FLNG Compared To LNG Carriers
FLNG Compared To LNG Carriers
FLNG Compared To LNG Carriers
ERIK ARONSSON
Department of Shipping and Marine Technology
Division of Marine Design
CHALMERS UNIVERSITY OF TECHNOLOGY
Gothenburg, Sweden, 2012
Report No. X-12/279
ERIK ARONSSON
Abstract
An increasing price and demand for natural gas has made it possible to explore remote gas
fields. Traditional offshore production platforms for natural gas have been exporting the
partially processed natural gas to shore, where it is further processed to permit consumption
by end-users. Such an approach is possible where the gas field is located within a reasonable
distance from shore or from an existing gas pipeline network. However, much of the worlds
gas reserves are found in remote offshore fields where transport via a pipeline is not feasible
or is uneconomic to install and therefore, to date, has not been possible to explore. The
development of floating production platforms and, on the receiving end, regasification
platforms, have increased the possibilities to explore these fields and transport the liquefied
gas in a more efficient form, i.e. liquefied natural gas (LNG), to the end user who in turn can
readily import the gas.
Floating production platforms and regasification platforms, collectively referred to as FLNG,
imply a blend of technology from land-based LNG industry, offshore oil and gas industry and
marine transport technology. Regulations and rules based on experience from these
applications could become too conservative or not conservative enough when applied to a
FLNG unit. Alignment with rules for conventional LNG carriers would be an advantage since
this would increase the transparency and possibility for standardization in the building of
floating LNG production vessels.
The objective of this study is to identify the risks relevant to FLNG. The risks are compared
to conventional LNG carriers and whether or not regulatory alignment possibilities exist. To
identify the risks, a risk analysis was performed based on the principles of formal safety
assessment methodology. To propose regulatory alignment possibilities, the risks found were
also evaluated against the existing rules and regulations of Det Norske Veritas.
The conclusion of the study is that the largest risk-contributing factor on an FLNG is the
presence of processing, liquefaction or regasification equipment and for an LNG carrier it is
collision, grounding and contact accidents. Experience from oil FPSOs could be used in the
design of LNG FPSOs, and attention needs to be drawn to the additional requirements due to
processing and storage of cryogenic liquid on board. FSRUs may follow either an approach
for offshore rules or, if intended to follow a regular docking scheme, follow an approach for
ship rules with additional issues addressed in classification notes.
Keywords: FLNG, FSA, FSRU, LNG, LNG carriers, LNG FPSO, risk assessment.
iii
iv
Preface
This thesis is a part of the requirements for the masters degree in Naval Architecture at
Chalmers University of Technology, Gothenburg, and has been carried out at the Division of
Marine Design, Department of Shipping and Marine Technology, Chalmers University of
Technology.
I would like to acknowledge and thank my examiner and supervisor, Professor Jonas
Ringsberg at the Department of Shipping and Marine Technology, for his help and guidance
throughout this project.
I would also like to thank my co-supervisor, Conn Fagan, Vice President, Business
Development, Floating Gas Projects at the head office of Det Norske Veritas in Hvik Oslo
for sharing his knowledge and guidance during this project.
Further, I would like to thank Christian Hertzenberg, Head of Section at the department of
Marine & Process Systems at the head office of Det Norske Veritas in Hvik Oslo for his help
with practical and administrative issues during this project.
Finally, I would like to thank everyone at the head office of Det Norske Veritas who have
helped out in different ways during this project.
All pictures within this report are printed with permission from the copyright holder; the
cover photo is credited to Photographic Services, Shell International Ltd.
Gothenburg, June, 2012
Erik Aronsson
vi
Contents
Abstract --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- iii
Preface ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ v
Contents ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------vii
List of abbreviations ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ ix
1.
Introduction ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 1
1.1. Background ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 1
1.2. Objective ---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 2
1.3. Methodology and limitations ---------------------------------------------------------------- 2
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Discussion-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31
7.1. Structure design ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 31
7.2. Gas processing and LNG production ------------------------------------------------------ 31
7.3. Cargo handling -------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 32
7.4. Transfer systems ------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 33
7.5. Additional-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 33
vii
8.
Conclusions------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 35
9.
viii
List of abbreviations
AIS
ALARP
DNV
ECDIS
ESD
FLNG
FMECA
FPSO
FSA
FSRU
GCAF
HAZID
HAZOP
HVAC
IACS
IGC
ILO
IMO
LNG
LPG
LRFD
MARPOL
MTPA
NCAF
PLL
QRA
RCM
RCO
RPT
SOLAS
UNCLOS
ix
1.
Introduction
In the last decades, the international natural gas market has been growing at a very high rate
and continues to increase [1][2]. Traditional offshore production platforms for natural gas
have been exporting the partially processed natural gas to shore where it is further processed
to permit consumption by end-users [3]. Such an approach is possible where the gas field is
located within a reasonable distance from shore or from an existing gas pipeline network.
However, much of the worlds gas reserves are found in offshore fields [4] where transport
via a pipeline is not feasible or is uneconomic to install and therefore, to date, it has not been
possible to develop these fields [2][4].
During the past four decades studies have been carried out on offshore liquefied natural gas
(LNG) production options [4]. This has resulted in a new kind of production facility called
LNG floating production storage and offloading (FPSO). The benefits are a platform which
does not need much external support and which allows for the transformation of gas into a
readily transportable form, i.e. LNG. This also permits more flexibility in marketing the gas,
since LNG shuttle tankers can be directed to where the market price is best [4]. When the gas
field is depleted the production platform can be moved to a new gas field. To date, no LNG
FPSO has been built. However, several concepts exist and have been planned to be built [5]
[6].
A further development is the floating regasification units that transform the LNG back to
natural gas at the market location. Such units are called floating storage and regasification
units (FSRU). Many countries are today opting for the floating offshore option instead of
onshore facilities [7]. According to Fagan et al. [3], an offshore unit usually means lower
investment costs, quicker project realisation and avoidance of many permitting issues. A
limited number of FSRUs have already been deployed, for example GOLAR LNG has today
5 FSRUs in operation. The fleet consists of converted LNG carriers [8]. Typically, LNG
FPSOs and FSRUs are collectively known as floating LNG (FLNG) units. In this report,
FLNG refers to both LNG FPSO and FSRU unless stated otherwise.
Concerns about global warming have been raised worldwide and governments are attempting
to find strategies for decreasing emissions of greenhouse gases. When burned, natural gas
emits lower quantities of greenhouse gases and criteria pollutants than other fuels and is
therefore seen by many to have a key role in strategies for lowering carbon emissions [9].
FLNGs could contribute further with a reduced environmental footprint compared to an
onshore LNG plant, with an associated offshore platform, that would require a significant
land-take and possibly coastal dredging. In addition, FLNGs also have the possibility of being
relocated to other locations.
1.1. Background
The FLNG concept is a mixture of technology from land-based LNG industry, offshore oil
and gas industry and marine transport industry. Regulations and rules based on previous
experience within respective field could become too conservative or not conservative enough
when applied to a floating LNG offshore unit [3]. According to Det Norske Veritas (DNV) [2]
an LNG FPSO could be considered as an offshore installation and would therefore follow
offshore classification practice. An FSRU could follow classification according to offshore or
ship classification practice depending on the mode of operation. Alignment with rules for
conventional LNG carriers would be an advantage as this would increase the transparency and
possibility for standardisation in the building of floating LNG production vessel. The inherent
1
risk of gas treatment and its being stationary, either offshore or berthed close to shore,
compared to the risk on board an LNG carrier may be significant.
1.2. Objective
The objective of this study is to identify the risks relevant to FLNGs, compare them to risks
for conventional LNG carriers and propose regulatory alignment possibilities as input for
future DNV rule development. To find the risks, the study was divided into four sub-targets:
To study existing rules and regulations pertaining to LNG processes and storage.
To perform a risk evaluation of key aspects of LNG production and re-gasification
technology, both safety and regularity.
To report and present the risks specifically related to FLNG concepts.
To propose regulatory alignment possibilities.
2.
Each classification society has its own set of rules covering standard ship construction and
supplements covering the specific application of different ship types and their equipment. The
requirements are formed so that they implicitly describe the hazards. The rules are normally
based on experience and operations within the shipping industry. The shipping industry
traditionally had a prescriptive approach in implementation of new requirements and
regulations. Gas carriers are today governed by essentially prescriptive regulation and class
requirements, which is favourable for ship-owners and shipyards as it provides clarity for
contracting vessels [3]. A tendency to move from the prescriptive regulations to goal-based
regulations with an integration of risk analysis is seen today, and this will facilitate novel
technology and novel ship design [15]. This section briefly describes how classification is
obtained and which organizations that have an interest in the vessel.
Classification Societies issue classification certificates, which certify that safety and rule
compliance is fulfilled. Their validity is five years given that annual and intermediate
surveys are fulfilled successfully. Several parties have an interest in the safety and quality
of a ship and the classification system serves as a verification system to ensure that the
requirements of rules and other standards are fulfilled. Such parties could be, among
others, insurance companies, ship owner, cargo owners and national authorities under
whose flag the ship will sail [16].
Coastal state is the state in which a foreign ship operates when entering a port or
operating in the coastal areas of a country. According to the United Nations Convention
on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) [17], a coastal state has the right to enforce its own laws
and regulations considering pollution on foreign ships entering their waters. A country
could also act as a port state when a foreign ship enters a port or offshore terminal, and
then the state has the right to detain a vessel and require repairs if the ship is not found to
be seaworthy.
Flag state is where a ship or offshore structure is registered in order to identify it for legal
and commercial purposes. The object does not have to be registered in the same state as
the company and it could be beneficial to register the ship in another flag state for tax
reasons. The flag state is responsible for the ship and it complies with the law of the flag
state. The most significant flag states have implemented the International Convention for
the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) and the International Convention for the Prevention of
Pollution from ships (MARPOL) and other IMO conventions into their own laws.
UNCLOS [17] states that the flag is responsible for the seaworthiness of a vessel flying its
flag and that laws and regulations targeted at preventing and controlling pollution are
followed.
The United Nations set up the broad framework of the law of the sea, UNCLOS [17], and
to date 162 states or entities have signed the convention. The IMO and the International
Labour Organization (ILO) are the two agencies that they operate through.
Flammability.
Toxicity.
Corrosivity.
Reactivity.
Collisions and strandings.
Cryogenic release.
The IGC code is not mandatory, but most flag states require that the code is fulfilled if the
ship is to sail under their flag. If an LNG carrier is classified according to DNV rules it is also
fulfilling the IGC code:
Rules for Ships Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.1 [16]
A 100 Application
103 The requirements of this chapter are considered to meet the requirements of the
International Code for the Construction and Equipment of Ships Carrying Liquefied
Gases in Bulk, IGC Code, Res. MSC.5 (48). The following amendments to the IGC
Code are included in this edition of the rules: Res. MSC.30(61) (1992 amendments),
Res. MSC.32(63) (1994 amendments), Res. MSC.59(67) (1996 amendments) and Res.
MSC.103(73) (2000 amendments).
treatment and liquefaction plant. DNV-OSS-103 [19] contains references to the appropriate
offshore standard applicable for the different areas of the unit, see Appendix A for details.
Future rule development could benefit from alignment possibilities from the classification
rules for LNG carriers. However, it is important that the rules allow novel technology so that
future development of technology is not restricted for use due to regulations.
3.
This section presents the technology of an LNG FPSO. LNG FPSOs are offshore floating
production units that contain both gas processing and liquefaction equipment as well as
storage for the produced LNG. The unit could have a fixed mooring or be equipped with a
turret, external or internal, that will allow the unit to weathervane. On top of the main deck, a
supporting structure, called the topside, is installed, which contains the gas processing and
liquefaction equipment. The raw natural gas is transferred from the wells in risers and
diverted to the topside through a turret, if equipped with a connection along the side of the
hull. The produced LNG is then transferred from the topside to cargo tanks situated below
deck. The stored LNG is frequently transferred to arriving LNG carriers via offloading
equipment, which could be located amidships or in the aft of the unit. To provide the crew
with living quarters, control room, etc., an accommodation block is needed, and this could be
situated on the deck in front or aft of the topside. Fig. 1 shows a possible layout of an LNG
FPSO and an artists rendering can be seen in Fig. 2. The different building blocks and their
difference compared to an LNG carrier are presented further according to the following list:
3.1. Structure
The main structure of LNG FPSOs will be of similar design as oil FPSOs and oil tankers [2]
and could generally follow the principles of the design of steel ships. Due to similarities to
tankers with regard to structural arrangement, many reliability formulations developed for
ships could be applied to LNG FPSOs [20]. The design of an offshore structure will, however,
have additional requirements compared to a ship [2]. Due to continuous operation and the
absence of regular docking, additional attention needs to be drawn to corrosion prevention. To
ensure the structural integrity, corrosion-protective coating and cathodic protection could be
used. For critical structural members, corrosion allowance should be used as a safety factor in
design [2].
Additional loads on the hull structure from the topside and mooring equipment need to be
accounted for in the design. Depending on the intended capacity of the LNG FPSO the weight
of the topside could exceed 70 000 tonnes for a large production unit producing between 3-5
million tons per annum (MTPA) [2]. Today, there are two different mooring systems in use
for permanently moored offshore structures, spread mooring and turret mooring [2]. The
additional load will affect internal major load-carrying structural elements, such as
longitudinal and transverse bulkheads, and, depending on the system used, the load will be
taken up by different areas on the hull. Spread mooring constrains the vessel in one direction
and is typically equipped with chain stoppers distributed along the main deck of the hull. A
turret mooring system could be fitted externally or internally of the structure and will affect
the structure in its vicinity [2].
Flash vaporization: To allow flashing of lighter components, such as methane-ethanepropane, from the condensate, the pressure is lowered progressively through several
stages. The flashing could be done in 2 to 4 stages. The vapour is injected back into the
natural gas stream after recompression or could be used as fuel to on board power
generation. The remaining heavy hydrocarbons are sent to a storage tank [21].
According to Benoy and Kale [21], the Fractionation technique is the least space demanding
of the two types and also requires less compressor power when compared to a three stage
flashing plant.
Deethanizer: In the first step ethane and propane is separated, the ethane goes overhead
and propane and heavier components are extracted from the bottom and sent to the
depropanizer.
Depropanizer: In the second step the propane is separated, the propane now goes
overhead and isobutene and heavier components are extracted from the bottom and sent
further to the debutanizer.
Debutanizer: In the last step butanes are separated from the flow leaving natural gasoline
from the fractionation train.
Liquefaction
The liquefaction cools the clean feed gas in normally three steps down to its storage
temperature of -160 to -163 C [2][22]. When liquefied the natural gas is equivalent to 1/600
of its volume in a gaseous state. There are three main technologies, mixed refrigerant
processes, cascade refrigerant processes and expander processes [2].
10
Cascade refrigerant process: The natural gas is cooled in three steps using different
refrigerants for each step. Propane is used in the first step to pre-cool the gas, secondly
ethylene or ethane is used to bring the gas down to its liquefaction temperature. In the
final sub-cooling step methane is used to cool the gas.
Expander processes: The natural gas is cooled in a heat exchanger process with either
methane or nitrogen as refrigerant gas. The refrigerant gas is cooled in a compressionexpansion cycle.
For offshore application, an expander process utilizing Nitrogen as cooling medium would be
preferable due to its small form factor and to its being less sensitive to motion than the other
techniques. Other advantages of the technology are higher safety and that it is easier to
operate compared to the others. Generally, the expander process has a higher power
consumption and poorer economy compared to cascade and mixed refrigerant processes [23]
[4].
Power generation
The power demand of an LNG FPSO is large mainly due to the large amount of compressors
involved in the process. Proposed LNG FPSOs have a power demand between 100 to 250
MW [2][22]. Directly driven equipment would reduce the complexity but add even more
layout challenges to the platform. Electrical motors would most likely be the choice for
powering the compressors and pumps, which offers more flexibility in the power supply.
Several solutions for power supply have been proposed. Due to its small form factor and high
power output, gas turbines would be a good choice for powering electrical generators. The gas
turbine could be equipped with a waste heat recovery system utilizing the exhaust heat from
the gas turbines. The recovered waste heat could also be used to generate steam used for
powering equipment and/or used in the pre-heat process. Pure steam driven systems have also
been considered [2].
Cooling water
The different processes on board require a large amount of cooling. Sea water would likely be
used for cooling the medium of a closed loop cooling system. To prevent marine growth and
corrosion, substances such as biocides need to be added to the water. To prevent pollution of
the marine environment around the FLNG the residual of these substances have to be held at a
low level. The amount of cooling water needed for the FLNG could reach levels of 50,000 m3
per hour [24].
11
Type B tanks are common on existing LNG carriers and often proposed for use on FLNG,
therefore type A and type C will not be described further [2][4]. Type B can be divided into
Prismatic and Spherical types.
Prismatic type: the tanks, shown in Fig. 5, are built up of a single primary barrier and have an
internal structure with typical ship hull structural elements in a plate stiffener - girder
system. The tank system has a partial secondary barrier in the form of an insulation system
surrounding the tank, and drop trays covering the bottom and side of the tank. The internal
structure will reduce liquid motions and consequently the effects of sloshing, and this,
however, could be significant if not designed properly [2][4].
Fig. 5. IHI-SPB tank system; picture by courtesy of IHI Marine United Inc.
12
Spherical tank: the spherical tank system, shown in Fig. 6, consists of a primary barrier of
aluminium and a partial secondary barrier made from insulation surrounding the entire sphere
and drip trays beneath. A cargo pump tower is installed reaching from the bottom to the top of
the sphere. Sloshing can be significant but the impact pressure is insignificant due to the
spherical design of the tank [2]. Low utilization of hull space and the absence of deck space
for process equipment makes this tank solution unlikely for use on an LNG FPSO [4].
Fig. 6. Moss spherical tank system; picture by courtesy of Moss Maritime AS.
A novel technology, HiLoad DP [26], originally developed by Remora, utilizes a selfpropelled unit that attaches itself to the carrier. The unit is always connected to an FLNG or
pipeline. Since the unit manoeuvres itself alongside the LNG carrier and attaches itself using
suction, the relative motion between carrier and platform is absent. The possibility of multiple
units increases the offloading capacity and the redundancy of the production unit [26].
14
15
16
4.
The main difference between an LNG carrier and an FSRU is the presence of a re-gasification
plant. The FSRU could either be purpose-built or a rebuild of a conventional LNG carrier,
which is fitted with a re-gasification plant. The FSRU receives LNG from arriving shuttle
tankers via loading equipment fitted amidships or in the aft part of the unit. The transferred
LNG is diverted to the storage tanks situated below main deck. The re-gasification plant
receives LNG from the storage tanks and the vaporised natural gas is fed into a pipeline. The
pipeline could be connected in the turret if the FSRU is equipped with one of these or with
loading arms if the FSRU is moored to a jetty. Fig. 9 shows a possible layout of an FSRU and
an artists rendering can be seen in Fig. 10. The different building blocks and their difference
compared to an LNG carrier and/or an LNG FPSO are presented further according to the
following list:
17
4.1. Structure
The structure of an FSRU will be similar to an LNG FPSO, which is described in Section 3.1.
With conversions of existing LNG tankers to FSRUs, attention needs to be on additional loads
from the topside and the mooring system if the FSRU is equipped with a turret mooring
system [2].
19
20
5.
This section presents data and conclusions of a Formal Safety Assessment (FSA) study of
LNG carriers from the research project SAFEDOR [12] - [14]. This can be seen as an
example of how an FSA is carried out, and some of the results are discussed in Section 7.5.
The principles of risk-based design and the FSA methodology can be found in Appendix B.
According to IMO [12], major concerns regarding the safety of LNG shipping have resulted
in the fact that the general reputation of LNG carriers is that they are well designed,
constructed, maintained, manned and operated, with a high focus on safety in every aspect.
LNG carriers are considered to be among the safest vessels in the merchant fleet of today, but
a single catastrophic event could damage the whole LNG shipping industry.
(1)
(2)
According to stvik [14], HAZID was chosen as the technique in the study and was
performed in a workshop event with participants from various sectors within the LNG
industry. The result was a list of 120 hazards within 17 different operational categories. The
probability index and consequence index used in the project is shown in Table 2 and
21
Table 3, and the risk matrix in Table 4. The risk index for each hazard was assigned by the
assessment of the participants in the HAZID regarding probability and consequence.
Probability
Definition
8
7
6
5
4
Very frequent
Frequent
Probable
Reasonably
probable
Little probability
Remote
2
1
Very remote
Extremely
remote
P(per ship
year)
100
10
1
0,1
0,01
0,001
0,0001
0,00001
Human
safety
Minor
Single or
minor
injuries
Significant
Multiple
or severe
injuries
Severe
Catastrophic
Single
fatality or
multiple
severe
injuries
Multiple
fatalities
Disastrous
Large
number of
fatalities
Cargo /
3rd
Monetary Effect on ship party
assets
losses
Negligible release - 30.000
Local equipment Minor
negligible
damage (repair damage
US$
pollution - no acute
on board
environmental or
possible,
public health
downtime
impact
negligible)
Minor release 300.000 Non-severe ship Signific
minimal acute
US$
damage - (port ant
environmental or
stay required,
damage
public health
downtime 1 day)
impact - small, but
detectable
environmental
consequences
Major release 3 mill.
Severe damage - Severe
effects on
US$
(yard repair
damage
recipients shortrequired,
in
term disruption of
downtime < 1
vicinity
the ecosystem
week)
of ship
Severe pollution - 30 mill. Total loss (of, Extensiv
medium-term
US$
e.g. a medium- e
effect on recipients
size merchant
damage
- medium-term
ship)
disruption of the
ecosystem
Uncontrolled
300 mill. Total loss (of, Major
pollution - longUS$
e.g. a large
public
term effect on
merchant ship) interest
recipients - longterm disruption of
the ecosystem
Environment
related
22
Equivalent
fatalities
0,01
0,1
10
100
Probability
Very frequent
Frequent
Probable
Reasonably
probable
Little probability
Remote
Very remote
Extremely remote
1
Minor
9
8
7
6
Consequence/Severity
2
3
4
Significant
Severe Catastrophic
10
11
12
9
10
11
8
9
10
7
8
9
5
Disastrous
13
12
11
10
5
4
3
2
6
5
4
3
9
8
7
6
7
6
5
4
8
7
6
5
The hazards with the highest risk found by stvik [14] are shown in tableTable 5. The values
were obtained as a mean value of the independent score from the participants in the HAZID.
Risk Index
7.0
7.0
6.8
6.8
6.8
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.6
6.5
According to Vanem et al. [13], the following accident scenarios were chosen for further
study:
Collision.
Grounding.
Contact.
Fire or Explosion.
Incidents while loading/unloading cargo.
The choice was based on the historical accidents of LNG carriers, presented in Table 1, and
the top-ranked hazards found in the HAZID, presented in Table 5. Vanem et al. [13] regarded
these 5 accident scenarios are associated with severe consequences in terms of fatalities and
the risk from other scenarios was assumed as being negligible in comparison.
23
Table 6. Potential loss of lives from LNG carrier operations per ship year [13].
Accident category
PLL (crew)
PLL (passengers of other ships)
-3
Collision
4.42 x10
1.59 x10-3
-3
Grounding
2.93 x10
0
-3
Contact
1.46 x10
0
-4
Fire and explosion
6.72 x10
0
Loading/unloading events
2.64 x10-4
0
-3
TOTAL
9.74 x10
1.59 x10-3
Vanem et al. [13] also find that the societal risk is within the ALARP area, as well as
collision, contact and grounding, are the largest contributing factors to the overall risk. Fire
and collision were found to dominate the low-consequence risk contribution in the order of
one fatality.
24
According to IMO [12] two additional RCOs were found to be cost-effective but with limited
risk reduction effects:
5.4. Recommendations
The recommendation from IMO [12] was that additional navigational equipment should be
made mandatory in the IMO requirements for LNG carriers. Although some RCOs were
rejected, the IMO [12] states that the rejected RCOs could be cost-effective for particular
ships or particular trades. It is always important that the RCOs are suitable for the intended
site of use or transfer route of a vessel. The three RCOs that were recommended were the
following:
To further increase the safety on board LNG carriers, the IMO [12] also proposed the
requirement of a risk-based maintenance plan for critical navigational equipment. The final
proposal was that the bridge design should be beyond the standard/minimum SOLAS bridge
design.
25
26
6.
The first step of the FSA methodology is to perform a risk assessment. This section presents
some of the hazards due to the physical properties of LNG and LNG vapour. The risk analysis
is mainly focused on the LNG FPSO due to its larger complexity compared to an LNG carrier
or an FSRU.
6.1. Hazards due to the physical properties of LNG and LNG vapour
According to the IMO [12], LNG is a colourless, odourless, non-corrosive, non-toxic and
cryogenic liquid, but when vaporized it forms a visible cloud that can become flammable if
the gas-to-air mixture is between 5 15 %. LNG will behave differently if spilled over water
compared to land. When spilled over land, the vaporization will be rapid but decreases as the
ground underneath is cooled down, and therefore the evaporation of the created LNG pool can
proceed during a long period of time. If spilled over water, LNG will float on the surface due
to lower density. In contrast to when spilled on ground, heat will be transmitted through the
water causing the LNG pool to boil and rapidly vaporize. A gas-to-air mixture of 10 % LNG
vapour has an auto-ignition temperature of 540 C [12], and therefore the vapour cloud is
highly unlikely to self-ignite and will dissipate into the atmosphere unless it encounters any
source of ignition.
According to the IMO [12], the main hazards of LNG in liquid or vapour form are:
Pool fires: If the spilled LNG is ignited the mixture of evaporated gas and air will burn
above the LNG pool. The fire cannot be easily extinguished. The heat from the fire may
injure people or property at a significant distance from the fire.
Vapour clouds: The vapour cloud can travel some distance from the spill site before
encountering any source of ignition - the vapour cloud is normally expected to burn back
to its source of spill and continue to burn as a pool fire.
Cryogenic temperature: LNG is held at a temperature of -160C, if human skin is
exposed to this temperature the damage effect will be similar to a thermal burn. If
structural elements and equipment are exposed to LNG and have not been designed to
withstand the low temperature they will most likely become brittle and failure will occur.
Asphyxiation: LNG is non-toxic but can cause death by replacing breathable air if spilled
and could be of significant risk in enclosed or confined spaces.
Rollover: When loading LNG with different compositions, these might not mix at once
but form layers with different density within the tank. After a period of time the LNG may
rollover to stabilize the liquid in the tank. The rollover causes the liquid to give off a large
amount of vapour, which creates an overpressure in the tank.
Rapid phase transition (RPT): When large enough quantities are rapidly spilled over
water the LNG could change phase at such a fast rate that a cold explosion occurs. No
combustion occurs but a large amount of energy is transferred in the form of heat from the
water to the LNG.
Explosion: LNG is not explosive in a liquid state and the vapour is only flammable at
gas-to-air mixture of 5-15%. The only way for LNG to cause an explosion is if being
ignited in an enclosed or semi-enclosed space and at the same time being in the flammable
region.
27
28
29
Risk level
Frequency Consequence
3
2
1
3
4
5
30
7.
Discussion
One of the most distinct differences between an LNG carrier and an FLNG is the ability to
transport LNG between different locations. While the FLNG could be moored on location for
several years at a time, the LNG carrier is always in transit. This changes the requirements on
service and surveys. An FSRU could have the option to follow a regular service and survey
plan giving it the possibility to follow classification according to ship rules with the
supplement of Classification Note 61.3 - Regasification vessels [32].
FPSOs. The relative safety of the different liquefaction processes differs. The Mixed
Refrigerant and Cascade process, see Section 3.2, involves large quantities of flammable
refrigerant which circulates through the process lines with extensive overpressure potential in
the event of a leakage and explosion. Facilities for obtaining and storing the refrigerant are
also needed. The Expander process uses nitrogen as refrigerant and is safer due to the inert
properties of nitrogen. Besides the higher safety, the expander process is beneficial due to a
smaller footprint and its being unaffected by motions due to the refrigerant that always
operates in a gas phase [1][35]. However, the lower efficiency compared to other systems
argues against its selection.
LNG carriers are designed with requirements for minimizing potential leakage sources and
with the provision of safety measures in form of protective water spray. For FLNG
applications the potential leak sources will increase. This needs to be addressed and additional
installations of water spray and drip shields for protecting critical structural members should
be implemented in design. With regard to such leakage, experience from oil FPSOs cannot be
used as they do not involve cryogenic leakage, and neither are onshore- based process plants
affected to the same degree as a floating steel structure in case of leakage. A process plant on
land uses typically a safety by separation philosophy. Due to the limitations of space on a
floating unit, more attention needs to be paid to layout and arrangement and to avoid the
congestion and confinement of gas in case of leakage, which could increase the effects of any
fire and explosion.
32
7.5. Additional
The research from the SAFEDOR project described in Section 5 concluded that 90 % of the
accidents of an LNG carrier occurred during collision, grounding and contact accidents and
their RCOs regarded implementation of several navigational systems to lower the risk of these
hazards. The risk to a moored unit should be investigated by risk analysis with traffic
information for the intended site as a base. The frequent arrival of shuttle carriers also
increases the risk of collision or contact.
The continuous operation involving both the processing of natural gas and the simultaneous
offloading sets high demands on control and safety systems. Fire and gas detection systems
should be based on risk assessment so that even the smallest amount of gas is detected and
proper actions for the prevention of an accident are launched. Due to the complexity of an
FLNG, the regulations regarding the safety systems in todays regulation may not be
sufficient to cover all areas and hazards. Future rules could implement risk assessment to
determine the necessary level of safety systems in order to ensure safety on board.
With regard to the LNG FPSO application, the raw natural gas will (depending on the well) to
some extent contain CO2, which needs to be reduced to a certain level before the liquefaction
process. To reduce the CO2 emissions to air, it needs to be collected and disposed in some
manner and there are several techniques available. One possibility is to inject the recovered
CO2 back into the well. This could also be beneficial as it could improve oil and gas recovery
for an LNG FPSO. The environmental impact of an FSRU could be lowered by not using a
direct fired heater for vaporization.
33
34
8.
Conclusions
The risk analysis performed on the FLNG showed a large risk contribution from the topside
process equipment and of fire or explosion in this area or within the cargo hold. The external
FSA on LNG carriers studied showed that the largest risk contributing factors were collisions,
grounding and contact accidents. Although an FLNG will be permanently moored it will still
need monitoring of its perimeters and a high rate of arriving shuttle tankers will increase the
risk of contacts or collisions.
An FSRU may follow ship rule practice or it may follow offshore rule practice. Generally, if
the FSRU intends to follow a regular dry dock scheme similar to a gas carrier, it may follow a
ship class approach. If it intends to remain permanently on location without dry docking it
may follow the offshore approach. Whichever approach is selected needs to be accepted by
the relevant Flag State and the requirements applied should address the additional safety
concerns relevant for operation as an FSRU compared to operation as a conventional LNG
carrier. An LNG FPSO will generally not follow a regular docking scheme and therefore
needs to follow an offshore class approach. Below are listed the differences between an LNG
carrier and an FSRU/LNG FPSO that have been discussed in this report and for which special
attention needs to be drawn:
FSRU
Additional load from topside and mooring equipment.
Fatigue design life.
Sloshing in cargo tanks.
Venting of cargo tanks.
Access for inspection and repair during operation.
Additional fire and explosion loads.
Additional LNG leakage sites.
Presence of high pressure LNG and high pressure gas.
Proximity of arriving shuttle tanker.
Complex integrated Control System.
Design of loading system.
The list should not be seen as comprehensive. It is important that while Rules for Gas Carriers
[16] may form the basis of an FSRU design, these additional issues, addressed in
Classification Note 61.3 [32], are also addressed. Determining concrete requirements risk
studies will need to be carried out.
LNG FPSO
Additional load from topside and mooring equipment.
Fatigue design life.
Gas processing and LNG production.
Sloshing in cargo tanks.
Venting of cargo tanks.
Access for inspection and repair during operation.
Additional fire and explosion loads.
Additional LNG leakage sites.
Proximity of arriving shuttle tanker.
Complex integrated control system.
Design of offloading system.
35
Experience from oil FPSOs could be used with additional requirements to address the safety
concerns regarding processing and handling of cryogenic liquid. Experience from the cargo
containment system of LNG carriers, and thereby the IGC code [18], could form a basis for
the regulations of cargo systems for both LNG FPSOs and FSRUs. However, deviations from
the IGC code exist and could be assessed by risk assessment.
36
9.
Future work
To fully analyse the risk of an FLNG, a full FSA needs to be performed. Suggestions for the
different steps involved are presented below.
Risk analysis
To be able to perform a real risk analysis of the hazard due to fire and explosion, a detailed
analysis has to be performed. Drawings of the equipment and location in the process plant
must be known or estimated. The risk assessment referenced in this work [13] and performed
on an LNG carrier showed that the greatest risk contributors are collisions, groundings and
contact accidents. To investigate the risk contribution from collisions and contact accidents to
an FLNG, information regarding traffic in the intended area and the frequency of shuttle
tankers arriving also needs to be implemented in such an analysis. The risk analysis could
implement a numerical simulation of gas leakage. In order to analyse the risk in case of a
release event during offloading, a comparison between the different offloading methods
described in Section 3.4 could be made.
Risk control options and cost benefits
The risk found in the risk analysis could be further investigated. For example, for hazard 11,
drip trays could be installed below critical points in the offloading station. Water curtains
could also be installed to decrease the risk of an explosion in case of an LNG leakage. The
different RCOs and their effectiveness should be compared to each other.
37
38
10. References
[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
[11]
[12]
[13]
[14]
[15]
[16]
[17]
[18]
[19] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Service Specification, DNV-OSS-103, Rules for
Classification of LNG/LPG Production and Storage Units. Det Norske Veritas. October
Hvik, Norway, 2011.
[20] H.-H. Sun, C. Guedes Soares. Reliability-based structural design of ship-type FPSO
units. Journal of Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering, volume 125, May 2003,
pp. 108-113.
[21] J. Benoy, R.N. Kale. Gas Processing, Condensate stabilization. Offshore World, 34,
August/September 2010. Pp. 34-37.
[22] Braemar Steege presentation. A look into the processes of LNG Liquefaction Plants.
http://www.braemarsteege.com/lecturenotes/lecture66.pdf [Accessed 2012-05-26]
[23] Q.Y. Li, Y.L. Ju. Design and analysis of liquefaction process for offshore associated
gas resources. Applied Thermal Engineering, 30, 2010, pp. 2518-2525.
[24] Shell. Prelude Floating LNG Project, Draft Environmental Impact Statement. Shell
Development (Australia) Proprietary Limited, EPBC 2008/4146, October, 2009.
[25] G. Yan, Y. Gu. Effect of parameters on performance of LNG-FPSO offloading systems
in offshore associated gas fields. Applied Energy, 87, 2010, pp. 3393-3400.
[26] Remora website, http://www.remoratech.com/index.php?sideID=38. [Accessed 201205-26].
[27] Design of a FLNG Production Facility, The Journal of Offshore Technology, May/June
2004, pp. 17-19.
[28] H.Y.S. Han, J.H. Lee, Y.S. Kim. Design Development of FSRU from LNG carrier and
FPSO Construction Experiences. OTC 14098, In: the Offshore Technology Conference,
Houston, Texas, USA, 6-9 May, 2002.
[29] E. Skjong, E. Vanem, . Endresen. Risk Evaluation Criteria. SAFEDOR Deliverable
D.4.5.2. 2007.
[30] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-E201, Oil and Gas Processing
Systems. Hvik, Norway, October 2010.
[31] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-C102, Structural Design of
Offshore Ships. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2011.
[32] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Classification Note, 61.3, Regasification Vessel. Det Norske
Veritas. Hvik, Norway, January 2012.
[33] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-D301, Fire Protection. Det
Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2009.
[34] Conn Fagan. Offshore Gas Terminals Guidance on Design and Construction. OTC
21479, In: the Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, USA, 2-5 May 2011.
[35] Michael Barclay, Noel Denton, Selecting offshore LNG processes, LNG Journal,
October, 2005, pp 34-36.
[36] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Classification Note, 30.9, Sloshing Analysis of LNG
Membrane Tanks. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, June 2006.
[37] W. van Wijngaarden, H. Oomen, J. van der Hoorn. Offshore LNG Terminals: Sunk or
Floated? OTC 16077, In: the Offshore Technical Conference, Houston, Texas, USA, 36 May, 2004.
[38] G.F. Clauss, S.A. Mavrakos, F. Sprenger, D. Testa, M. Dudek. Hydrodynamic
Considerations for FLNG concepts. Proceedings of the ASME 2011 30th International
Conference on Ocean, Offshore and Arctic Engineering, Rotterdam, The Netherlands,
19-24 June, 2011.
[39] R.-T. Ho. Engineering Considerations for Offshore FSRU LNG Receiving Terminals.
OTC 19439, In: the Offshore Technical Conference, Houston, Texas, USA, 5-8 May,
2008.
40
[40] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-A101, Safety Principles and
Arrangements. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, April 2009.
[41] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-B101, Metallic Materials. Det
Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, April 2009.
[42] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-C101, Design of Offshore
Steel Structures, General (LRFD Method). Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, April
2011.
[43] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-C301, Stability and Watertight
Integrity. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, April 2011.
[44] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-C401, Fabrication and
Testing of Offshore Structures. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2010.
[45] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-D101, Marine and Machinery
Systems and Equipment. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2011.
[46] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-D201, Electrical Installations.
Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, April 2011.
[47] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-D202, Automation, Safety,
and Telecommunication Systems. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2008.
[48] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-E301, Position Mooring. Det
Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2010.
[49] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Recommended Practice, DNV-RP-E301, Design and
Installation of Fluke Anchors in Clay. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, May 2000.
[50] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Recommended Practice, DNV-RP-E302, Design And
Installation of Plate Anchors in Clay. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, December
2002.
[51] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Recommended Practice, DNV-RP-E303, Geotechnical
Design and Installation of Suction Anchors in Clay. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik,
Norway, October 2005.
[52] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-E401, Helicopter Decks. Det
Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, April 2011.
[53] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Offshore Standard, DNV-OS-F201, Dynamic Risers. Det
Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2010.
[54] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Recommended Practice, DNV-RP-F201, Design of
Titanium Risers. Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2002.
[55] Det Norske Veritas (DNV). Recommended Practice, DNV-RP-F202, Composite Risers.
Det Norske Veritas. Hvik, Norway, October 2010.
[56] The National Archives of UK legislation website,
http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1974/37/contents. [Accessed 2012-05-26].
41
42
Helideck
Risers
A1
Offshore Rule
DNV-OS-A101 [40]
DNV-OS-B101 [41]
DNV-OS-C101 [42]
DNV-OS-C102 [31]
DNV-OS-C301 [43]
DNV-OS-C401 [44]
DNV-OS-D101 [45]
DNV-OS-D201 [46]
DNV-OS-D202 [47]
DNV-OS-D201 [46]
DNV-OS-E201 [30]
DNV-OS-D301 [33]
DNV-OS-E201 [30]
DNV-OS-E301 [48]
DNV-RP-E301 [49]
DNV-RP-E302 [50]
DNV-RP-E303 [51]
DNV-OS-E401 [52]
DNV-OS-F201 [53]
DNV-RP-F201 [54]
DNV-RP-F202 [55]
Classification
of
ships Pt.5 Ch.5 [16]
CN-61.3 [32]
Helideck
Risers
A2
Offshore Rule
DNV-OS-A101 [40]
DNV-OS-B101 [41]
DNV-OS-C101 [42]
DNV-OS-C102 [31]
DNV-OS-C301 [43]
DNV-OS-C401 [44]
DNV-OS-D101 [45]
DNV-OS-D201 [46]
DNV-OS-D202 [47]
DNV-OS-D201 [46]
DNV-OS-E201 [30]
DNV-OS-D301 [33]
DNV-OS-E201 [30]
DNV-OS-E201 [30]
DNV-OS-E301 [48]
DNV-RP-E301 [49]
DNV-RP-E302 [50]
DNV-RP-E303 [51]
DNV-OS-E401 [52]
DNV-OS-F201 [53]
DNV-RP-F201 [54]
DNV-RP-F202 [55]
Classification
of
ships Pt.5 Ch.5 [16]
B1
Hazard review.
Hazard checklist.
Hazard and operational study (HAZOP).
Procedural HAZOP.
What-If Analysis.
Hazard Identification (HAZID).
Failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA).
Emergency Systems Survivability Analysis.
Safety inspections and audits.
In the offshore industry, the HAZOP and hazard checklists are the ones most widely used. In
the early stages of design a HAZID is normally used, which is a high level version of
HAZOP. According to Spouge [11], the strengths of HAZID are:
Guide words require development for each installation, and may omit some hazards.
Its benefits depend on the experience of the leader and the knowledge of the team.
The different hazards are then ranked to prioritize them against each other using available
data and judgement. The IMO guidelines [10] give an example of how to rank the different
scenarios. To facilitate the ranking and validation of ranking the indices of consequence and
frequency are defined on a logarithmic scale. The risk index is obtained by adding the
frequency and consequence indices:
Risk = ProbabilityxConsequence
Log(Risk) = log(Probability) + log(Consequence)
(3)
(4)
Table B.1 shows an example of the Severity Index, an example of the Frequency Index is
shown in Table B.2
B2
SEVERITY
Minor
Significant
Severe
Catastrophic
Severity Index
EFFECTS ON
EFFECTS ON
HUMAN SAFETY
SHIP
Single
or
minor Local
equipment
injuries
damage
Multiple or severe Non-severe
ship
injuries
damage
Single fatality or Severe damage
multiple
severe
injuries
Multiple fatalities
Total loss
S
(Equivalent fatalities)
0.01
0.1
1
10
FREQUENCY
Frequent
Reasonably
probable
Remote
Extremely remote
Frequency Index
DEFINITION
Likely to occur once per month on one
ship
Likely to occur once per year in a fleet
of 10 ships, i.e. likely to occur a few
times during the ships life
Likely to occur once per year in a fleet
of 1,000 ships, i.e. likely to occur in the
total life of several similar ships
Likely to occur once in the lifetime (20
years) of a world fleet of 5,000 ships
The combination of Table B.1 and Table B.2 give the risk matrix shown in Table B.3.
4
Catastrophic
11
10
9
8
7
6
5
The output from step 1 is a list of hazards and a description of causes and effects, all ranked
by risk level. According to Spouge [11], the first step is often referred to as the most
important step since it identifies all hazards. If a hazard is missed it will not occur later in the
process and hence will not be evaluated.
B3
By analysing the different risks considering their frequency and severity of outcome, the risks
with an unacceptable risk level will become the primary focus. Measures that reduce these
risks have to be identified. Probability of the risks should be reviewed irrespective of the
severity. The aim of the produced RCMs is to reduce the frequencies and mitigate the effect
of failures and accidents. Potential RCMs are compiled into groups of RCOs that can focus on
controlling the initiation or escalation of accidents.
B4
Averting a Fatality (GCAF). Quantitative values must be set for the optimum/maximum of the
cost of averting a fatality, and the definitions of NCAF and GCAF are:
GCAF = Cost/PLL
NCAF = (Cost - Economic_Benefits)/ PLL
(5)
(6)
Cost = Marginal cost of the Risk Control Option, see Section B.4
PLL = the reduced number of fatalities
Economic Benefits = the economic benefits of implementing the RCO
According to Skjong [29], the IMO proposed values for the individual risk to be used as risk
acceptance criteria. For a large project exposing a large number of people to risks, the societal
risk criteria is preferable. This criteria is expressed in frequency versus number of fatalities,
but the risks are not as straightforward to develop as the individual risk criteria. In some cases
both societal and individual risk criteria must be complied with. For example, with a
passenger ferry that carries a large number of passengers the risk should be expressed in
societal risk. However, the crew is exposed to additional hazards related to their work and this
should be expressed as individual risk. A technique for presenting risk is FN curves, see Fig.
B.2.
B5
B6
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
HAZARD REGISTER
1
Blowout
Feedstock
Uncontrolled flow of well fluid
Pressure failure
Potential economic losses due to downtime of process plant
3
1
4
HAZARD REGISTER
2
Hydrocarbon release from the turret
Feedstock
Uncontrolled release of well fluid in the turret
Could be caused by mechanical failure due to fatigue and/or design fault in
the turret
If leakage is ignited it could cause injury or death to personnel in the area.
Severe damage to ship could occur
2
3
5
HAZARD REGISTER
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
3
Hydrocarbon release in Gas process area
Gas Process area
Uncontrolled release of hydrocarbon in the process area
Could be caused by mechanical failure or equipment failure. Human error
could also be the cause
If ignited it could cause injury or death to personnel in the area. Severe
damage to ship could occur. Fire and explosion will give different degree
of severity. Fire is assumed in this investigation
2
3
5
C1
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
HAZARD REGISTER
4
Cryogenic spill in liquefaction area (regasification plant in case of FSRU)
Gas Process area
Spill of cryogenic liquid (LNG)
Damage to or fatigue of piping and/or equipment, corrosion, thermal
effects
Multiple injuries and/or fatalities among crew, damage to ship could be
severe. Vaporized LNG could cause asphyxiation to crew over the entire
ship.
1
3
4
HAZARD REGISTER
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
5
Spill of hazardous substance
Gas Process area
Spill of hazardous substance used in process
Failure of equipment, human error, dropped objects
Single or minor injuries, only small damage to ship, could be potentially
hazardous to the environment
2
1
3
HAZARD REGISTER
6
Fire/explosion in the process area
Gas Process area
Fire and/or explosion in the process area
Ignition of released LNG vapour or hydrocarbon
Depending on the size of the release the damage to crew and ship could be
minor to catastrophic. Severe effect on crew and ship is assumed
2
3
5
C2
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
HAZARD REGISTER
7
Fire/explosion in cargo containment area
Cargohandling system
Fire and/ or explosion in containment area due to spillage of LNG
Failure of cargo tank system, collision, process error
The effects would probably be catastrophic due to the contained space
surrounding the cargo tanks
2
4
6
HAZARD REGISTER
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
8
Inert gas release in containment area
Cargohandling system
Release of inert gas in the containment area
Failure of equipment, mechanical failure, mechanical failure due to fatigue
Cold burns could occur if human skin comes into contact with the inert gas
2
1
3
HAZARD REGISTER
9
Sloshing in cargo tanks
Cargo handling system
Sloshing could occur in cargo tanks when partially filled
Partially filled cargo tanks could cause sloshing when the FLNG is under
influence of bad weather
The effects of sloshing could involve damage to cargo tanks and cause
instability to the FLNG causing production shutdown
4
1
5
C3
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
HAZARD REGISTER
10
Ship collision
Total ship
Collision with LNG carrier or other ship
LNG carrier drift into the FLNG
During docking the LNG carrier would most likely have a low speed and
the effects would be held at a significant level. Due to the assistance of
tugboats the frequency is assumed low
1
2
3
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
Frequency
Severity
Risk level
HAZARD REGISTER
11
Cryogenic leak during offloading (loading in case of FSRU)
Deck of FLNG
Rapture of loading arm or other mechanical failure of offloading system
Mechanical failure of offloading system
Severe fatalities and severe damage to hull
1
3
4
Hazard no
Hazard
Area
Description
Cause
Effect
C4
D1
Deviations from DNV-OS-E201 [30] or hazards which are not covered are shown below:
Hazard 1 - Blowout
In addition to E201 the structural design load is also considered in DNV-OS-C102 [31]:
DNV-OS-C102 Sec. 12
C 100 Mooring loads
101 A unit may be kept on location by various methods. These methods may include several
different types of station-keeping systems such as internal and submerged turret systems,
external turret, buoy, fixed spread mooring and dynamic positioning. Each mooring system
configuration will impose loads on the hull structure. These loads shall be considered in the
structural design of the unit, and combined with other relevant load components.
main deck, including deck penetrations, bottom structure and side shell
longitudinal stiffener end connections to transverse webframe and bulkhead
shell plate connection to longitudinal stiffener and transverse frames with special
consideration in the splash zone.
hopper knuckles and other relevant discontinuities
openings and penetrations in longitudinal members
D2
Hulltopside
interface
structure
D3
For offshore hazards related to Fire the following rule is applicable [33]:
DNV-OS-D301 Sec. 9:
A 100 Introduction
101 This section gives fire technical requirements applicable to oil production and storage
units. The requirements are to be applied supplementary to the requirements given by Sec.1
to Sec.5.
102 For specific requirements for ESD and fire and gas detection systems, see DNV-OSA101 and DNV-OS-D202.
For an FSRU unit classed according to Ship and Classification Note 61.3 [30], fire is
regulated through a risk assessment which has to be performed in order to establish the risk:
CN 61.3 Sec.5:
5.1 Risk assessment
A risk assessment should be conducted, preferably in the early phase of the project, and
should include at least assessment of the following:
-Collision
-fire- and explosion
-dropped object
-cryogenic leakage.
The findings from the risk assessments carried out are to be considered in the design phase
and addressed in the documentation submitted to class. The risk assessment should comply
with the principles outlined in DNV-OS-A101 App. C. Design loads and recommendations
from the risk assessment are to be addressed in the final design.
D4
Offshore rules [19] refer to Ship rules [16] regarding cargo containment systems:
DNV-OSS-103, Ch.2 Sec.4
C 200 Supplementary technical requirements
202 Containment systems may in general be designed using the methodology described in
DNV Rules for Classification of Ships Pt.5 Ch.5 Gas Carriers, provided the loading
conditions and operational modes for an offshore application are taken into account.
Guidance note:
Aspects such as the actual site-specific environmental conditions, partial filling
modes, project-specific accidental loads, provision for in-situ inspection for units not
intending to dry-dock will need to be specially assessed.
---e-n-d---of---G-u-i-d-a-n-c-e---n-o-t-e---
Classification Note 30.9 [36] supplements the rules as to how the additional loads due to
sloshing should be accounted for.
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For offshore use regarding the transfer of LNG the following rule could be applicable [30]:
DNV-OS-E201, Ch.2 Sec.11
C 500 LNG transfer
For the transfer of LNG the following rule in Ship rules could be applicable [16]:
Rules for ships, Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.6
C. Cargo Piping Systems
If the transfer system is intended to be placed in the bow or stern [16]:
Rules for ships Pt.5 Ch.5 Sec.6
E. Bow or Stern Loading and Unloading Arrangements
D6