5Ind/r/daa//smandtheMenta/

SinceHegel`sPhenomenologyofSpirit,abroad,inarticulatedivisionofemphasis
betweentheindividualandhissocialenvironmenthasmarkedphilosophical
discussionsofmind.Ononehand,thereisthetraditionalconcernwiththe
individualsubjectofmentalstatesandevents.IntheelderlyCartesiantradi-
tion,thespotlightisonwhatexistsortranspires'in`theindividual-hissecret
cogitations,hisinnatecognitivestructures,hisprivateperceptionsandintro-
spections,hisgraspingofideas,concepts,orforms.Moreevidentiallyoriented
movements,suchasbehaviorismanditsliberalizedprogeny,havehighlighted
theindividual`spubliclyobservablebehavior-hisinput-outputrelationsand
thedispositions,states,oreventsthatmediatethem.ButbothCartesianand
behavioristviewpointstendtofeaturetheindividualsubject.Ontheotherhand,
thereistheHegelianpreoccupationwiththeroleofsocialinstitutionsinshaping
theindividualandthecontentofhisthought.Thistraditionhasdominatedthe
ContinentsinceHegel.ButithasfoundechoesinEnglish-speakingphilosophy
duringthiscenturyintheformofaconcentrationonlanguage.Muchphilo-
sophicalworkonlanguageandmindhasbeenintheinterestsofCartesianor
behavioristviewpointsthatIshallterm'individualistic`.ButmanyofWittgen-
stein`sremarksaboutmentalrepresentationpointupasocialorientationthatis
discerniblefromhisfirtationswithbehaviorism.Andmorerecentworkonthe
theoryofreferencehasprovidedglimpsesoftheroleofsocialcooperationin
determiningwhatanindividualthinks.
Inmanyrespects,ofcourse,theseemphaseswithinphilosophy-individua-
listicandsocial-arecompatible.Toanextent,theymayberegardedsimply
asdifferentcurrentsintheturbulentstreamofideasthathaswashedtheintel-
lectuallandscapeduringthelasthundredandsomeoddyears.Buttheroleof
thesocialenvironmenthasreceivedconsiderablylessclear-headedphilosoph-
icalattention(thoughperhapsnotlessphilosophicalattention)thantherole
ofthestates,occurrences,oractsin,on,orbytheindividual.Philosophical
IamgratefultoparticipantsatapairoftalksgivenattheUniversityofLondoninthespringof
1978,andtoRichardRortyfordiscussionsearlier.IamalsoindebtedtoRobertAdamsandRogers
Albrittonwhosecriticismsforcednumerousimprovements.Iappreciativelyacknowledgesupport
oftheJohnSimonGuggenheimFoundation.
IndividualismandtheMental101
discussionsofsocialfactorshavetendedtobeobscure,evocative,metaphor-
ical,orplatitudinous,ortobebentonestablishingsomelargethesisabout
thecourseofhistoryandthedestinyofman.Thereremainsmuchroomfor
sharpdelineation.Ishalloffersomeconsiderationsthatstresssocialfactorsin
descriptionsofanindividual`smentalphenomena.Theseconsiderationscall
intoquestionindividualisticpresuppositionsofseveraltraditionalandmod-
erntreatmentsofmind.Ishallconcludewithsomeremarksaboutmental
models.
I.TERMINOLOGICALMATTERS
Ourordinarymentalisticdiscoursedividesbroadlyintotwosortsofidiom.
Onetypicallymakesreferencetomentalstatesoreventsintermsofsentential
expressions.Theotherdoesnot.Aclearcaseofthefrstkindofidiomis'Alfred
thinksthathisfriends`sofaisugly`.Aclearcaseofthesecondsortis'Alfred
isinpain`.Thoughts,beliefs,intentions,andsofortharetypicallyspecifedin
termsofsubordinatesententialclauses,that-clauses,whichmaybejudgedastrue
orfalse.Pains,feels,tickles,andsoforthhavenospecialsemanticalrelationto
sentencesortotruthorfalsity.Thereareintentionalidiomsthatfallinthesecond
categoryonthischaracterization,butthatshareimportantsemanticalfeatures
withexpressionsinthefrst-idiomslike'AlworshipsBuicks`.ButIshallnot
sorttheseouthere.Ishalldiscussonlytheformerkindofmentalisticidiom.
Theextensionofthediscussiontootherintentionalidiomswillnotbediffcult.
Inanordinarysense,thenounphrasesthatembedsententialexpressions
inmentalisticidiomsprovidethecontentofthementalstateorevent.We
shallcallthat-clausesandtheirgrammaticalvariants'contentclauses`.Thusthe
expression'thatsofasaremorecomfortablethanpews`providesthecontentof
Alfred`sbeliefthatsofasaremorecomfortablethanpews.Myphrase'provides
thecontent`representsanattemptatremainingneutral,atleastforpresentpur-
poses,amongvarioussemanticalandmetaphysicalaccountsofpreciselyhow
that-clausesfunctionandpreciselywhat,ifanything,contentsare.
Althoughthenotionofcontentis,forpresentpurposes,ontologicallyneutral,
Idothinkofitasholdingaplaceinasystematictheoryofmentalisticlan-
guage.Thequestionofwhentocountcontentsdifferent,andwhenthesame,is
answerabletotheoreticalrestrictions.Itisoftenremarkedthatinagivencontext
wemayascribetoapersontwothat-clausesthatareonlylooselyequivalentand
countthemasattributionsofthe'sameattitude`.WemaysaythatAl`sinten-
tiontoclimbMt.McKinleyandhisintentiontoclimbthehighestmountainin
theUnitedStatesarethe'sameintention`.(Iintendthetermsforthemoun-
taintooccurobliquelyhere.Seelaterdiscussion.)Thissortofpointextends
eventocontentclauseswithextensionallynon-equivalentcounterpartnotions.
Forcontextuallyrelevantpurposes,wemightcountathoughtthattheglass
containssomewateras'thesamethought`asathoughtthattheglasscontains
102IndividualismandtheMental
somethirst-quenchingliquid,particularlyifwehavenoreasontoattributeeither
contentasopposedtotheother,anddistinctionsbetweenthemarecontextually
irrelevant.Nevertheless,inboththeseexamples,everysystematictheoryIknow
ofwouldwanttorepresentthesemanticalcontributionofthecontentclausesin
distinguishableways-as'providingdifferentcontents`.
Onereasonfordoingsoisthatthepersonhimselfiscapableofhaving
differentattitudesdescribedbythedifferentcontentclauses,evenifthesedif-
ferencesareirrelevantinaparticularcontext.(Almighthavedevelopedthe
intentiontoclimbthehighestmountainbeforedevelopingtheintentiontoclimb
Mt.McKinley-regardlessofwhetherhe,infact,didso.)Asecondreason
isthatthecounterpartcomponentsofthethat-clausesalludetodistinguishable
elementsinpeople`scognitivelives.'Mt.McKinley`and'thehighestmoun-
tainintheU.S.`serve,ormightserve,toindicatecognitivelydifferentnotions.
Thisisavague,informalwayofgeneralizingFrege`spoint:thethoughtthat
Mt.McKinleyisthehighestmountainintheU.S.ispotentiallyinterestingor
informative.ThethoughtthatMt.McKinleyisMt.McKinleyisnot.Thuswhen
wesayinagivencontextthatattributionofdifferentcontentsisattributionof
the'sameattitude`,weuse'sameattitude`inawaysimilartothewayweuse
'samecar`whenwesaythatpeoplewhodriveFords(orgreen1970FordMav-
ericks)drivethe'samecar`.Forcontextualpurposesdifferentcarsarecounted
as'amountingtothesame`.
Althoughthisuseof'content`istheoretical,itisnot,Ithink,theoreticallycon-
troversial.Incaseswhereweshallbecountingcontentsdifferent,thecaseswill
beuncontentious:Onanysystematictheory,differencesintheextension-the
actualdenotation,referent,orapplication-ofcounterpartexpressionsinthat-
clauseswillbesemanticallyrepresented,andwill,inourterms,makefor
differencesincontent.Ishallbeavoidingthemorecontroversial,butinteresting,
questionsaboutthegeneralconditionsunderwhichsentencesinthat-clausescan
beexpectedtoprovidethesamecontent.
Ishouldalsowarnofsomesubsidiaryterms.Ishallbe(andhavebeen)
usingtheterm'notion`toapplytocomponentsorelementsofcontents.Just
aswholethat-clausesprovidethecontentofaperson`sattitude,semantically
relevantcomponentsofthat-clauseswillbetakentoindicatenotionsthatenter
intotheattitude(ortheattitude`scontent).Thistermissupposedtobejustas
ontologicallyneutralasitsfellow.WhenItalkofunderstandingormasteringthe
notionofcontract,Iamnotrelyingonanyspecialepistemicorontologicalthe-
ory,exceptinsofarastheearliermentionedtheoreticalrestrictionsonthenotion
ofcontentareinheritedbythenotionofnotion.Theexpression,'understanding
(mastering)anotion`istobeconstruedmoreorlessintuitively.Understanding
thenotionofcontractcomesroughlytoknowingwhatacontractis.Onecan
masterthenotionofcontractwithoutmasteringtheterm'contract`-atthevery
leastifonespeakssomelanguageotherthanEnglishthathasatermroughly
synonymouswith'contract`.(Ananalogouspointholdsformyuseof'mastering
acontent`.)Talkofnotionsisroughlysimilartotalkofconceptsinaninformal
IndividualismandtheMental103
sense.'Notion`hastheadvantageofbeingeasiertoseparatefromtraditional
theoreticalcommitments.
Ispeakofattributingacontent,ornotion,andofascribingathat-clauseor
otherpieceoflanguage.Ascriptionsarethelinguisticanalogsofattributions.
Thisuseof'ascribe`isnonstandard,butconvenientandeasilyassimilated.
Therearesemanticalcomplexitiesinvolvingthebehaviorofexpressionsin
contentclauses,mostofwhichwecanskirt.Butsomemustbetouchedon.
Basictothesubjectistheobservationthatexpressionsincontentclausesare
oftennotintersubstitutablewithextensionallyequivalentexpressionsinsuch
awayastomaintainthetruth-valueofthecontainingsentence.Thusfrom
thefactsthatwaterisH
2
OandthatBertrandthoughtthatwaterisnotftto
drink,itdoesnotfollowthatBertrandthoughtthatH
2
Oisnotfttodrink.
Whenanexpressionlike'water`functionsinacontentclausesothatitisnot
freelyexchangeablewithallextensionallyequivalentexpressions,weshallsay
thatithasobliqueoccurrence.Roughlyspeaking,thereasonwhy'water`and
'H
2
O`arenotinterchangeableinourreportofBertrand`sthoughtisthat'water`
playsaroleincharacterizingadifferentmentalactorstatefromthatwhich
'H
2
O`wouldplayaroleincharacterizing.Inthiscontextatleast,thinking
thatwaterisnotfttodrinkisdifferentfromthinkingthatH
2
Oisnotftto
drink.
Bycontrast,therearenon-obliqueoccurrencesofexpressionsincontent
clauses.Onemightsaythatsomewater-say,thewaterintheglassover
there-isthoughtbyBertrandtobeimpure;orthatBertrandthoughtthatthat
waterisimpure.Andonemightintendtomakenodistinctionthatwouldbelost
byreplacing'water`with'H
2
O`-or'thatwater`with'thatH
2
O`or'thatcom-
monliquid`,oranyotherexpressionextensionallyequivalentwith'thatwater`.
WemightallowtheseexchangeseventhoughBertrandhadneverheardof,say,
H
2
O.Insuchpurelynon-obliqueoccurrences,'water`playsnoroleinproviding
thecontentofBertrand`sthought,onouruseof`content',or(inanynarrow
sense)incharacterizingBertrandorhismentalstate.Noristhewaterpartof
Bertrand`sthoughtcontent.WespeakofBertrandthinkinghiscontentofthe
water.Atitsnon-obliqueoccurrence,theterm'thatwater`simplyisolates,in
oneofmanyequallygoodways,aportionofwetstufftowhichBertrandor
histhoughtisrelatedorapplied.Incertaincases,itmayalsomarkacontext
inwhichBertrand`sthoughtisapplied.Butitisexpressionsatobliqueoccur-
renceswithincontentclausesthatprimarilydothejobofprovidingthecontent
ofmentalstatesorevents,andincharacterizingtheperson.
Mentalisticdiscoursecontainingobliquelyoccurringexpressionshastradition-
allybeencalledintentionaldiscourse.Thehistoricalreasonsforthisnomenclature
arecomplexandpartlyconfused.Butroughlyspeaking,grammaticalcontexts
involvingobliqueoccurrenceshavebeenfxeduponasspeciallyrelevanttothe
representationalcharacter(sometimescalled'intentionality`)ofmentalstatesand
events.Clearly,obliqueoccurrencesinmentalisticdiscoursehavesomethingtodo
withcharacterizingaperson`sepistemicperspective-howthingsseemtohim,
104IndividualismandtheMental
orinaninformalsense,howtheyarerepresentedtohim.Sowithoutendorsing
allthecommitmentsofthistradition,Ishalltakeoveritsterminology.
Thecrucialpointintheprecedingdiscussionistheassumptionthatobliquely
occurringexpressionsincontentclausesareaprimarymeansofidentifyinga
person`sintentionalmentalstatesorevents.Afurtherpointisworthremark-
inghere.Itisnormaltosupposethatthosecontentclausescorrectlyascrib-
abletoapersonthatarenotingeneralintersubstitutablesalvaveritate-and
certainlythosethatinvolveextensionallynon-equivalentcounterpartexpres-
sions-identifydifferentmentalstatesorevents.
Ihavecitedcontextualexceptionstothisnormalsupposition,atleastin
amannerofspeaking.Wesometimescountdistinctionsincontentirrelevant
forpurposesofagivenattribution,particularlywhereourevidenceforthe
precisecontentofapersonoranimal`sattitudeisskimpy.Differentcontents
maycontextuallyidentify(whatamountto)the'sameattitude`.Ihaveindicated
thateveninthesecontexts,Ithinkitbest,strictlyspeaking,toconstruedistinct
contentsasdescribingdifferentmentalstatesoreventsthataremerelyequivalent
forthepurposesathand.Ibelievethatthisviewiswidelyaccepted.ButnothingI
saywilldependonit.Foranydistinctcontents,therewillbeimaginablecontexts
ofattributioninwhich,evenintheloosest,mostinformalwaysofspeaking,
thosecontentswouldbesaidtodescribedifferentmentalstatesorevents.This
isvirtuallyaconsequenceofthetheoreticalroleofcontents,discussedearlier.
Sinceourdiscussionwillhavean'inprinciple`character,Ishalltakethese
contextstobetherelevantones.Mostofthecaseswediscusswillinvolve
extensionaldifferencesbetweenobliquelyoccurringcounterpartexpressionsin
that-clauses.Insuchcases,itisparticularlynaturalandnormaltotakedifferent
contentsasidentifyingdifferentmentalstatesorevents.
II.ATHOUGHTEXPERIMENT
IIa.FirstCase
Wenowturntoathree-stepthoughtexperiment.Supposefrstthat:
Agivenpersonhasalargenumberofattitudescommonlyattributedwith
contentclausescontaining'arthritis`inobliqueoccurrence.Forexample,
hethinks(correctly)thathehashadarthritisforyears,thathisarthritisin
hiswristsandfngersismorepainfulthanhisarthritisinhisankles,thatit
isbettertohavearthritisthancanceroftheliver,thatstiffeningjointsisa
symptomofarthritis,thatcertainsortsofachesarecharacteristicofarthritis,
thattherearevariouskindsofarthritis,andsoforth.Inshort,hehasawide
rangeofsuchattitudes.Inadditiontotheseunsurprisingattitudes,hethinks
falselythathehasdevelopedarthritisinthethigh.
GenerallycompetentinEnglish,rational,andintelligent,thepatientreportsto
hisdoctorhisfearthathisarthritishasnowlodgedinhisthigh.Thedoctor
IndividualismandtheMental105
repliesbytellinghimthatthiscannotbeso,sincearthritisisspecifcallyan
infammationofjoints.Anydictionarycouldhavetoldhimthesame.Thepatient
issurprised,butrelinquisheshisviewandgoesontoaskwhatmightbewrong
withhisthigh.
Thesecondstepofthethoughtexperimentconsistsofacounterfactualsup-
position.Wearetoconceiveofasituationinwhichthepatientproceedsfrom
birththroughthesamecourseofphysicaleventsthatheactuallydoes,rightto
andincludingthetimeatwhichhefrstreportshisfeartohisdoctor.Precisely
thesamethings(non-intentionallydescribed)happentohim.Hehasthesame
physiologicalhistory,thesamediseases,thesameinternalphysicaloccurrences.
Hegoesthroughthesamemotions,engagesinthesamebehavior,hasthesame
sensoryintake(physiologicallydescribed).Hisdispositionstorespondtostimuli
areexplainedinphysicaltheoryastheeffectsofthesameproximatecauses.
Allofthisextendstohisinteractionwithlinguisticexpressions.Hesaysand
hearsthesamewords(wordforms)atthesametimesheactuallydoes.He
developsthedispositiontoassentto'Arthritiscanoccurinthethigh`and'I
havearthritisinthethigh`asaresultofthesamephysicallydescribedproximate
causes.Suchdispositionsmighthaveariseninanumberofways.Butwecan
supposethatinbothactualandcounterfactualsituations,heacquirestheword
'arthritis`fromcasualconversationorreading,andneverhearinganythingto
prejudicehimfororagainstapplyingitinthewaythathedoes,heappliesthe
wordtoanailmentinhisthigh(ortoailmentsinthelimbsofothers)which
seemstoproducepainsorothersymptomsroughlysimilartothediseasein
hishandsandankles.Inbothactualandcounterfactualcases,thedispositionis
neverreinforcedorextinguishedupuntilthetimewhenheexpresseshimself
tohisdoctor.Wefurtherimaginethatthepatient`snon-intentional,phenom-
enalexperienceisthesame.Hehasthesamepains,visualfelds,images,and
internalverbalrehearsals.Thecounterfactualityinthesuppositiontouchesonly
thepatient`ssocialenvironment.Inactualfact,'arthritis`,asusedinhiscom-
munity,doesnotapplytoailmentsoutsidejoints.Indeed,itfailstodosobya
standard,non-technicaldictionarydefnition.Butinourimaginedcase,physi-
cians,lexicographers,andinformedlaymenapply'arthritis`notonlytoarthritis
buttovariousotherrheumatoidailments.Thestandarduseofthetermistobe
conceivedtoencompassthepatient`sactualmisuse.Wecouldimagineeither
thatarthritiswasnotsingledoutasafamilyofdiseases,orthatsomeotherterm
besides'arthritis`wasapplied,thoughnotcommonlybylaymen,specifcallyto
arthritis.Wemayalsosupposethatthisdifferenceandthosenecessarilyassoci-
atedwithitaretheonlydifferencesbetweenthecounterfactualsituationandthe
actualone.(Otherpeoplebesidesthepatientwill,ofcourse,behavedifferently.)
Tosummarizethesecondstep:
Thepersonmighthavehadthesamephysicalhistoryandnon-intentional
mentalphenomenawhiletheword'arthritis`wasconventionallyapplied,
anddefnedtoapply,tovariousrheumatoidailments,includingtheonein
theperson`sthigh,aswellastoarthritis.
106IndividualismandtheMental
Thefnalstepisaninterpretationofthecounterfactualcase,oranaddition
toitassofardescribed.Itisreasonabletosupposethat:
Inthecounterfactualsituation,thepatientlackssome-probablyall-of
theattitudescommonlyattributedwithcontentclausescontaining'arthritis`
inobliqueoccurrence.Helackstheoccurrentthoughtsorbeliefsthathe
hasarthritisinthethigh,thathehashadarthritisforyears,thatstiffening
jointsandvarioussortsofachesaresymptomsofarthritis,thathisfather
hadarthritis,andsoon.
Wesupposethatinthecounterfactualcasewecannotcorrectlyascribeany
contentclausecontaininganobliqueoccurrenceoftheterm'arthritis`.Itishard
toseehowthepatientcouldhavepickedupthenotionofarthritis.Theword
'arthritis`inthecounterfactualcommunitydoesnotmeanarthritis.Itdoesnot
applyonlytoinfammationsofjoints.Wesupposethatnootherwordinthe
patient`srepertoiremeansarthritis.'Arthritis`,inthecounterfactualsituation,
differsbothindictionarydefnitionandinextensionfrom'arthritis`asweuse
it.Ourascriptionsofcontentclausestothepatient(andascriptionswithinhis
community)wouldnotconstituteattributionsofthesamecontentsweactually
attribute.Forcounterpartexpressionsinthecontentclausesthatareactually
andcounterfactuallyascribablearenotevenextensionallyequivalent.However
wedescribethepatient`sattitudesinthecounterfactualsituation,itwillnotbe
withatermorphraseextensionallyequivalentwith'arthritis`.Sothepatient`s
counterfactualattitudecontentsdifferfromhisactualones.
Theupshotoftheserefectionsisthatthepatient`smentalcontentsdiffer,
whilehisentirephysicalandnon-intentionalmentalhistories,consideredin
isolationfromtheirsocialcontext,remainthesame.(Wecouldhavesupposed
thathedroppeddeadatthetimehefrstexpressedhisfeartothedoctor.)The
differencesseemtostemfromdifferences'outside`thepatientconsideredas
anisolatedphysicalorganism,causalmechanism,orseatofconsciousness.The
differenceinhismentalcontentsisattributabletodifferencesinhissocialenvir-
onment.Insum,thepatient`sinternalqualitativeexperiences,hisphysiological
statesandevents,hisbehaviorallydescribedstimuliandresponses,hisdisposi-
tionstobehave,andwhateversequencesofstates(non-intentionallydescribed)
mediatedhisinputandoutput-alltheseremainconstant,whilehisattitude
contentsdiffer,evenintheextensionsofcounterpartnotions.Asweobserved
attheoutset,suchdifferencesareordinarilytakentospelldifferencesinmental
statesandevents.
IIb.FurtherExempliücations
Theargumenthasanextremelywideapplication.Itdoesnotdepend,for
example,onthekindofword'arthritis`is.Wecouldhaveusedanartifact
term,anordinarynaturalkindword,acoloradjective,asocialroleterm,aterm
forahistoricalstyle,anabstractnoun,anactionverb,aphysicalmovement
IndividualismandtheMental107
verb,oranyofvariousothersortsofwords.Iprefertoleaveopenprecisely
howfaronecangeneralizetheargument.ButIthinkithasaverywidescope.
Theargumentcangetunderwayinanycasewhereitisintuitivelypossibleto
attributeamentalstateoreventwhosecontentinvolvesanotionthatthesubject
incompletelyunderstands.Aswillbecomeclear,thispossibilityisthekeyto
thethoughtexperiment.Iwanttogiveamoreconcretesenseofthepossibility
beforegoingfurther.
Itisusefultorefectonthenumberandvarietyofintuitivelyclearcasesin
whichitisnormaltoattributeacontentthatthesubjectincompletelyunder-
stands.Oneneedonlythumbthroughadictionaryforanhourorsotodevelop
asenseoftheextenttowhichone`sbeliefsareinfectedbyincompleteunder-
standing.
1
Thephenomenonisrampantinourpluralisticage.
a.Mostcasesofincompleteunderstandingthatsupportthethoughtexperi-
mentwillbefairlyidiosyncratic.Thereisareasonforthis.Commonlinguistic
errors,ifentrenched,tendtobecomecommonusage.Butagenerallycompetent
speakerisboundtohavenumerouswordsinhisrepertoire,possiblyevencom-
monwords,thathesomewhatmisconstrues.Manyofthesemisconstrualswill
notbesuchastodefectordinaryascriptionsofthat-clausesinvolvingtheincom-
pletelymasteredterminobliqueoccurrence.Forexample,onecanimaginea
generallycompetent,rationaladulthavingalargenumberofattitudesinvolving
thenotionofsofa-includingbeliefsthatthose(somesofas)aresofas,that
somesofasarebeige,thathisneighborshaveanewsofa,thathewouldrather
sitinasofaforanhourthanonachurchpew.Inaddition,hemightthink
thatsuffcientlybroad(butsingle-seat)overstuffedarmchairsaresofas.With
care,onecandevelopathoughtexperimentparalleltotheoneinsectionIIa,in
whichatleastsomeoftheperson`sattitudecontents(particularly,inthiscase,
contentsofoccurrentmentalevents)differ,whilehisphysicalhistory,disposi-
tionstobehavior,andphenomenalexperience-non-intentionallyandasocially
described-remainthesame.
b.Althoughmostrelevantmisconstrualsarefairlyidiosyncratic,theredoseem
tobecertaintypesoferrorwhicharerelativelycommon-butnotsocommon
anduniformastosuggestthattherelevanttermstakeonnewsense.Muchof
ourvocabularyistakenoverfromotherswho,beingspecialists,understandour
termsbetterthanwedo.
2
Theuseofscientifctermsbylaymenisarichsource
1
Ourexamplessuggestpointsaboutlearningthatneedexploration.Itwouldseemnaivetothink
thatwefrstattainamasteryofexpressionsornotionsweuseandthentacklethesubjectmatterswe
speakandthinkaboutinusingthoseexpressionsornotions.Inmostcases,theprocessesoverlap.
Butwhilethesubject`sunderstandingisstillpartial,wesometimesattributementalcontentsin
theverytermsthesubjecthasyettomaster.Traditionalviewstakemasteringawordtoconsist
inmatchingitwithanalreadymastered(orinnate)concept.Butitwouldseem,rather,thatmany
concepts(ormentalcontentcomponents)arelikewords,inthattheymaybeemployedbeforethey
aremastered.Inbothcases,employmentappearstobeanintegralpartoftheprocessofmastery.
2
AdevelopmentofasimilarthememaybefoundinHilaryPutnam`snotionofadivision
oflinguisticlabor.Cf.'TheMeaningof'Meaning`¨,inPhilosophicalPapers,ii(Cambridge:
108IndividualismandtheMental
ofcases.Asthearthritisexampleillustrates,thethoughtexperimentdoesnot
dependonspeciallytechnicalterms.Ishallleaveittotheimaginationofthe
readertospinoutfurtherexamplesofthissort.
c.Oneneednotlooktothelaymen`sacquisitionsfromscienceforexamples.
Peopleusedtobuyingbeefbrisketinstoresororderingitinrestaurants(and
conversantwithitinageneralway)probablyoftendevelopmistakenbeliefs
(oruncertainties)aboutjustwhatbrisketis.Forexample,onemightthinkthat
CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),227ff.Putnam`simaginativeworkisinotherwayscongenial
withpointsIhavedeveloped.Someofhisexamplescanbeadaptedinfairlyobviouswayssoasto
giveanargumentwithdifferentpremises,butaconclusioncomplementarytotheoneIarriveatin
Sec.IIa.
ConsiderAlfred`sbeliefcontentsinvolvingthenotionofwater.WithoutchangingAlfred`s(orhis
fellows`)non-intentionalphenomenalexperiences,internalphysicaloccurrences,ordispositionsto
respondtostimulionsensorysurfaces,wecanimaginethatnotwater(H
2
O),butadifferentliquid
withdifferentstructurebutsimilarmacro-properties(andidenticalphenomenalproperties)played
theroleinhisenvironmentthatwaterdoesinours.Insuchacase,wecouldascribenocontent
clausestoAlfredwith'water`inobliqueposition.Hisbeliefcontentswoulddiffer.Theconclusion
(withwhichIaminsympathy)isthatmentalcontentsareaffectednotonlybythephysicaland
qualitativelymentalwaythepersonis,butbythenatureofhisphysicalenvironment.
Putnamhimselfdoesnotgivequitethisargument.Henowherestatesthefrstandthirdsteps,
thoughhegivesanalogsofthemforthemeaningof'water`.Thisispartlyjustaresultofhis
concentrationonmeaninginsteadofpropositionalattitudes.Butsomeofwhathesaysevenseems
toopposetheargument`sconclusion.Heremarksineffectthatthesubject`sthoughtsremainconstant
betweenhisactualandcounterfactualcases(p.224).Inhisownargumentheexplicatesthedifference
betweenactualandcounterfactualcasesintermsofadifferenceintheextensionofterms,nota
differenceinthoseaspectsoftheirmeaningthatplayaroleinthecognitivelifeofthesubject.And
hetriestoexplicatehisexamplesintermsofindexicality-amistake,Ithink,andonethattends
todivertattentionfrommajorimplicationsoftheexampleshegives.(Cf.Sec.IId.)Inmyview,
theexamplesdoillustratethefactthatallattitudesinvolvingnaturalkindnotions,includingde
dictoattitudes,presupposedereattitudes.Buttheexamplesdonotshowthatnaturalkindlinguistic
expressionsareinanyordinarysenseindexical.Nordotheyshowthatbeliefsinvolvingnaturalkind
notionsarealwaysdere.Eveniftheydid,thechangefromactualtocounterfactualcaseswould
affectobliqueoccurrencesofnaturalkindtermsinthat-clauses-occurrencesthatarethekeyto
attributionsofcognitivecontent.(Cf.aboveandnote3.)Inthecitedpaperandearlierones,much
ofwhatPutnamsaysaboutpsychologicalstates(andimpliesaboutmentalstates)hasadistinctly
individualisticring.BelowinSec.IV,Icriticizeviewpointsaboutmentalphenomenainfuencedby
andatleaststronglysuggestedinhisearlierworkonfunctionalism.(Cf.note9.)
Ontheotherhand,Putnam`sarticulationofsocialandenvironmentalaspectsofthemeaningof
naturalkindtermscomplementsandsupplementsmyviewpoint.Forme,ithasbeenarichrewarder
ofrefection.Morerecentworkofhisseemstoinvolveshiftsinhisviewpointonpsychological
states.Itmayhavesomewhatmoreincommonwithmyapproachthantheearlierwork,butthere
ismuchthatIdonotunderstandaboutit.
TheargumentregardingthenotionofwaterthatIextractedfromPutnam`spaperisnarrower
inscopethanmyargument.ThePutnam-derivedargumentseemstoworkonlyfornaturalkind
termsandcloserelatives.Anditmayseemnottoprovideasdirectathreattocertainversionsof
functionalismthatIdiscussinSec.IV:Atleastafewphilosopherswouldclaimthatonecould
accommodatethePutnamianargumentintermsofnon-intentionalformulationsofinput-output
relations(formulationsthatmakereferencetothespecifcnatureofthephysicalenvironment).My
argumentdoesnotsubmittothismaneuver.Inmythoughtexperiment,thephysicalenvironment
(sofas,arthritis,andsoforthinmyexamples)andthesubject`scausalrelationswithit(atleast
astheseareusuallyconceived)wereheldconstant.ThePutnamianargument,however,hasfas-
cinatinglydifferentimplicationsfrommyargument.Ihavenotdevelopedthesecomparisonsand
contrastsherebecausedoingjusticetoPutnam`sviewpointwoulddemandadistractingamountof
space,astheamplegirthofthisfootnotemaysuggest.
IndividualismandtheMental109
brisketisacutfromthefankorrump,orthatitincludesnotonlythelower
partofthechestbutalsotheupperpart,orthatitisspecifcallyacutofbeef
andnotof,say,pork.Noonehesitatestoascribetosuchpeoplecontentclauses
with'brisket`inobliqueoccurrence.Forexample,apersonmaybelievethathe
iseatingbrisketunderthesecircumstances(where'brisket`occursinoblique
position);orhemaythinkthatbriskettendstobetougherthanloin.Someof
theseattitudesmaybefalse;manywillbetrue.Wecanimagineacounter-
factualcaseinwhichtheperson`sphysicalhistory,hisdispositions,andhis
non-intentionalmentallife,areallthesame,butinwhich'brisket`iscommonly
appliedinadifferentway-perhapsinpreciselythewaythepersonthinksit
applies.Forexample,itmightapplyonlytobeefandtotheupperandlower
partsofthechest.Insuchacase,asinthesofaandarthritiscases,itwouldseem
thatthepersonwould(ormight)lacksomeorallofthepropositionalattitudes
thatareactuallyattributedwithcontentclausesinvolving'brisket`inoblique
position.
d.Someoneonlygenerallyversedinmusichistory,orsuperfciallyacquainted
withafewdrawingsofmusicalinstruments,mightnaturallybutmistakenly
cometothinkthatclavichordsincludedharpsichordswithoutlegs.Hemayhave
manyotherbeliefsinvolvingthenotionofclavichord,andmanyofthesemay
betrue.Again,withsomecare,arelevantthoughtexperimentcanbegenerated.
e.Afairlycommonmistakeamonglawyers`clientsistothinkthatonecannot
haveacontractwithsomeoneunlesstherehasbeenawrittenagreement.The
clientmightbeclearinintending'contract`(intherelevantsense)toapplyto
agreements,nottopiecesofpaper.Yethemaytakeitaspartofthemeaning
oftheword,ortheessenceoflaw,thatapieceofformalwritingisaneces-
saryconditionforestablishingacontract.Hisonlyexperienceswithcontracts
mighthaveinvolvedformaldocuments,andheundergeneralizes.Itisnotter-
riblyimportantherewhetheronesaysthattheclientmisunderstandstheterm`s
meaning,oralternativelythattheclientmakesamistakeabouttheessenceof
contracts.Ineithercase,hemisconceiveswhatacontractis;yetascriptions
involvingtheterminobliquepositionaremadeanyway.
ItisworthemphasizingherethatIintendthemisconceptiontoinvolvethe
subject`sattachingcounterfactualconsequencestohismistakenbeliefaboutcon-
tracts.Letmeelaboratethisabit.Acommondictionarydefnitionof'contract`
is'legallybindingagreement`.AsIamimaginingthecase,theclientdoesnot
explicitlydefne'contract`tohimselfinthisway(thoughhemightusethis
phraseinexplicatingtheterm).Andheisnotmerelymakingamistakeabout
whatthelawhappenstoenforce.Ifaskedwhyunwrittenagreementsarenot
contracts,heislikelytosaysomethinglike'Theyjustaren`t`or'Itispartof
thenatureofthelawandlegalpracticethattheyhavenoforce`.Heisnot
disposedwithoutproddingtoanswer,'Itwouldbepossiblebutimpracticalto
giveunwrittenagreementslegalforce`.Hemightconcedethis.Buthewould
addthatsuchagreementswouldnotbecontracts.Heregardsadocumentas
110IndividualismandtheMental
inseparablefromcontractualobligation,regardlessofwhetherhetakesthisto
beamatterofmeaningorametaphysicalessentialisttruthaboutcontracts.
Needlesstosay,thesenicetiesarephilosophers`distinctions.Theyarenot
somethinganordinarymanislikelytohavestrongopinionsabout.Mypoint
isthatthethoughtexperimentisindependentofthesedistinctions.Itdoesnot
dependonmisunderstandingsofdictionarymeaning.Onemightsaythatthe
clientunderstoodtheterm`sdictionarymeaning,butmisunderstooditsessen-
tialapplicationinthelaw-misconceivedthenatureofcontracts.Thethought
experimentstillfies.Inacounterfactualcaseinwhichthelawenforcesboth
writtenandunwrittenagreementsandinwhichthesubject`sbehaviorandso
fortharethesame,butinwhich'contract`means'legallybindingagreement
basedonwrittendocument`,wewouldnotattributetohimamistakenbelief
thatacontractrequireswrittenagreement,althoughthelawyermighthaveto
pointoutthatthereareotherlegallybindingagreementsthatdonotrequire
documents.Similarly,theclient`sotherpropositionalattitudeswouldnolonger
involvethenotionofcontract,butanothermorerestrictednotion.
f.Peoplesometimesmakemistakesaboutcolorranges.Theymaycorrectly
applyacolortermtoacertaincolor,butalsomistakenlyapplyittoshadesofa
neighboringcolor.Whenaskedtoexplainthecolorterm,theycitethestandard
cases(for'red`,thecolorofblood,freengines,andsoforth).Buttheyapply
thetermsomewhatbeyonditsconventionallyestablishedrange-beyondthe
reachofitsvagueborders.Theythinkthatfreengines,includingthatone,are
red.Theyobservethatredrosesarecoveringthetrellis.Buttheyalsothinkthat
thosethingsareashadeofred(whereastheyarenot).Secondlooksdonot
changetheiropinion.Buttheygiveinwhenotherspeakersconfdentlycorrect
theminunison.
Thiscaseextendsthepointofthecontractexample.Theerrorislinguisticor
conceptualinsomethinglikethewaythattheshopper`smistakeinvolvingthe
notionofbrisketis.Itisnotanordinaryempiricalerror.Butonemayreason-
ablydoubtthatthesubjectsmisunderstandthedictionarymeaningofthecolor
term.Holdingtheirnon-intentionalphenomenalexperience,physicalhistory,and
behavioraldispositionsconstant,wecanimaginethat'red`wereappliedasthey
mistakenlyapplyit.Insuchcases,wewouldnolongerascribecontentclauses
involvingtheterm'red`inobliqueposition.Theattributionofthecorrectbeliefs
aboutfreenginesandroseswouldbenolessaffectedthantheattributionof
thebeliefsthat,intheactualcase,displaythemisapplication.Casesbearingout
thelatterpointarecommoninanthropologicalreportsoncommunitieswhose
colortermsdonotmatchours.Attributionsofcontenttypicallyallowforthe
differencesinconventionallyestablishedcolorranges.
Hereisnottheplacetorefneourroughdistinctionsamongthevarious
kindsofmisconceptionsthatservethethoughtexperiment.Ourphilosophical
purposesdonotdependonhowthesedistinctionsaredrawn.Still,itisimport-
anttoseewhatanarrayofconceptualerrorsiscommonamongus.Andit
IndividualismandtheMental111
isimportanttonotethatsucherrorsdonotalwaysorautomaticallyprevent
attributionofmentalcontentprovidedbytheverytermsthatareincompletely
understoodormisapplied.Thethoughtexperimentisnourishedbythisaspect
ofcommonpractice.
IIc.ExpansionandDelineationoftheThoughtExperiment
AsIhavetriedtosuggestintheprecedingexamples,therelevantattributionsin
thefrststepofthethoughtexperimentneednotdisplaythesubject`serror.They
maybeattributionsofatruecontent.Wecanbeginwithapropositionalattitude
thatinvolvedthemisconceivednotion,butinatrue,unproblematicapplication
ofit:forexample,thepatient`sbeliefthathe,likehisfather,developedarthritis
intheanklesandwristsatage58(where'arthritis`occursobliquely).
Oneneednotevenrelyonanunderlyingmisconceptioninthethoughtexper-
iment.Onemaypickacaseinwhichthesubjectonlypartiallyunderstandsan
expression.Hemayapplyitfrmlyandcorrectlyinarangeofcases,butbe
unclearoragnosticaboutcertainofitsapplicationsorimplicationswhich,in
fact,arefullyestablishedincommonpractice.Mostoftheexampleswegave
previouslycanbereinterpretedinthisway.Totakeanewone,imaginethatour
protagonistisunsurewhetherhisfatherhasmortgagesonthecarandhouse,or
justoneonthehouse.Heisalittleuncertainaboutexactlyhowtheloanand
collateralmustbearrangedinorderfortheretobeamortgage,andheisnot
clearaboutwhetheronemayhavemortgagesonanythingotherthanhouses.
Heissure,however,thatUncleHarrypaidoffhismortgage.Imagineourman
constantinthewayspreviouslyindicatedandthat'mortgage`commonlyapplied
onlytomortgagesonhouses.Butimaginebankingpracticesthemselvestobe
thesame.Thenthesubject`suncertaintywouldplausiblynotinvolvethenotion
ofmortgage.Norwouldhisotherpropositionalattitudesbecorrectlyattributed
withtheterm'mortgage`inobliqueposition.Partialunderstandingisasgood
asmisunderstandingforourpurposes.
Ontheotherhand,thethoughtexperimentdoesappeartodependonthe
possibilityofsomeone`shavingapropositionalattitudedespiteanincomplete
masteryofsomenotioninitscontent.Toseewhythisappearstobeso,let
ustrytorunthroughathoughtexperiment,attemptingtoavoidanyimputa-
tionofincompleteunderstanding.Supposethesubjectthinksfalselythatall
swansarewhite.Onecancertainlyholdthefeaturesofswansandthesubject`s
non-intentionalphenomenalexperience,physicalhistory,andnon-intentional
dispositionsconstant,andimaginethat'swan`meant'whiteswan`(andper-
hapssomeotherterm,unfamiliartothesubject,meantwhat'swan`means).
Couldonereasonablyinterpretthesubjectashavingdifferentattitudecontents
withoutatsomepointinvokingamisconception?Thequestionstobeasked
hereareaboutthesubject`sdispositions.Forexample,intheactualcase,ifhe
wereshownablackswanandtoldthathewaswrong,wouldhefairlynaturally
concedehismistake?Orwouldherespond,'I`mdoubtfulthatthat`saswan,`
112IndividualismandtheMental
untilwebroughtindictionaries,encyclopedias,andothernativespeakersto
correcthisusage?Inthelattercase,hisunderstandingof'swan`wouldbedevi-
ant.Supposethenthatintheactualsituationhewouldrespondnormallytothe
counterexample.Thenthereisreasontosaythatheunderstandsthenotionof
swancorrectly;andhiserrorisnotconceptualorlinguistic,butempiricalinan
ordinaryandnarrowsense.(Ofcourse,thelinewearedrawinghereispretty
fuzzy.)Whenonecomestothecounterfactualstageofthethoughtexperiment,
thesubjecthasthesamedispositionstorespondpliablytothepresentationofa
blackspecimen.Butsucharesponsewouldsuggestamisunderstandingofthe
term'swan`ascounterfactuallyused.Forinthecounterfactualcommunity,what
theycall'swans`couldnotfailtobewhite.Themerepresentationofablack
swanwouldbeirrelevanttothedefnitionaltruth'Allswansarewhite`.Ihave
notsetthiscaseupasanexampleofthethoughtexperiment`sgoingthrough.
RatherIhaveusedittosupporttheconjecturethatifthethoughtexperiment
istowork,onemustatsomestagefndthesubjectbelieving(orhavingsome
attitudecharacterizedby)acontent,despiteanincompleteunderstandingor
misapplication.Anordinaryempiricalerrorappearsnottobesuffcient.
Itwouldbeamistake,however,tothinkthatincompleteunderstanding,in
thesensethattheargumentrequires,isingeneralanunusualorevendevi-
antphenomenon.WhatIhavecalled`partialunderstanding'iscommonoreven
normalinthecaseofalargenumberofexpressionsinourvocabularies.'Arth-
ritis`isacaseinpoint.Evenifbythegraceofcircumstanceapersondoesnot
fallintoviewsthatruncountertotheterm`smeaningorapplication,itwould
notbeintheleastdeviantor'sociallyunacceptable`tohavenoclearattitude
thatwouldblocksuchviews.'Brisket`,'contract`,'recession`,'sonata`,'deer`,
'elm`(toborrowawell-knownexample),'pre-amplifer`,'carburetor`,'gothic`,
'fermentation`,probablyprovideanalogouscases.Continuingthelistislargely
amatterofpatience.Thesortof'incompleteunderstanding`requiredbythe
thoughtexperimentincludesquiteordinary,nondeviantphenomena.
Itisworthremarkingthatthethoughtexperimentasoriginallypresented
mightberuninreverse.Theideawouldbetostartwithanordinarybeliefor
thoughtinvolvingnoincompleteunderstanding.Thenwefndtheincomplete
understandinginthesecondstep.Forexample,properlyunderstanding'arth-
ritis`,apatientmaythink(correctly)thathehasarthritis.Hehappenstohave
heardofarthritisonlyoccurringinjoints,andhecorrectlybelievesthatthat
iswherearthritisalwaysoccurs.Holdinghisphysicalhistory,dispositions,and
painconstant,weimaginethat'arthritis`commonlyappliestorheumatoidail-
mentsofallsorts.Arthritishasnotbeensingledoutforspecialmention.Ifthe
patientweretoldbyadoctor'Youalsohavearthritisinthethigh`,thepatient
wouldbedisposed(asheisintheactualcase)torespond,'Really?Ididn`t
knowthatonecouldhavearthritisexceptinjoints`.Thedoctorwouldanswer,
'No,arthritisoccursinmuscles,tendons,bursas,andelsewhere.`Thepatient
wouldstandcorrected.Thenotionthatthedoctorandpatientwouldbeoperating
withinsuchacasewouldnotbethatofarthritis.
IndividualismandtheMental113
Myreasonsfornothavingoriginallysetoutthethoughtexperimentinthis
wayarelargelyheuristic.Aswillbeseen,discussionofthethoughtexperiment
willtendtocenteronthestepinvolvingincompleteunderstanding.AndIwanted
toencourageyou,dearreader,toimagineactualcasesofincompleteunderstand-
inginyourownlinguisticcommunity.Ordinaryintuitionsinthedomesticcase
areperhapslesssubjecttoprematurewarpingintheinterestsoftheory.Cases
involvingnotonlymentalcontentattribution,butalsotranslationofaforeign
tongue,aremorevulnerabletointrusionofsideissues.
Asecondaryreasonfornotbeginningwiththis'reversed`versionofthe
thoughtexperimentisthatIfnditdoubtfulwhetherthethoughtexperiment
alwaysworksinsymmetricfashion.Theremaybespecialintuitiveproblemsin
certaincases-perhaps,forexample,casesinvolvingperceptualnaturalkinds.
Wemaygivespecialinterpretationstoindividuals`misconceptionsinimagined
foreigncommunities,whenthosemisconceptionsseemtomatchourconcep-
tions.Inotherwords,theremaybesomesystematicintuitivebiasinfavorof
atleastcertainofournotionsforpurposesofinterpretingthemisconceptions
ofimaginedforeigners.Idonotwanttoexplorethepointhere.Ithinkthat
anysuchbiasisnotalwayscrucial,andthatthethoughtexperimentfrequently
works'symmetrically`.Wehavetotakeaccountofaperson`scommunityin
interpretinghiswordsanddescribinghisattitudes-andthisholdsintheforeign
caseaswellasinthedomesticcase.
Thereversalofthethoughtexperimentbringshometheimportantpoint
thateventhosepropositionalattitudesnotinfectedbyincompleteunderstanding
dependfortheircontentonsocialfactorsthatareindependentoftheindividual,
asociallyandnon-intentionallydescribed.Forifthesocialenvironmenthad
beenappropriatelydifferent,thecontentsofthoseattitudeswouldhavebeen
different.
Evenapartfromreversalsofthethoughtexperiment,itisplausible(inthe
lightofitsoriginalversions)thatourwell-understoodpropositionalattitudes
dependpartlyfortheircontentonsocialfactorsindependentoftheindividual,
asociallyandnon-intentionallyconstrued.Foreachofuscanreasonasfol-
lows.Takeasetofattitudesthatinvolveagivennotionandwhosecontents
arewell-understoodbyme.ItisonlycontingentthatIunderstandthatnotion
aswellasIdo.Nowholdingmycommunity`spracticesconstant,imaginethat
Iunderstandthegivennotionincompletely,butthatthedefcientunderstand-
ingissuchthatitdoesnotpreventmyhavingattitudecontentsinvolvingthat
notion.Infact,imaginethatIaminthesituationenvisagedinthefrststep
ofoneoftheoriginalthoughtexperiments.Insuchacase,apropersubset
oftheoriginalsetofmyactualattitudecontentswould,ormight,remainthe
same-intuitively,atleastthoseofmyactualattitudeswhosejustifcationor
pointisuntouchedbymyimagineddefcientunderstanding.(Inthearthritis
case,anexamplewouldbeatruebeliefthatmanyoldpeoplehavearthritis.)
Theseattitudecontentsremainconstantdespitethefactthatmyunderstanding,
inferencepatterns,behavior,dispositions,andsoonwouldinimportantways
114IndividualismandtheMental
bedifferentandpartlyinappropriatetoapplicationsofthegivennotion.What
isitthatenablestheseunaffectedcontentstoremainapplicationsoftherelevant
notion?Itisnotjustthatmyunderstanding,inferencepatterns,behavior,and
soforthareenoughlikemyactualunderstanding,inferencepatterns,behavior,
andsoforth.Forifcommunalpracticehadalsovariedsoastoapplytherel-
evantnotionasIamimaginingImisapplyit,thenmyattitudecontentswould
notinvolvetherelevantnotionatall.Thisargumentsuggeststhatcommunal
practiceisafactor(inadditiontomyunderstanding,inferencepatterns,and
perhapsbehavior,physicalactivity,andotherfeatures)infxingthecontentsof
myattitudes,evenincaseswhereIfullyunderstandthecontent.
IId.IndependencefromFactive-VerbandIndexical-Reference
Paradigms
Thethoughtexperimentdoesnotplayonpsychological'success`verbsor
'factive`verbs-verbslike'know`,'regret`,'realize`,'remember`,'foresee`,
'perceive`.Thispointisimportantforourpurposes,becausesuchverbssuggest
aneasyandclearcutdistinctionbetweenthecontributionoftheindividualsub-
jectandtheobjective,'veridical`contributionoftheenvironmenttomakingthe
verbsapplicable.(Actuallythematterbecomesmorecomplicatedonrefection,
butweshallstaywiththesimplestcases.)Whenapersonknowsthatsnowis
commoninGreenland,hisknowledgeobviouslydependsonmorethantheway
thepersonis.ItdependsonthereactuallybeingalotofsnowinGreenland.
Hismentalstate(beliefthatsnowiscommoninGreenland)mustbesuccessful
inacertainway(true).Bychangingtheenvironment,onecouldchangethe
truth-valueofthecontent,sothatthesubjectcouldnolongerbesaidtoknow
thecontent.Itispartoftheburdenofmyargumentthatevenintentionalmental
statesoftheindividuallikebeliefs,whichcarrynoimplicationofveridicality
orsuccess,cannotbeunderstoodbyfocusingpurelyontheindividual`sacts,
dispositions,and'inner`goingson.
Thethoughtexperimentalsodoesnotrestonthephenomenonofindexicality,
orondereattitudes,inanydirectway.WhenAlfredreferstoanapple,sayingto
himself,'Thatiswholesome,`whathereferstodependsnotjustonthecontent
ofwhathesaysorthinks,butonwhatappleisbeforehim.Withoutalteringthe
meaningofAlfred`sutterance,thenatureofhisperceptualexperiences,orhis
physicalactsordispositions,wecouldconceiveanexchangeoftheactualapple
foranotheronethatisindistinguishabletoAlfred.Wewouldtherebyconceive
himasreferringtosomethingdifferentandevenassayingsomethingwitha
differenttruth-value.
Thisratherobviouspointaboutindexicalityhascometobeseenasproviding
amodelforunderstandingacertainrangeofmentalstatesorevents-dere
attitudes.Theprecisecharacterizationofthisrangeisnosimplephilosophical
task.Buttheclearestcasesinvolvenon-obliquelyoccurringtermsincontent
clauses.WhenwesaythatBertrandthinksofsomewaterthatitwouldnotslake
IndividualismandtheMental115
histhirst(where'water`occursinpurelynon-obliqueposition),weattribute
aderebelieftoBertrand.WeassumethatBertrandhassomethinglikean
indexicalrelationtothewater.ThefactthatBertrandbelievessomethingofsome
water,ratherthanofaportionofsomeotherliquidthatisindistinguishableto
him,dependspartlyonthefactthatitiswatertowhichBertrandiscontextually,
'indexically`related.Forintuitivelywecouldhaveexchangedtheliquidswithout
changingBertrandandtherebychangedwhatBertrandbelievedhisbeliefcontent
of-andevenwhetherhisbeliefwastrueofit.
3
Itiseasytointerpretsuch
casesbyholdingthatthesubject`smentalstatesandcontents(withallowances
forbrutedifferencesinthecontextsinwhichheappliesthosecontents)remain
thesame.Thedifferencesinthesituationsdonotpertaininanyfundamental
waytothesubject`smindorthenatureofhismentalcontent,buttohowhis
mindorcontentisrelatedtotheworld.
Ithinkthisinterpretationofstandardindexicalandderecasesisbroadly
correct,althoughitinvolvesoversimplifcationsanddemandsrefnements.But
whatIwanttoemphasizehereisthatitisinapplicabletothecasesourthought
experimentfxesupon.
Itseemstomeclearthatthethoughtexperimentneednotrelyondere
attitudesatall.Thesubjectneednothaveenteredintospecialenrapportor
quasi-indexicalrelationswithobjectsthatthemisunderstoodtermappliestoin
orderfortheargumenttowork.Wecanappealtoattitudesthatwouldusually
beregardedasparadigmaticcasesofdedicto,non-indexical,non-de-re,mental
attitudesorevents.Theprimarymistakeinthecontractexampleisonesuch,but
wecouldchooseotherstosuitthereader`staste.Toinsistthatsuchattitudesmust
allbeindexicallyinfectedorderewould,Ithink,betotrivializeandemasculate
thesenotions,makingnearlyallattitudesdere.Alldedictoattitudespresuppose
dereattitudes.Butitdoesnotfollowthatindexicalordereelementssurvive
ineveryattitude.(Cf.notes2and3.)
Ishallnot,however,arguethispointhere.Theclaimthatiscrucialis
notthatourargumentdoesnotfxondereattitudes.Itis,rather,thatthe
socialdifferencesbetweentheactualandcounterfactualsituationsaffectthe
contentofthesubject`sattitudes.Thatis,thedifferenceaffectsstandardcasesof
obliquelyoccurring,cognitive-content-conveyingexpressionsincontentclauses.
Forexample,stillwithhismisunderstanding,thesubjectmightthinkthatthis
(referringtohisdiseaseinhishands)isarthritis.Orhemightthinkdereofthe
diseaseinhisankle(orofthediseaseinhisthigh)thathisarthritisispainful.It
doesnotreallymatterwhethertherelevantattitudeisdereorpurelydedicto.
Whatiscrucialtoourargumentisthattheoccurrenceof'arthritis`isobliqueand
3
Ihavediscussedderementalphenomenain'BeliefDeRe`,TheJournalofPhilosophy,74
(1977),338-62(Ch.3above).ThereIarguethatallattitudeswithcontentpresupposedereattitudes.
Ourdiscussionheremaybeseenasbearingonthedetailsofthispresupposition.ButforreasonsI
merelysketchinthenextparagraph,Ithinkitwouldbeasuperfcialviewpointthattriedtoutilize
ourpresentargumenttosupporttheviewthatnearlyallintentionalmentalphenomenaarecovertly
indexicalordere.
116IndividualismandtheMental
contributestoacharacterizationofthesubject`smentalcontent.Onemighteven
hold,implausiblyIthink,thatallthesubject`sattitudesinvolvingthenotionof
arthritisaredere,that'arthritis`inthat-clausesindexicallypicksouttheprop-
ertyofbeingarthritis,orsomethinglikethat.Thefactremainsthattheterm
occursobliquelyintherelevantcasesandservesincharacterizingthedictaor
contentsofthesubject`sattitudes.Thethoughtexperimentexploitsthisfact.
ApproachestothementalthatIshalllatercriticizeasexcessivelyindividu-
alistictendtoassimilateenvironmentalaspectsofmentalphenomenatoeither
thefactive-verbortheindexical-referenceparadigm.(Cf.note2.)Thissort
ofassimilationsuggeststhatonemightmaintainarelativelyclearcutdistinc-
tionbetweenextra-mentalandmentalaspectsofmentalisticattributions.And
itmayencouragetheideathatthedistinctivelymentalaspectscanbeunder-
stoodfundamentallyintermsoftheindividual`sabilities,dispositions,states,
andsoforth,consideredinisolationfromhissocialsurroundings.Myargument
underminesthislattersuggestion.Socialcontextinfectseventhedistinctively
mentalfeaturesofmentalisticattributions.Noman`sintentionalmentalphe-
nomenaareinsular.Everymanisapieceofthesocialcontinent,apartofthe
socialmain.
III.REINTERPRETATIONS
IIIa.Methodology
Ifndthatmostpeopleunspoiledbyconventionalphilosophicaltrainingregard
thethreestepsofthethoughtexperimentaspainfullyobvious.Suchfolktend
tochafeovermyfllingindetailsorelaboratingonstrategy.Ithinkthisnaivete
appropriate.Butforsophisticatesthethreestepsrequiredefense.
Beforelaunchingadefense,Iwanttomakeafewremarksaboutitsmeth-
odology.Myobjectiveistobetterunderstandourcommonmentalisticnotions.
Althoughsuchnotionsaresubjecttorevisionandrefnement,Itakeitasevid-
entthatthereisphilosophicalinterestintheorizingaboutthemastheynow
are.Iassumethataprimarywayofachievingtheoreticalunderstandingisto
concentrateonourdiscourseaboutmentalisticnotions.Nowitis,ofcourse,
neverobviousattheoutsethowmuchidealization,regimentation,orspecial
interpretationisnecessaryinordertoadequatelyunderstandordinarydiscourse.
Phenomenasuchasambiguity,ellipsis,indexicality,idioms,andahostofoth-
erscertainlydemandsomeregimentationorspecialinterpretationforpurposes
oflinguistictheory.Moreover,moreglobalconsiderations-suchassimplicity
inaccountingforstructuralrelations-oftenhaveeffectsonthecastofone`s
theory.Forallthat,thereisamethodologicalbiasinfavoroftakingnatural
discourseliterally,otherthingsbeingequal.Forexample,unlessthereareclear
reasonsforconstruingdiscourseasambiguous,elliptical,orinvolvingspecial
idioms,weshouldnotsoconstrueit.Literalinterpretationisceterisparibus
IndividualismandtheMental117
preferred.Mydefenseofthethoughtexperiment,asIhaveinterpretedit,partly
restsonthisprinciple.
Thisrelativelynon-theoreticalinterpretationofthethoughtexperimentshould
beextendedtotheglossonitthatIprovidedinSectionIIc.Thenotionsof
misconception,incompleteunderstanding,conceptualorlinguisticerror,and
ordinaryempiricalerroraretobetakenascarryinglittletheoreticalweight.I
assumethatthesenotionsmarkdefensible,commonsensedistinctions.ButIneed
nottakeapositiononavailablephilosophicalinterpretationsofthesedistinctions.
Infact,Idonotbelievethatunderstanding,inourexamples,canbeexplicated
asindependentofempiricalknowledge,orthattheconceptualerrorsofour
subjectsarebestseenas'purely`mistakesaboutconceptsandasinvolvingno
'admixture`oferrorabout'theworld`.WithQuine,Ifndsuchtalkaboutpurity
andmixturedevoidofilluminationorexplanatorypower.Butmyviewsonthis
matterneitherentailnorareentailedbythepremisesoftheargumentsIgive(cf.
e.g.Sec.IIId).Thoseargumentsseemtometoremainplausibleunderanyof
therelevantphilosophicalinterpretationsoftheconceptual-ordinary-empirical
distinction.
Ihavepresentedtheexperimentasappealingtoordinaryintuition.Ibelieve
thatcommonpracticeintheattributionofpropositionalattitudesisfairlyrepres-
entedbythevarioussteps.Thispointisnotreallyopentodispute.Usagemay
bedividedinafewofthecasesinwhichIhaveseenitasunited.Butbroadly
speaking,itseemstomeundeniablethattheindividualstepsofthethought
experimentareacceptabletoordinaryspeakersinawidevarietyofexamples.
Theissueopentopossibledisputeiswhetherthestepsshouldbetakeninthe
literalwayinwhichIhavetakenthem,andthuswhethertheconclusionIhave
drawnfromthosestepsisjustifed.IntheremainderofSectionIII,Ishalltry
tovindicatetheliteralinterpretationofourexamples.Idothisbycriticizing,in
orderofincreasinggeneralityorabstractness,aseriesofattemptstoreinterpret
thethoughtexperiment`sfrststep.Ultimately,Isuggest(Secs.IIIdandIV)
thattheseattemptsderivefromcharacteristicallyphilosophicalmodelsthathave
littleornoindependentjustifcation.Athoroughgoingreviewofthesemodels
wouldbeoutofbounds,butthepresentpaperisintendedtoshowthattheyare
defcientasaccountsofouractualpracticeofmentalisticattribution.
Ishallhavelittlefurthertosayindefenseofthesecondandthirdstepsofthe
thoughtexperiment.Bothrestontheirintuitiveplausibility,notonsomepar-
ticulartheory.Thethirdstep,forexample,certainlydoesnotdependonaview
thatcontentsaremerelysentencesthesubjectisdisposedtoutter,interpreted
ashiscommunityinterpretsthem.Itiscompatiblewithseveralphilosophical
accountsofmentalcontents,includingthosethatappealtomoreabstractentities
suchasFregeanthoughtsorRussellianpropositions,andthosethatseektodeny
thatcontentclausesindicateanythingthatmightbecalledacontent.Ialsodo
notclaimthatthefactthatoursubjectlackstherelevantbeliefsinthethirdstep
followsfromthefactsIhavedescribed.Thepointisthatitisplausible,and
certainlypossible,thathewouldlackthosebeliefs.
118IndividualismandtheMental
Theexactinterpretationofthesecondstepisrelevanttoanumberofcausalor
functionaltheoriesofmentalphenomenathatIshalldiscussinSectionIV.The
intuitiveideaofthestepisthatnoneofthedifferentphysical,non-intentionally
describedcausalchainssetgoingbythedifferencesincommunalpracticeneed
affectoursubjectsinanywaythatwouldberelevanttoanaccountoftheirmen-
talcontents.Differencesinthebehaviorofothermembersofthecommunity
will,tobesure,affectthegravitationalforcesexertedonthesubject.ButI
assumethatthesedifferencesareirrelevanttomacro-explanationsofoursub-
jects`physicalmovementsandinnerprocesses.Theydonotrelevantlyaffect
ordinarynon-intentionalphysicalexplanationsofhowthesubjectacquiresoris
disposedtousethesymbolsinhisrepertoire.Ofcourse,thesocialoriginsof
aperson`ssymbolsdodifferbetweenactualandcounterfactualcases.Ishall
returntothispointinSectionsIVandV.TheremainderofsectionIIIwillbe
devotedtothefrststepofthethoughtexperiment.
IIIb.IncompleteUnderstandingandStandardCases
ofReinterpretation
Thefrststep,asIhaveinterpretedit,isthemostlikelytoencounteropposition.
Infact,thereisalineofresistancethatissecondnaturetolinguisticallyoriented
philosophers.Accordingtothisline,weshoulddenythat,say,thepatientreally
believedorthoughtthatarthritiscanoccuroutsideofjointsbecausehemis-
understoodtheword'arthritis`.Moregenerally,weshoulddenythatasubject
couldhaveanyattitudeswhosecontentsheincompletelyunderstands.
Whatapersonunderstandsisindeedoneofthechieffactorsthatbearonwhat
thoughtshecanexpressinusingwords.Iftherewerenotdeepandimportant
connectionsbetweenpropositionalattitudesandunderstanding,onecouldhardly
expectone`sattributionsofmentalcontenttofacilitatereliablepredictionsof
whatapersonwilldo,say,orthink.Butourexamplesprovidereasontobelieve
thattheseconnectionsarenotsimpleentailmentstotheeffectthathavinga
propositionalattitudestrictlyimpliesfullunderstandingofitscontent.
Thereare,ofcourse,numeroussituationsinwhichwenormallyreinterpretor
discountaperson`swordsindecidingwhathethinks.Philosophersofteninvoke
suchcasestobolstertheiranimusagainstsuchattributionsastheoneswemade
tooursubjects:'Ifaforeignerweretomouththewords'arthritismayoccur
inthethigh¨or'myfatherhadarthritis¨,notunderstandingwhatheutteredin
theslightest,wewouldnotsaythathebelievedthatarthritismayoccurinthe
thigh,orthathisfatherhadarthritis.Sowhyshouldweimputethebelieftothe
patient?`Why,indeed?Orrather,whydowe?
Thequestionisagoodone.Wedowantageneralaccountofthesecases.But
theimpliedargumentagainstourattributionisanemic.Wetacitlyandroutinely
distinguishbetweenthecasesIdescribedandthoseinwhichaforeigner(or
anyone)utterssomethingwithoutanycomprehension.Thebestwaytounder-
standmentalisticnotionsistorecognizesuchdifferencesinstandardpractice
IndividualismandtheMental119
andtrytoaccountforthem.Onecanhardlyjustifytheassumptionthatfull
understandingofacontentisingeneralanecessaryconditionforbelievingthe
contentbyappealingtosomecasesthattendtosupporttheassumptioninorder
torejectothersthatconfictwithit.
Itisagoodmethodofdiscovery,Ithink,tonotethesortsofcasesphilo-
sopherstendtogravitatetowardwhentheydefendtheviewthatthefrststep
inthethoughtexperimentshouldreceivespecialinterpretation.Byrefectingon
thedifferencesbetweenthesecasesandthecaseswehavecited,oneshould
learnsomethingaboutprinciplescontrollingmentalisticattribution.
Ihavealreadymentionedforeignerswithoutcommandofthelanguage.A
child`simitationofourwordsandearlyattemptstousethemprovidesimil-
arexamples.Inthesecases,masteryofthelanguageandresponsibilitytoits
preceptshavenotbeendeveloped;andmentalcontentattributionbasedonthe
meaningofwordsutteredtendstobeprecluded.
Therearecasesinvolvingregionaldialects.Aperson`sdevianceorignorance
judgedbythestandardsofthelargercommunitymaycountasnormalityorfull
masterywhenevaluatedfromtheregionalperspective.Clearly,theregional
standardstendtobetherelevantonesforattributingcontentwhenthespeaker`s
trainingorintentionsareregionallyoriented.Theconditionsforsuchorient-
ationarecomplex,andIshalltouchonthemagaininSectionV.Butthere
isnowarrantinactualpracticefortreatingeachperson`sidiolectasalways
analogoustodialectswhosewordsweautomaticallyreinterpret-forpurposes
ofmentalcontentattribution-whenusageisdifferent.Peoplearefrequently
held,andholdthemselves,tothestandardsoftheircommunitywhenmisuse
ormisunderstandingareatissue.Oneshoulddistinguishthesecases,which
seemtodependonacertainresponsibilitytocommunalpractice,fromcasesof
automaticreinterpretation.
TongueslipsandSpoonerismsformanotherclassofexamplewhererein-
terpretationofaperson`swordsiscommonandappropriateinarrivingatan
attributionofmentalcontent.Inthesecases,wetendtoexemptthespeakereven
fromcommitmenttoahomophonicallyformulatedassertioncontent,aswellas
totherelevantmentalcontent.Thespeaker`sownbehaviorusuallyfollowsthis
line,oftencorrectinghimselfwhenwhatheutteredisrepeatedbacktohim.
Malapropismsformamorecomplexclassofexamples.Ishallnottrytomap
itindetail.Butinafairlybroadrangeofcases,wereinterpretaperson`swords
atleastinattributingmentalcontent.IfArchiesays,'Leadthewayandwe
willprecede`,weroutinelyreinterpretthewordsindescribinghisexpectations.
Manyofthesecasesseemtodependonthepresumptionthattherearesimple,
superfcial(forexample,phonological)interferenceorexchangemechanisms
thataccountforthelinguisticdeviance.
Therearealsoexamplesofquiteradicalmisunderstandingsthatsometimes
generatereinterpretation.Ifagenerallycompetentandreasonablespeakerthinks
that'orangutan`appliestoafruitdrink,wewouldbereluctant,anditwould
unquestionablybemisleading,totakehiswordsasrevealingthathethinkshe
120IndividualismandtheMental
hasbeendrinkingorangutansforbreakfastforthelastfewweeks.Suchtotal
misunderstandingoftenseemstoblockliteralisticmentalcontentattribution,at
leastincaseswherewearenotdirectlycharacterizinghismistake.(Contrary
tophilosophicallore,Iamnotconvincedthatsuchamancannotcorrectlyand
literallybeattributedabeliefthatanorangutanisakindoffruitdrink.ButI
shallnotdealwiththepointhere.)
Therearealsosomecasesthatdonotseemgenerallytopreventmental
contentattributiononthebasisofliteralinterpretationofthesubject`swords
inquitethesamewayastheothers,butwhichdeservesomemention.For
almostanycontentexceptforthosethatdirectlydisplaythesubject`sincomplete
understanding,therewillbemanycontextsinwhichitwouldbemisleadingto
attributethatcontenttothesubjectwithoutfurthercomment.SupposeIam
advisingyouaboutyourlegalliabilitiesinasituationwhereyouhaveentered
intowhatmaybeanunwrittencontract.YouaskmewhatAlwouldthink.It
wouldbemisleadingformetoreplythatAlwouldthinkthatyoudonothave
acontract(orevendonothaveanylegalproblems),ifIknowthatAlthinksa
contractmustbebasedonaformaldocument.YourevaluationofAl`sthought
wouldbecruciallyaffectedbyhisinadequateunderstanding.Insuchcases,itis
incumbentonustocitethesubject`seccentricity:'(Hewouldthinkthatyoudo
nothaveacontract,butthen)hethinksthatthereisnosuchthingasaverbally
basedcontract.`
Incidentally,thesamesortofexamplecanbeconstructedusingattitudesthat
areabnormal,butthatdonothingeonmisunderstandingofanyonenotion.If
Alhadthoughtthatonlytraffclawsandlawsagainstviolentcrimesareever
prosecuted,itwouldbemisleadingformetotellyouthatAlwouldthinkthat
youhavenolegalproblems.
Bothsortsofcasesillustratethatinreportingasingleattitudecontent,we
typicallysuggest(implicate,perhaps)thatthesubjecthasarangeofotheratti-
tudesthatarenormallyassociatedwithit.Someofthesemayprovidereasons
forit.Inbothsortsofcases,itisusuallyimportanttokeeptrackof,andoftento
makeexplicit,thenatureandextentofthesubject`sdeviance.Otherwise,pre-
dictionsandevaluationsofhisthoughtandaction,basedonnormalbackground
assumptions,willgoawry.Whenthedevianceishuge,attributionsdemand
reinterpretationofthesubject`swords.Radicalmisunderstandingandmental
instabilityarecasesinpoint.Butfrequently,commonpracticeseemstoallow
ustocancelthemisleadingsuggestionsbymakingexplicitthesubject`sdevi-
ance,retainingliteralinterpretationofhiswordsinourmentalisticattributions
allthewhile.
Alloftheforegoingphenomenaarerelevanttoaccountingforstandardprac-
tice.Buttheyarenomoresalientthancasesofstraightforwardbeliefattribution
wherethesubjectincompletelyunderstandssomenotionintheattributedbelief
content.Ithinkanyimpulsetosaythatcommonpracticeissimplyincon-
sistentshouldberesisted(indeed,scorned).Wecannotexpectsuchpractice
tofollowgeneralprinciplesrigorously.Butevenourbriefdiscussionofthe
IndividualismandtheMental121
mattershouldhavesuggestedthebeginningsofgeneralizationsaboutdiffer-
encesbetweencaseswherereinterpretationisstandardandcaseswhereitis
not.Aperson`soveralllinguisticcompetence,hisallegianceandresponsibility
tocommunalstandards,thedegree,source,andtypeofmisunderstanding,the
purposesofthereport-allaffecttheissue.Fromatheoreticalpointofview,
itwouldbeamistaketotrytoassimilatethecasesinonedirectionoranother.
Wedonotwanttocreditatwo-year-oldwhomemorizes'emc
2
`withbelief
inrelativitytheory.Butthepatient`sattitudesinvolvingthenotionofarthritis
shouldnotbeassimilatedtotheforeigner`suncomprehendingpronunciations.
ForpurposesofdefendingthethoughtexperimentandtheargumentsIdraw
fromit,Icanaffordtobefexibleaboutexactlyhowtogeneralizeaboutthese
variousphenomena.Thethoughtexperimentdependsonlyontherebeingsome
casesinwhichaperson`sincompleteunderstandingdoesnotforcereinterpret-
ationofhisexpressionsindescribinghismentalcontents.Suchcasesappearto
belegion.
IIIc.FourMethodsofReinterpretingtheThoughtExperiment
Inowwanttocriticizeattemptstoarguethatevenincaseswhereweordin-
arilydoascribecontentclausesdespitethesubject`sincompleteunderstanding
ofexpressionsinthoseclauses,suchascriptionsshouldnotbetakenliterally.
Inordertooverturnourinterpretationofthethoughtexperiment`sfrststep,
onemustarguethatnoneofthecasesIhavecitedisappropriatelytakenin
theliteralmanner.Onemusthandle(apparent)attributionsofunproblematically
truecontentsinvolvingincompletelymasterednotions,aswellasattributions
ofcontentsthatdisplaythemisconceptionsorpartialunderstandings.Idonot
doubtthatonecanerectlogicallycoherentandmetaphysicallytraditionalrein-
terpretationsofallthesecases.WhatIdoubtisthatsuchreinterpretationstaken
intotocanpresentaplausibleview,andthattakenindividuallytheyhaveany
claimtosuperiorityovertheliteralinterpretations-eitherasaccountsofthe
languageofordinarymentalisticascription,orasaccountsoftheevidenceon
whichmentalattributionsarecommonlybased.
Fourtypesofreinterpretationhavesomecurrency.Ishallberathershort
withthefrsttwo,thefrstofwhichIhavealreadywarnedagainstinSection
IId.Sometimesrelevantmentalisticascriptionsarereinterpretedasattributions
ofdereattitudesofentitiesnotdenotedbythemisconstruedexpressions.For
example,thesubject`sbeliefthathehasarthritisinthethighmightbeinterpreted
asabeliefofthenon-arthriticrheumatoidailmentthatitisinthethigh.The
subjectwillprobablyhavesuchabeliefinthiscase.Butithardlyaccounts
fortherelevantattributions.Inparticular,itignorestheobliqueoccurrenceof
'arthritis`intheoriginalascription.Suchoccurrencesbearonacharacterization
ofthesubject`sviewpoint.Thesubjectthinksofthediseaseinhisthigh(and
ofhisarthritis)inacertainway.Hethinksofeachdiseasethatitisarthritis.
Othertermsforarthritis(orfortheactualtroubleinhisthigh)maynotenable
122IndividualismandtheMental
ustodescribehisattitudecontentnearlyaswell.Theappealtodereattitudes
inthiswayisnotadequatetothetaskofreinterpretingtheseascriptionssoas
toexplainawaythedifferencebetweenactualandcounterfactualsituations.It
simplyoverlookswhatneedsexplication.
Asecondmethodofreinterpretation,whichDescartesproposed(cf.Sec.IV)
andwhichcropsupoccasionally,istoclaimthatincasesofincompleteunder-
standing,thesubject`sattitudeorcontentisindefnite.Itissurelytruethatin
caseswhereapersonisextremelyconfused,wearesometimesatalossin
describinghisattitudes.Perhapsinsuchcases,thesubject`smentalcontentis
indefnite.ButinthecasesIhavecited,commonpracticelendsvirtuallyno
supporttothecontentionthatthesubject`smentalcontentsareindefnite.The
subjectandhisfellowstypicallyknowandagreeonpreciselyhowtoconürmor
inürmhisbeliefs-bothinthecaseswheretheyareunproblematicallytrue(or
justempiricallyfalse)andinthecaseswheretheydisplaythemisconception.
Ordinaryattributionstypicallyspecifythementalcontentwithoutqualifcations
orhesitations.
Incasesofpartialunderstanding-say,inthemortgageexample-itmay
indeedbeunclear,shortofextensivequestioning,justhowmuchmastery
thesubjecthas.Buteventhissortofunclaritydoesnotappeartoprevent,
underordinarycircumstances,straightforwardattributionsutilizing'mortgage`
inobliqueposition.Thesubjectisuncertainwhetherhisfatherhastwomort-
gages;heknowsthathisunclehaspaidoffthemortgageonhishouse.The
contentsareunhesitatinglyattributedandadmitofunproblematictestingfor
truth-value,despitethesubject`spartialunderstanding.Thereisthuslittleprima
faciegroundfortheappealtoindefniteness.Theappealappearstoderive
fromapriorassumptionthatattributionofacontententailsattributionoffull
understanding.Lackinganeasymeansofattributingsomethingotherthanthe
misunderstoodcontent,oneistemptedtosaythatthereisnodefnitecontent.
Butthisisunnecessarilymysterious.Itrefectsonthepriorassumption,which
sofarhasnoindependentsupport.
Theothertwomethodsofreinterpretationareofteninvokedintandem.Oneis
toattributeanotionthatjustcapturesthemisconception,thusreplacingcontents
thatareapparentlyfalseonaccountofthemisconception,bytruecontents.For
example,thesubject`sbelief(trueorfalse)thatthatisasofawouldbereplaced
by,orreinterpretedas,a(true)beliefthatthatisachofa,where'chofa`is
introducedtoapplynotonlytosofas,butalsotothearmchairsthesubject
thinksaresofas.Theothermethodistocounttheerrorofthesubjectaspurely
metalinguistic.Thusthepatient`sapparentbeliefthathehadarthritisinthe
thighwouldbereinterpretedasabeliefthat'arthritis`appliedtosomething(or
somedisease)inhisthigh.Thetwomethodscanbeappliedsimultaneously,
attemptingtoaccountforanordinarycontentattributionintermsofareinter-
pretedobject-levelcontenttogetherwithametalinguisticerror.Itisimportant
torememberthatinordertooverturnthethoughtexperiment,thesemethods
mustnotonlyestablishthatthesubjectheldtheparticularattitudesthatthey
IndividualismandtheMental123
advocateattributing;theymustalsojustifyadenialoftheordinaryattributions
literallyinterpreted.
Themethodofinvokingobject-levelnotionsthatpreciselycapture(and
thatreplace)thesubject`sapparentmisconceptionhaslittletobesaidforit
asanaturalandgenerallyapplicableaccountofthelanguageofmentalist-
icascriptions.Wedonotordinarilyseekouttrueobject-levelattitudecon-
tentstoattributetovictimsoferrorsbasedonincompleteunderstanding.For
example,whenwefndthatapersonhasbeeninvolvedinamisconception
inexampleslikeours,wedonotregularlyreinterpretthoseascriptionsthat
involvedthemisunderstoodterm,butwereintuitivelyunaffectedbytheerror.
Anattributiontosomeoneofatruebeliefthatheiseatingbrisket,orthat
hehasjustsignedacontract,orthatUncleHarryhaspaidoffhismort-
gage,isnottypicallyreformulatedwhenitislearnedthatthesubjecthad
notfullyunderstoodwhatbrisket(oracontract,oramortgage)is.Asimil-
arpointapplieswhenweknowabouttheerroratthetimeoftheattribution-at
leastifweavoidmisleadingtheaudienceincaseswheretheerroriscrucial
totheissueathand.Moreover,weshallfrequentlyseethesubjectasshar-
ingbeliefswithotherswhounderstandtherelevantnotionsbetter.Incounting
beliefsasshared,wedonotrequire,ineverycase,thatthesubjects'fullyunder-
stand`thenotionsinthosebeliefcontents,orunderstandtheminjustthesame
way.Differencesinunderstandingarefrequentlylocatedasdifferencesover
otherbeliefcontents.Weagreethatyouhavesignedacontract,butdisagree
overwhethersomeoneelsecouldhavemadeacontractbymeansofaverbal
agreement.
Therearereasonswhyordinarypracticedoesnotfollowthemethodof
object-levelreinterpretation.Inmanycases,particularlythoseinvolvingpar-
tialunderstanding,fndingareinterpretationinaccordwiththemethodwould
beentirelynon-trivial.Itisnotevenclearthatwehaveagreeduponmeansof
pursuingsuchinquiriesinallcases.Considerthearthriticpatient.Supposewe
aretoreinterprettheattributionofhiserroneousbeliefthathehasarthritisin
thethigh.Wemakeupaterm'tharthritis`thatcoversarthritisandwhatever
itishehasinhisthigh.Theappropriaterestrictionsontheapplicationofthis
termandofthepatient`ssupposednotionareunclear.Isjustanyproblemin
thethighthatthepatientwantstocall'arthritis`tocountastharthritis?Are
otherailmentscovered?Whatwoulddecide?Theproblemisthatthereareno
recognizedstandardsgoverningtheapplicationofthenewterm.Insuchcases,
themethodispatentlyadhoc.
Themethod`swillingnesstoinvokenewterminologywheneverconceptual
errororpartialunderstandingoccursisadhocinanothersense.Itprolifer-
atesterminologywithoutevidenttheoreticalreward.Wedonotengenderbetter
understandingofthepatientbyinventinganewwordandsayingthathethought
(correctly)thattharthritiscanoccuroutsidejoints.Itissimplerandequally
informativetoconstruehimasthinkingthatarthritismayoccuroutsidejoints.
Whenwearemakingotherattributionsthatdonotdirectlydisplaytheerror,we
124IndividualismandtheMental
mustsimplybearthedeviantbeliefinmind,soasnottoassumethatallofthe
patient`sinferencesinvolvingthenotionwouldbenormal.
Themethodofobject-levelreinterpretationoftenfailstogiveaplausible
accountoftheevidenceonwhichwebasementalattributions.Whencaught
inthesortsoferrorswehavebeendiscussing,thesubjectdoesnotnormally
respondbysayingthathisviewshadbeenmisunderstood.Thepatientdoesnot
say(orthink)thathehadthoughthehadsome-category-of-disease-like-arthritis-
and-including-arthritis-but-also-capable-of-occurring-outside-of-jointsinthe
thighinsteadoftheerrorcommonlyattributed.Thissortofresponsewould
bedisingenuous.Whateverotherbeliefshehad,thesubjectthoughtthathehad
arthritisinthethigh.Insuchcases,thesubjectwillordinarilygivenoevidenceof
havingmaintainedatrueobject-levelbelief.Inexampleslikeours,hetypically
admitshismistake,changeshisviews,andleavesitatthat.Thusthesubject`s
ownbehavioraldispositionsandinferencesoftenfailtosupportthemethod.
Themethodmaybeseentobeimplausibleasanaccountoftherelevantevid-
enceinanotherway.Thepatientknowsthathehashadarthritisintheankle
andwristsforsometime.Nowwithhisnewpainsinthethigh,hefearsand
believesthathehasgotarthritisinthethigh,thathisarthritisisspreading.Sup-
posewereinterpretalloftheseattitudeattributionsinaccordwiththemethod.
Weuseourrecentlycoinedterm'tharthritis`tocover(somehow)arthritisand
whateveritishehasinthethigh.Onthisnewinterpretation,thepatientisright
inthinkingthathehastharthritisintheankleandwrists.Hisbeliefthatithas
lodgedinthethighistrue.Hisfearisrealized.Buttheseattributionsareoutof
keepingwiththewaywedoandshouldviewhisactualbeliefsandfears.His
beliefisnottrue,andhisfearisnotrealized.Hewillberelievedwhenheistold
thatonecannothavearthritisinthethigh.Hisreliefisboundupwithanetwork
ofassumptionsthathemakesabouthisarthritis:thatitisakindofdisease,that
therearedebilitatingconsequencesofitsoccurringinmultiplelocations,andso
on.Whentoldthatarthritiscannotoccurinthethigh,thepatientdoesnotdecide
thathisfearswererealized,butthatperhapsheshouldnothavehadthosefears.
Hedoesnotthink:Well,mytharthritishaslodgedinthethigh;butjudgingfrom
thefactthatwhatthedoctorcalled'arthritis`cannotoccurinthethigh,tharth-
ritismaynotbeasinglekindofdisease;andIsupposeIneednotworryabout
theeffectsofitsoccurringinvariouslocations,sinceevidentlythetharthritis
inmythighisphysiologicallyunrelatedtothetharthritisinmyjoints.There
willrarelyifeverbeanempiricalbasisforsuchadescriptionofthesubject`s
inferences.Thepatient`sbehavior(includinghisreports,orthinkings-out-loud)
inthissortofcasewillnormallynotindicateanysuchpatternofinferences
atall.Butthisisthedescriptionthattheobject-levelreinterpretationmethod
appearstorecommend.
Onthestandardattributions,thepatientretainshisassumptionsabouttherela-
tionbetweenarthritis,kindsofdisease,spreading,andsoon.Andheconcludes
thathisarthritisisnotappearinginnewlocations-atanyrate,notinhisthigh.
Theseattributionswilltypicallybesupportedbythesubject`sbehavior.The
IndividualismandtheMental125
object-levelreinterpretationmethodpostulatesinferencesthataremorecom-
plicatedanddifferentinfocusfromtheinferencesthattheevidencesupports.
Themethod`spresentationinsuchacasewouldseemtobeanadhocfction,
notadescriptionwithobjectivevalidity.
Noneoftheforegoingismeanttodenythatfrequentlywhenapersonincom-
pletelyunderstandsanattitudecontenthehassomeotherattitudecontentthat
moreorlesscaptureshisunderstanding.Forexample,inthecontractexample,
theclientwillprobablyhavethebeliefthatifonebreaksalegallybinding
agreementbasedonformaldocuments,thenonemaygetintotrouble.Thereare
alsocasesinwhichitisreasonabletosaythat,atleastinasense,aperson
hasanotionthatisexpressedbyhisdispositionstoclassifythingsinacertain
way-evenifthereisnoconventionaltermintheperson`srepertoirethatneatly
correspondstothat'way`.Thesofacasemaybeonesuch.Certainanimalsas
wellaspeoplemayhavenon-verbalnotionsofthissort.Ontheotherhand,the
factthatsuchattributionsarejustifableperseyieldsnoreasontodenythat
thesubject(also)hasobject-levelattitudeswhosecontentsinvolvetherelevant
incompletelyunderstoodnotion.
Whereasthethirdmethodpurportstoaccountforthesubject`sthinkingatthe
objectlevel,thefourthaimsataccountingforhiserror.Theerrorisconstrued
aspurelyametalinguisticmistake.Therelevantfalsecontentisseentoinvolve
notionsthatdenoteorapplytolinguisticexpressions.Inexamplesrelevanttoour
thoughtexperiment,weordinarilyattributeametalinguisticaswellasanobject-
levelattitudetothesubject,atleastinthecaseofnon-occurrentpropositional
attitudes.Forexample,thepatientprobablybelievesthat'arthritis`appliesin
Englishtotheailmentinhisthigh.Hebelievesthathisfatherhadadiseasecalled
'arthritis`.Andsoon.Acceptingthesemetalinguisticattributions,ofcourse,does
nothingpersetowardmakingplausibleadenialthatthesubjectsinourexamples
havethecounterpartobject-levelattitudes.
Likethethirdmethod,themetalinguisticreinterpretationmethodhasnoprima
faciesupportasanaccountofthelanguageofmentalisticascriptions.Whenwe
encounterthesubject`sincompleteunderstandinginexampleslikeours,wedo
notdecidethatallthementalcontentswhichwehadbeenattributingtohim
withthemisunderstoodnotionmusthavebeenpurelymetalinguisticinform.
Wealsocountpeoplewhoincompletelyunderstandtermsinascribedcontent
clausesassharingtrueandunproblematicobject-levelattitudeswithotherswho
understandtherelevanttermsbetter.Forexample,thelawyerandhisclient
mayshareawishthattheclienthadnotsignedthecontracttobuythehouse
withoutreadingthesmallprint.Aclaimthatthesepeopleshareonlyattitudes
withmetalinguisticcontentswouldhavenosupportinlinguisticpractice.
Thepointaboutsharedattitudesgoesfurther.Ifthemetalinguisticreinterpret-
ationaccountistobebelieved,wecannotsaythatarelevantEnglishspeaker
sharesaview(forexample)thatmanyoldpeoplehavearthritis,withanyone
whodoesnotusetheEnglishword'arthritis`.Fortheforeignerdoesnothave
theword'arthritis`toholdbeliefsabout,thoughhedoeshaveattitudesinvolving
126IndividualismandtheMental
thenotionarthritis.AndtheattributiontotheEnglishspeakeristobeinterpreted
metalinguistically,makingreferencetotheword,soasnottoinvolveattribu-
tionofthenotionarthritis.Thisresultishighlyimplausible.Ascriptionsofsuch
that-clausesastheabove,regardlessofthesubject`slanguage,servetoprovide
singledescriptionsandexplanationsofsimilarpatternsofbehavior,inference,
andcommunication.Toholdthatwecannotaccuratelyascribesinglecontent
clausestoEnglishspeakersandforeignersinsuchcaseswouldnotonlyaccord
badlywithlinguisticpractice.Itwouldsubstantiallyweakenthedescriptive
andexplanatorypowerofourcommonattributions.Incountlesscases,unify-
ingaccountsoflinguisticallydisparatebutcognitivelyandbehaviorallysimilar
phenomenawouldbesacrifced.
Themethodisimplausibleinothercasesasanaccountofstandardevidence
onwhichmentalattributionsarebased.Takethepatientwhofearsthathis
arthritisisspreading.Accordingtothemetalinguisticreinterpretationmethod,
thepatient`sreasoningshouldbedescribedasfollows.Hethinksthattheword
'arthritis`appliestoasinglediseaseinhim,thatthediseaseinhimcalled
'arthritis`isdebilitatingifitspreads,that'arthritis`appliestothediseaseinhis
wristsandankles.Hefearsthatthediseasecalled'arthritis`haslodgedinhis
thigh,andsoon.Ofcourse,itisoftendiffculttofndevidentialgroundsfor
attributinganobject-levelattitudeasopposedtoitsmetalinguisticcounterpart.
AsInoted,whenapersonholdsoneattitude,heoftenholdstheother.Butthere
aretypesofevidence,incertaincontexts,formakingsuchdiscriminations,
particularlycontextsinwhichoccurrentmentaleventsareatissue.Thesubject
maymaintainthathisreasoningdidnotfxuponwords.Hemaybebrought
upshortbyametalinguisticformulationofhisjust-completedruminations,and
mayinsistthathewasnotinterestedinlabels.Insuchcases,especiallyifthe
reasoningisnotconcernedwithlinguisticissuesinanyinformalorantecedently
plausiblesense,attributionofanobject-levelthoughtcontentissupportedby
therelevantevidence,andmetalinguisticattributionisnot.Toinsistthatthe
occurrentmentaleventreallyinvolvedametalinguisticcontentwouldbeapiece
ofadhocspecialpleading,underminedbytheevidenceweactuallyusefor
decidingwhetherathoughtwasmetalinguistic.
Infact,thereappearstobeageneralpresumptionthatapersonisreasoningat
theobjectlevel,otherthingsbeingequal.Thebasisforthispresumptionisthat
metalinguisticreasoningrequiresacertainself-consciousnessaboutone`swords
andsocialinstitutions.Thissortofsophisticationemergedratherlateinhuman
history.(Cf.anyhistoryoflinguistics.)Semanticalnotionswereaproductof
thissophistication.
Occurrentpropositionalattitudespreventtheoverallreinterpretationstrategy
fromprovidingaplausibletotalaccountwhichwouldblockourthoughtexperi-
ment.Forsuchoccurrentmentaleventsasthepatient`sthoughtthathisarthritis
isespeciallypainfulinthekneethismorningare,orcanbeimaginedto
be,clearcasesofobject-levelattitudes.Andsuchthoughtsmayenterintoor
connectupwithpiecesofreasoning-saythereasoningleadingtoreliefthat
IndividualismandtheMental127
thearthritishadnotlodgedinthethigh-whichcannotbeplausiblyaccounted
forintermsofobject-levelreinterpretation.Theotherreinterpretationmethods
(thosethatappealtoderecontentsandtoindefniteness)arenon-starters.In
suchexamples,theliterallyinterpretedascriptionsappeartobestraightforwardly
superioraccountsoftheevidencethatisnormallyconstruedtoberelevant.Here
oneneednotappealtotheprinciplethatliteralinterpretationis,otherthings
equal,preferabletoreinterpretation.Otherthingsarenotequal.
Atthispoint,certainphilosophersmaybedisposedtopointoutthatwhata
personsaysandhowhebehavesdonotinfalliblydeterminewhathisattitude
contentsare.Despitetheapparentevidence,thesubject`sattitudecontentsmay
inallcasesIcitedbemetalinguistic,andmayfailtoinvolvetheincompletely
understoodnotion.Itiscertainlytruethathowapersonactsandwhathesays,
evensincerely,donotdeterminehismentalcontents.Imyselfhavementioned
anumberofcasesthatsupportthepoint.(Cf.Sec.IIIb.)Butthepointisoften
usedinasloppyandirresponsiblemanner.Itisincumbentonsomeonemaking
it(andapplyingittocaseslikeours)toindicateconsiderationsthatoverride
thelinguisticandbehavioralevidence.InsectionIIId,Ishallconsiderintuitive
oraprioriphilosophicalargumentstothisend.ButfrstIwishtocompletemy
evaluationofthemetalinguisticreinterpretationmethodasanaccountofthe
languageofmentalisticascriptioninourexamples.
Inthiscenturyphilosophershavedevelopedthehabitofinsistingonmeta-
linguisticreinterpretationforanycontentattributionthatdirectlydisplaysthe
subject`sincompleteunderstanding.Thesecasesconstitutebutasmallnumber
oftheattributionsthatservethethoughtexperiment.Onecouldgrantthese
reinterpretationsandstillmaintainouroverallviewpoint.Butevenasapplied
tothesecases,themethodseemsdubious.Idoubtthatanyevidentiallysup-
portedaccountofthelanguageoftheseattributionswillshowthemingeneral
tobeattributionsofmetalinguisticcontents-contentsthatinvolvedenotative
referencetolinguisticexpressions.
Theascription'Hebelievesthatbroadoverstuffedarmchairsaresofas`,as
ordinarilyused,doesnotingeneralmean'Hebelievesthatbroad,overstuffed
armchairsarecoveredbytheexpression'sofas¨`(orsomethinglikethat).There
arecleargrammaticalandsemanticaldifferencesbetween
(i)broad,overstuffedarmchairsarecoveredbytheexpression'sofas`
and
(ii)broad,overstuffedarmchairsaresofas.
Whenthetwoareembeddedinbeliefcontexts,theyproducegrammaticallyand
semanticallydistinctsentences.
Asnoted,ordinaryusageapprovesascriptionslike
(iii)Hebelievesthatbroad,overstuffedarmchairsaresofas.
Itwouldbewildlyadhocandincrediblefromthepointofviewoflinguistic
theorytoclaimthatthereisnoreadingof(iii)thatembeds(ii).Butthereisno
128IndividualismandtheMental
evidencefromspeakerbehaviorthattrueascriptionsof(iii)always(orperhaps
evenever)derivefromembedding(i)ratherthan(ii).Infact,Iknowofnoclear
evidencethat(iii)isambiguousbetweenembedding(i)and(ii),orthat(ii)is
ambiguous,withonereadingidenticaltothatof(i).Peopledonotingeneral
seemtoregardascriptionslike(iii)aselliptical.Moreimportantlyinmostcases
noamountofnon-philosophicalbadgeringwillleadthemtowithdraw(iii),under
someinterpretation,infavorofanascriptionthatclearlyembeds(i).Atleast
inthecasesofnon-occurrentpropositionalattitudes,theywilltendtoagree
toaclearlymetalinguisticascription-abeliefsentenceexplicitlyembedding
somethinglike(i)-incaseswheretheymakeanascriptionlike(iii).Butthis
isevidencethattheyregardascriptionsthatembed(i)and(ii)asbothtrue.It
hardlytellsagainstcountingbeliefascriptionsthatembed(ii)astrue,oragainst
taking(iii)intheobvious,literalmanner.Insum,thereappearstobenoordinary
empiricalpressureonatheoryofnaturallanguagetorepresenttrueascriptions
like(iii)asnotembeddingsentenceslike(ii).Andotherthingsbeingequal,
literalreadingsarecorrectreadings.Thusitisstronglyplausibletoassumethat
ordinaryusageroutinelyacceptsastrueandjustifedevenascriptionslike(iii),
literallyinterpretedasembeddingsentenceslike(ii).
Therearevariouscontextsinwhichwemaybeindifferentoverwhetherto
attributeametalinguisticattitudeorthecorrespondingobject-levelattitude.I
haveemphasizedthatfrequently,thoughnotalways,wemayattributeboth.Or
wemightcountthedifferentcontentsasdescribingwhatcontextually'amount
tothesameattitude`.(Cf.Sec.I.)Eventhislatterlocutionremainscompatible
withthethoughtexperiment,aslongasbothcontentsareequallyattributablein
describing'theattitude`.Inthecounterfactualstepofthethoughtexperiment,the
metalinguisticcontent(say,thatbroad,overstuffedarmchairsarecalled'sofas`)
willstillbeattributable.Butinthesecircumstancesitcontextually'amountsto
thesameattitude`asanobject-levelattitudewhosecontentisinnosenseequival-
entto,or'thesameas`,theoriginalobject-levelcontent.Fortheyhavedifferent
truthvalues.Thus,assumingthattheobject-levelandmetalinguisticcontentsare
equallyattributable,itremainsinformallyplausiblethattheperson`sattitudes
aredifferentbetweenactualandcounterfactualstepsinthethoughtexperiment.
Thiscontextualconfationofobject-levelandmetalinguisticcontentsisnot,
however,generallyacceptableevenindescribingnon-occurrentattitudes,much
lessoccurrentones.Therearecontextsinwhichthesubjecthimselfmaygive
evidenceofmakingthedistinction.
IIId.PhilosophicalArgumentsforReinterpretation
IhavesofararguedthatthereinterpretationstrategiesthatIhaveciteddonot
provideaplausibleaccountofevidencerelevanttoatheoryofthelanguageof
mentalisticascriptionsortodescriptionsofmentalphenomenathemselves.Inow
wanttoconsidercharacteristicallyphilosophicalargumentsforrevisingordinary
discourseorforgivingitanon-literalreading,argumentsthatrelypurelyon
IndividualismandtheMental129
intuitiveoraprioriconsiderations.Ihaveencounteredthreesucharguments,or
argumentsketches.
4
Oneholdsthatthecontentclausesweascribedmustbereinterpretedsoas
tomakereferencetowordsbecausetheyclearlyconcernlinguisticmatters-or
areaboutlanguage.Evenifthisargumentweresound,itwouldnotaffectthe
thoughtexperimentdecisively.Formostofthementalcontentsthatvarybetween
actualandcounterfactualsituationsarenotinanyintuitivesense'linguistic`.
Thebeliefthatcertainarmchairsaresofasisintuitivelylinguistic.Butbeliefs
thatsomesofasarebeige,thatKirkpatrickisplayingaclavichord,andthat
Miltonhadseverearthritisinhishandsarenot.
Buttheargumentisunpersuasiveevenasappliedtothecontentsthat,inan
intuitivesense,doconcernlinguisticmatters.Abeliefthatbroad,overstuffed
armchairsaresofasislinguistic(or'about`language)inthesamesensesasan
'analytically`truebeliefthatnoarmchairsaresofas.Butthelinguisticnature
ofthelatterbeliefdoesnotmakeitslogicalformmetalinguistic.Socitingthe
linguisticnatureoftheformerbeliefdoesnotsuffcetoshowitmetalinguistic.
Nosemanticallyrelevantcomponentofeithercontentappliestoordenotes
linguisticexpressions.
Boththe'analytically`trueandthe'analytically`falseattitudesarelinguistic
inthesensethattheyaretestedbyconsultingadictionaryornativelinguistic
intuitions,ratherthanbyordinaryempiricalinvestigation.Wedonotscrutinize
piecesoffurnituretotestthesebeliefs.Thepragmaticfocusofexpressions
oftheseattitudeswillbeonusage,concepts,ormeaning.Butitissimplya
mistaketothinkthatthesefactsentail,orevensuggest,thattherelevantcontents
aremetalinguisticinform.Manycontentswithobject-levellogicalformshave
primarilylinguisticorconceptualimplications.
Asecondargumentholdsthatcharitableinterpretationrequiresthatwenot
attributetorationalpeoplebeliefslikethebeliefthatonemayhavearthritisinthe
thigh.Hereagain,theargumentobviouslydoesnottouchmostoftheattitudes
thatmaylaunchthethoughtexperiment;formanyarestraightforwardlytrue,
orfalse,onordinaryempiricalgrounds.Evenso,itisnotagoodargument.
Thereisnothingirrationalorstupidaboutthelinguisticorconceptualerrorswe
attributetooursubjects.Theerrorsareperfectlyunderstandableasresultsof
linguisticmisinformation.
4
Cf.my'BeliefandSynonymy`,TheJournalofPhilosophy,75(1978),119-138,sec.III,
whereIconcentrateonattributionofbeliefcontentscontaining'onecriterion`termslike'vixen`or
'fortnight`whichthesubjectmisunderstands.Thenextseveralpagesinterweavesomeofthepoints
inthatpaper.Ithinkthataparallelthoughtexperimentinvolvingeventhesewordsisconstructible,
atleastforanarrowlyrestrictedsetofbeliefs.Wecanimaginethatthesubjectbelievesthatsome
femalefoxes-say,thosethatarevirgins-arenotvixens.Orhecouldbelievethatafortnight
isaperiodoftendays.(Ibelievedthisformanyyears.)Holdinghisphysicalhistory,qualitative
experience,anddispositionsconstant,wecanconceiveofhislinguisticcommunitydefningthese
termsasheactuallymisunderstandsthem.Insuchacase,hisbeliefcontentswoulddifferfromhis
actualones.
130IndividualismandtheMental
Infact,theargumentmakessenseonlyagainstthebackgroundofthevery
assumptionthatIhavebeenquestioning.Abeliefthatarthritismayoccurinthe
thighappearstobeinexplicableoruncharitablyattributedonlyifitisassumed
thatthesubjectmustfullyunderstandthenotionsinhisattitudecontents.
Athirdintuitiveoraprioriargumentisperhapsthemostinteresting.Some-
timesitisinsistedthatweshouldnotattributecontentsinvolvingincompletely
understoodnotionsbecausetheindividualmustmeansomethingdifferentbythe
misunderstoodwordthanwhatwenon-deviantspeakersmeanbyit.Noteagain
thatitwouldnotbeenoughtousethisargumentfromdeviantspeakermeaning
toshowthatthesubjecthasnotionsthatarenotproperlyexpressedintheway
hethinkstheyare.Insomesenseof'expressed`,thisissurelyoftenthecase.To
berelevant,theargumentmustarriveatanegativeconclusion:thatthesubject
cannothavetheattitudesthatseemcommonlytobeattributed.
Theexpression'theindividualmeantsomethingdifferentbyhiswords`can
beinterpretedinmorethanoneway.Ononegroupofinterpretations,theexpres-
sionsayslittlemorethanthatthespeakerincompletelyunderstoodhiswords:
Thepatientthought'arthritis`meantsomethingthatincludesdiseasesthatoccur
outsideofjoints.Theclientwouldhavemisexplainedthemeaning,use,or
applicationof'contract`.Thesubjectapplied'sofa`tothingsthat,unknown
tohim,arenotsofas.Asecondgroupofinterpretationsemphasizesthatnot
onlydoesthespeakermisconstrueormisapplyhiswords,buthehadinmind
somethingthatthewordsdonotdenoteorexpress.Thesubjectsometimes
hadinmindcertainarmchairswhenheused'sofa`.Theclientregardedthe
notionoflegalagreementbasedonwrittendocumentsasapproximatelyinter-
changeablewithwhatisexpressedby'contract`,andthushadsuchanotion
inmindwhenheused'contract`.Apersonwithaproblemabouttherangeof
redmightsometimeshaveinmindamentalimageofanon-redcolorwhenhe
used'red`.
Theitalicizedpremiseoftheargumentis,ofcourse,alwaystrueinour
examplesunderthefrstgroupofinterpretations,andoftentrueunderthesecond.
Butinterpretedintheseways,theargumentisanonsequitur.Itdoesnotfollow
fromtheassumptionthatthesubjectthoughtthatawordmeanssomethingthat
itdoesnot(ormisappliestheword,orisdisposedtomisexplainitsmeaning)
thatthewordcannotbeusedinliterallydescribinghismentalcontents.Itdoes
notfollowfromtheassumptionthatapersonhasinmindsomethingthata
worddoesnotdenoteorexpressthatthewordcannotoccurobliquely(andbe
interpretedliterally)inthat-clausesthatprovidesomeofhismentalcontents.
AsIhavepointedoutinSectionIIIb,thereisarangeofcasesinwhichwe
commonlyreinterpretaperson`sincompletelyunderstoodwordsforpurposesof
mental-contentattribution.Butthepresentargumentneedstoshowthatdeviant
speakermeaningalwaysforcessuchreinterpretation.
Inmanyofourexamples,theideathatthesubjecthassomedeviantnotion
inmindhasnointuitivelyclearapplication.(Considerthearthritisandmortgage
examples.)Butevenwherethisexpressiondoesseemtoapply,theargument
IndividualismandtheMental131
doesnotsupporttherelevantconclusion.Atbestitshowsthatanotiondeviantly
associatedwithawordplaysaroleinthesubject`sattitudes.Forexample,
someonewhohasinmindthenotionofanagreementbasedonwrittendocu-
mentswhenhesays'Ihavejustenteredintoacontract`,maybecorrectlysaid
tobelievethathehasjustenteredintoanagreementbasedonwrittendocu-
ments.Itdoesnotfollowfromthisthathelacksabelieforthoughtthathehas
justenteredintoacontract.Infact,inourview,theclient`shavingthedeviant
notioninmindisalikelyconsequenceofthefactthathebelievesthatcontracts
areimpossiblewithoutawrittendocument.
Ofcourse,giventhefrst,moreliberalsetofinterpretationsof'meanssome-
thingdifferent`,thefactthatinourexamplesthesubjectmeanssomething
differentbyhiswords(oratleastappliesthemdifferently)isimpliedbycer-
tainofhisbeliefs.Itisimpliedbyabeliefthathehasarthritisinthethigh.
Aqualifedversionoftheconverseimplicationalsoholds.Givenappropriate
backgroundassumptions,thefactthatthesubjecthascertaindeviant(object-
level)beliefsisimpliedbyhismeaningsomethingdifferentbyhiswords.So
far,noargumenthasshownthatwecannotaccepttheseimplicationsandretain
theliteralinterpretationofcommonmentalisticascriptions.
Theargumentfromdeviantspeakermeaningdownplaysanintuitivefeature
thatcanbeexpectedtobepresentinmanyofourexamples.Thesubject`s
willingnesstosubmithisstatementandbelieftothearbitrationofanauthority
suggestsawillingnesstohavehiswordstakeninthenormalway-regardlessof
mistakenassociationswiththeword.Typically,thesubjectwillregardrecourse
toadictionary,andtotherestofus,asatonceacheckonhisusageandhis
belief.Whentheverdictgoesagainsthim,hewillnotusuallypleadthatwehave
simplymisunderstoodhisviews.Thissortofbehaviorsuggeststhat(giventhe
sortsofbackgroundassumptionsthatcommonpracticeusestodistinguishour
examplesfromthoseofforeigners,radicalmisunderstandings,andsoforth)we
cansaythatinasenseourmanmeantby'arthritis`arthritis-where'arthritis`
occurs,ofcourse,obliquely.Wecansaythisdespitethefactthathisincomplete
understandingleadsus,inoneofthesensesexplicatedearlier,tosaythathe
meantsomethingdifferentby'arthritis`.
Ifonetriestoturntheargumentfromdeviantspeakermeaningintoavalid
argument,onearrivesatanassumptionthatseemstoguideallthreeofthe
philosophicalargumentsIhavediscussed.Theassumptionisthatwhataperson
thinkshiswordsmean,howhetakesthem,fullydetermineswhatattitudeshe
canexpressinusingthem:thecontentsofhismentalstatesandeventsare
strictlylimitedtonotions,howeveridiosyncratic,thatheunderstands;aperson
cannotthinkwithnotionsheincompletelyunderstands.Butsupplementedwith
thisassumption,theargumentbegsthequestionatissue.
Theleastcontroversialjustifcationoftheassumptionwouldbeanappeal
tostandardpracticeinmentalisticattributions.Butstandardpracticeiswhat
broughttheassumptionintoquestioninthefrstplace.Ofcourse,usageisnot
sacredifgoodreasonsforrevisingitcanbegiven.Butnonehavebeen.
132IndividualismandtheMental
Theassumptionislooselyderived,Ithink,fromtheoldmodelaccordingto
whichapersonmustbedirectlyacquaintedwith,ormustimmediatelyappre-
hend,thecontentsofhisthoughts.Noneoftheobjectionsexplicitlyinvokesthis
model-andmanyoftheirproponentswouldrejectit.ButIthinkthatallthe
objectionsderivesomeoftheirappealfromphilosophicalhabitsthathavebeen
moldedbyit.IshalldiscussthismodelfurtherinSectionIV.
Onemay,ofcourse,quiteself-consciouslyneglectcertainaspectsofcommon
mentalisticnotionsintheinterestsofarevisedoridealizedversionofthem.One
suchidealizationcouldlimititselftojustthoseattitudesinvolving'fullunder-
standing`(forsomesuitablyspecifednotionofunderstanding).Thislimitation
islessclearcutthanonemightsuppose,sincethenotionofunderstandingitself
tendstobeusedaccordingtomisleadingstereotypes.Still,oversimplifedmod-
els,idealizations,ofmentalisticnotionsaredefensible,aslongasthecharacter
andpurposeoftheoversimplifcationsareclear.Inmyopinion,limitingone-
selfto'fullyunderstood`attitudesprovidesnosignifcantadvantageinfnding
elegantandilluminatingformalsemanticaltheoriesofnaturallanguage.Such
astrategyhasperhapsabetterclaiminpsychology,thougheventhereitspro-
prietyiscontroversial.(Cf.Sec.IV.)Moretothepoint,Ithinkthatmodels
thatneglecttherelevantsocialfactorsinmentalisticattributionsarenotlikely
toprovidelong-runphilosophicalilluminationofouractualmentalisticnotions.
Butthisviewhardlyadmitsofdetailedsupporthereandnow.
Ourargumentintheprecedingpagesmay,ataminimum,beseenasinveigh-
ingagainstalong-standingphilosophicalhabitofdenyingthatitisanoversim-
plifcationtomake'fullunderstanding`ofacontentanecessaryconditionfor
havingapropositionalattitudewiththatcontent.Theoversimplifcationdoes
notconstituteneglectofsomequirkofordinaryusage.Misunderstandingand
partialunderstandingarepervasiveandinevitablephenomena,andattributions
ofcontentdespitethemareanintegralpartofcommonpractice.
Ishallnothereelaborateaphilosophicaltheoryofthesocialaspectsof
mentalisticphenomena,thoughinSectionVIshallsuggestlinessuchatheory
mighttake.Oneofthemostsurprisingandexcitingaspectsofthethought
experimentisthatitsmostliteralinterpretationprovidesaperspectiveonthe
mentalthathasreceivedlittleseriousdevelopmentinthephilosophicaltradition.
Theperspectivesurelyinvitesexploration.
IV.APPLICATIONS
Iwanttoturnnowtoadiscussionofhowourargumentbearsonphilosophical
approachestothementalthatmaybetermedindividualistic.Imeanthistermto
besomewhatvague.Butroughly,Iintendtoapplyittophilosophicaltreatments
thatseektoseeaperson`sintentionalmentalphenomenaultimatelyandpurely
intermsofwhathappenstotheperson,whatoccurswithinhim,andhow
herespondstohisphysicalenvironment,withoutanyessentialreferencetothe
IndividualismandtheMental133
socialcontextinwhichheortheinterpreterofhismentalphenomenaissituated.
HowIapplytheterm'individualistic`willperhapsbecomeclearerbyreference
totheparticularcasesthatIshalldiscuss.
a.AsIhavealreadyintimated,theargumentoftheprecedingsectionsaffects
thetraditionalintro-(orextro-)spectionisttreatmentsofthemind,thoseofPlato,
Descartes,Russell,andnumerousothers.Thesetreatmentsarebasedonamodel
thatlikenstherelationbetweenapersonandthecontentsofhisthoughtto
seeing,whereseeingistakentobeakindofdirect,immediateexperience.On
themostradicalandunqualifedversionsofthemodel,aperson`sinspectionof
thecontentsofhisthoughtisinfallible:thenotionofincompletelyunderstanding
themhasnoapplicationatall.
Themodeltendstoencourageindividualistictreatmentsofthemental.Forit
suggeststhatwhatapersonthinksdependsonwhatoccursor'appears`withinhis
mind.Demythologized,whatapersonthinksdependsonthepowerandextent
ofhiscomprehensionandonhisinternaldispositionstowardthecomprehended
contents.Themodelisexpressedinperhapsitscrudestandleastqualifedform
inawell-knownpassagebyRussell:
Wheneverarelationofsupposingorjudgingoccurs,thetermstowhichthesupposing
orjudgingmindisrelatedbytherelationofsupposingorjudgingmustbeterms
withwhichthemindinquestionisacquainted..Itseemstomethatthetruthof
thisprincipleisevidentassoonastheprincipleisunderstood.
5
Acquaintanceis(forRussell)direct,infallible,non-propositional,non-perspec-
tivalknowledge.'Terms`likeconcepts,ideas,attributes,forms,meanings,or
sensesareentitiesthatoccurinjudgmentsmoreorlessimmediatelybeforethe
mindonacloseanalogytothewaysensationsaresupposedto.
ThemodelismorequalifedandcomplicatedinthewritingsofDescartes.In
particular,heemphasizesthepossibilitythatonemightperceivethecontentsof
one`smindunclearlyorindistinctly.Heisevenhigh-handedenoughtowrite,
'Somepeoplethroughouttheirlivesperceivenothingsocorrectlyastobecap-
ableofjudgingitproperly.`
6
Thissortofremarkappearstobeaconcessiontothe
pointsmadeinSectionsIandIIaboutthepossibilityofasubject`sbadlyunder-
standinghismentalcontents.Buttheconcessionisdistortedbytheunderlying
5
BertrandRussell,MysticismandLogic(London:UnwinHyman,1959),221.AlthoughRussell`s
statementisunusuallyunqualifed,itskinshiptoDescartes`sandPlato`smodelisunmistakable.
Cf.Plato,Phaedrus249b-c,Phaedo47b6-c4,bothinTheCollectedDialoguesofPlato,trans.
E.HamiltonandH.Cairus(NewYork:PantheonBooks,1961);Descartes,PhilosophicalWorks,
ed.E.HaldaneandG.R.T.Ross,2vols.(NewYorkDover,1955),RulesfortheDirectionof
theMind,sec.XII,i.41-42,45;PrinciplesofPhilosophy,PartI,XXXII-XXXV,i.232-233;
Replies,ii.52;Hume,ATreatiseofHumanNature,ed.L.A.Selby-Bigge(Oxford:ClarendonPress,
1965),I.35;II,26;Kant,CritiqueofPureReason,trans.N.K.Smith(NewYork:StMartin`s
Press,1965),A7-B11;Frege,TheFoundationsofArithmetic,ed.J.L.Austin(Evanston,Ill.:North-
westernUniversityPress,1968),sec.105;G.E.Moore,PrincipiaEthica(Cambridge:Cambridge
UniversityPress,1966),86.
6
Descartes,PrinciplesofPhilosophy,XLV-XLI.
134IndividualismandtheMental
introspectionmodel.OnDescartes`sview,theperson`sfacultyofunderstand-
ing,properlyso-called,makesnoerrors.Failuretograspone`smentalcontents
resultsfromeitherblindprejudiceorinterferenceby'mere`bodilysensations
andcorporealimagery.Theimplicationisthatwithsuffcientlycarefulrefection
onthepartoftheindividualsubject,theseobstaclestoperfectunderstanding
canbecleared.Thatis,oneneedonlybecarefulorproperlyguidedinone`s
introspectionstoachievefullunderstandingofthecontentofone`sintentional
mentalphenomena.MuchthatDescartessayssuggeststhatwherethesubject
failstoachievesuchunderstanding,nodefnitecontentcanbeattributedtohim.
Insuchcases,his'thinking`consistsofunspecifableorindeterminateimagery;
attributionofdefniteconceptualcontentisprecluded.Theseimplicationsare
reinforcedinDescartes`sappealtoself-evident,indubitabletruths:
Therearesomesoevidentandatthesametimesosimplethatwecannotthink
ofthemwithoutbelievingthemtobetrue..Forwecannotdoubtthemunlesswe
thinkofthem;andwecannotthinkofthemwithoutatthesametimebelievingthem
tobetrue,i.e.wecanneverdoubtthem.
7
Theself-evidencederivesfromthemereunderstandingofthetruths,andfully
understandingthemisapreconditionforthinkingthematall.Itisthislast
requirementthatwehavebeenquestioning.
IntheEmpiricisttraditionDescartes`squalifcationsonthedirectexperience
model-particularlythoseinvolvingtheinterferingeffectsofsensationsand
imagery-tendtofallaway.Whatonethinkscomestobetakenasasortof
impression(whethermoreimagisticormoreintellectual)onordirectlygrasped
bytheindividual`smind.Thetendencytomakefullcomprehensiononthepart
ofthesubjectanecessaryconditionforattributingamentalcontenttohim
appearsbothinphilosopherswhotakethecontenttobeaPlatonicabstraction
andinthosewhoplaceit,insomesense,insidetheindividual`smind.Thisis
certainlythedirectioninwhichthemodelpulls,withitspictureofimmediate
accessibilitytotheindividual.ThusDescartes`soriginalconcessionstocasesof
incompleteunderstandingbecamelostashismodelbecameentrenched.What
W¨ olffinsaidofpaintersistrueofphilosophers:theylearnmorefromstudying
eachotherthanfromrefectingonanythingelse.
Thehistoryofthemodelmakesanintricatesubject.Myremarksaremeant
merelytoprovideasuggestivecaricatureofit.Itshouldbeclear,however,thatin
broadoutlinethemodelmixespoorlywiththethoughtexperimentofSectionII,
particularlyitsfrststep.Thethoughtexperimentindicatesthatcertain'linguistic
truths`thathaveoftenbeenheldtobeindubitablecanbethoughtyetdoubted.
Anditshowsthataperson`sthoughtcontentisnotfxedbywhatgoesonin
him,orbywhatisaccessibletohimsimplybycarefulrefection.Thereason
forthislastpointabout'accessibility`neednotbethatthecontentliestoodeep
intheunconsciousrecessesofthesubject`spsyche.Contentsaresometimes
7
Descartes,PhilosophicalWorks,ii:Replies,42.
IndividualismandtheMental135
'inaccessible`tointrospectionsimplybecausemuchmentalisticattributiondoes
notpresupposethatthesubjecthasfullymasteredthecontentofhisthought.
Inacertainsense,themetaphysicalmodelhasfxedonsomefeaturesofour
useofmentalisticnotionstotheexclusionofothers.Forexample,themodel
fastensonthefactsthatweareprettygoodatidentifyingourownbeliefs
andthoughts,andwehaveatleastaprimafacieauthorityinreportingawide
rangeofthem.Italsounderlinesthepointthatforcertaincontentswetendto
countunderstandingasasuffcientconditionforacknowledgingtheirtruth.(It
isdebatable,ofcourse,howwellitexplainsorilluminestheseobservations.)
Themodelalsohighlightsthetruismthatacertainmeasureofunderstanding
isrequiredofasubjectifwearetoattributeintentionalphenomenaonthe
basisofwhatheutters.Aswehavenoted,chanceorpurelyroteutterances
providenogroundformentalcontentattributions;certainverbalpathologiesare
discounted.Themodelextrapolatesfromtheseobservationstotheclaimthat
apersoncanneverfailtounderstandthecontentofhisbeliefsorthoughts,
orthattheremedyforsuchfailurelieswithinhisownresourcesofrefec-
tion(whetherautonomousandconscious,orunconsciousandguided).Itis
thisextrapolationthatrequiresonetopassovertheequallypatentpracticeof
attributingattitudeswherethesubjectincompletelyunderstandsexpressionsthat
providethecontentofthoseattitudes.Insistenceonmetalinguisticreinterpret-
ationandtalkabouttheindefnitenessofattitudecontentsincasesofincom-
pleteunderstandingseemtoberearguarddefensesofavastlyoverextended
model.
TheCartesian-Russellianmodelhasfewstrictadherentsamongprominent
linguisticphilosophers.Butalthoughithasbeenwidelyrejectedorpolitely
talkedaround,claimsthatitboreandnurturedarecommonplace,evenamong
itsopponents.Aswehaveseenintheobjectionstothefrststepoftheargument
ofsectionII,theseclaimspurporttorestrictthecontentswecanattributeto
apersononthebasisofhisuseoflanguage.Therestrictionssimplymimic
thoseofDescartes.Freedofthepicturesquebutvulnerablemodelthatformed
them,theclaimshaveassumedthepowerofdogma.Theirstrictures,however,
misrepresentordinarymentalisticnotions.
b.Thiscentury`smostconspicuousattempttoreplacethetraditionalCartesian
modelhasbeenthebehavioristmovementanditsheirs.Itakeitasobviousthat
theargumentofSectionIIprovidesyetanotherreasontorejectthemostradical
versionofbehaviorism-'philosophical`,'logical`,or'analytical`behaviorism.
Thisistheviewthatmentalisticattributionscanbe'analytically`defned,or
givenstrictmeaningequivalences,purelyinnon-mental,behavioralterms.No
analysisrestingpurelyontheindividual`sdispositionstobehaviorcangivean
'analytic`defnitionofamentalcontentattribution,becausewecanconceiveof
thebehavioraldefniensapplyingwhilethementalisticdefniendumdoesnot.
Butanewargumentforthisconclusionishardlyneeded,since'philosophical`
behavioristsare,ineffect,extinct.
136IndividualismandtheMental
Thereis,however,anheirofbehaviorismthatIwanttodiscussatsome-
whatgreaterlength.Theapproachsometimesgoesbythename'functionalism`,
althoughthattermisappliedtonumerousslogansandprojects,oftenvaguely
formulated.Evenviewsthatseemtometobeaffectedbyourargumentare
frequentlystatedsosketchilythatonemaybeinconsiderabledoubtaboutwhat
isbeingproposed.Somyremarksshouldbetakenlessasanattempttorefute
thethesesofparticularauthorsthanasanattackonawayofthinkingthatseems
toinformaclusterofviewpoints.ThequotationsIgiveinfootnotesaremeant
tobesuggestive,ifnotalwaysdefnitive,ofthewayofthinkingtheargument
tellsagainst.
8
TheviewaffectedbytheargumentofSectionIIattemptstogivesomething
likeaphilosophical'account`ofthemental.Thedetailsandstrategy-even
thenotionof'account`-varyfromauthortoauthor.Butarecurrentthemeis
thatmentalnotionsaretobeseenultimatelyintermsoftheindividualsubject`s
input,output,andinnerdispositionsandstates,wheretheselatterarecharacter-
izedpurelyintermsofhowtheyleadtoorfromoutput,input,orotherinner
statessimilarlycharacterized.Mentalnotionsaretobeexplicatedoridentifedin
functional,non-mentalistic,non-intentionalterminology.Proponentsofthissort
ofideaarerarelyveryspecifcaboutwhattermsmaybeusedindescribinginput
andoutput,orevenwhatsortsoftermscountas'functional`expressions.But
theimpressionusuallygivenisthatinputandoutputaretobespecifedinterms
(acceptabletoabehaviorist)ofirritationsofthesubject`ssurfacesandmove-
mentsofhisbody.Onsomeversions,neurophysiologicaltermsareallowed.
Morerecently,therehavebeenliberalizedappealstocausalinputandoutput
relationswithparticular,specifedphysicalobjects,stuffs,ormagnitudes.Func-
tionaltermsincludetermslike'causes`,'leadstowithprobabilityn`,andthe
like.Forourpurposes,thedetailsdonotmattermuch,aslongasanapproach
allowsnomentalisticorotherintentionalterms(suchas'means`orthat-clauses)
intoitsvocabulary,andaslongasitappliestoindividualstakenonebyone.
Adifferencebetweenthisapproachandthatofphilosophicalbehaviorismis
thatawholearrayofdispositionalorfunctionalstates-causallyorprobabilist-
icallyinterrelated-mayenterintothe'account`ofasinglementalattribution.
Thearraymustbeultimatelysecuredtoinputandoutput,buttheinternalstates
neednotbesosecuredonebyone.Theviewisthusnotimmediatelyvulnerable
toclaimsagainstsimplisticbehaviorisms,thatagivenstimulus-responsepattern
8
Certainmovementssometimescalled'functionalist`aredefnitelynotmypresentconcern.
NothingIsayismeanttoopposetheclaimthathypothesesinpsychologydoandshouldmakeref-
erenceto'sub-personal`statesandprocessesinexplaininghumanactionandordinarymentalstates
andprocesses.Myremarksmaybearonpreciselyhowsuchhypothesesareconstruedphilosoph-
ically.Butthehypothesesthemselvesmustbejudgedprimarilybytheirfruits.Similarly,Iamnot
concernedwiththeclaimthatcomputersprovideanilluminatingperspectiveforviewingthemind.
Again,myviewmaybearontheinterpretationofthecomputeranalogy,butIhavenointentionof
questioningitsgeneralfruitfulness.Ontheotherhand,insofarasfunctionalismismerelyaslogan
totheeffectthat'onceyouseehowcomputersmightbemadetowork,yourealizesuchandsuch
aboutthemind`,Iaminclinedtoletthecloudcondensealittlebeforeweighingitscontents.
IndividualismandtheMental137
mayhavedifferentcontentsindifferentsocialcontexts.Suchclaims,which
hardlyneedadefender,havebeentranquillyacceptedonthisview.Theview`s
hopeisthatdifferencesincontentdependonfunctionaldifferencesintheindi-
vidual`slargerfunctionalstructure.Fromthisviewpoint,analyticalbehaviorism
erredprimarilyinitsfailuretorecognizetheinterlockingorholisticcharacter
ofmentalattributionsandinitsoversimplifcationoftheoreticalexplanation.
AsIsaid,thenotionofanaccountofthementalvariesfromauthorto
author.Someauthorstakeovertheold-fashionedidealofan'analysis`from
philosophicalbehaviorismandaimatadefnitionofthemeaningofmentalistic
vocabulary,oradefnitionaleliminationofit.Othersseetheiraccountsasindic-
atingaseriesofscientifchypothesesthatidentifymentalstateswithcausalor
functionalstates,orroles,intheindividual.Theseauthorsrejectbehaviorism`s
goalofprovidingmeaningequivalences,aswellasitsrestrictivemethods.The
hypothesesaresupposedtobetypeorpropertyidentitiesandarenowadays
oftenthoughttoholdnecessarily,eveniftheydonotgivemeaningrelations.
Moreover,thesehypothesesareofferednotmerelyasspeculationaboutthe
futureofpsychology,butasprovidingaphilosophicallyilluminatingaccountof
ourordinarynotionofthemental.Thusiftheviewsystematicallyfailedtomake
plausibletypeidentitiesbetweenfunctionalstatesandmentalstates,ordinarily
construed,thenbyitsownlightsitwouldhavefailedtogiveaphilosophical
'account`ofthemental.Ihavecrudelyover-schematizedthemethodological
differencesamongtheauthorsinthistradition.Butthedifferencesfallroughly
withinthepolarnotionsofaccountthatIhavedescribed.Ithinkmydiscussion
willsurvivetheoversimplifcations.
9
9
Arepresentativeofthemorenearly'analytical`formoffunctionalismisDavidLewis,'Psycho-
physicalandTheoreticalIdentifcations`,AustralasianJournalofPhilosophy,50(1972),249-258:
'Appliedtocommon-sensepsychology-folkscienceratherthanprofessionalscience,buta
theorynonetheless-wegetthehypothesis.thatamentalstateM.isdefnableastheoccupant
ofacertaincausalroleR-thatis,asthestate,ofwhateversort,thatiscausallyconnectedin
specifedwaystosensorystimuli,motorresponses,andothermentalstates`(pp.249-250).Actu-
ally,itshouldbenotedthattheargumentofsec.IappliestoLewis`spositionlessdirectlythan
onemightsuppose.Forreasonsunconnectedwithmattersathand,Lewisintendshisdeünitionto
applytorelationalmentalisticpredicateslike'thinks`butnottocomplexpredicatesthatidentify
actualmentalstatesorevents,like'thinksthatsnowiswhite`.Cf.ibid.,256n.13.Thisseems
tomeapuzzlinghalfwayhouseforsomeofLewis`sphilosophicalpurposes.Butourargument
appearstoapplyanyway,sinceLewisisexplicitinholdingthatphysicalfactsaboutapersontaken
inisolationfromhisfellows'determine`allhisspecifcintentionaleventsandstates.Cf.'Radic-
alInterpretation¨,Synthese,27(1974),331ff.IciteLewis`sdefnitionalapproachbecauseithas
beenthemostinfuentialrecentpieceofitsgenre,andmanyofthoseinfuencedbyithavenot
excludeditsapplicationtospecifcintentionalmentalstatesandevents.Otherrepresentativesof
thedefnitionalapproachareJ.J.C.Smart,'FurtherThoughtsontheIdentityTheory`,TheMon-
ist,56(1972),149-162;D.W.Armstrong,AMaterialistTheoryofMind(London:Routledge&
KeganPaul,1968),pp.90-91andpassim;SidneyShoemaker,'FunctionalismandQualia`,Philo-
sophicalStudies,27(1975),306-307.Arepresentativeofthemorefrequentlyheld'hypothesis`
versionoffunctionalismisHilaryPutnam,'TheMentalLifeofSomeMachines`,inPhilosophical
Papers,ii(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975),and'TheNatureofMentalStates`,ibid.,
cf.p.437:'.iftheprogramoffndingpsychologicallawsthatarenotspeciesspecifc.eversuc-
ceeds,thenitwillbringinitswakeadelineationofthekindoffunctionalorganizationthatis
138IndividualismandtheMental
Anyattempttogiveanaccountofspecifcbeliefsandthoughtsalongthe
linesIhaveindicatedwillcomeupshort.Forwemayfxtheinput,output,and
totalarrayofdispositionalorfunctionalstatesofoursubject,aslongasthese
arenon-intentionallydescribedandarelimitedtowhatisrelevanttoaccounting
forhisactivitytakeninisolationfromthatofhisfellows.Butwecanstill
conceiveofhismentalcontentsasvarying.Functionallyequivalentpeople-on
anyplausiblenotionoffunctionalequivalencethathasbeensketched-may
havenon-equivalentmentalstateandeventcontents,indicatedbyobliquely
non-equivalentcontentclauses.Theargumentindicatesasystematicinadequacy
inattemptsofthesortIdescribed.
Proponentsoffunctionalistaccountshaveseenthemasrevealingthetrue
natureofcharacteristicmarksofthementalandasresolvingtraditionalphilo-
sophicalissuesaboutsuchmarks.Inthecaseofbeliefs,desires,andthoughts,
themostsalientmarkisintentionality-theill-specifedinformation-bearing,
representationalfeaturethatseemstoinvestthesementalstatesandevents.
10
In
myterminology,accountingforintentionalitylargelyamountstoaccountingfor
thecontentofmentalstatesandevents.(Thereisalso,ofcourse,theapplication
ofcontentinderecases.Butletusputthisasidehere.)Suchcontentisclearly
partofwhatthefunctionalrolesofoursubjects`statesfailtodetermine.
Itisworthre-emphasizingherethattheproblemisunaffectedbysugges-
tionsthatwespecifyinputandoutputintermsofcausalrelationstoparticular
necessaryandsuffcientforagivenpsychologicalstate,aswellasaprecisedefnitionofthenotion
'psychologicalstate¨.`Inmorerecentwork,Putnam`sviewsontherelationbetweenfunctional
organizationandpsychological(andalsomental)statesandeventshavebecomemorecomplicated.
Imakenoclaimsabouthowtheargumentofsec.IIbearsonthem.Otherrepresentativesofthe
'hypothesis`approachareGilbertHarman,'ThreeLevelsofMeaning`,TheJournalofPhilosophy,
65(1968);'AnIntroductionto'TranslationandMeaning¨`,inD.DavidsonandI.Hintikka(eds.),
WordsandObjections(Dordrecht:Reidel,1969),21;andThought(Princeton:PrincetonUniver-
sityPress,1973),43-46,56-65,e.g.,p.45:'.mentalstatesandprocessesaretobefunctionally
defned(byapsychologicaltheory).Theyareconstitutedbytheirfunctionorroleintherelevant
programme`;JerryFodor,TheLanguageofThought(NewYork:Cravell,1975),ch.1;Armstrong,
AMaterialistTheoryofMind,84.Anattempttoarticulatethecommoncoreofthedifferenttypesof
functionalist'account`occursinNedBlockandJerryFodor`s'WhatPsychologicalStatesareNot`,
PhilosophicalReview,81(1972),173:'.functionalisminthebroadsenseofthatdoctrinewhich
holdsthattypeidentityconditionsforpsychologicalstatesreferonlytotheirrelationstoinputs,
outputsandoneanother.`
10
Oftenfunctionalistsgivementalcontentsonlycursorydiscussion,ifanyatall.Butclaims
thatafunctionalaccountexplainsintentionalitybyaccountingforallspecifcintentionalstatesand
eventsinnon-intentional,functionallanguageoccurinthefollowing:DanielDennett,Contentand
Consciousness(London:Rontledge&KeganPaul,1969),ch.2andpassim;Harman,Thought,e.g.
p.60:'Tospecifythemeaningofasentenceusedincommunicationispartlytospecifythebelief
orothermentalstateexpressed;andtherepresentativecharacterofthatstateisdeterminedbyits
functionalrole`;Fodor,LanguageofThought,ch.1and2e.g.p.75:'Thewaythatinformation
isstored,computed.orotherwiseprocessedbytheorganismexplainsitscognitivestatesandin
particular,itspropositionalattitudes`;Smart,'FurtherThoughtsontheIdentityTheory`;Hartry
Field,'MentalRepresentation`,Erkenntnis,13(1978),9-61.Ishallconfnediscussiontotheissue
ofintentionality.Butitseemstomethattheindividualisticcastoffunctionalistaccountsrenders
theminadequateintheirhandlingofanothermajortraditionalissueaboutintentionalmentalstates
andevents-frst-personauthority.
IndividualismandtheMental139
objectsorstuffsinthesubject`sphysicalenvironment.Suchspecifcationsmay
bethoughttohelpwithsomeexamplesbasedonindexicalityorpsycholo-
gicalsuccessverbs,andperhapsincertainargumentsconcerningnaturalkind
terms(thougheveninthesecasesIthinkthatonewillbeforcedtoappeal
tointentionallanguage).(Cf.note2.)Butthissortofsuggestionhasnoeasy
applicationtotheargument.Fortherelevantcausalrelationsbetweenthesubject
andthephysicalenvironmenttowhichhistermsapply-wheresuchrelations
arenon-intentionallyspecifed-wereamongtheelementsheldconstantwhile
thesubject`sbeliefsandthoughtsvaried.
ThefunctionalistapproachesIhavecitedseemtoprovideyetanothercasein
whichmentalcontentsarenotplausiblyaccountedforinnon-intentionalterms.
Theyarecertainlynotexplicableintermsofcausallyorfunctionallyspecifed
statesandeventsoftheindividualsubject.Theintentionalorsemanticalroleof
mentalstatesandeventsisnotafunctionmerelyoftheirfunctionallyspecifed
rolesintheindividual.Thefailureoftheseaccountsofintentionalmentalstates
andeventsderivesfromanunderestimationofsociallydependentfeaturesof
cognitivephenomena.
Beforeextendingtheapplicationoftheargument,Iwantbriefytocanvass
somewaysofbeinginfuencedbyit,waysthatmightappealtosomeonefxed
onthefunctionalistideal.Oneresponsemightbetodrawastrictdistinction
betweenmentalstates,ordinarilyso-called,andpsychologicalstates.Onecould
thenclaimthatthelatterarethetruesubjectmatterofthescienceofpsychology
andmaybeidentifedwithfunctionalstatesfunctionallyspecifed,afterall.Thus
onemightclaimthatthesubjectwasinthesamepsychological(functional)states
inboththeactualandtheimaginedsituations,althoughhehaddifferentbeliefs
andthoughtsordinarilyso-called.
Therearetwoobservationsthatneedtobeenteredaboutthisposition.The
frstisthatitfranklyjettisonsmuchofthephilosophicalinterestoffunctional-
istaccounts.Thefailuretocopewithmentalcontentsisacaseinpoint.The
secondobservationisthatitisfarfromclearthatsuchadistinctionbetween
thepsychologicalandthementalisorwillbesanctionedbypsychologyitself.
Functionalistaccountsaroseasphilosophicalinterpretationsofdevelopments
inpsychologyinfuencedbycomputertheory.Theinterpretationshavebeen
guidedbyphilosophicalinterests,suchasthrowinglightonthemind-body
problemandaccountingformentalisticfeaturesinnon-mentalisticterms.But
thetheoriesofcognitivepsychologists,includingthosewhoplacegreatweight
onthecomputeranalogy,arenotordinarilypurifedofmentalisticorintentional
terminology.Indeed,intentionalterminologyplaysacentralroleinmuchcon-
temporarytheorizing.(Thisisalsotrueoftheoriesthatappealto'sub-personal`
statesorprocesses.The'sub-personal`statesthemselvesareoftencharacterized
intentionally.)Purifyingatheoryofmentalisticandintentionalfeaturesinfavor
offunctionalorcausalfeaturesismoreclearlydemandedbythegoalsofphilo-
sophersthanbytheneedsofpsychology.Thusitisatleastanopenquestion
whetherfunctionalapproachesofthesortwehavediscussedgiveasatisfactory
140IndividualismandtheMental
accountofpsychologicalstatesandevents.Itisnotevidentthatpsychologywill
everbemethodologically'pure`(ortheoreticallypurifablebysomedefnitional
device)inthewaytheseapproachesdemand.Thisgoaloffunctionalistsmay
besimplyameta-psychologicalmistake.
Toputthepointanotherway,itisnotclearthatfunctionalstates,character-
izedpurelyinfunctional,non-intentionalterms(andnon-intentionaldescriptions
ofinputandoutput)arethenaturalsubjectmatterofpsychology.Psychology
would,Ithink,beanunusualtheoryifitrestricteditself(orcouldbedefnition-
allyrestricted)tospecifyingabstractcausalorfunctionalstructuresinpurely
causalorfunctionalterms,togetherwithvocabularyfromotherdisciplines.Of
course,itmaybethatfunctionalstates,functionallyspecifed,formapsycho-
logicalnaturalkind.Anditiscertainlynottobeassumedthatpsychologywill
respectordinaryterminologyinitsindividuationoftypesofpsychologicalstates
andevents.Psychologymustrunitsowncourse.Buttheassumptionthatpsy-
chologicalterminologywillbeultimatelynon-intentionalandpurelyfunctional
seemswithoutstrongsupport.Moreimportantfrommyviewpoint,ifpsycho-
logydidtaketheindividualisticroutesuggestedbytheapproachesIhavecited,
thenitspowertoilluminetheeverydayphenomenaalludedtoinmentalistic
discoursewouldbecorrespondinglylimited.
Theseremarkssuggestasecondsortoffunctionalistresponsetotheargument
ofSectionII,onethatattemptstotakethecommunityratherthantheindividual
astheobjectoffunctionalanalysis.Onemight,forexample,seektoexplain
anindividual`sresponsibilitytocommunalstandardsintermsofhishavingthe
rightkindofinteractionwithotherindividualswhocollectivelyhadfunctional
structuresappropriatetothosestandards.Spellingouttherelevantnotionsof
interactionandappropriatenessis,ofcourse,anythingbuttrivial.(Cf.SectionV.)
Doingsoinpurelyfunctional,non-intentionaltermswouldbeyetafurther
step.Untilsuchatreatmentisdevelopedandillustratedinsomedetail,thereis
littlepointindiscussingit.Ishallonlyconjecturethat,ifitistoremainnon-
intentional,suchatreatmentislikelytobesoabstract-atleastinourpresent
stateofpsychologicalandsociologicalignorance-thatitwillbeunilluminating
fromaphilosophicalpointofview.Someoftheapproacheswehavebeen
discussingalreadymorethanfirtwiththisdiffculty.
c.Individualisticassumptionsaboutthementalhaveinfectedtheorizingabout
therelationbetweenmindandmeaning.AnexampleistheGriceanproject
ofaccountingforconventionalorlinguisticmeaningintermsofcertaincom-
plexintentionsandbeliefsofindividuals.
11
TheGriceanprogramanalyzes
11
H.P.Grice,'Meaning`,ThePhilosophicalReview,66(1957),377-388;'Utterer`sMeaning,
Sentence-Meaning,andWord-Meaning`,FoundationsofLanguage,4(1968),225-242;Stephen
Schiffer,Meaning(Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1972),cf.esp.pp.13,50,63.ff.;Jonathan
Bennett,'TheMeaning-NominalistStrategy`,FoundationsofLanguage,10(1974),141-168.Anoth-
erexampleofanindividualistictheoryofmeaningistheclaimtoexplicateallkindsofmeaning
ultimatelyinpsychologicalterms,andtheselatterinfunctionalistterms.Seee.g.Harman,'Three
LevelsofMeaning`.Thisprojectseemstorestonthefunctionalistapproachesjustcriticized.
IndividualismandtheMental141
conventionalmeaningintermsofsubtle'mutualknowledge`,orbeliefsand
intentionsabouteachothers`beliefsandintentions,onthepartofmostorall
membersofacommunity.Seenasaquasi-defnitionalenterprise,theprogram
presupposesthatthenotionofanindividual`sbelievingorintendingsomething
isalways'conceptually`independentoftheconventionalmeaningofsymbols
usedtoexpressthatsomething.Insofaras'conceptually`hasanyintuitivecon-
tent,thisseemsnottobethecase.Oursubject`sbelieforintentioncontentscan
beconceivedtovarysimplybyvaryingconventionsinthecommunityaround
him.Thecontentofindividuals`beliefsseemssometimestodependpartlyon
socialconventionsintheirenvironment.Itistruethatoursubjectsareactu-
allyratherabnormalmembersoftheircommunity,atleastwithrespecttotheir
useandunderstandingofagivenword.Butnormalityhereisjudgedagainst
thestandardssetbycommunalconventions.Sostipulatingthattheindividuals
whosementalstatesareusedindefningconventionalmeaningberelevantly
normalwillnotavoidthecircularitythatIhaveindicated.Iseenowaytodo
so.Thischargeofcircularityhasfrequentlybeenraisedonintuitivegrounds.
Theargumentgivestheintuitionssubstance.Explicatingconventionintermsof
beliefandintentionmayprovidevarioussortsofinsight.Butitisnotdefninga
communalnotionintermsofindividualisticnotions.Norisitreducing,inany
deepsense,thesemantical,ortheintentionalgenerally,tothepsychological.
d.Individualisticassumptionshavealsosetthetoneformuchdiscussionofthe
ontologyofthemental.Thissubjectistoolargetoreceivedetailedconsideration
here.Itiscomplicatedbyavarietyofcrosscurrentsamongdifferentprojects,
methodologies,andtheses.Ishallonlyexplorehowtheargumentaffectsa
certainlineofthinkingcloselyalliedtothefunctionalistapproachesalready
discussed.Theseapproacheshavefrequentlybeenseenasresuscitatinganold
argumentforthematerialistidentitytheory.Theargumentisthree-staged.First,
onegivesaphilosophical'account`ofeachmentalisticlocution,anaccountthat
isprimafacieneutralasregardsontology.Forexample,abelieforathought
thatsofasarecomfortableissupposedtobeaccountedforasonefunctionally
specifedstateoreventwithinanarrayofothers-allofwhicharesecuredto
inputandoutput.Second,therelevantfunctionallyspecifedstatesoreventsare
expectedtobeempiricallycorrelatedorcorrelatablewithphysiologicalstates
oreventsinaperson(statesoreventsthathavethosefunctions).Theempirical
basisforbelievinginthesecorrelationsisclaimedtobeprovidedbypresentor
futurephysicalscience.Thenatureofthesupposedcorrelationsisdifferently
describedindifferenttheories.Butthemostprevalentviewsexpectonlythat
thecorrelationswillholdforeachorganismandperson(perhapsatagiven
time)takenonebyone.Forexample,thefunctionallyspecifedeventtype
thatisidentifedwithathoughtthatsofasarecomfortablemayberealizedin
onepersonbyaninstance(or'token`)ofonephysiologicaleventtype,and
inanotherpersonbyaninstanceofanotherphysiologicaleventtype.Third,
the('token`)mentalstateoreventinthepersonisheldtobeidenticalwiththe
142IndividualismandtheMental
relevant('token`)physiologicalstateorevent,ongeneralgroundsofexplanatory
simplicityandscientifcmethod.Sometimes,thisthirdstageissubmergedby
buildinguniquenessofoccupancyoffunctionalroleintothefrststage.
12
Iamscepticalaboutthissortofargumentateverystage.ButIshalldoubt
onlythefrststagehere.TheargumentIgaveinSectionIIdirectlyundermines
theattempttocarryoutthefrststagebyrecoursetothesortoffunctionalist
approachesthatwediscussedearlier.Samenessoffunctionalrole,individual-
isticallyspecifed,iscompatiblewithdifferenceofcontent.Iknowofnobetter
non-intentionalaccountofmentalisticlocutions.Ifamaterialistargumentofthis
genreistoarrive,itwillrequirealongerfrststep.
Ishallnottrytosaywhetherthereisaphilosophicallyinterestingsensein
whichintentionalmentalphenomenaarephysicalormaterial.ButIdowantto
notesomeconsiderationsagainstmaterialistidentitytheories.
State-likephenomena(say,beliefs)raisedifferentproblemsfromevent-like
phenomena(say,occurrentthoughts).Evenamongidentitytheorists,itissome-
timesquestionedwhetheranidentitytheoryistheappropriategoalformaterial-
isminthecaseofstates.SinceIshallconfnemyselftoidentitytheories,Ishall
concentrateonevent-likephenomena.Butourconsiderationswillalsobearon
viewsthathopetoestablishsomesortoftokenidentitytheoryformentalstates
likebeliefs.
Oneotherpreliminary.Iwanttoremainneutralabouthowbesttodescribe
therelationbetweentheapparentevent-likefeatureofoccurrentthoughtsandthe
apparentrelationalfeature(theirrelationtoacontent).Onemightthinkofthere
beinganevent,thetokenthoughtevent,thatisinacertainrelationtoacontent
(indicatedbythethat-clause).Onemightthinkoftheeventasconsisting-as
notbeinganything'overandabove`-therelevantrelation`sholdingatacertain
timebetweenapersonandacontent.Oronemightprefersomeotheraccount.
Fromtheviewpointofanidentitytheory,thefrstwayofseeingthematteris
mostadvantageous.SoIshallftmyexpositiontothatpointofview.
Ourordinarymethodofidentifyingoccurrentthoughteventsanddifferenti-
atingbetweenthemistomakereferencetothepersonororganismtowhom
thethoughtoccurs,thetimeofitsoccurrence,andthecontentofthethought.If
person,time,andcontentarethesame,wewouldnormallycountthethought
eventthesame.Ifanyoneoftheseparametersdiffersindescriptionsofthought
events(subjecttoqualifcationsaboutduration),thentheeventsoroccurrences
describedaredifferent.Ofcourse,wecandifferentiatebetweeneventsusing
descriptionsthatdonothomeinontheseparticularparameters.Butthese
12
PerhapsthefrstreasonablyclearmodernstatementofthestrategyoccursinJ.J.C.Smart,
'SensationsandBrainProcesses`,ThePhilosophicalReview,68(1959),141-156.Thisarticletreats
qualitativeexperiences;butSmartisexplicitinapplyingittospecifcintentionalstatesandevents
in'FurtherThoughtsontheIdentityTheory`.Cf.alsoDavidLewis,'AnArgumentfortheIdentity
Theory`,TheJournalofPhilosophy,63(1966),17-25;'PsychophysicalandTheoreticalIdenti-
fcations`;Armstrong,AMaterialistTheoryofMind.passim;Harman,Thought,42-43;Fodor,
LanguageofThought,Introduction.
IndividualismandtheMental143
parametersaredominant.(Itisworthnotingthatdifferentiationsintermsof
causesandeffectsusuallytendtorelyonthecontentofmentaleventsorstates
atsomepoint,sincementalstatesoreventsareoftenamongthecausesoreffects
ofagivenmentalevent,andthesecausesoreffectswillusuallybeidentifed
partlyintermsoftheircontent.)Theimportantpointforourpurposesisthatin
ordinarypractice,samenessofthoughtcontent(oratleastsomesortofstrong
equivalenceofcontent)istakenasanecessaryconditionforsamenessofthought
occurrence.
Nowonemightcodifyandgeneralizethispointbyholdingthatnooccur-
renceofathought(thatis,notokenthoughtevent)couldhaveadifferent(or
extensionallynon-equivalent)contentandbetheverysametokenevent.Ifthis
premiseisaccepted,thenourargumentofSectionIIcanbedeployedtoshow
thataperson`sthoughteventisnotidenticalwithanyeventinhimthatis
describedbyphysiology,biology,chemistry,orphysics.Forletbbeanygiv-
eneventdescribedintermsofoneofthephysicalsciencesthatoccursinthe
subjectwhilehethinkstherelevantthought.Let'b`besuchthatitdenotes
thesamephysicaleventoccurringinthesubjectinourcounterfactualsituation.
(Ifyouwant,let'b`berigidinKripke`ssense,thoughsostrongastipulation
isnotneeded.)ThesecondstepofourargumentinSectionIImakesitplaus-
iblethatbneednotbeaffectedbycounterfactualdifferencesinthecommunal
useoftheword'arthritis`.Actually,thesubjectthinksthathisanklesarestiff
fromarthritis,whileboccurs.Butwecanconceiveofthesubject`slacking
athoughteventthathisanklesarestifffromarthritis,whileboccurs.Thus
inviewofourinitialpremise,bisnotidenticalwiththesubject`soccurrent
thought.
13
Identitytheoristswillwanttorejectthefrstpremise-thepremisethatno
eventwithadifferentcontentcouldbeidenticalwithagiventhoughtevent.
Onsuchaview,thegiventhoughteventthathisanklesarestifffromarth-
ritismightwellhavebeenathoughtthathisanklesarestifffromtharthritis,
13
TheargumentisbasicallyCartesianinstyle,(cf.MeditationsII),thoughthecriticismof
functionalism,whichisessentialtoitssuccess,isnotinanyobvioussenseCartesian.(Cf.note
14.)AlsotheconclusiongivesnospecialsupporttoCartesianontology.Theterminologyofrigid-
ityisderivedfromSaulKripke,'NamingandNecessity`,inD.DavidsonandG.Harman(eds.),
SemanticsofNaturalLanguage(Dordrecht:Reidel,1972),thoughasmentionedabove,anotionof
rigidityisnotessentialfortheargument.KripkehasdonemuchtoclarifytheforceoftheCartesian
sortofargument.Hegivessuchanargumentaimedatshowingthenon-identityofsensationswith
brainprocesses.Theargumentaspresentedseemstosufferfromafailuretocriticizematerialistic
accountsofsensationlanguageandfromnotindicatingclearlyhowtokenphysicaleventsandtoken
sensationeventsthatareprimafaciecandidatesforidentifcationcouldhaveoccurredindepend-
ently.ForcriticismofKripke`sargument,seeFredFeldman,'KripkeontheIdentityTheory`,The
JournalofPhilosophy,71(1974),665-676;WilliamG.Lycan,'KripkeandtheMaterialists`,The
JournalofPhilosophy,71(1974),677-689;RichardBoyd,'MaterialismwithoutReductionism:
WhatPhysicalismDoesNotEntail`,inN.Block(ed.),ReadingsinthePhilosophyofPsychology,
i(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1980);ColinMcGinn,'AnomalousMonismand
Kripke`sCartesianIntuitions`,Analysis,37(1977),78-80.Itseemstome,however,thatthese
issuesarenotclosed.
144IndividualismandtheMental
yetbepreciselythesametokenthoughtevent.Suchaviewisintuitivelyvery
implausible.Iknowofonlyonereasonablyspelled-outbasisofsupportforthis
view.Suchabasiswouldbeprovidedbyshowingthatmentalisticphenomena
arecausalorfunctionalstates,inoneofthestrongsensesdiscussedearlier,
andthatmentaleventsarephysicaltokensorrealizationsofthosestates.If
'thatthoughtthathisanklesarestifffromarthritis`couldbeaccountedforin
termslike'thateventwithsuchandsuchacausalorfunctionalrole`(where
'suchandsuch`doesnotitselfinvolveintentionalterminology),andifinde-
pendentlyidentifedphysicaleventssystematicallyflledtheseroles(orrealized
thesestates),wecouldperhapsseeagiventhoughteventashavingadifferent
role-andhencecontent-indifferentpossiblesituations.Givensuchaview,
thefunctionalspecifcationcouldperhapsbeseenasrevealingthecontingency
oftheintentionalspecifcationasappliedtomentaleventtokens.Justaswecan
imagineagivenphysiologicaleventthatactuallyplaystheroleofcausingthe
littlefngertomovetwoinches,asplayingtheroleofcausingthelittlefnger
tomovethreeinches(assumingcompensatorydifferencesinitsphysiological
environment),sowecouldperhapsimagineagiventhoughtashavingadiffer-
entfunctionalrolefromitsactualone-andhence,assumingthefunctionalist
account,ashavingadifferentcontent.Buttherelevantsortoffunctionalist
accountofintentionalphenomenahasnotbeenmadegood.
14
Therecentprosperityofmaterialist-functionalistwaysofthinkinghasbeenso
greatthatitisoftentakenforgrantedthatagiventhoughteventmighthavebeen
athoughtwithadifferent,obliquelynon-equivalentcontent.Anyoldevent,on
thisview,couldhaveadifferentcontent,adifferentsignifcance,ifitssurround-
ingcontextwerechanged.Butinthecaseofoccurrentthoughts-andintentional
mentaleventsgenerally-itishardlyobvious,oreveninitiallyplausible,that
14
Itisimportanttonotethatourargumentagainstfunctionalistspecifcationsofmentalistic
phenomenadidnotdependontheassumptionthatnooccurrentthoughtcouldhaveadifferent
contentfromtheoneithasandbetheverysameoccurrenceorevent.Ifitdid,thesubsequent
argumentagainsttheidentitytheorywould,ineffect,begthequestion.Thestrategyofthelatter
argumentisrathertopresupposeanindependentargumentthatunderminesnon-intentionalfunc-
tionalistspecifcationsofwhatitistobeathoughtthat(say)sofasarecomfortable;thentotakeas
plausibleandundefeatedtheassumptionthatnooccurrentthoughtcouldhaveadifferent(obliquely
non-equivalent)contentandbethesameoccurrenceorevent;and,fnally,tousethisassumption
withthemodalconsiderationsappealedtoearlier,toarriveatthenon-identityofanoccurrent
thoughteventwithanyeventspecifedbyphysicaltheory(thenaturalsciences)thatoccurswithin
theindividual.
Perhapsitisworthsayingthatthemetaphoricalclaimthatmentaleventsareidentifedbytheir
roleinsome'inference-actionlanguagegame`(touseaphraseofSellars`s)doesnotprovidea
plausiblegroundforrejectingtheinitialpremiseoftheargumentagainsttheidentitytheory.For
evenifonedidnotrejectthe'role-game`ideaasunsupportedmetaphor,onecouldagreewiththe
claimontheunderstandingthattherolesarelargelytheintentionalcontentsthemselvesandthe
sameeventinthissortof'game`couldnothaveadifferentrole.Apossibleviewinthephilosophy
ofmathematicsisthatnumbersareidentifedbytheirroleinaprogressionandsuchrolesare
essentialtotheiridentity.Thepointofthiscomparisonisjustthatappealtotherolemetaphor,even
ifaccepted,doesnotsettlethequestionofwhetheranintentionalmentaleventorstatecouldhave
hadadifferentcontent.
IndividualismandtheMental145
anythingismoreessentialtotheidentityoftheeventthanthecontentitself.
Materialistidentitytheorieshaveschooledtheimaginationtopicturethecon-
tentofamentaleventasvaryingwhiletheeventremainsfxed.Butwhether
suchimaginingsarepossiblefactorjustphilosophicalfancyisaseparate
question.
15
Atanyrate,functionalistaccountshavenotprovidedadequatespecifcation
ofwhatitistobeathoughtthat--,forparticularfllingsoftheblank.Soa
specifcationofagiventhoughteventinfunctionalisttermsdoesnotrevealthe
contingencyoftheusual,undisputedintentionalspecifcations.
Well,isitpossibleforathoughteventtohavehadadifferentcontentfrom
theoneithasandbetheverysameevent?Itseemstomenaturalandcertainly
traditionaltoassumethatthisisnotpossible.Rarely,however,havemateri-
alistsseentheidentitytheoryasnaturalorintuitive.Materialistsaregenerally
revisionistaboutintuitions.Whatisclearisthatwecurrentlydoidentifyand
distinguishthoughteventsprimarilyintermsofthepersonwhohasthem,the
roughtimesoftheiroccurrence,andtheircontents.Andwedoassumethata
thoughteventwithadifferentcontentisadifferentthoughtevent(insofaraswe
distinguishatallbetweenthethinkingeventandtheperson`sbeingrelatedtoa
thoughtcontentatatime).Ithinkthesefactsgivethepremiseprimafaciesup-
portandtheargumentagainsttheidentitytheorysomeinterest.Idonotclaim
thatwehave'apriori`certaintythatnoaccountofintentionalphenomenawill
revealintentionallanguagetobeonlycontingentlyapplicabletobeliefstatesor
thoughtevents.Iamonlydubious.
15
Thereareprimafacieviablephilosophicalaccountsthattakesentences(whethertokensor
types)astruth-bearers.Onemighthopetoextendsuchaccountstomentalcontents.Onsuch
treatments,contentsarenotthingsoverandabovesentences.Theysimplyaresentencesinterpreted
inacertaincontext,treatedinacertainway.Givenadifferentcontextoflinguisticinterpretation,the
contentofthesamesentencemightbedifferent.Onecouldimaginementaleventstobeanalogousto
thesentencesonthisaccount.Indeed,somephilosophershavethoughtofintentionalmentalevents
asbeinginner,physicalsentence(orsymbol)tokens-asortofbrainwriting.Hereagain,thereis
apictureaccordingtowhichthesamethoughteventmighthavehadadifferentcontent.Buthere
againthequestioniswhetherthereisanyreasontothinkitisatruepicture.Thereistheprior
questionofwhethersentencescanreasonablybetreatedascontents.(Ithinksentencetypesprobably
canbe;buttheviewhashardlybeenestablished,anddefendingitagainstsophisticatedobjectionsis
treacherous.)Evenifthisquestionisansweredaffrmatively,itisfarfromobviousthattheanalogy
betweensentencesandcontents,ontheonehand,andthoughteventsandcontents,ontheother,is
agoodone.Sentences(typesortokens)arecommonlyidentifedindependentlyoftheirassociated
contents(asevidencedbyinter-andintra-linguisticambiguity).Itisrelativelyuncontroversialthat
sentencescanbeidentifedbysyntactical,morphemic,orperceptualcriteriathatareinprinciple
specifableindependentlyofwhatparticularcontentthesentencehas.Thephilosophicalquestion
aboutsentencesandcontentsiswhetherdiscourseaboutcontentscanbereasonablyinterpreted
ashavinganontologyofnothingmorethansentences(andintentionalagents).Thephilosophical
questionaboutmentaleventsandcontentsis'Whatisthenatureoftheevents?`'Regardlessofwhat
contentsare,couldtheverysamethoughteventhaveadifferentcontent?`Theanalogousquestion
forsentences-insteadofthoughtevents-hasanuncontroversialaffrmativeanswer.Ofcourse,
weknowthatwhenandwherenon-intentionallyidentifablephysicaleventshavecontents,thesame
physicaleventcouldhavehadadifferentcontent.Butitcanhardlybeassumedforpurposesof
arguingapositiononthemind-bodyproblemthatmentaleventsarenon-intentionallyidentifable
physicalevents.
146IndividualismandtheMental
Onemightnurturefaithorhopethatsomemoresociallyorientedfunctionalist
specifcationcouldbefound.Butnosuchspecifcationisreadytohand.AndI
seenogoodreasontothinkthatonemustbefound.Evenifsuchaspecifcation
werefound,itisfarfromclearthatitwoulddefecttheargumentagainstthe
identitytheoryjustconsidered.The'functional`statesenvisagedwoulddepend
notmerelyonwhattheindividualdoesandwhatinnercausalstatesleadto
hisactivity-non-intentionallyspecifed-butalsoonwhathisfellowsdo.The
analogybetweenfunctionalstatesandphysiologicalstatesincausingtheindi-
vidual`sinternalandexternalactivitywasthechiefsupportfortheviewthata
giventokenmentaleventmighthavebeenatokenofadifferentcontent.But
theenvisagedsociallydefned'functionalstates`bearnointuitiveanalogyto
physiologicalstatesorotherphysicalcausalstateswithintheindividual`sbody.
Theirfunctionisnotsimplythatofrespondingtoenvironmentalinfuencesand
causingtheindividual`sactivity.Itisthereforenotclear(shortofassumingan
identitytheory)thatanyeventthatisatokenofoneoftheenvisagedsocially
defned'functionalstates`couldhavebeenatokenofadifferentone.Theevent
mightbeessentiallyidentifedintermsofitssocialrole.Thereisasyetno
reasontoidentifyitintermsofphysicallydescribedeventsintheindividual`s
body.Thusitisnotclearthatsuchasociallyorientedfunctionalaccount
ofthoughtcontentswouldyieldgroundstobelievethattheusualintentional
specifcationsofmentaleventsaremerelycontingent.Itis,Ithink,evenless
clearthatanappropriatesociallyorientedfunctionalaccountisviable.
Identitytheories,ofcourse,donotexhausttheresourcesofmaterialism.To
takeoneexample,ourargumentdoesnotspeakdirectlytoamaterialismbased
oncompositionratherthanidentity.Onsuchaview,thesamephysicalmaterial
mightcomposedifferentthoughtsindifferentcircumstances.Ishallsaynothing
evaluativeaboutthissortofview.Ihavealsobeensilentaboutotherarguments
foratokenidentitytheory-suchasthosebasedonphilosophicalaccountsof
thenotionsofcausalityorexplanation.Indeed,myprimaryinteresthasnotbeen
ontologyatall.Ithasbeentoidentifyandquestionindividualisticassumptions
inmaterialistaswellasCartesianapproachestothemental.
V.MODELSOFTHEMENTAL
Traditionalphilosophicalaccountsofmindhaveofferedmetaphorsthatproduce
doctrineandcarryconvictionwhereargumentandunaidedintuitionfag.Of
course,anysuchbroadreconstructionscanbeaccusedofmissingthepied
beautiesofthenaturalarticle.Buttheproblemwithtraditionalphilosophyof
mindismoreserious.Thetwooverwhelminglydominantmetaphorsofthe
mental-theinfallibleeyeandtheautomaticmechanism-haveencouraged
systematicneglectofprominentfeaturesofawiderangeofmentalphenomena:
broadlyspeaking,socialfeatures.Eachmetaphorhasitsattractions.Eithercan
beelaboratedordoctoredtoftthefactsthatIhaveemphasized.Butneither
IndividualismandtheMental147
illuminesthosefacts.Andbothhaveplayedsomepartininducingphilosophers
toignorethem.
Ithinkitoptimisticindeedtohopethatanyonepicture,comparabletothe
traditionalones,willprovideinsightintoallmajoraspectsofmentalphenomena.
Evenso,afunctionofphilosophyistosketchsuchpictures.Thequestionarises
whetheronecanmakegoodthesocialdebtsofearlieraccountswhileretaining
atleastsomeoftheirconceptualintegrityandpictorialcharm.Thisisnoplaceto
startsketching.Butsomesummaryremarksmayconveyasenseofthedirection
inwhichourdiscussionhasbeentending.
ThekeyfeatureoftheexamplesofSectionIIwasthefactthatweattribute
beliefsandthoughtstopeopleevenwheretheyincompletelyunderstandcon-
tentsofthoseverybeliefsandthoughts.Thispointaboutintentionalmental
phenomenaisnoteverywhereapplicable:non-linguisticanimalsdonotseemto
becandidatesformisunderstandingthecontentsoftheirbeliefs.Butthepointis
certainlysalientandmustbeencompassedinanypictureofintentionalmental
phenomena.Crudelyput,whereverthesubjecthasattainedacertaincompet-
enceinlargerelevantpartsofhislanguageandhas(implicitly)assumeda
certaingeneralcommitmentorresponsibilitytothecommunalconventionsgov-
erningthelanguage`ssymbols,theexpressionsthesubjectusestakeonacertain
inertiaindeterminingattributionsofmentalcontenttohim.Inparticular,the
expressionsthesubjectusessometimesprovidethecontentofhismentalstates
oreventseventhoughheonlypartiallyunderstands,orevenmisunderstands,
someofthem.Globalcoherenceandresponsibilityseemsometimestooverride
localizedincompetence.
Thedetailedconditionsunderwhichthis'inertialforce`isexertedarecom-
plicatedanddoubtlessmorethanalittlevague.Clearly,thesubjectmustmain-
tainaminimalinternallinguisticandrationalcoherenceandabroadsimilarity
toothers`useofthelanguage.Butmeetingthisconditionishardlysuffcient
toestablishtherelevantresponsibility.Fortheconditionismetinthecaseof
apersonwhospeaksaregionaldialect(wherethesamewordsaresometimes
givendifferentapplications).Theperson`saberrationsrelativetothelargercom-
munitymaybenormalitiesrelativetotheregionalone.Insuchcases,ofcourse,
theregionalconventionsaredominantindeterminingwhatcontentsshouldbe
attributed.Atthispoint,itisnaturaltoappealtoetiologicalconsiderations.The
speakerofthedialectdevelopedhislinguistichabitsfrominteractionwithothers
whowereapartytodistinctivelyregionalconventions.Thepersoniscommitted
tousingthewordsaccordingtotheconventionsmaintainedbythosefromwhom
helearnedthewords.Butthesituationismorecomplicatedthanthisobservation
suggests.Apersonbornandbredintheparentcommunitymightsimplydecide
(unilaterally)tofollowtheusageoftheregionaldialectoreventofashionhis
ownusagewithregardtoparticularwords,self-consciouslyoptingoutofthe
parentcommunity`sconventionsintheseparticulars.Insuchacase,members
oftheparentcommunitywouldnot,andshouldnot,attributementalcontentsto
himonthebasisofhomophonicconstrualofhiswords.Heretheindividual`s
148IndividualismandtheMental
intentionsorattitudestowardcommunalconventionsandcommunalconcep-
tionsseemmoreimportantthanthecausalantecedentsofhistransactionswith
aword-unlessthoseintentionsaresimplyincludedintheetiologicalstory.
Ishallnotpursuetheseissueshere.Theproblemofspecifyingthecondi-
tionsunderwhichapersonhastherelevantgeneralcompetenceinalanguage
andaresponsibilitytoitsconventionsisobviouslycomplicated.Themixtureof
'causal`andintentionalconsiderationsrelevanttodealingwithithasobvious
nearanalogsinotherphilosophicaldomains(etiologicalaccountsofpercep-
tion,knowledge,reference).Ihavenoconfdencethatallofthedetailsofthe
storywouldbephilosophicallyinteresting.WhatIwanttostressisthattoa
fairdegree,mentalisticattributionrestsnotonthesubject`shavingmastered
thecontentsoftheattribution,andnotonhishavingbehavioraldispositions
peculiarlyrelevanttothosecontents,butonhishavingacertainresponsibility
tocommunalconventionsgoverning,andconceptionsassociatedwith,symbols
thatheisdisposedtouse.Itisthisfeaturethatmustbeincorporatedintoan
improvedmodelofthemental.
Ithinkitproftabletoseethelanguageofcontentattributionasconstitutinga
complexstandardbyreferencetowhichthesubject`smentalstatesandevents
areestimated,oranabstractgridonwhichtheyareplotted.Differentpeoplemay
varywidelyinthedegreetowhichtheymastertheelementsandrelationswithin
thestandard,evenasitappliestothemall.Thismetaphormaybedevelopedin
severaldirectionsandwithdifferentmodels:appliedgeometry,measurementof
magnitudes,evaluationbyamonetarystandard,andsoforth.AmodelIshall
illustratebriefyhereborrowsfrommusicalanalysis.
Giventhatacomposerhasfulflledcertaingeneralconditionsforestablishing
amusicalkey,hischordalstructuresareplottedbyreferencetotheharmon-
icsystemofrelationsappropriatetothetonickey.Thereisvastscopefor
variationandnoveltywithintheharmonicframework.Thechordsmaydepart
widelyfromtraditional'rules`orpracticesgoverningwhatcountasinterestingor
'reasonable`chordalstructuresandprogressions.Andthecomposermayormay
notgrasptheharmonicimplicationsanddeparturespresentinhiscomposition.
Thecomposermaysometimesexhibitharmonicincompetence(andoccasion-
allyharmonicgenius)byradicallydepartingfromthosetraditionalrules.But
theharmonicsystemofrelationsappliestothecompositioninanycase.Once
established,thetonickeyanditsassociatedharmonicframeworkareapplied
unlessthecomposertakespainstosetupanothertonickeyorsomeatonal
arrangement(therebyintentionallyoptingoutoftheoriginaltonalframework),
orwritesdownnotesbysomethinglikeaslipofthepen(sufferingmechanical
interferenceinhiscompositionalintentions),orunintentionallybreaksthehar-
monicrulesinamassiveandunprincipledmanner(therebyindicatingchaosor
completeincompetence).Thetonickeyprovidesastandardfordescribingthe
composition.Theapplicationofthestandarddependsonthecomposer`smain-
tainingacertainoverallcoherenceandminimalcompetenceinconformingto
thestandard`sconventions.Andthereareconditionsunderwhichthestandard
IndividualismandtheMental149
wouldbereplacedbyanother.Butonceapplied,theharmonicframework-its
formalinterrelations,itsapplicabilityeventodeviant,pointlessprogressions-is
partlyindependentofthecomposer`sdegreeofharmonicmastery.
Oneattractiveaspectofthemetaphoristhatithassomeapplicationtothe
caseofanimals.Inmakingsounds,animalsdosometimesbehaveinsucha
waythataharmonicstandardcanberoughlyappliedtothem,eventhoughthe
standard,atleastinanydetail,isnopartofwhattheyhavemastered.Sincethey
donotmasterthestandard(thoughtheymaymastersomeofitselements),they
arenotcandidatesforpartialunderstandingormisunderstanding.(Ofcourse,
thismaybesaidofmanypeopleasregardsthemusicalstandard.)Thestandard
appliestobothanimalsandpeople.Buttheconditionsforitsapplicationare
sensitiveinvariouswaystowhetherthesubjecthimselfhasmasteredit.Where
thesubjectdoesusethestandard(whetherthelanguage,orasystemofkey
relationships),hisusestakeonspecialweightinapplicationsofthestandard
tohim.
Oneofthemetaphor`schiefvirtuesisthatitencouragesonetoseeksocial
explicationsforthisspecialweight.Thekeytoourattributionofmentalcontents
inthefaceofincompletemasteryormisunderstandinglieslargelyinsocialfunc-
tionsassociatedwithmaintainingandapplyingthestandard.Inbroadoutline,
thesocialadvantagesofthe'specialweight`areapparent.Symbolicexpres-
sionsaretheoverwhelminglydominantsourceofdetailedinformationabout
whatpeoplethink,intend,andsoforth.Suchdetailisessentialnotonlyto
muchexplanationandprediction,butalsotofulfllingmanyofourcooperative
enterprisesandtorelyingononeanotherforsecond-handinformation.Words
interpretedinconventionallyestablishedwaysarefamiliar,palpable,andpublic.
Theyarecommoncoin,arelativelystablecurrency.Thesefeaturesarecrucial
toachievingtheendsofmentalisticattributionjustcited.Theyarealsocrit-
icalinmaximizinginterpersonalcomparability.Andtheyyieldabiastoward
takingothersattheirwordandavoidingadhocreinterpretation,onceoverall
agreementinusageandcommitmenttocommunalstandardscanbeassumed.
Thisbiasissuesinthepracticeofexpressingevenmanydifferencesinunder-
standingwithoutreinterpretingthesubject`swords.Ratherthanreinterpretthe
subject`sword'arthritis`andgivehimatriviallytrueobject-levelbeliefand
merelyafalsemetalinguisticbeliefabouthow'arthritis`isusedbyothers,itis
commonpractice,andcorrect,simplytotakehimathisword.
Ihardlyneedre-emphasizethatthesituationisvastlymorecomplicatedthan
Ihavesuggestedintheforegoingparagraphs.Insincerity,tongueslips,certain
malapropisms,subconsciousblocks,mentalinstabilityallmakethepicturemore
complex.Therearedifferencesinourhandlingofdifferentsortsofexpressions,
depending,forexample,onhowclearandfxedsocialconventionsregarding
theexpressionsare.Therearedifferencesinourpracticeswithdifferentsubject
matters.Therearedifferencesinourhandlingofdifferentdegreesoflinguistic
error.Therearedifferencesinthewaymeaning-,assertion-,andmental-contents
areattributed.(Cf.note4.)Idonotproposeignoringthesepoints.Theyareall
150IndividualismandtheMental
parametersaffectingtheinertialforceof'facevalue`construal.ButIwant
tokeepsteadilyinmindthephilosophicallyneglectedfactaboutsocialprac-
tice:Ourattributionsdonotrequirethatthesubjectalwayscorrectlyorfully
understandthecontentofhisattitudes.
Thepointsuggestsfundamentalmisorientationsinthetwotraditionalpic-
turesofthemental.Theauthorityofaperson`sreportsabouthisthoughtsand
beliefs(modulosincerity,lackofsubconsciousinterference,andsoforth)does
notissuefromaspecialintellectualvisionofthecontentsofthosethoughts
andbeliefs.Itextendseventosomecasesinwhichthesubjectincompletely
understandsthosecontents.Anditdependspartlyonthesocialadvantagesof
maintainingcommunallyestablishedstandardsofcommunicationandmentalist-
icattribution.Likewise,thedescriptiveandexplanatoryroleofmentaldiscourse
isnotadequatelymodeledbycomplexnon-intentionalmechanismsorprograms
fortheproductionofanindividual`sphysicalmovementandbehavior.Attribut-
ingintentionalmentalisticphenomenatoindividualsservesnotonlytoexplain
theirbehaviorviewedinisolationbutalsotocharttheiractivity(intentional,
verbal,behavioral,physical)bycomplexcomparisontoothers-andagainst
sociallyestablishedstandards.
16
Bothtraditionalmetaphorsmakethemistake,
amongothers,oftreatingintentionalmentalphenomenaindividualistically.New
approachesmustdobetter.Thesenseinwhichhumanbeingsaresocialanimals
runsdeeperthanmuchmainstreamphilosophyofmindhasacknowledged.
16
Inemphasizingsocialandpragmaticfeaturesinmentalisticattributions,Idonotintendto
suggestthatmentalattributionsareanythelessobjective,descriptive,orontheontologicalupand
up.Therearesubstantialargumentsintheliteraturethatmightleadonetomakesuchinferences.But
mypresentremarksarefreeofsuchimplications.Someonemightwanttoinsistthatfroma'purely
objectiveviewpoint`onecandescribe'thephenomena`equallywellinaccordwithcommonpractice,
literallyinterpreted,orinaccordwithvariousreinterpretationstrategies.Thenourargumentswould,
perhaps,showonlythatitis'objectivelyindeterminate`whetherfunctionalismandtheidentitytheory
aretrue.Iwouldbeinclinedtoquestiontheapplicationoftheexpressionsthatarescare-quoted.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'151
Postscriptto~IndividualismandtheMental¨
'IndividualismandtheMental`hasbeenreprintedandanthologizedsofre-
quently,andsomuchmoreprominentlythansomeofmycloselyrelatedpapers,
thatitsplaceinmyworkisoftenmisunderstood.Sometimesmisunderstand-
inghasstemmedfromsuperfcialreadingoftheessayitself.Oftenithas
derivedfromreadingonlyit,andnotrecognizingthebackgroundfromwhich
itdeveloped,orthequalifcations,supplements,andinitiativesthatcamelater.
HereIwanttoreframesomeofthekeypointsinthearticle.
Themainideaofthearticleisthatthenaturesandcorrectindividuationof
manyofanindividualperson`sintentional,orrepresentational,mentalstates
andeventscommonlydependinaconstitutivewayonrelationsthattheindi-
vidualbearstoawidersocialenvironment.Inthearticle,Isupportthisideaby
afamilyofthoughtexperiments.Inallthesethoughtexperiments,Idescribea
situationinwhichanindividualhascertainthoughts,buthascertainmisconcep-
tionsaboutthesubjectmatterofthethoughts.ThenIdescribeacounterfactual
situationinwhichanotherindividualissupposedtohavesubstantiallythesame
bodilyhistory-includingphysicaldispositionsandproximalstimulations-but
inwhichthesocialenvironmentwithwhichtheindividualhasnormalinterac-
tionsisdifferent.Thesecondindividual`sbodilyhistoryisdescribedinsuch
awaythatanydifferencesfromtheoriginalindividual`sbodyare,inthem-
selves,intuitivelyirrelevanttotheindividual`spsychologyormentalstates.
Thedifferencesinthesocialenvironmentbearonthemeaningsofwordsand
thewayswordsareconnectedthroughsocialchainstotheirsubjectmatters.
Thissecondindividualdoesnothaveanymisconceptionatall.Finally,Ipoint
outthatinthecounterfactualsituationthesecondindividualdoesnothavethe
sametypesofthoughtsthatthefrstonehasintheoriginalsituation.Thisis
thestructureofthethoughtexperiments.Thedetailedcontentiswhatcarries
persuasion.
Themainidea,again,isthatdifferencesintypesornaturesofthoughts
dependontheindividuals`differentsocialrelationsinthetwosituations.In
particular,thedifferentwaysinwhichthesocialchainsconnecttheindividuals
todifferentsubjectmattersbearonthedifferencesintheirthoughts.Theupshot
isthatthenaturesoftheindividuals`thoughts,asmarkedbytherepresentational
contentsoftheirthoughts,constitutivelydependonthesocialenvironment.The
individualsthemselvesmaynotknowenoughtodescribetheelementsinthe
socialenvironmentorsubjectmatterthatconstitutivelydeterminethenaturesof
theirthoughts.
Ibelievethattheseideasandthelinesofthoughtthatsupportthemhaveheld
upwellintheinterveningyears.Iwouldliketosettheminawidercontext.
152Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
WHAT'INDIVIDUALISM`MEANS
Thetitleofthearticlecontainstheterm'individualism`.Thetermhasbeen
usedinvariousways,bymyselfandothers.IseeinretrospectthatIchanged
myconstrual,thoughmyunderstandingoftherangeofphenomenabroadly
associatedwiththetermremainedthesame.
Thetermisintroducedonthefrstpagebyreferencetoacontrastbetween
theindividualsubjectandthesocialenvironment.Thelastsentenceoftheart-
iclecitesthesamecontrast.Theterm(oritscousin'individualistic`)isgiven
aroughglossatthebeginningofSectionIV.Itissaidtoapply,roughly,to
viewsthat'seektoseeaperson`sintentionalmentalphenomenaultimatelyand
purelyintermsofwhathappenstotheperson,whatoccurswithinhim,and
howherespondstohisphysicalenvironment,withoutanyessentialreference
tothesocialcontextinwhichheortheinterpreterofhismentalphenomenaare
situated`.Therelevanceoftheterm'individualism`toissuesaboutanindividu-
al`srelationstoasocialsurroundisreinforcedbythefactthatthetermhasa
similaruseindiscussionsofthenatureofsocialscience.Alloftheseconsider-
ationssupportinterpretingmyusesof'individualism`in'Individualismandthe
Mental`asbearingspecifcallyonwhetherthereiseveraconstitutiverelation
betweenanindividual`sthoughtsandtheindividual`ssocialenvironment.
Ontheotherhand,Irecognizedfromthebeginningthattheroleofsocial
relationsindeterminingthenaturesofmentalstatesandeventswasonepartof
alargerorder.Imakethisveryclearinfootnote2of'Individualismandthe
Mental`.Thisfootnotearguesthatthenaturesofmanymentalstatesarepartly
determinedbyrelationstothephysicalenvironment.Iexpandedthissortof
argumentinsubsequentwork.ThefootnoteemphasizesapointthatIdeveloped
laterin'OtherBodies`(Ch.4above):Putnamdidnotusehisownimaginative
argumentsaboutlanguage,'meaning`,andreferencetosupporttheviewthat
thenaturesofmostordinarynon-factivementalstatesandevents(asordin-
arilyunderstoodandinadditiontotheirmerereferentialrelations)arepartly
determinedbyrelationstothephysicalenvironment.
Putnammistakenlytooknaturalkindtermstobeindexical.Suchaview
naturallysupportstheideathatthementalstateanditsdistinctivelyrepresent-
ationalcontentor'meaning`areconstantbetweentheactualindividualandthe
counterfactualindividual,evenasthereferentsoftheirsharedthoughtcontent
differ.Therepresentationalcontentofthementalstates,onthisview,remains
thesame.ThisideanodoubtplayedaroleinPutnam`smissingtheimport
ofhistwin-earthargumentsformind.InSectionIIdof'Individualismandthe
Mental`,Imakethispointagain.Thethoughtexperimentscannotbeglossedas
involvingreferenceshiftsincontext-dependentthoughts.
1
1
ThesepointsarediscussedintheIntroduction.Mycriticismisalsoelaboratedingreaterdetail
andappliedspecifcallytoPutnamin'OtherBodies`(Ch.3above).Putnam`soriginaldiscussion
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'153
Atthetime,Iregardedthephysicalenvironmentasmorefundamentalthan
thesocialenvironmentindeterminingthenaturesofmentalstates.Itismore
fundamentalpsychologically,ontogenetically,andphylogenetically.Ifocused
frstonthesocialenvironmentbecauseIthoughtthatitsrolewaslesscloseto
thesurface,lesseasilyrecognized.
InlaterworkIdevelopedtheroleofthephysicalenvironment-especially
in'OtherBodies`,'IndividualismandPsychology`,'CartesianErrorandthe
ObjectivityofPerception`,and'IntellectualNormsandFoundationsofMind`
(Chs.4,9,7,10inthisvolume).Eachofthesearticlesproducedargumentsthat
broughtoutwaysinwhichnon-socialfactorsbeyondthecognitivepurviewof
theindividualhelpdeterminethenaturesofhisorhermentalstatesandevents.
Inthecourseofthislaterdevelopment,certainlybythemid-1980s,Icame
consistentlytousetheterm'individualism`toapplytoanyviewthattakes
thenatureofmentalstatestodependentirelyonphysicalfactorsintheindi-
vidualorpsychologicalresourcescognitivelyavailabletotheindividual.Onthis
understandingoftheterm,individualismisnotconcernedpurelywithdenying
aroleforsocialrelationsbeyondtheindividual.Itisconcernedwithdenying
aconstitutiveroletoanyfactorsbeyondtheindividual.AlthoughIseethat
in'IndividualismandtheMental`myusageandcontextualexplicationisthe
narrowerone,IthinkthatIalwaysunderstoodthegeneralphenomenoninthe
broaderway.Myuseoftheterm'anti-individualism`camefrmlytorefectthis
broaderunderstanding.
2
occursin'TheMeaningof'Meaning`¨inPhilosophicalPapers,ii(Cambridge:CambridgeUniver-
sityPress,1975).Putnam`sacknowledgmentofthecorrectnessofmycriticismoccursinAndrew
PessinandSanfordGoldberg(eds.),TheTwinEarthChronicles(London:M.E.Sharpe,1996),
p.xxi.
2
Iamtakingitforgrantedthatindividualismisnottheclaimoflocalsupervenienceofan
individual`smentalstatesontheindividual`sphysicalstates.Inthefrstplace,Itakeadualism
thatmaintainsthatmentalstatesdonotdependinanywayonanythingoutsidewhatisboth
internaltotheindividual`smindandavailablebyrefectiontotheindividualtobeindividualistic.
Suchanindividualismwouldrejectlocalsupervenience.Inthesecondplace,anti-individualismis
compatiblewithmaintaininglocalsupervenienceofthementalonthephysical.Itcouldholdthat
theindividual`sbodilystatesareindividuatedonlythroughrelationstothewiderenvironment.Or
itcouldholdthatanydifferenceintheenvironmentthathelpsdeterminethementalstateswillhave
someimpactontheindividual`sbodilystatesinsuchawayastopreservelocalsupervenience.In
thethirdplace(andmostimportantly),individualismandanti-individualismarenotfundamentally
aboutsupervenience,butaboutthenaturesofmentalstates,theircorrectindividuationconditions.
Theyareabouttheexplanatoryconditionsassociatedwiththosenatures,notaboutameremodal
relation.Cf.my'TheIndexicalStrategy:ReplytoOwens`,inMartinHahnandBjornRamberg
(eds.),ReüectionsandReplies.EssaysonthePhilosophyofTylerBurge,(Cambridge,Mass.;MIT
Press,2003),371-372.Allmyexplicit,set-pieceformulationsofwhatanti-individualismisfocused
onthenaturesofmentalstates,notonsupervenience.Somecarelesswritinginmyearliestpapers
mistakenlyimpliesthatanti-individualismistherejectionoflocalsupervenience.Ihave,however,
longdisavowedthisidentifcation,anddosoagainhere.
Someofthethoughtexperimentsdorejectlocalsupervenience.Butthemainpointofthethought
experimentsisindependent.Itistocallattentiontotherelevanceofrelationstomattersbeyond
theindividualinthedeterminationofwhatrepresentationalcontentsmentalstateshave(andwhat
typesofmentalstatesareinplay)-regardlessofwhetherthesemattersvarywithdifferencesin
theindividuals`bodies.
154Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
Someauthorscametousetheterm'internalism`forthebroaderphenomenon,
confning'individualism`toaclaimaboutsocialrelations.Bynow,Ithink,more
authorstakethetermstobeapproximatelyinterchangeable,asIdo.Usage
hereisobviouslyamatteroftaste.Ihavepreferrednottouse'internalism`
and'externalism`foranumberofreasons.Oneisthatmybroaderusageof
'individualism`isasearlyassimilarusesof'internalism`.Individualisminthis
broadsenserulesoutrelationstoasocial,physical,ormathematicalenvironment
asconstitutivefactorsindeterminingmentalkinds.
Asecondreasonformypreferring'individualism`isthattheterms'intern-
alism`and'externalism`arealreadyusedinphilosophyforarelatedbutquite
distinctissueinepistemology.
Athirdreasonisthat'internalism`and'externalism`arenotspecifcabout
whatconstitutestheinside-outsideborder.Thetermshavebeenusedtodraw
thisborderinmanyways,notallofwhichhavetodowithadistinctionbetween
theindividualandawiderreality.
3
Myprimaryreasonisthattheterm'externalism`suggeststomanythatthe
mainissueisessentiallyconcernedwithspatiallocation.Ithasalsosuggested
tomanythatmentalstatesandeventsarethemselves'outsidethehead`orare
relationstosomethingoutsidetheindividual.Bothsuggestionsaremistaken.
First,asIunderstandanti-individualism,thedoctrineappliestosomecasesin
whichnospatialrelationsareatissue.Ithinkthatthenaturesofmathematical
thoughtsaredeterminedbyrelationstoanabstractsubjectmatterthatisnot
onlynotintheindividual,butitisnotanywhere.Thepointisthatthemental
kindsarenotunderstandablebyfocusingentirelyontheindividual-notthat
theconstitutivelyrelevantrelationsarespatiallyexternaltotheindividual.
Astothesecondsuggestion,anti-individualismcertainlydoesnotentailthat
thoughtsare'outsidethehead`orarethemselvesrelationstosomethingextern-
al.Neitherthoughtsthemselvesnortheirrepresentationalcontentsarerelations
tosomethingoutsidetheindividual.Theirnaturesconstitutivelydependonrela-
tionsthatarenotreducibletomattersthatconcerntheindividualalone.Butthe
naturesarenotthemselvesrelations,andtheirrepresentationalcontentsarenot
themselves(ingeneral)relational.
4
Psychologicalexplanationsnormallydonottakementalstatesoreventsto
berelationstothedistalenvironment.Theyarepsychologicalkindsthatrep-
resentthatenvironment.Tobethekindsthattheyare,Iclaim,theremustbe
anunderlyingnetworkofrelationstotheenvironment.Theseareconstitutive
enablingconditions.Referringtothoserelationsoccursinadifferentsortof
explanation-aconstitutiveorphilosophicalexplanation-thanpsychological
3
Forausefuldiscussionoftheenormousvariationinwaysinwhichaninternal-externaldivision
hasbeendrawninbiologyandpsychology,seePeterGodfrey-Smith,ComplexityandtheFunction
ofMindinNature(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1996),ch.2.
4
Thesepointsareoftenobscuredbyphilosopherswhousetheterm'intrinsicproperty`.Some
ofthesewritersclaim,withoutexplication,thatmentalcontentsareintrinsicpropertiesofthemind.
Thissortofwritingtendstobeobfuscatory.Therearemanyusesof'intrinsic`.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'155
explanations.Thepsychologicalexplanations,ineffect,takethenaturesof
mentalstatesforgranted.Theymakereferencetokindsthataredependent
onrelations.Buttherelationsareusuallynotappealedtoinpsychological
explanations;nordotheyenterintopsychologicallaws.Iconjecture,withsome
confdence,thatoftentherelationsthatconstitutivelydetermineorenablea
psychologicalkindtobewhatitisarenotnaturalorpsychologicalkindsatall.
Theideathatanatureorkinddependsonrelationsbeyondentitiesthatare
ofthatkindisarelativelymodestclaim-arguablyapplicabletomostorall
physicalkinds.Aphysicalbody`sshapeandrestmass,forexample,arguably
dependonthebody`sbeinginspace.Spaceissomethingbeyondtheindividual.
Shapeandrestmassarenotthemselvesrelationstoanythingexternal.Similarly,
beingthenumber3dependsforbeingwhatitisonrelationstoothernumbers,
butitdoesnotfollowthatbeingthenumber3isitselfarelation.
5
Avoidingthesesuggestionsiscompatiblewithusingtheterms'internalism`
and'externalism`.Nevertheless,Ifndthesetermslessappropriatetothemain
issuethan'individualism`and'anti-individualism`.Themainissueconcerns
theroleoftheindividualandtheindividual`srelationstoawiderorderin
theconstitutiveconditionsfortheindividual`sbeinginspecifcrepresentational
mentalstates,orengaginginspecifcrepresentationalmentaleventsoracts.
Soanti-individualismconcernsavarietyofwaysinwhichthenaturesofan
individual`smentalstatesandeventsaredeterminedbyrelationsbetweenthe
individualandawiderorderorenvironment.Thewiderorderorenvironmentis
notingeneralintheindividual`sbodyormind,orsubjecttorefectivecognit-
ivecontrolbytheindividual,orexplicablepurelyintermsoftheindividual`s
functional,causal,ordispositionalcapacities.Relationstoasocialenvironment
areaprominentsubclassamongtherelevantrelationstoawiderorder.
THENATUREOFMINDANDTHENATUREOFCONTENT
Letmeturntoanotherwayinwhichanti-individualismhasbeenmisunder-
stood.Itiscommontotakeanti-individualismasatheoryofcontent.Thistake
isunderstandable.'IndividualismandtheMental`hasalottosayaboutcontent.
Itderivesitsconclusionsfromrefectiononwhattherepresentationalcontents
ofparticularmentalstatesandeventsare.Nevertheless,anti-individualismisnot
fundamentallyaboutthenatureofcontent.Itisaboutthenatureofrepresent-
ationalmentalstatesandevents.Itisaboutconstitutiveoressentialconditions
5
Imakethispointin'PhenomenalityandReference:ReplytoLoar`,inHahnandRamberg
(eds.),ReüectionsandReplies,435-436.Thepointcaneasilybeinferredfromnumerouspassages
in'IndividualismandtheMental`.ThepointisfullyunderstoodandincisivelydevelopedinRobert
Stalnaker,'OnWhat`sintheHead`,inJamesTomberlin(ed.),PhilosophicalPerspectives,iii(Ata-
scadero,Calif.:RidgeviewPublishingCompany,1989),repr.inPessinandGoldberg(eds.),Twin
EarthChronicles.
156Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
onanindividual`shavingthekindsofmentalstatesandeventsthattheindi-
vidualhas.
InthethoughtexperimentsImaintainedthattheindividualsintheoriginaland
counterfactualsituationshavethoughtswithdifferentrepresentationalcontents.
Sincerepresentationalcontentshelptype-identifythoughts,thethoughtsareof
differenttypesorkinds.Theconclusionisaboutthethoughtsthemselves.Itis
abouthowhavingcertainthoughtsconstitutivelydependsonrelationstothe
environment.Itisnotaboutthenatureofthethoughtcontentsthemselves.
Thetalkofrepresentationalcontentswasnotstrictlynecessarytotheargu-
mentsatall.Itservedtowardoffphilosophicalmisunderstandings-suchas
assimilatingthedifferencesinoriginalandcounterfactualsituationstodiffer-
encesinthereferentsoftermsorinthesubjectmatterofthethoughts.The
argumentscenteronthepointthatintheoriginalsituationanindividualhasone
setofthoughts,andinthecounterfactualsituationtheindividualcannothave
thosesamethoughts.Thekindsofmentalstatesandeventsdifferinthetwo
situations.Sowhatkindsofmentalstatesandeventstheindividualhasdepends
essentiallyonrelationstothedifferentenvironments.
Iemphasizethatanti-individualismisaboutthenatureofthemental,not
aboutthenatureofrepresentationalcontent.Thelattersubjectseemstometo
bearelativelyrecherch´ eontologicaltopic.Formeithassubstantiallyfewer
interestingphilosophicalconsequences.Moreover,thethoughtexperimentsare
compatiblewiththeFregean-Platonicviewthatthenaturesofrepresentational
contentsarecompletelyindependentofrelationstoanythingelse.Onsucha
view,differentthoughtcontentsmarkdifferentkindsofthoughteventsormental
statesintheoriginalandcounterfactualsituations.Still,thecontentsthemselves
areindependentofanythinginspaceortime,includingsocialrelations.Ithink
thatthisview,atleastinanygeneralform,isimplausible.Itisnot,however,
theobjectiveofanti-individualismpersetodefeatit.
6
Representationalcontentsandmentalstatesandeventsareontologicallydif-
ferenttopics.Determiningconstitutiveconditionsforbeingarepresentational
contentisadifferententerprisefromdeterminingconstitutiveconditionsfor
beingaparticularkindofbelieforthought.Nevertheless,representationalcon-
tentsaretothisdegreecentraltothenaturesofmentalstatesandevents.Repres-
entationalcontentsareaspectsofthefundamentalorconstitutivekinds(natures)
ofrepresentationalmentalstatesandevents.Anti-individualismisaboutthe
conditionsunderwhichmentalstatesandeventscanhavetherepresentational
contentsthattheyhave,notaboutthenatureofthecontentsthemselves.
ThispointfguresinmyargumentinSectiondofSectionIVagainstmateri-
alisttokenidentitytheoriesofmentalevents.Thefrstpremiseinthatargument
isthatathoughteventaisnecessarilydistinctfromathoughteventbifaand
bhavedifferentrepresentationalcontents.(Thisprincipleiscompatiblewitha
6
TheseissuesarediscussedfurtherinmyTruth.Thought.Reason.EssaysonFrege(Oxford:
OxfordUniversityPress,2005),Introduction,esp.pp.54-68.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'157
varietyofontologiesofrepresentationalcontents.)Idefendedthisprincipleby
appealtothecentralityofrepresentationalcontentsintheexplanatoryenterprises
inwhichmentalisticnotionsft.Istandbythisrelativelypragmaticdefense.In
retrospect,Iseeitasoverlymodest.Itseemstomethatdenyingtheprinciple
isreallyquiteevidentlyandaprioriunacceptable.Anaccountofthoughtsthat
allowsthatagiventhoughtcouldhaveeitheroftwodifferentrepresentational
contentswhileremainingthesamethoughteventamountstochangingthesub-
ject.Thoughteventsarepartlytype-orkind-identifedbytheircontents.They
arepartlyindividuatedbytheircontents.Itseemstomethataphilosophythat
deniesthisprinciplehaslostitswayinungroundedideology.
LANGUAGEANDMIND
IfIweretorewrite'IndividualismandtheMental`,whatIwouldchangemost
issomeofitsemphasisonissuesinthephilosophyoflanguage.
7
Thisemphasis
wasasignofthetimes.Itwaspartlynecessaryforclarifyingexactlywhat
Iwasclaiming.Sometimesitdidnotdistinguishissuesaboutnatural-language
ascriptionsofpropositionalattitudesfromissuesaboutthenatureoftheattitudes
assharplyasInowwould.
Thearticleisexplicitlyaboutthenatureofmentalstatesandevents-the
natureofthoughts,orpropositionalattitudes.Astrategyforrefectingona
subjectmatterthathasyieldedsomeinsight,especiallyoverthelastcentury,is
tobeginbyrefectingonaspectsoflanguagethatwetaketodescribeasubject
matterveridicallyandsystematically.Byunderstandingsuchlinguisticaspects,
onethengainsinsightintostructuresandotherlargefeaturesofthesubject
matter.Althoughthelanguageisonelevelremovedfromthesubjectmatter,the
language`sconcretenessandstructureoftenenableonetorecognizefeaturesof
thesubjectmatterthatwouldotherwisebemissed.
8
Thislinguisticapproachhasspecialadvantageswhenthesubjectmatteris
mind.Agoodbitofourthinkingdependsonlanguage,bothinthesensethat
withoutlanguagewewouldneverhavebeenabletothinkmanyofourthoughts
andinthesensethatmanyofthestructuresofthought-forexample,logical
structures-arealsostructuresoflanguage.
Ontheotherhand,thisstrategyhasobviouslimitations.Inthefrstplace,it
canneversupplantdirectexplorationofthesubjectmatter,whetherbyscience
orbycommonsense.Theknowledgeaboutmindthatreposesincommonsense
andinpsychologyismoreextensiveand,inasense,morenearlyfnalthanany
7
Forparallelpointsabout'BeliefDeRe`,seethePostscripttothatarticleabove.
8
Themethodologyderives,ofcourse,fromFrege.Forfullerexplicationofthemethodology,see
SectionIofPostscriptto'BeliefDeRe`above.Itisclearthatthemethodologyisbettersuitedto
somesubjectmattersthantoothers.Refectingonlanguagepromisesmuchlessinsightwithrespect
toastronomyandmolecularbiologythanitdoeswithrespecttoformallogicalconsequenceorthe
grammarmoduleinthemind.
158Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
knowledgegainedbyrefectingonlanguage.Inthesecondplace,languageis
usedformanyotherpurposesbesidesthoseoflimningthenatureofasubject
matter.Ithasmetaphorical,rhetorical,emotional,andotherbroadlycommunic-
ativefunctionsaswell.Onecannotsimplyassumethatallaspectsoflanguage
mirrororcorrespondtoaspectsofitssubjectmatters.
Inwriting'IndividualismandtheMental`,Iself-consciouslyfollowedthis
strategyandwasthoroughlyawareofitslimitations.Ithoughtthatthelim-
itationscouldbemitigatedbyacknowledgingthemandbybeingsensitiveto
thevariouspurposesforwhichlanguageisused.Ibelievedthen,andbelieve
now,thatcommonsenseiscloseenoughtopsychology,certainlytowhatisnow
knowninpsychology,thatonecanlearnthingsfromrefectingoncommon
sensetalkaboutmentalstatesandevents.Althoughlaterworkofminerefects
onpsychologydirectly,'IndividualismandtheMental`stayedclosetoordin-
aryintuitiverefection.Astosensitivitytothedifferentpurposesofordinary
language,Ithinkthat,forthetimeatwhichitwaswritten,thearticleshows,
especiallyinSectionsIIc-d,IIIa-c,afairlysophisticatedsensitivitytodifferent
waysinwhichlanguagecanbetakenorused.Itriedtoindicatethatthethought
experimentsinSectionsIIa-bavoiddependingonusesoflanguagethatdonot
refectanythingsignifcantaboutthementalisticsubjectmatter.
Mostofthediscussionoflanguageinthearticlewasintendedtobedefens-
iveandclarifcatory.Iwantedtoshowthatcommonphilosophicalassumptions
aboutautomaticallyreinterpretingaperson`slanguageandmentalstates,when
thepersondoesnotfullyunderstandaterm,failtoaccordwithcommonpractice
andfailtoissuefromanystrongrationale.Iwantedtodistinguishmypoints
aboutthenaturesofmentalstatesandeventsfrompointsthathadalreadybeen
madeaboutthereferenceofcertaintermsandconcepts.Iwantedtoshowthat
thethoughtexperimentsapplytonearlyallmentalstates,notsimplytofactive
mentalphenomena(knowing,seeing,beingjealousof)thatobviouslydepend
onsomerelationtothesubjectmatter.AndIwantedtodistinguishthephe-
nomenathatinterestedmefromindexicalphenomenathatwereeasilyconfated
withthem.Allofthesepointswerefacilitatedbyemployingterminologyand
reasoningfromthephilosophyoflanguage.IstandbythepointsthatImade
then,andIbelievethatmywayofmakingthemwascorrect.
Still,therearescatteredremarksinthearticleaboutcontributingtoatheory
oflanguageaboutpropositionalattitudes(SectionsI,IIId).Andsomeofthe
strategyofargumentationmovesbackandforthbetweendiscussingascriptions
ofpropositionalattitudesanddiscussingthenatureoftheattitudesthemselves.
Someofthisshuttlingbackandforthfailedtokeepitcompletelyclearthat
ascriptionsaresimplyevidenceoradiagnosticdevice,nottheprimarysubject
matter.Infact,someresponsestothearticlemaintainedthatIhadgivenareas-
onableaccountofordinarylanguageuse,butthatordinarylanguageissimply
misleadingaboutthenaturesofmentalstatesandevents.Ibelievethatsuch
responsesmissedtherealforceofthethoughtexperiments.Ithinkthatsomeof
whatIwroteanticipatedsuchresponsesanddidalottorebuttheminadvance.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'159
(Cf.thesectionsmentionedabove:IIc-d,IIIa-c,butalsoSectionbofIV.)
Thereisnoquestionthatthearticleisfundamentallyaboutmind,notfunda-
mentallyaboutmentalisticlanguage.Ialsobelievethatthemethodologyofthe
thoughtexperimentsandofthediscussionsoflanguagecouldhavebeenmore
sharplydelineated.Ithinkthatthearticledoescontributetoanunderstanding
oflanguage.Nonetheless,Ithinkthatthisisasecondarycontribution.
Therearemorespecifc,moretechnicalassumptionsaboutlanguagethat
enterintotheargumentationofthearticle.Inordertoshowthatmythought
experimentsbearonthenaturesofmentalstates,andnotmerelyonascriptions
ofmentalstatesthatovertlyrelatethestatestoaspectsoftheenvironment,I
emphasizedthatthepointsaresupportedby'obliqueoccurrences`incontent
clausesofmental-stateascriptions.Iwantedtobringoutthatmyclaimsbore
notonlyon'dere`aspectsofmentalstatesandevents,butalsoon'dedicto`
aspects.Moreaccurately,Iwantedtobringoutthattheclaimsborenotonlyon
demonstrative-likeaspectsofthecontentofmentalstates,butalsoonconstant,
non-indexical,non-demonstrativeconcepts.
Wecansay'AlfredbelievesthatthatX-raymachineisblockinghisway`.
IfAlfredisachimp,itisobviousthatAlfredhasnothoughtsaboutX-ray
machinesassuch.Theterm'thatX-raymachine`isnotusedtoevensuggest
anythingabouthowAlfredthinksaboutanything.Theascriptionisjustaloose
wayofindicatingthatAlfredhassomethoughtaboutthephysicalobjectthat
is(orconstitutes)themachine,andthatthethoughtistotheeffectthatthat
thingisinhisway.Anyotherexpressionthatpickedoutroughlythesame
thing-suchas'thatbigcontraption`or'thebiggestartifactintheroom`or
'thathunkofmetal`(recognizingthattheseexpressionsdonotreallydenote
thesameobjects)-wouldhaveservedcommunicativepurposesaboutaswell,
andwouldhaveproducedasentencethatisroughlytrue.Anyothersingular
expressionthatpickedoutevenroughlythesameobjectwoulddoaswell.
ThepurposeoftheascriptionisnotprimarilytoindicatethenatureofAlfred`s
mentalstate,orevenexactlywhatobjectAlfredhasabeliefabout.Itindicates
almostnothingabouthowheisthinking.(Eventhepredication'isblocking
hisway`isprettyloose.)ThemainpointissimplytorelateAlfredtosome
hunkorartifactintheworldandsaythatAlfredbelievedittobesomesortof
obstacle.
Imeanttocontrastthissortofcasewithascriptionsthathadmorethepoint
ofindicatingsomethingabouthowanindividualisthinking-whattheindi-
vidual`sconceptsorrepresentationalcontentsare,whatkindsofmentalstates
theindividualisin.Itookitthatthereareascriptionsofpropositionalatti-
tudesinwhichcertainexpressionsincontentclausescannotbeexchangedwith
anyoldcoextensiveexpressionwithoutchangingthetruth-valueofthewhole
sentence.Thereasonthattheycannotbeexchangedisthattheexpressionin
thecontentclausehaspartlytheroleofsignifyingsomething(perhapsexactly,
perhapsapproximately)abouttheindividual`swayofthinking,orequivalently,
abouttherepresentationalcontentofhisorherthought.
160Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
Thus,Bertmaybelievethatmercuryisinthethermometerwithoutbelieving
thatquicksilverisinthethermometer,eventhoughmercuryisquicksilver.Or
CarymaybelievethatMohammedAliwasagreatfghterwithoutbelievingthat
CassiusClaywasagreatfghter,eventhoughCassiusClayisMohammedAli.
OrchildDirkmightbelievethatthree-quartersofthemilkwasspiltwithout
believingthat75percentofthemilkwasspilt,eventhoughthree-quartersand
75percentarethesameproportion.Ineachcase,thekeyterm-'mercury`,
'MohammedAli`,'three-quarters`-playsarolenotonlyinindicatingsome
kind,property,individual,proportion,orrelation.Italsosignifesaparticular
wayofthinking,oraclassofwaysofthinking,abouttheentity.Onecanthink
ofsomeoneasMohammedAliwithoutthinkingofhimasCassiusClay.One
canthinkofamaterialasmercurywithoutrealizingthatmercuryisquicksilver.
Andsoon.
Isummedupthesesortsofpointsbysayingthattherelevantexpressions
inthecontentclausesoccurobliquelyandwouldnotundergoexchangewith
coextensiveexpressionswithoutriskingaffectingthetruth-valueofthewhole
sentence.Ibelievethatthereareusesofthelanguageaccordingtowhichthese
pointsarecorrect.
SubsequenttothetimewhenIwrote'IndividualismandtheMental`,some
philosophersoflanguagehavemaintainedthatthesekindsofpointaboutlan-
guageareincorrect.Theyholdthat,always,ifanindividualbelievesthatmer-
curyisinthethermometer,theindividualbelievesthatquicksilverisinthe
thermometer,eveniftheindividualthinksofquicksilverasakindofsilver,
orisunsurewhatquicksilveris.Theymaintainthattheremaybeapragmatic
implicatureinthesentence'Bertbelievesthatmercuryisinthethermometer`.
Theimplicaturewouldbethattheindividualuses'mercury`andnot'quicksil-
ver`,orappropriatecognates.Theyholdthatitmightbecontextuallymisleading
tosay'Bertbelievesthatquicksilverisinthethermometer`.Theyholdthatthe
termsareneverthelessinter-substitutablewithoutriskofchangeoftruth-value
ofthewholesentence.Sotheyhold,'Bertbelievesthatquicksilverisinthe
thermometer`istrueifandonlyif'Bertbelievesthatmercuryisinthethermo-
meter`istrue.AndsimilarlyforalltheotherexamplesthatIcitedorgesturedat:
Ifonebelievesthatmercuryisinthethermometer,onebelievesthatquicksilver
isinthethermometer-fullstop.
Ifndthissortofviewimplausible,oratbestincomplete.Therearecertainly
standardusesofthesesentencesonwhichcoextensiveexpressionsareinter-
substitutablesalveveritate.
9
Therearealsostandardusesonwhichtheexchanges
9
Adereascriptionthatdoesnotpurporttoberelevanttohowtheindividualisthinkingofthe
resimplyspecifesareferentandimpliesthattheindividualhadsomedereattitudetowardit.A
pseudodereascriptionsimplyspecifesanobjectthattheattributeroftheattitudetakestobea
denotationofsomecomponentintheindividual`sthought,withoutimplyingthatthespecifcation
isrelevanttohowtheindividualthoughtoftheobject,oreventowhethertheindividual`sthought
isdereatall.Therearecasesinwhicheventheattributermaynothaveadereattitudetowardthe
denoted(perhapsmerelydescribed)object.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'161
willleadtofalsesentences,notjustmisleadingones.Thereisasystematicpoint
torefusingexchange-thatofindicatingsomethingaboutthewayanindividual
isthinking.Thefactthatthispointissystematic,andwellunderstoodamong
languageusers,indicatesthatitisnotmerelyamatterofcontextualimplicature.
Thefactthatitisexpressedinsystematicstructuralways,independentlyof
particularlexicalitems,indicatesthatitisnotanalogoustostandardexamples
ofconventionalimplicature.
Thedifferencesinthesentencesthatderivefromsuchsubstitutionscanbear
ondifferencesintheindividualthinker`spointofview.Ithinkthatwhenwe
allowfreesubstitution,weareengaginginastandarduseinwhichwedonot
careaboutsuchdifferences.Whatproponentsoftherelevantpragmatictheory
countascancellationsofimplicaturesareinfactswitchesfromonestandard
usagetotheother.
SoIstandbymyoriginalarguments.InthoseargumentsIpointedoutthat
thethoughtexperimentsapplyjustasmuchtoanascription'Albelievesthathe
hasarthritis`if'arthritis`isunderstoodtooccurobliquely(inawaythatdoes
notadmitfreeinterchangeofcoextensiveexpressionssalveveritate)asitdoes
if'arthritis`isunderstoodtooccurtransparently(inawaythatadmitsoffree
interchangewithcoextensiveexpressionssalveveritate).Thepurposeofthis
pointwas,again,toemphasizethatthethoughtexperimentsbearnotjuston
whattheindividual`sbeliefsreferto(ortowhatwerefertoinascribingthe
beliefs).Theybearprimarilyonthewaytheindividualthinks,whatkindsof
mentalstateshehas.
Thisissueaboutthesemanticsofnaturallanguageisnot,however,ofcentral
importanceformyprimarypurposes.Whetherexchangeofwhatarenormally
coextensiveexpressionsinordinarybeliefascriptionscanyieldchangesintruth-
valueisarelativelytechnicalissueinthephilosophyoflanguage.Ibelievethat
twootherpointsareprimary.
Oneisthattheforceandpurposeofmylinguisticargumentisunaffectedby
theoutcomeofthedisputejustdescribed.Evenifthereismerelyapragmatic
differencebetweenthetwoascriptions,thepragmaticdifferencebearsonadif-
ferenceinmentalstate,orpointofviewintheindividualtowhomthemental
stateisascribed.Thisisthepointatissue.Itdoesnotmatterwhetherthedif-
ferenceisindicatedsemanticallyorpragmatically.Myargumentwassupposed
tobringoutthatthethoughtexperimentsbearondifferencesinmentalstate,
notmerelydifferencesinmentalreference(orreferencebytheascriber).That
factstandswhetherthedifferencesareactuallydenotedsemanticallyinnatural-
languageascriptions,orareonlypragmaticallyimplicatedinsuchascriptions.
Myprimaryinterestlaynotinthecharacterofnatural-languageascriptions,
butinthenatureofmentalstates.Theascriptionsplayedmerelytheroleof
clarifcationandevidenceforaconclusionaboutmind.
Ibelievethatitisobviousthatevenifthepragmaticaccountofthenatural-
languagephenomenawerecorrect,wecouldexplainalanguageofpsychological
ascriptioninwhichtherepresentationalcontentsofmentalstates,andrelevant
162Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
differencesamongthem,wouldbedenotedinascriptions,notmerelyimplicated.
Ibelievethatsuchalanguagewouldbeusefulinpsychologicaldescriptionand
explanation.Infact,Ibelievethatournaturallanguagecloselyapproximates
suchalanguageinsomeofitsuses.
Theotherprimarypointisreallythefundamentalone.Thethoughtexperi-
mentsin'IndividualismandtheMental`donotrelyprimarilyoressentiallyon
argumentationaboutthenatureofascriptionsofmentalstatesatall.Although
discussionofascriptionsloomslargeinthearticle-toolarge-itisnotessen-
tialtotheforceorpurposeofthemainlineoftheargument.Thefundamental
reasoningin'IndividualismandtheMental`,andinsubsequentthoughtexper-
imentsthatsupportanti-individualism,isnotreasoningaboutlanguage.The
fundamentalreasoningconcernsconditionsunderwhichonecanbeincertain
sortsofmentalstates,orhavecertainconcepts.Theintuitionsonwhichthe
thoughtexperimentsrelycenteronconditionsunderwhichitispossibleor
impossibletohavecertainthoughtsorperceptions.
Thisapproachtotheissuesisevidentintheextensivediscussionofincom-
pleteunderstandingofconceptsornotions,whereunderstandinganotionXis
explicatedroughlyasknowingwhatanXis(SectionsI,IIc-d).Itispresent
inthevariousnon-meta-linguisticformulationsofthethoughtexperiments,and
insuchremarksasthatitishardtoseehowthepatient(inthethirdstepof
thearthritisthoughtexperiment)'couldhavepickedupthenotionofarthritis`
(endofSectionIIa).Itispresentinthepersistentreasoningaboutthesubject`s
viewpoint(SectionsIIIc-d)andaboutthecontentsofstates,whichItaketo
helpmarkortype-identifythebasicmental-statekinds(passim).
Thearthritisthoughtexperimentisthissimple:Thefrststageillustrates
thatitispossibleforanindividualtohavethoughtsaboutarthritisassuch
evenifonedoesnotrealizethatarthritismustoccurinjoints.Otherpeopleon
whomtheindividualpartlyreliesincommunicationforconnectiontoarthritis
doknowthis.Thesecondstagesetsoutapossiblesituationinwhichasimilar
individual,is,inwaysrelevanttounderstandinghispsychology,aduplicateof
theoriginalindividual,fromtheskininwards.Thesecondindividualisina
differentsocialsituation.Inthissituation,neithertheindividualnoranyoneelse
hasisolatedarthritisasasyndromeofdiseases.Inthissituation,theindividual`s
andcommunity`swordform'arthritis`isstandardlyusedtoapplytosome
syndromethatincludesrheumatoidalailmentsthatoccuroutsidejoints.The
thirdstageindicatesthatinsuchasituationitisnotpossiblefortheindividual
tohavethoughtsaboutarthritisassuch.Sothefrstandsecondindividualshave
differentkindsofthoughts.
METHODOLOGYANDEPISTEMICIMPLICATIONS
Thethoughtexperimentscenteronexamples.Inphilosophy,atleastphilosophy
thatisnotexplicitlyphilosophyofscience,itseemstomethatthereiscommonly
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'163
moreepistemicpowerandpersuasivenessinexamplesthaninprinciples.One
aimofphilosophyistofndprinciples.Findingthemisoftensurerthrough
refectiononcasesthanthroughtryingtothinkupprinciplesdirectly.The
examplestestandprovidecounterexamplesforputativeprinciples.Theyalso
stimulatediscovery.Thethoughtexperimentsproposedin'Individualismand
theMental`areintendedtobecounterexamplestoindividualistprinciples.They
arealsointendedtosuggestdirectionsforfndingpositiveprinciplesaboutcon-
stitutivefactorsinvolvedindeterminingmentalstates,orindeterminingwhat
representationalcontentsanindividual`smentalstatescanhave.
Thestepsofthethoughtexperimentsarenotprinciples,itmustbestressed.
10
Theyarejudgmentsabouthypotheticalcases.Howtogeneralizefromacaseis
usuallynotevident.Usually,onehastoconsidermorecases.
Mythoughtexperimentssuggestsomeepistemiclessons.Oneofthebroadest
lessonsisthatconceptualandlinguisticunderstandingcommonlydonotreston
thestablemasteryofself-evidentprinciplesgoverninguseofconceptsorterms.
Onecanmasteraconceptwellenoughtothinkwithitwithoutunderstanding
constitutiveprinciplesthatgovernitsusage.Broadly,thereasonforthisisthat
constitutiveprinciplesdependonthenatureofthesubjectmatteroftheconcept.
Normally,wedonothaveinfallibleinsightintothenatureofthesubjectmatter.
Suffcientmasterytothinkwithaconceptcommonlyresidesinaknow-how
abilitytoapplytheconcepttocasesandinmasteryofafewmembersfroma
largefamilyofrulesofthumbandformsofinference,perhapsinassociation
withsomeperceptualpresentations.Therulesofthumbneednotbedistinctive
totheconceptorsuffcienttofxitsrangeofapplication.Theyneednoteven
beveridical.Wemaybevagueastohowtoapplyaconcepteventhoughour
conceptisnotitselfvague,orislessvague.Thenaturalcommitmentsofour
usagemaybefullerthanwerealize.
InwhatfollowsIwillbeusingtheterms'explicationalprinciple`,'conceptual
understanding`,'explicationalunderstanding`,and'explicationalbelief`.Iintend
theseexpressionsinverybroadsenses.Idonotthinkthatthereisasharpline
betweenwhatconstitutesunderstandingaconceptandwhatconstitutesusing
aconceptwhilepresupposingcomprehensionofit.Examplesofexplicational
principlesare'Atomsareindivisibleparticles`,'Atomsareparticleswithanuc-
leusofprotonsandneutronssurroundedbyelectronsinorbits`,'Genesarethe
basicbiologicalunit-determinersofheredity`,'Arthritisoccursonlyinjoints`,
'Contractscanbeoralaswellaswritten`,'WaterisH
2
O`,'Tobeanartifact
istobearsomerelationtoanindividual`sintentionoruse`,'Setsareidentical
ifandonlyiftheyhavethesamemembers`,'Afunctionisanabstractlawof
correlationwhichgivenaninputyieldsauniqueoutput,ifanyoutputatall`.
Suchprinciples,trueorfalse,purporttobearonwhatitistobethesortof
10
Amongmythoughtexperiments,theoneexceptiontothisclaimisthethoughtexperiment
commonto'CartesianErrorandtheObjectivityofPerception`and'IndividualismandPsychology`
(Chs.7and9below).SeethediscussionofthisexceptionintheIntroduction.
164Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
thingindicatedbytheconceptbeingexplicated.Theprinciplesbearbothonthe
natureofthething-whatitistobethatsortofthing-andthenatureofthe
concept.Conceptualunderstandingispurportedlydeepenedwhenonecomesto
believesuchprinciples.TherelevantcasesthatIdiscussareintuitivelycentral
todeepeningunderstanding,ormakingitfullerormorenearlycomplete.They
arerelevanttoconditionsthatbearonthenatureoftheconceptbybearingon
thenatureofthesubjectmatterthatitspecifes.
IshallbediscussingcasesinwhichIbelievethatconceptsaresharedamong
individualssomeofwhomunderstandtheconceptbetterthanothers.Muchof
whatIsaydoesnotdependonthisbelief.Whatisimportantisthattherelevant
explicationsprovideconstitutiveconditionsontheapplicationoftheconcept,
orconcepts,toasharedreferent(orrangeofapplication).Ibelievethatthe
strongerdescriptionintermsofsharedconceptsisneverthelessoftencorrect.It
ispartofthebestexplanationofthetransmissionofknowledge.Itisalsooften
psychologically,culturally,historically,andepistemicallyilluminating.
Itwillbeapparent,bothfromtheexamplesandfromwhatfollows,thatI
donotbelievethatallexplicationsofconceptsareanalytic,inanysenseof
'analytic`.Manyareempiricallywarranted.Eventhosebeliefsinconceptual
explicationsthatareaprioriwarrantedarenormallynotanalyticinanysense.I
rejectasaltogetherwithoutapplicationthenotionofanalyticitythatentailsthat
ananalytictruthisvacuousornotmadetruebyasubjectmatter.Ialsobelieve
thatrelativelyfewconceptsarebestregardedashavinganyextensiveinternal
conceptualstructure,whichwouldallowotherconceptstobe'contained`in
them.SoIthinkthatthereareveryfewanalytictruthsofcontainment.
11
Most
oftheaprioribeliefsthatIdiscussthatbearonconceptualunderstandingare
syntheticapriori,ineverynormalsenseof'synthetic`.
ThenotionsofconceptualunderstandingandconceptualexplicationthatI
employaremeanttobeintuitive,relativelynon-technicalnotions.Idonot
assumethatthereis,ingeneral,asharplinebetweenwhatconstitutesanexplic-
ationalprincipleandwhatconstitutesanon-constitutivefactaboutasubject
matter.Still,inthecasesIdiscuss,Idoassumethatitisintuitivelycorrect
toregardtheidentityornatureofaconcepttobepurportedlyilluminatedby
explicationalprinciples.Ialsotakethenotionsofconceptualunderstandingand
explicationalprincipletobeilluminatedbythecasestowhichtheyseemto
apply.Idonotassociatethesenotionswithaworked-throughtheory.Iintend
11
Therejectionofthesortofanalyticitythatclaimsthatanalytictruthsarevacuousandnot
madetruebyasubjectmatterderives,ofcourse,fromW.V.Quine.Cf.his'CarnapandLogical
Truth`(1954),repr.inWaysofParadox(NewYork:RandomHouse,1960).Therejectionofall
butafewcasesofthesortofanalyticitythatclaimsthatanalytictruthsenunciatecontainment
relationsamongconceptsderivesfromHilaryPutnam,'TheAnalyticandtheSynthetic`(1962),
repr.inPhilosophicalPapers,ii(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1975).Discussionofthe
thesedifferentconceptionsofanalyticity,andoneother,occursinmy'PhilosophyofLanguageand
Mind:1950-1990`,ThePhilosophicalReview,100(1992),3-51(Cf.Ch.20below);andinmy
'LogicandAnalyticity`,GrazerPhilosophischeStudien,66(2003),199-249,secs.I-II.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'165
theremarksthatfollowtopointtowardabetterunderstandingoftheterms,and
perhapsultimatelytowardsomethingresemblingtheory.
Ithinkthatonecandistinguishfourtypesofcasesthatbearonconceptual
understanding.Thesecasesdelineateconditionsunderwhichrefectioncanor
cannotyieldfullerunderstandingofourconceptsandconceptualabilities.
12
Inthefrsttypeofcase,conceptualunderstandingofanexplicationalprinciple
isdependentforitswarrantonempiricalinformation.Theexplicationalprin-
ciplecanbeunderstoodimplicitlyandbroughttoexplicitconsciousnessthrough
refection.Oritcanbeconstructedthroughprovidingempiricalexplanations.
Thesecond,third,andfourthtypesofcaseinvolvedifferentformsofapriori
explicationalunderstanding.
13
Thesecondtypeinvolvesaprioriimplicitunder-
standingofaprinciplethatcanbebroughttothesurfacebyrefection.Theidea
isthatanaprioriwarrantedimplicitbeliefinanexplicationalprincipleguides
theindividual`semploymentofaconcepteventhoughrefectionordialecticis
necessaryiftheimplicitlyunderstoodprincipleistobebroughttoconscious-
ness.Thethirdtypeinvolvesimplicitunderstandingofmaterialsfromwhichthe
relevantexplicationalprinciplecanbeconstructed.Buttheprincipleitselfisnot
implicitlybelieved.Itdoesnotimplicitlyguidetheindividual`semploymentof
theconcept,atleastuntiltheindividualcomestobelievetheprincipleexplicitly.
Eventualbeliefintheprincipleisaprioriwarranted.Inthiscase,refectiondoes
notsimplyclarifyandmakedistinctsomethingthatisalreadyunconsciously
presentintheindividual`spsychologyandguidingtheindividual`sjudgments
aboutcases.Refectionputstogethertheexplicationalprincipleforthefrsttime
withintheindividual`spsychology.Thefourthtypeofcaseinvolvescomingto
recognize,withaprioriwarrant,aprinciplethatintuitivelybearsonthecorrect
explicationofaconcept,atleastpartlyfrommaterialsthatwerenotallavailable
inearlierusesofthesameconcept.Inthiscase,atacertaintime,refectionalone
wouldnothavesuffcedforrecognitionoftheprinciple,forsomeusersofthe
concept.Furthereducation,perhapsevennewconcepts,wouldbenecessary.
14
12
InthissectionofthePostscript,Idrawonallthethoughtexperiments,notjustthosein
'IndividualismandtheMental`.Forfurtherdiscussionofthesemethodologicalandepistemicmatters,
seemy'TheThoughtExperiments:ReplytoDonnellan`and'Concepts,Conceptions,Refective
Understanding:ReplytoPeacocke`,bothinHahnandRamberg(eds.),ReüectionsandReplies,and
myrepliestotheessaysbyMartinDaviesandAntoniGomilaBenejaminMariaJ.Frapolliand
EstherRomero(eds.),Meaning.BasicSelf-Knowledge.andMind.EssaysonTylerBurge(Stanford,
Calif.:CSLIPublications,2003).
13
Itwillbeseenthatthethreetypesofaprioriunderstandingcouldbetakentohavethree
counterpartsassub-casesofempiricallywarrantedunderstandingofexplicationalbeliefs.Igive
fourcasesinsteadofsixonlybecauseIthinkthatseparatingthesub-casesisphilosophicallyand
historicallymoreilluminatingincasesofaprioriexplicationalunderstanding.
14
Delicateissueshoveroverthesepoints.Somekindsofrefection,especiallyinthethirdtype
ofcase,yieldnewknowledgefortheindividual.Thiscanbeseenasasortofself-education.
Nevertheless,Ithinkthatwehavearough,atleastcase-based,senseofadistinctionbetweenwhen
theindividualusesmaterialsalreadyavailabletoworkoutnewknowledge,andwhentheindividual
gainsfurtherknowledgethatisnotsimplyderivedfromputtingthingstogetherthathealready
knew.Sometimesnewconceptsortechniquesareneeded.Sometimescommunicationwithothers
166Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
Thelastthreetypesofcasebearonaprioriwarrantedunderstanding,and
thusonthelimitedrationalismthatImaintain.Thelasttypeofcasewasnot
recognizedbytraditionalrationalists,andthenexttolastwasnothigh-lighted.
Itistherefore,Ithink,ofsomeinteresttomarktheirpossibility.
15
Inallfourcases,theprinciplethatistakentoexplicatetheconceptand
illuminateitsapplicationconditionscouldbefalse.Thisisanimportantpoint.
Allexplicationiseventuallyresponsibletoanobjectivesubjectmattertowhich
theconceptspurportedlyapply.Inviewofourfallibility,explicationscanbe
mistaken,eventhosethataretakentobedefnitional.Ishall,however,assume
inthisdiscussionthattherelevantexplicativeprinciplesaretrue.
Letmeturntoconcreteexamplesofthefourtypesofcases.Inthethought
experimentsthatIhavegiven,themostcommontypeofbeliefthatexpresses
conceptualunderstandingisempirical.
16
Forexample,thebeliefthatacontract
canbeoralaswellaswrittenhasempiricalwarrant.Thebeliefthatwateris
H
2
Oclearlyempirical.Thethoughtexperimentfrom'IntellectualNormsand
FoundationsofMind`(Ch.10below)suggeststhatthebeliefthatsofasare
artifactsmadeormeantforsittinghaspartlyempiricalsourcesofwarrantand
isvulnerabletoempiricallybaseddoubt.
Similarly,Dalton`sfalseexplicationalbeliefthatatomsareindivisibleand
our(presumablytrue)explicationalbeliefthatatomshaveanucleussurrounded
byelectronsinorbitsare,respectively,empiricallydisconfrmedandwarranted.
Theempiricalexplicationdoesnot,ofcourse,giveconceptual'defnitions`ofthe
empiricalconcept,conceptuallyguaranteedtobetrue,althoughperhapsDalton
mistakenlythoughtthathisdid.Itisneverthelessrelevanttounderstandingbasic,
constitutivemattersabouttheconcept`sapplication.
isessential.Thedistinctionbetweensyntheticaprioriknowledgegainedbyrefectionandsynthetic
aprioriknowledgegainedbyothermeansisdelicate.Ithink,however,thatthereisnoreasonsimply
toignorethedistinction.Ratherweshouldusecasesandrefectiontotrytounderstanditbetter.
15
IbelievethatFregehadaconceptionofaprioriknowledgethatineffectacknowledgestheselast
twosortsofcases.MyconceptionofapriorityhasbeensubstantiallyinfuencedbyFrege.Aspects
oftheideasthatfollow,togetherwiththeirrelationstoanti-individualism,arediscussedinmuch
greaterdetailin'FregeonExtensionsofConcepts,from1884to1903`,'FregeonTruth`,'Fregeon
SenseandLinguisticMeaning`,'FregeonKnowingtheFoundation`,'FregeonApriority`,collected
inBurge,Truth.Thought.Reason,theIntroduction,ibid.54-68;and'LogicandAnalyticity`.
Thekeydifferencebetweenmyconceptionofrationalismandclassicalrationalismisthemain
pointofanexchangebetweenmeandChristopherPeacocke.Peacockeadvancesafairlystandard,
Leibnizianversionofthetraditionalrationalistview.Ipointtowaysinwhichsuchaviewmisses
theresourcesthatanti-individualismprovidestoexpandtherangeofpossibilitiesforunderstand-
ingthenatureofrefection.Cf.ChristopherPeacocke,'ImplicitConceptions,Understanding,and
Rationality`andBurge,'Concepts,Conceptions,RefectiveUnderstanding:ReplytoPeacocke`both
inHahnandRamberg(eds.),ReüectionsandReplies.
16
Thegeneralpointabouttheextremefallibilityandempiricalityofmostexplicationsofempir-
icallyapplicablewords,inbothscienceandcommonsense,isamajortheme,developedrepeatedly
andwell,intheworkofHilaryPutnam.Hisdevelopmentofthepointismuchearlierthanmy
developmentoftheanti-individualisticframework.Ithinkthatthatframeworkhelpsexplainsev-
eralofPutnam`sinsights.SeenumerousarticlesinhisPhilosophicalPapers,IandII.Seeesp.
'AnExaminationofGr¨ unbaum`sPhilosophyofGeometry`(1963),'AMemoonConventionalism`
(1963)(vol.i),and'TheAnalyticandtheSynthetic`(1962),'IsSemanticsPossible?`(1970)(vol.ii).
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'167
Therearecasesofempiricallywarrantedbeliefsorpresuppositionsthatare
relevanttoconceptualunderstandingandthataremore'meta`.Forexample,
thefactthathavingtheconceptaluminumisconstitutivelydependentoneither
theorizingaboutthestructureofaluminuminawaythatisapproximatelycorrect
orbearingsomecausalrelationtosomethingwiththechemicalstructureof
aluminum,dependsonaluminum`sbeinganaturalkindconceptandaluminum`s
beinganaturalkind.Anindividualdoesnothavetobelievethataluminumis
anaturalkind,orthataluminumisanaturalkindconcept,iftheindividualis
tohavetheconceptaluminum.ButIthinkthattheindividualmusthavesome
notionofwhatanaturalkindis,andmustnotbeclosedtothepossibilitythat
aluminummightbeanaturalkind.Understandingthataluminumisanaturalkind
orthataluminumisanaturalkindconceptisrelevanttofullyunderstandingthe
conceptaluminum.Understandingthesetwotruthsiswarrantedonlyempirically.
Similarly,ourtheoreticalmeta-knowledgethathavingtheconceptaluminum
requiresbearingsomecausalorcorrecttheoreticalrelationtosomethingwith
thechemicalstructureofaluminumiswarrantedonlyempirically.
Thesecondtypeofcaseisthesortemphasizedbytheclassicalrational-
ists-Descartes,Leibniz,Kant.Theideaisthatembeddedinanindividual`s
psychologyisanimplicitunderstandingofaprinciplethatexplicatestherelev-
antconcept.Theunderstandingisimplicitinthatitisunconsciousandavailable
toconsciousbeliefonlythroughrefection.Itispresentintheindividual`spsy-
chologyinthatbeliefintheprinciplehelpsexplaintheindividual`sapplication
oftheconcepttocases,orinotherlessgeneralapplications.Thejobofrefec-
tionistomakeone`sconceptualunderstandingconsciouslyexplicit,partlyby
makingone`sideasclearanddistinct.
Mythoughtexperimentshavenotcenteredoncasesofthissort.Butthose
experiments,andearlieronesbyKripke,Donnellan,andPutnam,broughtback
tophilosophicalprominencetheclassicalrationalistviewofrefection.Theydid
sobecausetheclassicalrationalistsrefectedmoreonrefection,andhadafuller
storyaboutit,thanotherphilosophersinthehistoryofphilosophy.Andthese
thoughtexperimentsclearlyutilizesomesortofrefection-eventhoughthere
areclearlyempiricalaspectstoallofthesethoughtexperiments.Forexample,
theymakesuchassumptionsasthatJonah,Aristotle,aluminum,arthritis,and
soon,exist.
AnexamplethatIbelieveillustratestheclassicalrationalistviewisZermelo`s
formulationoftheprinciplesofextensionalityandgroundingforthe(iterative)
conceptofset.Theseprinciples,orapproximationstothem,arefundamentalto
anyone`sunderstandingoftheiterativeconceptofset.Theyaresowellknown
nowthattheydonotillustrateimplicitknowledgeformanyofus.However,an
intelligentnoviceinsettheorywhohasbeengivenafewexamplesofsetsand
thengiventheprinciplesmightwell,onrefection,explicitlyrecognizethetruth
oftheprinciplesforthefrsttime.Itmightwellbecorrectthattheprinciples
implicitlyguidedtheindividual`suseoftheconceptinreasoningaboutparticular
sets,beforetheprincipleswereformulatedforhimorher.
168Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
Itisimportantinunderstandingtheclassicalrationalistviewthatonenot
assumethattheconceptbeingexplicated,ortheconceptsusedintheexplication,
mustbenon-empirical.Someoftheapplicationsoftheconceptofsettocases
inpuremathematicsarenotempiricalatall.Butnotallconceptsusedinapriori
conceptualexplicationsneedbeofthissort.
Forexample,theconceptsnaturalkindandchemicalstructureareempiric-
alintwoways.First,theconceptswereprobablyacquiredthroughempirical
experience.
17
Second,allapplicationsofthemtoinstancesthattheyaretrue
ofarewarrantedempirically.Acceptanceofcertainprinciplesthatarepartof
explicationalunderstandingoftheconceptnaturalkindneverthelessseemsto
beaprioriwarranted.Considertheprinciples:
Ifsomethingisanaturalkindconcept,anindividualcouldusetheconcept
withoutbeingabletotelldefnitivelybycorrectobservationwhethersome-
thingisaninstanceofthenaturalkind:instancesofnaturalkindsadmitof
look-alikesinnormalconditions.
Ifsomethingisanaturalkindconcept,andtherelevantnaturalkindis
individuatedbyitschemicalstructure,thenanindividualcouldhavethat
naturalkindconceptwithoutknowingthekind`schemicalstructure.
Itseemstomethatbeliefintheseprinciplesisaprioriwarranted,eventhoughthe
conceptsnaturalkindandchemicalstructureareacquiredonlythroughexperi-
ence,andeventhoughanywarrantsforidentifyinginstancesofthesekindsare
certainlyempirical.
Asregardsthefrstprinciple,knowingwhatanaturalkindisrequiresbeing
opentoperception`snotdeterminingwhethersomethingisaninstanceofanat-
uralkind.Whethersomethingisaninstanceofthenaturalkindswater,gold,
fruit,andsoondependsonfactsthatmaynotbeimmediatelyevidenttoper-
ception.Whatdeterminesaninstanceofanaturalkindtobeaninstancemaybe
afactaboutthethingthatishiddenfromview,anddiscoverableonlythrough
furtherinvestigation.Answerstowhichthingsarenaturalkindsarewarran-
tedonlyempirically.Whetheraconceptisanaturalkindconceptissimilarly
dependentontheseempiricalmatters.Butwarrantforbelievingtheprinciple
17
Probablyallconceptsare'acquired`throughexperience,atleastinthattheyaretriggeredand
becomeavailablethroughperceptualstimulation.Someconceptualdevelopmentis,however,the
resultofnormalhumanmaturation,ratherthantheproductofbeingtaughtthroughthetransmission
ofhistoryandculture,ordependentonanyparticularrangeofexperiencesforacquisition.Itis
commonincurrentdevelopmentalpsychologytoconsiderconceptsthatareacquiredinthisweak
senseasinnate,notlearned.Soforsuchconcepts,thesenseinwhichtheiracquisitionisempirical
isveryweak.Infact,thereisaspectrumofcasesonthisissue.Theconceptnaturalkindis,at
leastinWesternculture,acquiredbyhumanchildrenatafairlyregulartimeoflife,about3or
4yearsold.Cf.S.A.GelmanandE.M.Markham,'YoungChildren`sInductionsfromNatural
Kinds:TheRoleofCategoriesandAppearances`,ChildDevelopment,58(1987),1532-1541.It
wouldbeinterestingtoknowwhethertheconceptisuniversalamonghumanbeings.Itwouldalso
beinterestingtoknowwhetherparticularsortsofexperiences,andifsowhich,arenecessarytoits
beingacquired.Thesamequestionsarisefortheconceptchemicalstructure.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'169
itselfseemstometobeapriori.Understandingtheprinciple,orsomedumbed-
downapproximationtoit,ispartofdistinguishingnaturalkindconceptsfrom
observationalconcepts.Similarremarksapplytothesecondprinciple.
Lower-orderversionsoftheseprinciplescan,andprobablyoftendo,impli-
citlyguideanindividual`sapplicationofnaturalkindconcepts.Tohavethe
conceptnaturalkind,muchlesstohavenaturalkindconcepts,anindividual
neednothavetheconceptnaturalkindconcept.Soonlylower-orderanalogs
oftheseprinciplesarelikelytobepsychologicallyinplayinearlyusesof
naturalkindconcepts.Butoncetheindividualbelieves,onempiricalgrounds,
thatsomethingisanaturalkind,orusesanaturalkindconcept,theindividual
willbeopentoallowingthatwhethersomethingisaninstanceofthekindcan
bedeterminedbymorethanmeetstheeye.Ifanindividualhastheconcept
naturalkindconcept,andtheotherconceptsintheprinciples,theindividual
willprobablyalsobeguidedinapplicationsofhisorhernaturalkindcon-
ceptsbysomethingliketheprinciples.Ofcourse,evenso,theindividualmight
failtoassenttothem.Theindividualmightrequiredialecticorrefectionto
maketheprinciplesexplicitandconvincing.Andofcourse,individuals,not
excludingphilosophers(!),canmistakenlydenytheprinciples,becauseofbias
orinterferenceintheirunderstanding.
Similarly,acquisitionofaconceptlikearthritisdependsonexperience.
Applicationoftheconcepttocasesrestsonempiricalwarrant.Anappreci-
ationofthewaysthatpeopledependononeanotherinlanguageusederives
fromexperienceofspecializations,differencesofpositioning,anddifferencesin
backgroundknowledgeamongpeoplewithinaculture.Considertheprinciple:
Ifanindividualreliesonothersincertainwaysforacquisitionoftheconcept
arthritisandforcorrectioninitsuseandapplication,thereferent(orrangeof
correctapplication)oftheindividual`sconceptcandependpartlyonwhat
otherscountasarthritis,andonothers`connectingtheindividualtothe
referent(ordenotation)oftheconceptthroughcausallymediatedchains.
Ithinkthatthisprinciple,likeananalogousprincipleforthereferentsofproper
names,isaprioriwarranted.Itisaprioriwarrantedeventhoughacquisitionof
conceptsintheprincipleisempirical.Thisprinciplemayguiderecognition
ofexamplesofreferenceforaconceptofarthritis,eventhoughanindividual
maynotrecognizetheprincipleimmediatelywhenpresentedwithit-andeven
thoughanindividualmaydenytheprinciplewhenpresentedwithit.
18
Thethirdtypeofcaseisalsorelevanttounderstandingaprioriconceptu-
alunderstanding.Thistypeofcaseisincompatiblewithdoctrinesofclassical
rationalists.Oratleastthosedoctrinescommonlyneglectsuchcases.Some
explicationalprincipleswhoserecognitionderivesfromrefectionmakeuseonly
18
Itwaspartofclassicalrationalismtoholdthataprioriknowableprinciplesmaynotbeknown,
evenonrefection,becausesomeprejudicemayblockclearanddistinctunderstandingofprinciples
thatimplicitlyguideusage.
170Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
ofmattersthatarealreadyknownorareatleastimplicitlyavailabletorefection.
Yetsomeofthoseprinciplesareinnosenseimplicitinthepsychologyofthe
individualbeforerefection.Theyarenotpartoftheexplanationoftheindi-
vidual`sprevioususesoftheconcept.Implicitbeliefinthemdoesnotguide
theindividual`sapplicationoftheconcept.Theprincipleisarrivedatsynthetic-
ally,throughaprioritheorybuilding.Itgoesbeyondanythingthattheindividual
implicitlyknew,believed,orhad'asaunit`inhisorherpsychologypriorto
refection.Ityieldsnewconceptualunderstanding.
19
Manycasesmaybeindeterminate,oratleastdiffculttodetermine.Ibelieve
itplausibleandcertainlycoherenttotakeNewton`snotionoflimittobewhat
Weierstrass`sdefnitionoflimitexplicates.Weierstrass`sexplicationgivesthe
bestunifyingexplicationofNewton`sprimaryusesofaconceptoflimitinhis
calculus.ItgivesaconstitutiveexplicationofwhatNewton`sconceptappliesto.
Theexplicationplausiblyprovidesdeeperunderstandingofaconceptthatwas
usedpriortoitsrecognition.Acceptanceoftheexplicationisaprioriwarranted.
Newton`sactualusesneednothavebeenguidedbyunconsciousbeliefinthe
explication.Ithinkitplausiblethattheywerenot.Newton`suseswere,ormight
havebeen,guidedonlybyagrab-bagofapplicationstocases,rulesofthumb,
partialexplications,idealizedgeometricaldiagrams,andsoon.Nevertheless,
NewtoncouldhaveunderstoodWeierstrass`sexplicationandcouldhaverecog-
nizedittobetrue.Themainpointhereisthatthisdescriptionofthecaseis
coherentandpossible.
20
19
Idevelopthesepointsforempiricalaswellasaprioricasesin'Concepts,Conceptions,Refect-
iveUnderstanding:ReplytoPeacocke`.
20
ThehistoricalcasesthatIdiscussaremeanttobeillustrativeofepistemicpossibilities.I
recognizethatafulltreatmentofcases,andmakingthemplausibletohistorians,wouldrequire
muchmoredevelopment.Thisparticularcaseisespeciallycomplex.Newtonalsohadtheconcept
oflimitsasinfnitesimals.Thisideais,however,morecentraltoLeibniz`streatmentofthecalculus.
(SeethediscussionofLeibnizbelow.)AsIunderstandthehistory,fromtheearly1670sonward,
Newtoncametothinkthathisuseoftheconceptofmotioninhisapplicationofthecalculuswasin
sometensionwiththemorestatic/geometricalnotionofinfnitesimal.Hetriedtodevelophistheory
of'fuxions`inawaythatfreeditfromrelianceonthenotionofinfnitesimal.Inanunpublished
treatiseDeMethodis(probably1671-2),hewroteofquotientsofaffectedequationsextendedinan
infniteseriesthatthey'evermorecloselyapproachtheroottillfnallytheydifferfromitbyless
thananygivenquantityandso,whentheyareinfnitelyextended,differfromitnotatall.`Newton
developedthisconceptionduringthenextffteenyears,intotheworkofPrincipia.Thiswayof
thinkingisdifferentfromthinkingoflimitsintermsofinfnitesimals.Althoughinlaterpublished
workhemixestalkofinfnitesimalswiththisideaofapproachingaroot,thereareunpublished
passagesinwhichhescornstheideaofinfnitesimalsandtakeshisfuxionmethodtobesuperior.
Newtonwasclearlyawarethathehad(atleast)twoconcepts.Itakethelatterfuxionconcepttobe
dominantinguidingNewton`smainconceptionanduseofthecalculus.Itakethequotedpassage
tobesuggestiveofWeierstrass`sintuitiveidea,andquitedifferentfromLeibniz`s(andNewton`s
own)infnitesimalconception.Ofcourse,Newtonprobablysawtheideaofapproachingalimit
literallyindynamicalterms,andinthisrespecthisviewdiffersfromWeierstrass`s.Iregardthis
aspectofNewton`spositionasamistakenconfationofdynamicalideaswithanunderlying,partially
understood,purelymathematicalconcept.Ofcourse,wenowunderstandWeierstrass`sconception
oflimitintermsofthenotionsoffunctionandoperator.Newtonhadonlyapartialunderstandingof
thesenotions.Theytoodidnotbecomeclarifeduntilcenturieslater.AswithWeierstrass`sdefnition
oflimit,Newtonhadtheconceptualmaterialstounderstandthelaterexplications,eventhough
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'171
Similarly,pre-Fregeannineteenth-centurylogiciansmadejudgmentsabout
onepropositionorthoughtfollowing,asalogicalconsequence,fromothers.
Suchlogicianscouldhaveunderstood,withminimalexplanation,thegeneral
explicationsthatweregivenoflogicalconsequencebyTarskiandothers.Itis
extremelyimplausibletothinkthattheearlierlogicians`judgmentsaboutcases
wereguidedbyanimplicitunderstandingofthegeneralexplications.They
wereguidedintheirjudgmentsbyparticularunderstandingsoflogicalconstants
inparticulararguments,andperhapsbyvaguemiddle-levelprinciples.Itisnot,
however,plausiblethatthegeneralizationsthatarerequiredtoyieldasystematic
accountoflogicalconsequencewereembeddedintheirpsychologies-even
thoughsuchgeneralizationswerebothcomprehensibletothenineteenth-century
logiciansandcorrectgeneralmeta-logicalexplicationsoftheirintuitiveconcept
oflogicalconsequence.
21
AlthoughthethirdprinciplethatIblockedoffindiscussingthesecondcase
ofconceptualunderstandingmayoftenimplicitlyguideindividuals`judgments
aboutinstances,Ithinkthatthisneednotbeso.Anindividualcanbeper-
suadedbytheprinciplebecauseitaccountswellforrememberedcases.For
example,anindividualcanrememberparticularcasesinwhichheorshedidnot
knowenoughaboutarthritistodetermineitsrangeofapplicationbydescrip-
tion,butinwhichheorshewasthinkingaboutarthritis.Thenitcouldbe
noticedthatthethinkingmusthavesucceededthroughrelianceonotherswho
knewmoreandwhocouldbetterdistinguisharthritisfromotherpossibleor
actualdiseases.Theindividualneednot,evenunconsciously,haveputtogether
thegeneralization.Buttheindividualcanunderstandtheprincipleandrecog-
nizeitstruth,atleastarguablywithaprioriwarrant,oncegivenafewcasesto
refectupon.
Iturnnowtoafourthcaseofconceptualexplication.Hereagainbeliefin
theexplicationcanbeaprioriwarranted.Thecasediffersfromthethirdcasein
thatanindividualmaynotbeinaposition,eveninprinciple,toputtogetherthe
explicationandrecognizeitstruthwithoutverysubstantialadditionaleducation.
Someaprioriwarrantedbeliefcanconstitutefullerunderstandingofaconcept
thanemployersoftheconcepthadbefore,eventhoughtheexplicatingprinciple
doesnotderivefullyfrommaterialaccessibletothosewhohadthoughtwith
theconcept.
almostsurelytheyhadnotbeenputtogetherasaunitinhispsychology,inawaythatimplicitly
guidedhisownunderstanding.Still,itseemsplausibletosaythathehadaconceptoflimitthat
Weierstrassexplicated,andaconceptoffunction,oroneconceptoffunction,thatlaterbecame
clarifed.Ihopetowritemorefullyonthesecases.FormaterialonNewton`smathematicalviews
onwhichIhavedrawn,seeD.T.Whiteside(ed.),TheMathematicalWorksofIsaacNewton,2vols.
(NewYork:JohnsonReprintCorporation,1964),Introduction;D.T.Whiteside,TheMathematical
PrinciplesUnderlyingNewton'sPrincipia(Glasgow:UniversityofGlasgowPress,1970);Richard
S.Westfall,NeveratRest.ABiographyofIsaacNewton(Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,
1980);thequoteisfrompage228ofthiswork.
21
Cf.my'LogicandAnalyticity`,esp.secs.IV-VI.
172Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
Inthethirdcase,weassumedthatacorrectexplicationalprincipleofan
individual`sconcepthadnotcoalescedandhadnotbeenputtogetheratany
leveloftheindividual`spsychology.Sotheprincipledidnotimplicitlyguide
hisorherusage.Still,theindividualcouldinprinciplehavecometorecognize
thetruthoftheprinciplebyputtingtogethermaterialsalreadyathisorher
disposal.Thus,althoughitwouldhavebeentoomuchtoexpect,Newtoncould
inprinciplehavethoughtupWeierstrass`sdefnitionoflimit,fromconceptual
materialsandmathematicalprinciplesalreadyavailabletohim.Suchthinking-up
mayhaverequiredputtingtogetherconceptualmaterialsthatNewtonhadnotput
togetherinhisusesofhisconceptlimit.Newtonneverthelesshadthebackground
knowledgeandconceptualwherewithaltohaveunderstoodthedefnition,and
tohaveevenproducedit,ifhehadexercisedsuffcientrefection.
Inthisfourthcase,anindividualwhoseconceptisexplicatedinacon-
stitutivelyrelevantwaymightnotbeinapositiontorecognizethetruthof
theprinciple,nomatterhowmuchrefectionheorsheexercisedonavailable
material.AplausibleexampleofthissortofcaseisLeibniz`suseofanotion
ofinfnitesimalinhisdevelopmentofthecalculus.Thenotionreceivedarigor-
ousandstableexplicationbyAbrahamRobinsonthreecenturieslater.Robinson
usedmathematicalconceptsandtechniquesthatsimplywerenotavailableto
Leibniz.YetRobinson`saccountthroughnon-standardanalysisplausiblygives
amathematicallycorrectexplicationoftheconceptthatLeibnizemployed.The
explicationbearsonconstitutiveapplicationconditionsoftheconcept.Robinson
wasaprioriwarrantedinhisacceptanceoftheexplication.AndLeibnizmight
havebeenwarrantedifhehadbeenbroughttounderstandit.Buthecouldnot
haveunderstooditwithoutsubstantialfurthereducationandnewmathematical
concepts.Refectiononwhathealreadyknewandunderstoodcouldnothave
suffcedtogiveLeibnizanadequateunderstandingoftheconstitutivelyrelevant
explicationofhisownconcept.
22
22
AlthoughLeibnizandhisfollowersontheContinenttendedtoemploythenotionofinfnites-
imalintheiruseofthecalculus,complicationsinLeibniz`sworkparallelthosenotedinNewton`s.
(Cf.note20.)Leibnizwasawareofmetaphysicaldoubtsabouthisnotionofinfnitesimal.Inaletter
toVarignon,1702,hecitesaworkofhisowninwhichheclaims:'myintentionwastopointout
thatitisunnecessarytomakemathematicalanalysisdependonmetaphysicalcontroversiesorto
makesurethattherearelinesinnaturewhichareinfnitelysmallinarigoroussenseincontrastto
ordinarylines.`Hecontinues:'itwouldsuffceheretoexplaintheinfnitethroughtheincomparable,
thatis,tothinkofquantitiesincomparablygreaterorsmallerthanours.`Heseemstomeanthese
incomparablequantitiestobefnite.Forheclaimsfurther:'wemustconsiderthattheseincompar-
ablemagnitudesthemselves,ascommonlyunderstood,arenotatallfxedordeterminedbutcanbe
takentobeassmallaswewish.`Leibnizremarksthatinfnitesimalsmaybetakenasidealconcepts
whichshortenreasoninginthesamewaythatimaginarynumbersdo.Althoughimpreciselystated,
theremarksabouttakingmagnitudestobeincomparableandassmallasonewishesseemtobe
inthedirectionofthelimitconcept.BothNewtonandLeibnizknewthattheyhad(atleast)two
conceptsthatcouldbeusedindifferentiation.Newton`sdominantconceptisontracktowardWeier-
strass`sexplicationoflimits.Leibniz`sdominantconceptisontracktowardRobinson`sexplication
ofinfnitesimals.Buteachhadatleastsomeapproximationtotheother`sdominantconcept.Cf.
G.W.Leibniz,PhilosophicalPapersandLetters,trans.anded.L.Loemker(Chicago:Universityof
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'173
Ahumblerinstanceofthissamesortofcaseispresentinthethought
experimentsaboutarthritisandbrisket.TheindividualAlisinnoposition
torecognizethroughrefectionthatarthritisisadiseasethatcanonlyoccurin
joints.Alcannotrecognizethroughrefectionalonethatbrisketisacutfrom
thebreast,orlowerpartofthechest,ofcertainquadrupeds.Almustlearnnew
informationtobeinapositiontoobtainfullexplicationalunderstandingofthe
implicationsofhisownconceptualusage.Theinformationmightbeobtained
throughempiricalexperience.
23
Beliefintherelevantexplicationalprincipleis
neverthelessaprioriknowable.Al`sownacceptanceofitcanbeaprioriwar-
rantedonceheisapprisedofhisownincompleteunderstanding.Hereagain
weseetheimportanceofdistinguishingdependenceonexperiencetoacquire
themeanstounderstandaconcept,ortothinkanexplicationalprinciple,from
dependenceonexperienceforbeingwarrantedinbelievinganexplicational
principle.
Sometimesarthritisiscalleda'deferentialconcept`.Thisphraseseemsto
meverymisleading.Nearlyanyconceptcanbeemployedinsuchaway
thattheemployerdependsonothersfortherangeoftheconcept`sapplic-
ation,andevenforinstructiononexplicationalprinciplesandothernorms
governingtheconcept.Ourrelianceonothersplacesusunderstandardsand
normsthatwemaynothavefullymastered.Moreover,wecannotingen-
eraltellbysimplerefectionwhetherandhowwedependonothers.The
dependencecommonlyisburiedinthehistoryofone`susageandindis-
positionsnotallofwhichareopentorefectiverecognition.Themainissue
hastodowithwhatobjectiverealityweareconnectedtoandwhatstandards
forfullunderstandingapplytothoseaspectsofourusagethatrelyonsuch
connection.
Otherinstancesofthisfourthcasemaybepresentinstandardphilosophical
explications.Itmaybethatthecorrectaccountofjustice,forexample,requires
knowledgeofmattersthatwillemergeonlywithexperienceofavarietyofcom-
munitiesandinstitutions.Suchinformationmaybeneededtoindicatecertain
possibilitiesthattheconceptmustaccommodate.Perhapsagivenindividualcan
thinkaboutjusticeassuchwithouthavingtheexperience,oreventheconcepts,
necessaryforgivingafullyadequateexplicationofthenotion.Theeventual
explicationmightnonethelessbeaprioriwarranted.
Thefourthcasebringsoutthatcomingtofullerunderstandingofone`scon-
ceptsandtheirconstitutiveapplicationconditionsmayrequireobtainingnew
information,ornewconcepts.Thispointisfairlyobviousinthecaseofempir-
icallywarrantedconstitutiveexplications.Itisofsomeinterestthatitcanapply
toaprioriwarrantedconstitutiveexplicationsaswell.
ChicagoPress,1956),ii,881-883IamindebtedtoSheldonSmithforfndingthispassageandfor
generaldiscussionontheseissuesinthehistoryofthecalculus.
23
Inmyview,warrantforbelievingtheinformationisusuallyempirical.Butitneednotbe.Cf.
my'ContentPreservation`,ThePhilosophicalReview,103(1993),457-488.
174Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
Anti-individualismindicatesthattheconditionsthatdeterminewhatconcepts
onehasarenotfullydeterminedbydefnitionsthattheindividualhasmastered,
orbyanyothersetofconditionsimmediatelyavailabletotheindividual`srefec-
tion.Conceptualabilitiesarenotingeneral,orevenoften,madewhattheyare
bymasteryofexplicationalprinciples.Theyaredeterminedpartlybypercep-
tionanddispositionsthatwemaynothavefullyconceptualizedorunderstood.
Theyaredeterminedbyrelationstoawiderorder,theobjectivesubjectmat-
ter,aboutwhichourknowledgeandunderstandingmaybequitelimited.The
thoughtexperimentsawakeustothelimitsofourconceptualmastery.
Thispointholdsevenincasesofaprioriknowableconditions.Anti-
individualismleadsonetoexpectthatfndingprinciplesthatgovernconditions
forhavingthoughtswillnotbeeasy.Ofcourse,traditionalrationalistsemphas-
izedthediffcultyofsuccessfulrefection.Anti-individualismdemonstratesthat
thedependenceonempiricalconditionsthatdeterminewhatconceptanindi-
vidualhasmayvastlyoutruntheindividual`sownawarenessofthoseconditions.
Anditshowsthatevenwhererefectionisanappropriatemethodforgaining
explicationalknowledgerelevanttotheindividuationofone`sconceptsand
mentalstates,andevenwheretheresultingknowledgeisapriori,theindividual
doingtherefectingmaynothavetheprinciplesoralltheircomponents,expli-
citlyorimplicitly,withinhispsychology.Theindividualmaylacktheresources,
informationalorconceptual,togainaprioriwarrantedunderstandingofapriori
knowableprinciplesgoverningconditionsonhavingtheconceptsthatheorshe
has.Thissituationispossiblebecausethenaturesofanindividual`sthoughts
aredeterminedbymattersthatneednotbecognitivelyavailable,implicitlyor
explicitly,totheindividual.
Westillhavemuchtolearnaboutbasicanti-individualistprinciplesthem-
selves.Somelearningmaybeopentopresentrefection,pushedfurther.There
is,however,noguaranteethatweareinapositionevennowtolearnby
refectionallgeneralprinciples,evenaprioriprinciples,governingconditions
ofhavingtherepresentationalcontentthatwehave.Newknowledgemaybe
necessary.Herephilosophyhasledtoanimprovedexplanationofwhyitisso
diffcult.
INCOMPLETEUNDERSTANDING
EarlyinSectionIIc,Iwrite:'thethoughtexperimentdoesappeartodependon
thepossibilityofsomeone`shavingapropositionalattitudedespiteanincomplete
masteryofsomenotioninitscontent.`Therelevantincompleteunderstanding
neednotbeafailuretoknowthesortofexplicationcodifedinadictionary.As
IpointoutneartheendofSectionIIb,incompleteunderstandingofobservation
concepts,suchascolorconcepts,orofconceptslikecontract,canyieldthought
experimentsanalogoustothearthritisthoughtexperiment,withoutcentering
onfailuretocomprehenddictionarymeaning.Incompleteunderstandingcan
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'175
involveanyfailuretounderstandsomeconditionthatisconstitutivelynecessary
totheapplicationrangeofaconcept.
Incompleteunderstandingisnotthekeytoallthethoughtexperimentsthat
supportanti-individualism.Thethoughtexperimentsthatcenteronperception,
onnaturalkindconcepts,andonquestioningoffundamentalexplicationalbeliefs
donotrequireanyincompleteunderstanding-inanyordinarysenseofthe
phrase-onthepartoftheprotagonists.Inthosecases,certainlimitationsof
perspectiveorfailuresofomnisciencesuffce.
Incompleteunderstandingis,however,thepivotonwhichtheparticular
thoughtexperimentsof'IndividualismandtheMental`turn.Refectionon
incompleteunderstandingseemstomevaluableineliciting,throughthethought
experiments,asocialfactorinthedeterminationofanindividual`smentalstates.
Havingconceptscandependpartlyonrelianceonothersforpossiblecorrection
ofexplications.Thecorrectionsmakereferencetofactsaboutthesubjectmatter
towhichtheconceptsapply.
Incompleteunderstandingisalsoakeyelementinunderstandingsuchhistor-
icalcasesasthoseofNewtonandLeibniz.Inthosecases,theincompleteunder-
standingisnotamatterofknowinglessthanotherexpertsinthecommunity.
Theirexplicationsoftheirconceptsfailedtoaccordwiththeirapplicationsofthe
conceptsandwiththenatureoftherealitytowhichtheyappliedtheirconcepts.
Theirexplicationswerecorrectedonlylater.
Whatexplainstheirhavingtherelevantconceptsistheirabilitytoapplythem
veridicallytocases,andtheirhavingparadigmsandrulesofthumbthatwere
approximatelyveridical.Thispartialunderstanding-thisinadequacyofunder-
standingbothtousageandtosubjectmatter-motivatedexplicationsbysub-
sequentthinkers.Thesubsequentexplicationsclarifedandunifedtheusage.In
theserespects,thecasesofNewtonandLeibnizaresimilartothecaseofDalton.
Reading'IndividualismandtheMental`again,Iwasstruckbymyinsistent
emphasisontheideathatonecanhavethoughtsthatoneincompletelyunder-
stands.Thisemphasishadanautobiographicalroot.Aprimaryimpetusformy
discoveringthethoughtexperimentswasrecognizinghowmanywordsorcon-
ceptsIwentaroundusingwhichIfound,onpressingmyself,thatIdidnotfully
understand.Icametorealizethatthiswasnotjustapersonalweakness.Itwas
partofthehumancondition,atleastincomplexsocieties.
Inthearticle,Ipaidspecialattentiontocriticizinganear-automaticresponse
tothefrststageofthethoughtexperiments.Thenear-automaticresponsewas
thatifanindividualincompletelyunderstandsaword,theindividual`sword
meaning-andtheconceptthattheindividualassociateswiththeword-must
bereconstrued.Ifaforeignerusesoneofourwordswithoutunderstandingit,
wereconstruetheforeigner`sword.Wetaketheforeignertobeusingaconcept
differentfromanyconceptthatwewouldexpressifweusedtheword.Aread-
inesstoinvokereconstrualtointerpretincompleteunderstandingwaspartof
theelementarytoolkitofeverymainstreamphilosopherofthetime.Automatic
176Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
reinterpretationiscertainlylesswidelytakenasgospelnowadays.Yetitisstill
fairlycommon.
24
Ofcourse,therearemanysituationsinwhichreconstrualisappropriate.
Butneitherreconstrualnor'homophonic`interpretationisautomaticallycorrect.
Reconstrualiscorrectinmanyfewerinstancesthanthecommonphilosophical
wisdommaintainedthreedecadesago.
Reinterpretationpicksuponsomethinginordinarypractice.Misusesor
failuresofunderstandingexemplifedbymalapropisms,tongueslips,extreme
'category`misuses,thefrstusesofwordsbyveryyoungchildren,andthe
fumblingsofforeigners,allnormallyandrightlyoccasionreinterpretation.Most
othercasesaremorecomplex.
Individualscanfashionidiosyncraticusesofcommunalwords.Iftheirusage
correspondstotheirownunderstanding,andtheydonotrelyinunconscious
waysonothersforfxingtheapplicationsoftheirwordsorconcepts,individuals
cancutthemselvesofffromcommunalusage.Itisnopartofmyviewthatjust
becauseapersonisusingthesamewordformsasothersinagivensocial
network,theperson`swordsexpressthesameconceptsthathisfellows`words
do.Anydependenceonothersforlinguisticorpsychologicalcontentderives
fromrelianceonothersthroughcertaintypesofcausalrelationstothem.
Neitherreconstrualnorstandardconstrualisautomatic.Therelevantcondi-
tionsgoverningeachareextremelycomplexandvaried.Asthethoughtexperi-
mentssuggest,however,reinterpretationislessoftencorrectthanwascommonly
supposedwhenthearticlewaswritten.
Themotivationsforinvokingautomaticreconstrualarevaried.Somelie
deeplyembeddedincertainformsofindividualism.Ifonethinksthatthecon-
stitutiveconditionsforbeinginamentalstatearelimitedtowhatisinthe
individual,onemighttakethis'beingin`tobebeingintheindividual'sunder-
standing.oratleastavailabletoit.Thevariousviewsaccordingtowhichhaving
aconceptisbeingabletogiveadefnition,oracriterionforapplication,areways
ofexpressingthisidea.Amoresophisticatedexpressionisanover-generalization
oftheinsightthatanindividual`srepresentationalcontentdepends(partly)on
awebofinferentialconnectionswithotherrepresentationalcontents.Theidea
isthattheconstitutiveconditionsforunderstandingaconceptcannotoutrunthe
networkofinferencesthattheindividualcandraw.
24
Twoesteemedformercolleagues,KeithDonnellanandDonaldDavidson,appealedtoitrightto
theendsoftheircareers.Cf.KeithDonnellan,'BurgeThoughtExperiments`inHahnandRamberg
(eds.),ReüectionsandReplies;DonaldDavidson,'KnowingOne`sOwnMind`and'Epistemology
Externalized`,collectedinhisSubjective.Intersubjective.Objective(Oxford:OxfordUniversity
Press,2001).TheseresponsestomyworkbyDavidsonandDonnellanseemtometobevulnerable
torepliesthatamounttorepeatingSec.IIIb-d.Cf.alsopartsofSec.V.MyresponsetoDonnellan
isin'TheThoughtExperiments:ReplytoDonnellan`,inHahnandRamberg(eds.),Reüectionsand
Replies.MyresponsetoDavidsonisin'SocialAnti-Individualism,ObjectiveReference`(Ch.13
below).
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'177
Apsychologicalstate`srepresentationalcontentcannotbeexplainedfullyin
termsofconfrmationprocedures,oranyothertransitionsamongpsychological
states.Theerrorsoftheseviewsareclearfromrefectingontheanti-individualist
thoughtexperiments,andnotjustthoseexperimentsthatinvokeincomplete
understanding.Representationalcontentisdeterminedpartlybycausalrelations
toactualaspectsoftheenvironment.Sometimestheserelationsrunthrough
otherpeople.Ineithercase,theyrunbeyondwhatmustshowupintheindi-
vidual`sinferences.
Thestillbroaderideathatmeaningisuseissometimesinvokedtomotivate
automaticreconstrual.Therearetwodiffcultieswithsuchinvocation.Thereis
noevidentreasonwhyanindividualcannotfailtounderstandhisorherownuse.
Andusecannotbeseparatedfromrelationstokinds,properties,andrelations
inasubjectmatter.Onecanfailtounderstandthesubjectmatterinawaythat
limitsone`sunderstandingofone`suse.
Theprogrammaticcharacterofthesedoctrinesleavesthemvulnerableto
over-generalization.ThecasesthatIdiscussin'IndividualismandtheMental`
showthatordinarypracticesimplydoesnotaccordwithautomaticreconstrual
inthefaceofaperson`sincompleteunderstanding.Thereisacomplexterrain
here.Automaticreconstrualisarevisionistposition,notapieceofcommon
senseorphilosophicalwisdom.
Iwanttodiscussoneotherrationaleforautomaticreconstrualinthefaceof
incompleteunderstanding.Theideaisthatindividualswithpsychologiesmust
beguidedbyrulesandprinciplesintheirrepresentationalprocesses.Tobe
guidedbyaruleorprinciple(goesthereasoning),anindividualmustbecap-
ableofaccessingit.Anydifferenceinrulemustbeaccessibletotheindividual.
Soincompleteunderstandingnotremediablebyrefectionisimpossible.Soany
supposedincompleteunderstandingthatdependsforcompletiononmattersinac-
cessibletotheindividualmustbeillusory.Supposedincompleteunderstanding
ofruleorprincipleisreallyunderstandingofsomeotherruleorprinciple.
Thisreasoninginformsnotonlyviewsthattrytoblockthethoughtexper-
iments.Italsoinformssomeviewsthatnominallyacceptthem,butusethe
reasoningtomotivateanunderlyinglevelofcontentthatiscommontothetwins
inthethoughtexperimentsandthatguidesourintuitionsaboutthecases.The
ideaisthatonlybybeingguidedbyrulesorprinciplesthatexplainhowcontent
isestablished(perhapsbyreferencetoasocialorphysicalenvironment)canan
individualhavetheenvironment-dependentcontentthatthethoughtexperiments
postulate.Soalevelof'narrowcontent`mustunderlieandsupplementthelevel
of'wide`or'broad`content.
25
25
Forfurther,briefdiscussionofotheraspectsorversionsofsuchadistinction,seetheIntroduc-
tion.Thepresumptionthatanyprinciplethatguidesintuitionsaboutthethoughtexperimentsismade
upofconceptsthatcanbe'narrowly`individuatedisitselfwithoutfoundation.Anindividual`shav-
ingnotionslikecause,environment,social,physical,naturalkind,andsoonisitselfconstitutively
dependentontheindividual`srelationstoawiderorderbeyondhim-orherself.Thereareother
178Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
Regardlessofwhetherthereasoningisusedtoresistthethoughtexperiments
ortomotivateanewlayerofrepresentationalcontent,Ibelievethatthislineof
reasoningconstitutesafundamentalmisunderstandingoftheimplicationsofall
thethoughtexperiments,notjustthoseof'IndividualismandtheMental`.The
individuatingprinciplesthatgovernrelationsbetweenrepresentationalactivity
andtheenvironmentarenotingeneralimplicitinthepsychologiesofindividuals
governedbytheprinciples.Moreover,suchprinciplesneednotbeandoften
arenotaccessibletotheindividual.Relevantindividualsneednotbeableto
understandorfollowthethoughtexperiments.Averyyounglanguageusermight
notbeabletofollowthethoughtexperimentof'IndividualismandtheMental`.
Ananimalperceiverneednotbeabletounderstandtheconsiderationsthat
supportanti-individualismaboutperception.Evenforadultsophisticateswhose
judgmentsregardingthethoughtexperimentsarepresumablypartlyguidedby
animplicitunderstandingofsomeprinciples,notalldetailsoftheprinciples
needbeaccessible.Anindividualmayhavetoobtainnewinformationabout
socialorphysicalmatterstoseethetruthofsomeconstitutiveprinciples.
Thethoughtexperimentsin'IndividualismandtheMental`elicittheintuitive
pointthatpartialunderstandingneednotbefullyremediablebyrefection,and
neednotbemerelyamatterofnothavingbroughttoconsciousnessanimplicit
fullunderstanding.Itbegsthequestionagainstthethoughtexperimentssimply
toinvokethenegationofthispointinmotivatingsomecontraryorsupplemental
view.
In'IndividualismandtheMental`Iseveraltimesindicateinpassingthat
arequirementofinfallibleandindubitableexplicationalunderstanding-even
implicitunderstanding-issurelyodd.Iwanttoemphasizethispointhere.The
viewthatincompleteunderstandingrequiresreconstrualreallyrestsonsucha
requirement.Alittlerefectionshowstherequirementtobewildlyimplausible.
Representationalcontentis,broadlyspeaking,fxedbyusage.Regardlessofhow
usageisspecifed,itissurelyahyper-intellectualizedconceittothinkthatthe
usermusthave(implicitly)anunderstandingthatexactlyrefectsthenatureof
thisusage-insuchawayastobeabletohaveaninfalliblegeneralexplicational
mastery.
26
Themainupshotofthethoughtexperimentsin'IndividualismandtheMental`
isthatindividualshavefarlesscognitivecontroloverdiscursiveaccountsofthe
naturesoftheirmentalstatesandthecontentsofthosestatesthanithasbeen
commontoconcedeinphilosophy.Theprevalenceofincompleteunderstanding,
evenincompleteunderstandingthatcannotberemediedbymererefection,is
onesignifcantsignofthislimitation.Thislimitationoncognitiveomnipotence
diffcultieswiththeview.Forexample,theconceptionof'wide`contentcommonlymisconstrues
whatwidthamountsto.
26
Beliefinsimplemathematicalorlogicaltruthsandbeliefinthepurestcasesofcogitocan
perhapscountasinfallibleandindubitable.Suffcientmisunderstandingtoyieldapparentdisbelief
perhapsrequiresreconstrualinthesecases.Butexplicationalunderstandingofthesortthatmy
discussionshavecentereduponseemstomeclearlyverydifferent.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'179
overone`sownmindisinretrospectnotsosurprising.Ibelievethatitputsus
inabetterpositiontounderstandthesortsofcognitivecontrolandinsightthat
wedohave.
NORMSASNATURALSTANDARDS
InSectionVof'IndividualismandtheMental`Idiscusscertainmodelsfor
understandingtherepresentationalcontentofmentalstates.ThemodelIoutline
isthatofthesetofkeyrelationshipssetupbyacomposition`stonickey.The
modelwasmeanttobringoutwaysinwhichstandardsofevaluationallowfor
quitealotofindividualvariationbutareindependentoftheindividual`sattitudes
towardthosestandards,oncetheindividualhasthecompetencetowritemusic
ormakesoundsthatestablishasetofkeyrelationships.
Thismetaphorwas,ofcourse,nevermeanttobemorethansuggestive.I
wouldliketocommentonitabitfurther,however,partlytoreinforceitsmain
points,partlytohighlightwaysinwhichthemetaphorisdefcient.
Thesystemofkeyrelationshipsislikethelogicalrelationsamongrepres-
entationalcontents,andthesemanticalrelationsbetweensuchcontentsandthe
world,inonerespect.Botharewhattheyareindependentlyoftheindividual`s
particularattitudesorunderstandingregardingwhattheyare.Bothallowfora
lotofindividualvariationevenasthesystemappliesequallytoall.Thisisthe
basicpointofthemetaphor.
Themetaphor`smaindefciencyliesintherebeingnoanaloginthemusic-
alcasetotherepresentationalityofrepresentationalcontent.Representational
contententailsorsetsconditionsforveridicality-truthorcorrectness.Inhelp-
ingtotype-identifymentalstates,itentailscertainfundamentalgoodsofthose
states.Veridicalityisarepresentationalgood,atypeofrepresentationalsuccess.
Representationalcontentsetsconditionsfortherepresentationalsuccessofmen-
talstates.Thesystemofkeyrelationshasnoimplicationsforrepresentational
correctnessorsuccess.
Althoughthepointisobvious,someofitsimplicationsareperhapslessso.
Therearetwosortsofdoingwellorbadlyinthemakingofsounds.First,
animalscandowellorbadlyinsofarasmakingthesoundsfulfllsabiological
function.Thebird`ssingingloudlyenoughandaccordingtosomeappropriate
templateenablesittoattractamate.Successnormallyhasnothingtodowith
accordingwithkeyrelationshipsperse.Allthebirdneedsissomedistinctive
sequenceofsoundsthatcanyieldanuptakeappropriatetothebird`sneeds.By
contrast,representationalcontentssetveridicalityconditions,andveridicalityis
atypeofrepresentationalsuccess.
Second,humanmakersofmusiccandowellorbadlyinsofarasthesounds
thattheymakeorcomposefulflltheirintentions,ormeetsomehistoricaland
partlyconventionalstandardofbeauty,ingenuity,orcoherencewithrespectto
keyrelationships.Issuesofgenuineevaluationariseforthesesoundmakersonly
180Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'
insofarastheyintendtomakemusic.Goodmusicmakingmaybeanobjective
matter,butitdependsonsomecombinationofindividualintentionandhistor-
icalnorms.Bycontrast,veridicalityasastandardofrepresentationalsuccessis
notsetbysocialactivityorhistoricalconventions.Nordoesitsbeingastand-
ardofrepresentationalsuccessdependontheindividual`saimingtoachieve
it.Veridicalityissetasastandardforrepresentationalsuccessnecessarilyand
apriori.Itisastandardconstitutivelypresentintheveryhavingofrepresent-
ationalcontent.Giventhatacreaturehasstateswithrepresentationalcontent,
inparticularthoselikeperceptionorbelief,itfollowsthatatypeofsuccess
(representationalsuccess!)isinherentinbeingveridical;andakindoffailure
residesinbeingnon-veridical.
Furtherstandardsforachievingrepresentationalsuccess-includingepi-
stemicnorms-arealsosetbythepsychologicalcapacitiesandinformational
resourcesoftheindividual,notbyanyaimtomeetthenorms.Thussomestand-
ardsgoverninghowwellanindividualorrepresentationalsystemisdoingat
achievingveridicalityarenaturalnorms.Theyarepartofthetermsofbeing
inthepsychologicalstates.
27
Thetermsforachievingharmonicallysuccessful
compositionsarenotsetpurelybythetermsofbeingacomposer.Theydepend
onthecomposer`saimsandonhistorical-conventionalunderstandingsofwhat
countasbetterorworseharmonicfgurations,giventhoseaims.
Inbothmusicalcompositionandrepresentationalstatecases,meetingstand-
ardsforsuccesscandependonrelationstoothers:incomposition,through
intendedrelationstotheexamplessetbypredecessorsandcontemporaries;in
thought,throughrelianceonothersforconnectiontothesubjectmatter.The
termsofthisreliancediffergreatly,however.Asnoted,thecomposer`sinten-
tionshelptosetwhatstandardsapply.Bycontrast,theveridicalityconditions
andcontentofanindividual`spsychologicalstatesmostlydependonfactorsover
whichtheindividualhasverylittlecontrol.Sowhatcountsasrepresentational
successandwhatnormsapplyaremuchlessunderthecontrolofintentional
activitybytheindividual.
RETROSPECTIVE
Ithinkthat'IndividualismandtheMental`madefourmaincontributionsin
itshistoricalcontext.Oneistheshiftoffocusinunderstandingreferenceand
'meaning`fromlanguagetomind.Thearticletakesmindtobeadistinctsubject
matterforwhichissuesofreference,dependenceoncausalchains,sharingand
transmittingofcognition,arise.Ibelievethattherootsoflinguisticrepresenta-
tion-referenceandmeaning-lieatleastinitiallyinperceptualandconceptual
representation.Languageandmindinevitablybecomeintertwinedatrelatively
sophisticatedlevels.Atthatpoint,aspectsofeachdependpsychologically,and
27
Formoreonthesepoints,see'PerceptualEntitlement`,PhilosophyandPhenomenological
Research,67(2003),Secs.IandII,pp.503-548.
Postscriptto¨IndividualismandtheMental'181
perhapsevenconstitutively,onaspectsoftheother.Butatprimitivelevels,
includingprimitiveperceptionandperceptualbelief,mentalrepresentationpre-
cedesandhelpsexplainlanguage,bothidiolecticandpublic.Theroleofpercep-
tionandperceptualbeliefinaccountsoflinguisticreferenceispartlyindependent
ofanythingabouttheroleoflinguisticreferenceinperceptionandperceptual
belief.Sotheshiftinfocusistowardpartofthegroundunderlyingthework
onlinguisticrepresentation.'IndividualismandtheMental`startedthisshift,
althoughonlylaterdidIcenteronperceptualaspectsofmentalrepresentation.
Asecondcontributionistheconcentrationnotprimarilyonreference(lin-
guisticormental),orondereaspectsofmentalstates,butonthenatureof
representationalstates,andonhowtheirrepresentationalcontentisdetermined.
Referenceplaysaroleinthearticleinsofarasithelpsillumineconstitutivecon-
ditionsthatdeterminethenatureofmentalstatesthemselves.
28
Theargumentsof
thearticleshowthatthenaturesofcertainmentalstatesandevents,understood
ascenteringontheexplanatorykindandepistemicperspectiveassociatedwith
thementalstate,constitutivelydependonrelationstoabroaderenvironment.
Athirdcontributionistoshowthatthementalstatesandeventswhosenatures
dependonrelationstoanenvironmentconstituteamuchwiderrangethanthe
conceptualcounterpartsofdemonstratives,propernames,andnaturalkindterms,
whichtherevolutionarytheoryoflinguisticreferencehadcenteredupon.This
isthemainpointofSectionIIb.Ilaterextendedtherangeofapplicationof
anti-individualismyetfurther-particularlytoperceptionsandperception-based
thoughts.Ialsoshowedlaterthatthewidthoftherangedoesnotdependpurely
onrelianceonothersinalinguisticcommunity.
Afourthcontribution,theonemostoftenrecognized,isthatofshowinghow
thenaturesofanindividual`srepresentationalstatescandependontheindividu-
al`srelationtoasocialenvironment.Ourdependenceonotherstoconnectour
wordstoasubjectmatterandtocorrectourbeliefsaboutthesubjectmatterhelps
constitutivelytodeterminewhatattitudeswehave.Certainrepresentationaland
epistemicnormsderivefromthesesociallydeterminedrelations.
'IndividualismandtheMental`wasthefrstmodernworktoformulateanti-
individualismclearlyandtogivespecifcconvincingargumentsforit.Anti-
individualismis,however,veryold-almostacommonplaceinthehistoryof
philosophy.Thereremainsmuchtobeunderstoodbyrefectingonthisoldidea,
developingit,andexploringitsconsequences.Fullerunderstandingofitwould
enrichunderstandingofmanyotherphilosophicalmatters.
28
Manyphilosophersstilldonotappreciatetheimportanceanddistinctivenessofthispoint.
Manystillruntogetherreferential'content`-thereferentsoflinguisticterms,ormentalstates-with
representationalcontent.Differenttypesofmentalstatecanmakereferencetothesameobjectsand
properties.Thedifferencesaredifferencesofperspectiveinabroadsense.Theyaredifferencesin
psychologicalandepistemicpointofview.Thesedifferencesarefundamentaltoepistemicevaluation
andpsychologicalexplanation.Theyarenotmerelydifferencesinreference.Theyarefundamental
tobothcommonsenseandscientifcunderstanding,toexplanation,toepistemology,andtoother
evaluationofmentalstatesandevents.