Principles of Computer Security: Simen Hagen
Principles of Computer Security: Simen Hagen
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Simen Hagen
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Lu Xing is unable to stay on as student assistant New student assistant will be Ebenezer Paintsil
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Outline
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Policy Risk Analysis Foundation Policy Policy Violations Faults Faults Probabilities Detecting aws
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Last week
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This week
Risk Analysis What are the threats? How can we guard against these threats (countermeasures)?
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Simen Hagen
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Policy
Denition (From Merriam-Webster Online) a : a denite course or method of action selected from among alternatives and in light of given conditions to guide and determine present and future decisions b : a high-level overall plan embracing the general goals and acceptable procedures especially of a governmental body Denition (From Wikipedia) A policy is a plan of action for tackling issues.
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Security policy
Denition (Policy) A security policy is a statement of what is, and what is not, allowed.
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Policy
There are several challenges with making policies: We have to state what we value. We do not always agree on what is valuable. Security is often inconvenient. Management is necessary (assign and control of privileges).
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Human-Computer System
Denition (Human-Computer system) A human-computer system is an organized effort involving humans and computers to solve some problem or perform a service.
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Bank example
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What are we trying to protect? Find sources of trust and risks Find Counter-measures
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Airport example
If you were considering an airport, identify at least 5 items for each of the following points: Assets baggage, human life, aircraft, equipment, ticket, money Risks lost luggage, plane crash, mechanical failures, sabotage, hijack, robbery Counter-measures baggage tracking, pilot redundancy (co-pilot), protocols, personnel restrictions, security checks (X-rays, metal detectors)
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Simen Hagen
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Computer system
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Trust
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Policy
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Policy violations
Example (ATM Scam) Install ATM to collect card information Read information from card Ask for PIN code Give error message
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Policy Violations
Example (Password violations) Attach Post-It with password on screen Use childs name as password Give password to family or friend Send password in e-mail
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Unintentional violations
Not all violations are intentional Forgetfulness Misunderstandings Confusion/Stress/Intoxication Ignorance Carelessness Slowness of response Inability to cooperate with others
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Faults Probabilities
Faults
Design fault System does not meet specication Emergent fault Bug! System has unpredictable and unintended behavior Catastrophe Power failure, ood . . .
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Faults Probabilities
Fault Dependency
Faults propagate through dependencies.
Serial (dependent)
Single point of failure
Parallel (redundant)
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Faults Probabilities
Fault Trees
Simple systematic method for analyzing risk Assume hierarchical dependency (cause-effect) List independent causes with AND, OR etc. Estimate probability of component failure Sum probabilities to nd the most important pathway Countermeasures
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Faults Probabilities
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Faults Probabilities
Probabilities
Use these rules for combining probability
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Faults Probabilities
Example calculation
Limited model: Threaten employee and all else has zero probability P(Guess password)= P(A) = 5/1000 = 0.005 P(Find service bug) = P(B) = 5/100 = 0.05 P(Machine miscongured) = P(C) = 10% = 0.1
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Faults Probabilities
Example calculation
P(Attack) = P(B AND C) = P(BC) = P(B)P(C). P(Hack) = P(A OR BC) = P(A) + P(BC) - P(A)P(BC) = P(A) + P(B)P(C) - P(A)P(B)P(C)
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Simen Hagen
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Faults Probabilities
Example calculation
Alternative
P(Hack) = P(A) OR P(NOT A) AND (P(B) AND P(C)) = P(A) + (1-P(A)) P(B)P(C) = P(A) + P(B)P(C) - P(A)P(B)P(C)
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Simen Hagen
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Faults Probabilities
Example calculation
In numbers
P(Hack) = 0.005 + 0.995 x 0.05 x 0.1 = 0.005 + 0.0049 = 0.01 = 1% chance Both branches have about the same probability We should protect both equally
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Faults Probabilities
Conicts
What happens if there are disagreements about the policy? There are different ways to protect against attacks Choose
The best Several
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Faults Probabilities
Risk Analysis
We need a rational method of evaluating systems Model of the system How threats occur Cause of failure
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Formal verication
Technique for detecting vulnerabilities Analyze design and implementation {Precondition} | Program | {Postconditions}
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Penetration studies
An authorized attempt to violate a security policy Evaluate the strengths of all security controls Designed to test
Procedures Operations Technologies
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In any human-computer system, it is unlikely to nd a technology that can protect against all these forms and motivations for attack.
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