United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit
2d 933
First American Bank & Trust Co. (First American) instituted this action
pursuant to 15 U.S.C. Secs. 4, 15, and 26 (antitrust laws) seeking injunctive and
other relief against the North Dakota State Banking Board to prevent the Board
from holding a hearing and making findings concerning appellant's solvency
and banking practices. First American alleged that the Board could not afford
the plaintiff a fair hearing because Board members are competitors of the
plaintiff and because they had made statements indicating prejudgment of the
case. The district court denied preliminary injunctive relief on the grounds that
this was an appropriate case for abstention. The court then granted a motion for
summary judgment for the defendant-Board and dismissed the action on the
merits, apparently on grounds that: (1) the Sherman Act did not provide for an
action against the state; (2) no jurisdictional basis had been stated for
consideration of plaintiff's claim of a denial of constitutional rights; (3) the
question was moot because the Board had already heard the matter; and (4) a
final judgment would conflict with the court's abstention on the question of
temporary injunctive relief. The court concluded:
I2 could leave it to the plaintiffs to amend their pleading to recite a proper
jurisdictional basis, and to enunciate a relevant prayer for relief, but it appears that
the business of the Court, and the best way to approach any further problems which
may develop is by dismissal of this action on its merits.
3
On this appeal First American urges that the district court should have
exercised jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. Sec. 1983 and 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1343,
although plaintiff failed to rely on these statutes in its complaint. First
American argues that the complaint on its face alleges facts which make out a
violation of its right to due process of law.
First American asserts that due to the alleged prejudice and prejudgment of the
Board, it has been denied the opportunity to present its case to a "fair and
unbiased" tribunal.2
At oral argument, the parties stipulated that as of December 11, 1972, the State
Banking Board had already heard the matter and had made a determination of
insolvency and ordered a receiver appointed. The parties also stipulated that the
Board's order had been stayed by the District Court of Burleigh County pending
resolution of an appeal to that court. As indicated by the stipulation, North
Dakota permits appeals from administrative agencies to the state courts of
general jurisdiction and then to the state supreme court.3
8
Assuming, arguendo, that the federal district court might have exercised
jurisdiction on grounds that the Board under the circumstances alleged was
incapable of affording appellant a fair hearing in conformity with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the circumstances presented to
the district court and to us on appeal demonstrate a classic case in which federal
courts should stay their hands under the doctrine of abstention. The matters
presented to the federal court are now in the state courts, and their
determination of the "fairness of the hearing" issue may well eliminate the need
for any consideration of constitutional issues by the federal judiciary.4
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 63 S.Ct. 1098, 87 L.Ed. 1424 (1943),
the Supreme Court said:
10
Although
a federal equity court does have jurisdiction of a particular proceeding, it
may, in its sound discretion, whether its jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of
diversity of citizenship or otherwise, "refuse to enforce or protect legal rights, the
exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest"; for it "is in the public
interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with
proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out
their domestic policy." [Id. at 317-318, 63 S.Ct. at 1099 (footnotes omitted).]
11
(1943); Railroad Commission of Texas v. Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 311 U.S. 570,
577, [61 S.Ct. 343, 346, 85 L.Ed. 358] (1941); Railroad Commission of Texas v.
Rowan & Nichols Oil Co., 310 U.S. 573, [60 S.Ct. 1021, 84 L.Ed. 1368], as
amended, 311 U.S. 614, 615, [61 S.Ct. 66, 85 L.Ed. 390] (1940). [Id. at 349-350, 71
S.Ct. at 768-769 (footnotes omitted).]
13
A dispute concerning the Examiner's authority and the application of the state's
statutes governing administrative procedure, has been previously litigated in the
state supreme court in an action related to the present controversy. First
American Bank & Trust Company v. Ellwein, 198 N.W.2d 84 (N.D.1972)
At oral argument the parties conceded that the question of the competency of
the Board and its right to proceed under the circumstances has been preserved
in the record of the administrative hearing and can be presented to the North
Dakota courts