Crim Pro Digests
Crim Pro Digests
Crim Pro Digests
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indecisiveness by relying on the public prosecutors assurance that his court had acquired jurisdiction. - Aside from this instance, there were two other occasions when Beltran was charged and found guilty of gross ignorance of the law (in De Austria v. Beltran and Andres v. Beltran). DISPOSITION Judge Beltran was found guilty of gross ignorance of the law for which he is fined P20,000 as recommended by the OCA and is warned that a repetition of the same act would merit a graver penalty.
Criminal Procedure
- The Municipality of Ligao was converted into a city by RA 9008 which took effect on Feb 21, 2001. This law, also known as the charter of the City of Ligao, provides in Sec. 50 that: (a) There shall be established in the city a prosecution service to be headed by a city prosecutor and such number of assistant prosecutors as may be necessary, who shall be organizationally part of the DOJ (b) The City Prosecutor shall handle the criminal prosecution in the MTC in the city as well as in the RTC for criminal cases originating in the territory of the city, and shall render to or for the city such services as are required by law, ordinance or regulation of the DOJ - Clearly, respondent judge had no more authority to conduct a preliminary investigation of the subject criminal complaint. The officer authorized to conduct preliminary investigations in the then newly-created City of Ligao was its City Prosecutor. At that time, the duty devolved upon OIC City Prosecutor Vasquez, despite the administrative difficulties he was encountering. 2. YES - We noticed the contradiction between her answer and her motion for reconsideration as to what she actually conducted on November 29, 2001. In her answer, she justified her authority to conduct a preliminary investigation. In her motion for reconsideration of the OCAs resolution, however, she declared that she conducted a preliminary examination to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest -There appear just too many intriguing uncertainties surrounding the filing of the estafa case. We therefore direct our attention to respondent judges failure to erase our doubts over how she administers justice in her jurisdiction. - Respondent judge must be reminded that she should do honor to her position not only by rendering just, correct and impartial decisions but doing so in a manner free from any suspicion as to their fairness and impartiality, and as to her integrity. A spotless dispensation of justice requires not only that the decision rendered be intrinsically fair but that the judge rendering it must at all times maintain the appearance of fairness and impartiality. - Considering all this, respondent judge committed simple misconduct in office. Misconduct in office has a well-defined meaning. It refers to misconduct that affects the judges performance of her duties and not just her character as a private individual. To constitute an administrative offense, misconduct should relate to or be connected with the performance of the official functions and duties of a public officer. 3. YES - Respondent correctly observed that it was not needed in the estafa case. The maximum penalty for the crime allegedly committed there (6 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months) did not meet the minimum penalty (at least 4 years, 2 months and 1 day) required to make a preliminary investigation part of the spouses right to due process. 4. YES - As long as the constitutional mandate was complied with, that is, the warrant of arrest was issued upon a finding of probable cause personally by the judge after an examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, the warrant of arrest was valid. - Respondent judge examined the complainant Pedro Vega on the day the complaint was filed and she was satisfied that probable cause existed. The warrant of arrest she issued against the spouses Ribaya was,
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therefore, justified and no violation of their constitutional rights occurred. DISPOSITION Respondent Judge Aurora Binamira-Parcia is hereby found guilty of simple misconduct and a fine of P11,000 is imposed on her. She is hereby directed to devote her time and effort exclusively to discharging her judicial functions. She is furthermore warned that a repetition of the same or similar act will merit a more severe penalty.
Criminal Procedure
3. WON the trial court err in granting private complainants motion for reconsideration/retrial 4. WON the assailed orders violate petitioners constitutional right against double jeopardy HELD 1. NO Ratio Only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction which he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Reasoning - Sec. 7 Rule 120 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, provides: Sec. 7. Modification of judgment - A judgment of conviction may, upon motion of the accused, be modified or set aside before it becomes final or before appeal is perfected. Except where the death penalty is imposed, a judgment becomes final after the lapse of the period for perfecting an appeal, or when the sentence has been partially or totally satisfied or served, or when the accused has waived in writing his right to appeal, or has applied for probation. - It is thus clear that only the accused may ask for a modification or setting aside of a judgment of conviction. And this he must do before the said judgment becomes final or before he perfects his appeal. Such judgment becomes final in any of the following ways: (a) when no appeal is seasonably filed by the accused, except in case of automatic review of the decision imposing the capital penalty; (b) when he has partially or totally served his sentence; (c) when he expressly waives his right to appeal the judgment, except when the death penalty is imposed; or (d) when he applies for probation. When a judgment becomes final, the trial court which rendered the judgment of conviction loses jurisdiction to alter, modify, or revoke it. 2. YES Ratio The waiver by the accused of his right to appeal from a judgment of conviction has the effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable. Reasoning - It is an undisputed fact that after the promulgation of the judgment of conviction, petitioner filed a manifestation expressly waiving his right to appeal therefrom. His intention not to appeal is further indicated by his prayer in the same manifestation for the immediate issuance of a commitment order so he could serve his sentence. Such waiver has the effect of causing the judgment to become final and unalterable. Thus, it was beyond the authority of the trial court to issue the order of May 3, 2000 setting aside its Feb.3, 2000 Decision which had attained finality. 3. YES Ratio When the MFR of the judgment of conviction is not initiated by the accused or at the instance of the trial court with the consent of the accused, the same should be denied outright. Reasoning - Sec. 1 Rule 121 of the same Rules provides: Sec.1. New trial or reconsideration At any time before a judgment of conviction becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.
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- Since the MFR of the judgment of conviction was not initiated by the accused or at the instance of the trial court with his consent, the same should have been denied outright as being violative of the above provision. At any rate, the records do not show any irregularity in the preliminary investigation of the case before the Provincial Prosecutors Office. 4. YES Ratio The right against double jeopardy prohibits any subsequent prosecution of any person for a crime of which he has previously been acquitted or convicted. Reasoning - To invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites must be present: (1) a valid complaint or information; (2) the court has jurisdiction to try the case; (3) the accused has pleaded to the charge; and (4) he has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. - These requisites have been established. Records show that petitioner was charged with homicide under a valid information before the trial court which has jurisdiction over it. He was arraigned and pleaded guilty to the charge. On the basis of his plea, petitioner was convicted and meted the corresponding penalty. As petitioner has been placed in jeopardy for the crime of homicide, he cannot be prosecuted anew for the same offense, or any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged. DISPOSITION The petition is granted. The assailed orders dated May 3, 2000 and May 26, 2000 issued by the trial court are set aside. Its decision dated Feb. 1, 2000 is reinstated.
Criminal Procedure
On Election of Remedies - In its broad sense, election of remedies refers to the choice by a party to an action of one of two or more coexisting remedial rights, where several such rights arise out of the same facts, but the term has been generally limited to a choice by a party between inconsistent remedial rights, the assertion of one being necessarily repugnant to, or a repudiation of, the other. In its more restricted and technical sense, the election of remedies is the adoption of one of two or more coexisting ones, with the effect of precluding a resort to the others. - no binding election occurs before a decision on the merits is had or a detriment to the other party supervenes - it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the prosecution of the civil action that corresponds to the estafa case, should the latter also be filed. The crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from each other. There is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses charged in the informations are perfectly distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly they may be connected in point of fact - In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not intend to leave the offended parties without any remedy to protect their interests in estafa cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of Court is limited in the sense that rules shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Private complainants intervention in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only for the prosecution of her interests, but also for the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice as mandated by the Constitution. DISPOSITION Petition is DISMISSED and the assailed order AFFIRMED
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- On March 22, 1978, The Undersecretary of Justice Hon Catalino Macaraig Jr, resolving the petition for review, reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. The Provincial Fiscal filed a motion to dismiss for insufficiency of evidence on April 10, 1978. On November 24 1978, The Judge denied the motion and set the arraignment - The accused filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with petition for the issuance of preliminary writ of prohibition and/or temporary restraining order in the CA. On January 23 1979, a restraining order was issued by the CA against the threatened act of arraignment of the accused. However, in a decision of October 25 1979, the CA dismissed the petition and lifted the restraining order of Jan 23,1979. The motion for reconsideration of the accused was denied in a resolution. ISSUE WON the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits HELD YES Ratio Once an information is filed in court, the courts prior permission must be secured if fiscal wants to reinvestigate the case. While it is true that the fiscal has the quasi judicial discretion to determine whether or not a criminal case should be filed in court or not, once the case had already been brought to Court, whatever disposition the fiscal may feel should be proper in the case thereafter should be addressed for the consideration of the Court. DISPOSITION Petition dismissed
STA. ROSA MINING v ZABALA 153 SCRA 367 BIDIN; August 31, 1987
NATURE Mandamus to compel respondent Fiscal to prosecute Criminal Case No. 821 of the then Court of First Instance of Camarines Norte until the same is terminated. FACTS - On March 21, 1974, petitioner filed a complaint for attempted theft of materials (scrap iron) forming part of the installations on its mining property at Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte against private respondents Romeo Garrido and Gil Alapan with the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Camarines Norte, then headed by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. - The case was assigned to third Assistant Fiscal Esteban P. Panotes for preliminary investigation who, after conducting said investigation, issued a resolution dated August 26, 1974 recommending that an information for Attempted Theft be filed against private respondents on a finding of prima facie case which resolution was approved by Provincial Fiscal Joaquin Ilustre. Private respondents sought reconsideration of the resolution but
Criminal Procedure
ISSUE WON the fiscal can be compelled to prosecute the case after his motion to dismiss has been denied HELD YES - This court is of the view that the writ prayed for should issue. Notwithstanding his personal convictions or opinions, the fiscal must proceed with his duty of presenting evidence to the court to enable the court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to the culpability of the accused. The fiscal should not shirk from his responsibility much less leave the prosecution of the case at the hands of a private prosecutor. At all times, the criminal action shall be prosecuted under his direction and control (Sec. 4, Rule 110, Rules of Court). Otherwise, the entire proceedings will be null and void (People vs. Beriales, 70 SCRA 361). - "In the trial of criminal cases, it is the duty of the public prosecutor to appear for the government since an offense is an outrage to the sovereignty of the State." (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., p. 10). This is so because "the prosecuting officer is the representative not of an ordinary party to a controversy but of a sovereignty where obligation to govern impartially is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all; and whose interest, therefore, in criminal prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar and very definite sense the servant of the law, the two-fold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer" (Suarez vs. Platon, 69 Phil. 556). - Accordingly, if the fiscal is not at all convinced that a prima facie case exists, he simply cannot move for the dismissal of the case and, when denied, refuse to prosecute the same. He is obliged by law to proceed and prosecute the criminal action. He cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. At least what he can do is to continue appearing for the prosecution and then turn over the presentation of evidence to another fiscal or a private prosecutor subject to his direction and control (U.S. vs. Despabiladeras, 32 Phil. 442; U.S. vs. Gallegos, 37 Phil. 289). Where there is no other prosecutor available, he should proceed to discharge his duty and present the evidence to the best of his ability and let the court decide the merits of the case on the basis of the evidence adduced by both parties. - The mere fact that the Secretary of Justice had, after reviewing the records of the case, directed the prosecuting fiscal to move for the dismissal of the case and the motion to dismiss filed pursuant to said directive is denied by the trial court, is no justification for the refusal of the fiscal to prosecute the case. It is the court where the case is filed and not the fiscal that has full control of it. - In order therefore to avoid such a situation whereby the opinion of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the action of the fiscal may be disregarded by the trial court, the Secretary of Justice should, as far as practicable, refrain from entertaining a petition for review or appeal from the action of the fiscal, when the complaint or information has already been filed in Court. The matter should be left entirely for the determination of the Court." DISPOSITION petition is hereby Granted Public respondent or any other person who may be assigned or appointed to act in his place or stead, is hereby ordered to continue prosecuting Criminal Case No. 821 until the same is terminated.
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PEREZ v HAGONOY 327 SCRA 588 DE LEON; March 9, 2000
NATURE: Review on Certiorari FACTS - Private respondent Hagonoy Rural Bank, Inc. owns the Hagonoy Money Shop which employed petitioner Cristina O. Perez as Officer-In-Charge, Cashier and Teller, Alberto S. Fabian as Bookkeeper, and Cristina Medina and Milagros Martin as Solicitors/Field Managers. - For the period starting August 3, 1992 up to December 5, 1993, the Laya, Manabat, Salgado and Company, an independent management, consultancy and accounting firm, conducted an audit of the financial affairs of the Hagonoy Money Shop and found anomalies in more or less twenty-eight (28) savings accounts consisting of withdrawals which were recorded in the subsidiary ledgers of the money shop but not in the passbooks which were in the possession of the depositors. The audit also revealed that to cover-up the anomalous withdrawals, fake deposits were recorded in the money shop's subsidiary ledgers whenever the remaining balance in a particular savings account went below the amount of legitimate withdrawals made by a depositor.This prompted the private respondent to file an affidavit-complaint for estafa against the aforementioned employees of the money shop and two outsiders, Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas. Acting Provincial Prosecutor, Jesus Y. Manarang (hereinafter "prosecutor"), issued a resolution finding prima facie evidence that the petitioner and her co-employees had committed the crime of estafa thru falsification of commercial documents, and recommending the filing of the corresponding information against them with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan. The charges against Susan Jordan and Brigida Mangahas were, however, dismissed. - Perez filed a petition for review with the Secretary of Justice praying for the dismissal of the charges against her. On the other hand, private respondent moved for a reconsideration of the portion of the same resolution dismissing the complaint against Susan Jordan. - The prosecutor granted private respondent's motion for reconsideration.8 Hence, on April 27, 1994, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents was filed against herein petitioner, Alberto Fabian, Milagros Martin, Cristina Medina and Susan Jordan, - On September 23, 1994, then Secretary of Justice, Franklin M. Drilon, issued Resolution No. 696, series of 1994 ordering the prosecutor to cause the dismissal of the information against herein petitioner on the ground of insufficient evidence. The private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of the Secretary of Justice, which motion, however, was denied with finality by the latter.Pursuant to the said resolution, the prosecutor filed a motion in the RTC praying for the dismissal of the case against herein petitioner and the admission of an amended information excluding petitioner as one of the accused which motion was granted by the RTC. Private respondent assailed the dismissal of the case against the petitioner in a motion for reconsideration filed in the RTC which motion was denied by the RTC after finding that the private respondent, as private complainant, had no legal personality to question the dismissal of the criminal charges against the petitioner.
Criminal Procedure
respondent tribunal, to allow it an opportunity to correct its assigned errors.
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TAN, JR v GALLARDO 73 SCRA 308 ANTONIO; October 5, 1976
NATURE Original action for certiorari and prohibition FACTS - Solicitor General Estilito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor General Alicia Simpio-Diy and Solicitor Eduardo L. Kilayko for respondents. Estanisloo A. Fernandez and Dakila F. Castro & Associate as private prosecutors. - petitioners seek the annulment of respondent Judge's Orders in the Criminal Case People of the Philippines v Jorge Tan, Jr, Cesar Tan, Teofanis Bondoc, Osmundo Tolentino, Mariano Bartido and Librado Sode for frustrated murder and Double Murder of the son and uncle of Mayor Inigo Larazzabal. - Judge Pedro Gallardo made the two life sentences to death penalty allegedly after meeting with Mayor Larazzabal and receipt of other paraphernalia such as whisky and wine according to the court stenographer. - Jan 14, 1976 - SolGen, on behalf of the People of the Philippines, submitted his Comment to the petition. They are "persuaded that there are bases for stating that the rendition of respondent Judge's decision and his resolution on the motion for new trial were not free from suspicion of bias and prejudice therefore, they interpose no objection to the remand of the aforementioned criminal cases "for the rendition of a new decision by another trial judge." - Jan 30, 1976 - private prosecutors submitted their Comment in justification of the challenged Orders of the respondent Judge and objected to the remand of this case. - Feb 12, 1976, the petitioners moved to strike out the "Motion to Admit Attacked Comment" and the "Comment" of the private prosecutor on the ground that the latter has "absolutely no standing in the instant proceedings before this Honorable Court and, hence, without any personality to have any paper of his entertained by this Tribunal - private prosecutors now contend that they are entitled to appear before this Court, to take part in the proceedings, and to adapt a position in contravention to that of the Solicitor General. ISSUES 1. WON private prosecutors have the right to intervene independently of the Solicitor General and to adopt a stand inconsistent with that of the latter 2. WON respondent Judge should be disqualified from further proceeding with the criminal cases HELD 1. NO Ratio Private prosecutors cannot intervene independently of and take a position inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General. Reasoning - Participation of the private prosecution in the instant case was delimited by this Court in its Resolution of October 1, 1975, thus: "to collaborate with the Solicitor General in the preparation of the Answer and pleadings
Criminal Procedure
evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, except when the case is pending in the Court of First Instance, the continuation of the offended party's intervention depends upon the continuation of the proceeding. Consequently, if the promotor fiscal desists from pressing the charge or asks the competent Court of First Instance in which the case is pending for the dismissal thereof, and said court grants the petition, the intervention of the person injured by the commission of the offense ceases by virtue of the principle that the accessory follows the principal. Consequently, as the offended party is not entitled to represent the People of the Philippine Islands in the prosecution of a public offense, or to control the proceeding once it is commenced, and as his right to intervene therein is subject to the promotor fiscal's right of control, it cannot be stated that an order of dismissal decreed upon petition of the promoter fiscal himself deprives the offended party of his right to appeal from an order overrruling a complaint or information, which right belongs exclusively to the promotor fiscal by virtue of the provisions of section 44 of General Orders, No. 58. To permit a person injured by the commission of an offense to appeal from an order dismissing a criminal case issued by a Court of First Instance upon petition of the promoter fiscal, would be tantamount to giving said offended party of the direction and control of a criminal proceeding in violation of the provisions of the above-cited section 107 of General Orders, No. 58. - from the nature of the offense, or where the law defining and punishing the offense charged does not provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not intervene in the prosecution of the offense. - Solicitor General represents the People of the Philippines or the State in criminal proceedings pending either in the Court of Appeals or in this Court. Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 478, "Defining the Powers and Functions of the Office of the Solicitor General", provides: SECTION 1. Function and Organization, (1) The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. * * * The office of the Solicitor General shall constitute the law office of the Government, and as such, shall discharge duties requiring the services of a lawyer. It shall have the following specific powers and functions: (a) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all criminal proceedings; represent the Government and its officers in the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and all other courts or tribunals in all civil actions and special proceedings in which the Government or any officer thereof in his official capacity is the party. (k) Act and represent the Republic and/or the people before any court, tribunal, body or commission in any matter, action or proceeding which, in his opinion, affects the welfare of the people as the ends of justice may require. It is evident, therefore, that since the Solicitor General alone is authorized to represent the State or the People of the Philippines the interest of the private prosecutors is subordinate to that of the State and they cannot be allowed to take a stand inconsistent with that of the Solicitor General, for that would be tantamount to giving the latter the direction and control of the criminal proceedings, contrary to the provisions of law and the settled rules on the matter. 2. It is already moot because the judge is no longer in the judicial service
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DISPOSITION SC grants the petition and hereby remands the case to the trial court in order that another Judge may hear anew petitioners' motion for new trial and to resolve the issue accordingly on the basis of the evidence
PEOPLE v DELA CRUZ 384 SCRA 375 DAVIDE; July 11, 2002
FACTS - Upon a complaint signed by JONALYN with the assistance of her aunt Carmelita Borja, two informations were filed by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor before the RTC of Malolos charging Bienvenido Dela Cruz with rape. BIENVENIDO entered a plea of not guilty. - When JONALYN was presented as its first witness, the prosecution sought to obtain from the trial court an order for the conduct of a psychiatric examination to determine her mental and psychological capability to testify in court. Trial court allowed the prosecutor to conduct direct examination on JONALYN so that if in its perception she would appear to be suffering from mental deficiency, the prosecutor could be permitted to ask leading questions. Noticing that JONALYN had difficulty in expressing herself, the trial court decided to suspend the proceedings to give the prosecution sufficient time to confer with her. - Trial court allowed the prosecution to put on the witness stand a Medical Officer of the National Center for Mental Health. Dr. Tuazon testified that she found that JONALYN was suffering from a moderate level of mental retardation and that although chronologically the latter was already 20 years of age, she had the mental age of an 8-year-old child under the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale. - The trial court issued an order allowing leading questions to be propounded to JONALYN. Thus, JONALYN took the witness stand. She declared in open court that BIENVENIDO raped her twice. She stated that BIENVENIDO placed himself on top of her and inserted his private part into her womanhood. - The defense filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted. It admitted that it could have moved to quash the information but it did not because the complaint on which the information was based was on its face valid, it having been signed by JONALYN as the offended party. However, the undeniable truth is that JONALYN had no capacity to sign the same considering her mental deficiency or abnormality. The defense also insisted on assailing the competency of JONALYN as a witness. It claimed that JONALYNs testimony, considering her mental state, was coached and rehearsed. - The trial court denied the Demurrer to Evidence and set the dates for the presentation of the evidence for the defense. Trial court convicted BIENVENIDO of the crime of rape in Criminal Case No. 1275-M-96, but acquitted him in Criminal Case No. 1274-M-96 for insufficiency of evidence. ISSUES 1. WON the complaint for rape filed was valid 2. WON Jonalyn was competent to testify 3. WON Jonalyn was credible as a witness 4. WON leading questions should have been allowed to be asked to Jonalyn
Criminal Procedure
HELD 1. YES - The pertinent laws existing at the time the crimes were committed were Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code (prior to its amendment by R.A. No. 8353 which took effect on 22 October 1997) and Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. - The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. - Section 5 of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure states: The offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. In case the offended party dies or becomes incapacitated before she could file the complaint and has no known parents, grandparents, or guardian, the State shall initiate the criminal action in her behalf. The offended party, even if she were a minor, has the right to initiate the prosecution for the above offenses, independently of her parents, grandparents or guardian, unless she is incompetent or incapable of doing so upon grounds other than her minority. Where the offended party who is a minor fails to file the complaint, her parents, grandparents or guardian may file the same. - A complaint of the offended party or her relatives is required in crimes against chastity out of consideration for the offended woman and her family, who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial. The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, fault, and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. - The complaint in the instant case has complied with the requirement under the Revised Penal Code and the Rules of Criminal Procedure, which vest upon JONALYN, as the offended party, the right to institute the criminal action. As signed by JONALYN, the complaint started the prosecutory proceeding. The assistance of JONALYNs aunt, or even of her mother, was a superfluity. JONALYNs signature alone suffices to validate the complaint. - If a minor under the Rules of Court can file a complaint for rape independently of her parents, JONALYN, then 20 years of age who was found to have the mentality of an 8-year-old girl, could likewise file the complaint independently of her relatives. Her complaint can be rightfully considered filed by a minor. 2. YES - The determination of the competence of witnesses to testify rests primarily with the trial judge who sees them in the witness stand and observes their behavior or their possession or lack of intelligence, as well as their understanding of the obligation of an oath. - The prosecution has proved JONALYNs competency by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon. The finding of the trial court, as supported by the testimony of Dr. Tuazon that JONALYN had the understanding of an 8-year-old child, does not obviate the fact of her competency. Its only effect was to consider her testimony from the point of view of an 8-year-old minor.
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3. YES - The foregoing narrative has established not only JONALYNs competency but also her credibility. Considering her feeble mind, she could not have fabricated or concocted her charge against BIENVENIDO. Also, no improper motive was shown by the defense as to why JONALYN would file a case or falsely testify against BIENVENIDO. - Complainant has made herself clear about the sexual molestation she suffered in the hands of the accused. Plain and simple her testimony may have been, unembellished, as it is, with details, yet, it is in its simplicity that its credence is enhanced. 4. YES - It is usual and proper for the court to permit leading questions in conducting the examination of a witness who is immature; aged and infirm; in bad physical condition; uneducated; ignorant of, or unaccustomed to, court proceedings; inexperienced; feeble-minded; confused and agitated; terrified; timid or embarrassed while on the stand; lacking in comprehension of questions asked; deaf and dumb; or unable to speak or understand the English or imperfectly familiar therewith. - The leading questions were neither conclusions of facts merely put into the mouth of JONALYN nor prepared statements which she merely confirmed as true. DISPOSITION RTC decision finding accused-appellant BIENVENIDO DELA CRUZ guilty of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua is AFFIRMED, with the modification that accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim JONALYN YUMANG civil indemnity in the reduced amount of P50,000 and moral damages in the amount of P50,000.
Criminal Procedure
FACTS - Domingo Roco, engaged in buying and selling of dressed chicken, purchased his supply from private respondent Cals Poultry Supply Corporation (Cals) - As payment for his purchase, petitioner drew 5 checks payable to Cals against his account with PCIB. PCIB dishonored the checks for having been drawn from a closed account. Cals then filed a criminal complaint for violation of BP22 - Before trial could commence, Roco filed with the BIR a denunciation letter against Cals in that it failed to issue commercial invoices. BIR found no prima facie evidence of tax evasion. - Trial for Rocos violation of BP 22 commenced. After the prosecution rested, the MTCC declared the cases submitted for decision on account of petitioners failure to adduce evidence in his behalf. Later, MTCC rendered a judgment of conviction against petitioner. - Petitioner went to appeal to the RTC contending that he was deprived of due process. RTC agreed and vacated the MTCC decision. - Pending the remanded cases, petitioner filed with the MTCC a Request for Issuance of Subpoena Ad Testificandum and Subpoena Duces Tecum, requiring Vivian Deocampo or Danilo Yap, both of Cals Corporation or their duly authorized representatives, to appear and testify in court and to bring with them certain documents, records and books of accounts for the years 1993-19991. Prosecution did not object. - Acting Judge Geomer C. Delfin, issued an order granting petitioners request and accordingly directed the issuance of the desired subpoenas. -Cals counsel manifested that it was improper for the trial court to have directed the issuance of the requested subpoenas, to which the Roco countered by saying that Judge Delfins had become final and hence, immutable. Nonetheless, the trial court issued an order allowing the prosecution to file its comment or opposition to petitioners request for the issuance of subpoenas. They argued that Deocampo had earlier attested that the documents, records and books of accounts were already burned, they did not maintain the requested sales ledger and that other documents could not be produced because of the recent computerization of records was still in the process of completion. They also maintained that the documents requested are immaterial and irrelevant to the crimes for which the petitioner was being prosecuted. - In a resolution, the MTCC, thru its Judge Edward B. Contreras, denied petitioners request on the following grounds: (a) the requested documents, book ledgers and other records were immaterial in resolving the issues posed before the court; and (b) the issuance of the subpoenas will only unduly delay the hearing of the criminal cases. - Judge Contreras similarly denied the MFR. RTC denied due course to petition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion. Similarly, it denied
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MFR. Petitioner went to CA via certiorari. The petition was still dismissed. MFR was still dismissed. Petitioners claim The denial of the request for the issuance of subpoena ad testificandum and subpoena duces tecum is violative of his constitutional rights ISSUE WON the lower courts erred in denying the subpoena requested by Roco HELD Ratio NO. Before a subpoena duces tecum may issue, the court must first be satisfied that the following requisites are present: (1) the books, documents or other things requested must appear prima facie relevant to the issue subject of the controversy (test of relevancy); and (2) such books must be reasonably described by the parties to be readily identified (test of definiteness). Reasoning - A subpoena is a process directed to a person requiring him to attend and to testify at the hearing or trial of an action or at any investigation conducted under the laws of the Philippines, or for the taking of his deposition. The first, subpoena ad testificandum, is used to compel a person to testify, while the second, subpoena duces tecum, is used to compel the production of books, records, things or documents therein specified. - The books and documents that petitioner requested to be subpoenaed are designated and described in his request with definiteness and readily identifiable. The test of definiteness, therefore, is satisfied in this case. However, in the matter of relevancy of those books and documents to the pending criminal cases that petitioner miserably failed to discharge his burden. - Based on the records below and as correctly pointed out by the CA, petitioner had been issued by Cals with temporary receipts in the form of yellow pad slips of paper evidencing his payments, which pad slips had been validated by the corporation itself. It is clear that the production of the books and documents requested by petitioner are not indispensable to prove his defense of payment. DISPOSITION the instant petition is DENIED and the challenged decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED.
Sales Journal for the year 1993; Accounts Receivable Journal for the year 1993; Sales Ledger for the year 1993; Accounts Receivable Ledger for the year 1993 (in its absence, Accounts Receivable Ledger for the years 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 or 1999); Audited Income Statement for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and Income Statements as of February 1999; Audited Balance Sheet for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998 and pBalance Sheet as of February 1999; and Income Tax Returns for the years 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996 and 1997.
1
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v TULIN RICARZE v CA (PEOPLE, CALTEX) G.R. No. 160451 CALLEJO, SR; February 9, 2007
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals FACTS - Petitioner Eduardo G. Ricarze was employed as a collector-messenger by City Service Corporation, a domestic corporation engaged in messengerial services. He was assigned to the main office of Caltex Philippines, Inc. (Caltex) in Makati City. His primary task was to collect checks payable to Caltex and deliver them to the cashier. He also delivered invoices to Caltexs customers. - On November 6, 1997, Caltex filed a criminal complaint against petitioner before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City for estafa through falsification of commercial documents. Romano alleged that, on October 16, 1997, while his department was conducting a daily electronic report from Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank (PCIB) Dela Rosa, Makati Branch, one of its depositary banks, it was discovered that unknown to the department, a company check, Check No. 74001 dated October 13, 1997 in the amount of P5,790,570.25 payable to Dante R. Gutierrez, had been cleared through PCIB on October 15, 1997, notwithstanding two missing checks and two other check forgeries, one of which amounted to P1,790,757.25. All of these were never issued by Caltex. - Further investigation revealed that said savings account had actually been opened by petitioner; the forged checks were deposited and endorsed by him under Gutierrezs name. - In the meantime, the PCIB credited the amount of P581,229.00 to Caltex on March 29, 1998. However, the City Prosecutor of Makati City was not informed of this development. After the requisite preliminary investigation, the City Prosecutor filed two (2) Informations for estafa through falsification of commercial documents on June 29, 1998 against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 63. - Petitioner was arraigned on August 18, 1998, and pleaded not guilty to both charges. Pre-trial ensued and the cases were jointly tried. The prosecution presented its witnesses, after which the Siguion Reyna, Montecillio and Ongsiako Law Offices (SRMO) as private prosecutor filed a Formal Offer of Evidence. 7 Petitioner opposed the pleading, contending that the private complainant was represented by the ACCRA Law Offices and the Balgos and Perez Law Office during trial, and it was only after the prosecution had rested its case that SRMO entered its appearance as private prosecutor representing the PCIB. Since the ACCRA and Balgos and Perez Law Offices had not withdrawn their appearance, SRMO had no personality to appear as private prosecutor. Under the Informations, the private complainant is Caltex and not PCIB; hence, the Formal Offer of Evidence filed by SRMO should be stricken from the records. - Petitioner further averred that unless the Informations were amended to change the private complainant to PCIB, his right as accused would be prejudiced. He pointed out, however, that the Informations can no longer be amended because he had already been arraigned under the original
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Informations.8 He insisted that the amendments of the Informations to substitute PCIB as the offended party for Caltex would place him in double jeopardy. - PCIB, through SRMO, opposed the motion. It contended that the PCIB had re-credited the amount to Caltex to the extent of the indemnity; hence, the PCIB had been subrogated to the rights and interests of Caltex as private complainant. Consequently, the PCIB is entitled to receive any civil indemnity which the trial court would adjudge against the accused. Moreover, the re-credited amount was brought out on cross-examination by Ramon Romano who testified for the Prosecution. PCIB pointed out that petitioner had marked in evidence the letter of the ACCRA Law Office to PCIBank dated October 10, 1997 and the credit memo sent by PCIB to Caltex - On July 18, 2001, the RTC issued an Order granting the motion of the private prosecutor for the substitution of PCIB as private complainant for Caltex. It however denied petitioners motion to have the formal offer of evidence of SRMO expunged from the record. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which the RTC denied on November 14, 2001. - Petitioner filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with Urgent Application for Temporary Restraining Order with the Court of Appeals (CA,) praying for the annulment of the RTCs Orders of July 18, 2001 and November 14, 2001. - According to petitioner, damage or injury to the offended party is an essential element of estafa. The amendment of the Informations substituting the PCIBank for Caltex as the offended party would prejudice his rights since he is deprived of a defense available before the amendment, and which would be unavailable if the Informations are amended. Petitioner further insisted that the ruling in the Sayson case did not apply to this case. - The appellate court declared that when PCIB restored the amount of the checks to Caltex, it was subrogated to the latters right against petitioner. It further declared that in offenses against property, the designation of the name of the offended party is not absolutely indispensable for as long as the criminal act charged in the complaint or information can be properly identified. The appellate court cited the rulings of this Court in People v. Ho and People v. Reyes. ISSUE 1. WON petitioners rights are prejudiced with the substitution of the complainant 2. WON there was a valid subrogation of rights by Caltex to PCIB 3. WON charges against him should be dismissed because the allegations in both Informations failed to name PCIB as true offended party HELD 1. NO - The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment is whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v GUEVARRA 179 SCRA 740 PADILLA: December 4, 1989
NATURE Automatic Review FACTS -On or about April 8, 1980, in Gapan, Nueva Ecija, several armed men namely Jaime Guevarra y Arcega, Poncing Abergas, Dan Tolentino, Baldo de Jesus, Roming Longhair, Boy Tae, Boy Pogi, Chotse Doe alias Bernabe Sulaybar y Hernandez, and Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak", entered the house of the sps Cruz and robbed them of P3000 and jewelry. Thereafter, Luisito Cruz was threatened by the men and forced to give the keys to his car by Vergel Bustamante. The members of the household were then made to enter a room and were tied. After the robbery, Priscilla Cruz was forcibly boarded in her own car by 5 of her kidnappers where she was held at knife and gunpoint. She was then told she was being held for ransom of P50k but they had to stop in San Rafael Bulucan to hire a truck because the car broke down. However, she was left at Valenzuela Bulacan as the men said the kidnapping did not materialize. The five men then boarded a taxi and the truck driver later took her home. On the same night, Luisito reported the incident which led to the detention of Vergel Bustamante who was positively identified by Priscilla. -Bustamante denied the allegations and interposed the defense of alibi, claiming to be in Caloocan at the time of the crime. His defense was rejected considering the proximity of Gapan and Caloocan and since witnesses had positively identified him. -After a separate trial for Poncing Abergas and Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak," inasmuch as Dan Tolentino, who had previously entered of plea of "not guilty" could not be served with subpoenas, and the other accused were reported to have died, judgment was rendered finding the accused Vergel Bustamante alias "Dan Saksak" guilty of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention and sentenced to suffer the death penalty, and to indemnify the offended party, Mrs. Priscilla Cruz, in the amount of P5,000.00. The accused Poncing Abergas, upon the other hand, was acquitted of the charge. Hence, this appeal. ISSUES 1. WON TC erred in ordering the amendment of the information to include Vergel Bustamante alias Dan Saksak despite lack of proof that the 2 are 1 and the same person. 2. WON there was no reinvestigation conducted to justify the filing of the amended information 3. WON the TC erred in convicting Bustamante upon the prosecution witnesses contradictory and improbable testimonies and the appellants extra-judicial confession 4. WON the accused can be convicted of kidnapping for ransom HELD 1. NO. - The ff circumstances led the RTC judge of Nueva Ecija to believe that Vergel Bustamante and Dan Saksak are one and the same person as the accused is mentioned in each as Vergel Bustamante alias Dan
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Saksak: A subpoena issued by the MTC of Gapan; a Return of Service of one subpoena; an order issued by the Municipal Court of Gapan finding a prima facie case against the accused; and the letter of transmittal of the records of the cases to the RTC of Nueva Ecija stating Bustamante aka Dan Saksak was detained in the Manila City Jail. -In, any case, the issue cannot be raised for the first time on appeal as it is one affecting jurisdiction over the person and should have been raised before the trial court in a motion to quash the information. As the accused failed to do so, he is deemed to have waived his objection to the information and is assumed to be satisfied with its legality. 2. NO - The reinvestigation is evidenced by the certification of the Fiscal stating that there was reasonable ground to believe a crime had been committed and that the accused were informed of the complaint and given an opportunity to submit controverting evidence. 3. NO - The said discrepancies in the testimonies were minor details which could not destroy the substance of said testimonies. As the highest degree of respect is accorded to the factual findings of the TC, the issue of the credibility of the witnesses cannot be raised. Also, the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to support a finding of guilt even without the said extra-judicial confession. 4. NO -No element of ransom exists as no ransom note was presented in court. Neither was there a demand for money in exchange for Priscillas safe return. Besides, the Amended Information failed to allege that the kidnapping was for the purpose of extorting a ransom. The rule is that an accused cannot be convicted of a higher offense than that charged in the complaint or information. -Hence, Bustamante can only be convicted of kidnapping of a female under Article 267 with the aggravating circumstances of (a) the use of a motor vehicle and (b) the aid of armed men bringing the penalty up to the maximum. However, due to Article 3 Sec. 19 of the Constitution, the death penalty is reduced to reclusion perpetua. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v PURISIMA 86 SCRA 542 MUNOZ-PALMA; November 20, 1978
NATURE Petitions for review (26 petitions consolidated) of the decisions of the Courts of First of Manila and Samar. FACTS -The private respondents were all charged with illegal possession of deadly weapons (one (1) carving knife with a blade 1/2 inches and a wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-3/4 inches in the Information filed with J.Purisima; ice pick with an overall length of about 8 1/2 inches in the Information filed with J. Maceren; socyatan in the Information filed with J. Polo) in violation of PD 9, Par. 3. Informations were filed with respondent judges in their respective courts (2 Branches of CFI, then CFI Samar) but upon motion to quash filed by the several accused, the said judges dismissed the Informations on the common ground that the said Informations did not allege facts which constitute the offense penalized by PD 90 failed to state 1 of the 2 essential elements of the crime punished (the carrying outside of the accused's residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.) - In the 2 cases filed before the different branches of CFI Manila, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the accused. In the criminal case before the CFI Samar the accused was arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on other charges. -ON PD 9:THIS CASE INVOLVES THE INTERPRETATION AND THE EXPLANATION OF THE INTENT OF THIS P.D. The pertinent paragraphs of the said PD is its Whereas clause ("WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons) and par3 (It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as 'fan knife,' 'spear,' 'dagger,' 'bolo,' 'balisong,' 'barong,' 'kris,' or club, except where such articles are being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.) -Petitioners Contention: (1) Par 3, PD 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to the subversive activities; that the act proscribed is essentially malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of public policy; (3) that since it is malum prohibitum, the intention of the accused who commits it is immaterial; (4) that PD was enacted to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days; and (5) that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information.
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ISSUE WON the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the offense of Illegal Possession of Deadly Weapon penalized under PD 9 HELD NO. The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the information in order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. Ratio. The sufficiency of an Information is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. Where the facts are incomplete and do not convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order. - It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Reasoning. The offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one's residence of any bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a livelihood; and second that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos, or public disorder. There are other statutes (SECTION 26 OF ACT NO. 1780, ORDINANCE NO. 3820 OF THE CITY OF MANILA) which may be charged against the accused for their acts to constitute a crime. It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed, outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation behind it. Without that motivation, the act fans within the purview of the city ordinance or some statute when the circumstances so warrant. -ON SUFFICIENCY OF THE INFORMATION: for a complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia, state the designation of the offense by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his defense accordingly. It is necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.(PD 9 punishes the offender with 5-10 yrs imprisonment; Sec26, Act 1780 with a fine of P500 or by imprisonment not exceeding 6 months or both; Ordinance 3820 with a fine of not more than P200 or imprisonment for not more than 1 month or both). But since it was specified in the Informations that the accused were charged with violation of Par3, PD 9, it was necessary for the Court to elucidate the elements of the said PD to differentiate it from other statutes (see above) the rest of the discussion was on the intent of the PD: to justify their decision that Par3 should be interpreted with the Whereas clause. - there exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptable is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by
Criminal Procedure
ISSUES 1. WON CFI erred in convicting them for 2 crimes of rape 2. WON CFI erred in holding that the rape was attended by the aggravating circumstance of cruelty or ignominy 3. WON CFI erred in sentencing each to suffer 2 penalties of death HELD 1. NO Ratio The imposition on each of the accused of the penalty corresponding to 2 crimes of rape is proper, because of the existence of conspiracy. In multiple rape, each defendant is responsible not only for the rape personally committed by him, but also for the rape committed by the others, because each of them cooperated in the commission of the rape perpetrated by the others, by acts without which it would not have been accomplished. Reasoning CFI is accused of violating the rule against duplicity of offenses in that, the accused were convicted for 2 crimes of rape even when under the criminal complaint against them, there is only 1 crime of rape alleged. The rule invoked is Sec 13, Rule 110 of the ROC which states that there should be only 1 offense charged in a criminal complaint or information, the purpose of which is to afford the defendant a necessary knowledge of the charge so that he may not be confused in his defense. (a) BUT it is likewise the rule that if ever duplicity of offenses is committed, the same constitutes a ground for a motion to quash the complaint; failure of the accused to interpose the objection constitutes waiver. Neither can he claim that he was denied information that he was to be tried for two crimes. The acts complained of were stated in ordinary and concise language that any person of common intelligence would be able to understand and thereby know what acts he was to defend himself against. (b) As clearly found by the trial court: Both accused have, obviously, conspired and confederated to commit the crime, considering that they entered the bathroom where Rebecca was, together and at the same time. Accused Fernandez then tied her with a piece of cloth tightly around her neck, while accused Conrado held her hands placing them behind her body. Then after Fernandez had raped Rebecca, Conrado raped her. Both fled from the scene of the crime together and at the same time. 2. NO - Appreciating the aggravating circumstance of ignominy is correct because of the greater perversity displayed by the offenders. The act of "plastering" mud on the victim's vagina right after she was raped is adequately described as "ignominy" (rather than cruelty or ignominy) 3. NO - The original death sentence was correctly imposed: Art 335 RPC states that when the crime of rape is committed by 2 or more persons, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death; Art 63 RPC states that when the penalty prescribed is composed of 2 indivisible penalties and the offense is attended by an aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied. - However, since the original death penalties imposed by the trial court are no longer imposable under the present Constitution and are reduced to reclusion perpetua, the sentence on appellant Conrado has to be reduced to 2 penalties of reclusion perpetua. But the indemnity he has to pay to the victim must be increased to P20T in line with prevailing jurisprudence. Dispositive Appeal has no merit. Decision affirmed.
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PEOPLE v LUMILAN 323 SCRA 170 DE LEON; June 25, 2000
NATURE Appeal from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela FACTS - Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ilagan, Isabela, found accused-appellants Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts of murder, two (2) counts of frustrated murder, and three (3) counts of attempted murder, under an Information charging them and accused Fred Orbiso with the crime of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder, in violation of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866. - The evidence of the prosecution reveals that in the early evening of October 12, 1987, Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Roque, Eliong dela Cruz, Jerry Palomo, Simeon Pacano, Benito Alonzo, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo Pacho were drinking liquor inside the house of Policarpio Palomo when it was sprayed with bullets. The successive gunshots emanated from the fence about six (6) meters away from where they were drinking, killing Meliton Asuncion, Modesto Rogue, and Eliong dela Cruz and seriously wounding Jerry Palomo, Simeon Pacano, Nolasco Estrada, Mario Palomo and Romeo Pacho. - Upon being arraigned, both Lumilan and Garcia entered the plea of not guilty, and during trial, they interposed the defense of alibi. - After an assessment of the evidence, the trial court declared that no proof beyond reasonable doubt was adduced by the prosecution to justify the conviction of appellants for Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder. However, the trial court convicted the appellants for Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder. - Appellants filed a motion for reconsideration which was, however, denied - Hence, the instant appeal. ISSUE WON the appellants may be properly convicted of murder, frustrated murder and attempted murder under an Information that charges them with qualified illegal possession of firearms used in murder in violation of Section 1 of presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1866, as amended. HELD YES - At the time the trial court promulgated its judgment of conviction in September 1990, it had already been six (6) months since the Court held in People v. Tac-an that the unlawful possession of an unlicensed firearm or ammunition, whether or not homicide or murder resulted from its use, on one hand, and murder or homicide, on the other, are offenses different and separate from and independent of, each other. While the former is punished under a special law, the latter is penalized under the Revised Penal Code. Consequently, the prosecution for one will not bar prosecution for the other, and double jeopardy will not lie. - Sec. 4. Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that an accused may not be convicted of an offense other than that with which he is charged in the Information, unless such other offense was both
Criminal Procedure
-As such, appellants cannot pretend that the Information did not fully apprise them of the charges against them as to cause them surprise in the event of conviction. The appellation of the crime charged as determined by the provincial fiscal may not exactly correspond to the actual crimes constituted by the criminal acts described in the Information to have been committed by the accused, but what controls in the description of the said criminal acts and not the technical name of the crime supplied by the provincial fiscal. Since appellants defended themselves not only against the offense of Qualified Illegal Possession of Firearms Used in Murder as specified in the Information, but also, and more seriously against the crimes of Murder, Frustrated Murder and Attempted Murder as described in the body of the Information, it cannot be said that their conviction for the latter crimes is infirm and invalid ***Appellants in this case were nonetheless acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. The constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants was not over-turned by the evidence adduced by the prosecution. The Court entertained doubts as to the prosecutions witnesses testimony that they were able to identify the appellants as the authors of the crime considering that it was dark outside, and the only source of light were two kerosene lamps inside the house. They also took note of the fact that Pacano, one of the witnesses, only executed his sworn statement more than five months atfer the incident. Disposition The decision of the Regional Trial Court of Ilagan, Isabela is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The accused-appellants, Leon Lumilan and Antonio Garcia, are hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that their alleged guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.
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petitioner was "working on, or using or producing" as employee or laborer of the complainant, as provided for in Presidential Decree No. 133. Except for the dates of commission and the amounts involved, the aforesaid three (3) informations uniformly stated that said accused were charged with the crime of qualified theft, in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133, committed as follows: "That on or about the 14th day of November, 1973 in the Municipality of Pasig, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, being then laborers working at the Markes Agro-Chemical Enterprises, conspiring and confederating together with one Renato Matuto y Ann, who is still at large, all of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent of gain, grave abuse of confidence, and without the knowledge and consent of the said firm, its President and General Manager, Marciano K. Espiritu, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and carry away the following, to wit: . . ." - When the informations were amended from Qualified Theft to Simple theft and deleting from the body of Information the phrase Grave abuse of confidence, Matilde pleaded GUILTY but the Court imposed the penalty under PD 133 and not those by Article 309 (3) of the RPC. From this decision, Matilde sought from the Court a quo a reconsideration contending that in the absence of any allegation in the body of information alleging specifically all the elements of the offense defined and penalized under PD. 133, he cannot be conviceted and penalized under the aforesaid decree. ISSUE WON the information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft in relation to PD 133 suffices HELD NO - The Supreme Court granted the writ of certiorari and set aside the judgment, and directed that another one be rendered. It held that since the objective of Presidential Decree No. 133 is to place a strong deterrent on workers from sabotaging the productive efforts of the industry where they are employed, it is essential, to qualify the offense and to justify the imposition of the heavier penalty prescribed by said Decree, that the information should aver that the articles stolen were materials or products which the accused was "working on or using or producing," and that a statement in the preamble of the information that the accused is charged with the crime of simple theft "in relation to Presidential Decree No. 133," does not suffice for the purpose envisioned by the constitutional guarantee that the accused should be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The Supreme Court said that the appropriate penalty is that under Article 309 (3) of the RPC-prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods if value of property stolen is more than 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos. But with the mitigating plea of guilty, penalty is in its minimum period.
Criminal Procedure
- Inasmuch as the crime of estafa through misappropriation or with grave abuse of confidence is charged, the information must contain these elements: (a) that personal property is received in trust, on commission, for administration or under any other circumstance involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though the obligation is guaranteed by a bond; (b) that there is conversion or diversion of such property by the person who has so received it; (c) that such conversion, diversion or denial is to the injury of another and (d) that there be demand for the return of the property. - The position of the defense is that the testimonies tend to prove another kind of estafa --- using false pretenses or fraudulent acts (Art 315 par 2a RPC)--- and not thru abuse of confidence (Art 315 par 1b RPC). The elements of these two are different. Under par 2a, demand is not necessary and deceit or false representation must be shown. But this doesnt mean that proof of deceit is not allowed for par 1b. Abuse of confidence and deceit may co-exist. Even if deceit may be present, the abuse of confidence will characterize the estafa as the deceit will be merely incidental or, is absorbed by abuse of confidence. - As long as there is a relation of trust and confidence between the complainant and the accused and even though such relationship has been induced by the accused thru false representations and pretense and which is continued by active deceit without truthfully disclosing the facts to the complainant, the estafa committed is by abuse of confidence although deceit co-exists in its commission. - The presence of deceit would not change the whole theory of the prosecution that estafa with abuse of confidence was committed. Dispositive CFI decision to strike out testimonies is reversed and set aside.
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complaint of the offended party, Neddy Calayca, accuses ARTEMIO CALAYCA of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows: That on or about the 29th day of January, 1994 at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning, more or less, at Barangay Solo, Municipality of Balingasag, Province of Misamis Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and by means of force and intimidation, succeeded in having carnal knowledge (sexual intercourse) with her (sic) own daughter, Neddy Calayca, against her will and consent. "CONTRARY TO and in VIOLATION OF Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659. "Cagayan de Oro City, Philippines, March 6, 1995. (SGD.) ROBERTO S. CASIO "Asst. Provincial Prosecutor II" - When arraigned under the above-quoted Information, the appellant entered a plea of "Not guilty" to the crime charged. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. - The evidence for the prosecution was anchored mainly on the testimony of 16-year old Neddy Calayca who, on May 2, 1995, narrated that at about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of January 29, 1994, she was sound asleep inside their house at Barangay Solo, Balingasag, Misamis Oriental when she was awakened by the weight of her father, herein appellant Artemio Calayca, who was already on top of her, naked and armed with a bolo. He forcibly undressed her, inserted his penis into her vagina and made a push and pull motion. Feeling the pain in her vagina, she resisted his onslaught by kicking and hitting him, telling him with bitter tears, "I wish you would die. You are a father without good morals." But she was helpless to resist his lustful desire as he threatened her with a knife saying, "I will kill you if you will not agree." After the sexual assault, she picked up her clothes, dressed up and was left weeping. She was then 15 years old when this incident happened. 7 - Neddy Calayca first thought of immediately filing a case against appellant but was prevented by his threat to kill her. She, however, reported her awful experience with the appellant to her relatives in Mambayaan. She informed them that even before the January 29, 1994 incident, appellant had sexually abused her many times. Her relatives, who were also afraid of appellant, merely advised her to sue him. She immediately went home in Solo because she feared her father. When she reached home, her eldest sister Betty Lani Calayca also arrived from Manila. Informed of the rape incident, Lani and Neddy decided to leave the appellant. The two then traveled to Don Carlos, Bukidnon and worked as servants of the mayor, thinking their father could no longer find them there. However, appellant was able to locate them. While in the house of the mayor, appellant harassed them, so Betty Lani had him arrested by the police. While appellant was in jail, Neddy reported to the police authorities that he raped her. The police then took her sworn statement on the rape incident. Thereafter, Neddy filed her complaint for rape against the appellant. - Appellant Artemio Calaycadid not deny the imputation of her daughter Neddy Calayca that he raped her in the early morning of January 29, 1994. All that he testified to was that he was a widower in 1998 and has six children by his late wife, two of whom he identified as Neddy, the private complainant, and Betty Lani. He claimed that Neddy was only nine years old when his wife died. The private complainant stayed with him
Criminal Procedure
US v JAVIER DICHAO 27 Phil 421 MORELAND; March 30, 1914
NATURE Appeal From CFI Davaos Decision FACTS - Said CFI sustained a Demurrer to an INFORMATION and dismissed the case of rape against Antonio Javier Dichao. - The Information stated that Dichao committed the crime of rape on or about and during the interval between October 1910, to August 1912 (vague di ba?) in Davao and that Dichao was, at that period, the legal guardian, being the stepfather, of Isabel de la Cruz who was under 12 years old when he raped her; that as a result of said carnal knowledge Isabel gave birth to a child on August 5, 1912. - The Demurrer alleged that the facts set forth in the Information did not constitute a public offense and that the criminal complaint did not conform substantially to prescribed form and that complaint was vague and ambiguous. ISSUE WON CFI committed an error in dismissing the case based upon the Demurrer HELD NO. CFIs decision must be affirmed. Ratio The allegations of an information should, if possible, be sufficiently explicit and certain as to TIME to inform the defendant of the date on which the criminal act is alleged to have been committed. Unless the accused is informed of the day, or about the day, he may be, to an extent deprived of the opportunity to defend himself. Reasoning - While Sec 7 of the Code of CrimPro provides that except when time is a material ingredient of an offense, the precise time of commission need not be stated in a complaint or information, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time before the filing thereof, - this DOES NOT MEAN that the prosecuting officer may be careless in fixing the date of the alleged crime, or that he may omit the date altogether, or that he may make the allegation indefinite as to amount to the same thing. - Where the exact date cannot be fixed, or where the prosecuting officer is NOT thoroughly satisfied that he can prove a precise date, he should allege in the information that the crime was committed ON or ABOUT a DATE NAMED. - Under such an allegation he is not required to prove any precise date but may prove any date which is NOT SO REMOTE as to surprise and prejudice the defendant. - In case of SURPRISE, the Court may allow an amendment of the information as to time and an adjournment to the accused, if necessary to meet the amendment. - SC then cited cases: US v De Castro~ While it is not necessary, unless time is a material ingredient of the offense, that the precise time of the commission of the offense should be stated, still the act should be alleged to have been committed at some time before the filing of the complaint.
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US v. Enriquez- question of time as alleged in the information was discussed in an incidental way for the purpose of determining whether it of itself or in connection with the other allegations sufficiently identified the transaction which constituted estafa so as to notify the defendant of the transaction referred to; Time is not a matl ingredient in the crime of estafa. US v. Cardona- question of time was raised in the demurrer (on appeal) as to the variance bet the date of the crime in the info and that proved on the trial; Court here said that time being not an ingredient of the theft of a carabao, it did not have to be proved as laid. - The question whether the allegations of the info are sufficiently definite as to time and the question which arises on a variance between the allegations and the proof are different in nature and legal effect, and are decided on different principles. - In this case, the statement of the time when the crime was committed is too indefinite to give the accused an opportunity to prepare his defense, and that indefiniteness is not cured by setting out the date when a child was born as a result of such crime. - Sec 7 Rules of CrimPros purpose is to permit the allegation of a date of the commission of a crime as NEAR to the ACTUAL date as the information of the prosecuting officer will permit and when that has been done, any date proved which does not surprise and substantially prejudice the defense. - It does not authorize the total omission of a date or such an indefinite allegation with reference thereto as amounts to the same thing. - SC: the variance bet the date of the commission of the crime as alleged in the info and that as proved on trial DOES NO warrant necessarily the acquittal of the accused. IF such variance occurs and it is shown that the defendant is surprised thereby, and that, by reason of that surprise, he is unable to defend himself properly, the court may in the exercise of sound discretion based on ALL circumstances, order the information amended so as to set forth the correct date and may grant an adjournment for such a length of time as will enable the defendant to prepare himself to meet the variance in date which was the cause of his surprise. Dispositive Decision affirmed.
PEOPLE v MOLERO 144 SCRA 397 GUTIERREZ JR.; September 24, 1986
NATURE Appeal from decision of CFI FACTS - Molero was charged with rape by daughter in complaint filed in CFI Negros Oriental. Molero told daughter to go with him to the river to catch shrimps and fish. She was barely 17. She was hugged fr behind by Molero and she fell to the ground. He unsheathed his bolo. He succeeded in having sexual intercourse and warned her not to tell anyone. - The mother learned of the incident and told daughter to keep quiet for the moment; they were secretive of their plan to report because Molero is a fierce man. - Mother and daughter went to Station Commander. They were advised to report to the PC Headquarters. At the PC Headquarters, complaint was
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v LUALHATI 171 SCRA 277, 283 GRINO-AQUINO; March 16, 1989
NATURE Petition for review of the Decision of the Trial court FACTS - Complainant Josephine Dimaunahan was born on January 7, 1967 - In 1970, her mother separated from her father and started to live with appellant Vicente Lualhati without the benefit of marriage. She likewise lived with appellant who supported her, took care of her studies and treated her like his own daughter. - Sometime in June, 1978, while complainant's mother was at work, appellant and complainant were alone in the house. Appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant. It appeared that even prior to June, 1978, appellant had already several sexual relations with complainant - Upon arraignment on, the accused pleaded not guilty - The defense filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint charged more than one offense, namely: That on or about the month of June, 1978, and for sometime prior and subsequent thereto, ... the accused Vicente Lualhati wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant Josephine M. Dimaunahan ... - Fiscal alleged that the accused was being tried on the Information which charged only one offense committed "in or about the month of June 1978." - Trial judge denied motion to dismiss. - The accused filed another Motion to Dismiss, alleging that he had been pardoned by the offended party, her mother and grandmother. Attached, to the Motion to Dismiss was the joint affidavit of desistance signed by the offended party, her mother and grandmother - -The offended party executed and filed an affidavit alleging that her father abandoned her at the age of two years and three months, without providing for her support and studies, and that the same were provided by her mother and grandmother who, on the same date, executed a joint affidavit to the same effect - The Prosecuting Fiscal filed an Addendum to the Opposition to the Motion to Dismiss. He alleged that the express pardon given the accused was invalid for the offended party did not have "a will of her own," being merely eleven years old when the crime was committed; that the father of the offended party, executed an affidavit objecting to the pardon given to the accused; and that, as the father, he still possessed the "patria potestas" over the offended party in spite of his having abandoned her. - Trial court denied the motion to dismiss on account of the insistence of the victim's father to prosecute the accused, absent judicial pronouncement depriving him of parental authority over the offended party, a child below twelve years old. - Accused filed Motion to Quash, which was denied by the trial court - Trial court convicted the accused of rape, and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUES 1. WON there was a valid complaint against the appellant
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2. WON the pardon given to him by the offended party, her mother, and grandmother extinguished his criminal liability, in spite of the objection of the victim's father. HELD 1. YES Ratio Discrepancies between the accusation and the complaint as to time of occurrence of the carnal copulations in rape do not affect any essential right of the accused, where the acts occurred within the period of time alleged in both writings and the difference noted in other respects was of a formal, rather than a substantial, character. Reasoning - Appellant contends that the complaint is void because it charges at least three crimes of rape, namely: (1) that which was committed "on or about the month of June, 1978;" (2) that which was committed "sometime prior to said period;" and (3) that which was committed "subsequent thereto." - Argument has no merit. Attached to Josephine's complaint was her sworn statement wherein, she categorically affirmed that Vicente abused her before the start of classes in June 1978. That affidavit, which may be considered part of the complaint required by law, cures any ambiguity in the complaint regarding the number of offenses committed by the accused. - Furthermore, Section 10, Rule 110 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided: Sec. 10. Time of the commission of the offense.-It is not necessary to state in the complaint or information the precise time at which the offense was committed except when time is a material ingredient of the offense, but the act may be alleged to have been committed at any time as near to the actual date at which the offense' was committed as the information or complaint will permit. 2. NO Ratio Art. 344(3) of the Revised Penal Code prohibits a prosecution for seduction, abduction, rape, or acts of lasciviousness, except upon a complaint made by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor, in any case, if the offender has been expressly pardoned by the above-named persons, as the case may be. It does not prohibit the continuance of a prosecution if the offended party pardons the offender after the cause has been instituted, nor does it order the dismissal of said cause. The only act that riding to Article 344 extinguishes the penal action and the penalty that may have been imposed, is the marriage between the offender and the offended party. Reasoning - The rationale of the law on the prosecution of private crimes is simple: The law deems it the wiser policy to let the aggrieved woman and her family decide whether to expose to public view or to heated controversies in court the vices, faults and disgraceful acts occurring in the family. However, when, as in the case at bar, the pardon is given after the filing of the complaint in court, it comes too late to hide the shameful occurrence from public notice. Dispositive Decision of trial court affirmed
Criminal Procedure
Reasoning - Firstly, it behooved the accused to raise the issue of a defective information, on the ground that it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form, in a motion to quash said information or a motion for bill of particulars. An accused who fails to take this seasonable step will be deemed to have waived the defect in said information. The only defects in an information that are not deemed waived are where no offense is charged, lack of jurisdiction of the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and double jeopardy. Corollarily, we have ruled that objections as to matters of form or substance in the information cannot be made for the first time on appeal. Razonable did not raise either in a motion to quash or a motion for bill of particulars the defect in the Information regarding the indefiniteness of the allegation on the date of the commission of the offense. - Secondly, during the trial, the defense never objected to the presentation of evidence by the prosecution to prove that the offense was committed in the middle of June 1987. It has not been shown that Razonable was taken by surprise with the testimony of Maria Fe that she was raped in the middle of June 1987, and hence could not properly defend himself. On the contrary, he was able to give an alibi as to his whereabouts at that particular time. In fine, he cannot pretend that he was unable to defend himself in view of the vagueness of the allegation in the information as to when the crimes were committed. 2. NO Reasoning Appellant claims that his guilt has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt on the following grounds: (1) the identity of the perpetrator has not been established with certitude since the room was dark and it has not been shown that it was properly illuminated; (2) it was unnatural for Maria Fe to remain in their house if it was true that she was threatened and intimidated; and (3) there was an unreasonable delay in the filing of the complaint which rendered the rape charges doubtful. - It is highly inconceivable that Maria Fe would not recognize her own father with whom she has been living alone for a long time. It is the most natural reaction for victims of criminal violence to strive to see the appearance of their assailant and observe the manner in which the crime was committed. Most often, the face and body movements of the assailant create a lasting impression which cannot be easily erased from their memory. The impression becomes more profound where the malefactor is the victim's own father. - The fact that Maria Fe continued to live with Razonable will not likewise crumple her credibility. At the time of the incident, she was a simple, nave and hapless child of twelve years. She was living by her lonesome self with her father, entirely dependent on him for all her needs. Her mother was in Isabela and her nearest sibling lived in another town. It could hardly be expected that such a child of tender age would know what to do and where to go under the circumstances. It is not proper to judge the actions of children who have undergone traumatic experiences by the norms of behavior expected under the circumstances from mature persons. - The delay in the filing of the cases does not necessarily impair the credibility of the victim. Experience teaches us that many victims of rape never complain or file criminal charges against the rapist, for they prefer to silently bear the ignominy and pain, rather than reveal their shame to the world or risk the offender's making good on his threats.
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Dispositive Considering that the acts were committed prior to the effectivity of RA 7659, the trial court correctly imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each of the three cases. However, consistent with recent rulings, the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape should be awarded by way of moral damages, and hence the award given by the trial court should be reduced to P150,000. Likewise, current case law dictates that the victim shall be entitled to civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000 for each count of rape. - Decision of the RTC AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
ALMEDA v VILLALUZ PEOPLE v CASEY and FELIX 103 SCRA 21 GUERRERO; February 24, 1981
NATURE Automatic review of the judgment of the Circuit Criminal Court imposing upon Casey and Felix the capital c\punishment for the death of Alfredo Valdez. FACTS - On May 22, 1968, Assistant Fiscal Herminio I. Benito filed an Information for Murder against accused-appellant Joseph Casey alias "Burl", alleging: That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above- named accused, being then armed with a knife, together with one Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who is then armed with a firearm and who was (sic) still at large, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly caused his death. - In June, 1968, upon arraignment, Casey pleaded not guilty to the crime charged in the said complaint. - September, 1968, accused ' appellant Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" was arrested. Accordingly, an Amended Information was filed by the same fiscal to include Ricardo Felix as an accused, stating: That on or about the 31st day of March, 1968, in the municipality of San Juan, province of Rizal, a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Joseph Casey alias "Burl" being then armed with a knife, together with the accused Ricardo Felix alias "Carding Tuwad" who was then armed with a firearm, and the two of them conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent to kill, evident premeditation and treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, did, then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot and stab with the said firearm and knife one Alfredo Valdez, thereby inflicting upon the latter fatal wounds which directly - The court a quo rendered the aforementioned judgment of conviction. It
Criminal Procedure
- There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully planned by the offender or when he had previously prepared the means which he had considered adequate to carry it out, when he had prepared beforehand the means suitable for carrying it into execution, when he has had sufficient time to consider and accept the final consequences, and when there had been a concerted plan. 16 It has also been held that to appreciate the circumstances of evident premeditation, it is necessary to establish the following; (1) the time when the offender determined to commit the crime; (2) the act manifestly indicating that the culprit has clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse of time between the determination and execution to snow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will had he desired to hearken to its warning. - From the answers of accused-appellant Casey in said sworn statement, it can be gleaned that the killing was not a preconceived plan. It was not preceded by any reflection or deep thought. It was just a spontaneous decision reached when the victim started to run away upon being approached by accused-appellant Ricardo Felix. - There are indeed two accused-appellants in this case charged with the murder of not one victim but superiority in number does not necessarily mean superiority in strength. It is necessary to show that the aggressors "cooperated in such a way as to secure advantage from their superiority in strength." 3. YES Reasoning - Although there is no direct showing that the accused had conspired together, but their acts and the attendant circumstances disclose that common motive that would make accused Ricardo Felix as a co-principal with the actual slayer, Joseph Casey. Without doubt, he performed overt acts in furtherance of the conspiracy. - Ricardo Felix's overt acts consist in instigating the pursuit of the deceased, in firing a shot at him and in giving Joseph Casey encouragement by his armed presence while the latter inflicted the fatal wounds on the deceased. From the extrajudicial confession of the accused-appellant Joseph Casey, it can also be inferred that Ricardo Felix was the moving factor of the evil act perpetrated by the former against the victim. While it was Joseph Casey who inflicted the mortal wounds that caused the death of the victim, he did so out of his perverted sense of friendship or companionship with Ricardo Felix. 4. YES Reasoning - claim is uncorroborated and contrary to the testimony of the eyewitness, Mercedes Palomo. - The fact that the victim sustained four stab wounds while the accused complained merely of abrasions on his back indicates the falsity of the claim. Dispositive the judgment of the trial court under automatic review is MODIFIED in that the accused-appellants Joseph Casey and Ricardo Felix are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide without any attending circumstances and should be sentenced to reclusion temporal in its medium period. But applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, each of the accused is sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen years and four months of reclusion temporal, as maximum. The accused are likewise sentenced to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Alfredo Valdez
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in the amount of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS jointly and severally, and to pay the costs.
PEOPLE v REYES 108 SCRA 203 CONCEPCION, JR; October 23, 1981
NATURE Petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction on the order dated July 10, 1970, of the respondent Judge, (Hon. Alfredo C. Reyes of the Circuit Criminal Court, 4th Judicial District, Cabanatuan City) in Criminal Case No. CCC-IV-170-NE, "People v Francisco Estrella," which denied petitioner's verbal motion for the amendment of the information in said case, by deleting the year "1969" as alleged therein, and in lieu thereof to put the year "1964 ". FACTS - Sometime in October, an information for qualified theft was filed against private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, as Criminal Case No. 6799, in the Municipal Court of San Jose, Nueva Ecija, pertinent portion as follows: That in the month of August, 1964, in the municipality of San Jose, province of Nueva Ecija, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused Narciso Mananing being the driver of complainant Maria Ignacio- Francisco, Florentino Alcantara, repair shop owner where the truck hereinafter described was found and recovered, Francisco Estrella, a Philippine Constabulary soldier stationed at Bulacan, and Melecio Guevarra, all conspiring together, without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, take, steal and carry away one (1) Bedford truck with Chassis No. 153559, with Motor No. 2/54/5/6, with Plate No. T-35049, Series of 1964, to the damage and prejudice of the owner, Maria IgnacioFrancisco in the amount of P23,000.00, value of said vehicle. - On November 15, 1969, the Acting City Fiscal of San Jose City, (converted into city) Nueva Ecija, filed an information (Crim. Case No. CCC-IV-170) with the respondent Court, charging private respondent Francisco Estrella and three others, with qualified theft. This time the information contained Aug. 1969 instead of Aug. 1964 in the previous information and alleged grave abuse of confidence and that accused dismantled the vehicle. - On January 28, 1970, private respondent Francisco Estrella was arraigned, and he pleaded not guilty. During the arraignment, respondentJudge required his clerk to read the information to Francisco Estrella. From January 28, 1970, up to May 21, 1970, the latter date being the scheduled trial of the case, the prosecution never moved to amend the information. - On May 21, 1970 when the prosecution was scheduled to present its evidence, it verbally moved that it be allowed to amend the information so as to change the date of the commission of the offense from "August 1969" to "August 1964." Private respondent Francisco Estrella, having come to the trial court ready to defend himself from an offense allegedly committed in "August 1969", vigorously objected to the verbal motion. - Respondent Judge withheld his ruling on the prosecution's motion to amend, and instead, required the prosecution to present its first witness,
Criminal Procedure
SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur]
I concur, but I believe this decision cannot bar another prosecution of private respondent under another information charging theft committed in 1964.
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pleaded not guilty to homicide, to dismiss the charge against him so as to file another charge for murder will place him thereby in double jeopardy. Aquino concur: - respondent Judge relied on Dimalibot vs. Salcedo - The Dimalibot case is different from the instant case. The plea in the Dimalibot case was made during the preliminary investigation to a complaint for homicide filed in the justice of the peace court. That is not the plea contemplated in Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court. The plea in the instant case was made to an information filed in the Court of First Instance.
DIONALDO v DACUYCUY 108 SCRA 736 ABAD SANTOS; October 30, 1981
NATURE Petition to nullify orders of respondent judge FACTS -Petitioner Rolando Dionaldo stands charged with the crime of homicide. After he entered a plea of not guilty, the prosecution filed a motion for leave to amend the information, attaching thereto an amended information charging the accused with murder qualified by treachery and evident premeditation-a more serious offense. -No explanation was given in the motion for alleging evident premeditation but as to the allegation of treachery it was explained that, "the affidavit of the complaining witness indicates that the attack was sudden and it was only after they sustained the wounds consequent to the treacherous attack that they were forced to fight back to repel further aggression." It can thus be seen that all along this claimed circumstance was known to the prosecution but it was not alleged. -Counsel for the accused opposed the motion to amend the information but the respondent judge granted the motion ISSUE WON an information for the crime of homicide can be amended so as to charge the crime of murder after the accused had entered a plea of not guilty HELD NO. - The provision which is relevant to the problem is Rule 110, Sec. 13 of the Rules of Court - The petitioner invokes the first paragraph, whereas the respondent relies on the second. - To amend the information so as to change the crime charged from homicide to the more serious offense of murder after the petitioner had pleaded not guilty to the former is indubitably proscribed by the first paragraph of the above-quoted provision. For certainly a change from homicide to murder is not a matter of form; it is one of substance with very serious consequences. - Can the amendment be justified under the second paragraph? The answer is, No. For the provision speaks not of amendment but of dismissal of the information. in other words the provision contemplates the filing of a substitute, not an amended information - Can not the information for homicide against the petitioner be dismissed since no judgment has yet been rendered and another information for murder be filed? The answer, again, is, No. For the petitioner having
Criminal Procedure
accused, and (3) deleting all items, articles and pieces of jewelry alleged to have been stolen in the original Information and substituting them with a different set of items valued at P71,336.80. - Private respondents opposed the admission of the Amended Information. The respondent court resolved to deny the proposed amendments contained in the Amended Information. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the aforesaid order but the respondent court denied said motion; hence, this petition. ISSUE WON the amended information should be admitted HELD - Amendment of an information under Sec. 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (formerly, Section 13, Rule 110 of the old Rules on Criminal Procedure) may be made at any time before the accused enters a plea to the charge. Thereafter and during the trial, amendments to the information may also be allowed, as to matters of form, provided that no prejudice is caused to the rights of the accused. - The test as to when the rights of an accused are prejudiced by the amendment of a complaint or information is when a defense under the complaint or information, as it originally stood, would no longer be available after the amendment is made, and when any evidence the accused might have, would be inapplicable to the complaint or information as amended. On the other hand, an amendment which merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the original information, and which, therefore, adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime charged is an amendment to form that can be made at anytime. - The proposed amendments in the amended information, in the instant case, are clearly substantial and have the effect of changing the crime charged from "Robbery" punishable under Article 209 to "Robbery in an Uninhabited Place" punishable under Art. 302 of the Revised Penal Code, thereby exposing the private respondents-accused to a higher penalty as compared to the penalty imposable for the offense charged in the original information to which the accused had already entered a plea of "not guilty" during their arraignment. - Moreover, the change in the items, articles and pieces of jewelry allegedly stolen into entirely different articles from those originally complained of, affects the essence of the imputed crime, and would deprive the accused of the opportunity to meet all the allegations in the amended information, in the preparation of their defenses to the charge filed against them. It will be observed that private respondents were accused as accessories-after-the-fact of the minor Ricardo Cabaloza who had already been convicted of robbery of the items listed in the original information. To charge them now as accessories-after-the-fact for a crime different from that committed by the principal, would be manifestly incongruous as to be allowed by the Court. - The allegation of conspiracy among all the private respondents-accused, which was not previously included in the original information, is likewise a substantial amendment saddling the respondents with the need of a new defense in order to meet a different situation in the trial court. To allow at this stage the proposed amendment alleging conspiracy among all the accused, will make all of the latter liable not only for their own individual transgressions or acts but also for the acts of their co-conspirators.
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Dispositive Petition is DISMISSED. Orders of the respondent court AFFIRMED. TRO lifted.
Criminal Procedure
the Civil Code, which do not provide for the reservation required in the proviso." - But in whatever way We view the institution of the civil action for recovery of damages under quasi-delict by petitioners, whether as one that should be governed by the provisions of Section 2 of Rule 111 of the Rules which require reservation by the injured party considering that by the institution of the civil action even before the commencement of the trial of the criminal case, petitioners have thereby foreclosed their right to intervene therein, or one where reservation to file the civil action need not be made, for the reason that the law itself (Article 33 of the Civil Code) already makes the reservation and the failure of the offended party to do so does not bar him from bringing the action, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, We find no legal justification for respondent court's order of dismissal. 2. YES, because the action in fact satisfies the elements of quasi-delict. Ratio An action shall be deemed to be based on a quasi-delict when all the essential averments under Articles 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code are present, namely: (a) act or omission of the private respondents; (b) presence of fault or negligence or the lack of due care in the operation of the passenger bus No. 25 by respondent Pedro Tumala resulting in the collision of the bus with the passenger car; (c) physical injuries and other damages sustained by petitioners as a result of the collision; (d) existence of direct causal connection between the damage or prejudice and the fault or negligence of private respondents; and (e) the absence of pre-existing contractual relations between the parties. Reasoning - The circumstance that the complaint alleged that respondents violated traffic rules in that the driver drove the vehicle "at a fast clip in a reckless, grossly negligent and imprudent manner in violation of traffic rules and without due regard to the safety of the passengers aboard the PU car" does not detract from the nature and character of the action, as one based on culpa aquiliana. The violation of traffic rules is merely descriptive of the failure of said driver to observe for the protection of the interests of others, that degree of care, precaution and vigilance which the circumstances justly demand, which failure resulted in the injury on petitioners. Certainly excessive speed in violation of traffic rules is a clear indication of negligence. Since the same negligent act resulted in the filing of the criminal action by the Chief of Police with the Municipal Court (Criminal Case No. 4960) and the civil action by petitioners, it is inevitable that the averments on the drivers' negligence in both complaints would substantially be the same. It should be emphasized that the same negligent act causing damages may produce a civil liability arising from a crime under Art. 100 of the Revised Penal Code or create an action for quasi-delict or culpa extra-contractual under Arts. 2176-2194 of the New Civil Code. This distinction has been amply explained in Barredo vs. Garcia, et all (73 Phil. 607, 620-621). - It is true that under Sec. 2 in relation to Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Court which became effective on January 1, 1964, in the cases provided for by Articles 31, 33, 39 and 2177 of the Civil Code, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the civil action, may be instituted by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided said party has reserved his right to institute it separately, but it should be noted, however, that neither Section 1 nor Section 2 of Rule 111 fixes a time limit when such reservation shall be made.
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SEPARATE OPINION BARREDO [concur]
- I would like to limit my concurrence. - Article 2176 and 2177 definitely create a civil liability distinct and different from the civil action arising from the offense of negligence under the Revised Penal Code. Since Civil Case No. 2850 is predicated on the above civil code articles and not on the civil liability imposed by the Revised Penal Code, I cannot see why a reservation had to be made in the criminal case. As to the specific mention of Article 2177 in Section 2 of the Rule 111, it is my considered view that the latter provision is inoperative, it being substantive in character and is not within the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate, and even if it were not substantive but adjective, it cannot stand because of its inconsistency with Article 2177, an enactment of the legislature superseding the Rules of 1940. - Besides, the actual filing of Civil Case No. 2850 should be deemed as the reservation required, there being no showing that prejudice could be caused by doing so. - Accordingly, I concur in the judgment reversing the order of dismissal of the trial court in order that Civil Case No. 2850 may proceed, subject to the limitation mentioned in the last sentence of Article 2177 of the Civil Code, which means that of the two possible judgments, the injured party is entitled exclusively to the bigger one.
Criminal Procedure
NAGUIAT v IAC (TIMOG SILANGAN DEVELOPMENT CORP) 164 SCRA 505 PADILLA; August 18, 1988
NATURE Petition to review on certiorari the decision of the Intermediate Appellate Court FACTS -Timog Silangan Development Corporation (TSDC, for short) is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of developing and selling subdivision lots in "Timog Park," located in Angeles City, with Manuel P. Lazatin (Lazatin, for short) as its President. - Antolin T. Naguiat purchased, on installment basis, four (4) lots from TSDC, identified as Lots Nos. 13, 14, 15 and 16, of Block 26 of Timog Park. Each lot consists of 300 square meters. The four (4) lots have a total area of 1,200 square meters, with a price of P60.00 per square meter. On the same date (7 February 1983) petitioner made a down payment of P7,200.00, representing 10% of the alleged total price of P72,000.00 for the four (4) lots. A corresponding receipt for the downpayment was issued by TSDC to the petitioner. While the Contract to Sell between TSDC and the petitioner stipulated a two-year period within which to pay the total contract price, the latter made substantial payments in the months of June to August 1983. On 10 August 1983, he paid the sum of P12,529.30 as his alleged full payment for Lot. No. 16, after which, TSDC caused to be issued in the name of the petitioner the title to said lot. On 7 November 1983, petitioner paid TSDC the amount of P36,067.97, which was allegedly his full payment for the remaining three (3) Lots, namely, Lots Nos. 13, 14 and 15. A corresponding receipt for said amount was also issued by TSDC to the petitioner. -Thereafter, from December 1983 up to June 1984, petitioner demanded from TSDC the issuance in his favor of the certificates of title for the three (3) lots, last paid for, but the private respondents (TSDC and Lazatin) refused on the ground that the petitioner had not fully paid for said three (3) lots. -Sometime in January, 1983, TSDC's Board of Directors approved the petitioner's contemplated purchase of the aforesaid lots. To confirm the agreement, respondent Lazatin wrote petitioner a letter reiterating standard conditions of the sale, which the petitioner allegedly accepted by affixing his conformity to said letter. The conditions for the sale of the lots were among others, "(i) 10% down payment with a commitment to commence construction therefrom (thereon) in one month's time; (ii) said construction to be finished within a period of six (6) months; and, (iii) the effective price was P70 per square meter with a rebate of P10.00 per square meter upon completion of the house in six (6) months." But, as alleged by the private respondents, petitioner commenced the construction of a house on one lot but failed to finish it within the stipulated period of six (6) months. And as to the other lots, petitioner allegedly failed altogether to construct houses on them. -Private respondents contend that since petitioner did not comply with the agreement, he was not entitled to the 10% rebate in price, and as a consequence, the previous payments made by petitioner did not amount to full payment as required for all the lots and which would have entitled
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petitioner to the issuance and delivery of the certificates of title to all the lots. -On 26 July 1984, petitioner, filed a complaint for specific performance with damages, with the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, Branch LX, docketed as Civil Case No. 4224. In his complaint, petitioner prayed, among others, that judgment be rendered ordering private respondents to deliver to him the transfer certificates of title covering the three (3) lots which he had allegedly fully paid for, and which private respondents had refused to do so. Also, it was prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the private respondents to jointly and severally pay the petitioner, actual damages equal to P320,000.00, representing unrealized gross profits; moral damages at the discretion of the court; and, attorney's fees equal to P15,000.00, plus the costs of the action. -Before the civil action was filed, petitioner also filed on 5 June 1984 with the City Fiscal of Angeles City a criminal complaint against herein respondent Manuel Lazatin, for violation of Presidential Decree No. 957, specifically Section 25 thereof, which provides: "PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 REGULATING THE SALE OF SUBDIVISIONS LOTS AND CONDOMINIUMS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS THEREOF. SEC. 25. Issuance of Title. The owner or developer shall deliver the title of the lot or unit to the buyer upon full payment of the lot or unit. No fee, except those required for the registration of the deed of sale in the Registry of Deeds shall be collected for the issuance of such title. In the event a mortgage over the lot or unit is outstanding at the time of the issuance of the title to the buyer, the owner or developer shall redeem the mortgage or the corresponding portion thereof within six months such issuance in order that the title over any fully paid lot or unit may be secured and delivered to the buyer in accordance herewith. SEC. 39. Penalties. Any person who shall violate any of the provisions of this Decree and/or any rule or regulation that may be issued pursuant to this Decree, shall, upon conviction, be punished by a fine of not more than twenty thousand (P20,000.00) pesos and/or imprisonment of not more than ten years: Provided, that in the case of corporations, partnership, cooperatives, or associations, the President, Manager or Administrator or the person who has charge of the administration of the business shall be criminally responsible for any violation of this Decree and/or the rules and regulations promulgated pursuant thereto." -On 13 September 1984, an information was filed against respondent Lazatin. -Petitioner filed on 23 February 1985 a motion to consolidate Civil Case No. 4224 and Criminal Case No. 6727. Despite the objection and opposition of the private respondents, in an Order dated 20 March 1985, the trial court granted the motion and ordered consolidation of the two (2) cases. -At the pre-trial hearing of both cases, petitioners's counsel appeared as counsel for the plaintiff in Civil Case and as private prosecutor in the Criminal Case. Private respondents objected, and filed their Motion and Opposition to Appearance of Plaintiff as Private Prosecutor with respect to the trial of the Criminal Case; the opposition was overruled by the trial court.
Criminal Procedure
the Habaluyas ruling became effective, and strictly enforced, only beginning 1 July 1986. 2. YES - In the cases at bar, the nature of the issues involved, at least, the factual issues in the civil and criminal actions are almost identical, i.e., whether or not petitioner had fully paid for the lots he purchased from the private respondents, so as to entitle him to the delivery of the certificates of title to said lots. The evidence in both cases, likewise, would virtually be the same, which are, the Contract to Sell, the letter which contains the conditions for the purchase of the lots and, to which petitioner allegedly affixed his conformity, the official receipts for the alleged payments made by the petitioner, and other related documents. - Based on the foregoing, and considering that the criminal action filed is one for violation of a special law where, irrespective of the motives, mere commission of the act prohibited by said special law, constitutes the offense, then the intervention of the petitioner's counsel, as private prosecutor in the criminal action, will not prejudice the substantial rights of the accused. - The consolidation of the two cases in question, where petitioner's counsel may act as counsel for the plaintiff in the civil case and private prosecutor in the criminal case, will instead be conducive to the early termination of the two (2) cases, and will redound to the benefit and convenience of the parties; as well as to the speedy administration of justice. - As a ground for the consolidation of the criminal and civil cases, petitioner invokes Rule 111, Sec. 3(a), Rules of Court, which provides: "Sec. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses. Whenever the offended party shall have instituted the civil action to enforce the civil liability arising from the offense, as contemplated in the first paragraph of Section 1 hereof, the following rules shall be observed: (a) 'After a criminal action has been commenced, the pending civil action arising from the same offense shall be suspended, in whatever stage it may be found until final judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. However, if no final judgment has been rendered by the trial court in the civil action, the same may be consolidated with the criminal action upon application with the court trying the criminal action. If the application is granted, the evidence presented and admitted in the civil action shall be deemed automatically reproduced in the criminal action, without prejudice to the admission of additional evidence that any party may wish to present. Under the aforequoted provision, the civil action that may be consolidated with a criminal action, is one for the recovery of civil liability arising from the criminal offense, or ex delicto. In the case at bar, the civil action filed by the petitioner was for specific performance with damages. The main relief sought in the latter case, i.e., the delivery of the certificates of title to the lots which petitioner had allegedly fully paid for, was grounded on the Contract to Sell between the petitioner and the private respondent. Hence the civil action filed by the petitioner was for the enforcement of an obligation arising from a contract, or ex contractu, and not one for the recovery of civil liability arising from an offense; hence, the law invoked by the petitioner is inapplicable. - But, as held in Canos v. Peralta, the consolidation of a criminal action with a civil action arising not ex delicto, may still be done, based upon the
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express authority of Section 1, Rule 31 of the Rules of Court, which provides: "Section 1. Consolidation. When actions involving a common question of law or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay." - In Canos v. Peralta, where the Court sustained the order of a trial court to consolidate a civil action (an action for the recovery of wage differential, overtime and termination pay, plus damages) with a criminal action (for violation of the Minimum Wage Law), it was held that: "A Court may order several actions pending before it to be tried together where they arise from the same act, event or transaction, involve the same or like issues, and depend largely or substantially on the same evidence, provided that the court has jurisdiction over the cases to be consolidated and that a joint trial will not give one party an undue advantage or prejudice the substantial rights of any of the parties . . . - The obvious purpose of the above rule is to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties litigants." Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the respondent appellate court, dated 9 October 1985, is SET ASIDE. The Orders of the trial court, in Civil Case No. 4224 and Criminal Case No. 6727, dated 20 March 1985 and 29 May 1985 are REINSTATED. SO ORDERED.
CORPUS v PAJE BORDAS v CANADALLA REYES v SEMPIO-DIY 141 SCRA 208 PATAJO; January 29, 1986
NATURE Direct appeal on a question of law from a resolution of the Regional Trial Court (Malabon). FACTS - MTC (Navotas): Cristina Malicsi was charged with the crime of intriguing against honor. Zenaida Cruz Reyes (petitioner) was the aggrieved party. In said criminal case, Reyes was represented by a private prosecutor named Atty. Barayang. - Malicsi pleaded guilty to the information and was sentenced to pay P50. Because of her plea of guilty, the aggrieved party was unable to present evidence to prove damages against the accused. Reyes was not able to make a reservation of her right to file a separate civil action for damages. - Instead, she filed a new action against Cristina Malicsi and her husband with the Regional Trial Court for damages arising from defamatory words which were the subject of the information in the Criminal action.
Criminal Procedure
the offended party did not constitute such active intervention as could only import an intention to press a claim for damages in the same action. - The failure of petitioner to make a reservation to file a separate civil action did not foreclose her right to file said separate complaint for damages. Under Article 33 of the Civil Code there is no requirement that as a condition to the filing of a separate civil action for damages a reservation to file said civil action be first made in the criminal case and such reservation is not necessary, the provision of Rule 111, Section 2 notwithstanding. Dispositive Petition is granted.
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be granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit." -Plaintiffs filed motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration. -Defendants filed a comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs. -December 15, 1983: Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." -Plaintiffs resolved an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee. -May 2,1984: defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration. -May 11, 1984: RTC Judge Esteban Lising, without acting on the motion to set aside order of November 8, 1983, issued an order declaring that since certain plaintiffs failed to file a motion to reconsider the Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs. -on May 28,1984: plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that it was not true that the plaintiffs mentioned in the order of May 11, 1984 failed to file MR within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only some of the lawyers. -September 21, 1984: RTC issued order dealing with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11, 1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2) to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In effect, the case against the defendants (except for Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balabaere) was dismissed. -March 15, 1985: petitioners (plaintiffs below) filed the instant petition for certiorari seeking to annul and set aside RTC's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. -Respondents filed comment on the petition, November 9, 1985. -A reply was filed by petitioners on August 26, 1986. ISSUES 1. WON the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution 2. WON a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties have been violated 3. WON RTC was correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos
Criminal Procedure
injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one (1) year. -Even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment. -However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic. 2. YES -The doctrine of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e. employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their subordinates. -Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32; the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party. -By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution acquires added meaning and a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression joint tortfeasors. -RTC was therefore mistaken in dropping defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col. Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. -The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be based on what appears on the face of the complaint. To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. -Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.
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3. NO -A timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by plaintiffs, through counsel. True, the motion was not signed by all the counsels for the several plaintiffs but the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs.This must have been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs. -In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in this case. Dispositive Petition granted. SC annuled and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8, 1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Case remanded to the respondent court for further proceedings. Costs against private respondents.
Criminal Procedure
- People vs. Coloma: from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not dependent upon the other. Petitioner may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the decision on the civil liability from attaining finality. 2. YES - Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by Article 100 of the RPC which provides that "Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also found in the Civil Code. - Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage, contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private person injured by the crime. In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or negligently and whether or not punishable by law. - As a general rule, a person who is found to be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was caused to a private person. - There is here an offended party, whose main contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages. - Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation. The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary damages. Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident complained of.
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- Petitioner is entitled to moral damages in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary damages. Dispositive The petition was granted.
US v HEERY
Criminal Procedure
25 Phil 600 TRENT; Oct 22, 1913
FACTS -Heery was charged with attempted murder, but was convicted of the lesser crime of maliciously inflicting serious injury upon Alex Sternberg, and was sentenced to one year and three months of prision correccional by the trial court. -On appeal, the decision was affirmed but case was remanded because it did not include the evidence of civil damages suffered by the offended party. -Then lower court, in its ruling, restated the conviction (of one yr to 3 months of prision correccional) and then included P50,500 for indemnity, with subsidiary imprisonment, in case of insolvency. -Heery raised the question of double jeopardy, and the award being excessive. ISSUES 1. WON remanding the case for determination of civil damages and their assessment against the defendant are to be considered as a modification of the punishment, by increasing the penalty or otherwise, meted out to the defendant for the commission of the crime. (WON there is double jeopardy) 2. WON award was excessive HELD 1. NO. - Civil damages are no part of the punishment for the crime. - What was the effect of the action of this court in affirming that judgment as to the guilt and punishment of the accused and of reversing it as to the question of civil damage, with instructions to execute the punishment imposed and to try the civil branch of the case? Bearing in mind the broad line of demarcation between the civil liability of the accused and his criminal liability, the bare fact that his civil liability was determined and fixed had nothing whatever to do with the punishment imposed. The latter was not thereby affected. This time intervening between the judgment of guilt and the judgment of civil damages could in no way give to the latter the character of the former. - (That) the defendant might serve the term of imprisonment fixed by the court as the punishment for his crime, and after the sentence for civil damages and in case of his insolvency, he would have to return to prison to serve the subsidiary imprisonment by reason of his insolvency, being argued that this would constitute double jeopardy. It is well settled that execution against the person will issue in civil actions in case of personal injuries, and that this is not imprisonment for debt or punishment for crime. It is in lieu of the payment of the indemnity and is considered as a discharge thereof. If the payment of the indemnity is not punishment for the crime, the imprisonment in lieu thereof is not punishment for the crime. - As the civil liability is no part of the punishment for the crime, there would have been no question of double jeopardy... In the present case, the civil liability of the defendant was established, and the sole question determined upon the second trial was the amount of civil damages. The plea of double jeopardy can not be allowed. -On civil liability of persons accused of crime:
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- Springer vs. Odlin: "By General Orders, No. 58, section 107, the privileges secured by the Spanish law to persons claiming to be injured by the commission of an offense to take part in the prosecution of the offense and to recover damages for the injury sustained by reason of the same, are preserved and remain in force, and it is therein expressly provided that the court, upon conviction of the accused, may enter judgment in favor of the injured person, against the defendant in the criminal case for the damage occasioned by the wrongful act." - Rakes vs. Atlantic, Gulf & Pacific Co.: "According to article 112 (Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure) the penal action once started, the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been waived by the party injured or been expressly reserve by him for civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be extinguished." - Almeida vs. Abaroa (8 Phil. Rep., 178), was a civil action for damages brought the plaintiff against a person who had been previously acquitted on a criminal charge. It was held that his acquittal in the criminal action was a complete bar to a civil action for damages based upon the alleged criminal act of which the defendant had been accused. In the course of this decision it was said: - "Instituting a criminal action only, it will be understood, brings the civil action as well, unless the damaged or prejudiced person waives the same or expressly reserves the right to institute the civil action after the termination of the criminal case, if there be any reason therefor. (Art. 112 of the said Law of Criminal Procedure.) - "The right to bring the civil action, as reserved by the person damaged or prejudiced, after the termination of the criminal case, is only permitted, if there be any reason therefore, and so says the law, in the event that the judgment rendered in the criminal cause is a finding of guilt against the accused; but if the accused be acquitted, then the compliant in the civil action must be based on some fact and or cause distinct and separate from the criminal act itself." - The court then quotes from article 114 of the Spanish Code of Criminal Procedure provides: "When a criminal proceeding is instituted for the judicial investigation of a crime or misdemeanor, no civil action arising from the same act can be prosecuted; but the same shall be suspended, if there be one, in whatever stage or state it may be found, until final sentence in the criminal proceeding is pronounced. "To prosecute a penal action it shall not be necessary that a civil action arising from the same crime or misdemeanor be previously instituted." - Under the Spanish criminal law, an injured person had the right to intervene in the prosecution of the accused for the purpose of having his damages ascertained. The trial court was required to include the amount of these damages in the judgment of conviction. The plain provisions of section 107 of our criminal procedure, quoted supra, expressly preserves this right to the injured person. The refusal of the trial court to allow the injured person to introduce evidence as to his damages is, therefore, clearly prejudicial error. 2. YES. - There can be no objection to allowing the physicians' fees of P500 and P1,300 for the three months' salary, being the time the injured party was incapacitated from performing the work in which he was then engaged. The remainder, P48,700, appears to have been allowed on account of the
PARKER v PANLILIO and PHIL AIR LINES 91 PHIL 1 BAUTISTA ANGELO; March 5, 1952
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Asuncion Parker and her minor daughter Kathleen filed a complaint for damages against Philippine Air Lines, Inc., based on the alleged failure of PAL to carry safely Richard Parker from Daet, Camarines Norte to Manila. - PAL set up as special defense that the plane exploded in mid-air due to dynamite surreptitiously introduced into said air craft by criminal hands. A criminal case was already filed in CFI Camarines Norte against the supposed guilty parties. - When the case was set for the continuation of the hearing, PAL presented an oral motion for the suspension of the hearing, invoking (then) sec 1 Rule 107, of the Rules of Court, which provides that no civil action arising from the same offense can be prosecuted until final
Criminal Procedure
judgment in the criminal proceeding has been rendered. Parker vehemently opposed. - CFI suspended the hearing until the final determination of the criminal case which was then pending appeal in the SC. Petitioners Claim It was a mistake on the part of respondent judge to consider and apply Sec 1, Rule 107 of the Rules of Court, as her cause of action in the civil case is based on culpa contractual and not on the civil liability arising from the offense involved in the criminal case. Respondents Comments When a criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the offense charged is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party expressly waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute it separately, and that, inasmuch as petitioner had failed to expressly reserve her right to institute the civil action separately, she may not now institute another action under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code based on the act or omission complained of in the criminal action. ISSUES 1. WON CFI was correct in considering and applying Sec 1, Rule 107, of the Rules of Court 2. WON respondent judge erred in suspending the hearing HELD 1. NO - The present civil case is based upon a cause of action not arising from the civil liability involved in the criminal case instituted against the accused. The civil case is based on alleged culpa contractual incurred by PAL because of its failure to carry safely Richard Parker to his place of destination, whereas the criminal case involves the civil liability of the accused. - Rule 107 contemplates a case where the offended party desires to press his right to demand indemnity from the accused in the criminal case which he may assert either in the same criminal case or in a separate action. - The failure of Parker to reserve her right to institute the civil action in the criminal case cannot in any way be deemed as waiver on her part to institute a separate civil action against PAL based on its contractual liability. 2. NO - The present civil case is directly interwoven with the criminal case in the sense that the main issue involved in both cases is the determination of the failure of Richard Parker to reach safely his destination or the determination of the cause of his death. This was the main reason that guided the lower court in postponing the hearing of the civil case until final judgment in the criminal case has been rendered. - Inasmuch as the power to grant or refuse continuances is inherent in all courts unless expressly limited by statute, and there is no showing that the lower court has abused its discretion is suspending the hearing, the petition for certiorari must fail. Dispositive Petition denied
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YAKULT PHILIPPINES v CA [CAMASO] 190 SCRA 357 GANCAYCO; Oct. 5, 1990
NATURE Petition for review of decision of the CA FACTS - 5 year old Roy Camaso (standing on a sidewalk) was sideswiped by a motorcycle owned by Yakult Philippines and driven by its employee, Larry Salvado on Dec.1982. - An information was then filed on Jan.1983 against Salvado charging him with the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in slight physical injuries. - On Oct. 1984, a complaint for damages was filed in the RTC of Manila by Roy Camaso (represented by his father, David) against Yakult and Salvado. The RTC decided in favor of the Camasos and held the defendants (herein petitioners) jointly and severally liable for damages, which then moved said defendants Yakult and Salvado to appeal the judgment. They also filed a peitition for certiorari in the CA challenging the RTCs jurisdiction in the civil case. Their argument was that the civil action for damages for injuries arising from alleged criminal negligence, there being no malice, cannot be filed independently of the criminal action and that under Rule 111 Sec.1 of the 1985 Rules of Crim. Pro., such a separate civil action may not be filed unless reservation thereof is expressly made. - The CA on Nov. 1989, dismissed the petition and the subsequent MFR. ISSUE WON a civil action instituted after a criminal action was filed can prosper even if there was no reservation to file a separate civil action HELD YES - Although the separate civil action filed in this case was without previous reservation in the criminal case, it was nevertheless instituted before the prosecution presented evidence in the criminal action, and the presiding judge handling the criminal action was duly informed thereof, such that no damages was awarded in the disposition of the criminal action. Reasoning - Under the aforecited provisions of the rule, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. - Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. It is also provided that the reservation of the right to institute the separate civil action shall be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable opportunity to make such reservation. ** The SC considered the actual filing of the civil action far better than a compliance with the requirement of an express reservation that should be made by the offended party before the prosecution presents its evidence. It added that the purpose of this rule requiring reservation is to prevent the
MANIAGO vCA (BOADO) 253 SCRA 674 MENDOZA; February 20, 1996
FACTS - Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority in Loakan, Baguio City. - One of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado along Loakan Road, Baguio City. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioners driver, Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City - A month later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado against petitioner himself - Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver. But the trial court denied petitioners motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in the criminal case. - CA dismissed his petition - There is no dispute that private respondent, as offended party in the criminal case, did not reserve the right to bring a separate civil action, based on the same accident, either against the driver, Herminio Andaya, or against the latters employer, herein petitioner Ruben Maniago. - petitioner argues that the civil action against him was impliedly instituted in the criminal action previously filed against his employee because private respondent did not reserve his right to bring this action separately. (The records show that while this case was pending in the Court of Appeals, the criminal action was dismissed on July 10, 1992 for failure of the prosecution to file a formal offer of its evidence, with the consequence that the prosecution failed to prosecute its case. Accordingly, it seems to be petitioners argument that since the civil action to recover damages was impliedly instituted with the criminal action, the dismissal of the criminal case brought with it the dismissal of the civil action.) - Private respondent admits that he did not reserve the right to institute the present civil action against Andayas employer. He contends, however, that the rights provided in Arts. 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code are substantive rights and, as such, their enforcement cannot be conditioned on a reservation to bring the action to enforce them separately. ISSUE WON despite the absence of reservation, Boado may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the Art.2176, 2180 and 2177 of the Civil Code and Rule 111 of the Rules of Court.
Criminal Procedure
HELD NO Ratio The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. 1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. The right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. Reasoning A. There are statements in some cases implying that Rule 111, 1 and 3 are beyond the rulemaking power of the Supreme Court under the Constitution. A careful examination of the cases, however, will show that approval of the filing of separate civil action for damages even though no reservation of the right to institute such civil action had been reserved rests on considerations other than that no reservation is needed. - In Garcia v. Florido the right of an injured person to bring an action for damages even if he did not make a reservation of his action in the criminal prosecution for physical injuries through reckless imprudence was upheld on the ground that by bringing the civil action the injured parties had in effect abandoned their right to press for recovery of damages in the criminal case. - In Abellana v. Marave in which the right of persons injured in a vehicular accident to bring a separate action for damages was sustained despite the fact that the right to bring it separately was not reserved. But the basis of the decision in that case was the fact that the filing of the civil case was equivalent to a reservation because it was made after the decision of the City Court convicting the accused had been appealed. - In Jarantilla v. CA the ruling is that the acquittal of the accused in the criminal case for physical injuries through reckless imprudence on the ground of reasonable doubt is not a bar to the filing of an action for damages even though the filing of the latter action was not reserved. This is because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code which provides that when an accused is acquitted on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. This ruling obviously cannot apply to this case because the basis of the dismissal of the criminal case against the driver is the fact that the prosecution failed to prove its case as a result of its failure to make a formal offer of its evidence. - the rulings in these cases are consistent with the proposition herein made that, on the basis of Rule 111, 1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code. - Through all the shifts or changes in policy as to the civil action arising from the same act or omission for which a criminal action is brought, one thing is clear: The change has been effected by this Court. The new rules
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require reservation of the right to recover the civil liability, otherwise the action will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal action. - Contrary to private respondents contention, the requirement that before a separate civil action may be brought it must be reserved does not impair, diminish or defeat substantive rights, but only regulates their exercise in the general interest of orderly procedure. - It is the conduct of the trial of the civil action - not its institution through the filing of a complaint - which is allowed to proceed independently of the outcome of the criminal case. B. There is a practical reason for requiring that the right to bring an independent civil action under the Civil Code separately must be reserved. It is to avoid the filing of more than one action for the same act or omission against the same party. Any award made against the employer, whether based on his subsidiary civil liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code or his primary liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code, is ultimately recoverable from the accused. - In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee, bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. But if the right to bring a separate civil action (whether arising from the crime or from quasi-delict) is reserved, there would be no possibility that the employer would be held liable because in such a case there would be no pronouncement as to the civil liability of the accused. In such a case the institution of a separate and independent civil action under the Civil Code would not result in the employee being held liable for the same act or omission. The rule requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition against double recovery for the same act or omission. - Nor does it matter that the action is against the employer to enforce his vicarious liability under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code. Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Dispositive The decision appealed from is REVERSED and the complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SAN ILDEFONSO LINES, INC. v CA (PIONEER INSURANCE AND SURETY CORPORATION) 300 SCRA 484 MARTINEZ; April 24, 1998
NATURE Petition for review after a motion for reconsideration of respondent court judgment was denied FACTS - In the afternoon of June 24, 1991, a Toyota Lite Ace Van being driven by its owner Annie U. Jao and a passenger bus of herein petitioner San Ildefonso Lines, Inc. (hereafter, SILI) collided with each other at the intersection of Julia Vargas Avenue and Rodriguez Lanuza Avenue in
Criminal Procedure
111, it is easily deducible from the present wording of Section 3 as brought about by the 1988 amendments to the Rules on Criminal Procedure -- particularly the phrase " which has been reserved" -- that the "independent" character of these civil actions does not do away with the reservation requirement. In other words, prior reservation is a condition sine qua non before any of these independent civil actions can be instituted and thereafter have a continuous determination apart from or simultaneous with the criminal action. - According to Justice Jose Y. Feria, remedial law expert and a member of the committee which drafted the 1988 amendments, whose learned explanation on the matter was aptly pointed out by petitioners, the 1988 amendment expands the scope of the civil action which is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action unless waived, reserved or previously instituted. Under the present Rule as amended, such a civil action includes not only recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but also damages under Article 2176 (quasi-delicts) of the said code. - It should be noted that while it was ruled in Abella vs. Marave (57 SCRA 106) that a reservation of the right to file an independent civil action is not necessary, such a reservation is necessary under the amended rule. Without such reservation, the civil action is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless previously waived or instituted. - Far from altering substantive rights, the primary purpose of the reservation is, to borrow the words of the Court in "Caos v. Peralta":" to avoid multiplicity of suits, to guard against oppression and abuse, to prevent delays, to clear congested dockets, to simplify the work of the trial court; in short, the attainment of justice with the least expense and vexation to the parties-litigants." 2. NO - Private respondent PISC, as subrogee, is not exempt from the reservation requirement with respect to its damages suit based on quasidelict arising from the same act or omission of petitioner Javier complained of in the criminal case. As private respondent PISC merely stepped into the shoes of Ms. Jao (as owner of the insured Toyota van), then it is bound to observe the procedural requirements which Ms. Jao ought to follow had she herself instituted the civil case. Dispositive The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 24, 1995 and the Resolution dated April 3,1995 denying the motion for reconsideration thereof are reversed. The "manifestation and motion to suspend civil proceedings" filed by petitioners is granted.
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FACTS - On December 23, 1956, in the municipality of Lubao, Pampanga, a passenger bus operated by private respondent Victory Liner, Inc. and driven by its employee, private respondent Felardo Paje, collided with a jeep driven by Clemente Marcia, resulting in the latter's death and in physical injuries to herein petitioners, Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap. Thereupon, an information for homicide and serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Felardo Paje in the CFI of Pampanga. - On January 23, 1957, an action for damages was filed in the CFI of Rizal by Edgar Marcia and Renato Yap, together with their respective parents, against the Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje, alleging that the mishap was due to the reckless imprudence and negligence of the latter in driving the passenger bus. - While said Civil Case was in progress in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, the criminal action proceeded in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga. The accused Felardo Paje was convicted of the offense charged. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeals, he was acquitted with the CA holding that "CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE is WANTING in this case, and that appellant was NOT even guilty of CIVIL NEGLIGENCE. Insofar as appellant was concerned, the CA held that this was a case of PURE ACCIDENT." - As a consequence, herein private respondents, defendants in Civil Case of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, moved for the dismissal of the complaint invoking the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting Felardo Paje and citing Section 1 (d), Rule 107 of the Rules of Court (now Section 3 (c), Rule 111 of the New Rules of Court). On August 10, 1966, the Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered a decision dismissing plaintiffs' complaint against the defendants Victory Liner, Inc. and Felardo Paje. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA, which basically affirmed the RTC decision. Hence, this recourse. ISSUE WON the decision of the Court of Appeals acquitting the accused in reckless imprudence on the ground that the incident was accidental, extinguished by implication the civil action for damages HELD YES Ratio Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. Since, the CA found that this case was of pure accident, it is as good as saying as if he did not commit the crime charged. There being no crime committed, no civil liability arises. Reasoning - It is the stand of herein petitioners that Section 2, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court, not Section 3 (c) thereof, should apply in the case at bar. "Sec. 2. Independent civil action. - In the cases provided for in Articles 31, 32, 33, 34 and 2177 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, an independent civil action entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party during the pendency of the criminal case, provided the right is reserved as required in the preceding section. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the
BUNAG JR. v CA (CIRILO) 211 SCRA 440 REGALADO; July 10, 1992
NATURE Petition for review from the decision of the CA FACTS - On Sept. 8, 1973 Conrado Bunag Jr. brought Zenaida Cirilo to a motel or hotel where they had sexual intercourse and later that evening he brought Zenaida to the house of his grandmothers house where they lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until Sept. 29, 1973. They filed their application for marriage license with the Local Civil Registral of Bacoor, Cavite. However, after a few days, Conrado filed an affidavit withdrawing his application for a marriage license. Plaintiffs Claim Conrado Bunag Jr. abducted her in the vicinity of San Juan de Dios Hospital in Pasay City and brought her to a motel where she was raped. Afterwhich he said that he would not let her go unless they get married, as he intended to marry her , so much so that she promised not to make any scandal and to marry him. They went to his gradmothers house and lived together as husband and wife for 21 days until Bunag Jr. left and never returned which humiliated Zenaida and compelled her to go back to her parents. Respondents Comment Conrado Bunag Jr.and Zenaida Cirilo had earlier made plans to elope and get married (same as first set of facts) . And that the reason why Conrado broke off their plan to get married was their bitter disagreements over money and Zenaidas threats to his life. - The Cirilos filed a complaint for damages against Conrado Bunag Jr. and his father Conrado Bunag Sr. (Zenaidas uncle claims that Bunag Sr. assured them that the couple were to be married). The
MARCIA v CA (PAJE and VICTORY LINER) 120 SCRA 190 RELOVA; January 27, 1983
NATURE Appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals affirming the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, which dismissed the complaint filed by the petitioners against private respondents in the concept of an independent civil action for damages for physical injuries resulting from reckless imprudence.
Criminal Procedure
Trial Court ordered Bunag Jr. to pay damages (80K-moral damages,20Kexemplary damages, 20k-temperate damages and 10k attorneys fees) Bunag Sr. was absolved from any and all liability.CA affirmed in toto - Bunag Jr contends that both the trial court awarded the damages on the basis of a finding that he is guilty of forcible abduction with rape,despite the prior dismissal of the complaint therefore filed by Zenaida with the Pasay City Fiscals Office. ISSUE WON the Fiscals dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape extinguished the civil liability of Conrado Bunag Jr HELD NO - The dismissal did not in any way affect the right of Zenaida Cirilo to institute a civil action arising from the offense. - Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist. Reasoning -Generally, every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Criminal Liability will give rise to civil liability ex delicto only if the same felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the direct and proximate cause thereof. -The two proceedings involved are not between the same parties (the criminal action is between the State and the defendant and the civil case is between the offended party and the defendant). Also, there are different rules as to the competency of witnesses and the quantum of evidence in criminal and civil proceedings.(criminal action proof beyond reasonable doubt; civil actionpreponderance of evidence) - In this case the dismissal of the complaint for forcible abduction with rape was by mere resolution of the fiscal at the preliminary investigation stage. There is no declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil case might arise did not exist.
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the prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. Petitioner was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt". - On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. In his answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative detenses that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil aspect and actively participated in the criminal case. - Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial. Petitioner thereafter filed in this Court a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-40992, assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was dismissed for lack of merit in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a resolution of October 28, 1975. - After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay damages. Thus, petitioner appealed said decision to the CA but said respondent court affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court with a few changes in the amount of the damages to be paid. ISSUE WON the private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the judgment of acquittal HELD YES - The action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. Ratio The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner. The Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill that: ... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
Criminal Procedure
- Pre-ratio: Jimenez erred in the filing of a certiorari petition, and should have filed a mandamus to the SC instead to compel the lower court to proceed with the case. ISSUE WON the determination of the issue raised in the civil case mentioned heretofore is a prejudicial question, in the sense that it must be first resolved before the proceedings in the criminal case for estafa may proceed HELD NO - The issue of fraud and deceit raised in the civil case does not constitute a prejudicial question. The criminal court must now try the estafa case against the two accused. Reasoning - A prejudicial question has been define to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which, (question ) is a logical antecedent of the issued involved in said case, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. Simply put, the questions must be determinative of the case before the court, and that jurisdiction to try and resolve said question must be lodged in another tribunal. - Applying these to the case, it will be readily seen that the alleged prejudicial question is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the parties charged with estafa, because even on the assumption that the execution of the receipt whose annulment they sought in the civil case was vitiated by fraud, duress or intimidation, their guilt could still be established by other evidence showing, to the degree required by law, that they had actually received from the complaint the sum of P20,000.00 with which to buy for him a fishing boat, and that, instead of doing so, they misappropriated the money and refused or otherwise failed to return it to him upon demand. The contention of the private respondents herein would be tenable had they been charged with falsification of the same receipt involved in the civil action. - If the ruling were otherwise, there would hardly be a case for estafa that could be prosecuted speedily, it being the easiest thing for the accused to block the proceedings by the simple expedient of filing an independent civil action against the complainant, raising therein the issue that he had not received from the latter the amount alleged to have been misappropriated.
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which consisted of petitioner having executed a chattel mortgage when a prior chattel mortgage was still valid and subsisting, thus giving lie to his express manifestation that the property was free from all liens and encumbrances. - Note: the trigger for the filing of information re: art.319 violation was the filing of 5 estafa cases against Rojas. - CFI Judge Alikpala ordered the arraignment, then the trial for the criminal case. Rojas filed an action for certiorari against the arraignment order, and prohibition against the order setting the trial, based on the civil action for the revocation of the management contract. He contended that a prejudicial question was involved, thus he could no longer be tried pending the termination of the civil suit. The respondents, in turn, contended that the resolution of the civil case will not determine the liability of Rojas in the criminal case (not a prejudicial question); and even granting that there was a prejudicial question, the cases could proceed independently pursuant to Art.33 of CC, which provides: In cases of defamation, fraud and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. ISSUE WON the is a prejudicial question, thus requiring the resolution of the civil action for the determination of the criminal case HELD NO Ratio: A prejudicial question, which is must be determinative of the case before the court, and jurisdiction to try the same must be lodged in another court, is not present in this case. Reasoning: - It is indispensable then for this petition to succeed that the alleged prejudicial question must be determinative of the criminal case before respondent Judge. It is not so in this case. - Pisalbor. v. Tesoro: CFI erred in holding that the criminal case should be suspended. In the present proceedings, the civil case does not involve a question prejudicial to the criminal case, for to whomsoever the land may be awarded after all the evidence has been presented in the civil case, may not affect the alleged crime committed by the notary public, which is the subject of the criminal case. But, even supposing that both the civil and the criminal case involve the same question and one must precede the other, it should be the civil case which should be suspended rather than the criminal, to await the result of the latter. - Dela Cruz v City Fiscal: Regardless of the outcome of the pending civil case for annulment of the affidavit of adjudication, determination of the charge of falsification would be based on the truth or falsity of the narration of facts in the affidavit of adjudication, * * *. Therefore, the civil case aforementioned does not involve a prejudicial question. - Benitez v. Concepcion, Jr (more analogous): the fact that the principal issues in both cases are the same and did arise from the same facts would not show any necessity that the civil case be determined first before taking up the criminal case. - Isip v. Gonzales: there is a prejudicial question only when the matter that has to be priorly decided by another authority is one the cognizance of
Criminal Procedure
- there appears to be a prejudicial question in the case at bar, considering that Ras' defense in Civil Case of the nullity and forgery of the alleged prior deed of sale in favor of Pichel (plaintiff in the civil case and complaining witness in the criminal case) is based on the very same facts which would be necessarily determinative of Ras' guilt or innocence as accused in the criminal case. Ratio A prejudicial question is defined as that which arises in a case the resolution of which is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein, and the cognizance of which pertains to another tribunal. The prejudicial question must be determinative of the case before the court but the jurisdiction to try and resolve the question must be lodged in another court or tribunal. It is a question based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused. Reasoning - For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the criminal action pending the determination of the civil, it must appear not only that the civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in said civil action would be necessarily determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused. - If the first alleged sale in favor of Pichel is void or fictitious, then there would be no double sale and petitioner would be innocent of the offense charged. A conviction in the criminal case (if it were allowed to proceed ahead) would be a gross injustice and would have to be set aside if it were finally decided in the civil action that indeed the alleged prior deed of sale was a forgery and spurious. Dispositive Order of respondent judge in Criminal Case dated December 12, 1978 is hereby set aside. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on May 16, 1979 is hereby made permanent and respondent judge is enjoined from proceeding with the arraignment and trial of the criminal case unless the civil case shall have been finally decided and terminated adversely against petitioner.
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- In the meantime, according to the petitioner, private respondents, Guanteros, harvested the sugar canes he planted on the land he leased from Rufino. On August 10, 1978, a Criminal Case (the Criminal Case) was filed against the respondents for theft demanding damages amounting to Pesos 15,120.00. During the pendency of the Criminal Case, another case for damages (the Damages Case) against the private respondents alleging damages to the petitioner caused by the private respondents theft of the sugar canes and their occupation of the leased properties thus preventing him from cultivating or taking possession of the same. He alleged that this resulted in his being deprived of income for two years amounting to Pesos 78,280.00. - In their answer, respondents asserted that the lots are still under coownership among the heirs and that this is the subject of another special proceeding (the Intestate Case). That said, Democrata contended that Rufino could not execute the lease contracts without her conformity without her conformity as co-owner. The Guanteros filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the Criminal Case on the ground of pendency of the Damages Case, the Intestate Case, and the ejectment case (the Ejectment Case) which was filed by Rufino against Democrata on January 13, 1977. - The respondents took the position that the various cases focused on the issues of possession and ownership of the lots involved as well as of the improvements thereon, hence, determinative of their guilt in the criminal action and hence constitutive of a prejudicial question. - Despite the objections made by the petitioner, the lower court issued the order finding that a prejudicial question existed and suspending the Criminal case proceeding. Hence this appeal. ISSUE WON the issues raised in the three cases mentioned involve a prejudicial question that warrants a suspension of the Criminal Case HELD NO The issues raised in the three cases do not involve the pivotal question of who planted the sugar can and, therefore, are not determinative juris et jure of guilt or innocence in the Criminal Case. Reasoning - A prejudicial question is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused., and for it to suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. - In the case at bar, the issues raised would not constitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Case. The Intestate Case involves only the coheirs and the facts involved are totally unrelated to the Criminal Case. Even if the Intestate Court should annul the division and uphold the coownership, that would not be determinative of the criminal responsibility of private respondents for theft of the sugar cane, which petitioner claims he planted in good faith by virtue of the valid lease agreement. The Ejectment Case also does not constitute a prejudicial question to the Criminal Case. It involves the issue of possession between co-owners. A decision therein
LIBRODO v COSCOLLUELA, JR. (GUANTERO) 116 SCRA 303 MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30, 1982
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review Negros CFI order FACTS - Felipe Rivera died leaving certain properties in San Carlos, Negros Occidental. His estate was settled in a special proceeding on November 24, 1976 and was terminated on the basis of a Project of Partition among Rufino Rivera Damandaman, Democrata Guantero, and Zosimo Guantero. - Rufinos share of the estate comprise of lots designated as Lots 559-B, 1906-B, 1910-B, and a901-B which were all sugar lands. On January 18, 1977, Rufino leased the properties to Dr. Librodo, the petitioner, for a period of ten agricultural crop years. - On August 31, Democrata filed a petition to re-open the intestate proceeding on the ground that she was not present when the subdivision plan was submitted and that the judgment has not become final as the boundaries on the partition have not been platted.
Criminal Procedure
proposed course of action must be addressed to the sound discretion of the court. - The only instance when the appellate court should stay the hand of the trial court in such cases is when it is shown that the trial court acted without jurisdiction or in excess of its jurisdiction or otherwise committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to such lack or excess of jurisdiction. - Petitioners are public officers charged with having violated Section 3(c) of RA 3019, for evident bad faith and manifest partiality in enforcing the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 4047 against a Mustang car registered in the name of Leticia Acosta-Ang (complainant) who is not the judgment debtor thereby causing undue injury to said complainant and giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor in said case. - Upon reinvestigation of the criminal case by the Tanodbayan, he found evidence tending to show that the sale of said car to the complainant by Juanito Ang, the judgment debtor, was a sham intended to defraud his creditors; that the deed of absolute sale which ostensibly was executed before a notary public appeared to be fictitious inasmuch as the entry of the document in the notarial register of said notary public on said date referred to a catering contract of other parties; that the certificate of registration of the car was issued to complainant only on June 13, 1984 which showed that the document of sale was actually executed only on or about the same date, that is, seven days after Juanito Ang received copy of the adverse decision in Civil Case No. 4047; and that upon the execution of the judgment, the car was found in the possession of Alvin, the son of Juanito Ang, who admitted that the car belonged to his father by showing the receipt of its repair in the name of Juanito Ang. This is the basis of the motion for withdrawal of the information of the Tanodbayan. - The respondents are aware that the complainant is not a party to the civil case filed by the creditor against spouses Juanito and Lydia Ang and that a writ of execution cannot be implemented validly against one who is not a party to the action. All these, coupled with the under haste in which the levy on the Mustang car was made without first ascertaining the true owner thereof demonstrate quite convincingly the evident bad faith and manifest partiality of the respondents, thereby giving unwarranted benefits to the judgment creditor to the damage and prejudice of the complainant. - Although at the reinvestigation, the Tanodbayan was persuaded that in fact the sale of the car to Leticia Ang was fraudulent, this did not necessarily clear petitioners of the aforesaid Anti-Graft charge against them. Still the burden is on the petitioners to establish that they acted in good faith in proceeding with the execution on the car even they were presented evidence tending to show it did not belong to Juanito Ang anymore. - The denial of the motion to suspend the criminal proceedings on the ground of the pendency of a prejudicial question in Civil Case No. 5307 is well taken. The doctrine of prejudicial question comes into play usually in a situation where a civil action and a criminal action are both pending and there exists in the former an issue which must be preemptively resolved before the criminal action may proceed, because whatsoever the issue raised in the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et jure of the guilt or innocence of the accused in the criminal case. - The pending civil case for the annulment of the sale of the car to Leticia Ang is not determinative of the guilt or innocence of the petitioners for the acts allegedly committed by them in seizing the car. Even if in the civil action it is ultimately resolved that the sale was null and void, it does not necessarily follow that the seizure of the car was rightfully undertaken.
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The car was registered in the name of Leticia Ang six months before the seizure. Until the nullity of the sale is declared by the courts, the same is presumptively valid. Thus, petitioners must demonstrate that the seizure was not attended by manifest bad faith in order to clear themselves of the charge in the criminal action. Dispositive The petition is DENIED for lack of merit and the restraining order dated June 6, 1989 is hereby lifted. No costs.
UMALI v IAC (EDANO) 219 SCRA 339 PADILLA; June 21, 1990
NATURE Review on certiorari FACTS - Petitioners (Umali, Calleja, Ledesma) are officers of the Orosea Devt Corporation. Sometime on Sept. 4, 1979, Umali purchased from spoused Homorio and Solina Edano a lot in Mulanay, Province of Queazon for P1, 036,500 payable on 4 installments (P225,000, P271,500, P270,000, P 270,000) They issued for this purpose 4 checks drawn against the Chartered Bank, Manila Branch. The first check for P225,000.00 was honored upon its presentment. By arrangement the petitioners made with the Edano spouses, a deed of absolute sale in the name of Orosea Devt Corp. was executed even of the full purchase price has not yet been fully paid. Thereafter, OROSEA secured a loan of P1,000,000.00 from the Philippine Veterans Bank using this property as security. When the check for the second installment fell due, petitioners twice asked for deferment. The checks they have issued were dishonored. As a consequence of the dishonor of these checks, the Edano spouses filed a complaint for estafa against petitioners. - The information was filed by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioners on May 21, 1981, and it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 1423-I. Arraignment was set on September 4, 1981 but petitioners failed to appear. It was reset to October 5, 1981 but this was postponed upon motion of petitioners. - On October 14, 1981, OROSEA filed a Complaint in the Court of First Instance of Quezon against the Edano spouses for the annulment/rescission of the Contract of Sale for which the petitioners issued the checks, subject of the criminal case. - The estafa case was again set for arraignment. This was postponed. With the entry of a new counsel, petitioners filed a motion to quash the estafa case, on ground of improper venue, but this motion was withdrawn by petitioners before it could be resolved. - The arraignment was again postponed thrice. Petitioners then filed a 'Motion to Suspend Arraignment and Further Proceedings, with a Supplemental Motion To Suspend Proceedings. This was opposed by the Provincial Fiscal of Quezon. Resolving the motion to suspend, respondent Judge issued his orders, now under question, denying the motion. CFI of Zambales also denied the same motion. A petition for certiorari is filed with CA and CA affirmed. ISSUE WON proceedings should be suspended until the civil case is disposed of, since CV No. 8769 involves a prejudicial question.
Criminal Procedure
- CFI rendered decision reiterating findings of CA. Petitioner again appealed to CA which affirmed the CFI decision. - MFR was filed on the ground that lower court had no jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter of the action wrt the offense of abduction with consent. MFR was denied Petitioners claims there was no complaint for abduction with consent filed and that the lower court acquired no jurisdiction over his person or over the crime of abduction with consent. ISSUE WON CA erred in not reversing he decision of the TC for lack of jurisdiction over the accused and the subject matter of the action for the offense abduction with consent HELD NO. - Jurisdiction over the person of an accused is acquired upon either his apprehension, with or without warrant, or his submission to the jurisdiction of the court. It is not claimed that petitioner had not been apprehended or had not submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. His actions show that he never questioned the judicial authority of the CFI, the justice of peace and the CA. He is deemed to have waived whatever objection he might have had to the jurisdiction over his person, and, hence, to have submitted himself to the Court's jurisdiction. His behavior - particularly the motions therein filed by him implied, not merely a submission to the jurisdiction thereof, but also, that he urged the courts to exercise the authority thereof over his person. - On the other hand, it is well settled that jurisdiction over the subject matter of an action is and may be conferred only by law. That jurisdiction over a given crime, not vested by law upon a particular court, may not be conferred thereto by the parties involved in the offense; and that, under an information for forcible abduction, the accused may be convicted of abduction with consent. Art 344 (3) RPC states that: ". . . the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasciviousness, shall not be prosecuted except upon a complaint filed by the offended party or her parents, grandparents, or guardian, nor in any case, if the offended has been expressly pardoned by the above- named persons, as the case may be". - Art 344 RPC does not determine the jurisdiction of our courts over the offense therein enumerated. It could not affect said jurisdiction, because the same is governed by the Judiciary Act of 1948, not by RPC, which deals primarily with the definition of crimes and the factors pertinent to the punishment of the culprits. The complaint required in said Article 344 is merely a condition precedent to the exercise by the proper authorities of the power to prosecute the guilty parties. And such condition has been imposed "out of consideration for the offended woman and her family who might prefer to suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through with the scandal of a public trial." - The gist of petitioner's pretense is that there are some elements of the latter which are not included in the former, and, not alleged, according to him, in the complaint filed herein, namely: 1) that the offended party is a virgin; and 2) that she is over 12 and under 18 years of age. The second element is clearly set forth in said complaint, which states that Ester Ulsano is "a minor . . . 17 years of age . . .", and, hence, over 12 and below 18 years of age.
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- As regards the first element, it is settled that the virginity mentioned in Art 343 RPC, as an essential ingredient of the crime of abduction with consent, should not be understood in its material sense and does not exclude the idea of abduction of a virtuous woman of good reputation because the essence of the offense "is not the wrong done to the woman, but the outrage to the family and the alarm produced in it by the disappearance of one of its members." - The complaint in the case at bar alleges not only that Ester Ulsano is a minor 17 years of age, but also that petitioner "willfully, unlawfully and feloniously" took her by force and violence . . . against her will and taking advantage of the absence of her mother" from their dwelling and carried "her to a secluded spot to gain carnal intercourse with the offended party against her will, using force, intimidation and violence, with lewd designs." This allegation implies that Ester is a minor living under patria protestas, thus leading to the presumption that she is a virgin apart from being virtuous and having a good reputation. The presumption of innocence includes that of morality and decency, and of chastity. Dispositive Wherefore, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner Maximino Valdepenas. It is so ordered.
Criminal Procedure
and this Court's decision in the instant murder case inasmuch as the victims in the two cases are different. The attempted murder case decided by the Court of Appeals involved the wounding of a certain Tomas Metucua whereas, in the instant murder case the victim was Pedro Candel. The acquittal of Lahoy in connection with the wounding of Metucua would not affect the determination of his guilt or innocence in connection with the death of Pedro Candel. - This holding does not in anyway emasculate the rule in section 17(1) that criminal cases appealed to the Court of Appeals, involving offenses which arose out of the same occurrence, or which were committed on the same occasion as the offense punished by death or reclusion perpetua should be certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals. It is this Court that would determine whether or not the cases appealed to the Court of Appeals should be decided together with the case appealed to this Court. 2. YES The feeble denials of Plateros and Lahoy (who admittedly were near the owns of the crime, when it was perpetrated) cannot prevail over the positive and unequivocal declarations of the eyewitnesses, Aora and Piquero, that the appellants were the authors of the stab wounds which caused Candal's death. Their guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt. 3. YES. There was a conspiracy between Plateros and Lahoy as shown in their concerted efforts to injure Candel. Plateros and Lahoy, as boon companions, had been together since four o'clock in the afternoon. They had gone to different places and repaired twice to the kitchenette. They were together when they left the scene of the stabbing. 4. NO Lahoy and Plateros, who could have stabbed Candel or Metucua inside the kitchenette, did not do so. They waited for Metucua and the pedicab drivers to leave the kitchenette. Their intention was to make a surprise attack without any risk to themselves. The assault was deliberate, sudden and unexpected. That is the characteristics manifestation of treachery (alevosia). Hence, the killing was properly categorized as murder by the trial court (Art. 14(16), Revised Penal Code). Dispositive WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is affirmed with costs against the appellants. They are entitled to credit for their preventive imprisonment under the conditions laid down in article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.
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NO - It is settled doctrine that jurisdiction of a court in criminal law matters is determined by the law in effect at the time of the commencement of the criminal action and not the law in effect at the time of the commission of the offense charged. -Under Sec 87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, municipal judges in the capitals of provinces and sub-provinces and judges of city courts shall have like jurisdiction as the CFI to try parties charged with an offense within their respective jurisdictions, in which penalties provided do not exceed prision correccional or fines no exceeding P6,000 or both. -At the time of the commission of the crime, the imposable penalty under Art 315 of the RPC was arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional it is minimum period, falling well within the jurisdiction of the City Court. But when the information was filed, PD 818 had increased the imposable penalty to prision mayor in its medium period. -The real question raised by petitioner is whether the said doctrine disregards the rule against retroactivity of penal laws. It has been repeatedly held that in criminal prosecutions, jurisdiction is not determined by what may be meted out to the offender in after trial but by the extent of the penalty which the law imposes. Once jurisdiction is acquired by the Court in which the information is filed, it is retained regardless of whether the evidence proves a lesser offense which carries a penalty that would otherwise fall within the jurisdiction of an inferior court. -In the instant case, should the information be refiled with the RTC, the court may not impose a more onerous penalty upon Lagon. Although the RTC retains subject-matter jurisdiction to try and decide the refiled case under PD 818, given the date of the commission of the crime (before effectivity of PD 818), the lower penalty provided in Art 315 (otherwise within the jurisdiction of the City Court) should be imposed. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the Court resolved to DENY the petition
Criminal Procedure
- Sec. 1 of the RCP begins with the phrase, "for offenses not subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases," which plainly signifies that the section does not apply to offenses which are subject to summary procedure. The phrase "in all cases" appearing in the last paragraph obviously refers to the cases covered by the Section, that is, those offenses not governed by the RSP. - The charge against the petitioner, which is for violation of a municipal ordinance of Rodriguez, is governed by the RSP and not the RCP. - Where paragraph (b) of the section does speak of "offenses falling under the jurisdiction of the MTC and MCTC," the obvious reference is to Section 32 (2) of B.P. No. 129, vesting in such courts: (2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon, irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof; Provided, however, That in offenses involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos. - These offenses are not covered by the RSP. Under Section 9 of the RSP, "the complaint or information shall be filed directly in court without need of a prior preliminary examination or preliminary investigation." Both parties agree that this provision does not prevent the prosecutor from conducting a preliminary investigation if he wants to. However, the case shall be deemed commenced only when it is filed in court, whether or not the prosecution decides to conduct a preliminary investigation. This means that the running of the prescriptive period shall be halted on the date the case is actual filed in court and not on any date before that. - This interpretation is in consonance with the afore-quoted Act No. 3326 which says that the period of prescription shall be suspended "when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." The proceedings referred to in Section 2 thereof are "judicial proceedings," contrary to the submission of the SolGen that they include administrative proceedings. - At any rate, the Court feels that if there be a conflict between the RSP and the RCP, the former should prevail as the special law. And if there be a conflict between Act No. 3326 and the RCP, the latter must again yield because this Court, in the exercise of its rule-making power, is not allowed to "diminish, increase or modify substantive rights" under Article VIII, Section 5 (5) of the Constitution Prescription in criminal cases is a substantive right. The prescriptive period for the crime imputed to the petitioner commenced from its alleged commission on May 11, 1990, and ended two months thereafter, on July 11, 1990, in accordance with Section 1 of Act No. 3326. It was not interrupted by the filing of the complaint with the OPP on May 30, 1990, as this was not a judicial proceeding. The judicial proceeding that could have interrupted the period was the filing of the information with the MTC of Rodriguez, but this was done only on October 2, 1990, after the crime had already prescribed. Dispositive Petition is GRANTED. Case is DISMISSED on the ground of prescription.
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NATURE Petition for review on Certiorari and Prohibition FACTS -Petitioners (Roy Villasor, Angelina Meijia Lopez and Aurora Mejia Villasor) and other heirs of spouses Manuel Meijia and Gloria Lazatin entered into a contract with respondent Trinidad Lazatin for the development and subdivision of 3 parcels of land belonging to the intestate estate. Lazatin transferred his rights to Terra Devt Co (TDC). -Petitioners and co-heirs filed an action in CFI QC for rescission of said contract with Lazatin for alleged gross and willful violation of its terms. -Respondents (Lazatin and TDC) filed with Fiscals Office of City of Angeles a complaint against petitioners for violation of A172 in relation to A171, par4, RPC. Preliminary investigation conducted. Fiscal filed with Court in Angeles City information charging petitioners with crime of falsification of private document. Allegedly, Aurora and Angelina made it appear that they were the guardians of minors George and Alexander Meijia (sons of the spouses?) when they werent the guardians at the date of the execution of the document, a certain Carolina M. de Castro was the judicial guardian of the said minors). -Petitioners asked for a reinvestigation. Angeles City Fiscal reinvestigated to give them opportunity to present exculpatory evidence. After reinvestigation, parties charged moved for the dismissal of the case mainly on the ground that the City Court of Angeles had no jurisdiction over the offense because the private document that contained the alleged false statement of fact was signed by them outside the territorial limits of said city (One in Makati, the other one in QC). -However, the resolution of their motion to dismiss was delayed and the City Court already set their criminal case for arraignment. Petitioners secured several postponements of the arraignment. But since City Fiscal continually failed to act on their motion to dismiss, petitioners filed a motion to quash instead, on the ground that court had no jurisdiction. Respondents (with conformity of City Fiscal) filed an opposition to the motion to quash. Respondent judge denied motion to quash, set arraignment. So petitioners filed present action. ISSUE 1. WON City Court of Angeles City had jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal case for alleged falsification of a private document allegedly done by the parties named in the info even if the acts of falsification was allegedly done in Makati and QC, and thus outside the jurisdiction of said court Other procedural issues 2. WON the motion to quash was improper, and should not be allowed since by filing the said motion, the petitioners necessarily assumes the truth of the allegation of the information to the effect that the offense was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of Angeles City 3. WON the prayer for writs of certiorari and prohibition is proper HELD 1. NO.
Criminal Procedure
FACTS - Cecilia YABUT was accused of ESTAFA by means of false pretenses before the CFI Bulacan. She, as treasurer of the Yabut Transit Lines, made out 3 checks in the total sum of P6, 568.94 drawn against the Merchants Banking Corp (located in Caloocan City), payable to Freeway Tires Supply. The checks were dishonored because of insufficient funds. Yabut failed to deposit the necessary funds to cover the checks. - Instead of entering a plea, YABUT filed a MOTION TO QUASH contending that: (1) the acts charged do not constitute the offense as there is no allegation that the postdated checks were issued and delivered to the complainant prior to or simultaneously with the delivery of the merchandise; (2) estafa is not indictable when checks are postdated or issued in payment of pre-existing obligations; (3) venue was improperly laid because checks were issued and received by complainant in Caloocan, Yabuts office. - The People opposed and maintained that new law on checks, RA 4885, amending Art. 315 par.2(d) RPC, penalizes the postdating and that Malolos court can exercise jurisdiction since the last ingredient of the case, damage, transpired in Bulacan (residence of the complainant) after the dishonor of the checks for lack of funds. - The judge quashed the information for the reason of improper venue. The other issue was not resolved by the judge. - Peoples MFR for this dismissal was denied. ** This is actually a decision for two petitions: the other case involved Cecilias husband, GEMINIANO who was also charged with estafa, in his capacity as the President of Yabut Transit Lines. The exact same thing happened in his case (motion to quash -> improper venue reason -> quashed -> MFR denied). ISSUE 1. WON CFI Bulacan had jurisdiction over the case 2. WON new law punishes the postdating or issuance thereof in payment of a pre-existing obligation 3. WON facts charged in the informations constitute estafa HELD 1. YES Ratio Estafa by postdating or issuing a bad check under Art. 315 par 2(d) of the RPC may be a transitory or continuing offense. Its basic elements of deceit and damage may independently arise in separate places. In the event of such occurrence, the institution of the criminal action in either place is legally allowed. - The venue of the offense lies at the place where the check was executed and delivered to the payee. Reasoning Section 14(a), Rule 110 of the ROC: In all criminal prosecutions the action shall be instituted and tried in the Court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place. - The estafa charged in the 2 informations involved here appear to be transitory or continuing in nature. Deceit has taken place in Malolos (thru issuance and delivery of worthless checks), while the damage in Caloocan, where the checks were dishonored by the drawee banks there. - The place where the bills were written, signed or dated does not necessarily fix the place where they were executed. What is decisive is
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the delivery of the instrument which is the final act essential to its consummation as an obligation. - The receipt of the bad checks by a certain Yambao in Caloocan cannot be taken as delivery of the checks to Freeway Tires because he did not take delivery of the checks as holder. - Place of business of Freeway Tires is at Malolos, Bulacan from where the tire and gas purchases were made by the private respondents. Payment should then be considered effected there. 2. YES - Due to the absence of concrete evidence on the specific nature of the obligation assumed or supposedly discharged by the issuance of the bad checks, resolution of this controversial issue on the basis of the averments in the informations alone is not ripe. 3. YES Reasoning In considering a motion to quash based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the point of resolution is whether the facts alleged, if hypothetically admitted, would meet the essential elements of the offense as defined in the law. Facts alleged should be taken as they are. Dispositive Appealed orders ordering the quashal of the estafa informations against the two private respondents are reversed and set aside. Arraignment of the private respondents in the criminal cases should be set at the earliest date, and thereafter, the trial on the merits to proceed immediately.
Criminal Procedure
"Preliminary investigation of criminal actions for written defamations as provided for in the chapter shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such actions may be instituted in accordance with the provisions of this article. ". . . ." (As amended by Republic Act Nos. 1289 and 4363) - Before article 360 was amended, the rule was that a criminal action for libel may be instituted in any jurisdiction where the libelous article was published or circulated, irrespective of where it was written or printed. Under that rule, the criminal action is transitory and the injured party has a choice of venue. -Experience had shown that under that old rule the offended party could harass the accused in a libel case by laying the venue of the criminal action in a remote or distant place. -Republic Act No. 4363 was enacted so as to prevent the offended party in written defamation cases from inconveniencing the accused by means of out-of-town libel suits, meaning complaints filed in remote municipal courts -The rules on venue in article 360 may be restated thus: 1. Whether the offended party is a public official or a private person, the criminal action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first published. 2. If the offended party is a private individual, the criminal action may also be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province where he actually resided at the time of the commission of the offense. 3. If the offended party is a public officer whose office is in Manila at the time of the commission of the offense, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of Manila. 4. If the offended party is a public officer holding office outside of Manila, the action may be filed in the Court of First Instance of the province or city where he held office at the time of the commission of the offense. -As a corollary, the preliminary investigation of the criminal action for written defamation shall be conducted by the provincial or city fiscal of the province or city, or by the municipal court of the city or capital of the province where such action may be instituted. -Applying the foregoing rules, the proper venue of Mahinan's criminal action for written defamation against the petitioners is the Court of First Instance of Isabela, since as a GSIS branch manager, he was a public official stationed at Cauayan, Isabela and the alleged libel was committed when he was (as he still) in the public service. The preliminary investigation of the complaint should have been conducted by the provincial fiscal of Isabela, or by the municipal judge of Ilagan, the provincial capital, or by the Court of First Instance of the same province. -The criminal action could have been filed also in the Court of First Instance of the province or in the city court of the city where the libel was printed and first published. -The information in this case is defective or deficient because it does not show that the Court of First Instance of Nueva Vizcaya, where it was filed, has jurisdiction to entertain the criminal action for written defamation initiated by Mahinan against the petitioners and that the provincial fiscal of that province had the authority to conduct the preliminary investigation. -Venue in criminal cases is an essential element of jurisdiction
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Dispositive Petition granted. The trial court's order denying petitioners' motion to quash is set aside. It is directed to dismiss Criminal Case No. 509, the libel case against the petitioners, without prejudice to the filing of another criminal action for written defamation in the Court of First Instance of Isabela
Criminal Procedure
- Elements: (1) Deceit took place in Pampanga, where it was uttered and delivered. The rule is that the issuance as well as the delivery of the check must be to a person who takes it as a holder, which means the payee or indorsee of a bill or note, who is in possession of it, or the bearer, thereof, who in this case is the Financial Officer of SMC (2) Damage took place in Bulacan, where the check was dishonored by the drawee bank. - Therefore, jurisdiction may be entertained by either the Bulacan or the Pampanga court. BP 22 violation - In respect of the Bouncing Checks Case, the offense also appears to be continuing in nature. It is true that the offense is committed by the very fact of its performance; and that the Bouncing Checks Law penalizes not only the fact of dishonor of a check but also the act of making or drawing and issuance of a bouncing check. The case, therefore, could have been filed also in Bulacan. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. However, it is likewise true that knowledge on the part of the maker or drawer of the check of the insufficiency of his funds, which is an essential ingredient of the offense is by itself a continuing eventuality, whether the accused be within one territory or another. Accordingly, jurisdiction to take cognizance of the offense also lies in the Regional Trial Court of Pampanga. - Jurisdiction or venue is determined by the allegations in the Information, which are controlling. The Information filed herein specifically alleges that the crime was committed in San Fernando, Pampanga, and, therefore, within the jurisdiction of the Court below. 2. NO The case was dismissed not on merits but on the erroneous conclusion of the judge that his court had no jurisdiction over the case. The dismissal being null and void, the proceedings before the RTC cant be said to have been lawfully terminated. Therefore, there is no second proceeding to place the accused in double jeopardy. Dispositive Petition granted. Judge is ordered to reassume jurisdiction over Criminal Cases Nos. 2800 and 2813 of his Court and to render judgment of either conviction or acquittal in accordance with the evidence already adduced during the joint trial of said two cases.
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applied for and was granted probation by the respondent judge in his order dated August 11, 1982. The petitioner was then placed under probation for a period of one (1) year, subject to the terms and conditions enumerated therein. - The probationer (petitioner) asked his supervising probation officer for permission to transfer his residence from BF Homes to Phil-Am Life Subdivision in Las Pias specifically 33 Jingco Street. The probation officer verbally granted the probationer's request as he found nothing objectionable to it. - By the terms of the petitioner's probation, it should have expired on August 10, 1983, one year after the order granting the same was issued. But, the order of final discharge could not be issued because the respondent probation officer had not yet submitted his final report on the conduct of his charge. Subsequently, the respondent People of the Philippines, through Assistant City Fiscal Jose D. Cajucom of Manila, filed a motion to revoke the probation of the petitioner before Branch XX of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, presided over by the respondent judge. The motion alleged that the petitioner had violated the terms and conditions of his probation. - On January 4, 1984, the petitioner filed his opposition to the motion on the ground that he was no longer under probation, his probation period having terminated on August 10, 1983, as previously adverted to. As such, no valid reason existed to revoke the same, he contended. As if to confirm the Manila Assistant City Fiscal's motion to revoke the petitioner's probation, the respondent probation officer filed on January 6, 1984, a motion to terminate Manuel Bala's probation, at the same time attaching his progress report on supervision dated January 5, 1984. The same motion, however, became the subject of a "Manifestation," dated January 10, 1984, which stated that the probation officer was not pursuing the motion to terminate dated January 6, 1984; instead, he was submitting a supplemental report which recommended the revocation of probation "in the light of new facts, information, and evidences." - Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion to dismiss and/or strike out the motion to revoke probation, questioning the jurisdiction of the court over his case inasmuch as his probation period had already expired. Moreover, his change of residence automatically transferred the venue of the case from the RTC of Manila to the Executive. Judge, of the RTC of Makati which latter court include under its jurisdiction the Municipality of Las Pias the probationer's place of residence, invoking Section 13, P.D. No. 968, which provides Sec. 13. Control and Supervision of Probationer. ... Whenever a probationer is permitted to reside in a place under the jurisdiction of another court, control over him shall be transferred to the Executive Judge of the, Court of First Instance of that place, and in such a case a copy of the probation order the investigation report and other pertinent records shall be furnished to said Executive Judge. Thereafter. the Executive Judge to whom jurisdiction over the probationer is transferred shall have the power with respect to him that was previously possessed by the court which granted the probation. - The respondent judge denied the motion to dismiss for lack of merit. Hence, this petition. ISSUE
Criminal Procedure
- After due preliminary examination of the complainant's witnesses and his other evidence, the municipal court found probable cause against the accused. It thus issued an order for their arrest. - Without giving the prosecution the opportunity to prove that the evidence of guilt is strong, the court granted them the right to post bail for their temporary release. Sola, Garcia and Cabral posted bail and have since been released. -The witnesses informed the prosecution of their fears that if the trial is held at the CFI Himamaylan which is but 10 kilometers from Kabankalan, their safety could be jeopardized. At least two of the accused are officials with power and influence in Kabankalan and they have been released on bail. In addition, most of the accused remained at large. Indeed, there have been reports made to police authorities of threats made on the families of the witnesses. - February 11, 1981: petition for cancellation of bail bonds and change of venue was filed. - February 12, 1981: the Court required the comment of the Solicitor General as well as of the private respondents. - March 4, 1981, the Comment was submitted by Solicitor General Mendoza. It opened with this preliminary statement: "The present petition was filed by the private prosecutors in Criminal Cases Nos. 1700-1706, People v. Pablo Sola, et al., pending trial before the CFI of Negros Occidental. Rightly, any petition before this Honorable Court on behalf of the People of the Philippines can, under the law, be instituted only by the Solicitor General. The assertion of the petitioner private prosecutors that they are instituting the action 'subject to the control and supervision of the Fiscal' will not, therefore, improve their legal standing." Nonetheless, it adopted the two-pronged trusts of the petition: 1. the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the criminal cases mentioned above, and 2. the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of justice. - March 15, 1981: The Court Resolved to: (a) [Note] the comment of the Solicitor General on the urgent petition for change of venue and cancellation of bail bonds, adopting the plea of the petition, namely, (1) the setting aside, by certiorari, of the order of the Municipal Court of Kabankalan, presided over by Judge Rafael Gasataya, granting bail to the accused in the 7 Criminal Cases, and (2) the petition for a change of venue or place of trial of the same criminal cases to avoid a miscarriage of Justice; (b) [Transfer] the venue of the aforesaid criminal cases to Branch V of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental at Bacolod City, presided by Executive Judge Alfonso Baguio, considering that District Judge Ostervaldo Emilia of the Court of First Instance, Negros Occidental, Branch VI at Himamaylan has an approved leave of absence covering the period from January 12 to March 12, 1981 due to a mild attack of cerebral thrombosis and that the said Branch V is the nearest court station to Himamaylan: and (c) [Await] the comment of respondents on the petition to cancel bail, without prejudice to the public officials concerned taking the necessary measures to assure the safety of the witnesses of the prosecution." Thus, the issue of a change of venue has become moot and academic. ISSUE WON the bail bonds should be cancelled
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HELD YES Ratio Whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that ground. (People v San Diego) Reasoning - Bail was granted to the accused without hearing the prosecution -Justice Cardozo: "The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent in every concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept inviolate and inviolable, however crushing may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is narrowed to a filament. We are to keep the balance true." - It does not suffice that the questions asked by the municipal judge before bail was granted could be characterized as searching. That fact did not cure an infirmity of a jurisdictional character. On change of venue - 1973 Constitution: The Supreme Court could order "a change of venue or place of trial to avoid a miscarriage of justice." - People v. Gutierrez: To compel the prosecution to proceed to trial in a locality where its witnesses will not be at liberty to reveal what they know is to make a mockery of the judicial process, and to betray the very purpose for which courts have been established." - It may be added that there may be cases where the fear, objectively viewed, may, to some individuals, be less than terrifying, but the question must always be the effect it has on the witnesses who will testify. The primordial aim and intent of the Constitution must ever be kept in mind. In case of doubt, it should be resolved in favor of a change of venue. As a matter of fact, there need not be a petition of this character filed before this Court. Such a plea could have been done administratively. In this particular case, however, there is justification for the procedure followed in view of the fact that along with the change of venue, the cancellation of the bail bonds was also sought. Dispositive The assailed order of Judge Gasataya granting bail to private respondents is nullified, set aside, and declared to be without force and effect. Exec. Judge Alfonso Baguio of the CFI of Negros Occidental, to whose sala the cases had been transferred is directed forthwith to hear the petitions for bail of private respondents, with the prosecution being duly heard on the question of whether or not the evidence of guilt against the respondents is strong. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.
Criminal Procedure
1. WON there was error in filing the complaint since it was not filed in Plaridel, Bulacan or Talavera, Nueva Ecija but in Pulilan, Bulacan (and if yes, then WON an error was by the CFI of Bulacan in hearing the said case and not by the CFI of Nueva Ecija) 2. WON Judge Vega had authority to hear the case (***there are other issues but no longer related to the topic venue so I didnt include them anymore ~ eoc) HELD 1. NO - The Municipal Court of Pulilan had jurisdiction because the abductors and their captive passed Pulilan on their way from Plaridel to Talavera. And the CFI of Bulacan [as well as the CFI of Nueva Ecija] had jurisdiction because essential elements of the offense took place in Bulacan [and also in Nueva Ecija]. Reasoning Abduction is a persistent and continuing offense. (U.S. vs. Bernabe, 23 Phil. 154 [1912]). - Hence it may be "tried in the court of the municipality or province wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential ingredients thereof took place." (Rules of Court, Rule 110, Sec. 14[a]). 2. YES. - Judge de Vega had the power to decide the case. Reasoning "Where a court of first instance is divided into several branches, each of the branches is not a court distinct and separate from the others. Jurisdiction is vested in the court, not in the judges, so that when a complaint or information is filed before one branch or judge, jurisdiction does not attach to said branch or judge alone, to the exclusion of the others. Trial may be had or proceedings may continue by and before another branch or judge." [Lumpay, et al. vs. Moscoso, 105 Phil. 968 (1959)]. Dispositive The judgment of the Court a quo is hereby affirmed in all respects.
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ISSUE WON in prelim investigation by fiscal, accused is entitled to be informed of substance of testimony and evidence against him HELD NO - Prelim investigation by fiscal is not within purview of Sections 13 and 11 of Rule 108. Sec 13 deals with transmission of records requirements and Sec 11 deals with prelim investigation by justices of peace and judges for purpose of issuance of warrant. - Sec 2, Act No 612: In cases triable only in CFI, defendant shall have speedy trial, but shall not be entitled as of right to a prelim investigation where prosecuting attorney, after investigation, shall have presented an information against him. - THE RIGHT TO A PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION IS STATUTORY, NOT CONSTITUTIONAL. Its purpose is to secure the innocent against hasty prosecutions and protect him from public accusation, and also to protect the State from useless prosecutions. - This investigation is called preliminary, to be followed by trial proper. Investigating judge or prosecuting officer acts upon probable cause and reasonable belief, not upon proof beyond reasonable doubt. - In this case, to ask for abstract of testimony at that stage for no other purpose than to scrutinize the same is, in effect, to ask for another prelim investigation.
HASHIM v CITY FISCAL OF MANILA 71 Phil 216 LAUREL; January 13, 1941
NATURE Certiorari and mandamus FACTS - Hashim was caught in possession of counterfeit treasury certificates, but was released upon filing of bond. Complaint was filed with Office of City Fiscal and after investigation of fiscal, information was lodged. Case was docketed and Judge issued arrest warrant. Petitioners counsel filed motion asking fiscal to furnish clerk of court w/ testimony of witnesses who testified at preliminary investigation. Fiscal opposed. - Counsel for petitioner put in motion that should his first motion be acted upon adversely, that Court itself conduct the investigation under Sec 4 of Rule 108. Fiscal opposed. - Petitioners counsel asked that warrant of arrest be cancelled and the court conduct preliminary investigation. Judge denied motions and the MFRs. Hence the instant certiorari and mandamus petition.
Criminal Procedure
- The prescriptive period of a crime depends upon the penalty imposed by law. The penalties for the crimes charged are: arresto mayor for Trespass to Dwelling, Grave Threats and Less Serious Physical Injuries; and arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period for Serious Physical Injuries. The prescriptive period of offenses punishable by arresto mayor is 5 years, while crimes punishable by correctional penalties prescribe in 10 years. The complaints were filed with the City Court only 9 months from said occurrence. - The re-investigation sought by petitioners applies only to instances where a case is cognizable by the Court of First Instance but filed with the City Court for purposes of preliminary investigation only and thereafter dismissed by the latter on the ground that no prima facie case exists. However, for cases cognizable by inferior courts and filed with the same not only for purposes of preliminary investigation but for trial on the merits, the Office of the City Fiscal has no authority to re-investigate. On Preliminary Investigation: - Purpose: to protect the accused from the inconvenience, expense and burden of defending himself in a formal trial unless the reasonable probability of his guilt shall have been first ascertained in a fairly summary proceeding by a competent officer; and to protect the state from having to conduct useless and expensive trials. - Stages: (1) the preliminary examination of the complainant and his witnesses prior to the arrest of the accused to determine whether or not there is ground to issue a warrant of arrest; (2) preliminary investigation proper, wherein the accused, after his arrest, is informed of the complaint filed against him and is given access to the testimonies and evidence presented, and he is also permitted to introduce evidence in his favor. The purpose of this stage of investigation is to determine whether or not the accused should be released or held before trial. - Nature: merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering the persons who may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the fiscal to prepare his complaint or information; not a trial of the case on the merits and has no purpose except that of determining whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof, and it does not place the person against whom it is taken in jeopardy. - Under Section 10, Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, in cases falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of an inferior court, as well as in cases within the concurrent jurisdiction of the city courts or municipal courts with Courts of First Instance, the accused was not entitled to be heard in a preliminary investigation proper. The reason behind this rule is as follows: " The loss of time entailed in the conduct of preliminary investigations, with the consequent extension of deprivation of the accused's liberty, in case he fails to post bail, which at times outlasts the period of the penalty provided by law for the offense, besides the mental anguish suffered in protracted litigations, are eliminated with the assurance of a speedy and expeditious trial for the accused, upon his arraignment (without having to undergo the second stage of the preliminary investigation), and of a prompt verdict on his guilt or innocence. On the other hand, the so-called first stage of preliminary investigation or the preliminary examination, conducted by the duly authorized officer, as borne out by the examination and sworn written statement of the complainants and their witnesses, generally suffices to establish the existence of reasonable ground to charge the accused with having committed the offense complained of."
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- The result of a preliminary investigation can neither constitute nor give rise to the defense of double jeopardy in any case, because such preliminary investigation is not and does not in itself constitute a trial or even any part thereof. In order that the defense of jeopardy may lie, there must be a former judgment, either of acquittal or of conviction, rendered by a court competent to render the same, not only by reason of the offense committed, which must be the same or at least comprised within it, but also by reason of the place where it was committed. Dispositive Petition dismissed.
Criminal Procedure
conducted the preliminary investigation and issued an order to the effect that there was probable cause to prosecute the offense charged which falls within the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance." HELD After a criminal case has been remanded by the justice of the peace to the Court of First Instance which has jurisdiction to try it on the merits, and before the provincial fiscal has filed the necessary information, the latter not only has the power but also the duty to investigate the facts upon which the complaint filed in the justice of the peace court was based, to examine the evidence submitted to the justice of the peace and such other evidence as the parties may deem proper to submit on their own free will or on demand of the fiscal, for the purpose of determining whether there is at least prima facie evidence establishing the guilt of the accused and overcoming the presumption of innocence in his favor. If after he has done all this and considering all the circumstances of the case, the fiscal believes that the evidence is not sufficient to establish prima facie the guilt of the accused, he should submit to the court before which the case is pending the corresponding motion for dismissal. The provincial fiscal of Laguna complied with all these requirements before asking for the dismissal of the present case, thereby keeping within the powers conferred upon him by section 1687 of the Revised Administrative Code. Dispositive Finding no merit in the sole error assigned by the appellant, the offended party in this case, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed,' with costs against the appellant.
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Petitioners' Claim (1) the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of preliminary investigation (2) the extrajudicial confession he executed was obtained through force and intimidation and, therefore, inadmissible in evidence, and (3) in the absence of adequate proof that it was he who killed the deceased Hermenegildo Odiamar, he should be held guilty of the offense of robbery only, and not of the complex crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries.
ISSUE WON the trial court had no jurisdiction to try the case for want of preliminary investigation HELD NO Reasoning - When Judge Templo set the case for preliminary investigation to afford the accused occasion to confront the witnesses against him, the accused instead filed a manifestation waiving his right to present evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. When the case was forwarded to the CFI, the accused entered his plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation. The aforesaid constitute waiver of the accuseds right to preliminary investigation. It is well-settled that the right to preliminary investigation is not a fundamental right and that the same may be waived expressly or by silence. Such waiver carried with it the waiver of any procedural error or irregularity that may have attended the preliminary investigation. Dispositive The judgment under review is hereby affirmed
PEOPLE v VELOSO 112 SCRA 173 PER CURIAM; February 25, 1982
NATURE Automatic review of CFI decision imposing the capital penalty of death on accused Veloso for the crime of robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries FACTS - Veloso and others entered the Odiamars house and robbed them around 7:30 in the evening. They stole money, tear gas gun, jewelry, old coins. - Hermenegildo Odiamar was shot and killed during the robbery, while the Odiamar spouses sustained serious physical injuries. - Veloso, among others, was charged for robbery with homicide and double serious physical injuries - July 5, 1970 (the case says july but I think its a typo probably june) : Judge Templo conducted preliminary examination - June 22, 1970 Judge Templo set the case for preliminary investigation to afford the accused the occasion to confront the witnesses against him and to present his own evidence - instead of availing himself of this opportunity, he filed a manifestation stating that he Waives his right to present evidence at the second stage of the preliminary investigation. - the case was forwarded to the CFI, and it appears that accused entered his non-guilty plea without raising the question of lack of preliminary investigation.
Criminal Procedure
conducted." (People vs. Casiano, 1 SCRA 478). The defendants in these cases did not question the validity of the informations on the ground of defective certifications or the right to preliminary investigations before they entered the plea of not guilty. They filed the motion to declare informations and warrants of arrest null and void only after more than one (1) year thereafter. Consequently, when they entered a plea of not guilty, they thereby waived all objections that are grounds for a motion to quash, except lack of jurisdiction or failure of the information to charge an offense. Thus, they waived the right to a preliminary investigation when they failed to invoke it prior to, or at least at, the time of the entry of their plea in the Court of First Instance. Dispositive ACCORDINGLY, the order dated November 2, 1966 of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga is set aside and the said court is hereby ordered to proceed with the trial of the said criminal cases.
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and other documentary evidence presented during the preliminary investigation HELD NO. -The primary requirement for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of probable cause (Sec. 3, Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution). P.D. No. 911 authorizes the fiscal or state prosecutor to determine the existence of probable cause. - There is thus no dispute that the judge may rely upon the fiscal's certification of the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest. But this does not bind the judge to issue a warrant - Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court:: "Warrant of arrest, when issued. - If the judge be satisfied from the preliminary examination conducted by him or by the investigating officer that the offense complained of has been committed and that there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused has committed it, he must issue a warrant or order for his arrest." -the judge must satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause before issuing a warrant or order of arrest. If on the face of the information the judge finds no probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's certification and require the submission of the affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of a probable cause. Without the affidavits of the prosecution witnesses and other evidence which, as a matter of long-standing practice had been attached to the informations filed in his sala, respondent found the informations inadequate bases for the determination of probable cause -Also, Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, is applicable to some of the crimes in the said informations. This rule requires that the complaint or information must be accompanied by the affidavits of the complainant and of his witnesses in such number of copies as there are defendants plus two (2) copies for the court's files -judge also did not commit grave abuse of discretion in remanding some of the cases to the City Fiscal for further investigation. From the informations and affidavits presented to him, he found the charges patently without basis or merit. For respondent to issue the warrants of arrest and try the accused would only expose the latter to unnecessary harrassment, anxiety and expense. And as already pointed out, under the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, the respondent judge has the power to order the outright dismissal of the charge if, from the information and the affidavits attached thereto, he finds the same to be patently without basis or merit
Criminal Procedure
- September 19, 1991 The trial started and the prosecution presented its first witness. This was followed by three more witnesses on October 3, 1991. - September 23, 1991 The CA dismissed the petition for habeas corpus and the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus on the following grounds, among others: a) Validity of the warrantless arrest because the crime had been freshly committed. He was positively identified by the witness and his identity had been established when he came to the police station. b) Waiver of the right to preliminary investigation when he did not invoke it properly and waiver of any irregularity in his arrest when accused posted bail. c) Validity of the information against the accused precluded the grant of the petition for habeas corpus Petitioners Claim: Go contends that the crime had not been just committed because of the 6-day disparity. - None of the police officers who arrested him had any personal knowledge of the crime. Respondents Comments: Go had been validly arrested because the crime had been committed 6 days before he was arrested. - Invoking Umali vs. Ramos where the Court upheld that a warrantless arrest was valid 14 days after the crime was committed. - The prosecutor proceeded under the erroneous supposition that Section 7 of Rule 112 was applicable and required petitioner to waive the provisions of Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code as a condition for carrying out a preliminary investigation. Go was entitled to a preliminary investigation and that right should have been accorded him without any conditions. ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest was lawful 2. WON the accused Go had waived his right to preliminary investigation HELD 1. NO, the warrantless arrest was not lawful Ratio Rule 112, Sec. 7 states that a complaint for information can be filed sans preliminary investigation when a person has been lawfully arrested without a warrant except than an affidavit should be executed by the person who was responsible for the arrest. But the person arrested can ask for preliminary investigation by the proper officer before the complaint or information can be filed. In this case, the person arrested must waive the provisions of A125, RPC with the assistance of counsel (a lawyer or another person of his choice if a lawyer is not available). He may also apply for bail despite the waiver and the investigation must terminate within 15 days. Reasoning - Umil vs. Ramos only applies to continuing crimes so it does not apply in the case at bar. Murder is not a continuing crime because it happens in one place at a particular point in time and ends there as well. - The warrantless arrest does not follow the requisites in Rule 113, Sec. 5 because: >The arrest took place 6 days after Maguan was shot whereas the RoC provide that the crime should have been just committed, is about to be committed or is being committed.
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>None of the arresting officers had personal knowledge of the facts indicating that Go was the gunman as required in the RoC. The information that the police had was derived from eyewitness accounts. - When Go walked into the police station 6 days after Maguan was shot, he did not surrender (so as not to imply that he committed the crime) nor was he arrested but he placed himself in the disposal of the police authorities. 2. NO, Go had not waived his right to preliminary investigation. Ratio The rule is that the right to preliminary investigation is waived when the accused fails to invoke it before or at the time of entering a plea at arraignment. Reasoning - The right to have a preliminary investigation conducted before being bound over to trial for a criminal offense and hence formally at risk of incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right. - The nature of the crime demanded that a preliminary investigation be conducted. Go did ask for a preliminary investigation from the start. On the day the information for murder was filed, he also filed an OMNIBUS MOTION for IMMEDIATE RELEASE and PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION. The Court is not ready to ignore that act by Go and consider it as a waiver based simply on the contention of the SolGen that the motion should have been filed with the trial court and not the prosecutor. - According to Crespo vs. Mogul: The preliminary investigation conducted by the fiscal for the purpose of determining whether a prima facie case exists warranting the prosecution of the accused is terminated upon the filing of the information in the proper court. Should the fiscal find it proper to conduct a reinvestigation of the case, at such stage, the permission of the Court must be secured. After such reinvestigation the finding and recommendations of the fiscal should be submitted to the Court for appropriate action. - However, in the case at bar, Gos omnibus motion asked for a PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION not REINVESTIGATION as discussed in Crespo vs. Mogul. The Prosecutor also filed a MOTION for LEAVE TO CONDUCT PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION so the omnibus motion of Go was, in effect, filed in the trial court. Go did ask for a preliminary investigation on the very day that the information was filed without such preliminary investigation, and that the trial court was 5 days later apprised of the desire of the petitioner for such preliminary investigation. - There was no waiver of the right to preliminary investigation because Go had vigorously insisted on his right to preliminary investigation before his arraignment. At the time of his arraignment, petitioner was already before the Court of Appeals on certiorari, prohibition and mandamus precisely asking for a preliminary investigation before being forced to stand trial. - Gos act of posting bail cannot be deemed to be a waiver of his right to preliminary investigation. Go asked for release on recognizance or on bail and for preliminary investigation in one omnibus motion. He had thus claimed his right to preliminary investigation before respondent Judge approved the cash bond posted by petitioner and ordered his release. Obiter - However, contrary to petitioner's contention, the failure to accord preliminary investigation, while constituting a denial of the appropriate and full measure of the statutory process of criminal justice, did not impair the
GUTIERREZ [concurring]
- The need for a trial court to follow the Rules and to be fair, impartial, and persistent in getting the true facts of a case is present in all cases but it is particularly important if the accused is indigent; more so, if he is one of
Criminal Procedure
those unfortunates who seem to spend more time behind bars than outside.
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International Trading Corporation which submitted bids to supply equipment to the DECS and the National Manpower and Youth Council. - January 25, 1988, Special Prosecution Officer filed in the Sandiganbayan an information against petitioner. - The petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition in the SC questioning the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan to file the information without the approval of the Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987 Constitution. - June 30, 1988, the SC annulled the information - Upon the annulment of the information against the petitioner, the Special Prosecutor sought clearance from the Ombudsman to refile it - The Ombudsman granted clearance but advised that some changes be made in the information previously filed - A new information was filed in the Sandiganbayan - Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information for being invalid because there had been no preliminary investigation and defective because the facts alleged do not constitute the offense charged. - The Sandiganbayan denied the motion to quash - The Special Prosecutor filed a motion to suspend accused pendente lite. Over the objection of the accused the Sandiganbayan ordered his suspension pendente lite from his position as PCGG Commissioner and from any other office he may be holding. ISSUES 1. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioners motion to quash the information 2. WON the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in suspending the petitioner from office despite the Presidents having previously approved his indefinite leave of absence until final decision in the case HELD 1. YES - A new preliminary investigation of the charge against the petitioner is in order not only because the first was a nullity but also because the accused demands it as his right. Moreover, the charge against him had been changed as directed by the Ombudsman. The petitioners right to a preliminary investigation of the new charge is secured to him by Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. That right of the accused is substantial and its denial over his opposition is a prejudicial error in that it subjects the accused to loss of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. Since the right belongs to the accused, he alone may waive it. If he demands it, the State may not withhold it. However, as the absence of a preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash the complaint or information, the proceedings upon such information in the Sandiganbayan should be held in abeyance and the case should be remanded to the office of the Ombudsman for him or the Special Prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation. 2. NO - Since the petitioner is an incumbent public official charged in a valid information with an offense punishable under the Constitution and the laws, the laws command that he shall be suspended from office pendent lite must be obeyed. His approved leave of absence should not be a bar to his preventive suspension for, as indicated by the Solicitor General, and approved leave, whether it be for a fixed of indefinite period may be
GRIO-AQUINO [dissenting]
- After 4 witnesses have already testified, among them an eyewitness who identified the accused as the gunman and a security guard who identified the plate number of the gunman's car, there is no need to conduct a preliminary investigation the sole purpose of which would be to ascertain if there is sufficient ground to believe that a crime was committed (which the petitioner does not dispute) and that he (the petitioner) is probably guilty thereof (which the prosecutor, by filing the information against him, presumably believed to be so). - This case did not suffer from a lack of previous investigation. Diligent police work, with ample media coverage, led to the identification of the suspect who, 7 days after the shooting, appeared at the San Juan police station to verify news reports that he was the object of a police manhunt. There witnesses identified him to be the assailant. - It should be remembered that as important as is the right of the accused to a preliminary investigation, it is not a constitutional right. Its absence is not a ground to quash the information. It does not affect the court's jurisdiction, nor impair the validity of the information, nor constitute an infringement of the right of the accused to confront witnesses. - The petitioner's motion for a preliminary investigation is not more important than his application for release on bail, just as the conduct of such preliminary investigation is not more important than the hearing of the application for bail. The court's hearing of the application for bail should not be subordinated to the preliminary investigation of the charge. The hearing should not be suspended, but should be allowed to proceed because the parties will have an opportunity to show not only: (a) whether or not there is probable cause to believe that the petitioner killed Eldon Maguan, but more importantly (b) whether or not the evidence of his guilt is strong. The judge's determination that the evidence of his guilt is strong would naturally foreclose the need for a preliminary investigation to ascertain the probability of his guilt. - Go was indeed arrested by the police. Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest
DOROMAL v SANDIGANBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN and SPECIAL PROSECUTOR) 177 SCRA 1989 GRINO-AQUINO; September 7, 1989
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - October 1987, the Special Prosecution Officer conducted a preliminary investigation of the charge against petitioner, Quintin Doromal, a former commissioner of the Presidential Commission on Good Government for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act in connection with his shareholdings and position as president and director of the Doromal
Criminal Procedure
kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest's reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the next morning. This is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected to intense heat. Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely ground to dust. - Strangely, if not awkwardly, after Van Twest's reported abduction which culminated in his decimation by cremation, his counsel continued to represent him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Hence, even Asst. Solicitor General Estoesta believes that counsel of Van Twest doubted the latter's death. - Verily, respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead, he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For, otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners. - In Soliven v. Makasiar, we said that the judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause. - In People v. Inting, we emphasized the important features of the constitutional mandate: (a) The determination of probable cause is a function of the judge; it is not for the provincial fiscal or prosecutor to ascertain. Only the judge and the judge alone makes this determination; (b) The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause; and, (c) Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial is a function of the prosecutor. - ALLADO DOCTRINE: If upon the filing of the information in court, the trial judge, after reviewing the information and the document attached thereto, finds that no probable cause exists, he must either call for the
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complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists. Dispositive Petition granted
PEOPLE v CA (CERBO) (Republic v CA in page 5 of the outline) 301 SCRA 475 PANGANIBAN; January 21, 1999
NATURE Petition for Review FACTS - Private Respondent Jonathan Cerbo shot, at pointblank range, Rosalinda Dy in the presence and at the office of his father private respondent Billy Cerbo. - An information for murder was filed against Jonathan Cerbo. - The daughter of the victim executed an affidavit-complaint charging private respondent Billy Cerbo of conspiracy in the killing. - Accordingly, the prosecution filed an amended information including Billy Cerbo in the murder case. A warrant for his arrest was later issued. - Billy Cerbo filed a motion to quash warrant of arrest arguing that the same was issued without probable cause. - The respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case against Billy Cerbo and recalling the warrant for his arrest. - The Court of Appeals debunked the petitioners assertion that the trial judge committed grave abuse of discretion and that the evidence presented thus far did not substantiate the charge.. Hence this petition. ISSUE
The Judge does not have to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses. The Prosecutor can perform the same functions as a commissioner for the taking of the evidence. However, there should be a report and necessary documents supporting the Fiscals bare certification. All of these should be before the Judge. 4 The supporting documents may consist of, viz., the affidavits, the transcripts of stenographic notes (if any), and all other supporting documents behind the Prosecutors certification which are material in assisting the Judge to make his determination of probable cause 5 The issuance of the warrants of arrest by a judge solely on the basis of the prosecutors certification in the information that there existed probable cause, without having before him any other basis for his personal determination of the existence of a probable cause, is null and void.
3
Criminal Procedure
WON the CA erred in finding that no probable cause exists to merit the filing of charges against private respondent Billy Cerbo
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- Provincial Fiscal failed to file the information required within the time appointed, or at any time thereafter. Consequently, he was directed by His Honor to explain within 10 days "why he should not be punished for contempt of court for delaying the speedy administration of justice for disobeying a lawful order of the Court." Fiscal filed a MFR, but was denied. Hence, this petition for certiorari and prohibition was presented by petitioner Fiscal, seeking annulment of the aforesaid orders. ISSUES 1.WON respondent judge had no jurisdiction to conduct preliminary investigations, because the law creating Circuit Criminal Courts, R.A. 5179, did not confer on said courts the power to conduct preliminary investigations 2. WON judge erred in compelling fiscal under sanction of contempt, to file an information in court without conducting his own preliminary investigation HELD 1. YES Ratio: The conduct of a preliminary investigation is not a judicial function but part of the fiscals job, a function of the executive. Wherever there are enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts are counseled to leave this job which is essentially executive to them, and the fact that a certain power is granted does not necessarily mean that it should be indiscriminately exercised. Reasoning: [a] Sec. 37 of BP. 129 reiterated the removal from Judges of Metropolitan Trial Courts in the National Capital Region of the authority to conduct preliminary investigations and Sec 2 of Rule 112 of 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure no longer authorizes RTC Judges to conduct PIs. [b] The assignment of PI function to judges of inferior courts and to a very limited extent to courts of first instance was dictated by necessity and practical considerations, and the consequent policy, was that wherever there were enough fiscals or prosecutors to conduct preliminary investigations, courts were to leave that job which is essentially executive to them. It follows that the conclusions derived by a judge from his own investigation cannot be superior to and conclusively binding on the fiscal or public prosecutor, in whom that function is principally and more logically lodged. 2. YES The power to conduct PI is lodged in the fiscal. It is grave abuse of discretion on a judge to seek to foreclose the fiscal's prerogative to conduct his own preliminary investigation to determine for himself the existence or non-existence of probable cause, and to require him to show cause for not filing the information within 24 hours, on the sole basis of the Judge's conclusions. The fiscal has the duty to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause, and could not shirk or be made to evade it by an unreasoning and indiscriminate reliance on the judge's investigation. Dispositive: Petition GRANTED. Challenged Orders annulled and set aside.
HELD YES - The petition is meritorious. - The determination of probable cause during preliminary investigation is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function. - The public prosecutor has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case must be filed in court. - The primary objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy, and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt in a more or less summary proceeding by a competent office designated by law for that purpose. 6 - Secondarily, such summary proceeding also protects the state from the burden of the unnecessary expense of an effort in prosecuting alleged offenses and in holding trials arising from false, frivolous, or groundless charges.7 - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. - A judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. - Corrollarily, the judge should not override the public prosecutors determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial, on the ground that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case. - Therefore, if the information is valid on its face, and there is no showing of manifest error, grave abuse of discretion and prejudice on the part of the public prosecutor, the trial court should respect such determination. Dispositive Reversed.
BALGOS v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 34] RODIL v GARCIA 104 SCRA 362 FERNANDO; May 13, 1981
NATURE Writ of Certiorari FACTS -Counsel for Reynaldo Rodil who was charged with murder, asks to recall witnesses for the prosecution to enable such counsel to cross-examine them, on, to quote his words, "clarificatory and amplificatory matters" which was denied by Municipal Judge Segundo M. Garcia of Sta. Cruz, Marinduque. -What is prayed for is not only that such order denying counsel's request to recall government witnesses be set aside and nullified, but also that bail be granted petitioner, a petition to that effect having been denied with a subsequent motion for reconsideration still undecided. -Respondents were required to comment and the Court likewise issued a temporary restraining order. Such a comment was submitted on behalf of respondents by the Solicitor General seeking the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the right to cross-examine in a preliminary investigation is not a right granted an accused and that the exercise of discretion by respondent Judge considering the evidence of record sufficed to justify denial of the application for bail. -An examination of the record, as well as the pertinent doctrines, makes evident that the jurisdictional issue posed arises from the failure to accord petitioner a hearing on his application for bail. -A resolution of that question in the sense of respondent Judge affording petitioner his day in court is equally decisive of the other issue, whether or not counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions. That he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is strong. Under the present state of the law, it cannot be said that the right to cross-examine is guaranteed an accused at the stage of preliminary investigation. ISSUE WON counsel for petitioner could recall witnesses for the prosecution for the purpose of asking clarificatory questions (that he could very well do when they testify to prove evidence of guilt is strong) HELD
6 7
Criminal Procedure
YES. Counsel could recall the witnesses. - The Judge issued the denial for bail on the basis of the motion of petitioner that he be granted such right and the opposition filed by the First Assistant Provincial Fiscal without conducting any hearing on such motion. Clearly, he acted on the mistaken belief that the presentation of evidence by the prosecution for the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest, the preliminary examination proper, suffices for the denial of the plea for bail. In the latest case on the subject, People v. Sola, decided on March 17, 1981, this Court relying on People v. San Diego, nullified an order of a municipal judge named respondent in that case as he granted bail to the accused without hearing the prosecution. The present case is much stronger; it is the accused himself, the explicit beneficiary of the constitutional right, who was not heard. - There was misapprehension on the part of respondent Judge of the import of the ruling in Ocampo v. Bernabe citing that The regular trial is, to a limited extent at least, anticipated. While the guilt or innocence of the accused is not to be determined, the quantity and character of the proofs on this point are, for the special purpose in hand, necessarily considered. Occasionally much time is thus consumed, and the court's attention is correspondingly diverted from other business. But these objections cannot avail against a positive constitutional command; if the Constitution requires the court to determine for itself whether or not the proof is evident or presumption great in a given case, all considerations of expediency or convenience, however potent they might be at the common law, must give way.'" This is so because the procedure to be followed in the hearing on an application for bail, while summary in character, is not to be a mere sham or pretense. It must not be an exercise in futility. The accused is not to be denied his day in court. - While it could be said that that the refusal of the Justice of the Peace to allow the defense to cross-examine the prosecution's witnesses presented prior to petitioner's arrest, cannot be utilized as argument for the contention that the prosecution should not have been allowed to cross-examine the defense witnesses and that an accused is not entitled to cross-examine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer concerned (People v. Ramilo, \Dequito v. Arellano, Bustos v. Lucero) it could still be argued that the judge is not a ministerial officer reduced to recording what takes place and what witnesses say in the examination. Above all, his is the great responsibility of safeguarding the accused from groundless or vindictive prosecution. If the justice of the peace is to ascertain, as he must, whether a crime has been committed and, if so, whether there is probable cause that the accused committed it, his authority cannot be confined as in a straight jacket to the stiffness of medieval and outmoded technicalities of practice. It thus appears clearly that in the exercise of his discretion respondent Judge could have granted the request and thus avoided the necessity of a petition of this character having to be filed. The interest of a more speedy and a more efficient administration of justice would be best served if there is a greater awareness on the part of judges that in addition to safeguarding the express rights of an accused person, a matter mandated by the Constitution or the Rules of Court, they should likewise exercise their discretion in such a way that the
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purpose of a preliminary investigation, the avoidance of groundless or vindictive prosecutions, could be attained in as fair and objective manner as possible. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted. The order of respondent Judge denying bail is set aside. He, or whoever is now the Municipal Judge of Santa Cruz, Marinduque, must set forthwith the hearing on the application for bail of petitioner, to be conducted in accordance with the requirements of the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and this opinion. No costs.
Criminal Procedure
- Municipal Judge Samulde conducted a preliminary investigation upon a complaint for robbery. After making a preliminary investigation based on the affidavits of the complainant and her witnesses and counter-affidavits of the respondent and his witnesses, Judge Samulde transmitted the records of the case to Provincial Fiscal Salvani with his finding that "there is prima facie evidence of robbery as charge in the complaint". The fiscal returned the records on the ground that Judge Samulde failed to include the warrant of arrest against the accused as provided in Sec 5, Rule 112 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. Judge Samulde sent back the records to Fiscal Salvani. He pointed out that under Sec 6, Rule 112, he may issue a warrant of arrest if he is satisfied "that a probable cause exists and that there is a necessity of placing the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, " implying that, although he found that a probable cause existed, he did not believe that the accused should be immediately placed under custody. Hence, he refused to issue a warrant of arrest. - A special civil action of mandamus was filed in the RTC by Provincial Fiscal Salvani against Judge Samulde to compel the latter to issue a warrant of arrest. The RTC dismissed the petition but nevertheless ordered Judge Samulde to issue a warrant of arrest, and to transmit the warrant to the Provincial Fiscal for appropriate action. He further advised the Municipal Judge "that henceforth he adheres to the same rule in similar cases where he conducts a preliminary investigation with a finding of a prima facie or probable cause." Unconvinced, Judge Samulde appealed to this Court. ISSUE WON a judge may be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest upon a finding of probable cause HELD NO Ratio 3 conditions must concur for the issuance of the warrant of arrest. The investigating judge must: (a) have examined in writing and under oath the complainant and his witnesses by searching questions and answers; (b) be satisfied that a probable cause exists; and (c) that there is a need to place the respondent under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. Reasoning The mandatory provision that the investigating judge "must issue a warrant of arrest" if he finds probable cause that the respondent committed the crime charged, found in all previous rules of criminal procedure, from General Orders No. 58 down to Rule 112 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court, is absent in Section 1 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure. It is not obligatory, but merely discretionary, upon the investigating judge to issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused, for the determination of whether a probable cause exists and whether it is necessary to arrest the accused in order not to frustrate the ends of justice, is left to his sound judgment or discretion. In this particular case, since the robbery charge was the offshoot of a boundary dispute between two property owners, the investigating judge did not believe there was any danger of the accused absconding before the filing of the information against him by the fiscal, hence, he found no need to place him under immediate custody. Dispositive The appealed decision is SET ASIDE.
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TANDOC v RESULTAN [SUPRA, PAGE 43] LIM vFELIX 194 SCRA 292 GUTIERREZ; February 19, 1991
NATURE Review for certiorari. FACTS - March 17, 1989: at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate Domestic Airport (Masbate, Masbate), Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante, another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound. - For the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg (Legaspi) filed an amended complaint with the Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate, Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor Antonio Kho of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection with the airport incident. - July 31, 1989: after the preliminary investigation court released an order stating after that a probable cause has been established for the issuance of a warrant of arrest of named accused in the amended complaint. - August 29, 1989: records of the case were transmitted to Provincial Prosecutor of Masbate. Respondent Acting Fiscal Antonio C. Alfane was designated to review the case. On September 22, 1989, Fiscal Alfane issued a Resolution which affirmed the finding of a prima facie case against the petitioners but differed in the designation of the crime (he said it should be MURDER for each case, with serious physical injuries). Fiscal Alfane filed with the Regional Trial Court of Masbate, four (4) separate informations of murder against the twelve (12) accused with a recommendation of no bail. - Respondents Lims filed a verified petition for a change of venue. Court granted the petition. The case was raffled to Judge Nemesio Felix. - Lims then prayed for the following: 1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause. 2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right; - In another manifestation, the Lims reiterated that the court conduct a hearing to determine if there really exists a prima facie case against them in the light of documents which are recantations of some witnesses in the
Criminal Procedure
- Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary examinations and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding cases filed before their courts. - The determination of probable cause for the warrant of arrest is made by the Judge. The preliminary investigation proper - whether or not there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and, therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial - is the function of the Prosecutor. - The power to make a preliminary examination for the purpose of determining whether probable cause exists to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest (or search warrant) has been and remains vested in every judge by the provisions in the Bill of Rights in the 1935, the 1973 and the present [1987] Constitutions securing the people against unreasonable searches and seizures, thereby placing it beyond the competence of mere Court Rule or Statute to revoke. - The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial functions. Dispositive Petition is granted.
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Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the Revised Penal Code." Petitioners claim that the aforementioned search warrants are null and void, as contravening the Constitution and the Rules of Court; that the searches and seizures made in pursuance thereof are illegal; and that evidences obtained therein are consequently inadmissible. Respondents/prosecutors comments (1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law; (2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and (3) that, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures. Procedure: -March 22, 1962: SC issued the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for in the petition. -June 29, 1962: the writ was partially lifted or dissolved, insofar as the papers, documents and things seized from the offices of the corporations above mentioned are concerned; but, the injunction was maintained as regards the papers, documents and things found and seized in the residences of petitioners. NOTE: The ponencia splits the documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question into two (2) major groups: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners. ISSUES 1. As regards the first group, WON petitioners have a cause of action 2. As regards the second group, WON the search warrants in question, and the searches and seizures made under the authority thereof, are valid (and, WON said documents, papers and things may be used in evidence against petitioners) HELD 1. NONE. -The legality of a seizure can be contested only by the party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Petitioners may not validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the offices and premises of the corporations, since the right to object to the admission of said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 2. NO. -1935 Constitution (Art. III, Sec. 1, par. 3) provides (a) that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said provision; and (b) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized. -Search warrants, issued upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed offenses as abstract as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code" do not satisfy the constitutional requirements because no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. It was impossible for the judges who issued the
-The exclusionary rule is the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. -The non-exclusionary rule is contrary, not only to the letter, but also, to the spirit of the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures. If there is competent evidence to establish probable cause of the commission of a given crime by the party against whom the warrant is intended, then there is no reason why the applicant should not comply with the requirements of the fundamental law. If he has no such evidence, then it is not possible for the Judge to find that there is probable cause, and, hence, no justification for the issuance of the warrant. The only possible explanation (not justification) for its issuance is the necessity of fishing evidence of the commission of a crime. But, then, this fishing expedition is indicative of the absence of evidence to establish a probable cause. Foreign references cited to support this contention 1. Judge Learned Hand: Only in case the prosecution which itself controls the seizing officials, knows that it cannot profit by their wrong will that wrong be repressed. 2. Weeks v US (1914): The efforts of the courts and their officials to bring the guilty to punishment, praiseworthy as they are, are not to be aided by the sacrifice of those great principles established by years of endeavor and suffering which have resulted in their embodiment in the fundamental law of the land. 3. Mapp v Ohio (1961): all evidence obtained by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, inadmissible in a State court. *Without that rule the freedom from state invasions of privacy would be so ephemeral and so neatly severed from its conceptual nexus with the freedom from all brutish means of coercing evidence as not to permit this Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in the concept of ordered liberty.
Criminal Procedure
*The exclusion of the evidence which an accused had been forced to give by reason of the unlawful seizure is the most important constitutional privilege. *The purpose of the exclusionary rule to "is to deter -- to compel respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way -- by removing the incentive to disregard it." *We can no longer permit that right to remain an empty promise, to be revocable at the whim of any police officer who, in the name of law enforcement itself, chooses to suspend its enjoyment. Our decision, founded on reason and truth, gives to the individual no more than that which the Constitution guarantees him to the police officer no less than that to which honest law enforcement is entitled, and, to the courts, that judicial integrity so necessary in the true administration of justice. Obiter -In their MFR, petitioners further alleged possession of and control over the records, papers and effects found in the offices of the corporation, and the alleged "personal" nature thereof. -SC disposed of them by saying that this new theory was advanced, not in their petition or amended petition, but in the MR. At any rate, it is best to leave the matter open for determination in appropriate cases in the future. Dispositive Writs granted in part and denied in part; MR denied.
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courts, especially the Federal Supreme Court and the Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals. -The U.S. doctrines and pertinent cases on standing to move for the suppression or return of documents, papers and effects which are the fruits of an unlawful search and seizure, may be summarized as follows: (a) ownership of documents, papers and effects gives "standing;" (b) ownership and/or control or possession actual or constructive -- of premises searched gives "standing"; and (c) the "aggrieved person" doctrine where the search warrant and the sworn application for search warrant are "primarily" directed solely and exclusively against the "aggrieved person," gives "standing." -An examination of the search warrants in this case will readily show that, excepting three, all were directed against the petitioners personally. In some of them, the petitioners were named personally, followed by the designation, "the President and/or General Manager" of the particular corporation. The three warrants excepted named three corporate defendants. But the "office/house/warehouse/premises" mentioned in the said three warrants were also the same as those declared to be owned by or under the control of the petitioners in all the other search warrants. -Thus, the petitioners have full standing to move for the quashing of all the warrants regardless whether these were directed against residences in the narrow sense of the word, as long as the documents were personal papers of the petitioners or (to the extent that they were corporate papers) were held by them in a personal capacity or under their personal control. -SC, at all events, should order the return to the petitioners all personal and private papers and effects seized, no matter where these were seized, whether from their residences or corporate offices or any other place or places. The uncontradicted sworn statements of the petitioners in their, various pleadings submitted to this Court indisputably show that amongst the things seized from the corporate offices and other places were personal and private papers and effects belonging to the petitioners. -If there should be any categorization of the documents, papers and things which where the objects of the unlawful searches and seizures, I submit that the grouping should be: (a) personal or private papers of the petitioners, and (b) purely corporate papers belonging to corporations.
- The respondent Judge examined the prosecution witnesses by reading to them "all over again the questions and answers" in their statements in writing, and the witnesses-affiants declared before said Judge that the questions were propounded by T-Sgt. Candido Patosa, and that the answers were made by them.
Criminal Procedure
ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred in giving absolute credence to the testimony of respondent Municipal Judge. 2. WON the requirements of Republic Act No. 3828 was satisfied. 3. WON the issuance of the warrant of arrest was a violation of the Constitution and of procedural due process. 4. WON the trial court erred in denying the writ of habeas corpus. HELD 1. NO - As a general rule, the lower court's findings, as to the credibility of witnesses will not be interfered with by appellate courts. Since petitioner appealed directly to this Court he must, raise only questions of law and he has thereby waived the right to raise any question of fact, and the findings of facts of the trial court, under the rules and precedents, must be deemed final and binding upon this Court. 2. YES. - As provided in Republic Act No. 3828 Before a municipal judge may issue a warrant of arrest, the following conditions must first be fulfilled: (1) he must examine the witnesses personally; (2) the examination must be under oath; (3) the examination must be reduced to writing in the form of searching questions and answers. - The first condition was fulfilled. The trial court found as a fact that "the respondent judge personally examined the witnesses for the prosecution; that respondent judge adopted as his own personal examination the questions asked by T-Sgt. Patosa as appearing in the written statements, which he read over again to the witnesses together with the answers given therein, asking the witnesses whether said answers were theirs, and whether the same answers were true, to which the witnesses answered in the affirmative. Republic Act No. 3828 does not prohibit the municipal Judge from adopting the questions asked by a previous investigator. - The second condition was also fulfilled. The trial court found that the complaint was "supported by statements of the witnesses under oath." The record also shows there were documents to have been subscribed and sworn to before respondent Judge. - The third condition was likewise fulfilled. The examination of the witnesses was written down, in the form of searching questions and answers. The term searching questions and answers" means only, taking into consideration the purpose of the preliminary examination which is to determine "whether there is a reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof so that a warrant of arrest may be issued and the accused held for trial," such questions as have tendency to show the commission of a crime and the perpetrator thereof. What would be searching questions would depend on what is sought to be inquired into, such as: the nature of the offense, the date, time, and place of its commission, the possible motives for its commission; the subject, his age, education, status, financial and social circumstances, his attitude toward the investigation, social attitudes, opportunities to commit the offense; the victim, his age, status, family responsibilities, financial and social circumstances, characteristics, etc. The points that are the subject of inquiry may differ from case to case. - The questions, therefore, must to a great degree depend upon the Judge making the investigation. At any rate, the court a quo found that respondent Judge was "satisfied that the questions and answers
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contained in the sworn statements taken by T-Sgt. Patosa partake of the nature of his searching questions and answers as required by law," so the respondent Judge adopted them. 3. NO - The Constitution, in Section 1 (3), Article III, provides that no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce. - The constitutional requirement of examination of witnesses under oath was, as shown above, fulfilled. The existence of probable cause depended to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge conducting the examination. Respondent Judge found that there was a probable cause, as stated in his order of arrest. - Preliminary examination is not an essential part of due process of law. Preliminary examination may be conducted by the municipal judge, prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest, either in the presence, or in the absence, of the accused. - The record shows that herein petitioner waived the preliminary investigation before respondent Municipal Judge, and instead, he riled a petition for bail. This conduct of petitioner indicates that he had waived his objection to whatever defect, if any, in the preliminary examination conducted by respondent Judge prior to the issuance of the warrant of arrest. 4. NO - Section 4 of Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides in part, as follows: "Sec. 4 When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge ... and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process ... or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed ... " - All the conditions, in the afore-quoted Section 4, set forth to deny the writ, are present in the instant case. - Petitioner is detained and is in the custody of the respondent Provincial Warden by virtue of the order of arrest and the order of respondent Judge, to confine petitioner in the provincial jail. It is not disputed by petitioner that respondent Judge had jurisdiction to issue the warrant of arrest and the order of commitment under the provisions of Section 47, Republic Act No. 409, as amended by Republic Act No. 1201, although petitioner did question the validity of the warrant of arrest for allegedly having been issued in violation of Republic Act No. 3828 which was found to be untenable. - The remedy available to the petitioner herein, under the circumstances stated in this opinion, is not a petition for a writ of habeas corpus but a petition to quash the warrant of arrest or a petition for a reinvestigation of the case by the respondent Municipal Judge or by the Provincial Fiscal. - The Court stressed that what has been stated in the opinion was not intended to sanction the return to the former practice of municipal judges of simply relying upon affidavits or sworn statements that are made to accompany the complaints that are filed before them, in determining whether there is a probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. - That practice is precisely what is sought to be voided by the amendment of Section 87 (c) of Republic Act 296 (Judiciary Act of 1948) which requires that before a municipal judge issues a warrant of arrest he should first satisfy himself that there is a probable cause by examining the
Criminal Procedure
lane. The jeep's rear left wheel was on the road, leaving short tire marks behind it; while the car left long tire marks, specially its left rear wheel. Respodents Version Juanito Rosario who was driving the car, with his wife and daughter, were along MacArthur Highway going southwards. They saw ahead of them a big heavily loaded cargo truck. The truck was moving very slowly because of its heavy load so that Rosario decided to overtake it. But before doing so, he first saw to it that the road was clear and as additional precautionary measure, he blew his horn several times at the time he was overtaking the truck. - As the car was about to overtake the slow moving cargo truck, the car's front left tire suddenly burst due to pressure causing the car to swerve to the left and naturally making steering and control difficult. - Because of the tendency of the car to veer towards the left due to the blown out tire, the driver steered the car towards the direction where he could find a safe place to park and fix the tire. He finally brought the car to a halt at the left shoulder of the road. - Just as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped by the jeep which came from the opposite direction ISSUE WON petitioners were deprived of due process because their civil action was decided on the basis of private respondent Juanita Rosario's acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence HELD NO Ratio Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive on the parties and on the Supreme Court, unless (1) the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises and conjectures; (2) the inference made is manifestly mistaken; (3) there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) the Court of Appeals went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee; (6) the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) said findings of facts are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (9) when the finding of facts of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. Reasoning - The subject action for damages, being civil in nature, is separate and distinct from the criminal aspect, necessitating only a preponderance of evidence. - A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil Code, with a substantively all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime. A distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-contractual. The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasidelictos or culpa extra-contractual under the Civil Code. Therefore, the acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case. - But this rule is not without exception. Thus, Section 2 (c) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court provides:
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Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil, unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration from a final judgment that the fact from which the civil action might arise did not exist. - In a previous case, CA-G.R. No. 07684-CR, People v. Rosario, the CA after a painstaking analysis of. (a) the testimonial evidence; (b) the relative positions of the two vehicles as depicted in the sketches; (c) the distance of each of the two vehicles from the cemented edge of the road; (d) the point of impact; (e) the visible tire marks, and (f) the extent of the damage caused upon each of the two vehicles, ruled that it was the driver of the jeep and not the accused driver of the car who was negligent and accordingly acquitted the latter. - Negligence, being the source and foundation of actions of quasi-delict, is the basis for the recovery of damages. In the case at bar, the CA found that collision was not due to the negligence of Rosario but rather it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of the road where the car was, which was actually the proximate cause of the collision. With this finding, the CA exonerated Rosario from civil liability on the ground that the alleged negligence did not exist. - During the trial of the case before the CFI, respondents were not present because they were abroad. Their counsel introduced as part of their evidence, the records in the criminal case, in accordance with Section 41, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. These records, mostly composed of transcripts of the hearing in the criminal case, were attached to their "Request for Admission" and were substantially admitted by petitioners. Petitioners raised, as one of their objections, the propriety and correctness of admitting and adopting these transcripts as part of the record in the civil case. According to them, this is a violation of Section 41, Rule 130, on the ground that petitioners were not given the opportunity to cross-examine. We disagree. A careful reading of the transcripts would reveal that counsel for petitioners actively participated during the proceedings of the criminal case. He raised various objections, in the course of the trial. Petitioners, therefore, thru counsel had the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses. Dispositive Petition denied
Criminal Procedure
RODRIGUEZ v VILLAMIEL 65 Phil 230 IMPERIAL; DEC 23, 1937
FACTS -Victor Villamiel, special agent for the Anti-Usury Board, made two affidavits for the purpose of obtaining search warrants against Rodriguez and Evangelista. The text of both affidavits reads as follows: "Victor D. Villamiel having taken the oath prescribed by law, appears and states: that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that the books, lists, chits, receipts, documents, and other papers relating to the activities of Juan Evangelista, as usurer, are being kept and concealed in the house of said Juan Evangelista situated at Lucena, Tayabas, all of which is contrary to the statute of law." -The justice of the peace of the provincial capital issued the two search warrants against the petitioners (see original for the wording of the warrant) -Villamiel, with other agents and a constabulary soldier, executed the warrants, went to the residences of the petitioners, searched them and seized documents and papers belonging to petitioners. Villamiel issued a receipt to each of the petitioners, without specifying the documents and papers seized by him, which were taken to his office in Manila, keeping them there until he was ordered by the CFI to deposit them in the office of the clerk of court. -Petitioners filed a petition praying that the search warrants be declared null and void and illegal; that Villamiel be punished for contempt of court for having conducted the searches and for having seized the documents and papers without issuing detailed receipts and for not having turned them over to the court, and that said documents and papers be ordered returned to the petitioners. -the CFI found Villamiel guilty of contempt of court and fined him P10. The court declared the search warrants and the seizure of the documents and papers VALID, authorizing the agents of the Anti-Usury Board to examine them and retain those that are necessary and material to whatever criminal action they may wish to bring against the petitioners. -Petitioners appealed. They contend that the search warrants issued by the court are illegal because they have been based on the affidavits of special agent Villamiel wherein he affirmed and stated that he had no personal knowledge of the facts that were to serve as basis for the issuance of the search warrants, but merely confined himself to asserting that he believed and there was probable cause to believe that the documents and papers were related to the activities of the petitioners as usurers. As has been seen, the special agent's affirmation in this respect consisted merely in the following: "that he has and there is just and probable cause to believe and he does believe that the books (etc) relating to the activities of . . . as usurer, are being kept and concealed in the house. . . all of which is contrary to the statute of law." ISSUE WON the search warrant and the seizure were illegal HELD YES
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-Reason 1: it appears that the affidavits, which served as the exclusive basis of the search warrants, are insufficient and fatally defective by reason of the manner in which the oaths were made and, therefore, it is hereby held that the search warrants in question and the subsequent seizure of the documents and papers are illegal and do not in any way warrant the deprivation to which the petitioners were subjected. -The oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause. The true test of sufficiency of an affidavit to warrant issuance of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages caused. -Sec 1, par 3, of Art III, Constitution: "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." Sec 97 of General Orders No. 58: "A search warrant shall not issue except for probable cause and upon application supported by oath particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." - Both provisions require that there be not only probable cause before the issuance of a search warrant but that the search warrant must be based upon an application supported by oath of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce. In its broadest sense, an oath includes any form of attestation by which a party signifies that he is bound in conscience to perform an act faithfully and truthfully. -Reason 2: At the hearing of the case, it was shown that the documents and papers had really been seized to enable the Anti-Usury Board to conduct an investigation and later use all or some of them as evidence against the petitioners in the criminal cases that may be brought against them. The seizure of books and documents by means of a search warrant, for the purpose of using them as evidence in a criminal case against the person in whose possession they were found, is unconstitutional because it makes the warrant unreasonable, and it is equivalent to a violation of the constitutional provision prohibiting the compulsion of an accused to testify against himself Therefore, it appearing that the documents and papers were seized for the purpose of fishing for evidence to be used against the petitioners in the criminal proceedings for violation of the Anti-Usury Law which might be instituted against them, this court holds that the search warrants issued are illegal and that the documents and papers should be returned to them. - Definition and rationale of search warrant: A search warrant is an order in writing, issued in the name of the People of the Philippine Islands, signed by a judge or a justice of the peace, and directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court. Of all the rights of a citizen, few are of greater importance or more essential to his peace and happiness than the right of personal security, and that involves the exemption of his private affairs, books, and papers from the inspection and scrutiny of others. While the power to search and seize is necessary to the public welfare, still it must be exercised and the
BURGOS SR v CHIEF OF STAFF 133 SCRA 800 ESCOLIN; December 26, 1984
NATURE Petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction FACTS - December 7, 1982 Judge Ernani Cruz-Pao CFI Rizal [Quezon City], issued two search warrants under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City, business address of Metropolitan Mail newspaper, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City, business address of the "We Forum" newspaper were searched. - office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper, were seized. - The questioned search warrants were issued by respondent judge upon application of Col. Rolando N. Abadilla, Intelligence Officer of the P.C. Metrocom. The application was accompanied by the Joint Affidavit of Alejandro M. Gutierrez and Pedro U. Tango, members of the Metrocom Intelligence and Security Group under Col. Abadilla which conducted a surveillance of the premises prior to the filing of the application for the search warrants on December 7, 1982. - Respondents aver that the case should be dismissed on the ground that petitioners had come to SC without having previously sought the quashal of the search warrants before the issuing judge. But this procedural flaw notwithstanding, SC took cognizance of this petition in view of the seriousness and urgency of the constitutional issues raised, not to mention the public interest generated by the search. - Respondents likewise urge dismissal of the petition on ground of laches, since said search warrants were issued on December 7, 1982, but the instant petition impugning the same was filed only on June 16, 1983. However, SC found that the extrajudicial efforts exerted by petitioners quite evidently negate the presumption that they had abandoned their right to the possession of the seized property, thereby refuting the charge of laches against them. Petitioners' Claims > Petitioners fault respondent judge for his alleged failure to conduct an examination under oath or affirmation of the applicant and his witnesses, as mandated by the constitution as well as Sec. 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court. However, SC found that as petitioners themselves conceded during the hearing on August 9, 1983, that an examination had indeed been conducted by respondent judge of Col. Abadilla and his witnesses, this issue is moot and academic.
Criminal Procedure
> Search Warrants No. 20-82[a] and No. 20-82[b] were used to search two distinct places: No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City. Objection is interposed to the execution of Search Warrant No. 20-82[b] at the latter address on the ground that the two search warrants pinpointed only one place where petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. was allegedly keeping and concealing the articles listed therein, i.e., No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon City. > although the warrants were directed against Jose Burgos, Jr. alone, articles belonging to his co-petitioners Jose Burgos, Sr., Bayani Soriano and the J. Burgos Media Services, Inc. were seized. > real properties were seized under the disputed warrants. > that documents relied on by respondents could not have provided sufficient basis for the finding of a probable cause upon which a warrant may validly issue in accordance with Section 3, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution ISSUES WON the two search warrants are: 1. defective for stating only one and the same place to be searched 2. null and void for including properties not owned by the person named in the warrants 3. null and void for including real properties 4. null and void for being violative of the constitution, thus encroaching on petitioners' fundamental rights HELD 1. NO - The defect pointed out is a typographical error. Two search warrants were applied for and issued because the purpose and intent were to search two distinct premises. The addresses of the places sought to be searched were specifically set forth in the application, and since it was Col. Abadilla himself who headed the team which executed the search warrants, the ambiguity that might have arisen by reason of the typographical error is more apparent than real. - In the determination of whether a search warrant describes the premises to be searched with sufficient particularity, it has been held "that the executing officer's prior knowledge as to the place intended in the warrant is relevant. This would seem to be especially true where the executing officer is the affiant on whose affidavit the warrant had issued, and when he knows that the judge who issued the warrant intended the building described in the affidavit. And it has also been said that the executing officer may look to the affidavit in the official court file to resolve an ambiguity in the warrant as to the place to be searched." 2. NO - Section 2, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, enumerates the personal properties that may be seized under a search warrant. The rule does not require that the property to be seized should be owned by the person against whom the search warrant is directed. It may or may not be owned by him. Ownership, therefore, is of no consequence, and it is sufficient that the person against whom the warrant is directed has control or possession of the property sought to be seized. 3. NO
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- Under Article 415[5] of the Civil Code , "machinery, receptables, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works" are considered immovable property. Petitioners do not claim to be the owners of the land and/or building on which the machineries were placed. This being the case, the machineries in question, while in fact bolted to the ground remain movable property susceptible to seizure under a search warrant. 4. YES - Probable cause for a search is defined as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the objects sought in connection with the offense are in the place sought to be searched. And when the search warrant applied for is directed against a newspaper publisher or editor in connection with the publication of subversive materials, as in the case at bar, the application and/or its supporting affidavits must contain a specification, stating with particularity the alleged subversive material he has published or is intending to publish. Mere generalization will not suffice. - In mandating that "no warrant shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, . . . after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce the Constitution requires no less than personal knowledge by the complainant or his witnesses of the facts upon which the issuance of a search warrant may be justified. In Alvarez v. CFI, SC ruled that "the oath required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of probable cause." - the search warrants are in the nature of general warrants. - As a consequence of the search and seizure, the premises were padlocked and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners' freedom to express themselves in print. Dispositive Search Warrants Nos. 20-82[a] and 20-82[b] issued by respondent judge on December 7, 1982 are null and void. All articles seized thereunder are ordered released to petitioners.
Criminal Procedure
be made without a warrant, it is unlawful and therefore, the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine applies. Reasoning Under Sec.6 (a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by Burgos wife. At the time of arrest, Burgos was not in actual possession of any firearm or subversive document. Neither was he committing any act which could be described as subversive. He was, in fact, plowing his field at the time. - The SolGen believes that the arrest may still be considered lawful under Sec.6(b) using the test of reasonableness. The SolGen submits that the info given by Masamlok was sufficient to induce a reasonable ground that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. In arrests without a warrant under Sec.6(b), however, it is not enough that there is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator. In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted. More important, We find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown. - The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution. Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a valid arrest. Neither can it be presumed that there was a waiver, or that consent was given by the accused to be searched simply because he failed to object. To constitute a waiver, it must appear first that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a permission to make a search therein.
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2. NO. Since the extra-judicial confession, the firearm, and the alleged subversive documents are inadmissible in evidence, the only remaining proof to sustain the charge is the testimony of Masamlok, which is inadequate to convict Burgos beyond reasonable doubt. Reasoning Although it is true that the trial court found Masamloks testimony credible and convincing, the SC is not necessarily bound by the credibility which the trial court attaches to a particular witness. As stated in People v Cabrera (100 SCRA 424): When it comes to question of credibility the findings of the trial court are entitled to great respect upon appeal for the obvious reason that it was able to observe the demeanor, actuations and deportment of the witnesses during the trial. But We have also said that this rule is not absolute for otherwise there would be no reversals of convictions upon appeal. We must reject the findings of the trial court where the record discloses circumstances of weight and substance which were not properly appreciated by the trial court. In the instant case, Masamloks testimony was totally uncorroborated. Considering that Masamlok surrendered to the military, certainly his fate depended on how eagerly he cooperated with the authorities. Otherwise, he would also be charged with subversion. Masamlok may be considered as an interested witness. His testimony cannot be said to be free from the opportunity and temptation to be exaggerated and even fabricated for it was intended to secure his freedom. Moreover, despite the fact that there were other persons present during the alleged NPA seminar who could have corroborated Masamlok's testimony that the accused used the gun in furtherance of subversive activities or actually engaged in subversive acts, the prosecution never presented any other witness. Dispositive Judgment of conviction is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused Burgos is ACQUITTED on grounds of reasonable doubt.
Criminal Procedure
- The respondents cannot even plead the urgency of the raid because it was in fact not urgent. They knew where the petitioners were. They had every opportunity to get a search warrant before making the raid. If they were worried that the weapons inside the compound would be spirited away, they could have surrounded the premises in the meantime, as a preventive measure. - Conceding that the search was truly warrantless, might not the search and seizure be nonetheless considered valid because it was incidental to a legal arrest? Surely not. If all the law enforcement authorities have to do is force their way into any house and then pick up anything they see there on the ground that the occupants are resisting arrest, then we might as well delete the Bill of Rights as a fussy redundancy. - If the arrest was made under Rule 113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court in connection with a crime about to be committed, being committed, or just committed, what was that crime? There is no allegation in the record of such a justification. Parenthetically, it may be observed that under the Revised Rule 113, Section 5(b), the officer making the arrest must have personal knowledge of the ground therefor. - It follows that as the search of the petitioners' premises was violative of the Constitution, all the firearms and ammunition taken from the raided compound are inadmissible in evidence in any of the proceedings against the petitioners. These articles are "fruits of the poisonous tree. Dispositive WHEREFORE, the search of the petitioners' premises on November 25, 1984, is hereby declared ILLEGAL and all the articles seized as a result thereof are inadmissible in evidence against the petitioners in any proceedings. However, the said articles shall remain in custodia legis pending the outcome of the criminal cases that have been or may later be filed against the petitioners.
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possess firearms and ammunitions found in his possession but he failed to do so. - He was then taken to the Davao Metrodiscom office and the prohibited articles recovered from him were indorsed to M/Sgt. Didoy the officer then on duty. He was prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the Regional Trial Court of Davao City wherein after a plea of not guilty and trial on the merits a decision was rendered on October 8, 1987 finding petitioner guilty of the offense. (It appearing that the accused was below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the commission of the offense (Art. 68, par. 2), he was sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from TEN (10) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor to TWELVE (12) Years, FIVE (5) months and Eleven (11) days of Reclusion Temporal, and to pay the costs. The firearm, ammunitions and smoke grenade are forfeited in favor of the government and the Branch Clerk of Court is hereby directed to turn over said items to the Chief, Davao Metrodiscom, Davao City.) - The petitioner interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals wherein in due course a decision was rendered on February 23, 1989 affirming the appealed decision with costs against the petitioner. Hence, this petition for review, the main thrust of which is that there being no lawful arrest or search and seizure, the items which were confiscated from the possession of the petitioner are inadmissible in evidence against him. ISSUE WON the warrantless search imposed on the petitioner is valid HELD NO Ratio - The argument of the Solicitor General that when the two policemen approached the petitioner, he was actually committing or had just committed the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions in the presence of the police officers and consequently the search and seizure of the contraband was incidental to the lawful arrest in accordance with Section 12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure is untenable. At the time the peace officers in this case identified themselves and apprehended the petitioner as he attempted to flee they did not know that he had committed, or was actually committing the offense of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions. They just suspected that he was hiding something in the buri bag. They did now know what its contents were. The said circumstances did not justify an arrest without a warrant. However, there are many instances where a warrant and seizure can be effected without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, foremost of which is the "stop and search" without a search warrant at military or police checkpoints, the constitutionality or validity of which has been upheld by this Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa (to quote: Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case. Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute unreasonable search. True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform in the same manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional inconvenience,
ALLADO v DIOKNO [supra, page 48] MALALOAN v CA (FINEZA) 232 SCRA 249 REGALADO; May 6, 1994
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari of a decision of CA. FACTS - 1st Lt. Absalon V. Salboro of the CAPCOM Northern Sector (now Central Sector) filed with the Regional Trial Court of Kalookan City an application for search warrant. The search warrant was sought for in connection with
Criminal Procedure
an alleged violation of P.D. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions) perpetrated at No. 25 Newport St., corner Marlboro St., Fairview, QUEZON CITY. On March 23, 1990, respondent RTC Judge of KALOOKAN CITY issued Search Warrant No. 95-90. - On the same day, at around 2:30 p.m., members of the CAPCOM, armed with subject search warrant, proceeded to the situs of the offense alluded to, where a labor seminar of the Ecumenical Institute for Labor Education and Research (EILER) was then taking place. According to CAPCOM's 'Inventory of Property Seized,' firearms, explosive materials and subversive documents, among others, were seized and taken during the search. And all the sixty-one (61) persons found within the premises searched were brought to Camp Karingal, Quezon City but most of them were later released, with the exception of the herein petitioners, EILER Instructors, who were indicted for violation of P.D. 1866 in Criminal Case No. Q-90-11757 before Branch 88 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, presided over by respondent Judge Tirso D.C. Velasco. - On July 10, 1990, petitioners presented a 'Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and For the Suppression of All Illegally Acquired Evidence' before the Quezon City court; and a 'Supplemental Motion to the Motion for Consolidation, Quashal of Search Warrant and Exclusion of evidence Illegally Obtained'. - On September 21, 1990, the respondent Quezon City Judge issued the challenged order, consolidating subject cases but denying the prayer for the quashal of the search warrant under attack, the validity of which warrant was upheld; opining that the same falls under the category of Writs and Processes, within the contemplation of paragraphs 3(b) of the Interim Rules and Guidelines, and can be serve not only within the territorial jurisdiction of the issuing court but anywhere in the judicial region of the issuing court (National Capital Judicial Region). - Respondent Court of Appeals rendered judgment, in effect affirming that of the trial court, by denying due course to the petition for certiorari and lifting the temporary restraining order it had issued on November 29, 1990 in connection therewith. This judgment of respondent court is now impugned in and sought to be reversed through the present recourse before us. ISSUE WON a court may take cognizance of an application for a search warrant in connection with an offense committed outside its territorial jurisdiction and to issue a warrant to conduct a search on a place likewise outside its territorial jurisdiction. HELD YES - No law or rule imposes such a limitation on search warrants, in the same manner that no such restriction is provided for warrants of arrest. The arguments of petitioners are not inferable by necessary implication from the statutory provisions which are presumed to be complete and expressive of the intendment of the framers. A contrary interpretation on whatever pretext should not be countenanced. - A bit of legal history on his contestation will be helpful. The jurisdictional rule heretofore was that writs and process of the so-called inferior courts could be enforced outside the province only with the approval of the former court of first instance. Under the Judiciary Reorganization Act, the enforcement of such writs and processes no longer needs the approval of
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the regional trial court. On the other hand, while, formerly, writs and processes of the then courts of first instance were enforceable throughout the Philippines, under the Interim or Transitional Rules and Guidelines, certain specified writs issued by a regional trial court are now enforceable only within its judicial region. - PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS The Court cannot be blind to the fact that it is extremely difficult, as it undeniably is, to detect or elicit information regarding the existence and location of illegally possessed or prohibited articles. The Court is accordingly convinced that it should not make the requisites for the apprehension of the culprits and the confiscation of such illicit items, once detected, more onerous if not impossible by imposing further niceties of procedure or substantive rules of jurisdiction through decisional dicta. For that matter, we are unaware of any instance wherein a search warrant was struck down on objections based on territorial jurisdiction. - We do not believe that the enforcement of a search warrant issued by a court outside the territorial jurisdiction wherein the place to be searched is located would create a constitutional question. Nor are we swayed by the professed apprehension that the law enforcement authorities may resort to what could be a permutation of forum shopping, by filing an application for the warrant with a "friendly" court. It need merely be recalled that a search warrant is only a process, not an action. Furthermore, the constitutional mandate is translated into specifically enumerated safeguards in Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure for the issuance of a search warrant, and all these have to be observed regardless of whatever court in whichever region is importuned for or actually issues a search warrant. Said requirements, together with the tenday lifetime of the warrant would discourage resort to a court in another judicial region, not only because of the distance but also the contingencies of travel and the danger involved, unless there are really compelling reasons for the authorities to do so. Besides, it does seem odd that such constitutional protests have not been made against warrants of arrest which are enforceable indefinitely and anywhere although they involve, not only property and privacy, but persons and liberty. - On the other hand, it is a matter of judicial knowledge that the authorities have to contend now and then with local and national criminal syndicates of considerable power and influence, political or financial in nature, and so pervasive as to render foolhardy any attempt to obtain a search warrant in the very locale under their sphere of control. Nor should we overlook the fact that to do so will necessitate the transportation of applicant's witnesses to and their examination in said places, with the attendant risk, danger and expense. Also, a further well-founded precaution, obviously born of experience and verifiable data, is articulated by the court a quo, as quoted by respondent court: "This court is of the further belief that the possible leakage of information which is of utmost importance in the issuance of a search warrant is secured (against) where the issuing magistrate within the region does not hold court sessions in the city or municipality, within the region, where the place to be searched is located." - The foregoing situations may also have obtained and were taken into account in the foreign judicial pronouncement that, in the absence of statutory restrictions, a justice of the peace in one district of the county may issue a search warrant to be served in another district of the county and made returnable before the justice of still another district or another court having jurisdiction to deal with the matters involved. In the present
Criminal Procedure
connection with a crime committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. The majority view suggests or implies that a municipal trial court in Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, or Batanes can validly entertain an application for a search warrant and issue one in connection with a crime committed in Manila. Elsewise stated, all courts in the Philippines, including the municipal trial courts, can validly issue a search warrant in connection with a crime committed anywhere in the Philippines. Simply put, all courts of justice in the Philippines have, for purposes of issuing a search warrant, jurisdiction over the entire archipelago. - I cannot subscribe to this view since, in the first place, a search warrant is but an incident to a main case and involves the exercise of an ancillary jurisdiction therefore, the authority to issue it must necessarily be coextensive with the court's territorial jurisdiction. To hold otherwise would be to add an exception to the statutory provisions defining the territorial jurisdiction of the various courts of the country, which would amount to judicial legislation. The territorial jurisdiction of the courts is determined by law, and a reading of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 discloses that the territorial jurisdiction of regional trial courts, metropolitan trial courts, municipal trial courts and municipal circuit trial courts are confined to specific territories. In the second place, the majority view may legitimize abuses that would result in the violation the civil rights of an accused or the infliction upon him of undue and unwarranted burdens and inconvenience as when, for instance, an accused who is a resident of Basco, Batanes, has to file a motion to quash a search warrant issued by the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila in connection with an offense he allegedly committed in Itbayat, Batanes. - Nor can Stonehill vs. Diokno (20 SCRA 383) be an authoritative confirmation of the unlimited or unrestricted power of any court to issue search warrants in connection with crimes committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. While it may be true that the forty-two search warrants involved therein were issued by several Judges ---- specifically Judges (a) Amado Roan of the City Court of Manila, (b) Roman Cansino of the City Court of Manila, (c) Hermogenes Caluag of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch), (d) Eulogio Mencias of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig Branch), and (e) Damian Jimenez of the City Court of Quezon City (Footnote 2, page 387) ---- there is no definite showing that the forty-two search warrants were for the searches and seizures of properties outside the territorial jurisdiction of their respective courts. The warrants were issued against the petitioners and corporations of which they were officers and some of the corporations enumerated in Footnote 7 have addressed in Manila and Makati. (pp. 388-89). Rizal (which includes Makati) and Quezon City both belonged to the Seventh Judicial District. That nobody challenged on jurisdictional ground the issuance of these search warrants is no argument in favor of the unlimited power of a court to issue search warrants. - I have serious misgivings on the majority decision on the matter where another court may, because of extreme and compelling circumstances, issue a search warrant in connection with a criminal case pending in an appropriate court. To illustrate this exception, the Municipal Trial Court of Argao, Cebu, may validly issue a warrant for the search of a house in Davao City and the seizure of any property therein that may have been used in committing an offense in Manila already the subject of an information filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila. I submit that the exception violates the settled principle that even in cases of concurrent jurisdiction, the first court which acquires jurisdiction over the
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case acquires it to the exclusion of the other. (People vs. Fernando, 23 SCRA 867, 870 [1968]). This being so, it is with more reason that a court which does not have concurrent jurisdiction with the first which had taken cognizance of the case does not also have the authority to issue writs or processes, including search warrants, in connection with the pending case. Moreover, since the issuance of a search warrants is an incident to a main case or is an exercise of the ancillary jurisdiction of a court, the court where the main case is filed has exclusive jurisdiction over all incidents thereto and in the issuance of all writs and processes in connection therewith. Furthermore, instead of serving the ends of justice, the exception may provide room for unwarranted abuse of the judicial process, wreak judicial havoc and procedural complexities which effective law enforcement apparently cannot justify. I cannot conceive of any extreme and compelling circumstance which the court that first acquired jurisdiction over the case cannot adequately meet within its broad powers and authority. - In the light of the foregoing, and after re-examining my original view in this case, I respectfully submit that: 1. Any court within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed may validly entertain an application for and issue a search warrant in connection with said crime. However, in the National Capital Judicial Region, Administrative Circulars No. 13 of 1 October 1985, and No. 19 of 4 August 1987 must be observed. 2. After the criminal complaint or information is filed with the appropriate court, search warrants in connection with the crime charged may only be issued by said court.
Criminal Procedure
the public prosecutor, to preempt trial by filing a motion with the Trial Court praying for the quash or dismissal of the indictment on the ground that the evidence upon which the same is based is inadequate. Nor is it permitted, on the antipodal theory that the evidence is in truth inadequate, for the complaining party to present a petition before the Court praying that the public prosecutor be compelled to file the corresponding information against the accused. xxx xxx xxx - Indeed, the public prosecutor has broad discretion to determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those whom he or she believes to have committed the crime as defined by law. Otherwise stated, such official has the quasi-judicial authority to determine whether or not a criminal case list be filed in court. - Crespo v. Mogul: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The reason for placing the criminal prosecution under the direction and control of the fiscal is to prevent malicious or unfounded prosecutions by private persons. Judicial Determination of Probable Cause - The determination of probable cause to hold a person for trial must be distinguished from the determination of probable cause to issue a warrant of arrest, which is a judicial function. The judicial determination of probable cause in the issuance of arrest warrants has been emphasized in numerous cases. - The rulings in Soliven, Inting and Lim, Sr. were iterated in Allado v. Diokno, where we explained again what probable cause means. Probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, the judge, before issuing a warrant of arrest, "must satisfy himself that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof." At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. It is sufficient that he personally evaluates such evidence in determining probable cause. - As held in Inting, the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor is for a purpose different from that which is to be made by the judge. Whether there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and should be held for trial is what the prosecutor passes upon. The judge, on the other hand, determines whether a warrant of arrest should be issued against the accused, i.e., whether there is a necessity for placing him under immediate custody in order not to frustrate the ends of justice. - Verily, a judge cannot be compelled to issue a warrant of arrest if he or she deems that there is no probable cause for doing so. Corollary to this principle, the judge should not override the public prosecutor's determination of probable cause to hold an accused for trial on the ground
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that the evidence presented to substantiate the issuance of an arrest warrant was insufficient, as in the present case. Inapplicabilty of Allado and Salonga - Allado and Salonga constitute exceptions to the general rule and may be invoked only if similar circumstances are clearly shown to exist. However, the present case is not on all fours with Allado and Salonga. First, Elsa Gumban, the principal eyewitness to the killing of Rosalinda Dy, was not a participation or conspirator in the commission of the said crime. In Allado and Salonga, however, the main witnesses were the confessed perpetrators of the crimes, whose testimonies the court deemed 'tainted'. Second, in the case at bar, the private respondent was accorded due process, and no precipitate haste or bias during the investigation of the case can be imputed to the public prosecutor. On the other hand, the Court noted in Allado the "undue haste in the filing of the Information and in the inordinate interest of the government" in pursuing the case; and in Salonga, " . . . the failure of the prosecution to show that the petitioner was probably guilty of conspiring to commit the crime, the initial disregard of petitioner's constitutioner rights and the massive and damaging publicity against him." The rulings in the two aforementioned cases cannot apply to it.
PEOPLE v USANA and LOPEZ 323 SCRA 754 DAVIDE; January 28, 2000
NATURE Appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court convicting the two accused together with Julian D. Escano for the violation of R.A. 6425, as amended FACTS - On the 5th of April 1995 and during a COMELEC gun ban, some law enforcers of the Makati Police were manning a checkpoint at the corner of Senator Gil Puyat Ave. and the South Luzon Expressway. They were checking the cars going to Pasay City, stopping those they found suspicious, and imposing merely a running stop on the others. At about past midnight, they stopped a Kia Pride car with Plate No. TBH 493. One of the policemen saw a long firearm on the lap of the person seated at the passenger seat, who was later identified as Virgilio Usana. They asked the driver, identified as Escao, to open the door. PO3 Suba seized the long firearm, an M-1 US Carbine, from Usana. When Escao, upon order of the police, parked along Sen. Gil Puyat Ave., the other passengers were search for more weapons. Their search yielded a .45 caliber firearm which they seized from Escao. - The three passengers were thereafter brought to the police station Block 5 in the Kia Pride driven by PO3 Nonato. Upon reaching the precinct, Nonato turned over the key to the desk officer. Since SPO4 de los Santos was suspicious of the vehicle, he requested Escao to open the trunk. Escao readily agreed and opened the trunk himself using his key. They noticed a blue bag inside it, which they asked Escao to open. The bag contained a parcel wrapped in tape, which, upon examination by National Bureau of Investigation, was found positive for hashish. - An information for violation of RA 6425 thereafter was filed against them. The trial court found the three accused guilty of the said crime.
Criminal Procedure
- Even though there was ample opportunity to obtain a search warrant, we cannot invalidate the search of the vehicle, for there are indications that the search done on the car of Escao was consented to by him. 3. NO - No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car and there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Ratio Despite the validity of the search, we cannot affirm the conviction of Usana and Lopez for violation of R.A. No. 6425, as amended. The following facts militate against a finding of conviction: (1) the car belonged to Escao; (2) the trunk of the car was not opened soon after it was stopped and after the accused were searched for firearms; (3) the car was driven by a policeman from the place where it was stopped until the police station; (4) the cars trunk was opened, with the permission of Escao, without the presence of Usana and Lopez; and (5) after arrival at the police station and until the opening of the cars trunk, the car was in the possession and control of the police authorities. No fact was adduced to link Usana and Lopez to the hashish found in the trunk of the car. Their having been with Escao in the latters car before the "finding" of the hashish sometime after the lapse of an appreciable time and without their presence left much to be desired to implicate them to the offense of selling, distributing, or transporting the prohibited drug. In fact, there was no showing that Usana and Lopez knew of the presence of hashish in the trunk of the car or that they saw the same before it was seized. Dispositive Accused appellants are hereby acquitted.
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ISSUES 1. WON the warrantless arrest of Doria and Gaddao, the search of the latters person and house, and the admissibility of the pieces of evidence obtained therefrom is valid 2. WON the marijuana was seized validly for being in plain view of the police officers HELD 1. YES - We also hold that the warrantless arrest of accused-appellant Doria is not unlawful. Warrantless arrests are allowed in three instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; - Under Section 5 (a), as above-quoted, a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." - In the case, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. - However, the warrantless arrest, search and seizure of Gaddao is invalid - Accused-appellant Gaddao was not caught red-handed during the buy-bust operation to give ground for her arrest under Section 5 (a) of Rule 113. She was not committing any crime. Contrary to the finding of the trial court, there was no occasion at all for appellant Gaddao to flee from the policemen to justify her arrest in "hot pursuit." 114 In fact, she was going about her daily chores when the policemen pounced on her. - Neither could the arrest of appellant Gaddao be justified under the second instance of Rule 113. "Personal knowledge" of facts in arrests without warrant under Section 5 (b) of Rule 113 must be based upon "probable cause" which means an "actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." In case, there was no reasonable suspicion especially as she was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused - Doria did not point to appellant Gaddao as his associate in the drug business, but as the person with whom he left the marked bills. This identification does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that appellant Gaddao conspired with her co-accused in pushing drugs as Doria may have left the money in her house, with or without her knowledge, with or without any conspiracy. Save for accused-appellant Doria 's word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. - As the arrest was illegal, the search and seizure is not incidental to the arrest 2. NO - The marijuana was not in plain view of the police officers and its seizure without the requisite search warrant was in violation of the law and the Constitution as the contents of the box where the marijuana was partially hidden was not readily apparent to PO Manlangit, one of the arresting officers.
Criminal Procedure
- RTC: Guilty, under RA 6425. penalty of reclusion perpetua and fine of P9million. Elamparo appealed. ISSUE: 1. WON RTC was correct in the assessment of credibility of witnesses 2. WON the arrest of Elamparo was valid 3. WON the penalty imposed was correct HELD: 1. YES Ratio: Unless the trial court overlooked substantial facts which would affect the outcome of the case, we accord the utmost respect to their findings of facts. Reasoning: -Elamparo contends that it is highly unusual for arresting officers to act on an information of an unknown source without confirming the veracity of the report, and that it is incredible that a peddler of marijuana would be so brazen as to approach total strangers and offer to sell them marijuana. He insists that he was charged with illegal possession of marijuana because he failed to pay the police officers P15,000.00 for his release. - it is well-settled that the assessment of credibility of witnesses is within the province of the trial court which had an opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor during their testimonies. As compared to the baseless claims of Elamparo, the version of the prosecution witnesses appears worthy of belief, coming as it does from law enforcers who are presumed to have regularly performed their duty in the absence of proof to the contrary. -in many cases, drug pushers did sell their prohibited articles to prospective customers, be they strangers or not, in private as well as in public places, even in the daytime. Indeed, some drug pushers appear to have become exceedingly daring, openly defiant of the law. Hence, what matters is not the existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting sale and delivery of prohibited drugs 2. YES Ratio: The arrest was within the purview of Sec5 (a), Rule 113, Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit: Arrest without warrant, when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; Reasoning: -Elamparo assails the legality of his arrest for failure of the apprehending officers to secure a search warrant. - for warrantless arrests, 2 elements must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating the he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. Thus, when he was seen repacking the marijuana, the police officers were not only authorized but also duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. Re: warrantless seizures: -However, not being absolute, the right against unreasonable searches and seizures is subject to exceptions. Thus, for example, Sec.12, Rule 126, Rules on CrimPro, provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
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searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant. -5 generally accepted exceptions to the right against warrantless searches and seizures have also been judicially formulated, viz: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs searches, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right against unreasonable search and seizure. - this case falls squarely under the plain view doctrine People v Doria: Objects falling in plain view of an officer who has a right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure even without a search warrant and may be introduced in evidence. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent. - members of the buy-bust team were justified in running after Spencer (when he escaped) and entering the house without a search warrant for they were hot in the heels of a fleeing criminal. Once inside the house, the police officers cornered Spencer and recovered the buy-bust money from him. They also caught Elamparo in flagrante delicto repacking the marijuana bricks which were in full view 3. YES Ratio: Minority serves as a privileged mitigating circumstance to a crime, thus entitling the accused to a reduction of penalty one degree lower than that imposable (by virtue of art.13 (2) RPC) Reasoning: - contends that if found guilty, the privileged mitigating circumstance of minority should be appreciated in his favor. - In drug cases, the quantity of prohibited drugs involved is determinative of the imposable penalty. Section 20 of R.A. No. 6425, as amended by Section 17 of R.A. No. 7659, provides that when the quantity of indian hemp or marijuana is 750 grams or more, as in this case, the penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) to ten million pesos (P10,000,000.00). - Appellant having been born on January 9, 1978, was only 17 years, 1 month, and 3 days old, at the time of the commission of the crime on February 12, 1995. - being a minor over 15 and under 18 at the time of the commission, he is entitled to a reduced penalty due to the privileged mitigating circumstance - Thus, penalty should be reduced to reclusion temporal. No fine is imposable in this case, for it is imposed as a conjunctive penalty only if the penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. Dispositive Petition AFFIRMED with modification.
Criminal Procedure
shots. It could not be determined whether those shots hit Nicanor as he and the accused were already inside the premises of the fence of Ading. Jose who was near Nicanor when the two accused chased him did not render assistance to him. After Alan heard the two shots, he and Jose ran home. Alan told his father and uncle that Sergon stabbed Nicanor and that Ramil shot him. Alan, his father, uncle, Jose and the mother of Nicanor then went to where the body of Nicanor was in the downhill portion of the premises of the house of Ading. Nicanor was lying on his back, with 2 wounds on the breast, 1 gunshot wound and 1 stab wound. According to the accused(Ramil) > June 23, 1991 in the afternoon, he was at home cooking. At around 5:00 to 5:30, he heard shouts coming from the direction of the barangay basketball court, which was about ten (10) meters away from his house. He went to the window to check what it was. He saw his younger brother Sergon lying on the concrete pavement and several persons were ganging up on him, three of whom he identified as Nicanor, Alan and Jose. They kept on boxing and kicking his brother prompting him to come to the latter's aid. On his way out, he saw a gun on top of the table and brought it with him to the basketball court. > While on his way to the basketball court, Ramil fired a warning shot to prevent Nicanor from stabbing his brother Sergon. Nicanor persisted in the pursuit of Sergon, with a knife in his hand. Sergon was about three meters ahead of Nicanor who was about ten meters ahead of the pursuing Ramil. Ramil fired another shot that hit Nicanor who,, fell to the ground. Meanwhile, Sergon managed to flee. Ramil also fled to the direction of the sugarcane field as soon as he fired the second shot because he saw the group of Alan approaching,, armed with guns .12 Ramil and his brother Sergon went into hiding and only surfaced a year later when they were arrested in Romblon. - prosecutions set of facts was favored by the court ISSUE WON petitioner has a right to bail HELD NO Ratio When an accused is charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment or death, and evidence of guilt is strong, bail must be denied, as it is neither a matter of right nor of discretion Reasoning - In offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua, life imprisonment or death, the accused has no right to bail when evidence of guilt is strong. The court must hear a petition for bail to determine whether the evidence of guilt is strong before deciding to grant or deny bail to the accused. While the accused can apply for bail and have the court hear his application summarily and promptly, such right may be waived expressly or impliedly. In this case, the trial court proceeded to try the case without resolving the petition for bail that appellants filed. However, the latter did not call the attention of the trial court to their unresolved application for bail. It was only in the appeal that they raised this issue. Thus, for failure to bring to the attention of the trial Court at the earliest opportune time, appellants are deemed to have waived their right to bail. - defense of relative: FAILED TO PROSPER because
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1) unlawful aggression, the essential element to defense of relative is absent because if it were true that Sergon was being attacked, he would have suffered injuries. 2) if indeed he acted in defense of his younger brother Sergon who was then under attack, he would not harbor any fear in presenting himself to the proper authorities. - even though prosecution failed to show evident premeditation, trial court correctly considered treachery as qualifying the killing of the victim to murder. Dispositive we AFFIRM the judgment of the trial court convicting accused-appellants Sergon Manes and Ramil Manes of murder and sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties of the law and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Nicanor Tamorite in the amount of P50,000.00, plus P21,250.00, as actual damages.
Criminal Procedure
Dispositive Grant of bail is declared void. The court should issue a warrant of arrest of Odiamar if his bail bond has been approved.
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c) The hold-departure Order of this Court dated April 10, 1997 stands; and d) Approval of the bail bonds shall be made only after the arraignment to enable this Court to immediately acquire jurisdiction over the accused; - Petitioner filed a motion to quash the informations against him. Pending resolution of his motion, he asked the trial court to suspend the arraignment scheduled. He then filed a motion in which he prayed that the amounts of bail bonds be reduced to P40,000.00 for each case and that the same be done prior to his arraignment. - Trial court denied petitioners motions to reduce bail bonds, to quash the informations, and to suspend arraignment. - Petitioner was arraigned during which he pleaded not guilty to the charges against him and then ordered him released upon posting bail bonds in the total amount of P800,000.00, subject to the conditions and the "hold-departure" order. The pre-trial conference was set. - Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in CA, assailing the trial courts orders. - While the case was pending in the Court of Appeals, two more informations were filed against petitioner, bringing the total number of cases against him to 12, which were all consolidated. - CA: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;] - CA invalidated the first two conditions imposed in the May 16, 1997 order for the grant of bail to petitioner but ruled that the issue concerning the validity of the condition making arraignment a prerequisite for the approval of petitioners bail bonds to be moot and academic. It noted "that petitioner has posted the cash bonds; that when arraigned, represented by lawyers, he pleaded not guilty to each offense; and that he has already been released from detention." CA thought that the aforesaid conditions in the May 16, 1997 order were contrary to Art. III, 14(2) of the Constitution which provides that "[a]fter arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable." - With respect to the denial of petitioners motion to quash the informations against him, CA held that petitioner could not question the same in a petition for certiorari before it, but what he must do was to go to trial and to reiterate the grounds of his motion to quash on appeal should the decision be adverse to him. ISSUE WON CA erred in not determining the validity of the conditions imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail.. HELD YES - CA should have determined the validity of the conditions imposed in the trial courts order of May 16, 1997 for the grant of bail because petitioners contention is that his arraignment was held in pursuance of these conditions for bail. - Bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash. For if the information is quashed and the case is dismissed, there would then be no need for the
LAVIDES v CA (PISON and PEOPLE) 324 SCRA 321 MENDOZA; February 1, 2000
FACTS - Lavides was arrested for child abuse under R.A. 7610. His arrest was made without a warrant as a result of an entrapment conducted by the police. - Parents of complainant Lorelie San Miguel reported to the police that their daughter, then 16 years old, had been contacted by petitioner for an assignation that night at petitioners room at the Metropolitan Hotel. This was not the first time the police received reports of petitioners activities. An entrapment operation was therefore set in motion. The police saw him with Lorelie, who was wearing only a shirt and an underwear, whereupon they arrested him. Based on the sworn statement of complainant and the affidavits of the arresting officers, which were submitted at the inquest, an information for violation of Art. III, 5(b) of R.A. 7610 was filed. - Petitioner filed an "Omnibus Motion (1) For Judicial Determination of Probable Cause; (2) For the Immediate Release of the Accused Unlawfully Detained on an Unlawful Warrantless Arrest; and (3) In the Event of Adverse Resolution of the Above Incident, Herein Accused be Allowed to Bail as a Matter of Right under the Law on Which He is Charged." - Nine more informations for child abuse were filed against petitioner by the same complainant, Lorelie San Miguel, and by three other minor children, Mary Ann Tardesilla, Jennifer Catarman, and Annalyn Talingting. In all the cases, it was alleged that, on various dates mentioned in the informations, petitioner had sexual intercourse with complainants who had been "exploited in prostitution and . . . given money [by petitioner] as payment for the said [acts of] sexual intercourse." - No bail was recommended. Nonetheless, petitioner filed separate applications for bail in the nine cases. - Trial court granted the right to post bail in the amount of P80,000.00 for each case or a total of P800,000.00 for all the cases under the following conditions: a) The accused shall not be entitled to a waiver of appearance during the trial of these cases. He shall and must always be present at the hearings of these cases; b) In the event that he shall not be able to do so, his bail bonds shall be automatically cancelled and forfeited, warrants for his arrest shall be immediately issued and the cases shall proceed to trial in absentia;
Criminal Procedure
Dispositive The decision of the Court of Appeals is SET ASIDE and another one is RENDERED declaring the orders dated May 16, 1997 and May 23, 1997 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City to be valid, with the exception of condition (d) in the second paragraph of the order of May 16, 1997 (making arraignment a prerequisite to the grant of bail to petitioner), which is hereby declared void.
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ISSUE WON he is entitled to bail and to provisional liberty while the extradition proceedings are pending HELD NO Ratio. After being taken into custody, potential extraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants have a history of absconding, they have the burden of showing that (a) there is no flight risk and no danger to the community; and (b) there exist special, humanitarian or compelling circumstances. The grounds used by the highest court in the requesting state for the grant of bail therein may be considered, under the principle of reciprocity as a special circumstance. In extradition cases, bail is not a matter of right; it is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of each case. Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, is worded as follows: Art. III, Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required." - the constitutional right to bail "flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt." It follows that the constitutional provision on bail will not apply to a case like extradition, where the presumption of innocence is not at issue. - That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to grant him one in the present case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for which he is charged. He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the extradition court. - Also, we cannot allow our country to be a haven for fugitives, cowards and weaklings who, instead of facing the consequences of their actions, choose to run and hide. Hence, it would not be good policy to increase the risk of violating our treaty obligations if, through overprotection or excessively liberal treatment, persons sought to be extradited are able to evade arrest or escape from our custody. In the absence of any provision -- in the Constitution, the law or the treaty -- expressly guaranteeing the right to bail in extradition proceedings, adopting the practice of not granting them bail, as a general rule, would be a step towards deterring fugitives from coming to the Philippines to hide from or evade their prosecutors. > - The denial of bail as a matter of course in extradition cases falls into place with and gives life to Article 14 of the Treaty, since this practice would encourage the accused to voluntarily surrender to the requesting state to cut short their detention here. Likewise, their detention pending the resolution of extradition proceedings would fall into place with the emphasis of the Extradition Law on the summary nature of extradition cases and the need for their speedy disposition. Dispositive the Petition is GRANTED. The bail bond posted by private respondent is CANCELLED. The Regional Trial Court of Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it, with all deliberate speed
PEOPLE v MARK JIMENEZ G.R. No. 148571 PANGANIBAN; September 24, 2002
NATURE Petition for certiorari praying for the lifting of the bail Order, the cancellation of the bond, and the taking of Jimenez into legal custody FACTS - The US govt through diplomatic channels sent to the Phil. govt a note requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez, also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA) transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of the Extradition Law. - Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a TRO by the RTC of Manila, which prohibited the DOJ from filing with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The TRO was assailed byt the Sec. of Justice. Initially, the court dismissed the petition but after acting upon the motion for reconsideration, it reversed its earlier decision. It held that Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process. - Finding no more legal obstacle, the US govt, represented by the Philippine DOJ, filed with the RTC the appropriate Petition for Extradition. The Petition alleged that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the US District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection with the following charges: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to commit certain offenses; (2) tax evasion; (3) wire fraud (4) false statements, and (5) illegal campaign contributions. - In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for the issuance of an order for his "immediate arrest" pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069 - Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an "Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion,"which prayed that application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing. RTC grantes the motion of Jimenez. In that hearing, he manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest. After the hearing, the court a quo required the parties to submit their respective memoranda. In his Memorandum, Jimenez sought an alternative prayer: that in case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000. The alternative prayer of Jimenez was also set for hearing. Thereafter, the court below issued its questioned July 3, 2001 Order, directing the issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at one million pesos in cash. After he had surrendered his passport and posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. Hence, this Petition.
Special Protection of Children against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
Criminal Procedure
for bail, but on substantial justice and considering new trial was granted in the case. - RTC ordered Fitzgeralds temporary release upon filing a cash bond of P100 000.00. Petitioners Claim > People filed this petition to annul the CA Resolution arguing that the CA erred in granting the Motion for Bail despite the crime charged was punishable by reclusion perpetua and the evidence of guilt is strong. Plaintiffs Claim > the grant for new trail negated the previous findings of the existence of strong evidence of guilt. The justification for provisional release is on humanitarian grounds, citing his deteriorating health and old age. ISSUES 1. WON CA had jurisdiction over the motion to post bail after issuing the resolution granting new trial 2. WON CA erred in allowing bail HELD 1. (the ruling on this matter is limited to this specific case) When the SC grants new trial, it vacates the judgment of the TC convicting the accused and remands the case to the TC for reception of newly-discovered evidence and promulgation of a new judgment. - However, when CA grants new trial, notwithstanding Sec1 Rule 125 ROC providing for the uniformity of the procedure between the SC and CA, CA may decide questions of fact and of law. When it grants a new trial pursuant to Sec14 Rule 124 ROC, it may either a) receive the new evidence under Sec 12 or b) refer the case to the court of origin for reception of such evidence under Sec 15. in either case, it does not relinquish to the TC jurisdiction over the case. It retains sufficient authority to resolve the incidents in the case and decide its merits. - Even when CA remanded the case to the TC, CA retained appellate jurisdiction. CA retained its authority to act on the respondents bail application. 2. The right to bail emanates from the right to be presumed innocent. It is accorded to a person in the custody of law who may by reason of the presumption of innocence he enjoys, be allowed provisional liberty upon filing of a security to guarantee his appearance before any court, as required under specific conditions. - Bail is a matter of right to an accused person in custody for an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, but a matter of discretion on the part of the court, concerning one facing an accusation for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is strong. 9 - RTC and CA were unanimous in their findings of the existence of strong evidence of guilt. Under Sec 6(b) Rule 121, the grant of a new trial allows for reception of newly discovered evidence, but maintains evidence already presented or on record. In the present case, no new evidence had been introduced negating the earlier findings of the RTC and CA. Bail was not a matter of right but a mere privilege subject to the discretion of CA. - However, the CA admitted that the bail was based on health reasons disregarding the substantive and procedural requirements on bail.
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- CA made no specific findings that the respondent suffered from an ailment of such gravity that his continued confinement during trial will permanently impair his health or put his life in danger. - Moreover, there is finding on the record on the potential risk of respondent committing a similar offense. Dispositive petition is granted and the CA resolution annulled and set aside. The bail bond posted is cancelled. Let an order of arrest issue against the person of the accused.
PEOPLE v AMBROSIO
9
Sec 4 and 5 Rule 114 ROC, and Sec 13 Art III 1987 Consti
Criminal Procedure
-In Samar during the night of November 28, 1970, Rafael Serna and Antonio Cipriano took away P80 from Romualdo Villones and Leonardo Carlos. The latter were paying for the fish that they bought from a fisherman when the former stole their P80 and on the occasion killed the 2 victims. -the 2 were charged with Robbery with Double Homicide, with the aggravating circumstances of use of motorized banca as a means for flight or concealment, plus recidivism as regards Serna since he was previously convicted by final judgment in CFI of Manila, and was sentenced to an imprisonment from 10 to 17 years in 1958. -upon arraignment, both pleaded guilty, invoking the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt. Immediately, CFI of Samar found the 2 guilty, considering the mitigating circumstance of plea of guilt and the aggravating circumstance cited above. Cipriano was sentenced to Reclusion Perpetua (MC offset AC) while Serna was sentenced to death (1MC to 2AC), therefore sent to SC for automatic review. -the information was read to the appellants in English and translated in Samar dialect, thereafter, the 2 pleaded guilty. After the plea, the Fiscal asked the plea of guilty to be considered mitigating then asked the court to consider the 2 aggravating circumstance against Serna. The court did not explain the import of the plea to the 2 accused, did not even bother to ask if they understood their plea, and just imposed on Serna the death penalty. ISSUE WON the trial court erred in automatically rendering the penalty of death to Serna HELD NO. Ratio. Considering that the appellant was charged with an offense punishable by death, the trial court should have required the prosecution to present its evidence to prove the extent of his culpability. The taking of such testimony is the prudent and proper course to follow for the purpose of establishing not only the guilt but also the precise culpability of the defendant. Where a plea of guilty is entered by the defendant, in cases where the capital penalty may be imposed, the court should make certain that defendant fully understands the nature of the charge preferred against him and the character of the punishment provided by law before it is imposed. The trial court should therefore call witnesses for the purposes of establishing the guilt and degree of culpability of the defendant, not only to satisfy the trial judge, but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. Dispositive. WHEREFORE, the judgment under automatic review is hereby SET ASIDE and the case REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings. SO ORDERED.
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means of flight and not for the commission of the crime; (3) treachery generic aggravating but offset by plea of guilt; (4) fact of more than 1 homicide not aggravating, not enumerated under Art14, RPC. -Serna understood his plea because there was no improvident plea -dont need to remand, 14 years already passed
Criminal Procedure
Automatic review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Oriental Mindoro FACTS -On April 28, 1996, Oleby and Maricris, assisted by a neighbor, Lita Macalalad, told their mother that they had been raped by their father, herein accused-appellant. Thereupon, they went to the police authorities of Naujan and filed a complaint against accused-appellant -After preliminary examination, on June 6, 1996, four informations charging accused-appellant with rape on various dates were filed in the Regional Trial-Court, Calapan, Oriental Mindoro. -The record shows that at his arraignment on July 23, 1996, accusedappellant, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the charges filed against him. -However, on August 5, 1997, after the prosecution had presented Dr. Cynthia S. Fesalbon, accused-appellant pleaded guilty to the crime charged in all the informations. -On August 12, 1997, the prosecution formally offered its documentary evidence and rested its case thereafter. -Accused-appellant did not present any evidence in his defense. -On August 27, 1997, the trial court rendered judgment finding accusedappellant guilty of four counts of rape against his daughters. -Nadera appealed ISSUES 1. WON the trial court erred when it accepted his plea of guilty to a capital offense without making a searching inquiry to determine whether he understood the consequences of his plea 2. WON the conviction must be set aside HELD 1. YES - Rule 116 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 3. Plea of guilty to capital offense; reception of evidence. When the accused pleads guilty to a capital offense, the Court shall conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea and require the prosecution to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. The accused may also present evidence on his behalf. -Under this Rule, three things are enjoined upon the trial court when a plea of guilty to a capital offense is entered: (1) the court must conduct a searching inquiry into the voluntariness of the plea and the accused's full comprehension of the consequences thereof; (2) the court must require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability; and, (3) the court must ask the accused if he desires to present evidence on his behalf and allow him to do so if he desires. -As explained in People v. Alicando, a searching inquiry must focus on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. -In the case at bar, the record does not show what exactly transpired at the re-arraignment of accused-appellant, for what reason he changed his plea from "not guilty" to "guilty," and whether he fully understood the consequences of his guilty plea.
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-In its decision, the trial court described the manner in which the accused pleaded guilty, thus: Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by Atty. Manolo A. Brotonel of the Public Attorney's Office, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. However, when these cases were called for pre-trial and trial, counsel for the accused manifested that the accused, realizing the futility of entering into trial and considering that he actually committed the acts complained of, intimated his intention to enter a plea of guilty to the above-mentioned charges. The accused was then asked by this Court if he was aware of the consequences of a plea of guilty to a capital offense: that for the rape he committed on May 17, 1992 against his daughter, Oleby Nadera, who was 9 years old at the time, he would be sentenced to reclusion perpetua and for the three other counts of rape committed on April 17 and 24, 1995 [both against Oleby Nadera] and on March 3, 1996 [against Maricris Nadera, 11 years old at the time], he would be sentenced to death by lethal injection. After having been informed of this, he insisted that he is willing to enter a plea of guilty to the crimes charged and is ready to face the consequences thereof. -The warnings given by the trial court in this case fall short of the requirement that it must make a searching inquiry to determine whether accused-appellant understood fully the import of his guilty plea. As has been said, a mere warning that the accused faces the supreme penalty of death is insufficient. For more often than not, an accused pleads guilty upon bad advice or because he hopes for a lenient treatment or a lighter penalty. The trial judge must erase such mistaken impressions. He must be completely convinced that the guilty plea made by the accused was not made under duress or promise of reward. The judge must ask the accused the manner the latter was arrested or detained, and whether he was assisted by counsel during the custodial and preliminary investigations. In addition, the defense counsel should also be asked whether he conferred with the accused and completely explained to him the meaning and the consequences of a plea of guilt. Furthermore, since the age, educational attainment and socio-economic status of the accused may reveal insights for a proper verdict in the case, the trial court must ask questions concerning them. -In this case, absent any showing that these questions were put to accused-appellant, a searching inquiry cannot be said to have been undertaken by the trial court. -In People v. Sevillano, this Court held that: In every case where the accused enters a plea of guilty to a capital offense, especially where he is an ignorant person with a little or no education, the proper and prudent course to follow is to take such evidence as are available and necessary in support of the material allegations of the information, including the aggravating circumstances therein enumerated, not only to satisfy the trial judge himself but also to aid the Supreme Court in determining whether the accused really and truly understood and comprehended the meaning, full significance and consequences of his plea. -Clearly, the plea of guilty of accused-appellant in this case was made improvidently. 2. Yes. -Convictions based on an improvident plea of guilt are set aside only if such plea is the sole basis of judgment. If the trial court relied on sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused, the conviction must be
Criminal Procedure
HELD NO - The section of the rule permitting a motion to quash on the ground that "the facts charged do not constitute an offense" omits reference to the facts detailed "in the information." Other sections of the same rule would imply that the issue is restricted to those alleged in the information. - Prima facie, the "facts charged" are those described in the complaint, but they may be amplified or qualified by others appearing to be additional circumstances, upon admissions made by the people's representative, which admissions could anyway be submitted by him as amendments to the same information. - It would seem to be pure technicality to hold that in the consideration of the motion, the parties and the judge were precluded from considering facts which the fiscal admitted to be true, simply because they were not described in the complaint. Of course, it may be added that upon similar motions the court and the fiscal are not required to go beyond the averments of the information, nor is the latter to be inveigled into a premature and risky revelation of his evidence. - But the Court sees no reason to prohibit the fiscal from making, in all candor, admissions of undeniable facts, because the principle can never be sufficiently reiterated that such official's role is to see that justice is done; not that all accused are convicted, but that the guilty are justly punished. Less reason can there be to prohibit the court from considering those admissions, and deciding accordingly, in the interest of a speedy administration of justice. - The Beloncios were thus deprived of their liberty by order of the military authorities, a few days after the liberations of Mindoro. Judicial notice may be taken of the fact, that upon military occupation and before the establishment of the normal processes of civil government the liberties and rights of citizens are likely to suffer temporary restrictions, what with the exigencies of military strategy, or the confusion usually resulting from the situation. While the infringement of constitutional precepts and privileges is not to be tolerated, war necessities and consequences cannot be overlooked. At any rate, no reasons are shown why the irregularity, if any, committed by others, should be visited upon defendants-appellees. The acts imputed to them, do not, of themselves, constitute a punishable offense. Dispositive Appealed decision affirmed.
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another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously incriminate or impute to one Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime by bribery thru unlawful arrest, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused, on the aforesaid date, without reasonable ground therefor and for the purpose of delivering said Marcial Apolonio y Santos to the proper authorities, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously arrest said Marcial Apolonio y Santos; that after the said Marcial Apolonio y Santos had been arrested in the manner aforestated, and while the latter was supposedly being investigated by the said accused, the said accused did then and there place on commingle a marked P1.00 bill together with the money taken from said Marcial Apolonio y Santos, supposedly given to the latter by one Emerita Calupas de Aresa, so that he (Marcial Apolonio y Santos), then an employee of the Local Civil Registrar's Office of Manila, would appear to have agreed to perform an act not constituting a crime, in connection with the performance of his (Marcial Apolonio y Santos) duties, which was to expedite the issuance of a birth certificate, thereby directly incriminating or imputing to said Marcial Apolonio y Santos the commission of the crime of bribery." -defendants filed a motion to quash saying that (1) the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense (because the two crimes cannot be complexed); and (2) the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged -CFI granted motion to dismiss agreeing with defendants -MFR was denied -appeal by fiscal before SC ISSUE WON the CFI erred in granting motion to quash HELD YES - It is very apparent that by the use of the phrase "thru unlawful arrest" in the information an idea is conveyed that the unlawful arrest was resorted to as a necessary means to plant evidence in the person of the offended party, thereby incriminating him. From a reading of the info the SC finds a close connection between the act of the accused in first unlawfully arresting the offended party and then investigating him; and it was during that investigation that they plated incriminatory evidence against him. SC agrees with the Solicitor General in his contention that the accused first had to resort to unlawful arrest in order to be able to plant the P1.00 bill among the money taken from the offended party. Also the court a quo has jurisdiction to try the accused of the offense charged in the information. The crime of unlawful arrest is punishable with arresto mayor or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months, and a fine not exceeding P500.00; 5 and the crime of incriminatory machinations is punishable with arresto mayor, or imprisonment of from one month and one day to six months. Dispositive The order appealed from is reversed and set aside
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] GAMBOA v CRUZ 162 SCRA 642
Criminal Procedure
-Rolando Abadilla, a former colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, was charged before the QC RTC with the offense of Violation of PD No. 1866 [ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND AMMUNITION) --The Information read that he willfully, unlawfully and feloniously had in his possession and under his custody and control rifles, pistons, ammunitions and magazines (see orig case for the list) without first securing the necessary license and/or permit from the lawful authority. -Upon motion of the accused, Asuncion dismissed the Information on the ground that it did not allege sufficient facts to constitute an offense, since the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se, in view of Executive Order No. 107 which gives holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition a period of six months from its effectivity, extended to 31 December 1987 by EO No. 222, within which to surrender the same to the proper authorities, without incurring any criminal liability therefor, except if the unlicensed firearm or ammunition is carried outside of one's residence, not for the purpose of surrendering the same, or used in the commission of any other offense, and there is no allegation in said information that the firearms and ammunition enumerated therein were carried outside the accused's residence or used in the commission of some other crime. - In support thereof, the respondent judge cited the decision in People vs. Lopez, 79 Phil 658. -The prosecution filed a MR of said Resolution, but the motion was denied -Hence, the present recourse by the prosecution. Petitioners Claims -nothing is contained in said EOs which legalizes the possession of firearms and ammunition without a permit; -that said EOs merely authorized holders or possessors of unlicensed firearms and ammunition to surrender the same within a specified filing period without incurring criminal liability; -that illegal possession of firearms and ammunition is still penalized under PD No. 1866 which was not repealed by said EO NO. 107 and 222. ISSUES 1. WON J. Asuncion erred in holding that the possession of loose firearms and explosives is not illegal per se during the period covered by EO Nos. 107 and 222 2. WON it was not necessary for the prosecution to allege in the information that the firearms and ammunition, subject matter of this case, were brought out of the residence of the accused or were used by him in the commission or another offense, since these circumstances are not essential ingredients of the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition 3. WON under the allegation in the information, prosecution may prove that the accused earned the firearms and ammunition outside of his residence HELD 1. EO NO. 107, as amended by EO No. 222, is similar to RA Nos. 4 and 482. SC did NOT give it a different meaning because there is no basis for such a difference. 2. NO. IT IS NECESSARY TO ALLEGE IT IN THE INFO.
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3. NO. The information, in this particular charge against Abadilla, is fatally defective. It would be fatally defective against any other accused charged with the same offense. J. Asunction, in dismissing the information, committed no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion. Ratio (citing People vs. Austria) the presentation of evidence "cannot have the effect of validating a void information, or proving an offense which does not legally exist. ... The information was not merely defective but it does not charge any offense at all. Technically speaking, that information does not exist in contemplation of law." -Abadilla is regarded with unusual ease and facility as the "hit man" of the Marcos regime. But the Court cannot be swayed by appellations for it has a duty, as a temple of justice, to accord to every man who comes before it in appropriate proceedings the right to due process and the equal protection of the laws. Reasoning 1. It may be true that there is nothing in EO Nos. 107 and 222 that expressly legalizes the unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition, but this Court, applying statutes similar to the executive orders in question, and which also provided for a period within which a holder or possessor of unlicensed firearms and ammunition may surrender the same to the proper authorities without incurring criminal liability, had ruled that a criminal liability was temporarily LIFTED for mere possession' of unlicensed firearms and ammunition during the period covered, although such person is not exempt from criminal liability filing within the period provided, he carries the firearm and ammunition (unless it is for the purpose of surrendering the same) or he commits any other offense with the use of such unlicensed firearm and ammunition. -People vs. Lopez~ It will be seen that sec 2 (of RA NO 4) excluded from the operation of sec 1 up to August 31, 1946, possession of firearms and ammunition so long as they were not used for any purpose other than selfdefense or carried for any purpose other than of surrendering them to the proper authorities. The Government does not dispute this interpretation. Although the law does not categorically state that criminal liability was temporarily lifted for mere possession of filing firegems and ammunition, that is the only construction compatible with the spirit and purposes of the enactment as revealed by its context. -People vs. Feliciano~ SC ruled that RA No. 482 legalized mere unlicensed possession of firearms and ammunition for the limited period specified in said law, and punished only (1) the use of unlicensed firearm or ammunition, or (2) the carrying of such firearm or ammunition on the person, except to surrender them. The Court said: -Feliciano ruling was reiterated in People vs. Tabunares: RA No. 482, in effect legalized mere unlicensed on within one year from said date, and punished only (1) the use of a or ammunition or (2) the carriage thereof on the person except for purpose of surrender. Appellant's conviction cannot stand, since it is rested solely on unlicensed possession on or about November 6, 1950. 2. People vs. Lopez~ the Court already ruled that, under RA No. 4, the use or the carrying of firearms and/or ammunition was an ingredient, if not the sole ingredient, of the offense; i.e. the very acts which were punished, subject to certain conditions, and hence, should be alleged and proved. -People vs. Austria~ the Court also ruled that in order that an information charging illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, under RA No. 482, may be deemed suffident, it must allege that the accused was using the
LOPEZ v CITY JUDGE [supra, page 41] LAYOSA v RODRIGUEZ 86 SCRA 300 AQUINO; November 10, 1978
NATURE Certiorari from order of CA FACTS - This is about suspension of Layosa, collector of customs, who was charged by city fiscal in CFI w/ having violated AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Law (Republic Act No. 3019). Information was based on complaint filed by assistant director of District Anti-Smuggling Action Center. It was one of 5 cases filed against Layosa, aside from malversation case. - Gravamen is that he demanded and received from M/V Lady Angelita I 2 to 3 cases of beer & soft drinks as consideration for giving preferential berthing facilities. - Fiscal, pursuant to sec 13 of RA No. 3019, filed motion for Layosa's suspension. Respondent Judge granted motion. He found that a valid information had been filed against Layosa. - Layosa filed instant petition for certiorari. He prayed that suspension be set aside. He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over his person because no warrant of arrest had as yet been issued when hearing on his suspension was held and the case was not raffled to respondent Judge, that the Chief State Prosecutor in a telegram to the fiscal directed that the record of the case be elevated for review, and that respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion. - Because Layosa defied suspension, lower court adjudged him in contempt of court and penalized him by imprisonment for 3 mos and fine of P500. Layosa appealed to CA. - Respondent Judge explained that, to avoid delay, he acted on motion for suspension because case was filed after raffling between 2 branches of court had been terminated. He was scheduled to hold sessions and the other Judge was to begin one-month vacation. Judge pointed out that his action was sanctioned by Administrative Order No. 6 of SC which empowers Executive Judge to act on interlocutory matters prior to raffling. Case was eventually raffled to sala of respondent Judge. Layosa posted bail bond. He was arraigned and replaced as collector of customs. Office of State Prosecutors sustained filing of information against Layosa. - Layosa did not submit memorandum. Respondent fiscal alleged that petitioner had abandoned contention as to lack of jurisdiction. Fiscal stressed that case had been scheduled for trial at instance of petitioner and that latter manifested his willingness to proceed. ISSUE WON trial court acted with grave abuse of discretion in ordering suspension
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HELD NO - Lower court acquired jurisdiction upon filing of information. Petitioner was notified of pre-suspension hearing. His counsel participated. Requirements of due process were observed. Public interest demands a speedy determination of that question. - It is true that petitioner was not yet arrested or taken into custody when pre-suspension hearing was held. However, voluntary appearance through counsel was submission to lower court's jurisdiction. (Note that in civil cases, defendant's voluntary appearance is equivalent to service of summons.) - "Where a court has jurisdiction of the offense or subject matter, the objection that it has no jurisdiction of the person of the accused may be waived. One who desires to object to the jurisdiction of the court over his person must appear in court for that purpose only, and if he raises other questions, he waives the objection." Layosa waived the objection based on lack of jurisdiction over his person when, as already noted, he appeared at the pre-suspension hearing and his counsel cross-examined the prosecution witness.
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fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of the offense and, together with the facts existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. Reasoning - Respondent court held that above rule does not apply in this case. It based its decision on the ruling in People v Buan, which held that Article 365 of the Penal Code punishes the negligent state of mind and not the resulting injury. The trial court concluded that once prosecuted for and convicted of negligence, the accused cannot again be prosecuted for the same negligence although for a different resulting injury. - In his memorandum, the Solicitor General made mention of the fact that on October 21, 1972, the City Fiscal filed an Urgent Motion asking that the "hearing and arraignment of this case be held in abeyance for there is information that the victim, Diolito dela Cruz died, and the information would have to be amended." - Be that as it may, the fact remains that the victim Diolito dela Cruz died on October 18 "one (1) day after the accident and the arrest of the respondent Gapay" and that on October 20, 1972, the accused was arraigned, pleaded guilty and sentenced accordingly. Thus, jeopardy had attached and no new fact supervened after the arraignment and conviction of the accused. Dispositive Order of dismissal of lower court affirmed.
PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA 121 SCRA 637 RELOVA; April 27, 1983
NATURE Petition to review the order of the City Court of Manila, Branch XI FACTS - October 17, 1971: The incident occurred. - October 18, 1971: An information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was filed against Francisco Gapay y Mallares, driver of the truck. On the same day, the victim Diolito de la Cruz died. - October 20, 1972: Gapay was arraigned on the charge of serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence. - October 24, 1972: An information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed against Gapay - November 17, 1972: the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent, issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the ground of double jeopardy. ISSUES WON a person who has been prosecuted for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered HELD NO Ratio One who has been charged with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. However, where after the first prosecution a new
Criminal Procedure
which it had scheduled on November 20, 1985 and that judgment be rendered declaring a mistrial and nullifying the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan and ordering a re-trial before an impartial tribunal by an unbiased prosecutor. - The Supreme Court resolved by nine-to-two votes to issue the restraining order prayed for. But ten days later on November 28, 1985, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the temporary restraining order issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. [Hmmm tsk] - Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits because if the charge of partiality and bias against the respondents and suppression of vital evidence by the prosecution are proven, the petitioners would be entitled to the relief demanded: The People are entitled to due process which requires an impartial tribunal and an unbiased prosecutor. If the State is deprived of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict because certain material evidence is suppressed by the prosecution and the tribunal is not impartial, then the entire proceedings would be null and void. Petitioners prayed that the Sandiganbayan be restrained from promulgating their decision as scheduled anew on December 2, 1985. - On December 5, 1985, the Court required the respondents to comment on the motion for reconsideration but issued no restraining order. Thus, on December 2, 1985, as scheduled, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. [Note: the word used by the Sandiganbayan was innocent instead of not guilty!] - Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. On February 4, 1986, the same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. [Note that EDSA I happened before the month ended.] - On March 20, 1986, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration. The thrust of the second motion for reconsideration was the startling and therefore unknown revelations of Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera as reported in the March 6, 1986 issue of the Manila Times entitled "Aquino Trial a Sham," that the then President had ordered the respondents Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan Bernardo Fernandez and the prosecution panel headed by Herrera to whitewash the criminal cases against the 26 respondents accused and produce a verdict of acquittal. - Tanodbayan Fernandez claimed he never succumbed to any alleged attempts to influence his actuations in the premises, having instead successfully resisted perceived attempts to exert pressure to drop the case after preliminary investigation and actually ordered the filing and prosecution of the two murder cases against private-party respondents. Respondents Justices of the Sandiganbayan First Division in their collective comment of April 9, 1986 stated that the trial of the criminal cases by them was valid and regular and decided on the basis of evidence presented and the law applicable, but manifested that "if it is true that the former Tanodbayan and the Deputy Tanodbayan, Chief of the Prosecution Panel, were pressured into suppressing vital evidence which would probably alter the result of the trial, Answering Respondents would not interpose any objection to the reopening of those cases, if only
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to allow justice to take its course." - Respondents-accused opposed the second motion for reconsideration and prayed for its denial. The accused-respondents raised the issue of double jeopardy, and invoked that the issues had become moot and academic because of the rendition of the Sandiganbayan's judgment of acquittal of all respondents-accused on December 2, 1985, with counsels for respondents Ver and Tigas, as well as Olivas, further arguing that assuming that the judgment of acquittal is void for any reason, the remedy is a direct action to annul the judgment where the burden of proof falls upon the plaintiff to establish by clear, competent and convincing evidence the cause of the nullity. - The Supreme Court appointed a three-member commission composed of retired SC Justice Conrado Vasquez, chairman, and retired IAC Justices Milagros German and Eduardo Caguioa as members, to hear and receive evidence, testimonial and documentary, of the charges of collusion and pressures and relevant matters, upon prior notice to all parties, and to submit their findings to this Court for proper disposition. The Commission submitted the following recommendation: Considering the existence of adequate credible evidence showing that the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which proved to be beyond their capacity to resist, and which not only prevented the prosecution to fully ventilate its position and to offer all the evidences which it could have otherwise presented, but also predetermined the final outcome of the case, the Commission is of the considered thinking and belief, subject to the better opinion and judgment of this Honorable Court, that the proceedings in the said case have been vitiated by lack of due process, and hereby respectfully recommends that the prayer in the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted." ISSUES 1. WON the petition for a declaration of a mistrial in Sandiganbayan Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled 'People vs. Luther Custodio, et al.,' be granted 2. WON a retrial would constitute double jeopardy HELD 1. YES Reasoning - The Supreme Court cannot permit such a sham trial and verdict and travesty of justice to stand unrectified. The courts of the land under its aegis are courts of law and justice and equity. They would have no reason to exist if they were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and suppress the truth, instead of repositories of judicial power whose judges are sworn and committed to render impartial justice to all alike who seek the enforcement or protection of a right or the prevention or redress of a wrong, without fear or favor and removed from the pressures of politics and prejudice. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to know the truth and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake. In life, as an accused before the military tribunal Ninoy had pleaded in vain that as a civilian he was entitled to due process of law and trial in the regular civil courts before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. In death, Ninoy is the victim of the "treacherous and vicious assassination" and the relatives and
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people were denied due process of law with a partial court and biased Tanodbayan under the constant and pervasive monitoring and pressure exerted by the authoritarian President to assure the carrying out of his instructions. A dictated, coerced and scripted verdict of acquittal such as that in the case at bar is a void judgment. In legal contemplation, it is no judgment at all. It neither binds nor bars anyone. Such a judgment is "a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw". It is a terrible and unspeakable affront to the society and the people. To paraphrase Brandeis: If the authoritarian head of the government becomes the lawbreaker, he breeds contempt for the law, he invites every man to become a law unto himself, he invites anarchy. Dispositive Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted. The resolutions of November 28, 1985 dismissing the petition and of February 4, 1986 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside and in lieu thereof, judgment is hereby rendered nullifying the proceedings in respondent Sandiganbayan and its judgment of acquittal in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 entitled "People of the Philippines vs. Gen. Luther Custodio, et al." and ordering a re-trial of the said cases which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements of due process, so that the truth may be finally known and justice done to all.
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which prescribes two months from the time of discovery thereof, and it appearing further that the information was filed by the fiscal more than nine months after discovery of the offense charged in February 1975. - Fourteen (14) days later, another information against Manuel Opulencia, this time for theft of electric power under Article 308 in relation to Article 309, paragraph (1), of the Revised Penal Code. Before he could be arraigned thereon, Manuel Opulencia filed a Motion to Quash, alleging that he had been previously acquitted of the offense charged in the second information and that the filing thereof was violative of his constitutional right against double jeopardy. -Respondent Judge granted the accused's Motion to Quash and ordered the case dismissed. An MOR was denied. - On 1 December 1976, the present Petition for certiorari and mandamus was filed in this Court by the Acting City Fiscal of Batangas City on behalf of the People. ISSUE WON the defense of double jeopardy applies in this case. (Yes) HELD RATIO: Where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under a statute. REASONING: Constitutional provision on double jeopardy reads: No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. (Article IV (22), 1973 Constitution) This case must be examined, not under the terms of the first sentence of Article IV (22) of the 1973 Constitution, but rather under the second sentence of the same section. The first sentence of Article IV (22) sets forth the general rule: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is not available where the second prosecution is for an offense that is different from the offense charged in the first or prior prosecution, although both the first and second offenses may be based upon the same act or set of acts. The second sentence of Article IV (22) embodies an exception to the general proposition: the constitutional protection, against double jeopardy is available although the prior offense charged under an ordinance be different from the offense charged subsequently under a national statute such as the Revised Penal Code, provided that both offenses spring from the same act or set of acts. Put a little differently, where the offenses charged are penalized either by different sections of the same statute or by different statutes, the important inquiry relates to the identity of offenses charged: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available only where an Identity is shown to exist between the earlier and the subsequent offenses charged. In contrast, where one offense is charged under a municipal ordinance while the other is penalized by a statute, the critical inquiry is to the identity of the acts which the accused is said to have committed and which are alleged to have given rise to the two offenses: the constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available so long as the acts which constitute or have given rise to the first offense
PEOPLE v GROSPE [supra, page 43] CANIZA v PEOPLE (AGLORO) 159 SCRA 16 FELICIANO; March 18, 1988
NATURE Petition for Prohibition and certiorari directed at 1) the CFI Order of Nov. 27, 1979 issued by Branch 23 of CFI of Manila in Criminal Case 46768 and 2) said courts Order of March 20, 1980 in the same case denying Canizas Motion for Reconsideration FACTS - March 20, 1974: Assistant City Fiscal of Manila filed an Information for falsification of public documents allegedly committed on Nov. 5, 1968 by Caniza. - May 24, 1974: Caniza filed Motion to Quash saying that allegations in the information did not constitute an offense, and that the information contained averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or justification - trial court granted Motion to Quash, dismissed case against Caniza - Fiscals Motion for Reconsideration of this Order was denied - June 13, 1979: a second Information (docketed as Criminal Case 46768) was filed charging Caniza with substantially the same offense as that charged under the previous information - Caniza moved to quash this second information on the grounds that 1) the offense charged had already prescribed, 2)quashal of the first Information had been on the merits, 3)the allegations of the second Information did not constitute and offense - Respondent judge issued an order denying the motion to quash - He also denied Canizas motion for reconsideration
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ISSUES 1. WON the offense charged had already prescribed 2. WON the filing of the second Information has placed the accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense a second time HELD 1. NO Reasoning - 5 years, 4 months, and 16 days had elapsed between November 5, 1968 (the date of commission of the alleged offense) and March 20 1974 (date of filing the first information); 4 years, 2 months and 12 days had elapsed between April 3, 1975 (date of denial by the trial court of the Fiscals motion for reconsideration) and June 13, 1979 (date of filing of the second information). A total of 9 years, 6 months and 28 days had been consumed by the time the second Information was filed in court. - Under Article 90, in relation with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of falsification of public document committed by a private individual - the offense with which petitioner Caiza is presently charged prescribes in ten (10) years. In this respect, Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code states further: - Computation of prescription of offenses. The period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are justifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. 2. NO Reasoning - Section 9 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court 6 lists the following requisites in order that the defense of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by an accused person: a. a valid Complaint or Information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction; b. a Court of competent jurisdiction; c. that the accused had pleaded to the charge against him; d. that the accused had been convicted, or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent; and e. that the second offense charged is the same as the first, or an attempt to commit the same or a petition thereof, or that the second offense necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first offense charged. - Criminal Case No. 16879 was ordered dismissed by the trial court with the express consent of the accused i.e., upon Motion to Quash filed by petitioner Caiza. Generally, a dismissal under such circumstance win not bar another prosecution for the same offense; the defendant, in having the case against him dismissed, thereby waives his constitutional right against double jeopardy for the reason that he effectively prevents the trial court from proceeding to trial on the merits and rendering a judgment of conviction against him - Application of the aforestated doctrine of waiver, however, is subject to two (2) sine qua non conditions: first, dismissal must have been sought or induced by the defendant, either personally or through counsel; and second, such dismissal must not have been on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an acquittal. In this respect, the record shows that
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petitioner Caiza moved to quash the first Information (Criminal Case No. 16879) on grounds that the allegations made therein did not constitute an offense and/or that the first Information contained allegations which, if true, constituted a legal excuse or justification. These grounds, upon which the trial court anchored its 27 November 1974 Order of dismissal, are clearly directed at the sufficiency of said information to sustain the conviction of petitioner Caniza and, hence, indicate the absence of the first requisite in double-jeopardy. Furthermore, and more importantly, dismissal of a criminal action on this basis is not properly considered as amounting to an acquittal on the merits; from a legal standpoint, the defendant is deemed as not having been charged with the commission of any offense whatsoever under the deficient information. Consequently, petitioner Caizas plea of second jeopardy cannot be sustained: he effectively waived his right to assert that plea when he moved to quash the first Information filed against him. Dispositive Petition for Prohibition and certiorari is DISMISSED. The 8 December 1980 Resolution of this Court giving due course to the Petition is withdrawn and the disputed Orders dated 27 November 1979 and 20 March 1980 issued by respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 46768 are hereby AFFIRMED. This case is remanded to the court a quo for trial on the merits.
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witness for the prosecution, was then present and ready to testify. On the other hand, it appears that Atty. Lorenzo Coloso also asked for at least two (2) postponements. In invoking the right of the accused to speedy trial, Atty. Coloso is not therefore coming to this court with clean hands. Considering the two (2) postponements requested by Atty. Coloso, the accused in effect waived their right to speedy trial." Dispositive WHEREFORE, the petition docketed as G.R. 81861 is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The petition docketed as G. R. No. 83114 is GRANTED and the questioned orders of Judge Cosico dated May 22, 1987 and November 27, 1978 are AFFIRMED. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 22, 1988 is SET ASIDE.
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1. WON the acts done by him, as found by the Court of Appeals constitute gross imprudence 2. WON he was correctly found guilty of the offense estafa through (falsification by) negligence HELD 1. YES - Appellant was, or must have been aware that the claim was for a sizeable amount, totalling over twelve thousand pesos, and ordinary prudence required that he should satisfy himself by all proper and adequate means of the identity of the persons claiming said amounts, since they we personally unknown to him. The mere assurance of a former class, mate would certainly not be a satisfactory identification to justify disbursement of such a large amount - appellant as a Lieutenant of the Army is sufficiently intelligent and educated to foresee the possibility that the certificates could be forged or stolen - appellant cooperated in the commission of the complex offense of estafa through falsification by reckless imprudence by acts without which it could not have been accomplished, and this being a fact, there would be no reason to exculpate him from liability 2. YES - counsel contends that: Samson cannot be convicted of the crime of estafa through falsification by imprudence for the reason that the information filed against him charges only a willful act of falsification and contains no reference to any act of imprudence on his part; the alleged imprudent act does not include or is not necessarily included in the offense charged in the information because a deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with the idea of negligence. - The rule regarding variance between allegation and proof in a criminal case, is: "When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information, and that proved or established by the evidence, and the offense as charged, is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the defendant shall be convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is proved" (Section 4, Rule 116 now rule 120. Rules of Court). -"An offense charged necessarily includes that which is proved, when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the complaint or information, constitute the latter. And the offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proves, when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter" (Section 5, Rule 116, now rule 120) - conviction for a criminal negligent act can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense - appellant did not act with criminal intent but merely failed to take proper and adequate means to assure himself of the identity of the real claimants as an ordinary prudent man would do. In other words, the information alleges acts which charge willful, falsification but which turned out to be not willful but negligent. This is a case covered by the rule when there is a variance between the allegation and proof - Moreover, Section 5, Rule 116 now 120, of the Rules of Court does not require that all the essential elements of the offense charged in the information be proved, it being sufficient that some of said essential elements or ingredients thereof be established to constitute the crime
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON G.R. No. 149453 RESOLUTION: May 28, 2002
NATURE Petition for review on certiorari FACTS - The assailed Decision of the appellate court granted respondent Lacsons Second Amended Petition for Prohibition with application for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, (1) assailing the Order issued by Judge Herminia Pasamba of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 40, that allowed the continuation of the re-investigation of the Kuratong Baleleng cases; and (2) praying for the dismissal of Criminal Cases entitled People of the Philippines v. Panfilo Lacson, et al. pending before Branch 81 of the RTC of Quezon City. - On May 18, 1995, then PNP Director-General Recaredo Sarmiento II
Criminal Procedure
announced, in a press conference, the killing of eleven (11) members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang (KBG) in a shootout with police elements near the fly-over along Commonwealth Avenue, Quezon City at about 4:00 A.M. that day. - On May 22, 1995, morning papers carried the news that SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes had claimed that the killing of the eleven (11) gang members was a rub-out or summary execution and not a shootout. - In an affidavit he executed the following day, delos Reyes stated that he was part of a composite police team called the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Force Group (ABRITFG) composed of elements of the National Capital Region Commandand headed by Chief Superintendent Jewel Canson; Traffic Management Command, headed by Senior Superintendent Francisco Subia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC), headed by Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command, headed by Chief Superintendent Ricardo de Leon; and Criminal Investigation Command (CIC), headed by Chief Superintendent Romeo Acop - Delos Reyes claimed that the police team arrested the eleven (11) gang members in early morning of May 18, 1995 at the gangs safe house in Superville Subdivision, Paraaque; that after their arrest, the gang members were made to board two vans, their hands tied behind their backs, and brought initially to Camp Crame where a decision to summarily execute them was made, and later to Commonwealth Avenue where they were shot to death by elements of the Anti-Bank Roberry Intelligence Task Force Group - On May 26, 1995, SPO2 Corazon dela Cruz, another CIC investigator, executed an affidavit corroborating the material allegations of delos Reyes - On May 31, 1995, Armando Capili, a reporter of Remate, executed an affidavit stating that he was present when the KBG members were arrested in Superville Subdivision - On June 1, 1995, Chief Superintendent Job A. Mayo, PNP Director for Investigation, filed murder charges with the Office of the Ombudsman against ninety-seven (97) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. The nextof-kin of the slain KBG members also filed murder charges against the same officers and personnel. - Ombudsman Aniano Desierto then created a panel of investigators to conduct a preliminary investigation of the murder charges. On October 20, 1995, the panel issued a resolution recommending the dismissal of the charges for lack of probable cause. - Ombudsman Desierto referred the resolution for review. On November 20, 1995, the review panel reversed the resolution and found probable cause for the prosecution of multiple murder charges against twenty-six (26) officers and personnel of ABRITFG. - On November 2, 1995, the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan eleven (11) Informations for MURDER, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057, against respondent Panfilo M. Lacson and twenty-five (25) other accused. All twenty-six (26) of them were charged as principals. - Upon motion of the respondent, the criminal cases were remanded to the Ombudsman for reinvestigation. On March 1, 1996, Amended Informations were filed against the same twenty-six (26) suspects but the participation of respondent Lacson was downgraded from principal to accessory. Arraignment then followed and respondent entered a plea of not guilty. - With the downgrading of charges against him, respondent Lacson questioned the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to hear the criminal
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cases as none of the principal accused in the Amended Informations was a government official with a Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher, citing Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975 then prevailing. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the cases transferred to the Regional Trial Court - The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed a motion for reconsideration of the transfer. Pending resolution of the motion, R. A. No. 8249 took effect on February 23, 1997, amending R. A. No. 7975. In particular, the amendatory law deleted the word principal in Section 2 of R. A. No. 7975, thereby expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to include all cases where at least one of the accused, whether principal, accomplice or accessory, is a government official of Salary Grade (SG) 27 or higher. The amendment is made applicable to all cases pending in any court in which trial has not yet begun as of the date of its approval. - In Lacson v. Executive Secretary, respondent Lacson challenged the constitutionality of the amendment and contended that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the criminal cases. This Court, while dismissing the constitutional challenge, nonetheless ordered the transfer of the criminal cases to the Regional Trial Court on the ground that the Amended Informations for murder failed to indicate that the offenses charged therein were committed in relation to, or in discharge of, the official functions of the respondent, as required by R. A. No. 8249. - The Criminal Cases were raffled off to Branch 81 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, then presided by Judge, now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, Wenceslao Agnir, Jr. - Before the accused could be arraigned, prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Corazon de la Cruz, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez recanted their affidavits which implicated respondent Lacson in the murder of the KBG members. - On the other hand, private complainants also executed their respective affidavits of desistance declaring that they were no longer interested to prosecute these cases. - Due to these developments, the twenty-six (26) accused, including respondent Lacson, filed five separate but identical motions to: (1) make a judicial determination of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of warrants of arrest (2) hold in abeyance the issuance of the warrants (3) dismiss the cases should the trial court find lack of probable cause. - The records of the case before us are not clear whether the private offended parties were notified of the hearing on March 22, 1999 held by Judge Agnir to resolve the motions filed by respondent Lacson and the other accused. - During the said hearing, the private offended parties who desisted do not appear to have been presented on the witness stand. In their stead, Atty. Godwin Valdez testified that he assisted them in preparing their affidavits of desistance and that he signed said affidavits as witness. On the other hand, Atty. Aurora Bautista of the Philippine Lawyers League presented the affidavits of recantation of prosecution witnesses Eduardo de los Reyes, Armando Capili and Jane Gomez. Only prosecution witness Corazon de la Cruz testified to affirm her affidavit. - On March 29, 1999, Judge Agnir issued a Resolution dismissing the Criminal Cases - On March 27, 2001, PNP Director Leandro R. Mendoza indorsed to the Department of Justice the new affidavits of P/Insp. Ysmael S. Yu and P/S Insp. Abelardo Ramos regarding the Kuratong Baleleng incident for preliminary investigation. On the strength of this indorsement, Secretary of
Criminal Procedure
- Like any other favorable procedural rule, this new rule can be given retroactive effect. However, the Court cannot rule on this issue due to the lack of sufficient factual bases. Thus, there is need of proof of the following facts: (1) whether the provisional dismissal of the cases had the express consent of the accused; (2) whether it was ordered by the court after notice to the offended party, (3) whether the 2-year period to revive has already lapsed, and (4) whether there is any justification for the filing of the cases beyond the 2-year period. - There is no uncertainty with respect to the fact that the provisional dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson bears his express consent. It was respondent Lacson himself who moved to dismiss the subject cases for lack of probable cause before then Judge Agnir, hence, it is beyond argument that their dismissal bears his express consent. - The records of the case, however, do not reveal with equal clarity and conclusiveness whether notices to the offended parties were given before the cases against the respondent Lacson were dismissed by then Judge Agnir. It appears from the resolution of then Judge Agnir that the relatives of the victims who desisted did not appear during the hearing to affirm their affidavits. Their affidavits of desistance were only presented by Atty. Godwin Valdez who testified that he assisted the private complainants in preparing their affidavits and he signed them as a witness. It also appears that only seven (7) persons submitted their affidavits of desistance. From the records of the case before us, it cannot be determined whether there were affidavits of desistance executed by the relatives of the three other victims. The same records do not show whether they were notified of the hearing or had knowledge thereof. To be sure, it is not fair to expect the element of notice to be litigated before then Judge Agnir for Section 8, Rule 117 was yet inexistent at that time. - The fact of notice to the offended parties was not raised either in the petition for prohibition with application for temporary restraining order or writ of preliminary injunction filed by respondent Lacson in the RTC of Manila, to enjoin the prosecutors from reinvestigating the said cases against him. The only question raised in said petition is whether the reinvestigation will violate the right of respondent Lacson against double jeopardy. Thus, the issue of whether or not the reinvestigation is barred by Section 8, Rule 117 was not tackled by the litigants. - Nor was the fact of notice to the offended parties the subject of proof after the eleven (11) informations for murder against respondent Lacson and company were revived in the RTC of Quezon City presided by Judge Yadao. There was hardly any proceeding conducted in the case for respondent Lacson immediately filed a petition for certiorari in the appellate court challenging, among others, the authority of Judge Yadao to entertain the revived informations for multiple murder against him. - The applicability of Section 8, Rule 117 was never considered in the trial court. It was in the Court of Appeals where respondent Lacson raised for the first time the argument that Section 8, Rule 117 bars the revival of the multiple murder cases against him. But even then, the appellate court did not require the parties to elucidate the crucial issue of whether notices were given to the offended parties before Judge Agnir ordered the dismissal of the cases against respondent Lacson and company. - Indeed, the records of this case are inconclusive on the factual issue of whether the multiple murder cases against respondent Lacson are being revived within or beyond the 2-year bar. The reckoning date of the 2-year bar has to be first determined - - - whether it is from the date of the Order of then Judge Agnir dismissing the cases or from the dates the Order
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were received by the various offended parties or from the date of the effectivity of the new rule. - If the cases were revived only after the 2-year bar, the State must be given the opportunity to justify its failure to comply with said timeline. The new rule fixes a timeline to penalize the State for its inexcusable delay in prosecuting cases already filed in courts. It can therefore present compelling reasons to justify the revival of cases beyond the 2-year bar. - In light of the lack of or the conflicting evidence on the various requirements to determine the applicability of Section 8, Rule 117, this Court is not in a position to rule whether or not the re-filing of the cases for multiple murder against respondent Lacson should be enjoined. Fundamental fairness requires that both the prosecution and the respondent Lacson should be afforded the opportunity to be heard and to adduce evidence on the presence or absence of the predicate facts upon which the application of the new rule depends. They involve disputed facts and arguable questions of law. The reception of evidence on these various issues cannot be done in this Court but before the trial court. Dispositive Case remanded
Criminal Procedure
1. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; 2. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; 3. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; 4. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. - The foregoing requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included therein. Although the second paragraph of the new rule states that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after the issuance thereof without the case having been revived, the provision should be construed to mean that the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. - Express consent to a provisional dismissal is given either viva voce or in writing. It is a positive, direct, unequivocal consent requiring no inference or implication to supply its meaning. Where the accused writes on the motion of a prosecutor for a provisional dismissal of the case No objection or With my conformity, the writing amounts to express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of the case. The mere inaction or silence of the accused to a motion for a provisional dismissal of the case or his failure to object to a provisional dismissal does not amount to express consent. A motion of the accused for a provisional dismissal of a case is an express consent to such provisional dismissal. If a criminal case is provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused, the case may be revived only within the periods provided in the new rule. On the other hand, if a criminal case is provisionally dismissed without the express consent of the accused or over his objection, the new rule would not apply. The case may be revived or refiled even beyond the prescribed periods subject to the right of the accused to oppose the same on the ground of double jeopardy or that such revival or refiling is barred by the statute of limitations. - In this case, the respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of the first paragraph of the new rule were present when Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases. Irrefragably, the prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional dismissal of the said criminal cases. The respondent did not pray for the dismissal, provisional or otherwise of the Criminal Cases. Neither did he ever agree, impliedly or expressly, to a mere provisional dismissal of the cases. - The Court also agrees with the petitioners contention that no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing thereon was served on the heirs of the victims at least three days before said hearing as mandated by Rule 15, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. It must be borne in mind that in crimes involving private interests, the new rule requires that the offended party or parties or the heirs of the victims must be given
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adequate a priori notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal of the criminal case. Such notice may be served on the offended party or the heirs of the victim through the private prosecutor, if there is one, or through the public prosecutor who in turn must relay the notice to the offended party or the heirs of the victim to enable them to confer with him before the hearing or appear in court during the hearing. - In the case at bar, even if the respondents motion for a determination of probable cause and examination of witnesses may be considered for the nonce as his motion for a provisional dismissal of the Criminal Cases, however, the heirs of the victims were not notified thereof prior to the hearing on said motion on March 22, 1999. It must be stressed that the respondent filed his motion only on March 17, 1999 and set it for hearing on March 22, 1999 or barely five days from the filing thereof. Although the public prosecutor was served with a copy of the motion, the records do not show that notices thereof were separately given to the heirs of the victims or that subpoenas were issued to and received by them - Since the conditions sine qua non for the application of the new rule were not present when Judge Agnir, Jr. issued his resolution, the State is not barred by the time limit set forth in the second paragraph of Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. The State can thus revive or refile the Criminal Cases or file new Informations for multiple murder against the respondent. 2. NO - The Court agrees with the petitioners that to apply the time-bar retroactively so that the two-year period commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State two years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than two years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the Criminal Cases on March 29, 1999. The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-bar retroactively, the State would have only one year and three months or until March 31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the two-year period fixed under the new rule. - On the other hand, if the time limit is applied prospectively, the State would have two years from December 1, 2000 or until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevent injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and wrongful results in the administration of justice. The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the computation of the two-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar. It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the two-year period under the new rule. To require the State to give a valid justification as a condition sine qua non to the revival of a case provisionally dismissed with the express consent of the accused before the effective date of the new rule is to assume that the State is obliged to comply with the time-bar under the new rule before it took effect. This would be a rank denial of justice. The State must be given a period of one year or two years as the case may be from December 1, 2000 to revive the criminal case without requiring the State to make a valid justification for not reviving the case before the
Criminal Procedure
instead, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion and, if after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law Reasoning: [a] Sec. 1, Rule 117 of the ROC provides that, upon arraignment, defendant shall immediately either move to quash the complaint or information or plead thereto, or do both and that, if the defendant moves to quash, without pleading, and the motion is withdrawn or overruled, he should immediately plead, which means that trial must proceed. If, after trial on the merits, judgment is rendered adversely to the movant in the MTQ, he can appeal the judgment and raise the same defenses or objections earlier raised in his MTQ which would then be subject to review by the appellate court. [b] An order denying a MTQ, like an order denying a motion to acquit, is interlocutory and not a final order, and thus, not appealable. Neither can it be the subject of a petition for certiorari. Such order of denial may only be reviewed, in the ordinary course of law, by an appeal from the judgment, after trial. [c] In Collins vs. Wolfe and reiterated in Mill vs. Yatco, the accused, after the denial of his MTQ, should have proceeded with the trial of the case in the court below, and if final judgment is rendered against him, he could then appeal, and upon such appeal, present the questions which he sought to be decided by the appellate court in a petition for certiorari.[d] Whether or not the alleged libelous statements in the reply-affidavit are covered within the mantle of absolutely privileged communications, is a defense which petitioners could raise upon the trial on the merits, and, if that defense should fail, they could still raise the same on appeal. The MTQ the information for libel on the ground of qualified privilege, duly opposed by the prosecution, is properly denied, as the prosecution is entitled to prove at the trial that there was malice in fact on the part of the petitioners Dispositive Petition is DENIED. CA decision is AFFIRMED.
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HELD YES. The CA committed a mistake. -The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, which became effective on January 1, 1985, applicable to this case since the pre-trial was held on August 8, 1985, provides: "SEC. 4. Pre-trial agreements must be signed. No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel." (Rule 118) The Rule is mandatory. Under the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory (McGee vs. Republic). The use of the term "shall" further emphasizes its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced (Bersabal vs. Salvador). And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused (People vs. Terrado). -The conclusion is inevitable, therefore, that the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily required by the Rules, renders the Stipulation of Facts inadmissible in evidence. The fact that the lawyer of the accused, in his memorandum, confirmed the Stipulation of Facts does not cure the defect because Rule 118 requires both the accused and his counsel to sign the Stipulation of Facts. What the prosecution should have done, upon discovering that the accused did not sign the Stipulation of Facts, as required by Rule 118, was to submit evidence to establish the elements of the crime, instead of relying solely on the supposed admission of the accused in the Stipulation of Facts. Without said evidence independent of the admission, the guilt of the accused cannot be deemed established beyond reasonable doubt. -Consequently, under the circumstances obtaining in this case, the ends of justice require that evidence be presented to determine the culpability of the accused. When a judgment has been entered by consent of an attorney without special authority, it will sometimes be set aside or reopened (Natividad vs. Natividad). Dispositive WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Appellate Court is REVERSED and this case is hereby ordered RE-OPENED and REMANDED to the appropriate Branch of the Regional Trial Court of Lucena City, for further reception of evidence. SO ORDERED.
Criminal Procedure
which his counsel may have entered into without his knowledge, as he may have waived his presence at the pre-trial conference; eliminate any doubt on the conformity of the accused to the facts agreed upon. - Nevertheless, Uy cannot take advantage of the absence of his and his counsels signatures on the pre trial order. They did not object when the prosecution presented the plastic bags and said that it contained shabu. Uy cannot now raise it for the first time on appeal. Objection to evidence cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. Dispositive Decision affirmed in toto
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penalty of 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum. Dispositive The MFR is GRANTED. For the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention with homicide and rape, James Andrew Uy is sentenced to reclusion perpetua; For the crime of simple kidnapping and serious illegal detention, the penalty of 12 years of prision mayor in its maximum period, as minimum, to 17 years of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.
Criminal Procedure
ESCOLIN; September 30, 1983
NATURE Appeal from CFI Rizal decision FACTS -Artemio Castillo, an employee of FILTEX and a member of the Samahan ng Malaya Manggagawa sa Filtex (FFW), was charged together with others in the MTC Makati with the offense of slight physical injuries, for his alleged involvement in a mauling and shining incident which occurred sometime in July 1964 at the height of a strike called by the SAMAHAN. During the pendency of the case, Castillo was suspended from his job. -July 8, 1964: FILTEX and SAMAHAN entered into a Return Work Agreement: >par. 3: company employees against whom court cases are filed or to be filed, shall be suspended by the company upon filing of such cases by the fiscal with the proper courts for as long as the said cases shall remain pending in court >par. 4: in the event said employees are found innocent by the courts, the COMPANY agrees to reinstate them to their respective jobs with back wages minus whatever earnings they earned during the period of suspension; otherwise, if found guilty they shall remain dismissed; -After trial, the MTC Makati found Castillo guilty of slight physical injuries. -CFI Rizal dismissed the case (November 28, 1966) because complainant failed to appear at the scheduled trial. -Castillo asked for reinstatement and back wages. When FILTEX paid no head to his demands, he instituted action in CFI Rizal, claiming that dismissal of the criminal case justified his reinstatement and payment of back wages, pursuant to paragraph 4 of the Return to Work Agreement. -FILTEX filed motion to dismiss; grounds: lack of cause of action and want of jurisdiction, the case being allegedly within the exclusive jurisdiction of CIR. This motion was denied. -Pre-trial: the parties defined the principal issue Is Castillo entitled to reinstatement and back wages after the dismissal of the charge against him in accordance with par. 4 of the "Return to Work Agreement? -Case was submitted for decision on the bases of the parties memoranda and stipulation of facts. CFI Rizal dismissed Castillos complaint, and ordered him to pay FILTEX P1thou as attorney's fees, plus costs. Reasoning: CFI Rizals dismissal of the case was only because of the failure of the complainant to appear at the scheduled trial. The agreement to reinstate an employee expressly states that there must be a finding of innocence by the courts. It did not stipulate that the case should be dismissed. -Hence, this appeal. ISSUE WON Castillo is entitled to reinstatement and backwages HELD YES. Since the criminal case was ultimately dismissed, the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellant should be applied. Castillos innocence need no longer be proved, since under the fundamental law his innocence is presumed.
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-While it is true that Castillo was convicted of the offense of slight physical injuries by MTC Makati, it is undisputed that on appeal, CFI Rizal dismissed the case for failure of the prosecution witnesses to appear. -ROC Rule 123, Sec 7: Trial de novo on appeal. An appealed case shall be tried in all respects anew in the courts of first instance as if it had been originally instituted in that court. -Applying this rule, the judgment of conviction rendered by MTC Makati was vacated upon perfection of the appeal, to be tried de novo in the CFI as if it were originally instituted therein. The phrase "to vacate" applied to a judgment means "to annul, to render void." -People vs. Dramayo: The starting point is the constitutional presumption of innocence - a right safeguarded the accused. Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to demonstrate that culpability lies. Guilt must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard this Court has always been committed. -There is need for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by person on trial under such an exacting test could sentence be one of conviction. -It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. So it has been held from the 1903 decision of United States v. Reyes. Interpretation of par. 4 of Return to Work Agreement -FILTEX: said paragraph requires an express finding of innocence by the court in order to entitle an employee to reinstatement and back wages; no such finding of innocence had been made because the criminal case was dismissed on a mere technicality; interpretation of said agreement should not be stretched to include a "mere presumption of innocence under the law." -SC: Constitutional provision on protection to labor constrains courts to interpret the agreement in question in favor of the claim of the laborer and against that of management. Those who are less fortunate in terms of economic well-being should be given preferential attention. States obligation to protect labor is welfare state concept vitalized. (Art. 4, Labor Code. Art. 1700, NCC. ^_^ hehe! ) Dispositive CFI Rizal decision set aside. Remand to Labor Arbiter of NLRC for determination of the amount of back wages.
Criminal Procedure
failure to appear is unjustified." As pointed out then by the Solicitor General, the indispensable requisite for trial in absentia is that it should come "after arraignment." - Without the accused having been arraigned, it becomes academic to discuss the applicability of this exception to the basic constitutional right that the accused should be heard by himself and counsel. - The appeal to the Court of First Instance presided by respondent Judge Mendoza did not possess any curative aspect. Respondent considered the appeal taken by the petitioner as waiver of the defects in the proceedings in the respondent City Court. - Precisely, the appeal itself is tantamount to questioning those defects. In fact, the Memorandum in support of the appeal unmistakably raised as error the absence of petitioner at the arraignment and cited jurisprudence, commentaries and the rules to bolster his position. Specifically, the absence of an arraignment can be invoked at anytime in view of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial. Dispositive The petition was granted.
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HELD NO 1. Arraignment of the accused was null and void Ratio During arraignment, the complaint or the information should be read in a language or dialect which the accused understands. Reasoning - The trial judge failed to follow the procedure outlined in Rule 116 of the RoC. - The information was written in English and it was unknown whether or not the accused could understand English well. It could not be said with certainty that the accused was informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 2. The plea of guilt was null and void. Ratio Rule 116, Sec. 3 provides that in a plea of guilt, the court should ascertain that the accused voluntarily entered into the plea and fully comprehends the ramifications of such a plea and, in addition, the prosecution should also be required to prove his guilt and the precise degree of culpability. Reasoning - This rule is a restatement of the doctrine laid down in People vs. Apduhan. The searching inquiry of the trial court must be focused on: (1) the voluntariness of the plea, and (2) the full comprehension of the consequences of the plea. - The questions of the trial court failed to show the voluntariness of the plea of guilt of the appellant nor did the questions demonstrate appellant's full comprehension of the consequences of his plea. > The records do not clearly illustrate the personality profile of the accused. > The age, socio-economic status and educational background of the accused were not examined. > With regard to voluntariness, questions regarding the presence or absence of maltreatment of the accused are deemed insufficient when a record of events in the penal facility indicate that Alicando suffered a hematoma from being locked up in a cell with violent inmates upon his arrest. > With regard to comprehension, the trial court inadequately warned Alicando that a plea of guilt would result to a mandatory of penalty of death without explaining to him what mandatory meant. - The rule requires that after a free and intelligent plea of guilt the trial court must require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the appellant and the precise degree of his culpability beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 116, Sec. 3 modifies priorituis prudence that a plea of guilt even in capital offenses is sufficient to sustain a conviction charged in the information without need of further proof. 3. Some prosecution evidence, offered independently of the plea of guilt of the appellant, were inadmissible, yet were considered by the trial court convicting the appellant. Ratio Fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine: once the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the "fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. In other words, illegally seized evidence is obtained as a direct result of the illegal act, whereas the "fruit of the poisonous tree" is the indirect result of the same illegal act. The "fruit of the poisonous tree" is at least once removed from the illegally seized evidence, but it is equally inadmissible. Reasoning
Criminal Procedure
- and that his guilty plea has not therefore been given improvidently - other by actual threats of physical harm from malevolent quarters or simply because of his, the Judge's, intimidating robes. 2. the lower court should require the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability 3. the court should inquire whether or not the accused wishes to present evidence on his behalf and should allow him to do so if he so desires - The plea of guilt was not improvident. > When the appellant pleaded guilty in open court, the appellant was clearly assisted by counsel. > The trial court, on its own, in fact went out of its way to repeatedly inform the defendant of the nature of his plea and the implications of the plea he was making. He was asked a number of times if he was sure of the plea he was making. > The records fail to indicate that appellant questioned his plea of guilty at any stage of the trial. He did not put up any defense with regard to the evidence and the testimonies and even directed the police to the location of the evidence. > The accuseds silence can counter the assertion of the Court that the plea of guilt was improvident. Silence is assent as well as consent, and may, where a direct and specific accusation of crime is made, be regarded under some circumstances as a quasi-confession. An innocent person will defend himself so silence can be understood as a person deferring to do just that. > The absence of an extra-judicial confession does not detract from the efficacy or validity of appellant's plea of guilty. It does not affect the requirement compelling the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused and the precise degree of his culpability. Nowhere in the rules does it state that an extra-judicial confession is a prerequisite for a conviction based on a plea of guilty. - The physical evidence objected to falls under the exclusionary rule. > The 1987 Constitution's exclusionary rules absolutely forbid evidence obtained from illegal searches and seizures or evidence resulting from uncounseled custodial investigations of accused individuals. > The doctrine is not without its exceptions, and the evidence in dispute in the instant case falls within those exceptions. + The discovery of the victim's body near the house of the accused would have naturally led authorities to undertake a more thorough investigation of the site, particularly in those areas where the victim was last seen. + Under one of the recognized exceptions of the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, the more appropriate question in such cases is whether the evidence to which the objection is made would not have been discovered at all but for the illegality or would have been discovered anyway by sources or procedures independent of the illegality. + Another exception refuses to treat the doctrine as absolutely sacred if the evidence in question would have been inevitably discovered under normal conditions. - There is adequate legal evidence to sustain the trial courts conviction with moral certainty. The testimony of a lone witness, free from signs of impropriety or falsehood, is sufficient to convict an accused even if uncorroborated.
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AQUINO v MILITARY COMMISSION 2 63 SCRA 546 ANTONIO; May 9, 1975
FACTS - After Martial Law was proclaimed, Benigno Aquino Jr. was arrested (on Sept 22, 1972), pursuant to General Order No. 2-A of the President for complicity in a conspiracy to seize political and state power in the country and to take over the Government. - On September 25, 1972, he sued for a writ of habeas corpus in which he questioned the legality of the proclamation of martial law and his arrest and detention. - SC issued a writ of habeas corpus and heard the case. SC dismissed the petition and upheld the validity of martial law and the arrest and detention of petitioner. - In the present case, petitioner challenges the jurisdiction of military commissions to try him, alone or together with others, for illegal possession of firearms, ammunition and explosives, for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and for murder. - When the proceedings before the Military Commission opened, petitioner questioned the fairness of the trial and announced that he did not wish to participate in the proceedings even as he discharged both his defense counsel of choice and his military defense counsel. - For the petitioner's assurance, a Special Committee was created to reinvestigate the charges against petitioner. Petitioner filed supplemental petition questioning the legality of the creation of the Special Committee. - On March 24, 1975, petitioner filed an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order Against Military Commission No. 2"; praying that said Commission be prohibited from proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated March 10, 1975, the same being illegal, until further orders from the Supreme Court. - On April 14, 1975, this Court also issued a restraining order against respondent Military Commission No. 2, restraining it from further proceeding with the perpetuation of testimony under its Order dated March 10, 1975 until the matter is heard thereto. - When this case was called for hearing, petitioner's counsel presented to this Court a Motion to Withdraw the petition and all other pending matters and/or incidents in connection therewith. ISSUES 1. WON the court has jurisdiction despite petitioners motion to withdraw 2. WON Military Commission No. 2 has been lawfully constituted and validly vested with jurisdiction to hear the cases against civilians, including the petitioner. 3. WON Administrative Order No. 355, creating the Special Committee strips the petitioner of his right to due process 4. WON the denial to an accused of an opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses against him in the preliminary investigation constitutes an infringement of his right to due process, 5. WON the taking of testimonies and depositions were void 6. WON petitioner may validly waive his right to be present at his trial HELD 1. YES
Criminal Procedure
less presume, that the members of the military commission, the Chief of Staff of the AFP, the Board of Review and the Secretary of National Defense, with their corresponding staff judge advocates, as reviewing authorities, through whom petitioner's hypothetical conviction would be reviewed before reaching the President, would all be insensitive to the great principles of justice and violate their respective obligations to act fairly and impartially in the premises. This assumption must be made because innocence, not wrongdoing, is to be presumed. 3. NO - It was precisely because of petitioner's complaint that he was denied the opportunity to be heard in the preliminary investigation of his charges .The President created a Special Committee to reinvestigate the charges filed against him in the military commission. It is intended that the Committee should conduct the investigation with "utmost fairness, impartiality and objectivity" ensuring to the accused his constitutional right to due process, to determine whether "there is reasonable ground to believe that the offenses charged were in fact committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof." Petitioner, however, objected by challenging in his supplemental petition before this Court the validity of Administrative Order No. 355, on the pretense that by submitting to the jurisdiction of the Special Committee he would be waiving his right to cross-examination because Presidential Decree No. 77, which applies to the proceedings of the Special Committee, has done away with cross-examination in preliminary investigation. 4. NO - The Constitution "does not require the holding of preliminary investigations. The right exists only, if and when created by statute." It is "not an essential part of due process of law." The absence thereof does not impair the validity of a criminal information or affect the jurisdiction of the court over the case. As a creation of the statute it can, therefore, be modified or amended by law. - It is also evident that there is no curtailment of the constitutional right of an accused person when he is not given the opportunity to "crossexamine the witnesses presented against him in the preliminary investigation before his arrest, this being a matter that depends on the sound discretion of the Judge or investigating officer concerned." 5. NO, the taking of the testimony or deposition was proper and valid. - Petitioner does not dispute respondents' claim that on March 14, 1975, he knew of the order allowing the taking of the deposition of prosecution witnesses on March 31, to continue through April 1 to 4, 1975. - The provisions of PD No. 328, dated October 31, 1973, for the conditional examination of prosecution witnesses before trial, is similar to the provisions of Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court. - In Elago,the court said that the order of the court authorizing the taking of the deposition of the witnesses of the prosecution and fixing the date and time thereof is the one that must be served on the accused within a reasonable time prior to that fixed for the examination of the witnesses so that the accused may be present and cross-examine the witness. - 'The opportunity of cross-examination involves two elements: "(1) Notice to the opponent that the deposition is to be taken at the time and place specified, and "(2) A sufficient interval of time to prepare for examination and to reach the place,
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"(2) The requirements as to the interval of time are now everywhere regulated by statute * * *; the rulings in regard to the sufficiency of time are thus so dependent on the interpretation of the detailed prescriptions of the local statutes that it would be impracticable to examine them here. But whether or not the time allowed was supposedly insufficient or was precisely the time required by statute, the actual attendance of the party obviate any objection upon the ground of insufficiency, because then the party has actually had that opportunity of cross-examination for the sole sake of which the notice was required." 6. YES - Under the present Constitution, trial even of a capital offense may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused. It is now provided that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified." - On the basis of the aforecited provision of the Constitution which allows trial of an accused in absentia, the issue has been raised whether or not petitioner could waive his right to be present at the perpetuation of testimony proceedings before respondent Commission. - As a general rule, subject to certain exceptions, any constitutional or statutory right may be waived if such waiver is not against public policy. The personal presence of the accused from the beginning to the end of a trial for felony, involving his life and liberty, has been considered necessary and vital to the proper conduct of his defense. The "trend of modern authority is in favor of the doctrine that a party in a criminal case may waive irregularities and rights, whether constitutional or statutory, very much the same as in a civil case." - There are, certain rights secured to the individual by the fundamental charter which may be the subject of waiver. The rights of an accused to defend himself in person and by attorney, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation, to a speedy and public trial, and to meet the witnesses face to face, as well as the right against unreasonable searches and seizures, are rights guaranteed by the Constitution. They are rights necessary either because of the requirements of due process to ensure a fair and impartial trial, or of the need of protecting the individual from the exercise of arbitrary power. And yet, there is no question that all of these rights may be waived. Considering the aforecited provisions of the Constitution and the absence of any law specifically requiring his presence at all stages of his trial, there appears, therefore, no logical reason why petitioner, although he is charged with a capital offense, should be precluded from waiving his right to be present in the proceedings for the perpetuation of testimony, since this right, like the others aforestated, was conferred upon him for his protection and benefit. - It is also important to note that under Section 7 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court (Deposition of witness for the prosecution) the "Failure or refusal on the part of the defendant to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition after notice hereinbefore provided, shall be considered a waiver" - Presidential Decree No. 328 expressly provides that the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver. "
TEEHANKEE [dissent]
- Petitioners presence at the proceedings could not be compelled by virtue of his express waiver thereof as explicitly allowed by the Constitution and by P.D. No. 328 itself. - Petitioner's submittal that he cannot be compelled to be present at the proceedings even against his will by virtue of his express waiver is meritorious. Whereas previously such right of waiver of the accused's presence in criminal proceedings was generally recognized save in capital cases (leading to the suspension of trial whenever the accused was at large) or where the accused was in custody although for a non-capital offense, the 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital cases, and provides that "after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified," thus recognizing the right of an accused to waive his presence. P.D. No. 328 under which the perpetuation proceedings are being conducted in military commissions (as the counterpart rule for similar proceedings before the regular civil courts, as provided in Rule 119, section 7 of the Rules of Court) explicitly provides that after reasonable notice to an accused to attend the perpetuation proceedings, the deposition by question and answer of the witness may proceed in the accused's absence and "the failure or refusal to attend the examination or the taking of the deposition shall be considered a waiver." Thus, an accused's right of total waiver of his presence either expressly or impliedly by unjustified failure or refusal to attend the proceedings is now explicitly recognized and he cannot be compelled to be present as against his express waiver.
BARREDO [concur]
- Petitioner has the right to waive his presence at the perpetuation proceedings before the respondent Commission.I find eminent merit in the contention of petitioner that even for identification purposes he cannot be made to be present at the trial against his will. Since under the Constitution, trial of criminal cases in the absence of the accused is allowed, when after the arraignment and in spite of due notice he fails to appear without justification, pursuant to Section 19 of the Bill of Rights or Article IV. - I can understand why an accused has to be present at the arraignment and at the reading of the sentence. In the former, it has to be known to the
Criminal Procedure
court that he is indeed the person charged and that he personally understands the accusation against him. More importantly, the plea must be entered by him personally to avoid any misconstruction or misrepresentation, innocent or otherwise. In the latter, it is essential that the accused himself, should be aware from personal knowledge what is the verdict of the court, and if it be conviction, what is the penalty to be served by him. These are matters too personal to permit delegation. At the same time, his presence makes it simpler in the public interest for the authorities to enforce execution of any adverse judgment. But I cannot see why an accused should be compelled to be present at the trial when he prefers perhaps the solitude of his cell to pray either for forgiveness, if he knows he is guilty, or, if he is innocent, for God to illumine the court so there would be unerring justice in his case. (hehehe) - My understanding is that the problem of identification of an accused may be adequately solved without violating the justified wishes of the accused to be left alone. To start with, if he is referred to by the witnesses of the prosecution by name, the court may presume that the amused who has acknowledged his true name at the arraignment is the one indicated.
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- Private respondent claims that Sec 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution grants him absolute right to absent himself from the trial of the case filed against him despite the condition of his bail bond that he "will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the Court." ISSUE WON the judge erred in granting private respondents manifestation to waive his right to be present during trial HELD YES - Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, Section 19 thereof provides: SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. - The 1973 Constitution now unqualifiedly permits trial in absentia even of capital offenses, provided that after arraignment he may be compelled to appear for the purpose of Identification by the witnesses of the prosecution, or provided he unqualifiedly admits in open court after his arraignment that he is the person named as the defendant in the case on trial. - The reason for requiring the presence of the accused, despite his waiver, is, if allowed to be absent in all the stages of the proceedings without giving the People's witnesses the opportunity to Identify him in court, he may in his defense say that he was never Identified as the person charged in the information and, therefore, is entitled to an acquittal. - Furthermore, it is possible that a witness may not know the name of the culprit but can Identify him if he sees him again, in which case the latter's presence in court is necessary. Dispositive petition granted and the assailed order of respondent judge is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE
BORJA v MENDOZA [SUPRA, PAGE 78] PEOPLE v PRESIDING JUDGE OF URDANETA 125 SCRA 269 RELOVA; October 26, 1983
NATURE Petition for certiorari FACTS - Private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. is charged with murder before the RTC of Pangasinan, in Urdaneta. He is out on a P30,000.00 bail bond which contains the following conditions: The aforenamed, as bondsmen, hereby jointly and severally undertake that the above-mentioned defendant, as principal therein will appear and answer the charge above-mentioned in whatever Court it may be tried, and will at all times hold himself amenable to the orders and processes of the Court, and if convicted, will appear for judgment, and render himself to the execution thereof; or that if he fails to perform any of these conditions will pay to the Republic of the Philippines the sum of Thirty Thousand Pesos (P30,000.00) ... - After his arraignment, Valdez, thru his counsel, manifested orally in open court that he was waiving his right to be present during the trial. The prosecuting fiscal moved that Valdez be compelled to appear and be present at the trial so that he could be identified by prosecution witnesses. Respondent judge sustained the position of private respondent who cited the majority opinion in Aquino, Jr. vs. Military Commission No. 2 and held that "he cannot be validly compelled to appear and be present during the trial of this case." - Petitioner prays that the order of respondent judge be annulled and set aside and that private respondent Rodolfo Valdez, Jr. be compelled to appear during the trial of the criminal case whenever required to do so by the trial court.
PEOPLE v SALAS (ABONG, DE LEON, ET AL) 143 SCRA 163 CRUZ; July 29, 1986
NATURE Certiorari and Mandamus FACTS - Mario Abong was originally charged with homicide in the CFI of Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated on motion of the prosecution. As a result of the reinvestigation, an amended information was filed, with no bail recommended, to which he pleaded not guilty. - While trial was in progress, the prisoner, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the city court of Cebu into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped.
Criminal Procedure
- Respondent judge Salas, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered Abong's re-arrest. But he was gone. Nonetheless, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia under certain circumstances. The respondent judge denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of the accused. ISSUE WON the judge erred in suspending the proceedings HELD YES Ratio Under Art.IV Sec.19, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution and possibly eventual conviction provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. Reasoning - The rule is found in the last sentence of Article IV, Section 19, of the 1973 Constitution: In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to he informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. - The purpose of this rule is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. - the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. Escape can never be a legal justification. - The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will Identify the accused. - the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. Dispositive the order of the trial court denying the motion for the trial in absentia of the accused is set aside.
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pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. Following the arraignment, the respondent judge, Hon. Ramon E. Nazareno, set the hearing of the case for September 18, 1973 at 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. All the acused including private respondent, were duly informed of this. - Before the scheduled date of the first hearing the private respondent escaped from his detention center and on the said date, failed to appear in court. This prompted the fiscals handling the case (the petitioners herein) to file a motion with the lower court to proceed with the hearing of the case against all the accused praying that private respondent de la Vega, Jr. be tried in absentia invoking the application of Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which provides: SEC. 19. In all criminal prosecution, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory process to the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified. - Pursuant to the above-written provision, the lower court proceeded with the trial of the case but nevertheless gave the private respondent the opportunity to take the witness stand the moment he shows up in court. After due trial, or on November 6,1973, the lower court rendered a decision dismissing the case against the five accused while holding in abeyance the proceedings against the private respondent. On November 16,1973 the petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the above-quoted dispositive portion on the ground that it will render nugatory the constitutional provision on "trial in absentia" cited earlier. However, this was denied by the lower court in an Order dated November 22, 1973. Hence, this petition. ISSUES 1. WON a court loses jurisdiction over an accused who after being arraigned, escapes from the custody of the law 2. WON trial in absentia is warranted 3. WON under Section 19, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution, an accused who has been duly tried in absentia retains his right to present evidence on his own behalf and to confront and cross-examine witnesses who testified against him HELD 1. NO - It is not disputed that the lower court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused-private respondent when he appeared during the arraignment on August 22,1973 and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. In cases criminal, jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired either by his arrest for voluntary appearance in court. Such voluntary appearance is accomplished by appearing for arraignment as what accused-private respondent did in this case. Jurisdiction once acquired is not lost upon the instance of parties but continues until the case is terminated. To capsulize the foregoing discussion, suffice it to say that where the accused appears at the arraignment and pleads not guilty to the crime charged, jurisdiction is acquired by the court over his person
PEOPLE v SALAS
Criminal Procedure
CRUZ; July 29, 1986
NATURE Special civil actions, certiorari and mandamus. FACTS - ABONG was originally charged with homicide in CFI Cebu but before he could be arraigned the case was reinvestigated. An amended information was filed as a result, with no bail recommended, to which ABONG pleaded not guilty. During the trial, ABONG, taking advantage of the first information for homicide, succeeded in deceiving the court into granting him bail and ordering his release; and so he escaped. Judge SALAS, learning later of the trickery, cancelled the illegal bail bond and ordered ABONG's re-arrest. Meanwhile, the prosecution moved that the hearing continue in accordance with the constitutional provision authorizing trial in absentia. SALAS denied the motion, however, and suspended all proceedings until the return of ABONG. Hence, the present petitions. ISSUE WON J. SALAS is correct in disallowing trial in absentia of ABONGs case HELD NO - The purpose of the constitutional rule that after arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to appear is unjustified,10 is to speed up the disposition of criminal cases, trial of which could in the past be indefinitely deferred, and many times completely abandoned, because of the defendant's escape. Now, the prisoner cannot by simply escaping thwart his continued prosecution provided only that: a) he has been arraigned; b) he has been duly notified of the trial; and c) his failure to appear is unjustified. - J. SALAS was probably still thinking of the old doctrine when he ruled that trial in absentia of the escapee could not be held because he could not be duly notified. He forgets that the fugitive is now deemed to have waived such notice precisely because he has escaped, and it is also this escape that makes his failure to appear at his trial unjustified. The right to be present at one's trial may now be waived except only at that stage where the prosecution intends to present witnesses who will identify the accused.11 Under [Sec.14(2), 1987 Const.], the defendant's escape will be considered a waiver of this right and the inability of the court to notify him of the subsequent hearings will not prevent it from continuing with his trial. He will be deemed to have received due notice. The same fact of his escape will make his failure to appear unjustified because he has, by escaping, placed himself beyond the pale, and protection, of the law. - ABONG should be prepared to bear the consequences of his escape, including forfeiture of the right to be notified of the subsequent proceedings and of the right to adduce evidence on his behalf and refute the evidence of the prosecution, not to mention a possible or even probable conviction.
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Dispositive Order of J. SALAS was SET ASIDE, and he was directed to continue hearing ABONGs case in absentia as long as he has not reappeared, until it is terminated.
PEOPLE v PRIETO (alias EDDIE VALENCIA) 80 Phil 138 TUASON: January 29, 1948
NATURE APPEAL from a judgment of the People's Court FACTS - The appellant was prosecuted in the People's Court for treason on 7 counts. After pleading not guilty he entered a plea of guilty to counts 1, 2, 3 and 7, and maintained the original plea as to counts 4, 5 and 6. The special prosecutor introduced evidence only on count 4, stating with reference to counts 5 and 6 that he did not have sufficient evidence to sustain them. - The attorney de officio manifested that he would like to be relieved from his assignment. The defendant was found guilty on count 4 as well as counts 1, 2, 3 and 7 and was sentenced to death and to pay a fine of P20,000. ISSUE WON the judgment must be reversed because of the trial court's failure to appoint "another attorney de oficio for the accused in spite of the manifestation of the attorney de oficio (who defended the accused at the trial) that he would like to be relieved for obvious reasons." HELD NO - The appellate tribunal will indulge reasonable presumptions, in favor of the legality and regularity of all the proceedings of the trial court, including the presumption that the accused was not denied the right to have counsel. (U. S. vs. Labial, 27 Phil., 82.) It is presumed that the procedure prescribed by law has been observed unless it is made to appear expressly to the contrary. (U. S. vs. Escalante, 36 Phil., 743.) The fact that the attorney appointed by the trial court to aid the defendant in his defense expressed reluctance to accept the designation because, as the present counsel assumes, he did not sympathize with the defendant's cause, is not sufficient to overcome this presumption. The statement of the counsel in the court below did no necessarily imply that he did not perform his duty to protect the interest of the accused. As a matter of fact, the present counsel "sincerely believes that the said Attorney Carin did his best, although it was not the best of a willing worker." We do not discern in the record any indication that the former counsel did not conduct the defense to the best of his ability. If Attorney Carin did his best as a sworn member of the bar, as the present attorney admits, that was enough; his sentiments did not cut any influence in the result of the case and did not imperil the rights of the appellant.
10 11
1973 Const, ART. IV, Sec.19. Now, ART. III, Sec.14(2), 1987 Const. Citing Aquino v. Mil. Commission No. 2 and People v. Presiding Judge. See p.9 of outline.
Criminal Procedure
'writ of habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error.' These principles, however, must be construed and applied so as to preserve-not destroyconstitutional safeguards of human life and liberty. The scope of inquiry in habeas corpus proceedings has been broadened-not narrowed-since the adoption of the Sixth Amendment. In such a proceeding, 'it would be clearly erroneous to confine the inquiry to the proceedings and judgment of the trial court' and the petitioned court has 'power to inquire with regard to the jurisdiction of the inferior court, either in respect to the subjectmatter or to the person, even if such inquiry involves an examination of facts outside of, but not inconsistent with, the record.' Congress has expanded the rights of a petitioner for habeas corpus and the '... effect is to substitute for the bare legal review that seems to have been the limit of judicial authority under the common-law practice, and under the act of 31 Car. II, chap. 2, a more searching investigation, in which the applicant is put upon his oath to set forth the truth of the matter respecting the causes of his detention, and the court, upon determining the actual facts, is to 'dispose of the party as law and justice require.' - 'There being no doubt of the authority of the Congress to thus liberalize the common-law procedure on habeas corpus in order to safeguard the liberty of all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States against infringement through any violation of the Constitution or a law or treaty established thereunder, it results that under the sections cited a prisoner in custody pursuant to the final judgment of a state court of criminal jurisdiction may have a judicial inquiry in a court of the United States into the very truth and substance of the causes of his detention, although it may become necessary to look behind and beyond the record of his conviction to a sufficient extent to test the jurisdiction of the state court to proceed to judgment against him. ... '... it is open to the courts of the United States, upon an application for a writ of habeas corpus, to look beyond forms and inquiry into the very substance of the matter ....' - If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release by habeas corpus. A judge of the United States-to whom a petition for habeas corpus is addressed-should be alert to examine 'the facts for himself when if true as alleged they make the trial absolutely void.' - It must be remembered, however, that a judgment cannot be lightly set aside by collateral attack, even on habeas corpus. When collaterally attacked, the judgment of a court carries with it a presumption of regularity. Where a defendant, without counsel, acquiesces in a trial resulting in his conviction and later seeks release by the extraordinary remedy of habeas corpus, the burden of proof rests upon him to establish that he did not competently and intelligently waive his constitutional right to assistance of Counsel. If in a habeas corpus hearing, he does meet this burden and convinces the court by a preponderance of evidence that he neither had counsel nor properly waived his constitutional right to counsel, it is the duty of the court to grant the writ. Dispositive The cause is reversed and remanded to the District Court for determination whether petitioner did not competently and intelligently waive his right to counsel. If court finds for petitioner the decision of the district court convicting petitioner must be declared void.
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85 PHIL 752 MORAN; March 22, 1950
FACTS - Appellant Frisco Holgado was charged in the court of First Instance of Romblon with slight illegal detention because according to the information, being a private person, he did "feloniously and without justifiable motive, kidnap and detain one Artemia Fabreag in the house of Antero Holgado for about eight hours thereby depriving said Artemia Fabreag of her personal liberty." - During the trial, he plead guilty as he was without a lawyer, and that a certain Numeriano Ocampo told Holgado to plead guilty. The Court reserved the sentence for a two days despite the fiscals assurances that the certain Numeriano Ocampo has been investigated and found without evidence to link him to the crime - It must be noticed that in the caption of the case as it appears in the judgment above quoted, the offense charged is named SLIGHT ILLEGAL DETENTION while in the body of the judgment if is said that the accused "stands charged with the crime of kidnapping and serious illegal detention." In the formation filed by the provincial fiscal it is said that he "accuses Frisco Holgado of the crime of slight illegal detention." The facts alleged in said information are not clear as to whether the offense is named therein or capital offense of "kidnapping and serious illegal detention" as found by the trial judge in his judgment. Since the accusedappellant pleaded guilty and no evidence appears to have been presented by either party, the trial judge must have deduced the capital offense from the facts pleaded in the information. ISSUE WON the conviction of the lower court is valid HELD NO. It is invalid. - Under the circumstances, particularly the qualified plea given by the accused who was unaided by counsel, it was not prudent, to say the least, for the trial court to render such a serious judgment finding the accused guilty of a capital offense, and imposing upon him such a heavy penalty as ten years and one day of prision mayor to twenty years, without absolute any evidence to determine and clarify the true facts of the case. - rules of Court, Rule 112, section 3, that If the defendant appears without attorney, he must be informed by the court that it is his right to have attorney being arraigned., and must be asked if he desires the aid of attorney, the Court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him. A reasonable time must be allowed for procuring attorney. - the court has four important duties to comply with: 1 It must inform the defendant that it is his right to have attorney before being arraigned; 2 After giving him such information the court must ask him if he desires the aid of an attorney; 3 If he desires and is unable to employ attorney, the court must assign attorney de oficio to defend him; and 4 If the accused desires to procure an attorney of his own the court must grant him a reasonable time therefor. - IN THE CASE, Not one of these duties had been complied with by the trial court. The record discloses that said court did not inform the accused of his right to have an attorney nor did it ask him if he desired the aid of
PEOPLE v HOLGADO
Criminal Procedure
NATURE Appeal from judgment of CFI Manila FACTS - Pursuant to information regarding the illegal sale of prohibited drugs by Nicandro, the WPD conducted surveillance and organized an entrapment with the confidential informant acting as the buyer of marijuana. With marked money, the informant asked to buy marijuana from Nicandro, and upon delivery of 4 sticks of marijuana cigarettes, the police nabbed Nicandro. The marked bills were recovered from her pockets, as well as marijuana flowering top. - Allegedly, upon being investigated and after having been duly apprised of her constitutional rights, Nicandro orally admitted having sold the marijuana, but refused to reduce her confession to writing. The prosecution relied principally on the testimony of Patrolman Joves, one of the officers who conducted the entrapment. His testimony said when we saw the accused handed the 4 sticks of suspected marijuana cigarettes to our confidential informant and after a prearranged signal was given by the informant that the accused had already sold her the marijuana, we immediately nabbed said suspect and at the same time we identified ourselves as police officers. - When asked how he conducted the investigation, Pat. Joves testified that the first thing I did was I informed the accused of her constitutional rights, then I questioned her about the marijuana that were confiscated xxx and she verbally admitted that she sold the 4 sticks and possessed and owned the other marijuana leaves. CFI convicted her, relying mostly on Nicandros confession as stated in the Joves testimony. She appealed. ISSUES 1. WON court erred in giving probative value to the testimony of the officer 2. WON rights of accused (vs self-incrimination and to confront witness vs her) were violated, thus any evidence obtained therefrom are inadmissible HELD 1. YES Ratio The prosecution evidence leaves much to be desired. It is at best uncertain whether any prosecution witness really saw the alleged sale of marijuana. Reasoning - The court found the testimony of Pat. Joves unreliable as it appears that he himself was unsure of what he saw, first saying that he saw the marijuana being sold openly, but when the improbability of illegal drugs being sold openly was pointed out, he qualified his story by saying that the sale took place secretly. -it is probable that Joves did not really see either the alleged delivery of marijuana or the supposed payment therefor. With his testimony seriously placed in doubt, there is not much left of the prosecution evidence. 2. YES Ratio the right of a person under interrogation to be informed implies a correlative obligation on the part of the investigator to explain, and contemplates an effective communication that results in understanding what is conveyed. Short of this, there is a denial of the right, as it cannot truly be said that the person has been informed of his rights. Reasoning
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- reliance on oral admission is assailed as violative of Sec20, Art.IV, 1973 Consti (No person shall be compelled to be a witness vs himself. Any person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be in. formed of each right. No force, violation, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence) .
- above provision is an expanded version of the right vs self-incrimination, formally incorporating the doctrine in Miranda v Arizona: the prosecution may not use statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial interrogation of the defendant unless it demonstrates the use of procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege against selfincrimination. xxx As for the procedural safeguards to be employed, unless other fully effective means are devised to inform accused persons of their right of silence and to assure a continuous opportunity to exercise it, the ff measures are required. Prior to any questioning, the person must be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of an atty, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive those rights, provided such is made voluntarily, knowingly & intelligently. If, however, he indicates in any manner & at any stage of the process that he wishes to consult with an atty before speaking, there can be no questioning. Likewise, if the individual is alone & indicates in any manner that he does not wish to be interrogated, the police may not question him. The mere fact that he may have answered some questions or volunteered some statements on his own does not deprive him of the right to refrain from answering any further inquiries until he has consulted with an attorney & thereafter consents to be questioned. (the court points out that the Miranda doctrine rests on the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be compelled to be a witness vs himself) - since right to be informed implies comprehension, degree of explanation required will necessary vary, depending upon the education, intelligence & other relevant personal circumstances of the person under investigation. A simpler & more lucid explanation is needed where the subject is unlettered - Like other constitutional rights, the right vs self-incrimination, including the right of a person under investigation to remain silent & to counsel, and to be informed of such right, may be waived. To be valid, however, a waiver must not only be voluntary; it must be made knowingly & intelligently, which presupposes an awareness or understanding of what is being waived. It stands to reason that where the right has not been adequately explained and there are serious doubts as to whether the person interrogated knew and understood his relevant constitutional rights when he answered the questions, it is idle to talk of waiver of rights. - in this case, Joves did not say what specific rights he mentioned to Nicandro, neither did he state the manner he advised her of her rights so as to make her understand them. This is particularly impt because Nicandro was illiterate and cant be expected to be able to grasp the significance of her rights merely by hearing an abstract statement thereof. - As it is the obligation of the investigator to inform a person under investigation of his rights, so is it the duty of the prosecution to affirmatively establish compliance by the investigator with his said obligation. Absent such affirmative showing, admission or confession made by a person under investigation cannot be admitted in evidence. - Miranda v Arizona: we will not presume that defendant has been effectively apprised of his rights and that his privilege vs self incrimination has been adequately safeguarded on a record that doesnt show that any
BATAAN SHIPYARD & ENGINEERING CO INC (BASECO) v PCGG 150 SCRA 181 NARVASA; May 27, 1987
NATURE SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Presidential Commission on Good Government FACTS - Challenged in this special civil action of certiorari and prohibition by a private corporation known as the Bataan Shipyard and Engineering Co., Inc. are: (1) Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2, promulgated by President Aquino on February 28, 1986 and March 12, 1986 (2) the sequestration, takeover, and other orders issued, and acts done, in accordance with said executive orders by the Presidential Commission on Good Government and/or its Commissioners and agents, affecting said corporation. - BASECO prays that this Court 1) declare unconstitutional and void Executive Orders Numbered 1 and 2; 2) annul the sequestration order dated April 14, 1986, and all other orders subsequently issued and acts done on the basis thereof, inclusive of the takeover order of July 14, 1986 and the termination of the services of the BASECO executives. ISSUES 1. WON Executive No s 1, 2 and 14 are unconstitutional 2. WON right against self-incrimination can be invoked by BASECO HELD 1. NO Executive Order No. 1 > stresses the "urgent need to recover all ill-gotten wealth," and postulates that "vast resources of the government have been amassed by former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, and close associates both here and abroad." Upon these premises, the Presidential Commission on Good Government was created, "charged with the task of assisting the President in regard to (certain specified) matters, - among which was precisely > In relation to the takeover or sequestration that it was authorized to undertake in the fulfillment of its mission, the PCGG was granted "power and authority" to do the following particular acts, to wit: 1. "To sequester or place or cause to be placed under its control or possession any building or office wherein any ill-gotten wealth or properties may be found, and any records pertaining thereto, in order to prevent their destruction, concealment or disappearance which would frustrate or hamper the investigation or otherwise prevent the Commission from accomplishing its task.
Criminal Procedure
2. "To provisionally take over in the public interest or to prevent the disposal or dissipation, business enterprises and properties taken over by the government of the Marcos Administration or by entities or persons close to former President Marcos, until the transactions leading to such acquisition by the latter can be disposed of by the appropriate authorities." 3. "To enjoin or restrain any actual or threatened commission of acts by any person or entity that may render moot and academic, or frustrate or otherwise make ineffectual the efforts of the Commission to carry out its task under this order. " > So that it might ascertain the facts germane to its objectives, it was granted power to conduct investigations, require submission of evidence by subpoenae ad testification and duces tecum; administer oaths; punish for contempt. It was given power also to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the purposes of (its creation). " Executive Order No. 2 > gives additional and more specific data and directions respecting "the recovery of ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime." It declares that: 1) "* * the Government of the Philippines is in possession of evidence showing that there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to former Ferdinand E. Marcos, and/or his wife Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the government of the Philippines or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment and causing grave damage and prejudice to the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines; and 2) " * said assets and properties are in the form of bank accounts, deposits, trust accounts, shares of stocks, buildings, shopping centers, condominiums, mansions, residences, estates, and other kinds of real and personal properties in the Philippines and in various countries of the world." Upon these premises, the President 1) froze "all assets and properties in the Philippines in which former President Marcos and/or his wife, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees have any interest or participation" 2) prohibited former President Ferdinand Marcos and/or his wife * *, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents, or nominees from transferring, conveying, encumbering, concealing or dissipating said assets or properties in the Philippines and abroad 3) prohibited "any person from transferring conveying, encumbering or otherwise depleting or concealing such assets and properties or from assisting or taking part in their transfer, encumbrance. concealment or dissipation under pain of such penalties as are prescribed by law;" and 4) required "all persons in the Philippines holding such assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure of the same to the Commission on Good Government within thirty (30) days from publication of * (the) Executive Order, " Executive Order No. 14
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> PCGG is empowered, "with the assistance of the Office of the Solicitor General and other government agencies, * * to file and prosecute all cases investigated by it * * as may be warranted by its findings.'"34 All such cases, whether civil or criminal, are to be filed "with the Sandiganbayan, which shall have exclusive and original jurisdiction thereof." > "(c)ivil suits for restitution, reparation of damages, or indemnification for consequential damages, forfeiture proceedings provided for under Republic Act No. 1379, or any other civil actions under the Civil Code or other existing laws, in connection with * * (said Executive Orders Numbered I and 2) may be filed separately from and proceed independently of any criminal proceedings and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence;" and that, moreover, the "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be strictly applied to* *(said) civil cases." 2. NO, there is No Violation of Right against Self-Incrimination Ratio It is elementary that the right against self-incrimination has no application to juridical persons. Reasoning - BASECO contends that its right against self-incrimination and unreasonable searches and seizures had been transgressed by the Order of April 18, 1986 which required it "to produce corporate records from 1973 to 1986 under pain of contempt of the Commission if it fails to do so." The order was issued upon the authority of Section 3 (e) of Executive Order No. 1, treating of the PCGG's power to "issue subpoenas requiring the production of such books, papers,contracts, records, statements of accounts and other documents as may be material to the investigation conducted by the Commission," and paragraph (3), Executive Order No. 2 dealing with its power to "(r)equire all persons in the Philippines holding * *(alleged "ill-gotten") assets or properties, whether located in the Philippines or abroad, in their names as nominees, agents or trustees, to make full disclosure of the same **. " - While an individual may lawfully refuse to answer incriminating questions unless protected by an immunity statute, it does not follow that a corporation, vested with special privileges and franchises, may refuse to show its hand when charged with an abuse of such privileges - Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling > corporations are not entitled to all of the constitutional protections which private individuals have. They are not at all within the privilege against self-incriminatior, although this court more than once has said that the privilege runs very closely with the 4th Amendment's Search and Seizure provisions. It is also settled that an officer of the company cannot refuse to produce its records in its possession, upon the plea that they will either incriminate him or may incriminate it. - Wilson v. United States > The corporation is a creature of the state. It is presumed to be incorporated for the benefit of the public. It received certain special privileges and franchises, and holds them subject to the laws of the state and the limitations of its charter. Its powers are limited by law. It can make no contract not authorized by its charter. Its rights to act as a corporation are only preserved to it so long as it obeys the laws of its creation. There is a reserve right in the legislature to investigate its contracts and find out whether it has exceeded its powers. It would be a strange anomaly to hold that a state, having chartered a corporation to make use of certain franchises, could not, in the exercise of sovereignty, inquire how these franchises had been employed, and whether they had been abused, and
Criminal Procedure
WON the CFI judge erred in allowing the just the submission of affidavits in lieu of oral testimony HELD YES - Sections 1 and 2, Rule 132 12 of the rules of Court clearly require that the testimony of a witness shall be given orally in open court. Reasoning - The main and essential purpose of the rule is to secure for the adverse party the opportunity to cross-examine the witness presented. The opponent demands confrontation for the purpose of cross examination which cannot be had except by the direct and personal putting of questions and obtaining immediate answers. - There is also the advantage obtained in the personal appearance of the witness in open court as it affords the judge to assess the weight and value that can be given to any of the testimony based on his perception of the witness countenance, manner, and expression. In deed, the great weight given the findings of fact of the trial judge in the appellate court is based precisely upon the judge having had the opportunity and the assumption that he took advantage of it to ascertain the credibility of the witness. - Rules governing the examination of witnesses are intended to protect the rights of the litigants and to secure orderly dispatch of the business of the courts. Hence only questions directed to the eliciting of testimony which, under the general rules of evidence, is relevant to and competent to prove, the issues of the case, may be propounded to the witness. Dispositive Petition granted. The order of the judge is set aside.
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be submitted to the judge for his own examination as to materiality and relevance.
Criminal Procedure
- Violation of Republic Act No. 1700, or subversion, is a crime distinct from that of actual rebellion. - The crime of rebellion is committed by rising publicly and taking up arms against the Government for any of the purposes specified in Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code; while the Anti-Subversion Act punishes affiliation or membership in a subversive organization as defined therein. In rebellion, there must be a public uprising and the taking of arms against the Government; whereas, in subversion, mere membership in a subversive association is sufficient, and the taking up of arms by a member of a subversive organization against the Government is but a circumstance which raises the penalty to be imposed upon the offender. - In the rebellion case, the appellant and several others were charged and convicted of rebellion for having risen publicly and taken up arms against the Government for the purpose of removing the allegiance of the Republic of the Philippines or its laws, the territory of the Philippines, and in furtherance thereof, engaged in combat against the forces of the Government, destroyed property, and committed serious violence during the period from May 28, 1946 to June 19, 1957. - The accused is prosecuted under RA 1700 for having remained a high ranking member of the CPP and its military arm, the HMB, from January, 1946 to June 21, 1960, without having renounced his membership in said organizations; and, being a member or officer of said subversive association, has taken up arms against the Government. - Although the information charges the appellant with having taken up arms against the Government, the same is not specific as to the period covered by it. But, since the appellant is prosecuted for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 it is deducible that the period covered is that from June 20, 1957, when the Act took effect, up to June 21, 1960, when the appellant was captured. Inasmuch as the rebellion case covered the period up to June 19, 1957 and the period covered in the instant case is from June 20, 1957 to June 21, 1960, the claim of having been put twice in jeopardy for the same act cannot be sustained. 4. NO - The records show that he had been confined at Fort Bonifacio (then known as Fort William Mckinley), Makati, Rizal, since November 20, 1962 and continued to be detained therein during the continuation of the trial, up to its termination. Dispositive UPON THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from should be, as it is, hereby affirmed, with costs.
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its decision in all the four cases finding Talino, Basilio, Macadangdang Ulat and Renato Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged while absolving the other defendants for insufficient evidence. This decision is now challenged by Talino on the ground that it violates his right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution. - In its decision, the court made the ff remarks: The peculiarity of the trial of these cases is the fact that We allowed, upon their petition, separate trials for the accused Basilio and Talino and Macadangdang. This being the case, We can only consider, in deciding these cases as against them, the evidence for the, prosecution as wen as their own evidence. Evidence offered by the other accused can not be taken up. It would really have been simpler had there been no separate trial because the accused Pio Ulat said so many incriminatory things against the other accused when he took the stand in his own defense. But because Basilio, Talino and Macadangdang were granted separate trials and they did not cross examine Ulat because, as a matter of fact, they were not even required to be present when the other accused were presenting their defenses, the latter's testimonies can not now be considered against said three accused. - The grant of a separate trial rests in the sound discretion of the court and is not a matter of right to the accused, especially where, as in this case, it is sought after the presentation of the evidence of the prosecution. The rule in every case is that the trial court should exercise the utmost circumspection in granting a motion for separate trial, allowing the same only after a thorough study of the claimed justification therefor, if only to avoid the serious difficulties that may arise, such as the one encountered and regretted by the respondent court, in according the accused the right of confrontation. - The right of confrontation is one of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the person facing criminal prosecution who should know, in fairness, who his accusers are and must be given a chance to cross-examine them on their charges. No accusation is permitted to be made against his back or in his absence nor is any derogatory information accepted if it is made anonymously, as in poison pen letters sent by persons who cannot stand by their libels and must shroud their spite in secrecy. In United States v. Javier confrontation is essential because cross-examination is essential. A second reason for the prohibition is that a tribunal may have before it the deportment and appearance of the witness while testifying. ISSUE WON the decision of the court violates Talinos right of confrontation as guaranteed by the Constitution HELD NO - The court have carefully studied the decision under challenge and find that the respondent court did not consider the testimony given by Ulat in convicting Talino. The part of that decision finding Talino guilty made no mention of Ulat at all but confined itself to the petitioner's own acts in approving the questioned vouchers as proof of his complicity in the plot to swindle the government. Talino makes much of the statement in the Comment that the petitioner's guilt could be deduced "from the evidence for the prosecution and from the testimony of Pio Ulat," but that was not
Criminal Procedure
would get the money to pay for his debt. After being introduced to Bostick, they proceeded to Irisan to get the bag Emateo would five the American as gift. Emateo asked Bagano to get the bag because Emateo did not want to get wet. On the way back to Baguio, the NBI team came out and made the arrests. - He claims that the court erred: in finding that he agreed to sell 10kgs of marijuana when he had no knowledge of the alleged sale. In not holding as hearsay the alleged conversation between Bolstick and the appellant when Emateo, the informant who interpreted the conversation was never presented to testify In appreciating the bag and not the sack against the appellant that which Emateo owned and deposited in the quarter of the appellant at irisan earlier the same day of the alleged buy-bust operation. In not appreciating the defense that it was Emateo who owns the Marijuana in question ISSUE WON the Bolstick testimonies were hearsay HELD YES - From Bolsticks testimonies as principal witness for the prosecution, such were mere translations and/or interpretations of what Bagano supposedly said in the dialect and interpreted by Emateo. The only exception is the testimony on what Bolstick saw. - Where a witness is offered to testify to statements of another person, spoken in a language not understood by him, but translated to his by an interpreter, such witness is not qualified, because he does not speak from personal knowledge. All that he can know as to the testimony which is in fact given in such a case is from the interpretation thereof which is given by another person. - The prosecution should have presented Emateo himself to testify on what actually transpired. The lower court ignored the right of the accused to meet the witness face to face. - Prosecution revealed not to know anything about the informants background. Although there is a policy of non-disclosure of an informants identity, it cannot be invoked in this case. The informants failure to take the witness to stand to confirm the correctness of his interpretations not only rendered the testimonies as hearsay and inadmissible, but also deprived the appellant of his right to cross-examine him. - Non-presentation of an informer is a privilege that has its own inherent limitation. Where in the disclosure of an informers identity is relevant and helpful to the defense of the accused, or is essential to the proper disposition of the case, the privilege must give way. - Although the identity of the informer was disclosed, prosecution failed to present him as witness on the assertion that his whereabouts are unknown. No subpoena has been issued by the prosecution to Emateo, the presumption that evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced (Sec 5(e), Rule 131) arises. - The appellants claim that the ownership of the sack of marijuana was previously deposited by Emateo was never contradicted by prosecution. Bare assertion of Baganos delivery of the bag does not, by itself indicate ownership nor even illegal possession absent any other evidence.
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- Apellants signature appearing on the sack and individual bundles containing marijuana do not signify, much less evidence, guilt for they are mere procedural steps undertaken after arrest. Furthermore, it appearing that appellant was not informed of his right to counsel at the time he affixed his signature, the same has been obtained in violation of his right as a person under custodial investigation for the commission of an offense and is therefore inadmissible. - It is a cardinal rule that in order to merit conviction, the prosecution must rely on the strength of its own evidence and not on the weakness of evidence presented by the defense. An accused must always be deemed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable doubt. In the instant case, the prosecution failed to so establish the guilt of herein appellant. Dispositive challenged judgment is REVERSED and appellant is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground of reasonable doubt.
Criminal Procedure
- It is important now to inquire whether the rights mentioned apply to persons under preliminary investigation or already charged in court for a crime. It is evident that a defendant under preliminary investigation is not under custodial interrogation, and there is thus no occasion to speak of such rights under custodial interrogation; however, the accused still possesses the right against self-incrimination. - Under the Rules of Court, the accused occupies a different tier of protection from an ordinary witness and is entitled, among others: (1) not be a witness against himself (2) to testify as a witness on his own behalf; but if he offers himself as a witness, he may be cross-examined as any other witness; his neglect of refusal to be a witness shall not in any manner prejudice or be used against him. Thus, unlike an ordinary witness, the accused may refuse to take the witness stand, be sworn, or answer any question altogether. The accused, if he chooses to testify, may refuse to answer only questions which could incriminate him of a crime for which he isnt charged. - It appears that respondent Judge mistakenly applied the rights set forth in Sec 20 Art. IV of the 1973 Constitution. It is clear from the undisputed facts that Ramos was not in any sense under custodial interrogation, and thus his constitutional rights in relation thereto dont apply. Also, Ramos had voluntary answered the questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative investigation and agreed that the proceedings be recorded and filed as exhibits A and K, spontaneously offering to compromise his liability. Said exhibits may not be excluded as the so-called Miranda rights had not been accorded to Ramos. Dispositive the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of respondent Judge, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence exhibits A and K
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period of several months, the accused were at all times represented by their respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only 1 day (April 20) when Atty. Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. But at the insistence of Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page memorandum in support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of petitioner Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to or pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the merits of the cases. - The promulgation of judgment scheduled on Sep 23, 1968 was postponed to Sep 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Consengco, , and again to Oct 1, 1968. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings. - However, on October 1, 1968, Calo and Carbonnel, thru their counsel, filed with the CFI of Manila a petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and mandatory injunction alleging jurisdictional defects. Respondent Judge Felix Domingo issued a restraining order thus causing the deferment of the promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated, adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial, noting 'that the trial of these cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge Garcia, "to desist from reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered already in the criminal cases pending in his Court, until further orders of this Court. - The MR was denied. Hence, on January 28, 1969, the matter was elevated to the SC by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. ISSUE WON respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in ruling that the holding of the trial of the accused inside the chambers of petitioner ,city court Judge Gregorio Garcia, as violative of the constitutional right to public trial HELD YES - The procedure had been agreed to beforehand by accused. The hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection on their part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy. - The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of this petition explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to which an accused was
Criminal Procedure
by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge that a judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just because, as did happen here, it was in the airconditioned chambers of a city court judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place. Dispositive Writ of certiorari is granted.
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ISSUE WON the right of the petitioners to a speedy trial has been accorded HELD NO Ratio. The constitutional right to a speedy trial means one free from vexatious, capricious and oppressive delays [Acebedo v. Sarmiento, Conde v. Rivera]. Thus, if the person accused were innocent, he may within the shortest time possible be spared from anxiety and apprehension arising from a prosecution, and if culpable, he will not be kept long in suspense as to the fate in store for him, within a period of course compatible with his opportunity to present any valid defense. -"The Government should be the last to set an example of delay and oppression in the administration of justice and it is the moral and legal obligation of this court to see that the criminal proceedings against the accused come to an end and that they be immediately discharged from the custody of the law." [People v. Castaeda] - An accused person is entitled to a trial at the earliest opportunity. . . . He cannot be oppressed by delaying the commencement of trial for an unreasonable length of time. If the proceedings pending trial are deferred, the trial itself is necessarily delayed. xxx The Constitution does not say that the right to a speedy trial may be availed of only where the prosecution for crime is commenced and undertaken by the fiscal. It does not exclude from its operation cases commenced by private individuals. Where once a person is prosecuted criminally, he is entitled to a speedy trial, irrespective of the nature of the offense or the manner in which it is authorized to be commenced. [Mercado v. Santos] - remedies available to the accused: The remedy in the event of a nonobservance of this right is by habeas corpus if the accused were restrained of his liberty, or by certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus for the final dismissal of the case. [Acebedo v. Sarmiento] Reasoning - In the absence of any valid decision, the stage of trial has not been completed. Thus, when they moved to dismiss in the CA, they could contend that they had not been accorded their right to be tried as promptly as circumstances permit. It was not the pendency in the Court of Appeals of their cases that should be deemed material. It is at times unavoidable that appellate tribunals cannot, even with due diligence, put an end to suits elevated to them. What is decisive is that with the setting aside of the previous decision in the resolution of August 5, 1959, petitioners could validly premise their plea for dismissal on this constitutional safeguard. *the procedural issue on the CA not being made the party respondent, Court considered the substantial issues over this technicality. Dispositive petition for certiorari is granted, and the order of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR No. 16641-R entitled, People v. Francisco Flores, et al., of September 28, 1965 denying the motion to dismiss as well as its order of January 8, 1966 denying the motion for reconsideration, and the order of January 28, 1966 denying the second motion for reconsideration are hereby set aside, nullified, and considered of no force and effect. The criminal case against petitioners in the aforesaid CA-GR No. 16641-R are ordered dismissed.
Criminal Procedure
- The spate of publicity in this case before us did not focus on the guilt of the petitioners but rather on the responsibility of the Government for what was claimed to be a "massacre" of Muslim trainees. If there was a "trial by newspaper" at all, it was not of the petitioners but of the Government. Absent here is a showing of failure of the court-martial to protect the accused from massive publicity encouraged by those connected with the conduct of the trial either by a failure to control the release of information or to remove the trial to another venue or to postpone it until the deluge of prejudicial publicity shall have subsided. Indeed we cannot say that the trial of the petitioners was being held under circumstances which did not permit the observance of those imperative decencies of procedure which have come to be identified with due process. - Even granting the existence of "massive" and "prejudicial" publicity, since the petitioners here do not contend that the respondents have been unduly influenced but simply that they might be by the "barrage" of publicity. 2. YES Ratio Each of the 23 petitioners (accused before the general courtmartial) is entitled to one peremptory challenge, irrespective of the number of specifications and/or charges and regardless of whether they are tried jointly or in common. The right to challenge is in quintessence the right to reject, not to select. If from the officers who remain an impartial military court is obtained, the constitutional right of the accused to a fair trial is maintained. Reasoning - It is the submission of the petitioners that "for every charge, each side may exercise one peremptory challenge," and therefore because there are eleven charges they are entitled to eleven separate peremptory challenges. The respondents argue that although there are actually a total of eleven specifications against the petitioners, three of these should be considered as merged with two other specifications, "since in fact they allege the same offenses committed in conspiracy, thus leaving a balance of eight specifications." The general court-martial thereof takes the position that all the 23 petitioners are entitled to a total of only eight peremptory challenges. (a) A peremptory challenge is afforded to an accused who, whether rightly or wrongly, honestly feels that the member of the court peremptorily challenged by him cannot sit in judgment over him, impartially. Every accused person is entitled to a fair trial. It is not enough that objectively the members of the court may be fair and impartial. It is likewise necessary that subjectively the accused must feel that he is being tried by a fair and impartial body of officers. Because the petitioners may entertain grave doubts as to the fairness or impartiality of distinct, separate and different individual members of the court-martial, it follows necessarily that each of the accused is entitled to one peremptory challenge. (b) Article of War 18 does not distinguish between common trials and joint trials, nor does it make the nature or number of specifications and/or charges a determinant. (c) A perceptive analysis of the companion articles convinces us that the word, "each side," as used in the said article in reference to the defense, should be construed to mean each accused person. Dispositive Subject to our pronouncement that each of the 23 petitioners is entitled to one separate peremptory challenge, the present petition is DENIED. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby lifted.
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PEOPLE v ORSAL 113 SCRA 226 PER CURIAM; March 29, 1982
NATURE Automatic review FACTS - Vicente Orsal is one of four accused in four separate cases filed in the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga City - The three (3) other accused are Ramon Gutierrez, Generoso Abapo and Romeo Flores, but the two (2) last named accused having gone at large, only appellant Vicente Orsal and Ramon Gutierrez stood trial - The cases stemmed from the ff acts: *On April 13, 1974 appellant, together with Generoso Abapo, Ramon Gutierrez and Romeo Flores, killed Crisanto Bejic, his wife Eduarda, as well as his grandchildren Atanacia Legazpi and Roberto Bejic, and burned his house *On April 14, 1974, the same accused ransacked the house of Jesus Limen, taking his shoes and clothes, one paltik revolver, two paltik shotguns and a hand grenade, killed Jesus Limen, and burned his house - The court found Orsal and Gutierrez guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes, attended by two (2) aggravating circumstances, namely, that the crimes were committed at nighttime and by a band, without any mitigating circumstances to offset the same, and sentenced them accordingly: (1) Criminal Case No. 471 (1183) for Arson-penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as the minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify Francisco Limen the amount of P8,000.00, and to pay of the costs of this suit (2) Criminal Case No. 472 (1184) for Arson- penalty of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as the minimum to Seventeen (17) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify Francisco Limen the amount of P8,000.00, and to pay of the costs of this suit (3) Criminal Case No. 473 (1185) for Robbery in Band with Multiple Homicide- four separate and distinct imprisonment's of Ten (10) years and One (1) day of Prision Mayor as the minimum to Seventeen (17) years and Five (5) months of Reclusion Temporal as the maximum, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Cristino Bejic, Eduarda Bejic, Roberto Bejic and Atanasia Legazpi the total amount of P48,000.00 and to pay of the costs of this suit in each of these four cases (4) Criminal Case No. 432 (1157) for Robbery in Band with HomicideSupreme penalty of 'DEATH', to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Jesus Limen the amount of P12,000.00, and to pay one fourth of the costs in each of these four cases - In the case of Gutierrez, owing to the fact that he is a youthful offender, as he is only 18 years old, the Court ordered his commitment to the Department of Social Services and Development, Region IX, Zamboanga City - The sentence of death having been imposed in Criminal Case No. 432 (1157), which was heard jointly with the other three (3) cases, the single decision rendered for all the four (4) cases is before the SC for automatic review.
Criminal Procedure
contradictions and inconsistencies were on minor and inconsequential details that would not in any way affect Ramon's credibility. - As earlier stated, no sufficient motive was shown why the two (2) eyewitnesses, Antonio Bejic and Ramon Jimenez, would perjure themselves in pointing to appellant as one of the perpetrators of very grave and heinous crimes. That appellant's mother may have accused Ramon Jimenez of theft would, therefore, not serve as motive to induce the two (2) aforenamed witnesses to give the testimony that named and pointed to not only appellant but three (3) other persons including Ramon Gutierrez who stood trial with appellant, as the malefactors. Even as to Ramon Jimenez alone, the alleged motive is assuredly not enough for him to charge falsely appellant, who is his cousin, with such grievous offenses as the killing of four (4) persons, burning down of two (2) houses and stealing of valuable personal belongings. - From how appellant's identity as one of the perpetrators of the four (4) crimes just mentioned has been established, his defense of alibi is futile. The barrio captain of New Sagay,Jesus Agabon, with whom appellant claimed to be with when the crimes were being committed, was presented to corroborate appellant's alibi by testifying that in accordance with the regulation in his place, he registered appellant's name in a notebook as a transient therein. His testimony became worthless when despite sufficient opportunity given him to produce the notebook in Court, by postponing the hearing not just once but twice, the defense witness never again appeared in Court. If his salvation hanged on the credibility of this witness, appellant should have done everything and resorted to even the coercive process of the Court to make said witness go to Court and present the desired document, or explain his inability to do so. Dispositive Decision affirmed in toto.
PEOPLE v ANG GIOC 73 PHIL 336 ABAD SANTOS; October 31, 1941
NATURE Petition for a writ of certiorari FACTS - Ang Gioc, together with Sio Go, Gang Kan, Kee Ya and Chua Chui, was charged with the crime of frustrated murder in the Court of First Instance of Manila. He was released on bail. After a protracted trial, which lasted several months, Ang Gioc and one of his co-accused, Sio Go, were found guilty and sentenced to twelve years and one day of cadena temporal. Ang Gioc and his sureties were duly notified to appear before the court for the reading of the sentence, but the former failed to appear and thereupon the trial judge ordered his arrest and the confiscation of the bond furnished for his temporary release. - All attempts to arrest him proved futile. He was, however, finally arrested after nearly thirteen years from the date fixed for the reading of the sentence. He was subsequently brought before the court and the sentence was read to him, from which he appealed to the Court of Appeals where, against the objection of the Solicitor General, he was allowed to file a bond for his temporary release. - In perfecting the record on appeal it was found that the stenographic notes taken during the trial were not transcribed and that the two stenographers who took the notes were already dead. The matter was referred to several stenographers who stated that they could not transcribe the notes because the deceased had used systems known only to themselves. In this situation, Ang Gioc petitioned the Court of Appeals to remand the cause to the court below for a new trial. - CA remanded for new trial ISSUE WON the CA acquired jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him HELD NO - The accused has rights, one of which is the right of appeal; but this is a purely statutory, not a constitutional, right and this is not one of those fundamental rights which cannot be waived. This right is granted solely for the benefit of the accused. He may avail of it or not, as he pleases. He may waive it either expressly or by implication. When the accused flees after the case has been submitted to the court for decision, he will be deemed to have waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. Such was the situation with reference to the the respondent Ang Gioc. He was duly notified to appear before the trial court for the reading of the sentence, but failed to do so; and when an order was issued for his arrest, the warrant could not be served on him because he could not be found. Whether or not he escaped to China is immaterial for our present purpose. The fact remains that he succeeded in evading arrest for nearly thirteen years. The record shows that upon his failure to
PEOPLE v JARDIN 124 SCRA 167 GUTIERREZ JR; August 17, 1983
NATURE Petition for certiorari on decision of CFI Quezon dismissing the criminal cases against accused Demetrio Jardin because his constitutional right to speedy trial was allegedly violated. FACTS - The criminal prosecutions originated from a letter-complaint of the Provincial Auditor of Quezon requesting the Provincial Fiscal to file the necessary criminal action under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code against Demetrio Jardin for malversation of public funds thru falsification of public documents on six counts. (1967) - {This case is full of delaying tactics} - PI 1: accused moved to postpone 4 times, and failed to appear everytime. - PI was nevertheless conducted. And the six criminal informations were filed in CFI. - AR 1: accused moved to postpone 4 time, never appeared; counsel asked for reinvestigation on the ground that the accused was not given the opportunity to present his defense during the preliminary investigation. Court granted motion. - PI 2: accused moved to postpone many times, failed still to appear. When he finally appeared with his counsel, they asked for 15 days to file
Criminal Procedure
appear for the reading of the sentence, the trial court declared the confiscation of the bond filed by Ang Gioc, and later issued the corresponding order of execution. This action of the court amounted to a judicial declaration that Ang Gioc was a fugitive from justice, and such declaration cannot after the lapse of nearly thirteen years be controverted by proof aliunde. A contrary view would encourage accused persons to trifle with the administration of justice, and provide means for guilty parties to escape punishment. We reject it without the least hesitation by declaring that Ang Gioc had waived his right to appeal from the judgment rendered against him. The law will not allow a person to take advantage of his own wrong. - Ang Gioc has waived his right of appeal. Court of Appeals acquired no jurisdiction of the appeal filed by him, except to dismiss it; and that court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it ordered the cause to be remanded to the court of origin for a new trial Dispositive remanding order must be set aside, and the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila declared final and executory.
SAMSON v CA [SUPRA, PAGE 84] PEOPLE v CITY COURT OF MANILA [SUPRA, PAGE 72] GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 82] CAES v IAC 179 SCRA 54 CRUZ; November 6, 1989
FACTS - Joel Caes was charged in 2 separate informations with ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS AND ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA before the CFI of Rizal. (SHORT version: this guy stayed in prison for 3 yrs coz nothing was happening with his case-trial was postponed 11 times-the court then decided to dismiss it provisionally but was later on revived. ***But if maam wants details, read on!) - The cases were consolidated on Dec 10, 1981. - Arraignment was originally scheduled on January 11, 1982, but was for some reason postponed. - August 31, 1982, Caes was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. - Trial was scheduled for October 13, 1982, but this was reset upon agreement of the parties. - Nov 15, 1982: the trial was again postponed for reasons that do not appear in the record. - Dec 20, 1982: the trial was again postponed because the prosecution witnesses were absent. - Jan 19, 1983: the third resetting of the case was also canceled, no reason appearing in the record. - Feb 21, 1983: no trial could be held again, because witnesses being absent. - March 21, 1983: the trial was reset once more, again because the prosecution witnesses were absent. - April 19, 1983: the trial of the case had not yet started. It was reset because the prosecution witnesses were again absent. - June 3, 1983, a sheriffs return informed the trial court that the prosecution witnesses, namely, Capt. Carlos Dacanay and Sgt. Bonifacio Lustado had been personally served with subpoena to appear and testify at the hearing scheduled on June 6, 1983. - June 6, 1983: the trial was again postponed, this time because there was no trial fiscal. - July 12, 1983: trial was reset for lack of material time.
Criminal Procedure
-The prosecutor should have initiated the motion himself if he thought it proper. The presumption that he approved of the motion is not enough, especially since we are dealing here with the liberty of a person who had a right at least to be notified of the move to prosecute him again. - The fact that he was not so informed made the irregularity even more serious. It is curious that the motion was granted just the same, and ex parte at that and without hearing, and the petitioner's subsequent objection was brushed aside. 2. YES - Fittingly described as "res judicata in prison grey," the right against double jeopardy prohibits the prosecution of a person for a crime of which he has been previously acquitted or convicted. The purpose is to set the effects of the first prosecution forever at rest, assuring the accused that he shall not thereafter be subjected to the danger and anxiety of a second charge against him for the same offense. - People v. Ylagan, Mendoza v. Almeda Lopez, People v. Obsania ~ To constitute double jeopardy, there must be: (a) a valid complaint or information; (b) filed before a competent court; (c) to which the defendant had pleaded; and (d) of which he had been previously acquitted or convicted or which was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent. - There is no question that the first three requisites are present in the case at bar. WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE PROV. DISMISSAL? - People v Ylagan: It is settled that a case may be dismissed if the dismissal is made on motion of the accused himself or on motion of the prosecution with the express consent of the accused. Such a dismissal is correctly denominated provisional. But a dismissal is not provisional even if so designated if it is shown that it was made without the express consent of the accused. This consent cannot be presumed nor may it be merely implied from the defendant's silence or his failure to object. - Pendatum v. Aragon, People v. Hinaut, Solis v. Agloro: Such consent must be express, so as to leave no doubt as to the defendant's conformity. Otherwise, the dismissal will be regarded as final, i.e., with prejudice to the refiling of the case. - There are instances in fact when the dismissal will be held to be final and to dispose of the case once and for all even if the dismissal was made on motion of the accused himself. - The first is where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to the evidence filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested. Such dismissal has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal. - The other exception is where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial. This is in effect a failure to prosecute. - SC said that this case is similar to Conde v. Rivera (so this doctrine applies in this case too) where a prosecuting officer, without good cause, secures postponements of the trial of a defendant against his protest beyond a reasonable period of time, as in this instance for more than a year, the accused is entitled to relief ... - The circumstance that the dismissal of the cases against the petitioner was described by the trial judge as "provisional" did not change the nature of that dismissal. As it was based on the "lack of interest" of the prosecutor and the consequent delay in the trial of the cases, it was final and operated as an acquittal of the accused on the merits.
PEOPLE v PANFILO LACSON [SUPRA, PAGE 74] GODOY v CA MELENCIO-HERRERA; August 30, 1988
NATURE Petition for certiorari to review the decision of the CA FACTS - Godoy is one of 6 accused of homicide. All pleaded not guilty. Trial proceeded until prosecution concluded presentation of evidence after which prosecution formally offered documentary exhibits. Before defense submitted objections to offer, petitioner filed Motion to Acquit on ground of lack of evidence proving guilt beyond reasonable doubt. - TC denied Motion to Acquit and admitted Formal Offer of Documentary Exhibits for prosecution. - Prosecution moved for disqualification of Godoy from presenting evidence as well as his exclusion from proceedings on ground that the Motion to Acquit is equivalent to a demurrer to the evidence so he had already waived his right to present evidence. TC denied the disqualification and allowed Godoy to present evidence. Prosecution filed MFR but this was denied. - Father of victim filed Petition for Certiorari before CA. CA nullified the orders of TC and held that Godoys Motion to Acquit was a demurrer to evidence. ISSUE WON the Motion to Acquit is the same as a motion to dismiss on demurrer to evidence HELD NO - Section 15 Rule 119 of the 1985 Rules on Crim Pro is relevant. The rule is explicit that in filing a Motion to Dismiss on ground of insufficiency of evidence, an accused waives the right to present evidence. There is no material difference between the Motion to Acquit by Godoy and a demurrer to evidence. A different label doesnt change the true nature of pleading. - The rationale is that when accused moves for dismissal on ground of insufficiency of evidence, he does so in belief that evidence is insufficient to convict and any need for him to present evidence is negated. Accused cannot be allowed to wager on outcome of judicial proceedings by
HELD YES
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- A demurrer to evidence is defined as an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. - The order dated September 29, 2003, inaccurately stated that Atty. Belarmino manifested that he will be filing a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court when the records show no such manifestation was made. On the contrary, the records show that Atty. Belarmino asked for leave of court to file a demurrer to evidence and for time to discuss the same with his co-counsel but was instead ordered by the court to file the same without leave of court within ten days. - Atty. Belarmino did not cite any ground when he moved for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence; neither did the Sandiganbayan make any inquiry thereon before issuing the order, directing the petitioner to file a demurrer to evidence even without leave of court. This is contrary to the provisions of Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure which specifically instructs that the motion for leave of court to file demurrer to evidence shall specifically state its grounds. - Petitioner was not consulted nor did his counsel confer with him and ask whether he understood the significance of filing a demurrer to evidence. Atty. Belarmino was not given the opportunity to discuss with petitioner the consequences of filing a demurrer to evidence without leave of court. - People v. Bodoso: Henceforth, to protect the constitutional right to due process of every accused in a capital offense and to avoid any confusion about the proper steps to be taken when a trial court comes face to face with an accused or his counsel who wants to waive his clients right to present evidence and be heard, it shall be the unequivocal duty of the trial court to observe, as a prerequisite to the validity of such waiver, a procedure akin to a searching inquiry as specified in People v. Aranzado when an accused pleads guilty, particularly 1. The trial court shall hear both the prosecution and the accused with their respective counsel on the desire or manifestation of the accused to waive the right to present evidence and be heard. 2. The trial court shall ensure the attendance of the prosecution and especially the accused with their respective counsel in the hearing which must be recorded. Their presence must be duly entered in the minutes of the proceedings. 3. During the hearing, it shall be the task of the trial court to a. ask the defense counsel a series of question to determine whether he had conferred with and completely explained to the accused that he had the right to present evidence and be heard as well as its meaning and consequences, together with the significance and outcome of the waiver of such right. If the lawyer for the accused has not done so, the trial court shall give the latter enough time to fulfill this professional obligation. b. inquire from the defense counsel with conformity of the accused whether he wants to present evidence or submit a memorandum elucidating on the contradictions and insufficiency of the prosecution evidence, if any, or in default theory, file a demurrer to evidence with prior leave of court, if he so believes that the prosecution evidence is so weak that it need not even be
HUN HYUNG PARK v EUNG WON CHOI CARPIO-MORALES; February 12, 2007
FACTS - Eung Won Choi, was charged for violation of BP 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing PNB Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of P1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient funds. He pleaded not guilty.
Criminal Procedure
a conjunctive sense and construed to mean as and, or vice versa, when the context of the law so warrants. - A pleading may be verified under either of the two given modes or under both. The veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either ones own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as warranted. The use of the preposition or connotes that either source qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient. Bearing both a disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone. - However, the range of permutations is not left to the pleaders liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources. Authentic records as a basis for verification bear significance in petitions where the greater portions of the allegations are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. - To sustain petitioners explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of simple preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations. 2. NO Ratio Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice. Reasoning - The materiality of those documents is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which Park is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the same Demurrer. The Rules require that the petition must be accompanied by clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court [Sec 2(d) Rule 42]. - The only duplicate original or certified true copies attached as annexes to the petition are the RTC Order granting respondents MFR and the RTC Order denying petitioners MFR. The copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his MFR a duplicate original copy. - While petitioner averred before the CA in his MFR that the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as Annex G, Annex G bares a replicate copy of a different order. It was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondents Comment. The copy of the other MeTC Order, dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is similarly uncertified as true. Since
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witnesses thereto knowingly affixed their signatures on said extrajudicial confession were never questioned. Buttressing the foregoing evidence is the positive identification of the accused at the situs and during the occurrence of the crime. We agree with the well-reasoned opinion of the trial court that the accused is not entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity. Against the effete efforts in the accused's afterthought to create an insanity defense is the whole weight of the presumption of sanity provided by law, amply supported by convincing circumstances laudably pointed out by the trial court. DISPOSITION WHEREFORE, with the modifications that the death sentence imposed by the trial court is reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Section 19(l), Article III of the Constitution, and the indemnification for the death of Teresita Gumapay is hereby increased from P12,000.00 to P30,000.00, consonant with present jurisprudence.
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Ratio The concept of speedy disposition is relative or flexible. A mere mathematical reckoning of the time involved is not sufficient. Particular regard must be taken of the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Reasoning - The right to a speedy disposition of a case, like the right to speedy trial, is deemed violated when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays; or when unjustified postponements of the trial are asked for and secured; or when without cause or justifiable motive, a long period of time is allowed to elapse without the party having his case tried. - Cabarles invokes the jurisdiction of this Court in the interest of speedy justice since the information against him was filed way back in June 1999, and almost eight years thereafter, no judgment has yet been rendered. Any further delay in the resolution of the instant petition will be prejudicial to Cabarles. Also, the Court has full discretionary power to take cognizance of the petition filed directly to it for compelling reasons or if warranted by the nature of the issues raised. Since Section 24 is a new provision, and considering the irregularities in the issuance of the April 1, 2003 Order, it is necessary to resolve the issues raised in this petition. - In fine, we are not unmindful of the gravity of the crime charged; but justice must be dispensed with an even hand. Regardless of how much we want to punish the perpetrators of this ghastly crime and give justice to the victim and her family, the protection provided by the Bill of Rights is bestowed upon all individuals, without exception, regardless of race, color, creed, gender or political persuasion - whether privileged or less privileged - to be invoked without fear or favor. Hence, the accused deserves no less than an acquittal; ergo, he is not called upon to disprove what the prosecution has not proved. Dispositive instant petition is GRANTED. We hold that the assailed Order dated April 1, 2003 was issued with grave abuse of discretion. Said Order is hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, any evidence received and offered in this case as a result of the April 1, 2003 Order is hereby stricken off the record. Let the records of this case be REMANDED immediately to the trial court concerned for its appropriate action without further delay.
ISSUES 1. WON the application of the Rules on Summary procedure was valid 2. WON he was afforded due process HELD NO - The Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases applies only to criminal cases where the penalty prescribed by law for the offense charged does not exceed six (6) months imprisonment or a fine of one thousand pesos (P1,000.00) or both - The crime of Theft as charged herein is penalized with arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or, from two (2) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. 6 Clearly, the Rule on Summary Procedure is inapplicable - But even assuming that the case falls under the coverage of said Rule, the same does not dispense with trial "Section 11. When case set for arraignment and trial.- Should the court, upon a consideration of the complaint or information and the affidavits submitted by both parties, find no cause or ground to hold the defendant for trial, it shall order the dismissal of the case; otherwise, the court shall set the case for arraignment and trial. "Section 14. Procedure of Trial.- Upon a plea of not guilty being entered, the trial shall immediately proceed. The affidavits submitted by the parties shall constitute the direct testimonies of the witnesses who executed the same. Witnesses who testified may be subjected to cross-examination. Should the affiant fail to testify, his affidavit shall not be considered as competent evidence for the party presenting the affidavit, but the adverse party may utilize the same for any admissible purpose. "No witness shall be allowed to testify unless he had previously submitted an affidavit to the court in accordance with Sections 9 and 10 hereof." - since petitioner-accused had pleaded not guilty, trial should have proceeded immediately. But not only was petitioner unrepresented by counsel upon arraignment; he was neither accorded the benefit of trial Dispositive Judge's Decision promulgated on July 16, 1994, is hereby ANNULLED for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The case is remanded to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of MagaraoCanaman, Camarines Sur, for proceedings strictly in accordance with law.
COMBATE v SAN JOSE 135 SCRA 693 MELENCIO-HERRERA; April 15, 1985
NATURE Petition for Certiorari FACTS - petitioner was charged with the crime of Theft of one (1) Rooster [Fighting Cock] color red, belonging to Romeo Posada worth P200.00. - Following the procedure laid down in the Rule on Summary Procedure in Special Cases, respondent Judge required petitioner and his witnesses to submit counter-affidavits to the supporting affidavits of the complainant - On June 5, 1984, petitioner was subpoenaed to appear before respondent Judge and was arraigned without the assistance of counsel. He pleaded not guilty.
Criminal Procedure
the court may direct one or more of the accused to be discharged with their consent so that they may be witnesses for the state when, after requiring the prosecution to present evidence and the sworn statement of each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge, the court is satisfied that: (a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose discharge is requested; (b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused; (c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its material points; (d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and (e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense involving moral turpitude. Evidence adduced in support of the discharge shall automatically form part of the trial. If the court denies the motion for discharge of the accused as state witness, his sworn statement shall be inadmissible in evidence. - The power to prosecute includes the initial discretion to determine who should be utilized by the government as a state witness. The prosecution has gathered the evidence against the accused and is in a better position to decide the testimonial evidence needed by the State to press its prosecution to a successful conclusion. Under our Rules, however, it is the courts that will finally determine whether the requirements have been satisfied to justify the discharge of an accused to become a witness for the government. - The testimony of dela Cruz was an absolute necessity. - Neither does dela Cruz appear to be the most guilty of the accused. The trial court held that dela Cruz was not privy to the kidnap plan and was merely taken in later by the group because they suspected that she already knew too much. - Did the lower courts properly consider the testimony of dela Cruz? It is a jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a self-confessed accomplice or co-conspirator imputing the blame to or implicating his co-accused cannot, by itself and without corroboration, be regarded as proof with a moral certainty that the latter committed or participated in the commission of the crime. The testimony must be substantially corroborated in its material points by unimpeachable testimony and strong circumstances and must be to such an extent that its trustworthiness becomes manifest. The testimony of dela Cruz was substantially corroborated by no less than the victim himself, Oliver, as well as Pedro. - As noted by the trial court, there may have been inconsistencies in the narration of dela Cruz. These, however, were minor details and simply could be attributed to the frailty of human memory. It cannot be expected that her testimony would be entirely flawless. Inconsistencies as to minor details and collateral matters do not affect the credibility of the witnesses nor the veracity or weight of their testimonies. Such minor inconsistencies may even serve to strengthen their credibility as they negate any suspicion that the testimonies have been rehearsed. Moreover, the testimony of dela Cruz coincides with that of Oliver and Pedro relating to the principal occurrence and the positive identification of appellants. - Plata insists that dela Cruz harbored a grudge against him because he was apparently a member of the Armando Rodrigo group, the lone suspect in the murder of Bert Liwanag, dela Cruzs boyfriend. Platas
Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE v SAPAL 328 SCRA 417 KAPUNAN; December 22, 1997
NATURE Automatic Review of the Decision FACTS - The RTC of Manila sentenced accused-appellant Jimmy Sapal to DEATH after he was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of unlawful possession of three (3) kgs. of marijuana. - The prosecution presented two witnesses, namely P03 Jesus Gomez and Renee Checa, a forensic chemist. Gomez testified that the office of the Drug Enforcement Unit received a call that accused who had a standing warrant of arrest had been seen at Jocson St., Sampaloc Manila. - Their group spotted the car frequently used by the accused. The police operatives approached the car, told the accused and his wife, along with two other companions, to get down of the car. Forthwith, Gomez conducted a search of the vehicle and in the course thereof, allegedly found a light green plastic bag in the back seat containing three bricks of marijuana. - The accused testified that the police operatives took his wallet which contained cash and several ATM cards and that the latter coerced him into divulging the PIN numbers of the ATM cards. - Accused gave them the correct PIN number to his Far East Bank account but purposely mixed up the other PIN numbers to his other bank accounts. - The accused and his companions were brought to the WPD headquarters where their male companion, Jerry, was mauled to force him to admit that drugs were recovered from their group. The accuseds wife and her other companion were likewise coerced to admit the same. However, they all insisted that no illegal drugs were recovered from any of them. - After trial, the trial court rendered the decision under review. ISSUE WON the guilt of the accused was proven beyond reasonable doubt to warrant the supreme penalty of death HELD The Court finds for the accused. - While the Court is mindful that law enforcers enjoy the presumption of regularity in the performance of their duties, this presumption cannot prevail over the constitutional right of the accused to be presumed innocent and it cannot, by itself, constitute proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt. - In the present case, there is sufficient evidence to show that the manner by which the law enforcers effected the arrest of the accused was highly irregular and suspect. - Gomez claimed that they arrested accused pursuant to the warrant issued by Judge Barrios which explicitly stated that said accused Jimmy Sapal be brought before him as soon as possible. However, contrary to the clear directive of the warrant, the law enforcers never brought him before the said judge. Gomez himself admitted the same and did not offer
Criminal Procedure
- After promulgation of the judgment, petitioner on that same day, filed his notice of appeal. Petitioner filed a motion praying that the case be reopened to permit him to present, pursuant to a reservation he had made in the course of the trial, a permit to possess the handgrenade in question. The trial court denied the motion mainly on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case in view of the perfection of the appeal by the accused on the very date the decision was promulgated. - The records were then elevated to the Court of Appeals where petitioner as accused-appellant raised the issues of (1) an erroneous conviction for illegal possession of explosives when there was no proof of an essential element of the crime, and (2) erroneous denial of his motion to reopen the case for the reception of his permit to possess the handgrenade. Jose prayed for his acquittal or in the alternative for the remand of the case back to the trial court for a new trial. CA affirmed RTC. - A motion for reconsideration and/or new trial was filed but was denied. - Jose filed before the SC but was denied. Thus this Motion for Reconsideration. - Manifestation was submitted by the Solicitor General informing the Court that in view of the "persistence of accused petitioner Lorenzo Jose both before this Honorable Court and respondent Court of Appeals as to his alleged existing appointment as PC Agent and/or authority to possess handgrenade," in the interest of justice, he was constrained to make pertinent inquiries from the PC Chief, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos who in reply sent his letter dated December 27, 1974 that states that Mr. Lorenzo Jose was appointed as PC Agent. The Solicitor General now concedes that the interests of justice will best be served by remanding this case to the court of origin for a new trial. ISSUE WON CA committed an error of law and gravely abuse its discretion when it denied petitioner's motion for new trial "for the reception of (1) the written permit of petitioner to possess and use handgrenade, and (2) the written appointment of petitioner as PC agent with Code No. P-36-68 and Code Name 'Safari' (both documents are dated 31 January 1968)" HELD YES - This is a situation where a rigid application of rules of procedure must bow to the overriding goal of courts of justice to render justice where justice is due to secure to every individual all possible legal means to prove his innocence of a crime of which he is charged. The failure of the Court of Appeals to appreciate the merits of the situation, involving as it does the liberty of an individual, thereby closing its ear to a plea that a miscarriage of justice be averted, constitutes a grave abuse of discretion which calls for relief from this Court. - We do not question the correctness of the findings of the Court of Appeals that the evidence sought to be presented by the petitioner do not fall under the category of newly-discovered evidence because the same his alleged appointment as an agent of the Philippine Constabulary and a permit to possess a handgrenade were supposed to be known to petitioner and existing at the time of trial and not discovered only thereafter. - It is indeed an established rule that for a new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown that (a) the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) such evidence could not have
First Womens Credit Corp filed a petition before the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against the corporations officers Jacinto, Colayco, Sangil and Cruz, for alleged mismanagement of the corporation. - The SEC, in SEC Case No. 11-97-5816, created an Interim Management Committee (IMC) for the corporation by Order of November 17, 1999. The Order was upheld by the SEC en banc on July 4, 2000. - The IMC thereupon issued directives to the corporations president Antonio Tayao and corporate secretary and treasurer Glicerio Perez. - Allegedly in conspiracy with Jacinto and Colayco, Tayao and Perez defied the implementation of the SEC November 17, 1999 Order6 when IMC attempted to enter the main office of the corporation in Makati on December 3, 1999, December 29, 1999 and January 28, 2000 - The IMC then preventively suspended Tayao and Perez. However, Tayao and Perez continued to issue memoranda to the employees to disobey the IMC. Later, the IMC dismissed them both. - The corporation, represented by Katayama (minority stockholder), filed before the Makati City Prosecutor criminal complaints against Jacinto, Colayco, Tayao and Perez for: a) Article 151 which punishes resistance and disobedience to person in authority or the agents of such person (20 counts); b) Article 154 which punishes the unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful utterances (2 counts); c) Article 172(2) which punishes falsification by private individuals and use of falsified documents (2 counts); d) Article 315, paragraph 2(a) Estafa by falsely pretending to be officers of FWCC (23 counts) - The investigating prosecutor found no probable cause for violations under A151, A154 and A315. However, it found probable cause for 2 counts of violation of A 172(2) against Jacinto, Colayco and Perez, and 3 counts of grave coercion against Tayao and 3 secuirty guards.. The City prosecutor approved the investigating prosecutors resolution. - The respondents appealed to the DOJ. The DOJ reversed the resolution and ordered that the informations be withdrawn. The corporation moved to reconsider but was denied by the DOJ. They then assailed the DOJ order before the CA. - In the meantime, respondents filed a motion to dismiss the criminal cases. Judge Baybay granted the motion. ISSUES
Criminal Procedure
1. WON the judge correctly dismissed the criminal case 2. WON the only remedy for the petitioners was a petition fro certiorari, not an ordinary appeal HELD 1. NO - As to what mode of review petitioners may avail of after a court grants an accuseds motion to withdraw information and/or to dismiss the case, Section 1 of Rule 122 of the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs: "Any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy." - In availing of the remedy of certiorari before the RTC, petitioners claim that they had no plain, adequate and speedy remedy to question the MeTCs grant of the motion. -The records of the cases show, however, that the motion was granted by the MeTC before respondents were arraigned. Thus, the prohibition against appeal in case a criminal case is dismissed as the accused would be placed in double jeopardy does not apply. - Petitioners not having availed of the proper remedy to assail the dismissal of the cases, the dismissal had become final and executory. On this score alone, the present petition must fail. 2. YES - The judge made a finding independent of that of the DOJs. - The trial court did stress in its December 3, 2002 Order denying the motion for reconsideration that it was bound to make, as it did, a preliminary finding independently of those of the Secretary of Justice. - The trial judge need not state with specificity or make a lengthy exposition of the factual and legal foundation relied upon by him to arrive at his decision. It suffices that upon his own personal evaluation of the evidence and the law involved in the case, he is convinced that there is no probable cause to indict the accused. Dispositive Petition denied
GALMAN v SANDIGANBAYAN [SUPRA, PAGE 82] PEOPLE v BAYOTAS 236 SCRA 239 ROMERO; September 2, 1994
FACTS - Rogelio Bayotas was charged with Rape and eventually convicted thereof. Pending appeal of his conviction, Bayotas died at the National Bilibid Hospital. Consequently, the Supreme Court dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas' civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged. In his comment, the Solicitor General expressed his view that the death of accused-appellant did not extinguish his civil liability as a result of his commission of the offense charged. - Counsel for the accused-appellant argues that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. Said counsel invoked the ruling of the CA in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a
Criminal Procedure
- If any remedy was available to private complainant, it was a petition for certiorari, not an appeal. ISSUE WON complainant is allowed to file an appeal HELD YES Ratio The right to appeal from a final judgment or order in a criminal case is granted to "any party", except when the accused is placed thereby in double jeopardy. Reasoning Section 2, Rule 122 RCP "Who may appeal. Any party may appeal from a final judgment or order, except if the accused would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. - Court ruled that the word "party" must be understood to mean not only the government and the accused, but also other persons who may be affected by the judgment rendered in the criminal proceeding. Thus, the party injured by the crime has been held to have the right to appeal from a resolution of the court which is derogatory to his right to demand civil liability arising from the offense. (People v. Guido) - Offended parties in criminal cases have sufficient interest and personality as 'person(s) aggrieved' to file the special civil action of prohibition and certiorari under Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 65 in line with the underlying spirit of the liberal construction of the Rules of Court - The procedural recourse of appeal taken by private complainant Laurel is correct because the order of dismissal was a final order. It finally disposed of the pending action so that nothing more could be done with it in the lower court. - The remedy against such a judgment is an appeal, regardless of the questions sought to be raised on appeal, whether of fact, or of law, whether involving jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion of the Trial Court. . . . (T)he party aggrieved . . . did not have the option to substitute the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 for the remedy of appeal provided for in Rule 41. Indeed, the existence and availability of the right of appeal are antithetical to the availment of the special civil action of certiorari. - The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. Although the fiscal retains the direction and control of the prosecution of criminal cases even while the case is already in Court he cannot impose his opinion on the trial court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. (Crespo v. Mogul) Dispositive Petition is denied.
Criminal Procedure
order to justify the imposition of the death penalty. The record of the case is bereft of any independent evidence, such as the victim's duly certified Certificate of Live Birth, accurately showing private complainant's age. - The fact that accused-appellant Manuel has not denied the allegation in the complaint that Maricel was 16 years old when the crime was committed cannot make up for the failure of the prosecution to discharge its burden in this regard. - Because of this lapse, as well as the corresponding failure of the trial court to make a categorical finding as to the minority of the victim, we hold that the qualifying circumstance of minority under Republic Act No. 7659 cannot be appreciated in this case, and accordingly the death penalty cannot be imposed. - The award of damages made by the trial court should likewise be modified. As regards the civil indemnity, this Court has to date consistently ruled that if, in the crime of rape, the death penalty is imposed, the indemnity ex delicto for the victim should be in the amount of P75,000.00; and if the death penalty is not decreed by the Court, the victim would instead be entitled to P50,000. Accordingly, accused~appellants shall each pay the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for each count of rape. In addition, as held in People vs. Prades, both accused-appellants must each indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages for each count of rape without the need of pleading or proof as the basis thereof. Lastly, accused~appellant Manuel is also liable to pay the sum of P20,000.00 as exemplary damages to deter other fathers with perverse tendencies or aberrant sexual behavior from sexually abusing their own daughters Dispositive Judgment appealed from was affirmed with the modification.