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What is wrong with modern accounts of context in linguistics?

Roman Kopytko, Pozna1 1. Introduction
The two main objectives of this paper are as follows first to identify the weaknesses of current approaches to context in linguistics and second to propose some remedy. The latter will take the shape of an account of context as relation investigated within the framework of non-Cartesian Relational Pragmatics. The role and significance of the notion of context for pragmatics and discourse analysis cannot be overestimated. Context is a constitutive concept for these disciplines, because without it they simply would not exist. Language users in real speech situations and analysts describing and interpreting pieces of discourse have to relate the relevant texts to the rich universe of contextual elements that regulate the pragmatic interpretation and use of utterances/discourses. Non-Cartesian pragmatics (cf. Kopytko 2001, 2002) should focus on the pancontextual (all-embracing) view of pragmatic phenomena. To be more specific, the question to consider is the following: How much context (or rather which contextual elements) language users must either know or retrieve from the universe of contextual factors that is located in their physical, mental, social and interactive environment. In addition, linguists have to examine the structure, function, and dynamic interaction of the (intrinsic) cognitive, affective, and conative context, and the (extrinsic) social, cultural, and interactive one, concluding with the investigation of the dynamic interrelations between the two types of context and the characterization of their interface. The idea of pancontextualism implies (1) a broad range of pragmatic research and (2) no restrictions on the scope of potential contextual factors in linguistic interaction, especially, no restrictions imposed by pragmaticians and discourse analysts by fiat.

1 Institute of English, Adam Mickiewicz University, Pozna, Poland

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2. Context in discourse analysis and modern pragmatics a brief overview

The researchers associated with the tradition of British contextualism include Bronislaw Malinowski (1966 [1923]), J. R. Firth (1957), and M. A. K. Halliday (1978). Malinowski notes that a statement, spoken in real life, is never detached from the situation in which it has been uttered the utterance has no meaning except in the context of situation. (1923: 307). It should be noted that he also puts emphasis on the functions of language associated with the social life of a speech community and the relation between language use and action (for him the use of language depends on the course of activity). Finally, he attaches great importance to the context of culture both on the level of language use and interpretation. Kryk-Kastovsky (2002) presents an illuminating comparison of accounts of context in the works of Malinowski, Firth, and Austin. She also considers the significance of context in intercultural communication.

2.1. Context in discourse analysis

The role and scope of context vary in different approaches to language use (cf. Schiffrin 1993). In speech act theory (cf. Austin 1962; Searle 1969) and Gricean pragmatics (cf. Grice 1975) the view of context as knowledge dominates. This is because the language users knowledge of the world (including its mental, social and cultural aspects) guides the use and interpretation of language. We could expect the importance of context to grow in interactional sociolinguistics (cf. Gumperz 1982). Gumperzs notions such as contextualization cues, contextual presuppositions and situated inferences put context at the centre of interactional, sociolinguistic investigations. It should be noted that both contextual cues and situated inferences relate the pragmatic interpretation of meaning to the cognitive knowledge of the interactants and the present situation (situational context). The ethnography of communication (cf. Hymes 1974) attempts to integrate the cognitive context viewed as the knowledge stored in our communicative competence, and the socio-cultural context that defines communicative events. Its central notion is that of communicative competence. In William Labovs (1972) variation analysis context as a situation and text come to the fore. The situational context in variation analysis is investigated by way of separate components such as (1) the social situation considered as the setting and scene, (2) the social identities (gender, age, and ethnicity), and/or (3) the key (formal vs. informal style). In contrast to interac-

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tional sociolinguistics, variation analysis regards the situational factors as discrete and mutually exclusive entities that can be coded, counted and compared. Furthermore, the situational factors are considered to be relatively stable categorical variables. In interactional sociolinguistics contextual elements are viewed as dynamic concepts susceptible to influence from the self and interpersonal processes. In conversational analysis or CA (cf. Garfinkel 1967; Sacks 1992) the scope of context seems to be the broadest (among the approaches presented so far). This is so because it combines the view of context as (1) knowledge, (2) situation, and (3) text. Yet, it should be noted that in CA knowledge cannot be separated from the situation because it is knowledge in use rather than an independent knowledge stored in the brain (characteristic of speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics) that differentiates the notion of knowledge in CA from that used in other approaches to discourse analysis. In CA each utterance in a sequence is dependent on a prior context and creates context for the next utterance (thus it functions as its co-text). Some approaches to discourse processing postulate the presence and/or necessity of knowledge schemata (as mental representations of typical situations) in our cognitive brain (cf. Schank and Abelson 1977). Researchers in Artificial Intelligence have specially been attracted to the idea of mental schemata. Clearly, they view schemata as knowledge structures. Similarly, in their relevance theory Sperber and Wilson (1986) focus on mental knowledge structures. Verschueren (1999: 263) claims that relevance theory limits pragmatics to whatever can be said in terms of a cognitively defined notion of relevance. Sperber and Wilson suggest that relevant information yields the greatest change in our knowledge for the least processing effort. Closely related to the cognitive view of context in relevance theory is the figure vs. ground distinction proposed by Duranti and Goodwin (1992). Despite some undeniable merits and theoretical advantages the interpretation of meaning by way of context and the focal event (cf. Duranti and Goodwin 1992; Auer 1995), derived from the figure-ground relationship in the Gestalt psychology of perception, has to face serious problems. The distinction between the figure vs. ground aims at organizing the unstructured, amorphous, or chaotic sense-data by selecting and focusing on the figure (or theme, topic, etc.), and relegating all the other elements or phenomena to the status of background. However, the problem is that actors frequently disagree about what is (or should be) the focal event or the figure and what is the background in a specific verbal interaction. This is so because actors in speech

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events are endowed with their specific knowledge structures and cognitive idiosyncrasies that make them perceive, categorize, and interpret reality subjectively. In addition, there are numerous theoretical and practical questions associated with contextual focus, especially concerning the mutual influence of contextual elements on each other and the selection of the focal event; note that emotions and goals influence social perception and as a result figure selection. Therefore, selecting one focal event rather than another seems to be a matter of subjective preference (bias) and chance rather than that of the inescapable, deterministic and universal mechanism. If the figure-ground dichotomy is not positively resolved during verbal interaction either miscommunication (or an illusion of communicative success), or interpersonal conflict may ensue. In sum, different approaches to discourse focus on different elements of context. Thus, speech act theory and Gricean pragmatics view context primarily as knowledge, interactional sociolinguistics and the ethnography of speaking emphasize the significance of knowledge and situation, variation analysis concentrates on situation and text, and conversational analysis takes the relationships between knowledge, situation, and text as a major object of investigation.

2.2. Context in pragmatics

Ludwig Wittgensteins view of linguistic philosophy radically changed the interest and orientation of many scholars concerning language use. The surprising conversion from Cartesian and positivistic methods and ideas in Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus to the Non-Cartesian (cf. Kopytko 2001) claims in Wittgensteins late philosophy (cf. Wittgenstein 1922/92, 1953) stimulated the development of ordinary language analysis, that is, a method of philosophical investigation that focuses on contextual language use rather than abstract meaning. The names associated with this orientation include such famous British philosophers as John L. Austin, Gilbert Ryle, John Wisdom and George E. Moore. Wittgensteins rejection of philosophical essentialism (cf. Kopytko 1995) and his new notions and metaphors such as family resemblance or language game resulted in a new perspective on linguistic phenomena. Lyons (1977: 574) singles out the role of knowledge in language use including: the knowledge of role and status, location, formality level, the medium (spoken or written), subject matter, province (or domain determining the

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register of a language). Additionally, Lyons also sees the importance of linguistic features that interact with context. Leech (1983: 13) characterizes context as any background knowledge assumed to be shared by s and h and which contributes to the hs interpretation of what s means by a given utterance. (The letters s and h stand for the speaker and hearer respectively). Levinson (1983: 13) restricts context to the basic parameters of the context of utterance which include participants identity, role, location, assumptions about knowledge, etc. He justifies such an approach to context with the aim of his book, which he sees as an introduction to the philosophical-linguistic tradition rather than an exhaustive coverage of all the contextual coordinates of linguistic organization. Mey (1993) presents a broad view of context as knowledge, situation, and co-text. He maintains that context is a dynamic rather than static phenomenon; therefore, contextual factors are in steady development during the process of social interaction. Besides, Mey holds that any understanding that linguists can hope to obtain of what goes on between people using language is based, necessarily and uniquely, on a correct understanding of the whole context (my emphasis) in which the linguistic interaction takes place. (1993: 186). He has also introduced the notion of wording the world that has social and contextual implications. Thus, Mey maintains that in order to understand another persons wording, I have to participate in his or her contexts, to word the world with him or her. (1993: 304). Verschueren (1999: 74-114) locates language users within contextual correlates of adaptability represented as a linguistic context and the mental world, social world, and physical world. This is a broad scope of contextual factors including knowledge, situation, co-text, and others. According to Verschueren, the mental world activated in language use contains cognitive and emotive elements. He also mentions personality, beliefs, desires, wishes, motivations, and intentions. The social world is examined by its social settings, institutions, cultural norms, and values. The analysis of the physical world focuses on temporal and spatial reference, and the physical properties of language users such as bodily postures, gestures, gaze, sex, physical appearance, etc. In his approach to pragmatics, Verschueren puts emphasis on the dynamics of interactive meaning generation. In conclusion, the approaches to context presented above (see sections 2.1. and 2.2.) differ in their view of the scope of context and in their focus (one might also say bias) on some elements of context and the exclusion of others. The reason for this is the disciplinary bias and goals of particular researchers; note the influence of cultural anthropology on Malinowskis idea of

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context, of analytical philosophy on John Austin, John Searle and Paul Grice, of sociolinguistics on William Labovs variation analysis and John Gumperzs interactional sociolinguistics or of ethnomethodology on conversational analysis and so on. A prevailing method used by contextualists (or researchers analyzing the context of language use) is that of enumeration of relevant contextual factors (elements). Sometimes, they provide some disciplinary (local) justification for their claims rather than offering a general framework or justified theory of contextual phenomena.

3. Context in non-Cartesian Pragmatics

Since the early 60s the Cartesian paradigm has been very popular in the cognitive psychology then cognitive science, the philosophy of mind, and linguistics. Kopytko, (2001a:790-91) characterizes Cartesian pragmatics by a set of metaphysical and epistemological-methodological assumptions, claims, and features including the following: (1) the duality of the mental vs. physical world, (2) the innateness hypothesis, (3) the modularity of mind, (4) a common cognitive processing mechanism, (5) the representational view of mind, (6) essentialism, (7) the discreteness/categoriality of pragmatic phenomena, (8) cognitive rationality, (9) certain knowledge, (10) universal rules, (11) universal claims, (12) the deductive method, (13) predictiveness, and (14) the priority of the knower over the known. The emerging trends labeled as non-Cartesian pragmatics may not endorse several or even all of the above postulates. Some non-Cartesians (including the present author) reject the disjunctive logic of either or and prefer to view pragmatic and other phenomena as gradable, interactive, unstable, etc. For that reason, the innateness hypothesis, for example, should not be rejected or accepted but rather corroborated or falsified at the ratioempirical level for each object of scientific investigation. The truth about human faculties seems to be that they are neither inborn nor socially acquired but rather that they result from a complex interaction between different systems (from the genetic and biological through the mental to the physical, social and cultural). The real relations between these interacting elements should be viewed as the subject matter of ratioempirical research rather than the result of philosophical assumptions. The scope of interactional context is indefinite and infinite because each context is embedded in its own context that is embedded in its context and so on; in consequence, the situation of infinite contextual regress follows. Although for researchers this question remains a philosophical quandary, for

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language users it is much less so, because, after all, they are capable of communicating effectively most of the time. Interpersonal communication is possible by actors focusing on the relevant, interactional elements of the current contextual dynamics. A systematic explanation of this complex dynamic process is a goal worth pursuing, although, as may be expected, it will take much effort and multidisciplinary research to succeed. Of special importance to language users seems to be the issue of access to contextual information. In this connection, it is necessary to formulate the question whether all participants in verbal interaction have equal access to contextual information and what the possible consequences of such situations are. The sum of individual perspectives contributed by language users makes the contextual potential of linguistic interaction. Manifestly, in this approach contextual knowledge is distributed among discourse participants. This means that no single actor acquires all contextual knowledge and that its distribution among them is not equal. Nonetheless, to communicate successfully they have to share at least some contexts to a certain degree. It should be emphasized that actors can learn and extend their contextual knowledge in the process of social interaction not only by the joint construction of new contexts but also by the acquisition of new information, the contextual change of individual perspectives and changing or seeking new goals of interaction. Finally, they can learn by coping with (1) the social and linguistic emergent2 phenomena, which include faux pas, embarrassment, humor, joking, the loss of face, verbal duel, conflict, etc., and (2) the affective context of interaction viewed as the emotional states/processes and interrelations between actors. One feature of perspective taking that emerges clearly from this discussion is that of subjectivity. If actors embrace their perspectives in social interaction they may be viewed as their subjective points of view that depend on the content, structure, and interactional properties of their individual pragmatic potential. Thus, the feature of subjectivity must be assigned to the individuals mental faculties, the organization and content of (1) knowledge, beliefs, experience, social skills, social perception, etc., (2) affect characterized by the idiosyncratic structure of emotions related to personality features, (3) a hierarchy of goals and intentions and (4) the interrelations between the elements in (1-3) above. The content, structure and operation of an individuals contextual potential are subjective and unique (with some areas of possible
2 Linguistic emergent phenomena in verbal interaction are first of all associated with the

low predictability of their occurrence and potential threat to the course and success of communicative events.

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overlap as has been suggested above). As a result, the addition of a new perspective may extend the contextual potential of interaction. By adding other perspectives/participants the contextual potential may grow ad infinitum, and as a consequence the phenomenon of infinite regress appears. Obviously, for practical reasons the scope of the contextual potential is rationally controlled and restricted; thus, the number of speeches in a parliamentary debate, participants in a talk-show, points of view in a newspaper debate, book or film reviews, the number of speakers in verbal interaction, are rationally regulated. The feature of subjectivity associated with perspective taking/contextual potential leads to the supposition that no theory can predict the relevance of contextual elements in verbal interaction and their impact on its course. Nonetheless, the claim that some elements of context are more relevant than others does not appear to be unfounded. Kopytko maintains that the relevant pragmatic context should include those elements of the (general) context that directly influence and shape the rationality of the course of discourse, both in the positive and negative sense. Positively when all participants of a speech encounter properly identify the relevant contextual features and conform to the accepted norms of linguistic interaction by maintaining face, observing conversational principles, etc.; and negatively when the course of discourse is not smooth but disturbed by unexpected contextual intrusion such as faux pas, affective events, emergent pragmatic phenomena, etc. (1995: 486). What language users contribute to the social interaction is their subjective pragmatic potential that can be seen as a structured system of cognitive, affective, and conative mental faculties and phenomena (cf. Kopytko 1998). The three elements are closely related and frequently form a unified cognitive-affective-conative system (for Platos view of the triad reason, will, and passion cf. Kopytko 1995, 2001). We may assume, for the sake of a theoretical consideration that language users can be characterized either as subjective agents by their Individual Pragmatic Potentials (IPPs), or as members of an abstract social construct/set of language users characterized by their Universal Pragmatic Potential (UPP) with some claims to universality and objectivity. Finally, reconciliation between these two views might lead to a complementary approach so that both the IPP and the UPP of language users could be investigated. Nota bene, pragmability, that is, the human ability both inborn and acquired to produce and interpret texts in a holistic-relational context, has to be analyzed both in terms of the Individual Pragmatic Potential and the Universal Pragmatic Potential. It follows then that pragmability is a conditio sine qua non of

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appropriate language use. Finally, as the name clearly indicates the Individual Pragmatic Potential represents and focuses on the subjective and personspecific aspects of a language users linguistic skills. Language users placed in a specific communicative situation have to play their parts by relying on the Individual Pragmatic Potential (IPP) at their disposal. Their communicative actions may either be a success or failure; both seem to depend not only on the agents (IPP) but also on those of other participants in verbal interaction. Moreover, a third factor of utmost importance appears on the scene, namely, the interactional phenomena, processes, relations, etc. These may i.a. include collaboration and the collective construction of discourse reality, conflict, misunderstanding, persuasion, numerous emergent phenomena, etc. As a result, the centrality of (or focus on) language users is being questioned, and rightly so. Language users become only one of the many elements of social interaction. In addition, they should be viewed as dynamic rather than static entities, because they may develop, learn, and adapt to the changing, dynamic, social interaction. The changes may include any aspect of social intercourse such as the composition of the group (the number of participants), interactional goals, affective events, (mis)understanding, numerous cognitive factors (attention, memory, perception), or the individual behaviors of participants. In the pancontextual view of pragmatics advocated here there is no limit to the scope of context. The relational context is open and dynamic. There is not just one locus of contextual knowledge; instead, context is distributed between actors, negotiated and frequently collectively constructed, deconstructed, and sometimes imposed upon them. Thus, the more skillful and powerful language users such as art or film critics, politicians and ideologists may impose their views, beliefs, or context interpretations on others. In the present approach, we may propose a basic dichotomy between the intrinsic vs. extrinsic context. Accordingly, the relational context may be examined by the intrinsic, contextual properties, phenomena and processes specified above as actors Subjective Individual Pragmatic Potentials (IPP) correlated with other mental/cognitive elements and phenomena such as reasoning, selfconcept, goals, emotions, etc. The elements of the relational context that are located beyond the mind/brain of the actor will be referred to as the extrinsic context. Actors have access to the extrinsic context through perceptual, cognitive-affective, and linguistic interfaces. Such a position has important philosophical consequences, namely, the question whether the available interfaces can secure objective cognition, or whether the intrinsic context does or does not influence/distort the perception of the extrinsic context. The answer

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is that objective cognition is rather an unattainable ideal, and obviously, the subjective intrinsic context may distort social perception/judgment (cf. Forgas 1991). The dynamic relations between the intrinsic and extrinsic contexts result in the interactional context, viewed as a theoretical construct that should account for all elements, factors, phenomena and processes that appear in a specific verbal interaction. The most important among them are (1) the integrative discourse processes such as the collective construction of meaning/context, rationality, and cooperation, and (2) the disintegrative phenomena, viz., understanding, embarrassment, verbal aggression, conflict, deception, propaganda, social influence, etc. (cf. Giles and Robinson, 1990). In conclusion, the pancontextual view of pragmatics suggested above raises the following issues: (1) questions the objectivity of the notion of context, (2) suggests a defocusing of the language user, (3) proposes an interactional point of view in pragmatic analysis, (4) explains why communicative success in verbal interaction is never guaranteed, and illusory understanding, or miscommunication occur so frequently, (5) suggests that actors subjective (IPPs) may change, develop, and be enriched, (6) notes that the interactional processes (including actors (IPPs) adaptation, enrichment, etc.) of multifarious cooperation between actors may lead to some form of social consensus and understanding (which, however, may prove to be unstable and only temporary), (7) reveals the dependence of Relational Pragmatics on other disciplines that investigate the different aspects of the relational context, (8) points to the possible interdependence between related disciplines (as an interactive cluster of shared elements, phenomena, and processes) (9) shows the interface between disciplines and the theoretical and practical consequences of such a situation, and (10) suggests that the neighboring disciplines of pragmatics constitute and control all the phenomena and processes of social/linguistic interaction.

4. Context in Relational Pragmatics

Relational Pragmatics (RP) puts into focus the analysis of relations between elements of a pragmatic system that consists of (1) interactants or language users, (2) language and (3) context. Relational Pragmatics aims at showing the problems that language users have to solve if they wish to participate successfully in social interaction, and, even more importantly, it also aims at accounting for the communicative-interactive failures of incompetent participants. The three basic elements of the theory of language use, that is, the lan-

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guage user, language and context, do not function in isolation; quite the opposite, they form an integrated system of interrelations. For this reason, the study of these interdependencies will be referred to as Relational Pragmatics. As presented above, a pragmatic system (PS) in Relational Pragmatics (RP) will be investigated as a triad (1) the language user or interactant (the latter term seems to be more abstract and more convenient when non-verbal communication (NVC) is referred to), (2) language (or code), and (3) context. It follows that three pairs of binary relations (xRy) make a pragmatic system: (1) Interactant (I) Language (L), (2) Language (L) Context (C) and (3) Interactant (I) Context (C); (see Kopytko 1998). The crucial claim of Relational Pragmatics is the proposition that the three entities and interrelations between them make the pragmatic system which underlies the pragmability (my term) of language users. It follows then that pragmability is a conditio sine qua non of appropriate language use. Pragmability in Relational Pragmatics is a general notion that embraces both the Individual Pragmatic Potential (IPP) and the Universal Pragmatic Potential (UPP). Besides, it is significant to note that it is not equivalent to the idea of pragmatic or communicative competence, because there is no distinction between competence and performance in RP. Actually, Relational Pragmatics is the study of language users pragmability. The self-system in Relational Pragmatics also contains the concepts of rationality and face (cf. Kopytko 1993), the former cognitvely and the latter affectively-oriented. However, the meaning and function of these constructs in RP are different. In RP they are seen as pragmatic notions whose basic properties are the following: (1) incompleteness, (2) indeterminacy, and (3) instability (for brevity, they will be referred as the 3-Is). As a consequence, their functions (roles) in language use are less categorical and have to be, in principle, contextually evaluated. A view of pragmability as qualitatively equivalent to linguistic competence that may occasionally be distorted by performance phenomena has been rejected here in favor of the claim that imperfect and incomplete acquisition of contextual knowledge and the three defining features of pragmatic context (see the 3-Is above) are phenomena sui generis associated with pragmatics. This is so because (1) the scope of the relevant context is usually unpredictable, (2) context is a dynamic phenomenon that may be constructed (regulated) by interactants, and (3) no two contexts or situations can be claimed to be identical (this also holds for the mental context discussed above). In brief, each contextual situation is unique.

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Everything that is has its context of being. Even so called autonomous objects do not exist in a vacuum but are subject to a variety of internal and external factors that may influence, change, distort, or even destroy them. Context is the dynamic relation that may affect the autonomous, natural (physical) objects, or mental objects like language. At its most fundamental level context must be viewed as a relation of co-being or co-presence characterized as a situation such that there must exist at least two objects (entities) capable of entering into physical, mental, social, cultural, and interactive relations in which one of them will assume the role of the context for the other. This is the necessary (ontological) condition for the existence of context. Thus, the latter can be considered, first of all, as a relation of co-being and then as a sequence of dynamic relations between context and its object, or between the effector (Latin originator, creator) and affectus (Latin affected, suffering). The causal relation between effectors and affectus will be referred to as event. In brief, then, context may be characterized as the (dynamic) relations between effectors and affectus. As a result, the principles no relation, no context, (and its reverse) no context, no relation reflect clearly the basic assumption of Relational Pragmatics (RP). Furthermore, although RP does not focus on universal claims and innate ideas in pragmatic research it may be suggested, however, that the fundamental pragmability and the social practice of relating effectors to affectus (hearers perspective) and affectus to effectors (speakers perspective) appears to be universal among language users and plausibly, at least in its cognitive aspect, be to some extent innate. The individual differences in the mastery of the skill, which, certainly, relies not only on our pragmability or the IPP but also on the content and relations in the cognitiveaffective-conative system, are so striking that some innate substratum could be tentatively posited to account for the innate differences associated with these phenomena. Texts (characterized as any representation of meaning by way of a symbolic system) are related to their contexts. Such a situation of relatedness may be examined by using the concepts of effectors and affectus. The latter refers to different types of texts and the former to contexts. It may be useful to propose a distinction between the internal, linguistic, and the non-linguistic, socio-cultural context of texts. Thus, effectors responsible for the linguistic relations within text (such as coherence and cohesion) will be identified as textors; on the other hand, those governing the non-linguistic relations between text and context will be referred to as contextors. Accordingly, texts are

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doubly related, first, linguistically to textors and second, non-linguistically to contextors. The latter constitutes a large set that includes the following classes of effectors: (1) mental (cognitive-affective-conative system), (2) social (micro- and macro-structures, social facts, social representations, gender, etc,), (3) interactional (creativity, emergent phenomena, miscommunication and others), (4) cultural (individualistic and collectivist cultures, cultural relativism, etc.). The main task of Relational Pragmatics is to specify the relations between effectors and affectus, and specifically between contextors and texts. The crucial notion in RP is that of relation (for an account of the notion of relation in pragmatics see Kopytko 2002) which, unfortunately, belongs to the vaguest terms in the scholarly dictionary.

6. Conclusions
In contrast to other approaches to pragmatics and discourse analysis Relational Pragmatics does not (tacitly or by definition of pragmatics) only assume the presence of relations in pragmatic phenomena but first of all it attempts to investigate them in the framework of the Pragmatic Relational System and its dynamic relations with the Pragmatic Reference System (cf. Kopytko 2002). Such a change of perspective from the relatively static ideas of knowledge, situation, and text to the operation of relations accounts for a range of dynamic interactional phenomena associated with human communication as well as interaction with and interpretation of a variety of texts. Thus, such communicative problems as misunderstanding, misinterpretation (or pragmatic emergent phenomena including faux pas, verbal conflict, face threatening acts, etc.) come into being, most of the time, as a result of relational failures (that is, contextually inadequate relating of effectors and affectus rather than the sheer lack of specific knowledge). In other words, the presence of the required knowledge does not guarantee a communicative success. The latter depends primarily on the relational work between the Pragmatic Relational System3 and the Pragmatic Reference System. Similarly, the inter3 The ability to relate effectors to affectus seems to be a complex human faculty sui

generis that involves many cognitive systems (knowledge, reasoning, attention, memory, etc.) but also social skills, social practice and pragmatic consequences of specific (social) verbal interactions; this is so because each verbal interaction is new, different, and unrepeatable. All these elements (subsystems) constitute the Pragmatic Relational System, which is a part of the IPP. Another part of the IPP is the Pragmatic Reference

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pretation and understanding of any complex academic (scholarly or philosophical) texts relies first of all on the progressive, successful relational work within the available Pragmatic Reference System. It should also be noted that the focus on relations in pragmatics clearly demarcates the boundary between the semantic and pragmatic relations and phenomena. In brief, then, what is wrong with modern accounts of context in linguistics? (1) different approaches to discourse and pragmatics present different views of the scope of context (knowledge, situation, text); (2) they frequently introduce disciplinary bias and promote selective goals of particular researchers (e.g. Malinowski, Austin, Labov, Gumperz, and others); (3) they rely on a number of unjustified assumptions about the nature of context and of the language user; (4) as a result, they assume the objectivity of the notion of context, or that of common (mutual) knowledge; (5) they either neglect the role of the language user in their approaches or present it as a rational, selfcontained, and static being; (6) they pay little attention to the process of social (linguistic) interaction and its consequences for interpersonal communication; (7) they do not account (in their theories) for the reasons of communicative failure, misunderstanding, etc.; (8) they do not account for pragmatic emergent phenomena; (9) they focus (most of the time) either on the social or mental aspects of context; (10) they fail to emphasize the fact that contextual knowledge is socially distributed, constructed, or negotiated. Obviously, this critique (summarized here in ten points) concerns the specific approaches to discourse analysis and pragmatics to a different degree. Finally, to remedy this situation we have proposed a holistic-relational view of pragmatics and context. Thus, the pragmatic system based on three pairs of binary relations ((1) interactant/language, (2) language/context, and (3) interactant/context) underlies the pragmability of language users. As a consequence, a theory of context demands a theory of the language user as its indispensable element. Language users have been analyzed in terms of their Individual Pragmatic Potentials (IPPs) and Universal Pragmatic Potentials (UPPs). This distinction clearly emphasizes the subjective view of context and interactional processes, which explains, inter alia, the persistent phenomena of communicative failures, misunderstanding, etc. In addition the holisticrelational view of context offers the following advantages over other theoretical approaches to context: (1) it attempts to account for the whole context rather than its arbitrarily selected elements; (2) it focuses on the relations beSystem. The latter system comprises a dynamic library of effectors that may be activated in verbal interaction or in the case of text interpretation.

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tween effectors and the affected (entity), that is, views context in terms of causal relations; (3) it emphasizes the dynamics of interpersonal communication (this concerns both the processes within the intrinsic context and at the interface between the intrinsic and extrinsic context); and in consequence, (4) it investigates interactional dynamics and pragmatic emergent phenomena; (5) it aims at relating the social and mental aspects of context; (6) it shows the social distribution of context; and (7) it points to the processes associated with the social construction and negotiation of context and interpretations of texts (for an account of relations in pragmatics see Kopytko 2002).

References
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