Government Role in Ending The Great Recession

How the Great Recession
Was Brought to an End

JULY 27, 2010
Prepared By
Alan S. Blinder
Gordon S. Rentschler Memorial Professor of Economics, Princeton University
609.258.3358
[email protected]
Mark Zandi
Chief Economist, Moody’s Analytics
610.235.5151
[email protected]
How the Great Recession Was Brought to an End
BY ALAN S. BLINDER AND MARK ZANDI1
T
he U.S. government’s response to the financial crisis and ensuing Great Recession included some
of the most aggressive fiscal and monetary policies in history. The response was multifaceted and
bipartisan, involving the Federal Reserve, Congress, and two administrations. Yet almost every one
of these policy initiatives remain controversial to this day, with critics calling them misguided, ineffective
or both. The debate over these policies is crucial because, with the economy still weak, more government
support may be needed, as seen recently in both the extension of unemployment benefits and the Fed’s
consideration of further easing.
In this paper, we use the Moody’s Analytics model of the U.S. economy—adjusted to accommodate some
recent financial-market policies—to simulate the macroeconomic effects of the government’s total policy
response. We find that its effects on real GDP, jobs, and inflation are huge, and probably averted what could
have been called Great Depression 2.0. For example, we estimate that, without the government’s response,
GDP in 2010 would be about 11.5% lower, payroll employment would be less by some 8½ million jobs, and
the nation would now be experiencing deflation.
When we divide these effects into two components—one attributable to the fiscal stimulus and the other at-
tributable to financial-market policies such as the TARP, the bank stress tests and the Fed’s quantitative eas-
ing—we estimate that the latter was substantially more powerful than the former. Nonetheless, the effects
of the fiscal stimulus alone appear very substantial, raising 2010 real GDP by about 3.4%, holding the unem-
ployment rate about 1½ percentage points lower, and adding almost 2.7 million jobs to U.S. payrolls. These
estimates of the fiscal impact are broadly consistent with those made by the CBO and the Obama administra-
tion.2 To our knowledge, however, our comprehensive estimates of the effects of the financial-market policies
are the first of their kind.3 We welcome other efforts to estimate these effects.
HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 1

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END
The U.S. economy has made enormous ity to financial institutions and markets.4 The use of TARP funds to mitigate foreclosures.
progress since the dark days of early 2009. Fed aggressively lowered interest rates during While the housing market remains troubled,
Eighteen months ago, the global financial 2008, adopting a zero-interest-rate policy by its steepest declines are in the past.
system was on the brink of collapse and the year’s end. It engaged in massive quantitative The near collapse of the domestic auto
U.S. was suffering its worst economic down- easing in 2009 and early 2010, purchasing industry in late 2008 also threatened to
turn since the 1930s. Real GDP was falling Treasury bonds and Fannie Mae and Freddie exacerbate the recession. GM and Chrysler
at about a 6% annual rate, and monthly job Mac mortgage-backed securities (MBS) to eventually went through bankruptcies, but
losses averaged close to 750,000. Today, bring down long-term interest rates. TARP funds were used to make the process
the financial system is operating much more The FDIC also worked to stem the finan- relatively orderly. GM is already on its way
normally, real GDP is advancing at a nearly cial turmoil by increasing deposit insurance to being a publicly traded company again.
3% pace, and job growth has resumed, albeit limits and guaranteeing bank debt. Congress Without financial help from the federal
at an insufficient pace. established the Troubled Asset Relief Pro- government, all three domestic vehicle pro-
From the perspective of early 2009, this gram (TARP) in October 2008, part of which ducers and many of their suppliers might
rapid snap back was a surprise. Maybe the was used by the Treasury to inject much- have had to liquidate many operations, with
country and the world were just lucky. But we needed capital into the nation’s banks. The devastating effects on the broader economy,
take another view: The Great Recession gave Treasury and Federal Reserve ordered the 19 and especially on the Midwest.
way to recovery as quickly as it did largely largest bank holding companies to conduct Although the economic pain was severe
because of the unprecedented responses by comprehensive stress tests in the spring of and the budgetary costs were great, this
monetary and fiscal policymakers. 2009, to determine if they had sufficient sounds like a success story.6 Yet nearly all
A stunning range of initiatives was un- capital to withstand further adverse circum- aspects of the government’s response have
dertaken by the Federal Reserve, the Bush stances—and to raise more capital if neces- been subjected to intense criticism. The Fed-
and Obama administrations, and Congress sary. Once the results were made public, the eral Reserve has been accused of overstepping
(see Table 1). While the effectiveness of any stress tests and subsequent capital raising its mandate by conducting fiscal as well as
individual element certainly can be debated, restored confidence in the banking system. monetary policy. Critics have attacked efforts
there is little doubt that in total, the policy The effort to end the recession and to stem the decline in house prices as inap-
response was highly effective. If policymak- jump-start the recovery was built around a propriate; claimed that foreclosure mitigation
ers had not reacted as aggressively or as series of fiscal stimulus measures. Tax rebate efforts were ineffective; and argued that the
quickly as they did, the financial system checks were mailed to lower- and middle- auto bailout was both unnecessary and unfair.
might still be unsettled, the economy might income households in the spring of 2008; Particularly heavy criticism has been aimed at
still be shrinking, and the costs to U.S. tax- the American Restoration and Recovery Act the TARP and the Recovery Act, both of which
payers would have been vastly greater. (ARRA) was passed in early 2009; and sev- have become deeply unpopular.
Broadly speaking, the government set eral smaller stimulus measures became law The Troubled Asset Relief Program was
out to accomplish two goals: to stabilize in late 2009 and early 2010.5 In all, close to controversial from its inception. Both the
the sickly financial system and to mitigate $1 trillion, roughly 7 percent of GDP, will be program’s $700 billion headline price tag and
the burgeoning recession, ultimately re- spent on fiscal stimulus. The stimulus has its goal of “bailing out” financial institutions—
starting economic growth. The first task done what it was supposed to do: end the including some of the same institutions that
was made necessary by the financial crisis, Great Recession and spur recovery. We do triggered the panic in the first place—were
which struck in the summer of 2007 and not believe it a coincidence that the turn- hard for citizens and legislators to swallow. To
spiraled into a financial panic in the fall of around from recession to recovery occurred this day, many believe the TARP was a costly
2008. After the Lehman Brothers bank- last summer, just as the ARRA was providing failure. In fact, TARP has been a substantial
ruptcy, liquidity evaporated, credit spreads its maximum economic benefit. success, helping to restore stability to the
ballooned, stock prices fell sharply, and a Stemming the slide also involved rescuing financial system and to end the freefall in
string of major financial institutions failed. the nation’s housing and auto industries. The housing and auto markets. Its ultimate cost to
The second task was made necessary by the housing bubble and bust were the proximate taxpayers will be a small fraction of the head-
devastating effects of the financial crisis on causes of the financial crisis, setting off a vi- line $700 billion figure: A number below $100
the real economy, which began to contract cious cycle of falling house prices and surging billion seems more likely to us, with the bank
at an alarming rate after Lehman. foreclosures. Policymakers appear to have bailout component probably turning a profit.
The Federal Reserve took a number of ex- broken this cycle with an array of efforts, in- Criticism of the ARRA has also been stri-
traordinary steps to quell the financial panic. cluding the Fed’s actions to bring down mort- dent, focusing on the high price tag, the slow
In late 2007, it established the first of what gage rates, an increase in conforming loan speed of delivery, and the fact that the un-
would eventually become an alphabet soup of limits, a dramatic expansion of FHA lending, a employment rate rose much higher than the
new credit facilities designed to provide liquid- series of tax credits for homebuyers, and the Administration predicted in January 2009.

TABLE 1
Federal Government Response to the Financial Crisis
$ bil Originally Committed Currently Provided Ultimate Cost
Total 11,937 3,513 1,590
Federal Reserve
Term auction credit 900 0 0
Other loans Unlimited 68 3
Primary credit Unlimited 0 0
Secondary credit Unlimited 0 0
Seasonal credit Unlimited 0 0
Primary Dealer Credit Facility (expired 2/1/2010) Unlimited 0 0
Asset-Backed Commercial Paper Money Market Mutual Fund Unlimited 0 0
AIG 26 25 2
AIG (for SPVs) 9 0 0
AIG (for ALICO, AIA) 26 0 1
Rescue of Bear Stearns (Maiden Lane)** 27 28 4
AIG-RMBS purchase program (Maiden Lane II)** 23 16 1
AIG-CDO purchase program (Maiden Lane III)** 30 23 4
Term Securities Lending Facility (expired 2/1/2010) 200 0 0
Commercial Paper Funding Facility** (expired 2/1/2010) 1,800 0 0
TALF 1,000 43 0
Money Market Investor Funding Facility (expired 10/30/2009) 540 0 0
Currency swap lines (expired 2/1/2010) Unlimited 0 0
Purchase of GSE debt and MBS (expired 3/31/2010) 1,425 1,295 0
Guarantee of Citigroup assets (terminated 12/23/2009) 286 0 0
Guarantee of Bank of America assets (terminated) 108 0 0
Purchase of long-term Treasuries 300 300 0
Treasury
Fed supplementary financing account 560 200 0
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac Unlimited 145 305
FDIC
Guarantee of U.S. banks’ debt* 1,400 305 4
Guarantee of Citigroup debt 10 0
Guarantee of Bank of America debt 3 0
Transaction deposit accounts 500 0 0
Public-Private Investment Fund Guarantee 1,000 0 0
Bank Resolutions Unlimited 23 71
Federal Housing Administration
Refinancing of mortgages, Hope for Homeowners 100 0 0
Expanded Mortgage Lending Unlimited 150 26
Congress
TARP (see detail in Table 9) 600 277 101
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 170 170 170
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009*** 784 391 784
Cash for Clunkers 3 3 3
Additional Emergency UI benefits 90 39 90
Other Stimulus 21 12 21
NOTES: *Includes foreign denominated debt; **Net portfolio holdings; *** Excludes AMT patch

While we would not defend every aspect The differences between Scenario 1 and how much of the decline in credit spreads to
of the stimulus, we believe this criticism is Scenario 4 provide the answers we seek attribute to the policies, and here we tried
largely misplaced, for these reasons: about the impacts of the panoply of anti- several different assumptions.9 All of this is
The unusually large size of the fiscal recession policies. Scenarios 2 and 3 enable discussed in Appendix B.
stimulus (equal to about 7% of GDP) is con- us to decompose the overall impact into
sistent with the extraordinarily severe down- the components stemming from the fiscal The results
turn and the limited ability to use monetary stimulus and financial initiatives. All simula- Under the baseline scenario, which in-
policy once interest rates neared zero. tions begin in the first quarter of 2008 with cludes all the financial and fiscal policies, and
Regarding speed, almost $500 billion the start of the Great Recession, and end in is the most likely outlook for the economy,
has been spent to date (see Table 2). What the fourth quarter of 2012. the recovery that began a year ago is expect-
matters for economic growth is the pace of Estimating the economic impact of the ed to remain intact. The economy struggles
stimulus spending, which surged from noth- policies is not an accounting exercise, but an during the second half of this year, as the
ing at the start of 2009 to over $100 billion econometric one. It is not feasible to identify sources of growth that powered the first
(over $400 billion at an annual rate) in the and count each job created or saved by these year of recovery—including the stimulus and
second quarter. That is a big change in a policies. Rather, outcomes for employment a powerful inventory swing—begin to fade.
short period, and it is one major reason why and other activity must be estimated using Fallout from the European debt crisis also
the Great Recession ended and recovery be- a statistical representation of the economy weighs on the U.S. economy. But by this time
gan last summer.7 based on historical relationships, such as the next year, the economy gains traction as
Critics who argue that the ARRA failed Moody’s Analytics model. This model is regu- businesses respond to better profitability and
because it did not keep unemployment below larly used for forecasting, scenario analysis, stronger balance sheets by investing and hir-
8% ignore the facts that (a) unemployment and quantifying the impacts of a wide range ing more. In the baseline scenario, real GDP,
was already above 8% when the ARRA was of policies on the economy. The Congres- which declined 2.4% in 2009, expands 2.9%
passed and (b) most private forecasters (in- sional Budget Office and the Obama Admin- in 2010 and 3.6% in 2011, with monthly job
cluding Moody’s Analytics) misjudged how se- istration have derived their impact estimates growth averaging near 100,000 in 2010 and
rious the downturn would be. If anything, this for policies such as the fiscal stimulus using a above 200,000 in 2011. Unemployment is
forecasting error suggests the stimulus pack- similar approach. still close to 10% at the end of 2010, but
age should have been even larger than it was. The modeling techniques for simulat- closer to 9% by the end of 2011. The federal
This study attempts to quantify the contri- ing the fiscal policies were straightforward, budget deficit is $1.4 trillion in the current
butions of the TARP, the stimulus, and other and have been used by countless modelers 2010 fiscal year, equal to approximately 10%
government initiatives to ending the financial over the years. While the scale of the fiscal of GDP. It falls only slowly, to $1.15 trillion in
panic and the Great Recession. In sum, we find stimulus was massive, most of the instru- FY 2011 and to $900 billion in FY 2012.
they were highly effective. Without such a de- ments themselves (tax cuts, spending) were In the scenario that excludes all the
termined and aggressive response by policy- conventional, so not much innovation was extraordinary policies, the downturn con-
makers, the economy would likely have fallen required on our part. A few details are pro- tinues into 2011. Real GDP falls a stunning
into a much deeper slump. vided in Appendix B. 7.4% in 2009 and another 3.7% in 2010
But modeling the vast array of financial (see Table 3). The peak-to-trough decline in
Quantifying the economic impact policies, most of which were unprecedented GDP is therefore close to 12%, compared to
To quantify the economic impacts of and unconventional, required some creativity, an actual decline of about 4%. By the time
the fiscal stimulus and the financial-market and forced us to make some major simplify- employment hits bottom, some 16.6 million
policies such as the TARP and the Fed’s quan- ing assumptions. Our basic approach was to jobs are lost in this scenario—about twice as
titative easing, we simulated the Moody’s treat the financial policies as ways to reduce many as actually were lost. The unemploy-
Analytics’ model of the U.S. economy under credit spreads, particularly the three credit ment rate peaks at 16.5%, and although
four scenarios: spreads that play key roles in the Moody’s not determined in this analysis, it would not
1. a baseline that includes all the policies Analytics model: The so-called TED spread be surprising if the underemployment rate
actually pursued between three-month Libor and three-month approached one-fourth of the labor force.
2. a counterfactual scenario with the fis- Treasury bills; the spread between fixed mort- The federal budget deficit surges to over $2
cal stimulus but without the financial gage rates and 10-year Treasury bonds; and trillion in fiscal year 2010, $2.6 trillion in fis-
policies the “junk bond” (below investment grade) cal year 2011, and $2.25 trillion in FY 2012.
3. a counterfactual with the financial spread over Treasury bonds. All three of these Remember, this is with no policy response.
policies but without fiscal stimulus spreads rose alarmingly during the crisis, but With outright deflation in prices and wages
4. a scenario that excludes all the policy came tumbling down once the financial med- in 2009-2011, this dark scenario constitutes
responses.8 icine was applied. The key question for us was a 1930s-like depression.

TABLE 2
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act Spendout
$ bil, Historical data through June 2010
Currently 2009
Provided Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2
Total 472 0.0 3.4 9.7 20.3 36.6 45.8 24.6 26.9 52.2 30.1 30.4 28.9 13.1 102.8 103.7 89.4 80.8 82.4
Infrastructure and
56 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.5 3.7 1.7 3.2 4.3 3.8 3.9 4.7 0.0 5.2 9.2 12.4 14.1 15.1
Other Spending
Traditional
14 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.8 1.2 0.7 1.8 1.5 1.4 0.0 0.4 2.6 4.6 2.9 3.4
Infrastructure
Nontraditional
42 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1.3 3.5 0.9 2.1 3.5 2.1 2.4 3.3 0.0 4.8 6.5 7.8 11.2 11.6
Infrastructure
Transfers to
state and local 119 0.0 3.4 6.6 5.8 9.4 8.4 8.2 8.0 8.4 8.2 8.0 7.7 10.0 23.5 24.6 23.9 17.2 20.2
governments
Medicaid 69 0.0 3.4 6.6 5.4 4.8 4.7 4.5 4.3 4.3 4.1 4.3 4.1 10.0 14.9 13.1 12.6 9.0 9.3
Education 51 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 4.6 3.7 3.7 3.7 4.1 4.1 3.7 3.6 0.0 8.7 11.5 11.4 8.2 10.9
Transfers to persons 109 0.0 0.0 0.8 6.1 17.5 7.6 6.1 6.4 6.4 6.4 6.7 6.7 0.8 31.2 18.9 19.8 19.4 18.8
Social Security 13 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.6 1.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 13.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
Unemployment
66 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.1 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.8 4.8 0.0 12.2 13.1 14.1 13.6 13.0
Assistance
Food stamps 10 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9
Cobra Payments 20 0.0 0.0 0.8 1.4 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 0.8 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.9 3.9
Tax cuts 188 0.0 0.0 2.3 8.5 8.3 26.1 8.6 9.3 33.2 11.7 11.9 9.7 2.3 42.8 51.1 33.2 30.2 28.4
Businesses
and other tax 40 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 0.0 0.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 18.0 22.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
incentives
Individuals
ex increase in 148 0.0 0.0 2.3 8.5 8.3 8.1 8.6 9.3 11.2 11.7 11.9 9.7 2.3 24.8 29.1 33.2 30.2 28.4
AMT exemption
Sources: Treasury, Joint Committee on Taxation, Recovery.gov, Moody’s Analytics

TABLE 3 No Policy Response Baseline (with actual policy response)

Simulation of No Policy Response
08q1 08q2 08q3 08q4 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 10Q3 10Q4 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real GDP
13,367 13,365 13,251 13,003 12,609 12,324 12,132 12,014 11,903 11,831 11,771 11,760 13,246 12,270 11,816 12,008 12,620
(Bil. 05$, SAAR)
annualized % change -0.7 -0.1 -3.4 -7.3 -11.6 -8.7 -6.1 -3.8 -3.6 -2.4 -2.0 -0.3 -0.1 -7.4 -3.7 1.6 5.1
Real GDP
13,367 13,415 13,325 13,142 12,925 12,902 12,973 13,150 13,239 13,335 13,400 13,490 13,312 12,987 13,366 13,852 14,552
(Bil. 05$, SAAR)
annualized % change -0.7 1.5 -2.7 -5.4 -6.4 -0.7 2.2 5.6 2.7 2.9 2.0 2.7 0.4 -2.4 2.9 3.6 5.1
Payroll Employment
137.9 137.5 136.6 134.6 131.6 128.4 125.9 124.0 122.8 122.3 121.5 121.3 136.7 127.5 122.0 122.4 125.9
(Mil., SA)
annualized % change 0.1 -1.3 -2.4 -5.7 -8.8 -9.3 -7.7 -6.0 -3.8 -1.5 -2.8 -0.4 -0.7 -6.7 -4.3 0.3 2.9
Payroll Employment
137.9 137.5 136.7 135.0 132.8 131.1 130.1 129.6 129.7 130.4 130.5 130.8 136.8 130.9 130.4 132.2 136.0
(Mil., SA)
annualized % change 0.1 -1.2 -2.3 -4.8 -6.4 -5.0 -3.1 -1.3 0.2 2.1 0.4 1.0 -0.6 -4.3 -0.4 1.4 2.9
Unemployment
5.0 5.3 6.1 7.1 8.7 10.6 12.1 13.5 14.0 15.0 15.7 16.2 5.9 11.2 15.2 16.3 15.0
Rate (%)
Unemployment
5.0 5.3 6.0 7.0 8.2 9.3 9.6 10.0 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.9 5.8 9.3 9.8 9.8 8.3
Rate (%)
CPI (Index,
212.8 215.6 218.9 213.6 212.2 212.7 211.4 209.4 208.1 207.2 205.6 204.8 215.2 211.4 206.4 204.4 208.7
1982-84=100, SA)
annualized % change 4.7 5.2 6.3 -9.3 -2.6 1.1 -2.5 -3.7 -2.5 -1.6 -3.0 -1.6 3.8 -1.8 -2.4 -1.0 2.1
CPI (Index,
212.8 215.6 218.9 213.7 212.5 213.5 215.4 216.8 217.6 218.1 218.6 219.4 215.2 214.5 218.4 222.7 229.6
1982-84=100, SA)
annualized % change 4.7 5.3 6.4 -9.2 -2.2 1.9 3.7 2.6 1.5 0.8 1.0 1.4 3.8 -0.3 1.8 2.0 3.1
Sources: BEA, BLS, Moody’s Analytics
TABLE 4
Baseline vs. No Policy Response Scenario
Difference 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real GDP (Bil. 05$, SAAR) 66 718 1,549 1,843 1,933
percentage points 0.50 4.93 6.61 2.01 -0.03
Payroll Employment (Mil., SA) 0.12 3.45 8.40 9.82 10.03
Unemployment Rate (%) -0.05 -1.96 -5.46 -6.55 -6.74
CPI (percentage points) 0.02 1.44 4.17 2.94 1.00

The differences between the baseline 2009 and increases only 1% in 2010 (see Ta- The total direct costs, including the TARP,
scenario and the scenario with no policy re- ble 7). The peak-to-trough decline in employ- the fiscal stimulus, and other efforts, such as
sponses are summarized in Table 4. These dif- ment is more than 10 million. The economy addressing the mortgage-related losses at
ferences represent our estimates of the com- finally gains some traction by early 2011, but Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, are expected
bined effects of the full range of policies—and by then unemployment is peaking at nearly to reach almost $1.6 trillion. Adding in nearly
they are huge. By 2011, real GDP is $1.8 trillion 12%. The federal budget deficit reaches $750 billion in lost revenue from the weaker
(15%) higher because of the policies; there are $1.6 trillion in fiscal year 2010, $1.3 trillion in economy, the total budgetary cost of the
almost 10 million more jobs, and the unem- FY 2011, and $1 trillion in FY 2012. These re- crisis is projected to top $2.35 trillion, about
ployment rate is about 6½ percentage points sults are broadly consistent with those of the 16% of GDP. For historical comparison, the
lower. The inflation rate is about 3 percentage Congressional Budget Office in its analysis of savings-and-loan crisis of the early 1990s
points higher (roughly 2% instead of -1%). the economic impact of the ARRA.10 cost some $350 billion in today’s dollars:
That’s what averting a depression means. The differences between the baseline and $275 billion in direct costs plus $75 billion
But how much of this gigantic effect was the scenario based on no fiscal stimulus are due to the associated recession. This sum
due to the government’s efforts to stabilize summarized in Table 8. These differences rep- was equal to almost 6% of GDP at that time.
the financial system and how much was due resent our estimates of the sizable effects of It is understandable that the still-fragile
to the fiscal stimulus? The other two scenari- all the fiscal stimulus efforts. Because of the economy and the massive budget deficits
os are designed to answer those questions. fiscal stimulus, real GDP is about $460 billion have fueled criticism of the government’s
The financial policy responses were es- (more than 6%) higher by 2010, when the im- response. No one can know for sure what the
pecially important. In the scenario without pacts are at their maximum; there are 2.7 mil- world would look like today if policymakers
them, but including the fiscal stimulus, the lion more jobs; and the unemployment rate is had not acted as they did—our estimates are
recession would only now be winding down, almost 1.5 percentage points lower. just that, estimates. It is also not difficult to
a full year after the downturn’s actual end. Notice that the combined effects of the find fault with isolated aspects of the policy
Real GDP declines by 5% in 2009, and it financial and fiscal policies (Table 4) exceed response. Were the bank and auto industry
grows only a bit in 2010, with a peak-to- the sum of the financial-policy effects bailouts really necessary? Do extra UI ben-
trough decline of about 6% (see Table 5). (Table 6) and the fiscal-policy effects efits encourage the unemployed not to seek
Some 12 million payroll jobs are lost peak- (Table 8) in isolation. This is because the work? Should not bloated state and local
to-trough in this scenario, and the unem- policies tend to reinforce each other. To il- governments be forced to cut wasteful bud-
ployment rate peaks at 13%. There is also a lustrate this dynamic, consider the impact gets? Was the housing tax credit a giveaway
lengthy period of modest deflation in this of providing housing tax credits, which were to buyers who would have bought homes
scenario. The federal deficit is $1.75 trillion part of the stimulus. The credits boost hous- anyway? Are the foreclosure mitigation ef-
in fiscal year 2010, and remains a discon- ing demand. House prices are thus higher, forts the best that could have been done?
certingly high $1.5 trillion in fiscal year 2011 foreclosures decrease, and the financial The questions go on and on.
and $1.1 trillion in FY 2012. system suffers smaller losses. These smaller While all of these questions deserve care-
The differences between the baseline and losses, in turn, enhance the effectiveness ful consideration, it is clear that laissez faire
the scenario based on no financial policy re- of the financial-market policy efforts. Such was not an option; policymakers had to act.
sponses are summarized in Table 6. They rep- positive interactions between financial and Not responding would have left both the
resent our estimates of the combined effects fiscal policies play out in numerous other economy and the government’s fiscal situ-
of the various policy efforts to stabilize the ways as well. ation in far graver condition. We conclude
financial system—and they are very large. By that Ben Bernanke was probably right when
2011, real GDP is almost $800 billion (6%) Conclusions he said that “We came very close in October
higher because of the policies, and the unem- The financial panic and Great Recession [2008] to Depression 2.0.”11
ployment rate is almost 3 percentage points were massive blows to the U.S. economy. While the TARP has not been a universal
lower. By the second quarter of 2011—when Employment is still some 8 million below success, it has been instrumental in stabiliz-
the difference between the baseline and this where it was at its pre-recession peak, and ing the financial system and ending the re-
scenario is at its largest—the financial-rescue the unemployment rate remains above 9%. cession. The Capital Purchase Program gave
policies are credited with saving almost The hit to the nation’s fiscal health has been many financial institutions a lifeline when
5 million jobs. equally disconcerting, with budget deficits there was no other. Without the CPP’s eq-
In the scenario that includes all the finan- in fiscal years 2009 and 2010 of close to uity infusions, the entire system might have
cial policies but none of the fiscal stimulus, $1.4 trillion. come to a grinding halt. TARP also helped
the recession ends in the fourth quarter of These unprecedented deficits reflect shore up asset prices, and protected the
2009 and expands very slowly through sum- both the recession itself and the costs of the system by backstopping Fed and Treasury
mer 2010. Real GDP declines almost 4% in government’s multi-faceted response to it. efforts to keep large financial institutions


Simulation of No Financial Policy Response
08q1 08q2 08q3 08q4 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 10Q3 10Q4 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real GDP
13,367 13,415 13,325 13,073 12,733 12,592 12,565 12,637 12,634 12,647 12,658 12,724 13,295 12,632 12,665 13,065 13,774
(Bil. 05$, SAAR)
annualized % change -0.7 1.5 -2.7 -7.4 -10.0 -4.3 -0.9 2.3 -0.1 0.4 0.4 2.1 0.3 -5.0 0.3 3.2 5.4
Real GDP
13,367 13,415 13,325 13,142 12,925 12,902 12,973 13,150 13,239 13,335 13,400 13,490 13,312 12,987 13,366 13,852 14,552
(Bil. 05$, SAAR)
Payroll Employment
137.9 137.5 136.7 134.8 131.9 129.4 127.5 126.4 125.8 125.9 125.8 126.1 136.7 128.8 125.9 127.4 131.3
(Mil., SA)
annualized % change 0.1 -1.2 -2.3 -5.5 -8.2 -7.4 -5.9 -3.5 -1.7 0.4 -0.5 0.9 -0.6 -5.8 -2.2 1.2 3.1
Payroll Employment
137.9 137.5 136.7 135.0 132.8 131.1 130.1 129.6 129.7 130.4 130.5 130.8 136.8 130.9 130.4 132.2 136.0
(Mil., SA)
Unemployment
5.0 5.3 6.0 7.1 8.4 9.9 10.9 11.9 11.9 12.5 12.6 12.8 5.8 10.3 12.5 12.7 11.1
Rate (%)
Unemployment
5.0 5.3 6.0 7.0 8.2 9.3 9.6 10.0 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.9 5.8 9.3 9.8 9.8 8.3
Rate (%)
CPI (Index,
212.8 215.6 218.9 213.6 212.3 213.1 213.5 213.3 212.9 212.5 211.9 211.8 215.2 213.1 212.3 212.9 218.0
1982-84=100, SA)
annualized % change 4.7 5.3 6.4 -9.3 -2.5 1.4 0.9 -0.4 -0.7 -0.8 -1.2 -0.2 3.8 -1.0 -0.4 0.3 2.4
CPI (Index,
212.8 215.6 218.9 213.7 212.5 213.5 215.4 216.8 217.6 218.1 218.6 219.4 215.2 214.5 218.4 222.7 229.6
1982-84=100, SA)
TABLE 6
Baseline Scenario vs. No Financial Policy Scenario
Difference 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real GDP (Bil. 05$, SAAR) 17 356 700 787 778
percentage points 0.13 2.55 2.65 0.48 -0.37


Simulation of No Fiscal Stimulus
08q1 08q2 08q3 08q4 09Q1 09Q2 09Q3 09Q4 10Q1 10Q2 10Q3 10Q4 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real GDP
13,367 13,365 13,251 13,098 12,875 12,759 12,719 12,761 12,802 12,873 12,931 13,026 13,270 12,779 12,908 13,474 14,216
(Bil. 05$, SAAR)
annualized % change -0.7 -0.1 -3.4 -4.5 -6.6 -3.6 -1.2 1.3 1.3 2.3 1.8 3.0 0.1 -3.7 1.0 4.4 5.5
Real GDP
13,367 13,415 13,325 13,142 12,925 12,902 12,973 13,150 13,239 13,335 13,400 13,490 13,312 12,987 13,366 13,852 14,552
(Bil. 05$, SAAR)
Payroll Employment
137.9 137.5 136.6 135.0 132.8 130.6 129.2 128.0 127.5 127.8 127.6 127.9 136.7 130.1 127.7 129.6 133.9
(Mil., SA)
annualized % change 0.1 -1.3 -2.4 -4.8 -6.4 -6.3 -4.3 -3.5 -1.6 1.0 -0.5 0.7 -0.6 -4.8 -1.9 1.5 3.3
Payroll Employment
137.9 137.5 136.7 135.0 132.8 131.1 130.1 129.6 129.7 130.4 130.5 130.8 136.8 130.9 130.4 132.2 136.0
(Mil., SA)
Unemployment
5.0 5.3 6.1 7.0 8.2 9.5 10.2 10.8 10.8 11.0 11.2 11.6 5.8 9.7 11.2 11.4 9.5
Rate (%)
Unemployment
5.0 5.3 6.0 7.0 8.2 9.3 9.6 10.0 9.7 9.7 9.8 9.9 5.8 9.3 9.8 9.8 8.3
Rate (%)
CPI (Index, 1982-

212.8 215.6 218.9 213.7 212.4 213.2 214.0 214.2 214.3 214.4 214.3 214.6 215.2 213.4 214.4 216.8 223.0
84=100, SA)
annualized % change 4.7 5.2 6.3 -9.2 -2.3 1.6 1.4 0.4 0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.5 3.8 -0.8 0.5 1.1 2.9
CPI (Index, 1982-

212.8 215.6 218.9 213.7 212.5 213.5 215.4 216.8 217.6 218.1 218.6 219.4 215.2 214.5 218.4 222.7 229.6
84=100, SA)
TABLE 8
Baseline Scenario vs. No Fiscal Stimulus Scenario
Difference 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Real GDP (Bil. 05$, SAAR) 42 209 458 378 336
percentage points 0.32 1.26 1.90 -0.75 -0.45

functioning. TARP money was also vital to payments and tax cuts put cash into house- at least this time next year. And business
ensuring an orderly restructuring of the holds’ pockets that they have largely spent, tax cuts have contributed to increased in-
auto industry at a time when its unraveling supporting output and employment. With- vestment and hiring.
would have been a serious economic blow. out help from the federal government, state When all is said and done, the financial
TARP funds were not used as effectively in and local governments would have slashed and fiscal policies will have cost taxpayers a
mitigating foreclosures, but policymakers payrolls and programs and raised taxes at substantial sum, but not nearly as much as
should not stop trying. just the wrong time. (Even with the stimu- most had feared and not nearly as much as
The fiscal stimulus also fell short in some lus, state and local governments have been if policymakers had not acted at all. If the
respects, but without it the economy might cutting and will cut more.) Infrastructure comprehensive policy responses saved the
still be in recession. Increased unemploy- spending is now kicking into high gear and economy from another depression, as we es-
ment insurance benefits and other transfer will be a significant source of jobs through timate, they were well worth their cost.

Appendix A: Some Details on the Financial and Fiscal Policies

Troubled Asset Relief Program major U.S. financial institution was contem- The largest use of the TARP funds has
The Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) plating the consequences of failure. There been to recapitalize the banking system via
was established on October 3, 2008 in re- were silent deposit runs on many money mar- the Capital Purchase Program. At its con-
sponse to the mounting financial panic. As ket funds, and the commercial paper market ception, the CPP was expected to amount
originally conceived, the $700 billion fund shut down, threatening the ability of major to $250 billion. Instead, its peak in early
was to buy “troubled assets” from struggling nonfinancial businesses to operate. Global 2009 was actually about $205 billion, and
financial institutions in order to re-establish financial markets were in disarray. as financial conditions have improved, many
their financial viability. But because of the Poor policymaking prior to the TARP of the nation’s largest banks have repaid the
rapid unraveling of the financial system, the helped turn a serious but seemingly controlla- funds. There is only $67 billion outstanding
funds were used for direct equity infusions ble financial crisis into an out-of-control panic. in the CPP. Banks also paid an appropriately
into these institutions instead and ultimately Policymakers’ uneven treatment of troubled high price for their TARP funds in the forms
for a variety of other purposes. institutions (for example, saving Bear Stearns of restrictions on dividends and executive
Some elements of the TARP clearly have but letting Lehman fail) created confusion compensation, and additional regulatory
been more successful than others. Perhaps about the rules of the game and uncertainty oversight. These costs made banks want
the most effective was the Capital Purchase among shareholders, who dumped their stock, to repay TARP as quickly as possible. Since
Program—the use of TARP funds to shore and creditors, who demanded more collateral nearly all CPP funds are expected to be
up banks’ capital. It seems unlikely that the to provide liquidity to financial institutions. repaid eventually with interest, with ad-
system would have stabilized without it or The TARP was the first large-scale at- ditional proceeds from warrant sales, the
something similar. A small amount of TARP tempt by policymakers to restore stability to CPP almost certainly will earn a meaningful
money was eventually used to facilitate the the system. In late September 2008, the U.S. profit for taxpayers.
purchase of troubled assets through the Fed’s Treasury and Federal Reserve asked Congress Approximately $200 billion in TARP
TALF program and Treasury’s PPIP program. to establish a $700 billion fund, primarily to funds were committed to support the finan-
The volume of transactions was small, but purchase the poorly performing mortgage cial system in other ways. Some $115 billion
the TALF appears to have improved the pric- loans and related securities that threatened went to three distressed and systemically
ing of these assets, thus reducing pressure on the system. Responding to a variety of important financial institutions: AIG, Bank
the system as a whole. The TARP also helped economic and political counter-arguments, of America, and Citigroup. BofA and Citi
bring about the orderly bankruptcies of GM Congress initially rejected the TARP, further have repaid what they owed, but the $70
and Chrysler, forestalling what otherwise exacerbating the financial turmoil. billion provided to AIG is still outstanding,
would have been a disorderly liquidation With the financial panic intensifying and and an estimated $40 billion is now ex-
accompanied by massive layoffs during the threats to the economy growing clearer, Con- pected to be lost.13 Other efforts to support
worst part of the recession. The TARP has gress quickly reversed itself, however, and the the financial system, including TALF, PPIP,
probably been least effective, at least to TARP was established on October 3, 2008. and the small business lending initiatives
date, in easing the foreclosure crisis. But with the banks deteriorating rapidly and have not amounted to much, quantitatively,
While TARP’s ultimate cost to taxpayers asset purchases extremely complex, the TARP ensuring that the costs of these programs to
will be significant—it is projected between was quickly shifted to injecting capital directly taxpayers will be minimal.
$100 billion and $125 billion—it will fall well into major financial institutions. Initially, this The TARP commitment to the motor ve-
short of the $700 billion originally proposed. meant buying senior preferred stock and war- hicle industry, including GM, GMAC, Chrys-
Indeed, the bank bailout part will likely turn rants in the nine largest American banks, a ler, and various auto suppliers, totaled more
a profit. To date, more than half the banks tactic subsequently extended to other banks. than $80 billion. Approximately half of this
that received TARP funds have repaid them is estimated as a loss, although the actual
with interest and often with capital gains (on TARP costs loss will depend significantly on the success
options) as well. While Congress appropriated $700 bil- of the upcoming GM initial public offering.
lion for the TARP, only $600 billion was ever For taxpayers, the costliest part of the
TARP history committed, and as of June 2010, only $261 TARP will likely be its efforts to promote resi-
The nation’s financial system nearly col- billion was still outstanding (see Table 9). dential mortgage loan modifications, short
lapsed in the fall of 2008. Fannie Mae and TARP’s ultimate cost to taxpayers probably sales, and refinancings via the Homeowner
Freddie Mac and insurer AIG were effectively will end up close to $100 billion, nearly half Affordability and Stability Plan. All of the
nationalized; Lehman Brothers, Wachovia, and of that from GM.12 While this is a large sum, $50 billion committed for the various as-
Washington Mutual failed; Merrill Lynch and early fears that much of the $700 billion pects of this effort are expected to be spent
Citigroup staggered, and nearly every other would be lost were significantly overdone. and not recouped.

TABLE 9
Troubled Asset Relief Program
$ bil Orginally Committed Post-FinReg Currently Provided Ultimate Cost
Total 600 475 261 101
CPP (Financial institutions) 250 205 67 -24

Tarp Repayments 138
Losses 2
Dividends, Warrant proceeds 21
AIG 70 70 70 38
Citi (TIP) 20 20 Repaid 0
Bank of America (TIP) 20 20 Repaid 0
Citi debt guarantee 5 NA Repaid 0
Federal Reserve ( TALF) 55 4 4 0
Public-Private Investment Fund (PPIP) 30 22 10 1
SBA loan purchase 15 0 >1 0
Homeowner Affordability and Stability Plan 52 49 41 49
GMAC 13 13 13 4
GM 50 50 43 25
GM (for GMAC) 1 1 1 0
Chrysler 13 13 11 8
Chrysler Financial Loan 2 2 Repaid 0
Auto suppliers 5 5 Repaid 0
Sources: Federal Reserve, Treasury, FDIC, FHA, Moody’s Analytics
Capital Purchase Program the financial panic (see Chart 1). Today, de- toxic assets owned by financial institutions.14
The CPP has been the most successful spite the uncertainty created by the European Because institutions are uncertain of these
part of the TARP. Without capital injections debt crisis, the Libor-T-Bill bill spread is nearly assets’ value and thus of their own capital
from the federal government, the financial 25 basis points, close to the level that pre- adequacy, they have been less willing and
system might very well have collapsed. It vailed prior to the crisis. Nonetheless, while able to provide credit.
is difficult to trace out such a scenario, but depository institutions are lending more freely The Fed’s TALF program and Treasury’s
at the very least the resulting credit crunch to each other, they remain reluctant to extend PPIP program provided favorable financing
would have been much more severe and credit to businesses and consumers. to investors willing to purchase a wide range
long-lasting. As it is, private financial and A variety of other policy initiatives helped of “toxic” assets. TARP funds were available
non-financial debt outstanding has been restore stability to the financial system. The to cover the potential losses in both pro-
contracting for nearly two years. unprecedented monetary policy response, grams. While neither program resulted in a
The financial system is still not function- the bank stress tests, and the FDIC’s guaran- significant amount of activity, they did help
ing properly—small banks continue to fail tees on bank debt issuance as well as higher support asset prices as interest rates came
in large numbers, bank lending is weak and deposit insurance limits were all important. down and spreads over risk-free Treasuries
the private-label residential mortgage and Yet none of these efforts would likely have narrowed.15 When TALF was announced in
commercial securities markets remain largely succeeded without the CPP, which bought late 2008, the option-adjusted spread on
dormant—but it is stable. Evidence of normal- the time necessary to allow these other ef- auto-loan-backed securities stopped ris-
ization in the financial system is evident in the forts to work. ing, topping out at a whopping 1,000 basis
sharp narrowing of credit spreads. For exam- points (see Chart 2). By the time of the first
ple, the spread between Libor (the rate banks Toxic assets TALF auction in early 2009, the spread had
charge each other for loans) and Treasury bills TARP has also been useful in mitigating narrowed to 900 basis points, and it is now
hit a record 450 basis points at the height of systemic risks posed by the mountain of hovering close to 100 basis points. While

Chart 1: The Financial System Has Stabilized Chart 2: TALF Caused ABS Spreads to Narrow
Difference between 3-mo Libor and Treasury bill yields Automobile ABS, option-adjusted spread, bps
5.0 1,200
4.5 TARP fails to TALF announced First auction
4.0 pass Congress 1,000
3.5 No TARP asset
Bear Stearns purchases 800
3.0 hedge funds Bear Stearns
liquidate collapse
2.5 600
Lehman
2.0 failure Bank stress
tests 400
1.5
1.0
Bank funding Fannie/Freddie 200
0.5
problems takeover
0.0 0
07 08 09 10 07 08 09
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, Moody’s Analytics Source: BofA Merrill Lynch
FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 1 FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 2
this narrowing of spreads was driven by a but impossible. Debtor-in-possession (DIP) primarily by temporary reductions in interest
multitude of factors, arguably most impor- financing is critical to pay suppliers, finance rates and thus in monthly payments—not
tant was the TALF. inventories, and meet payroll while com- by principal reductions. Yet take-up on the
The TARP also supported asset prices panies restructure. It is risky even in good HAMP plan has fallen well short of what pol-
by forestalling the collapse of AIG, Bank of times, so DIP lenders become senior credi- icymakers hoped.17 The reason: Many home
America, and Citi. Had these huge institu- tors when a bankruptcy court distributes a loans are so deeply under water that, even
tions failed, they might have been forced to firm’s assets and can charge high rates and with modifications that lower monthly pay-
dump their toxic assets at fire-sale prices, fees for their risks. Yet in the credit crunch ments, they face high probabilities of default.
thereby imperiling other institutions that that prevailed in early 2009, it is unlikely Thus, mortgage servicers and creditors have
owned similar assets. In a sense, the troubled that DIP lenders would have taken such little interest in making such modifications.
assets owned by AIG, BofA and Citi were risks. Money from the TARP was necessary To address this impediment, the administra-
quarantined so they would not infect asset to fill this void. tion made a number of changes to HAMP
markets and drive prices even lower. The GM and Chrysler have now been sig- in spring 2010 to encourage principal write-
government still owns nearly all of AIG, and nificantly rationalized and appear to be downs. While this approach is expected to
although it has been selling its Citi shares, it financially viable even at depressed current work better, it is too soon to tell.
continues to hold a sizable ownership stake.16 vehicle sales rates. GM has already begun to The idea behind the HARP was to allow
repay its government loans, and there is even Fannie and Freddie to refinance loans they
Auto bailout discussion of when it will go public. Ford, own or insure—even on homes whose mar-
TARP also was instrumental in assuring which did not take government funds, is do- ket values have sunk far below the amounts
the orderly bankruptcy of GM and Chrysler ing measurably better, and conditions across owed. The take-up on the HARP has been
and supporting the entire motor vehicle in- the industry have improved. Production is up particularly low because homeowners need
dustry. Without money from the TARP, these and employment has stabilized (see Chart to pay transaction costs for the refinancing
firms would have very likely ceased as going 3). This seemed unlikely just a year ago, and and are not permitted to capitalize these
concerns. The liquidation of GM and Chrysler TARP was instrumental in the turnaround. costs into their mortgage principal. Some
would have in turn caused the bankruptcy of homeowners whose credit characteristics
many vehicle part suppliers and, as a result, Foreclosure crisis have weakened also find that the interest
Ford as well. The TARP has been less successful, at rates offered for refinancing are not low
Without government help, the vehicle least so far, in combating the residential enough to cover the transaction costs in a
manufacturers’ Chapter 11 restructurings mortgage foreclosure crisis. TARP is funding reasonable time.
would have likely turned into Chapter 7 liq- the Housing Affordability Stability Plan, or The HAMP and other foreclosure miti-
uidations. Their factories and other opera- HASP, which consists of the Home Afford- gation efforts have slowed the foreclosure
tions would have been shut down and their ability Mortgage Plan (HAMP) and the Home process a bit. Mortgage servicers and owners
assets sold to pay creditors. The collapse Affordability Refinancing Plan (HARP). have been working to determine which of
in the financial system and resulting credit The HAMP’s original strategy was to en- their troubled mortgage loans might qualify
crunch made financing the companies while courage homeowners, mortgage servicers, for the various plans. The slower pace of
they were in the bankruptcy process all and mortgage owners to modify home loans, foreclosures and short sales has resulted in

Chart 3: Autos Go From Free Fall to Stability Chart 4: The Foreclosure Crisis Continues
Motor vehicles and parts First mortgage loans, ths
110 1,200 4,500
4,000 90 days and over delinquent
100 1,100
3,500 In foreclosure
90
1,000 3,000
Cash for
80 clunkers 2,500 Strategic defaults, in which the
900 homeowner can reasonably afford their
70 2,000
mortgage payment but defaults anyway,
Industrial production, 800 1,500
60 are now over 20% of defaults.
index: 2002=100 (L)
1,000
50 Employment, ths (R) 700
500
40 600 0
05 06 07 08 09 10 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10
Sources: Federal Reserve Board, BLS Sources: Equifax, Moody’s Analytics
more stable house prices this past year, but unemployment would be well into the double ing to the economy’s weakness. Aside from
troubled loans are backing up in the fore- digits and rising, and the nation’s budget defi- additional UI and state aid, fiscal policymak-
closure pipeline. As of the end of June 2010, cit would be even larger and still rising. ers have generally relied more on tax cutting
credit file data show an astounding 4.3 mil- In the popular mind, the fiscal stimulus than on increased spending as a stimulus.
lion first mortgage loans in the foreclosure is associated with the American Restoration The massive public works projects of the
process or at least 90 days delinquent (see and Recovery Act—the $784 billion package Great Depression are an exception.
Chart 4). For context, there are 49 million of temporary spending increases and tax cuts The unusually large amount of fiscal
first mortgage loans outstanding; so this is al- passed in February 2009. In fact, the stimu- stimulus provided recently is consistent both
most 9% of the total. Mortgage servicers and lus began in the spring of 2008 with the with the extraordinarily severe downturn
owners are deciding that many of these loans mailing of tax rebate checks.18 Smaller stimu- and the reduced effectiveness of monetary
are not viable candidates for the HAMP plan, lus measures followed the ARRA, including policy as interest rates approach zero. The
and have begun pushing these loans towards cash for clunkers, a tax credit for homebuy- Federal Reserve’s job is further complicated
foreclosure. Thus foreclosures and short sales ers that expired in June, a payroll tax credit by the still significant risk of deflation. Falling
are expected to increase measurably in the for employers to hire unemployed workers, prices cause real interest rates to rise, since
coming months, which would put even more and other measures. In total, the stimulus the Fed can not lower nominal rates further.
downward pressure on house prices. provided under both the Bush and Obama This situation stands in sharp contrast to the
Policymakers are hoping the revised HAMP administrations amounts to more than $1 early 1980s—the last time unemployment
and other private mitigation efforts will work trillion, about 7% of GDP (see Table 10).19 reached double digits—when interest rates
well enough to reduce foreclosures and short Some form of fiscal stimulus has been and inflation were both much higher and the
sales and thus prevent house price declines part of the government’s response to nearly Federal Reserve had substantially more lati-
from undermining the broader economy. every recession since the 1930s, but the cur- tude to adjust monetary policy.
rent effort is the largest. For comparison, The greater use of government spending
Fiscal Stimulus the stimulus provided during the double-dip rather than tax cuts as a fiscal stimulus dur-
Like the TARP, the government’s fiscal downturn of the early 1980’s equaled almost ing the current period is also consistent with
stimulus has grown unpopular. There appears 3% of GDP, and the stimulus provided a de- the record length of the recession and the
to be a general perception that, at best, the cade ago after the tech bust totaled closer to persistently high unemployment.21 Histori-
stimulus has done little to turn the economy 1.5% of GDP.20 cally, the principal weakness of government
around, and at worst, it has funded politi- Extended or expanded unemployment in- spending, for example infrastructure proj-
cians’ pet projects with little clear economic surance benefits have been a common form ects, is that it takes too long to affect eco-
rationale. In fact, the fiscal stimulus was quite of stimulus, as has financial help to state and nomic activity. Given the length and depth of
successful in helping to end the Great Reces- local governments. Since nearly all states are the recent recession, however, the time-lag
sion and to accelerate the recovery. While the legally bound to balance their budgets, and issue is less of a concern.
strength of the recovery has been disappoint- since nearly all face significant budget short-
ing, this speaks mainly to the severity of the falls during recessions, they would have been Tax cuts
downturn. Without the fiscal stimulus, the forced to cut spending and raise taxes even Tax cuts have played an important role
economy would arguably still be in recession, more in the absence of federal aid, thus add- in recent stimulus efforts. Indeed, tax cuts

Table 10
Fiscal Stimulus Policy Efforts
$ bil Originally Committed Currently Provided Ultimate Cost
Total Fiscal Stimulus 1,067 712 1,067
Spending Increases 682 340 682
Tax Cuts 383 371 383
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 170 170 170
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 784 473 784

Infrastructure and Other Spending 147 56 147
Traditional Infrastructure 38 14 38
Nontraditional Infrastructure 109 42 109
Transfers to state and local governments 174 119 174
Medicaid 87 69 87
Education 87 51 87
Transfers to persons 271 109 271
Social Security 13 13 13
Unemployment Assistance 224 66 224
Food stamps 10 10 10
Cobra Payments 24 20 24
Tax cuts 190 188 190
Businesses & other tax incentives 40 40 40
Making Work Pay 64 62 64
First-time homebuyer tax credit 14 14 14
Individuals excluding increase in AMT exemption 72 71 72
Cash for Appliances 0.3 0.2 0.3
Cash for Clunkers 3 3 3
HIRE Act (Job Tax Credit) 17 8 17
Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 91 57 91

Extended of unemployment insurance benefits (Mar 16) 6 6 6
Extended of unemployment insurance benefits (Apr 14) 12 12 12
Extended of unemployment insurance benefits (May 27) 3 3 3
Extended of unemployment insurance benefits (July 22) 34 34
Extended/expanded net operating loss provisions of ARRA* 33 33 33
Extended/extension of homebuyer tax credit 3 3 3
Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010 >2 >3 >2

Extended guarantees and fee waivers for SBA loans >1 >1 >1
Expanded COBRA premium subsidy >1 >1 >1
Sources: CBO, Treasury, Recovery.gov, IRS, Department of Labor, JCT, Council of Economic Advisors, Moody’s Analytics

for individuals and businesses account for TABLE 11

36% of the total stimulus, nearly $400 bil- Fiscal Stimulus Bang for the Buck
lion. Lower- and middle-income households Tax Cuts Bang for the Buck
have received tax rebate checks, paid less in
Non-refundable Lump-Sum Tax Rebate 1.01
payroll taxes, and benefited from tax credits
Refundable Lump-Sum Tax Rebate 1.22
to purchase homes and appliances. All to-
gether, individuals will receive almost Temporary Tax Cuts
$300 billion in tax cuts. Payroll Tax Holiday 1.24
The cash for clunkers program and hous- Job Tax Credit 1.30
ing tax credits were particularly well-timed Across the Board Tax Cut 1.02
and potent tax breaks. Cash for clunkers gave
Accelerated Depreciation 0.25
households a reason to trade in older gas-
guzzling vehicles for new cars in the summer Loss Carryback 0.22
of 2009, when GM and Chrysler were strug- Housing Tax Credit 0.90
gling to navigate bankruptcy. Sales jumped, Permanent Tax Cuts
clearing out inventory and setting up a Extend Alternative Minimum Tax Patch 0.51
rebound in vehicle production and employ-
Make Bush Income Tax Cuts Permanent 0.32
ment. The program was very short-lived,
however, and sales naturally weakened in the Make Dividend and Capital Gains Tax Cuts Permanent 0.37
immediate wake of the program. But they Cut in Corporate Tax Rate 0.32
have largely held their own since.
Spending Increases Bang for the Buck
Three rounds of tax credits for home pur-
chasers were also instrumental in stemming Extending Unemployment Insurance Benefits 1.61
the housing crash. The credit that expired in Temporary Federal Financing of Work-Share Programs 1.69
November was particularly helpful in breaking Temporary Increase in Food Stamps 1.74
the deflationary psychology that was gripping General Aid to State Governments 1.41
the market. Until that point, potential home-
Increased Infrastructure Spending 1.57
buyers were on the sidelines, partly because
Low Income Home Energy Assistance Program (LIHEAP) 1.13
they expected prices to fall even further. The
tax credit offered a reason to buy sooner, Source: Moody’s Analytics
helping to stabilize house prices. The credit Note: The bang for the buck is estimated by the one year $ change in GDP for a given $ reduction in federal
was especially helpful in preventing the large tax revenue or increase in spending.
number of foreclosed properties then hitting
the market from depressing prices. The expi-
ration of the most recent tax credit, in June, to the Treasury upfront is largely paid back produces very high economic activity per
was followed by a sharp decline in sales. But in subsequent years when businesses have federal dollar spent (see Table 11).23 Most
this may have been partly due to potential higher tax liabilities. unemployed workers spend their benefits
homebuyers expecting Congress to offer yet immediately; and without such extra help,
another tax credit. Government spending increases laid-off workers and their families have little
The fiscal stimulus also provided busi- A potpourri of temporary spending increas- choice but to slash their spending. The loss
nesses with approximately $100 billion in tax es were also included in the fiscal stimulus. of benefits is debilitating not only for unem-
cuts, including accelerated depreciation ben- Additional unemployment insurance beyond ployed workers, but also for friends, family,
efits and net operating loss rebates. While the regular 26-week benefit period has been and neighbors who may have been providing
such incentives have historically not been far and away the most costly type of stimulus financial help themselves.
particularly effective as a stimulus—they do spending, with a total price tag now approach- The fiscal stimulus also provided almost
not induce much extra near-term investing $300 billion. The high rate and surprisingly $50 billion in other income transfers, includ-
ment—they may be more potent in the cur- long duration of unemployment—well over ing Social Security, food stamps, and COBRA
rent environment, when businesses face se- half the jobless have been out of work more payments to allow unemployed workers to
vere credit constraints.22 It is also important than 26 weeks—have added to the bill. retain access to healthcare. Food stamps
to consider that accelerated-depreciation Yet UI benefits are among the most are another particularly powerful form of
and operating-loss credits are ultimately not potent forms of economic stimulus avail- stimulus, as such money flows quickly into
very costly to taxpayers. The tax revenue lost able. Additional unemployment insurance the economy. COBRA and Social Security

Chart 5: States Avoid Massive Budget Cutting Chart 6: Tax Cuts Have Supported Spending
Change yr ago, $ bil $ tril
150 11.0 66
Household 64
100
wealth (R) Disposable 62
50 10.5 income ex rebates
60
0 58
Disposable
Federal grants in aid income (L) 56
-50 10.0
Tax revenues 54
-100 Consumer
Expenditures 52
spending
-150 9.5 50
05 06 07 08 09 07 08 09
Source: BEA Sources: BEA, FRB, Moody’s Analytics
have smaller multipliers, as not all of the aid weaker consumer spending that would have eryone in the 1990s, infrastructure spending
is spent quickly. surely occurred without such help. In the produces diminishing returns. Investing only
Strapped state and local governments nomenclature of the debate surrounding the in bridges, for example, ultimately creates
have also received significant additional merits of the stimulus, this stimulus saves bridges to nowhere.
aid through the Medicaid program, which jobs rather than creates them. Arguments that temporary tax cuts have
states fund jointly with the federal govern- Funds for infrastructure projects generally not supported consumer spending are also
ment, and through education. As part of do not generate spending quickly, as it takes overstated. This is best seen in the 2008 tax
the ARRA, states will receive almost $175 time to get projects going. That is not a bad rebates. While these payments significantly
billion through the end of 2010. This money thing: rushing raises the risks of financing un- lifted after-tax income, consumer spend-
went a long way to filling states’ budget productive projects. But infrastructure spending did not follow, at least not immediately.
holes during their just-ended 2010 fiscal ing does pack a significant economic punch, One reason was the income caps attached
year (see Chart 5). States were still forced to particularly to the nation’s depressed construc- to the rebates. Higher-income households
cut jobs and programs and raise taxes, but tion and manufacturing industries. Almost did not receive them, and because of rapidly
fairly modestly given their budget problems. $150 billion in ARRA infrastructure spending falling stock and house prices, these same
Budget cutting has intensified in most states is now flowing into the economy, and is par- households were saving significantly more
this summer, because the budget problems ticularly welcome, as the other stimulus fades and spending less (see Chart 6). The saving
going into fiscal 2011 are still massive, and while the economy struggles. rate for households in the top quintile of the
prospects for further help from the federal The ARRA has also been criticized for income distribution surged from close to
government are dwindling. including a hodgepodge of infrastructure nothing in early 2007 to double digits by ear-
State and local government aid is another spending, ranging from traditional outlays ly 2008. Lower- and middle-income house-
especially potent form of stimulus with a on roads and bridges to spending on elec- holds did spend a significant part of their tax
large multiplier. It is defensive stimulus, tric power grids and the internet. Given the rebates, but the sharp pullback by higher-
forestalling draconian cuts in government uncertain payoff of such projects, diversifi- income households significantly diluted the
services, as well as the tax increases and cation is probably a plus. As Japan taught ev- impact of the tax cut on overall spending.

Appendix B: Methodological Considerations

The Moody’s Analytics model of the U.S. wealth, and financial wealth.24 Household and land development loans. The availability
economy was used to quantify the economic cash flow equals the sum of personal dispos- of such loans is proxied by the Federal Re-
impact of the various financial and fiscal able income, capital gains realizations on the serve’s Senior Loan Officer Survey question
stimulus policies implemented during the cri- sale of financial assets, and net new borrow- regarding commercial real estate mortgage
sis and recession. This model is used regularly ing—including mortgage equity withdrawal. underwriting standards; it is modeled as a
for a range of purposes, including economic Changes in household cash flow were sub- function of the delinquency rate on commer-
forecasting, scenario and sensitivity analysis, stantially greater than those of disposable cial banks’ commercial real estate mortgage
and most relevant for the work presented income during the boom and the bubble. loans, and the spread between three-month
here, the assessment of the economic impact Mortgage equity withdrawal was a major Libor and the three-month Treasury bill yield.
of monetary and fiscal policies. It is used by a difference between cash flow and disposable This so-called TED spread is one of the two
wide range of global companies, federal, state income in the boom. It is in turn driven by key credit spreads in the Moody’s model and
and local governments, and policymakers. capital gain realizations on home sales and thus one main channel via which the uncon-
The model was already well equipped to home equity borrowing—both of which are ventional financial policies operated.
assess the economic impact of the various determined by mortgage rates and the avail- Business investment is another impor-
fiscal stimulus measures. But several adjust- ability of mortgage credit (see Chart 7). Fixed tant determinant of aggregate demand and
ments to the model were necessary to deal mortgage rates are modeled as a function of the business cycle. It both responds to and
with the financial policies, many of which the 10-year Treasury yield, the refinancing amplifies shifts in output. Investment also
were innovative. In the context of the model, share of mortgage originations, the foreclo- influences the supply side of the economy
this mainly meant estimating the effects of sure rate, and the value of Federal Reserve since it is the principal determinant of po-
the policies on credit conditions. Credit condi- assets.25 The latter variable was added to the tential output and labor productivity in the
tions are measured by interest rates, including model explicitly for this exercise. Including long run. Investment spending not only adds
both Treasury rates and credit spreads, and Fed assets captures the impact of the Fed’s to the stock of capital available per worker,
bank underwriting standards. The key financial credit easing efforts, which involved expand- but also determines the extent to which the
policy levers included in the model are Federal ing the assets it owns largely through the capital stock embodies the latest and most
Reserve assets, the capital raised by financial purchases of Treasury bonds and mortgage efficient technology.
institutions (as a result of the CPP and the securities. The availability of mortgage credit The investment equations in the model
stress tests), the conforming mortgage loan is measured by the Federal Reserve’s Senior are specified as a function of changes in
limit (which was increased as part of fiscal Loan Officer Survey question regarding resi- output and the cost of capital.27 The cost of
stimulus), and the FHA share of purchase dential mortgage underwriting standards; it capital is equal to the implicit cost of leas-
mortgage originations, which surged as the is modeled as a function of the foreclosure ing a capital asset, and therefore reflects the
private mortgage market collapsed. rate, the conforming loan limit, and the FHA real after-tax cost of funds, tax and depre-
In broad terms, here is how the model share of purchase originations.26 ciation laws, and the price of the asset. More
works: In the short run, fluctuations in These policy efforts have also had explicitly, the cost of funds is defined as the
economic activity are determined primar- significant impacts on residential invest- weighted-average after-tax cost of debt
ily by shifts in aggregate demand, including ment, which is determined in the model and equity capital. The cost of debt capital
personal consumption, business investment, by household formation, the inventory of is proxied by the “junk” (below investment
international trade and government expendi- vacant homes, the availability of credit to grade) corporate bond yield, which is the
tures. The level of resources and technology homebuilders, and the difference between second of the two key credit spreads in the
available for production are taken as given. house prices and the costs of construction. Moody’s model. The cost of equity capital is
Prices and wages adjust slowly to equate Housing starts closely follow the number of the sum of the 10-year Treasury bond yield
aggregate demand and supply. In the long household formations, abstracting from the plus an exogenously set equity risk pre-
run, however, changes in aggregate supply number of demolitions and second and vaca- mium. Changes in the cost of capital, which
determine the economy’s growth potential. tion homes. Inventories of homes depend have a significant impact on investment,
Thus the rate of expansion of the resource significantly on home sales, which are driven reflect the fallout from the financial crisis,
and technology base of the economy is the by real household income, the age composi- any benefit from the various business tax
principal determinant of economic growth. tion of the population, mortgage rates, and cuts, and the policy efforts to stabilize the
the availability of mortgage credit. The avail- financial system.
Aggregate demand ability of credit to builders is also important, The availability of credit is also an impor-
Real consumer spending is modeled as a particularly in the current period given the tant determinant of business investment and
function of real household cash flow, housing reluctance of lenders to make construction is measured by the Federal Reserve’s Senior

Chart 7: Mortgage Equity Withdrawal Falls Chart 8: The Output Gap Is Wide
$ bil, annualized Difference between actual unemployment rate and NAIRU
1,000 5
800 4
600 3
400 2
200 1
0 0
-200 -1
-400 -2
00 02 04 06 08 10 60 70 80 90 00 10
Sources: BEA, Equifax, Moody’s Analytics Sources: BLS, Moody’s Analytics
Loan Officer Survey question regarding under- defined as personal income less nontaxable The key unknown in estimating aggregate
writing standards for commercial and indus- components of income including other labor supply is the full-employment level of labor,
trial loans. This is modeled as a function of the income and government transfers. The aver- which is derived from a measure of potential
interest coverage ratio—the share of nonfi- age effective tax rate is modeled as a func- labor supply and the long-run equilibrium
nancial corporate cash flow going to servicing tion of marginal rates, which are exogenous unemployment rate. This rate, often referred
debt—and the three-month TED spread. and form a key policy lever in the model. to as the Non-Accelerating Inflation Rate of
The international trade sector of the mod- State and local government spending Unemployment, or NAIRU, is the unemploy-
el captures the interactions among foreign is modeled as a function of the sum of tax ment rate consistent with steady price and
and domestic prices, interest rates, exchange revenues, which are the product of average wage inflation. It is also the unemployment
rates, and product flows.28 The key determi- effective tax rates and their corresponding rate at which actual GDP equals potential
nants of export volumes are global real GDP tax base, and exogenously determined fed- GDP. NAIRU, which is estimated from an
growth and the real trade-weighted value of eral grants-in-aid. Given balanced budget expectations-augmented Phillips curve, is
the U.S. dollar. Real imports are determined requirements in most states, government currently estimated to be near 5.5%.29 Given
by specific domestic spending categories and spending is closely tied to revenues. Grants- the current 9.5% unemployment rate, the
relative prices. Global real GDP growth comes in-aid are also an important policy lever in economy is operating well below its poten-
from the Moody’s Analytics international an assessment of the economic impact of tial (see Chart 8). This output gap is the key
model system and is provided exogenously to fiscal stimulus. determinant of prices in the model. It is thus
the U.S. model. The value of the dollar is de- not surprising that inflation is decelerating,
termined endogenously based on relative U.S. Aggregate supply raising concerns that the economy may suf-
and global interest rates, global growth, and The supply side of the economy describes fer outright deflation.
the U.S. current account deficit. the economy’s capabilities for producing out-
Most federal government spending is put. In the model, aggregate supply or po- Monetary policy, interest rates
treated as exogenous in the model since leg- tential GDP is estimated from a Cobb-Doug- and stock prices
islative and administrative decisions do not las production function that combines factor Monetary policy is principally captured in
respond predictably to economic conditions. input growth and improvements in total la- the model through the federal funds rate tar-
The principal exception is transfer payments bor productivity. Factor inputs include labor get.30 The funds rate equation is an FOMC re-
for unemployment benefits, which are mod- and business fixed capital. Factor supplies are action function that is a modified Taylor rule.
eled as a function of unemployment and net defined by estimates of the full-employment In this framework, the real funds rate target
interest payments. Total federal government labor force and the existing capital stock of is a function of the economy’s estimated real
receipts are the sum of personal tax receipts, private nonresidential equipment and struc- growth potential, the difference between
contributions for social insurance, corporate tures. Total factor productivity is calculated the actual and target inflation rate (assumed
profits tax receipts, and indirect tax receipts. as the residual from the Cobb-Douglas pro- to be 2% for core CPI), and the difference
Personal taxes (income plus payroll) account duction function, estimated at full employ- between the actual unemployment rate and
for the bulk of federal tax collections, and are ment. Potential total factor productivity is NAIRU. This specification is augmented to
equal to the product of the average effective derived from a regression of actual TFP on include the difference between the presumed
income tax rate and the tax base, which is business-cycle specific trend variables. 2% inflation target and inflation expecta-

Chart 9: The Fed Expands Its Balance Sheet Chart 10: Capital Raised Thanks to Policy Support
Composition of Federal Reserve’s balance sheet, $ bil Bank capital raised through:
3,500 600
Short-term lending to financial firms and markets Cumulative, $ bil
3,000 Operations focused on longer-term credit conditions 500
Rescue operations
2,500 Traditional portfolio 400
2,000
300
1,500 Other
200 Needed SCAP
1,000
TLFG
500 100 CPP
0 0
Mar-08 Jul-08 Nov-08 Mar-09 Jul-09 Nov-09 Mar-10 Jul-10 Oct-08 Jan-09 Apr-09 Jul-09 Oct-09 Jan-10 Apr-10 Jul-10
Sources: Federal Reserve, Moody’s Analytics Sources: Treasury, SEC, Moody’s Analytics
tions, as measured by five-year, five-year- three-month Treasury bill yields (which is the latter was added to the model to capture
forward Treasury yields. tied closely to the funds rate) is modeled as a the impact of recent quantitative easing ef-
Because of the Federal Reserve’s exten- function of the delinquency rate on commer- forts. Bond investors’ expectations of future
sive use of quantitative easing to respond cial bank loans and leases, the market value monetary policy are assumed to be driven by
to the financial crisis, Federal Reserve assets of equity lost in failing financial institutions current inflation expectations and the federal
were added to the model for this exercise. during the financial crisis, and the amount of government’s future fiscal situation.
Fed assets are specified as a function of the capital raised by the banking system via the The junk bond yield is another important
federal funds rate target described above. CPP and stress tests (see Chart 10). The latter interest rate in the model, as it impacts
When the funds rate implied by the equa- variable was added explicitly for these stimu- businesses’ cost of capital. It is driven by the
tion falls below zero, the Fed’s balance sheet lations. The rationales are straightforward: 10-year Treasury yield, the interest coverage
expands. And the more negative the implied As the delinquency rate increases, banks de- ratio for nonfinancial corporate businesses,
funds rate, the greater the assumed balance mand higher interest to lend to other banks. and capacity utilization. Higher interest
sheet expansion. Specifically, for every 100 The equity lost in failing institutions captures coverage—the greater the share of cash flow
basis points that the desired (but unachiev- the growing panic that investors felt as the businesses must devote to meeting debt
able) funds rate becomes negative, the Fed crisis intensified. The capital raised by banks payments to remain current—and lower ca-
is presumed to expand its balance sheet by either from the federal government or in the pacity utilization push junk yields up relative
$1.2 trillion.31 At present, the implied funds equity market captures the benefit of the to the risk-free Treasury yield.
rate is near negative 2%, which suggests that financial policy response in restoring stability Stock prices, measured by the S&P
the Fed should be holding close to $3 trillion to short-term funding markets. 500 stock index, are modeled based on a
in assets—compared with the Fed’s actual The most important long-term interest traditional earnings discount model. The
current holdings of $2.4 (see Chart 9). rate in the model is the yield on the 10-year principal determinants of stock prices in
The most important private short-term Treasury bond, which is a key determinant this framework are thus corporate profits
interest rate in the model is the three-month of both mortgage rates and corporate bond and the Baa corporate bond yield.32 Chang-
Libor rate, which in turn drives home-equity rates. The 10-year Treasury yield is modeled ing stock prices have an important impact
and credit-card lending rates as well as the as a function of the federal funds rate, infla- on consumer spending through the wealth
rate on adjustable residential mortgages. The tion expectations, the federal budget deficit effect and on business investment through
TED spread between three-month Libor and as a share of GDP, and Federal Reserve assets; the cost of capital.

Endnotes
JULY 28, 2010 1 P.M. CORRECTION: This article now contains corrected figures for our estimate of 2010 GDP with and without the
stimulus. As the article now reflects, GDP in 2010 would be about 11.5% lower without the government’s response, and the fiscal
stimulus has raised GDP by about 3.4%.
1. Princeton University and Moody’s Analytics, respectively. These affiliations are for identification only. None of the views expressed
here should be attributed to any organization with which we are affiliated.
2. The CBO’s estimates of the economic impact of ARRA can be found at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11525/05-25-AR-
RA.pdf . The Council of Economic Advisors’ most recent estimates of the economic impact of ARRA can be found at http://www.
whitehouse.gov/files/documents/cea_4th_arra_report.pdf.
3. Alan Krueger, the Assistant Treasury Secretary for Economic Policy, estimated that the capital injections into banks alone may
have added roughly 900,000 to 1.8 million jobs. See his Remarks to the American Academy of Actuaries, Washington, DC, July
20, 2009 (at www.treasury.gov/offices/economic-policy/AK-Actuaries-07-20-2009.pdf) A Federal Reserve Bank of New York staff
report estimated that the Fed’s purchases of long-term assets (Treasury securities and MBS) alone lowered long-term interest
rates on a range of securities by 30-80 basis, with effects on mortgage rates about 50 basis points higher than that. See Joseph
Gagnon, Matthew Raskin, Julie Remache, and Brian Sack, “Large-Scale Asset Purchases by the Federal Reserve: Did They Work?,”
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report No. 441, March 2010.
4. The new credit facilities include the Term Auction Facility, the Term Securities Loan Facility, the Term Asset-Backed Securities Loan
Facility, the Commercial Paper Funding Facility, the Money Market Investor Funding Facility, and currency swap lines.
5. These include, among others, the cash-for-clunkers tax incentive in the fall of 2009, the extension and expansion of the housing tax
credit through mid-2010, the passage of a job tax credit through year-end 2010, and several extensions of emergency UI benefits.
6. We refer here to the response to the crisis, once it occurred. Many government policies and regulatory lapses contributed to bring-
ing on the crisis, however.
7. The pace of change also explains why the fiscal stimulus will soon turn into a drag on economic growth. The government’s policies
have added just over $80 billion per quarter to the economy since late 2009, a flow that will dry up to essentially nothing over
the next several quarters.
8. Under the baseline and no-financial-policy scenarios, an additional $80 billion in fiscal stimulus is assumed through mid-2011, in-
cluding approximately $50 billion for additional emergency UI benefits, $25 billion in state government aid and $5 billion in other
stimulus including increased funding for small business lending. It is also assumed under all the scenarios that tax rates rise only
for the top 2% of income earners and that these higher rates are phased in over two years. In all the scenarios, monetary policy
is treated endogenously, with the federal funds rate target constrained to be non-negative and the Fed engaging in credit easing
consistent with the degree to which the model calls for a negative federal funds rate. The broad trade-weighted dollar is also en-
dogenously determined and falls in the scenarios, supporting an improvement in the trade balance and cushioning the economic
downturn. This benefit is overstated in the scenarios, however, as global economic growth excluding the U.S. is held exogenously
in order to simplify the analysis.
9. We make no attempt to decompose the financial-policy effects into portions attributable to TARP, to the Fed’s quantitative easing
policies, etc.
10. The CBO’s estimates of the economic impact of ARRA can be found at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/115xx/doc11525/05-25-
ARRA.pdf .
11. See The Wall Street Journal, July 24, 2009.
12. The Treasury’s Office of Financial Stability recently published updated cost estimates of TARP using publicly available data
through March 31, 2010. See http://www.treas.gov/press/releases/tg713.htm. Treasury currently expects TARP losses to be $105
billion. If much of the projected loss on GM stock is recouped, this figure will drop substantially.
13. This is another huge sum. But remember that the three-stage commitment to AIG amounted to over $180 billion.
14. In our (apparently minority) view, it is unfortunate that TARP wasn’t used more for its original purpose, namely the purchase of
toxic assets from financial institutions using, for example, a reverse auction process. This idea was quickly shelved when the rapid
unraveling of the financial system forced the Treasury to change objectives from asset purchases to direct capital infusions into
financial institutions.
15. TALF has supported $58 billion in asset-backed securities, along with $12 billion of securitization for commercial mortgages. Us-
ing a combination of TARP and private capital, Public-Private Investment Funds have purchased, to date, $12 billion of securities
from banks.

16. In April and May, Treasury sold roughly 20% of the government’s stake for $6.2 billion, $1.3 billion above its cost. The Treasury
is in the process of selling another 1.5 billion shares, and plans to liquidate the remainder of its stake in an orderly fashion by
the end of 2010.
17. Introducing the HAMP in spring 2009, President Obama said he expected between 3 million and 4 million loan modifications.
Even with the more recent changes to the plan, the number of permanent modifications is likely to be well under half that
amount.
18. These costs do not include adjustments to the Alternative Minimum Tax, which was included as part of the ARRA, but which
would have been passed by Congress regardless. They do include the added costs of providing unemployment insurance ben-
efits, which were underestimated in the original cost estimate for the ARRA.
19. The U.S. hasn’t been alone in using fiscal stimulus during the current period. Nearly all major economies did so, with total
global fiscal stimulus approaching $5 trillion. The Chinese were the most aggressive, adding nearly twice as much stimulus as
the U.S. as a share of GDP.
20. This includes only the cost of the tax cuts from 2001 to 2003. The tax cuts instituted in this period largely expire at the end of
this year.
21. The Great Recession likely lasted at least 18 months between December 2007 and June 2009. This is the longest downturn
since the Great Depression and compares with an average of 10 months for recessions since World War II. The recovery over
the past year has also been among the weakest in the post war period.
22. See Cohen, D. and Cummins, J. “A Retrospective Evaluation of the Effects of Temporary Partial Expensing,” Federal Reserve
Board, Finance and Economics Discussion Series Working Paper No. 2006-19 (April 2006). Also see House C. and Shapiro, M.
“Temporary Investment Tax Incentives: Theory with Evidence from Bonus Depreciation,” NBER Working Paper 12514, September
2006.
23. These multipliers are calculated based on simulations of the Moody’s Analytics macroeconomic model of the U.S. economy.
24. Consumer spending in the model is actually disaggregated into various durable goods, nondurable goods, and services categories.
25. The refinance share proxies for the prepayment risk in mortgage loans.
26. The Federal Reserve’s Senior Loan Officer Survey is conducted quarterly. Loan officers are asked by the Fed how their under-
writing standards and loan demand have changed since the last time they responded to the survey the quarter before. Equa-
tions for three questions from this survey were added to the model for the purposes of this study.
27. The specification is based largely on the neoclassical theory of the firm. Fixed investment is divided into five categories of
producers’ durable equipment, and nine categories of nonresidential structures. Additional drivers important to the different
categories of investment are also included in the equations. Investment in industrial equipment, for example, is also driven by
capacity utilization and investment in transportation equipment is driven by vehicle sales to account for vehicle purchases by
vehicle lessors.
28. Exports in the model are divided into eight different categories and imports are divided into ten categories.
29. Estimates of NAIRU were closer to 5% before the recession. They have risen because the lengthening duration of unemploy-
ment is eroding the ability of jobless workers to return to the labor market, and because of the large number of underwater
homeowners whose ability to relocate for employment is limited.
30. The federal funds rate equation is estimated over the period beginning in late 1987, which coincides with Alan Greenspan’s and
Ben Bernanke’s tenures as chairman of the Federal Reserve. Prior to this period monetary policy was much less transparent,
and for a time during the late 1970s and early 1980s was based on targeting money supply growth.
31. This result is consistent with research done by Goldman Sachs. See “No Rush for the Exit,” Jan Hatzius, et al, Goldman Sachs
Global Economics Paper No. 200, June 30, 2010. It is also consistent with results in “The Fed’s Exit Strategy for Monetary
Policy,” Glenn Rudebusch, San Francisco Federal Reserve Board Economic Letter, 2010-18, June 14, 2010 http://www.frbsf.org/
publications/economics/letter/2010/el2010-18.html.
32. The single-A corporate bond yield is used in the equation for the S&P 500 stock index instead of the junk corporate bond yield
as the larger companies in the index have closer to a single-A rating. Single-A corporate bonds are modeled as a function of
Baa bonds, which are in turn modeled as a function of junk corporate bonds.

Government Role in Ending The Great Recession

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Government Role in Ending The Great Recession

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How the Great Recession

Was Brought to an End

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 1

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 2

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 3

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 4

Sources: Treasury, Joint Committee on Taxation, Recovery.gov, Moody’s Analytics

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 5

TABLE 3 No Policy Response Baseline (with actual policy response)

Sources: BEA, BLS, Moody’s Analytics

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 6

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 7

TABLE 5 No Policy Response Baseline (with actual policy response)

Sources: BEA, BLS, Moody’s Analytics

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 8

TABLE 7 No Policy Response Baseline (with actual policy response)

CPI (Index, 1982-

CPI (Index, 1982-

Sources: BEA, BLS, Moody’s Analytics

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 9

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 10

Appendix A: Some Details on the Financial and Fiscal Policies

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 11

CPP (Financial institutions) 250 205 67 -24

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 12

FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 1 FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 2

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 13

FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 3 FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 4

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 14

Economic Stimulus Act of 2008 170 170 170

American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 784 473 784

Cash for Clunkers 3 3 3

HIRE Act (Job Tax Credit) 17 8 17

Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assistance Act of 2009 91 57 91

Department of Defense Appropriations Act of 2010 >2 >3 >2

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 15

for individuals and businesses account for TABLE 11

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 16

FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 5 FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 6

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 17

Appendix B: Methodological Considerations

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 18

FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 7 FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 8

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 19

FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 9 FROM MOODY’S ECONOMY.COM 10

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 20

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 21

HOW THE GREAT RECESSION WAS BROUGHT TO AN END 22

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