Bodin Commonwealth
Bodin Commonwealth
Bodin Commonwealth
OF THE
COMMONWEALTH
JEAN BODIN
/
Abridged and translated
- -by
..
M . J. T O O L E Y
BASIL BLACKWELL
,,i,+'.
OXFORD !
PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN IN THE CITY OF OXFORD
AT THE ALDEN PRESS
BOUND BY THE KEMP HALL BINDERY, OXFORD
CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
I. Biographical Sketch.
11. The Argument of the Six books of the Commonwealth.
INTRODUCTION
I. BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH
right, and that the only remedy was the recognition of the absolute
authority of the state 'to which, after immortal God, we owe all
thingsy. Roman law suggested to him the essential concept of such a
power. But the comparative historical studies already undertaken in
the Method enabled h111 to free the concept of sovereignty from its
particular Roman associations, and to consider it in general as the mark
of all types of states at all times. His conviction that it is the conltion
of human well-being that this power must in all circumstances be
preserved led him into the attempt to construct a universal science of
politics.
Almost immediately after the publication of the book his career
took a downward turn. This had nothing to do with the work itself,
but was a consequence of h s lsinterested conduct as deputy for
Vermandois in the Estates of Blois. The occasion proved to be one of
the first importance. Since the Estates of Tours in 1484, assembled by
the Regency on the death of Louis XI, there had been none in France
tlll Francis I summoned them to meet at Orlians in December 1560.
His death a few days.before they assembled robbed the meeting of any
direction, and they were dissolved in January. The Estates-General
met again that year at Pontoise, but was again overshadowed, this
time by the Colloquy of Passy, which was looked to more hopefully
for a solution of the growing religious troubles of the kingdom. It
failed however and civil war started. Therefore the expedient of a
meeting of the Estates was again tried. This time they were summoned
to meet at Blois in December 1576.
The opportunity was the Paix de Monsieur which had brought a
lull in hostilities. The yolitiques hoped to convert it into a lasting peace
by negotiating a settlement. But the Catholic League had just been
founded by the intransigeant conservatives, and it doninated the two
privileged orders of the nobles and the clergy. In these circumstances
religious peace was unattainable. Much important business was
nevertheless transacted. The Estates discussed a considerable pro-
gramme of administrative reform, and financial expedients to relieve
the chronic inadequacy of the revenues. The results of these delibera-
tions were embodied in the bills of recommendation presented by the
three estates, and on these the great Ordinance of Blois of 1579 was
based, for the Estates could only petition for legislation. The framing
and publication of edicts belonged to the Crown.
Judging by what he says in the Six books ofthe Commonwealth these
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INTRODUCTION
Estates, the most important of any that met in the sixteenth century,
were a model of what Estates should be to Bodin's mind. Yet his
personal share in them was disastrous to hmself. It was his first and
only appearance in public life, and also the only occasion on which he
made an open stand for principles in circumstances damaging to
himself. He perhaps found the courage, or the conviction, necessary
to do this because it was the future of France, and not simply his own
safety, which was at stake. His sense of the importance of the occasion
led him to publish an account of what had happened in a pamphlet
entitled Rectreil de tout ce qu'il s'est ndgociP etz la comyagnie du Tiers Etat
L Fratlce . . . en la Ville de Blois. In an assembly dominated by the
Catholic League, ofwhich the Icing himself, Henry 111, was aspiring to
become head, he opposed the reopening of the war against the Hugu-
enots, and urged that a solution of the religious problem could only be
achieved by negotiation. He upheld the riglrt of the third estate to
dissent from the recommendations of the two privileged orders,
despite their opposition. He opposed as damaging to the monarchy
the alienation of royal donlain as a means of raising money for the
prosecution of the war.
His success in the last two instances cost him the favour of the King.
When therefore the Duc d' Alen~ondied in I 583, he retired from Paris
and took up the office of yrocurateur au prbsidial de La"ota whch he
inherited from his brother-in-law in 1578. Provincial seclusion did not,
however, mean peace and security. In 1588, on the assassination of its
leader, the Duc de Guise, the League started a reign of terror in LSon
as in so many other places in France, and Bodin thought it prudent to
join an association which stood for everything in both politics and
religion which he utterly condemned. The advent of Henry IV in
1594, and the long-deferred triumph of the policy of the yolitiques,
could not have been anything but profoundly welcome to him. But
if he had entertainid any hopes of restored favour, his joining the
League cost him any advancement. He was still in LBon when he died
towards the end of 1596.
Judging by his writings at this time, however, his withdrawal from
politics went deeper than a mere change of scene and occupation.
There was also an intellectual withdrawal. He abandoned his preoc-
cupation with men and affairs in favour of the contemplation of the
order of nature, and an enquiry into the truths of religion. He was still
the same Bodin however in search of a universal system. In the
...
XUI
INTRODUCTION
it also has the merits of its defects. The exposition is complete and
coherent. The other, and even more important lesson that Bodin
learned in the schools was to achieve clarity and unambiguity by
careful definition of all the important terms used. It was these defini-
tions that on occasions he quite rightly claimed were new, and that a
generation that was fast casting behind it the rigid formalism of the
schools found most arresting and most illuminating.
The opening sentences of the S i x books of the Corninonwealth betray
the original plan of the whole work. Bodin starts by defining the
commonwealth as 'the rightly ordered government of a number of
families and of those things which are their common concern, by a
sovereign power'. He then goes 011 'we start in this way with a defini-
tion because the final end of any subject must be understood before
the means of attaining it can profitably be considered, and the defini-
tion indicates what that end is'. In other words he is concerned to
establish first what a state is and the ends for which it exists, and then
to discuss the practical policies necessary for their accomplishment.
His book is therefore a work of the same mixed character 'as Aristotle's
Politics. That is to say it is concerned at once with a philosophy of the
state, and with the science of politics. In fact, although he seldom
mentions Aristotle except to disagree with him, the Politics obviously
provided the general model for the Six books of the Cornmontueabb.
The structure is the same. The first two books of the latter work
reproduce the order of the argument in books I and I11 of the former,
being concerned with establishing the nature of the state as such, its
end, its foundation in the family, citizenship, and the possible forms
the state can assume, and in the same order. Again, Bodin shared
Aristotle's lively interest in the causes of the preservation and des-
truction of states, and therefore the theme of boolcs IV and V in the
Six books ofthe Corninonwealth bear a general resemblance to the central
books of the Politics. But in this part of the work, where he is con-
cerned with the practice, and not with the theory of politics, Bodin
moves away from Aristotle. For one thing the great difference in
political conditions in ancient Greece and in his own times meant that
there could be little correspondence in the particulars of this discussion.
The problems were not the same. Moreover there is an urgency in
Bodin's writing that one does not sense in the Politics. He wanted to
remedy, not just to analyse, the evils of the times. As he says in the
Dedication, when the ship of state is in danger of foundering, it
xvi
INTRODUCTION
behoves the very passengers to give what assistance they can, and it is
in the hope of restoring the ancient splendour of the French monarchy
that he has undertaken to write on the commonwealth. The theme of
what is to be done and what avoided becomes more and more insistent
as the argument proceeds, and altogether dominates the later books.
But as has been said, though France might be his immediate concern,
he wanted to enlarge his enquiry so as to arrive at a universal science of
politics. His procedure was the same as that already used in the
Method, induction from the known relevant facts. He surveyed all
the evidence about the way the state works, much as Aristotle con-
ducted a preliminary enquiry into the constitutions of Greek city
states, only he did what Aristotle did not do, included all this material
in the main work. For Bodin the relevant facts were in the first instance
all the information he could collect about the contemporary world
from the dominions of the Grand Turk to the New World, and from
Sweden to Ethiopia. His sources were those already used for the
enquiry into universal law, the accounts of travellers and contemporary
historians such as Leo the African and Francesco Alvarez, Paolo
Giovio and Las Casas, Machiavelli, Guicciardini and the Venetian
constitutional historians, Sleidan, Sigismond dYHerbersteinand many
others. As has been shown, this information he checked, supple-
mented and brought up to date by inspecting diplomatic correspond-
ence, and talking with diplomats whenever he could.
In the second place the relevant evidence included, he considered,
the facts of past history. This meant for him, as for all men of the
renaissance, primarily the ancient world as portrayed by the Greek
and Roman historians, and he shared the characteristic humanist
admiration for its achievements. But he also had a good deal to say
about medieval France, and had troubled to consult the archives at
Rheims, Beauvais and elsewhere. He knew something about England,
and how the Empife and the Papacy had developed during the middle
ages. As he had already explained in the Method, the study of history is
not only the means of discovering the principles of universal law, but
also of political wisdom. 'For acquiring prudence nothing is more
important or more essential than history, because episodes in human
life recur as in a circle, repeating themselves.' It is clear that he regarded
history as the record of a series of recurrences rather than of a process
of change. As will appear later, his cosn~ologicalsystem implied that
the order of events is cyclic and not evolutionary. History therefore
B xvii
INTRODUCTION
rely on fear to keep his subjects obedient and in awe, Bodin thinks
that he should win their affection because friendship and not interest
is the bond of society [IV, vi] .
It is clear from these instances that for Bodin the science of politics
was not just a study*ofthe technique of successful government af it was
for Machiavefi. He borrowed the method of investigation, but he
strongly reprehended the lack of regard for moral principles, and in the
Dedcation classed Machiavelh with the apologists of the right of
rebellion, as the writers whose doctrines had caused the ruin of com-
monwealths in his own day. He had as clear a vision as the Italian of
what states are &e, and of how men conduct themselves politically.
But unlike the Italian he always measured them by an absolute standard
of right to which they ought to conform. Therefore for him the
examination of things as they are did not cover the whole enquiry
necessary. An historical survey can be made to yield conclusions about
what are politically expedient ways and means, but he did not think
it was capable of determining the ends to which those ways and
means should be directed. He rejected the notion that one can arrive
at a true conception of the proper order in human affairs by considering
things merely as they are. This comes out in his discussion of slavery
[I, v]. He will not allow that it can be defended as a natural institution
simply because it has always existed among men. It is the work of sin,
not of nature, and condemned as such by Jew, Christian, axid Moham-
medan alike.
This is indicative of his whole approach to politics. His values are as
traditional as was his cosmology. He thought of the natural order as
contained within an eternal order comprehending the universe and all
particulars within it, in a single system of relationsllips. To that order
all actions and all institutions must be referred as their end. It is
spontaneously realized in all created things save man. The proper
motions of the heavenly bodies can be determined by observation
because in them there is no imperfection. But when one comes to
consider men, the divine and natural intention has been disturbed by
the Fall. The proper order of human society cannot therefore be
determined by observation simply, because men are imperfect. To
know that order we must consult natural reason, and with even more
certainty, the law of God revealed in the scriptures. For Bodin
therefore, as he himself observed at the beginning, the science of
politics must be founded in a philosophy of the state indicating ends.
xix
INTRODUCTION
agreed with Calvin that the state originated in sin, he did not agree
with him that in consequence it is merely a machinery for the punish-
ment of sin. He followed up his account of the wickedness of the first
rulers by observing that in the face of the threat of enslavement, men
were drawn together to form a society whose purpose was the pre-
servation of rights [111, vii]. A true state is therefore a droit gouverne-
ment.
It is clear from his discussion of the term droit that he meant nothing
less by it than the whole good of man. He repeats the accepted formula
that the body should be disciplined to virtuous activity, and virtuous
activity directed to the apprehension of eternal truth. Aquinas would
have agreed. But Bodin added that contemplation, or the develop-
ment of those qualities of mind whereby men distinguish good and
evil, true and false, pious and impious, is not only the sovereign good
of the individual, but also the true end of the state, for he explicitly
identdied the two. The importance of this modification can hardly be
exaggerated, for it brings not only natural virtue, but religion within
the sphere of politics [I, i]. He does not however enlarge upon the
implications, nor ever discuss the Church as such. But it is clear that he
did not mean that the state has an obligation to establish 'true religion',
or that it is for the prince to set up an organized Church and compel
conformity to it. This is clear from his treatment of the subject of
heresy [IV, vii]. He objected to persecution as only too &Gely to
produce a general scepticism about religion. This he thought a disarter
of the first importance, for in his opinion any system of beliefs is to be
preferred to none. Religion, because it induces reverence and obed-
ience, is the foundation of the commonwealtl~,and it largely rests with
the prince whether it flourishes or not. What the prince must do is to
establish conditions under which religion in the general sense is
encouraged. Only by toleration of all forms can genuine piety be
promoted, and only the prince can implement a policy of toleration.
When therefore Bodin makes droit the end of the state, he does not
mean, as Aristotle did, that the state is the means to the good life
because political activity is the highest exercise of virtue. He meant
that the state alone can maintain those conditions under which subjects
can individually live virtuous, thoughtful, and pious lives. The best
state, he says, is the one in which the greatest number of citizens live
such lives.
Bodin was at the same time fully aware of the fact that in this
xxii
INTRODUCTION
imperfect world all states fall short of this ideal in varying degrees,
and pursue not the highest good, but some particular good only,
Sparta courage and devotion, Rome justice. As he says, the state must
first secure the lives of its citizens before it can consider how they
should live virtuously, and the energies of most states are absorbed in
the initial effort of survival. In fact, in the ensuing books of the Six
books of the Commonwealth the discussion is largely confined to this
immediate problem of self-preservation. But as he said in his opening
chapter, he did not intend to take Plato as his model and describe an
ideal impossible of realization. Like Aristotle, he was looking for the
best in the possible, and he was fully aware that as things were, states
fell far below the level of what in favourable circumstances they might
become. Having defined the ideal, or ultimate goal, his practical inten-
tion involved concentrating on what can in fact be achieved.
When he comes to consider the essential structure of the state, he
follows Aristotle in holding that the family group, and not the
individual, is the unit out of which the commonwealth is made up
[I, ii]. He agreed that the family is a natural society held together by
the authority of the husband over the wife, the father over his children
and the master over his servants, all sharing a common means of
subsistence. But what he emphasized was its moral and political
rather than its economic significance, complaining that Aristotle
neglected this aspect of it. He discussed it from the polnt of view of the
father, and the father in his role of ruler rather than in his role of
organizer of the common life. This was because, as is clear from all
that he has to say about both the origin of the state, and the causes of its
destruction, he was convinced that what men chiefly need is discipline
to correct their factious and rebellious spirits. Therefore, he wanted
to see the authority of the father not only preserved, but strengthened
even to the extent of the power of life and death over his dependants,
for he saw in that 'power the only means of training the young in the
habit of obedience necessary to be acquired if they were later to exhibit
that submission to the ruler proper in a subject [I, iv]. Good citizens
are made in the nursery. It is thus its political importance that impels
him to defend the authority of parents.
Starting from these ideas of sin and its correction, it is not surprising
that he should have seen the state in terms of power [I, viii]. Its
distinguishing mark is puissance souveraine, a sovereign power. It is
necessarily perpetual and absolute, for any person or persons, within
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INTRODUCTION
the community or outside it, who can impose any time limits, or
restrictions on its competence, must be the true sovereign, and the
apparent sovereign only an agent. His admission of lois royales, or
fundamental laws of the French monarchy, does not really compromise
these statements. The salic law is a rule restricting, not the exercise
of sovereignty, but the choice of the person who may exercise it. The
denial of the right to alienate royal domain was an application of the
principle of Roman law that the one thing a sovereign cannot do is to
destroy his own sovereignty, and this, Bodin thought, the impoverish-
ment of the Crown would bring about.
On the other hand the use of the term 'absolute' did not necessarily
imply that sovereign power was underived, since jurists were familiar
with the Roman theory that the irnperium is inherent in the community,
and conferred by it on the ruler. But Bodin, though trained in the
civil law, rejected this part of it. He did so almost certainly because the
doctrine of the popular origin of political authority was already being
associated by Huguenot writers such as Hotman, with doctrines of the
right of resistance. It was very likely this association which led Bodin
to deny that consent to government was any part of natural liberty,
or that the obligation to obey depended on such consent being given.
Bodin's ideas on the origin of political authority derive not from the
civil law but from the Hebrew Scriptures. All power is of God [I,
viii]. All right to command is therefore essentially independent of the
consent of the commanded. The artificial society of the common-
wealth should be modelled on the natural society of the family, and no
father is appointed by his children to rule over them.
The unqualified right to command is therefore the distinguishg
mark of the ruler. This characterization of the sovereign in terms of
power is one of Bodin's most original conceptions, and marks the
break with the traditional view of the king, enshrined in coronation
oaths in use everywhere, that he was in virtue of Es office essentially
the embodiment ofjustice, and his primary function was to judge his
subjects. Such a conception of monarchy was still that commonly
held. Louis XII, busy with projects for the codification of law, spoke
of himself as 'dkbiteur de justice 2i nos sujets'. The same view was taken
by so eminent a contemporary of Bodin's as the Chancellor, Michel
de L'HGpital, whose politique views on the French monarchy, ex-
pounded in his great speech to the Estates in 1560, were in other ways
very much the same as Bodin's. Kings were first instituted, he told
xxiv
INTRODUCTION
them, for the sake ofjustice, and this remains the essential attribute of
the h g l y office, as is shown by the representation of the king on the
great seal, seated on his throne in the act of judgement.1 Bodin, while
agreeing that all jurisdiction derived from the king, did not even
include the exercise ofjurisdiction among the attributes of sovereignty,
much less make it the distinctive mark, since the king exercises this
right indirectly, by delegation [IV, vi]. For him the peculiar and
essential mark of sovereignty is the right to make law; it is its unique
attribute, for it is the normal means by which the sovereign indicates
his commands. Law then is simply the command of the sovereign.
This voluntarist conception is underlined by the distinction he makes
between law - that which is commanded - and right - that which is
equitable. Only the first proceeds from the sovereign.
If law is command simply it includes, as Bodin saw, all activities
of the sovereign. There are however certain matters which the
sovereign must attend to himself in virtue of his office and not delegate
to the subject, as he delegates rights of jurisdiction, and these powers
Bodin calls the attributes of sovereignty. First there is included what
Locke called the federative power, or sole right of making war and
peace, and concluding alliances. Second there is the right to authorize
all appointments to public office, whatever the actual procedure in use.
Again, as the source of all rights ofjurisdiction, the sovereign is the final
resort of appeal for all his subjects and in all causes. Finally he has the
exclusive right to demand unqualified oaths of submission, for the
relations of the subject to his sovereign are unique in that all his other
obligations, as vassal of h s lord, for instance, are subject to the prior
obligation to h s sovereign. These rights are inseparable from sover-
eignty, for the alienation or delegation of any one of them destroys the
sovereign.
From these premises Bodin was able to reach that conclusion that
he was convinced"must be established if-any order was to be main-
tained anywhere. There is no right whatsoever in the subject of
rebellion against the sovereign he had no part in instituting or of
disobedience to the law he had no part in making [11, v]. So long as
the king had been regarded as the embodiment ofjustice, the obligation
to obey was conditional on the justice of the command. But once the
king was conceived of as an absolute and independent power, the usual
grounds of resistance were denied. At the same time Bodin wanted to
P. Dufiy,Michel de L'Hi~ital:E~rvrescompl2fes (Paris, 1824-26),Vol. I, NO. 4.
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INTRODUCTION
imply condemnation in the one case and apboval in the other. In the
one the principles of divine and natural law, which are the mark of the
rightly ordered government, are observed, and in the other they are
not. Bodin would probably have answered that he is not here classing
states according to the particular ends they pursue, but only according
to the mode of their operation. Nevertheless one cannot get over
the fact that another element than purely constitutional factors is
brought in. It is a particular example of his tendency to mingle judge-
ments of fact with judgements of value without distinguishing them.
Much more original was the distinction he made in the second place
between the sovereign and the government, or machine through wlich
the sovereign operates. Each of the three fundamental types of
commonwealth can be provided with a form of government normally
characteristic of one of the other two [11, ii]. By tlis test ancient
Rome was a democracy governed aristocratically, and contemporary
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INTRODUCTION
class. Such a state has both the strength that comes from unity, and
the strength that comes from common consent.
Not that Bodin thought that it was possible to establish at will
those forms perceived to be the most stable. O n the contrary he did
not consider that the particular forms of states are a matter of human
choice and contrivance at all, but rather the inevitable product of
environment, or 'climate' as he calls it [V, i]. His doctrines were a
deduction from still current medieval physiological theories about the
close inter-relation of mind and body. Temperature and humidity
determine physique, and physique determines mental and moral
aotitudes. This be in^a so it is obvious that the forms of law and
gbvernment must also be shaped by these unalterable conditions.
Rather surprisingly for so systematic a thmker he makes no attempt to
bring his argument full circle, and work out a connection between the
three climates he distinguished, frigid, temperate, and torrid, and the
three fundamental types of commonwealth. It would have meant
much forcing of the facts about the distribution of political forms in
Europe to make them fit into a neat pattern of this sort. He preferred
to leave these ends loose, and confined himself to such scattered
observations as that the vigour and independence of mountain peoples,
w h c h comes from the severity of the climatic conditions, explain why
the Swiss and the Florentines have developed democratic forms of
government, whereas the more relaxing effect of damp and marshy
country predispose Venetians to submit to the rule of an aristocracy.
Forms of government and of law must be judged therefore by
relative and not by absolute standards. The savage penal code, and
warlike policies appropriate to the physically vigorous, brave but
stupid northern races are altogether unsuited to the delicate, timid,
imaginative, and subtle southerner. Diplomacy is the effective weapon
of their advancement. Bodin had said at the beginning of the Six
books ofthe Commoizwealth that no state pursues the good life absolutely,
but always some particular and partial good. His doctrine of the
influence of environment meant that it is in the nature of things that
this should be so.
Here a modern reader would be satisfied that Bodin had made lus
point and need carry the argument no further. But Bodin meant by
'climate' something much more all-pervasive than temperature,
humidity, and the lie of the land, though he included all these things.
When he subordinated the commonwealth to divine and natural law
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INTRODUCTION
he did not only mean that its laws and its government ought to con-
form to a moral order. He also meant that it had its necessary place in
a physical universe subject to invariable natural laws proceeding from
God as first cause. It is only when his cosmological ideas are taken into
consideration that the full significance of his relativist views on politics
is to be appreciated.1 His system was medieval, for he deliberately
rejected Copernicus in the Novum Theatrum Nattrrae, and adhered to the
traditional view based on Aristotle's physics. That system was necessar-
ily astrological. If Aristotle's premises were accepted, first that the
universe consists of a material core, the earth and its atmosphere,
enclosed within an immaterial envelope, the heavens; and second, that
matter is in itself inert and formless; it followed that its myriad forms,
and the unceasing transmutation to w h c h it is subject, must proceed
&om immaterial agents external to it. These agents can only be the
stars. Their perpetual and complex revolutions in their circular orbits
round the earth are the cause of all phenomena and all change of any
kind. All things, from a grain of corn to a commonwealth, are moulded
by the place and time of their occurrence, and their life-histories
governed by the movement of the heavens. Hence his view of history
as the record of recurrences. The historical process must be cyclic
rather than evolutionary since it proceeds from the circular motion of
the heavens.
It was therefore natural and inevitable that his treatment of history
should seem from our point of view to lack perspective. He agreed
with Machiavelli that history repeats itself: democracy in ancient Rome,
or in the Forest Cantons of contemporary Switzerland was a manifesta-
tion of a fixed and constant type. But whereas Machiavelli derived his
cyclic view of the historical process from his doctrine of the constancy
of human nature, Bodin derived it from the recurrent pattern of events
inherent in the cosmic process. It will be observed that Bodin's ideas
about the relativity of laws and institutions have a spatial rather than a
temporal reference. As one moves through space they differ, according
to the different figure of the heavens enclosed within their horizon.
But as one moves through time oneskeeps on coming upon the same
phenomena, according as the stars repeat their revolutions.
This is not to say that he believed in an order of necessity in human
affairs. The search for the principles of practical wisdom in politics
For a fuller account of this relationship, see my article, 'Jean Bodin and the medieval
theory of climate', in Speculum, Vol. XXVIII, No I , Jan. 1953.
xxxiii
INTRODUCTION
commonwealth, that is to say the working of the criminal law, and the
administration. But whereas natural justice is presumably in his view
constant and universal, here the proper order of justice is relative to
the type of commonwealth. Commutative justice, or the strictly
equal distribution of honours and penalties preserves a democracy but
would destroy an aristocracy. Conversely distributive justice, or
award in accordance with the quality of persons, safeguards an aris-
tocracy but would corrupt a democracy. In a monarchy where a more
elastic social system is possible than in either of the other two types,
since in it classes are at once distinguished and yet not mutually ex-
clusive, harmonic justice is the appropriate form since by it honours
are given not in accordance with the status of persons, but with their
particular suitability [VI, vi].
This treatment of the theme of justice, therefore, does not really
bring the argument back to the state considered as the instrument of the
good life. It is true that justice here means right order in the common-
wealth, but it is the right order that preserves it as a type, rather than
any embodiment of universal moral principles. As he said, states must
live before they can live well, and the discussion in book IV of the
causes of revolution made it clear that they do not find it so easy to
live. The whole work ends on this note, how may their survival be
assured.
However, the theme of book I, that the state exists to promote
virtue in its citizens, is not completely lost sight of, and at one point in
the final book he returns to the problem of the pursuit of higher ends.
Every state, he says, ought to undertake the moral discipline of its
citizens, such as was exercised in pagan Rome by the censors. In the
modern state he regarded it as the function of priests and ministers of
religion [VI, i]. The Church has a duty and a place within the state.
It is clear that whep he included true religion in that total good which
it is the state's purpose to promote, he did not only mean that the prince
should free the practice of one's beliefs from legal restrictions. He also
meant that the clergy have a necessary function in the disciplining of the
citizen. They are not however solely responsible for this discipline. It
is a duty incumbent on the sovereign to use such opportunities as he
has to the same end. Surprisingly enough he thought the proper
management of taxation a suitable means. In spite of the chronic
inadequacy of the revenues in France in his day, he clung to the
conviction that the king ought to be able to 'live of his own', and that
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xlii
BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE
Texts.
A collected edition of Bodin's works is in preparation. Jean Bodin.
etrvres philosophiques, texte Ctabli, traduit, et publit par P. Mesnard
(Corpttsghthral des philosophesfran~ais). O f this series the first volume
has appeared, Methodus ad facilem historiarum cognitionenz (Paris, 195 I).
(Ths is prefaced by the most recent biography.)
For the Six looks of the Conimonwealth only sixteenth- andseventeenth-
century editions are at present available. An abridged version by
J. C. de Laire was published in 1755.
Authorities.
H. J. L. Baudrillart, Jean Bodin et son temps (Paris, 1853).
R. Chauviri, Jean Bodin, auteur de la RCpublique (Paris, 1914).
E. Hancke, Bodin. Studien iiber die Begriy der Souveranitat (Breslau,
1894).
A. Garosci, Jean Bodin, Politica e diritto nel rirrascimentofrancese (Milano,
1934).
E. Fournol, Bodin, p rhddcesseur de Montesquieu (Paris, I 896).
J. Moreau-Reibel, Jean Bodiit et le droit public cotnpari darts ses rapports
avec la p hilosophie d'histoire (Paris, 1933).
B. Reynolds, Proponents of limited monarchy in sixteenth century France.
Frfli~coisHotmaii and Jean Bodin (Columbia University Stttdies irt
History, No, 3 34). (New York, 193I).
See also:
J. W . Allen, Political Thought in the Sixteenth Century (London, 1928).
P. Mesnard, L'Essor de la philosophie politique arr 1 8 siicle (Paris, 1936).
G. H. Sabine, A History of Political Theory (London, 1937).
G. Weill, Les thkories sur le pouvoir royal en France pendant les guerres de
reli,aion (Paris, I 89 I).
xliii
THE SIX BOOKS OF THE COMMONWEALTH
CONTENTS
[The chapter numbers in brackets are those of the original French.]
PAGE
xlviii
BOOK ONE
The Final End of the Well-ordered Commonwealth [CHAPTER I ]
what avoided. These are the sum of true wisdom, which is the highest
felicity attainable in this world.
If one turns from the microcosm to the macrocosm, it follows by
parity of argument that the con~monwealthshould have a territory
x ~ h ~ cish large enough, and sufficiently fertile and well stocked, to
feed and clothe its inhabitants. It should have a mild and equable
climate, and an adequate supply of good water for health. If the
geography of the country is not in itself its best defence, it should have
sites capable of fortification against the danger of attack. These are
the basic needs which are the first objects of concern in all common-
wealths. These secured, one looks for such luxuries as minerals,
mehcinal plants, and dyes. Offensive weapons must also be provided
if one would extend one's frontiers and subjugate the enemy, for the
appetites of men being for the most part insatiable, they desire to
secure great abundance not only of what is necessary and useful, but
of what is pleasant merely, and redundant. But just as one does not
think of educating a child until it is grown and capable of instruction,
so commonwealths do not concern themselves with the moral and
mental sciences, still less with philosophy, till they are amply furnished
with all that they regard as necessities. They are contented to cultivate
that modest degree of prudence which is sdcjent for the defence of
the state against its enemies, the prevention of disorders among its
subjects, and the reparation of injuries.
A man of good disposition however who finds himself well
@irovided with the necessities and comforts of life, secure and at peace,
turns away from unworthy companions and seeks the society of wise
and virtuous men. When he has purged his soul of troubling passions
and desires, he is free to give h s attention to observing his fellows, and
interests himself in the difference that age and temperament makes
between them, the causes of the greatness of some and the failure of
others, and of the fluctuations of states. From men lie turns to the con-
templation of nature, and considers the great chain of being, minerals,
plants, and animals in their hierarchical order, the forms, qualities, and
virtues of all generated things, and their mutual attractions and
repulsions. From the world of material things he moves forward to
the contemplation of the immaterial world of the heavens, where the
splendour, beauty, and power of the stars is manifested in their proud,
remote, and majestic movements, comprehending the whole universe
in a single harmony. The ecstasy of this vision inspires him with a
ORDERED COMMONWEALTH Chap. I
perpetual longing to penetrate to the first cause and author of this
perfect creation. But there he must pause, for the greatness, the power,
the wisdom, and goodness of the Supreme Being, being infinite, must
for ever remain inscrutable in its essence. By such a progression a wise
and thoughtful man reaches the concept of the one infinite and eternal
God, and thereby as it were attains the true felicity of mankind.
If such a man L adjudged both wise and happy, so also will be the
commonwealth which has many such citizens, even though it be
neither large nor rich, for in it :he pomps and vanities of proud
citizens, given over to pleasure, are contemned. But it must not be
assumed from this account that felicity comes from a confusion of
many elements. Man is made up of a mortal body and an immortal
soul, but hls final good pertains to the more noble part of himself. . .
For though those activities such as eating and drinking by which life is
supported are necessary, no thoughtful man finds in them his sovereign
good. The habit of good deeds is of the first importance, for the soul
that is not illumined and purified by the moral virtues cannot enjoy the
fruits of contemplation. The moral virtues are therefore ordained to
the intellectual. Felicity cannot be found in that imperfect state in
which there is still some good yet to be realized; that which is less noble
is ordained to that which is more noble as its final end, body to spirit,
spirit to intellect, appetite to reason, living to right living. Therefore
when Varro found felicity in both contemplation and action, he
would have done better, in my opinion, to have said that a man has
need of both action and contemplation in this life, but that his sovereign
good lies in contemplation. Nevertheless it is certain that a common-
wealth is not rightly ordered which neglects altogether, or even for
any length of time, mundane activities such as the administration of
justice, the defence of the subject, the provision of the necessary means
of subsistence, any more than a man whose soul is so absorbed in
contemplation that'he forgets to eat and drink can hope to live long. . . .
The same principles hold good for the well-ordered commonwealth.
It is ordained to the contemplative virtues as its final end, and those
things which are least in order of dignity come first in order of necessity.
Those material things necessary to the sustenance and defence of the
subject must first be secured. Nevertheless such activities are ordained.
to moral activities, and moral activities to intellectual, or the contem-
plation of the noblest subjects within the scope of men's imaginations.
Thus we see that God allotted six days for all those labours to which
Book I CONCERNING
the greater part of man's life is dedicated. But He ordained that these
labours should cease on the seventh day, and He blessed it above all
other days as the holy day of rest, so that men might then have leisure
to contemplate His works, His law, and His glory. Such is the final
end of well-ordered commonwealths, and they are the more happy
the more nearly they come to realizing it. For just as there are degrees
of felicity among men, so are there among commonwealths, some
greater, some less, in accordance with the end which each sets out to
attain. It was said of the Spartans that they were courageous and
magnanimous, but for the rest unjust and perfidious, if they could
thereby further the public interest. The sole purpose of their laws,
their customs, their institutions was to make men brave and indifferent
to hardship and pain, contemptuous of ease and pleasure, and totally
devoted to the state. The Roman Republic on the other hand was
dstinguished for its justice, and surpassed that of the Spartans, for its
citizens were not only magnanimous, but justice was the mainspring
of all their actions.
In treating of the commonwealth we must therefore try and find
means whereby it may come as near as possible to realizing the felicity
me have described, and conforming to the definition we have postu-
lated. Let us continue with the terms of the definition and pass on to
the family.
So much for the difference and the resemblance that there is between
the family and the commonwealth in general. Let us now consider the
members of the family. The government of all commonwealths,
colleges, corporate bodies, or households whatsoever, rests on the right
to command on one side, and the obligation to obey on the other,
which arises when the natural liberty w h c h each man has to live as he
chooses, is exercised subject to the power of another. The right to
command another is either of a public or a private character; public
when vested in a sovereign who declares the law, or in the magistrate
who executes it, and issues orders binding on his subordinates and
private citizens generally; private when vested in heads of households,
or in the collective authority which colleges and corporate bodies
exercise over their particular nembers, or the minority of the whole
body. Authority in the family rests on the fourfold relationship
between husband and wife, father and child, master and servant,
owner and slave. And since the rightful government of any society,
1 The Anabaptist movement in the Low Countries and in Germany in the sixteenth
century caused widespread fear and anger out of aU proportion to its real threat, because
the doctrine that the visible Church consisted of a congregation of the elect, or those
illuminated by the inner light, under a shepherd, challenged all officially organized and
inclusive Churches whether Catholic, Lutheran, or Calvinist. Attention centred on
Miinster where there was such a congregation of Anabaptists that they established control
over the nominally episcopal city. They took as their second leader in 1534,John of
Leyden, who established a regime of communism and polygamy. It took an army raised
by the Diet, and a seige of eighteen months, to capture the city, when John of Leyden was
executed and the community dissipated. Bodin returns several times to the episode as a
good illustration of all that he disapproved of. See p. IIZ and p. 143..
Book I CONCERNING
in the obedience, love, and reverence that children owe their father.
Authority properly belongs to all those who have recognized power to
command another. So, says Seneca, the prince commands his subjects,
the magistrate the citizens, the master his pupils, the captain his
soldiers, and the lord his slaves. But of all these there is none that has a
natural right to command save only the father, who is the image of
Almighty God, the Father of all things. Therefore Plato, having first
defined the laws which touch the hono~zrof God, speaks of them as an
introduction to the reverence that a son owes his father, from whom,
after God, he draws his life and all he may expect to enjoy in this world.
And just as nature impels the father to foster his child so long as he is
defenceless, and educate him in honourable and virtuous principles, so
the child is prompted, and by an even stronger impulse, to love,
honour, serve, and care for h s father, to be obedient to his commands,
support him, protect him, conceal all his infirmities and imperfections,
and to spare neither goods nor life to preserve the life of him from
whom he draws his own. This obligation is obvious, and founded in
nature. But if one wishes further proof, one has only to remember
that it was the first commandment in the second table of the law, and
the only one of the ten commandments of the Decalogue that carried
with it any promise of reward, for it is not usual to reward one who
simply does that which he is under a strict obligation to do by both
divine and positive law. Conversely we find the first curse recorded
in Scripture was the curse laid on Ham for not concealing his father's
shame. . . .
In any rightly ordered commonwealth, that power of life and death
over their children which belongs to them under the law of God and
of nature, should be restored to parents. This most primitive of cus-
toms was observed in ancient times by the Persians, and people of
Asia generally, by the Romans and the Celts; it was also recognized
throughout the Newworld till the time of the Spanish conquests. If
this power is not restored, there is no hope of any restoration of good
morals, honour, virtue, or the ancient splendour of commonwealths.
Justinian and those who have repeated h m are wrong in saying that the
Romans alone recognized such power of parents over their children.
We have the testimony of the law of God which ought to be regarded
as holy and inviolate by all peoples. W e also have the evidence of
Greek and Roman historians such as Caesar, of the customs of the
Persians, the Romans, and the Celts. He said of the Gauls that they had
I2
TKE FAMILY Chap. 2-5
power of life and death as much over their wives and children as over
their slaves. Moreover by the laws of Romulus, whereas the power
of life and death which a husband had over his wife was restricted to
four occasions only, that which he had over his children was unquali-
fied, being a plenary power to dispense life or death to them as he
thought fit, and to be seized of all property which they might acquire.
Roman fathers had such authority not only over their natural children,
but also over their children by adoption. . . .
A father is bound to educate and instruct his children, especially in the
fear of God. But if he fails of his duty, the son is not excused his,
though Solon in his laws acquitted children from the obligation of
supporting their father if he had failed to apprentice them to some
trade by which they could earn a living. There is no need to enter into
any discussion of this particular point since we are only concerned here
with the question of paternal authority. One of the greatest benefits
which resulted from it in ancient times was the proper upbringing of
children. Public courts do not take cognizance of the contempt,
disobedience, and irreverence of children towards their parents, nor the
vices to which their indiscipline disposes the young, such vices as
extravagance, drunkenness, fornication, and gambhng, not to mention
those graver crimes punishable by law, which their unhappy parents
neither dare to discover, nor have the power to punish. For children
who stand in little awe of their parents, and have even less fear of the
wrath of God, readily set at defiance the authority of magistrates,
who in any case are chiefly occupied with the habitual criminal. It is
therefore impossible that a commonwealth should prosper while the
families which are its foundation are ill-regulated. . . .
Yet paternal power was gradually undermined in the time of the
decline of the Roman Empire. The antique virtue thereupon vanished
and with it the glory of the Republic, and a million vices and evil
habits replaced the old loyalty and upright ways. For the paternal
power of life and death was gradually restricted by the ambition of the
magistrates, who wished to extend their own jurisdiction over all
such matters . . . Nowadays, fathers having been deprived of their
paternal authority, and any claim to property acquired by their
children, it is even suggested that the son can defend himself and resist
by force any unjust attempt at coercion on the part of his father, and
there are those that agree that he can . . . But I hold that it is imperative
that princes and legislators should revive the ancient laws touching
I3
Book I CONCERNING
the power of fathers over their children, and restore the usages pre-
scribed by the law of God. . . .
It may be objected that an enraged father may abuse the power which
he has over the life and property of his children. The law however puts
those who are truly mad under ward, and takes from them any power
over others when they do not possess it over themselves. But if a father
is not out of his mind, he will never be tempted to kill his own child
without cause, and if the son has merited such a fate, it is not for the
magistrate to intervene. The affection of parents for their children is so
strong, that the law has always rightly presumed that they will only do
those things which are of benefit and honour to their children. The
real danger lies in the temptation of parents to be too partial. Indeed
there are innumerable cases of parents setting at defiance both divine
and positive law in order to advance the interests of their children by
fair means or foul. Therefore the father who kills his son is not liable
to the same penalty as the parricide, for the law presumes he would
only commit such an act upon good and just grounds. The law more-
over gives hlm, to the exclusion of all others, the right to hll the
adultress, or his daughter taken in sin. All these instances show that
parents are not suspected of being liable to abuse their authority. Even
if it be true that there have been cases where such powers have been
misused, one cannot refuse to establish a good custom because certain
ill consequences might occasionally ensue. No law, however just,
natural, and necessary, but carries with it some risks. Anyone who
wished to abolish all those laws which were liable to give rise to dfi-
culties would abolish all laws whatsoever. But I hold that the natural
affection of parents for their children is incompatible with cruelty and
abuse ofpower. . . .
many rulers and legislators have upheld an institution which was un-
natural, or so many wise and virtuous men approved of them for doing
so, or so many peoples for so many centuries maintained the practice
of slavery, and even restricted the right of manumission, and still
prospered in peace and war, if it had been against nature.
Again, who would deny that it is laudible and charitable to spare the
life of a prisoner taken in legitimate warfare who cannot find a ransom,
instead of killing him in cold blood, for this was generally the origin
of enslavement. Moreover a man is required by divine and positive
law to submit to corporal punishment if he cannot pay the forfeit for
any act he has committed. No one doubts that those who make violent
assaults upon the goods and lives of others are brigands and robbers,
deserving of death. It cannot be against nature in such a case to exact
services from the malefactor instead of killing him. If it were against
nature to have power of life and death over another, all kingdoms and
lordships in the world would be against nature, seeing that icings and
princes have the like power over their subjects, noble and simple, if they
are proved guilty of a capital crime.
All these arguments tend to prove that slavery is natural, useful, and
right. I think however that strong objections can be urged against
them all. I agree that servitude is natural where the strong, brutal,
rich, and ignorant obey the wise, prudent, and humble, poor though
they may be. But no one would deny that to subject wise men to fools,
the well-informed to the ignorant, saints to sinners is against nature . . .
One sees in fact how often quiet and peaceable men are the prey of
evildoers. When princes attempt to settle their differences by war, it is
always claimed that the victor had right on his side, and the vanquished
were in the wrong. If the vanquished did indeed make war without
just cause, as do brigands, ought one not rather to make an example of
them and put them to death, than to show them mercy? As for the
argument that slavery could not have been so enduring if it had been
contrary to nature, I would answer that the principle holds good for
natural agents whose property it is to obey of necessity the unchanging
laws of God. But man, being given the choice between good and evil,
inclines for the most part to that which is forbidden, and chooses the
evil, defjmg the laws of God and of nature. So much is such a one
under the domination of his corrupt imagination, that he takes his own
will for the law. There is no sort of impiety or wickedness which in
this way has not come to be accounted virtuous and good. I will be
I6
THE FAMILY Chap. 2-5
content with one instance. It is sufficiently obvious that there can be no
more cruel and detestable practice than human sacrifice. Yet there is
hardly a people which has not practised it, and each and all have done
so for centuries under the cover of piety. In our own times it was com-
mon throughout the Western Isles . . . Such things show how little the
laws of nature can be deduced from the practices of men, however
inveterate, and one cannot on these grounds accept slavery as natural.
Again, what charity is there in sparing captives in order to derive some
profit or advantage from them as if they were cattle? For where is the
man who would spare the lives of the vanquished if he saw more profit
in hlling than in sparing them? . . .
I will refrain from setting down in words the base humiliations that
slaves have been made to suffer. But the cruelties one reads about
are unbelievable, and yet only the thousandth part has been told. For
writers only refer to the subject incidentally, and such accounts as we
have, come from the most civilized races in the world. Slaves were
made to work in the fields chained, as they still do in Barbary, and
sleep in the open when work was done, as they still do everywhere in
the East, for fear that they would abscond, or fire the house, or murder
their masters . . . So much have cities and commonwealths always
feared their slaves that they have never dared to permit them the use of
arms, or to be enrolled for service. It was forbidden on pain of death. . .
Yet they never succeeded so well but that some desperate man, by
promising liberty to the slaves, threw the whole state into confusion,
as did Viriat the pirate who made himself King of Portugal, Cinna,
Spartacus, and others down to Simon Gerson the Jew. All these raised
themselves from humble origins to be powerful rulers simply by
enfranchising the slaves who joined them. . . .
Since the Christian religion was established however the number of
slaves has diminished. The process was hastened by the publication of
the law of Mahomet, which enfranchised all who rofessed that faith.
P
By the year 1200 slavery had been abolished near y everywhere save
in the West Indies, where great numbers were found at the time of
their discovery . . . It may be objected that if the Mohammedans really
enfranchised their co-religionists, who cover the whole of Asia, the
greater part of Africa and even a considerable area of Europe, and the
Christians have done the same, how come there to be still so many slaves
in the world? For the Jews by the terms of their law may not make
slaves of their own people either, nor yet of Christians if they live in a
E 17
Book I CONCERNING
So much for the meaning of the terms subject, citizen, and alien. Let
us now consider allies, especiallythose under protection, for no one who
has written about the commonwealth has considered this subject,
important as it is for all governments. The term protection can be
applied in a general sense to all subjects owing obedience to a sovereign
lord or prince. As we have already shown, the.prince is obliged to safe-
guard the persons, possessions, and families of h s subjects, by force of
arms, and by force of law, while his subjects are under a reciprocal
obligation to give their prince loyal and obedient service. This is the
first and most effective form of protection there is. The rights of pro-
tection that masters have over their slaves, patrons over their freedmen,
and lords over their vassals are much inferior. The slave, freedman,
vassal, it is true, owes faith, homage, and service to his lord, but subject
to the prior claims of his sovereign prince, whose liege man he is. In
the same way the soldier owes obedience and assistance to his captain,
and merits death if he does not guard his life at the risk of his own.
But in treaties between sovereign princes the word protection is used
in a special sense, implying neither subjection on the part of the one
who is protected, nor right to command in the one who protects. The
22
THE CITIZEN Chap. 6 and 7
latter can only claim honour and reverence from those whose defence
he has undertaken; their sovereignty is in no way diminished by the
relationship, nor has he any authority over them. This particular right
of protection is therefore the best, the most honourable and dignified
of all rights. Sovereign princes, masters, patrons, and overlords exact
obedience and derive some profit from the defence of their subjects,
slaves, freedmen, or vassals as the case may be. But the simple protector
is satisfled with the mere honour and gratitude of his protkgls. If he
takes any profit it is not, properly speaking, simple protection that he
gives. If anyone lends any of his belongings to another, or assists him
by good offices on his behalf, but sees he makes a profit in so doing, he
is no better than a mercenary who hires out his services for gain. In the
same way if anyone freely promises assistance to another, he is obliged
to redeem his promise without expecting any reward for so doing.
There is no promise more binding than the undertaking to defend the
goods, the life, and the honour of the weak against the strong, the poor
against the rich, or the innocent threatened by the violence of wicked
men. . . .
ProtCgts are sometimes called clients, and protectors patrons, because
of a similarity in the two relationships. But it is the difference between
them that is more important. The freedman owes services to his patron
and can be reduced to servitude again if he fails in his obligations. But
the prottg6 owes no services, and cannot be deprived of his liberty
. however ingrate he may be. The freedman must leave a proportion
of his goods to his patron should he predecease him. The protkgi owes
nothing of his inheritance to his protector. Again the vassal also
resembles the prottgt to such an extent that some have confused the
two. But again, the difference between them is more sigdicant than
the resemblance. The vassal owes faith, homage, and honour to his
lord. If he commits a felony, renounces his allegiance, or refuses the
services due to his lord he loses his fief, which then reverts to his lord
by right of escheat. The protigt, holding no fief, has no such pelldty
to fear. Furthermore if the vassal is his lord's liege man, he is also his
natural subject, and owes him not only faith and homage but submission
and obedience, and canilot escape from the authority of his sovereign
lord without his consent, even should he have been deprived of his fief.
The prot6gC bears no such relationship to his protector, and is not sub-
ject to him. . ..
But in the case of the sovereign prince who puts himself under the
23
Book I CONCERNING
that neither the Roman Dictator, the Harmost of Sparta, the Esyrnnete
of Salonika,the Archus of Malta, nor the ancient Balia of Florence (who
had the same sort of authority), nor regents of kingdoms, nor holders
of any other sort of commission, nor magistrates whatsoever, who
have absolute power to govern the commonwealth for a certain term
only, Are possessed of sovereign authority. . . .
But supposing the king grants absolute power to a lieutenant for the
term of his life, is not that a perpetual sovereign power? For if one
confines perpetual to that which has no termination whatever, then
sovereignty cannot subsist save in aristocracies and popular states, which
never die. If one is to include monarchy too, sovereignty must be
vested not in the king alone, but in the king and the heirs of his body,
which supposes a strictly hereditary monarchy. In that case there can
be very few sovereign kings, since there are only a very few strictly
hereditary monarchies. Those especially who come to the throne by
election could not be included.
A perpetual authority therefore must be understood to mean one that
lasts for the lifetime of him who exercises it. If a sovereign magistrate
is given office for one year, or for any other predetermined period, and
continues to exercise the authority bestowed on I i r n after the conclu-
sion of his term, he does so either by consent or by force and violence.
If he does so by force, it is manifest tyranny. The tyrant is a true
sovereign for all that. The robber's possession by violence is true and
natural possession although contrary to the law, for those who were
formerly in possession have been disseized. But if the magistrate con-
tinues in office by consent, he is not a sovereign prince, seeing that he
only exercises power on sufferance. Still less is he a sovereign if the
term of his office is not fixed, for in that case he has no more than a
precarious commission. . . .
What bearing have these consideratioils on the case of the man to
whom the people has given absolute power for the term of his natural
life? One must distinguish. If such absolute power is given him simply
and unconditionally, and not in virtue of some office or commission,
nor in the form of a revocable grant, the recipient certainly is, and
should be acknowledged to be, a sovereign. The people has re-
nounced and alienated its sovereign power in order to invest him with
it and put him in possession, and it thereby transfers to him all its
powers, authority, and sovereign rights, just as does the man who gives
to another possessory and proprietary rights over what he formerly
26
SOVEREIGNTY Chap. 8
owned. The civil law expresses this in the phrase 'all power is conveyed
to him and vested in him'.l
But if the people give such power for the term of his natural life to
anyone as its official or lieutenant, or only gives the exercise of such
power, in such a case he is not a sovereign, but simply an officer,
lieutenant, regent, governor, or agent, and as such has the exercise only
of a power inhering in another. When a magistrate institutes a per-
petual lieutenant, even if he abandons all his rights of jurisdiction and
leaves their exercise entirely to his lieutenant, the authority to com-
mand and to judge nevertheless does not reside in the lieutenant, nor
the action and force of the law derive from him. If he exceeds his
authority his acts have no validity, unless approved and confirmed by
h m from whom he draws his authority. For this reason King John,
after his return from captivity in England, solemnly ratified all the acts
of his son Charles, who had acted in his name as regent, in order, as was
necessary, to regularize the position.
Whethcr then one exercises the power of another by commission,
by institution, or by delegation, or whether such exercise is for a set
term, or in perpetuity, such a power is n9t a sovereign power, even if
there is no mention of such words as representative, lieutenant, gover-
nor, or regent, in the letters of appointment, or even if such powers are
a consequence of the normal working of the laws of the country. In
ancient times in Scotland, for instance, the law vested the entire govern-
ance of the realm in the next of kin, if the king should be a minor, on
condition that everything that was done, was done in the king's name.
But this law was later altered because of its inconvenient con-
sequences. ,
Let us now turn to the other t q m of our definition and consider the
force of the word absolute. The people or the magnates of a common-
wealth can bestow simply and unconditionally upon someone of their
choice a sovereign and perpetual power to dispose of their property and
persons, to govern the state as he thinks fit, and to order the succession,
in the same way that any proprietor, out of his liberality, can freely and
unconditionally make a gift of his property to another. Such a form of
gift, not being qualified in any way, is the only true gift, being at once
unconditional and irrevocable. Gifts burdened with obligations and
hedged with conditions are not true gifts. Similarly sovereign power
given to a prince charged with conditions is neither properly sovereign,
1 Ei et in eum omnem potestatem contulit.
27
Book I CONCERNING
nor absolute, unless the con&tions of appointment are only such as are
inherent in the laws of God and of nature. . . .
~fwe insist however that absolute power means exemption from all
law whatsoever, there is no prince in the world who can be regarded as
sovereign, since all the princess of the earth are subject to the laws of
God and of nature, and even to certain human laws common to all
nations. On the other hand, it is possible for a subject who is neither a
prince nor a ruler, to be exempted from all the laws, ordinances, and
customs of the commonwealth. W e have an example in Pompey the
Great who was dispensed from the laws for five years, by express
enactment of the Roman people, at the instance of the Tribune Gabinius
. . . But notwithstanding such exemptions from the operations of the
law, the subject remains under the authority of him who exercises
sovereign power, and owes him obedience.
On the other hand it is the distinguishing mark of the sovereign that
he cannot in any way be subject to the commands of another, for it is he
who makes law for the subject, abrogates law already made, and
amends obsolete law: No one who is subject either to the law or to
some other person can do this. That is why it is laid down in the civil
law that the prince is above the law, for the word law in Latin implies
the command of him who is invested with sovereign power. There-
fore we find in all statutes the phrase 'notwithstanding all edicts and
ordinances to the contrary that we have infringed, or do infringe by
these present'. This clause applies both to former acts of the prince
himself, and to those of his predecessors. For all laws, ordinances,
letters patent, privileges, and grants whatsoever issued by the prince,
have force only during his own lifetime, and must be expressly, or at
least tacitly, confirmed by the reigning prince who has cognizance of
them . . . In proof of which, it is the custom of this realm for all corpor-
ations and corporate bodies to ask for the confirmation of their privileges,
rights, and jurisdictions, on the accession of a new king. Even Parle-
ments and high courts do this, as well as individual officers of the crown.
If the prince is not bound by the laws of his predecessors, still less can
he be bound by his own laws. One may be subject to laws made by
another, but it is impossible to bind oneself in any matter which is the
subject of one's own free exercise of will. As the law says, 'there can be
no obligationin any matter which proceeds from the free will of the un-
dertaker'.~It follows of necessity that the king cannot be subject to his
Nulla obligatio consistere potest, quae a voluntate promittentis statum capit.
28
SOVEREIGNTY Chap. 8
own laws. Just as, according to the canonists, the Pope can never tie
his own hands, so the sovereign prince cannot bind himself, even if he
wishes. For this reason edicts and ordinances conclude with the formula
'for such is our good pleasure', thus intimating that the laws of a
sovereign prince, evenwhen founded on truth and right reason, proceed
simply from his own free will.
It is far otherwise with divine and natural laws. All the princes of the
earth are subject to them, and cannot contravene them without treason '
and rebellion against God. His yoke is upon them, and they must bow
their heads in fear and reverence before His divine majesty. The
absolute power of princes and sovereign lords does not extend to the
laws of God and of nature. He who best understood the meaning of
absolute power, and made kings and emperors submit to his will,
defined his sovereignty as a power to override positive law; he did not
claim power to set aside divine and natural 1aw.l
But supposing the prince should swear to keep the laws and customs
of his country, is he not bound by that oath? One must distinguish. If
a prince promises in his own heart to obey his own laws, he is neverthe-
less not bound to do so, any more than anyone is bound by an oath
taken to himself. Even private citizens are not bound by private oaths
to keep agreements. The law permits them to cancel them, even if the
agreements are in themselves reasonable and good. But if one sovereign
prince promises another sovereign prince to keep the agreements
entered into by his predecessors, he is bound to do so even if not under
oath, if that other prince's interests are involved. If they are not, he is
not bound either by a promise, or even by an oath.
The same holds good of promises made by the sovereign to the
subject, even if the promises were made prior to his election (for this
does not make the difference that many suppose). It is not that the
prince is bound either by his own laws or those of his predecessors.
But he is bound by the just covenants and promises he has made,
whether under oath to do so or not, to exactly the same extent that a
private individual is bound in l k e case. A private individual can be
released from a promise that was unjust or unreasonable, or beyond his
competence to fulfil, or extracted from him by misrepresentations or
fraud, or made in error, or under restraint and by intimidation, because
of the injury the keeping of it does him. In the same way a sovereign
prince can make good any invasion of his sovereign rights, and for the
1 There is a marginal reference to Innocent IV. ,
29
Book I CONCERNING
same reasons. So the principle stands, that the prince is not subject to
his own laws, or those of his predecessors, but is bound by the just and
reasonable engagements w h c h touch the interests of his subjects
individually or collectively.
Many have been led astray by confusing the laws of the prince with
covenants entered into by him. This confusion has led some to call
these covenants contractual laws. This is the term used in Aragon
when the king issues an ordinance upon the petition of the Estates, and
in return receives some aid or subsidy. It is claimed that he is strictly
bound by these laws, even though he is not by any of his other enact-
ments. It is however admitted that he may override even these when
the purpose of their enactment no longer holds. All this is true enough,
and well-founded in reason and authority. But no bribe or oath is
required to bind a sovereign prince to keep a law which is in the
interests of his subjects. The bare word of a prince should be as sacred
as a divine pronouncement. It loses its force if he is ill-thought of as one
who cannot be trusted except under oath, nor relied on to keep a
promise unless paid to do so. Nevertheless it remains true in principle
that the sovereign prince can set aside the laws which he has promised
or sworn to observe, if they no longer satisfy the requirements of
justice, and he may do this without the consent of his subjects. It
should however be added that the abrogation must be express and
explicit in its reference, and not just in the form of a general repudia-
tion. But if on the other hand there is no just cause for breaking a law
which the prince has promised to keep, the prince ought not to do so,
and indeed cannot contravene it, though he is not bound to the same
extent by the promises and covenants of his predecessors unless he
succeeds by strict hereditary right.
A law and a covenant must therefore not be confused. A law pro-
ceeds from him who has sovereign power, and by it he binds the sub-
ject to obedience, but cannot bind himself. A covenant is a mutual
undertaking between a prince and his subjects, equally binding on both
parties, and neither can contravene it to the prejudice of the other, with-
out his consent. The prince has no greater privilege than the subject
in this matter. But in the case of laws, a prince is no longer bound by
his promise to keep them when they cease to satisfy the claims ofjustice.
Subjects however must keep their engagements to one another in all
circumstances, unless the prince releases them from such obligations.
Sovereign princes are not bound by oath to keep the laws of their
30
SOVEREIGNTY Chap. 8
predecessors. If they are so bound, they are not properly speaking
sovereign. . . .
The constitutional laws of the realm, especially those that concern the
king's estate being, like the salic law, annexed and united to the
Crown, cannot be infringed by the prince. Should he do so, his suc-
cessor can always annul any act prejudicial to the traditional form of
the monarchy,' since on this is founded and sustained his very claim to
sovereign majesty. . . .
As for laws relating to the subject, whether general or particular,
which do not involve any question of the constitution, it has always
been usual only to change them with the concurrence of the three
estates, either assembled in the States-General of the whole of France, or
in each bailiwick separately. Not that the king is bound to take their
advice, or debarred from acting in a way quite contrary to what they
wish, if his acts are based on justice and natural reason. At the same
time the majesty of the prince is most f d y manifested in the assembly
of the three estates of the whole realm, humbly petitioning and supplica-
ting him, without any power of commanding or determining, or any
right to a deliberative voice. Only that which it pleases the prince to
assent to or dissent from, to command or to forbid, has the force of law
and is embodied in his edict or ordinance.
Those who have written books about the duties of magistrates and
such like mattersQre in error in maintaining that the authority of the
, Estates is superior to that of the prince. Such doctrines serve only to
encourage subjects to resist their sovereign rulers. Besides, such views
bear no relation to the facts, except when the king is in captivity,
lunatic or a minor. If he were normally subject to the Estates, he would
be neither a prince nor a sovereign, and the commonwealth would not
be a kingdom or a monarchy, but a pure aristocracy where authority
is shared equally between the members of the ruling class. . . .
Although in the Parliaments of the kingdom of England, which
meet every three years, all three orders use great freedom of speech, as
is characteristic of northern peoples, they still must proceed by petitions
and supplications . . . Moreover Parliaments in England can only
assemble, as in this kingdom and in Spain, under letters patent expressly
summoning them in the king's name. This is s ~ ~ c i e proof nt that
Parliaments have no independent power of considering, commanding
1 The term used is 'lois royales'.
2 A reference to Thtodore Btza, Du droit des Magistrats, 1576?
Book I CONCERNING
properly natural laws. Laws which are profitable as well as just are
even more binding on him. One need hardly concern oneself about the
sanctity of laws which involve neither profit nor honour. But if it is a
question of weighing honour against profit, honour should always be
preferred. Aristides the Just said of Themistocles that his advice was
always very useful to the people, but shameful and dishonourable.
But if a law is simply useful and does not involve any principle of
natural justice, the prince is not bound by it, but can amend it or annul
it altogether as he chooses, provided that with the alteration of the law
the profit to some does not do damage to others without just cause.
The prince then can annul an ordinance which is merely useful in order
to substitute one more or less advantageous, for profit, honour, and
justice all have degrees of more and less. And just as the prince can
choose the most useful among profitable laws, so he can choose the -
most just among equitable laws, even though while some profit by
them others suffer, provided it is the public that profits, and only the
private individual that suffers. It is however never proper for the sub-
ject to disobey the laws of the prince under the pretext that honour and
justice require it. . . .
Edicts and ordinances therefore do not bind the ruler except in so far
as they embody the principles of natural justice; that ceasing, the
obligation ceases. But subjects are bound till the ruler has expressly
abrogated the law, for it is a law both divine and natural that we should
obey the edicts and ordinances of him whom God has set in authority
over us, providing his edicts are not contrary to God's law. For just
as the rear-vassal owes an oath of fealty in respect of and against all
others, saving his sovereign prince, so the subject owes allegiance to h s
sovereign prince in respect of and against all others, saving the majesty
of God, who is lord of all the princes of this world. From this principle
we can deduce that other rule, that the sovereign prince is bound by the
covenants he makes either with his subjects, or some other prince. Just
because he enforces the covenants and mutual engagements entered
into by his subjects among themselves, he must be the mirror ofjustice
in all his own acts . . . He has a double obligation in this case. He is
bound in the first place by the ~rinciplesof natural equity, which
require that conventions and solemn promises should be kept, and in the
second place in the interests of his own good faith, which he ought topre-
serve even to his own disadvantage, because he is the formal guarantor
to all his subjects of the mutual faith they owe one another. . . .
34
SOVEREIGNTY Chap. 8
A distinction must therefore be made between right and law, for one
implies what is equitable and the other what is commanded. Law is
nothing else than the command of the sovereign in the exercise of his
sovereign power. A sovereign prince is not subject to the laws of the
Greeks, or any other alien power, or even those of the Romans, much
less to his own laws, except in so far as they embody the law of nature
which, according to Pindar, is the law to which all kings and princes
are subject. Neither Pope nor Emperor is exempt from thislaw, though
certain flatterers say they can take the goods of their subjects at will.
But both civilians and canonists have repudiated this opinion as con-
trary to the law of God. They err who assert that in virtue of their
sovereign power princes can do this. It is rather the law of the jungle,
an act of force and violence. For as we have shown above, absolute
power only implies freedom in relation to positive laws, and not in
relation to the law of God. God has declared explicitly in His Law that
it is notjust to take, or even to covet, the goods of another. Those who
defend such opinions are even more dangerous than those who act on
them. They show the lion his claws, and arm princes under a cover of
just claims. The evil will of a tyrant, drunk with such flatteries, urges
him to an abuse of absolute power and excites his violent passions to the
pitch where avarice issues in confiscations, desire in adultery, and anger
in murder. . . .
Since then the prince has no power to exceed the laws of nature
which God Himself, whose image he is, has decreed, he cannot take his
subjects' property without just and reasonable cause, that is to say by
purchase, exchange, legitimate confiscation, or to secure peace with
the enemy when it cannot be otherwise achieved. Natural reason
instructs us that the public good must be preferred to the particular,
and that subjects should give up not only their mutual antagonisms and
animosities, but also their possessions, for the safety of the common-
wealth. . . .
It remains to be determined whether the prince is bound by the
covenants of his predecessors, and whether, if so, it is a derogation or
his sovereign power . . . A distinction must be made between the ruler
who succeeds because he is the natural heir of his predecessor, and the
ruler who succeeds in virtue of the laws and customs of the realm. In
the first case the heir is bound by the oaths and prcimises of his pre-
decessors just as is any ordinary heir. In the second case he is not so
bound even if he is sworn, for the oath of the predecessor does not bind
35
Book I CONCERNING FEUDATORY
the successor. He is bound however in all that tends to the benefit of the
kingdom.
There are those who will say that there is no need of such distinctions
since the prince is bound in any case by the law of nations, under which
covenants are guaranteed. But I consider that these distinctions are
necessary nevertheless, since the prince is bound as much by the law
of nations, but no more, than by any of his own enactments. If the
law of nations is iniquitous in any respect, he can disallow it within his
own kingdom, and forbid h s subjects to observe it, as was done in
France in regard to slavery. He can do the same in relation to any
other of its provisions, so long as he does nothing against the law of
God. Ifjustice is the end of the law, the law the work of the prince, and
the prince the image of God, it follows of necessity that the law of the
prince should be modelled on the law of God.
approved of the way the temporal power of the Popes had been built
up, he admitted it as a fact. He regarded the Spanish kingdoms, Naples,
Hungary, and Jerusalem together with many of the Italian city states as
Papal fiefs. The rest of the Italian states, with the exception of Venice
were Imperial fiefs. The New World was also held of the Pope in
consequence of the Bull of Alexander VI. The Emperor he would not
allow to be a sovereign prince anywhere. He either held of the Pope,
or in Germany itself was subject to the Diet, for he regarded Germany
as an aristocracy. His views on England are not so clear. It was a Papal
fief till Henry VIII repudiated Papal authority. He says however in
another place that feudal dependence was imprescriptible unless the fief
was abandoned. Yet whereas in one place he speaks of the Swiss
Cantons as originally fiefs of the Empire, he ends by describing them
as absolute sovereign states, admitting no overlord. Of the Moham-
medan world he says he has not enough evidence to discuss it, but he
notices a passage in the Koran which forbids the title of Seigneur to any
but the Caliph, and supposes that this is why no Mohammedan ruler
wears a crown.
Tributary princes he hardly discusses, since by his own account it is
a temporary status. He gives a few examples such as the tribute paid
by Carthage to Rome, or by the Emperor Ferdinand to the Sultan in
respect of the kingdom of Hungary. France alone emerges from t h s
survey with an unqualified claim to be a sovereign state with no
linziration whatsoever. In 11. v [p. 671 however he lists France,
Spain, England, Scotland, Ethiopia, Turkey, Persia, and Muscovy as
absolute and sovereign monarchies.]
BECAUSE there are none on earth, after God, greater than sovereign
princes, whom God establishes as H.ISlieutenants to coinmand the
rest of mankind, we must enquire carefully into their estate, that we
may respect and revere their majesty in all due obedience, speak and
think of them with all due honour. He who contemns his sovereign
prince, contemns God whose image he is. . . .
Aristotle, Polybius, and Dionysius Halicarnassus alone among the
Greeks discussed the attributes of sovereignty. But they treated the
subject so briefly that one can see at a glance that they did not really
understand the principles involved. I quote Aristotle. 'There are', he
OF SOVEREIGNTY Cllfl]~.I0
and draws its force from him who has the right to bind all the rest.
Custom is established imperceptibly and without any exercise of
compulsion. Law is ~romulgatedand imposed by authority, and often
against the wishes of the subject. For this reason Dion Chrysostom
compared custom to the king and law to the tyrant. Moreover law can
break custom, but custom cannot derogate from the law, nor can the
magistrate, or any other responsible for the administration of law, use
h s discretion about the enforcement of law as he can about custom.
Law, unless it is permissive and relaxes the severity of another law,
always carries penalties for its breach. Custom only has binlng force
by the sufferance and during the good pleasure of the sovereign prince,
and so far as he is w i h g to authorize it. Thus the force of both
statutes and customary law derives from the authorization of the
prince . . . Included in the power of malung and unmaking law is that
of promulgating it and amending it when it is obscure, or when the
magistrates find contradictions and absurdities. . . .
--A All the other attributes and rights of sovereignty are included in this
power of making and unmakmg law, so that strictly speaking this is
the unique attribute of sovereign power. It includes all other rights of
sovereignty, that is to say of making peace and war, of hearing appeals
from the sentences of all courts whatsoever, of appointing and dis-
missing the great officers of state; of taxing, or granting privileges of
exemption to all subjects, of appreciating or depreciating the value and
weight of the coinage, of receiving oaths of fidelity from subjects and
liege-vassals alike, without exception of any other to whom faith
is due. . . .
But because law is an unprecise and general term, it is as well to
specify the other attributes of sovereignty comprised in it, such as the
making of war and peace. T h s is one of the most important rights of
sovereignty, since it brings in its train either the ruin or the salvation
of the state. This was a right of sovereignty not only among the ancient
Romans, but has always been so among all other peoples . . . Sovereign
princes are therefore accustomed to keep themselves informed of the
smallest accidents and undertakings connected with warfare. What-
ever latitude they may give to their representatives to negotiate peace
or an alliance, they never grant the authority to conclude without
their own express consent. This was illustrated in the negotiations
leading up to the recent treaty of CBteaux-CambrCsis, when the king's
envoys kept him almost hourly informed of all proposals and counter-
44
OF SOVEREIGNTY Chap. 10
proposals . . . In popular states and aristocracies the difliculty of assem-
bling the people, and the danger of making public all the secrets of
diplomacy has meant that the people have generally handed respon-
sibility over to the council. Nevertheless it remains true that the
commissions and the orders that it issues in discharge of this function
proceed from the authority of the people, and are ;despatched by the
council in the name of the people. . . .
The third attribute of sovereignty is the power to institute the great
officers of state. It has never been questioned that the right is an
attribute of sovereignty, at any rate as far as the great officers are
concerned. I confme it however to high officials, for there is no
commonwealth in which these officers, and many guilds and corporate
bodies besides, have not some power of appointing their subordinate
officials. They do this in virtue of their office, which carries with it the
power to delegate. For instance, those who hold feudal rights of
jurisdiction of their sovereign prince in faith and homage have the
power to appoint the judges in their courts, and their assistants. But
thls power is devolved upon them by the prince . . . It is therefore not
the mere appointment of officials that implies sovereign right, but the
authorization and confirmation of such appointments. It is true
however that in so far as the exercise of this nght is delegated, the
sovereignty of the prince is to that extent qualified, unless his concur-
rence and express consent is required.
The fourth attribute of sovereignty; and one which has always been
among its principal rights, is that the prince should be the final resort of
appeal from all other courts.. . Even though the prince may have pub-
lished a law, as did Caligula, forbidding any appeal or petition against
the sentences of his officers, nevertheless the subject cannot be deprived
of the right to make an appeal, or present a petition, to the prince in
person. For the prince cannot tie his own hands in this respect, nor take
from his subjects the means of redress, supplication, and petition,
notwithstanding the fact that all rules governing appeals and juris-
dictions are matters of positive law, which we have shown does not
bind the prince. This is why the Privy Council, including the Chancel-
lor de l'H6pita1, considered the action of the commissioners deputed to
hold an enquiry into the conduct of the President l'Alemantl irregular
and unprecedented. They had forbidden him to approach within
twenty leagues of the court, with the intention of denying him any
1 I have been unable to identify this episode.
Book I THE TRUE ATTRIBUTES
opportunity of appeal. The king himself could not deny this right to
the subject, though he is free to make whatsoever reply to the appeal,
favourable or unfavourable, that he pleases . . .Were it otherwise, and
the prince could acquit lus subjects or his vassals from the obligation
to submit their causes to him in the last instance, he would make of
them sovereigns equal with himself. . . But if he would preserve his
authority, the surest way of doing so is to avoid ever devolving any
of the attributes of sovereignty upon a subject. . . .
With this right is coupled the right of pardoning convicted persons,
and so of overruling the sentences of his own courts, in mitigation of
the severity of the law, whether touching life, property, honour, or
domicile. It is not in the power of any magistrate, whatever his
station, to do any of these things, or to make any revision of the
judgement he has once given . . . In a well-ordered commonwealth
the right should never be delegated either to a specialcommission, or to
any high officer of state, save in those circumstances where it is neces-
sary to establish a regency, either because the king is abroad in some
distant place, or in captivity, or incapable, or under age. For instance,
during the minority of Louis IX, the authority of the Crown was
vested in his mother Blanche of Castile as his guardian . . . Princes
however tend to abuse t h s right, thinking that to pardon is pleasing
to God, whereas to exact the utmost punishment is displeasing to Him.
But I hold, subject to correction, that the sovereign prince cannot
remit any penalty imposed by the law of God, any more than he can
dispense any one from the operation of the law of God, to which he
himself is subject. If the magistrate who dispenses anyone from
obedience to the ordinance of his king merits death, how much more
unwarrantable is it for the prince to acquit a man of the punishment
ordained by God's law? If a sovereign prince cannot deny a subject
his civil rights, how can he acquit him of the penalties imposed by God,
such as the death penalty exacted by divine law for treacherous murder?
It may be objected that the prince can never show the quality of
mercy if he cannot remit punishments prescribed by divine law. But
in my opinion there are other means of showing clemency, such as
pardoning breaches of positive laws. For instance, if the prince
forbids the carrying of arms, or the selling of foodstuffs to the enemy
in time of war, on pain of death, he can very properly pardon the
offence of carrying arms if it was done in self-defence, or the selling of
provisions if done under the pressure of extreme poverty. Again, the
46
OF SOVEREIGNTY C ~ Z OI0~ ? .
penalty for larceny under the civil law is death. A merciful prince
can reduce this to fourfold restitution, which is what is required by
divine law. It has always been the custom among Christian kings to
pardon unpardonable offences on Good Friday. But pardons of this
kind bring in their train pestilences, famine, war, and the downfall of
states. That is why it is said in the law of God that in punishng those
who have merited death one averts the curse on the whole people. Of
a hundred criminals only two are brought to justice, and of those
brought to justice only one half are proved guilty. If the few proven
cases of guilt are pardoned, how can punishment act as a deterrent to
evil-doers? . . . The best way for a prince to exercise his prerogative of
mercy is to pardon offences against his own person. O f all exercises
of mercy none is more pleasing to God. But what can one hope of the
prince who cruelly avenges all injuries to hmself, but pardons those
inflicted on others? . . .
Faith and homage are also among the nlost important attributes of
sovereignty, as was made clear when the prince was described as the
one to whom obedience was due without exception.
As for the right of coinage, it is contained within the law-making
power, for only he who can make law can regulate currency. This is
illustrated in the very terms used by Greeks, Romans, and French alike,
for the word nunlnius comes from the Greek nomos signifying both
law and alloy. There is nothng of more moment to a country, after
the law, than the denomination, the value, and the weight of the
coinage, as we have already shown in a separate treatise.l Therefore in
every well-ordered commonwealth the prince reserves thls right
exclusively to hmself . . . And although in this kingdom many private
persons, such as the ~ i i o m t ede Touraine, the Bishops of Meaux,
Cahors, Agde, Ambrun and the Counts of St. Pol, de la Marche,
Nevers, Blois, and others enjoyed this right, Francis I in a general
edict cancelled all such rights whatsoever, declaring the concessions
null and void. This right and attribute of sovereignty ought not ever
to be granted to a subject. . . .
The right of levying taxes and imposing dues, or of exempting
persons from the payment of such, is also part of the power of making
This treatise was published three times under different titles. In 1568 as RGonse au
paradoxe de Monsieur de Malestroict, in 1574 as Discours sur les causes dc l'extrkrne chert6 qrri
est aujourd'hrri en France, and in 1578 as Discours de Jean Boditi sur le rehaussement et diminu-
tion des Monnaies. In 1591 a Latin translation appeared.
Book I THE TRUE ATTRIBUTES
1 This has not survived. In hls will Bodin directed that many of his earlier or less
important works should be destroyed. The D e Imperio belongs to the Toulouse period,
and was probably a sketch of parts of the Six books ofthe Commonwealtlt.
BOOK T W O
Now that we have determined what sovereignty is, and have described
its rights and attributes, we must consider in whom it is vested in
every kind of commonwealth, in order to determine what are the
various possible types of state. If sovereignty is vested in a single prince
we call the state a monarchy. If all the people share in it, it is a popular
state. If only a minority, it is an aristocracy.
It is desirable to be exact in the use of these terms in order to avoid
the confusion which has arisen as a result of the great variety of govern-
ments, good and bad. This has misled some into distinguishing more
than three kinds of commonwealth. But if one adopts the principle of
distinguishing between commonwealths according to the particular
virtues and vices that are characteristic of each, one is soon faced with
an infinity of variations. It is a principle of all sound definition that
one should pay no regard to accidental properties, which are innumer-
able, but confine oneself to formal and essential distinctions. Otherwise
one becomes entangled in a labyrinth w h c h defies exact analysis. For
there is no reason why one should stop short at the difference
between good and bad. There are other inessential variations. A king
can be chosen for his strength, his beauty, his fame, his noble birth,
his wealth, all of them matters of indifference. Or he may be chosen
because he is the most warlike or most peace-loving, the wisest, the
most just, a lover of display, of great learning, the most prudent, the
most modest, the simplest, the most chaste. One could add to the list
indefinitely and arrive at an infinity of types of monarchy. It would
be the same in the case of aristocracies. The ruling class might be
drawn from the rich, the nobles, or those esteemed as wise, or just, or
warlike. Moreover, one would have to make a similar reckoning of
bad qualities. The result would be merely absurd, and for this reason
such a method of classification must be rejected.
Since then the nature of things is not changed by their accidental
properties, we conclude that there are only three types of state, or
commonwealth, monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. A state is
called a monarchy when sovereignty is vested in one person, and the
rest have only to obey. Democracy, or the popular state, is one in
51
Book 2 OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS
other powers, vested in ofEicials, really belong to the people, and are
only entrusted by them to the magistrates. The people, having in-
stituted the latter, can also deprive them, and the state therefore
remains a ~ o p u l a rone. In order to confirm what I have just said, let
us look more closely at the examples of mixed states cited by Polybius,
Contarini and others. . . .
One of the examples given is Rome, whose constitution, it is alleged,
was a mixture of monarchy, democracy, and aristocracy, in such a way
that according to Polybius the Consuls embody the monarchical
principle, the Senate the aristocratic, the Estates of the people the
democratic. Halicarnassus, Cicero, Contarini, and others have accepted
this analysis, inaccurate as it is. In the first place monarchical power
cannot subsist in two persons simultaneously, since monarchy by
definition is the rule of one. If it is divided, there is either no monarchy,
or no kingdom. One could, with more reason, describe the Doge of
Genoa or Venice as a monarch. But in any case what kingly power
could be ascribed to the Consuls, seeing that they could not make law,
declare war and peace, appoint any oflicials, pardon any offenders,
spend a penny of public money, or even condemn a citizen to corporal
punishment except in time of war? This last power belongs to any
leader in the field. These would also have to be called kings, and with
more reason. The Constable in this realm, and the great Pascha in
Turkey have ten times the power of the two Consuls put together,
yet they are no more than the subjects and slaves of the prince, as the
Consuls were of the people. . . .
Again, conduct of affairs of state undertaken by the Senate, and the
decisions reached by it, had no force unless confirmed by the people,
or assented to by the tribunes, as will be explained more fully when we
come to deal with the council in the state. There can be no real doubt
that the Roman constitution, from the moment that the kings were
expelled, was popular, except for the two years of the Decemvirate,
erected to revise the laws and customs. This temporarily converted
the constitution into an aristocracy, or rather, oligarchy. I have said
above that the authority of magistrates, of whatever degree they may
be, is never properly their own, but enjoyed by them as a trust. It is
clear that the people originally elected the Senate, but in order to get
rid of the burden of so doing, they committed this power to the
censors, who were, of course, also elected by the people. Thus all the
authority of the Senate derived from the people. The people were
53
Book 2 OF THE DIFFERENT KINDS
to some of his subjects, a king to others and a tyrant to the rest. For
instance he may tyrannize over the rich and the nobility, but be a
beneficent protector of the poor. For tyranny is always a matter of
degree, inore or less. There is no prince, however worthy, who has
not soine notable vice. There is no tyrant, however cruel, who has not
some virtue, or laudable quality. For this reason it is most ill-advised
and dangerous to condemn a prince without a proper understanding
of his conduct, and without balancing his good deeds against his bad,
hls heroic exploits against lis mortal wickednesses. The Persians for
instance never condemned anyone till it could be shown that the evil
that he did outweighed the good.
In contrasting the king and the tyrant therefore we must take the
extreme cases of the good and just king, and the utterly detestable
tyrant, to make the distinction between them clear. But be it noted
that by a good and just king I mean one who is popularly accepted as
such, and not some impossible ideal figure of heroic proportions, or a
paragon of wisdom, justice, and piety, without blame or reproach.
Such perfection is all too rare. I mean by a good and just king one
who consistently strives to be such, and who puts all that he has, even
to his life's blood, at the service of his people. Such were a Codrus, or a
Decius. Apprehending that victory depended on their deaths, they
forthwith laid down their lives. But best of all examples is that of
Moses, whom Phlo calls the wise legislator, just king, and great
prophet. He prayed God the rather to blot out his name from the
book of life than that the people should go unpardoned, preferring
rather his own damnation than that the people should perish. Here
indeed is the likeness of the true prince and the father of his people.
The most notable distinction between the king and the tyrant is that
the king conforms to the laws of nature and the tyrant tramples them
underfoot. The one is guided by piety, justice, and faith. The other
denies his God, his faith, and the law. The one does that which he
believes will further the common good, and the welfare of his subjects.
The other consults only his own profit, vengeance, or pleasure. The
one tries to enrich h s subjects by any means he can discover. The
other builds his prosperity on the ruin of other people's. The one
avenges injuries done to his subjects but pardons those committed
against himself. The other takes a cruel revenge for injuries done to
himself but pardons those done to others. The one encourages free
speech on the part of lis subjects to the point of wise rebuke when he
62
MONARCHY Chap. 4 atzd 5
has failed in his duty. The other dislikes none so much as the serious,
free-spirited, and virtuous citizen. The one tries to keep his subjects in
peace and unity among themselves. The other sows dissensions, that
his subjects may ruin one another, and he himself grow rich on the
profits thereof. The one takes pleasure in being seen and heard by his
subjects. The other shuts himself away as from his mortal enemies.
The one bases his rule on the love of his people, the other on their fear.
The one only imposes burdens on his people when absolutely necessary,
and is as moderate as possible in his demands. The other sucks the
marrow from the bones of his subjects, and bleeds them white to
keep them weak. The one seeks out upright men to fill the public
offices. The other sells them to the highest bidder in order to vex h s
subjects by setting robbers on them, and then executes the thieves in
order to get himself the reputation of a just ruler. The one conforms
his conduct to the laws, the other makes the laws subserve his con-
venience. The one is loved and revered by his subjects, the other is
hated by all and hates all. The one appeals to the assistance of his own
subjects in time of war, and keeps no garrison unless they man it. The
other makes war on his subjects and surrounds himself with foreign
guards. The one lives in peace and security, in expectation of eternal
felicity, honoured in this life and regretted after death. The other
drags out his existence in perpetual terror, without the hope of es-
caping eternal punishment, defamed whle alive, and cursed after his
death. There is no need to verify all these truths by a wealth of
examples, for they are known to all. . . .
One must not however label as evidence of tyranny the execu-
tions, banishments, confiscations and other deeds of violence that
mark a revolution or restoration in a commonwealth. Such changes
are necessarily violent, as was illustrated by what happened at the
establishment of the Triumvirate in Rome, and at the election of
many of the Emperors. It is not proper, either, to call Cosirno de'
Medici a tyrant for building a citadel, surrounding himself with
foreign guards, and taxing his subjects heavily for their upkeep,
after the assassination of Alessandro, Duke of Florence. Such medicine
' was necessary to a commonwealth ravaged by so many seditions and
insurrections, and for a licentious and unruly populace, everlastingly
plotting against the new duke, though he was accounted one of the
wisest and most virtuous princes of his age. On the contrary it often
happens that mildness in a prince would ruin a commonwealth,
63
Book 2 CONCERNING TYRANNICAL
The misuse of the term tyrant has misled many, and led to all sorts
of unfortunate consequences. W e have already said that,the tyrant is
64
MONARCHY Chap. 4 aizd 5
one who on his own responsibility makes of himself a sovereign
prince without election, hereditary claim, just conquest, or special
&vine commission. The opinions, and the laws of the ancient world
condemned such to death. What is more, the ancients bestowed praise
and honour in the form of titles of nobility, of cl~valry,and statues
and other marks of honour on the slayers of tyrants. They regarded
them as the liberators of their fatherland, or as the inhabitants of
Candia said, their motherland. They made no distinction between the
virtuous prince and the evil and corrupt one. They did not think it
roper that any man living should seize sovereign power, and make
Kimself master over those who had been his equals and companions
under any pretence of virtue and justice that he could allege. What is
more, according to the civil law, anyone who assumed the authority
reserved to the sovereign merited death. Wherefore if the subject
tries to seize the government from the hands of l i s king by any means
whatsoever - and the same principle applies in popular states and in
aristocracies -he is worthy of death. It would seem then that our
question is answered.
The Greeks and the Romans were at variance however as to what
form the proceedings should take, whether by the operation of the
law, or the act of an individual. The Lex Valeria, published at the
instance of Publius Valerius Publicola, permitted homicide if one
could make out a reasonable case for supposing that the dead man had
indeed aspired to sovereign power. It was based on the argument that
it was better to have resort to violence than to risk the destruction of
both law and government in an anxiety to maintain the rule of law.
If one insisted on a legal process, it was unlikely that such could be
effected before the would-be tyrant had actually seized power, and
once he had done so, it would be impossible to accomplish anything
against one in control of all the organized forces in the commonwealth.
O n the other hand Solon legislated in the opposite sense, by expressly
forbidding the resort to violence, and the assassination of the aspirant
to power, until he had been brought to justice and condemned by due
process of law. This seems more equitable than the Lex Valeria, for
many good citizens and men of note have been murdered by their
. private enemies under the pretence that they were aiming at tyranny.
After all, one can in such a case always regularize the situation by a
retrospective trial after the fact. But it seems to me that both these
principles can be accepted if one applies the law of Solon in the case
H 65
Book 2 CONCERNING TYRANNICAL
where the prospective tyrant has not as yet got any armed forces
under his control, and the Lex Valeria when the tyrant has come into
the open and seized the citadel and its garrison. . . .
~ u thet real problem we have to consider is whether the legitimate
ruler who has succeeded to power by election, hereditary right, just
conquest, or divine commission, and then abandons himself to cruel
exactions and every sort of wicked oppression can be killed, for this is
the sort of man one generally means when one uses the word 'tyranty.
Many of the jurists and theologians who have considered the question
have concluded that it is justifiable to kill the tyrant and without
distinction. Indeed some have used the mutually exclusive terms
'tyrant-king'. This doctrine has been the ruin of many great and
flourishing monarchies.
Before this question can be resolved, one must make a distinction
between the prince who is an absolute sovereign, and the one who is
not, and between the position in relation to him of the subject and the
foreigner. For just as it is right and proper for anyone to take forcible
action to defend the honour and life of those who are oppressed
unjustly when the law offers no remedy, so it is highly honourable,
and befitting a prince, to take up arms in defence of a wllole people
unjustly oppressed by a cruel tyrant. Such a one was Hercules when
he went about the world destroying monsters of tyranny everywhere.
For these exploits he was deified. Such also were Dion, Timoleon,
and other generous princes who earned the title of scourge of tyrants
. . . In such a case there is no doubt that a virtuous prince can proceed
against a tyrant either by force of arms, diplomatic intervention, or
process of law. If he takes the tyrant captive, it is more to his honour
to punish him as a murderer, a parricide, or a robber than to allow him
the benefit of the law of nations.
But when it comes to the question of the conduct befitting a subject,
one must distinguish between the sovereign prince and one who is not
so. If he is not sovereign, sovereignty must lie with the people or with
the magnates. In such cases one is justified in taking legal proceedings
against him, if this is practicable, or in resorting to force and violence
if there is no other way of bringing him to reason. Action of the first
sort was taken by the Roman Senate against Nero, and of the second
against Maxirnian, for the Roman Emperors were only the first
magistrates of the Republic, sovereignty remaining in the people and
the Senate . . . A parallel case is the Empire of Germany. It is an
66
MONARCHY Chap. 4 atld 5
aristocratic principality, in which the Emperor is only the first magis-
trate. The power and majesty of the Empire is vested in the Diet, and
the Diet deposed the Emperor Adolf in 1296, and again in 1400 the
Emperor Wenceslas, in each case by due process of law, for it had
jurisdiction over them. . . .
But if the prince is an absolute sovereign, as are the true kings of
France, Spain, England, Scotland, Ethiopia, Turkey, Persia, and
Muscovy, whose authority is unquestionably their own, and not
shared with any of their subjects, then it is in no circumstances per-
missible either by any of their subjects in particular, or all in general,
to attempt anything against the life and honour of their king, either by
process of law or force of arms, even though he has committed all the
evil,impious, and cruel deeds imaginable. No process of law is possible,
for the subject has no jurisdiction over his prince, for all power and
authority to command derives from him, he can revoke the com-
missions of all magistrates whatsoever, and his mere presence suspends
the powers of all magistrates, corporations, colleges, estates, and com-
munities. And if it is not allowable for the subject to pass judgement
on his prince, the vassal on his lord, the servant on his master, that is to
say proceed judicially against them, how much less is it allowable to
proceed by force of arms. It is not a question of whether the subject
has the means to do so, but whether it is lawful or within the compe-
tence of the subject to do so.
Not only is the subject guilty of high treason who kills his prince,
but so also is he who has merely attempted it, counselled it, wished it
or even considered it . . .We read that the most holy doctors that the
Jews ever knew, those who were known as the Essenes or experts in
the law of God, held that sovereign princes, of whatever character,
should be regarded by their subjects as sacred and inviolable, and
given of God. One cannot doubt that David, king and prophet, was
informed by the spirit of God if ever man was, having always before
his eyes the law of God. It was he who said, 'slander not the prince,
nor speak evil of the magistrate'. Nothing is more insisted on in
Holy Writ than the wickedness of compassing the death of the prince,
or any responsible magistrate, or even making any attempt against
their life or honour, even though, adds the Scripture, they be evil men.
If then the man who merely slanders the magistrates commits high
treason by both divine and positive law, what punishment is sdcient
for the man who attempts their lives? The law of God is much more
67
Book 2 CONCERNING TYRANNICAL
precise on t h s point than are positive laws. Under the Lex Julia it is
high treason to counsel the death of the magistrate or public official.
But the law of God forbids any sort of detraction of the magistrate.
It would be waste of time to meet point by point the trivial argu-
ments of those who maintain the opposite view. One does not argue
with the man who doubts if there is a God, one merely subjects him
to the merited penalties of the law. They should be treated in the
same way who have called in question a principle so obvious, and have
maintained in print that the subject can justly take up arms against a
tyrannical prince, and compass his death by any means in their power.
Albeit, some of the most undoubted scholars among theologians' have
denied that it is ever justifiable to kill or even resist a sovereign prince,
unless by a special and indubitable commission from God. W e have
an example of such a one in Jehu, who was chosen of God, and anointed
king b y the Prophet with the express command to bring about the
destruction of the race of Ahab. He was a subject, and never attempted
anything against his prince, despite the latter's many cruelties, exac-
tions and massacres. of prophets, until he had received an express
command from God through the mouth of the Prophet. . . .
But one must not use these occasions of special divine coinmission
to justify in general the conspiracies and insurrections of rebellious
subjects against their sovereign lords . . . I cannot find a better analogy
than the relationshp between a father and his son. The law of God
declares that the son who defies his father or mother should be put to
death. If the father is a murderer, a thief, the betrayer of his country,
incestuous, a parricide, a blasphemer or an atheist, though all the
punishments imaginable would not be sufficient penalty for him, it is
not for h s son to play the executioner. But the person of one's native
ruler is even more sacred, and should be regarded as more inviolable
even than that of one's father, for he is ordained and set over his subjects
by God.
I conclude then that the subject is never justified in any circum-
stances in attempting anything against his sovereign prince, however
evil and tyrannical he may be. It is however permissible to fail to
obey him in any commands contrary to the law of God and of nature,
but one must then seek refuge in flight, go into hiding or suffer death
rather than attempt anything against his life or his honour.
What a great number of tyrants would be discovered if one might
There is a marginal reference to Luther and Calvin.
68
MONARCHY Chap. 4 and 5
kill them. The prince who imposed heavy taxes would be one in the
eyes of the vulgar. The man who ruled contrary to the wishes of the
people would be one in Aristotle's eyes. The man who kept a body-
guard for his protection and the man who executed those who con-
spired against his life would also be tyrants. What security could
virtuous princes enjoy? I do not wish to deny to neighbouring princes
the right to pursue tyrants by force of arms. I only wish to deny it to
the subject. . . .
What is more, the ten Circles, or circuits of the Empire, hold their
separate diets to formulate their particular petitions, grievances, and
complaints, to the Imperial Diet, in order that it may issue its decisions
in the matter. Again, the Electoral Princes, after the coronation of the
Emperor, take an oath of allegiance to the Empire, not to the Emperor,
though they actually swear the oath between his hands . . . Finally, the
Emperor as head unites the Empire even more closely in a single
commonwealth than if it was only united in the Diet. I have said 'as
head of the Empire', or captain in chief, but I do not mean by that as
sovereign lord, such as many think he is. For whereas kings and
monarchs make princes, the Emperor on the contrary is elected and
made such by the Princes. . . .
In the face of these facts how can anyone persist in the opinion that
the Emperor is a sovereign, and the Empire a monarchy united in a
single person? . . . It must also be conceded that there is no Prince or
Imperial City which has sovereign authority. Each is a member of the
Empire, governing the state under his authority subject to the laws and
ordinances of the Einpire . . . It is only when the Empire is divided
into hostile factions, as has so often happened, and the Princes banded
together the one against the other, that the communal governments of
the towns, and the subordinate jurisdictions of the Princes, are conver-
ted into a number of separate aristocracies and monarchies. Each
member of the Empire then constitutes itself a particular sovereign
state. . . .
A well-ordered aristocracy is extraordinarily satisfactory as a form of
government. A corrupted one is correspondingly pernicious, for
instead of a single tyrant there are a multitude. This is most likely to
happen, and often does when the nobles band together against the
common people. In ancient times, when the nobles were admitted to
power in aristocratic states, they took an oath that they would be from
that time forth the sworn enemies of the people. This was the ruin
of aristocracies. Let us now t u n to popular states.
rest of the community. This law is the same in principle as the law
governing the procedure of guilds and corporate associations, by which
two-thirds of the members are required to be present in session, and the
majority of this two-thirds in agreement, to make a regulation binding
on the rest. . . .
W e have said above that the state can be a pure monarchy and its
government popular, as happens when the prince distributes lands,
offices, and rewards indifferently to rich and poor, noble and commoner
without exception of persons. O r a state can be a monarchy governed
aristocratically if the prince confines his gifts of lands and offices to a
few nobles, or a handful of rich men, or his personal favourites. On
the other hand if the majority of the citizens share sovereign power,
but only bestow the responsible offices, honours, and prerogatives on
the nobles, as was done in Rome till the publication of the Lex Canuleia,
the state will be a popular one, but the government aristocratic. If
government is in the hands of the nobles, or the wealthy, but they open
offices and privileges to poor and simple citizens, as well as to the rich,
without favour shah, the state is an aristocracy governed democrati-
cally. If the people have sovereign power and give lands and political
privileges to all without respect of persons, or if all offices and benefices
are filled by lot, the state is not only a popular state, but governed as
such. . . In the same way, if the nobles or the wealthy alone govern the
state, and reserve lands and honourable charges for their own class,
one can say not only that the state is an aristocracy, but also that it is
governed aristocratically. Such is the case of Venice.
It may be objected that I am alone in making such distinctions, and
that none of the ancients, still less contemporary writers on politics,
have developed such views. This I don't deny. But it seems to me
necessary to make such distinctions if one would understand the true
character of every type of commonwealth, and avoid falling into a
maze of errors, such as did Aristotle. He confused the popular and the
aristocratic state, and vice versa, against common opinion and even
common sense.
But one can never build a secure superstructure on ill-founded
principles. Such confusions lead to the ill-formed opinion of those
who think one can have a commonwealth compounded of all three
basic types which we have rejected as impossible. W e consider it
indisputable that the form of the commonwealth is always simple,
even though the government may be of a contrary type, as a monarchy
74
POPULAR STATES Chap. 7
is clearly contrary to a popular state in principle, yet nevertheless
sovereign majesty may reside in a prince who governs his realm as if it
were a popular state. But this is not a commixture of monarchy and
democracy, which are mutually incompatible. It is a monarchy with
a popular government, and this is the most secure kind of monarchy
there is. The same may be said of the state which is an aristocracy whose
govelmment is popular. It is much more secure than if its government
were aristocratic. . . .
Popular government can admit of degrees of more and less, as can
be seen in the case of the Swiss Republics. Uri, Schwyz, Untenvalden,
Zug, Glarus, and Ap~enzelare governed by sovereign communes, and
there is not a fortified town in any of the five, save only Zug. The
other nine Cantons and Geneva are governed by a council of magnates,
as I learn from M. de Bassefontaine, Bishop of Limoges, who has long
discharged the duties of ambassador there in the most unexceptionable
and honourable manner. Even the Bernese, whose senate is composed
of craftsmen, choose the Advocate from the most noble and ancient
f a d e s . It is in consequence more stable than the others. The three
leagues of the Grisons, w h c h are the most popular in organization,
are much the most disturbed, as foreign ambassadors have always
found.
For the true nature of a people is to seek unbridled liberty without
restraint. They would make all equal in goods, honours, punishments,
and rewards, without any respect whatsoever for noble birth, educa-
tion, or virtue. As Plutarch said in his Symposia, they want everything
decided by lot or by divination, without respect of persons. If the
nobles or the wealthy show any signs ofwishing to make their influence
felt, they hasten to massacre or banish them, and divide their codis-
cated property among the poor. This happened at the foundation of
the free Swiss republics, after the battle of Sempach.1 The noblesse
were all but exterminated, and the remnant compelled to renounce
their title to nobility, yet nevertheless they were ejected from their
lands and offices, save in Zurich and Berne. . . .
On the other hand nobles and wealthy men generally look at things
in quite a different way. They think that those who are distinguished
by birth, wealth, education, or experience should be more esteemed,
deferred to, and honoured than the rest, and that all honourable charges
* 1377. It was fought against their Hapsburg overlords, and the victory laid the
foundations of the effective independence of the Forest Cantons.
Book 2 CONCERNING POPULAR STATES Chap. 7
should be reserved to such men. They therefore take pains to exclude
the poor from any share in the management of affairs of state. It is
impossible to compound two such diametrically opposed attitudes, in
spite of Solon's claim to have made laws which were equal alike for
rich and poor, noble and simple. For the rich understand by equality,
proportional equality, the poor, absolute equality. We shall explain in
the proper place what is meant by these terms, and the advantages and
disadvantages of each type of commonwealth. At the moment it
suffices to have defined and described them.
BOOK THREE1
difference there is between one ruler and many, a prince and the people,
a king and a multitude of men. W e read of the Romans, whose re-
public was admittedly the most flourishing and well-ordered that has .
ever existed, that the Senate had the power to manage the finances,
which is one of the undoubted attributes of sovereignty. It could also
appoint lieutenants and governors of provinces, award triumphs, and
consider matters of religion . . . Notwithstanding all this, I still say that
the council in a democracy or an aristocracy should have no function
but to deliberate and advise. Power to act ought to be reserved to those
who have sovereign authority. Whatever can be said about the powers
of the Roman Senate, they were only a matter of dignity, authority,
and counsel, and not of authority. The Roman people could, whenever
it saw fit, confirm or reject the decrees of the Senate. The Senate had
no power of command, or even of executing its own orders . . . If then
in a popular state the council has no ordinary power of commanding,
save on sufferance, still less has it such powers in an aristocracy or a
monarchy. In a monarchy especially, the king is much more jealous
of invasions of his authority than are a people.
The reason why the council in a commonwealth ought not to have
power to give effect to its own advice is that, if it had, sovereignty
would lie in the council, and the councillors would rule, having power
to manage the affairs of state and order all things according to their
own good pleasure. This could not be without the diminution or even
destruction of the sovereign majesty, though sovereignty is of so high
and sacred a character that no subject of whatever degree can have any
part in it, great or small. For this reason the Great Council at Venice,
which in that state is the sovereign power, forbad the Ten, who were
extending their activities beyond the limits prescribed, upon pain of
treason to take any action, or even to chctate letters which they call
definitive, without having recourse to the Signory, pending the
assembly of the Great Council. . . .
We have said that the magistrate is the officer who commands in the
name of the commonwealth. The right of command belongs to him
who has authority to constrain those who do not wish to obey his
orders, or who disobey his provisions, and who can suspend his own
prolubitions. When we say that the force of law lies in the fact that
it commands and prohibits, permits, and punishes, we are speaking of
the magistrate rather than the law, wluch is silent. The magistrate is
the life of the law because he accomplishes these things. The commands
and prohibitions of the law would be useless were it not for the
penalties for contravention, and the magistrate who gives them effect.
Properly speaking the law is only concerned with prohibitions and
the punishment of those who disobey, for a command implies a
prohibition of any breach of that command. Law is not permission,
for permission suspends prohibitions, and therefore carries with it no
penalty or threat of punishment, without which there can be no law,
seeing that law signifies nothng else than the command of the sover-
90
MAGISTRATE Chap. 4 and 5
eign, as we have shown. But whatever penalties and threats of punish-
ment may be attached to the law, they never follow in fact on an act of
disobedience save through the agency of the magistrate. The force of
all laws is therefore vested in those with power to command, whether
it be the sovereign prince or the magistrate, for they alone can con-
strain the subject to obey, and actually punish hini if he does not do so.
Thus are those commands executed which Demosthenes calls the
nerves of the commonwealth.
I have said that the magistrate has a public power of commanding, to
differentiate his authority from domestic power. I have said he has
power to constrain, to distinguish him from those who have only
cognizance of causes, who can judge, and pass sentence, and cite before
them, but who have no power of compulsion, or of executing their
own judgements and injunctions. Such were the ancient pontiffs, and
in our times the bishops. In ancient times commissioners appointed by
the magistrates had cognizance of the causes committed to them and
could pass sentence, and even summon parties before them. But they
had no power of 'compulsion, and they had to submit their sentences
to the magistrates for confirmation or rejection as seemed good to
them. . . Nowadays by our statutes and ordinances, the commissions
issued to judges give them powers of compulsion, and they can
execute their own sentences by means of their serjeants and other
public persons, under commissions sealed with their seals. Bishops,
having no such powers, report their sentences to the magistrates for
execution. . . .
The simplest kind of constraint that can be imposed by those who
have powers of compulsion is seizure of body or goods. It is no good
being able to summon an accused person, pass judgement on him, and
impose a fine, unless one can seize the person or the goods of the
convicted man who will not obey . . . The magistrate has power to
convict or acquit, and take cognizance some of matters concerning
property, others concerning property and honour, and yet others of
property, honour, and corporal pains exclusive or inclusive of the
death penalty, with or without appeal from their decisions. The
highest degree of compulsion is power of life and death, that is of
condemning to death, or of pardoning those who have incurred this
sentence. This is the highest attribute of sovereignty, proper to the
majesty of a prince, and inherent in him to the exclusion of all other
public persons.
91
Book 3 THE
It follows that there are two sorts of public persons with a right to
command. One is the sovereign right which is absolute, unlimited,
and above the law, the magistrates and all citizens. The other is the
legal right, subject to the laws and the sovereign. This is proper to the
magistrate, and those who have extraordinary powers conferred on
them by commission. These persons can exercise the right only until
their office is revoked or their commission expired. The prince after
God recognizes no superior whatsoever. The magistrate, under God,
holds his powers of the prince and exercises them subject to the prince
and the laws. The citizen, under God, is each according to his degree
subject to the prince, his laws, and his magistrates, each in his proper
sphere. I should add that I comprehend under the name of magistrate
all those who have rights ofjurisdiction annexed to their fiefs, for these
rights they hold of the prince just as does any other magistrate. Only
sovereign princes have an absolute right to command, in the sense that
they alone can use the phrase 'I ordain that . . . '. The will of the
magistrate, and of all others who have power to command is subject
to the will of the sovereign, to which they are strictly bound, for he
can revise, amend, or revoke his orders at will. Therefore the magis-
trates can never, either individually or collectively use the phrases
'for such is our good pleasure', or 'on pain of death' in the commissions
they issue. Only the sovereign can do this in his ordinances.
Thls raises an important question which has never been propcrly
determined, and that is whether the power of the sword is peculiar to
the prince and inseparable from his sovereignty, so that the magistrate
has only the right of execution of high justice, or whether such power
is proper to the magistrate because communicated to him by the
prince. . . .
But this point cannot be settled unless two other questions are
resolved. First whether an officebelongs to the commonwealth, to the
sovereign, to him who holds it, or is common to the public and the
subject; second whether the power which is delegated by the institu-
tion of a magistrate belongs to him to whom it is given in virtue of
his office, or whether it belongs to the person of the prince, but is
exercised by the magistrate, or is common to the prince and the
magistrate. The first question presents no difficulty. All magistracies,
jurisdictions, and offices whatsoever belong to the commonwealth
(except in a despotic monarchy) and the provision only belongs to the
sovereign. They cannot be appropriated by individuals except by the
MAGISTRATE Chap. 4 aizd 5
grant of the sovereign, the consent of the estates, or confirmed by
long undisputed enjoyment, as is the case with the duchies, marquisates,
counties and other feudal jurisdictions w h c h were in ancient times
colnmissions whlch could be revoked at will by the sovereign, but
were subsequently granted for a man's life, and then to his heirs, male
and then female, till they have become a form of patrimony in many
kingdoms. The power of the sword and other feudal jurisdictions are
now without doubt the property of the holders once they have
rendered faith and homage, sworn to hold of the sovereign, saving
always the right of appeal and other sovereign rights. . . .
Although the powers of the marshals are only given them for the
prosecution of war, nevertheless military discipline carries with it the
power of the sword, although this is not expressly laid down by
statute, and has nothing in common with the powers legally vested in
police and other magistrates . . . In all commonwealths the power of
the sword belongs to marshals and captains in chief, without lirnita-
tion, or restriction to any given form of procedure, or the ascription
of given penalties to given crimes and misdemeanours. All is left to
their judgement and discretion. They therefore cannot be regarded
as simple executors of the law, for there is no law governing their
modes of action. One must therefore conclude that in their case the
power of the sword is transferred to them in person. . . .
This point cleared up, we can proceed to the next. It follows that
the powers granted to a magistrate by his institution to an office are
proper to that office, since the office is not his personal property . . .
One can lay down as a general rule that whenever and in as much as
magistrates or commissioners are obliged by laws and ordinances to
use the powers committed to them in a strictly prescribed manner,
whether in matters of procedure, or in the sentences they must inflict
without power of increasing or modifying them, they are the simple
executioners and ministers of the prince and the laws. No authority
properly belongs to them whether it be a matter of police, or justice,
or war, or diplomacy. But where they are allowed to use their own
judgement and discretion, power and authority properly belongs to
them. There are two principal considerations that magistrates in all
commonwealths should have before their eyes, and those are the! aw
and equity. That is to say there is always the question of how the law
is to be executed, and of the function of the magistrate in relation to it.
The word judgement should be confined to that which is ordained by
93
Book 3 THE
the magistrate under the terms of the law. The word decree only refers
to that which is based on the principles of equity and not law. For
this reason the decisions of the prince are called decrees and not
judgements, since the sovereign is not subject to the law. It is an
error then to use the term decree for anything else than a sentence of
the council proceeding from deliberations undertaken at the prince's
instance, a sentence of the prince himself, or an order of a magistrate
to which neither law nor custom binds him.
There is the same relation between equity and the function of the
magistrate as there is between law and its execution. In the cases in
whch the magistrates are not bound by rigid rules of law they re-
semble arbitrators in a matter of right. Where they are strictly bound
by the letter of the law they resemble judges appointed to take cog-
nizance of the facts simply without power of adjudicating on the
justice of the cause. In the one case their position is servile, in the other
honourable, because in the one case they are bound by the law and in
the other not. In the one case they are only concerned with determin-
ing the facts, in the other with determining what is right, so that in the
former case the decision rests with the law, and not with them as in the
latter case. By way of underlining this difference, the law allows no
appeal from a sentence in which the magistrate has no option but to
apply the letter of the law, except an appeal against conviction. But
one can appeal against a sentence which depends on the discretion of
the magistrate. The penalty inflicted by the law however is inflicted
by the sovereign, from whom there is no appeal.
In ancient times it was usual to bind the hands of magistrates,
governors, ambassadors, and generals in the field by compelling them
by the strict letter of the law in what they undertook, the forms they
used, and the penalties they inflicted, without power of addition or
subtraction of any sort. Today the tendency is all the other way.
There is hardly a state in which pains and penalties do not depend upon
the consideration and arbitrament of the magistrate. In all civil cases
he has complete discretion, without being bound in any way by the
pains ascribed by Roman law or by decisions recorded in the courts.
The Emperor Justinian caused a great deal of confusion by attempting
to embody these latter in a code strictly binding on magistrates in the
execution of their functions. But judges and jurists alike wished to do
what they considered just, and that was often incompatible with
ancient rules. In the end it was found necessary to leave all to the
94
MAGISTRATE Chap. 4 and 5
conscience and good faith of the judges, owing to the variety of
circumstances, of places, and persons. This variety cannot be compre-
hended in any law or ordinance. And although there are still certain
pains and penalties which are required by law to be infbcted without
qualification in certain cases, nevertheless the magistrates do not keep
to the restrictions. An example is the edict against coining published
by King Francis I, inflicting the death penalty in cases either civil or
criminal. The very parlements, bailiffs, and seneschals who registered
it without demur do not keep it. They have found by time and ex-
perience that the edict is inequitable. The infinite variety of circum-
stances do not permit of uniform treatment. . . .
The magistrate, when not in court or exercising his magisterial
function, is no more than any other private citizen, and if he does
anyone a wrong, he may be resisted and legal redress sought. But when
exercising his f~mctionin his official resort, and not exceeding his
powers, there can be no doubt that he must be obeyed whether he does
that which is right or wrong, for so says the law. If he exceeds his
sphere or his competence one is not bound to obey if the excess is
notorious. The remedy is the appeal. If there is no possibility of appeal,
or if the magistrate persists without deferring to h s superior, then one
must distinguish between the wrong that is irreparable and that which
can be remedied. If the latter, the injured person has no right of
offering any sort of resistance. If the former, for instance if it is a
question of life or limb and the magistrate persists in proceeding to
execute judgement without permitting appeal, in that case one can
resist, not so much in order to defy the magistrate, as to defend the
life of one in danger, provided always the action is disinterested. It is
never permissible to resist the magistrate in the confiscation of property,
even if he is exceeding his powers, and will not allow an appeal. One
can proceed to appeal, or petition, or to bring an action against him,
or by some other means. But there is no law human or divine that
permits one to take the law into one's own hands, and use force
against the magistrate, as some have argued. This opens the way to
rebels to trouble the commonwealth. For if it is permitted to the
subject to seek redress against the magistrate by force, by parity of
argument one could similarly resist the sovereign prince, and trample
the laws underfoot altogether. . . .
Not only is it not permissible to offend or injure the magistrates by
word or deed, but they should be honoured and reverenced as those to
95
Book 3 CONCERNING CORPORATE ASSOCIATIONS,
whom God has given power . . . The magistrate on his side should
merit respect for h s justice, his prudence, and devotion, so that subjects
should have sufficient occasion to honour him. He should not preju-
dice the honour of the commonwealth by his own unworthiness, for a
fault committed by a magistrate is doubly reprehensible. By a provi-
sion in his laws Solon allowed the magistrate who was drunk in the
exercise of h s duties to be put to death. This illustrates how strongly
vice was reprobated, and a good reputation expected in a magistrate.
Many magistrates seek to avoid criticism by severity in judgement.
Others seek popularity by pardoning freely. But the law condemns
both excesses. Many of those who have discretionary powers of
punishment not precisely defined by law make the mistake of thinking
that equity supposes a greater leniency than the rigour of the law
requires, imagining that equity does not spring from strict justice but
from mercy. But equity is not to be identified with either justice or
mercy, but is a balance which can incline either way. If the crime is
greater than the penalties of the law cover, the magistrate with dis-
cretionary powers should increase them. If the misdemeanour is a light
one, he should mitigate them. He should not aim at the reputation of a
merciful magistrate; for this is a fault more to be avoided than a
reputation for severity. For severity, though it is blameworthy,
maintains the subject in obedience to the laws, and the sovereign who
has instituted them. That is why the law of God expressly forbids the
exercise of mercy towards the poor in giving judgement. . . .
HAVING discussed the family and its members, sovereign power, and
magistrates, let us now consider corporate associations and guilds,
beginning with their origins, proceeding to their powers and privi-
leges, and concluding by deciding whether their existence is indis-
pensable to the commonwealth. The difference between the family
and a corporate association or guild, and the latter and the common-
wealth, is the difference between the part and the whole. A community
of a number of heads of households, or of a village, a town or a
The terms are, corps, colleges, &tats, coinmui~aut~s.
Chapter VI is concerned with the relations of the different grades of officials to one
another. But it adds nothing in principle to Bodin's account of the nature-of magistracy.
96
GUILDS, ESTATES, AND COMMUNITIES Chflp.7
province can subsist without there being any commonwealth, and the
family without there being any guild. But a group of families bound
together by mutual trust forms a corporate association or community,
and a group of corporate associations and communities bound to-
gether by sovereign power forms a commonwealth. The family is a
natural community, the guild a civil one. The commonwealth is, in
adhtion, a community governed by sovereign power, but it can be so
small as to include no other civil communities or guilds, but to consist
only of family groups. The word community is common to the f a d y ,
the g d d , and the commonwealth. The word corporate association
properly speaking refers to a group of families, or a group of guilds,
or a mixed group of both families and guilds.
The origin of all corporate associations and guilds is rooted in the
family. As the principal stem put forth branches, so it was necessary
to found separate households, hamlets, and villages, so that the family
spread over a whole neighbourhood. But with the increase in numbers,
it became no longer possible for them all to inhabit and find smtenance
in a single place, and they were compelled to spread abroad. Gradually
the villages grew into towns, each with its separate interests and
distinct locality. As these communities were originally without laws,
without magistrates, and without sovereign rulers, quarrels easily
arose over such things as ownership of some spring or well. We find
evidence of t h s in the Scriptures, and how the stronger party drove its
weaker neighbours from their houses and villages. This led to the
towns first surrounding themselves with ditches and then walls, and
to men associating together, some for the defence of their homes
and families, others to attack those in possession, and rob, despoil, and
destroy them. The activities which were held in the greatest esteem
among primitive men, says Plutarch, were the massacre, slaughter, and
ruin of their fellows, and the reduction of them to slavery. W e read
also in Thucydides that conditions were the same throughout Greece
only a little before his day, and brigandage was not in the least
contemned. . . .
This licence and impunity in preying upon one another compelled
men, who knew neither rulers nor magistrates, to join together as
friends for mutual defence one against another, and institute communi-
ties and brotherhoods . . . A society or a community is rooted in
mutual affection, that sacred flame which first springs into life with
love between husband and wife, then between parents and children,
K 97
Book 3 CONCERNING CORPORATE ASSOCIATIONS,
then between brothers and their kindred, till it includes all those
belonging to or abed to the family group. But it would have flickered
out had it not been kept alight and fed by ahances, communities,
corporate associations, and guilds, instituted by all sorts of people who
knew no form of commonwealth, and were ignorant of the nature of
sovereign power. This is illustrated in the book of Judges, where we
read that the Hebrews were long without princes or magistrates, each
living as he chose according to his own good pleasure, in perfect
freedom. But they were bound together into communities of families
and of tribes, and when harassed by their enemies, gatherings of the
tribes met and chose a leader, whom God had inspired, to whom they
gave sovereign authority. Many families and tribes thus united
together by a sovereign power formed a commonwealth.
The first princes and lawgivers, not yet having discovered how to
keep their subjects in the paths of justice, founded fraternities, guilds,
and communities, for the parts and members of the body politic
being thereby brought into agreement among themselves, it would be
easier to regulate the commonwealth as a whole. Numa, the King and
lawgiver of the Romans, established fraternities and guilds for all
crafts, and to each fraternity appointed a patron, priests, and special
sacrifices. Later a fraternity of merchants w-as founded, with Mercury
as its patron, after the example of Solon, who 'permitted fraternities
to be instituted for any sort of purpose, with power to make such
statutes as they wished, provided they did not conflict with public law
and custom. Lycurgus not only permitted, but strictly enjoined the
setting up of such communities for both general and particular ends,
and required all subjects to gather themselves into guilds of fifteen
persons each for the purpose of common meals. These the Greeks
called philitia because of the sworn friendship the members entertained
for one another. In Italy similar guilds were called sodalitia because
of the unity, intercourse and friendship, which bound together those
u7ho were in the habit of eating and drinking together. If differences
arose amongst the associates, they composed them themselves, realizing
that mutual trust is the foundation of any society, and much more
necessary to men than justice. Justice is never pitiful. Involving as it
does strict exaction of rights, it often makes enemies of friends. But
mutual affection leads men to make concessions, and this secures that
natural justice shall prevail. The sole end of all laws divine and human
is to foster love among men, and between men and God, and this is
98
GUILDS,
ESTATES,
AND COMMUNITIES Chap. 7
best secured by intercourse and daily association . . . Nowadays this is
better observed among the Swiss than any other people in the world.
In every town the fraternities and craft guilds have their guildhalls
where they hold frequent banquets and festive meetings. The smallest
vlllage never lacks a communal hall for such purposes. Dis utes are
normally settled amicably, and the sentence recorded in ch& on the
table at which they have eaten. As well as artisans and merchants,
priests and bishops had their guilds and fraternities, and philosophers
too, especially the Pythagoreans who lived together in common for
the most part.
So much for the origin and growth of corporate associations and
communities, which in course of time have come to be regulated by
laws, statutes, and customs, in all commonwealths. In order the easier
to explain this last development, one can say that all corporate associa-
tions and guilds are instituted for the purpose of religion; or police,
which includes the administration of justice and the distribution of
obligations; or to regulate the food supply and the merchants who
handle it, and the crafts necessary to the commonwealth; or for
discipline. A guild can be confrned to a single craft or profession, or
type of merchandise or kind ofjurisdiction. Or many guilds can form
a single corporate association, such as a guild for all crafts, merchants
dealing in all sorts of commodities, all branches of learning, or all the
magistrates. Or many guilds can become a general community or
university. And not only g d d s and communities, but all the inhabi-
tants of a village, a district or a province have the right of association,
and can, together with the guilds and communities, assemble as Estates.
Each of these can have its particular regulations, statutes, and privileges.
We can therefore say that a corporate association or a guild is a
legal right of communal organization, subject to sovereign power.
The word legal implies that it is authorized by the sovereign, for
without his permission no guild can be instituted. It also implies there
is a constitution of the guild, determining the time, place, and form of
meeting, and the business it is competent to transact. The word corn-
munal signifies that there can be no college where there is no corn-
mon bond, though it is not necessary that everything should be in
common. It is enough if there is an assembly open to all colleagues, a
common trustee, or a common purse. It is not necessary that there
should be a common life. Some people have called it a guild when three
or more persons live together and share their goods in common. But
99
Book 3 CONCERNING CORPORATE ASSOCIATIONS,
this is a double error. In the first place such a group is not a guild,
but parties to a contract for the sharing of property. In the second
place colleagues of a guild live in their own houses apart, as do frater-
nities of craftsmen.
There are no restrictions as to the number that may form a guild,
save that it must be more than three. By colleagues, I mean those who
are equal in respect of conlmunal rights, each having a deliberative
voice. But the guild, or the prince, can choose one of the colleagues to
rule, correct, and punish each individual among his colleagues. Bishops
and abbots have power to chastise canons and monks. But if the head
of the guild has such power over the whole body considered collect-
ively, it is not properly speaking a guild, but rather a form of the
family, like the colleges of young scholars where none of the bursars
have a deliberative voice. If some of the bursars have collegiate rights
and a deliberative voice in the assembly, then it is a college even though
the rest of the young scholars are subject to the power and correction
of a principal. . . .
The person chosen by the guild or the prince to have authority over
all his colleagues individually has two characters, one in relation to
each of the others, and one in relation to the guild as a whole. He is
called the principal, the bishop, the abbot, the prior, the president as
the case may be, having authority to command each of the others.
But in relation to the guild as a whole he is just one of the colleagues,
though he has precedence over the rest. That is why these distinctions
are preserved in the ternlinolog~used, bishop, canons and chapter,
abbot, monks, and convent, principal, bursars, and college. One of the
greatest of the jurists1 was in error on this point when he said that the
philosophers use college for the persons who make it up. But no
philosopher has said this, for college is a legal concept. The whole
revenue and privileges of a college may be vested in one person, all the
others having died. The college survives legally and its property
cannot be seized for the fisc, nor by private persons until the college
has been dissolved by the authority of the sovereign. . . .
The origin and definition of a guild and a community having been
demonstrated, its authority in general must be considered. These
general matters cannot be ascertained from articles of incorporation,
statutes, and particular privileges, for they are infinite in number,
being diverse for the diversity of communities. The first corporate
1 There is a marginal reference to Bartolus.
I00
GUILDS,ESTATES,
AND COMMUNITIES Chap. 7
associations and guilds in any commonwealth, and those which are
most influential, are the colleges ofjudges and magistrates. Not only
have they authority over the minority of the college considered
collectively, and over each in particular, but also over persons who are
not nlembers of the college, but subject to its jurisdiction. The peculi-
arity of colleges of this type by comparison with all others is that
whereas guilds are established in general to regulate what is common,
colleges of judges and magistrates are instituted chiefly for the purpose
of regulating the affairs of outside persons, and even other colleges, and
correcting them if they do anything contrary to their laws and
statutes.
An upright man should be concerned first to be just in himself,
'before he starts administering justice to others, whence the Hebrews
had a poverb that charity bigins at home if it is to be true charity.
Colleges of judges therefore should first establish a just order within
their own ranks, before dispensing it to other people. It is therefore
pertinent to consider whether it is better that colleges of magistrates
should punish their own members, or submit the case to outsiders.
To be brief, one must make a distinction. If the college is one of
vicious men, the correction of their own vices should not be left to
them. But if they are upright men there is no doubt that colleagues
are better judged by the college than by other judges. There are
imponderable values in each college which cannot be properly under-
stood nor judged except by the members of that body. Moreover this
reinforces the bond of union among the colleagues. For this reason the
Emperor Adrian permitted a Roman senator only to be tried by the
Senate. For the same reason civil suits between merchants, and suits
concerning matters of trade have been very wisely conceded to the
guilds and colleges of merchants, first throughout Italy and then in
France. They decide summarily the disputes which arise out of con-
tracts, which have peculiarities not found in other kinds of suits. As to
other corporate associations and guilds, although they are not instituted
for the purpose of justice or command, they nearly always have a
limited power of coercion under their statutes and privileges. At
times they even have unlimited powers, and correction is left to the
prudence and discretion of the guild or its head. Such power should
be exercised with the moderation that a father shows his son . . .
Canonists ascribe to abbots jurisdiction over their religious to the
exclusion of the bishop, and this has been confirmed by a judgement
Book 3 CONCERNING CORPORATE ASSOCIATIONS,
of the Parlement of Paris. Monks cannot be brought before the
luagistrate even for what they did before entering religion. But this
must be understood to refer to light and youthful follies only, other-
wise a way would be opened for robbers and murderers to retire into
such communities, in preference to the forests, to escape punish-
ment. . . .
As to the regulation of matters of individual interest to its members,
in my opinion a guild cannot do anything without the consent of all
the colleagues, as in the case of arbitrations. In all communities the
espress consent of each is required in all matters of common interest
which concern all considered separately as individuals. But if it is a
question of what is common to all considered collectively, then, if the
greater part are agreed, they can oblige the rest, provided that what
is to be ordained is not contrary to the statutes of the college as es-
tablished by the sovereign, or by its founder and authorized by the
sovereign. The ordinances of the commonwealth, and the statutes of
the college not being slighted, the college can make regulations relating
to the affairs of the,community which bind both the minority as a
whole, and each of the colleagues individually, provided that two
thirds of the total number are present in the assembly, even if not
agreed. But the majority considered as a corporate whole, still more
the entire college, cannot be bound by their own statutes, any more
than can the prince by his own law, the testator by his own will, or
private individuals by their contracts, since they can be dissolved by
common consent. Thus two thirds of the guild can repeal an ordinance
made by the whole guild. This is a general rule applying to all com-
munities, corporate associations, and guilds.
But in an assembly of estates made up of several corporate associa-
tions such as the Diets of the Empire, and the Estates of other common-
wealths, which are composed of the three orders of clergy, nobles, and
people, two of them cannot do anything to the prejudice of the third.
Bodin, deputy for the t h r d estate at Blois,"protested against the other
two estates, with many forceful arguments, that the appointment of a
body of thirty-six judges to examine the bills of recommendation
presented by the Estates was prejudicial to the interests of the kingdom.
1 These Estates met in December-January 1576-77, a few months after the publication
of the Six books of the Commonwealth. The passage was added in all editions after 1577.
The point of the measure was to secure that the proposals of the Estates should be em-
bodied in the forthcoming Ordinance. But the third estate feared its interests would be
swamped. Bodin moreover objected on principle to dictation by the Estates to the king.
GUILDS,
ESTATES,
AND COMMUNITIES Chap. 7
Whereupon the Archbishop of Lyons, president of the estate of the
clergy, argued that the estate of the clergy and of the nobility had
already settled the matter by so resolving. Bodin protested that from
earliest times each of the three estates had jealously guarded its right
not to be liable to coercion against its will by the other two. This
principle had been accepted without question at the Estates of Orlians,
and was the established practice in the Estates of the Empire, of
England, and of Spain. He therefore prayed the other two orders to
forgive him if he opposed the proposal, since he represented the
interest of the third estate. This led forthwith to the matter being
debated, and the estate of the nobility and the estate of the clergy
changed their minds. That same day the king said in the presence of
the Bishop of Angers and other seigneurs that Bodin had made the
Estates dance to his tune. . . .
To sum up on the subject of the powers of corporate associations and
legitimate communities, the law of Solon is accepted on principle in all
commonwealths, and approved by both jurists and canonists, that
corporate associations and legitimate communities can establish such
ordinances as they think in their best interests, provided they do not
derogate from the statutes of the college, imposed or authorized by
the king, or run counter to the ordinances of the commonwealth . . . I
do not agree however with those who say that a guild can make
regulations, but cannot attach penalties to the breach of them. An
ordinance has no force if there is no punishment for ignoring it, or if he
who made the ordinance cannot compel its observation by penalties.
W e have any number of examples of craft guilds, legally incorporated,
that have certain powers of coercion, of inspection of workshops and
warehouses, and of seizure or confiscation of anything made contrary
to the regulations, though the magistrate always has cognizance if they
are resisted in so doing. . . .
Let us now consider how an offending community can be punished
. . . The acts of the majority of colleagues, or inhabitants of a town,
agreed upon in their legally constituted assemblies, are the acts of the
whole community or town. That is why in such a case the whole
community is punished. Rebellions of towns, and insurrections of
whole communities are punished by deprivation of privileges, of the
right of association, by fines, imposts, enslavement, and other penalties
according to the gravity of the case. But no such punishment should
be inflicted unless the rebellion, or other crime, was committed by the
103
Book 3 CONCERNING CORPORATE ASSOCIATIONS,
will of the community, and agreed to in their formal assembly, as was
decided by an order of the Court of the Parlement regarding the
commune of Corbeil. Nevertheless if the penalty is corporal, even
though the whole commui~ityshould be convicted, only those who
have consented should suffer it. But if the thing is done by some one
particular person on the advice and with the will of the rest, they can
each and all be prosecuted, and the punishment of one does not acquit
the rest.
~t may be argued that there seems little appearance of justice in
punishing a whole community when the greater part were innocent
of the offence. The alternative is however worse, and th.at is when
victims are selected by lot, and the innocent run the same risk with the
guilty that the choice will fall on them. T h s happened when the
Roman army was decimated for having behaved with cowardice in the
face of the enemy. The lot frequently fell on the bravest and most
valiant, but they were executed for cowardice along with the rest.
This incident was cited by the Senator Cassius when persuading the
Senate to put four hundred slaves to death because one of their number
had murdered their master. It is not, it is true, a solution of a problem
to point out that the alternative action is worse. But one of the first
principles of justice in action is that of avoiding anlong many incon-
veniences that which is the worst. When it is a question of crimes, it is
of the first importance that they should not go unpunished. . . .
The prince who suffers seditions and rebellions of the communities
of his realm, whether towns or provinces, to go unpunished, gives
encouragement to others to follow suit. Those who practice a remorse-
less cruelty, on the other hand, put the whole state in peril. He earns
the reputation of a just prince, and preserves his state, who takes the
middle course and only punishes the leaders of a rebellion. This was
what Charles of France, afterwards King of Naples, did. Sent to
chastise the inhabitants of Montpellier, he deprived them of their
communal rights, consuls, and localjurisdiction, ordered the walls to be
razed and the bells dismantled, and imposed a fine of one hundred and
twenty thousand gold francs. Some writers say that one half of the
property ofthe inhabitants was confiscated, and six hundred burghers
executed by drowning, hanging, or burning. In effect however the
matter was managed with more moderation and only the guilty were
executed. Yet there had not been at MontpeKer any assembly of the
inhabitants, nor a deliberate conspiracy of the whole body. Even when
104
GUILDS, ESTATES, AND COMMUNITIES Ch0p. 7
all the inhabitants of a city have severally and collectively debated and
decided upon a rebellion or a conspiracy, the wise prince will not
punish them all, for fear of putting the whole state in danger. . . .
It remains to be decided whether a commonwealtl~can dispense
with associations and guilds. W e have shown how men led by a
sociable and companionable instinct, proceed to the foundation of
communities of various kinds, estates, corporate associations, and
guilds, till finally they achieve a commonwealth. After God, such
communities have no surer foundation than friendship and goodwill
among men, the which cannot endure unless fostered by associations,
whether of estates, fraternities, corporate associations, or guilds. So to
ask whether communities and corporate associations are necessary to
the commonwealth, is to ask if the commonwealth can subsist without
fellowship, w h c h even the world itself cannot do.
I insist on t h s point because there have been those who thlnk that
corporate associations and guilds ought to be prohibited, forgetting
that the family and the commonwealth itself are nothing but com-
munities. It is an error that men of the best minds very often fall into.
Because of some inconvenience attendant on a particular custom or
ordinance, they want to abolish the whole t h g , without considering
what good it would do. I confess that the existence of ill-regulated
communities entails a swarm of factions, seditions, cabals, monopolies
leading at times to the total ruin of the commonwealth. Instead of
mutual fellowship and charitable goodwill, one sees plots and con-
spiracies of one against another hatched. What is worse, under the
veil of religion there have been societies practising a wicked and
execrable impiety. There is no better example than the fraternity of
the bacchanals in Rome. More than seven thousand persons were
accused, convicted, and many executed or banished for the abominable
misdeeds which they committed in the name of religion. This led to
the suppression of the fraternities of the bacchanals throughout Italy
by order of the Senate, confirmed by the people. A law was published
forbidding sacrifices henceforth save in ~ublic. Long before this a
Greek sage had argued with the Athenians that sacrifices under cover
of darkness were extraordinarily suspect. It is much more conducive
to the welfare of the commonwealth either to permit the public
assembly of societies which claim religion as their purpose, or to
~ r o h i b i tthem altogether, than to permit them to function as secret
societies. For any sort of plot can be initiated in such secret sessions,
10s
Book 3 CONCERNING CORPORATE ASSOCIATIONS,
gether the people find the will and the strength for the defence and
safety of their princes. This is especially so when an Estates-General
of all the people is assembled in the presence of the sovereign. Matters
touching the whole body of the commonwealth, and each of its
members are there made public. There thejust complaints and grievan-
ces of poor subjects, which otherwise would never reach the prince's
ears, are heard and attended to. There the frauds, depredations, and
usurpations committed in the prince's name, but entirely without his
knowledge, are discovered. It is extraordinary what satisfaction
subjects get from seeing their prince preside in their assemblies, how
proud they are to appear in his presence. If he hears their complaints
and receives their petitions, even though he must frequently refuse
them, they are exalted by the mere fact of having had access to their
prince. This practice of holding Estates is better observed in Spain than
anywhere else in the world, for they meet every two or three years.
This is also the case in England, for the people will not give up their
control of taxation, so Parliament must meet. . . .
I have said that moderation, which is in all situations a virtue, ought
to be observed with regard to all kinds of associations and guilds in
aristocracies and royal monarchies. To abolish all such societies is to
embark on a barbarous tyranny and so ruin the state. But it is also
dangerous to permit all sorts of assemblies and fraternities whatsoever.
They are often a cover for conspiracies and illicit monopolies, of which
we have had only too many examples. This is the reason why it has
been found necessary from time to time to abolish fraternities by
express edict, though such edicts have been very ill-observed. It is
better however to get rid of abuses only, rather than root out good and
bad alike. . . .
. BOOK IV
wealth, but they can all be reduced to certain few fundamentals. There
are first the struggles for power that develop among the magnates
whenever there is a failure of heirs in the royal line, or when the great
mass of the people are very poor, and a small handful excessively rich,
or where there is great inequality in the distribution of estates and of
honours. Or revolutions may be brought about by the ambition which
incites some men, or the desire to avenge injuries, or the fear of
punishment only too well deserved. Again changes in law or in re-
ligion, the cruelty of tyrants, or the indignation with which men see
the highest ofices in the land defiled by the bestial and voluptuous
behaviour of their occupants, all precipitate revolutions.
I have already said that the original rulers and founders of common-
wealths were violent tyrants, but their successors were in some cases
despots, in others kings ruling by hereditary right. Further changes
were due to the causes I have already indicated. Thus it is that all the
histories, sacred and profane, agree that the first form of a common-
wealth, and the first creation of a sovereign power, was to be found in
the Assyrian monarchy. Its first prince, Nimrod, whom many call
Ninus, made himself sovereign by force and violence. His successors
ruled as despots, assuming an absolute right to dispose of the lives and
goods of their subjects as they thought fit until Arbaces, governor of
Media, dethroned Sardanapalus, the last Prince of Assyria, and made
himself king in his stead, without any form of election. He was able
to do this because Sardanapalus was given over to the vice of luxury,
spending his time among the women instead of the men of his court,
and men of spirit will not endure to find themselves subjects of one
who is a man only in appearance. W e read also that the Princes of the
Medes, descended from Artabazus, the Kings of Persia, Egypt, and the
Kings of the Hebrews, the Macedonians, the Corinthians, the Spartans,
Athenians, and Celts all ruled by hereditary succession over kingdoms
for the most part founded in force and violence, though they subse-
quently came to be regulated by good laws, and in accordance with the
principles of justice.
This state of affairs continued until either there was a failure of
heirs in the royal line, or till some prince, abusing his power, mal-
treated his subjects and so was expelled or killed. Thereupon their
subjects, fearing perhaps that they would fall again under a similar
tyranny if they gave sovereign power to a single person, or perhaps
merely reluctant to submit to the commands of someone who had
L 113
Book 4 TKE RISE AND FALL
voluptuary is a coward at heart, and that the man who cannot com-
mand hmself is unworthy to command a whole people. Sardanapalus,
King of Assyria, Canades, King of Persia, Dionysius the Young and
Hieronymus, Kings of Sicily . . . Galeazzo Sforza, Alessandro de'
Medici, the Cardinal Petruccio, tyrant of Siena, all lost their realms as a
result of their own viciousness, and the most of them also were killed
in the act . . . But states are not so easily brought to the point of revo-
lution through the cruelty of a prince, unless it be the extreme and
bestial cruelty of a Phalaris, a Nero, Vitellius, Domitian, Commodus,
Caracalla, Ezzelino of Padua, or Giovanni Maria of Milan who were
all lulled or driven out, and their tyrannous governnlents supplanted
by popular rule. This fate befell them not so much for their cruelty to
their humbler subjects (to whom scant attention is paid in tyrannies)
but for acts of individual cruelty committed against the magnates and
men of good family. Often the cause of the catastrophe is not so
much a cruel act as one that puts shame upon a man, for to be shamed
is more intolerable to men of honour than to suffer cruelty. Bodda
hlled Chllderic together with h ~ wifes and unborn child for having had
him whipped . . . The murderers of tyrants have nearly always seized
the government, or the highest magistracies as a reward for their
action. Both Brutuses seized the hlghest ofices in Rome, the one for
having driven out Tarquin, the other for having assassinated Caesar . . .
Luigi Gonzaga having killed Bonaccorsi, tyrant of Mantua, was elected
ruler by the subjects, and his posterity has continued in the government
for two hundred and fifty years. The Venetians secured the lordship
of Padua after they killed the tyrant Ezzelino. . . .
All monarchies newly founded on the ruins of an aristocratic or
~ooularstate took their beginnings
I I " " from the moment when one of the
magistrates, captains, or subordinate governors, having force at his
disoosal. raised himself from the position of colleague
L - to that of
so;ereign; or from conquest by a foreign power; or from voluntary
submission to the law and government of another. The first is by far
the most usual occurence, and there have been any number of ex-
amples . . . the Decemvirate in Rome and after them Sulla and Caesar,
the Scaligeri in Verona, the Bentivoglio in Bologna, the Malatesta in
Rimini, the Baglioni in Perugia, the Sforzas in the duchy of hlilan.
But many others besides these have by force and violence advanced
fiom the position of a simple captain, or provincial governor, to that
of sovereign lord. For in matters of state one can take it as a general
OF COMMONWEALTEIS Chap. I
rule that he who is in co~ltrolof the armed forces is master of the state.
It is for this reason that in well-ordered aristocracies and popular
states the hlghest honours in the state are not the positions of most
effective power, and further, the most responsible magistracies are
always shared by a group of colleagues. If this is not possible, and
indeed in time of war such an arrangement is positively dangerous,
the term of office is always very short. Thus the Romans instituted
two consuls who commanded on alternate days. For although the
dissensions which so easily arise between two officials equal in au-
thority sometimes hold up the execution of business, the common-
wealth is not so exposed to the danger of conversion into a monarchy
as when there is a sole magistrate. For the same reason the Roman
dictator was only appointed for such a term as the crisis required. It
was never longer than six months, and sometimes lasted only a single
day. The time expired, his authority to command expired, and if he
continued to keep his forces in being, he could be accused of treason
against the Republic . . . It is therefore of the utmost importance that
the laws governing the terms of office should be preserved without
modifications, and the legal terms not prolonged except in cases of
extreme necessity . . . If the law had been thus strictly observed,
Caesar would never have seized control of the state. . . .
The conversion of a popular state into an aristocracy is generally the
result of defeat in battle, or some other notable injury at the hands of
an enemy. O n the other hand a popular state is secured and strength-
ened by victory. These tendencies are illustrated in the histories of two
commonwealths, Athens and Syracuse. The Athenians, who till then
had enjoyed a popular form of government, having been defeated by
the Syracusans through the fault of their captain, Nicias, fell under the
dominion of four hundred citizens, though by a trick of Pisander they
were know11 as the Five Hundred. When the humbler citizens tried to
resist, they were overcome because the four hundred could dispose of
the armed forces, and used them to kill the leaders and keep the rest in
awe. But the Syracusans, puffed up by victory, destroyed their
aristocracy and set up a popular state. A little later, the Athenians, on
learning of the defeat of the Spartans by Alcibiades, killed or expelled
their four hundred rulers and restored the popular state under the
leaderslip of Thrasilus . . . W e read also that the Florentines, on
hearing of the sack of Rome and the captivity of Pope Clement,' at
1 A Medici who governed Florence through the Cardinal Passerini. Hence the out-
117
Book 4 THE RISE AND FALL
once got rid of the oligarchy that he had established in Florence. They
persecuted, killed, or banished the partisans of the Medici, threw down
their statues, broke open their treasuries, expunged their names from
all buildings in the city and re-established the popular state. Again,
the nloment the Swiss Cantons had defeated the ilobles in the battle
of Sempach in 1377, there was no more heard of an aristocracy, nor of
recognizing the Emperor in any form whatsoever. The reason for a
revolution of t h s sort is the inconstancy and rashness of a populace,
without sense or judgement, and variable as the winds. It is stunned
by defeat and insupportable in victory. No enemy is more fatal to it
than success in its own undertakings, no master so wise as the one that
imposes the severest restraints on it, in other words, a victorious
enemy. In such a crisis the wiser and richer citizens on whom the
greatest burden falls, seeing dangers threaten from all sides, take the
conduct of affairs, abandoned by the people, into their own hands.
Indeed, the only way to secure the continuance of a popular state is to
keep it at war, and create enenies if they do not already exist. This
was the chef reason which led Scipio the Younger to try and stop the
razing of Carthage. He had the wisdom to foresee that a warlike and
aggressive people like the Romans would fall to making war on each
other, once all external enemies were disposed of . . . But popular
states are more Uely to change into monarchies as a result either of
civil war, or of the folly of the people in giving too n ~ u c hpower to an
individual. . . .
On the other hand when a tyranny is overthrown as a result of a
civil war, it is nearly always succeeded by a popular state. This is
because the people know no moderation, and once the tyrant is
expelled, the hatred of Ius memory, and the fear of once again f a h g
a victim, excites them to rush to the other extreme . . . Ths happened
in Rome after the expulsion of Tarquin the Proud, and in Switzerland,
once the Imperial Vicars were killed, the people established a popular
state w h c h has lasted till the present day, that is to say for two hundred
and sixty years. . . .
It also sometimes happens that a people is so unstable that it is
impossible to find any form of government with which it does not
become discontented after a brief experience of it. The Athenians . . .
the Florentines and the Genoese were like this. The minute they had
break against the regime when the Pope became a prisoner in Castel Sant' Angelo in
I 527 when Rome was sacked by the Imperial army under the Constable de Bourbon.
118
OF COMMONWEALTHS Cl10p. I
and peacefully. This happens when a city admits foreign settlers who
in course of time considerably increase in numbers, but who remain
ineligible for office or political rights. The strain of government and
of war brings about a gradual diminution in the ruling class, whereas
the number of aliens steadily increases. A point is reached when it is
only a minority of the inhabitants who enjoy rights of sovereignty,
and ths, we have shown, is the distinguishing mark of an aristocracy.
The commonwealths of Venice, Lucca, Ragusa, and Genoa were all
once popular states which have gradually and insensibly been converted
into aristocracies. The change was further facilitated, of course, by the
reluctance of the poorer citizens, who needed all their time and energy
to make aliving, to accept public duties to which no profit was attached.
In course of time, and by prescription, their families have lost the right
to such ofices altogether.
This type of revolution is the easiest and least insupportable of any.
But if one wishes to prevent it happening, the children of immigrants
must be admitted to public charges and offices, unless there are very
urgent reasons why. not, especially if the commonwealth is much
involved in wars abroad. Otherwise there is the danger that the ruling
class, not daring to arm its subjects, will be destroyed by defeat in
battle, whereupon the people will seize power . . . The tlung that most
assisted the victory of the Roman people over the nobles was the
defeat of the latter by the men of Viei, for the greater part of the gentry
were lulled, including three hundred menibers of the most ancient
and noble family of the Fabii. The Venetians solve this problem by
employing foreign mercenaries as a general rule, if they have to make
war, though they avoid doing so whenever possible.
This danger of a revolution in the form of the state, following the
destruction of the nobles, does not afflict monarchies, except in the
extreme case of all Princes of the Blood perishing with the nobles.
The Turks have seen to it that no single gentlem.an escaped in any
province which they intended to annex. But this sort of change is
rather the absorption of one state by another than a revolution in
government, and proceeds from external and not internal causes. But
practically the entire noblesse of France was lulled in the battle of
Fontenoy near Auxerre, in the war between Lothar, son of Louis the
Pious, and his brothers Louis and Charles the Bald. Nevertheless all
three monarchies survived as such. . . .
Great and notable revolutions are most likely to befall aristocracies
I20
OF COMMONWEALTHS Chap. I
Acropolis, and extremely hostile to them till Pericles included the port
within his long walls. Venice was at one time in extreme danger from
a similar conflict between the sailors and pilots on the one hand, and
inhabitants of the city on the other, and but for the intervention of
Pietro Loredanol would have suffered a violent revolution.
Internal seditions often bring about external disasters, for a neigh-
bouring prince very frequently falls upon an adjacent state in the hour
of its defeat, as did the Normans after the battle of Fontenoy when the
noblesse of France was practically exterminated . . . External disasters
attendant on internal disorders are all the more to be feared if one's
nearest neighbours are not friends and allies. Proxinlity whets the
appetite for securing that which belongs to another, before he can
prevent it. There is nothing surprising in this. When one considers
that neither seas, mountains, nor uninhabitable deserts are sufficient
barriers against the ambition and avarice of princes, how can one
expect them to be content with what they possess, and refrain from
encroaching on their neighbours, when their frontiers coincide, and
opportunity offers? .
Such a fate is much more likely to befall small republics such as
Ragusa, Geneva, or Lucca, which consist of a single city and a very
small dependent territory. Who conquers the city conquers the state.
This cannot happen to great or powerful commonwealths w h c h have
many provinces, and many local centres of government. If one is
occupied, the others can come to its assistance, as several members of a
powerful body who can aid one another at need. Moreover monar-
ches have t h s advantage over aristocracies and popular states, that
there is no one centre of sovereignty which is the stronghold of the
ruling class, so that if it is destroyed the state perishes. A killg can
remove h s capital from place to place. Even if he i s himself captured,
the ruin of the state does not necessarily follow. When the city of
Capua was taken by the Romans the whole state perished, and no
other city or fortress offered the least resistance, for the sovereign,
senate, and people had all been made captive. Again when the Duke of
Florence took the city of Siena all its subjects, cities, and fortresses
surrendered forthwith. But should a king be made captive, he is often
released again for the price of his ransom. Even if the enemy will not
1 Venetian admiral commanding in the wars of the early fourteenth century, victor
over the Turks at Gallipoli in 1416, over the Genoese at Rapallo in 1431, and defender of
Constantinople 1421-24.
be content with that, the estates can always proceed to another election,
or enthrone the next in blood if there are other princes. A captive
h n g will sometimes rather lose his throne or die a prisoner than
a a c t his subjects. The Emperor Charles V was extremely embarrassed
by the resolution of Francis I in letting it be known that he would
resign the crown to his eldest son were his terins not accepted. For
the kingdom and the government had survived intact without suffering
revolution or alteration whatsoever as a result of the crisis. Although
Spain, Italy, England, the Low Countries, the Pope, the Venetians,
and all the Italian estates, were allied against the French house, none
dared enter France to conquer her, knowing the strength of her institu-
tions and the nature of the monarchy.1 As a strong building raised on
sure fo~mdations,constructed of durable materials and knit together in
all its parts need not fear storms and tempests, nor violent assaults, so
the comn~onwealthbased on good laws and united together in all its
parts does not easily fall a prey to revolution. There are however
some so ill-founded and ill-united that the slightest: wind destroys
them. There is nevertheless no co~ninonwealthwhich does not suffer
transformation with the passage of time, and come to ruin eventually.
But the transformation that is accomplished slowly is the most toler-
able. . . .
new law, however good, is outweighed by the fact that the whole
general force of law is weakened once one begins to make changes.
In short, there is nothing more difficult to undertake, more doubtful of
success, or more dangerous in the attempt, than the introduction of
new laws.
This argument seems to me to have considerable force. I would add
another consideration which also seems to me of great weight. I
think it extremely dangerous to make any change in the law touching
the constitution. The amendment of laws and customs touching
inheritances, contracts, or servitudes is on the whole permissible. But
to touch the laws of the constitution is as dangerous as to undermine
the foundations, or remove the corner-stone on which the wholeweight
of the building rests. Disturbed in this way, apart from the risk of
collapse, a building often receives more damage than the advantage
of new material is worth, especially if it is old and decaying. The
AND LAW Chap. 3
same is true of an old-established commonwealth. The slightest
disturbance of its foundations spells ruin. Therefore the ancient
maxim of wise statesmen, that one should not tamper with the con-
stitution of any con~monwealthwhich has long maintained itself in
good order for any advantage that can be imagined, should be weighed
carefully. . . .
If anyone objects that changes in the law are often necessary, es-
pecially in matters concerning the policing of a country, I agree that
such necessity is prior to all rules about wisdom in legislation. But it is
always dangerous to introduce laws and edicts which are a matter of
choice, however good and they may be, especially if they
relate to the constitution. Not that I wish a commonwealth to cling
to laws whch no longer conduce to its preservation. One must always
bear in nind the principle to which there is no exception, saItrs yoptrli
stlprerlla lex esto. Thus Themistocles persuaded the Athenians to
fortify the city with walls and fortresses, the better to defend it and
secure their own safety. But Theremanes, for exactly the same reason,
persuaded them to dismantle them, for otherwise the total ruin of the
people and of the commonwealth would have been certain. There are
no laws, however excellent, which do not sooner or later change their
value, and when necessity requires, they should be altered, but not
before. Therefore when Solon published his laws, he made the people
swear to keep them for the next hundred years, so Plutarch says. In
doing this he showed that he did not wish that the laws should be
regarded as unalterable, but that they should not be abandoned in any
haste. . . .
Even when the law is patently unjust, it is better to let it lapse
gradually than to make any sudden change . . . Again, the nature of men
is extraordinarily corruptible, and they continually descend from good
to bad, and from bad to worse. Their vices slowly establish a hold on
them, like the ill humours which gradually invade the body till they
entirely possess it. It is therefore necessary at times to make new laws
to deal with the situation, but it should always be done very gradually
. . . The ordering of the commo~~wealth should be modelled on the
ordering of the universe. God, the first cause, accomplishes all t h g s
gradually and almost insensibly. During the lifetime of the Doge
Agostino Barbarino,' the Venetians did nothing to curtail his authority
Agostino Barberigo was Doge from 1486 to 1501. He was suspected of corrupt
practices, but an enquiry was deferred till after his death.
125
Book 4 CHANGES OF GOVERNMENT
because of the disturbance it night cause. But after his death, and
before proceeding to the election of Loredano, the Signory published
new laws which drastically limited the powers of the Doge. W e have
shown how a similar policy was adopted at the election of the Emperors
of Germany. From sovereign kings they were reduced step by step
to the position of mere captains in chief. T o make the change more
palatable, they were left in possession of all the marks of imperial
splendour in the vestments they wore, the style in w h c h they were
addressed, and in the ceremonies which surrounded them, but of very
little else. Just as it is perilous to deprive a sovereign ruler suddenly
of his authority, or a prince who has an armed force at his disposal, so
it is no less dangerous for a prince to dismiss or rebuff abruptly the
former officers of his predecessor, or suddenly to deprive a whole body
of officials while retaining others. Those who are retained are sus-
pected of jealous intrigues and those who are dismissed, of incompe-
tence or dishonesty, besides being deprived of the charges which they
have often enough bought dear. Perhaps one of the surest foundations
of the French monarchy is that the officers of the crown retain their
posts on the death of the king, and so are able to preserve the common-
wealth intact. . . .
T h s is not a danger which threatens popular or aristocratic states,
since with them the sovereign never dies. But the risk is just as great
when they have to appoint new high officers of state, or captains in
chief; or when they have to initiate some law which is disagreeable to
the people, because it favours the nobles and burdens the humbler
citizens, or because there is a shortage of provisions, or because prices
are too high. Such occasions always breed popular agitations and
seditions.
Generally, when it is necessary to deprive magistrates, suppress
guilds and colleges, cancel privileges, cut down salaries and benefices,
increase penalties; or to restore the ancient usages in either politics or
religion when they have deteriorated through the natural human
propensity to corruption, there is no better way of achieving success
than by gradual means. The use of force, such as is necessary if insti-
i
.r tutions are to be suppressed, is to be avoided wherever possible. W e
have a notable warning in the case of Charles V of France. When
regent, he was misled by evil counsel into suspending or dismissing
suddenly the majority of the officers of the realm, and replacing them
by commissioners. France was immediately shaken by disorders from
126
AND LAW Clzap. 3
end to end, from the number of the malcontents1 . . . But when the
Signory of Base1 established the Reformed Church, it did not wish to
expel immediately and forcibly all the inmates of abbeys and monas-
teries. It merely ordained that as they died no successors should
take their place, whereby it happened that a single Carthusian contin-
ued to inhabit his convent for a great time all alone, all his fellow inonks
having voluntarily left. He was nevertheless never compelled to leave
the place, nor abandon his habit or his profession. . . .
I hold that the great increase in officials, in guilds, in privileged
persons, or of evil-doers which has come about through the negligence
of princes and magistrates ought to be checked in t l s way. The same
principle holds good for all matters touching subjects as a whole, for it
is rooted in the very nature of law, for law only really begins to take
effect after some considerable passage of time.
Even in the case of tyranny, which is a thing cruel and detestable in
itself, it is better if the tyrant has neither chldren nor near relatives,
to defer bringing an end to the tyranny till after his death, rather than
to use violent measures against the tyrant hmself, and so expose the
state to the risk of the ruin w h c h so often befalls on such occasions.
Only if the tyrant has heirs, and is employing himself, as is almost
universal custom, in killing off all the people of any importance one
by one, and in getting rid of any magistrates who might check him in
his courses, in order to establish his own sole and unchallengeable
authority, is it permissible to have recourse to violent measures, in
accordance with the principles we laid down at the start; otherwise
not. In governing a well-ordered state therefore one should follow
the example of the workings of nature, by which all things are accom-
plished slowly, one step at a time. God causes a tall and spreading tree-)
to spring from one small seed, but always by imperceptible degrees.
He unites extremes by their mean, putting spring between winter and
summer, and autumn between summer and winter, ordering all
things according to His perfect wisdom And if it is dangerous to
change laws easily, let us consider whether it is dangerous to change
In 1357 while King John was a prisoner in England, the Estates-General, angry at
heavy taxation and the disastrous course of the war, and suspicious of misgovernment,
forced upon the Dauphin Charles, as regent, a council of 36 reformer-generals with wide
powers of correction. One of its first acts was to suspend all officers ofjustice and finance,
pending an enquiry into their conduct. The consequent anarchy brough its own reaction,
and assisted Charles in getting rid of the Estates and re-establishing the authority of the
Crown.
Book 4 WHETHER TENURE OF OFFICE
abuse of power. Offices and honours will be given to the rich and those
of noble birth, even though they may not be as well-informed as less
wealthy citizens, because it is a necessary precaution against sedition.
But it will always be arranged that those exalted persons who are not
really capable of discharging their functions properly shall have men
well-versed in the business as their associates, to cover and remedy
their defects. But should necessity arise the king is not bound to
observe his own laws in the matter. He can deprive men of offices
which by law are perpetual, should he judge that those who have been
appointed are incapable in either mind or body of the office they hold;
or to save the face of those who have proved incapable, he can give
them some favourable opportunity of resigning their position, as
Augustus did in the case of a number of senators who were induced to
resign in this way without public action being taken; or he can at least
appoint cominissioners to execute the functions of any office, vvlule
leaving the holder with the title and the privileges.
In the interests of justice however always the principal foundation
of any commonwealth, the king will provide that both criminal and
civil jurisdiction shall be committed to colleges ofjudges in perpetuity,
even for cases where there is no appeal. In this way hc will secure
judges slulled in their profession, partly from long experience in
hearing cases, partly from constantly having to listen to the opinions
of their colleagues. At the same time their numbers make them
individually not very powerful, and therefore less able to abuse their
trust, and more difficult to corrupt. It is not easy to contaminate a
great volume of water. It often happens that a good and upright
judge can carry a whole Bench with him, either by detecting the
partiality and secret manauvres of dishonest judges, or, where they
are honest but led astray by false witnesses and legal chicanery, by
putting them wise to such practices. I have seen a single judge cause a
whole Bench to change its mind and set free an innocent woman,
cleared of all suspicion, whom the rest had decided to condemn to
death as guilty. His name deserves to be recorded. It was the councillor
Potier, lord of Blanc-Mesnil. . . .
I have said that a lung will neither make all office perpetual, nor all
office temporary. There is no need to make such subordinates as
clerks of the court, constables, ushers, notaries, and such like officers
temporary. They have no independent authority and so can do no
harm to the state, while the efficiency necessary to the proper discharge
130
SHOULD BE PERMANENT Chap. 4
of their functions is the result of long practice in them. T h s is only
possible if their appointments are permanent. The same may be said
of subordinate magistrates whose sentences are subject to revision by
their s~~periors. But if, in the case of sovereign magistrates, whether
concerned with war, justice, or finance, the king only appoints them
for the term of one, two, or three years, he has opportunities of examin-
ing their actions, and doing justice upon them. Incidentally, the dread
of an enquiry keeps dishonest magistrates in check. But sudden and
complete change is dangerous, and in order to avoid replacing all the
officers of the realm at the same time, to the interrupting of public
business, it is best that colleges of magistrates should be renewed by
succession of persons, one at a time. This is done in the Republic of
Ragusa, where the Senate is perpetual, but the senators, who form the
sovereign judicial body, only hold office for one year at a time, but do
not all go out of office together, but successively, so that the change is
hardly noticeable. After a certain period they may serve again. . . .
Such measures obviate the difficulties which arise with the interrup-
tion of public business caused by a simultaneous change of all the chef
officers of state, and avoid the danger of the commonwealth being left
without magistrates, like a ship without a pilot. This sort of thing
frequently occurred in Rome, through the intrigues of magistrates
who thwarted one another, and all came into officeand went out at the
same time. These arrangements also remove all fear that those who
attain to the highest positions of trust in the state by bribery and by
favour will remain inaccessible to punishment, or that ignorant men
will continuously monopolize power, for after a short interval those
who have already held office, and acquired experience, can be reap-
pointed. . . .
Yet ill-advised princes repeatedly abandon a good custonl because
of some defect they find in it. I need only give the one example of
Loms XI. When he came to the throne, he immediately dismissed
all the former servants of his father. They managed things in such a
fashion thereafter as to bring him almost to the point of resigning or
losing h s crown, as he afterwards confessed. Fearing that his son would
fall into the same error, he charged him never to deprive those whom
he himself had advanced. Not content with this, he promulgated an
ordinance making all office perpetual; once appointed, the holders
could not be deprived except as a result of resignation, death, or
forfeiture. . . .
131
Book 4 SHOULD THE PRINCE
1 The Count Valentino was Cesare Borgia. Louis XI1 intervened on behalf of the
Republic to check his conquests in Tuscany. The office referred to, that of Gonfaloniere a
vita was instituted in 1502, but its holder, Piero Soderini, was forced to resign when the
Medici, with the support of Spanish arms, re-entered the city in 1512.
RENDER JUSTICE IN PERSON? Chap. 6
Whether the Prince should render Justice to his Subjects in Persot11
[CHAPTER VI] '
SOME readers may think that this is a question about which no dis-
cussion is necessary, seeing that all the ancients, and all discriminating
students of politics are agreed that kings were first established for no
other reason that to do justice, as Herodotus shows of the Medes and
Cicero of the Romans . . . The chief consideration that should move
princes to do justice is the mutual bond between them and their
subjects, whereby the subject owes obedience and assistance to his
lord, and the prince owes justice, care, and protection to his subject. He
does not discharge this obligation by appointing a representative to
act in his name. For just as the subject is bound to swear allegiance in
person, and to render homage and service himself, so there is a reci-
procal obligation on the prince. Indeed, it is not so serious if the vassal
swears allegiance and homage by proxy as if the prince does justice
only through his officers. The obedence due from the subject is not
thereby called in question. But the subject on his side has no guarantee
that the prince's officers will not be corrupt. The prince is responsible
before God, and the obligation on his conscience to see that justice
is done is not discharged by his mere iilstruction to judges to see to it.
Moreover it is of the greatest importance for the preservation of the
commonwealth that whoever exercises sovereign power should him-
self dispense justice. Union and mutual amity between a prince and
his subjects is best fostered by mutual intercourse. This advantage is
lost if the prince acts only through his officers. Subjects always imagine
themselves despised and neglected by officials,a suspicion more serious
in its results than if they experience actual injustice at the prince's hands,
for contempt is harder to endure than a straightforward injury. But
when subjects see their prince giving judgement in person, they are by
this mere fact already half satisfied, even though he does not thereupon
grant their requests. They reflect that at any rate the king has attended
This question was not entirely academic in Bodin's day. Louis XI1 still attended and
heard cases in the Parlement of Paris. The practice however was discontinued after his
death. However Henry 111 could still promise in the Ordinance of Blois, r 579,to render
justice personally to such of his subjects as sought it, but by then such action no longer
corresponded with the facts.
2 Chapter V is devoted to considering whether magistrates ought to be unanimous
or divided in their opinions and policies. The general conclusion is that division is
mischievous in popular and aristocratic states, but not very dangerous in a monarchy
where the king can hold the balance.
Book 4 SHOULD THE PRINCE
to their petition, heard their complaints, and taken pains to judge the
matter. It is extraordinary how uplifted and delighted subjects are to be
seen, heard, and attended to by a prince even of very inodest virtues, or
of some mild degree of amiability. Moreover notlung gives greater
authority to magistrates and subordinate officials, or excites more fear,
and reverence for justice, than the sight of the king enthroned for
judgement . . . In fine, it cannot be doubted that the prince in doing
justice constantly upon his subjects accustonls himself to be in his own
person just, upright, and true. Seeing that this is the greatest boon that
can fall to the lot of any commonwealth, should not one desire
constantly and ardently that the prince should be ceaselessly employed
in giving judgement? The true function of the prince is to judge his
people. He must of course also be armed against the enemy, but
justice is h s necessary attribute in all places, and at all times.
But the example of wise princes is of more weight than reasons and
arguments. Was there ever a prince the equal of Solomon for wisdom?
W e read that his sole prayer to God was for wisdom so that he might
judge h s people aright, and his judgements were reported throughout
the world, to the wonder and edification of all peoples. Who was ever
the equal of the great Augustus for political prudence:' W e read of
him that he was incessantly employed in giving judgement? He would
not let even illness prevent him from being carried into the court.
Such was the ordinary and daily function of the Roman Emperors and
they won thereby a reputation for justice above all other princes of
the world. . . .
Nevertheless I do not think these arguments are of sufficient weight
to settle the question and prove conclusively that the prince should
dispense justice in person. It is true this would be expedient and even
necessary if princes were, as Scylax said of those in the Indies, as superior
to their subjects as God is high above mankind. There is nothing fmer
or more royal than the spectacle of a prince performing exploits of
virtue in the presence of his people, and out of his own mouth re-
buking and condemning wicked men, praising and rewarding the
good, publicly taking co~mseiof the wise, and engaging in weighty
debate. Only a man who is himself upright esteems virtuous company
and hates evil men, and only a prince who is himselfjust and true can
dispense impartial justice.
But should we agree that vicious princes ought also to live in the
public eye, and thereby communicate their vices to their subjects,?
134
RENDER JUSTICE IN PERSON? Clzap. 6
The least vice in a prince defaces his fair image, and cannot but have
the effect of attracting, persuading, or even compelling his subjects to
evil. It is the most natural t h g in the world for subjects to model
themselves on the manners, the behaviour, and the conversation of
their prince. No gesture, action, or expression of his escapes the notice
of those who observe him with the closest attention with a view to
imitation . . . W e have seen how, when Francis I, King of France, and
Mansur called the Great, Emperor of Africa and Spam, each in their
several times and places began to patronize learning, immediately- the
princes, the nobles, the clergy, and common people devoted themselves
with such ardour to the sciences, that never was such a concourse of
men learned in all languages and sciences seen as in their time. Since
princes then are a model to their subjects, let them be as perfect as in
them lies, and if they fall short in this respect, let them not make
public appearances.
It may be objected that this is not a good enough reason why a
prince should live retired, and not appear to judge and comlnunicate
directly with his'people, since they have the wits, w h c h they should
employ, to judge of his actions, and follow the good and eschew the
evil. But I would answer that it is much easier to imitate vice than
virtue, for men are naturally inclined more to evil than good, and
whereas there is only one straight and narrow way that leads to virtue,
there are a hundred thousand side paths that lead to vice . . . Such
power has a faulty prince of transforming and turning the hearts of
his subjects according to his own good pleasure. He has even greater
power of turning them to folly. I can give another example from the
conduct of King Francis. He once shaved his scalp in order to assist
his recovery from a wound in the head. Immediately first h s court,
and then everyone else shaved too, so that from that time long hair
which was once a mark of beauty and privilege of nobility became
an object of ridicule. . . .
Suppose however we grant that the prince is neither inept, ridiculous
or vicious, but virtuous and well-conducted, the fact remains that
daily communication and a too great familiarity with h s subjects
engenders a certain contempt for the sovereign. Contempt of him
leads to disobedience to his commands and his laws, and disobedience
spells the ruin of the state. O n the other hand, if the prince makes a
habit of appearing in public, but always in great state and in the guise
of a severe and terrible judge, it is true that he may inspire his subjects
I35
Book 4 SHOULD THE PRINCE
with respect, but he mill also run the risk of losing their love. Love of
the subject for his sovereign is much more conducive to the preserva-
tion of the state than fear, for love always has an element of fear in it,
the fear of offending the object of one's love. But fear by itself can be,
,
and mostly is, devoid of any admixture of love. Almighty God, the
ruler of the whole world, made manifest what relations earthly
princes, who are his true images, ought to have with their subjects.
For God only communicated with men in dreams and visions, or
through the very small body of the elect, and the greatest saints.
When He declared the decalogue in His own voice, divine fire filled
the heavens, and thunder like the terrible sound of trumpets shook the
mountains, so that the people threw themselves upon their faces,
praying Him to cease speaking lest they should die. It is written that
He caused them to hear His voice that they might for ever after tremble
to offend Him. Nevertheless He moved them to love Him by blessing
them with manifold and great favours and bounties. The wise prince
who imitates in the management of his subjects the wisdom of God in
governing the world will show himself little to his subjects, and then
in solemn state as befits his h g h authority. He should moreover choose
men of great worth, such as are not easily found, to make known his
will. For the rest, he should constantly bestow his graces and favours
on all his subjects. . . .
But granted that the prince has wisdom, understanding, prudence,
discretion, experience, patience, and all the virtues, it is still of doubtful
advantage for him to judge his subjects in person. The best means of
preserving the authority of the monarchy is that the prince should be
loved by all, without any alloy of contempt, and as far as possible
hated by none. T o achieve this two things are necessary. First, just
punishments must be meted out to malefactors, and rewards to the
worthy. But seeing that whereas the latter is a pleasing task, and the
former is invidious, the prince who wishes to command the affection
of his subjects should reserve to himself the distribution of rewards,
whether estates, honours, offices, benefices, pensions, privileges and
concessions, grants of immunity, exemptions, and restitutions, and all
such graces and favours. Any prudent prince should bestow such
himself. But for condemnations, fines, confiscations, and all like
penalties, let him delegate their infliction to his officers, for them to
administer good and expeditious justice. If he manages his affairs in
this way, those who have received benefits at his hands are constrained
136
RENDER JUSTICE IN PERSON? Chap. 6
to love, respect, and honour their benefactor; those who have been
punished will have no occasion to hate him, but will vent their anger
on their judges. The prince, showering benefits on all, but injuries on
none will be welcome to all and hated of none. Nature has provided
us with a model in the king of the bees, who has no sting . . . I myself
think that one of the admirable secrets of the long success of this
monarchy is the wise practice of our kings, since earliest times, of
themselves distributing graces and favours, while delegating the duty
of punishment, without respect of persons, to their officers. . . .
What I have said about the inadvisability of the prince assuming the
role of judge has even more force in popular states, because of the
great difficulty of assembling the people, of making them listen to
reason when they are assembled, and having listened, to pass sound
judgement. Such difficulties were the greatest single cause of civil wars
among the Romans until the dictator Sulla vested the cognizance of all
causes, save treason in the first degree, in the magistrates. Moreover
the denial of the exercise of their ordinary and legitimate powers to the
senate and the magistrates, in order to attribute them to those in whom
sovereign power is vested, has been a most frequent cause of the ruin
of commonwealths. The true attributes of sovereignty apart, the more
powers a sovereign has, the less secure he is . . . Perhaps the thing that
has most conduced to the preservation of the Venetian state is that
there has never been a republic in which those in whom sovereign
power was vested interfered less with the business of the council and
the magistrates. The Great Council hardly concerned itself with
anything save the appointment of magistrates, the issue of general
ordinances, and the granting of graces, which are, of course, the
principal attributes of sovereignty. All other affairs of state were
attended to by the Senate, or the Council of Ten, and the administra-
tion ofjustice by the magistrates.
If this is well-ordered and praiseworthy in an aristocracy, it is even
more desirable in a popular state, for the more heads, the less counsel,
and the less resolution . . .W e read that the Roman Republic was never
more flourishing than at the time when the people did not concern
themselves with any exercise of power save their rights of sovereignty.
This was the period from the first Punic war till the conquest of the
kingdom of Macedon. But once the Tribune Caius Gracchus cur-
tailed the powers of the Senate and the magistrates in order to make
the people cognizant of matters of all sorts, nothing but seditions,
I37
Book 4 HOW SEDITIONS
assassinations and civil wars followed, till this outrageous licence of the
people was exchanged for an extreme servitude. . . .
A state cannot fail to prosper where the sovereign retains those
rights proper to his majesty, the senate preserves its authority, the
maoistrates
?
exercise their legitimate powers, and justice runs its
ordinary course. Otherwise, if those who have sovereign power
attempt to invade the sphere of the senate or the magistrate, they only
risk the loss of their own authority. They are much mistaken who think
to exalt the sovereign by making him aware of his claws, and impress
on him that I i s will, his very glance, has the force of an edict or a
judgement, so that none of his subjects can take cognizance of any
matter which may not be revised or reversed by him. T h s engenders
an insupportable arrogance and tyranny in the prince. . . .
. . .WEput first as a general maxim that factions and parties are danger-
ous, and threaten the well-being of all lunds of commonwealths.
They must therefore be prevented wherever possible by wise counsel,
and if only discovered after they have been set on foot, every means
should be taken to cure them, or at the worst, nothng should be
omitted which is likely to mitigate the evil. I would not deny that
factions and seditions bring in their train great benefits, such as some
wise law, or beneficial reform, w h c h would hardly have come about
without agitation. But this does not disprove the fact that sedition is
in itself dangerous, for its good results are purely fortuitous and
accidental . . . Seditions often lead to the death or banishment of evil
men, whch allows the rest to live thereafter in peace. Or unjust laws
and ordinances may be abolished, and replaced by just ones whch
otherwise would not have been accepted . . . But just as diseases are
pernicious to the body, so conspiracy and conjuration is pernicious to
the commonwealth.
Someone may say that factions are necessary to the preservation of
tyrants, since they are inevitably the enemies of their subjects, and
could not long maintain themselves in the face of a united people. We
have already shown that tyranny is the weakest of all forms of the
commonwealth, since it is upheld by cruel and wicked deeds. Never-
theless tyrannies are generally brought to an end by sedition or civil
war. Even the most ingenious of tyrants, who have committed their
138
MAY BE AVOIDED Chap. 7
murders one at a time, growing fat on the life-blood of their subjects,
and preserved their own miserable lives, though dragged out in terror
and despair, have not escaped the knife of the conspirator. The more
subjects they put to death, the more are conspiracies against them
nourished by the avengers of murdered lundred. Even should whole
families be exterminated, in the end all good Inen and true rise against
them . . . Therefore the Florentines were mistaken in thinlung that
their authority in Pistoia was the better secured by nourishing factions
among its inhabitants. They only lost influence by the death of good
citizens destroyed in civil strife.'
But if factions and seditions are dangerous to monarches, they are
even more so to popular states and to aristocracies. Monarchs can
preserve tlieir authority, either by impartially composing quarrels, or
in alliance with one of the parties by bringing the other to reason, or
by destroying it altogether. But if the people in a popular state are
divided, there is no sovereign to appeal to, any more than there is
when the governing class in an aristocracy splits up into cliques. . . .
If it is obvious that the opposing factions cannot be dealt with by
process of law, the sovereign ought to resort to force to extinguish
them altogether, by the punishment of the manifest leaders before they
have become so strong that there is no prevailing against them . . . The
punishmcut of a few nlay then induce the rest to remember their
allegiance, and discourage those who have not yet openly joined in.
The prince should avoid however mass executions, or the torturing of
suspects. . . .
In the case of factions and conjurations wlich are not directed
against the prince personally, nor against his government, but divide
the nobles, or the towns, or the provinces subject to h m from each
other, he ought by all means in his power to stop then1 developing. He
should not omit the smallest precaution. Great storms and tempests
are bred from almost imperceptible mists and vapours, and civil wars
can originate in the most trivial circumstances. . . .
Just as it is easier to prevent an invasion than to expel the enemy once
he has effected an entry, so it is better to prevent sedition than co try
and cure it. This is even more difficult in a popular state than in any
1 Pistoia was a subject city to Florence. Its inhabitants were divided into the factions
of the Panciatichi and the Cancellieri. Their rivalries prevented any united resistance
to Florentine domination, but assumed such proportions that from 1500 to 1502 it was
not possible to exercise ally control in the city, till some sort of a compromise was negotia-
ted by the Florentine government.
Book 4 HOW SEDITIONS
141
Book 4 HOW SEDITIONS
from the mouth of God himself.) But if the prince who has assurance
of the true religion wishes to convert his subjects, split by sects and
factions, he should not, in my opinion, attempt to coerce them. The
more one tries to constrain men's wills, the Inore obstinate they become.
But if the prince in his own person follows the true religion without
hypocrisy or deceit, without any use of force, or any infliction of
punishments, he may turn his subjects' hearts. In doing this, not only
does he escape unrest, trouble, and civil strife, but he guides his errant
subjects to the gates of salvation. . . .
The King of the Turks, who rules over a great part of Europe, safe-
guards the rites of religion as well as any prince in this world. Yet he
constrains no one, but on the contrary permits everyone to live accord-
ing as his conscicnce dictates. What is more, even in his seraglio at
Pera he permits the practice of four diverse religions, that of the Jews,
the Christian according to the Roman rite, and according to the Greek
rite, and that of Islam. He also sends alms to the good fathers or
Christian monks of Mount Athos, in order that they shall pray for him.
Augustus did likewise with the Jews, sending the usual alms and
oblations to Jerusalem. Although Theodoric, Icing of the Goths,
favoured the Asian sect, he did not force the consciellces of h s subjects,
giving as his reason, according to Cassiodorus, that he could not com-
mand in matters of religion, since no one can be forced to believe
against h s will.
If a prince does otherwise, those who are prevented from the
exercise of their own religion, and not in sympathy with any other,
end by becoming atheists, as we know. Once they have lost the fear
of God, they trample under foot the law and the magistrate, and give
thenlselves over to every sort of impiety and wickedness, beyond the
power of any human laws to remedy. And just as the cruellest tyranny
does not make for so much wretchedness as anarchy, when neither
prince nor magistrate is recognized, so the most fantastic superstition
in the world is not nearly so detestable as atheism. One inust therefore
avoid the greater evil if one cannot establish the true religion. . . .
W e have spoken of the causes leading to changes in the form of
governments and of commonwealths. The same causes give rise to
unrest and civil war; that is to say failure to do justice, oppression of
the poor and humble, the unfair distribution of punishments and
honours, excessive riches in a few and excessive poverty in the rest,
idkscss in the subject, and impunity in ill doing. This last is of the
142
MAY BE AVOIDED Chap. 7
greatest importance, though it is mostly considered the least. I have
already said this, but it bears frequent repetition. In proportion as
princes and magistrates try to win a reputation for mercy, so they call
down on their own heads the penalties that evil-doers have merited. . . .
But besides these causes of unrest there is another which proceeds
from the freedom which is allowed to orators, who play upon the
emotions and fan the desires of the people as they choose. There is
nothing which has greater influence over men's souls than the art of
eloquent speech. Our forefathers portrayed the Celtic Hercules as an
old man, trailing after him a crowd of people fastened by the ears with
chains issuing from his mouth. They thus intimated that the powers
and armed forces of kings and princes are not so potent as the ve-
hemence of an ardent and eloquent man. He can excite the most
cowardly to overcome the bravest, he makes the proudest cast aside
their arms, turns cruelty into gentleness, barbarity into humanity,
revolutionizes a commonwealth, and plays upon the people at will.
I don't say all this in praise of eloquence, but to show what force it has,
for it is a force more often used for ill than good ends. It is nothing
more than the art of disguising the truth, an artifice to make that w h c h
is evil seem good, that which is right, wrong, make a mountain out of
a molehill and an elephant out of a mouse. In other words it is the art
of successful lying. There is no doubt that for one who makes a good
use of this art, fifty abuse it . . . There is no need to prove this by
examples from Greece and Rome, one can see it in our own age . . .
Jolm of Leyden, who was a cobbler turned preacher, seized Miinster,
the capital city of Westphalia, caused hmself to be crownedits sovereign
king, and sustained a seige by the imperial army for three years. The
preacher Geronimo Savonarola, supported by Pagolantonio Soderini,
moved the people to choose a popular form of state when it was in
doubt whether Florence should become an aristocracy or a popular
state. In the same way Pericles employed the orator ~phialtesto
persuade the Athenians to a popular state of an extreme type. In brief,
we have seen all Germany in arms, and a hundred thousand people
killed in less than a year because unruly preachers incited the people
against the nobles. . . .l
Nevertheless, for those who wish to make good use of this weapon,
it is a means of converting a people from barbarism to humanity, it is
a means of reforming manners, improving the laws, expelling tyrants,
1 A reference to the Peasants' Revolt of 1524-25. .
I43
Book 4 HOW SEDITIONS MAY BE AVOIDED Chap. 7
banishing vice, and strengthening virtue. There is no better means of
appeasing discontent, and persuading subjects to obedience than to
employ a good preacher, for he will find a way to soften and turn the
hearts of the most obstinate rebels. This is especially true in a popular
state where an ignorant people is master, and cannot be restrained
except by orators. For that reason they have always enjoyed the
highest degree of honour and power in popular states, controlling the
distributions of ofices and charges, gifts and honours according to their
good pleasure. In brief, the issues of peace and war, arms and laws
hang upon the words of orators. On the other hand there is nothmg
that the tyrant has to fear more than a popular orator, if his tyranny is
hated.
But since these rules which we have formulated should be adapted
to the nature of the commonwealth and the type of government,
laws, and customs to the nature of each particular people, let us con-
sider the nature of the various ~eoplesas a matter most necessary to be
understood for the good government of commonwealths.
BOOK V
much greater strength and natural vigour than have the rest. The
coldness of the climate, by conserving their natural heat, gives them a
greater appetite, and they eat and drink more than others. In conse-
quence when armies drawn from the more southerly regions invade
the frigid zone, they become more vigorous and bold. This was
evident when Hannibal's army invaded Italy, or when the Arabs and
the Moors invaded Spain, or in the case of the seven thousand Spaniards
the Emperor Charles V took to Germany.l They all won notable
victories. On the other hand northern troops lose their vigour and
become dispirited when they are transported into southern countries,
especially if it be in summer. The Cimbrians were an example. Plutarch
says that the heat they had to endure in Provence completely exhausted
them by keeping them in a perpetual sweat. Had not the Romans
vanquished them first they would almost certainly have died. The
same fate overtook the French before N a p l e ~ ,and~ the lanzknechts
who were led into Italy by Charles of Bourbon and George Fronsberg.~
After they had sacked Rome, before the year was out, ten thousand of
them had perished without a blow struck, according to Guicciardini.4
The same effects are to be observed in cattle that are transported from
the north to some southern country. They lose their fat, fail to give
milk, and suffer a general decline. Pliny remarked on it, and traders
are always experiencing the same thing. A Spaniard doubles his energy
and his appetite when he goes into France, while a Frenchman in
Spain becomes languid and dainty. If he tries to go on eating as he was
accustomed to do at home, he runs the risk of putting a term to his
existence. Northerners feel languid when a south wind blows. For
the same reason men and animals, and especially birds, who are very
sensitive to change, grow fat in winter and thin in summer.
If Leo A f r i c a n u s ~ dFrancesco d'Alvare~,~
the authors of histories
of Africa and of Ethiopia, had observed the working of these natural
In 1546 Charles brought a Spanish army under the Duke of Alva to Germany to deal
with the rebel Princes, which defeated them at the battle of Miihlberg in 1547.
Many French armies perished before Naples. This is probably a reference to the
disastrous expedition under de Lautrec in 1528,an incident in the war against Charles V
for Italian territory.
3 The Imperial army that sacked Rome in 1527.
4 Bodin makes much use of his Storia d'ltalia, published in 1561,for his treatment of
Italian politics.
An Italian translation of the original Arabic, Descrittione dell' Africa: e delle cose notabile
che ivi sono, appeared in 1550, and a French one, Historiale description de I'Ajique, in 1556.
6 The original Spanish appeared in a French translation as Histoire de I'Ethiopie de'crite
par dom. F. Alvarez en son voyage, 1566and 1568.
Book 5 ADAPTING THE FORM OF THE COMMONWEALTH
causes, they would not have praised the abstinence of the people of
these regions so highly. They cannot have much appetite if they lack
internal heat. For the same reason one should not blame northerners
for their gross appetites, and for eating more voraciously than souther-
ners; it is a consequence of the heat, the size and the bulk of their
bodies. The same effects may be found in antarctic regions. We read
in the History of the Indiesl that Magellan found in those territories
which were named after him, Patagonian giants, so large and so
powerful that eight armed Spaniards were hardly sufficient to hold
their own against one of these simple and stupid ~ e o p l e .
Northerners succeed by means of force, southerners by means of
finesse, people of the middle regions by a measure of both. They are
therefore the most apt for war, in the opinion of Vegetius and Vitruvius.
It is they who have founded all the great empires which have flourished
in arms and in laws. God has so distributed His favours that great
strength and great cunning are never allied either in men or in beasts,
for there is nothing more cruel than injustice armed with force. People
of the middle regions have more ~hysicalenergy but less cunning than
southerners, and more intelligence but less strength than northerners.
They are better fitted to command, and to govern commonwealths,
and they are more just in their conduct. If one reads the histories of
these various peoples attentively, one will find that great and pou7erful
armies have always been raised in the north, while the occult sciences,
philosophy, mathematics, and other pure sciences are the achievement
of southern races. But political sciences, law, jurisprudence, rhetoric,
and logic originated among the people of the middle regions. These
people have established all the great empires the world has known,
that of the Assyrians, the Medes, the Persians, the Parthians, the Greeks,
the Romans, the Celts. Though the Arabs and the Moors for a time
conquered the empire of Persia, Syria, Egypt, and Barbary, and
subjected a great part of Spain, they could never subject Greece or
Italy, and when they tried t o subject France they were defeated, and
an army of three hundred thousand men routed. The Romans ex-
tended their empire over the peoples of the south and east. But they
had only moderate success against those of the west and north, though
victors over all other peoples. Nevertheless they applied all their
resources and made the greatest efforts to parry the blows delivered by
those northern races who had, as Tacitus says, speaking of the Germans,
B. de las Casas, Brevissirlia relacion de la dcstruycion de las Indas, 1552.
148
TO DIVERS CONDITIONS OF MEN Chap. I
neither walls, towns, nor fortifications. Although Trajan constructed
a great bridge over the Danube and defeated Decebalus, King of the
Dacians, his successor the Emperor Adrian caused it to be demolished,
being afraid that the northern barbarians would destroy the empire
and the power of the Romans. This they did after Constantine had
disbanded the Roman legions that held the frontiers of the Rhine and
the Danube. Thereafter first the Germans, then the Goths, Ostrogoths,
Vandals, Franks, Burgundians, Herules, Hungarians, Gepidae, Lom-
bards and finally the Normans, the Tartars, and the Turks overran
the provinces that the Romans had once held. Though the English
have won notable victories over the French, in nine hundred years they
have not been able to expel the Scots from the island, although one
knows how much more numerous the French are than the English,
and the English than the Scots. . . .
In my opinion Aristotle was mistaken in tlinking that people who
lived either in extremely cold or extremely hot climates were bar-
barous. O n the contrary their histories, and experience shows that
people who live in the extreme south are much more ingenious than
those of the middle regions. Herodotus has left it on record that the
Egyptians were the most subtle and ingenious people in the world.
Seven hundred years later Caesar in his history of the civil wars made
the same judgement on them . . . Without looking further afield, we
have the same point illustrated in the difference in intelligence between
the French and the English. The latter complained to Philippe de
Comines that to their surprise the French generally lost the battles they
fought against them, but recovered their advantage in the subsequent
treaties. W e can say the same thing of the Spaniards. For the past
hundred years they have not made a treaty with the French in which
all the advantages have not been on their side. This would take a long
time to demonstrate in detail, but I can take an example in the treaty
of Cambricis made in the year 1559. It could not be denied that the
strength of the king of France was very great and sufficient to set him
above his enemies. Nevertheless the Spaniards gained more in this
treaty, without striking a blow, than they had for the past ninety years,
for they had never hoped, as they afterwards confessed, to snatch
Savoy and Piedmont from the hands of the French. . . .
Those who live at the extremities near the poles are phlegmatic and
those in the extreme south, melancholic. Those who live thirty
degrees below the pole are of a more sanguine complexion, and those
I49
Book 5 ADAPTING THE FORM OF THE COMMONWEALTH
southerners, in that the former are modest and chaste, and the latter
very libidinous as a result of their melancholy temperament. W e
read that the Kings of Africa and of Persia always kept a harem of
wives. This cannot be imputed to depraved morals seeing that in the
New World King Alcazares had four hundred wives, and the father
of Atabalippa, the last king of Peru, who was done to death by the
Pizarro brothers, had two hundred wives and fifty chldren . . .Among
the barbarians Tacitus says the Germans only allowed one wife.
Sometimes they even lived together in perpetual virginity, as did the
Emperor Henry 11. Casimir I, Icing of Poland, and Wenceslas, King
of Bohemia, never married at all. This was not however so much that
they were chaste, as naturally impotent . . . People of the middle
regions are moderate in these matters. Their laws for the most part
allow one legitimate wife . . . The Roman Emperors even made a
general law, applying to all peoples indifferently, that the stigma of
infamy should attach to anyone who took more than one wife. Later
they made it a matter of capital punishment. But this law, acceptable
to the Romans,-was never taken much account of by the Africans,
since it was ill-suited to their chspositions. This is what happens to the
schemes of anyone who tries to apply laws proper to northern races
to people of the south, without considering their dispositions . . . The
historians of the ancient world would make the same sort of mistake
in praising the goodness and honesty of the Scythians and their
neighbours. They deserve no praise for their virtue who lack the spirit
to do evil, and do not know how to sin. Machiavelli was also wrong
in saying that the Spaniards, the Italians, and the French were the
corruptors of the world. He had not read good books, nor had he
experience of other races. . . .
If one considers carefully the natures of the peoples of the northern,
southern, and temperate zones, one finds that they can be compared
to the three ages of man, youth, age, and maturity, and the qualities
characteristic of these ages. Moreover in the governing of their
commonwealths, they rely on those appeals which carry most weight
in each case. Northerners rely on force, those in the middle regions
on justice, and southerners on religion. The magistrate in Germany,
says Tacitus, can command nothing except he does it sword in hand.
Caesar says in his Memoirs that the Germans have no religion, and only
respect prowess in war and the chase. The Scythians, says Solinus,
set a sword in the earth and worship that, founding all their actions,
151
Book j ADAPTING THE FORM OF THE ' COMMONWEALTH
laws, religion, and judgements on force and the sword. W e find that
judicial combats are characteristic of northern races, and are freely
enjoined in tile laws of the Salians, the Franconians, the Angles, the
Ri-puarians, and other such peoples. Frontonl, King of Dentnark,
enacted that all quarrels were to be settled by combat. N o one has
ever been able to abrogate these laws, although popes and other
princes have tried, regardless of the fact that the nature of northern
races is quite different from that of southern. . . .
It is equally obvious that laws and the forms of justice originated
with the people of the temperate regions such as Asia Minor (where
orators and rhetoricians were held in high honour), Greece, Italy,
France. It is not just a present day phenomenon that the French are
continually employed in litigation. Whatever laws or ordinances are
made to diminish it, the natural inclinatioll of the people will always
reassert itself. In any case it is much better to decide disputes by legal
process than by the sword. In short, nearly all the great orators,
legislators, jurisconsults, historians, poets, satirists, and all such like
who win men's hearts by argument and fair speech, come from the
temperate regions. W e find in the histories of the Greeks and the
Romans that before they embarked on the most insignificant little
war, they debated the rights of the case with much discussion, denuncia-
tion, and solemn protestation. This is not at all characteristic of northern
races, who rush to take up arms at once. They resort to force for all
purposes, as do lions; those of the temperate regions to reason and law.
Southern races rely on diplomacy and finesse as do foxes, or they
appeal to religion. Rational argument is too mild for the crude
northern races, and too prosaic for southerners, who do not want to
bother with legal opinion and forensic conjectures, where truth and
falsehood are weighed a~ainsteach other. They wish to be made
certain by proofs, or by divine oracles which transcend human reason.
Thus we see that southern races, the Egyptians, the Chaldaeans, and the
Arabs, have developed the occult, the natural, and the mathematical
sciences. These have always fascinated the greatest spirits and con-
strained them to the pursuit of truth. All great systems of religion have
originated in the south and from there have spread throughout the
world. Not that God respects either places or peoples, or fails to pour
out His divine light over all. But just as the sun is reflected more
Frothe was a legendary King of Denmark, who appears in Saxo Grammaticus,
Historia Daneruin (published 1514)as a pattern of the primitive legislator. .
1.52
TO DIVERS CONDITIONS OF MEN Clrap. I
1 Matthias Hunyady, surnamed the Just, for his great work of legal reform. He was a
prince of the renaissance, who preferred Italian models in architecture, learning, and legal
administration, to the traditional feudal institutions of Hungary. Hence the measure of
resistance referred to by Bodin.
Book 5 ADAPTING THE FORM OF THE COMMONWEALTH
Spaniards and Italians are filled with admiration at the manv and
diverse manufactured articles that they import from ~ e r k a n ~ ,
England. and Flanders.
U
There are three principal parts of the soul in a man, that is to say the
speculative reason, the practical reason, and the factive imagination.
Similarly in the commonwealth priests and phlosophers are concerned
with the exploration of divine and occult science, magistrates and
officers with commanding, judging, and providing for the govern-
ment of the commonwealth, the ordinary subjects with labour and the
mechanical arts. The same characteristics are to be observed in the
universal commonwealth of the world. God in His miraculous
wisdom has so ordered it that the southern races are ordained to
search into the most abstruse sciences in order that thereby they might
teach the rest. The northern races are ordained to labour and the
mechanical arts, and the people of the middle regions to bargain, trade,
judge, persuade, command, establish commonu~ealths,and make laws
and ordinances for the other races. The northern peoples from lack
of prudence are not apt for this, neither are southern peoples, either
because too given up to the contemplation of matters divine and
natural, or because they lack that promptness and energy required in
human activities, or because they cannot compromise, nor dissimulate,
nor endure the fatigues necessary to a life given to active politics. . . .
These are the general characteristics of the different races of men. As
for their particular characteristics, there are of course men of all kinds
of temperament in all localities and countries, though more or less
subject to these general conditions which I have described. Moreover
the particular can greatly modify the general character of the country.
Though there is no identifiable boundary between east and west, as
there is between north and south, all the ancients held that oriental
peoples were gentler, more courteous, tractable, and intelligent than
western peoples, though less warlike. 'See', said the Emperor Julian,
'how docile and tractable are the Persians and Syrians, the Germans
and Celts proud and jealous of their liberty, the Normans both
courteous and warhke, the Egyptians intelligent, subtle and generally
effeminate.' The Spaniards have observed that the Chinese, the most
eastern people we know, are the most intelligent and courteous people
in the world, while the Brazilians, the most occidental race, the most
barbarous and cruel. In brief, if one reads histories carefully one will
find that within the same latitudes the western peoples approximate
I54
TO DIVERS CONDITIONS OF MEN Chap. I
Hoiu to Preverlt those Disorders which spring fvom Excessive Lt'enltlz and
Excessive Poverty [CHAPTER 11]
THEcommonest cause of disorders and revolutions in commonwealths
has always been the too great wealth of a handful of citizens, and the
too great poverty of the rest. The histories are full of occasions on
which those who have given all sorts of reasons for their discontents
have taken the first opportunity that offered of dispoiling the rich of
their possessions . . . For this reason Plato called riches and poverty
the two original plagues of the commonwealth, not only because of
the misery that hunger occasions, but the shame, and shame is a very
evil and dangerous malady. To remedy ths condition of things, it has
been suggested that there should be an equality of possessions. This
suggestion has been strongly supported, and it has been claimed that it
would prove a source of peace and amity among subjects, whereas
inequality is the source of enmity, faction, hatred, and prejudice. He
who has more than another, and is conscious of being richer in posses-
sions, thinks he should also enjoy a greater measure of honour, luxury,
pleasure, have more food and more clothes. He thnks he should be
looked up to by the poor whom he despises and treads underfoot.
The poor, for their part, suffer acute envy and jealousy in considering
themselvesjust as worthy or even more worthy of riches, yet oppressed
by hunger, poverty, misery, and contempt. Therefore many architects
of republics in the ancient world advocated an equal division of
property among all subjects. Even within living memory Thomas
More, the Chancellor of England, in his Republic laid down that a
necessary condition of general well-being was that men should enjoy
a community of goods, which is not possible where there are private
property rights . . . Lycurgus accomplished this at the risk of his life,
for after having prohibited the circulation of gold and silver, he made
an equal division of all lands . . . The Romans as a people were more
equitable and had more understanding of the principles ofjustice than
any other. They often decreed a general remission of debts, sometimes
to the amount of one quarter, or one third, sometimes even the whole
amount. This was the best and quickest way they found of composing
disorders and discontents. . . .
On the other side it can be argued that equality of possessions is
subversive of the commonwealth. The surest foundation of a common-
wealth is public confidence, for without it neither justice, nor any sort
158
AND POVERTY Chap. 2
reject the idea of liniting the number of citizens, and conclude that
there should beno partitionofinheritances except on the foundation of a
new commonwealth in a conquered country. In such case the division
should be by families and not by individuals, and a certain pre-eminence
should be accorded to one particular family, and an order of priority
established within each family. . . .
The law of God shows us plainly how matters should be arranged
. . . By that law the principle of an exact equality is not sustained, for
some are assigned more, some less than others. The tribe of Levi apart,
there was an even distribution of lands among the twelve tribes. In the
family there was an equal division of property among the younger
sons, saving the right of the first-born (to a double portion). He was
not allowed even four-fifths or two-thirds, much less the whole of
the inheritance. This was for fear that so great a degree of inequality
might occasion fratricides, quarrels between the tribes, or conflicts
and civil wars between subjects. But in order to maintain this balance
between too much or too little, alienation either to living persons, or
by will, must not be prohibited, as it is in some places, provided that
the provisions of the law of God are observed. That is to say all
alienated inheritances revert to the house or family from which they
have been withdrawn after fifty years. In this way those who get into
difficulties, and have to sell their heritages in order to provide for the
necessities of life, can redeem them any time within fifty years, at
which term they will return to them or their heirs. In this way bad
managers are not able to dissipate their estates permanently, and the
avarice of successful managers is kept in check.
As to the abolition of debts, such a proceeding sets a very bad
example, as already said. This is not so much because of the loss to
creditors, for this is a matter of little moment by co~nparisonwith the
public interest. What is more serious is the excuse it affords of violating
legitimate agreements, and the encouragement it gives to dissatisfied
persons to make trouble, in the hope of promoting a remission of
debts. . . .
What is most to be feared is that one of the estates of the common-
wealth, and that the weakest and least numerous, should become as
rich as all the rest put together. This was once the position of the
estate of the clergy. An estate of the commonwealth which num-
bered only one hundredth part of the subjects, collected tithes of all
sorts, and, in defiance of the decrees of the primitive Church, as the
160
AND POVERTY Chap. 2
1 Much of what Bodin had to say about the distribution of rewards must have been
inspired by dislike of developments in France, for Francis I had systematized the traffic in
offices, and in 1522 set up a special Bureau des parties casuelles to administer it. Much
opposition was offered. Complaints were made already at the Estates of Tours in 1484.
The practice was forbidden by the Ordinance of Orltans in 1561and that of Moulins in
1566,and officials on appointment had to take an oath that they had not purchased their
offices. This was so flagrantly in defiance of the facts that it was abolished in 1597.
Heritability of office was a consequence.
Book 5 WHETHER IT IS EXPEDIENT
THISis one of the most important problems of policy, and one of the
most difficult to solve, because of the disadvantages of either course of
action. I will summarize them as well as I can, and indicate what I
t h k the best course, but the practical solution must be left to the
slull of statesmen. Simply to follow Aristotle and say that the city
should be well fortified, and so placed as to be a good base for aggressive
operations, but difficult of access to the enemy, does not take into
account the real difficulties. One must consider whether the same
policy is as suitable in a monarchy as in a popular state, and 111 a tyranny
as in a kmgdom, seeing that, as we have already shown, common-
wealths of contrary tendencies need regulating by contrary institu-
tions.
It is said, for instance, that nothing is more destructive of a warlike
spirit in the subject than fortifications, since they turn the inhabitants
into cowards . . . Again, citadels and defence works encourage bad
rulers to oppress their subjects. Strong walls also enable subjects to
rebel against their sovereign lords and rulers. For this reason the Kings
of England do not allow any of their subjects to fortify their houses,
even with a moat . . . But all fortified cities, which cannot hope to
sustain a long siege, generally treat and secure the withdrawal of the
enemy by an indemnity, and they can do this without any shame or
reproach . . . This could not be done if the city were well fortified,
because of the dishonour attached to those who make composition
with an enemy they could have resisted . . . If then it is true that
fortresses offer opportunities to evil princes to tyrannize over their
subjects, to enemies to occupy the country, to subjects to show them-
selves cowards in the face of the enemy, rebel against their prince,
and scheme against one another, it cannot be argued that they are
either useful or necessary, but on the contrary, they are harmful and
destructive of the commonwealth.
But on the general question of whether one should train citizens
to arms, and seek war rather than peace, there appears to be no doubt
as to the answer. A commonwealth is to be esteemed happy where
the king is obedient to divine and natural law, the magistrate to the
king, subjects to the magistrate, children to parents, servants to masters,
and where subjects are bound to each other and to their prince by ties
166
TO PREPARE FOR WAR Chap. 5
of affection, for the enjoyment of the blessings of peace and true
tranquillity of spirit. War is a condition quite contrary to this, and
warriors are sworn enemies to such a way of life. It is not possible
for religion, justice, charity, security of life, in short, all the liberal
sciences and mechanical arts to flourish in any commonwealth w h c h
does not enjoy a profound and lasting peace. But such a state of
affairs is ruination to professional soldiers, for times of piping peace
render their calling useless. No one is a greater enemy to a man of
peace than a rough soldier, to the good peasant than brutal mercenary,
to the philosopher than the captain, to the wise than fools. What the
fighting man most enjoys is to devastate the countryside, rob peasants,
burn villages, besiege, storm and sack towns, slaughter good and evil
alike, young and old of whatever age or sex, ravish women, drench
themselves in blood, defile sacred things, raze churches, blaspheme the
holy name, and tread underfoot all rights, human and divine. Such
are the fruits of war, pleasing and agreeable to men of war, but
abominable to men of good will, and detestable in the sight of God.
There is no need to enlarge upon what has been practised in so many
places, when the very memory is sufficient to make the hair of the
boldest stand on end. If this be so then one should on no account
train subjects in arms and start them on the road to so execrable a way
of life, nor indeed make war at all, except as a measure of defence in
cases of extreme necessity. . . .
Such are the arguments on one side. But one can argue on the other
side that unfortified towns are exposed to spoliation by the first
comer, and the lives of their inhabitants are at the mercy of all. More-
over it would appear that open towns are a temptation t'o all those who
contenlplate aggression, whereas walls deprive the enemy of both the
wdl and the power to attack. In like case those who travel unarmed
invite thieves and robbers to kill them for what they carry on them.
One knows very well that the loot of captured towns is hild out as a
reward to troops. They are the natural enemies of the weak, but dare
attempt little against h e well-armed. It must also be remembered
that tLe first andonly occasion of men gathering together into societies
and communities was for the safety and defence of each in particular
and all in general whether women and children, or goods and chattels.
This could not be secured unless towns were fortified. For to say that
men are the best defence against the enemy is only applicable on the
actual field of battle. In any case those who can thus defend themselves
Book 5 WHETHER IT IS EXPEDIENT
are never more than a fourth part of the inhabitants, for there are
always more women than men in any community, and there are
besides children and old people, the sick and the helpless, and their
protection must lie in strong walls. It is moreover ridiculous to say
that men are more valiant if they have no fortifications to rely on.
If this is so, one should not permit the use of a shield or defensive
armour in face of the enemy. Logically we should then prohibit men
from fighting otherwise than quite naked . . . Besides, the experience
of Inany centuries has shown that we must do as the Persians, the
Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, and the Gauls did of old, and
fortifjr, equip with arms, and provision towns, ports and fortifiable
sites, for the defence and security of friends, and resistance against the
enemy.
Such are the argume~ltsin support of the view that towns should be
fortified. For the same reasons we hold that the subject should be
trained to arms. For since the right to preserve life and punish thieves
is recognized by divine, natural, and positive law, it must be presumed
that subjects ought t o be practised in arms, not only for defensive, but
also for offensive purposes, in order to shield the innocent and repulse
the wicked. I call all those who bring unjust war, and lay hands upon
the possessions of others, thieves and villains. If one must take ven-
geance on thievish and predatory subjects, it follows that one must also
do so on foreigners who behave as such, whatever title of lungshp
they bear. This obligation is founded on divine and natural law.
There are other and more articular considerations. In the first
place, the best uiay of preserving a state, and guaranteeing it against
sedition, rebellion, and civil war is to keep the subjects in amity one
with another, and to this end, to find an enemy against whom they
can make common cause. Examples of t h s can be found in all com-
monwealths. The Romans are a specially good illustration. They could
find no better antidote to civil war, nor one more certain in its effects,
than to oppose an enemy to the citizens. O n one occasion, when they
were engaged in bitter mutual strife, the enemy found his way into
the city and seized the Capitol. The citizens instantly composed their
differences, and united to expel the enemy . . . Without looking further
afield, we have an example in this kingdom wnen it was in grave peril
in 1562. The English set foot in France and seized Havre de Grace,
whereupon the civil war was abandoned, and the subjects united to
make common cause against the enemy. Perceiving which, the
168
TO PREPARE FOR WAR Chap. 5
English resolved to leave the French to fight one another, and wait
till they were thereby altogether ruined, when they might invade the
kingdom without difficulty, or the danger of encouilteriilg resis-
tance. . . .
Unrestrained freedom inflates men and encourages them to abandon
themselves to every sort of vice. Fear however keeps them mindful of
their duty. One can have no doubt that the great Ruler and Governor
of the whole world, in creating t h g s so that each is balanced by its
contrary, permits wars and enmities between men to punish them the
one by the other, and keep all in fear, for fear is the sole inducement to
virtue. When Samuel addressed the people, he told them plainly that
God had raised up enemies against them to keep them humble, and to
try, prove, and punish them. These considerations serve to show how
wrong are those who say that the sole end of war is peace. . . .
These arguments have a measure of truth, and are in part valid, and
can on the one side or the other blind the eyes of the most clear-
sighted, if one does not look too carefully into them. To resolve the
problem satisfactorily one must distinguish between the different
kinds of commonwealth. I hold that in a popular state it is expedient
to train the subjects to arms because of the weaknesses to u h c h I
infer popular states are prone by their very nature. If the subjects are
naturally warlike and intractable, as are northern peoples, once they
are trained in the art of war and in military disciphe, it is expedient
to keep them frequently engaged against an enemy, and only make
peace, a condition not adapted to a warlike people, on very advan-
tageous terms. Even when peace is concluded, an army must be
maintained and kept on the frontiers. T h s was Augustus' policy after
he had converted a popular state into a monarchy. The alternative is to
hire them out to aked princes, as the governments of the Confederates
very wisely do, to keep them practised in the military art. They have
to deal with a mountain population, apt for war and difficult to keep
at peace, and used to the enjoyment of popular liberty. By this policy
they are always provided with experienced soldiers, maintained at the
expense of others, who at the same time earn considerable subsidies
for the state, and pensions for individuals. Added to which their
safety is assured by the alliances thus formed with some puissant king.
As to fortifications, there is no need for the towns to be very heavily
fortified except the capital city, which is the seat of government in a
popular state. Even less is there any need of a multiplication of castles
169
Book 5 WHETHER IT IS EXPEDIENT
and citadels. For one may be sure that ambition will move someone or
other to seize a fortified place, and then convert the popular state into
a monarchy, as did Dionysius the tyrant, after taking Acradine in
Syracuse. . . In our own day Cosimo de' Medici, Duke of Florence,
constructed two citadels in Florence and garrisoned them with foreign-
ers, having found out that it was impossible to live secure in the
midst of his subjects once he had converted the popular state into
a monarchy. Such considerations explain why the Cantons of Uri,
Intenvalden, Glarus, and Appenzel, which are extreme democracies,
have no fortified towns as have the others whose government is aristo-
cratic.
The same considerations regarding fortresses hold good in aristoc-
racies as in popular states, for there is no less danger that one of the
seigneurs will make himself master of his colleagues. Indeed it is even
more to be feared in that it is easier for one of the seigneurs to secure
a following among the simple citizens and so make head against the
more powerful. Above all, in kingdoms which are long-established
and extensive, it is never expedient for the prince to erect citadels and
strongholds except on the frontiers, least his subjects suspect that he
intends to become their tyrant. But if he encircles his kingdom with
strong frontier posts, h s subjects will believe that they are directed
against the enemy, and the prince, at need, can use them either to repel
the enemy, or master his subjects should they rebel. . . .
So much for fortifications. It is much more d~ficultto determine,
in an aristocracy, whether it is better to arm only the governing class,
or the ordinary citizen as well, or to keep all indifferently unarmed. If
the lower classes are once armed, and not then constantly employed
against the enemy, there is no doubt that sooner or later they will try
to, and succeed in, changing the form of the government in order to
have a share themselves, as I have already shown. If only the r u h g
class is armed, one day they will be defeated in the field, and again,
this w d of necessity entail a change of government. If on the other
hand they prohibit the practice of military art altogether in the
commonwealth, they will by and by fall a prey to their neighbours,
unless protected by a close alliance with powerful friends, or unless
their cities are inaccessible and their fortifications impregnable. There
is the example of the Venetians. Fearful of the dangers I have described,
they prohibited the practice of arms altogether, as the Cardinal Con-
tarini has shown, though they achieved this only gradually over a
170
TO PREPARE FOR WAR Chap. 5
period of about two hundred years. They were once a belligerent
people, and sustained long wars, and beat the Genoese in set battles by
sea and by land. But since then they have enjoyed a long period of
secure peace, and have gradually abandoned the military arts, relying
for their assistance on foreigners . . . And if, as many think, one should
only make war to secure peace, and all that is required for the welfare
of the commonwealth is that by being well armed and fortified it can
defend its own against an enemy and enjoy the blessings of peace, the
Republic of Venice may be called happy. It is situated in an impregnable
position, and cares little for conquest, or the expansion of its
territories. We find that the Venetians have always avoided war like
the plague, and never wage it save in cases of extreme necessity, but
seek peace at any price, even at the cost of the loss and diminution of
their domains . . . But such a policy seems contemptible to a warlike
people, or an ambitious prince, who cannot sue for peace at the hands
of the enemy without shame. . . .
A wise prince should never permit the enemy to invade his kingdom
if he call by any 'means scatter their forces or check their advance
before they can cross the frontier, or at any rate unless he has a second
army, and some impregnable base to which he can retreat. Otherwise
he risks all on a single battle. This was the error of Antiochus, Perseus,
and Ptolemy, the last King of Egypt, in the war with the Romans; of
Darius in the war with Alexander, and the French time and time again
in the wars with England . . . But Francis I took his army across the
Alps in order to keep h s country free from war, and attacked the
enemy in laying siege to Pavia. Apart from the devastation which
two powerful armies would have caused in France, the capture of the
~ ~ i n g ' w o uhave
l d exposed the kmgdom to great danger. But happen-
ing, as it did, in Italy, and the victors being at first content with their
success, time was given to the King's subjects to rally their forces and
secure the frontiers . . . I do not wish to enter into any discussion of
the art of war, for others have treated of this subject., I am only
concerned with what touches the state. I hold that the prince should
provide for the thorough fortification of his frontiers, and if he suspects
that any enemy contemplates invading his territory, he ought to
anticipate him and wage war as far from his own frontiers as pos-
sible. . . .
This chapter is largely based on MachiaveWs Arte della guerra, published in 1521,
though characteristically adapted to Bodin's political views.
171
Book 5 WHETHER IT IS EXPEDIENT
the relations between princes, for seeing that they are the guarantors
of good faith and sworn engagements, what assurance will those
subject to them have of their own mutual undertakings if the rulers
themselves are the principal breakers and violators of good faith? I
have added, 'in all cases where no injustice is contemplated', for it is a
double sin to engage one's faith to do an evil act. In such a case he
who fails of his promise, so far from being perfi&ous, is to be commen-
ded. In like case, if the prince promises not to do something permitted
by natural law, he is not perjured if he breaks his oath. Even the
subject is not foresworn who breaks his oath regarding any action
permitted by the law. But wise princes should never bind themselves
by oath to other princes to do anything forbidden by natural law, or
the law of nations, nor should they ever compel princes weaker than
themselves to swear to an agreement quite unreasonable in its terms . . .
Not that princes who fail to carry out promises to their disadvantage,
which have been exacted from them by their conquerors, escape the
dishonour of perjury, as certain doctors argue. These doctors are as ill-
informed about the character of the commonwealth as they are about
past history, and the true foundations of justice. They treat engage-
ments between sovereign princes as if they were of the same order as
contracts and agreements between private citizens. The consequences
have been most unfortunate. During the last two to three hundred
years this opinion has gained ground, with the result that there has
been no treaty, however beneficial, which has not been infringed.
It is remarkable that the first legislators and jurists, and the Romans
who were models of justice, never thought of such subtleties. For it is
very obvious that most treaties of peace are made under constraint,
from fear of the victor, or of him who is the stronger party. What
fear is more excusable than fear for one's life? Yet the Consul Attilius
Regulus, having sworn to the Carthaginians to return, knowing that he
was going to his death, took refuge in no such subtle excuses. . . .
Jurists rightly hold that faith is not to be kept with him who breaks
it. But they go further. They allege that by the decree of the Council
of Constance it was laid down that one is not bound to keep faith with
enenlies of the faith. The Emperor Sigismund had pledged his word
towenceslas, King of Bohemia, and given a safe-conduct to John Huss
and Jerome of Prague, and therefore resisted proceedings against them.
To satisfy his conscience a number ofjurists, canonists, and theologians,
especially Nicholas, Abbot of Palermo, and Luigi da Ponte surnamed
178
TREATIES AND ALLIANCES Chap. 6
Romanus elaborated this opinion, and it was given the backing of a
decree published by the Council. John Huss and his companion were
executed, though neither the Council nor the Emperor had any
jurisdiction over them, and their natural lord, the King of Bohemia,
did not give his consent. But no attention was paid to these things.
This is no matter for surprise seeing that Bartolus, the first jurist of his
age, maintained that one was not bound to keep faith with individuals
in the enemy camp who were not responsible leaders. . . .
But if faith should not be kept with the enemy, it ought never to be
pledged. On the contrary, if it is permissible to treat with the enemy,
it follows that one is bound to honour one's engagements to him.
This raises the question as to whether it is permissible to treat with
pagans and infidels, as the Emperor Charles V treated with the King
of Persia.. .The Kings of Poland, the Venetians, Genoese, and Ragusans,
all made similar alliances with them. The Emperor Charles V himself
pledged his word to Martin Luther, though he had been denounced
as an enemy to the faith in a Papal bull, that he might safely attend the
Imperial Diet at Worms in I 5 19. There van Eyck, seeing that Luther
w&ld not renounce his opinions, cited the decree of constance as
grounds for proceeding against him regardless of the pledged word
of the Emperor. But there was not a prince present that did not
express horror at van Eyck's petition, and in fact the Emperor dis-
missed Luther with a safe-conduct, and under armed protection. I do
not wish to discuss the merits of the decree, but the opinion of Bartolus,
and those who maintain that one need not keep faith with the enemy
is not worthy of formal refutation, so contrary is it to ordinary com-
mon sense. . . .
There have been no greater exponents of the principles of justice
and good faith than the ancient Romans. Pompey the Great treated
with sea-rovers and'pirates, and allowed them to take refuge in certain
towns and territories where they could settle under the authority of
Rome. But he was well aware that the pirates had a fleet of nine
hundred sail, and access to some five hundred coastal towns and
villages. Governors could not reach their provinces, nor merchants
carry on their business of trading. War could not be made on such a
power without exposing the whole Roman state to danger, whereas
its dignity was preserved intact by this treaty. If he had not honoured
the agreement he made with them, or the Senate had refused to ratify
the treaty, the honour of the Republic would have been smirched, and
Book 5 TREATIES AND ALLIANCES Chap. 6
the glory of Pompey's achevement obscured. In normal circumstances
however we do not hold that one should either give or receive
pledges where pirates are concerned, for one should have no dealings
with them, nor observe the rules of the law of nations where they are
concerned . . . But once one has pledged one's faith to an outlaw, one
should keep the engagement. I can think of no better instance of this
than that afforded by the Emperor Augustus. He caused it to be
published, to the sound of trumpets, that he would give twenty-five
thousand scudi to anyone who could deliver to him Crocotas, leader of
the Spanish brigands. Crocotas, hearing of it, presented himself
before Augustus and claimed the reward of twenty-five thousand
sctrdi. Augustus ordered that he should be paid, and then granted him
a free pardon, in order to give a good example of keeping faith, for
in such matters the honour of God and of the Republic is involved. . . .
BOOK VI
individual, and how he earns his living. This makes it possible to get
rid of those parasites which prey upon the commonwealth, to banish
idlers and vagabonds, the robbers and ruffians of all sorts that live
among good citizens like wolves among the sheep. One can find
them out, and track them down wherever they are.
A declaration of property is as necessary as a census of individuals
. . . Such a survey was made throughout the Roman Empire in order
that the burdens which each ought to bear could be fairly assessed.
Such a measure is even more necessary now when there are so many
more charges than the ancients ever knew. It is of the first importance
that every subject should be required to make a return of his property
and his revenues. This was done in Provence in 1471. It immediately
became clear that one t h r d of the population bore all the burdens of
the other two thrds . . . Such enquiries reveal the frauds and favours
of the tax collectors and assessors, whose duty it is to secure an equal
distribution of imposts.
The periodic reformation of abuses was one of the best and most
excellent measures that was ever introduced into any commonwealth,
and the one which most contributed to the preservation of the Roman
Empire. The censors were always elected from among the most
upright men to be found in the whole commonwealth, and they
endeavoured to the utmost of their powers to inculcate in the subject
true sentiments of honour and virtue. They carried out this duty every
five years, after they had put the finances in order and farmed out the
domain. If at any time they omitted the censorship, as occasionally
happened during a long war, one can see at a glance how the morals
of the people deched, and the commonwealth fell sick, like a body
denied its customary purgations. . . .
They concerned themselves always only with those abuses which
did not come before the courts. The magistrates and the people took
cognizance of murders, parricides, robberies, assaults, and such like
crimes, punishable by the laws. But someone might ask whether it is
not sufficient only to punish the crimes and misdemeanours forbidden
by law. I would answer however that the law only punishes those
misdeeds which trouble the public peace, but the most evil men often
enough escape the penalties of the law, like strong animals brushing
aside spiders' webs. What man is so mistaken as to measure honour
and virtue solely by the rules of the law? It is sufficiently obvious that
the most detestable vices that poison the whole body politic cannot be
I 82
THE CENSORSHIP Chap. I
punished in the courts. Perfidy, one of the most abominable of vices
is never punishable by law. But the censors, said Cicero, were more
anxious to punish perjury than anything else. Again, drunkenness,
gambling, fornication, and lust can be indulged in without check from
the law. Who can remedy this state of things but the censor? One sees
also how most commonwealths are afRicted with vagabonds, idlers,
and ruffians who corrupt good citizensby their deeds and their example.
There is no means of getting rid of such vermin save by the censor.
There is however a more particular reason w h c h makes the censor-
ship more necessary today than ever it was before. In ancient times
each head of a family had high, middle, and lowjustice; as father over
his children, as master over his slaves he had sovereign power, so to
speak, over life and death, without appeal. The husband had such
authority over his wife in four respects, as we have shown in its proper
place. But now that t h s condition of things no longer obtains, what
justice can one expect from the impiety of children towards their
parents, from the ill-regulated relations of married people, or contempt
for masters? HOWoften do we see daughters sold or dishonoured by
their own parents, so that often enough they prefer to be cast off than
to be married to the husband chosen for them? There is no possible
remedy save in the establishment of a censorship.
I am not here concerned with the question of reverence towards
God, which should be the first and principal care of every family and
every commonwealth. This has always been the concern of popes,
bishops, and ministers of religion, to whom magistrates ought always
to give every assistance. For though the law of God commands that
everyone should attend divine worship at least at the three great
festivals of the year, one finds a great number who never do so at all.
This neglect of religion encourages the insidious growth of the
detestable sect of atheists. They have nothing but blasphemies on their
lips, and despise all laws equally, whether human or divine. From this
state of affairs follows-an infinity of crimes such as murder, parricide,
treason, perjury, adultery, and icest. For one cannot expe;t princes
and magistrates to succeed in making those of their subjects who
trample all religion underfoot amenable to their own laws. This is a
matt& for min~ktersand censors, who can appeal to divine laws where
human laws have lost their force. As Lactantius said 'those actions
which fear of the laws prevent are acts of violence, not sins. The laws
can punish crimes but cannot stir the conscience'.
Book 6 THE CENSUS AND
priests, giving them the tithe of all cattle, harvests, and inheritances,
together with many honours and privileges. By an article of the &vine
law, the man who disobeyed the High Priest was adjudged worthy of
death.
Those who wish to diminish the estate of bishops, ministers, and
overseers, and deprive them of their powers of ecclesiastical censure,
their possessions and their privileges, to trample them underfoot,
dishonour God, and destroy all religion. This important question was
in part the reason why the chief minister of Lausanne left the town, for
the governing bodies of the confederate states would not submit to the
censorship of the elders. One must in that case institute special censors.
The governing body of Geneva has however reserved this prerogative
to bishops, ministers, and elders. They have corporate rights, and can,
in their consistory, censure morals. They have no jurisdiction, or
power of compulsion, or of execution, either themselves or in the
persons of the public officials. But in case of disobedience they excom-
municate. This involves the most serious consequences, for the
excommunicate, 'after a certain lapse of time, is liable to a criminal
prosecution before the magistrates, by the Inquisitor of the faith.
There is the same system in the Catholic Church, but proceedings are
not there so expeditious. . . .
I leave it to wiser heads then mine to decide whether one should
divide temporal censorship in matters touching morals and other
matters remarked on, from ecclesiastical censorship, or to unite the
two. But it is better to let bishops and ministers exercise both than to
deprive them of such powers altogether, and so deny the common-
wealth that which is most necessary to its welfare. One sees common-
wealths that have such an institution flourish in laws and morals.
Licence, usury, excesses of all sorts are prevented; blasphemers,
ruffians, idlers, expelled. One cannot question that commonwealths
that employ these measures of censure are lasting, and fortified by all
the virtues. But once thecensure is neglected, laws, virtue, and religion
are despised, as happened in Rome a short time before the Empire
collapsed in ruins. . . .
the public domain, the second the profits of conquests, the third gifts
from friends, the fourth tribute from allies, the fifth the profits of
trading ventures, the sixth customs on exports and imports, and the
seventh tases on the subject. The first, which is the domain, appears
to be the most defensible and the most reliable of all sources of income.
W e read that all ancient kings and legislators who founded common-
wealths or planted colonies, besides public buildings such as roads,
temples, and theatres, assigned certain lands to the commonwealth
which belonged to all in general, and these they called common
lands. Other lands were farmed or leased to private individuals for a
term of years, or in perpetuity, and the rents of these lands were paid
into the treasury for the discharge of the expenses of the common-
wealth. W e read, for instance, that Romulus, founder of Rome and the
Roman Republic, divided the whole territory into three parts, assign-
ing one third for the upkeep of the Church, a second as the public
domain, and the rest was divided among private individuals. . . .
In order that princes should not be constrained to burden their
subjects with imposts, or devise excuses for confiscating their posses-
sions, all kings and people have taken it for a universal and unchalleqe-
able rule that the public domain should be sacred, inviolable, and
inalienable, either through contract or prescription. Kings therefore
even in this kingdom, issuing letters patent for the recovery of domain,
declare that on their accession to the throne they took an oath never
to alienate the domain. If it has been alienated, even according to the
proper legal forms, and in perpetuity, it nevertheless remains suscept-
ible of recovery, so that prescription of one hundred years, which
normally constitutes a title to possession, does not hold for the domain.
Edicts, judgements, and ordinances on the subject are sufficiently
familiar in t h s kingdom, not only directed against private citizens,
but even against Princes of the Blood who have been deprived of
domainal lands after a hundred prescription. T h s is not a rule
peculiar to this kingdom, but is a custom binding on the Kings of
Spain, Poland, and England, for they also are required to take an oath
against alienating the domain. The rule is also observed in aristoc-
racies and popular states . . . It is therefore never permissible for
sovereign princes to misappropriate the revenues from the domain.
They have not the right of usufruct, but simply of administration, and
they must, once the expenses of maintaining the commonwealth and
their own estate are met, reserve the rest for some public necessity . . .
I 86
REVENUES Chap. 2
That secured, and the army and the officers of the crown paid regu-
larly, all poor subjects will benefit. If funds then permit, part should
be employed in constructing fortifications in strategic positions on
the frontiers, making roads, building bridges, chartering ships, erecting
public buildings, founding colleges of learning and of honour. This
work of upkeep is not only necessary, but it redounds to the profit of
the whole con~monwealth. Crafts and craftsmen are encouraged, and
the necessities of the poor relieved. Moreover the unpopularity of
taxation is mitigated when the ruler sees to it that the money he takes
from his subjects is used for the benefit of all in general, and each in
particular. . . .
W E have now discussed the commonwealth fairly fully from all points
of view. It remains to draw our conclusions, that is to say to consider
the advantages and disadvantages of each type, and then pronounce
on the best. This can only properly be done after one has discussed
all aspects of the commonwealth, both general and particular . . .
Tyranny in a prince is evil, but it is even worse where many rule. As
Cicero says, there is no more reinorseless tyranny than that of the
people. All the same it is a condition of things to be preferred to
anarchy, where there is no form of a commonwealth whatsoever,
and where none can command, and none are obliged to obey. Let us
avoid such evil conditions as these, and consider which is the best of
the three legitimate forms of commonwealth, that is to say a popular
state, an aristocracy, or a royal monarchy. In order to make my
conclusions quite clear, I shall first set out the arguments for and against
each type.
In the first place it can be argued that the popular state is the most
to be esteemed since it aims at an indifferent and equal rule of law,
without favour or exception of persons. In such a state civil constitu-
tions are brought into conformity with the laws of nature. In equaliz-
ing men it follows the order of nature, under which riches, estates, and
honours are not attributed to one more than to another. Similarly, in
Chapter III deals with the establishment of a pure standard coinage, and is an abstract
of his tract on currency already referred to (see note, p. 47).
190
TYPES OF COMMONWEALTH Chap. 4
a popular state all enjoy equality in respect of goods, honours, and legal
rights, without any being privileged or entitled to prerogatives . . . For
instance, when Lycurgus converted the monarchy into a popular state,
he burnt all records of debts, forbad the use of gold or silver, and
divided the land into equal lots. It gave him great satisfaction to see
an equal harvest gathered in from each holding. By such means the
two most ruinous plagues of the commonwealth, the avarice of some
and the arrogance of others, were avoided. By such means also he got
rid of all thefts and robberies, disorders, libels, parties and factions, for
such cannot develop where all are equal, and no one has the advantage
over another. Again, if friendship is the necessary foundation of
human society, and if equality is a condition of friendship, since there
is no equality except in a popular state, it follows that this is the best
form of the commonwealth, and ought to be preferred to all others.
In it is to be found natural liberty, and equal justice for all, without
fear of tyranny, cruelty or oppression, and the charms of a social
intercourse open to all alike, which would seem to secure to men that
felicity that nature intended for them. But there is an even stronger
argument to prove that the popular state is the best, most worthy and
most perfect form, and that is that democracies have generally pro-
duced the men who have most excelled in arms and in justice, the
greatest orators, jurists, and craftsmen. In other commonwealths,
factions among the ruling class, or the king's jealous regard for his
own honour and glory, have discouraged subjects from attempting
anything outstanding. And finally, it would seem that a popular
state alone bears the true mark of a commonwealth. In it everyone
partakes in the common good, having a share in the common property,
the spoils of war, ~ u b l i chonours, and conquered, territory, whereas in
an aristocracy a handful of the upper class, in a monarchy a single
person, appear to convert what should be enjoyed in common to their
private advantage. Briefly, if what is most to be hoped for in the
commonwealth is that magistrates should be subject to the laws, and
the subjects to the magistrates, this seems best secured in a popular
state where the law is lady and mistress of all.
These are the principal arguments in favour of the popular state.
They appear conclusive, but in effect are no better than spiders' webs,
glittering, subtle, and fine-drawn, but of no strength. In the first place,
there has never been a commonwealth in which it has been found
possible to preserve equality of property and of honours. With
191
Book 6 A COMPARISON OF LEGITIMATE
dangers, for even when the succession of a new king means a change
from a bad king to a good, or from a good king to a better, there is
necessarily a change in the seat of sovereignty, and such a change is
critical in all kinds of commonwealth. It is a matter of common
experience that when a new prince succeeds, all sorts of new plans,
new laws, new officials, new friends, new enemies, new customs, new
social habits spring up. Most princes are pleased to introduce novelties
of all sorts, just to get themselves talked about. This often entails the
most serious consequences, not only for their individual subjects, but
for the whole body of the commonwealth. Even when a prince is the
wisest of men, and does not behave in this manner, the alliances and
peace settlements made by his predecessor are dissolved by his death.
That being so, neighbouring princes take up arms, and the stronger
attacks, or dictates terms to the weaker. T h s cannot happen to the
undying sovereigns of popular and aristocratic states, for they can
make perpetual alliances . . . The other drawback to monarchy is the
danger of civil war between aspirants to the crown, especially where
it is elective. Thls has often brought ruin on the state. Even when the
crown is hereditary there is no little danger when there is a dispute
between claimants of the same degree of relationshp. Assassinations
follow, and divisions among the subjects, and often the legitimate heir
is expelled by the man with the worse title. W e have had only too
many examples of this before our eyes. Even when the succession is
not in question, if the king is under age there are conflicts about the
regency, either between the Queen Mother and Princes of the Blood,
or among the Princes themselves. When God intended to punish
the sins of the people, he threatened them with women and children
as rulers . . . Even if a people enjoys the greatest blessing it can hope
for - and this seldom happens - and the prince on his accession is of
mature years and experienced in affairs, nevertheless the enjoyment of
sovereign power too often has the unhappy effect of making fools of
wise men, cowards of brave ones, wicked men of honest. There have
been too many instances for any examples to be necessary. . . .
Such are the dangers inherent in the monarchical form of govern-
ment. They are great enough. But they are not so great as those which
threaten an aristocracy, and even less than those that threaten popular
states. Most of these dangers are avoided when the monarchy passes
by hereditary succession, as we shall show in its proper place. Sedition,
faction, civil war are a perpetual threat to all types of commonwealth,
196
TYPES OF COMMONWEALTH Chap. 4
and the struggle for power in aristocracies and popular states is fre-
quently much more bitter than in a monarchy. In a monarchy
conflict over office and over political power only breaks out openly on
the death of the prince, and then not very often.
The principal mark of a commonwealth, that is to say the existence
of a sovereign power, can hardly be established except in a monarchy.
There can only be one sovereign in the commonwealth. If there are
two, three or more, not one of them is sovereign, since none of them
can either impose a law on his coinpanions or submit to one at their
instance. Though one can imagine a collective sovereign power,
vested in a ruling class, or a whole people, there is no true subject nor
true protector if there is not some head of the state in whom sovereign
power is vested, who can unite all the rest. A simple magistrate,
not endowed with sovereign authority, cannot perform this function.
Moreover if the ruling class, or the people are, as often happens,
divided, the dispute can only be settled by force, and by one taking up
arms against another. Even when the majority isagreed, it can easily
happen with a people that the minority have considerable resources,
and choose a leader whom they force upon the majority, and so
carry all before them. W e have plenty of evidence of the difficulties
that arise in aristocracies and popular states when there is a divergence
of opinion and diverse views taken by the magistrates. Some want
peace, some war; some want this law, some another; some this presi-
dent, some that, some alliance with the King of France, others with the
King of Spain . . . Again, in a popular or aristocratic state numbers
always carry the day. But the wise and virtuous are only a small
minority ill any community, so that for the most part the more
reasonable and discrete are compelled to give way to the majority, at
the dictation of some impudent tribune or envious demagogue. But
the sovereign monarch can seek the support of the smaller and wiser
part, and choose expert advisers, experienced in affairs of state. In
popular and aristocratic states, wise and foolish alike have to be
admitted to the estates and to the councils.
It is impossible for a people or an aristocracy themselves to issue
sovereign commands, or give effect to any project which requires a
single person to undertake it, such as the command of an army and
such like matters. They have to appoint magistrates or commissaires
to this end, and these have neither the sovereign power, the authority,
nor the majesty of a king. Whatever powers they have in virtue of
197
Book 6 A COMPARISON OF LEGITIMATE
monarchy is the most excellent. Among those that are not so well
regulated, democracy is the most perverted. The true monarchical
state, hke a strong and healthy body, can easily maintain itself. But
the popular state and the aristocracy are weak and subject to many ills,
and must be supported by strict diet and discipline. It is not however
always in the power of even wise men, and those practised in affairs of
state, either to choose the best or avoid the worst . . . The statesmen,
the philosophers, theologians, and historians who have praised
monarchy above every other form of state, have not done so to flatter
the prince, but to secure the safety and happiness of the subject. But
if the authority of the monarch is to be limited, and subjected to the
popular estates or to the senate, sovereignty has no sure foundations,
and the result is a confused form of popular state, or a wretched
condition of anarchy which is the worst possible condition of any
commonwealth. These matters should be weighed carefully, and the
deceptive arguments of those who would persuade subjects to sub-
ordinate the king to their own pleasure, and impose laws on him,
should be exposed as leading to the ruin not only of the monarchy,
but of the subject. . . .
The lot of the subject of a powerful king ruling a wide domain is a
happy one if he makes any attempt to rule justly. Aristocracy is
better suited to a small state, but is always preferable to a weak tyranny.
There are eighteen aristocratic or popular republics in the Swiss
Confederation, without counting the Grisons, though the distance
from Geneva to Constance is only two hundred and forty thousand
paces, and that from the Alps to the Jura, one hundred and sixty
thousand paces. A good deal of this area is besides barren rock. Yet
their inhabitants have lived happily enough for a very long time. But
if such a people begin to covet the territories of their neighbours, they
risk losing their own. On the other hand the more extensive a
monarchy, the more flourishing it is, and the better assured are its
people of peace and contentment. If it breaks up into democracies
and aristocracies, or into a number of petty tyrannies, its people fall
a prey either to tyranny, or civil disorders, or perpetual struggles
with their neighbours. . . .
SHOULD BE HEREDITARY Chap. 5
That in a Royal Monarchy Successioiz shoirld not he by Electioiz nor iiz the
Fenrole Line, but by Hereditary Succession in the Male Line . . . [CHAPTER V]
-
IT is not sufficient to say that a royal monarchy is better than either
democracy or aristocracy if one does not add that the monarchy
should devolve undivided, and by right of inheritance, on the next
male heir. Just as monarchy is to be preferred to any other form of
commonwealth, among monarchies those that pass by right of
inheritance to the next heir in the male line are more ordered and
stable than those that pass by election . . . However it is not only
simple people and those who have little understanding of politics, but
even those who are experienced in such matters, who are led astray by
considering all the advantages, and ignoring all the many absurdities
and difficulties that arise from some particular line of action. Even
Aristotle thought that kings should be elected, and stigmatized as
barbarians all those ~eopleswho are ruled by hereditary kings. . . .
But all elective monarchies are constantly menaced by the danger
of a relapse into 'anarchy on the death of each king. The state is left
without a ruler or regular government, and is in imminent danger of
destruction, just as a ship without a master is liable to be wrecked by
the first wind that blows. During such an interregnum, theves and
murderers are encouraged to rob and kill as they please, having little
fear of punishment. This is the usual state of affairs, for instance, on
the death of a Pope . . . As to the civil wars of the Romans, and in more
recent times of the Germans, incidental to the elections to the Empire,
their histories are full of nothing else. Anyone may read therein the
hideous story of looted cities, and of whole provinces pillaged and
ravaged by one side or the other.
There is another disadvantage, and that is the danger that the public
domain will be converted to private ownership. This has happened to
the temporalities of the Holy See, and to the Empire. Elected rulers,
knowing they cannot pass on their position to their sons, endow them
from the public resources by gifts or sales . . . Charles IV not being
able to find the hundred thousand crowns promised to each Elector,
sold them imperial rights to procure the election of his son as Emperor,
the same who was shortly after dethroned by those same Electors. . . .
There is another factor to be considered. A man of mean extraction,
suddenly advanced to the first rank of honour, thinks himself a god on
earth. As the wise Hebrew remarked, no ruler is more unendurable
201
Book 6 A ROYAL MONARCHY
than the slave turned master. Moreover the love of a father for his
son is so strong that he would subvert heaven and earth, if he could,
if he might thereby leave the crown to his son.
But these are not the most serious difficulties. In the choice of a
prince, the election must fall either on a foreigner or a native. In an
elective monarchy each aspires to the crown, and among so many
equals serious factions cannot be avoided, and these divide the whole
population into mutually hostile camps. Even if the candidates are
not equal in ability, or in resources, they consider themselves to be so,
and are reluctant to obey one of themselves. Tacitus says that the
ruling class in Armenia would not choose a native king, and in Poland
recently the senate disqualified all natives of the country from com-
peting, as I learned from Baron Horbort, one of the thirteen ambassa-
dors from Poland' . . . As for foreign princes, they always endeavour,
as far as they are able, to subvert the laws, customs, and religion of the
country. For this reason God forbad His people to choose an alien
ruler. Wherever there is an election, and the way is open to a number
of competitors, if recourse is had to force, it is always the most un-
scrupulous and cunning, or the boldest who is willing to risk every-
thing for the chance of success, who prevails. If by any chance an
honest man is elected, his life is in perpetual danger from each of his
powerful rivals. During the three hundred and sixty years that the
crown in Germany has been elective, eight or nine Emperors have
been killed or poisoned, as was William of Holland, Rudolf, Albert,
Henry VII, Frederick 11, Louis of Bavaria, and Charles IVYnot counting
those who have been shamefully ousted from the imperial throne. . . .
Therefore even if it were possible that good and virtuous princes
were invariably elected, the difficulty of securing this, and the dangers
that threaten on all sides, should be sufficient to deter men from allow-
ing monarchy to become elective, so long as it is possible to observe
a rule of succession . . . Any law of succession however will not do
equally well. It must be that of primogeniture in the male line, the
right of the first born son to bear his father's name, to the succession.
The order of nature requires that the eldest should come next after his
father, and the rest follow each in order. The eldest is therefore to be
preferred to the others. One may regard this as a law of nature, and
1 In August 1573 a magnificent Polish embassy arrived in Paris to conduct the Duke of
Anjou back to Poland, following his election to the throne in the preceding May. Bodin
was a member of the deputation that met the embassy at Metz.
SHOULD BE HEREDITARY Chap. 5
it has been commonly observed among practically all people*. . .
I have said that the crown ought to descend in the male line, seeing
that gynecocracy is directly contrary to the laws of nature. Nature
has endowed men with strength, foresight, pugnacity, authority, but
has deprived women of these qualities. Moreover the law of God
explicitly enjoins that the woman should be subject, not only in matters
concerning law and government, but within each particular family.
The most terrible of maledictions uttered against the enemy was that
they might have women to rule over them. Even the civil law forbids
to women all charges and offices proper to men, such as judging,
pleading, and such-like acts. This is not only because of their lack of
prudence, but also because vigorous action is contrary to the sex, and
to the natural modesty and reserve of women. . . .
But dangerous as elections to the crown are, for the reasons we have
already given, should there be a failure of heirs male, this expedient
is to be preferred to the succession of women, for that means outright
gynecocracy in defiance of natural law. Should the sovereign princess
marry, as she must do to secure th.e succession, she must marry either
a subject or a foreigner. If a subject, it is a great abasement for a
princess to marry one of her servants, seeing that the greatest sovereign
princes in the world have found all sorts of difficulties follow marriage
to a subject. There is besides the risk of the envy and jealousy of great
and powerful nobles, in the contempt they always feel for men of
inferior station, if she insists on marrying the man of her preference . . .
On the other hand no foreign prince who tries to rule over an alien
people can be secure of his life unless he lives behind fortifications, and
goes about strictly guarded. But if he thus has control of the armed
forces he can control the state, and in order then to make himself the
more secure, he is tempted to advance his own compatriots. This is a
thing which no nation in the world will endure. W e have a thousand
examples, among them that of William of Sicily. In 1268 the people
of Naples were so enraged that a Frenchman should be promoted to
the office of chancellor that they conspired to kill, and in fact did kill
every Frenchmen in either Naples or Sicily. If the foreigners are not
the stronger party, they get their throats cut on the slighest provoca-
tion by patriots. . . .
If natural law is violated by gynecocracy, so are the civil law and the
law of nations, and to an even greater degree. By them the woman is
required to follow her husband though he have neither lands nor
203
Book 6 CONCERNING JUSTICE AND
respect the most humble judges have the same kind of discretion as
the most exalted, but neither of them can do what a sovereign court
can, that is to say reverse a judgement on appeal, or exempt an accused
person entirely from paying the penalty under the law. They can only
act w i h their terms of reference . . . But to speak truly, law without
equity is like a body without a soul, seeing that the law can only
lay down general rules, while equity is dependent on the circumstances
of particular cases, which are infinitely variable. The law must be
accommodated to these circumstances, whether it is a matter of the
administration of justice or affairs of state, if awkward or absurd
consequences are to be avoided. The magistrates however must not
bend the law so much as to break it, even if it is a severe law, when its
intention is unambiguous . . . As an ancient doctor once said, it does
not pertain to the magistrates to judge of the law, but to judge accord-
ing to the law. If he does otherwise, he is by common agreement
unworthy of his oflice . . . The magistrate is under the law, and equity
should be in his soul, whereby it is his duty to supply its defects, and
elucidate its principles, for the right interpretation of law is the very
essence of law. . . .
In nearly all the customs and ordinances of this realm, fines are of
fured amounts . . . and embody a clause 'it is forbidden to our judges
to modify this penalty'. If the convicted person has not the where-
withal to discharge the fine imposed for his default or fraud, by a
general rule common to all peoples, he must then suffer corporal
punishment. To this it may be objected that it is unjust to condemn
a poor man to a fine of say sixty livres on some frivolous charge, and
require no greater sum from a rich man. By the principle of &s-
tributive justice, if a poor man whose total assets only amounted to one
hundred livres was sentenced to a fine of sixty livres, the rich man who
has one hundred thousand livres ought to pay sixty thousand livres,
since sixty bears the same proportion to a hundred, as sixty thousand
to a hundred thousand. The consequence is that in the one case the
principle of distributive justice deprives the rich of their privileges,
and in the other the principle of commutative justice can be used by
the rich as a means of ruining the poor under the cloak of justice.
For this reason our ordinances permit a judge to levy an extraordinary
fine where the circumstances warrant it, in addition to the ordinary
amount fixed by law. This comes very near the principle of harmonic
justice. What further is required is that the ordinances should allow
208
ITS RELATION TO THE STATE Clzap. 6
judges, or at least supreme courts also to abate a fine, having regard
to the resources of the poor and ignorant, as in fact is always done by
the high court of Rouen . . . But he who would be p i d e d by the
principle of strict distributive justice, and make the punishment
exactly fit both the crime and the criminal must give up the attempt
to formulate laws for this purpose, for the variety of persons, acts,
times, and places is infinite, and cannot be comprehended within the
scope of any general rule. O n the other hand a strict equality of
penalties on the principle of commutative justice is unjust. . . .
However although a popular state is characterized by equal laws
on the principle of commutative justice, whereas an aristocracy
preserves the principle of distributive justice, each must borrow some-
thing from the other if they are to be preserved, and so approximate
to harmonic justice. Otherwise, were an aristocracy to exclude the
common people from the estates, and from all honours and offices,
denying them any share in the spoils of war or conquered territories,
the common people, however much they might be strangers to arms,
would revolt and bring a revolution in the government as soon as an
opportunity offered. This may be seen in the Signory of Venice,
which is an aristocracy if ever there was one, and governs itself in
accordance with aristocratic principles, reserving all high honours and
dignities, benefices, and magistracies to Venetian gentlemen, and only
giving subordinate officesto which no power is attached to commoners,
following therein the principle of distributive justice, much to the
great, little to the humble. Nevertheless, in order to keep the common
people content, they open to them the ofice of Chancellor which is
one of the hghest and most honourable, besides being a perpetual
office. To this they add the Secretaryships of State, also very important
and honourable offices. Furthermore the least offence committed by a
Venetian gentleman against any inhabitant of the city is strictly
punished, and indeed, there is a general ease and liberty for all which
is more suggestive of a popular than an aristocratic state. Magistrates
are appointed by a mixed system of election and lot, the one cllarac-
teristic of aristocracies, the other of popular states. In short, the two
types of institutions are so well combined that it is clear that though
an aristocracy, it is the fact that it is regulated according to the principles
of harmonic justice that has made this republic so admirable and so
flourishing. . . .
The monarchical state is necessarily founded upon the principles of
Book 6 CONCER-NING JUSTICE AND
struck together. In doing this the prince reconciles his subjects to one
another, and all alike to himsel& . . .
The prince exalted above all his subjects, whose majesty does not
admit of any division, represents the principle of unity, from which all
the rest derive their force and cohesion. Below him are the three
estates, which have always been disposed in the same way in all well-
ordered commonwealths. The estate of the clergy is placed first
because of its dignity in ministering to religion. It includes both nobles
and commoners. Next comes the military estate, which also includes
nobles and commoners. Last there is the third estate of scholars,
merchants, craftsmen, and peasants. Each of these three estates should
have a share in public offices, benefices, jurisdictions, and honourable
charges, each according to the merits and qualities of persons. Thus
an admirable harmony will subsist between the subjects themselves,
and the subjects and their prince . . . Aristocratic and popular states
also flourish and maintain a government. But they are not so well
united and knit together as ifthey had a prince. He unites all parts and
relates them one to another . . . One can regard the three estates as
characterized by prudence, courage, and temperance respectively.
These three virtues complement each other, and that of the king, who
supplies the rational and contemplative element. Such a form of
commonwealth is harmonious and therefore admirable, for the union
of its members depends on unity under a single ruler, on whom the
effectiveness of all the rest depends. A sovereign prince is therefore
indispensable, for it is his power which informs all the members of
the commonwealth. . . .