3. Homeowners Savings and Loan Bank versus Felonia (GR no.

189477,
Feb. 26, 2014)
FACTS:
Felonia and De Guzman mortgaged a parcel of land to Delgado to
secure a loan. However, instead of a real estate mortgage, the parties
executed a deed of absolute sale with an option to repurchase thus
Felonia and De Guzman filed an action for reformation of instrument.
Inspite of the pendency of the Reformation case in which she was the
defendant, Delgado filed a Petition for Consolidation of Ownership of
Property Sold with an Option to Repurchase and Issuance of a New
Certificate of Title. The RTC declared Delgado the absolute owner and
ordered the Registry of Deeds to issue a new certificate of title in the
name of Delgado.
Delgado mortgage the property to Homeowners Savings and Loan
Bank (HSLB) using her newly registered title. Felonia and De Guzman
subsequently caused the annotation of a notice of lispendens on
Delgados title. On November 1997, HLRB foreclosed the property and
later consolidated ownership in its favor.
Felonia and De Guzman instituted a complaint before RTC of Las Pinas
for reconveyance of possession and ownership of the subject property
in their favor. As defendant, HLRC contended that it was a mortgagee
in good faith. RTC ruled in favor of Felonia and De Guzman. CA affirmed
the RTC decision
ISSUE: Whether or not HSLB is a mortgagee and a purchaser in good
faith
HELD: No. Decision of CA sustained.
Although the doctrine of mortgagee in good faith, upon which
petitioner relies, was clarified as "based on the rule that all persons
dealing with property covered by the Torrens Certificate of Title, as
buyers or mortgagees, are not required to go beyond what appears on
the face of the title. In turn, the rule is based on public interest in
upholding the indefeasibility of a certificate of title, as evidence of
lawful ownership of the land or of any encumbrance thereon."
Insofar as the HSLB is concerned, there is no longer any public interest
in upholding the indefeasibility of the certificate of title of its
mortgagor, Delgado. Such title has been nullified in a decision that had

become final and executory. Its own title, derived from the foreclosure
of Delgado's mortgage in its favor, has likewise been nullified in the
very same decision that restored the certificate of title in respondents'
name. There is absolutely no reason that can support the prayer of
HSLB to have its mortgage lien carried over and into the restored
certificate of title of respondents.
Moreover , HSLB utterly failed to take the necessary precautions. At
the time the subject property was mortgaged, there was yet no
annotated Notice ofLis Pendens. However, at the time HSLB purchased
the subject property, the Notice ofLis Pendenswas already annotated
on the title. When a prospective buyer is faced with facts and
circumstances as to arouse his suspicion, he must take precautionary
steps to qualify as a purchaser in good faith.
Indeed, at the time HSLB bought the subject property, HSLB had actual
knowledge of the annotated Notice of Lis Pendens. Instead of heeding
the same, HSLB continued with the purchase knowing the legal
repercussions a notice of lis pendens details.
4. PINAUSUKAN SEAFOOD HOUSE, ROXAS BOULEY ARD, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
FAR EAST BANK & TRUST COMPANY, NOW BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS AND HECTOR I. GALURA

Facts: Bonier, then the President of petitioner corporation (Pinausukan),

executed four real estate mortgages in favor of Far East Bank and Trust
Company (now BPI) which was registered in name of Pinausukan. After
Pinausukan defaulted, bank commenced proceedings for the
extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgages. Pinausukan brought an
action for the annulment of real estate mortgages in the RTC, averring
that Bonier had obtained the loans only in his personal capacity and
had constituted the mortgages on the corporate asset without
Pinausukans consent through a board resolution.
The counsels of the parties did not appear in court on the hearing
scheduled. RTC dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. The order
of dismissal attained finality. Pinausukan brought the petition for
annulment in the CA seeking the nullification of the order dismissing
the Civil Case salleging that its counsel had been guilty of gross and
palpable negligence in failing to keep track of the case he was handling
amounting to extrinsic fraud. CA dismissed the petition for annulment.

Issues: (a) WON counsels failure to apprise Pinausukan of the

developments in the case constitutes extrinsic fraud.
(b) WON it is the CA that has jurisdiction over an action to annul the
judgment.
Held:
(a)The allegations do not speak of the extrinsic fraud contemplated by
Rule 47. The petition suggests that the negligence of counsel may
constitute professional misconduct (but this is a matter for lawyer and
client to resolve). What is certain, for purposes of the application of
Rule 47, is that mistake and gross negligence cannot be equated to the
extrinsic fraud that Rule 47 requires to be the ground for an annulment
of judgment.
By its very nature, extrinsic fraud relates to a cause that is collateral in
character. Even in the presence of fraud, annulment will not lie unless
the fraud is committed by the adverse party, not by ones own lawyer.
In the latter case, the remedy of the client is to proceed against his
own lawyer and not to re-litigate the case where judgment had been
rendered.

(b) The Legislature has enacted Batas Pambansa Blg.129 (Judiciary

Reorganization Act of 1980). Among several innovations of this
legislative enactment was the formal establishment of the annulment
of a judgment or final order as an action independent from the generic
classification of litigations in which the subject matter was not capable
of pecuniary estimation, and expressly vested the exclusive original
jurisdiction over such action in the CA. The action in which the subject
of the litigation was incapable of pecuniary estimation continued to be
under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC, which replaced the
CFI as the court of general jurisdiction. Since then, the RTC no longer
had jurisdiction over an action to annul the judgment of the RTC,
eliminating all concerns about judicial stability. To implement this
change, the Court introduced a new procedure to govern the action to
annul the judgment of the RTC in the 1997 revision of the Rules of
Court under Rule 47, directing in Section 2 thereof that the annulment
may be based only on the grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction.

5
G.R. No. 199595
April 2, 2014
PHILIPPINE
WOMAN'S
CHRISTIAN
TEMPERANCE
UNION,
INC., Petitioner,
vs.
TEODORO R. YANGCO 2ND AND 3RD GENERATION HEIRS
FOUNDATION, INC., Respondent.
Facts:
Philanthropist Teodoro R. Yangco (Yangco) donated on May 19, 1934 a
14,073-square meter parcel of land (subject property) located at 21
Boni Serrano Avenue, Quezon City in the following manner,8 viz:
a) the property shall be used as a site for an institution to be
known as the Abierrtas House of Friendship the purpose of which
shall be to provide a Home for needy and unfortunate women
and girls, including children of both sexes and promote, foster all
efforts, work and activities looking toward their protection from
the ravages of all forms of immoralities;
b) Should the property herein be used for any other purpose or
purposes not herein specified, the present gift shall become ipso
facto null and void and property given shall automatically revert
to the donor, his heirs and assigns, but any improvement or
improvements placed, constructed and/or maintained on said
premises by the Donee, shall remain the property of said Donee
to be by it removed there[f]rom (sic) at its expense after
reasonable notice from the donor, his heirs and assigns. 9
The property was registered in the name of PWCTUI by virtue of TCT
No. 20970 at the back of which the above-quoted conditions of the
donation were annotated. PWCTUI is a non-stock, non-profit
corporation originally registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) in 1929.
PWCTUIs corporate term expired in September 1979.11 Five years
thereafter, using the same corporate name, PWCTUI obtained SEC
Registration No. 12208812 and forthwith applied for the issuance of a
new owners duplicate copy of TCT No. 20970 over the subject property
thru LRC Case No. 22702. The application was granted and PWCTUI
was issued a new TCT No. 20970 T-22702 13 which, however, bore only
the first condition imposed on the donation.
Recounting the foregoing episodes, TRY Foundation claimed that the
expiration of PWCTUIs corporate term in 1979 effectively rescinded
the donation pursuant to the "unwritten resolutory condition" deemed
written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code14 prescribing that the
Corporation Code, specifically Section 12215 thereof, be read into the
donation.
Being comprised of the heirs of the donor, TRY Foundation claimed that
it is entitled to petition for the issuance of a new title in their name

pursuant to Section 108 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1529. 16 TRY

Foundation prayed for the issuance of a new title in its name after the
cancellation of PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-22702.
PWCTUI opposed the petition.
RTC denied the Opposition18 of PWCTUI. According to the trial court,
when the corporate life of PWCTUI expired in 1979, the property
ceased to be used for the purpose for which it was intended, hence, it
automatically reverted to Yangco. As such, TRY Foundation, being
composed of his heirs, is considered "other person in interest" under
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 with a right to file a petition for the
issuance of title over the property.
The RTC granted TRY Foundations petition by ordering the cancellation
of PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and the issuance of a new title in
the name of TRY Foundation. PWCTUI appealed the decision but CA
denied the appeal and the assailed decision was affirmed in toto.
Issue:
WON the judgment was proper.
Ruling:
the RTC, acting as a land registration court, had no jurisdiction over the
actual subject matter contained in TRY Foundations petition for
issuance of a new title. TRY Foundation cannot use the summary
proceedings in Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to rescind a contract of
donation as such action should be threshed out in ordinary civil
proceedings. In the same vein, the RTC had no jurisdiction to declare
the donation annulled and as a result thereof, order the register of
deeds to cancel PWCTUIs TCT No. 20970 T-22702 and issue a new one
in favor of TRY Foundation.
The RTC, acting as a land registration court, should have dismissed the
land registration case or re-docketed the same as an ordinary civil
action and thereafter ordered compliance with stricter jurisdictional
requirements. Since the RTC had no jurisdiction over the action for
revocation of donation disguised as a land registration case, the
judgment in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04) is null and void. Being void, it
cannot be the source of any right or the creator of any obligation. It
can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is
likewise void.48
Resultantly, the appellate proceedings relative thereto and all
issuances made in connection with such review are likewise of no force
and effect. A void judgment cannot perpetuate even if affirmed on
appeal by the highest court of the land. All acts pursuant to it and all
claims emanating from it have no legal effect.50
the petition is GRANTED and All proceedings taken, decisions,
resolutions, orders and other issuances made in LRC Case No. Q-

18126(04), CA-G.R. CV No. 90763 and G.R. No. 190193 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
The Register of Deeds of Quezon City is hereby ORDERED to CANCEL
any Transfer Certificate of Title issued in the name of Teodoro R. Yangco
2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. as a consequence of the
execution of the disposition in LRC Case No. Q-18126(04), and to
REINSTATE Transfer Certificate of Title No. 20970 T-22702 in the name
of Philippine Womans Christian Temperance Union, Inc.

6
G.R. No. 182908
August 6, 2014
HEIRS OF FRANCISCO I. NARVASA, SR., and HEIRS OF PETRA
IMBORNAL and PEDRO FERRER, represented by their Attorneyin-Fact, MRS. REMEDIOS B. NARVASA-REGACHO, Petitioners,
vs.
EMILIANA, VICTORIANO, FELIPE, MA TEO, RAYMUNDO, MARIA,
and EDUARDO, all surnamed IMBORNAL,Respondents.
Facts:
Basilia owned a parcel of land situated at Sabangan, Pangasinan which
she conveyed to her three (3) daughters Balbina, Alejandra, and
Catalina (Imbornal sisters) sometime in 1920.
Meanwhile, Catalinas husband, Ciriaco Abrio (Ciriaco), applied for and
was granted a homestead patent over a 31,367-sq. m. riparian land
(Motherland) adjacent to the Cayanga River in San Fabian,
Pangasinan.14 He was eventually awarded Homestead Patent No.
2499115 therefor, and, on December 5, 1933, OCT No. 1462 was issued
in his name. Later, or on May 10, 1973, OCT No. 1462 was cancelled,
and Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 101495 16 was issued in the
name of Ciriacos heirs, namely: Margarita Mejia; Rodrigo Abrio,
marriedto Rosita Corpuz; Antonio Abrio, married to Crisenta Corpuz;
Remedios Abrio, married to Leopoldo Corpuz; Pepito Abrio; Dominador
Abrio; Francisca Abrio; Violeta Abrio; and Perla Abrio (Heirs of Ciriaco).
Ciriaco and his heirs had since occupied the northern portion of the
Motherland, while respondents occupied the southern portion.17
Sometime in 1949, the First Accretion, approximately 59,772 sq. m. in
area, adjoined the southern portion of the Motherland. On August 15,
1952, OCT No. P-318 was issued in the name of respondent Victoriano,
married to Esperanza Narvarte, covering the First Accretion. 18 Decades
later, or in 1971, the Second Accretion, which had an area of 32,307
sq. m., more or less, abutted the First Accretion on its southern

portion.19 On November 10, 1978, OCT No. 21481 was issued in the
names of all the respondents covering the Second Accretion.
Claiming rights over the entire Motherland, Francisco, et al., as the
children of Alejandra and Balbina, filed on February 27,1984 an
Amended Complaint20 for reconveyance, partition, and/or damages
against respondents, docketed as Civil Case No. D-6978. They
anchored their claim on the allegation that Ciriaco, with the help of his
wife Catalina, urged Balbina and Alejandra to sell the Sabangan
property.
Likewise, Francisco, et al. alleged that through deceit, fraud, falsehood,
and misrepresentation, respondent Victoriano, with respect to the First
Accretion, and the respondents collectively, with regard to the Second
Accretion, had illegally registered the said accretions in their names,
notwithstanding the fact that they were not the riparian owners (as
they did not own the Motherland to which the accretions merely
formed adjacent to). In this relation, Francisco, et al. explained that
they did not assert their inheritance claims over the Motherland and
the two (2) accretions because they respected respondents rights,
until they discovered in 1983 that respondents have repudiated their
(Francisco, et al.s) shares thereon. 22 Thus, bewailing that respondents
have refused them their rights not only with respect to the Motherland,
but also to the subsequent accretions, Francisco, et al. prayed for the
reconveyance of said properties, or, in the alternative, the payment of
their value, as well as the award of moral damages in the amount
of P100,000.00, actual damages in the amount of P150,000.00,
including attorneys fees and other costs.23
On August 20, 1996, the RTC rendered a Decision 26 in favor of
Francisco, et al. and thereby directed respondents to: (a) reconvey to
Francisco, et al. their respective portions in the Motherland and in the
accretions thereon, or their pecuniary equivalent; and (b) pay actual
damages in the amount of P100,000.00, moral damages in the amount
ofP100,000.00, and attorneys fees in the sum of P10,000.00, as well
as costs of suit.
On November 28, 2006, the CA rendered a Decision 29 reversing and
setting aside the RTC Decision and entering a new one declaring: (a)
the descendants of Ciriaco as the exclusive owners of the Motherland;
(b) the descendants of respondent Victoriano asthe exclusive owners of
the First Accretion; and (c) the descendants of Pablo (i.e., respondents
collectively) as the exclusive owners of the Second Accretion.
At odds with the CAs disposition, Francisco et al. filed a motion for
reconsideration which was, however denied by the CA in a
Resolution35 dated May 7, 2008, hence, this petition taken by the
latters heirs as their successors-in-interest.
Issues:

(a) WON the descendants of Ciriaco are the exclusive owners of the
Motherland; (b) WON the descendants of respondent Victoriano are the
exclusive owners of the First Accretion; and
(c) WON the descendants of Pablo (respondents collectively) are the
exclusive owners of the Second Accretion on the basis of the following
grounds:
(1) prescription of the reconveyance action, which was duly raised as
an affirmative defense in the Amended Answer, and
(2) the existence of an implied trust between the Imbornal sisters and
Ciriaco.
Ruling:
The petition is bereft of merit.
A. Procedural Matter: Issue of Prescription.
At the outset, the Court finds that the causes of action pertaining to
the Motherland and the First Accretion are barred by prescription.
To recount, Francisco, et al. asserted co-ownership over the
Motherland, alleging that Ciriaco agreed to hold the same in trust for
their predecessors-in-interest Alejandra and Balbina upon issuance of
the title in his name. Likewise, they alleged that respondents acquired
the First and Second Accretions by means of fraud and deceit.
When property is registered in anothers name, an implied or
constructive trust is created by law in favor of the true owner.
An action for reconveyance based on an implied trust prescribes in 10
years. The reference point of the 10-yearprescriptive period is the date
of registration of the deed or the issuance of the title. The prescriptive
period applies only if there is an actual need to reconvey the property
as when the plaintiff is not in possession of the property. However, if
the plaintiff, as the real owner of the property also remains in
possession of the property, the prescriptive period to recover title and
possession of the property does not run against him.
Based on the foregoing, Francisco, et al. had then a period of ten (10)
years from the registration of the respective titles covering the
disputed properties within which to file their action for reconveyance,
taking into account the fact that they were never in possession of the
said properties. Hence, with respect tot he Motherland covered by OCT
No. 1462 issued on December 5, 1933 in the name of Ciriaco, an action
for reconveyance therefor should have been filed until December 5,
1943; with respect to the First Accretion covered by OCT No. P-318
issued on August 15, 1952 in the name of respondent Victoriano, an
action of the same nature should have been filed until August 15,
1962; and, finally, with respect to the Second Accretion covered by
OCT No. 21481 issued on November 10, 1978in the name of the

respondents, a suit for reconveyance therefor should have been filed

until November 10, 1988.
A judicious perusal of the records, however, will show that the
Amended Complaint42 covering all three (3) disputed properties was
filed only on February 27, 1984. As such, it was filed way beyond the
10-year reglementary period within which to seek the reconveyance of
two (2) of these properties, namely, the Motherland and the First
Accretion, with only the reconveyance action with respect to the
Second Accretion having been seasonably filed.
B. Substantive Matter: Existence of an Implied Trust.
The main thrust of Francisco, et al.s Amended Complaint is that an
implied trust had arisen between the Imbornal sisters, on the one
hand, and Ciriaco, on the other, with respect to the Motherland.
a homestead patent award requires proof that the applicant meets the
stringent conditions48 set forth under Commonwealth Act No. 141, as
amended, which includes actual possession, cultivation, and
improvement of the homestead. It must be presumed, therefore, that
Ciriaco underwent the rigid process and duly satisfied the strict
conditions necessary for the grant of his homestead patent application.
As such, it is highly implausible that the Motherland had been acquired
and registered by mistake or through fraud as would create an implied
trust between the Imbornal sisters and Ciriaco.
Hence, when OCT No. 1462 covering the Motherland was issued in his
name pursuant to Homestead Patent No. 24991 on December 15,
1933, Ciriacos title to the Motherland had become indefeasible. It
bears to stress that the proceedings for land registration that led to the
issuance of Homestead Patent No. 24991 and eventually, OCT No.
1462 in Ciriacos name are presumptively regular and proper, 49 which
presumption has not been overcome by the evidence presented by
Francisco, et al.
Consequently, as Francisco, et al. failed to prove their ownership rights
over the Motherland, their cause of action with respect to the First
Accretion and, necessarily, the Second Accretion, must likewise fail. A
further exposition is apropos.
As regards the third issue, being the owner of the land adjoining the
foreshore area, respondent is the riparian or littoral owner who has
preferential right to lease the foreshore area.
Accordingly, therefore, alluvial deposits along the banks of a creek or a
river do not form part of the public domain as the alluvial property

automatically belongs to the owner of the estate to which it may have

been added. The only restriction provided for by law is that the owner
of the adjoining property must register the same under the Torrens
system; otherwise, the alluvial property may be subject to acquisition
through prescription by third persons.53
In this case, Francisco, et al. and, now, their heirs, i.e., herein
petitioners are not the riparian owners of the Motherland to which the
First Accretion had attached, hence, they cannot assert ownership over
the First Accretion. Consequently, as the Second Accretion had merely
attached to the First Accretion, they also have no right over the Second
Accretion. Neither were they able to show that they acquired these
properties through prescription as it was not established that they
were in possession of any of them. Therefore, whether through
accretion or, independently, through prescription, the discernible
conclusion is that Francisco et al. and/or petitioners' claim of title over
the First and Second Accretions had not been substantiated, and, as a
result, said properties cannot be reconveyed in their favor. This is
especially so since on the other end of the fray lie respondents armed
with a certificate of title in their names covering the First and Second
Accretions coupled with their possession thereof, both of which give
rise to the superior credibility of their own claim. Hence, petitioners'
action for reconveyance with respect to both accretions must
altogether fail.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.

11.
G.R.No.202805,March23,2015ROSARIOBANGUISTAMBUYAT,
Petitioner, v.WENIFREDABALCOMTAMBUYAT, Respondent. DECISIO
NDELCASTILLO,J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the February 14,
2012 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 84954
affirming with modification the May 26, 2003 Decision3 of the Regional Trial
Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 10 in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as well
as its July 26, 2012 Resolution4 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration5 of the herein assailed judgment.
FactualAntecedents

Adriano M. Tambuyat (Adriano) and respondent Wenifreda BalcomTambuyat (Wenifreda) were married
on September 16, 1965.6 During their marriage, Adriano acquired several
real properties, including a 700square meter parcel of land located at Barangay Muzon, San Jose del
Monte, Bulacan (the subject
property),7 which was bought on November 17, 1991.8 The deed of sale
over the said property was signed by Adriano alone as vendee; one of the
signing witnesses to the deed of sale was petitioner
Rosario Banguis-Tambuyat (Banguis), who signed therein as Rosario
Banguis.9 When Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-145321(M) (TCT T-145321) covering the subject
property was issued, however,
it was made under the name of ADRIANO M. TAMBUYAT married to
ROSARIO E. BANGUIS.10
All this time, petitioner Banguis remained married to Eduardo Nolasco
(Nolasco). They were married on
October 15, 1975, and at all times material to this case, Nolasco was alive,
and his marriage to petitioner
subsisted and was never annulled.11
On June 7, 1998, Adriano died intestate.12
On October 18, 1999, Wenifreda filed a Petition for Cancellation13 of TCT T145321, which was docketed as LRC Case No. P-443-99 and assigned to
Branch 10 of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan (Malolos RTC).
She alleged therein that she was the surviving spouse of Adriano; that TCT
T-145321

was erroneously registered and made in the name of ADRIANO M.

TAMBUYAT married to ROSARIO E.
BANGUIS
; that
per annexed Marriage Contract, Banguis was still married to Nolasco; that
Banguis could
not have been married to Adriano;
that the issuance of the title in Banguiss name as Adrianos spouse was
due to an insidious machination by her and the person who brokered the
sale of the subject
property, allegedly a cousin or relative of hers;14 and that consequently,
she suffered damages. Thus,
Wenifreda prayed that TCT T-145321 be cancelled; that a new certificate of
title be made out in Adrianos
name, with her as the spouse indicated;
that Banguis be ordered to surrender her copy of TCT T-145321; and that
moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees, and costs of litigation be
adjudged in her favor.
In her Opposition15 to the petition for cancellation,
Banguis denied specifically that the subject property
was acquired by Adriano and Wenifreda
during their marriage. alone bought the subject property using her personal
funds; that
that on the other hand, she

that their union produced a son, who was born on April 1, 1990; that the
trial court has no jurisdiction over the petition for cancellation,
which is merely a summary proceeding considering that a thorough
determination will have to be made as to whether the property is conjugal
or exclusive property, and since she and Adriano have a child whose rights
will be adversely affected by any judgment in the case; and that Wenifreda
is guilty of forum- shopping in filing LRC Case No. P-443-99, considering
that a prior similar case was already filed by her and dismissed on April 22,
1999 by Branch 76 of the Malolos RTC. Banguis prayed for the dismissal of
LRC Case No. P-443-99 and to be paid moral damages and attorneys fees
by way of counterclaim.
During the course of the proceedings, the parties presented the following
evidence, among others:
She claimed
September 2, 1988 and thereafter lived together as a married couple;
she and Adriano were married on
1.Marriage Contract of Adriano and Wenifreda;16
2.Publication of Adrianos death;17

3.Social Security System (SSS) data record of Adriano indicating that Wenifreda is his spous

4.Barangay Council Certificate indicating that Adriano and Wenifreda were legally married an
Phase V, Pilar Village, Las Pias City since 1981;19
5.Marriage Contract of Banguis and Nolasco dated October 15, 1975;20

6.Banguiss SSS Members Data Change or Addition Report indicating that Banguis: a) soug
Banguis to Rosario B. Nolasco; b) listed Nolasco as her husband; and c) changed h

7.Banguiss correspondence at work Ocean East Agency Corporation (Ocean East), which

which she signed as Rosario B. Nolasco;22

8.Banguiss rsum on file with Ocean East, reflecting that she was married;23

9.Negative Certification of Marriage issued by the Civil Registrar of Bulacan to the effect that
of Adriano and Banguiss marriage which was supposedly solemnized on September 2
10.

Certification dated April 17, 2002 issued by Rev. Fr. Narciso Sampana, Parish Priest o
parish never had a parish priest by the name of Fr. Roberto de Guzman who is claim
marriage between Adriano and Banguis;25

11.

Banguiss testimony on direct examination that she and Adriano were married on Sept
Adrian; that Adriano purchased the subject property on November 17, 1991 per Deed
Adriano as the purchaser entered as Document No. 173; Page No. 3550; series of 1
Tubig; that she paid for the same with her own money; and that she stayed at the subje
night;26

12.

Banguiss testimony on cross-examination that she is married to Nolasco, who is still a

subsisting and has not been annulled; and that she knew that Adriano was married to

13.

Photographs depicting Adriano and Banguis as a couple and with a child, supposedly

On May 26, 2003, the Malolos RTC rendered its Decision, decreeing thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby RENDERED in favor of the petition

1.Directing the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan to cancel TCT
No. T-145321 (M) and in lieu thereof to issue a new certificate of title
in the name of Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Wenifreda Winnie
Balcom Tambuyat;
2.Directing the defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco of 1714 Ibarra St.,
Sampaloc, Manila to surrender to the Register of Deeds for
Meycauayan, Bulacan, the owners duplicate copy of TCT
No. T-145321 (M) within five (5) days from receipt of the order, failing which

the Register of Deeds should proceed with the cancellation of said TCT.
3.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum
of P100,000.00 as and by way of moral damages.
4.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner the sum
of P100,000.00 as and by way of exemplary damages; and
5.Directing defendant Rosario Banguis Nolasco to pay petitioner attorneys
fees in the amount of P100,000.00, and the cost of suit.

Accordingly, the counterclaim of the oppositor is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO OR

In arriving at the above pronouncement, the trial court held among others that under Section
Registration Act now Section 108 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 (PD 1529) or the Prope
authorization is required for any alteration or amendment of a certificate of title when any err
entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon, or on any duplicate certificate, or when th
amendment or alteration of the title; that it has been established that Wenifreda is the survivi
property was acquired during their marriage, but it was erroneously registered in the name o
marriage with Nolasco when TCT T-145321 was issued with her being erroneously included
spouse; that Adrians filiation may not be proved collaterally through LRC Case No. P-443-99
moral and exemplary damages without proof of pecuniary loss, for the damage caused upon
by the wanton, fraudulent, malicious and unwarranted inclusion of Banguiss name in the title
attorneys fees as she was compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests b
RulingoftheCourtofAppeals

Petitioner appealed the trial courts Decision with the CA. Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 8495
thesis that the trial court erred in applying Section 108 of PD 1529; that with the serious obje
that she is the actual owner and possessor of the subject property, a proper action in a differ
should be filed, rather than in the current trial court which sits merely as a land registration c
148 of the Family Code31 which provides for the division of properties acquired by individuals
court erred in awarding damages, attorneys fees and costs of suit; that the trial court erred in
despite the absence of any good or special reasons; and that the denial of her counterclaim

Meanwhile, on October 30, 2003, Wenifreda moved for execution pending appeal. It appears

Banguis failed to oppose the motion; she did not appear during the scheduled hearings on th
issued a March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a Writ of Execution. Such writ was t
145321 was cancelled, and a new title TCT T-433713(M) was issued in its place.

On February 14, 2012, the CA issued the assailed Decision containing the following decretal

WHEREFORE, the appeal is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated May 26, 2
Branch 10 of Malolos, Bulacan is AFFIRMED with the modification that the award of moral a
cost of the suit in favor of Wenifreda Tambuyat is hereby deleted.
SO ORDERED.33

The CA sustained the trial courts application of Section 108 of PD 1529, noting that Banguis
error or mistake. It held that the evidence adduced proved that Wenifreda and not Banguis
a valid and subsisting marriage between Nolasco and Banguis, and the latter admitted to suc
in the trial court; and that Banguiss opposition to Wenifredas petition for cancellation of TCT
place the latters title to the subject property in doubt.34

The CA added that contrary to Banguiss position, a separate and different proceeding is not
petition in LRC Case No. P-443-99, as: 1) she in effect acquiesced and freely submitted her
complete determination, submitting all her relevant documentary and other evidence to the c
particularly that she is the lawful spouse of Adriano and that she is the actual owner and pos

property; and 2) pursuant to law35 and jurisprudence,36 the distinction between the trial court
court of general jurisdiction has been eliminated with the passage of PD 1529. It held further
Adriano and Banguis are not co-owners of the subject property as it has been shown that: a)
marriages when they conducted their adulterous relations; b) Banguis failed to present even
contributed to the purchase of the subject property; and c) the deed of sale itself indicated th
denying Wenifredas pecuniary awards and Banguiss counterclaim, the CA held that the par
legal and factual basis to grant them.

Banguis moved for reconsideration, but in a July 26, 2012 Resolution, the CA was unconvinc
Issues
Banguis cites the following issues for resolution:

I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

RTC WHICH CANCELLED AND CORRECTED THE QUESTIONED
ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) FROM ROSARIO E. BANGUIS TO
WENIFREDA WINNIE BALCOM TAMBUYAT UNDER SECTION 108 OF
THE PROPERTY REGISTRATION DECREE DESPITE THE LACK OF
JURISDICTION TO HEAR THE SAME IN VIEW OF THE SERIOUS AND
WEIGHTY OBJECTIONS OF THE PETITIONER AND THAT THE
INSTITUTION OF ESTATE PROCEEDINGS OF THE LATE ADRIANO M.
TAMBUYAT AND THE CONSEQUENT APPOINTMENT OF AN
EXECUTOR OR ADMINISTRATOR WHICH IS THE PROPER REMEDY
WHO CAN GO AFTER HIS PROPERTIES HELD BY OTHER PERSONS.
III.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING

THE RTC WHICH CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE
QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO. T-145321 (M) IN CLEAR
VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 148 OF THE FAMILY CODE PROVIDING
FOR THE SHARING OF PROPERTIES ACQUIRED BY PERSONS
UNITED IN A DEFECTIVE MARRIAGE.

IV.

THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING

THE RTC WHICH GRANTED THE IMMEDIATE EXECUTION OF
ITS DECISION NOTWITHSTANDING THE SEASONABLE

II. THE COURT OF APPEALS GROSSLY ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE

RTC WHICH

CORRECTED AND CANCELLED THE QUESTIONED ENTRY IN TCT NO.

T-145321 (M)
THROUGH AN ABSOLUTE AND COMPLETE DISREGARD OF THE
PROOF OF OWNERSHIP

AND POSSESSION BY THE PETITIONER OVER THE SUBJECT

PROPERTY.

APPEAL OF THE PETITIONER AND THE UTTER LACK OF ANY GOOD

OR SPECIAL REASONS JUSTIFYING THE SAME.37
PetitionersArguments
In her Petition and Reply38 seeking to reverse and set aside the assailed
CA dispositions and thus dismiss Wenifredas petition for cancellation in
LRC Case No. P-443-99, Banguis insists on her original position adopted
below that Section 108 of PD 1529 cannot apply in view of the contentious
and controversial nature of her opposition to the petition for cancellation,
which can be threshed out only in a separate proper proceeding where the
court sits not merely as a land registration court, but as a court of general
jurisdiction. She cites TagaytayTaalTouristDevelopmentCorporationv.Court
ofAppeals,39Liwagv.CourtofAppeals,40 and Vda.deArceov.Courtof
Appeals,41 which made pronouncements to such effect.
Banguis adds that the instant case involved the partition of Adrianos estate
which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests

her and her son Adrian of their rights and interests therein; that based on
the evidence she introduced, it should be concluded that the property
belongs to her as it was acquired using solely her own funds and money
borrowed from her sister, and because she has been in constant
possession thereof, introducing improvements thereon through the years;
that the subject property is owned in common by her and Adriano since it
was acquired during their cohabitation; and that the CA erred in refusing to
rule on the propriety of the trial courts grant of execution pending appeal.
RespondentsArguments
In Wenifredas Comment,42 it is stressed that the distinction between the
trial court acting as a land registration court, on one hand, and its acting as
a court of general jurisdiction, on the other, has been removed with the
effectivity of PD 1529; thus, trial courts are no longer fettered by their
former limited jurisdiction which enabled them to grant relief in land
registration cases only when there is unanimity among the parties, or when
none of them raises any adverse claims or serious objections. It is further
argued that Banguiss claim of ownership cannot stand, for the evidence
fails to indicate that she contributed to the purchase of the subject property,
even as the deed of sale to the property itself shows that Adriano alone is
the vendee thereof, and Banguis signed merely as a witness thereto.
Finally, respondent explains that during the proceedings covering the
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution pending appeal, Banguis was
accorded the opportunity to participate, but she did not; as a result, the old
title was cancelled and a new one was accordingly issued in its stead.
OurRuling
The Court denies the Petition.
The trial court in LRC Case No. P-443-99 was not precluded from resolving
the objections raised by Banguis in her opposition to the petition for
cancellation; a separate action need not be filed in a different
Under Section 108 of PD 1529, the proceeding for the erasure, alteration,
or amendment of a certificate

of title may be resorted to

(3) when any error, omission or mistake
court exercising general jurisdiction. Banguis should be considered to have
acquiesced and freely submitted the case to the trial court for complete
determination on her opposition, when she went to trial and adduced and
submitted all her relevant evidence to the court. The active participation of
the party against whom the action was brought, coupled with his failure to
object to the jurisdiction of the court or quasi-judicial body where the action
is pending, is tantamount to an invocation of that jurisdiction and a
willingness to abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party
from later on impugning the court or bodys jurisdiction.43
in seven instances: (1) when registered interests of any description,
whether vested, contingent, expectant, or inchoate, have terminated and
ceased; (2) when new interests have
arisen or been created which do not appear upon the certificate;
was made in entering a certificate or any memorandum thereon or on any
duplicate certificate
; (4) when the name of any person on the certificate has been changed; (5)
when the registered owner has been
married, or, registered as married, the marriage has been terminated and
no right or interest of heirs or creditors will thereby be affected; (6) when a
corporation, which owned registered land and has been dissolved, has not
conveyed the same within three years after its dissolution; and (7)
4

Proceedings under Section 108 are summary in nature, contemplating

corrections or insertions of mistakes which are only clerical but certainly
not controversial issues.45 Banguiss opposition to the petition for
cancellation ostensibly raised controversial issues involving her claimed
ownership and the hereditary rights of Adrian, which she claims to be her

son by Adriano. However,

Adriano M. Tambuyat married to Rosario E. Banguis when, in truth and in
fact, respondent Wenifreda
and not Banguis is Adrianos lawful spouse.
evidence of Banguiss ownership is irrelevant in Wenifredas petition, the
evidence apparently indicates
is irrelevant and unnecessary to the complete determination of Wenifredas
petition. The Court is thus led
when there is
reasonable ground for the amendment or alteration of title.4
where the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan committed an error in issuing
TCT T-145321 in the name of
The present case falls under (3) and (7),
apart from the fact that
that Banguis could not be the owner of the subject property, while a
resolution of the issue of succession
to the conclusion that the Registrar of Deeds of Bulacan simply erred in
including Banguis in TCT T145321 as Adrianos spouse.
As correctly ruled by the appellate court, the preponderance of evidence
points to the fact that Wenifreda is the legitimate spouse of Adriano.
Documentary evidence among others, the parties respective marriage
contracts, which, together with marriage certificates, are considered the
primary evidence of a marital union46 indicates that Adriano was married

to Wenifreda, while Banguis was married to Nolasco and both marriages

were subsisting at the time of the acquisition of the subject property and
issuance of the certificate of title thereto. Thus, it cannot be said that
Adriano and Banguis were husband and wife to each other; it cannot even
be said that they have a common-law relationship at all. Consequently,
Banguis cannot be included or named in TCT T-145321 as Adrianos
spouse; the right and privilege belonged to Wenifreda alone.
x x x Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A
man and woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as
husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband and
wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where
they live may be considered legally married in common law jurisdictions but
not in the Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such
relationships are present in our society, and that they produce a community
of properties and interests which is governed by law, authority exists in
case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the man
and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract
marriage. In any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with
another woman, a legal impediment which disqualified him from even
legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, the Court, thru Mr.
Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving
Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated:
Be it noted however that with respect to spouse, the same must be the
legitimate spouse (not common-law spouses).
There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term
spouse embraces common law relation for purposes of exemption from
criminal liability in cases of theft, swindling and malicious mischief
committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code article, it is
said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and
wife de facto. But this view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at

bar. WeholdthattheprovisionsoftheCivilCode,unlessexpresslyprovidingto
thecontraryasinArticle144,whenreferringtoaspousecontemplatealawfully
weddedspouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her
lifetime.47 (Emphasissupplied)
The only issue that needed to be resolved in LRC Case No. P-443-99 is
who should be included in the

title to the subject property as Adrianos spouse, Banguis or Wenifreda? Was there error in p
Adrianos spouse? If Banguis is Adrianos spouse, then there would be no need to amend or
Wenifreda is Adrianos spouse, the inclusion of Banguis would then be erroneous, and TCT T
that is required in resolving this issue is to determine who between them is Adrianos spouse
that she is the actual owner of the property. Title to the property is different from the certifica

x x x. In LeeTekShengv.CourtofAppeals, the Court made a clear distinction between title an

referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds known as the Transfer Certifica
ownership which is represented by that document. Petitioner apparently confuses certificate
mantle of the Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be dispute
of title. The TCT is only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Besides, the

certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership. Mere issuance

person does not foreclose the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership w
that the registrant may only be a trustee or that other parties may have acquired interest sub
title. To repeat, registration is not the equivalent of title, but is only the best evidence thereof.
be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of such ownership although both are inte
not vest title; it is merely the evidence of such title. Land registration laws do not give the hol
has.48

Nonetheless, if Banguis felt that she had to go so far as to demonstrate that she is the true o
convince the trial court that there is no need to cancel TCT T-145321, then she was not prec
effect. Understandably, with the quality of Wenifredas documentary and other evidence, Ban
beyond the certificate of title, she actually owned the property. Unfortunately for her, this Cou
ownership; the view taken by the CA must be adopted that she and Adriano could not have b
she failed to present sufficient proof that she contributed to the purchase of the subject prope
subject property showed that Adriano alone was the vendee. This Court is not a trier of facts

the Court of Appeals, which are thus considered conclusive and binding.49 Moreover, the Cou
alone paid for the property using her own funds and money borrowed from her sister, she no
co-owner thereof, thus implying that he contributed to its acquisition. Such contradictory state
basically, if she were the sole purchaser of the property, it would only be logical and natural f
on the deed of sale as the vendee, and not as mere witness which is what actually occurre
contributed to its purchase, Banguis would have required that her name be placed on the de
failure to explain why despite her claims that she is the purchaser of the property she allo
sole vendee, renders her claim of ownership doubtful. Where a party has the means in his p

rebutting and explaining the evidence adduced against him, if it does not tend to the truth, th
inference against him.50 One cannot also ignore the principle that the rules of evidence in th
common sense.51

Neither can the Court believe Banguiss assertion that Wenifredas petition for cancellation o
Adrianos estate which in effect transfers the subject property to Wenifreda and thus divests
and interests therein. LRC Case No. P-443-99 is simply a case for the correction of the wron
to reflect the truth in the certificate of title that Adriano is married to Wenifreda and nothin
proceeding, but Banguis complicated matters by injecting her claims of ownership, which are
stated, registration is not the equivalent of title.
Finally, with the foregoing disquisition, it becomes unnecessary to resolve
the other issues raised by the petitioner, particularly those relating to the
trial courts March 30, 2004 Order directing the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, as well as the April 14, 2004 Writ of Execution
issued, as they have become moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The February 14, 2012 Decision
and July 26, 2012 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No.
84954 are AFFIRMED.
SOORDERED.
G.R.No.163928,January21,2015MANUELJUSAYAN,ALFREDOJUSAYAN,
ANDMICHAELJUSAYAN, Petitioners, v.JORGE
SOMBILLA, Respondent. DECISIONBERSAMIN,J.:

The Court resolves whether a lease of agricultural land between the

respondent and the predecessor of the petitioners was a civil law lease or
an agricultural lease. The resolution is determinative of whether or not the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) had original exclusive jurisdiction over the
action commenced by the predecessor of the petitioners against the
respondent.cralawred
TheCase
Under review on certiorariis the decision promulgated on October 20,
2003,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the judgment in favor
of the petitioners rendered on April 13, 1999 in CAR Case No. 17117
entitled TimoteoJusayan,ManuelJusayan,AlfredoJusayanandMichaelJusayan
v.JorgeSombillaby the RTC, Branch 30, in Iloilo
City.2chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Antecedents
and would deliver 110 cavans of palay annually to Timoteo without need for
accounting of the cultivation expenses provided that Jorge would pay the
irrigation fees. From 1971 to 1983, Timoteo and Jorge followed the
arrangement. In 1975, the parcels of land were transferred in the names of
Timoteos sons, namely; Manuel, Alfredo and Michael (petitioners).
Wilson Jesena (Wilson) owned four parcels of land situated in New
Lucena, Iloilo. On June 20, 1970,
Wilson entered into an agreement with respondent Jorge Sombilla (Jorge),3
wherein Wilson designated
Jorge as his agent to supervise the tilling and farming of his riceland in
crop year 1970-1971. On August
20, 1971,
before the expiration of the agreement,
Wilson sold the four parcels of land to Timoteo Jusayan

(Timoteo).4 Jorge and Timoteo verbally agreed that Jorge would retain
possession of the parcels of land
terminating his administration and demanding the return of the possession
of the parcels of
In 1984, Timoteo sent several letters to Jorge
land
against Jorge in the RTC
Timoteo filed on June 30, 1986 a complaint for recovery of possession and
accounting
In his answer,6 Jorge asserted that he enjoyed security of tenure as the
agricultural lessee of Timoteo;
and that he could not be dispossessed of his landholding without valid
cause
.5chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Due to the failure of Jorge to render accounting and to return the
possession of the parcels of land despite demands,
(CAR Case No. 17117). Following Timoteos death on October 4, 1991, the
petitioners substituted him as the plaintiffs.
RulingoftheRTC
.cralawred
In its decision rendered on April 13, 1999,7 the between Timoteo and Jorge;
and petitioners.cralawred
JudgmentoftheCA

Jorge appealed to the CA.In the judgment promulgated on October 20,

2003,8 the
; and that the demand of Timoteo for the delivery of his share in the harvest
and the payment of irrigation fees
constituted an agrarian dispute that was outside the jurisdiction of the RTC,
and well within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture
(DAR) pursuant to Section 3(d) of Republic Act No. 6657
RTC upheld the contractual relationship of agency
ordered Jorge to deliver the possession of the parcels of land to the
declaring that the contractual relationship between the parties was one of
agricultural tenancy
CA reversed the RTC and dismissed the case,
(ComprehensiveAgrarianReformLawof1988).cralawredIssuesThe petitioners
now appeal upon the following issues, namely:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Whether or not the relationship between the petitioners and respondent is
that of agency or
agricultural leasehold;
a.)
and
b.) Whether or not RTC, Branch 30, Iloilo City as Regional Trial Court and
Court of Agrarian Relations, had jurisdiction over the herein case.9
RulingoftheCourt
The petition for review lacks merit.

To properly resolve whether or not the relationship between Timoteo and

Jorge was that of an agency or a tenancy, an analysis of the concepts of
agency and tenancy is in order.
r.1011 the elements of which are, namely: (a) the relationship is established
by the
parties consent, express or implied; (b) the object is the execution of a
juridical act in relation to a third person; (c) the agent acts as
representative and not for himself; and (d) the agent acts within the scope
of his authority.12 Whether or not an agency has been created is
determined by the fact that one is representing and acting for another.13
.14chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
The claim of Timoteo that Jorge was his agent contradicted the verbal
agreement he had fashioned with Jorge. By assenting to Jorges
possession of the land sans accounting of the cultivation expenses and
actual produce of the land provided that Jorge annually delivered to him
110 cavans of palay and paid the irrigation fees belied the very nature of
agency, which was representation. The verbal agreement between Timoteo
and Jorge left all matters of agricultural production to the sole discretion of
Jorge and practically divested Timoteo of the right to exercise his authority
over the acts to be performed by Jorge. While in possession of the land,
therefore, Jorge was acting for himself instead of for Timoteo. Unlike Jorge,
Timoteo did not benefit whenever the production increased, and did not
suffer whenever the production decreased. Timoteos interest was limited
to the delivery of the 110 cavans of palay annually without any concern
about how the cultivation could be improved in order to yield more produce.
On the other hand, to prove the tenancy relationship, Jorge presented
handwritten receipts15 indicating that the sacks of palay delivered to and
received by one Corazon Jusayan represented payment of rental. In this
regard, rental was the legal term for the consideration of the lease.16
Consequently, the receipts substantially proved that the contractual
relationship between Jorge and Timoteo was a lease.

In agency, the agent binds himself to render some service or to do

something in representation or on

behalf of the principal, with the consent or authority of the latte

agency is representation,
The basis of the civil law relationship of

The law does not presume agency; hence, proving its existence,
nature and extent is incumbent upon the person alleging it
Yet, the lease of an agricultural land can be either a civil law or an
agricultural lease.
the members of his immediate farm household,
and of
17

In the civil law lease,

one of the parties binds himself to give to another the enjoyment or use of
a thing for a price certain, and
for a period that may be definite or indefinite.
In the agricultural lease, also termed as a leasehold
tenancy, the physical possession of the land devoted to agriculture is given
by its owner or legal
possessor (landholder) to another (tenant) for the purpose of production
through labor of the latter

in consideration of which the latter agrees to share the

harvest with the landholder, or to pay a price certain or ascertainable
, either in produce or in money, or in both.18 Specifically, in Gabrielv.
Pangilinan,19 this Court differentiated between a leasehold tenancy and a
civil law lease in the following manner, namely: (1) the subject matter of a
leasehold tenancy is limited to agricultural land, but that of a civil law lease
may be rural or urban property; (2) as to attention and cultivation, the law
requires the leasehold tenant to personally attend to and cultivate the
agricultural land; the civil law lessee need not personally cultivate or work
the thing leased; (3) as to purpose, the landholding in leasehold tenancy is
devoted to agriculture; in civil law lease, the purpose may be for any other
lawful pursuits; and(4) as to the law that governs, the civil law lease is
governed by the CivilCode, but the leasehold tenancy is governed by
special laws.
The sharing of the harvest in proportion to the respective contributions of
the landholder and tenant, otherwise called share tenancy,20 was abolished
on August 8, 1963 under Republic Act No. 3844. To date, the only
permissible system of agricultural tenancy is leasehold tenancy,21 a
relationship wherein a fixed consideration is paid instead of proportionately
sharing the harvest as in share tenancy.
In Teodorov.Macaraeg,22 this Court has synthesized the elements of
agricultural tenancy to wit: (1) the object of the contract or the relationship
is an agricultural land that is leased or rented for the purpose of agricultural
production; (2) the size of the landholding is such that it is susceptible of
personal cultivation by a single person with the assistance of the members
of his immediate farm household; (3) the tenant- lessee must actually and
personally till, cultivate or operate the land, solely or with the aid of labor
from his immediate farm household; and (4) the landlord-lessor, who is
either the lawful owner or the legal possessor of the land, leases the same
to the tenant-lessee for a price certain or ascertainable either in an amount
of money or produce.

It can be gleaned that in both civil law lease of an agricultural land and
agricultural lease, the lessor gives to the lessee the use and possession of
the land for a price certain. Although the purpose of the civil law lease and
the agricultural lease may be agricultural cultivation and production, the
distinctive attribute that sets a civil law lease apart from an agricultural
lease is the personal cultivation by the lessee. An agricultural lessee
cultivates by himself and with the aid of those of his immediate farm
household. Conversely, even when the lessee is in possession of the
leased agricultural land and paying a consideration for it but is not
personally cultivating the land, he or she is a civil law lessee.
The only issue remaining to be resolved is whether or not Jorge personally
cultivated the leased agricultural land.
Cultivation is not limited to the plowing and harrowing of the land, but
includes the various phases of farm labor such as the maintenance, repair
and weeding of dikes, paddies and irrigation canals in the landholding.
Moreover, it covers attending to the care of the growing plants,23 and grown
plants like fruit trees that require watering, fertilizing, uprooting weeds,
turning the soil, fumigating to eliminate plant pests24 and all other activities
designed to promote the growth and care of the plants or trees and
husbanding the earth, by general industry, so that it may bring forth more
products or fruits.25 In Taronav.CourtofAppeals,26 this Court ruled that a
tenant is not required to be physically present in the land at all hours of the
day and night provided that he lives close enough to the land to be
cultivated to make it physically possible for him to cultivate it with some
degree of constancy.
Nor was there any question that the parcels of agricultural land with a total
area of 7.9 hectares involved herein were susceptible of cultivation by a
single person with the help of the members of his immediate farm
household. As the Court has already observed, an agricultural land of an
area of four hectares,27 or even of an area as large as 17 hectares,28 could
be personally cultivated by a tenant by himself or with
help of the members of his farm household.It is elementary that he who

alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof.29 Hence,
His ability to farm the seven hectares of land despite his regular
employment as an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal Agriculture
Office32 was not physically
impossible for him to accomplish considering that his daughter, a member
of his immediate farm household, was cultivating one of the parcels of the
land.33 Indeed, the law did not prohibit him as the agricultural lessee who
generally worked the land himself or with the aid of member of his
immediate household from availing himself occasionally or temporarily of
the help of others in specific jobs.34 In short, the claim of the petitioners that
the employment of Jorge as an Agricultural Technician at the Municipal
Agriculture Office disqualified him as a tenant lacked factual or legal basis.
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 3844 provides that once there is an
agricultural tenancy, the agricultural tenants right to security of tenure is
recognized and protected. The landowner cannot eject the agricultural
tenant from the land unless authorized by the proper court for causes
provided by law. Section 36 of Republic Act No. 3844, as amended by
Republic Act No. 6389, enumerates the several grounds for the valid
dispossession of the tenant.35It is underscored, however, that none of such
grounds for valid dispossession of landholding was attendant in Jorges
case.
Although the CA has correctly categorized Jorges case as an agrarian
dispute, it ruled that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over the case based on
Section 50 of Republic Act No. 6657, which vested in the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) the primary jurisdiction to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters and the exclusive original jurisdiction
over all matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform except
disputes falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Department of
Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
We hold that the CA gravely erred. The rule is settled that the jurisdiction of
a court is determined by the statute in force at the time of the

commencement of an action.36 In 1980, upon the passage of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 129 (JudiciaryReorganizationAct), the Courts of Agrarian
Relations were integrated into the Regional Trial Courts and the jurisdiction
of the Courts of Agrarian Relations was vested in the Regional Trial
Courts.37 It was only on August 29, 1987, when Executive Order No. 229
took effect, that the general jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts to try
agrarian reform matters was transferred to the DAR. Therefore, the RTC
still had jurisdiction over the dispute at the time the complaint was filed in
the RTC on June 30, 1986.chanrobleslaw
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTSthe petition for review on certioraribyand
ORDERSthe petitioners to
pay the costs of suit.The parties are ordered to comply with their
undertakings as agricultural lessor and agricultural lessee. SOORDERED.