VOL.

157,JANUARY29,1988

455

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

*

No.L44546.January29,1988.

RUSTICO ADILLE, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE

COURTOFAPPEALS,EMETERIAASEJO,TEODORICA
ASEJO, DOMINGO ASEJO, JOSEFA ASEJO, and
SANTIAGOASEJO,respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Coownership; Redemption; Redemption of
the whole property by a coowner will not make him of all of
it.The right of repurchase may be exercised by a coowner with
respect to his share alone. While the records show that the
petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety, shouldering the
expenses therefor, that did not make him the owner of all of it. In
otherwords,itdidnotputtoendtheexistingstateofcoownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Failure of all coowners to
redeem the property entitles the vendee a retro to retain it and
consolidate title thereto in his name; Redemption not a mode of
terminating a coownership.The result is that the property
remains to be in a condition of coownership. While a vendee a
retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, may not be compelled to
consent to a partial redemption, the redemption by one coheir or
coowner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
ownershipoverit.Failureonthepartofallthecoownerstoredeem
itentitlesthevendeearetrotoretainthepropertyandconsolidate
title thereto in his name. But the provision does not give to the
redeeming coowner the right to the entire property. It does not
provideforamodeofterminatingacoownership.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Registration of property not a
means of acquiring ownership.Neither does the fact that the
petitioner had succeeded in securing title over the parcel in his
name terminate the existing coownership. While his halfbrothers
andsistersare,aswesaid,liabletohimforreimbursementasand
for their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim exclusive
right to the property owned in common. Registration of property is
notameansofacquiringownership.Itoperatesasamerenoticeof
existingtitle,thatis,ifthereisone.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Petitioner is a trustee of the property
on behalf of private respondents.Thepetitionermustthenbesaid
tobeatrusteeofthepropertyonbehalfoftheprivaterespondents.
WeagreewiththerespondentCourtofAppealsthatfraudattended
theregistra
_______________
* SECONDDIVISION.

456

456

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Adille vs. Court of Appeals

tionoftheproperty.Thepetitionerspretensionthathewasthesole
heir to the land in the affidavit of extrajudicial settlement he
executed preliminary to the registration thereof betrays a clear
effortonhisparttodefraudhisbrothersandsistersandtoexercise
sole dominion over the property. It is the view of the respondent
Courtthatthepetitioner,intakingovertheproperty,didsoeither
onbehalfofhiscoheirs,inwhichevent,hehadconstitutedhimself
anegotiorumgestorunderArticle2144oftheCivilCode,orforhis
exclusivebenefit,inwhichcase,heisguiltyoffraud,andmustact
as trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries, under
the Article 1456. The evidence, of course, points to the second
alternative, the petitioner having asserted claims of exclusive
ownership over the property and having acted in fraud of his co
heirs. He cannot therefore be said to have assumed the mere
management of the property abandoned by his coheirs, the
situationArticle2144oftheCodecontemplates.Inanycase,asthe
respondent Court itself affirms, the result would be the same
whetheritisoneortheother.Thepetitionerwouldremainliableto
theprivaterespondents,hiscoheirs.
Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription must be preceded
by repudiation to terminate coownership; Requisites.Prescription,
as a mode of terminating a relation of coownership, must have
been preceded by repudiation (of the coownership). The act of
repudiation,inturn,issubjecttocertainconditions:(1)acoowner
repudiatesthecoownership;(2)suchanactofrepudiationisclearly
made known to the other coowners; (3) the evidence thereon is
clear and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the
propertyfortheperiodrequiredbylaw.
Same; Same; Land registration; Torrens Title cannot cover up
fraud; Registration not equivalent to notice of repudiation.It is
true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive
noticeoftitle,butithaslikewisebeenourholdingthattheTorrens
titledoesnotfurnishashieldforfraud.Itisthereforenoargument
to say that the act of registration is equivalent to notice of
repudiation, assuming there was one, notwithstanding the long
standingrulethatregistrationoperatesasauniversalnoticeoftitle.
Civil Procedure; Prescription; While actions to enforce a
constructive trust prescribe in ten years from registration of the
property, private respondents right commenced from actual
discovery of petitioners act of defraudation.For the same reason,
we cannot dismiss the private respondents claims commenced in
1974 over the estate registered in 1955. While actions to enforce a
constructivetrustprescribesintenyears,reckonedfromthedateof
theregistrationoftheproperty,we,as
457

VOL.157,JANUARY29,1988

457

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

we said, are not prepared to count the period from such a date in
thiscase.Wenotethepetitionerssubrosaeffortstogetholdofthe
property exclusively for himself beginning with his fraudulent
misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of extrajudicial
settlement that he is the only heir and child of his mother Feliza
with the consequence that he was able to secure title in his name
also.Accordingly,weholdthattherightoftheprivaterespondents
commenced from the time they actually discovered the petitioners
act of defraudation. According to the respondent Court of Appeals,
they came to know [of it] apparently only during the progress of
thelitigation.Hence,prescriptionisnotabar.
Same; Same; Prescriptive as an affirmative defense must be
pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer otherwise it
is deemed waived.Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an
affirmative defense that must be pleaded either in a motion to
dismiss or in the answer otherwise it is deemed waived, and here,
the petitioner never raised that defense. There are recognized
exceptions to this rule, but the petitioner has not shown why they
apply.

PETITIONforcertioraritoreviewthedecisionoftheCourt
ofAppeals.
ThefactsarestatedintheopinionoftheCourt.
SARMIENTO,J.:
Inissuehereinarepropertyandpropertyrights,afamiliar
subjectofcontroversyandawellspringofenormousconflict
thathaslednotonlytoprotractedlegalentanglementsbut
toevenmorebitterconsequences,likestrainedrelationships
andeventheforfeitureoflives.Itisaquestionthatlikewise
reflects a tragic commentary on prevailing social and
cultural values and institutions, where, as one observer
notes, wealth and its accumulation are the basis of self
fulfillmentandwherepropertyisheldassacredaslifeitself.
It is in the defense of his property, says this modern
thinker, that one will mobilize his deepest protective
devices, and anybody that threatens
his possessions will
1
arousehismostpassionateenmity.
The task of this Court, however, is not to judge the
wisdom of values; the burden of reconstructing the social
order is shouldered by the political leadershipand the
peoplethemselves.
_______________
1GREENE,FELK,THEENEMY234(1971).

458

458

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Adille vs. Court of Appeals

The parties have come to this Court for relief and

accordingly, our responsibility is to give them that relief

pursuanttothedecreeoflaw.
2
The antecedent facts are quoted from the decision
appealedfrom:
xxxxxxxxx
x x x [Th]e land in question Lot 14694 of Cadastral Survey of
Albay located in Legaspi City with an area of some 11,325 sq. m.
originallybelongedtooneFelisaAlzulasherownprivateproperty;
shemarriedtwiceinherlifetime;thefirst,withoneBernabeAdille,
with whom she had as an only child, herein defendant Rustico
Adille;inhersecondmarriagewithoneProcopioAsejo,herchildren
werehereinplaintiffs,now,sometimein1939,saidFelisasoldthe
property in pacto de retro to certain 3rd persons, period of
repurchasebeing3years,butshediedin1942withoutbeingable
toredeemandafterherdeath,butduringtheperiodofredemption,
hereindefendantrepurchased,byhimselfalone,andafterthat,he
executedadeedofextrajudicialpartitionrepresentinghimselftobe
the only heir and child of his mother Felisa with the consequence
thathewasabletosecuretitleinhisnamealonealso,sothatOCT.
No. 21137 in the name of his mother was transferred to his name,
that was in 1955; that was why after some efforts of compromise
had failed, his halfbrothers and sisters, herein plaintiffs, filed
present case for partition with accounting on the position that he
wasonlyatrusteeonanimpliedtrustwhenheredeemed,andthis
is the evidence, but as it also turned out that one of plaintiffs,
EmeteriaAsejowasoccupyingaportion,defendantcounterclaimed
forhertovacatethat,
Well then, after hearing the evidence, trial Judge sustained
defendant in his position that he was and became absolute owner,
he was not a trustee, and therefore, dismissed case and also
condemned plaintiff occupant, Emeteria to vacate; it is because of
this that plaintiffs have come here and contend that trial court
erredin:
I. ...declaringthedefendantabsoluteowneroftheproperty;
II. ...notorderingthepartitionoftheproperty;and
III. ... ordering one of the plaintiffs who is in possession of the
portion of the property to vacate the land, p. 1 Appellants
brief.
whichcanbereducedtosimplequestionofwhetherornotonthe
basis
________________
2 Gatmaitan, Magno, Acting Pres. J.; Domondon, Sixto and Reyes, Samuel,

JJ.,Concurring.

459

VOL.157,JANUARY29,1988

459

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

of evidence and law, judgment appealed from should be
3
maintained. xxxxxxxxx
4

The respondent Court of Appeals reversed the trial court,

and ruled for the plaintiffsappellants, the private

respondents herein. The petitioner now appeals, by way of

certiorari,fromtheAppellateCourtsdecision.
We required the private respondents to file a comment
and thereafter, having given due course to the petition,
directedthepartiestofiletheirbriefs.Onlythepetitioner,
however, filed a brief, and the private respondents having
failedtofileone,wedeclaredthecasesubmittedfordecision.
Thepetitionraisesapurelylegalissue:Mayacoowner
acquire exclusive ownership over the property held in
common?
Essentially, it is the petitioners contention that the
property subject of dispute devolved upon him upon the
failure of his coheirs to join him in its redemption within
the period required by law. He relies on the provisions of
Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the
presentCode,givingthevendeearetrotherighttodemand
redemptionoftheentireproperty.
Thereisnomeritinthispetition.
Therightofrepurchasemaybeexercisedbyacoowner
5
withrespecttohissharealone. Whiletherecordsshowthat
the petitioner redeemed the property in its entirety,
shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him
theownerofallofit.Inotherwords,itdidnotputtoendthe
existingstateofcoownership.
Necessary expenses may be incurred by one coowner,
subject to his right6 to collect reimbursement from the
remainingcoowners. Thereisnodoubtthatredemptionof
propertyentailsanecessaryexpense.UndertheCivilCode:
ART.488.Eachcoownershallhavearighttocompeltheotherco
ownerstocontributetotheexpensesofpreservationofthethingor
rightownedincommonandtothetaxes.Anyoneofthelattermay
exempthimselffromthisobligationbyrenouncingsomuchofhis
________________
3Rollo,1415.
4Solidum,Arsenio,PresidingJudge,CourtofFirstInstanceofAlbay,Civil

Caseno.5029.
5CIVILCODE,art.1612;CIVILCODE(1889),art.1514.
6Supra,art.489.

460

460

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Adille vs. Court of Appeals

undividedinterestasmaybeequivalenttohisshareoftheexpenses
andtaxes.Nosuchwaivershallbemadeifitisprejudicialtotheco
ownership.

Theresultisthatthepropertyremainstobeinacondition
ofcoownership.Whileavendeearetro,underArticle1613
of the Code, may not be compelled to consent to a partial
redemption, the redemption by one coheir or coowner of
the property in its totality does not vest in him ownership
overit.Failureonthepartofallthecoownerstoredeemit
entitles the vendee a retro to retain
the property and
7
consolidatetitletheretoinhisname. Buttheprovisiondoes

not give to the redeeming coowner the right to the entire

property.Itdoesnotprovideforamodeofterminatingaco
ownership.
Neitherdoesthefactthatthepetitionerhadsucceededin
securing title over the parcel in his name terminate the
existing coownership. While his halfbrothers and sisters
are,aswesaid,liabletohimforreimbursementasandfor
their shares in redemption expenses, he cannot claim
exclusive right to the property owned in common.
Registration of property is not a means of acquiring
ownership.Itoperatesasamerenoticeofexistingtitle,that
is,ifthereisone.
The petitioner must then be said to be a trustee of the
property on behalf of the private respondents. The Civil
Codestates:
ART. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.

WeagreewiththerespondentCourtofAppealsthatfraud
attended the registration of the property. The petitioners
pretension that he was the sole heir to the land in the
affidavitofextrajudicialsettlementheexecutedpreliminary
totheregistrationthereofbetraysacleareffortonhispart
to defraud his brothers and sisters and to exercise sole
dominion over the property. The aforequoted provision
thereforeapplies.
ItistheviewoftherespondentCourtthatthepetitioner,
intakingovertheproperty,didsoeitheronbehalfofhisco
heirs, in which event, he had constituted himself a
negotiorum gestor
_______________
7Supra,art.1607.

461

VOL.157,JANUARY29,1988

461

Adille vs. Court of Appeals

under Article 2144 of the Civil Code, or for his exclusive
benefit,inwhichcase,heisguiltyoffraud,andmustactas
trustee, the private respondents being the beneficiaries,
undertheArticle1456.Theevidence,ofcourse,pointstothe
secondalternativethepetitionerhavingassertedclaimsof
exclusiveownershipoverthepropertyandhavingactedin
fraud of his coheirs. He cannot therefore be said to have
assume the mere management of the property abandoned
by his coheirs, the situation Article 2144 of the Code
contemplates. In any case, as the respondent Court itself
affirms, the result would be the same whether it is one or
theother.Thepetitionerwouldremainliabletotheprivate
respondents,hiscoheirs.
This Court is not unaware of the wellestablished
principle that prescription bars any demand on property
(ownedincommon)heldbyanother(coowner)followingthe

required number of years. In that event, the party in

possessionacquirestitletothepropertyandthestateofco
8
ownership is ended. In the case at bar, the property was
registered in 1955 by the petitioner, solely in his name,
whiletheclaimoftheprivaterespondentswaspresentedin
1974.Hasprescriptionthen,setin?
We hold in the negative. Prescription, as a mode of
terminating a relation of coownership, must have been
preceded by repudiation (of the coownership). The act of
repudiation,inturn,issubjecttocertainconditions:(1)aco
owner repudiates the coownership; (2) such an act of
repudiation is clearly made known to the other coowners;
(3)theevidencethereonisclearandconclusive;and(4)he
hasbeeninpossessionthroughopen,continuous,exclusive,
and notorious possession
of the property for the period
9
requiredbylaw.
The instant case shows that the petitioner had not
complied with these requisites. We are not convinced that
hehadrepudiatedthecoownership;onthecontrary,hehad
deliberately kept the private respondents in the dark by
feigning sole heirship over the estate under dispute. He
cannotthereforebesaidtohave
________________
8

The modes of terminating a coownership other than by

prescription are partition (CIVIL CODE, arts. 494; 1079,1082), merger

orconsolidation,andlossofthething(3Manresa486).
9

Santos v. Heirs of Crisostomo, 41 Phil. 3342 (1921); Bargayo v.

Camumot,40Phil.857(1920).
462

462

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
Adille vs. Court of Appeals

made known his efforts to deny the coownership.

Moreover,oneoftheprivaterespondents,EmeteriaAsejo,is
occupying a portion of the land up to the present, yet, the
petitionerhasnottakenpainstoejecthertherefrom.Asa
matter of fact, he sought to recover possession of that
portion Emeteria is occupying only as a counterclaim, and
onlyaftertheprivaterespondentshadfirstsoughtjudicial
relief.
It is true that registration
under the Torrens system is
10
constructive notice of title, but it has likewise been our
holdingthattheTorrenstitledoesnotfurnishashieldfor
11
fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registrationisequivalenttonoticeofrepudiation,assuming
therewasone,notwithstandingthelongstandingrulethat
registrationoperatesasauniversalnoticeoftitle.
For the same reason, we cannot dismiss the private
respondents claims commenced in 1974 over the estate
registered in 1955. While actions
to enforce a constructive
12
trustprescribesintenyears, reckonedfromthedateofthe
13
registration of the property, we, as we said, are not
preparedtocounttheperiodfromsuchadateinthiscase.
We note the petitioners sub rosa efforts to get hold of the

property exclusively for himself beginning with his

fraudulent misrepresentation in his unilateral affidavit of
extrajudicialsettlementthatheistheonlyheirandchildof
hismotherFelizawiththeconsequencethathewasableto
14
secure title in his name also. Accordingly, we hold that
the right of the private respondents commenced from the
time they actually
discovered the petitioners act of
15
defraudation. According to the respondent Court of
Appeals,theycametoknow[ofit]apparentlyonlyduring
16
theprogressofthelitigation. Hence,prescriptionisnota
bar.
Moreover, and as a rule, prescription is an affirmative
defense
________________
10Pres.DecreeNo.1529,sec.31.
11Amerolv.Bagumbaran,G.R.No.33261,September30,1987.
12Supra.
13 Gerona v. De Guzman, No. L19060, May 29, 1964, 11 SCRA 153

(1964).
14Rollo,id.,14.
15Geronav.DeGuzman,supra.
16Rollo,id.,18.

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VOL.157,JANUARY29,1988

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Adille vs. Court of Apppeals

thatmustbepleadedeitherinamotiontodismissorinthe
17
answer otherwise it is deemed waived,
and here, the
18
petitionerneverraisedthatdefense. Therearerecognized
exceptionstothisrule,butthepetitionerhasnotshownwhy
theyapply.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error
committedbytherespondentCourtofAppeals,thepetition
is DENIED. The Decision sought to be reviewed is hereby
AFFIRMEDintoto.Nopronouncementastocosts.
SOORDERED.
Yap (Chairman), MelencioHerrera, Paras and Padilla,
JJ., concur.
Petition denied. Decision affirmed.
Notes.After the lapse of redemption period without
anyredemptionmade,awritofpossessioncanbeissuedin
favorofapurchaser.(Banco Filipino vs. IAC,142SCRA44.)
Policy of the law is to aid rather than defeat right of
redemption.(Tioseco vs. CA,143SCRA705.)
o0o
________________
17

RULES OF COURT, Rule 9, sec. 2. A party need not plead the

statute of limitations in a responsive pleading (or motion to dismiss)

where the complaint itself shows that the claims have prescribed

[Ferrer v. Ericta, No. L41767, August 23, 1978, 84 SCRA 705 (1978)].
Likewise, it has been held that where the defendant had no way of
knowing that the claim advanced by the plaintiff had prescribed, his
failure to invoke the statute (in his answer or motion to dismiss) does
not constitute a waiver of such a defense [Guanzo v. Ramirez, 32 Phil.
492 (1914)]. In another case, we said that prescription need not be
pleaded specifically in an answer where the evidence itself shows that
prescription bars the plaintiffs claims [Philippine National Bank v.
Perez, No. L 20412, February 28, 1966, 16 SCRA 270 (1966); see also
Chua Lanko v. Dioso, 97 [Phil. 821 (1955); Philippine National Bank v.
Pacific Commission House, No. L22675, March 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 766
(1969)].
18Rollo,id.,18.

464

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