Lessons From The Indo-China War. Vol - 2
Lessons From The Indo-China War. Vol - 2
Lessons From The Indo-China War. Vol - 2
I'S0i
Vol
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A ~j may a 55
.JN 1967 j
TABLE OF CONTENTS
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Airborne Troops 201
SGrowth of Airborne Units 201
Territorial Organization 202
Transport Planes 204
Recovery of Parachutes 206
Results Accomplished 207
Airborne Operations and the War Without a Front 212
Armored Forces 218
Utilization .220
Organization 222
Amphibious Groups 225
River Units 228
Reconnaissance Squadron Groups 229
The Tank-Destroyer Regiment 230
Air Transport 230
VM Anti-Tank Activities 232
Night Involvement 233
Artillery 236
(in fortifications)
Fixed Artillery Artillery (attached to Mobile Groups)
237
242,
Missions 244
Light Artillery Observation Aircraft 252
Organization 2j52
Tasks 253
Guiding of Fighters and Bombers 256
Helicopters 261
Organization 262
Uses 263
Tactical Employment 265
Engineers 267
Organization 268
i Missions 271
Personnel 273
Road Systems 273
Transportation 277
Organization 277
Operations 280
Signal. 285
Organization 285
Uses 287
Aerial Support 289
Organization 292
Naval Air Operations 293
Command Relationships 295
Missions 297
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River Forces 304
The Dinassaut 305
IUtilization
Types of WNater Craft Used
309
311
Mines 312
IFemale Personnel
Types of Jobs
315
316
Recruiting 316
Logistics 318
Base Structure 319
Sources of Supplies 320
IMaterial Inadequacies
Quartermaster Corps
323
327
The Supply System 327
IClothing Problems
Foodstuff Problems
.3-30-
331
Medical Service 335
Tactics 335
Forward Aid Personnel 336
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Organization for Evacuation
Hygiene and Prophylaxis
Fuel Services
337
340
344
3
Transportation 345
In', Depot Protection
Material Service (Material Overhaul and Repair)
Organization
346
348
350
R
| IMissions
ie ore
Material Upkeep Problams
0
350
353
STeDnssu
Alterations to Equipmont 0
355
IA Special Problem -The
R and D
Technical Organization 358
360
jTesting 360
CO14MANr)MONT IN C11117
IN THIE FAIR EAST
L ES S ON-S
fror the
14 DI INODCHINA
.A.
Volume II
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w hae folit ovev the last nine years has practiced, under
The ne~y
the ao~is of self'-criticismi, an old discipline of' our ourn Arnpy which we simpl.y
oallod the "critique".
Such a collective self-examination following our operations has been
our best maberhia for study and development. But in it not shocking to apply one
same method of' introspection to peaceful exercises as wel~l as to the brultal reali-
ties of war?
All things considered we are nevertheless compelled to dwell. on the
causjes which brought our failures about, or our successes, and the testimony borne
by each one of our dead must not be buried among the memories of the surviving.
Besides, an Army endowed with a lonS military past is rich enough to let
I her mon tell the truth.
In order to prepare these Teachings from the Indochina Campaign, we h~ave
I dra~r from~ veterans' relationships and the 1400 reports written ~rofficesof
rl
j ranks oanstitute the main basis of' this study.
[ The z-o:ý.tcats, the news bulletins and the many s'hort works prepared in
lndlochina during hostilities for trainino purposes have been druim uponi aloo, as
well as the Volioies la!J dormn by sucoe.-isive Commanaings Officors.
0-2 syntheses and lastly the various statiFsti.cal data collected by the Staff of
- The first section, a very limited edition, covers the lessons which, due
irrelevant to tactics.
- The second section, intended for wide distribution, groups together everya
thing the Armed Forces have learned during the Campaign which would still
tioned, attempts to group all the lessons of a more general character which,
Ined h fn iedaw ewe hecnet o h eod eto n
consequently, deserve to influence our tactical principles.
.• •Indeed, the fine line dra%,n between the contents of the second section and
that which is the object of the third may seem at times questionable, One deals
mainly with the thousand and one forms of Viet Minh guerilla, and the other deals
mainly with European-style combat methods. But this division, based on convenience,
must not lead one to forget that the fortunes of war admit only one didactical
classification.
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3
3 Generals,
i 8 Colonals,
I 18 Lieutenant-Colonels,
69 Majors,
jI 341 Captains,
1P140 Lieutenants and 2nd Lieutenants,
N.• ]
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AIR FOR•CE LOSSES DURING COM;BAT MISSIONSs
I General,
60 Offioeers,
160 Non-Commissionned Offioers,
49 Mon.
IN ADDITION: 85 Offioers,
243 Non-Commicsioned Offioers,
52 Mon,
27 Officerst
| 39 Petty- 0ffioers,ý
235 Seamen,
IN ADDITION: 53 Officers,
157 Petty Offioers,
6 15 Seamen,
5,345 killed,
9,790 woundod, for the three branches of the Armed Forces combined,
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H. EG1A~-' U T
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FIRST
PART
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THE
'IAR OF IDEkS
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"Whore the guerilla is deprived of any
"CHAPTER I
i INSURGENT
PRE- ~~*
k'*• PERIOD
one can surmise that It begins at the moment when opposition to established law
and order has acquired sufficient hold on the population to breed trouble.
In Indochina, such a period has probably had its sources around 1925,and
the gravo incidents of 1930 in North-Annam and in the Tonkin Delta area are espe-
cially responsible for it. Thus, it lasted some twenty years and could have lasted
longer if the war circumstances, namely the elimination of French authority by the
Japanese In 1945, had not given the Viet-Minh Party the opportunity to fill a vacant
place.
It is difficult to draw other lessons from this period other than the con-
Sa pre.lnsurgent stito was not suspected, and also because the insurgency had lost
SECRECY OF PRE-INSURGENT SYMPTOMS.- The various reports relating to the pre-war situation
gave an optimistic view of the internal security and placed responsibility for the
incidents and troubles with some distraught individuals, against whom force was
"One might wonder if the errors committed in the estimation of the situation
did not stem from the training of the ranking file, for one part, which was oriented
other part, from their standard of living which kept them apart from the Vietnamese
people"(1).
For, in 1954, Colonel N.... who followed the events, oommonted in those
terms on the use made of force with regard to the same repression.
"Pro-war revolts were brought to heel: short-lived triumph whioh cost
a lot. Because force did muoh more harm than good; the Tonkin village of X....
which was shelled was to remain a hbtbed of revolt and North Armam, which was o0-
oupied by minority troops, was to see no more French men after 1945". (3)
j EVOL,7TON OF THE. IMSM•OLCY - To the Black Flag, to the Coohin-4binese pirate moved
by person1l ambition, by greed or by some looal patriotism, was gradually substi-
tuted an sary animated by a racial patriotism and by a new set of ideals
based on Earxism.
T But the communist disciplines provided them with a propaganda and indoc-
trination technique which allowed them to win over large numbers of adherents within
the most unfavoured classes.
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" From this double-aided, double souroc idboloao sprang a duality of ori.in
in the supports from which the rebellion benofitod. On the one hand, the Viet Minh
jl made maximum use of the local ressouroes it had secured for itself by intimidation
and terrorism if neoessary! on the other hand, it had the outside oupport of foreign
I nations..., and some French quarters.
It found, aotually, certain favors, both official and olandestine, within
I a fraction of our public opinion and of our Assemblies. This combination of oompli-
cities and material aid quiokly allowed the rebels to get over the phase of the
I armed bands which oharacterized the year 1945. With the help of circumstances and
time, they passed from regularly formed groups to units of all branches of the
•I services and finally to major units.
SPERIkNENCE OF HOTBEDS OF AGITATION.- What we have observed in Indochina confirms an
already known fact in our African possessions: there exists a permanence in the
hotbeds and areas of agitation. History and geography point out certain regions
as being the traditional birthplaoe of insurgent movements, then as the favored
guerilla theatre of operations.,
It is in the provinces where the population has always been the proudest,
the most conceited and the most independent, that the revolt has taken-on: the most
acute and intense forms (the PLAINE DES JONCS, the Region of VINNH$ the mountains
surrounding LANGSON, etc..). Being able to compare some recent engagements to the
history of certain battles of the conquest is a gripping thing. Thesamo events
Soccur often, sometimes at the same spots. Some of the pamphlets or notes from
Tonkinese Mandarins to the North VIETNAM pacifiers were written in the same vein
as the Viet Minh 'pamphlets.
To these traditional circumstances were added of course the coftributions
fof the modern era. The existence of a proletariat in the cities has favored the
[ birth of urban disturbances (in particular on December 19, 19046), while the patience
of the rural masses finally wore out,
Duo to the very nature of this pre-insurgent state, it appeared that the
jIsolution to the problem could not be brought about by the use of force alone.
The authorities responsible for law and order must step in at the poli-
j •tical, economic and social level rather than at the police level. "Under penalty
of inefficiency it must not be assigned the mission of maintaining law and order
as well as the causes of disorder".
As long as the loaders of the revolt must exert prudence and caution,
j we must not resort to savakq repression.
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PREPARATION OF TM• AR1MED FORCES. - The very struoture of our Armed Forces makzea them
ill-fitted to maintain law and order. The pro-insurgent period thus takes on an
all-important character in their setting up, as well as in adjustment of backing-
up forces eventually coming from other territories,
If the Indochina War provides us with fVyR'4iVBns in this area, it can
hoirevqr point out the gaps of our preparation. A great number of Officers at first
deplojed the fact thait the Expeditionary Corps wis deprived of a Specialized Officers
Group• similar to that of the Indegenous Affairs Group.
1Beides the Commander's general information which must include all details
of local politics, all the problems brought on by the gathering of information,
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INVOLVEM•IMN• OF TROOPS. - When criminal assaults, sabotage actions and riots get so
important that they cannot be handled by the police, the only course is to resort
to troop units. However, it is desirable to avoid certain errors which Colonel X.o.
(1) has 'pointod ouL:
"Essentially, the Armed Forces must be present, but not involved."
1_-"heir rapid involvement servos as tho signal to trigger hostilities.
In their task to maintain critical points and communications means, which consti-
tute the essential instrument of Command, of the Government and of economic life,
they can adopt one of two behaviors the choice of which depends on local conditions
and cannot follow any set of rules:
-"either they make themselves evident, by a large deployment if necessary$
wit-"or they make use of discretion, aooomplishing their miasions off icieiit~y
but unobtrusively."
" Should the probability of involving troops become evident, then it is
absolutely imperative that their involvement be preparods
- In the selection of objectives. Much too often there is a tendency to
assign troops to secondary tasks. Since troops constitute the final
argument, their use must made in a decisive action.
_.1-"Mopping-ups, searching, and all operations of this type run the risk of
producing deceiving results if they have no connection with the magni-
tude of the instrument set in motion. In this case they annoy the po-
pulation and demonstrate the futility of force. So, during pre-insur-
gent periods, they will be used only if sufficient assurance of aohie-
ving the objectives of importance exists.
-"In its duration. It must be strictly limited to the brutal act and
care must be exercised so as not to let it go on. This means that the
assigned mission must be determined with great precision, where its
nature and the nnticipated results are concerned.
_--________- __-_________
i_ In its conduct. Due to the Cravity of psychological consequences,
it is imporative to take the necessary stops and use enough troops
that are adapted to the type of mission indicated. It is more advi-
sable to act by means of massive and short demonstrations rather than
14b&a succession of small-scale operations. In all, the principle of
economy of forces must be rigorously applied.
When the use of the military becomes inevitable, do so with caution, for
its psychological impact on the masses will be as important as its clash with
rebel factions#
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C H APT E F II
If war always opposes two will-powers, civil war adds to it the clash of
J4 two doctrines and even two explanations of tho world when Marxism inspires one of
the two adversaries.
We are not attempting here to state the multiple causes which have
resultbd in the triumph of the Viet-LMinh 'ideoloC.r over social conservatism and over
it~Mjo
the gqvernmental weaknesý of traditional Vietnam.
.... ',":
After all there causes are too well knoim: "We oouldn't possibly re-esta--
blish a new order for the prof,ýJt of a constitutional and social'disorder" (l)-(2).
There is not one ,'renoh Veteran who hasn't expressod his bittez'ne~ssand
his anger towards the conflicting policios he was forced to serve as a soldier,
The following avraisal can-be construed as one of the mildoot...
"In 1946, in!order to dq,',our duty here, we were shipped off between two rows of
constables, like criminals. Upon returning in 1953, we were searched bgr Vietnamese
Customs off'ioers, like tourists" (3).
"I- M~ost of the appraisals however are much more bitter and reflect these
4. opinions of two officers:
Captain P...:If "If we have been unable to oppose
oposestwowil-poerscivl
wr away •r Communist
ads t propaganda o
ittheclah
2)-The Viet ;Minh capitalized on statistics such as these (translated from flocu-
mont, 11o953/FPNV/2 of 6 April, 1955) :
therefore mere).y be a statement of facts as far as our successes are concerned, and
* especially our failures in the areas where the oommanding officers were able to wage
a restrained psychological Mwar.
ACTION ON VIETNAMESE POPULATIONS .- In the zones where our units attempted to rid or
preserve of the V.M. oontamination, it was normal that we resort fo propaganda,
while making use of weapons at the same time.
But the troops and their leadership were, with few exceptions, assisted
by mediocre persuasion and indootrination agents.
First of all, d to poor preparation:
"Political actibn is not a part of our formation ... our leaders were
.ill at ease when faced with problems of contact with the population, of propaganda...
S(2)",
lack of knowledge in the field of political action... Some destroyed what others
had taken such pains to build."
"A living example is the village of D..., on the Bassac, In an abandoned
area, one of our Platoon leaders had succeeded, with great pains and patience, to
convince 2,000 of the inhabitants to return. This village was the pride of rw
Company. Unfortunately, after we weere relieved, some incompetent station leader
lost the confidence of the population and it didn't take more than two weeks for
D... to be entirely burned and abandoned by the very ones who populated it and pre-
ferred rejoining the V.M. zone rather than endure the vexations of an incompetent
section leader arid troops that were unprepared politically for their mission".(3)
I time, in most oases, we had to pay for some military advantages with the permanent
alienation of the populations. The latter, actually, believed in the return of the
Franco-Vietnamese Foroes, maintained a benevolent neutrality and even gave us some
tokens of faith, only to find themselves abandoned to reprisals of the V.14. Ceose-
quently, an incursion or a raid in a non-controlled zone should never be conducted
together with an attempt to win over populations.
Under such unfavorable conditions, the poor results can be easily explained.
(5[ao ..F''NV
From 1946 to 1952 a "Propae.nda Section" operated within the general staffs
of the Commander-ir-Chief and the Territorial Comieandors. It distributed all noose..
mary instructions to Zon•zwid Sector Intelligenoe Officers and provided them with
the material moans neoessary.
In 1953c, a "Bureau of Psychological Wtrfarel" was created within the General
Staff of the CommandeI-4n-Chief and this organisation received an over-inoreosing
amount of funds.
Instruction courses wore organized to train propoa.ndists. All equipment
for printing leaflets and posters was distributed, display rooms were arrangod;
Mobile teams were equipped with inegaphones, tens of millions of leaflets were
parachute-dropped (1) and a plane equipped with loudspeakers was frequently used.
This tardy, effort was sloued down anywyV br a lack of oompetent personnel.
For "the ideological wars of our contemporar'y era demand highly speeialioea cadres
in the fields of political aotion and propaganda. Ques•ions of dootrine pet aside,
there is a tochn.quo in which the greatest possible number of officers must be ini-
tiated, and in which some of them nust be specialized"(2).
ACTDON ON ENENY TROOPS. While direct proppganda on V.M1. troops ha, yielded, very, few
desertions and rallying soldiers due to the ascendacy Aof the politiotl cadres on. ,
troop39, we have achieved considerable success with the prisoners.
Action on the P.I.M.'s was based on a difference of regime (3).
Those who didn't belong to the regular arnW were assigned, afýelr a pro-
bation period, to workers units from which it was never difficult to recruit coolies!
to serve voluntarily in our units. The latter have been practically always the
devote&i and extraordinarily faithful assistants to our formations: Without the neces-
sary and concerted psychological action, common life with our tro9ps has succeeded,
in almo3t all cases, in transforming a former adversary into an unarmed auxiliary
who shared his unit's "esprit do corps".
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"In my Battalion, wrotc Captain X... (PMSV), we quiokly noolimu.tizod our
"PIMI"i and a great many of thom gave us undeniable tokens of alloegianoe - search
",
of underground paasqeos, for example - and requested to become partimans".
With roeard to the P.I.M. who had to endure the regime of oaptivity, the
Pqyohologioal Action Servioe conducted, from 1952 on, suocessful actions* In the
camps whore this was tried, the majority of prisoners, onco the indomitable elements
4 strained and sogregated, proovod to be reoeptive to objective information (on Vietnam,
the Vietnamese Government, the National Army, the opportunities offereds to the
Vietnasmese youth, bo#.O), and aparble of receiving professional and intellectual
training( 1)
These two achievements of very different character prove that political
rehabilitation is possible. They aro, moreover, the Judgement passed against a
penitentiary regime 'whioh assembled the prisoners, without any distinction, into the
same 6amp. An attpippt to provide the, oaptives 1with a, cetain oomfort and of course
the abolition of all brutality'. are indispensable to create a-olimate which is,
favorable to the rehabilitation phase.
V.M. ACTION ON OUR TROOPS.- With the exception of indegenous units, recruited among
the ethnical minorities who always revealed themselves hostile to the V.14. due to
raoial repulsion, tho enemy found fer tile grounds for its opaganda among the in-
degenous elements of our fornations and naturally within the Vietnamese Army.,
The "DICH-VAN" movement (meaning: appeal to the onemy) was doted upon by
the V.M1. National Defenoe Ministry. Consid1e~rble dooulnentation whichcamh to our
attention beqrs this out.
For the intention of nationalist Vietnamese the following arguments were
used: "the Vietnamese soldier is not an enemy; he is a lost sheep, at most a rebel".
If he "rallies" he will be treated with respect.
Simultaneously, pressure, even blackmail, were exercized against his family.
Ever.ything, the narrow overlapping of our installations or of that of the
adversary in the two delta areas and along the coastal zone, tho receptivity of po-
pulations to the V.JI. argurments from fear, or simply for attentism, favored the
actions of the DICH-VAN.
(l)- For example: 2,000 PIMs were th.is treated in camp X... in TONKIN in 1952-1954,
900 enlisted in the Vietnamese Army whore they served honorably; 1,100 were
I liberated.
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Communist Party; in addition, they made use of -leaflets and sometimes.., women.
The defeatist propag.anda originating from the Metropole was unquestion-
ably the most demoralising factor for the French personnel, without however, having
provoked. any appreciable numbor of defections. (1)
With roeard to the other elements of the Expeditionary Force, the V.M.
widely used pamphlets which were written in every language and well suited to the
time and place. In some oases, they also made use of interpreters, who harangued
the garrisons of attacked posts with the aid of loudspeakors.
DECEPTIVE OPERATIONS.
Ever since the Anglo-Saxons made such great noise about their "deceptive"/
operations during the period 1940-1945, it has been the habit to cover a certain
character with the cloak of psychological war, which was called the Stratagem of
War from the times of the siege of Troy and the battle of the Horatii and the Curiatii.
(I)- The number of French deserters has not been more than a few tens during 8 years
of war and in moot cases, the defection was caused by.."a female cong. Furthor-
more, many of those deserters tried later to escape.
(2)- The number of Afolcan, North-African anJ Legionnaire dejerters totalod a feai
hundred during the eight years of war, and the great majority of them tried
I to escape later.
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In fact, t):e deceptive action "whose objective is to achieve a pqyohoo-
gioal victory over tho eoneiry, by leading'him to a falee interprottation of our in-
tentionns and thus reduciilg his ability to oounter"(1), is always a fictitious
manoeuver, the achievement of which ie more or leis strained.
But the meoans of modern propaganda have allowed the o.onsiderable increase
of the impact of false stops, wrona ordero, and wrong activities in communications.
In this respect, but this one on3y, one can lend to peyoholoiioal warfare
noisy orohootratlon Sthe
of a stratagem.
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SECOND PART
- It is the people...".
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On December 19, 1946, large strips of TONKIN and ANNAM roll in the
I hands of the Viet-Minh and 'beoame so maiy provinces of a now State. For, although
HO-CHI-MINHI's government was condemned to a life of diffioulties, little by little
j Iit succeeded in establishing an administration, a judicial branch and a few public
offioes, while subsisting from a rudimentdry economy.
I T•he outline of part of those territories kept shifting during the eight
yearn df war, ospeoially in South VIETNAM. In TONKIN, however, the year 1951 was
j notod for the actual delimitation of the Viet-Minh zone: by the oreotion of a forti-
fied enclosure around the Delta, we more or less acknowledged our inability to re-
j gain the central rogion.
Indeed, we attempted on several occasions to recapture some of the
I .enemy's riefs. le went thus to BAO-KAN and CAO-BNG in 1947 and launched the
"ATLANTE" operation in 1954 to attempt to recapture a portion of the ANNAM coast.
I Other operations led us to take the offensive in Viet-Minh territories,
whether larger soale raids (1) were involved, or we had infiltrated into enevy ter-
Sritory with the hope of drawing out his troops and destro'ying them (2).
But these undertakings constituted only a series of events while the
struggle took on a permanent form in the very regions we wished to control, namely
the two Deltas and some areas of the ANNAMI coastline, which were densely populated
c.ndthe most productive land areas.
.The "War without a front" thus waged for eight years was a struggle in
which the adhesion of a population massed together in the villages was at stake.
j (l)- For example the "LORRAINE" operation in 1952 and the "MOUETTE" operation in 1953.
(2)- For example the HOA-BINH affair in 1951, the NA-SAN affair, and finally
j DIEN-BI EN-PHU.
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IV
I• Surface war actions take on various aspeots, but they all. center around
three exercises:
I - Read.y avallibility of -the main roads and waterw.Vs which are necessary
to the existence of units as well as to manouvubility.
Thus emeres a policy of control of the roads and waterways.
- Provressive reoganization of various regions by a policy of surface
I control.
- Apeasoment of the minds and disari.ament of rebels by a policy of
j paci f i. ion.
activities have been e:3dential]y the work of tern-
These three to,,reý no
j to'ial and Onpocial.yV that of so-called. "imiplanted"
'rries units. Theye will be
di ;CUz.:Ac'Cl in th eree cl-1.1•r•.
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,•C}HAPTER~
MAIN KARTICUIJA[US
ORGAI'TIZATTON OF C0.11AD,1M.- Duzring the mhole oampaign, the territorial chain of ocommand
reiained as based on a geoo•paphio partition of IJ)()OC1TI\Aj
- T D1 Im)-ICT w.t3 equivalent to one of the wide nat~ural regions of tCe
oun try,
Its LoeLder had at his disposoul a more or less large numbor of, terri-
4 torial, units and could, in addit-ion, dispose of Air and River Foeoes
which wexre adapted to the torrain,
- T-E ZONES wo.ve, subdivisions of the D.istriot and inoluidod themselves
SECTORS, broken down into sub-sectors, the latter oorrespondiqg in
principle to the caab.-.lities of actilon of a more or leos reinforced
brittalion.
[ The nijor preooocupation of each lovel of Comniinrd wLs to r ,e "a i
organizing resorve. to oon,:hiot more or less important operaliono., and thie only con-.
trovesi.l out.bjoet mainta.ined botweoii the mobile a"nd
I-,s the proportio-o to be r,
implanted fbores. This problen, will be reviewed later.
It is to be noted that, on the one hand, as the means were reinforced
in both carips, and due to the strategic nature the Viet Minh final2ly gave its aotiono,
we were forced to create more and more important Operational Commands. Their Jauxta-
position or superimposition to the existing Territorial, Commands did not alwurs
nprove to be P, feovorbe element to the sought af'er rational pac.ificati.on it~e~f.
IETIGTNC,.- It L,- been oxten strt.-fthat one of the m-.ln c..:usef• o u failures
our
was the, lack of good intu.1.]ience.
Yet,
a ot one cy wo n by th: •t he Cornder-T,-e ....- and his LC loeveol
3 ,, o t d e t e ri ni,n e
c c o u lM n.wrs
Lib o r ,.l n !.)tIpbct from
,_ e i pr ... ' G-2 chiefs,
cnte.d to them by their 10,.r,,f s:
the cocipleto Vlot-Ni.nh inlts disposition, often with a better thlvi- 001,1 acouraoy,
and rarely below.
j Inoontrast, the Battalion Commander, the post Leader and even the ,lobilo
Group Commander were to have one day or another the most painful of surprises. In
addition to their motor vehicles being blom up daily, in mined areas, their patrols
found nothing or disappeared after being ambushed, and when their unit made its wrV
Sinto rn vill]-o, it lac!&od the llt-o) h.voy
-e0teoe,hn cwoulclo lth;,>l "theo•m to clahs-
25 kJ.
I ) 11.
~t i.-, t fo N . L~
o oot:.4&l t h~-~Iino beto-L'1n1 t111one.L~
to
iulel
''114al'.ie .,9171V') Whlot IGthyý:- oi ;y. vh jlw
ro !xvidr1 with Cvoct pc~ in
nevot' obtained,
Vlono oo2Uulclooll .~ "The Cn nd-iCh1finorma the) Ba.ttalion
X1jeade' w!ho in turn nover in o I ed the C6mmandor-in-hf"
The G-2n soizoens of' intelli~onoe were th6 standard ohosi,pland the Indo-
johinese Wa~r hrj not produced any par tioular, leason: -the methodo and, the means were
good.
H
lowever, at the company level., an(d espooially at the Sub-seotor Commanders
level, the failure of intelligence was attributed. to Var'ious 0ausos, the first one
of 1.1hLioh was the lack of interest some of the Atithorities showed in searching for it..
"At the lower 1eyelos, tie: im prtanoe of the f fltiono of the Intelligen~
Officer, was much too of ten i'gnored.. FPrequent).y repl~aced, somietimnes burdened with
several ta.3ks of variouo natures, he tedd ýtobeome a pawn, in an administrative
I group.,,
If one said: "One good, intelligence off iber equals a battalion, not-one
Ileader, in fact did without-a battalion in order to have all intelligence officeT."1(l)
On the other hand,' tile 6elmentn' responsiblo. f or research of'ten lacked
jthe proper ineans and particularly lacked aerial photographs.
The formcor Intolligeence Officer of a Sub--sector wrote, for- example, that
in 12:months he was unable to obtain, a cover pioturo Qf his territoty.
wa no anexcptin;even in TONKCIN 'the no~-ativos were
Suc aninsanc
fnever' availJable in adequa te quan l.itieo andl nover i.uenowtod :rro ,,uontly erncuZgh,
Ono cou],C1 alsoo Oepioze.v t:eV ustttiead.qaitt inadIequacy of
jt.,1 Agternwetcr 71o~roc. the abnomri~o or, ins Lrumrnt,- for olose r.onitorln.- and final1~
tet~ a')i %-,0- of't'okniotoP uh.10oh, ini vEar'ousobciuEa couldIA1 tro
1 ~ "Forj 0fmn
1"i2.o ut-1*
c~in~iirlt. t~'~'r to,"~V~4,X~~ tiblaU 1mz.'
cout~q. om'
with aO%
ahf vllapv
an t1i es~'iiu
Subrt Ia Ic ah0 bVI bI d h.
In thiý salmo 'voin) vwo -mixt inaint onoa at~ain oil the imvo)ttLLý&Of
a 0 vn
I a ~Group of' Ind~~o~ A±'Cira
an Iritellfl.enoo D~ip'ion~
io erd-i I ll m~lwd. 00.r
htistitut 'aoes ''0
~
dition of' a proven do~otrine 'ý oonstiitut tho major As sat s of the I.A. Officer;
j e il n~ ee toý gthor a~b ýtt'nt&u i'i4A~r epd hisg ?fteld "T> invostigation.
~ ri.ý~~dpitc.L
'~~~~1 ~ _ p, L oe . 'ztt: '-Tlt 6m
rei,.t iratjor2.ty, of C
te
vi Ilanm ,h~r.ch con. tujec d tn utoey ~c~& rol urbra.o - Lobo Pf reo0
st ttl ol .,,.e 'I ,,b U4 on !r's a c.
Tho V.
conoi0 I' , p zni2'Vo
ha aihi S.t"rv.1 e to nsak Use or'
some 11CO1'S anci solcli6vsi' i21 e capblte cpA roivd vrr .Wn
~.. Iinstruction in this field.
IThe 11TRIITrHi-.SArP" wiuo represontod start1.nj .t th~e Cpmpan~ level, (one
Ncri-commistsioned Ofricer and three nen) all the ýway to the Divi~,ion. where a special
27 , ,
which were6 to obtain oonfidence potst. The adversary did not hesitate to prosoribe
to its partisans that they should class themselves among the best NOCs and soldiers
unti)I the day they received their orders to reveal themselves.
In order to achieve this infiltration, the V.M. contaminated. individuals,
±.risons and units, irreoularity in the schedules and guarcl dutios, false epart ure,etc.
(I)- Quite often two, which ignored the other's existence until the day of action.
(2)- In this fashion, some "married peoples camps" were created within the fenced
enclosure of posts or of bases to the rear.
(3)- Lieutenant X... Commander of an Auxiliary Companry N.V.N.
l
28
CASUALTIBS Or'1" NSECM1ITY,- The gradual inore,ýso of tho V.14. potential capabilities
and the pro&;ociu of deooy in cert~ain rogionm meant that we had to pay a hig~her and
higher t&wx for the aeourity of our installations and movements,
This inlnobilt7.ation of a large part of the troops for missions o! seouriit'
is one of the main cha~racteristics o:C the war without a front. We shall got back to
this subject of-ton and ire will ori3,v mention a few typioal faots herobelowt
M~obile unita lval -to opend npproximatel~y 1/4 of tlioir otrongtli for the
pro tnc L-on oP Vinir 1.rti
iry $ thoir CJ, P. nil thoix hriu-qr appxclantuss 6tLo, ,
Moro thant a thiict, ii not. half ofr tho cautlivi tict of -the I1Cfantryr, whethner
ii).uic~o~r robl.lo, atJn~t 1v ~ ;?.uI3tý., -nirl omt~urv~o~ .131oo of v. 20 hI.o)
mtov to oý'r:..1 us tho-. Vn-11t of
00hl1,1ce. La.ic !kV1c a batto~ry, wrhoiro,-,
tile cOnol;ý ;tde1 zi~ rt U 4r~~ of about u orLair Ini thle roro
ronefllx-oý1on.,wo neodoc, to st, n(I up, -to the taoi. tioo41 or' two Peoctiona
j and6 rototzlca
c'.0 kio tcr ior f ro:ýd, o11G B-Attai-ion -ancl whatovor -I.uxi-liaries -
Group
Group Head
sub-Bead
cell c .cl
3 combatant agents 3 comb. agents 3 comb. agents
I
Ii
I:
LL . . ~ a
130 ' ' U F, 0 N
f C HAP T E R Il
set up:
I worry; due to the wide coverage of our communications and the transportation diffi-
culties however, we quickly discovered we had to be content with protecting only
certain roads and only during the day, as It would have been prohibitive in the way
jof personnel to maintain surveillance nightly and to extend it to the routes deep in
the forest or to the foot-hills of the Annamite range.
As far as the waterways are concerned, ready availability of communications
was furnished for most of them, in South as well as North VIETNAM, at the price of
ever-increasing difficulties to sweep for mines before the convoys and to furnish
I,
!
:3.(
- Finally the potential action of reserves who stationned within certain posts
and sometimes included armored units.
deployed; particularly where the posts were closer together with varying degrees.
All the same, the security of the arteries under our control, In principle (1)
_.-was always relative. At all t-imes, motor vehicules and troops could Ub- taken to task
by rebel infantry weapons fired from a great distance (250 to 350 ft), or be the
victims of an ambush laid after the clearing of a road (by elements under the disguise
of civilians for example, oven a s women), or blow up on an undetected mine.
Control of the waterways was provided in a similar fashion, but the posts
were more rare, Except on well-travelod channels and where the width of the river it-
I self constituted good protection, traffic Tas generally effected by heavily escorted
j convoys preceded by ,inne-sweeping formations (2).
? DEFENCE EQUIPMENT ON THE ARTERIES.- The work we were to undertake in order to control a
70 ft) deep on each side of the roadway, with the additional measures of prohibiting
cultivation of certain plants with tall sterns (such as corn, sugar cane, etc.)
Finally, the "¢clh.rlng out"of villages located less than 200 feet from the
road becomes absolutely necessary. As a result of our reluctance to take such un.-
popular action, we have seen once too often "chronic" ambushes kill men while crossing
the same village where the inhabit:ants welcomied V.M. regional units whether tihey liked
it or not.
One exception can be made for the communities that were friendly without a
I doubt and whose willingness was to he proven by the founding of a militia and by the
of a watch towers system conceived by General DE LA TOUR and implemented in South VIETNAM
iWho were-posted along communication channels (usually within sight of each: other, at
- assist motor vehicles, act as moles for thoir defense In case of attack.
Any alarm given by these complexes allowed to stop all traffic imnediately
in case a convoy was being ambushed, while it started the action of the mobile garrisons
This system produced excellent results at first, but it became rapidly Inef-
S t1icient. Indeed, as early as 1950, the Viet Minh began to use the first
the smaller garrisons avoided -Ivlng the alert or abandonned their position in self-
J quickly repressed, the surveillance of our land arteries must depend on strong posts
STRUCTURE OF POSTS.- The number of posts never' ceased to increase during the o¢ampalgn and
their great variety has spoken for the evolution of our concept as tar as defence works
Initially the rebels only disposed of automatic weapons and hand grenades.
The brick tower, the "banco" wall and the bamboo fence proved to be sufficient to break
-4 their assault. In addition, elevated works were sought after to dominate the horizon-
With the advent of V.M. mortars this fortification in the form of a shoddy
tsuperstructure was to crumble. Protection against shells was dlicovered under shifting
. forms and as masonry works buried under earth mounds. The defense was entrusted to some
closely spaced flanking elements and the rectangular or triangular shaped complex brought
some answers to the establishment of the blockhaus, deriving directrly from the scarp
I boxes.
Such is the way the triangular post built in South VIETNAM starting in 1951
However, a double and quite often triple net of barbed wire constituted the
obstacle and the trench was used only in exceptional cases. In addition, the necessity
Sto
have an elevated observatory led to the maintaining of at least one mirador in the
But a crisis was to emerge with the advent of the Soviet rocket-launcher, or
I S.K.Z. From the moment the V.M. obtained Chinese assistance with a sufficient number
(I)- This evolution was in fact very similar to that which came about durlna the lost
century in Europe.
L (i) Translator's note: Belgian General and writer, specialist in the construction of
forti f ic-atilns.
Ii
34
I Arepellent of fortune was found by covering the front of the most threatened
I embrasures with wire-netting and around the miradors. While observatories were being
built, the pedestal of which were buried within a mound of earth for protect.ion.
II
The post Internal courtyard, rendered unruaintainable by mortar shells in
case of an attack, was eliminated and not one rampart stibsisted. Only the three or
four blockhaus which were necessary to insure the flanking of the nets emerged from
the ground. ,
This was a comprimise between the advocated organizations in the years 1913--,
I 1914 and what was accomplished In certain areas of the front during the winter of
1939-1940. However, the use of tank turrets, mounted on the roof of some blockhaus'
and of tunnels for mortars built in the solid mass of.,the other blockhaust gave a note
of modernism.
Those bases of operations had been initially designed to protect the access
to the North of the Tonkinese Delta, when, Marshal do LATTRE was givA,:i reason -to fear
Until 1953, this type of structure impressed the Vietminh who rarely braved
an attack; but the assault on the YEN VI post, on May' 26 and 27, 1953, although un-
Ssuccessful, showed that the combination of the artillery, the mortars and the SIK.Z.
t could be decisive: One the one hand, the adversary dealt mortal blows at the embrasures,
and on the other hand, the striking forces opened breaches in the nets without any dif-
£ Ciculty, then drove at the und of bamboo perches explosive charges within the blockhaus
(1) The last structures wore completed during the siunemr of 1953 at the S.E, end of the
delta.
(2) Namely the addition of blocks, combining living quarters with one or two firiti
•:;
(2)Nz•.ni-l the adiino lcs obnn iin ureswt rtofr
Io
From then on, other attacks took place and, towards the end of the conflict,
j the momint uhen a type of fortification such as the blockhaus would be obsolete seemed
to bo lmm 4nent.
No doubt, the obstacles should have been up-graded, the number of blockhaus'
I should have been increased and they shoul%, have been provided with a greater number of
turrets and,6diochos for curving fire missiles, proven shelters should have been provided
against counter-a0tecks, a redoubt should have been arranged to enolose the CP and with
The evolution was therefore not accomplished# Unfortunately its traces re-
mainied engrab'ehe, I le ground, for it was impossible to modernize all the older poets
A count taken on January Ist, 1953 in the Tonkin delta shows, for example, that
o-t of a total of 917 posts or small structures, only 80 were modern, 25 were rolatively
Srecent
and.810 were obsolete by barying degrees,
The author of a Report summnarized the situation with the following hunmor..,
" lot us not forget that the "Dubout- style posts we denounce in 1953 were strictly
to regulations inSaccording
1947, with their straw huts, their banco little walls, their
All the same, the V.M. potential varied according to the regions, since the
j Thus, the posts coming into contact with the zones of deployment of the V.M.
battle formation were relatively much more obsolete than those in Cochin-China, where
j the adversary was deprived of artillery and did not dispose of mtch ammunition. Such
structure, which still made a good show in South VIETIAM in 1953, was totally obsolete
A constant renovation of the posts was therefore necessary, but the conmand
efforts were always dampened by financial considerations, and especially by the stag.
I
!A '
Often, we found ourselves faced with the old problem fortifters, experience
when asked to refurbish a structuret It is always difficult for them to avoid a bad
compromise if not granted authorization to raze the old structures.
A general lesson can be drawn from the Sisyphean labour accomplisahed by le
Engineers in Indochina: One must build immediately posts which are Proof against arms
superior to those then available to the rebels. More specifically, the automatic weapon
and grenade stage must be passed and one must build structures proof against heavy
Smortar
as well as rocket-launchers.
One must imnedintely have recourse to concrete and adopt low-built structures.(l)
These elementary cautious measures will prevent the enemy from obtaining a
I series of easy successes some months later, when he will be provided with more power-
ful weapons. In addition, the presence of impregnablc posts will not fail to impress
upon the indegenous population and will facilitate pacification actions.
The adversary has systematically attacked posts during the night and, of
course, by surprise. Under the circumstances the resistance of a structure was natur-
ally a function of the fortification's quality, but it was Just as much dependent upon
necessary relaxation.
j - Amunition supply adequate enough to sustain a long night battle.
I The same was true for food supplies, the volume of which varied with the
degree of isolation of the garrison.
I, - Finally adequate support for the positionned artillery.
I The aims equipment of the post must be a dependent variable of its strenath.
Providing a structure which might succumb rapidly with a largo supply of arms cannot
be justified as it would only increase the enemy's booty without due consideration (3).
and were forced to serve as -tanrored sentry-box" which our regulations have always
proscribed(4).
Save an exceptional case, where tho preparations for the attack of a post
were discovered and whore it was possible to take counter-measures, the seo.urlty of a
"garrison was dependent upon a triple alarm system:
most
- At some distance, ambushes wore laid on the/probable incoming access routes of
the assailants,
- At a short distance, call devices and patrols watching the intervals between
j . At close range, watchers and dogs whose vigilance was ensured by a service on
guard duty.
When the alarm system did not work due to its inefficiency or to internal
I complicities, the conduct of defense operations was out of the question: After an out-
") l rageously brutal and brief attack, the defenders were felled by the assailants before
they could take up arms and before the radio contact could be effected with the District
I or Sub-sector Comnmander.
(3) This consideration is applicable only to the equipment described as "sector". The
oylnqn the post must, whatever the circumstances, be organically equipped,
unit o-•#
! (4) In particular during the attack on the LE KHU post on September 4, 1953, three
Sherman tanks were put out of action before the crews could man the arms onboard.
I
!
38..
I the flash of an explosion and the raging fires gave him some indication. The only thing
he had left was the satisfaction of opening a time-fuso fire on the ruins of the structure
But the adversary could only conduct such an assault with success after meti-
Some garrisons did not hesitate to adopt extreme solutions, and we can relate
the decision of 2nd Lieutenant X..., a Vletnnmese, who upon being assigned as Commanding
Officer of a post equipped with 5 powerful blockhaus', carved a real success for himself
by posting all his defenders in perfectly camouflaged trenches, at the foot of the blocks
1When the alarm system worked, the whole garrison was posted on the battlements
and radio contact had been effected with the higher echelon at the crucial moment ,?hen
- Heavy fire directed precisely on the assault waves or on the assailant fire
positions.
" If the Post Leader managed to determine the objectives, to adjust interdict-
ion fire on the enemy and his own fire, he had a good chance of succeeding.
Otherwise he didn't, for the V.M. knew the art of avoiding classical inter-
providing a refuge for the survivors of the blockhaust taken by the enemy.
(I)- Captain X... Officer on Duty, relating the attack on the Y... tower in the TOMKIN,
on November 11, 1953, during which the V.M. firino position was set up within the
nets surrounding the tower and on this side of the proposed interdiction fire.
LI
" From the moment, tho enemy went over the accessory defenses, the only hope
left to the post is with efficient counter-attacks. Their officiency
and rehearsed constantly, night and day, under bad weather conditions and
in the smoke, according to the various assumptions which correspond to the
Senemy etc..)(1)
capabilities of penetration (all aspects and angles,
In this connection, the concrete basis of resistance o1forad a precious ad.
vantage for the positionned artillery could open a violent time.fuse fire perpend-
The lighting of the battlefield by lighting traps and shells has always been
a valuable assistance asset. The use of the "Luciolo" Dakota-type plane to drop light-
t ing bombs had become normal at the end of hostilities, but it assumed that the attacked
post was in a position to maintain radio contact with the crew flying over it,(3)
The nocturnal intervention of the Air Force has been the object of many
studies aid files, particularly concerning certain structures in TONKIN, which showed
the objectives located closest to those fortifications (probable positions of the op-
posing fire apparatus, zones where the reserves were most likely grouping, etc..) were
set up. But experience did not allow to doterivine whether those bombings were first of
all feasible and most of all whether they were productive.
(1N)ote from the General, Conander-in-Chief, of November 1953.
(2) This type of fire is actually just a new version of the "Clearing Fire" practiced by
the fortress gunners of the "Ligne Maginot".
(3) In addition, the intervention of the Luciole plane could not be envisaged at the
beginning of the attack for a ten-minute delay was necessary from the time the alert
was given to the airfield, plus the time necessary for the trip to the post.
II
k2
40 ~ ~~
i.e. bazookas, recoilless guns, mortars, explosives, etc., and ignoring its losses,
I itfalls; the success of the defense depends on favorable circumstances, which must
Sbe considered exceptional if the assailant has obtained the element of surprise"(l),
"a river operation, It is true that, when a river exists, some river-going v6ss6ls.t
i can go through while the land route. is interdiected, and their fire power, which is
particular to them, can be a decisive asset in the defense of the attacked post'. Un-
fortunately our ships are slow and few and their availability for intervention In duo
time can only be an exception. In addition, they are noisy and could never benefit
I QUOC, QUANG KHE ANL FAI FOO on the, Annameso coasL) by several Coast Guard ships.
Diveri~jon
Attaque' principobie
Diversio n
'KPoste to'fau e
It
Road cittzs
~. Coupures ýde rut
A,7
*10*
477'
-ottr
-
e tI
I - ~~~~~Btterie0
ie;n
Id
ppS ti6
Ir
Every time it could, moreover, the Viet Mlnh tried to interdict or at least
delay any support, and during the last two years of the war, every attack launched against
- Diversions against neighboring posts to confuse our retort (short distance auto-
mortars, etc.o).
What was called the "extrication of the post" could therefore not be attended
to until the following morning and was merely the taking up again of ýovatact with tl.* post.
If the latter had fallen, the adversary had already accomplished its sacking
and had disappeared; if the garrison still held, it was frequently the case that the
On the other hand, we were certain to meattwith bad ambushes, The V.M. tactics
improved and towards the end of the hostilities, the General., Commander-in-Chief wrote:
"L•t. us nove% forgt that the eneny does not always consider the attack of
post as his main objective. The latter can very well be the destruction of the support
4 units iA.ith well-placed anabushes; the taking of the post was only a minimum objective
During the first years of the war It was possible to come and assist quickly
garrisons which still held on in th, morning following the attack by calling in the
paratroop units: Alerted during the night, a company or a section could take off as
soon as aerial observation had determined the post was still holding. The jump was
executed in the immediate vicinity of the post and, in some favorable instances, over
*l (1) Sometimes it continued to blockade the post from a certain distance and prepared
a new assault for the following night.
I
| _
42
Durina the war years several operations of this type wore conducted and a
total of 25 posts wore supportod by air. Moreover, 30 garrisons, which were more or
less vietims of a blockade, received paratroops support before being actually attacked,
But the advent of a VH. anti-aircraft defence made such operations quite
exceptional and the extrication operation was normally an action of the force which
required air support and the cooperation of all available artillery (1).
ments, at well as the rear positions of the mobile units, led to the erection of
I fortified complexes,
The towns thus became vast entrenched camps, whose borderline waa defended
J
by a cordon of posts or simple blockhaust interconnected by nets,
I But in most cases, it was impossible to include within the protected peor-
[ meter the airflold(s) rorving the area. The airfieild then constituted almost always
I During all of the hostilities, the objectives enclosed within these haven
,I attracted sabotage and the actions of the V.M. commandos (2). The airfields were, in
particular, the victims of raids, on several occasions, which resulted in the destruct.
j, The parries that were developped from experience are therefore worth being
presented here.
(I) On December 6, 1953, X... post (TONKIN) being attacked, fell during the night with
the exception of a few defenders. The element sent co extricate the post (a re-
inforced battAllon) was a.mbushed the following morning by two V.M, battalions.
Losses were heavy on every front in spite of the fighters intervention.
(2) Mass attacks on cities seemed to be avoided by the V.., for it was necessary
that they maintain the possibility of sending numerous emissaries to obtain all
sorts of manufactured goods and medicines.
I[
I On the Cormnand level, it first appeared necessary to create an #'Inspection
of sensitive spots, whose leader was a General, directly under the Commander-In-Chiet
and who had as such all the capabilities required to correct errors and shake the apathies,
Coordination of defenses for all the sensitive spots forming a complex was
entrusted to one leader only, even If the various installations were from different
branches of the Service. In addition, this sole authority was assisted by a Security
I Officer responsible for checking the orders constantly and bring about some improvement
ii of same,
of sn On the defence plane itself, it was necessary to set up a guard unit required
f by his particular mission, which was being measured by the nuxnber of blockhaust to equip
ra
end by the necessity of maintaiing strong reserve for counter-attack.
The clearing of civilian populations inside the defence perimeter was desir-
able but impossible to accomplish in the case of citics. On the other hand, the forced
I evacuation of communities outside the enclosure but close to the most sensitive spots
all trees and bushes which could serve as refuges for the assailants.
I complex: wire nets to channel the enemy attack, organization of independent redoubts
I CLEARING OF ROADS
Each night the roads were abandoned to the enemy. Nevertheless the experience
I of controling the roadway with armored elements, circulating at night and provided with
I
I
A=
ii ~~OFFICIAL USE ONLYC AT
2113
30
41 6
4
46
I.3
14.
sVa mI -
I OFFICIAL USE ONLY
/9dun
3 4 hi4
16
*
5 Ag
ILI
424
10 LEGENDE
Cfoture .Vnlsr
- Pot& lcar
0Poslos F. T ~AU
I ~ Po~ei P.T.
This attempt was fruitless, It was really not surprisind in vue of the fact
that the elements utilized were not adapted for observation: they were either machines
'1 headlights on full 8o through w1*hout being attacked or suffering any losses due to
mines. The surprise element was there and the V.M, had had no time to prepare ambushes.
I Nocturnal trafic several nights in a row would have probably caused the most deadly
attacks.
Some of our elemonts wore able to cnvisage the possibility: "of maintaining
t the routes open at night by "an Incesa•4nt,trafic of armored or motorized patrols equipped
wi~th powerful ligh*ing-apparxitl2sf.
","The latter should p'lrit the lightin.5, not only of the whole route, but both
sides, wth OVerlapping tghtj , beamns", in tha same way as two guns overlapý their fire(]).,
No matter, the procedure was to open each morning the stretch of road between
two posts when an exceptiona•lly essential artery to our transport was at stake.
on the secondary roads, however, the operation was conducted only at varying
S Intervals and, in certain areas which were particularly dangerous, a route was cleared
only excoptionally, The norinaX supply of, the posts was then lhindled, by parachute drops
or via river, but this was another type of operation for an escorted convoy, preceded
The clearing operation had a tactical aspect in that the objective was to
"rouse" the V.M. ready to trigger an ambush, but it also had a technical aspect due to
the sweoping of mines and traps the enemy had set.(2)
adversary and also of the importance given to the security of the route.
This i,•s bcinn, eone o'ily In thi. case of an operation de.fl1ned to Incroase the
flow of latr•" trai.ic.
According to different caost the opening could be entrusted to a small
T element which, 4n-the mopped-up areas, could be reducod to the equivaloaL of a battle
group and which, in the worst battles of the Tonklinuse Delta, required at liast one, if
not two battalions, reinforced armored and engineers elements, supported by powerful
The operation stayed within the most standard rules of the infantry manomuver,
sinco it was always a "search fr the enemy" in the imnodiate vicinity of an axis.
But the greatest danger It offered was that the rebels know the route, the
The Command constantly insisted on the necessity to vary the procedures for
a clearing operation, but the executeants declared themselves incompetent for the most
part, v
Very rare indoed were those who could writer "Contrary to many of y cotrades
and to a widespread opinion, I found relatively easy to vary the opening procedures
L and avoid almost systematically the surprise element during those operatiuns,,.
"At the Sub-sector echelon, the first thing to be done is to not assign the
samo Xtime every day to the subordinate units responsible for the road openings, which
"$"However, imprehc upon the Garrison Commanders to open only on piece of the
road at a tim. (they usually have at least two pieces, in opposite directions). If all
available personnol 'nes not participate in the opening of each piece, those who do not
(for example from West to East two days In a row, then from East to West, etc.)"..
""anoeuver no~r from one side, now from the othvr, from tho. road, somotimes
"across it".
(I) Such is the casro of thiz dally Cl.vairIn:, of the 1UT'OI.-HATP.ONG road in Hay-June 1951,
"in thu viciaity of BAN YE'N NHI.
I "Open up with force at irregular intervals. In such & ease, utilize all
I available personnel for the opening of the road, from one end to the other".
"Sometimes conduct opaning operations at night; or, during the night, position
I the personnel responsible for the opening of a piece of the road, outside the road."
j "Leave some night ambushes in position close to the road, and on that day,
clear with a reduced force while relying on the posItionned ambush elements".
"Actually, the variety of tricks we can use to upset the enemy's ambushes is
infinite, and the clearing of roads takes on tho monotonous aspect often attributed to
such oporations only when the troops are mediocre and bndly led". (1)
-This lost judgement is certainly exaggerated for tho bast of units finally
S . row weary of ox-tcuting the same task conatantly and the sluggishness in their reflexes
"I-Every,.day, I send out the cloaring team. In spite of calls to order, habits
are formed, and if we don't watch, the automatic riflemen are placed in position at the
f same spots, and the infantrymen walk in a coluxni behind the mine-sweeper's frying pan",.
Control of the arteries proves to be quite expensive:
pieces of the Tonkin road, chosen for their importance(2), cost us, over a period during
which the enemy contested the privilege with the greatest tenacity, that is during the
preparations and the dovolopment of the battle of DIEN BIFN PHU (January to July 1954).
(2) Study made by the General Commanding the F.T.N.V. relating to:
the 65 Kins of the HANOI-HAIPHONG road (R.N.5)
the 36 Kms of the road connecting BAN YEN NHAN & HUNG YEN (R.I.39)
the 28 Knms of the HAIDUONI-SEPT PACODES road (R.P.17 North)
the 26 Kms of the SEPT PAGODIES-DONG TRJEU road (R.P.18)
I
.I
1-
Ih_
On those land arteries, the posts wore located at average distanoes of 3 to
nol actually taking part in the defence, and if we consider the subsidiaries (militia
and auxiliaries) for only half of their strength (which is reasonable considering their
Stask servitudes), we can readily see that a density of 20 to 30 fighting men per kilo-,
The clearing of roads resulted daily in the engagement of about 10 man per
f wore no loss severe: Each day we counted an average of 3 to 10 men killed, wounded or
missing for every 100 kilometers (approx. 75 miles), as a result of attacks against
I That isto say that the spur of necessity must be-present for one to consent
to such a high pricel Save this case, control of the arteries must be sought after only
with the hope of achieving more orIcrs rapidly the mopping-up of an area.
"If we bring .in the time factor, considering the great expense in personnel
I the control of an axis costs, we cannot but realize that control of an axis without
which would require (for example) three battalions for 6 months, after which time the
I
I
[I
48
i
"Given a two year period, it is therefore more economical, If possible, to
I pacify Zone B (18 Battallon/mt)nths) rather than control part A (25 Battalion/months)."(l)
I to open up roads, which will only serve to supply posts, themselves Implanted to guard
j these roads".
Consequently, the Command must forego the control of roads which are not
strictly indispensablo; even if they must be re-opened with force to insure the success
j• of a particular operation and to keep them open during the whole operation in question.
But in such a case the retaking of the roadway goes hand in hand with its
rebuilding in many parts and the employment of large elements of. the Engineers must
be foreseen.
C H A P T E R III
I SURFACE~ CONTROL
Control of the ortorie; and the defence of posts must be put down as a lia-
bility of the surface war, f6r they neither lead to the nnutzalltation nor the destruc-
tion of the onomy(l). They are a necessary Investment which produce no interests.
In the asset coluin of the balance sheet, can be registered only the actions
of "Surface Control" which are aimed at wiping out from a zone the rebels who might
be hiding there. This sort of surgery, based on the diaghosis of the trost contaminated
corunilties and of the villages still relatively healthy, must produce the removal of
the cancerous tissues and open the way to a convolescense represented by pacification
-_ proper.
Therefore, control of the arteries and surface control are at opposite ends
of the game in their objectives: The first submits to operational activities, the second
war interfere on one same territory. It is true, for example, that the control of the
arteries, while increasing the civil trafic possibilities, favor the return of economic
S . (I) Except for the losses which the adversary must suffer to take a post.
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I CONDITIONS OF SURFACE COINTROL,- In South Vietnam, a favorable climate permitted to, rather
I rapidly, pass from the control of the arteries to the surface control, at least In
some areas (1). With the help of political action, pacification followed. In 1954,
I however, it was in a state of recession following "too great a disaffoctation that led
/[ to the replacement of the towers by more powerful and less numerous posts, but with
insufficient personnel".
"In short, one post replaced six towers and, since there must have been a
gain in personnel, absorbed the garrison of three towers only... As the new posts,
triangular in shape, were provided with a mirador at each summit, the three towers'
i personnel was absorbed by guard duty and could hardly perform efficient patrols.."(2)
factors have come into play and prevented an efficient "surface control".
SSURFACE CONTROL IN NORTH V.N. - In TONKIIN actually, our forces were at first Imposed
upon by the pledges resulting from the presence of the V.M. divisions all, around the
delta. Not only was it necessary to be able to ropeo thVlhwr s was the case at VINH
j YEN in1951, but it was also necessary to intercept the units which the opposing
Command re-introduced in the areas locally purged. This mission was never to be
adequately accomplished.
ganda, and consequently to remove the ferments of decay. The Vietnamese Administra.
tion's default did the rest, and little by little, surface control, which is always
short-lived and localized, had to be abandonnod except in a few areas of the delta.
(1) This control, for the most part furnished by the statical not of the towors,could
have still boon improved by et.onding It to the rivers:"A partitionnino by a mul-
titude of loops could have been made possible by using the "wizzo"Irs" extcnl.ively".
(Captaia corntandin3 the River Flotilla in South Indochina. See chaptur dvvot,:d to
the river forces).
ii
Terrain-wise, tho delta hydroaraphy has been a constant handicap to us: Out
t! of an area 12,000 kilometers square, 8 million inhabitants were conglomerated into three
of four thousand.villages.
Very soon the road and trail embankments were cut up by destruction and the
J Five hundred meters (ap.3/4:ai.) of flooded rice paddies defended the rebals against any
surprise, while a jutm:ble of ponds, hedges and gardens offered them in every community
•
"= I
a thousand nnd one refuges.
- The speed of progress was from then on similar to that of an infantryman sunk
into quicksand and all our manoceuver graphs were reduced to a strange equation: One
trol and reduce us to the control of the arteries only, which led inevitably to the
multiplication of posts,
But the personnel of these posts quickly became Insufficient to spread around
80 men), one can ascertain that the pemnanent guard duty obligations immobilized about
I 1/3 of the men during. the day and more than 3/4 at night. Therefore It was possible to
let one squad go out during the day, at the most., and practically no-one at night.
j The enemy, on the contrary, could hold out with much inferior forces, for
the support of the population allowed him to concentrate his efforts and attack, at the
time and place of his choice, the garrison which might have ventured Itself too far
b.ttalions emplaced in a central position, could get into action against one of the 100
Sector posts, manned'by approximately 7,000 men, every night. Each of these 7,000 men
logged 4 hours of guard duty or night defensive outside action to provide security for
sleep with the monotony of the tasks and days going by, without seeing that the people
who come to it are no more than shadows, that the Canton leader will spend the night
in the District, that the partisans, wifes have gone to nurse their sick old 1"others
in the neighboring village. Then one night, the post falls like a necrotic bone - or
this is the most fr'.quent case - it becoaies a sort of strange body, a cyst in a living
tissue: the tissue made room for it then closed in around it. All the nerve and blood
"The Vietininh surgeon does not feel like operating, because the post does not
At the end of 1953 our activities tended to merely be punctual and it could
Sbe said: "It isn't the V,.M that is infiltrated in the delta, but us"(2). A count
taken as of January 1st 1954 shows, in addition, that 82,470 men of all races were
immobilized behind barbed wires in 920 posts, more or less important and more or less
delapidated. (3)
At the same time, the Viet Minh maintained within the delta only 37,000 men
jproof of the rniscalculAt tons of the Command when It accupted the cheapness of a string
of posts and It did not prefer the quality offered by a small numbor of modern structurcs.
I 'In
conclusion, the Genoral, Conimnanderwin-Chlet, could well write: The system,
over a hundrodyears ole, inhierited from the colonial wars, was adequate against badly
armed and rolacively few In number rebels. It had been only symbolically modernized
I by the roplacemeat of walls and fences by barbed wire, and the construction of fire
shelters with field no-arts or masonry"f.
All the posts that were attacked with determinization fell; the resistance put up by some
of them, quite often honorable, was sometimes successful only due to outside assistance
(fl~at terrain)
i (63 tMlchino gun~s 11 Automatic
Rifles)
226 men
2 Scale 1 k'in
(Accidented terrain)A
Scale 1 km
Therefore, It Was projoctoed to substitute), little by little, this systont
Thoast would serve as" support and base of operations for a group of mobile
If forces, oompoa•d mainly of indeganous troops, roaming around tihe coutry, living as
much as posulblo with the local population, reguliting and assisting the activities-
of the solf.dofense olements and tracking without truce nor respite rebel detachment",.
would require lit:tle time and small means.,. knd stock on defended points... the equip.
The attached. sketch nevertheless shows the aspect of the CHO GANH ald NINH
Captain: "The unit: moves about consantly on its own initiative, while knowing it
I
"It follows... all villages are known completely, one by one, terrain is
known by heart like the routes, contacts with the population are frequent, when unex-
The mobile elements of an entrenched camp must be so th•t they are able to
go within half a day or overnight to the most remote point of the territory to be con.
troled and return. Undcr these conditions, they will provoke permanent insecurity in
[
LI (1) Colonel N...7one Comrindr in TONIN.
I
I
An entrenched comp mlht have done w0th one company to secure control within
a 10 to 15 km. radius in a zone easily accessible, with a clear vue, with a sparse po-O
puletion, where the rebel elements were few and only lightly armed.
i like some socrions of tho TONKIN, the garrison of the entrenched camp could not go below
would have b.on possible to control efficiently a radius of not more than 4 to 5 K1Is,
for all exits would have to be done with force and with the slowness•Inherent to strict
I security measures.(I)
up entrenched campas capable of sheltering forces equal to a niobile group and foresee
Sthat fortified installations of this caliber would be located approximately every 15 Wms,
2
per 100 Yi2 approximately, to 6 or 70Q :men per 100Kl ; whllo at the beginning of 1954
the rapid multiplication of the posts resulted in an expense of 660 men per 10OKm 2 within
the Tonkinose delta. (2)
SURFACE CONTROL IN SOUTH VIETNAM.- Contrary to the TONKIN where initiative eluded us more
f and more, South VI1MNAM was the scene of a slow progres for a surface control conducted
I an area. Little by little it was laced with a communications net, closely guarded by
posts close to one another. The arteries within the periphery were equipped with de-
fensive nets so as to prevent the return of rob6ls in the zone to control, and surface
One must admit that the task was greatly facilitated by the support of various
sects (BINH XUYEN, HOA HAO, CAODAISTS) who played a role similar to that of the rallied
S (1) uI :*,' A,. t'. C ,:v2•~l~- d t:a!v'e rc ::,aný'dci thin thco scope, of ',unf Ire of
(2) Only counting the troops implanted in the posts, as seon previously.
56 -,
j The conduct of operations was no less dolicate and the example ilven hore,-
The Cisbassac region had about 800,000 inhabitants, for a 4,200 square Kma,
areas Towards the end of the Summer of 1951, it sheltered about four regional rebel
companies, The two main routes wore scantily guarded by one of our Battalions, and
the fall. of several towers and posts bore witness to our precarious position..
In the last months of 1951 and the first months of 1952 control was placed
in the hands of forces totaling approximately five battalions. About ton operations,
which lasred each fo':r to five days, resulted in the capture of 700 prisoners and a
hundred'weapons, while the robelý; left 120 killed on the terrain. In the Spring of
1952, the remains of the V.M. unilts, after being relentlessly pursued, took refuge in
February 1953, the enoropy infiltrate:d again, but the base of its companies was totally
CLEAR AND SEARCH,- Thv activlties of a Sector Include daily operations of extremely varied
foras and importance. But the most significant are always identified with clearing,
then searching for the question is to constantly sweep the area in order to find
I Clear and Search is "to run a tooth-comb through an area and .its dense popu-
j elation" (1); for the Infantry progro-ssos through the countryside at a maximumn speed of
I l<i,.11 per hour et the search of a densely populated village (10 to 20 hectares, 2,000
inhabitants), can require several companies for several days.
and sorting tho suspects: Finally time will bring the rebels out of their holes or
loosen tongues.
!
57 4
But a thorough search is absolutely essential and the cadres wore unanimous
I " In deploring the rarity with which enough timo was devoted to it.
I I spent 18 months of G.M. operations in the delta", writes Captain R..,, "9y
Company has so-called searched hundreds of villages. But we never had the ti'o to
A make a thorough search and we left when the Inhabitants might have been able to talk.
- The rulo was that upon our leaoving a village our last elements be fired on by the guerm
have obtained excellent results by specializing the Auxiliary Company In this operation.
Our Vietnamese in the end knew all the V.M. tricks, how to explore and destroy the
underground installations, The Legionnaires, strange to the country, could have never
succeoded so well"y.(n)
the service, volunteers who wished to enlist in the "C0OHDANDO" were required, before
In the case of
"C"veterans".
Experience has given the mo•t practical methods for search proper:
for --- il"Defensive grenades had no effect. Offensive grenades are very efficient
for small underground installations, but should only be used in case of emergency,
because the V.M. elements o'vertaken by the blast, cannot talk for at least two hours,
= •.rj
58 - J ". .. "
does not excood 20 meters (7 ft approx.). The capture of prisoners is always achieved.
Thare is but one inconvenient: further search is vary difficult due to noxious gas which
I persists and the documents can only be road one hour after their seizure for they have
,S i noa"Their inconvenients are the same as those of toar..gas grenades, their effect
Is not as lasting",
I
TROOPS WEARING AWAY.- All actions of a surface war are essentially a matter of the Ina
j fantry. But contrary to conventional war, where the two adversaries wear each other
I out simultaneously, the side which dovs not bonefit from the support of the population
' Colonel X... emphasized "the inconsiderate wearing away of the Infantry,
j preventing it from operating at night after a full day's activities". The same held
true for the posts' garrisons .. the defense of which demanded even more of the per-
Ssonnel
since it occurred at night, every night, whether the troops were threatented or not.
On the other hand the enemy did not suffer such a wearinS down: "No one
thought often enough of the fact that some night raids during which such V.MI. Bat-
ý7_ talion showed such vigor and fury were sometimes the only fight of the year for this
I*
unit". (2)
*****r' ¢ r •
aI
I V
I
C H A P T E R IV
All units which wer not implanted to insure the defense of posts and sonsi=
tivo points were designated as "*Mobile Forces". Some of th¢.4 wore assigned to terri-
torial sectors, but most of them forned the reserves of each Territory Conmandor(l).
of some being possibly more powerful and more protracted than those of others.
Fifty years later, we took up again the mission of the mobile groups and of
general reserve elements under a much more brutal formula: "To break the Viet". For
here was the main point and surface war is still subject to the same necessities of
any other form of operation: Find the enemy and dastroy his units one by one.
Indeed, as soon as the latter had infiltrated into the zones we claimed to
control, thoy roamed around in groups of various sizes from village to village, in a
perfect "hunting ground"', where they found a multitude of clandestine depots and a
* Translator's note! Goneral, one of the great French colonizers in Africa & Tonkin.
_____________________
60
VM. elemeonts had spent ona night here or there; from crossochocks wo could doduct
that a battalion was located in such and such zone the boundaries of which were not
very precisu; but all this intelligence was quickly outdated and the adversary ap.
f peared to be $a sort of mobile cloud, with a vague and ever-changing outline, spread.
Ing to dissolve Itself like a mist or concentrating to burst like a violent storm,
quickly gone and leaving behind just a blue sky...and a few ruins",
For the enemy systematically avoided any engagement: in which he might hove
risked being destroyed. On the other hand, as soon as one of our units became Iso-
lated, he attacked, by surprise with the advantage of numerical superiority and a lot
of punch.
Our operations in the V.M. disputed zones were therefore inspired by the
ever-present concern over finding the opponent and this explains why they took on the
form of a converging march made up of several groups each looking for the onenty from a
different direction. Those concentric actions were to determine, it was hoped, the
encircling of rebel elements of some importance and and permitted afterwards their I
destruction, thanks to our superiority in artillery and aviation.
V.M. controled zones, for the V.M. then used the same vanishing tactics, But we had
to forgo inevitably any converging manoeuver and we could only progress In one or two
directions, with the hope of enticing the adversary to attack us, wrongly believing to
surprise us.F
ACTION IN V.M. DISPUTED TERRITORIES.- In the territories we were seeking to control, the
enemy disposed of a nucleus of guerllas (DU KICH) in most of the villages. The re-
I~i
gional or provincial forces (DIA PHUON1G QUAN) finished the job of securing his ascen-
dancy over the population, which allowed him to not only recruit his fightcrs and
cadres (1), but also to obtain the rice and manufactured products which were esscntlal.
(1) The Delta areas englobe 9/10th of the annavnese population in Indochina.
I
I
For the V,. Logistics system was based on the following principle: "the
In order to deeply penetrate such organized areas and to undertake the un-
covering of the opposing units, we had to throw in, near the end of the conflict, so.
I
, veral battalions and oft:en, sovoral mobile groups. In October 1953 one could write:(2)
"i "If dctachments equal to or oven inferior to a battalion can still fight
efficiently against regional, provincial formiations and guerillas, they must be much
I "In the latter case, without confining itself in a guilty Inertia... they
must launch actions, mainly of the type "commando", i.e. quick raids, ambushes, surprise
I
• I attacks.,. With an incessant harrassinenV of the regular V.11. unitsthe smaller terri-
toeal units will ensure their own security.., and will prepare destruction which,
and particularly of the mobile groups which constitute the basis of a battle formation".
The experience we had gained In Tonkin showed that a strength at least six 4
times superior to that of the opponent was necessary to encircle and destroy it.(3)
I w
On these conditions, the general sketch of any operation was the following:
i After rapidly and discreetly taking position, clearing operations began In several
I directions in order to throw back the enemy to a natural line, if possible, which we
first occupied, or towards other friendly units, advancing to meot the first ones.
lowed by a phase of destruction of the opposing alcmnent:s and the search of the area.
(1) Chinese supplies were never sufficient to allow the V.M. to do without the r.s-
sources of the deltas.
(2) N;oto from the General, Coi,.r.andcr-In-Chief, on the battle procedures of thel.o1bile
g Group, October 1953.
(3) This proportion, unfortunately, was attaIned only excc~ptionally.
I
I
62 ,? s, ::j>
This sketch was practically nover Implemented in whole. Now, a recent and
f accurate piece of Information (or believed to be so) lvt us to go Into the destruction
I trary, the first phases of the operation did not produce the anticipated result and
So, it was necessary to change the set-up and continue the operation as a
function of the new information obtained, either by attemptinr to cut off the retreat
(routeof some enncmy fractions, or by taking up the same attempt to encircle in a
netightborin3 zone.
An analysis of the various phases of the inanoeuver will clearly show the
j reason buhind our repeated failures, as well as the difficulties of the undertaklng.
PREPAR•ATION.- It was to be done in secret, of course, or nothing could have been more
J tryin
On the one hand, the services and especially the General Staffs operated
in the citlos, In the h¢crt of a population w*orked on by propaganda and with cells
of the V.M. orgonization (I). They naturally employed indegenous workers and the
-,ess server as well as the "boy" of an Officer could be the source of serious "lealts',
I •whether consciously or urconsciously.
On the other hand, the least change in our set-up, in the placing of our
depots, in our communitcations, was instantly known to the V.M. agents hidden among
the population.
For this reason operat ions wore often prepared at a high echolon (Terri-
tory, even Coim.ander-in-Chief) by a small numbor of officers and the executants had
I
S•I
63-
(Mobile Group) Commnidor coa.-iip.laned of. learning that his G.M. was going tc, 'LmLark (1)
only after tho garrison had loft. Such Group Commander deplored being sernt in an area
where he did not even know if he would find an adequate position to deploy his batteries
etc'.
But the inconvenience which stems from maintaining strict secrecy is certainly
less than the advantage obtainr d by the oenemy's indecision as to the time and the exact
1DISPOSITION.- Revealing our Intentions and our manoe uver, displayingour means in broad
I daylight, the dispositon phase was essential to the succuss of the operation. Conbe-
quently, it was stamped with the mark of speed and entailed the acceptation of certain
risks (2) for its successful performance eliminated any pos.s'ibillity for the enemy to
j slip away.
Concentration of our forces in the zone involved was therefore not preceded
any setting-up or depots, In short, nothing was to draw the attention of the V.M.
Our motorized means and utilization of rivers permitted us, in the deltas,
I to start from ramote places; but the scarcity of roads always imposed to go on foot
These movements were made at night as far as possible in spite of the diffi-
j We did our best of course to bring in this fashion all units to their base of
departure during the first morning hours, But the least incident sufficed to upset the
flooded rice paddy, and the wholu column was imnobilized for an hour or two(q)... or
I of the elementary manoeuvers, for the chances of meeting with the enemy depended after-
i wards on the speed with which our units converged on the objectives calculated to
I Sihce our air capabilities and our artillery prevented any recognized V.M,
I formation to passe btw|teen our columns durin,-. thc day, we could count on the assumIption
1that the enomy would gradually bo imprisonned and that, towards the end of the day, we
the -nocossity to seorch every -.shrub delayed its progress even more. Consequentty-ithe
i delays accumulated and the battalions were still far from their objectives at night-
Frequently, however, contact was made with the adversary in the course of
E the day: After encountering the DU KICH fire which gave the alarm, and after passing
The enemy most certainly avoided comnmunities which might attract our fire
during the dry season; but in the rainy season, "in the middle of this maze of rice
fields, flooded by varying degrees, and of this notwork of waterways and streams,
the major terrain element was the village and its annexes (gardens, banana plantations
graveyards...)" 0 (1)
The ensuing battle could most certainly bring the destruction of an enemy
unit, as we will see further. But more often, it did not bring about any decision
(1) Note from the Genctral, Conruander-in-Chief, on the mobile group'combat procedures
I ~in Oc~."19153.
I
To make a long story short, instead of a close formation without any gaps,
v'e were, at the end of the first day of oper'ations, in a sinuous and discontinuous line,
After which our forces wore not large enough to give the necessary density
of man for an imipervious barrage. Small wonder then that t,,he enenmy managed to get
elements (river marine) and a curtain of infantrymen posted along one of the banks.
'The results howaovr have been deceiving as a whole. One obstacle (river,
dike) handicapped the V.M. only slightl (1) and only allowed a small reduction of
the occupatth•n forces (fCro', ¼ toC) according to the obsnrvatlon motas in any given
night).
.It would have been necessary fo the seal ing f•ormation to include-
- "A surveillance curtain night and Oay to eIxpose crossing attempts and detect
their direction",
- "A stopping position constitttOd by a single or double chain of bases of operation
DESTRUCTION OF THE ENEMY,- As we hnve seen, contact with the onemy was almost always
(2) Note from the General, Commandor-in.Chief, on the mobile group combat procedures
in October, 1953,
L
STh* chock could, of course, occur at night when some of the opposing elomvnt s
attempted to break through our sealing curtfin by force or when some other elements
thought they could easily triumph over one of our units which was badly guarded,(I)
I The meeting took on th•n the form of a defensive battle: The attcaokedaele.,
S ment resisted as much as it could the V,.M assault, whll our artillery fired a series
of stopping rounds* The encounter was almost always settled at daybreak and the',oe-
casions when we could pursue the opponent with fighter patrols or gunfire were rare.
The most coimoon aspect of the clash of our mobile troops with the VO. in-
fantry was tharaforo the attack of villages and greenery Islets emerging fromn the flat-
The problem at hand was then to not only got a foothold amid the tangle ofl
vegetation in spite of the fire that swept the icy surface of the rice paddles, but
to triumph over counter-ottacks launchad inside tho bush and, most of aU,.eýrmn-
L, the battle bc fore nightfall or before the enny •had a chance of •csappearing in the
caches. A clever manoeuver of our infantry and of the heavy support fire was thus
,• Imperativle.
"Artillery
f group fire...
;1... the contact was to be made at a chosen point allowing a concentration of efforts
Often, the configuration of the conmunltles and the fact that they stretched
j like a spindle Justified an attack and mopping-up operatJon of the Infantry in the
most favorable direction.
I Favorite khjectJvcs of the V.H. units were artillery aroups, tho C.P.s of mobile
groups and concentration of truck~s.
I (2) See V.NI. defonnivv proccdures in Volume III
3
(4) rote ''rom the General, Coninander-in-Chief, on mobile group combet procedure-s, Oct.195 .
4O4'0 19 4G
... H to 4- 0N
401 4,1
,:o, O N
. ...-1
HH" N-
04
VI
0o C* 40 0 0 t,-,&. CA..
P- H H
i+4-1 4)) No
I!
I H 0
D.
- i'
J:J
I s~ pL ~I, . , ,,*I ,A
I Changes of direction were thus ncessary and the quaternary formations nature
i ally provad to be very adaptable to these manoeuvers which permitted "to carry out
right angle or Sradual wheeling actions against certain objectives, making use of
I This requirement was all too often neglected and it was too frequent that some groups
j Many claimed that the 105 shell was Ineffectivo on Viet.Ninh village orga-
SI nizations. Most certainly, a 155 m/m caliber would have been bettor suited to the task,
but the 105 would have obtained good results on most of the structures built of mud (2)
But t he available road network and our supply level made such co.rnptio-
-- It remains that too much, or too little.,, was asked of the artillery, with-
T out denying its decisive role in the annihilation of V.1. units when these could bd
cornered in a village.
ore o reover, it is beyond argrument that air artillery led most certainly to
I the annihilation of V.H. organizations in the villages. The 500 lbs. bomb, and es.
pecially the 1000 lbs. one, were greatly effective, both materially and morally, for
I the fighters were "in chock" for a sufficiently long duration within a 'radius of a
(I) Note from the General, Comrvinnder-ln-Chief, on mobile group combat procedures, Oct.53.
(2) The undorgrounds are not involved here since they are not combat organizations but
hiding places.
(3) As an example, it takes 1,000 rou:nds of a 105 to onfilrb a 100 m. trench & destroy it.
-- it takes 100 to 400 rounds of 155 to destroy a good shelter in country according to
the distance; it tokos 80 rounds of 105 In 4 min. to neutralize an hectare, and 120
rounds per hour ro mAint:3in such n.utrilization (General Directives on firing of
August 8, 1946).
JJ
I At the and of tha first night of oporation, the enemy very often had managed
j - Go over the doubtful lone in every direction, arrest any suspect, find and destroy
This searching phase could extend to ten or fifteen days and sometimes pro.
t yoked aomo engagements when the enemy reappeared in the wake of one of our Mobile
Groups.
- Condu~ct the same manocuver again in a neighboring zone in order to affect another
j sealing or attempt to out off the Gnemy route, by a movement of the battalions,
I ing for the Infantvy and sometimes were successful in annihilating a VM. unit that
IJ
was pursued, tracked for days, ,even WeLeks.(1)
During this period we had to guard against nocturnal surpriso attacks. The
I Mobile Groups had to look for their security Ia a defensive formation, every night,
each other re.affirmed itself. The artillery element and the C,P. of the Mobile Group
The miniiniu strength required to protect them was that of a company, and
the offensive reactions in various directions constituted the best security for the
M.G., as they guaranteed its freedom of movement and ensured the effective coverage of
j a zone much larger than that which could be covered by static implantation".
(1) The attachod synopsis "ives an idea of the ten major operations conducted in
jthe Tonkln from 1951 to 1954. The losses inflicted to the enemy could not be
listed, as it was very difficult to discriminate between suspects, guerillas
and resulars.
(2) Note from the General, Cormnander-in-Chief, on mobile group combat procedures
of 1953.
1 ~69
I ambush barrages, varying each niaht across passing and traffic zones".
COMIAND ORGANIZATION.- Not matter how important an operation was, the problem of knowing
1J The Torritorial Comiand was the only one well aware of the political si-
tuation in the area. It would have been therefore logical that the direction of the
operation be under it since tactical considerations took second place after local
j opport un ities.
which the st.ron3•h of a small division (3d 14.G.) came to operate was at most - Lieu-
the young and brilliant Colonel. who came to establish his operational C.P. with a
hundred or so vehicles within his post and in the vicinity".(l)
torial Division echelon in order to find the proper Authority to conduct the operation.
But this Authority was sometimes "far from the scene of the operation" and "not in the
know". (2)
A close liaison between the Sector and Sub-sector territorial P.C.s, and the
M.G. operational C.P.a, could have avoided these inconveniences, But one must admit
leader
(2) that "such a liaison was satisfactory only in the case where the operational
and the territorial leader knew and respected each other, which was rather rare".
t frequently occurred:
The solution to this problem of Command was complicated 'by the difference
in outlook botwean the mobile forces cadres and the territorial leaders. It ended
up in regrettable lacks of understanding and "the tendency, alast all too natural, to
scoff at everything that is not from us.,.made the M.G. cadres cnsilder with contempt,
an mstFor the Mobile Groups spent whole months seeing the enemy vanish before themo
and most of their engagements ended up in the disappearance of the opponent, sometimes
in it6s destruction. Then they often arrived in posts whose garrisons could barely
show themselves in the neighboring village (1). gnd were being harassed every night.
Duo to the presence of the newly arrived, the area suddenly became calm and
the n elements wondered if "the posts people did not exagerate somewhat".(2)
during operatlonst hns dug a ditch between the two unit c.assifications which needed to
be tunited....
ACTION OF MOBILE FORCES ON THE BORDERS OF V.M.-CONTROLED ZONES.- The activities of our
mobile forces on the borders of V.M.-controled zones were aimed, at some time and ac-
tions designed to destroy rebel units or Installations and to thereby thwart the great
Viet Minh offensives, or which tried to compel the opposing battle formation to fight
took place.
(1) It happenecd sometimes also (case of the DAO VIEN - TRUONG XA - DONG LY posts... in
Juni-, 1954) thtit the posts' garrisons could not gather the supplies that were air-
dropped until dark.
(2) Lieutenant X... Company Leader.
(3) Zone Commander in TONKIN.
I
I
71
For this battle formation included five Infantry Divisions and one heavy
Division beginning with 1951 and 4/5 of theso great units were based in the middle
region of North VIETNAM, as well as on the Tonkinese Delta periphery. So, we w•ere
constantly valled upon to go out and meet these forces In order to reach at last the
of movement in the areias he controled, never tried to oppose the progress of our forces
J when they emerged, in one or two directions, from the path of our outposts.
[ •As the opercitions inside the doltas, the fight that took place during our
I forays never took on the form of a struggle to solze defended objectives, The V.M.
J Command cleared everything before us, ahandonning at times without any rosistonce the
installations it could not evacuate, sabotaging the routes as much as possible, slow-
structure of hidden depots and inconspicuous conriuni cations m'eans, while we wer .e
hit by surprise ono of our elements which seemed particularly "up In the air" to it,
I The offensive wedge we drove into V.M. territory had to be quickly trans.
formed Into a defensive installation. For, as we advanced and time went by, the
from where our units radiated (remaining cautiously within the scope of action of our
j (1) For examplo entrtinched camp of HOA BIN'H for the "LOTUS" operation and entrenched
camp of LAI CAC for the "NOUVETTE" operation.
S|I
I+
71 A OFFICIAL USE ONLY
V.M, IMPLANTATION
Sin 9- 30- 153
•& , ,,, • 0
. 0 • o •
O
0 O0
* i -,I0
0;
0. "'"
00".
'V
i o0~ 0
"5. ,'S.o
\00
... .. ...
/0 ,
S
* Infantry Battalion (Rerular)
S
0 Reglona Battalion
Artillery Wittalloi, or
D.C.A. nrFgiir
The various enaagwnonts which occurred during this phase of the operation
were as many occasions to achieve the wearing out, if not the destruction, of a
q fraction of the opposing forces. But the protraction of such a situation ran the
g Our stay in the HOA BINH basin from November 3.951 to February 1.952 entailed
i
1 iimmobilization of three Viet Minh divisions (304th, 308th and 312th), but It required
I In addition, the farther into V.M. territory our wedge was drive, the more
difficult it was becoming to withdraw.. The HOA DINH withdrawal was successful, because
it had been possible to establish a security corridor several hundred meters wide with
principles, was also successful, But with the "LORRAINE" operation, we cncountored a
serious
o ambush 0) and other examples have come up to show that retreat manoouvers;
must be conducted accor:lina to the same rules as for a European war, and should most
ing which could find a place under similar circumstances. However, they pointed up
I clearly the necessity of closply consldering the duration of the undertaking: By Judging
too short, we risk loosing the opportunity to engage and put eneiy units In a bad
difficult disenganermont.
(1) The 36th V.M. Rogirient annihilated the equivalent of a battalion on the R.C.2
[I ,Novcmnhr 17, 1952.
w I
1I
w
I
IC A P T E R V
I- PACIFICATION
a_~1949 roport:
"For a province to be recognized as pacified, the authority of the legal
j tions, the purge must have beon conducted by the population, finally the collecti-
vitios must have organized self-defense foruisations, capable of protecting the sons.
But the assumption in such a program resides in the two terms "legal
government" on the one hand, and "authority" on the other hand, and it is not neces-
I sary to bring back to mind the fact that these necessary conditions were only slight.
I ly achieved in VIETNAIM.
Sconverge
towards the same goal.., which is impossible unless the same authority has
£In confining our study to the first stages of the return to stability%
athe quallin.- of any hostile action on the part of populations.
ýSUPP.RESSION OP~ REBrTELLIOUS FM~INGS.'. All surface war operations should be deriviad fromt
I political opportunities. But this necessity wias not always presen~t In the Inte'rested
j minds and Lloutornant Colonoi X...'s roitarh hns been justified many times... "An oper-
ation. was conducted and political consequonces wero thought ýto be derived fromt it".
IThe contrary has been equally observed on-many occas ions. In order to meet
I requirentents of a I-trictly xailltary nAture, c'ertain areas whe~ro 'paq1I f loatlon was,ý if
I not go ing ni-- woell, at leaist fensible, and wherce the Viet Mdinh was IL9 t P.r able to
"Nthing was;more costly to our.' Armines In~ Indochina: than the -abandonmient of
'I
I
H
cstrtain populations, because our plans were chan-in-, or thiat our undertakings were
The same was true when we wore unable; to stay in, iOA =2411 and had to..1orgo the rallying.
I of the MUONGS.
The LYAUTEY tradition, which first gave its Inde onous Affairs Officers
the plans of an offensive action and launched it only when "Itimo is ripe", was not
alto.-ether for.-otton.
General X...(2) wrote the following directives to his cadres: "In the area
I of pacification... not one rule should be considered as Imnperative nor eternal... But
one could niot discard the followIntg; principles, which are, moreover, found in all
In the population t~o wish for the Implantatior of our troops' and of our adnministration
over her Is a 1o~phAsu, wh~ch waii stietchcd over 0 months In BUI CH1J".(1)
Pacification was pricticaliy prcapared by !a close' study of the arc-a's whore
tho V.M. comrmunislt Nysti.cisrn clished with a mil.I tant C rist~lanity (case -of,-the TONKIN
* Cathol Ics) or with psoudo-religitotts foudol systaims, (case of the 'South VIE~TNAM sects)
SSubject to this none of the standard methods have lost any effectiveness.
Bosides, the V.M. Command never concealed the fact that one of the main
Sobjectives of the guerilla was to prevent us from implementing our pacification
J
" procedures.
For eoxample, a doctor, former war prisoner, reports: "The VM, told me
numnorous tihios that their worst enemy was a doctor looking after the populations".
Tho officers who successfully brought back general well-obeinra and prosperity
in an arean rel~ted their favorable results with as much enthusiasm as their predo-
Sand defend the Inhabitants not only against the VM. but also against the auxiliaries.
"A Navy Doctor, understanding and courageous, was my major asset: He risked,
his own skin to answer any call for help. V.M. wounded men were taken care of at his
S...
i• dispensary: we w¢ere ho fools, thle rebel know It:,' but: I -pl~ybd'the*gamef-.
"fWith the population and the not~ables, I feigned confidence, I t~old t~hev:
• I ask nothing from you except to work your fields and be happy. Tho war is my business.
"I provided thorn with seeds and fertilizers, for which I provided transport-
ation myself, helped them sell their wood, work the undeveloped rice fields collocti.
vely; in 1953 1 helped therp sell, at a good price, 400 tons of excess paddy, the first
authorized the Sampan line from X,,, to Y...; the prosperity of markets roturned",
L L
"With or without the support of the Province, I oponod schools| I encouraged
V a Scout movement, put vehicles at its disposal. My first reward came when, in 1953, I
( instead of 5,000, new and clean villages, one of which bears my name",
i When It has reached such a point, this stage of pacification is always known
I by a sinifiiceat sign: Dononciation of rebel elements who could still be hiding by the
population Itself.
must b.e started as soon as they hnve given some token of faith, but there exist no
I duelnhto rules for the constitution of solf~defense militia. As Colonel X....(I) puts
it: "Militias must represent ,the anmed expression of the will of social groups....,
any uni.form- rule would bea erroneous, for social groups are qutte varied. Village . ..
Militia where the group is the village... Parochial Militia, for the parish.., any-
thing can be conceived and achieved, providing the proper balance is kept between the
troops' task, but it will not eliminate the necessity to keep some territorial forces
in order to intervene quickly and powerfuly in case of an offensive return of the rebels.
Major X.4. (2) draws the attention on this major mission: "In my Sub-Sector, in 1953,
the staze of pacification had been reached. We had been able to arm the villages from
which the V.M. bases had been completely eradicated, and the population was doing its
I
I
3 "But from the beginning of 1954 the situation deterlorated. The V.M. re.
i aInfiltrated units more powerful thazn the marching company at my disposal. The Wjobile
Groups, busy in more sensitivu areas, wore unable to Intervene in time, I had been
J kept infored on the st~te of decay against which I was powerless for some tinle; then,
i village by village, the Inhabitnnts, faithful in spite of everything, came to return
"In order to save the pacification, I should have had a strong reserve'.,.
For paolfication remains fragile for a long time and its final success requires
the last months of the war, A recrudescence of V.M. activities could be noted, which
The rest of the tones under our control was gangrenous'$, (1)
" "To concludo this short Chapter, we ban only restato a principla of General X...
while deplorinZ the fact that circumstances did not permit its constant and full im.,
I[ i; plemenutation,
"...The indegenous elemnts must participate rmore and more in the struggle
for pacification".
I
(1) Captain (Navy) commandinS the River Forces in South Indochina.
I
79
I
I
j C HA P T E R VI
THE FORTIFICATION
A.1iong the various typos of structures that were built during the campaign,
three of them are worthy of a detaiiled study, for each met the requirements of a given
j situation which might occur ngain:
f In the regions whtich areonot yot seriously- contaminated, or at a Vt:iLt wlhn the
rebol bands do not dispose of any artillery and rocoilless guns, the small sur-
.- vaiilanpe structuros of the type "Tower" ca still bo of some u;so.
I - In tho more infested sectors, but where the enemy Infantry does not have highly
powerful weapons at: its disposal yet, which was the case in South VIETNAM, the
40 centimeters thick, surroundod by a low wall. The door was located at least t$10
S
I motors from the ground and one had access to it by a ladder,
The mirndor was five to six motors high and its roof was sufficiently open
I motor-thick, two meters hlrth brick wAll, ldavinS a spaco of about one metor between it
and the tower sides, or by surrounding It'with one or two curtains of areca or bamboo
trees. The objective of this device was to proeont tho enemy from placing explosive
I charges at the foot of the wall, or against the sides with the help of polos.
,But, of course, those shields of fortunrc wore insufficionr against shells _nd
I we tried to separate the observation element, boing of course the most vulnorable, from
jI the main body of the struct'ure, which was to provide the garrison with the means to live
SxFrom 1-952, we came up with the: following formula which proved to ble, as a
Ir The main body Is surbased as much as possible and buried in a mound of earth,
I Living quarters for the garrison are Inside this nialn body. They are con-
ceivod to glve a surface of about 16 square meters with two meters high ceilina.
One can cnter either throuth a ground level entrance, or through a manhole
The defense capabilities are provided by battleatents fasbioned about 1ý' meter
abov•af . level and protected against curved fire projectiles by a sighting device
and a "Diamorod" ditch. f
The main body is made proof against blows (particularly from shells) by
,akinZ the mound of earth at least tv, motors thick (1). In addition, the earth is
I (1) The carth cone•s from the diiging of the DITV,1.ND ditch.
I
!
80AOFFICIAL USE ONLY
WATCH TOWE~RS 1948
j Entranca
EchelleMureLte ExL~rieure
Laddqr
149 - 1950
in 194) -1950
Om25Om30TOUR
I Observation Post
Poste d~observationi
V _V
__________Coupe ducops______CrssSctonoffrtfiaiobd
4M 20
4118
80 C OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I TOWER WITH METAL LOOKOUT
Cross-Section A-B
I ~ entrance t 11.
1 L~jfl *~~11W
Is
(~ 4~ V
v___ ____
I6 -j-
L7
r .
80 D OFFICIAL USE ONLY
iTRIANGULAR POST for 60 Men
I:Ifuli Pa rad os
ea
Emptciergeme ce
algpur Pait
Enceinte wall
226msIk .-
Incit Mu
2 aaus 12I p
2Taoryms
IC _
*i j;Il j
I:Fosse'float
61-8(70770a100I'0 150 600
I
Thit latoral. sides are composed as follows:
Finally, the upper side can be covered by a thin concrete cuat, Its protection
blows stand-point. Its frame con bc of metallic tubes,, which offer the advantage
Noreover, the observatory 4is of the smallest size possible (lI square metier)
The sides are proof against tnachine-gun bullets and the height of the roof
I SOUT VIE'rNAM 1952-!953-TYPE POST.- This small structure was nevertheless capable of re-
Since it was designed for usually flat terrain which characterizes South
Ii VIETNAVI, it could take on a geometrical forqi'and the triangular shape was generally
supports.
? ENCLOSUP. AND TH. BLOCKHAUM.- The enclosure protected the defenders against bullets and,
to a point, a-ain.:t shells, whilo at the samie time constituting a last obstacle to
the assault.
It was made up of a dirt and log low wall of a height of at least I meter 80
and co'accted on the outside to a ditch by a glacis. This rampart had a thickness of
La
-.--- !~,
SA cortain nu.,tiber of crenels, calculatod Itn proportion to tho stronuh of tho
post, woro built, and each of them had a roof and a spllnlter-proof shield,
I At teh sanliont of thkt structure was a flankin% blockhaus (1) that Jotted out
I" and gave the im:ao of the towors being built in South VTI•TNAM from 1952 on,
The blockhnus was expectod to no: only enfilade the networks with close$
V
4 grAzing fire, but also Siva the 'najbility to observe the surroundings and throw grenades,
Thus, the fire chantbor had cronels which could never be frontal (2). It was
connected to the obs~ervation and greninde floor by a trap. The latter could, however,
ICOURTYARD AND REWU)3T.- In case of an attack, the post courtyard was a shelter for shells,
cations to allow tihe defenders to reach their comnbat: posl•Jons whain the opp)osing she•l-
j Mortar(s) with which every garrison was furnished had to be buried Inpitsn
suppled by zigzag trenches. The same wnas truo all the more so when the post was
The redoubt covered the vital elements of the post, that is the C.P., the
radio (3), a munitions reserve; but, in additioni, it had to provide shelter for a
counter-attack element.
Last, it had to be a refuge for the men who had been thrown out of their
combat positions. Its location had to be such that it was spared the first blows. A
smaller surface Inside the post, and especially the addition of extended fire weapons.
(1) In some rcctan,,ular-shped and little exposed posts, we could do with two diagonal-
ly positionned blockhouses in order. to flank the four sides.
(2) The frontal cronel can be exceptlonally justified only to cover a dead angle out of
ranz-u of tho ne1-h:•orin•, blvekhnus and whorn grenades are not sufficienit.
(3) Spare antennae had to be prrv'dod and their easy replacevicnt carcfully planned.
I
I
83'
ILIVING QUARTERS AND ARMORYS" Mhille prov~dlng a cortain comfort to tho. garrison, the livitiS
j quarters must meet the defense rocquiremutilts,, aspocially not obstrLuct tbo redoubt'sarange
of fire or Intarfare with the :ninning of niortaru.
IThey must shield tho oc,',upnnt:s f rom1 jhljlts (At: tile tniritlun) fronmspltinters),
and also from any tire, which will often load tr) hnav thenm buried or laid as close as
possible agains~t tho, rtiriart'(l). The aid Station of 'course will bonetlt from the
I maxiniwin protection enrace
4i...rnhs prIie with. n re st
IFinally, sonic. of thoentacspoie ihzg~ enhsadCeast
allow a clqso defonse in case of ene my panctrAtiton iJs ide the pqst, (nanmply in case of
tr 4 go'n). '
fThe armory(3ios) must b o located within the buried quarters ard proof against
mortar blows (2), In addition, they arc proof against thefts (doors solidly cloSed,
I.,windows, If there aro soiie, barrod); those for anratunition rnt~st be proof against humi-
jdity and, as far as; possible, nicet with ammutnition conservation riequirem'nts,
FFu supplie s must be protected against fire and Ospecially against deflagra.
el
Itions'. Except if It Is too smnial, it must be wall ventilated and far from the munitions
j depots and from the red*3ubt. If the fuel supply is considerable, it must be placed Inj
J the post Is sniall), to store fuel In intersticf~s located outside the onclo-suro,
if
will be proscribed.
(2) Two lay'ars of logs. and dirt are nvcossary to give a minimuti thickness of 75 centlm..
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
83 A
SKEM011 OF B3LC01flAIJS
c~0
Iu w
OI
TýA-
0 WI
.7
TONKIN CONCRETE: BASE 011 O1IFmATIONS*. The ocatioreto ba~so of operations covarad a m~uch lfir~or
I surface, that tho oldor posts for It wa made Lip of sevoral poriphoric blocks, supportod
Iby one or sieveral ooxatral blocks, the vhola boina surrounded by a thick barbed wire not,
The structura represanted then the concretion of a plan of fire and tho numbor
Ias well as the location of? the blocks was a function of the terrain characteristics,
IARRANNOENU.NT
OF EACH B~LOCK,- As tha olemontary coil of this type of fortification, the block
J was to generally Insurt, two Micnk~s and ono intvrior partitionnina, whilo pornittinZ, at
the some time, a frontol dofonao at short distance,
Flank fi re
* ~Switch trechpe
{00 i\.Flank fire
I Seto blocks, moreover have been conceived to accomrodato an observatory, or
'Their construction was subjectod to hardships which have Influenced the vo-
lume, that Is the number of arms and crow as well as the dogree of protection.
The problem was to ant quickly, fn a guerilla atimoaphore with rare local
materials, or they had to bo brought from far away (stones, sand), with a qualified
manpower in small nimiber and everochanging, insufficient funds, and we had to build
shape easy to apply, capable of using in some parts some replacement equipment, with
only the strict ntvcossary protection agninst the opposing weapons so as to be light
and economicail.
But before developing the standard block which is the object of our later
study, there were numerous tentativo efforts. From 1951 till the and of the war, the
I Engineers, in fact, had planned and built rnny models before developing a completely
satisfactory form.
Tho following dingrams will give an Idea of the peripheric block's evolution
I
I
!
I
I
Ij
L!'~-.
|.Ok' :' Is"
'I ! ý ý"'%
" (I!• •
I
I
1L7B -- J
ILI~ T 7 dio/1'elephonel
habitat Billet
j As far as the central blocks are concerned, we started with the circular form
which is the most rational at first alance but, in fact, of a very difficult construction,
passed to the hexagon (with tho addition of caponiers or living quarters), then to the
I squiareo
87 "''"
|~' .
C. t"1. Cove
iLhnd of 11)51 19,52
200/240 m3 Block 225 m3 Block
i gBillet hb00
I
IJ/)53
225 m3 Block
End of 1953/54
130 m3 Block
I
At this final staoe of evolution, the central block merged with the poripheric
' Eperience had finally led to consider only three types of blocks:
- One of them, a light fortification, would insure protection No.2, that is to say
I against the 81 M/m shell of great capacity or against an Isolated 105 m/m blow.
a As for the tuo others, built as a medium fortification, the differentiation between
protection No. 1,
was kept, but both of them would insure
central and peripheric
that is to say against an Isolated 155:n/n blow or two 105 tn/r blows.
I
I
SI
1 88 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
I The all azimuth block asl a liglit fortification could be built in a month 1/2.
I
Type" battlerments, each of which was usually lined with a small crenel for L.G.2 grenade-
I launchers (since the same crew manned the automatic weapons and the L.G.2 in case of
necessity).
The radio, telephone and a bunk for the radio-telephone operator wore Grouped
I grenade launching woro arranged at will near the crenels and accesses.
j The latter were located under the shooting crenel in back and in the living
quarters. They were obturated by double ariaored doors with a concrete plaque in a
"leanditch" mcaner. Finally, ventilation of course was provided through air-chimneys
I piercinZ the ceiling.
Its layout wae such that an observatory, furnished with a periscope installed
above the radio-telephone room, or a t-mk turret (with a 37m/m, or a 47 ri/m, or even a
i 57 m/m 6un) lod.ed above and in back of the frontal crenol, could be added.
-9.60
-, ,"
, '
%
J I
IF . %%
'N
% . N.j
I]
00
CD 8 .15
t ,~.a d io
Habitat ]
i-l
x f-Mer19n-c-Ine. A -0
% ... 't. 'J%
- I
I OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1 88A
f ~ALL-AZII IUT BLOCK
In
Radio
0.40 ý2 0 Varal
Vari~ble
~0.4O!Entrance
89
piedrolts, roinforced concrete, for the flagstone and revettitent), not so much for rea-
sons of economy (1) as for questions of technical feasibility (difficulties with the
franing and shortancv of irons). But the damage suffered at the KESAT and YEN VI posts
after an anemy attack proved that one caraiot cheat with fortifications.
Later, a mortar sheolling on a garrison at BAN YEN N*IAN In 1954 showed that
I
Ti the 30centinieter flagstones did not provide protection No.2 and that a thickness of
ono of the numerous dikes to be found in the Tonkinose Delta. In order to avoid a gap
in the firing range we "splintered the work" (2) that is we split the structure Into
• mI I I I -- I I I I I I I II I I ?II *II I II CI
DIG U E DAM
'n -il ii l -III II
In other cases the high number of peripheric blockhauses (usually over 4),
made the protection afforded to the central one. Two wore therefore necessary.
houses connected togcther by some quarters. Those were formed of sti!:nat' cells,
measuring 6.40 meters by 4.80 meters, and varied In number, Ventilation was insured
.I (2) It was naturally Impossible to cut through the dike for fear of provokinzv a flood.
I
__=J
•4 1
l. , . ... . ...
S~ Casernernent
B.,UIRACKS
i>
i
TWK TVO !,NEDUI'1 LLOCIKHOUSS,- The attached sketchcs show the layout of the blockhouses that
j The pertpheric blockhouse measured approximately 150.3 cubic maters. and resembled a
simplif:ied double casc;iiato, .1ith a front caponier provided with a frontal firing crenel.
I The flankivv crcaels were protected by a siall wing-wall of 1.20 meter. A 3.60 meter by
4.40 meter protected habitat was Installed in the back for the garrison.
The central blockhtu';e measured 245.3 cubic meters and derived from the hexa-
gonal type with two turret-equipped caponiers, to which were joined a habitat, C.P., and
I machine shop.
A comilunlcations room was located in the center of the hexagon, under the
observatory turret. The machine shop could be equipped with either a generating set or
batteries. (1)
(1) All crenels were of the "Carnc" type (600) or ,,Gazin" typo (900) completely obtu.
rating trie apertures.
An artifIcal ventilation was necessary, which required a more modern Installation
than the I ight blockhouses.
I
[
--
. OFFICIAL USE ONLY
DCU31,3i CT,,1TR,\L BLOCK. ',41iH RESTING RfOOM
PLAN - SECTION
EA•N-COUPE ®®
S'ront Caponier
ia njire avant . . . .
260 - ~M Billet 0
fB.A. Volume :260 m3 Central Block:
Floor surface: 135.58m (Billet : m1
in
r '.'31ZTAx •OF
2 BLOC2XHCUTS2S.- A series of tests were made on licht fortification
blockhouses of 140 cubic moters (1) under the worst possible conditions for them
I
e results obtainod with differont types c.0 projectiles Aro givan In the
Thh
followina tubla,*
Typo ;? Frlcl E FP C T
used
-- I/-n nan~iial Incidence 60 ems, 0 of reinforced coricreta pier~ced.
* Vietmilnh BazookA~ 2/. Incidence higher than 45 rioochat
Plane
rclkets22 rockets, fired, 5 of which hIt: their objcicttves.
4
2501bs. bombis 22 bombs dropped, only one of which hit the objective and
ricocheted on the flagstone making a 14centirnetor deep, hole,
The other bombs, dropped over swampy terrain within a 150 by
r 50 motor rectnngle, did not even upset the barbed wires.
500 lbs bombs with M 8 bomibs dropped at a distance of 15 to 35 moters froin the
time-delay fuse structure,
None hit the objective,
The blockhouse tipped over from 3 to 4 centimeters, At the end
of throe days the tipping had reached 20 cm. (vertical lines
deviated from 2 to 3%~).
j With all the caution that is required in the ovaluntion of such 4P exptriment (1)
Concrete (avon in a suaill volumn) is proof against small and even medium site
the objective was not camouflaged; however, one single hit was realiesd out of
1 30 bombs. As one might have expected, rockets were much more accurate.
front of the wall to protect. But the firing crenels or observation crenols, of course,
cannot be hidden. In addition, their protection with wire-not.ilng (oven tight) remains
On the other hand, the blind walls (whether the ones of the blockhouse or of
the fuel tanks, for example) were effectively protected by a brick bursting wall (or
made of dirt packed betWean two rows of stones) or a tight bamboo wall.:.
This bursting wall must be located at least two meters from the wall to be
Tprotected.
The experionce of the last few woekstof the wAr seem to confirm these data.
S The Vioes furious assaults on SONTAY, VIE TRI, LUC NAHM ardd SEPT PAGODES over t~he
last few weeks, in particular, have met with bloody failures. But the garrisons were
then adequately supp,)rtc-d by our artillery and the nearness of several Mobille Groups.
It has been noted on several occasions that the concrete was not the best.
I - The construction companles were not suporvised Etdquately and sometimes cheated
of rvtAfc)rctd concrcte.
(1) The neutralization effect: on the garrison actually deponds on too many factors
to be gauged.
[
:"
.. r%%4 4 %*
5 Filially the poor juality of the toil was the cause of many disappointnments
and It took a long timo to develop tho technique applicable to fortification of the
Deltas,
I And last., t~he living corn~llitons wrer qiM. poor vhatevor the type of struc-
turo. Two problc.is, in particulort, had not. boon satisfactorily resolved: That of
OBSTACLES.- Any V.M, attack of a post boaan with a silent approach phase, during which
., the oppon-at deployod his assault groups as close a's possible, while at the same time
p paroI.ng
. to- open breaches in our barbed wire network.
This task was given to "dynamiting cells",• who placed bensaloros of forturne,
Smade up of bamboo sticks filled with explosives (1). Their mission was also to clear
"In order to dotect this ants' work, we had-to, creatQ a complete wat:ch system:
Alanii devices and patrols, operating far enough to surprise the arrival of
required to stop the enomy, and that the inost favorable disposition included a panel
It goes without saying that the netuvrks (or the panels) were to remain trans.
parent and completely cleared of all vegetation, as well as the strip of land on which
(I) The cells tried also to creep close to the bloc!hhaus to place charges concentrated
on contact with the crenels. The explosion of charges was almost always the signal
of attack.
(2) In order to avoid the case where one single charge will shear the strip.
(3) The VN. ftared tbe stralght1 panel, 2 motors hi-h, &oin&40 cms dec-p into the ground
(to prevent its crossin- via a tunnel), made up of barbed wire mesh as close as pos.
slblý (20 cm,; waximimi) s'ronoly bound at every angle, This panel had to be sup.
[
[ Maintenanco of this stripped "billiard table, required constant, but essential
I work.(0)
Somotties the notwork's ground was covered with sand, the clarity of which
facilita:ed surveillanco.
rI The ditches, as for the XVIIth contury fortification, were used especially
in South VIETNAN. The model ditch was to be 6 meters wide, 2.50meters deep, filled with
i water if possible, at least bristling with bamboo darts for the Viet-Minh )'ad found a
way to cross on ladders thrown overboard. In fact, the ditches wore of insufficient
Mines gave us more disappointmnonts than satisfaction$ for they have probably
resulted in more losses in our camp than that of.-:th@ enemy due to the many hardships
they imposed. When placed inside the networks, they prevented later cleening and the.
best proof of this is given by the fall of Camp ERULIN (TONKIN) on July 14, 1954.
I This structure was surrounded by a deep barbed wire network, mined, and soon
was invaded by a luxuriant vegetation. The successive chiefs of the post attempted to
get rid of it, but fire gave no results and the cleaning by hand was the cause of many
through which they successfully infiltratoed with a diabolical dexterlty, without suf-
better to place them in an accessible and open location. They should not be left per-
J manontly, othorwise the enemy finally detects them, tokos them up and uses them against: us.
"but be constantly modified. This entails of course rigourous hardships for the laying,
Slighting and detecting, which are not compatible with frequent changes of gatrison.
r (1) Several tests with herbicides were made but none were satisqfactory. The power of
vegetation in Indochina could have been conquered only by a massive use of such
products, making the defense prohibitive.
!
-!
1 ~~~96 ~(~'
S LIGHTING.- Artificial liqhtin.j was necoessary for the defender to adjust his fire against
tho V.14. nocturnal. assault, mid whllc. raitinv for the attack, this lishtin- systom was
not proof against an accidental fallureo, or against a failure brought about by the
or Zenerating set. It was installed near the end of the war for the main sensitive
points (plane pnrting, munitions dumps, fuel depots, important CP. etc..),
condition thdt they wtre well served. Routine, hero as anywhere else, was the worst
enemy, for a beam directed at regular intervals and sweepinn the terrain always in the
In the TONKIN bases of operation, the blockhouses were equippod with search
lights (usually automobile lichts) installed in the, turrets of the central observatories
or on the, periphorics. But the latter were often unusable at the time of the attack
The set-up adopted for the observatory of a central structure was the follow-
ing: Four special cronels ware worked out above the obserwvtion crenols, for automobile
lights. The horizontal sweep of each light was better than 900, consequently an all-
(1) The oquipiient of a central blockhaus, with this set-up, and the power supply re.
quiregencs for interior li:3htin- and ventilation necossitated a 5 to 8 Kw 8enorator
set, When thcre wras no venerator set, feed was obtained by 6 to 12 volts batteries
that were roechried periodically by Conntunicat ions -enerator sets.
The Experience has showed that the model search light had a 25 to 30 cms dia:ieter,
a 500 watts poi•rz', a usoful, p(rncil of 50 to 300 metvrs.
I
!
WATCH
To this survel lance', 11ahtinc, sysb'A:11 was added an vL~nrii lt1ht-Ing syst~om 0 i~ch
was obta~nod! by pulling light traps, bý' lighting mo~rtar sjte11s. and ,ftinnily flarets, Whlch
A ~ -1
STHIRD PART
f,
Ii
V I
I II-
' I
C A P T E R
To the war without front that took place on the territories for whose control
both sidets contend with each other, and to oporations conducted along the boundaries of
L zones owing allegiance to the. V.M., can be added another forml of hostilities, which
•i each day In the Deltas or the coastal plains a•Id the "tcountryside.t ones whose theat~re
of oper-Ations wa4s iII turn part of the Im,mensities of the High Tonkin, the Laos and
In these vast territories, the V.M. had the initiative of the operations, if
we rwke exception of our activities of 1947 tending to reduce the LANGSON-THAI NGUYEN-
I CAO BANG triangle, then controlcd by the opposing forces.
Actually, the Viet Minh quickly realized that it could not prevail by main
force in the rice field areas, as the nunber and fanatisir of Its troops wore not suf.
expected from guerilla warfare alone were limited and he wrote at the time: "It has
been demonstrated that, without the war of movement, guerilla warfare can only develop
I The choice of the objectives remained" "Economic targets were not what the
Viet Minh could iaim at (there wore only two such targets In Indochina, the two inter-
dieted deltas), but outlying ,ones,where the French were weak, but the loss of which
would nevertheless deal thom such a political and psychological blow that they would
have to, either bring In roinlforcemonts conditions of inferiority which would weaken
I their vital posltlon In tho Delta, or suffer the results of their incepability of do-
f fendIngg. thcn... 1)
The -?Cro.t Wastelands" offered also the advantage of being suited to the
I now to support civillan authorities, now still to prevent the encmy from proceeding
Therefore, our parry could only consist of reinforcing some of the posts In
order to preserve them and establish now mooring bases (land or aoro-land bases),
sweeping and pursuit operations, but on the contrary, to attract the enemy and cons-
[
!
I
I HOLDING OF GARRISONS,- During the first years of the war, our Mobile Forces directly
i intervened to help our posts of the Highland and Laos, but the scarcity or the absence
of communi ontions mean.s forced us very soon to make wide use of air-transport or air-
I drops, to rainforce (for exanmple: CAOBANG before its evacuation), as well as to take
I back (DONG KHE in 1950), or still to extricate (for example: NGHIA LO in 1951).
I while extricating operatlons politcd tip the advisability of. acting on the supply lines
"I"Only large-scale manoeuvers, bosides the land routes give results against
f an adversary who practically always dodges a direct attack, who systematically seeks
nocturnal attacks or the riihush-type battle, but who must live off the land or be
-I supplied by transport",
"These manoeuvers are particularly pay off when they can reach the travel
zones which the Coolie colitnins are compelled to usc, and interce'.pt thcm".(1)
-t From 1950, the strength of the V.M. attacks became such that Our array of
posts proved more and more difficult to maintnin, Sometimes, we were able to preserve
"When,
such was the case of NGIIIA LO in 1951:
a few weeks before our HOA BINII offensive, the Viet Minh had attempted
I to seize NGAIIA LO in Thai country, It had only succeeded, with the conditions under
[ which it
retreat,
had engaged the 316th Division,
thn
in givilig the dfenders the opportunity to feigni
oexert a brutal reaction which had. been so costly to LIDDELL HART and MAO
j TSE TOUNG".
"Slowed down by an elastic defense, the assailant was countertattacked by
1 two Airborno Battalions dropped on one of Its flanks, it sturibled on its objective which
j had been reinforced, and fell back to the Red River with heavy losses..,". (2)
102 ,,.,
I
It also happened that the garrisons were reinforced In time thanks to an air-
I flift: MUONG SAI, LUANG PrRABANG, PLEIKU, or extricated by a land action combined with a
,I| threat on the V.1. rears (A2'.HE, 1953 and the attack on QUI NMON).
Often, however, the garrisons had to fall back in order to escape total des-
j truction by the enemy. These falling back operations were generally quite costly, in
f spite of the support Siven by our mobile forces to disongaagemnt operations. The results
of the CAO BANG, SAM HRUA, ANUUMU, withdrawals are well known, and we will cover thlis
More particularly, an Officer who tool- part in the LAOS operations of 1953
wrote: (1)
"The falling back of the SAM NEUA (2), SAMI TEU, WUONG SOI, MUONG HMEM garrisons,
etc.. has oncci aw&_iu pointed out: the difficulties of such an operation carried out under
enemy pressure".
avoid general confusion, the risks of whtch are auf•mented by nervous tension
and fatigue-.
a The ,,MIaquis" I presence is a major asset for aiding the men who have fallen out".
-- [I
101 'i , . 1 :,4.,. 11 q
I when thy oporated In the deltas, whorc they manociuvercd In the squares uo a checkor-
board madu up of the controlcd roads and of posts arriiuaed in quincunx, givo an idea
I of what they could be whon trying to uncovor onomy unIts on a vast and cove.red terrAIn.
"The various ca nighs t'h.at took place demonstrated, In a general way, tho in.
cnpability of our troops to annIhIlate oven with fnr ouperlor moans an onciny who, in
j I addition to his ,•aterlal infrlorlty, could not profit by the populations' complicity
s "For thu Viot Minh disposed of vast surfaces to fall back in case of threat,
j to got supplies, to rogroup, and from there fall upon our Isolate•d posts, loy ambushes,
"In short, thtey mnage.d to play strong against wcak, because on the tactical
£ plane, they lived in two dimensIons naalnst an adversary who, even wi0th an Air Force,
operated all too often In only one dImbnsion: the axis of the road or the trall.,(1)l
We were lackln3 Intolli-ence vswn more than in tho Deltas. ilora is what wrote
"One must ariilt that the lack of Intellienco wAs even moro acute in Laos than
in thn, Tonk in".
i tIt was practically iipossible to know, just: through local moans, the Viet Minh
Forces' strength, their bases, their movements... What little intelligcnce w6 had, in
most Initancc:s conccalcd the truth and most of all vvrer too late to be exploltablo...".
The sone h Id true on the IPlateaus and the followin, c:•atmplo is typical:
"The CHUH DRCH operation, launched from PLI.,.U and BAN Mb- THUOT, aimed at the
annihilation of a Vict Sattalion reportc.d to be in the area. But once the operation was
I launched, four to five Viet Battalions appeared 40 to 50 kilometers N.E. of CHUN I)REH.
This uiil-i)vctý(! thrn'.t co;ipnlced the Comnaiehr to change thc- U!)Jc(t1vor th%, opeI,•tion
...
and to direct his Chief to clear the BAIN MI TIlUOT road as soon as pos.4ible".
Sl
104 .. ' '"ab
Thus, for lack of tirely intellignce rogarding the opponomnt's big elemre-rLbs
an operation which began as a drivu to destroy the Viat nearly ended as an operation
order to carry out an off vnelve Action. The lattr necessarily comes within-the frame.
work of a combined situtiaton and we cannot dispense with int.olligenco concerning all
If on the contrary the Viet linh P.K.22 ambush on the Antkhu road nearly n10t with
sUECS, on June 24, and cou.ed hoovy losses, It was due to the fact that the oncny did
not ignoro that he only had 24 hours In which to act before t:he reserve MNbilc Groups
Come Into I-,lay. The Viet did possess Intelli-aonce re-ardin8 the overall situatio s .is
stated it! was "1:,14nn a finessre", a touri doigned to. conceal our Ignoranoc', of the op.
posing e; tab!i hmientand calllip to .ILnd thc boldnesss,.of a Po•cr, playor much more than
"...As to the procodure followed to pursu'ý, t~he vntm'y, It provvd qui to,'n4pt&4it vh
as soon as the approach lasted more than 24 hours for the cieversary, informnd by his •
agents, had ample time to ward off the oncoming thriats". (1)
SIn additilon, to boing badly in-formed, our unlts woer not walt Adapted t~o the 0
terr in and even less pre-pared to fight In donse forests and bushes. (2) So all oper.
.stions were chara•cterized by on cxc,'¢'slve sloii-,nss
"...The battal' ns moved about a bloc in a sinaale file. Their fire power could
never bn dcployed ,it', Cimel.iness. The terrain was searched only on a narrow strip,
S( 1) Cu o m(,n
A Y. 1M,G , o :. r~ n ..
(2) See., the chapters dcvotod to this subjrict: in Pactr Ill of this Voltine.
"I"A few stoppors on tho way alowod down tho advanco considerably and inflictoeI
casualt~ies. The woutided then~ had to be transported on strotchors and tho units lost
all manneuverability capcabllitios".
I "Under those conditions, theo naity was In a position to easily play with time
Iand spaco, to dodga contact in order to deliver battle on the terrain and with the
means of his cholcoole(i)
I SOMO of these deficiencies had bocotno so flagran~t that, at tho end of 1'953,, the
Coiwmwnd.er-InChlof wrote In a widely-dist~ributed note:
",,*The LI.anders at all echelons still have the reflexces of the "motorized" too
Ioften, as they are used to maneuver with motorized units, limited to passable roads
jand strips-, they tead to forget that ouir enomy is totnlly indopendent of motors anid
that ho. cctn rinpidly group togethor and move lnrgo forces In difficult terrain, where
I we canniot' pursue h~im and give 1xittlo If wo are not willing to do away with our inotor.
"Corti&inly,ý in a bott1e !tnking placoe, fnr away f rom the points of ponetrntion,
wo are deprived of tho aroat asset which our artillory fire ropresents, but to a point,
footing atrd severpal of our Unts proved thut theýy possessed the will and the capacity
"F.Dn -,a ved In d if ficul r tbrrain, our Units oftei give the iniprossion of being
blind, of mo.vin,;, albout h#esitatingly,, of, encou. terinthe poetol ftelte
bf thec. ,opponen onl the~ lande
ha.S benw n ob n~Z, adth en getting involvod tundar ir.provised and often
by new surrouadings, our Btalions, for the m~ost part, disposp of Auxiliary Units or
a S2pJ
n onv'lltcd by locnl prisons~, If some formatt'.n. arv n~ot provided with, t:' r,,
due to tho fact that thny conte fromt d different region, the local territorial Cot! -Ini
1 ~ h '
~~~106 ~ ~ w
I must do overything in his power to procure th•zi rapidly. In this vein, a rotioxil
chanco, too many of our Units have a defensive reflex. They can only
, think of sitting
t with flexibility to catch It unawares, then attack in force and beat it with no con.
"Every timo a formoition is not sitting for some time, that security is not
ensured, the personnel dug in, coherent firing ýlnns, with no gaps, the only effective
parry - if ono dounn t want to be hust1ed out of one's position - is the intnediato
counter-attack, conducted if necessary by the whole unit, the diroct rush on the eneiny
"With troops lacking solidity and cohesion due to insufficient training and in-
forior off icering quite often, it should ba remembered that, the offensive is easier
than the defensive, that the attack binds together while the defense divides, and that
"the flilht ahead" requires loss.nmaneuverability than fixed resistance, or elastic ro-
sistance any time the resistant is not rivettfd to the ground by a sufficient ground
organization or that the units are not too strongly officered anid energetically
Scomr..,anded , ,"
"c..Some of our elements get harassed
or attacked In their night bivouacs
be-
cause their installation is carried out too long before night fall, it lacks secrecy (1)
"The Chiefs must have the strength to Impost upon their troops, -in spite of the
day's fatigue, the necessar'y amovcmonts, the rapid and sufficient organization of the
(1) In pnrticttar, too miny units make the error of co:vipLng for the night in the vici.
nity of the supply DZ.
[
[ :p
IPA
j "A
unit which arrives just before the night on a covered terrain and esta-
In the middle of the encmy foriation and attempted to join our bases".
"A few succeedodl tihosc, which, no matter what the efforts or fatiguo expe-
I rienced, made It a rule to rmove at night, to avoid wetll-traveled tracks, live off the
land refraining to roquist for air-drops which are always Indiscreet, to stay away front
areas under systematic survaillance of the enemy such as posts, intersections, large
iI villaVes,
Iee.
shiftinS fronts and light rears", Imposed upon then by the Viet Winh, and few and far
b-.twean we-cc? the "coltwnns" or "groups" which pioved capable of "ronming" like the rebel
units.
f to iaoorin-' bases, qhich were both logistics bases and cntrranched canrmps of fortune as
I to feed the battle, and push in the wake of battalions a few portions of tracks that
AIA-GROU'ND HOLES.- The concept of the mooring base was gradually moidiffied by an evolution
which seYned surprisina at first glance, as the air-ground moles were to become, from
I yaneuver auxLillaries, It's essential elaiicnt and they were Soing= to be expected to
I
"The Comitandor-lu-Chiof cULtcidod to force the onemy to fight on a terrain
favorable to our Joined forces, servod by an air-field permitting the regular supply
of our fighting unit:s and flnally, locatod at a distnnce from the anctmy advanced Zuard
II| Tho advantage of this formula was, first of all, that the plane freed us
f
iI from t:he obligation to defend a lino of cotiiunicatiions.
"NASNk achlovod the three main objectives assigned to it: receive the Sar.
- risons of the North-Wost ?,one Isolatod posts, prevent Viot Minh exploitation of their
I NGHIA LO success near LATCHAU, finally hold on if the Center of Resistance was attnacked"..
- at NASAN could neither neutralize tho alr-strlp, nor seize the bases of operation ... ,"(2)
ijim" • 1From then on, the establishunent of ontraanchod camps and air-ground mnoles
appeared to be the best parry to the seasonal off,•nives of the V.M. battle formation.
I- After the experliences of NASAN, of THE JARRISS PLAIN, of SWNO, the Cornander-
I n-Chief wrote: "...the lesson fromu the recent operations In the High Region, in LAOS
and on the MoTnta-nards Plateaus, shows that the vnc.-my bitter fail.urvs, or dropped the
and whose garrison was strong enough to be abl.e to go out, scout, deploy, counter-attack
- "...Ilhen the onc.:ty ,-iassively commiits lar,-e forces, the mobile eleoments retract
on tlhe en trenched canips. The latter are relnforced, If necessary, via land, air, river
i and sea"t.
"The arlversary Is Lhon forcted to uavnto in real siege war operations which
are lin:tthy, costly and difficult, and requlre large forces that cinlnot escape the
i! !
-- =-j
log 4
10 € .. ... '-j * ., , * .- *
Did thc. lVittI. of DL;.4 BIEN PHUa thu failure of this doctrine? It
is not the pvporc. of this study to examinen %'i i1ts trategic aspects, but thc opinion
i "The fl(llure of DIEN BIEN PIIU is due to the fact that this isolatcd base was
itat:aelced by an enemy dispo•i•g of artillery and anti-aircraft defense, and the study
of this failure can funilsh toachinas regarding the requirements to be meot by an air.
operAtIons against rebels who probably would not dispose of any artileery nor any anti.
S rv-ostabhishment of our Authorlty and influonco In aroas distant from our bases, or
"For whatever can be done or said, our nilitary establIshmont•js such that
our forces could not possibly have the capacity to "f, at in space" as the Vior Minh
j did successfully".
"In a war of the gxeat expanses, we will alv'ays need rears, even if they are
constitttAd by a tiny temporary air-ground fortress. Thi? quest-on is not to got stuck
provc-d that tact•Ical mohility was just as necessary without being identified with
nmotorization.
(1) Batrallon Lc.adc•r X... Co.•naodhi% a Cont~cr ol Reslstan-CC ot DIYN BTUN 1111U.
I
In addition, nil our operations hAvej dvionstrnotd th•ut In actions of tho
i war without front, juste• n thosoe In the w•,r of tht g•art expanaes, there comes a tirio
I and equipment; nothin. could possibly replace the niuber nnd quallt:y ahd only local
SI
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I C H A P T E R I I
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THE MAQUIS
I - a -- - wt
In the vast territories that fell into the hand., of the Viet-Minh as ,arly as
j 1945 and in which Nre could never regain foothold, save on the occasion of an episodic
raid (1), the creation of a maquis seemed at first possibl as the terrain was eminently
favornble: accantuated relief, dense vegetation often taking on the air of an inextri-
I cable jungle.
j The appearance of the maquis, however, came rather late for ethnical reasons.
The success of the Viet-Minh approach near the Annamlte populations and the
!F
f
ineffectiveness of our political action, left no hope of provoking any armed opposition
against our adversaries in the regions with a population of high Vietnamese dc-rsity.
Our incapacity to Interdict the slow decay of the Tonkineso Delta constItutes the best
proof of this.
The only element which could still serve our cause was the racial repulsion
whi~h the M!ontgnard populations and certain ethnical .nlinorities nurtured for the Annam-
I In the zones with Thai populations, In those with th-•. Hcis or the Mans, the
Annar'ite u-as thý, enonty, but it was difficult to arouse a ho.•til< movemLnnt, all the rmore
1 so a rebellion, as long as the Viet-Minh did nut oporato in the High Rc.'Ion of the North-
buted to them. In Jantiary 1954, 4 V.11,1 Battalons woro nply for the reprossion of
the inaquis In thi. LAICI1AU rcqion. At the end of April 1954, there were 8 of thein; in
Secondly, the. maquis brou.-hlt an uneasiness. among, the onouiy elomonts and kept
it olive. The V.M4. political cadres considered their action as "tone of the artatest
1owover, it sec-ns this uneisiness prcvailed inostly anionc, the lower echelons
and the Isolated units: AL, ono t~ine, the V.M. High Coimiand did not seem a bit disturbed
by the actions of our M~aquis. Soma. of them achireved some brilliant successes: For
In their attemnpt to intorvone against the V.M. corn iuxiica~ttons facilities linking the
PHUTO area and V01~ PDOA to DIEN BIEN P1IU, while covuring a 400 to 500 kilometors dis-
I•Scnltemqi
t-ince over forests and mountains. rultatuo.qns mn h aoyeeot
A coiruion section, COI"'0I-DIEN n et
BIEN PHtU, 200 kilometers
iI long, In partIcular, was never seriously harassed.
This low output of the inaquis, which numbe-red 15,000 men at the end of the
(1) Stch as the Moo naquis of the MENG KHOUANG region which phrentthed to round up nenny
scat-tered groups of tho SXM NEAc ltinin uhost withdlrawal was almost tra1z;c.
(2) An oxpans ion of our mnquls was soet for October 1953 In the BANXAT, BIN'fLU, MHI'APA TILS.
UYEN reoions. To matke It easier, it had scemod necessazy to make a diviersion on a
plausiblv nind dietant enough objective on which the, advorsary hung seriously: The
- •double Fstlohcr CnC-LEU-
:looLation of AY was chosen. Six hundred partisans attacke-
COC LEU on Octhnbr I with thU support of the Aviation and *ne Paratroop Conindo fro:h; the
T-adioncso Dolta. Durbný attackro
sovoral s, Otý partdasshnh penetrated in th, to s kean sup-
portsicd by b' eInZ tctked t:hns vroutnd csualtqis te the V.M.
150 rekillehd ndenceo.
I At: fIrst, thcefte~ee of Wihe tuItqil was doubtod for u long timev. v"The
G.M.!. (1), tmccordliit, to mon of t~his organ~zation's reports, hind diffictilt baeaillin-S,
quite oftenm plagued by thco HIgh Cornmnanc's hostility at tho Zone. or Territory echelons,
j This lact. of Fni~th could bo Justified, for., "W had no Ideology or xenophobia
"Wo did no Rtt:ow whothor thero wais a positive rc at Ionrhi i brt~woen tho obtattndc
restilts and Lho rpr~sn2s which, soonor or lator, the action of our mnquis would bring
But most of all, this mistrust IlluXStrAtod the scopticisrn of our cadres, forý
In short, the rtleof the' runrs mis started too Into, It was only In 1951
that the Airbolrne JOInt Comi.-'ncto Groups (G.CM.A,) wora ahlo to pi'fomi an action. But
by thit time the Viet Minh hold oxtencitd alreaidy on vast aroas., It couild no longor be
dcemonz.;trzat Ions tblvt we maust prer'pde thci enemiy In the rtialns where hit has not yet
Any zoote hold to be se,.'ura can somne cl.Ay beermo tho. thezit~rz olf battltes. We
nmut; thzr..:forcu propara for this po~ssibiltty so as not to mc.It. with Insuvm~untnblo dif-
ficul tios later andc the offorts must bo concentrntecd on the cr(,ation of nrmed coils,
tho sgrin of intf.l1i~anco agents, the establislimoet of channelsr (2), finally the
Tho~ c~v4'cttI;on of tho m1qtlds %ins lator slowedt down by theQ shorto-;o of officors
who wf.-re fa~i1iiar with the cthnical and oeographtcal characteristics of favorable arons,
Ind, a fortiori, spode the llontn-nnrd dialect;.s Here orgoi~n the abscinco of a Corpi; of
(1) The3 Joint lintc-rv ýntlon Croup (CMI)was crcated on Decc-tiber 1st, 1953 vith a
vi ý' to eo:u~thr, ftizht onl tho rearr,. It rc'plnred thfu Airborne Joilnt C~iid
I uprl.AIný starL:.;
114 v(,
train tho guor111cn. A School wcmn createtd nt Capco SatIri-Joequos, but It only bc-gan to
The equal
.~ly suffered from at poor relationship with tho similar Oran-
Thc. effort lateor fuwnlsb'.ýd on~ Its~ behalf iqas consIderablo, particulairly In the field
of avint:ioi. At the' end oj' hust11ItItes, atctuoily, tht. rol.owvfln was (Srantcd as fAsalis.
1500 WA1,'TA
Is houirs.
JIL ~ - 300 rc-conn,,tks.1nqic0. plimu hOUrs.
The oharacteristlcs of combat in forest are well known, but in Indochina, they
j - The vastness of wooded areas which cover 2/3 of the Indoohinese soil,(1)
a The density cf the undergrowth (2) and its inhospitablo aspect.
o The unusual rarity of foot-paths and trails (2) as well as the extreme poverty
a
our planes. So. little by little, he came to conceal his bases, his workshops, his
hospitals, and his Con~nand staff under the umbrella of tropical trees.
Most of his units were equipped and trained in the wooded valleys of the
mountains or the rivers flowing towards the Tonkineso Delta. They lived there between
two operations, bringing their loot and preparing their future Involvements at length.
Thus, it was due to a protection reflex that the Viet Hinh favored the forest
(1) 86% of the surface of Indochina is covered with a spontaneous and extremely dense
vegetation, takin3 on the form of a forest for 47% of the area, at least.
I
For our troops, on the contrary, the format only represented one more elemont
of hostility. Far from finding shalter, they could only oxpoot constant and hidden
Any offensive operation tmn, first of all$ against the doonses at, nltur*1
That is1*the fati'ue due to the Inextrilcable entanglement of a vegetation aligned with
the neny, to the depressing climate, to.the thousand hostile bugs". (1)
"It is the depression duo to the stiftlig feeling one gets from solitude.
We didn't hovo any good Intolligence regarding the eneamy, ue.to a la1ck of'
We managed, houvrer, some progress, but at a speed which varied ýrom 300 moetrs
to 3 kilometers per hour according to the density of the ntdorgrowth, andothe fatigue
oas In':everso proportion to the speed. 'It -as InpossIble, to,.establ sb a deo1nit~e
march sch~odule, for.the necessary security measurCs still slowed down the pace.
Thhe enemy, in, fact, used a, very simple combat procedure against us, but parts.
Icularly efficient:Our approach was always detected by a cordon of watchers posted along
and on the paths penetrating inside the wooded areas. As soon as It wos alertoed, the
6wore
Viet Minh unit sent out intelligenoe agents who, followed us stop by stop while we
being slowod down by snipers, traps and mOnes., When our formation had been stretched,
the enemy slowly dismembered our columns by ambushes laid in the clearings or along the
Any encircling and sweeping operation was an illusion with such a terrain and
To this first lesson can be added another one Immediately: Tho necessity to
"rin the Such war, Infanitry units conduct ciase..attione woloh requi re Immediate
1'short range fire pover rather than continuous,, dense tire, Gou~batants musat'be *,quloppe
as lightly as possible... The sections are forma4 of two Ii4ht infantrymen groua ýand
one support Crottp with two automatic riftesl, the comipanies only,,t&ke one 60 rn/r mortar
etc.
"- observe radio silence,
J Moreover, the shifting of the base must systematically be planned for within
a few days.
group, must operate in forest, It must be divided Into several columnis, each of which
must not be equivalent to more than ono or two companies.
(1) Such an exporiment was not tried In Indochina, but In Malaysia by the British,
Several reports do Include such a suS~ostione
(2) Every timie an air-drop was performed during the day In support of a column, the
V.14. was able to Identify the presence of our alembn&;,
We must: admit that tho tubes will not be able to act 'except, in clear 'forest
t or If clearings exist.
we must resort to mules, poneys, even to carrying on men's backs and this limits the
equipment to 120 m/m or-4 by 2 Inch mortars, 75 m/m guns (S.R.) and mountain guns.
?Mountain guns and recoilless guns have the same inconvenlences: Too weak of.
ftct of the shell In proportion to the tube's weight (for mountain pieces) and to the
Mortars, In spite of their greater dispersion and their short range, proved
much more utilizable. The 4 by 2 inch U.S. model 30, in particular, has given satls.
faction. (2)
"In one day, the rules can provide for renewal of a company's 24 rounds within
These assumptions are pt7-:-ly theoretical, since son,* of the mules must be reserved to
"Beyond one march of infantry, the output of the mule columns becomes negi.-Lblon
The bulletin concornin Infantry combat in mountainous terrain of May 10, 1951, states
that it is better to dispose of few weapons well provided ,Witb ammunition, then numerous
weapons with little amunition. This constitutes the condemnation of the company of
heavy mortars on pack, which can be defined as a unit having too many tubes and not enough
amunition,,. (3)
Yoreover, the vulnerability of the mules columns is,extreme; their protection
must be provided at all tims,.., The drain on personmel becomes prohibitiVe as coiuni.
cations extend".
(1) The mountain gun is blamed, furthermore, for Its complication and the recoilless gun
for the hardships due to roar belching out of flames.
(2) Let us renmbar that this mortar has a 5,350 motor range and that its probable do.
viation is only 1.3% of its range. The heaviest charge wi•i;hs 68 Kgs. and five
mules carry the piece, A eao of 2 rounds woighnlZ 32.600 Kgs, one mule can there.
fore carry 4 rounds. This results in a requirement for 134 mules to provide one
company with 8 piecos, with 28 rounds per piece.
(3) St'udy by a Colon,=.l Cs, :,udin, a ?1.bl C*,:,u•.l
12,0
to the enomy.
Or, artillery or mortar support must be replaced by air support upon request
and without delay. (2) Providing the pilot can easily and accurately pinpoint the
desired objoctivos.
in wooded areas*, Indeed, It Is out of the question to place along the route posts at
dlose enough intorvals to be able to watch all of them constantly. (3) These postsJ
would be truly efficient Only If the approaches to the road were cleared of all vegeta.
(2) Battalion Leader Xo,, con~anding a group of several Battalions,, states that one must
I "palliate the absence of artillery and any possibility of supplying via land or river
I by providing air support with fire and efficient transport by thio assionment of a
D..I.A. to their Staffs,,..".
(3) At the end of 1947, the VM. successfully attacked a convoy on the way to DALAT near
a post, thanlks to excessively covered terrain. Colonel de SAIRIGN1E was killed there..
(4) This system, aithou.-h quite costly, was used In South VIETNX-4 on portions of roads
or railroad Vracks that were particularly dangerouse.-It proved excellen~t. (For
example road from THU DAU MOT to LOC NINJI. Or a portion of the road from BIEN HOA
j to RARIA),
(1) Stu~dy by a Colonc.1, C:idi.a 1.obile Group,
121' "S
If the convoy is Important (100 or store vehicles), before launching it, the
I rout. and vicinity must be reconnoltorod,, fixed flank watchors must be emplaced in the
spots known to be danlgorous, the artillery O:ust be po~itionned in such a way that its
fire will cover at least the most exposed portions of the route, and mobile reserves
In the ,,securlty corridor" thus batablished, the vehicles are feely released,
. the onatty who mtight have Infiltrated and be lying in ambush can only attack a few
I of a rapid conumunicatIons syst•ci, and also reliable, between all the elements involved
I on the one hand, and on, the organization of aerial protectlonon the other handt con.
In conclusion, it: can be sald that the novci•ont of o motorized convoy in rebel
zone and in covered torrain rattst be planned like an actual operation. But boldness and
I the "dice throwing" must never be considered as a factor in the decision-making, for
any negligence in. tho area of security might bring disaster, (2)
--•- I
It Remainsito be noted that it was sometimes possible to resort to the airborne
- I element when security in a wooded arce became too slight. An aero-terrestrial base
then served as a real port, where the motorized columns came for supplies.
_ (1) Tho •ifticulty of aerial interventions in wooded areAs Is not to be pointed out.
In fact, only the marking of the obJectit•os by a light observation plane permits
efficient treatment of the enemy by the fighters and avoids mistakes.
. (2) We had such &n example in the end of June 1954 when the convoy of a Mobile Group
was taken by surprised. Casualties came to 50 killed, 253 wounded, 771 missing
" Iand 240 destroyed vehicles (a:ong which the equiptaent of an Artillery Group).
I I~II
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12.
Such was the case of the SENO base, which appeared like an Islard in the
i middle of the forest clearlng of the Middlo LAOS, and which grouLpod around a strip
i usable for Dakotas sno= important depots. One or two Infantry Battalions, reinforced
by armored elements, the Engineers and somo Artillery, provided for its defense against
I a raid, and furthor reinforcements could flow in, in case of a serious threat. Thus,
i t S$NO was the indispensable engagemnent point for the operations carried out in the
i (1
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Solo I (I) A portion of the t~raffic could be handled by the Mlekong until KRATIE.
il~i
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123 7,O',
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C H A P T E R IV
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COMMANDO ACTIONS
II
The War Without a Front is full of occasions to execute commando actions:
tics installations, ambushes, etc.. So, beginning with our spectacular raids on the
t Viet Minh Rears in the High Region until clandestine lendings along the Annam Coastline,
not to mention our actions against V.M, villages on the borders and inside the Deltas,
The same holds true on the Viet Minh side, and some of tho attacks on our
air-fields or C.P.s, as well as the sabotage of some of our depots can be considered
drawn, Universally recognized rules have been confirmed on every occasion, and it ap-
pears to us that success was closely related to accurate intelligoence, secrecy and mi-
least too often lacking precision, and this explains the relatively few occasions that
"This lack of useful Information is due to the lightness of the opposing CP.s
I as well as to the, secrecy with which the Viet Minh surrounded himself to well. It can
I also be traced to the dispersion of the depots, to their camouflage and especially to
On July 19, 1949, whon an amphibious back and forth raid was carried out on the
TAMQUAN station where the biggest railway supply depot.of the Viet Minh in Central
N f 6 l' (1)
- On July 17, 1953, during the airborne raid over the LANGSON depots, known as the
1947 in South VIETNAM to capture the impregnable NGUYEN BINH, to the unsuccessful dril j
lings of the DINASSAUTS in 1953-19541 And how many more encountered a solidly encampod
operation. All the more so bacause some of the Commando actions required the involve-
(2) - Result: 1,000 automatic rifles - 255 individual weapons a 6 trucks - 250 tires -
18,000 litros of gasoline - 55 motors - I ton of ammunition and considerable
equipmont.
The "MARS" airborne operation carried out In March 1951 on the Viet Minh work
shops and depots in South VIETNAI, can also be mentioned.
(3) - For eonmple, the North Vietnam Commando raids to destroy V.,. ammunition depots
which were concealed in the llmcatone quarries of the Along Terrestre Bay.
I
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125 "
By the same token, It would be useful to recall that the success of the
"HIRONDELLE" operation was due, for the most part, to the strict security measures
Rapidity of execution was our only asset in order to avoid the case when
The mobility and fluidity of the Viet Minh C,P.e allowed them to "go past
our nose" and there is no better example of this than the "LEA" operation
during which
the 1st Shock Battalion, was air-dropped over BAC KAN on October 7, 1947, only a few
hours after Ho CHI MIN| and his government had left the town.
But this "evaporation" of the objectives was again, encountered when depots
which the V.M. succeeded in evacuating or camouflaging wore involved, even when we
dropped paratroopers and the onemy only disposed of a few.minutes interval between the
For the protection of all depots was Insured by an alarm system and the
of time.
Consequently,. in order to win the speed competition entered Into by the V.M.
near to the objective as possible, and that these men regroup almost Instantanoous.
ly, take their bearings without hesitation and hurl themselves convinced that a
(1)-- PREPARATION OF THE "HIRO SLE'-OPERATION, from the report of the TAP Co;nnander
on the lessons to be dravm from the cantpalgn,
"The success of the operation dopendina on tho secrecy regarding its date and
point of execution, all plannification will be conducted with absolute secrecy by the
Group Coimnander with the only assistance of a G2 Officer. Orders from the G3 will be
issued only from July 15th. Between the time of the general briefing and that of the
embarking, Draconian measures will be taken to prevent any indiscretion through outside
contact. The units will be alerted beginning at 1400 Hrs on the 16th and restricted to
their quarters. The briefing of the Airborne Troops Comaandant will take place on the
16th at 1500 Hrs.
The Commanders of subordinate units will dispose of one hour to conduct their
Lt
individual briefings....
r The first tnke-offs Wrlll bo,,in at 700 the following day,
our purely terrestrial elements (Commandos and groups in the maquis) be capable
But of course, the nature of the terrain, the degree of training of our troops
I and the Viet linh vigilance were so many obstacles to the achievement of these conditions.
I
The withdrawal of ole9'ents having carried out a co=ando operation proved
J ust as delicate., except in the case of the makquis in place far out in the V.M, roars,
j and except in the case of an amphibious action, since the return was executed with the
same means as the first trip (for example: raids on QUIINION, TANQUAN, etc..).
But, when It was a question of raids by air or land from tones under our
control, the return problem conditionned the Importance of thq raid and even the do-
~ picuous and to live in an area subjected to the polit.•co-military hold of the Viet MinW1,
(2) and only particularly well recruited units managed to~live more than A few hours
:On the other hand, the saee problem did not confront the opponent, who could
vanish right away and~find hundreds of shatters within the villagesdurrounding the
!• obJ ectlivo. (4)
successive collection echelons. This is how, for the "HIIRONDELLE" operation, the Com-.
mander had to deploy, half-way between TIEN YEN and LANGSON, a strength three times more
!7
Finally, on a more general plane, which was that of the territory co•mandors
As it matters that all latitude be left to look for local objectives and to
! set up profitablo raids at the opportue time, at the sector and sone levels, as it is
Ij fitting that important undertakings and especially deep ,raids be planned, then launched
other actions, but converging as far as their effects are concerned. The V.M. provided
us with a strikinZ proof of this wuen they launched a series of sabotage actions on our
I air-fields of Tonkin at the time the first attockes on the entrenched camp of DIEN BIEN
- PH1U were boeinning. In addition, they stopped up their sabotage and ambush actions on
the railroad track and the roaid linking KM•PIONG and HANOI at.the same time.
IIn the saine manxter, our Commando raids on the shoies of the TANH HOA in Octo-
I ber-Novecibar, 1953, took place in conjunction with the "PELICAI" operation, which was
SThis coordination of Commando actions comes also under the aegis of opportunity,
for surface war-brings such an imbrication of formations that a tempting raid or sabotage
cAn cause regrettable reprl-als, as much for ourselves as for, the friendly populations,
We have had the bloody proof of this at the time of the enemy raid on the
I o
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SC H A P T E R V
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j RIVER AND COASTAL ACTIONS (1)
j During the whole campaign, the Viet Minh who proved to be a remarkable
not possess any small craft equipped for combat, but every time small transport boats
were suiprisod, .their personnel did not attempt using any ofitheir arms to defend
Ithemselves,
By somo contradiction, the V.M. who did not hesitate to launch nocturnal
assaults against our fortifications, always proved himself on water 'ItIMid and some-
times evet, chicken-hearted in the exploitation of the rasults obtained by fire or minos".
In no case did the enemy attevpt boarding actions, which many a time would have placed
Sbanks to contend with us for free traffic on the rivers (4) and in the form of:
- Either mines, controled from the bank in order to select the objective,(5)
Finally, sabotage actions by assault swirmors could be feared more than laying.
(1) Rjeadino this chapter should be preceded by that of Chapter XIII, Part 4 concern-
ing "RIVER FO.INATIONS".
(2) Excopt for a flotilla of a dozen craft of various types (ferries, tug-boats, etc.),
one of which was cquippod with a 75m/m anti-aircraft Sutt recuperated on the Aviso
"Admiral CHARINR", which had been found and taken during a raid made between RACH
j GIA and CAM.AU in robruary 1946 by a Section of the 6th R.I.C. boarded on 2 LOAs.
(3) Report by the Admiral, Comimandino MLaritime Forces in the Far-East.
(4) The eneny also erected barrages to cut all traffic on some narrow rivers and canals.
(5) Also because this type of mine was easy to use.
129 " "
The V.M. used of his art to got information and obtain the adhesion of popu.
lotions along the rivers through fear or persuasion, his meticulous preparation of the
least of his actionsi, his usual mastery in the utilisation of the terrain and camouflage,
finally his perfect discipline of fire, which always guaranteed him the initial surprise.
"nBut he could also count on the efficiency of the amphibious maquis. For the
V.M. was also well versed in the use of the countless flotilla of junks and sampans of
the locale to infiltrate everywhere and extricate himself. from the most minutely esta.
blished of our fqotctiona.j
"The systminatic. destruction of all. ndoeenous-.small boaLs detected during the
operations by our woapons has only touched a small proportion of a floating equipmont
well concealed. Betides, the method consisting of individual floats of the banana stump
typpe has been laroely utiiied".(I)
Moreover, the enemy liarned quickly how to combine action on our static ale.
Yseets (z0ilitary or river posts) and action on the units sent as reinforcements (river
'Convoys). On the other hand, the ae handicapped by 18the almost total absence of
was.
marine sense and the ignorance of the capabilities as well as the weaknesses of our
veaponsi.o
(1) Admiral, Cor.mandin the F.M.dE.O. (Marititeo Forces in the Far East).
I.
""tMost of tho time, one or two rocoilless guiis, a few mortars or automatic rifleo
g constitute the formation; or when the arms are more plentiful, they are widely deployed
along the banks"..(l)
I "There again, the search for protection (through dispersion) can projudice the
I efficiency of the attacks Our weapons, always poorly armored, would have resisted a
massive shook, unexpected, much worse than a fusillade or a cannonade extending in time
I and space and to which we were in a position to retort successfully after the first few
I direct ambush or the individual action against anchored boats and coordinate widely the
I operations in time and space in order to handicap our concentrations; he also showed a
lack of Inmagination in the selection of his modon and sites of attack which were practi.
have been eternal, and the increase in the opposing camp's possibilities, especially in
1 1954, threatened to make the three missions assigned to our River Forces much more difficul
- Storm Innding.
I - Security whild at anchor.
The methods devised to achieve these various tasks were improved over the nine
years of war according to our moans and those of the enemy, but without too much depth.
The following procedures, which were prevailing at the end of the war, were practically
"They are obsessed by the fact that, contrary to terrestrial forces, river
forces never have the opportunity to conceal themselves and rarely that of withdrawing.
On the other hand, they have the advantage of being able to generally combine weight,
therefore power and mobility. So, if tactical surprise is in a large measure denied them,
the strateeic surplrise Is liable to be one of their greatest assets". (2)
(I) -Admiral, Commanding the F.M.E,O .
(2) Somietimes even over a several kilometers stretch, as in the battle of DAY Loop, in
Ni.tr.ibc.r, 1952, vh.rn approximatoly 20 75r./m and 57 mn/m pieces and more than 150
lc re stzrwn ovc;.r hilo:-cýtcr of tcrrain.
~~~~~13 1 ' w ," '"q" ,•
' CONVOYS*. Any group of ships navigating together (whether carrying charge weapons) adopted
"At the front sailed the "clearing group" which comprises three sweeping
I msections, plus a spare sweeper. One LoC.M. Monitor serves as guide to the formation.
A large piece of ordnance is in support about a hundred meters bohing the tail sveepers".
"Behind the clearing group, at a variable distance according to th. river oon-
I figuration, but remaining within 2 to 300 metors, comes themain portion, in line of
Monitors)Y,
I - Charge ships or weapons (L.S.M.-L.C.T.-L.CM.. various lighters) (1)
j When there is only one support ship, it sails at the rear and carries the
Senior Co•=sander. When there are two, one of them sails in front, and the o her brings
up the rear, the latter carrying the Senior Commander (except in case of partic"larly
When there are more than two, they are distributed among the front, center
and reari the one carrying the Senior Commander occupying the center position.
watch or ship masters permits. A distance of 50 meters between large ships and 20
the swept channel, it is sometimes advisable to distribute the ships or charge weapons
over two columns, to alleviate congestion of the formation as well as to insure a recl.
-- procal cover for the columns (case of an attack on both banks). The solution of having
At night the ships and engines sail without lights. Exceptionnally, some
lamps with subdued flash can be "shown" to allow the capture or holding of a post".
"Those night river operations gave rise to much rarer and much less powerful
onemy reactions that during the day (let us note that it is ritich oeasie to detoet
j enemy weapons at night than it is during the day because of the departure flashes)".(I)
Theso various dispositions limited the effect of ambushes; but, when intol.
ligonac at hand gave a hint as to the probability of an encounter and capecially when
his approxiiative position could be guessed, a series of additional measures could be
taken: (2)
"Where the C.L,A, (Light Escort Companies) composed of Dinassauts and fro-
qoently reinforcotent troops are embarlted, and maintained on the alert to land for the
assault. The shipst crews aro at their comabnt positilns ahead of, time",
"In the phase of presentation, proventive bombings can be carried out on the
suspected bankcs, either by the ships' artillery (particularly 120%/m mortars) or even
by the air support elements when we dispose of corresponding credits of flight missions
In this respect, it was necessary "navigate to the post on guard, react ins.
tantancously .with the moons actually set up in perinanence, go straight to the combat,
position and obtain cover from an intense firing of all arms until forcing of the pas.
sage is achieved".
(2) Namely, this was the case on some of the Tonkin rivers.
(
"° !II
-
.
I OFFICIAL USE ONLY
132 A
.3 Maino-swoepor
+ 1 mine-sweoper (spare)
!4 convoy
Command rid
support (1)
LSIL or LMSL
(Hig1h Command)
0
,
h et r
si
:z •:n
t.e cit is forward; it is the
(1) dhen there i3 a z-in,1e support ,ship,
•
.. •z! .
"r
commanding-
; :...
ship.
-:_: are 2 -isut ort ships,
Then there the cormnrvnd is in rear.
'...It
(2) z; ?. ,;
:l;:t 77•c, " ,•t,. or tiod in c.u:, .
133 .• ,., ,t' "'I: e.ll
"This is the taotics referred to as "ball of fire"' which after all is said
and done, has been our best defence for our river elements, where fire power has al-
ways prevailed over protection".
In this type of engagement, always short and brutals energy and swiftness
are the prerequisite qualities. It would be folly to search for different tactical
combinations besides the closing up of the formation, designed to reinforce reciprocal
support and the Immediate fire power".(1)
non-controlod zones".
Its major disadvantago is that It only inflicts moderate losses to the enemy
almost always carefully entranched; it neutralises him more than it destroys! it is
not very well adapted to the cover of prior sweeping of mines (it is useful to note
however that the enemy who wants to successfully ambush the main part of the convoy
is reluctant to twnvail his formation for minor vessels of the advance guard)"f. (1)
On the other hand, when we had wind of an ambush, it was possible to provide
..
"a methodical counter-action by an assault landing".
The latter can only be carried out at the ends and tends to "maneuver the
r| opponent by encircling, which is a rather hazardous proposition, when one disposes of
few convoy troops".
So, some Navy men advocated: "'The systemiatic destruction of enemy positions,
being attackedone by one with methodical and appropriate fire performed if necessary
by stopped, even aground vessels. The forthcoming landing of escort troops taking
place right in,the heart of the position under cover of an intense, close fire".
t n --
...-
Y°'"1°1•I.. -'O"°>"•
I " " ".. .. ° .J.I
L 0'
lMonitor MA•n.Ror
1 or2 Oilou2
2 fSs Ie' Front de
Q debarquemenL
3to 6 316 Twice the:lThndihg f1iont
ObUin/
orrn .(re 0
i SLLSIL U
11cl.:. L C1
0 R
I or2Wjop
LSIL
I "This method has the unquestionable advantage of adquately overcoming
the
( ambush and Inflict heavy losses to the enemy, both in personnel and material,
When
carried out with determination and boldness, it can lead to a smashing success (1),
likely to discourage for quite some time enemy attempts, all the
more repeated that
f they count on a relative impunity".
the mission",
J-' "In addition, no matter what the adopted method, partlcipation of land
or
air artillery fire is rarely feasible at the time of crossing. But they must inter-
vene whenever possible, before and e.specially after the crossing",.(2)
"During the period from January to June, 1954, the Artillery Staff of the
South Zone at NAM DINH, provided on nuerous occasions some DoL,O,s aboard
the convoys'
escort vessels on the Rod River".
Such a system was highly praised by the sea-mn, %,ho have always insisted
to
insure that a D.L.O. was present amon&.iheir convoysi-,. Actually, convoys were
rarely
attacked and experience showed that In such a case the, protection afforded by
the Art.
illery was an illusion"t.
(1) Such as the engagement of March 27, 1954'at the 85 kilometer p6int of the Middle
"Red River,
(2) Admiral, Com!anding the F.ME.O,
•' "'I • , ''- E+"i('
STOR• LANDINGS.- Durina ambush crossing, as montioned Above, landing of troopo merely In.
I volvod small forces and only led to the temporary occupation of a narrov strip of land.
Any other landings wore carriod out in conjunction with a large scale terrestrial
I operation.
. , The problem then, was to got units often hoavily equipped (artillery, armored
*lemonts, supplies) close to the bank in art hostile or suspected area. The action was
I scheduled according to our decisions however, and was no longer some sort of a counter.
AlthouSh the effect of surprise was always sought after in such a case, the
i The launching was possible during the day as well as during the night, but the most
"I "The convoy bearing the troops (cownposed of L.C.T. or L.S.M.) was preceded at
S a distance of 1,000 to 1,500 meters by a "shock group" which.was sailing behind the
".clearing group"o described earlier. This "shock Groupt normally included two support
I vessels (L.S.S*L. or L.S.I.L.), one as a guide, the other.bringing up the rear (One of
them carries the Senior Commander, Navy, and the Troops Commander), guiding three to six
armored L.C.M. which carried the companies forming the first wave with two to three
L.C.M. per companyt The whole formation was accompanied by one, or two L.C.M. Monitors
sectionsW. (3)
Whentho ensemble arrived before the intended landing, beach: "The shock Group
landed with maximum spend; the guide vessel separating to.Sain an interval equal to
I about twice the landing front. It defiled before this front letting out a preventive
Sfire at close renge and landed without stopping on tho front baser.
II
13i
"The LOC*M of the first wave, closed doors and the rear vessel sailed back
' tup inthe waters of the guide, wiped everything at the same time and landed in a fashion
similar to that of the roar vessel, which took up the rear base position".(l)
I *'During the landing of the shook companies, carried out in combat position with
j! the maximum of speodt the two base vessels covered with fire the two flanks of the forma.
tion while the LXC.M. sections "onitors patroled above and below the base vessels, or
observed .the non-engaged bank, The LC.M. for transport disengaged as soon as ready".
"Durins this -phase, the convoy remained stationned at about 1,500 mete's on
"I "As soon as the shock companies had established,their, beach-head and after
I. "notice from the Troops Commander, the Navy Senior Commander gave the order to the convoy
to take its turn. The L.CT. then came to shore in the front line within the orenol
I formed by the two support vessels that had stayed on shore as bases".
f ,,The landing of battalions and equipment was then carried out without preci-
pitation and without losing any time, and the transport vessels, wore withdrawn immedia-
I rtoly after".
f I"This method has always given excellent results, for the landings, taking place
at a well chosen point and benefitting of the surprise effect, Ot least relative, rarely
I encountered doliborate opposition from an opponent batter.sulted for the ambush than
Sensemble of landings, and in the Tonkin, the simultaneous landing of forces having the
As soon as the terrestrial units had reached their destination, the river
Selements were rogrouied in order to provide fire support according to a plan conceived
j between the Terrestrial and Naval Forces, The vessels could also provide transport: sup-
port and the big ships were, furthermore, frequently used as floating C,P.s for the
land rn
(1) 1,"Oore were two to three J. per company, in order to leave every facility of
P..
moveoment to the troops at.the time of beachin%.- The shock companies were either
thn C.L.A. Din sritts, ,ordati-ch-•onts specially constituted by the battalions to
land.
(2) Admiral, Corsanding the FI.E.O.
PROTECTION OF MOORINGS,- "The list of our losses or deunage for the whole canpaisgn shows
that attacks at anchor have been mora dangerous thaft eogagements on the way-o(1)
The term mooriugs applies to all stopping of vessels and battle ships, whether
they are anchored at some distance from the bank, voluntarily aground or not, beached
In the latter came "1the enemy has all the time in the world to prepare his
I mations which are ctuibersome and costly, but powerful. One of the banks is, by dofi.
Snition, under our complete control, eatd the opposite bank is generally covered by friend-
ly elements".()
I The parry to combat swirn-ors attacks or floating mines (2) has been sought
I after by placing nets aslant mid upstreun in relation to the current, and by consider.
Ing the fact that this current could change with the tides.
I The watch and guard were constant worrios and systematic fire on every drifting
j object, patrols .on vessels, preventive grenade launching, and finally lighting of the
I All these methods are all right, but they are.insufficient and the Captain,
SI Commanding the River Forces in South Indochina, complained in 1954 that different parries
had not been envisaged against the actions of the combat swimmers:
S- horizontal leadsmen,
I
1138 ',, t, . ,,i, .. ,''', ,. ,,.',;., ,•i:,
Sthe latter is inefficient, the whole mooring operation con be in dansert this Is how
"in the beginning of 1954, the harassing by mortars of vessels anchorod at SEPT PAGODIES
I finally made this position impossible to hold and the first Dinassaut had to be with-
f case for the security of sensitive points and the defensive organization of the river
j Inthe case of occasional moorings, the opponent rarely had the time to pre-
pare his attacks slowly, and the usa of combat swimmors or of drifting minos is then
i not to be feared so much* The enemy intervenes mostly by harassing with automatic '
weapons, with light artillery pieces or mortars, quietly poaltionned and aimed durit.g
the night.
taining of the crows to the watch post, etc,.) lights completely out, and as far as
I possible, changes of moorings during the night, in order to upset the previously set
j battery positions".
The water plan is patroled by small craft. Liaison between vessels out of
I sight is carofully attended to, in particular for the "sealing" formations, where the
Ssaying that the front of the beaching must be covered by a landed element or at least
Sby "alarms". But such a solution is always hazardous at night and mooring right in the
,I was finally abandonned for occasional moorings as beina incompatible with the
necessity to be able to rig without delay.
139 " .
banks which give a deceiving security as they hinder the freedom of reaction fire,
provoke the risks of error and impose hardships for re-embarkling in case of unecpected
B as it may, and in spite of a few successes, the enemy did not exploit fully
the possibilities of attackinS ,our vessels at anchor and particularly, he never used
V his medium caliber artillery, whose blows would have beon deadly for our ships.
with the hardships of ships, could use moans similar to those in the Viet Minh's posses.
sion at the end of the war, to Interdict the practice of anchoring outside of zones
SCOASTAL lAP1HIXIOVS ACTiONS.. The rarity of our operations in Viet Minh.controled tones
con be the reason why our amphibious actions ,along, the 2,400 kilomaeters of Indochinese
coasts have boon rare. Until 1952 they were restricted to raids and actions of the
maritime watcli vessels conducted with their own means to destroy on land the accessible
However, the advantage of such landings and their techniquo had been clearly
"In Annam, as on the Cambodia coastline, large portions of coasts are practi.
cally inaccessible by land and amphibious operations are sometimes imperative in order
A rapid transport), It is necessary to call on the Navy which will make use of Its big
I,"Therefore it will rather rare to be able to land directly on dry land some
- or on small boats on board, motor boats, youyous, or on M,2 boats of the Engineers,
"If the operation does not justify the asbistance of ,the Navy, routing of the
S"In this case the embarked forces are small and do not include Infantry *1*-
ments. Orders are given before departure and each has his mission at the time of landing:
rebel bands-on sea as well as weapons smuggling, search of the islands and execution of
obstruct the withdrawal of pursued Viot Minh bands, constitute as many real small-scale
amphibious operations".
(1)" In addition, Terrestrial Forces usually lack tho necessary amphibious training;
IL there were no assaults against positions on the littoral liable to be solidly de-
fended, but a simple landing on beaches non-hold although often mined, the tactical
formation being tied to the embankment, atter regrouping of the units. (Captain
Commanding the Naval Division in the Far East),
!
I
14 1 Y
"Those actions are generally the responsibility of Marine Commando* on board,
Sto the Maritime Surveillance elements sometimes reinforced by land units, and commanded
The frequency, of these raids and their Importance tended to increase along with
the V.M. capabilities and as the coasts offered more tempting objectives. Moreover,
i the enemy maritime traffic d06reased and we were led to look for supplies and Junks on
solid ground.
I "The general lesson to be drawn from these raids, independently of the progres.
I sire changes brought to the constitution (vessels and troops) of the executing forces
i o"the "punch" tactic, a standard one among the Commandos, is always more productive
I than the so-called "sealing" tactic, as the net in most cases closes In on Innocent po-
pulations who then become practically the only ones to pay for the operation".(1)
S, Starting In 1952, more Important operations were launched In spite of the It-
numerous forces, the landing problem was not altogether solved. The L.S.T. were usually
I not capable of beaching with the first wave, and anyway the sites permitting such a
Therefore we had to use small craft such as the L.C.M. and L.C.V.P. which
Shad to be brought on the scene. But the -1FOUDRE, which is the only vessel we disposed
j of for such type of transport was put in service only in July 1953.(2)
Our amphibious actions during the last two years of the War were thus limited,
- being practically always coupled with a ground maneuver, while the synchronization
(2) Until then, we could only transport small craft on plane tenders of by means of
fortune*
142 '] ,; •
None of these operations was a failure, but they all disclosed various degrees
In 1952 the Admiral, Coinanding the Naval Division in the Far East pointed
out a lack of coordinatlon(l)i "These landings took on the forin of a "settinS in position"
of the units transported by L,S,Tas. The "UI" Hour determined was the time limit of land-
I"n of the last elements on board, instead of being, according to the official and logi-
cal principle at the base of combined operation, the time of landing of the first elements"
"The result being that the troops, sent aground with the maxim•m of secrecy,
had to wait sometimes for several hours before getting on with their progress, in order
to comply •ith the pre-dotermined time-table. Under these conditions, one could wonder
what was loft of the elcxnt of surprise which seemed to be so important to the operation
Co-:.TiderV*
* the Services, which must be evident in the plenificatlon as woll as the preparation and
"@qualified Reprosentatives of the Navy, the Air Force, as well as the Airborne
if the air-drop of a unit is envisaged, must hold preliminary moetings with the Opera.
the maneuver on ground and the technical capabilities of the other forces."
phase, the choice of beaches can only be determined after agreeiaent with the Navy, taking
into account the available means (number and nature of the vessels and barges), of the
f.• (1) During 1952 the QUADRILLE, CABESTAN, CAMIN operations had been executed,
ii
[i
143 03 *
"A possible postpornment, of the launching date for the operation and reduction
action against the troops and boats might be latmohed during Phe landing. The amphibious
phase.must not be considered like a simple treuisport operation".
"The LCT. and L.C.M. utilized were river craft, that is they had been modified
(armor, top) which,makes them inadequate for their 'initial mission, coastal landings, as
their manoouivrability and loading capacity is reduced, or transfer operations hindered",
* "The L.C.V.P. wore not in sufficient number to allow simultaneous and rapid
landing of the three L.ST, which, in turn, sometimes did not haveenough transfer nats:
"The main obstacle to rapid execution of landings was the lack of training of
the troops, who for the most part were incapable of descending with their gear along
the transfer nets which they had to use, since the ramps were usually reserved for
[1
I
144 ,
The QUI NHON landing was actually $$executed in order to confront, during a
storin attack, the organised resistance of a regular regimeant supported by regional for.
mations. But, like in the previous operations, we found a non-defended coast. }Iowovert
the firin executionof units whose major elcments had undergono the C.E.A.C. training
The wav ctune to an end before the amphibious actions .ona large-scale envisaged
for the Suir.or of 1954 could be carried out(2)o So we can understand the followinS
6pinion expressed In an overall report on the conduct of the Naval Wiar in Indochina.
"It can only be rearetted that the seas over which we exercised total control,
and which wore easily passable from April to August along the involved coasts, did not
take more room in the general plans of operation"(l) providing of course measures for
But such actions implied that we could dispose of sufficient forces to conduct
the battle on the various territories at the same time and to open. a new operational
sector. Those conditions, undortunatoly, were not met; therefore it vas useless to
wait for amphibious operations, the fixation then destruction of Important V.M. Forces.
!l f
(2( They were designed to extend the "ATLANTE" operation by a series of similar
I attacks.
I I
F 0 U R T ,H P A R T
!I _-._-
* 1 I
$!
I I1 146 ,
SITO ADAPT the ombat procodu.es and the structure of,the units to
!The #tyranny of the terrain" has asserted Itself, especially due to the lack of
good roads and the length of the tones of difficult crossing (brush, forest, rice-
Even with a country-type service like the Infantiyj, the lack of adaptationI
was acute and all Co~mpany Cor-anders could weoll observe: "We are too heavy, not
Commanders cried upon returning from a mission against the DU-KICH: "You can't
the most effective tire support, but also the most destructive.
obtained different results. The Infantry, for example, has often had to do without the
support of tanks and the artillery, while deploring that its action "frequently fell in
a vacuum, before an enemy that vanished"(1). In many instances the Artillery "did not
see the objective and did not possess any exploitable intelligence on the encwnyý142).
Tanks found it extremely difficult to deploy, Logistics was slow, its output poor and
Our formation of now-type units or operational groups met with the require.
ments of the peculiar forms of combnt, but this solution to the problem of adaptation
- In 194ý the Units of the Expoditionary Force uere heavy and awkward (9th D.I,C.,
The mobile groups designed to be utilized in the deltas proved inadequate for
- The lituantry battolions of the type "F.T.E.O.", created for the rice-field combat
"were handicapped every time they vtere utilized in the brush. Wihen they were used as
the defense ror the posts or the defense of a base of maneuver, their 9utput was
slowed down,
In addition:
- The heavy vehicles, particularly some armored vehicles, were not adapted to the
terrain of Indochina.
- The administrative system of the troops was still impregnated with the peacetime
Such are the critics we have found aniong many of the reports.
- The light Vietnamese ba¶ttalions (TDKq), whose principle was good, but the use of
which •w•s not always appropriate, and whose training remained insufficient.
Whothor with tho cadres jointly formed or with various units of each Service,
come procedures wore tried, succossive chaones waore snade. In view of the experienoe of
Ar. asscntial characteristic of the Indochina War was the chronic wear of
personnel never constituted a defense against the constant erosion that afflicted
the formations of all Services because of the harassinZ nature of the operations, of
the absence of any truce, and of the practically permanent shortage of.personnel.
More than any other, the Infantry suffered from those ills and many com.panies
fitted the description a Lieutenant gave of his unit in the Spring of 1954:
"#This Comipany has no Captain. The Company Corrandor is a young Lieutenant.
He only has one Officer under him instead of two; the Serjleant-Major, wounded, is in
the h~spital; only one of the Section Leaders, a Master-SerJcant, is the recipient of
cerned; the sergeants are generally good, even excellent. The strength (175) is
achieved. But in the field, the Lieutenant only takes along about a hundred men.
As a matter of fact:
Indochina: thoy are the infantry and operational unfit - physically defective
for one reason or another whom the Company Commander is requested to employ at
"I"This Company has been a part ofa Mobile Group Battalion for 4 years.
The 14.0. has had ton daya of respite in April 1953; for the last nine months, it
has been marches, counter.%marchen, and fighting without interruption. The forces
ihave been supplomontod by a reinfor•mennt -of 25 NCO's and men who have never used a
woapor in the field, have never fired at night, nor thrown grenades".
just srrived and not used to it yet, is bothoerd by it cj11. ,k far as I a=f' rccol-
loct as nn officer (some are in their third turn), the Battalion has hover boml
the ar1 of tha conflict no mntter what the service branch; for a war, even a vic.o
torious one, ends with a handful of vetorans and, a mixture of recalled medical dis-
chmvgos and draftees hastily put In shape. But this vituation untortunatoly be-
came that of our Infantry, for soon as the units arrived with Mirshall LECLERC9
THE PERSOENL MID OFFICER, CRISIS4- While it was not contested that; Indochina neoded
the facilities to maintain a huge supply of mat~erial, and little by little she was
provided with food, inmuniticn and spare reserves for a duration of 4 to 6 mos.,,
nothing was ever provided to replace the men who fell nor to Insure the rest of
the units that had reached the limits of human endurance.
'the muther country has always calculated the Expeditionaey Force per-
sonnel in relation to the 7equirorents of the moment. It was therefore far
i
I+
S151 f
but they would have to give up the establishmtent of now battalions, new
they would throw all their human rossouroas in the fight against the emer-
gonce of new oppocino units and they would do without any flyina personnel.
Many a tivie they had to wait tor the arrival of a ship to regroup their
battAlion which had just suffered heavy losses, or to satisfy the SOS sent out by
such Territory CGmmander or such Service Commander. At the time of the DIEN-BIEN.
POU battle there subsisted for example no other reinforcement available than about
a hundred legionnaires and 200 to 300 North African riflemen, results of the G-l
ec¢on.om1y,..
obvious truth: Even more than in a European war, a campaign outside of the Metro-
polls must be conducted with a large reserve of flying men and officers. This
flying reserve must be established and regularly procured in several depots where
the new arrivals will complete their training while adapting to the, country.
sence of which characterized all the ills suffered by the troops, should be at
of the regiments was the exception, each battalion (or unit of the same size)
had to leave approximately 1/10th of its personnel on the rear to provide for Its
Ji material needs and to e"ploy the convalescing or the unfit for the field.
I
as the missing wore not replaced, and the replacnent elements generally did not
come until the moviant whorn the number of combatants faell under two-thirds of the
established force.
In the Infantry, at the time the last years of the war began, at least
half of the junior off icers and 11COts wore in their second teorm and strongly folt
the eoffects of a physical as well as moral fatigues In addition, the Infantry had
been fozriodp for a third of it approximetely, by cadres who wore notlonger able
to adequntely fulfill thoir task, either because reservists or elements from other
b.anchos had been called upon, or because elcmnts obviously •too old to co=and
were lacking in tactical cxporionce and many troop lenders were led to write:
"The importnnco of the training and the resistance of the Infantry cadres
does not have to ba dvaontrated any more. It saeos that the Infantry should have
a school whore, with appropriate courses, the officers called upon to assume Coom.
On the other hand, the young officers who care from other branches have.
for the greater part, adapted themselves quite well and quickly to the severe re-
"After a few months of training in the rice fields, the substitute Infantry
Officers of my Battalion became real infantrymen. They had used their pride to
I
I served In the Infantry had acquired An enriching expaieonce, buts it ould b* in
the general intorest however to limit the duration of their assignmeont to about
f 12 months",
To swu up, all these findings are not nOlt whather involved in a colonial
|I extranoly greater woaring down of men and even moro of ICO's than all the other'
j arms,
Icient numbor and regularly. For each Section Leader and each Company Commanders
I one or two possible roplacaants who will complete thoir Initiation in a training
I GAPS IN THE TRAINING.- Certainly, rost of the units included, durin'gthe last years
of the war. a good percentage of voterans, who started or comploted a second turn.L
Swho
only had a few months of service and had only received a much too brief
I instruct ions
There is not one officer who did not emphasize the disastrous results
"...Many small scale operations would have had a happy ending...if the
I
had been bettor trained. .e." Sriflemen
j "The three usual deficiencies of the French Infantry were felt once again...:
Major X...dwells on night firing: "In this war of Indochina, one had to
I
fire at close range according to one's judgment. But my mon had never experienced
6 such fCiring techniques In the Motropolis. This lack seems all the more serious
that no one can advance that, even in Europe, an opponent would niot attack our
bases of oporations, with the come moant as the V.M. so successfully used here".
Hanoeuverability bocamne more and more difficult and the battalions called
on the artillery and aviation more and more to settle the Incidents that intil-
tration or liCht weapons' fire could have liquidated. The increase in the expen.
dituro of unit•ltlon roflouets this increasingly greater role which was given to
4,800 tons (1) of projectiles and in 1954 it consumed 8,900 tons for a quantity
The sme kind of ogrosS occurred in Central VIETNAM, since the 11,200
- In Tonkin 1,980 tons per trimester in 1954, for a force which certainly
These figures do rot have an absolute meaning, of course, for their inter-
pretation would require consideration of various other factors; on the other hand,
their general trend is quite clear: There was more and more fire, but the effects
sary to form thorn on the spot before they could be put to work. "This Is how some
young soldiers Just arriving spont five months in conmiunLoations training before
being assigned to a fornation; five months of stay which were not productive finan-
arrivina in Indochina, since it wis obvious that the increaso in strength of the
Expeditionary forco ••s accomplishod to the exponse of quality and that we could
AFRICA did not produce any noteworthy rosults, either because too many men or NCO's
had been there, or bocause tho training periods were too short, or because their
create low ranking 4COt's, if nothing else to give the best combatants the neces-
except...those of the Infantry. The follotffng statistics computed for 1953 bear
this out:
- 14% of the Artillery personnel had undergone training during the year.
- 12% of the Enginoers personnel had undergone training during the year.
I -,.'~
and only 6% of the Infantry personnel, among whom were of Courne the India-
"With the exception of the preparation to the second degree Armed Services
certificate (and only a very small portion of the possible candidates wore Inter-
esaod) at the Territory echelon, and I and 2 squads of the Foreign Legion, no sort-
"##In the other territories, where the units have a certain stability, the
training of Infantry cadres was given under the most satisfactory conditions; how-
ever, they still could be improved", for the battalions in formation were too In-
"teorio to be capable of leeding squads of NCO's. On tho other hand, the Legion,
for which the roeigiont formula was never abandoned, could well accomplish this
task, and this fact constituted one of the argunonts which, In 1953, led to a slew
return to tho fonaula of the hoinoacnous, MG.G, arrangod around an Infantry Regiment.
Unfortunately, nothing could'be done "for the light grenadier, the most
scarce, the most precious, the hardest to train specialist of the whole Infantry".(1)
"flvery battalion co:iriandier could add his regrets for not being able to
provide for the instruction and training prescribed durinv operations or combat,
but for which he had never had the time nor the moans to achieve seriously. And
Training Center, whore individual units and reinforcement elCcients would have
stayed upon their arrival in Indochina, where they would have been rapidly con-
ditioned and adaptcd to the country and the guorilla. Such training camps would
o
Sl1
| _
157
have been very valuable for annual reviews which wore so nocessaryt" (1)
of which was conceived to accomodato one Mobile Group, were organized, and
it was decided that the N, G.'s vould go through one of these "areas" in turn
Mien the war was over, many minds had undergone some evolution,
After having deplored the increasing deficiencies of the troops and cadres#
formation, but having re-stated with no lss vigor that we could not, at the
sLUe time "ware war and provide for training," most of the authorities finally
admitted that we had to roturn to the solutions of the preceding wars, where
The outlay of instructors and necessary means could not, in any case,
Force personnel was absorbed in 1954 by instruction duties, and 1/200th would
have boon the maxiunw, had the other necessary schools boon organized.
EVACUATION AND GEAR.- If the Expeditionary Force suffered from a chronic per-
sonnel shortage, it succeeded in saving the maximum of men from diseases and
the other hand, the tardy appearance of the helicopter made It difficuli for
a long time to transfer patients from the place where they were %vunded to the
[ Z
[() Letnn Z...- H. 0. Io.snc sIist1anI t.i IlI ..
Out of the 45,000 man' from French Union formations who were wounded from
1946 to the end of hostilities, 15,000 wore repatriated to the Metropolis, but
detailed accounts in the chapter devoted to the Medical Corps, but it is impora-
tive to point out here the progress which was achieved compared to the colonial
Force suffered from the mediocrity, oven the Inadequacy of supplies and equipment.
* the efforts of the Metropolis, the U.SAo, and also the Services to which Lleuten.
I ant X,9 pays tribute In the following torms: "In spite of obvious difficulties,
Imy company had fresh food to eat most of the time and we often had ice; as a whole,
clothing and gear were adequate. The services did their very best to enable us
mI
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i
CHAP TER II
The Mobile Group has been, in Indochina, tha adaptation of th. Tactical
Group formula, It is however worthwhile noting that the Mobile Group has not &I.
ways constituted the basic tactical uait. In the Command calculations, the evalua-
tion of the voltwie of the vioais was frequently done on rho basis of "battalions"
- finally, and mostly, they absorbed only about a third of the Infantry,
At the beginning of the camipaign, the Big Units arriving from the Metro-
polls: 9th D.I.C., 3rd D.I.C., 2nd D.B., were overpowerful and too heavy. The
units became the Infantry Battalions, artillery groups and units of the same
size. Only the Foreign Legion regiments subsisted, and even though, their battal-
But, although the Viet Minh, at that time, had not yet constituted any
powerful forezatlons, the necessity for the Comand.to dispose of Joint Services
Frog 1946 to 1950 the old formula of Morocco was put to use: the mobile
I
160
,ld
\I U1: 4 a
coltanm, boaring the name of its chief. For each operation the one who was to com.
it •as dosignated, a stAff was "set-up" for him - It was provided with a
amend
From 1950 on - the creation and the Increasing Importance of the V.M.
1951), tho form of opoerations Itsolf, which in the surface war sometimes took on
the aspect of "whilwind maneuvers" where the battalions pnssod from one commiand
to another more and more frequently as the convaunications links became ntore scarce,
led the Cowiand to strike out the European foriiula by creating permannnt Joint
One of thc~i already existed: the North African Mobile Group. Four others
wore created by Marshal do LATT1U2 shortly after his arrival in Indochina in order
to face the grave threats which hun- over the Tonkinose Delta. Their number in-
creased and their maxiniun was reached in 1951: 11 M.G.'s composed of French Union
turn to the Divisionary formula was undertlcen from 1954 by uniting several Mobile
Groups (Light Divisions). Thus, the Indochina war was to see once Ajnin the Divi-
sion Echelon which had ch•ractariZed its baginliin.. But the evolution closing
The Coiia•ad facilities of the tf.G. included a limited staff, a well provi.
! .
reinforcements, and finally a comand company and services that included a defend.
the use of field telephone, the complete motorisation of the C.C.So and of the
bile Group could, in case of a crisis, rapidly become a very powerful complex,
troops, taling advantabe of a fiold of action prepared by the provincials, the re-
time: the Legion - North Africans - Africans - Indigenous. These battalions dis-
An Artillery Group was an organic part of the M.G. It was entirely motor-
: ~ized and included t~hroe gun batt:eries• composed of four 10510.12 pieces* In cert~ain
M.G. this group was replaced by a Heavy Mortar Company (in view of the shortage
of tubes and artillerymen). The M.G. was often provided with considerable rein-
The M.G. was not provided with any of the services (except for a very
limited medical service to the C.C.S.,) for it was initially conceived to operate
ter, or in some cases (ATLANTE Operation, for example), by some sort of a base
did not give rise to any severe critics. Only the Infantry structure has been the
II
In the opinion of some, the diversity of the ba~tailns constituted a fact
tor for efficiency for "the mixing of different units allowed us to draw the maxi.
The partisans of the hatorogonous MC., maintain that !'the formula produced ex-
This diversity was no doubt necessary at the time when maneuvers stayed
within the N.G. framoworl. It was hardly Justified from the moment when sovoral
at the end of the war in Indochina was thus loaning toward the regrouping of the
"battalions of the sozo race into one regimont, constituting the Mobile Group's
"On the tactical plano, the search and destruction of the enemy and his
bases by isolated M.G.Is composed of several of the Arm Battalions has become
passe: there is always some advantage in that the M.G.'s be horilogenous". (3)
has been a failure, ruveryone likes to serve under the orders of a Colonel who
wears the same badge and who is considered as responsible of his units in all
"Mixing of races must be avoided. The throe battalion M.G. under the
orders of his Colonel is clearly preferable to the mixing for three main reasons:
bettor developed esprit-de-corps in battle, noral ties, management of personnel
a fourth Indigenous Battalion integrated within the N.G, can give excellent
Ia
The M.G, working alona oni a terkitori'xI occupation, plb~n of the tprrain Is
either too important for the result .anticipated If th'eaeney disporsies, snd slips
ayor insufficient if the enov&y accepts to fight on surgace. rn all, the XG.I
constitutes a formaction which Is too easily I'iialoiviouvrabl~e" for the enemy. (2)
I
Mobile Groups and capable ofproviding for theilr ov'rtsecurlty or to attempt to,
conduct concentrAc madneuivers ldestined to izl th enemy fri~ its fa~culty ito dippore.st
The efficiency of the M.,G. was equally variable etccording to the terrain.
"My W.MG.'s organization Perniitte A very hondrable co~iduct In all opera-
4 tions it participated in around the Delta. 1.4ut it In cortaili that from the moment
Istics of tho torrain nor of the envy we have encounterod on the PLATEAUS". (I)
Indeod, the mcans of the K.C, only allowed its full efficiency in areas
"#"It s•ems that the M,.G. was actually concoived to operate in view of acti-
vitles within reach of a road network. Indeed, the some hundred twenty organic
vehicles IL disposed of inexorably tied It to the road, and to those were added
the necessary means of traneport for the relnforcc-nent units and the impediments
Scounterpart in auto colunuis. Their approaches woro such that,, except in rare open
"areas, it was difficult to doploy. In many spots, they wore strewn with perfectly
J So, in the Arens with a very poor density of road (Plateaus, Middle-LAOS),
progressively passed under control of the V.M. The latter had installed a real
the roads and maintaining the communications connections with narrower and nar-
in the Immediate vicinities of the road and they had no place to outflank broadly
"In addition, the battalions could not go more than 10 kilometers away
I
from the road on each side without risking the loss of their guns' support* On
the opposing side, all the V,.M had to do was not to get closer than 10 rous. from
the t4.G. axis In order to be invulnerable unless the infantry chose to commit Ito
Even in the aroas where the road network was satisfactory other imperfec-
(including if necessary sone radios carried on backs) and free of liaisons with
the rear as much as possible, and a REAR C.P., grouping all the non-indispensable
moans In front, and consequently vary heavy* The Security Section provided for
the ToE.D. was In any'caso very insufficlent to maintain the ensemble. It could,
- "A•S for the REAR C.P., it had to insure its own close security by keeping
stationed in a post or In the immediate vicinity of a territorial formation.
This was a real handicap as far as the M1.G.0s mobility was concerned".
(convoys, route guards, etc.), In most cases, only two battalions were practi-
| - "Lack of m oans
of transport".
The latter point remains to debate as the Infantry Battalions were motor-
ized by one-third of their capabilities; the Artillery and the C.C.S. by 100%.
tively well suited to operations in the delta zones or uncovered areas when the
On the other hand, It proved "unusable and oven very risky in all covered
to the situation.
- two types of M.G., one totally conceived to operate away from roads, the
"$The .G.," says a 1.G. Staff Captain,, "must be capable of operating within i
two limits:
- that of an Infantry Grouping composed of only one mobilo C.P. with por-.
table radio facilities and three or bettor, four reduced battalions; this group,
going alone on foot, outside of the guns cover to engago the enemy in an actual
I "The H.G,," says also a Coonel Counanding a MG., "must, in rouoh terrain
reserve',
- "be reduced to its infantry only, disposing of the whole range of Its
could include: a Staff and Command facilities, four Battalions, one or two
would be assured by air-drops, the evacuations and movements from the front to
the rear via helicopters, or terrain permitting, via plane." (3) - (4)
S(f) The Coiuundor of Naval Forces in the Par East wishes also for the creation
of uhilts tra:lsportnibla via rivers, of the size of a G.T., and suZgests (in
case the principle of the "Joint Combined Group" mi,;ht be c.nsslderod, the bc!t
thing would be to include in it a Tactical Grouping of 3 Foreign Legion
16 A OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- --- ERT01E
Coman
54 06' g
PC
THE INFAN.iTY
"One of the teachings of the Indochina War, and one of the main ones,
writes Colonel X,..,, Zone Cotmiander, is that the Infantry, in this War with.
out a front, takes on a very special Importance. More than ever, It conducts
the fight",
of the Infantry as would be done for the othor Arms: This would mean to absorb
Thus, we shall only attempt to give back just the essential charactoris-
The three Components which make up good Infantvy have been confirmed once
more:
- MAN : If•ssential element of combat" (Colonel Be..)
Unfortunately those three assets were lacking once too often during the
campaign.
IIMAN
"j •In 1953, the Infantry represented 52.3% of the whole strength. But during
Si
S
169 .**
the same year, its losso* reached a perccntago of 65 in proportion to the total
*,,es of thw &peditionnry Force and this was sufficient to show the frightening
The mobile units wore first of all subject to constant strains "There was
never time to rest% As soon as an operation was over, another one was undertaken,
or rather, as soon as a Battalion had completed an operation, a new one was. quickly,
prepared for it. By dcy, it was the extenuating march along embankments or over
trails, in mud or in the brush. By night, It was the watching, patroling, ambushes"'.
"This lasted tor years: in six months, we did not go to the roar once.
an exaniple of military inaction; not that its occupants didnt.t do anything, quite
the contrary, for activities were numerous and varied, but not one positive action
waa accomplished: the Post prevented neither road sabotage, nor V.M, crossing of
troops or supplies, nor the laying of big &nbushes. It served the purpose of
For the most part, losses wore due to the lack of instruction. "In the
to fight ritth that, since he was thrown into the battle as soon as he arrived in
Indochina. He got his real training under fire; at what pricol It was often
heard: if one can last the first three months, one has a chance to get out of
it'#. (2)
In addition, the age of s.me members of the cadres was another handicap.
out that the average ages of the Infantry Officers on the departure roster of the
!I
L
170
first trimester of 1954 were the followingi 2nd Lieutenants - 311 Lieutenants -
35; Captains - 38; Battalion Leaders - 431 he could also state that:
"A French Union Battalion operating in the Highlands in December 1952 was
led by a 42.-year-old Captain. The average age of the 2nd Lieutenants was 36,
tha. of Lieutenants, 38. Small wonder that this Battalion arrived on the battle
field exhausted after five days of march and that it was roughed up in the first
encounter".
FLUIDITY
It was a characteristic of the adversary, but rarely ours: "In the face
of the Viet Minh, lightly equipped, used to the rough treatment, moving about with
the rice pack, crossing rivers on banana tree trunks, we opposed a poorly trained
Infantry, weighed down by its impediments, too heavily burdened with supplies
and ammunition."
"Lieutenant Colonel X.... had been nicknames "RICE-DRY FISH" during the
years 1949-50-51 because for every operation under his orders, we loft with every-
thing that becrare his name. He was one of those rare ones who brou;'ht to combat
fresh troops, and if we 'bellyached like thieves' about the imposed diet, we could
"On the other hand, at the start of the -'CONDOR' Operation on April 13,j
1954, we left with five days of rations in our bags (or a weight of close to 15
Kgs., about 31:lbs.) and reserve amtunition. At the end of the second day of
march, we had buried one Corporal and had to evacuate, the next day, 25 men who,
otherwise, could have served as milestones".
This heaviness and therefore this lack of fluidity have been deplored in
every single one of the reports. But isn't this questioning our very concept of
the organization and use of forces and...the problem is far from being peculiar
to the Infantry.
I:
The Infantry at first suffered fttm a chronic shortage of officers:
such a tough war against an adversary who could,.-coihbine modern weapons and a per-
fect adaptation to the country it w*uld have been necessary to have our units solidly
reality there w:ere never more than 10 or 12 officers and about forty NIWOs during
operations". (1)
But the In1matry suffered also from a lack of men. Here is an eXample
February 1954, 350 in March, 450 in early April, 350 on April 18; at the end of May
It reached a high of 575... Andp a Battalion which does not count 600 men in combat
Is not a bnttalion". (2) Indeed, as soon as the strength of a battalion decreases,
the light infantryimon arc the most hit: losses in combat, re-affectation in other
specialties, etc., and then comes the cry so often heard: "We don't have enough
light infantrymeni"l
And yet, "in the attack, the Infantry must in the end conduct the shock
action: the shock, the Infantryman Is the element of security and counter-attack".(2)
A good measure would have been to dissolve the Battalions as soon as their
strength grow dangerously thin* and the particularly pointed re.ark of an Officer
"The more a Battalion is weak, the more it suffers losses" comes to the support
ceded to dissolutions. So, the Infantry, already worn out by losses and fatigue,
Every Battalion in fact reflected the racial character of its men and,
Indigenous personnel, from such or such region, it proved bettor in the offensive
Some were strong under fire, but heavier and slower than the adversary;
then some others obtainodia certain lightness, but proved unstable in action.
Some engaged in ni-ht combat without any apprehension, some others felt an oppros-
sion when faced with dnrltness. Some wore at eaoe in the rice fields, some others
lities could have a.ierged from these differences. But the multiplicity of the forms
of war and their extension to the surface of Indochina practically prevented it,
A comparison with: the Viet Minh Infantry will finally illustrate how handi.
Our& lived off reinforcenonts that were not consistent as to their number and their
timeliness. Now a massive arrival of new infantrymen required several weeks of
felt, (physical strain and instinctive tendency to reduce risks): now, again, the
I
new arrivals all came from a same ethnical group and the desirable distribution
between branches of a same race %,as no longer observed* This, of course, consti.
tuted an irretrievable weakness, since it was inherent to the formula of an Dxpedi-
tionary Force, but it had the worst effect on the Infantry.
The Viet Minh Battalion was wholly Vietnamese whereas our Battalions
j] didn't always dispose of officers and non-commissioned officers who had the
opportunity to know their men beforehand. In addition, we cannot ignore the
fact that some of them have never made the necessary effort to acquaint them.
We did have Knights, thanks to aerial, road and water transport facil-
-i
ities. But a Battalion, broken down by combat in the rice fields, did not pass
all of a sudden .to operations in dense forest, jungle or mountain terrAin with
impunity. This slow adaptation to the terrain which the Viet lMinh Units pos-
sensed, because they went over It on foot and had, therefore, all the time to
"study, inderstand and evaluate it, could not possibly be an asset of our Bat-
tallons which were "thrown" in the space of a few hours from an area to another
to straighten out an emergency situation.
They had barely noticed the changes in the relief characteristics and
the density of the vegetation when they had to give up hope of assimilating
different tactics and had to engage in a combat where there was no room for
any error (-hether on the part of the Chief or that of the executants).
Finally, our Bittalion was infinitely more vulnerable than the V. M.
Battalion. First, because the opponent always attacked with a local quanti-
style combat rules, could not give up the artillery and air support and became
totally confused without-them.I
174 I' "~ ' L
This incessant call for the Artillery to reduco• Lhe least resistance
"the Infantry suffered too many losses and its momenturm was worn out by too
many combats. The same hold true for the encircling phoebia which struck most
of our Battalions the minute they had the Impression of being "in the air",
was Justly restrained by the fear of mines and booby-traps, by the inadequacy
of the mcdical evacuation facilities (1) and mostly by the thought that the
.:% I
THE INFANTRY BATTALION
type. (2)
- the groupina into one single company (the CoC&B.) not only of the command
- coexistence of the quaternary rule (four Combat Companies) and the ter-
nary rule (three Combat Platoons with three identical combat groups In
(1) A man wounded one or two hours before dark vas practically always condemned
to wait until the following morning for a helicopter; an evacuation by stretcher
over rice fields or the brush for several hours would have assuredly killed him,
(2) With the exception of the MOROCCAN TABORS,
(3) 1he Combat Coiipany di.poscd in addLtion of a Co;-t.iand Section and a Heavy Section.
partial motorisatlon.
i
A Cotlipany of Indigenous auxiliaries was often added to it which brought,
Thus constituted and provided with the administrative autonomy, the F.T.E.O.
terrain.
The formula thus was acceptable for Mobile Battalions, since it was adapted
to the particular conditions of combat in the Far East. On the other hand, it lost
all meaning for the Implanted Battalions; the distribution of capabilities was then
made according to the numbor of posts to be occupied and the guns to pan.
S-Any operating Battalion has been provided with its "Rear Base"t an india.
pensable element, arduoucly put together by imposing upon the units (the C.CBo
in particular), but which was not shown on any organization chart. Alienating
part of their cadres and their transport facilities for the benefit of the 'Base',
Some are of the opinion therefore that "instead of wanting to freeze nor-
elements into a single C.C,,, it would have been advisable to split this complex
priori into:
- "An Operational Command Company".
I i
176 ,. : .. , L:•
I
This formula In particularly desirable In the case where the Battalions
I belong to the same Regiment and the latter constitutes the backbone of a MA,. In
I | the case of isolated Battalions, the division of the C.C.B. into two independent
On the other hand, the quartonary rule applied to combat Companies met with
unanimous support: "At the Battalion echelon, the quartonary rule allows the uti.
lization of throe elements to engage, cover, and maneuver, with the fourth element
security of the Battalion C.Po, of the D.O. and that of heavy weapons, which had
become necessary due to the fluidity of the Viet Minh Infantry and the spreading
insecurity.
In some Battalions, "the C.C.B. was integrated into the offensive appara-
tus and worked under cover of one of the combat Companies. But with this arrange- j
ment, the heavy armament often found itself poorly sot up within range of the op-
ponont's Infantry light weapons, and generally too close to the encmy".
In others, "the Pioneers Squadron was responsible for the security of the
C.P. and heavy armament. But this became a difficult task when the pioneers ahd
to man 57SR guns with which the Battalions were provided, without any additional
platoons charged with numerous missions: C.P. defense - protection of escort ele-
SIn the war In Lurface, the problem of security of the Conmand and Escort
elements comes up for the Infantry the same as for the other branches. But the
K -"
178 ''j "'.'. . • ,
"A preliminary remark is of the order: the lack of cadres initiated in tho.
command of platoorns requires an organization of light and easily led units. For
"this major reason, the platoon with two combat groups is justified, in spite of
all the inconveniences it presents otherwise".
practice, fares in combat like a reinforced group, with two automatic rifles inter-
vening in the front* It is enough that the Chief provides them with a cover, a
and that the Company Cc-nmander is practically led to split his unit along the bi-
nary line by grouping his platoons two by two under the command of an experienced
Officer or N~on-Commissioned Oficer".
weakness of the platoon with two groups does not permit it to be charged with a
mission which would normally be entrusted to a unit of the ternary type capable
platoon"'
its efficiency in the operations led in the Delta against the V.M, Regionals.
But it became too light in a standard operation where the unit had to remain close
in order to give its maximtu efficiency and where the platoon had to be capable
(1) Captain V.... Conpany Commander. The quartenary rule however diminished
the fire power of an automatic rifle Company. Tbhe automatic rifle was often
used to arm a security group, which most of the Company Coi=anders main-
tained at their side.
I
179 1 Z,
j "It seems therefore that the quartonary formula was working in the parti-
cular case of the Delta war, whore the presence of V.M. Rogionals required light-
I noss and flexibility, more than maneuver and storm action* It would be perfectly
I suited to light Battalions, but should apparently be proscribed in the M.G. units
The disadvantages of tha quartenary rule appear even greater when the
of the fire unit) end a teo of 5 or 6 light.infantrymnn, including the two Grena-.
diers V.B. and the telescope rifle carrier. There was no longer any maneuver of
the platoon, and that of the Compr.ny bacame weighed doim on account of the neces-
sity to assign the same limited objective to the platoon".
f Thus we can remember, from these various opinions, that the quaternary'
I rule only offers serious advantages when the strength of the combat platoons is
maintainod to a minimnum of 30 fighting men.
The Heavy Platoon (a group of machine guns - a group of 60 m/m mortars)
But the lack of mon, the alleviation requirements, often reduced it to one machine
gun and one 60 n/m mortar, with very low &mmunition supplies.
guns, at the rate of a group of 2 per Company is not Justified: it weighs down
the unit and takes away from the Battalion Commandor one of his facilities to
make his own personal action felt: the 8 machine guns must be regrouped with the
escort Company, since their use at the Battalion echelon or thoir distribution
This leads us to note how much the splitting of facilities "upon request"
was adopted at all echelons, even though it did meet with some opposition.
idea of the undivided group, of the automatic rifle as the 'spirit of the group',
while the terrain and ospecially the vegetation did not permit the use of such a
weapon except in rare instancos... From the 'obsession' of the F.M., there some-
titmes resulted an aversion for individual action although it was productive in
the areas whore infiltration was the ordur of the day"'.
But It must also be pointed out that the distribution• "upon request",
such as was defined by the Infantry Rule of 1951 tended to harden: it had, become
conmonplace to dub the twmporary, detachients by using terms designating the In-
fantry maneuver, FIRE and SIIOCK, whilo giving these detachments a practically per,.
manent character.
I capaign.
Various organization charts made the procedure official at the end of the
Some of the cadres went even further and envisaged companies made up of
1 firing section and 2 shock sections, whilG others advocaced, as the Soviet Army
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does, the creation within each Battalion of an autcxatic pistol Company for ac.
Those ohnngos bear witness to the fact that the flexibility of formations
which had beon advocated by the authors of the 1951 roaulatlon had boon adopted,
but they also show two very pronounced tendencies; first the systOnatic abandon.
mont of the three automatic rifles of the section and then the splitting I priori
of tho nection for missions more common in the Far East. So that, using of their
right to split their capabilities "upon request", many Section Chiefs adopted a
psychological reasons; for, if the separation into a shock element and a firing
element from the three standard groups of the soction naturally permits to obtain
a more productive split, this proportion has the serious disadvantage of cutting
all friendly bonds of olomentary units at the moment when they are the most impora-
The a priori organization of fire nucleus and shock nucleus, merely signi-
de co~s
lities of constitutinz groups "upon request"; but the possible reshuffling would
be made under more favorable conditions by combining "firing" groups and "shock"
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groups in order to obtain Joint groups than by accomplishing the reverse conbi.-
nation.
- the posts,
It may seem somewhat surprising that some sort of Infantry Position, some
of the units of which would have been the extension of the vorking team Companies
* while others iould have played the role of interim Companies, was never set up.
The first ones would have been assigned to certain posts to erect works of an ad-
vanced technical nature (tank turrets - heavy mortars - power plant for the net.
works - etc.). The others would have provided for the normal armament and would
have boon responsible for all sorties (road clearing, patrols, ambushes, limited
First of all, the groat variety of fortifications and the widely different
Chart of the Unit assigned to such Post or to such Sensitive Complex every time
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taln Sensitive Complexes was created. For *xample, the Colonial Battalion of
HAIPP.ONG, the 31st D.M.T.S. with 5 Companies, the CAP-St-JACqUES Company. But
* But each Battalion had first of all to provide for the C.?.. of the Zone
The occupation of the Posts then severed the organic bonds. betwoen units
and the result was redhibitory needs: too many Posts wore not even led by a
Senior Non-Conissioned Officer and they were all lacking in the low ranks.
Therefore, there was little personnel left for sorties. Thus "the weak-
ness of the implanted troops in a Sub-Sector did not permit the availability of suf-
- ficient intervention elesints; the consequences were grave: the Posts' Garrisons
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S Infantry$ the units tied to blockhouses are unavoidably diminishodt "Due to the
fact that the implanted Battalions generally remained tied down permanently, the
of troops above the average. During the day, the clearing of several acres, the
weapon per man in some P.A.'s), participation for two-thirds of the force for
cover and protection of roads, searches of villazes, which took place at dawn as
"At night, there wore ntnerous end anxious watches, the 'bolls', the am-
3 buchos, Nervous tension was extrcma among the men, but even more so among the
Posts Leaders, who, every night, when the Post shut itself up, asked the question:
4
'Is my Post goin- to be attacked tonight?"' (2)
To physical strain was added moral strain: first because concrete did
j not generate any enthusiasm: "Concretel this single word spokon in the assign-
ment organizations for the new arrival's attention made him worry and think.
The echos of this troglodytic lifo which came to his ears even before he had
f set foot in the place had already given rise to some apprehension at the idea
Another officer wrote: "Concrete alienates the best of will power, stuns
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the most experienced of men. Why must privileged Forces remain forever shut
up in those reinforced concrete cages, when others would have asked nothing
having the moans to go into the opposing camp is the worst I have ever known,
being unable to have an idea of the lossee Inflicted on the enemy, all this In
"From the day we built concrete, in spite of all the beautiful posters
plastered all over: 'Don't wait for the Viet, Go get the Viet,,,*, an obligation
to defend was creatod which inexorably took precedence over the attack* All tone
and posts missions boaan by: 'to insure the ontirety of...' This favored habit
and intellectual decay, and it has never been the varying element in the clearing
of roads, the moving of bushes around the barbed wires that would be called
"This could have been called 'waiting' in another fashion, with its de.
plorable consequefices:
the day when the Viet took advantage of a favorable occasion to launch a
brutal action;
All this points up to the absolute necessity of relieving the troops and
that is the essential teaching of the whole campaign: when the occupation and the
defense the posts or Sensitive Cornplexes are attended to by normal Infantry units,
(
' (1) Capt~ain J,... Company Commuander.
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The duration of the implantation must not exceed a few months and the re-.
FOMDCIRTI of the Roman Armies to the 110GHA.NIS of the Moroccan Operations, there
have always bomn men willing to risk their lives for a small pay and without any
hope of a pension for their families, against the guarantee of being able to fight
within the limits of their province of origin and if only they are allowed to lay
down their arms when they so choose. If only they can also return to their wives
Since before the war, Implanted posts in the districts which constituted
the border zone of the Tonkin enployed partisans as atulliarles.. From 1946-1947,
the gargantuan needs of men led to the recruiting of partisans on the whole terri-
tory of the Peninsula and their number never ceased to increase: in 1954, the supple.
SThese auxiliary forces prevented our regular units from being assigned
to second-class missions, and in addition, they provided our indigenous units with
showed:
two radiosc
tour Platoons, each Including one Firing Section (only one automatic
f
The total strength was 100 men and the officer force was practically
The equipmreont was mainly composed of individual arms for the unit only
disposed of four automatic rifles. The weapons wore nondescript for quite some
Thus organized, the C.S.M. was a very light formation, capable of supple-
menting the regular troops for certain missions but mainly of complementing them.
Its maximum results were obtained when a C.S.M. was adapted to a Battalion, and
Interesting. Anyway it is derived from the concept which prevailed for the
tions seems to be an anomaly: the suppletive formations are not very valuable
in wait and they need assistance and reinforcements atthe first alarmf".
for they are not very well armed, badly trained, poorly equipped.**.Their
tives..,) without any moral engagament attachod to it. On tho other hand,
leaving suppletives alone in posts, with femilies, children, etc., would mean
for watch duties, to serve as 'boys# for some of the services, instead of being
pretense that they are light and that they might offer security risks compared
to the others*
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evidence that it was perfectly possible to create excellent tools, for weak
defenses. Unforttmately, their number has been reduced as the result of the
which tho outward appearance and discipline often presented startling aspects
answer to the idea that some espoused on the character of the war in Indochina.
Those Units, light and very fluid, made up of man with a thorough knowledge of
the enemy's tricks, tactics and terrain, rendered invaluable services although
their efficiency had been influenced by the mediocrity of the Officer element
and the number of European NCO's rarely rose to more than two or three.
But, no matter what his rank was, the European NCO was automatically
"These units should have been provided with a first-rate officer force,
well-trained in military matters, with a high morale and fully cognizant of the
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customns prevailing in the regions they wore called upon to oarate In; much too
often, the Officer force of tho supplotivo Companies Included elements preoccupied
first with living off the country and providing themselves with personal material
conveniences instead of carrying out the missions entrusted to them unselfishly", (1)
from one day to the next and his training was acquired in combat; but this was
bring out their inharent qualities, but technical instruction should be empha-
sized%. (2)
Finally, but this problem was not special to the Suppletives, the equip-
ment could havy included a hihor proportion of automatic weapons and grenade-
launchers.
With these considerations in mind then, the Suppletives assigned missions
are in proportion to their lightness and their rusticity, while remaining essen-
"tiallyoffensive.
- thorough soarch of a village or of a zone of resistance recently occupied;
(1) In so-o torrltories, Suppletive Officers Schools were created and produced
some excellent elements. But they wore few and far between.
i (2) Colonel N.... Zone Commander. Providing this training Is well oriented and
"controled.
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Lastly, each C.S.M, is liable to constitute, In the SAm* vein as the VoMo
units, an Zntelligence Service centor (10 to 12 seleotod men)* Working with lo.
cal elements (self-defense militias, inhabitants), such a group can collect parti-
cularly interosting intelligence concerning the terrain, the population and the
Thus employed, the Suppletive Forces would act as.a light Infantry, radia-
ting around the regular units when the latter operate in a Territory whose charac-
COMHAND0 UNITS
not only meant a type of action, a spirit, a doctrine, but it also served to
t~he Cynoco~andose
for a type of action better suited to the war without a front than that of
regular units.
The creation of Commandos derived, in fact, from the need to play the
same gome as the opponent. "We could not limit ourselves to traditional actions
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192
in close cooperation with the other Arms and tndlng to occupy the terrain*
We also had to proceed with shock actions, guerilla actions dependent on sur-
priso, decontralized, at a syncopated tempo, conducted by isolated detachments
tending, not to occupy the Sprrain, but to destroy the opponent and his war
mach in".,
The theator of operations chracteristios was well suited to missions
which had become standard for Commandos, while providing a differentlation
betweon:
actions in territories actually under V. H. control.
The location of these territories resulted in that those were mostly
The role of the coimandos was then to provide the counter-action to the
en~~y
enemy raIds nd...
raids
and ...... .....
.........................
ambushes* *
This rapidly gave much better results, but, unfortunately, it came about too
late,
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J ORGANIZATION
Suppletive Indigenous elements, but they were given a truly valorixed status
V
The problem in fact was to put an end to the Instability of the troops
which highly prejudiced the productivity of units that necessltatod Intensive
training. Therefore, the men bad to sign a yonrls contract, but in componsation
tuted the raoasuros affecting the status, the train•g and the principle of
each Territory,
- 1 Command Group
- I Administrative Center, thus relieving all units of such tasks.
..aei'f;ilsh all the missions their name brings to mind, but experience led the
Indochina geography and the form of operations had given rise to.
(in North Vietnam), and several scores of kilometers in areas lending themselves
But most of the time they operated within the disputed sectors themselves
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The regular Commando included one Command Section and three combat
sections, each composed of a Comn:,and element and two combat groups. The
strength was very much the same as that of the Suppletives Company (106 at the
Commando against 100 at the C.S.M.), but with a much botter officer force.
-1 Officer, 4 N004s, I Radio Corporal for French personnel.
- 8 NCO's and 25 Corporals for indigenous personnel.
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CO.X)ANDOS PRODUCTIVITY
The very existence of the Commandos gave rise to controversies and many
were the cadres who were opposed to anything that used the name "Commando" or
"Special Units". The position taken by Battalion Leader X.... suMmarises quite
..
accuratoly the arguments of this th..ry's supporterst
by the missions given to thcm: quite often they perform the ordinary task of an
Infantry Company, somnotimes bettor because they may be better offleered and trained,
sometimes worse because they don't know the country. Special Units actually
present a certain number of inconveniences:"
"They pass out the normal chain of co=,and: which is contrary to the neces-
sities of war as only one Conmmnder has to provide for unity of Coimuand and dcc.
trine.",
"Or they take orders from 2 chains of command, which creates unimaginable
"The whole effort must bear upon the normal units. If the whole of the
cadres, the credits, the training facilities, If the elite of the special units
were assigned to valorize the regular units, the latter would be capable of accom.
plishing all missions, including the special ones, and the whole value of the com-
bat formation, upon which rests after all the outcome of the war, would be con-
siderably improved".
"To proscribe to the maximum. A good and well trained fighter must be
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capable of accomplishing all normal combatant missions. The truly special missions
themsolves to the h1uiblo task of the combatant and are no more than disguised
parasites".'
As one can readily see, the dispute over the Commandos has replacod that
doubt because in Indochina the Commando Units often gave deceiving results and
posts, etc.), the Sector Conmnnmders frequcntly turned Con.,ndos away from their *
destination to make tLhc.m clenr or guard roads, and at night, to use them as alarms
for protection of Posts or close ambushes which could have been handled by the
Posts themselves".
to General Reserve Commandos, while those units were not any better trained than
regular Com-..,ndos, many times led the local Command to involve them in operations
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"Often, Sectors and Sub Sectors had a tendency to use Commandos stationed
on their torritory as nortnal companles, or on the contrary, as shock units and the
of discipline".
It should be noted right here, in their defense, that the quality of the
"A 'Commando#, in the full sense of the wrd, can only be formed by regu-
lar troops that have received thorouah advance training and are periodically
brought to the roar to;" reconditioning, Any other solution will produce a band,
full of drive perhaps, but with all the faults and weaknesses of a band",.
from being so as a rational use of human resources. These units were too unsta-
ble to be coherently trained, even when they disposed of adequate cadre to do so.
Indeed, in spite of the special one year contract created by the suppletive Comi-
mando Status, nothing was provided to pursue the men who decided to leave for the
most varied reasons as deserters; Military Justice refused to pursue and this was
soon known. Almost all Commando Chiefs report that all their operations were
(1) The comments that follow do not apply to the Navy Commandos who are considered
an exception. Bosidest the principle behind their recruiting technique was
different since those units were composed of personnel who had received spe.
i cialized training In the Metropolis, Blut the Navy Commandos too wero not al-
ways employed wisely.
of operations and none of the men received a basic training, not even elementary.
one is dynamic and courageous is not enough, This is a trade that one learns
and can only be taught In a Special Center in France. A much too large proportion
of our cadres had not undergone such periods of training or had been there for
Some efforts had been made in this area nevortheloss. Courses of instruo-
tion had been organizod at the FREJUS Centor for some cadres waiting to depart,
and a few training centers had been created In Indochina upon the initiative of
certain leaders,
But these facilities remained insufficient until 1953 when a school fur-
nished with the desirable facilities and instructors (2) was created at VAT CHAY
the Center for 6 to 8 weeks during which Instruction was given from A to Z.
The results were excellent, but the operational requirements were such
that at the end of hostilities, only a fraction of units had taken advantage of
(2) The VAT-CRAY School inherited the facilities and buildings created by the
Commando Training Center of North Vietnam. Thus an Officer School for all
the FTEO's and a Training Center for the Tonkin Coumandos were combined
j at VAT-CHAY.
(3) Two or three less elaborate centers had been created in other Territories
and were just beginning to operate.
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Finally the action of the Commandos were fouled up by the Inaccuracy of
Intoll1gonce. On many ooonsion8 a promising raid hit a vacuun, or on the contrary,
tailed because the encountered enaeny olemonts wore more Important than anticipated.
Indeed, collecting Intelligenco was one of the major missions of the Com-
mandos, espoclally of the nornal Commandos, but they needed for that the required
ability to "livo" with the Viet MInh, to foil his tactics and lastly to dilute
All this stood out even more so on account of the gaps in the cadres
auxiliaries as well as the importance of well-trained troops for these two units
htraining
school.
SThe discredit often accorded the Commandos stems as much from their lack
of success as the drain imposed on other units in order to creat them.
Without denying them some interest, one must, however, reserve to them
only the missions a good infantry force can accomplish and anticipate two types
of units.
The "Shock" Commandos were to handle deep raids and try to live the life
of the rebels.
"structure similar to that of the TRINH SAT formations of the V.M., the methods
i-
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turopemns; the Intelligenoe Commandos must be composed, with tho exception of
S •Eperience showod that one will find among the Indigenous personnel very few
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CHAPTER IV
AIRBORNE TROOPS
The French Airborne Troops took their first steps in INDOCHINA: only
the "sticks" of the 2nd R.CP, had been able to participate in some airborne
operations of the 1939 - 1945 war and it was in the Far East that the troops
were to conquer their noble name, that the Command was to try out a utilization
For nine years, our Airborne Units never ceased to fight, but they never
stopped either to search for the path to follow and this search was carried out
Moreover, this war had no encmy in the air. The control of the sky
was thus guaranteed and this "sine qua non" condition to undertake airborne
operations being secured, all possibilities were offered to us within the air
Also, this war was a war without a front, which placed the Airborne in .',
between what our paratroop units accomplished and what they wished to have
Saccomplished,
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due to its size and the relatively high number of zones suitable for
jumping". (1)
These data, the benefits drawn from our first paratrooper drops and
also the favoritism for a new Arm, for dynamic cadres and promising capabili-
ties, wore such that the Coirand constantly wished for the growth of airborne
In December 1950 the strength reached a total of 5,684 men, but one
year later they had almost doubled (10,639 men), and Artillery formations made
their appearance (two 75 in/m recoilless platoons), as well as those of the
TERRITORIAL ADAPTATION
At first, the companies and Battalions were utilized either Isolated
units were forced to draw upon themselves the necessary elements for the operation
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of their technical services.
At the beginning of 1949 it proved necessary to create a "tCommand of the
Airborne Forces" (1) which was to exeroiso functios analogous to those of the
Artillery, the A.B.C., Co~mands, etc., and which was to undertake, In particular,
the organization of paratroop units within the National Armies. ,
In 1949, the infrastructure problem had also been resolved by the creation
of two airborne bases, one in SAIGON (B.A.P.S.), the other in HANOI (B.A.P.N.).
These bases, equipped to handle materially the air-drops, included com-
mand eloi.ents, air supply formations and parachute folding and maintanance services.
But their perman(int character led to the annexing of other organizationst
Jump Training Centers, Training Companies, Student-Officer Platoons, etc.,.Their
strength thus augmented considerably.
establishing for each of them a file including all useful information. (2)
(1) In 1950, this Command changed name and became "Airborne Troops Command in Indo-
china" or T.A.P.I. At the same time, an Airborne Troops Command North to cover
* all the Tonkin formations was created.
(2) Each file Included:
- terrain characteristics (size, nature of soil, existing defense organizations,
comi•unications means, etc.);
- oblique and vertical aerial photographs;
information relating to enemy activities and implantations in the area;
- drop capabilities (by full stick of half stick, etc.);
- periodical weather infornition (rainfall, wind prevalence, etc.).
j 2,400 drop zones were thus classified, 900 of which in the Tonkin.
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Once en oporation had been deoidod upon, the E.P.E.M.O. insured its plan.
.ning with the appropriato services of the Staff under which It was operating.
The time gained and the a9curacy of the planning were obvious.
DEMAND$
If Indochina".presented a vast field of operations for airborne operations,
these wore no less handicapped by the demands of the terrain and climate.
"Opposed.to the vast horizons of the Doltas were the mountain Tagion as
much due to the rarity of landing zones as to obstacles presented by the relief
and atnospheric conditions for the evolutions of transport formations: and it was
in those regions that the heart of the Viet Minh might beat". (1)
not an absolute obstacle. But, like everything that pertains to air space, the
use of paratroopers was subjected to the necessities of the weather. (2) The per-
5ods following or preceding typhoons, in particular, interdicted any operation.
But the most serious demands ste=med from the lack of transport planes and
recuperation of parachutes.
TRANSPORT PLANES
In 1951, the Commander-in-Chief thus expressed our needs:
"Experience acquired by Marshall do LATTRE's predecessors had shown how
vain the hope of seizing the enemy and submitting him to a ruining battle was as
long as the Air Transport Service was unable to drop in one wave a force the size
of at least three Battalions on the enemy rears".
But a year later, the Commander of the Air Forces of Indochina thus ex-
offensive, hcd placed as a condition for the execution of any aerial operation
the capacity to drop three Battalions, or approximately 2,400 mon, in on* single
wave",
"To satisfy this requiromenc, one hundred DAKOTAS were needed while we
only possessed fifty (to which could be added twenty.two old JUNKER 529s), The
problem of finding those fifty DAKOTAS, the necessary personnel, pilots and mecan.
"But, as the Battle of NGHIA-LO gave us the indication, the Air Transport
was to be used, under the pressure of the situation at the moment, not for the of-
"The rapid ovolution of the military situation forced the Comand to lo.
immobilize it via the NA.SAN redoubt. In particular, the Air Transport was to
Unfortunately this state of affairs was to remain such until the end of
the war, especially from the time the DIEN-BIEN PHU affair became felt.
During this period, the number of available C-47 planes went from 90 in
January 1954 to a hundred at the beginning of April. American aid, which had pro-
vided us with five C-119's from October 1953 brought these to 15 by January and
But the numbor of available crews was inferior to that of the planes as
In short, we never had the air vehicles that would have been required to
carry more than two Battalions, due as much to the inadequacy of our Air Transport
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force as to all the other demands (air supply, medical evacuations, air transport
For a long time, the Airborne Troops had to provide for the recuperation
of parachutes.
This task was the rosponsibility of the unit which had just jumpedl Ex-
had-to be employed for the first half-day to protect the drop zone and recuperate
The Viets wore fully aware of the importance we gave this material and did
his best to destroy it, compelling even women and children to do it. Here is an
example of this:
"During the NGHIA DO Airborne Operation when on February 28, 1950, the
F X..BCCP jumped directly over the Viets who were attacking a post about to fall;
"As soon as we held the terrain, the parachutes began to be picked up:
only two-thirds of them could be recuperated. The remainder, or 150i had been
But once the parachutes recuperated, they had to be taken away at the price
cuate the 350 retrieved parachutes, a convoy was formed which, from post to post
was sent out across mountains for about 200 Kilometers to LAD KAY where was an
This situation was to improve only towards the end of the conflict thanks
to American aid and French manufacturers. In 1953, the "HIRONDELLE" Operation
order still carried the "Parachute" paragraph, but the following had boon finally
added: "the parachutes of units which are to Jump at LAIGSON will be destroyed
on the spot".
BALANCE SHEET OF THE OPERtATION•S
At the end of hostilities, the Airborne Troops Conmiand passed the follow-
Ing Judgment on the units:
"The morale hasn't changed much during the campaigns It is that of the
carrier soldier, volua.cor for anything he believes the most difficult, sure of
his physical fitness, willing to take the risks he believes he can surmount with
his personal values; it is the "Para spirit". It was maintained to the end". (2)
The Officer force, young and vigorous, excellent in thr first years, remained
satisfactory as a whole* However, it suffered from the aging caused by time and
insufficient replacement of personnel and also by wearing out (considerable losses
under fire; diseases),
After 1952, older cadres arrived or came back; although quite competent
and animated by a very high senseof duty, they were not as dynamic as those of the
first years".
The degree and level of instruction in particular constituted the variable
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element The Airborne Unit~s, although benefit~tng from the advantage of arriving
ranks, as the years want by, some qualitatively Inferior and insutficiently trained
elements.,
The Airborne Troops Command could never obtain that a period of adaptation
be granted to the units arriving from the Metropolis, and those were in most in.
stances put to the test immediately after landing. It has never been possible to
obtain sufficient time nor the necessary facilities for the change of control and
and even then at the price of costly losses* The knowledge of woapons, markman.
his comrades, could never be pushed to the limit for lack of time and, in the case
For the same reasons, the man-sto-man storm actions were never sufficiently
prepared. The lack of time also prevented a thorough study of night actions, and
While the Viet Minh Infantry progressed to the point of becoming excellent
and redoubtable on Its own terrain, ours became, for the reasons given above, less
efficient. The superiority complex that prevailed anion& the paratroopers at first
This rough self-critic tends to dim the fact that our paratroop Units, in
spite of a weakening of their value, remained an excellent Infantry and that the
slow devaluation of our land battalions made of the "Paras" the best reserve of
the Commander-in-Chiof.
[ From this comes the fact that they were used.'in all Instances where the
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straightening out of a situation, the need of an exceptional effort or simply
the hope of success required the presence of an alert and vigorously led force.
units and It couldn't be any other way because it was always short of troops
Thus can be explained the number of land combat actions in.which par-
ticipatod some airborne elements. In 1950, this already aroused the protests
"The Commander must make sure that his paratroopers units were not used
beyond certain limits in land operations where other tuits could have replaced
which require their use and where they are indispensable...," (1)
Four years later, the Airborne Troops Commander formulated the same
approciation:
",.#It would have been more rational, admitting that it seemed too
strictly airborne missions, to reduce this figure and increase the number of
Infantry Battalions".
(1) It would be useful to note that during the 1940-45 war the same thing had
happened and that it could not be otherwise, The Germans were rapidly led
to use their paratroopers divisions like large normal units and the Allies
required their Airborne Divisions to hold certain sectors of the front,
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Division among several Infantry Divisions to escort the BAttalions or to
use them as tank.blockhouses in the Resistance Conmplexes, with the only
But, due to tha necessities of the battle, the paratroopers not only
tought often ilk* simple Infantrymen, but the airborne operations proper
wore too often small scale actions without much method instead of being
massive involvewents.
- 5 times only were the units promoted to carry out independent actions
of a large scale.
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I extricate a post (1) have already been mentioned in the study on control of the
rout~es,
r But it wouldn't be
useless to recall the
doctrinAl opposition
which
I separated the cadres of the Airborne Units in 1945 and which gave rise to
Must we, like the British S.A.S., give preference to Comando actions
and only require paratroopers to operate in small fractions and thus execute
raids?
IJ
Must we, on the contrary, operate with constituted formations and, in
of sensitive points while waiting for jtmction with the land columns?
The first trend satisfied the desire to constantly harass the opponent
and seemed well suited to a war without a front; but the second would be
other thesis, During the first years of the war, the shortage of transport
planes naturallyforced the airborne units into actions requiring small forces.
(1) EItricating actions proper have been rare. They either consisted of
dropping Units on the rears of the assailant and cut off their conmuni-
cations (NGHIA-LO in February 1950 and DONG KHE in May 1950). The last
two operations were the most risky. Nevertheless, they were successful:
- because in NGHIA DO, it was possible to cover a knoll from the beginning,
Fwhich gave us control of the terrain.
because in DONG KIM, the V.1. who had already taken the post, abandonned
the terrain taking the garrison and material after noticing that their
efficient ARD could not stop the air-drops.
S~However,violent andit can be conceded that such actions ban be t:ried If:
a powerful air Intervention did actually neutralize the drop zone.
- the assisted post can protect the regrouping of the paratroopers with its fire.
But the only plausible action Is a drop on the assailant's rears.
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Besides, the relative weakness of the V.M. permuitted small coiyrando actions. (1)
But, besinning in 1951, the Command created the 0.C.M.A. (2) in order to
activate guerilla actions on the enemy's rears (3) and, on the other hand, the very
structure of the units showed the abandonment of the commando formula: in 1946
the paratroop battalion with a completely French constituted force was a copy
of the S.A.S. units and disposed, for example, of 60 to 70 jeeps equipped with
f
throe machine guns, while at the end of the war the same battalion had a struo.
ture similar to that of the normal infantry formations (quaternary rule) and in-
eluded 50% indigenous elements*
This change did not make the units unfit for commando" rats, however,
since one of the last engagements of the campaign, and the most fruitful, was a
(1) Thus, there have been 28 Commando operations in 1948-1949 and only 3 in 1953.
However, in 1952 there were still 9 airborne raids in Cochinchina and in LAOS.
(2) Group of Joint Airborne Commandos,
(3) See chapter devoted to the "1faquis".
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maneuvers in the great wastes, suffice to demonstrate that the absence of a front
and the enemyts fluidity took all the meaning out of vertical encirclement, which
BANG and CAO DIN-CAO MOI communities simultaneously in order to open a way
to forces designed to permit our re-implantation in the High Region on
TONKIN.
- "LOTUS" was launched on November 14, 1951 to occupy IIOA BINH9, when we took
land columns at the time the paratroopers Jumped somewhere behind him. Without
being even linked together by a logistics communications network, he had all the
but through the trickery of a localizing abces. The Initial action of the parae-
was not a direct hit dealt from behind to the enemy. We can well understand the
disappointment of our paratroop cadres who waited vainly for the occasion to exe-
cute the ideal maneuver for which the Airborne was conceived.
operations:
"Fooling all their physical and moral resources that their choice permits,
the paratroopers have accomplished in Indochina, day after day, for nine years,
bloodiest sacrifices, their bitterness before the mediocre results obtained after
so. much effort and pair,, are tempered by the kimowled-e of having done their duty".
On the other hand, one could not participate in ths Judgment expressed in
"Airborne opcratlops wore numerous, they have not always been wisely
surface operations".
its strict meaning, deceptive and we can only wonder if the airborne actions could
Such was certainly not the case as long as the enemy kept to the guerilla
On the other hand, from the moment the Chinese aid increased and material-
ized itself by depot zones, sensitive points and automobile convoys similar to those
of the European Armies, it would have been possible to undertake actions like
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"MARION" or 'I'IRONDELLE"V Such is the opinion of the Airborne Troops Commander,,
"Operations of the PHU DOAN (1952) or LANG SON (July 1953) type could haye,
it seems, been more often undertaken at the opportune time against enemy depot
zones and couinunications means.., The YEN BAY depots, Highway 41, the TRANH SON
communications nucleus, the region of NHA N'i, THAI NGUYEN, to name Just a few,
could have constituted at some particular time, choice obJectives",. (1) (2)
Certainly, the execution of such raids wouldn't have been too difficult;
but it must be pointed out that the return of parachuted units in the Delta would
regions:
"It should perhaps be regretted that operationrs such as those of CAPE
FALAISE in 1949 or of qUI NHON in 1953 were not more;often planned, then launched,
All ports on the coast in Viet Minh hands could have been under the constant
However, these raids could not have obtained Immediate results as the V.M,
received only a minimal part of his supplies by sea. The systematic destruction
of the river force however would have dealt a very hard blow to fishing which
But mainly, the actions against enomy communications systems were considered
when the battle of DIEN BIEN PHU started, for the big enemy units began to stick
together into columns on the land routes while at the same time they became heavier
Indeed, these divisions had not entirely done away with their usual fluid-
ity, but while they flowed in DIEN BIEN PHU their supplies and vehicles became
with actions of the Commandos and the Mobile Intervention Group (G.MI, (1) and
aiming for enemy communications systems would have not been especially productive,
due to the Importance of the limited 1ou7ct, which presented critical points and
In short, the war cane to an end without having had the opportunity to
really meet the requirements of utiliation of airborne units as seen by the
European doctrine,
This explains why our paratroop formations could never be a major asset
in-the Com.and's camp.
Certainly, they have constituted an element of many tactical maneuvers,
but they found no way of being used strategically, as in contrast to the 1939-45
var, for the strategy requirements were no longer the same,
The uneasiness felt by the paratroop adres can thus be explained for pay.
chological reasons and we can well understand that their Chief wrote after the
battle of DIEN BIEN PHU:
"In the field of utilization of forces, it is once more proven that airborne
units, the ultimate strategic reserve of the Command, can only find their full
use and efficiency in a massive engagement and with the element of surprise. •o
use them like surface units because they actually are the best Infantry of the
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But we cannot avoid comparing this disenchantment of ardent troops to the
Sl disillusionment of our cavalry cadres after the tirst engagments of 1914 and during
the long months of the war in trenches* The evolution of combat gave them however
the opportunity to be cavalrymen more or lose in the last days of the conflict
and tactics gave them a large place only in 1939-40 under now signs.
The Indochina campaign only wanted the paratrooper to be a commando some
of the time, and an excellent Infantryman all the timo.
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CHAP TER V
formations in Indoohina were to become of many and varied types during the nine
However, at the end of hostilities, most of the units were still furnished
with standard machines, inherited from the campaigns of France and Germany. So.
Their utilization did not produce any unusual teaching, The amphibious
units, on the other hand, found in Indochina a fruitful field of experience which
down by the shortage of adequate vehicles and often by the inferiority of the main-
spaces, totally practiceable for the usual military vehicles and rarely accessible
to tanks, transplerced by narrow and few roads. The adaptation of the road network
would have made the task of the A.F.C. easier, but it was still incomplete at the
A Tank Squadron Leader deplored that practicability maps for the armor
II
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219 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
had not been prepared and wrote: "The system of the seasons In the Tonkin
is almost regular. It is therefore feasible to establish a "terrain' map
which would be perfectly marked month by month, would include accurate Indi.
cations as to the routes, the practicable zones and compulsory points of
passage." (1)
In fact the armored forces lacked ways and free space most of the time,
for no "all terrain" material in the European sense of the word proved bo be
such in Indochina. (2) Moreover,, the heat and humidity rendered the combat
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220
UTILIZAT ION
Under various aspects the Armored Forces found again the traditional
missions of the Cavalryt
- Scouting for the Infantry, marching or stationing.
mont" and the attack, as well as the counter-attacks and the cover of
withdrawals).
- Pursuits and raids; although rare and of little importance.
aBut due to the shortage of troops, the Command balked for a long time
at the assignment of a true Infantry to the Armored Regiments as it would have
been unemployed during the periods of maintenance and conditioning of the
groups thus formed suffered, as did the flexibility and rapidity of actions.
rather slow pace of the lnfantryman's maneuver and took on the classical form
More and more the monotony o! the operations, constantly executed over
on identical ground, the long waiting periods along communication routes to
guard, the dispersion of threats, have too often Influenced the Command towards
routine. In addition, they have encouraged the static use and fragmentation
This situation naturally reduced the efficiency of the units and brought
about their rapid attrition, as the Regiment or Squadron services were not
It vould, however, "have been normal to expect much more from the service
which, with the aid of the motor, Joins mobility to power; the Service of
But, It was not until 1951 that the first experience in using the
Until then, "the Armored Squadrons had rendered excellent services but
had only obtained sporadic results, because they were organized like reservoirs
of armored machines rather than like units capable of engaging combat alone". (1)
In the last part of the campaign, the A.F.C. included:
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alone and constituting Implements of maneuver.
- Units capable of temporarily backing up certain Infantry unite or
Battallons, etc.).
"The high proportion of elements on foot, of an element the size of one
Battalion for one Tank Squadron, gave the Armored Sub-Group its character of a
well-balanced flexible and powerful Intervention element". (3)
The M424 tank Squadron moved about easily in dry rice fields and some-
times even in flooded rice fields. On the other hand, the tanks could, in
transport vehicles of borne support elements were not on the same footing as
(1) While in North Vietnam the Armored Units wore part of the general reserve
and could be temporarily made available to a Sector Commander, units specie
fically assigned to Territorial Commands existed in the other territories.
(2) It should be noted that no dozer tanks were in Indochina. The presence of a
bulldozer with its trailer-tractor constituted a heavy burden for the Sub-
Group, if and when it had one*
(3) Teachings of the war of Indochina relating to the Armored Forces
written by the Inspection Services of the AF.C.
223 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
the tanks, which would have made It possible to provide for supplies and
evacuations,
Rule (1) was perfectly in keeping with the requirmonts of a var without a
Moreoever, the four tank platoon retained very satisfactory maneuver capabilities,
as the splitting up into tto patrols was unusual and was always executed on the
propelling swoop missile fire. So the users have advocated the croation of a
Howitzer platoon at the Sub-Group level, to replace the Mortars platoon. (2)
The combats engagod at DIEN BlEN P1IU by the March Squadron of the
1st Light Infantry reminded us of the light tank unitst vulnerability under
supply and maintenanco operations losses nearly equaling those due to combat,
"When engaged only against Infantry units, the tanks rapidly exhausted
a*munition outside the tanks and on the floors, assignment of one tank per
platoon to the supply. But the only satisfactory solution would have been to
The borne squadrons (on Gt.C. or half-tracks) had been put, like
the Infantry Companies, under the quaternary rule: Four combat platoons
(1) The tables of organization provided for three 5-tank platoons and 2 Command
tanks, but the adopted organization has been almost alwaysa Four 4-tank pla-
toons and only one Command tank (although a second one would have been
quite often desirable).
(2) Solution advocated by the A.FC, in tis report on the teachings of the campaign.
224 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
(38 men and 2 F.,M) and one heavy platoon (2 light machine guna and 2
60 rn/m mortars).
Service advocated at the end of 1954 the procurement of one 58 SR gun and
two 60 m/m or 81 m/m Suns (depending on whether the personnel was being borne
by 0,M.C. or half-track). (1)
The half-track borne squadron constituted a slow, cumbersome grouping
which lacked mobility, and the demands imposed upon by the watch of the
vehicles reduced the combat force to about a hundred men.
However, thanks to its considerable firepower (36 machine guns and F.M,
procured from three fire units), this squadron proved capable of accomplishing
the missions of route-watching, liaison and escort, and depending on the
condition of the terrain, of fixing. But, even in such cases, its inability to
* depart from the routes was a great handicap,
The Command and Sub-Group Services Squadron was torn between two missions:
to guard the rear base and escort the C.P. in operation. Its task would have
been facilitated by a splitting up into two elements each having a chief (2):
a base element and a combat element,
In addition, the protection platoon (3) responsible for liaison escort
(1) The inspection also pointed out the fact that the adoption of the
-quaternary rule should have been supplemented by arranging for the pro-
curement of radio equipment for the squadron (seven ANPRC-10 posts Instead
of five).
In addition, the guarding of G.H.C, borne squadron vehicles would have been
more efficient with the procurement of an additional automatic-rifle (10 F.M.
instead of 9).
(2) Some cadres even requested that two separate squadrons be created.
(3) Two half-tracks,
(4) The A.PC, Inspection required that the platoon include 3 sub-machine guns
and three scout-cars.
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I
AMPHIBIOUS GROUPS
Using equipment of which part had boon conceived with Alaska polar expe.
y ditions in mind (the crabs) and the others derived from a lifesaving vehicle uti-
limed in the flooded Mississippi area (the alligators) (1), the Amphibious groups
proved in Indochina their special fitness to combat in flooded areas, that is in
the Deltas or the coasts.
Their development gave rise to numerous experiments which were not all suc.
¢essful and the first engagements resulted in failure even.
Initially, the crabs alone were used, "Being limited in number and en-
trusted to an insufficiently qualified personnel, their burned out skeletons quickly
littered the 'Plaine des Jones"'. (2)
In 1948, however, a group of amphibious squadrons (with two crabs squadrons
each) was created in South Vietnam (3). So the crabs were used in units com-
pletely formed; they were put in the hands of trained personnel, assisted by ade.
quate repair facilities, and "they went over the 'Plaine des Joncs' In all direc.
tions throwing panic in the enemy rankcs". (2)
The results were so encouraging that two new squadrons were created in
Cochinchina and Tonkino (4)
"But the problem of support of the Infantry was quickly presented. The
squadrons had remote reconnaissance missions and the standard Infantry could not
follow or followed slowly". (2)
The assignment of one Infantry Section to each squadron did not give the
anticipated results. The troops transported in such a fashion were not sufficient
and the considerable weighing down of the vehicles made thum lose their mobility
(1) The exact name of the crabs Vas Cargo Carrier:29C, The Alligators: LVT4 or 4A.
(2) Note from the F,T,S,V, Commander on Amphibious Units*
(3) Under ,the st Foreign Cavalry Regiment.
(4) Under the lst Foreign Cavalry Regiment and the lot Light Infantry Regiment.
226 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
capabilities.
I Thus was conceived the use of new machines: Alligators which were first
- This formula proved satisfactory and was extended. Thus were born the
I The group derived its superiority, not only from its independence con-
Scerning the road network, but its firepover which wa.i equal to that of a metro-
j 130 men), its perfect autonomy (3 days of combat) and the abundance of its com-
munications made a particularly well suited group for deep penetrations into
I insecure zones.
However, its weakness lay in the fragility of its equipment which prohi-
bited any halts on roads (1) and required frequent periods of maintenance. (2)
The CRABS SQUADRON organically Included 33 Crabs split Into three platoons.
jt Its great fluidity, the noiseless nature of Its vehicles, its considerable fire-
power (30 machine guns or automatic rifles, six 57SR suns, three 60 m/m mortars),
(1) The Crabs had to be transported on G.M.C, trucks and the Alligators on tank-
trailers, unless the equipment was loaded on barges.
I (2) Thanks to the "acrobatics" ocecoted by the Groups personnel, the Groups have
not been unavailable more than 2 days out of 2. (Lieutenant-Colonel X....
ConmnandinS an Aphiblous Group).
227 ,,O .AL USE Oi, LY
compensated for the inconveniences that resulted from its lack of armor and made
j "A piece of equipment without armor that no obstacle can stop i3 more effl-
I • The L.V.T. Squadron was split into three combat platoons and one support
platoon,
Howitzers) and its three borne Infantry sections, it constituted alone one
f[ Sub-Group". (1)
"It is the only known unit to combine an Infantry Company, its own trans-
port facilities and escort tanks. Nowhere is the Infantry Tank liaison is accom-
"Only the L.V.T. squadrons and the HowiLzer platoon can participate In
"The ideal form of maneuver would be to be able to Join the Group by air,
dropped or helicopter-borne Infantry once the enemy has been localized and fixed". (3)
The same process could be applied to the borne elements of the Armored
Sub-Groups:
"In a really difficult ter~ain, the helicopter is the' ideal means of trans.
port since it brushes off obstacles and doesn't fear mines. ,One might think that
the borne squadrons would be used to the utilization of such machines which would
"#We have seen at night, in a bright moonlight, within a few minutes, one
single Crab Squadron inflict on the enemy, engagod in open terrain, losses esti-
mated at 500 to 600 killed or woundod (120 bodies were left on the terrain).*#
courage and accepted the next day either total destruction (many times) or surren-
Amphibious Group in a terrain for which it isn't suited. This is a delicate matter
which requires a great deal of experience on the aprt of the Chiefs, for terrain
favorable to the crabs are not always so for the alligators and vice versa. The
form of maneuver can be affected by this and, when the participation of amphi-
bious eleients is being planned for an operation, it is imperative that the Comman-
Generally, it must be admitted that very few have been the Territory, Zone
or Operation Commanders who utilized the Amphibious Groups adequately and gave up
These elements give their best results when only cavalry missions are as-
signed to them.
They also answered to the preoccupation of making maximum use of the exist-
having been equipped during the campaign with a great variety of boats,
armored or not, they possessed at the end of hostilities practically nothing but
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8 to 11 meters launches.
They had$ on water, missions comparable to those of the land unite along
One unit commander pointed out that their participation had been of some
"Night activities were intensified, which had the result that the Viets
wore forced to watch around the clock. This climate of insecurity contributed
Organically, they were composed of one M.24 Tank Squadron and a Staff of
Squadron Groups (2) to which were adapted, for a given operation, some Infantry
elements of the size of a Battalion generally. This unit could be put at the
* Their daily use had condemned, once more, the utilization of patrols
On the other hand, some of them would have liked to see an increase of
the borne facilities and envisaged squadrons with two light armored car
the users, naturally, deplored its lack of adaptation to the terrain of Many
aspects, the absence of reversing device, the mediocrity of the gun.., and
This regiment was created at the end of 1953 as the answer to the possible
appearance of Chinese Armored elements. But It was generally split into ,.t
platoons and rarely into squadrons (2) in order to satisfy the requirements of
Territorial Commanders.
equal to that of the M,24 tanks and its 90 gun applied much more efficient fire,
The necesbity to bring armored elements in places distant from any road
equipment had not been considered with their transportation by plane in mind. (3)
However, our few experiences in this field have proven the advantages
of this formula, for a country like France with responsabilities spreading over
five continentýo.
(1)
The T.D. (tank-destroyers) were transformed by the addition of a turret roof
and a conning-tower machine gun; the radio equipment was also modified.
(2) Four TeD. Squadrons, distributed over the whole Tonkinese Delta area, were
Ssupported only wlth great difficulty by the Regiment's services, as the latter
did not have theescort and liaison equipment permitting to put its
logistics facilities into use.
(3) The example of the air-transport of the M.24 tank is particularly striking.
After beinge dismantled, this piee was divided into 82 packages of which the
hoavieot, the cavo, v7eighed 4,600 kilos, Two lDristols and five Dakotas were
required for its transportation.
231
there (1) and the action of the Itt R.C.C. Marching Squadron (2) taken to
constantly informed on the free space that existed between our positions and
SAfterwards, "the tanks became the storm force of any action",. (3)
weight of which, being considerable, rapidly exceeds that of the equipment itself.(4)
Thanks to the efforts made in the logistics field, the Squadron of DIEN
BIEN PHU still included on May 7th, six available tanks, two •mmobilized tanks
(utilized in fixed blockhouses) and one out of action. Only'one was destroyed. (5)
(1) A five M.24 tank platoon at LUANG-PRABANG, a three MS-M8' tank squadron in
the Plaine des Jarres.
(2) This Squadron included 3 M.24 tank platoons and one Command tank. One of
the platoons emplaced in the "ISABELLE" resistance center was quickly cut
off from the rest of the Squadron.
(3) Report on the action of the M.24 tanks in the battle of DIEN BIEN PHU.
(4) For example, more than 200,000 rounds of 75 gun were fired from December 7
to May 7; which represents approximately eight times the tankst weight.
(5) All tanks, with no exception, were sabotaged by the crews on May 7. The optic,
the collective armament, the radio were smashed or thrown into the water, the
gun breeches dismounted and buried, the main of the tubes damaged with incen-
diary grenades. The panels, delcos, carburators, filters, were smashed with
sledge-hannerso In addition several grenades exploded in the motor compart-
ments. The participation of a tank in the Victory Parade organized by the
enemy was only possible by assembling the necessary pieces taken from all the
tanks to put one single motor temporarily together. The turret and the
artuament were sabotaged. Those tanks were absolutely unfit for combat.
(Report on M.24 tanks at the battle of DIEN BIEN PHU.)
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as varied, but the pressure lighters and command firing were the most commonly
used,
In the face of this danger, our detecting devices were inadequate and
a Squadron Con, ander observed that the tAks had become "explodin.k machines".
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233
j regular maintenance of roads, double armor of the lower part of vehicles, anti.
mine covers and rubber rolls filled with sand on floors (1), makeshift reversing
devices for light armored cars, covoring of the arvored elements with barbed ,
wire to avoid an exoalade, and with faggots to provide the premature bursting of J
All these procedures, which wore not new anyway, proved their worth, with
the exception of the two last ones which offered more inconveniences than
advantages,
As to the tactical parries, they wore also standard: articulation in
depth and action of the "borne support elements". In addition, the role of
patrols, the harassing fire at night executed on portions of roads known to be
usually mined, as well as the laying of mines on the small dikes of access gave
good results.
And last, in case of enemy assault, the utilization of "canister"
shells, of grenades and of the individual equipment of the craw, as well as
(1) The assembling of grill-work roofs to protect th* vehicles Into the open
against grenades comes from similar preoccupations.
(2) The example of the attack on the LE KHU post already mentioned has
_ illustrated this incapacity to litsure the security of the Armor at night,
particularly the case In the ,,attack launched by the Armored Sub.Group No. 3
at TIEN•)•/ (Tonkin), July 18, 1954, when the VH.1 left 200 dead on the field
The night Interventions for the attacked posts were.in some cases
efficient, The V.o4. mined all roads leading to the post scheduled to be
attacked and slowed down, if they didn't altogether stop, the intervention
eleomlntS".
Some even felt that "the use of the arhored forces must, as a general
(1) Captain X,... Assistant to the Lt. Colonel Comianding the 3rd Armored
Sub-Group,
(2) Captain X..., Conmuanding an A.M. Reconnaissance Squadron.
(3) Colonel X.... Commanding a Reconnaissance Regiment.
_ _ _ _ _
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two 81 m/m shells per minute, regulated so as to light the terrain 400 meters
in front of the tanks on a 600 motor front". (1)
I The adjustment of weapons turret under the light of a flood-light
S directed parallel to the gun gave good re.tilts, (2) But the fact that in
Indochina Infra-red devices were not adapted to armored vehicles adequately,
did not permit, unfortunately, to draw any definite conclusions on this
technique,
Anyway, "the French Army must make all necessary efforts to learn to
maneuver at night, This will not be accomplished without difficulty, for as men
become more and more civilized, they become loss and less comfortable in darkness". (3)
The Armored Force had begun the campaign by drawing on the facilitios
A• of a few regiments. It ended it with four Sub-Groupstwo Amphibious Groups and
j two Reconnaissance Squadron Groups.
The Command had thus recognized the necessity of having armored units
capable of waging combat on their own.
(1) Captain X.... Commanding the Borne Squadron Group of an Armored Sub-Group.
(2) The presence of an automatic weapon for close-range defense, with a shield
to protect its servant, proved equally useful.
(3) Lieutenant Colonel X.... Commanding an Armored Regiment.
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[ ARTILLERY
I as war operations. But the graph of this evolution shows a discontinuity when the
S gun comes into play for i it creates fear, it has often difficulty in descerning
j "In the war on surface, when the artillery must intervene as mounted police
I and not as local constables, the outcome of the game is in danger, for success...
is much more based on political action than on the action of the fires". (1)
But can mounted police and even the local constable be done away with?
I So the artillery intervened from the start of the conflict and articulated itself
The followingi table shows the continuous increase in the number of tubes
and particularly of the ammunition consumIption over the last years of the conflict.
Therefore, the Artillery has played a major role, "Iless because of its
power, outdone by the Air Force, than by the permanency of its support, the in-
Position and Intervention pieces have equally shared the honors of being
A - POSITION ARTILLERY
From the moment the rebels have been able to activate powerful enough
elements to successfully attack the field fortifications "the network of our posts
scattered to provide protection for the roads and the safety of the populations
had to have the permanent support of immediate and powerful fire. This was the
(North Vietnam, South Vietnam) was "the evidence that instantaneous interventions
friendly element operating within the limit of its tubes' range, or capable of
engaging any enemy making himself known, had a psychological as well as material
mission to accomplish with respect to oyr own elements as well as the adversary". (4)
the organization which should be a carbon copy of the Joint Territorial Command.
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238 j1 "o.. "
over on a single objective cannot be accomplished adequately nor within the proper
The setting of fire was accomplished through various procedures: from the
A•OA observation plane to the Infantry Non-.Com spacing the blows as best he could.
The lack of DLO and the inadequacy of terrestrial observation can often
force Officers of any Armi to sot up the firing line. It is imperative that the
#sticky' aspect than in the case of the mobile units, but it exists". (2)
This group was to remain mobile, never fixed, and as far as possible, was not to
be dissociated.
!
- Be relatively easily accessible.
In rice fields, these conditions could not always be met. But It is prom
cisely on a difficult terrain that tWe Initial deployment of a position artillery
must take them into due consideration, under penalty of hampering all further
movement of the material.
fices where the only requirement from the gun is to make noise, the battery comes
into play as soon as a fire action is required. The battery can be limited to
two pieces when economy is necessary". (2)
required to have the same capabilities as a battery Commander. "If the Command
a fortiori the isolated gun can only deliver psychological fire without much ma-
terial efficiency;. (3)
I
f to provide all the fixed elements with moral support, but little by little, the
Delta "decay" imposed a regrouping.
The year 1953 was noted in TONKIN for this re-organiaation. but some Ime
planted units were no longer as well covered by fire and felt abandoned when the
enemy was becoming more powerful, Consequently, some posts were successfully
attacked by the V.1. (case of the LA-TIEN post in February 1954).
- these units, "every possible means were used" (1), which is the cause of the gaudy
aspect of the tubes (75 1897 models, 25 Pounder, 105 1934 and 1935 models...).
i DurinS those first years of the campaign the users vainly waited for
adequate amnunition allotments. Was it not the era when "a gun without any parti-
cular relation and support was granted a monthly ration of 30 rounds?" (2)
Towards the end of the conflict, however, most of the batteries had been
I equipped:
- Either with 105 whose range however was inadequate (practically 10,000
Sim,) and whose double trail mount required instructions for the all-azinuth
j fire,
- or with 105 long 1936, with a satisfactory range (14,500 m.) but whose
II
t 1241 ONC\L~
CLY
I dispersion in scope limited the utilization possibilities. In addition,
the Sun was too heavy, rather awkward to handle in spite of the use of
j The users would have preferred one same piece, all azimuth, not only
for its aiming capabilities but also to reduce the size of the pits. An increase
So, many officers wondered "why the French modern material such as the
105 ABS ware not tried in Indochina, where they would have been so precious on
the post where it,was housed. However, it somotimes happened that such a post
was commanded by an Infantry Officer, even a non-commissioned officer of a rank
It then seems desirable that "the gunner who represents the Viet's main
j objective in the post, be master of his defense and command the ensemble", (1)
But we must not forget that "the artillery protects itself with the
~1
This was not always possible, and the mortars (particularly 120 mortars),
of V.M, armament (in particular mortars and guns), a grave problem. At the end
artillery unit which was responsible for the halting fire in the area.
This counter-battery found its expression at DIEN BIEN PHU, where the two
artillery groups deployed for the defense of resistance centers were neutralized,
The problem of protection of guns was felt more and more accutely and
tripling the means for one same mission. Such a demand can only be justified
'#entrenched camp",I
The solution of a turret, which has quite a few partisans, would perhaps
be Justified in the form of armored elements turrets, rapidly installed by
procedures to be studied (for example: 105 Howitzer turret from a Sherman tank).
Position artillery, which had rendered the greatest services, was under.
going a cirsis at the end of the war and tis disappearance, or at least its
B - INTERVENTION ARTILLERY
some of which were assigned to joint units (mobile groups) and the others made
available to some territorial commanders, while the 155 lUi.1 groups were
243 . . "..
The eight years of war have confirmed the value of our principles and
|
r "the various notes, studies or instructions on the uses of artillery that were
I issued from 1946 to 1954...are all dominated by the same governing principles',. (2)
As early as 1946, the Colonel Commanding the F.T.E.O. Artillery (3) wrote:
S '"as a general rule, the errors do not stem from a surprise brought about by the
special nature of oporations in Indochina, but simply from the fact that the
sector for an operation, or when the general reserve artillery was assigned to
reinforcement tasks.
It was then the responsibility of the territorial commander to insure
the conduct of operations, and the responsibility of his gunner to take
Commanders of artillery, general reserve units under his command, as well as those
delicate due to the assignment of an Artillery Group to each M.G, and due to the
fact that the M.G. operated most of the time in isolation or at least at considerable
intervals from one another. The tactical and technical "double subordination",
!
thus was inclined to be only tactical,
(Middle LAOS) was often flon-oxistarit: the disperaion of the MG. which were often
several hundred kilometers apart allowed mast actions only on rare occasions". (1)
Moreover, if "the relations between the Joint Commander and the Artillery
Commander were, as a general rule, inpreganted with understanding and trust" (2).
it is nevertheless to be noted that "a certain number of M,.G, Commanders did not
j possess:
- definite knowledge of the capabilities and demnands of the artillery.
- full realization that this was the weapon with which thoy impose their
On the other hand, the Group Commanders were for the fmost part recently-
i their rank did not alone carry the desirable weight....In the special case of
|i ] the isolated HCG., it would be desirable to see the group led by a Lieutenant-
as follows (3):
iI
[•
-- I
reassuring the friendly troops,,,hile .ýrryij the enemy -t PSYCHOLO-
GICAL FIRE,
"have been executed in all wars...have been used extensively during the Indochina
campaign and which, nonetheless, are never mentioned in our regulations: that
- either on the enemy, whose action is feared, to ,give him the im pression
that the artillery is ready to get him under fire should he appear;
or on the friendly element, to give him comfidence and remind him that
""**.These low consumption fires achieved their goal most of the time.
'There is the certain danger of ahving them become widespread if they are incorpo-
It would be wise to take them under study and determine their mechanism and the
consumption to be allowed (1) for the gunner artilleryman lives the combat and
can understand the requirements of the infantry which bears the biggest load of
is also an undeniable fact that certain factors, such as the nature of the
Inflict losses to him, After the first minute of fire, he Is safe, Therefore,
"a'max imuixi of tubes delivering a mintimum of rounds Is Imperative as they must hit
taneously. The enemy assemable together In secrecy and reveals himself only
through an attack: sometimes his base of departure Is on this side of our halting
fire (night attacks), Without considering losses, he pushes ahead with fury In
tho space of the first minutes, The artillery fire must aim first to stop him
for, should he penetrate our position, the artillery can do no more than hamper
In this case, "rapidity of fire opening takes precedence over the mass
effects When a Group supports widely spaced units (battalions, posts...), this
leads to regulate each battery on a different halting fire contrary to the standard
doctrine of utilization. During the minutes following the opening of fire, the
*on account of the scarcity of our means which did not permit the
--- I
detachment of a group adequate to insure continuous observation in "the"
patience was of the essence: "How many days went by without seeing a thing,
all their traffic. In France, they have 2 frequencies at their disposal and the
standard question is to find out if it would be better to use the m with one
distribute a priori the posts on two networks, one tire network and one
conmand network. The obtained results would seem to support the partisans of
the first alternative; but it might be interesting to see what its results might
be with groups capable of putting up three D.L.O. with four Officers and each
..
248' t. J,, ':-
'| I|
it was the second pre-set frequency of the 609 posts, which was at the disposal of
Artillery Units movements caused grave worries to the Command in all the
territories.
Engineers, The M.G. Artillery group, in the first days of Febrtary, took one
15 Klms, and at the price of tremendous efforts on the part of the troop',*
enemy know this weakness and his documents Insist on the efficiency of an attack
But, the best guarantee was obtained by the fire vf other units in
falling-back of our M,G, from BAN NA PHAO to MARAXAY by the R.C. 12 in 1954
can be cited.
....... . .. . .
249 L
Indochinat
a The absence of enemy air forces and the rarity of his artillery intervention.
- The importance attributed to the close defense against the V.M. Infantry.
all the group elemonts are drawn tighter together in order to make maximun use
of a limited area and to reduce the perimeter to defended. This drawing close
which give more the impression of a Gipsy camp than of an artillery group in
position". (1)
on the one hand the INDOCHINA-type deployment (2 to 3 hectares) and on the other
hand those usually advocated in the mother land which easily reach 40 to 50
artillery attack from the enemy with the first case, the second, however, does not
"This problem of close defense which stemmed from the absence of a front
orientations (for examiple: the group of one of our M.G. took particular
the group and of an HG, Command Post; it varied from one Company to one
76 Non-Coms and 377 gunners, being already low, was never realised. Thus the
group set utp three D.L.O. with 2 Officers, with difficulty, while the A.,. often
the troop cadres, particularly the Non-comse But this advantage was offset, as
calling on personnel from other teams, while the permanent radio monitoring on
the forward network (D.L.O.) and the rear network (AD.), presented problems
that were practically impossible to resolve when the A.D. was beyond the range
And last, the personnel required for close defense was constituted, with
each battery must have four Officers. Only on that condition can the battery
cor.•nand of the battery to the Fire Lieutenant, being the only one to know the
The group had a "rear base", a rest cantonment where some elements from
I
•'i • t, * •' , •" •
the B.C.S, and the batteries head bookkeepers remained in permanence, But the
However, the brevity and rarity of contacts between the unit and its
rear base made it possible to group around a contonment suitable for a firing
group, the services of several groups and thus realize economies in guard
personnel.
observation,.,)*
However, one fact emerges from the evidences the increasing importance
of the Artillery during the conflict, recognized not only by our own Infantry,
but also by the Biet Minh who, rendering judgement on our bases of operations and
our defense tactics wrote: "of all the French defense facilities, the
I
251 A OFFICIAL USE ONLY
1,o
......---------------- ...........
.CID
0 LIIn 0 p
00
0
4-4- _ I- '
IcI .40J 0 00
Lo cm
C H A P T E R VII
(A, L. 0. A.)
The campaign of Indochina showed, if such was the need, that the Army
From the start of hostilities, the Command requirements and those of the
Artillery proved to be huge and from 1945 to 1947, the Piper Cubs of the 9th
DI.C., then the 1torane 500" Groups, sent out successively, failed. The
Command of the Artillery Aviation, created in September 1, 1946, did not succeed
But the Air Force had evaluated the services which the A.L.O.A. could
render in the scouting for fighters and even bombers. Therefore, an effort was
made to the profit of the Artillery ObAervation Aviation Groups (G.AOA.) which
then existed and put back into shape in 1848. Until 1952, they were to remain
On March 3, 1952, the decree joining the A.L.O.A. to the Army was
AL.O.A. Co.nand was merely created on January lst, 1954; the relief of personnel
was accomplished only in April of the same yoar and the application of all facilities
was not yet placed under the responsability of the Army without reserve at the end
of the war,
Ii
Ii
i ~ ~~~~~~~~253
,,.• ,., ,. • ,,
"All sorts of demands were placed upon the Air Observation Corps: P
Artillery and mortar fire ranging, search of Intellignece, escorting the troops,
radio relay, guiding of fighters and bombers, search for D.Z., food supply, mail
and medicines, Medical evacuation, etc. (1); the following can also be added:
armed reconnaissance at the start of the campaign, during which the observer
shelled on the ground the objectives which he had judged detrimental to his
F.M. (I)
Artillery fire ranging• by observation place was particularly advantageous
in Indochina due to the shortage of terrestrial observatories.
needed them, that is after taking position at the end of the day, after
trusted. Certainly the Officers of all Branches are capable of appreciating the
played an intermediary role between the airman and the gunner. The latter could
only avoid the "fire hole" between air action and the artillery shelling by
iI I
il I
• . •
254 ..
successive air Interventions and announced the moment when they started off.
and also the alarm given a long time ahead by the noisy and slow Morano".#
at low altitude (between 200 and 600 meters). At the end of hostilities,
light A.A. more and more dense...the flight altitude was then brought to 900
and 1,000 motors; a passage at low altitude could be executed but could not be
renewed6 The results of the missions was not worse,..°the Viets, less cautious,
and reconnaissance missions at night. Towards the end of the campaign, a few
cautious attempts were made in this domain, but they have not been pushed far
immediate approaches of the units involved. In such cases the observer could
not hesitate to stray from our troops as the most productive intelligence was
often gathered a few kilometers away and even sometimes outside the zone of
operation.
I
I III 255 ""4 • ' •''••' i•',! •
an operation from an observation planet "In fact, whon dealing with large-scale
operations, the Operation Command itself should direct it from the flying
from one end to the other from a plane. But, this periodic overall view, of the
to this mission, In the face of an extremely fluid enemy, the transience of the
objectives Is such that many occasions were lost due to the Inevitable slowness
",,.On December lst 1953, around 6 P11, upon returning from a reconnaissance
mission on sight, we discovered about a hundred rebels grouped on the east bank
of the SONG ThAI BINH and preparing to cross the river on sampans. No fighters
were available in HAIPHONG; a B.26 at the end of a mission arrived more than
10 minutes later, then two fighters sent from HARUOI arrived another fifteen minutes
later. In the interval, the rebels dispersed; the intervention was practically
useless"... (3)
-As Lieutenant T.... pointed out, "The light observation plane would
have boon able to Intervene with success on limited and vanishing objectives had
1
GUIDING OF FIGHTERS AND B0OMBRS proved to be a mission almost
Indispensable for close air support, as a rapid plane does not sea very well and
is not in contact with the troops on the grounds But the air observer sees
naturally the terrain In the same a"~le as the fighter of the bomber, but in
addition, he knows where the friendly troops are, the situation, talks to the
liahts with -oeor several grenades for an objective to be treated by the fighter
of the bomber".
plane to go down at a low altitude (100 in.). It was midified by the utilization
of the U.S. rifle smoke grenade (grenade with fins) of the M.20 or 14.22 type,
One observer who performed many missions at DIEN BIEN PHIL experienced
The Importance of this guiding mission explains why the Air Force wished
to keep at its disposal the light observation planes, and why it wanted, at least,
to insure their control through the Tactical Air Groups (GATAC). In addition,
I'I
, J
257'
Independent A.L.AT., for the guiding mission seaned to them not worthy of more
importance than any other mission. As such, It should have been left to the
appreciation of the Joint Commander and if necessary, It should have been
reversible. (1) On the other hand, the GATAC can be informed of aerial
activities without the necessity of placing the planes under his command.
"It seems normal, actually, that the interested Command activate its
A.LIO.A. or that it delegate its responsability to a subordinate authority; on
the other hand, It is irrational that the Command should have to address itself
to an organization outside his authority (GARAC aerial intervention C.P.) in
Independence at the beginning of 1954 and, if the wai" had gone on, it is quite
probable that it would have become the essential element of the Army, as it
After the end of hostilities, a new step forward was taken and the
Implementation was from then on Insured by the aerial support channel. This
new procedure was satisfactory, but was not confirmed by combat.
(1) In most cases the requests for aerial intervention indicate that one observation
plane would perform the guiding mission# Then there is no particular
request to be made.
(2) Squadron Leader commanding the ALOA of the F.T.E.O.
L
A.L.O.A, formations were stationed on air bases.
which it was difficult to provide the cadres, and deploy them as close as possible
to the C,P. of the authority in charge of the operation. In addition, the crews
were not always allowed to work for the profit of the same units,
all circumstances..."
""iIf the means are not sufficient, the organization of squadrons of four
to eight planes appears preferable to the organization of larger elements; these
squadrons would be adapted to the users in accordance with their requirements.
In such a manner, only the users could dispose of the necessary aerial means at
Many observer Officers are of the same opinion: "It would have been
preferable to have observers and even crews specialized in one area...the observer
follows the appearances of the enemy, observes the progress of his activities...
"To know the formations for which he works,is also important to the
observer...and the same goes for the troops on the ground who would have
'i I
GAOA. wrote: "In most cases, orders were given in very concise fortm via
teletypc fri,,, t®1- 1ATA,. Tliq•u. orders generally indicated only the point of
rendez-vous and the radio signals...and left theobserver without any idea as to
intervention delays. The same Captain continues: "On the other hand, an
unexplainable delay of several hours (1) passed between the ambush or the attack
against the post and the arrival of the plane. In a delta of only 15,000 square
kilometers, this can only be explained by the number of t"unproductive', inter-
to save It, in case something might happen". (3) This misuse could have been
avoided by a decentralization of facilities, which w.as only interdicted by the
shortage of planes.
(1) This delay varied: half an hour when the plane waited on the ground, with
radio set in place. Several hours if the radio set had to be set on a
given frequency, alert the crew...
(2) Captain..o, Commanding a GA.OA,
(3) Lieutenant..,. Plane Observer.
(4) A group of artillery observation planes (GAOA) with 3 squadrons of 6 planes
included 19 officers, 50 non-comns and 88 men (total 166)e
(5) Lieutenant-Colonel Conmmanding the ALOA of the F.T.E.O.
= I
SU 260 ~ c
become operational, a pilot required training for one month, a mecanic two to
But, after according these delays, the crews were entirely satisfactory:
"Very new at the trade and full of enthusiasm, they sometimes accomplished
missions under conditions which would have made bemedaled pilots shrink". (2)
To sum up, the observation plane lhas been in Indochina "the Jack of all
trades" (3), the "shoe-shine boy" (3), "the most'procious auxiliary," (3) of the
Command, and its appearance in the sky was a relief to the Infantryman in
If the ALOA was mainly used by the Air Force, it was because of the lack
But its Implementation by the Army is the desire of all combatants who
have assessed the wealth of Its possibilities and, moreover, wish for the
IiI I A
261.
CHAPTER VIZI
HELICOFTMS
w
t
ii
late in In spite of their obvious usefulnosat helicopters appeared very
Indochina@
Two of them were bought by the Headquarters of the Sanitary Ser-
vices and put to use by the Army Air Corps. In 1952, this stock was in-
creased by purchases and by private gifts and it amounted to a dozen of
helicopters.
This increase made necessary the organization of units and bet-.
ween January and April 1954 the Army created a Command of Helicopter For-
mations. The con~truction of a helicopter field was begun in SAIGON,
while it was decided upon a plan to obtain 100 helicopters that same year*
In the meantime $ the Air Force had also decided to create heli-
copter units and the economic situation had forced the Army and the Air
Force .to unite their means and form a mixed units where the personnel of
both would work jointly until the Army units would have reached a volume
that woulA justify their independence. (1)
(1) - The 65th Squadron was expected to includes A squadron command; a unit
of 25 light helicopters; a unit of 25 medium helicopters; a unit for techni-
cal maintenanceo
In actuality, it reached only a total of 28 helicopters after the cease-fire.
.•,.•.:.
,.• • • . .;='• W 262
" The zones of the delta (or costal plains). Flat terrain with
a high density of population and troops; short distances; metoreological
conditions generally good,"
" The plateaus and the mountains predominantly covered with fo-
rests, specialized troops, in small numbers and scattered$ high altitudes5
often poor metereological conditions."
" In the second ones the helicopter had to be powerful and sure$
had to carry instruments for navigationg and to be used at high altitudes.
The S#51 was not succosful and, fortunately$ was abandoned fcr the SIKOR-
The operation 6f the H.19 in LAOSp which was done from SAIGONp
was a waste of a potential 30 hours (to go and come back) out of the 130
available between inspections# that is, 20,." (2)
Training of personnel. - " The first Air Force pilots had been trained
in civilian schools for helicopter pilots in France, England, and in the
military schools of the U.S.A.F."
S~I
" Army pilots were
AIR, FWICK, SNCASE)." (2) trained in French civilian schools ( HELICOP-
(1) - Report of the Air Commander in the Far East, March 1955.
-
T
IJ
L
~', ~ 263
Neither were ready for the operations and they had to follow a
complete course of instructions in the air and on the ground, before being
combat ready. These indispensable classes absorbed many hours of flight$
and this often interfered with the o5erations," C Report of the Air Com-
mander for the Far East, March 1955.,
The mechanics were originally those of the Air Liaison squadrons$
" with a cadre of one officer and 28 enlisted men with a background in the
field of helicopters, five of which had followed training in England with
the WMMTLAND Company*" Later, ether mechanics were prepared in France.
At the end of the war, the Arm• had pilots and mechanics as well
prepared as the Air Force specialists, and this would have allowed them to
create autonomous units.
Use during the hostilities* - "0 With a few exceptions, the helicopters were
+ used an emergency vehicles* Their mission was the evacuation of the wound-
ed, the sick, to pick up prisoners that had boon liberated, escaped prison-
era, isolated soldiers," Li. Battallion Commander X... Commander of the
O.F.H. (Groups of Helicopter Formationsa) 2. By 31 July 1954, there were
10p820 wounded or sick evaouated; 38 pilots and 80 escaped prisoners pick-
ed up; for a total of 5p400 missions or 7p040 hours of operations.)
ctOn December 14, 1953, one helicopter of the type H.19 ove-
euated 76 wounded from a support point at DIIN BL24 PHU to a central
C.P. Later# between 50 and 80 wounded were evacuated by each plane se-
veral times. C Report of the Air Comuander for the Far East, March 1955.)
".ooo From the 14th to the 25th of March, 1964, helicopters eva-
custed wounded soldier from DIM BIEN PHU in 53 hours of flight.ooe"
" From the 7th of May to the 20th of Julyp 1954, 80 people es-
caped from DIE BIN4 PHU were saved by helicopters in difficult conditions
(altitudep forest.o.) with the use of winches or rope ladders."
"loos One H910 after the hostilities, has recovered the crew
of a British commercial ship lost in the bay of Along.*' Battallion Com-
mander X..,, Commander of the GFH.l
I.
this protest from the pilotas
"In regard to the Army, we must try to ftmiliari-e the officers
and the enlisted men with the helicopter and to remove ideas that are too
optimistic about its behaviour in a vertical flight, caused by too many
insufficient landing strips and as many acrobatic maneuvers, which, fortu-
nately, almost always succeeded." I Riport of the Air Commander for the
Far East, March 1958.]
I
In theory, the convention assures the safety of the vehioless
airorafttp boats.... transporting the wounded, the sick, or hospital
0EVA Convention, 12 August 1949, Chapter 111 Articles
personnels.C OE
19, 90, 35, 886.) ut one believes only too often that it suffices to
place a red aross on an aircraft to protect it.
In tact, in the delta of Tonkin, the guerrilleros often fired
at the hospital helicopters and it became necessary to protect them.
H It
is not forbidden to ask in what measure the use of the
infantry for the protection of helicopters led the V.M. to consider them
as enemies and to treat them as such*"
Tactical employment. - The small number of aircrafts did not allow their
tactical utilization during the campaign.
[
[i
a•'u Ipl.
•" • I Q
, y ~ I[266
-- To
To dispose of 100 light
traln sufficient holioopters,
pilots and 400
and mechanics* projectones.
A heavy was thus con-
sidered ( based on the original issue of 25 aircrafts ) to become effective
in one year.
- A credit in the amount of 70 to 80 billions.
(1) - For your informations here is a list of the aircrafts of the Army Air
Corps, organic to each division in the United States.
~.tot 267
CHAPTER IX
THE ENGINEERS
The war between 1939 and 1945 had already shown the growing im-
portance that had assumed the Engineer Corps. Its role, however$ was poin-
ted out even more clearly during the Indochina Campaign, because the Ixpe-
ditionary Corps found itself in an immense territory where the Department
of Public Works, desorganized by the events of 1947 and locking the neces-
sary fundsp was incapable to repair and maintain the structure necessary
for the operations.
The work of the engineers was even more considerable than in
Europes but their strength remmined " always inferior to the needs9 because
it comprised only 4% of the Expeditionary Forces while to resolve the dif-
ficulties derived from the geographical characteristics of the country the
strngth should have been between 12 and 14% of the total, as planned by.-
all foreign armies." [ Report on the operations of the Commanding General
of the Engineers in the Far East.]
I.
268
I• - " The lack of spare parts which had to come from SAIGON and some-
times had to be fabricated locally,
]!m ['
I : Se
S~269
-" The great variety of appliances utilized, French and American [ For
instancel there were at least 20 makes of generator sets, for a total of
42 models.) which required more specialized personnel, a considerable va-
"riety of spare parts, the installation of very well developed shops and
a service of receipt and delivery utilizing numerous and highly qualified
personnels C Report of the Commanding General for the Far Ehat.)
Once more the specialist leaves his shop to go out and findsmostly
see, a lack of maintenance.
liiiiserious#
If the damage is not:f,^ especially when it has to do with small en-
gines that exist in large quantitiess it becomes very serious whenever the
materiel involved is as important as a bulldozer. The driver does all he
can on his ont; but if the vehicle stops, most of the time he is incapable
to repair it and ends up by calling up the repair facilities*" [ Report of
Colonel Xoooo forwer commander of the Engineers in the Far East.]
The service - Mhen the Expeditionary Force arrived, it found and organi-
mation identical to that in France, including, therefore, a section for
iulding and Works and a section for Materials, r This section was directed
by an Assistant Director of Idaterials, who resided in SAIGON. His mission
was to supply materials of the Engineers to all territories that needed
them. The Building soection had staffs in all territories and an assistant
director attached to the Engineers Headquarters.]
All this did not make it impossible for the Service to request
the help, as is done In France, of private enterprises and local indus-
"tries to execute the majority of the works, often even in the less secure
areas.
i i{i
S"-'...< , , , ., 270
" On the other hands the Service, relieved of these missions, has
been able to ramp bettor the problems in their totality and to prepare for
•IIthe futures" Report of the Commanding General of the Engineers in the Par
East.]
Nevertheless$ many engineer. would have liked at1"t awartie
organization and that military staffs replaced the local ones. Because the
latter functioned according to the regulations valid in France before 1945
and included specialized sectors under the orders of one officer.
The administrative regulations and job descriptions were those
used in France. The organization was done in each territory by an assistant
director, delegated by the director in SAIGON.
But one could ask if the general organization of the combat and
service units actually sufficed to the requirements of a war without front,
where the distinction between "Combat Engineers" and "Service Engineers"
lost most of its significance.
I
_ _
Actually, this solution would have been only a
medi~re compromise, and if the lack of personnel had not
made it impossible, the Engineer Corps should have included:
- Combat battallions in sufficient number to satisfy the
operational needs of our mobile forces.
- General reserve units, including other combat battal-
lions and a variety of specialized units to fulfill the mis-
sion of equipping the different territories and to reinfor-
ce occasionally the Engineers to the front.
iI
it
I
St., •,, 3 2
, " 9.72
I
I [ .273
The work force - The lack of personnel always forced the En-
gineers to make use of local emplo.yesoprison..4rs and coolies of both
sexes.
If the output of the individuals was not high, the number was
sufficient to perform all the work necessary for the digging and filling
up of areas at sometimes surprising speeds. For excavating# for instan-
cop between 2,000 and 4,000 cubic motors of earth, small containers ma-
nipulated by dozens of workers could be famter than the bulldozer, and
onC Engineer officer wrotet " The advantages of machines over man is
not always a dogma in all circumstances and under all latitudesooo.o"
".....If we admit that the beat solution of a certain dif-
ficulty ',i.s, that which allows to 'obtain results with the least expen-
ses and the least delay, it is then better to accomplish an occasional
work in a certain terrain X .... to hire 200 coolies, to give them
picks and shovels and to make them work for 15 days, than to request a
bulldozer, its equipment and gasoline from the nearest depot ( and es-
pecially from SAIGON, which was 600 miles away ) even it this modern
machine could perform the work in 48 hours.." ..: Colonel Xo..
conference on the complicated service structures of the Indochina
theatre.)
'I
L hp , Q )L
approximately one meter wide and spaced about 3 to 5 meters one from
the other and leaving a narrow passage for the circulation of pedes-
trianso. All the material removed was thrown In the rice paddies.
In the second step, the p;.no keyboard was transformed into
a ditch. In the third step# the ditch became longer and the whole
structure of the road was elirinated leaving no road for several
hundred meter&. The waters covered the road, which scattered in
the rice paddies.
In the high and middle regions, the bridges and all the
passages built on the mountain side constituted the most delicate
points, aid the powerful vegetation made necessary a continuous sta-
te of maintenances an abandoned road was literally devoured within
two seasons and had to be built all over again. E That was the case
of route number 68 abandoned in 1960 and utilized again in 1061 for
the operation in HOA BINH.]
The opening of a road not in such terrain could be done
only with the use of digging equipment because the clearing of the
smallest obstacles necessitated the construction of elaborated
structures or the establishment of frames that the next fkoods would
remove. The road number 4 p South of XIMO IKOUANOG opened for 40
kilometers, had to be rebuilt entirely after only one season of rains*..
The tasks faced by the Engineers were, thus, very hard, since
they not only had to reestablish circulation, but also to accomplish,
little by little, the following programs
f
Considerable maintenance had to be performed, and fotthis
reason work groups had to be organized and important vehicles mobilimedo
tipping trucks, tankers, *to...*
" The tight against tpe wear and erosion of road& was actually
never won, because to do its solid foundations had to be built. The
tonnage of materials used was enormous and it reached up to three tons
for one meter of road." C Colonel C.... former commander of the EMgi-
neers in the kar Nut.]
"It was impossible to change the piers each time, and the brid-
ges had to withstand these differences of water levels. The solution
adopted and the one that was very satisfactory was the use of the float-
ing Bailey."
ii
O•AL USE Of( 2 76
Only the LoCoT.i of the Navy could navigate at & speed higher
than 3 meters per second, speed that was obtained during the floods ( as
on the Rad River around HANOI from the let of July to the 15th of Septem-
ber.)
[
I
277
CHAPTER X
TRANSPORTATION
I cement.
I
[
OEF.ý "Y278
I
The transport group - As in France, it generally inclu-
ded two and even three oomptinies; but, t was never usid as
a whole, The Headquarters platoon and its services were al-
co greatly reduced and did not perform any administrative
work.
The Transportation Compny included 3 or 4 platoons
and its Headquarters Platoon wns made up of one administrative
section one security, and one transmissions sections. E 100
enliste& men and drivors.]
The security section had scout cars and half-tracks.
" It was diviLded into elements that possessed one light armor-
ed vehicle and one personnel carrier and there were as many
elements as there were transportation platoons in the cormpany.
SSquadron Commander X.... Coaxiander of a Transport Group.J
Many officers found these means insufficient and
requested two armored vehicles for each transportation pla-
toon, or nine for a company.
The scout car, that some had predicted as good as
the carriers, was criticized by all the administrative & com-
bat peftsoinH. It bould not be utilized in all types of ter-
rain and especially mud made it useless whenever it had to
leave the road, as in the case of an ambush.
Combat troops requested rifle grenades and light
mortars in greater quantities and less machine guns " which
could not be utilized properly over roads surrounded by
dense vegetation." C Second Lieutenant Y.,... Platoon Leader.
To show the need for weapons with a high parabola, here
is the narration of an ambush happened in 1954, which caused
us pnrticularly heavy losses in woodden terrain.
"At 1300 hours the Nth Battallion, having reached X....
contacted an enemy block of an estimated strength of one bat-
tallion, positioned across the road. A violent combat begins.
At the same time, another enemy b-attallion, camouflaged,
and positioned away from the road, approxiimately to the North
of it and at about 700 meters to the East, begins an extreme-
ly violent bombardment with heavy weapons of the second series
I of the convoy. In a few minutes, under the violence of tae
thne amaunition trucLs,
all theintensified
fire, vehicles ofby the
the series were of
explosions destroyed."]
I
I
27
I !'
!I
"£Mixed units ( Headquarters, transportation, oir-
culation ) had to be s2lit in Headquarters Auto Companies
and Headquarters Companies proper.
!
' . .... •.,282
L
NAII~
th ".. 11sb.he-igt Transportation erefotme
po~ndr aslone
F*0rance and missins. Buretoir of a Trnsorto
alasncs Oprtio om
These octonvo
he wete loef inthehands anome a,1
Trnsoration
Bureoyu thout becomte inevelry imorntiont. Report of thes.
" oaa
heTransportatnrion Cnochiandrdl,]e n f
SIGNAL
!
286
At the level of the Comoiander in Chief:
. One Signal Coniiand,
- One headquarters for materiel,
I One battolion of general reserve.
At ýhe level of each territorial oou.mander:
- A Signal Coo.mvand,
- A company or a battalion oomprising all means available
in the territory I '• Experience confirmed, thnt it was advan-
tageous to vroup in the same unit all the Signal means ava-
ilable in a territory, whenever tactical considerations did
allow it." ( Report of the Signal Comiiander in the Faa' East.)],
I - One forvard materiel unit which, in some places, assumed
the proportions of a depot.
'!-
h2 87
V I
I i. . . r- -' -- • ' -• . . •. ...... .• " •• -- " - •@• - • • i .. .. • '•.. • - "•
Qk&I~L 1 ja:V .~.288
I The general lnok of security oaused the elimination
of telephone and messenger services. Radio services assumed
a considerable importance butlif 'they/eplaoed easily the te-
lephone by means of hertzian uives, they could not replace
the services rendered previously by motorcycle messengers.
The Signail Cozwnmnd thus often regretted its lRok of airplanes,
or helicopters, to carry written messages.
Contrazy to what would have happened in Europe, the
development of radio nets, in all their forms, was never hinder-
ed by cluttered radio frequencies. The small number of units
involved and the utilization of posts th•,t could work with ra-
latively low frequenoies eliminnted all difficulties. C Espe-
cially in Tonkin. - The ANGRO.9, that operated between two
and four mepaoyoles, proved to be nn excellent radio from all
points of viev.]
The good supply system made it possible to equip
units with ra•dio equipment more powerful than that issued to
similar units in France; the telegraph and the telephone by
hertzian waves were also greatly developed.
The best results obtained in this field were the
continuous liaisons maintained with the garrison at DIEN
BIEN PHU: although very far away and under constant bombard-
ment, it was possible to insure contact tiith the Commanding
General of the Operational Group of the North West and his
"Headquarters until the last minutes of the battle and the
tape of these last conversations is the first document of
I its kind in military history.
The Signal Corps succeeded over all technical dif-
ficulties and obtained a flexible system of liaisons, which
always satisfied the High Como•:and even though, sometimes, the
demands were questionable and some officers frequently did
* not respect radio discipline.
S[
I
ri
V!_
'u~"289
C HAPTER XII
AERIAL SUPPORT
S i
* 1
V
E!
USE 290
II
1 OFFICIAL USE ONLY
( 291
ad 0-:§
q~. ~~J CH
I 94949 ,~,Vol
¶r4
Ic
uj0
~ 292
I
lP C?:U3. (293
possiblo questions regarding the use of the aircraft. [ The
tonnagse of thie bombs drop:oed by bombers und combat planes
follows a constant progression:
- 834 tons in 1949
- 3,004 tons in 1950
- 8,621 tons in 1951
- 9,361 tons in 1952
-12,802 tons for the first 7 months of 1954.)
ii The reconnaissance utilized different types of air-
craft in Indochina. During the last phase of the campaign,
two specialized squadron9 were created'and equi-pýed with F.
8 F. and R.B.26, which proved to be useful from the point
of view of their missions. They helped greatly, but the
g~reat need for photographic missions made it impossible for
these two formations to satisfy all the demands.
¶ The evolution of means of aerial transport was
pointed out in the ch.pter dedicated to the Airborne Troops.
The four groups vwhich existed at the end of the war were
equip'.ed with Dakotas ( 0.47 ) and received a reinforcement
of C.119 during the last months, r Aerial transportation
was helped re'ny times by the requisitioning of airplanes
belonging to the civilian companies that served Indochina.]
Finally, two squadrons of light aircraft satis-
tr fled the numerous needs for liaison. They were equipped
different models ( Siebel, Nord 1000, Morane,
with veryetco...).
'Beaver,
il
I
LRS 0.)j,294+
I:
2 9
ORGANIZATION OF THT_,W
C00L1:AND AND OF THE AERIAL SUPORT -
The flexibility of all air units had to be based
on the geography of Indochina nnd this made necessary three
groups of forces: in the i'North, the Center, the South.
This org<anization, however, was set up only when our means
became important enough to justify the existence of three
air comnmands. [This type organization responded only to
operational requirements, For all other operations, and
especially for logistics, the Air Force depended on the Air
com:aand in Saigon. for the entire "'ar East and the 14aval
Air Force on the iAavy CoL'Inand for the Far Last.]
IJ
. , |
iI
IOFFICiAL j 296
I The fixity of land and aerial coomand posts and
their nearness allowed to creds excellent liaisons. Further,
personal relations were created among the officers of the
two branches and the solidity of tilese contacts was one of
the factors that contributed to tbn very satisfying fonotion-
ing of the aerial support on the level of command. [ An Air
Force Colonel has sumiied up with humour the necessity for an
intimate liaison, which will free some pilots from their at-
Stitude towards those who direct tamfrom the land:
" The pilot is a Jealous animal who Will not take 0
off unless it hns received orders from an Air Force officer-
he is ready, to protect the autonomy of his branch, to take
the most inflexible positions."
"It is in respect to fire support that our head-
quarters have the most difficulties in keeping good liai-
sons."
" The Infantry, and it is a natural desire would
lilro the Air Force work close to them' Just as during the
w6rld wars it expected the tanks to advance with them. It
is a mission which we will never refuse when a co.vn'rade is
4 i in danger.,..
protected But, please,
by cannons do not weapons.
and inplaoed chose objectives
ask us to Among other thingso
such utilization of the air capabilities is contrary to the
4
rules. J
The process to request aerial sup-port to coordina-
te it and to utilize it varied frequently aocrding to the
V place and the situation. One teaching point can be learned
from these continuous modifications which were inspired by
a constant desire for flexibility. It is not a good idea
to make too great use of certain particular organizations
which are temporary by their nature, because the personnel
r ~must be trained
for precise in theOnly
duties. practice thisa regulated
under of condition, pr'ocess
it can and
attain
a convenient efficieacy.
In Indochina the fact that land units were widely
spread out often calleA for a decentralization of the autho-
rizntion to relquest aerial support. For this reason, it be-
came necessary at times to authorize an isolated battalion
or post to request directly aerial intervention. Two ways
of going about this have given satisfaction: the utilization
of a light reconnaissance aircraft and the establishmient of
a "security net",
I The reconnaissance plnnes 1orane frequently trans-
mitted direct requests to the GATACs. This method permitted
a rapid intervention and it alleviated the lack of trans:ait-
Ii ting equipment. It must therefore be kept, especially for
operations demanded by a surface defenso of the territory.
!
I.!
and the announce:aant that the aerial support of a mission had
been granted irnvedi,'tely alleviated the units in difficulty.
This decentralization, however, had to be followed
a year EJ courses
by an effort
GATACs severalto times
trainduring
the cadres
so as were set theup by the
gnement of a sufficiently competent officerto toallow assi-
each Mobile
SGroup and to each Territorial Comtiand at the level of a sector.
Finally, transmissions, which were fairly bad in the
beginnin,, were later iiiproved ond, by the end of the conflict,
became excellent.
- independent actions,
- fire missions ( direct and indirect support, )
- reconnaissance,
- support of transportation coluzms.
!i
•, JA.~298
[F
[ U~i01QILY299
i Fire supoort- Th6 incertitude which always existed
about the exact loc!tion where our land troops contacted
the enemy made it difficult to prepare a schedule of tar-
gets to be bombed and we had to be satipefied with targets
of opportunity. The pre-scheduled type of support was,
therefore, used very little.
.[
% OILY 30o
best way to attack was ' straffing E the bullets utilized
by weapons mounted on airplanes measure the diminishing use
mado of this tactio. In 1949, three million bullets were
shot by the two groups existing at the time, while in 1952,
only 5,467,000 were utilized by all formations.) In all
other circumstances, the siaptation of the am ,unition to the
nnture of the ene.*%7 targets was necessary.
This choice of ammaunitions was the object of long
studies, the results of which did not bear any fruits until
the last months of the campaign. The best ammunitions seem-
ed to hove been the napalm and the 260 lbs fragmentation
bombs.
iC !
0~~V-SAZ OiNQLY 301
Tha lack of precise info,'mation about the enemy and
tho mobility and fluidity of its for:nntions have considera-
bly diminished the efficacity of indirect supp.ort which was
utihized much less thnn direct support.
The requests were addressed to GATAC in an urgen-
cy sequence and often with a time to respect. The fluidity
U of operations however, forced the 4ifferent centers of ae-
rial support to change their targets at the last minute.
Under these conditions, the GATACs have not been able to
adapt the aimunitions nnd the means available to the mif-
sions requested because of the short notices.
The fortified villages and the resupply points
justified the employment of the B26 and of the Privateers
of the Nnval Air Force, but delays made it often necessary
to utilize combat planes instead, which aotually obtainehd
k very satisfactory results.
,Night interventions, in situations where posts
wero surrounded, were best with the Dakota Luciole which
was really efficient and which had a happy psychological
influenece over the combatants.. Its utilization, however,
could not have lasted for along time since the Vietminh
defense systemSnwere improving. It is betterandto the some
use conclu--.
prudence while evaluating its performance
sions to be derived from it.
SDuring the months premaing the end of the hos-
i tilities, the enemuy anti-aircraft system improved greatly
and the battle of DIEN BIEN PHU marked the impotene of
our aerial support, for different reasons, but mainly be-
cause of the density of enemy fire in the skies above their
bases.
The processes that had been envisaged to counter-
act afgainst enemy artillery, some of which had been inspi-
red by tha war in Korea C and we must mention here the Viet-
minh's battery groups of 105 mm -nd 155 mm guns,] proved to
be insuf.iciently powerful, most of nll because of the lalck
of guns.
From this defeat, however, we may derive some tea-
ching points.
First of all, the need for mas-ive and repeated
bombings over the entire area where the ene:.iy batteries are
inplaced so as to destroy them with certainty, since their
exact location is very difficult to find. The dropp:ing of
napalm, which was tried, doesn't seem to have given any va-
lunble results, perhaps because areas that weren't large
enough wvre covered.
!
'I
-I
-In r'egard to combat planes, it serems thtit rwe can
ing Air Force m~ust be mreoz raodeZ'n than. the ene anti-ai
~
defense' syste. The jet pro~ed'to beý essential in I1oýe
I and ittj"W0i414 1,iave proven epqti
tlte ad utee
inIndo,'hika iftý~ho6-
the dovelop~ent of enz
fense Obr-the proloble creation of pner.ay
a~i.ýr de.-~
aoiibi 64p- abi,.ý
litiepQ' Raeprt by -the flotillas 3P andl #F 6f, tliei 1,avWA
Air Force.]n
'i
I]
1?
i
I
<I
,CHAPTER XII I
RI VER FORCES
1-
I
.I . ... ... ]
I,, Ol~UY 3o
[
II
OFFICIAL USE ONLY
N07
P.T. F.OOM.
SL.C.V.P Vidette. F.OM
P.T. Y
Vedette.Y L.C.M
L.C.M. Monitor
L.C.M. Monitor
Vedette de P'ort.V.P
L.CT1
U U
308
4 9
p..
I . 9 9
.1 -
I
1 *. .1.
.3 .
H . I
1..*
'I, "-3
* 'Do
I
11
It ?urther, the low level of the waters in the ri-
vers of this regionmrnida it a nocesoity to use flat-bottom
boats." E Corn.eandor X.... Navy Oonueander of Central Vietnam.
SAt the and of the, cai paign, the Dinassaut appeared
to be insifficient in volume and, ( especially in North Viet-
nam,) it was necessary to set up a group of many of them
and to reinforce it with transportation units of the Trans.
portation Corps and of the Navy.
-- i
"equipment of certain wciterwcays of vitcl. importanoe ( Red
River,- Bamboo Oona! ) Wihioh made convoy escorts necessary,
to ouch an'extent a~nd nuxaber~ that they absorbed al~most the
totality of means available while detracting from the ope-
i I rations proper."
'He also remarked "1'the insufficient fortification
oof. river poIsts "when ýeach of them should be as well secured
I and 6t-ni~ed 1", as AnAigy porst. C~ramndez' X.*
CoX=nder in Central Vietnam,]-
,I I
OFCA 311.
F
water without sikn ~[Coml.iandor of the river f orces in
71 ~ Sou~th Vietna'lin 0011,.USIC. ThIs is a-p)lic,-ble to t~he boats
toy
we~~~~ ba i osnt tov an that le-vel-bottomed bo-
ats of.L a stronL-ar const-ruction ý-,re not'desirable.J
i~ie~wepi~ ws oe o ou~ ~o~s oo0_2:4_ul 0,e
useessaginst moledernm,.,llse O2neOZ .'our jao olto to desto
rzat Io ns rnd o ur zi neswieepers Drove~d It be vai~y .'f'i oi eat
a ca in at all telecontrolled naines, but t!hey would have been
aiem from a distan-ce niust. still be discovrd
ji
1 " The L.Oi,. onitor, useful at its echelon, did
not correspond to our needs. A boat derived from the I.C.i.
or the L.C.T., with vreapons of the caliber between 40 and
130 or 150, and an armor between 12 mm and 10 cm would have
prob-bly solved the problem of the lack of' power from the
very beginning, the campaign of the Black River, in 1947."
1i -
-
discration,
speed,
secarity over water,
. . - an aooeptable protection. . .
.I l
II
I ~ ~ 314+
i|i
I|
iA
iI ,
,I I
if-
-I
---
SI CH AP T E R X IV
-M-
.LkL 3 PERSOINNEL
tl I
A
IA
I
3316
I
SW;CCI,,LIZM O
l - •'."omen hold nwaerous Jobs in the Signal
Corps, .,.some Jobs sc *....... .sCcetcnries in some of the
permanent Headquarters, and in the Services Administration,
but they were also utilized in other positionA:
- For the 'folding and maintenance of parachutes.[ During
operations they had to put in an extremely heavy work day.
For instance, during the battle of DIEN BI ET P1-•U, each
team of two women packed a parachute in seven minutes.)
j - Social aides and assistants
- .ovie operators.[ They drove and set up the movie trucks
that went each night to a post or a bivouac to show a fill.]
"- Nurses and medical auxil!ixries ( between 300 and 350. )
- Ambulance drivers. [ These are esx-ecially wortvy of praise.
they were about 70 to 80. Wýithout even mentioning Aline
ILEROUGE, numerous were thosa who should--be oi-ea. Ai nur-
see £ who belonged to the Army Air Corps.]
Beginning in 1943, the increasa of personnel had
I made it necessary to dissolve t'ie 47th P.F.A.T. unit and
all the problems concerning the distribution of personnel
and related problems, were taken carefby a section of the
first bureau of the Headqur*are for th t'er.torie...
i- ~-:
", 317
.=-.
LOGISTICS
I-S
forced ius
Tho conduct of thF campaign sometimes war and
of the
to croate new bases durinnr the last years for iho .supplies
to connect theni with the ports of arr'ival
by means of artificial axes as air lifts. C For instignae
the bas's of STNO to sup.ort the oa.mp'i!• from Central LAOS
to allow the resupply of the operation
and that of OUINHOTl
AMTIATE.]
The different services were forced little by little.
be able to support certain ope-
to set u*o mobile eleaents to be created
rations. 'Forinst.noe, surgical aerials hsd to
repair sec-
that 6ouldc be transported and parachuited, mobile
tions,.qoper'.tional exploitation groups, etc....
es-
B,1iafly, if the logistical deployment remained to
and ansevered well
sentielly be.sed on a certain te:r.itory, it was ne-
the: demanns >of-..a war without front, noverrtheless
were
.which
o^,sary t.o; iXA.gine new foxhulas to satisfy de..ans could not ma-
sometimes, similar to those in Europe, and yet
ke ,ise of the sane solutions applied there.
other hand,
On theouldonl a country where
invefryeli industria-
tionry Crps find 1939rehources.
93iten
and had been
lization had been merely sk.tched before
t the Expedi-
brutally interrupted by the Second ',orld Var, resources.
tioncnry Corps could only find very limited
3 Indochina was capable to furnish a certain gluan-
and buil-
tity of foodstuff ( rice, catitle, fish,) some coal
ding materials.
i Small industries, localized essentially around
SAIGOIT ,anA HAN'TOI, transformed some rough or semi-finished
brid.os and
materials th:?t hý-.d been imported ( especilly be of help
I metallic frames.) Consequently, these
Service and tie ,agineers.
-could
to the .Lateriel
I
I
I
Fin.lly spaoialized laborers were scarce and it
was difficult to hind apprentices and9 to train them.
All these factors contributed to make us dependent
I YOI....Francoe and the United States for supplies. [ Somotimes,
supplies coming from Japan and Australia helped us to solve
some problems, Yet, the Expeditionary Corps still, depen-
ded from very distant territories.] ''
|I
II
~. ~~ ~322
I
Thd importanoe nsý,.e by Tonk~in in the course
of tho operc~tioi,,3 ai-0 its b,,comin,, eep,-,rated fromi SAIG-01T,
l~~~~c~3.
th"eetai~in
to tho suipA.ly sy otoa; inl that
territory tint, to its breinv oiplo yH PUG e
inrnin'2, in lc9)2, th- operctional ba,, of IiTon~c:-n wvi.s created
) -IV1~..T
11 t plecya thoc samie role for: thn*vý territory
thr-it wo, w~oUld 11vvo wished to see .played by ani oý?arctionalJ
bns,ý in Fra~nco fo~ th enti.re B~:dition.,- y CorpoD.
All the wnvea of sup,,llies originý?ting in SAIG~ON
or I1AI?11O1G %-,ero varic&ble and their total. 0caýIity vns
mieasured by taMcin,, into account t'he aiam les ia-n
tr~nns*ort--1tion. If ,-ie could. for~w~r-i ~iin1jortt.nt loads of
8 up -lesby boait, Wao encounterecýd the -ý,Datost difcl
tic,-: in aevoanciiw- viith tuhese stvp-lierj in-to -'TiO points
that werc2 more distant fro,'a tie cocast.
In the deltap thco river net a)loevic-ted the pro-
blos
ou~e byth: ~cr~city of rive- r'oadcs.. The roilroads
wer
p~c~oalyno-e-istant since i~t h-.--d only 4' fewi lines
towara,: the interior e~n( vie could only utilize half of them,
Only by aiir could we go f rom one point to the
otlier, but t~h-j uneven -foru of the terreain tand the small
num~b-er of p3.aces vihate lending strips could be built r'e-
duced our possibilities, which were calways-limitad-by
the insuffiocenoy of 'our fl-eet, too. Three exanmplee- iI~
lulstr~inte th10 cot'lext of" the 169istio-1l1 11 obleas posed,
b-) the s~oft c-,rtain units,
-the zone of DOING HOI0, in Central Vietnarai, could not
be resupplied- exoeptý curinS certzin mainthe -when the -port of
th-,~it town vivac ticcessiblo. The, sU-,)'ljeS d to be calculated
for at longý )eriod of tiucj '.7 .thou IMnowin wheather certain
unpl.:innod o-oar-tions w-ould throwV of:? our estimctes...
-V2 ITE.ATE eil -T~orthe-~ L-os hnlad., for the -.ost'U part,
to b3 resup-plIe J by air from rTonk-in, since the access fr-o.m
the South was veydif.?'icUlt. Yh:Ž rout.:,ý batwve-)n Tt-LAýcM2131K ýnd
`.
V2TIM.1ANE vt'-,s destroyed ciid the :!3K0:mT c,,zinot be utilized
fro.u. X!AVLIIE e::cna)t .-or six montla of tlht year.
-the v-rrioons of LANL'SOT and CAO lA{G, until their
ev-:.cL1%11t ion nt t.he end 0J of 150 ve re thae t rbt:ri e s o f the
o-0.4 %./-o !:nlovfr wh'at prc~vie lriid t'o pro
1(*c1 te Veid~
±0 -J.1 atili z2:,ti.oa of thn uný-le route
ith
U. .c% ban. i - c~:: the tra~a.iorts !--d a yield
2..vch inf orio r to thn'- :.-'i ch co uld 'hae beaon o b'-7, ned in :,'r..n-
cC) for th~o sa-:e clist-flcr. .hav'i>deven rl.oroý on t7,40
totý:.l bajG;-!:,-' oaZ t'-c Ex' ~dit-ULo nn ry C") 0. 41oLLr~ae ,:oe o,
the costs only fr t'r:, con"o insic&o I n Jo chin-a n fo r
IA
S 325
Wuong Sol ~ ~ 2~ 0
IS Luang Probong
*Xleng Khouong *
04
-Tooron.
TI
Po se,
Kontu4
04
Pleikuo
Oul
ho
Popt tugTe
= I
U I,* A " 329
II
1[ Jv..3 3
of' t:_L'cT of' fts)31 food ( v1Z-tcble m, ntp). and of' t,11e 1.
saonotony of' r,,tions." L Rep1rt Of' t" 6 S`1nit'2KrYF rv CC.J-----
... It s!euAb o~~ ht ;t fey,' ex~-
ce-ption ýnid for briof -periode-,of ~i fresh ifood be edded
It
woumld I1,ave been. desýirmble .to lheve aev.i 1 -ablIeV
dom t ~hle~veol Tthe co ipanx ton of water thr-t [
'dnsO'-z s-roci:ad &'iriolnd
chierai Cal mems~dr''b
:'l chine, siihU.ailr to L1,t o?ý
t h.,- kii.e-ricai Arr~ay.
Th~e cansuniption :of ten obiu-asl~x
-
h
prb~tof drink:s v nd thie 'Buro--eans .:.n -at uised to it
guie wllwit soie ersvernce., but, tl-ie tei mast
be LO
gV0oocet quality.
It is useless -to under-line the inconveniency of-
wiein a, tropical country: its consmwa~tioaa curini5 the dc-.y
ha-:s c.auLied scever-a!Li .ccidents ( heo.t sti'ol~rs. ) Purtlaer, itsV
-price, the way it keens, tlivz. difficulties in utilizino- it
there, nal-ale it a "lde lti-a" product
Conocýntrmted vine did not hswe a great success,t
undoc..btedJ.z7 bee _-sa the wiater needed to diluto it hadl a
saltyr ta-)ste, but 'iso beca.use t~he qp.lit-y of' the product,
e :zceljjnt in the b~inr~ trbecome worse.
Deer ,oe to te zma:;o 2ýrobln:s, ojhnot aLs
bnd. It vtc_:s :±aae loc~ally and could be clisuribu-ed with
ea se and ever-yvhere.
T~ D;IHX22<i.I2T "Since
- th-10 ia2 in Tnhdochina
of ouir fi~rst elo!2:ents, the Bx:?aclitioninry 0orps macle use of
4en ,idrI.ni2strctivo.,sct a2~ vlhich- o7,:istecl :,Po_ ,i 1-n- 1jime.
At tho be-innin- !Tiere were no d~ficlte.
f ch.n,3ed,
Ltr tir
33
" Thc: It' ok of~ ý,,roonnel i,.n4 iaiatez'io3,
Jtiie utili.ution of~ por-ot~i~v, ntropolitan nnd coloniall
tex~ts cwc theo aduinistrativc method~t o:ý' the Units, became
the wa~r-
ii* r
II_I
•| II
QfALUSE 0&ýý.YNI
3
iI
T1TH'HEALTH SERV.0iE
ITI
Smission fThe health
qjuite service
well since it, can be affirmedfIliCosled
in IndochLna its
that ever~y
I
•[ wounded soldier who had a chance to survive and reached
, [
Sight' yers later, if we take as an example the ope-
rations between Septiabar 1953, inoludedand 'Inroh 1954, ex-
oludcd, in the Northern area of the TL'onkdn delta, the pro-
portion of losses wcs dif:ý?orent: one dendfor every four
wound&od. The via r with mines had boeLn end we had to at-
;tributoAt toDIEN
it 731 of the dead and 59' of the wounded,
BIEN PHU, instead, the losnos were caused
mainly by the artillery and the mortars.]
. The scarcity and','adiodority of the itinertries.
made the evotuations slow and "shocking", Sometimes an
entire route hd to be opened for this purpose :nc only
by siir lift could the aeelth units oper.te as coherent
unitoj.
- The last step' in the ewvcuation was to Prs.nce. But,...
first of all, the wound ed and the demased had' to befit
___for ah a trip_ nd !,-a hospitbll facili.iesv:e~ze-nQeded-
for, this.
- Finally, as the nAabor of indigenous soldiers in-
croased cand the No.tional Armies were formed, the n'..mber
of the sick and the wouhded increased, It was impossible
to send them to France raid they had to be treated locally
u.nt4l they i,!ere wp l1again, The hospital facilities had
-eo ibo %-~'t~se n di-d
-~zi the -Spp~i.-l7rd ~4.res-- ---
For all' these reasons, the fiealth Service had to
iimprove towards d'ecentralization.
- 10
-V!, :_.odical te:._.,s,
laoboratory
!m-'rts, eto.....[ The og:-nization of the
missions of the ýi-inci:x! units are exoosed in Volum•e III,
,becusc t'.e.g(eter part of tVh .. for.•niuas t.i•"- out in Indo-
.fl.2,.J..fl
-- .2V2.. 0 •,
Sti7on. 0 :
4-
~ ~ 337
T1v1B UiIITIT 1 Th
- ein'fal -- orc~i
£anc of the whl structureof th aiaysevc o h
territory was. bassod on the xmobila elementslwhioh beotme
stvtionnry and wvere reinfo~rced aa needod,."
"1 Garrison in.UrAnwri es, ho spital infiriaeries,
ae e~er ooad.- srie sot U~p" This
continuous of'fo0rt of or"3aniz~ntio'i n
wptho -thea nyiobo.
o.:- miaterieilai pesnal but remsodw rnth tpicale
csIL~: Pr~a- -rk ana -did -not- yzre ent any partrioular -pr
EVACV
Ox:'T3J The
wouncobilit th pi of tho
ruch wzMs t-10 tr b0-attalion midt corapany
"II -2e av
cibit io of thie iroun~ded froriitho battle-
Dc~i~fotoy ;acnner.
" In t ho region of the deltag -the u.nits that were
ou iii~ t'6,io :,,co ovddies viere of-ten severl 4,16
ils
away from any road or: via t ervvw-r The vwou~ndoe h-ad to be eve-
cuzn.tod. -f ro m the rice' )-d,1ieo on stretchlers.-
- ~ ----- ~ 't,ý~i~e di ,
i e o o f ma~~rohin,- over slip, ery psne-asarii
f1i cti
ýaum of four uciJ vias abou- na~cO'.-s-ry foax"' :a- wf.fl\ho
17ý1 o~ Io.sy wo ul cl,:,d Fý 0ou.1 d no w a11. * 1P ur taar,
Ju
~-t~--½oko-
- o~riy t iht ia ipi'~ to eva-
CU- oe at nir'it: the ix~i ;;ho h-ad been at 1G0
1nded s
Iv. n,- - ruem'n:o ra cohan es to tha-n the man w~ounded at noon,"
" .dith the Gex.Ltion of so~ae favor2able o,*;s c.ei
te v',ouln led coul be ev,,,cuated ovar short ots teol
pospible s al u tion was t~he heV ootter.
"Tn o f ti-)mn wore needed, lso to pick
Iabl
un thie vi oand d wi ';' a iainimi~au of risck.. ~o~ from
the reports of tvto battualion m~edics.J.
but th'tesme-
Therefore,' th~ere -should havI been manyr halicop~ters,
ar'zived_ oil~rlat inte
be tatwas alwavs insufficient
xe 150 anc in a nia-
hsetit we aved~
A
ble, hovwever, did a good job and betwieen 1950O and the it
of Aug-ust. 1.954t they effected 9,640 "prim~ary" evaCcuations.
Shetotral nt~aber was 10,820 as 'indicated in the chapter
dadic:Ated to thae helioopters8j
In the i terior and'in theaesna SAIcG0Nthe
1< ~eveteatinions-co-ud- ~be~9-P-Výeot
werez' used wth ref-eten-ee
e -b~y- car, -but
I-Gve the~eqsq-
-ho
,t~ine
spita- -i -~fts-
elel.aysý,aw-woe-
often lon;., [ Report of t6e Headqua~rters for the Sanitary
Services in t*hnL, Far East.]
n1
Fýrance the wiouxjidead or' the sick since wie actuallvr did not have
areail hos-)ital ship, At the en, fann ers old viar
Twe still used modified ships. The one that, in 1954., was
consi dered as the hosp)ita shlin fox- *7-)C-HC"1A w~as the 0QR1GO11,I
which wn8 so~n to be olilm1nated, ana. whi ch woiit bn et ad*
forth four til~ies a year wi~th its old, en-4 nes."
There ts. no air conditionin- on board: with one
enrrine oat it cann~ot re-o&e ye the wounded. nor the sic!. it
is nr~t a hospitI7J. ShIp" L Report o~f the FHeadquorters fo r
the Sanitary Services in the r"Ir RastoJ
The airel.are was, thus, -recatly used to bring
Ithe wIoundad bacok to France, eopecially in 193-3-1954.
11It i0 of 12,000 1:iloactmrs, thait lasts
-11 gjlgt
at least _31 hours, This zaearis thnt tho pv.tiento Luuet be in
the condition to -o throug,-h this tirinz~ trip. Planes wiere
utilized only for thos'o vwo coulcd traveal; Et long period of
prec~iration was nooded before do,.-rtin- on w~oh a tr'ip.'
"So:.e airplanes carried men in stretchers. It
seems that, fortmen who must lay down the evacuation by
air should be an eception, especially over such long dis-
tancos, and this Just to save time."
" The ship is the best way: the patients can lay
down and find the same conditions of a hospital." E Report
of the Headquarters of the Sanitary Services'in the Far East.]
V . .
In his report on the operations<, the Director of
the S.nitary Services said:.
" The Imowledge of the cadre and of the indivi,
dual1 in regard to persona'l and collective hygiene, and the
principles of first aid, is almost non-existant."
" The eleTaentary rules of hygiene are explained
in all manuals. Unfortunately t hey are not followed or
-theiy ~a~re -otThe ~s~oldr4-is iliar ed foroe hoa i-
J en ranwa-onS- -zazd~-h~e-is~ n~ot--~-choe -f-rhsh-pla1--i'-
condition and hygiene, which are equally important...."
1 The soldier's instruction should be implemented
t•hat oove~r-thi~ •.utv ecaich~is~as.imp~r• ...............
S......t......ch.sses-
as subjects about combat. in the camps, and especially'in
those whate personnel is assembled and the last medical
check urs tre UaAde, pr,-.ctical exercises in hygiene should
be conducted: individual, collective, camp hygiene, drink-
ing ylvater ( how filters work, ) etc...."
" Just as the specin'lized teams of the Sanitary
Service cannot insure the cleaning, the m=intenance, and
* the hygiene of each unit or group, so the Sanitary Service
wil 1 not be able to assist all the wounded on the battle-
fieid when needed."
" It is
useless to iaultiply the number of nur'ses
Sr strechter bearers. V-That is needed is that eoch soldier
ca:rries a first aid kit. While waiting for the nurses, the
strechter bearers, t ,.c doctors, ho must b• hble to givc the
first aid with the means he hos on hand, lie iaus know what
to do and what not to do. This is even more iTm1portant for
isolated soldiers, in a hostile jttn.le."
i' !
'3 1
fl
th ichnweetThhrersiso in tllohtio-s
Al 6
gthi munst be , Cond itti
sorc u
ttollof 'aioiln. 1 eve[ lai.oc
ot otetJ laf~tlitoss nof
th
b dr
a n voa in thce ar
[PRPYAIýO
ŽAr1 tiavs muthbe,most notable. an ite dis riue:bs-
tinQ nttioin e th
prorate -ervfý eHcdruaiiansta
£oflw Oinsceip ns, sh0r thC the sod do ot norel
ers
Sly itakey therv1e ti-n thei Farllsq.]?el~nea~ ako
1 S Shn it i
CRAIýD'eEn roe atthee
th11
The~1 ditiiin the 7nd th
axne mautin-
ý)dten of nets viain st paoseqdfitosm'v
OAnce nteone
a lwy bI
hno eiy.Sm nt aebe to
ot'sareas ta w
very si trithute tny trotpto.
la rilai n
Someti wat iotal r eae
n ~ cured thban
am
careýTh wy"sp-,easures to ren
vlenits-.vent th
Sct-y at huswere
protection of
rle
bega.n, therefore, to improve the external
the depots and that of the tankers.
!, [
I~I•
1.
"~I
, TFTE IA•TNHRI-L SIMVIOCE
h--
I
"N1'ew sp~ooinlJized units viere orecated, zat~de up
~-TheI~iv~i~so
-au-a-irt- er qjý howevor vI*'~ec~~d
77Uonly - -
aii
xJih wiorkc.
w! " wo solutions ,%ere akjxod:--e to
reli,-vo thlp )o'l-I
A c I a z7;i:; ciCtO 1o;.) wen 3): :-rid 4tha ec0110-lon
c,-llect 'd e'c2nlonr.-,tarn. "~l [ Rnno 1?t o6f thae ?Tevr-.d -
-!u;.rter3 of t '.o gervice, F .~'.E~C.2::C~eI)55,] A ve-
hicle C1L 4 ~1in s~tto~i arafamire' -;f s iocjt t o its Unit
a~nd replr~oeJ, :a,,1 l;volhicle 283 it
en~n. f11.')
vi-s dione 7xt tlioe4t ecaoiolo level; 1!0V~evn2r, it V!s -not
sent forviwtrO to a 4ý1th ochelon ~io.Th-is -oes'i.Jt(d inI
less movemient o2'.trc,3f~ ~ fCi)1tt~l
anidc so Inx/:_z.tinsg t-imnexh it col.uld suabstitut-e
the cl&-.-.Eed vehiclo with a siuaiL.r o-ae.
*'The autlorilz'2ttiozn to pqrforýa 3dt ocbholori
m-i~ntanince 1oc2.llvi, v'hic-h relieved tie ,Tz~teziel Sor-
vict 4.ro:u, can izt.tload of 23:t Qch~lo-1n, L 7vlpox't of
? V~'~ 351
N
SAT UO
-t&nau.. o1. @ca lot n ::ia:n` av-ýn0
i
Tho~ ~~-u;j:yQf materiel otheor tha zito~
It .,as insu~ by t, plan oa th 3 ,,L~I~cv InSX
GO'00 eiiviclod i n tw"vo stooc- comp-nieo "'.hich, for the
1Ye 3, ro)c.ýivod 105,000 tons of :v,17t,'ri ".-a shid
~~A. , C f,. -
C~~
e.
II , iali unitio,111 %1vere Criticized
- 7.6,5=a btull~etk..
,rmnvd a i. 6FJ
Q- 3 7 t~e -as C
- n wn~b ýr 60 !me 6161e,
s
- , gn' gpr 7,wl,, s L 0,~
Fn1Jy,
IIt i pod to 6 bse
eýnIa throtiuw
.4 ig to h-osnecial *pa Iking ecqi~pl at ýan~ ~~
for the cizacIitions,
?Tine very bad inf'1ucmne of' th6r~c1cia
te over tho 6onsex'vation. of ~tý=o' 'is waell k~novin-; it is
due e~s;?ecitlly to theC h.oIgh do%, of' Iltmriclity, and 'to- the
impo-rtft~nt virin:vtions in' to7n)e. lte rthel powders
mewhc1
PRBj F .T.*.O.JTGvie
&rcthl xc
th;,owrsa douible.
c ni_~o r qu drUplo *0_ It- TIM
ooocl~t
~.Groncadc~
u,o del1 19 36 :nxT arranged a~proprin-toly'Y Report of- the
~:tr~~.Soa':LV.OI'S ~T.e U1 T,1 '~,This
vieppon
' 1 '~sutiedclin p 0 ss or on armored onrx'iera,
P lo,'ting Quipmeat, (fl.T1a3 54.), x'high ml12~owed the
soldier to lJoat -1i-1 his eIui 1ý10t. 3000 16icoeb ýViere
built.
adntxt
ndf iOil o2T 0ati atr.*as V t'he defti-,c of in)noJ~eament
10i211i 0--1S l':e-ro t-ried out forý tr'ucks L the wvei'sZt %vas too
--Ile ox-elptio-a of t' 'a) ". . r t:ate,1-i h e
40A.A.sl anc
aJ aa bi~ot us ice L Only theiz bo:nt 1~li-
~tor' c un bi 2rnx-orcc1 1 ever. in th crase_ at t'ho,
Cost of Speecd recbtlotion' J; t'he floors. o-P vehlioles were
reinforced,. _but this8metho be~eiefc~Votwa
th. en
of th ci n,] aind anti-mines aiid .t-Je -
* des protective nueastros ve~re ta~ken,
Mio~difications viere cr-eated for~ rapid deaf crls ive
~methodsa and tal 11ijna(S of rVehicles and. boats wiere so armied
see 11severv2. cotmbin.-.tions were rcll2.z3.; the- .vere t'he
fruit o l ii ahn' m-clýtzd Ta1e~ studi es,.. S, ern..iu r ct ro~,,-,
Ct _ý,v ,Ithe.4y zoc,ýu too vo.ved ru oher
Ihd h-ý be.on
a~~ e)o
m~1~b~rncin- the totality of t'_e.sce Droio:i
sponsored by th'v 11he
(1a e 0"~'r
f h
~e~clurterzof th-evio *tri2 7
Finallv,, thie %flt 0.2v
ofortified l1Centi
t~~~
1C~Ctflof ~ cartc-in veh!Aclc,3 tr!A1 ~s- o ~cs
oevr, LthOn~ tho e:~f Ort w'as "!~,ran it VIL o reot' in~ tho
I q~t'in
clI' 0 revuei Of~tc o~ i~ni~jthrt it Shoul~.d hr~wo
Only~ 'x;hen, 1 h
Ibo~on cjt,'ýidiocl Lt plcniý.,d om'e~""ll~y.
Oquil).-Ont 1c101S2Lry fOl" thO ' 1:l±11lont Of' the OOx~bat
zato~ionm would ha-.ve been bu~ilt pr~operly canC accordingI
toinatistricm1 =thocs." Re-')rt of Vhc" OIo.runrte i
of' the ."xtcniol, Srvice-, W~X
11Tberi were two pr~oblemsr, 011 of 3.do 1 of~ nemniss
theo othor of lcv~ok of otion,
A ~pecivt1 pzoblo:nn
In. oh t r)a'-tt o 1-
al h,ý d~n
cga
q. ct r r
COmrnnafCs, an.fl officar is7 selectod,ý calle " te "TeCh
111 n Ic
O ft- e re (T -o'ft'io rr) - i: x- o atnVot- - Ith t~re ToaftnIoal -
-0
Section of' the Mird, Brenau of tho I,;.J..2 Ino
a~id
oadtirtcrsforLad orce ., Fo ntis job, it
±s'not 1.neoeszory thc_-.t the OffVicer.',h.'As a tcavl di-
p~oaia, but ho must be oble to produce new i deasa nd to
belie)ver in them," In refocrenco to the Army -,?roblems.J
Sup~.'~i~
~ c, vould be voxry uselqLJ, es',o ciallJy coni-
~ie~~tl'ý grovwinG izaport_-nce oa staffba, or-anisms
of co'..a.nek
- Th.s-r-ol- IC 6 lso ted,~by _camAd jvtant _
of t lo. Chi o-'f Saf
This ne-vi Set tin should0 not require ,aoro per-
1 b0
soarAbvacttUsc the1 tecno'Czi.cl fonctiols vioauU of'Iten.
too :ýýae,
,Ji~n tvr ~
iýiiortfnt, xoto at
cis A
n~ IV%t a. c~
X. lv2.-~tA
inC"'ci, bclcc esp
1 'a
L) f--cuen
C" S;' 0 n t' U5 Cthe re-
'I-Se %
-a ue 1 eS to e-apusiz to LloCn c::-1
:$c
-it s,,?sevral -,robJloio cowvs.ýrd ~~yricL.
$t2llcooV tho'." ofd rhct' d h o:
0"n
L ill~
o likoon Or t'lt,,o
tfýý WEV) cC :1O:1t
z'; hsof 0")Drlin
so~lldiorls a.oC
.cm(: iv the ac'i
jr½ : the
C 0;tIi~~cAlV
1.1"ci! Of 1,4 1 och,~.
tA.to th L.c01 oC- 0-xmaun-
s ro t ) 1 o2 of:iot'
0 .- to.I10
- D ut
200U U;cn
t 10c-'-.; C, tio an o111e a o ..cct0 o~f l~ac)d."rn
op ioil : 'El toclhllloo:". 'O:c~cCt' Cou~ Or(!'iza"t i oil is
"~~~z
tt=- iC~.
ot c.nCt:'o. Thy 0,u Oovu be totzlJ.1y
i nl2:T: ot iv C b~oonuso 0o1 1:141 laock ofV oooo~ný'2tionl Of one
V faI~rts
cu itra
Ie
C1 M2 V - "!he A 1=or 218
c::-~ T -I . ie At1ry236
CT_ D RI WrI Artil).ey-Air Rocorn-anee 252
C:i?'*
'11 He ali cc-ters 261
c':2I TX T'no 3,
""T~ Ct~ 277
Zir- ....~ Cor- s * 26
Aerial Su~yot28
CvTA2'2:XrT - RJ vor23~'~ 0,
I? c AIiIla " 0
31
T"I{)X0
(Ooiu' VC)?'1%l
:Lnuo a)II
C"1T
:P1
~318'
V I. X.V - Lo. Jt. o 318
- TLho -Qi%,to,Sor i:ot or 327 -|
- T tnývao
oiuic2L.n cý 33+
T'.b... o't aIzaV'xice
The- Orj:. 358
lIi C:: t t 6
36.A
1
1 41
I
it
I
!
S/
M-tor -pag;e Thc tra ra in:
~ta
del2z oP on:i n
2. The ulaci .le rrin(CtOltivated)
3. The zam;ida1 re&'ion,' (Tr a s s
.Th~ hJ ; rei on
.40 -Atta cl: of~ a po st
4+3 Do. ni:?e o- te ai r ba'ea CTB
DS.f
njL s-scc0 f vil-la-ze L17- e.e r