Fighting For The Enemy: Koreans in Japan's War, 1937-1945
Fighting For The Enemy: Koreans in Japan's War, 1937-1945
Fighting For The Enemy: Koreans in Japan's War, 1937-1945
S
PR
TO
N
G
IN
H
AS
W
F
O
TY
SI
ER
IV
N
U
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
PR
TO
N
ES
S
IN
AS
TY
IV
ER
SI
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
BR A N D ON PA L M ER
U niversity of Washington Press | Seattle and London
PR
ES
S
2019181716151413 87654321
IN
TO
N
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including
photocopy, recording, or any information storage or retrieval system, without
permission in writing from the publisher.
TY
www.washington.edu/uwpress
AS
IV
ER
SI
CONTENTS
ES
S
Acknowledgmentsvii
TO
N
PR
Abbreviationsix
IN
Introduction3
AS
IV
Notes195
ER
SI
TY
Conclusion183
Bibliography224
Index240
TY
SI
ER
IV
TO
N
IN
AS
ES
S
PR
Acknowledgments
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
I have finally come to the end of this journey. I know that my friends and
family feel it is about time. My debt to my friends, family, colleagues, and
mentors who have contributed to Fighting for the Enemy is enormous.
This project would not have come to fruition without the generosity of Dr.
Kim Do-hyng (of the Independence Hall of Korea), who sent me research
materials and provided me room and board during my visits to Korea. I also
thank my wife, Sunny, for all her patience and assistance.
When I was a graduate student at the University of Hawaii, the History
Department, the Center for Korean Studies, and the Center for Japanese
Studies provided support that was invaluable to the formation of this
research topic and to the progression of my academic career. Namely, I
extend my appreciation to Yng-ho Choe and Peter Hoffenberg for the
extra time they took to provide quality feedback; to Margot Henriksen and
George Akita for the advice and humor that sustained me during some difficult times; and to John Haig and Kakuko Shoji, who gave freely of their
time to double-check translations (saving me from myself). Of course, any
errors in writing, translation, or interpretation are my own. Funding for the
publication of this project was made possible through the Association for
Asian Studies First Book Subvention Program and the Korea Foundations
Publication Support Program.
I wish to thank my colleagues in the history department at Coastal Carolina University, especially Amanda Brian, Aneilya Barnes, and Carolyn
Dillian, for their support (and for the free meals). I hope that our lottery
numbers come up soon. Also, I wish to extend my gratitude to the faculty
and staff at the University of Washington Press for their careful proofreading and insight that have been critical to the refinement of this project.
Thanks to Lorri Hagman, Clark Sorensen, Mary Ribesky, and the outside
readers for their advice throughout the editing process.
vii
TY
SI
ER
IV
TO
N
IN
AS
ES
S
PR
ABBREVIATIONS
company-directed recruitment
GDR
government-directed recruitment
GGK
government-general of Korea
ICCCSC
LMP
NGML
POW
prisoner of war
SAJAN
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
CDR
SI
ER
IV
TGSS
TY
TY
SI
ER
IV
TO
N
IN
AS
ES
S
PR
TY
SI
ER
IV
TO
N
IN
AS
ES
S
PR
TY
SI
ER
IV
TO
N
IN
AS
ES
S
PR
Introduction
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
| INTRODUCTION
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
Koreans during the war period, while undeniable, should not be the sole
focal point of analysis. Instead, the totality of experiences related to imperial Japans mobilization of Koreans, such as volunteer soldiers, conscript
soldiers, industrial laborers, and civilian employees of the military, need
to be included to portray Koreas wartime history in a more complex light.
Japans populace and bureaucracy considered the Korean population
educationally and ideologically unprepared to contribute to Japans war
efforts, and, as a result, Japanese bureaucrats were hesitant to include
Koreans as an integral part of Japans war effort. Underlying the Japanese
hesitancy was decades of negative publicity within Japan proper that highlighted the Koreans social and cultural backwardness. In this context, it
was no simple task to incorporate hundreds of thousands of Korean soldiers
and laborers in the mobilization process. An important part of this story
is that Japan cautiously implemented wartime policies to marshal Koreans
in a way that minimized ethnic resistance and prevented a sense of entitlement among the Korean population. Japans control over Korea, while
heavy-handed, was not absolute. In fact, the Japanese state began recruitment by eliciting Korean cooperation and compliance; this gave Koreans a
choice to participate. Thus, Koreans were active agents (not passive victims)
throughout the mobilization processes. Of course, if Koreans opted against
cooperation, the colonial regime exerted pressure on the unwilling.
An examination of the Japanese colonial regimes policymaking process
reveals that wartime manpower laws for Koreans were watered-down versions of policies used to mobilize Japanese citizens. The average Korean
subject was educationally and culturally unprepared to contribute to the
war effort on a level comparable to that of the average Japanese; and the
mobilization had to account for this. The alteration of laws provides a
window through which much knowledge can be gained. These differences
indicate that Koreans were not completely trusted and that Korea held an
ancillary position in Japans wartime empire.
The mobilization of Korea was not an automatic feat at the outbreak of
war in 1937, nor was it a knee-jerk reaction to the declining war fortunes of
Japan in the 1940s. The decision to involve Korean manpower, especially as
soldiers, was plagued with anxiety and much hand-wringing by Japanese
authorities. The dilemma for Japanese authorities was that they needed
Korean soldiers and laborers to enhance Japans fighting capacity, but colo-
INTRODUCTION |
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
| INTRODUCTION
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
pletely evaded wartime demands. But the vast majority of Koreans quietly
acquiesced to mobilization policies as a fiat accompli in order to avoid
coercion and unwanted attention from the bureaucracy. The point here is
that Koreans were not solely victims of the colonial state; instead, they were,
as a whole, agents in the state-society relationship. Japans efforts to win the
support of the Korean populace, along with the GGKs inability to police
noncompliance, show that the colonial regime was not an all-powerful
monolithic bureaucratic organ; it had vulnerabilities that the Korean people
exploited to their own benefit.4
Japans mobilization of Koreans is placed in a more global context in
order to show that Japans colonial policies were consistent with Western
colonial practices. One of the great ironies that imperial powers, including
Japan, faced when mobilizing subaltern peoples was that the superior
races entrusted the welfare of their empires to the colonized races. The British and French used their colonial troops from Africa and Asia to expand,
police, and sustain their empires. European powers had few qualms about
utilizing colonial subjects as an expendable resource; the Japanese, on the
other hand, were much more reluctant to delegate the responsibility of
soldiering.
Comparison of Japans mobilization of Korea with European colonial
practices shows that the Korean experience was not unique in global history. In fact, Japans policies and actions were not as far-reaching as many
Western colonial policies. Specifically, the French utilized hundreds of
thousands of Africans and Indochinese as soldiers or laborers, and the British recruited even greater numbers of colonial subjects from India, Africa,
Malaya, and wherever else the Union Jack flew. These analogies highlight
the similarities and differences between the methods used by the Western
and Japanese empires to mobilize their colonies for war. Acknowledging
the exploitation of other colonies in no way diminishes the suffering that
is such a large part of Koreas historical remembrance; nor does it justify
Japans actions, but it is instead an indictment of all colonial powers wanton abuse of their colonial subjects.
INTRODUCTION |
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
| INTRODUCTION
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
INTRODUCTION |
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
miners and comfort women, but pay little attention to Korean soldiers or to
structural isses.12 Few works within this field address the international and
historical context of colonial subjects mobilized for war.
Coverage of Korean soldiers has slowly grown over the past two decades.
The most prolific authors in the Japanese language are Higuchi Yichi and
Utsumi Aiko; while in Korea, Kim To-hyng has numerous studies about
Koreas military participation in the war. Higuchis Koreans Who Were
Forced to Be Imperial Army Soldiers (J: Kgun heishi ni sareta Chsenjin,
1991) and Korean People and Conscription during the War (J: Senjika Chsen
no minsh to chhei, 2001) are meticulously researched studies that focus
on Japans program of military mobilization in Korea, making them the
most important secondary works in this field. Utsumis study, The Korean
Imperial Army Soldiers War (J: Chsenjin kgun heishitachi no sens,
1991) provides a nice survey of Korean soldiers; she has also published
extensively on the postwar conditions of Korean soldiers and laborers. And
Kims numerous articles and pamphlets published through the Independence Hall of Korea and the Truth Commission on Forced Mobilization
stress the plight of Koreans in New Guinea, Burma, and the Philippines.
Critics of forced mobilization studies note that South Korean scholarly
efforts blur the lines between critical and popular understandings of Koreas
modern history.13 One outcome of this approach is that Korean scholarship
protects and promotes the nationalist Korean political and social identity.14
The marriage of scholarship and wider society has increased this scholarships rigidity to such an extent that all other historical explanations are
ignored.15 In other words, counternarratives or contradictory evidence are
generally dismissed.
In recent decades, the nationalist historical paradigm has been challenged by Korean and Western scholars who advocate the colonial modernization theory, which contends that Japans colonization of Korea,
including the wartime mobilization, was critical to the modernization of
the peninsula. This revisionist approach moves beyond a rigid nationalist
view and explores the ways that Koreans encountered modernity within
Japanese colonialism. Studies in this field examine educational advancement, technical training, industrial development, modern infrastructure,
and legal systems as Japanese contributions that helped Koreas postwar
growth. Since the early 1990s there has been a growing movement to exam-
| INTRODUCTION
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
ine colonial modernity as yet another alternate view of the colonial era.
Colonial modernity moves beyond the rigid interpretations of nationalism
and colonialism found in the historiography of modern Korea by analyzing
the formation of Korean identity under colonialism. These studies claim
that the use of emotive terms obscures our understanding of the colonial
era, as well as the options available to the Korean people. More significantly,
this paradigm challenges the binary explanations (exploitation versus
resistance) of nationalist history by adopting a more pluralistic approach
to historical studies.
Studies of modernity evaluate the intricate relationship between the
Korean people and the colonial regime, between colonialism and modernity, and between personal and national motives. Yun Haedong is one of the
best scholars in this field. His works Another Reckoning of Modern Times
(K: Kndae rl tasi ingnnda, 2006) and A Rediscovery of History before and
since Liberation (K: Haebang chnhusa i chaeinsik, 2006) are examples of
recent Korean scholars willingness to recognize positive outcomes of the
colonial era. English-language works such as Carter J. Eckerts Offspring
of Empire (1991), Soon-won Parks Colonial Industrialization and Labor
in Korea (1999), and Theodore Jun Yoos The Politics of Gender in Colonial
Korea (2008) offer a revisionist understanding the colonial era. While
addressing larger issues of capitalism, industrialization, and gender, respectively, these works provide insight into the role Koreans played in shaping
their own lives under Japans rule; they show that Koreans participated
in the creation of a modern society. These scholars maintain that, while
morally objectionable, the colonial era was not necessarily detrimental to
Korea.
In terms of wartime mobilization, a majority of English-language works
recount the experiences of the comfort women, placing emphasis on their
victimization. One welcomed exception to these studies is C. Sarah Sohs
The Comfort Women (2008). Her study provides an anthropological interpretation of the comfort womens victimization that resulted from Japanese
and Korean patriarchy. Soh terms their experience as gendered structural
violence.16 Beyond The Comfort Women, there are no English-language
monograph-length studies focused solely on Korean industrial labor or
soldiers; most of the published research on wartime Korean soldiers and
laborers have been book chapters or journal articles. For example, Utsumi
10
INTRODUCTION |
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
Aiko has published articles in Asian Labor in the Wartime Japanese Empire
(2005) and Perilous Memories (2001), but, unfortunately, none of her books
have been translated into English.
The most significant works on Koreans in the Japanese military have
been by Takashi Fujitani, who has published articles in Senri Ethnological
Studies (2000) and Representations (2007), as well as a monograph, Race for
Empire (2011). His works compare the biopolitical policies and discourses
of the Japanese toward Koreans in the Japanese Army and the United States
toward Japanese Americans in the United States Army.17 Fujitani provides
excellent coverage of the volunteer soldier and conscription systems, as well
as insightful chapters on war-era movies and literature. However, Fujitanis
works rely almost exclusively on English- and Japanese-language sources.
The result is that his works do not incorporate Korean opinions and
responses to Japans policies. Fighting with the Enemy, on the other hand,
utilizes a variety of Korean sources and explores in much greater detail the
Korean wartime experience.
Revisionist and postcolonial studies portray Koreans as active agents in
the creation of Korean history, not as victims of unmitigated exploitation.
The colonial regime was not capable of imposing its unabridged policies
upon the Korean people. Fighting for the Enemy differs from Higuchis,
Utsumis, and other major works in two important ways: It moves beyond
an emphasis on the suffering of Koreans, and it places Koreas mobilization in a global context. Furthermore, it contributes to the field of colonial
modernity by arguing that the economic and social conditions accompanying wartime industrialization created opportunities for Koreans who cooperated with and worked within the colonial system. Countless Koreans at
the local and national level chose to become policemen, educators, soldiers,
bureaucrats, laborers, heads of local neighborhood units, and businessmen.
The Colonial Regimes Power
Many Korean and Western scholars implicitly or directly portray the GGK
as a monolithic, hegemonic, and demonic structure. This misrepresentation
needs to be replaced by a more nuanced treatment that judiciously questions the limits of the colonial regimes powers. In 2005 a Korean scholar
stated to the author that the colonial bureaucracy had absolute power over
11
| INTRODUCTION
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
every aspect of every Koreans life, and that any resistance was due to
Korean ingenuity. While this opinion does not hold universal support
among Korean scholarship, widespread misconceptions such as this are
common in this field. Any claim that the GGK held absolute power should
be questioned. Michel Foucault aptly noted, Power is not something that
is acquired, seized, or shared, something that one holds on to or allows to
slip away; power is exercised from innumerable points.18 And no government, including the Japanese colonial regime in Korea, can control every
point of power. For example, despite an all-out assimilation policy to force
Koreans to speak Japanese, less than one-quarter of Koreans were able to
do so. Quite simply, the GGK, like other colonial regimes, had weaknesses.
The colonial state was not monolithic, nor was it omnipotent. It lacked the
foresight to predict its future needs, and instead reacted to circumstances
as they arose.19 The GGK realized its vulnerabilities and adapted the way it
dealt with the Korean population throughout the period under examination. These weaknesses left room for Koreans to act, with limitations, of
their own volition.
Colonial regimes, while powerful entities, were neither monolithic nor
omnipotent organisms. They controlled many aspects of life within their
colonies, but that power had limitations and vulnerabilities. The actions
of all colonial bureaucracies were shaped by a nervousness that colonial
subjects would rise up against the imperial power, as happened in India
in 1857. Imperial powers learned quickly that colonized peoples could not
be forced to abandon their indigenous political consciousness, history,
or loyalties. Colonial regimes understood that colonies were better ruled
through laws and cooperation from native elites than by a reliance on
brute force. Of course, military action was necessary from time to time.
For example, in the 1890s the British in India reacted to frequent peasant
uprisings by passing tenancy actswhich were haphazard and ineffective.
The British did not have the manpower to properly patrol the provinces to
prevent uprisings; they reacted to events as they arose.20 Colonial regimes
focused on policing outward behavior and demanding obedience, but were
powerless to control personal thoughts and behavior behind closed doors.
Consider the extreme example of African slaves in the American South.
They were chattel, and therefore politically and legally powerless. Yet they
retained a degree of agency and, by extension, power within the relation-
12
INTRODUCTION |
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
13
| INTRODUCTION
IV
ER
SI
TY
AS
IN
TO
N
PR
ES
S
14