Unofficial Stock Exchanges
Unofficial Stock Exchanges
Unofficial Stock Exchanges
T
he history of the unofficial, illegal stock exchanges that operated in Vijayawada,
Andhra Pradesh offers fascinating insights into the economic and cultural life of small
towns and cities (non-metropolitan regions), and their response to the changing
business environment in the immediate aftermath of globalisation and liberalisation in the
early 1990s. But there is a far larger significance to the story that I would like to tell here.
It has to do with the social and cultural foundations of economic activity in general, which
social scientists have tended to underplay or completely ignore. The unofficial, illegal
exchanges that thrived for a brief period in the 1990s were not shady organisations
operating from some obscure corner of the town. Instead, they functioned openly and were
the centres of phenomenal economic activity by the standards of the region. They used
state-of-the-art technologies, which at that time were not available to most stock exchanges
in the country. Further, their illegal status meant nothing to the populace, which accorded
them high social respectability. The causes for this social respectability and widespread
acceptance, despite their illegality, deserve greater attention. The leaders in the exchange
shared the stage with important constitutional functionaries: Governors, Chief Ministers,
Union and State Ministers among others. Indeed, this perceptible gap between ‘legality’ and
‘legitimacy’ throws up a number of interesting questions for the social scientist. The study
of informal, unofficial exchanges of Vijayawada is necessary in order to understand the
business culture of the region, how speculation operated at the ground level in the early
1990s, and other such region-specific issues. The history that I attempt to reconstruct here
is of a business institution's social and cultural foundations. At this level of generality, the
stock exchanges of Vijayawada are useful points of entry into a larger research problem.
Unstable Structures / 511
Even the casual observer is struck by the way these stock exchanges leveraged the
formal institutions to conduct and further their businesses – often along far more efficient
lines than those carried out by their formal counterparts in different parts of the country.
Quite clearly, small-town and provincial city businesses and networks were able to
channelise capital from surrounding regions, often in competition with the metropolitan
regions. How were they able to do so? That too when they were not even supposed to exist,
according to the law. How do we understand this gap between the law and ‘illegal’ reality?
Vijayawada, reputed to be the finance capital of Andhra Pradesh, housed five stock
exchanges including the largest unofficial and illegal exchanges of the 1990s. These
exchanges functioned just as any other legitimate business activity, often using state
institutions to further their business interests. A detailed study of this phenomenon is
imperative: not only to understand the investment behaviour of people in the region in the early
years of the post-liberalisation era, but to also to counter the view, propagated by neo-liberals,
that most 'unorganised' businesses lack sophistication, which arrives only with globalisation.
The largest of the exchanges was the Vijayawada Share Brokers Welfare Association
(VSBWA). This and the other Vijayawada exchanges did not have the approval of any higher
governmental authority or the larger 'official' exchanges in India (for example, the Bombay Stock
Exchange). I focus here on VSBWA, which was an obvious choice of study in that the other
Vijayawada exchanges were much smaller in terms of both membership and volume. Very often
the smaller exchanges, namely Vijayawada Share Dealers Association, Delta Share Brokers
Exchange, Vijayawada Stock Exchange and Andhra Stock Exchange, would imitate the systems
and practices that existed in VSBWA. Apart from the Vijayawada Share Dealers Association
(VSDA, popularly known as the 'one town exchange'), the others were only marginal players.
The following account is based on sources ranging from newspaper reports, court
records, case files and records of the exchanges of Vijayawada. Most importantly, face-to-face
interviews with the major players of the exchanges have been used to piece together a
chapter of the city's history that a number of key participants are only too willing to forget.
Information has been difficult to come by and is full of vast gaps. Nevertheless, it is valuable.
In 1990, the existing brokers who were already trading amongst themselves informally
entered into an agreement, and a Memorandum of Articles was signed to facilitate mutual
trading. The Vijayawada Share Brokers Welfare Association, VSBWA, was registered under
the Societies Registration Act XXI of 1860 at Bandar (the district headquarters) on 23 June
1990 (registration number 194 of 1990). The initial list consisted of 21 members (the
maximum permissible). Gaddipati Satyanarayana (a Kamma), T. Srinivasu (a Vysya), C.
Nageswara Rao (a Kamma), and Gopal Biyani (a Marwari) were appointed as founding
president, vice-president, general secretary and treasurer respectively. The office bearers
reflected the social composition of those involved in the exchange, which was drawing to it
all the important and dominant trading communities in the region – Kammas, Vysyas and
Marwaris. Very few of the brokers were worried about the unofficial status of the exchange.
Thus the registration process only formalised the informal 'matching' with the ongoing
mutuality between the traders taking the shape of an association.
Though the exchange was registered in 1990, for about a year it did not undertake any
trading activity. Trading in the exchange was formally inaugurated by the then- Union
Minister of Commerce Pranab Mukherjee, on 10 November 1991. Surprisingly, the
unofficial status of the exchange did not seem to be an issue even for the minister. The visit
of the minister along with various other high-profile personalities provided great legitimacy
to the exchange in the early days of its existence. This legitimacy continued till about 1996.
It is of course possible that at this point of time it was not clear to anyone outside the
association that the grouping was going to be a stock exchange. Immediately after its
registration, the only activity the exchange undertook was to provide its members with
more information about quotations and other trade-related data.
second phase, applicants paid Rs 15,000 for membership. The last phase was
characterised by extreme demand (about 1000 applications) for membership, and the fee
was Rs 30,000. Applicants exerted pressure on the office bearers; some had their cases
recommended by ministers, members of the legislative assembly and members of
parliament. The members increased from about 20 at the time of the initial registration to
about 73 (in early 1990), and finally rose to about 287 at the end of the membership drive
in 1991. The first expansion was carried out in order to accommodate the large clients who
were already in business under the brokers of the exchange. The second expansion was
carried out due to the increasing popularity of the exchange, and pressure from various
sections to grant membership. Each member was allowed two trading assistants. At its
height, the card value quoted as high as Rs 8 lakh.
During this first phase, friends, acquaintances and relatives of existing members were
enrolled as members. This informal nature of enrolment was in tune with the general
procedures at the exchange and the economic activity in the region in general. Business in
the region thrives on an informal culture that may shock an outsider. Law, courts, and other
formal institutions are brought into the picture only when there is a collapse of the informal
order. This general pattern, it soon became clear, was repeated even in VSBWA.
The erstwhile office bearers, however, proudly proclaim that they followed strict
'procedures' in the selection process. In personal interviews, Koneru Vasudeva Rao, the
treasurer of the exchange during its zenith, claimed the exchange took care to select "only
educated young people". He denies that caste or other considerations had any role to play.
Most of the old hands, however, deny that a rigorous selection procedure was followed.
One member closely associated with the exchange argues that the exchange was very
careful while selecting members. The exchange selected only those who would be 'useful'
to the growth of the institution. For people to meet this criterion, they had to be either
prominent speculators/traders, or financiers, or peddamanushulu, eminent/prominent
citizens. A large number of peddamanushulu were given free membership. One broker
estimates that about 10% of the total membership was allocated in this manner.
Peddamanushulu were selected from a range of fields, and included criminals-turned-
politicians, government officials who were given benami membership (under assumed
names), and leading professionals. Some of these people paid for their membership, and
this category is said to have included police officers, journalists, and of course the leaders
of local criminal gangs which have had a considerable presence in all spheres of life in the
town, including its economic activity. Among the journalists who were active in the exchange
were Anka Babu (of the daily newspaper Udayam) and Venkateswarulu (the then- finance
manager of the newspaper Andhra Jyothi) – two prominent citizens of Vijayawada at that
time. It is difficult to believe that the selection procedure was objective in a situation where
'recommendations' or references are an essential part of the business culture.
a weekly settlement (Monday to Friday). This was in contrast to the official exchanges such
as BSE, which normally followed a fortnightly settlement. Exchange office-bearers proudly
point out that unlike the BSE, which would often merge settlements (leading to delayed
payments), the VSBWA never followed this practice. The pay-in and pay-out was always
completed as scheduled.1
A unique aspect of the VSBWA was the time of trading. There were two sessions in a
day: from 9.30 am to 11.00 am, and from 4.00 pm to 5.00 pm. There was trading on
Saturday from 9.00 am to 11.00 am. The Vijayawada bourses were the only exchanges in
India that had Saturday trading. These timings were in complete contrast to the official
stock exchanges, which trade between 10 am and 3.30 pm. The timings in Vijayawada
exchanges gave the smart traders excellent arbitrage opportunities. They could buy in one
exchange at a discount and sell in another exchange.
A distinctive feature of the exchange was the rules governing new listings of company shares
that were eligible for trading – there were none. This seems to have attracted speculators from
different parts of India to this bourse. The erstwhile office bearers claim that the exchange had
clear-cut rules for a company to start trading of its shares on the Vijayawada bourse. They claim
that any person who wanted to trade in a particular stock/share had to furnish evidence that
trade had commenced in that counter in any of the official exchanges of the country, and then
members were allowed to begin trading in that counter. Critics of the committee claim that this
rule was selectively used. Traders who were considered to be supporters of the committee
would be given a free hand to deal in the shares of any companies, while opponents of the
committee would have to abide by the letter and spirit of the rule. This caused some
consternation among the opponents, as they believed that the committee was unjustly curtailing
their business. Never mind the fact that these practices were illegal.
The VSBWA claimed to be trading in about 220 companies in 1992; by 1993, when the
exchange activity had reached its peak, about 400 companies were involved in trading. The
average daily volume of the exchange gradually increased to about Rs 20 crores in 1992,
and Rs 30 crores by 1993. In this year the VSBWA reached its zenith, supposedly reaching
a gross volume of between Rs 2,500 and Rs 3,000 crores. In a letter to the Chief Editor of
Eenadu, the largest Telugu daily newspaper, the VSBWA claimed that in 1994-95 they had
recorded a gross volume of Rs 4,600 crores. The volumes were far more than the average
daily volumes of the official regional exchange, the Hyderabad Stock Exchange. A
comparison with some of the other official stock exchanges provides greater evidence of the
phenomenal success of the VSBWA. In 1990, the Cochin Stock Exchange had 476 members
while the Ahmedabad Stock Exchange had 295, the Delhi Stock Exchange 124, and the
Bangalore Stock Exchange had 233 members. In the Cochin Stock Exchange, about 200-
250 companies were traded, and daily trading volume increased to about Rs 8 crores in
1989. VSBWA was about twice the size of the Cochin Stock Exchange, which was the
biggest in South India and the fourth-largest in the country after Bombay, Calcutta and Delhi.
The success of the Vijayawada bourses was extended due to what came to be known
as the 'grey' market – a completely illegal market within an illegal and unofficial market. This
Unstable Structures / 515
'grey' market trading was frowned upon by a number of brokers and was considered to be
speculative beyond acceptable levels.
The 'grey' market was speculation in its purest form. Here trading would start even
before an Initial Public Offering (IPO) had closed its subscription. Two brokers would enter
into trades (buying and selling) and would sign undated contract notes. These would not be
submitted to the exchange; instead, these trades would be submitted and settled only after
the exchange permitted regular trading at a later date. Thus, no cash actually changed
hands at the 'grey' market stage. Initial public offerings of a number of fly-by-night
companies were sold to unknowing investors by getting news published about the fictitious
premiums that their issues were trading in at the Vijayawada bourses, in the grey market.
The use of the term 'grey' market in an unofficial and illegal exchange is worth noting. It
indicates that the members of the exchange had a clear sense what was legitimate and
what was not.
to the borrower in the form of a cheque, as in the case of any other borrowing transaction.
This transaction would complete the first part of the deal. In the second part, immediately
after taking delivery of the securities, the badla financier who took the delivery would enter
into a contract with the broker. The broker (who had borrowed the money in the first place)
would buy back the securities at cost plus 1% or 2%, in a post-dated contract note.
This post-dated contract would be submitted to the exchange on the agreed date,
usually the very beginning of next settlement day. Once it was submitted, the exchange
would guarantee the trade. This carry forward could be continued for as long as the
borrower and financier wished to. In case the financier was not willing to carry on with this
arrangement into the next settlement, the borrower would either find a new financier, or
would simply renegotiate the interest rates and offer higher interest. Such high returns (4%
or more in a month) led to the increased participation of financiers in the exchanges.
The consequence of this easy availability of badla is difficult to gauge. Clearly, it led to
increased speculation. Many financiers and businessmen purchased membership, only to
lend money through badla. A significant number of rice mill owners, and even a local MLA's
brother known for his criminal activities, were lending large amounts to brokers through this
badla. The press estimated that there were about 120 badla financiers in the two main
exchanges, VSBWA and VSDA (Indian Express, 18 November 1995, 27 October 1997, p.
1). Rough estimates of badla are put at about Rs 20 crores per settlement (essentially on
a weekly basis) at the peak of the exchange's activities. A rough calculation indicates that
badla-based volumes amounted to over Rs 900 crores; this translates into roughly 25-50%
of the gross volume, based on the gross volume figures declared by VSBWA.
type did not exist in any of the official exchanges of India. The local exchanges claimed that
this was one of the 'advanced systems' in place in Vijayawada that did not exist even in
Bombay Stock Exchange, the oldest and largest bourse. Such a fund would mean that
investors would be paid by a separate exchange controlled fund in case of default by a
broker who may have entered a trade. The other system that existed but only on paper was
the Investor Grievance Cell (henceforth referred to as IGC). The IGC was constituted with
three eminent individuals as its members. These peddamanushulu from the city were
selected by the president of the Exchange Committee. But they actually took up very few
cases, and nearly all the members concur that there was very little chance for an aggrieved
investor to get justice from the internal mechanisms that existed within the stock exchange.
The only time the IGC preformed its duties fully was when both the aggrieved parties were
brokers. Small wonder that most of the investors opted to take their grievances to the
panchayats of the local criminal syndicates. But there was little an aggrieved party could
do if the problem was a part of the structural deficiency of the exchange itself. The
president was the final arbiter in any issue, and his factional approach allegedly created
more problems.
case, Nagabhusanam (the president of the exchange) responded, "Nothing will happen just
because three investors have gone to the court. [The exchange] still enjoys the confidence
of four lakh investors in Vijayawada” (Money Business, 22-28 July 1995, p. 3). Members
continued to claim that they were unaware of the legal status of the exchange, a claim
difficult to believe. The ignorance of the members seems shocking in light of the
statements made by SEBI from time to time. The local papers prominently covered the
statements of G.V. Ramakrishna, the then chairman of SEBI, who clearly announced that
such exchanges were illegal, and that SEBI had written to the state authorities to take
necessary action. Newspaper articles were already questioning the status of the exchange.
Interestingly, in March 1995 M.S.N. Reddy, one of the members of the exchange, had
lodged a specific complaint to the Union Ministry of Finance, and the Central Bureau of
Investigation. The Finance Ministry replied in June 1995 that it had "instructed the Securities
and Exchange Board of India, the District Magistrate and the Police authorities at
Vijayawada to take action against promoters/organisations for running the unrecognised
stock exchange" (letter dated 15 June 1995; reference no F.1/17/SE/95, signed by V.
Sachdeva, Section Officer, Ministry of Finance).
The role of the press merits special attention here. In the case of Vijayawada,
considering that the newspapers were at that point of time the only sources of information
about the local exchanges (and since the publicity till mid-1995 was all positive), the middle
classes seem to have become convinced from local news coverage that the neighbourhood
stock exchange was a very convenient and short road to wealth. Common press coverage
was of the record levels of Bombay Stock Exchange Sensitive Index (Sensex) and the
increased amount of foreign investment and the record subscription procured for the new
offerings of companies keen on selling their shares.
Structural problems and the general bearishness that set in the markets had a great
deal to do with the demise of the exchange. Bad deliveries, fake certificates and frauds
increasingly made investors weary and suspicious, and most brokers agree that this led to
greater risks and reduced interest in stock market speculation. Speculative capital went in
search of new avenues, and there was a gradual withdrawal from the local exchange. The
onset of a bear market in 1995 led to investors becoming gradually disillusioned with the
potential of stocks. The internal squabbling of the exchange, and the court cases in which
it was implicated, occurred at the time of the birth of National Stock Exchange (NSE), which
might be interpreted as the final blow to the Vijayawada bourse. With a screen-based
national market and the practice of low commissions, accompanied by an excellent price
discovery mechanism, NSE made the open outcry system (or trading hall where members
jostle to execute an order) of even the legal, official traditional exchanges redundant.
VSBWA did not stand a chance against such a competitor. The Vijayawada exchanges also
became a major centre for transactions in fake shares. It was easy to sell these locally, as
there was little or no institutional protocol in place to protect investors and brokers.
Selling such shares in an official exchange would have been a problem for brokers, due
to various penal provisions that could be applied. This was not the case in Vijayawada.
Unstable Structures / 519
Since early 1995, the illegal bourses had been facing various kinds of pressures due to bad
media publicity. Income tax raids, SEBI accusations, denunciation by the finance ministry,
all had affected the public image of the exchange; and a series of defaults and scams
involving members led to the disintegration of the trading systems. Fake shares were one
of the major problems with the exchange. A report in the Deccan Chronicle cited the case
of 1600 fake share certificates of UTI Master Gain. This report also cited the case of a
dispute arbitrator (in Vijayawada, a peddamanishi ) who forced one party to hand over
30,000 fake shares to their rivals.
The case of fake Essar Shipping shares is quite unique. About 2000 shares were sent
to the share transfer agent in Madras (Data Soft Research Company Limited); these shares
were returned with a letter declaring that the shares were fake. Interestingly, the police
refused to even register a case (Deccan Chronicle, 10 July 1995, p. 17).
The strength of VSBWA had been its reputation, founded in the assurance to investors
that it had a smooth settlement system in which there would be no delays in pay-in and pay-
out. The collapse of broking outfits destroyed the bourse's foundations. The largest such
collapse was that of Mega Corp Securities Private Limited, which had been promoted by 13
members of VSBWA. Its chairman was T. Srinivasu, who was also the general secretary of
VSBWA. The total amount defaulted had been estimated at Rs 60 lakhs (Eenadu, 7 July
1995, p. 5). However, local brokers in personal interviews claim that it was about Rs 2
crores. In a number of ways, the collapse of Mega Corp Securities marked the beginning
of the bourse's decline.
thought of by the official exchanges, and their ideas foresaw future developments in the
country – for example, screen-based trading, which was the unique feature of the National
Stock Exchange. From 1993 (about six months after the establishment of satellite television
channels in Vijayawada), the exchanges started broadcasting real-time quotes on the local
network, via the Master Channel. A significant intervention took place in mid-1994: the
exchange contracted CMC Limited (at that point of time, a government undertaking) to
design and implement a screen-based online trading system, which the VSBWA called
'MEGA PROJECT', for the Vijayawada exchange. The CMC was paid about Rs 1 crore and
20 lakhs for the software and basic hardware, while WIPRO Acer was paid about Rs 60
lakhs for providing members with computer terminals and other accessories. The BSE
subsequently introduced a system based on similar software.
Stock trading and speculation had become increasingly accepted largely because a
large number of people seem to think that it is one of the few means to make quick profits.
The concept of rapid and easy profit is ingrained in the culture of Vijayawada, due to the
large petty-bourgeois class in the region. Vijayawada is unique in that it is probably one of
the few regions in India where nearly all the big/grande bourgeois elements have petty-
bourgeois origins. The latter, aspiring to join the ranks of the rich, believe that stock market
trading and speculating is one of the few opportunities available for their social
advancement. Trading was a successful practice also because it was associated with all the
important sections of Vijayawada society and economy. The participation or support of
nearly all the powerful elements of local society (financiers, gang leaders, journalists,
police), along with the fact of huge sums of money being at the disposal of the exchange,
also meant that people were not willing to antagonise them.
Despite their illegality, Vijayawada stock exchanges were not taboo. They were the
nerve centres of speculation, trading and financing activity. They took up various activities,
including the organising of New Year celebrations where members and their families were
invited and given expensive gifts. One area of the exchange deserves special mention: the
active organising of seminars in Vijayawada. The exchange invited well-known members of
the stock-broking fraternity, financial administrators and government functionaries. These
included Pranab Mukherjee for the inauguration of the trading floor, M. Narasimham, former
governor of the Reserve Bank of India, Sundar Iyyar, Director of Bombay Stock Exchange,
and M.R. Mayya, former Executive Director of BSE. These events were largely public
relations exercises to reinforce claims to legality rather than aimed at actual investor
education and protection.
The experience of the unofficial, illegal exchanges clearly indicates that as long as they
functioned, these organisations worked in a manner that was no different from official
organisations. The fact that they operated and thrived in a system that was reinforced by
existent formal networks merely adds to the dichotomy of Indian business culture. Weber
(1930:22) believed that the stock exchanges are places which "rationalise speculation", but
in the case of Vijayawada exchanges seemed to have been places that allowed speculation
to flourish unhindered as long as it was profitable for capital. Once the risks involved in
speculation far exceeded the rewards, the market place rather than governmental action
killed off these speculative unregulated enterprises. The Vijayawada exchanges seem to
have aggravated the modern regulatory dilemma that has essentially followed the Weberian
paradigm – regulating the individual speculator (or the financial strength of the speculator),
rather than curbing speculation itself. Weber in his study of agricultural commodity
exchanges believed that it was impossible to stop speculation; therefore it was better to
regulate the class of speculators rather than trying to curb speculation itself. Such
regulation would reduce the possibility of systemic collapse. The case of Vijayawada
exchanges seem to suggest that Indian regulators, like their international counterparts,
believe this to be the easier option.
522 / Sarai Reader 2006: Turbulence
A large part of this research was funded by a liberal grant from the Sarai Independent Fellowship Programme,
2004-05. This is a modified version of the paper presented at the Sarai Independent Fellowship Workshop held
in Delhi in August 2005.
NOTES
1. There are different stages in stock market trading. Executing a trade is just one part of stock market
transaction. The settlement of the transaction is essentially a back office operation and takes place after
the end of the trading period (known as settlement). All the trades are settled by way of paying cash (on
the part of the buyers) and delivering securities/shares (on the part of the sellers). The pay-in denotes a
period when both the parties to complete their payment and then lodge their securities (as may be the
case). Pay-out is a term used to denote disbursement of the cash and securities. In the past, the BSE
followed a system where the trades were settled on a monthly basis, in order to allow investors from non-
metropolitan areas to send money and share certificates. As it was believed that this led to rampant
speculation, this was reduced to two weeks. Vijayawada exchanges had a weekly settlement system, one
of the first in the country.
2. At the end of each week, trades in the bourse are settled through the giving of cash or the delivery of
stocks. A settlement number is assigned by the exchange to all transactions of that particular week; 1
April being the start of the financial year, the trades of that week fall within Settlement 1. Settlement 42
can thus be identified as a transaction that took place 42 weeks from this date.
REFERENCE
Weber, Max.The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (George Allen & Unwin, 1930, London).