Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions, Vol. 5
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions, Vol. 5
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions, Vol. 5
Research for this paper was made possible in part by the generous support
of Fritz Thyssen Foundation, Cologne, Germany.
1
Peter Kemp, as quoted from the program of the XXII World Congress of
Philosophy, Seoul, Korea, 2008.
2
I use the term mainstream economics here in order to refer to economics as
it is usually taught in prominent and even in not so prominent
universities around the world. It is, in this sense, closely associated with
neoclassical economics and other schools that conform to the mainstream
language of mathematical models.
3
Among the proponents of capitalism, Ayn Rand has worked out such a
metaphysics explicitly. Cp. Ayn Rand, Capitalism: The Unknown Ideal
(New York: Signet, 1967). Here, however, I am rather concerned with its
implicit forms. For a more detailed analysis, see my The Basho of
Economics: An Intercultural Analysis of the Process of Economics
(Heustenstamm: Ontos, 2005), especially pp. 36-81.
4
An excellent summary of this development can be found in Philip
Mirowski. More Heat than Light: Economics as Social Physics, Physics as
Natures Economics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).
5
Carl Menger, Grundstze der Volkswirtschaftslehre (Wien, 1871), p. viii
6
Ludwig von Mises, Nationalkonomie: Theorie des Handelns und
Wirtschaftens (Genf, 1940), p. 2.
7
Within the liberal tradition, deistic explanations of economic powers play
an important role. See, for example, the often quoted passage from C.F.
Bastiat: I would like to show the harmony of the divine laws ruling human
society. . . I believe that he who created the material order of the cosmos has
not denied his attention to the social world order. I believe that he combined
the free force and set it in harmonic movement, like the lifeless
molecules. I believe that nothing is more necessary to the gradual and
peaceful development of mankind than that we do not cross these tendencies
and dont disturb their free motion. C.F. Bastiat, Harmonies Economiques
(Paris, 1855), citation in German in John Maynard Keynes, Das Ende des
Laisser-faire (Mnchen, 1926), p. 20.
8
Adam Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (New York: Prometheus
Books, 2000), p. 126.
9
Paul A. Samuelson, Maximum Principles in Analytical Economics. In
The Collected Scientific Papers of Paul A. Samuelson, ed. R.C. Merton, Vol.
III (Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press, 1972), pp. 2-17.
10
See the following quotation from Adam Smith: God himself is the
In the Face of Global Crisis 103
immediate administrator and director. If he [manSG] is deeply impressed
with the habitual and thorough conviction that this benevolent and all-wise
Being can admit into the system of his government no partial evil which is
not necessary for the universal good, he must consider all the misfortunes
which may befall himself, his friends, his society, or his country, as
necessary for the prosperity of the universe, and, therefore, as what he ought
not only submit to with resignation, but as what he himself, if he had known
all the connections and dependencies of things, ought sincerely and
devoutly to have wished for. Adam Smith, Theory of Moral Sentiments, p.
346.
11
The omnipresent use of mechanical metaphors in economics is brilliantly
analyzed in K.-H. Brodbeck, Die fragwrdigen Grundlagen der konomie
(Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft Darmstadt, 2000).
12
Joseph Schumpeter, Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (New York:
Harper Perennial, 1976), p. 129.
13
Leon Walras, Elements of Pure Economics (New York: Kelly, 1969), p.
69.
14
K. Nishitani, Modernisierung und Tradition in Japan, in Japan und der
Westen, ed/ K. Wehrhahn-Mees, Vol. 1 (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1986), p.
194.
15
Nishitani, Modernisierung und Tradition in Japan, pp. 194-95.
16
Masao Abe, The Problem of Self-Centeredness as the Root-source of
Human Suffering, Japanese Religions, vol. 15 (1989), p. 17.
17
Alasdair MacIntyre, Individual and Social Morality in Japan and the
United States: Rival Conceptions of the Self, Philosophy East & West, vol.
40 (1990), pp. 489-497.
18
Here, I am referring to subjective and behavioral economics in general
and, more specifically, to the methodological individualism underlying
them.
19
Philip Mirowski, More Heat than Light (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1989), chapter 4.
20
Kitar Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness, tr.
Robert Schinzinger (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1958), p. 184.
21
Thorstein Veblen, The Place of Science in Modern Civilization (New
York: Viking, 1969), p. 162. Emphasis added.
22
Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit (Mineola: Dover
Publications 2006), pp. 13-21.
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 104
23
Knight, Risk, Uncertainty and Profit, pp. 313-17.
24
Francis Y. Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics. An Essay on the
Application of Mathematics to the Moral Science (London: Kegan Paul,
1881), p. 16.
25
Mirowski, More Heat than Light, p. 138.
26
Edgeworth, Mathematical Psychics, p. 15.
27
Friedrich von Wieser, Gesammelte Abhandlungen (Tbingen: Mohr
1929), p. 18.
28
M. Baurmann, Der Markt der Tugend: Recht und Moral in der liberalen
Gesellschaf: Eine soziologische Untersuchung. (Tbingen: Mohr, 1996), p.
325.
29
C.B. MacPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 58.
30
A. Baruzzi, Freiheit, Recht und Gemeinwohl, Grundfragen einer
Rechtsphilosophie (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1990),
pp. 205-206.
31
Lao Tsu, Tao Te Ching, chapter 57.
32
David L. Hall and Roger T. Ames, Thinking from the Han: Self, Truth,
and Transcendence in Chinese and Western Culture (New York: SUNY
Press, 1998), p. 284.
33
Graupe, The Basho of Economics, pp. 246-251.
34
This, however, is precisely the credo of liberalism.
35
Tetsuro Watsuji, Watsuji Tetsuros Rinrigaku, Ethics in Japan, tr. S.
Yamamoto and R.E. Carter (New York: SUNY Press, 1996), pp. 276 and
281. Emphasis added.
36
Ken Wilber quoted in Joan Stambaugh, The Formless Self (New York:
SUNY 1999), p. 93.
37
Bin Kimura, Zwischen Mensch und Mensch: Strukturen japanischer
Subjektivitt (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2002).
38
Friedrich A. Hayek, Recht, Gesetzgebung und Freiheit: Regeln und
Ordnung (Mnchen: Verlag Moderne Industrie, 1980), pp. 35-36.
39
Ludwig von Mises, The Ultimate Foundation of Economic Science
(Indianapolis: Liberty Fund, 2006).
40
Ludwig von Mises, Human Action. A Treatise on Economics (London:
Hodge, 1949), pp. 755-46.
In the Face of Global Crisis 105
41
Friedrich A. Hayek, Individualism and Economic Order (Chicago:
Chicago University Press, 1980), p. 24.
42
Hall and Ames, Thinking from the Han, p. 25.
43
Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness, p. 176.
44
Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness, p. 208.
45
Nishida, Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness, p. 223.
REHABILITATING VALUE REHABILITATING VALUE REHABILITATING VALUE REHABILITATING VALUE: QUESTIONS OF MEANI : QUESTIONS OF MEANI : QUESTIONS OF MEANI : QUESTIONS OF MEANING AND NG AND NG AND NG AND
ADEQUACY ADEQUACY ADEQUACY ADEQUACY
Karim Crow
It is indispensable that man`s attention move Irom the
meaning (al-ma`na ) to the wording (al-laIz ) more than it
move Irom the term to the meaning, Ior in reality the
wording does not evince the meaning save by the
mediation oI the Iorm` oI that meaning in the heart` (illa
bi-wa sitati s u rati dha liIa l-ma`na Ii l-qalb); when the Iorm oI
the meaning is not ascertained in the heart, the meaning
can never be grasped through the wording
|al-Ra ghib al-IsIaha ni (11
th
cent.), al-Dhari ah, ed. Abu
Zayd al-`Ajami , p. 124|
Spirit in the body is liIe Meaning in the word
al-ruh Ii l-jasad Ia-l-ma`na Ii l-laIz .
Ali (7
th
cent.)
|Sala h al-Di n al-S aIadi, Sharh La miyah al-`Ajam
(Cairo: 1290 H) II p. 133|
INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION
How the language oI Scripture and Tradition embedded in revealed texts or
sacred writings, and in the Ioundational narratives supporting pre-modern
world-views, may be understood and applied today remains a major issue
Ior the world religions. Traditional articulations oI religious conceptions
and past modes oI discourse now appear inadequate Ior meeting sweeping
global challenges Iacing most human societies. Increasingly, thinIing
people oI Iaith seeI to re-awaIen and re-appropriate essential religious
teachings through creatively transIormative understandings yielding more
meaningIul ways oI addressing problems raised by our global reality in
relation to pervasive material and cultural conditions. The axis around
which these attempts revolve is twoIold: :: : First: recovering primary values
oI universal true validity, and recognizing which disciplines and individuals
really possess the authority to enunciate application oI such values in the
context oI speciIic conditions prevailing within our societies. Secondly:
recovering the deep essential intelligibility oI Knowledge and Virtue at the
heart oI the endeavour to more Iully realize our humanity. These two
eIIorts are intertwined and should not be pursued separately.
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 108
Such awaIened awareness involves a creative adjustment and
appreciation oI new modes and applications oI Inowledge in our age
without doing violence to the genuine modes oI Inowing and being that
provided strength and versatility in the past and which potentially oIIer
resources that may aid us now. This mode oI selI-awareness involves
training the imagination to live the creative process received Irom within
our own traditions oI learning, practice, and organization so as to see and
to grasp what is most adequate to our tasI, discriminating what remains
moist` and viable Irom what has dried out becoming brittle` and no
longer adequate or needing to be discarded or archived.
Approaches embedded in past models may be contrasted with those
arising Irom speciIic cultural and political realities oI our modern age an
era posing unprecedented changes signalling a rupture Irom the past. We
shall taIe as our model oI pre-modern (traditional) experience the Islamic
intellectual and spiritual teachingdiscipline,
1
and seeI to draw out its
relevance Ior peoples and cultures when searching Ior more adequate ways
oI invoIing religious teachings in response to contemporary needs. Ideally
we would pursue a double path by Iirst invoIing instructive models Irom
the past, and then demonstrating in what manner such previous eIIorts
achieved more adequate modes oI conceptualization and application during
their particular eras, thereby pointing to modes oI activity required Ior us
to accomplish a parallel tasI. An example oI such a model might be the
worI oI Abu H a mid al-Ghaza li (d. 1111 CE). Here we only have space to
brieIly suggest these tasIs, and our remarIs resemble more oI a partial
sIeleton than a Iull bodied entity.
The promise inherent in comprehending past modes oI
conceptualization and application may assist eIIorts by individuals and
leading circles Ior awaIening a Iuller adequacy oI traditional ideas and
values. Such awaIening has the potential to Iacilitate wise solutions to
personal, societal, regional and international problems, and to meet the
challenge oI inhabiting our individual and communal humanity more Iully.
However, this potential is conditioned by the manner with which
permanent values are grasped and brought to liIe within individuals and by
extension throughout their societies and polities.
VALUE VALUE VALUE VALUE
Values are essential Ior revitalizing the universal rather than the national
or particular (exclusivist) side oI religious identity. Values are critical Ior
nurturing a Iaith-commitment that aIIirms the unity and dignity oI the
Iullness oI human liIe. The primary values upheld, Ior example, by leading
Muslim exponents in their experiential teachings embrace: Oneness oI The
Real /tawhid; Security and Peace, Justice, Knowledge (with its hierarchy
oI Inowers and their authority), and Integrity and Purity oI Soul |virtue`|
through cultivating and practicing praiseworthy character traits with
Rehabilitating Value
109
these values embodied in the psychic and intellective substance oI
individuals |Soul|, radiating through their community and beyond into the
world.
By values` we mean those ethical attitudes and immaterial ideals
that sincere conviction implants into humans through their Iamily
upbringing, training, education, and liIe experiences attitudes and ideals
which may grow into interior motivating impulses expressed through
actions. Values possess a practical Iorce operating deep within the human
at the level oI conscience and will. Values operate Iirst and Ioremost by
the inner willing oI conscience, and are maniIested outwardly in
praiseworthy character traits and admirable models Ior behavior. This
practical dimension oI ethical endeavor and moralvolition is termed the
Iaculty oI conation (that is to say, volition and will-power). Ethics (in
Arabic: the AIhla q or Mah a sin /`virtuous character-traits`) is the domain oI
Practical Reason or prudential mind` (aql amali in Islamic terminology)
involving the Iaculty or power oI conation. Conative power denotes the
impulse or striving to change one`s behavior and act in accordance with
both the directives oI inner conscience arising Irom within the innate
constitution oI the created person, as well as oI outer guidance or revealed
imperatives received Irom without.
Furthermore, the human attitudes and ideals prompting actions, and
which are mediated by values, possess an intellectual or cognitive power
shaping the worldview and discourse oI humans collectively Iorming a
cultural community Iunctioning Ior a deIinite purpose within the created
order. For Islam, these two related aspects oI values are bound together
through Knowledge: the conative Iaith-induced dimension oI Inowledge
yielding conviction and moral-volition through the operation oI human
intelligence embedded in conscience, being intimately joined with the
cognitive or perceiving or Inowing dimension operated by our intelligence.
A closely related pair oI Islamic notions expressing these two dimensions
is the joining oI Righteous Action (al-`amal al-s a lih ) with BeneIicial
Knowledge (al-`ilm al-na Ii` ): :: : Inowledge and practice must go hand in
hand Ior values to become truly operative and eIIective in human
experience. Here is an example oI what we have just stated concerning the
conative and cognitive dimensions oI value. In an utterance by the Shiite
imam Ja`Iar al-S a diq (d. 765), the term understanding or cognition`
/ma`riIah is employed in conjunction with activity or practice` /`amal :
God accepts (a person`s) practice only (iI perIormed) with
cognizance`/illa bi-ma`riIat
in
, and (God accepts a person`s) cognition
only (iI accompanied) by practice. Whomever Inows/`araIa, the
cognition directs them to the practice; and whomever does not
practice, that person has no ma`riIah /cognition.
2
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 110
Islam teaches that the true origin oI universal human values mirrors
or reIlects the transcendent source oI all that is valuable`, that the
permanent enduring values saIeguarding our true humanity are sourced in
the divine. The highest human values possess true value only because they
spring Irom a transcendent source and help to draw us closer to the
ultimate source oI Being, Existence, and Value. A well-Inown tradition oI
the Prophet Muh ammad (S) counsels us to 'Adorn yourselI with the
virtuous character traits oI God /taIhalluq bi-aIhla qi lla hi as the chieI
path to authentic service and inner realization. This Iundamental insight
insists that the transcendent source oI values is the true reason why they
are deemed universal and permanent, and objectively to be sought and
practiced by all humans. Another way oI stating this is to aIIirm the
complementarity oI right thought and right activity, or intellectual
perIection and moral perIection, or awaIened intelligence and ethical
action. But here we simply say that cognition and conation are integral to
actualising the Iullness oI human nature, and that realization oI value
requires their conjoined Iunctioning.
The universal values upheld and taught should be clearly evident and
displayed in the lived practice oI their practitioners, their exemplars or
living examples. Otherwise, one is dealing with hypocrisy, with hollow
words lacIing any conative Iorce Iailing to touch and move us Irom within,
thereby Iailing to maniIest outwardly in any substantive change oI
behavior. Contemporary Scientism |physicalism| universalized by Euro-
American inspired modernity is deIicient in both the quantity and quality
oI the bond that arranges universal values into an authoritative hierarchy.
ANTHROPOCOSMIC ANTHROPOCOSMIC ANTHROPOCOSMIC ANTHROPOCOSMIC AND ANTHROPOSOPHIC AND ANTHROPOSOPHIC AND ANTHROPOSOPHIC AND ANTHROPOSOPHIC
In general, the traditional (pre-modern) worldviews embedded in religious
cultures with elaborated intellectual and spiritual disciplines were
concerned with realizing Inowledge in Iour domains: metaphysics or
apprehension oI The One Real |Being, First Principle, Absolute, God|;
cosmology; spiritual psychology; and ethics.
3
These are Iour
complementary domains: investigation oI the cosmos yields insight into
the interior world oI spiritual psychology, while apprehension oI
metaphysics and cosmology leads to grasping the true nature oI the human
soul`, and proper prehension oI soul science` returns the SelI to the
ground oI Being.
We may also invoIe the venerable conviction oI the uterine inter-
relatedness oI the celestial, cosmic, and human orders. And as most oI us
Inow, the modern heedlessness or ignorance over understanding the SelI as
a uniIied Iield` Ior energy-activity-awareness conjoining cosmos and soul
as both object and subject at once, has led humans to IalsiIy the relations
between selI, people, and nature.
Rehabilitating Value
111
In order to avoid the traps oI exclusivist parochial dogmatism and oI
the ideology
4
characteristic oI our modernities, we must each individually
recover Ior ourselves a proper understanding oI our own nature. William
ChitticI states:
.in order to Inow the proper way oI acting in the world and living
out our human embodiment, we must Inow what the world signiIies
to us. In order to Inow the signiIicance oI things, we must Inow our
own nature and our own proper destiny. In order to Inow our own
nature, we must Inow the selI that Inows.
5
What is Inowledge Ior? What is the proper role and qualitative
context oI human thought? There is a very real discrimination between
two Iundamental modes oI Inowing involving distinct Iaculties or
energies: :: :
First, we can speaI oI transmitted Inowledge employing
instrumental rationality |viz., the brain`|, viewing the world as a
collection oI objects, which understands Inowledge as the means to control
nature, society, and the body; thus, humans seeI control and power over
creation by means oI the technological application oI Inowledge and
exclusive reliance on instrumental reason.
Second, there is direct unmediated Inowledge which transpires by
awaIening and actualizing human innate intelligence |heart` and
spirit`. light: Arabic aql, qalb & ru h . nur| Iorming the peculiarly
special perceptiveunderstanding power oI our interior selI |soul or mind|.
Such prehension is termed realization` /tahqiq in Islamic teaching in
contrast to the imitative` mode oI transmitted Inowledge termed taqli d.
Philosophy with its metaphysic oI soul-science` was particularly
interested in ways oI activating the human potential Ior realized
intelligence or heart`; ontemporary Euro-American philosophy` does not
Inow oI, or admit, this reality anymore, but speaIs oI neurophysiological
cognition in terms oI measurable physical events. To say more about this
might mislead and conIuse meaning, so I let another speaI Ior me: 'Only
what is Inown in the depths oI the soul without intermediary is
intellectual in the proper sense oI the word . the only locus oI intellectual
Inowledge is the Inowing selI.
6
Nor should we Iorget that transmitted
Inowledge, since it exists embedded in a speciIic cultural matrix
conditioned by habits oI mind solidiIied within its own priesthoods`
molded by socio-political Iactors and selI-interested needs, Irequently
becomes a veil preventing attempts to actualize true realized intelligence.
A Iine example oI this is the description provided by the 11
th
century
authority al-Ghaza li (d. 1111), in his analysis oI the Iamous tradition that
seventy thousand veils oI light and darIness separate God Irom His
creatures.
7
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 112
Realized Intelligence` exploits both the critical powers oI reason and
employs the imagination through envisioning things` as signs and symbols
oI The One Real (seeing the Face oI God` everywhere and in everything, as
the Qur`an states). Intelligence may be rationalist and symbolist together,
and it may resuscitate the mythic imagination by restoring the creative
power oI symbolic and mythic discourse which lies at the heart oI
traditional religious language (proIoundly imbued with anthropomorphic
imagery). This mode oI trans-rational apprehension vehiculed by the
human soul when actualized as realized intelligence` enables one to erase
the boundary between the literal and Iigurative meanings oI sacred texts,
and go beyond this by aIIirming a reality Ior the imaginal realm as an
intermediate domain partaIing oI the qualities oI the corporeal as well as
the purely immaterial. In Islamic experience, this aIIirmation oI an
imaginal reality has a long history until our own time, and is particularly
associated with the Andalusian saint buried in Damascus, the Greatest
ShayIh Ibn Arabi (d. 1240), whose understanding oI the World oI
Imagination` /`Alam al-Khayal combining qualities oI spirit and body was
so inIluential.
8
Ibn Arabi integrated the achievments oI the philosopher
Avicenna (d. 1037) as well as oI al-Ghaza li in his own grand synthesis; and
centuries later the Iranian sages including S adr al-Di n Shirazi (d. 1640)
elaborated upon this in a proIound manner which invites serious attention
today.
9
Do not misunderstand my meaning: there is no going bacI, no
return to the dogmatic literalism oI traditionalist anthropomorphism when
apprehending sacred texts. Yet there remains the possibility Ior us to
expand our horizons, to embrace the truths aIIirmed by intelligence
inIormed through Iaith-cognition and thereby to awaIen the dormant
potential oI our humanity. Teachings oI the order just mentioned oIIer us a
model oI a mode oI experience and activity to accomplish a parallel tasI
and thus rehabilitate a living intellectual tradition. But it will be ours,
not that oI the past. Furthermore, we must be especially wary oI ill-
conceived exploitations oI powerIul ideas that might yield great harm and
generate much Ialsehood. Is not the energy contained in the human
imaginal Iaculty increasingly being abused in our era by all manner oI
delectations and temptations Iacilitated by technological advances
(television, electronic media, computers)? Are we even aware oI its
possible deletrious eIIects? Here is an area oI psycho-somatic research that
will have to start Irom the data already amassed by advertising
organizations Ior decades in their dedicated eIIorts to persuade consumers
and amass wealth.
Every Inowledge maIes ethical demands upon the Inower. Realized
Intelligence becomes actualized within oneselI through a lengthy process
oI cognitive training and inner puriIication, oI disciplining the mind and
the soul. Achieving correct understanding oI the Absolute, cosmos, and
soul by grasping an authentic vision oI reality demands the actualization oI
Rehabilitating Value
113
the pristine human character and cultivation oI virtue the corresponding
activity oI selI-understanding and selI-realization in conIormity with such
direct Inowledge. The cognition calls out Ior its complementary conative
practice; Inowledge necessitates virtue. ChitticI observes: '.correct
activity ethical, moral, and virtuous action depends upon correct
Inowledge oI the world, and correct Inowledge oI the world depends upon
Inowing the contingent and convergent reality oI soul and cosmos.
10
This
entails healing the split between subject and object upon which the
prevailing modern scientiIic worldview is grounded.
There is another issue related to the illumination that awaIened
intelligence and direct experiencing may shed today on re-thinIing values
and virtues on the path to becoming more Iully human. This involves
language, with its organic aptitude Ior sharing and communicating
experiences and ideas within one linguistic Iamily. Language may also
bridge across diIIerent linguistic groups through Iostering unitive
disclosures oI meaning, allowing over-arching understanding oI more
universalizing values dressed in various conceptual and linguistic guises
speciIic to diIIerent cultural matrices. In conjunction with this, the barriers
between social groups and cultural blocIs Iostered by linguistic
diIIerentiation may under the right conditions operate as Iilters selectively
admitting congenial elements while blocIing others.
11
We may observe
this operating within the two most signiIicant translation movements in
human history: the 8
th
10
th
century movement oI Hellenic sciences and
philosophy Irom GreeI into Arabic, and the 12
th
14
th
century transposition
oI sciences, philosophy, and spirituality Irom Arabic into Hebrew and
Latin in Europe.
12
Perhaps the most instructive example oI the operation oI language as
a congruent unitary Iorce is the lingua Iranca` phenomenon whereby one
tongue serves as a vehicular language` Ior communication and exchange
between many other local vernaculars, reIlecting the military, mercantile or
cultural dominance oI the vehicular language group. Currently the
recognized dominance oI spoIen English with its Latin script |341 million|
is rivaled by written standard Chinese and standard spoIen Mandarin in
East Asia |ca. 1.2 billion persons|, spoIen Arabic vernaculars |ca. 422
million|, Hindi in S. Asia |366 million| and spoIen Spanish in the
Americas |322 million|.
13
Today Arabic vernaculars Iorm the second
largest spoIen language aIter standard Chinese, ,, , while the Arabic script
the language oI the Qur`a n remains aIter Latin the second most widely
used alphabetic system in the world.
14
It is well Inown that Iew cultures placed more emphasis on their
language as a uniIying Iactor than have the Arabs; yet the unprecedented
diIIusion oI Arabic linguistic and conceptual presence Irom sub-Saharan
and East AIrica, the Iberian peninsula, through to Central and South Asia,
China and to South East Asia was due as much to religious and cultural
grounds than to commerce or polities. Within various Muslim cultural
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 114
regions historically, a number oI other languages adopting Arabic script
also served vehicular Iunctions such as Persian (lingua Iranca oI India,
beIore the British conquest), TurIish, Azeri, Urdu, Swahili, and Jawi
|Melayu|. This displays the integrating unitive eIIect oI Islam over Iar
Ilung territories, previously separated by geographical barriers and racial
cultural divides. Subjectivities tend to exclusion and conIlict, disclosure oI
meaning tends to inclusion and harmonious awareness.
LANGUAGE AND MEANING LANGUAGE AND MEANING LANGUAGE AND MEANING LANGUAGE AND MEANING
Language, comprising speech and narrative (e.g. text) and poetry, is rightly
taIen as a Iey index oI the human Iaculty Ior grasping and communicating
meaning, and is intimately involved in rationality and critical
apprehension. A signiIicant aspect oI speech and its accompanying seizure
oI meaning is the conjunction oI symbol and the reality it points to,
namely the meaning disclosed through its apprehension; or, to express this
relationship another way: the Word and the Meaning which it discloses.
Restoration oI the imaginal power oI symbolic and mythic discourse at the
basis oI religious language centers on apprehending the eIIicacy` oI Names
in their qualitative depth, not merely their quantitative Ilatness.
15
We can only reIer brieIly to one aspect oI the relation between word
and meaning. The word is a tangible sensory Iorm conveying meaning;
language points to meaning and discloses signiIicance thus, Arabic
calligraphy became Islam`s pre-eminent art Iorm and mode oI symbolic
representation. But such disclosure requires the minds and hearts oI
humans to be prepared and capable to conceive and grasp meaning, to heed
the indications or pointers words provide and thereby penetrate to their
intended signiIicances. The identity or non-identity oI name and thing-
named was intensively discussed among Muslim speculative theologians,
while the legalist-oriented traditionalists avoided the topic as a
reprehensible innovation. This issue was oIten cast in the polarity oI ism
and ma`na / name` and concept`, where proper comprehension elevates
the conceptmeaning` above its name`. The gist is captured in an
utterance by the reputable early thinIer Ja`Iar al-Sa diq (d. 765):
.the name is other than what-is-named, so whomever worships the
name disregarding the concept/ma`na commits unIaith (IuIr ) and he
worships nothing, and whomever worships the name and the concept
commits unIaith by worshipping Two, and whomever worships the
concept disregarding the name now that is true oneness`/tawhid.
16
Two things must be borne in mind: a) the same meaning may be pointed to
by more than one term or phrase within the same language, as well as by
several words across several languages; and b) without the meaning already
being present, or suIIiciently evoIed and indicated, within our
Rehabilitating Value
115
understanding intellective Iaculty, the proper apprehension oI the Word is
diIIicult or the Word itselI Iails to convey the intended Meaning and may
even be taIen in a wrong` meaning (e.g. conIining the term to merely one
restricted surIace sense while ignoring its deeper symbolic or mythic
signiIicance).
ConIirmation oI this would be our common experience oI Iirst having
apprehended the meaning oI a term in an ordinary` sense as a young
person, then later, with increased Inowledge and insight, achieving a
deeper more signiIicant sense. Furthermore, signiIicances may be Ilat`
(Iigurative or rhetorical), or may possess depth,` opening out onto a
hierarchy oI related meanings and apprehensions. Poetry, as well as
prophecy, Irequently operates in this latter mode oI symbolic signiIicance.
Incorporation oI Iresh meanings through borrowing or inIluence Irom
another language or culture represents a particular case oI expansion oI
meaning, and Irequently induces new values or new ways oI looIing within
the worldview oI the host culture. The phenomenon oI bilingualism
(whose many dimensions we leave untouched here
17
) underlines the
importance oI cross-cultural penetration, and demonstrates that successIul
bilingualism and becoming bi-cultural require intelligence as well as proper
attitudes toward the other group(s) and motivation. Similarly with
translation between languages, where the competence oI the translator in
rendering the meaning requires more than linguistic expertise, but also
conceptual and cognitive insight into other cultural patterns oI thought and
experience and the critical intelligence inIorming particular disciplines.
This reminds us oI: the complementary operation oI a barrier acting
simultaneously and selectively as a Iilter; as well as: the requirement that
meaning already be present in the mind or heart in order that Word may
Iunction as disclosing symbol. (The notion oI disclosure` is useIul here.)
Meaning the ability or Iacility to elicit or to evoIe over-arching
correspondences and conIluences, or contrasting points oI
complementarity, bridging separately expressed meaning |discourse,
imagery| embedded within distinct cultural matrices is capable oI
prompting a unitary sense oI value or signiIicance wherein each speciIic
culture with its unique manner oI discourse and symbol may come to be
seen in some degree as simultaneously both a light and a veil. This is not a
matter oI doctrines or oI dogma, Ior the Christian Trinity remains a
stumbling blocI Ior Muslims and Jews, while the personal Creator oI
prophetic monotheism may appear alien to the IneIIable Principle oI
Buddhism. And even within one religious culture there are varying
conceptions oI origination: thus Islamic thinIers spoIe variously oI
temporal creation /Ihalq & h udu th, or oI divine Iiat (creative imperative:
Ialimah & amr), or oI timeless existentiation /ibda , or the continual
emanation /Iayd oI the Peripatetics (all but the last oI these terms are
drawn Irom the Qur`a n).
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 116
Rather, tapping the unitary sense is a matter oI essence and the
congruence Ilowing Irom it, grounded above all on the reality that the
human species is not only biologically but ontologically one and the same.
This reality Iacilitates the openness oI religious texts, imagery and symbols
to a hierarchy oI readings and seizures oI meaning in accordance with the
hierarchy oI Inowers who plumb their depths and hold them up as lenses
through which to apprehend metaphysics, the cosmos, and the horizons
within the human soul. Knowledge is hierarchical along with
gradations oI the Inowers who seize meanings.
FINAL REMARKS FINAL REMARKS FINAL REMARKS FINAL REMARKS
Restoration oI the imaginal noetic power oI symbolic and mythic
discourse at the ground oI religious language must be guided by the
recognition that the qualitative power oI words |Names| aIIords a more
real and eIIective mode oI insight and meaning Ior bridging across cultures.
What is truly being asIed oI us is to learn new languages oI the spirit
and heart, to experience Iresh thoughts and grasp the Inowledge joining
our inmost selI to the whole and the source. ThereIore, cultural multi-
lingualism should be one oI our means Ior soliciting the desired unitary
sense oI value. We all must worI as translators Irom the limiting cultural
constraints given us at birth, into the unutterable Iullness oI being which is
our veritable human birthright. This might be the best worI oI translation
to render the SelI bacI into its essential meaning. It is certainly a more
adequate response to the global conIlicts and cognitive chaos that threaten
conscious liIe on earth.
Name is a veil over Essence
Muh ammad al-NiIIari (10
th
cent.)
International Institute oI Advanced Islamic Studies (IAIS),
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
1
The purpose oI language is to convey meaning, so we shall use Arabic
Islamic terms sparingly in order to spare those unIamiliar with this
tradition Irom conIusion. Nevertheless, in terms oI transIorming inter-
cultural misunderstanding, there is a great beneIit to be derived Irom
clariIying the Iey terms and notions oI speciIic cultures, so as to Ioster
apprehending shared meanings. (See our remarIs on the utility oI cultural
bi-lingualism below.) However, this clariIication has to begin with an intra-
cultural eIIort, given that most moderns` are now estranged Irom the deep
roots oI their own particular intellectualcultural heritage. Actually, the
most pressing concern today may be the dialogue within one culture
between its traditional components and its own mode oI modernity this
Rehabilitating Value
117
is certainly true oI Islam. Remember: there is more than one way to be
modern.
2
al-Kulayni , Us u l al-Ka Ii , ed. al-GhaIIa ri (3
rd
ed., Tehran: 1388) I Iita b
Iadl al-`ilm, bab isti`mal al-`ilm p. 44 2.
3
Consult e.g., Seyyed Hossein Nasr, An Introduction to Islamic
Cosmological Doctrines (Boulder: Shambala, 1978).
4
We intend by ideology the secularist socio-political programs deemed
rational and scientiIic, including the varieties oI politicized religious-ethno
nationalism termed Iundamentalism`.
5
ChitticI, Science oI the Cosmos, Science oI the Soul: The Pertinence oI
Islamic Cosmology in the Modern World (OxIord: Oneworld, 2007) p. 73.
He also asserts: 'Cosmos and soul are not two separate realities, but two
sides oI the same coin. (p. 132).
6
ChitticI, Cosmos pp. 136, 138.
7
Abu Ha mid al-Ghaza li , The Niche oI Lights, tr. D. Buchman (Provo, UT:
1998); and see Hermann Landolt, 'Ghaza li and ReligionswissenschaIt`:
some notes on the MishIat al-Anwa r., Asiatische Studien 45 (1991).
8
See in particular: Ibn al-`Arabi , The Meccan Revelations vol. I, ed. M.
ChodIiewicz, trans. W. C. ChitticI & J. W. Morris (New YorI: Pir Press,
2002) index s.v. Ihaya l ; W. C. ChitticI, The SelI-Disclosure oI God:
Principles oI Ibn al-`Arabi s Cosmology (Albany: SUNY, 1998) The
Imaginal BarzaIh p. 331370; W. C. ChitticI, Imaginal Worlds: Ibn al-
`Arabi and the Problem oI Religious Diversity (Albany: SUNY, 1994) p.
67119; and Henry Corbin, Creative Imagination in the Su Iism oI Ibn
Arabi (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969).
9
See preceding note; and our contribution to the international syposiuim
Ibn Arabi and Modern Era (Istanbul & Damascus, May 2328, 2008), 'Ibn
Arabi and Imagination: The BacIground, Iorthcoming.
10
ChitticI, Cosmos, p. 136.
11
See especially Norman Daniel, The Cultural Barrier (Edinburgh:
Edinburgh University Press, 1975) Ior an extended meditation on obstacles
to Inowing other cultures by a long time observer oI Islam. I taIe this
notion oI Iilter` Irom Daniel.
12
Dimitri Gutas, GreeI Thought, Arabic Culture. The Graeco-Arabic
Translation Movement in Baghdad and Early Abba sid Society (2
nd
4
th
/8
th
10
th
centuries), (London & New YorI: Routledge, 1998). For a survey oI
the translations, scholars and institutions involved, see Gerhard Endress,
'Die wissenschaItliche Literatur |ScientiIic Literature`|, in Grundriss der
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 118
Arabischen Philologie, vol. II: LiteraturwissenschaIt, ed. H. Gtje
(Wiesbaden: 1987) 8.18.5, pp. 400506 (esp. pp. 41631), and
Supplementband (1992) pp. 3152; and the ongoing compilation edited by
G. Endress & D. Gutas, A GreeI and Arabic Lexicon: material Ior a
dictionary oI the mediaeval translations Irom GreeI into Arabic (Leiden:
Brill, 1992-).
13
'Languages SpoIen by More Than 10 Million People, MicrosoIt
Encarta 2008. Retrieved June 21, 2008.
14
Even aIter TurIish, Azeri, Swahili, Malay /Brunei /Indonesian, and Uyghur
switched to Latin script.
15
ChitticI, Cosmos, pp. 96101 Ior the notion oI qualitative eIIicacy oI
Names; also Paul-A. Hardy, 'Epistemology and Divine Discourse, in The
Cambridge Companion to Classical Islamic Theology, ed. Tim Winter
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) pp. 288307, treating al-Ghaza li `s
important contribution to this theme.
16
al-Kulayni , Us u l al-Ka Ii , I I. al-Tawhid, ba b al-ma`bu d p. 87 2. This
utterance is also assigned to Ali in other sources.
17
For an approach between psycholinguistics and sociolinguistics, see W.
E. Lambert (in colloboration with Elizabeth Peal), 'The Relation oI
Bilingualism to Intelligence, in Language, Psychology and Culture.
Essays by Wallace E. Lambert (StanIord, CA: StanIord University Press,
1972) pp. 111159. Lambert`s worI shows 'that a person can comIortably
become bilingual and bi-cultural, that one`s attitudes toward the other
group whose language is being learnt play an important role in language
acquisition and that such attitudes both aIIect and are aIIected by one`s
motivation to learn the other language. . (p. xiii).
WHAT REMAINS OF MODERNITY?
PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURE IN THE TRANSITION TO A
GLOBAL ERA
William Sweet
INTRODUCTION
A view often attributed to many of the major thinkers of the modern period,
such as Descartes, Hobbes, and Kant, is that philosophy goes beyond
particular cultural or historical or contingent concerns that it seeks to
provide arguments that all rational beings, regardless of their culture or
tradition, can recognize as sound, and that it proposes to arrive at certain,
universal, timeless and absolute truths. On this modern view, then, while
philosophy may emerge from cultures, it seeks to leave cultural specificity
behind, and to abstract itself from the particularities of these cultures.
This view of philosophy has been challenged, especially since the
early nineteenth century and the development of hermeneutics and it has
come increasingly under fire during the late twentieth century, largely as a
result of an increasing global awareness and the recognition of the
diversities in ethical practice and in ways of knowing. How conclusive are
these challenges to modernity and to modern approaches to philosophy? Is
there anything characteristic of modernity that remains in philosophy after
the contemporary critique?
In this paper, I wish to focus principally on issues related to this
latter question, namely, What, if anything, remains of modernity in
philosophical thinking in the global era? To respond to this question, I begin
by explaining what it means to say that philosophy emerges from culture.
Next, I outline what is generally considered to be the contrary view one
that is allegedly characteristic of modernity and explain why
philosophys relation to culture has been described as merely incidental and
contingent, and as telling us nothing about the philosophical enterprise
itself; I give a brief illustration of this view drawn from ethical theory. I
then present a critique of this account and give a constructive alternative,
taken from the perspective of postmodern thought showing how one
might conclude that philosophy not only emerges from culture but can never
separate itself from it. Again, I illustrate this by an example from ethical
theory. Finally, I note some criticisms of this postmodern approach, and
offer another constructive alternative to both the modern and the
postmodern views which allows us to say that philosophy emerges from
culture and yet retains many of the characteristics of modern thought an
alternative which has an affinity with philosophical idealism.
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 120
WHAT DOES IT MEAN FOR PHILOSOPHY TO EMERGE FROM
CULTURE?
One finds today a thesis that philosophy emerges from culture, and can
never free itself from it. This thesis is not universally accepted, but it is
nevertheless widely held.
But before one can assess this thesis as a whole, one needs to
consider the first part of it i.e., what it means to say that philosophy
emerges from culture and what evidence we have for thinking so.
I think that this can be understood in a number of ways.
1
At the most mundane level, one can say that philosophy emerges
from culture in the sense that culture is part of, or influences, the material
environment in which philosophical questions are raised; for example,
culture determines the opportunities for and character of leisure, and it is
generally only where people are freed from constant effort to obtain what
they need to live that they have leisure time in which philosophy can be
done.
One may go further and say that cultures set up the specific sorts of
problems and questions that philosophers pursue. For example, in the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in the West where we have an
increasing individualism, where science and technology made traditional
forms of labour obsolete, and where there was not simply a search for more
resources, but a search to expand markets we find philosophical enquiries
concerning human nature, the rights of the individual, political order, and
conceptions of the good.
Perhaps, more controversially, one may say that culture seems to
determine, as well, what counts as philosophy (as distinct from literature,
science, history, or religion), and how to distinguish philosophy from the
religious, scientific, axiological, and literary elements of ones culture. For a
number of years, in the West, the writings of figures such as Laozi,
Confucius, or Sankara, or the traditions of thought in Asia or Africa or of
American aboriginal tribes, were regarded by many as not being
philosophy, but matters of religion or social practice. Such an emphasis on
the influence of culture has affected how even some western authors are
regarded today. There is certainly debate whether Nietzsche or, in our day,
Judith Butler, is a philosopher, and opinions may shift over time; Paracelsus
(Phillip von Hohenheim; 1493-1541) was regarded as a philosopher in his
time, but today almost certainly would not be.
Further, and more concretely, some have argued that culture
influences in what language philosophical questions are expressed and
answered and what counts as a satisfactory answer.
2
For example, by
establishing norms of reason or emphasising values (such as the value of the
individual, the common good, and the good of communities such as the
nation, the church, humanity, and the biosphere), a culture provides a
language that puts limits on the kinds of philosophical questions that can
meaningfully be asked.
What Remains of Modernity? 121
And finally, more broadly, some may say further that philosophy
emerges from culture in the sense that culture provides or imposes the
conceptual framework in which philosophical enquiry takes place.
In short, to say that philosophy emerges from culture can mean
many different things and some would say that it means all of the above;
that culture determines the very possibility of philosophy.
3
ARGUMENTS FOR PHILOSOPHY EMERGING FROM CULTURE
What is the evidence for such a view i.e., that culture determines the very
possibility of philosophy? Interestingly, there are several arguments that
might lead us to this conclusion, but today the most influential of them
come from followers of postmodern hermeneutics. (It is also a claim of
philosophical idealism a point that I will return to, later.)
The argument here is primarily a negative one that the view of the
relation between philosophy and culture that is typical of modernity (though
also typical of much of Western philosophy from the time of Plato), and
which holds that philosophical work is independent of or transcends culture,
is defective. And so, the argument goes, the opposite position must be true
i.e., that philosophy not only emerges from, but can never free itself from,
culture.
To see how strong this argument is, a brief survey of the modern
view will be helpful.
The Modern View
How do critics of the modern view understand modernity?
Modernity has generally been described as reflecting a number of
basic principles.
4
1. It rejects tradition and custom as a priori authoritative;
everything must be subject to rational criticism.
2. It seeks objective truth and knowledge ideally, absolute, law-
like, ahistorical principles that can be known by reason, employing a
formal, rational method.
3. Modernity is, therefore, rationalist at least in a broad sense,
meaning that all reasonable beliefs and claims to knowledge must
have sufficient evidence for them. This evidence is, ideally,
provided using demonstrative deductive arguments that start from
self-evident or indubitable premises. In this sense, it is usually
foundationalist in its epistemology.
4. It acknowledges that the conditions of knowledge are, in some
way, determined by the capacities of the knowing subject; we have,
then, a turn to the subject, and epistemology has a priority over
metaphysics.
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 122
5. This priority of the subject is also reflected in an emphasis on the
value of the individual over that of the community.
6. According to Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, modernity
sees reason as instrumental that is, as a tool to be used, not only to
understand, but to master or control, the world.
5
7. Modernity is, however, optimistic it suggests that knowledge
is progressive and emancipatory, and that the knowing subject is
(self) perfectible.
As a result, then, contingent matters of tradition or history or
culture are not of fundamental importance at least, not to philosophy.
Broadly construed, philosophical modernism is said to have
begun in the early seventeenth century (e.g., around the time of Descartes),
and to have had its most complete statement in the work of the eighteenth-
century enlightenment philosophers and, principally, Kant. These
philosophers rejected having culture or context or tradition play a
determining role in knowledge, seeking instead law-like, absolute,
foundationalist principles, and ahistorical, timeless, objective truths.
As an illustration here, consider the principle based
(deontological) ethics of Kant.
6
Kant, as we know, rejected any ethics based
on custom or tradition or past practice, or any external sanction. For there to
be a genuine moral philosophy, it must be law-like that is, it must be a
priori. Kants approach is not to look at culture or context or tradition
doing this would be sociology, not philosophy but to ask what a rational
being, reflecting on what one ought to do, would discover and assent to.
His answer, as we know, is Law something that can be
rationally grasped and recognised as true (and obligatory) by all rational
beings, not just human beings. Autonomy is simply assenting to or giving
this law to oneself.
The moral law which Kant seeks is, qua law, objective, universal
and absolute it is a priori and without exception. It is recognized and
enacted by reason alone specifically, the reason of each individual agent
hence, it is (though only in this sense) subjective. It does not matter if
people like it, agree to it, or not; it does not indeed, it cannot depend on
an external lawgiver. Neither does morality depend on consequences or
results; only on conformity to reason.
It is clear, then, that the moral law is what it is, independent of any
contingencies of culture, history, or tradition. Indeed, it is for this reason
that it applies to all rational beings qua rational beings, and not just to
human beings.
The very point of modernism, then is that one had to put all claims
of culture, custom and tradition under the light of reason and, if they are
found wanting, reject them. Thus, there was no significant relation between
philosophy and culture or, what relation there was, was purely incidental.
What Remains of Modernity? 123
Criticism of the Modern View
Critics of the modern approach to philosophy and those employing a
hermeneutical method here have played a key role have argued that there
are several problems with this view:
1. To begin with, these critics challenge the view that there are any
absolute, universal, ahistorical, objective truths or principles or, at
the very least, they deny that we could ever know them.
2. There are no neutral, unprejudiced subjects who can make
objective judgements, independent of their interests. Indeed, there can
be no privileging of the human subject because, really, there are no
subjects and, in any event, there is no reason to prefer the human
subject over any other being. In fact, the modern privileging of the
subject (anthropocentrism) is itself the source of a wide range of
contemporary problems philosophical, political, social and
economic.
3. The modern ideal of rationality is problematic; there is no
neutral, formal method of arriving at objective truth. Reason or
rationalism is not independent of tradition and culture; it is just
another tradition. Empirical observation and history reveal that there
are many different models of rationality, each rooted in distinct
historical periods and each reflecting different social and cultural
conditions and there is no means of establishing any one as
ultimately preferable. In other words, there is no single model of
rationality in terms of which one could show that anything is true or
can be known. Reason is contextual. As Richard Rorty has argued,
there can be no grounding no foundation outside of a context
or (what Wittgenstein called) a form of life.
7
4. Epistemological foundationalism is, therefore, arbitrary. Indeed,
the principle of foundationalism is not only arbitrary but self-
defeating. It is arbitrary because there is no reason for believing that it
is true, and there are other, equally plausible models of knowledge
that are available. (In fact, few, if any, of our knowledge claims could
ever satisfy this standard.) It is self-refuting because it cannot
measure up to the standard that it sets i.e., it is neither derivable
from principles we know independently to be true, nor is it self-
evident. In short, there is (and there can be) no ground for our
common-sense beliefs or knowledge claims.
5. (Therefore) There is no objectivity; there simply are no impartial,
objective absolute truths or principles upon which all informed,
mature, intellectually competent individuals can or must agree.
6. We cannot know nature or reality as it is in itself; indeed, such
an ideal is illusory. Thus, truth cannot be the correspondence of
statements to the world (since, at the very least, we can never make
sense of such a correspondence). All that we can have are
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 124
interpretations of texts or (more broadly) interpretations of
experience.
7. There is, therefore, no essence or nature or natural law of
anything, including any human nature.
Thus, these critics claim, we need to reject the modern tradition
altogether or, at least, to recognise that modernity (and its accompanying
rationalism and dismissive attitude towards culture and tradition) are simply
part of another tradition. Philosophy can never be separated from tradition
and culture.
But if the modern approach fails, what is the alternative?
Postmodern Views
Some philosophers offer what we may call the postmodern response,
which draws extensively on the insights of the hermeneutical movement of
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Postmodernism describes, and
even celebrates, the disintegration of the cultural, political, and
philosophical views typical of modernity. Philosophers as Friedrich
Nietzsche, Martin Heidegger, Jacques Derrida, Hlne Cixous, Michel
Foucault, and Richard Rorty challenge the modern view that there is a
community of discourse or an epistemological model that allows for rational
and objective knowledge. In the words of another of its principal
representatives, Jean-Franois Lyotard, postmodernism is an incredulity
towards metanarratives
8
an incredulity towards the claim that there is or
can be one story into which all truth or knowledge can be placed. More
specifically, within Anglo-American and German philosophy,
postmodernism is considered to be anti-foundationalist, anti-realist, anti-
essentialist, highly pluralistic and pragmatist.
What does philosophy look like after modernity? What is its
relation to culture? One suggestion is provided by the late Richard Rorty,
who proposed a postmodern approach to (modern) philosophy.
In a recent tribute to Rorty by Raymond Geuss a tribute widely
circulated on the Internet
9
Geuss mentions a pet project of Rortys. Rorty
apparently was long interested in giving an undergraduate course that would
be called An Alternative History of Modern Philosophy, starting with the
end of the Middle Ages and proceeding up to the beginning of the twentieth
century. It would focus, not on the major canonical figures, but on some of
the lesser known though, from Rortys perspective, equally or more
philosophically powerful figures.
Rorty may have had a number of reasons for proposing such an
alternative approach. But Geuss conjectures that one in particular reflects
Rortys view of the activity of philosophy.
10
Geuss notes that Rorty held
that what some people called philosophy at certain times in history, was,
at other times, not regarded as philosophy at all. Geuss writes that,
according to Rorty:
What Remains of Modernity? 125
There is no such thing as a universal set of philosophical questions or
issues; Paracelsus wasnt remotely interested in asking or answering
questions like those we find philosophical, still lots of people at the
time thought his work a paradigm of what a philosopher should be
doing. The assumption here would be that the longer and more deeply
one reflected on this fact, the more one would see that philosophy
at different times and places referred to different clusters of
intellectual activities, none of which formed a natural kind and none
of which had any inherent claim to a monopoly on the proper use
of the term philosophy. Doing a history in which Paracelsus figured
centrally but not Descartes, could be seen as a part of trying to give a
history, not so much of philosophy, as of historically differing
conceptions of what philosophy was.
11
For the postmodern philosopher like Rorty, then, philosophy is
clearly a product of culture, and what philosophy is, is also a matter of
culture. There is no one model or one approach into which all philosophical
knowledge can be placed or to which all philosophical knowledge aspires.
But the position of the postmodernist, such as Rorty, is not just that
there is no transhistorical or ahistorical conception of philosophy, or that
there are no essences or natures outside of cultures and contexts which
philosophy should seek. It is also the case that, if philosophy is contextually
determined, then what counts as reasonable, or reason, or a good
argument, is also contextually determined; there are no universal standards
of rationality. Terms like objectivity and true do not mean what the
moderns took them to mean. Objectivity does not mean corresponding to
what there is
12
, but a property of theories which, having been thoroughly
discussed, are chosen by a consensus of rational discussants.
13
Truth is
not a correspondence between a statement and reality, but is the product of
the widest consensus or agreement within our set of social practices. (Thus,
for Rorty, we cannot provide proofs, only explanations and narratives.)
According to Rorty, then, we are fools if we spend our time looking
for some neutral, universal conception of reason, or of truth, or of human
nature, or essences.
This critique seems to be particularly corrosive of ethical theory.
14
For example, Rorty finds the language of universal human rights at best
question begging, and at worst incapable of any clear justification; it is
simply an ideological approach that appeals to those, like him, who are
liberals living in the West. There is no external justification of rights or
argument or proof requiring the equal consideration of others. Instead,
Rorty says that we need sentimental education
15
an education of the
sentiments so that people come to see the world less in terms of us and
them or, at least, so that they are willing to enlarge the sphere of us, and
thus extend their moral communities. The aim of ethics is not to construct a
theory of the good or the right, but to promote solidarity. Instead of
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 126
seeking argument and proof in ethics, then, we should try to awaken or
educate the sentiments. To the extent that we do so, Rorty writes, there is
moral progress.
If the postmodern view is correct in its critique of modern
philosophy and in its recognition of the place of historicity, context, and
interpretation, then the modern claim that philosophy somehow transcends
its origins and is not essentially a product of the culture in which it arises,
simply fails. This, postmoderns would note, is simply to inject humility and
perspective into the juggernaut that the modern view has been. Philosophy
emerges from culture. We should henceforth focus on philosophies rather
than Philosophy, so that our philosophical investigations will be more
modest, but also more respectful, of other cultures and traditions outside our
own cultures of origin.
CRITICISMS OF POSTMODERN VIEWS
Is this generic postmodern view plausible? There is of course a great danger
in talking of the postmodern view, since the accounts that one finds in
Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Cixous, Foucault, Rorty and others vary
widely indeed. Still, it is fair to say that there are two parts to this approach:
its critique of modernity, and its own positive view.
Clearly, postmodern views have their advantages. They draw our
attention to problems in modern thought, such as the emphasis on the
powers of human reason and the exclusion of any role for the sentiments in
knowledge. Moreover, by focusing on particulars rather than universal
principles, postmodernism reminds us that certain features of reality have
been long marginalized or overlooked (e.g., the experience of non-western
cultures, of women, and of propertyless classes). Postmodernists such as
Rorty are oriented towards practice and the practical. Moreover, because of
its attention to particulars, to difference, and to the marginalized,
postmodernism seeks to be open to diversity, whereas modern philosophies
which seem to focus on a totalizing or a reductionist approach
presumably were not.
But postmodernism has been severely and extensively criticized
itself. In general, its arguments against modernity have been challenged for
being inconclusive, inconsistent, or based on over-generalizations.
Thus when we look at Rortys views on ethics and human rights,
for example, we find that his own positive account seems to be at least as
problematic as the views he challenges.
For example, it is certainly true that philosophical demonstrations
are far from the most effective tools to address front line (ethical) conflict.
But this does not mean that they have no role. And while Rortys appeal to
sentimental education is not without its benefits, it is far from an adequate
alternative.
An ethical response cannot be just a feeling that what we are doing
is appropriate to the situation; we must believe that we must do something
What Remains of Modernity? 127
in this situation and this requires justification, argument, and proof. By
itself, nothing follows from feeling; one might show compassion in a
particular case, but one might just as well (depending on ones sentiments)
show indifference. Besides, the feeling of compassion can be acted out in
different ways; some people focus on the immediate needs of the suffering
individual, others may try to address what caused the suffering, and so on.
And if what is central is ones own feeling or sentiment, then how can we
call on others to take an ethical position to be in solidarity? Such a
postmodern approach results in emotivism and in ethical confusion.
16
There also seems to be a deep-rooted inconsistency in Rortys
ethics. Presumably, the aim of sentimental education is to make us more
aware, not just differently aware. If Rortys sentimental education is
indeed an education, then there must better and worse ways of
understanding the world for which reasons need to be given. Rorty does not,
however, seem to recognize this. (And, as we will see below, there is no
inconsistency in promoting sentimental education and yet also insisting on
giving reasons and proof.)
Though Rorty rejects the charge, there do seem to be grounds for
saying that his position is relativistic and some would hold that
postmodernism as a whole is not only relativistic, but, as a result of this,
fundamentally conservative, because it can provide no clear argument to
challenge cultural norms or the status quo.
The preceding criticisms are, of course, at a very high level of
generality, and there have been responses to them. Nevertheless, at the very
least, it seems plausible to say that the postmodern approach is problematic.
Even if a postmodern philosopher can respond to these criticisms, one might
still argue that there are arguments for both modernism and postmodernism;
that there are reasons for and against the notion of philosophy as embedded
in, and emerging from, culture; and that modernism and postmodernism,
as philosophical approaches, are on a par.
AN ALTERNATIVE VIEW: RECOVERING MODERNITY
Are we, then, at a stalemate?
I would argue that there is another critical approach to modernism
that avoids at least some of the challenges to postmodernism and yet retains
several of modernisms central principles. In this way, we can speak of
philosophy as emerging from culture and never being separate from it and,
at the same time, of modernism still having an important place and still
being able to make an important contribution in a world where we recognize
the pluralistic character of philosophy.
The Model of Critical History
At approximately the same time as hermeneutics was being developed by
thinkers such as Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Alexander von
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 128
Humboldt (17691859), and Friedrich Ast (1778-1841), we find significant
critical reflection on history by British idealist philosophers. For example,
in his Presuppositions of Critical History (1874), F.H. Bradley (1846-1924)
raised a number of fundamental questions about history and the role of the
historian. No doubt influenced by German Biblical scholarship and criticism
(and perhaps, indirectly, by Biblical hermeneutics), Bradley argued that
(historical) texts do not stand on their own, but must be interpreted and
evaluated from the perspective of the historian. History, then, must be
critical it cannot pretend just to seek to provide a copy or mirror of
what happened in the past. The historian must select from the available data
and, in the process, must also be aware of the presuppositions of the
approach she or he brings to the selection process or historical enquiry.
Bradley argued that it is the historian and the historians judgement
that is the basis for history; The historian ... is the real criterion.
17
Bradley
does not deny that there are facts; he simply rejects the view that these facts
exist independently of the historian and are there for scholars just to
collect and repeat. While Bradleys position is not (narrowly) historicist, it
recognises the importance of understanding historical events within their
contexts, and that the historian is engaging in a normative, and not just a
descriptive, activity.
Bradleys contemporary, Bernard Bosanquet (1848-1923) took an
even more cautious and sceptical view. When confronted with mechanistic
accounts of history or accounts that emphasized the fundamental role of
great individuals, Bosanquet was struck by their fragmentary and dead
quality. He was suspicious of any history qua narrative or qua chronicle of
the contingent events of the past, which proposed to give a total
explanation
18
and he was also suspicious of the view of the historian as
one who provides an explanation of the minds and natures of great men as
if he was Gods spy.
19
We see this critical approach to history in R.G. Collingwood
(18891943) as well. Influenced by Bradley
20
, Benedetto Croce
21
(though
he rejected many of Croces views
22
) and, later in life, by Wilhelm Dilthey,
Collingwood is best known for his The Idea of History (posthumously
published in 1946). Here, Collingwood develops some of the insights of the
idealist tradition by insisting that historians focus on thought that is, on
what was going through the minds of the historical actors at the time.
Collingwood argued that All history is the history of thought ... and
therefore all history, is the re-enactment of past thought in the historians
own mind
23
; the scientific historian reenacts the evidence making the
thoughts of his subject [i.e., the historical actor] his own
24
and, thereby,
comes not merely to understand the reasons for, but knows, what happened.
Collingwood also argued for a closer relation between history and
philosophy than was generally held, and insisted that philosophy must
understand itself as a historical discipline. Philosophys task was to
articulate the absolute presuppositions characteristic of each age or way of
What Remains of Modernity? 129
thinking, and the truth and falsity of philosophical claims can and must be
determined only be understanding them in their original context.
Collingwood provides another important methodological insight
claiming that philosophy rests on a logic of question and answer.
25
(It is
interesting that Hans-Georg Gadamer sees a link between Collingwoods
view and Gadamers own logic of question and answer, which he develops
in Wahrheit und Methode [Truth and Method].
26
) Thus, in order to
understand what exactly a philosopher said or meant, we need to see the
question that she or he sought to answer. Collingwood writes that Every
statement that anybody ever makes is made in answer to a question
27
, and
that In order to find out [a philosophers] meaning you must also know
what the question was . . . to which the thing he [or she] has said or written
was meant as an answer.
28
(This also suggests that genuine disagreement
may be less common that we might think, for two propositions do not
contradict each other unless they are answers to the same question.
29
)
Collingwoods method is, in a sense, backward looking (and hence reflects
a kind of hermeneutics), but it is also forward looking, for it provides a way
of pursuing future enquiries on a topic. And this, together with the theory of
re-enactment, shows us the importance and the role of context and culture in
historical knowledge that is nevertheless consistent with a rejection of
relativism, subjectivism, and historicism.
30
I have outlined here what has been called critical history, but this
approach is not idiosyncratic or sui generis, and it is particularly congenial
with doing the history of philosophy. With elements of both empiricism and
rationalism, and of both objectivity and subjectivity, this critical view is
also quite modern. Yet it anticipates and addresses many of the criticisms
later raised by postmodernists against modernism.
Lessons from Critical History
How does the preceding model of critical history help to see the place of
modernity in contemporary philosophy?
In the first instance, this model recognises that certain elements of
modernism are problematic. It rejects attempts to understand history and,
in light of Collingwoods remarks on the relation of philosophy to history,
philosophy in abstraction from specific, concrete concerns; historical truth
is not out there in the world, waiting to be discovered by the scholar.
Critical history insists on knowing the particular situation and understanding
the underlying issues in order to make sense of historical and philosophical
claims. It is, like many postmodern views, an approach that is sensitive to
context taking account of the perspective of the person carrying out the
investigation, and the situation in which it is being carried out. The logic (or
dialectic) of question and answer is based upon just this insight.
But there is more to critical history than this. While it does not see
tradition and custom as providing a last word, critical history does hold
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 130
that they provide essential insights, and it sees them as containing truths that
need to be recognized in arriving at a more complete account of an event.
Critical history would certainly challenge the foundationalist
model of reason and argument that knowledge can be had only by starting
from self-evident or indubitable premises and using deductive modes of
argument. Hence, its employment of question and answer and re-
enactment. It also sees investigation and analysis as collective processes
as social practices. Thus, it would reject the view that, in our knowledge of
the world or of what is of value, the individual historian or his or her
subject is central. Proponents of critical history challenge modern
tendencies to individualism and atomism. In these ways, then, a critical
history and, by extension, a critical philosophy would call into question
some of the key assumptions of modernism.
Yet a theory of critical history satisfies many of the principles of
modernism.
Critical history holds that there is objective truth and knowledge
though it may be more of a challenge to arrive at them than many moderns
have assumed. It is through the model of re-enactment and the method of
question and answer that critical history enables one to reach truth.
Consequently, in critical history, the historian looks at the particulars and
attempts to rethink the thoughts of the historical actors and, by doing so,
achieves a (more comprehensive) view of reality.
Thus, while critical history is attentive to context and contingency,
and is aware of the role of the particular interests of the historian, it is not
obviously historicist (as postmodern views tend to be), for it does not reduce
truth claims to statements about what is true in a context. Indeed, while
there is no single method across the disciplines that can be used to arrive at
objective truth, critical history does hold that there are arguments whose
validity is not limited to the cultures, traditions and practices in which they
first arise. There can be absolute, universal truths but the critical historian
(and the critical philosopher) recognise that these are not easily reached and,
indeed, can only be reached once we have a comprehensive grasp of reality.
And, underlying its method, there is a commitment to reason, coherence,
evidence, and argument, and to the claim that there are truths that all should
see, even if some do not.
There is an important place for the subject in this view though,
again, it is reducible neither to the purely modern view nor to a postmodern
view. Instead, it is a view that sees individuals as ultimately intelligible only
when in relation to other individuals i.e., when seen as being what some
have called the concrete universal.
Finally, this view is broadly optimistic. Admittedly, it does not
claim that history is essentially and inevitably progressive from moment to
moment, and it rejects the view that individuals can be passive and
unengaged in the world, comfortable in the knowledge that all will
gradually, and inevitably, improve. Nevertheless, it does hold that, overall,
there is progress, and that the elimination of incompleteness or conflict in
What Remains of Modernity? 131
ideas leads increasingly to a more rational conception and development
of the world.
The approach adopted by critical history one which we may
describe as a broadly idealist approach acknowledges that modernity fails
in certain respects. But idealism also affirms that these failures are just what
we should expect that coherence and consistency are goals to be achieved,
not simply features of the world as it is. The solution to this incoherence and
inconsistency, so to speak, is not to abandon the modern view, but to
recover it by addressing its tensions and contradictions, thereby arriving at a
more comprehensive and complete understanding of the world that reflects
unity amid diversity. For such a result to be attained, then, there needs to be
a recognition of diversity and cultures, and a recognition that philosophy
itself is a product of culture that can, in turn, inform and challenge culture.
What would this approach imply, for example, for ethics? How
could an ethics retain characteristics of modernism and yet also be seen as
emerging from, and being dependent on, culture?
Consider the view of the idealist, Bosanquet. Bosanquet like
many of the British idealists, though not all wrote little on ethical theory,
focusing more on questions of practical ethics and particularly on questions
of social and public policy and of education. Bosanquet held that what was
needed most in the contemporary world was concrete moral action i.e.,
practice and conduct that focussed on specific moral, social, cultural, and
political issues and the development of the moral character of the
individual moral agent. Thus, he emphasised moral training and education,
and he repeatedly wrote on and spoke of the importance of being adequate
to the situation.
31
He would have had little hesitation in endorsing a kind of
sentimental education, for feelings as well as reason are relevant to moral
action. As Bosanquets teacher Edward Caird wrote: if, in order that reason
may rule, all such impulses have to be driven out, reason will rule in an
empty house.
32
Yet Bosanquet did not reject moral theory he simply recognised
that its place was not to address concrete issues directly and immediately.
And while Bosanquet, in his applied philosophy, focussed on the specifics
of situations, he in no way rejected moral objectivism. Underlying his views
on moral education and moral action, Bosanquet held that there is a moral
theory which focuses on human flourishing, and which has both
deontological and teleological elements. It has, moreover, basic principles
concerning human nature, for culture and tradition, the value of the
individual and its ends, the existence of a common good, a recognition of
the role of reason, and criteria for moral progress. He acknowledged,
however, that our knowledge of such principles is, as it were, in progress.
These principles were manifest in traditions and culture and, hence, one
ought to be aware of them; indeed, Bosanquet insisted that tradition and
culture often serve as important indicators of these principles at the various
stages of moral development.
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 132
Like the modern philosophers, then, Bosanquet held that there were
moral principles and proof of them that moral action was rational action
and that what is right or good is something that all rational beings can come
to recognise. But Bosanquet would not claim that any particular articulation
of a (moral) law could be absolute and applied to all rational beings at all
times. Again, the value of the individual was not to be found in that being as
distinct and separate from others, but through though not necessarily in
ones relations to them.
Like postmodern philosophers, then, Bosanquet had an expansive
view concerning what is relevant to and appropriate in ethics, and he was
critical of abstract models of how people should act. Moreover, our
standards of rationality, argument, and proof clearly reflect our histories and
cultures; not surprisingly, then, he was also critical of a correspondence
theory of truth and of justification. We can also find in his work reasons for
why we should enlarge our moral communities and why we should
awaken and educate the sentiments.
Unlike the postmoderns, however, Bosanquet would insist on the
existence of standards of rationality and on a robust account of objectivity
and truth, and hold that there are proofs and principles in ethics and, of
course, in epistemology and metaphysics that are more than consensus. He
admits that, when it comes to ethics, proofs i.e., moral theory cannot
settle many concrete moral conflicts; one cannot stop evil just by arguing
against it. Nevertheless, if one is going to try to stop evil, one needs to know
what the nature and goal and purpose of morality is, and why it is
important.
33
Bosanquet held that one can, in short, adopt many of the principles
of modernism as goals to be achieved while, at the same time, recognise that
much needs to be done to realise them, and that, in the meantime, we can
rightly be satisfied with less.
The preceding model which I have called the model of critical
history has had its critics. Nevertheless, it acknowledges the challenges to
modernism especially the relation of philosophy to culture and tradition
while, at the same time, recognises the positive elements in it. It reminds us,
then, that modernism has features that are necessary for any view even the
postmodern view to be plausible, and it shows us how modernity has a
place as we negotiate the transition to a global era.
CONCLUSION
In a world in which there is an increasing global awareness, as well as a
growing recognition of different ways of knowing and ways of living, the
paradigmatic modern approaches to philosophy no longer seem
appropriate to the task. There is, moreover, good reason to believe that
philosophy emerges from culture that philosophys relation to culture is
not a merely incidental and contingent matter. The culture or tradition from
which we come tells us about both the meaning of the questions that we
What Remains of Modernity? 133
raise and seek to answer, and the methods or ways in which we seek to
answer them.
Does anything, then, remain of modernity in the transition to a
global era? I have claimed that a critique of modernity does not entail the
validity of postmodern approaches for example, that while each
philosophy emerges from a particular culture, it can never separate itself
from it, and that there is no objectivity or truth. To show this, I have drawn
on some of the insights characteristic of critical history and, more broadly,
of late nineteenth century British idealism. Such a view challenges some of
the key theses of modernity while, at the same time, embraces others. Thus,
philosophy can be recognised as emerging from culture and yet, because of
the possibility of going beyond the particular and local, can seek to satisfy
some of the goals of modernity. In the current transition to a global era,
such a model of philosophy may well provide a way of allowing us to draw
on the resources provided by various cultures and traditions while, at the
same time, giving assurance that all cultures can and ought to form a
common cause. Only in so doing will humanity be adequately prepared to
address the many challenges arising in an increasingly pluralistic world.
St Francis Xavier University,
Antigonish, NS, Canada
NOTES
1
For more on this, see Culture and Pluralism in Philosophy, my
Introduction to Philosophy, Culture, and Pluralism (Aylmer, QC: Editions
du scribe, 2002), especially pp. x-xii.
2
Some would insist, for example, that political philosophy in the United
States frequently reflects assumptions and principles that are virtually
uniquely American.
3
Of course, such claims about how philosophy emerges from and is
affected by culture are quite consistent with claims about how philosophy
affects culture. For a discussion of this, see my Philosophy, Culture, and
Pluralism, pp. viii-ix.
4
What follows is a generic view of what modernity has been commonly
understood to involve. It does not claim that all modern philosophers or,
indeed, any held all of these principles, although the more of them one
adopts, the more plausibly one is what many call a modern.
5
See their Dialectic of the Enlightenment [1944], tr. John Cumming (New
York: Herder and Herder, 1972).
6
Another modern (enlightenment) theory which is alleged to be
paradigmatically rationalistic is the natural law theory of John Locke. Locke
writes: The state of nature has a law of nature to govern it, which obliges
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 134
every one: and reason, which is that law, teaches all mankind, who will but
consult it Two Treatises of Government, Second Treatise, section 6.
7
See Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1979). See also Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical
Investigations, section 19: To imagine a language means to imagine a form
of life.
8
Jean-Franois Lyotard, La condition postmoderne: rapport sur le savoir
(Paris: Minuit, 1979) [The Postmodern Condition, tr. Geoff Bennington and
Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: U of Minnesota Press, 1984), p. xxiv].
9
Raymond Geuss, Richard Rorty at Princeton: Personal Recollections,
Arion, 15 (2008); internet text at http://www.bu.edu/arion/Geuss.htm
10
For more on this point, Geuss refers us to Rortys 1984 paper, The
Historiography of Philosophy [in Philosophy in History: Essays in the
Historiography of Philosophy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984)].
11
Geuss, Richard Rorty at Princeton: Personal Recollections.
12
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 339.
13
Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature, p. 338.
14
In his 1981 After Virtue (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame
Press), Alasdair MacIntyre draws on some of this criticism: he writes that a
demand for proof in ethics is odd, if not impossible; that modern ethics
combines many cultural traditions and norms and leads to relativism or
emotivism or skepticism; and proposes that we should focus on moral
practices, the traditions in which they appear, and on people of practical
wisdom. (This is the basis for MacIntyres resurrection of Aristotelian
virtue ethics.)
15
Rorty, Human Rights, Rationality, and Sentimentality, in On Human
Rights: The Oxford Amnesty Lectures, ed. S. Shute and S. Hurley (New
York: Basic Books, 1993), pp. 111-134. See also Rortys Solidarity or
Objectivity, in his Objectivity, Relativism, and Truth (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 21-34.
16
For a development of this criticism, see my Solidarity and Human
Rights, in Philosophical Theory and the United Nations Declaration of
Human Rights, ed. William Sweet (Ottawa: University of Ottawa Press,
2003), pp. 213-231.
17
F.H. Bradley, The Presuppositions of Critical History, ed. with
introduction and commentary by Lionel Rubinoff (Chicago: Quadrangle
Books, 1968), p. 78.
What Remains of Modernity? 135
18
See Bernard Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value
(London, Macmillan, 1912). While Bosanquet was somewhat skeptical of
the discipline of history that history was the doubtful story of successive
events [which] cannot amalgamate with the complete interpretation of social
mind, of art, or of religion (p. 79) his objection was not that history could
not be done. It was that histories when they are understood simply as a
series of contingent events in a narrative ignore the general; they are not a
concrete universal. And so Bosanquet proposes that, rather than concern
ourselves with histories that focus on listing events, we turn to art and
religion, which bring together the particular and the general. Thus, he could
write a history of aesthetic of the development of aesthetic consciousness
in and through particular works of art without being interested in a history
of art itself.
19
Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value, p. 79.
20
Bradleys view, R.G. Collingwood later wrote, was a Copernican
revolution in the theory of historical knowledge. See Collingwood, The
Idea of History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 240.
21
Croce, Teoria e stria della storiografia (Theory and History of
Historiography), tr. Douglas Ainslie (London: George G. Harrap & Co.,
1921).
22
See Croces Philosophy of History, Hibbert Journal, Vol. 19 (1921), pp.
263-278.
23
Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 215.
24
David Boucher, The Significance of R. G. Collingwoods Principles of
History, Journal of the History of Ideas, Vol. 58, No. 2 (1997), pp. 309-
330, at p. 326.
25
Collingwood, The New Leviathan or Man, Society, Civilization, and
Barbarism (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1942), p. 74.
26
Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzuge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik
(Tubingen: JCB Mohr Verlag [Paul Siebeck], 1960); See the English
translation, Truth and Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1975), p. 333.
27
Collingwood, An Essay on Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940),
p. 23.
28
Collingwood, Autobiography, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1939), p. 31.
29
Collingwood, Autobiography, p. 33
30
For claims that Collingwood is adopting a form, of historicism, see Leo
Strauss, On Collingwoods Philosophy of History, Review of Metaphysics,
Vol. 5 (1952), pp. 559-586; Louis O. Mink, Collingwoods Historicism: A
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 136
Dialectic of Process, and Collingwoods Dialectic of History, in Louis O.
Mink, Historical Understanding, ed. Brian Fay, Eugene O. Golob, and
Richard T. Vann (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987), pp. 223-45, 246-
85.
31
See Bernard Bosanquet, Some Suggestions in Ethics (London: Macmillan,
1918), p. 146.
32
See Edward Caird, The Evolution of Theology in the Greek Philosophers,
2 vols. (Glasgow: J. MacLehose, 1904), Vol. 2, p. 125. (Caird is here
discussing Stoicism, in comparison with Kantian ethics.)
33
For a more extensive discussion here, see my Social Policy and
Bosanquets Moral Philosophy, in Collingwood Studies, Vol. VI (1999),
pp. 127-146.
RETHINKING PHILOSOPHY IN AN ORIENTAL WAY
Gholamreza Aavani
The theme Rethinking Philosophy is of utmost importance, because it
concerns directly or indirectly the destiny of philosophy itself and
consequently the destiny of humankind, particularly at this present critical
juncture.
Rethinking is embedded and inherent in the very nature of
philosophy if it is not to turn into a fragile and stereotyped dogma. But the
way or the method of rethinking is particularly important. As a matter of
fact, it is all that matters. So the all important question is: How should we
rethink philosophy? My solution is that we can rethink philosophy in an
oriental way. In my view, this is the only way, or at least, the best way that
can save us from the blind alley that Western philosophy is confronted with
and which as philosophy the West has always ignored.
It is almost a platitude to say that philosophy is a Greek term
meaning the love of Sophia or Wisdom. But the etymological derivation of
this word has come to signify that philosophy is Greek, not only in
nomenclature, but also by birthright. This is what most books on the history
of western philosophy inculcate. The idea perhaps might be traced back to
Aristotle, who sought the origin of every philosophical issue in his Greek
predecessors, whom he considered as crude and presumptuous physilogoi
and estimated himself as the culmination of the philosophical enterprise in
his days. Non-Greeks or Berbers were moreover regarded as below the
dignity of being considered as philosophers. This has been more or less the
attitude of Westerners with regard to philosophy, at least in academic
philosophical circles. Hegel, the father of modem philosophical
historiography and the analogue of Aristotle in our age, could be quoted as
an example. Surveying the whole gamut and vista of philosophy over the
millennia in the eastern lands, whether China, India or Persia, he was not
able to spot a single philosopher, even of a diminutive stature.
The Islamic civilization was the intellectual heir of Greek culture
and civilization. In an unprecedented translation movement, nearly all the
great Greek philosophical and scientific works, together with all their major
commentaries, were translated into Arabic mainly in a famous institution
called Baytal Hikmah or the House of Wisdom. To give but one single
instance of the extent of this translation movement, suffice it here to
mention that all the works of Aristotle (with the possible exception of the
Politics) were translated into Arabic for the first time, and Muslims, in
possession of this vast intellectual treasury, together with the cultural and
intellectual bequest of other civilizations, started to rethink philosophy in a
fresh way. They did not take the philosophical presuppositions of Greek
philosophers for granted or as self-evident. Rethinking Greek philosophy
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 138
profoundly, they came out with new solutions to which we allude for
exemplification to certain instances.
Avicenna (980-1037 CE), one of the great Muslim sage-
philosophers unlike Averroes, known in the Latin West and also by Dante
in his Divine Comedy as the Commentator did not consider Aristotle as
the culmination and the last word in philosophy, although he paid deep
respect to him. He envisaged an alternative system of philosophy, one other
than the Aristotelian, while he was composing his magnum opus Kitab ash-
shifa (translated into Latin as Sufficientia) at the age of forty. In the
prologue of this book, Avicenna makes it clear that he has compiled this
work according to the principles laid down in Peripatetic philosophy. But at
the same time he mentions that he has expounded philosophy
in a manner more consonant with human nature and as dictated by my
express judgment, in which I have not taken into consideration the
views of my partners in this art (i.e., Peripatetic philosophers). Unlike
my other books, I have not been afraid to oppose them. I mean the
book I have written entitled the oriental philosophy. As to the
present book, it is more detailed and elaborate and I have tried to
corroborate the views of my partners in Peripatetic philosophy. But
he who desires to know the truth without any taint and blemish
should consult my other book.
From Avicennas statement, it is evident that he had already, in his maturity,
devised another framework for philosophy which he had designated as
Oriental Philosophy, and had complied a work under the said appellation.
The book is no longer extant but, fortunately, the first part of the book
(which comprises the introduction) has been recently recovered and
published. In the introduction, again Avicenna complains about the bigotry
of those who study philosophy with the eye of fanaticism, desire, habit, and
attachment. He has no hesitation to divulge his differences with the people
instructed in Greek books: We have no fear if we reveal to the
philosophers something other than what we have written for the common
people the common people who have been enamored of the Peripatetic
philosophy and who think that no one has enjoyed the Divine Mercy except
them.
Of course, Avicenna admits that Aristotle had discovered many
things that his teachers and predecessors did not know: he distinguished
between various sciences, he arranged sciences in a better manner than
before, he discovered the truth of many subjects he was superior to those
who came before him; but those who came after him should have brought to
order the confusion in his thought, and should have mended whatever
cracks they found in his structure. Those who came after him could not,
however, transcend what they had inherited from him. Bigotry over
whatever he had not found became a shield, so that they remained bound to
Rethinking Philosophy in an Oriental Way 139
the past and found no opportunity to make use of their intellects. Avicenna
again stresses the point that:
And often we gained knowledge from non-Greek sources. . .. Under
these conditions we longed to write a book containing the important
aspects of real knowledge. Only the person who has thought much,
has meditated deeply and is not devoid of the excellence of
intellectual intuition can make deductions from it. We have composed
this book for ourselves that is for those who are like ourselves. As for
the commoners who have to do with philosophy, we have provided in
the Kitab al-Shifa more than they need ... soon in the supplement we
shall present whatever is suitable for them beyond that which they
have seen up to this time. And in all conditions we seek the assistance
of the Unique God.
Fantastic guesswork has been done by good orientalists who were not as
good philosophers about identifying the nature and substance of Avicennas
Oriental Philosophy. L. Gauthier, identifies it with Tassawuf (Sufism)
which he calls la tendance mystique de lorient. A.M. Goichon identifies
it with the medical school of Gundishapur and its connection with
experimental tendencies. L. Gardet considers it a more Pythagorean
Platonic, Plotinian and less Aristotleian strand in Avicennas philosophy.
Pines, more justly pinpoints the arbitration of Avicenna between the oriental
and occidental philosophers in his non-extant work Kitab al-Insaf (The
Book of Equitable Arbitration), which was pillaged among other works of
Avicenna during the sack of Isfahan by the Ghaznavid emperor Mahmud,
and which concerned adjudication regarding thousands of philosophical
issues at odds between orientals and the occidentals.
Henry Corbin and Seyyed Hossein Nasr, more aptly consider the
word Oriental to be a symbolic term signifying the realm of light rather
than just a geographical designation. The orient (Sharq) symbolically
alludes, and is etymologically related, to Ishraq (illumination) and hence
signifies the orient of light. It means a fleeing away from the prison of
sense and matter, of the journeying toward the realm of the spirit and the
Divine. A close study of the later works of Avicenna corroborates this view
and reveals that oriental philosophy is not a ratiocinative, abstract
thinking, but it is more bolstered by a sort of enlightenment, unveiling or
intellectual intuition, akin to what we find in Eastern traditions.
A more glorious instance is Suhrawardi (1153-1191 CE), the
founder of the famous school of Illumination (Hikmah al-Ishraq) which, as
we said, is symbolically connected with the east or the orient of light, just as
the West, where the sun sets, is symbol of spiritual darkness. Suhrawardi
has written many works and treatises in which he has expounded both the
essentials and the details of the oriental philosophy both in Arabic and in
Persian, his mother tongue. His most famous book in oriental philosophy is
The Philosophy of Illumination (Hikmah al-Ishraq), which can also be
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 140
rendered as The Philosophy of Orientals, which might be considered a
continuation and the culmination of Avicennas oriental philosophy. Here
we shall point out some of the most essential features of the illuminationist
school of Suhrawardi as laid down in his Hikmah al-Ishraq. The first point
to be mentioned with regard to Suhrewardis conception of Hikmah
(translated as philosophy, but also meaning sagacity and wisdom, and
equivalent of the Greek Sophia) is that it surpasses the bounds of apace
and time. As against the Aristotelian conception, it is neither Eastern nor
Western. Each seeker after truth has a share in the Divine light which is
Hikmah. Everyone who exerts himself to attain it, shall have a taste of it. It
is not the monopoly of a single race, nation or community, otherwise the
gate of the Divine Mercy would be closed. God, the bestower of knowledge
and wisdom is not so stingy as to deprive certain people of His eternal
bounty. The worst age is the one in which the itinerary of thoughts has
been cut off and the gate of revelations has been closed.
Suhrawardi again has a new theory with regard to the development
of the history of philosophy which itself reveals another aspect of his
Ishraqi (illuminationist) wisdom. Philosophy was revealed by God to
mankind through the prophet Hermes (identified with the prophet Enoch in
Judaism and Christianity and with the prophet Idris in Islam). This wisdom
was then divided into two branches: one going to Persia and the East and
the other was bequeathed to Egypt and thence to the Greece and the West.
These two sources that is the East and the West exemplified by Greece
and Persia finally merged together in the Islamic philosophy. Among the
Western sages he mentions Hermes, Agathedemon (Seth), Asclepius,
Pythagoras, some of the pre-Socratics, Empedocles, Socrates, Plato and
Aristotle. Among the Eastern sages he names certain Persian priest-kings
such as Kayumarth, Furaydun, Kai Khusraw, and, strangely enough, the
Buddha. Among the Muslim sages he classifies the well-known
philosophers such as Farabi and Avicenna who occupy a secondary rank
compared to such great mystics as Bayazid Bastami, Hallaj, Junayd and
Abu Sahl Tustari.
A second feature of illuminationist philosophy is its emphasis on
symbolism. The truth cannot be conveyed except through signs and symbols
(ramz). Symbolism is the language of being itself. Ramz can also be
construed as an allusion. The procedure of the master of philosophy and
the Imam of wisdom, the Divine Plato, was the same and the sages who
preceded him like Hermes, the father of philosophy, followed the same
path. Since the sages of the past, because of the ignorance of the masses
expressed their sayings in secret symbols and the refutations made against
them have concerned the exterior of these sayings, not their real intentions.
Suhrawardi vehemently reprimands Aristotle for not
comprehending the real significance of these symbols and for having
reduced them to their literal and outward meaning.
A third feature of illuminationist philosophy is the construal of
being as light. According to Suhrawardi, all reality is nothing but light
Rethinking Philosophy in an Oriental Way 141
which possesses various degrees of intensity. It needs no definition, for to
define is to explicate the less evident by the more evident and nothing is
more evident than light. light is evident by itself and by manifesting makes
every thing evident. Needless to say the ontology of light is a true
phenomenology and evades such abstract concepts as the secondary
intelligibles. According to Suhrawardi, the phenomenology of light had
been at the core of the sacred doctrines of the ancient sages.
Another main feature of Suhrawardis oriental philosophy is that it
has vertical and longitudinal rather than horizontal and latitudinal
dimensions. In other words, it is hierarchical in the sense that some kinds of
philosophy are superior in worth and dignity than others. The best kind of
philosophy is the one based on direct intellectual intuition or sapiential
wisdom based on the formal training of the soul. It is founded on direct
intellectual vision, contemplation and spiritual illumination; hence it cannot
be destroyed by the doubts of skeptics.
Following Plato, he calls this sapiential wisdom theosis (Taalluh)
and the possessor of such wisdom a theosopher (Hakim mutalliha), He,
moreover, includes all the eastern sages and most of the Presocratics in this
category, but also the semimythical ancient Persian kings such as Jamasp,
Farshaushtar, Buzurgmehr and others. But strangely enough his list
comprises all the great sufi saints of Islam which means that for Suhrawardi
authentic Sufism, which is based on direct intellectual vision of reality and
on purification of the soul and ultimate illumination and union, is a pure
oriental metaphysics.
Next in the hierarchy of philosophers are the adherents of
Peripatetic philosophy. Peripateticism is a kind of discursive philosophy,
based on ratiocination and conceptual abstraction and on deductive
inference. It is not based on direct intellectual vision. The master of this
kind of discursive philosophy is Aristotle, and his followers in Islam Farabi
and Avicenna. Suhrawardi blames Aristotle for having reduced the
sapiential theosis of his master Plato to pure ratiocination and discursive
philosophy. For Suhrawardi, the philosopher par excellence is Plato who
has merged into a unique synthesis both the intuitive and the discursive
philosophy. He claims that he has done the same synthesis in Islamic
philosophy.
This latter distinction between the intuitive ( la Suhrawardi) and
the discursive is very significant for rethinking philosophy in an oriental
manner. The sapiential wisdom is not based on ratiocination and
conceptualization alone, but it is primarily based on spiritual realization,
direct inner intellectual disclosure. If philosophy is the search after truth, it
should ultimately end in the realization of the truth and that is what is
underlined in all traditional schools of oriental philosophy. But we should at
the same time bear in mind that, for Suhrawardi, this oriental philosophy
does not merely have geographical significance. We should not forget that
Plato for him was the master of oriental philosophy.
If Aristotle and Hegel deprived the non-Greeks and Easterners from
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 142
having tasted the flavor of philosophy, this would mean that they have had a
very narrow conception of philosophy and have reduced philosophy to its
discursive connotation. But if we take the sapiential philosophy based on
direct intellectual intuition and spiritual illumination and the science of
realization, then we can see all its luminaries in the East: in China, in India,
in Japan, in Korea, in Persia. But if we take philosophy in the pure
deductive, syllogistic, discursive and ratiocinative sense, then we could say
it started in Greece and continued in its cultural inheritor, that is Europe.
Discursive philosophy, if not bolstered by the sapiential wisdom, will end in
skepticism. Moreover knowledge of the deeper realities, such as knowledge
of the Self, of the ultimate reality, knowledge of the universal principles, of
the Absolute, of the Atma, is only possible through sapiential wisdom;
Discursive philosophy only roams far aroud them, but is never able to
attain.
Islamic philosophy continued the path delineated by Suhrawardi,
and its illustrious career could boast of such great sage philosophers as
Mulla Sadra, whose philosophical system called al-Hikmah-aIMuta aliyah
was the culmination of the unique synthesis between the ratiocinative and
sapiential philosophy.
The lesson which Suhrawardi has to teach us is a total revision in
our conception of philosophy. The history of philosophy in the West has
been a gradual distancing from the sapiential wisdom even in its Greek
phase. We see this decline even in one generation and its total denigration
by the Sophists. One might see certain glimpses of philosophy in the
medieval sages, but had Suhrawardi been alive to see the flourishing of
modem philosophy, he would have seen the correctness of his hypothesis
that philosophy not propped by sapiential wisdom would end in skepticism
and in nihilism. He would have seen most of the great achievements of
modem philosophy as trivial, not being based on the search and the
realization of the truth.
We saw Suhrawardi mentioning the Buddha among the great sages
of oriental wisdom. Had he lived longer he was martyred at the age of 37
to study the Indian and Chinese classics such as the Upanishads and the
Tao Te Ching, he would again have been much amazed at the depth,
plenitude and richness of their sapiential wisdom and he would be more
confirmed in his hypothesis that true sapiential wisdom has been and if
not harassed by the torrential skepticism of the West is still oriental.
Iranian Institute of Philosophy
Teheran
ORDINARY LANGUAGE ANALYSIS AND AFRICAN
PHILOSOPHY: SOME COMMENTS ON METHOD
Moses k
The systematic analysis of ordinary, everyday language use in culture can
significantly consolidate and enlarge philosophical traditions. This is
universalizable to all cultures of the world; it is not applicable to just non-
Western, particularly, African cultures.
1
Since language is acknowledged as a vehicle of culture, and
philosophy is definable as the systematic critique of cultures, the analysis of
language use in a culture will provide a philosophically valuable means of
examining the wisdom and life of the people in that culture. It will also
make it possible to describe a distinctive philosophical tradition for that
culture, especially where it is a traditional culture. This is moreso when it
is realized that a peoples languages, beliefs, practices and institutions are
invariably intertwined into what is known as their culture (that is, their
comprehensive design for living).
There is no doubt, therefore, that through a systematic analysis of a
peoples language, we may come to have a critical understanding of their
culture. However, there is a strong need to be cautious in using this method
as it could be inappropriately employed in specific contexts. The comments
in this paper are not on the method in itself, but on its operational prospects
and difficulties in particular cultures, using the Yorb culture as an
example. The main objective of this paper is to clear some of the obstacles
in the way of an optimally productive use of Barry Hallens proposed
linguistic approach, and indicate as he himself proposes a line of future
research.
2
In Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft and in The Good, The Bad,
and The Beautiful,
3
Barry Hallens consistent interest is in intercultural
studies, especially intercultural translation
4
. Hence, he makes a concerted
effort to find a pattern for making a distinction between m and gbgb
in Yorb language discourse along the lines of a distinction between
know and believe in English language discourse.
5
In this, and in many
other issues, the contributions of Hallen are immensely valuable. It is in
view of these contributions that Hallen, though an American citizen, is an
eminent African philosopher, in the strictest sense of that label.
6
Hallen has, also consistently, sought to use the phenomenological
approach in the philosophical study of the Yorb culture
7
. The ordinary
language method, which he has used in the two works cited above, is a
species of the phenomenological approach. It is important, however, to
recall that Anglophone ordinary language philosophers have always had
a
vast repertoire of centuries-old theories of professional academic (and
practical) philosophers as well as long traditions of commentaries on those
theories and philosophers against and within which they sought to practice
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 144
their kind of analysis. The problems and issues considered philosophically
significant in Anglophone cultures have been extensively mapped out and
discussed from various perspectives over several centuries. There was
therefore never a need for any of the analysts to go outside the universe of
academic philosophy for generating problems or distinctions to treat. Also,
the Anglophone ordinary language philosophers never needed to consult
an established translation manual (etm)
8
or some alleged sages
9
of the
cultures that they chose to analyse. Rather, they depended on their personal
mastery of the English language and individual analytical competence, such
as Austins elevated insights into the nature of certain forms of expression
in the English language.
10
This was not what Hallen did or could have done
with respect to the materials for analysis in the Yorb language culture.
Given the nascence of academic Yoruba philosophy, Hallen could
not have had the luxury of an armchair or on-campus conceptual analyst in
his application of the analytic method to Yorb concepts. Hence, he had to
go the extra phenomenological length to interrogate the culture in order to
discover some of what it contains. Hallen chose the onsgn as his point
of cultural interrogation on the concepts of knowledge and value in Yorb
culture. This choice constitutes a major part of the operational issues about
which to be cautious.
If Hallen were to undertake a similar study on the concepts of
knowledge and value in English language culture, he will certainly not
make the medical professionals (as he did with the onsgn Yorb
traditional healers, masters of medicine, herbalists, or (today) alternative
medical doctors
11
his target group or primary (nay, sole) source of
information about the ordinary uses of those concepts. It is also noteworthy
that Austin and other English ordinary language philosophers did not have
recourse to interpreters or translators in their analysis of philosophical
concepts in ordinary English usage. Similarly, they did not have to go to
some illiterate English-speaking villagers to learn how words were used, or
were to be used, in English. On the other hand, Ludwig Wittgenstein
although he lived virtually all his university life in Britain (as Hallen
almost did in Nigeria), and practiced conceptual analysis there did not
seek the services of English interpreters or sages to facilitate his work.
Rather, he worked with his native German language and culture, aided by
the competence that he had acquired in English language and culture. In that
way, he did not need an interpreter either, and he also did not require the
intervention of any group or groups of German, Austrian, or English, sages
to facilitate his work. The upshot of this is that the ideal use of the method
of ordinary language analysis requires that the analyst belong to the culture
and be a regular, conscious and competent primary user of the language
concerned, in the way that African professional philosophers use either
English or French language, and have become immersed in the
corresponding culture. Hallens use of the method of ordinary language
analysis in the works under reference cannot be said to have satisfied these
minimum requirements. The use of an interpreter reinforces the feeling that
Ordinary Language Analysis and African Philosophy 145
Sodipo, Hallens Yorb co-author of Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft,
either did not participate in the fieldwork
12
or did not wish to claim
sufficient competence in his own language as he claimed of English.
Otherwise, the research would have been less problematically conducted in
his dialect area of Yorb land, where the researchers would not have
needed an interpreter.
The use of an interpreter, rather than help, could only have
complicated matters for Hallen in his bid to get to the mind of his Yorb
discussants.
In ordinary Yorb language usage, the problematic
epistemological know-believe distinction probably does not exist as such.
In most cases, where gbgb or gbgb is correctly used, m or m
is either uncalled for as contrast, or will come to mean the same (and so be
superfluous), or will become extra-ordinary. This is why for a person
supremely fluent in the Yoruba language, Hallens questions to the
onsgn were not the sort of questions he could have asked and expected
to have been taken seriously
13
. His use of the method, as he had done, will
undoubtedly be appropriate and productive if we were concerned with
special (technical, extra-ordinary) usages of the language such as in
divination (If), folk science (gn), religious worship (sn) and ritual
(tt). In these cases, there are identifiable acknowledged specialists and
masters of the appropriate language use and practices who have to be
consulted for education and information in their respective fields. These are
babalwo (diviners/If priests), olgn (folk scientists, including herbalists
and native doctors (onsgn)), ols (deity devotees) and elgb (cultists),
respectively. Apart from their alleged professional knowledge in their fields,
the onsgn do not possess any special training, knowledge or wisdom as a
class to qualify them for the privileged role of philosophical discussants and
informants of the race on correct ordinary language usage such as Hallen
has given to them. Outside their occupational or professional settings, the
onsgn are not specialists in the Yoruba language relative to other Yoruba
persons or groups of them, such as to qualify them to be regarded as
colleagues, wise men, and satisfactory equivalents of the academic
philosopher.
14
The reason why the local people in Hallens area of
research
15
recommended the onsgn was precisely because they
mistakenly believed that Hallen was after the special knowledge of the
onsgn (to wit, gn).
16
Also, if ordinary language is ordinary language,
Hallen would certainly have done a more analytic experiment if he had
sought information about correct usage in everyday discourse from ordinary
folk in everyday contexts and walks of life. What he went to the village to
do could have been done more profitably and methodologically less
controversially if he had organized discussion meetings among various
Yorb people from diverse fields, areas and backgrounds. This would have
been a kind of focus-group discussion, akin to Austins weekly discussion
meetings in Oxford.
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 146
In Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, Hallens inquiries targeted
what the components or elements of knowledge (m) were thought to be by
the Yorb
17
(such as belief, truth, and justification, in English). In
doing this, Hallen must have believed that he was engaging in some sort of
philosophical dialogue
18
with Yorb culture. As it appears, he seems to
have structured the discussion with the onsgn in line with his supposition
that there might exist in Yorb language discourse a distinction between
m and gbgb similar to the distinction between knowledge and belief in
English.
19
The following question is important and worth asking. If the
onsgn made a mistake in their accounts or prescriptions of the correct use
of a term, how was the researcher to have known or to have pointed it out to
them? In the case of Austins weekly meetings, that was not likely to have
been a problem because the interrogators and the discussants were equally
masters of the language and did not restrict their enquiries to any one
professional or social group of English-speaking people gratuitously
regarded as experts or the wise ones in the language-culture. This problem
manifests at many points in Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, especially in
the several glaringly incorrect (not indeterminate) interpretations and
translations of the onsgns responses to Hallens questions. It is also
important to ask if the onsgn were always unanimous in their responses
to Hallens prompts, or whether they and Hallen ever disagreed on any
relevant issue in the course of their discussions.
Given the manner of his approach to the onsgn, they must have
been thoroughly and understandably flattered, and have wanted to impress
him (the white university professor of wisdom) by responding
appropriately to his prompts, even if they could not see either the point or
the wider links of the distinction he was trying to establish in ordinary
language Yorb discourse. The approach of the researcher to both the
local population and the onsgn must have been sufficiently ambiguous
and vague, or at least not really understood by the people, so as to have
misled them on the recommendations they made, especially when we
consider the generally very low level of Western education and familiarity
with academic discourse in a typical African village. If the researcher had
sought the opinion of the local people about those who understood, or
were deep in the language (wn t gbd, or wn t jinl nn
Yorb), or those who knew the wisdom of the Yorb (wn t m
gb Yorb), the most likely idea that will occur to the average Yorb
person is that some special persons with extra-ordinary powers and abilities,
rather than ordinary language competence, were intended. This is because
gbd, jinl, and mgb are not cognitively neutral expressions; they
elicit in the thought of the average Yorb something special, uncommon
and un-ordinary. It is not surprising, therefore, that the local people
recommended the onsgn, who they regarded as possessing some kind of
secret, esoteric or mysterious knowledge of nature. This however does not
make them, qua onsgn, masters of the Yorb language or culture. To
Ordinary Language Analysis and African Philosophy 147
regard them, simpliciter, as masters of correct ordinary use of the language,
therefore, might be methodologically less than appropriate.
The extra effort which Hallen has had to make to try and justify his
research method
20
indicates his own dissatisfaction with, or reservations
about, the method or of the appropriateness of his use of it. However,
Hallen deserves credit for proposing the approach and for testing it in a
particular African culture. He deserves credit even more so when it is
realized that many Africans who are professional philosophers have not
done as much, if anything, for the development of African philosophy as he
has done.
21
A philosophers approach, such as Hallen proposes, to a traditional
culture requires, as a necessary condition, a firm grounding in the culture in
question. The essential aspects of this grounding are (i) a mastery of the
language of the culture in question, (ii) a full participatory immersion in the
culture, and (iii) a routine conscious working use of the language of the
culture. In this regard, Africans who are philosophers need not bemoan their
training and upbringing in European languages and cultures. All they need
do is to get back, or move forward, to being as competent in their native
languages as many of them are in those European languages, and as
knowledgeable and participatory in their own cultures as many of them are
in those European cultures. Then, they will be at a great cultural and
philosophical advantage over their European and American counterparts,
who are usually not well situated (even though many of them try very
conscientiously) to master African languages and be sufficiently
participatory in African cultures as many African intellectuals have had to
be in European languages and cultures.
Hallens analytical experiments in Yorb philosophy must be
seen, therefore, as a great challenge to African professional philosophers,
especially those of the Yorb language-culture. They can become analytic
philosophers of their own culture if they adopt the method of ordinary
language analysis, provided they are not either linguistically or culturally
deficient. It is possible that the outcome of the investigations of such
Yorb analytic philosophers will challenge part of Hallens findings, thus
engendering further critical interest in analytic Yorb philosophy. Hallen
himself expects this much when he says: these conclusions are
incomplete (not indeterminate). Many interesting comparisons between the
two systems remain to be made.
22
Hallen would then have succeeded
finally in providing a universally viable alternative method for doing
credible contemporary African philosophy.
Finally, it has to be remarked that, since the application of Austins
kind of elevated insights is required for the proper analysis of concepts in
any language, only those who have the requisite linguistic skill, cultural
immersion and philosophical competence can hope to do satisfactory
ordinary language analysis in any language or culture. The special (rare)
kind of insights required here cannot be imported through an interpreter
who himself/herself might lack it, as in the case of Hallens undergraduate
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 148
student-interpreter. Neither can the onsgn be necessarily credited with
such insights, or the activation of such insights in others, since knowing
medicine
23
does not entail expertise or privileged competence in the use or
analysis of ordinary language. Neither does knowledge of medicine place
any one in any culture at a level of understanding and analysis of life
and thought that is more critically sophisticated than that of the ordinary
person.
24
Philosophically, as far as anyone can reasonably expect, however,
Barry Hallen has done the best that an alien genuinely interested in an
African culture can do under the circumstances.
What remains to perfect Hallens procedure is the philosophers
personal sharpness of his eye and ear for very fine nuances
25
in Yorb,
or any other African language. For this reason, Africans in professional
philosophy, who are competent primary users of their respective languages
and are ideally intimate with their cultures, should take up the challenge and
the cue that Hallen has given to them. As they are the best suited to do it,
they should become committed to philosophical analyses of concepts in
their respective cultures and conceptual schemes, for both practical and
theoretical purposes.
26
What Hallen has initiated in the Yorb context is collaboration
between scholar and producer of culture.
27
Such an inquiry, which is a
prerequisite for critique,
28
will, however, be enhanced if it is undertaken as
multidisciplinary experiments involving linguistically and culturally well-
positioned philosophers, linguists, sociologists, artists and other relevantly
knowledgeable persons among who may be onsgn.
Obafemi Awolowo University,
Ile-Ife. Nigeria
NOTES
1
B. Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful: Discourse about Values
in Yoruba Culture (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press,
2000), p. 1.
2
B. Hallen and J. O. Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic
Experiments in African Philosophy, (London: Ethnographica, 1987), p. 9.
3
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 1.
4
M. k, Modeling the Contemporary African Philosopher: Kwasi Wiredu
in Focus, in O. Oladipo (ed.) The Third Way in African Philosophy: Essays
in Honour of Kwasi Wiredu (Ibadan, Nigeria: Hope Publications, 2003), pp.
19 -35.
5
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 8.
6
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, and Hallen, The
Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful.
Ordinary Language Analysis and African Philosophy 149
7
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 39.
8
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 39.
9
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 8.
10
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 11.
11
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 11.
12
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 7, where he says: Of
course, Femi was with me throughout all of this and p. 10, where he says;
in my discussions with the onsgn. For I was relying upon them to
explain to me (Emphases are mine). The use of the first person limiting
personal pronoun referring to Hallen as the sole researcher, with Femi, his
interpreter, is all over the texts. Moreover, Sodipo would not have referred
to his own native language Yoruba as an alien language, or speak of any
of its concepts as an alien theoretical term, etc. (p. 39).
13
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 7.
14
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, pp. 8, 11.
15
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, pp. 5-6; Ijan Ekiti is a
small remote Yorb village inhabited mostly by illiterate old people with
little or no formal education or exposure to academic life.
16
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 13; and Hallen,
The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 7.
17
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 39; and Hallen,
The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 7.
18
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 5.
19
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, p. 7; and Hallen and
Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 13.
20
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, pp. 11-13; and
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, pp. 10-11.
21
For references to some of his major publications in African Philosophy,
see M. k, Modeling the Contemporary African Philosopher, pp. 28-29.
22
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 39.
23
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 13.
24
Hallen and Sodipo, Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft, p. 39.
25
G. J. Warnock, English Philosophy Since 1900 (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1966), p. 97. Also, Anders Wedberg, A History of
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 150
Philosophy, Volume 3 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), pp. 315-316.
26
Hallen, The Good, The Bad, and The Beautiful, pp. 34 -35.
27
I. Karp & D. A. Masolo, (Ed.) African Philosophy As Cultural Inquiry
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, and Edinburgh: Edinburgh
University Press Ltd; 1994), p. 13.
28
Karp and Masolo, (Ed.) African Philosophy As Cultural Inquiry, p. 13.
A WAR ON DISTRUST:
REINVENTING THE MODE OF TOGETHERNESS IN AN AGE OF
CONFLICT
Donny Gahral Adian
After the 9/11 catastrophe, the moral face of the globe has changed.
Relationships among nations are increasingly colored by prejudices and
stereotypes in particular, prejudices and stereotypes obstructing
relationships between the West and those in Middle East and parts of Asia.
Those prejudices and stereotypes are being concretized in terms such as the
axis of evil, the war on terror, weapons of mass destruction, and so on.
These terms are being used by the West, especially the United States, to
generalize about some states in the Middle East, saying that they are
terrorist nests which pose an imminent threat to national and international
security. On the other hand, some Middle Eastern nations also show a deep
distrust of any kind of diplomacy proposed by the United Nations, including
its humanitarian-oriented diplomacy. They suspect that there is a hidden
agenda at the very root of that diplomacy. That hidden agenda is suspected
as promoting the interests mainly the economic and ideological interests
of the United States.
At this time, there seems to be little mutual trust or cooperation.
The climate of prejudice and stereotyping has blocked the very conditions
for symmetrical trust. The prejudices backed by eachs national interests
create a particular mode of togetherness called the us/them mode of
togetherness. This is a mode of togetherness which negates any possibility
of cooperation. In this paper, I will explore the root of this deep mutual
distrust among nations resulting in continuing conflict, both potential and
actual. First, I would like to explain the idea of precautionary principle in
international relations. Second, I would like to relate that idea to what I call
social trap, Finally, a new mode of togetherness has to be developed to
prevent that social trap. In this case, I introduce something called authentic
we-ness as a new mode of togetherness in international relations.
SUSTAINED DISTRUST
International relations can be divided into two major phenomena: harmony
and discord. It is harmony when a states policies automatically aid the
attainment of one anothers goals. It is harmony when bargaining is not
required since there are no conflicting interests. The relationship changes
into discord when a states policies hinder the attainment of another states
goals, and there is no incentive to change behavior.
There is third alternative called cooperation. In cooperation,
policies or actions of different states are brought into conformity through a
process of policy coordination. The possibility of cooperation requires that
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 152
each state will change its behavior toward the others. It is founded in the
strong belief that cooperation will maximize each others benefits. This,
however, is a difficult task to be accomplished in a world that has changed
radically since 9/11. States have made national security the top priority. It is
more advantageous to distrust others than not. Trusting others is a risky
foreign policy that might create another unprecedented catastrophe.
We have come into what I call a climate of distrust in the world.
An address by former President George W. Bush at the West Point military
academy gives us a lucid illustration. He said, if we wait for threats to fully
materialize, we will have waited too long. I believe it is essential that when
we see a threat, we deal with those threats before they become imminent.
1
In other words, Bush proposed a worst-case scenario foreign policy or, to
put it in simple words: Better safe than sorry.
This scenario rests upon a principle called the precautionary
principle. The precautionary principle takes many forms. Despite these
variants, the basic idea is that the regulator should take steps to protect
against potential harm, even if causal chains are unclear and even if the
chances of the materialization of harm are unknown. There are two basic
reasons why the precautionary principle is worthy of sustained attention.
First, it provides the foundation for intensely pragmatic debates about
danger, fear and security. Second, the precautionary principle raises a host
of theoretically fascinating questions about individual and social decision-
making under conditions of risk and uncertainty.
2
Based on the precautionary principle, the object of uncertainty must
be found. In this case, the United States simply could not search elsewhere
than in some nations in the Middle East which, it thought, most probably
posed terrorist threats to its national security. That probability was not the
result of scientific calculations, but certain historical stereotypes in the
minds of American policy makers. Those stereotypes were responsible for
blocking any information challenging the existence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq.
What former President Bush said about the condition of uncertainty
was certainly a subjective possibility. It was advantageous to distrust Iraq
due to its recent history and, most of all, its being a Moslem country. The
United States, however, has its own history. Its double standard concerning
the conflict between Israel and Palestine has created suspicion among
Middle Eastern nations. That is allegedly why Iraq denied the UNs request
for inspections related to the existence of weapons of mass destruction. It
suspected a hidden agenda behind the UNs actions an agenda it thought
to be that of the United States.
Both sides were trapped in mutual distrust. For them, it was more
advantageous to distrust than to trust, considering eachs national interests.
However, was it truly advantageous to distrust one another and be in a
cautionary relationship at that time? The answer was that it was not. It has
ended up that the United States has lost thousands of soldiers and Iraq has
beem torn apart by civil war and insurgencies.
A War on Distrust 153
Following the violent conflict between the United States and Iraq,
the climate of distrust among global actors has increased. The climate of
distrust creates an institutionalized conflict among nations. Conflict is
institutionalized when distrust has become the ruling norm in international
relations. Conflict, not cooperation, becomes the pattern of behavior among
nations. Shadowed by the climate of distrust, this pattern of conflict will
continue. It will stay that way until each nation puts an end to their
sustainable distrust.
In this climate of distrust, nations are falling into a social trap.
Before we move on this important subject, it is necessary to clarify the
notion of social trap. The notion of social trap was invented by the
psychologist John Platt
3
. It is an umbrella term for a number of strategic
situations in which social actors find themselves. In this situation, their
behavior is determined by their assessment of the future actions of others.
The logic of the social trap can be described as follows:
1. Everyone wins if everyone chooses to cooperate
2. But if people cannot trust that almost everyone else will
cooperate, it is meaningless to choose to cooperate, because the end is
contingent on cooperation by almost everyone else.
3. Non-cooperation is rational when people do not trust that others
will also cooperate.
4. Conclusion: efficient cooperation for common purposes can come
about only if people trust that most other people will also choose to
cooperate.
5. Lacking that trust, the social trap will slam inexorably shut. That is,
we end up in a state of affairs that is worse for everyone, even though
everyone realizes that they would profit by choosing to cooperate.
In terms of cooperation, the social trap entails two important
problems. First, actors in a situation where there are options of
cooperation or non-cooperation may end up in a situation that is most
disadvantageous to them all. The parties involved might fall into certain
pathological situations without any of them having intended the result. This
happens simply by mistake when something that actually is an attempt to
cooperate is misunderstood by the counterpart perceiving the action as
deceitful or threatening, and the matter escalates into a social trap. Second,
the term trap in social trap refers to the fact that once a group, society
or organization has fallen into it, the escape route is difficult to find.
Escaping from a social trap requires people who have developed deep
mistrust over a long time to begin to trust each other and abandon memories
of past deceitful behavior of the other group.
It must be noted that the actors in a social trap situation are not
mathematically naive. They are not perfectly informed, strictly rational,
unbiased actors, but real political actors having incomplete information and
limited knowledge of their interlocutor. Nations reflect the behaviors of
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 154
political actors. If political actors are moved by their self-interest, nations
are moved by their national interest. Political actors are moved by self-
interest alone and use instrumental modes of rationality to further that
interest. Consideration of other values is neglected. What matters the most
is promoting ones self-interest effectively. The same logic works for
nations. What matters the most is a nations national interest and how to
promote it effectively. In this new climate of distrust, the incentive to
cooperate is low. As a result, most nations are falling into social traps.
The inability to trust one another is caused by how the image of the
other appears in the mind of the policy makers. The shaping of an image of
another is determined by variables, such as personal knowledge about the
individuals in question, and culturally or ideologically-determined
stereotypes or memories of how the actors have acted in similar situations in
the past
4
. In the mind of the western policy makers and political actors, the
image of Middle Eastern nations has been polluted by stereotypes such as
terrorist nest, home of fundamentalism, breeding ground of radicals,
and so on. These images have blocked the minds of policy makers from any
positive information about that region. Unfortunately, it is the acceptance of
positive information that might actually change the climate of distrust
among nations after the 9/11 catastrophe.
The inability to trust one another is also caused by domestic
political interests. What we understand as a social trap is very much related
to domestic politics. Domestic political entrepreneurs often build their
power by manipulating our knowledge or memories of the behavior of other
groups as having been treacherous. What they are doing is selling their
foreign policy grounded on manipulated memory. That kind of political
marketing is necessary to get votes. Domestic political actors also often
choose to concentrate on negative information about the other groups
intentions. This is frequently done to justify their foreign policy. This was
done by American policy makers in the lead up to the war in Iraq. By
manipulating evidence about Iraqs weapons programs, American policy
makers justified a pre-emptive strike.
THE U.S.-IRAQ (UNDER SADDAM) SOCIAL TRAP
IRAQ (under Saddam)
U.S.
Trust
Distrust
Trust
(x, y)
(x-3, y)
Distrust
(x, y-3)
(x-2, y-2)
A War on Distrust 155
According to the above matrix, the ideal solution for shared benefit is
trusting each other (x,y). However, due to the absence of trust, the parties
got themselves into a disadvantageous situation (x-2, y-2). This is said to be
the inevitable consequence of the rational behavior of political actors in a
social trap situation. It leads to the question whether global political actors
can ever escape from a social trap and engage in a mutually advantageous
relationship. The answer, I believe, lies in the mode of togetherness that
creates perpetual conflict among global political actors. In other words, we
need to think about a new mode of togetherness which is not mutually
exclusive and entraps actors in a situation of perpetual conflict.
TRANSLUCENCY AND THE NEW MODE OF TOGETHERNESS
As we can see, sustainable distrust produces a loss rather than a benefit. The
remaining question is how to end that sustainable distrust responsible for
social traps. How do we assure policy makers around the globe that
cooperation is far more beneficial than the opposite strategy. Without that,
the option not to cooperate will always look more reasonable.
Nations can be understood as agents motivated by self-interest.
David Gauthier, for example, differentiates between straightforward
maximizers and constrained maximizers.
5
Straightforward maximizers only
take into account the others strategies. To take into account the others
strategies is to act in accordance with the ways in which you expect the
other will act. Constrained maximizers, however, consider both the others
strategy and utility. To take account of the others utility is to consider how
she will fare as a result of your action, and allow that to affect how you act.
Consider recent American foreign policy. The United States acted
as a straightforward maximizer when it considered that the Iraqi strategy
would be to hide the truth about the location of any weapons of mass
destruction. The only option for the United States, then, was to launch a pre-
emptive strike to protect itself. The United States had neglected the benefit
of trusting Iraq and considering how a pre-emptive strike wiould create
disutility for Iraq. The United States could have prevented that from
happening by acting as a constrained maximizer. It could have considered
Iraqs utility and chosen to cooperate for a long-term benefit. In other
words, the United States could have constrained the maximization of its
own utility (national security) by adopting the principle of morality. The
principle of morality, in this case, is different from the principle of utility.
Whereas the principle of utility focuses on utility maximization or expected
utility maximization, the principle of morality focuses on rational judgment
of preference based on impartial and unbiased criteria
6
.
Nations should act cooperatively with each other. However, in a
social trap situation that is unlikely to happen. To cooperate, each nation
must believe that the others are disposed towards cooperation. Nations as
agents must be able to assure themselves of the intentions of others in order
to constrain their behavior. The United States, however, would not
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 156
cooperate until it was assured that Iraq would not lie concerning the
existence of its weapons. Iraq also would not cooperate until it was assured
that the UN observers would be neutral and independent of the U.S. agenda.
What is needed for cooperation is translucency.
7
Translucency is a
cognitive assumption that the others disposition, while not entirely
transparent, is also not entirely hidden. It is assumed that agents might be
able to discern the true disposition of the other. It is not a guaranteed
disclosure, but it is better than guesswork. Translucency is an assumption
that discriminates between the straightforward maximizer and the
constrained one. The straightforward maximizer focuses only on negative
information. The constrained maximizer, however, tries to determine the
true motives of the other by suspending all stereotyped judgments.
There are two important results of translucency. First, it gives us a
criterion by which we can decide whether to trust others, by allowing us to
judge whether they have disposed themselves to be cooperative. Second, it
gives us a reason to be trustworthy ourselves, for if others can see us well
enough to be able to ascertain whether we have disposed ourselves to
cooperativeness, then the benefits of cooperation will available to us only if
in fact we are to be constrained maximizers. There are two criteria of
trustworthiness entailed by translucency. The first is our willingness to
suspend our stereotyped judgments. Through this kind of willingness, others
will develop trust and be disposed to act so that they can be trusted. The
second is the others disposition to disclose herself in terms of her true
motives. This disposition allows the opposite party to accept new
information that leads to cooperation rather than conflict.
The phenomenon of the social trap placed the United States and
Iraq in a situation of conflict. The conflict was sustained by eachs
stereotypes about the other. The conflict had blinded both to the long term
benefits of a peaceful relationship. They would have avoided catastrophe if
they had adopted translucency in their policies. In fact, we would have had a
different story if they had disposed themselves to trust and be trusted. For,
in such a situation, both states would have tried very hard to determine the
true disposition of their counterpart, and so both would try to be trustworthy
in the eye of the other. The result is illustrated in the following matrix:
IRAQ (under Saddam)
U.S.
Trust (plus
translucency)
Distrust (minus
translucency)
Trust (plus translucency)
(x, y)
(x-3, y)
Distrust (minus
translucency)
(x, y-3)
(x-2, y-2)
A War on Distrust 157
What translucency means is that we not discount anothers
disposition in advance without further inquiry. Translucency implies a
willingness to trust and be trusted. This willingness, unfortunately, is
blocked by the particular mode of togetherness called the us/them mode of
togetherness. This mode of togetherness is a prejudiced one. The logic of
this mode of togetherness is the logic of exclusion. One grouping based on
common interest always excludes the other as having an opposed interest. It
is us against them or to put it in former President Bushs terms,
either you are with us or against us. Them is an absolute evil, and the
only policy available is total eradication. There is no possibility for trust.
The hidden assumption of the us/them mode of togetherness is as
follows. A group may consider itself consisting of self-sufficient entities,
each detached from the other. This, however, is inauthentic, since this
denies that there is any mutual and enriching relationship with one another
in the group. On the other hand, there is another mode of togetherness called
authentic we-ness.
8
In this mode of togetherness, being-together-with-
others is established in an atmosphere of mutual respect and understanding.
There is no objectification of the other. The other is not a mere atom or
signularity, but a being worthy of respect and care. Here, the patterns of
reciprocal objectification or manipulation within the group are absent. All
there is, is mutual respect and enrichment. Authentic we-ness as a basic
mode of togetherness is objective and supportive i.e., constituents tend to
lose their respective subjectivities and are incapable of actualization by
themselves alone since, as a we-ness, they experience themselves in
relation to others.
The coalition of the willing led by the United States is a vivid
example of the inauthentic we-ness mode of togetherness. It is build upon
the presumption of the existence of a third party, namely terrorist-harboring
nations. The coalition of the willing denied any possibility whatsoever that
its judgment might be misled by historical stereotypes. For them, Iraq (i.e.,
Saddam) was objectified as the threatening third party, for whom the only
response available was military action. There was no incentive for
cooperation or dialogue. Singularity or non-possibility meant there was no
willingness to trust. The coalition of the willing was actually a coalition of
the unwilling.
To escape the social trap, it is necessary to transform inauthentic
we-ness into an authentic we-ness mode of togetherness. It is important
to consider that the other is in the realm of relation and not singularity. This
other asks us to be in a translucent mode of relationship with it. In other
words, we must be willing to listen to others. The other is, ultimately, not a
stereotype or an object of enmity but a fellow subject colored by possibility.
This means that any presumption about the other must be suspended until
there is convincing evidence to the contrary. Taking precautions concerning
the other does not necessarily mean that our prior negative presumptions are
immune to correction.
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 158
CONCLUDING REMARKS
For the sake of perpetual peace, the war on terror must be replaced by a war
on distrust. The success of this war, however, requires us to rethink our
current mode of togetherness, i.e., us/them or inauthentic we-ness. This
current mode of togetherness, I believe, is responsible for blocking
trustworthiness among nations in the present era. However, it is only a
fragment of a larger story. Due to this current mode of togetherness, the
only pattern of global behavior seems to be one of conflict, not cooperation.
Nations are making coalitions to invade other states, based on unquestioned
assumptions. These assumptions, unfortunately, are left unchallenged.
Information itself might be manipulated to justify the reasons for war (jus
ad bellum). This, in fact, creates a social trap, resulting in collective
disadvantage. To escape the social trap, each nation must adopt a new mode
of togetherness based on translucency and mutual trust. This authentic we-
ness mode of togetherness will take the global community to a new era of
harmony where the possibilities of conflicts will be greatly reduced.
University of Indonesia
Jakarta
NOTES
1
See the complete text of former President Bushs West Point Address (June
3, 2002) at http://www.newsmax.com/ archives/ articles/ 2002/ 6 /2
/81354.shtml.
2
See Cass Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 4.
3
See Bo Rothstein, Social Traps and the Problem of Trust (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2005), p. 12.
4
See Rothstein, Social Traps and the Problem of Trust, p. 15.
5
See David Gauthier, Morals by Agreement (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1986), pp. 15-16, 166-170, 179-181.
6
See John Harsanyi, Advances in Understanding Rational Behavior in
Rationality in Action (New York: 1990), p. 278.
7
Celeste M Friend, Trust and the Presumption of Translucency in Social
Theory and Practice (January 2001), p.27.
8
For further elaboration on the difference between inauthentic and authentic
we-ness see Fuad Hassan, Kita and Kami: the Basic Mode ofTogetherness
(Jakarta: Winoka, 2005), p. 28.
HUMAN RIGHTS, PRACTICES, AND CODES OF ETHICS
1
David Lorenzo Izquierdo
INTRODUCTION
One of the most important issues in contemporary ethics (and also in
political theory) is the relation between first principles and the application
of those principles to specific fields of action, such as politics, economics,
law, medicine, and so on. We find a similar issue with human rights. One of
the most important challenges nowadays regarding human rights is how
they can be applied and protected in practice.
Human rights are principles which have been accepted by many
countries and institutions as, so to speak, first or common principles.
They are both ethical and political principles. But nowadays a new facet is
called for: they have to guide particular acts they have to be applied to
specific fields of action (through specific laws, regulations, codes, etc.). But
this is not an easy matter.
One of the areas where human rights have to be applied and
protected is in the field of professional endeavours or the workplace. In
recent years, codes of ethics have arisen as a possible means to foster and to
define ethical behaviour in the professions. Among the principles of a code,
human rights play the role of first principles as I shall explain below
2
.
Humnan rights tend to function in codes as the principles that inspire and
guide the rest of the moral rules. But how can codes of ethics make
individuals respect and foster ethical principles and human rights in the
professions? Can they guarantee a good ethical environment in the
workplace? This paper aims to answer those questions.
PRACTICES, GOODS AND MORAL RULES
The concept of practice is a central concept in contemporary sociology as
well as in moral and political philosophy. One author who has focused on
this concept is Alasdair MacIntyre. This concept is useful when thinking
about the role of codes of ethics in applying and protecting human rights
3
.
According to MacIntyre, practices are important because as we
read in his paper Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and
Goods
4
individual acts and the development of human beings take place
only in them. Social and individual lives are structured by practices, which
take place in particular institutions and in a particular history or tradition
so that every practice is part of a history and a tradition.
In his book After Virtue, MacIntyre defines practice as
any coherent and complex form of socially established cooperative
human activity through which goods internal to that form of activity
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 160
are realized in the course of trying to achieve those standards of
excellence which are appropiate to, and partially definitive of, that
form of activity, with the result that human powers to achieve
excellence, and human conceptions of the ends and goods involved,
are systematically extended.
5
Sciences, architecture, and farming are examples of practices.
6
Therefore, a
practice is an activity with internal goods and with internal standards of
excellence. The academic life of a university can be considered, for
instance, a practice; thus, this paper can be considered as a part of the
practice which is the academic life of a particular university.
There are three elements of a practice, according to MacIntyre:
goods, models of excellence (or authorities), and rules. Let us consider
briefly each one of these. Regarding goods, the author distinguishes two
kinds: external goods and internal goods. The internal ones are those goods
which refer to the proper excellence of a specific practice. The best building
and the best way to design it are internal goods to architecture. External
goods are those not related directly to the proper excellence of a practice.
These can be achieved through many kinds of practices and can be
independent of the achievement of the internal goods to a practice. Some
examples of external goods are money, power, and prestige. Therefore,
internal goods are the proper or essential telos of a practice.
7
Rules are necessary elements of a practice because they are the
guidelines or the norms to be followed by the individual who wishes to
achieve the internal goods of the practice.
8
Certain rules have to be
observed, because they are relkevant to an individual reaching excellence in
a practice. For instance, it is necessary for the members of a soccer team to
train weekly if one wishes to build a good soccer team.
The third element of practices are models or authorities. According
to MacIntyre, they are necessary because the individual needs to know the
rules and the goods of the practices, and he or she also has to learn how to
apply the rules and how to understand the internal goods. Models and
authorities are the means whereby individuals learn and practice these
elements.
9
Of course, in After Virtue, MacIntyre is cognizant that there are
practices which are evil in themselves: for instance, torture, sadomasochistic
sexuality, etc..
10
But, if all practices contain goods, how is it possible to
consider a practice evil or wrong in itself? The author answers that we need
a good external to the practices in order to judge the issue. This external
good is what MacIntyre, in his book Dependent Rational Animals, calls
flourishing. Flourishing is the development of the powers that a human
being possesses as a human being, or, in other words, how human beings
should live.
11
This is why MacIntyre says that an individual has to be able to
make two distinctions:
Human Rights, Practices, and Codes of Ethics 161
1) Regarding the good internal to the practice, he or she has to
distinguish between what seems good for him or her at this moment
and what is really good according to the practice.
2) Regarding flourishing, he or she has to distinguish what is good for
him or her here and now, and what is good in itself, for everybody
12
.
Therefore, the final good beyond the goods of the practices is
necessary to be able to judge the same practices. In addition, a final good
is necessary to explain human existence because there are many practices in
which an individual can be involved, but the individual him or herself is an
unity one and the same person in different practices. A final good which
relates to the individual as a whole, as a unity is necessary.
Because of this, MacIntyre distinguishes three meanings of the
concept of good:
1) Good as a means to another good, which is a good in itself.
2) Good according to a specific practice. In this sense, an individual
is good as a father, as a teacher and so on.
13
3) Good as a human being, as a member of the human species. In
this sense, an individual is good if he or she is flourishing as such.
14
In fact, this third sense of the concept is the main one for MacIntyre:
something is good for an individual if it contributes to his/her flourishing
15
.
Therefore, flourishing is the final good, the final telos of human life.
We have seen so far four important ideas: human acts take place in
practices; every practice has its own internal good; rules are necessary
elements to achieve the internal good to any practice; and those rules imply
both technical and moral aspects. Achieving the internal good to a practice
is not only a technical matter but also a moral matter, because it is related to
the individuals human qualities as a practicioner and also as a human
being.
In order to think about how codes of ethics can be a means to
protect human rights, we can take two important and useful concepts from
MacIntyres thought: flourishing and practice. According to MacIntyre,
beyond the goods of the practices, there must be a final good, which is
necessary to judge the same practices. Flourishing is this final good,
16
as
we have seen above. If flourishing is the development of the powers that a
human being possesses as a human being, it can be said that human rights
are a set of ethical and political principles whose aim is to protect some
basic goods which are necessary to make possible the individuals
development or the individuals flourishing. MacIntyre does not relate
human rights to the concept of flourishing, but we think that this relation
can be acknowledged
17
.
Regarding the MacIntyrean concept of practice, we can see that
every profession is a practice (although not every practice is a profession
strictly speaking
18
). It can be said that codes of ethics are sets of moral rules
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 162
whose aim is to guide human acts in the workplace from the moral point of
view. If a profession includes both technical and moral aspects, codes of
ethics can be narrowly related to practices. MacIntyre does not connect the
rules of practices to codes of ethics, but we think that this relation exists and
also that it is important to understand the role of codes of ethics in
protecting human rights.
HUMAN ACTION, CODES OF ETHICS AND HUMAN RIGHTS
In our time, professional ethics has become more important and, as a result,
the number of existing codes of ethics has increased. This fact can be used
to point out many features of our society, but we wish to focus for the
moment on the resulting increased awareness of two important matters: the
difficulty of making decisions in certain particular circumstances
19
, and the
importantance of the social responsibility of individuals and their acts.
As we have seen by employing the MacIntyrean concept of
practice, human action is a complex fact. Perhaps one of the most
important and fruitful topics in ethics today has been the account of the
different elements from which human action can be explained, or, in other
words, how it is possible to explain human actions. It seems that it is a fact
that cannot be explained in a static or fixed way. This difficult point
comes partly from the fact, obvious but deep, that human action is twofold:
it has both an external and internal side (intentions, feelings, etc.). That is
why we can say that an action shows how an individual is. From this
twofold nature of action, we can surmise that every human action implies
three different kinds of relations: individual-end, individual-context and
individual-fact/action. That is to say that when an individual acts, he or she
carries out an action (a fact) within the frame of a particular context, and
this action comes from a personal intention (from a personal end, which is
related, of course, to that context). These relationships are so various and
changeable that sometimes individuals do not know how to act, how to
make a decision. Codes of ethics tend to guide the external side of human
actions (although they presuppose the internal side).
Codes of ethics include rules to guide an individuals actions in a
specific field of activities. Because of this, one feature of such codes is that
they contribute to the individuals training or formation: they make use of
the experience and history of this activity (i.e., of this practice) in order to
be able to teach the individual rules of acting correctly. Some of these rules
perhaps are not known by the individual; or, if he or she knew about them,
perhaps he or she didnt know their importance; one of the functions of
models of excellence or authorities is to help the individual with those
issues. This is possible only because codes of ethics make some rules
explicit, so that they more easily show individuals that they must respect
them. And, at the same time, this fact makes clearer and more obvious the
social responsibility of an individuals acts. Another important feature of
codes of ethics is that they are supported by a community (e.g., a
Human Rights, Practices, and Codes of Ethics 163
professional association, a company, etc.), which defines the codes content
and watches over the observance of its rules.
In order to explain these features, let us consider, for instance, the
Code of Ethics for Engineers of the National Society for Professional
Engineers (in the United States). This code says that, in order to show
objectivity and independence in their professional duties, Engineers shall
disclose all known or potential conflicts of interest that could influence or
appear to influence their judgment or the quality of their services (Part II,
art. 4.a). It also says: Engineers shall not accept compensation, financial or
otherwise, from more than one party for services on the same project, or for
services pertaining to the same project, unless the circumstances are fully
disclosed and agreed to by all interested parties (Part II, art 4.b). These
rules are determined by a professional association (the National Society for
Professional Engineers) in accord with the experience and history of a
profession (engineering, in this case). An engineer, as an engineer (and, to
some extent, as a person) has to know and to follow these rules in order to
carry out his or her profession. In this sense, we say that a code gives rules
to guide the individuals actions. Perhaps an engineer does not need a code
giving him or her those rules, because he or she can see or grasp those
rules on his or her own, by him or herself. These rules are, for some people,
evident. But we think that it is clear that, by stating these rules explicitly, a
code can help an individual to know and to follow them (in this case, in
order to keep his or her objectivity and impartiality).
Nevertheless, a codes rules do not always help the individual to
make decisions (and correct decisions) in a particular situation. This is due,
first of all, to the fact that codes cannot rule on or solve all the possible
situations that an individual may find in a practice. Codes of ethics include
rules concerning a practice, but this does not imply that they include all
the possible rules related to it. In fact, professional associations must
periodically change and update their codes according to circumstances. This
is one of their important functions. Moreover, we have to take into account
that sometimes, in particular situations, two or more rules of a code can
come into conflict with one another. For instance, the conflict between the
right to privacy and a common good can lead a physician, a lawyer, or a
psychologist to not keep a professional secret. (Here, individuals need a
model of excellence to solve such problems, that is to say, they need
someone who can help them to make good decisions.) But why does this
happen and what are its consequences? In order to answer these questions,
we have to focus on the nature of human acts.
Human acts may be judged to be correct, not only with regard to
some principle, rule or good, but also with regard to particular
circumstances. Given the importance of individual circumstances, be they
internal or external, contingency is the proper field of human acts. An act
that has to be done by me under some particular circumstances (here and
now) is not the same as an act that another person ought to do (under the
same, at least external, circumstances). In order to reach the internal good of
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 164
a practice, an individual has to act according to his or her personal
circumstances and qualities, which are different from another individuals
circumstances and qualities. People involved in a practice share the same
good internal to this practice, but every individual seeks to reach this good
according to his or her particular qualities. In this sense, they can share the
same rules, but the way of applying them though not the rule itself can
change depending on personal qualities and circumstances. That is why the
rules included in a code of ethics can only guide an individuals act, but
cannot define or determinate it totally. So human action is always a
creative fact.
20
It is a creative fact because the individual, in a particular
situation, has to discover which rules should be followed and, at the same
time, how he or she should apply them.
This creativity is based on the fact that a particular act in any
profession (and in any practice) is the result of three elements: (1) an
individual who mediates (2) some first principles, and (3) some
professional rules
21
. When individuals act in their professional fields, they
are applying not only the rules of their codes of ethics, but also some
primary or first moral principles (which are then first principles with
regard to this code). Take, for instance, a moral principle regarding truth.
There is a first moral principle according to which every human being has
the duty to say the truth; this would be a first principle. But different duties
or rules can be derived from this principle depending on different practices
(or professions). That is to say, different professional rules (the third
element we have mentioned) can be derived from the same first moral
principle.
For instance, both a marketer and an engineer, as human beings,
have the duty to say the truth, but, each has to follow different rules in order
to apply this principle (in their particular professions). The Code of Ethics
and Standards of Practice of the Canadian Marketing Association says that
Marketing communications must be clear and truthful. Marketers must not
knowingly make a representation to a consumer or business that is false or
misleading (Section H, art. I). The Code of Ethics for Engineers of the
National Society for Professional Engineers says that Engineers shall be
objective and truthful in professional reports, statements, or testimony. They
shall include all relevant and pertinent information in such reports,
statements, or testimony, which should bear the date indicating when it was
current (Section II, art. 3.a).
What is the relation between first moral principles and professional
rules? The first link between them is that the rules of a code of ethics base
their legitimacy founded on some principles prior to them. A proof of this is
the fact that the first articles of a code are usually dedicated to so called
general principles. Such principles express and refer to some human goods
and also to some general rules which are the frame of the profession (e.g.,
the Preamble and section I of the Code of Ethics for Engineers of the
National Society for Professional Engineers; articles 5-14 of the
Catalonias Psychologists Code of Ethics; articles 4-6 of the Spanish
Human Rights, Practices, and Codes of Ethics 165
Medical Code of Ethics). The Catalan Medical Associations Code of
Ethics devotes its first section to making such principles explicit. Article 1
defines the goal (end) of the medical profession: individual and social
health, while the subsequent articles define more general principles, such as
the respect for human rights and human dignity (article 5). The
Economists Code of Ethics of Spain devotes section I to defining the
basic principles of this profession: independence, integrity, loyalty, etc.
Nevertheless, first and basic ethical principles (and goods) do not
always appear in the same way. For instance, the Catalan Bar Code of
Ethics does not use words like human dignity or human rights in its first
articles. However it states, in article 4, the principles of freedom,
independence and competence as basic principles for lawyers.
Those facts show that there are some principles (related to some
goods) that, in an implicit or explicit way, form the basis of the rules of a
code of ethics. We can ask ourselves, of course, why such principles must
be those specific principles, or why those principles must be defined with
those particular words (and not with different words). But the most
important matter here is the fact that those principles express some goods
which work as a point of reference for a practice and for its rules. We have
to take into account that there is a narrow relation between rules and goods.
Both from the moral and legal point of view, goods are the sense of rules. A
rule does not make sense without a good. The aim of a rule is to protect a
good. We have talked above about the concept of truth. Truth is the good
protected by rules (e.g., such as we have mentioned above regarding
marketers and engineers). In fact, normally, individuals do not follow a rule
unless they know and understand the good that a rule tends to protect.
Using the MacIntyrean concepts explained above, we could say that
an individual can reach the internal goods of a practice only if he or she
follows or respect those principles (e.g., related to some specific goods)
22
.
Life, freedom, truth, justice, human dignity, integrity, amd so on, are those
goods on which the rules of a code of ethics are based. And those goods are
the goods that human rights try to protect, as we can see, for instance, in the
articles 1, 3, 4, and 18 to 20 of the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights:
Art. 1. All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and
rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should
act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.
Art. 3. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the
person.
Art. 4. No one shall be held in slavery or servitude; slavery and the
slave trade shall be prohibited in all their forms.
Art. 18. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience
and religion; this right includes freedom to change his religion or
belief, and freedom, either alone or in community with others and
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 166
in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in teaching,
practice, worship and observance.
Art. 19. Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and
expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without
interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas
through any media and regardless of frontiers.
Art. 20. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly
and association. (2) No one may be compelled to belong to an
association.
In the first part of this paper we claimed that human rights can be related to
the MacIntyrean concept of flourishing. We admitted that MacIntyre does
not state this relation as such, although he thinks that the rules of natural law
are the rules that an individual has to observe in order to achieve his or her
flourishing as a human being.
23
In order to relate human rights to human
flourishing, beyond the debate over natural law, we think that the most
important thing is the fact that there is a narrow relationship between human
development (human flourishing) and some basic goods (life, freedom,
etc.). Those basic goods (or some of them) are the goods protected by the
articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights that we have just
quoted. Given the relationship between rules and goods, we surmise that the
aim of the principles of this Declaration is to protect some basic goods
which are necessary to make possible the individuals development and
flourishing.
Moreover regarding codes of ethics, we can find a narrow
relationship between these six articles (or some of them) and, for instance,
the Code of Ethics for Engineers (of the National Society for Professional
Engineers), the Catalan Medical Associations Code of Ethics, or the
European Code of Police Ethics. The Code of Ethics for Engineers does
not include an explicit reference to the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, but the first of its Fundamental Canons states: (Engineers shall)
Hold paramount the safety, health, and welfare of the public (Section I, art.
1). The Catalan Medical Associations Code of Ethics includes an explicit
reference to this Declaration by saying, in the fifth principle of its General
Principles, that a physician shall respect human rights in carrying out his or
her activities (Section I, General Principles, art. 5). The European Code
of Police Ethics, in its first section (Objetives of the Police), says that
one of the objectives of the Police is to protect and respect the individuals
fundamental rights and freedoms as enshrined, in particular, in the European
Convention on Human Rights (Section I, art. 1).
The second important link between first principles and professional
rules is that the goods protected by these principles are the point of
reference or the criteria for applying these professional rules. It could be
said that those goods are the spirit of the codes letter (that is to say, of
the codes rules). For this reason, when two or more rules of a code conflict
with one another in some particular circumstance, the individual takes this
Human Rights, Practices, and Codes of Ethics 167
spirit as a criterion (e.g., as a point of reference) to apply the rules of the
code correctly, that is to say, the individual thinks about the goods to be
protected. Thats why a physician (according to the Catalan Medical
Associations Code of Ethics, Article 32) or a lawyer (according to the
Catalan Bar Code of Ethics, Article 41) can break their professional
secrecy under certain special circumstances when another good (for
instance, social safety) has to be protected
24
.
Because of the relation between principles and basic goods
(regarding human flourishing) in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, and also because of the relation between those goods and general
principles in codes of ethics, we believe that human rights can play the role
of first principles with regard to moral rules in codes of ethics. In this
sense, it can be said that some basic human goods can be protected at
different levels through different kinds of principles: first principles and
(also) professional rules (which would be secondary principles). And we
can say, therefore, that, in carrying out a practice and in seeking to reach the
internal good to a practice, an individual has the duty to respect some first
principles since he or she has the duty to protect some basic human goods.
So far we have seen two important links between ethical first
principles and the rules of codes of ethics. In dealing with the former, after
seeing that these rules are based on these principles, we asked ourselves
why those principles stated in a code explicitly must be specifically those
principles (and not others), and why those principles must be defined with
some words (and not with different words). In dealing with the latter, we
have said that the goods protected by these first principles are the point of
reference needed in order to apply the rules of a code to a particular
situation correctly.
Both issues can be stated and tackled from the point of view of the
main element of the human act, as we have mentioned above, namely, the
individual. We have also said that an individual acts by mediating first
principles and also the codes rules. It is the individual, through his or her
abilities, virtues, conscience, qualities, etc. who, together with others (a
professional association, for example), selects and states the suitable
principles to a code of ethics according to the social, technical and historical
circumstances related to the practice (which is ruled by this code). And it
is the individual who mediates the principles and the rules in order to
know how to apply them in the best way.
According to MacIntyre (and also to classical ethics), this relation
(individual and rules or principles) depends on the virtue of prudence or
phronesis. MacIntyre, following Aristotle and Aquinas, defines prudence as
the exercise of a capacity to apply truths about what it is good for
such and such a type of person or for persons as such to do generally
and in certain types of situation to oneself on particular occasions.
The phronimos is able to judge both which truths are relevant to
him in his particular situation and from that judgment and from his
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 168
perception of the relevant aspects of himself and his situation to act
rightly
25
.
and, MacIntyre adds, the virtue of being able in particular situations to
bring to bear the relevant universals and to act so that the universal is
embodied in the particular.
26
By combining these definitions with the concept of basic good
regarding first principles, we can say that the virtue of prudence is twofold.
It implies that there are some goods which are goods for every human
being. These are narrowly related to human flourishing and, therefore, there
are some principles that an individual has always to respect. On the other
hand, this virtue implies, at the same time, that an individual has to discover
how to protect these goods and how to respect these principles in his or her
particular situation or circumstances, because this is not an automatic
process. That is the core of this virtue. In this sense, and specifically in a
professional situation, codes of ethics help individuals discover these things.
The virtue of prudence shows us the creative nature of human acts and
ethics.
CONCLUSION
We can conclude by saying that codes of ethics are nowadays an important
means to protect human rights in a specific field of action, namely, the
workplace. We have seen that any profession, as a practice, implies both
technical and moral rules rules set explicitly in the code of ethics related
to it. At the same time, human rights play the role of first principles on
which rules of different codes are based. The goods protected by human
rights are the point of reference used to define or to state duties in every
practice through codes of ethics. In this sense, human rights are first
principles and codes of ethics are secondary principles.
Nevertheless, codes of ethics are not enough to protect or to apply
human rights in particular situations. We have seen that, because of the
nature of human actions and codes, individual moral qualities play an
important role in protecting human rights. Individual moral qualities are
very important, not only in defining the rules of the codes (in the social
context of the professional association), but also in applying them to
particular situations. Human actions are so complex that sometimes the
rules of a code cannot show the individual how to act or at least they
cannot define or determine it totally. Therefore, it is the individual, through
his or her conscience, virtues (especially the virtue of prudence), etc., and
by following the spirit of a code (the goods protected by it and by the
principles of human rights), who must grasp which is the best, and not
only the correct, action in his or her particular circumstances.
University of Puerto Rico at Mayagez
Puerto Rico, USA
Human Rights, Practices, and Codes of Ethics 169
REFERENCES:
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1948.
Codes of Ethics:
Code of Ethics for Engineers, National Society for Professional
Engineers, 2007.
Code of Ethics and Standards of Practice, Canadian Marketing
Association, 2007.
Code of Police Ethics, Council of Europe, Committee of Ministers,
Recommendation 2001/10, 2001.
Cdigo de Deontologa del Consejo de Colegios de Mdicos de Catalua
(Catalan Medical Association Code of Ethics), 2005.
Cdigo de tica y Deontologa Mdica Espaola (Spanish Medical
Code of Ethics), 1999.
Cdigo de la Abogaca Espaola (Spanish Bar Code of Ethics), 2002.
Cdigo Deontolgico de Economistas de Espaa (Economists Code of
Ethics of Spain), 1999.
Cdigo Deontolgico de la Abogaca Catalana (Catalan Bar Code of
Ethics), 2001.
Cdigo Deontolgico de los Abogados de la Unin Europea (European
Bar Code of Ethics), 1988.
Cdigo Deontolgico del Psiclogo de Catalua (Catalonia
Psychologists Code of Ethics), 1989.
NOTES
1
This paper is the initial result of a research project on the relations among
human rights, applied ethics, and codes of ethics. The author would like to
thank the referees for their valuable comments and suggestions to improve
its content. He also would like to thank Professor Halley Snchez for his
suggestions on some grammatical and stylistic issues.
2
According to the frame and the aim of this paper, by first principle we
mean a principle from which other principles can be derived, but also a
principle that inspires other principles.
3
MacIntyre, of course, criticizes human rights discourse for instance, in
his paper Are there any natural rights? [Charles F. Adams lecture,
delivered Feb. 28, 1983 in Bowdoin College, Brunswick, Maine], pp. 14-15,
and in other work. But we think that this need not prevent us from relating
the concept of human right to the (MacIntyrean) concept of practice (as
we shall see). See his After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame,
IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 70ff.
4
MacIntyre, Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy: Rules, Virtues and
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 170
Goods, in The MacIntyre Reader, ed. K. Knight (Notre Dame, IN:
University of Notre Dame, 1998), 13652 at p. 139.
5
MacIntyre, After Virtue, pp. 187-188.
6
After Virtue, pp. 187-188, 200-201.
7
After Virtue, pp. 188-194; MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral
Enquiry: Encyclopaedia, Genealogy, and Tradition (London: Duckworth,
1990), pp. 64-65.
8
After Virtue, pp. 194-195; MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 31-32.
9
After Virtue, pp. 194-195.
10
After Virtue, p. 200.
11
MacIntyre, Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings Need the
Virtues (London: Duckworth, 1999), pp. 63-65, 76-77.
12
Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, pp. 126-127; MacIntyre, Plain
Persons and Moral Philosophy, p. 140.
13
Dependent Rational Animals, pp. 65-66.
14
Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy, p. 151; Dependent Rational
Animals, p. 66.
15
I would like to thank Prof. MacIntyre for personal conversation on this
issue (September 2004).
16
Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy, p. 151; Dependent Rational
Animals, p. 66.
17
In our opinion, although MacIntyre does not say this explicitly, this
relation can be stated because he agrees that there is a natural law (and
natural law can be related to human rights). Natural law is a topic which
MacIntyre has dealt with mainly through papers or articles (see, for
instance: How Can We Learn What Veritatis Splendor Has To Teach?,
The Thomist, Vol. 58 (1994), pp. 171-195; Natural Law As Subversive:
The Case of Aquinas, Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, Vol.
26, n. 1 (1996), pp. 61-83; Natural Law Reconsidered, International
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 37 (1997), pp. 95-99; Theories of Natural
Law in the Culture of Advanced Modernity, in Common Truths: New
Perspectives on Natural Law, Edward B. McLean (ed.), (Wilmington,
Delaware: ISI Books, 2000), pp. 91-115. We have seen that practices can be
judged and understood based on flourishing. Just as there are rules for
practices, there are also rules for flourishing. These rules, according to
MacIntyre, are the rules of natural law. The individual has to observe them
in order to flourish as a human being. See MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions
of Moral Enquiry, p. 139; Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy, p. 143;
How Can We Learn What Veritatis Splendor Has To Teach?, The
Thomist, p. 173; Wahre Selbsterkenntnis durch Verstehen unserer selbst
aus der Perspektive anderer (interview with Dmitri Nikulin), Deutsche
Human Rights, Practices, and Codes of Ethics 171
Zeitschrift fr Philosophie, Vol. 44 (1996), pp. 671-683, at pp. 676-677;
The Privatization of Good. An Inaugural Lecture, The Review of Politics,
Vol. 52 (1990), pp. 344-361, at p. 344).
18
We mean a profession with a contract, a salary, etc.
19
For instance, an individual has to know how to apply rules in a particular
situation, or sometimes rules conflict with one another.
20
D. Innerarity, Libertad como passion (Pamplona: Eunsa, 1992), pp. 42-
43.
21
By saying that an individual mediates these elements, we mean that an
individual has to establish a dialogue with them in order to make the best
decision.
22
These principles are, as we can see, not only technical rules.
23
See, for example, MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry:
139; Plain Persons and Moral Philosophy, p. 143; How Can We Learn
What Veritatis Splendor Has To Teach?, p. 173; Wahre Selbsterkenntnis
durch Verstehen unserer selbst aus der Perspektive anderer, pp. 676-677;
The Privatization of Good. An Inaugural Lecture, p. 344
24
This is an example of how two different goods (privacy and, for instance,
social safety) can conflict with each other. Or, strictly speaking, they can
conflict with each other in some particular circumstances. Such goods do
not conflict with one other in themselves, but only in some particular
circumstances. In some cases, there are additional rules that can help an
individual to find out which good has to be protected in a particular
situation; in other cases, it depends on the virtue of prudence (phronesis).
This issue is an important issue for ethics (and also for professional ethics),
but we cannot deal with it in this paper (whose aim is related to other
issues), at least in a deep way.
25
MacIntyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality?, pp. 115-116.
26
MacIntyre, Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry, p. 139.
THE ARGUMENTATIVE TRADITION IN INDIAN PHILOSOPHY
1
Balaganapathi Devarakonda
A spirit of disintegration and disunity is conspicuous in the contemporary
social as well as philosophical scenes. There is a celebration of
fragmentations and differences. In such a scenario, no less than a person
than Amartya Sen rose to the occasion and traced out the roots and the
space of a democratic discourse that has been sustained in the Indian
philosophical tradition. It is laudable that he opened up a discussion that
will strengthen the democratic spirit which is missing in the present. This
paper examines the dialogic tradition projected by Sen in his The
Argumentative Indian (2005). Following a general exposition of the
significance of the dialogic tradition, a paradigm of argument is constructed
to explicate the dynamics of argumentation. Further, the place of
argumentation in the methodology of the Indian philosophical tradition as
projected by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya is also discussed. The limitations
of Sens exposition of the Indian argumentative tradition are explicated, first
by pointing out the problem of distinction between argument and dialogue
and lack of an explicitly stated extended definition of heterodoxy. Next, this
paper critically examines Sens four important claims which are put forth
as: 1. India has a strong argumentative tradition; 2. Participation in the
argumentative tradition is not limited to a few sections of the society; 3.
Heterodoxy contributed extensively to the argumentative tradition; and 4.
the argumentative tradition has created a public sphere.
SIGNIFICANCE OF DIALOGIC TRADITION
Amartya Sens The Argumentative Indian rightly emphasizes the
significance of the dialogic tradition in the formation of public reasoning
in which every one has a part, irrespective of gender and social
distinctions.
2
He opined that, if used with care and commitment, the
argumentative tradition can be extremely useful in resisting social inequality
and in alleviating poverty and deprivation. The work also informs us of the
role that heterodoxy plays in making the dialogic tradition lively and
forming public reasoning. Sen states that the tradition of public reasoning
is closely related to the roots of Democracy across the globe.
3
Public
reasoning, for him, includes the opportunity for citizens to participate in
political discussions and to influence public choice. He adds that open
discussions on important public issues can not only enhance society and our
respective priorities, but also provide the opportunity for revising the chosen
priorities in response to public discussion.
Sen, while applying dialogic tradition, heterodoxy, and public
reasoning to the Indian tradition and pointing out instances from the Epics
(such as Ramayana and Mahabharata), Upanishads, and medieval mystical
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 174
poets, argues that the richness of the tradition of argument has helped to
make Heterodoxy the natural state of affairs in India: persistent arguments
are an important part of our public life. Heterodoxy deeply influences
Indian politics, and is particularly relevant to the development of
Democracy in India and the emergence of its secular priorities.
4
PARADIGM OF ARGUMENT
The word argument is often used to mean a verbal dispute or
disagreement, which is different from the way it is used in philosophy.
When two people verbally disagree with each other, unless they merely
resort to name calling or threats, they typically present an argument for their
respective positions. An argument, here, is a connected series of statements
or propositions, some of which are intended to provide justification or
evidence for the truth of another statement or proposition. In philosophy,
then, arguments are those statements a person makes in an attempt to
convince someone of something, or present reasons for accepting a given
conclusion. Arguments must be separated from other uses of language, such
as conversation, explaining, giving an example or telling a story. In these
cases, one might find a connected series of statements, but the author or
speaker does not intend it to be the case that some of the statements provide
support or evidence in favour of one of the others. So they are not
arguments. Argument must also be distinguished from dialogue, which Sen
often uses as interchangeably with argumentation which will be discussed
a little later in this paper. Let us now examine the form of the argument, in
order to have a better understanding of the concept.
FORM OF AN ARGUMENT
Prerequisites of an Argument: --- Parties committed to their views
--- Equally shared platform with open
minds
--- Difference of opinion over an issue
Act of Argument : --- Methodical reasoning
--- Equal opportunity to contradict the
opponent and to advocate his view
--- Attempt to oppose or menace each
others views.
Outcome of the Argument: --- One wins the argument; making the
opponent realize the inadequacy of his
view; making the opponent accept that his
view is correct or valid.
--- End in disagreement
--- Compromise
The Argumentative Tradition in Indian Philosophy 175
From the above depiction, it is understood that argument begins with
difference and continues to strengthen or weaken the difference in its
course. But it may not necessarily result in dissolution of difference.
Differences may continue or may become still stronger in the course of
argumentation. Further, a defeated argument may refuse to go into oblivion;
A defeated argument that refuses to be obliterated can remain very alive.
5
The course of argument may strengthen both the parties or may weaken at
least one of them. The methodical reasoning employed by the parties is vital
to the whole course of argument. Sometimes the methodical reasoning may
be compelling in the sense that it is capable of convincing someone about
the truth of the conclusion. Such reasoning is mostly either inadequate or
misleading, since it depends more on the skill of the person in constructing
the argument to manipulate the person who is being convinced, and less on
the objective truth or undeniability of the argument itself. Hence, though
argumentation is a skill by itself, it should not be manipulative. If the
motive is strictly winning the argument, then the methodical reasoning
adopted may sometimes be compelling and manipulative. But if the
argument is initiated with an open mind, then it could result either in
winning or in disagreement, both of which can be of ideal value. Though the
parties involved start the argument with differences of opinion over an issue
and oppose each others views, it is possible that the argument may end in
either disagreement or compromise.
Arguments can be either static or interactive on the basis of the
involvement of the other. In a static argument, the other (purvapaksha)
that is being represented for rejection (khandana) is inactive. The other, in
this case, is presented to strengthen ones argument. In an interactive
argument, the other is an active participant. The position of the other always
shifts between the parties involved in the argument. The other is
purvapaksha for both. Both parties proposer and interlocutor
interchange their roles according to their position. The proposer and
interlocutor have a more symmetrical relationship. The premises as well as
the validity of the intermediate inferences would be discussed actively.
Unlike the static argument, the interactive argument is dynamic in practice.
The static argument is passive in the sense that it represents the argument
from only one point of view. However, a static argument has the potency of
generating a dynamic argument. For instance, a text which is passive in
representing its argument can generate a lively argument, by going beyond
its spacio-temporal limitations, as it increases the accessibility of the
argument. An interactive argument is dynamic in nature, as both the parties
put forth their arguments while criticising the other in an interactive mode.
As mentioned above, the change of roles as proposer and interlocutor makes
the argumentative process dynamic. In a dynamic mode of argumentation,
not only the roles, but also the rules and the reasoning may change
according to the need. A static argument, once laid down, is limited by itself
and leaves no scope for modification of the rules or the reasoning. But in an
interactive argument, the rules are always negotiable and reasoning can be
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 176
modified accordingly. Sometimes static arguments may also depict
interactive ones. But such depictions are limited by the intentions and
motivation of the presenter of the argument.
Often, it is observed that the hierarchical power structure of the
existent social set up not only determines the argumentation process, but
also defines the terms of discourse. Rarely do arguments, whether social,
intellectual or political, go outside the existent paradigm. However, the rules
of the argumentation, whether it is static or interactive, may sometimes be
negotiable by the parties, although in many cases the rules are already
determined by social mores. Sometimes argumentation is viewed more as a
process of discovery than as the justification of a conclusion. Ideally, the
goal of argumentation is for participants to arrive jointly at a conclusion,
whether it be unity or difference, by mutually accepted inferences.
Let us now proceed to explicate the argumentative methodology of
the Indian philosophical tradition, as projected by Debiprasad
Chattopadhyaya.
ARGUMENTATIVENESS OF THE INDIAN PHILOSOPHICAL
TRADITION
Sen affirms the existence of a great many discussions and compositions of
different kinds, conforming to the loquaciousness of the argumentative
tradition in Indian philosophical texts.
6
These texts, according to him,
include elaborate religious expositions and protracted defences, along with
controversies between defenders of religiosity on one side, and advocates of
general scepticism on the other. While stressing the existence of the
argumentative tradition, Sen states, in philosophical discourses throughout
Indian history, atheists and sceptics make frequent appearances and even
though, in many cases, their points of view are ultimately rejected, they do
get their say.
7
Before we examine the claims of Sen regarding the
Argumentative tradition of India, let us explicate the place of argumentation
in the Indian philosophical tradition.
Argumentativeness is considered to be the starting point of the
methodology of the Indian philosophical tradition. The source of this
methodology was traced by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya to the Upanishads.
The main point of the methodology, he maintains, consists in moving
towards a philosophical position through a clash of ideas or through
confrontation of a thesis with its anti-thesis in short, through arguments.
The Upanishadic word for this is Vakovakya,
8
which means the art of
argument through the medium of question and answer.
Argument has two forms: destructive and constructive. Unlike the
former, which leads us nowhere in the acquisition of knowledge, the latter
plays a significant role in the advancement of knowledge. It aids the zeal for
knowledge and its clarification improves the technique of communication
and strengthens conviction by way of removing doubt in the pre-existing
stock of knowledge.
9
The art of argumentation, taken seriously, raises
The Argumentative Tradition in Indian Philosophy 177
questions concerning evidence, reason and fallacious thinking. It is Gotama
and Vatsayana who first made a clear cut statement of philosophical
methodology as growing out of the technique of debate or argument or, to
be more specific, of the direct, frontal clash of ideas.
In Indian philosophical methodology, generally followed by most
of the systems of philosophy, the final ascertainment (nirnaya) of a
philosophical position is based on the critical examination (Pariksha).
There can be no final ascertainment or nirnaya without critical examination
or pariksha. Pariksha, in turn, is dependent on Doubt or Samsaya. Doubt
is the intellectual situation of being confronted by two philosophical
positions, opposing and menacing each other. It is the doubt resulting from
contradictory assertions about the same thing the argumentation between
the two each wanting to negate the other; this is the beginning of
philosophical activity in India. A questioning attitude is the starting point of
argumentation or the frontal clash of ideas.
Though questioning is a necessary aspect of the argumentative
process, one must note that, mere questioning cannot be taken to be an
argument. Questioning can be of at least three kinds; 1. questioning to know
or obtain knowledge, 2. questioning to bring out how far the other knows,
and 3. questioning to critically evaluate a view. In the first case, the
questioner is a seeker and the other is presupposed to be a knowledgeable
person. The second presupposes a doubt regarding the knowledge of the
other. Here the questioner is not as ignorant as the one in the first case. In
both these cases, though interaction and questioning are involved, they
cannot be regarded as arguments. Argumentation makes use of the third
kind of questioning coupled with methodological reasoning. Both the
parties involved would question the view of the other and critically evaluate
it. In this process, both try to substantiate their views by providing support
or evidence through logical reasoning. One can infer from this that only this
kind of questioning leads to argumentation.
As argumentation is the beginning of philosophical activity, it has
played a key role in strengthening the positions in the Indian philosophical
systems. This argumentativeness is presented by the philosophers of India
while putting forth their views in writing. They developed their views, first
by confronting it with its opposite i.e., the opponents view, called
purvapaksha. Only on the basis of a more or less elaborate negation of it,
they established their own thesis called siddhanta. There was a continuous
interchange of argument and counter argument between the participants,
resulting in a cumulative sophistication of the positions held in an
intellectual achievement of the highest order of which any culture might be
reasonably proud.
10
This is the general methodology which is argumentative
in nature that is adopted by most of the philosophers of India.
Stressing the importance of argumentation, Daya Krishna stated
that argumentation provides an interesting starting point for exploring those
possibilities of thought which have been so brusquely or casually rejected in
the text.
11
In a sense, the Indian philosophical texts provide a far greater
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 178
opportunity for such an exercise than most philosophical texts written in the
Western tradition as the Indian texts provide, in the very format of their
presentation, the possible argument or arguments against their position and
their reply to them. Daya Krishna highlighted the sophisticated
reformulations of the views following the process of argumentation which
avoid static repetitions on the part of the Indian thinkers, when he wrote:
the history of the debate on any philosophical issue documents,
thinker by thinker, the development of the argument and the flaws
pointed out by each in the position of the others. There was, however,
in this matter no static repetition of positions but a modification of
ones position in the light of opponents trenchant criticism or even a
more sophisticated reformulation of ones position in the light of
those criticisms.
12
While stating the purvapaksha, utmost care was taken by Indian thinkers to
avoid static repetitions. This care facilitated a more sophisticated
reformulation of ones position. Thus, undeniably, the argumentative nature
has made a significant contribution to Indian philosophical thought.
However, one must also note that there is always the socially constituted
and ideologically legitimised hierarchy that was ruling the argumentative
platform. The hierarchy could be of gender, or social, or of a socially
constructed spiritual nature. This ideologically legitimised hierarchy often
implicitly imposes its own constitutive prejudices and threats.
Let us now proceed to examine the limitations of Sens exposition
of the argumentative tradition of India, first by pointing out the problem of
distinction between argument and dialogue and the lack of an explicitly-
stated extended definition of heterodoxy, and then by critically examining
his four important claims.
PROBLEM OF DISTINCTION: ARGUMENT AND DIALOGUE
Sen used the phrases Argumentative tradition and Dialogic tradition
inter-changeably while referring to the Indian tradition. This inter-
changeable use ignores the essential distinction between the two. Though
both seem to be stressing the involvement of more than one person in the
discussion, they are distinct in their character. Dialogue is more of a
general talk or conversation or discussion between two groups. But an
argument is an exchange of views, especially of a contentious nature, with
the support of methodical reasoning by the parties or groups involved.
Unlike a dialogue, an argument involves a disagreement regarding an issue,
methodical reasoning by the parties involved, and the intention of each of
the parties involved to challenge and oppose the others views. Dialogue
need not involve opposing groups, but an argument invariably presupposes
opposing groups. All arguments, with some reservation, could be
considered as discussions, but not all discussions are arguments.
The Argumentative Tradition in Indian Philosophy 179
DEFINITION OF HETERODOXY
A significant issue given very little attention by Sen is the definition of the
term heterodoxy. Sen opined that heterodoxy has contributed enormously
to the argumentative tradition of India. He states
The particular point of the focus on heterodoxy and loquaciousness is
not so much to elevate the role of tradition in the development of
India, but to seek a fuller reading of Indian traditions, which have
interacted with other factors in the dynamism of Indian society and
culture.
13
Sen used the examples of heterodox philosophical traditions such as
Jainism, Buddhism and Carvaka. Sen also mentioned the voices of the
oppressed against the affluent as heterodoxy. The Indian philosophical
tradition in general categorizes those who do not accept the Vedic authority
as a part of the heterodox traditions. Sen seems to be going beyond this
traditionally accepted definition by including the voices of various
marginalized groups of the both ancient and modern times. Participation in
argumentation requires substantial logical skills besides participation in a
dialogue. Argumentation is a specialised skill and cannot be a general
opportunity as claimed by Sen.
14
Debate could serve as a better supplement
to dialogue than argument, if Sen is only looking for a synonym. The claim
for this extension or inclusiveness is in need of a clearly and explicitly
stated definition of heterodoxy something which has not been provided by
Sen.
CRITIQUE OF SENS CLAIMS
Taking the above exposition to be the background of Sens account of the
argumentative tradition in Indian philosophy, let us now proceed to
critically examine the four claims he makes.
1. India has a strong argumentative tradition
2. Participation in the argumentative tradition is not limited to a few
sections of the society.
3. Heterodoxy contributed extensively to the argumentative tradition.
4. The argumentative tradition created a public sphere.
Sen provided instances from the Geeta and the Upanishads in
support of his first claim. The discussion between Krishna and Arjuna is
stated as an example of the argumentative tradition. It presents, according to
Sen, a tussle between two contrary moral positions Krishnas emphasis
on doing ones duty, on one side, and Arjunas focus on avoiding bad
consequences (and generating good ones), on the other.
15
One can certainly
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 180
extract two different moral positions from the discussion between Krishna
and Arjuna, but whether doing ones duty and avoiding bad consequences
can be contrary to each other is a debatable issue. If we take the main focus
of the discussion to be doing ones duty and avoiding bad consequences and
generating good ones, as Sen himself stated, then the two parties are arguing
from two different standpoints, though both are talking about the same
action. One is talking about the duty of the individual and the other is
talking about the consequences of the action. Argument requires both the
parties to be either equal or standing on an equal platform without being
subjected to any threat. But unfortunately the parties involved in the
discussion in the Geeta are neither equals, nor standing on the equal
platform for discussion. Further, none of the characteristics that are
discussed above with regard to an argument can be applicable to the Geeta.
There is no disagreement regarding an issue. There is no methodical
reasoning provided by both the parties involved in support of their views
and to oppose or challenge the views of the other. The discussion between
Krishna and Arjuna implicitly presupposes a spiritual hierarchy; one is
enlightened and the other is a seeker. It is not methodical reasoning, but
emotional despair that prompts Arjuna to seek clarifications. Though there
is active participation by both the parties and there is a process of
questioning and answering involved, a mere conversation without
employing any methodological reasoning or critical attitude towards the
view of the other would fall short of qualifying as an argument. Further, the
actual argument of the Geeta was held at an imagined situation
constructed by a war for existence. The situation of existential challenge
cannot create any ideal space for symmetrical argument. Thus, the Geeta
cannot be regarded as an example of argument, neither static nor interactive,
as it is a conversation between Realised and the Seeker. A similar kind of
criticism applies even to the Upanishadic texts. Daya Krishna, while
referring to the dialogue contained in the Upanishads, noted that, they do
not even attempt to provide the atmosphere of a real dialogue, for it is a
dialogue between those who have known and realized the truth and others
who have not.
16
The implications of the discussion may be very relevant to
the present time, as Sen rightly points out, but that itself cannot prompt us to
judge anything about the strength of Indian argumentative tradition.
While stating that one cannot expect the argumentational
participation to be uniformly distributed over all segments of the population,
Sen argued that in India it is not confined only to the more affluent and male
literate. He pointed out the participation of women like Gargi and Maitreyi
(Brihadaranyaka Upanishad) and Draupadi (Mahabharata) in support of
his argument. But one has to accept that the number of women who were
shown to be participants in the argumentative tradition were incomparably
fewer and were only the participants in the dominant tradition. They neither
questioned nor argued against the affluent tradition. If one goes through the
discussions of Maitreyi and Gargi with that of Yajnavalkya, one would
come across the questions of seekers rather than questions loaded with
The Argumentative Tradition in Indian Philosophy 181
methodical reasoning. To recall the above discussion, questioning can be of
at least three kinds; questioning used to seek answers regarding unknown
issues, questioning the knowledge of the other, and questioning employed to
critically evaluate viewpoints. The discussions of Maitreyi and Gargi are of
either the first or the second kind. They attempt either to know what is not
known or to know whether the other knows anything. In the first case the
questioner is ignorant and in the second case the questioner attempts to
prove the ignorance of the other. In any case, if the questioning is pursued
beyond a point, there is always a threat to life.
17
While claiming that argumentative encounters have frequently
crossed the barriers of class and caste
18
, Sen points to religious movements
such as Jainism and Buddhism which have played quite a large role in the
rebellious religious movements against the superiority of the priestly caste.
According to Sen, they stood for human equality and protested and resisted
the system of social hierarchy. Though both religious movements stressed
the importance of equality, they themselves were caught up in the
complicated structure of hierarchy. Subsequent to their initial
19
propagation
of egalitarianism, they slowly succumbed to the hierarchical structure of the
Indian tradition.
Heterodoxy in India, Sen maintains, has contributed extensively to
the argumentative tradition, and underestimating this would give an
inadequate picture of Indian thought. While pointing out the selective
inattention paid to rationalist parts of this Indian heritage, Sen states that an
inadequately inclusive understanding of Indian heterodoxy is particularly
important for appreciating the reach and range of heterodoxy in the
countrys intellectual background and diverse history.
20
It is true that the
range of heterodoxy is underrepresented in contemporary accounts of the
Indian tradition. Sen points to the constant neglect of the frequent
appearance of atheists and sceptics in philosophical discourses throughout
Indian history. But one must note that even these frequent appearances may
be selective representations, presented on the basis of their possibility of
being rejected. That is why most of the interesting accounts of the
arguments involving members of disadvantaged groups tend to be biased.
Sen mentions Carvaka and Buddhism as the examples of the
extensive contribution of heterodoxy to the argumentative tradition. Before
we say anything about Carvaka, it must be noted that there are no original
accounts of their philosophy written by their own exponents. Whatever
material is available, is so through the selective representations of secondary
sources.
21
These secondary sources do not depict any form of
argumentation; rather they provide a pre-conceived representation of a
defeated point. Though Carvaka is represented selectively, if not honestly,
with the motive of defeating its tenets, one must be happy for at least an
acknowledgement of its existence. These selective representations are cases
of static argumentation, in which the other in this case Carvaka is
neither active nor interactive. They are representations constrained by the
intentions and the motives of the presenters. The ulterior motives of the
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 182
presenters may have thrown some or most of the dissenting voices, both
unconquerable and weak, into oblivion.
Buddhist councils were mentioned by Sen for their contribution to
the Indian argumentative tradition. Sen opines that these councils also
addressed the demands of social and civic duties, and furthermore helped in
a general way, to consolidate and promote the tradition of open discussion
on contentious issues.
22
But if one looks at the history of these councils
and the discussions that went on in the course of the meetings of the
councils, one may wonder, how far were they addressing the demands of
social and civic duties? It may be true that they promoted the tradition of
open discussion on contentious issues, but they were limited to issues of
religious practices. A cursory view of the origin of the councils would
reveal that they were invented by brilliant Buddhist monks in order to
resolve religious conflicts. Some of the topics include the authoritative
versions of the sacred texts, the Tripitakas, and the conduct and status of the
Arhat.
23
Interestingly, instead of resolving the conflicts as conceived by the
monks, the councils ended up in schism. Though the Buddhist councils can
be regarded as the earliest attempts of brilliant Buddhists to facilitate open
discussion, they were limited to religious practices of sangha.
Sen also claims that the argumentative tradition in India has created
a public sphere which has to be carefully scrutinised. In its ideal form, the
public sphere is made up of private individuals gathered together as a
public, and articulating the needs of society with the state. Through acts of
assembly and dialogue, the public sphere generates opinions and attitudes
which serve to affirm or challenge and, therefore, to guide the affairs of
state. In ideal terms, the public sphere is the source of public opinion needed
to legitimate authority in any functioning democracy.
24
Creation of a
public sphere through argumentation is desirable and democratic, but it is
only possible in an ideal situation. Even Jurgen Habermas, the most
influential contemporary proponent of public sphere, opined that the public
sphere is a virtual or imaginary community which does not necessarily exist
in any identifiable space.
25
For a society like that of India with manifold
cultures and religions possessing well-formulated ideologically imposed
hierarchical systems, it would be a difficult dream to realise. Sens claim, as
pointed above, has a number of limitations. If we take the strength of the
argumentative tradition to be the participation of people from all sections of
society, then his discussion on the extent and reach of the argumentative
tradition is not sufficient. We must note that the examples of less affluent
and privileged people, which Sen provided, are not a representative sample.
One should be careful in taking support of exceptions for forming
generalisations. Though the participation in the argumentative tradition is
not limited to a few privileged groups, the place and participation of the less
privileged is very marginal and negligible. Further, one must also note that,
as Sen himself pointed out, it is doubtful whether the sceptical arguments
put forth belonged to the people to whom they are attributed, as they are the
representations of a third person. One must see this to be a case of static
The Argumentative Tradition in Indian Philosophy 183
argument. These static arguments are mostly presented to defeat another or
to prove another inadequate. It would also be possible that some of the
authors had their vested interests and might have constructed the sceptical
arguments in order to highlight the point they want to make.
Finally, Sen takes a leap in his argument from the existence of
argumentative tradition to the resultant creation of a public sphere. The
meagre evidences available can only prove the existence of the
argumentative tradition, but they cannot conclusively establish the creation
of public sphere. One should note in this context that, even among these
meagre evidences, whenever there is an involvement of the less privileged
in a dialogue or discussion, there was a possible threat to the life of the less
privileged. Thus, the limitations and the threats of the argumentative
tradition have curtailed the creation of a public sphere in India.
CONCLUSION
The limitations of Sens account of an argumentative tradition of India, as
pointed out above, do not undermine the relevance of an argumentative
tradition in the formation of public reasoning which promotes democracy
and upholds public sphere. The distinction between dialogue and argument
is not maintained by Sen, which undermines the significance of argument.
Further, though he seems to be advocating the voice of the dissent as
heterodoxy, this is not explicitly stated as an extended definition, in contrast
to the traditionally accepted one. The projection of the discussion between
Arjuna and Krishna in the Geeta, as an instance of argumentation, can be
contested, as it belongs neither to Static nor to Interactive forms of
argument. Though it involves interaction and questioning, it does not carry
the weight of the argument since it lacks the commitment to a particular
standpoint and use of methodical reasoning in support of it. In contrast to
the claim of Sen, there is discrimination on the basis of gender, class and
caste in the Indian philosophic tradition. Whatever instances Sen provides in
support of his claim are only exceptions, and no generalisation can be drawn
on the basis of exceptions. An authors representation of an opponents
argument would always be limited by the possibility of refutation. Mostly
an opponents view (i.e., purvapaksha) is presented to suit the refutation.
This prompts us to wonder whether there is any honest representation of the
opponent at all.
Though Buddhist councils, for the first time in Indian history,
facilitated a space for open discussion, they were limited only to religious
issues and did not extend to other socially relevant matters. Since the Indian
argumentative tradition is restrictive in scope, it could not create a public
sphere. But this should not be surprising; there is no distinction between a
public and a private sphere in the Indian tradition.
Dravidian University,
Kuppam, India
Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions 184
NOTES
1
I have benefited from suggestions and comments made by Dr. Tirupathi
Rao, Dr. K.M. Anil, Mr. Srikumar, Ms. Anuradha and Ms. Sridevi in the
course of developing this paper. I record my gratitude to them.
2
Amartya Sen, The Argumentative Indian. Writings on Indian History,
Culture and Identity (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2005), pp. 3-33.
3
The Argumentative Indian, p. 12.
4
The Argumentative Indian, p. 12.
5
The Argumentative Indian, p. 6.
6
The Argumentative Indian, p. 23.
7
The Argumentative Indian, p. 25.
8
Chandogya Upanishad. VII. 1.1-4.
9
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, What is Living and What is Dead in Indian
Philosophy (Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1993), p. 5.
10
Daya Krishna, Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to
Be? in Interpreting Across Boundaries: New Essays in Comparative
Philosophy, eds. Gerald James Larson & Eliot Deutsch (Delhi: Motilal
Banarasidas Publishers, 1989), p. 76.
11
Daya Krishna, Thinking vs Thought. Strategies for Conceptual
Creativity, Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research, Vol. V,
No.2 (1988), pp. 45-57, at pp. 50-51.
12
Daya Krishna, Comparative Philosophy: What It Is and What It Ought to
Be?, p. 75.
13
The Argumentative Indian, p. 30.
14
The Argumentative Indian, p. xiii.
15
The Argumentative Indian, pp. 3-4.
16
Daya Krishna, Thinking vs Thought, p. 50.
17
The two questions referred to by Sen that are asked by Gargi, while
seemingly challenging Yajnavalkya, are one and the same. They represent
the thirst of a seeker to know the ultimate eternal reality which is above the
heavens, beneath the earth and between these two the heaven and the earth
and that which is said to exist in the past, the present and the future (See
D.S. Sarma, The Upanishads: An Anthology [Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya
Bhavan, 1961], p 222). At yet another place in the same Upanishad, when
the discussion is probed further by Gargi, Yajnavalkya warns her by saying,
The Argumentative Tradition in Indian Philosophy 185
O Gargi! Do not ask too much, lest your head should fall off
(maatiiprakshiirmaa te muurdhaa vyapatpadanati! Brihadaranyaka
Upanishad, VII. Up. III.1, 4-9. 7. from D.S. Sharma, p. 216).
18
Sen, The Argumentative Indian, p. 10.
19
Only probable exception to such a religious movement is the Bhakti
movement.
20
The Argumentative Indian, p. 25.
21
Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya has made a significant contribution to Indian
philosophical heritage by reconstructing the philosophical doctrines of
Carvaka.
22
The Argumentative Indian, p. 15.
23
Nalinaksha Dutt, Buddhist Sects in India (Delhi: Motilal Banarasidass.
1998), pp. 15-23.
24
Paul Rutherford, Endless Propaganda: The Advertising of Public Goods.
Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2000), p. 18.
25
See, for example, Jrgen Habermas, The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a Category of Bourgeois Society, tr. Thomas
Burger with Frederick Lawrence (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1991), and
his Further Reflections on the Public Sphere, in Habermas and the Public
Sphere, ed. Craig Calhoun, tr. Thomas Burger (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1992) Though it is not intended to impose the Habermasian paradigm on
Sens view, one should be made aware of the significant discussion
regarding public sphere. The success of the public sphere, as it is pointed
out by Rutherford (Endless Propaganda, p. 18), depends upon; i. the extent
of access (as close to universal as possible), ii. the degree of autonomy
(citizens must be free of coercion), iii. the rejection of hierarchy (so that
each might participate on an equal footing), iv. the rule of law (particularly
the subordination of the state) and v. the quality of participation (the
common commitment to the ways of logic). One can observe problems in
applying all these aspects to the Indian Argumentative tradition and the
consequent creation of a public sphere.
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finding and having a sense of home. This step clearly puts us out of step
with what Bouma-Prediger and Walsh see as the socio-economic and
cultural focus of our times. They use a wild and wide array of resources to
develop this point from philosophers, social scientists, environmentalists
188 Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions
and theologians to the Wizard of Oz and Somewhere over the Rainbow.
Walter Bruggeman and N. T. Wright are their most obvious biblical guides.
Each chapter is followed by a Biblical Interlude, a kind of hermeneutical
theological retelling of biblical stories in relation to current issues of home
and homelessness.
The discussion of home as a redemptive gift in this postmodern
world is bolstered by appeals to Martin Heidegger, David Tracy, Peter
Berger, John Milbank and Jacques Derrida, among many others. Their
arguments are woven into a rich, biblical fabric, along with personal
testimony and stories of urban and rural homeless and migrants, government
hearings, urban planning and environmental studies. Particular cases studied
tend to be from Canada. Poetry and pop music blend with scholarship.
Wendell Berry and Bruce Cockburn provide lyrics and melody, and the
outcome is both heady and heartfelt.
Nine chapters bring the reader through the authors description of a
culture of displacement, amnesia, and homelessness to a phenomenological
description of the meaning of home. From there, they analyze some
practical implications of social, economic, ethnic, and racial factors in
homelessness and displacement worldviews, rights, public policy and
planning, and role of church in these affairs. They then move on to
questions of environment and ecology and the biblical vision of Shalom
homemaking and earthkeeping.
The final chapters provide a Christian biblical response to
postmodern migrants and homeless consumers. Most of us are
programmed to think of homelessness in terms of the vague, cold figures
who wait outside our subway stops in hope of a hand-out, but Bouma-
Prediger and Walsh widen that picture to include even the well-off business
man who spends his time on an airplane and the middle-class family
constantly seeking to sell-off and trade-up their homes. The authors
response is the imaginative construction of hope based on biblical faith,
which they call Redemptive Homecoming. It involves trusting God but
also taking the shackles off our imaginations; we are all homeless, but
there is a home in which our yearning hearts can and will find rest (p. 320).
Bouma-Prediger and Walsh have done us a great service by
emphasizing homelessness and displacement as much more than a real
estate or economic issue. The issue reveals a crisis of worldviews. But they
might have helped their argument with more discussion of the economics of
balance and growth, further exposition of the role of Christian social
thought, and the importance of faith-based organizing. They clearly present
the conflict, even demise, of grand narratives in this postmodern age, but
then proceed to the biblical narrative of redemptive homecoming. For me,
this makes sense but needs the intervening steps of arguing the validity of
Christian and Jewish social principles and showing them in practice. The
volume leads us to a fundamental option in contemporary theology: the
relation between the sacred and the secular. I would love to see this text
discussed and debated in dialogue with Charles Taylors A Secular Age.
Book Reviews 189
The book is an excellent resource for college courses, adult
education programs, and para-liturgies celebrating social justice and/or
environmental themes. However, covering so much ground, the argument
sometimes becomes hard to follow. Summaries and perhaps a few reflection
questions at the end of each chapter would help.
John P. Hogan
Council for Research in Values and Philosophy
Washington, DC
Karim Douglas Crow, ed., Islam, Cultural Transformation, and the Re-
Emergence of Falsafah: Studies Honoring Professor George Francis
McLean on his Eightieth Birthday (Tehran: Iranian Institute of Philosophy,
2008). xiii + 179 pp.
A festschrift in honour of George McLean, O.M.I., Professor Emeritus at
the Catholic University of America and Founder of the Council for
Research in Values and Philosophy, this volume offers ten essays each of
which deals with one or more of the titular themes. The authors were asked
to focus on specific contexts of Muslim cultures with an eye toward
cultural transformation, (p. viii) and further to inspire the contributors to
reflection, Fr. McLean himself provided the following statement:
Given the global social-political and economic transformations
underway, there is a need to shift into a period of social
reconstruction. Philosophy may now draw upon the cultural resources
of many world peoples and apply them in a creative retrieval of the
dignity of persons and societies. What is sought is a new integration
of humanity with nature, of persons with society, and of the secular
with the sacred. (p. viii)
The result is an eclectic volume of topics unified by their common
reflection on the questions how may philosophy emerge from culture? and
how may culture emerge from philosophy?
The first two essays are eminently scholarly in detail and
presentation. Fr. Joseph Kennys contribution, Ibn Sn and the Origin of
Human Life, is a presentation (in Arabic and English) of Book 8, Chapter
16 of Avicennas al-Shif (The Cure), with Fr. Kennys commentary. The
text is a section from Avicennas treatise on animals, in which he presents
his position on the genesis at conception of the sensitive and intellective
souls. Amid critical analysis, Kenny highlights the ways Avicennas
conclusions as a physician and natural philosopher depart from the received
(and Quranic) legal position (fiqh) that spirit is breathed into the flesh
many days after conception.
190 Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions
In the next essay, Is ens per se the Definition of Substance in
Avicenna? Gholamreza Aavani wishes to correct tienne Gilsons answer
to the title question, claiming that Gilson merged two questions into one
(p. 21), namely, the textual question of whether scholars can find the
relevant text in Avicenna and the philosophical question of the
substantiality of God. Aavani points out that Gilson focused only on chapter
4 of tract 8 of Avicennas Metaphysica, which is devoted to special rather
than general metaphysics, and Gilson consequently failed to find Avicenna
teaching that substance is ens per se (as St. Thomas cites, in De potentia
9.7). Aavani also provides an appendix with a translated passage from
Avicennas logical work Kitb al Burhn, in which Avicenna offers an
explicit teaching of the doctrine.
The next four essays offer prescriptions for merging Islamic
philosophy and contemporary secular culture. Karim Crow presents the
thesis that we ought to reconceptualize our understanding of intelligence
away from the predominant information-processing model and toward the
Islamic conception of aql. Aql is comprised of not only narrated reports
(i.e. reason-giving, serving as the basis for legal rulings), but also an
infused wisdom, a light in the heart, amounting to a kind of innate
intelligence in matters of faith. (p. 47) For Crow, reconceptualizing human
intelligence as aql would restore the notion of non-scientific modes of
knowing, thus giving faith a renewed appreciation as being not irrational but
a-rational. He also offers a curious thesis that a misreading al-Ghazls
critique of falsafah has been responsible for the current mistrust in Islamic
intellectual heritage.
Yasien Mohamed presents medieval ethicist Raghib Isfahns
integration of Aristotle within Isfahns own Islamic theory of justice.
Mohamed is writing against viewing the call for the Islamization of
knowledge as meaning that knowledge must be changed to become more
Islamic (whatever this may mean). Against this, Mohamed proposes that
instead we may transform the secular epistemic paradigm which informs
contemporary knowledge, (p. 59) in explanation of which he says that the
secular paradigm will be replaced by an Islamic paradigm elaborated from
our understanding of human nature and creation, and that secular concepts
and terms are replaced or expanded by faith-based conceptions and terms
mediating our own values & concerns. (p. 60) He offers as examples of
such transformations that human law might be expanded by divine intent,
gods may be replaced by One God, and worldly happiness could be
extended to otherworldly happiness. (p. 60) The first is what Isfahn does
with Aristotle, replacing Aristotles notion of human law with divinely
revealed law (Sharah), by regarding justice of the self as the basis for
justice towards others, and bringing in benevolence to temper justice. (p.
75) Mohamed is sympathetic to Islamization as a response to secular
modernity (p. 62) but his worry seems to be that it is not integrative of
other modes of knowledge in the (true philosophic) spirit of e.g., al-Kind,
al-Frb, Ibn Sn, who looked to Hellenic knowledge in conjunction with
Book Reviews 191
Islamic teaching, integrating them into an authentic Islamic worldview.
(p. 62) Mohamed says, Once foreign knowledge is integrated into an
Islamic context, it becomes naturalized and indigenous to Islam. (p. 62)
Isfahns treatment of Aristotle is presented as a model of how secular
knowledge is to be naturalized to Islam (perhaps not fully convincingly,
but that is an especially tall order).
Burhanettin Tatar addresses the severe tension or anxiety (p. 88)
Muslims experience when considering the Quran as achieving a complete
worldview and at the same time offering a re-interpretable living text
relevant to present-day concerns. Tatar identifies this tension between the
letter and the spirit as a split consciousness of many Muslims. He notes
that in the Golden Age of Islam roughly from the time of al-Kinds
school to the Mongol siege of Baghdad in 1258 Muslim jurists held that
the Quran maintains a universal relevance to every human historical and
immaterial condition thanks to the rationally attainable correspondence
between the inherent sapientially ordered nature of thinks and Divine
hukm (wise ordinance). (p. 82) Tatar proposes a Quranic hermeneutic,
influenced by his reading of Hans-Georg Gadamer, whereby the past reveals
itself within the continually unfolding present, which present includes art,
politics, commerce, religious knowledge and rituals, science, daily cultural
practices, customs, and even humor and tragedy; thus tradition becomes
not mere knowledge of the past, but rather the nexus of historical
continuities linking the past and the present. (p. 91) Tatar sees this vision
as consistent with McLeans hermeneutical project to replace culture clash
with complementarity.
Rahim Nohabar, in a substantial essay, presents the position of
Islamic Teaching on the question of a division between public and private
spheres. He distinguishes two issues: first, how Islam treats the public and
private as domains separate from the state, and second, how Islamic
Teachings differ on the public-private demarcation of classical or orthodox
Liberalism. Nohabar offers various examples from early and current Islamic
legal thinking to argue that Islam respects and values individual privacy. At
the same time, Islamic Teachings do not agree with the absolute distinction
between the public and the private sphere as it is recognized in classic
Liberalism. (p. 140) Nohabar notes that the Quran teaches that all aspects
of a Muslims life are under the dominion of a coherent spectrum of
values; the upshot is that Muslim peoples formulate their identity freely
through careful consideration of their Islamic tradition. (p. 131)
The final four essays are very much focused on presenting
McLeans philosophy and approach to culture complementarity. Md. Sirajul
Islams essay is a broad review of how Islam and Hinduism came together
to forge Indian culture. He praises and follows Fr. McLeans goal for a
common global pluralist culture, focusing on the experience of Indian
Muslims. The author ends on a programmatic note: In forging a global
pluralist culture we shall take care to guard their specific identity.
192 Philosophy, Culture, and Traditions
Preserving their unique identities yields a more inclusive cultural whole
sharing certain common characteristics. (p. 110)
Musa S. Dibadjs essay, McLean About Us, suggests that current
globalization cannot offer humans a new anthropology. Dibadj presents
McLean as aim[ing] at an integral reconstruction of the whole in which
another reality, society or culture occupies its place in the ultimate
completeness of the human being. This aspect of McLeans hermeneutics is
all the more remarkable in that no other hermeneutical vision rivals any
comparable theory of the reconstruction or re-creation of culture. (p. 141)
Thus McLeans stance is more promising than the present eighteenth-
century-rooted Enlightenment political philosophy of individualism and
subjectivism.
The final two offerings from Latif H.S. Kazmi and Asna Husin are
reflections on Fr. McLeans dedication and vision. Kazmi, tracking
McLeans accomplishments and emphasizing his scholarship on al-Ghazl,
also praises McLeans firm belief in God as that which oriented him to
serve people of all faiths, to communicate with them and to work out the
modalities for inter-faith, inter-cultural and inter-societal dialogues and for
extracting commonalities between religions, cultural groups and societies.
(p. 157) Husin, reflecting on McLeans remark: I hope Muslims never
become secularized, considers the relevance of McLeans ideology for
modern Indonesia, highlighting the core of Professor McLeans life
mission of forging global cooperation and interchange of philosophical
insights among faith communities and thinking believers to address the vital
concerns of the age for the sake of our common good. (p. 176)
The volume includes a brief and laudatory introductory summary of
Fr. McLeans accomplishments, as well as many statements of his mission,
one of which, from Kazmi, I include here as exemplary of the tone of
reverence taken by various contributors: It is McLeans firm faith,
devotion and commitment which enables him to work insistently in
cultivating the atmosphere of love, togetherness and faithful rational
communication for cross-cultural dialogue, freedom of thought and
expression, respect for human rights, inter-faith understanding, democratic
co-existence, value-based governance and sensible humane unity in
diversity. (p. 157) The essays succeed in addressing issues of importance,
and throughout the book, Father McLeans students, colleagues and
contemporaries very much present him as engaged as a sage seeking
wisdom.
Robbie Moser,
Canisius College,
Buffalo, New York