Society for Comparative Studies in Society and History

Caudillo Politics: A Structural Analysis Author(s): Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen Reviewed work(s): Source: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 9, No. 2 (Jan., 1967), pp. 168-179 Published by: Cambridge University Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/177739 . Accessed: 20/07/2012 14:08
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CA UDILLO POLITICS: A STRUCTURAL ANALYSIS *

The Latin-American of Independence Wars realized long-standing the hope 1 gentry ridthemselves Spanish of thecriollo to of limitations their on ecoFrom beginning theNewWorld nomic political and activities. the of colonies, the Spanishrulers had laboreddiligently checkthe aspirations the to of colonialgentry limiting by their accessto bothland and status. Grants of encomienda yielded to the colonists rights Indianlaborand had up use to produce, nottheownership land.At thesametime, Crown but of the had of to of curtailed ability criollos obtain the titles nobility. Theselimitations had beensupported theprowess Spanish by of arms, effective perhaps even morein keeping at potential competitors bay in Europethanin exercising in viablemilitary control theNewWorld. of The failure thisultimate means of control during Napoleonic the warsfinally calledintoquestion also continued Spanish dominance theAmerican over colonies. In spite thedecline Spanish of of power, however, New World the planter too class proved weaknumerically too lacking cohesion oustthe in and to Peninsular forces itsownunaided by To efforts. gaintheir independence own into with numerically weretherefore forced political alliances the they strong and highly mobile yetat thesametimeeconomically, socially politiand callydisprivileged social strataof the population whichare designated from ments derived these them do battle to propertyless andsent strata against theSpaniards (Wolf,1955). Successin maintaining continuing the loyalties of theseelements of depended largely upon the ability leadersin building ties with in leading in personal of loyalty their following and them ventures of successful pillage. The emerging pattern colonial had prototypes. Landowners longmainhad tained armed retainers their on of ownestates. creation a colonial The army
* Some of the arguments forward put here were first presented a paper entitled in "Cultural Dimensions the Caudillo Complex",read by Eric R. Wolf and EdwardC. of Hansen at the 63rd Annual Meetingof the AmericanAnthropological Association, Detroit,on November20, 1964, in the symposium The Presentation Self in on of HispanicCulture, organized Anthony by Lauria Jr. I Literallytranslated, criollo means a personof Spanish ancestry born in the New World. 2 Literally translated, mestizomeans a personof mixedSpanishand Indian ancestry.

Not without as criolloleaders armed elecollectively mestizos.2 trepidation,

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had underwritten creation suchlocalized the of militia. Mexico,forinIn stance, "theviceroy themilitary and authorities found convenient a it that militia at oneandthesametime landlord themenwhoserved be the of under his command" (Wolf,1955, 192). The Spanish government thusconhad of to tributed paradoxically thediminution itsownpowerand to theformationof manylocal powercenters. the additional Yet instep of granting bothto retainers to other dependent armament and potential elemilitary ments thepopulation in entailed risks. the further Although alliance criollos of inwinning WarsofIndependence, andmestizos instrumental was the granting armsto themestizo elements freed theseto create ownarmed their bands. in The mestizos turnwerethusenabledto compete withthe criollos for available wealth. The case of Venezuela, whileuniquein its extreme manithis nevertheless demonstrates new and continent-wide festations, of ability to ownbehalf. themestizos act on their Theretheroyalists wereoriginally victorious granting lianeroplainsmen, the criollo by formerly retainers, pillage rights against their ownmasters. Havingeliminated their own masters, the llaneros then turned upontheroyalists massacred in and them an effort to obtain additional (Hansen, loot 1965). In granting independent to armament themestizos, the therefore, criollo also gentry sacrificed chance might it any of havehad to establish monopoly power. a The beneficiaries thisdistribution weaponry of of werethe leaderson horseback, caudillos,3 resultant the the political system, caudillaje. came It to be marked foursalient characteristics: therepeated by (1) of emergence armed ties patron-client cemented personal of dominance subsets, by and mission, by a common and to desire obtain wealth force arms;(2) the of by lackofinstitutionalized for to means succession offices; theuseofviolence (3) inpolitical competition; (4) therepeated and of failures incumbent to leaders guarantee tenures chieftains. paperis concerned an analysis their as This with of thispolitical system, witha search its causesand consequences. and for It alsowishes suggest this bestaccomplished an understanding to that is by of thesystem LatinAmerican in terms, rather in terms concepts than of derived from in events Europe.The broaddiffusion military of poweramong wide of strata thepopulation differentiates LatinAmerican the experience from whathappened Europe;caudillaje, Richard Morsehas aptly in as M. said, the "deranges predictable interplay hierarchical of class relations" (Morse,
1954, 79). The Criollo in Politics: "Anarchy"and Alliance

The desire makeuse ofEuropean to models analyzing LatinAmerican in the experience also obscured role of the criollos has the during "stateof the
3 Caudillois besttranslated chieftain. as The termderived from Latin caput,head. the Caudillajerefers the condition caudillocompetition rule. to of and

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Thus numerous historians appear Independence. anarchy"whichset in after to be speakingfromthe European pointof view whentheysee the dominant and (e.g. Worcester politicalmotifof thisperiod in "the quest for stability" in seemsto implicit suchformulations Schaeffer, 1962, 414). The assumption would fulfill in the same role in commercialdevelopment be that stability in Latin Americathatit had fulfilled Europe. It may be argued,on the conwas a natubeinganathemato the criollos anarchy trary, - farfrom that of ral condition theirexistence. thatcriollo wealthwas ultimately upon the hacienda: We mustnot forget hybridin its ends, the haciendaprovedstrangely Organizedfor commercial in features whichseem oddlycontradictory characteristics.combined practice It it in little sell. to in theory. Gearedto sell products a market yetaimedat having with madeinefficient of it. Operating use large Voracious land,it deliberately for worker between it personalized relations the numbers workers, nevertheless of it to a a and owner. Created produce profit, consumed largepartof itssubstance of have called displays wealth.Some writers in conspicuous and unproductive landowner over becauseit involved ruleof a dominant the theinstitution 'feudal', But whichcomhis dependent laborers. it lackedthelegal guarantees security of and self-determination. Others the feudalserffor his lack of liberty pensated and from different thecommercial havecalledit 'capitalist', so itwas,butstrangely in in with commerestablishments agriculture whichwe are familiar themodern half'capitalist', between cial and industrial world.Half 'feudal', past and caught of it characteristics bothwaysof life,as well as theirinherent future, exhibited contradictions. (Wolf,1958, 204). in The success of thishybridinstitution the period afterIndependencewas conunderanarchiccommercial to in largemeasuredue to its ability flourish whichhad dependedupon mercanditions.Duringthisperiod all industries tilistprotection were buried under the onslaughtof the open market;even to of the ground a halt.Yet thehacienda mining, motor thecolonialeconomy, the survivedand flourished. could withstand vagaries of supply and deIt to mand,because - in slack periods- it could return self-sufficiency. If the hacienda provided a bulwark of defense against the laissez-faire of market,the hacienda systemitselfmilitatedagainst the development a techcohesivepoliticalassociationof hacienda owners.Geared to a stagnant the hacienda nology,yet under repeated pressuresto expand production, tendedto "eat up" land, in orderto controlthe populationsettledupon the the to land. The aim of each hacienda was ultimately producecrops through arithmetic additionof workers, each one of whom laboringwithhis traditionaltools- wouldcontribute increasethesumof produceat thedisposal to of the estate. While in some parts of Latin America,notablyin the Andes and in Middle America,the expansionist tendencies thehacienda could be of in directedagainst Indian communities, areas withoutIndians a hacienda hacienda. Not surprisingly, could expand only at the expenseof neighboring we therefore, findthat blood feuds among hacienda owners are a notable

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feature thisperiod: of each hacendado's bitterest enemy potentially was his In closest neighbor. thiscompetition mustfindthe economic we rootsof criollo anarchy. Sucheconomic determinantsanarchy of werereinforced further social by organizational factors. Competition conflict theeconomic and on planecould, to someextent, compensated through workings kinship. be for the of Arnold Strickon, writing aboutArgentina (1962), has notedthatthecriollo kinship is system radically different thatof other from classesin Argentine society, in its tendency buildup extensive to non-unilineal kindreds. correctly He ascribed variation thefactthatthedifferent this to classeshave differential accessto strategic resources. notes, others He as havedone(e.g.Crow,1946, and of 620; Worcester Schaeffer, 1962,414), thegrowth regional aristocratic families their and rolein national We politics. do notyetpossessadequate were how dataonhowsuchalliances were formed, many people and involved, howmuchterritory covered. Theoretical lead they considerations, however, us to believethatthe organizing musthave been powerof such alliances relatively weak.If we assume that hacienda owners favored maintenance the of largeestates inheritance primogeniture; assumefurther if we through by thatthechances equal thatthechief are heirwillbe either maleor female; andifwe postulate eachhacienda that to owner strives maximize number the ofhis alliances, then seemsunlikely thenumber strategic it that of alliances based on landedproperty between hacendado a of and other family origin hacendado of will The families procreation exceedthree. marriage Father of with Father's Wifecreates one suchalliance; marriage thefirst-born of the sonwith woman another a of swells number two;and themarto family the son riageof the eldestdaughter withthefirst of a third family brings the number strategic of alliances three. to These considerations intended are to yielda measure insight theinability thecriollo of into of gentry form to a wide-ranging network strategic of alliances political for purposes. Parenthetically, considerations throw such also light thetendencies on of theLatin American gentry secludewomen. to William Goode (1959) has suggested every that society needsto curblovein order preserve social to its structure. Cultural restrictions lovepermit in upon rational choices theconstruction alliances, of while barring emotions from affecting choices the made. If kinship alliances concerted males are crucialto the maintenance by of property, females then become strategic a resource, symbolizing property and status capableof beingjoinedtogether. manystrictures The placedon the sexualactivities gentry of women Latin America in disposeone to accept Gilberto Freyre's description thehacienda House as a female's of Big prison (1963, passim). Suchextreme seclusion couldbe directed toward protecting women from interclass entanglements seekers status power with for and from disadvantaged groups, certainly motive mestizo a as aspirants powerbeto camemore numerous important. it also served reduce matchand Yet to the

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owner's maker's fearthata hacienda daughter might becomeinvolved with in thewrong haciendaowner's son,i.e. a partner a non-strategic alliance. Femaleseclusion thus seenas still may be another indication thedifficulties of involved concerting in alliances among criollo gentry families. on overland and limitations thenumbers kindsof alliances and Rivalry thusrender owners both of opento thehacienda intelligible thegrowth regionalkindreds, the constant and antagonistic relationships between such thesefactors for kindreds. thesametime, At account thestrong opposition shown suchkindreds anyeffort form centralized to a Such by to government. would inevitably have possessedgreater a government, established, once built from units. thananykindred power alliance, up three-family Economic thus to and socialorganization conspired guarantee political the disunity of thecriollos theperiodafter in demise. Spanish Rise of theMestizo for The Warsof Independence initiated periodof political a apprenticeship of society. we view class relations defined If as the mestizo elements by differential the of accessto strategic resources, social position the mestizo can be defined simply his lack of accessto suchresources. by Mestizo was, in fact, morethana blanket no for forced term the"dispossessed": Indians and outof their manumitted run-away and communities, slaves, illegitimate of and unclaimed and offspring criollos non-criollo women, thedescendants ofimpoverished colonists the such (Marshall, 1939). During colonial period allocated socialpositions; survive, to peoplehad no accessto formally they out had to live largely their by wits, ferreting whatextra-legal possibilities existed themargins in theinterstices theestablished on or of order. Mostof to these were of possibilities opened in thecourse attempts thecriollos up by circumvent mercantilist the controls the metropolis. of From the mestizo were the of category, therefore, drawn cattle the rustlers, buyers sellers and clandestine property, go-betweens legal middlemen: short, the and in the of whoseillicit made colonialsociety gamut undercover agents transactions work. the werethusforced relyon a category the to Paradoxically, criollos of which bothhatedand feared. a society population they In which demanded thateveryone adhere to rigidly his niche, they weredrawn intodependence on socially mobile elements which calledintoquestion very the existence of thatsocialorder. spiteof thefactthat mestizo theunrecognized In the was the allyof thecriollo, criollo gentry cameto castblameon themestizo for precisely those their activities daily "of own that subverted order society an of they wereformally committed uphold" to (Wolf, 1958,238), an ambivalence fedcontinuously thecontradiction by between socialideal and reality.

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By arming in mestizo elements thecourse theWarofIndependence, of the the criollos the for finally granted mestizo means gaining alternative forms of and wealth powergained wealth power, and endeavor. through political Alto ready trained their colonialexperience be forever thelookout by on for theupholders theestablished newpossibilities envisaged not of by and order, this in skilledalso through experience the manipulation interpersonal of was the into relationships, mestizo nowpropelled thepolitical arenaarmsin set hand.The resultant ofactivities continuous that thepast:the was with of of did advent themestizo notconstitutesocialrevolution; formation a the of armed owncaudillos, mestizo bands, captained their by constitutedsimple a of widening therangeof economic in activities which had already enthey under oldregime. the Political gaged warfare continued socialstrategy mestizo the of through acquisition newtactics. The Caudilloand His Organization In analyzing caudillo the modeofpolitical organization, areforced rely we to on materials withcaudilloswho made their dealing felt influence on the national level.The available literature mainly deals with maximal the bands, on butshedslittle light how theminimal bandsof chieftains followers and werefirst formed. caudillos The whoemerged thelight day are thus into of all leaderswho proved capable of welding seriesof structurally a similar minimal bands into maximal a coalition, capableofexercising dominance over wideregions. datadealing The with suchnational caudillos, however, permit some generalizations aboutthe patterns coalition of formation, about the distribution wealth theleaderto his band,and aboutthe sources of by of strength fragility. are also enabledto makecertain political and We combetween different the parisons problems facedby mestizo criollo and chiefIn tains. ourdiscussion, shallemploy ethnographic we the present. The aimofthecaudillo bandis togainwealth; tactic the employed essenis For tially pillage. theretainers, correct selection a leader paramount. of is No retainer guarantee he willreceive can that recompense from leaderin his becausetheband seeksto obtainwealth advance, whichis not yetin its All possession. knowthatthewealth sought after finite; is onlycertain resources "safegame".The band cannotattack are withimpunity basic the sources criollo of wealth, suchas land;andit cannot sequester, without international the complications, property foreign of firms operating the area. in Hencethere notonly is intense competition movable for but resources, great skillis required diagnosing in which resources currently are "available" and which taboo. The exercise powertherefore of givesrise to a code which regulates modeofaccessto resources. coderefers twobasicattrithe The to butesof leadership: first, interpersonal neededto keep theband the skills

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through second,the acumen requiredto cementtheserelationships together; skills is the of the correctdistribution wealth. Possession of interpersonal will thatthe second attribute it to initialprerequisite; suggests the retainers also be fulfilled. is of The social idiom in whichthe first these attributes discussedis that what has of masculinity constitutes the social assertion of "masculinity": come to be knownas machismo(frommacho, masculine).Accordingto the in is idiom,masculinity demonstrated two ways: by the capacityto dominate and by thereadinessto use violence.These two capacitiesare closely females, relationsbetweenmen. The capacityto related;both point to antagonistic capacityto best othermen in the comdominatewomenimpliesthe further on of focusing the over females.But the vocabulary sexual relations, petition females males and passive,suffering betweenactive and aggressive interplay male bests another in and agressive also coverssituations whichone dominant casts him in the role of the submissiveand passive whose defeatthereby relain (Paz, 1961, 65-88). Assertionof masculinity interpersonal sufferer leaderand a following betweena dominant tionsthusimpliesa social ordering his whichsuffers dominanceand admireshis prowess.The themeof sexual in shouldalso be read againstthewidersocial background, which competition theirhold on property symbolizes femaleseclusionon the part of the gentry of on and status.The assertion masculinity the partof the caudillo threatens to thatmonopoly;like thepossessionof arms,it "threatens derangethe preclass relations"(Morse, 1954, 79). of dictableinterplay hierarchical in of Assertions dominanceare testedin numerousencounters, whichthe claiments. againstotherpotential leadermusttesthimself potential are isolatedby poor Latin Americanrural communities frequently Although from timeto the are into communication facilities, local caudillos thrown contact and card carousing, in such as drinking, playing, time... occasionally activities a accepthis authority automatically brawling, man so standsout thatthe others and extendto him theirloyalties. (Stokes,1952, 448). Such situations chargedwithpotentialviolence,for in such antagonistic are to mustbe preparedto kill theirrivals confrontations, claimants victory the For the loser thereis no middle and to demonstrate willingness this publicly. to or ground;he mustsubmitto the winner, be killed.Willingness riskall in The drama involvedin such such encounters further is proofof masculinity. episode in the rise of a by tests of leadershipis illustrated the following Boliviancaudillo (Crow, 1946, 623): sexual to given thewildest MarianoMelgarejo, ignorant drunken an and murderer the got from 1864-71.Melgarejo intopowerby killing orgies, ranthecountry ... tookplacebefore palace.The shooting in dictator, country's Belzui, thepresidential of a great crowd in which had gathered theplaza to see themeeting thetworivals. to strode the WhenBeIzui dead intothearmsof one of his escorts, Melgarejo fell for?'The mob, window exclaimed: and 'Belz(iis dead.Now who are you shouting cry:'Viva Melgarejo!' of threw itsfearand gave a bestial thusprompted,

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Personal leadership thuscreatea successful may band; by thesametoken, of however, personal the nature leadership threatens maintenance. also band If thecaudillo killedor dies of natural is causes,theband willdisintegrate The becausethere be no institutionalized can successor. qualities leaderof To it shipreside hisperson, in theoffice. establish system offices in not a of to would havebeennecessary reorganize post-Independence society. Attempts in this were direction continuously thwarted criollo one by arms; has to note in of thedefeat the"centralists" all parts LatinAmerica. of Proofof masculinity notyetmakea man a caudillo. does Men willnot flockto his banner unlesshe also proveshimself capableof organizing a of number minimal bands into a maximal his faction, and demonstrates to To ability hold thefaction together. thisend,the caudillomustweld a number lieutenants a core of "right-hand of into men" (hombres conde in fianza). Important this of followers notmerely is creation a coreofdevoted of assertion dominance, also calculated but to individuals gift-givingfavored withloyalty. who are expected reciprocate to Such gifts may consistof movable goods, money, perquisites as theright pillage given or such to a area or socialgroup. of suchgifts bestunderstood a prestais The importance as tion favors of defined merely objects, also as attributes thegiver. not as but of Where receiver the with counter-gift wouldpartake which cannot respond a he of to with equally hisownpersonal attributes, is expected respond loyalty, of for or that he makes gift hisperson a more lesslimited is, a period time. of of men The existence sucha coreofright-hand produces owndemonstraits to of tioneffect. Theyare living testimony thelargesse thecaudillo aspirant in to riches return personal for andto hiscommitmentgrant support. To satisfy desire riches, caudillo this for the must exhibit further abilities. We havealready discussed someof thelimitations under which caudillo the laborsin acquiring wealth: there certain are groups maynotattack he with To impunity. castaboutin questofriches resistance maystir resistance; may imply defeat. be successful, To a caudillo needswhatwe maycall therefore, "accessvision", related the"business to acumen" the of capabilities closely North He American entrepreneur. must able to diagnose be resources which are available seizure for witha minimum resistance thepartof their of on present owners. must He how estimate muchwealth neededto satisfy is his retainers. must He the of also control freelance activities his followers, such as cattle and lest mobilize resistance effective of the rustling robbery, they vetogroups. must able to estimate He be the correctly forces thedisposal at ofthose in presently control resources; he must able to predict of and the be behavior powerof potential and competitors theseizure wealth. in of Nor canhe rest content initial with success hisendeavors. must in He continuously find newsources wealth of which be distributed his following, he can to or must attach which resources replenish themselves. Initial successes thereare forefrequently followed sudden by failures: manycaudillo ventures as end

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The "one-shot" undertakings. caudillo may successful seizing governbe in the or of menttreasury thereceipts a custom house;thenno other sourceof The wealth found, thefaction is and disintegrates. morelimited supply the of ofready wealth, morerapidtheturnover caudillos. the ThusBolivia, one countries this of themostimpoverished during period, averaged morethan of one violent change government year(Crow,1946,620). every with to thecriollo ties It follows this the from that caudillo gentry possesses The deniedto his mestizo advantages counterpart. criollomaybe able to of at whenliquid drawon his own wealth thebeginning his undertaking; to from ownestate. his wealth grows scarce, can retrench provide he booty this of it However much a burden mayputownresources, can enablehimto caudillo whilethemestizo of weather period scarcity, a requires continuing abundance. eventhemostsuccessful Such considerations affected caudillos, such as ManuelRosas. Paez heldswayin Venezuela 33 for JoseA. Patez Juan and for years(1830-63); Rosas dominated Argentina twenty years(1829-31, which furnished quan1835-52).Bothowned enormous cattle ranches large Both their of retainers the from tities beef, staple thecountryside. drew of the the in ranks thefierce of cowpunchersthetallgrass of prairie, gauchos Argenof whosemodeof livelihood tinaand theIlaneros Venezuela provided ideal for Timeand again, bothmendefeated atpreparation caudillo warfare. the forms government. the tempts rivals setup centralized of to of Despite initial control "natural" of their of and advantages abundant wealth, military forces, of both their to a ability neutralize largenumber competitors, however, men met had to beat offnumerous armed uprisings, bothultimately defeat. and the whichbesetcaudillosoperating Theircases illustrate difficulties even conditions. under optimal Salient Weaknesses theCaudilloOrganization of The caudilloorganization mustthusface alwaysthe threat insufficient of At thesametime, is also threatened within, thevery it from "pay-off". by of nature thesocialtieswhich holdit together. Thereare,at anyone time, moremenqualified becomecaudillos, aspiring demonstrate or always to to their capabilities potential as chieftains, there caudillos. than are Suchcompetition necessarily encourages rivalry within band forthe position the of chieftainship. Usually salient the rivalis one of thecaudillo's own"menof confidence",person a whois himself leaderof menwithin framework a the of themaximal band.LatinAmerica's political history during period this is therefore expectably with rife examples treachery influential of by underlings. ThusPaiez wasbetrayed Monagas, whom had granted by to he titular control overthegovernment, Rosas by his ownGeneral and Urquiza(Crow,1946, 610). In theabsenceof institutional controls, caudillo the himself only can

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guesswhether subordinates loyalor disloyal. his are The classicloyalty test in occurs meet head-on violent when rivals in of encounter, a situation public confrontation. a situation Such demands retainers a stand; that take must they "declare themselves" for one of theprotagonists. (declararse) or against If stand their they by their leader, support constituteskindof voteof confia dence;ifthey desert his will him, career cometo an end.Suchvotesof confidence take variousforms. Rosas' gauchoretainers deserted him on the fieldof battle. GarciaMoreno, theocratic caudilloof Ecuador,was assasin sinated plainviewof his followers; Mexico'sSanta Anna was declared "for"'and "against" the crises hisgovernment of repeatedly, in during many its relations withFranceand the UnitedStates(Worcester Schaeffer, and 1962,538). A far-sighted caudillo welladvised planhisroute escape is to of from country advance themoment the in of his when retainers transfer their loyalty another, he wishes liveto fight to if to another in an attempt day to to return power.
Caudillaje and ModernLatin America

Thispaperhas presented model caudillo a of organization, has explored and thecausesunderlying political this We phenomenon. have seenthereasons foritsemergence theinability anysocio-economic to monopolize in of class both and in sufficiently wealth power order organize centralized to a political whileendowed apparatus. Criollos, withwealth, lackedthe economic and social cohesion developthe wide-mesh to coalitions necessary control to government. mestizos, the otherhand,lackedthe permanent The on and replenishable sources wealth of necessary support to wide-ranging political In activity. theabsence a framework institutional of for politics, LatinAmerican politics becamepersonalized. In spiteof its chaotic appearance, cautdillaje was a truepolitical system, an organized effort thepartof competing on to groups determine got who whenand where. thecriollo what, For caudillo, possession control of often guaranteed temporary a of position preference dealings in with foreign trade for interests; themestizo meant it accessto a new arenain which seek to wealth. Giventhe terms competition, of violence constitutes predictable a aspectof the system. Leadership be achieved can onlythrough violence; resources claimed onlythrough and violence; thebalanceof power between criollos, and mestizos foreign traders maintained vetogroup only by violence a whooverstepped bounds. against caudillo his Whiletheendemic threat of violence rendered uncertain tenure anyone caudillo, the of however, the in endit served stabilize system caudillaje a whole. to the of as We have argued thatthesystem depended upona particular balancebetween criollos, mestizos, foreign and interests. are thusarguing We implicitly that caudillo the system couldpersist onlyas longas this balanceofinterests

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to who investigators continue see in thus takeissuewith We prevailed. would down thepresent to in system LatinAmerica political the caudillaje dominant behavior of 1962). Whilemuch thecode of caudillo day (e.g. Tannenbaum, to idiomof machismo, readiness use violence, survives in a continuing was loyalties by the 1870's the caudillosystem personalized gift-giving, of and system, dictatorships"order progress". the way giving to a newpolitical functhe features, dictator somecaudillo exhibited dictatorships While these predicated machinery, centralized governmental withan increasingly tioned balanceof socialforces. different upona very was caudillaje thesenew dictatorships trigto from The cycleof change which the marked onset of depression 1873-86, European by gered thegreat overabroad.Where expansion at ofprotectionismhomeand of imperialist by characterized thesimple this had beenlargely before time seas expansion of and countries theconversion these of the extraction goodsfrom dependent beganto the on goodsintocommodities thehomemarket, newimperialists in of sectors production the of certain in heavily thetransformation invest in this majorchanges theproareas.In LatinAmerica, signalled dependent in industry, of duction cash crops;it also resulted thegrowth somelight of - with built-in its the in areas.Mostsignificantly, hacienda primarily urban of market becamea thing thepast.Large defenses the against laissez-faire witnessedwholea but intact, they might remain estates criollo-owned landed to hacienda themechalabor-intensive from saletransformation plant oftheir to spurleading with complete railroad plantation, nizedandcapital-intensive thenearest port. the institutions, of the This transformation required development credit of of and the stabilization currencies, improvement widening thenetwork of of demanded modicum political a requirements these In turn, transportation. of Thisneedwas metbytheforging pillage. and stability an endto anarchic of criollo oligarchies landowners interests native and alliances between foreign could for and progress of The and merchants. stability suchalliances order of forces. localrepresentative The armed be guaranteed theuse offoreign by in but caudillo origin, often a the suchan alliance typically newdictator, was the from derived no in His no longer caudillo function. recompense longer a it by pillageof "free"resources; was furnished the alliance.In systematic forcibly neutralizing policeforce, he as turn, functioned head of an alliance of was Porfirio dictator thistype to The prototypical all threats thealliance. pan slogan o palo His 1876-1911. expressive Diaz whoruled Mexicobetween wealth (pan) of or functions hisgovernment: the (bread club)symbolizes twin potential of the to thebeneficiaries thealliance, use of force(palo) against excommerce built, industry weredredged, harbors Thus challengers. while were Mexico'sprisons capitalpouredintothecountry, pandedand foreign to filled capacity. and of by represented thealliances order progThe newbalanceofpower

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on ressspelled endofthecaudillo horseback. thenational the On level, they produced dictatorships underwritten At byforeign guarantees. thesametime, of they drovethemestizos, deprived resources which wouldhave enabled in themto participate the alliance, seek countervailing coalitions with to in groups hitherto not represented thepolitical process. Theyturned the to of rural population thehinterland. of Everywhere raised slogans land they the and reform, populareducation mass participation politics. countries in In Indiancomponents, countervailing with these strong alliances formed under of theideological banner Indianism, utopian a ideology envisaged synthat a thesis the industrial withthe glorious of age Indianpast; elsewhere they groped towards form another populism one or of (Worsley, 1964, 164-167). Castin theorganizational ofmassparties thePeruvian form like APRA, the for Mexican substituted theinsurrectionary PRM, or theBolivian MPR, they different ofleadership, in caudillo very a type skilled themanagement the of "organizational weapon"employed synchronize to divergent group interests. in Thuspolitics modern LatinAmerica no longer is caudillo politics; is a it conflict between of alliances orderand progress many-sided ranged against populist coalitions.
ERIC R. WOLF

and
EDWARD C. HANSEN

University Michigan of References Cited

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