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    T8 B5 FAA Wash Center Dana McFarland FDR - Typed and Handwritten Notes - Emergency Traffic Management Response Issues203

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    9/11 Document Archive
    Dana McFarland was a traffic management coordinator (TMU) at the FAA's Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on 9/11. As a TMU, she helped coordinate traffic flow and respond to emergencies. On 9/11, she received multiple calls notifying ZDC of the hijacked flights and worked to ground planes and reroute air traffic in response. She watched the flights on radar but had limited situational awareness beyond what the FAA Command Center relayed. Her focus was on the ground stop efforts rather than communicating with the military.

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    T8 B5 FAA Wash Center Dana McFarland FDR - Typed and Handwritten Notes - Emergency Traffic Management Response Issues203

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    9/11 Document Archive
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    Dana McFarland was a traffic management coordinator (TMU) at the FAA's Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on 9/11. As a TMU, she helped coordinate traffic flow and respond to emergencies. On 9/11, she received multiple calls notifying ZDC of the hijacked flights and worked to ground planes and reroute air traffic in response. She watched the flights on radar but had limited situational awareness beyond what the FAA Command Center relayed. Her focus was on the ground stop efforts rather than communicating with the military.

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    T8 B5 FAA Wash Center Dana McFarland Fdr- Typed and Handwritten Notes- Emergency Traffic Management Response Issues203

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    Dana McFarland was a traffic management coordinator (TMU) at the FAA's Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on 9/11. As a TMU, she helped coordinate traffic flow and respond to emergencies. On 9/11, she received multiple calls notifying ZDC of the hijacked flights and worked to ground planes and reroute air traffic in response. She watched the flights on radar but had limited situational awareness beyond what the FAA Command Center relayed. Her focus was on the ground stop efforts rather than communicating with the military.

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    Download as PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
    Download as pdf or txt
    111 views5 pages

    T8 B5 FAA Wash Center Dana McFarland FDR - Typed and Handwritten Notes - Emergency Traffic Management Response Issues203

    Uploaded by

    9/11 Document Archive
    Dana McFarland was a traffic management coordinator (TMU) at the FAA's Washington Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZDC) on 9/11. As a TMU, she helped coordinate traffic flow and respond to emergencies. On 9/11, she received multiple calls notifying ZDC of the hijacked flights and worked to ground planes and reroute air traffic in response. She watched the flights on radar but had limited situational awareness beyond what the FAA Command Center relayed. Her focus was on the ground stop efforts rather than communicating with the military.

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    of 5

    ZDC INTERVIEW 12/4/03

    DANA McFARLAND (TMU on 9/11)

    • Has no objections to recording.

    • FAA background: Hired in 1991, ZDC whole time. TMU since 1998.

    • Traffic management coordinator. Usually ESP (Enroute Spacing) and WSP (all
    other issues) and a DD posit (re-router for severe weather). WC and SC posits
    have most contact with Command Center.

    • Command Center divided into East, West, Severe Weather areas. Multiple people
    in each area.

    • ZDC always talking to the East side at Command Center.

    • Group Conference Calls (Strategic Planning telecom - every 2 hours) all major
    TRACONS, Airlines, and Command Center. Works out the larger plan taking
    into account traffic density and weather.

    • Training TMUs in emergency traffic management response issues? Yes for HJs,
    but standard to the controllers HJ training. Any special TMU training HJ? Not
    really, but we do have comms with all of the other centers and can be used in
    emergencies.

    • Don't know if TMU is recorded. Assume it is.

    • 9/11: Don Slaughter was her supervisor on 9/11. First phone call came in over
    the CC line, notified of poss HJ heading "our way" - NY Center was also onteh
    line. It turned out to be AA11.1 went to Gary and told him about it. Don't recall
    if they referred to it by name. I went to Area 8 (Virginia was Supervisor there)
    and watched the aircraft. Another call came in from CC to notify them that the ac
    had crashed into WTC.

    • NY Center went into ATC 0 (full ground stop). Massive effort to reroute ac on
    ground and in air. Boston then does same. Tons of phone calls.

    • Got calls on FLT175, UA93 (we watched him on Primary only). As well as
    multiple erroneous calls/reports.

    • For a hj, we would try to determine where they were going and provide heads up
    to the Area Supervisors or centers that the ac would be heading towards.

    • Any calls on AA77? Don't remember any call, but I wasn't the only one
    receiving calls. We were all answering the phones.
    • Did most of information sharing with Dave

    • Don't recall any call to the WOC. Possibly the OPS Manager did. Or my
    supervisor may have.

    • Did not speak with Huntress or anyone in NORAD. Did well after the attacks,
    but not during (Rich Downer coordinated with them later in the day).

    • Our contacts were mostly with the Command Center. Our focus was on the
    grounding efforts.

    • Recalls CC putting out a general "watch for suspicious activity" but doesn't recall
    specific instructions to turn on Primaries.

    • General impression of CC's situational awareness: they were dependant on NY


    Center and that area's TRACON.

    • AA11: CC provided us with a location of the ac and a heading on it.

    • AA77: Because Indy lost the track, you wouldn't know where to look.

    • Because NY notified us of AA11 we knew exactly where to look. Not the same
    with AA77.

    • Did get word when Dulles Approach picked up a fast-moving, Primary target
    heading to DC. How did you know Dulles picked it up? We got a call from
    Dulles (Mark someone..) I know they also called the White House.

    • Learned it was AA77 that hit Pentagon much later in the day.

    • Report of military crash in Camp David. False.

    • Any knowledge of reports that AA11 was still heading south? No, don't recall
    any such reports.

    • Aware ac was scrambled? Performed a "see all" function and watched fighters
    take off from Langley. Not involved in comms with them, focus of routing and
    landing ac. No NEADs comms.

    • Talk to NEADs a lot post-9/11.

    • Aware of any ROE or shoot down orders? No.


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