United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit

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474 F.

2d 933

FIRST AMERICAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY et al.,


Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
G. W. ELLWEIN, Commissioner, State Examiner and
Chairman of
the State Banking Board, Department of Banking and
Financial Institutions of the State of
North Dakota, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
No. 72-1596.

United States Court of Appeals,


Eighth Circuit.
Submitted Jan. 12, 1973.
Decided Feb. 27, 1973.

Frederick E. Saefke, Jr., Bismarck, N. D., for plaintiffs-appellants.


Frank F. Jestrab, Bjella & Jestrab, Williston, N. D., for defendantsappellees.
Before MATTHES, Chief Judge, BRIGHT, Circuit Judge, and TALBOT
SMITH, Senior District Judge.*
PER CURIAM.

First American Bank & Trust Co. (First American) instituted this action
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Secs. 4, 15, and 26 (antitrust laws) seeking injunctive and
other relief against the North Dakota State Banking Board to prevent the Board
from holding a hearing and making findings concerning appellant's solvency
and banking practices. First American alleged that the Board could not afford
the plaintiff a fair hearing because Board members are competitors of the
plaintiff and because they had made statements indicating prejudgment of the
case. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds that
this was an appropriate case for abstention. The court then granted a motion for

summary judgment for the defendant-Board and dismissed the action on the
merits, apparently on grounds that: (1) the Sherman Act did not provide for an
action against the state; (2) no jurisdictional basis had been stated for
consideration of plaintiff's claim of a denial of constitutional rights; (3) the
question was moot because the Board had already heard the matter; and (4) a
final judgment would conflict with the court's abstention on the question of
temporary injunctive relief. The court concluded:
I2 could leave it to the plaintiffs to amend their pleading to recite a proper
jurisdictional basis, and to enunciate a relevant prayer for relief, but it appears that
the business of the Court, and the best way to approach any further problems which
may develop is by dismissal of this action on its merits.
3

On this appeal First American urges that the district court should have
exercised jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343,
although plaintiff failed to rely on these statutes in its complaint. First
American argues that the complaint on its face alleges facts which make out a
violation of its right to due process of law.

As we construe the plaintiff's briefs, the precise question sought to be presented


and resolved on this appeal is whether or not the district court had jurisdiction
to hear the case on its merits. For reasons stated below, we believe the case in
its present posture presents an appropriate situation for abstention rather than
dismissal on the merits and thus direct that the judgment dismissing the action
on its merits be vacated.

The brief factual background, as related in the complaint and as stipulated to at


oral argument, discloses that the appellant engages in trust company business
under 1 N.D.Cent.Code Ch. 6-05. In a meeting held May 26, 1972, the State
Banking Board authorized the State Examiner to commence a proceeding
before the Board to determine the solvency of First American and to develop
other matters concerning First American's banking practices. With this
authorization, the State Examiner proceeded under the North Dakota
Administrative Agencies Practice Act, 5 N.D.Cent.Code Ch. 28-32.1

First American asserts that due to the alleged prejudice and prejudgment of the
Board, it has been denied the opportunity to present its case to a "fair and
unbiased" tribunal.2

At oral argument, the parties stipulated that as of December 11, 1972, the State
Banking Board had already heard the matter and had made a determination of

insolvency and ordered a receiver appointed. The parties also stipulated that the
Board's order had been stayed by the District Court of Burleigh County pending
resolution of an appeal to that court. As indicated by the stipulation, North
Dakota permits appeals from administrative agencies to the state courts of
general jurisdiction and then to the state supreme court.3
8

Assuming, arguendo, that the federal district court might have exercised
jurisdiction on grounds that the Board under the circumstances alleged was
incapable of affording appellant a fair hearing in conformity with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the circumstances presented to
the district court and to us on appeal demonstrate a classic case in which federal
courts should stay their hands under the doctrine of abstention. The matters
presented to the federal court are now in the state courts, and their
determination of the "fairness of the hearing" issue may well eliminate the need
for any consideration of constitutional issues by the federal judiciary.4

In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943),
the Supreme Court said:

10
Although
a federal equity court does have jurisdiction of a particular proceeding, it
may, in its sound discretion, whether its jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of
diversity of citizenship or otherwise, "refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, the
exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest"; for it "is in the public
interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with
proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out
their domestic policy." [Id. at 317-318, 63 S.Ct. at 1099 (footnotes omitted).]
11

This holding was reaffirmed in Alabama Public Service Commission v.


Southern Railway Co., 341 U.S. 341, 71 S.Ct. 762, 95 L.Ed. 1002 (1951):

12 adequate state court review of an administrative order based upon predominantly


As
local factors is available to appellee, intervention of a federal court is not necessary
for the protection of federal rights. Equitable relief may be granted only when the
District Court, in its sound discretion exercised with the "scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of state governments which should at all times actuate the
federal courts," is convinced that the asserted federal right cannot be preserved
except by granting the "extraordinary relief of an injunction in the federal courts."
Considering that "[f]ew public interests have a higher claim upon the discretion of a
federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless friction with state policies," the
usual rule of comity must govern the exercise of equitable jurisdiction by the District
Court in this case. Whatever rights appellee may have are to be pursued through the
state courts. Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, [63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424]

(1943); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570,
577, [61 S.Ct. 343, 346, 85 L.Ed. 358] (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, [60 S.Ct. 1021, 84 L.Ed. 1368], as
amended, 311 U.S. 614, 615, [61 S.Ct. 66, 85 L.Ed. 390] (1940). [Id. at 349-350, 71
S.Ct. at 768-769 (footnotes omitted).]
13

As already mentioned, the federal district court denied preliminary relief on


grounds of abstention but the final judgment in form dismissed the action on
the merits. It is obviously inappropriate to make a determination on the merits
while applying the abstention doctrine. Accordingly, while approving the
action of the district court, we remand this case to the district court for the
purpose of modifying the judgment to reflect abstention from action rather than
decision on the merits and to recite that "jurisdiction should not be exercised in
this case as a matter of sound equitable discretion." Alabama Public Service
Commission, supra, at 350, 71 S.Ct. at 769.

Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation

A dispute concerning the Examiner's authority and the application of the state's
statutes governing administrative procedure, has been previously litigated in the
state supreme court in an action related to the present controversy. First
American Bank & Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D.1972)

The complaint also seeks to declare 1 N.D.Cent.Code Sec. 6-01-03


unconstitutional. That section pertains to the composition of the State Banking
Board. Appellant did not request that a three-judge court be convened and does
not press the issue of the constitutionality of the statute before this court

5 N.D.Cent.Code Secs. 28-32-15 and 28-32-21

At oral argument the parties conceded that the question of the competency of
the Board and its right to proceed under the circumstances has been preserved
in the record of the administrative hearing and can be presented to the North
Dakota courts

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