18corpo Cometa V CA
18corpo Cometa V CA
18corpo Cometa V CA
COURT OF
APPEALS, HON.GEORGE MACLI-ING, in his capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City Branch 100, REYNALDO S. GUEVARA and HONEYCOMB BUILDERS,
INC. respondents.
GR 124062 JANUARY 21, 1999
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner State Investment Trust, Inc. (SITI), formerly State Investment House, Inc. (SIHI), is an investment
house engaged in quasi-banking activities. Petitioner Reynaldo Cometa is its president. Private respondent
Honeycomb Builders, Inc. (HBI), on the other hand, is a corporation engaged in the business of developing,
constructing, and selling townhouses and condominium units. Private respondent Reynaldo Guevara is
president of HBI and chairman of the board of directors of Guevent Industrial Development Corp.
(GIDC).
Sometime in 1979, petitioner SITI extended loans in various amounts to GIDC which the latter failed to pay
on the dates they became due. For this reason, a rehabilitation plan was agreed upon for GIDC under which it
mortgaged several parcels of land to petitioner SITI. Among those mortgaged was a Mandaluyong lot
covered by TCT No. 462855 (20510). However, GIDC again defaulted. Hence, petitioner SITI foreclosed
the mortgages and, in the foreclosure sale, acquired the properties as highest bidder.[2]
Alleging irregularities in the foreclosure of the mortgages and the sale of properties to petitioner SITI, GIDC
filed a case entitled Guevent Industrial Development Corp. et al., plaintiffs v. State Investment House Inc. et
al., defendants, in the Regional Trial Court of Pasig. The case was eventually settled through a compromise
agreement which became the basis of the trial courts judgment. A dispute later arose concerning the
interpretation of the compromise agreement, as respondent HBI offered to purchase from GIDC the
lot covered by TCT No. 462855 (20510) and the latter agreed but petitioner SITI (the mortgagee)
refused to give its consent to the sale and release its lien on the property.[3] For this reason, GIDC asked
the trial court for a clarification of its decision.[4]
Subsequently, the trial court directed petitioner SITI to accept the offer of respondent HBI to purchase the
property covered by TCT No. 462855 (20510). Petitioner SITI appealed the order to the Court of Appeals
which affirmed the same. On appeal to this Court, the decision of the Court of Appeals was affirmed.[5]
Meanwhile, respondent HBI applied to the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board for a permit to develop
the property in question. Its application was granted, on account of which respondent HBI built a
condominium on the property called RSG Condominium Gueventville II. When respondent HBI applied
for a license to sell the condominium units it was required by the HLURB to submit an Affidavit of
Undertaking which in effect stated that the mortgagee (SITI) of the property to be developed agrees to
release the mortgage on the said property as soon as the full purchase price of the same is paid by the
buyer. Respondent HBI submitted the required affidavit purportedly executed by petitioner Cometa as
president of SITI (mortgagee).
Petitioner Cometa denied, however, that he ever executed the affidavit. The NBI found Cometas signature
on the Affidavit of Undertaking to be a forgery on the basis of which a complaint for falsification of public
document was filed against HBI president Guevara. [6] However, the Rizal Provincial Prosecutors Office
found no probable cause against private respondent Guevara and accordingly dismissed the complaint in its
resolution of September 25, 1989.[7]
Petitioners appealed the matter to then Secretary of Justice Franklin Drilon who reversed the Provincial
Prosecutors Office and ordered it to file an information against private respondent Guevara for falsification
of public document.[8] Private respondent Guevara moved for a reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution,
but his motion was denied.[9]An information for Falsification of Public Document was thus filed against
Guevara.
Following the dismissal of the criminal case against him, private respondents Reynaldo S. Guevara and
HBI filed a complaint for malicious prosecution against petitioners Cometa and SITI in the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City.[12]
Petitioners SITI and Cometa filed their respective answers. After the pre-trial of the case, they filed a joint
motion to dismiss with alternative motion to drop respondent HBI as a party plaintiff, upon the
following grounds:[13]
1. The complaint states no cause of action.
2. Secretary Drilon, Undersecretary Bello and the prosecutor, not impleaded herein, are the real
parties in-interest-defendants, which again makes the complaint lack a cause of action. At the
least, the above public official are indispensable parties, and their non-inclusion renders this
court without jurisdiction over the case.
On May 30, 1994, the trial court, through Judge George Macli-ing, denied petitioners joint motion.
ISSUE : Can a corporation be a real-party-in-interest for the purpose of bringing an action for malicious
prosecution.
HELD: YES
It is contended that HBI is not a real-party-in-interest, whatever interest it may have being purely
speculative.[39] On this point, we think the Court of Appeals correctly ruled:[40]
Section 11 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides:
Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. Misjoinder of parties is not a ground for dismissal of an action. Parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court or on motion of any party or on its own initiative at any stage
of the action and on such terms as are just.
Given (1) the foregoing rule, (2), the fact that Guevara, in his capacity as president of HBI, filed HBIs
application to sell at the HLURB and it was in the same capacity and in connection with the application that
he was criminally charged, and (3) the allegations in the complaint including that stating that by the filing of
the criminal case against Guevara, the application of HBI with the HLURB for a regular license to sell the
condominium units . . . had been delayed, resulting in the corresponding delay in the sale thereof on account
of which plaintiffs incurred over runs in development, marketing and financial costs and charges, resulting in
actual damages, the deferral by public respondent of petitioners motion to drop HBI as party plaintiff
cannot be said to have been attended with grave abuse of discretion. It bears emphasis that the
phraseology of Section 11 of Rule 3 is that parties may be dropped . . . at any stage of the action.
It is true that a criminal case can only be filed against the officers of a corporation and not against the
corporation itself.[41] It does not follow from this, however, that the corporation cannot be a real-partyin-interest for the purpose of bringing a CIVIL action for malicious prosecution.