict religious practices. Emphasizing the absence of coercion on
religious adherents, the Court in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cem-
etery Protective Ass’n 327 held that the Forest Service, even absent a
compelling justification, could construct a road through a portion of
a national forest held sacred and used by Indians in religious obser-
vances.
The Court distinguished between governmental actions having
the indirect effect of frustrating religious practices and those actu-
ally prohibiting religious belief or conduct: “ ‘the Free Exercise Clause
is written in terms of what the government cannot do to the indi-
vidual, not in terms of what the individual can exact from the gov-
ernment.’ ” 328 Similarly, even a sincerely held religious belief that
assignment of a social security number would rob a child of her soul
was held insufficient to bar the government from using the number
for purposes of its own recordkeeping.329 It mattered not how eas-
ily the government could accommodate the religious beliefs or prac-
tices (an exemption from the social security number requirement
might have been granted with only slight impact on the govern-
ment’s recordkeeping capabilities), since the nature of the govern-
mental actions did not implicate free exercise protections.330
Compelling interest analysis is also wholly inapplicable in the
context of military rules and regulations, where First Amendment
review “is far more deferential than . . . review of similar laws or
regulations designed for civilian society.” 331 Thus the Court did not
religious import); and Hernandez v. Commissioner, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (questioning
but not deciding whether any burden was imposed by administrative disallowal of a
deduction for payments deemed to be for commercial rather than religious or chari-
table purposes).
326 Jimmy Swaggart Ministries, 493 U.S. at 392.
327 485 U.S. 439 (1988).
328 485 U.S. at 451, quoting Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 412 (1963) (Doug-
las, J., concurring).

329 Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
330 “In neither case . . . would the affected individuals be coerced by the Govern-
ment’s action into violating their religious beliefs; nor would either governmental
action penalize religious activity.” Lyng, 485 U.S. at 449.
331 Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503, 507 (1986).
question the decision of military authorities to apply uniform dress

code standards to prohibit the wearing of a yarmulke by an officer
compelled by his Orthodox Jewish religious beliefs to wear the yar-
mulke.332
A high degree of deference is also due decisions of prison admin-
istrators having the effect of restricting religious exercise by in-
mates. The general rule is that prison regulations impinging on ex-
ercise of constitutional rights by inmates are “ ‘valid if . . . reasonably
related to legitimate penological interests.’ ” 333 Thus because gen-
eral prison rules requiring a particular category of inmates to work
outside of buildings where religious services were held, and prohib-
iting return to the buildings during the work day, could be viewed
as reasonably related to legitimate penological concerns of security
and order, no exemption was required to permit Muslim inmates to
participate in Jumu’ah, the core ceremony of their religion.334 The
fact that the inmates were left with no alternative means of attend-
ing Jumu’ah was not dispositive, the Court being “unwilling to hold
that prison officials are required by the Constitution to sacrifice le-
gitimate penological objectives to that end.” 335
Finally, in Employment Division v. Smith 336 the Court indi-
cated that the compelling interest test may apply only in the field
of unemployment compensation, and in any event does not apply to
require exemptions from generally applicable criminal laws. Crimi-
nal laws are “generally applicable” when they apply across the board
regardless of the religious motivation of the prohibited conduct, and
are “not specifically directed at . . . religious practices.” 337 The un-
employment compensation statute at issue in Sherbert was pecu-
liarly suited to application of a balancing test because denial of ben-
efits required a finding that an applicant had refused work “without
good cause.” Sherbert and other unemployment compensation cases
thus “stand for the proposition that where the State has in place a
332 Congress reacted swiftly by enacting a provision allowing military personnel
to wear religious apparel while in uniform, subject to exceptions to be made by the

Secretary of the relevant military department for circumstances in which the ap-
parel would interfere with performance of military duties or would not be “neat and
conservative.” Pub. L. 100–180, § 508(a)(2), 101 Stat. 1086 (1987); 10 U.S.C. § 774.
333 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342, 349 (1987) (quoting Turner v. Safley,
482 U.S. 78, 89 (1987)).

334 O’Lone v. Estate of Shabazz, 482 U.S. 342 (1987).
335 482 U.S. at 351–52 (also suggesting that the ability of the inmates to en-
gage in other activities required by their faith, e.g., individual prayer and obser-
vance of Ramadan, rendered the restriction reasonable).
336 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (holding that state may apply criminal penalties to use
of peyote in a religious ceremony, and may deny unemployment benefits to persons

dismissed from their jobs because of religiously inspired use of peyote).
337 494 U.S. at 878.
system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that

system to cases of ‘religious hardship’ without compelling rea-
son.” 338
Wisconsin v. Yoder and other decisions holding “that the First
Amendment bars application of a neutral, generally applicable law
to religiously motivated action” were distinguished as involving “not
the Free Exercise Clause alone, but the Free Exercise Clause in
conjunction with other constitutional protections” such as free speech
or “parental rights.” 339 Except in the relatively uncommon circum-
stance when a statute calls for individualized consideration, the Free
Exercise Clause affords no basis for exemption from a “neutral, gen-
erally applicable law.” As the Court concluded in Smith, accommo-
dation for religious practices incompatible with general require-
ments must ordinarily be found in “the political process.” 340
Smith has potentially widespread ramifications. The Court has
apparently returned to a belief-conduct dichotomy under which re-
ligiously motivated conduct is not entitled to special protection. Laws
may not single out religiously motivated conduct for adverse treat-
ment,341 but formally neutral laws of general applicability may regu-
late religious conduct (along with other conduct) regardless of the
adverse or prohibitory effects on religious exercise. That the Court
views the principle as a general one, not limited to criminal laws,
seems evident from its restatement in Church of Lukumi Babalu
Aye v. City of Hialeah: “our cases establish the general proposition
that a law that is neutral and of general application need not be
justified by a compelling governmental interest even if the law has
the incidental effect of burdening a particular religious prac-
tice.” 342
Similar rules govern taxation. Under the Court’s rulings in Smith
and Swaggart, religious exemptions from most taxes are a matter
of legislative grace rather than constitutional command, since most
important taxes (e.g., income, property, sales and use) satisfy the
criteria of formal neutrality and general applicability, and are not
license fees that can be viewed as prior restraints on expression.343
338 494 U.S. at 884.
339 494 U.S. at 881.
340 494 U.S. at 890.
341 This much was made clear by Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hia-
leah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993), which struck down a city ordinance that prohibited ritual
animal sacrifice but that allowed other forms of animal slaughter.
342 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
343 This latter condition derives from the fact that the Court in Swaggart distin-
guished earlier decisions by characterizing them as applying only to flat license fees.
493 U.S. at 386. See also Laycock, The Remnants of Free Exercise, 1990 SUP. CT. REV.
1, 39–41.
The result is equal protection, but not substantive protection, for

religious exercise.344 The Court’s approach also accords less protec-
tion to religiously based conduct than is accorded expressive con-
duct that implicates speech but not religious values.345 On the prac-
tical side, relegation of free exercise claims to the political process
may, as concurring Justice O’Connor warned, result in less protec-
tion for small, unpopular religious sects.346
It does appear that, despite Smith, the Court is still inclined to
void the application of generally applicable laws to religious con-
duct when the prohibited activity is engaged in, not by an indi-
vidual adherant, but by a religious institution. For instance, in
Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC,347
the Court established a “ministerial exception” that precludes the
application of employment discrimination laws 348 to claims arising
out of an employment relationship between a religious institution
and its ministers.349 The Court found that even where such law is
a “valid and neutral law of general applicability,” and even if the
basis for the employment decision is not religious doctrine, the Free
Exercise Clause prohibits the application of an employment discrimi-
nation law, since enforcement of such law would involve “govern-
ment interference with an internal church decision that affects the
faith and mission of the church itself.” 350
Because of the broad ramifications of Smith, the political pro-
cesses were soon used in an attempt to provide additional legisla-
tive protection for religious exercise. In the Religious Freedom Res-
toration Act of 1993 (RFRA),351 Congress sought to supersede Smith
and substitute a statutory rule of decision for free exercise cases.
344 Justice O’Connor, concurring in Smith, argued that “the Free Exercise Clause
protects values distinct from those protected by the Equal Protection Clause.” 494
U.S. at 901.
345 Although neutral laws affecting expressive conduct are not measured by a
“compelling interest” test, they are “subject to a balancing, rather than categorical,
approach.” Smith, 494 U.S. at 902 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
346 494 U.S. at 902–03.
347 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–553, slip op. (2012).
348 In this case, the employee, who suffered from narcolepsy, alleged that she
had been fired in retaliation for threatening to bring a legal action against the church
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, 104 Stat. 327, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.
349 An important issue in the case was determining when an employee of a reli-
gious institution was a “minister.” The Court declined to create a uniform standard,
but suggested deference to the position of the religious institution in making such a
determinination. In this case, a “called” elementary school teacher (as opposed to a
“contract” teacher) was found to be a “minister” based on her title, the religious edu-
cation qualifications required for the position, how the church and the employee rep-
resented her position to others, and the religious functions performed by the em-
ployee as part of her job responsibilities. 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–553, slip op. at 15–
20.
350 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–553, slip op. at 15.
351 Pub. L. 103–141, 107 Stat. 1488 (1993); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb–4.
The Act provides that laws of general applicability—federal, state,

and local—may substantially burden free exercise of religion only
if they further a compelling governmental interest and constitute
the least restrictive means of doing so. The purpose, Congress de-
clared in the Act itself, was “to restore the compelling interest test
as set forth in Sherbert v. Verner and Wisconsin v. Yoder and to guar-
antee its application in all cases where free exercise of religion is
substantially burdened.” 352 But this legislative effort was partially
frustrated in 1997 when the Court in City of Boerne v. Flores 353
held the Act unconstitutional as applied to the states.
In applying RFRA to the states, Congress had exercised its power
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enact “appropriate leg-
islation” to enforce the substantive protections of the Amendment,
including the religious liberty protections incorporated in the Due
Process Clause. But the Court held that RFRA exceeded Congress’s
power under § 5, because the measure did not simply enforce a con-
stitutional right but substantively altered that right. “Congress,” the
Court said, “does not enforce a constitutional right by changing what
the right is.” 354 Moreover, it said, RFRA “reflects a lack of propor-
tionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legiti-
mate end to be achieved . . . [and] is a considerable congressional
intrusion into the States’ traditional prerogatives and general au-
thority to regulate for the health and welfare of their citizens.” 355
“RFRA,” the Court concluded, “contradicts vital principles neces-
sary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.” 356
Boerne did not close the books on Smith, however, or even on
RFRA. Although Boerne held that RFRA was not a valid exercise of
Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power as applied to restrict states,
it remained an open issue whether RFRA may be applied to the
Federal Government, and whether its requirements could be im-
posed pursuant to other powers. Several lower courts answered these
questions affirmatively,357 and the Supreme Court has applied RFRA
to the Federal Government without addressing any constitutional
questions.358
352 Pub. L. 103–141, § 2(b)(1) (citations omitted). Congress also avowed a pur-
pose of providing “a claim or defense to persons whose religious exercise is substan-

tially burdened by government.” § 2(b)(2).
353 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
354 521 U.S. at 519.
355 521 U.S. at 533–34.
356 521 U.S. at 536.
357 See, e.g., In re Young, 141 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 811
(1998) (RFRA is a valid exercise of Congress’s bankruptcy powers as applied to insu-

late a debtor’s church tithes from recovery by the bankruptcy trustee); O’Bryan v.
Congress responded to Boerne by enacting a new law purport-

ing to rest on its commerce and spending powers. The Religious Land
Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA) 359 imposes the same
strict scrutiny test struck down in Boerne but limits its application
to certain land use regulations and to religious exercise by persons
in state institutions.360 In Cutter v. Wilkinson,361 the Court upheld
RLUIPA’s prisoner provision against a facial challenge under the
Establishment Clause, but it did not rule on congressional power
to enact RLUIPA. The Court held that RLUIPA “does not, on its
face, exceed the limits of permissible government accommodation
of religious practices.” 362 Rather, the provision “fits within the cor-
ridor” between the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses, and
is “compatible with the [latter] because it alleviates exceptional
government-created burdens on private religious exercise.” 363
Corporations.—The issue of what free exercise rights are avail-
able to corporations came before the Court in Burwell v. Hobby
Lobby.364 In 2010, Congress passed the Patient Protection and Af-
fordable Care Act (“ACA”),365 which requires employers with fifty
or more employees to provide their employees with a minimum level
of health insurance, including, under agency guidelines, “[a]ll Food
and Drug Administration approved contraceptive methods, steriliza-
tion procedures, and patient education and counseling for women
with reproductive capacity.” 366 The plaintiffs in this case included
three closely-held corporations, one owned by a family who are mem-
bers of the Mennonite Church and two owned by members of a Pen-
tecostal Christian family. Based on their religious beliefs, the plain-
Bureau of Prisons, 349 F.3d 399 (7th Cir. 2003) (RFRA may be applied to require
the Bureau of Prisons to accommodate religious exercise by prisoners); Kikumura v.
Hurley, 242 F.3d 950 (10th Cir. 2001) (RFRA applies to Bureau of Prisons).
358 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418
(2006) (affirming preliminary injunction issued under RFRA against enforcement of

the Controlled Substances Act to prevent the drinking of a sacramental tea that
contains a hallucinogen regulated under the Act).
359 Pub. L. 106–274, 114 Stat. 804 (2000); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc et seq.
360 The Act requires that state and local zoning and landmark laws and regula-
tions which impose a substantial burden on an individual’s or institution’s exercise

of religion be measured by a strict scrutiny test, and applies the same strict scru-
tiny test for any substantial burdens imposed on the exercise of religion by persons
institutionalized in state or locally run prisons, mental hospitals, juvenile detention
facilities, and nursing homes. Both provisions apply if the burden is imposed in a
program that receives federal financial assistance, or if the burden or its removal
would affect commerce.
361 544 U.S. 709 (2005).
362 544 U.S. at 714.
363 544 U.S. at 720.
364 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–354, slip op. (2014).
365 Pub. L. No. 111–148 (2010).
366 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725 (Feb. 15, 2012) (alterations in original) (internal quo-
tation marks omitted).

tiffs did not wish to provide insurance coverage to their employees

for “emergency contraception” drugs, as those contraceptives may
prevent the implantation of fertilized eggs. They argued that en-
forcement of this portion of the ACA against their corporations is a
violation of their right to free exercise and of RFRA.367
The Court decided the case under RFRA, finding that Congress
had intended the statute to allow religious claims made by, at a
minimum, closely-held corporations.368 Its analysis, however, is sug-
gestive of the larger question of whether a corporation can be said
to engage in constitutionally protected religious activities. In Hobby
Lobby, the Court noted that it had previously entertained free-
exercise claims brought by nonprofit corporations such as churches,369
and that there was no reason (at least under RFRA) to distinguish
nonprofit corporations from for-profit corporations.370 As to the ques-
tion of whether a corporate form can “exercise religion,” the Court
held that allowing a closely-held corporations to bring a suit under
RFRA helped to protect the religious liberties of the plaintiffs.
The Court rejected the argument that profit-making by a corpo-
ration precludes a finding that the corporations were “exercising re-
ligion,” noting that regulation of single proprietor for-profit busi-
nesses had been found in previous cases to implicate the employers’
free exercise rights.371 The Court also noted that organizations with
religious or charitable goals might organize as for-profit corpora-
tions because of the potential benefits of that corporate form.372 The
Court did note that difficulties could arise in ascertaining the sin-
cere “beliefs” of large, publicly traded corporations such as IBM or
367 See discussion of RFRA under General Governmental Requirements, supra.

368 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–354, slip op. at 19–30.
369 See Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v. EEOC, 565
U.S. ___, No. 10–553, slip op. (2012); Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hia-
leah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
370 RFRA applies to a “person’s” exercise of religion, 42 U.S.C. §§2000bb-1(a),
(b), and the Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. §1, generally provides that the word “person”
includes “corporations, companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies, and
joint stock companies, as well as individuals.”
371 Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605 (1961)(Sunday closing law “operates
so as to make the practice of . . . religious beliefs” of Orthodox Jewish merchants

more expensive); United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982) (“compulsory partici-
pation in the social security system interferes with [Amish employers’] free exercise
rights”).
372 For instance, the for-profit corporate form might give an organization the
freedom to participate in lobbying for legislation or campaigning for political candi-

dates who promote their religious or charitable goals.
General Electric,” 373 but held that this concern was not at issue
regarding the closely-held corporations before the Court, whose own-
er’s religious beliefs had not been disputed.374
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION—SPEECH AND PRESS
Adoption and the Common Law Background

Madison’s version of the speech and press clauses, introduced
in the House of Representatives on June 8, 1789, provided: “The
people shall not be deprived or abridged of their right to speak, to
write, or to publish their sentiments; and the freedom of the press,
as one of the great bulwarks of liberty, shall be inviolable.” 375 The
special committee rewrote the language to some extent, adding other
provisions from Madison’s draft, to make it read: “The freedom of
speech and of the press, and the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and consult for their common good, and to apply to the
government for redress of grievances, shall not be infringed.” 376 In
this form it went to the Senate, which rewrote it to read: “That
Congress shall make no law abridging the freedom of speech, or of
the press, or the right of the people peaceably to assemble and con-
sult for their common good, and to petition the government for a
redress of grievances.” 377 Subsequently, the religion clauses and these
clauses were combined by the Senate.378 The final language was agreed
upon in conference.
Debate in the House is unenlightening with regard to the mean-
ing the Members ascribed to the speech and press clause, and there
is no record of debate in the Senate.379 In the course of debate, Madi-
son warned against the dangers that would arise “from discussing
373 The dissent, in an opinion authored by Justice Ginsburg, noted that the ma-
jority would rely on state corporate law to resolve disputes among corporate owners
over religious values and accommodations, despite the majority having elsewhere
suggested that “courts have no business addressing [whether an asserted religious
belief] is substantial,” 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–354, slip op. at 19–20 (Ginsburg, J., dis-
senting) quoting slip op. at 36.
374 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–354, slip op. at 58.
375 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434 (1789). Madison had also proposed language limit-
ing the power of the states in a number of respects, including a guarantee of free-
dom of the press. Id. at 435. Although passed by the House, the amendment was
defeated by the Senate. See “Amendments to the Constitution, Bill of Rights and
the States,” supra.
376 Id. at 731 (August 15, 1789).
377 THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1148–49 (B. Schwartz ed. 1971).
378 Id. at 1153.
379 The House debate insofar as it touched upon this amendment was con-
cerned almost exclusively with a motion to strike the right to assemble and an amend-
ment to add a right of the people to instruct their Representatives. 1 ANNALS OF CON-
GRESS 731–749 (August 15, 1789). There are no records of debates in the states on
ratification.
and proposing abstract propositions, of which the judgment may not

be convinced. I venture to say, that if we confine ourselves to an
enumeration of simple, acknowledged principles, the ratification will
meet with but little difficulty.” 380 That the “simple, acknowledged
principles” embodied in the First Amendment have occasioned con-
troversy without end both in the courts and out should alert one to
the difficulties latent in such spare language.
Insofar as there is likely to have been a consensus, it was no
doubt the common law view as expressed by Blackstone. “The lib-
erty of the press is indeed essential to the nature of a free state;
but this consists in laying no previous restraints upon publications,
and not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when pub-
lished. Every freeman has an undoubted right to lay what senti-
ments he pleases before the public; to forbid this, is to destroy the
freedom of the press: but if he publishes what is improper, mischie-
vous, or illegal, he must take the consequences of his own temerity.
To subject the press to the restrictive power of a licenser, as was
formerly done, both before and since the Revolution, is to subject
all freedom of sentiment to the prejudices of one man, and make
him the arbitrary and infallible judge of all controverted points in
learning, religion and government. But to punish as the law does
at present any dangerous or offensive writings, which, when pub-
lished, shall on a fair and impartial trial be adjudged of a perni-
cious tendency, is necessary for the preservation of peace and good
order, of government and religion, the only solid foundations of civil
liberty. Thus, the will of individuals is still left free: the abuse only
of that free will is the object of legal punishment. Neither is any
restraint hereby laid upon freedom of thought or inquiry; liberty of
private sentiment is still left; the disseminating, or making public,
of bad sentiments, destructive to the ends of society, is the crime
which society corrects.” 381
Whatever the general unanimity on this proposition at the time
of the proposal of and ratification of the First Amendment,382 it ap-
380 Id. at 738.
381 4 W. BLACKSTONE’S COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 151–52 (T. Cooley, 2d
rev. ed. 1872). See 3 J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
1874–86 (1833). The most comprehensive effort to assess theory and practice in the
period prior to and immediately following adoption of the Amendment is L. LEVY,
LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN HISTORY (1960),
which generally concluded that the Blackstonian view was the prevailing one at the
time and probably the understanding of those who drafted, voted for, and ratified
the Amendment.
382 It would appear that Madison advanced libertarian views earlier than his
Jeffersonian compatriots, as witness his leadership of a move to refuse officially to

concur in Washington’s condemnation of “[c]ertain self-created societies,” by which
the President meant political clubs supporting the French Revolution, and his suc-
pears that there emerged in the course of the Jeffersonian counter-

attack on the Sedition Act 383 and the use by the Adams Administra-
tion of the Act to prosecute its political opponents,384 something of
a libertarian theory of freedom of speech and press,385 which, how-
ever much the Jeffersonians may have departed from it upon assum-
ing power,386 was to blossom into the theory undergirding Supreme
Court First Amendment jurisprudence in modern times. Full accep-
tance of the theory that the Amendment operates not only to bar
most prior restraints of expression but subsequent punishment of
cess in deflecting the Federalist intention to censure such societies. I. BRANT, JAMES
MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION 1787–1800 at 416–20 (1950). “If we advert to the
nature of republican government,” Madison told the House, “we shall find that the
censorial power is in the people over the government, and not in the government
over the people.” 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 934 (1794). On the other hand, the early Madi-
son, while a member of his county’s committee on public safety, had enthusiastically
promoted prosecution of Loyalist speakers and the burning of their pamphlets dur-
ing the Revolutionary period. 1 PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 147, 161–62, 190–92 (W.
Hutchinson & W. Rachal, eds., 1962). There seems little doubt that Jefferson held to
the Blackstonian view. Writing to Madison in 1788, he said: “A declaration that the
Federal Government will never restrain the presses from printing anything they please,
will not take away the liability of the printers for false facts printed.” 13 PAPERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON 442 (J. Boyd ed., 1955). Commenting a year later to Madison on
his proposed amendment, Jefferson suggested that the free speech-free press clause
might read something like: “The people shall not be deprived or abridged of their
right to speak, to write or otherwise to publish anything but false facts affecting
injuriously the life, liberty, property, or reputation of others or affecting the peace of
the confederacy with foreign nations.” 15 PAPERS, supra, at 367.
383 The Act, 1 Stat. 596 (1798), punished anyone who would “write, print, utter
or publish . . . any false, scandalous and malicious writing or writings against the
government of the United States, or either house of the Congress of the United States,
or the President of the United States, with intent to defame the said government,
or either house of the said Congress, or the said President, or to bring them, or
either of them, into contempt or disrepute.” See J. SMITH, FREEDOM’S FETTERS: THE ALIEN
AND SEDITION LAWS AND AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES (1956).
384 Id. at 159 et seq.
385 L. LEVY, LEGACY OF SUPPRESSION: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS IN EARLY AMERICAN
HISTORY ch. 6 (1960); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 273–76 (1964).
But compare L. LEVY, EMERGENCE OF A FREE PRESS (1985), a revised and enlarged edi-
tion of LEGACY OF EXPRESSION, in which Professor Levy modifies his earlier views, ar-
guing that while the intention of the Framers to outlaw the crime of seditious libel,
in pursuit of a free speech principle, cannot be established and may not have been
the goal, there was a tradition of robust and rowdy expression during the period of
the framing that contradicts his prior view that a modern theory of free expression
did not begin to emerge until the debate over the Alien and Sedition Acts.
386 L. LEVY, JEFFERSON AND CIVIL LIBERTIES: THE DARKER SIDE (1963). Thus President
Jefferson wrote to Governor McKean of Pennsylvania in 1803: “The federalists hav-

ing failed in destroying freedom of the press by their gag-law, seem to have at-
tacked it in an opposite direction; that is, by pushing its licentiousness and its lying
to such a degree of prostitution as to deprive it of all credit. . . . This is a danger-
ous state of things, and the press ought to be restored to its credibility if possible.
The restraints provided by the laws of the States are sufficient for this if applied.
And I have, therefore, long thought that a few prosecutions of the most prominent
offenders would have a wholesome effect in restoring the integrity of the presses.
Not a general prosecution, for that would look like persecution; but a selected one.”
9 WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 449 (P. Ford ed., 1905).
all but a narrow range of expression, in political discourse and in-

deed in all fields of expression, dates from a quite recent period,
although the Court’s movement toward that position began in its
consideration of limitations on speech and press in the period fol-
lowing World War I.387 Thus, in 1907, Justice Holmes could ob-
serve that, even if the Fourteenth Amendment embodied prohibi-
tions similar to the First Amendment, “still we should be far from
the conclusion that the plaintiff in error would have us reach. In
the first place, the main purpose of such constitutional provisions
is ‘to prevent all such previous restraints upon publications as had
been practiced by other governments,’ and they do not prevent the
subsequent punishment of such as may be deemed contrary to the
public welfare. The preliminary freedom extends as well to the false
as to the true; the subsequent punishment may extend as well to
the true as to the false. This was the law of criminal libel apart
from statute in most cases, if not in all.” 388 But as Justice Holmes
387 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), provides the principal
doctrinal justification for the development, although the results had long since been
fully applied by the Court. In Sullivan, Justice Brennan discerned in the controver-
sies over the Sedition Act a crystallization of “a national awareness of the central
meaning of the First Amendment,” id. at 273, which is that the “right of free public
discussion of the stewardship of public officials . . . [is] a fundamental principle of
the American form of government.” Id. at 275. This “central meaning” proscribes
either civil or criminal punishment for any but the most maliciously, knowingly false
criticism of government. “Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court,
the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of history. . . . [The
historical record] reflect[s] a broad consensus that the Act, because of the restraint
it imposed upon criticism of government and public officials, was inconsistent with
the First Amendment.” Id. at 276. Madison’s Virginia Resolutions of 1798 and his
Report in support of them brought together and expressed the theories being devel-
oped by the Jeffersonians and represent a solid doctrinal foundation for the point of
view that the First Amendment superseded the common law on speech and press,
that a free, popular government cannot be libeled, and that the First Amendment
absolutely protects speech and press. 6 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 341–406 (G. Hunt
ed., 1908).
388 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 462 (1907) (emphasis in original, cita-
tion omitted). Justice Frankfurter had similar views in 1951: “The historic anteced-
ents of the First Amendment preclude the notion that its purpose was to give un-
qualified immunity to every expression that touched on matters within the range of
political interest. . . . ‘The law is perfectly well settled,’ this Court said over fifty
years ago, ‘that the first ten amendments to the Constitution, commonly known as
the Bill of Rights, were not intended to lay down any novel principles of govern-
ment, but simply to embody certain guaranties and immunities which we had inher-
ited from our English ancestors, and which had from time immemorial been subject
to certain well-recognized exceptions arising from the necessities of the case. In in-
corporating these principles into the fundamental law there was no intention of dis-
regarding the exceptions, which continued to be recognized as if they had been for-
mally expressed.’ Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281. That this represents the
authentic view of the Bill of Rights and the spirit in which it must be construed has
been recognized again and again in cases that have come here within the last fifty
years.” Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 521–522, 524 (1951) (concurring opin-
ion).
also observed, “[t]here is no constitutional right to have all general

propositions of law once adopted remain unchanged.” 389
But, in Schenck v. United States,390 the first of the post-World
War I cases to reach the Court, Justice Holmes, in his opinion for
the Court upholding convictions for violating the Espionage Act by
attempting to cause insubordination in the military service by cir-
culation of leaflets, suggested First Amendment restraints on sub-
sequent punishment as well as on prior restraint. “It well may be
that the prohibition of laws abridging the freedom of speech is not
confined to previous restraints, although to prevent them may have
been the main purpose . . . . We admit that in many places and in
ordinary times the defendants in saying all that was said in the
circular would have been within their constitutional rights. But the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it
is done. . . . The most stringent protection of free speech would not
protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and causing a
panic. . . . The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such a nature as to create a clear and present danger
that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent.”
Justice Holmes, along with Justice Brandeis, soon went into dis-
sent in their views that the majority of the Court was misapplying
the legal standards thus expressed to uphold suppression of speech
that offered no threat to organized institutions.391 But it was with
the Court’s assumption that the Fourteenth Amendment restrained
the power of the states to suppress speech and press that the doc-
trines developed.392 At first, Holmes and Brandeis remained in dis-
sent, but, in Fiske v. Kansas,393 the Court sustained a First Amend-
ment type of claim in a state case, and in Stromberg v. California,394
voided a state statute on grounds of its interference with free speech.395
389 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, 461 (1907).
390 249 U.S. 47, 51–52 (1919) (citations omitted).
391 Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919); Abrams v. United States, 250
U.S. 616 (1919); Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466 (1920); Pierce v. United
States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920); United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Pub.
Co. v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921). A state statute similar to the federal one was
upheld in Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325 (1920).
392 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S.
357 (1927). The Brandeis and Holmes dissents in both cases were important formu-
lations of speech and press principles.
393 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
394 283 U.S. 359 (1931). By contrast, it was not until 1965 that a federal statute
was held unconstitutional under the First Amendment. Lamont v. Postmaster Gen-
eral, 381 U.S. 301 (1965). See also United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
395 See also Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697 (1931); Herndon v.
Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Lovell v. City
of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
State common law was also voided, with the Court in an opinion
by Justice Black asserting that the First Amendment enlarged pro-
tections for speech, press, and religion beyond those enjoyed under
English common law.396
Development over the years since has been uneven, but by 1964
the Court could say with unanimity: “we consider this case against
the background of a profound national commitment to the principle
that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open, and that it may well include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public offi-
cials.” 397 And, in 1969, the Court said that the cases “have fashioned
the principle that the constitutional guarantees of free speech and
free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe advocacy of
the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely
to incite or produce such action.” 398 This development and its myriad
applications are elaborated in the following sections.
The First Amendment by its terms applies only to laws enacted
by Congress, and not to the actions of private persons.399 This leads
to a “state action” (or “governmental action”) limitation similar to
that applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment.400 The limitation has
seldom been litigated in the First Amendment context, but there is
no obvious reason why analysis should differ markedly from Four-
teenth Amendment state action analysis. Both contexts require “cau-
tious analysis of the quality and degree of Government relation-
ship to the particular acts in question.” 401 In holding that the National
Railroad Passenger Corporation (Amtrak) is a governmental entity
for purposes of the First Amendment, the Court declared that “[t]he
Constitution constrains governmental action ‘by whatever instru-
ments or in whatever modes that action may be taken’ . . . [a]nd
under whatever congressional label.” 402 The relationship of the gov-
396 Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 263–68 (1941) (overturning contempt con-
victions of newspaper editor and others for publishing commentary on pending cases).
397 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
398 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
399 Through interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment, the prohibition ex-
tends to the states as well. See discussion on incorporation under Fourteenth Amend-
ment, infra. Of course, the First Amendment also applies to the non-legislative branches
of government—to every “government agency—local, state, or federal.” Herbert v.
Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 168 n.16 (1979).
400 See discussion on state action under the Fourteenth Amendment, infra.
401 CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm, 412 U.S. 94, 115 (1973) (opinion of Chief
Justice Burger).
402 Lebron v. National R.R. Passenger Corp., 513 U.S. 374, 392 (1995) (quoting
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 346–47 (1880)). The Court refused to be bound by
the statement in Amtrak’s authorizing statute that the corporation is “not . . . an
agency or establishment of the United States Government.” This assertion can be
ernment to broadcast licensees affords other opportunities to ex-

plore the breadth of “governmental action.” 403
Freedom of Expression: The Philosophical Basis

Probably no other provision of the Constitution has given rise
to so many different views with respect to its underlying philosophi-
cal foundations, and hence proper interpretive framework, as has
the guanantee of freedom of expression.404 The argument has been
fought out among the commentators. “The outstanding fact about
the First Amendment today is that the Supreme Court has never
developed any comprehensive theory of what that constitutional guar-
antee means and how it should be applied in concrete cases.” 405
Some commentators argue on behalf of a complex of values, none
of which by itself is sufficient to support a broad-based protection
of freedom of expression.406 Others would limit the basis of the First
effective only “for purposes of matters that are within Congress’s control,” the Court
explained. “[I]t is not for Congress to make the final determination of Amtrak’s sta-
tus as a Government entity for purposes of determining the constitutional rights of
citizens affected by its actions.” 513 U.S. at 392.
403 In CBS v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), the Court held that
a broadcast licensee could refuse to carry a paid editorial advertisement. Chief Jus-
tice Burger, joined only by Justices Stewart and Rehnquist in that portion of his
opinion, reasoned that a licensee’s refusal to accept such an ad did not constitute
“governmental action” for purposes of the First Amendment. “The First Amendment
does not reach acts of private parties in every instance where the Congress or the
[Federal Communications] Commission has merely permitted or failed to prohibit
such acts.” Id. at 119.
404 Although “expression” is not found in the text of the First Amendment, it is
used herein, first, as a shorthand term for the freedoms of speech, press, assembly,
petition, association, and the like, that are covered by the Amendment, and, second,
as a recognition of the fact that judicial interpretation of the clauses of the First
Amendment has greatly enlarged the definition commonly associated with “speech,”
as the following discussion will reveal. The term seems well settled, see, e.g., T. EM-
ERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION (1970), although it has been criticized. F.
SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY 50–52 (1982). The term also, as used
here, conflates the speech and press clauses, explicitly assuming they are governed
by the same standards of interpretation and that, in fact, the press clause itself
adds nothing significant to the speech clause as interpreted, an assumption briefly
defended in the next topic.
405 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 15 (1970). The practice in
the Court is largely to itemize all the possible values the First Amendment has been
said to protect. See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 530, 534–35 (1980);
First Nati’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77 (1978).
406 T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 6–7 (1970). For Emerson,
the four values are (1) assuring individuals self-fulfillment, (2) promoting discovery
of truth, (3) providing for participation in decisionmaking by all members of society,
and (4) promoting social stability through discussion and compromise of differences.
For a persuasive argument in favor of an “eclectic” approach, see Shriffrin, The First
Amendment and Economic Regulation: Away From a General Theory of the First Amend-
ment, 78 NW. U.L. REV. 1212 (1983). A compressive discussion of all the theories may
be found in F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY (1982).
Amendment to only one among a constellation of possible values

and would therefore limit the coverage or the degree of protection
of the speech and press clauses.
For example, one school of thought believes that, because of the
constitutional commitment to free self-government, only political speech
is within the core protected area,407 although some commentators
tend to define more broadly the concept of “political” than one might
suppose from the word alone. Others recur to the writings of Mil-
ton and Mill and argue that protecting speech, even speech in er-
ror, is necessary for the eventual ascertainment of the truth through
the conflict of ideas in the marketplace—a view skeptical of our abil-
ity ever to know the truth.408 A broader-grounded view is ex-
pounded by scholars who argue that freedom of expression is neces-
sary to promote individual self-fulfillment—that, when speech is freely
chosen by the speaker to persuade others, it defines and expresses
the speaker ’s “self ” and promotes his liberty 409 and “self-
realization” by enabling him to develop his powers and abilities and
to make and influence decisions regarding his destiny.410 The litera-
ture is enormous and no doubt the Justices as well as the larger
society are influenced by it, and yet the decisions, probably in large
part because they are the collective determination of nine individu-
als, seldom clearly reflect a principled and consistent acceptance of
any philosophy.
Freedom of Expression: Is There a Difference Between

Speech and Press?
Use of the single word “expression” to reach speech, press, peti-
tion, association, and the like, raises the question of whether the
free speech clause and the free press clause are coextensive, or whether
407 E.g., A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Bork, Neutral Principles and
Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971); BeVier, The First Amend-
ment and Political Speech: An Inquiry Into the Substance and Limits of Principle,
30 STAN. L. REV. 299 (1978). This contention does not reflect the Supreme Court’s
view. “It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment ‘was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.’ . . . But our cases have never
suggested that expression about philosophical, social, artistic, economic, literary, or
ethical matters—to take a nonexclusive list of labels—is not entitled to full First
Amendment protection.” Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 231 (1977).
408 The “marketplace of ideas” metaphor is attributable to Justice Holmes’ opin-
ion in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919). See Scanlon, Freedom of
Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. PITT. L. REV. 519 (1979). The theory
has been the dominant one in scholarly and judicial writings. Baker, Scope of the
First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV. 964, 967–74 (1978).
409 E.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Process of Change and the Liberty Theory of the
First Amendment, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 293 (1982); C. Edwin Baker, Realizing Self-
Realization: Corporate Political Expenditures and Redish’s The Value of Free Speech,
130 U. PA. L. REV. 646 (1982).
410 Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982).
one reaches where the other does not. It has been much debated,
for example, whether the “institutional press” is entitled to greater
freedom from governmental regulations or restrictions than are non-
press individuals, groups, or associations. Justice Stewart has ar-
gued: “That the First Amendment speaks separately of freedom of
speech and freedom of the press is no constitutional accident, but
an acknowledgment of the critical role played by the press in Ameri-
can society. The Constitution requires sensitivity to that role, and
to the special needs of the press in performing it effectively.” 411 But,
as Chief Justice Burger wrote: “The Court has not yet squarely re-
solved whether the Press Clause confers upon the ‘institutional press’
any freedom from government restraint not enjoyed by all oth-
ers.” 412
Several Court holdings do firmly point to the conclusion that
the press clause does not confer on the press the power to compel
government to furnish information or otherwise give the press ac-
cess to information that the public generally does not have.413 Nor,
in many respects, is the press entitled to treatment different in kind
from the treatment to which any other member of the public may
be subjected.414 “Generally applicable laws do not offend the First
Amendment simply because their enforcement against the press has
incidental effects.” 415 Yet, it does seem clear that, to some extent,
the press, because of its role in disseminating news and informa-
tion, is entitled to deference that others are not entitled to—that
its role constitutionally entitles it to governmental “sensitivity,” to
use Justice Stewart’s word.416 What difference such “sensitivity” might
make in deciding cases is difficult to say.
411 Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1, 17 (1978) (concurring opinion). Justice Stew-
art initiated the debate in a speech, subsequently reprinted as Stewart, Or of the

Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631 (1975). Other articles are cited in First National Bank
of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Chief Justice Burger concurring).
412 435 U.S. at 798. The Chief Justice’s conclusion was that the institutional
press had no special privilege as the press.

413 Houchins v. KQED, 438 U.S. 1 (1978), and id. at 16 (Justice Stewart concur-
ring); Saxbe v. Washington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S.
817 (1974); Nixon v. Warner Communications, 435 U.S. 589 (1978). The trial access
cases, whatever they may precisely turn out to mean, recognize a right of access of
both public and press to trials. Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
414 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665 (1972) (grand jury testimony be newspa-
per reporter); Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978) (search of newspaper
offices); Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979) (defamation by press); Cohen v. Cowles
Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 (1991) (newspaper’s breach of promise of confidentiality).
415 Cohen v. Cowles Media, 501 U.S. 663, 669 (1991).
416 E.g., Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974); Landmark Com-
munications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). See also Zurcher v. Stanford Daily,
436 U.S. 547, 563–67 (1978), and id. at 568 (Justice Powell concurring); Branzburg
v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 709 (1972) (Justice Powell concurring). Several concurring
opinions in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. (1980), imply recognition of
The most interesting possibility lies in the First Amendment pro-

tection of good-faith defamation.417 Justice Stewart argued that the
Sullivan privilege is exclusively a free press right, denying that the
“constitutional theory of free speech gives an individual any immu-
nity from liability for libel or slander.” 418 To be sure, in all the cases
to date that the Supreme Court has resolved, the defendant has
been, in some manner, of the press,419 but the Court’s decision in
First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti that corporations are en-
titled to assert First Amendment speech guarantees against fed-
eral and, through the Fourteenth Amendment, state, regulations causes
the evaporation of the supposed “conflict” between speech clause pro-
tection of individuals only and press clause protection of press cor-
porations as well as of press individuals.420 The issue, the Court
wrote in Bellotti, was not what constitutional rights corporations
have but whether the speech that is being restricted is protected
by the First Amendment because of its societal significance. Be-
cause the speech in Bellotti concerned the enunciation of views on
the conduct of governmental affairs, it was protected regardless of
its source; while the First Amendment protects and fosters indi-
vidual self-expression as a worthy goal, it also and as importantly
affords the public access to discussion, debate, and the dissemina-
tion of information and ideas. Despite Bellotti’s emphasis upon the
some right of the press to gather information that apparently may not be wholly
inhibited by nondiscriminatory constraints. Id. at 582–84 (Justice Stevens), 586 n.2
(Justice Brennan), 599 n.2 (Justice Stewart). Yet the Court has also suggested that
the press is protected in order to promote and to protect the exercise of free speech
in society at large, including peoples’ interest in receiving information. E.g., Mills v.
Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966); CBS v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394–95 (1981).
417 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See discussion of “Defa-
mation,” infra.
418 Stewart, Or of the Press, 26 HASTINGS L. J. 631, 633–35 (1975).
419 In Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 133 n.16 (1979), the Court noted
that it has never decided whether the Times standard applies to an individual defen-
dant. Some think they discern in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974),
intimations of such leanings by the Court.
420 435 U.S. 765 (1978). The decision, addressing a question not previously con-
fronted, was 5-to-4. Justice Rehnquist would have recognized no protected First Amend-
ment rights of corporations because, as entities entirely the creation of state law,
they were not to be accorded rights enjoyed by natural persons. Id. at 822. Justices
White, Brennan, and Marshall thought the First Amendment implicated but not disposi-
tive because of the state interests asserted. Id. at 802. Previous decisions recogniz-
ing corporate free speech had involved either press corporations, id. at 781–83; see
also id. at 795 (Chief Justice Burger concurring), or corporations organized espe-
cially to promote the ideological and associational interests of their members. E.g.,
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
political nature of the contested speech, it is clear that the same

principle—the right of the public to receive information—governs
nonpolitical, corporate speech.421
With some qualifications, therefore, the speech and press clauses
may be analyzed under an umbrella “expression” standard, with little,
if any, hazard of missing significant doctrinal differences.
The Doctrine of Prior Restraint

“[L]iberty of the press, historically considered and taken up by
the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally although not exclu-
sively, immunity from previous restraints or censorship.” 422 “Any
system of prior restraints of expression comes to this Court bear-
ing a heavy presumption against its constitutional validity.” 423 Gov-
ernment “thus carries a heavy burden of showing justification for
the imposition of such a restraint.” 424 Under the English licensing
system, which expired in 1695, all printing presses and printers were
licensed and nothing could be published without prior approval of
the state or church authorities. The great struggle for liberty of the
press was for the right to publish without a license what for a long
time could be published only with a license.425
The United States Supreme Court’s first encounter with a law
imposing a prior restraint came in Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Ol-
son,426 in which a five-to-four majority voided a law authorizing the
permanent enjoining of future violations by any newspaper or peri-
odical once found to have published or circulated an “obscene, lewd
and lascivious” or a “malicious, scandalous and defamatory” issue.
An injunction had been issued after the newspaper in question had
printed a series of articles tying local officials to gangsters. Al-
though the dissenters maintained that the injunction constituted
no prior restraint, because that doctrine applied to prohibitions of
publication without advance approval of an executive official,427 the
majority deemed it “the essence of censorship” that, in order to avoid
a contempt citation, the newspaper would have to clear future pub-
421 Commercial speech when engaged in by a corporation is subject to the same
standards of protection as when natural persons engage in it. Consolidated Edison

Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 530, 533–35 (1980). Nor does the status of a corporation as a
government-regulated monopoly alter the treatment. Id. at 534 n.1; Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 566–68 (1980).
422 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931).
423 Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
424 Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415, 419 (1971); New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971).
425 Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 713–14 (1931); Lovell v. Grif-
fin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).

426 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
427 283 U.S. at 723, 733–36 (Justice Butler dissenting).
lications in advance with the judge.428 Liberty of the press to scru-

tinize closely the conduct of public affairs was essential, said Chief
Justice Hughes for the Court. “[T]he administration of government
has become more complex, the opportunities for malfeasance and
corruption have multiplied, crime has grown to most serious propor-
tions, and the danger of its protection by unfaithful officials and of
the impairment of the fundamental security of life and property by
criminal alliances and official neglect, emphasizes the primary need
of a vigilant and courageous press, especially in great cities. The
fact that the liberty of the press may be abused by miscreant pur-
veyors of scandal does not make any the less necessary the immu-
nity of the press from previous restraint in dealing with official mis-
conduct. Subsequent punishment for such abuses as may exist is
the appropriate remedy, consistent with constitutional privi-
lege.” 429 The Court did not explore the kinds of restrictions to which
the term “prior restraint” would apply, nor do more than assert that
only in “exceptional cases” would prior restraint be permissible.430
Nor did subsequent cases substantially illuminate the murky
interior of the doctrine. The doctrine of prior restraint was called
upon by the Court as it struck down restrictions on First Amend-
ment rights, including a series of loosely drawn statutes and ordi-
nances requiring licenses to hold meetings and parades and to dis-
tribute literature, with uncontrolled discretion in the licensor whether
or not to issue them.431 The doctrine that generally emerged was
that permit systems and prior licensing are constitutionally valid
428 283 U.S. at 713.

429 283 U.S. at 719–20.
430 283 U.S. at 716.
431 E.g., Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S.
268 (1951); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). For other applications, see
Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233 (1936); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319
U.S. 105 (1943); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).
so long as the discretion of the issuing official was limited to ques-

tions of time, place, and manner.432 “[O]nly content-based injunc-
tions are subject to prior restraint analysis.” 433
The most recent Court encounter with the doctrine in the na-
tional security area occurred when the government attempted to en-
join press publication of classified documents pertaining to the Viet-
nam War 434 and, although the Court rejected the effort, at least
five and perhaps six Justices concurred on principle that, in some
circumstances, prior restraint of publication would be constitu-
tional.435 But no cohesive doctrine relating to the subject, its appli-
cations, and its exceptions has emerged.
The Supreme Court has written that “[t]he special vice of a prior
restraint is that communication will be suppressed . . . before an
432 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345
U.S. 395 (1953). In Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175
(1968), the Court held invalid the issuance of an ex parte injunction to restrain the
holding of a protest meeting, holding that usually notice must be given the parties
to be restrained and an opportunity for them to rebut the contentions presented to
justify the sought-for restraint. In Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402
U.S. 415 (1971), the Court held invalid as a prior restraint an injunction preventing
the petitioners from distributing 18,000 pamphlets attacking respondent’s alleged
“blockbusting” real estate activities; he was held not to have borne the “heavy bur-
den” of justifying the restraint. “No prior decisions support the claim that the inter-
est of an individual in being free from public criticism of his business practices in
pamphlets or leaflets warrants use of the injunctive power of a court. Designating
the conduct as an invasion of privacy . . . is not sufficient to support an injunction
against peaceful distribution of informational literature of the nature revealed by
this record.” Id. at 419–20. See also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing
Co., 486 U.S. 750 (1988) (ordinance vesting in the mayor unbridled discretion to
grant or deny annual permit for location of newsracks on public property is facially
invalid as prior restraint).
The necessity of immediate appellate review of orders restraining the exercise
of First Amendment rights was strongly emphasized in National Socialist Party v.
Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977), and seems to explain the Court’s action in
Philadelphia Newspapers v. Jerome, 434 U.S. 241 (1978). But see Moreland v. Sprecher,
443 U.S. 709 (1979) (party can relinquish right to expedited review through failure
to properly request it).
433 DVD Copy Control Association, Inc. v. Bunner, 75 P.3d 1, 17 (Cal. 2003) (“[a]
prior restraint is a content-based restriction on speech prior to its occurrence,” id. at

17–18). Regarding the standard for content-neutral injunctions, see “Public Issue Pick-
eting and Parading,” infra.
434 New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971). The vote was
6-to-3, with Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Marshall in the
majority and Chief Justice Burger and Justices Harlan and Blackmun in the minor-
ity. Each Justice issued an opinion.
435 The three dissenters thought such restraint appropriate in this case. Id. at
748, 752, 759. Justice Stewart thought restraint would be proper if disclosure “will
surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable damage to our Nation or its people,”
id. at 730, while Justice White did not endorse any specific phrasing of a standard.
Id. at 730–33. Justice Brennan would preclude even interim restraint except upon
“governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly, and
immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the safety of a
transport already at sea.” Id. at 712–13.
adequate determination that it is unprotected by the First Amend-

ment.” 436 The prohibition on prior restraint, thus, is essentially a
limitation on restraints until a final judicial determination that the
restricted speech is not protected by the First Amendment. It is a
limitation, for example, against temporary restraining orders and
preliminary injunctions pending final judgment, not against perma-
nent injunctions after a final judgment is made that the restricted
speech is not protected by the First Amendment.437
The Supreme Court has also written “that traditional prior re-
straint doctrine may not apply to [commercial speech],” 438 and “[t]he
vast majority of [federal] circuits . . . do not apply the doctrine of
prior restraint to commercial speech.” 439 “Some circuits [however]
have explicitly indicated that the requirement of procedural safe-
guards in the context of a prior restraint indeed applies to commer-
cial speech.” 440 In addition, prior restraint is generally permitted,
even in the form of preliminary injunctions, in intellectual prop-
erty cases, such as those for infringements of copyright or trade-
mark.441
Injunctions and the Press in Fair Trial Cases.—Confront-
ing a claimed conflict between free press and fair trial guarantees,
The same issues were raised in United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp.
990 (W.D. Wis. 1979), in which the United States obtained an injunction prohibiting
publication of an article it claimed would reveal information about nuclear weap-
ons, thereby increasing the dangers of nuclear proliferation. The injunction was lifted
when the same information was published elsewhere and thus there was no appel-
late review of the order.
With respect to the right of the Central Intelligence Agency to prepublication
review of the writings of former agents and its enforcement through contractual re-
lationships, see Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980); Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. v.
Colby, 509 F.2d 1362 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 992 (1975); United States v.
Marchetti, 446 F.2d 1309 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1063 (1972).
436 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Commission on Human Relations, 413 U.S.
376, 390 (1973); see also Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308, 315–316
(1980) (“the burden of supporting an injunction against a future exhibition [of alleg-
edly obscene motion pictures] is even heavier than the burden of justifying the im-
position of a criminal sanction for a past communication”).
437 See Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions
in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke Law Journal 147, 169–171 (1998).

438 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), citing Vir-
ginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748,
772 n.24 (1976).
439 Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 930 (N.D. Ohio 2004).
440 New York Magazine v. Metropolitan Transportation Authority, 136 F.3d 123,
131 (2d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 824 (1998), citing Desert Outdoor Adver. v.
City of Moreno Valley, 103 F.3d 814, 818 (9th Cir. 1996); In re Search of Kitty’s
East, 905 F.2d 1367, 1371–72 & n.4 (10th Cir. 1990).
441 See Bosley v. WildWetT.com, 310 F. Supp. 2d 914, 930 (N.D. Ohio 2004). See
also Mark A. Lemley and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Injunctions in In-
tellectual Property Cases, 48 Duke Law Journal 147 (1998) (arguing that intellec-
tual property should have the same First Amendment protection from preliminary
injunctions that other speech does).
the Court unanimously set aside a state court injunction barring

the publication of information that might prejudice the subsequent
trial of a criminal defendant.442 Though agreed as to the result, the
Justices were divided as to whether “gag orders” were ever permis-
sible and if so what the standards for imposing them were. The Court
used the Learned Hand formulation of the “clear and present dan-
ger” test 443 and considered as factors in any decision on the impo-
sition of a restraint upon press reporters “(a) the nature and ex-
tent of pretrial news coverage; (b) whether other measures would
be likely to mitigate the effects of unrestrained pretrial publicity;
and (c) how effectively a restraining order would operate to pre-
vent the threatened danger.” 444 Though the Court found that one
seeking a restraining order must meet “the heavy burden of demon-
strating, in advance of trial, that without a prior restraint a fair
trial would be denied,” it refused to “rule out the possibility of show-
ing the kind of threat to fair trial rights that would possess the
requisite degree of certainty to justify restraint.” 445 Justice Bren-
nan’s concurring opinion flatly took the position that such restrain-
ing orders were never permissible. Commentary and reporting on
the criminal justice system is at the core of First Amendment val-
ues, he would have held, and secrecy can do so much harm “that
there can be no prohibition on the publication by the press of any
information pertaining to pending judicial proceedings or the opera-
tion of the criminal justice system, no matter how shabby the means
by which the information is obtained.” 446 The only circumstance in
which prior restraint of protected speech might be permissible is
when publication would cause “virtually certain, direct, and imme-
442 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).

443 427 U.S. at 562, quoting Dennis v. United States, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir.
1950), aff’d, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951).
444 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976) (opinion of Chief
Justice Burger, concurred in by Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist, and, also writing
brief concurrences, Justices White and Powell). Applying the tests, the Chief Justice
agreed that (a) there was intense and pervasive pretrial publicity and more could
be expected, but that (b) the lower courts had made little effort to assess the pros-
pects of other methods of preventing or mitigating the effects of such publicity and
that (c) in any event the restraining order was unlikely to have the desired effect of
protecting the defendant’s rights. Id. at 562–67.
445 427 U.S. at 569–70. The Court distinguished between reporting on judicial
proceedings held in public and reporting of information gained from other sources,
but found that a heavy burden must be met to secure a prior restraint on either. Id.
at 570. See also Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. District Court, 430 U.S. 308 (1977) (setting
aside injunction restraining news media from publishing name of juvenile involved
in pending proceeding when name has been learned at open detention hearing that
could have been closed but was not); Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
446 427 U.S. at 572, 588. Justices Stewart and Marshall joined this opinion and
Justice Stevens noted his general agreement except that he reserved decision in par-
ticularly egregious situations, even though stating that he might well agree with
diate” national harm, Justice Brennan continued, but “the harm to

a fair trial that might otherwise eventuate from publications which
are suppressed . . . must inherently remain speculative.” 447 Al-
though the result in the case does not foreclose the possibility of
future “gag orders,” it does lessen the number to be expected and
shifts the focus to other alternatives for protecting trial rights.448
On a different level, however, are orders that restrain the press as
a party to litigation in the dissemination of information obtained
through pretrial discovery. In Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart,449 the
Court determined that such orders protecting parties from abuses
of discovery require “no heightened First Amendment scrutiny.” 450
Obscenity and Prior Restraint.—Only in the obscenity area
has there emerged a substantial consideration of the doctrine of prior
restraint, and the doctrine’s use there may be based upon the fact
that obscenity is not a protected form of expression.451 In Kingsley
Books v. Brown,452 the Court upheld a state statute that, though it
embodied some features of prior restraint, was seen as having little
more restraining effect than an ordinary criminal statute; that is,
the law’s penalties applied only after publication. But, in Times Film
Corp. v. City of Chicago,453 a divided Court specifically affirmed that,
at least in the case of motion pictures, the First Amendment did
not proscribe a licensing system under which a board of censors could
refuse to license for public exhibition films that it found obscene.
Books and periodicals may also be subjected to some forms of prior
restraint,454 but the thrust of the Court’s opinions in this area with
regard to all forms of communication has been to establish strict
standards of procedural protections to ensure that the censoring agency
Justice Brennan there also. Id. at 617. Justice White, while joining the opinion of
the Court, noted that he had grave doubts that “gag orders” could ever be justified
but he would refrain from so declaring in the Court’s first case on the issue. Id. at
570.
447 427 U.S. at 599.
448 One such alternative is the banning of communication with the press on trial
issues by prosecution and defense attorneys, police officials, and court officers. This,
of course, also raises First Amendment issues. See, e.g., Chicago Council of Lawyers
v. Bauer, 522 F.2d 242 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
449 467 U.S. 20 (1984).
450 467 U.S. at 36. The decision was unanimous, all other Justices joining Jus-
tice Powell’s opinion for the Court, but Justices Brennan and Marshall noting addi-
tionally that under the facts of the case important interests in privacy and religious
freedom were being protected. Id. at 37, 38.
451 See discussion of “Obscenity,” infra. See also Justice Brennan’s concurrence
in Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. at 590.

452 354 U.S. 436 1957). See also Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
453 365 U.S. 43 (1961). See also Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50
(1976) (zoning ordinance prescribing distances adult theaters may be located from
residential areas and other theaters is not an impermissible prior restraint).
454 Cf. Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
bears the burden of proof on obscenity, that only a judicial order

can restrain exhibition, and that a prompt final judicial decision is
assured.455
Subsequent Punishment: Clear and Present Danger and

Other Tests
Granted that the controversy over freedom of expression at the
time of the ratification of the First Amendment was limited almost
exclusively to the problem of prior restraint, nevertheless the words
speak of laws “abridging” the freedom of speech and press, and the
modern cases have been largely fought over subsequent punish-
ment. “[T]he mere exemption from previous restraints cannot be all
that is secured by the constitutional provisions, inasmuch as of words
to be uttered orally there can be no previous censorship, and the
liberty of the press might be rendered a mockery and a delusion,
and the phrase itself a byword, if, while every man was at liberty
to publish what he pleased, the public authorities might neverthe-
less punish him for harmless publications . . . .”
“[The purpose of the speech and press clause] has evidently been
to protect parties in the free publication of matters of public con-
cern, to secure their right to a free discussion of public events and
public measures, and to enable every citizen at any time to bring
the government and any person in authority to the bar of public
opinion by any just criticism upon their conduct in the exercise of
the authority which the people have conferred upon them. . . . The
evils to be prevented were not the censorship of the press merely,
but any action of the government by means of which it might pre-
455 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965); Teitel Film Corp. v. Cusack, 390
U.S. 139 (1968); Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Blount v.
Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410 (1971); United States v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363,
367–375 (1971); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975); Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S.
215, 229 (1990) (ordinance requiring licensing of “sexually oriented business” “does
not provide for an effective limitation on the time within which the licensor’s deci-
sion must be made [and] also fails to provide an avenue for prompt judicial re-
view”); City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D–4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 784 (2004) (“Where
(as here and as in FW/PBS) the regulation simply conditions the operation of an
adult business on compliance with neutral and nondiscretionary criteria . . . and
does not seek to censor content, an adult business is not entitled to an unusually
speedy judicial decision of the Freedman type”); Fort Wayne Books, Inc. v. Indiana,
489 U.S. 46 (1989) (seizure of books and films based on ex parte probable cause hear-
ing under state RICO law’s forfeiture procedures constitutes invalid prior restraint;
instead, there must be a determination in an adversarial proceeding that the mate-
rials are obscene or that a RICO violation has occurred). But cf. Alexander v. United
States, 509 U.S. 544 (1993) (RICO forfeiture of the entire adult entertainment book
and film business of an individual convicted of obscenity and racketeering offenses,
based on the predicate acts of selling four magazines and three videotapes, does not
constitute a prior restraint and is not invalid as “chilling” protected expression that
is not obscene).
vent such free and general discussion of public matters as seems

absolutely essential to prepare the people for an intelligent exer-
cise of their rights as citizens.” 456 A rule of law permitting criminal
or civil liability to be imposed upon those who speak or write on
public issues would lead to self-censorship, which would not be re-
lieved by permitting a defense of truth. “Under such a rule, would-be
critics of official conduct may be deterred from voicing their criti-
cism, even though it is believed to be true and even though it is in
fact true, because of doubt whether it can be proved in court or
fear of the expense of having to do so . . . . The rule thus dampens
the vigor and limits the variety of public debate.” 457
“Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me per-
fectly logical. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power
and want a certain result with all your heart you naturally express
your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposi-
tion by speech seems to indicate that you think the speech impo-
tent, as when a man says that he has squared the circle, or that
you do not care whole-heartedly for the result, or that you doubt
either your power or your premises. But when men have realized
that time has upset many fighting faiths, they may come to believe
even more than they believe the very foundations of their own con-
duct that the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade
in ideas—that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to
get itself accepted in the competition of the market, and that truth
is the only ground upon which their wishes safely can be carried
out. That at any rate is the theory of our Constitution.” 458 “Those
who won our independence believed that the final end of the State
was to make men free to develop their faculties; and that in its
government the deliberative forces should prevail over the arbi-
trary. They valued liberty both as an end and as a means. They
believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the
secret of liberty. They believed that freedom to think as you will
and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discov-
ery and spread of political truth; that without free speech and as-
sembly discussion would be futile; that with them, discussion af-
fords ordinarily adequate protection against the dissemination of
noxious doctrine; that the greatest menace to freedom is an inert
people; that public discussion is a political duty; and that this should
456 2 T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 885–86 (8th ed. 1927).
457 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279 (1964). See also Speiser
v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 (1958); Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153–54 (1959);
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 389 (1967).
458 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Justice Holmes dissent-
ing).
be a fundamental principle of the American government. They rec-

ognized the risks to which all human institutions are subject. But
they knew that order cannot be secured merely through fear of pun-
ishment for its infraction; that it is hazardous to discourage thought,
hope and imagination; that fear breeds repression; that repression
breeds hate; that hate menaces stable government; that the path
of safety lies in the opportunity to discuss freely supposed griev-
ances and proposed remedies; and that the fitting remedy for evil
counsels is good ones. Believing in the power of reason as applied
through public discussion, they eschewed silence coerced by law—
the argument of force in its worst form. Recognizing the occasional
tyrannies of governing majorities, they amended the Constitution
so that free speech and assembly should be guaranteed.” 459
“But, although the rights of free speech and assembly are fun-
damental, they are not in their nature absolute. Their exercise is
subject to restriction, if the particular restriction proposed is re-
quired in order to protect the State from destruction or from seri-
ous injury, political, economic or moral.” 460 The fixing of a stan-
dard is necessary, by which to determine what degree of evil is
“sufficiently substantial to justify resort to abridgment of speech and
press and assembly as a means of protection” and how clear and
imminent and likely the danger is.461 That standard has fluctuated
over the years, as the cases discussed below demonstrate.
Clear and Present Danger.—Certain expression, oral or writ-
ten, may incite, urge, counsel, advocate, or importune the commis-
sion of criminal conduct; other expression, such as picketing, dem-
onstrating, and engaging in certain forms of “symbolic” action, may
either counsel the commission of criminal conduct or itself consti-
tute criminal conduct. Leaving aside for the moment the problem
of “speech-plus” communication, it becomes necessary to determine
when expression that may be a nexus to criminal conduct is sub-
ject to punishment and restraint. At first, the Court seemed dis-
posed in the few cases reaching it to rule that if the conduct could
be made criminal, the advocacy of or promotion of the conduct could
be made criminal.462 Then, in Schenck v. United States,463 in which
the defendants had been convicted of seeking to disrupt recruit-
ment of military personnel by disseminating leaflets, Justice Holmes
formulated the “clear and present danger” test that has ever since
been the starting point of argument. “The question in every case is
459 Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375–76 (1927) (Justice Brandeis concur-
ring).
460 274 U.S. at 373.
461 274 U.S. at 374.
462 Davis v. Beason, 133 U.S. 333 (1890); Fox v. Washington, 236 U.S. 273 (1915).
463 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of
such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they
will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to
prevent. It is a question of proximity and degree.” 464 The convic-
tions were unanimously affirmed. One week later, the Court again
unanimously affirmed convictions under the same act with Justice
Holmes writing, “we think it necessary to add to what has been
said in Schenck v. United States only that the First Amendment
while prohibiting legislation against free speech as such cannot have
been, and obviously was not, intended to give immunity for every
possible use of language. We venture to believe that neither Hamil-
ton nor Madison, nor any other competent person then or later, ever
supposed that to make criminal the counselling of a murder within
the jurisdiction of Congress would be an unconstitutional interfer-
ence with free speech.” 465 And, in Debs v. United States,466 Justice
Holmes upheld a conviction because “the natural and intended ef-
fect” and the “reasonably probable effect” of the speech for which
the defendant was prosecuted was to obstruct military recruiting.
In Abrams v. United States,467 however, Justices Holmes and
Brandeis dissented upon affirmance of the convictions of several alien
anarchists who had printed leaflets seeking to encourage discon-
tent with the United States’ participation in World War I. The ma-
jority simply referred to Schenck and Frohwerk to rebut the First
Amendment argument, but the dissenters urged that the govern-
ment had made no showing of a clear and present danger. Another
affirmance by the Court of a conviction, the majority simply saying
that “[t]he tendency of the articles and their efficacy were enough
for the offense,” drew a similar dissent.468 Moreover, in Gitlow v.
New York,469 a conviction for distributing a manifesto in violation
of a law making it criminal to advocate, advise, or teach the duty,
necessity, or propriety of overthrowing organized government by force
or violence, the Court affirmed in the absence of any evidence re-
garding the effect of the distribution and in the absence of any con-
tention that it created any immediate threat to the security of the
state. In so doing, the Court discarded Holmes’ test. “It is clear that
the question in such cases [as this] is entirely different from that
involved in those cases where the statute merely prohibits certain
acts involving the danger of substantive evil, without any reference
464 249 U.S. at 52.
465 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 206 (1919) (citations omitted).
466 249 U.S. 211, 215–16 (1919).
467 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
468 Schaefer v. United States, 251 U.S. 466, 479 (1920). See also Pierce v. United
States, 252 U.S. 239 (1920).

469 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
to language itself, and it is sought to apply its provisions to lan-

guage used by the defendant for the purpose of bringing about the
prohibited results. . . . In such cases it has been held that the gen-
eral provisions of the statute may be constitutionally applied to the
specific utterance of the defendant if its natural tendency and prob-
able effect was to bring about the substantive evil which the legis-
lative body might prevent. . . . And the general statement in the
Schenck Case . . . was manifestly intended . . . to apply only in cases
of this class, and has no application to those like the present, where
the legislative body itself has previously determined the danger of
substantive evil arising from utterances of a specified charac-
ter.” 470 Thus, a state legislative determination “that utterances ad-
vocating the overthrow of organized government by force, violence
and unlawful means, are so inimical to the general welfare and in-
volve such danger of substantive evil that they may be penalized
in the exercise of its police power” was almost conclusive to the
Court.471 It is not clear what test, if any, the majority would have
used, although the “bad tendency” test has usually been associated
with the case. In Whitney v. California,472 the Court affirmed a con-
viction under a criminal syndicalism statute based on the defen-
dant’s association with and membership in an organization that ad-
vocated the commission of illegal acts, finding again that the
determination of a legislature that such advocacy involves “danger
to the public peace and the security of the State” was entitled to
almost conclusive weight. In a technical concurrence, which was in
fact a dissent from the opinion of the Court, Justice Brandeis re-
stated the “clear and present danger” test. “[E]ven advocacy of vio-
lation [of the law] . . . is not a justification for denying free speech
where the advocacy fails short of incitement and there is nothing
to indicate that the advocacy would be immediately acted on. . . .
In order to support a finding of clear and present danger it must
be shown either that immediate serious violence was to be ex-
470 268 U.S. at 670–71.

471 268 U.S. at 668. Justice Holmes dissented. “If what I think the correct test
is applied, it is manifest that there was no present danger of an attempt to over-
throw the government by force on the part of the admittedly small minority who
shared the defendant’s views. It is said that this manifesto was more than a theory,
that it was an incitement. Every idea is an incitement. It offers itself for belief and
if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure of
energy stifles the movement at its birth. The only difference between the expression
of an opinion and an incitement in the narrower sense is the speaker’s enthusiasm
for the result. Eloquence may set fire to reason. But whatever may be thought of
the redundant discourse before us it had no chance of starting a present conflagra-
tion. If in the long run the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined
to be accepted by the dominant forces of the community, the only meaning of free
speech is that they should be given their chance and have their way.” Id. at 673.
472 274 U.S. 357, 371 (1927).
pected or was advocated, or that the past conduct furnished reason

to believe that such advocacy was then contemplated.” 473
The Adoption of Clear and Present Danger.—The Court did
not invariably affirm convictions during this period in cases like those
under consideration. In Fiske v. Kansas,474 it held that a criminal
syndicalism law had been invalidly applied to convict one against
whom the only evidence was the “class struggle” language of the
constitution of the organization to which he belonged. A conviction
for violating a “red flag” law was voided because the statute was
found unconstitutionally vague.475 Neither case mentioned clear and
present danger. An “incitement” test seemed to underlie the opin-
ion in DeJonge v. Oregon,476 upsetting a conviction under a crimi-
nal syndicalism statute for attending a meeting held under the aus-
pices of an organization that was said to advocate violence as a political
method, although the meeting was orderly and no violence was ad-
vocated during it. In Herndon v. Lowry,477 the Court narrowly re-
jected the contention that the standard of guilt could be made the
“dangerous tendency” of one’s words, and indicated that the power
of a state to abridge speech “even of utterances of a defined charac-
ter must find its justification in a reasonable apprehension of dan-
ger to organized government.”
Finally, in Thornhill v. Alabama,478 a state anti-picketing law
was invalidated because “no clear and present danger of destruc-
tion of life or property, or invasion of the right of privacy, or breach
of the peace can be thought to be inherent in the activities of every
person who approaches the premises of an employer and publicizes
the facts of a labor dispute involving the latter.” During the same
term, the Court reversed the breach of the peace conviction of a
Jehovah’s Witness who had played an inflammatory phonograph re-
cord to persons on the street, the Court discerning no clear and pres-
ent danger of disorder.479
The stormiest fact situation the Court faced in applying the clear
and present danger test occurred in Terminiello v. City of Chi-
473 274 U.S. at 376.

474 274 U.S. 380 (1927).
475 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
476 299 U.S. 353 (1937). See id. at 364–65.
477 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937). At another point, clear and present danger was
alluded to without any definite indication it was the standard. Id. at 261.
478 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940). The Court admitted that the picketing did result in
economic injury to the employer, but found such injury “neither so serious nor so
imminent” as to justify restriction. The doctrine of clear and present danger was
not to play a future role in the labor picketing cases.
479 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 308 (1940).
cago,480 in which a five-to-four majority struck down a conviction

obtained after the judge instructed the jury that a breach of the
peace could be committed by speech that “stirs the public to anger,
invites dispute, brings about a condition of unrest, or creates a dis-
turbance.” “A function of free speech under our system of govern-
ment,” wrote Justice Douglas for the majority, “is to invite dispute.
It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condi-
tion of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are,
or even stirs people to anger. Speech is often provocative and chal-
lenging. It may strike at prejudices and preconceptions and have
profound unsettling effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea.
That is why freedom of speech, though not absolute, . . . is never-
theless protected against censorship or punishment, unless shown
likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious substan-
tive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance, or
unrest.” 481 The dissenters focused on the disorders that had actu-
ally occurred as a result of Terminiello’s speech, Justice Jackson say-
ing: “Rioting is a substantive evil, which I take it no one will deny
that the State and the City have the right and the duty to prevent
and punish . . . . In this case the evidence proves beyond dispute
that danger of rioting and violence in response to the speech was
clear, present and immediate.” 482 The Jackson position was soon
adopted in Feiner v. New York,483 in which Chief Justice Vinson said
that “[t]he findings of the state courts as to the existing situation
and the imminence of greater disorder coupled with petitioner’s de-
liberate defiance of the police officers convince us that we should
not reverse this conviction in the name of free speech.”
Contempt of Court and Clear and Present Danger.—The
period during which clear and present danger was the standard by
which to determine the constitutionality of governmental suppres-
sion of or punishment for expression was a brief one, extending roughly
from Thornhill to Dennis.484 But in one area it was vigorously, though
not without dispute, applied to enlarge freedom of utterance and it
is in this area that it remains viable. In early contempt-of-court cases
in which criticism of courts had been punished as contempt, the
Court generally took the position that, even if freedom of speech
and press was protected against governmental abridgment, a publi-
cation tending to obstruct the administration of justice was punish-
480 337 U.S. 1 (1949).

481 337 U.S. at 4–5.
482 337 U.S. at 25–26.
483 340 U.S. 315, 321 (1951).
484 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494 (1951).
able, irrespective of its truth.485 In Bridges v. California,486 how-

ever, in which contempt citations had been brought against a
newspaper and a labor leader for statements made about pending
judicial proceedings, Justice Black, for a five-to-four majority, be-
gan by applying the clear and present danger test, which he inter-
preted to require that “the substantive evil must be extremely seri-
ous and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances
can be punished.” 487 He noted that “[t]he substantive evil here sought
to be averted . . . appears to be double: disrespect for the judiciary;
and disorderly and unfair administration of justice.” As for the first
evil, Justice Black rejected “[t]he assumption that respect for the
judiciary can be won by shielding judges from published criticism
. . . .” 488 As for “[t]he other evil feared, disorderly and unfair ad-
ministration of justice, [it] is more plausibly associated with restrict-
ing publications which touch upon pending litigation.” But the “de-
gree of likelihood” of the evil being accomplished was not “sufficient
to justify summary punishment.” 489 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter
accepted the application of the clear and present danger, but he in-
terpreted it as meaning no more than a “reasonable tendency” test.
“Comment however forthright is one thing. Intimidation with re-
spect to specific matters still in judicial suspense, quite an-
other. . . . A publication intended to teach the judge a lesson, or to
vent spleen, or to discredit him, or to influence him in his future
conduct, would not justify exercise of the contempt power. . . . It
must refer to a matter under consideration and constitute in effect
a threat to its impartial disposition. It must be calculated to create
an atmospheric pressure incompatible with rational, impartial ad-
judication. But to interfere with justice it need not succeed. As with
other offenses, the state should be able to proscribe attempts that
fail because of the danger that attempts may succeed.” 490
A unanimous Court next struck down the contempt conviction
arising out of newspaper criticism of judicial action already taken,
although one case was pending after a second indictment. Specifi-
cally alluding to clear and present danger, while seeming to regard
it as stringent a test as Justice Black had in the prior case, Justice
Reed wrote that the danger sought to be averted, a “threat to the
impartial and orderly administration of justice,” “has not the clear-
ness and immediacy necessary to close the door of permissible pub-
485 Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454 (1907); Toledo Newspaper Co. v. United
States, 247 U.S. 402 (1918).

486 314 U.S. 252 (1941).
487 314 U.S. at 263.
488 314 U.S. at 270.
489 314 U.S. at 271.
490 314 U.S. at 291.
lic comment.” 491 Divided again, the Court a year later set aside con-
tempt convictions based on publication, while a motion for a new
trial was pending, of inaccurate and unfair accounts and an edito-
rial concerning the trial of a civil case. “The vehemence of the lan-
guage used is not alone the measure of the power to punish for con-
tempt. The fires which it kindles must constitute an imminent, and
not merely a likely, threat to the administration of justice. The dan-
ger must not be remote or even probable; it must immediately im-
peril.” 492
In Wood v. Georgia,493 the Court again divided, applying clear
and present danger to upset the contempt conviction of a sheriff
who had been cited for criticizing the recommendation of a county
court that a grand jury look into African-American bloc voting, vote
buying, and other alleged election irregularities. No showing had
been made, said Chief Justice Warren, of “a substantive evil actu-
ally designed to impede the course of justice.” The case presented
no situation in which someone was on trial, there was no judicial
proceeding pending that might be prejudiced, and the dispute was
more political than judicial.494 A unanimous Court in 1972 appar-
ently applied the standard to set aside a contempt conviction of a
defendant who, arguing his own case, alleged before the jury that
the trial judge by his bias had prejudiced his trial and that he was
a political prisoner. Though the defendant’s remarks may have been
disrespectful of the court, the Supreme Court noted that “[t]here is
no indication . . . that petitioner’s statements were uttered in a bois-
terous tone or in any wise actually disrupted the court proceeding”
and quoted its previous language about the imminence of the threat
necessary to constitute contempt.495
491 Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 336, 350 (1946). To Justice Frank-
furter, the decisive consideration was whether the judge or jury is, or presently will
be, pondering a decision that comment seeks to affect. Id. at 369.
492 Craig v. Harney, 331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947). Dissenting with Chief Justice Vinson,
Justice Frankfurter said: “We cannot say that the Texas Court could not properly
find that these newspapers asked of the judge, and instigated powerful sections of
the community to ask of the judge, that which no one has any business to ask of a
judge, except the parties and their counsel in open court, namely, that he should
decide one way rather than another.” Id. at 390. Justice Jackson also dissented. Id.
at 394. See also Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 844 (1978);
Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562–63 (1976).
493 370 U.S. 375 (1962).
494 370 U.S. at 383–85, 386–90. Dissenting, Justices Harlan and Clark thought
that the charges made by the defendant could well have influenced the grand jurors
in their deliberations and that the fact that laymen rather than judicial officers were
subject to influence should call forth a less stringent test than when the latter were
the object of comment. Id. at 395.
495 In re Little, 404 U.S. 553, 555 (1972). The language from Craig v. Harney,
331 U.S. 367, 376 (1947), is quoted in the previous paragraph of text, supra.
Clear and Present Danger Revised: Dennis.—In Dennis v.

United States,496 the Court sustained the constitutionality of the Smith
Act,497 which proscribed advocacy of the overthrow by force and vio-
lence of the government of the United States, and upheld convic-
tions under it. Dennis’ importance here is in the rewriting of the
clear and present danger test. For a plurality of four, Chief Justice
Vinson acknowledged that the Court had in recent years relied on
the Holmes-Brandeis formulation of clear and present danger with-
out actually overruling the older cases that had rejected the test;
but while clear and present danger was the proper constitutional
test, that “shorthand phrase should [not] be crystallized into a rigid
rule to be applied inflexibly without regard to the circumstances of
each case.” It was a relative concept. Many of the cases in which it
had been used to reverse convictions had turned “on the fact that
the interest which the State was attempting to protect was itself
too insubstantial to warrant restriction of speech.” 498
Here, by contrast, “[o]verthrow of the government by force and
violence is certainly a substantial enough interest for the govern-
ment to limit speech.” 499 And in combating that threat, the govern-
ment need not wait to act until the putsch is about to be executed
and the plans are set for action. “If Government is aware that a
group aiming at its overthrow is attempting to indoctrinate its mem-
bers and to commit them to a course whereby they will strike when
the leaders feel the circumstances permit, action by the govern-
ment is required.” 500 Therefore, what does the phrase “clear and
present danger” import for judgment? “Chief Judge Learned Hand,
writing for the majority below, interpreted the phrase as follows:
‘In each case [courts] must ask whether the gravity of the “evil,”
discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free speech
as is necessary to avoid the danger.’ 183 F.2d at 212. We adopt this
statement of the rule. As articulated by Chief Judge Hand, it is as
succinct and inclusive as any other we might devise at this time. It
takes into consideration those factors which we deem relevant, and
relates their significances. More we cannot expect from words.” 501
496 341 U.S. 494 (1951).
497 54 Stat. 670 (1940), 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
498 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508 (1951).
499 341 U.S. at 509.
500 341 U.S. at 508, 509.
501 341 U.S. at 510. Justice Frankfurter, concurring, adopted a balancing test,
id. at 517, discussed in the next topic. Justice Jackson appeared to proceed on a
conspiracy approach rather than one depending on advocacy. Id. at 561. Justices Black
and Douglas dissented, reasserting clear and present danger as the standard. Id. at
579, 581. Note the recurrence to the Learned Hand formulation in Nebraska Press
Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976), although the Court appeared in fact to
apply balancing.
The “gravity of the evil, discounted by its improbability” was found

to justify the convictions.502
Balancing.—Clear and present danger as a test, it seems clear,
was a pallid restriction on governmental power after Dennis, and it
virtually disappeared from the Court’s language over the next twenty
years.503 Its replacement for part of this period was the much dis-
puted “balancing” test, which made its appearance the year before
Dennis in American Communications Ass’n v. Douds.504 There the
Court sustained a law barring from access to the NLRB any labor
union if any of its officers failed to file annually an oath disclaim-
ing membership in the Communist Party and belief in the violent
overthrow of the government.505 Chief Justice Vinson, for the Court,
rejected reliance on the clear and present danger test. “Govern-
ment’s interest here is not in preventing the dissemination of Com-
munist doctrine or the holding of particular beliefs because it is feared
that unlawful action will result therefrom if free speech is prac-
ticed. Its interest is in protecting the free flow of commerce from
what Congress considers to be substantial evils of conduct that are
not the products of speech at all. Section 9(h), in other words, does
not interfere with speech because Congress fears the consequences
of speech; it regulates harmful conduct which Congress has deter-
mined is carried on by persons who may be identified by their po-
litical affiliations and beliefs. The Board does not contend that po-
litical strikes, the substantive evil at which § 9(h) is aimed, are the
502 In Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957), the Court substantially lim-
ited both the Smith Act and the Dennis case by interpreting the Act to require advo-
cacy of unlawful action, to require the urging of doing something now or in the fu-
ture, rather than merely advocacy of forcible overthrow as an abstract doctrine, and
by finding the evidence lacking to prove the former. Of Dennis, Justice Harlan wrote:
“The essence of the Dennis holding was that indoctrination of a group in prepara-
tion for future violent action, as well as exhortation to immediate action, by advo-
cacy found to be directed to ‘action for the accomplishment’ of forcible overthrow, to
violence as ‘a rule or principle of action,’ and employing ‘language of incitement,’ id.
at 511–12, is not constitutionally protected when the group is of sufficient size and
cohesiveness, is sufficiently oriented towards action, and other circumstances are such
as reasonably to justify apprehension that action will occur.” Id. at 321.
503 Cf. Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 8 (1965). See Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S.
157, 185–207 (1961) (Justice Harlan concurring).
504 339 U.S. 382 (1950). See also Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950). Balanc-
ing language was used by Justice Black in his opinion for the Court in Martin v.
City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943), but it seems not to have influenced the
decision. Similarly, in Schneider v. Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161–62 (1939), Justice
Roberts used balancing language that he apparently did not apply.
505 The law, § 9(h) of the Taft-Hartley Act, 61 Stat. 146 (1947), was repealed, 73
Stat. 525 (1959), and replaced by a section making it a criminal offense for any per-
son “who is or has been a member of the Communist Party” during the preceding
five years to serve as an officer or employee of any union. § 504, 73 Stat. 536 (1959);
29 U.S.C. § 504. It was held unconstitutional in United States v. Brown, 381 U.S.
437 (1965).
present or impending products of advocacy of the doctrines of Com-

munism or the expression of belief in overthrow of the Government
by force. On the contrary, it points out that such strikes are called
by persons who, so Congress has found, have the will and power to
do so without advocacy or persuasion that seeks acceptance in the
competition of the market.” 506
The test, rather, must be one of balancing of interests. “When
particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and
the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridge-
ment of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of these
two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the
particular circumstances presented.” 507 As the interest in the re-
striction, the government’s right to prevent political strikes and the
disruption of commerce, was much more substantial than the lim-
ited interest on the other side in view of the relative handful of
persons affected in only a partial manner, the Court perceived no
difficulty upholding the statute.508
Justice Frankfurter, in his concurring opinion in Dennis v. United
States,509 rejected the applicability of clear and present danger and
adopted a balancing test. “The demands of free speech in a demo-
cratic society as well as the interest in national security are better
served by candid and informed weighing of the competing interest,
within the confines of the judicial process, than by announcing dog-
mas too inflexible for the non-Euclidian problems to be solved.” 510
But the “careful weighing of conflicting interests” 511 not only placed
in the scale the disparately weighed interest of government in self-
preservation and the interest of defendants in advocating illegal ac-
tion, which alone would have determined the balance, it also in-
volved the Justice’s philosophy of the “confines of the judicial process”
within which the role of courts, in First Amendment litigation as
in other, is severely limited. Thus, “[f]ull responsibility” may not be
placed in the courts “to balance the relevant factors and ascertain
which interest in the circumstances [is] to prevail.” “Courts are not
representative bodies. They are not designed to be a good reflex of
a democratic society.” Rather, “[p]rimary responsibility for adjust-
ing the interests which compete in the situation before us of neces-
sity belongs to the Congress.” 512 Therefore, after considering at some
length the factors to be balanced, Justice Frankfurter concluded:
506 American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 396 (1950).
507 339 U.S. at 399.
508 339 U.S. at 400–06.
509 341 U.S. 494, 517 (1951).
510 341 U.S. at 524–25.
511 341 U.S. at 542.
512 341 U.S. at 525.
“It is not for us to decide how we would adjust the clash of inter-
ests which this case presents were the primary responsibility for
reconciling it ours. Congress has determined that the danger cre-
ated by advocacy of overthrow justifies the ensuing restriction on
freedom of speech. The determination was made after due delibera-
tion, and the seriousness of the congressional purpose is attested
by the volume of legislation passed to effectuate the same ends.” 513
Only if the balance struck by the legislature is “outside the pale of
fair judgment” 514 could the Court hold that Congress was deprived
by the Constitution of the power it had exercised.515
Thereafter, during the 1950s and the early 1960s, the Court used
the balancing test in a series of decisions in which the issues were
not, as they were not in Douds and Dennis, matters of expression
or advocacy as a threat but rather were governmental inquiries into
associations and beliefs of persons or governmental regulation of
associations of persons, based on the idea that beliefs and associa-
tions provided adequate standards for predicting future or in-
tended conduct that was within the power of government to regu-
late or to prohibit. Thus, in the leading case on balancing, Konigsberg
v. State Bar of California,516 the Court upheld the refusal of the
state to certify an applicant for admission to the bar. Required to
satisfy the Committee of Bar Examiners that he was of “good moral
character,” Konigsberg testified that he did not believe in the vio-
lent overthrow of the government and that he had never know-
ingly been a member of any organization that advocated such ac-
tion, but he declined to answer any question pertaining to membership
in the Communist Party.
For the Court, Justice Harlan began by asserting that freedom
of speech and association were not absolutes but were subject to
various limitations. Among the limitations, “general regulatory stat-
utes, not intended to control the content of speech but incidentally
limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type
of law the First or Fourteenth Amendment forbade Congress or the
States to pass, when they have been found justified by subordinat-
ing valid governmental interests, a prerequisite to constitutionality
which has necessarily involved a weighing of the governmental in-
terest involved.” 517 The governmental interest involved was the as-
surance that those admitted to the practice of law were committed
to lawful change in society and it was proper for the state to be-
513 341 U.S. at 550–51.
514 341 U.S. at 540.
515 341 U.S. at 551.
516 366 U.S. 36 (1961).
517 366 U.S. at 50–51.
lieve that one possessed of “a belief, firm enough to be carried over

into advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form” of
government did not meet the standard of fitness.518 On the other
hand, the First Amendment interest was limited because there was
“minimal effect upon free association occasioned by compulsory dis-
closure” under the circumstances. “There is here no likelihood that
deterrence of association may result from foreseeable private ac-
tion . . . for bar committee interrogations such as this are con-
ducted in private. . . . Nor is there the possibility that the State
may be afforded the opportunity for imposing undetectable arbi-
trary consequences upon protected association . . . for a bar appli-
cant’s exclusion by reason of Communist Party membership is sub-
ject to judicial review, including ultimate review by this Court, should
it appear that such exclusion has rested on substantive or proce-
dural factors that do not comport with the Federal Constitu-
tion.” 519
Balancing was used to sustain congressional and state inqui-
ries into the associations and activities of individuals in connection
with allegations of subversion 520 and to sustain proceedings against
the Communist Party and its members.521 In certain other cases,
involving state attempts to compel the production of membership
lists of the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
and to investigate that organization, use of the balancing test re-
sulted in a finding that speech and associational rights outweighed
the governmental interest claimed.522 The Court used a balancing
test in the late 1960s to protect the speech rights of a public em-
ployee who had criticized his employers.523 Balancing, however, was
not used when the Court struck down restrictions on receipt of ma-
terials mailed from Communist countries,524 and it was not used in
cases involving picketing, pamphleteering, and demonstrating in pub-
518 366 U.S. at 52.

519 366 U.S. at 52–53. See also In re Anastaplo, 366 U.S. 82 (1961). The status
of these two cases is in doubt after Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), and In re
Stolar, 401 U.S. 23 (1971), in which neither the plurality nor the concurring Justice
making up the majority used a balancing test.
520 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72 (1959); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 (1961).
521 Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 367 U.S. 1 (1961);
Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961).

522 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investiga-
tion Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
523 Pickering v. Board of Education, 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
524 Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965).
lic places.525 But the only case in which it was specifically rejected
involved a statutory regulation like those that had given rise to the
test in the first place. United States v. Robel 526 held invalid under
the First Amendment a statute that made it unlawful for any mem-
ber of an organization that the Subversive Activities Control Board
had ordered to register to work in a defense establishment.527 Al-
though Chief Justice Warren for the Court asserted that the vice of
the law was that its proscription operated per se “without any need
to establish that an individual’s association poses the threat feared
by the Government in proscribing it,” 528 the rationale of the deci-
sion was not clear and present danger but the existence of less re-
strictive means by which the governmental interest could be accom-
plished.529 In a concluding footnote, the Court said: “It has been
suggested that this case should be decided by ‘balancing’ the gov-
ernmental interests . . . against the First Amendment rights as-
serted by the appellee. This we decline to do. We recognize that both
interests are substantial, but we deem it inappropriate for this Court
to label one as being more important or more substantial than the
other. Our inquiry is more circumscribed. Faced with a clear con-
flict between a federal statute enacted in the interests of national
security and an individual’s exercise of his First Amendment rights,
we have confined our analysis to whether Congress has adopted a
constitutional means in achieving its concededly legitimate legisla-
tive goal. In making this determination we have found it necessary
to measure the validity of the means adopted by Congress against
both the goal it has sought to achieve and the specific prohibitions
of the First Amendment. But we have in no way ‘balanced’ those
respective interests. We have ruled only that the Constitution re-
quires that the conflict between congressional power and indi-
vidual rights be accommodated by legislation drawn more narrowly
to avoid the conflict.” 530
The “Absolutist” View of the First Amendment, With a Note
on “Preferred Position”.—During much of this period, the opposi-
tion to the balancing test was led by Justices Black and Douglas,
who espoused what may be called an “absolutist” position, denying
525 E.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 and 559 (1965) (2 cases); Edwards v.
South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Brown
v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966). But see Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972),
where balancing reappears and in which other considerations overbalance the First
Amendment claims.
526 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
527 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 5(a)(1)(D), 64 Stat. 992, 50 U.S.C.
§ 784(a)(1)(D).
528 United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967).
529 389 U.S. at 265–68.
530 389 U.S. at 268 n.20.
the government any power to abridge speech. But the beginnings

of such a philosophy may be gleaned in much earlier cases in which
a rule of decision based on a preference for First Amendment liber-
ties was prescribed. Thus, Chief Justice Stone in his famous Carolene
Products “footnote 4” suggested that the ordinary presumption of
constitutionality that prevailed when economic regulation was in is-
sue might be reversed when legislation is challenged that restricts
“those political processes which can ordinarily be expected to bring
about repeal of undesirable legislation,” or that reflects “prejudice
against discreet and insular minorities . . . tend[ing] seriously to
curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be re-
lied upon to protect minorities.” 531 Then, in Murdock v. Pennsylva-
nia,532 in striking down a license tax on religious colporteurs, the
Court remarked that “[f]reedom of press, freedom of speech, free-
dom of religion are in a preferred position.” Two years later the Court
indicated that its decision with regard to the constitutionality of
legislation regulating individuals is “delicate . . . [especially] where
the usual presumption supporting legislation is balanced by the pre-
ferred place given in our scheme to the great, the indispensable demo-
cratic freedoms secured by the First Amendment. . . . That prior-
ity gives these liberties a sanctity and a sanction not permitting
dubious intrusions.” 533 The “preferred-position” language was sharply
attacked by Justice Frankfurter in Kovacs v. Cooper,534 and it dropped
from the opinions, although its philosophy did not.
Justice Black expressed his position in many cases but his
Konigsberg dissent contains one of the lengthiest and clearest expo-
sitions of it.535 That a particular governmental regulation abridged
speech or deterred it was to him “sufficient to render the action of
the State unconstitutional” because he did not subscribe “to the doc-
531 United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). In other
words, whereas economic regulation need have merely a rational basis to be consti-
tutional, legislation of the sort to which Chief Justice Stone referred might be sub-
ject to “more exacting judicial scrutiny under the general prohibitions of the Four-
teenth Amendment . . . .” Id. Justice Powell later wrote that footnote 4 “is recognized
as a primary source of ‘strict scrutiny’ judicial review.” Lewis F. Powell, Jr., Carolene
Products Revisited, 82 Columbia L. Rev. 1087, 1088 (1982).
532 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943). See also West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943).

533 Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 529–30 (1945).
534 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (collecting cases with critical analysis).
535 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 56 (1961) (dissenting opin-
ion). See also Braden v. United States, 365 U.S. 431, 441 (1961) (dissenting); Wilkinson
v. United States, 365 U.S. 399, 422 (1961) (dissenting); Uphaus v. Wyman, 364 U.S.
388, 392 (1960) (dissenting); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 140 (1959)
(dissenting); American Communications Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 445 (1950);
Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1, 137 (1961) (dissenting); Beauharnais v. Illi-
nois, 343 U.S. 250, 267 (1952) (dissenting); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (concurring); New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S.
trine that permits constitutionally protected rights to be ‘balanced’

away whenever a majority of this Court thinks that a State might
have an interest sufficient to justify abridgment of those freedoms
. . . I believe that the First Amendment’s unequivocal command that
there shall be no abridgment of the rights of free speech and assem-
bly shows that the men who drafted our Bill of Rights did all the
‘balancing’ that was to be done in this field.” 536 As he wrote else-
where: “First Amendment rights are beyond abridgment either by
legislation that directly restrains their exercise or by suppression
or impairment through harassment, humiliation, or exposure by gov-
ernment.” 537 But the “First and Fourteenth Amendments . . . take
away from government, state and federal, all power to restrict free-
dom of speech, press, and assembly where people have a right to be
for such purposes. This does not mean, however, that these amend-
ments also grant a constitutional right to engage in the conduct of
picketing or patrolling, whether on publicly owned streets or on pri-
vately owned property.” 538 Thus, in his last years on the Court, Jus-
tice Black, while maintaining an “absolutist” position, increasingly
drew a line between “speech” and “conduct which involved commu-
nication.” 539
Modern Tests and Standards: Vagueness, Overbreadth, Strict
Scrutiny, Intermediate Scrutiny, and Effectiveness of Speech
Restrictions.—Vagueness is a due process vice that can be brought
into play with regard to any criminal and many civil statutes,540
but it has a special signficance when applied to governmental re-
strictions of speech: fear that a vague restriction may apply to one’s
speech may deter constitutionally protected speech as well as con-
stitutionally unprotected speech. Vagueness has been the basis for
713, 714 (1971) (concurring). For Justice Douglas’ position, see New York Times Co.
v. United States, 403 U.S. at 720 (concurring); Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476,
508 (1957) (dissenting); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 450 (1969) (concurring).
536 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 60–61 (1961).
537 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 528 (1960) (concurring).
538 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 578 (1965) (dissenting) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
539 These cases involving important First Amendment issues are dealt with infra,
under “Speech Plus.” See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39 (1966).
540 The vagueness doctrine generally requires that a statute be precise enough
to give fair warning to actors that contemplated conduct is criminal, and to provide
adequate standards to enforcement agencies, factfinders, and reviewing courts. See,
e.g., Connally v. General Const. Co., 269 U.S. 385 (1926); Lanzetta v. New Jersey,
306 U.S. 451 (1939); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Village of Hoffman
Estates v. The Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
voiding numerous such laws, especially in the fields of loyalty oaths,541

obscenity and indecency,542 and restrictions on public demonstra-
tions.543 It is usually combined with the overbreadth doctrine, which
focuses on the need for precision in drafting a statute that may af-
fect First Amendment rights; 544 an overbroad statute that sweeps
under its coverage both protected and unprotected speech and con-
duct will normally be struck down as facially invalid, although in a
non-First Amendment situation the Court would simply void its ap-
plication to protected conduct.545
But, even in a First Amendment situation, the Court has writ-
ten, “there are substantial social costs created by the overbreadth
doctrine when it blocks application of a law to constitutionally un-
protected speech, or especially to constitutionally unprotected con-
duct. To ensure that these costs do now swallow the social benefits
of declaring a law ‘overbroad,’ we have insisted that a law’s applica-
tion to protected speech be ‘substantial,’ not only in an absolute sense,
but also relative to the scope of the law’s plainly legitimate applica-
tions, before applying the ‘strong medicine’ of overbreadth invalida-
tion. . . . Rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge succeed against
541 E.g., Cramp v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 368 U.S. 278 (1961); Baggett v.
Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
See also Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (attorney discipline,
extrajudicial statements).
542 E.g., Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Interstate Circuit v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968);
Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870–874 (1997). In National Endowment for the Arts
v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569 (1998), the Court held that a “decency” criterion for the award-
ing of grants, which “in a criminal statute or regulatory scheme . . . could raise sub-
stantial vagueness concerns,” was not unconstitutionally vague in the context of a
condition on public subsidy for speech.
543 E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Gregory v. City of Chi-
cago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). See also
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (flag desecration law); Lewis v. City of New
Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974) (punishment of opprobrious words); Hynes v. Mayor of
Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (door-to-door canvassing). For an evident narrowing of
standing to assert vagueness, see Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 60
(1976).
544 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 432–33 (1963).
545 E.g., Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
378 U.S. 500 (1964); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Zwickler v. Koota,
389 U.S. 241 (1967); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Massachu-
setts v. Oakes, 491 U.S. 576, 581 (1989). But see Washington State Grange v. Wash-
ington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 1190 (2008) (facial challenge to bur-
den on right of association rejected “where the statute has a ‘plainly legitimate sweep’ ”).
a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or

to conduct necessarily associated with speech (such as picketing or
demonstrating).” 546
Out of a concern that is closely related to that behind the
overbreadth doctrine, the Court has insisted that when the govern-
ment seeks to carry out a permissible goal and it has available a
variety of effective means to do so, “[i]f the First Amendment means
anything, it means that regulating speech must be a last—not first—
resort.” 547 Thus, the Court applies “strict scrutiny” to content-
based regulations of fully protected speech; this means that it re-
quires that such regulations “promote a compelling interest” and
use “the least restrictive means to further the articulated inter-
est.” 548
With respect to most speech restrictions to which the Court does
not apply strict scrutiny, the Court applies intermediate scrutiny;
i.e., scrutiny that is “midway between the ‘strict scrutiny’ de-
manded for content-based regulation of speech and the ‘rational ba-
sis’ standard that is applied—under the Equal Protection Clause—to
government regulation of nonspeech activities.” 549 Intermediate scru-
tiny requires that the governmental interest be “significant” or “sub-
546 Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119–20, 124 (2003) (italics in original; cita-
tions omitted) (upholding, as not addressed to speech, an ordinance banning from

streets within a low-income housing development any person who is not a resident
or employee and who “cannot demonstrate a legitimate business or social purpose
for being on the premises”). Virginia v. Hicks cited Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601 (1973), which, in the majority opinion and in Justice Brennan’s dissent, id. at
621, contains extensive discussion of the overbreadth doctrine. Other restrictive de-
cisions include Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158–64 (1974); Parker v. Levy, 417
U.S. 733, 757–61 (1974); and New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 766–74 (1982). None-
theless, the doctrine continues to be used across a wide spectrum of First Amend-
ment cases. Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 815–18 (1975); Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 932–34 (1975);
Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620, 633–39
(1980); Secretary of State of Maryland v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947 (1984)
(charitable solicitation statute placing 25 percent cap on fundraising expenditures);
City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1987) (city ordinance making it unlawful to
“oppose, molest, abuse, or interrupt” police officer in performance of duty); Board of
Airport Comm’rs v. Jews for Jesus, 482 U.S. 569 (1987) (resolution banning all “First
Amendment activities” at airport); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874–879 (1997) (stat-
ute banning “indecent” material on the Internet).
547 Thompson v. Western States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 373 (2002).
548 Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
549 Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 790 (1994) (parenthe-
ses omitted). The Court, however, applied a rational basis standard to uphold a state
statute that banned the sale of sexually explicit material to minors. Ginsberg v. New
York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968). Of course, governmental restrictions on some speech,
such as obscenity and fighting words, receive no First Amendment scrutiny, except
that particular instances of such speech may not be discriminated against on the
basis of hostility “towards the underlying message expressed.” R.A.V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992).
stantial” or “important” (but not necessarily “compelling”), and it

requires that the restriction be narrowly tailored (but not necessar-
ily the least restrictive means to advance the governmental inter-
est). Speech restrictions to which the Court does not apply strict
scrutiny include those that are not content-based (time, place, or
manner restrictions; incidental restrictions) and those that restrict
categories of speech to which the Court accords less than full First
Amendment protection (campaign contributions; commercial speech).550
Note that restrictions on expression may be content-based, but will
not receive strict scrutiny if they “are justified without reference to
the content of the regulated speech.” 551 Examples are bans on nude
dancing, and zoning restrictions on pornographic theaters or book-
stores, both of which, although content-based, receive intermediate
scrutiny on the ground that they are “aimed at combating crime
and other negative secondary effects,” and not at the content of
speech.552
The Court uses tests closely related to one another in free speech
cases in which it applies intermediate scrutiny. It has indicated that
the test for determining the constitutionality of an incidental restric-
tion on speech “in the last analysis is little, if any, different from
the standard applied to time, place, or manner restrictions,” 553 and
that “the validity of time, place, or manner restrictions is deter-
mined under standards very similar to those applicable in the com-
mercial speech context.” 554
In addition, the Supreme Court generally requires—even when
applying less than strict scrutiny—that, “[w]hen the government de-
550 E.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 481 (1988) (time, place, and manner
restriction upheld as “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,

and leav[ing] open ample alternative channels of communication”); Ward v. Rock Against
Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–799 (1989) (incidental restriction upheld as “promot[ing]
a substantial governmental interest that would be achieved less effectively absent
the regulation”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976) (campaign contribution ceil-
ing “may be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest
and employs means closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedom”); Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (commercial speech
restrictions need not be “absolutely the least severe that will achieve the desired
end,” but must exhibit a “ ‘fit’ between the legislature’s ends and the means chosen
to accomplish those ends—a fit that is not necessarily perfect, but reasonable . . . ”
(internal quotation mark and citation omitted)). But see Thompson v. Western States
Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 371 (2002) (commercial speech restriction struck down
as “more extensive than necessary to serve” the government’s interests).
551 Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 48 (1986) (emphasis in origi-
nal).
552 Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 291 (2000) (upholding ban on nude danc-
ing); Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 47 (1986) (upholding zoning of
“adult motion picture theaters”). Zoning and nude dancing cases are discussed be-
low under “Non-obscene But Sexually Explicit and Indecent Expression.”
553 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 (1984).
554 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 430 (1993).
fends a regulation on speech as a means to redress past harms or

prevent anticipated harms, it must do more than simply ‘posit the
existence of the disease sought to be cured.’ . . . It must demon-
strate that the recited harms are real, not merely conjectural, and
that the regulation will in fact alleviate these harms in a direct
and material way.” 555 The Court has held, however, that to sustain
a denial of a statute denying minors access to sexually explicit ma-
terial “requires only that we be able to say that it was not irratio-
nal for the legislature to find that exposure to material condemned
by the statute is harmful to minors.” 556
In certain other contexts, the Court has relied on “common sense”
rather than requiring the government to demonstrate that a re-
cited harm was real and not merely conjectural. For example, it held
that a rule prohibiting high school coaches from recruiting middle
school athletes did not violate the First Amendment, finding that it
needed “no empirical data to credit [the] common-sense conclusion
that hard-sell [speech] tactics directed at middle school students could
lead to exploitation . . . .” 557 On the use of common sense in free
555 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994) (federal “must-
carry” provisions, which require cable television systems to devote a portion of their
channels to the transmission of local broadcast television stations, upheld as a content-
neutral, incidental restriction on speech, not subject to strict scrutiny). The Court
has applied the same principle in weighing the constitutionality of two other types
of speech restrictions to which it does not apply strict scrutiny: restrictions on com-
mercial speech, Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 770–771 (1993) (“a governmental
body seeking to sustain a restriction on commercial speech must demonstrate that
the harms it recites are real”), and restrictions on campaign contributions, Nixon v.
Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 392 (2000) (“We have never ac-
cepted mere conjecture as adequate to carry a First Amendment burden”).
556 Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 641 (1968) (upholding a ban on sale to
minors of “girlie” magazines, and noting that, although “studies all agree that a causal
link [between ‘minors’ reading and seeing ‘sexual material’ and an impairment in
their ‘ethical and moral development’] has not been demonstrated, they are equally
agreed that a causal link has not been disproved either,” id. at 641–42). In a case
involving a federal statute that restricted “signal bleed” of sexually explicit program-
ming on cable television, a federal district court wrote, “We recognize that the Su-
preme Court’s jurisprudence does not require empirical evidence. Only some mini-
mal amount of evidence is required when sexually explicit programming and children
are involved.” Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. v. U.S., 30 F. Supp. 2d 702, 716
(D. Del. 1998), aff’d, 529 U.S. 803 (2000). In a case upholding a statute that, to
shield minors from “indecent” material, limited the hours that such material may
be broadcast on radio and television, a federal court of appeals wrote, “Congress
does not need the testimony of psychiatrists and social scientists in order to take
note of the coarsening of impressionable minds that can result from a persistent
exposure to sexually explicit material. . . .” Action for Children’s Television v. FCC,
58 F.3d 654, 662 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996). A
dissenting opinion complained, “[t]here is not one iota of evidence in the record . . .
to support the claim that exposure to indecency is harmful—indeed, the nature of
the alleged ‘harm’ is never explained.” Id. at 671 (Edwards, C.J., dissenting).
557 Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S.
291, 300 (2007).

speech cases, Justice Souter wrote: “It is not that common sense is
always illegitimate in First Amendment demonstration. The need
for independent proof varies with the point that has to be estab-
lished . . . . But we must be careful about substituting common as-
sumptions for evidence when the evidence is as readily available
as public statistics and municipal property evaluations, lest we find
out when the evidence is gathered that the assumptions are highly
debatable.” 558
Is There a Present Test?.—Complexities inherent in the myriad
varieties of expression encompassed by the First Amendment guar-
antees of speech, press, and assembly probably preclude any single
standard for determining the presence of First Amendment protec-
tion. For certain forms of expression for which protection is claimed,
the Court engages in “definitional balancing” to determine that those
forms are outside the range of protection.559 Balancing is in evi-
dence to enable the Court to determine whether certain covered speech
is entitled to protection in the particular context in which the ques-
tion arises.560 Use of vagueness, overbreadth, and less intrusive means
may very well operate to reduce the number of occasions when ques-
tions of protection must be answered squarely on the merits. What
is observable, however, is the re-emergence, at least in a tentative
fashion, of something like the clear and present danger standard
in advocacy cases, which is the context in which it was first devel-
oped. Thus, in Brandenburg v. Ohio,561 a conviction under a crimi-
nal syndicalism statute of advocating the necessity or propriety of
criminal or terrorist means to achieve political change was re-
versed. The prevailing doctrine developed in the Communist Party
cases was that “mere” advocacy was protected but that a call for
concrete, forcible action even far in the future was not protected
speech and knowing membership in an organization calling for such
558 City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 459 (2002) (Souter,
J., dissenting).
559 Thus, obscenity, by definition, is outside the coverage of the First Amend-
ment, Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49 (1973), as are malicious defamation, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964), and “fighting words,” Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942). The Court must, of course, decide in each instance whether the ques-
tioned expression, as a matter of definition, falls within one of these or another cat-
egory. See, e.g., Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518 (1972).
560 E.g., the multifaceted test for determining when commercial speech is pro-
tected, Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980); the
standard for determining when expressive conduct is protected, United States v. O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968); the elements going into decision with respect to access at
trials, Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606–10 (1982); and the
test for reviewing press “gag orders” in criminal trials, Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stu-
art, 427 U.S. 539, 562–67 (1976), are but a few examples.
561 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
action was not protected association, regardless of the probability

of success.562 In Brandenburg, however, the Court reformulated these
and other rulings to mean “that the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or pro-
scribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where
such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent law-
less action and is likely to incite or produce such action.” 563 The
Court has not revisited these issues since Brandenburg, so the long-
term significance of the decision is yet to be determined.564
Freedom of Belief
The First Amendment does not expressly speak in terms of lib-
erty to hold such beliefs as one chooses, but in both the religion
and the expression clauses, it is clear, liberty of belief is the foun-
dation of the liberty to practice what religion one chooses and to
express oneself as one chooses.565 “If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can
prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion,
or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or
act their faith therein.” 566 Speaking in the context of religious free-
dom, the Court said that, although the freedom to act on one’s be-
liefs could be limited, the freedom to believe what one will “is abso-
lute.” 567 But matters are not so simple.
562 Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298 (1957); Scales v. United States, 367 U.S.
203 (1961); Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961). See also Bond v. Floyd, 385
U.S. 116 (1966); Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
563 395 U.S. at 447. Subsequent cases relying on Brandenburg indicate the stan-
dard has considerable bite, but do not elaborate sufficiently enough to begin filling
in the outlines of the test. Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105 (1973); NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 928 (1982). But see Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 308–09
(1981).
564 In Stewart v. McCoy, 537 U.S. 993 (2002), Justice Stevens, in a statement
accompanying a denial of certiorari, wrote that, while Brandenburg’s “requirement

that the consequence be ‘imminent’ is justified with respect to mere advocacy, the
same justification does not necessarily adhere to some speech that performs a teach-
ing function. . . . Long range planning of criminal enterprises—which may include
oral advice, training exercises, and perhaps the preparation of written materials—
involve speech that should not be glibly characterized as mere ‘advocacy’ and cer-
tainly may create significant public danger. Our cases have not yet considered whether,
and if so to what extent, the First Amendment protects such instructional speech.”
Id. at 995.
565 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943); Cantwell
v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303–04 (1940); United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78
(1944); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961); American Communications Ass’n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 408 (1950); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116, 132 (1966); Speiser v.
Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958); Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1, 5–6 (1971),
and id. at 9–10 (Justice Stewart concurring).
566 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
Flag Salutes and Other Compelled Speech.—One question

that has arisen is whether the government may compel a person to
publicly declare or affirm a personal belief. In Minersville School
District v. Gobitis,568 the Court had upheld the power of Pennsylva-
nia to expel from its schools certain children—Jehovah’s Witnesses—
who refused upon religious grounds to join in a flag salute cer-
emony and recite the pledge of allegiance. “Conscientious scruples
have not, in the course of the long struggle for religious toleration,
relieved the individual from obedience to a general law not aimed
at the promotion or restriction of religious beliefs.” 569 But three years
later, in West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,570 a six-to-
three majority of the Court overturned Gobitis.571 Justice Jackson,
writing for the Court, chose to ignore the religious argument and
to ground the decision upon freedom of speech. The state policy, he
said, constituted “a compulsion of students to declare a belief. . . .
It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his ac-
ceptance of the political ideas [the flag] bespeaks.” 572 The power of
a state to follow a policy that “requires affirmation of a belief and
an attitude of mind,” however, is limited by the First Amendment,
which, under the standard then prevailing, required the state to
prove that for the students to remain passive during the ritual “cre-
ates a clear and present danger that would justify an effort even to
muffle expression.” 573
The rationale of Barnette became the basis for the Court’s deci-
sion in Wooley v. Maynard,574 which voided a requirement by the
state of New Hampshire that motorists display passenger vehicle
license plates bearing the motto “Live Free or Die.” 575 Acting on
the complaint of a Jehovah’s Witness, the Court held that the plain-
tiff could not be compelled by the state to display a message mak-
ing an ideological statement on his private property. In a subse-
568 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

569 310 U.S. at 594. Justice Stone alone dissented, arguing that the First Amend-
ment religion and speech clauses forbade coercion of “these children to express a
sentiment which, as they interpret it, they do not entertain, and which violates their
deepest religious convictions.” Id. at 601.
570 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
571 Justice Frankfurter dissented at some length, denying that the First Amend-
ment authorized the Court “to deny to the State of West Virginia the attainment of
that which we all recognize as a legitimate legislative end, namely, the promotion of
good citizenship, by employment of the means here chosen.” 319 U.S. at 646, 647.
Justices Roberts and Reed simply noted their continued adherence to Gobitis. Id. at
642.
572 319 U.S. at 631, 633.
573 319 U.S. at 633, 634.
574 430 U.S. 705 (1977).
575 The state had prosecuted vehicle owners who covered the motto on their ve-
hicle’s license plate.

quent case, however, the Court found that compelling property owners
to facilitate the speech of others by providing access to their prop-
erty did not violate the First Amendment.576 Nor was there a con-
stitutional violation where compulsory fees were used to subsidize
the speech of others.577
Other governmental efforts to compel speech have also been held
by the Supreme Court to violate the First Amendment; these in-
clude a North Carolina statute that required professional fundrais-
ers for charities to disclose to potential donors the gross percentage
of revenues retained in prior charitable solicitations,578 a Florida
statute that required newspapers to grant political candidates equal
space to reply to the newspapers’ criticism and attacks on their re-
cords,579 an Ohio statute that prohibited the distribution of anony-
mous campaign literature,580 and a Massachusetts statute that re-
quired private citizens who organized a parade to include among
576 As to the question of whether one can be required to allow others to speak
on his property, compare the Court’s opinion in PruneYard Shopping Center v. Rob-
ins, 447 U.S. 74, 85–88 (1980) (upholding a state requirement that privately owned
shopping centers permit others to engage in speech or petitioning on their property)
with Justice Powell’s concurring opinion in the same case, id. at 96 (would limit the
holding to situations where a property owner did not feel compelled to disassociate
themselves from the permitted speech).
577 The First Amendment does not preclude a public university from charging
its students an activity fee that is used to support student organizations that en-
gage in extracurricular speech, provided that the money is allocated to those groups
by use of viewpoint-neutral criteria. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Wisconsin Sys-
tem v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217 (2000) (upholding fee except to the extent a stu-
dent referendum substituted majority determinations for viewpoint neutrality in al-
locating funds). Nor does the First Amendment preclude the government from
“compel[ling] financial contributions that are used to fund advertising,” provided that
such contributions do not finance “political or ideological” views. Glickman v. Wile-
man Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 471, 472 (1997) (upholding Secretary of Ag-
riculture’s marketing orders that assessed fruit producers to cover the expenses of
generic advertising of California fruit). But, for compelled financial contributions to
be constitutional, the advertising they fund must be, as in Glickman, “ancillary to a
more comprehensive program restricting marketing autonomy” and not “the princi-
pal object of the regulatory scheme.” United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S.
405, 411, 412 (2001) (striking down Secretary of Agriculture’s mandatory assess-
ments, used for advertising, upon handlers of fresh mushrooms). The First Amend-
ment is, however, not violated when the government compels financial contributions
to fund government speech, even if the contributions are raised through a targeted
assessment rather than through general taxes. Johanns v. Livestock Marketing Ass’n,
544 U.S. 550 (2005).
578 Riley v. National Fed’n of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
In Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., Inc., 538 U.S. 600, 605 (2003),
the Supreme Court held that a fundraiser who has retained 85 percent of gross re-
ceipts from donors, but falsely represented that “a significant amount of each dollar
donated would be paid over to” a charitable organization, could be sued for fraud.
579 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). In Pacific Gas
& Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986), a Court plurality held
that a state could not require a privately owned utility company to include in its
billing envelopes views of a consumer group with which it disagrees.
580 McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
the marchers a group imparting a message—in this case support

for gay rights—that the organizers did not wish to convey.581
The principle of Barnette, however, does not extend so far as to
bar a government from requiring of its employees or of persons seek-
ing professional licensing or other benefits an oath generally but
not precisely based on the oath required of federal officers, which
is set out in the Constitution, that the taker of the oath will up-
hold and defend the Constitution.582 It is not at all clear, however,
to what degree the government is limited in probing the sincerity
of the person taking the oath.583
By contrast, the Supreme Court has found no First Amend-
ment violation when government compels disclosures in commer-
cial speech, or when it compels the labeling of foreign political pro-
paganda. Regarding compelled disclosures in commercial speech, the
Court held that an advertiser’s “constitutionally protected interest
in not providing any particular factual information in his advertis-
ing is minimal. . . . [A]n advertiser’s rights are reasonably pro-
tected as long as disclosure requirements are reasonably related to
the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers. . . . The
right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate information
regarding his services is not . . . a fundamental right.” 584 Regard-
ing compelled labeling of foreign political propaganda, the Court up-
held a provision of the Foreign Agents Registration Act of 1938 that
required that, when an agent of a foreign principal seeks to dissemi-
nate foreign “political propaganda,” he must label such material with
certain information, including his identity, the principal’s identity,
and the fact that he has registered with the Department of Justice.
The Court found that “Congress did not prohibit, edit, or restrain
the distribution of advocacy materials. . . . To the contrary, Con-
gress simply required the disseminators of such material to make
581 Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group, 514 U.S. 334 (1995).

582 Cole v. Richardson, 405 U.S. 676 (1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S.
207 (1971); Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Knight v. Board of Regents, 269 F.
Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (three-judge court), aff’d, 390 U.S. 36 (1968); Hosack v.
Smiley, 276 F. Supp. 876 (C.D. Colo. 1967) (three-judge court), aff’d, 390 U.S. 744
(1968); Ohlson v. Phillips, 304 F. Supp. 1152 (C.D. Colo. 1969) (three-judge court),
aff’d, 397 U.S. 317 (1970); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond,
401 U.S. 154, 161 (1971); Fields v. Askew, 279 So. 2d 822 (Fla. 1973), aff’d per curiam,
414 U.S. 1148 (1974).
583 Compare Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966), with Law Students Civil Rights
Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).

584 Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 651, 652 n.14 (1985).
See Milavetz, Gallop, & Milavetz v. United States, 559 U.S. ___, No. 08–1119 (2010),
slip op. at 19–23 (requiring advertisement for certain “debt relief ” businesses to dis-
close that the services offered include bankruptcy assistance).
additional disclosures that would better enable the public to evalu-

ate the import of the propaganda.” 585
Imposition of Consequences for Holding Certain Beliefs.—
Despite the Cantwell dictum that freedom of belief is absolute,586
government has been permitted to inquire into the holding of cer-
tain beliefs and to impose consequences on the believers, primarily
with regard to its own employees and to licensing certain profes-
sions.587 It is not clear what precise limitations the Court has placed
on these practices.
In its disposition of one of the first cases concerning the federal
loyalty-security program, the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia asserted broadly that “so far as the Constitution is con-
cerned there is no prohibition against dismissal of Government em-
ployees because of their political beliefs, activities or affilia-
tions.” 588 On appeal, this decision was affirmed by an equally divided
Court, its being impossible to determine whether this issue was one
treated by the Justices.589 Thereafter, the Court dealt with the loyalty-
security program in several narrow decisions not confronting the
issue of denial or termination of employment because of beliefs or
“beliefs plus.” But the same issue was also before the Court in re-
lated fields. In American Communications Ass’n v. Douds,590 the Court
was again evenly divided over a requirement that, in order for a
union to have access to the NLRB, each of its officers must file an
affidavit that he neither believed in, nor belonged to an organiza-
585 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987).
587 The issue has also arisen in the context of criminal sentencing. Evidence that
racial hatred was a motivation for a crime may be taken into account, Barclay v.
Florida, 463 U.S. 939, 949 (1983); Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993) (crimi-
nal sentence may be enhanced because the defendant intentionally selected his vic-
tim on account of the victim’s race), but evidence of the defendant’s membership in
a racist group is inadmissible where race was not a factor and no connection had
been established between the defendant’s crime and the group’s objectives. Dawson
v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159 (1992). See also United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
(defense witness could be impeached by evidence that both witness and defendant
belonged to group whose members were sworn to lie on each other’s behalf).
588 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950). The premise of the deci-
sion was that government employment is a privilege rather than a right and that
access thereto may be conditioned as the government pleases. But this basis, as the
Court has said, “has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years.” Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972). For the vitiation of the right-
privilege distinction, see “Government as Employer: Free Speech Generally,” infra.
589 Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). See also Washington v. McGrath,
341 U.S. 923 (1951), aff ’g by an equally divided Court, 182 F.2d 375 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
Although no opinions were written in these cases, several Justices expressed them-
selves on the issues in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123
(1951), decided the same day.
590 339 U.S. 382 (1950). In a later case raising the same point, the Court was
again equally divided. Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950).

tion that believed in, the overthrow of government by force or by

illegal means. Chief Justice Vinson thought the requirement reason-
able because it did not prevent anyone from believing what he chose
but only prevented certain people from being officers of unions, and
because Congress could reasonably conclude that a person with such
beliefs was likely to engage in political strikes and other conduct
that Congress could prevent.591 Dissenting, Justice Frankfurter thought
the provision too vague,592 Justice Jackson thought that Congress
could impose no disqualification upon anyone for an opinion or be-
lief that had not manifested itself in any overt act,593 and Justice
Black thought that government had no power to penalize beliefs in
any way.594 Finally, in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California,595 a
majority of the Court supported dictum in Justice Harlan’s opinion
in which he justified some inquiry into beliefs, saying that “[i]t would
indeed be difficult to argue that a belief, firm enough to be carried
over into advocacy, in the use of illegal means to change the form
of the State or Federal Government is an unimportant consider-
ation in determining the fitness of applicants for membership in a
profession in whose hands so largely lies the safekeeping of this
country’s legal and political institutions.”
When the same issue returned to the Court years later, three
five-to-four decisions left the principles involved unclear.596 Four Jus-
tices endorsed the view that beliefs could not be inquired into as a
basis for determining qualifications for admission to the bar; 597 four
Justices endorsed the view that while mere beliefs might not be suf-
ficient grounds to debar one from admission, the states were not
precluded from inquiring into them for purposes of determining
whether one was prepared to advocate violent overthrow of the gov-
ernment and to act on his beliefs.598 The decisive vote in each case
was cast by a single Justice who would not permit denial of admis-
sion based on beliefs alone but would permit inquiry into those be-
591 339 U.S. at 408–09, 412.
592 339 U.S. at 415.
593 339 U.S. at 422.
594 339 U.S. at 445.
595 336 U.S. 36, 51–52 (1961). See also In re Anastaplo, 336 U.S. 82, 89 (1961).
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas and Chief Justice Warren, dissented on the
ground that the refusal to admit the two to the state bars was impermissibly based
upon their beliefs. Id. at 56, 97.
596 Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1 (1971); In re Stolar, 401 U.S. 23
(1971); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971).
597 401 U.S. at 5–8; 401 U.S. at 28–29 (plurality opinions of Justices Black, Doug-
las, Brennan, and Marshall in Baird and Stolar, respectively); 401 U.S. at 174–76,
178–80 (Justices Black and Douglas dissenting in Wadmond), 186–90 (Justices Mar-
shall and Brennan dissenting in Wadmond).
598 401 U.S. at 17–19, 21–22 (Justices Blackmun, Harlan, and White, and Chief
Justice Burger dissenting in Baird).

liefs to an unspecified extent for purposes of determining that the

required oath to uphold and defend the Constitution could be taken
in good faith.599 Changes in Court personnel following this decision
would seem to leave the questions presented open to further litiga-
tion.
Right of Association
“It is beyond debate that freedom to engage in association for
the advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of
the ‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech. . . . Of course, it
is immaterial whether the beliefs sought to be advanced by associa-
tion pertain to political, economic, religious or cultural matters, and
state action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to
associate is subject to the closest scrutiny.” 600 It appears from the
Court’s opinions that the right of association is derivative from the
First Amendment guarantees of speech, assembly, and petition,601
although it has at times been referred to as an independent free-
dom protected by the First Amendment.602 The doctrine is a fairly
recent construction, the problems associated with it having previ-
ously arisen primarily in the context of loyalty-security investiga-
tions of Communist Party membership, and these cases having been
resolved without giving rise to any separate theory of associa-
tion.603
Freedom of association as a concept thus grew out of a series of
cases in the 1950s and 1960s in which certain states were attempt-
ing to curb the activities of the National Association for the Advance-
ment of Colored People. In the first case, the Court unanimously
set aside a contempt citation imposed after the organization re-
fused to comply with a court order to produce a list of its members
within the state. “Effective advocacy of both public and private points
of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by
group association, as this Court has more than once recognized by
remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of speech and
599 401 U.S. at 9–10; 401 U.S. at 31 (Justice Stewart concurring in Baird and
Stolar, respectively). How far Justice Stewart would permit government to go is not
made clear by his majority opinion in Wadmond. 401 U.S. at 161–66.
600 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460–61 (1958).
601 357 U.S. at 460; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522–23 (1960);
United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576, 578–79 (1971);
Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972).
602 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 461, 463 (1958); NAACP
v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 429–30 (1963); Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 487 (1975);
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412, 426 (1978); Democratic Party v. Wisconsin, 450 U.S.
107, 121 (1981).
603 See “Maintenance of National Security and the First Amendment,” infra.
assembly.” 604 “[T]hese indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press,

or association,” 605 may be abridged by governmental action either
directly or indirectly, wrote Justice Harlan, and the state had failed
to demonstrate a need for the lists which would outweigh the harm
to associational rights which disclosure would produce.
Applying the concept in subsequent cases, the Court, in Bates
v. City of Little Rock,606 again held that the disclosure of member-
ship lists, because of the harm to “the right of association,” could
be compelled only upon a showing of a subordinating interest; ruled
in Shelton v. Tucker 607 that, though a state had a broad interest to
inquire into the fitness of its school teachers, that interest did not
justify a regulation requiring all teachers to list all organizations
to which they had belonged within the previous five years; again
struck down an effort to compel membership lists from the NAACP; 608
and overturned a state court order barring the NAACP from doing
any business within the state because of alleged improprieties.609
Certain of the activities condemned in the latter case, the Court
said, were protected by the First Amendment and, though other ac-
tions might not have been, the state could not infringe on the “right
of association” by ousting the organization altogether.610
A state order prohibiting the NAACP from urging persons to
seek legal redress for alleged wrongs and from assisting and repre-
senting such persons in litigation opened up new avenues when the
Court struck the order down as violating the First Amendment.611
“[A]bstract discussion is not the only species of communication which
the Constitution protects; the First Amendment also protects vigor-
ous advocacy, certainly of lawful ends, against governmental intru-
sion. . . . In the context of NAACP objectives, litigation is not a tech-
nique of resolving private differences; it is a means for achieving
the lawful objectives of equality of treatment by all government, fed-
eral, state and local, for the members of the Negro community in
this country. It is thus a form of political expression. . . .”
“We need not, in order to find constitutional protection for the
kind of cooperative, organizational activity disclosed by this record,
whereby Negroes seek through lawful means to achieve legitimate
political ends, subsume such activity under a narrow, literal concep-
tion of freedom of speech, petition or assembly. For there is no lon-
604 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958).
605 357 U.S. at 461.
606 361 U.S. 516 (1960).
607 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
608 Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961).
609 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Flowers, 377 U.S. 288 (1964).
610 377 U.S. at 308, 309.
611 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
ger any doubt that the First and Fourteenth Amendments protect
certain forms of orderly group activity.” 612 This decision was fol-
lowed in three cases in which the Court held that labor unions en-
joyed First Amendment protection in assisting their members in pur-
suing their legal remedies to recover for injuries and other actions.
In the first case, the union advised members to seek legal advice
before settling injury claims and recommended particular attor-
neys; 613 in the second the union retained attorneys on a salaried
basis to represent members; 614 in the third, the union recom-
mended certain attorneys whose fee would not exceed a specified
percentage of the recovery.615 Justice Black wrote: “[T]he First Amend-
ment guarantees of free speech, petition, and assembly give rail-
road workers the rights to cooperate in helping and advising one
another in asserting their rights. . . .” 616
Thus, a right to associate to further political and social views
is protected against unreasonable burdening,617 but the evolution
of this right in recent years has passed far beyond the relatively
narrow contexts in which it was born.
612 371 U.S. at 429–30. Button was applied in In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978),
in which the Court found foreclosed by the First and Fourteenth Amendments the
discipline visited upon a volunteer lawyer for the American Civil Liberties Union
who had solicited someone to use the ACLU to bring suit to contest the sterilization
of Medicaid recipients. Both the NAACP and the ACLU were organizations that en-
gaged in extensive litigation as well as lobbying and educational activities, all of
which were means of political expression. “[T]he efficacy of litigation as a means of
advancing the cause of civil liberties often depends on the ability to make legal as-
sistance available to suitable litigants.” Id. at 431. “[C]ollective activity undertaken
to obtain meaningful access to the courts is a fundamental right within the protec-
tion of the First Amendment.” Id. at 426. However, ordinary law practice for commer-
cial ends is not given special protection. “A lawyer’s procurement of remunerative
employment is a subject only marginally affected with First Amendment concerns.”
Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 459 (1978). See also Bates v. State
Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 376 n.32 (1977), and see the comparison of Ohralik
and Bates in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551
U.S. 291, 296–98 (2007) (“solicitation ban was more akin to a conduct regulation
than a speech restriction”).
613 Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1 (1964).
614 United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass’n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
615 United Transportation Union v. State Bar of Michigan, 401 U.S. 576 (1971).
616 401 U.S. at 578–79. These cases do not, however, stand for the proposition
that individuals are always entitled to representation of counsel in administrative

proceedings. See Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305 (1985)
(upholding limitation to $10 of fee that may be paid attorney in representing veter-
ans’ death or disability claims before VA).
617 E.g., NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–15 (1982) (con-
certed activities of group protesting racial bias); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972)
(denial of official recognition to student organization by public college without justi-
fication abridged right of association). The right does not, however, protect the deci-
sion of entities not truly private to exclude minorities. Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S.
160, 175–76 (1976); Norwood v. Harrison, 413 U.S. 455, 469–70 (1973); Railway Mail
Ass’n v. Corsi, 326 U.S. 88 (1945); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609
(1984).
Social contacts that do not occur in the context of an “orga-

nized association” may be unprotected, however. In holding that a
state may restrict admission to certain licensed dance halls to per-
sons between the ages of 14 and 18, the Court declared that there
is no “generalized right of ‘social association’ that includes chance
encounters in dance halls.” 618
In a series of three decisions, the Court explored the extent to
which associational rights may be burdened by nondiscrimination
requirements. First, Roberts v. United States Jaycees 619 upheld ap-
plication of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to prohibit the United
States Jaycees from excluding women from full membership. Three
years later in Board of Directors of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of
Duarte,620 the Court applied Roberts in upholding application of a
similar California law to prevent Rotary International from exclud-
ing women from membership. Then, in New York State Club Ass’n
v. New York City,621 the Court upheld against facial challenge New
York City’s Human Rights Law, which prohibits race, creed, sex, and
other discrimination in places “of public accommodation, resort, or
amusement,” and applies to clubs of more than 400 members pro-
viding regular meal service and supported by nonmembers for trade
or business purposes. In Roberts, both the Jaycees’ nearly indiscrimi-
nate membership requirements and the state’s compelling interest
in prohibiting discrimination against women were important to the
Court’s analysis. The Court found that “the local chapters of the
Jaycees are large and basically unselective groups,” age and sex be-
ing the only established membership criteria in organizations oth-
erwise entirely open to public participation. The Jaycees, therefore,
“lack the distinctive characteristics [e.g., small size, identifiable pur-
pose, selectivity in membership, perhaps seclusion from the public
eye] that might afford constitutional protection to the decision of
its members to exclude women.” 622 Similarly, the Court deter-
mined in Rotary International that Rotary Clubs, designed as com-
munity service organizations representing a cross section of busi-
ness and professional occupations, also do not represent “the kind
of intimate or private relation that warrants constitutional protec-
tion.” 623 And, in New York City, the fact “that the antidiscrimina-
618 City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19, 24, 25 (1989). The narrow factual
setting—a restriction on adults dancing with teenagers in public—may be con-

trasted with the Court’s broad assertion that “coming together to engage in recre-
ational dancing . . . is not protected by the First Amendment.” Id. at 25.
619 468 U.S. 609 (1984).
620 481 U.S. 537 (1987).
621 487 U.S. 1 (1988).
622 468 U.S. at 621.
623 481 U.S. at 546.
tion provisions of the Human Rights Law certainly could be consti-

tutionally applied at least to some of the large clubs, under the Court’s
decisions in Rotary and Roberts,” and the fact that the clubs were
“ ‘commercial’ in nature,” helped to defeat the facial challenge.624
Some amount of First Amendment protection is still due such
organizations; the Jaycees had taken public positions on a number
of issues, and, the Court in Roberts noted, “regularly engage[d] in
a variety of civic, charitable, lobbying, fundraising, and other activi-
ties worthy of constitutional protection under the First Amend-
ment. There is, however, no basis in the record for concluding that
admission of women as full voting members will impede the organi-
zation’s ability to engage in these protected activities or to dissemi-
nate its preferred views.” 625 Moreover, the state had a “compelling
interest to prevent . . . acts of invidious discrimination in the dis-
tribution of publicly available goods, services, and other advan-
tages. . . .” 626
Because of the near-public nature of the Jaycees and Rotary
Clubs—the Court in Roberts likening the situation to a large busi-
ness attempting to discriminate in hiring or in selection of customers—
the cases may be limited in application, and should not be read as
governing membership discrimination by private social clubs.627 In
New York City, the Court noted that “opportunities for individual
associations to contest the constitutionality of the Law as it may
be applied against them are adequate to assure that any overbreadth
. . . will be curable through case-by-case analysis of specific facts.” 628
When application of a public accommodations law was viewed
as impinging on an organization’s ability to present its message,
the Court found a First Amendment violation. Massachusetts could
not require the private organizers of Boston’s St. Patrick’s Day pa-
rade to allow a group of gays and lesbians to march as a unit pro-
claiming its members’ gay and lesbian identity, the Court held in
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay Group.629 To do so would require pa-
rade organizers to promote a message they did not wish to pro-
mote. Roberts and New York City were distinguished as not involv-
ing “a trespass on the organization’s message itself.” 630 Those cases
624 487 U.S. at 11–12.
625 468 U.S. at 626–27 (citations omitted).
626 468 U.S. at 628.
627 The Court in Rotary rejected an assertion that Roberts had recognized that
Kiwanis Clubs are constitutionally distinguishable, and suggested that a case-by-

case approach is necessary to determine whether “the ‘zone of privacy’ extends to a
particular club or entity.” 481 U.S. at 547 n.6.
628 487 U.S. at 15.
629 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
630 515 U.S. at 580.
stood for the proposition that the state could require equal access
for individuals to what was considered the public benefit of organi-
zation membership. But even if individual access to the parade might
similarly be mandated, the Court reasoned, the gay group “could
nonetheless be refused admission as an expressive contingent with
its own message just as readily as a private club could exclude an
applicant whose manifest views were at odds with a position taken
by the club’s existing members.” 631
In Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,632 the Court held that appli-
cation of New Jersey’s public accommodations law to require the
Boy Scouts of America to admit an avowed homosexual as an adult
member violated the organization’s “First Amendment right of ex-
pressive association.” 633 Citing Hurley, the Court held that “[t]he
forced inclusion of an unwanted person in a group infringes the group’s
freedom of expressive association if the presence of that person af-
fects in a significant way the group’s ability to advocate public or
private viewpoints.” 634 The Boy Scouts, the Court found, engages
in expressive activity in seeking to transmit a system of values, which
include being “morally straight” and “clean.” 635 The Court “ac-
cept[ed] the Boy Scouts’ assertion” that the organization teaches that
homosexual conduct is not morally straight.636 The Court also gave
“deference to [the] association’s view of what would impair its ex-
pression.” 637 Allowing a gay rights activist to serve in the Scouts
would “force the organization to send a message . . . that the Boy
Scouts accepts homosexual conduct as a legitimate form of behav-
ior.” 638
Political Association.—The major expansion of the right of as-
sociation has occurred in the area of political rights. “There can no
longer be any doubt that freedom to associate with others for the
631 515 U.S. at 580–81.

632 530 U.S. 640 (2000).
633 530 U.S. at 644.
634 530 U.S. at 648.
635 530 U.S. at 650.
636 530 U.S. at 651.
637 530 U.S. at 653.
638 530 U.S. at 653. In Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights,
Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 69 (2006), the Court held that the Solomon Amendment’s forcing
law schools to allow military recruiters on campus does not violate the schools’ free-
dom of expressive association because “[r]ecruiters are, by definition, outsiders who
come onto campus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to become
members of the school’s expressive association. This distinction is critical. Unlike
the public accommodations law in Dale, the Solomon Amendment does not force a
law school ‘to accept members it does not desire.’ ” Rumsfeld is discussed below un-
der “Government and the Power of the Purse.” See also ANDREW KOPPELMAN AND TO-
BIAS BARRINGTON WOLFF, A RIGHT TO DISCRIMINATE?: HOW THE CASE OF BOY SCOUTS OF AMERI-
CAN V. JAMES DALE WARPED THE LAW OF FREE ASSOCIATION (Yale University Press, 2009).
common advancement of political beliefs and ideas is a form of ‘or-

derly group activity’ protected by the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments. The right to associate with the political party of one’s choice
is an integral part of this basic constitutional freedom.” 639 Usually
in combination with an equal protection analysis, the Court since
Williams v. Rhodes 640 has passed on numerous state restrictions that
limit the ability of individuals or groups to join one or the other of
the major parties or to form and join an independent political party
to further political, social, and economic goals.641 Of course, the right
is not absolute. The Court has recognized that there must be sub-
stantial state regulation of the election process, which will necessar-
ily burden the individual’s right to vote and to join with others for
political purposes. The validity of governmental regulation must be
determined by assessing the degree of infringement of the right of
association against the legitimacy, strength, and necessity of the gov-
ernmental interests and the means of implementing those inter-
ests.642 Many restrictions upon political association have survived
this sometimes-exacting standard of review, in large measure upon
the basis of some of the governmental interests having been found
compelling.643
639 Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51, 56–57 (1973) (citation omitted).
640 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
641 E.g., Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) (time deadline for enroll-
ment in party in order to vote in next primary); Kusper v. Pontikes, 414 U.S. 51
(1973) (barring voter from party primary if he voted in another party’s primary within
preceding 23 months); American Party of Texas v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974) (bal-
lot access restriction); Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440
U.S. 173 (1979) (number of signatures to get party on ballot); Citizens Against Rent
Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (limit on contributions to associa-
tions formed to support or oppose referendum measure); Clements v. Fashing, 457
U.S. 957 (1982) (resign-to-run law).
642 Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30–31 (1968); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S.
134, 142–143 (1972); Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 730 (1974); Illinois State Bd. of
Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 183 (1979).
643 Thus, in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724, 736 (1974), the Court found “compel-
ling” the state interest in achieving stability through promotion of the two-party sys-
tem, and upheld a bar on any independent candidate who had been affiliated with
any other party within one year. Compare Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31–32
(1968) (casting doubt on state interest in promoting Republican and Democratic vot-
ers). The state interest in protecting the integrity of political parties was held to
justify requiring enrollment of a person in the party up to eleven months before a
primary election, Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973), but not to justify re-
quiring one to forgo one election before changing parties. Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51 (1973). See also Civil Serv. Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413
U.S. 548 (1973) (efficient operation of government justifies limits on employee politi-
cal activity); Rodriguez v. Popular Democratic Party, 457 U.S. 1 (1982) (permitting
political party to designate replacement in office vacated by elected incumbent of
that party serves valid governmental interests). Storer v. Brown was distinguished
in Anderson v. Celebrezze, 460 U.S. 780 (1983), holding invalid a requirement that
independent candidates for President and Vice-President file nominating petitions
by March 20 in order to qualify for the November ballot; state interests in assuring
If people have a First Amendment right to associate with oth-

ers to form a political party, then it follows that “[a] political party
has a First Amendment right to limit its membership as it wishes,
and to choose a candidate-selection process that will in its view pro-
duce the nominee who best represents its political platform. These
rights are circumscribed, however, when the State gives a party a
role in the election process—as . . . by giving certain parties the
right to have their candidates appear on the general-election bal-
lot. Then, for example, the party’s racially discriminatory action may
become state action that violates the Fifteenth Amendment. And then
also the State acquires a legitimate governmental interest in assur-
ing the fairness of the party’s nominating process, enabling it to
prescribe what that process must be.” 644
A political party’s First Amendment right to limit its member-
ship as it wishes does not render invalid a state statute that al-
lows a candidate to designate his party preference on a ballot, even
when the candidate “is unaffiliated with, or even repugnant to, the
party” he designates.645 This is because the statute in question “never
voter education, treating all candidates equally (candidates participating in a party

primary also had to declare candidacy in March), and preserving political stability,
were deemed insufficient to justify the substantial impediment to independent can-
didates and their supporters. See also Tashjian v. Republican Party of Connecticut,
479 U.S. 208 (1986) (state interests are insubstantial in imposing “closed primary”
under which a political party is prohibited from allowing independents to vote in its
primaries); California Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 577 (2000) (require-
ment of a “blanket” primary, in which all registered voters, regardless of political
affiliation, may participate, unconstitutionally “forces political parties to associate
with—to have their nominees, and hence their positions, determined by—those who,
at best, have refused to affiliate with the party, and, at worst, have expressly affili-
ated with a rival.”); Clingman v. Beaver, 544 U.S. 581 (2005) (Oklahoma statute
that allowed only registered members of a political party, and registered indepen-
dents, to vote in the party’s primary does not violate freedom of association; Oklaho-
ma’s “semiclosed primary system” distinguished from Connecticut’s closed primary
that the Court struck down in Tashjian).
644 New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 128 S. Ct. 791, 797–98 (2008)
(citations omitted). In Lopez Torres, the Court upheld a state statute that required
political parties to select judicial candidates at a convention of delegates chosen by
party members in a primary election, rather than to select candidates in direct pri-
mary elections. The statute was challenged by party members who had not been
selected and who claimed “that the convention process that follows the delegate elec-
tion does not give them a realistic chance to secure the party’s nomination.” Id. at
799. The Court rejected their challenge, holding that, although a state may require
“party-candidate selection through processes more favorable to insurgents, such as
primaries,” id. at 799, the Constitution does not demand that a state do so. “Party
conventions, with their attendant ‘smoke-filled rooms’ and domination by party lead-
ers, have long been an accepted manner of selecting party candidates.” Id. at 799.
The plaintiffs had an associational right to join the party but not to have a certain
degree of influence in the party. Id. at 798.
645 Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 128 S. Ct.
1184, 1189 (2008). This was a 7-to-2 decision written by Justice Thomas, with Jus-
tices Scalia and Kennedy dissenting.
refers to the candidates as nominees of any party, nor does it treat

them as such”; it merely allows them to indicate their party prefer-
ence.646 The Court acknowledged that “it is possible that voters will
misinterpret the candidates’ party-preference designations as reflect-
ing endorsement by the parties,” but “whether voters will be con-
fused by the party-preference designations will depend in signifi-
cant part on the form of the ballot.” 647 If the form of the ballot used
in a particular election is such as to confuse voters, then an as-
applied challenge to the statute may be appropriate, but a facial
challenge, the Court held, is not.648
A significant extension of First Amendment association rights
in the political context occurred when the Court curtailed the al-
ready limited political patronage system. At first holding that a non-
policymaking, nonconfidential government employee cannot be dis-
charged from a job that he is satisfactorily performing upon the sole
ground of his political beliefs or affiliations,649 the Court subse-
quently held that “the question is whether the hiring authority can
demonstrate that party affiliation is an appropriate requirement for
the effective performance of the public office involved.” 650 The Court
thus abandoned the concept of policymaking, confidential positions,
noting that some such positions would nonetheless be protected,
whereas some people filling positions not reached by the descrip-
tion would not be.651 The Court’s opinion makes it difficult to evalu-
ate the ramifications of the decision, but it seems clear that a ma-
jority of the Justices adhere to a doctrine of broad associational political
646 128 S. Ct. at 1192.
647 128 S. Ct. at 1193. The Court saw “simply no basis to presume that a well-
informed electorate will interpret a candidate’s party preference designation to mean
that the candidate is the party’s chosen nominee or representative or that the party
associates with or approves of the candidate.” Id.
648 A ballot could avoid confusion by, for example, “includ[ing] prominent dis-
claimers explaining that party preference reflects only the self-designation of the
candidate and not an official endorsement by the party.” 128 S. Ct. at 1194. Justice
Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy in dissent, wrote that “[a]n individual’s endorse-
ment of a party shapes the voter’s view of what the party stands for,” and that it is
“quite impossible for the ballot to satisfy a reasonable voter that the candidate is
‘not associated’ with the party for which he has expressed a preference.” Id. at 1200.
649 Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). The limited concurrence of Justices Stew-
art and Blackmun provided the qualification for an otherwise expansive plurality
opinion. Id. at 374.
650 Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507, 518 (1980). On the same page, the Court re-
fers to a position in which “party membership was essential to the discharge of the
employee’s governmental responsibilities.” (Emphasis added.) A great gulf separates
“appropriate” from “essential,” so that much depends on whether the Court was us-
ing the two words interchangeably or whether the stronger word was meant to char-
acterize the position noted and not to particularize the standard.
651 Justice Powell’s dissents in both cases contain lengthy treatments of and de-
fenses of the patronage system as a glue strengthening necessary political parties.

445 U.S. at 520.
freedom that will have substantial implications for governmental

employment. Refusing to confine Elrod and Branti to their facts,
the court in Rutan v. Republican Party of Illinois 652 held that re-
strictions on patronage apply not only to dismissal or its substan-
tial equivalent, but also to promotion, transfer, recall after layoffs,
and hiring of low-level public employees. In 1996, the Court ex-
tended Elrod and Branti to protect independent government con-
tractors.653
The protected right of association enables a political party to
assert against some state regulation an overriding interest suffi-
cient to overcome the legitimate interests of the governing body. Thus,
a Wisconsin law that mandated an open primary election, with party
delegates bound to support at the national convention the wishes
of the voters expressed in that primary election, although legiti-
mate and valid in and of itself, had to yield to a national party
rule providing for the acceptance of delegates chosen only in an elec-
tion limited to those voters who affiliated with the party.654
Provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act requiring the
reporting and disclosure of contributions and expenditures to and
by political organizations, including the maintenance by such orga-
nizations of records of everyone contributing more than $10 and the
reporting by individuals and groups that are not candidates or po-
litical committees who contribute or expend more than $100 a year
for the purpose of advocating the election or defeat of an identified
candidate, were sustained.655 “[C]ompelled disclosure, in itself, can
seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed
by the First Amendment. . . . We long have recognized the signifi-
cant encroachments on First Amendment rights of the sort that com-
pelled disclosure imposes cannot be justified by a mere showing of
some legitimate governmental interest. . . . We have required that
the subordinating interests of the State must survive exacting scru-
652 497 U.S. 62 (1990). Rutan was a 5–4 decision, with Justice Brennan writing
the Court’s opinion. The four dissenters indicated, in an opinion by Justice Scalia,
that they would not only rule differently in Rutan, but that they would also over-
rule Elrod and Branti.
653 O’Hare Truck Serv., Inc. v. City of Northlake, 518 U.S. 712 (1996) (allegation
that city removed petitioner’s company from list of those offered towing business on
a rotating basis, in retaliation for petitioner’s refusal to contribute to mayor’s cam-
paign, and for his support of mayor’s opponent, states a cause of action under the
First Amendment); Board of County Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668 (1996) (ter-
mination or non-renewal of a public contract in retaliation for the contractor’s speech
on a matter of public concern can violate the First Amendment).
654 Democratic Party v. Wisconsin ex rel. LaFollette, 450 U.S. 107 (1981). See
also Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477 (1975) (party rules, not state law, governed
which delegation from state would be seated at national convention; national party
had protected associational right to sit delegates it chose).
655 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 60–84 (1976).
tiny. We have also insisted that there be a ‘relevant correlation’ or

‘substantial relation’ between the governmental interest and the in-
formation required to be disclosed.” 656 The governmental interests
effectuated by these requirements—providing the electorate with in-
formation, deterring corruption and the appearance of corruption,
and gathering data necessary to detect violations—were found to
be of sufficient magnitude to be validated even though they might
incidentally deter some persons from contributing.657 A claim that
contributions to minor parties and independents should have a blan-
ket exemption from disclosure was rejected inasmuch as an injury
was highly speculative; but any such party making a showing of a
reasonable probability that compelled disclosure of contributors’ names
would subject them to threats or reprisals could obtain an exemp-
tion from the courts.658 The Buckley Court also narrowly construed
the requirement of reporting independent contributions and expen-
ditures in order to avoid constitutional problems.659
Conflict Between Organization and Members.—In the course
of things, disputes can arise between an organization and a portion
of its membership. If there is some connection between the dispute
and the government, First Amendment principles may be impli-
cated. This is particularly so when statutes or government agree-
ments authorize or require compulsory support of a labor union.660
The tenor of the Court’s decisions on compulsory support of unions
has been shifting over time.
Union shop agreements authorized by law can require, as a con-
dition of employment, membership in the union on or after the thir-
tieth day following the beginning of employment. In Railway Em-
ployees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality
of such agreements, noting that the record in the case did not indi-
cate that union dues were being “used as a cover for forcing ideo-
logical conformity or other action in contravention of the First Amend-
656 424 U.S. at 64 (footnote citations omitted).

657 424 U.S. at 66–68.
658 424 U.S. at 68–74. Such a showing, based on past governmental and private
hostility and harassment, was made in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign
Comm., 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
659 424 U.S. at 74–84.
660 Section 8(a)(3) of the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 61 Stat. 140,
29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(3), permits the negotiation of union shop agreements. Such agree-
ments, however, may be outlawed by state “right to work” laws. Section 14(b), 61
Stat. 151, 29 U.S.C. § 164(b). See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &
Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525 (1949); AFL v. American Sash & Door Co., 335 U.S. 538
(1949). In industries covered by the Railway Labor Act, union shop agreements may
be negotiated regardless of contrary state laws. 64 Stat. 1238, 45 U.S.C. § 152, Elev-
enth; see Railway Employees’ Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956).
ment,” such as by being spent to support political candidates.661 In

International Ass’n of Machinists v. Street, where union dues had
been collected pursuant to a union shop agreement and had been
spent to support political candidates, the Court avoided the First
Amendment issue by construing the Railway Labor Act to prohibit
the use of compulsory union dues for political causes.662
In Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Education,663 the Court applied Hanson
and Street in a public employment context, finding “agency shops” 664
permissible, but also limiting compelled support of a union’s politi-
cal activities.665 Recognizing that any system of compelled support
restricted an employee’s right not to associate or support a particu-
lar view, the Court nonetheless found the governmental interests
served by an agency shop agreement—the promotion of labor peace
and stability of employer-employee relations—to be of overriding im-
portance and justify the impact upon employee freedom.666 In look-
ing at the scope of support that may be required, the Court distin-
guished between compelling support of a union’s labor-related activities
and compelling support of a union’s political activities. The balance
of interests was different, the Court held, and employees compelled
to support the union were constitutionally entitled to object to the
use of exacted funds to support political candidates or to advance
ideological causes not germane to the union’s duties as collective-
bargaining representative. To compel financial support of political
661 351 U.S. 225, 238 (1956).

662 367 U.S. 740, 749–50 (1961). Justices Douglas, Black, Frankfurter, and Har-
lan would have reached the constitutional issue, with differing results. On the same
day that it decided Street, the Court, in Lathrop v. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820 (1961),
declined to reach the constitutional issues presented by roughly the same fact situ-
ation in a suit by lawyers compelled to join an “integrated bar.” These issues, how-
ever, were faced squarely in Keller v. State Bar of California, 496 U.S. 1, 14 (1990),
which held that an integrated state bar may not, against a members’ wishes, devote
compulsory dues to ideological or other political activities not “necessarily or reason-
ably related to the purpose of regulating the legal profession or improving the qual-
ity of legal service available to the people of the State.”
663 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
664 An agency shop agreement requires all employees, regardless of union mem-
bership, to pay a fee to the union that reflects the union’s efforts in obtaining em-
ployment benefits through collective bargaining. The Court in Abood noted that it is
the “practical equivalent” of a union shop agreement. 431 U.S. at 217 n.10.
665 That a public entity was the employer and the employees consequently were
public employees was deemed constitutionally immaterial for the application of the
principles of Hanson and Street, id. at 226–32, but, in a concurring opinion joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun, Justice Powell found the distinction
between public and private employment crucial. Id. at 244.
666 431 U.S. at 217–23. For a similar argument over the issue of corporate po-
litical contributions and shareholder rights, see First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 792–95 (1978), and id. at 802, 812–21 (Justice White dissenting).
activities is to violate freedom of belief and the right to act on those

beliefs just as much as if government prohibited him from acting
to further his own beliefs.667
The Abood Court determined that an employee’s right not to
support personally disagreeable political activities, did not require
that unions operating as agency shops refrain from making non-
collective-bargaining-related expenditures. Rather, those unions were
required to ensure that funds supporting political activities came
only from employees who did not object. Consequently, the lower
courts were directed to oversee development of a system under which
employees could object generally to such use of union funds and
could obtain either a proportionate refund or a reduction of future
exactions.668 However, this remedy was criticized as both unwieldy
and insufficiently protective of First Amendment rights. For ex-
ample, the Court later found a proportionate refund to be unaccept-
able because “even then the union obtains an involuntary loan for
purposes to which the employee objects”; 669 an advance reduction
of dues corrects the problem only if accompanied by sufficient infor-
mation by which employees may gauge the propriety of the union’s
fee.670 Therefore, the union procedure must also “provide for a rea-
sonably prompt decision by an impartial decisionmaker.” 671
In Davenport v. Washington Education Ass’n,672 the Court noted
that, although Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson had “set forth vari-
ous procedural requirements that public-sector unions collecting agency
fees must observe in order to ensure that an objecting nonmember
can prevent the use of his fees for impermissible purposes,” 673 it
“never suggested that the First Amendment is implicated when-
ever governments place limitations on a union’s entitlement to agency
fees above and beyond what Abood and Hudson require. To the con-
trary, we have described Hudson as ‘outlin[ing] a minimum set of
procedures by which a [public-sector] union in an agency-shop rela-
667 431 U.S. at 232–37. On the other hand, nonmembers may be charged for
such general union expenses as contributions to state and national affiliates, ex-
penses of sending delegates to state and national union conventions, and costs of a
union newsletter. Lehnert v. Ferris Faculty Ass’n, 500 U.S. 507 (1991). A local union
may also charge nonmembers a fee that goes to the national union to pay for litiga-
tion expenses incurred on behalf of other local units, but only if (1) the litigation is
related to collective bargaining rather than political activity, and (2) the litigation
charge is reciprocal in nature, i.e., other locals contribute similarly. Locke v. Karass,
129 S. Ct. 798, 802 (2009)
668 431 U.S. at 237–42.
669 Ellis v. Brotherhood of Railway, Airline & Steamship Clerks, 466 U.S. 435,
444 (1984).
670 Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson, 475 U.S. 292 (1986).
671 475 U.S. at 309.
672 551 U.S. 177 (2007).
673 551 U.S. at 181, citing 475 U.S. 292, 302, 304–310.
tionship could meet its requirements under Abood [, i.e., collection

of fees from all employees in an agency shop to support labor relations-
related activity].’ ” 674 Thus, the Court held in Davenport that the
State of Washington could prohibit “expenditure of a nonmember’s
agency fees for [political] election-related purposes unless the non-
member affirmatively consents.” 675
In Ysursa v. Pocatello Education Ass’n,676 the Court upheld an
Idaho statute that outright prohibited payroll deductions for union
political activities. Because the statute did not restrict the union’s
political speech, but merely declined to subsidize it by providing for
payroll deductions, the state did not abridge the union’s First Amend-
ment right and therefore could justify the ban merely by demon-
strating a rational basis for it. The Court found that it was “justi-
fied by the State’s interest in avoiding the reality or appearance of
government favoritism or entanglement with partisan politics.” 677
And then, in Knox v. Service Employees International Union,678
the Court suggested a public union may not assess political fees in
an agency shop other than through a voluntary opt in system. The
union in Knox had proposed and implemented a special fee to fund
political advocacy before providing formal notice with an opportu-
nity for non-union employees to opt out. Five Justices character-
ized agency shop arrangements in the public sector as constitution-
ally problematic in the first place, and, then, charged that requiring
non-union members to affirmatively opt out of contributing to politi-
cal activities was “a remarkable boon for unions.” Continuing to call
opt-out arrangements impingements on the First Amendment rights
of non-union members, the majority more specifically held that the
Constitution required that separate notices be sent out for special
political assessments that allowed non-union employees to opt in
rather than requiring them to opt out.679 Two concurring Justices,
echoed by the dissenters, heavily criticized the majority for reach-
ing “significant constitutional issues not contained in the questions
presented, briefed, or argued.” Rather, the concurrence more nar-
674 551 U.S. at 185, quoting Keller v. State Bar of Cal., 496 U.S. 1, 17 (1990),
and adding emphasis.

675 551 U.S. at 184.
676 129 S. Ct. 1093 (2009).
677 129 S. Ct. at 1098. The unions had argued that, even if the limitation was
valid as applied at the state level, it violated their First Amendment rights when
applied to local public employers. The Court held that a political subdivision, “cre-
ated by the state for the better ordering of government, has no privileges or immu-
nities under the federal constitution which it may invoke in opposition to the will of
its creator.” Id. at 1101, quoting Williams v. Mayor of Baltimore, 289 U.S. 36, 40
(1933).
678 567 U.S. ___, No. 10–1121, slip op. (2012).
679 567 U.S. ___, No. 10–1121, slip op. at 17 (2012) (Alito, J., joined by Roberts,
C.J., and by Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, JJ.).

rowly found that unions may not collect special political assess-
ments from non-union members who earlier objected to noncharge-
able (i.e., political) expenses, and could only collect from nonobjecting
nonmembers after giving notice and an opportunity to opt out.680
Doubts on the constitutionality of agency shops in the public
sector intensified in Harris v. Quinn.681 Justice Alito, for the major-
ity, characterized Abood as questionable on several grounds. He par-
ticularly honed in on conceptual difficulties in distinguishing be-
tween union expenditures for labor-related activities and those for
political activities in the context of the public sector, where collec-
tive bargaining, lobbying, and advocacy efforts are all directed at
the government. Administering Abood was further fraught with sig-
nificant administrative difficulties. Yet the five-Justice majority de-
clined to overturn Abood outright, despite pleas from the petition-
ers to do so. Instead, Justice Alito focused on what he saw as the
peculiar status of the employees at issues, home health care assis-
tants subsidized by Medicaid. These “partial-public employees” were
largely under the direction and control of their individual clients,
Justice Alito emphasized. Moreover, they had little direct interac-
tion with state agencies, were frozen out from many state-
employee benefits by law, and could bargain with the state only on
limited issues. In the end, the majority found too little at stake vis
a vis state agencies to justify compelling dissenting home health
care assistants to subsidize speech by the union, a third party with
whom they disagreed.
On another issue touching on conflict between an organization
and its members, the Court has held that a labor relations body
may not prevent a union member or employee represented exclu-
sively by a union from speaking out at a public meeting on an is-
sue of public concern, simply because the issue was a subject of col-
lective bargaining between the union and the employer.682
Maintenance of National Security and the First

Amendment
Preservation of the security of the Nation from its enemies, for-
eign and domestic, is the obligation of government and one of the
foremost reasons for government to exist. Pursuit of this goal may
lead government officials at times to trespass in areas protected by
the guarantees of speech and press and may require the balancing
away of rights that might be preserved inviolate at other times. The
680 567 U.S. ___, No. 10–1121, slip op. (2012) (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg,
J., concurring).
681 Harris v. Quinn, 573 U.S. ___, No. 11–681, slip op. (2014).
682 Madison School Dist. v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167 (1976).
drawing of the line is committed, not exclusively but finally, to the

Supreme Court. In this section, we consider a number of areas in
which the necessity to draw lines has arisen.
Punishment of Advocacy.—Criminal punishment for the ad-
vocacy of illegal or of merely unpopular goals and ideas did not origi-
nate in the United States with the post-World War II concern with
Communism. Enactment of and prosecutions under the Sedition Act
of 1798 683 and prosecutions under the federal espionage laws 684 and
state sedition and criminal syndicalism laws 685 in the 1920s and
early 1930s have been alluded to earlier.686 But it was in the 1950s
and the 1960s that the Supreme Court confronted First Amend-
ment concepts fully in determining the degree to which govern-
ment could proceed against persons and organizations that it be-
lieved were plotting and conspiring both to advocate the overthrow
of government and to accomplish that goal.
The Smith Act of 1940 687 made it a criminal offense to know-
ingly or willfully to advocate, abet, advise, or teach the duty, neces-
sity, desirability, or propriety of overthrowing the government of the
United States or of any state by force or violence, or to organize
any association that teaches, advises, or encourages such an over-
throw, or to become a member of or to affiliate with any such asso-
ciation. No case involving prosecution under this law was reviewed
683 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596 (1798).

684 The cases included Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919) (affirming
conviction for attempting to disrupt conscription by circulation of leaflets bitterly
condemning the draft); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919) (affirming convic-
tion for attempting to create insubordination in armed forces based on one speech
advocating socialism and opposition to war, and praising resistance to the draft);
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919) (affirming convictions based on two
leaflets, one of which attacked President Wilson as a coward and hypocrite for send-
ing troops into Russia and the other of which urged workers not to produce materi-
als to be used against their brothers).
685 The cases included Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (affirming con-
viction based on publication of “manifesto” calling for the furthering of the “class
struggle” through mass strikes and other mass action); Whitney v. California, 274
U.S. 357 (1927) (affirming conviction based upon adherence to party which had plat-
form rejecting parliamentary methods and urging a “revolutionary class struggle,”
the adoption of which defendant had opposed).
686 See discussion under “Adoption and the Common Law Background,” and “Clear
and Present Danger,” supra. See also Taylor v. Mississippi, 319 U.S. 583 (1943), set-
ting aside convictions of three Jehovah’s Witnesses under a statute that prohibited
teaching or advocacy intended to encourage violence, sabotage, or disloyalty to the
government after the defendants had said that it was wrong for the President “to
send our boys across in uniform to fight our enemies” and that boys were being killed
“for no purpose at all.” The Court found no evil or sinister purpose, no advocacy of
or incitement to subversive action, and no threat of clear and present danger to gov-
ernment.
687 54 Stat. 670, 18 U.S.C. § 2385.
by the Supreme Court until, in Dennis v. United States,688 it consid-

ered the convictions of eleven Communist Party leaders on charges
of conspiracy to violate the advocacy and organizing sections of the
statute. Chief Justice Vinson’s plurality opinion applied a revised
clear and present danger test 689 and concluded that the evil sought
to be prevented was serious enough to justify suppression of speech.
“If, then, this interest may be protected, the literal problem which
is presented is what has been meant by the use of the phrase ‘clear
and present danger’ of the utterances bringing about the evil within
the power of Congress to punish. Obviously, the words cannot mean
that before the government may act, it must wait until the putsch
is about to be executed, the plans have been laid and the signal is
awaited. If Government is aware that a group aiming at its over-
throw is attempting to indoctrinate its members and to commit them
to a course whereby they will strike when the leaders feel the cir-
cumstances permit, action by the government is required.” 690 “The
mere fact that from the period 1945 to 1948 petitioners’ activities
did not result in an attempt to overthrow the Government by force
and violence is of course no answer to the fact that there was a
group that was ready to make the attempt. The formation by peti-
tioners of such a highly organized conspiracy, with rigidly disci-
plined members subject to call when the leaders, these petitioners,
felt that the time had come for action, coupled with the inflam-
mable nature of world conditions, similar uprisings in other coun-
tries, and the touch-and-go nature of our relations with countries
with whom petitioners were in the very least ideologically attuned,
convince us that their convictions were justified on this score.” 691
Justice Frankfurter in concurrence developed a balancing test,
which, however, he deferred to the congressional judgment in apply-
ing, concluding that “there is ample justification for a legislative
judgment that the conspiracy now before us is a substantial threat
to national order and security.” 692 Justice Jackson’s concurrence was
based on his reading of the case as involving “a conviction of con-
spiracy, after a trial for conspiracy, on an indictment charging con-
spiracy, brought under a statute outlawing conspiracy.” Here the gov-
ernment was dealing with “permanently organized, well-financed,
semi-secret, and highly disciplined organizations” plotting to over-
throw the Government; under the First Amendment “it is not for-
bidden to put down force and violence, it is not forbidden to punish
688 341 U.S. 494 (1951).

689 341 U.S. at 510.
690 341 U.S. at 509.
691 341 U.S. at 510–11.
692 341 U.S. at 517, 542.
its teaching or advocacy, and the end being punishable, there is no

doubt of the power to punish conspiracy for the purpose.” 693 Jus-
tices Black and Douglas dissented separately, the former viewing
the Smith Act as an invalid prior restraint and calling for reversal
of the convictions for lack of a clear and present danger, the latter
applying the Holmes-Brandeis formula of clear and present danger
to conclude that “[t]o believe that petitioners and their following
are placed in such critical positions as to endanger the Nation is to
believe the incredible.” 694
In Yates v. United States,695 the convictions of several second-
string Communist Party leaders were set aside, a number ordered
acquitted, and others remanded for retrial. The decision was based
upon construction of the statute and appraisal of the evidence rather
than on First Amendment claims, although each prong of the rul-
ing seems to have been informed with First Amendment consider-
ations. Thus, Justice Harlan for the Court wrote that the trial judge
had given faulty instructions to the jury in advising that all advo-
cacy and teaching of forcible overthrow was punishable, whether it
was language of incitement or not, so long as it was done with an
intent to accomplish that purpose. But the statute, the Justice con-
tinued, prohibited “advocacy of action,” not merely “advocacy in the
realm of ideas.” “The essential distinction is that those to whom
the advocacy is addressed must be urged to do something, now or
in the future, rather than merely to believe in something.” 696 Sec-
ond, the Court found the evidence insufficient to establish that the
Communist Party had engaged in the required advocacy of action,
requiring the Government to prove such advocacy in each instance
rather than presenting evidence generally about the Party. Addition-
ally, the Court found the evidence insufficient to link five of the de-
fendants to advocacy of action, but sufficient with regard to the other
nine.697
Compelled Registration of Communist Party.—The Inter-
nal Security Act of 1950 provided for a comprehensive regulatory
scheme by which “Communist-action organizations” and “Communist-
693 341 U.S. at 561, 572, 575.

694 341 U.S. at 579 (Justice Black dissenting), 581, 589 (Justice Douglas dissent-
ing).
695 354 U.S. 298 (1957).
696 354 U.S. at 314, 315–16, 320, 324–25.
697 354 U.S. at 330–31, 332. Justices Black and Douglas would have held the
Smith Act unconstitutional. Id. at 339. Justice Harlan’s formulation of the standard
by which certain advocacy could be punished was noticeably stiffened in Brandenburg
v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
front organizations” could be curbed.698 Organizations found to fall

within one or the other of these designations were required to reg-
ister and to provide for public inspection membership lists, account-
ings of all money received and expended, and listings of all print-
ing presses and duplicating machines; members of organizations which
failed to register were required to register and members were sub-
ject to comprehensive restrictions and criminal sanctions. After a
lengthy series of proceedings, a challenge to the registration provi-
sions reached the Supreme Court, which sustained the constitution-
ality of the section under the First Amendment, only Justice Black
dissenting on this ground.699 Employing the balancing test, Justice
Frankfurter for himself and four other Justices concluded that the
threat to national security posed by the Communist conspiracy out-
weighed considerations of individual liberty, the impact of the reg-
istration provision in this area in any event being limited to what-
ever “public opprobrium and obloquy” might attach.700 Three Justices
based their conclusion on findings that the Communist Party was
an anti-democratic, secret organization that was subservient to a
foreign power and that used more than speech in attempting to achieve
its ends, and was therefore subject to extensive governmental regu-
lation.701
Punishment for Membership in an Organization That En-
gages in Proscribed Advocacy.—The Smith Act provision mak-
ing it a crime to organize or become a member of an organization
that teaches, advocates, or encourages the overthrow of govern-
ment by force or violence was used by the government against Com-
munist Party members. In Scales v. United States,702 the Court af-
firmed a conviction under this section and held it constitutional against
First Amendment attack. Advocacy such as the Communist Party
engaged in, Justice Harlan wrote for the Court, was unprotected
698 Ch. 1024, 64 Stat. 987. Sections of the Act requiring registration of Communist-
action and Communist-front organizations and their members were repealed in 1968.
Pub. L. 90–237, § 5, 81 Stat. 766.
699 Communist Party v. SACB, 367 U.S. 1 (1961). The Court reserved decision
on the self-incrimination claims raised by the Party. The registration provisions ul-
timately floundered on this claim. Albertson v. SACB, 382 U.S. 70 (1965).
700 367 U.S. at 102.
701 367 U.S. at 170–75 (Justice Douglas dissenting on other grounds), 191 (Jus-
tice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren dissenting on other grounds). Justice Black’s
dissent on First Amendment grounds argued that “Congress has [no] power to out-
law an association, group or party either on the ground that it advocates a policy of
violent overthrow of the existing Government at some time in the distant future or
on the ground that it is ideologically subservient to some foreign country.” Id. at
147.
702 367 U.S. 203 (1961). Justices Black and Douglas dissented on First Amend-
ment grounds, id. at 259, 262, while Justice Brennan and Chief Justice Warren dis-
sented on statutory grounds. Id. at 278
under Dennis, and he could see no reason why membership that

constituted a purposeful form of complicity in a group engaging in
such advocacy should be a protected form of association. Of course,
“[i]f there were a similar blanket prohibition of association with a
group having both legal and illegal aims, there would indeed be a
real danger that legitimate political expression or association would
be impaired, but the membership clause . . . does not make crimi-
nal all association with an organization which has been shown to
engage in illegal advocacy.” 703 Only an “active” member of the Party—
one who with knowledge of the proscribed advocacy intends to ac-
complish the aims of the organization—was to be punished, the Court
said, not a “nominal, passive, inactive or purely technical” mem-
ber.704
Disabilities Attaching to Membership in Proscribed Orga-
nizations.—The consequences of being or becoming a member of a
proscribed organization can be severe. Aliens are subject to depor-
tation for such membership.705 Congress made it unlawful for any
member of an organization required to register as a “Communist-
action” or a “Communist-front” organization to apply for a passport
or to use a passport.706 A now-repealed statute required as a condi-
703 367 U.S. at 229.

704 367 U.S. at 220. In Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961), the Court
reversed a conviction under the membership clause because the evidence was insuf-
ficient to prove that the Party had engaged in unlawful advocacy. “[T]he mere ab-
stract teaching of Communist theory, including the teaching of the moral propriety
or even moral necessity for a resort to force and violence, is not the same as prepar-
ing a group for violent action and steeling it to such action. There must be some
substantial direct or circumstantial evidence of a call to violence now or in the fu-
ture which is both sufficiently strong and sufficiently pervasive to lend color to the
otherwise ambiguous theoretical material regarding Communist Party teaching, and
to justify the inference that such a call to violence may fairly be imputed to the
Party as a whole, and not merely to some narrow segment of it.” Id. at 297–98.
705 See 66 Stat. 205 (1952), 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a)(6). “Innocent” membership in an
organization that advocates violent overthrow of the government is apparently insuf-

ficient to save an alien from deportation. Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522 (1954). Later
cases, however, seem to impose a high standard of proof on the government to show
a “meaningful association,” as a matter of statutory interpretation. Rowoldt v. Perfetto,
355 U.S. 115 (1957); Gastelum-Quinones v. Kennedy, 374 U.S. 469 (1963).
706 Subversive Activities Control Act of 1950, § 6, 64 Stat. 993, 50 U.S.C. § 785.
The section was declared unconstitutional in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S.
500 (1964), as an infringement of the right to travel, a liberty protected by the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. But the Court considered the case as well
in terms of its restrictions on “freedom of association,” emphasizing that the statute
reached membership whether it was with knowledge of the organization’s illegal aims
or not, whether it was active or not, and whether the member intended to further
the organization’s illegal aims. Id. at 507–14. But see Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1,
16–17 (1965), in which the Court denied that State Department area restrictions in
its passport policies violated the First Amendment, because the policy inhibited ac-
tion rather than expression, a distinction the Court continued in Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 304–10 (1981).
tion of access to NLRB processes by any union that each of its offi-
cers must file affidavits that he was not a member of the Commu-
nist Party or affiliated with it.707 The Court has sustained state bar
associations in their efforts to probe into applicants’ membership in
the Communist Party in order to determine whether there was know-
ing membership on the part of one sharing a specific intent to fur-
ther the illegal goals of the organization.708 A section of the Commu-
nist Control Act of 1954 was designed to keep the Communist Party
off the ballot in all elections.709 The most recent interpretation of
this type of disability is United States v. Robel,710 in which the Court
held unconstitutional under the First Amendment a section of the
Internal Security Act that made it unlawful for any member of an
organization compelled to register as a “Communist-action” or
“Communist-front” organization to work in any defense facility. For
the Court, Chief Justice Warren wrote that a statute that so in-
fringed upon freedom of association must be much more narrowly
drawn to take precise account of the evils at which it permissibly
could be aimed. One could be disqualified from holding sensitive po-
sitions on the basis of active, knowing membership with a specific
intent to further the unlawful goals of an organization, but that
membership that was passive or inactive, or by a person unaware
of the organization’s unlawful aims, or by one who disagreed with
those aims, could not be grounds for disqualification, certainly not
for a non-sensitive position.711
A somewhat different matter is disqualifying a person for pub-
lic benefits of some sort because of membership in a proscribed or-
ganization or because of some other basis ascribable to doubts about
his loyalty. The First Amendment was raised only in dissent when
in Flemming v. Nestor 712 the Court sustained a statute that re-
quired the termination of Social Security old-age benefits to an alien
who was deported on grounds of membership in the Communist Party.
Proceeding on the basis that no one was “entitled” to Social Secu-
707 This part of the oath was sustained in American Communications Ass’n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), and Osman v. Douds, 339 U.S. 846 (1950).
708 Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961); In re Anastaplo,
366 U.S. 82 (1961); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401
U.S. 154 (1971). Membership alone, however, appears to be an inadequate basis on
which to deny admission. Id. at 165–66; Baird v. State Bar of Arizona, 401 U.S. 1
(1971); Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957).
709 Ch. 886, § 3, 68 Stat. 775, 50 U.S.C. § 842. The section was at issue without
a ruling on the merits in Mitchell v. Donovan, 290 F. Supp. 642 (D. Minn. 1968)
(ordering names of Communist Party candidates put on ballot); 300 F. Supp. 1145
(D. Minn. 1969) (dismissing action as moot); 398 U.S. 427 (1970) (dismissing appeal
for lack of jurisdiction).
710 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
711 389 U.S. at 265–66. See also Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968).
712 363 U.S. 603 (1960).
rity benefits, Justice Harlan for the Court concluded that a ratio-
nal justification for the law might be the deportee’s inability to aid
the domestic economy by spending the benefits locally, although a
passage in the opinion could be read to suggest that termination
was permissible because alien Communists are undeserving of ben-
efits.713 Of considerable significance in First Amendment jurispru-
dence is Speiser v. Randall,714 in which the Court struck down a
state scheme for denying veterans’ property tax exemptions to “dis-
loyal” persons. The system, as interpreted by the state courts, de-
nied the exemption only to persons who engaged in speech that could
be criminally punished consistently with the First Amendment, but
the Court found the vice of the provision to be that, after each claim-
ant had executed an oath disclaiming his engagement in unlawful
speech, the tax assessor could disbelieve the oath taker and deny
the exemption, thereby placing on the claimant the burden of prov-
ing that he was loyal. “The vice of the present procedure is that,
where particular speech falls close to the line separating the lawful
and the unlawful, the possibility of mistaken fact-finding—
inherent in all litigation—will create the danger that the legiti-
mate utterance will be penalized. The man who knows that he must
bring forth proof and persuade another of the lawfulness of his con-
duct necessarily must steer far wider of the unlawful zone than if
the State must bear these burdens . . . . In practical operation, there-
fore, this procedural device must necessarily produce a result which
the State could not command directly. It can only result in a deter-
rence of speech which the Constitution makes free.” 715
Employment Restrictions and Loyalty Oaths.—An area in
which significant First Amendment issues are often raised is the
establishment of loyalty-security standards for government employ-
ees. Such programs generally take one of two forms or may com-
bine the two. First, government may establish a system investigat-
ing employees or prospective employees under standards relating
to presumed loyalty. Second, government may require its employ-
713 363 U.S. at 612. The passage reads: “Nor . . . can it be deemed irrational for
Congress to have concluded that the public purse should not be utilized to contrib-
ute to the support of those deported on the grounds specified in the statute.” Id. But
see Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404–05, 409 n.9 (1963). Although the right-
privilege distinction is all but moribund, Flemming was strongly reaffirmed in later
cases by emphasis on the noncontractual nature of such benefits. Richardson v. Belcher,
404 U.S. 78, 80–81 (1971); United States Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S.
166, 174 (1980).
714 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
715 357 U.S. at 526. For a possible limiting application of the principle, see Law
Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154, 162–64 (1971),
and id. at 176–78 (Justices Black and Douglas dissenting), id. at 189 n.5 (Justices
Marshall and Brennan dissenting).
ees or prospective employees to subscribe to a loyalty oath disclaim-

ing belief in or advocacy of, or membership in an organization that
stands for or advocates, unlawful or disloyal action. The Federal
Government’s security investigation program has been tested nu-
merous times and First Amendment issues raised, but the Su-
preme Court has never squarely confronted the substantive consti-
tutional issues, and it has not dealt with the loyalty oath features
of the federal program.716 The Court has, however, had a long run-
ning encounter with state loyalty oath programs.717
First encountered 718 was a loyalty oath for candidates for pub-
lic office rather than one for public employees. Accepting the state
court construction that the law required each candidate to “make
oath that he is not a person who is engaged ‘in one way or another
in the attempt to overthrow the government by force or violence,’
and that he is not knowingly a member of an organization engaged
in such an attempt,” the Court unanimously sustained the provi-
sion in a one-paragraph per curiam opinion.719 Less than two months
later, the Court upheld a requirement that employees take an oath
that they had not within a prescribed period advised, advocated, or
taught the overthrow of government by unlawful means, nor been
a member of an organization with similar objectives; every em-
ployee was also required to swear that he was not and had not been
716 The federal program is primarily grounded in two Executive Orders by Presi-
dent Truman and President Eisenhower, E.O. 9835, 12 Fed. Reg. 1935 (1947), and
E.O. 10450, 18 Fed. Reg. 2489 (1953), and a significant amendatory Order issued by
President Nixon, E.O. 11605, 36 Fed. Reg. 12831 (1971). Statutory bases include 5
U.S.C. §§ 7311, 7531–32. Cases involving the program were decided either on lack
of authority for the action being reviewed, e.g., Cole v. Young, 351 U.S. 536 (1956);
and Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331 (1955), or on procedural due process grounds,
Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961). But cf. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967);
Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17 (1968). A series of three-judge district court deci-
sions, however, invalidated federal loyalty oaths and inquiries. Soltar v. Postmaster
General, 277 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Calif. 1967); Haskett v. Washington, 294 F. Supp.
912 (D.D.C. 1968); Stewart v. Washington, 301 F. Supp. 610 (D.D.C. 1969); National
Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Blount, 305 F. Supp. 546 (D.D.C. 1969) (no-strike oath).
717 So-called negative oaths or test oaths are dealt with in this section; for the
positive oaths, see “Imposition of Consequences for Holding Certain Beliefs,” supra.
718 Test oaths had first reached the Court in the period following the Civil War,
at which time they were voided as ex post facto laws and bills of attainder. Cum-
mings v. Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1867); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
333 (1867).
719 Gerende v. Board of Supervisors of Elections, 341 U.S. 56 (1951) (emphasis
original). In Indiana Communist Party v. Whitcomb, 414 U.S. 411 (1974), a require-
ment that parties and candidates seeking ballot space subscribe to a similar oath
was voided because the oath’s language did not comport with the advocacy stan-
dards of Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Four Justices concurred more
narrowly. 414 U.S. at 452 n.3. See also Whitcomb v. Communist Party of Indiana,
410 U.S. 976 (1973).
a member of the Communist Party.720 For the Court, Justice Clark

perceived no problem with the inquiry into Communist Party mem-
bership but cautioned that no issue had been raised whether an
employee who was or had been a member could be discharged merely
for that reason.721 With regard to the oath, the Court did not dis-
cuss First Amendment considerations but stressed that it believed
the appropriate authorities would not construe the oath adversely
against persons who were innocent of an organization’s purpose dur-
ing their affiliation, or persons who had severed their associations
upon knowledge of an organization’s purposes, or persons who had
been members of an organization at a time when it was not unlaw-
fully engaged.722 Otherwise, the oath requirement was valid as “a
reasonable regulation to protect the municipal service by establish-
ing an employment qualification of loyalty” and as being “reason-
ably designed to protect the integrity and competency of the ser-
vice.” 723
In the following Term, the Court sustained a state statute dis-
qualifying for government employment persons who advocated the
overthrow of government by force or violence or persons who were
members of organizations that so advocated; the statute had been
supplemented by a provision applicable to teachers calling for the
drawing up of a list of organizations that advocated violent over-
throw and making membership in any listed organization prima fa-
cie evidence of disqualification.724 Justice Minton observed that ev-
eryone had a right to assemble, speak, think, and believe as he pleased,
but had no right to work for the state in its public school system
except upon compliance with the state’s reasonable terms. “If they
do not choose to work on such terms, they are at liberty to retain
their beliefs and associations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus
deprived them of any right to free speech or assembly? We think
not.” 725 A state could deny employment based on a person’s advo-
cacy of overthrow of the government by force or violence or based
720 Garner v. Board of Pub. Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951)). Justice Frankfurter
dissented in part on First Amendment grounds, id. at 724, Justice Burton dissented
in part, id. at 729, and Justices Black and Douglas dissented completely, on bill of
attainder grounds, id. at 731.
721 341 U.S. at 720. Justices Frankfurter and Burton agreed with this ruling.
Id. at 725–26, 729–30.

722 341 U.S. at 723–24.
723 341 U.S. at 720–21. Justice Frankfurter objected that the oath placed upon
the takers the burden of assuring themselves that every organization to which they
belonged or had been affiliated with for a substantial period of time had not en-
gaged in forbidden advocacy.
724 Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952). Justice Frankfurter dissented
because he thought no party had standing. Id. at 497. Justices Black and Douglas
dissented on First Amendment grounds. Id. at 508.
725 342 U.S. at 492.
on unexplained membership in an organization so advocating with

knowledge of the advocacy.726 With regard to the required list, the
Justice observed that the state courts had interpreted the law to
provide that a person could rebut the presumption attached to his
mere membership.727
Invalidated the same year was an oath requirement, addressed
to membership in the Communist Party and other proscribed orga-
nizations, which the state courts had interpreted to disqualify from
employment “solely on the basis of organizational membership.” Stress-
ing that membership might be innocent, that one might be un-
aware of an organization’s aims, or that he might have severed a
relationship upon learning of its aims, the Court struck the law down;
one must be or have been a member with knowledge of illegal aims.728
But subsequent cases firmly reiterated the power of governmental
agencies to inquire into the associational relationships of their em-
ployees for purposes of determining fitness and upheld dismissals
for refusal to answer relevant questions.729 In Shelton v. Tucker,730
however, a five-to-four majority held that, although a state could
inquire into the fitness and competence of its teachers, a require-
ment that every teacher annually list every organization to which
he belonged or had belonged in the previous five years was invalid
because it was too broad, bore no rational relationship to the state’s
interests, and had a considerable potential for abuse.
The Court relied on vagueness when loyalty oaths aimed at
“subversives” next came before it. In Cramp v. Board of Public In-
struction,731 it unanimously held an oath too vague that required
one to swear, inter alia, that “I have not and will not lend my aid,
support, advice, counsel or influence to the Communist Party.” Simi-
larly, in Baggett v. Bullitt,732 the Court struck down two oaths, one
requiring teachers to swear that they “will by precept and example
726 342 U.S. at 492.
727 342 U.S. at 494–96.
728 Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
729 Beilan v. Board of Education, 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Lerner v. Casey, 357 U.S.
468 (1958); Nelson v. County of Los Angeles, 362 U.S. 1 (1960). Compare Slochower
v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956). For the self-incrimination as-
pects of these cases, see Fifth Amendment, “Self-Incrimination: Development and
Scope,” infra.
730 364 U.S. 479 (1960). “It is not disputed that to compel a teacher to disclose
his every associational tie is to impair that teacher’s right of free association, a right
closely allied to freedom of speech and a right which, like free speech, lies at the
foundation of a free society.” Id. at 485–86. Justices Frankfurter, Clark, Harlan, and
Whittaker dissented. Id. at 490, 496.
731 368 U.S. 278 (1961). For further proceedings on this oath, see Connell v. Hig-
ginbotham, 305 F. Supp. 445 (M.D. Fla. 1970), aff’d in part and rev’d in part, 403
U.S. 207 (1971).
732 377 U.S. 360 (1964). Justices Clark and Harlan dissented. Id. at 380
promote respect for the flag and the institutions of the United States
of America and the State of Washington, reverence for law and or-
der and undivided allegiance to the government,” and the other re-
quiring all state employees to swear, inter alia, that they would not
“aid in the commission of any act intended to overthrow, destroy, or
alter or assist in the overthrow, destruction, or alteration” of gov-
ernment. Although couched in vagueness terms, the Court’s opin-
ion stressed that the vagueness was compounded by its effect on
First Amendment rights and seemed to emphasize that the state
could not deny employment to one simply because he unintention-
ally lent indirect aid to the cause of violent overthrow by engaging
in lawful activities that he knew might add to the power of persons
supporting illegal overthrow.733
More precisely drawn oaths survived vagueness attacks but fell
before First Amendment objections in the next three cases. Elfbrandt
v. Russell 734 involved an oath that as supplemented would have been
violated by one who “knowingly and willfully becomes or remains a
member of the communist party . . . or any other organization hav-
ing for its purposes the overthrow by force or violence of the govern-
ment” with “knowledge of said unlawful purpose of said organiza-
tion.” The law’s blanketing in of “knowing but guiltless” membership
was invalid, wrote Justice Douglas for the Court, because one could
be a knowing member but not subscribe to the illegal goals of the
organization; moreover, it appeared that one must also have partici-
pated in the unlawful activities of the organization before public
employment could be denied.735 Next, in Keyishian v. Board of Re-
gents,736 the oath provisions sustained in Adler 737 were declared un-
constitutional. A number of provisions were voided as vague,738 but
the Court held invalid a new provision making Communist Party
membership prima facie evidence of disqualification for employ-
ment because the opportunity to rebut the presumption was too lim-
ited. It could be rebutted only by denying membership, denying knowl-
edge of advocacy of illegal overthrow, or denying that the organization
advocates illegal overthrow. But “legislation which sanctions mem-
bership unaccompanied by specific intent to further the unlawful
goals of the organization or which is not active membership vio-
733 377 U.S. at 369–70.
734 384 U.S. 11 (1966). Justices White, Clark, Harlan, and Stewart dissented.
Id. at 20.
735 384 U.S. at 16, 17, 19. “Those who join an organization but do not share its
unlawful purposes and who do not participate in its unlawful activities pose no threat,
either as citizens or public employees.” Id. at 17.
736 385 U.S. 589 (1967). Justices Clark, Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented.
Id. at 620.
737 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952).
738 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 597–604 (1967).
lates constitutional limitations.” 739 Similarly, in Whitehill v. Elkins,740

an oath was voided because the Court thought it might include within
its proscription innocent membership in an organization that advo-
cated illegal overthrow of government.
More recent cases do not illuminate whether membership changes
in the Court presage a change in view with regard to the loyalty-
oath question. In Connell v. Higginbotham 741 an oath provision read-
ing “that I do not believe in the overthrow of the Government of
the United States or of the State of Florida by force or violence”
was invalidated because the statute provided for summary dis-
missal of an employee refusing to take the oath, with no opportu-
nity to explain that refusal. Cole v. Richardson 742 upheld a clause
in an oath “that I will oppose the overthrow of the government of
the United States of America or of this Commonwealth by force,
violence, or by any illegal or unconstitutional method” upon the con-
struction that this clause was mere “repetition, whether for empha-
sis or cadence,” of the first part of the oath, which was a valid “up-
hold and defend” positive oath.
Legislative Investigations and the First Amendment.—
The power of inquiry by congressional and state legislative commit-
tees in order to develop information as a basis for legislation 743 is
subject to some uncertain limitation when the power as exercised
results in deterrence or penalization of protected beliefs, associa-
tions, and conduct. Although the Court initially indicated that it
would scrutinize closely such inquiries in order to curb First Amend-
ment infringement,744 later cases balanced the interests of the leg-
islative bodies in inquiring about both protected and unprotected
associations and conduct against what were perceived to be limited
restraints upon the speech and association rights of witnesses, and
upheld wide-ranging committee investigations.745 Later, the Court
placed the balance somewhat differently and required that the in-
739 385 U.S. at 608. The statement here makes specific intent or active member-
ship alternatives in addition to knowledge, whereas Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S.

11, 19 (1966), requires both in addition to knowledge.
740 389 U.S. 54 (1967). Justices Harlan, Stewart, and White dissented. Id. at
62.
741 403 U.S. 207 (1971).
742 405 U.S. 676, 683–84 (1972).
743 See subtopics under “Investigations in Aid of Legislation,” supra.
744 See United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 197–98 (1957); Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249–51 (1957).
Concurring in the last case, Justices Frankfurter and Harlan would have ruled that
the inquiry there was precluded by the First Amendment. Id. at 255.
745 Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Uphaus v. Wyman, 360 U.S.
72 (1959); Wilkinson v. United States, 365 U.S. 399 (1961); Braden v. United States,
365 U.S. 431 (1961). Chief Justice Warren and Justices Black, Douglas, and Bren-
nan dissented in each case.
vestigating agency show “a subordinating interest which is compel-

ling” to justify the restraint on First Amendment rights that the
Court found would result from the inquiry.746 The issues in this field,
thus, remain unsettled.
Interference With Vietnam War Effort.—Possibly the most cel-
ebrated governmental action in response to dissent to the Vietnam
War—the prosecution of Dr. Benjamin Spock and four others for con-
spiring to counsel, aid, and abet persons to evade the draft—failed
to reach the Supreme Court.747 Aside from a comparatively minor
case,748 the Court’s sole encounter with a Vietnam War protest al-
legedly involving protected “symbolic conduct” was United States v.
O’Brien.749 That case affirmed a conviction and upheld a congressio-
nal prohibition against destruction of draft registration certificates;
O’Brien had publicly burned his draft card. “We cannot accept the
view that an apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled
‘speech’ whenever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby
to express an idea. However, even on the assumption that the al-
leged communicative element in O’Brien’s conduct is sufficient to
bring into play the First Amendment, it does not necessarily follow
that the destruction of a registration certificate is constitutionally
protected activity. This Court has held that when ‘speech’ and
‘nonspeech’ elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a
sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the
nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations on First Amend-
ment freedoms.” 750 Finding that the government’s interest in hav-
ing registrants retain their cards at all times was an important one
and that the prohibition of destruction of the cards worked no re-
striction of First Amendment freedoms broader than necessary to
serve the interest, the Court upheld the statute. Subsequently, the
Court upheld a “passive enforcement” policy singling out for pros-
746 Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963).
Justices Harlan, Clark, Stewart, and White dissented. Id. at 576, 583. See also
DeGregory v. Attorney General of New Hampshire, 383 U.S. 825 (1966).
747 United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969).
748 In Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), the Court reversed a convic-
tion under 18 U.S.C. § 702 for wearing a military uniform without authority. The
defendant had worn the uniform in a skit in an on-the-street anti-war demonstra-
tion, and 10 U.S.C. § 772(f) authorized the wearing of a military uniform in a “the-
atrical production” so long as the performance did not “tend to discredit” the mili-
tary. This last clause the Court held an unconstitutional limitation of speech.
749 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
750 391 U.S. at 376–77. The Court applied the O’Brien test less deferentially in
Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994).

ecution for failure to register for the draft those young men who
notified authorities of an intention not to register for the draft and
those reported by others.751
Suppression of Communist Propaganda in the Mails.—A
1962 statute authorizing the Post Office Department to retain all
mail from abroad that was determined to be “communist political
propaganda” and to forward it to an addressee only upon his re-
quest was held unconstitutional in Lamont v. Postmaster Gen-
eral.752 The Court held that to require anyone to request receipt of
mail determined to be undesirable by the government was certain
to deter and inhibit the exercise of First Amendment rights to re-
ceive information.753 Distinguishing Lamont, the Court in 1987 up-
held statutory classification as “political propaganda” of communi-
cations or expressions by or on behalf of foreign governments, foreign
“principals,” or their agents, and reasonably adapted or intended to
influence United States foreign policy.754 “The physical detention of
materials, not their mere designation as ‘communist political propa-
ganda,’ was the offending element of the statutory scheme [in
Lamont].” 755
Exclusion of Certain Aliens as a First Amendment Prob-
lem.—Although a nonresident alien might be able to present no claim,
based on the First Amendment or on any other constitutional pro-
vision, to overcome a governmental decision to exclude him from
the country, it was arguable that United States citizens who could
assert a First Amendment interest in hearing the alien and receiv-
ing information from him, such as the right recognized in Lamont,
could be able to contest such exclusion.756 But the Court declined
to reach the First Amendment issue and to place it in balance when
it found that a governmental refusal to waive a statutory exclu-
751 Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985). The incidental restriction on
First Amendment rights to speak out against the draft was no greater than neces-
sary to further the government’s interests in “prosecutorial efficiency,” obtaining suf-
ficient proof prior to prosecution, and promoting general deterrence (or not appear-
ing to condone open defiance of the law). See also United States v. Albertini, 472
U.S. 675 (1985) (order banning a civilian from entering military base upheld as ap-
plied to attendance at base open house by individual previously convicted of destroy-
ing military property).
752 381 U.S. 301 (1965). The statute, 76 Stat. 840, was the first federal law the
Court ever struck down as an abridgment of the First Amendment speech and press
clauses.
753 381 U.S. at 307. Justices Brennan, Harlan, and Goldberg concurred, spelling
out in some detail the rationale of the protected right to receive information as the
basis for the decision.
754 Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).
755 481 U.S. at 480.
756 The right to receive information has been prominent in the rationale of sev-
eral cases, e.g., Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943); Thomas v. Collins,
323 U.S. 516 (1945); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
sion 757 was on facially legitimate and neutral grounds; the Court’s
emphasis, however, upon the “plenary” power of Congress over ad-
mission or exclusion of aliens seemed to indicate where such a bal-
ance might be drawn.758
Material Support of Terrorist Organizations

Congress may bar supporting the legitimate activities of cer-
tain foreign terrorist organizations through speech made to, under
the direction of, or in coordination with those groups. So held the
Court in Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project,759 a case challeng-
ing an effective prohibition on giving training in peaceful dispute
resolution, teaching how to petition the United Nations for relief,
providing legal expertise in negotiating peace agreements, and the
like.760 Without express reliance on wartime precedents, and yet also
without extended discussion of plaintiffs’ free speech interests, the
Court emphasized findings by the political branches that support
meant to promote peaceful conduct can nevertheless further terror-
ism by designated groups in multiple ways. The Court also cited
the narrowness of the proscription imposed. Only carefully defined
activities done in concert with previously designated organizations
were barred. Independent advocacy and mere membership were not
restricted. Given the national security and foreign affairs concerns
at stake, Congress had adequately balanced the competing inter-
ests of individual speech and government regulation, deference to
the informed judgment of the political branches being due even ab-
sent an extensive record of concrete evidence.761
757 By §§ 212(a)(28)(D) and (G) of the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952,
8 U.S.C. §§ 1182(a)(28)(D) and (G), aliens who advocate or write and publish “the
economic, international, and governmental doctrines of world communism” are made
ineligible to receive visas and are thus excluded from the United States. Upon the
recommendation of the Secretary of State, however, the Attorney General is autho-
rized to waive these provisions and to admit such an alien temporarily into the coun-
try. INA § 212(d)(3)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(3)(A).
758 Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972).
759 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1498, slip op. (2010).
760 The six-Justice majority also held that the statute at issue gave adequate
notice of what conduct was prohibited, a conclusion with which the dissenting Jus-
tices agreed, and basic First Amendment rights of association and assembly were
not implicated, a conclusion about which the dissent was less sanguine. 561 U.S.
___, No. 08–1498, slip op. at 13–20, 34–35 (2010). See also 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–
1498, slip op. 1, 3–5 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
761 The majority purported to apply a level of scrutiny more rigorous than the
intermediate scrutiny test applied in cases in which conduct, rather than the con-
tent of speech, is the primary target of regulation. 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1498, slip
op. at 22–23 (2010). The dissent found the majority’s analysis to be too deferential
and insufficiently exacting, and also thought the case might be susceptible to resolu-
tion on statutory grounds if remanded. 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1498, slip op. 7–22 (2010)
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
Particular Governmental Regulations That Restrict

Expression
Government adopts and enforces many measures that are de-
signed to further a valid interest but that may restrict freedom of
expression. As an employer, government is interested in attaining
and maintaining full production from its employees in a harmoni-
ous environment. As enforcer of the democratic method of carrying
out the selection of public officials, it is interested in outlawing “cor-
rupt practices” and promoting a fair and smoothly functioning elec-
toral process. As regulator of economic affairs, its interests are ex-
tensive. As educator, it desires to impart knowledge and training to
the young with as little distraction as possible. All these interests
may be achieved with some restriction upon expression, but, if the
regulation goes too far, then it will violate the First Amendment.762
Government as Employer: Political and Other Outside Ac-
tivities.—Abolition of the “spoils system” in federal employment
brought with it restrictions on political activities by federal employ-
ees. In 1876, federal employees were prohibited from requesting from,
giving to, or receiving from any other federal employee money for
political purposes, and the Civil Service Act of 1883 more broadly
forbade civil service employees to use their official authority or in-
fluence to coerce political action of any person or to interfere with
elections.763 By the Hatch Act, federal employees, and many state
employees as well, are forbidden to “take any active part in politi-
cal management or in political campaigns.” 764 As applied through
the regulations and rulings of the Office of Personnel Management,
762 Highly relevant in this and subsequent sections dealing with governmental
incidental restraints upon expression is the distinction the Court has drawn be-
tween content-based and content-neutral regulations—a distinction between regula-
tions that serve legitimate governmental interests and those that are imposed be-
cause of disapproval of the content of particular expression. Compare Police Dep’t of
Chicago v. Mosle, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S.
205 (1975); and Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), with Greer v. Spock,
424 U.S. 828 (1976); Civil Service Commission v. National Association of Letter Car-
riers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973); and United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Content-
based regulations are subject to strict scrutiny, but content-neutral regulations are
subject to lesser scrutiny. See “Modern Tests and Standards: Vagueness, Overbreadth,
Strict Scrutiny, Intermediate Scrutiny, and Effectiveness of Speech Restrictions,” su-
pra.
763 19 Stat. 143, § 6, 18 U.S.C. §§ 602–03, sustained in Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S.
371 (1882); 22 Stat. 403, as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 7323.

764 53 Stat. 1147 § 9(a), (1939), as amended, 5 U.S.C. § 7324(a)(2). By 54 Stat.
767 (1940), as amended, 5 U.S.C. §§ 1501–08, the restrictions on political activity

were extended to state and local governmental employees working in programs fi-
nanced in whole or in part with federal funds. This provision was sustained against
federalism challenges in Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947).
All the states have adopted laws patterned on the Hatch Act. See Broadrick v. Okla-
homa, 413 U.S. 601, 604 (1973).
formerly the Civil Service Commission, the Act prevents employees

from running for public office, distributing campaign literature, play-
ing an active role at political meetings, circulating nomination peti-
tions, attending a political convention except as a spectator, publish-
ing a letter soliciting votes for a candidate, and all similar activity.765
The question is whether government, which may not prohibit citi-
zens in general from engaging in these activities, may nonetheless
so control the off-duty activities of its own employees.
In United Public Workers v. Mitchell,766 the Court answered in
the affirmative. While the Court refused to consider the claims of
persons who had not yet engaged in forbidden political activities, it
ruled against a mechanical employee of the Mint who had done so.
The Court’s opinion, by Justice Reed, recognized that the restric-
tions of political activities imposed by the Act did in some measure
impair First Amendment and other constitutional rights,767 but it
based its decision upon the established principle that no right is
absolute. The standard by which the Court judged the validity of
the permissible impairment of First Amendment rights was a due
process standard of reasonableness.768 Thus, changes in the stan-
dards of judging incidental restrictions on expression suggested the
possibility of a reconsideration of Mitchell.769 In Civil Service Com-
mission v. National Association of Letter Carriers, however, a di-
vided Court, reaffirming Mitchell, sustained the Act’s limitations upon
political activity against a range of First Amendment challenges.770
The Court emphasized that the interest of the government in for-
bidding partisan political activities by its employees was so substan-
tial that it overrode the rights of those employees to engage in po-
litical activities and association; 771 therefore, a statute that barred
765 The Commission on Political Activity of Government Personnel, Findings and
Recommendations 11, 19–24 (Washington: 1968).

766 330 U.S. 75, 94–104 (1947). The decision was 4-to-3, with Justice Frank-
furter joining the Court on the merits only after arguing that the Court lacked juris-
diction.
767 330 U.S. at 94–95.
768 330 U.S. at 101–02.
769 The Act was held unconstitutional by a divided three-judge district court.
National Ass’n of Letter Carriers v. Civil Service Comm’n, 346 F. Supp. 578 (D.D.C.
1972).
770 413 U.S. 548 (1973). In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court
refused to consider overbreadth attacks on a state statute of much greater coverage

because the plaintiffs had engaged in conduct that the statute clearly could constitu-
tionally proscribe.
771 The interests the Court recognized as served by the proscription on partisan
activities were (1) the interest in the efficient and fair operation of governmental
activities and the appearance of such operation, (2) the interest in fair elections,
and (3) the interest in protecting employees from improper political influences. 413
U.S. at 557–67.
in plain language a long list of activities would clearly be valid.772

The issue in Letter Carriers, however, was whether the language
that Congress had enacted, forbidding employees to take “an active
part in political management or in political campaigns,” 773 was un-
constitutional on its face, either because the statute was too impre-
cise to allow government employees to determine what was forbid-
den and what was permitted, or because the statute swept in under
its coverage conduct that Congress could not forbid as well as con-
duct subject to prohibition or regulation. With respect to vague-
ness, plaintiffs contended and the lower court had held that the quoted
proscription was inadequate to provide sufficient guidance and that
the only further elucidation Congress had provided was in a sec-
tion stating that the forbidden activities were the same activities
that the Commission had as of 1940, and reaching back to 1883,
“determined are at the time of the passage of this act prohibited on
the part of employees . . . by the provisions of the civil-service
rules. . . .” 774 This language had been included, it was contended,
to deprive the Commission of power to alter thousands of rulings it
had made that were not available to employees and that were in
any event mutually inconsistent and too broad.
The Court held, on the contrary, that Congress had intended to
confine the Commission to the boundaries of its rulings as of 1940
but had further intended the Commission by a process of case-by-
case adjudication to flesh out the prohibition and to give content to
it. The Commission had done that. It had regularly summarized in
understandable terms the rules that it applied, and it was autho-
rized as well to issue advisory opinions to employees uncertain of
the propriety of contemplated conduct. “[T]here are limitations in
the English language with respect to being both specific and man-
ageably brief,” said the Court, but it thought the prohibitions as
elaborated in Commission regulations and rulings were “set out in
terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary common sense
can sufficiently understand and comply with, without sacrifice to
the public interests.” 775 There were conflicts, the Court conceded,
between some of the things forbidden and some of the protected ex-
pressive activities, but these were at most marginal. Thus, some
conduct arguably protected did under some circumstances so par-
take of partisan activities as to be properly proscribable. But the
Court would not invalidate the entire statute for this degree of
772 413 U.S. at 556.

773 413 U.S. at 554, 570 n.17.
774 413 U.S. at 570 n.17.
775 413 U.S. at 578–79.
overbreadth.776 Subsequently, in Bush v. Lucas 777 the Court held

that the civil service laws and regulations constitute a sufficiently
“elaborate, comprehensive scheme” to afford federal employees an
adequate remedy for deprivation of First Amendment rights as a
result of disciplinary actions by supervisors, and that therefore there
is no need to create an additional judicial remedy for the constitu-
tional violation.
The Hatch Act cases were distinguished in United States v. Na-
tional Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),778 in which the Court struck
down an honoraria ban as applied to lower-level employees of the
Federal Government. The honoraria ban suppressed employees’ right
to free expression while the Hatch Act sought to protect that right,
and also there was no evidence of improprieties in acceptance of
honoraria by members of the plaintiff class of federal employees.779
The Court emphasized further difficulties with the “crudely crafted”
honoraria ban: it was limited to expressive activities and had no
application to other sources of outside income, it applied when nei-
ther the subjects of speeches and articles nor the persons or groups
paying for them bore any connection to the employee’s job responsi-
bilities, and it exempted a “series” of speeches or articles without
also exempting individual articles and speeches. These “anomalies”
led the Court to conclude that the “speculative benefits” of the ban
were insufficient to justify the burdens it imposed on expressive ac-
tivities.780
Government as Employer: Free Expression Generally.— For
many years, the Court made a distinction between a government
employee’s free speech rights and the privilege of being a govern-
ment employee. That distinction was famously epitomized by Jus-
tice Holmes’ in the statement: “The petitioner may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right to be
a policeman.” 781 The Supreme Court embraced this application in
the early 1950s, first affirming a lower court decision,782 and soon
776 413 U.S. at 580–81.

777 462 U.S. 367, 385 (1983).
778 513 U.S. 454 (1995).
779 See 513 U.S. at 471. The plaintiff class consisted of all Executive Branch
employees below grade GS–16. Also covered by the ban were senior executives, Mem-
bers of Congress, and other federal officers, but the possibility of improprieties by
these groups did not justify application of the ban to “the vast rank and file of fed-
eral employees below grade GS–16.”Id. at 472.
780 513 U.S. at 477.
781 McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 2d 517 (1892).
782 Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 (D.C. Cir. 1950), aff’d by an evenly divided
Court, 341 U.S. 918 (1951). The appeals court majority, upholding the dismissal of a
government employee against due process and First Amendment claims, asserted
that “the plain hard fact is that so far as the Constitution is concerned there is no
thereafter applying the distinction itself. Upholding a prohibition

on employing as teachers anyone who advocated overthrowing the
government, the Court declared that “[i]t is clear that such persons
have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe
as they will. . . . It is equally clear that they have no right to work
for the state in the school system on their own terms. They may
work for the school system under reasonable terms laid down by
the proper authorities of New York. If they do not choose to work
on such terms, they are at liberty to retain their beliefs and asso-
ciations and go elsewhere. Has the State thus deprived them of any
right to free speech or assembly? We think not.” 783
The same year, however, in Wieman v. Updegraff, the Court ex-
pressly questioned the “right-privilege” doctrine, and has subse-
quently gone on to eliminate the distinction altogether. In Wieman,
the Court voided a public employee loyalty oath requirement condi-
tioned on mere membership in suspect organizations, reasoning that
the interest of public employees in being free of such an imposition
was substantial. “There can be no dispute about the consequences
visited upon a person excluded from public employment on disloy-
alty grounds. In the view of the community, the stain is a deep one;
indeed, it has become a badge of infamy. . . . [W]e need not pause
to consider whether an abstract right to public employment exists.
It is sufficient to say that constitutional protection does extend to
the public servant whose exclusion pursuant to a statute is pa-
tently arbitrary or discriminatory.” 784
The premise here—that there is a constitutional claim against
dismissal or rejection—has faded in subsequent cases. The ratio-
nale now is that, although government may deny employment for
any number of reasons (or any benefit for that matter), it may not
deny employment or other benefits on a basis that infringes a per-
prohibition against the dismissal of Government employees because of their politi-
cal beliefs, activities or affiliations. . . . The First Amendment guarantees free speech
and assembly, but it does not guarantee Government employ.” Id. at 59. Although
the Supreme Court issued no opinion in Bailey, several Justices touched on the is-
sues in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Committee v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951). Jus-
tices Douglas and Jackson in separate opinions rejected the privilege doctrine as
applied by the lower court in Bailey. Id. at 180, 185. Justice Black had previously
rejected the doctrine in United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 105 (1947)
(dissenting opinion).
783 Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 458, 492–93 (1952). Justices Douglas
and Black dissented, again rejecting the privilege doctrine. Id. at 508. Justice Frank-
furter, who dissented on other grounds, had previously rejected the doctrine in an-
other case, Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 725 (1951) (concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
784 344 U.S. 183, 190–91, 192 (1952). Some earlier cases had used a somewhat
qualified statement of the privilege. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75,
100 (1947); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716, 722 (1951).
son’s constitutionally protected interests. “For if the government could

deny a benefit to a person because of his constitutionally protected
speech or associations, his exercise of those freedoms would in ef-
fect be penalized and inhibited. This would allow the government
to ‘produce a result which [it] could not command directly.’ Such
interference with constitutional rights is impermissible.” 785
However, the fact that government does not have carte blanche
in dealing with the constitutional rights of its employees does not
mean that it has no power at all. “[I]t cannot be gainsaid,” the Court
said in Pickering v. Board of Education, “that the State has inter-
ests as an employer in regulating the speech of its employees that
differ significantly from those it possesses in connection with regu-
lation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” 786 Pickering con-
cerned the dismissal of a high school teacher who had written a
critical letter to a local newspaper reflecting on the administration
of the school system. The letter also contained several factual er-
rors. “The problem in any case,” Justice Marshall wrote for the Court,
“is to arrive at a balance between the interests of the teacher, as a
citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and the in-
terest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of
the public services it performs through its employees.” 787
The Court laid down no general standard, but undertook a sug-
gestive analysis. Dismissal of a public employee for criticism of his
superiors was improper, the Court indicated, where the relation-
ship of employee to superior was not so close—such as day-to-day
personal contact—that problems of discipline or of harmony among
coworkers, or problems of personal loyalty and confidence, would
785 Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (citation omitted). In a com-
panion case, the Court noted that the privilege basis for the appeals court’s due pro-
cess holding in Bailey “has been thoroughly undermined in the ensuing years.” Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 571 n.9 (1972). The test now in due process and
other such cases is whether government has conferred a property right in employ-
ment which it must respect, but the inquiry when it is alleged that an employee
has been penalized for the assertion of a constitutional right is that stated in the
text. A finding, however, that protected expression or conduct played a substantial
part in the decision to dismiss or punish does not conclude the case; the employer
may show by a preponderance of the evidence that the same decision would have
been reached in the absence of the protected expression or conduct. Mt. Healthy
City Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977); Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 416 (1979). See Amendment 14, “The Property Interest,”
infra.
786 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).
787 391 U.S. at 568.
arise.788 The school board had not shown that any harm had re-
sulted from the false statements in the letter and it could not pro-
ceed on the assumption that the false statements were per se harm-
ful, inasmuch as the statements primarily reflected a difference of
opinion between the teacher and the board about the allocation of
funds. Moreover, the allocation of funds is a matter of important
public concern about which teachers have informed and definite opin-
ions that the community should be aware of. “In these circum-
stances we conclude that the interest of the school administration
in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is
not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar con-
tribution by any member of the general public.” 789
Combining a balancing test of governmental interest and em-
ployee rights with a purportedly limiting statutory construction, the
Court, in Arnett v. Kennedy,790 sustained the constitutionality of a
federal law that authorized the removal or suspension without pay
of an employee “for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service” when the “cause” cited was speech by the employee. The
employee had publicly charged that his superiors had made an of-
fer of a bribe to a private person. The quoted statutory phrase, the
Court held, “is without doubt intended to authorize dismissal for
speech as well as other conduct.” But, recurring to its analysis re-
garding political activities by public employers in Letter Carri-
ers,791 it noted that the authority conferred was not impermissibly
vague, inasmuch as it is not possible to encompass within a statu-
tory enactment all the myriad situations that arise in the course of
employment, and inasmuch as the language used was informed by
788 391 U.S. at 568–70. Contrast Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), where
Pickering was distinguished on the basis that the employee, an assistant district
attorney, worked in an environment where a close personal relationship involving
loyalty and harmony was important. “When close working relationships are essen-
tial to fulfilling public responsibilities, a wide degree of deference to the employer’s
judgment is appropriate.” Id. at 151–52.
789 391 U.S. at 573. Pickering was extended to private communications of an
employee’s views to the employer in Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439
U.S. 410 (1979), although the Court recognized that different considerations might
arise in different contexts. That is, with respect to public speech, content may be
determinative in weighing impairment of the government’s interests, whereas, with
private speech, as “[w]hen a government employee personally confronts his immedi-
ate superior, . . . the manner, time, and place in which it is delivered” may also be
relevant. Id. at 415 n.4. As discussed below, however, in Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547
U.S. 410 (2006), the Court held that there is no First Amendment protection at all
for government employees when they make statements pursuant to their official du-
ties.
790 416 U.S. 134 (1974). The quoted language is from 5 U.S.C. § 7501(a).
791 Civil Service Comm’n v. National Ass’n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578–79
(1973) (discussed under Government as Employer: Political and Other Outside Ac-
tivities, supra).
developed principles of agency adjudication coupled with a proce-

dure for obtaining legal counsel from the agency on the interpreta-
tion of the law.792 Nor was the language overbroad, continued the
Court, because it “proscribes only that public speech which improp-
erly damages and impairs the reputation and efficiency of the em-
ploying agency, and it thus imposes no greater controls on the be-
havior of federal employees than are necessary for the protection of
the government as an employer. . . . We hold that the language ‘such
cause as will promote the efficiency of the service’ in the Act ex-
cludes constitutionally protected speech, and that the statute is there-
fore not overbroad.” 793
Pickering was distinguished in Connick v. Myers,794 a case in-
volving what the Court characterized in the main as an employee
grievance rather than an effort to inform the public on a matter of
public concern. The employee, an assistant district attorney in-
volved in a dispute with her supervisor over transfer to a different
section, was fired for insubordination after she circulated a ques-
tionnaire among her peers soliciting views on matters relating to
employee morale. The Court found this firing permissible. “When
employee expression cannot be fairly considered as relating to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community, gov-
ernment officials should enjoy wide latitude in managing their of-
fices, without intrusive oversight by the judiciary in the name of
the First Amendment.” 795 Whether an employee’s speech addresses
a matter of public concern, the Court indicated, must be deter-
mined not only by its content, but also by its form and context.796
Because one aspect of the employee’s speech did raise matters of
public concern, Connick also applied Pickering’s balancing test, hold-
ing that “a wide degree of deference is appropriate” when “close work-
ing relationships” between employer and employee are involved.797
The issue of public concern is not only a threshold inquiry, but, un-
der Connick, still figures in the balancing of interests: “the State’s
792 Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 158–64 (1974).
793 416 U.S. at 162. In dissent, Justice Marshall argued: “The Court’s answer is
no answer at all. To accept this response is functionally to eliminate overbreadth
from the First Amendment lexicon. No statute can reach and punish constitution-
ally protected speech. The majority has not given the statute a limiting construction
but merely repeated the obvious.” Id. at 229.
794 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
795 461 U.S. at 146. Connick was a 5–4 decision. Justice Brennan wrote the dis-
sent, arguing that information concerning morale at an important government office

is a matter of public concern, and that the Court extended too much deference to
the employer’s judgment as to disruptive effect. Id. at 163–65.
796 461 U.S. at 147–48. Justice Brennan objected to this introduction of context,
admittedly relevant in balancing interests, into the threshold issue of public con-
cern.
797 461 U.S. at 151–52.
burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon

the nature of the employee’s expression” and its importance to the
public.798
On the other hand, the Court has indicated that an employee’s
speech may be protected as relating to matters of public concern
even in the absence of any effort or intent to inform the public.799
In Rankin v. McPherson 800 the Court held as protected an employ-
ee’s statement “if they go for him again, I hope they get him,” made
to a co-worker upon hearing of an unsuccessful attempt to assassi-
nate the President and in a context critical of the President’s poli-
cies. Indeed, the Court in McPherson emphasized the clerical em-
ployee’s lack of contact with the public in concluding that the
employer’s interest in maintaining the efficient operation of the of-
fice (including public confidence and good will) was insufficient to
outweigh the employee’s First Amendment rights.801
In City of San Diego v. Roe,802 the Court held that a police de-
partment could fire a police officer who sold a video on the adults-
only section of eBay that showed him stripping off a police uniform
and masturbating. The Court found that the officer’s “expression does
not qualify as a matter of public concern . . . and Pickering balanc-
ing does not come into play.” 803 The Court also noted that the offi-
cer’s speech, unlike federal employees’ speech in United States v.
National Treasury Employees Union (NTEU),804 “was linked to his
official status as a police officer, and designed to exploit his employ-
er’s image,” and therefore “was detrimental to the mission and func-
tions of his employer.” 805 The Court, therefore, had “little difficulty
in concluding that the City was not barred from terminating Roe
under either line of cases [i.e., Pickering or NTEU].” 806 This leaves
798 461 U.S. at 150. The Court explained that “a stronger showing [of interfer-
ence with governmental interests] may be necessary if the employee’s speech more
substantially involve[s] matters of public concern.” Id. at 152.
799 This conclusion was implicit in Givhan, 439 U.S. 410 (1979), characterized
by the Court in Connick as involving “an employee speak[ing] out as a citizen on a

matter of general concern, not tied to a personal employment dispute, but . . . [speak-
ing] privately.” 461 U.S. at 148, n.8.
800 483 U.S. 378 (1987). This was a 5–4 decision, with Justice Marshall’s opin-
ion of the Court being joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens,
and with Justice Scalia’s dissent being joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and by
Justices White and O’Connor. Justice Powell added a separate concurring opinion.
801 “Where . . . an employee serves no confidential, policymaking, or public con-
tact role, the danger to the agency’s successful function from that employee’s pri-
vate speech is minimal.” 483 U.S. at 390–91.
802 543 U.S. 77 (2004) (per curiam).
803 543 U.S. at 84.
804 513 U.S. 454 (1995) (discussed under Government as Employer: Political and
Other Outside Activities, supra).

805 543 U.S. at 84.
806 543 U.S. at 80.
uncertain whether, had the officer’s expression not been linked to

his official status, the Court would have overruled his firing under
NTEU or would have upheld it under Pickering on the ground that
his expression was not a matter of public concern.
In Garcetti v. Ceballos, the Court cut back on First Amendment
protection for government employees by holding that there is no pro-
tection—Pickering balancing is not to be applied—“when public em-
ployees make statements pursuant to their official duties,” even if
those statements are about matters of public concern.807 In this case,
a deputy district attorney had presented his supervisor with a memo
expressing his concern that an affidavit that the office had used to
obtain a search warrant contained serious misrepresentations. The
deputy district attorney claimed that he was subjected to retalia-
tory employment actions, and he sued. The Supreme Court held “that
when public employees make statements pursuant to their official
duties, the employees are not speaking as citizens for First Amend-
ment purposes, and the Constitution does not insulate their commu-
nications from employer discipline.” 808 The fact that the employee’s
speech occurred inside his office, and the fact that the speech con-
cerned the subject matter of his employment, were not sufficient to
foreclose First Amendment protection.809 Rather, the “controlling fac-
tor” was “that his expressions were made pursuant to his du-
ties.” 810 Therefore, another employee in the office, with different du-
ties, might have had a First Amendment right to utter the speech
in question, and the deputy district attorney himself might have
had a First Amendment right to communicate the information that
he had in a letter to the editor of a newspaper. In these two in-
stances, a court would apply Pickering balancing.811
807 547 U.S. 410, 421 (2006).
808 547 U.S. at 421. However, “[s]o long as employees are speaking as citizens
about matters of public concern, they must face only those speech restrictions that
are necessary for their employers to operate efficiently and effectively.” Id. at 419.
Such necessity, however, may be based on a “common-sense conclusion” rather than
on “empirical data.” Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Acad-
emy, 551 U.S. 291, 300 (2007) (citing Garcetti).
809 The Court cited Givhan v. Western Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410 (1979),
for these points. In Givhan, the Court had upheld the First Amendment right of a
public school teacher to complain to the school principal about “employment policies
and practices at [the] school which [she] conceived to be racially discriminatory in
purpose or effect.” Id. at 413. The difference between Givhan and Ceballos was ap-
parently that Givhan’s complaints were not made pursuant to her job duties, whereas
Ceballos’ were. Therefore, Givhan spoke as a citizen whereas Ceballos spoke as a
government employee. See Ceballos, 547 U.S. at 420–21.
810 547 U.S. at 421.
811 The protections applicable to government employees have been extended to
independent government contractors, the Court announcing that “the Pickering bal-
ancing test, adjusted to weigh the government’s interests as contractor rather than
as employer, determines the extent of their protection.” Board of County Comm’rs v.
In distinguishing between unprotected “employee speech” and

protected “citizen speech,” the existence of a legal obligation to speak
which is external to one’s job responsibilities appears to place such
speech firmly in the “citizen speech” category. In Lane v. Franks,812
the director of a state government program for underprivileged youth
was called to testify regarding the alleged fraudulent activities of a
state legislator that occurred during the legislator’s employment in
the government program. Although the director’s testimony was based
on information learned during the course of his employment, the
Court held that testimony under oath by a public employee outside
the scope of his ordinary job duties is to be treated, for First Amend-
ment purposes, as speech by a citizen.813 Although the person testi-
fying may bear separate obligations to his employer during such
testimony, such as the obligation to act in a professional manner,
the independent legal obligation to testify truthfully renders such
testimony into a quintessential example of citizen speech.
In sum, although a public employer may not muzzle its employ-
ees or penalize them for their expressions and associations to the
same extent that a private employer can,814 the public employer none-
theless has broad leeway in restricting employee speech. If the em-
ployee speech does not relate to a matter of “public concern,” then
Connick applies and the employer is largely free of constitutional
restraint.815 If the speech does relate to a matter of public concern,
Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 673 (1996). See also O’Hare Truck Service, Inc. v. City of
Northlake, 518 U.S. 712, 715 (1996) (government may not “retaliate[ ] against a con-
tractor, or a regular provider of services, for the exercise of rights of political asso-
ciation or the expression of political allegiance”).
812 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–483, slip op. (2014).
813 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–483, slip op.at 9 (2014).
814 See, e.g., Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976), and Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S.
507 (1980) (political patronage systems impermissibly infringe protected belief and
associational rights of employees); Madison School Dist. v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167 (1977)
(school teacher may not be prevented from speaking at a public meeting in opposi-
tion to position advanced by union with exclusive representation rights). The public
employer may, as may private employers, permit collective bargaining and confer on
representatives of its employees the right of exclusive representation, Abood v. De-
troit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 223–32 (1977), but the fact that its employees may
speak does not compel government to listen to them. See Smith v. Arkansas State
Highway Employees, 441 U.S. 463 (1979) (employees have right to associate to pres-
ent their positions to their employer but employer not constitutionally required to
engage in collective bargaining). See also Minnesota State Bd. for Community Col-
leges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984) (public employees not members of union have
no First Amendment right to meet separately with public employers compelled by
state law to “meet and confer” with exclusive bargaining representative). Govern-
ment may also inquire into the fitness of its employees and potential employees, but
it must do so in a manner that does not needlessly endanger the expression and
associational rights of those persons. See, e.g., Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1969).
815 In Connick, the Court noted that it did not suggest “that Myers’ speech, even
if not touching upon a matter of public concern, is totally beyond the protection of
the First Amendment.” Rather, it was beyond First Amendment protection “absent
then, unless the speech was made by an employee pursuant to his

duties, Pickering’s balancing test is applied, with the governmental
interests in efficiency, workplace harmony, and the satisfactory per-
formance of the employee’s duties 816 balanced against the employ-
ee’s First Amendment rights. Although the general approach is easy
to describe, it has proven difficult to apply.817 The First Amend-
ment, however, does not stand alone in protecting the speech of pub-
lic employees; statutory protections for “whistleblowers” add to the
mix.818
Government as Educator.—Although the Court had previ-
ously made clear that students in public schools are entitled to some
constitutional protection,819 as are minors generally,820 its first at-
tempt to establish standards of First Amendment expression guar-
antees against curtailment by school authorities came in Tinker v.
Des Moines Independent Community School District.821 There, high
school principals had banned the wearing of black armbands by stu-
dents in school as a symbol of protest against United States’ ac-
tions in Vietnam. Reversing the refusal of lower courts to reinstate
students who had been suspended for violating the ban, the Court
set out the balance to be drawn. “First Amendment rights, applied
in light of the special characteristics of the school environment, are
available to teachers and students. It can hardly be argued that
either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to free-
dom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate. . . . On the
the most unusual of circumstances.” 461 U.S. at 147. In Ceballos, however, the Court,
citing Connick at 147, wrote that, if an employee did not speak as a citizen on a
matter of public concern, then “the employee has no First Amendment cause of ac-
tion based on his or her employer’s reaction to the speech.” 547 U.S. at 418.
816 In some contexts, the governmental interest is more far-reaching. See Snepp
v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 509 n.3 (1980) (interest in protecting secrecy of for-
eign intelligence sources).
817 For analysis of efforts of lower courts to apply Pickering and Connick, see
Massaro, Significant Silences: Freedom of Speech in the Public Sector Workplace, 61

S. CAL. L. REV. 1 (1987); and Allred, From Connick to Confusion: The Struggle to
Define Speech on Matters of Public Concern, 64 IND. L.J. 43 (1988). In Waters v. Churchill,
511 U.S. 661 (1994), the Court grappled with what procedural protections may be
required by the First Amendment when public employees are dismissed on speech-
related grounds, but reached no consensus.
818 The principal federal law is the Whistleblower Protection Act of 1989, Pub.
L. 101–12, 103 Stat. 16, 5 U.S.C. § 1201 note.

819 West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (flag
salute); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (limitation of language curriculum
to English); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (compulsory school at-
tendance in public rather than choice of public or private schools).
820 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Of course, children are in some respects sub-
ject to restrictions that could not constitutionally be applied to adults. E.g., Ginsberg
v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (access to material deemed “harmful to minors,”
although not obscene as to adults).
821 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
other hand, the Court has repeatedly emphasized the need for af-
firming the comprehensive authority of the States and of school of-
ficials, consistent with fundamental constitutional safeguards, to pre-
scribe and control conduct in the schools.” 822 Restriction on expression
by school authorities is only permissible to prevent disruption of
educational discipline. “In order for the State in the person of school
officials to justify prohibition of a particular expression of opinion,
it must be able to show that its action was caused by something
more than a mere desire to avoid the discomfort and unpleasant-
ness that always accompany an unpopular viewpoint. Certainly where
there is no finding and no showing that engaging in the forbidden
conduct would ‘materially and substantially interfere with the re-
quirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school,’
the prohibition cannot be sustained.” 823
The Court reaffimed Tinker in Healy v. James,824 in which it
held that the withholding of recognition by a public college admin-
istration from a student organization violated the students’ right of
association, which is implicit in the First Amendment. Denial of rec-
ognition, the Court held, was impermissible if it had been based on
the local organization’s affiliation with the national SDS, or on dis-
agreement with the organization’s philosophy, or on a fear of disrup-
tion with no evidentiary support. Furthermore, the Court wrote, “the
precedents of this Court leave no room for the view that, because
of the acknowledged need for order, First Amendment protections
should apply with less force on college campuses than in the com-
munity at large. Quite to the contrary, ‘[t]he vigilant protection of
constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in the commu-
nity of American schools.’ . . . The college classroom with its sur-
rounding environs is peculiarly the ‘market place of ideas,’ and we
break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedi-
cation to safeguarding academic freedom.” 825 A college administra-
822 393 U.S. at 506, 507.

823 393 U.S. at 509 (quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744, 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
See also Papish v. Board of Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (state university could not
expel a student for using “indecent speech” in campus newspaper). However, offen-
sive “indecent” speech in the context of a high school assembly is punishable by school
authorities. See Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (uphold-
ing 2-day suspension, and withdrawal of privilege of speaking at graduation, for stu-
dent who used sophomoric sexual metaphor in speech given to school assembly).
824 408 U.S. 169 (1972).
825 408 U.S. at 180–81 (internal quotation marks omitted).
tion may, however, impose a requirement “that a group seeking of-

fical recognition affirm in advance its willingness to adhere to
reasonable campus law.” 826
Although a public college may not be required to open its facili-
ties generally for use by student groups, once it has done so it must
justify any discrimination and exclusions under applicable constitu-
tional norms, such as those developed under the public forum doc-
trine. Thus, it was constitutionally impermissible for a college to
close off its facilities, otherwise open, to students wishing to en-
gage in religious speech.827
While it is unclear whether this holding would extend beyond
the college level to students in high school or below who are more
“impressionable” and perhaps less able to appreciate that equal ac-
cess does not compromise a school’s neutrality toward religion,828
Congress has done so by statute.829 On the other hand, a public
university that imposed an “accept-all-comers” policy on student groups
as a condition of receiving the financial and other benefits of offi-
cial school recognition did not impair a student religious group’s right
to expressive association, because the school’s policy was reason-
able and viewpoint neutral.830
826 Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 193. Because a First Amendment right was in
issue, the burden was on the college to justify its rejection of a request for recogni-
tion rather than upon the requesters to justify affirmatively their right to be recog-
nized. Id. at 184. Justice Rehnquist concurred in the result, because in his view a
school administration could impose upon students reasonable regulations that would
be impermissible if imposed by the government upon all citizens; consequently, he
did not think that cases the Court cited that had arisen in the latter situation were
controlling. Id. at 201. See also Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), in
which the Court upheld an anti-noise ordinance that forbade persons on grounds
adjacent to a school to willfully make noise or to create any other diversion during
school hours that “disturbs or tends to disturb” normal school activities.
827 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). To permit access by religious groups
does not violate the Establishment Clause, and, even if the Missouri Constitution
“has gone further than the Federal Constitution in proscribing indirect state sup-
port for religion, . . . the state interest asserted here—in achieving greater separa-
tion of church and State than is already ensured under the Establishment Clause of
the Federal Constitution—is limited by the Free Exercise Clause and in this case
by the Free Speech Clause as well.” Id. at 275–276.
828 454 U.S. at 274 n.14; see Brandon v. Board of Education, 635 F.2d 971 (2d
Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1123 (1981).

829 By enactment of the Equal Access Act in 1984, Pub. L. 98–377, title VIII, 98
Stat. 1302, 20 U.S.C. §§ 4071–74, Congress applied the same “limited open [public]
forum” principles to public high schools, and the Court upheld the Act against First
Amendment challenge. Westside Community Bd. of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226
(1990).
830 Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1371, slip op. (2010).
The Court did not address the more difficult question raised by the school’s written
policy, which forbade discrimination, among other things, based on religion or sexual
orientation, because the parties stipulated that in practice student groups were re-
quired to accept all students who complied with neutral membership requirements
When faced with another conflict between a school system’s ob-

ligation to inculcate community values in students and the free-
speech rights of those students, the Court splintered badly, remand-
ing for full trial a case challenging the authority of a school board
to remove certain books from high school and junior high school
libraries.831 In dispute were the school board’s reasons for remov-
ing the books—whether, as the board alleged, because of vulgarity
and other content-neutral reasons, or whether also because of politi-
cal disagreement with contents. The plurality conceded that school
boards must be permitted “to establish and apply their curriculum
in such a way as to transmit community values,” and that “there is
a legitimate and substantial community interest in promoting re-
spect for authority and traditional values be they social, moral, or
political.” At the same time, the plurality thought that students re-
tained substantial free-speech protections and that among these was
the right to receive information and ideas. Carefully limiting its dis-
cussion to the removal of books from a school library, and exclud-
ing the question of the acquisition of books as well as questions of
school curricula, the plurality held a school board constitutionally
disabled from removing library books in order to deny access to ideas
with which it disagrees for political reasons.832 The four dissenters
rejected the contention that school children have a right to receive
information and ideas and thought that the proper role of educa-
tion was to inculcate the community’s values, a function into which
the federal courts could rarely intrude.833 The decision provides little
guidance to school officials and to the lower courts and may neces-
sitate a revisiting of the controversy by the Supreme Court.
The Court distinguished Tinker in Hazelwood School District v.
Kuhlmeier,834 in which it relied on public forum analysis to hold
that editorial control and censorship of a student newspaper spon-
sored by a public high school need be only “reasonably related to
legitimate pedagogical concerns.” 835 “The question whether the First
Amendment requires a school to tolerate particular student speech—
the question that we addressed in Tinker—is different from the ques-
(e.g., payment of dues). Id. at 11–12. Thus, the Court did not address whether the
application of the narrower written anti-discrimination policies constituted view-
point discrimination against a student group that required its members to adhere
to its religious tenets, including the belief that sexual activity should only occur in
the context of marriage between a man and a woman. Id. at 21–23 (Alito, J., dissent-
ing).
831 Board of Education v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
832 457 U.S. at 862, 864–69, 870–72. Only Justices Marshall and Stevens joined
fully Justice Brennan’s opinion.

833 The principal dissent was by Justice Rehnquist. 457 U.S. at 904. See also id.
at 885 (Chief Justice Burger), 893 (Justice Powell), 921 (Justice O’Connor).
834 484 U.S. 260 (1988).
835 484 U.S. at 273.
tion whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively

to promote particular student speech.” 836 The student newspaper
had been created by school officials as a part of the school curricu-
lum, and served “as a supervised learning experience for journal-
ism students.” 837 Because no public forum had been created, school
officials could maintain editorial control subject only to a reasonable-
ness standard. Thus, a principal’s decision to excise from the publi-
cation an article describing student pregnancy in a manner be-
lieved inappropriate for younger students, and another article on
divorce critical of a named parent, were upheld.
The category of school-sponsored speech subject to Kuhlmeier
analysis appears to be far broader than the category of student ex-
pression still governed by Tinker. School-sponsored activities, the
Court indicated, can include “publications, theatrical productions,
and other expressive activities that students, parents, and mem-
bers of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprima-
tur of the school. These activities may fairly be characterized as
part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a tradi-
tional classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty
members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to
student participants and audiences.” 838 Because most primary, in-
termediate, and secondary school environments are tightly struc-
tured, with few opportunities for unsupervised student expres-
sion,839 Tinker apparently has limited applicability. It may be, for
example, that students are protected for off-premises production of
“underground” newspapers (but not necessarily for attempted dis-
tribution on school grounds) as well as for non-disruptive symbolic
speech. For most student speech at public schools, however, Tin-
ker’s tilt in favor of student expression, requiring school administra-
tors to premise censorship on likely disruptive effects, has been re-
placed by Kuhlmeier’s tilt in favor of school administrators’ pedagogical
discretion.840
836 484 U.S. at 270–71.

837 484 U.S. at 270.
838 484 U.S. at 271. Selection of materials for school libraries may fall within
this broad category, depending upon what is meant by “designed to impart particu-
lar knowledge or skills.” See generally Stewart, The First Amendment, the Public
Schools, and the Inculcation of Community Values, 18 J. LAW & EDUC. 23 (1989).
839 The Court in Kuhlmeier declined to decide “whether the same degree of def-
erence is appropriate with respect to school-sponsored expressive activities at the

college and university level.” 484 U.S. at 274, n.7.
840 One exception may exist for student religious groups covered by the Equal
Access Act; in this context the Court seemed to step back from Kuhlmeier’s broad
concept of curriculum-relatedness, seeing no constitutionally significant danger of
In Morse v. Frederick,841 the Court held that a school could pun-

ish a pupil for displaying a banner that said, “BONG HiTS 4 JE-
SUS,” because these words could reasonably be interpreted as “pro-
moting illegal drug use.” 842 The Court indicated that it might have
reached a different result if the banner had addressed the issue of
“the criminalization of drug use or possession.” 843 Justice Alito, joined
by Justice Kennedy, wrote a concurring opinion stating that they
had joined the majority opinion “on the understanding that (a) it
goes no further than to hold that a public school may restrict speech
that a reasonable observer would interpret as advocating illegal drug
use and (b) it provides no support for any restriction on speech that
can plausibly be interpreted as commenting on any political or so-
cial issue, including speech on issues such as ‘the wisdom of the
war on drugs or of legalizing marijuana for medicinal use.’ ” 844 As
Morse v. Frederick was a 5-to-4 decision, Justices Alito and Kenne-
dy’s votes were necessary for a majority and therefore should be
read as limiting the majority opinion with respect to future cases.
Governmental regulation of school and college administration
can also implicate the First Amendment. But the Court dismissed
as too attenuated a claim to a First Amendment-based academic
freedom privilege to withhold peer review materials from EEOC sub-
poena in an investigation of a charge of sex discrimination in a fac-
ulty tenure decision.845
Government as Regulator of the Electoral Process: Elec-
tions and Referendums.—Government has increasingly regu-
lated the electoral system by which candidates are nominated and
elected, requiring disclosure of contributions and certain expendi-
tures, limiting contributions and expenditures, and imposing other
regulations.846 These regulations can restrict freedom of expression
and association, which include the rights to join together for politi-
perceived school sponsorship of religion arising from application of the Act’s require-
ment that high schools provide meeting space for student religious groups on the
same basis that they provide such space for student clubs. Westside Community Bd.
of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
841 127 S. Ct. 2618 (2007).
842 127 S. Ct. at 2624.
843 127 S. Ct. at 2625.
844 127 S. Ct. at 2636.
845 University of Pennsylvania v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182 (1990).
846 The basic federal legislation regulating campaign finances is spread over sev-
eral titles of the United States Code. The relevant, principal modern laws are the
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, 86 Stat. 3, as amended by the Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, 88 Stat. 1263, the Federal Election Cam-
paign Act Amendments of 1979, 93 Stat. 1339, and the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002, 116 Stat. 81, found at 2 U.S.C. 431 et seq., and sections of Titles
18 and 26. The Federal Corrupt Practices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1074, was upheld in
Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534 (1934), but there was no First Amend-
ment challenge. All states, of course, extensively regulate elections.
cal purposes, to promote candidates and issues, and to participate

in the political process.847 The Court is divided with respect to the
constitutionality of many of these federal and state restrictions, but
it has been consistent in not permitting the government to bar or
penalize political speech directly. Thus, it held that the Minnesota
Supreme Court could not prohibit candidates for judicial election
from announcing their views on disputed legal and political is-
sues.848 And, when Kentucky attempted to void an election on the
ground that the winner’s campaign promise to serve at a lower sal-
ary than that affixed to the office violated a law prohibiting candi-
dates from offering material benefits to voters in consideration for
their votes, the Court ruled unanimously that the state’s action vio-
lated the First Amendment.849
Similarly, California could not prohibit official governing bodies
of political parties from endorsing or opposing candidates in pri-
mary elections.850 Minnesota, however, could prohibit a candidate
from appearing on the ballot as the candidate of more than one
party.851 The Court wrote that election “[r]egulations imposing se-
vere burdens on plaintiffs’ [associational] rights must be narrowly
tailored and advance a compelling state interest. Lesser burdens,
however, trigger less exacting review, and a State’s important regu-
latory interests will usually be enough to justify reasonable nondis-
criminatory restrictions.” 852 Minnesota’s ban on “fusion” candi-
dates was not severe, as a party that could not place another party’s
candidate on the ballot was free to communicate its preference for
that candidate by other means, and the ban served “valid state in-
terests in ballot integrity and political stability.” 853
847 See, e.g., Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1966); Buckley v. Valeo,
424 U.S. 1, 14, 19 (1976); First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
776–78 (1978); Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 52–54 (1982).
848 Republican Party of Minnesota v. White, 536 U.S. 765 (2002). Four Justices,
however, dissented from this decision.

849 Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45 (1982). See also Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S.
214 (1966) (setting aside a conviction and voiding a statute that punished election-
eering or solicitation of votes for or against any proposition on the day of the elec-
tion, applied to publication of a newspaper editorial on election day supporting an
issue on the ballot); Vanasco v. Schwartz, 401 F. Supp. 87 (E.D.N.Y. 1975) (three-
judge court), aff’d, 423 U.S. 1041 (1976) (statute barring malicious, scurrilous, and
false and misleading campaign literature is unconstitutionally overbroad).
850 Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214 (1989).
Cf. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (upholding Tennessee law prohibiting
solicitation of votes and distribution of campaign literature within 100 feet of the
entrance to a polling place; plurality found a “compelling” interest in preventing voter
intimidation and election fraud).
851 Timmons v. Twin City Area New Party, 520 U.S. 351 (1997).
852 520 U.S. at 538 (internal quotation marks omitted).
853 520 U.S. at 369–70.
In the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, as amended in

1974, Congress imposed new and stringent regulation of and limi-
tations on contributions to and expenditures by political cam-
paigns, as well as disclosure of most contributions and expendi-
tures, setting the stage for the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo.854
Acting in basic unanimity, the Court sustained the contribution and
disclosure sections of the statute (although several Justices felt that
the sustained provisions trenched on protected expression), but voided
the limitations on expenditures.855 Although “contribution and ex-
penditure limitations both implicate fundamental First Amend-
ment interests,” the Court found, “expenditure ceilings impose sig-
nificantly more severe restrictions on protected freedoms of political
expression and association than do . . . limitations on financial con-
tributions.” 856
As to contribution limitations, the Court in Buckley recognized
that political contributions “serve[ ] to affiliate a person with a can-
didate” and “enable[ ] like-minded persons to pool their resources
in furtherance of common political goals.” Contribution ceilings, there-
fore, “limit one important means of associating with a candidate or
committee. . . .” 857 Yet “[e]ven a significant interference with pro-
tected rights of political association may be sustained if the State
demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational free-
doms.” 858
As to expenditure limitations, the Court wrote, “[a] restriction
on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quan-
tity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.” 859
The expenditure of money in political campaigns may involve speech
alone, conduct alone, or mixed speech-conduct, the Court noted, but
all forms of it involve communication, and when governmental regu-
lation is aimed directly at suppressing communication it does not
matter how that communication is defined. As such, the regulation
must be subjected to close scrutiny and justified by compelling gov-
ernmental interests.
Applying these differing standards, the contribution limita-
tions, with some construed exceptions, survived, but the expendi-
854 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
855 The Court’s lengthy opinion was denominated per curiam, but five Justices
filed separate opinions.
856 424 U.S. at 23.
857 424 U.S. at 22.
859 424 U.S. at 19.
ture limitation did not. The contribution limitation was seen as im-
posing only a marginal restriction upon the contributor’s ability to
engage in free communication, inasmuch as the contribution shows
merely a generalized expression of support for a candidate without
communicating reasons for the support; “the size of the contribu-
tion provides a very rough index of the intensity of the contribu-
tors’ support for the candidate.” 860 The political expression really
occurs when the funds are spent by a candidate; only if the restric-
tions were set so low as to impede this communication would there
arise a constitutional infringement. This incidental restraint upon
expression may therefore be justified by Congress’s purpose to limit
the actuality and appearance of corruption resulting from large in-
dividual financial contributions.861
Of considerable importance to the contributions analysis, the Court
voided a section restricting the aggregate expenditure anyone could
make to advocate the election or defeat of a “clearly identified can-
didate” to $1,000 a year. Though the Court treated the restricted
spending as purely an expenditure, the activity seems to partake
equally of the nature of a contribution spent on behalf of a candi-
date (although not given to him or her directly). However, “[a]dvo-
cacy of the election or defeat of candidates for federal office is no
less entitled to protection under the First Amendment than the dis-
cussion of political policy generally or advocacy of the passage or
defeat of legislation.” 862 The Court found that none of the justifica-
tions offered in support of a restriction on such expression was ad-
equate; independent expenditures did not appear to pose the dan-
gers of corruption that contributions did, and it was an impermissible
purpose to attempt to equalize the ability of some individuals and
groups to express themselves by restricting the speech of other in-
dividuals and groups.863
860 424 U.S. at 21.

861 424 U.S. at 14–38. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun would have
struck down the contribution limitations. Id. at 235, 241–46, 290. See also Califor-
nia Medical Ass’n v. FEC, 453 U.S. 182 (1981), sustaining a provision barring indi-
viduals and unincorporated associations from contributing more than $5,000 per year
to any multicandidate political action committee, on the basis of the standards ap-
plied to contributions in Buckley; and FEC v. National Right to Work Comm., 459
U.S. 197 (1982), sustaining a provision barring nonstock corporations from solicit-
ing contributions from persons other than their members when the corporation uses
the funds for designated federal election purposes.
862 424 U.S. at 48.
863 424 U.S. at 39–51. Justice White dissented. Id. at 257. In an oblique return
to the right-privilege distinction, the Court agreed that Congress could condition re-
ceipt of public financing funds upon acceptance of expenditure limitations. Id. at 108–
09. In Common Cause v. Schmitt, 512 F. Supp. 489 (D.D.C. 1980), aff’d by an equally
divided Court, 455 U.S. 129 (1982), a provision was invalidated that limited indepen-
dent political committees to expenditures of no more than $1,000 to further the elec-
Similarly, limitations upon the amount of funds a candidate could

spend out of his own resources or those of his immediate family
were voided. A candidate, no less than any other person, has a First
Amendment right to advocate.864 The limitations upon total expen-
ditures by candidates seeking nomination or election to federal of-
fice could not be justified: the evil associated with dependence on
large contributions was met by limitations on contributions, the pur-
pose of equalizing candidate financial resources was impermissible,
and the First Amendment did not permit government to determine
that expenditures for advocacy were excessive or wasteful.865
The government not only may not limit the amount that a can-
didate may spend out of his own resources, but, if a candidate spends
more than a particular amount, the government may not penalize
the candidate by authorizing the candidate’s opponent to receive in-
dividual contributions at higher than the normal limit. In Davis v.
Federal Election Commission, the Court struck down, as lacking a
compelling governmental interest, a federal statute that provided
that, if a “self-financing” candidate for the House of Representa-
tives spends more than a specified amount, then his opponent may
accept more individual contributions than otherwise permitted. The
statute, the Court wrote, imposed “a special and potentially signifi-
cant burden” on a candidate “who robustly exercises [his] First Amend-
ment right.” 866 Citing Buckley, the Court stated that a burden “on
the expenditure of personal funds is not justified by any governmen-
tal interest in eliminating corruption or the perception of corrup-
tion.” This is because “reliance on personal funds reduces the threat
of corruption, and therefore . . . discouraging use of personal funds[
tion of any presidential candidate who received public funding. An equally divided
affirmance is of limited precedential value. When the validity of this provision, 26
U.S.C. § 9012(f), was again before the Court in 1985, the Court invalidated it. FEC
v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985). In an opinion
by Justice Rehnquist, the Court determined that the governmental interest in pre-
venting corruption or the appearance of corruption was insufficient justification for
restricting the First Amendment rights of committees interested in making indepen-
dent expenditures on behalf of a candidate, since “the absence of prearrangement
and coordination undermines the value of the expenditure to the candidate, and thereby
alleviates the danger that expenditures will be given as a quid pro quo for improper
commitments from the candidate.” Id. at 498. See also Colorado Republican Cam-
paign Comm. v. FEC, 518 U.S. 604 (1996) (the First Amendment bars application of
the Party Expenditure Provision of the Federal Election Campaign Act, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a(d)(3), to expenditures that the political party makes independently, without
coordination with the candidate).
864 424 U.S. at 51–54. Justices Marshall and White disagreed with this part of
the decision. Id. at 286.

865 424 U.S. at 54–59.
866 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2771, 2772 (2008). The statute was § 319(a) of the Biparti-
san Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA), Pub. L. 107–155, 116 Stat. 109, 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a–1(a), which was part of the so-called “Millionaire’s Amendment.”
] disserves the anticorruption interest.” 867 Citing Buckley again, the

Court added that the governmental interest in equalizing the finan-
cial resources of candidates does not provide a justification for re-
stricting expenditures, and, in fact, to restrict expenditures “has omi-
nous implications because it would permit Congress to arrogate the
voters’ authority to evaluate the strengths of candidates competing
for office. . . . Different candidates have different strengths. Some
are wealthy; others have wealthy supporters who are willing to make
large contributions. Some are celebrities; some have the benefit of
a well-known family name. Leveling electoral opportunities means
making and implementing judgments about which strengths should
be permitted to the outcome of an election.” 868
A related question is whether the government violates the First
Amendment rights of a candidate running a privately funded cam-
paign when it provides public “equalization” funds to opposition can-
didates. In Arizona Free Enterprise Club’s Freedom Club PAC v. Ben-
nett,869 the Court considered an Arizona voluntary public financing
system which granted an initial allotment to the campaigns of can-
didates for state office who agreed to certain requirements and limi-
tations.870 In addition, matching funds were made available to the
campaign if the expenditures of a privately financed opposing can-
didate, combined with the expenditures of any independent groups
supporting that opposing candidacy, exceeded the campaign’s ini-
tial allotment. Citing Davis, the Court found the scheme unconsti-
tutional because it forced the privately financed candidate to “shoul-
der a special and potentially significant burden” in choosing to exercise
his First Amendment right to spend funds on behalf of his candi-
dacy.871 Although the dissent argued that the provision of benefits
to one speaker had not previously been considered by the Court as
867 128 S. Ct. at 2773 (emphasis in original). Justice Stevens, in the part of his
dissenting opinion joined by Justices Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer, found that the
Millionaire’s Amendment does not cause self-funding candidates “any First Amend-
ment injury whatsoever. The Millionaire’s Amendment quiets no speech at all. On
the contrary, it does no more than assist the opponent of a self-funding candidate in
his attempts to make his voice heard. . . . Enhancing the speech of the millionaire’s
opponent, far from contravening the First Amendment, actually advances its core
principles.” Id. at 2780.
868 128 S. Ct. at 2773–74. The Court also struck down the disclosure require-
ments in § 319(b) of BCRA because they “were designed to implement the asymmetri-
cal contribution limits provided for in § 319(a), and . . . § 319(a) violates the First
Amendment.” Id. at 2775.
869 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–238, slip op. (2011).
870 These included limiting the expenditure of personal funds to $500, participat-
ing in at least one public debate, adhering to an over all expenditure cap, and re-
turning all unspent public moneys to the State.
871 Bennett, 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–238, slip op. at 11 quoting Davis, 554 U.S. at
739.
a significant burden to another,872 the majority distinguished those

cases as not having involved the provision of subsidies to directly
counter the triggering speech.873
It was mentioned above that the Court in Buckley upheld the
disclosure requirements of the Federal Election Campaign Act. The
Court found that, although compelled disclosure “cannot be justi-
fied by a mere showing of some legitimate governmental interest,”
the governmental interests in the disclosure that the statute in Buckley
mandated were “sufficiently important to outweigh the possibility
of infringement” of the First Amendment.874 Disclosure, the Court
found, “provides the electorate with information ‘as to where politi-
cal campaign money comes from and how it is spent by the candi-
date’ ”; it deters “actual corruption and the appearance of corrup-
tion”; and it is “an essential means of gathering the data necessary
to detect violations of the contribution limitations” that the statute
imposed.875
The Court indicated, however that, under some circumstances,
the First Amendment might require exemption for minor parties that
were able to show “a reasonable probability that the compelled dis-
closure of a party’s contributors’ names will subject them to threats,
harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or pri-
vate parties.” 876 This standard was applied both to disclosure of con-
tributors’ names and to disclosure of recipients of campaign expen-
ditures in Brown v. Socialist Workers ’74 Campaign Committee,877
in which the Court held that the minor party had established the
requisite showing of likely reprisals through proof of past govern-
mental and private hostility and harassment. Disclosure of recipi-
ents of campaign expenditures, the Court reasoned, could not only
dissuade supporters and workers who might receive reimburse-
ment for expenses, but could also dissuade various entities from per-
forming routine commercial services for the party and thereby “cripple
a minor party’s ability to operate effectively.” 878
The Court has apparently extended the reasoning of these cases
to include not just disclosure related to political contributions, but
also to disclosure related to legally “qualifying” a measure for the
ballot. In Doe v. Reed,879 the Court found that signing a petition to
initiate a referendum was a protected form of political expres-
872 Slip op. 10–11 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
873 Slip op. at 17.
874 424 U.S. at 64, 66. See also Amendment I, “Political Association,” supra.
875 424 U.S. at 66, 67, 68.
876 424 U.S. at 74.
877 459 U.S. 87 (1982).
878 459 U.S. at 97–98.
879 561 U.S. ___, No. 09–559, slip op. (2010).
sion,880 and that a state requirement to disclose the names and ad-
dresses on those petitions to the public would be subjected to “ex-
acting scrutiny.” 881 The Court upheld the disclosure requirement on
its face, finding that it furthered the state’s interest in detecting
fraud and mistake in the petitioning process, while also providing
for transparency and accountability. The case was remanded, how-
ever, to ascertain whether in this particular instance (a referen-
dum to overturn a law conferring rights to gay couples) there was
a “reasonable probability” that the compelled disclosures would sub-
ject the signatories to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either
Government officials or private parties.882
In Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC,883 the Court held
that Buckley v. Valeo “is authority for state limits on contributions
to state political candidates,” but state limits “need not be pegged
to Buckley’s dollars.” 884 The Court in Nixon justified the limits on
contributions on the same grounds that it had in Buckley: “prevent-
ing corruption and the appearance of it that flows from munificent
campaign contributions.” 885 Further, Nixon did “not present a close
call requiring further definition of whatever the State’s evidentiary
obligation may be” to justify the contribution limits, as “there is
little reason to doubt that sometimes large contributions will work
actual corruption of our political system, and no reason to question
the existence of a corresponding suspicion among voters.” 886 As for
the amount of the contribution limits, Missouri’s fluctuated in accor-
dance with the consumer price index, and, when suit was filed, ranged
from $275 to $1,075, depending on the state office or size of constitu-
880 Note, however, that the Court subsequently declined to extend the reasoning
of this case to find that a legislator’s vote was a form of expression protected by the
First Amendment. Nevada Comm’n on Ethics v. Carrigan, 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–568,
slip op. (2011) (upholding law prohibiting legislator with a conflict of interest from
voting on a proposal or advocating its passage or failure).
881 Reed, No. 09–559, slip op. at 7. Five Justices joined the majority opinion writ-
ten by Chief Justice Roberts—Justices Kennedy, Ginsburg, Breyer, Alito and Sotomayor.
One might question, however, what level of scrutiny Justice Breyer would support,
since he also joined a concurrence by Justice Stevens, which suggested that the dis-
closure of the name and addresses on the petitions is not “a regulation of pure speech,”
and consequently should be subjected to a lesser standard of review. Slip op. at 1
(Stevens, J., concurring in part and in judgment). Justice Breyer, in his own concur-
rence, suggests that “in practice [the standard articulated in both the majority and
Justice Steven’s concurrence] has meant asking whether the statute burdens any
one such interest in a manner out of proportion to the statute’s salutary effects upon
the others.” Slip op. at 1 (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, on the other hand,
questioned whether “signing a petition that has the effect of suspending a law fits
within ‘freedom of speech’ at all.” Slip op. at 1 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
882 Slip op. at 12–13 (citation omitted).
883 528 U.S. 377 (2000).
884 528 U.S. at 381–82.
885 528 U.S. at 390.
886 528 U.S. at 393, 395.
ency. The Court upheld these limits, writing that, in Buckley, it had
“rejected the contention that $1,000, or any other amount, was a
constitutional minimum below which legislatures could not regu-
late.” 887 The relevant inquiry, rather, was “whether the contribu-
tion limitation was so radical in effect as to render political associa-
tion ineffective, drive the sound of a candidate’s voice below the level
of notice, and render contributions pointless.” 888
In McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission,889 however, a
plurality of the Court 890 appeared to signal an intent to more closely
scrutinize limits on contributions to ensure a “fit” between govern-
mental objective and means utilized.891 Considering aggregate lim-
its on individual contributions 892—similar to the ones that were ap-
proved in Buckley as a means to prevent political corruption—the
plurality opinion emphasized that the corruption rationale did not
extend to preventing contributors from gaining influence over or ac-
cess to elected officials. Instead, the Court asserted that the govern-
mental interest identified in Buckley was a more narrow avoidance
of quid pro quo corruption or the appearance thereof.893 The aggre-
gate limits had been previously upheld as a means to prevent indi-
viduals from giving unrestricted funds to groups most likely to di-
rect money to a desired candidate, effectively circumventing the
contribution rules. The plurality, however, noted that a variety of
anti-circumvention laws and regulations had been implemented since
the Court’s decision in Buckley, thus undermining the rationale for
aggregate limits. Distinguishing Buckley based on these facts, but
without overruling its holding, the Court struck down the aggre-
gate limits.
887 528 U.S. at 397.

888 528 U.S. at 397.
889 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–536, slip op. (2014).
890 Chief Justice Roberts wrote the plurality opinion, joined by Justices Scalia,
Kennedy and Alito. Justice Thomas, concurring in judgment, declined to join the
reasoning of the plurality, arguing that, to the extent that Buckley afforded a lesser
standard of review to restrictions on contributions than to expenditures, it should
be overruled.
891 The Court declined to revisit the differing standards between contributions
and expenditures established in Buckley, holding that the issue in question, aggre-
gate spending limits, did not meet the demands of either test. 572 U.S. ___, slip op.
at 10.
892 In 2014, these aggregate limits allowed individuals to contribute up to $2,600
per election to a candidate, $5,000 per year to a Political Action Committee, $2,400
per year to a national party committee, and $10,000 per year to a state or local
party committee. 2 U.S.C. § 441a(a)(1).
893 In a dissenting opinion by Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor
and Kagan, this characterization of the corruption rationale in Buckley (as well as
in subsequent cases) was vigorously disputed. 572 U.S. ___, slip op. at 4–13 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
Outside the context of contributions to candidates, however, the

Court has not been convinced of the justifications for limiting such
uses of money for political purposes. Thus, a municipal ordinance
regulating the maximum amount that could be contributed to or
accepted by an association formed to take part in a city referen-
dum was invalidated.894 Although Buckley had sustained limits on
contributions as a prophylactic measure to prevent corruption or its
appearance, no risk of corruption was found in giving or receiving
funds in connection with a referendum. Similarly, the Court invali-
dated a criminal prohibition on payment of persons to circulate pe-
titions for a ballot initiative.895
Venturing into the area of the constitutional validity of govern-
mental limits upon political activities by corporations, a closely di-
vided Court struck down a state law that prohibited corporations
from expending funds to influence referendum votes on any mea-
sure save proposals that materially affected corporate business, prop-
erty, or assets. In First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, the Court
held that the free discussion of governmental affairs “is the type of
speech indispensable to decisionmaking in a democracy,” and that
“this is no less true because the speech comes from a corporation
rather than an individual.” 896 The Court held that it is the nature
of the speech, not the status of the speaker, that is relevant for First
Amendment analysis, thus allowing it to pass by the question of
the rights a corporate person may have. The “materially affecting”
requirement was found to be an impermissible proscription of speech
based on the content of the speech and the identity of the interests
894 Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1980). It is
not clear from the opinion whether the Court was applying a contribution or an ex-
penditure analysis to the ordinance, see id. at 301 (Justice Marshall concurring), or
whether it makes any difference in this context.
895 Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414 (1988). The Court subsequently struck down a
Colorado statute that required ballot-initiative proponents, if they pay circulators,

to file reports disclosing circulators’ names and addresses and the total amount paid
to each circulator. Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182
(1999). Although the Court upheld a requirement that proponents’ names and the
total amount they have spent to collect signatures be disclosed, as this served “as a
control or check on domination of the initiative process by affluent special interest
groups” (id. at 202), it found that “[t]he added benefit of revealing the names of paid
circulators and the amounts paid to each circulator . . . is hardly apparent and has
not been demonstrated.” Id. at 203. The Court also struck down a requirement that
circulators be registered voters, as the state’s interest in ensuring that circulators
would be amenable to subpoenas was served by the requirement that they be resi-
dents a requirement on which the Court had no occasion to rule.
896 435 U.S. 765, 777 (1978). Justice Powell wrote the opinion of the Court. Dis-
senting, Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall argued that while corporations were
entitled to First Amendment protection, they were subject to more regulation than
were individuals, and substantial state interests supported the restrictions. Id. at
802. Justice Rehnquist went further in dissent, finding no corporate constitutional
protection. Id. at 822.
that the speaker represented. The “exacting scrutiny” that restric-

tions on speech must pass was not satisfied by any of the justifica-
tions offered and the Court in any event found some of them imper-
missible.
Bellotti called into some question the constitutionality of the fed-
eral law that makes it unlawful for any corporation or labor union
“to make a contribution or expenditure in connection with any elec-
tion” for federal office or “in connection with any primary election
or political convention or caucus held to select candidates” for such
office.897 The Court had previously passed on several opportunities
to assess this restriction,898 and one of the dissents in Bellotti noted
the potential conflict.899 While the dissent’s concerns were ulti-
mately realized in Citizens United v. FEC,900 it was only after many
years of the Court either distinguishing Bellotti or applying it nar-
rowly.
During that interim, the Court first considered challenges to dif-
ferent aspects of the federal statute and to related state statutes,
upholding some restrictions on corporate electoral activities, but lim-
iting others. In FEC v. National Right to Work Committee,901 the
Court considered the operation of “separate segregated funds” (in
common parlance, a Political Action Committee or “PAC”), through
which, according to federal law, corporations can engage in speci-
fied political activities. The Court unanimously upheld a prohibi-
tion on a corporation soliciting money from other corporations for a
PAC in order to make contributions or expenditures in relation to
federal elections. Relying on Bellotti for the proposition that the gov-
ernment may act to prevent “both actual corruption and the appear-
ance of corruption of elected representatives,” the Court saw no rea-
897 2 U.S.C. § 441b. The provision began as § 313 of the Federal Corrupt Prac-
tices Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 1074, prohibiting contributions by corporations. It was

made temporarily applicable to labor unions in the War Labor Disputes Act of 1943,
57 Stat. 167, and became permanently applicable in § 304 of the Taft-Hartley Act.
61 Stat. 159.
898 All three cases involved labor unions and were decided on the basis of statu-
tory interpretation, apparently informed with some constitutional doubts. United States
v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106 (1948); United States v. United Automobile Workers, 352 U.S.
567 (1957); Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385 (1972).
899 Bellotti, 435 U.S. at 811–12 (Justice White dissenting). The majority opin-
ion, however, saw several distinctions between the federal law and the law at issue
in Bellotti. The Court emphasized that Bellotti was a referendum case, not a case
involving corporate expenditures in the context of partisan candidate elections, in
which the problem of corruption of elected representatives was a weighty problem.
“Congress might well be able to demonstrate the existence of a danger of real or
apparent corruption in independent expenditures by corporations to influence candi-
date elections.” Id. at 787–88 & n.26.
900 558 U.S. ___, No. 08–205, slip op. (2010).
901 459 U.S. 197 (1982).
son that Congress could not, in its legislative judgment, treat unions,
corporations, and similar organizations differently from individu-
als.902
However, an exception to this general principle was recognized
by a divided Court in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc.,903
holding the section’s requirement that independent expenditures be
financed by voluntary contributions to a PAC unconstitutional as
applied to a corporation organized to promote political ideas, hav-
ing no stockholders, and not serving as a front for a “business cor-
poration” or union. The Court found that one of the rationales for
the special rules on corporate participation in elections—
elimination of “the potential for unfair deployment of [corporate] wealth
for political purposes”—had no applicability to a corporation “formed
to disseminate political ideas, not to amass capital.” 904 The other
principal rationale—protection of corporate shareholders and other
contributors from having their money used to support political can-
didates to whom they may be opposed—was also deemed inappli-
cable. The Court distinguished National Right to Work Committee
because “restrictions on contributions require less compelling justi-
fication than restrictions on independent spending,” and also ex-
plained that, “given a contributor’s awareness of the political activ-
ity of [MCFL], as well as the readily available remedy of refusing
further donations, the interest protecting contributors is simply in-
sufficient to support § 441b’s restriction on . . . independent spend-
ing.” 905 What the Court did not address directly was whether the
same analysis could have led to a different result in National Right
to Work Committee.906
Clarification of Massachusetts Citizens for Life was provided by
Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,907 in which the Court
upheld application to a nonprofit corporation of Michigan’s restric-
tions on independent expenditures by corporations. The Michigan
law, like federal law, prohibited such expenditures from corporate
treasury funds, but allowed them to be made from a corporation’s
PAC funds. This arrangement, the Court decided, serves the state’s
compelling interest in ensuring that expenditure of corporate wealth,
902 459 U.S. at 210–11.
903 479 U.S. 238 (1986). Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court was joined by
Justices Marshall, Powell, O’Connor, and Scalia; Chief Justice Rehnquist, author of
the Court’s opinion in National Right to Work Comm., dissented from the constitu-
tional ruling, and was joined by Justices White, Blackmun, and Stevens.
904 479 U.S. at 259.
905 479 U.S. at 259–60, 262.
906 The Court did not spell out whether there was any significant distinction
between the two organizations, NRWC and MCFL; Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dis-
sent suggested that there was not. See 479 U.S. at 266.
907 494 U.S. 652 (1990).
accumulated with the help of special advantages conferred by state

law, does not “distort” the election process.908 The law was suffi-
ciently “narrowly tailored” because it permits corporations to make
independent political expenditures through segregated funds that
“accurately reflect contributors’ support for the corporation’s politi-
cal views.” 909 Also, the Court concluded that the Chamber of Com-
merce was unlike the MCFL in each of the three distinguishing fea-
tures that had justified an exemption from operation of the federal
law. Unlike MCFL, the Chamber was not organized solely to pro-
mote political ideas; although it had no stockholders, the Cham-
ber’s members had similar disincentives to forgo benefits of mem-
bership in order to protest the Chamber’s political expression; and,
by accepting corporate contributions, the Chamber could serve as a
conduit for corporations to circumvent prohibitions on direct corpo-
rate contributions and expenditures.910
In FEC v. Beaumont,911 the Court held that the federal law that
bars corporations from contributing directly to candidates for fed-
eral office, but allows contributions though PACs, may constitution-
ally be applied to nonprofit advocacy corporations. The Court in Beau-
mont wrote that, in National Right to Work, it had “specifically rejected
the argument . . . that deference to congressional judgments about
proper limits on corporate contributions turns on details of corpo-
rate form or the affluence of particular corporations.” 912 Though non-
profit advocacy corporations, the Court held in Massachusetts Citi-
zens for Life, have a First Amendment right to make independent
expenditures, the same is not true for direct contributions to candi-
dates.
In McConnell v. FEC,913 the Court upheld against facial consti-
tutional challenges key provisions of the Bipartisan Campaign Re-
form Act of 2002 (BCRA). A majority opinion coauthored by Jus-
tices Stevens and O’Connor upheld two major provisions of BCRA:
(1) the prohibition on “national party committees and their agents
from soliciting, receiving, directing, or spending any soft money,” 914
which is money donated for the purpose of influencing state or lo-
cal elections, or money for “mixed-purpose activities—including get-
908 Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) Austin
found the law helped prevent “the corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggre-
gations of wealth that are accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that
have little or no correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”
494 U.S. at 660.
909 494 U.S. at 660–61.
910 494 U.S. at 661–65.
911 539 U.S. 146 (2003).
912 539 U.S. at 157.
913 540 U.S. 93 (2003).
914 540 U.S. at 133.
out-the-vote drives and generic party advertising,” 915 and (2) the
prohibition on corporations and labor unions’ using funds in their
treasuries to finance “electioneering communications,” 916 which BCRA
defines as “any broadcast, cable, or satellite communication” that
“refers to a clearly identified candidate for Federal Office,” made
within 60 days before a general election or 30 days before a pri-
mary election. Electioneering communications thus include both “ex-
press advocacy and so-called issue advocacy.” 917
As for the soft-money prohibition on national party commit-
tees, the Court applied “the less rigorous scrutiny applicable to con-
tribution limits” 918 and found it “closely drawn to match a suffi-
ciently important interest.” 919 The Court’s decision to use less rigorous
scrutiny, it wrote, “reflects more than the limited burdens they [i.e.,
the contribution restrictions] impose on First Amendment free-
doms. It also reflects the importance of the interests that underlie
contribution limits—interests in preventing ‘both the actual corrup-
tion threatened by large financial contributions and the eroding of
public confidence in the electoral process through the appearance
of corruption.’ ” 920
As for the prohibition on corporations and labor unions’ using
their general treasury funds to finance electioneering communica-
tions, the Court applied strict scrutiny, but found a compelling gov-
ernmental interest in preventing “the corrosive and distorting ef-
fects of immense aggregations of wealth that are accumulated with
the help of the corporate form and that have little or no correlation
to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideals.” 921 These
corrosive and distorting effects result both from express advocacy
and from so-called issue advocacy. The Court also noted that, be-
cause corporations and unions “remain free to organize and admin-
ister segregated funds, or PACs,” for electioneering communica-
tions, the provision was not a complete ban on expression.922 In
response to the argument that the justifications for a ban on ex-
press advocacy did not apply to issue advocacy, the Court found that
the “argument fails to the extent that the issue ads broadcast dur-
915 540 U.S. at 123.

916 540 U.S. at 204.
917 540 U.S. at 190.
918 540 U.S. at 141.
920 540 U.S. at 136.
921 540 U.S. at 205 (quoting Austin v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce,
494 U.S. at 660).

922 540 U.S. at 204.
ing the 30- and 60-day periods preceding federal primary and gen-
eral elections are the functional equivalent of express advocacy.” 923
The limitations on electioneering communication, however, soon
faced renewed examination by the Court. In Wisconsin Right to Life,
Inc. v. Federal Election Comm’n (WRTL I),924 the Court vacated a
lower court decision that had denied plaintiffs the opportunity to
bring an as-applied challenge to BCRA’s regulation of electioneer-
ing communications. Subsequently, in Federal Election Commission
v. Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL II),925 the Court considered what
standard should be used for such a challenge. Chief Justice Rob-
erts, in the controlling opinion,926 rejected the suggestion that an
issue ad broadcast during the specified periods before elections should
be considered the “functional equivalent” of express advocacy if the
“intent and effect” of the ad was to influence the voter’s decision in
an election.927 Rather, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion held that an
issue ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the
ad is “susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an
appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate.” 928
Then came the case of Citizens United v. FEC,929 which signifi-
cantly altered the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on corporations
and election law. In Citizens United, a non-profit corporation re-
leased a film critical of then-Senator Hillary Clinton, a candidate
in the Democratic Party’s 2008 Presidential primary elections, and
sought to make it available to cable television subscribers within
30 days of that primary. The case began as another as-applied chal-
lenge to BCRA, but the Court asked for reargument, and, in a 5–4
decision, not only struck down the limitations on electioneering com-
munication on its face (overruling McConnell) but also rejected the
use of the antidistortion rationale (overruling Austin).
923 540 U.S. at 206.

924 546 U.S. 410 (2006).
925 127 S. Ct. 2652 (2007).
926 Only Justice Alito joined Parts III and IV of Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion,
which addressed the issue of as-applied challenges to BCRA. Justices Scalia (joined
by Kennedy and Thomas) concurred in the judgment, but would have overturned
McConnell and struck down BCRA’s limits on issue advocacy on its face.
927 The suggestion was made that an “intent and effect” standard had been en-
dorsed by the Court in McConnell, which stated that “[t]he justifications for the regu-
lation of express advocacy apply equally to ads aired during those periods if the ads
are intended to influence the voters’ decisions and have that effect.” 540 U.S. at 206.
While acknowledging that an evaluation of the “intent and effect” had been relevant
to the rejection of a facial challenge, Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion in WRTL II de-
nied that such a standard had been endorsed for as-applied challenges. 127 S. Ct.
at 2664–66.
928 127 S. Ct. at 2667.
929 558 U.S. ___, No. 08–205, slip op. (2010).
In Citizens United, the Court noted that there was a tension

between the right of corporations to engage in political speech, as
articulated in Bellotti and its progeny, and the limitations on such
speech allowed in Austin to avoid the disproportionate economic power
of corporations. Reasoning that the Court had rejected similar at-
tempts to level the playing field among differing voices with dispa-
rate economic resources,930 the Court held that the premise that
the First Amendment generally prohibits the suppression of politi-
cal speech based on the speaker’s identity of necessity prevents dis-
tinctions based on wealth.931 In particular, the Court noted that me-
dia corporations, although statutorily exempted from these restrictions,
do not receive special constitutional protection under the First Amend-
ment,932 and thus would be constitutionally vulnerable under an
antidistortion rationale.
The Court also held that the ability of a corporation to form a
PAC neither allowed that corporation to speak directly, nor did it
provide a sufficient alternative method of speech. The Court, found
that PACs are burdensome alternatives that are “expensive to ad-
minister and are subject to extensive regulation.” 933 The Court noted
that the difficulty in establishing a PAC might explain why fewer
than 2,000 of the millions of corporations in the country have PACs.
Further, the Court argued that even if a corporation did want to
establish a PAC to speak to an urgent issue, that such corporation
might not be able to establish one in time to address issues in a
current campaign.
While the holding of Citizens United would appear to diminish
the need for corporations to create PACs in order to engage in po-
litical speech, it is not clear what level of regulation will now be
930 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49 (First Amendment’s protections do not depend
on the speaker’s “financial ability to engage in public discussion.”); Davis v. Federal

Election Commission, 554 U.S. ___, No. 07–320, slip op. (2008) (invalidating the cap
on contributions to one candidate if the opponent made certain expenditures from
personal funds.
931 Citizens United, slip op. at 34. The Court concluded that “independent expen-
ditures, including those made by corporations, do not give rise to corruption or the
appearance of corruption,” slip op. at 42. The State of Montana had had a long-
standing bar on independent political expenditures by corporations founded on a re-
cord that those expenditures in fact could lead to corruption or the appearance of
corruption. In a per curiam opinion, with four justices dissenting, the Court struck
down the Montana law as contrary to Citizens United. American Tradition Partner-
ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–1179, slip op. (2012).
932 Slip op. at 35–37.
933 558 U.S. ___, slip op. at 21. For example, a PAC must appoint a treasurer,
keep detailed records of persons making donations, preserve receipts for three years,
must report changes to its organizational statement within 10 days, and must file
detailed monthly reports with the FEC. Id.
allowed over speech made directly by a corporation.934 The Court

did uphold the requirements under BCRA that electioneering com-
munications funded by anyone other than a candidate must in-
clude a disclaimer regarding who is responsible for the content of
the communication, and that the person making the expenditure
must disclose to the FEC the amount of the expenditure and the
names of certain contributors. The Court held that these require-
ments could be justified based on a governmental interest in “pro-
vid[ing] the electorate with information” about the sources of election-
related spending, helping citizens “make informed choices in the
political marketplace,” and facilitate the ability of shareholders to
hold corporations accountable for such political speech.935
In Randall v. Sorrell, a plurality of the Court struck down a
Vermont campaign finance statute’s limitations on both expendi-
tures and contributions.936 As for the statute’s expenditure limita-
tions, the plurality found Buckley to control and saw no reason to
overrule it and no adequate basis upon which to distinguish it. As
for the statute’s contribution limitations, the plurality, following
Buckley, considered whether the “contribution limits prevent candi-
dates from ‘amassing the resources necessary for effective [cam-
paign] advocacy’; whether they magnify the advantages of incum-
bency to the point where they put challengers to a significant
disadvantage; in a word, whether they are too low and too strict to
survive First Amendment scrutiny.” 937 The plurality found that they
were.938 Vermont’s limit of $200 per gubernatorial election “(with
significantly lower limits for contributions to candidates for State
Senate and House of Representatives) . . . are well below the lim-
its this Court upheld in Buckley,” and “are the lowest in the Na-
934 For instance, while the Court in National Right to Work allowed restrictions
on corporate solicitation of other corporations for PAC funds, the Court might be
disinclined to allow restrictions on corporations soliciting other corporations for funds
to use for direct independent expenditures.
935 558 U.S. ___, slip op. at 50–51 (citations omitted). The Court had previously
acknowledged that as-applied challenges would be available to a group if it could

show a “reasonable probability” that disclosure of its contributors’ names would “sub-
ject them to threats, harassment, or reprisals from either Government officials or
private parties.” McConnell, 540 U.S. at 198 (quoting Buckley, 427 U.S. at 74).
936 548 U.S. 230 (2006). Justice Breyer wrote the plurality opinion, with only
Chief Justice Roberts joining it in full. Justice Alito joined the opinion as to the
contribution limitations but not as to the expenditure limitations. Justice Alito and
three other Justices concurred in the judgment as to the limitations on both expen-
ditures and contributions, and three Justices dissented.
938 Although, as here, limits on contributions may be so low as to violate the
First Amendment, “there is no constitutional basis for attacking contribution limits

on the ground that they are too high. Congress has no constitutional obligation to
limit contributions at all . . . .” Davis v. Federal Election Commission, 128 S. Ct.
2759, 2771 (2008) (dictum).
tion.” 939 But the plurality struck down Vermont’s contribution lim-
its “based not merely on the low dollar amounts of the limits
themselves, but also on the statute’s effect on political parties and
on volunteer activity in Vermont elections.” 940
Government as Regulator of the Electoral Process: Lobby-
ing.—Legislators may depend upon representations made to them
and information supplied to them by interested parties, and there-
fore may desire to know what the real interests of those parties
are, what groups or persons they represent, and other such infor-
mation. But everyone is constitutionally entitled to write his con-
gressman or his state legislator, to cause others to write or other-
wise contact legislators, and to make speeches and publish articles
designed to influence legislators. Conflict is inherent. In the Fed-
eral Regulation of Lobbying Act,941 Congress, by broadly phrased
and ambiguous language, seemed to require detailed reporting and
registration by all persons who solicited, received, or expended funds
for purposes of lobbying; that is, to influence congressional action
directly or indirectly. In United States v. Harriss,942 the Court, stat-
ing that it was construing the Act to avoid constitutional doubts,943
interpreted covered lobbying as meaning only direct attempts to in-
fluence legislation through direct communication with members of
Congress.944 So construed, the Act was constitutional; Congress had
“merely provided for a modicum of information from those who for
hire attempt to influence legislation or who collect or spend funds
for that purpose,” and this was simply a measure of “self-
protection.” 945
Other statutes and governmental programs affect lobbying and
lobbying activities. It is not impermissible for the Federal Govern-
ment to deny a business expense tax deduction for money spent to
defeat legislation that would adversely affect one’s business.946 But
the antitrust laws may not be applied to a concert of business en-
terprises that have joined to lobby the legislative branch to pass
and the executive branch to enforce laws that would have a detri-
939 548 U.S. at 249 (citation omitted). The plurality noted that, “in terms of real
dollars (i.e., adjusting for inflation),” they were lower still. Id. at 250.
940 548 U.S. at 253.
941 60 Stat. 812, 839 (1946), 2 U.S.C. §§ 261–70.
942 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
943 347 U.S. at 623.
944 347 U.S. at 617–24.
945 347 U.S. at 625. Justices Douglas, Black, and Jackson dissented. Id. at 628,
633. They thought the Court’s interpretation too narrow and would have struck the
statute down as being too broad and too vague, but would not have denied Congress
the power to enact narrow legislation to get at the substantial evils of the situation.
See also United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
946 Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959).
mental effect upon competitors, even if the lobbying was conducted

unethically.947 On the other hand, allegations that competitors com-
bined to harass and deter others from having free and unlimited
access to agencies and courts by resisting before those bodies all
petitions of competitors for purposes of injury to competition are
sufficient to implicate antitrust principles.948
Government as Regulator of Labor Relations.—Numerous
problems may arise in this area,949 but the issue here considered is
the balance to be drawn between the free speech rights of an em-
ployer and the statutory rights of his employees to engage or not
engage in concerted activities free of employer coercion, which may
well include threats or promises or other oral or written communi-
cations. The Court has upheld prohibitions against employer inter-
ference with union activity through speech so long as the speech is
coercive,950 and that holding has been reduced to statutory form.951
Nonetheless, there is a First Amendment tension in this area, with
its myriad variations of speech forms that may be denominated “pre-
dictions,” especially because determination whether particular ut-
terances have an impermissible impact on workers is vested with
an agency with no particular expertise in the protection of freedom
of expression.952
Government as Investigator: Reporter’s Privilege.—News or-
ganizations have claimed that the First Amendment compels a rec-
ognition by government of an exception to the ancient rule that ev-
ery citizen owes to his government a duty to give what testimony
he is capable of giving.953 The argument for a limited exemption to
permit reporters to conceal their sources and to keep confidential
certain information they obtain and choose at least for the moment
947 Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
See also UMW v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 669–71 (1965).

948 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508 (1972).
Justices Stewart and Brennan thought that joining to induce administrative and
judicial action was as protected as the concert in Noerr but concurred in the result
because the complaint could be read as alleging that defendants had sought to fore-
stall access to agencies and courts by plaintiffs. Id. at 516.
949 E.g., the speech and associational rights of persons required to join a union,
Railway Employees Dep’t v. Hanson, 351 U.S. 225 (1956); International Ass’n of Ma-
chinists v. Street, 367 U.S. 740 (1961); see also Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431
U.S. 209 (1977) (public employees), restrictions on picketing and publicity cam-
paigns, Babbitt v. United Farm Workers, 442 U.S. 289 (1979), and application of
collective bargaining laws in sensitive areas, NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672
(1980) (faculty collective bargaining in private universities); NLRB v. Catholic Bishop,
440 U.S. 490 (1979) (collective bargaining in religious schools).
950 NLRB v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 314 U.S. 469 (1941).
951 61 Stat. 142, § 8(c) (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(c).
952 Cf. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 616–20 (1969).
953 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 2192 (3d ed. 1940). See Blair v. United States, 250
U.S. 273, 281 (1919); United States v. Bryan, 339 U.S. 323, 331 (1950).
not to publish was rejected in Branzburg v. Hayes 954 by a closely

divided Court. “Fair and effective law enforcement aimed at provid-
ing security for the person and property of the individual is a fun-
damental function of government, and the grand jury plays an im-
portant, constitutionally mandated role in this process. On the records
now before us, we perceive no basis for holding that the public in-
terest in law enforcement and in ensuring effective grand jury pro-
ceedings is insufficient to override the consequential, but uncer-
tain, burden on news gathering which is said to result from insisting
that reporters, like other citizens, respond to relevant questions put
to them in the course of a valid grand jury investigation or crimi-
nal trial.” 955 Not only was it uncertain to what degree confidential
informants would be deterred from providing information, said Jus-
tice White for the Court, but the conditional nature of the privilege
claimed might not mitigate the deterrent effect, leading to claims
for an absolute privilege. Confidentiality could be protected by the
secrecy of grand jury proceedings and by the experience of law en-
forcement officials in themselves dealing with informers. Difficul-
ties would arise as well in identifying who should have the privi-
lege and who should not. But the principal basis of the holding was
that the investigation and exposure of criminal conduct was a gov-
ernmental function of such importance that it overrode the interest
of reporters in avoiding the incidental burden on their newsgather-
ing activities occasioned by such governmental inquiries.956
954 408 U.S. 665 (1972). “The claim is, however, that reporters are exempt from
these obligations because if forced to respond to subpoenas and identify their sources
or disclose other confidences, their informants will refuse or be reluctant to furnish
newsworthy information in the future. This asserted burden on news gathering is
said to make compelled testimony from newsmen constitutionally suspect and to re-
quire a privileged position for them.” Id. at 682.
955 408 U.S. at 690–91. The cases consolidated in Branzburg all involved grand
juries, so the reference to criminal trials should be considered dictum.

956 Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist joined
the Court’s opinion. Justice Powell, despite having joined the majority opinion, also
submitted a concurring opinion in which he suggested a privilege might be avail-
able if, in a particular case, “the newsman is called upon to give information bear-
ing only a remote and tenuous relationship to the subject of the investigation, or if
he has some other reason to believe that his testimony implicates confidential source
relationships without a legitimate need of law enforcement.” 408 U.S. at 710. Jus-
tice Stewart’s dissenting opinion in Branzburg referred to Justice Powell’s concur-
ring opinion as “enigmatic.” Id. at 725. Judge Tatel of the D.C. Circuit wrote, “Though
providing the majority’s essential fifth vote, he [Powell] wrote separately to outline
a ‘case-by-case’ approach that fits uncomfortably, to say the least, with the Branzburg
majority’s categorical rejection of the reporters’ claims.” In re: Grand Jury Sub-
poena, Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 987 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring) (cita-
tion omitted), rehearing en banc denied, 405 F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005 (Tatel, J., con-
curring), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005), reissued with unredacted material, 438
F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006).
The Court observed that Congress, as well as state legislatures

and state courts, are free to adopt privileges for reporters.957 Al-
though efforts in Congress have failed, 49 states have done so—33
(plus the District of Columbia) by statute and 16 by court decision,
with Wyoming the sole holdout.958 As for federal courts, Federal Rule
of Evidence 501 provides that “the privilege of a witness . . . shall
be governed by the principles of the common law as they may be
interpreted by the courts of the United States in the light of rea-
son and experience.” 959 The federal courts have not resolved whether
the common law provides a journalists’ privilege.960
Nor does the status of an entity as a newspaper (or any other
form of news medium) protect it from issuance and execution on
probable cause of a search warrant for evidence or other material
properly sought in a criminal investigation.961 The press had ar-
gued that to permit searches of newsrooms would threaten the abil-
ity to gather, analyze, and disseminate news, because searches would
be disruptive, confidential sources would be deterred from coming
forward with information because of fear of exposure, reporters would
“[C]ourts in almost every circuit around the country interpreted Justice Pow-
ell’s concurrence, along with parts of the Court’s opinion, to create a balancing test
when faced with compulsory process for press testimony and documents outside the
grand jury context.” Association of the Bar of the City of New York, The Federal
Common Law of Journalists’ Privilege: A Position Paper (2005) at 4–5
[http://www.abcny.org/pdf/report/White%20paper%20on%20reporters%20privilege.pdf]
(citing examples).
957 408 U.S. at 706.
958 The 33rd state statute enacted was the State of Washington’s, which took
effect on July 22, 2007. See the website of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of
the Press for information on the state laws. The greatest difficulty these laws expe-
rience is the possibility of a constitutional conflict with the Fifth and Sixth Amend-
ment rights of criminal defendants. See Matter of Farber, 78 N.J. 259, 394 A.2d 330,
cert. denied sub nom. New York Times v. New Jersey, 439 U.S. 997 (1978). See also
New York Times v. Jascalevich, 439 U.S. 1301, 1304, 1331 (1978) (applications to
Circuit Justices for stay), and id. at 886 (vacating stay).
959 Rule 501 also provides that, in civil actions and proceedings brought in fed-
eral court under state law, the availability of a privilege shall be determined in ac-
cordance with state law.
960 See, e.g., In re: Grand Jury Subpoena. Judith Miller, 397 F.3d 964, 972 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) (Tatel, J., concurring) (citation omitted), rehearing en banc denied, 405
F.3d 17 (D.C. Cir. 2005 (Tatel, J., concurring), cert. denied, 545 U.S. 1150 (2005),
reissued with unredacted material, 438 F.3d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia “is not of one mind on the existence of a common
law privilege”).
961 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 563–67 (1978). Justice Powell thought
it appropriate that “a magistrate asked to issue a warrant for the search of press
offices can and should take cognizance of the independent values protected by the
First Amendment” when he assesses the reasonableness of a warrant in light of all
the circumstances. Id. at 568 (concurring). Justices Stewart and Marshall would have
imposed special restrictions upon searches when the press was the object, id. at 570
(dissenting), and Justice Stevens dissented on Fourth Amendment grounds. Id. at
577.
decline to put in writing their information, and internal editorial

deliberations would be exposed. The Court thought that First Amend-
ment interests were involved, but it seemed to doubt that the con-
sequences alleged would occur, and it observed that the built-in pro-
tections of the warrant clause would adequately protect those interests
and noted that magistrates could guard against abuses when war-
rants were sought to search newsrooms by requiring particulariza-
tions of the type, scope, and intrusiveness that would be permitted
in the searches.962
Government and the Conduct of Trials.—Conflict between
constitutional rights is not uncommon. One of the most difficult to
resolve is the conflict between a criminal defendant’s Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to a fair trial and the First Amendment’s protec-
tion of the rights to obtain and publish information about defen-
dants and trials. Convictions obtained in the context of prejudicial
pre-trial publicity 963 and during trials that were media “spectacu-
lars” 964 have been reversed, but the prevention of such occurrences
is of paramount importance to the governmental and public inter-
est in the finality of criminal trials and the successful prosecution
of criminals. However, the imposition of “gag orders” on press pub-
lication of information directly confronts the First Amendment’s bar
on prior restraints,965 although the courts have a good deal more
discretion in preventing the information from becoming public in
the first place.966 Perhaps the most profound debate that has arisen
in recent years concerns the right of access of the public and the
press to trial and pre-trial proceedings, and the Court has ad-
dressed the issue.
When the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a pub-
lic trial did not guarantee access of the public and the press to pre-
trial suppression hearings,967 a major debate flowered concerning
the extent to which, if at all, the speech and press clauses pro-
962 Congress enacted the Privacy Protection Act of 1980, Pub. L. 96–440, 94 Stat.
1879, 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, to protect the press and other persons having material
intended for publication from federal or state searches in specified circumstances,
and creating damage remedies for violations.
963 Irvin v. Dowd, 366 U.S. 717 (1961); Rideau v. Louisiana, 373 U.S. 723 (1963).
964 Sheppard v. Maxwell, 384 U.S. 333 (1966); compare Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S.
532 (1965), with Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560 (1981).

965 Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
966 See, e.g., Gentile v. State Bar of Nevada, 501 U.S. 1030 (1991) (disciplinary
rules restricting extrajudicial comments by attorneys are void for vagueness, but such
attorney speech may be regulated if it creates a “substantial likelihood of material
prejudice” to the trial of a client); Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20 (1984)
(press, as party to action, restrained from publishing information obtained through
discovery).
967 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979).
tected the public and the press in seeking to attend trials.968 The
right of access to criminal trials against the wishes of the defen-
dant was held protected in Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia,969 but
the Justices could not agree upon a majority rationale that would
permit principled application of the holding to other areas in which
access is sought.
Chief Justice Burger pronounced the judgment of the Court, but
his opinion was joined by only two other Justices (and one of them
in a separate concurrence drew conclusions probably going beyond
the Chief Justice’s opinion).970 Basic to the Chief Justice’s view was
an historical treatment that demonstrated that trials were tradition-
ally open. This openness, moreover, was no “quirk of history” but
“an indispensable attribute of an Anglo-American trial.” This char-
acteristic flowed from the public interest in seeing fairness and proper
conduct in the administration of criminal trials; the “therapeutic
value” to the public of seeing its criminal laws in operation, purg-
ing the society of the outrage felt at the commission of many crimes,
convincingly demonstrated why the tradition had developed and been
maintained. Thus, “a presumption of openness inheres in the very
nature of a criminal trial under our system of justice.” The presump-
tion has more than custom to command it. “[I]n the context of tri-
als . . . the First Amendment guarantees of speech and press, stand-
ing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time that amend-
ment was adopted.” 971
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, followed a signifi-
cantly different route to the same conclusion. In his view, “the First
Amendment . . . has a structural role to play in securing and fos-
tering our republican system of self-government. Implicit in this struc-
tural role is not only ‘the principle that debate on public issues should
be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,’ but the antecedent assump-
tion that valuable public debate—as well as other civic behavior—
must be informed. The structural model links the First Amend-
ment to that process of communication necessary for a democracy
968 DePasquale rested solely on the Sixth Amendment, the Court reserving judg-
ment on whether there is a First Amendment right of public access. 443 U.S. at
392.
969 448 U.S. 555 (1980). The decision was 7 to 1, with Justice Rehnquist dissent-
ing, id. at 604, and Justice Powell not participating. Justice Powell, however, had
taken the view in Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 397 (1979) (concurring),
that the First Amendment did protect access to trials.
970 See Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 582 (1980) (Justice Ste-
vens concurring).
971 448 U.S. at 564–69. The emphasis on experience and history was repeated
by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior
Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (Press-Enterprise II).
to survive, and thus entails solicitude not only for communication

itself but also for the indispensable conditions of meaningful com-
munication.” 972
The trial court in Richmond Newspapers had made no findings
of necessity for closure, and neither Chief Justice Burger nor Jus-
tice Brennan found the need to articulate a standard for determin-
ing when the government’s or the defendant’s interests could out-
weigh the public right of access. That standard was developed two
years later. Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court 973 involved a
statute, unique to one state, that mandated the exclusion of the pub-
lic and the press from trials during the testimony of a sex-crime
victim under the age of 18. For the Court, Justice Brennan wrote
that the First Amendment guarantees press and public access to
criminal trials, both because of the tradition of openness 974 and be-
cause public scrutiny of a criminal trial serves the valuable func-
tions of enhancing the quality and safeguards of the integrity of
the factfinding process, of fostering the appearance of fairness, and
of permitting public participation in the judicial process. The right
is not absolute, but in order to close all or part of a trial govern-
ment must show that “the denial is necessitated by a compelling
governmental interest, and [that it] is narrowly tailored to serve
that interest.” 975 The Court was explicit that the right of access
was to criminal trials,976 so that the question of the openness of
civil trials remains.
The Court next applied and extended the right of access in sev-
eral other areas, striking down state efforts to exclude the public
from voir dire proceedings, from a suppression hearing, and from a
972 448 U.S. at 587–88 (emphasis in original, citations omitted).

973 457 U.S. 596 (1982). Joining Justice Brennan’s opinion of the Court were
Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun, and Powell. Justice O’Connor concurred in the
judgment. Chief Justice Burger, with Justice Rehnquist, dissented, arguing that the
tradition of openness that underlay Richmond Newspapers, was absent with respect
to sex crimes and youthful victims and that Richmond Newspapers was unjustifi-
ably extended. Id. at 612. Justice Stevens dissented on the ground of mootness. Id.
at 620.
974 That there was no tradition of openness with respect to the testimony of mi-
nor victims of sex crimes was irrelevant, the Court argued. As a general matter, all
criminal trials have been open. The presumption of openness thus attaches to all
criminal trials and to close any particular kind or part of one because of a particu-
lar reason requires justification on the basis of the governmental interest asserted.
457 U.S. at 605 n.13.
975 457 U.S. at 606–07. Protecting the well-being of minor victims was a compel-
ling interest, the Court held, and might justify exclusion in specific cases, but it did
not justify a mandatory closure rule. The other asserted interest—encouraging mi-
nors to come forward and report sex crimes—was not well served by the statute.
976 The Court throughout the opinion identifies the right as access to criminal
trials, even italicizing the words at one point. 457 U.S. at 605.
preliminary hearing. The Court determined in Press-Enterprise I 977

that historically voir dire had been open to the public, and that “[t]he
presumption of openness may be overcome only by an overriding
interest based on findings that closure is essential to preserve higher
values and is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.” 978 No such
findings had been made by the state court, which had ordered closed,
in the interest of protecting the privacy interests of some prospec-
tive jurors, 41 of the 44 days of voir dire in a rape-murder case.
The trial court also had not considered the possibility of less restric-
tive alternatives, e.g., in camera consideration of jurors’ requests for
protection from publicity. In Waller v. Georgia,979 the Court held that
“under the Sixth Amendment any closure of a suppression hearing
over the objections of the accused must meet the tests set out in
Press Enterprise,” 980 and noted that the need for openness at sup-
pression hearings “may be particularly strong” because the conduct
of police and prosecutor is often at issue.981 And, in Press Enter-
prise II,982 the Court held that there is a similar First Amendment
right of the public to access to most criminal proceedings (here a
preliminary hearing) even when the accused requests that the pro-
ceedings be closed. Thus, an accused’s Sixth Amendment-based re-
quest for closure must meet the same stringent test applied to gov-
ernmental requests to close proceedings: there must be “specific
findings . . . demonstrating that first, there is a substantial prob-
ability that the defendant’s right to a fair trial will be prejudiced
by publicity that closure would prevent, and second, reasonable al-
ternatives to closure cannot adequately protect the defendant’s fair
trial rights.” 983 Openness of preliminary hearings was deemed im-
portant because, under California law, the hearings can be “the fi-
nal and most important step in the criminal proceeding” and there-
fore may be “the sole occasion for public observation of the criminal
justice system,” and also because the safeguard of a jury is unavail-
able at preliminary hearings.984
Government as Administrator of Prisons.—A prison inmate
retains only those First Amendment rights that are not inconsis-
tent with his status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penologi-
977 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 464 U.S. 501 (1984).
978 464 U.S. at 510.
979 467 U.S. 39 (1984).
980 Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368 (1979), did not involve assertion by
the accused of his 6th Amendment right to a public trial; instead, the accused in
that case had requested closure. “[T]he constitutional guarantee of a public trial is
for the benefit of the defendant.” Id. at 381.
981 467 U.S. at 47.
982 Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court, 478 U.S. 1 (1986).
983 478 U.S. at 14.
984 478 U.S. at 12.
cal objectives of the corrections system.985 The identifiable govern-

mental interests at stake in administration of prisons are the
preservation of internal order and discipline, the maintenance of
institutional security against escape or unauthorized entry, and the
rehabilitation of the prisoners.986 In applying these general stan-
dards, the Court at first arrived at somewhat divergent points in
assessing prison restrictions on mail and on face-to-face news inter-
views between reporters and prisoners. The Court’s more recent def-
erential approach to regulation of prisoners’ mail has lessened the
differences.
First, in Procunier v. Martinez,987 the Court invalidated mail
censorship regulations that permitted authorities to hold back or
to censor mail to and from prisoners whenever they thought that
the letters “unduly complain,” express “inflammatory . . . views,”
or were “defamatory” or “otherwise inappropriate.” 988 The Court based
this ruling not on the rights of the prisoner, but instead on the out-
sider’s right to communicate with the prisoner either by sending or
by receiving mail. Under this framework, the Court held, regula-
tion of mail must further an important interest unrelated to the
suppression of expression; regulation must be shown to further the
substantial interest of security, order, and rehabilitation; and regu-
lation must not be used simply to censor opinions or other expres-
sions. Further, a restriction must be no greater than is necessary
to the protection of the particular government interest involved.
In Turner v. Safley,989 however, the Court made clear that a stan-
dard that is more deferential to the government is applicable when
the free speech rights only of inmates are at stake. In upholding a
Missouri restriction on correspondence between inmates at differ-
ent institutions, while striking down a prohibition on inmate mar-
riages absent a compelling reason such as pregnancy or birth of a
child, the Court announced the appropriate standard: “[W]hen a regu-
lation impinges on inmates’ constitutional rights, the regulation is
valid if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological inter-
985 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974).

986 Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 412 (1974).
987 416 U.S. 396 (1974). But see Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners’ Union, 433
U.S. 119 (1977), in which the Court sustained prison regulations barring solicitation
of prisoners by other prisoners to join a union, banning union meetings, and deny-
ing bulk mailings concerning the union from outside sources. The reasonable fears
of correctional officers that organizational activities of the sort advocated by the union
could impair discipline and lead to possible disorders justified the regulations.
988 416 U.S. at 396.
989 482 U.S. 78 (1987).
ests.” 990 Four factors “are relevant in determining the reasonable-

ness of a regulation at issue.” 991 “First, is there a valid, rational
connection between the prison regulation and the legitimate govern-
mental interest put forward to justify it? Second, are there alterna-
tive means of exercising the right that remain open to prison in-
mates? Third, what impact will accommodation of the asserted
constitutional right . . . have on guards and other inmates, and on
the allocation of prison resources generally? And, fourth, are ready
alternatives for furthering the governmental interest available?” 992
Two years after Turner v. Safley, in Thornburgh v. Abbott, the Court
restricted Procunier v. Martinez to the regulation of outgoing corre-
spondence, finding that the needs of prison security justify a more
deferential standard for prison regulations restricting incoming ma-
terial, whether those incoming materials are correspondence from
other prisoners, correspondence from nonprisoners, or outside pub-
lications.993
In Beard v. Banks, a plurality of the Supreme Court upheld “a
Pennsylvania prison policy that ‘denies newspapers, magazines, and
photographs’ to a group of specially dangerous and recalcitrant in-
mates.” 994 These inmates were housed in Pennsylvania’s Long Term
Segregation Unit and one of the prison’s penological rationales for
its policy, which the plurality found to satisfy the four Turner fac-
tors, was to motivate better behavior on the part of the prisoners
by providing them with an incentive to move back to the regular
prison population.995 Applying the four Turner factors to this ratio-
nale, the plurality found that (1) there was a logical connection be-
tween depriving inmates of newspapers and magazines and provid-
ing an incentive to improve behavior; (2) the Policy provided no
alternatives to the deprivation of newspapers and magazines, but
990 482 U.S. at 89. In Overton v. Bazzetta, 539 U.S. 126 (2003), the Court ap-
plied Turner to uphold various restrictions on visitation by children and by former

inmates, and on all visitation except attorneys and members of the clergy for in-
mates with two or more substance-abuse violations; an inmate subject to the latter
restriction could apply for reinstatement of visitation privileges after two years. “If
the withdrawal of all visitation privileges were permanent or for a much longer pe-
riod, or if it were applied in an arbitrary manner to a particular inmate, the case
would present different considerations.” Id. at 137.
991 482 U.S. at 89.
992 Beard v. Banks, 548 U.S. 521, 529 (2006) (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted; this quotation quotes language from Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. at
89–90).
993 490 U.S. 401, 411–14 (1989). Thornburgh v. Abbott noted that, if regulations
deny prisoners publications on the basis of their content, but the grounds on which
the regulations do so is content-neutral (e.g., to protect prison security), then the
regulations will be deemed neutral. Id. at 415–16.
994 548 U.S. 521, 524–25 (2006). This was a 4–2–2 decision, with Justice Alito,
who had written the court of appeals decision, not participating.

995 548 U.S. at 531.
this was “not ‘conclusive’ of the reasonableness of the Policy”; (3)

the impact of accommodating the asserted constitutional right would
be negative; and (4) no alternative would “fully accommodate the
prisoner’s rights at de minimis cost to valid penological inter-
ests.” 996 The plurality believed that its “real task in this case is
not balancing these factors, but rather determining whether the Sec-
retary shows more than simply a logical relation, that is, whether
he shows a reasonable relation” between the Policy and legitimate
penological objections, as Turner requires.997 The plurality con-
cluded that he had. Justices Thomas and Scalia concurred in the
result but would do away with the Turner factors because they be-
lieve that “States are free to define and redefine all types of punish-
ment, including imprisonment, to encompass various types of depri-
vation—provided only that those deprivations are consistent with the
Eighth Amendment.” 998
Neither prisoners nor reporters have any affirmative First Amend-
ment right to face-to-face interviews, when general public access to
prisons is restricted and when there are alternatives by which the
news media can obtain information respecting prison policies and
conditions.999 Prison restrictions on such interviews do indeed im-
plicate the First Amendment rights of prisoners, the Court held,
but such rights must be balanced against “the legitimate penologi-
cal objectives of the corrections system” and “internal security within
the corrections facilities,” taking into account available alternative
means of communications, such as mail and “limited visits from mem-
bers of [prisoners’] families, the clergy, their attorneys, and friends
of prior acquaintance.” 1000
While agreeing with a previous affirmation that “news gather-
ing is not without its First Amendment protections,” 1001 the Court
denied that the First Amendment imposed upon the government any
affirmative obligation to the press. “The First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments bar government from interfering in any way with a free press.
The Constitution does not, however, require government to accord
the press special access to information not shared by members of
996 548 U.S. at 531–32.

997 548 U.S. at 533.
998 548 U.S. at 537 (Thomas, J., concurring), quoting Overton v. Bazzetta, 539
U.S. at 139 (Thomas, J., concurring) (emphasis originally in Overton).

999 Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974). Justices Douglas, Brennan, and Mar-
shall dissented. Id. at 836.

1000 417 U.S. at 822–25.
1001 Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 707 (1972), quoted in Pell v. Procunier,
417 U.S. 817, 833 (1974).

the public generally.” 1002 Pell and Saxbe did not delineate whether
the “equal access” rule applied only in cases in which there was
public access, so that a different rule for the press might follow when
general access was denied; nor did they purport to define what the
rules of equal access are. No greater specificity emerged from Houchins
v. KQED,1003 in which a broadcaster had sued for access to a prison
from which public and press alike were barred and as to which there
was considerable controversy over conditions of incarceration. Fol-
lowing initiation of the suit, the administrator of the prison autho-
rized limited public tours. The tours were open to the press, but
cameras and recording devices were not permitted, there was no
opportunity to talk to inmates, and the tours did not include the
maximum security area about which much of the controversy cen-
tered. The Supreme Court overturned the injunction obtained in the
lower courts, the plurality reiterating that “[n]either the First Amend-
ment nor the Fourteenth Amendment mandates a right of access to
government information or sources of information within the gov-
ernment’s control. . . . [U]ntil the political branches decree other-
wise, as they are free to do, the media have no special right of ac-
cess to the Alameda County Jail different from or greater than that
accorded the public generally.” 1004 Justice Stewart, whose vote was
necessary to the disposition of the case, agreed with the equal ac-
cess holding but would have approved an injunction more narrowly
drawn to protect the press’s right to use cameras and recorders so
as to enlarge public access to the information.1005 Thus, any ques-
tion of special press access appears settled by the decision; yet the
questions raised above remain: May everyone be barred from ac-
cess and, if access is accorded, does the Constitution necessitate any
limitation on the discretion of prison administrators? 1006
1002 417 U.S. at 834. The holding was applied to federal prisons in Saxbe v. Wash-
ington Post, 417 U.S. 843 (1974). Dissenting, Justices Powell, Brennan, and Mar-
shall argued that “at stake here is the societal function of the First Amendment in
preserving free public discussion of governmental affairs,” that the press’s role was
to make this discussion informed, and that the ban on face-to-face interviews uncon-
stitutionally fettered this role of the press. Id. at 850, 862.
1003 438 U.S. 1 (1978). The decision’s imprecision of meaning is partly attribut-
able to the fact that there was no opinion of the Court. A plurality opinion repre-
sented the views of only three Justices; two Justices did not participate, three Jus-
tices dissented, and one Justice concurred with views that departed somewhat from
the plurality.
1004 438 U.S. at 15–16.
1005 438 U.S. at 16.
1006 The dissenters, Justices Stevens, Brennan, and Powell, believed that the
Constitution protects the public’s right to be informed about conditions within the
prison and that total denial of access, such as existed prior to institution of the suit,
was unconstitutional. They would have sustained the more narrowly drawn injunc-
tive relief to the press on the basis that no member of the public had yet sought
access. 438 U.S. at 19. It is clear that Justice Stewart did not believe that the Con-
Government and the Power of the Purse.—The unconstitu-

tional conditions doctrine limits the authority of the federal govern-
ment to impose conditions on the receipt of federal funds that limit
the speech of the recipient. However, as an exercise of its spending
power, Congress may refuse to subsidize the exercise of First Amend-
ment rights by those recipients. The distinction between these two
closely related principles seemed, initially at least, to hinge on the
severity and pervasiveness of the restriction placed on the exercise
of rights to free speech. What has emerged more recently is the prin-
ciple that Congress may condition the receipt of federal funds on
acceptance of speech limitations on persons working for a project
receiving the federal funding—even if the project also receives non-
federal funds—provided that the speech limitations do not extend
to the use of non-federal funds outside of the federally funded proj-
ect.
In Regan v. Taxation with Representation,1007 the Court held that
Congress could constitutionally limit tax-exempt status under
§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code to charitable organiza-
tions that do not engage in lobbying. “Congress has merely refused
to pay for the lobbying out of public moneys,” the Court con-
cluded.1008 The effect of the ruling on the organization’s lobbying
activities was minimal, however, since it could continue to receive
tax-deductible contributions by creating a separate affiliate to con-
duct the lobbying. In FCC v. League of Women Voters,1009 by con-
trast, the Court held that the First Amendment rights of public broad-
casting stations were abridged by a prohibition on all editorializing
by any recipient of public funds. There was no practical alternative
means, as there had been in Taxation with Representation, by which
the stations could continue to receive public funding and create an
affiliate to engage in the prohibited speech. The Court rejected dis-
senting Justice Rehnquist’s argument that the subsidization prin-
ciple of Taxation with Representation should be controlling.1010
stitution affords any relief. Id. at 16. Although the plurality opinion of the Chief
Justice Burger and Justices White and Rehnquist may be read as not deciding whether
any public right of access exists, overall it appears to proceed on the unspoken basis
that there is none. The second question, when Justice Stewart’s concurring opinion
and the dissenting opinion are combined, appears to be answerable qualifiedly in
the direction of constitutional constraints upon the nature of access limitation once
access is granted.
1007 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
1008 461 U.S. at 545. See also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 512–13
(1959) (exclusion of lobbying expenses from income tax deduction for ordinary and
necessary business expenses is not a regulation aimed at the suppression of danger-
ous ideas, and does not violate the First Amendment).
1009 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
1010 468 U.S. at 399–401, & n.27. See also Oklahoma v. Civil Service Comm’n,
330 U.S. 127 (1947).

In Rust v. Sullivan, however, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted

for the Court that restrictions on abortion counseling and referral
imposed on recipients of family planning funding under the Public
Health Service Act did not constitute discrimination on the basis of
viewpoint, but instead represented the government’s decision “to fund
one activity to the exclusion of the other.” 1011 In addition, the Court
noted, the “regulations do not force the Title X grantee to give up
abortion-related speech; they merely require that the grantee keep
such activities separate and distinct from Title X activities. Title X
expressly distinguishes between a Title X grantee and a Title X proj-
ect. . . . The regulations govern the scope of the Title X project’s
activities, and leave the grantee unfettered in its other activi-
ties.” 1012 The Court did allow that the application of this decision
might be limited outside of the particular facts of the case.1013
The Court has also suggested that there are limits to what se-
lection criteria the government can use to ensure that a recipient
of federal funds has views consistent with the purposes of the pro-
gram. In National Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, the Supreme
Court upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute requiring the
NEA, in awarding grants, to “tak[e] into consideration general stan-
dards of decency and respect for the diverse beliefs and values of
the American public.” 1014 In Finley, grant applicants for federal arts
funding were denied art funding, allegedly based on the controver-
sial nature of their art. The Court acknowledged that, if the stat-
1011 500 U.S. 173, 193 (1991). Dissenting Justice Blackmun contended that Taxa-
tion With Representation was easily distinguishable because its restriction was on
all lobbying activity regardless of content or viewpoint. Id. at 208–09.
1012 500 U.S. at 196 (emphasis in original). Dissenting Justice Blackmun wrote:
“Under the majority’s reasoning, the First Amendment could be read to tolerate any
governmental restriction is limited to the funded workplace. This is a dangerous
proposition, and one the Court has rightly rejected in the past.” Id. at 213 (empha-
sis in original).
1013 The Court attempted to minimize the potential sweep of its ruling in Rust.
“This is not to suggest that funding by the Government, even when coupled with
the freedom of the fund recipient to speak outside the scope of the Government-
funded project, is invariably sufficient to justify government control over the content
of expression.” 500 U.S. at 199. The Court noted several possible exceptions to the
general principle: government ownership of a public forum does not justify restric-
tions on speech; the university setting requires heightened protections through ap-
plication of vagueness and overbreadth principles; and the doctor-patient relation-
ship may also be subject to special First Amendment protection. (The Court denied,
however, that the doctor-patient relationship was significantly impaired by the regu-
latory restrictions at issue.) Lower courts were quick to pick up on these sugges-
tions. See, e.g., Stanford Univ. v Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 476–78 (D.D.C. 1991)
(confidentiality clause in federal grant research contract is invalid because, inter alia,
of application of vagueness principles in a university setting); Gay Men’s Health Cri-
sis v. Sullivan, 792 F. Supp. 278 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“offensiveness” guidelines restrict-
ing Center for Disease Control grants for preparation of AIDS-related educational
materials are unconstitutionally vague).
1014 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998).
ute were “applied in a manner that raises concern about the sup-
pression of disfavored viewpoints,” 1015 then such application might
be unconstitutional. This was not the result in this case, however,
as the statute on its face “impose[d] no categorical requirement,”
being merely “advisory.” 1016 The Court also found that the terms of
the statute, “if they appeared in a criminal statute or regulatory
scheme, . . . could raise substantial vagueness concerns. . . . But
when the government is acting as patron rather than as sovereign,
the consequences of imprecision are not constitutionally se-
vere.” 1017
In contrast, in Agency for International Development v. Alliance
for Open Society Int’l,1018 the Court found that the federal govern-
ment could not explicitly require a federal grantee to adopt a pub-
lic policy position as a condition of receiving federal funds. In Alli-
ance for Open Society Int’l, organizations receiving federal dollars
to combat HIV/AIDS internationally were required to 1) ensure that
such funds were not being used “to promote or advocate the legal-
ization or practice of prostitution or sex trafficking,” and 2) have a
policy “explicitly opposing prostitution.” 1019 While the first condi-
tion legitimately ensured that the government was not funding speech
which conflicted with the purposes of the grant, the second require-
ment improperly affected the recipient’s protected conduct outside
of the federal program. Further, the organization could not, as in
previous cases, avoid the requirement by establishing an affiliate
to engage in opposing advocacy because of the “evident hypocrisy”
that would entail.1020
Sometimes it is the nature of the speech at issue that pre-
cludes restrictions imposed by a government grant. In Legal Ser-
vices Corp. v. Valazquez,1021 the Court struck down a provision of
the Legal Services Corporation Act that prohibited recipients of Le-
gal Services Corporation (LSC) funds (i.e., legal-aid organizations
that provide lawyers to the poor in civil matters) from representing
1015 524 U.S. at 587.
1016 524 U.S. at 581. “Any content-based considerations that may be taken into
account in the grant-making process are a consequence of the nature of arts fund-
ing. . . . The ‘very assumption’ of the NEA is that grants will be awarded according
to the ‘artistic worth of competing applications,’ and absolute neutrality is simply
‘inconceivable.’ ” Id. at 585. Justice Scalia, in a concurring opinion joined by Justice
Thomas, claimed that this interpretation of the statute “gutt[ed] it.” Id. at 590. He
believed that the statute “establishes content- and viewpoint-based criteria upon which
grant applications are to be evaluated. And that is perfectly constitutional.” Id. at
581.
1017 524 U.S. at 588–89.
1018 570 U.S. ___, No. 12–10, slip op. (2013).
1019 22 U.S.C. §7631(e), (f).
1020 570 U.S. ___, No. 12–10, slip op. at 13.
1021 531 U.S. 533 (2001).
a client who seeks “to amend or otherwise challenge existing [wel-

fare] law.” This meant that, even with non-federal funds, a recipi-
ent of federal funds could not argue that a state welfare statute
violated a federal statute or that a state or federal welfare law vio-
lated the Constitution. If a case was underway when such a chal-
lenge became apparent, the attorney had to withdraw. The Court
distinguished this situation from that in Rust v. Sullivan on the
ground “that the counseling activities of the doctors under Title X
amounted to governmental speech,” whereas “an LSC-funded attor-
ney speaks on behalf of the client in a claim against the govern-
ment for welfare benefits.” 1022 Furthermore, the restriction in this
case “distorts the legal system” by prohibiting “speech and expres-
sion upon which courts must depend for the proper exercise of the
judicial power,” and thereby is “inconsistent with accepted separation-
of-powers principles.” 1023
But, in United States v. American Library Association, Inc., a
four-Justice plurality of the Supreme Court upheld the Children’s
Internet Protection Act (CIPA), which provides that a public school
or “library may not receive federal assistance to provide Internet
access unless it installs software to block images that constitute ob-
scenity or child pornography, and to prevent minors from obtaining
access to material that is harmful to them.” 1024 The plurality con-
sidered whether CIPA imposes an unconstitutional condition on the
receipt of federal assistance by requiring public libraries to limit
their freedom of speech if they accept federal funds. The plurality,
citing Rust v. Sullivan, found that, assuming that government enti-
ties have First Amendment rights (it did not decide the question),
CIPA does not infringe them. This is because CIPA does not deny a
benefit to libraries that do not agree to use filters; rather, the stat-
ute “simply insist[s] that public funds be spent for the purposes for
which they were authorized.” 1025 The plurality distinguished Legal
Services Corporation v. Velazquez on the ground that public librar-
ies have no role comparable to that of legal aid attorneys “that pits
them against the Government, and there is no comparable assump-
tion that they must be free of any conditions that their benefactors
might attach to the use of donated funds or other assistance.” 1026
Finally, the unconstitutional conditions doctrine may have lim-
ited application on incidental restrictions on speech. In Rumsfeld v.
1022 531 U.S. at 541, 542.
1023 531 U.S. at 544, 546.
1024 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
1025 539 U.S. at 211.
1026 539 U.S. at 213 (emphasis in original). Other grounds for the plurality deci-
sion are discussed under “Non-obscene But Sexually Explicit and Indecent Expres-
sion” and “The Public Forum.”
Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, Inc., the Supreme Court
upheld the Solomon Amendment, which provides, in the Court’s sum-
mary, “that if any part of an institution of higher education denies
military recruiters access equal to that provided other recruiters,
the entire institution would lose certain federal funds.” 1027 FAIR,
the group that challenged the Solomon Amendment, is an associa-
tion of law schools that barred military recruiting on their cam-
puses because of the military’s discrimination against homosexu-
als. FAIR challenged the Solomon Amendment as violating the First
Amendment because it forced schools to choose between enforcing
their nondiscrimination policy against military recruiters and con-
tinuing to receive specified federal funding. The Court concluded:
“Because the First Amendment would not prevent Congress from
directly imposing the Solomon Amendment’s access requirement, the
statute does not place an unconstitutional condition on the receipt
of federal funds.” 1028 The Court found that “[t]he Solomon Amend-
ment neither limits what law schools may say nor requires them to
say anything. . . . It affects what law schools must do—afford equal
access to military recruiters—not what they may or may not say.” 1029
The law schools’ conduct in barring military recruiters, the Court
found, “is not inherently expressive,” and, therefore, unlike flag burn-
ing, for example, is not “symbolic speech.” 1030 Applying the O’Brien
test for restrictions on conduct that have an incidental effect on speech,
the Court found that the Solomon Amendment clearly “promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effec-
tively absent the regulation.” 1031
The Court also found that the Solomon Amendment did not un-
constitutionally compel schools to speak, or even to host or accom-
modate the government’s message. As for compelling speech, law
schools must “send e-mails and post notices on behalf of the mili-
tary to comply with the Solomon Amendment. . . . This sort of re-
cruiting assistance, however, is a far cry from the compelled speech
in Barnette and Wooley. . . . [It] is plainly incidental to the Solo-
mon Amendment’s regulation of conduct.” 1032 As for forcing one speaker
to host or accommodate another, “[t]he compelled-speech violation
in each of our prior cases . . . resulted from the fact that the com-
1027 547 U.S. 47, 51 (2006).

1028 547 U.S. at 60. The Court stated that Congress’s authority to directly re-
quire campus access for military recruiters comes from its Article I, section 8, pow-
ers to provide for the common defense, to raise and support armies, and to provide
and maintain a navy. Id. at 58.
1029 547 U.S. at 60.
1030 547 U.S. at 64, 65.
1031 547 U.S. at 67.
1032 547 U.S. at 61, 62.
plaining speaker’s own message was affected by the speech it was

forced to accommodate.” 1033 By contrast, the Court wrote, “Nothing
about recruiting suggests that law schools agree with any speech
by recruiters, and nothing in the Solomon Amendment restricts what
the law schools may say about the military’s policies.” 1034 Finally,
the Court found that the Solomon Amendment was not analogous
to the New Jersey law that had required the Boy Scouts to accept
a homosexual scoutmaster, and that the Supreme Court struck down
as violating the Boy Scouts’ “right of expressive association.” 1035 Re-
cruiters, unlike the scoutmaster, are “outsiders who come onto cam-
pus for the limited purpose of trying to hire students—not to be-
come members of the school’s expressive association.” 1036
Governmental Regulation of Communications Industries

As in the previous section, the governmental regulations here
considered may have only the most indirect relation to freedom of
expression, or may clearly implicate that freedom even though the
purpose of the particular regulation is not to reach the content of
the message. First, however, the judicially formulated doctrine dis-
tinguishing commercial expression from other forms is briefly con-
sidered.
Commercial Speech.—Starting in the 1970s, the Court’s treat-
ment of “commercial speech” underwent a transformation from to-
tal nonprotection under the First Amendment to qualified protec-
tion. The conclusion that a communication proposing a commercial
transaction is a different order of speech underserving of First Amend-
ment protection was arrived at almost casually in 1942 in Valen-
tine v. Chrestensen.1037 In Chrestensen, the Court upheld a city or-
dinance prohibiting distribution on the street of “commercial and
business advertising matter,” as applied to an exhibitor of a subma-
rine who distributed leaflets describing his submarine on one side
and on the other side protesting the city’s refusal of certain dock-
ing facilities. The doctrine was in any event limited to promotion of
commercial activities; the fact that expression was disseminated for
profit or through commercial channels did not expose it to any greater
1033 547 U.S. at 63.

1034 547 U.S. at 65.
1035 547 U.S. at 68, quoting Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 644
(2000).
1036 547 U.S. at 69.
1037 316 U.S. 52 (1942). See also Breard v. City of Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
The doctrine was one of the bases upon which the banning of all commercials for
cigarettes from radio and television was upheld. Capital Broadcasting Co. v. Mitch-
ell, 333 F. Supp. 582 (D.D.C. 1971) (three-judge court), aff’d per curiam, 405 U.S.
1000 (1972).
regulation than if it were offered for free.1038 The doctrine lasted in

this form for more than twenty years.
The Court later modified this position so that commercial speech
is protected “from unwarranted governmental regulation,” al-
though its nature makes it subject to greater limitations than may
be imposed on expression not solely related to the economic inter-
ests of the speaker and its audience.1039 The change to its earlier
holdings was accomplished within a brief span of time in which the
Justices haltingly but then decisively moved to a new position. Ap-
plying the doctrine in a narrow five-to-four decision, the Court sus-
tained the application of a city’s ban on employment discrimination
to bar sex-designated employment advertising in a newspaper.1040
Suggesting that speech does not lose its constitutional protection
simply because it appears in a commercial context, Justice Powell,
for the Court, did find the placing of want-ads in newspapers to be
“classic examples of commercial speech,” devoid of expressions of
opinions with respect to issues of social policy; so the “did no more
than propose a commercial transaction.” But the Justice also noted
that employment discrimination, which was facilitated by the adver-
tisements, was itself illegal.1041
Next, the Court overturned a conviction under a state statute
that made it illegal, by sale or circulation of any publication, to en-
courage or prompt the procuring of an abortion. The Court held the
statute unconstitutional as applied to an editor of a weekly newspa-
per who published an advertisement announcing the availability of
legal and safe abortions in another state and detailing the assis-
tance that would be provided state residents in obtaining abortions
in the other state.1042 The Court discerned that the advertisements
conveyed information of other than a purely commercial nature, that
they related to services that were legal in the other jurisdiction,
and that the state could not prevent its residents from obtaining
abortions in the other state or punish them for doing so.
1038 Books that are sold for profit, Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959);
Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 474–75 (1966), advertisements dealing with
political and social matters which newspapers carry for a fee, New York Times Co.
v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265–66 (1964), motion pictures which are exhibited for an
admission fee, United States v. Paramount Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 166 (1948); Jo-
seph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501–02 (1952), were all during this pe-
riod held entitled to full First Amendment protection regardless of the commercial
element involved.
1039 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980).
1040 Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Comm’n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
1041 413 U.S. at 385, 389. The Court continues to hold that government may
ban commercial speech related to illegal activity. Central Hudson Gas & Electric
Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 563–64 (1980).
1042 Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
Then, the Court swept all these distinctions away as it voided

a statute that declared it unprofessional conduct for a licensed phar-
macist to advertise the prices of prescription drugs.1043 In a suit
brought by consumers to protect their right to receive information,
the Court held that speech that does no more than propose a com-
mercial transaction is nonetheless of such social value as to be en-
titled to protection. Consumers’ interests in receiving factual infor-
mation about prices may even be of greater value than political debate,
but in any event price competition and access to information about
it is in the public interest. State interests asserted in support of
the ban—protection of professionalism and the quality of prescrip-
tion goods—were found either badly served or not served by the stat-
ute.1044
Turning from the interests of consumers to receive information
to the asserted right of advertisers to communicate, the Court voided
several restrictions. The Court voided a municipal ordinance that
barred the display of “For sale” and “Sold” signs on residential lawns,
purportedly so as to limit “white flight” resulting from a “fear psy-
chology” that developed among white residents following sale of homes
to nonwhites. The right of owners to communicate their intention
to sell a commodity and the right of potential buyers to receive the
message was protected, the Court determined; the community inter-
est could have been achieved by less restrictive means and in any
event may not be achieved by restricting the free flow of truthful
information.1045 Similarly, deciding a question it had reserved in the
Virginia Pharmacy case, the Court held that a state could not for-
bid lawyers from advertising the prices they charged for the perfor-
mance of routine legal services.1046 None of the proffered state jus-
tifications for the ban was deemed sufficient to overcome the private
and societal interest in the free exchange of this form of speech.1047
Nor may a state categorically prohibit attorney advertising through
mailings that target persons known to face particular legal prob-
1043 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748 (1976). Justice Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 781.

1044 425 U.S. at 763–64 (consumers’ interests), 764–65 (social interest), 766–70
(justifications for the ban).

1045 Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
1046 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). Chief Justice Burger
and Justices Powell, Stewart, and Rehnquist dissented. Id. at 386, 389, 404.
1047 433 U.S. at 368–79. See also In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191 (1982) (invalidating
sanctions imposed on attorney for deviating in some respects from rigid prescrip-
tions of advertising style and for engaging in some proscribed advertising practices,
because the state could show neither that his advertising was misleading nor that
any substantial governmental interest was served by the restraints).
lems,1048 or prohibit an attorney from holding himself out as a cer-

tified civil trial specialist,1049 or prohibit a certified public accoun-
tant from holding herself out as a certified financial planner.1050
However, a state has been held to have a much greater counter-
vailing interest in regulating person-to-person solicitation of clients
by attorneys; therefore, especially because in-person solicitation is
“a business transaction in which speech is an essential but subordi-
nate component,” the state interest need only be important rather
than compelling.1051 Similarly, the Court upheld a rule prohibiting
high school coaches from recruiting middle school athletes, finding
that “the dangers of undue influence and overreaching that exist
when a lawyer chases an ambulance are also present when a high
school coach contacts an eighth grader.” 1052 The Court later re-
fused, however, to extend this principle to in-person solicitation by
certified public accountants, explaining that CPAs, unlike attor-
neys, are not professionally “trained in the art of persuasion,” and
that the typical business executive client of a CPA is “far less sus-
ceptible to manipulation” than was the accident victim in Ohralik.1053
A ban on personal solicitation is “justified only in situations ‘inher-
ently conducive to overreaching and other forms of miscon-
duct.’ ” 1054 To allow enforcement of such a broad prophylactic rule
1048 Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass’n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988). Shapero was distin-
guished in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618 (1995), a 5–4 decision up-
holding a prohibition on targeted direct-mail solicitations to victims and their rela-
tives for a 30-day period following an accident or disaster. “Shapero dealt with a
broad ban on all direct mail solicitations” (id. at 629), the Court explained, and was
not supported, as Florida’s more limited ban was, by findings describing the harms
to be prevented by the ban. Dissenting Justice Kennedy disagreed that there was a
valid distinction, pointing out that in Shapero the Court had said that “the mode of
communication [mailings versus potentially more abusive in-person solicitation] makes
all the difference,” and that mailings were at issue in both Shapero and Florida
Bar. 515 U.S. at 637 (quoting Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475).
1049 Peel v. Illinois Attorney Disciplinary Comm’n, 496 U.S. 91 (1990).
1050 Ibanez v. Florida Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S. 136 (1994) (also ruling that
Accountancy Board could not reprimand the CPA, who was also a licensed attorney,
for truthfully listing her CPA credentials in advertising for her law practice).
1051 Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978). But compare In re
Primus, 426 U.S. 412 (1978). The distinction between in-person and other attorney
advertising was continued in Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S.
626 (1985) (“print advertising . . . in most cases . . . will lack the coercive force of
the personal presence of the trained advocate”).
1052 Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551 U.S.
291, 298 (2007).

1053 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 775 (1993).
1054 Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. at 774, quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203,
and quoted in Tennessee Secondary School Athletic Ass’n v. Brentwood Academy, 551
U.S. 291, 298 (2007).
absent identification of a serious problem such as ambulance chas-

ing, the Court explained, would dilute commercial speech protec-
tion “almost to nothing.” 1055
Moreover, a statute prohibiting the practice of optometry under
a trade name was sustained because there was “a significant possi-
bility” that the public might be misled through deceptive use of the
same or similar trade names.1056 But a state regulatory commis-
sion prohibition of utility advertisements “intended to stimulate the
purchase of utility services” was held unjustified by the asserted
interests in energy consumption and avoidance of subsidization of
additional energy costs by all consumers.1057
Although commercial speech is entitled to First Amendment pro-
tection, the Court has clearly held that it is different from other
forms of expression; it has remarked on the commonsense differ-
ences between speech that does no more than propose a commer-
cial transaction and other varieties.1058 The Court has developed the
1055 507 U.S. at 777.
1056 Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
1057 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). See also
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (voiding a
ban on utility’s inclusion in monthly bills of inserts discussing controversial issues
of public policy). However, the linking of a product to matters of public debate does
not thereby entitle an ad to the increased protection afforded noncommercial speech.
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983).
1058 Commercial speech is viewed by the Court as usually hardier than other
speech; because advertising is the sine qua non of commercial profits, it is less likely
to be chilled by regulation. Thus, the difference inheres in both the nature of the
speech and the nature of the governmental interest. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy
v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 771–72 n.24 (1976); Ohralik v.
Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 455–56 (1978). It is, of course, important to
develop distinctions between commercial speech and other speech for purposes of
determining when broader regulation is permissible. The Court’s definitional state-
ments have been general, referring to commercial speech as that “proposing a com-
mercial transaction,” Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, supra, or as “expression re-
lated solely to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience.” Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980). It has simply viewed as non-
commercial the advertising of views on public policy that would inhere to the eco-
nomic benefit of the speaker. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447
U.S. 530 (1980). So too, the Court has refused to treat as commercial speech chari-
table solicitation undertaken by professional fundraisers, characterizing the commer-
cial component as “inextricably intertwined with otherwise fully protected speech.”
Riley v. National Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988). By contrast, a mixing
of home economics information with a sales pitch at a “Tupperware” party did not
remove the transaction from commercial speech. Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S.
469 (1989). In Nike, Inc. v. Kasky, 45 P.3d 243 (Cal. 2002), cert. dismissed, 539 U.S.
654 (2003), Nike was sued for unfair and deceptive practices for allegedly false state-
ments it made concerning the working conditions under which its products were manu-
factured. The California Supreme Court ruled that the suit could proceed, and the
Supreme Court granted certiorari, but then dismissed it as improvidently granted,
with a concurring and two dissenting opinions. The issue left undecided was whether
Nike’s statements, though they concerned a matter of public debate and appeared
in press releases and letters rather than in advertisements for its products, should
four-pronged Central Hudson test to measure the validity of re-

straints upon commercial expression.1059
Under the first prong of the test, certain commercial speech is
not entitled to protection; the informational function of advertising
is the First Amendment concern and if an advertisement does not
accurately inform the public about lawful activity, it can be sup-
pressed.1060
Second, if the speech is protected, the interest of the govern-
ment in regulating and limiting it must be assessed. The state must
assert a substantial interest to be achieved by restrictions on com-
mercial speech.1061
Third, the restriction cannot be sustained if it provides only in-
effective or remote support for the asserted purpose.1062 Instead, the
regulation must “directly advance” the governmental interest. The
be deemed “ ‘commercial speech’ because they might affect consumers’ opinions about
the business as a good corporate citizen and thereby affect their purchasing deci-
sions.” Id. at 657 (Stevens, J., concurring). Nike subsequently settled the suit.
1059 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557 (1980). In one case,
the Court referred to the test as having three prongs, referring to its second, third,
and fourth prongs, as, respectively, its first, second, and third. The Court in that
case did, however, apply Central Hudson’s first prong as well. Florida Bar v. Went
For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995).
1060 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 563, 564 (1980).
Within this category fall the cases involving the possibility of deception through such
devices as use of trade names, Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979), and solicita-
tion of business by lawyers, Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447 (1978), as
well as the proposal of an unlawful transaction, Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Commission
on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376 (1973).
1061 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 564, 568–69 (1980).
The Court deemed the state’s interests to be clear and substantial. The pattern here
is similar to much due process and equal protection litigation as well as expression
and religion cases in which the Court accepts the proffered interests as legitimate
and worthy. See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic
Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987) (governmental interest in protecting USOC’s exclusive
use of word “Olympic” is substantial); Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995) (government’s interest in curbing strength wars among brewers is substan-
tial, but interest in facilitating state regulation of alcohol is not substantial). Con-
trast United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993), finding a substan-
tial federal interest in facilitating state restrictions on lotteries. “Unlike the situation
in Edge Broadcasting,” the Coors Court explained, “the policies of some states do
not prevent neighboring states from pursuing their own alcohol-related policies within
their respective borders.” 514 U.S. at 486. However, in Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod-
ucts Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), the Court deemed insubstantial a governmental in-
terest in protecting postal patrons from offensive but not obscene materials. For def-
erential treatment of the governmental interest, see Posadas de Puerto Rico Associates
v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico, 478 U.S. 328 (1986) (Puerto Rico’s “substantial” inter-
est in discouraging casino gambling by residents justifies ban on ads aimed at resi-
dents even though residents may legally engage in casino gambling, and even though
ads aimed at tourists are permitted).
1062 447 U.S. at 569. The ban here was found to directly advance one of the
proffered interests. Contrast this holding with Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433
U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748 (1976); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983);
Court resolves this issue with reference to aggregate effects, and

does not limit its consideration to effects on the challenging liti-
gant.1063
Fourth, if the governmental interest could be served as well by
a more limited restriction on commercial speech, the excessive re-
striction cannot survive.1064 The Court has rejected the idea that a
“least restrictive means” test is required. Instead, what is now re-
quired is a reasonable “fit” between means and ends, with the means
“narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.” 1065 The Court,
however, does “not equate this test with the less rigorous obstacles
of rational basis review; . . . the existence of ‘numerous and obvi-
ous less-burdensome alternatives to the restriction on commercial
Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (prohibition on display of alcohol
content on beer labels does not directly and materially advance government’s inter-
est in curbing strength wars among brewers, given the inconsistencies and “overall
irrationality” of the regulatory scheme); and Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993)
(Florida’s ban on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants does not di-
rectly advance its legitimate interests in protecting consumers from fraud, protect-
ing consumer privacy, and maintaining professional independence from clients), where
the restraints were deemed indirect or ineffectual.
1063 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427 (1993) (“this ques-
tion cannot be answered by limiting the inquiry to whether the governmental inter-
est is directly advanced as applied to a single person or entity”).
1064 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 565, 569–71 (1980).
This test is, of course, the “least restrictive means” standard. Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960). In Central Hudson, the Court found the ban more extensive
than was necessary to effectuate the governmental purpose. See also Bolger v. Youngs
Drug Products Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983), where the Court held that the governmen-
tal interest in not interfering with parental efforts at controlling children’s access to
birth control information could not justify a ban on commercial mailings about birth
control products; “[t]he level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be lim-
ited to that which would be suitable for a sandbox.” Id. at 74. See also Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (there are less intrusive alternatives—e.g.,
direct limitations on alcohol content of beer—to prohibition on display of alcohol con-
tent on beer label). Note, however, that, in San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v.
United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522, 539 (1987), the Court applied the test
in a manner deferential to Congress: “the restrictions [at issue] are not broader than
Congress reasonably could have determined to be necessary to further these inter-
ests.”
1065 Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989). In a 1993 opinion the
Court elaborated on the difference between reasonable fit and least restrictive alter-
native. “A regulation need not be ‘absolutely the least severe that will achieve the
desired end,’ but if there are numerous and obvious less-burdensome alternatives to
the restriction . . . , that is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether
the ‘fit’ between ends and means is reasonable.” City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Net-
work, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 417 n.13 (1993). But see Thompson v. Western States Medi-
cal Center, 535 U.S. 357, 368 (2002), in which the Court quoted the fourth prong of
the Central Hudson test without mentioning its reformulation by Fox, and added,
again without reference to Fox, “In previous cases addressing this final prong of the
Central Hudson test, we have made clear that if the government could achieve its
interests in a manner that does not restrict speech, or that restricts less speech, the
government must do so.” Id. at 371.
speech . . . is certainly a relevant consideration in determining whether

the “fit” between ends and means is reasonable.’ ” 1066
The “reasonable fit” standard has some teeth, the Court made
clear in City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc.,1067 striking
down a city’s prohibition on distribution of “commercial handbills”
through freestanding newsracks located on city property. The city’s
aesthetic interest in reducing visual clutter was furthered by reduc-
ing the total number of newsracks, but the distinction between pro-
hibited “commercial” publications and permitted “newspapers” bore
“no relationship whatsoever” to this legitimate interest.1068 The city
could not, the Court ruled, single out commercial speech to bear
the full onus when “all newsracks, regardless of whether they con-
tain commercial or noncommercial publications, are equally at
fault.” 1069 By contrast, the Court upheld a federal law that prohib-
ited broadcast of lottery advertisements by a broadcaster in a state
that prohibits lotteries, while allowing broadcast of such ads by sta-
tions in states that sponsor lotteries. There was a “reasonable fit”
between the restriction and the asserted federal interest in support-
ing state anti-gambling policies without unduly interfering with poli-
cies of neighboring states that promote lotteries.1070 The prohibi-
tion “directly served” the congressional interest, and could be applied
to a broadcaster whose principal audience was in an adjoining lot-
tery state, and who sought to run ads for that state’s lottery.1071
In 1999, the Court struck down a provision of the same statute
as applied to advertisements for private casino gambling that are
broadcast by radio and television stations located in a state where
such gambling is legal.1072 The Court emphasized the interrelated-
ness of the four parts of the Central Hudson test: “Each [part] raises
a relevant question that may not be dispositive to the First Amend-
ment inquiry, but the answer to which may inform a judgment con-
cerning the other three.” 1073 For example, although the govern-
ment has a substantial interest in reducing the social costs of gambling,
the fact that the Congress has simultaneously encouraged gam-
1066 Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 632 (1995).
1067 507 U.S. 410 (1993). See also Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993), de-
cided the same Term, relying on the “directly advance” third prong of Central Hud-
son to strike down a ban on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants.
1068 507 U.S. at 424.
1069 507 U.S. at 426. The Court also noted the “minute” effect of removing 62
“commercial” newsracks while 1,500 to 2,000 other newsracks remained in place.

Id. at 418.
1070 United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993).
1071 507 U.S. at 428.
1072 Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S.
173 (1999).
1073 527 U.S. at 184.
bling, because of its economic benefits, makes it more difficult for

the government to demonstrate that its restriction on commercial
speech materially advances its asserted interest and constitutes a
reasonable “fit.” 1074 In this case, “[t]he operation of [18 U.S.C.] § 1304
and its attendant regulatory regime is so pierced by exemptions and
inconsistencies that the Government cannot hope to exonerate it.” 1075
Moreoever, “the regulation distinguishes among the indistinct, per-
mitting a variety of speech that poses the same risks the Govern-
ment purports to fear, while banning messages unlikely to cause
any harm at all.” 1076
In Posadas de Puerto Rico Assocs. v. Tourism Co. of Puerto Rico,
the Court asserted that “the greater power to completely ban ca-
sino gambling necessarily includes the lesser power to ban advertis-
ing of casino gambling.” 1077 Subsequently, however, the Court es-
chewed reliance on Posadas,1078 and it seems doubtful that the Court
would again embrace the broad principle that government may ban
all advertising of an activity that it permits but has power to pro-
hibit. Indeed, the Court’s very holding in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island,1079 striking down the state’s ban on advertisements that pro-
vide truthful information about liquor prices, is inconsistent with
the general proposition. A Court plurality in 44 Liquormart squarely
rejected Posadas, calling it “erroneous,” declining to give force to
its “highly deferential approach,” and proclaiming that a state “does
not have the broad discretion to suppress truthful, nonmisleading
information for paternalistic purposes that the Posadas majority was
willing to tolerate.” 1080 Four other Justices concluded that Posadas
1074 527 U.S. at 186–87.

1075 527 U.S. at 190.
1076 527 U.S. at 195.
1077 478 U.S. 328, 345–46 (1986). For discussion of the case, see P. Kurland, Posadas
de Puerto Rico v. Tourism Company: “’Twas Strange, ‘Twas Passing Strange; ‘Twas
Pitiful, ‘Twas Wondrous Pitiful,” 1986 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
1078 In Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476 (1995) (invalidating a federal
ban on revealing alcohol content on malt beverage labels), the Court rejected reli-
ance on Posadas, pointing out that the statement in Posadas had been made only
after a determination that the advertising could be upheld under Central Hudson.
The Court found it unnecessary to consider the greater-includes-lesser argument in
United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 427 (1993), upholding through
application of Central Hudson principles a ban on broadcast of lottery ads.
1079 517 U.S. 484 (1996).
1080 517 U.S. at 510 (opinion of Stevens, joined by Justices Kennedy, Thomas,
and Ginsburg). Stevens’ opinion also dismissed the Posadas “greater-includes-the-

lesser argument” as “inconsistent with both logic and well-settled doctrine,” point-
ing out that the First Amendment “presumes that attempts to regulate speech are
more dangerous than attempts to regulate conduct.” Id. at 511–512.
was inconsistent with the “closer look” that the Court has since re-
quired in applying the principles of Central Hudson.1081
The “different degree of protection” accorded commercial speech
has a number of consequences as regards other First Amendment
doctrine. For instance, somewhat broader times, places, and man-
ner regulations are to be tolerated,1082 and the rule against prior
restraints may be inapplicable.1083 Further, disseminators of com-
mercial speech are not protected by the overbreadth doctrine.1084
On the other hand, there are circumstances in which the nature of
the restriction placed on commercial speech may alter the First Amend-
ment analysis, and even result in the application of a heightened
level of scrutiny.
For instance, in Sorrell v. IMS Health, Inc.,1085 the Court struck
down state restrictions on pharmacies and “data-miners” selling or
leasing information on the prescribing behavior of doctors for mar-
keting purposes and related restrictions limiting the use of that in-
formation by pharmaceutical companies.1086 These prohibitions, how-
ever, were subject to a number of exceptions, including provisions
allowing such prescriber-identifying information to be used for health
care research. Because the restrictions only applied to the use of
this information for marketing and because they principally ap-
plied to pharmaceutical manufacturers of non-generic drugs, the Court
found that these restrictions were content-based and speaker-
based limits and thus subject to heightened scrutiny.1087
1081 517 U.S. at 531–32 (concurring opinion of O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice
Rehnquist and by Justices Souter and Breyer).

1082 Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425
U.S. 748, 771 (1976); Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 384 (1977). But,
in Linmark Associates v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 93–94 (1977), the
Court refused to accept a times, places, and manner defense of an ordinance prohib-
iting “For Sale” signs on residential lawns. First, ample alternative channels of com-
munication were not available, and second, the ban was seen rather as a content
limitation.
1083 Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 571 n.13 (1980), cit-
ing Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 772 n.24 (1976). See “The Doctrine of Prior Restraint,” supra.
1084 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 379–81 (1977); Central Hudson
Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 565 n.8 (1980).
1085 564 U.S. ___, No. 10–779, slip op. (2011).
1086 “Detailers,” marketing specialists employed by pharmaceutical manufactur-
ers, used the reports to refine their marketing tactics and increase sales to doctors.
1087 Although the state put forward a variety of proposed governmental inter-
ests to justify the regulations, the Court found these interests (expectation of physi-
cian privacy, discouraging harassment of physicians, and protecting the integrity of
the doctor-physician relationship) were ill-served by the content-based restrictions.
564 U.S. ___, No. 10–779, slip op. at 17–21. The Court also rejected the argument
that the regulations were an appropriate way to reduce health care costs, noting
that “[t]he State seeks to achieve its policy objectives through the indirect means of
restraining certain speech by certain speakers—that is, by diminishing detailers’ abil-
Different degrees of protection may also be discerned among dif-

ferent categories of commercial speech. The first prong of the Cen-
tral Hudson test means that false, deceptive, or misleading adver-
tisements need not be permitted; government may require that a
commercial message appear in such a form, or include such addi-
tional information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to
prevent deception.1088 But even truthful, non-misleading commer-
cial speech may be regulated, and the validity of such regulation is
tested by application of the remaining prongs of the Central Hud-
son test. The test itself does not make further distinctions based
on the content of the commercial message or the nature of the gov-
ernmental interest (that interest need only be “substantial”). Re-
cent decisions suggest, however, that further distinctions may ex-
ist. Measures aimed at preserving “a fair bargaining process” between
consumer and advertiser 1089 may be more likely to pass the test 1090
than are regulations designed to implement general health, safety,
or moral concerns.1091 As the governmental interest becomes fur-
ther removed from protecting a fair bargaining process, it may be-
come more difficult to establish the absence of less burdensome regu-
ity to influence prescription decisions. Those who seek to censor or burden free ex-
pression often assert that disfavored speech has adverse effects. But the ‘fear that
people would make bad decisions if given truthful information’ cannot justify content-
based burdens on speech.” Id. at 21–22.
1088 Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350, 383–84 (1977); Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978). Requirements that advertisers disclose
more information than they otherwise choose to are upheld “as long as [they] are
reasonably related to the State’s interest in preventing deception of consumers,” the
Court explaining that “[t]he right of a commercial speaker not to divulge accurate
information regarding his services is not . . . a fundamental right” requiring strict
scrutiny of the disclosure requirement. Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel,
471 U.S. 626, 651 & n.14 (1985) (upholding requirement that attorney’s contingent
fees ad mention that unsuccessful plaintiffs might still be liable for court costs).
1089 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996).
1090 See, e.g., Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass’n, 436 U.S. 447, 465 (1978) (uphold-
ing ban on in-person solicitation by attorneys due in part to the “potential for over-
reaching” when a trained advocate “solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or dis-
tressed lay person”).
1091 Compare United States v. Edge Broadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418 (1993) (up-
holding federal law supporting state interest in protecting citizens from lottery infor-
mation) and Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 631 (1995) (upholding a
30-day ban on targeted, direct-mail solicitation of accident victims by attorneys, not
because of any presumed susceptibility to overreaching, but because the ban “fore-
stall[s] the outrage and irritation with the . . . legal profession that the [banned]
solicitation . . . has engendered”) with Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476
(1995) (striking down federal statute prohibiting display of alcohol content on beer
labels) and 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484 (1996) (striking down
state law prohibiting display of retail prices in ads for alcoholic beverages).
latory alternatives and the presence of a “reasonable fit” between

the commercial speech restriction and the governmental inter-
est.1092
Taxation.—Disclaiming any intimation “that the owners of news-
papers are immune from any of the ordinary forms of taxation for
support of the government,” the Court voided a state two-percent
tax on the gross receipts of advertising in newspapers with a circu-
lation exceeding 20,000 copies a week.1093 In the Court’s view, the
tax was analogous to the 18th-century English practice of imposing
advertising and stamp taxes on newspapers for the express pur-
pose of pricing the opposition penny press beyond the means of the
mass of the population.1094 The tax at issue focused exclusively upon
newspapers, it imposed a serious burden on the distribution of news
to the public, and it appeared to be a discriminatorily selective tax
aimed almost solely at the opposition to the state administra-
tion.1095 Combined with the standard that government may not im-
pose a tax directly upon the exercise of a constitutional right it-
1092 “[S]everal Members of the Court have expressed doubts about the Central
Hudson analysis and whether it should apply in particular cases.” Thompson v. West-
ern States Medical Center, 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002). Justice Stevens has criticized
the Central Hudson test because it seemingly allows regulation of any speech pro-
pounded in a commercial context regardless of the content of that speech. “[A]ny
description of commercial speech that is intended to identify the category of speech
entitled to less First Amendment protection should relate to the reasons for permit-
ting broader regulation: namely, commercial speech’s potential to mislead.” Rubin v.
Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 494 (1995) (concurring opinion). The Justice re-
peated these views in 1996: “when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of
truthful, nonmisleading commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preserva-
tion of a fair bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous
review that the First Amendment generally demands.” 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode
Island, 517 U.S. 484, 501 (1996) (a portion of the opinion joined by Justices Ken-
nedy and Ginsburg). Justice Thomas, similarly, wrote that, in cases “in which the
government’s asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service igno-
rant in order to manipulate their choices in the marketplace, the Central Hudson
test should not be applied because such an interest’ is per se illegitimate. . . .” Greater
New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n, Inc. v. United States, 527 U.S. 173, 197 (1999)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted). Other decisions in which
the Court majority acknowledged that some Justices would grant commercial speech
greater protection than it has under the Central Hudson test include United States
v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–410 (2001) (mandated assessments, used
for advertising, on handlers of fresh mushrooms struck down as compelled speech,
rather than under Central Hudson), and Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S.
525, 554 (2001) (various state restrictions on tobacco advertising struck down under
Central Hudson as overly burdensome).
1093 Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 250 (1936).
1094 297 U.S. at 245–48.
1095 297 U.S. at 250–51. Grosjean was distinguished on this latter basis in Min-
neapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575 (1983).
self,1096 these tests seem to permit general business taxes upon receipts
of businesses engaged in communicating protected expression with-
out raising any First Amendment issues.1097
Ordinarily, a tax singling out the press for differential treat-
ment is highly suspect, and creates a heavy burden of justification
on the state. This is so, the Court explained in 1983, because such
“a powerful weapon” to single out a small group carries with it a
lessened political constraint than do those measures affecting a broader
based constituency, and because “differential treatment, unless jus-
tified by some special characteristic of the press, suggests that the
goal of the regulation is not unrelated to suppression of expres-
sion.” 1098 The state’s interest in raising revenue is not sufficient jus-
tification for differential treatment of the press. Moreover, the Court
refused to adopt a rule permitting analysis of the “effective bur-
den” imposed by a differential tax; even if the current effective tax
burden could be measured and upheld, the threat of increasing the
burden on the press might have “censorial effects,” and “courts as
institutions are poorly equipped to evaluate with precision the rela-
tive burdens of various methods of taxation.” 1099
Also difficult to justify is taxation that targets specific sub-
groups within a segment of the press for differential treatment. An
Arkansas sales tax exemption for newspapers and for “religious, pro-
fessional, trade, and sports journals” published within the state was
struck down as an invalid content-based regulation of the press.1100
Entirely as a result of content, some magazines were treated less
favorably than others. The general interest in raising revenue was
again rejected as a “compelling” justification for such treatment, and
1096 Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Follett v. McCormick, 321
U.S. 573 (1944) (license taxes upon Jehovah’s Witnesses selling religious literature
invalid).
1097 Cf. City of Corona v. Corona Daily Independent, 115 Cal. App. 2d 382, 252
P.2d 56 (1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 833 (1953) (Justices Black and Douglas dissent-
ing). See also Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498 (1959) (no First Amend-
ment violation to deny business expense tax deduction for expenses incurred in lob-
bying about measure affecting one’s business); Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439
(1991) (no First Amendment violation in applying general gross receipts tax to cable
television services while exempting other communications media).
1098 Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S.
575, 585 (1983) (invalidating a Minnesota use tax on the cost of paper and ink prod-
ucts used in a publication, and exempting the first $100,000 of such costs each cal-
endar year; Star & Tribune paid roughly two-thirds of all revenues the state raised
by the tax). The Court seemed less concerned, however, when the affected group
within the press was not so small, upholding application of a gross receipts tax to
cable television services even though other segments of the communications media
were exempted. Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991).
1099 460 U.S. at 588, 589.
1100 Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221 (1987).
the measure was viewed as not narrowly tailored to achieve other

asserted state interests in encouraging “fledgling” publishers and
in fostering communications.
The Court seemed to change course somewhat in 1991, uphold-
ing a state tax that discriminated among different components of
the communications media, and proclaiming that “differential taxa-
tion of speakers, even members of the press, does not implicate the
First Amendment unless the tax is directed at, or presents the dan-
ger of suppressing, particular ideas.” 1101
The general principle that government may not impose a finan-
cial burden based on the content of speech underlay the Court’s in-
validation of New York’s “Son of Sam” law, which provided that a
criminal’s income from publications describing his crime was to be
placed in escrow and made available to victims of the crime.1102 Al-
though the Court recognized a compelling state interest in ensur-
ing that criminals do not profit from their crimes, and in compen-
sating crime victims, it found that the statute was not narrowly
tailored to those ends. The statute applied only to income derived
from speech, not to income from other sources, and it was signifi-
cantly overinclusive because it reached a wide range of literature
(e.g., the Confessions of Saint Augustine and Thoreau’s Civil Disobe-
dience) “that did not enable a criminal to profit from his crime while
a victim remains uncompensated” 1103
Labor Relations.—Just as newspapers and other communica-
tions businesses are subject to nondiscriminatory taxation, they are
entitled to no immunity from the application of general laws regu-
lating their relations with their employees and prescribing wage and
hour standards. In Associated Press v. NLRB,1104 the application of
the National Labor Relations Act to a newsgathering agency was
found to raise no constitutional problem. “The publisher of a news-
paper has no special immunity from the application of general laws.
He has no special privilege to invade the rights and liberties of oth-
ers. . . . The regulation here in question has no relation whatever
to the impartial distribution of news.” Similarly, the Court has found
no problem with requiring newspapers to pay minimum wages and
observe maximum hours.1105
1101 Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 453 (1991) (tax applied to all cable tele-
vision systems within the state, but not to other segments of the communications
media).
1102 Simon & Schuster v. New York Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).
1103 502 U.S. at 122.
1104 301 U.S. 103, 132 (1937).
1105 Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
Antitrust Laws.—Resort to the antitrust laws to break up re-

straints on competition in the newsgathering and publishing field
was found not only to present no First Amendment problem, but to
comport with the government’s obligation under that Amendment.
Justice Black wrote: “It would be strange indeed, however, if the
grave concern for freedom of the press which prompted adoption of
the First Amendment should be read as a command that the gov-
ernment was without power to protect that freedom. The First Amend-
ment, far from providing an argument against application of the
Sherman Act, here provides powerful reasons to the contrary. That
Amendment rests on the assumption that the widest possible dis-
semination of information from diverse and antagonistic sources is
essential to the welfare of the public, that a free press is a condi-
tion of a free society. Surely a command that the government itself
shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon
that constitutionally guaranteed freedom. Freedom to publish means
freedom for all and not for some. Freedom to publish is guaranteed
by the Constitution, but freedom to combine to keep others from
publishing is not.” 1106
Thus, both newspapers and broadcasters, as well as other such
industries, may not engage in monopolistic and other anticompeti-
tive activities free of possibility of antitrust law attack,1107 even if
such activities might promote speech.1108
Broadcast Radio and Television.—Because there are a lim-
ited number of broadcast frequencies for radio and non-cable televi-
sion use, the Federal Government licenses access to these frequen-
cies, permitting some applicants to use them and denying the greater
number of applicants such permission. Even though this licensing
system is in form a variety of prior restraint, the Court has held
that it does not present a First Amendment issue because of the
1106 Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
1107 Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951) (refusal of newspa-
per publisher who enjoyed a substantial monopoly to sell advertising to persons also
advertising over a competing radio station violates antitrust laws); United States v.
Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S. 334 (1959) (FCC approval no bar to antitrust suit);
United States v. Greater Buffalo Press, 402 U.S. 549 (1971) (monopolization of color
comic supplements). See also FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broadcasting, 436
U.S. 775 (1978) (upholding FCC rules prospectively barring, and in some instances
requiring divesting to prevent, the common ownership of a radio or television broad-
cast station and a daily newspaper located in the same community).
1108 Citizen Publishing Co. v. United States, 394 U.S. 131 (1969) (pooling arrange-
ment between two newspapers violates antitrust laws; First Amendment argument
that one paper will fail if arrangement is outlawed rejected). In response to this
decision, Congress enacted the Newspaper Preservation Act to sanction certain joint
arrangements where one paper is in danger of failing. 84 Stat. 466 (1970), 15 U.S.C.
§§ 1801–1804.
unique characteristic of scarcity.1109 Thus, the Federal Communica-

tions Commission has broad authority to determine the right of ac-
cess to broadcasting,1110 although, of course, the regulation must be
exercised in a manner that is neutral with regard to the content of
the materials broadcast.1111
In certain respects, however, governmental regulation does im-
plicate First Amendment values, and, in Red Lion Broadcasting Co.
v. FCC, the Court upheld an FCC regulation that required broad-
casters to afford persons an opportunity to reply if they were at-
tacked on the air on the basis of their “honesty, character, integrity
or like personal qualities,” or if they were legally qualified candi-
dates and a broadcast editorial endorsed their opponent or opposed
them.1112 In Red Lion, Justice White explained that “differences in
the characteristics of [various] media justify differences in First Amend-
ment standards applied to them.” 1113 Thus, although everyone has
a right to speak, write, or publish as he will, subject to very few
limitations, there is no comparable right of everyone to broadcast.
The frequencies are limited and some few must be given the privi-
lege over others. The particular licensee, however, has no First Amend-
ment right to hold that license and his exclusive privilege may be
qualified. Qualification by censorship of content is impermissible,
but the First Amendment does not prevent a governmental insis-
tence that a licensee “conduct himself as a proxy or fiduciary with
obligations to present those views and voices which are representa-
tive of his community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be
barred from the airwaves.” 1114 Furthermore, said Justice White, “[b]e-
cause of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the government is permit-
ted to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views
1109 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); see also Red Lion Broadcasting
Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375–79, 387–89 (1969); FCC v. National Citizens Comm.
for Broadcasting, 436 U.S. 775, 798–802 (1978).
1110 NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943); Federal Radio Comm’n v. Nel-
son Bros. Bond & Mortgage Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933; FCC v. Pottsville, 309 U.S. 134
(1940); FCC v. ABC, 347 U.S. 284 (1954); Farmers Union v. WDAY, 360 U.S. 525
(1958).
1111 “But Congress did not authorize the Commission to choose among appli-
cants upon the basis of their political, economic or social views or upon any other
capricious basis. If it did, or if the Commission by these regulations proposed a choice
among applicants upon some such basis, the issue before us would be wholly differ-
ent.” NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 226 (1943).
1112 395 U.S. 367, 373 (1969). “The Federal Communications Commission has
for many years imposed on radio and television broadcasters the requirement that
discussion of public issues be presented on broadcast stations, and that each side of
those issues must be given fair coverage. This is known as the fairness doc-
trine. . . .” Id. at 369. The two issues passed on in Red Lion were integral parts of
the doctrine.
1113 395 U.S. at 386.
1114 395 U.S. at 389.
should be expressed on this unique medium. But the people as a

whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and their collec-
tive right to have the medium function consistently with the ends
and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the view-
ers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is para-
mount.” 1115 The broadcasters had argued that, if they were re-
quired to provide equal time at their expense to persons attacked
and to points of view different from those expressed on the air, ex-
pression would be curbed through self-censorship, for fear of contro-
versy and economic loss. Justice White thought this possibility “at
best speculative,” but if it should materialize “the Commission is
not powerless to insist that they give adequate and fair attention
to public issues.” 1116
In Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Com-
mittee,1117 the Court rejected claims of political groups that the broad-
cast networks were constitutionally required to sell them broadcast-
ing time for the presentation of views on controversial issues. The
ruling terminated a broad drive to obtain that result, but the frag-
mented nature of the Court’s multiple opinions precluded a satisfac-
tory evaluation of the constitutional implications of the case. How-
ever, in CBS v. FCC,1118 the Court held that Congress had conferred
on candidates seeking federal elective office an affirmative, promptly
enforceable right of reasonable access to the use of broadcast sta-
tions, to be administered through FCC control over license revoca-
tions, and held such right of access to be within Congress’s power
to grant, the First Amendment notwithstanding. The constitutional
analysis was brief and merely restated the spectrum scarcity ratio-
nale and the role of the broadcasters as fiduciaries for the public
interest.
In FCC v. League of Women Voters,1119 the Court took the same
general approach to governmental regulation of broadcasting, but
struck down a total ban on editorializing by stations receiving pub-
lic funding. In summarizing the principles guiding analysis in this
1115 395 U.S. at 390.
1116 395 U.S. at 392–93.
1117 412 U.S. 94 (1973).
1118 453 U.S. 367 (1981). The dissent argued that the FCC had assumed, and
the Court had confirmed it in assuming, too much authority under the congressio-
nal enactment. In its view, Congress had not meant to do away with the traditional
deference to the editorial judgments of the broadcasters. Id. at 397 (Justices White,
Rehnquist, and Stevens).
1119 468 U.S. 364 (1984), holding unconstitutional § 399 of the Public Broadcast-
ing Act of 1967, as amended. The decision was 5–4, with Justice Brennan’s opinion
for the Court being joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor,
and with Justices White, Rehnquist (joined by Chief Justice Burger and by Justice
White), and Stevens filing dissenting opinions.
area, the Court reaffirmed that Congress may regulate in ways that
would be impermissible in other contexts, but indicated that broad-
casters are entitled to greater protection than may have been sug-
gested by Red Lion. “[A]lthough the broadcasting industry plainly
operates under restraints not imposed upon other media, the thrust
of these restrictions has generally been to secure the public’s First
Amendment interest in receiving a balanced presentation of views
on diverse matters of public concern. . . . [T]hese restrictions have
been upheld only when we were satisfied that the restriction is nar-
rowly tailored to further a substantial governmental interest.” 1120
However, the earlier cases were distinguished. “[I]n sharp contrast
to the restrictions upheld in Red Lion or in [CBS v. FCC], which
left room for editorial discretion and simply required broadcast edi-
tors to grant others access to the microphone, § 399 directly prohib-
its the broadcaster from speaking out on public issues even in a
balanced and fair manner.” 1121 The ban on all editorializing was
deemed too severe and restrictive a means of accomplishing the gov-
ernmental purposes—protecting public broadcasting stations from
being coerced, through threat or fear of withdrawal of public fund-
ing, into becoming “vehicles for governmental propagandizing,” and
also keeping the stations “from becoming convenient targets for cap-
ture by private interest groups wishing to express their own parti-
san viewpoints.” 1122 Expression of editorial opinion was described
as a “form of speech . . . that lies at the heart of First Amendment
protection,” 1123 and the ban was said to be “defined solely on the
basis of . . . content,” the assumption being that editorial speech is
speech directed at “controversial issues of public importance.” 1124
Moreover, the ban on editorializing was both overinclusive, apply-
ing to commentary on local issues of no likely interest to Congress,
and underinclusive, not applying at all to expression of controver-
sial opinion in the context of regular programming. Therefore, the
Court concluded, the restriction was not narrowly enough tailored
to fulfill the government’s purposes.
Sustaining FCC discipline of a broadcaster who aired a record
containing a series of repeated “barnyard” words, considered “inde-
cent” but not obscene, the Court posited a new theory to explain
why the broadcast industry is less entitled to full constitutional pro-
1120 468 U.S. at 380. The Court rejected the suggestion that only a “compelling”
rather than “substantial” governmental interest can justify restrictions.

1121 468 U.S. at 385.
1122 468 U.S. at 384–85. Dissenting Justice Stevens thought that the ban on edi-
torializing served an important purpose of “maintaining government neutrality in

the free marketplace of ideas.” Id. at 409.
1123 468 U.S. at 381.
1124 468 U.S. at 383.
tection than are other communications entities.1125 “First, the broad-

cast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all Americans. Patently offensive, indecent material pre-
sented over the airwaves confronts the citizens, not only in public,
but also in the privacy of the home, where the individual’s right to
be left alone plainly outweighs the First Amendment rights of an
intruder. . . . Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to chil-
dren, even those too young to read. . . . The ease with which chil-
dren may obtain access to broadcast material . . . amply justif[ies]
special treatment of indecent broadcasting.” 1126 The Court empha-
sized the “narrowness” of its holding, which “requires consideration
of a host of variables.” 1127 The use of more than “an occasional exple-
tive,” the time of day of the broadcast, the likely audience, “and
differences between radio, television, and perhaps closed-circuit trans-
missions” were all relevant in the Court’s view.1128
Governmentally Compelled Right of Reply to Newspapers.—
However divided it may have been in dealing with access to the
broadcast media, the Court was unanimous in holding void under
the First Amendment a state law that granted a political candidate
a right to equal space to answer criticism and attacks on his record
by a newspaper.1129 Granting that the number of newspapers had
declined over the years, that ownership had become concentrated,
and that new entries were prohibitively expensive, the Court agreed
with proponents of the law that the problem of newspaper respon-
1125 FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).

1126 438 U.S. at 748–51. This was the only portion of the constitutional discus-
sion that obtained the support of a majority of the Court. In Denver Area Educa-
tional Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 748 (1996), the Court
noted that spectrum scarcity “has little to do with a case that involves the effects of
television viewing on children.”
1127 438 U.S. at 750. See also id. at 742–43 (plurality opinion), and id. at 755–56
(Justice Powell concurring) (“The Court today reviews only the Commission’s hold-
ing that Carlin’s monologue was indecent ‘as broadcast’ at two o’clock in the after-
noon, and not the broad sweep of the Commission’s opinion.”).
1128 438 U.S. at 750. Subsequently, the FCC began to apply its indecency stan-
dard to fleeting uses of expletives in non-sexual and non-excretory contexts. The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit found this practice arbitrary and capricious
under the Administrative Procedure Act, but the Supreme Court disagreed and up-
held the FCC policy without reaching the First Amendment question. FCC v. Fox
Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–582 (2009). See also CBS Corp. v. FCC,
535 F.3d 167 (3d Cir. 2008), vacated and remanded, 129 S. Ct. 2176 (2009) (invali-
dating, on non-constitutional grounds, a fine against CBS for broadcasting Janet Jack-
son’s exposure of her breast for nine-sixteenths of a second during a Super Bowl
halftime show). The Supreme Court vacated and remanded this decision to the Third
Circuit for further consideration in light of FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc. De-
cisions regarding legislation to ban “indecent” expression in broadcast and cable me-
dia as well as in other contexts are discussed under “Non-obscene But Sexually Ex-
plicit and Indecent Expression,” infra.
1129 Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
sibility was a great one. But press responsibility, although desir-

able, “is not mandated by the Constitution,” whereas freedom is.
The compulsion exerted by government on a newspaper to print what
it would not otherwise print, “a compulsion to publish that which
‘reason tells them should not be published,’ ” runs afoul of the free
press clause.1130
Cable Television
The Court has recognized that cable television “implicates First
Amendment interests,” because a cable operator communicates ideas
through selection of original programming and through exercise of
editorial discretion in determining which stations to include in its
offering.1131 Moreover, “settled principles of . . . First Amendment
jurisprudence” govern review of cable regulation; cable is not lim-
ited by “scarce” broadcast frequencies and does not require the same
less rigorous standard of review that the Court applies to regula-
tion of broadcasting.1132 Cable does, however, have unique charac-
teristics that justify regulations that single out cable for special treat-
ment.1133 The Court in Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC 1134 upheld
federal statutory requirements that cable systems carry local com-
mercial and public television stations. Although these “must-carry”
requirements “distinguish between speakers in the television pro-
gramming market,” they do so based on the manner of transmis-
sion and not on the content the messages conveyed, and hence are
1130 418 U.S. at 256. The Court also adverted to the imposed costs of the com-
pelled printing of replies but this seemed secondary to the quoted conclusion. The
Court has also held that a state may not require a privately owned utility company
to include in its billing envelopes views of a consumer group with which it dis-
agrees. Although a plurality opinion to which four Justices adhered relied heavily
on Tornillo, there was no Court majority consensus as to rationale. Pacific Gas &
Elec. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1 (1986). See also Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay Group, 514 U.S. 334 (1995) (state may not compel parade organizer
to allow participation by a parade unit proclaiming message that organizer does not
wish to endorse).
1131 City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 476 U.S. 488 (1986) (leav-
ing for future decision how the operator’s interests are to be balanced against a com-
munity’s interests in limiting franchises and preserving utility space); Turner Broad-
casting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 636 (1994).
1132 Turner Broadcasting System v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 638–39 (1994).
1133 512 U.S. at 661 (referring to the “bottleneck monopoly power” exercised by
cable operators in determining which networks and stations to carry, and to the re-
sulting dangers posed to the viability of broadcast television stations). See also Leath-
ers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439 (1991) (application of state gross receipts tax to cable
industry permissible even though other segments of the communications media were
exempted).
1134 512 U.S. 622 (1994).
content-neutral.1135 The regulations could therefore be measured by

the “intermediate level of scrutiny” set forth in United States v.
O’Brien.1136 Two years later, however, a splintered Court could not
agree on what standard of review to apply to content-based restric-
tions of cable broadcasts. Striking down a requirement that cable
operators must, in order to protect children, segregate and block
programs with patently offensive sexual material, a Court majority
in Denver Area Educational Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC,1137
found it unnecessary to determine whether strict scrutiny or some
lesser standard applies, because it deemed the restriction invalid
under any of the alternative tests. There was no opinion of the Court
on the other two holdings in the case,1138 and a plurality 1139 re-
jected assertions that public forum analysis,1140 or a rule giving cable
operators’ editorial rights “general primacy” over the rights of pro-
grammers and viewers,1141 should govern.
Subsequently, in United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group,
Inc.,1142 the Supreme Court made clear, as it had not in Denver Con-
sortium, that strict scrutiny applies to content-based speech restric-
tions on cable television. The Court struck down a federal statute
designed to “shield children from hearing or seeing images result-
ing from signal bleed,” which refers to blurred images or sounds
that come through to non-subscribers.1143 The statute required cable
1135 512 U.S. at 645. “Deciding whether a particular regulation is content-based
or content-neutral is not always a simple task,” the Court confessed. Id. at 642. In-
deed, dissenting Justice O’Connor, joined by Justices Scalia, Ginsburg, and Thomas,
viewed the rules as content-based. Id. at 674–82.
1136 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). The Court remanded Turner for further factual
findings relevant to the O’Brien test. On remand, the district court upheld the must-
carry provisions, and the Supreme Court affirmed, concluding that it “cannot dis-
place Congress’s judgment respecting content-neutral regulations with our own, so
long as its policy is grounded on reasonable factual findings supported by evidence
that is substantial for a legislative determination.” Turner Broadcasting System v.
FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 224 (1997).
1137 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996) (invalidating § 10(b) of the Cable Television Con-
sumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992).

1138 Upholding § 10(a) of the Act, which permits cable operators to prohibit inde-
cent material on leased access channels; and striking down § 10(c), which permits a
cable operator to prevent transmission of “sexually explicit” programming on public
access channels. In upholding § 10(a), Justice Breyer’s plurality opinion cited FCC
v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978), and noted that cable television “is as
‘accessible to children’ as over-the-air broadcasting, if not more so.” 518 U.S. at 744.
1139 This section of Justice Breyer’s opinion was joined by Justices Stevens, O’Connor,
and Souter. 518 U.S. at 749.

1140 Justice Kennedy, joined by Justice Ginsburg, advocated this approach, 518
U.S. at 791, and took the plurality to task for its “evasion of any clear legal stan-
dard.” 518 U.S. at 784.
1141 Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, advo-
cated this approach.

1142 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000).
1143 529 U.S. at 806.
operators, on channels primarily dedicated to sexually oriented pro-

gramming, either to scramble fully or otherwise fully block such chan-
nels, or to not provide such programming when a significant num-
ber of children are likely to be viewing it, which, under an FCC
regulation meant to transmit the programming only from 10 p.m.
to 6 a.m. The Court found that, even without “discount[ing] the pos-
sibility that a graphic image could have a negative impact on a young
child,” it could not conclude that Congress had used “the least re-
strictive means for addressing the problem.” 1144 Congress in fact
had enacted another provision that was less restrictive and that served
the government’s purpose. This other provision requires that, upon
request by a cable subscriber, a cable operator, without charge, fully
scramble or otherwise fully block any channel to which a sub-
scriber does not subscribe. 1145
Government Restraint of Content of Expression

As a general matter, government may not regulate speech “be-
cause of its message, its ideas, its subject matter, or its con-
tent.” 1146 “It is rare that a regulation restricting speech because of
its content will ever be permissible.” 1147 Invalid content regulation
includes not only restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also pro-
1144 529 U.S. at 826–27. The Court did not state that there is a compelling in-
terest in preventing the possibility of a graphic image’s having a negative impact on

a young child, and may have implied that there is no compelling interest in prevent-
ing the possibility of a graphic image’s having a negative impact on an older child.
It did state: “Even upon the assumption that the government has an interest in
substituting itself for informed and empowered parents, its interest is not suffi-
ciently compelling to justify this widespread restriction on speech.” Id. at 825.
1145 47 U.S.C. § 560.
1146 Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosle, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See also Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208–12 (1975); First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Metromedia v.
City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490 (1981) (plurality opinion); Widmar v. Vincent, 454
U.S. 263 (1981); Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641 (1984).
1147 United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 801, 818 (2000).
The distinction between, on the one hand, directly regulating, and, on the other hand,
incidentally affecting, the content of expression was sharply drawn by Justice Har-
lan in Konigsberg v. State Bar of California, 366 U.S. 36, 49–51 (1961): “Through-
out its history this Court has consistently recognized at least two ways in which
constitutionally protected freedom of speech is narrower than an unlimited license
to talk. On the one hand, certain forms of speech, or speech in certain contexts, has
been considered outside the scope of constitutional protection. . . . On the other hand,
general regulatory statutes, not intended to control the content of speech but inci-
dentally limiting its unfettered exercise, have not been regarded as the type of law
the First or Fourteenth Amendments forbade Congress or the States to pass, when
they have been found justified by subordinating valid governmental interests, a pre-
requisite to constitutionality which has necessarily involved a weighing of the gov-
ernmental interest involved.” The Court set forth the test for “incidental limitations
on First Amendment freedoms” in United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
See also San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympic Comm., 483
U.S. 522, 537 (1987).
hibitions on public discussion of an entire topic.1148 Although, as dis-

cussed below, there are certain categories of speech that fall out-
side of First Amendment scrutiny, such as obscenity or defamation,
the Court is generally reluctant to add new exceptions.1149 The Court
has suggested that while new categories of unprotected speech may
be identified in the future, that such categories as already exist have
long-established roots in First Amendment law.1150
Originally the Court took a “two-tier” approach to content-
oriented regulation of expression. Under the “definitional balanc-
ing” of this approach, some forms of expression are protected by
the First Amendment and certain categories of expression are not
entitled to protection. This doctrine traces to Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire,1151 in which the Court opined that “certain well-defined and
narrowly limited classes of speech . . . are no essential part of any
exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to
truth” that government may prevent those utterances and punish
those uttering them without raising any constitutional problems. If
speech fell within the Chaplinsky categories, it was unprotected, re-
gardless of its effect; if it did not, it was covered by the First Amend-
ment and it was protected unless the restraint was justified by some
test relating to harm, such as clear and present danger or a balanc-
ing of presumptively protected expression against a compelling gov-
ernmental interest.
For several decades, the decided cases reflected a fairly consis-
tent and sustained march by the Court to the elimination of, or a
severe narrowing of, the “two-tier” doctrine. The result was protec-
tion of much expression that before would have been held abso-
lutely unprotected (e.g., seditious speech and seditious libel, fight-
ing words, defamation, and obscenity). Later, the march was deflected
by a shift in position with respect to obscenity and by the creation
of a new category of non-obscene child pornography. But, in the course
of this movement, differences surfaced among the Justices on the
permissibility of regulation based on content and the interrelated
1148 Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230 (1987) (citing
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 537 (1980)).
1149 See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. ___, No. 08–769, slip op. (2010) (strik-
ing down a federal law that makes it a felony to knowingly create, sell, or possess a
depiction of animal cruelty); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Association, 564 U.S.
___, No. 08–1448, slip op. (2011) (strking down a state law that imposes a civil fine
of up to $1000 for selling or renting “violent video games” to minors, and requires
their packaging to be labeled “18”).
1150 For instance, child pornography, which appears to be a relatively recently
identified category of unprotected speech, see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982),
is “intrinsically related” to the sexual abuse of children, and thus falls into the pre-
viously existing category of speech facilitating criminal activity. Stevens, 559 U.S.
___, No. 08–769, slip op. at 8.
1151 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).
issue of a hierarchy of speech values, according to which some forms

of expression, while protected, may be more readily subject to offi-
cial regulation and perhaps suppression than other protected expres-
sion. These differences were compounded in cases in which First
Amendment values came into conflict with other values, either con-
stitutionally protected values such as the right to fair trials in crimi-
nal cases, or societally valued interests such as those in privacy and
reputation.
Attempts to work out these differences are elaborated in the fol-
lowing pages, but the effort to formulate a doctrine of permissible
content regulation within categories of protected expression neces-
sitates a brief treatment. It remains standard doctrine that it is
impermissible for the government to regulate protected expression
on the basis of its content.1152 Justice Stevens, however, has articu-
lated a theory that would permit some governmental restraint based
upon content. In Justice Stevens’ view, there is a hierarchy of speech,
and where the category of speech at issue fits into that hierarchy
determines the appropriate level of protection under the First Amend-
ment. A category’s place on the continuum is guided by Chaplinsky’s
formulation of whether it is “an essential part of any exposition of
ideas” and what its “social value as a step to truth” is.1153 Thus,
offensive but nonobscene words and portrayals dealing with sex and
excretion may be regulated when the expression plays no role or a
minimal role in the exposition of ideas.1154 “Whether political ora-
tory or philosophical discussion moves us to applaud or to despise
what is said, every schoolchild can understand why our duty to de-
fend the right to speak remains the same. But few of us would march
our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen’s right to
see ‘Specified Sexual Activities’ exhibited in the theaters of our
choice.” 1155
1152 See, e.g., Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime
Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105 (1991).

1153 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
1154 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 63–73 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291, 317–19 (1977) (Justice Stevens dissent-
ing); Carey v. Population Services Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (Justice Stevens concur-
ring in part and concurring in the judgment); FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726, 744–48 (1978) (plurality opinion); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S.
61, 80, 83 (1981) (Justice Stevens concurring in judgment); New York v. Ferber, 458
U.S. 747, 781 (1982) (Justice Stevens concurring in judgment); R. A. V. v. City of St.
Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 422 (1992) (Justice Stevens concurring in the judgment).
1155 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (plurality opin-
ion).
Although a majority of the Court has not joined in Justice Ste-

vens’ theory,1156 the Court has in some contexts of covered expres-
sion approved restrictions based on content,1157 and, in still other
areas, such as privacy, has implied that it would approve some content-
based restraints on expression.1158 Moreover, the Court has empha-
sized numerous times the role of the First Amendment in facilitat-
ing, indeed in making possible, political dialogue and the operation
of democratic institutions.1159 Although this emphasis may be read
as premised on a hierarchical theory of the worthiness of political
speech over other forms of speech, it is more likely merely a celebra-
tion of the importance of political speech, and not a suggestion that
other kinds of speech enjoy less protection under the First Amend-
ment.1160
If a category of speech is protected under the First Amend-
ment, then it cannot be restricted on the basis of its level of “outra-
geousness.” In Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell,1161 the Court re-
fused to recognize a distinction between permissible political satire
and “outrageous” parodies that are “doubtless gross and repugnant
in the eyes of most.” 1162 “If it were possible by laying down a prin-
cipled standard to separate the one from the other,” the Court sug-
1156 In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982), a majority of the Court
joined an opinion quoting much of Justice Stevens’ language in these cases, but the
opinion rather clearly adopts the proposition that the disputed expression, child por-
nography, is not covered by the First Amendment, not that it is covered but subject
to suppression because of its content. Id. at 764. See also id. at 781 (Justice Stevens
concurring in judgment).
1157 E.g., commercial speech, which is covered by the First Amendment but is
less protected than other speech, is subject to content-based regulation. Central Hud-
son Gas & Electric Co. v. PSC, 447 U.S. 557, 568–69 (1980). See also Rowan v. Post
Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728 (1970) (sexually oriented, not necessarily obscene mail-
ings); and Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991) (nonobscene nude danc-
ing).
1158 E.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975). See also Zac-
chini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).

1159 E.g., First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 776–77, 781–83
(1978); Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 299–300
(1982).
1160 E.g., First National Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); Consolidated
Edison Co. v. Public Service Comm’n, 447 U.S. 530, 534 n.2 (1980). Compare Erie v.
Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 289 (2000) (“nude dancing . . . falls only within the outer
ambit of the First Amendment’s protection”) with United States v. Playboy Entertain-
ment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000) (“[w]e cannot be influenced . . . by the
perception that the regulation in question is not a major one because the speech
[‘signal bleed’ of sexually oriented cable programming] is not very important”).
1161 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
1162 485 U.S. at 55, 50 (applying the New York Times “actual malice” standard
for defamation to suits by public figures for the intentional infliction of emotional
distress). The parody in this case, which contained the disclaimer, “ad parody—not
to be taken seriously,” had Jerry Falwell, a nationally known minister, stating that
he lost his virginity “during a drunken incestuous rendevous with his mother in an
outhouse.” Id. at 48.
gested, “public discourse would probably suffer little or no harm.

But we doubt that there is any such standard, and we are quite
sure that the pejorative description ‘outrageous’ does not supply
one.” 1163 Falwell can also be read as consistent with the hierarchi-
cal theory of interpretation; the offensive advertisement parody was
protected as within “the world of debate about public affairs,” and
was not “governed by any exception to . . . general First Amend-
ment principles.” 1164
Even if a category of speech is unprotected by the First Amend-
ment, regulation on the basis of its content may be impermissible.
In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul,1165 the Court struck down a hate crimes
ordinance construed by the state courts to apply only to use of “fight-
ing words.” The difficulty, the Court found, was that the ordinance
made a further content discrimination, proscribing only those fight-
ing words that “arouse[ ] anger, alarm or resentment in others . . .
on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or gender.” 1166 This amounted
to “special prohibitions on those speakers who express views on dis-
favored subjects.” 1167 The fact that government may proscribe ar-
eas of speech such as obscenity, defamation, or fighting words does
not mean that these areas “may be made the vehicles for content
discrimination unrelated to their distinctively proscribable content.
Thus, the government may proscribe libel; but it may not make the
further content discrimination of proscribing only libel critical of the
government.” 1168
The constitutionality of content-based regulation of fully pro-
tected expression is determined by a compelling interest test de-
rived from equal protection analysis: government “must show that
its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling interest and is nar-
rowly drawn to achieve that end.” 1169 Narrow tailoring in the case
of fully protected speech requires that the government “choose[ ]
the least restrictive means to further the articulated interest.” 1170
Application of this test ordinarily results in invalidation of the regu-
1163 485 U.S. at 55.

1164 485 U.S. at 53, 56.
1165 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
1166 505 U.S. at 391.
1167 505 U.S. at 391.
1168 505 U.S. at 383–84 (emphasis in original).
1169 Arkansas Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987); Simon
& Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S.
105, 118 (1991).
1170 Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989).
lation.1171 Objecting to the balancing approach inherent in this test

because it “might be read as a concession that States may censor
speech whenever they believe there is a compelling justification for
doing so,” Justice Kennedy argued instead for a rule of per se inva-
lidity.1172 But compelling interest analysis can still be useful, Jus-
tice Kennedy suggested, in determining whether a regulation is
content-based or content-neutral; in those cases in which the gov-
ernment tenders “a plausible justification unrelated to the suppres-
sion of expression,” application of the compelling interest test may
help to determine “whether the asserted justification is in fact an
accurate description of the purpose and effect of the law.” 1173
Seditious Speech and Seditious Libel.—Opposition to gov-
ernment through speech alone has been subject to punishment
throughout much of history under laws proscribing “seditious” ut-
terances. In this country, the Sedition Act of 1798 made criminal,
inter alia, malicious writings that defamed, brought into contempt
or disrepute, or excited the hatred of the people against the govern-
ment, the President, or the Congress, or that stirred people to sedi-
tion.1174 In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,1175 the Court surveyed
the controversy surrounding the enactment and enforcement of the
Sedition Act and concluded that debate “first crystallized a na-
tional awareness of the central meaning of the First Amend-
ment. . . . Although the Sedition Act was never tested in this Court,
the attack upon its validity has carried the day in the court of his-
tory . . . . [That history] reflect[s] a broad consensus that the Act,
because of the restraint it imposed upon criticism of government
and public officials, was inconsistent with the First Amendment.”
The “central meaning” discerned by the Court, quoting Madison’s
comment that in a republican government “the censorial power is
in the people over the Government, and not in the Government over
the people,” is that “[t]he right of free public discussion of the stew-
1171 But see Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191 (1992) (state law prohibiting the
solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign literature within

100 feet of a polling place upheld as applied to the traditional public forum of streets
and sidewalks). The Burson plurality phrased the test in terms of whether the law
was “necessary” to serve compelling state interests. Id. at 199, 206.
1172 Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the New York State Crime Victims
Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 124–25 (1991) (concurring).

1173 Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 213 (1992) (concurring).
1174 Ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596. Note also that the 1918 amendment of the Espionage
Act of 1917, ch. 75, 40 Stat. 553, reached “language intended to bring the form of
government of the United States . . . or the Constitution . . . or the flag . . . or the
uniform of the Army or Navy into contempt, scorn, contumely, or disrepute.” Cf. Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919). For a brief history of seditious libel here and
in Great Britain, see Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 19–35, 497–516 (1941).
1175 376 U.S. 254, 273–76 (1964). See also Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S.
616, 630 (1919) (Justice Holmes dissenting).

ardship of public officials was thus, in Madison’s view, a fundamen-

tal principle of the American form of government.”
Little opportunity to apply this concept of the “central mean-
ing” of the First Amendment in the context of sedition and crimi-
nal syndicalism laws has been presented to the Court. In Dombrowski
v. Pfister 1176 the Court, after expanding on First Amendment con-
siderations the discretion of federal courts to enjoin state court pro-
ceedings, struck down as vague and as lacking due process proce-
dural protections certain features of a state “Subversive Activities
and Communist Control Law.” In Brandenburg v. Ohio,1177 a state
criminal syndicalism statute was held unconstitutional because its
condemnation of advocacy of crime, violence, or unlawful methods
of terrorism swept within its terms both mere advocacy as well as
incitement to imminent lawless action. A seizure of books, pam-
phlets, and other documents under a search warrant pursuant to a
state subversives suppression law was struck down under the Fourth
Amendment in an opinion heavy with First Amendment over-
tones.1178
Fighting Words and Other Threats to the Peace.—In
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,1179 the Court unanimously sus-
tained a conviction under a statute proscribing “any offensive, deri-
sive or annoying word” addressed to any person in a public place
under the state court’s interpretation of the statute as being lim-
ited to “fighting words”—i.e., to words that “have a direct tendency
to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed.” The statute was sustained as “narrowly drawn
and limited to define and punish specific conduct lying within the
domain of state power, the use in a public place of words likely to
cause a breach of the peace.” 1180 The case is best known for Justice
Murphy’s famous dictum. “[I]t is well understood that the right of
free speech is not absolute at all times and under all circum-
stances. There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes
1176 380 U.S. 479, 492–96 (1965). A number of state laws were struck down by
three-judge district courts pursuant to the latitude prescribed by this case. E.g., Ware
v. Nichols, 266 F. Supp. 564 (N.D. Miss. 1967) (criminal syndicalism law); Carmichael
v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985 (N.D. Ga. 1966) (insurrection statute); McSurely v. Ratliff,
282 F. Supp. 848 (E.D. Ky. 1967) (criminal syndicalism). This latitude was then cir-
cumscribed in cases attacking criminal syndicalism and criminal anarchy laws. Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
1177 395 U.S. 444 (1969). See also Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Ashton
v. Kentucky, 384 U.S. 195 (1966), considered under “Defamation,” infra.

1178 Stanford v. Texas, 379 U.S. 476 (1965). In United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972), a government claim to be free to wiretap in
national security cases was rejected on Fourth Amendment grounds in an opinion
that called attention to the relevance of the First Amendment.
1179 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
1180 315 U.S. at 573.
of speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been

thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or ‘fight-
ing’ words—those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend
to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has been well ob-
served that such utterances are no essential part of any exposition
of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a step to truth that
any benefit that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed
by the social interest in order and morality.” 1181
Chaplinsky still remains viable for the principle that “the States
are free to ban the simple use, without a demonstration of addi-
tional justifying circumstances, of so-called ‘fighting words,’ those
personally abusive epithets which, when addressed to the ordinary
citizen, are, as a matter of common knowledge, inherently likely to
provoke violent reaction.” 1182 But, in actuality, the Court has closely
scrutinized statutes on vagueness and overbreadth grounds and set
aside convictions as not being within the doctrine. Chaplinsky thus
remains formally alive but of little vitality.1183
On the obverse side, the “hostile audience” situation, the Court
once sustained a conviction for disorderly conduct of one who re-
fused police demands to cease speaking after his speech seemingly
stirred numbers of his listeners to mutterings and threatened dis-
orders.1184 But this case has been significantly limited by cases that
hold protected the peaceful expression of views that stirs people to
anger because of the content of the expression, or perhaps because
of the manner in which it is conveyed, and that breach of the peace
and disorderly conduct statutes may not be used to curb such ex-
pression.
1181 315 U.S. at 571–72.

1182 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1971). Cohen’s conviction for breach of
the peace, occasioned by his appearance in public with an “offensive expletive” let-
tered on his jacket, was reversed, in part because the words were not a personal
insult and there was no evidence of audience objection.
1183 The cases hold that government may not punish profane, vulgar, or oppro-
brious words simply because they are offensive, but only if they are “fighting words”
that have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom they
are directed. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972); Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105
(1973); Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130 (1974); Lucas v. Arkansas, 416
U.S. 919 (1974); Kelly v. Ohio, 416 U.S. 923 (1974); Karlan v. City of Cincinnati,
416 U.S. 924 (1974); Rosen v. California, 416 U.S. 924 (1974); see also Eaton v. City
of Tulsa, 416 U.S. 697 (1974).
1184 Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951). See also Milk Wagon Drivers v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941), in which the Court held that a court
could enjoin peaceful picketing because violence occurring at the same time against
the businesses picketed could have created an atmosphere in which even peaceful,
otherwise protected picketing could be illegally coercive. But compare NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
The cases are not clear as to what extent the police must go in
protecting the speaker against hostile audience reaction or whether
only actual disorder or a clear and present danger of disorder will
entitle the authorities to terminate the speech or other expressive
conduct.1185 Nor, in the absence of incitement to illegal action, may
government punish mere expression or proscribe ideas,1186 regard-
less of the trifling or annoying caliber of the expression.1187
Threats of Violence Against Individuals.—The Supreme Court
has cited three “reasons why threats of violence are outside the First
Amendment”: “protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from
the disruption that fear engenders, and from the possibility that
the threatened violence will occur.” 1188 In Watts v. United States,
however, the Court held that only “true” threats are outside the First
Amendment.1189 The defendant in Watts, at a public rally at which
he was expressing his opposition to the military draft, said, “If they
ever make me carry a rifle, the first man I want to get in my sights
is L.B.J.” 1190 He was convicted of violating a federal statute that
prohibited “any threat to take the life of or to inflict bodily harm
upon the President of the United States.” The Supreme Court re-
versed. Interpreting the statute “with the commands of the First
Amendment clearly in mind,” 1191 it found that the defendant had
not made a “true ‘threat,’ ” but had indulged in mere “political hy-
perbole.” 1192
1185 The principle actually predates Feiner. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S.
296 (1940); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949). For subsequent application,
see Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394
U.S. 111 (1969); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564 (1970). Significant is Justice
Harlan’s statement of the principle reflected by Feiner. “Nor do we have here an
instance of the exercise of the State’s police power to prevent a speaker from inten-
tionally provoking a given group to hostile reaction. Cf. Feiner v. New York, 340
U.S. 315 (1951).” Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 20 (1970).
1186 Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S.
564 (1970); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Schacht v. United States, 398
U.S. 58 (1970); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Kingsley Pic-
tures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359
(1931).
1187 Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Cohen v. California, 403
U.S. 15 (1971); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518 (1972).

1188 R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992).
1189 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam).
1190 394 U.S. at 706.
1191 394 U.S. at 707.
1192 394 U.S. at 708. In Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 359 (2003), the Court,
citing Watts, upheld a statute that outlawed cross burnings done with the intent to
intimidate. A cross burning done as “a statement of ideology, a symbol of group soli-
darity,” or “in movies such as Mississippi Burning,” however, would be protected speech.
Id. at 365–366.
In NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., white merchants in

Claiborne County, Mississippi, sued the NAACP to recover losses
caused by a boycott by black citizens of their businesses, and to
enjoin future boycott activity.1193 During the course of the boycott,
NAACP Field Secretary Charles Evers had told an audience of “black
people that any ‘uncle toms’ who broke the boycott would ‘have their
necks broken’ by their own people.” 1194 The Court acknowledged that
this language “might have been understood as inviting an unlaw-
ful form of discipline or, at least, as intending to create a fear of
violence . . . .” 1195 Yet, no violence had followed directly from Evers’
speeches, and the Court found that Evers’ “emotionally charged rheto-
ric . . . did not transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth
in Brandenburg. . . . An advocate must be free to stimulate his au-
dience with spontaneous and emotional appeals for unity and ac-
tion in a common cause. When such appeals do not incite lawless
action, they must be regarded as protected speech.” 1196 Although it
held that, under Brandenburg, Evers’ speech did not constitute un-
protected incitement of lawless action,1197 the Court also cited Watts,
thereby implying that Evers’ speech also did not constitute a “true
threat.” 1198
In Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,
the en banc Ninth Circuit, by a 6-to-5 vote, upheld a damage award
in favor of four physicians and two health clinics that provided medi-
cal services, including abortions, to women.1199 The plaintiffs had
sued under a federal statute that gives aggrieved persons a right
of action against whoever by “threat of force . . . intentionally . . .
intimidates any person because the person is or has been . . . pro-
viding reproductive health services.” The defendants had published
“WANTED,” “unWANTED,” and “GUILTY” posters with the names,
photographs, addresses, and other personal information about abor-
tion doctors, three of whom were subsequently murdered by abor-
tion opponents. The defendants also operated a “Nuremberg Files”
website that listed approximately 200 people under the label “ABOR-
TIONIST,” with the legend: “Black font (working); Greyed-out Name
(wounded); Strikethrough (fatality).” 1200 The posters and the web-
site contained no language that literally constituted a threat, but,
1193 458 U.S. 886 (1982). Claiborne is also discussed below under “Public Issue
Picketing and Parading.”

1194 458 U.S. at 900, n.29. See id. at 902 for a similar remark by Evers.
1195 458 U.S. at 927.
1196 458 U.S. at 928.
1197 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg is discussed above
under “Is There a Present Test?”

1198 Claiborne, 458 U.S. at 928 n.71.
1199 290 F.3d 1058 (9th Cir. 2002) (en banc), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 958 (2003).
1200 290 F.3d at 1065.
the court found, “they connote something they do not literally say,”
namely “You’re Wanted or You’re Guilty; You’ll be shot or killed,” 1201
and the defendants knew that the posters caused abortion doctors
to “quit out of fear for their lives.” 1202
The Ninth Circuit concluded that a “true threat” is “a state-
ment which, in the entire context and under all the circumstances,
a reasonable person would foresee would be interpreted by those to
whom the statement is communicated as a serious expression of in-
tent to inflict bodily harm upon that person.” 1203 “It is not neces-
sary that the defendant intend to, or be able to carry out his threat;
the only intent requirement for a true threat is that the defendant
intentionally or knowingly communicate the threat.” 1204
Judge Alex Kozinski, in one of three dissenting opinions, agreed
with the majority’s definition of a true threat, but believed that the
majority had failed to apply it, because the speech in this case had
not been “communicated as a serious expression of intent to inflict
bodily harm. . . .” 1205 “The difference between a true threat and pro-
tected expression,” Judge Kozinski wrote, “is this: A true threat warns
of violence or other harm that the speaker controls. . . . Yet the opin-
ion points to no evidence that defendants who prepared the posters
would have been understood by a reasonable listener as saying that
they will cause the harm. . . . Given this lack of evidence, the post-
ers can be viewed, at most, as a call to arms for other abortion pro-
testers to harm plaintiffs. However, the Supreme Court made it clear
that under Brandenburg, encouragement or even advocacy of vio-
lence is protected by the First Amendment. . . .” 1206 Moreover, the
Court held in Claiborne that “[t]he mere fact the statements could
be understood ‘as intending to create a fear of violence’ was insuffi-
cient to make them ‘true threats’ under Watts.” 1207
Group Libel, Hate Speech.—In Beauharnais v. Illinois,1208 re-
lying on dicta in past cases,1209 the Court upheld a state group li-
bel law that made it unlawful to defame a race or class of people.
The defendant had been convicted under this statute after he had
distributed a leaflet, part of which was in the form of a petition to
his city government, taking a hard-line white-supremacy position,
1201 290 F.3d at 1085.
1202 290 F.3d at 1085.
1203 290 F.3d at 1077.
1204 290 F.3d at 1075.
1205 290 F.3d at 1089 (quoting majority opinion at 1077 and adding emphasis).
1206 290 F.3d at 1089, 1091, 1092 (emphasis in original).
1207 290 F.3d at 1094 (citation omitted).
1208 343 U.S. 250 (1952).
1209 Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942); Near v. Minne-
sota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 707–08 (1931).

and calling for action to keep African Americans out of white neigh-
borhoods. Justice Frankfurter for the Court sustained the statute
along the following reasoning. Libel of an individual, he estab-
lished, was a common-law crime and was now made criminal by
statute in every state in the Union. These laws raise no constitu-
tional difficulty because libel is within that class of speech that is
not protected by the First Amendment. If an utterance directed at
an individual may be the object of criminal sanctions, then no good
reason appears to deny a state the power to punish the same utter-
ances when they are directed at a defined group, “unless we can
say that this is a willful and purposeless restriction unrelated to
the peace and well-being of the State.” 1210 The Justice then re-
viewed the history of racial strife in Illinois to conclude that the
legislature could reasonably have feared substantial evils from un-
restrained racial utterances. Nor did the Constitution require the
state to accept a defense of truth, because historically a defendant
had to show not only truth but publication with good motives and
for justifiable ends.1211 “Libelous utterances not being within the area
of constitutionally protected speech, it is unnecessary . . . to con-
sider the issues behind the phrase ‘clear and present danger.’ ” 1212
Beauharnais has little continuing vitality as precedent. Its hold-
ing, premised in part on the categorical exclusion of defamatory state-
ments from First Amendment protection, has been substantially un-
dercut by subsequent developments, not the least of which are the
Court’s subjection of defamation law to First Amendment challenge
and its ringing endorsement of “uninhibited, robust, and wide-
open” debate on public issues in New York Times Co. v. Sulli-
van.1213 In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, the Court, in an opinion by
Justice Scalia, explained and qualified the categorical exclusions for
defamation, obscenity, and fighting words. These categories of speech
are not “entirely invisible to the Constitution,” even though they
“can, consistently with the First Amendment, be regulated because
of their constitutionally proscribable content.” 1214 Content discrimi-
nation unrelated to that “distinctively proscribable content,” how-
1210 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–58 (1952).

1211 343 U.S. at 265–66.
1212 343 U.S. at 266.
1213 376 U.S. 254 (1964). See also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D. Ill.)
(ordinances prohibiting distribution of materials containing racial slurs are unconsti-

tutional), aff’d, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953 (1978), cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978) (Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist dissenting on the ba-
sis that Court should review case that is in “some tension” with Beauharnais). But
see New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763 (1982) (obliquely citing Beauharnais with
approval).
1214 505 U.S. 377, 383 (1992) (emphasis in original).
ever, runs afoul of the First Amendment.1215 Therefore, the city’s

bias-motivated crime ordinance, interpreted as banning the use of
fighting words known to offend on the basis of race, color, creed,
religion, or gender, but not on such other possible bases as political
affiliation, union membership, or homosexuality, was invalidated for
its content discrimination. “The First Amendment does not permit
[the city] to impose special prohibitions on those speakers who ex-
press views on disfavored subjects.” 1216
In Virginia v. Black, the Court held that its opinion in R.A.V.
did not make it unconstitutional for a state to prohibit burning a
cross with the intent of intimidating any person or group of per-
sons.1217 Such a prohibition does not discriminate on the basis of a
defendant’s beliefs: “as a factual matter it is not true that cross burn-
ers direct their intimidating conduct solely to racial or religious mi-
norities. . . . The First Amendment permits Virginia to outlaw cross
burnings done with the intent to intimidate because burning a cross
is a particularly virulent form of intimidation. Instead of prohibit-
ing all intimidating messages, Virginia may choose to regulate this
subset of intimidating messages. . . .” 1218
Defamation.—One of the most seminal shifts in constitutional
jurisprudence occurred in 1964 with the Court’s decision in New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan.1219 The Times had published a paid advertise-
ment by a civil rights organization criticizing the response of a South-
ern community to demonstrations led by Dr. Martin Luther King,
and containing several factual errors. The plaintiff, a city commis-
sioner in charge of the police department, claimed that the adver-
tisement had libeled him even though he was not referred to by
name or title and even though several of the incidents described
had occurred prior to his assumption of office. Unanimously, the Court
1215 505 U.S. at 384.

1216 505 U.S. at 391. On the other hand, the First Amendment permits enhance-
ment of a criminal penalty based on the defendant’s motive in selecting a victim of
a particular race. Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993). The law has long rec-
ognized motive as a permissible element in sentencing, the Court noted. Id. at 485.
It distinguished R.A.V. as involving a limitation on speech rather than conduct, and
because the state might permissibly conclude that bias-inspired crimes inflict greater
societal harm than do non-bias inspired crimes (e.g., they are more likely to provoke
retaliatory crimes). Id. at 487–88. See generally Laurence H. Tribe, The Mystery of
Motive, Private and Public: Some Notes Inspired by the Problems of Hate Crime and
Animal Sacrifice, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 1.
1217 538 U.S. 343 (2003). A plurality held, however, that a statute may not pre-
sume, from the fact that a defendant burned a cross, that he had an intent to intimi-
date. The state must prove that he did, as “a burning cross is not always intended
to intimidate,” but may constitute a constitutionally protected expression of opinion.
Id. at 365–66.
1218 538 U.S. at 362–63.
1219 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
reversed the lower court’s judgment for the plaintiff. To the conten-
tion that the First Amendment did not protect libelous publica-
tions, the Court replied that constitutional scrutiny could not be fore-
closed by the “label” attached to something. “Like . . . the various
other formulae for the repression of expression that have been chal-
lenged in this Court, libel can claim no talismanic immunity from
constitutional limitations. It must be measured by standards that
satisfy the First Amendment.” 1220 “The general proposition,” the Court
continued, “that freedom of expression upon public questions is se-
cured by the First Amendment has long been settled by our deci-
sions . . . . [W]e consider this case against the background of a pro-
found national commitment to the principle that debate on public
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open, and that it may
well include vehement, caustic, and sometimes unpleasantly sharp
attacks on government and public officials.” 1221 Because the adver-
tisement was “an expression of grievance and protest on one of the
major public issues of our time, [it] would seem clearly to qualify
for the constitutional protection . . . [unless] it forfeits that protec-
tion by the falsity of some of its factual statements and by its al-
leged defamation of respondent.” 1222
Erroneous statement is protected, the Court asserted, there be-
ing no exception “for any test of truth.” Error is inevitable in any
free debate and to place liability upon that score, and especially to
place on the speaker the burden of proving truth, would introduce
self-censorship and stifle the free expression which the First Amend-
ment protects.1223 Nor would injury to official reputation afford a
warrant for repressing otherwise free speech. Public officials are sub-
ject to public scrutiny and “[c]riticism of their official conduct does
not lose its constitutional protection merely because it is effective
criticism and hence diminishes their official reputation.” 1224 That
neither factual error nor defamatory content could penetrate the pro-
tective circle of the First Amendment was the “lesson” to be drawn
from the great debate over the Sedition Act of 1798, which the Court
reviewed in some detail to discern the “central meaning of the First
Amendment.” 1225 Thus, it appears, the libel law under consider-
ation failed the test of constitutionality because of its kinship with
1220 376 U.S. at 269. Justices Black, Douglas, and Goldberg, concurring, would
have held libel laws per se unconstitutional. Id. at 293, 297.

1221 376 U.S. at 269, 270.
1222 376 U.S. at 271.
1223 376 U.S. at 271–72, 278–79. Of course, the substantial truth of an utter-
ance is ordinarily a defense to defamation. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine,

501 U.S. 496, 516 (1991).
1224 376 U.S. at 272–73.
1225 376 U.S. at 273.
seditious libel, which violated the “central meaning of the First Amend-
ment.” “The constitutional guarantees require, we think, a federal
rule that prohibits a public official from recovering damages for a
defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves
that the statement was made with ‘actual malice’—that is, with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false or not.” 1226
In the wake of the Times ruling, the Court decided two cases
involving the type of criminal libel statute upon which Justice Frank-
furter had relied in analogy to uphold the group libel law in
Beauharnais.1227 In neither case did the Court apply the concept of
Times to void them altogether. Garrison v. Louisiana 1228 held that
a statute that did not incorporate the Times rule of “actual malice”
was invalid, while in Ashton v. Kentucky 1229 a common-law defini-
tion of criminal libel as “any writing calculated to create distur-
bances of the peace, corrupt the public morals or lead to any act,
which, when done, is indictable” was too vague to be constitu-
tional.
The teaching of Times and the cases following it is that expres-
sion on matters of public interest is protected by the First Amend-
ment. Within that area of protection is commentary about the pub-
lic actions of individuals. The fact that expression contains falsehoods
does not deprive it of protection, because otherwise such expres-
sion in the public interest would be deterred by monetary judg-
ments and self-censorship imposed for fear of judgments. But, over
the years, the Court has developed an increasingly complex set of
standards governing who is protected to what degree with respect
to which matters of public and private interest.
Individuals to whom the Times rule applies presented one of
the first issues for determination. At times, the Court has keyed it
to the importance of the position held. “There is, first, a strong in-
terest in debate on public issues, and, second, a strong interest in
debate about those persons who are in a position significantly to
influence the resolution of those issues. Criticism of government is
at the very center of the constitutionally protected area of free dis-
cussion. Criticism of those responsible for government operations
must be free, lest criticism of government itself be penalized. It is
clear, therefore, that the ‘public official’ designation applies at the
1226 376 U.S. at 279–80. The same standard applies for defamation contained in
petitions to the government, the Court having rejected the argument that the peti-
tion clause requires absolute immunity. McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985).
1227 Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 254–58 (1952).
1228 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
1229 384 U.S. 195 (1966).
very least to those among the hierarchy of government employees

who have, or appear to the public to have, substantial responsibil-
ity for or control over the conduct of governmental affairs.” 1230 But
this focus seems to have become diffused and the concept of “public
official” has appeared to take on overtones of anyone holding public
elective or appointive office.1231 Moreover, candidates for public of-
fice were subject to the Times rule and comment on their character
or past conduct, public or private, insofar as it touches upon their
fitness for office, is protected.1232
Thus, a wide range of reporting about both public officials and
candidates is protected. Certainly, the conduct of official duties by
public officials is subject to the widest scrutiny and criticism.1233
But the Court has held as well that criticism that reflects gener-
ally upon an official’s integrity and honesty is protected.1234 Candi-
dates for public office, the Court has said, place their whole lives
before the public, and it is difficult to see what criticisms could not
be related to their fitness.1235
1230 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).

1231 See Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966) (supervisor of a county recre-
ation area employed by and responsible to the county commissioners may be public
official within Times rule); Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964) (elected munici-
pal judges); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S. 356 (1965) (county attorney and chief of po-
lice); St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727 (1968) (deputy sheriff); Greenbelt Coop-
erative Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (state legislator who was major real
estate developer in area); Time, Inc. v. Pape, 401 U.S. 279 (1971) (police captain).
The categorization does not, however, include all government employees. Hutchinson
v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 119 n.8 (1979).
1232 Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265 (1971); Ocala Star-Banner Co. v.
Damron, 401 U.S. 295 (1971).

1233 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966).
1234 Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964), involved charges that judges were
inefficient, took excessive vacations, opposed official investigations of vice, and were
possibly subject to “racketeer influences.” The Court rejected an attempted distinc-
tion that these criticisms were not of the manner in which the judges conducted
their courts but were personal attacks upon their integrity and honesty. “Of course,
any criticism of the manner in which a public official performs his duties will tend
to affect his private, as well as his public, reputation. . . . The public-official rule
protects the paramount public interest in a free flow of information to the people
concerning public officials, their servants. To this end, anything which might touch
on an official’s fitness for office is relevant. Few personal attributes are more ger-
mane to fitness for office than dishonesty, malfeasance, or improper motivation, even
though these characteristics may also affect the official’s private character.” Id. at
76–77.
1235 In Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 274–75 (1971), the Court said:
“The principal activity of a candidate in our political system, his ‘office,’ so to speak,
consists in putting before the voters every conceivable aspect of his public and pri-
vate life that he thinks may lead the electorate to gain a good impression of him. A
candidate who, for example, seeks to further his cause through the prominent dis-
play of his wife and children can hardly argue that his qualities as a husband or
father remain of ‘purely private’ concern. And the candidate who vaunts his spotless
record and sterling integrity cannot convincingly cry ‘Foul’ when an opponent or an
For a time, the Court’s decisional process threatened to expand

the Times privilege so as to obliterate the distinction between pri-
vate and public figures. First, the Court created a subcategory of
“public figure,” which included those otherwise private individuals
who have attained some prominence, either through their own ef-
forts or because it was thrust upon them, with respect to a matter
of public interest, or, in Chief Justice Warren’s words, those per-
sons who are “intimately involved in the resolution of important pub-
lic questions or, by reason of their fame, shape events in areas of
concern to society at large.” 1236 Later, the Court curtailed the defi-
nition of “public figure” by playing down the matter of public inter-
est and emphasizing the voluntariness of the assumption of a role
in public affairs that will make of one a “public figure.” 1237
Second, in a fragmented ruling, the Court applied the Times stan-
dard to private citizens who had simply been involved in events of
public interest, usually, though not invariably, not through their own
choosing.1238 But, in Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc.1239 the Court set off
on a new path of limiting recovery for defamation by private per-
sons. Henceforth, persons who are neither public officials nor pub-
lic figures may recover for the publication of defamatory falsehoods
industrious reporter attempts to demonstrate the contrary. . . . Given the realities
of our political life, it is by no means easy to see what statements about a candidate
might be altogether without relevance to his fitness for the office he seeks. The clash
of reputations is the staple of election campaigns and damage to reputation is, of
course, the essence of libel. But whether there remains some exiguous area of defa-
mation against which a candidate may have full recourse is a question we need not
decide in this case.”
1236 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Chief Justice War-
ren concurring in the result). Curtis involved a college football coach, and Associ-
ated Press v. Walker, decided in the same opinion, involved a retired general active
in certain political causes. The suits arose from reporting that alleged, respectively,
the fixing of a football game and the leading of a violent crowd in opposition to en-
forcement of a desegregation decree. The Court was extremely divided, but the rule
that emerged was largely the one developed in the Chief Justice’s opinion. Essen-
tially, four Justices opposed application of the Times standard to “public figures,”
although they would have imposed a lesser but constitutionally based burden on
public figure plaintiffs. Id. at 133 (plurality opinion of Justices Harlan, Clark, Stew-
art, and Fortas). Three Justices applied Times, id. at 162 (Chief Justice Warren),
and 172 (Justices Brennan and White). Two Justices would have applied absolute
immunity. Id. at 170 (Justices Black and Douglas). See also Greenbelt Cooperative
Pub. Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970).
1237 Public figures “[f]or the most part [are] those who . . . have assumed roles
of especial prominence in the affairs of society. Some occupy positions of such persua-
sive power and influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes. More
commonly, those classed as public figures have thrust themselves to the forefront of
particular public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved.” Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974).
1238 Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, 403 U.S. 29 (1971). Rosenbloom had been prefig-
ured by Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374 (1967), a “false light” privacy case consid-
ered infra
1239 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
so long as state defamation law establishes a standard higher than

strict liability, such as negligence; damages may not be presumed,
however, but must be proved, and punitive damages will be recov-
erable only upon the Times showing of “actual malice.”
The Court’s opinion by Justice Powell established competing con-
stitutional considerations. On the one hand, imposition upon the press
of liability for every misstatement would deter not only false speech
but much truth as well; the possibility that the press might have
to prove everything it prints would lead to self-censorship and the
consequent deprivation of the public of access to information. On
the other hand, there is a legitimate state interest in compensating
individuals for the harm inflicted on them by defamatory false-
hoods. An individual’s right to the protection of his own good name
is, at bottom, but a reflection of our society’s concept of the worth
of the individual. Therefore, an accommodation must be reached.
The Times rule had been a proper accommodation when public offi-
cials or public figures were concerned, inasmuch as by their own
efforts they had brought themselves into the public eye, had cre-
ated a need in the public for information about them, and had at
the same time attained an ability to counter defamatory falsehoods
published about them. Private individuals are not in the same po-
sition and need greater protection. “We hold that, so long as they
do not impose liability without fault, the States may define for them-
selves the appropriate standard of liability for a publisher or broad-
caster of defamatory falsehood injurious to a private indi-
vidual.” 1240 Thus, some degree of fault must be shown.
Generally, juries may award substantial damages in tort for pre-
sumed injury to reputation merely upon a showing of publication.
But this discretion of juries had the potential to inhibit the exer-
cise of freedom of the press, and moreover permitted juries to pe-
nalize unpopular opinion through the awarding of damages. There-
fore, defamation plaintiffs who do not prove actual malice—that is,
knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard for the truth—will be lim-
ited to compensation for actual provable injuries, such as out-of-
pocket loss, impairment of reputation and standing, personal hu-
miliation, and mental anguish and suffering. A plaintiff who proves
actual malice will be entitled as well to collect punitive dam-
ages.1241
Subsequent cases have revealed a trend toward narrowing the
scope of the “public figure” concept. A socially prominent litigant in
1240 418 U.S. at 347.
1241 418 U.S. at 348–50. Justice Brennan would have adhered to Rosenbloom,
id. at 361, while Justice White thought the Court went too far in constitutionalizing
the law of defamation. Id. at 369.
a particularly messy divorce controversy was held not to be such a

person,1242 and a person convicted years before of contempt after
failing to appear before a grand jury was similarly not a public fig-
ure even as to commentary with respect to his conviction.1243 Also
not a public figure for purposes of allegedly defamatory comment
about the value of his research was a scientist who sought and re-
ceived federal grants for research, the results of which were pub-
lished in scientific journals.1244 Public figures, the Court reiterated,
are those who (1) occupy positions of such persuasive power and
influence that they are deemed public figures for all purposes or
(2) have thrust themselves to the forefront of particular public con-
troversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues in-
volved, and are public figures with respect to comment on those is-
sues.1245
Commentary about matters of “public interest” when it de-
fames someone is apparently, after Firestone 1246 and Gertz, to be
protected to the degree that the person defamed is a public official
or candidate for public office, public figure, or private figure. That
there is a controversy, that there are matters that may be of “pub-
lic interest,” is insufficient to make a private person a “public fig-
ure” for purposes of the standard of protection in defamation ac-
tions.
The Court has elaborated on the principles governing defama-
tion actions brought by private figures. First, when a private plain-
tiff sues a media defendant for publication of information that is a
matter of public concern—the Gertz situation, in other words—the
burden is on the plaintiff to establish the falsity of the information.
Thus, the Court held in Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps,1247 the
common law rule that defamatory statements are presumptively false
must give way to the First Amendment interest that true speech
on matters of public concern not be inhibited. This means, as the
dissenters pointed out, that a Gertz plaintiff must establish falsity
in addition to establishing some degree of fault (e.g., negli-
gence).1248 On the other hand, the Court held in Dun & Bradstreet
v. Greenmoss Builders that the Gertz standard limiting award of
presumed and punitive damages applies only in cases involving mat-
ters of public concern, and that the sale of credit reporting informa-
1242 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448 (1976).
1243 Wolston v. Reader’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).
1244 Hutchinson v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111 (1979).
1245 443 U.S. at 134 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974)).
1246 Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454 (1976). See also Wolston v. Read-
er’s Digest Ass’n, 443 U.S. 157 (1979).

1247 475 U.S. 767 (1986).
1248 475 U.S. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
tion to subscribers is not such a matter of public concern.1249 What

significance, if any, is to be attributed to the fact that a media de-
fendant rather than a private defendant has been sued is left un-
clear. The plurality in Dun & Bradstreet declined to follow the lower
court’s rationale that Gertz protections are unavailable to nonmedia
defendants, and a majority of Justices agreed on that point.1250 In
Philadelphia Newspapers, however, the Court expressly reserved the
issue of “what standards would apply if the plaintiff sues a nonmedia
defendant.” 1251
Other issues besides who is covered by the Times privilege are
of considerable importance. The use of the expression “actual mal-
ice” has been confusing in many respects, because it is in fact a
concept distinct from the common law meaning of malice or the mean-
ings common understanding might give to it.1252 Constitutional “ac-
tual malice” means that the defamation was published with knowl-
edge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was
false.1253 Reckless disregard is not simply negligent behavior, but
publication with serious doubts as to the truth of what is ut-
tered.1254 A defamation plaintiff under the Times or Gertz standard
has the burden of proving by “clear and convincing” evidence, not
merely by the preponderance of evidence standard ordinarily borne
in civil cases, that the defendant acted with knowledge of falsity or
with reckless disregard.1255 Moreover, the Court has held, a Gertz
plaintiff has the burden of proving the actual falsity of the defama-
1249 472 U.S. 749 (1985). Justice Powell wrote a plurality opinion joined by Jus-
tices Rehnquist and O’Connor, and Chief Justice Burger and Justice White, both of
whom had dissented in Gertz, added brief concurring opinions agreeing that the Gertz
standard should not apply to credit reporting. Justice Brennan, joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, dissented, arguing that Gertz had not been lim-
ited to matters of public concern, and should not be extended to do so.
1250 472 U.S. at 753 (plurality); id. at 773 (Justice White); id. at 781–84 (dis-
sent).
1251 475 U.S. at 779 n.4. Justice Brennan added a brief concurring opinion ex-
pressing his view that such a distinction is untenable. Id. at 780.

1252 See, e.g., Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153, 199 (1979) (Justice Stewart dis-
senting).
1253 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964); Garrison v. Loui-
siana, 379 U.S. 64, 78 (1964); Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245,
251–52 (1974).
1254 St. Amant v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 730–33 (1968); Beckley Newspapers
Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81 (1967). A finding of “highly unreasonable conduct consti-
tuting an extreme departure from the standards of investigation and reporting ordi-
narily adhered to by responsible publishers” is alone insufficient to establish actual
malice. Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (1989) (none-
theless upholding the lower court’s finding of actual malice based on the “entire re-
cord”).
1255 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 331–32 (1974); Beckley Newspa-
pers Corp. v. Hanks, 389 U.S. 81, 83 (1967). See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 285–86 (1964) (“convincing clarity”). A corollary is that the issue on
tory publication.1256 A plaintiff suing the press 1257 for defamation

under the Times or Gertz standards is not limited to attempting to
prove his case without resort to discovery of the defendant’s edito-
rial processes in the establishment of “actual malice.” 1258 The state
of mind of the defendant may be inquired into and the thoughts,
opinions, and conclusions with respect to the material gathered and
its review and handling are proper subjects of discovery. As with
other areas of protection or qualified protection under the First Amend-
ment (as well as some other constitutional provisions), appellate courts,
and ultimately the Supreme Court, must independently review the
findings below to ascertain that constitutional standards were met.1259
There had been some indications that statements of opinion, un-
like assertions of fact, are absolutely protected,1260 but the Court
held in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.1261 that there is no consti-
tutional distinction between fact and opinion, hence no “wholesale
defamation exemption” for any statement that can be labeled “opin-
ion.” 1262 The issue instead is whether, regardless of the context in
which a statement is uttered, it is sufficiently factual to be suscep-
tible of being proved true or false. Thus, if statements of opinion
may “reasonably be interpreted as stating actual facts about an in-
motion for summary judgment in a New York Times case is whether the evidence is
such that a reasonable jury might find that actual malice has been shown with con-
vincing clarity. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
1256 Philadelphia Newspapers v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767 (1986) (leaving open the
issue of what “quantity” or standard of proof must be met).

1257 Because the defendants in these cases have typically been media defen-
dants (but see Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964); Henry v. Collins, 380 U.S.
356 (1965)), and because of the language in the Court’s opinions, some have argued
that only media defendants are protected under the press clause and individuals
and others are not protected by the speech clause in defamation actions. See discus-
sion, supra, under “Freedom of Expression: Is There a Difference Between Speech
and Press?”
1258 Herbert v. Lando, 441 U.S. 153 (1979).
1259 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 284–86 (1964). See, e.g., NAACP
v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 933–34 (1982). Harte-Hanks Communica-
tions v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989) (“the reviewing court must consider
the factual record in full”); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, 466
U.S. 485 (1984) (the “clearly erroneous” standard of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
52(a) must be subordinated to this constitutional principle).
1260 See, e.g., Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974) (“under the
First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea”); Greenbelt Cooperative

Publishing Ass’n v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6 (1970) (holding protected the accurate report-
ing of a public meeting in which a particular position was characterized as “black-
mail”); Letter Carriers v. Austin, 418 U.S. 264 (1974) (holding protected a union news-
paper’s use of epithet “scab”).
1261 497 U.S. 1 (1990).
1262 497 U.S. at 18.
dividual,” 1263 then the truthfulness of the factual assertions may

be tested in a defamation action. There are sufficient protections
for free public discourse already available in defamation law, the
Court concluded, without creating “an artificial dichotomy between
‘opinion’ and fact.” 1264
Substantial meaning is also the key to determining whether in-
exact quotations are defamatory. Journalistic conventions allow some
alterations to correct grammar and syntax, but the Court in Mas-
son v. New Yorker Magazine 1265 refused to draw a distinction on
that narrow basis. Instead, “a deliberate alteration of words [in a
quotation] does not equate with knowledge of falsity for purposes
of [New York Times] unless the alteration results in a material change
in the meaning conveyed by the statement.” 1266
False Statements.—As defamatory false statements can lead
to legal liability, so can false statements in other contexts run afoul
of legal prohibitions. For instance, more than 100 federal criminal
statutes punish false statements in areas of concern to federal courts
or agencies,1267 and the Court has often noted the limited First Amend-
ment value of such speech.1268 The Court, however, has declined to
find that all false statements fall outside of First Amendment pro-
tection. In United States v. Alvarez,1269 the Court overturned the
Stolen Valor Act of 2005,1270 which imposed criminal penalties for
falsely representing oneself to have been awarded a military deco-
ration or medal. In an opinion by Justice Kennedy, four Justices
distinguished false statement statutes that threaten the integrity
of governmental processes or that further criminal activity, and evalu-
ated the Act under a strict scrutiny standard.1271
1263 497 U.S. at 20. In Milkovich the Court held to be actionable assertions and
implications in a newspaper sports column that a high school wrestling coach had
committed perjury in testifying about a fight involving his team.
1264 497 U.S. at 19.
1265 501 U.S. 496 (1991).
1266 501 U.S. at 517.
1267 United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482, 505–507, and nn. 8–10 (1997) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (listing statute citations).

1268 See, e.g., Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. at 52 (1988) (“False
statements of fact are particularly valueless [because] they interfere with the truth-
seeking function of the marketplace of ideas.” ); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy Vir-
ginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. at 771 (“Untruthful speech, commercial
or otherwise, has never been protected for its own sake.”).
1269 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–210, slip op. (2012).
1270 18 U.S.C. § 704.
1271 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–210, slip op. at 8–12 (Kenndy, J.). Justice Kennedy
was joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor.
Noting that the Stolen Valor Act applied to false statements made
“at any time, in any place, to any person,” 1272 Justice Kennedy sug-
gested that upholding this law would leave the government with
the power to punish any false discourse without a clear limiting
principle. Justice Breyer, in a separate opinion joined by Justice Kagan,
concurred in judgment, but did so only after evaluating the prohibi-
tion under an intermediate scrutiny standard. While Justice Breyer
was also concerned about the breadth of the act, his opinion went
on to suggest that a similar statute, more finely tailored to situa-
tions where a specific harm is likely to occur, could withstand legal
challenge.1273
Invasion of Privacy.—Governmental power to protect the pri-
vacy interests of its citizens by penalizing publication or authoriz-
ing causes of action for publication implicates directly First Amend-
ment rights. Privacy is a concept composed of several aspects.1274
As a tort concept, it embraces at least four branches of protected
interests: protection from unreasonable intrusion upon one’s seclu-
sion, from appropriation of one’s name or likeness, from unreason-
able publicity given to one’s private life, and from publicity which
unreasonably places one in a false light before the public.1275
Although the Court has variously recognized valid governmen-
tal interests in extending protection to privacy,1276 it has neverthe-
less interposed substantial free expression interests in the balance.
Thus, in Time, Inc. v. Hill,1277 the Times privilege was held to pre-
clude recovery under a state privacy statute that permitted recov-
ery for harm caused by exposure to public attention in any publica-
tion which contained factual inaccuracies, although not necessarily
defamatory inaccuracies, in communications on matters of public in-
terest. Since Gertz held that the Times privilege did not limit the
recovery of compensatory damages for defamation by private per-
1272 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–210, slip op. at 10 (Kennedy, J). Justice Kennedy was
joined in his opinion by Chief Justice Roberts, and Justices Ginsburg and Sotomayor..
1273 567 U.S. ___, No. 11–210, slip op. at 8–9 (Breyer, J).
1274 See, e.g., WILLIAM PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS 117 (4th ed. 1971); Prosser, Privacy,
48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY AND PRIVACY
(1987); THOMAS EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 544–61 (1970). Note
that we do not have here the question of the protection of one’s privacy from govern-
mental invasion.
1275 Restatement (Second), of Torts §§ 652A–652I (1977). These four branches
were originally propounded in Prosser’s 1960 article, incorporated in the Restate-

ment, and now “routinely accept[ed].” McCarthy, § 5.8[A].
1276 Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 383 n.7 (1967); and id. at 402, 404 (Justice
Harlan, concurring in part and dissenting in part), 411, 412–15 (Justice Fortas dis-
senting); Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487–89 (1975).
1277 385 U.S. 374 (1967). See also Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419
U.S. 245 (1974).

sons, the question arose whether Hill applies to all “false-light” cases
or only such cases involving public officials or public figures.1278 And,
more important, Gertz left unresolved the issue “whether the State
may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted
publicity in the press.” 1279
In Cox Broadcasting, the Court declined to pass on the broad
question, holding instead that the accurate publication of informa-
tion obtained from public records is absolutely privileged. Thus, the
state could not permit a civil recovery for invasion of privacy occa-
sioned by the reporting of the name of a rape victim obtained from
court records and from a proceeding in open court.1280 Neverthe-
less, the Court in appearing to retreat from what had seemed to be
settled principle, that truth is a constitutionally required defense
in any defamation action, whether plaintiff be a public official, pub-
lic figure, or private individual, may have preserved for itself the
discretion to recognize a constitutionally permissible tort of inva-
sion of privacy through publication of truthful information.1281 But
in recognition of the conflicting interests—in expression and in pri-
vacy—it is evident that the judicial process in this area will be cau-
tious.
1278 Cf. Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co., 419 U.S. 245, 250–51 (1974); Cox
Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 490 n.19 (1975).

1279 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 491 (1975).
1280 More specifically, the information was obtained “from judicial records which
are maintained in connection with a public prosecution and which themselves are
open to public inspection.” 420 U.S. at 491. There was thus involved both the First
Amendment and the traditional privilege of the press to report the events of judi-
cial proceedings. Id. at 493, 494–96.
1281 Thus, Justice White for the Court noted that the defense of truth is consti-
tutionally required in suits by public officials or public figures. But “[t]he Court has
nevertheless carefully left open the question whether the First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments require that truth be recognized as a defense in a defamatory action brought
by a private person as distinguished from a public official or public figure.” 420 U.S.
at 490. If truth is not a constitutionally required defense, then it would be possible
for the states to make truthful defamation of private individuals actionable and, more
important, truthful reporting of matters that constitute invasions of privacy action-
able. See Brasco v. Reader’s Digest, 4 Cal.3d 520, 483 P.2d 34, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866
(1971); Commonwealth v. Wiseman, 356 Mass. 251, 249 N.E.2d 610 (1969), cert. de-
nied, 398 U.S. 960 (1970). Concurring in Cohn, 420 U.S. at 497, Justice Powell con-
tended that the question of truth as a constitutionally required defense was long
settled in the affirmative and that Gertz itself, which he wrote, was explainable on
no other basis. But he too would reserve the question of actionable invasions of pri-
vacy through truthful reporting. “In some instances state actions that are denomi-
nated actions in defamation may in fact seek to protect citizens from injuries that
are quite different from the wrongful damage to reputation flowing from false state-
ments of fact. In such cases, the Constitution may permit a different balance. And,
as today’s opinion properly recognizes, causes of action grounded in a State’s desire
to protect privacy generally implicate interests that are distinct from those pro-
tected by defamation actions.” 420 U.S. at 500.
Continuing to adhere to “limited principles that sweep no more

broadly than the appropriate context of the instant case,” the Court
invalidated an award of damages against a newspaper for printing
the name of a sexual assault victim lawfully obtained from a sher-
iff ’s department press release. The state was unable to demon-
strate that imposing liability served a “need” to further a state in-
terest of the highest order, since the same interest could have been
served by the more limited means of self regulation by the police,
since the particular per se negligence statute precluded inquiry into
the extent of privacy invasion (e.g., inquiry into whether the vic-
tim’s identity was already widely known), and since the statute singled
out “mass communications” media for liability rather than apply-
ing evenhandedly to anyone disclosing a victim’s identity.1282
Emotional Distress Tort Actions.—In Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell,1283 the Court applied the New York Times v. Sullivan
standard to recovery of damages by public officials and public fig-
ures for the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
case involved an advertisement “parody” portraying the plaintiff, de-
scribed by the Court as a “nationally known minister who has been
active as a commentator on politics and public affairs,” as stating
that he lost his virginity “during a drunken incestuous rendezvous
with his mother in an outhouse.” 1284 Affirming liability in this case,
the Court believed, would subject “political cartoonists and sati-
rists . . . to damage awards without any showing that their work
falsely defamed its subject.” 1285 A proffered “outrageousness” stan-
dard for distinguishing such parodies from more traditional politi-
cal cartoons was rejected; although not doubting that “the carica-
ture of respondent . . . is at best a distant cousin of [some] political
cartoons . . . and a rather poor relation at that,” the Court ex-
plained that “ ‘[o]utrageousness’ in the area of political and social
discourse has an inherent subjectiveness about it which would al-
low a jury to impose liability on the basis of the jurors’ tastes or
views. . . .” 1286 Therefore, proof of intent to cause injury, “the gra-
1282 The Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989). The Court left open the ques-
tion “whether, in cases where information has been acquired unlawfully by a news-
paper or by a source, the government may ever punish not only the unlawful acqui-
sition, but the ensuing publication as well.” Id. at 535 n.8 (emphasis in original). In
Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514 (2001), the Court held that a content-neutral stat-
ute prohibiting the publication of illegally intercepted communications (in this case
a cell phone conversation) violates free speech where the person who publishes the
material did not participate in the interception, and the communication concerns a
public issue.
1283 485 U.S. 46 (1988).
1284 485 U.S. at 47, 48.
1285 485 U.S. at 53.
1286 485 U.S. at 55.
vamen of the tort,” is insufficient “in the area of public debate about
public figures.” Additional proof that the publication contained a false
statement of fact made with actual malice was necessary, the Court
concluded, in order “to give adequate ‘breathing space’ to the free-
doms protected by the First Amendment.” 1287
The Court next considered whether an intentional infliction of
emotional distress action could be brought by a father against pub-
lic protestors who picketed the military funeral of his son, where
the plaintiff was neither a public official nor a public figure. Based
on the reasoning of Hustler Magazine, one might presume that the
Times privilege would not extend to the intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress upon a private citizen. However, in Snyder v. Phelps,1288
the Court avoided addressing this issue, finding that where public
protesters are addressing issues of public concern, the fact that such
protests occurred in a setting likely to upset private individuals did
not reduce the First Amendment protection of that speech. In Phelps,
the congregation of the Westboro Baptist Church, based on the be-
lief that God punishes the United States for its tolerance of homo-
sexuality, particularly in America’s armed forces, had engaged in
nearly 600 protests at funerals, mostly military. While it was admit-
ted that the plaintiff had suffered emotional distress after a pro-
test at his son’s funeral, the Court declined to characterize the pro-
tests as directed at the father personally.1289 Rather, considering the
“content, form, and context” of that speech,1290 the Court found that
the dominant themes of the protest went to public concerns, and
thus could not serve as the basis for a tort suit.1291
“Right of Publicity” Tort Actions.—In Zacchini v. Scripps-
Howard Broadcasting Co.,1292 the Court held unprotected by the First
Amendment a broadcast of a video tape of the “entire act” of a “hu-
1287 485 U.S. at 53, 56.

1288 562 U.S. ___, No. 09–751, slip op. (March 2, 2011).
1289 Signs displayed at the protest included the phrases “God Hates the USA/Thank
God for 9/11,” “America is Doomed,” “Don’t Pray for the USA,” “Thank God for IEDs,”
“Thank God for Dead Soldiers,” “Pope in Hell,” “Priests Rape Boys,” “God Hates Fags,”
“You’re Going to Hell,” and “God Hates You.” , 562 U.S. ___, No. 09–751, slip op. at
2.
1290 562 U.S. ___, No. 09–751, slip op. at 8 (citations omitted).
1291 Justice Alito, in dissent, argued that statements made by the defendants
on signs and on a website could have been reasonably interpreted as directed at the
plaintiffs, and that even if public themes were a dominant theme at the protest,
that this should not prevent a suit from being brought on those statements argu-
ably directed at private individuals. Slip op. at 9–11 (Alito, J., dissenting).
1292 433 U.S. 562 (1977). The “right of publicity” tort is conceptually related to
one of the privacy strands: “appropriation” of one’s name or likeness for commercial
purposes. Id. at 569–72. Justices Powell, Brennan, and Marshall dissented, finding
the broadcast protected, id. at 579, and Justice Stevens dissented on other grounds.
Id. at 582.
man cannonball” in the context of the performer’s suit for damages

against the company for having “appropriated” his act, thereby in-
juring his right to the publicity value of his performance. The Court
emphasized two differences between the legal action permitted here
and the legal actions found unprotected or not fully protected in
defamation and other privacy-type suits. First, the interest sought
to be protected was, rather than a party’s right to his reputation
and freedom from mental distress, the right of the performer to re-
muneration for putting on his act. Second, the other torts if permit-
ted decreased the information that would be made available to the
public, whereas permitting this tort action would have an impact
only on “who gets to do the publishing.” 1293 In both respects, the
tort action was analogous to patent and copyright laws in that both
provide an economic incentive to persons to make the investment
required to produce a performance of interest to the public.1294
Publication of Legally Confidential Information.—
Although a state may have valid interests in assuring the confiden-
tiality of certain information, it may not enforce this confidentiality
by criminally prosecuting nonparticipant third parties, including the
press, who disclose or publish the information.1295 The case that made
this point arose in the context of the investigation of a state judge
by an official disciplinary body; both by state constitutional provi-
sion and by statute, the body’s proceedings were required to be con-
fidential and the statute made the divulging of information about
the proceeding a misdemeanor. For publishing an accurate report
about an investigation of a sitting judge, the newspaper was in-
dicted and convicted of violating the statute, which the state courts
construed to apply to nonparticipants. Although the Court recog-
nized the importance of confidentiality to the effectiveness of such
a proceeding, it held that the publication here “lies near the core of
the First Amendment” because the free discussion of public affairs,
including the operation of the judicial system, is primary and the
state’s interests were simply insufficient to justify the encroach-
1293 433 U.S. at 573–74. Plaintiff was not seeking to bar the broadcast but rather
to be paid for the value he lost through the broadcasting.

1294 433 U.S. at 576–78. This discussion is the closest the Court has come in
considering how copyright laws in particular are to be reconciled with the First Amend-
ment. The Court emphasizes that copyright laws encourage the production of work
for the public’s benefit.
1295 Landmark Communications v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829 (1978). The decision
by Chief Justice Burger was unanimous, Justices Brennan and Powell not partici-
pating, but Justice Stewart would have limited the holding to freedom of the press
to publish. Id. at 848. See also Smith v. Daily Mail Pub. Co., 443 U.S. 97 (1979).
ment on freedom of speech and of the press.1296 The scope of the

privilege thus conferred by this decision on the press and on indi-
viduals is, however, somewhat unclear, because the Court ap-
peared to reserve consideration of broader questions than those pre-
sented by the facts of the case.1297 It does appear, however, that
government would find it difficult to punish the publication of al-
most any information by a nonparticipant to the process in which
the information was developed to the same degree as it would be
foreclosed from obtaining prior restraint of such publication.1298 There
are also limits on the extent to which government may punish dis-
closures by participants in the criminal process, the Court having
invalidated a restriction on a grand jury witness’s disclosure of his
own testimony after the grand jury had been discharged.1299
Obscenity.—Although public discussion of political affairs is at
the core of the First Amendment, the guarantees of speech and press
are broader. “We do not accede to appellee’s suggestion that the con-
stitutional protection for a free press applies only to the exposition
of ideas. The line between the informing and the entertaining is
too elusive for the protection of that basic right.” 1300 The right to
impart and to receive “information and ideas, regardless of their
social worth . . . is fundamental to our free society.” 1301 Indeed, it
is primarily with regard to the entertaining function of expression
that the law of obscenity is concerned, as the Court has rejected
1296 435 U.S. at 838–42. The Court disapproved of the state court’s use of the
clear-and-present-danger test: “Mr. Justice Holmes’ test was never intended ‘to ex-
press a technical legal doctrine or to convey a formula for adjudicating cases.’ ” Id.
at 842, quoting from Pennekamp v. Florida, 328 U.S. 331, 353 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J. concurring).
1297 Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469 (1975), in the context of a
civil proceeding, had held that the First Amendment did not permit the imposition
of liability on the press for truthful publication of information released to the public
in official court records, id. at 496, but had expressly reserved the question “whether
the publication of truthful information withheld by law from the public domain is
similarly privileged,” id. at 497 n.27, and Landmark on its face appears to answer
the question affirmatively. Caution is impelled, however, by the Court’s similar res-
ervation. “We need not address all the implications of that question here, but only
whether in the circumstances of this case Landmark’s publication is protected by
the First Amendment.” 435 U.S. at 840.
1298 See Nebraska Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
1299 Butterworth v. Smith, 494 U.S. 624 (1990).
1300 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507, 510 (1948). Illustrative of the general
observation is the fact that “[m]usic, as a form of expression and communication, is

protected under the First Amendment.” Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781,
790 (1989). Nude dancing is also. Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 564
(1991).
1301 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
any concept of “ideological” obscenity.1302 However, this function is

not the reason that obscenity is outside the protection of the First
Amendment, although the Court has never really been clear about
what that reason is.
Adjudication over the constitutional law of obscenity began in
Roth v. United States,1303 in which the Court in an opinion by Jus-
tice Brennan settled in the negative the “dispositive question” “whether
obscenity is utterance within the area of protected speech and
press.” 1304 The Court then undertook a brief historical survey to
demonstrate that “the unconditional phrasing of the First Amend-
ment was not intended to protect every utterance.” All or practi-
cally all the states that ratified the First Amendment had laws mak-
ing blasphemy or profanity or both crimes, and provided for
prosecutions of libels as well. It was this history that had caused
the Court in Beauharnais to conclude that “libelous utterances are
not within the area of constitutionally protected speech,” and this
history was deemed to demonstrate that “obscenity, too, was out-
side the protection intended for speech and press.” 1305 “The protec-
tion given speech and press was fashioned to assure unfettered in-
terchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes
desired by the people . . . . All ideas having even the slightest re-
deeming social importance—unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas,
even ideas hateful to the prevailing climate of opinion—have the
full protection of the guaranties, unless excludable because they en-
1302 Winters v. New York, 333 U.S. 507 (1948); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson,
343 U.S. 495 (1952); Commercial Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 346 U.S. 587 (1954);
Kingsley Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684 (1959). The last case involved the
banning of the movie Lady Chatterley’s Lover on the ground that it dealt too sympa-
thetically with adultery. “It is contended that the State’s action was justified be-
cause the motion picture attractively portrays a relationship which is contrary to
the moral standards, the religious precepts, and the legal code of its citizenry. This
argument misconceives what it is that the Constitution protects. Its guarantee is
not confined to the expression of ideas that are conventional or shared by a major-
ity. It protects advocacy of the opinion that adultery may sometimes be proper no
less than advocacy of socialism or the single tax. And in the realm of ideas it pro-
tects expression which is eloquent no less than that which is unconvincing.” Id. at
688–89.
1303 354 U.S. 476 (1957). Heard at the same time and decided in the same opin-
ion was Alberts v. California, involving, of course, a state obscenity law. The Court’s
first opinion in the obscenity field was Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), con-
sidered infra. Earlier the Court had divided four-to-four and thus affirmed a state
court judgment that Edmund Wilson’s Memoirs of Hecate County was obscene. Doubleday
& Co. v. New York, 335 U.S. 848 (1948).
1304 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 481 (1957). Justice Brennan later changed
his mind on this score, arguing that, because the Court had failed to develop a work-
able standard for distinguishing the obscene from the non-obscene, regulation should
be confined to the protection of children and non-consenting adults. See Paris Adult
Theatre v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
1305 354 U.S. at 482–83. The reference is to Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S.
250 (1952).
croach upon the limited area of more important interests. But im-
plicit in the history of the First Amendment is the rejection of ob-
scenity as utterly without redeeming social importance.” 1306 It was
objected that obscenity legislation punishes because of incitation to
impure thoughts and without proof that obscene materials create a
clear and present danger of antisocial conduct. But because obscen-
ity was not protected at all, such tests as clear and present danger
were irrelevant.1307
“However,” Justice Brennan continued, “sex and obscenity are
not synonymous. Obscene material is material which deals with sex
in a manner appealing to prurient interest. The portrayal of sex,
e.g., in art, literature and scientific works, is not itself sufficient rea-
son to deny material the constitutional protection of freedom of speech
and press . . . . It is therefore vital that the standards for judging
obscenity safeguard the protection of freedom of speech and press
for material which does not treat sex in a manner appealing to pru-
rient interest.” 1308 The standard that the Court thereupon adopted
for the designation of material as unprotected obscenity was “whether
to the average person, applying contemporary community stan-
dards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole ap-
peals to prurient interest.” 1309 The Court defined material appeal-
ing to prurient interest as “material having a tendency to excite
lustful thoughts,” and defined prurient interest as “a shameful or
morbid interest in nudity, sex, or excretion.” 1310
In the years after Roth, the Court struggled with many obscen-
ity cases with varying degrees of success. The cases can be grouped
topically, but, with the exception of those cases dealing with protec-
tion of children, 1311 unwilling adult recipients, 1312 and proce-
dure,1313 these cases are best explicated chronologically.
1306 354 U.S. at 484. There then followed the well-known passage from Chaplinsky
v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571–72 (1942).

1307 354 U.S. at 486, also quoting Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952).
1308 354 U.S. at 487, 488.
1309 354 U.S. at 489.
1310 354 U.S. at 487 n.20. A statute defining “prurient” as “that which incites
lasciviousness or lust” covers more than obscenity, the Court later indicated in Brockett
v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1985); obscenity consists in appeal to
“a shameful or morbid” interest in sex, not in appeal to “normal, healthy sexual de-
sires.” Brockett involved a facial challenge to the statute, so the Court did not have
to explain the difference between “normal, healthy” sexual desires and “shameful”
or “morbid” sexual desires.
1311 In Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380 (1957), the Court unanimously re-
versed a conviction under a statute that punished general distribution of materials

unsuitable for children. Protesting that the statute “reduce[d] the adult population
of Michigan to reading only what is fit for children,” the Court pronounced the stat-
ute void. Narrowly drawn proscriptions for distribution or exhibition to children of
materials which would not be obscene for adults are permissible, Ginsberg v. New
Manual Enterprises v. Day 1314 upset a Post Office ban upon the
mailing of certain magazines addressed to homosexual audiences,
but resulted in no majority opinion of the Court. Nor did a major-
ity opinion emerge in Jacobellis v. Ohio, which reversed a convic-
York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968), although the Court insists on a high degree of specificity.
Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968); Rabeck v. New York,
391 U.S. 462 (1968). Protection of children in this context is concurred in even by
those Justices who would proscribe obscenity regulation for adults. Paris Adult The-
atre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 73, 113 (1973) (Justice Brennan dissenting). But chil-
dren do have First Amendment protection and government may not bar dissemina-
tion of everything to them. “Speech that is neither obscene as to youths nor subject
to some other legitimate proscription cannot be suppressed solely to protect the young
from ideas or images that a legislative body thinks unsuitable for them.” Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1975) (in context of nudity on movie
screen). See also FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 749–50 (1978); Pinkus v.
United States, 436 U.S. 293, 296–98 (1978).
1312 Protection of unwilling adults was the emphasis in Rowan v. Post Office Dep’t,
397 U.S. 728 (1970), which upheld a scheme by which recipients of objectionable
mail could put their names on a list and require the mailer to send no more such
material. But, absent intrusions into the home, FCC v. Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S.
726 (1978), or a degree of captivity that makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure, government may not censor content, in the context of
materials not meeting constitutional standards for denomination as pornography, to
protect the sensibilities of some. It is up to offended individuals to turn away. Erznoznik
v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208–12 (1975). But see Pinkus v. United States,
436 U.S. 293, 300 (1978) (jury in determining community standards must include
both “ ‘sensitive’ and ‘insensitive’ persons” in the community, but may not “focus[ ]
upon the most susceptible or sensitive members when judging the obscenity of ma-
terials . . . ”).
1313 The First Amendment requires that procedures for suppressing distribution
of obscene materials provide for expedited consideration, for placing the burden of
proof on government, and for hastening judicial review. Additionally, Fourth Amend-
ment search and seizure law has been suffused with First Amendment principles,
so that the law governing searches for and seizures of allegedly obscene materials is
more stringent than in most other areas. Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717
(1961); A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205 (1964); Heller v. New York, 413
U.S. 483 (1973); Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York,
442 U.S. 319 (1979); see also Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). Scienter—
that is, knowledge of the nature of the materials—is a prerequisite to conviction,
Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959), but the prosecution need only prove the
defendant knew the contents of the material, not that he knew they were legally
obscene. Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 119–24 (1974). See also Vance v.
Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (public nuisance injunction of show-
ing future films on basis of past exhibition of obscene films constitutes impermis-
sible prior restraint); McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669 (1976) (criminal defen-
dants may not be bound by a finding of obscenity of materials in prior civil proceeding
to which they were not parties). None of these strictures applies, however, to forfei-
tures imposed as part of a criminal penalty. Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S.
544 (1993) (upholding RICO forfeiture of the entire adult entertainment book and
film business of an individual convicted of obscenity and racketeering offenses). Jus-
tice Kennedy, dissenting in Alexander, objected to the “forfeiture of expressive mate-
rial that had not been adjudged to be obscene.” Id. at 578.
1314 370 U.S. 478 (1962).
tion for exhibiting a motion picture.1315 Chief Justice Warren’s con-

currence in Roth 1316 was adopted by a majority in Ginzburg v. United
States,1317 in which Justice Brennan for the Court held that in “close”
cases borderline materials could be determined to be obscene if the
seller “pandered” them in a way that indicated he was catering to
prurient interests. The same five-Justice majority, with Justice Har-
lan concurring, the same day affirmed a state conviction of a dis-
tributor of books addressed to a sado-masochistic audience, apply-
ing the “pandering” test and concluding that material could be held
legally obscene if it appealed to the prurient interests of the devi-
ate group to which it was directed.1318 Unanimity was shattered,
however, when on the same day the Court held that Fanny Hill, a
novel at that point 277 years old, was not legally obscene.1319 The
prevailing opinion again restated the Roth tests that, to be consid-
ered obscene, material must (1) have a dominant theme in the work
considered as a whole that appeals to prurient interest, (2) be pa-
tently offensive because it goes beyond contemporary community stan-
dards, and (3) be utterly without redeeming social value.1320
After the divisions engendered by the disparate opinions in the
three 1966 cases, the Court over the next several years submerged
its differences by per curiam dispositions of nearly three dozen cases,
in all but one of which it reversed convictions or civil determina-
tions of obscenity. The initial case was Redrup v. New York,1321 in
which, after noting that the cases involved did not present special
questions requiring other treatment, such as concern for juveniles,
1315 378 U.S. 184 (1964). Without opinion, citing Jacobellis, the Court reversed
a judgment that Henry Miller’s Tropic of Cancer was obscene. Grove Press v. Gerstein,
378 U.S. 577 (1964). Jacobellis is best known for Justice Stewart’s concurrence, con-
tending that criminal prohibitions should be limited to “hard-core pornography.” The
category “may be indefinable,” he added, but “I know it when I see it, and the mo-
tion picture involved in this case is not that.” Id. at 197. The difficulty with this
visceral test is that other members of the Court did not always “see it” the same
way; two years later, for example, Justice Stewart was on opposite sides in two ob-
scenity decisions decided on the same day. A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs
of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attorney Genera, 383 U.S. 413 (1966) (concurring on
basis that book was not obscene); Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502, 518 (1966)
(dissenting from finding that material was obscene).
1316 Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 494 (1957).
1317 383 U.S. 463 (1966). Pandering remains relevant in pornography cases. Splawn
v. California, 431 U.S. 595 (1977); Pinkus v. United States, 436 U.S. 293, 303–04
(1978).
1318 Mishkin v. New York, 383 U.S. 502 (1966). See id. at 507–10 for discussion
of the legal issue raised by the limited appeal of the material. The Court relied on
Mishkin in Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767, 772 (1977).
1319 A Book Named “John Cleland’s Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure” v. Attor-
ney Genera, 383 U.S. 413 (1966).

1320 383 U.S. at 418. On the precedential effect of the Memoirs plurality opin-
ion, see Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 192–94 (1977).
1321 386 U.S. 767 (1967).
protection of unwilling adult recipients, or proscription of pander-

ing,1322 the Court succinctly summarized the varying positions of
the seven Justices in the majority and said: “[w]hichever of the con-
stitutional views is brought to bear upon the cases before us, it is
clear that the judgments cannot stand . . . .” 1323 And so things went
for several years.1324
Changing membership on the Court raised increasing specula-
tion about the continuing vitality of Roth; it seemed unlikely the
Court would long continue its Redrup approach.1325 The change when
it occurred strengthened the powers of government, federal, state,
and local, to outlaw or restrictively regulate the sale and dissemi-
nation of materials found objectionable, and developed new stan-
dards for determining which objectionable materials are legally ob-
scene.
At the end of the October 1971 Term, the Court requested argu-
ment on the question whether the display of sexually oriented films
or of sexually oriented pictorial magazines, when surrounded by no-
tice to the public of their nature and by reasonable protection against
exposure to juveniles, was constitutionally protected.1326 By a five-
to-four vote the following Term, the Court in Paris Adult Theatre I
v. Slaton adhered to the principle established in Roth that obscene
material is not protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments
even if access is limited to consenting adults.1327 Chief Justice Burger
for the Court observed that the states have wider interests than
protecting juveniles and unwilling adults from exposure to pornog-
raphy; legitimate state interests, effectuated through the exercise
of the police power, exist in protecting and improving the quality of
life and the total community environment, in improving the tone of
commerce in the cities, and in protecting public safety. It does not
matter that the states may be acting on the basis of unverifiable
1322 386 U.S. at 771.
1323 386 U.S. at 770–71. The majority was thus composed of Chief Justice War-
ren and Justices Black, Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, White, and Fortas.
1324 See Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 82–83 & n.8 (1973) (Jus-
tice Brennan dissenting) (describing Redrup practice and listing 31 cases decided on
the basis of it).
1325 See United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351 (1971) (federal prohibition of dis-
semination of obscene materials through the mails is constitutional); United States

v. Thirty-seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971) (customs seizures of obscene mate-
rials from baggage of travelers are constitutional). In Grove Press v. Maryland State
Bd. of Censors, 401 U.S. 480 (1971), a state court determination that the motion
picture “I Am Curious (Yellow)” was obscene was affirmed by an equally divided Court,
Justice Douglas not participating. And Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 560–64,
568 (1969), had insisted that Roth remained the governing standard.
1326 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 408 U.S. 921 (1972); Alexander v. Virginia,
408 U.S. 921 (1972).

1327 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
assumptions in arriving at the decision to suppress the trade in por-

nography; the Constitution does not require in the context of the
trade in ideas that governmental courses of action be subject to em-
pirical verification any more than it does in other fields. Nor does
the Constitution embody any concept of laissez faire, or of privacy,
or of Millsean “free will,” that curbs governmental efforts to sup-
press pornography.1328
In Miller v. California,1329 the Court prescribed standards by
which unprotected pornographic materials were to be identified. Be-
cause of the inherent dangers in undertaking to regulate any form
of expression, laws to regulate pornography must be carefully lim-
ited; their scope is to be confined to materials that “depict or de-
scribe patently offensive ‘hard core’ sexual conduct specifically de-
fined by the regulating state law, as written or construed.” 1330 The
law “must also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal
to the prurient interest in sex, which portray sexual conduct in a
patently offensive way, and which, taken as a whole, do not have
serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.” 1331 The stan-
dard that a work must be “utterly without redeeming social value”
before it may be suppressed was disavowed and discarded. In deter-
mining whether material appeals to a prurient interest or is pa-
tently offensive, the trier of fact, whether a judge or a jury, is not
1328 413 U.S. at 57, 60–62, 63–64, 65–68. Delivering the principal dissent, Jus-
tice Brennan argued that the Court’s Roth approach allowing the suppression of por-
nography was a failure, that the Court had not and could not formulate standards
by which protected materials could be distinguished from unprotected materials, and
that the First Amendment had been denigrated through the exposure of numerous
persons to punishment for the dissemination of materials that fell close to one side
of the line rather than the other, but more basically by deterrence of protected ex-
pression caused by the uncertainty. Id. at 73. “I would hold, therefore, that at least
in the absence of distribution to juveniles or obtrusive exposure to unconsenting adults,
the First and Fourteenth Amendments prohibit the State and Federal Governments
from attempting wholly to suppress sexually oriented materials on the basis of their
allegedly ‘obscene’ contents.” Id. at 113. Justices Stewart and Marshall joined this
opinion; Justice Douglas dissented separately, adhering to the view that the First
Amendment absolutely protected all expression. Id. at 70.
1329 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
1330 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 27 (1973). The Court stands ready to read
into federal statutes the standards it has formulated. United States v. 12 200–Ft.
Reels of Film, 413 U.S. 123, 130 n.7 (1973) (Court is prepared to construe statutes
proscribing materials that are “obscene,” “lewd,” “lascivious,” “filthy,” “indecent,” and
“immoral” as limited to the types of “hard core” pornography reachable under the
Miller standards). For other cases applying Miller standards to federal statutes, see
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 110–16 (1974) (use of the mails); United States
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139 (1973) (transportation of pornography in interstate com-
merce). The Court’s insistence on specificity in state statutes, either as written by
the legislature or as authoritatively construed by the state court, appears to have
been significantly weakened, in fact if not in enunciation, in Ward v. Illinois, 431
U.S. 767 (1977).
1331 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. at 24.
bound by a hypothetical national standard but may apply the local

community standard where the trier of fact sits.1332 Prurient inter-
est and patent offensiveness, the Court indicated, “are essentially
questions of fact.” 1333 By contrast, the third or “value” prong of the
Miller test is not subject to a community standards test; instead,
the appropriate standard is “whether a reasonable person would find
[literary, artistic, political, or scientific] value in the material, taken
as a whole.” 1334
The Court in Miller reiterated that it was not permitting an
unlimited degree of suppression of materials. Only “hard core” ma-
terials were to be deemed without the protection of the First Amend-
ment, and the Court’s idea of the content of “hard core” pornogra-
phy was revealed in its examples: “(a) Patently offensive
representations or descriptions of ultimate sexual acts, normal or
perverted, actual or simulated. (b) Patently offensive representa-
tions or descriptions of masturbation, excretory functions, and lewd
exhibition of the genitals.” 1335 Subsequently, the Court held that a
publication was not obscene if it “provoked only normal, healthy sexual
desires.” To be obscene it must appeal to “a shameful or morbid in-
terest in nudity, sex, or excretion.” 1336 The Court has also indi-
1332 It is the unprotected nature of obscenity that allows this inquiry; offensive-
ness to local community standards is, of course, a principle completely at odds with
mainstream First Amendment jurisprudence. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S.
397 (1989); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).
1333 413 U.S. at 30–34. “A juror is entitled to draw on his knowledge of the views
of the average person in the community or vicinage from which he comes for mak-
ing the required determination, just as he is entitled to draw on his knowledge of
the propensities of a ‘reasonable’ person in other areas of the law.” Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974). The holding does not compel any particular circum-
scribed area to be used as a “community.” In federal cases, it will probably be the
judicial district from which the jurors are drawn, id. at 105–106. Indeed, the jurors
may be instructed to apply “community standards” without any definition being given
of the “community.” Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 157 (1974). In a federal pros-
ecution for use of the mails to transmit pornography, the fact that the legislature of
the state within which the transaction takes place has abolished pornography regu-
lation except for dealings with children does not preclude permitting the jurors in
the federal case to make their own definitions of what is offensive to contemporary
community standards; they may be told of the legislature’s decision but they are not
bound by it. Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977).
1334 Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S. 497, 500–01 (1987).
1335 Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 25 (1973). Quoting Miller’s language in
Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 114 (1974), the Court reiterated that it was
only “hard-core” material that was unprotected. “While the particular descriptions
there contained were not intended to be exhaustive, they clearly indicate that there
is a limit beyond which neither legislative draftsmen nor juries may go in conclud-
ing that particular material is ‘patently offensive’ within the meaning of the obscen-
ity test set forth in the Miller cases.” Referring to this language in Ward v. Illinois,
431 U.S. 767 (1977), the Court upheld a state court’s power to construe its statute
to reach sadomasochistic materials not within the confines of the Miller language.
1336 Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 498 (1984).
cated that obscenity is not be limited to pictures; books containing

only descriptive language may be suppressed.1337
First Amendment values, the Court stressed in Miller, “are ad-
equately protected by the ultimate power of appellate courts to con-
duct an independent review of constitutional claims when neces-
sary.” 1338 But the Court had conferred on juries as triers of fact
the determination, based upon their understanding of community
standards, whether material was “patently offensive.” Did not this
virtually immunize these questions from appellate review? In Jen-
kins v. Georgia,1339 the Court, while adhering to the Miller stan-
dards, stated that “juries [do not] have unbridled discretion in de-
termining what is ‘patently offensive.’ ” Miller was intended to make
clear that only “hard-core” materials could be suppressed and this
concept and the Court’s descriptive itemization of some types of
hardcore materials were “intended to fix substantive constitutional
limitations, deriving from the First Amendment, on the type of ma-
terial subject to such a determination.” The Court’s own viewing of
the motion picture in question convinced it that “[n]othing in the
movie falls within either of the two examples given in Miller of ma-
terial which may constitutionally be found to meet the ‘patently of-
fensive’ element of those standards, nor is there anything suffi-
ciently similar to such material to justify similar treatment.” 1340 But,
in a companion case, the Court found that a jury determination of
obscenity “was supported by the evidence and consistent with” the
standards.1341
The decisions from the Paris Adult Theatre and Miller era were
rendered by narrow majorities,1342 but nonetheless have guided the
Court since. In addition, the Court’s willingness to allow some regu-
1337 Kaplan v. California, 413 U.S. 115 (1973).
1338 413 U.S. at 25.
1339 418 U.S. 153 (1974).
1340 418 U.S. at 161. The film at issue was Carnal Knowledge.
1341 Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87 (1974). In Smith v. United States,
431 U.S. 291, 305–06 (1977), the Court explained that jury determinations in accor-
dance with their own understanding of the tolerance of the average person in their
community are not unreviewable. Judicial review would pass on (1) whether the jury
was properly instructed to consider the entire community and not simply the mem-
bers’ own subjective reaction or the reactions of a sensitive or of a callous minority,
(2) whether the conduct depicted fell within the examples specified in Miller, (3)
whether the work lacked serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value, and
(4) whether the evidence was sufficient. The Court indicated that the value test of
Miller “was particularly amenable to judicial review.” The value test is not to be
measured by community standards, the Court later held in Pope v. Illinois, 481 U.S.
497 (1987), but instead by a “reasonable person” standard. An erroneous instruction
on this score, however, may be “harmless error.” Id. at 503.
1342 For other five-to-four decisions of the era, see Marks v. United States, 430
U.S. 188 (1977); Smith v. United States, 431 U.S. 291 (1977); Splawn v. California,
431 U.S. 595 (1977); and Ward v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 767 (1977).
lation of non-obscene but sexually explicit or “indecent” expression

reduces the importance (outside the criminal area) of whether ma-
terial is classified as obscene.
Even as to materials falling within the constitutional definition
of obscene, the Court has recognized a limited private, protected
interest in possession within the home,1343 unless those materials
constitute child pornography. Stanley v. Georgia was an appeal from
a state conviction for possession of obscene films discovered in ap-
pellant’s home by police officers armed with a search warrant for
other items which were not found. The Court reversed, holding that
the mere private possession of obscene materials in the home can-
not be made a criminal offense. The Constitution protects the right
to receive information and ideas, the Court said, regardless of their
social value, and “that right takes on an added dimension” in the
context of a prosecution for possession of something in one’s own
home. “For also fundamental is the right to be free, except in very
limited circumstances, from unwanted governmental intrusions into
one’s privacy.” 1344 Despite the unqualified assertion in Roth that ob-
scenity was not protected by the First Amendment, the Court ob-
served, it and the cases following were concerned with the govern-
mental interest in regulating commercial distribution of obscene
materials. Roth and the cases following that decision are not im-
paired by today’s decision, the Court insisted,1345 but in its rejec-
tion of each of the state contentions made in support of the convic-
tion the Court appeared to be rejecting much of the basis of Roth.
First, there is no governmental interest in protecting an individu-
al’s mind from the effect of obscenity. Second, the absence of ideo-
logical content in the films was irrelevant, since the Court will not
draw a line between transmission of ideas and entertainment. Third,
there is no empirical evidence to support a contention that expo-
sure to obscene materials may incite a person to antisocial con-
duct; even if there were such evidence, enforcement of laws proscrib-
ing the offensive conduct is the answer. Fourth, punishment of mere
possession is not necessary to punishment of distribution. Fifth, there
was little danger that private possession would give rise to the ob-
jections underlying a proscription upon public dissemination, expo-
sure to children and unwilling adults.1346
Stanley’s broad rationale has been given a restrictive reading,
and the holding has been confined to its facts. Any possible implica-
tion that Stanley was applicable outside the home and recognized
1343 Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969).
1344 394 U.S. at 564.
1345 394 U.S. at 560–64, 568.
1346 394 U.S. at 565–68.
a right to obtain pornography or a right in someone to supply it

was soon dispelled.1347 The Court has consistently rejected Stan-
ley’s theoretical underpinnings, upholding morality-based regula-
tion of the behavior of consenting adults.1348 Also, Stanley has been
held inapplicable to possession of child pornography in the home,
the Court determining that the state interest in protecting chil-
dren from sexual exploitation far exceeds the interest in Stanley of
protecting adults from themselves.1349 Apparently for this reason, a
state’s conclusion that punishment of mere possession is a neces-
sary or desirable means of reducing production of child pornogra-
phy will not be closely scrutinized.1350
Child Pornography.—In New York v. Ferber,1351 the Court rec-
ognized another category of expression that is outside the coverage
of the First Amendment: the visual depiction of children in films or
still photographs in a variety of sexual activities or exposures of
the genitals. The reason that such depictions may be prohibited was
the governmental interest in protecting the physical and psychologi-
cal well-being of children, whose participation in the production of
these materials would subject them to exploitation and harm. The
state may go beyond a mere prohibition of the use of children, be-
cause it is not possible to protect children adequately without pro-
hibiting the exhibition and dissemination of the materials and ad-
vertising about them. Thus, “the evil to be restricted so overwhelmingly
outweighs the expressive interests, if any, at stake, that no process
of case-by-case adjudication is required.” 1352 But, because expres-
sion is involved, the government must carefully define what con-
duct is to be prohibited and may reach only “works that visually
depict sexual conduct by children below a specified age.” 1353
1347 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65–68 (1973). Transportation
of unprotected material for private use may be prohibited, United States v. Orito,
413 U.S. 139 (1973), and the mails may be closed, United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S.
351 (1971), as may channels of international movement, United States v. Thirty-
seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363 (1971); United States v. 12 200–Ft. Reels of Film,
413 U.S. 123 (1973).
1348 Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65–70 (1973) (commercial show-
ing of obscene films to consenting adults); Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S.
560 (1991) (regulation of non-obscene, nude dancing restricted to adults).
1349 Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103 (1990).
1350 495 U.S. at 109–10.
1351 458 U.S. 747 (1982). Decision of the Court was unanimous, although there
were several limiting concurrences. Compare, e.g., 775 (Justice Brennan, arguing for
exemption of “material with serious literary, scientific, or educational value”), with
774 (Justice O’Connor, arguing that such material need not be excepted). The Court
did not pass on the question, inasmuch as the materials before it were well within
the prohibitable category. Id. at 766–74.
1352 458 U.S. at 763–64.
1353 458 U.S. at 764 (emphasis original). Child pornography need not meet Miller
obscenity standards to be unprotected by the First Amendment. Id. at 764–65.

The reach of the state may even extend to private possession of

child pornography in the home. In Osborne v. Ohio 1354 the Court
upheld a state law criminalizing the possession or viewing of child
pornography as applied to someone who possessed such materials
in his home. Distinguishing Stanley v. Georgia, the Court ruled that
Ohio’s interest in preventing exploitation of children far exceeded
what it characterized as Georgia’s “paternalistic interest” in protect-
ing the minds of adult viewers of pornography.1355 Because of the
greater importance of the state interest involved, the Court saw less
need to require states to demonstrate a strong necessity for regulat-
ing private possession as well as commercial distribution and sale.
In Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, the Court held unconstitu-
tional the federal Child Pornography Prevention Act (CPPA) to the
extent that it prohibited pictures that were not produced with ac-
tual minors.1356 Prohibited pictures included computer-generated (“vir-
tual”) child pornography, and photographs of adult actors who ap-
peared to be minors, as well as “a Renaissance painting depicting a
scene from classical mythology.” 1357 The Court observed that stat-
utes that prohibit child pornography that use real children are con-
stitutional because they target “[t]he production of the work, not
the content.” 1358 The CPPA, by contrast, targeted the content, not
the means of production. The government’s rationales for the CPPA
included that “[p]edophiles might use the materials to encourage
children to participate in sexual activity” and might “whet their own
sexual appetites” with it, “thereby increasing . . . the sexual abuse
and exploitation of actual children.” 1359 The Court found these ra-
tionales inadequate because the government “cannot constitution-
ally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person’s
private thoughts” and “may not prohibit speech because it in-
creases the chance an unlawful act will be committed ‘at some in-
definite future time.’ ” 1360 The government had also argued that the
existence of “virtual” child pornography “can make it harder to pros-
ecute pornographers who do use real minors,” because, “[a]s imag-
ing technology improves . . . , it becomes more difficult to prove that
a particular picture was produced using actual children.” 1361 This
1354 495 U.S. 103 (1990).

1355 495 U.S. at 108.
1356 535 U.S. 234 (2002).
1357 535 U.S. at 241.
1358 535 U.S. at 249; see also id. at 241.
1359 535 U.S. at 241.
1360 535 U.S. at 253.
1361 535 U.S. at 242.
rationale, the Court found, “turns the First Amendment upside down.
The Government may not suppress lawful speech as a means to sup-
press unlawful speech.” 1362
In United States v. Williams,1363 the Supreme Court upheld a
federal statute that prohibits knowingly advertising, promoting, pre-
senting, distributing, or soliciting material “in a manner that re-
flects the belief, or that is intended to cause another to believe, that
the material” is child pornography that is obscene or that depicts
an actual minor (i.e., is child pornography that is not constitution-
ally protected).1364 Under the provision, in other words, “an Inter-
net user who solicits child pornography from an undercover agent
violates the statute, even if the officer possesses no child pornogra-
phy. Likewise, a person who advertises virtual child pornography
as depicting actual children also falls within the reach of the stat-
ute.” 1365 The Court found that these activities are not constitution-
ally protected because “[o]ffers to engage in illegal transactions [as
opposed to abstract advocacy of illegality] are categorically ex-
cluded from First Amendment protection,” even “when the offeror
is mistaken about the factual predicate of his offer,” such as when
the child pornography that one offers to buy or sell does not exist
or is constitutionally protected.1366
Non-obscene But Sexually Explicit and Indecent Expres-
sion.—There is expression, consisting of words or pictures, that some
find offensive but that does not constitute obscenity and is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. Nudity portrayed in films or stills
1362 535 U.S. at 255. Following Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition, Congress en-
acted the PROTECT Act, Pub. L. 108–21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003), which, despite the
decision in that case, defined “child pornography” so as to continue to prohibit computer-
generated child pornography (but not other types of child pornography produced with-
out an actual minor). 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)(B). In United States v. Williams, 128 S.
Ct. 1830, 1836 (2008), the Court, without addressing the PROTECT Act’s new defi-
nition, cited Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coalition with approval.
1363 128 S. Ct. 1830 (2008).
1364 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(3)(B).
1365 128 S. Ct. at 1839.
1366 128 S. Ct. at 1841, 1842, 1843. Justice Souter, in a dissenting opinion joined
by Justice Ginsburg, agreed that “Congress may criminalize proposals unrelated to

any extant image,” but disagreed with respect to “proposals made with regard to
specific, existing [constitutionally protected] representations.” Id. at 1849. Justice Souter
believed that, “if the Act stands when applied to identifiable, extant [constitution-
ally protected] pornographic photographs, then in practical terms Ferber and Free
Speech Coalition fall. They are left as empty as if the Court overruled them for-
mally . . . .” Id. at 1854. Justice Scalia’s opinion for the majority replied that this
“is simply not true . . . . Simulated child pornography will be as available as ever,
so long as it is offered and sought as such, and not as real child pornography. . . .
There is no First Amendment exception from the general principle of criminal law
that a person attempting to commit a crime need not be exonerated because he has
a mistaken view of the facts.” Id. at 1844–45.
cannot be presumed obscene; 1367 nor can offensive language ordinar-

ily be punished simply because it offends someone.1368 Nonetheless,
government may regulate sexually explicit but non-obscene expres-
sion in a variety of ways. Legitimate governmental interests may
be furthered by appropriately narrow regulation, and the Court’s
view of how narrow regulation must be is apparently influenced not
only by its view of the strength of the government’s interest in regu-
lation, but also by its view of the importance of the expression it-
self. In other words, sexually explicit expression does not receive
the same degree of protection afforded purely political speech.1369
Government has a “compelling” interest in the protection of chil-
dren from seeing or hearing indecent material, but total bans appli-
cable to adults and children alike are constitutionally suspect.1370
1367 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 212–14 (1975).
1368 E.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971). Special rules apply to broad-
cast speech, which, because of its pervasive presence in the home and its accessibil-
ity to children, is accorded “the most limited First Amendment protection” of all me-
dia; non-obscene but indecent language and nudity may be curtailed, with the time
of day and other circumstances determining the extent of curtailment. FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726, 748 (1978). However, efforts by Congress and the FCC to
extend the indecency ban to 24 hours a day were rebuffed by an appeals court. Ac-
tion for Children’s Television v. FCC, 932 F.2d 1504 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (invalidating
regulations promulgated pursuant to Pub. L. 100–459, § 608), cert. denied, 503 U.S.
913 (1992). Earlier, the same court had invalidated an FCC restriction on indecent,
non-obscene broadcasts from 6 a.m. to midnight, finding that the FCC had failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to support the restraint. Action for Children’s Television
v. FCC, 852 F.2d 1332, 1335 (D.C. Cir. 1988). In 1992, however, Congress imposed a
6 a.m.-to-midnight ban on indecent programming, with a 10 p.m.-to-midnight excep-
tion for public radio and television stations that go off the air at or before midnight.
Pub. L. 102–356, § 16 (1992), 47 U.S.C. § 303 note. This time, after a three-judge
panel found the statute unconstitutional, the en banc court of appeals upheld it,
except for its 10 p.m.-to-midnight ban on indecent material on non-public stations.
Action for Children’s Television v. FCC, 58 F.3d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (en banc), cert.
denied, 516 U.S. 1043 (1996). See also “Broadcast Radio and Television,” supra.
1369 Justice Scalia, concurring in Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115,
132 (1989), suggested that there should be a “sliding scale” taking into account the
definition of obscenity: “The more narrow the understanding of what is ‘obscene,’
and hence the more pornographic what is embraced within the residual category of
‘indecency,’ the more reasonable it becomes to insist upon greater assurance of insu-
lation from minors.” Barnes v. Glen Theatre, 501 U.S. 560 (1991), upholding regula-
tion of nude dancing even in the absence of a threat to minors, may illustrate a
general willingness by the Court to apply soft rather than strict scrutiny to regula-
tion of more sexually explicit expression.
1370 See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989) (FCC’s “dial-a-porn”
rules imposing a total ban on “indecent” speech are unconstitutional, given less re-
strictive alternatives—e.g., credit cards or user IDs—of preventing access by chil-
dren). Pacifica Foundation is distinguishable, the Court reasoned, because that case
did not involve a “total ban” on broadcast, and also because there is no “captive
audience” for the “dial-it” medium, as there is for the broadcast medium. 492 U.S.
at 127–28. Similar rules apply to regulation of cable TV. In Denver Area Educa-
tional Telecommunications Consortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 755 (1996), the Court,
acknowledging that protection of children from sexually explicit programming is a
“compelling” governmental interest (but refusing to determine whether strict scru-
In Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union,1371 the Court struck down

two provisions of the Communications Decency Act of 1996 (CDA),
one of which would have prohibited use of an “interactive computer
service” to display indecent material “in a manner available to a
person under 18 years of age.” 1372 This prohibition would, in effect,
have banned indecent material from all Internet sites except those
accessible by only by adults. Although intended “to deny minors ac-
cess to potentially harmful speech . . . , [the CDA’s] burden on adult
speech,” the Court wrote, “is unacceptable if less restrictive alterna-
tives would be at least as effective . . . . [T]he Government may
not ‘reduc[e] the adult population . . . to . . . only what is fit for
children.’ ” 1373
In Reno, the Court distinguished FCC v. Pacifica Founda-
tion,1374 in which it had upheld the FCC’s restrictions on indecent
tiny applies), nonetheless struck down a requirement that cable operators segregate
and block indecent programming on leased access channels. The segregate-and-
block restrictions, which included a requirement that a request for access be in writ-
ing, and which allowed for up to 30 days’ delay in blocking or unblocking a channel,
were not sufficiently protective of adults’ speech and viewing interests to be consid-
ered either narrowly or reasonably tailored to serve the government’s compelling in-
terest in protecting children. In United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc.,
529 U.S. 803 (2000), the Supreme Court, explicitly applying strict scrutiny to a content-
based speech restriction on cable TV, struck down a federal statute designed to “shield
children from hearing or seeing images resulting from signal bleed.” Id. at 806.
The Court seems to be becoming less absolute in viewing the protection of all
minors (regardless of age) from all indecent material (regardless of its educational
value and parental approval) to be a compelling governmental interest. In striking
down the Communications Decency Act of 1996, the Court would “neither accept
nor reject the Government’s submission that the First Amendment does not forbid a
blanket prohibition on all ‘indecent’ and ‘patently offensive’ messages communicated
to a 17-year-old—no matter how much value the message may have and regardless
of parental approval. It is at least clear that the strength of the Government’s inter-
est in protecting minors is not equally strong throughout the coverage of this broad
statute.” Reno v. American Civil Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997). In Playboy
Entertainment Group, 529 U.S. at 825, the Court wrote: “Even upon the assumption
that the government has an interest in substituting itself for informed and empow-
ered parents, its interest is not sufficiently compelling to justify this widespread re-
striction on speech.” The Court also would “not discount the possibility that a graphic
image could have a negative impact on a young child” (id. at 826), thereby suggest-
ing again that it may take age into account when applying strict scrutiny.
1371 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
1372 The other provision the Court struck down would have prohibited indecent
communications, by telephone, fax, or e-mail, to minors.

1373 521 U.S. at 874–75. The Court did not address whether, if less restrictive
alternatives would not be as effective, the government would then be permitted to

reduce the adult population to only what is fit for children. Courts of appeals, how-
ever, have written that “[t]he State may not regulate at all if it turns out that even
the least restrictive means of regulation is still unreasonable when its limitations
on freedom of speech are balanced against the benefits gained from those limita-
tions.” ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 179 (3d Cir. 2000), vacated and remanded sub
nom., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002); Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC,
837 F.2d 546, 555 (2d Cir. 1988).
1374 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
radio and television broadcasts, because (1) “[t]he CDA’s broad cat-
egorical prohibitions are not limited to particular times and are not
dependent on any evaluation by an agency familiar with the unique
characteristics of the Internet,” (2) the CDA imposes criminal pen-
alties, and the Court has never decided whether indecent broad-
casts “would justify a criminal prosecution,” and (3) radio and tele-
vision, unlike the Internet, have, “as a matter of history . . . ‘received
the most limited First Amendment protection,’ . . . in large part be-
cause warnings could not adequately protect the listener from un-
expected program content. . . . [On the Internet], the risk of encoun-
tering indecent material by accident is remote because a series of
affirmative steps is required to access specific material.” 1375
After the Supreme Court struck down the CDA, Congress en-
acted the Child Online Protection Act (COPA), which banned “ma-
terial that is harmful to minors” on Web sites that have the objec-
tive of earning a profit.1376 The Third Circuit upheld a preliminary
injunction against enforcement of the statute on the ground that,
“because the standard by which COPA gauges whether material is
‘harmful to minors’ is based on identifying ‘contemporary commu-
nity standards[,]’ the inability of Web publishers to restrict access
to their Web sites based on the geographic locale of the site visitor,
in and of itself, imposes an impermissible burden on constitution-
ally protected First Amendment speech.” 1377 This is because it re-
sults in communications available to a nationwide audience being
judged by the standards of the community most likely to be of-
fended. The Supreme Court vacated and remanded, holding “that
COPA’s reliance on community standards to identify ‘material that
is harmful to minors’ does not by itself render the statute substan-
tially overbroad for purposes of the First Amendment.” 1378
Upon remand, the Third Circuit again upheld the preliminary
injunction, and the Supreme Court affirmed and remanded the case
for trial. The Supreme Court found that the district court had not
abused its discretion in granting the preliminary injunction, be-
cause the government had failed to show that proposed alterna-
tives to COPA would not be as effective in accomplishing its goal.
The primary alternative to COPA, the Court noted, is blocking and
filtering software. Filters are less restrictive than COPA because “[t]hey
impose selective restrictions on speech at the receiving end, not uni-
1375 521 U.S. at 867.
1376 “Harmful to minors” statutes ban the distribution of material to minors that
is not necessarily obscene under the Miller test. In Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S.
629, 641 (1968), the Supreme Court, applying a rational basis standard, upheld New
York’s harmful-to-minors statute.
1377 ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 166 (3d Cir. 2000).
1378 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564, 585 (2002) (emphasis in original).
versal restriction at the source.” 1379 Subsequently, the district court

found COPA to violate the First Amendment and issued a perma-
nent injunction against its enforcement; the Third Circuit affirmed,
and the Supreme Court denied certioriari.1380
In United States v. American Library Association, Inc., a four-
Justice plurality of the Supreme Court upheld the Children’s Inter-
net Protection Act (CIPA), which, as the plurality summarized it,
provides that a public school or “library may not receive federal as-
sistance to provide Internet access unless it installs software to block
images that constitute obscenity or child pornography, and to pre-
vent minors from obtaining access to material that is harmful to
them.” 1381 The plurality asked “whether libraries would violate the
First Amendment by employing the filtering software that CIPA re-
quires.” 1382 Does CIPA, in other words, effectively violate library pa-
trons’ rights? The plurality concluded that it does not, after finding
that “Internet access in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor
a ‘designated’ public forum,” and that it therefore would not be ap-
propriate to apply strict scrutiny to determine whether the filter-
ing requirements are constitutional.1383
The plurality acknowledged “the tendency of filtering software
to ‘overblock’—that is, to erroneously block access to constitution-
ally protected speech that falls outside the categories that software
users intend to block.” 1384 It found, however, that, “[a]ssuming that
such erroneous blocking presents constitutional difficulties, any such
concerns are dispelled by the ease with which patrons may have
the filtering software disabled.” 1385
The plurality also considered whether CIPA imposes an uncon-
stitutional condition on the receipt of federal assistance—in other
words, does it violate public libraries’ rights by requiring them to
1379 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004). Justice Breyer, dissenting, wrote
that blocking and filtering software is not a less restrictive alternative because “it is
part of the status quo” and “[i]t is always less restrictive to do nothing than to do
something.” Id. at 684. The majority opinion countered that Congress “may act to
encourage the use of filters,” and “[t]he need for parental cooperation does not auto-
matically disqualify a proposed less restrictive alternative.” Id. at 669.
1380 American Civil Liberties Union v. Gonzales, 478 F. Supp. 2d 775 (E.D. Pa.
2007), aff’d sub nom. American Civil Liberties Union v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 181 (3d
Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 129 S. Ct. 1032 (2009).
1381 539 U.S. 194, 199 (2003).
1382 539 U.S. at 203.
1383 539 U.S. at 205.
1384 539 U.S. at 208.
1385 539 U.S. at 209. Justice Kennedy, concurring, noted that, “[i]f some librar-
ies do not have the capacity to unblock specific Web sites or to disable the filter . . .
that would be the subject for an as-applied challenge, not the facial challenge made
in this case.” 539 U.S. at 215. Justice Souter, dissenting, noted that “the statute
says only that a library ‘may’ unblock, not that it must.” 539 U.S. at 233.
limit their freedom of speech if they accept federal funds? The plu-
rality found that, assuming that government entities have First
Amendment rights (it did not decide the question), “CIPA does not
‘penalize’ libraries that choose not to install such software, or deny
them the right to provide their patrons with unfiltered Internet ac-
cess. Rather, CIPA simply reflects Congress’s decision not to subsi-
dize their doing so.” 1386
The government may also take notice of objective conditions at-
tributable to the commercialization of sexually explicit but non-
obscene materials. Thus, the Court recognized a municipality’s au-
thority to zone land to prevent deterioration of urban areas, upholding
an ordinance providing that “adult theaters” showing motion pic-
tures that depicted “specified sexual activities” or “specified anatomi-
cal areas” could not be located within 100 feet of any two other es-
tablishments included within the ordinance or within 500 feet of a
residential area.1387 Similarly, an adult bookstore was subject to clo-
sure as a public nuisance where it was being used as a place for
prostitution and illegal sexual activities, because the closure “was
directed at unlawful conduct having nothing to do with books or
other expressive activity.” 1388 However, a city was held constitution-
ally powerless to prohibit drive-in motion picture theaters from show-
ing films containing nudity where the screen is visible from a pub-
lic street or place.1389 Also, the FCC was unable to justify a ban on
transmission of “indecent” but not obscene telephone messages.1390
The Court has held, however, that “live” productions containing
nudity may be regulated to a greater extent than may films or pub-
1386 539 U.S. at 212.
1387 Young v. American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976). Four of the five ma-
jority Justices thought the speech involved deserved less First Amendment protec-
tion than other expression, id. at 63–71, while Justice Powell, concurring, thought
the ordinance was sustainable as a measure that served valid governmental inter-
ests and only incidentally affected expression. Id. at 73. Justices Stewart, Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun dissented. Id. at 84, 88. Young was followed in City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41 (1986), upholding a city ordinance prohibiting lo-
cation of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of residential areas, churches, or parks,
and within one mile of any school. Rejecting the claim that the ordinance regulated
content of speech, the Court indicated that such time, place and manner regulations
are valid if “designed to serve a substantial governmental interest” and if “allow-
[ing] for reasonable alternative avenues of communication.” Id. at 50. The city had
a substantial interest in regulating the “undesirable secondary effects” of such busi-
nesses. And, although the suitability for adult theaters of the remaining 520 acres
within the city was disputed, the Court held that the theaters “must fend for them-
selves in the real estate market,” and are entitled only to “a reasonable opportunity
to open and operate.” Id. at 54. The Supreme Court also upheld zoning of sexually
oriented businesses in FW/PBS, Inc. v. Dallas, 493 U.S. 215 (1990), and City of Los
Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425 (2002).
1388 Arcara v. Cloud Books, 478 U.S. 697, 707 (1986).
1389 Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 204 (1975).
1390 Sable Communications of California v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
lications. Whether this represents a distinction between live perfor-

mances and other entertainment media, or whether it signals a more
permissive approach overall to governmental regulation of non-
obscene but sexually explicit material, remains to be seen. In Barnes
v. Glen Theatre, Inc.,1391 the Court upheld application of Indiana’s
public indecency statute to require that dancers in public perfor-
mances of nude, non-obscene erotic dancing wear “pasties” and a
“G-string” rather than appear totally nude. There was no opinion
of the Court, three Justices viewing the statute as a permissible
regulation of “societal order and morality,” 1392 one viewing it as a
permissible means of regulating supposed secondary effects of pros-
titution and other criminal activity,1393 and a fifth Justice seeing
no need for special First Amendment protection from a law of gen-
eral applicability directed at conduct rather than expression.1394 All
but one of the Justices agreed that nude dancing is entitled to some
First Amendment protection,1395 but the result of Barnes was a bare
minimum of protection. Numerous questions remain unanswered.
In addition to the uncertainty over applicability of Barnes to regu-
lation of the content of films or other shows in “adult” theaters,1396
there is also the issue of its applicability to nudity in operas or the-
atrical productions not normally associated with commercial exploi-
1391 501 U.S. 560 (1991).

1392 501 U.S. at 568 (Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor and
Kennedy).
1393 501 U.S. at 581 (Justice Souter).
1394 501 U.S. at 572 (Justice Scalia). The Justice thus favored application of the
same approach applied to free exercise of religion in Employment Division v. Smith,

494 U.S. 872 (1990).
1395 Earlier cases had established as much. See California v. LaRue, 409 U.S.
109, 118 (1972); Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557–58 (1975);
Doran v. Salem Inn, 422 U.S. 922, 932 (1975); Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim,
452 U.S. 61, 66 (1981); New York State Liquor Auth. v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 714, 716,
718 (1981). Presumably, then, the distinction between barroom erotic dancing, en-
titled to minimum protection, and social “ballroom” dancing, not expressive and hence
not entitled to First Amendment protection (see City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S.
19, 24 (1989)), still hangs by a few threads. Justice Souter, concurring in Barnes,
501 U.S. 560, 587 (1991), recognized the validity of the distinction between ball-
room and erotic dancing, a validity that had been questioned by a dissent in the
lower court. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1128–29 (7th Cir.
1990) (Easterbrook, J.).
1396 Although Justice Souter relied on what were essentially zoning cases (Young
v. American Mini Theatres and Renton v. Playtime Theatres) to justify regulation of

expression itself, he nonetheless pointed out that a pornographic movie featuring
one of the respondent dancers was playing nearby without interference by the au-
thorities. This suggests that, at least with respect to direct regulation of the degree
of permissible nudity, he might draw a distinction between “live” and film perfor-
mances even while acknowledging the harmful “secondary” effects associated with
both.
tation of sex.1397 But broad implications for First Amendment doc-

trine are probably unwarranted.1398 The Indiana statute was not
limited in application to barrooms; had it been, then the Twenty-
first Amendment would have afforded additional authority to regu-
late the erotic dancing.
In Erie v. Pap’s A.M.,1399 the Supreme Court again upheld the
application of a statute prohibiting public nudity to an “adult” en-
tertainment establishment. Although there was again only a plural-
ity opinion, parts of that opinion were joined by five justices. These
five adopted Justice Souter’s position in Barnes, that the statute
satisfied the O’Brien test because it was intended “to combat harm-
ful secondary effects,” such as “prostitution and other criminal ac-
tivity.” 1400 Justice Souter, however, although joining the plurality
opinion, also dissented in part. He continued to believe that second-
ary effects were an adequate justification for banning nude danc-
ing, but did not believe “that the city has made a sufficient evidentiary
showing to sustain its regulation,” and therefore would have re-
manded the case for further proceedings.1401 He acknowledged his
“mistake” in Barnes in failing to make the same demand for evi-
dence.1402
The plurality opinion found that Erie’s public nudity ban “regu-
lates conduct, and any incidental impact on the expressive element
1397 The Court has not ruled directly on such issues. See Southeastern Promo-
tions v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (invalidating the denial of use of a public audi-
torium for a production of the musical “Hair,” in the absence of procedural safe-
guards that must accompany a system of prior restraint). Presumably the Barnes
plurality’s public-morality rationale would apply equally to the “adult” stage and to
the operatic theater, while Justice Souter’s secondary effects rationale would not.
But the plurality ducked this issue, reinterpreting the lower court record to deny
that Indiana had distinguished between “adult” and theatrical productions. 501 U.S.
at 564 n.1 (Chief Justice Rehnquist); id. at 574 n.2 (Justice Scalia). On the other
hand, the fact that the state authorities disclaimed any intent to apply the statute
to theatrical productions demonstrated to dissenting Justice White (who was joined
by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens) that the statute was not a general
prohibition on public nudity, but instead was targeted at “the communicative aspect
of the erotic dance.” Id. at 591.
1398 The Court had only recently affirmed that music is entitled to First Amend-
ment protection independently of the message conveyed by any lyrics (Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989)), so it seems implausible that the Court was
signaling a narrowing of protection to only ideas and opinions. Rather, the Court
seems willing to give government the benefit of the doubt when it comes to legiti-
mate objectives in regulating expressive conduct that is sexually explicit. For an ex-
tensive discourse on the expressive aspects of dance and the arts in general, and
the striptease in particular, see Judge Posner’s concurring opinion in the lower court’s
disposition of Barnes. Miller v. Civil City of South Bend, 904 F.2d 1081, 1089 (7th
Cir. 1990).
1399 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
1400 529 U.S. at 292, 291.
1401 529 U.S. 310–311.
1402 529 U.S. at 316.
of nude dancing is de minimis,” because Erie allowed dancers to

perform wearing only pasties and G-strings.1403 It may follow that
“requiring dancers to wear pasties and G-strings may not greatly
reduce . . . secondary effects, but O’Brien requires only that the regu-
lation further the interest of combating such effects,” not that it
further it to a particular extent.1404 The plurality opinion did not
address the question of whether statutes prohibiting public nudity
could be applied to serious theater, but its reliance on secondary
effects suggests that they could not.
Speech Plus—The Constitutional Law of Leafleting,

Picketing, and Demonstrating
Communication of political, economic, social, and other views is
not accomplished solely by face-to-face speech, broadcast speech, or
writing in newspapers, periodicals, and pamphlets. There is also “ex-
pressive conduct,” which includes picketing and marching, distribu-
tion of leaflets and pamphlets, addresses to publicly assembled au-
diences, door-to-door solicitation, and sit-ins. There is also a class
of conduct, now only vaguely defined, that has been denominated
“symbolic conduct,” which includes such actions as flag desecration
and draft-card burnings. Because all these ways of expressing one-
self involve conduct rather than mere speech, they are all much more
subject to regulation and restriction than is simple speech. Some of
them may be forbidden altogether. But, to the degree that these
actions are intended to communicate a point of view, the First Amend-
ment is relevant and protects some of them to a great extent. Sort-
ing out the conflicting lines of principle and doctrine is the point of
this section.
The Public Forum.—In 1895, while on the highest court of Mas-
sachusetts, future Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes rejected a conten-
tion that public property was by right open to the public as a place
where the right of speech could be recognized,1405 and on review
1403 529 U.S. at 301. The plurality said that, though nude dancing is “expres-
sive conduct,” we think that it falls “only within the outer ambit of the First Amend-
ment’s protection.” Id. at 289. The opinion also quotes Justice Stevens to the same
effect with regard to erotic materials generally. Id. at 294. In United States v. Play-
boy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 826 (2000), however, the Court wrote
that it “cannot be influenced . . . by the perception that the regulation in question
is not a major one because the speech [‘signal bleed’ of sexually oriented cable pro-
gramming] is not very important.”
1404 529 U.S. at 301.
1405 Commonwealth v. Davis, 162 Mass. 510, 511 (1895). “For the Legislature
absolutely or conditionally to forbid public speaking in a highway or public park is

no more an infringement of rights of a member of the public than for the owner of a
private house to forbid it in the house.”
the United States Supreme Court endorsed Holmes’ view.1406 Years

later, beginning with Hague v. CIO,1407 the Court reconsidered the
issue. Justice Roberts wrote in Hague: “Wherever the title of streets
and parks may rest, they have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used for
purposes of assembly, communicating thoughts between citizens, and
discussing public questions. Such use of the streets and public places
has from ancient times, been a part of the privileges, immunities,
rights, and liberties of citizens.” Although this opinion was not it-
self joined by a majority of the Justices, the Court subsequently en-
dorsed the view in several opinions.1408
The Roberts view was called into question in the 1960s, how-
ever, when the Court seemed to leave the issue open,1409 and when
a majority endorsed an opinion by Justice Black asserting his own
narrower view of speech rights in public places.1410 Later decisions
restated and quoted the Roberts language from Hague, and that is
now the position of the Court.1411 Public streets and parks,1412 in-
cluding those adjacent to courthouses 1413 and foreign embas-
1406 Davis v. Massachusetts, 167 U.S. 43, 48 (1897).

1407 307 U.S. 496 (1939). Only Justice Black joined the Roberts opinion, but only
Justices McReynolds and Butler dissented from the result.
1408 E.g., Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939); Kunz v. New
York, 340 U.S. 290, 293 (1951).

1409 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965). For analysis of this case in the
broader context, see Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965
SUP. CT. REV. 1.
1410 Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966). See id. at 47–48; Cox v. Louisiana,
379 U.S. 559, 578 (1965) (Justice Black concurring in part and dissenting in part);
Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413, 416 (1943) (Justice Black for the Court).
1411 E.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147, 152 (1969); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 460
(1980).
1412 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Shuttlesworth v. City of Birming-
ham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971); Grayned
v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 835–36 (1976);
Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
1413 Narrowly drawn statutes that serve the state’s interests in security and in
preventing obstruction of justice and influencing of judicial officers are constitu-

tional. Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559 (1965). A restriction on carrying signs or plac-
ards on the grounds of the Supreme Court is unconstitutional as applied to the pub-
lic sidewalks surrounding the Court, since it does not sufficiently further the
governmental purposes of protecting the building and grounds, maintaining proper
order, or insulating the judicial decisionmaking process from lobbying. United States
v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983).
sies,1414 as well as public libraries 1415 and the grounds of legisla-

tive bodies,1416 are open to public demonstrations, although the uses
to which public areas are dedicated may shape the range of permis-
sible expression and conduct that may occur there.1417 Moreover, not
all public properties are public forums. “[T]he First Amendment does
not guarantee access to property simply because it is owned or con-
trolled by the government.” 1418 “The crucial question is whether the
manner of expression is basically compatible with the normal activ-
ity of a particular place at a particular time.” 1419 Thus, by the na-
ture of the use to which the property is put or by tradition, some
sites are simply not as open for expression as streets and parks
are.1420 But if government does open non-traditional forums for ex-
pressive activities, it may not discriminate on the basis of content
1414 In Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (1988), the Court struck down as content-
based a District of Columbia law prohibiting the display of any sign within 500 feet
of a foreign embassy if the sign tends to bring the foreign government into “public
odium” or “public disrepute.” However, another aspect of the District’s law, making
it unlawful for three or more persons to congregate within 500 feet of an embassy
and refuse to obey a police dispersal order, was upheld; under a narrowing construc-
tion, the law had been held applicable only to congregations directed at an embassy,
and reasonably believed to present a threat to the peace or security of the embassy.
1415 Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (sit-in in library reading room).
1416 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Jeanette Rankin Brigade
v. Capitol Police Chief, 342 F. Supp. 575 (D.C. 1972) (three-judge court), aff’d, 409
U.S. 972 (1972) (voiding statute prohibiting parades and demonstrations on United
States Capitol grounds).
1417 E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972) (sustaining ordi-
nance prohibiting noisemaking adjacent to school if that noise disturbs or threatens

to disturb the operation of the school); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966) (si-
lent vigil in public library protected while noisy and disruptive demonstration would
not be); Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wear-
ing of black armbands as protest protected but not if it results in disruption of school);
Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968) (preservation of access to courthouse); Frisby
v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988) (ordinance prohibiting picketing “before or about”
any residence or dwelling, narrowly construed as prohibiting only picketing that tar-
gets a particular residence, upheld as furthering significant governmental interest
in protecting the privacy of the home).
1418 United States Postal Serv. v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Assn’s, 453 U.S.
114 (1981).
1419 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 116 (1972).
1420 E.g., Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (jails); Lehman v. City of Shaker
Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (advertising space in city rapid transit cars); Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (military bases); United States Postal Service v. Council
of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns, 453 U.S. 114 (1981) (private mail boxes); Perry Educ.
Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (interschool mail system);
ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) (publicly owned airport terminal).
or viewpoint in according access.1421 The Court, however, remains

divided with respect to the reach of the public forum doctrine.1422
Speech in public forums is subject to time, place, and manner
regulations that take into account such matters as control of traffic
in the streets, the scheduling of two meetings or demonstrations at
the same time and place, the preventing of blockages of building
entrances, and the like.1423 Such regulations are closely scrutinized
in order to protect free expression, and, to be valid, must be justi-
fied without reference to the content or subject matter of speech,1424
must serve a significant governmental interest,1425 and must leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the informa-
tion.1426 The Court has written that a time, place, or manner regu-
lation “must be narrowly tailored to serve the government’s legiti-
mate, content-neutral interests but that it need not be the least
restrictive or least intrusive means of doing so. Rather, the require-
ment of narrow tailoring is satisfied . . . [s]o long as the means cho-
sen are not substantially broader than necessary to achieve the gov-
ernment’s interest . . . .” 1427 A content-neutral time, place, and manner
regulation of the use of a public forum must also “contain adequate
standards to guide the official’s decision and render it subject to ef-
fective judicial review.” 1428 Unlike a content-based licensing scheme,
1421 E.g., Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546 (1975) (munici-
pal theater); Madison School District v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167 (1976) (school board
meeting); Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640 (1981) (state fair grounds); Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university meeting facilities).
1422 Compare United States Postal Service v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Ass’ns,
454 U.S. 114, 128–31 (1981), with id. at 136–40 (Justice Brennan concurring), and
142 (Justice Marshall dissenting). For evidence of continuing division, compare ISKCON
v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992) with id. at 693 (Justice Kennedy concurring).
1423 See, e.g., Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 647–50 (1981), and id. at 656
(Justice Brennan concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating law and discuss-
ing cases); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288 (1984) (pro-
hibition of sleep-in demonstration in area of park not designated for overnight camp-
ing).
1424 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosle, 408 U.S. 92 (1972); Madison School District
v. WERC, 429 U.S. 167 (1976); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980); Widmar v. Vin-
cent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981). In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974),
a divided Court permitted the city to sell commercial advertising space on the walls
of its rapid transit cars but to refuse to sell political advertising space.
1425 E.g., the governmental interest in safety and convenience of persons using
public forum, Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 650 (1981); the interest in preserva-
tion of a learning atmosphere in school, Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104,
115 (1972); and the interest in protecting traffic and pedestrian safety in the streets,
Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554–55 (1965); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290,
293–94 (1951); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515–16 (1939).
1426 Heffron v. ISKCON, 452 U.S. 640, 654–55 (1981); Consolidated Edison Co.
v. PSC, 447 U.S. 530, 535 (1980).

1427 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 798–99, 800 (1989).
1428 Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 323 (2002).
however, it need not “adhere to the procedural requirements set forth

in Freedman.” 1429 These requirements include that the “burden of
proving that the film [or other speech] is unprotected expression
must rest on the censor,” and that the censor must, “within a speci-
fied brief period, either issue a license or go to court to restrain
showing the film. Any restraint imposed in advance of a final judi-
cial determination on the merits must similarly be limited to pres-
ervation of the status quo for the shortest fixed period compatible
with sound judicial resolution.” 1430
A corollary to the rule forbidding regulation based on content
is the principle—a merging of free expression and equal protection
standards—that government may not discriminate between differ-
ent kinds of messages in affording access.1431 In order to ensure against
covert forms of discrimination against expression and between dif-
ferent kinds of content, the Court has insisted that licensing sys-
tems be constructed as free as possible of the opportunity for arbi-
trary administration.1432 The Court has also applied its general
1429 534 U.S. at 322, citing Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965). See Na-
tional Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977).

1430 Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58–59 (1965).
1431 Police Dep’t of Chicago v. Mosle, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) (ordinance void that
barred all picketing around school building except labor picketing); Carey v. Brown,
447 U.S. 455 (1980) (same); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (striking down
college rule permitting access to all student organizations except religious groups);
Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268 (1951) (striking down denial of permission to
use parks for some groups but not for others); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S.
377 (1992) (striking down ordinance that prohibited symbols, such as burning crosses,
that constituted fighting words that insult on the basis of some factors, such as race,
but not on the basis of other factors). These principles apply only to the traditional
public forum and to the governmentally created “limited public forum.” Government
may, without creating a limited public forum, place “reasonable” restrictions on ac-
cess to nonpublic areas. See, e.g., Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n,
460 U.S. 37, 48 (1983) (use of school mail system); and Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense and Educational Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985) (charitable solicitation of fed-
eral employees at workplace). See also Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974) (city may sell commercial advertising space on the walls of its rapid tran-
sit cars but refuse to sell political advertising space); Capitol Square Review Bd. v.
Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (denial of permission to Ku Klux Klan, allegedly in
order to avoid Establishment Clause violation, to place a cross in plaza on grounds
of state capitol); Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819 (1995) (Univer-
sity’s subsidy for printing costs of student publications, available for student “news,
information, opinion, entertainment, or academic communications,” could not be with-
held because of the religious content of a student publication); Lamb’s Chapel v. Cen-
ter Moriches School Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993) (school district rule prohibiting after-
hours use of school property for showing of a film presenting a religious perspective
on child-rearing and family values, but allowing after-hours use for non-religious
social, civic, and recreational purposes).
1432 E.g., Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939); Schneider v. Town of Irvington,
308 U.S. 147, 164 (1939); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Poulos v.
New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313, 321–25
(1958); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555–58 (1965); Shuttlesworth v. City of Bir-
strictures against prior restraints in the contexts of permit sys-

tems and judicial restraint of expression.1433
It appears that government may not deny access to the public
forum for demonstrators on the ground that the past meetings of
these demonstrators resulted in violence,1434 and may not vary a
demonstration licensing fee based on an estimate of the amount of
hostility likely to be engendered,1435 but the Court’s position with
regard to the “heckler’s veto,” the governmental termination of a
speech or demonstration because of hostile crowd reaction, remains
unclear.1436
mingham, 394 U.S. 147, 150–53 (1969). Justice Stewart for the Court described these
and other cases as “holding that a law subjecting the exercise of First Amendment
freedoms to the prior restraint of a license without narrow, objective, and definite
standards to guide the licensing authority is unconstitutional.” Id. at 150–51. A per-
son faced with an unconstitutional licensing law may ignore it, engage in the de-
sired conduct, and challenge the constitutionality of the permit system upon a sub-
sequent prosecution for violating it. Id. at 151; Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 602
(1942) (Chief Justice Stone dissenting), adopted per curiam on rehearing, 319 U.S.
103 (1943). See also City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., 486 U.S. 750
(1988) (upholding facial challenge to ordinance vesting in the mayor unbridled dis-
cretion to grant or deny annual permit for location of newsracks on public prop-
erty); Riley v. National Fed’n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781 (1988) (invalidating as per-
mitting “delay without limit” licensing requirement for professional fundraisers); Forsyth
County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992). But see Walker v. City of Bir-
mingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967) (same rule not applicable to injunctions).
1433 In Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), the Court re-
affirmed the holdings of the earlier cases, and, additionally, both Justice Stewart,
for the Court, id. at 155 n.4, and Justice Harlan concurring, id. at 162–64, asserted
that the principles of Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), governing systems
of prior censorship of motion pictures, were relevant to permit systems for parades
and demonstrations. The Court also voided an injunction against a protest meeting
that was issued ex parte, without notice to the protestors and with, of course, no
opportunity for them to rebut the representations of the seekers of the injunction.
Carroll v. President and Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
1434 The only precedent is Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951). The holding
was on a much narrower basis, but in dictum the Court said: “The court below has
mistakenly derived support for its conclusions from the evidence produced at the
trial that appellant’s religious meetings had, in the past, caused some disorder. There
are appropriate public remedies to protect the peace and order of the community if
appellant’s speeches should result in disorder and violence.” Id. at 294. A different
rule applies to labor picketing. See Milk Wagon Drivers Local 753 v. Meadowmoor
Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941) (background of violence supports prohibition of all peace-
ful picketing). The military may ban a civilian, previously convicted of destroying
government property, from reentering a military base, and may apply the ban to
prohibit the civilian from reentering the base for purposes of peaceful demonstra-
tion during an Armed Forces Day “open house.” United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S.
675 (1985).
1435 Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123 (1992) (a fee based
on anticipated crowd response necessarily involves examination of the content of the

speech, and is invalid as a content regulation).
1436 Dicta indicate that a hostile reaction will not justify suppression of speech,
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 502 (1939); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965);
Bachellar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970), and one holding appears to point
this way. Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969). Yet the Court upheld a
The Court has defined three categories of public property for

public forum analysis. First, there is the traditional public forum—
places such as streets and parks that have traditionally been used
for public assembly and debate, where the government may not pro-
hibit all communicative activity and must justify content-neutral time,
place, and manner restrictions as narrowly tailored to serve a legiti-
mate interest.1437 Second, there is the designated public forum, where
the government opens property for communicative activity and thereby
creates a public forum. Such a forum may be limited—hence the
expression “limited public forum”—for “use by certain groups, e.g.,
Widmar v. Vincent (student groups), or for discussion of certain sub-
jects, e.g., City of Madison Joint School District v. Wisconsin PERC
(school board business),” 1438 but, within the framework of such le-
gitimate limitations, “a content-based prohibition must be nar-
rowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state interest.” 1439 Third,
with respect to “[p]ublic property which is not by tradition or desig-
nation a forum for public communication,” the government “may re-
serve the forum for its intended purposes, communicative or other-
wise, as long as the regulation on [sic] speech is reasonable and
not an effort to suppress expression merely because public officials
oppose the speaker’s view.” 1440 The distinction between the first and
second categories, on the one hand, and third category, on the other,
can therefore determine the outcome of a case, because speakers
breach of the peace conviction of a speaker who refused to cease speaking upon the
demand of police who feared imminent violence. Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315
(1951). In Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 273 (1951) (concurring opinion), Jus-
tice Frankfurter wrote: “It is not a constitutional principle that, in acting to pre-
serve order, the police must proceed against the crowd whatever its size and temper
and not against the speaker.”
1437 “[A]lthough a park is a traditional public forum for speeches and other tran-
sitory expressive acts, the display of a permanent monument in a public park is not
a form of expression to which forum analysis applies. Instead, the placement of a
permanent monument in a public park is best viewed as a form of government speech
and is therefore not subject to scrutiny under the Free Speech Clause.” Pleasant
Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 129 S. Ct. 1125, 1129 (2009).
1438 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 45, 46 n.7
(1983).
1439 460 U.S. at 46.
1440 460 U.S. at 46. Candidate debates on public television are an example of
this third category of public property: the “nonpublic forum.” Arkansas Educational
Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679 (1998). “Although public broadcast-
ing as a general matter does not lend itself to scrutiny under the forum doctrine
[i.e., public broadcasters ordinarily are entitled to the editorial discretion to engage
in viewpoint discrimination], candidate debates present the narrow exception to this
rule.” Id. at 675. A public broadcaster, therefore, may not engage in viewpoint dis-
crimination in granting or denying access to candidates. Under the third type of
forum analysis, however, it may restrict candidate access for “a reasonable, viewpoint-
neutral” reason, such as a candidate’s “objective lack of support.” Id. at 683.
may be excluded from the first and second categories only for a “com-
pelling” governmental interest, whereas exclusion from the third cat-
egory need only be “reasonable.”
The Court held that a school system did not create a limited
public forum by opening an interschool mail system to use by se-
lected civic groups “that engage in activities of interest and educa-
tional relevance to students,” and that, in any event, if a limited
public forum had thereby been created a teachers union rivaling
the exclusive bargaining representative could still be excluded as
not being “of a similar character” to the civic groups.1441 Less prob-
lematic was the Court’s conclusion that utility poles and other mu-
nicipal property did not constitute a public forum for the posting of
signs.1442 More problematic was the Court’s conclusion that the Com-
bined Federal Campaign, the Federal Government’s forum for coor-
dinated charitable solicitation of federal employees, is not a limited
public forum. Exclusion of various advocacy groups from participa-
tion in the Campaign was upheld as furthering “reasonable” govern-
mental interests in offering a forum to “traditional health and wel-
fare charities,” avoiding the appearance of governmental favoritism
of particular groups or viewpoints, and avoiding disruption of the
federal workplace by controversy.1443 The Court pinpointed the gov-
ernment’s intention as the key to whether a public forum has been
created: “The government does not create a public forum by inac-
tion or by permitting limited discourse, but only by intentionally
opening a non-traditional forum for public discourse.” 1444 Under this
categorical approach, the government has wide discretion in main-
1441 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983). This
was a 5–4 decision, with Justice White’s opinion of the Court being joined by Chief
Justice Burger and by Justices Blackmun, Rehnquist, and O’Connor, and with Jus-
tice Brennan’s dissent being joined by Justices Marshall, Powell, and Stevens. See
also Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (student newspaper
published as part of journalism class is not a public forum).
1442 City Council v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789 (1984) (upholding an
outright ban on use of utility poles for signs). The Court noted that “it is of limited
utility in the context of this case to focus on whether the tangible property itself
should be deemed a public forum.” Id. at 815 n.32.
1443 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, 473 U.S. 788 (1985).
The precedential value of Cornelius may be subject to question, because it was de-
cided by 4–3 vote, the non-participating Justices (Marshall and Powell) having dis-
sented in Perry. Justice O’Connor wrote the opinion of the Court, joined by Chief
Justice Burger and by Justices White and Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justice Brennan, dissented, and Justice Stevens dissented separately.
1444 473 U.S. at 802. Justice Blackmun criticized “the Court’s circular reasoning
that the CFC is not a limited public forum because the Government intended to
limit the forum to a particular class of speakers.” Id. at 813–14.
taining the nonpublic character of its forums, and may regulate in

ways that would be impermissible were it to designate a limited
public forum.1445
Application of the doctrine continues to create difficulty. A ma-
jority of Justices could not agree on the public forum status of a
sidewalk located entirely on Postal Service property.1446 The Court
was also divided over whether nonsecured areas of an airport ter-
minal, including shops and restaurants, constituted a public fo-
rum. Holding that the terminal was not a public forum, the Court
upheld restrictions on the solicitation and receipt of funds.1447 But
the Court also invalidated a ban on the sale or distribution of lit-
erature to passers-by within the same terminal, four Justices believ-
ing that the terminal constituted a public forum, and Justice
O’Connor 1448 contending that the multipurpose nature of the fo-
rum (shopping mall as well as airport) made restrictions on expres-
sion less “reasonable.” 1449
In United States v. American Library Association, Inc., a four-
Justice plurality of the Supreme Court found that “Internet access
in public libraries is neither a ‘traditional’ nor a ‘designated’ public
forum.” 1450 The plurality therefore did not apply “strict scrutiny”
in upholding the Children’s Internet Protection Act, which, as the
plurality summarized it, provides that a public school or “library
may not receive federal assistance to provide Internet access un-
less it installs software to block images that constitute obscenity or
child pornography, and to prevent minors from obtaining access to
material that is harmful to them.” 1451 The plurality found that In-
ternet access in public libraries is not a “traditional” public forum
because “[w]e have ‘rejected the view that traditional public forum
status extends beyond its historical confines.’ ” 1452 And Internet ac-
cess at public libraries is not a “designated” public forum because
“[a] public library does not acquire Internet terminals in order to
1445 Justice Kennedy criticized this approach in ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
695 (1992) (concurring), contending that recognition of government’s authority to des-

ignate the forum status of property ignores the nature of the First Amendment as
“a limitation on government, not a grant of power.” Justice Brennan voiced similar
misgivings in his dissent in United States v. Kokinda: “public forum categories—
originally conceived of as a way of preserving First Amendment rights—have been
used . . . as a means of upholding restrictions on speech.” 497 U.S. at 741 (empha-
sis in original) (citation omitted).
1446 United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720 (1990) (upholding a ban on solicita-
tion on the sidewalk).

1447 ISKCON v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672 (1992).
1448 505 U.S. at 690.
1449 Lee v. ISKCON, 505 U.S. 830 (1992) (per curiam).
1450 539 U.S. 194, 205 (2003).
1451 539 U.S. at 199.
1452 539 U.S. at 206.
create a public forum for Web publishers to express themselves, any

more than it collects books in order to provide a public forum for
the authors of books to speak. It provides Internet access, not to
‘encourage a diversity of views from private speakers,’ but for the
same reasons it offers other library resources: to facilitate re-
search, learning, and recreational pursuits by furnishing materials
of requisite and appropriate quality.” 1453
Nevertheless, although Internet access in public libraries is not
a public forum, and particular Web sites, like particular newspa-
pers, would not constitute public forums, the Internet as a whole
might be viewed as a public forum, despite its lack of a historic
tradition. The Supreme Court has not explicitly held that the Inter-
net as a whole is a public forum, but, in Reno v. ACLU, which struck
down a prohibition in the Communications Decency Act of 1996 on
“indecent” material on the Internet, the Court noted that the Inter-
net “constitutes a vast platform from which to address and hear
from a worldwide audience of millions of readers, viewers, research-
ers, and buyers. Any person or organization with a computer con-
nected to the Internet can ‘publish’ information.” 1454
Quasi-Public Places.—The First Amendment precludes gov-
ernment restraint of expression and it does not require individuals
to turn over their homes, businesses, or other property to those wish-
ing to communicate about a particular topic.1455 But it may be that

1454 521 U.S. at 853. A federal court of appeals wrote: “Aspects of cyberspace
may, in fact, fit into the public forum category, although the Supreme Court has
also suggested that the category is limited by tradition. Compare Forbes, 523 U.S.
at 679 (‘reject[ing] the view that traditional public forum status extends beyond its
historic confines’ [to a public television station]) with Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844,
851–53 (1997) (recognizing the communicative potential of the Internet, specifically
the World Wide Web).” Putnam Pit, Inc. v. City of Cookeville, 221 F.3d 834, 843 (6th
Cir. 2000) (alternate citations to Forbes and Reno omitted). In Putnam Pit, the city
denied a private Web site’s request that the city’s Web site establish a hyperlink to
it, even though the city’s Web site had established hyperlinks to other private Web
sites. The court of appeals found that the city’s Web site was a nonpublic forum, but
that even nonpublic forums must be viewpoint neutral, so it remanded the case for
trial on the question of whether the city’s denial of a hyperlink had discriminated
on the basis of viewpoint.
1455 In Garner v. Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185, 201–07 (1961), Justice Harlan,
concurring, would have reversed breach of the peace convictions of “sit-in” demon-
strators who conducted their sit-in at lunch counters of department stores. He as-
serted that the protesters were sitting at the lunch counters where they knew they
would not be served in order to demonstrate that segregation at such counters ex-
isted. “Such a demonstration . . . is as much a part of the ‘free trade in ideas’ . . .
as is verbal expression, more commonly thought of as ‘speech.’ ” Conviction for breach
of peace was void in the absence of a clear and present danger of disorder. The Jus-
tice would not, however protect “demonstrations conducted on private property over
the objection of the owner . . . , just as it would surely not encompass verbal expres-
sion in a private home if the owner has not consented.” He had read the record to
in some instances private property is so functionally akin to public

property that private owners may not forbid expression upon it. In
Marsh v. Alabama,1456 the Court held that the private owner of a
company town could not forbid distribution of religious materials
by a Jehovah’s Witness on a street in the town’s business district.
The town, wholly owned by a private corporation, had all the attri-
butes of any American municipality, aside from its ownership, and
was functionally like any other town. In those circumstances, the
Court reasoned, “the more an owner, for his advantage, opens up
his property for use by the public in general, the more do his rights
become circumscribed by the statutory and constitutional rights of
those who use it.” 1457 This precedent lay unused for some twenty
years until the Court first indicated a substantial expansion of it,
and then withdrew to a narrow interpretation.
First, in Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza,1458 the
Court held constitutionally protected the picketing of a store lo-
cated in a shopping center by a union objecting to the store’s em-
ployment of nonunion labor. Finding that the shopping center was
the functional equivalent of the business district involved in Marsh,
the Court announced there was “no reason why access to a busi-
ness district in a company town for the purpose of exercising First
Amendment rights should be constitutionally required, while ac-
cess for the same purpose to property functioning as a business dis-
trict should be limited simply because the property surrounding the
‘business district’ is not under the same ownership.” 1459 “[T]he State,”
said Justice Marshall, “may not delegate the power, through the use
of its trespass laws, wholly to exclude those members of the public
wishing to exercise their First Amendment rights on the premises
in a manner and for a purpose generally consonant with the use to
which the property is actually put.” 1460 The Court observed that it
would have been hazardous to attempt to distribute literature at
the entrances to the center and it reserved for future decision “whether
respondents’ property rights could, consistently with the First Amend-
indicate that the demonstrators were invitees in the stores and that they had never
been asked to leave by the owners or managers. See also Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S.
474 (1988) (government may protect residential privacy by prohibiting altogether pick-
eting that targets a single residence).
1456 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
1457 326 U.S. at 506.
1458 Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308
(1968).
1459 391 U.S. at 319. Justices Black, Harlan, and White dissented. Id. at 327,
333, 337.
1460 391 U.S. at 319–20.
ment, justify a bar on picketing which was not thus directly re-
lated in its purpose to the use to which the shopping center prop-
erty was being put.” 1461
Four years later, the Court answered the reserved question in
the negative.1462 Several members of an antiwar group had at-
tempted to distribute leaflets on the mall of a large shopping cen-
ter, calling on the public to attend a protest meeting. Center guards
invoked a trespass law against them, and the Court held that they
could rightfully be excluded. The center had not dedicated its prop-
erty to a public use, the Court said; rather, it had invited the pub-
lic in specifically to carry on business with those stores located in
the center. Plaintiffs’ leafleting, not directed to any store or to the
customers qua customers of any of the stores, was unrelated to any
activity in the center. Unlike the situation in Logan Valley Plaza,
there were reasonable alternatives by which plaintiffs could reach
those who used the center. Thus, in the absence of a relationship
between the purpose of the expressive activity and the business of
the shopping center, the property rights of the center owner will
overbalance the expressive rights to persons who would use their
property to communicate.
Then, the Court formally overruled Logan Valley Plaza, hold-
ing that shopping centers are not functionally equivalent to the com-
pany town involved in Marsh.1463 Suburban malls may be the “new
town squares” in the view of sociologists, but they are private prop-
erty in the eye of the law. The ruling came in a case in which a
union of employees engaged in an economic strike against one store
in a shopping center was barred from picketing the store within
the mall. The rights of employees in such a situation are generally
to be governed by federal labor laws 1464 rather than the First Amend-
ment, although there is also the possibility that state constitu-
tional provisions may be interpreted more expansively by state courts
to protect some kinds of public issue picketing in shopping centers
and similar places.1465 Henceforth, only when private property “ ‘has
1461 391 U.S. at 320 n.9.

1462 Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972).
1463 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507 (1976). Justice Stewart’s opinion for the
Court asserted that Logan Valley had in fact been overruled by Lloyd Corp., 424
U.S. at 517–18, but Justice Powell, the author of the Lloyd Corp. opinion, did not
believe that to be the case, id. at 523.
1464 But see Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Carpenters, 436 U.S. U.S. 180 (1978).
1465 In PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980), the Court held
that a state court interpretation of the state constitution to protect picketing in a

privately owned shopping center did not deny the property owner any federal consti-
tutional rights. But cf. Pacific Gas & Elec. v. Public Utilities Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1
taken on all the attributes of a town’ ” is it to be treated as a pub-

lic forum.1466
Picketing and Boycotts by Labor Unions.—Though “logi-
cally relevant” to what might be called “public issue” picketing, the
cases dealing with application of economic pressures by labor unions
are set apart by different “economic and social interests,” 1467 and
consequently are dealt with separately here.
It was in a labor case that the Court first held picketing to be
entitled to First Amendment protection.1468 Striking down a flat pro-
hibition on picketing to influence or induce someone to do some-
thing, the Court said: “In the circumstances of our times the dis-
semination of information concerning the facts of a labor dispute
must be regarded as within that area of free discussion that is guar-
anteed by the Constitution. . . .” 1469 The Court further reasoned that
“the group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanc-
tions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public inter-
est merely on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded to
take action inconsistent with its interests. Abridgment of the lib-
erty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear danger
of substantive evils arises under circumstances affording no oppor-
tunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance in
the market of public opinion.” 1470
The Court soon recognized several caveats. Peaceful picketing
may be enjoined if it is associated with violence and intimida-
tion.1471 Although initially the Court continued to find picketing pro-
tected in the absence of violence,1472 it soon decided a series of cases
recognizing a potentially far-reaching exception: injunctions against
peaceful picketing in the course of a labor controversy may be en-
joined when such picketing is counter to valid state policies in a
(1986), holding that a state may not require a privately owned utility company to
include in its billing envelopes views of a consumer group with which it disagrees, a
majority of Justices distinguishing PruneYard as not involving such forced associa-
tion with others’ beliefs.
1466 Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 516–17 (1976) (quoting Justice Black’s dis-
sent in Logan Valley Plaza, 391 U.S. 308, 332–33 (1968)).

1467 Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268, 276 (1951).
1468 Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). Picketing as an aspect of commu-
nication was recognized in Senn v. Tile Layers Union, 301 U.S. 468 (1937).
1469 310 U.S. at 102.
1470 310 U.S. at 104–05. See also Carlson v. California, 310 U.S. 106 (1940). In
AFL v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), the Court held unconstitutional an injunction
against peaceful picketing based on a state’s common-law policy against picketing
in the absence of an immediate dispute between employer and employee.
1471 Milk Wagon Drivers Union v. Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
1472 Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942); Carpenters &
Joiners Union v. Ritter’s Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942); Cafeteria Employees Union v.
Angelos, 320 U.S. 293 (1943).
domain open to state regulation.1473 These cases proceeded upon a

distinction drawn by Justice Douglas. “Picketing by an organized
group is more than free speech, since it involves patrol of a particu-
lar locality and since the very presence of a picket line may induce
action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of
the ideas which are being disseminated. Hence those aspects of pick-
eting make it the subject of restrictive regulations.” 1474 The appar-
ent culmination of this course of decision was the Vogt case, in which
Justice Frankfurter broadly rationalized all the cases and derived
the rule that “a State, in enforcing some public policy, whether of
its criminal or its civil law, and whether announced by its legisla-
ture or its courts, could constitutionally enjoin peaceful picketing
aimed at preventing effectuation of that policy.” 1475 Although the
Court has not disavowed this broad language, the Vogt exception
has apparently not swallowed the entire Thornhill rule.1476 The Court
has indicated that “a broad ban against peaceful picketing might
collide with the guarantees of the First Amendment.” 1477
Public Issue Picketing and Parading.—The early cases held
that picketing and parading were forms of expression entitled to
some First Amendment protection.1478 Those early cases did not, how-
ever, explicate the difference in application of First Amendment prin-
1473 Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949) (upholding on
basis of state policy forbidding agreements in restraint of trade an injunction against

picketing to persuade business owner not to deal with non-union peddlers); Interna-
tional Bhd. of Teamsters v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950) (upholding injunction against
union picketing protesting non-union proprietor’s failure to maintain union shop card
and observe union’s limitation on weekend business hours); Building Service Emp.
Intern. Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950) (injunction against picketing to per-
suade innkeeper to sign contract that would force employees to join union in viola-
tion of state policy that employees’ choice not be coerced); Local 10, United Ass’n of
Journeymen Plumbers v. Graham, 345 U.S. 192 (1953) (injunction against picketing
in conflict with state’s right-to-work statute).
1474 Bakery & Pastry Drivers Local v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769, 776–77 (1942) (con-
curring opinion).
1475 International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Vogt, 354 U.S. 284, 293 (1957). See also
American Radio Ass’n v. Mobile Steamship Ass’n, 419 U.S. 215, 228–32 (1974); NLRB
v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607 (1980); International Longshoremens’ Ass’n
v. Allied International, 456 U.S. 212, 226–27 (1982).
1476 The dissenters in Vogt asserted that the Court had “come full circle” from
Thornhill. 354 U.S. at 295 (Justice Douglas, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tice Black).
1477 NLRB v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964) (requiring—and
finding absent in NLRA—“clearest indication” that Congress intended to prohibit

all consumer picketing at secondary establishments). See also Youngdahl v. Rainfair,
355 U.S. 131, 139 (1957) (indicating that, where violence is scattered through time
and much of it was unconnected with the picketing, the state should proceed against
the violence rather than the picketing).
1478 Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569
(1941); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Niemotko v. Maryland, 340 U.S. 268
(1951).
ciples that the difference between mere expression and speech-plus

would entail. Many of these cases concerned disruptions or feared
disruptions of the public peace occasioned by the expressive activ-
ity and the ramifications of this on otherwise protected activity.1479
A series of other cases concerned the permissible characteristics of
permit systems in which parades and meetings were licensed, and
expanded the procedural guarantees that must accompany a permis-
sible licensing system.1480 In one case, however, the Court applied
the rules developed with regard to labor picketing to uphold an in-
junction against the picketing of a grocery chain by a black group
to compel the chain to adopt a quota-hiring system for blacks. The
Supreme Court affirmed the state court’s ruling that, although no
law prevented the chain from hiring blacks on a quota basis, pick-
eting to coerce the adoption of racially discriminatory hiring was
contrary to state public policy.1481
A series of civil rights picketing and parading cases led the Court
to formulate standards much like those it has established in the
labor field, but more protective of expressive activity. The process
began with Edwards v. South Carolina,1482 in which the Court re-
versed a breach of the peace conviction of several blacks for their
refusal to disperse as ordered by police. The statute was so vague,
the Court concluded, that demonstrators could be convicted simply
because their presence “disturbed” people. Describing the demon-
stration upon the grounds of the legislative building in South Caro-
lina’s capital, Justice Stewart observed that “[t]he circumstances in
this case reflect an exercise of these basic [First Amendment] con-
stitutional rights in their most pristine and classic form.” 1483 In sub-
sequent cases, the Court observed: “We emphatically reject the no-
tion urged by appellant that the First and Fourteenth Amendments
afford the same kind of freedom to those who would communicate
ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching, and picketing on streets
and highways, as those amendments afford to those who communi-
cate ideas by pure speech.” 1484 “The conduct which is the subject to
1479 Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Chaplinsky v. New Hamp-
shire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1 (1949); Feiner
v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
1480 See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Na-
tional Socialist Party v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43 (1977); Carroll v. President &
Commr’s of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175 (1968).
1481 Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). This ruling, allowing content-
based restriction, seems inconsistent with NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware, discussed

under this topic, infra.
1482 372 U.S. 229 (1963).
1483 372 U.S. at 235. See also Fields v. South Carolina, 375 U.S. 44 (1963); Henry
v. City of Rock Hill, 376 U.S. 776 (1964).

1484 Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555 (1965).
this statute—picketing and parading—is subject to regulation even

though intertwined with expression and association. The examples
are many of the application by this Court of the principle that cer-
tain forms of conduct mixed with speech may be regulated or pro-
hibited.” 1485
The Court must determine, of course, whether the regulation is
aimed primarily at conduct, as is the case with time, place, and
manner regulations, or whether instead the aim is to regulate the
content of speech. In a series of decisions, the Court refused to per-
mit restrictions on parades and demonstrations, and reversed con-
victions imposed for breach of the peace and similar offenses, when,
in the Court’s view, disturbance had resulted from opposition to the
messages being uttered by demonstrators.1486 Subsequently, how-
ever, the Court upheld a ban on residential picketing in Frisby v.
Shultz,1487 finding that the city ordinance was narrowly tailored to
serve the “significant” governmental interest in protecting residen-
tial privacy. As interpreted, the ordinance banned only picketing that
targeted a single residence, and it is unclear whether the Court would
uphold a broader restriction on residential picketing.1488
In 1982, the Justices confronted a case, that, like Hughes v. Su-
perior Court,1489 involved a state court injunction on picketing, al-
though this one also involved a damage award. NAACP v. Claiborne
Hardware Co.1490 may join in terms of importance such cases as
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan 1491 in requiring the states to ob-
serve enhanced constitutional standards before they may impose li-
ability upon persons for engaging in expressive conduct that impli-
cates the First Amendment. The case arose in the context of a protest
against racial conditions by black citizens of Claiborne County, Mis-
sissippi. Listing demands that included desegregation of public fa-
cilities, hiring of black policemen, hiring of more black employees
by local stores, and ending of verbal abuse by police, a group of
several hundred blacks unanimously voted to boycott the area’s white
merchants. The boycott was carried out through speeches and non-
violent picketing and solicitation of others to cease doing business
1485 379 U.S. at 563.
1486 Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536 (1965); Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111 (1969); Bachellar v. Maryland,
397 U.S. 564 (1970). See also Collin v. Smith, 447 F. Supp. 676 (N.D.Ill.), aff’d, 578
F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978).
1487 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
1488 An earlier case involving residential picketing had been resolved on equal
protection rather than First Amendment grounds, the ordinance at issue making an
exception for labor picketing. Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980).
1489 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
1490 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
1491 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
with the merchants. Individuals were designated to watch stores

and identify blacks patronizing the stores; their names were then
announced at meetings and published. Persuasion of others in-
cluded social pressures and threats of social ostracism. Acts of vio-
lence did occur from time to time, directed in the main at blacks
who did not observe the boycott.
The state Supreme Court imposed joint and several liability upon
leaders and participants in the boycott, and upon the NAACP, for
all of the merchants’ lost earnings during a seven-year period on
the basis of the common law tort of malicious interference with the
merchants’ business, holding that the existence of acts of physical
force and violence and the use of force, violence, and threats to achieve
the ends of the boycott deprived it of any First Amendment protec-
tion.
Reversing, the Court observed that the goals of the boycotters
were legal and that most of their means were constitutionally pro-
tected; although violence was not protected, its existence alone did
not deprive the other activities of First Amendment coverage. Thus,
speeches and nonviolent picketing, both to inform the merchants of
grievances and to encourage other blacks to join the boycott, were
protected activities, and association for those purposes was also pro-
tected.1492 That some members of the group might have engaged in
violence or might have advocated violence did not result in loss of
protection for association, absent a showing that those associating
had joined with intent to further the unprotected activities.1493 Nor
was protection to be denied because nonparticipants had been urged
to join by speech, by picketing, by identification, by threats of so-
cial ostracism, and by other expressive acts: “[s]peech does not lose
its protected character . . . simply because it may embarrass oth-
ers or coerce them into action.” 1494 The boycott had a disruptive
effect upon local economic conditions and resulted in loss of busi-
ness for the merchants, but these consequences did not justify sup-
pression of the boycott. Government may certainly regulate certain
1492 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 907–08 (1982).
1493 458 U.S. at 908.
1494 458 U.S. at 910. The Court cited Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945),
a labor picketing case, and Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415,
419 (1971), a public issues picketing case, which had also relied on the labor cases.
Compare NLRB v. Retail Store Employees, 447 U.S. 607, 618–19 (1980) (Justice Ste-
vens concurring) (labor picketing that coerces or “signals” others to engage in activ-
ity that violates valid labor policy, rather than attempting to engage reason, prohibitable).
To the contention that liability could be imposed on “store watchers” and on a group
known as “Black Hats” who also patrolled stores and identified black patrons of the
businesses, the Court did not advert to the “signal” theory. “There is nothing unlaw-
ful in standing outside a store and recording names. Similarly, there is nothing un-
lawful in wearing black hats, although such apparel may cause apprehension in oth-
ers.” 458 U.S. at 925.
economic activities having an incidental effect upon speech (e.g., la-

bor picketing or business conspiracies to restrain competition),1495
but that power of government does not extend to suppression of pick-
eting and other boycott activities involving, as this case did, speech
upon matters of public affairs with the intent of affecting govern-
mental action and motivating private actions to achieve racial equal-
ity.1496
The critical issue, however, had been the occurrence of violent
acts and the lower court’s conclusion that they deprived otherwise
protected conduct of protection. “The First Amendment does not pro-
tect violence . . . . No federal rule of law restricts a State from im-
posing tort liability for business losses that are caused by violence
and by threats of violence. When such conduct occurs in the con-
text of constitutionally protected activity, however, ‘precision of regu-
lation’ is demanded . . . . Specifically, the presence of activity pro-
tected by the First Amendment imposes restraints on the grounds
that may give rise to damages liability and on the persons who may
be held accountable for those damages.” 1497 In other words, the states
may impose damages for the consequences of violent conduct, but
they may not award compensation for the consequences of nonvio-
lent, protected activity.1498 Thus, the state courts had to compute,
upon proof by the merchants, what damages had been the result of
violence, and could not include losses suffered as a result of all the
other activities comprising the boycott. And only those nonviolent
persons who associated with others with an awareness of violence
and an intent to further it could similarly be held liable.1499 Be-
cause most of the acts of violence had occurred early on, in 1966,
there was no way constitutionally that much if any of the later losses
1495 See, e.g., FTC v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass’n, 493 U.S. 411 (1990)
(upholding application of per se antitrust liability to trial lawyers association’s boy-

cott designed to force higher fees for representation of indigent defendants by court-
appointed counsel).
1496 In evaluating the permissibility of government regulation in this context that
has an incidental effect on expression, the Court applied the standards of United
States v. O’Brien, which permits a regulation “if it is within the constitutional power
of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest;
if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and
if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than
is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” 458 U.S. at 912, n.47, quoting O’Brien,
391 U.S. 367, 376–77 (1968) (footnotes omitted).
1497 458 U.S. at 916–17.
1498 458 U.S. at 917–18.
1499 458 U.S. at 918–29, relying on a series of labor cases and on the subversive
activities association cases, e.g., Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203 (1961), and
Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290 (1961).
of the merchants could be recovered in damages.1500 As to the field

secretary of the local NAACP, the Court refused to permit imposi-
tion of damages based upon speeches that could be read as advocat-
ing violence, because any violent acts that occurred were some time
after the speeches, and a “clear and present danger” analysis of the
speeches would not find them punishable.1501 The award against the
NAACP fell with the denial of damages against its local head, and,
in any event, the protected right of association required a rule that
would immunize the NAACP without a finding that it “authorized—
either actually or apparently—or ratified unlawful conduct.” 1502
Claiborne Hardware is, thus, a seminal decision in the Court’s
effort to formulate standards governing state power to regulate or
to restrict expressive conduct that comes close to or crosses over
the line to encompass some violent activities; it requires great speci-
ficity and the drawing of fine discriminations by government so as
to reach only that portion of the activity that does involve violence
or the threat of violence, and forecloses the kind of “public policy”
limit on demonstrations that was approved in Hughes v. Superior
Court.1503
1500 458 U.S. at 920–26. The Court distinguished Milk Wagon Drivers Union v.
Meadowmoor Dairies, 312 U.S. 287 (1941), in which an injunction had been sus-
tained against both violent and nonviolent activity, not on the basis of special rules
governing labor picketing, but because the violence had been “pervasive.” 458 U.S.
at 923.
1501 458 U.S. at 926–29. The field secretary’s “emotionally charged rhetoric . . .
did not transcend the bounds of protected speech set forth in Brandenburg v. Ohio,
395 U.S. 444 (1969).”
1502 458 U.S. at 931. In ordinary business cases, the rule of liability of an entity
for actions of its agents is broader. E.g., American Soc’y of Mech. Eng’rs v. Hydrolevel
Corp., 456 U.S. 556 (1982). The different rule in cases of organizations formed to
achieve political purposes rather than economic goals appears to require substantial
changes in the law of agency with respect to such entities. Note, 96 HARV. L. REV.
171, 174–76 (1982).
1503 “Concerted action is a powerful weapon. History teaches that special dan-
gers are associated with conspiratorial activity. And yet one of the foundations of
our society is the right of individuals to combine with other persons in pursuit of a
common goal by lawful means.”
“[P]etitioners’ ultimate objectives were unquestionably legitimate. The charge of
illegality . . . derives from the means employed by the participants to achieve those
goals. The use of speeches, marches, and threats of social ostracism cannot provide
the basis for a damages award. But violent conduct is beyond the pale of constitu-
tional protection.”
“The taint of violence colored the conduct of some of the petitioners. They, of
course, may be held liable for the consequences of their violent deeds. The burden
of demonstrating that it colored the entire collective effort, however, is not satisfied
by evidence that violence occurred or even that violence contributed to the success
of the boycott. [The burden can be met only] by findings that adequately disclose
the evidentiary basis for concluding that specific parties agreed to use unlawful means,
that carefully identify the impact of such unlawful conduct, and that recognizes the
More recently, disputes arising from anti-abortion protests out-

side abortion clinics have occasioned another look at principles dis-
tinguishing lawful public demonstrations from proscribable con-
duct. In Madsen v. Women’s Health Center,1504 the Court refined
principles governing issuance of “content-neutral” injunctions that
restrict expressive activity.1505 The appropriate test, the Court stated,
is “whether the challenged provisions of the injunction burden no
more speech than necessary to serve a significant governmental in-
terest.” 1506 Regular time, place, and manner analysis (requiring that
regulation be narrowly tailored to serve a significant governmental
interest) “is not sufficiently rigorous,” the Court explained, “be-
cause injunctions create greater risk of censorship and discrimina-
tory application, and because of the established principle that an
injunction should be no broader than necessary to achieve its de-
sired goals.” 1507 Applying its new test, the Court upheld an injunc-
tion prohibiting protesters from congregating, picketing, patrolling,
demonstrating, or entering any portion of the public right-of-way
within 36 feet of an abortion clinic. Similarly upheld were noise re-
strictions designed to ensure the health and well-being of clinic pa-
tients. Other aspects of the injunction, however, did not pass the
test. Inclusion of private property within the 36-foot buffer was not
adequately justified, nor was inclusion in the noise restriction of a
ban on “images observable” by clinic patients. A ban on physically
approaching any person within 300 feet of the clinic unless that per-
son indicated a desire to communicate burdened more speech than
necessary. Also, a ban on demonstrating within 300 feet of the resi-
dences of clinic staff was not sufficiently justified, the restriction
covering a much larger zone than an earlier residential picketing
ban that the Court had upheld.1508
In Schenck v. Pro-Choice Network of Western New York,1509 the
Court applied Madsen to another injunction that placed restric-
tions on demonstrating outside an abortion clinic. The Court up-
importance of avoiding the imposition of punishment for constitutionally protected
activity. . . . A court must be wary of a claim that the true color of a forest is better
revealed by reptiles hidden in the weeds than by the foliage of countless freestand-
ing trees.” 458 U.S. at 933–34.
1504 512 U.S. 753 (1994).
1505 The Court rejected the argument that the injunction was necessarily content-
based or viewpoint-based because it applied only to anti-abortion protesters. “An in-

junction by its very nature applies only to a particular group (or individuals) . . . .
It does so, however, because of the group’s past actions in the context of a specific
dispute between real parties.” There had been no similarly disruptive demonstra-
tions by pro-abortion factions at the abortion clinic. 512 U.S. at 762.
1506 512 U.S. at 765.
1507 512 U.S. at 765.
1508 Referring to Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
1509 519 U.S. 357 (1997).
held the portion of the injunction that banned “demonstrating within

fifteen feet from either side or edge of, or in front of, doorways or
doorway entrances, parking lot entrances, driveways and driveway
entrances of such facilities” what the Court called “fixed buffer
zones.” 1510 It struck down a prohibition against demonstrating “within
fifteen feet of any person or vehicles seeking access to or leaving
such facilities” what it called “floating buffer zones.” 1511 The Court
cited “public safety and order” 1512 in upholding the fixed buffer zones,
but it found that the floating buffer zones “burden more speech than
is necessary to serve the relevant governmental interests” 1513 be-
cause they make it “quite difficult for a protester who wishes to en-
gage in peaceful expressive activity to know how to remain in com-
pliance with the injunction.” 1514 The Court also upheld a “provision,
specifying that once sidewalk counselors who had entered the buf-
fer zones were required to ‘cease and desist’ their counseling, they
had to retreat 15 feet from the people they had been counseling
and had to remain outside the boundaries of the buffer zones.” 1515
In Hill v. Colorado,1516 the Court upheld a Colorado statute that
made it unlawful, within 100 feet of the entrance to any health care
facility, to “knowingly approach” within eight feet of another per-
son, without that person’s consent, “for the purpose of passing a
leaflet or handbill to, displaying a sign to, or engaging in oral pro-
test, education, or counseling with such other person.” 1517 This de-
cision is notable because it upheld a statute, and not, as in Madsen
and Schenck, merely an injunction directed to particular parties.
The Court found the statute to be a content-neutral time, place, and
manner regulation of speech that “reflects an acceptable balance be-
tween the constitutionally protected rights of law-abiding speakers
and the interests of unwilling listeners . . . .” 1518 The restrictions
were content-neutral because they regulated only the places where
some speech may occur, and because they applied equally to all dem-
onstrators, regardless of viewpoint. Although the restrictions did not
apply to all speech, the “kind of cursory examination” that might
be required to distinguish casual conversation from protest, educa-
tion, or counseling is not “problematic.” 1519 The law was narrowly
tailored to achieve the state’s interests. The eight-foot restriction
1510 519 U.S. at 366 n.3.
1511 519 U.S. at 366 n.3.
1512 519 U.S. at 376.
1513 519 U.S. at 377.
1514 519 U.S. at 378.
1515 519 U.S. at 367.
1516 530 U.S. 703 (2000).
1517 530 U.S. at 707.
1518 530 U.S. at 714.
1519 530 U.S. at 722.
did not significantly impair the ability to convey messages by signs,

and ordinarily allowed speakers to come within a normal conversa-
tional distance of their targets. Because the statute allowed the speaker
to remain in one place, persons who wished to hand out leaflets
could position themselves beside entrances near the path of oncom-
ing pedestrians, and consequently were not deprived of the oppor-
tunity to get the attention of persons entering a clinic.
A five-Justice opinion in McCullen v. Coakley, written by Chief
Justice Roberts’, retained a content-neutral analysis similar to that
in Hill, but nonetheless struck down a statutory 35-foot buffer zone
at entrances and driveways of abortion facilities.1520 According to
the Chief Justice, the buffer zone was not narrowly tailored to serve
governmental interests in maintaining public safety and preserv-
ing access to reproductive healthcare facilities, the concerns claimed
by Massachusetts to underlie the law. The opinion cited several al-
ternatives to the buffer zone that would not curtail the use of pub-
lic sidewalks as traditional public fora for speech, nor significantly
burden the ability of those wishing to provide “sidewalk counsel-
ing” to women approaching abortion clinics. The Court also held that,
to preserve First Amendment rights, targeted measures, such as in-
junctions, enforcement of anti-harassment ordinances, and use of
general crowd control authority, as needed, are preferable to broad,
prophylactic measures.1521 The failure of the opinion to include a
more tightly drawn buffer zone as an alternative may raise a ques-
tion on any use of buffer zones as a protective device, especially
when considering that four concurring Justices viewed the buffer
zone in the case as a content-based restriction on speech requiring
strict judicial scrutiny.
Different types of issues were presented by Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay Group,1522 in which the Court held that a state’s pub-
lic accommodations law could not be applied to compel private orga-
nizers of a St. Patrick’s Day parade to accept in the parade a unit
that would proclaim a message that the organizers did not wish to
promote. Each participating unit affects the message conveyed by
the parade organizers, the Court observed, and application of the
public accommodations law to the content of the organizers’ mes-
sage contravened the “fundamental rule . . . that a speaker has the
autonomy to choose the content of his own message.” 1523
1520 573 U.S. ___, No. 12–1168, slip op. (2014)

1521 Slip op. at 23–29.
1522 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
1523 515 U.S. at 573.
Leafleting, Handbilling, and the Like.—In Lovell v. City of

Griffin,1524 the Court struck down a permit system applying to the
distribution of circulars, handbills, or literature of any kind. The
First Amendment, the Court said, “necessarily embraces pam-
phlets and leaflets. These indeed have been historic weapons in the
defense of liberty, as the pamphlets of Thomas Paine and others in
our own history abundantly attest.” 1525 State courts, responding to
what appeared to be a hint in Lovell that prevention of littering
and other interests might be sufficient to sustain a flat ban on lit-
erature distribution,1526 upheld total prohibitions and were re-
versed. “Mere legislative preferences or beliefs respecting matters
of public convenience may well support regulation directed at other
personal activities, but be insufficient to justify such as diminishes
the exercise of rights so vital to the maintenance of democratic in-
stitutions . . . . We are of the opinion that the purpose to keep the
streets clean and of good appearance is insufficient to justify an or-
dinance which prohibits a person rightfully on a public street from
handing literature to one willing to receive it. Any burden imposed
upon the city authorities in cleaning and caring for the streets as
an indirect consequence of such distribution results from the consti-
tutional protection of the freedom of speech and press.” 1527 In Tal-
ley v. California,1528 the Court struck down an ordinance that banned
all handbills that did not carry the name and address of the au-
thor, printer, and sponsor; conviction for violating the ordinance was
set aside on behalf of one distributing leaflets urging boycotts against
certain merchants because of their employment discrimination. The
basis of the decision is not readily ascertainable. On the one hand,
the Court celebrated anonymity. “Anonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
brochures and even books have played an important role in the prog-
ress of mankind. Persecuted groups and sects from time to time
throughout history have been able to criticize oppressive practices
and laws either anonymously or not at all . . . . [I]dentification and
fear of reprisal might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public
matters of importance.” 1529 On the other hand, responding to the
city’s defense that the ordinance was aimed at providing a means
to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertising, and the
like, the Court noted that “the ordinance is in no manner so lim-
1524 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
1525 303 U.S. at 452.
1526 303 U.S. at 451.
1527 Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147, 161, 162 (1939). The Court
noted that the right to distribute leaflets was subject to certain obvious regulations,
id. at 160, and called for a balancing, with the weight inclined to the First Amend-
ment rights. See also Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).
1528 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
1529 362 U.S. at 64, 65.
ited . . . .Therefore we do not pass on the validity of an ordinance

limited to these or any other supposed evils.” 1530
Talley’s anonymity rationale was strengthened in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Comm’n,1531 invalidating Ohio’s prohibition on the distri-
bution of anonymous campaign literature. There is a “respected tra-
dition of anonymity in the advocacy of political causes,” the Court
noted, and neither of the interests asserted by Ohio justified the
limitation. The state’s interest in informing the electorate was “plainly
insufficient,” and, although the more weighty interest in prevent-
ing fraud in the electoral process may be accomplished by a direct
prohibition, it may not be accomplished indirectly by an indiscrimi-
nate ban on a whole category of speech. Ohio could not apply the
prohibition, therefore, to punish anonymous distribution of pam-
phlets opposing a referendum on school taxes.1532
The handbilling cases were distinguished in City Council v. Tax-
payers for Vincent,1533 in which the Court held that a city may pro-
hibit altogether the use of utility poles for posting of signs. Al-
though a city’s concern over visual blight could be addressed by an
anti-littering ordinance not restricting the expressive activity of dis-
tributing handbills, in the case of utility pole signs “it is the me-
dium of expression itself ” that creates the visual blight. Hence, the
city’s prohibition, unlike a prohibition on distributing handbills, was
narrowly tailored to curtail no more speech than necessary to ac-
complish the city’s legitimate purpose.1534 Ten years later, however,
the Court unanimously invalidated a town’s broad ban on residen-
tial signs that permitted only residential identification signs, “for
1530 362 U.S. at 64. In Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967), the Court di-
rected a lower court to consider the constitutionality of a statute which made it a

criminal offense to publish or distribute election literature without identification of
the name and address of the printer and of the persons sponsoring the literature.
The lower court voided the law, but changed circumstances on a new appeal caused
the Court to dismiss. Golden v. Zwickler, 394 U.S. 103 (1969).
1531 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
1532 In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, 525 U.S. 182 (1999),
the Court struck down a Colorado statute requiring initiative-petition circulators to

wear identification badges. It found that “the restraint on speech in this case is more
severe than was the restraint in McIntyre” because “[p]etition circulation is a less
fleeting encounter, for the circulator must endeavor to persuade electors to sign the
petition. . . . [T]he badge requirement compels personal name identification at the
precise moment when the circulator’s interest in anonymity is greatest.” Id. at 199.
In Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002),
concern for the right to anonymity was one reason that the Court struck down an
ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without
first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit.
1533 466 U.S. 789 (1984).
1534 Justice Brennan argued in dissent that adequate alternative forms of com-
munication were not readily available because handbilling or other person-to-person

methods would be substantially more expensive, and that the regulation for the sake
of aesthetics was not adequately justified.
sale” signs, and signs warning of safety hazards.1535 Prohibiting home-

owners from displaying political, religious, or personal messages on
their own property entirely foreclosed “a venerable means of com-
munication that is unique and important,” and that is “an unusu-
ally cheap form of communication” without viable alternatives for
many residents.1536 The ban was thus reminiscent of total bans on
leafleting, distribution of literature, and door-to-door solicitation that
the Court had struck down in the 1930s and 1940s. The prohibi-
tion in Vincent was distinguished as not removing a “uniquely valu-
able or important mode of communication,” and as not impairing
citizens’ ability to communicate.1537
Sound Trucks, Noise.—Physical disruption may occur by other
means than the presence of large numbers of demonstrators. For
example, the use of sound trucks to convey a message on the streets
may disrupt the public peace and may disturb the privacy of per-
sons off the streets. The cases, however, afford little basis for a gen-
eral statement of constitutional principle. Saia v. New York,1538 while
it spoke of “loud-speakers as today indispensable instruments of ef-
fective public speech,” held only that a particular prior licensing sys-
tem was void. A five-to-four majority upheld a statute in Kovacs v.
Cooper,1539 which was ambiguous with regard to whether all sound
trucks were banned or only “loud and raucous” trucks and which
the state court had interpreted as having the latter meaning. In
another case, the Court upheld an antinoise ordinance which the
state courts had interpreted narrowly to bar only noise that actu-
ally or immediately threatened to disrupt normal school activity dur-
ing school hours.1540 But the Court was careful to tie its ruling to
the principle that the particular requirements of education necessi-
tated observance of rules designed to preserve the school environ-
ment.1541 More recently, reaffirming that government has “a substan-
tial interest in protecting its citizens from unwelcome noise,” the
Court applied time, place, and manner analysis to uphold New York
City’s sound amplification guidelines designed to prevent excessive
noise and assure sound quality at outdoor concerts in Central Park.1542
1535 City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43 (1994).

1536 512 U.S. at 54, 57.
1537 512 U.S. at 54. The city’s legitimate interest in reducing visual clutter could
be addressed by “more temperate” measures, the Court suggested. Id. at 58.

1538 334 U.S. 558, 561 (1948).
1539 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
1540 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972).
1541 408 U.S. at 117. Citing Saia and Kovacs as examples of reasonable time,
place, and manner regulation, the Court observed: “If overamplifled loudspeakers
assault the citizenry, government may turn them down.” Id. at 116.
1542 Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781 (1989).
Door-to-Door Solicitation and Charitable Solicita-

tion.—In one of the Jehovah’s Witness cases, the Court struck down
an ordinance forbidding solicitors or distributors of literature from
knocking on residential doors in a community, the aims of the ordi-
nance being to protect privacy, to protect the sleep of many who
worked night shifts, and to protect against burglars posing as can-
vassers. The five-to-four majority concluded that on balance “[t]he
dangers of distribution can so easily be controlled by traditional le-
gal methods, leaving to each householder the full right to decide
whether he will receive strangers as visitors, that stringent prohi-
bition can serve no purpose but that forbidden by the Constitution,
the naked restriction of the dissemination of ideas.” 1543
Later, although striking down an ordinance because of vague-
ness, the Court observed that it “has consistently recognized a mu-
nicipality’s power to protect its citizens from crime and undue an-
noyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing. A narrowly drawn
ordinance, that does not vest in municipal officers the undefined power
to determine what messages residents will hear, may serve these
important interests without running afoul of the First Amend-
ment.” 1544 The Court indicated that its precedents supported mea-
sures that would require some form of notice to officials and the
obtaining of identification in order that persons could canvas house-
to-house for charitable or political purposes.
However, an ordinance that limited solicitation of contributions
door-to-door by charitable organizations to those that use at least
75% of their receipts directly for charitable purposes, defined so as
to exclude the expenses of solicitation, salaries, overhead, and other
administrative expenses, was invalidated as overbroad.1545 A pri-
vacy rationale was rejected, as just as much intrusion was likely
by permitted as by non-permitted solicitors. A rationale of preven-
tion of fraud was unavailing, as it could not be said that all asso-
ciations that spent more than 25% of their receipts on overhead were
actually engaged in a profit-making enterprise, and, in any event,
more narrowly drawn regulations, such as disclosure requirements,
could serve this governmental interest.
1543 Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 147 (1943).
1544 Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 616–17 (1976).
1545 Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S. 620
(1980). See also Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982) (state law distinguishing be-
tween religious organizations and their solicitation of funds on basis of whether or-
ganizations received more than half of their total contributions from members or
from public solicitation violates the Establishment Clause). Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S.
414 (1988) (criminal penalty on use of paid circulators to obtain signatures for bal-
lot initiative suppresses political speech in violation of First and Fourteenth Amend-
ments).
Schaumburg was extended in Secretary of State v. Joseph H.

Munson Co.,1546 and Riley v. National Federation of the Blind.1547
In Munson, the Court invalidated a Maryland statute limiting pro-
fessional fundraisers to 25% of the amount collected plus certain
costs, and allowing waiver of this limitation if it would effectively
prevent the charity from raising contributions. In Riley, the Court
invalidated a North Carolina fee structure containing even more flex-
ibility.1548 The Court saw “no nexus between the percentage of funds
retained by the fundraiser and the likelihood that the solicitation
is fraudulent,” and was similarly hostile to any scheme that shifts
the burden to the fundraiser to show that a fee structure is reason-
able.1549 Moreover, a requirement that fundraisers disclose to poten-
tial donors the percentage of donated funds previously used for char-
ity was also invalidated in Riley, the Court indicating that the “more
benign and narrowly tailored” alternative of disclosure to the state
(accompanied by state publishing of disclosed percentages) could make
the information publicly available without so threatening the effec-
tiveness of solicitation.1550
In Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc’y v. Village of Stratton, the Court
struck down an ordinance that made it a misdemeanor to engage
in door-to-door advocacy—religious, political, or commercial—
without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit.1551
“It is offensive to the very notion of a free society,” the Court wrote,
“that a citizen must first inform the government of her desire to
speak to her neighbors and then obtain a permit to do so.” 1552 The
ordinance violated the right to anonymity, burdened the freedom of
speech of those who hold “religious or patriotic views” that prevent
them from applying for a license, and effectively banned “a signifi-
1546 467 U.S. 947 (1984).

1547 487 U.S. 781 (1988).
1548 A fee of up to 20% of collected receipts was deemed reasonable, a fee of
between 20 and 35% was permissible if the solicitation involved advocacy or the dis-
semination of information, and a fee in excess of 35% was presumptively unreason-
able, but could be upheld upon one of two showings: that advocacy or dissemination
of information was involved, or that otherwise the charity’s ability to collect money
or communicate would be significantly diminished.
1549 487 U.S. at 793.
1550 487 U.S. at 800. North Carolina’s requirement for licensing of professional
fundraisers was also invalidated in Riley, id. at 801–02. In Illinois ex rel. Madigan
v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 U.S. 600 (2003), the Court held unanimously that the
First Amendment does not prevent a state from bringing fraud actions against chari-
table solicitors who falsely represent that a “significant” amount of each dollar do-
nated would be used for charitable purposes.
1551 536 U.S. 150 (2002).
1552 536 U.S. at 165–66.
cant amount of spontaneous speech” that might be engaged in on a

holiday or weekend when it was not possible to obtain a permit.1553
The Problem of “Symbolic Speech”.—Very little expression
is “mere” speech. If it is oral, it may be noisy enough to be disturb-
ing,1554 and, if it is written, it may be litter; 1555 in either case, it
may amount to conduct that is prohibitable in specific circum-
stances.1556 Moving beyond these simple examples, one may see as
well that conduct may have a communicative content, intended to
express a point of view. Expressive conduct may consist in flying a
particular flag as a symbol 1557 or in refusing to salute a flag as a
symbol.1558 Sit-ins and stand-ins may effectively express a protest
about certain things.1559
Justice Jackson wrote: “There is no doubt that, in connection
with the pledge, the flag salute is a form of utterance. Symbolism
is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of
an emblem or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or
personality is a short cut from mind to mind.” 1560 When conduct or
action has a communicative content to it, governmental regulation
or prohibition implicates the First Amendment, but this does not
mean that such conduct or action is necessarily immune from gov-
ernmental process. Thus, although the Court has had few opportu-
nities to formulate First Amendment standards in this area, in up-
holding a congressional prohibition on draft-card burnings, it has
stated the generally applicable rule. “[A] government regulation is
sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of Gov-
ernment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged
1553 536 U.S. at 167.
1554 E.g., Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77
(1949).
1555 E.g., Schneider v. Town of Irvington, 308 U.S. 147 (1939).
1556 Cf. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
1557 Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359 (1931).
1558 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
1559 In Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131 (1966), the Court held protected a peace-
ful, silent stand-in in a segregated public library. Speaking of speech and assembly,
Justice Fortas said for the Court: “As this Court has repeatedly stated, these rights
are not confined to verbal expression. They embrace appropriate types of action which
certainly include the right in a peaceable and orderly manner to protest by silent
and reproachful presence, in a place where the protestant has every right to be, the
unconstitutional segregation of public facilities.” Id. at 141–42. See also Garner v.
Louisiana, 368 U.S. 157, 185, 201 (1961) (Justice Harlan concurring). On a different
footing is expressive conduct in a place where such conduct is prohibited for reasons
other than suppressing speech. See Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984) (upholding Park Service restriction on overnight sleeping as
applied to demonstrators wishing to call attention to the plight of the homeless).
1560 West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943).
First Amendment freedom is no greater than is essential to the fur-

therance of that government interest.” 1561 The Court has sug-
gested that this standard is virtually identical to that applied to
time, place, or manner restrictions on expression.1562
Although almost unanimous in formulating and applying the test
in O’Brien, the Court splintered when it had to deal with one of
the more popular forms of “symbolic” conduct of the late 1960s and
early 1970s—flag burning and other forms of flag desecration. No
unifying theory capable of application to a wide range of possible
flag abuse actions emerged from the early cases. Thus, in Street v.
New York,1563 the defendant had been convicted under a statute pun-
ishing desecration “by words or act” upon evidence that when he
burned the flag he had uttered contemptuous words. The convic-
tion was set aside because it might have been premised on his words
alone or on his words and the act together, and no valid governmen-
tal interest supported penalizing verbal contempt for the flag.1564
A few years later the Court reversed two other flag desecration
convictions, one on due process/vagueness grounds, the other un-
der the First Amendment. These cases were decided by the Court
in a manner that indicated an effort to begin to resolve the stan-
dards of First Amendment protection of “symbolic conduct.” In Smith
v. Goguen,1565 a statute punishing anyone who “publicly . . . treats
contemptuously the flag of the United States” was held unconstitu-
tionally vague, and a conviction for wearing trousers with a small
United States flag sewn to the seat was overturned. The language
subjected the defendant to criminal liability under a standard “so
indefinite that police, court, and jury were free to react to nothing
more than their own preferences for treatment of the flag.” 1566
The First Amendment was the basis for reversal in Spence v.
Washington,1567 which set aside a conviction under a statute pun-
ishing the display of a United States flag to which something is
1561 United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
1562 Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 298 & n.8 (1984).
1563 394 U.S. 576 (1969).
1564 394 U.S. at 591–93. Four dissenters concluded that the First Amendment
did not preclude a flat proscription of flag burning or flag desecration for expressive
purposes. Id. at 594 (Chief Justice Warren), 609 (Justice Black), 610 (Justice White),
and 615 (Justice Fortas). In Radich v. New York, 401 U.S. 531 (1971), aff’g, 26 N.Y.2d
114, 257 N.E.2d 30 (1970), an equally divided Court, Justice Douglas not participat-
ing, sustained a flag desecration conviction of one who displayed sculptures in a gal-
lery, using the flag in apparently sexually bizarre ways to register a social protest.
Defendant subsequently obtained his release on habeas corpus, United States ex rel.
Radich v. Criminal Court, 459 F.2d 745 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 115
(1973).
1565 415 U.S. 566 (1974).
1566 415 U.S. at 578.
1567 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
attached or superimposed; Spence had hung his flag from his apart-
ment window upside down with a peace symbol taped to the front
and back. The act, the Court thought, was a form of communica-
tion, and because of the nature of the act, and the factual context
and environment in which it was undertaken, the Court held it to
be protected. The context included the fact that the flag was pri-
vately owned, that it was displayed on private property, and that
there was no danger of breach of the peace. The nature of the act
was that it was intended to express an idea and it did so without
damaging the flag. The Court assumed that the state had a valid
interest in preserving the flag as a national symbol, but left un-
clear whether that interest extended beyond protecting the physi-
cal integrity of the flag.1568
The underlying assumption that flag burning could be prohib-
ited as a means of protecting the flag’s symbolic value was later
rejected. Twice, in 1989 and again in 1990, the Court held that pros-
ecutions for flag burning at a public demonstration violated the First
Amendment. First, in Texas v. Johnson 1569 the Court rejected a state
desecration statute designed to protect the flag’s symbolic value, and
then in United States v. Eichman 1570 rejected a more limited fed-
eral statute purporting to protect only the flag’s physical integrity.
Both cases were decided by 5-to-4 votes, with Justice Brennan writ-
ing the Court’s opinions.1571 The Texas statute invalidated in John-
son defined the prohibited act of “desecration” as any physical mis-
treatment of the flag that the actor knew would seriously offend
other persons. This emphasis on causing offense to others meant
that the law was not “unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion” and that consequently the deferential standard of United States
v. O’Brien was inapplicable. Applying strict scrutiny, the Court ruled
that the state’s prosecution of someone who burned a flag at a po-
1568 418 U.S. at 408–11, 412–13. Subsequently, the Court vacated, over the dis-
sents of Chief Justice Burger and Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, two
convictions for burning flags and sent them back for reconsideration in the light of
Goguen and Spence. Sutherland v. Illinois, 418 U.S. 907 (1974); Farrell v. Iowa, 418
U.S. 907 (1974). The Court, however, dismissed, “for want of a substantial federal
question,” an appeal from a flag desecration conviction of one who, with no appar-
ent intent to communicate but in the course of “horseplay,” blew his nose on a flag,
simulated masturbation on it, and finally burned it. Van Slyke v. Texas, 418 U.S.
907 (1974).
1569 491 U.S. 397 (1989).
1570 496 U.S. 310 (1990).
1571 In each case Justice Brennan’s opinion for the Court was joined by Justices
Marshall, Blackmun, Scalia, and Kennedy, and in each case Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justices White, Stevens, and O’Connor dissented. In Johnson the Chief Jus-
tice’s dissent was joined by Justices White and O’Connor, and Justice Stevens dis-
sented separately. In Eichman Justice Stevens wrote the only dissenting opinion, to
which the other dissenters subscribed.
litical protest was not justified under the state’s asserted interest
in preserving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity.
The Court’s opinion left little doubt that the existing federal stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 700, and the flag desecration laws of 47 other states
would suffer a similar fate in a similar case. Doubt remained, how-
ever, as to whether the Court would uphold a “content-neutral” stat-
ute protecting the physical integrity of the flag.
Immediately following Johnson, Congress enacted a new flag pro-
tection statute providing punishment for anyone who “knowingly mu-
tilates, defaces, physically defiles, burns, maintains on the floor or
ground, or tramples upon any flag of the United States.” 1572 The
law was designed to be content-neutral and to protect the “physical
integrity” of the flag.1573 Nonetheless, in overturning convictions of
flag burners, the Court found that the law suffered from “the same
fundamental flaw” as the Texas law in Johnson. The government’s
underlying interest, characterized by the Court as resting upon “a
perceived need to preserve the flag’s status as a symbol of our Na-
tion and certain national ideals,” 1574 still related to the suppres-
sion of free expression. Support for this interpretation was found
in the fact that most of the prohibited acts are usually associated
with disrespectful treatment of the flag; this suggested to the Court
“a focus on those acts likely to damage the flag’s symbolic value.” 1575
As in Johnson, such a law could not withstand “most exacting scru-
tiny” analysis.
The Court’s ruling in Eichman rekindled congressional efforts,
postponed with enactment of the Flag Protection Act, to amend the
Constitution to authorize flag desecration legislation at the federal
and state levels. In both the House and the Senate these measures
failed to receive the necessary two-thirds vote.1576
1572 The Flag Protection Act of 1989, Pub. L. 101–131 (1989).

1573 See H.R. REP. NO. 231, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1989) (“The purpose of the
bill is to protect the physical integrity of American flags in all circumstances, regard-
less of the motive or political message of any flag burner”).
1574 United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. at 316.
1575 496 U.S. at 317.
1576 In the 101st Congress, the House defeated H.J. Res. 350 by vote of 254 in
favor to 177 against (136 CONG. REC. H4086 (daily ed. June 21, 1990), and the Sen-
ate defeated S.J. Res. 332 by vote of 58 in favor to 42 against (136 CONG. REC. S8737
(daily ed. June 26, 1990). In every Congress since then (though the 111th in 2009),
constitutional amendments to allow Congress or the states to prohibit flag desecra-
tion have been proposed. In each Congress from the 104th through the 109th (1995–
2006), the House passed such a proposal, but the Senate either rejected it or did not
vote on it.
RIGHTS OF ASSEMBLY AND PETITION
Background and Development

The right of petition took its rise from the modest provision made
for it in chapter 61 of the Magna Carta (1215).1577 To this meager
beginning are traceable, in some measure, Parliament itself and its
procedures for the enactment of legislation, the equity jurisdiction
of the Lord Chancellor, and proceedings against the Crown by “pe-
tition of right.” Thus, while the King summoned Parliament for the
purpose of supply, the latter—but especially the House of Commons—
petitioned the King for a redress of grievances as its price for meet-
ing the financial needs of the Monarch, and as it increased in im-
portance, it came to claim the right to dictate the form of the King’s
reply, until, in 1414, Commons declared itself to be “as well assent-
ers as petitioners.” Two hundred and fifty years later, in 1669, Com-
mons further resolved that every commoner in England possessed
“the inherent right to prepare and present petitions” to it “in case
of grievance,” and of Commons “to receive the same” and to judge
whether they were “fit” to be received. Finally Chapter 5 of the Bill
of Rights of 1689 asserted the right of the subjects to petition the
King and “all commitments and prosecutions for such petitioning
to be illegal.” 1578
Historically, therefore, the right of petition is the primary right,
the right peaceably to assemble a subordinate and instrumental right,
as if the First Amendment read: “the right of the people peaceably
to assemble” in order to “petition the government.” 1579 Today, how-
ever, the right of peaceable assembly is, in the language of the Court,
“cognate to those of free speech and free press and is equally fun-
damental. . . . [It] is one that cannot be denied without violating
those fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the
base of all civil and political institutions,—principles which the Four-
teenth Amendment embodies in the general terms of its due pro-
cess clause. . . . The holding of meetings for peaceable political ac-
tion cannot be proscribed. Those who assist in the conduct of such
meetings cannot be branded as criminals on that score. The ques-
tion . . . is not as to the auspices under which the meeting is held
but as to its purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers, but
whether their utterances transcend the bounds of the freedom of
1577 C. STEPHENSON & F. MARCHAM, SOURCES OF ENGLISH CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 125

(1937).
1578 12 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 98 (1934).
1579 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876), reflects this view.
speech which the Constitution protects.” 1580 Furthermore, the right

of petition has expanded. It is no longer confined to demands for “a
redress of grievances,” in any accurate meaning of these words, but
comprehends demands for an exercise by the government of its pow-
ers in furtherance of the interest and prosperity of the petitioners
and of their views on politically contentious matters.1581 The right
extends to the “approach of citizens or groups of them to adminis-
trative agencies (which are both creatures of the legislature, and
arms of the executive) and to courts, the third branch of Govern-
ment. Certainly the right to petition extends to all departments of
the Government. The right of access to the courts is indeed but one
aspect of the right of petition.” 1582
The right of petition recognized by the First Amendment first
came into prominence in the early 1830s, when petitions against
slavery in the District of Columbia began flowing into Congress in
a constantly increasing stream, which reached its climax in the win-
ter of 1835. Finally on January 28, 1840, the House adopted as a
standing rule: “That no petition, memorial, resolution, or other pa-
per praying the abolition of slavery in the District of Columbia, or
any State or Territories of the United States in which it now ex-
ists, shall be received by this House, or entertained in any way what-
ever.” Because of efforts of John Quincy Adams, this rule was re-
pealed five years later.1583 For many years now the rules of the House
of Representatives have provided that Members having petitions to
present may deliver them to the Clerk and the petitions, except such
as in the judgment of the Speaker are of an obscene or insulting
character, shall be entered on the Journal and the Clerk shall fur-
nish a transcript of such record to the official reporters of debates
for publication in the Record.1584 Even so, petitions for the repeal
of the espionage and sedition laws and against military measures
for recruiting resulted, in World War I, in imprisonment.1585 Proces-
1580 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353, 364, 365 (1937). See also Herndon v. Lowry,
301 U.S. 242 (1937).

1581 See Eastern R.R. Presidents Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
1582 California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510
(1972). See also NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 913–15 (1982);
Missouri v. NOW, 620 F.2d 1301 (8th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 842 (1980)
(because of its political nature, a boycott of states not ratifying the Equal Rights
Amendment may not be subjected to antitrust suits).
1583 The account is told in many sources. E.g., SAMUEL FLAGG BEMIS, JOHN QUINCY
ADAMS AND THE UNION, chs. 17, 18 and pp. 446–47 (1956); WILLIAM LEE MILLER, ARGUING
ABOUT SLAVERY: THE GREAT BATTLE IN THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS (1996), 465–487; DAVID
P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829–1861 (2005),
3–23.
1584 Rule 22, ¶ 1, Rules of the House of Representatives, H.R. Doc. No. 256, 101st
Congress, 2d Sess. 571 (1991).

1585 1918 ATT’Y GEN. ANN. REP. 48.
sions for the presentation of petitions in the United States have

not been particularly successful. In 1894 General Coxey of Ohio or-
ganized armies of unemployed to march on Washington and pres-
ent petitions, only to see their leaders arrested for unlawfully walk-
ing on the grass of the Capitol. The march of the veterans on
Washington in 1932 demanding bonus legislation was defended as
an exercise of the right of petition. The Administration, however,
regarded it as a threat against the Constitution and called out the
army to expel the bonus marchers and burn their camps. Marches
and encampments have become more common since, but the re-
sults have been mixed.
The Cruikshank Case.—The right of assembly was first be-
fore the Supreme Court in 1876 1586 in the famous case of United
States v. Cruikshank.1587 The Enforcement Act of 1870 1588 forbade
conspiring or going onto the highways or onto the premises of an-
other to intimidate any other person from freely exercising and en-
joying any right or privilege granted or secured by the Constitution
of the United States. Defendants had been indicted under this Act
on charges of having deprived certain citizens of their right to as-
semble together peaceably with other citizens “for a peaceful and
lawful purpose.” Although the Court held the indictment inad-
equate because it did not allege that the attempted assembly was
for a purpose related to the Federal Government, its dicta broadly
declared the outlines of the right of assembly. “The right of the people
peaceably to assemble for the purpose of petitioning Congress for a
redress of grievances, or for anything else connected with the pow-
ers or the duties of the National Government, is an attribute of na-
tional citizenship, and, as such, under the protection of, and guar-
anteed by, the United States. The very idea of a government,
republican in form, implies a right on the part of its citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs and to peti-
tion for a redress of grievances. If it had been alleged in these counts
that the object of the defendants was to prevent a meeting for such
a purpose, the case would have been within the statute, and within
the scope of the sovereignty of the United States.” 1589 Absorption
of the assembly and petition clauses into the liberty protected by
1586 See, however, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35 (1868), in which the
Court gave as one of its reasons for striking down a tax on persons leaving the state
its infringement of the right of every citizen to come to the seat of government and
to transact any business he might have with it.
1587 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
1588 Act of May 31, 1870, ch. 114, 16 Stat. 141 (1870).
1589 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552–53 (1876).
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment means, of course,

that the Cruikshank limitation is no longer applicable.1590
The Hague Case.—Illustrative of this expansion is Hague v.
CIO,1591 in which the Court, though splintered with regard to rea-
soning and rationale, struck down an ordinance that vested an un-
controlled discretion in a city official to permit or deny any group
the opportunity to conduct a public assembly in a public place. Jus-
tice Roberts, in an opinion that Justice Black joined and with which
Chief Justice Hughes concurred, found protection against state abridg-
ment of the rights of assembly and petition in the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. “The privilege
of a citizen of the United States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions may be regulated in
the interest of all; it is not absolute, but relative, and must be ex-
ercised in subordination to the general comfort and convenience, and
in consonance with peace and good order; but it must not, in the
guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.” 1592 Justices Stone and
Reed invoked the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment for the result, thereby claiming the rights of assembly and
petition for aliens as well as citizens. “I think respondents’ right to
maintain it does not depend on their citizenship and cannot rightly
be made to turn on the existence or non-existence of a purpose to
disseminate information about the National Labor Relations Act. It
is enough that petitioners have prevented respondents from hold-
ing meetings and disseminating information whether for the orga-
nization of labor unions or for any other lawful purpose.” 1593 This
due process view of Justice Stone’s has carried the day over the
privileges and immunities approach.
Later cases tend to merge the rights of assembly and petition
into the speech and press clauses, and, indeed, all four rights may
well be considered as elements of an inclusive right to freedom of
expression. While certain conduct may still be denominated as ei-
ther petition 1594 or assembly 1595 rather than speech, there seems
1590 DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252 (1941); Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516 (1945).
1591 307 U.S. 496 (1939).
1592 307 U.S. at 515. For another holding that the right to petition is not abso-
lute, see McDonald v. Smith, 472 U.S. 479 (1985) (the fact that defamatory state-
ments were made in the context of a petition to government does not provide abso-
lute immunity from libel).
1593 307 U.S. at 525.
1594 E.g., United States v. Harriss, 347 U.S. 612 (1954); Eastern R.R. Presidents
Conf. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127 (1961); BE & K Construction Co. v. NLRB,
536 U.S. 516 (2002).
1595 E.g., Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971).
little question that similar standards will be applied in most cases.1596

For instance, as discussed earlier, where a public employee sues a
government employer under the First Amendment’s Speech Clause,
the employee must show that he or she spoke as a citizen on a mat-
ter of public concern.1597 In Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania v.
Guarnieri,1598 the Court similarly held that a police chief who al-
leged retaliation for having filed a union grievance challenging his
termination was not protected by the right to petition, because his
complaints did not go to matters of public concern.1599
1596 See, e.g., Borough of Duryea, Pennsylvania v. Guarnieri, 564 U.S. ___, No.
09–1476, slip op. at 7 (2011) (“It is not necessary to say that the [Speech and Peti-
tion] Clauses are identical in their mandate or their purpose and effect to acknowl-
edge that the rights of speech and petition share substantial common ground”); But
see id. (“Courts should not presume there is always an essential equivalence in the
[Speech and Petition] Clauses or that Speech Clause precedents necessarily and in
every case resolve Petition Clause claims”).
1597 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
1598 564 U.S. ___, No. 09–1476, slip op. (2011).
1599 Justice Scalia, in dissent, disputed the majority’s suggestion that a petition
need be of “public concern” to be protected, noting that the Petition Clause had his-
torically been a route for seeking relief of private concerns. Slip op. at 5–7 (2011)
(Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia also suggested that the Clause should be lim-
ited to petitions directed to an executive branch or legislature, and that grievances
submitted to an adjuciatory body are not so protected. Id. at 1–3.
BEARING ARMS
SECOND AMENDMENT
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms shall
not be infringed.
IN GENERAL
Test For over 200 years, despite extensive debate and much leg-
islative action with respect to regulation of the purchase, posses-
sion, and transportation of firearms, as well as proposals to substan-
tially curtail ownership of firearms, there was no definitive resolution
by the courts of just what right the Second Amendment protects.
The Second Amendment is naturally divided into two parts: its prefa-
tory clause (“A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the secu-
rity of a free State”) and its operative clause (“the right of the people
to keep and bear Arms shall not be infringed”). To perhaps oversim-
plify the opposing arguments, the “states’ rights” thesis empha-
sized the importance of the prefatory clause, arguing that the pur-
pose of the clause was to protect the states in their authority to
maintain formal, organized militia units. The “individual rights” the-
sis emphasized the operative clause, so that individuals would be
protected in the ownership, possession, and transportation of fire-
arms.1 Whatever the Amendment meant, it was seen as a bar only
to federal action, not state 2 or private 3 restraints.
1 A sampling of the diverse literature in which the same historical, linguistic,
and case law background shows the basis for strikingly different conclusions in-
cludes: STAFF OF SUBCOMM. ON THE CONSTITUTION, SENATE COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY, 97th
Congress, 2d Sess., THE RIGHT TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS (Comm. Print 1982); DON B.
KATES, HANDGUN PROHIBITION AND THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT (1984);
GUN CONTROL AND THE CONSTITUTION: SOURCES AND EXPLORATIONS ON THE SECOND AMENDMENT
(Robert J. Cottrol ed., 1993); STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE
EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT (1984); Symposium, Gun Control, 49 LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 1 (1986); Sanford Levinson, The Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE
L.J. 637 (1989); JOYCE LEE MALCOLM, TO KEEP AND BEAR ARMS: THE ORIGINS OF AN ANGLO-
AMERICAN RIGHT (1994); Glenn Harlan Reynolds, A Critical Guide to the Second Amend-
ment, 62 TENN. L. REV. 461 (1995); William Van Alystyne, The Second Amendment
and the Personal Right to Bear Arms, 43 DUKE L.J. 1236 (1994); Symposium, Sympo-
sium on the Second Amendment: Fresh Looks, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 3 (2000).
2 Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886). See also Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S.
535 (1894); Robertson v. Baldwin, 165 U.S. 275, 281–82 (1897). The non-application
of the Second Amendment to the states was reaffirmed in Quilici v. Village of Mor-
ton Grove, 695 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 863 (1983).
3 United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1876).
1361
1362 AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS
One of the Second Amendment cases that the Court has heard,
and until recently the only case challenging a congressional enact-
ment, seemed to affirm individual protection but only in the con-
text of the maintenance of a militia or other such public force. In
United States v. Miller,4 the Court sustained a statute requiring reg-
istration under the National Firearms Act of sawed-off shotguns.
After reciting the original provisions of the Constitution dealing with
the militia, the Court observed that “[w]ith obvious purpose to as-
sure the continuation and render possible the effectiveness of such
forces the declaration and guarantee of the Second Amendment were
made. It must be interpreted with that end in view.” 5 The signifi-
cance of the militia, the Court continued, was that it was composed
of “civilians primarily, soldiers on occasion.” It was upon this force
that the states could rely for defense and securing of the laws, on a
force that “comprised all males physically capable of acting in con-
cert for the common defense,” who, “when called for service . . . were
expected to appear bearing arms supplied by themselves and of the
kind in common use at the time.” 6 Therefore, “[i]n the absence of
any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun
having a barrel of less than 18 inches in length’ at this time has
some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a
well-regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment
guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument. Cer-
tainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part
of the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute
to the common defense.” 7
4 307 U.S. 174 (1939). The defendants had been released on the basis of the
trial court determination that prosecution would violate the Second Amendment and
no briefs or other appearances were filed on their behalf; the Court acted on the
basis of the government’s representations.
5 307 U.S. at 178.
6 307 U.S. at 179.
7 307 U.S. at 178. In Cases v. United States, 131 F.2d 916, 922 (1st Cir. 1942),
cert. denied, 319 U.S. 770 (1943), the court, upholding a similar provision of the
Federal Firearms Act, said, “Apparently, then, under the Second Amendment, the
Federal Government can limit the keeping and bearing of arms by a single indi-
vidual as well as by a group of individuals, but it cannot prohibit the possession or
use of any weapon which has any reasonable relationship to the preservation or ef-
ficiency of a well-regulated militia.” See Lewis v. United States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n.8
(1980) (dictum: Miller holds that the “Second Amendment guarantees no right to
keep and bear a firearm that does not have ‘some reasonable relationship to the
preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia’ ”). See also Hickman v. Block,
81 F.3d 98 (9th Cir.) (plaintiff lacked standing to challenge denial of permit to carry
concealed weapon, because Second Amendment is a right held by states, not by pri-
vate citizens), cert. denied, 519 U.S. 912 (1996); United States v. Gomez, 92 F.3d
770, 775 n.7 (9th Cir. 1996) (interpreting federal prohibition on possession of fire-
arm by a felon as having a justification defense “ensures that [the provision] does
not collide with the Second Amendment”). United States v. Wright, 117 F.3d 1265
AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS 1363
After that decision, Congress placed greater limitations on the

receipt, possession, and transportation of firearms,8 and proposals
for national registration or prohibition of firearms altogether have
been made.9 Miller, however, shed little light on the validity of such
proposals. Pointing out that interest in the “character of the Sec-
ond Amendment right has recently burgeoned,” Justice Thomas, con-
curring in the Court’s invalidation (on other grounds) of the Brady
Handgun Violence Prevention Act, questioned whether the Second
Amendment bars federal regulation of gun sales, and suggested that
the Court might determine “at some future date . . . whether Jus-
tice Story was correct . . . that the right to bear arms has justly
been considered, as the palladium of the liberties of a republic.’ ” 10
It was not until 2008 that the Supreme Court definitively came
down on the side of an “individual rights” theory. Relying on new
scholarship regarding the origins of the Amendment,11 the Court in
District of Columbia v. Heller 12 confirmed what had been a grow-
ing consensus of legal scholars—that the rights of the Second Amend-
ment adhered to individuals. The Court reached this conclusion af-
ter a textual analysis of the Amendment,13 an examination of the
historical use of prefatory phrases in statutes, and a detailed explo-
ration of the 18th century meaning of phrases found in the Amend-
ment. Although accepting that the historical and contemporaneous
use of the phrase “keep and bear Arms” often arose in connection
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 522 U.S. 1007 (1997) (member of Georgia unorganized mili-
tia unable to establish that his possession of machine guns and pipe bombs bore
any connection to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia).
8 Enacted measures include the Gun Control Act of 1968. 82 Stat. 226, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 921–928. The Supreme Court’s dealings with these laws have all arisen in the
context of prosecutions of persons purchasing or obtaining firearms in violation of
prohibitions against such conduct by convicted felons. Lewis v. United States, 445
U.S. 55 (1980); Barrett v. United States, 423 U.S. 212 (1976); Scarborough v. United
States, 431 U.S. 563 (1977); United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336 (1971).
9 E.g., NATIONAL COMMISSION ON REFORM OF FEDERAL CRIMINAL LAWS, WORKING PAPERS
1031–1058 (1970), and FINAL REPORT 246–247 (1971).

10 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 937–39 (1997) (quoting 3 Commentar-
ies § 1890, p. 746 (1833)). Justice Scalia, in extra-judicial writing, has sided with
the individual rights interpretation of the Amendment. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER
OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, 136–37 n.13 (A. Gutmann, ed., 1997)
(responding to Professor Tribe’s critique of “my interpretation of the Second Amend-
ment as a guarantee that the Federal Government will not interfere with the indi-
vidual’s right to bear arms for self-defense”).
11 E. Volokh, The Commonplace Second Amendment, 73 N. Y.U. L. Rev. 793 (1998);
R. Barnett, Was the Right to Keep and Bear Arms Conditioned on Service in an Or-
ganized Militia?, 83 Tex. L. Rev. 237 (2004); E. Volokh, “Necessary to the Security of
a Free State,” 83 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1 (2007); What Did “Bear Arms” Mean in the
Second Amendment?, 6 Georgetown J. L. & Pub. Policy (2008).
12 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008).
13 The “right of the people,” for instance, was found in other places in the Con-
stitution to speak to individual rights, not to collective rights (those that can only
be exercised by participation in a corporate body). 128 S. Ct. at 2790–91.
1364 AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS
with military activities, the Court noted that its use was not lim-
ited to those contexts.14 Further, the Court found that the phrase
“well regulated Militia” referred not to formally organized state or
federal militias, but to the pool of “able-bodied men” who were avail-
able for conscription.15 Finally, the Court reviewed contemporane-
ous state constitutions, post-enactment commentary, and subse-
quent case law to conclude that the purpose of the right to keep
and bear arms extended beyond the context of militia service to in-
clude self-defense.
Using this “individual rights theory,” the Court struck down a
District of Columbia law that banned virtually all handguns, and
required that any other type of firearm in a home be dissembled or
bound by a trigger lock at all times. The Court rejected the argu-
ment that handguns could be banned as long as other guns (such
as long-guns) were available, noting that, for a variety of reasons,
handguns are the “most popular weapon chosen by Americans for
self-defense in the home.” 16 Similarly, the requirement that all fire-
arms be rendered inoperable at all times was found to limit the
“core lawful purpose of self-defense.” However, the Court specifi-
cally stated (albeit in dicta) that the Second Amendment did not
limit prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill, penalties for carrying firearms in schools and govern-
ment buildings, or laws regulating the sales of guns. The Court also
noted that there was a historical tradition of prohibiting the carry-
ing of “dangerous and unusual weapons” that would not be affected
by its decision. The Court, however, declined to establish the stan-
dard by which future gun regulations would be evaluated.17 And,
more importantly, because the District of Columbia is a federal en-
clave, the Court did not have occasion to address whether it would
reconsider its prior decisions that the Second Amendment does not
apply to the states.
The latter issue was addressed in McDonald v. Chicago,18 where
a plurality of the Court, overturning prior precedent, found that the
Second Amendment is incorporated through the Fourteenth Amend-
14 128 S. Ct. at 2791–97.

15 128 S. Ct. at 2799–2800. Similarly, the phrase “security of a free state” was
found to refer not to the defense of a particular state, but to the protection of the
national polity. 128 S. Ct. at 2800–01.
16 128 S. Ct. at 2818.
17 128 S. Ct. at 2817 n.27 (discussing non-application of rational basis review).
See id. at 2850–51 (Breyer, J., dissenting).

18 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. (2010).
AMENDMENT 2—BEARING ARMS 1365
ment and is thus enforceable against the states.19 Relevant to this

question, the Court examined whether the right to keep and bear
arms is “fundamental to our scheme of ordered liberty” 20 or “deeply
rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition.” 21 The Court, relying
on historical analysis set forth previously in Heller, noted the Eng-
lish common law roots of the right to keep arms for self-defense 22
and the importance of the right to the American colonies, the draft-
ers of the Constitution, and the states as a bulwark against over-
reaching federal authority.23 Noting that by the 1850s the per-
ceived threat that the National Government would disarm the citizens
had largely faded, the Court suggested that the right to keep and
bear arms became valued principally for purposes of self-defense,
so that the passage of Fourteenth Amendment, in part, was in-
tended to protect the right of ex-slaves to keep and bear arms. While
it was argued by the dissent that this protection would most logi-
cally be provided by the Equal Protection Clause, not by the Due
Process Clause,24 the plurality also found enough evidence of then-
existent concerns regarding the treatment of blacks by the state mi-
litia to conclude that the right to bear arms was also intended to
protect against generally-applicable state regulation.
19 The portion of the opinion finding incorporation was authored by Justice Alito,
and joined by Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Scalia and Justice Kennedy. Justice Thomas
declined to join the plurality’s opinion as regards incorporation under the Due Pro-
cess Clause. Instead, Justice Thomas, alone among the Justices, would have found
that the Second Amendment is applicable to the states under the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause. For a more detailed discussion of incorporation and the Privileges
or Immunities Clause, see supra Bill of Rights, Fourteenth Amendment and Four-
teenth Amendment, Privileges or Immunities.
20 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149 (1968).
21 Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 721 (1997) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
22 McDonald, 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. at 20 (noting that Blackstone
had asserted that the right to keep and bear arms was “one of the fundamental
rights of Englishmen”).
23 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. at 20–22.
24 561 U.S. ___, No. 08–1521, slip op. at 23–24 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
QUARTERING SOLDIERS
THIRD AMENDMENT
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house,
without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner to be prescribed by law.
IN GENERAL
There has been no Supreme Court explication of this Amend-
ment, which was obviously one guarantee indicating a preference
for the civilian over the military.1
1 In fact, save for the curious case of Engblom v. Carey, 677 F.2d 957 (2d Cir.
1982), on remand, 572 F. Supp. 44 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff’d per curiam, 724 F.2d 28 (2d
Cir. 1983), there has been no judicial explication of the Amendment at all.
1367
FOURTH AMENDMENT
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
CONTENTS
Page
Search and Seizure .................................................................................................................... 1371
History and Scope of the Amendment .............................................................................. 1371
History .......................................................................................................................... 1371
Scope of the Amendment ............................................................................................ 1373
The Interest Protected ................................................................................................ 1378
Arrests and Other Detentions .................................................................................... 1383
Searches and Inspections in Noncriminal Cases ...................................................... 1386
Searches and Seizures Pursuant to Warrant ................................................................... 1391
Issuance by Neutral Magistrate ................................................................................ 1392
Probable Cause ............................................................................................................ 1393
Particularity ................................................................................................................. 1396
First Amendment Bearing on Probable Cause and Particularity ........................... 1397
Property Subject to Seizure ........................................................................................ 1399
Execution of Warrants ................................................................................................ 1403
Valid Searches and Seizures Without Warrants .............................................................. 1406
Detention Short of Arrest: Stop and Frisk ............................................................... 1407
Search Incident to Arrest ........................................................................................... 1413
Vehicular Searches ...................................................................................................... 1418
Vessel Searches ............................................................................................................ 1423
Consent Searches ........................................................................................................ 1424
Border Searches ........................................................................................................... 1425
“Open Fields” ............................................................................................................... 1427
“Plain View” ................................................................................................................. 1428
Public Schools .............................................................................................................. 1429
Government Workplace ............................................................................................... 1430
Prisoners, Probatitoners, and Parolees ..................................................................... 1431
Drug Testing ................................................................................................................ 1433
Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment ...................................................... 1437
The Olmstead Case ..................................................................................................... 1437
Federal Communications Act ..................................................................................... 1437
Nontelephonic Electronic Surveillance ...................................................................... 1438
The Berger and Katz Cases ....................................................................................... 1439
Warrantless “National Security” Electronic Surveillance ........................................ 1442
Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule ........................................... 1444
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule ...................................................................... 1444
Development of the Exclusionary Rule ..................................................................... 1446
The Foundations of the Exclusionary Rule ............................................................... 1450
Narrowing Application of the Exclusionary Rule ..................................................... 1452
Operation of the Rule: Standing ................................................................................ 1458
1369
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
FOURTH AMENDMENT
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,

papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and sei-
zures, shall not be violated; and no Warrants shall issue but upon
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
History and Scope of the Amendment

History.—Few provisions of the Bill of Rights grew so directly
out of the experience of the colonials as the Fourth Amendment,
embodying as it did the protection against the use of the “writs of
assistance.” But though the insistence on freedom from unreason-
able searches and seizures as a fundamental right gained expres-
sion in the colonies late and as a result of experience,1 there was
also a rich English experience to draw on. “Every man’s house is
his castle” was a maxim much celebrated in England, as Saman’s
Case demonstrated in 1603.2 A civil case of execution of process,
Saman’s Case nonetheless recognized the right of the homeowner
to defend his house against unlawful entry even by the King’s agents,
but at the same time recognized the authority of the appropriate
officers to break and enter upon notice in order to arrest or to ex-
ecute the King’s process. Most famous of the English cases was Entick
v. Carrington,3 one of a series of civil actions against state officers
who, pursuant to general warrants, had raided many homes and
1 Apparently the first statement of freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures appeared in The Rights of the Colonists and a List of Infringements and Vio-
lations of Rights, 1772, in the drafting of which Samuel Adams took the lead. 1 B.
SCHWARTZ, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 199, 205–06 (1971).
2 5 Coke’s Repts. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604). One of the most forceful
expressions of the maxim was that of William Pitt in Parliament in 1763: “The poor-
est man may in his cottage bid defiance to all the force of the crown. It may be
frail—its roof may shake—the wind may blow through it—the storm may enter, the
rain may enter—but the King of England cannot enter—all his force dares not cross
the threshold of the ruined tenement.”
3 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. 807 (1705).
1371
1372 AMENDMENT 4—SEARCHES AND SEIZURE
other places in search of materials connected with John Wilkes’ po-

lemical pamphlets attacking not only governmental policies but the
King himself.4
Entick, an associate of Wilkes, sued because agents had forc-
ibly broken into his house, broken into locked desks and boxes, and
seized many printed charts, pamphlets, and the like. In an opinion
sweeping in terms, the court declared the warrant and the behav-
ior it authorized subversive “of all the comforts of society,” and the
issuance of a warrant for the seizure of all of a person’s papers rather
than only those alleged to be criminal in nature “contrary to the
genius of the law of England.” 5 Besides its general character, the
court said, the warrant was bad because it was not issued on a show-
ing of probable cause and no record was required to be made of
what had been seized. Entick v. Carrington, the Supreme Court has
said, is a “great judgment,” “one of the landmarks of English lib-
erty,” “one of the permanent monuments of the British Constitu-
tion,” and a guide to an understanding of what the Framers meant
in writing the Fourth Amendment.6
In the colonies, smuggling rather than seditious libel afforded
the leading examples of the necessity for protection against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures. In order to enforce the revenue laws,
English authorities made use of writs of assistance, which were gen-
eral warrants authorizing the bearer to enter any house or other
place to search for and seize “prohibited and uncustomed” goods,
and commanding all subjects to assist in these endeavors. Once is-
sued, the writs remained in force throughout the lifetime of the sov-
ereign and six months thereafter. When, upon the death of George
II in 1760, the authorities were required to obtain the issuance of
new writs, opposition was led by James Otis, who attacked such
writs on libertarian grounds and who asserted the invalidity of the
authorizing statutes because they conflicted with English constitu-
tionalism.7 Otis lost and the writs were issued and used, but his
arguments were much cited in the colonies not only on the immedi-
ate subject but also with regard to judicial review.
4 See also Wilkes v. Wood, 98 Eng. 489 (C.P. 1763); Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng.
Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763), aff’d 19 Howell’s State Trials 1002, 1028; 97 Eng. Rep. 1075
(K.B. 1765).
5 95 Eng. 817, 818.
6 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 626 (1886).
7 The arguments of Otis and others as well as much background material are
contained in Quincy’s MASSACHUSETTS REPORTS, 1761–1772, App. I, pp. 395–540, and

in 2 LEGAL PAPERS OF JOHN ADAMS 106–47 (Wroth & Zobel eds., 1965). See also Dickerson,
Writs of Assistance as a Cause of the American Revolution, in THE ERA OF THE AMERI-
CAN REVOLUTION: STUDIES INSCRIBED TO EVARTS BOUTELL GREENE 40 (R. Morris, ed., 1939).
AMENDMENT 4—SEARCHES AND SEIZURE 1373
Scope of the Amendment.—The language of the provision that

became the Fourth Amendment underwent some modest changes
on its passage through the Congress, and it is possible that the changes
reflected more than a modest significance in the interpretation of
the relationship of the two clauses. Madison’s introduced version
provided “The rights to be secured in their persons, their houses,
their papers, and their other property, from all unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated by warrants issued without prob-
able cause, supported by oath or affirmation, or not particularly de-
scribing the places to be searched, or the persons or things to be
seized.” 8 As reported from committee, with an inadvertent omis-
sion corrected on the floor,9 the section was almost identical to the
introduced version, and the House defeated a motion to substitute
“and no warrant shall issue” for “by warrants issuing” in the com-
mittee draft. In some fashion, the rejected amendment was in-
serted in the language before passage by the House and is the lan-
guage of the ratified constitutional provision.10
As noted above, the noteworthy disputes over search and sei-
zure in England and the colonies revolved about the character of
warrants. There were, however, lawful warrantless searches, pri-
marily searches incident to arrest, and these apparently gave rise
to no disputes. Thus, the question arises whether the Fourth Amend-
ment’s two clauses must be read together to mean that the only
searches and seizures which are “reasonable” are those which meet
the requirements of the second clause, that is, are pursuant to war-
rants issued under the prescribed safeguards, or whether the two
clauses are independent, so that searches under warrant must com-
ply with the second clause but that there are “reasonable” searches
under the first clause that need not comply with the second clause.11
This issue has divided the Court for some time, has seen several
reversals of precedents, and is important for the resolution of many
8 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 434–35 (June 8, 1789).
9 The word “secured” was changed to “secure” and the phrase “against unreason-
able searches and seizures” was reinstated. Id. at 754 (August 17, 1789).
10 Id. It has been theorized that the author of the defeated revision, who was
chairman of the committee appointed to arrange the amendments prior to House

passage, simply inserted his provision and that it passed unnoticed. N. LASSON, THE
HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION
101–03 (1937).
11 The amendment was originally in one clause as quoted above; it was the in-
sertion of the defeated amendment to the language which changed the text into two
clauses and arguably had the effect of extending the protection against unreason-
able searches and seizures beyond the requirements imposed on the issuance of war-
rants. It is also possible to read the two clauses together to mean that some sei-
zures even under warrants would be unreasonable, and this reading has indeed been
effectuated in certain cases, although for independent reasons. Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), overruled by War-
cases. It is a dispute that has run most consistently throughout the

cases involving the scope of the right to search incident to arrest.12
Although the right to search the person of the arrestee without a
warrant is unquestioned, how far afield into areas within and with-
out the control of the arrestee a search may range is an interesting
and crucial matter.
The Court has drawn a wavering line.13 In Harris v. United
States,14 it approved as “reasonable” the warrantless search of a four-
room apartment pursuant to the arrest of the man found there. A
year later, however, a reconstituted Court majority set aside a con-
viction based on evidence seized by a warrantless search pursuant
to an arrest and adopted the “cardinal rule that, in seizing goods
and articles, law enforcement agents must secure and use search
warrants wherever reasonably practicable.” 15 This rule was set aside
two years later by another reconstituted majority, which adopted
the premise that the test “is not whether it is reasonable to pro-
cure a search warrant, but whether the search was reasonable.”
Whether a search is reasonable, the Court said, “must find resolu-
tion in the facts and circumstances of each case.” 16 However, the
Court soon returned to its emphasis upon the warrant. “The [Fourth]
Amendment was in large part a reaction to the general warrants
and warrantless searches that had so alienated the colonists and
had helped speed the movement for independence. In the scheme
of the Amendment, therefore, the requirement that ‘no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause,’ plays a crucial part.” 17 There-
fore, “the police must, whenever practicable, obtain advance judi-
cial approval of searches and seizures through a warrant proce-
den v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); but see id. at 303 (reserving the question whether
“there are items of evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being
the object of a reasonable search and seizure.”)
12 Approval of warrantless searches pursuant to arrest first appeared in dicta
in several cases. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Carroll v. United
States, 267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925).
Whether or not there is to be a rule or a principle generally preferring or requiring
searches pursuant to warrant to warrantless searches, however, has ramifications
far beyond the issue of searches pursuant to arrest. United States v. United States
District Court, 407 U.S. 297, 320 (1972).
13 Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), with Go-Bart Import-
ing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932).
14 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
15 Trupiano v. United States, 334 U.S. 699, 705 (1948). See also McDonald v.

16 United States v. Rabinowitz, 339 U.S. 56, 66 (1950).
17 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 761 (1969).
dure.” 18 Exceptions to searches under warrants were to be closely

contained by the rationale undergirding the necessity for the excep-
tion, and the scope of a search under one of the exceptions was simi-
larly limited.19
During the 1970s the Court was closely divided on which stan-
dard to apply.20 For a while, the balance tipped in favor of the view
that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable, with a few care-
fully prescribed exceptions.21 Gradually, guided by the variable-
expectation-of-privacy approach to coverage of the Fourth Amend-
ment, the Court broadened its view of permissible exceptions and
of the scope of those exceptions.22 By 1992, it was no longer the
18 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968). In United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972), Justice Powell explained that the “very heart”
of the Amendment’s mandate is “that where practical, a governmental search and
seizure should represent both the efforts of the officer to gather evidence of wrong-
ful acts and the judgment of the magistrate that the collected evidence is sufficient
to justify invasion of a citizen’s private premises or conversation.” Thus, what is “rea-
sonable” in terms of a search and seizure derives content and meaning through ref-
erence to the warrant clause. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 473–84 (1971).
See also Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721, 728 (1969); Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347, 356–58 (1967); Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 299 (1967).
19 Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762–64 (1969) (limiting scope of search
incident to arrest). See also United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S.
297 (1972) (rejecting argument that it was “reasonable” to allow President through
Attorney General to authorize warrantless electronic surveillance of persons thought
to be endangering the national security); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967)
(although officers acted with great self-restraint and reasonably in engaging in elec-
tronic seizures of conversations from a telephone booth, a magistrate’s antecedent
judgment was required); Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964) (warrantless
search of seized automobile not justified because not within rationale of exceptions
to warrant clause). There were exceptions, e.g., Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58
(1967) (warrantless search of impounded car was reasonable); United States v. Har-
ris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (warrantless inventory search of automobile).
20 See, e.g., Almighty-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973), Justices
Stewart, Douglas, Brennan, and Marshall adhered to the warrant-based rule, while
Justices White, Blackmun, and Rehnquist, and Chief Justice Burger placed greater
emphasis upon the question of reasonableness without necessary regard to the war-
rant requirement. Id. at 285. Justice Powell generally agreed with the former group
of Justices, id. at 275 (concurring).
21 E.g., G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352–53 (1977) (unani-
mous); Marshall v. Barrow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312 (1978); Michigan v. Tyler, 436
U.S. 499, 506 (1978); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 390 (1978) (unanimous); Ar-
kansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 743 (1979) (1979); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
824–25 (1982).
22 E.g., Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970) (warrantless search of automo-
bile taken to police station); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (same); New York v.
Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (search of vehicle incident to arrest); United States v.
Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982) (automobile search at scene); Brigham City, Utah v. Stu-
art, 547 U.S. 398 (2006) (warrantless entry into a home when police have an objec-
tively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is seriously injured or immi-
nently threatened with such injury); Michigan v. Fisher, 558 U.S. ___, No. 09–91
(2009) (applying Brigham City). On the other hand, the warrant-based standard did
preclude a number of warrantless searches. E.g., Almighty-Sanchez v. United States,
case that the “warrants-with-narrow-exceptions” standard nor-

mally prevails over a “reasonableness” approach.23 Exceptions to the
warrant requirement have multiplied, tending to confine applica-
tion of the requirement to cases that are exclusively “criminal” in
nature. And even within that core area of “criminal” cases, some
exceptions have been broadened.
The most important category of exception is that of administra-
tive searches justified by “special needs beyond the normal need for
law enforcement.” Under this general rubric the Court has upheld
warrantless searches by administrative authorities in public schools,
government offices, and prisons, and has upheld drug testing of pub-
lic and transportation employees.24 In all of these instances, the war-
rant and probable cause requirements are dispensed with in favor
of a reasonableness standard that balances the government’s regu-
latory interest against the individual’s privacy interest; in all of these
instances, the government’s interest has been found to outweigh the
individual’s. The broad scope of the administrative search excep-
tion is evidenced by the fact that an overlap between law enforce-
ment objectives and administrative “special needs” does not result
in application of the warrant requirement; instead, the Court has
upheld warrantless inspection of automobile junkyards and disman-
tling operations in spite of the strong law enforcement component
of the regulation.25
Warrant requirements and individualized suspicion at times are
also set aside in a pure law enforcement context in favor of a rea-
sonableness test that balances governmental and individual inter-
ests. The outcome in these cases may depend on how the respec-
tive interests at stake are characterized. For example, in Maryland
v. King, the five-Justice majority and four-Justice dissent clashed
over what governmental interests were served by a law allowing
for DNA testing of suspects being taken into custody after being
413 U.S. 266 (1973) (warrantless stop and search of auto by roving patrol near bor-
der); Marshall v. Barrow’s, Inc., 436 U.S. 307 (1978) (warrantless administrative in-
spection of business premises); Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (warrantless
search of home that was “homicide scene”); Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–
542 (2009) (search of vehicle incident to arrest where arrestee had no access to ve-
hicle).
23 Of the Justices on the Court in 1992, only Justice Stevens frequently sided
with the warrants-with-narrow-exceptions approach. See, e.g., Illinois v. Rodriguez,

497 U.S. 177, 189 (Justice Stevens joining Justice Marshall’s dissent); New Jersey
v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 370 (1985) (Justice Stevens dissenting); California v. Acevedo,
500 U.S. 565, 585 (1991) (Justice Stevens dissenting).
24 See various headings infra under the general heading “Valid Searches and
Seizures Without Warrants.”

25 New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
arrested for a serious crime.26 The majority insisted testing was con-
ducted to ensure that suspects were properly identified and pro-
cessed for detention. A skeptical dissent maintained that the test-
ing was intended to further investigative, not administrative, ends.
And, in the dissent’s opinion, a general investigative purpose to pos-
sibly link a suspect to unrelated unsolved crimes was an illegiti-
mate fishing expedition.27
There has been some other loosening of a warrant requirement
in the law enforcement context, where search by warrant is still
the general rule. For example, the scope of a valid search “incident
to arrest,” once limited to areas within the immediate reach of the
arrested suspect, was expanded to a “protective sweep” of the en-
tire home, if arresting officers have a “reasonable” belief that the
home harbors an individual who may pose a danger.28 In another
case, the Court shifted focus from whether exigent circumstances 29
justified failure to obtain a warrant, to whether an officer had a
“reasonable” belief that an exception to the warrant requirement
applied.30 The Court has also held that an exigent circumstances
exception applied even where the exigency arose as a result of po-
lice conduct, so long as the police conduct was “reasonable” in that
it neither threatened to nor violated the Fourth Amendment.31
Another matter of scope that the Court has addressed is the
category of persons protected by the Fourth Amendment; i.e., who
constitutes “the people.” This phrase, the Court determined, “refers
to a class of persons who are part of a national community or who
have otherwise developed sufficient connection with [the United States]
to be considered part of that community.” 32 The Fourth Amend-
ment therefore does not apply to the search and seizure by United
States agents of property that is owned by a nonresident alien and
located in a foreign country. The community of protected people in-
cludes U.S. citizens who go abroad, and aliens who have volun-
tarily entered U.S. territory and developed substantial connections
26 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–207, slip op. (2013).
27 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–207, slip op. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
28 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
29 See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 770 (1966) (allowing warrant-
less blood test of DWI suspect where the officer “might reasonably have believed
that he was confronted with an emergency, in which the delay necessary to obtain a
warrant, under the circumstances, threatened ‘the destruction of evidence”). But see
Missouri v. McNeely, 569 U.S. ___, No. 11–1425, slip op (2013) (rejecting a per se
exception for obtaining warrants in DWI cases, requiring that exigent circumstance
be evaluated under a “totality of the circumstances” test).
30 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
31 Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. ___, No. 09–1272, slip op. (2011) (police justified
in entering apartment after smelling burning marijuana in a hallway, knocking on

apartment door, and hearing noises consistent with evidence being destroyed).
32 United States v. Vertigo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 265 (1990).
with this country. There is no resulting broad principle, however,

that the Fourth Amendment constrains federal officials wherever and
against whomever they act.
The Interest Protected.—For the Fourth Amendment to ap-
ply to a particular set of facts, there must be a “search” and a “sei-
zure,” occurring typically in a criminal case, with a subsequent at-
tempt to use judicially what was seized.33 Whether there was a search
and seizure within the meaning of the Amendment, and whether a
complainant’s interests were constitutionally infringed, will often turn
upon consideration of his interest and whether it was officially abused.
What does the Amendment protect? Under the common law, there
was no doubt. In Entick v. Carrington,34 Lord Camden wrote: “The
great end for which men entered in society was to secure their prop-
erty. That right is preserved sacred and incommunicable in all in-
stances where it has not been taken away or abridged by some pub-
lic law for the good of the whole. . . . By the laws of England, every
invasion of private property, be it ever so minute, is a trespass. No
man can set foot upon my ground without my license but he is li-
able to an action though the damage be nothing . . . .” Protection
of property interests as the basis of the Fourth Amendment found
easy acceptance in the Supreme Court 35 and that acceptance con-
trolled the decision in numerous cases.36 For example, in Olmstead
v. United States,37 one of the two premises underlying the holding
that wiretapping was not covered by the Amendment was that there
had been no actual physical invasion of the defendant’s premises;
33 See, e.g., California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 626 (1991) (because there was
no “seizure” of the defendant as he fled from police before being tackled, the drugs
that he abandoned in flight could not be excluded as the fruits of an unreasonable
seizure).
34 19 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 1035, 95 Eng. Reg. 807, 817–18 (1765).
35 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 627 (1886); Adams v. New York, 192 U.S.
585, 598 (1904).

36 Thus, the rule that “mere evidence” could not be seized but rather only the
fruits of crime, its instrumentalities, or contraband, turned upon the question of the
right of the public to possess the materials or the police power to make possession
by the possessor unlawful. Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921), overruled
by Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). See also Davis v. United States, 328
U.S. 582 (1946). Standing to contest unlawful searches and seizures was based upon
property interests, United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48 (1951); Jones v. United States,
362 U.S. 257 (1960), as well as decision upon the validity of a consent to search.
Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961); Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483
(1964); Frazier v. Culp, 394 U.S. 731, 740 (1969).
37 277 U.S. 438 (1928). See also Goldman v. United States, 316 U.S. 129 (1942)
(detectaphone placed against wall of adjoining room; no search and seizure).

where there had been an invasion—a technical trespass—

electronic surveillance was deemed subject to Fourth Amendment
restrictions.38
The Court later rejected this approach. “The premise that prop-
erty interests control the right of the government to search and seize
has been discredited. . . . We have recognized that the principal ob-
ject of the Fourth Amendment is the protection of privacy rather
than property, and have increasingly discarded fictional and proce-
dural barriers rested on property concepts.” 39 Thus, because the
Amendment “protects people, not places,” the requirement of ac-
tual physical trespass is dispensed with and electronic surveillance
was made subject to the Amendment’s requirements.40
The new test, propounded in Katz v. United States, is whether
there is an expectation of privacy upon which one may “justifiably”
rely.41 “What a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in his
own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. But what he seeks to preserve as private, even in an area ac-
cessible to the public, may be constitutionally protected.” 42 That is,
the “capacity to claim the protection of the Amendment depends not
upon a property right in the invaded place but upon whether the
area was one in which there was reasonable expectation of freedom
from governmental intrusion.” 43
38 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961) (spike mike pushed through
a party wall until it hit a heating duct).

39 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967).
40 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (warrantless use of listening
and recording device placed on outside of phone booth violates Fourth Amendment).
See also Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 32–33 (2001) (holding presumptively
unreasonable the warrantless use of a thermal imaging device to detect activity within
a home by measuring heat outside the home, and noting that a contrary holding
would permit developments in police technology “to erode the privacy guaranteed by
the Fourth Amendment.”
41 389 U.S. at 353. Justice Harlan, concurring, formulated a two pronged test
for determining whether the privacy interest is paramount: “first that a person have
exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expecta-
tion be one that society is prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’ ” Id. at 361.
42 389 U.S. at 351–52.
43 Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 368 (1968) (official had a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in an office he shared with others, although he owned neither the
premises nor the papers seized). Minnesota v. Olson, 495 U.S. 91 (1990) (overnight
guest in home has a reasonable expectation of privacy). But cf. Minnesota v. Carter,
525 U.S. 83 (1998) (a person present in someone else’s apartment for only a few
hours for the purpose of bagging cocaine for later sale has no legitimate expectation
of privacy); Cf. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) (auto passengers demonstrated
no legitimate expectation of privacy in glove compartment or under seat of auto).
Property rights are still protected by the Amendment, however. A “seizure” of prop-
erty can occur when there is some meaningful interference with an individual’s pos-
sessory interests in that property, and regardless of whether there is any interfer-
ence with the individual’s privacy interest. Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56 (1992)
(a seizure occurred when sheriff ’s deputies assisted in the disconnection and re-
Katz’s focus on privacy was revitalized in Kyllo v. United States,44

in which the Court invalidated the warrantless use of a thermal
imaging device directed at a private home from a public street. The
rule devised by the Court to limit police use of new technology that
can “shrink the realm of guaranteed privacy” is that “obtaining by
sense-enhancing technology any information regarding the interior
of the home that could not otherwise have been obtained without
physical ‘intrusion into a constitutionally protected area’ . . . consti-
tutes a search—at least where (as here) the technology in question
is not in general public use.” 45 Relying on Katz, the Court rejected
as “mechanical” the Government’s attempted distinction between off-
the-wall and through-the-wall surveillance. Permitting all off-the-
wall observations, the Court observed, “would leave the home-
owner at the mercy of advancing technology—including technology
that could discern all human activity in the home.”
Although the sanctity of the home has been strongly reaffirmed,
protection of privacy in other contexts becomes more problematic. A
two-part test that Justice Harlan suggested in Katz often provides the
starting point for analysis.46 The first element, the “subjective expec-
tation” of privacy, has largely dwindled as a viable standard, be-
cause, as Justice Harlan noted in a subsequent case, “our expecta-
tions, and the risks we assume, are in large part reflections of laws
that translate into rules the customs and values of the past and pres-
ent.” 47 As for the second element, whether one has a “legitimate” ex-
pectation of privacy that society finds “reasonable” to recognize, the
Court has said that “[l]egitimation of expectations of privacy by law
must have a source outside of the Fourth Amendment, either by ref-
erence to concepts of real or personal property law or to understand-
ings that are recognized and permitted by society.” 48
moval of a mobile home in the course of an eviction from a mobile home park). The
reasonableness of a seizure, however, is an additional issue that may still hinge on
privacy interests. United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 120–21 (1984) (DEA agents
reasonably seized package for examination after private mail carrier had opened the
damaged package for inspection, discovered presence of contraband, and informed
agents).
44 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
45 533 U.S. at 34.
46 Justice Harlan’s opinion has been much relied upon. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143–144 n.12 (1978); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1979); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91–92
(1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105–06 (1980); Bond v. United States,
529 U.S. 334, 338 (2000).
47 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786 (1971). See Smith v. Maryland, 442
U.S. 735, 740 n.5 (1979) (government could not condition “subjective expectations”
by, say, announcing that henceforth all homes would be subject to warrantless en-
try, and thus destroy the “legitimate expectation of privacy”).
48 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 144 n.12 (1978).
Thus, protection of the home is at the apex of Fourth Amend-

ment coverage because of the right associated with ownership to ex-
clude others; 49 but ownership of other things, i.e., automobiles, does
not carry a similar high degree of protection.50 That a person has taken
normal precautions to maintain his privacy, that is, precautions cus-
tomarily taken by those seeking to exclude others, is usually a sig-
nificant factor in determining legitimacy of expectation.51 Some ex-
pectations, the Court has held, are simply not among those that society
is prepared to accept.52 In the context of norms for the use of rapidly
evolving communications devices, the Court was reluctant to con-
sider “the whole concept of privacy expectations” at all, preferring other
decisional grounds: “The judiciary risks error by elaborating too fully
on the Fourth Amendment implications of emerging technology be-
fore its role in society has become clear.” 53
What seems to have emerged is a balancing standard that re-
quires “an assessing of the nature of a particular practice and the
likely extent of its impact on the individual’s sense of security bal-
anced against the utility of the conduct as a technique of law en-
forcement.” Whereas Justice Harlan saw a greater need to restrain
police officers through the warrant requirement as the intrusions
on individual privacy grow more extensive,54 the Court’s solicitude
for law enforcement objectives frequently tilts the balance in the
other direction.
49 E.g., Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Mincey v. Arizona, 437
U.S. 385 (1978); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980); Kyllo v. United States,
533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001).
50 E.g., United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). See also Donovan v. Dewey,
452 U.S. 594 (1981) (commercial premises); Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S. 463 (1985)
(no legitimate expectation of privacy in denying to undercover officers allegedly ob-
scene materials offered to public in bookstore).
51 E.g., United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 11 (1977); Katz v. United States,
389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967). But cf. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)
(no legitimate expectation of privacy in automobile left with doors locked and win-
dows rolled up). In Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), the fact that defen-
dant had dumped a cache of drugs into his companion’s purse, having known her
for only a few days and knowing others had access to the purse, was taken to estab-
lish that he had no legitimate expectation the purse would be free from intrusion.
52 E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (bank records); Smith v.
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (numbers dialed from one’s telephone); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prison cell); Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983)
(shipping container opened and inspected by customs agents and resealed and deliv-
ered to the addressee); California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (garbage in sealed
plastic bags left at curb for collection).
53 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–1332, slip op. at 10 (2010) The
Court cautioned that “[a] broad holding concerning employees’ privacy expectations
vis-a-vis employer-provided technological equipment might have implications for fu-
ture cases that cannot be predicted.” Id. at 11–12.
54 United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745, 786–87 (1971) (Justice Harlan dissent-
ing).
Application of this balancing test, because of the Court’s weigh-

ing of law enforcement investigative needs,55 and its subjective evalu-
ation of privacy needs, has led to the creation of a two-tier or sliding-
tier scale of privacy interests. The privacy test was originally designed
to permit a determination that an interest protected by the Fourth
Amendment had been invaded.56 If it had been, then ordinarily a
warrant was required, subject only to the narrowly defined excep-
tions, and the scope of the search under those exceptions was “strictly
tied to and justified by the circumstances which rendered its initia-
tion permissible.” 57 But the Court now uses the test to determine
whether the interest invaded is important or persuasive enough so
that a warrant is required to justify it; 58 if the individual has a
lesser expectation of privacy, then the invasion may be justified, ab-
sent a warrant, by the reasonableness of the intrusion.59 Excep-
tions to the warrant requirement are no longer evaluated solely by
the justifications for the exception, e.g., exigent circumstances, and
the scope of the search is no longer tied to and limited by the justi-
fication for the exception.60 The result has been a considerable ex-
pansion, beyond what existed prior to Katz, of the power of police
and other authorities to conduct searches.
55 E.g., Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 429, 433–34 (1981) (Justice Powell
concurring), quoted with approval in United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 815–16 &
n.21 (1982).
56 Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351–52 (1967).
57 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968).
58 The prime example is the home, so that for entries either to search or to ar-
rest, “the Fourth Amendment has drawn a firm line at the entrance to the house.
Absent exigent circumstances, that threshold may not reasonably be crossed with-
out a warrant.” Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 590 (1980); Steagald v. United
States, 451 U.S. 204, 212 (1981); Kirk v. Louisiana, 536 U.S. 635 (2002) (per curiam).
See also Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). Privacy in the home is not limited
to intimate matters. “In the home all details are intimate details, because the en-
tire area is held safe from prying government eyes.” Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S.
27, 37 (2001).
59 One has a diminished expectation of privacy in automobiles. Arkansas v. Sand-
ers, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979) (collecting cases); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798,
804–09 (1982). A person’s expectation of privacy in personal luggage and other closed
containers is substantially greater than in an automobile, United States v. Chadwick,
433 U.S. 1, 13 (1977); Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753 (1979), although, if the
luggage or container is found in an automobile as to which there exists probable
cause to search, the legitimate expectancy diminishes accordingly. United States v.
Ross, supra. There is also a diminished expectation of privacy in a mobile home parked
in a parking lot and licensed for vehicular travel. California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386
(1985) (leaving open the question of whether the automobile exception also applies
to a “mobile” home being used as a residence and not adapted for immediate vehicu-
lar use).
60 E.g., Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975) (if probable cause to search automo-
bile existed at scene, it can be removed to station and searched without warrant);
United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973) (once an arrest has been validly made,
search pursuant thereto is so minimally intrusive in addition that scope of search is
not limited by necessity of security of officer); United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S.
In United States v. Jones 61 the Court seemed to revitalize the

significance of governmental trespass in determining whether a search
has occurred, suggesting that an expectation-of-privacy analysis is
needed only where no such trespass is at issue. In Jones, the Court
considered whether the attachment of a Global-Position-System de-
vice to a car used by a suspected narcotics dealer, and the monitor-
ing of such device for twenty-eight days, constituted a search for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Scalia, writing for the
Court, found that the attachment of the device to the car repre-
sented a physical intrusion on private property, and thus obviated
the need for an expectation-of-privacy analysis.62 While this hold-
ing meant that the Court did not rule on the constitutional signifi-
cance of long-term governmental monitoring of a defendant’s move-
ments without trespass (such as might occur by tracking a cell phone),
a different majority appears prepared to find a search in those cir-
cumstances.63
Arrests and Other Detentions.—That the Fourth Amend-
ment was intended to protect against arbitrary arrests as well as
against unreasonable searches was early assumed by Chief Justice
Marshall 64 and is now established law.65 At common law, warrant-
less arrests of persons who had committed a breach of the peace or
a felony were permitted,66 and this history is reflected in the fact
that the Fourth Amendment is satisfied if the arrest is made in a
public place on probable cause, regardless of whether a warrant has
800 (1974) (incarcerated suspect; officers need no warrant to take his clothes for test
because little additional intrusion). But see Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979)
(officers on premises to execute search warrant of premises may not without more
search persons found on premises).
61 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–1259, slip op. (2012).
62 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–1259, slip op. at 3–7. Justice Scalia reprised his physi-
cal trespass analysis in Florida v. Jardines, 569 U.S. ___, No. 11–564, slip op. (2013)
(police use of drug-sniffing dog on the front porch of a house based on month-old
anonymous tip). Emphasizing the primacy of the home among constitutionally pro-
tected areas, Justice Scalia reviewed the law of trespass and concluded that there is
no implied license, under customary community practice, for police to mount a porch
to conduct a drug sniff by a trained canine. Any implied license for the public to
approach a house is limited not only to specific areas, but also to specific purposes,
according to Justice Scalia. Four dissenting Justices disagreed with this last point,
and further concluded that the Katz “reasonable expectation of privacy” test was no
bar. 569 U.S. ___, No. 11–564, slip op. (2013) (Alito, J., dissenting).
63 565 U.S. ___, No. 10–1259, slip op. at 14 (Alito, J, concurring in judgment);
Id. at 3 (Sotomayor, J., concurring);

64 Ex parte Burford, 7 U.S. (3 Cr.) 448 (1806).
65 Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480, 485–86 (1958); United States v.
Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 416–18 (1976); Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 583–86
(1980); Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 211–13 (1981).
66 1 J. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 193 (1883). At common
law warrantless arrest was also permissible for some misdemeanors not involving a
breach of the peace. See the lengthy historical treatment in Atwater v. City of Lago
Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 326–45 (2001).
been obtained.67 However, in order to effectuate an arrest in the

home, absent consent or exigent circumstances, police officers must
have a warrant.68
The Fourth Amendment applies to “seizures” and it is not nec-
essary that a detention be a formal arrest in order to bring to bear
the requirements of warrants, or probable cause in instances in which
warrants are not required.69 Some objective justification must be
shown to validate all seizures of the person,70 including seizures
that involve only a brief detention short of arrest, although the na-
ture of the detention will determine whether probable cause or some
reasonable and articulable suspicion is necessary.71
67 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976). See also United States v. Santana,
427 U.S. 38 (1976) (sustaining warrantless arrest of suspect in her home when she
was initially approached in her doorway and then retreated into house). However, a
suspect arrested on probable cause but without a warrant is entitled to a prompt,
nonadversary hearing before a magistrate under procedures designed to provide a
fair and reliable determination of probable cause in order to keep the arrestee in
custody. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (1975). A “prompt” hearing now means a
hearing that is administratively convenient. See County of Riverside v. McLaughlin,
500 U.S. 44, 56 (1991) (authorizing “as a general matter” detention for up to 48
hours without a probable-cause hearing, after which time the burden shifts to the
government to demonstrate extraordinary circumstances justifying further deten-
tion).
68 Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980) (voiding state law authorizing police
to enter private residence without a warrant to make an arrest); Steagald v. United

States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981) (officers with arrest warrant for A entered B’s home with-
out search warrant and discovered incriminating evidence; violated Fourth Amend-
ment in absence of warrant to search the home); Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811
(1985) (officers went to suspect’s home and took him to police station for fingerprint-
ing).
69 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980) (“a person has been
‘seized’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment only if, in view of all the cir-
cumstances surrounding the incident, a reasonable person would have believed that
he was not free to leave”). See also Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980); United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878 (1975); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 16–19
(1968); Kaupp v. Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003). Apprehension by the use of deadly force
is a seizure subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement. See,
e.g., Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (police officer’s fatal shooting of a flee-
ing suspect); Brower v. County of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (1989) (police roadblock de-
signed to end car chase with fatal crash); Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372 (2007) (po-
lice officer’s ramming fleeing motorist’s car from behind in attempt to stop him).
70 The justification must be made to a neutral magistrate, not to the arrestee.
There is no constitutional requirement that an officer inform an arrestee of the rea-

son for his arrest. Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 155 (2004) (the offense for
which there is probable cause to arrest need not be closely related to the offense
stated by the officer at the time of arrest).
71 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 650 (1979) (“unreasonable seizure . . . to
stop an automobile . . . for the purpose of checking the driving license of the opera-
tor and the registration of the car, where there is neither probable cause to believe
nor reasonable suspicion” that a law was violated); Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51
(1979) (detaining a person for the purpose of requiring him to identify himself con-
stitutes a seizure requiring a “reasonable, articulable suspicion that a crime had
just been, was being, or was about to be committed”); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438,
The Fourth Amendment does not require an officer to consider

whether to issue a citation rather than arresting (and placing in
custody) a person who has committed a minor offense—even a mi-
nor traffic offense. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista,72 the Court, even
while acknowledging that the case before it involved “gratuitous hu-
miliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising
extremely poor judgment,” refused to require that “case-by-case de-
terminations of government need” to place traffic offenders in cus-
tody be subjected to a reasonableness inquiry, “lest every discretion-
ary judgment in the field be converted into an occasion for
constitutional review.” 73 Citing some state statutes that limit war-
rantless arrests for minor offenses, the Court contended that the
matter is better left to statutory rule than to application of broad
constitutional principle.74 Thus, Atwater and County of Riverside v.
McLaughlin 75 together mean that—as far as the Constitution is con-
cerned—police officers have almost unbridled discretion to decide
whether to issue a summons for a minor traffic offense or whether
instead to place the offending motorist in jail, where she may be
kept for up to 48 hours with little recourse. Even when an arrest
for a minor offense is prohibited by state law, the arrest will not
violate the Fourth Amendment if it was based on probable cause.76
Until relatively recently, the legality of arrests was seldom liti-
gated in the Supreme Court because of the rule that a person de-
tained pursuant to an arbitrary seizure—unlike evidence obtained
as a result of an unlawful search—remains subject to custody and
presentation to court.77 But the application of self-incrimination and
other exclusionary rules to the states and the heightening of their
scope in state and federal cases alike brought forth the rule that
441 (1980) (requesting ticket stubs and identification from persons disembarking from
plane not reasonable where stated justifications would apply to “a very large cat-
egory of innocent travelers,” e.g., travelers arrived from “a principal place of origin
of cocaine”); Michigan v. Summers, 452 U.S. 692, 705 (1981) (“it is constitutionally
reasonable to require that [a] citizen . . . remain while officers of the law execute a
valid warrant to search his home”); Illinois v. McArthur, 531 U.S. 326 (2001) (approv-
ing “securing” of premises, preventing homeowner from reentering, while a search
warrant is obtained); Los Angeles County v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007) (where depu-
ties executing a search warrant did not know that the house being searched had
recently been sold, it was reasonable to hold new homeowners, who had been sleep-
ing in the nude, at gunpoint for one to two minutes without allowing them to dress
or cover themselves, even though the deputies knew that the homeowners were of a
different race from the suspects named in the warrant).
72 532 U.S. 318 (2001).
73 532 U.S. at 346–47.
74 532 U.S. at 352.
75 500 U.S. 44 (1991).
76 Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008).
77 Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 440 (1886); see also Albrecht v. United States,
273 U.S. 1 (1927); Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952).

verbal evidence, confessions, and other admissions, like all deriva-

tive evidence obtained as a result of unlawful seizures, could be ex-
cluded.78 Thus, a confession made by one illegally in custody must
be suppressed, unless the causal connection between the illegal ar-
rest and the confession had become so attenuated that the latter
should not be deemed “tainted” by the former.79 Similarly, finger-
prints and other physical evidence obtained as a result of an unlaw-
ful arrest must be suppressed.80
Searches and Inspections in Noncriminal Cases.—Certain
early cases held that the Fourth Amendment was applicable only
when a search was undertaken for criminal investigatory pur-
poses,81 and the Supreme Court until recently employed a reason-
ableness test for such searches without requiring either a warrant
or probable cause in the absence of a warrant.82 But, in 1967, the
Court in two cases held that administrative inspections to detect
building code violations must be undertaken pursuant to warrant
if the occupant objects.83 “We may agree that a routine inspection
of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intru-
sion than the typical policeman’s search for the fruits and instru-
78 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). Such evidence is the “fruit
of the poisonous tree,” Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338, 341 (1939), that is,
evidence derived from the original illegality. Previously, if confessions were volun-
tary for purposes of the self-incrimination clause, they were admissible notwithstand-
ing any prior official illegality. Colombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
79 Although there is a presumption that the illegal arrest is the cause of the
subsequent confession, the presumption is rebuttable by a showing that the confes-

sion is the result of “an intervening . . . act of free will.” Wong Sun v. United States,
371 U.S. 471, 486 (1963). The factors used to determine whether the taint has been
dissipated are the time between the illegal arrest and the confession, whether there
were intervening circumstances (such as consultation with others, Miranda warn-
ings, etc.), and the degree of flagrancy and purposefulness of the official conduct.
Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975) (Miranda warnings alone insufficient); Dunaway
v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982); Kaupp v.
Texas, 538 U.S. 626 (2003). In Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356 (1972), the fact
that the suspect had been taken before a magistrate who advised him of his rights
and set bail, after which he confessed, established a sufficient intervening circum-
stance.
80 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Taylor v. Alabama, 457 U.S. 687
(1982). In United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980), the Court, unanimously but
for a variety of reasons, held proper the identification in court of a defendant, who
had been wrongly arrested without probable cause, by the crime victim. The court
identification was not tainted by either the arrest or the subsequent in-custody iden-
tification. See also Hayes v. Florida, 470 U.S. 811, 815 (1985), suggesting in dictum
that a “narrowly circumscribed procedure for fingerprinting detentions on less than
probable cause” may be permissible.
81 In re Strouse, 23 Fed. Cas. 261 (No. 13,548) (D. Nev. 1871); In re Meador, 16
Fed. Cas. 1294, 1299 (No. 9375) (N.D. Ga. 1869).

82 Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217 (1960); Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360
(1959); Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).
83 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967) (home); See v. City of Se-
attle, 387 U.S. 541 (1967) (commercial warehouse).

mentalities of crime. . . . But we cannot agree that the Fourth Amend-

ment interests at stake in these inspection cases are merely
‘peripheral.’ It is surely anomalous to say that the individual and
his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.” 84 Cer-
tain administrative inspections used to enforce regulatory schemes
with regard to such items as alcohol and firearms are, however, ex-
empt from the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement and may
be authorized simply by statute.85
Camara and See were reaffirmed in Marshall v. Barlow’s, Inc.,86
in which the Court held to violate the Fourth Amendment a provi-
sion of the Occupational Safety and Health Act that authorized fed-
eral inspectors to search the work area of any employment facility
covered by the Act for safety hazards and violations of regulations,
without a warrant or other legal process. The liquor and firearms
exceptions were distinguished on the basis that those industries had
a long tradition of close government supervision, so that a person
in those businesses gave up his privacy expectations. But OSHA
was a relatively recent statute and it regulated practically every
business in or affecting interstate commerce; it was not open to a
legislature to extend regulation and then follow it with warrant-
less inspections. Additionally, OSHA inspectors had unbounded dis-
cretion in choosing which businesses to inspect and when to do so,
leaving businesses at the mercy of possibly arbitrary actions and
certainly with no assurances as to limitation on scope and stan-
dards of inspections. Further, warrantless inspections were not nec-
essary to serve an important governmental interest, as most busi-
nesses would consent to inspection and it was not inconvenient to
require OSHA to resort to an administrative warrant in order to
inspect sites where consent was refused.87
84 Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967).

85 Colonnade Catering Corp. v. United States, 397 U.S. 72 (1970); United States
v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972). Colonnade, involving liquor, was based on the long
history of close supervision of the industry. Biswell, involving firearms, introduced
factors that were subsequently to prove significant. Thus, although the statute was
of recent enactment, firearms constituted a pervasively regulated industry, so that
dealers had no reasonable expectation of privacy, because the law provides for regu-
lar inspections. Further, warrantless inspections were needed for effective enforce-
ment of the statute.
86 436 U.S. 307 (1978). Dissenting, Justice Stevens, with Justices Rehnquist and
Blackmun, argued that not the warrant clause but the reasonableness clause should
govern administrative inspections. Id. at 325.
87 Administrative warrants issued on the basis of less than probable cause but
only on a showing that a specific business had been chosen for inspection on the
basis of a general administrative plan would suffice. Even without a necessity for
probable cause, the requirement would assure the interposition of a neutral officer
to establish that the inspection was reasonable and was properly authorized. 436
In Donovan v. Dewey,88 however, Barlow’s was substantially lim-

ited and a new standard emerged permitting extensive governmen-
tal inspection of commercial property,89 absent warrants. Under the
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act, governing underground and
surface mines (including stone quarries), federal officers are di-
rected to inspect underground mines at least four times a year and
surface mines at least twice a year, pursuant to extensive regula-
tions as to standards of safety. The statute specifically provides for
absence of advanced notice and requires the Secretary of Labor to
institute court actions for injunctive and other relief in cases in which
inspectors are denied admission. Sustaining the statute, the Court
proclaimed that government had a “greater latitude” to conduct war-
rantless inspections of commercial property than of homes, because
of “the fact that the expectation of privacy that the owner of com-
mercial property enjoys in such property differs significantly from
the sanctity accorded an individual’s home, and that this privacy
interest may, in certain circumstances, be adequately protected by
regulatory schemes authorizing warrantless inspections.” 90
Dewey was distinguished from Barlow’s in several ways. First,
Dewey involved a single industry, unlike the broad coverage in
Barlow’s. Second, the OSHA statute gave minimal direction to in-
spectors as to time, scope, and frequency of inspections, while FMSHA
specified a regular number of inspections pursuant to standards.
Third, deference was due Congress’s determination that unan-
nounced inspections were necessary if the safety laws were to be
effectively enforced. Fourth, FMSHA provided businesses the oppor-
tunity to contest the search by resisting in the civil proceeding the
U.S. at 321, 323. The dissenters objected that the warrant clause was being consti-
tutionally diluted. Id. at 325. Administrative warrants were approved also in Camara
v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). Previously, one of the reasons given
for finding administrative and noncriminal inspections not covered by the Fourth
Amendment was the fact that the warrant clause would be as rigorously applied to
them as to criminal searches and seizures. Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360, 373
(1959). See also Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 275 (1973) (Justice
Powell concurring) (suggesting a similar administrative warrant procedure empow-
ering police and immigration officers to conduct roving searches of automobiles in
areas near the Nation’s borders); id. at 270 n.3 (indicating that majority Justices
were divided on the validity of such area search warrants); id. at 288 (dissenting
Justice White indicating approval); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543,
547 n.2, 562 n.15 (1976).
88 452 U.S. 594 (1981).
89 There is no suggestion that warrantless inspections of homes is broadened.
452 U.S. at 598, or that warrantless entry under exigent circumstances is curtailed.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tyler, 436 U.S. 499 (1978) (no warrant required for entry by
firefighters to fight fire; once there, firefighters may remain for reasonable time to
investigate the cause of the fire).
90 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 598–99 (1981).
Secretary had to bring if consent was denied.91 The standard of a

long tradition of government supervision permitting warrantless in-
spections was dispensed with, because it would lead to “absurd re-
sults,” in that new and emerging industries posing great hazards
would escape regulation.92 Dewey suggests, therefore, that warrant-
less inspections of commercial establishments are permissible so long
as the legislature carefully drafts its statute.
Dewey was applied in New York v. Burger 93 to inspection of au-
tomobile junkyards and vehicle dismantling operations, a situation
where there is considerable overlap between administrative and pe-
nal objectives. Applying the Dewey three-part test, the Court con-
cluded that New York has a substantial interest in stemming the
tide of automobile thefts, that regulation of vehicle dismantling rea-
sonably serves that interest, and that statutory safeguards pro-
vided adequate substitute for a warrant requirement. The Court re-
jected the suggestion that the warrantless inspection provisions were
designed as an expedient means of enforcing the penal laws, and
instead saw narrower, valid regulatory purposes to be served, such
as establishing a system for tracking stolen automobiles and parts,
and enhancing the ability of legitimate businesses to compete. “[A]
State can address a major social problem both by way of an admin-
istrative scheme and through penal sanctions,” the Court declared;
in such circumstances warrantless administrative searches are per-
missible in spite of the fact that evidence of criminal activity may
well be uncovered in the process.94
In other contexts, the Court has also elaborated the constitu-
tional requirements affecting administrative inspections and searches.
In Michigan v. Tyler,95 for example, it subdivided the process by
which an investigation of the cause of a fire may be conducted. En-
try to fight the fire is, of course, an exception based on exigent cir-
cumstances, and no warrant or consent is needed; fire fighters on
the scene may seize evidence relating to the cause under the plain
view doctrine. Additional entries to investigate the cause of the fire
91 452 U.S. at 596–97, 604–05. Pursuant to the statute, however, the Secretary
has promulgated regulations providing for the assessment of civil penalties for de-
nial of entry and Dewey had been assessed a penalty of $1,000. Id. at 597 n.3. It
was also true in Barlow’s that the government resorted to civil process upon refusal
to admit. 436 U.S. at 317 & n.12.
92 Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 606 (1981). Duration of regulation will now
be a factor in assessing the legitimate expectation of privacy of a business. Id. Ac-

cord, New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987) (although duration of regulation of
vehicle dismantling was relatively brief, history of regulation of junk business gen-
erally was lengthy, and current regulation of dismantling was extensive).
93 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
94 482 U.S. at 712 (emphasis in original).
95 436 U.S. 499 (1978).
must be made pursuant to warrant procedures governing adminis-

trative searches. Evidence of arson discovered in the course of such
an administrative inspection is admissible at trial, but if the inves-
tigator finds probable cause to believe that arson has occurred and
requires further access to gather evidence for a possible prosecu-
tion, he must obtain a criminal search warrant.96
One curious case has approved a system of “home visits” by wel-
fare caseworkers, in which the recipients are required to admit the
worker or lose eligibility for benefits.97 In another unusual case, the
Court held that a sheriff ’s assistance to a trailer park owner in dis-
connecting and removing a mobile home constituted a “seizure” of
the home.98
In addition, there are now a number of situations, some of them
analogous to administrative searches, where “ ‘special needs’ be-
yond normal law enforcement . . . justify departures from the usual
warrant and probable cause requirements.” 99 In one of these cases
the Court, without acknowledging the magnitude of the leap from
one context to another, has taken the Dewey/Burger rationale—
developed to justify warrantless searches of business establishments—
and applied it to justify the significant intrusion into personal pri-
vacy represented by urinalysis drug testing. Because of the history
96 The Court also held that, after the fire was extinguished, if fire investigators
were unable to proceed at the moment, because of dark, steam, and smoke, it was
proper for them to leave and return at daylight without any necessity of complying
with its mandate for administrative or criminal warrants. 436 U.S. at 510–11. But
cf. Michigan v. Clifford, 464 U.S. 287 (1984) (no such justification for search of pri-
vate residence begun at 1:30 p.m. when fire had been extinguished at 7 a.m.).
97 Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971). It is not clear what rationale the ma-
jority used. It appears to have proceeded on the assumption that a “home visit” was
not a search and that the Fourth Amendment does not apply when criminal prosecu-
tion is not threatened. Neither premise is valid under Camara and its progeny, al-
though Camara preceded Wyman. Presumably, the case would today be analyzed
under the expectation of privacy/need/structural protection theory of the more re-
cent cases.
98 Soldal v. Cook County, 506 U.S. 56, 61 (1992) (home “was not only seized, it
literally was carried away, giving new meaning to the term ‘mobile home’ ”).
99 City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–1332, slip op. (2010) (reasonable-
ness test for obtaining and reviewing transcripts of on-duty text messages of police
officer using government-issued equipment); Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873
(1987) (administrative needs of probation system justify warrantless searches of pro-
bationers’ homes on less than probable cause); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526
(1984) (no Fourth Amendment protection from search of prison cell); New Jersey v.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985) (simple reasonableness standard governs searches of stu-
dents’ persons and effects by public school authorities); O’Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S.
709 (1987) (reasonableness test for work-related searches of employees’ offices by gov-
ernment employer); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989)
(neither probable cause nor individualized suspicion is necessary for mandatory drug
testing of railway employees involved in accidents or safety violations). All of these
cases are discussed infra under the general heading “Valid Searches and Seizures
Without Warrants.”
of pervasive regulation of the railroad industry, the Court rea-

soned, railroad employees have a diminished expectation of privacy
that makes mandatory urinalysis less intrusive and more reason-
able.100
With respect to automobiles, the holdings are mixed. Random
stops of automobiles to check drivers’ licenses, vehicle registra-
tions, and safety conditions were condemned as too intrusive; the
degree to which random stops would advance the legitimate govern-
mental interests involved did not outweigh the individual’s legiti-
mate expectations of privacy.101 On the other hand, in South Da-
kota v. Opperman,102 the Court sustained the admission of evidence
found when police impounded an automobile from a public street
for multiple parking violations and entered the car to secure and
inventory valuables for safekeeping. Marijuana was discovered in
the glove compartment.
Searches and Seizures Pursuant to Warrant

Emphasis upon the necessity of warrants places the judgment
of an independent magistrate between law enforcement officers and
the privacy of citizens, authorizes invasion of that privacy only upon
a showing that constitutes probable cause, and limits that invasion
by specification of the person to be seized, the place to be searched,
and the evidence to be sought.103 Although a warrant is issued ex
parte, its validity may be contested in a subsequent suppression hear-
ing if incriminating evidence is found and a prosecution is brought.104
100 Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627.

101 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Standards applied in this case had
been developed in the contexts of automobile stops at fixed points or by roving pa-
trols in border situations. Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973);
United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975); United States v. Ortiz, 422
U.S. 891 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
102 428 U.S. 364 (1976). See also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973) (sus-
taining admission of criminal evidence found when police conducted a warrantless

search of an out-of-state policeman’s automobile following an accident, in order to
find and safeguard his service revolver). The Court in both cases emphasized the
reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles and the noncriminal purposes of the
searches.
103 Although the exceptions may be different for arrest warrants and search war-
rants, the requirements for the issuance of the two are the same. Aguilar v. Texas,
378 U.S. 108, 112 n.3 (1964). Also, the standards by which the validity of warrants
are to be judged are the same, whether federal or state officers are involved. Ker v.
California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).
104 Most often, in the suppression hearings, the defendant will challenge the suf-
ficiency of the evidence presented to the magistrate to constitute probable cause.

Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S. 410 (1969); United States v. Harris, 403 U.S. 573
(1971). He may challenge the veracity of the statements used by the police to pro-
cure the warrant and otherwise contest the accuracy of the allegations going to es-
tablish probable cause, but the Court has carefully hedged his ability to do so. Franks
Issuance by Neutral Magistrate.—In numerous cases, the Court

has referred to the necessity that warrants be issued by a “judicial
officer” or a “magistrate.” 105 “The point of the Fourth Amendment,
which often is not grasped by zealous officers, is not that it denies
law enforcement the support of the usual inferences which reason-
able men draw from evidence. Its protection consists in requiring
that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and detached magis-
trate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often com-
petitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evi-
dence sufficient to support a magistrate’s disinterested determination
to issue a search warrant will justify the officers in making a search
without a warrant would reduce the Amendment to a nullity and
leave the people’s homes secure only in the discretion of police offi-
cers.” 106 These cases do not mean that only a judge or an official
who is a lawyer may issue warrants, but they do stand for two tests
of the validity of the power of the issuing party to so act. “He must
be neutral and detached, and he must be capable of determining
whether probable cause exists for the requested arrest or search.” 107
The first test cannot be met when the issuing party is himself en-
gaged in law enforcement activities,108 but the Court has not re-
quired that an issuing party have that independence of tenure and
guarantee of salary that characterizes federal judges.109 And, in pass-
v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978). He may also question the power of the official
issuing the warrant, Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449–53 (1971), or
the specificity of the particularity required. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192
(1927).
105 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464 (1932); Giordenello v. United
States, 357 U.S. 480, 486 (1958); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270 (1960);
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 356 (1967); United States v. United States Dis-
trict Court, 407 U.S. 297, 321 (1972); United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 9 (1977);
Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979).
106 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13–14 (1948).
107 Shadwick v. City of Tampa, 407 U.S. 345, 354 (1972).
108 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 449–51 (1971) (warrant issued by
state attorney general who was leading investigation and who as a justice of the
peace was authorized to issue warrants); Mancusi v. DeForte, 392 U.S. 364, 370–72
(1968) (subpoena issued by district attorney could not qualify as a valid search war-
rant); Lo-Ji Sales v. New York, 442 U.S. 319 (1979) (justice of the peace issued open-
ended search warrant for obscene materials, accompanied police during its execu-
tion, and made probable cause determinations at the scene as to particular items).
109 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270–71 (1960) (approving issuance of
warrants by United States Commissioners, many of whom were not lawyers and
none of whom had any guarantees of tenure and salary); Shadwick v. City of Tampa,
407 U.S. 345 (1972) (approving issuance of arrest warrants for violation of city ordi-
nances by city clerks who were assigned to and supervised by municipal court judges).
The Court reserved the question “whether a State may lodge warrant authority in
someone entirely outside the sphere of the judicial branch. Many persons may not
qualify as the kind of ‘public civil officers’ we have come to associate with the term
‘magistrate.’ Had the Tampa clerk been entirely divorced from a judicial position,
this case would have presented different considerations.” Id. at 352.
ing on the second test, the Court has been essentially pragmatic in
assessing whether the issuing party possesses the capacity to deter-
mine probable cause.110
Probable Cause.—The concept of “probable cause” is central
to the meaning of the warrant clause. Neither the Fourth Amend-
ment nor the federal statutory provisions relevant to the area de-
fine “probable cause”; the definition is entirely a judicial construct.
An applicant for a warrant must present to the magistrate facts
sufficient to enable the officer himself to make a determination of
probable cause. “In determining what is probable cause . . . [w]e
are concerned only with the question whether the affiant had rea-
sonable grounds at the time of his affidavit . . . for the belief that
the law was being violated on the premises to be searched; and if
the apparent facts set out in the affidavit are such that a reason-
ably discreet and prudent man would be led to believe that there
was a commission of the offense charged, there is probable cause
justifying the issuance of a warrant.” 111 Probable cause is to be de-
termined according to “the factual and practical considerations of
everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal tech-
nicians, act.” 112 Warrants are favored in the law and their use will
not be thwarted by a hypertechnical reading of the supporting affi-
davit and supporting testimony.113 For the same reason, reviewing
courts will accept evidence of a less “judicially competent or persua-
sive character than would have justified an officer in acting on his
110 407 U.S. at 350–54 (placing on defendant the burden of demonstrating that
the issuing official lacks capacity to determine probable cause). See also Connally v.
Georgia, 429 U.S. 245 (1977) (unsalaried justice of the peace who receives a sum of
money for each warrant issued but nothing for reviewing and denying a warrant is
not sufficiently detached).
111 Dumbra v. United States, 268 U.S. 435, 439, 441 (1925). “[T]he term ‘prob-
able cause’ . . . means less than evidence which would justify condemnation.” Lock
v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cr.) 339, 348 (1813). See Steele v. United States, 267
U.S. 498, 504–05 (1925). It may rest upon evidence that is not legally competent in
a criminal trial, Draper v. United States, 358 U.S. 307, 311 (1959), and it need not
be sufficient to prove guilt in a criminal trial. Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S.
160, 173 (1949). See United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 107–08 (1965). An
“anticipatory” warrant does not violate the Fourth Amendment as long as there is
probable cause to believe that the condition precedent to execution of the search
warrant will occur and that, once it has occurred, “there is a fair probability that
contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a specified place.” United States
v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006), quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
“An anticipatory warrant is ‘a warrant based upon an affidavit showing probable
cause that at some future time (but not presently) certain evidence of a crime will
be located at a specified place.’ ” 547 U.S. at 94.
112 Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175 (1949).
113 United States v. Ventresca, 380 U.S. 102, 108–09 (1965).
own without a warrant.” 114 Courts will sustain the determination

of probable cause so long as “there was substantial basis for [the
magistrate] to conclude that” there was probable cause.115
Much litigation has concerned the sufficiency of the complaint
to establish probable cause. Mere conclusory assertions are not
enough.116 In United States v. Ventresca,117 however, an affidavit by
a law enforcement officer asserting his belief that an illegal distill-
ery was being operated in a certain place, explaining that the be-
lief was based upon his own observations and upon those of fellow
investigators, and detailing a substantial amount of these personal
observations clearly supporting the stated belief, was held to be suf-
ficient to constitute probable cause. “Recital of some of the underly-
ing circumstances in the affidavit is essential,” the Court said, ob-
serving that “where these circumstances are detailed, where reason
for crediting the source of the information is given, and when a mag-
istrate has found probable cause,” the reliance on the warrant pro-
cess should not be deterred by insistence on too stringent a show-
ing.118
Requirements for establishing probable cause through reliance
on information received from an informant has divided the Court
in several cases. Although involving a warrantless arrest, Draper
v. United States 119 may be said to have begun the line of cases. A
previously reliable, named informant reported to an officer that the
defendant would arrive with narcotics on a particular train, and
114 Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 270–71 (1960). Similarly, the prefer-
ence for proceeding by warrant leads to a stricter rule for appellate review of trial
court decisions on warrantless stops and searches than is employed to review prob-
able cause to issue a warrant. Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690 (1996) (deter-
minations of reasonable suspicion to stop and probable cause to search without a
warrant should be subjected to de novo appellate review).
115 Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108, 111 (1964). It must be emphasized that the
issuing party “must judge for himself the persuasiveness of the facts relied on by a
[complainant] to show probable cause.” Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480,
486 (1958). An insufficient affidavit cannot be rehabilitated by testimony after issu-
ance concerning information possessed by the affiant but not disclosed to the magis-
trate. Whiteley v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560 (1971).
116 Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28 (1927) (affiant stated he “has good rea-
son to believe and does believe” that defendant has contraband materials in his pos-
session); Giordenello v. United States, 357 U.S. 480 (1958) (complainant merely stated
his conclusion that defendant had committed a crime). See also Nathanson v. United
States, 290 U.S. 41 (1933).
117 380 U.S. 102 (1965).
118 380 U.S. at 109.
119 358 U.S. 307 (1959). For another case applying essentially the same prob-
able cause standard to warrantless arrests as govern arrests by warrant, see Mc-
Cray v. Illinois, 386 U.S. 300 (1967) (informant’s statement to arresting officers met
Aguilar probable cause standard). See also Whitely v. Warden, 401 U.S. 560, 566
(1971) (standards must be “at least as stringent” for warrantless arrest as for obtain-
ing warrant).
described the clothes he would be wearing and the bag he would be

carrying; the informant, however, gave no basis for his informa-
tion. FBI agents met the train, observed that the defendant fully
fit the description, and arrested him. The Court held that the cor-
roboration of part of the informer’s tip established probable cause
to support the arrest. A case involving a search warrant, Jones v.
United States,120 apparently considered the affidavit as a whole to
see whether the tip plus the corroborating information provided a
substantial basis for finding probable cause, but the affidavit also
set forth the reliability of the informer and sufficient detail to indi-
cate that the tip was based on the informant’s personal observa-
tion. Aguilar v. Texas 121 held insufficient an affidavit that merely
asserted that the police had “reliable information from a credible
person” that narcotics were in a certain place, and held that when
the affiant relies on an informant’s tip he must present two types
of evidence to the magistrate. First, the affidavit must indicate the
informant’s basis of knowledge—the circumstances from which the
informant concluded that evidence was present or that crimes had
been committed—and, second, the affiant must present information
that would permit the magistrate to decide whether or not the in-
formant was trustworthy. Then, in Spinelli v. United States,122 the
Court applied Aguilar in a situation in which the affidavit con-
tained both an informant’s tip and police information of a corrobo-
rating nature.
The Court rejected the “totality” test derived from Jones and
held that the informant’s tip and the corroborating evidence must
be separately considered. The tip was rejected because the affidavit
contained neither any information which showed the basis of the
tip nor any information which showed the informant’s credibility.
The corroborating evidence was rejected as insufficient because it
did not establish any element of criminality but merely related to
details which were innocent in themselves. No additional corrobo-
rating weight was due as a result of the bald police assertion that
defendant was a known gambler, although the tip related to gam-
bling. Returning to the totality test, however, the Court in United
States v. Harris 123 approved a warrant issued largely on an inform-
er’s tip that over a two-year period he had purchased illegal whis-
120 362 U.S. 257 (1960).
121 378 U.S. 108 (1964).
122 393 U.S. 410 (1969). Both concurring and dissenting Justices recognized ten-
sion between Draper and Aguilar. See id. at 423 (Justice White concurring), id. at
429 (Justice Black dissenting and advocating the overruling of Aguilar).
123 403 U.S. 573 (1971). See also Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)
(approving warrantless stop of motorist based on informant’s tip that “may have been
insufficient” under Aguilar and Spinelli as basis for warrant).
key from the defendant at the defendant’s residence, most recently

within two weeks of the tip. The affidavit contained rather detailed
information about the concealment of the whiskey, and asserted that
the informer was a “prudent person,” that defendant had a reputa-
tion as a bootlegger, that other persons had supplied similar infor-
mation about him, and that he had been found in control of illegal
whiskey within the previous four years. The Court determined that
the detailed nature of the tip, the personal observation thus re-
vealed, and the fact that the informer had admitted to criminal be-
havior by his purchase of whiskey were sufficient to enable the mag-
istrate to find him reliable, and that the supporting evidence, including
defendant’s reputation, could supplement this determination.
The Court expressly abandoned the two-part Aguilar-Spinelli test
and returned to the “totality of the circumstances” approach to evalu-
ate probable cause based on an informant’s tip in Illinois v. Gates.124
The main defect of the two-part test, Justice Rehnquist concluded
for the Court, was in treating an informant’s reliability and his ba-
sis for knowledge as independent requirements. Instead, “a defi-
ciency in one may be compensated for, in determining the overall
reliability of a tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or by some
other indicia of reliability.” 125 In evaluating probable cause, “[t]he
task of the issuing magistrate is simply to make a practical, com-
monsense decision whether, given all the circumstances set forth in
the affidavit before him, including the ‘veracity’ and ‘basis of knowl-
edge’ of persons supplying hearsay information, there is a fair prob-
ability that contraband or evidence of a crime will be found in a
particular place.” 126
Particularity.—“The requirement that warrants shall particu-
larly describe the things to be seized makes general searches un-
der them impossible and prevents the seizure of one thing under a
warrant describing another. As to what is to be taken, nothing is
left to the discretion of the officer executing the warrant.” 127 This
requirement thus acts to limit the scope of the search, as the execut-
ing officers should be limited to looking in places where the de-
124 462 U.S. 213 (1983). Justice Rehnquist’s opinion of the Court was joined by
Chief Justice Burger and by Justices Blackmun, Powell, and O’Connor. Justices Bren-
nan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
125 462 U.S. at 213.
126 462 U.S. at 238. For an application of the Gates “totality of the circum-
stances” test to the warrantless search of a vehicle by a police officer, see, e.g., Florida
v. Harris, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–817, slip op. (2013).
127 Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927). See Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476 (1965). Of course, police who are lawfully on the premises pursuant to
a warrant may seize evidence of crime in “plain view” even if that evidence is not
described in the warrant. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–71 (1971).
scribed object could be expected to be found.128 The purpose of the

particularity requirement extends beyond prevention of general
searches; it also assures the person whose property is being searched
of the lawful authority of the executing officer and of the limits of
his power to search. It follows, therefore, that the warrant itself
must describe with particularity the items to be seized, or that such
itemization must appear in documents incorporated by reference in
the warrant and actually shown to the person whose property is to
be searched.129
First Amendment Bearing on Probable Cause and Particu-
larity.—Where the warrant process is used to authorize seizure of
books and other items that may be protected by the First Amend-
ment, the Court has required government to observe more exacting
standards than in other cases.130 Seizure of materials arguably pro-
tected by the First Amendment is a form of prior restraint that re-
quires strict observance of the Fourth Amendment. At a minimum,
a warrant is required, and additional safeguards may be required
for large-scale seizures. Thus, in Marcus v. Search Warrant,131 the
seizure of 11,000 copies of 280 publications pursuant to warrant is-
sued ex parte by a magistrate who had not examined any of the
publications but who had relied on the conclusory affidavit of a po-
liceman was voided. Failure to scrutinize the materials and to par-
ticularize the items to be seized was deemed inadequate, and it was
128 In Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17–19, (1968), the Court wrote: “This Court has
held in the past that a search which is reasonable at its inception may violate the
Fourth Amendment by virtue of its intolerable intensity and scope. Kremen v. United
States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957); Go-Bart Importing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344,
356–58 (1931); see United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 586–87 (1948). The scope
of the search must be ‘strictly tied to and justified by’ the circumstances which ren-
dered its initiation permissible. Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 310 (1967) (Jus-
tice Fortas concurring); see, e.g., Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364, 367–368
(1964); Agnello v. United States, 296 U.S. 20, 30–31 (1925).” See also Andresen v.
Maryland, 427 U.S. 463, 470–82 (1976), and id. at 484, 492–93 (Justice Brennan
dissenting). In Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 569 (1969), Justices Stewart, Bren-
nan, and White would have based the decision on the principle that a valid warrant
for gambling paraphernalia did not authorize police upon discovering motion pic-
ture films in the course of the search to project the films to learn their contents.
129 Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551 (2004) (a search based on a warrant that did
not describe the items to be seized was “plainly invalid”; particularity contained in
supporting documents not cross-referenced by the warrant and not accompanying
the warrant is insufficient); United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 97, 99 (2006) (be-
cause the language of the Fourth Amendment “specifies only two matters that must
be ‘particularly describ[ed]’ in the warrant: ‘the place to be searched’ and ‘the per-
sons or things to be seized[,]’ . . . the Fourth Amendment does not require that the
triggering condition for an anticipatory warrant be set forth in the warrant itself.”
130 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 730–31 (1961); Stanford v. Texas,
379 U.S. 476, 485 (1965). For First Amendment implications of seizures under the
Federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), see First Amend-
ment: Obscenity and Prior Restraint.
131 367 U.S. 717 (1961). See Kingsley Books v. Brown, 354 U.S. 436 (1957).
further noted that police “were provided with no guide to the exer-
cise of informed discretion, because there was no step in the proce-
dure before seizure designed to focus searchingly on the question
of obscenity.” 132 A state procedure that was designed to comply with
Marcus by the presentation of copies of books to be seized to the
magistrate for his scrutiny prior to issuance of a warrant was none-
theless found inadequate by a plurality of the Court, which con-
cluded that “since the warrant here authorized the sheriff to seize
all copies of the specified titles, and since [appellant] was not af-
forded a hearing on the question of the obscenity even of the seven
novels [seven of 59 listed titles were reviewed by the magistrate]
before the warrant issued, the procedure was . . . constitutionally
deficient.” 133
Confusion remains, however, about the necessity for and the char-
acter of prior adversary hearings on the issue of obscenity. In a later
decision the Court held that, with adequate safeguards, no pre-
seizure adversary hearing on the issue of obscenity is required if
the film is seized not for the purpose of destruction as contraband
(the purpose in Marcus and A Quantity of Books), but instead to
preserve a copy for evidence.134 It is constitutionally permissible to
seize a copy of a film pursuant to a warrant as long as there is a
prompt post-seizure adversary hearing on the obscenity issue. Un-
til there is a judicial determination of obscenity, the Court advised,
the film may continue to be exhibited; if no other copy is available
either a copy of it must be made from the seized film or the film
itself must be returned.135
The seizure of a film without the authority of a constitutionally
sufficient warrant is invalid; seizure cannot be justified as inciden-
tal to arrest, as the determination of obscenity may not be made
by the officer himself.136 Nor may a warrant issue based “solely on
the conclusory assertions of the police officer without any inquiry
by the [magistrate] into the factual basis for the officer’s conclu-
sions.” 137 Instead, a warrant must be “supported by affidavits set-
132 Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961).
133 A Quantity of Books v. Kansas, 378 U.S. 205, 210 (1964).
134 Heller v. New York, 413 U.S. 483 (1973).
135 Id. at 492–93. But cf. New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 n.6
(1986), rejecting the defendant’s assertion, based on Heller, that only a single copy
rather than all copies of allegedly obscene movies should have been seized pursuant
to warrant.
136 Roaden v. Kentucky, 413 U.S. 496 (1973). See also Lo-Ji Sales v. New York,
442 U.S. 319 (1979); Walter v. United States, 447 U.S. 649 (1980). These special
constraints are inapplicable when obscene materials are purchased, and there is con-
sequently no Fourth Amendment search or seizure. Maryland v. Macon, 472 U.S.
463 (1985).
137 Lee Art Theatre, Inc. v. Virginia, 392 U.S. 636, 637 (1968) (per curiam).
ting forth specific facts in order that the issuing magistrate may
‘focus searchingly on the question of obscenity.’ ” 138 This does not
mean, however, that a higher standard of probable cause is re-
quired in order to obtain a warrant to seize materials protected by
the First Amendment. “Our reference in Roaden to a ‘higher hurdle
. . . of reasonableness’ was not intended to establish a ‘higher’ stan-
dard of probable cause for the issuance of a warrant to seize books
or films, but instead related to the more basic requirement, im-
posed by that decision, that the police not rely on the ‘exigency’ ex-
ception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement, but in-
stead obtain a warrant from a magistrate . . . .’ ” 139
In Stanford v. Texas,140 the Court voided a seizure of more than
2,000 books, pamphlets, and other documents pursuant to a war-
rant that merely authorized the seizure of books, pamphlets, and
other written instruments “concerning the Communist Party of Texas.”
“[T]he constitutional requirement that warrants must particularly
describe the ‘things to be seized’ is to be accorded the most scrupu-
lous exactitude when the ‘things’ are books, and the basis for their
seizure is the ideas which they contain. . . . No less a standard could
be faithful to First Amendment freedoms.” 141
However, the First Amendment does not bar the issuance or ex-
ecution of a warrant to search a newsroom to obtain photographs
of demonstrators who had injured several policemen, although the
Court appeared to suggest that a magistrate asked to issue such a
warrant should guard against interference with press freedoms through
limits on type, scope, and intrusiveness of the search.142
Property Subject to Seizure.—There has never been any doubt
that search warrants could be issued for the seizure of contraband
and the fruits and instrumentalities of crime.143 But, in Gouled v.
138 New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 873–74 (1986) (quoting Marcus v.
Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 732 (1961)).

139 New York v. P.J. Video, Inc., 475 U.S. 868, 875 n.6 (1986).
140 379 U.S. 476 (1965).
141 379 U.S. at 485–86. See also Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717, 723
(1961).
142 Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547 (1978). See id. at 566 (containing
suggestion mentioned in text), and id. at 566 (Justice Powell concurring) (more ex-
pressly adopting that position). In the Privacy Protection Act, Pub. L. 96–440, 94
Stat. 1879 (1980), 42 U.S.C. § 2000aa, Congress provided extensive protection against
searches and seizures not only of the news media and news people but also of oth-
ers engaged in disseminating communications to the public, unless there is prob-
able cause to believe the person protecting the materials has committed or is com-
mitting the crime to which the materials relate.
143 United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 465–66 (1932). Of course, evidence
seizable under warrant is subject to seizure without a warrant in circumstances in

which warrantless searches are justified.
United States,144 a unanimous Court limited the classes of prop-

erty subject to seizures to these three and refused to permit a sei-
zure of “mere evidence,” in this instance papers of the defendant
that were to be used as evidence against him at trial. The Court
recognized that there was “no special sanctity in papers, as distin-
guished from other forms of property, to render them immune from
search and seizure,” 145 but their character as evidence rendered them
immune. This immunity “was based upon the dual, related prem-
ises that historically the right to search for and seize property de-
pended upon the assertion by the Government of a valid claim of
superior interest, and that it was not enough that the purpose of
the search and seizure was to obtain evidence to use in apprehend-
ing and convicting criminals.” 146 More evaded than followed, the
“mere evidence” rule was overturned in 1967.147 It is now settled
that such evidentiary items as fingerprints, 148 blood, 149 urine
samples,150 fingernail and skin scrapings,151 voice and handwriting
exemplars,152 conversations,153 and other demonstrative evidence may
be obtained through the warrant process or without a warrant where
“special needs” of government are shown.154
However, some medically assisted bodily intrusions have been
held impermissible, e.g., forcible administration of an emetic to in-
144 255 U.S. 298 (1921). United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), ap-
plied the rule in a warrantless search of premises. The rule apparently never ap-
plied in case of a search of the person. Cf. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966).
145 Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306 (1921).
146 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 303 (1967). See Gouled v. United States,
255 U.S. 298, 309 (1921). The holding was derived from dicta in Boyd v. United
States, 116 U.S. 616, 624–29 (1886).
147 Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
148 Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
149 Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); Skinner v. Railway Labor Ex-
ecutives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (warrantless blood testing for drug use by rail-
road employee involved in accident).
150 Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989) (warrant-
less drug testing of railroad employee involved in accident).

151 Cupp v. Murphy, 412 U.S. 291 (1973) (sustaining warrantless taking of scrap-
ings from defendant’s fingernails at the station house, on the basis that it was a
very limited intrusion and necessary to preserve evanescent evidence).
152 United States v. Dionisio, 410 U.S. 1 (1973); United States v. Mara, 410 U.S.
19 (1973) (both sustaining grand jury subpoenas to produce voice and handwriting
exemplars, as no reasonable expectation of privacy exists with respect to those items).
153 Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 44 n.2 (1967). See also id. at 97 n.4, 107–08
(Justices Harlan and White concurring), 67 (Justice Douglas concurring).

154 Another important result of Warden v. Hayden is that third parties not sus-
pected of culpability in crime are subject to the issuance and execution of warrants
for searches and seizures of evidence. Zurcher v. Stanford Daily, 436 U.S. 547, 553–60
(1978). Justice Stevens argued for a stiffer standard for issuance of warrants to
nonsuspects, requiring in order to invade their privacy a showing that they would
not comply with a less intrusive method, such as a subpoena. Id. at 577 (dissent-
ing).
duce vomiting,155 and surgery under general anesthetic to remove

a bullet lodged in a suspect’s chest.156 Factors to be weighed in de-
termining which medical tests and procedures are reasonable in-
clude the extent to which the procedure threatens the individual’s
safety or health, “the extent of the intrusion upon the individual’s
dignitary interests in personal privacy and bodily integrity,” and the
importance of the evidence to the prosecution’s case.157
In Warden v. Hayden,158 Justice Brennan for the Court cau-
tioned that the items there seized were not “ ‘testimonial’ or ‘com-
municative’ in nature, and their introduction therefore did not com-
pel respondent to become a witness against himself in violation of
the Fifth Amendment. . . . This case thus does not require that we
consider whether there are items of evidential value whose very na-
ture precludes them from being the object of a reasonable search
and seizure.” This merging of Fourth and Fifth Amendment consid-
erations derived from Boyd v. United States,159 the first case in which
the Supreme Court considered at length the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Boyd was a quasi-criminal proceeding for the forfei-
ture of goods alleged to have been imported in violation of law, and
concerned a statute that authorized court orders to require defen-
dants to produce any document that might “tend to prove any alle-
gation made by the United States.” 160 The entire Court agreed that
there was a self-incrimination problem, but Justice Bradley for a
majority of the Justices also used the Fourth Amendment.
Although the statute did not authorize a search but instead com-
pelled the production of documents, the Justice concluded that the
law was well within the restrictions of the Search and Seizure
Clause.161 With this point established, the Justice relied on Lord
Camden’s opinion in Entick v. Carrington 162 for the proposition that
seizure of items to be used as evidence only was impermissible. Jus-
tice Bradley announced that the “essence of the offence” committed
by the government against Boyd “is not the breaking of his doors,
and the rummaging of his drawers . . . but it is the invasion of his
155 Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
156 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753 (1985).
157 Winston v. Lee, 470 U.S. 753, 761–63 (1985). Chief Justice Burger concurred
on the basis of his reading of the Court’s opinion “as not preventing detention of an
individual if there are reasonable grounds to believe that natural bodily functions
will disclose the presence of contraband materials secreted internally.” Id. at 767.
Cf. United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
158 387 U.S. 294, 302–03 (1967). Seizure of a diary was at issue in Hill v. Cali-
fornia, 401 U.S. 797, 805 (1971), but it had not been raised in the state courts and
was deemed waived.
159 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
160 Act of June 22, 1874, § 5, 18 Stat. 187.
162 Howell’s State Trials 1029, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765).
indefeasible right of personal security, personal liberty and private

property. . . . Breaking into a house and opening boxes and draw-
ers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compul-
sory extortion of a man’s own testimony or of his private papers to
be used as evidence to convict him of crime or to forfeit his goods,
is within the condemnation of that judgment. In this regard the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other.” 163
Although it may be doubtful that the equation of search war-
rants with subpoenas and other compulsory process ever really
amounted to much of a limitation,164 the Court currently dispenses
with any theory of “convergence” of the two amendments.165 Thus,
in Andresen v. Maryland,166 police executed a warrant to search de-
fendant’s offices for specified documents pertaining to a fraudulent
sale of land, and the Court sustained the admission of the papers
discovered as evidence at his trial. The Fifth Amendment was inap-
plicable, the Court held, because there had been no compulsion of
defendant to produce or to authenticate the documents.167 As for
the Fourth Amendment, because the “business records” seized were
evidence of criminal acts, they were properly seizable under the rule
of Warden v. Hayden; the fact that they were “testimonial” in na-
ture (records in the defendant’s handwriting) was irrelevant.168 Ac-
knowledging that “there are grave dangers inherent in executing a
warrant authorizing a search and seizure of a person’s papers,” the
Court observed that, although some “innocuous documents” would
have to be examined to ascertain which papers were to be seized,
authorities, just as with electronic “seizures” of telephone conversa-
tions, “must take care to assure that [searches] are conducted in a
manner that minimizes unwarranted intrusions upon privacy.” 169
Although Andresen was concerned with business records, its dis-
cussion seemed equally applicable to “personal” papers, such as dia-
ries and letters, as to which a much greater interest in privacy ex-
ists. The question of the propriety of seizure of such papers continues

164 E.g., Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 209–09 (1946).
165 Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S.
391, 405–14 (1976). Fisher states that “the precise claim sustained in Boyd would
now be rejected for reasons not there considered.” Id. at 408.
166 427 U.S. 463 (1976).
167 427 U.S. at 470–77.
168 427 U.S. at 478–84.
169 427 U.S. at 482, n.11. Minimization, as required under federal law, has not
proved to be a significant limitation. Scott v. United States, 425 U.S. 917 (1976).
to be the subject of reservation in opinions,170 but it is far from clear

that the Court would accept any such exception should the issue
be presented.171
Execution of Warrants.—The Fourth Amendment’s “general
touchstone of reasonableness . . . governs the method of execution
of the warrant.” 172 Until recently, however, most such issues have
been dealt with by statute and rule.173 It was a rule at common
law that before an officer could break and enter he must give no-
tice of his office, authority, and purpose and must in effect be re-
fused admittance,174 and until recently this has been a statutory
requirement in the federal system 175 and generally in the states.
In Ker v. California,176 the Court considered the rule of announce-
ment as a constitutional requirement, although a majority there found
circumstances justifying entry without announcement.
In Wilson v. Arkansas,177 the Court determined that the com-
mon law “knock and announce” rule is an element of the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness inquiry. The rule is merely a presump-
tion, however, that yields under various circumstances, including
those posing a threat of physical violence to officers, those in which
a prisoner has escaped and taken refuge in his dwelling, and those
in which officers have reason to believe that destruction of evi-
dence is likely. The test, articulated two years later in Richards v.
Wisconsin,178 is whether police have “a reasonable suspicion that
knocking and announcing their presence, under the particular cir-
cumstances, would be dangerous or futile, or that it would inhibit
the effective investigation of the crime.” In Richards, the Court held
170 E.g., United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 440, 444 (1976); Fisher v. United
States, 425 U.S. 391, 401 (1976); California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21,
78–79 (1974) (Justice Powell concurring).
171 See, Note, Formalism, Legal Realism, and Constitutionally Protected Privacy
Under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, 90 HARV. L. REV. 945 (1977).
172 United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998).
173 Rule 41(c), Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, provides, inter alia, that
the warrant shall command its execution in the daytime, unless the magistrate “for
reasonable cause shown” directs in the warrant that it be served at some other time.
See Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498–500 (1958); Gooding v. United States,
416 U.S. 430 (1974). A separate statutory rule applies to narcotics cases. 21 U.S.C.
§ 879(a).
174 Semayne’s Case, 5 Coke’s Rep. 91a, 77 Eng. Rep. 194 (K.B. 1604).
175 18 U.S.C. § 3109. See Miller v. United States, 357 U.S. 301 (1958); Wong Sun

176 374 U.S. 23 (1963). Ker was an arrest warrant case, but no reason appears
for differentiating search warrants. Eight Justices agreed that federal standards should
govern and that the rule of announcement was of constitutional stature, but they
divided 4-to-4 whether entry in this case had been pursuant to a valid exception.
Justice Harlan who had dissented from the federal standards issue joined the four
finding a justifiable exception to carry the result.
177 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
178 520 U.S. 385, 394 (1997).
that there is no blanket exception to the rule whenever officers are

executing a search warrant in a felony drug investigation; instead,
a case-by-case analysis is required to determine whether no-knock
entry is justified under the circumstances.179 Similarly, if officers
choose to knock and announce before searching for drugs, circum-
stances may justify forced entry if there is not a prompt re-
sponse.180 Recent federal laws providing for the issuance of war-
rants authorizing in certain circumstances “no-knock” entries to execute
warrants will no doubt present the Court with opportunities to ex-
plore the configurations of the rule of announcement.181 A statute
regulating the expiration of a warrant and issuance of another “should
be liberally construed in favor of the individual.” 182 Similarly, just
as the existence of probable cause must be established by fresh facts,
so the execution of the warrant should be done in timely fashion so
as to ensure so far as possible the continued existence of probable
cause.183
Because police actions in execution of a warrant must be re-
lated to the objectives of the authorized intrusion, and because pri-
vacy of the home lies at the core of the Fourth Amendment, police
officers violate the Amendment by bringing members of the media
or other third parties into a home during execution of a warrant if
presence of those persons was not in aid of execution of the war-
rant.184
In executing a warrant for a search of premises and named per-
sons on it, police officers may not automatically search an un-
179 The fact that officers may have to destroy property in order to conduct a
no-knock entry has no bearing on the reasonableness of their decision not to knock
and announce. United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65 (1998).
180 United States v. Banks, 540 U.S. 31 (2003) (forced entry was permissible af-
ter officers executing a warrant to search for drugs knocked, announced “police search
warrant,” and waited 15–20 seconds with no response).
181 In narcotics cases, magistrates are authorized to issue “no-knock” warrants
if they find there is probable cause to believe (1) the property sought may, and if
notice is given, will be easily and quickly destroyed or (2) giving notice will endan-
ger the life or safety of the executing officer or another person. 21 U.S.C. § 879(b).
See also D.C. Code, § 23–591.
182 Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
183 Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206 (1932).
184 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603 (1999). Accord, Hanlon v. Berger, 526 U.S.
808 (1999) (media camera crew “ride-along” with Fish and Wildlife Service agents
executing a warrant to search respondent’s ranch for evidence of illegal taking of
wildlife).
named person found there.185 If they can articulate some reason-

able basis for fearing for their safety they may conduct a “patdown,”
but to search they must have probable cause particularized with
respect to the unnamed person. Detaining occupants of a premises
pending completion of a search is another matter. In Michigan v.
Summers,186 the Court held that officers executing a search war-
rant could detain an occupant found on site without having to show
probable cause. The Court determined that detention incident to a
search, which it considered “substantially less intrusive” than ar-
rest, was justified because detention could minimize the risk of harm
to officers, facilitate entry and the conduct of the search, and pre-
vent flight.187 The occupant in Summers was descending his front
steps when the police arrived with the search warrant. The law en-
forcement interests underlying detention incident to search clearly
pertained,and the detention was upheld. But what if law enforce-
ment officers allow an exiting occupant to proceed some distance
before stopping and detaining him?
Limits on detention incident to a search under these circum-
stances were addressed in Bailey v. United States.188 The police ob-
tained a warrant to search Bailey’s residence for firearms and drugs.
Meanwhile, detectives surreptitiously staked out the residence, saw
Bailey leave and drive away, and then called in a search team. While
the search was proceeding, the detectives tailed Bailey about a mile
before stopping and detaining him. A six-Justice majority held that
185 Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979) (patron in a bar), relying on and reaf-
firming United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948) (occupant of vehicle may not be
searched merely because there are grounds to search the automobile). But see Mary-
land v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (distinguishing Ybarra on basis that passengers
in car often have “common enterprise,” and noting that the tip in Di Re implicated
only the driver.
186 452 U.S. 692 (1981).
187 452 U.S. at 701–06. Ybarra was distinguished on the basis of its greater in-
trusiveness and the lack of sufficient connection with the premises. Id. at 695 n.4.
By the time Summers was searched, police had probable cause to do so. Id. at 695.
The warrant here was for contraband, id. at 701, and a different rule may apply
with respect to warrants for other evidence, id. at 705 n.20. In Los Angeles County
v. Rettele, 550 U.S. 609 (2007), the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation
where deputies did not know that the suspects had sold the house that the deputies
had a warrant to search. The deputies entered the house and found the new own-
ers, of a different race from the suspects, sleeping in the nude. The deputies held
the new owners at gunpoint for one to two minutes without allowing them to dress
or cover themselves. As for the difference in race, the Court noted that, “[w]hen the
deputies ordered [Caucasian] respondents from their bed, they had no way of know-
ing whether the African-American suspects were elsewhere in the house.” Id. at 613.
As for not allowing the new owners to dress or cover themselves, the Court quoted
its statement in Michigan v. Summers that “[t]he risk of harm to both the police
and the occupants is minimized if the officers routinely exercise unquestioned com-
mand of the situation.” Id. at 1993 (quoting 452 U.S. at 702–03).
188 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–770, slip op. (2013).
the detention was not constitutionally sustainable under Sum-

mers.189 According to the Court, application of the categorical excep-
tion to probable cause requirements for detention incident to a search
is determined by spatial proximity, that is, whether to occupant is
found “within the immediate vicinity of the premises to be searched,” 190
and not by temporal proximity, that is, whether the occupant is de-
tained “as soon as reasonably practicable” consistent with safety and
security.
The law enforcement interests that justify detention pending a
search also may justify the use of “reasonable force,” including hand-
cuffs, to effectuate a detention.191 Also, under some circumstances,
officers may search premises on the mistaken but reasonable belief
that the premises are described in an otherwise valid warrant.192
Although, for purposes of execution, as for many other matters,
there is little difference between search warrants and arrest war-
rants, one notable difference is that the possession of a valid arrest
warrant cannot authorize authorities to enter the home of a third
party looking for the person named in the warrant; in order to do
that, they need a search warrant signifying that a magistrate has
determined that there is probable cause to believe the person named
is on the premises.193
Valid Searches and Seizures Without Warrants

Although the Supreme Court stresses the importance of war-
rants and has repeatedly referred to searches without warrants as
“exceptional,” 194 it appears that the greater number of searches, as
well as the vast number of arrests, take place without warrants.
The Reporters of the American Law Institute Project on a Model
Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure have noted “their conviction that,
as a practical matter, searches without warrant and incidental to
189 As an alternative ground, the district court had found that stopping Bailey
was lawful as an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20 (1968), but
the Supreme Court offered no opinion on whether, assuming the stop was valid un-
der Terry, the resulting interaction between law enforcement and Bailey could inde-
pendently have justified Bailey’s detention. 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–770, slip op. at 14
(2013).
190 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–770, slip op. at 13–14 (2013).
191 Muehler v. Mena, 544 U.S. 93, 98–99 (2005) (also upholding questioning the
handcuffed detainee about her immigration status).

192 Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987) (officers reasonably believed there
was only one “third floor apartment” in city row house when in fact there were two).
193 Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204 (1981). An arrest warrant is a neces-
sary and sufficient authority to enter a suspect’s home to arrest him. Payton v. New
York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
194 E.g., Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948); McDonald v. United
States, 335 U.S. 451, 453 (1948); Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 528–29
(1967); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429 U.S. 338, 352–53, 355 (1977).
arrest have been up to this time, and may remain, of greater prac-
tical importance” than searches pursuant to warrants. “[T]he evi-
dence on hand . . . compel[s] the conclusion that searches under
warrants have played a comparatively minor part in law enforce-
ment, except in connection with narcotics and gambling laws.” 195
Nevertheless, the Court frequently asserts that “the most basic con-
stitutional rule in this area is that ‘searches conducted outside the
judicial process, without prior approval by judge or magistrate, are
per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment—subject only to
a few specially established and well-delineated exceptions.’ ” 196 The
exceptions are said to be “jealously and carefully drawn,” 197 and
there must be “a showing by those who seek exemption . . . that
the exigencies of the situation made that course imperative.” 198 Al-
though the record indicates an effort to categorize the exceptions,
the number and breadth of those exceptions have been growing.
Detention Short of Arrest: Stop and Frisk.—Arrests are sub-
ject to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment, but the courts
have followed the common law in upholding the right of police offi-
cers to take a person into custody without a warrant if they have
probable cause to believe that the person to be arrested has commit-
ted a felony or a misdemeanor in their presence.199 Probable cause
is, of course, the same standard required to be met in the issuance
of an arrest warrant, and must be satisfied by conditions existing
prior to the police officer’s stop, what is discovered thereafter not
sufficing to establish probable cause retroactively.200 There are, how-
ever, instances when a police officer’s suspicions will have been aroused
by someone’s conduct or manner, but probable cause for placing such
a person under arrest will be lacking.201 In Terry v. Ohio,202 the
Court, with only Justice Douglas dissenting, approved an on-the-
195 American Law Institute, A Model Code of Pre-Arraignment Procedure, Tent.
Draft No. 3 (Philadelphia: 1970), xix.

196 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 454–55 (1971) (quoting Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967)); G.M. Leasing Corp. v. United States, 429
U.S. 338, 352–53, 358 (1977).
197 Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 499 (1958).
198 McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 456 (1948). In general, with re-
gard to exceptions to the warrant clause, conduct must be tested by the reasonable-
ness standard enunciated by the first clause of the Amendment, Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 20 (1968). The Court’s development of its privacy expectation tests, dis-
cussed under “The Interest Protected,” supra, substantially changed the content of
that standard.
199 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411 (1976).
200 Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98 (1959); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10, 16–17 (1948); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62–63 (1968).
201 “The police may not arrest upon mere suspicion but only on ‘probable cause.’ ”
Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449, 454 (1957).

202 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
street investigation by a police officer that involved “patting down”

the subject of the investigation for weapons.
Terry arose when a police officer observed three individuals en-
gaging in conduct which appeared to him, on the basis of training
and experience, to be the “casing” of a store for a likely armed rob-
bery. Upon approaching the men, identifying himself, and not re-
ceiving prompt identification, the officer seized one of the men, pat-
ted the exterior of his clothes, and discovered a gun. Chief Justice
Warren for the Court wrote that the Fourth Amendment was appli-
cable “whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains
his freedom to walk away.” 203 Because the warrant clause is neces-
sarily and practically of no application to the type of on-the-street
encounter present in Terry, the Chief Justice continued, the ques-
tion was whether the policeman’s actions were reasonable. The test
of reasonableness in this sort of situation is whether the police offi-
cer can point to “specific and articulable facts which, taken to-
gether with rational inferences from those facts,” would lead a neu-
tral magistrate on review to conclude that a man of reasonable caution
would be warranted in believing that possible criminal behavior was
at hand and that both an investigative stop and a “frisk” was re-
quired.204 Because the conduct witnessed by the police officer rea-
sonably led him to believe that an armed robbery was in prospect,
he was as reasonably led to believe that the men were armed and
probably dangerous and that his safety required a “frisk.” Because
the object of the “frisk” is the discovery of dangerous weapons, “it
must therefore be confined in scope to an intrusion reasonably de-
signed to discover guns, knives, clubs, or other hidden instruments
for the assault of the police officer.” 205
203 392 U.S. at 16. See id. at 16–20.
204 392 U.S. at 20, 21, 22.
205 392 U.S. at 23–27, 29. See also Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40 (1968) (after
policeman observed defendant speak with several known narcotics addicts, he ap-
proached him and placed his hand in defendant’s pocket, thus discovering narcotics;
this was impermissible, because he lacked a reasonable basis for the frisk and in
any event his search exceeded the permissible scope of a weapons frisk); Adams v.
Williams, 407 U.S. 143 (1972) (stop and frisk based on informer’s in-person tip that
defendant was sitting in an identified parked car, visible to informer and officer, in
a high crime area at 2 a.m., with narcotics and a gun at his waist); Pennsylvania v.
Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977) (after validly stopping car, officer required defendant
to get out of car, observed bulge under his jacket, and frisked him and seized weapon;
while officer did not suspect driver of crime or have an articulable basis for safety
fears, safety considerations justified his requiring driver to leave car); Maryland v.
Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 413 (1997) (after validly stopping car, officer may order pas-
sengers as well as driver out of car; “the same weighty interest in officer safety is
present regardless of whether the occupant of the stopped car is a driver or passen-
ger”); Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786 (2009) (after validly stopping car, offi-
cer may frisk (patdown for weapons) both the driver and any passengers whom he
reasonably concludes “might be armed and presently dangerous”).
In a later case, the Court held that an officer may seize an ob-
ject if, in the course of a weapons frisk, “plain touch” reveals the
presence of the object, and the officer has probable cause to believe
it is contraband.206 The Court viewed the situation as analogous to
that covered by the “plain view” doctrine: obvious contraband may
be seized, but a search may not be expanded to determine whether
an object is contraband.207 Also impermissible is physical manipula-
tion, without reasonable suspicion, of a bus passenger’s carry-on lug-
gage stored in an overhead compartment.208
Terry did not rule on a host of problems, including the grounds
that could permissibly lead an officer to momentarily stop a person
on the street or elsewhere in order to ask questions rather than
frisk for weapons, the right of the stopped individual to refuse to
cooperate, and the permissible response of the police to that re-
fusal. The Court provided a partial answer in 2004, when it upheld
a state law that required a suspect to disclose his name in the course
of a valid Terry stop.209 Questions about a suspect’s identity “are a
routine and accepted part of many Terry stops,” the Court ex-
plained.210
After Terry, the standard for stops for investigative purposes
evolved into one of “reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.” 211 That
test permits some stops and questioning without probable cause in
order to allow police officers to explore the foundations of their sus-
picions.212 Although it did not elaborate a set of rules to govern the
application of the test, the Court was initially restrictive in recog-
206 Minnesota v. Dickerson, 508 U.S. 366 (1993).
207 508 U.S. at 375, 378–79. In Dickerson the Court held that seizure of a small
plastic container that the officer felt in the suspect’s pocket was not justified; the
officer should not have continued the search, manipulating the container with his
fingers, after determining that no weapon was present.
208 Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000) (bus passenger has reasonable
expectation that, although other passengers might handle his bag in order to make
room for their own, they will not “feel the bag in an exploratory manner”).
209 Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Ct., 542 U.S. 177 (2004).
210 542 U.S. at 186.
211 In United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411 (1981), a unanimous Court at-
tempted to capture the “elusive concept” of the basis for permitting a stop. Officers
must have “articulable reasons” or “founded suspicions,” derived from the totality of
the circumstances. “Based upon that whole picture the detaining officer must have
a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the particular person stopped of
criminal activity.” Id. at 417–18. The inquiry is thus quite fact-specific. In the anony-
mous tip context, the same basic approach requiring some corroboration applies re-
gardless of whether the standard is probable cause or reasonable suspicion; the dif-
ference is that less information, or less reliable information, can satisfy the lower
standard. Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990).
212 The extent and intrusiveness of a stop must be consistent with its investiga-
tory purpose, and extensive detention needs to be justified by something more that
reasonable suspicion. Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969); Dunaway v. New
York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979)
nizing permissible bases for reasonable suspicion.213 For example,

the Court held that an uncorroborated, anonymous tip is an insuf-
ficient basis for a Terry stop.214 Other cases have been more recep-
tive to reasonable suspicion claims, especially when authorities prof-
fer more details of the circumstances that contributed to their beliefs.215
“Reasonable suspicion” is a fact-intensive test that has now been
applied, and met, in a wide range of interactions.216
It took the Court some time to settle on a test for when a “sei-
zure” has occurred, and the Court has modified its approach. The
issue is of some importance, since it is at this point that Fourth
Amendment protections take hold. The Terry Court recognized in
dictum that “not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves ‘seizures’ of persons,” and suggested that “[o]nly
when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority,
has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we con-
clude that a ‘seizure’ has occurred.” 217 Years later Justice Stewart
proposed a similar standard—that a person has been seized “only
if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the incident, a
reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.” 218 A majority of the Justices subsequently endorsed this rea-
213 E.g., Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979) (individual’s presence in high crime
area gave officer no articulable basis to suspect him of crime); Delaware v. Prouse,
440 U.S. 648 (1979) (reasonable suspicion of a license or registration violation is
necessary to authorize automobile stop; random stops impermissible); United States
v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (officers could not justify random automobile
stop solely on basis of Mexican appearance of occupants); Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S.
438 (1980) (no reasonable suspicion for airport stop based on appearance that sus-
pect and another passenger were trying to conceal the fact that they were traveling
together). But cf. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (halting ve-
hicles at fixed checkpoints to question occupants as to citizenship and immigration
status permissible, even if officers should act on basis of appearance of occupants).
214 Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (no loosening of the reasonable suspicion
standards when tip involves possession of firearms).

215 Compare, e.g., Florida v. J.L., 529 U.S. 266 (2000) (anonymous tip that a man
wearing a plaid shirt and standing at a named spot is armed found insufficient to
justify stop and frisk) with Prado Navarette v. California, 572 U.S. ___, No. 12–
9490, slip op. (2014) (anonymous 911 call reporting an erratic swerve by a particu-
lar truck traveling in a particular direction barely held to be sufficient to justify
stop) and Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325 (1990) (anonymous tip describing in de-
tail that a particular person would be driving a particular car to deliver cocaine to a
particular destination held to be sufficiently reliable to justify reasonable suspicion
of criminal activity).
216 See,e.g., United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221 (1985) (reasonable suspicion
to stop a motorist may be based on a “wanted flyer” as long as issuance of the flyer
has been based on reasonable suspicion); United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1, 9
(1989) (airport stop based on drug courier profile may rely on a combination of fac-
tors that individually may be “quite consistent with innocent travel”); Illinois v. Wardlow,
528 U.S. 119 (2000) (unprovoked flight from high crime area upon sight of police
produces “reasonable suspicion”).
217 392 U.S. at 19, n.16.
218 United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 554 (1980).
sonable perception standard 219 and applied it in several cases in

which admissibility of evidence turned on whether a seizure of the
person not justified by probable cause or reasonable suspicion had
occurred prior to the uncovering of the evidence. No seizure oc-
curred, for example, when INS agents seeking to identify illegal aliens
conducted workforce surveys within a garment factory; while some
agents were positioned at exits, others systematically moved through
the factory and questioned employees.220 This brief questioning, even
with blocked exits, amounted to “classic consensual encounters rather
than Fourth Amendment seizures.” 221 The Court also ruled that no
seizure had occurred when police in a squad car drove alongside a
suspect who had turned and run down the sidewalk when he saw
the squad car approach. Under the circumstances (no siren, flash-
ing lights, display of a weapon, or blocking of the suspect’s path),
the Court concluded, the police conduct “would not have communi-
cated to the reasonable person an attempt to capture or otherwise
intrude upon [one’s] freedom of movement.” 222
Soon after, however, the Court departed from the Mendenhall
reasonable-perception standard and adopted a more formalistic ap-
proach, holding that an actual chase with evident intent to capture
did not amount to a “seizure” because the suspect had not com-
plied with the officer’s order to halt. The Court in California v. Hodari
D. wrote that Mendenhall stated a “necessary” but not a “suffi-
cient” condition for a seizure of the person through show of author-
ity.223 A Fourth Amendment “seizure” of the person, the Court de-
termined, is the same as a common law arrest; there must be either
application of physical force (or the laying on of hands), or submis-
sion to the assertion of authority.224 Indications are, however, that
Hodari D. did not signal the end of the reasonable perception stan-
dard, but merely carved an exception applicable to chases and per-
haps other encounters between suspects and police.
Later in the same term the Court ruled that the Mendenhall
“free-to-leave” inquiry was misplaced in the context of a police sweep
of a bus, but that a modified reasonable perception approach still
219 See, e.g., Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983), in which there was no opin-
ion of the Court, but in which the test was used by the plurality of four, id. at 502,
and also endorsed by dissenting Justice Blackmun, id. at 514.
220 INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210 (1984).
221 466 U.S. at 221.
222 Michigan v. Chesternut, 486 U.S. 567, 575 (1988).
223 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991). As in Michigan v. Chesternut, supra, the suspect
dropped incriminating evidence while being chased.

224 Adherence to this approach would effectively nullify the Court’s earlier posi-
tion that Fourth Amendment protections extend to “seizures that involve only a brief
detention short of traditional arrest.” United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873,
878 (1975), quoted in INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 215 (1984).
governed.225 In conducting a bus sweep, aimed at detecting illegal

drugs and their couriers, police officers typically board a bus dur-
ing a stopover at a terminal and ask to inspect tickets, identifica-
tion, and sometimes luggage of selected passengers. The Court did
not focus on whether an “arrest” had taken place, as adherence to
the Hodari D. approach would have required, but instead sug-
gested that the appropriate inquiry is “whether a reasonable per-
son would feel free to decline the officers’ requests or otherwise ter-
minate the encounter.” 226 “When the person is seated on a bus and
has no desire to leave,” the Court explained, “the degree to which a
reasonable person would feel that he or she could leave is not an
accurate measure of the coercive effect of the encounter.” 227
A Terry search need not be limited to a stop and frisk of the
person, but may extend as well to a protective search of the passen-
ger compartment of a car if an officer possesses “a reasonable be-
lief, based on specific and articulable facts . . . that the suspect is
dangerous and . . . may gain immediate control of weapons.” 228 How
lengthy a Terry detention may be varies with the circumstances. In
approving a 20-minute detention of a driver made necessary by the
driver’s own evasion of drug agents and a state police decision to
hold the driver until the agents could arrive on the scene, the Court
indicated that it is “appropriate to examine whether the police dili-
gently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm
or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was neces-
sary to detain the defendant.” 229
225 Florida v. Bostick, 501 U.S. 429 (1991).

226 501 U.S. at 436.
227 501 U.S. at 436. The Court asserted that the case was “analytically indistin-
guishable from Delgado. Like the workers in that case [subjected to the INS ‘sur-
vey’ at their workplace], Bostick’s freedom of movement was restricted by a factor
independent of police conduct—i.e., by his being a passenger on a bus.” Id. See also
United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194 (2002), applying Bostick to uphold a bus
search in which one officer stationed himself in the front of the bus and one in the
rear, while a third officer worked his way from rear to front, questioning passengers
individually. Under these circumstances, and following the arrest of his traveling
companion, the defendant had consented to the search of his person.
228 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (suspect appeared to be under the
influence of drugs, officer spied hunting knife exposed on floor of front seat and searched
remainder of passenger compartment). Similar reasoning has been applied to up-
hold a “protective sweep” of a home in which an arrest is made if arresting officers
have a reasonable belief that the area swept may harbor another individual posing
a danger to the officers or to others. Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
229 United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985). A more relaxed standard
has been applied to detention of travelers at the border, the Court testing the rea-
sonableness in terms of “the period of time necessary to either verify or dispel the
suspicion.” United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 544 (1985) (ap-
proving warrantless detention for more than 24 hours of traveler suspected of ali-
mentary canal drug smuggling).
Similar principles govern detention of luggage at airports in or-

der to detect the presence of drugs; Terry “limitations applicable to
investigative detentions of the person should define the permissible
scope of an investigative detention of the person’s luggage on less
than probable cause.” 230 The general rule is that “when an officer’s
observations lead him reasonably to believe that a traveler is carry-
ing luggage that contains narcotics, the principles of Terry . . . would
permit the officer to detain the luggage briefly to investigate the
circumstances that aroused his suspicion, provided that the investi-
gative detention is properly limited in scope.” 231 Seizure of luggage
for an expeditious “canine sniff ” by a dog trained to detect narcot-
ics can satisfy this test even though seizure of luggage is in effect
detention of the traveler, since the procedure results in “limited dis-
closure,” impinges only slightly on a traveler’s privacy interest in
the contents of personal luggage, and does not constitute a search
within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.232 By contrast, tak-
ing a suspect to an interrogation room on grounds short of prob-
able cause, retaining his air ticket, and retrieving his luggage with-
out his permission taints consent given under such circumstances
to open the luggage, since by then the detention had exceeded the
bounds of a permissible Terry investigative stop and amounted to
an invalid arrest.233 But the same requirements for brevity of de-
tention and limited scope of investigation are apparently inappli-
cable to border searches of international travelers, the Court hav-
ing approved a 24-hour detention of a traveler suspected of smuggling
drugs in her alimentary canal.234
Search Incident to Arrest.— The ability of the police to search
persons who have been arrested existed at common-law, and the
Supreme Court has had little occasion to question this basic author-
230 United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 709 (1983).

231 462 U.S. at 706.
232 462 U.S. at 707. However, the search in Place was not expeditious, and hence
exceeded Fourth Amendment bounds, when agents took 90 minutes to transport lug-
gage to another airport for administration of the canine sniff. Cf. Illinois v. Caballes,
543 U.S. 405 (2005) (a canine sniff around the perimeter of a car following a routine
traffic stop does not offend the Fourth Amendment if the duration of the stop is
justified by the traffic offense).
233 Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983). On this much the plurality opinion of
Justice White (id. at 503), joined by three other Justices, and the concurring opin-
ion of Justice Brennan (id. at 509) were in agreement.
234 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985).
ity.235 The Justices have often found themselves in disagreement,

however, when a search incident to an arrest extended to property
found either on the person or in the area where the person was
arrested—most commonly either his premises or his vehicle. Early
cases went both ways on the basis of some fine distinctions,236 and
in Harris v. United States 237 the Court approved a post-arrest search
of a four-room apartment, even though the evidence discovered re-
lated to a different crime than the one for which the defendant was
arrested. But, a year later, in Trupiano v. United States,238 a valid
arrest in an illegal distillery resulted in the seizure of the distillery
equipment. The Court reversed the conviction because the officers
had had time to obtain a search warrant and had not done so. “A
search or seizure without a warrant as an incident to a lawful ar-
rest has always been considered to be a strictly limited right. It
grows out of the inherent necessities of the situation at the time of
the arrest. But there must be something more in the way of neces-
sity than merely a lawful arrest.” 239
The Court, however, overruled Trupiano in United States v.
Rabinowitz,240 where officers had arrested the defendant in his one-
room office pursuant to an arrest warrant and proceeded to search
the room completely. The Court observed that the issue was not
whether the officers had the time and opportunity to obtain a search
warrant but whether the search incident to arrest was reasonable.
Though Rabinowitz approved of searches of the area within the ar-
restee’s “immediate control,” 241 it provided no standard by which
this area was to be determined, and extensive searches were subse-
quently permitted under the rule by the lower courts.242
The Court’s application of the “immediate control” standard re-
mained unsettled until the case of Chimel v. California.243 Disallow-
ing a search incident to arrest of an entire three-bedroom house—
235 Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914); Carroll v. United States,
267 U.S. 132, 158 (1925); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 30 (1925). The Court
has even upheld a search incident to an illegal (albeit not unconstitutional) arrest.
Virginia v. Moore, 128 S. Ct. 1598 (2008) (holding that, where an arrest for a minor
offense is prohibited by state law, the arrest will not violate the Fourth Amendment
if it was based on probable cause).
236 Compare Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927), with Go-Bart Import-
ing Co. v. United States, 282 U.S. 344 (1931), and United States v. Lefkowitz, 285
U.S. 452 (1932).
237 331 U.S. 145 (1947).
238 334 U.S. 699 (1948).
239 334 U.S. at 708.
240 339 U.S. 56 (1950).
241 339 U.S. at 64.
242 Cf. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 764–65 & n.10 (1969).
243 395 U.S. 752 (1969). In Kremen v. United States, 353 U.S. 346 (1957), the
Court had held that the seizure and removal of the entire contents of a house to
F.B.I. offices 200 miles away for examination, pursuant to an arrest under warrant
which included opening and rummaging through drawers—the Court

again asserted a narrower view, emphasized the primacy of war-
rants, and established a standard by which the scope of searches
pursuant to arrest could be ascertained.
When an arrest is made, it is reasonable for the arresting officer to search
the person arrested in order to remove any weapons that the latter might
seek to use in order to resist arrest or effect his escape. Otherwise, the offi-
cer’s safety might well be endangered, and the arrest itself frustrated. In
addition, it is entirely reasonable for the arresting officer to search for and
seize any evidence on the arrestee’s person in order to prevent its conceal-
ment or destruction. And the area into which an arrestee might reach in
order to grab a weapon or evidentiary items must, of course, be governed
by a like rule. A gun on a table or in a drawer in front of someone who is
arrested can be as dangerous to the arresting officer as one concealed in
the clothing of the person arrested. There is ample justification, therefore,
for a search of the arrestee’s person and the area ‘within his immediate
control’—construing that phrase to mean the area from within which he might
gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence. . . . There is no com-
parable justification, however, for routinely searching any room other than
that in which an arrest occurs—or, for that matter, for searching through
all the desk drawers or other closed or concealed areas in that room itself.
Such searches, in the absence of well-recognized exceptions, may be made
only under the authority of a search warrant.244
Although the viability of Chimel was in doubt for some time as
the Court refined and applied its analysis of reasonable and justifi-
able expectations of privacy,245 it has in some but not all contexts
survived the changed rationale. For instance, in Mincey v. Ari-
zona,246 the Court rejected a state effort to create a “homicide-
scene” exception for a warrantless search of an entire apartment
extending for four days after the occupant had been arrested and
removed. It was true, the Court observed, that a person legally taken
into custody has a lessened right of privacy in his person, but he
does not have a lessened right of privacy in his entire house. And,
in United States v. Chadwick,247 emphasizing a person’s reasonable
of one of the persons found in the house, was unreasonable. In decisions contempo-
raneous to and subsequent to Chimel, applying pre-Chimel standards because that
case was not retroactive, Williams v. United States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), the Court
applied Rabinowitz somewhat restrictively. See Von Cleef v. New Jersey, 395 U.S.
814 (1969), which followed Kremen; Shipley v. California, 395 U.S. 818 (1969), and
Vale v. Louisiana, 399 U.S. 30 (1970) (both involving arrests outside the house with
subsequent searches of the house); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 455–57
(1971). But, substantially extensive searches were then approved in Williams v. United
States, 401 U.S. 646 (1971), and Hill v. California, 401 U.S. 797 (1971).
244 395 U.S. at 763.
245 See, e.g., Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 492, 493, 510 (1971), in
which the four dissenters advocated the reasonableness argument rejected in Chimel.
246 437 U.S. 385, 390–91 (1978). Accord, Flippo v. West Virginia, 528 U.S. 11
(1999) (per curiam).

247 433 U.S. 1 (1977). Defendant and his luggage, a footlocker, had been re-
moved to the police station, where the search took place.

expectation of privacy in his luggage or other baggage, the Court

held that, once police have arrested and immobilized a suspect, val-
idly seized bags are not subject to search without a warrant.248
Police may, however, in the course of jailing an arrested sus-
pect, conduct an inventory search of the individual’s personal ef-
fects, including the contents of a shoulder bag, since “the scope of a
station-house search may in some circumstances be even greater
than those supporting a search immediately following arrest.” 249
Chimel has also been qualified by another consideration. Not only
may officers search areas within the arrestee’s immediate control
in order to alleviate any threat posed by the arrestee, but they may
extend that search if there may be a threat posed by “unseen third
parties in the house.” A “protective sweep” of the entire premises
(including an arrestee’s home) may be undertaken on less than prob-
able cause if officers have a “reasonable belief,” based on “articulable
facts,” that the area to be swept may harbor an individual posing a
danger to those on the arrest scene.250
For a time, vehicular searches incident to arrest appeared sub-
ject to more flexible limits. Stating that it was “in no way alter-
[ing] the fundamental principles established in the Chimel case,”
the Court in New York v. Belton 251 nevertheless held that police
officers who had made a valid arrest of the occupant of a vehicle
could make a contemporaneous search of the entire passenger com-
partment of the automobile, including containers found therein. Be-
lieving that a fairly simple rule understandable to authorities in
the field was desirable, the Court ruled “that articles inside the rela-
tively narrow compass of the passenger compartment of an automo-
248 If, on the other hand, a sealed shipping container had already been opened
and resealed during a valid customs inspection, and officers had maintained surveil-
lance through a “controlled delivery” to the suspect, there is no reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy in the contents of the container and officers may search it, upon the
arrest of the suspect, without having obtained a warrant. Illinois v. Andreas, 463
U.S. 765 (1983).
249 Illinois v. LaFayette, 462 U.S. 640, 645 (1983) (inventory search) (following
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976)). Similarly, an inventory search of
an impounded vehicle may include the contents of a closed container. Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Inventory searches of closed containers must, how-
ever, be guided by a police policy containing standardized criteria for exercise of dis-
cretion. Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1 (1990).
250 Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325, 334 (1990). This “sweep” is not to be a full-
blown, “top-to-bottom” search, but only “a cursory inspection of those spaces where
a person may be found.” Id. at 335–36.
251 453 U.S. 454, 460 n.3 (1981).
bile are in fact generally, if not inevitably, within ‘the area into which
an arrestee might reach in order to grab a weapon or evidentiary
ite[m].’ ” 252
Belton was “widely understood to allow a vehicle search inci-
dent to the arrest of a recent occupant even if there is no possibil-
ity the arrestee could gain access to the vehicle at the time of the
search.” 253 In Arizona v. Gant,254 however, the Court disavowed this
understanding of Belton 255 and held that “[p]olice may search a ve-
hicle incident to a recent occupant’s arrest only if the arrestee is
within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time
of the search or it is reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains
evidence of the offense of arrest.” 256
Still, the Court has not always closely adhered to these justifi-
cations for searches incident to arrest. For instance, it was argued
in United States v. Robinson 257 that the search of a person inci-
dent to a traffic offense arrest, which resulted in the discovery of
heroin inside a crumpled cigarette package, was invalid, because
there could have been no destructible evidence relating to the of-
fense nor a weapon concealed in the cigarette package. The Court
noted, however, that “[a] police officer’s determination as to how and
where to search the person of a suspect whom he has arrested is
necessarily a quick ad hoc judgment which the Fourth Amendment
does not require to be broken down in each instance into an analy-
sis of each step in the search.” Thus the Court ruled that, once a
person has been arrested based on probable cause, the police could
252 453 U.S. at 460 (quoting Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969)). In
this particular instance, Belton had been removed from the automobile and hand-
cuffed, but the Court wished to create a general rule removed from the fact-specific
nature of any one case. “ ‘Container’ here denotes any object capable of holding an-
other object. It thus includes closed or open glove compartments, consoles, or other
receptacles located anywhere within the passenger compartment, as well as lug-
gage, boxes, bags, clothing, and the like. Our holding encompasses only the interior
of the passenger compartment of an automobile and does not encompass the trunk.”
453 U.S. at 460–61 n.4.
253 Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–542, slip op. at 8 (2009).
254 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–542, slip op. (2009).
255 “To read Belton as authorizing a vehicle search incident to every recent occu-
pant’s arrest would . . . untether the rule from the justifications underlying the Chimel
exception . . . .” Slip op. at 9.
256 556 U.S. ___, No. 07–542, slip op. at 18. Justice Alito, in a dissenting opin-
ion joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kennedy and in part by Justice Breyer,
wrote that “there can be no doubt that” the majority had overruled Belton. 556 U.S.
___, No. 07–542, slip op. at 2.
257 414 U.S. 218 (1973).
perform a thorough search of that person without providing “addi-

tional justifications” for the scope of the search.258
While rejecting a case-by-case evaluation of searches made post-
arrest, the Court remains willing to make categorical evaluations
regarding such searches. Thus, in Riley v. California,259 the Court
declined to extend the holding of Robinson to the search of the digi-
tal data contained in a cell phone found on an arrestee.260 In Riley,
the Court distinguished a search of cell phones, which contain vast
quantities of personal data, from the brief physical search at issue
in Robinson.261 Focusing primarily on the rationale that searching
cell phones would prevent the destruction of evidence, the govern-
ment argued that cell phone data could be destroyed remotely or
become encrypted by the passage of time. The Court, however, both
discounted the prevalence of these events and the efficacy of war-
rantless searches to defeat them. Rather, the Court noted that other
means existed besides a search of a cell phone to secure the data
contained therein, including turning the phone off or placing the
phone in a bag that isolates it from radio waves.262
Vehicular Searches.—In the early days of the automobile, the
Court created an exception for searches of vehicles, holding in Car-
258 414 U.S. at 235 (1973). See also id. at 237–38 (Justice Powell concurring).
The Court applied the same rule in Gustafson v. Florida, 414 U.S. 260 (1973), involv-
ing a search of a motorist’s person following his custodial arrest for an offense for
which a citation would normally have issued. Unlike the situation in Robinson, po-
lice regulations did not require the Gustafson officer to take the suspect into cus-
tody, nor did a departmental policy guide the officer as to when to conduct a full
search. The Court found these differences inconsequential, and left for another day
the problem of pretextual arrests in order to obtain basis to search. Soon thereafter,
the Court upheld conduct of a similar search at the place of detention, even after a
time lapse between the arrest and search. United States v. Edwards, 415 U.S. 800
(1974).
On occasion, an opinion will maintain that a warrantless search incident to ar-
rest must be aimed at weapons or contraband or at evidence of the crime of arrest.
Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–207, slip op. (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(objecting to DNA testing incident to arrest for a serious crime).
259 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–132, slip op. (2014).
260 In Riley, the defendant was arrested for firearms violations, and his cell phone
was accessed and examined at the scene and at the police station. Photographs and
videos taken from the phone were introduced at trial to help establish the defen-
dant’s association with gang activity, an aggravating sentencing factor that carried
an enhanced sentence. In a companion case considered in the same opinion, the po-
lice arrested a defendant for a drug violation, and, using information found on a cell
phone taken from his person, were able to locate and search his home, where addi-
tional quantities of drugs were found.
261 “Cell phones differ in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense from other
objects that might be kept on an arrestee’s person.” 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–132, slip
op. at 17.
262 These so-called “Faraday bags” are made of aluminum foil, and are, accord-
ing to the court, “cheap, light-weight, and easy to use.” 573 U.S. ___, No. 13–132,
slip op. at 14.
roll v. United States 263 that vehicles may be searched without war-
rants if the officer undertaking the search has probable cause to
believe that the vehicle contains contraband. The Court explained
that the mobility of vehicles would allow them to be quickly moved
from the jurisdiction if time were taken to obtain a warrant.264
Initially, the Court limited Carroll’s reach, holding impermis-
sible the warrantless seizure of a parked automobile merely be-
cause it is movable, and indicating that vehicles may be stopped
only while moving or reasonably contemporaneously with move-
ment.265 The Court also ruled that the search must be reasonably
contemporaneous with the stop, so that it was not permissible to
remove the vehicle to the station house for a warrantless search at
the convenience of the police.266
The Court next developed a reduced privacy rationale to supple-
ment the mobility rationale, explaining that “the configuration, use,
and regulation of automobiles often may dilute the reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy that exists with respect to differently situated
property.” 267 “One has a lesser expectation of privacy in a motor
vehicle because its function is transportation and it seldom serves
as one’s residence or as the repository of personal effects. . . . It
travels public thoroughfares where both its occupants and its con-
tents are in plain view.’ ” 268 Although motor homes serve as resi-
dences and as repositories for personal effects, and their contents
are often shielded from public view, the Court extended the automo-
bile exception to them as well, holding that there is a diminished
expectation of privacy in a mobile home parked in a parking lot
and licensed for vehicular travel, hence “readily mobile.” 269
263 267 U.S. 132 (1925). Carroll was a Prohibition-era liquor case, whereas a
great number of modern automobile cases involve drugs.

264 267 U.S. at 153. See also Husty v. United States, 282 U.S. 694 (1931); Scher
v. United States, 305 U.S. 251 (1938); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949).
All of these cases involved contraband, but in Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42
(1970), the Court, without discussion, and over Justice Harlan’s dissent, id. at 55,
62, extended the rule to evidentiary searches.
265 Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 458–64 (1971). This portion of
the opinion had the adherence of a plurality only, Justice Harlan concurring on other
grounds, and there being four dissenters. Id. at 493, 504, 510, 523.
266 Preston v. United States, 376 U.S. 364 (1964); Dyke v. Taylor Implement Mfg.
Co., 391 U.S. 216 (1968).

267 Arkansas v. Sanders, 442 U.S. 753, 761 (1979).
268 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583, 590 (1974) (plurality opinion), quoted in
United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1, 12 (1977). See also United States v. Ortiz,
422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976);
South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976); Robbins v. California, 453
U.S. 420, 424–25 (1981); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798, 807 n.9 (1982).
269 California v. Carney, 471 U.S. 386, 393 (1985) (leaving open the question of
whether the automobile exception also applies to a “mobile” home being used as a
residence and not “readily mobile”).
The reduced expectancy concept has broadened police powers

to conduct automobile searches without warrants, but they still must
have probable cause to search a vehicle 270 and they may not make
random stops of vehicles on the roads, but instead must base stops
of individual vehicles on probable cause or some “articulable and
reasonable suspicion” 271 of traffic or safety violation or some other
criminal activity.272 If police stop a vehicle, then the vehicle’s pas-
sengers as well as its driver are deemed to have been seized from
the moment the car comes to a halt, and the passengers as well as
the driver may challenge the constitutionality of the stop.273 Like-
wise, a police officer may frisk (patdown for weapons) both the driver
and any passengers whom he reasonably concludes “might be armed
and presently dangerous.” 274
By contrast, fixed-checkpoint stops in the absence of any indi-
vidualized suspicion have been upheld for purposes of promoting
highway safety 275 or policing the international border,276 but not
270 Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973) (roving patrols); United
States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975). Cf. Colorado v. Bannister, 449 U.S. 1 (1980).
An automobile’s “ready mobility [is] an exigency sufficient to excuse failure to ob-
tain a search warrant once probable cause is clear”; there is no need to find the
presence of “unforeseen circumstances” or other additional exigency. Pennsylvania v.
Labron, 527 U.S. 465 (1996). Accord, Maryland v. Dyson, 527 U.S. 465 (1999) (per
curiam). Cf. Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. ___, No. 11–817, slip op. (2013).
271 Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 663 (1979) (discretionary random stops of
motorists to check driver’s license and automobile registration constitute Fourth Amend-
ment violation); United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975) (violation for
roving patrols on lookout for illegal aliens to stop vehicles on highways near inter-
national borders when only ground for suspicion is that occupants appear to be of
Mexican ancestry). But cf. United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002) (reasonable
suspicion justified stop by border agents of vehicle traveling on unpaved backroads
in an apparent effort to evade a border patrol checkpoint on the highway). In Prouse,
the Court cautioned that it was not precluding the states from developing methods
for spot checks, such as questioning all traffic at roadblocks, that involve less intru-
sion or that do not involve unconstrained exercise of discretion. 440 U.S. at 663.
272 An officer who observes a traffic violation may stop a vehicle even if his real
motivation is to investigate for evidence of other crime. Whren v. United States, 517
U.S. 806 (1996). The existence of probable cause to believe that a traffic violation
has occurred establishes the constitutional reasonableness of traffic stops regardless
of the actual motivation of the officers involved, and regardless of whether it is cus-
tomary police practice to stop motorists for the violation observed. Similarly, pretextual
arrest of a motorist who has committed a traffic offense is permissible. Arkansas v.
Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (per curiam) (upholding search of the motorist’s car
for a crime not related to the traffic offense).
273 Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 263 (2007).
274 Arizona v. Johnson, 129 S. Ct. 781, 786 (2009).
275 Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990) (upholding a so-
briety checkpoint at which all motorists are briefly stopped for preliminary question-
ing and observation for signs of intoxication).
276 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (upholding border pa-
trol checkpoint, over 60 miles from the border, for questioning designed to appre-
hend illegal aliens). See also United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004)
(upholding a search at the border involving disassembly of a vehicle’s fuel tank).
for more generalized law enforcement purposes.277 Once police have

validly stopped a vehicle, they may also, based on articulable facts
warranting a reasonable belief that weapons may be present, con-
duct a Terry-type protective search of those portions of the passen-
ger compartment in which a weapon could be placed or hidden.278
And, in the absence of such reasonable suspicion as to weapons,
police may seize contraband and suspicious items “in plain view”
inside the passenger compartment.279
Although officers who have stopped a car to issue a routine traf-
fic citation may conduct a Terry-type search, even including a pat-
down of driver and passengers if there is reasonable suspicion that
they are armed and dangerous, they may not conduct a full-blown
search of the car 280 unless they exercise their discretion to arrest
the driver instead of issuing a citation.281 And once police have prob-
able cause to believe there is contraband in a vehicle, they may re-
move the vehicle from the scene to the station house in order to
conduct a search, without thereby being required to obtain a war-
277 City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000) (vehicle checkpoint set
up for the “primary purpose [of] detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdo-
ing” (here interdicting illegal narcotics) does not fall within the highway safety or
border patrol exception to the individualized suspicion requirement, and hence vio-
lates the Fourth Amendment). Edmond was distinguished in Illinois v. Lidster, 540
U.S. 419 (2004), upholding use of a checkpoint to ask motorists for help in solving a
recent hit-and-run accident that had resulted in death. The public interest in solv-
ing the crime was deemed “grave,” while the interference with personal liberty was
deemed minimal.
278 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1049 (1983) (holding that contraband found
in the course of such a search is admissible).

279 Texas v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983). Similarly, because there is no reason-
able privacy interest in the vehicle identification number, required by law to be placed
on the dashboard so as to be visible through the windshield, police may reach into
the passenger compartment to remove items obscuring the number and may seize
items in plain view while doing so. New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106 (1986). And,
because there also is no legitimate privacy interest in possessing contraband, and
because properly conducted canine sniffs are “generally likely, to reveal only the pres-
ence of contraband,” police may conduct a canine sniff around the perimeter of a
vehicle stopped for a traffic offense. Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005).
280 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113 (1998) (invalidating an Iowa statute permit-
ting a full-blown search incident to a traffic citation).

281 See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001) (police officers, in their
discretion, may arrest a motorist for a minor traffic offense rather than issuing a
citation); New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (officers who arrest an occupant
of a vehicle may make a contemporaneous search of the entire passenger compart-
ment, including closed containers); Thornton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615 (2004)
(the Belton rule applies regardless of whether the arrestee exited the car at the offi-
cer’s direction, or whether he did so prior to confrontation); Arizona v. Gant, 556
U.S. ___, No. 07–542, slip op. at 18 (2009) (the Belton rule applies “only if the ar-
restee is within reaching distance of the passenger compartment at the time of the
search or it is reasonable to believe that the vehicle contains evidence of the offense
of arrest”); Arkansas v. Sullivan, 532 U.S. 769 (2001) (pretextual arrest of motorist
who has committed a traffic offense is permissible even if purpose is to search ve-
hicle for evidence of other crime).
rant.282 “[T]he justification to conduct such a warrantless search does

not vanish once the car has been immobilized; nor does it depend
upon a reviewing court’s assessment of the likelihood in each par-
ticular case that the car would have been driven away, or that its
contents would have been tampered with, during the period re-
quired for the police to obtain a warrant.” 283 Because of the less-
ened expectation of privacy, inventory searches of impounded auto-
mobiles are justifiable in order to protect public safety and the owner’s
property, and any evidence of criminal activity discovered in the course
of the inventories is admissible in court.284 The Justices were evenly
divided, however, on the propriety of warrantless seizure of an ar-
restee’s automobile from a public parking lot several hours after his
arrest, its transportation to a police impoundment lot, and the tak-
ing of tire casts and exterior paint scrapings.285
Police in undertaking a warrantless search of an automobile may
not extend the search to the persons of the passengers therein 286
unless there is a reasonable suspicion that the passengers are armed
and dangerous, in which case a Terry patdown is permissible,287 or
unless there is individualized suspicion of criminal activity by the
passengers.288 But because passengers in an automobile have no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in the interior area of the car, a war-
rantless search of the glove compartment and the spaces under the
seats, which turned up evidence implicating the passengers, in-
vaded no Fourth Amendment interest of the passengers.289 Lug-
gage and other closed containers found in automobiles may also be
subjected to warrantless searches based on probable cause, regard-
less of whether the luggage or containers belong to the driver or to
282 Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. 259 (1982). The same rule applies if it is the
vehicle itself that is forfeitable contraband; police, acting without a warrant, may
seize the vehicle from a public place. Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559 (1999).
283 Michigan v. Thomas, 458 U.S. at 261. See also Chambers v. Maroney, 399
U.S. 42 (1970); Texas v. White, 423 U.S. 67 (1975); United States v. Ross, 456 U.S.
798, 807 n.9 (1982).
284 Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973); South Dakota v. Opperman, 428
U.S. 364 (1976). See also Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967); United States v.
Harris, 390 U.S. 234 (1968). Police, in conducting an inventory search of a vehicle,
may open closed containers in order to inventory contents. Colorado v. Bertine, 479
U.S. 367 (1987).
285 Cardwell v. Lewis, 417 U.S. 583 (1974). Justice Powell concurred on other
grounds.
286 United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581 (1948);Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85,
94–96 (1979).
287 Knowles v. Iowa, 525 U.S. 113, 118 (1998).
288 Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366 (2003) (probable cause to arrest passen-
gers based on officers finding $783 in glove compartment and cocaine hidden be-
neath back seat armrest, and on driver and passengers all denying ownership of
the cocaine).
289 Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
a passenger, and regardless of whether it is the driver or a passen-

ger who is under suspicion.290 The same rule now applies whether
the police have probable cause to search only the containers 291 or
whether they have probable cause to search the automobile for some-
thing capable of being held in the container.292
Vessel Searches.—Not only is the warrant requirement inap-
plicable to brief stops of vessels, but also none of the safeguards
applicable to stops of automobiles on less than probable cause are
necessary predicates to stops of vessels. In United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez,293 the Court upheld a random stop and boarding of a ves-
sel by customs agents, lacking any suspicion of wrongdoing, for pur-
pose of inspecting documentation. The boarding was authorized by
statute derived from an act of the First Congress,294 and hence had
“an impressive historical pedigree” carrying with it a presumption
of constitutionality. Moreover, “important factual differences be-
tween vessels located in waters offering ready access to the open
sea and automobiles on principal thoroughfares in the border area”
justify application of a less restrictive rule for vessel searches. The
reason why random stops of vehicles have been held impermissible
under the Fourth Amendment, the Court explained, is that stops
at fixed checkpoints or roadblocks are both feasible and less sub-
ject to abuse of discretion by authorities. “But no reasonable claim
can be made that permanent checkpoints would be practical on wa-
ters such as these where vessels can move in any direction at any
time and need not follow established ‘avenues’ as automobiles must
do.” 295 Because there is a “substantial” governmental interest in en-
forcing documentation laws, “especially in waters where the need
to deter or apprehend smugglers is great,” the Court found the “lim-
290 Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 307 (1999) (“police officers with prob-
able cause to search a car may inspect passengers’ belongings found in the car that
are capable of concealing the object of the search”).
291 California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991) (overruling Arkansas v. Sanders,
442 U.S. 753 (1979).

292 United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). A Ross search of a container found
in an automobile need not occur soon after its seizure. United States v. Johns, 469
U.S. 478 (1985) (three-day time lapse). See also Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991)
(consent to search automobile for drugs constitutes consent to open containers within
the car that might contain drugs).
293 462 U.S. 579 (1983).
294 19 U.S.C. § 1581(a), derived from § 31 of the Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, 1
Stat. 164.
295 462 U.S. at 589. Justice Brennan’s dissent argued that a fixed checkpoint
was feasible in this case, involving a ship channel in an inland waterway. Id. at 608
n.10. The fact that the Court’s rationale was geared to the difficulties of law enforce-
ment in the open seas suggests a reluctance to make exceptions to the general rule.
Note as well the Court’s later reference to this case as among those “reflect[ing]
longstanding concern for the protection of the integrity of the border.” United States
v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531, 538 (1985).
ited” but not “minimal” intrusion occasioned by boarding for docu-

mentation inspection to be reasonable.296 Dissenting Justice Bren-
nan argued that the Court for the first time was approving “a
completely random seizure and detention of persons and an entry
onto private, noncommercial premises by police officers, without any
limitations whatever on the officers’ discretion or any safeguards
against abuse.” 297
Consent Searches.—Fourth Amendment rights, like other con-
stitutional rights, may be waived, and one may consent to a search
of his person or premises by officers who have not complied with
the Amendment.298 The Court, however, has insisted that the bur-
den is on the prosecution to prove the voluntariness of the con-
sent 299 and awareness of the right of choice.300 Reviewing courts
must determine on the basis of the totality of the circumstances
whether consent has been freely given or has been coerced. Actual
knowledge of the right to refuse consent is not essential for a search
to be found voluntary, and police therefore are not required to in-
form a person of his rights, as through a Fourth Amendment ver-
sion of Miranda warnings.301 But consent will not be regarded as
voluntary when the officer asserts his official status and claim of
right and the occupant yields because of these factors.302 When con-
sent is obtained through the deception of an undercover officer or
an informer’s gaining admission without advising a suspect who he
is, the Court has held that the suspect has simply assumed the risk
that an invitee would betray him, and evidence obtained through
the deception is admissible.303
296 462 U.S. at 593.

297 462 U.S. at 598. Justice Brennan contended that all previous cases had re-
quired some “discretion-limiting” feature such as a requirement of probable cause,
reasonable suspicion, fixed checkpoints instead of roving patrols, and limitation of
border searches to border areas, and that these principles set forth in Delaware v.
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), should govern. Id. at 599, 601.
298 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Zap v. United States, 328 U.S.
624 (1946); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).

299 Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
300 Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13 (1948).
301 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 231–33 (1973). See also Ohio v.
Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996) (officer need not always inform a detained motorist
that he is free to go before consent to search auto may be deemed voluntary); United
States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 207 (2002) (totality of circumstances indicated that
bus passenger consented to search even though officer did not explicitly state that
passenger was free to refuse permission).
302 Amos v. United States, 255 U.S. 313 (1921); Johnson v. United States, 333
U.S. 10 (1948); Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).

303 On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963); Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966); Lewis v. United States,
385 U.S. 206 (1966); United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971). Cf. Osborn v. United
States, 385 U.S. 323 (1966) (prior judicial approval obtained before wired informer
Additional issues arise in determining the validity of consent

to search when consent is given not by the suspect, but by a third
party. In the earlier cases, third-party consent was deemed suffi-
cient if that party “possessed common authority over or other suffi-
cient relationship to the premises or effects sought to be in-
spected.” 304 Now, however, actual common authority over the premises
is not required; it is sufficient if the searching officer had a reason-
able but mistaken belief that the third party had common author-
ity and could consent to the search.305 If, however, one occupant
consents to a search of shared premises, but a physically present
co-occupant expressly objects to the search, the search is unreason-
able.306 Common social expectations inform the analysis. One at the
threshold of a residence could not confidently conclude he was wel-
come to enter over the express objection of a present co-tenant. Ex-
pectations may change, however, if the objecting co-tenant leaves,
or is removed from, the premises with no prospect of imminent re-
turn.307
Border Searches.—“That searches made at the border, pursu-
ant to the longstanding right of the sovereign to protect itself by
sent into defendant’s presence). Problems may be encountered by police, however, in

special circumstances. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); United
States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980); United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984)
(installation of beeper with consent of informer who sold container with beeper to
suspect is permissible with prior judicial approval, but use of beeper to monitor pri-
vate residence is not).
304 United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974) (valid consent by woman
with whom defendant was living and sharing the bedroom searched). See also Chap-
man v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (1961) (landlord’s consent insufficient); Stoner v.
California, 376 U.S. 483 (1964) (hotel desk clerk lacked authority to consent to search
of guest’s room); Frazier v. Culp, 394 U.S. 731 (1969) (joint user of duffel bag had
authority to consent to search).
305 Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990). See also Florida v. Jimeno, 500
U.S. 248, 251 (1991) (it was “objectively reasonable” for officer to believe that sus-
pect’s consent to search his car for narcotics included consent to search containers
found within the car).
306 Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006) (warrantless search of a defen-
dant’s residence based on his estranged wife’s consent was unreasonable and in-
valid as applied to a physically present defendant who expressly refused to permit
entry). The Court in Randolph admitted that it was “drawing a fine line,” id. at
121, between situations where the defendant is present and expressly refuses con-
sent, and that of United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164, 171 (1974), and Illinois v.
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), where the defendants were nearby but were not
asked for their permission. In a dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts observed
that the majority’s ruling “provides protection on a random and happenstance basis,
protecting, for example, a co-occupant who happens to be at the front door when the
other occupant consents to a search, but not one napping or watching television in
the next room.” 547 U.S. at 127.
307 Fernandez v. California, 571 U.S. ___, No. 12–7822, slip op. (2014) (consent
by co-occupant sufficient to overcome objection of a second co-occupant who was ar-

rested and removed from the premises, so long as the arrest and removal was objec-
tively reasonable).
stopping and examining persons and property crossing into this coun-
try, are reasonable simply by virtue of the fact that they occur at
the border, should, by now, require no extended demonstration.” 308
Authorized by the First Congress,309 the customs search in these
circumstances requires no warrant, no probable cause, not even the
showing of some degree of suspicion that accompanies even investi-
gatory stops.310 Moreover, although prolonged detention of travel-
ers beyond the routine customs search and inspection must be jus-
tified by the Terry standard of reasonable suspicion having a
particularized and objective basis, Terry protections as to the length
and intrusiveness of the search do not apply.311 Motor vehicles may
be searched at the border, even to the extent of removing, disassem-
bling, and reassembling the fuel tank.312
Inland stoppings and searches in areas away from the borders
are a different matter altogether. Thus, in Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States,313 the Court held that a warrantless stop and search of de-
fendant’s automobile on a highway some 20 miles from the border
by a roving patrol lacking probable cause to believe that the ve-
hicle contained illegal aliens violated the Fourth Amendment. Simi-
larly, the Court invalidated an automobile search at a fixed check-
point well removed from the border; while agreeing that a fixed
checkpoint probably gave motorists less cause for alarm than did
roving patrols, the Court nonetheless held that the invasion of pri-
vacy entailed in a search was just as intrusive and must be justi-
308 United States v. Ramsey, 431 U.S. 606, 616 (1977) (sustaining search of in-
coming mail). See also Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765 (1983) (opening by customs
inspector of locked container shipped from abroad).
309 Act of July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 23, 24, 1 Stat. 43. See 19 U.S.C. §§ 507, 1581,
1582.
310 Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 154 (1925); United States v. Thirty-
seven Photographs, 402 U.S. 363, 376 (1971); Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413
U.S. 266, 272 (1973).
311 United States v. Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. 531 (1985) (approving war-
rantless detention incommunicado for more than 24 hours of traveler suspected of

alimentary canal drug smuggling). The traveler was strip searched, and then given
a choice between an abdominal x-ray or monitored bowel movements. Because the
suspect chose the latter option, the court disavowed decision as to “what level of
suspicion, if any, is required for . . . strip, body cavity, or involuntary x-ray searches.”
Id. at 541 n.4.
312 United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149 (2004).
313 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Justices White, Blackmun, Rehnquist, and Chief Jus-
tice Burger would have found the search reasonable upon the congressional determi-
nation that searches by such roving patrols were the only effective means to police
border smuggling. Id. at 285. Justice Powell, concurring, argued in favor of a gen-
eral, administrative warrant authority not tied to particular vehicles, much like the
type of warrant suggested for noncriminal administrative inspections of homes and
commercial establishments for health and safety purposes, id. at 275, but the Court
has not yet had occasion to pass on a specific case. See United States v. Martinez-
Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 547 n.2, 562 n.15 (1976).
fied by a showing of probable cause or consent.314 On the other hand,

when motorists are briefly stopped, not for purposes of a search but
in order that officers may inquire into their residence status, either
by asking a few questions or by checking papers, different results
are achieved, so long as the stops are not truly random. Roving pa-
trols may stop vehicles for purposes of a brief inquiry, provided of-
ficers are “aware of specific articulable facts, together with rational
inferences from those facts, that reasonably warrant suspicion” that
an automobile contains illegal aliens; in such a case the interfer-
ence with Fourth Amendment rights is “modest” and the law en-
forcement interests served are significant.315 Fixed checkpoints pro-
vide additional safeguards; here officers may halt all vehicles briefly
in order to question occupants even in the absence of any reason-
able suspicion that the particular vehicle contains illegal aliens.316
“Open Fields”.—In Hester v. United States,317 the Court held
that the Fourth Amendment did not protect “open fields” and that,
therefore, police searches in such areas as pastures, wooded areas,
open water, and vacant lots need not comply with the require-
ments of warrants and probable cause. The Court’s announcement
in Katz v. United States 318 that the Amendment protects “people
not places” cast some doubt on the vitality of the open fields prin-
ciple, but all such doubts were cast away in Oliver v. United States.319
Invoking Hester’s reliance on the literal wording of the Fourth Amend-
ment (open fields are not “effects”) and distinguishing Katz, the Court
ruled that the open fields exception applies to fields that are fenced
and posted. “[A]n individual may not legitimately demand privacy
for activities conducted out of doors in fields, except in the area im-
314 United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
315 United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975). However, stopping of
defendant’s car solely because the officers observed the Mexican appearance of the
occupants was unjustified. Id. at 886. Contrast United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S.
411 (1981), and United States v. Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266 (2002), where border agents
did have grounds for reasonable suspicion that the vehicle they stopped contained
illegal aliens.
316 United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976). The Court deemed
the intrusion on Fourth Amendment interests to be quite limited, even if officers

acted on the basis of the Mexican appearance of the occupants in referring motor-
ists to a secondary inspection area for questioning, whereas the elimination of the
practice would deny to the government its only practicable way to apprehend smuggled
aliens and to deter the practice. Similarly, outside of the border/aliens context, the
Court has upheld use of fixed “sobriety” checkpoints at which all motorists are briefly
stopped for preliminary questioning and observation for signs of intoxication. Michi-
gan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
317 265 U.S. 57 (1924). See also Air Pollution Variance Bd. v. Western Alfalfa
Corp., 416 U.S. 86 (1974).

318 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967). Cf. Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 450 (1973)
(citing Hester approvingly).

319 466 U.S. 170 (1984) (approving warrantless intrusion past no trespassing signs
and around locked gate, to view field not visible from outside property).
mediately surrounding the home.” 320 Nor may an individual de-

mand privacy for activities conducted within outbuildings and vis-
ible by trespassers peering into the buildings from just outside.321
Even within the curtilage and notwithstanding that the owner has
gone to the extreme of erecting a 10-foot high fence in order to screen
the area from ground-level view, there is no reasonable expectation
of privacy from naked-eye inspection from fixed-wing aircraft flying
in navigable airspace.322 Similarly, naked-eye inspection from heli-
copters flying even lower contravenes no reasonable expectation of
privacy.323 And aerial photography of commercial facilities secured
from ground-level public view is permissible, the Court finding such
spaces more analogous to open fields than to the curtilage of a dwell-
ing.324
“Plain View”.—Somewhat similar in rationale is the rule that
objects falling in the “plain view” of an officer who has a right to be
in the position to have that view are subject to seizure without a
warrant 325 or that, if the officer needs a warrant or probable cause
to search and seize, his lawful observation will provide grounds there-
320 466 U.S. at 178. See also California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988) (approv-
ing warrantless search of garbage left curbside “readily accessible to animals, chil-
dren, scavengers, snoops, and other members of the public”).
321 United States v. Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (space immediately outside a
barn, accessible only after crossing a series of “ranch-style” fences and situated one-
half mile from the public road, constitutes unprotected “open field”).
322 California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986). Activities within the curtilage are
nonetheless still entitled to some Fourth Amendment protection. The Court has de-
scribed four considerations for determining whether an area falls within the curtilage:
proximity to the home, whether the area is included within an enclosure also sur-
rounding the home, the nature of the uses to which the area is put, and the steps
taken by the resident to shield the area from view of passersby. United States v.
Dunn, 480 U.S. 294 (1987) (barn 50 yards outside of fence surrounding home, used
for processing chemicals, and separated from public access only by a series of live-
stock fences, by a chained and locked driveway, and by one-half mile’s distance, is
not within curtilage).
323 Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445 (1989) (view through partially open roof of green-
house).
324 Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227 (1986) (suggesting that aerial
photography of the curtilage would be impermissible).

325 Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982) (officer lawfully in dorm room
may seize marijuana seeds and pipe in open view); United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38 (1976) (“plain view” justification for officers to enter home to arrest after
observing defendant standing in open doorway); Harris v. United States, 390 U.S.
234 (1968) (officer who opened door of impounded automobile and saw evidence in
plain view properly seized it); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963) (officers entered
premises without warrant to make arrest because of exigent circumstances seized
evidence in plain sight). Cf. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 464–73 (1971),
and id. at 510 (Justice White dissenting). Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)
(items seized in plain view during protective sweep of home incident to arrest); Texas
v. Brown, 460 U.S. 730 (1983) (contraband on car seat in plain view of officer who
had stopped car and asked for driver’s license); New York v. Class, 475 U.S. 106
(1986) (evidence seen while looking for vehicle identification number). There is no
for.326 The plain view doctrine is limited, however, by the probable

cause requirement: officers must have probable cause to believe that
items in plain view are contraband before they may search or seize
them.327
The Court has analogized from the plain view doctrine to hold
that, once officers have lawfully observed contraband, “the owner’s
privacy interest in that item is lost,” and officers may reseal a con-
tainer, trace its path through a controlled delivery, and seize and
reopen the container without a warrant.328
Public Schools.—In New Jersey v. T.L.O.,329 the Court set forth
the principles governing searches by public school authorities. The
Fourth Amendment applies to searches conducted by public school
officials because “school officials act as representatives of the State,
not merely as surrogates for the parents.” 330 However, “the school
setting requires some easing of the restrictions to which searches
by public authorities are ordinarily subject.” 331 Neither the war-
rant requirement nor the probable cause standard is appropriate,
the Court ruled. Instead, a simple reasonableness standard gov-
erns all searches of students’ persons and effects by school authori-
ties.332 A search must be reasonable at its inception, i.e., there must
be “reasonable grounds for suspecting that the search will turn up
evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law
requirement that the discovery of evidence in plain view must be “inadvertent.” See
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) (in spite of Amendment’s particularity re-
quirement, officers with warrant to search for proceeds of robbery may seize weap-
ons of robbery in plain view).
326 Steele v. United States, 267 U.S. 498 (1925) (officers observed contraband in
view through open doorway; had probable cause to procure warrant). Cf. Taylor v.
United States, 286 U.S. 1 (1932) (officers observed contraband in plain view in ga-
rage, warrantless entry to seize was unconstitutional).
327 Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321 (1987) (police lawfully in apartment to inves-
tigate shooting lacked probable cause to inspect expensive stereo equipment to re-
cord serial numbers).
328 Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771 (1983) (locker customs agents had opened,
and which was subsequently traced). Accord, United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S.
109 (1984) (inspection of package opened by private freight carrier who notified drug
agents).
329 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
330 469 U.S. at 336.
331 469 U.S. at 340.
332 This single rule, the Court explained, will permit school authorities “to regu-
late their conduct according to the dictates of reason and common sense.” 469 U.S.
at 343. Rejecting the suggestion of dissenting Justice Stevens, the Court was “unwill-
ing to adopt a standard under which the legality of a search is dependent upon a
judge’s evaluation of the relative importance of various school rules.” Id. at n.9.
or the rules of the school.” 333 School searches must also be reason-
ably related in scope to the circumstances justifying the interfer-
ence, and “not excessively intrusive in light of the age and sex of
the student and the nature of the infraction.” 334 In applying these
rules, the Court upheld as reasonable the search of a student’s purse
to determine whether the student, accused of violating a school rule
by smoking in the lavatory, possessed cigarettes. The search for ciga-
rettes uncovered evidence of drug activity held admissible in a pros-
ecution under the juvenile laws.
In Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding,335 a student
found in possession of prescription ibuprofen pills at school stated
that the pills had come from another student, 13-year-old Savana
Redding. The Court found that the first student’s statement was
sufficiently plausible to warrant suspicion that Savana was in-
volved in pill distribution, and that this suspicion was enough to
justify a search of Savana’s backpack and outer clothing.336 School
officials, however, had also “directed Savana to remove her clothes
down to her underwear, and then ‘pull out’ her bra and the elastic
band on her underpants” 337—an action that the Court thought could
fairly be labeled a strip search. Taking into account that “adoles-
cent vulnerability intensifies the patent intrusiveness of the expo-
sure” and that, according to a study, a strip search can “result in
serious emotional damage,” the Court found that the search vio-
lated the Fourth Amendment.338 “Because there were no reasons to
suspect the drugs presented a danger or were concealed in her un-
derwear,” the Court wrote, “the content of the suspicion failed to
match the degree of intrusion.” 339 But, even though the Court found
that the search had violated the Fourth Amendment, it found that
the school officials who conducted the search were protected from
liability through qualified immunity, because the law prior to Red-
ding was not clearly established.340
Government Workplace.—Similar principles apply to a public
employer’s work-related search of its employees’ offices, desks, or
333 469 U.S. at 342. The Court has further elaborated that this “reasonable sus-
picion” standard is met if there is a “moderate chance” of finding evidence of wrong-

doing. Safford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–479, slip
op. at 5 (2009).
334 469 U.S. at 342.
335 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–479 (2009).
336 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–479, slip op. at 7.
337 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–479, slip op. at 8.
338 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–479, slip op. at 8.
339 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–479, slip op. at 1, 9. Justice Thomas dissented from the
finding of a Fourth Amendment violation.

340 See “Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule,” infra. Justices Stevens and Ginsburg
dissented from the grant of qualified immunity.

file cabinets, except that in this context the Court distinguished

searches conducted for law enforcement purposes. In O’Connor v.
Ortega,341 a majority of Justices agreed, albeit on somewhat differ-
ing rationales, that neither a warrant nor a probable cause require-
ment should apply to employer searches “for noninvestigatory, work-
related purposes, as well as for investigations of work-related
misconduct.” 342 Four Justices would require a case-by-case inquiry
into the reasonableness of such searches; 343 one would hold that
such searches “do not violate the Fourth Amendment.” 344
In City of Ontario v. Quon,345 the Court bypassed adopting an
approach for determining a government employee’s reasonable ex-
pectation of privacy, an issue unresolved in O’Connor. Rather, the
Quon Court followed the “special needs” holding in O’Connor and
found that, even assuming a reasonable expectation of privacy, a
city’s warrantless search of the transcripts of a police officer’s on-
duty text messages on city equipment was reasonable because it
was justified at its inception by noninvestigatory work-related pur-
poses and was not excessively intrusive.346 A jury had found the
purpose of the search to be to determine whether the city’s con-
tract with its wireless service provider was adequate, and the Court
held that “reviewing the transcripts was reasonable because it was
an efficient and expedient way to determine whether [the officer’s]
overages were the result of work-related messaging or personal use.” 347
Prisoners, Probatitoners, and Parolees.—The “undoubted se-
curity imperatives involved in jail supervision” require “defer[ence]
to the judgment of correctional officials unless the record contains
substantial evidence showing their policies are an unnecessary or
unjustified response to the problems of jail security.” 348 So saying,
the Court, in Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, upheld rou-
tine strip searches, including close-up visual cavity inspections, as
part of processing new arrestees for entry into the general inmate
population, without the need for individualized suspicion and with-
341 480 U.S. 709 (1987).
342 480 U.S. at 725. Not at issue was whether there must be individualized sus-
picion for investigations of work-related misconduct.
343 This position was stated in Justice O’Connor’s plurality opinion, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and by Justices White and Powell.

344 480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment).
345 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–1332, slip op. (2010).
346 In Quon, a police officer was dismissed after a review of the transcripts of
his on-duty text messages revealed that a large majority of his texting was not re-
lated to work, and some messages were sexually explicit.
347 560 U.S. ___, No. 08–1332, slip op. at 13 (2010).
348 Florence v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. ___, No. 10–945, slip op.
at 2, 9 (2012). See also, e.g., Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (1979). The Florence Court
made clear it was referring to “jails” in “a broad sense to include prisons and other
detention facilities.” 566 U.S. ___, No. 10–945, slip op. at 1 (2012).
out an exception for those arrested for minor offenses.349 Correc-

tional officials had asserted significant penological interests to jus-
tify routine strip searches of new arrivals: detecting and preventing
the introduction into the inmate population of infections, infesta-
tions, and contraband of all sorts; and identifying gang members.
Having cited serious concerns and having applied their profes-
sional expertise, the officials had, in the Court’s opinion, acted rea-
sonably and not clearly overreacted. But despite taking a deferen-
tial approach and recounting the grave dangers correctional officers
face, the Florence Court did not hold that individuals being pro-
cessed for detention have no privacy rights at all. In separate con-
currences, moreover, two members of the five-Justice majority held
out the prospect of exceptions and refinements in future rulings on
blanket strip search policies for new detainees.350
A legitimate interest in having safe and accurate booking proce-
dures to identify persons being taken into custody was prominently
cited by the Court in Maryland v. King to sustain taking DNA samples
from those charged with serious crimes.351 In the Court’s opinion,
tapping the “unmatched potential of DNA identification” facilitates
knowing with certainty who the arrestee is, his criminal history and
the danger he poses to others, his flight risk, and so on.352 By com-
parison, the Court characterized an arrestee’s expectation of pri-
vacy as diminished and the intrusion posed by a cheek swab as mini-
mal.353
Searches of prison cells by prison administrators are not lim-
ited even by a reasonableness standard, the Court’s having held that
“the Fourth Amendment proscription against unreasonable searches
349 566 U.S. ___, No. 10–945, slip op. (2012). The Court upheld similarly invasive
strip searches of all inmates following contact visits in Bell v. Wolfish. 441 U.S. 520,
558–60 (1979).
350 566 U.S. ___, No. 10–945, slip op. (2012) (Roberts, C.J., concurring); 566 U.S.
___, No. 10–945, slip op. (2012) (Alito, J., concurring). In the opinion of the dissent-
ers, a strip search of the kind conducted in Florence is unconstitutional if given to
an arriving detainee arrested for a minor offense not involving violence or drugs,
absent a reasonable suspicion to believe that the new arrival possesses contraband.
566 U.S. ___, No. 10–945, slip op. (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
351 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–207, slip op. (2013).
352 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–207, slip op. at 10–18, 23.
353 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–207, slip op. at 23–26. The four-Justice dissent insisted
that the primary purpose of the DNA testing was investigative, not administrative,
and that the testing could not be upheld as a search incident to arrest because it
was not aimed at detection of contraband or weapons or of evidence relevant to the
crime of arrest. 569 U.S. ___, No. 12–207, slip op. (Scalia, J., dissenting). Rather,
the dissent regarded the testing as a general effort, without individualized suspi-
cion, to see if the arrestee is connected to any unsolved crimes.
does not apply within the confines of the prison cell.” 354 Thus, prison
administrators may conduct random “shakedown” searches of in-
mates’ cells without the need to adopt any established practice or
plan, and inmates must look to the Eighth Amendment or to state
tort law for redress against harassment, malicious property destruc-
tion, and the like.
Neither a warrant nor probable cause is needed for an adminis-
trative search of a probationer’s home. It is enough, the Court ruled
in Griffin v. Wisconsin, that such a search was conducted pursuant
to a valid regulation that itself satisfies the Fourth Amendment’s
reasonableness standard (e.g., by requiring “reasonable grounds” for
a search).355 “A State’s operation of a probation system, like its op-
eration of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision
of a regulated industry, . . . presents ‘special needs’ beyond normal
law enforcement that may justify departures from the usual war-
rant and probable cause requirements.” 356 “Probation, like incar-
ceration, is a form of criminal sanction,” the Court noted, and a
warrant or probable cause requirement would interfere with the “on-
going [non-adversarial] supervisory relationship” required for proper
functioning of the system.357 A warrant is also not required if the
purpose of a search of a probationer is investigate a crime rather
than to supervise probation.358
“[O]n the ‘continuum’ of state-imposed punishments . . . , parol-
ees have [even] fewer expectations of privacy than probationers, be-
cause parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is to im-
prisonment.” 359 The Fourth Amendment, therefore, is not violated
by a warrantless search of a parolee that is predicated upon a pa-
role condition to which a prisoner agreed to observe during the bal-
ance of his sentence.360
Drug Testing.—In two 1989 decisions the Court held that no
warrant, probable cause, or even individualized suspicion is re-
354 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 526 (1984). See also Bell v. Wolfish, 441
U.S. 520, 555–57 (1979) (“It is difficult to see how the detainee’s interest in privacy
is infringed by the room-search rule [allowing unannounced searches]. No one can
rationally doubt that room searches represent an appropriate security measure . . . .”).
355 483 U.S. 868 (1987) (search based on information from police detective that
there was or might be contraband in probationer’s apartment).

356 483 U.S. at 873–74.
357 483 U.S. at 879.
358 United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001) (probationary status informs
both sides of the reasonableness balance).

359 Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 850 (2006) (internal quotation marks al-
tered).
360 547 U.S. at 852. The parole condition at issue in Samson required prisoners
to “agree in writing to be subject to a search or seizure by a parole officer or other

peace officer at any time of the day or night, with or without a search warrant and
with or without cause.” Id. at 846, quoting Cal. Penal Code Ann. § 3067(a).
quired for mandatory drug testing of certain classes of railroad and

public employees. In each case, “special needs beyond the normal
need for law enforcement” were identified as justifying the drug test-
ing. In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n,361 the Court up-
held regulations requiring railroads to administer blood, urine, and
breath tests to employees involved in certain train accidents or vio-
lating certain safety rules; in National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab 362 the Court upheld a Customs Service screening pro-
gram requiring urine testing of employees seeking transfer or pro-
motion to positions having direct involvement with drug interdic-
tion, or to positions requiring the incumbent to carry firearms.
The Court in Skinner found a “compelling” governmental inter-
est in testing the railroad employees without any showing of indi-
vidualized suspicion, since operation of trains by anyone impaired
by drugs “can cause great human loss before any signs of impair-
ment become noticeable.” 363 By contrast, the intrusions on privacy
were termed “limited.” Blood and breath tests were passed off as
routine; the urine test, although more intrusive, was deemed per-
missible because of the “diminished expectation of privacy” in em-
ployees having some responsibility for safety in a pervasively regu-
lated industry. 364 The lower court’s emphasis on the limited
effectiveness of the urine test (it detects past drug use but not nec-
essarily the level of impairment) was misplaced, the Court ruled.
It is enough that the test may provide some useful information for
an accident investigation; in addition, the test may promote deter-
rence as well as detection of drug use.365
In Von Raab the governmental interests underlying the Cus-
toms Service’s screening program were also termed “compelling”: to
ensure that persons entrusted with a firearm and the possible use
of deadly force not suffer from drug-induced impairment of percep-
tion and judgment, and that “front-line [drug] interdiction person-
nel [be] physically fit, and have unimpeachable integrity and judg-
ment.” 366 The possibly “substantial” interference with privacy interests
of these Customs employees was justified, the Court concluded, be-
361 489 U.S. 602 (1989).

362 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
363 489 U.S. at 628.
364 489 U.S. at 628.
365 489 U.S. at 631–32.
366 Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 670–71. Dissenting Justice Scalia discounted the “feeble
justifications” relied upon by the Court, believing instead that the “only plausible
explanation” for the drug testing program was the “symbolism” of a government agency
setting an example for other employers to follow. 489 U.S. at 686–87.
cause, “[u]nlike most private citizens or government employees gen-

erally, they have a diminished expectation of privacy.” 367
Emphasizing the “special needs” of the public school context, re-
flected in the “custodial and tutelary” power that schools exercise
over students, and also noting schoolchildren’s diminished expecta-
tion of privacy, the Court in Vernonia School District v. Acton 368
upheld a school district’s policy authorizing random urinalysis drug
testing of students who participate in interscholastic athletics. The
Court redefined the term “compelling” governmental interest. The
phrase does not describe a “fixed, minimum quantum of governmen-
tal concern,” the Court explained, but rather “describes an interest
which appears important enough to justify the particular search at
hand.” 369 Applying this standard, the Court concluded that “deter-
ring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren is at least as impor-
tant as enhancing efficient enforcement of the Nation’s laws against
the importation of drugs . . . or deterring drug use by engineers
and trainmen.” 370 On the other hand, the interference with privacy
interests was not great, the Court decided, since schoolchildren are
routinely required to submit to various physical examinations and
vaccinations. Moreover, “[l]egitimate privacy expectations are even
less [for] student athletes, since they normally suit up, shower, and
dress in locker rooms that afford no privacy, and since they volun-
tarily subject themselves to physical exams and other regulations
above and beyond those imposed on non-athletes.” 371 The Court “cau-
tion[ed] against the assumption that suspicionless drug testing will
readily pass muster in other contexts,” identifying as “the most sig-
nificant element” in Vernonia the fact that the policy was imple-
mented under the government’s responsibilities as guardian and tu-
tor of schoolchildren.372
Seven years later, the Court in Board of Education v. Earls 373
extended Vernonia to uphold a school system’s drug testing of all
junior high and high school students who participated in extra-
curricular activities. The lowered expectation of privacy that ath-
letes have “was not essential” to the decision in Vernonia, Justice
Thomas wrote for a 5–4 Court majority.374 Rather, that decision “de-
pended primarily upon the school’s custodial responsibility and au-
367 489 U.S. at 672.

368 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
369 515 U.S. at 661.
370 515 U.S. at 661.
371 515 U.S. at 657.
372 515 U.S. at 665.
373 536 U.S. 822 (2002).
374 536 U.S. at 831.
thority.” 375 Another distinction was that, although there was some
evidence of drug use among the district’s students, there was no
evidence of a significant problem, as there had been in Vernonia.
Rather, the Court referred to “the nationwide epidemic of drug use,”
and stated that there is no “threshold level” of drug use that need
be present.376 Because the students subjected to testing in Earls
had the choice of not participating in extra-curricular activities rather
than submitting to drug testing, the case stops short of holding that
public school authorities may test all junior and senior high school
students for drugs. Thus, although the Court’s rationale seems broad
enough to permit across-the-board testing,377 Justice Breyer’s con-
currence, emphasizing among other points that “the testing pro-
gram avoids subjecting the entire school to testing,” 378 raises some
doubt on this score. The Court also left another basis for limiting
the ruling’s sweep by asserting that “regulation of extracurricular
activities further diminishes the expectation of privacy among school-
children.” 379
In two other cases, the Court found that there were no “special
needs” justifying random testing. Georgia’s requirement that candi-
dates for state office certify that they had passed a drug test, the
Court ruled in Chandler v. Miller 380 was “symbolic” rather than “spe-
cial.” There was nothing in the record to indicate any actual fear
or suspicion of drug use by state officials, the required certification
was not well designed to detect illegal drug use, and candidates for
state office, unlike the customs officers held subject to drug testing
in Von Raab, are subject to “relentless” public scrutiny. In the sec-
ond case, a city-run hospital’s program for drug screening of preg-
375 536 U.S. at 831.

376 536 U.S. at 836.
377 Drug testing was said to be a “reasonable” means of protecting the school
board’s “important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its stu-
dents,” and the decision in Vernonia was said to depend “primarily upon the school’s
custodial responsibility and authority.” 536 U.S. at 838, 831.
378 Concurring Justice Breyer pointed out that the testing program “preserves
an option for a conscientious objector,” who can pay a price of nonparticipation that
is “serious, but less severe than expulsion.” 536 U.S. at 841. Dissenting Justice Ginsburg
pointed out that extracurricular activities are “part of the school’s educational pro-
gram” even though they are in a sense “voluntary.” “Voluntary participation in ath-
letics has a distinctly different dimension” because it “expose[s] students to physical
risks that schools have a duty to mitigate.” Id. at 845, 846.
379 536 U.S. at 831–32. The best the Court could do to support this statement
was to assert that “some of these clubs and activities require occasional off-campus
travel and communal undress,” to point out that all extracurricular activities “have
their own rules and requirements,” and to quote from general language in Vernonia.
Id. Dissenting Justice Ginsburg pointed out that these situations requiring a change
of clothes on occasional out-of-town trips are “hardly equivalent to the routine com-
munal undress associated with athletics.” Id. at 848.
380 520 U.S. 305 (1997).
nant patients suspected of cocaine use was invalidated because its

purpose was to collect evidence for law enforcement.381 In the pre-
vious three cases in which random testing had been upheld, the
Court pointed out, the “special needs” asserted as justification were
“divorced from the general interest in law enforcement.” 382 By con-
trast, the screening program’s focus on law enforcement brought it
squarely within the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions.
Electronic Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment
The Olmstead Case.—With the invention of the microphone,
the telephone, and the dictagraph recorder, it became possible to
“eavesdrop” with much greater secrecy and expediency. Inevitably,
the use of electronic devices in law enforcement was challenged, and
in 1928 the Court reviewed convictions obtained on the basis of evi-
dence gained through taps on telephone wires in violation of state
law. On a five-to-four vote, the Court held that wiretapping was not
within the confines of the Fourth Amendment.383 Chief Justice Taft,
writing the opinion of the Court, relied on two lines of argument
for the conclusion. First, because the Amendment was designed to
protect one’s property interest in his premises, there was no search
so long as there was no physical trespass on premises owned or
controlled by a defendant. Second, all the evidence obtained had been
secured by hearing, and the interception of a conversation could not
qualify as a seizure, for the Amendment referred only to the sei-
zure of tangible items. Furthermore, the violation of state law did
not render the evidence excludable, since the exclusionary rule op-
erated only on evidence seized in violation of the Constitution.384
Federal Communications Act.—Six years after the decision
in Olmstead, Congress enacted the Federal Communications Act and
included in § 605 of the Act a broadly worded proscription on which
the Court seized to place some limitation upon governmental wire-
381 Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
382 532 U.S. at 79.
383 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
384 Among the dissenters were Justice Holmes, who characterized “illegal” wire-
tapping as “dirty business,” 277 U.S. at 470, and Justice Brandeis, who contributed
to his opinion the famous peroration about government as “the potent, the omnipres-
ent, teacher” which “breeds contempt for law” among the people by its example. Id.
at 485. More relevant here was his lengthy argument rejecting the premises of the
majority, an argument which later became the law of the land. (1) “To protect [the
right to be left alone], every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a viola-
tion of the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 478. (2) “There is, in essence, no difference
between the sealed letter and the private telephone message. . . . The evil incident
to invasion of the privacy of the telephone is far greater than that involved in tam-
pering with the mails. Whenever a telephone line is tapped, the privacy of the per-
sons at both ends of the line is invaded and all conversations between them upon
any subject . . . may be overheard.” Id. at 475–76.
tapping.385 Thus, in Nardone v. United States,386 the Court held that

wiretapping by federal officers could violate § 605 if the officers both
intercepted and divulged the contents of the conversation they over-
heard, and that testimony in court would constitute a form of pro-
hibited divulgence. Such evidence was therefore excluded, although
wiretapping was not illegal under the Court’s interpretation if the
information was not used outside the governmental agency. Be-
cause § 605 applied to intrastate as well as interstate transmis-
sions,387 there was no question about the applicability of the ban to
state police officers, but the Court declined to apply either the stat-
ute or the due process clause to require the exclusion of such evi-
dence from state criminal trials.388 State efforts to legalize wiretap-
ping pursuant to court orders were held by the Court to be precluded
by the fact that Congress in § 605 had intended to occupy the field
completely to the exclusion of the states.389
Nontelephonic Electronic Surveillance.—The trespass ratio-
nale of Olmstead was used in cases dealing with “bugging” of prem-
ises rather than with tapping of telephones. Thus, in Goldman v.
United States,390 the Court found no Fourth Amendment violation
when a listening device was placed against a party wall so that con-
versations were overheard on the other side. But when officers drove
a “spike mike” into a party wall until it came into contact with a
heating duct and thus broadcast defendant’s conversations, the Court
determined that the trespass brought the case within the Amend-
385 Ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1103 (1934), providing, inter alia, that “. . . no person not
being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communication and divulge or
publish the existence, contents, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted com-
munication to any person.” Nothing in the legislative history indicated what Con-
gress had in mind in including this language. The section, which appeared at 47
U.S.C. § 605, was rewritten by Title III of the Omnibus Crime Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
22, § 803, so that the “regulation of the interception of wire or oral communications
in the future is to be governed by” the provisions of Title III. S. REP. NO. 1097, 90th
Cong., 2d Sess. 107–08 (1968).
386 302 U.S. 379 (1937). Derivative evidence, that is, evidence discovered as a
result of information obtained through a wiretap, was similarly inadmissible, Nardone

v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939), although the testimony of witnesses might be
obtained through the exploitation of wiretap information. Goldstein v. United States,
316 U.S. 114 (1942). Eavesdropping on a conversation on an extension telephone
with the consent of one of the parties did not violate the statute. Rathbun v. United
States, 355 U.S. 107 (1957).
387 Weiss v. United States, 308 U.S. 321 (1939).
388 Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952). At this time, evidence obtained in
violation of the Fourth Amendment could be admitted in state courts. Wolf v. Colo-
rado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). Although Wolf was overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961), it was some seven years later and after wiretapping itself had been made
subject to the Fourth Amendment that Schwartz was overruled in Lee v. Florida,
392 U.S. 378 (1968).
389 Bananti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957).
390 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
ment.391 In so holding, the Court, without alluding to the matter,

overruled in effect the second rationale of Olmstead, the premise
that conversations could not be seized.
The Berger and Katz Cases.—In Berger v. New York,392 the
Court confirmed the obsolescence of the alternative holding in Olmstead
that conversations could not be seized in the Fourth Amendment
sense.393 Berger held unconstitutional on its face a state eavesdrop-
ping statute under which judges were authorized to issue warrants
permitting police officers to trespass on private premises to install
listening devices. The warrants were to be issued upon a showing
of “reasonable ground to believe that evidence of crime may be thus
obtained, and particularly describing the person or persons whose
communications, conversations or discussions are to be overheard
or recorded.” For the five-Justice majority, Justice Clark discerned
several constitutional defects in the law. “First, . . . eavesdropping
is authorized without requiring belief that any particular offense
has been or is being committed; nor that the ‘property’ sought, the
conversations, be particularly described.”
“The purpose of the probable-cause requirement of the Fourth
Amendment to keep the state out of constitutionally protected ar-
eas until it has reason to believe that a specific crime has been or
is being committed is thereby wholly aborted. Likewise the stat-
ute’s failure to describe with particularity the conversations sought
gives the officer a roving commission to ‘seize’ any and all conversa-
tions. It is true that the statute requires the naming of ‘the person
or persons whose communications, conversations or discussions are
to be overheard or recorded. . . .’ But this does no more than iden-
tify the person whose constitutionally protected area is to be in-
vaded rather than ‘particularly describing’ the communications, con-
versations, or discussions to be seized. . . . Secondly, authorization
of eavesdropping for a two-month period is the equivalent of a se-
ries of intrusions, searches, and seizures pursuant to a single show-
ing of probable cause. Prompt execution is also avoided. During such
a long and continuous (24 hours a day) period the conversations of
any and all persons coming into the area covered by the device will
be seized indiscriminately and without regard to their connection
with the crime under investigation. Moreover, the statute permits
. . . extensions of the original two-month period—presumably for
two months each—on a mere showing that such extension is ‘in the
391 Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1961). See also Clinton v. Vir-
ginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (physical trespass found with regard to amplifying device
stuck in a partition wall with a thumb tack).
392 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
393 388 U.S. at 50–53.
public interest.’ . . . Third, the statute places no termination date

on the eavesdrop once the conversation sought is seized. . . . Fi-
nally, the statute’s procedure, necessarily because its success de-
pends on secrecy, has no requirement for notice as do conventional
warrants, nor does it overcome this defect by requiring some show-
ing of special facts. On the contrary, it permits unconsented entry
without any showing of exigent circumstances. Such a showing of
exigency, in order to avoid notice, would appear more important in
eavesdropping, with its inherent dangers, than that required when
conventional procedures of search and seizure are utilized. Nor does
the statute provide for a return on the warrant thereby leaving full
discretion in the officer as to the use of seized conversations of in-
nocent as well as guilty parties. In short, the statute’s blanket grant
of permission to eavesdrop is without adequate judicial supervision
or protective procedures.” 394
Both Justices Black and White in dissent accused the Berger
majority of so construing the Fourth Amendment that no wiretapping-
eavesdropping statute could pass constitutional scrutiny,395 and, in
Katz v. United States,396 the Court in an opinion by one of the Berger
dissenters, Justice Stewart, modified some of its language and pointed
to Court approval of some types of statutorily-authorized electronic
surveillance. Just as Berger had confirmed that one rationale of the
Olmstead decision, the inapplicability of “seizure” to conversations,
was no longer valid, Katz disposed of the other rationale. In the
latter case, officers had affixed a listening device to the outside wall
of a telephone booth regularly used by Katz and activated it each
time he entered; since there had been no physical trespass into the
booth, the lower courts held the Fourth Amendment not relevant.
The Court disagreed, saying that “once it is recognized that the Fourth
Amendment protects people—and not simply ‘areas’—against unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, it becomes clear that the reach of
that Amendment cannot turn upon the presence or absence of a physi-
394 388 U.S. at 58–60. Justice Stewart concurred because he thought that the
affidavits in this case had not been sufficient to show probable cause, but he thought
the statute constitutional in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 68. Jus-
tice Black dissented, arguing that the Fourth Amendment was not applicable to elec-
tronic eavesdropping but that in any event the “search” authorized by the statute
was reasonable. Id. at 70. Justice Harlan dissented, arguing that the statute with
its judicial gloss was in compliance with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 89. Justice
White thought both the statute and its application in this case were constitutional.
Id. at 107.
395 388 U.S. at 71, 113.
396 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
cal intrusion into any given enclosure.” 397 Because the surveillance
of Katz’s telephone calls had not been authorized by a magistrate,
it was invalid; however, the Court thought that “it is clear that this
surveillance was so narrowly circumscribed that a duly authorized
magistrate, properly notified of the need for such investigation, spe-
cifically informed of the basis on which it was to proceed, and clearly
apprised of the precise intrusion it would entail, could constitution-
ally have authorized, with appropriate safeguards, the very limited
search and seizure that the government asserts in fact took place.” 398
The notice requirement, which had loomed in Berger as an obstacle
to successful electronic surveillance, was summarily disposed of.399
Finally, Justice Stewart observed that it was unlikely that elec-
tronic surveillance would ever come under any of the established
exceptions so that it could be conducted without prior judicial ap-
proval.400
Following Katz, Congress enacted in 1968 a comprehensive stat-
ute authorizing federal officers and permitting state officers pursu-
ant to state legislation complying with the federal law to seek war-
397 389 U.S. at 353. “We conclude that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Gold-
man have been so eroded by our subsequent decisions that the ‘trespass’ doctrine
there enunciated can no longer be regarded as controlling. The Government’s activi-
ties in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner’s words violated the
privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus
constituted a ‘search and seizure’ within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”
398 389 U.S. at 354. The “narrowly circumscribed” nature of the surveillance was
made clear by the Court in the immediately preceding passage. “[The Government
agents] did not begin their electronic surveillance until investigation of the petition-
er’s activities had established a strong probability that he was using the telephone
in question to transmit gambling information to persons in other States, in viola-
tion of federal law. Moreover, the surveillance was limited, both in scope and in du-
ration, to the specific purpose of establishing the contents of the petitioner’s unlaw-
ful telephonic communications. The agents confined their surveillance to the brief
periods during which he used the telephone booth, and they took great care to over-
hear only the conversations of the petitioner himself.” Id. For similar emphasis upon
precision and narrow circumscription, see Osborn v. United States, 385 U.S. 323,
329–30 (1966).
399 “A conventional warrant ordinarily serves to notify the suspect of an in-
tended search . . . . In omitting any requirement of advance notice, the federal court
. . . simply recognized, as has this Court, that officers need not announce their pur-
pose before conducting an otherwise authorized search if such an announcement would
provoke the escape of the suspect or the destruction of critical evidence.” 389 U.S.
at 355 n.16.
400 389 U.S. at 357–58. Justice Black dissented, feeling that the Fourth Amend-
ment applied only to searches for and seizures of tangible things and not conversa-
tions. Id. at 364. Two “beeper” decisions support the general applicability of the war-
rant requirement if electronic surveillance will impair legitimate privacy interests.
Compare United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983) (no Fourth Amendment viola-
tion in relying on a beeper, installed without warrant, to aid in monitoring progress
of a car on the public roads, since there is no legitimate expectation of privacy in
destination of travel on the public roads), with United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705
(1984) (beeper installed without a warrant may not be used to obtain information
as to the continuing presence of an item within a private residence).
rants for electronic surveillance to investigate violations of prescribed

classes of criminal legislation.401 The Court has not yet had occa-
sion to pass on the federal statute and to determine whether its
procedures and authorizations comport with the standards sketched
in Osborn, Berger, and Katz or whether those standards are some-
what more flexible than they appear to be on the faces of the opin-
ions.402
Warrantless “National Security” Electronic Surveil-
lance.—In Katz v. United States,403 Justice White sought to pre-
serve for a future case the possibility that in “national security cases”
electronic surveillance upon the authorization of the President or
the Attorney General could be permissible without prior judicial ap-
proval. The Executive Branch then asserted the power to wiretap
and to “bug” in two types of national security situations, against
domestic subversion and against foreign intelligence operations, first
basing its authority on a theory of “inherent” presidential power
and then in the Supreme Court withdrawing to the argument that
such surveillance was a “reasonable” search and seizure and there-
fore valid under the Fourth Amendment. Unanimously, the Court
held that at least in cases of domestic subversive investigations, com-
pliance with the warrant provisions of the Fourth Amendment was
required.404 Whether or not a search was reasonable, wrote Justice
Powell for the Court, was a question which derived much of its an-
swer from the warrant clause; except in a few narrowly circum-
401 Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 82 Stat.
211, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510–20.

402 The Court has interpreted the statute several times without reaching the
constitutional questions. United States v. Kahn, 415 U.S. 143 (1974); United States
v. Giordano, 416 U.S. 505 (1974); United States v. Chavez, 416 U.S. 562 (1974); United
States v. Donovan, 429 U.S. 413 (1977); Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128 (1978);
Dalia v. United States, 441 U.S. 238 (1979); United States v. New York Telephone
Co., 434 U.S. 159 (1977); United States v. Caceres, 440 U.S. 741 (1979). Dalia su-
pra, did pass on one constitutional issue, whether the Fourth Amendment man-
dated specific warrant authorization for a surreptitious entry to install an autho-
rized “bug.” See also Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (no reasonable expectation
of privacy in numbers dialed on one’s telephone, so Fourth Amendment does not
require a warrant to install “pen register” to record those numbers).
403 389 U.S. 347, 363–64 (1967) (concurring opinion). Justices Douglas and Bren-
nan rejected the suggestion. Id. at 359–60 (concurring opinion). When it enacted its
1968 electronic surveillance statute, Congress alluded to the problem in ambiguous
fashion, 18 U.S.C. § 2511(3), which the Court subsequently interpreted as having
expressed no congressional position at all. United States v. United States District
Court, 407 U.S. 297, 302–08 (1972).
404 United States v. United States District Court, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). Chief Jus-
tice Burger concurred in the result and Justice White concurred on the ground that
the 1968 law required a warrant in this case, and therefore did not reach the consti-
tutional issue. Id. at 340. Justice Rehnquist did not participate. Justice Powell care-
fully noted that the case required “no judgment on the scope of the President’s sur-
veillance power with respect to the activities of foreign powers, within or without
this country.” Id. at 308.
scribed classes of situations, only those searches conducted pursu-

ant to warrants were reasonable. The Government’s duty to preserve
the national security did not override the guarantee that before gov-
ernment could invade the privacy of its citizens it must present to
a neutral magistrate evidence sufficient to support issuance of a war-
rant authorizing that invasion of privacy.405 This protection was even
more needed in “national security cases” than in cases of “ordi-
nary” crime, the Justice continued, because the tendency of govern-
ment so often is to regard opponents of its policies as a threat and
hence to tread in areas protected by the First Amendment as well
as by the Fourth.406 Rejected also was the argument that courts
could not appreciate the intricacies of investigations in the area of
national security or preserve the secrecy which is required.407
The question of the scope of the President’s constitutional pow-
ers, if any, remains judicially unsettled.408 Congress has acted, how-
ever, providing for a special court to hear requests for warrants for
electronic surveillance in foreign intelligence situations, and permit-
ting the President to authorize warrantless surveillance to acquire
foreign intelligence information provided that the communications
405 The case contains a clear suggestion that the Court would approve a congres-
sional provision for a different standard of probable cause in national security cases.
“We recognize that domestic security surveillance may involve different policy and
practical considerations from the surveillance of ‘ordinary crime.’ The gathering of
security intelligence is often long range and involves the interrelation of various sources
and types of information. The exact targets of such surveillance may be more diffi-
cult to identify than in surveillance operations against many types of crimes speci-
fied in Title III. Often, too, the emphasis of domestic intelligence gathering is on the
prevention of unlawful activity or the enhancement of the Government’s prepared-
ness for some future crisis or emergency. . . . Different standards may be compat-
ible with the Fourth Amendment if they are reasonable both in relation to the legiti-
mate need of Government for intelligence information and the protected rights of
our citizens. For the warrant application may vary according to the governmental
interest to be enforced and the nature of citizen right deserving protection. . . . It
may be that Congress, for example, would judge that the application and affidavit
showing probable cause need not follow the exact requirements of § 2518 but should
allege other circumstances more appropriate to domestic security cases. . . .” 407
U.S. at 322–23.
406 407 U.S. at 313–24.
407 407 U.S. at 320.
408 See United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
881 (1974); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594 (D.C. Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
944 (1976), appeal after remand, 565 F.2d 742 (D.C. Cir. 1977), on remand, 444 F.
Supp. 1296 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 606 F.2d 1172 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); Smith v. Nixon, 606 F.2d 1183 (D.C. Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 453 U.S. 912 (1981); United States v. Truong Ding Hung, 629 F.2d 908
(4th Cir. 1980), after remand, 667 F.2d 1105 (4th Cir. 1981); Halkin v. Helms, 690
F.2d 977 (D.C. Cir. 1982).
to be monitored are exclusively between or among foreign powers

and there is no substantial likelihood any “United States person”
will be overheard.409
Enforcing the Fourth Amendment: The Exclusionary Rule

The Fourth Amendment declares a right to be free from unrea-
sonable searches and seizures, but how this right translates into
concrete terms is not specified. Several possible methods of enforce-
ment have been suggested, but only one—the exclusionary rule—
has been applied with any frequency by the Supreme Court, and
Court in recent years has limited its application.
Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule.—Theoretically, there
are several alternatives to the exclusionary rule. An illegal search
and seizure may be criminally actionable and officers undertaking
one thus subject to prosecution, but the examples when officers are
criminally prosecuted for overzealous law enforcement are ex-
tremely rare.410 A police officer who makes an illegal search and
seizure is subject to internal departmental discipline, which may
be backed up by the oversight of police review boards in the few
jurisdictions that have adopted them, but, again, the examples of
disciplinary actions are exceedingly rare.411
Civil remedies are also available. Persons who have been ille-
gally arrested or who have had their privacy invaded will usually
have a tort action available under state statutory or common law,
or against the Federal Government under the Federal Tort Claims
Act.412 Moreover, police officers acting under color of state law who
violate a person’s Fourth Amendment rights are subject to a suit in
federal court for damages and other remedies 413 under a civil rights
statute.414 Although federal officers and others acting under color
409 Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. 95–511, 92 Stat. 1797,
50 U.S.C. §§ 1801–1811. See United States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141 (D.C. Cir. 1982)
(upholding constitutionality of disclosure restrictions in Act).
410 Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreasonable Searches and Seizures, 41 VA.
L. REV. 621 (1955).

411 Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Proposal for Improving Police Perfor-
mance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (1967).

412 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b), 2671–2680. Section 2680(h) prohibits suits against the
Federal Government for false arrest and specified other intentional torts, but con-
tains an exception “with regard to acts or omissions of investigative or law enforce-
ment officials of the United States Government.”
413 If there are continuing and recurrent violations, federal injunctive relief would
be available. Cf. Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966); Wheeler v. Good-
man, 298 F. Supp. 935 (preliminary injunction), 306 F. Supp. 58 (permanent injunc-
tion) (W.D.N.C. 1969), vacated on jurisdictional grounds, 401 U.S. 987 (1971).
414 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964). See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). In some
circumstances, the officer’s liability may be attributed to the municipality. Monell v.

New York City Dep’t of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). These claims that offi-
of federal law are not subject to this statute, the Supreme Court
has held that a right to damages for a violation of Fourth Amend-
ment rights arises by implication and that this right is enforceable
in federal courts.415
Although a damages remedy might be made more effectual,416
legal and practical problems stand in the way.417 Law enforcement
officers have available to them the usual common-law defenses, the
most important of which is the claim of good faith.418 Such “good
faith” claims, however, are not based on the subjective intent of the
officer. Instead, officers are entitled to qualified immunity “where
clearly established law does not show that the search violated the
Fourth Amendment,” 419 or where they had an objectively reason-
able belief that a warrantless search later determined to violate the
Fourth Amendment was supported by probable cause or exigent cir-
cumstances.420 On the practical side, persons subjected to illegal ar-
cers have used excessive force in the course of an arrest or investigatory stop are to
be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment, not under substantive due process. The
test is “whether the officers’ actions are ‘objectively reasonable’ under the facts and
circumstances confronting them.” Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 397 (1989) (cited
with approval in Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381 (2007), in which a police officer’s
ramming a fleeing motorist’s car from behind in an attempt to stop him was found
reasonable).
415 Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). The possibility
had been hinted at in Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 (1946).

416 See, e.g., Chief Justice Burger’s dissent in Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Nar-
cotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 411, 422–24 (1971), which suggests a statute allowing
suit against the government in a special tribunal and a statutory remedy in lieu of
the exclusionary rule.
417 Foote, Tort Remedies for Police Violations of Individual Rights, 39 MINN. L.
REV. 493 (1955).

418 This is the rule in actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S.
547 (1967), and on remand in Bivens the court of appeals promulgated the same
rule to govern trial of the action. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed-
eral Bureau of Narcotics, 456 F.2d 1339 (2d Cir. 1972).
419 Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, No. 07–751, slip op. (2009), quoted in Saf-
ford Unified School District #1 v. Redding, 557 U.S. ___, No. 08–479, slip op. at 11
(2009). In Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001), the Court had mandated a two-step
procedure to determine whether an officer has qualified immunity: first, a determi-
nation whether the officer’s conduct violated a constitutional right, and then a deter-
mination whether the right had been clearly established. In Pearson, the Court held
“that, while the sequence set forth [in Saucier] is often appropriate, it should no
longer be regarded as mandatory. The judges of the district courts and the courts of
appeals should be permitted to exercise their sound discretion in deciding which of
the two prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be addressed first in light
of the circumstances in the particular case at hand.” 555 U.S. ___, No. 07–751, slip
op. at 10. See also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
420 Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987). The qualified immunity inquiry
“has a further dimension” beyond what is required in determining whether a police

officer used excessive force in arresting a suspect: the officer may make “a reason-
able mistake” in his assessment of what the law requires. Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S.
194, 205–06 (2001). See also Brosseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 201 (2004) (because
cases create a “hazy border between excessive and acceptable force,” an officer’s mis-
rests and searches and seizures are often disreputable persons to-
ward whom juries are unsympathetic, or they are indigent and unable
to sue. The result, therefore, is that the Court has emphasized ex-
clusion of unconstitutionally seized evidence in subsequent crimi-
nal trials as the only effective enforcement method.
Development of the Exclusionary Rule.—Exclusion of evi-
dence as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations found its be-
ginning in Boyd v. United States,421 which, as noted above, in-
volved not a search and seizure but a compulsory production of
business papers, which the Court likened to a search and seizure.
Further, the Court analogized the Fifth Amendment’s self-
incrimination provision to the Fourth Amendment’s protections to
derive a rule that required exclusion of the compelled evidence be-
cause the defendant had been compelled to incriminate himself by
producing it.422 Boyd was closely limited to its facts and an exclu-
sionary rule based on Fourth Amendment violations was rejected
by the Court a few years later, with the Justices adhering to the
common-law rule that evidence was admissible however ac-
quired.423
Nevertheless, ten years later the common-law view was itself
rejected and an exclusionary rule propounded in Weeks v. United
understanding as to her authority to shoot a suspect attempting to flee in a vehicle

was not unreasonable); Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345 (1986) (qualified immu-
nity protects police officers who applied for a warrant unless “a reasonably well-
trained officer in [the same] position would have known that his affidavit failed to
establish probable cause and that he should not have applied for a warrant”).
421 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
422 “We have already noticed the intimate relation between the two Amend-
ments. They throw great light on each other. For the ‘unreasonable searches and
seizures’ condemned in the Fourth Amendment are almost always made for the pur-
pose of compelling a man to give evidence against himself, which in criminal cases
is condemned in the Fifth Amendment; and compelling a man in a criminal case to
be a witness against himself, which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws
light on the question as to what is an ‘unreasonable search and seizure’ within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we have been unable to perceive that the
seizure of a man’s private books and papers to be used in evidence against him is
substantially different from compelling him to be a witness against himself. We think
it is within the clear intent and meaning of those terms.” 116 U.S. at 633. It was
this use of the Fifth Amendment’s clearly required exclusionary rule, rather than
one implied from the Fourth, on which Justice Black relied, and, absent a Fifth Amend-
ment self-incrimination violation, he did not apply such a rule. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concurring opinion); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
493, 496–500 (1971) (dissenting opinion). The theory of a “convergence” of the two
Amendments has now been disavowed by the Court. See discussion, supra, under
“Property Subject to Seizure.”
423 Adams v. New York, 192 U.S. 585 (1904). Since the case arose from a state
court and concerned a search by state officers, it could have been decided simply by
holding that the Fourth Amendment was inapplicable. See National Safe Deposit
Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914).
States.424 Weeks had been convicted on the basis of evidence seized

from his home in the course of two warrantless searches; some of
the evidence consisted of private papers such as those sought to be
compelled in Boyd. Unanimously, the Court held that the evidence
should have been excluded by the trial court. The Fourth Amend-
ment, Justice Day said, placed on the courts as well as on law en-
forcement officers restraints on the exercise of power compatible with
its guarantees. “The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws
of the country to obtain convictions by means of unlawful searches
and enforced confessions . . . should find no sanction in the judg-
ments of the courts which are charged at all times with the sup-
port of the Constitution and to which people of all conditions have
a right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.” 425
The basis of the ruling is ambiguous, but seems to have been an
assumption that admission of illegally seized evidence would itself
violate the Fourth Amendment. “If letters and private documents
can thus be seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen
accused of an offense, the protection of the Fourth Amendment de-
claring his right to be secured against such searches and seizures
is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned, might
as well be stricken from the Constitution. The efforts of the courts
and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy
as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great prin-
ciples established by years of endeavor and suffering which have
resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land.” 426
Because the Fourth Amendment does not restrict the actions of
state officers,427 there was originally no question about the applica-
tion of an exclusionary rule in state courts 428 as a mandate of fed-
424 232 U.S. 383 (1914).

425 232 U.S. at 392.
426 232 U.S. at 393.
427 Smith v. Maryland, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 71, 76 (1855); National Safe Deposit
Co. v. Stead, 232 U.S. 58, 71 (1914).

428 The history of the exclusionary rule in the state courts was surveyed by Jus-
tice Frankfurter in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 29, 33–38 (1949). The matter was
canvassed again in Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 224–32 (1960).
eral constitutional policy.429 But, in Wolf v. Colorado,430 a unani-

mous Court held that freedom from unreasonable searches and sei-
zures was such a fundamental right as to be protected against state
violations by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.431 However, the Court held that the right thus guaranteed
did not require that the exclusionary rule be applied in the state
courts, because there were other means to observe and enforce the
right. “Granting that in practice the exclusion of evidence may be
an effective way of deterring unreasonable searches, it is not for
this Court to condemn as falling below the minimal standards as-
sured by the Due Process Clause a State’s reliance upon other meth-
ods which, if consistently enforced, would be equally effective.” 432
It developed, however, that the Court had not vested in the states
total discretion with regard to the admissibility of evidence, as the
Court proceeded to evaluate under the due process clause the meth-
ods by which the evidence had been obtained. Thus, in Rochin v.
California,433 evidence of narcotics possession had been obtained by
forcible administration of an emetic to defendant at a hospital af-
ter officers had been unsuccessful in preventing him from swallow-
ing certain capsules. The evidence, said Justice Frankfurter for the
Court, should have been excluded because the police methods were
429 During the period in which the Constitution did not impose any restrictions
on state searches and seizures, the Court permitted the introduction in evidence in
federal courts of items seized by state officers which had they been seized by federal
officers would have been inadmissible, Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398
(1914), so long as no federal officer participated in the search, Byars v. United States,
273 U.S. 28 (1927), or the search was not made on behalf of federal law enforce-
ment purposes. Gambino v. United States, 275 U.S. 310 (1927). This rule became
known as the “silver platter doctrine” after the phrase coined by Justice Frank-
furter in Lustig v. United States, 338 U.S. 74, 78–79 (1949): “The crux of that doc-
trine is that a search is a search by a federal official if he had a hand in it; it is not
a search by a federal official if evidence secured by state authorities is turned over
to the federal authorities on a silver platter.” In Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S.
206 (1960), the doctrine was discarded by a five-to-four majority, which held that,
because Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), had made state searches and seizures
subject to federal constitutional restrictions through the Fourteenth Amendment’s
due process clause, the “silver platter doctrine” was no longer constitutionally vi-
able. During this same period, since state courts were free to admit any evidence no
matter how obtained, evidence illegally seized by federal officers could be used in
state courts, Wilson v. Schnettler, 365 U.S. 381 (1961), although the Supreme Court
ruled out such a course if the evidence had first been offered in a federal trial and
had been suppressed. Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
430 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
431 “The security of one’s privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police—
which is at the core of the Fourth Amendment—is basic to a free society. It is there-
fore implicit in ‘the concept of ordered liberty’ and as such enforceable against the
States through the Due Process Clause.” 338 U.S. at 27–28.
432 338 U.S. at 31.
433 342 U.S. 165 (1952). The police had initially entered defendant’s house with-
out a warrant. Justices Black and Douglas concurred in the result on self-
incrimination grounds.
too objectionable. “This is conduct that shocks the conscience. Ille-

gally breaking into the privacy of the petitioner, the struggle to open
his mouth and remove what was there, the forcible extraction of
his stomach’s contents . . . is bound to offend even hardened sensi-
bilities. They are methods too close to the rack and screw.” 434 The
Rochin standard was limited in Irvine v. California,435 in which de-
fendant was convicted of bookmaking activities on the basis of evi-
dence secured by police who repeatedly broke into his house and
concealed electronic gear to broadcast every conversation in the house.
Justice Jackson’s plurality opinion asserted that Rochin had been
occasioned by the element of brutality, and that while the police
conduct in Irvine was blatantly illegal the admissibility of the evi-
dence was governed by Wolf, which should be consistently applied
for purposes of guidance to state courts. The Justice also enter-
tained considerable doubts about the efficacy of the exclusionary rule.436
Rochin emerged as the standard, however, in a later case in which
the Court sustained the admissibility of the results of a blood test
administered while defendant was unconscious in a hospital follow-
ing a traffic accident, the Court observing the routine nature of the
test and the minimal intrusion into bodily privacy.437
Then, in Mapp v. Ohio,438 the Court held that the exclusionary
rule applied to the states. It was “logically and constitutionally nec-
essary,” wrote Justice Clark for the majority, “that the exclusion doc-
trine—an essential part of the right to privacy—be also insisted upon
as an essential ingredient of the right” to be secure from unreason-
able searches and seizures. “To hold otherwise is to grant the right
but in reality to withhold its privilege and enjoyment.” 439 The Court
434 342 U.S. at 172.

435 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
436 347 U.S. at 134–38. Justice Clark, concurring, announced his intention to
vote to apply the exclusionary rule to the states when the votes were available. Id.
at 138. Justices Black and Douglas dissented on self-incrimination grounds, id. at
139, and Justice Douglas continued to urge the application of the exclusionary rule
to the states. Id. at 149. Justices Frankfurter and Burton dissented on due process
grounds, arguing the relevance of Rochin. Id. at 142.
437 Breithaupt v. Abram, 352 U.S. 432 (1957). Chief Justice Warren and Jus-
tices Black and Douglas dissented. Though a due process case, the results of the
case have been reaffirmed directly in a Fourth Amendment case. Schmerber v. Cali-
fornia, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
438 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
439 367 U.S. at 655–56. Justice Black concurred, doubting that the Fourth Amend-
ment itself compelled adoption of an exclusionary rule but relying on the Fifth Amend-
ment for authority. Id. at 661. Justice Stewart would not have reached the issue but
would have reversed on other grounds, id. at 672, while Justices Harlan, Frank-
furter, and Whittaker dissented, preferring to adhere to Wolf. Id. at 672. Justice Har-
lan advocated the overruling of Mapp down to the conclusion of his service on the
Court. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 490 (1971) (concurring opin-
ion).
further held that, because illegally seized evidence was to be ex-

cluded from both federal and state courts, the standards by which
the question of legality was to be determined should be the same,
regardless of whether the court in which the evidence was offered
was state or federal.440
The Foundations of the Exclusionary Rule.—Important to
determination of such questions as the application of the exclusion-
ary rule to the states and the ability of Congress to abolish or to
limit it is the fixing of the constitutional source and the basis of
the rule. For some time, it was not clear whether the exclusionary
rule was derived from the Fourth Amendment, from some union of
the Fourth and Fifth Amendments, or from the Court’s supervisory
power over the lower federal courts. It will be recalled that in Boyd 441
the Court fused the search and seizure clause with the provision of
the Fifth Amendment protecting against compelled self-incrimination.
In Weeks v. United States,442 though the Fifth Amendment was men-
tioned, the holding seemed clearly to be based on the Fourth Amend-
ment. Nevertheless, in opinions following Weeks the Court clearly
identified the basis for the exclusionary rule as the Self-
Incrimination Clause of the Fifth Amendment.443 Then, in Mapp v.
Ohio,444 the Court tied the rule strictly to the Fourth Amendment,
finding exclusion of evidence seized in violation of the Amendment
to be the “most important constitutional privilege” of the right to
be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, finding that the
rule was “an essential part of the right of privacy” protected by the
Amendment.
440 Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23 (1963).

441 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
442 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Defendant’s room had been searched and papers seized
by officers acting without a warrant. “If letters and private documents can thus be
seized and held and used in evidence against a citizen accused of an offense, the
protection of the Fourth Amendment declaring his right to be secure against such
searches and seizures is of no value, and, so far as those thus placed are concerned,
might as well be stricken from the Constitution.” Id. at 393.
443 E.g., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298, 306, 307 (1921); Amos v. United
States, 255 U.S. 313, 316 (1921); Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20, 33–34 (1925);
McGuire v. United States, 273 U.S. 95, 99 (1927). In Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 462 (1928), Chief Justice Taft ascribed the rule both to the Fourth and
the Fifth Amendments, while in dissent Justices Holmes and Brandeis took the view
that the Fifth Amendment was violated by the admission of evidence seized in vio-
lation of the Fourth. Id. at 469, 478–79. Justice Black was the only modern propo-
nent of this view. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concurring opinion); Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 493, 496–500 (1971) (dissenting opinion). See, how-
ever, Justice Clark’s plurality opinion in Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 30 (1963), in
which he brought up the self-incrimination clause as a supplementary source of the
rule, a position which he had discarded in Mapp.
444 367 U.S. 643, 656 (1961). Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949), also as-
cribed the rule to the Fourth Amendment exclusively.

“This Court has ever since [Weeks was decided in 1914] re-
quired of federal law officers a strict adherence to that command
which this Court has held to be a clear, specific, and constitution-
ally required—even if judicially implied—deterrent safeguard with-
out insistence upon which the Fourth Amendment would have been
reduced to a ‘form of words.’ ” 445 It was a necessary step in the ap-
plication of the rule to the states to find that the rule was of consti-
tutional origin rather than a result of an exercise of the Court’s
supervisory power over the lower federal courts, because the latter
could not constitutionally be extended to the state courts.446 In fact,
in Wolf v. Colorado,447 in declining to extend the exclusionary rule
to the states, Justice Frankfurter seemed to find the rule to be based
on the Court’s supervisory powers. Mapp establishes that the rule
is of constitutional origin, but this does not necessarily establish
that it is immune to statutory revision.
Suggestions appear in a number of cases, including Weeks, to
the effect that admission of illegally seized evidence is itself uncon-
stitutional.448 These suggestions were often combined with a ratio-
nale emphasizing “judicial integrity” as a reason to reject the prof-
445 Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 648 (1961) (emphasis added).
446 An example of an exclusionary rule not based on constitutional grounds may
be found in McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943), and Mallory v. United
States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), in which the Court enforced a requirement that ar-
restees be promptly presented to a magistrate by holding that incriminating admis-
sions obtained during the period beyond a reasonable time for presentation would
be inadmissible. The rule was not extended to the States, cf. Culombe v. Connecti-
cut, 367 U.S. 568, 598–602 (1961), but the Court’s resort to the self-incrimination
clause in reviewing confessions made such application irrelevant in most cases in
any event. For an example of a transmutation of a supervisory rule into a constitu-
tional rule, see McCarthy v. United States, 394 U.S. 459 (1969), and Boykin v. Ala-
bama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969).
447 Weeks “was not derived from the explicit requirements of the Fourth Amend-
ment . . . . The decision was a matter of judicial implication.” 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949).
Justice Black was more explicit. “I agree with what appears to be a plain implica-
tion of the Court’s opinion that the federal exclusionary rule is not a command of
the Fourth Amendment but is a judicially created rule of evidence which Congress
might negate.” Id. at 39–40. He continued to adhere to the supervisory power basis
in strictly search-and-seizure cases, Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 76 (1967) (dis-
senting), except where self-incrimination values were present. Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643, 661 (1961) (concurring). See also id. at 678 (Justice Harlan dissenting);
Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 216 (1960) (Justice Stewart for the Court).
448 “The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to ob-
tain convictions by means of unlawful searches and enforced confessions . . . should

find no sanction in the judgment of the courts which are charged at all times with
the support of the Constitution . . . .” Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392
(1914). In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 657 (1961), Justice Clark maintained
that “the Fourth Amendment include[s] the exclusion of the evidence seized in viola-
tion of its provisions” and that it, and the Fifth Amendment with regard to confes-
sions “assures . . . that no man is to be convicted on unconstitutional evidence.” In
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 12, 13 (1968), Chief Justice Warren wrote: “Courts which
sit under our Constitution cannot and will not be made party to lawless invasions
fer of such evidence.449 Yet the Court permitted such evidence to be

introduced into trial courts when the defendant lacked “standing”
to object to the search and seizure that produced the evidence 450
or when the search took place before the announcement of the deci-
sion extending the exclusionary rule to the states.451 At these times,
the Court turned to the “basic postulate of the exclusionary rule
itself. The rule is calculated to prevent, not to repair. Its purpose is
to deter—to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the
only effectively available way—by removing the incentive to disre-
gard it.” 452 “Mapp had as its prime purpose the enforcement of the
Fourth Amendment through the inclusion of the exclusionary rule
within its rights. This, it was found, was the only effective deter-
rent to lawless police action. Indeed, all of the cases since Wolf re-
quiring the exclusion of illegal evidence have been based on the ne-
cessity for an effective deterrent to illegal police action.” 453
Narrowing Application of the Exclusionary Rule.—For as
long as we have had the exclusionary rule, critics have attacked it,
challenged its premises, disputed its morality.454 By the early 1980s,
a majority of Justices had stated a desire either to abolish the rule
or to sharply curtail its operation,455 and numerous opinions had
rejected all doctrinal bases other than deterrence.456 At the same
of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered governmental use

of the fruits of such invasions. . . . A ruling admitting evidence in a criminal trial
. . . has the necessary effect of legitimizing the conduct which produced the evi-
dence.”
449 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 222–23 (1960); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 660 (1961). See McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 339–40 (1943).
450 See “Operation of the Rule: Standing,” infra.
451 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965).
452 Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
453 Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 636–37 (1965). The Court advanced other
reasons for its decision as well. Id. at 636–40.

454 Among the early critics were Judge Cardozo, People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13,
21, 150 N.E. 585, 587 (1926) (the criminal will go free “because the constable has
blundered”), and Dean Wigmore. 8 J. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYS-
TEM OF EVIDENCE 2183–84 (3d ed. 1940). For extensive discussion of criticism and sup-
port, with citation to the literature, see 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A
TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.2 (4th ed. 2004).
455 E.g., Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496 (1976) (Chief Justice Burger: rule
ought to be discarded now, rather than wait for a replacement as he argued earlier);
id. at 536 (Justice White: modify rule to admit evidence seized illegally but in good
faith); Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 261 (1973) (Justice Powell); Brown
v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 609 (1975) (Justice Powell); Robbins v. California, 453 U.S.
420, 437 (1981) (Justice Rehnquist); California v. Minjares, 443 U.S. 916 (1979) (Jus-
tice Rehnquist, joined by Chief Justice Burger); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403
U.S. 443, 510 (1971) (Justice Blackmun joining Justice Black’s dissent that “the Fourth
Amendment supports no exclusionary rule”).
456 E.g., United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 446 (1976) (deterrence is the “prime
purpose” of the rule, “if not the sole one.”); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338,
347–48 (1974); United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 536–39 (1975); Stone v. Pow-
time, these opinions voiced strong doubts about the efficacy of the
rule as a deterrent, and advanced public interest values in effec-
tive law enforcement and public safety as reasons to discard the
rule altogether or curtail its application.457 Thus, the Court empha-
sized the high costs of enforcing the rule to exclude reliable and
trustworthy evidence, even when violations have been technical or
in good faith, and suggested that such use of the rule may well “gen-
erat[e] disrespect for the law and administration of justice,” 458 as
well as free guilty defendants.459 No longer does the Court declare
that “[t]he essence of a provision forbidding the acquisition of evi-
dence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so acquired shall
not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all.” 460
Although the exclusionary rule has not been completely repudi-
ated, its use has been substantially curbed. For instance, defen-
dants who themselves were not subjected to illegal searches and
seizures may not object to the introduction of evidence illegally ob-
tained from co-conspirators or codefendants,461 and even a defen-
dant whose rights have been infringed may find the evidence admit-
ell, 428 U.S. 465, 486 (1976); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 134 n.3, 137–38 (1978);
Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979). Thus, admission of the fruits of
an unlawful search or seizure “work[s] no new Fourth Amendment wrong,” the wrong
being “fully accomplished by the unlawful search or seizure itself,” United States v.
Calandra, 414 U.S. at 354, and the exclusionary rule does not “cure the invasion of
the defendant’s rights which he has already suffered.” Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at
540 (Justice White dissenting). “Judicial integrity” is not infringed by the mere ad-
mission of evidence seized wrongfully. “[T]he courts must not commit or encourage
violations of the Constitution,” and the integrity issue is answered by whether exclu-
sion would deter violations by others. United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. at 458 n.35;
United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. at 347, 354; United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S.
at 538; Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 450 n.25 (1974).
457 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 448–54 (1976), contains a lengthy re-
view of the literature on the deterrent effect of the rule and doubts about that ef-
fect. See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 492 n.32 (1976).
458 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. at 490, 491.
459 Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed. Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 416 (1971) (Chief
Justice Burger dissenting).

460 Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
461 E.g., Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); United States v. Padilla, 508 U.S.
77 (1993) (only persons whose privacy or property interests are violated may object
to a search on Fourth Amendment grounds; exerting control and oversight over prop-
erty by virtue of participation in a criminal conspiracy does not alone establish such
interests); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448
U.S. 98 (1980). In United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727 (1980), the Court held it
impermissible for a federal court to exercise its supervisory power to police the ad-
ministration of justice in the federal system to suppress otherwise admissible evi-
dence on the ground that federal agents had flagrantly violated the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of third parties in order to obtain evidence to use against others when
the agents knew that the defendant would be unable to challenge their conduct un-
der the Fourth Amendment.
ted, not as proof of guilt, but to impeach his testimony.462 Further,

evidence obtained through a wrongful search and seizure may some-
times be used directly in the criminal trial, if the prosecution can
show a sufficient attenuation of the link between police misconduct
and obtaining the evidence.463 Defendants who have been con-
victed after trials in which they were given a full and fair opportu-
nity to raise claims of Fourth Amendment violations may not sub-
sequently raise those claims on federal habeas corpus because, the
Court found, the costs outweigh the minimal deterrent effect.464
The exclusionary rule is inapplicable in parole revocation hear-
ings,465 and a violation of the “knock-and-announce” rule (the pro-
cedure that police officers must follow to announce their presence
before entering a residence with a lawful warrant) 466 does not re-
quire suppression of the evidence gathered pursuant to a search.467
If an arrest or a search that was valid at the time it took place
462 United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Walder v. United States, 347
U.S. 62 (1954). Cf. Agnello v. United States, 269 U.S. 20 (1925) (now vitiated by
Havens). The impeachment exception applies only to the defendant’s own testimony,
and may not be extended to use illegally obtained evidence to impeach the testi-
mony of other defense witnesses. James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307 (1990).
463 Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487–88 (1963); Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165, 180–85 (1969); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975); Taylor v.
Alabama, 457 U.S. 687 (1982). United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978), re-
fused to exclude the testimony of a witness discovered through an illegal search.
Because a witness was freely willing to testify and therefore more likely to come
forward, the application of the exclusionary rule was not to be tested by the stan-
dard applied to exclusion of inanimate objects. Deterrence would be little served and
relevant and material evidence would be lost to the prosecution. In New York v. Har-
ris, 495 U.S. 14 (1990), the Court refused to exclude a station-house confession made
by a suspect whose arrest at his home had violated the Fourth Amendment be-
cause, even though probable cause had existed, no warrant had been obtained. And,
in Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984), evidence seized pursuant to a war-
rant obtained after an illegal entry was admitted because there had been an inde-
pendent basis for issuance of the warrant. This rule also applies to evidence ob-
served in plain view during the initial illegal search. Murray v. United States, 487
U.S. 533 (1988). See also United States v. Karo, 468 U.S. 705 (1984) (excluding con-
sideration of tainted evidence, there was sufficient untainted evidence in affidavit to
justify finding of probable cause and issuance of search warrant).
464 Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 (1976).
465 Pennsylvania Bd. of Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357 (1998).
466 The “knock and announce” requirement is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 3109, and
the Court has held that the rule is also part of the Fourth Amendment reasonable-
ness inquiry. Wilson v. Arkansas, 514 U.S. 927 (1995).
467 Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586 (2006). Writing for the majority, Justice
Scalia explained that the exclusionary rule was inappropriate because the purpose
of the knock-and-announce requirement was to protect human life, property, and the
homeowner’s privacy and dignity; the requirement has never protected an individu-
al’s interest in preventing seizure of evidence described in a warrant. Id. at 594.
Furthermore, the Court believed that the “substantial social costs” of applying the
exclusionary rule would outweigh the benefits of deterring knock-and-announce vio-
lations by applying it. Id. The Court also reasoned that other means of deterrence,
such as civil remedies, were available and effective, and that police forces have be-
come increasingly professional and respectful of constitutional rights in the past half-
becomes bad through the subsequent invalidation of the statute un-

der which the arrest or search was made, the Court has held that
evidence obtained thereby is nonetheless admissible.468 In other cases,
a grand jury witness was required to answer questions even though
the questions were based on evidence obtained from an unlawful
search and seizure,469 and federal tax authorities were permitted
in a civil proceeding to use evidence that had been unconstitution-
ally seized from a defendant by state authorities.470
The most severe curtailment of the rule came in 1984 with the
adoption of a “good faith” exception. In United States v. Leon,471 the
Court created an exception for evidence obtained as a result of offi-
cers’ objective, good-faith reliance on a warrant, later found to be
defective, issued by a detached and neutral magistrate. Justice White’s
opinion for the Court could find little benefit in applying the exclu-
sionary rule where there has been good-faith reliance on an invalid
warrant. Thus, there was nothing to offset the “substantial social
costs exacted by the [rule].” 472 “The exclusionary rule is designed
to deter police misconduct rather than to punish the errors of judges
and magistrates,” and in any event the Court considered it un-
likely that the rule could have much deterrent effect on the actions
of truly neutral magistrates.473 Moreover, the Court thought that
the rule should not be applied “to deter objectively reasonable law
enforcement activity,” and that “[p]enalizing the officer for the mag-
istrate’s error . . . cannot logically contribute to the deterrence of
century. Id. at 599. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion emphasizing that
“the continued operation of the exclusionary rule . . . is not in doubt.” Id. at 603. In
dissent, Justice Breyer asserted that the majority’s decision “weakens, perhaps de-
stroys, much of the practical value of the Constitution’s knock-and-announce protec-
tion.” Id. at 605.
468 Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31 (1979) (statute creating substantive crimi-
nal offense). Statutes that authorize unconstitutional searches and seizures but which
have not yet been voided at the time of the search or seizure may not create this
effect, however, Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85 (1979). This aspect of Torres and Ybarra was to a large degree nullified by
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340 (1987), rejecting a distinction between substantive and
procedural statutes and holding the exclusionary rule inapplicable in the case of a
police officer’s objectively reasonable reliance on a statute later held to violate the
Fourth Amendment. Similarly, the exclusionary rule does not require suppression of
evidence that was seized incident to an arrest that was the result of a clerical error
by a court clerk. Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
469 United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338 (1974).
470 United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433 (1976). Similarly, the rule is inappli-
cable in civil proceedings for deportation of aliens. INS v. Lopez-Mendoza, 468 U.S.
1032 (1984).
471 468 U.S. 897 (1984). The same objectively reasonable “good-faith” rule now
applies in determining whether officers obtaining warrants are entitled to qualified

immunity from suit. Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986).
472 468 U.S. at 907.
473 468 U.S. at 916–17.
Fourth Amendment violations.” 474 The Court also suggested some

circumstances in which courts would be unable to find that officers’
reliance on a warrant was objectively reasonable: if the officers have
been “dishonest or reckless in preparing their affidavit,” if it should
have been obvious that the magistrate had “wholly abandoned” his
neutral role, or if the warrant was obviously deficient on its face
(e.g., lacking in particularity).
The Court applied the Leon standard in Massachusetts v. Shep-
pard,475 holding that an officer possessed an objectively reasonable
belief that he had a valid warrant after he had pointed out to the
magistrate that he had not used the standard form, and the magis-
trate had indicated that the necessary changes had been incorpo-
rated in the issued warrant. Then, the Court then extended Leon
to hold that the exclusionary rule is inapplicable to evidence ob-
tained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable reliance on a
statute later held to violate the Fourth Amendme

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112th Congress DOCUMENT

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

INTERIM EDITION: ANALYSIS OF CASES DECIDED

CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE

U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE

39–309 WASHINGTON : 2014

Online Version: www.gpo.gov/constitutionannotated

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office

Senior Editor Emeritus

for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this document

preme Court, a cumulative pocket-part supplement to the

no longer serving after the issuance of the hardbound re-

dent States.” 3 Accordingly on June 7 a resolution was introduced in Con-

U.S. 155 (1894).

The Virginia legislature acted promptly upon this recommendation and

Morris of Pennsylvania, James Madison of Virginia, and Rufus King of Massachusetts.

Constitution a mere makeshift, a series of unfortunate compromises. The ad-

been frequently cited by the Supreme Court as an authoritative contemporary interpretation of

with a membership of 355, endorsed the new Constitution, but recom-

We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more

Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed

of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The

United States and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabit-

Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elec-

Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections,

Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive

Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time;

Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in

Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him,

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money

Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as

Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance,

der, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Con-

mit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States,

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of

Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of

the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassa-

Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress

Section 4. The President, Vice President and all Civil Offi-

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in

Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist

victed of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to

Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all

Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into

the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without

Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State

The Word, “the,” being inter- done in Convention by the Unanimous

New Hampshire JOHN LANGDON

Connecticut Wm SAMl JOHNSON

New York . . . . ALEXANDER HAMILTON

Delaware GEO: READ

Virginia JOHN BLAIR—

Georgia WILLIAM FEW

In Convention Monday, September 17th 1787.

assigned; that the Senators should appoint a President of the

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peace-

dent, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-

thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the