The Trial of the Germans: An Account of the Twenty-Two Defendants Before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg

Eugene Davidson University of Missouri (1997) Rating: ****

The "definitive one-volume study of Nuremberg," The Trial of the Germans is now available in paperback. An astute observer of the Nuremberg trial, Eugene Davidson has struggled with the issues it raised: Was it a necessary response to the heinous crimes of the Third Reich? How were Germany and the Germans capable of such extraordinary evil? Was the trial just, given the claims that the defendants were simply serving their country, doing as they had been told to do? And if not just, was it nonetheless necessary as a warning to prevent future crimes against humanity? Davidson's approach to these and other large questions of justice is made through examination of each of the defendants in the trial. His reluctant, but firm, conclusion is: "In a world of mixed human affairs where a rough justice is done that is better than lynching or being shot out of hand, Nuremberg may be defended as a political event if not as a court." Some sentences may have seemed too severe, but none was harsher than the punishments meted out to innocent people by the regime these men served. "In a certain sense," says Davidson, "the trial succeeded in doing what judicial proceedings are supposed to do: it convinced even the guilty that the verdict against them was just." Faulty as the trial was from the legal point of view, a catharsis of the pent-up emotions of millions of people had to be provided and a record of what had taken place duly preserved for whatever use later generations would make of it. **

title : The Trial of the Germans : An Account of the Twenty-two Defendants Before the International Military Tribunal At Nuremberg author : Davidson !ugene publisher : "niversity of Missouri #ress isbn10 | asin : $%&'&(()** print isbn13 : *+%$%&'&(()*& ebook isbn13 : *+%$%&'&'$&*( language : !nglish subject Nuremberg Trial of Ma,or German -ar .riminals Nuremberg Germany (*/0-(*/' -ar crime trials--Germany -orld -ar (*)*-(*/0--Atrocities -ar crimes -orld -ar (*)*-(*/0-Germany1 publication date : (**+ lcc : D%$/1G/&T+0 (**+eb ddc : )/(1'2*$&'% subject : Nuremberg Trial of Ma,or German -ar .riminals Nuremberg Germany (*/0-(*/' -ar crime trials--Germany -orld -ar (*)*-(*/0--Atrocities -ar crimes -orld -ar (*)*(*/03Germany1

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Disclaimer: Some images in the original version of this book are not available for inclusion in the netLibrary eBook. .o4yright 5 (*'' by !ugene Davidson 6irst 4ublished by Macmillan in (*''1 6irst "niversity of Missouri #ress 4a4erbac7 edition (**+1 "niversity of Missouri #ress .olumbia Missouri '0&$( #rinted and bound in the "nited 8tates of America All rights reserved 0 / ) & ( $( $$ ** *% *+ 9ibrary of .ongress .ataloging-in-#ublication Data The Trial of the Germans : an account of the twenty-two defendants before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg 2 by !ugene Davidson1 41 cm1 :riginally 4ublished: New ;or7 : Macmillan (*'' Includes bibliogra4hical references and inde<1 I8BN $-%&'&-(()*-* =4b71: al71 4a4er> (1 Nuremberg Trial of Ma,or German -ar .riminals Nuremberg Germany (*/0(*/'1 &1 -ar crime trialsGermany1 )1 -orld -ar (*)*(*/0Atrocities1 /1 -ar crimes1 01 -orld -ar (*)*(*/0 Germany1 I1 Davidson !ugene (*$& 1 D%$/1G/&T+0 (**+ )/(1'?*$&'%dc&( *+-&(+*0 .I# This 4a4er meets the re@uirements of the American National 8tandard for #ermanence of #a4er for #rinted 9ibrary Materials A)*1/% (*%/1 .over Designer: Bristie 9ee Ty4esetter: B::B.:M# #rinter and Binder: Thomson-8hore Inc1 Ty4efaces: !lectraC GalliardC Gill 8ans

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Ac7nowledgments i< ( In the #alace of Dustice ( & The .ore of the .ons4iracy )* Dulius 8treicher )* ) The Number-Two Man 0* Eermann -ilhelm Goering 0* / The #arty in Action and Theory ** Martin Bormann ** Fudolf Eess ($* Alfred Fosenberg (&0 0 The Di4lomats (/+ Doachim Gon Fibbentro4 (/+ .onstantin Gon Neurath ('+ 6ranH Gon #a4en (+' ' The #arty and Big Business &&& E,almar 8chacht &&& -alther !manuel 6un7 &/0

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+ The 9aw &'$ -ilhelm 6ric7 &'$ % The ;outh 9eader &%) Baldur Gon 8chirach &%) * The #arty the #olice 6orces and the Army )($ !rnst Baltenbrunner )(0 -ilhelm Beitel )&% Alfred Dodl )/& ($ The Navy )'% !rich Faeder )'% Barl DoenitH )*& (( The #roconsuls /&+ Eans 6ran7 /&+ Artur 8eyss-In@uart //' (& The -ar #lant and 6orced 9abor /%) Albert 84eer /%) 6ritH 8auc7el 0$/ () The #ro4agandist 0&0 ??This Is Eans 6ritHscheI 0&0 (/ The :rganiHations 00) (0 Two Decades 9ater 0%$ Bibliogra4hy 0*0 Inde< '(*

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Ac7nowledgments A considerable number of 4eo4le have hel4ed me to write this boo71 I am dee4ly indebted to two foundations the 9illy !ndowment Inc1 and one other which following the wishes of its founder 4refers to remain anonymous for grants that 4ermitted me to s4end the better 4art of seven years to do the research and writing1 In addition a generous su44orter of the 6oundation for 6oreign1 Affairs has 4rovided the 4hotogra4hs used in this boo7 as well as many indis4ensable volumes from the section of its library dealing with the National 8ocialist 4eriod1 The staff of the Institut fuer Aeitgeschichte in Munich has been most hel4ful and I wish to than7 es4ecially Anton Eoch and 6ranHis7a Giolet for their unfailing assistance1 I am also indebted to the staffs of the -iener 9ibrary in 9ondon and of the American Document .enter in Berlin where !rnst Muran7a who 7nows its thousands of documents as well as good collectors 7now the contents of their 4rivate libraries not only found material I was loo7ing for but called my attention to many things that might easily have been missed1 I am also obligated to 6raeulein Truchsess of the Amtsgericht in Munich and to the staffs of the 8taatsarchiv in Nuremberg and Munich the Bundesarchiv in BoblenH the Fi,7sinstituut voor :orlogsdocumentatie in Amsterdam the law section of the 9ibrary of .ongress and the National Archives in -ashington and the 9aw 9ibrary of Northwestern "niversity in .hicago1 The defense lawyers have been unfailingly coo4erative in answering @uestions1 I should li7e to e<4ress my a44reciation of the hel4 of the late Martin Eorn of :tto BranHbuehler -alter 8iemers Burt Bauffmann Alfred Thoma 6riedrich Bergold Alfred 8eidl Eans 9aternser Eanns Mar< Fobert 8ervatius !gon Bubuscho7 Eermann Dahrreiss Alfred 8chilf Gi7tor von der 9i44e and the family of Gustav 8teinbauer who allowed me to read an un4ublished manuscri4t Dr1 8teinbauer had written about his defense of 8eyss-In@uart1 I should li7e to than7 too the #resident of the Tribunal 9ord

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Dustice 9awrence now 9ord :a7sey for his 7indness in discussing the case1 The three defendants I was able to tal7 to Admiral DoenitH E,almar 8chacht and 6ranH von #a4en willingly answered @uestions about the issues of the trial and their 4artici4ation in it1 To 9uise Dodl I am es4ecially grateful for 4lacing at my dis4osal 4ersonal 4a4ers left by her husband and for much information both on General Dodl and on the German Eigh .ommand1 I should also li7e to than7 General -arlimont for letting me read the documents in his 4ossession relating to the .ommissar and .ommando :rders1 It is a 4leasure to e<4ress my indebtedness to #rofessors Fobert E1 6errell and 6ritH T1 !4stein both of the "niversity of IndianaC they have read every cha4ter and invariably have made criticisms and suggestions that have considerably im4roved the te<t1 I wish too to than7 the director of the Fi,7sinstituut voor :orlogsdocumentatie in Amsterdam Dr1 91 de Dong who read the cha4ter on 8eyssIn@uart and the e<ecutive director of the 6oundation for 6oreign Affairs David 81 .ollier for his loyal su44ort of the entire 4ro,ect1 6inally I am greatly indebted to my bilingual secretary !lisabeth EalasH who not only ty4ed and rety4ed the manuscri4t but has chec7ed many of the translations and to Dean 8mith of The Macmillan .om4any who did the co4y editing with great dis4atch and com4etence1 6:"NDATI:N 6:F 6:F!IGN A66AIF8 .EI.AG: D"N! (*''

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( In the #alace of Dustice :n the night of :ctober (0(' (*/' the stro7es of the bell tolling the hours in Nuremberg were being heard for the last time by eleven men lying in their cells in the #alace of Dustice the vast 4rison of the city that had been the center of the NaHi ceremonies celebrating the 4ower and glory of the #arty and its 6uehrer1 6ew lights burned in the city1 The reddish high4itched house where Albrecht Duerer had lived and hundreds li7e it were o4en to the s7ies1 The 4rison a scattering of half-destroyed houses the bell tower of the cathedral and the mounds of rust-colored rubble alongside bro7en walls were all that remained of the city that on Danuary + (*/0 in a half-hour air attac7 had been left in ruins1 In Nuremberg as in the rest of Germany the threadbare 4eo4le who had survived the war cared very little what was in store for the men who in the s4ace of twelve years had hel4ed to ma7e the German Feich the master of !uro4e and to destroy it1 6or one man a general condemned to die and for his wife the bell =so they had said to one another> would be their last communication1 The letters had been written the farewells said1 All they could share was the tolling now that his hour had struc7 as it had struc7 for millions of soldiers who had marched under the orders he had signed1 :nly the thread of sound brought the echoes of the old city to life1 The NaHi ,ac7boots the blaring bands of the #arty days of the thousand-year Feich the hoarse voice of the 6uehrer the shouts of ,ubilee of the masses who had lined the streets every 8e4tember in the city that was the ca4ital of National 8ocialism had long been overlaid by the tumult of the bombs and the battles and after them the busy traffic of the American occu4ation1 The Great German Feich had been battered to fragments1 -hat was left

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of it was being governed by foreign 4owers and the men res4onsible for the enormities that had accom4anied its rise were being or had been tried or would be tried in the course of the ne<t few years if they were alive and to be found1 Their trials were intended not only to bring the guilty to ,ustice but to ma7e clear to Germans and their con@uerors as well how a great (ulturvolk whose science music scholarshi4 4hiloso4hy and literature had been in the forefront of man7ind?s creative achievements had come to its moral and 4olitical colla4se1 In addition the trials es4ecially as the Americans saw them were to be a 4ro,ection of the new world order that would ,ustify the universal suffering brought about by the crimethe crime of war committed by the men who had led the Germans1 To 4unish those guilty of the murder of millions of combatants and noncombatants to evidence the continuing collaboration of the victorious Allies to establish once and for all in a court of law the 4ersonal res4onsibility of 4olitical and military leaders for the crimes of aggressive warfare and of a totalitarian 6ascist state against its own 4eo4le and those of foreign countriesthat is what American officials in -ashington and 9ondon and Nuremberg told their allies as well as the Germans and neutrals the Allies had been fighting for1 The crimes of the NaHi leadershi4 were in fact indis4utableC the record was so overwhelming that the 4rosecution found its chief difficulty to be mastering the tons of documents that came to Nuremberg in truc7loads1 The documents as well as the 4reconce4tions of the Allies dealt with real crimes and imaginary ones with crimes common to both sides and crimes only Germans had committed1 -hich Germans were guilty of them was clear from the beginning in some cases and was never to be satisfactorily decided in others1 The case of General Alfred Dodl for whom the bell was tolling was one of the latter as were the cases of the admirals and some of the others who were tried with him1 The idea of 4unishing war criminals at least those who had fought unsuccessfully was by no means new in history1 8amuel 7illed Bing Agag hewed him to 4ieces before the 9ordC the anger of 8amuel was shar4ened and ,ustified by a sense of righteousness of his cause1 Doshua the :ld Testament records when the Eebrews invaded the land of .anaan slew ??both man and woman young and old and o< and shee4 and ass with the sword 1 1 1 the young man and the virgin the suc7ling also and the man with gray hairs1I Gercingetori< was 4ut to the sword1 And in the Middle Ages the crusaders at BJHiers 7illed the entire 4o4ulation of &$ $$$ Iby reason of God?s wrath wonderfully 7indled against it1I A long 4rocession of defeated 7ings and generals marched to e<ecution in the victory 4arade of con@uerors1 In the more humane climate of the nineteenth century when Na4oleon surrendered to the British after his defeat at -aterloo he was not tried but merely was made harmless by removal to the roc7 of 8aint Eelena although he had been universally denounced as the enemy of the 4eace of !uro4e1 At the end of -orld -ar I a list of / *$$ war criminals including the Baiser Eindenburg 9udendorff and Bethmann Eollweg was eventually

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brought down to a ba7er?s doHen by the refusal of the Dutch to surrender the Baiser by the rea44earance of old cleavages of interest among the victorious 4owers and by German resistance to the Allies? demand to surrender the alleged violators of the customs and usages of war to foreign 4owers1 This the Germans said was illegal under German law1 They also 4ointed out that turning over Germans to Allied courts would only fan the unrest that flared u4 all over Germany in the 4ostwar years1 Nine trials too7 4lace before the German 8u4reme .ourt in 9ei4Hig two and a half years after the end of the war1 :f the *$( men tried %%% were ac@uitted or the charges were summarily dismissed for want of sufficient 4roof1 :nly thirteen cases ended in convictions and these carried relatively short terms of im4risonment1 A German ma,or was sentenced to two years in ,ail for the 7illing of 6rench 4risoners of war1 :ne man was sentenced to ten months? im4risonment another to si< months for mistreatment of British ca4tives1 Two defendants were sentenced to four years for having ta7en 4art in the sin7ing of a hos4ital shi4 the Llan)overy *astle and then of having fired on the lifeboats1 This they had been ordered to do because the ca4tain of their submarine had believed the Llan)overy *astle to be carrying munitions under the cover of its red cross had found that it was not and had wanted to destroy the witnesses to his crime1 ( The differences among the Allies after -orld -ar I were wide des4ite the unanimous conviction they held of the Germans? res4onsibility for the war and for innumerable atrocities and des4ite the clause in the Gersailles Treaty stating that their 4ur4ose was to try the Baiser ??for su4reme offenses against international morality and the authority of treaties I along with those who had violated the laws and customs of war1 The 84ecial .ommission of fifteen a44ointed on Danuary &0 (*(* consisting of two members from the chief Allied and associated 4owers =Great Britain 6rance the "nited 8tates Italy and Da4an> and one each from the smaller 4owers had s4lit1 The American and the Da4anese re4resentatives o44osed an international tribunal with Ia criminal ,urisdiction for which there was no 4recedent 4rece4t 4ractice or 4rocedure1I& The Americans went further1 They declared that the German military and 4olitical leaders and the alleged violators of the customs and usages of war could not be guilty of crimes under international law since no international 4enal statutes e<isted on such violations1 The British who during the war had strongly favored trying the Baiser as well as those guilty of violations of the rules of war es4ecially when the violations had to do with the use of submarines 4rofessed themselves sur4rised to find the names of Eindenburg 9udendorff and Bethmann Eollweg on the list of the 6rench and Belgians which at this 4oint had been brought down to %*' names1) 9loyd George who in the heat of an election cam4aign had declared that his intention was to hang the Baiser said that no self-res4ecting state would acce4t the trial of a military leader by other 4owers and that when he had

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first discussed the matter with .lemenceau he had thought of trying only those guilty of crimes against women and childrenacts of such nature that the Germans too would acce4t them as crimes1 Although the Allied 8u4reme .ouncil had agreed on December / (*(% that -illiam II and his 4rinci4al accom4lices should be tried for war guilt for violations of neutrality and for war crimes its members never des4ite 9loyd George?s 4olitical s4eeches demanded a death 4enalty1 It was thought that e<ile would serve the 4olitical and legal 4ur4oses1 After the election 9loyd George with an eye to restoring the balance and comity to the .ontinent that made for the security of Great Britain had wanted the 4artici4ation of German ,udges in any trials but in this he was vigorously o44osed by .lemenceau who missed no o44ortunity to show the Germans that they were a defeated 4eo4le whose leaders were to be ,udged by Allied tribunals only1 Nitti the Italian #rime Minister re4resenting a country that at the beginning of the war had been allied to Germany and now again was wary of 6rance su44orted the German counter4ro4osal to hold trials before a German court with Allied re4resentatives 4resent as observers1 No one wanted the trial of the Baiser held in his own country1 The Belgians e<4lained that as re4resentatives of a country governed under a constitutional monarchy they could scarcely favor trying a former 7ing and em4eror1 The 6rench said that 4ublic feeling ran too high in 6rance for the Baiser to be tried there1 And -ilson would not consider having the trials held in the "nited 8tates1 / The Dutch refusal to surrender the Baiser saved the Allies any further embarrassment as to where or how a trial would ta7e 4lace1L And news that the Germans were 4re4aring a list of Allied nationals who had allegedly committed atrocities may have had an effect on the Allied decision to let the Germans try their own cases1 Many of the Allied 4olicies of -orld -ar II were set by the failures of the 4olicies of -orld -ar I1 This time #resident 6ran7lin D1 Foosevelt said no stab-in-the-bac7 legend would s4read among the German 4eo4le and he demanded unconditional surrender1 This time it would be brought home to the Germans that war aggressive war is a crime that they had been not only the victims of but also the 4artici4ants in a criminal regime a criminal cons4iracy 4lanted in the #russian-German soil of militarism and that the u4rooting of such evil growths must be thorough1 No disagreement marred the Allied 4lans for this 4ur4ose1 The Germans were to be ruled under a strict Allied military occu4ationC heavy industry was to be destroyed or dismantled and the remaining factories were to turn out small articles that could have only 4eaceful uses1 The entire adult 4o4ulation was to be screened for its National 8ocialist and militaristic sentiments1 L #rofessor 8imon ,urist at the Dutch "niversity of "trecht 4ointed out that the 4olitical adversaries of the Baiser would be both ,udge and 4rosecution in the case that an im4artial ,udgment without 4re,udice was unli7ely and that ??the develo4ment of a new law cannot start with an in,usticeI =Eans-Eeinrich Desche7 ie +erant,ortlichkeit )er Staatsorgane nach )em +oelkerstrafrecht MBonn: 9udwig Foehrscheid Gerlag (*0&N 41 ')>1

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The trial of the relatively few ma,or offendersthe individuals whose crimes had not been limited to one country but were on such a scale that only an international court could deal with themnow ta7ing 4lace in Nuremberg was to be only the first of a series1 But it turned out to be the only one held before American British Fussian and 6rench ,udges1 Although the twelve later trials held in Nuremberg were called international they were 4urely American and a 4roceeding li7e that of the -eleus trial =see DoenitH .ha4t1 ($> was international only in the sense that it was conducted under a British military court of five British and two Gree7 ,udges1 The trials of the ma,or Da4anese war criminals were held before an international tribunal established by the 8u4reme .ommander for the Allied #owers General MacArthur who issued the order a44ointing the nine members who had been nominated by the nations that had gone to war with the Da4anese1 0 -ho -as GuiltyO Although no war can be fought in the twentieth century without the 4sychological offensives that reduce issues to blac7 and white the Allied 4ro4agandists in -orld -ar II had an easy assignment1 By (*/& the nations outside the countries occu4ied by the Germans 7new without @uestion that atrocities on an enormous scale were being 4er4etrated against Dews 4risoners of war and civilian 4o4ulations1 !yewitnesses including Germans had esca4ed or had managed to tell what they had e<4erienced to visiting neutrals1 The underground movements in #oland Fussia 6rance and the 9ow .ountries sent a stream of information and circumstantial accounts to 9ondon and -ashington and Moscow1 The .sraelitisches !ochenblatt 4ublished in 8witHerland regularly carried news that reached it through the underground of the de4ortations and 7illings1' -hen the war ended most of the men res4onsible for these crimes answered to the governments of those countries where the crimes had been committed1 The "nited Nations -ar .rimes .ommission had been established on :ctober + (*/& to draw u4 lists of such criminals who would be tried in due course1 6ifteen nations were re4resented including the "nited 8tates and Great Britain but not the 8oviet "nion which in this as in other matters 4referred to 4ursue its own course1 These lists did not include the names of the so-called ma,or war criminals1 In the autumn of (*/) the "nited 8tates 8ecretary of 8tate .ordell Eull ,ourneyed to the 8oviet "nion where he and Molotov and !den signed the Moscow Declaration of November ( 4romising the trial of war criminals but naming no one1 It declared: Those German officers and men and members of the NaHi 4arty 1 1 1 who have been res4onsible for 1 1 1 atrocities massacres and e<ecutions will be sent bac7 to the countries in which their abominable deeds were done in

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order that they may be ,udged and 4unished according to the laws of these liberated countries1 The above declaration is without 4re,udice to the case of the ma,or war criminals whose offenses have no 4articular geogra4hical localiHation and who will be 4unished by the ,oint decision of the governments of the allies1 + !ven before the "nited 8tates entered the war #resident Foosevelt and -inston .hurchill together had warned the Germans that they would be held accountable for war crimes1 In a statement on :ctober &0 (*/( .hurchill declared ??Fetribution for these crimes must henceforward ta7e its 4lace among the ma,or 4ur4oses of this war1I These warnings were often re4eated in the course of the war by all the warring nations1 In March (*/) the "nited 8tates 8enate and Eouse of Fe4resentatives in a concurrent resolution declared unanimously: IThe dictates of humanity and honorable conduct in war demand that the ine<cusable slaughter and mistreatment shall cease 1 1 1 and that those guilty of these criminal acts shall be held accountable and 4unished1I% The Allied foreign ministers as well as 8talin .hurchill Foosevelt and indeed any attentive reader of the 4ress had no doubt whatever as to who the 4er4etrators of these crimes were1 The chief criminals were the leaders of the NaHi #arty and 8tate the Eigh .ommand of the Army and Navy the di4lomats the industrialists the ban7ers the ,udges and the bureaucrats1 At the war?s end the Americans were holding for trial some )$$ Ima,orI criminals1 The Fussian ,udge I1 T1 Ni7itchen7o thought the list in his country might run to 0$$ but the chief Ima,orI criminals were easy to identify1 8oviet 6oreign Minister Molotov wrote on :ctober (/ (*/& IThe whole of man7ind 7nows the names and bloody crimes of the leaders of the criminal Eitlerite cli@ue: Eitler Goering Eess Goebbels Eimmler Fibbentro4 Fosenberg1I* 8uch members of the Foosevelt Administration as 8ecretaries 8timson and 8tettinius and Attorney General Biddle wrote a memorandum to the #resident for the ;alta .onference on Danuary ( (*/0 saying IThe names of the chief German leaders are well 7nown and the 4roof of their guilt will not offer great difficulties1I($ -hen 8talin a44eared at #otsdam with a list of those to be tried as ma,or war criminals no ob,ections were made to any of the names by the British or the Americans1 :n the Fussian list were names e@ually well 7nown among the -estern AlliesGoering Eess Fibbentro4 Beitel DoenitH Baltenbrunner 6ric7 8treicher Bru44 8chacht #a4en Eans 6ran7and this lineu4 was 4rom4tly acce4ted at the August ( meeting of the Big Three at #otsdam1(( 9oo7ing at the list #resident Truman e<4ressed a mild ob,ection remar7ing that while he li7ed none of the German industrialists he thought that naming some individually might cause others to thin7 they could esca4e1 8talin however said that those listed were only e<am4les1 Bru44 was there he said to show the general reason for trying German industrialists and if the Americans or British 4referred to name another he would have no ob,ection1(& This view was stated more strongly by the chief American 4rosecutor at

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Nuremberg Mr1 Dustice Fobert E1 Dac7son who said ??It has at all times been the 4osition of the "nited 8tates that the great industrialists of Germany were guilty of crimes charged in this indictment @uite as much as its 4oliticians di4lomats and soldiers1I () The German 4eo4le themselves were never to be formally indicted1 The 6rench 4rosecution alone among the four victorious 4owers made no distinction between the NaHis and the rest of the nation1 The Americans were careful to draw a line between the general 4o4ulation and those on trial1 Thomas D1 Dodd in his o4ening statement said IAs every German .abinet minister or high official 7new behind the laws and decrees of the /eichsgeset0blatt was not the agreement of the 4eo4le or their re4resentatives but the terror of the concentration cam4s and the 4olice state1I(/ Mr1 Dustice Dac7son declared in his o4ening s4eech I-e have no 4ur4ose to incriminate the whole German 4eo4le1 -e 7now that the NaHi #arty was not 4ut into 4ower by a ma,ority of the German vote I but by an alliance of e<treme NaHis German reactionaries and the most aggressive of militarists1(0 In effect des4ite the disclaimers the indictments were inevitably directed against the German 4eo4le1 -hen one defense lawyer heard the testimony of the raHing in (*/) of the -arsaw ghetto where '0 $$$ Dews were 7illed in what was called a military action although the 4olice and 88 troo4s involved lost only si<teen men he s4o7e of the indelible besmirching of the German namea reaction e<4ressed by a number of the defendants during the course of the trial1 IA thousand years shall 4ass I said the former Governor General of #oland Eans 6ran7 Iand this guilt of Germany will not be erased1I Fobert 9ey who hanged himself before the trial started said much the same thing in a farewell note1 :thers tal7ed as though they had been awa7ened from a fantastic dream in which they had somehow 4layed a 4art1 Now they found themselves in a 4rosaic non-NaHi world where murders of innocent 4eo4le had to be accounted for and they stared at the 4ictures of atrocities in disbelief and horror1 They confessed and s@uirmed and alternately blamed themselves and even more readily the men and creeds they had served1 8ome swore they had 7nown nothing of these eventsC they had carried out their duties in a state where by order of the 6uehrer every area was sealed off from matters outside its limits1 But outside the courts of law .atholics and #rotestants met in solemn sessions to confess their res4onsibility for what had ha44ened1 .ollective guilt though always re,ected clung to millions of Germans des4ite the 4hiloso4hical and historical demonstrations that it could scarcely e<ist1(' The Mass Murders The story that unfolded in the course of this trial and of the later ones shoo7 the com4lacency of a -estern culture that had overestimated the de4th of

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its civiliHed @ualities1 It was the story of the 4lanned mass murder of 4o4ulations of children old 4eo4le men and womenC of Dews Gy4sies and 8lavsC of 4risoners of warC of soldiers and civilians 7illed not in the heat of combat but in convoys or actions over a 4eriod of years as a 4olicy a duty to the race1 -itnesses and detailed documents told of a return to slavery and organiHed 4lunder on an enormous scaleC of institutions such as hos4itals and courts of law designed to assuage human 4ain and in,ustices that had been war4ed to the 4ur4ose of inflicting them1 A total of %$ $$$ technicians of slaughter had been involved in the e<termination 4rocess it was calculated but to ma7e their o4erations 4ossible in the wide reaches of the em4ire of the Great German Feich a well-trained bureaucracy and a su4erb army had been re@uired too as well as the coo4eration willing and unwilling of millions of 4eo4le in Germany and the occu4ied territories1 The 4icture of the tragedy would never be com4lete1 8ections of it a44eared in trials throughout !uro4e and later in Israel where the tattooed numerals of AuschwitH were worn as badges of honor1 -hat was heard and recorded in the trials shoc7ed the mid-twentieth-century war generation accustomed to the statistics of mass 7illing1 Attitudes toward race and toward the charismatic leader can never be the same as they were before the NaHis demonstrated their destructive 4ower1 To be sure the %$ $$$ 4eo4le who served the a44aratus of e<termination were not the only hangmen nor were the Germans alone guilty1 The 6irst Nuremberg trial brought u4 the fa7ed accusation that the Germans had murdered thousands of #olish 4risoners of war at Batyn1 These shootings as the #oles told Foosevelt and .hurchill were done by the Fussians1 Nor did German concentration cam4s and forced labor deal only with Dews and foreignersC there were 0$$ $$$ ??AryanI Germans among the early inmates of the cam4s1 -hat had distinguished the NaHi 8tate from other totalitarian systems was the efficiency of its inversion of every value1 Not only was God to be 7illed but with him religion the family and old notions of ,ustice1 9aw was merely something that reflected the intuition of the race1 The e<termination 4rocess was as rationaliHed as the 4roduction of war goodsC it was self-,ustifying an end in itself1 The victim was born into itC once 4laced in an undesirable category he could not esca4e1 After the 4risoners had been reduced to the status of creatures who were intended to lose their sense of identity with other human beings death followed1 :ne concentration-cam4 man called his dog Mensch =human being> and would turn him loose on the 4risoners shouting IMensch go after the dogsPI This was not the aberration of a single 88 manC it was an e<4ression of a com4licated 4arty line1 The efficiency of the 4rocess of e<terminationits careful records the turning of science and technology to 4seudoresearch and inflicting of horrorswas uni@ue1 The 88 men involved in the 7illings 7e4t tal7ing of their hard tas7 and the incom4rehension of many of their own countrymen who did not li7e to have to ta7e 4art in them1 The commandant of the concentration cam4 at AuschwitH Fudolf Eoess who

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su4ervised the e<ecution of a million and a half 4risoners too7 to 4oetry to describe what he had e<4erienced1 ??In the 84ring of (*/& I he wrote Imany blossoming 4eo4le wal7ed under the blossoming fruit trees of the farmstead most of them went with no 4remonition to their deaths1I Eis blossoming fruit trees were ne<t to the gas chambers1 (+ The cam4s were brutal in a surrealistic fashion1 In one o4eration two Gy4sy children were sewn together to create 8iamese twins1 The witness re4orting this wor7 of 88 Dr1 6ritH Mengele who succeeded in esca4ing from Germany after the war said their hands were badly infected where the veins had been resected1 .hildren in the death cam4s hel4ed s4read the ashes of the cremated victims on the roads1 -omen sle4t twelve to a shelf so tightly 4ac7ed that they had to lie head to feet and when one turned the others had to turn too1 !<4eriments on methods of castration were carried out on Gree7 boys1 The tattoos which have been described so often were actually sought because they meant that life would be s4ared for at least a time1 The numbers of the original inmates who came and 4erished went so high that the later arrivals had to have their numbers 4refi<ed with the letters A and B1 -hen Eungarian Dews arrived at AuschwitH in (*// other 4risoners told them to get tattoos as soon as 4ossible because a number meant being registered becoming 4art of the cam4 wor7 force1 The wor7 force would eventually be li@uidated too but there was an interval between the arrival of the registered 4risoners and their being gassed1 Those who came to the cam4 too wea7 to wor7 after the e<hausting marches and trans4orts were herded immediately to the death house1 They had no recordsC they came and went anonymously1 :ther means of identification were used under other circumstances1 An 88 man who saw a man swallow something before he entered the gas chamber mar7ed his chest with chal71 After the gassing bodies thus mar7ed were cut o4en so that diamonds or other articles of value might be recovered1 Accounts that filtered out of Germany and the occu4ied countries documents found in the walls of half-destroyed buildings archives saved from burning 4ersonal records li7e those of Eans 6ran7 who turned over the )% volumes of his diary to the Allies because he said he ac7nowledged his guilt and wanted the truth to be 7nown served to fill out what the Allied troo4s had seen as they ca4tured the concentration cam4s1 The starvation of the 4risoners at Dachau was so advanced that hundreds died after the liberation des4ite the medical aid and careful feeding American doctors immediately 4rovided1 Before they died some of the 4risoners as7ed to be allowed to see a soldier or wanted a 4iece of a uniform to hold in their hands1 The .hief .rime The 4hrasing of the indictment for these crimes did not long delay the Allied ,urists1 Discussions leading to the 9ondon Agreement of August % (*/0

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establishing the court and outlining its ,urisdiction disclosed only one serious difference of o4inion1L 8ome wrangling develo4ed over the 4hrasing of the clause on aggressive warfare eventually ado4ted1 9ong before atom bombs e<4loded over the New Me<ico desert and Da4an statesmen and 4ublicistsmainly from countries whose borders had been e<tended by -orld -ar I and from the "nited 8tateshad argued the necessity of outlawing war of regarding an attac7 on any nation as an assault on the international community and 4unishing 4er4etrators ,ust as lawbrea7ers are 4unished by domestic society1 :44onents of this collective-security 4olicy maintained that it threatened to ma7e every local conflict into a ma,or war involving the Great #owersC that it tended to 4reserve the status 1uo however un,ust or unstable it might beC that throughout history war however re4rehensible and 4rimitive its means had been the sole and last resort for establishing new 4ower relationsC and that in any event a decision to declare war was an act of statea 4olitical e<4edient not a 4ersonal act rooted in custom and international law1 -ar might 4rove only which was the stronger 4ower but it remained the final means of decision in international dis4utes that reached an incandescent e<treme where the issues could not be negotiated1 But for the 4ro4onents of collective security the only ,ust war was the war of defense against an aggressor1 In their o4inion the mechaniHation of war with its attac7s on civilian centers had dehumaniHed armed conflict to the e<tent that wars were now mainly contests between machines 4roving only which were the most ruthless and efficient1LL -ars they said had become no more than LThe 9ondon Agreement said the chief wholesale slaughter with automatic wea4ons1 American 4rosecutor Fobert Dac7son in his re4ort to the #resident re4resented ??the solemn ,udgment of &) governments re4resenting some *$$ million 4eo4leI =Fobert E1 Dac7son /e2ort to the .nternational *onference on Military Trials 9ondon (*/0 De4artment of 8tate #ublication )$%$ M-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/0N 41 %1 Eereinafter referred to as %ackson /e2ort>1 Actually two Fussians General I1 T1 Ni7itchen7o and A1 N1 TraininC two 6renchmen Fobert 6alco and AndrJ GrosC 8ir David Ma<well-6yfe on behalf of Great BritainC and Fobert Dac7son with a number LL The idea of the I,ust warIthe war raged on behalf of advisers drew u4 the agreement1 of the civiliHed communitywas an old one =see Desche7 o2. cit1>1 Fome regarded any war in which she was engaged as ,ust for Fome was the center of the law and its source1 The conce4t of the I,ust warI of the Middle Ages as a war fought against a state that had damaged the interest of .hristendom had been stated by Augustine in the fourth century and by Thomas A@uinas almost *$$ years later1 It was further develo4ed by !uro4ean writers re4resenting a .hristian culture where natural law was all-embracing1 Men of law and of 4hiloso4hy wrote in this s4irit: 6rancisco de Gitoria declared that the victor became the ,udge of the guilty as well as the stronger 4rince im4osing his willC 6rancisco 8uQreH regarded the ,ust war as an e<4edition of 4unishment against a wrongC the Italian Alberico Gentili thought it 4ossible that the issue of ,ustice might be unclear in which event a third state might be neutral but a ,ust war was one conducted against a state that had in,ured the laws of God and men1 To Eugo Grotius often called the father of international law the victorious state acted on behalf of the international community when it 4unished the wrongdoers 4roviding that neither the 4rince nor his followers had been themselves involved in the wrongs committed1 The counterschool in which the later /eal2olitiker flourished dealt with not the morality 3footnote continue) on ne4t 2age5

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page_11 #age (( In the years during and after -orld -ar II the battle between the 4ro4onents and o44onents of collective security continued but with far less vigor1 The conce4t of the aggressor had become firmly established in the language of statesmen and their constituents even if the definition continued to elude 3footnote continue) from 2revious 2age5 but the facts of 4ower1 Thomas Eobbes declared a ruler to be bound by no rules but his own1 Machiavelli instructed his master in the rules of the ruthless struggle of 4olitical life and in how to survive and be successful1 Montes@uieu reflecting the amenities of a milder 4olitical climate than that of the Italian city-state thought a ruler had the right to destroy a society com4osed of citiHens but not of menC that is he could destroy the form of an enemy state but not its 4eo4le1 Fousseau too believed a war to be a conflict between states not between individuals1 The argument continued into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries when with the com4lete seculariHation of ,uridical 4rinci4les the national states sought su44ort of their citiHens as well as of neutrals by declaring that they were fighting for a world order established under treaties and agreements of international law if not under the will of God1 The dicta of 4o4es and 4rinces were re4laced by treaties and references to the conscience of man7ind but warwhen it was successful at leastremained an e<4edition of 4unishment against the enemy1 The increasing difficulty of remaining neutral in any ma,or conflict was the result of not only technological and economic changes but the theories being e<4ounded about involvement1 The eighteenth-century 8wiss ,urist !mmerich von Gattel wrote in his roit )es 6ens: ??If therefore there was anywhere an un@uiet nation always ready to damage others and to cross them to bring to them domestic troubles there is no doubt that everyone would have the right to ,oin together to restrain it to 4unish it and even to 4ut it forever out of the 4ossibility of doing damage1I If the rights of the matter seemed to be in dis4ute then both sides would be regarded as legal 4artici4ants in a struggle and the 4rince who went to war in good faith was to be free of 4unishment1 In the nineteenth century Bismarc7 sounded li7e a 4rovincial #russian when he o44osed any trial of Na4oleon III who had declared war on #russia saying that the victor was in no situation to ,udge the van@uished with a moral code< in his hand1 The 4unishment of 4rinces and of 4eo4le for offenses against moral laws he wrote had to be left to the god of battle1 The various Eague and Geneva .onventions aimed at minor im4rovements in the lot of the embattled nations =safeguarding the wounded and sic7 and 4risoners of war> and at reducing horrors1 But the warring nations which had to find as much su44ort as 4ossible for what they did continued to act they said on behalf of humanity1 The !uro4ean 4owers in the confident days of the early nineteenth century had intervened in the Gree7-Tur7ish war they said because of the atrocities committed1 In (%') the Great #owers 4rotested against the inhuman treatment accorded the #olish u4rising1 #rotests from other 4owers rained in on the Tur7s for mistreatment of .hristians and on the .sarist Fussian Government for its mistreatment of Dews1 The "nited 8tates intervention in .uba against 84ain was underta7en because of alleged 84anish misdeeds committed against .uban 4atriots1 During -orld -ar I the E)inburgh /evie, called the invasion of Belgium not an act of war but a criminal act and the re4arations Germany 4aid afterward were said to be for damages for the 4er4etration of an illegal war1 Article &)( of the Gersailles Treaty stated IThe Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany acce4ts the res4onsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage to which the Allied and Associated Governments and their nationals have been sub,ected as a conse@uence of the war im4osed u4on them by the aggression of Germany and her allies1I 8till the notion that the war was criminal was not u4held by the Allied 84ecial .ommission which said IThe 4remeditation of a war of aggression 1 1 1 is conduct which the 4ublic conscience re4roves and which history will condemn but a war of aggression may not be considered as an act directly contrary to 4ositive law1I The attac7 on Belgium and 9u<embourg had been a violation of international law Ibut the .ommission is nevertheless agreed that no criminal charge may be made against the res4onsible authorities or individualsC the future should 4rovide such 4enal sanctions1I The damages to Belgium were to be 4aid by Germany as a conse@uence of her breach of the guarantee treaty of (%)*1 page_11

page_12 #age (& them1 Influential Americans both Fe4ublicans and Democrats swinging shar4ly from isolationism declared that -orld -ar II would not have come about had the "nited 8tates ,oined the 9eague of Nations and re4eatedly stated their determination in the course of the war to ma7e sure that this same blunder would not occur again1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son a man of urgent idealism and not without 4olitical ambitions came to the trial in the firm belief that aggressive war was a crimeC that the idea of neutrality had been outmoded by the BelloggBriand #act of August &+ (*&% outlawing warC and that individuals who acted in behalf of their governments were to be held res4onsible for what had 4reviously been acts of state1 6or him the outlawing of war was the cornerstone of the new world order1 !ven the crimes against the Dews were to be lin7ed to a cons4iracy to wage aggressive warfare1 :therwise Mr1 Dustice Dac7son feared the 4er4etrators could not 4ro4erly be brought before the court1 The BelloggBriand #act he said had started a new era in which the criminal res4onsibility of statesmen who deliberately resorted to war in violations of treaties must be made clear1 Ee declared at 9ondon in the course of the meetings that 4re4ared the indictments and 4rocedures for the trial: The 9end 9ease 4rogram the e<change of bases for destroyers and much of American 4olicy was based s@uarely on the 4ro4osition that a war of aggression is outlawed1 The thing that led us to ta7e sides in this war was that we regarded Germany?s resort to war as illegal from its outset as an illegitimate attac7 on the international 4eace and order1 And throughout the efforts to e<tend aid to the 4eo4les that were under attac7 the ,ustification was made by the 8ecretary of 8tate by the 8ecretary of -ar Mr1 8timson by myself as Attorney General that this war was illegal from the outset and hence we were not doing an illegal thing in e<tending aid to 4eo4les who were un,ustly and unlawfully attac7ed1 1 1 1 -e want this grou4 of nations to stand u4 and say as we have said to our 4eo4le as #resident Foosevelt said to the 4eo4le as members of the .abinet said to the 4eo4le that launching a war of aggression is a crime and that no 4olitical or economic situation can ,ustify it1 If that is wrong then we have been wrong in a good many things in the "nited 8tates which hel4ed the countries under attac7 before we entered the war1 8ince the German war was illegal in its ince4tion he continued so the "nited 8tates was ,ustified in abandoning the rules of neutrality and ?? 1 1 1 when it came to dealing with war criminals the 4osition of the #resident was clearly stated to the American 4eo4lethe launching of a war of aggression was a crime1I (% Germany he 4ointed out had not attac7ed the "nited 8tates and American intervention was ,ustified because the war itself was illegal1 The 6rench e<4ert in international law who was 4resent at the 9ondon .onference #rofessor AndrJ Gros and the Fussians remained unconvinced

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page_13 #age () that individuals could be tried for committing war1 Gros ta7ing the traditional view of res4onsibility for acts of state declared ??-e do not consider as a criminal violation a war of aggression1 If we declare war a criminal act of an individual we are going further than the actual law1I The 4rinci4le he thought might become law in the years to come Ibut as it now stands we do not believe these conclusions to be right1I In the meeting of Duly &) during the discussions on charging crimes under international law he said that what the conferees were doing in declaring certain acts li7e aggression criminal was Ia creation by four 4eo4le who are ,ust four individualsdefined by those four 4eo4le as criminal violations of international law1 These acts have been 7nown for years before and have not been declared criminal violations of international law1 It is e4 2ost facto legislation1I (* Fe4resenting a 4ower that had for the first time been admitted to membershi4 in the Big Three at this 9ondon meeting Gros was cautious if scholarly1 Two days later on Duly &0 he said that the American draft attem4ted to cover too much and on the matter of re4risals was trying to Idis4ose of the whole @uestion 1 1 1 e<isting for the last 0$$ years: and you cannot wi4e it out in ,ust one word1I&$ The Fussians =with their own e<4erience of having been declared aggressors in the 6innish war of (*/$/( by the 9eague of Nations no doubt in mind> sided with Gros1 General Ni7itchen7o said he did not thin7 aggression could be included in the charges1 Ee 4ointed out that Ialthough when 4eo4le s4ea7 of it they 7now what they mean they cannot define it1I As discussion dragged on he added that if the debate were to continue the criminals would die of old age1 The 8oviet 4osition on aggression was also 4resented by Ni7itchen7o?s colleague at the 9ondon .onference #rofessor A1 N1 Trainin1&( A member of the Moscow Institute of 9aw Trainin had written a boo7 in (*// on the NaHi war guilt which he lin7ed to an industrial-economic order characteristic of Germany before Eitler too7 4ower as well as after1 Trainin @uoted Molotov?s s4eech of Danuary ' (*/& which declared this war to be not a customary one but a bandit war with the aim of e<terminating 4eace-loving 4eo4les1 Tracing German history in this light Trainin detected what he called the IbanditI features of German im4erialism in the reign of -illiam II and in the behavior of #russia in (%+$+(1 I-acta sunt servan)aI =treaties must be observed> he @uoted1 Ee continued saying that aggression was the most dangerous among international crimes but the conce4t did not of course a44ly to wars of liberation1 The ran7 and file of the 6ascist troo4s had been cruel thic7-witted and greedy1 The higher-u4s were the genuinely guilty ones: the heads of government the industrial and financial leaders the masters of the economy1 These German leaders would be tried by the I4olitical verdict of the victorious democratic states1I The entire 4olitical and military history of #russian Germany had moved along the road to crime1 IIt is a criminal court

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page_14 #age (/ which is a44roaching stern and infle<ible 1 1 1 against the brigand machinery of the Eitlerite tyranny saturated with vile #russianism1??L Trainin?s boo7 had been read and carefully studied by most of those 4resent at the 9ondon .onference1 8ir -illiam Dowett the 9ord .hancellor in the 9abour Government called in the delegates to the .onference on August & (*/0 and declared himself an<ious Ito finaliHeI what they were doing1 Ee suggested that the indictment follow the te<t of Trainin?s boo7 calling aggression Ia crime against 4eaceI instead of a crime of war as 4ro4osed by the Americans1 The Fussians made few concessions to the Americans nor were they as res4ectful to the member of the "nited 8tates 8u4reme .ourt as were the re4resentatives of the other 4owers1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son chafing at the long argumentation and a44arently under the im4ression he was ma7ing a threat declared that the "nited 8tates would withdraw from the trial and leave the 4risoners to the other 4owers1 After one of these outbursts at the meeting of Duly &0 Ni7itchen7o merely restated the 8oviet 4osition: IIs it su44osed then to condemn aggression or initiation of war in general or to condemn s4ecifically aggressions started by the NaHis in this warO If the attem4t is to have a general definition that would not be agreeable1I -hen Mr1 Dustice Dac7son tal7ed on the sub,ect of the 4ower of the #resident of the "nited 8tates =who he 4ointed out had no authority to convict anybody> and went on to say that no 4olitical e<ecutions too7 4lace in the "nited 8tates Ni7itchen7o remar7ed I#erha4s I am mista7en but I understood our 4ur4ose was not to discuss the 4hiloso4hy of law but try and wor7 out an agreement 1 1 1 the carrying on of ,ustice in the naming of the war criminals1I && !ventually the Fussian L George A1 6inch in the American %ournal of .nternational La, =cited in Trials of !ar *riminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals &n)er *ontrol *ouncil La, No. 7$. October 789:A2ril 7898 M-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/'/*N I1 G1 6arben Gol1 GIII 41 %+0 Mhereinafter referred to as T!*N> 4ointed out how closely at times Mr1 Dustice Dac7son followed the te<t of Trainin?s boo71 Trainin had written IIn meting out 4unishment to the A<is war criminals Fussia would not 4ermit herself to be restricted by traditional legalisms1I The reason that no international law e<isted he said was that the 4owers of the world had wanted a united criminal front against the 8oviet "nion1 IThis is by no means accidental1 Its roots can be traced to the general character of international relations during the 4eriod of im4erialismI =A1 N1 Trainin Hitlerite /es2onsibility un)er *riminal La, A1 ;1 Gishins7y ed1 Andrew Fothstein trans1 M9ondon: Eutchinson R .o1 9td1 (*/0N 41 +>1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son in his re4ort to the #resident of Dune ' (*/0 wrote I-e must not 4ermit it Mthe state of lawN to become com4licated or obscured by legalisms develo4ed in the age of im4erialism for the 4ur4ose of ma7ing war res4ectableI =%ackson /e2ort 41 0(>1 Trainin?s view that the coming trial should establish the guilt not only of the military and civilian chiefs of the NaHi 8tate but also of the large industrialists was also ado4ted in the Allied .ontrol 9aw No1 ($ governing the military occu4ation of Germany as well as in the list of those to be 4rosecuted in the first and subse@uent trials1 =*f1 Suincy -right American %ournal of .nternational La, Gol1 /( 441 /( ff1> Fussian influence was evident too in an American memorandum of A4ril )$ (*/0 drawn u4 for the 8an 6rancisco meeting of the "nited Nations1 It re4eatedly refers to IEitlerite organiHation I IEitlerite leadersIterms characteristic of 8oviet usage but otherwise e<tremely rare1

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page_1 #age (0 delegates 4roduced a redraft of the clause on aggression that solved the matter very sim4ly1 It was far narrower than what Mr1 Dustice Dac7son had ho4ed for1 It declared the crime to be ??Aggression or domination over other nations carried out by the !uro4ean A<is in violation of international laws and treaties1IL This was a useful and wor7able formula from the 8oviet 4oint of view for when the indictment was drawn u4 !stonia 9atvia and 9ithuania were stated in it to be 4art of 8oviet territory1 :n :ctober ' Mr1 Dustice Dac7son wrote a formal reservation in a letter to the other chief 4rosecutors: IThis language is 4ro4osed by Fussia and is acce4ted to avoid the delay which would be occasioned by insistence on an alteration in the te<t1I &) Nothing in the indictment he declared austerely was a recognition by the "nited 8tates of Fussian sovereignty over these countries1 The Accused :rganiHations The 9ondon .onference named as defendants twenty-four men and si< organiHations1 The idea of indicting organiHations was also mainly American1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son argued that the individual members of one of these criminal grou4s would be tried in due course on their own account but that the ado4- L No Italian was tried by Allied military courts not because Italians had not made war =Italy had attac7ed 6rance toward the close of the cam4aign in the west and later Albania and Greece and had ,oined in the war against Fussia> but because Italy had changed governments and sides in the war1 #olitically it would have been undesirable if not legally im4ossible to try Italians before courts of their later allies1 Another consideration may have been the 7ind of war the Italians had fought which left the Allied nations with a sense of security in regard to future Italian military 4ower1 The Germans and Da4anese had been first-class soldiers and wars of aggression committed by them had to be met not only with e@ual or su4erior armed forces but with su4erior ideas in order to 4revent the li7elihood of future wars of aggression on their 4art1 The Italians could be dealt with in more casual fashion as though in fact they had never gone to war and the crime of aggression sto44ed at their borders1 This was one of the many Italian victories after Italy bro7e with their German alliesvictories won by 4olitical legerdemain1 If Italians could not be tried for waging war the Allies as the trial would disclose could obviously not be guilty of the crime1 6or e<am4le: The Fussians could not be tried for entering the war against Da4an which had a nonaggression 4act with Fussia and had been trying to 4ersuade Moscow to act as an intermediary with the "nited 8tates to obtain 4eace1 The invasion by American forces of the North African 4ossessions of 6rance =to 4revent as #resident Foosevelt had said the occu4ation of this strategic area by the Germans> and the occu4ation of Iceland and Greenland by American troo4s could not be com4ared with the German invasion of Norway and Denmar71 The trials were not trials of the Allies or of the Italians or of the 6inns although the 6inns had crossed the borders of the 8oviet "nion with the Germans1 :nly two years before this attac7 on the "88F they themselves had been attac7ed1 !arlier the 8oviet invasion of 6inland had caused the Fussians to be cast out of the 9eague of Nations a develo4ment that had no a44reciable effect on the Fusso-6innish war but might have been used by the British and the 6rench to ,ustify going to the aid of 6inland had not the une<4ected 4eace forced a change in their 4lans1 Now if either of these embattled 4owers of (*/$ had been in the doc7 it would have been the 6inns not the Fussians1

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page_1! #age (' tion of the Anglo-American conce4t of the cons4iracy of a grou4 would hel4 clarify the legal situation save time and avoid holding innumerable trials to 4rove the same 4oint1 This 4ro4osal ran into no great difficulties and was acce4ted although the idea of a cons4iracy was foreign to both 6rench and Fussian law1 The Fussians criticiHing the indictment of the NaHi organiHations as a mere com4lication 4ointed out that the grou4s had been disbanded that their crimes had been thoroughly established and that while the 8oviet "nion li7e 6rance had laws directed against agencies or organiHations dangerous to the state the Fussian 4rosecution 4referred to try individuals1L General Ni7itchen7o said that the Gesta4o and 88 had already been declared criminal by authorities higher than the Tribunal1 ??The fact of their criminality has definitely been established1 -e cannot imagine 1 1 1 the Tribunal might 4ossibly bring out a verdict that any one of these organiHations was not criminal when it has already been labelled so by the governments1I &/ But the 4oint made no great difference to the Fussians and Ni7itchen7o more than once 4ointed out to Mr1 Dustice Dac7son that the 8oviet "nion although at first o44osing the 4rosecution of organiHations had generously changed its mind and acce4ted the American 4ro4osal1 The memorandum sent to #resident Foosevelt for his use at ;alta signed by 8timson 8tettinius and Biddle had 4ro4osed that the chief German leaders be tried along with the organiHations in which they had been em4loyed: the 8A the 88 the Gesta4o1 #utting these leaders to death without a trial said the memorandum would violate Ithe most fundamental 4rinci4les of ,ustice common to all the "nited Nations1I The NaHi organiHations had been necessary for carrying out the criminal 4ur4oses of the regime the 4rosecution argued1 In the 8A it said the mass organiHation of the #arty had first been concentratedC in the 88 the #arty had been carried into the armed forcesC and in the Eigh .ommand and the General 8taff the cons4iracy against the 4eace of the world had its origins1 The organiHations indicted li7e the individuals varied widely in what they L The decision was to arouse lively 4rotest1 !minent American ,urists among others s4o7e u4 against the idea of collective guilt1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son argued for the guilt of the organiHations before the Tribunal and cited the laws in the "nited 8tates against the Bu Blu< Blan1 The British 4rosecutor referred to British laws against the Thugs in India in the nineteenth century1 A clear 4recedent he said was that of the 4irate shi41 It was enough to have been a member of the crew to be brought to ,usticeC even the coo7 was 4resumed to have 4artici4ated in crimes committed by the more active 4irates and coo7s could be and had been hanged along with the rest of the crew1 But 4irates the defense 4ointed out were tried under the national law of the 4ower that ca4tured them not under international law and this tribunal was an international one1 The other 4recedents cited for collective 4unishment were also of anti@ue character1 If a community in the Middle Ages had assisted fugitives to esca4e from the ,ustice of the 7ing the inhabitants might be 4unished collectively1 :r if a town had defended itself to a 4oint where victorious attac7ers considered their losses dis4ro4ortionate to the ,ustice of their cause the defenders might be 4ut to the sword1

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page_1" #age (+ had done1 The 8A had dwindled in im4ortance after the murder of scores of its leaders including its commander !rnst Foehm in (*)/1 !ven so among the indicted grou4s were 4olitical leaders of the #arty and 8tate called in the indictment the Feichsregierung and all the 88 the 8D and 8A1L The 8D was the security service that had started as the intelligence arm of the #arty and had develo4ed until its networ7 of terror s4read over !uro4e and the occu4ied territories1 The Gesta4o had been established by Eermann Goering as a secret 4olice to ferret out enemies of the 8tate and before long it could order the arrest of anyone without a court 4roceeding1 -hat Bind of TrialO :n the @uestion of the 7ind of trial that would be held o4inions had conflicted in the course of the years1 8ecretary of 8tate Eull had thought that the German leaders should be given short shrifttried as he said by a drumhead court-martial1 This view was shared by a number of 4rominent British including -inston .hurchill who said he wanted the to4 NaHi criminals ta7en out some morning and shot without 4reliminaries1 This was also the o4inion of the American 8ecretary of the Treasury Eenry Morgenthau1 The .hief Dustice of the "nited 8tates 8u4reme .ourt said he could understand that a s4ontaneous act of this 7ind might ta7e 4lace but he had serious doubts about a trial with the attributes of law and ,ustice which under the circumstances would inevitably be more a 4olitical than a legal 4roceeding1 .uriously Mr1 Dustice Dac7son had once held this view1 Life magaHine @uoted a s4eech he had made warning against the use of the ,udicial 4rocess for non,udicial ends in which he had attac7ed cynics who saw no reason why courts li7e other agencies should not be used as wea4ons1 ??If we want to shoot Germans I he wrote Ias a matter of 4olicy let it be done as such but don?t hide the deed behind a court1 If you are determined to e<ecute a man in any case there is no occasion for a trialC the world yields no res4ect to courts that are merely organiHed to convict1I &0 -hat had changed Mr1 Dustice L The 4rosecution had not been able to master the com4licated machinery of the NaHi 4olice a44aratus1 The Main :ffice of Feich 8ecurity headed by Eeinrich Eimmler had under it the 8i4o the 8ecurity 4olice the Gesta4o and the 8D as well as other im4ortant subdivisions li7e !ichmann?s Bureau IG A /b1 More than a hundred of these offices of the F8EA =Feichssicherheitshau4tamt> e<isted including one devoted to forging foreign ban7notes1 These offices the higher 88 and 4olice officials were directly under Eimmler1 The 8D was largely manned by 4rofessional hatchet men who did their ,obs methodically whether in actions against 4artisans or in e<ecuting 4risoners of war who were turned over to them1 :ne of its tas7s was re4orting on the morale of the civilian 4o4ulation and these summaries were remar7ably ob,ective with little attem4t to 4aint a rosier 4icture than was warranted1 In this vein the 8D re4orted in occu4ied 6rance in (*// near 9yons that it had closed down an or4hanage: forty-one children between the ages of three and thirteen it solemnly declared had been ta7en into custody and no articles of value had been found1

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page_1# #age (% Dac7son?s mind is not clear1 #erha4s his a44ointment as chief American 4rosecutor and the o44ortunity to 4resent the case for a new legal world order offered by the ,udicial e<4osure of the NaHi criminals was decisive for him1 :r 4erha4s his 4olitical ambitions were decisive1 A British ai)e;m<moire to Dudge 8amuel Fosenman #resident Foosevelt?s friend and re4resentative during the 4reliminary negotiations leading to the trials said that a long trial would arouse unfavorable 4ublic reaction and would furthermore loo7 li7e a ??4ut-u4 ,ob1I Both the Fussians and the #resident of the "nited 8tates however wanted a full-dress trial although for very different reasons1 Foosevelt and many of his advisers such as 8timson 8tettinius and Biddle saw the court as a symbol of a new international order1 6or the Fussians the @uestion of guilt had already been decidedC it need only be reenacted made 4lain before the world1 The trial would confirm decisions already ta7en1 Before the trial started the Fussian ,udge Ni7itchen7o said I-e are dealing here with the chief war criminals who have already been convicted and whose conviction has already been announced by both the Moscow and .rimea declarations and by the heads of the governments1I The tribunal therefore he thought had only to carry out the ,ust 4unishment immediately1 Nor was there any necessity he said Ito create a sort of fiction that the ,udge is a disinterested 4erson who has no legal 7nowledge of what has ha44ened before 1 1 1 MthatN would lead only to unnecessary delays1I &' The .harter of the International Military Tribunal The 9ondon Agreement of August % (*/0 was drawn u4 in accordance with its far-reaching 4ur4oses by the "nited 8tates Great Britain the 8oviet "nion and 6rance1 These four nations acted on behalf of the "nited Nationsthat is for the twenty-si< countries that had gone to war with Germany1 The agreement declared that the signatories after consulting with the Allied .ontrol .ouncil for Germany would establish the International Military Tribunal for the trial of war criminals whose offenses had no 4articular location1 It was signed by Fobert 6alco for 6rance 8ir -illiam Allen Dowett for Great Britain I1 N1 Ni7itchen7o for the 8oviet "nion and Fobert E1 Dac7son for the "nited 8tates1 Thus the chief American 4rosecutor and the Attorney General of Great Britain ,oined with the Fussian member of the tribunal and the 6rench alternate member to establish the court1 The charter of the tribunal which was 4art of the 9ondon Agreement 4rovided that the com4etence of the tribunal could be challenged neither by the 4rosecution nor by the defenseC that its decisions would be made by ma,ority vote the deciding vote in the event of a tie to be cast by the #resident of the .ourt1 This office the Fussians had at first wanted rotated

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page_1$ #age (* but they acce4ted the 4ro4osal to ma7e a renowned and 4racticed ,urist the British member of the tribunal 9ord Dustice Geoffrey 9awrence #resident of the .ourt1 During the meetings in 9ondon Ni7itchen7o and Trainin held stubbornly to ma7ing the seat of the trials Berlin where the records would be 7e4t and the decisions made although they were willing to let the first trial be in Nuremberg where ( &$$ 4risoners could be ,ailed1 No building large enough to house that many 4risoners remained undestroyed in Berlin1 The Fussians did not ,oin in the visit to ins4ect the #alace of Dustice at Nuremberg although Ni7itchen7o at first had acce4ted Dac7son?s invitation to go there with re4resentatives of the other 4owers1 At a dinner in the 8avoy Eotel in 9ondon he une<4ectedly told him that he and Trainin would not go1 Dac7son offered to change the date to suit their convenience but Ni7itchen7o said that no date would be suitable1 :bviously the instructions from Moscow were against such undue fraterniHation1 The Fussians were already starting what was before long to called the ??cold warI in Berlin #oland and the Bal7ans and did not feel called u4on to ma7e social occasions of the 4re4arations for the trial1 The court according to the charter could try any citiHen of the enemy nationsC the indictments need not be limited to Germans and among the accused were two Austrians1 It had the tas7 of trying and 4unishing those 4ersons who acting in the interests of the former !uro4ean A<is countries had 4lanned to wage or had waged aggressive war and those who had committed war crimes or crimes against humanity1 6our categories of crimes were described in detail: (1 .rimes Against #eace Mthere were two of theseN: namely =a> 4lanning 4re4aration initiation or waging of a war of aggression or a war in violation of international treaties agreements or assurances or =b> 4artici4ation in a .ommon #lan or .ons4iracy for the accom4lishment of any of the foregoing1 &1 -ar .rimes: namely violations of the laws and customs of war MincludingN murder ill-treatment or de4ortation to slave labor 1 1 1 of MtheN civilian 4o4ulation 1 1 1 in occu4ied territory murder or ill treatment of 4risoners of war or 4ersons on the seas 7illing of hostages 4lunder 1 1 1 wanton destruction of cities towns or villages or devastation not ,ustified by military necessity1 )1 .rimes Against Eumanity: namely murder e<termination enslavement de4ortation and other inhuman acts committed against any civilian 4o4ulation before or during the war or 4ersecutions on 4olitical racial or religious grounds 1 1 1 in connection with any crime within the ,urisdiction of the tribunal whether or not in violation of domestic law of the country where 4er4etrated1 Thus crimes committed in Germany were included des4ite the NaHi laws

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page_20 #age &$ of the 4eriod1 The fact that a defendant had acted under an order of his government or of a su4erior was not to free him from res4onsibility for having carried it out although su4erior orders could be considered in mitigation of 4unishment if the tribunal decided that such would be in the interest of ,ustice1 In this 4rovision the charter of the tribunal too7 care of what was certain to be a chief defense of many of the accused1 A clause e<4ressly 4rohibiting the carrying out of inhuman or illegal orders had 4rudently been inserted in the military manuals of the British and American armies only a year before1 "4 to that time the acce4ted doctrine of both armies had been that a soldier must obey the orders of his su4eriors whether he li7ed them or not1 -ith the trials coming u4 the regulations were changed to 4rovide that no order that offended a soldier?s conscience need be carried out1L =.uriously the German Army had a similarly 4hrased order1 The German soldier in -orld -ar I and even under the NaHis was told in his boo7 of military law that he was not to carry out orders he 7new to be illegal1LL> L In the British Manual of Military La, =9ondon: .ommand of the Army .ouncil (*&*> .ha4ter TIG ??The 9aws and "sages of -ar on 9and I read: IIt is im4ortant however to note that members of the armed forces who commit such violations of the recogniHed rules of warfare as are ordered by their government or by their commanders are not war criminals and cannot therefore be 4unished by the enemy1 Ee may 4unish the officials or commanders res4onsible for such orders if they fall into his hands but otherwise he may only resort to the other means of obtaining redress which are dealt with in this cha4ter1I This was changed in A4ril (*// to read: IThe @uestion however is governed by the ma,or 4rinci4le that members of the armed forces are bound to obey lawful orders only and that they cannot therefore esca4e liability if in obedience to a command they commit acts which both violate unchallenged rules of warfare and outrage the general sentiments of humanity1I The American orders Basic "iel) Manual /ules of Lan) !arfare had read: IIndividuals of the armed forces will not be 4unished for these offenses in case they are committed under the orders or sanction of their government or commanders1 The commanders ordering the commission of such acts or under whose authorities they are committed by the troo4s may be 4unished by the belligerent into whose hands they may fall1I This was changed on November (0 (*// to read: IIndividuals and organiHations who violate the acce4ted laws and customs of war may be 4unished therefor1 Eowever the fact that the acts com4lained of were done 4ursuant to order of a su4erior or government sanction may be ta7en into consideration in determining cul4ability either by way of defense or in mitigation of 4unishment1 The 4erson giving such orders may also be 4unished1I LL Fittau ed1 Militaerstrafgeset0buch= in )er "assung vom 7$ Oktober 789$mit Einfuehrungsgeset0 un) (riegsstrafrechtsor)nung =Berlin: -alter de Gruyter Gerlag (*/)>1 IMilitaerische +erbrechen un) +ergehen I 4ar1 /+ 41 **: I(> If carrying out an order in the course of duty should violate a law only the su4erior who gives the order is res4onsible1 Eowever the subordinate who obeys it is 4unishable as a 4artici4ant: a1 if he goes beyond the given order or b1 when he 7nows that the su4erior?s order would have the aim of leading to military or other crime or violation1I 8ee also Trial of the Ma>or !ar *riminals before the .nternational Military Tribunal. Nuremberg= 79 November 789?7$ October 789: Gol1 II =Nuremberg: (*/+/*> 41 (0$ =hereinafter referred to as N II N III N IG etc>1C /eichsgeset0blatt (*&' No1 )+ 41 &+% Art1 /+ cited by %ackson /e2ort1

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page_21 #age &( The .ourt and the #rison The tribunal was made u4 of four members and four alternatesthat is two ,udges from each of the Allied 4owers1L During the 4roceedings they a44eared dressed in their ,udicial robes with the e<ce4tion of the Fussians who wore military uniforms1 The courtroom holding some '$$ 4eo4le was on the second floor of the #alace of Dustice1 The defendants were brought in by way of an elevator which o4ened into the courtroom1 They came into the court one by one 4ast a series of chec74oints each of which tele4honed word of each 4risoner?s arrival to the ne<t1 They were housed in se4arate cells before each of which a guard was stationed night and day1 They were not allowed to tal7 with one another during their twenty-minute e<ercise 4eriods or in the showers but those who were on s4ea7ing terms could e<change o4inions in the doc7 during recesses1 No military insignia could be worn nor was German military ran7 recogniHed by the Allies for otherwise it would have been necessary to follow the Geneva .onvention on the treatment of 4risoners of war who under it could not be held in solitary confinement1 6or those in need of clothing =a number of the accused had only the clothes in which they had been arrested> a suit was made by a Nuremberg tailorC it could be worn only during the hours of the trial and had to be ta7en off 4rom4tly on the 4risoner?s return to his cell1 L 9ord Dustice Geoffrey 9awrence for the "nited Bingdom of Great Britain and North Ireland was #resident of the .ourtC his alternate was 8ir -illiam Norman Bir7ettC former Attorney General 6rancis Biddle for the "nited 8tates and Dudge Dohn D1 #ar7er of North .arolina alternateC #rofessor Donnedieu de Gabres for the 6rench Fe4ublic and M1 Ie .onseiller F1 6alco alternateC Ma,or General =of Duris4rudence> I1 Ni7itchen7o for the "88F and 9ieutenant .olonel A1 61 Golch7ov alternate1 6or the "nited 8tates 4rosecution Mr1 Dustice Fobert E1 Dac7son was .hief of .ounsel1 !<ecutive Trial .ounsel were .olonel Fobert G1 8torey and Thomas D1 Dodd1 Associate Trial .ounsel were 8idney 81 Alderman Brigadier General Telford Taylor .olonel Dohn Earlan Amen and Fal4h G1 Albrecht1 In addition there were si<teen American Assistant Trial .ounsel including the German-born Dr1 Fobert M1 Bem4ner1 The British .hief #rosecutor was Eis Ma,esty?s Attorney General 8ir Eartley 8hawcross B1.1 M1#1 The De4uty .hief #rosecutor was the Ft1 Eonorable 8ir David Ma<well-6yfe #1.1 B1.1 M1#1 who had been the Attorney General under the .hurchill government1 The leading counsel was G1 D1 Foberts B1.1 :1B1!1C in addition there were four ,unior counsel1 The Fussians? .hief #rosecutor was General F1 A1 Fuden7o1 The De4uty .hief #rosecutor was .olonel ;1 G1 #o7rovs7yC the Assistant #rosecutors included two state counselors of ,ustice of the second class 91 F1 8henin and M1 ;1 Fagins7y a state counselor of the third class N1 D1 Aorya and four others1 The 6rench had two .hief #rosecutors 6rancois de Menthon and Auguste .ham4etier de FibesC two De4uty .hief #rosecutorsC three Assistant #rosecutors who were chiefs of sectionC and five 4lain Assistant #rosecutors1

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page_22 #age && The Indictment In the eyes of the victorious nations two grou4s of defendants were the targets of the trial1 :ne was the German General 8taff the ob,ect of attac7 not only by the Allies but by ??liberalI German critics long before Eitler1 The American 4rosecution called it the 4erennial source of evil from which the NaHis or any other tem4orarily ruling 4olitical organiHation too7 orders1 Because the General 8taff obviously had had to be su44orted with the tools of war Mr1 Dustice Dac7son following the formula of the #otsdam .onference ordered one of his assistants to find two or more industrialists to indict1 To fail to find the Eigh .ommand guilty said the chief American 4rosecutor would be worse than freeing the entire grou4 of defendants1 &+ Dac7son?s view of the ini@uity of the General 8taff was widely held1 It was shared by eminent figures in !ngland and 6rance as well as by former "nited 8tates "ndersecretary of 8tate 8umner -elles by former 8ecretary of -ar Eenry 91 8timson and by #residents Foosevelt and Truman1 L The indictment called the NaHi #arty the I.entral .ore of the common 4lan or .ons4iracy1I The cons4irators had 4lanned it said Ito abrogate 1 1 1 the Treaty of Gersailles and its restrictions u4on the military armament and activity of GermanyC to ac@uire the territories lost by Germany as the result of the -orld -ar of (*(/(% 1 1 1 to ac@uire 1 1 1 Lebensraum 1 1 1 at the e<4ense of neighboring and other countries 1 1 1I and to this end had used Ifraud deceit threats intimidation fifth-column activities and 4ro4aganda1I L Telford Taylor during the trial of the Bru44 defendants said IThe Third Feich dictatorshi4 was based on this unholy trinity of NaHism Militarism and !conomic Im4erialism1I And in the 6lic7 case he re4eated that on the shoulders of industrialists li7e Bru44 and Thyssen and 6lic7 of military men li7e Bec7 6ritsch and Fundstedt Eitler had ridden to 4ower and from 4ower to con@uest1 But Bec7 had 4lanned the arrest of Eitler in (*)% and 6ritsch was cashiered after the fa7ed charges of his homose<uality had been entirely dis4roved1 Ee was never fully rehabilitated by EitlerC he went to the #olish front in the autumn of (*)* where on a 4atrol in the course of the fighting he sought and met a soldier?s death1 Bec7 made two unsuccessful attem4ts to 7ill himself when the Duly &$ 4lot failed and was mercifully given the cou2 )e gr@ce he as7ed for by a sergeant1 Mr1 Taylor was indulging in ,udicial or 4olitical rhetoric =August von Bnieriem The Nuremberg Trials M.hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*0*N 41 0$&>1 Taylor?s comment was an echo of what Trainin had written in his boo7 on the criminal res4onsibility of the Eitlerians1 Trainin had said: I-e 7now the NaHis had a social base the German trusts financial and economic1 1 1 1 The fifteen big trusts including I1G1 6arben and Bru44 1 1 1 these are the masters for whom the NaHi 8tate wor7s1 1 1 1 6rom the 4oint of view of 4enal ,ustice the members of the NaHi association of international malefactors are the following: Eitler and his ministers the commanders of the German ArmyGoering Eess Goebbels Eimmler Fibbentro4 Fosenberg and the other members of the Eitler cli@ueare the organiHers and the authors of grave crimes against the bases of the international community and human morality while the directors of the financial and economic trusts that sustained this cli@ue are the organiHers of and accom4lices in the same crimes1I =A1 N1 Trainin La /es2onsibilit< 2<nale )es Hitl<riens M#aris: 9a #ress 6ranUaise et !trangVre (*/0N 441 (0/('$1>

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page_23 #age &) Their doctrines included the view that 4ersons of German blood were su4erior a master race that the Germans themselves should be ruled under the "uehrer2rin0i2 that war was a noble and necessary activity of Germans and that the leadershi4 of the NaHi #arty ??was entitled to sha4e the structure 4olicies and 4ractices of the German state1I "nder the rule of the #arty 0 +$$ $$$ Dews had disa44eared so the indictment charged out of the * '$$ $$$ who had formerly lived in the countries that had come under NaHi domination1 IThe NaHi cons4irators 1 1 1 e<tended a system of terror against o44onents 1 1 1 or sus4ected o44onents of the regime 1 1 1 MtheyN destroyed the free trade unions 1 1 1 by 4romoting beliefs and 4ractices incom4atible with .hristian teaching sought to subvert the influence of the churches over the 4eo4le and in 4articular over the youth of Germany 1 1 1 4ursued a 4rogram of 4ersecution of 4riests clergy and members of monastic orders1I They resha4ed the educational system of Germany to 4re4are youth 4sychologically for war1 They de4rived labor of its rights and with Ithe industrialists among them embar7ed u4on a huge rearmament 4rogram1 1 1 1 They led Germany to enter u4on a course of secret rearmament from (*)) to March (*)0 1 1 1 to leave the International Disarmament .onference and the 9eague of Nations1I Their 4lan was to reoccu4y and fortify the Fhineland in violation of the Treaty of Gersailles and other treaties and to ac@uire military strength and 4olitical bargaining 4ower against other nations1 The occu4ation of the Fhineland in March (*)' had o4ened the way for the ma,or aggressive ste4s to follow: the invasion of Austria in (*)% and then of .Hechoslova7ia1 After that came the formulation of the 4lan to attac7 #oland the e<4ansion of the war into a general war of aggression the 4lanning and e<ecution of attac7s on Denmar7 Norway Belgium the Netherlands 9u<embourg ;ugoslavia and Greece1 Then Ion Dune && (*/( the NaHi cons4irators deceitfully denounced the Non-Aggression #actI that had been made with Fussia on August &) (*)* Iand without any declaration of war invaded 8oviet territory thereby beginning a -ar of Aggression against the "18181F1I The German cons4irators had collaborated with Italy and Da4an to wage aggressive war against the "nited 8tates and had made a ten-year militaryeconomic alliance with those countries in Berlin on 8e4tember &+ (*/$ which had strengthened the limited 4act made on November &0 (*)'1 They had e<horted Da4an to see7 Ia new order of things1I The indictment continued: ITa7ing advantage of the wars of aggression then being waged by the NaHi cons4irators Da4an commenced an attac7 on December + (*/( against the "nited 8tates 1 1 1 and against the British .ommonwealth of Nations 6rench Indo-.hina and the Netherlands1I The NaHi cons4irators also cons4ired to wage war Iin ruthless and com4lete disregardI of the laws of humanity and laws and customs of war1 Thus Ithe defendants with divers other 4ersons I the indictment said Iare guilty of a common 4lan or cons4iracy for the accom4lishment of .rimes Against #eaceC

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page_24 #age &/ of a cons4iracy to commit .rimes Against Eumanity in the course of the 4re4aration for war and in the course of the 4rosecution of warC and of a cons4iracy to commit -ar .rimes not only against the armed forces of their enemies but also against non-belligerent civilian 4o4ulations1?? &% This remar7able document succeeded in so confusing the real issues of the trial as they emerged in the course of the 4ostwar years that they never were entirely untangled1 -hile accusing the Germans of having invaded #oland as 4art of a cons4iracy the 4rosecution and the tribunal ignored what had made the invasion a safe o4erationnamely the nonaggression 4act Eitler had made with the 8oviet "nion in August (*)* and the secret document that had accom4anied it under the terms of which the Fed Army invaded #oland a few wee7s later and too7 u4 4rearranged 4ositions1 At the same time the Fusso-German nonaggression 4act was cited in the indictment as the treaty the Germans had violated when they invaded the "88F in Dune (*/(1 Giolations of the Treaty of Gersaillesa document that since (*(* had been increasingly under fire by leading statesmen and historians in the Allied countries as well as in Germanyand the occu4ation of the Fhineland were 4ut on the same level as the 7illing of millions of defenseless noncombatants1L The 4assages on the NaHi attac7s on churches and minds of youth and the 4romotion of Ibeliefs and 4ractices incom4atible with .hristian teachingI might have caused the trace of a smile on the faces of the 8oviet re4resentatives who for the 4ur4ose of the trial were as indignant as any of their -estern colleagues at such mal4ractices1 It was not new for -estern statesmen and observers to see in the Fussians a devotion to .hristian 4rinci4les which when glim4sed strengthened ho4es of Moscow?s coo4eration1 Foosevelt had said that 8talin?s character showed evidence of his early theological training and many British and American clergymen declared that in one form or another freedom of religion e<isted in the 8oviet "nion or that .ommunism was closely related to .hristianity es4ecially 4rimitive .hristianity which had also faced a hostile world with comradeshi4 and the sharing of a meager stoc7 of the world?s goods1 The Twenty-6our The chief defendant among the twenty-four originally named in the indictment was former Feichsmarschall Eermann Goering whose designation in (*)* by the 6uehrer as his successor remained in force until L near the end of the war when Eitler accused him of high treason and ordered his arrest1 Ne<t At 9ondon Mr1 Dustice Dac7son had said I-e 4ro4ose to 4unish acts which have been regarded as criminal since the time of .ain and have been so written in every civiliHed code1I Thereu4on he and later the indictment sim4ly listed the violations of 4ledges such as the invasion of the demilitariHed Fhineland by the German Army in (*)' the invasion of .Hechoslova7ia and #oland the wi4ing out of whole 4o4ulations and the use of slave labor =%ackson /e2ort 41 0$>1

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page_2 #age &0 in im4ortance was Doachim von Fibbentro4 6oreign Minister of the Feich during most of the years Eitler was .hancellor1 Fibbentro4 was unanimously considered one of the vainest and most incom4etent of the men around the 6uehrer1 There followed a cross section of the -rominente: Eans 6ran7 who had been Governor General of #oland1 Alfred Fosenberg the turgid theoretician of the #arty had been a44ointed to administer the !astern Territories but never succeeded in doing so1 Also listed were the two chief officers of the :B- =:ber7ommando der -ehrmacht the Eigh .ommand of the Armed 6orces> 6ield Marshal -ilhelm Beirel and General Alfred DodlC the ran7ing admirals of the German Navy !rich Faeder and Barl DoenitHC the secretary of the #arty chancellery who had not been ca4tured =and seems to have 4ermanently disa44eared> Martin BormannC the head of the F8EA =Feichssicherheitshau4tamt the Feich .entral 8ecurity :ffice> and the closest to the dead Eeinrich Eimmler the Allies were able to lay their hands on !rnst BaltenbrunnerC the chief of the 9abor 6ront of the Feich Fobert 9eyC the devoted Austrian NaHi who had become civil administrator of the Netherlands Artur 8eyss-In@uartC the head of the German youth movement who had 4ublished some of the most undistinguished 4oetry ever to a44ear in Germany Baldur von 8chirachC the most notorious among the anti-8emitic ,ournalists and s4ellbinders Dulius 8treicherC and a former German .hancellor and a 6oreign Minister who had served under Eitler after he overcame their conservative 4arties and 4rinci4les 6ranH von #a4en and .onstantin von Neurath1 6ritH 8auc7el who had been in charge of the forced labor of more than si< million men and women was also indicted1 8auc7el had brought convoys of foreign wor7ers to Germany from all the countries of !uro4e and with him in the doc7 would be the man who had made use of them Albert 84eer an architect by 4rofession who with this mi<ed force of slave labor and German wor7ers achieved such 4rodigies of 4roduction that des4ite the bombings Germany?s manufacture of war materials air4lanes tan7s guns and everything essential to 7ee4 the nation fighting had gone u4 steadily until the end of the war1 84eer had succeeded the builder of the -est -all and the Autobahnen 6ritH Todt after the latter?s death in an air4lane accident1 As Minister of Arms and Munitions 84eer had become the head of all German war 4roduction which before him had been under the direction of his codefendant Eermann Goering whose many assignments and offices greatly e<ceeded his ca4acity to co4e with them1 It was 84eer who had suggested to Eitler the a44ointment of a non4arochial Gauleiterthe 6uehrer named 8auc7elas head of the 9abor 6ront1 Interested solely in efficiency 84eer had conducted his ministry with such disregard for the National 8ocialist sentiments of the men he em4loyed that Eimmler and Bormann declared his Armament Ministry to be a center of anti-NaHi activity1 &* Fudolf Eess was another individual to stand trial although his British

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page_2! #age &' ,ailers had thought him insane1 Eess had been the 6uehrer?s de4uty the third man in the Feich designated after Goering to succeed Eitler until he had flown to Britain in (*/( in a wild effort to sto4 a war which he was certain could only bring disaster to both !ngland and Germany1 In !ngland he had shown unmista7able delusional sym4toms and had twice tried to commit suicide1 Ee had been diagnosed as 4yschotic by the !nglish doctors who had e<amined him as carefully as the British intelligence-service men had during his confinement1 But Eess remained a 7ey figure among the NaHi great one of the ??AryanI fanatics and doggedly throughout his delusions stayed 4ro!nglish and anti-.ommunist1 The Fussians were 4articularly sus4icious of him because of his (*/( flight1 8talin as7ed .lement Attlee at #otsdam why Eess was fed and treated so well in !ngland1 Attlee re4lied soothingly that 8talin had no cause to be troubled and !rnest Bevin 4romised that Eess would be duly 4roduced at the forthcoming trial as indeed he wasC he was flown over ,ust before it started1 :ne of the men both the Fussians and the Americans had immediately agreed u4on to indict was E,almar 8chacht ban7er and world-renowned 4restidigitator of German finances who had originated the 4lan that rescued the German mar7 from its worthlessness in (*&) and then a decade later con,ured u4 the loans and com4licated financing that made German rearmament 4ossible1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son said that either he was a great war criminal or he was nothing and Ni7itchen7o heartily agreeing said that such men were greater criminals than the minor 4eo4le who carried out the murders and who were directly guilty of ill treatment and similar crimes1 )$ Eans 6ritHsche who had been chief of German broadcasting was indicted re4resenting one of the branches of the activities of his former chief the late Minister of #ro4aganda Dose4h Goebbels1 Goebbels? s4here was also re4resented by -alther 6un7 who had been director of the German 4ress before he too7 over 8chacht?s ,ob as Minister of !conomics and became res4onsible for e<4loitation of German and foreign labor and resources1 Another defendant -ilhelm 6ric7 had been Feichsminister of the Interior Governor General of 9ower 8tyria and "44er .arinthia in Austria and of Alsace9orraine and Norway and then Feichs4rote7tor of Bohemia and Moravia following the 7illing of Feinhard Eeydrich1)( Gustav Bru44 was regarded by all the Allied #owers as one of the most im4ortant of the war criminals1 Bru44 who had headed the chief armaments firm of Germany and of !uro4e had been a member of the Feich !conomic .ouncil and #resident of the Feich Association of German Industry1 After an early 4eriod of hostility to Eitler he became one of the 6uehrer?s most devoted su44orters among German industrialists1 Born Gustav von Bohlen und Ealbach he had added his wife?s family name when he married Berta von Bru441 The entire 4rosecution was united on the desirability of trying a member of the Bru44 family and they argued long and learnedly on behalf of their

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page_2" #age &+ governments for an indictment1 The Americans were an<ious to try Gustav although he was in a hos4ital1 If he could not be 4resent in the court Mr1 Dustice Dac7son argued he could be tried in absentia1 In any event the symbolism of trying a Bru44 was all-im4ortant1 If Gustav could not under the circumstances be tried then his son Alfried should be substituted according to Dustice Dac7son because ??the "nited 8tates 1 1 1 submits that no greater disservice to the future 4eace of the world could be done than to e<cuse the entire Bru44 family from this trial1I )& The American 4rosecutor had to admit under @uestioning of the court that Gustav could not be tried in absentia before an American court but he was ,oined in his 4lea by the British 4rosecutor 8ir Eartley 8hawcross who also believed it would be better to try Gustav but if this were not 4ermitted agreed that Alfried might be willing to ta7e the 4lace of his father and thus occasion no delay in the 4roceedings1 The 6rench 4rosecutor did not thin7 that the elderly Bru44 could be tried until he had regained his health but the 6rench too regarded the trial of Alfried with favor since they agreed that it was im4erative to try a Bru441 The Fussians were ready to try father or son or both A medical 4anel chosen by the tribunal re4orted that the seventy-eight-year-old Gustav suffering from senility could not stand trial: he could not understand the nature of the 4roceedings1 The court decided that the indictment should remain 4ending against him so that he could be tried in the future should he recover1 This he never did but Alfried was tried by a later American court found guilty of divers crimes including the use of forced labor and sentenced to twelve years? im4risonment1 Ee served seven years and was then released1 Eis 4ro4erty which had been ordered confiscated was returned to him1 :utside the #alace of Dustice 8ome of the most eligible candidates for trial and 4unishment would not a44ear at Nuremberg1 Eitler and Goebbels were dead Bormann had disa44eared but would be tried in absentia and Eimmler had bitten into a cyanide crystal during an e<amination by a British doctor and died within a few moments1 The Allied net was wide and it caught thousands of large and small fry although some of them li7e !ichmann successfully mi<ed with the millions of war 4risoners too7 ,obs on farms disa44eared into the anonymity and misery of the German cities or got off to foreign 4arts1 8treicher the Dew baiter grew a beard but was recogniHed and ta7en 4risoner by an American lieutenant who was himself a Dew1 :swald #ohl who had lived disguised as a gardener was run down by British authorities after months of searching1 The British fearing he would try to commit suicide wor7ed the successful tric7 of having a German 4oliceman tell him he was

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page_2# #age &% wanted for @uestioning at the local 4olice station on sus4icion of having stolen a bicycle1 The ruse wor7edC #ohl was relieved of the two vials of 4oison he carried and turned over to the British authorities1 #ohl a notorious organiHer of 88 slave labor in the concentration cam4s was to be a 7ey witness against 6un7 and was himself tried by a later court1 But doHens among the 4arty Bon0en =bigwigs> committed suicidesome with their entire families1 :thers successfully esca4ed detection living for years under assumed names in Germany or abroad1 8ometimes they were identified when their names came u4 in the course of later trials and they were belatedly arrested and tried on their own account1 8ome esca4ed to !gy4t or 8outh America and were never found or if found were never e<tradited and brought to trial in Germany1 A few countries including Argentina granted them ??4olitical asylum I a strange category in cases such as that of former 88 doctor Mengele who was accused not of holding undesirable 4olitical views but of the murder of thousands of concentrationcam4 inmates1 After (*/0 every trial of NaHi war criminals resulted in indictments and the eliciting of evidence for new trials1 -itnesses sometimes revealed in the course of their testimony that they or another had been more than an onloo7er to an incident1 !ach trial set off a chain of trials of other defendants1 In the trial of the ma,or war criminals it was dangerous for even the innocent to testify1 In the years immediately after the war Germans had no rights other than those bestowed by the victorious 4owers and if testimony of a witness sounded dubious or unfriendly to the 4rosecution it was an easy matter to order his arrest1 8ome of the witnesses ,oined the defendants in the cells of the #alace of Dustice although they had come to Nuremberg as free men1 :ne of the defending lawyers #rofessor MetHger who re4resented Neurath was suddenly arrested in Nuremberg and s4ent si< wee7s in a cell in the same ,ail as his client without learning the charges against him1 )) A former chief of Abteilung "rem)e Heere !est .olonel 8ottmann telegra4hed his willingness to be a witness to testify to the British 4re4arations for landing in Norway and was 4rom4tly arrested1)/ The guilty were 4ic7ed u4 too1 During later trials men who had been living @uiet well-camouflaged lives as lawyers businessmen doctors or otherwise harmless citiHens were identified as having 4layed a 4art in the murders as 4rison officials 4rosecutors guards ,udges generals or IscientificI researchers1 Between the autumn of (*/0 and March (*/% about ( $$$ cases involving some ) 0$$ 4ersons were tried in many countries on the .ontinent before Allied courts although the "nited Nations -ar .rimes .ommission had com4iled a list of )' %$$ names of men who were either to be held as material witnesses or against whom it was considered li7ely a case could be made1 )0 These figures do not include the cases of those tried before German courts which

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page_2$ #age &* were of two 7indsC the denaHification 4roceedings that too7 4lace in the first years of the occu4ation and led to thousands of convictions and sentences of im4risonmentCL and the later trials that came as a result of criminal charges brought after denaHification courts had finished their wor71 The later trials those of 4eo4le accused of crimes committed during the NaHi 4eriod were to occu4y German courts to the 4resent writing and beyond1 To assist the 4rosecution of 4ersons whose misdeeds came to light in the future the Bundesre4ubli7 established a bureau in 9udwigsburg in (*0% to collect and sift evidence1 In the "nited 8tates courts in Nuremberg in the 4eriod from Duly (*/0 until Duly (*/* (** 4eo4le were tried of whom )% were ac@uitted )' sentenced to death =(% of whom were e<ecuted> &) to life im4risonment and ($& to shorter terms1 =American courts in Dachau sentenced /&$ to death1> In the event all 4rison sentences were cut down men sentenced to life usually were free within seven years1 But these figures reveal little of what went on1 The American trials at Nuremberg were for defendants by occu4ational categoriesfor those who had been directors in big businesses or who had served in the di4lomatic service as well as in the 8D for generals as well as members of the e<termination s@uads1 In the early years of the occu4ation it was as great a crime under .ontrol .ouncil 9aw No1 ($ to have committed aggressive warfare or to have been head of a factory em4loying ) $$$ 4eo4le as to have been a member of the Gesta4o and the ,udgments of the American courts were bewilderingin some cases they conflicted with one another1 The court that tried the socalled Bru44 case @uoted in its ,udgment forty 4ages from the 4rosecution?s brief1 In one case a ,udge denounced the 4roceedings as ??unfair1I In another the court admitted that it had made an error in convicting a defendant and declared that it was 4leased to rectify its error1 Men guilty of crimes as well as defendants who merely fitted into categories regarded as unsavoryIbig industry I Imunition ma7ers I Iofficer caste I di4lomatsall a44ear in figures cited1 8oviet Fussia held trials while the cases before the international court at Nuremberg were being heard1 8ome German generals were sentenced to 4rison terms or were e<ecuted1 :thers members of the 6ree Germany movement that had been formed among German officers ca4tured during the waramong them 6ield Marshal #aulus who a44eared as a 4rosecution witness at Nurembergwere held in a 7ind of honorable arrest from which many however would not return1 The 8oviet "nion li7e Fome regarded any war in which it was engaged as a ,ust war and those who had fought against it as criminals1 L The three men freed in the trial of the ma,or war criminals8chacht #a4en and 6ritHschewere sentenced to 4rison terms for the 4art they had 4layed in the NaHi 8tate by subse@uent German denaHification courts functioning in the Laen)er of the American Aone under the law enacted Ifor the liberation from National 8ocialism and Militarism I in which four classes of 4ersons were defined: ma,or offenders offenders lesser offenders and followers1 All three were found guilty as ma,or offenders1

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page_30 #age )$ But its decisions as to who should be tried were made with due regard to the criminals? 4ossible usefulness to the 8oviet "nion in the 4ostwar years1L Eans 6ritHsche Admiral Faeder and Faeder?s wife were ca4tured by Fussian troo4s and sent to Moscow to be interrogated1LL Both 6ritHsche and Faeder were treated well enough by the Fussians and were returned to Nuremberg for trial but the admiral?s wife was in ,ail for years4art of the time in a 4rison outside Berlinand re4eated attem4ts to bring her to Nuremberg as a witness for her husband were unsuccessful1 8he had been charged with no crime1 Fussia was not alone in Si22enhaftung the arrest of members of the family of war criminals1 The -estern Allies ,ailed wives of the ma,or war criminals but this was done only s4oradically and the im4risonment did not last long1 6rau Goering and her young daughter were in 4rison for some months as were the wives of Baldur von 8chirach and -alter 6un7 but wives of the other defendants were never arrested1 The decisions a44arently were made a) hoc and as a result of rumors as much as by weightier evidence1 Any seiHable family 4ro4erty in the form of ban7 accounts or art collections was uniformly confiscated without regard to the family?s guilt or innocence on the assum4tion that it belonged to or had come from the husbands1 The #rosecution and the Defense A large staff labored for the Allies on 4re4arations for the trials1 :f the ($$ $$$ ca4tured documents screened ($ $$$ were selected for use1 The Americans alone had more than '$$ 4eo4le at wor7 in Nuremberg and about the same number were em4loyed by the other Allied #owers1 The German lawyers were chosen from a list drawn u4 by the Allied authorities but the defendants could as7 to be re4resented by a lawyer not on the Allied list who then had to be a44roved1 8ome of the German counsel including the former head of the German bar had been #arty members but others had been anti-NaHisas one would say in the course of the trialwho had lost everything because of the NaHis and the war1 L The combined figures for all cases tried both in Allied and German courts u4 to (*') were as follows according to official German sources =The Bulletin Bonn Danuary + (*'/>: In the American Hone ( %(/ 4eo4le were sentenced of whom /0$ were given the death 4enalty1 In the British-occu4ied area where trials were held only for crimes against the laws and usages of war ( $%0 were sentenced &/$ to death1 In the 6rench Hone of & ($+ 4ersons sentenced ($/ received the death 4enalty1 :f those sentenced to death more than half were e<ecuted =cf1 also Giscount Maugham &NO an) !ar *rimes M9ondon: Dohn Murray (*0(N 41 &(>1 German authorities estimate that more than ($ $$$ 4ersons have been sentenced by the 8oviet "nion to either im4risonment or death1 German courts since the end of the war have arraigned (& %/' 4ersons of whom 0 /&' were convicted and / $&+ ac@uitted1 LL It was rumored later that Faeder and his wife had ta7en 4oison but were found by a Fussian officer who called in medical hel41 Faeder?s lawyer -alter 8iemers who 7new the admiral well does not corroborate the story1

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page_31 #age )( The German defense was conducted under handica4s of monumental 4ro4ortions1 In theory the German counsel had the same tas7 as the 4rosecution in dealing with the mass of documentary material assembled but the Germans had no access to the material and could not find out what was in it1 The documents were in the charge of the Allies and although the court re4eatedly ordered the 4rosecution to ma7e the ca4tured material available to the defense when the German lawyers tried to get hold of it they were told they first had to say what they wanted1 There were no inde<es and no ways of 7nowing the contents of 4articular documents so they could scarcely 7now what to as7 for1 In addition Allied files were closed to them1 They had no access to British and 6rench 4lans to invade Norway nor could they @uestion witnesses on the attem4ts by the British and 6rench to 4ersuade the Fussians to ,oin the -estern Alliance1 The defendants could ma7e no 4re4aration for their cases until they 7new the charges so until the indictments were served on :ctober (% on 6ritHsche and Faeder who were in Fussian hands in Berlin and on :ctober (* on the others neither the defendants nor their lawyers 7new the s4ecific charges1 The lawyers then had a month to 4re4are their cases for 4leas had to be entered by November &$1 The law under which the defendants were to be tried was mainly Anglo-American with some .ontinental inclusions to ma7e the 4rocedures more fle<ible1 8uch Anglo-American 4ractices as agreement by sti4ulation that both sides acce4t certain trial 4rocedures in the interest of efficiency were strange to the Germans1 The conce4t of a contest between the 4rosecution and the defense with the ,udge as im4artial arbiter does not e<ist in .ontinental law and the German lawyers had no e<4erience in rough-and-tumble cross-e<amination nor any clear idea of what was e<4ected of them when they were told to ta7e over a witness1 In .ontinental theory if not wholly in 4ractice the 4residing ,udge as well as the state?s attorney and the defense lawyers as officers of the court have the same 4ur4ose: getting at the truth of the matter at issue before the tribunal1 If the 4rosecution discovers something to the advantage of the defendant its duty is to bring it to the attention of the court1 The defending attorneys while there to bring out and em4hasiHe evidence to aid their client are e@ually under obligation to set the facts straight1 The 4residing ,udge the 4resident of the court is the most active 4erson in a German trial1 Ee @uestions witnesses conducts at the same time the direct and cross-e<aminaton of the defendants and the witnesses and is far removed from the dis4assionate referee of the Anglo-American courts who is su44osed to hold the balance even between defense and 4rosecution1 The Tribunal and the Defense The #resident of the Nuremberg tribunal 9ord Dustice 9awrence conducted the trial with im4erturbable courtesy and 4atience remar7ably maintaining

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page_32 #age )& both during the more than nine months of heated and 4rotracted argument about the guilt or innocence of the enemies of the states he and his colleagues re4resented1 Des4ite his wellschooled efforts to be im4artial the #resident and the .ourt as a whole could not but have had a different standard for the Germans and the Allies1 -hen 8oviet 4rosecutor Andrei Gyshins7y who had been in charge of the Fussian 4urge trials came to Nuremberg he sat with the 4rosecution1 During the trial a ban@uet given in his honor was attended by all the ,udges and the 4rosecution1 )' There were other anomalies1 :n hearing of the death of Earlan 61 8tone .hief Dustice of the "nited 8tates 8u4reme .ourt 9ord Dustice 9awrence e<4ressed the sym4athy of the tribunal and as7ed Mr1 Dustice Dac7son to say a few words for the occasion1 9ord Dustice 9awrence was often shar4 with the defense1 But he also 4atiently e<4lained why they could not be treated in 4recisely the same fashion as the 4rosecution which could and did sur4rise the defense with documents and witnesses1L The difference of treatment of the 4rosecution and the defense was e<4lained as the result of technical difficulties in having to translate the mass of documents and in trans4orting witnesseswho had to be brought to Nuremberg by the Allies since the Germans had no facilities for communication or travel other than those 4rovided by the occu4ation authorities1 But the difference in fact was that the Allies were able to bring in evidence for which the defense could ma7e no 4re4aration1 Moreover the 4rosecution because of the need for military security in an enemy country had full advance 7nowledge of who the defense witnesses were as well as the 4ower of retaliation over those witnesses whose testimony they ,udged sus4icious or unfriendly1 Any official 4ublication of any member state of the "nited Nations was automatically admitted by the court as evidence and few @uestions that might conceivably be embarrassing or disturbing to the 4owers sitting on the bench were 4ermitted1 The 8oviet .hief #rosecutor General Fuden7o could cross-e<amine Eans 6ritHsche on ??the German aggression against #oland I but 6ritHsche could go into no details on a matter 7nown to everyone in the courtthat the attac7 had been made certain and its success assured by the signing of the nonaggression 4act between Eitler and 8talin with its secret clauses that divided #oland between the 8oviet "nion and Germany1 -hen the evidence for this secret treaty a44eared it came in the form of an affidavit of the former legal adviser of the German 6oreign :ffice 6riedrich Gaus who had gone to Moscow with Fibbentro4 to hel4 draw u4 the document which the Fussian 4rosecutor at Nuremberg said he had never heard of1 Any argument based on the Gersailles Treaty and its influence on German 4olitics and decisions was im4ermissible1 The Fussian treatment of German 4risoners of war and the use of German forced labor could not be described L The defense lawyers had to e<4lain the relevance of both before they could be admitted1 :f the nineteen witnesses Dodl?s lawyer as7ed to call he was allowed four =N GIII 441 (%& 0*$*&>1

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page_33 #age )) nor could #aulus be @uestioned on the sub,ect although he could have testified on what had ha44ened to the survivors of the 8i<th Army only some 0 $$$ of whom eventually returned to Germany out of the (&) $$$ who had surrendered at 8talingrad1 )+ The bombing of German cities such as Dresden =where some (0$ $$$ 4eo4le were 7illed almost all noncombatants for Dresden was full of refugees> could 4lay no role in the issues under debate although the German air attac7s on -arsaw Belgrade Fotterdam and other 4o4ulation centers were brought u4 many times and the bombing of Fotterdam was 4art of the indictment1 The millions of German men women and children who had been driven from their homes in #oland Eungary .Hechoslova7ia Fumania and Bulgaria where their families had been settled for centuries could not be mentioned nor could the alleged atrocities committed against German troo4s by any of the Allied nations1 The British handboo7 of irregular warfare instructing the .ommandos to act li7e gangsters not soldiers could not be brought into the trial although Dodl?s lawyer 6ranH !<ner 4leaded that the British orders affected the German re4risals against the .ommandos and that the British Government had officially defended this 7ind of warfare as acce4table1L The #resident of the .ourt merely said that the tribunal could ta7e the matter into consideration1)% Tu @uo@ue was 4ermitted as a defense only in one instance with regard to the German Navy and the defense of Admirals DoenitH and Faeder whose lawyers argued that they had conducted submarine warfare under the same rules as the Allies and in its verdict the court acce4ted this defense as ,ustified1 The court @uoted the testimony of British and American officers most im4ortantly of Admiral .hester NimitH who in an affidavit declared that American submarines from the first day of the war against Da4an had orders to sin7 any Da4anese shi4 in the #acific without warning1 The British Admiralty also conceded that British submarines had orders to sin7 any shi4 on sight in the 87agerra71 The Fecord The trials with their truc7loads of documents =those of the 88 alone filled si< freight cars> with the searching out of witnesses from the wrec7age of the Great German Feich from the former concentration cam4s from the 4risoner-of-war stoc7ades of neutral and Allied countries were to bring to lightdes4ite the contradictions in the testimony of the accused and the misconce4tions of the 4rosecutionthe bone and flesh of the NaHi 8tate as well as the biHarre case histories of those who had served it1 The records were so detailed and in such @uantity that all the 4rosecution and defense lawyers together could scarcely master them1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son re4orting to #resident Truman after the trial said that there were more than five L .o4ies of the handboo7 had been found on ca4tured British .ommandos1

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page_34 #age )/ million 4ages in the ty4ewritten record1 In the twelve subse@uent American trials at Nuremberg some & $$$ 4rinted 4ages of the records of each trial were 4ublished and an additional &$ $$$ 4ages on each trial remained un4ublished1 8ince the Allies had charge of 4rinting the records and the 4roceedings the choice of material to be 4ublished was sometimes one-sidedfor e<am4le the inde< of the forty-two volumes of the trial of the ma,or war criminals contains no mention of Fussian aggression or of other matters unfavorable to any of the Allies1 Nevertheless the gross historical record is to be found in the 4ages if sometimes indirectly as when it is noted that the interrogatories 4re4ared by the German lawyers were answered by Germans awaiting trials or sentences mainly in American and British internment cam4s1 :nly two such interrogatories were answered from Fussian cam4s and none from the 6renchin 4art no doubt because conditions in those cam4s could not always bear the scrutiny of foreign observers1 -hen Goering who was understandably critical of the Allied conduct of the trials said that a Fussian interrogatory accurately re4orted his testimony he did so because in this case it was a matter of no conse@uence to either side1 In general the answers to Fussian interrogations and the affidavits and witnesses from 8oviet sources including testimony of German officers from Fussian 4risoner-of-war cam4s had a distressing sameness of vocabulary: ??the Eitlerite aggressors I Ithe 6ascist criminals I Ithe 4eaceloving 8oviet "nion1I The Defense 9awyers The defense in addition to the difficulty of getting at the Allies? collection of documents in Nuremberg lac7ed an e@ual o44ortunity for getting boo7s of documents useful to their cases from abroad1 Stars an) Stri2es and occasional issues of other Allied 4a4ers were to be had but it was im4ossible for them to obtain a co4y of a boo7 which dealt with the events 4receding the German attac7 on Fussia by former 6oreign Minister of Fumania and Ambassador to the 8oviet "nion Grigore Gafencu1 The Gafencu boo7 was on sale in every 8wiss boo7store but the defense could not get a co4y of it or of the final war re4ort of the American .hief of 8taff General George .1 Marshall which had been 4ublished in Allied news4a4ers1 Marshall wrote that American investigators had been unable to find a concerted 4lan between the Da4anese and the German Governments or General 8taffsa fact relevant to any charge of cons4iracy to wage war1 The Germans had in fact been as sur4rised by #earl Earbor as everyone else although they had urged the Da4anese to attac7 8inga4ore as well as the British and Dutch 4ossessions in the 8outh #acific1 Neither before the start of hostilities nor later had ,oint war 4lans been wor7ed out between the two countries1

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page_3 #age )0 The Germans could learn of such Allied evidence by chance conversations or through the German news4a4ers licensed by the Allies and 4ublished in Germany1 They had no foreign currency and could not travel e<ce4t by Allied 4ermission even within Germany1 8ince no 4ublications from outside Germany were available the Germans continued to live in much the same intellectual desert as under Eitler1 8ometimes they were able to establish friendly relations with Allied soldiers or civilians at Nuremberg and Dr1 8iemers the lawyer for Admiral Faeder obtained from one of these a 4hotoco4y of the secret treaty between Fussia and Germany that corroborated the testimony of 6riedrich Gaus1 In general the Germans wor7ed almost wholly de4endent on the Allies in a dimly lighted room confronted by thousands of documents of which they had no advance 7nowledge1 The defense lawyers were treated with a mi<ture of tolerance and goodwill as 4ariah Germans1 Their rations li7e those of the 4risoners were much better than those of ordinary Germans who were going hungry on ( &$$ and less calories a day outside the walls of the #alace of Dustice1 The American guards at the 4rison hustled the lawyers as they searched them and sent them on their way through the controls1 :n occasion the guards brought them before Allied su4eriors on charges of having behaved with inade@uate res4ect to Allied authority1 :ne lawyer who before a lunch brea7 had been arguing a 4oint on behalf of his client 7e4t the im4atient court waiting for a half hour after it reconvened1 -hen he turned u4 he a4ologetically related that the American guards for some une<4lained reason had refused to let him come bac7 into the courthouse1 There were far fewer cu4s and serving trays than the number of 4eo4le who ate in the lunchroom assigned to the defense counsel1 In the early days of the trial the accused met for conferences with their lawyers in a single room under surveillance of American M#s1 Throughout the trial the defense counsel com4lained that co4ies of documents submitted by the 4rosecution were not given them although in at least one case a considerable number of co4ies had been made available by the 4rosecution to news4a4ers1 The defense lawyers were attac7ed in the German 4ress and at the end of the trial the Bar Association of .ologne threatened an investigation of their bac7grounds1 This 4ro4osal was officially denounced by the court which did its best to 4rotect the attorneys against such attac7s and in the end 4raised them all on behalf of the legal 4rofession for having 4erformed an onerous and dutiful tas71 Farely some of them met socially with members of the 4rosecution and on one occasion Ma<well-6yfe the British 4rosecutor 4enned a note of congratulations to a German lawyer Alfred 8eidl for a s4irited s4eech on behalf of his client Fudolf Eess1 The stain of collective guilt was on the lawyers too1 The court s4o7e in different tones to them than to the 4rosecution1 They were told to move along with their cases to 4ay attention to sto4 tal7ing about irrelevant mat-

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page_3! #age )' ters li7e the Gersailles Treaty or Allied misbehavior and the usually gentle and urbane voice of the #resident of the .ourt could crac7 over their heads when as sometimes ha44ened they tal7ed at cross 4ur4oses1 And yet nothing could conceal from the lawyers the s4ectators or even the defendants that the trial was being conducted in com4arison with the summary 4rocedures of the Third Feich with decorum and considerable fairness1 In #ursuit of the :4en Suestions The trial of these Germans was a collective trial but it is through the life stories of each individual that many hidden s4rings of the National 8ocialist 8tate may be detected1 The twenty-two men and the si< organiHations which were tried were deliberately chosen because they could be identified as the foremost re4resentatives of the men and grou4s who had brought Eitler to 4ower and 7e4t him there against the aroused wrath and armed forces of almost the entire world1L !ven if the trial was im4erfect and the re4resentatives of the 8oviet "nion charged the Germans with crimes the Fussians had committed the trial had to be held in some form1 A catharsis of the 4ent-u4 emotions of millions of 4eo4le had to be 4rovided and a record of what had ta7en 4lace duly 4reserved for whatever use later generations would ma7e of it1 The record would not com4letely document the infamy in the twentieth century but it would reveal one vast concentration of evil that could be e<orcised1 The trial raised many @uestions that are raised again in the 4ages that follow1 The res4onsibilities of the individuals indicted of the German 4eo4le of #russian militarism of big business and of the German national character were clearer at the end of the trial than they were at the beginning1 They are clearer now than they were during the trial1 The Third Feich was not the first or the last of the totalitarian regimes that have a44eared in the last fifty years1 It is however the most com4letely documented and in this contribution to history the trial also 4layed its role1 Notes (1 History of the &nite) Nations !ar *rimes *ommission com4iled by the "nited Nations -ar .rimes .ommission =9ondon: E1 M1 8tationery :ffice (*/%> 441 /'0(1 Eereinafter referred to as History of &N!**1 &1 Eans-Eeinrich Desche7 ie +erant,ortlichkeit )er Staatsorgane nach )em +oelkerstrafrecht =Bonn: 9udwig Foehrscheid Gerlag (*0&> 41 001 )1 .bi)1 41 /%1 8ee also !ric Gabus La criminalit< )e la guerre Dissertation =Geneva: "niversitJ de GenfVve !ditions GJnJrales (*0)>1 D1 Daniel Le L The original twenty-four included Bru44C 9ey who committed suicideC and Bormann who was never found but was tried in absentia1

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page_3" #age )+ 2robl<me )u ch@timent )es crimes )e guerre )Aa2r<s les enseignments )e la )eu4i<me guerre mon)iale =.airo: F1 8chindler (*/'>1 8heldon Gluec7 !ar *riminalsB Their -rosecution an) -unishment =New ;or7: Alfred A1 Bno4f Inc1 (*//>1 /1 D1 -1 Bruegel ?? as Schicksal )er Strafbestimmungen )es +ersailler +ertrages I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 ) (*0% 441 &')+$1 01 Occu2ation of %a2an De4artment of 8tate #ublication &'+( =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice>1 %u)gment of the .nternational Tribunal for the "ar East =To7yo November (*/%>1 '1 Na0i *ons2iracy an) Aggression =hereinafter referred to as N*A> 8u441 A M-('( =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/'/+> 41 (&&01 +1 History of &N!** 441 ($+%1 Also ocuments on &nite) States "oreign /elations (*/)(*// =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/0> 441 &)()&1 %1 Desche7 o2. cit1 41 (&)1 *1 Fobert E1 Dac7son /e2ort to the .nternational *onference on Military Trials= Lon)on (*/0 De4artment of 8tate #ublication )$%$ =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/*> 41 (+1 Eereinafter referred to as %ackson /e2ort1 ($1 .bi)1 41 01 ((1 "oreign /elations of the &nite) States. The *onference of Berlin 3the -ots)am *onference> (*/0 Gol1 II =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*'$> 441*%/%01 (&1 .bi)1 41 0+&1 ()1 Trial of the Ma>or !ar *riminals before the .nternational Military Tribunal= Nuremberg= 79 November 789?7$ October 789: Gol1 I =Nuremberg (*/+/*> 41 ()+1 Eereinafter referred to as N I N II etc. (/1 N III 41 /$)1 (01 N II 441 ($&)1 ('1 Barl Das4ers IThe 8ignificance of the Nuremberg Trials for Germany and the -orld I in Notre ame La,yer Gol1 TTII Danuary (*/+1 (+1 Fudolf Eoess (omman)ant in Ausch,it0 =8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*0%> 41 (&01 (%1 %ackson /e2ort 441 &** )%)%/1 (*1 .bi)1 41 ))01 &$1 .bi)1 41 )%(1 &(1 A1 N1 Trainin Hitlerite /es2onsibility un)er *riminal La, A1 ;1 Gishins7y ed1 Andrew Fothstein trans1 =9ondon: Eutchinson R .o1 9td1 (*/0>1 &&1 %ackson /e2ort 41 ((01 &)1 N I 41 *01 &/1 %ackson /e2ort 41 ($+1 &01 Life May &% (*/0 41 )/1 &'1 %ackson /e2ort 441 ($/01 &+1 (eesingAs *ontem2orary Archives Gol1 G =9ondon> August &0 (*/01 &%1 N I 441 )$/(1 &*1 !rich Bordt !ahn un) !irklichkeit =8tuttgart: "nion deutsche Gerlagsgesellschaft (*/%> 41 )0(1 )$1 %ackson /e2ort 41 &0/1

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page_3# #age )% )(1 N TII 441 (0+)$'1 Also N TGIII 441 ('/%*1 )&1 N I 41 ()%1 ))1 Gi7tor von der 9i44e Nuernberger Tagebuchnoti0en November 789? bis Oktober 789: =6ran7furt a1M1: 6ritH Bna44 (*0(> 41 (*)1 )/1 9uise Dodl un4ublished biogra4hy of General Alfred Dodl1 )01 History of &N!**1 )'1 9i44e o2. cit1 )+1 EeinH 8chroeter Stalingra) .onstantine 6itHgibbon trans1 =New ;or7: Ballantine Boo7s (*0%>1 )%1 Dodl o2. cit1

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page_3$ #age )* & The .ore of the .ons4iracy Dulius 8treicher The defendants who sat in the doc7 were an oddly mi<ed collection of the leadershi4 of the Eitler 4eriod1 :nly a handful of them had 7e4t their un@uestioning Treue to the 6uehrer or retained his confidence intact until the end of the war1 8chacht had been retired from his ,ob as 4resident of the Feichban7 before the invasion of #oland and had been sent to a concentration cam4 toward the end of the war1 After the Duly &$ (*// attem4t on Eitler?s life he had been defended before a NaHi #eo4le?s .ourt by the same lawyer who was defending him at Nuremberg1 84eer a greatly gifted technician and organiHer had been one of the few men courageous enough to tell Eitler the war was lost1 -hen he became aware that Eitler was in fact ordering the destruction of Germany he wor7ed out a 4lan to 7ill the 6uehrer in his bun7er1 6ranH von #a4en?s secretary had been shot in (*)/ by the 88 at the time of the Foehm murder1 #a4en had been arrested but had afterward served the NaHi 8tate both in Austria and Tur7ey although he was always mistrusted by the #arty1 Neurath had been relieved of his 4ost as chief administrator of .Hechoslova7ia before the start of the war with Fussia because his loyalties were sus4ect and it was thought he dealt too lightly with the .Hech resistance1 :nly a few months before Eitler too7 4ower Neurath =he was then 6oreign Minister in #a4en?s .abinet> had told Eindenburg that the naming of Eitler to the 4ost of Feich .hancellor would be a catastro4he for German foreign 4olicy1 But he and #a4en had wanted to 7ee4 their 4ositions in the forefront of German 4olitical life to

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page_40 #age /$ 4revent worse things from ha44ening they told themselves and it was for this that they had made their unstable 4eace with Eitler1 Among the men who had remained faithful to the 6uehrer to the end and beyond was Dulius 8treicher1 Eis convictions about the baseness and wic7edness of the Dews matched those of EitlerC they went far beyond the anti-Dewish regulations im4osed by the Nuremberg 9aws1 8treicher said at his trial that he had not been called on to hel4 frame this statute and had felt neglected1 Eis anti-8emitism was of the brass-7nuc7les 7ind1 Ee had delighted in the destruction of the synagogues the beatings the smashing of 4eo4le and storefronts in every turn of the screw u4 to the 6inal 8olution in the 4its and gas chambers1 Ee had always wanted the Dews e<terminated1 8treicher was the core within the core of the #arty1 Ee stood for the one thing all the defendants had in common1 Although the others did their best to 7ee4 their distance from him all had believed in some 4art at least in the endlessly re4eated message he wrote as editor of er Stuermer which had as a subtitle ??Nuremberg wee7ly for the fight for truth1I Ee was in his way the 4erfect anti8emite1 This term which came into use only in the latter 4art of the nineteenth century re4laced the earlier cruder Ihater of the Dews1I 8treicher had the @ualities of the fanatic who could readily combine the medieval belief in the accursed Dew who was the 7iller of God with the contem4orary antica4italist anti-.ommunist antimar7et4lace ,argon of the NaHis and their immediate 4redecessors recruited as most of them were from the u4rooted disenchanted millions brooding over Germany?s incom4rehensible -orld -ar I defeat4eo4le no longer with a fi<ed 4lace in their society1 Anti8emitism was international1 The boo7s of learned foreigners li7e .ount Gobineau and !rnest Fenanwho in the nineteenth century declared race instead of economics or geogra4hy or 4olitics to be the decisive factor in history and the Nordics to be the most creative and illustrious of the 4lanet?s inhabitantshad been eagerly seiHed u4on by German writers li7e -ilhelm Marr who seems to have invented the term Ianti-8emite I and the economist !ugen Duehring who believed that the Dewish religion was a sign of the inferior race and monotheism a sign of the Dews? desire to rule other 4eo4le1 ( Facists of many varieties flourished1 The 8ocial Darwinists held that above all the s4ecies must be maintained the unfit should be steriliHed the stronger races had the right to stam4 out the wea7er1& There were men li7e Arthur Moeller van den Bruc7 who merely believed the Germans to be a su4erior 4eo4le and who in a boo7 4ublished in (*&) invented the name Eitler borrowedthe IThird FeichIC and Eans 61 B1 Guenter who conducted an investigation in Dresden that showed the streetcar motormen to have more Northern blood than the conductors1L L After Eitler came to 4ower Eans 61 B1 Guenter became a 4rofessor at the "niversity of Dena1

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page_41 #age /( In the 4urer forms of this racial doctrine by no means limited to Germany but develo4ed there with all the tra44ings of 4seudoscholarshi4 the Dews were not to be im4roved since they were racially inferior as were the blac7 and yellow 4eo4les1 They were nomads moving in to 4lunder the healthy-minded farmers and wor7ers who were the ??realI Germans or the IrealI 6rench or British1 !douard Drunon in La "rance %uive said that Dews were not 6rench but merely lived in 6rance as guests1 Their mission he said was to destroy the middle class1 As re4resentatives of the anonymous ca4italists the Dews not the 6rench were guilty of 6rance?s decadence1 Drunon?s boo7 had one of the largest sales =more than one million co4ies> among the bestsellers of nineteenth-century !uro4ean 4ublishing1 The German orientalist Adolf -ahrmund also bore down on the theme of the nomad Dew1 8o did Eouston 8tewart .hamberlain who wrote of the enormous cultural accom4lishments of the IAryans1I =The term was borrowed from authentic linguistic researchers of the nineteenth centuryMa< Mueller and otherswho used it to identify the Indo-Germanic family of languages1 In this meaning it had no connection whatever with race but was merely concerned with s4eech1> The new racist doctrine =the word IraceI came into !nglish and German through 6rench and until late in the nineteenth century the Germans s4elled it in the 6rench fashionC only later did it become GermaniHed to /asse> considered the Dew a mutation a different 7ind of creature a humanoid subs4ecies a 4arasite living off the creativeness of su4erior races one who could not be saved or changed by ba4tism1 The medieval hatred of the Dew became seculariHed1 Ee was unchangeable as res4ectable scholars li7e 6ichte and Treitsch7e saw him1 In 6rance Fussia the "nited 8tates and !ngland the anti-8emites distributed learned boo7s 4am4hlets and magaHines some of which in America were 4ornogra4hic1 -hen these doctrines reached the 4o4ulariHers who combined smut with their anti-8emitism the 8treichers came into their own1 In Germany one Eartwig Eundt-Fadows7y a 4re-8treicher writer on the sub,ect 4ro4osed that male Dews be sold to the !nglish and castrated and the women turned over to 4rostitution1 This would cleanse the country of the vermin the bacilli that must be destroyed1 8uch writers were 4articularly 4ersuasive to a lunatic fringe in Germany in the 4ost-orld -ar I years which found Germans li7e 8treicher in a new environment that had characteristics of a no-man?s-land1 Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century had lived more than any other !uro4ean country by a fi<ed 4rotocol1 !veryone had his 4lace in the society and 7new its forms1 A 6rench observer re4orted that even the thic7ness of the crust of 4astry was su44osed to be ada4ted to the social milieu or se< of the consumer: crustier servings for men and for women of the lower classes more delicate ones for the bDrgerliche Eausfrau1 In such a society the loss of landmar7s could only be e<4lained by the e<istence of

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page_42 #age /& devilsthat is by 4eo4le or forces outside the society?s culture1 The Dews became the targets1 In the "nited 8tates Eenry 6ord in the earborn .n)e2en)ent made Dews guilty of causing the loss of the horse-and-buggy age and he charged them with Mar<ism and Darwinism and starting wars and being res4onsible for short s7irts and li4stic71 ) 9othro4 8toddard wrote on The /ising Ti)e of *olor and his /evolt Against *ivili0ation was translated into German under the title er (ulturumstur0= )ie rohung )er &ntermenschen =The :verthrow of .ulture the Threat of the Inferior Faces>1 In Germany after -orld -ar I almost everything was worthless1 Des4ite all the sacrifices and the victories the war was lost faiths were lost 4ro4erty and ,obs were lost1 The signal lights had disa44eared1 The liberal 4rinci4les that had hel4ed emanci4ate the Dew now became the means of his destruction for the religious absolutes of the Middle Ages were gone and in a society where moral ,udgments were relative or meaningless it seemed reasonable to say that what was right for the +olk the race was the sole guide to the ,udgment of right and wrong1 #olitical 4arties became sectsC they e<isted for every shade of dissent1 In Bavaria alone there were fifty 4arties in (*&$1 In the disordered Germany of the early (*&$?s 8treicher was not the 4sycho4ath he would have been in let us say (*(&1 In the Germany of the (*)$?s his obscene ine4t scribblings were a grotes@ue distorting mirror of what both the ran7 and file and the #arty leaders believed1 In Nurembergthe city he administered as Gauleiter and 8tatthalterthe #arty found its s4iritual home1 8treicher 4reached the central ideology of the movement the one article of belief they all agreed on: The Dew was the sole or main cause of the disaster that had befallen Germany1 8treicher was far closer to the s4rings of Adolf Eitler?s undiluted anti-8emitism than was the muddled theoretician Alfred Fosenberg1 8treicher was one of the few men whom Eitler called u1/ Ee had the lowest intelligence of the twenty-one accused with an IS of ($& and in his long and faithful years of service to the cult of anti-8emitism he had been brought to trial in both #arty and German criminal courts for many offensesoffenses that ran all the way from slander to sadism to ra4e1 In (*)) he was in fact sus4ended from his office as Gauleiter for the many irregularities that occurred in his 4rovince of 6ranconia and in (*/$ he was finally dismissed1 But he 7e4t on with his news4a4er and his writing =in addition to er Stuermer he owned the "raenkische Ceitung> and he 7e4t his membershi4 in the Feichstag to which he had been elected in (*))1 A #arty court decided that he should be thrown out of the #arty but Eitler never a44roved this verdict1 8treicher remained a NaHi both officially and at heart until he was hanged10 Dulius 8treicher born on 6ebruary (& (%%0 was one of nine children in the family of a schoolteacher in 8wabia1 In -orld -ar I he fought in the infantry and rose to the ran7 of lieutenant in the Bavarian army where he was awarded the Iron .ross both first and second class1 After the war he returned to civilian life to teach in an elementary school1

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page_43 #age /) At this time Eitler was ma7ing s4eeches in the beer halls1L 8treicher not only was among the first to ,oin the #arty but brought to it his own siHable band of anti-8emites1 Ee had had a s4ec7led 4olitical career having belonged to one of many branches of the 8ocialist #arty for a time and then moving over to the ran7s of those who li7e the members of the German -er7gemeinschaft 4laced blame for the woes of the German wor7ers on the Dewish e<4loiters who became the symbol of ca4italism1 In (*&$ he had founded his own 4arty based wholly on anti-8emitism and in (*&( he 4resented its entire membershi4 as a gift to Eitler and the National 8ocialists1 In (*&0 he was named Gauleiter1 8even years later after the NaHi seiHure of 4ower there was almost no limit des4ite his enemies in Munich and Berlin to his im4ortance in 6ranconia1 8treicher was married twice the first time in (*() to Bunigunde Foth a brewer?s daughter from Bamberg who bore him two sons1 8he died in (*/) L In the early days of the #arty meetings the Dews were uniformly identified as they were to be throughout the NaHi 4eriod with the ca4italist right and the Mar<ist left as well as with the cabalistic anti-.hristians e@ui44ed with secret boo7s and rituals1 The ??serfdom of interestI was also a favorite to4ic for an audience loo7ing for 4lain labels to cure their malaise1 The range of anti-8emitism was fairly wide1 Eitler himself was em4loyed between (*(* and (*&$ as a G-man or agent of the Army and he too7 4art as an instructor in the I!nlightenment .oursesI given at the 9echfeld barrac7s designed against leftist ideas1 Eitler?s Army audience consisted mainly of returning 4risoners of war about to be demobiliHed1 Ee was never =as he and Foehm and many others re4orted> an officer of instruction in the Feichswehr1 The Army continued to refer to him as Gefreiterstill the cor4oral of -orld -ar Ibut he delivered lectures to soldiers and noncommissioned officers in the same general 4rogram as the university 4rofessors who gave courses to the officers1 Eitler tal7ed on a variety of sub,ects: the Brest-9itovs7 Treaty conditions of 4eace and reconstruction social and economic slogans and 4olitical @uestions1 But no matter what he discussed he always made his 4osition clear on the Dews and their res4onsibility for the ills of Germany1 -hile Eitler was still in the Army =he was discharged on March )( (*&$> he made his first s4eeches in the beer halls1 In fact it was as a 4olitical agent of the Army that he first came to 7now the German -or7ers? #arty which became the National 8ocialist -or7ers? #arty1 Army re4orts were made on those meetings1 The Bavarian Government because of the unstable and dangerous situation in Munich after the colla4se of the Faetere4ubli7 had moved to Bamberg and since it was 4art of the Army?s ,ob in the absence of the civil government to 7ee4 trac7 of 4olitical trends in the ca4ital of the Lan) observers were sent to the meetings where the Eitlers and the 8treichers tal7ed1 It is interesting to note that the Army in its I!nlightenment .ourses I 4ossibly because of the tastes of the man 4ut in charge .a4tain Mayr who was later to ,oin the 8ocial Democratic #arty and to die in Buchenwald made use of both 6eder whose only theme was the serfdom of interest and Eitler two of the favorite beer-hall s4ea7ers1 The Army accounts of the meetings were all mar7ed by a detectable bias in favor of the nationalist sentiments of the s4ea7ers1 But they matter-of-factly describe how dissidents would sometimes shout out their ob,ections1 :ne such account tells how a man Iwho called Eerr Eitler a mon7eyI was I@uietlyI told to leave and how a man who yelled I#fuiI was hustled out and ta7en under 4olice 4rotection1 6rom the use the Army made of Adolf Eitler and from the tone of the re4orts concerning him and similar anti-8emitic s4ellbinders it seems clear that the younger officers covering such meetings as well as their su4eriors believed in at least half the e@uation so 4o4ular in the beer hallsnamely that the Dews were not only the wheels of the leftist 4arties but of the threatening revolution as well =!rnst Deuerlein I okumentation. Hitlers Eintritt in )ie -oltik un) )ie /eichs,ehr I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1& (*0* 441 (++&&+>1

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page_44 #age // and early in (*/0 8treicher married his secretary Adele Ta44e so they could die together in Nuremberg he told the court in the last-ditch defense of the city1 !ven in the (*&$?s the children in 8treicher?s classes in the elementary school where he taught were told to greet him with ??Eeil EitlerI when class began1 Ee made such a nuisance of himself among his fellow teachersaccusing them of ta7ing 4art in the anti-German re4ublican attac7 on the minds of their 4u4ils and ta7ing sic7 leave at a time when his health 4ermitted him to ,oin a rally of the Brownshirts in Munichthat charges were brought against him in (*&%1 An eighty-seven-4age re4ort by the school commission found him guilty of conduct unbecoming a teacher and he was dismissed from his 4ost1 This biogra4hical item he 4roudly added after the NaHis came to 4ower to his s7etch in the German !hoAs !ho1 ' 8treicher?s real teaching was done outside the classroom1 -hen he first heard Eitler s4ea7 he 7new immediately that this was the leader to whom he could devote his energies and life1 A man sitting ne<t to him in the beer hall said that he could see a halo around Adolf Eitler?s head and with this 8treicher was always to agree1 But so erratic was the wor7ing of his mind that he managed to be in constant trouble even after (*)) with influential members of the #arty leadershi4men who were ordinarily not overconcerned with 4eccadilloes of a Gauleiter as long as he remained unconditionally faithful to the 6uehrer and the creeds1 8treicher no matter how devoted to Eitler and to the faith of the #arty was so dishonest so corru4t with his drive toward easy money and his sadism that the #arty leaders for all their dis4osition to blac7-and-white ,udgments had to ta7e account of his criminality1 Ee bas7ed in the substantial comforts of a Gauleiter and favorite of the 6uehrer1 Ee not only could drive when others had to wal7 during the war years but used the 4recious gasoline to drive to the stores to get food for his dog1 Ee was even unable to 7ee4 out of trouble with eminences li7e Goering who were in a 4osition to threaten his sybaritic life1 -hen Goering became the father of !dda 8treicher was foolish enough to write that the Feichsmarschall was only indirectly the father of the child who had really been conceived by means of artificial insemination1 Goering was angered by the accusation which although later retracted by 8treicher remained a barrier between them1 It was Goering who a44ointed the commission that scrutiniHed 8treicher?s 4ersonal life and business transactions and led to his 4artial retirement in (*/$1 The letters written to er Stuermer by admiring readers and the columns of the 4a4er 4lainly reveal the role of the man who was for almost twenty years the master rabble-rouser of the #arty1 The files of er Stuermer are full of letters that tell of malign e<4eriences1 :ne is from a mental hos4ital where the writer had been sent he confides as a result of a Dewish cons4iracy1 Another man =this was in the (*&$?s> said that he was fed o4ium by the Dewish head of the asylum where he was a 4atient and that 4eo4le made loud

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page_4 #age /0 noises to 7ee4 him awa7e while other 4retended to be ghosts as 4art of a 4lot to derange him1 A dentist wrote to com4lain of a Dewish colleague whose gold 4lates he said disintegrated1 :ne Stuermer subscriber wrote that a shirt he had bought in a Dewish-owned sho4 was not delivered1 Another com4lained that his boss was 4hilandering with a Dewish girl and that in effect the em4loyees of the factory were 4aying for the immoral conduct of its owner1 :ne of the favorite to4ics of writers of er Stuermer involved the 4roof that .hrist was not a Dew1 A reader wrote to 8treicher as7ing for hel4 in 4roving this contention which he said he had heard from friends and ac@uaintances among 4riests and religious families1 The concern to AryaniHe .hrist was by no means limited to a few 4rovincial readers1 It was shared among others by Eitler and Eimmler1 ;oung men wrote in to 4rotest that girls they 7new danced with Dews or that a Dew was seen at a 4arty in the field gray of the German -ehrmacht1 Nothing was too small or 4re4osterous for the subscribers of er Stuermer or for its editor if it had to do with the guilt of the Dews for the woes of the world1 -hen the Hin)enburg e<4loded at 9a7ehurst New Dersey 8treicher declared that this too was 4art of the Dewish 4lot1 Ee and his readers were full of concern for German traditions1 !ven on the sub,ect of women?s fashions issues of vice were raised1 :n the a44earance of the Bubiko2f =bobbed hair> in the (*&$?s er Stuermer said that it was a 4lot to destroy sound German mores and the even sounder German Eausfrau and that it was invented by the Dewish Bolshevist cons4iracy to brea7 u4 German society1 A subscriber wrote ??This is no matter of harmless style1 It is a Dewish attac7 an :riental influence to ma7e visible the Dewish victory over .hristians1 The Bubiko2f is Bolshevism1I + Another reader indignant over the malicious rumor that 8treicher had in his house a maid who wore the abominable haircut wrote that he 7new this to be another Dewish swindle and ho4ed that 8treicher would deny it in order to give the lie to the s4readers of such libels1 The stories of alleged histories of ritual murder and of the luring of children to what would have been their doom had it not been for the resourcefulness of the child or adult who saw through the Dew?s offer of candy the stories of the girls saved from fates worse than death which a44eared in the articles and boo7s issued by the 4a4er were matched by the e<4eriences of the subscribers1 :ne man told how a #arty lad riding in a train saw a German girl offered a banana by a Dew sitting in the same com4artment and but for the fortunate 4resence of the NaHi =doubtless himself> she would inevitably have fallen victim to his wily a44roach1 8treicher carried a riding whi4 as he strode through his Gau and his 4ersonal life was enlivened as doHens of 4eo4le testified during his many trials by beatings that he li7ed to administer in the 4resence of witnesses1 :nce he visited the Nuremberg ,ail where a young man was im4risoned for some minor offense and with two friends watching him beat the youth with a

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page_4! #age /' whi41 Ee felt relieved he said after thatC he often needed to wor7 off his tensions in this fashion1 Another time he was accused of ra4e and he was over and over again sued for libel1 The #arty Bon0en found his mendacity and thievery too muchC li7e his anti-8emitism they were gross1 -hat he stole was meant to enrich him1 This was different from the case of Goering?s art collection which went to the semiofficial Barinhall and then 4erha4s later might go to the Feich1 The in@uiry into his activities 4roved that he made a good deal of money by way of the transfer of Dewish 4ro4erties in his Gau1 A Dewish factory house or car that had to be ??AryaniHedI was normally sold at figures fi<ed by the 8tate1 -hile the Dewish owners rarely if ever got the amount the government agency said was the fair value of the 4ro4erty the IAryanI buyer was su44osed to 4ay the official sum and any difference between the selling 4rice and the official 4rice was to benefit the Feich1 But 8treicher and his friends were too e<4erienced in the illegal byways of the #arty and too firmly convinced of their rights to the 4er@uisites due them to be ta7en in by this law1 The corru4tion in Nuremberg was such that the Goering commission investigating 8treicher was able to return ') *)%1*& FM to the vaults of the Feich1 :n the average ($ 4er cent of the official 4rice was 4aid by friends of 8treicher for the Dewish 4ro4erty they ac@uired and in some of the e<changes thousands of mar7s could be made in a day1 :ne man 4aid ($$ FM for an automobile with a ta< value of ( %0$ FM then made a gift of ($$ FM to the 8A1 Ee thereu4on gave the car to his brother who ran a garage because he himself already had a car1 A Gauamtsleiter named 8choeller was able for 0 $$$ FM to get a 4iece of land valued at 0$ $$$ FM1 Another 4ro4erty bought for / &$$ FM was sold a wee7 later for /% $$$ FM1 % :ne city councilor was given a .hristmas 4resent of % $$$ FM and other smaller gifts as well by a grateful constituent who had bought a 4iece of 4ro4erty advantageously1 The councilor himself was e<4ected to ma7e a 4resent to the #arty organiHation in this case the Bund Deutscher Maedel but he never got around to doing that1 Another official was given large sums(0 $$$ FM (( $$$ FM and (& $$$ FM at various timesand cars were 4ut at his dis4osal for his friendly aid on behalf of a buyer1 -ith the hel4 of men li7e these 4ro4erty could be e<changed among friends and official city forms could be filled out and filed without @uestion1 8treicher bought a factory the Mars -er7e for 0 4er cent of its face value 4aying 0 '$$ FM instead of the ((& 0$$ FM at which it was valued1 Ee did very well as may be seen by the fact that he sold a villa he owned on 9a7e .onstance to the Eungarian .onsul in Munich for &/$ $$$ FM a transaction that was com4leted without the .onsul?s even bothering to ta7e a loo7 before he bought1 8treicher testified at Nuremberg that he had never been 4aid for his services as Gauleiter1 Ee obviously needed no salary of such relatively modest 4ro4ortions1* 6or all these elaborate dealings and for his 4ersonal vices 8treicher was re4rimanded from time to time and in (*/$ he was finally de4rived by Eitler

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page_4" #age /+ of his #arty 4ost of Gauleiter1 But eminences of the #arty continued to visit him and he continued to hold his editorial 4osition and to engage in writing1 6irst and foremost he was a crusading anti-8emite the anti-8emite of Germany one of the old fighters of the movement1 It was hard for the 6uehrer to thin7 that any man with those @ualifications would be ca4able of dee4 wrong to the world?s foremost Aryan state1 8treicher set the crane in motion that started the demolition of the main synagogue in Nuremberg1 Ee told the court that 4eo4le had com4lained that it contrasted incongruously with the rest of the architecture of the old city so he had ordered its destruction1 But he had a good deal of hel41 9ater at the time of the modestly named (ristallnacht it was the Nuremberg fire de4artment that burned down the remaining synagogues although a number of observers 4ointed out that the 4o4ulation as a whole disa44roved of the wanton damage1 At Nuremberg 8treicher declared that he had shared this disa44roval although at the time he wrote editorials saying the Dews got what they deserved1 8treicher wrote at great length on the ritual murders committed by the Dews and devoted a s4ecial number of er Stuermer to the to4ic1 The Dews he told a mass meeting of the Anti-Dewish -orld 9eague in (*)0 were 4re4aring for the greatest ritual murder of all timea new war1 ($ Ee demonstrated that the Dews were res4onsible for the de4ression the unem4loyment and the inflation in GermanyC that Dews were white slaversC that *$ 4er cent of the 4rostitutes in Germany were brought to their 4rofession by DewsC that Dews had ta7en over the businesses and best lands of the indulgent GermansC and that Dews who had swarmed in from the !ast had become millionaires in a short time1 Ee @uoted alleged Dewish sources which said it was legal and moral to violate a non-Dewish girl who was more than three years old1 Dews believed he declared that .hrist?s mother was a whore that .hrist?s real name was Ben 8tuda =whore?s son>1(( They also believed he wrote that .hristian money had no real owner and that Dews had every right to ta7e it away1 In fact according to 8treicher the Dews believed that all non-Dewish women were whores and that a marriage between a Dew and a .hristian was really whoredom1 Ee said too that Dews held it to be a great sin for a Dew to ma7e a 4resent to a .hristianC he might hel4 the 4oor and visit the sic7 but this would only be a cover for his sinister activities1 The Dew was the eternal racial enemy the Mar<ist the Bolshevi7 and the ca4italist wire-4uller1 8treicher foamed against all this and the slavery of interest as well1 8treicher?s teachings were re4eated albeit in more refined form by many of his betters1 Any number of the res4ectable Germans testifying at Nuremberg or writing de4ositionsgenerals and di4lomats and character witnessesstated that the crude anti-8emitism of the #arty fanatics was of course re4ugnant to them but at the same time the !astern Dews who were different from the German Dews had swarmed in from #oland after -orld -ar I and had done a land-office business during the German inflation and

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page_4# #age /% de4ression to the enormous disadvantage not only of the German 4eo4le but also of their own fellow Dews the victims of the anti-8emitism the !astern Dews unleashed1 The writers of er Stuermer and other anti-8emite 4ublications invented stories that the more so4histicated of their countrymen thought funny or ridiculous1 6or e<am4le there was the story of a #olish count who forced a neighbor?s Dewish serfs to climb trees and call out ??cuc7oo I and would then shoot them and declare he had 7illed a cuc7oo not a Dew1 And to a44ease his neighbor he would ma7e him a 4resent of ten of his own Dews1 -hile the more normal NaHis bal7ed at stories of shooting Dews out of trees they shoo7 their heads over the 4resence of Dews in Germany and said too many of them were there1 German action against the Dews was stimulated by #oland?s anti-8emitic legislation1 The #olish Government announced in (*)% that anyone holding a #olish 4ass4ort who had lived outside #oland for five years would lose his citiHenshi41 The Feich 4rom4tly moved to e<4el #olish Dews and when the #oles refused to acce4t them these e<iles with no legal status of any 7ind would often move bac7 and forth for wee7s in a no-man?s-land between the borders1 It was the son of such a family who shot vom Fath in the #aris !mbassy of the German Government on November + (*)% and this gave Goebbels the 4rete<t for organiHing the 4ogrom of the (ristallnacht1 Nothing 8treicher wrote was far from the 6uehrer?s own thin7ing1 Eitler had written in Mein (am2f: IThe blac7haired Dew-boy lur7s for hours his face set in a satanic leer waiting for the blissfully ignorant girl whom he defiles with his blood1I (& 6or foreign consum4tion such statements were watered down1 6or e<am4le when 6ric7 addressed the foreign di4lomats in Berlin in (*)/ he used the same statistics as 8treicher but e<4lained how fairly and decently the Dews were being de4rived of their ,obs and means of living1 8ince foreigners were li7ely to be s@ueamish he added that the "nited 8tates too had its immigration laws designed to 4rotect its racial integrity1 Against 8treicher?s violent attac7s the Dews before Eitler?s coming to 4ower too7 legal and e<tralegal measures designed to awa7en the 4ublic conscience1 They sued 8treicher and often were awarded damages: sums of &$$ FM and )$$ FM1 8ometimes 8treicher was sentenced to ,ail where he stayed for a few days before returning to his 4a4er and his onslaughts1 In the early (*&$?s individual Dews even invaded the beer halls where the NaHi s4ea7ers tal7ed to audiences of u4 to 0 $$$1 A rabbi rose to his feet after the notorious Dew-baiter FuetH had s4o7en and des4ite catcalls and boos tried to answer FuetH?s charges that the Talmud en,oins the Dews when they go to war to fight in the rear lines so they can be first in the retreat1 The rabbi was escorted to the doorC his five friends were struc7 and 4ushed around before being e<4elled from the hall1 FuetH had declared that the Dews tried to 4revent the dissemination of the Talmud1 The rabbi re4lied that on the contrary many co4ies were available in the city library1 8houts and beatings were the only result1

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page_4$ #age /* In the (*&$?s and on into the late (*)$?swell after the NaHis were entrenched in 4oweran attem4t was made to counterattac7 the anti-8emite 4ro4aganda by organiHations of Dewish veterans of -orld -ar I who had fought in the front lines for Germany or as they had then believed for their country1 :ne such grou4 was made u4 of Aionists who favored emigration1 :thers li7e the Fenewal Movement of German Dews =!rneuerungsbewegung der ,uedischen Deutschen> wanted to ta7e 4art somehow in the rebuilding of Germany even under the National 8ocialists1 The 4olice records disclose orders to forbid s4ea7ers for such assimilationist grou4s from addressing Dewish audiences but 4ermitting the Aionist s4ea7ers to a44ear before meetings1 () At this time Eimmler Goering Bormann and the rest were thin7ing in terms of a solution that would rid Germany of its Dews by emigration forced and voluntary1 Madagascar as a 4ossible Dewish colony was first tal7ed about in (*)%1 The Dewish war veterans wrote letters of e<hortation and 4rotest to one another and to NaHi officials saying they too wanted to 4artici4ate in Germany?s renewal1 6ollowing the NaHi cult of 4hysical fitness they called on the sons and daughters of their membershi4 to come out for e<ercise1 8ometimes they were even useful to the Governmentfor e<am4le during the :lym4ic Games of (*)' when the #ro4aganda Ministry utiliHed the occasion to im4ress world o4inion with German tolerance as well as the e<em4lary health and 4hysi@ue of its 4eo4le1 The members of the Ma77abi and the Dewish 6ront 9ine 8oldiers were 4ermitted for a few wee7s to use German athletic fields on certain daysat hours when they would not contaminate the Aryan 4o4ulation that 4layed games there1 As 4art of their counterattac7 they 4ut out in Nuremberg a news4a4er called first the Anti;Stuermer and later The Light1 8treicher went on telling the Germans how the Dews were 4oisoning them how 8alvarsan according to an eminent medical 4ractitioner?s article in er Stuermer was really a 4oison and had never cured anyone of sy4hilis1 The doctor !rwin 8ilber was one of the innumerable so-called ??FeformI doctors who flourished in Germanymen who o44osed Ischool medicineI and relied on a thera4y of herbs and diets1 8ilber said that the drug not only had cured no one but had caused brain damage1 Ee had written a 4am4hlet on the sub,ect and the article about him in er Stuermer declared that he too was a fuehrer and Iwe should follow his leadershi41I 8treicher 4ublished e<citing stories for children made s4eeches to them and wrote 4lays for them1 The children res4onded1 :ne of them wrote to reveal that his aunt traded at Dewish stores and another offered to su44ly a list of the customers who dealt with a Dewish firm1 8treicher arranged 4u44et shows1 In a gathering on .hristmas !ve he told his audience of children that the father of the Devil was the Dew1 Then he as7ed them I-ho is the father of the DevilOI and the children chorused IThe DewP The

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page_ 0 #age 0$ DewP?? Dee4 as was his feeling for the little Germans he tal7ed to he had not a shred of sym4athy for the children of the abominable race1 -hen they were e<cluded ste4 by ste4 from the 4ublic life of Germanyfrom the theaters the motion 4ictures the schoolshe wrote I;es they are wee4ing now but their tears will do them no good1I "nder his im4rint 4icture boo7s for children were 4ublished showing drawings of blond German children ,eering while Dewish children had to leave school I.rying wee4ing fury and anger doesn?t hel41 Away with the Dewish Brood I wrote the author1 (/ 8ome of 8treicher?s articles must have seemed badly timed to the 6uehrer1 In Danuary (*)% the 9ondon Ne,s *hronicle re4orted that Eitler had banned er Stuermer for a 4eriod because of an article advocating the death 4enalty for Dews who had relations with Aryan women1 The law that 4rovided for such a 4enalty was actually decreed after the war began1 8treicher had always been clear in his understanding of what Eitler meant and what needed to be done1 In a s4eech in A4ril (*&0 he said that it was time to destroy the Dews1(0 At the start of the war in 8e4tember (*)* a letter in er Stuermer urged that the Dewish 4eo4le be e<terminated root and branch1 IThe Dewish @uestion I 8treicher wrote in that same month Iwon?t find its solution by way of emotional reactions MAffekt; Han)lungenN but through disci4line and seeing into the future1I Eitler too commented on the differences between emotional anti-8emitism and what he called Ithe anti-8emitism of reason1I In a letter written as early as 8e4tember (*(* he had said that the anti-8emitism of reason had to follow a 4lanned legal getting rid =Beseitigung> of the Dewsand no wonder for the same letter declared that Dews were the cause of racial tuberculosis1(' Neither Eitler nor 8treicher was ever to change his mind nor were their minds ever at odds on this issue so fundamental to their fi<ed ideas1 er Stuermer had had a to4 circulation of between '$$ $$$ and %$$ $$$1 During the war it averaged (0$ $$$ to &$$ $$$1(+ But its covert readershi4 and its influence were e<tensive1 It served the tastes and beliefs of a wider audience than ,ust the subscribers for 8treicher delighted in tales of blood and murder and death and so did his readers1 In May (*)* three months before the 4act with the 8oviet "nion was signed er Stuermer 4ublished an article that said IThere must be a 4unitive e<4edition against the Dews in Fussia a 4unitive e<4edition which will 4rovide the same fate for them that every murderer and criminal must e<4ect: death sentence and e<ecution1 The Dews in Fussia must be 7illed1 They must be utterly e<terminated1 Then the world will see that the end of the Dews is also the end of Bolshevism1I (% :n :ctober )( (*)* 8treicher told a German audience IThis is our mission at home to a44roach these future decisions without hesitation to do our duty and to remain strong1 -e 7now the enemy we have called him by name for the last twenty years: he is the -orld Dew1 And we 7now that the Dew must die1I (* !arly in Danu-

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page_ 1 #age 0( ary (*/$ er Stuermer declared editorially ??The time is near when a machine will go into motion which is going to 4re4are a grave for the world?s criminalDudahfrom which there will be no resurrection1I :n Duly / the 4a4er declared I#ogroms were at all times demonstrations of the will of the 4eo4le1I A little later it said IDewry is criminality1 The Dewish rabble will be e<terminated li7e weeds and vermin1I 8treicher found su44orters and friends not only in Germany but in Anglo 8a<on and other countries as well1 In May (*)0 he had written to the British 6ascist :swald Mosley congratulating him on a s4eech1 Mosley had re4lied to than7 him and to say that as long as the Dews still governed 4eo4le the world would not be liberated1 I!verywhere I he wrote Ithe Dew is in 4ower1I 8treicher?s views were shared as late as (*/' in the notes written by Dodl in Nuremberg after he was sentenced in which the condemned general said that the NaHi 4rogram had not been all evil that Eitler had aimed at ridding Germany of the shac7les of the Gersailles iktat of Mar<ism and the conce4t of the class struggle and of the cultural and economic domination of the life of Germany by the Dews1 To some degree this 7ind of a4ologia a44eared in the testimony of all the defendants at Nuremberg as well as in the stoc7 of beliefs of any number of enlightened Germans whether of the Army or 4olitics or industry1 8treicher was charged on two counts in the indictment: having cons4ired to commit aggressive warfare and committing crimes against humanity1 Ee made a 4oor a44earance on the witness stand with his shaven bullethead and incoherent fulminations against his enemies who were all around him1 Ee seemed both insane and criminal1 Ee told the court that he had been beaten u4 by American Negro soldiers after his arrest1 This testimony was struc7 from the record on Dustice Dac7son?s motion1 If the testimony had been 4ermitted the court would have had to conduct an investigation1 8treicher?s accusations were li7ely to be illusionary but this one may have been true1 Ee fought in o4en court with his lawyer an able attorney by the name of Mar< over the manner in which Mar< was conducting the case1 Aside from the accusation of having 4lotted aggressive warfare there was not much that 8treicher could be defended against1 Mar< @uestioning his client as carefully as 4ossible nevertheless was unable to avoid touching off 4aranoid reactions1 8treicher was shar4ly re4rimanded by the #resident of the .ourt and told he would be sent bac7 to his cell if he did not behave himself1 Mr1 Dustice Fobert Dac7son wanted him cited for contem4t of court but the 4resident @uietly told Mar< to resume his @uestioning1 8treicher made s4eeches again but this time to a critical audience1 IIf it is 4roved that someone I he shouted wildly Isays that we are forcing Eitler into war then I can certainly say that a man who 7nows that Eitler is being forced into war is a mass murderer1I NaHi Germany he declared had 4ermitted the same freedom of the 4ress as the democratic countries1 -hen as7ed why

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page_ 2 #age 0& he had beaten u4 a man =he had done this in one of his sadistic onsets> he said that his victim had behaved in such a cowardly fashion that it became necessary to chastise him1 &$ Ee was ca4able of crude 4olitical gestures that com4orted with the NaHi view that a man who had committed even a serious transgression might still be saved if he were Aryan1 Ee told the court how in his benevolence he had given an annual .hristmas 4arty in the (*)$?s in the Deutscher Eof in Nuremberg for men let out for the day from the nearby concentration cam4 at Dachau1&( But there was really not much that could be dug u4 in his defense1 The other dedicated anti-8emites of his stri4e among his fellow 4risoners were @uiet now and even turned their bac7s on him1 Ee had been the most cons4icuous 4reacher of the crusade they had all ,oined but now that the words were heard out of conte<t they sounded li7e Hombi shrie7sshrill ranting filled with hateand the other defendants wanted nothing to do with them1 8till the 4osition of the ??correctI ones at Nuremberg and in the rest of Germany had somehow to be ,ustified1 6or these 4eo4le there was the other argument shared by millionsof re4utable well-meaning citiHens that while the e<cesses of the 8treichers were of course de4lorable they themselves had never countenanced or 4artici4ated in them1 They told one another and the court at Nuremberg that there had been too many Dewish lawyers doctors and university 4rofessors and too much Dewish influence in the cultural life of Germanyits theater music boo7s news4a4ers1 6urthermore the Dews from the !ast had made enormous sums from the German inflation1 It was never e<4lained by what blac7 magic these !astern Dews s4ea7ing little or no German and themselves im4overished managed these wonders against even the com4etition of their German coreligionists1 There were too many rich Dews too many Dewish ban7ers too few Dewish farmers1 =In one NaHi view the city was corru4t morally enervating1 .ity 4eo4le had no o44ortunity of breathing the fresh +olkish air that sustained farmers1> The Germans had wanted to get rid of the Dews by shi44ing them to Madagascar or some other remote 4lace =although the argument here could become circular for it was widely held that if trans4orted the Dews would form a center of the cons4iracy against Germany and they should therefore not be allowed to emigrate to #alestine or Madagascar or anywhere else>1 No 4lace on earth e<isted for Dews1 Ghettos were centers of crime but if Dews lived outside them it would be re4ulsive to the healthy racial sense of the Germans to have to see them in the trains restaurants and other 4ublic 4laces1 This attitude was e<em4lified in the case of two 88 men who in the course of the war against #oland had 7illed fifty unarmed Dews1 In defense it was said that one of the 88 men was es4ecially sensitive on the Dewish @uestion and had unfortunately been given a gun while he guarded the Dews who were members of a wor7ing 4arty1 The chance coming together of the Dewish wor7ers the sensitive 88 man and the gun that was handed to him resulted

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page_ 3 #age 0) in the shootings1 There was an Army trial of this crime conducted by German officers1 The Army 4rosecution as7ed for death sentences but the men were sentenced to nine years? and three years? im4risonment res4ectively1 Both however were 4ardoned as 4art of a general amnesty after a few months1 The Army in trying them at all was following a tradition that had gone out of fashion1 Eitler had ordered that no 4enalties be im4osed on soldiers who attac7ed or 7illed Dews1 The Army had managed to water down the effect of this invitation to mayhem and murder by declaring that the order a44lied only in cases when a soldier was not acting for his 4ersonal advantage1 && In the Feich the ste4s toward a violent solution of the Dewish 4roblem were gradual1 The mythical crimes such as ritual murder =beloved of the early issues of er Stuermer> and the tales of seduction ra4e thievery and blood lust =ranging from the orthodo< slaughter of animals to the alleged finding of a child?s body from which the blood had been drained> were 4art of an anachronistic lunatic fol7lore that went bac7 to the medieval belief that the Devil was a Dew1 But the legends of Dewish enrichment at the e<4ense of honest and e<4loited Germans of the Dewish ca4italist in league with an international cabal of the Fight or with the Dewish .ommunists came closer to the cons4iratorial solutions that were 4art of the fol7lore of the twentieth century1 8uch legends too7 root es4ecially among 4rovincial unso4histicated 4eo4les as may be seen in the anti-.atholic anti-Negro anti-yellow crusades of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the "nited 8tates and other countries1 The doctrines of race and of the innate desirable and undesirable characters of sections of man7ind not only were widely acce4ted by the half-educated but also 4reached by the learned1 A Nobel #riHe winner in 4hysics #rofessor #hili44 9enard would one day s4ea7 u4 on behalf of a ??German 4hysics1I The head of anthro4ology of the Baiser -ilhelm Institut in Berlin a44eared at a meeting with 88 men to discuss what might be done to get rid of inferior races in the !ast1 There was no lac7 of res4ectability for the race theory that won the hearts of millions of Germans1 Facial animus raged through Germany as it did in 6rance !astern !uro4e and 4arts of the American 8outh and North1 But in Germany it came to 4ower through a siHable minority and bolstered by a theoretical structure1 The racial doctrine in its most dogmatic and fanatical form 8treicher made his ownC he concentrated on the subhuman @ualities of one Irace I although er Stuermer also too7 for granted the inferiority of the Negro1 But once the blac7 6rench regiments had left the Fhine Negroes held little interest for 8treicher1 The Germans who later o44osed the violent measuresand many of them did =the 8D and other eyewitness re4orts are filled with e<am4les of 4ublic resentment>could do little about it1 The German 4o4ulation reacted unfavorably to the boycott of Dewish stores led by 8treicher in (*)) the burning of the synagogues and the destruction of other Dewish 4ro4erty as was remar7ed by 8treicher the 8D and foreign

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page_ 4 #age 0/ observers1 But 4ublic o4inion was of little im4ortanceC it was merely something to be mani4ulated1 The German 4o4ulation as a whole did not 7now until after the war of the e<istence of e<termination cam4s1 This was a closely held secret des4ite Allied broadcasts and handbills distributed by the Fesistance whose members o4erated at the ris7 of their lives1 The 8treichers who 7new of them were enthusiastic1 8treicher?s mind was filled with 4hantoms and much of his life was lived second hand1 Ee had a large collection of 4ornogra4hy1 &) A servant girl who wor7ed for him was e<amined at his re@uest for her virginity because she had 4reviously wor7ed for a Dew who had a .hristian wife1 In (*)% he as7ed the inmates of the concentration cam4 at Dachau whether ther wives were faithful and if they said ??yesI as7ed them how they could 7now1 Ee @uestioned children about their se< 4racticesfor e<am4le whether they masturbated1 Ee told them that he himself had nightly wet dreams and once showed his chauffeur the semen to 4rove it1 The disci4line committee of the 4ublic school system that reviewed 8treicher?s case in (*&% 4ointed out that he had been re4eatedly 4unished for criminal slanderC that in (*&& he had 4aid a fine of & $$$ FM on the com4laint of members of the Dewish communityC and that in (*&) he was fined ($ million FM for having said that a Dew had wanted to murder an anti-8emitic s4ea7er =this was the year of the inflation and ($ million FM was an insignificant sum>1 In May (*&/ when the currency had been revalued he 4aid a &$$-FM fine for slander and in Dune he had to 4ay another &$$ FM or go to ,ail for twenty days for the same offense1 Ee 4aid &$$ FM for saying that a #arty member he disli7ed had ta7en food from a canteen during -orld -ar I and he was fined & ($$ FM for having accused a man of adultery1 In December (*&0 he was sentenced to two months in ,ail for having written that the mayor of Nuremberg an old o44onent named 9u44e did favors for relatives and for the Dews1 The school disci4line committee that e<amined the evidence against him sentenced 8treicher to another 0$$-FM fine but in e<tenuation 4ointed out that he had served twenty-four years in the school system and had a good war record1 They censured the conduct of the mayor who they said while on an official visit had gone into an old-clothes store and bought an overcoat which they considered undignified behavior1 -hile 8treicher headed the lunatic fringe of the #arty his betters were not far behind1 :ne learned man 8taatsrat #rofessor Burt Astel 4rofessor for research on human heredity and race 4olitics =menschliche Erbforschung un) /assen2olitik> at the "niversity of Dena answered the hy4othetical @uestion whether his daughter should be 4ermitted to marry a man one of whose eight great-grand4arents was a Dew1 Ee would have to tell his daughter he said that she should not enter into such a marriage because she would then have Dewish relatives1 In -orld -ar I he said he had met Dews who too7 4ride in their ancestry1 :ne man for e<am4le one-@uarter Dew had told

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page_ #age 00 him that while the other three-@uarters of his ancestors and all of Astel?s were climbing trees the Dews had a flourishing culture1 Now declared Astel a German hero in the 4erson of Adolf Eitler had a44eared and one cannot ma7e a com4romise with this 4roblem1 The country must be not only free of Dews but free of 4eo4le with Dewish ancestry1 &/ The 4rotests of 4atriotic Dews in the early days of the NaHi regimefor e<am4le a letter written in (*)/ by the former com4any commander of a 8a<on regiment a Dew saying that the anti-Dewish demonstrations in Eamburg had unfortunately been seen by many foreigners at a time when the German Government was negotiating a commercial treaty with the !nglish were 7e4t in the 8treicher files but they might as well have been thrown in the wastebas7et1 The former Dewish commander wrote that such actions harmed the German fatherland of the Dews and the Aryans as well1 The Dews he said had suffered a great deal in silence but he was writing this letter in the interest of Germany1 !very German should try to 4revent foreign misunderstanding of Germany and the singing of such NaHi songs as one heard in 9ei4Hig should in the Feich?s interest be forbidden1 Ee ho4ed that the Gauleitung would understand his concern for the German fatherland and signed the letter ??-ith the German greetingPIthe closest to IEeil EitlerI he could 4ossibly come1 Another letter written in (*)) by the Association of Dewish -ar Geterans said they wanted to do their share in resha4ing the German fatherland1 This letter had been sent to er Stuermer by a reader who was indignant over the arrogance of the Dews in 4resuming to want to hel41L The 4lans for sending the Dews to Madagascar or 4ermitting Mischlinge to 7ee4 4ositions in industry which Fudolf Eess a44roved of for a time seem mild enough when com4ared with actual events1 In November (*)% a year in which Dews were still 4ermitted to have S2ortsvereine their right to wear the uniforms of the German or Austrian armies was revo7ed1 8ome- L The Army had similar documents =MA-)(>1 :ne member of the organiHation in a letter to #resident Eindenburg in March (*)/ said that many of the Dews in the Army had been rooted in Germany for decades and had done their duty as soldiers1 -hat they wanted was to be honorably incor4orated into the NaHi 8tate and this he considered to be im4ortant not only from the 4oint of view of the Dews but for the Germans too1 In -orld -ar I he said ($$ $$$ Dews had served in the German Army1 A letter from the IAryanI wife of a #olish-born Dew said that two of her brothers had been 7illed in action fighting for Germany that her four children were ba4tiHed .hristians and that her husband had been converted1 8he added that under the Nuremberg 9aws the family would be cast out of the German community1 The Ministry re4lied =Dan1 (' (*)'> that it regretted it could not hel4 since it was a civil not a military case1 9etters of a44eal were also written to Eitler on behalf of Dewish notaries who had been wounded in -orld -ar I many of them with high war decorations1 "nder the decree on 4rofessions they had to give u4 their 4ractices as did Dewish doctors and other 4rofessionals1 .ould they not serve Dewish clients they as7ed or be 4ermitted to go on with their wor7 if they had been in 4ractice for many yearsO 8ome of them were still suffering from war in,uries1 Nothing came of these letters1 But while Eindenburg was alive Eitler had to deal far more carefully with Dewish war veterans than he would later1

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page_ ! #age 0' times for 4ro4agandistic or 4ractical reasons the 4olicies evidenced a dece4tive thaw but they hardened ine<orably in the direction of the 6inal 8olution1 In (*)0 the Ministry of the Interior decided that in a factory owned by Dews the Feich flag could be hoisted if the ma,ority of the wor7ers were Aryans1 -ith the :lym4ic Games coming u4 the Ministry also announced that it did not want signs saying ??Dews Not -antedI to be seen in 4ublic 4laces1 Fe4orts were reaching the -ilhelmstrasse that 4artici4ation in the :lym4ic Games might be canceled by a number of countries in which the 4ublic reacted strongly against the Feich?s treatment of Dews1 That was the reason the Dewish organiHations of war veterans were given 4ermission to use s4ort fields1 Eitler and the 6oreign :ffice were determined even at the 4rice of ma7ing concessions to the Dews to hold the games1 The floodlights of 4ro4aganda to be turned on for the visitors from all over the world were so useful to the NaHis that they could 4ermit a handful of Dews to 4lay games together1 Dews were also given the right to have their own youth hostels but not more than twenty guests could be 4resent at a time1 The last signs of leniency were accorded the 4eo4le who were accounted neither Dews nor Germans: a 6uehrer order of August % (*/$ 4ermitted the use of Mischlinge of the first grade =that is those with two Dewish grand4arents> in the Army as su4erior officers1 But such men were always under sus4icionsoldiers with the brand of .ain u4on them1 :ne of them a submarine officer when as7ed at Nuremberg by a 4rosecution lawyer if he had belonged to the #arty said in sur4rise II could not belong to the #arty because of the Nuremberg 9aws1I Ee nevertheless had been awarded high decorations owing to the friendly attitude of his immediate su4erior in the German Navy which remained relatively free of the security forces? snoo4ing after sus4icious 4ersons1 But this submarine officer was an anomaly1 The last words Eitler wrote in the bun7er were a call to carry on the battle against the Dews1 8treicher was a restless 4risoner at Nuremberg1 !ven before he was sentenced to be hanged he had nightmares and cried out in his slee4 disturbing the 4risoners whose cells were near his1 The court found him not guilty of having cons4ired to wage aggressive warfare since he had ta7en no 4art in the 4lans for invasions and had not been a military 4olitical or di4lomatic adviser to Eitler1 No one had 4aid attention to anything he had said e<ce4t on the one sub,ect he had made his own1 8treicher was the first among the Bon0en to 4reach 4ublicly the e<termination of the Dews and when he heard that the death cam4s were in action he celebrated this as an achievement1 Ee tore the veil from the res4ectable bourgeois anti8emites who shran7 from him1 9ong before the -annsee .onference he told the Germans that the Dews had to be destroyed1 In (*&0 he warned his readers I;ou must realiHe the Dews want our 4eo4le to 4erish1I If that was soand 8treicher and thousands of others were convinced it wasit followed that the Dews must be e<terminated root and branch1 Ee told a Nuremberg audience on A4ril ) (*&0 I6or thousands of years the Dews have been destroying

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page_ " #age 0+ 4eo4lesC ma7e a beginning today MsoN that we can destroy the Dew1?? &0 In (*)+ he said IThe Dew always lives from the blood of other 4eo4les he needs such murders and such sacrifices1 1 1 1 The victory will be only entirely and finally achieved when the whole world is free of Dews1I&' In (*/) with the gas chambers wor7ing at full ca4acity he wrote that Adolf Eitler was indeed freeing the world of its Dewish tormentors and that this Iwill be the greatest deed in the history of man7ind1I&+ And in er Stuermer Danuary ' (*// he wrote IDevelo4ments since the rise of National 8ocialism ma7e it 4robable that the continent will be freed from its Dewish destroyers of 4eo4le and e<4loiters forever and the German e<am4le after the German victory in -orld -ar II will also serve to bring about the destruction of the Dewish world tormentors on other continents1I&% 8treicher never changed his mind1 Nothing affected his 4rivate world1 Eis last words when he mounted the ste4s to the gallows were IEeil Eitler1I Notes (1 Ale<ander Bein I er mo)erne Antisemitismus un) seine Be)eutung fuer )ie %u)enfrage I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 / (*0% 441 )/$'$1 &1 Eans Buchheim Martin BrosHat Eans-Adolf Dacobsen Eelmut Brausnic7 Anatomie )es SS;Staates Gol1 II =:lten and 6reiburg i1 Br1: -alter-Gerlag (*'0> 41 &*'1 )1 Dohn Dos #assos I er Autokoenig. Cum Bil)e von Henry "or) I in Sue))eutsche Ceitung May 02' (*'&1 /1 :tto Dietrich (& %ahre mit Hitler =Munich: Isar Gerlag (*00> 41 (+&1 01 .ount 9utH 8chwerin von Brosig7 Es geschah in eutschlan) =Tuebingen and 8tuttgart: Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*0&> 41 &'01 '1 !er .stAsO =Berlin: Degener Gerlag (*)0> 41 (0+)1 +1 er Stuermer Danuary (* (*&+ =B1D1.1>1 %1 N TTGIII (+0+-#8 41 ($)1 *1 .bi)1 441 00&)/1 ($1 N TTTGIII $$&-M 441 ((((&1 ((1 %ue)ische Selbstbekenntnisse =9ei4Hig: Eammer Gerlag (*&*>1 (&1 Adolf Eitler Mein (am2f =Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*/(> .ha41 TI I+olk un) /asse I 41 )0+1 ()1 Eans Mommsen I er nationalso0ialistische -oli0eistaat un) )ie %u)enverfolgung vor (*)% I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 T No1 ( (*'& 441 '%%+1 (/1 !lvira Bauer Ein Bil)erbuch fuer 6ross un) (lein =Nuremberg: 8tuermerGerlag (*)'>1 Suoted in )&-M1 (01 N*A GIII $()-M 41 ((1 ('1 I9etter to Gemlich 8e4tember (' (*(* I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 & (*0* 441 &$)01 (+1 N TII 41 )/&1

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page_ # #age 0% (%1 .bi)1 %((-D 41 )0%1 (*1 N*A G &0%)-#8 41 )((1 &$1 N TII 441 ))% ))* )'%1 &(1 .bi)1 41 ))/1 &&1 N TT 441 //*0( also N TTTG /&(-D 441 *(*)1 &)1 8chwerin von Brosig7 o2. cit.1 &/1 %u)enfragen 6ebruary ($ (*// =B1D1.1>1 &01 N TTTGIII $()-M 41 (&&1 &'1 .bi)1 $$/-M 441 ((&()1 &+1 .bi)1 ()'-M 441 (%+%*1 &%1 .bi)1 (0$-M 41 (*(1

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page_ $ #age 0* ) The Number-Two Man Eermann -ilhelm Goering In contrast to the disre4utable 8treicher and sitting on the same front bench with him at Nuremberg was the man who had been Feichsmarschall the ran7ing military officer in the Third Feichan art lover a war hero with the highest German decoration of -orld -ar I =#our le MJrite> but also a narcotics addict and 4lunderer on a monumental scaleEermann -ilhelm Goering1 During the trial Goering a44eared in a uniform =his 4ants were 4ressed every day by the 4rison tailor> that was much too large for him for he weighed only (0) 4ounds as against the &+0 in the days of his high living1 8ince his cell had no mirror he made use of the dar7 suit of his visiting attorney as a bac7ground to ma7e the glass 4artition se4arating them into a loo7ing glass that reflected the state of his hair1 Goering had always had an eye on the gallery1 At the trial with his eye on history he 4layed the role of the leader of the lost cause the defeated but faithful 4aladin of the 6uehrer true to the end to his liege lord1 -hen the defendants too7 their midday meals together he too7 it u4on himself to organiHe them into some sort of agreement to 4resent a 4atriotic and united front to the enemy1 L -hen he did not li7e the testimony of one witness he audibly called him a Sch,ein as the man left the stand and went by the 4risoners? doc71 Ee told his lawyer with gratification that DoenitH now realiHed that his a44ointment as the 6uehrer?s successor was no more L At first the 4risoneis too7 their midday meals together1 9ater they ate in grou4s of four with the e<ce4tion of Goering who ate alone in his cell1

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page_!0 #age '$ than a flu7ethat only a misunderstanding had 4revented the 6uehrer from carrying out his long-established commitment to Goering1 In his o4inion either Eimmler or Bormann had interce4ted his letter to the 6uehrer e<4laining that the Feichsmarschall had believed he was carrying out Eitler?s orders in offering to negotiate with the Allies on the 6uehrer?s behalf1 Ee could never acce4t the fact that Eitler had finally turned against him1 Ee told his lawyer trium4hantly that he was now the ac7nowledged cor4oral of the defendants1 But he could scarcely conceal what everyone in the courtroom heardnamely that most of the defendants thought little more of him than they did of the other to4-ran7ing #arty leaders who had brought them all to the shadow of the gallows1 8chacht testified that Goering who had headed the 6our-;ear #lan for the German economy was an ignoramus in economics1 :ther witnesses told of his colossal vanity his drug addiction his abnormal habits of behavior and dress1 8chacht said he had been told that Goering had a44eared at a tea dressed as a Foman gladiator with 4ainted toenails showing in his sandals rings on his fingers and rouge on his chee7s1 During the trial Goering made no attem4t as did so many of his codefendants to 4lace the blame on others or to hide behind the cor4se of Eitler1 :n the contrary he strove to em4hasiHe the significance of his own role in the Feich1 A witness who had served under him in the 9uftwaffe 6ield Marshal !rhard Milch was as7ed when his conversation with Eitler had been re4orted to Goering and Goering answered from his 4lace in the doc7 ??Immediately1I Ee also wanted to ma7e it clear to the court that the information had come to him directly from the 6uehrer not from Milch1 Ee always e<aggerated his im4ortance1 In the course of the war Goering had gradually lost favor1 Eis decline began in (*/$ when the German Air 6orce failed to defeat the British 84itfires over 9ondonC it accelerated in (*/( when the 9uftwaffe failed to re4eat the decisive victories in Fussia that had been won in the earlier cam4aignsC it 4lunged still lower after Goering had 4romised that he could su44ly the 8i<th Army at 8talingradC and it hit bottom as the enemy bombers 4oured destruction on German cities1 After the fall of his 4restige Eimmler Bormann Goebbels and 84eer became closer to Eitler and too7 over ,obs Goering had once held1 :n A4ril &) (*/0 a s@uad of 88 men arrested him on orders of the 6uehrer signed by BormannC and on the following day they received orders to shoot the Feichsmarschall and his family if Berlin fell1 Goering could not admit in 4ublic that he had ever lost his influence with Eitler although in 4rivate conversations he confessed that beginning in (*/( Eitler had cooled toward him1 In (*// he said he was deathly sic7 from a tonsil infection but Eitler who had once been so solicitous did not even in@uire after his health1 Ee declared that Eitler would doubtless have gotten rid of him but for the Feichsmarschall?s wide influence with the German 4eo4le1 To shore u4 what remained of his colla4sed world he =li7e !ich-

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page_!1 #age '( mann> romanticiHed himself as the true hero of a historic cause1 Ee declared at Nuremberg that he had indeed meant his oath of allegiance to the 6uehrer: ??I identify my fate with yours for better or worseC I dedicate myself to you in good times and in bad even unto death1I Now he added: II really meant it and still do1I Ee was much affected by what he thought was his success or failure with an audience1 After he routed Mr1 Dustice Dac7son in their verbal duel on the 4art he had 4layed in ma7ing 4lans for war he confided his satisfaction to one of his lawyers: IDac7son is not u4 to me1I ( But when the American ,ournalists in a 4oll decided )& to o that Goering would be e<ecuted and this news was communicated to him he said he should have shot himself in August (*/01& !ven his eternal Treue to the 6uehrer was in 4art a tactic for the gallery1 In conversations with his lawyers he admitted that it would have been better if Eitler had been 7illed in an automobile accident in (*)% and that the 6uehrer?s suicide had been a betrayal of the German 4eo4le ,ust as Eitler had called the suicide of the mayor of 9ei4Higat the time the mayor and his family had died together as the American troo4s a44roached the cityIa cowardly flight from res4onsibility1I ) Goering had suicide much on his mind1 Ee came to his first 4rison with a vial of cyanide hidden in his navel secured by an adhesive1 It was found and confiscated1 Ee had told his brother that he himself would determine how and when he died and that was one of his few 4ro4hecies that came true1 I-hat am I doing here anywayOI he once as7ed at Nuremberg in a mood of des4air1 Ee thought in such moments that 4erha4s Baltenbrunner the former 88 chief was right in sayin that the court was a sham and that he too should re,ect its authority and deny everything1 But the chance of ma7ing a last heroic a44earance on a world stage was too alluringC he needed to remain even an unfroc7ed Feichsmarschall as long as he could1 Goering had been li7ed and admired by countless foreigners as well as by the Germans for an outward bonhommie that contrasted with the austerity of the vegetarian Eitler and the taut faces of so many of the dedicated Bon0en who were ma7ing a religion of their revolution1 Ee a44eared to be a good fellow given to hearty laughter and sum4tuous living1 The 4rocession of foreign di4lomats who visited him in his 4alace in Berlin and in Barinhall#oles British 6renchmen Americans Italians Da4anesefound him an amiable and hos4itable host1 6or both foreigners and Germans he was a wholesome amusing intelligent as well as cor4ulent figure a flier with a brilliant war record and a man who aimed at 4olitical targets inside Germany in building u4 its economy and air force1L 8hrewd anti-NaHi observers li7e AndrJ 6rancois #oncet .olonel DWHef Bec7 9ord Ealifa< British Ambassador Nevile Eenderson and the 8wedish Birger Dahlerus and Bnut Bonde were convinced of his desire to avoid war1 Eenderson wor7ed with him even L Goering?s bonhommie a44ealed greatly to the Germans as is evidenced by the large stoc7 of ,o7es in which he 4layed a leading and comic 4art1

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page_!2 #age '& after the invasion of #oland and Bonde until December (*)* because they thought he was the one man of influence in the Feich who o44osed the war and would do what he could for 4eace1 At the Nuremberg trial Goering had a different re4utation among his fellow 4risoners and many of the witnesses although a few of his old admirers came to his aid1 Most of those who answered @uestions about him said that he was laHy vain arrogant 4retentious and unsuccessfulC that everything in his hands had fallen to 4iecesC that he had been su4erseded in almost all his active officesC that only fragments of the vast economic em4ire he had ruled and of his 9uftwaffe had remained at the end and then he was no longer in charge of either of them1 The Allies had won com4lete air su4remacy over Germany and the foolish boast with which he had begun the warthat no Allied 4lane would dro4 a bomb on Berlinbecame grotes@ue as the German centers were destroyed by the overwhelmingly su4erior numbers of Allied 4lanes1 ??.all me Meyer I he had once said =neither the Berliners nor the rest of Germany ever forgot it> Iif a single bomb is dro44ed on Berlin1I .ast out of the #arty by Eitler as a traitor and condemned to death and long before this su44lanted in the chain of command by Eimmler and Goebbels and 84eer Goering at Nuremberg heard himself called incom4etent by a 4rocession of witnesses who testified that he was no more successful in the various ,obs that he too7 over in the course of the NaHi rebuilding of the economy than he was in his contributions to the strategy and tactics of the war1 Nevertheless he had built the 9uftwaffe from Hero to the most 4owerful air force in the world1 In his single-minded concentration on the develo4ment of German air 4ower he had when he wanted to 4rotected Dewish officers who were thrown out of their ,obs in the Army1 IA Dew is whoever I say is one in Germany I he had declared and 6ield Marshal Milch who testified for him at Nuremberg was living evidence of this1 Milch?s legal father was of Dewish blood but Milch was officially declared to be ($$ 4er cent IAryanI when it was decided that his biological father was a .hristian and not the man his mother had married1 This was one of a number of cases where Goering had decided in favor of a man he needed or li7ed or because his vanity or sentiments were a44ealed to over the rigors of the anti-Dewish laws1 But his 6emuetlichkeit could vanish @uic7ly1 It was Goering who called the -annsee .onference which 4lanned the manner in which the Dews of !uro4e were to be destroyed and who chose one of the most bloodthirsty 7illers in Germany Feinhard Eeydrich to administer the 6inal 8olution1 The solution itself he doubtless acce4ted as reluctantly as he did the war1 Ee wanted neither of them but what could he do but acce4t them without @uestion as the faithful 4aladin of the 6uehrerO Ee delighted in brandishing his authority in a44earing before the 4ublic in an array of s4ecially designed uniforms and in returning as soon as he could to the grandiose domesticity of Barin-

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page_!3 #age ') hall where he got himself u4 in costumes suitable to romantic fantasies1 In his country retreat he was the gran) seigneur1 Ee met Eerbert Eoover in an armless doublet wearing a shirt of red-brown raw sil7 and a nec7erchief thrust through with a long 4in ornamented with a green ,ewel1 / Ee strutted in his varied wardrobe before the gaHe of the Germans and of his tame lions1 Ee brought together from all the occu4ied countries one of the greatest collections of art =as he boasted> in all !uro4e if not in the world1 Ee entertained visiting di4lomats in the theatrical architecture of Barinhall where he had among other things a toy railroad on which he could dro4 a toy bomb from an air4lane that was launched from a distant corner of the huge room1 Goering was a Hoo4hile as evidenced in his love not only for lions which he 7e4t in the house but also for all four-legged or feathered creatures1 As chief forester of Germany he too7 every 4recaution to see to it that game was humanely hunted1 Tra4s of a cruel or unusual 7ind were forbidden and a retriever had to accom4any the hunter to bring in wounded birds1 The hunting codes ado4ted had to be of the 7ind that a44ealed to his warm sentiments for animals1 Ee abolished the hunt with horse and hounds1 Germans and his foreign visitors had to hunt on foot1 Neither falcons nor eagles =the symbol of the Third Feich> could be shot nor could artificial light be used to attract animals at night1 All this was 4roof of his 7een s4ortsmanshi44roof not only to himself but also to many of his !nglish visitors who made no comment when he a44eared carrying a s4ear and dressed li7e a si<teenth-century hunterC and they res4onded warmly to his 7indness to animals and his firm stand against vivisection1 ??#eo4le who torture animals insult the feelings of the German 4eo4le I he declared1 Toward the German fol7 too he harbored sentiments of abiding charity1 !ven Germans who were criminals remained Germans he said1 -hen the tal7 turned to food su44lies in a war winter he said he was certain of only one thing namely that the Germans were not to go hungry whatever ha44ened to the 4eo4le who had grown and harvested the cro4s1 Goering was born in (%*) in Fosenheim in Bavaria1 The name according to one of his biogra4hers comes from IGer I meaning boundary and Iing I a descendant10 Eermann was ne<t to the youngest of five children three sons and two daughters1 Their father Eeinrich !rnst Goering was a 4rovincial ,udge in Germany and became a German colonial official when Bismarc7 a44ointed him .ommissioner of 8outhwest Africa in (%%01 Eeinrich in addition to his administrative duties had the assignment of enlarging as far as he could the s4here of influence and the territories that Germany coming late to the colonial table had ac@uired1 Ee 4erformed his duties with considerable success and young Eermann heard much from his father of the adventurous years when 8outhwest Africa was won for the Feich1 At the time Eermann was born his father was .onsul General of Eaiti but his mother was living in Bavaria1 Eermann was brought u4 in Berlin

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page_!4 #age '/ =his father had returned to the city after retiring from government service>1 The Goerings lived for a time with a rich friend Eermann von !4enstein nominally a .hristian but of Dewish descent who had met Eeinrich Goering when they were both in Africa1 !4enstein was Eermann?s godfather and according to one source Goering?s mother 6ranHis7a was his mistress1 In any event !4enstein an eccentric self-im4ortant man hel4ed meet the e<4enses of Goering?s education and left him considerable 4ro4erty including the castle of Geldenstein where he and the Goerings had lived together1 ' Eermann attended the cadet schools in Barlsruhe and Gross-9ichterfelde as a member of the Foyal #russian .adet .or4s and served in -orld -ar I from the beginning1 Eos4italiHed for an attac7 of rheumatism in (*(/ he got bac7 into action through the Air 6orce in which he flew as an observer before he became a 4ilot1 In (*(0 he was wounded in the leg and thigh by a British flier1 By (*(+ he was leader of a grou4 in 4ursuit s@uadron X)1 The celebrated 4ilot Baron Manfred von Fichthofen whose successor he became was leader of s@uadronX(1 According to the account of a Dane .a4tain #aulli Brause-Densen who flew against him for the 6rench Goering was one of the most redoubtable and chivalrous of 4ilots1 Brause-Densen re4orted that during a dogfight when his machine gun had ,ammed and he had beat his fist against it in des4eration Goering saw what had ha44ened and instead of firing his own machine gun and finishing him off had ban7ed his 4lane and saluted him1 6rom that time on Brause-Densen said he had an admiration for the Germans that had never left him1+ Goering too7 over the command of the Fichthofen 8@uadron after Fichthofen?s death and emerged from the war with the two main German military decorations#our le MJrite and the Iron .ross 6irst .lass1 Ee refused to carry out the order to deliver his s@uadron?s 4lanes to the Americans at the time of the armistice and flew them instead from 6rance to Duesseldorf1 After -orld -ar I Germany was incom4rehensible to Goering1 In (*(% a year after the Bolshevi7 revolution 8oldiers? .ouncils on the 8oviet 4attern were organiHed among the returning troo4s1 :ne .ommunist s4ea7er a member of the city council of Nuremberg told Goering?s s@uadron that he had fought in the front line while the German officers had remained safely in the rear but what he said was 4al4able nonsense1 Air 6orce officers were combat fliersGoering for one had downed twenty-five enemy 4lanesand the Air 6orce men 7new it1 The new #russian Minister of -ar General -alther Feinhardt addressed a meeting after he had issued an order for officers to remove their shoulder insignia and to wear instead blue stri4es on their sleeves1 Ee came to the meeting wearing the stri4es1 Goering a young officer of twenty-five rose from his seat to rebu7e him: Mr1 Minister I was convinced that you would be 4resent here today1 But I ho4ed to see a mourning band on your sleeve to e<4ress your dee4 regret for the wrong which you 4ro4ose to do us1 Instead you are wearing the blue colours on your arm1 Mr1 Minister you should have chosen redP 1 1 1 -e

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page_! #age '0 officers have done our duty for four long years on land on sea and in the air1 -e have ris7ed life and limb for our fatherland1 Now we have come homeand what do they do with usO They s4it on us and want to ta7e from us what was our honor1 And I tell you it is not the 4eo4le that is res4onsible1 The 4eo4le were our comrades every one of them whatever might be his ran7 for the four hard years of the -ar1 It is not the 4eo4le but those who have inflamed it who stabbed our s4lendid army in the bac7 and have no other wish but to rule so that they may enrich themselves at the 4eo4le?s e<4ense1 1 1 1 But the day will come I 7now it and I beg you to believe it when these men will have shot their bolt and when we?ll 7ic7 them out out of our Germany1 Ma7e yourselves ready be 4re4ared for that day and wor7 for it1 6or it will surely comePL % Goering had returned from the front with no idea of what to do and no ,ob1 But he was a well-7nown flier and the 6o77er com4any invited him to demonstrate their aircraft at an e<hibit in .o4enhagen1 6or some wee7s he flew 4aying customers at a seaside hotel in Denmar7 then moved on to 8weden where he got a ,ob first with a firm manufacturing 4arachutes and later with the 8wedish airline1 It was in 8weden that he met his first wife Baroness .arin von 6oc7 a woman four years older than he and already married1 The two fell in love immediately1 Goering with a 4assenger had made a forced landing on her estate which seemed to both of them the hand of fate1 They were an incurably romantic 4air addicted to sudden im4ulses and a belief in ha44y endings1 8he soon started divorce 4roceedings against her husband who made no ob,ection and she and Goering were married in Munich where Goering had settled in (*&(1 They were greatly attached to each other1 Although .arin was an invalid she traveled devotedly and gladly with her husband during their e<ile after the attem4ted 4utsch of (*&)1 They were never se4arated if they could avoid it during the decade of their life together before her death in (*)(1 .arin was not very intelligent1 Eer letters to her family are childish filled with e<clamation 4oints and adoration of Eermann and ne<t to him of the 6uehrer1 In (*&( Goering still had no clear idea of what he wanted to do1 Ee was vaguely interested in 4olitical science in which he too7 courses at the "niversity of Munich1 Ee attended nationalist 4olitical gatherings and one day he heard Eitler s4ea71 Ee sought out the 6uehrer-to-be and heard the very 4rogram he had himself been gro4ing for s4elled out by the man who could tal7 to him as 4ersuasively as he did to the thousands of 4eo4le in a beer hall1 The Gersailles Treaty had to be re4udiated the Dews and .ommunists and the Fe4ublicans had to be driven from 4ower a broad mass movement had to be created based on nationalism and socialism1 Goering had said the same things to himself1 9i7e thousands of returning soldiers he had never L The account a44ears in Goering?s official biogra4hy 4ublished in (*)+1 The boo7 was written by !rich GritHbach and edited by Goering himself1 It is the 7ind of legendary story that filled National 8ocialist literature1 A ca4tain even in the Germany of (*(* was not li7ely to address a general in such terms1

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page_!! #age '' been able to digest the defeat and Eitler had a 4lan of action for undoing it1 Eitler even gave him the o44ortunity of 4utting on a uniform again for he made Goering head of the 8A1 A war hero decorated with a #our le MJrite gave a cachet to the budding army of the #arty1 Goering said at Nuremberg that the 6uehrer had told him he had been loo7ing for a young flier or submarine officer to whom he could give an im4ortant #arty 4ost1 !ver since the end of the war Goering and Eitler had se4arately been searching for a man who would com4lement their own talents and both of them 7new when they had found the ordained 4erson1 Goering marched in the front lines with 8treicher at the time of the attem4ted 4utsch and at the 6eldherrnhalle when the 4olice o4ened fire he was shot in the leg1 Because of his wound he esca4ed im4risonment1 Ee was ta7en to a hos4ital in Munich and then was smuggled across the border to Austria while Eitler and Eess and others went to the 9andsberg 4rison1 The #arty was left to wither on the vine for a time1 .arin ,oined her husband in Innsbruc7 and they made their roundabout way bac7 to 8weden1 They lived chea4ly at the hotels run by #arty sym4athiHers in Austria and Italy 4aying their way on the 4roceeds of the sale of the house .arin had bought in Munich1 It was at this time a44arently that Goering became addicted to mor4hine which he had been given because of his wounds1 In (*&0 he too7 his first cure in 8weden where he came under 4sychiatric observation but he was never to rid himself entirely of the habit1 In (*&+ he re4eated the cure in Germany1 Ee seems to have been free of the habit for some years but he reverted to it under the stresses of the war1 At Nuremberg he was still in need of the drug but the 4rison authorities did not give it to him1 Ee had a large su44ly of 4aracodeine tablets when he surrendered to the Americans and he had flushed an even larger su44ly down the toilet before the Americans came thin7ing it unbecoming to have so much on hand1 * -ith the (*&+ amnesty Goering was able to return to Germany from 8weden where he was ma7ing a modest living as an agent of a 4arachute firm but because of his 4olitics in a less cordial atmos4here than he had e<4erienced before1 Ee and his wife settled down this time in Berlin and the following year he ran for and was elected to the Feichstag as one of the twelve National 8ocialist de4uties1 The NaHis 4olled only ) 4er cent of the votes but owing to the 4ro4ortional re4resentation that hel4ed 4roduce the s4linter 4arties that bedeviled the -eimar regime Goering got in1 Ee was chosen chief of the #arty delegation1 In (*)& he was elected to the #residency of the Feichstag and 4rom4tly 4re4ared the way for the dissolution of #arliament1 Ee gave u4 the leadershi4 of the 8A and concentrated on #arty affairs in the Feichstag and the country as a whole1 Eitler too7 him seriously for Goering had marched in the front ran7 of the u4rising and was utterly devoted to the 6uehrer1 Goering never com4eted with Eitler never dreamed as Foehm and Gregor 8trasser for e<am4le did of su44lant-

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page_!" #age '+ ing him1 The two men were o44osites and they com4lemented each other1 6or Goering Eitler was the 4olitical genius who could move the masses with the true doctrine1 6or Eitler Goering was a warrior of su4erior middle-class origins who could gain the res4ect of business 4eo4le and former Army officers and was above all a man of unswerving fidelity1 In (*)& the National 8ocialist #arty became the largest 4arty in the Feichstag Goering as #resident of that body used his office adroitly against .hancellor 6ranH von #a4en1 At a stormy session Goering made common cause with the .ommunists in his maneuver not to recogniHe #a4en who was see7ing in vain to get his eye so that he could announce the dissolution of the Feichstag which Eindenburg on his re@uest had ordered1 A 4residential decree of dissolution would have enabled #a4en to continue in office under emergency 4owers1 Goering turned instead to a woman .ommunist delegate who made a motion for a vote of no confidence in #a4ena vote that Georing 7new would be ado4ted1 -hen Eitler was called to the chancellorshi4 by Eindenburg to head what the #resident and #a4en believed was to be a coalition cabinet Goering was named Minister -ithout #ortfolio1 Ee and -ilhelm 6ric7 were the only National 8ocialist ministers in the Government but Eitler @uic7ly consolidated his 4osition1 Goering soon succeeded #a4en as Minister #resident of #russia an office #a4en had insisted on retaining when he acce4ted the vice-chancellorshi4 =at the time he had thought of this as a shrewd deal to 7ee4 Eitler in chec7 under the coalition>1 Goering collected ,obs1 In addition to Minister #resident he was Minister of the Interior for #russia and in this ca4acity had the #russian state 4olice under him1 Ee founded a secret 4olicethe Gesta4o =Geheime 8taats4oliHei>and the first concentration cam4s where the enemies of the regime brought in by his 4olice could be 7e4t1 At the time of the Feichstag fire he headed the roundu4 of members of the o44osition 4arties using the emergency as a 4rete<t for getting rid first of the .ommunists whom he immediately declared res4onsible for setting the blaHe and then of the e@ually hated 8ocial Democrats1 At Nuremberg he was accused of having set the fire himself but the evidence for this is as flimsy as that which Goering used to try to convict the Bulgarian .ommunist Georgi Dimitrov and two of his countrymen 8imon #o4ov and Gasili Tanev for their alleged 4art in causing the fire1L During his trial Dimitrov was able to turn the L -ho set the Feichstag fire remains a mystery1 A boo7 by 6ritH Tobias er /eichstagsbran) has been 4ublished on the sub,ect and learned articles have been written in scholarly ,ournals including Martin BrosHat?s ??Cum Streit um )en /eichstagsbran) I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte =Gol1 GIII No1 ) (*'$> but the case is still unclear1 Marinus van der 9ubbe a twenty-four-year-old Dutchman who had once belonged to the .ommunist #arty and who said he wanted to do a deed against NaHism that would be noted by the world was immediately arrested and charged with the crime1 Gan der 9ubbe was certainly guilty1 The only @uestion is whether he was the only 4erson involved or had assistance either from outsiders or from members of the NaHi #arty who had used him as a stooge1 -hile his trial was ta7ing 4lace at 9ei4Hig a countertrial was held under the aus4ices of a committee com4osed of ,urists from !ngland the "nited 8tates 8weden 3footnote continue) on ne4t 2age5

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page_!# #age '% tables on Goering when Goering a44eared in the witness bo< against him1 Twelve years later Goering was to turn the tables on Mr1 Dustice Dac7son in a similar way1 Dimitrov used the trial and his undoubted innocence to turn Goering?s bludgeoning accusations bac7 on the 4rosecution1 Ee as7ed Goering who said he had 7nown from the first that the .ommunists had set the fire whether he bothered to loo7 for anyone else who might be guilty1 The e<change develo4ed into name-calling with Goering losing both his tem4er and the argument1 It was all a curious 4review of what a doHen years later was to ha44en at Nuremberg1 In this 4eriod Goering was the most im4ortant of the Bon0en but he was not yet Eitler?s official successor1 ($ =At Nuremberg he said he had discussed the @uestion with Eitler as early as (*)/1>(( The 6uehrer?s crown 4rince at the time was 4robably Fudol4h Eess and it was only with the start of the war that Eitler 4ublicly decreed Goering as his successor1 Goering was always more indis4ensable to Eitler than Eess1 Among those closest to Eitler only Goering had sufficient credit with the armed forces to 4reside over the trial of .olonel General 6reiherr -erner von 6ritsch even though Goering had been 4romoted at one stro7e from his former ca4tain?s ran7 to general a daHHling rise un4recedented in the German Army1 The court that tried the former .ommander in .hief of the German Army consisted in addition to Goering of Admiral !rich Faeder General -alther von Brauchitsch and two Army ,udges1 It found 6ritsch innocent of the fa7ed charges of homose<uality which had been brought against him as 4art of the running battle between the Gesta4o by this time under Eimmler and the Army1 But its verdict did not result in Eitler?s reinstating 6ritsch nor did it allay the rumors among those who mistrusted Goering that he had engineered the charges to get rid of 6ritsch1 Faeder and Brauchitsch considered Goering a conservative National 8ocialist and both his ran7 and 3footnote continue) from 2revious 2age5 Eolland 6rance and some other countries and they found it 4robable that the NaHis were guilty1 The 9ei4Hig ,udges found the Bulgarians innocent =which enraged Eitler and Goering> but sentenced van der 9ubbe to death1 Much was made at the Nuremberg trial of the underground tunnel leading from Goering?s 4alace to the Feichstag and of Goering?s boast that he had been res4onsible for the destruction of a building whose architecture he said he had de4lored1 But no convincing evidence has ever come to light that lin7s him directly with the fire1 -hat is certain is that Goering Eitler and com4any 7new how to ma7e use of the event1 The .ommunist delegates to the Feichstag were 4revented from ta7ing their seats1 The Gesta4o made wholesale arrests and the atmos4here of nascent terror accounts in some 4art for the 4owers voted Eitler by the two-thirds ma,ority he needed to ta7e over both the full legislative and e<ecutive 4owers granted him in the !nabling Act =Ermaechtigungsgeset0>1 It is true that he would have obtained the two-thirds vote even if the .ommunists had been seated but the fire and its aftermath 4layed an essential 4art in softening the hitherto stubborn o44osition1 The Ermaechtigungsgeset0 could only be 4assed with the votes of longstanding enemies of the NaHis including the .enter1 The .enter voted in favor of the act only under the strongest 4ressure1 =!rich Matthias ?? ie Sit0ung )er /eichstagsfraktion )es Centrums am &)1 Maer0 (*)) I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IG No1 ) (*0'>1

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page_!$ #age '* his gras4 of the issues seemed to entitle him to act as #resident of the .ourt trying 6ritsch1 Many military men including Faeder disli7ed Goering but thought of him as a bona fide soldier and one who lac7ed the fanatical #arty dogmatism the Army and Navy so mistrusted1 At the time of the Foehm 4utsch Goering again 4layed an ambiguous 4art1 -ith Eitler and Eimmler he was in charge of the 88 and 4olice action that resulted in the arrest and shooting of scores of former high 8A officers as well as of men who li7e General Burt von 8chleicher and Gregor 8trasser were accused of 4lotting to overthrow Eitler1 At Nuremberg Goering was charged by Eans Gisevius a former Gesta4o man who had aided the American :88 during the war with having been res4onsible for the 7illing of 8chleicher by the 4olice who had been sent to arrest the general1 Gisevius? testimony however often seemed e<aggerated to some observers and the court did not find Goering res4onsible for the murders charged against him by Gisevius1 Goering did order the 4olice to burn the records of what had gone on during the 4urge and he undoubtedly 4layed one of the chief roles in the arrest and e<ecution of those he and Eitler regarded as attem4ting revolution1 8ome of the 4olice documents that have survived disclose that 8chleicher was murdered not 7illed with a wea4on in his hands with which he threatened the 4olice as Goering e<4lained at the time1 (& -hether or not Goering ordered 8chleicher to be 7illed he 4layed a characteristic 4art during the action against the alleged revolters by following orders no matter how brutal and by believing in whatever 4lot Eitler believed in1 At the same time he did 4rotect #a4en from being sent to a Gesta4o 4rison or from suffering the same fate as #a4en?s secretary who was shot down1 Goering was not by nature a 7iller1 The idea of murdering a former .hancellor and member of Eitler?s government was certainly re4ugnant to him but he would have had no com4unctions against doing even that had Eitler ordered it1 Goering acce4ted the 4urge at face value1 Ee had disli7ed Foehm as he disli7ed Eimmler Eeydrich and Goebbels all of whom were too rigid and dogmatic for his tastes and he carried out the conflicting ,obs of hel4ing to organiHe the 4urge and of 4rotecting #a4en whom the 88 regarded as one of their ma,or enemies1() Eitler than7ed Goering for the 4art he 4layed1 The 6uehrer told the Feichstag two wee7s after the ??revoltI was 4ut down: IMeanwhile Minister #resident Goering had 4reviously received my instructions that in case of a 4urge he was to ta7e analogous measures at once in Berlin and in #russia1 -ith an iron fist he beat down the attac7 on the National 8ocialist state before it could develo41I(/ Goering too7 no 4leasure in 7illing but he could be as ruthless as anyone when in a rage or when his own notions of ,ustice were flouted1 Ee could order the death sentenceeven of an officer he li7edwhen he thought the young man had shown contem4t for his leadershi41 During the Fussian cam4aign three young soldiers who stole some cans of meat were shot by

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page_"0 #age +$ an officer1 Goering was incensed1 Ee wanted the officer who had 7illed them e<ecuted but the 6uehrer refused1 Another time some young 9uftwaffe officers returning from a 4arty were sto44ed by an Army officer who demanded their 4a4ers1 They handed them over to him but when they saw their trolley car coming along the last one that would run until morning they snatched them bac7 and ran for it1 They were arrested charged with mutiny and shot1 Goering was enraged1 Ee stormed at the Army general under whose command the trial and e<ecution had ta7en 4lace but he went no further for his authority ran only as far as the 6uehrer 4ermitted and he could ta7e no undue ris7s1 (0 Ee acce4ted 6ritsch?s humiliation although he 7new him to be innocent1 In the 6ritsch case he was acting as the 6uehrer wanted him to1 In the case of the young officers he was following his own im4ulses which were more often than not generous1 The Army had far more confidence in him than in the other 4olitical advisers close to Eitler but they mistrusted him too1 Ee occu4ied a middle 4osition about as NaHi as NaHi General -alter von Feichenau but far removed from the threat re4resented by the Foehms and the Eimmlers who wanted to ta7e over or su44lant the ArmyFoehm with the 8A and Eimmler with the 881 -itnesses at Nuremberg declared that Goering had deliberately 4lotted the downfall of -ar Minister =Feichs7riegsminister> 6ield Marshal -erner von Blomberg1 They said he had induced the 6uehrer to be a witness to Blomberg?s marriage with as it turned out a registered 4rostitute as 4art of a 4lot to get Blomberg?s ,ob1 The evidence based mainly on Gisevius? testimony is flimsy1 Goering had told Eitler that the marriage would be regarded by stiff-nec7ed Army generals as ina44ro4riatethe lady 6raeulein !rna Gruhn was Blomberg?s secretary1 It is not clear how much more about her Goering 7new at the time1 The 4olice records of her 4rostitution were turned over to him only later by the 4resident of the Berlin 4olice .ount -olf von Eelldorf1 Goering immediately too7 them to Eitler and Blomberg had to resign1 The evidence that Goering had contrived these 4lots to get both 6ritsch and Blomberg out of the way in order to realiHe his ambition to become 8ecretary of -ar rests on no more stable a foundation than the con,ectures of 4eo4le who li7e Gisevius did not li7e him1 Goering was charged at Nuremberg on four counts: he had 4lotted to wage aggressive warfareC he had waged itC he had committed war crimesC he had committed crimes against humanity1 Ee was universally considered guilty from the outset and a44eared on all the lists of war criminals1 -hen he first surrendered to American General 8tac7 in Bavaria he was treated as a 4risoner of war of high ran7 retaining his marshal?s baton and together with his family dining with the general1 But that lasted only a very short time1 The ne<t day it was made clear to him that he was to be regarded not as a 4risoner of war but as a war criminal1 Goering was stri44ed of his Feichsmarschall?s insignia as soon as he was brought from General 8tac7?s

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page_"1 #age +( head@uarters to BitHbuehel1 6rom there he went to the collection cam4 which was in a beer cellar in Augsburg and then after a stay at MondorfAshcan was shi44ed to Nuremberg1 -herever he went he was an ob,ect of curiosity1 8oldiers wanted his autogra4h officers wanted to tal7 to him and a rumor went around that he was beaten by his ca4tors1 If so he never com4lained of it1 Ee 7new what lay in store for him1 Eis only tas7 as he saw it was to set an e<am4le to go down now that the shi4 had sun7but to go down as the former second in command who since the ca4tain had 7illed himself was in full charge of what remained of the wrec7age1 Not much of what had been the 4om4 of the NaHi state had 7e4t its gloss so Goering held on to his Treue as something that could not be ta7en from him as readily as his Feichsmarschall?s baton1 Goering made no secret at Nuremberg of having done all he could to rearm Germany to retool the economy to this end to ma7e the Feich bloc7ade4roof and to build bombers and fighters as ra4idly as 4ossible and in as great numbers as the economy and 4ersonnel training 4rograms 4ermitted1 The 4rosecution alleged that four-engined bombers were aggressive wea4ons and one of Goering?s witnesses testified that the Germans had very few of them1 :n ta7ing the stand Goering said that he would have been glad to have the four-engined bombers that he had merely decided against them in favor of other ty4es and that the decision had nothing to do with aggression but concerned only the allocation of scarce resources1 Ee 4roudly told the court that he gloried in the Anschluss and that he was the man mainly res4onsible for it1 The records of all his tele4hone conversations with 8eyss-In@uart and the other NaHi officials in Gienna as well as with Fibbentro4 in 9ondon were in the hands of the Allies in any case but Goering far from wanting to defend himself magnified what he had accom4lished in engineering the change of government that got rid of Burt von 8chuschnigg and 4ut 8eyss-In@uart in his 4lace1 Austria was ri4e for the 4luc7ing but Goering?s instructions in the last hours of the re4ublic were well timed and he held all the cards for the little state without foreign su44ort and with not much internal cohesion left was no longer viable1 Goering?s lawyer :tto 8tahmer had to defend him against charges that 4ointed to his com4licity in a far greater crime than turning the re,oicing Austrians over to the Feich Government1 The NaHi cons4irators Goering among them were charged with the mass murder of (( $$$ #olish soldiers in the Batyn forest1 It was a charge the Fussians insisted on including in the indictment des4ite the reluctance of the Americans and British1 Any number of 4eo4le at Nuremberg 7new that the evidence against the Germans was dubious or worse for the #oles had already made a careful investigation of the massacre1 They had 4ublished a 4am4hlet on the sub,ect in 9ondon and what they as well as American and British intelligence officers had discovered would be borne out in the future investigations that in due course would be conducted by an American congressional committee

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page_"2 #age +& as well as by historians1 The Fussians not the Germans had committed the crime in the Batyn forest and many 4eo4le in the courtroom including no doubt the Fussian 4rosecutors and ,udges 7new it1 The #olish underground was convinced the Germans had not committed the murders1 !leven #olish senators and ten de4uties of the government-in-e<ile sent their o4inion to Mr1 Dustice Dac7son before the start of the trial telling him that it would be ??inadvisableI to include Batyn among the charges against the Germans1 In fact according to a #olish source one of the Fussians the #oles accused of having ta7en 4art in the crime was acting as a 4rosecutor at Nuremberg1 (' The members of the American and British 4rosecutionand officials far higher than theywere caught in an embarrassing dilemma1 Neither the Nuremberg court nor before it convened the leaders of the -estern Allies could deal effectively with the charge against the Fussians1 #resident Foosevelt when he heard the story from George !arle 84ecial !missary for Bal7an Affairs told !arle he had been ta7en in by Goebbels? 4ro4aganda1 And .hurchill forbidding General -ladyslaw 8i7ors7i to investigate further said IIf they Mthe #olish officersN are dead nothing you can do will bring them bac71I(+ -hen !arle 4ersisted and wanted to 4ublish an account of the tragic e4isode Foosevelt e<4ressly forbade it and !arle an e<4ert on the Bal7ans was shi44ed off to 8amoa where he remained until after Foosevelt?s death1 The Fussians insisted that the Batyn massacre be made 4art of the Nuremberg charges but they could ma7e no case1 The court did not allude to the massacre in its verdict1 The 8oviet 4rosecution brought three witnesses: the de4uty mayor of 8molens7 during the German occu4ation who seemed to Dr1 8tahmer to be reading the answers to the @uestions as7ed him by the 8oviet 4rosecutorC a Fussian doctor whose testimony re4eated what the official 8oviet investigation had saidC and a Bulgarian who had served on the international committee the Germans had called together when the bodies were first discovered in the mass graves1 The Bulgarian Dr1 Mar7o Mar7ov recanted his earlier findings that the Fussians had committed the crime and now blamed the Germans1 -hat he said at Nuremberg was most unconvincing and the tribunal aside from the Fussian members was unim4ressed by him1 Mar7ov had a little earlier been brought before a 8oviet court and after he had formally re4udiated his earlier views he was brought on to Nuremberg to testify1 As a witness who would be returned to Bulgaria he was no more free to testify at Nuremberg than he was before the 8oviet court in his own country1G The 4lain facts of the Batyn murders could not easily be covered u41 6ifteen thousand #olish soldiers =including % )$$ officers> ca4tured by the Fussians had been missing since the s4ring of (*/$1 9etters from them to their families which had formerly been written once a month abru4tly ceased in midA4ril (*/$more than a year before the German attac7 on Fussia1 The efforts of the #olish underground and then of the #olish General -ladyslaw Anders who was released from a 8oviet 4rison cam4 and other

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page_"3 #age +) officials to get information from the 8oviet "nion as to the whereabouts of the soldiers were unsuccessful1 The missing men were badly needed to officer and man the new #olish Army that was to be recruited in Fussia1 In 6ebruary (*/) the German .ommunications Fegiment 0)+ discovered the cor4ses of some / 0$$ to / %$$ #olish officers1 These officers had been evacuated from the former 8oviet 4risoner-of-war cam4 at BoHels7 to the Batyn forest not far from 8molens71 The German #ro4aganda Ministry which heard about the matter in A4ril (*/) made a great fanfare of the discovery accusing the Fussians and as7ed the International Fed .ross to send a team of doctors to investigate1 Fed .ross authorities felt they could not do this unless the 8oviet Government also invited them1 Then the Germans formed a grou4 of 4ractitioners of forensic medicine from twelve states from among their allies and from neutral and occu4ied countries1 8witHerland 6inland Belgium 6rance Denmar7 Italy and other countries were re4resented1 6or once the Germans needed to 4rovide no stage setting and the commission was able to ma7e its e<aminations and findings in com4lete freedom1 The #oles sent to the scene a twelve-man medical team of their own as well as members of the underground and they along with the International .ommission soon had no doubt as to who the 4er4etrators were1 The e<ecuted men wore winter overcoats1 The trees that had been 4lanted over their graves a microsco4ic analysis showed had been 4laced there in (*/$ not in the summer of (*/( when the Germans arrived on the scene1 The 4hysical state of the cor4ses the decalcification of the s7ulls the diaries and letters found on the bodies all confirmed that they died in A4ril (*/$ and not later1 :tto 8tahmer dealt with the charge as did a number of the other German defense counsel including :tto BranHbuehler who was re4resenting Admiral DoenitH and Eans 9aternser who was re4resenting the German Eigh .ommand1 Against which defendant the charges were being made was vague1 It was clear only that the German armed forces the Eigh .ommand and the ??NaHi cons4iratorsI were im4licated1 The 8oviet 4rosecutor directly charged one of the German witnesses with having done the deed but this accusation fell through when the accused man .olonel 6riedrich Ahrens could 4rove that he had not even been at the site when the crime was alleged by the Fussians to have been committed1 The 8oviet 4rosecutors as was their inveterate 4ractice 4ut words into the mouths of their witnesses and were admonished by the court1 But when 9aternser tried to find out from the #resident of the .ourt ,ust who was being made res4onsible for the committing of the crime of Batyn 9ord Dustice Geoffrey 9awrence re4lied II do not 4ro4ose to answer @uestions of that sort1I In the end no one was held res4onsible1 The case was not cited in the verdict against Goering or any of the other defendants1 6rom the Allied 4oint of view it was by far the wea7est 4oint of the trial1 Goering?s lawyer had as7ed General Anders commander of the #olish Army in the 8oviet "nion for material in his 4ossession that the #oles had collected1 Anders

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page_"4 #age +/ was ready to com4ly but as an Allied officer he needed the 4ermission of his su4eriors which he as7ed for but never obtained1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son said later that he had never heard of General Anders? offer1 Goering had had nothing to do with the Batyn murders and some of the other minor charges against him also were wea71 The 4rosecution in its search for cons4iracies was gra44ling with organiHations that either had never e<isted or had 4layed no im4ortant role in the Third Feich1 Thus Goering was charged by Mr1 Dustice Dac7son with being chairman of the Feich Defense .ouncil an organiHation that clearly sounded ominous to the 4rosecution and might have indeed aided and abetted rearmament and the wars the Feich foughthad it ever functioned1 Goering testified that this first secret body founded in (*)) was dissolved in (*)% without having met1 The second 4ublicly announced Defense .ouncil founded in (*)% 4layed no im4ortant role a44arently because it was too unwieldy1 (% A meeting of November (% (*)% consisted almost entirely of an address by Goering to a large audience on the aim to tri4le German armaments to im4rove the trans4ort system and to hel4 the financial situation of the Feich by seiHing Dewish 4ro4erty1 There was no discussion and no action was ta7en1 The meeting was merely a sounding board for the 4lans of its chairman1(* Goering testified that he did not even attend another large gathering of this body and after a year it was converted into a ministerial council1 The Defense .ouncil had not much more significance as far as Goering?s guilt was concerned than the organiHation Goering said he had invented on the s4ur of the moment to hel4 Neurath save face1 -hen Fibbentro4 was a44ointed 6oreign Minister Goering 4ro4osed to Eitler that Neurath be named chairman of something he thought they should call the 8ecret .abinet .ouncil1 This he believed would sound im4ressive and be widely thought to have im4ortant functions1 Eitler ob,ected that Neurath could scarcely be chairman of a none<istent body so Goering as he told the court whi44ed out a 4encil and 4a4er and wrote down the names of the members who would serve under Neurath?s 4hantom chairmanshi4 naming himself last 1 Neurath was duly a44ointed but the 8ecret .abinet .ouncil never met1 The real case against Goeringnamely that as second man in the Feich he bore a ma,or share of res4onsibility for the murders and e<terminations as well as certain of the war crimeswas develo4ed slowly1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son?s first @uestion on cross-e<amining him was: ??;ou are 4erha4s aware that you are the only living man who can e<4ound to us the true 4ur4oses of the NaHi #arty and the inner wor7ings of its leadershi4OI G:!FING: II am 4erfectly aware of that1I DA.B8:N: I;ou from the very beginning together with those who were associated with you intended to overthrow and later did overthrow the -eimar Fe4ublicOI G:!FING: IThat was as far as I am concerned my firm intention1I

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page_" #age +0 Those were @uestions that could have been given the same answers by any successful revolutionary leader1 Goering was not vulnerable as a revolutionary or as one who had done all he could to get rid of the shac7les of Gersailles1 -hat he was criminally guilty of was murder and the 7ey document in this charge was the order he sent to Eeydrich on Duly )( (*/( which said: .om4lementing the tas7 that was assigned to you on Danuary &/ (*)* which dealt with carrying out by emigration and evacuation a solution of the Dewish 4roblem as advantageous as 4ossible I hereby charge you with ma7ing all necessary 4re4arations with regard to organiHational and financial matters for bringing about a com4lete solution of the Dewish @uestion in the German s4here of influence in !uro4e1 -herever other governmental agencies are involved they will coo4erate with you1 I re@uest furthermore that you send me before long an over-all 4lan concerning the organiHational factual and material measures necessary for the accom4lishment of the desired final solution of the Dewish @uestion1 &$ That order set the e<termination 4rocess in motion1 Goering issued it under his authority as head of the 6our-;ear #lan and as the second man in the Feich who issued directives under a wide ambience for the 6uehrer did not have time for everything1 The -annsee .onference attended by among others Adolf !ichmann followed as a result and it was this conference that wor7ed out the blue4rints for the mass slaughter1 The 4rotocol of the meeting begins as follows: ??.hief of the 8ecurity #olice and of the 8D 88 :bergru44enfuehrer Eeydrich told at the outset of his being named commissioner of the final solution of the Dewish 4roblem by the Feichsmarschall 1 1 1I Goering in his letter to Eeydrich had used the same word IEn)loesung I which as events were to show had but one meaning in the NaHi vocabularynamely e<termination1 At Nuremberg Goering told Mr1 Dustice Dac7son that Iwe had written total solution not final solution1I Dac7son did not 4ress him on the distinction1 Actually in the first 4aragra4h of his letter to Eeydrich Goering had used the word I6esamtloesung I which means Icom4lete solution I and in the final 4aragra4h he had used the word IEn)loesung I or Ifinal solution1I It was the En)loesung that Eeydrich as he said was wor7ing out at the -annsee .onference on Goering?s orders1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son read out the ste4s Goering had ta7en against the Dews: he had 4roclaimed the Nuremberg 9awsC he had 4romulgated an act in (*)' ma7ing it a crime 4unishable by death to transfer 4ro4erty abroadC in A4ril (*)% under the 6our-;ear #lan he had 4ublished the decree re@uiring the registration of Dewish 4ro4erty the 4recursor to its com4lete confiscationC and then as the vise tightened he had 4ublished the decree that Dews might not own retail stores or offer goods or services for sale at mar7ets fairs or e<hibitions or be leaders of enter4rises1 Goering remem-

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page_"! #age +' bered issuing all these decrees and to the last @uestion he answered ??;es1 Those are all 4art of the decrees for the elimination of Dewry from economic life1I It was no doubt easier for a man li7e Goeringwho li7ed individuals if they were useful or flattering to his vanity and on occasion even li7ed Dewsto use a collective noun li7e IDewry1I :n 6ebruary &( (*)* he signed the decree com4elling Dews to surrender whatever they owned of gold and silver and 4latinum and ,ewelry1 Goering?s signature a44eared on such documents but he had 7nown of and 4artici4ated in far worse measures than those 4ublished in the /eichsgeset0blatt1 Ee 7new about the lethal vans into which men women and children were loaded ostensibly for trans4ort and then gassedC he 7new about the gas chambers1 It was his order to Eeydrich that started the beltline of e<termination in motion1 Goebbels in his diary entry of March & (*/) re4orted his saying I!s4ecially in the Dewish @uestion we are so involved that there is no esca4e 1 1 1 a movement and a 4eo4le who have burned their bridges fight with much greater determination than those who are still able to retreat1I &( As early as March (& (*)) Goering had announced that the Dews could not loo7 for 4rotection of life or 4ro4erty in the Third Feich: I.ertainly I shall em4loy the 4olice and @uite ruthlessly whenever the German 4eo4le are hurtC but I refuse the notion that the 4olice are 4rotective troo4s for Dewish stores1 No the 4olice 4rotect whoever comes into Germany legitimately but it does not e<ist for the 4ur4ose of 4rotecting Dewish usurers1I&& In (*)% he said I-e can?t let the Dews starve I but he signed the laws and wrote the decrees that too7 away their livelihood1 IThese swine I as he called them had to be driven from German economic life and from the German community1 At the meeting that followed the (ristallnacht Goebbels and Eeydrich 4ressed Goering to determine what further anti-Dewish measures should be underta7en and how the Dews should 4ay for the damages1 Eeydrich re4orted that + 0$$ Dewish stores were destroyed and that ($( synagogues were destroyed by fire and +' demolished1&) Goering with some clowning matched Eeydrich?s and Goebbels? ferocity1 The meeting with Goering as chairman too7 4lace in the Air Ministry on November (& (*)% and lasted two hours and forty minutes1 The 4ogrom had followed the murder of a member of the German legation in #aris vom Fath by a young #olish Dew1 It was far from a s4ontaneous demonstration1 The 7illing was used by Goebbels Eeydrich and com4any as a 4rete<t for ta7ing further measures against the Dews1 Bands of NaHi hooligans systematically lootedDewish stores of ,ewelry and furs or whatever else they could lay their hands on1 The 4ogrom had long been 4re4ared and the murder of vom Fath was merely a 4rete<t to unleash it1 Goebbels a44eared at the meeting 4re4ared to ,ustify the anti-Dewish acts for he had been one of the chief instigators of the riots1

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page_"" #age ++ G:!BB!98: ??I advocate that Dews be banned from all 4ublic 4laces where they might cause 4rovocation1 It is still 4ossible for a Dew to share a slee4er with a German1 Therefore the Feich Ministry of Trans4ort must issue a decree ordering that there shall be se4arate com4artments for Dews1 If this com4artment is full then the Dews cannot claim a seat 1 1 1 They must not mi< with the GermansC if there is no more room they will have to stand in the corridor1I G:!FING: II thin7 it would be more sensible to give them se4arate com4artments1I G:!BB!98: INot if the train is overcrowded1I G:!FING: IDust a moment1 There will be only one Dewish coach1 If that is filled u4 the other Dews will have to stay at home1I G:!BB!98: IBut su44ose there are not many going let us say on the long-distance e<4ress train to Munich1 8u44ose there are two Dews on the train and the other com4artments are overcrowdedC these two Dews would then have a com4artment to themselves1 Therefore the decree must state Dews may claim a seat only after all Germans have secured a seat1I G:!FING: II would give the Dews one coach or one com4artment and should such a case as you mention arise and the train be overcrowded believe me we will not need a law1 Ee will be 7ic7ed out all right and will have to sit alone in the toilet all the way1I &/ Goebbels then com4lained that Dews were using German holiday resorts and a decree should be issued to 7ee4 them out1 Goering?s hearty solution was: IGive them their own1I -hen the discussion turned to the use of 4ar7s Goebbels again wanted the Dews sim4ly forbidden to use them1 Dews he said had to be removed from the 4ublic gaHeC their 4resence was 4rovocative1 To which Goering answered I-e will give the Dews a 4art of the forest and Al4ers will see to it that the various animals which are damnably li7e the Dewsthe el7 too has a hoo7ed nosego into the Dewish enclosure and settle among them1I&0 The meeting which had been called to settle how much the Dews must 4ay for the damages continued1 Goebbels relentlessly 4ursued the sub,ect of the intolerable 4resence of the Dews in German 4ublic 4laces1 Ee s4o7e of the whis4ering 4ro4aganda of Dewish women at the 6erbeliner #latH in Berlin1 G:!BB!98: IThere are Dews who don?t loo7 so Dewish1 They sit near German mothers with children and begin to com4lain and to 4ic7 everything a4art1I G:!FING: IThey don?t say they?re Dewish1I G:!BB!98: II see a great danger in it1I The Dews Goebbels continued need to have s4ecial 4laces and can sit on benches mar7ed I6or Dews only1I &' Ee wanted no Dewish children in German schools1 Goering declared at Nuremberg that Goebbels went so far as to say that he considered Goering?s attitude 4rovocative but Goebbels as is clear

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page_"# #age +% in the te<t was referring to the Dews when he used the word ??4rovocative I not to the second man in the Feich1 The meeting then came down to the business that had brought it together1 Eow were the Dews to 4ay for the (ristallnachtO :ne man 4resent said they might find a way to 4ay the fine demanded of them by dum4ing their Feich bonds1 Goering?s booming voice bro7e through the tal71 Ee said IThe solution is @uite sim4le1 I will merely issue a decree ma7ing it illegal for Dews to sell bonds or for others to buy from them1I Throughout the meeting Goering 4layed the role of the witty terrible but righteous viceroy who would do ,ustice in his own way1 In the end his decision was to im4ose fines for the damage on the Dews and the insurance com4anies were to 4ay in addition1 A billion-mar7 fine was levied on the Dews1 The insurance com4anies had a bill to 4ay of si< million mar7s for the bro7en windows alone1 The glass came from BelgiumC to 4ay for it would ta7e foreign currency which was in short su44ly1 This sum did not go to the Dewish 4ro4rietors of the sho4s or to their mostly Aryan owners who had ta7en out the insurance but on Goering?s ruling to the 8tate1 Goering said he was tired of these riots and disturbances which in the last resort were attac7s not on the Dews but on him as the man res4onsible for the success of the 6our-;ear #lan which was seriously damaged by this destruction of 4ro4erty1 The meeting reveals a good deal about Goering1 Eis anti8emitism was not far from the conventional German variety1 Dews were to be 4ermitted a minimal e<istence1 -hen their enter4rises were ta7en over by state trustees to be sold to Aryans the Dewish owners were to be given securities and live on the interest yield1 But they had to 4ay the billion-mar7 fine and the costs of the damage1 Goering did not want to have to travel with Dews or to see them in 4ublic 4laces but he would let them live he would even let them use German hos4itals at least for a time1 Ee would move them out of the economic life of the Feich but if they managed to survive 4erha4s by trading with one another they could travel on trains in s4ecial com4artments or sections or he said sla44ing his fat thigh sitting on the toilet1 Eis directive from Eitler to settle the Dewish @uestion meant at this 4oint introducing harsher economic measures but Goebbels and Eeydrich needled him into ta7ing a harder noneconomic line1 It was Goebbels who had ordered the (ristallnacht1 At the meeting he and Eeydrich re4resented the 8treicher brand of anti-8emitism1 Dews were a moral and 4hysical offense to the Germans1 Dust below the surface of what Goebbels was saying the ne<t wave was rising wherein the Dew would disa44ear com4letely from sight and from the living1 Goering ran through the various roles at the meeting1 Ee was the mighty viceroy: II will write a decree and everything will be arranged1I Ee was the clown getting laughs from his audience with his remar7s about the hoo7ed-nose el7s but he was 4ushed by Goebbels toward the more violent measures soon to be ado4ted against the Dews1 Goering was ready to fine

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page_"$ #age +* them to ma7e them suffer through their 4oc7etboo7s1 At one 4oint he said he would rather have &$$ Dews 7illed than so much 4ro4erty damage done the German Feich1 Eeydrich re4lied that thirty-five Dews had been 7illed1 The two remar7s revealed the character of each man1 Goering was 4arading his authority as head of the 6our-;ear #lan1 To him &$$ Dews were nothing com4ared to the tas7 he had to 4erform of conserving German 4ro4erty while the Feich rearmed1 Eeydrich tal7ing of death and not of 4ro4erty values was the real 7iller to whom thirty-five Dews were a small to7en of what was to come1 As the dialogue continued the Austrian economist Eans 6ischboec7 who had been one of 8eyss-In@uart?s collaborators told of the 4lans for Gienna: ($ $$$ of the (& $$$ Dewish wor7sho4s and / $$$ of the 0 $$$ Dewish retail stores were to be closed finally1 The remainder were to be AryaniHed1 Thus of these (+ $$$ businesses 6ischboec7 said () 0$$ or (/ $$$ would be shut down1 All that was needed was a short law1 Goering said ??I shall have this decree issued today1I &+ Buyers were already on hand 6ischboec7 said for half of the ) $$$ businesses that were to be AryaniHed but if by the end of a year no buyer a44eared for the remainder the Government could decide whether or not to li@uidate them1 They would be turned over to a trustee =acting for the 8tate> and the visible Dewish businesses would be finished1 G:!FING: IThat would be s4lendid1I 6"NB: I-e can do the same thing here1 I have 4re4ared a 9aw elaborating that1 !ffective Danuary ( (*)* Dews shall be 4rohibited from o4erating retail stores and wholesale establishments as well as inde4endent wor7sho4s1 They shall be further 4rohibited from 7ee4ing em4loyees or offering any ready-made 4roducts on the mar7etC from advertising or receiving orders1 -henever a Dewish sho4 is o4erated the 4olice shall shut it down 1 1 1I G:!FING: II believe we can agree with this law1I&% 6ischboec7 described how Dewish 4ro4erty had been e<4ro4riated in Austria and 6un7 as7ed why when their enter4rises were ta7en over they should not be able to 7ee4 bonds1 Goering declined this idea because in that way they would actually be 4artici4ating in the economy1 &* The discussion turned to isolating and identifying the Dews1 Eeydrich said they would have to wear a certain badge1 Goering as7ed IA uniformOI and Eeydrich re4lied IA badge1 In this way we could 4ut an end to foreign Dews being molested who do not loo7 different from ours1I Goering then 4ro4osed that ghettos be created1 The authorities could determine what stores could o4erate there and the delivery of goods from German sources could be controlled1 I;ou cannot let the Dews starve I he said1 At the close of the the meeting he summed u4 his sentiments: II demand that German Dewry as a whole as 4unishment for the abominable crimes etc1 ma7e a contribution of one billion mar7s1 That will wor71 The swine will not commit a second

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page_#0 #age %$ murder so @uic7ly1 Incidentally I would li7e to say again that I would not li7e to be a Dew in Germany1?? )$ Three years were to ela4se before Goering sent Eeydrich the order to wor7 out the 6inal 8olution1 In the 4rocess there was the long ste4 from wanting the Dews to be 4ut into ghettos where they would have industries and stores and be su44lied on a limited scale from German sources to gas ovens1 That was 4erha4s the reason why Eeydrich o44osed the ghettos in the November (& meeting1 The establishing of ghettos either by law or custom including economic sanctions and limitations on travel and the use of 4ublic 4laces was not new in !uro4e1 #ogroms li7e the (ristallnacht were not new either1 -hat Goering would invent with his directive to Eeydrich was the systematic Ilegal I cold-blooded annihilation of a race1 Eis own sentiments 4layed but a small 4art in what was 4lanned and later accom4lished1 If Goering had not given the order to Eeydrich the 6uehrer or Eimmler would have done it1 The order did not originate in Goering?s mindC nothing in his 4sychological ma7eu4 or in his !eltanschauung would lead him to ma7e the slightest resistance to those in the #arty who wanted the e<termination1 A witness for him at the trial General Barl BodenschatH told how he had at times 4rotected individual Dews: at Eans 6ran7?s urging he had sto44ed the de4ortation of #olish Dews into the General Government in (*/$ and he had allowed the families of Dews wor7ing for Feich munitions industries to remain in Germany for a year after the trans4orts to the !ast began in (*/(1 Eowever when the time came for the order of e<termination to be written it was Goering who in the trans4arently veiled language of the 6inal 8olution wrote it1 Eis anti-8emitism was at first of the runof-the-mill 4rewar NaHi 7ind as shown in his decrees driving Dews from the economic life of the Third Feich1 But in the s4ace of three years it had become more and more virulent until he finally sent Dews to the gas chambers1 Individual Dews he was on occasion willing to save but IDewryI he condemned to death1 Goering became ,ust as ruthless when dealing with the Fussians or the #oles1 II intend to 4lunder I he declared s4ea7ing of Fussia Iand to do it thoroughly1I Ee told his assistants on the economic staff I-henever you come across anything that may be needed by the German 4eo4le you must be after it li7e a bloodhound1 It must be ta7en out of store and brought to Germany1I )( Ee told the Feichs7ommissars for the :ccu4ied Territories on August ' (*/& IIf anyone goes hungry then it won?t be the Germans but others1I)& Eis Green #ortfolio was a 4lan for the ruthless e<4loitation of Fussian resources 4re4ared before the German attac7 on Fussia and his economic 8taff !ast on May &) (*/( foresaw Ia cessation of su44lies to the entire forest Hone Mof FussiaN including the essential industrial centers of Moscow and 9eningrad1I)) :n 8e4tember (' (*/( he issued an order: I:nly these 4eo4le are to be su44lied with an ade@uate amount of food who wor7 for us1 !ven if one wanted to feed all the other inhabitants one could not do it in the newly occu4ied !astern areas1 It is therefore wrong to

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page_#1 #age %( funnel off food su44lies for this 4ur4ose if it is done at the e<4ense of the army and necessitates increased su44lies from home1?? )/ In 4ursuit of the goal of ma7ing the Feich self-sufficient he told the Feichs7ommissars: God 7nows you were not sent out here Mto the !astN to wor7 for the welfare of the 4eo4le in your charge but to s@ueeHe the utmost out of them so that the German 4eo4le may live 1 1 1 This everlasting concern about foreign 4eo4le must cease once and for all 1 1 1 It ma7es no difference to me if you say that your 4eo4le are colla4sing from hunger1 9et them do so as long as no German colla4ses1 :ne thing I shall certainly do1 I will ma7e you deliver the @uantities as7ed of you and if you cannot do so I will set forces to wor7 that will force you to do so whether you want to or not1 Now let us see what Fussia can deliver1 I thin7 Fiec7e L we should be able to get two million tons of cereals and fodder out of the whole of Fussia1 FI!.B!: IThat can be done1I G:!FING: IThat means we must get three million a4art from -ehrmacht su44lies1I FI!.B!: INo all that is in the front areas goes for the -ehrmacht only1I G:!FING: IThen we bring two million1I FI!.B!: INo1I G:!FING: IA million and a half then1I FI!.B!: I;es 1 1 1I G:!FING: IGentlemen I have a very great deal to do and a great deal of res4onsibility1 I have no time to read letters and memoranda informing me that you cannot su44ly my re@uirements I have only time to ascertain from time to time through short re4orts 1 1 1 whether the commitments are being fulfilled1 If not then we shall have to meet on a different level1I)0 It was dangerous to cross Goering1 Eis anger was most easily aroused when his vanity was wounded1 Ee held Dews and 8lavs in low esteem1 Ee could however turn on anyone no matter what his nationality when what he demanded was not forthcoming1 IIn the occu4ied regions I he said II am interested only in those 4eo4le who wor7 to 4roduce armaments and food su44lies1 They must receive ,ust enough to enable them to continue wor7ing1 It is all one to me whether Dutchmen are Germanic or not1I)' -ith regard to the 4artisans he never o44osed the measures that were standard in the !astern areas1 Ee told with satisfaction how after an attac7 was made on German soldiers in one village the men were lined u4 on one side of the street the women on the other1 The men were threatened with immediate shooting if the women did not identify the strangers among them1 The women always 4ointed out the nonresidents he said in order to save their own men1 Those who were not shot were sent to concentration cam4s the children were 4laced in childrens? cam4s and then the villages were burned down1 L Eans Doachim !rnst Fiec7e a44ointed Feichs7ommissar for 8chaumburg-9i44e (*))1 6ood e<4ert in Goering?s Ministry1

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page_#2 #age %& Goering li7ed adventure and cowboy-and-Indian stories and easy-to-follow movies that were run for him on his 4rivate train and in Barinhall1 The .Hech Ambassador to Germany before the war re4orted that he saw in Goering?s bedroom at Barinhall the wor7s of Barl May a renowned German writer of adventure stories about the American Indians and also a set of Dules Gerne?s boo7s in a German translation1 :ne of his 4lans for the cam4aign in Fussia came close to the tactics of the reds7ins1 Ee 4ro4osed recruiting convicts who were first offenders 4oachers and outdoor fellows of the 7ind he so easily romanticiHed and sending them behind the Fussian lines to commit murder arson and ra4e1 Both at his interrogation of :ctober % (*/0 where the matter was brought u4 and in the courtroom Goering ob,ected only to his ever having countenanced ra4e1 Ee tended to be sentimental about women although he was never heard to e<4ress much sym4athy for those who were not German1 As the commanding officer of the 9uftwaffe he intervened to increase the severity of the 4enalty im4osed for ra4e changing sentences of im4risonment to death1 )+ As a routine matter Goering transmitted Eitler?s scorched-earth order for Fussia which he as the Feichsmarschall issued on 8e4tember + (*/)1 It read: (1> All agricultural 4roducts means of 4roduction and machinery of enter4rises serving the agriculture and food industry are to be removed1 &1> The factories serving the food economy both in the field of 4roduction and of 4rocessing are to be destroyed1 )1> The basis of agricultural 4roduction es4ecially the records and establishments storage 4lants etc1 of the organiHation res4onsible for the food economy are to be destroyed1 /1> The 4o4ulation engaged in the agricultural and food economy is to be trans4orted into the territory west of the fi<ed line1)% By the autumn of (*/) the cam4aign in Fussia had become for both sides a war of na7ed survival where food and shelter had as much military im4ortance in the bitter weather as the guns but the scorched-earth order was characteristic of the Feichsmarschall when he dealt with the enemy whether his own 4ersonal enemies or those of the 6uehrer and of the Third Feich1 Ee thought highly for e<am4le of Dose4h Terboven a man whose cruelty and 4artici4ation in wholesale murder in Norway could easily be com4ared to the rule of Eeydrich in .Hechoslova7ia1 Goering li7ed barbarians being one himselfthe 4oachers who would 7ill and lay wasteC the Gauleiter who burned the houses and slew their inhabitants on behalf of the Greater Feich1 6rom the time the German armies invaded #oland he went after forced labor on behalf of his 6our-;ear #lan1 ??In a struggle for the e<istence of the German 4eo4le one cannot afford to be too scru4ulous in the observance of treaties I he said1 And while this is a statement of how nations may act in emergencies des4ite agreements solemnly signed and is a doctrine that at one time or another had been 4racticed by everyone of the four 4owers sitting in ,udgment on the Feichsmarschall none of them =with the e<ce4tion of

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page_#3 #age %) the 8oviet "nion which had been using the forced labor of millions of its own 4eo4le> had conscri4ted labor on such a scale or under such inhuman conditions as develo4ed in the Feich1 At the end of the war both 6rance and Fussia too7 German 4risoners of war and 4ut them to wor7 often under conditions almost as bad as those the Germans had inflicted on their ca4tive wor7ers1 The "nited 8tates which had turned over hundreds of thousands of German 4risoners of war to 6rance was forced to 4rotest over how the 6rench treated them1 German civilian labor was liable to be called u41 #roclamation No1 & of the Allied .ontrol .ouncil in 8e4tember (*/0 ordered: ??The German authorities must 4lace at the dis4osal of the "nited Nations labor 4ersonnel and e<4ert and other services for use inside and outside Germany as they may be ordered by Allied authorities1I "nder this 4roclamation &$$ $$$ Germans were IlegallyI shi44ed off to the 8oviet "nion after the cessation of hostilities1 The Allies told one another the ,ustification lay in the fact that it was right that Germans should re4air the damages the Third Feich had caused1 But actually nothing in international law countenanced such use of forced labor1 Goering had undoubtedly acted illegally when he called on 6ritH 8auc7el whom he greatly admired for his energy to recruit the millions of wor7ers needed to carry out the Feich?s economic 4rogram and when he used 4risoners of war in the armaments industry and in the 9uftwaffe antiaircraft com4anies1 -hen his lawyer wanted to introduce the German -hite Boo7 as bac7ground to show how the Fussians had treated German 4risoners of war and thus to attem4t to e<4lain in 4art why Goering had made such use of Allied war 4risoners the #resident of the .ourt said I-ell we are here to try ma,or war criminalsC we are not here to try any of the signatory 4owers1I After further discussion the #resident added IThe @uestion is how can you ,ustify in a trial of the ma,or war criminals of Germany evidence against Great Britain or against the "nited 8tates of America or against the "88F or against 6ranceO If you are going to try the actions of all those four signatory 4owers a4art from other considerations there would be no end to the trial at all1I )* Des4ite this one-sided consideration of the evidence Goering cannot be e<cul4ated1 6orced laborers for the air4lane industry =including concentration-cam4 wor7ers> lived under terrible conditions and died by the thousands of malnutrition and inade@uate shelter in the 4ac7ed trans4orts shuttling to and from the Feich1 Goering had little directly to do with such atrocities but he certainly 7new of them1 In addition a series of ca4tured German documents identified Goering with the shooting without trial of ca4tured enemy Iterror fliers1I Toward the end of the war when the Germans could 4ut u4 only wea7 fighter resistance Allied 4lanes did vast destruction in their saturation bombing of German cities1 In hedge-ho44ing and dive-bombing raids they also attac7ed any car or train or horsecart that came before their sights1 They went after any live target4eo4le wor7ing in the fields or huddled on the sides of roads or wal7-

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page_#4 #age %/ ing or running for their lives1 In a conference held in May (*// attended by Goering and high Air 6orce officers the minutes read as follows: ??The Feichsmarschall wishes to 4ro4ose to the 6uehrer that American and !nglish crews who shoot indiscriminately over towns at moving civilian trains or at soldiers hanging on 4arachutes should be shot immediately at the s4ot1I /$ Goering denied on the stand having said this and instanced the fact that the 4hrase Ihanging on 4arachutesI was unusual but other orders besides this one connected him with the Ishoot-onca4tureI order1 Another German document a note signed by General -alter -arlimont on Dune ' (*// 4laced Goering at a conference with Baltenbrunner Eimmler and Fibbentro4 in which it was decided that lynch ,ustice would be the rule where direct attac7s had been made by Allied fliers shooting at civilians1/( Eitler had already ordered on May &( (*// that !nglish and American air crews be e<ecuted without trial if they had fired on German civilians railroad trains or German airmen bailing out with 4arachutes or who had been forced to land and were in the immediate neighborhood of downed 4lanes that Allied gunners were trying to destroy1 A to4-secret note from -arlimont of Dune )$ (*// revealed that both Fibbentro4 and Goering had a44roved the 4ro4osed measures to be ta7en against enemy fliers1/& The ,udgment did not mention these matters although Mr1 Dustice Dac7son had cross-e<amined Goering at length on the sub,ect1 Ealf the s4ace given by the ,udgment to its reasons for finding Goering guilty on all four counts was devoted to his having committed crimes against 4eacethat is having 4lotted to commit aggression and having waged war1 IEe was the 4lanner and 4rime mover I the ,udgment said Iin the military and di4lomatic 4re4aration for war which Germany 4ursued1I And it summed u4: IThere is nothing to be said in mitigation1 6or Goering was often indeed almost always the moving force second only to his leader1 Ee was the leading war aggressor both as 4olitical and military leader 1 1 1 1I/) Nevertheless the charges against Goering for having ta7en 4art in the shooting of Allied airmen without a trial were serious and des4ite his denial he seems guilty of having 4artici4ated in the crime1 In his defense it might be urged that what the Allied airmen were doing was also a crime but in any case it was a crime that could have been tried before a German courtmartial1 By (*// not much was left in Goering?s mind of the notions of legality not to mention the notions of chivalry he may have had in -orld -ar I and by fits and starts early in -orld -ar II when he had sent 9uftwaffe soldiers to 4rotect Allied fliers who had fallen into the hands of an enraged civilian 4o4ulation1 All these events were diversionary for the Feichsmarschall1 -hat he wanted was an unceasing flow of 4restige to be reminded daily that he was one of the great men of the world1 Goering had lived well even royally1 In the course of his first interrogations his financial 4osition and sources of income were carefully gone into by the Allied 4rosecution1 During Germany?s occu4a-

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page_# #age %0 tion of 6rance he had bought ,ewels in .artier?s in #aris1 Ee had his agents buy 4aintings for him in 8witHerland1 But outside his Berlin ban7 he had no accounts no money in foreign countries none buried e<ce4t in Barinhall where his American interrogators would have to deal directly with the Fussians to find out where it was1 Ee told his @uestioners he could only show them the s4ot if he were thereC he could not describe it nor was there a 4lan available1 Ee had once owned a 4ro4erty in Bavaria he testified but after the unsuccessful 4utsch and his flight from Germany his car had been confiscated by the Bavarian 8tate and later his wife had to sell the 4ro4erty to 4ay bills1 But this sacrifice for the cause had been richly com4ensated when the #arty too7 4ower1 As late as (*0* 4ro4erty in -est Berlin that had belonged to him was valued at +0' $$$ DM =it had been confiscated in denaHification 4roceedings> and this did not include the ducal houses and estates he had owned or the collections of art he had assembled by way of his own agents and with the hel4 of the !insatHstab Fosenberg which had orders to 4ic7 out es4ecially meritorious wor7s that might a44eal to the Feichsmarschall1 The Berlin 4ro4erty evaluated in (*0* consisted only of ban7 accounts stoc7s and scul4ture1 :ne of his subordinates 6ield Marshal Milch got a 4resent of &0$ $$$ FM on the occasion of his fiftieth birthday from a grateful 6uehrer1 Goering himself was given an art fund by Eitler to enable him to build u4 his gallery which he said at Nuremberg he had 4lanned to leave to the nation and therefore re4resented not only his taste in art but his generosity1 Ee received &% $$$ FM a month as Feichsmarschall he told an American interrogator and from a s4ecial fund he maintained a free residence in Berlin1 Eis income from boo7s alone during the years he was one of the NaHi greats came to between ( and (10 million FM1L In addition he received 0 $$$ to + $$$ FM a month in interest from annuities1 The e<4enses of running Barinhall and his 4alace in Berlin were also 4aid by the 8tate1 // :f his fidelity to the 6uehrer des4ite the latter?s sus4icions there can be no @uestion1 Goering 4ursued the delights of the table and of the 4rincely landlord with the same a44etite he had for the lighter ,obs among his military and economic assignments1 Ee was rightfully awarded his renaissance role as he li7ed to thin7 of it in his years of eminence by a grateful Eitler and he was 4aid on the monumental scale awarded the favorites1 These men were generous to one another both in the rewards and the 4unishments which were lavishly bestowed1 Goering loved to commandC he loved too to 4rostrate himself to bas7 in the reflected glory of the 6uehrer1 L These were the figures he gave at Nuremberg but he may have e<aggerated1 Goering had hastily written a short boo7 Aufbau einer Nation 36ermany /eborn> 4ublished in Berlin and 9ondon in (*)/1 It was a boastful story of NaHi successes1 Goering dictated the manuscri4t in a matter of hours with a British audience in mind1 A number of his s4eeches had also been 4ublished and he laid claim to 4art of the royalties of the GritHbach biogra4hy but his figures even allowing for the forced sales of boo7s by the Feichsmarschall seem high1

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page_#! #age %' To his subordinates he could be ruthless1 At meetings he dis4layed his 4ower by cutting off discussions: ??Gentlemen enough1 I will decide this @uestion later1I :r IThe solution is @uite sim4le1 I will merely issue a decree ma7ing it illegal for Dews to sell bonds or for others to buy from them1I The role of number-two man of destiny suited Goering1 Ee constantly referred even during the trial to the intimacy of the collaboration between himself and Eitler1 84ea7ing of the charge of cons4iracy against the twentytwo defendants he said there could only be one such charge: against him and the 6uehrer for no one else could have cons4ired no one else was close enough to the throne1 Ee e<4lained to his American interrogators at Nuremberg that as Feichsmarschall he could not resign nor could the title ever be ta7en from him: II shall have it as long as I live1I No command rights went with itC it was sim4ly the highest military title in the Feich1 As7ed whether he regarded himself as a military man he said he did1 Ee thought of himself as the only man in Germany aside from the 6uehrer himself who combined the highest military and 4olitical functions and ca4acity1 A number of witnesses testified to Goering?s attem4ts to 7ee4 the 4eace1 The 8wede Dahlerus who was the only foreign witness allowed to the defense by the court told of his flying bac7 and forth between Goering and the British 6oreign :ffice in the days before the #olish cam4aign on behalf of the Feichsmarschall who ho4ed he said that the war could be avoided1 An assistant of Dr1 8tahmer a lawyer who saw much of Goering during the Nuremberg trial received some documents from a 8wedish lawyer which were 4laced at the dis4osal of the defense1 /0 These documents came from a 8wede Baron Bnut Bonde who had been in touch with Goering through a 8wedish friend !ri7 von Fosen =a relative of Goering?s first wife>1 Goering had confided to Bonde his ho4e even after the war had started that he might act as intermediary between Germany and !ngland1 Goering had been delighted Bonde said with the o44ortunity to try to ma7e 4eace between the two countries1 At that time the following events too7 4lace: In the middle of December (*)* Bonde flew to !ngland where he tal7ed with 9ord Ealifa< who said !ngland had never refused to try to come to a 4eaceful settlement with Adolf Eitler?s Germany and if a #olish state could be reconstituted and more freedom given .Hechoslova7ia he thought something might be arranged1 Ealifa< said: IIf there is one man in Germany who could ma7e 4eace it is Goering1I/' Bonde?s efforts ended early in (*/( after Eitler?s declaration that the 4ossibility of reconstituting #oland was discussable but nothing could be done for the .Hechs1 By (*/( Goering?s influence with Eitler was already diminished Bonde said and efforts at negotiation were ended1 At the re@uest of Dr1 8tahmer 9ord Ealifa< signed an affidavit about his visits to Barinhall where he had tal7ed with Goering before the war1 Ee said somewhat frigidly that he thought Goering would have li7ed to have

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page_#" #age %+ avoided war if the Germans had been able to gain what they wanted without it1 Although Goering in (*)' had told a meeting of German air4lane manufacturers he was certain war would come the stories of his reluctance to see war brea7 out are undoubtedly true1 They can be accounted for in 4art by Goering?s rivalry with Fibbentro4 who had nothing to do with the missions of Dahlerus and who certainly wanted war because he thought that was what Eitler e<4ected of him1 Dahlerus wrote in his The Last Attem2t that Goering had warned him that Fibbentro4 might attem4t to 4lace a bomb in his 4lane to sabotage the 4eace efforts1 At Nuremberg Goering denied having said this and it seems li7ely that Dahlerus misinter4reted him1 The rivalry and differences between Goering and Fibbentro4 were of considerable dimensions1 Fibbentro4 as Ambassador to Britain had 4revented Goering?s attending the coronation of Bing !dward GIII1 Ee had told the 6uehrer that the !nglish would 4refer another re4resentative1 In reality Goering thought his own 4resence was o44osed because he and his wife since he was a 6ield Marshal would have outran7ed the Fibbentro4s1L Georing was never allowed to ta7e 4art in the negotiations in Bad Godesberg that led to the Munich Agreement1 Ee had gone on his own account to Munich for the signing of the agreement and he told his lawyer that !rnst von -eiHsaec7er 8tate 8ecretary in the 6oreign :ffice who greatly mistrusted Fibbentro4 had said to him ??Than7 God you are here1I At Nuremberg Fibbentro4 casting about for any hel4 he could get wrote a note to Goering as7ing him to testify that he had tried always to get a di4lomatic solution of the 4roblems before them1 Goering struc7 out the suggested answer with a bold stro7e and wrote in its 4lace: II have only heard that Fibbentro4 advised in favor of war1I /+ Goering had nothing to gain from a war1 True he was the ran7ing military officer of the NaHi hierarchy as well as chief of the 9uftwaffe1 Ee was intelligent he had the second highest IS among the twenty-one defendants =the highest was 8chacht with (/(C Goering was close behind with ()*> and he was aware that a war would 4ut everything at sta7e that had been wonthe succession of brilliant uniforms the rece4tions the hunting the #arty celebrations with their streaming lights and banners and the 4erfumes of adulation that rose not only to the 6uehrer but to his faithful 4aladin as well1 Goering was no coward1 Eis war record was a brilliant one and his conduct at Nuremberg although 4osturing showed none of the terror that seiHed Fibbentro41 Ee acce4ted ris7s when he had to1 -hen decisions were made by the 6uehrer he went along with them without visible misgivings1 But he wanted to en,oy the amenities of the victory after the long struggle to 4ower1 Ee 4referred the lush life of Barinhall to the 4rivate railroad train that bore him to the field of battle1 =A 4lane regularly too7 off from his 4rivate train to return with rare fruits and wines in the midst of the war1> 6or a time Goering had considerable success on the witness stand1 Ee had L After .arin?s death he married an actress from Eamburg !mmy 8onnemann in (*)01

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page_## #age %% no difficulty defending himself against the im4lacable ideology of the American 4rosecutor who was himself 4ut so on the defensive that he had to a44eal to the #resident of the .ourt for hel41 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son demanded of Goering who declared he had disa44roved of the war against Fussia why if that was so he had not told the German 4eo4le of the 4lan to attac7 the 8oviet "nion and why he had not resigned when the decision was made1 Goering 4ointed out that he was a soldier and that he had never heard of a case when in time of war a soldier could a44eal over the head of his commander in chief to the citiHenry merely because he did not a44rove of a decision his su4erior had made1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son as7ed about a document that seemed to him to show that Goering in connection with the German 4lans for mobiliHation in the mid-thirties had 4re4ared or hel4ed to 4re4are for the occu4ation of the Fhineland when this was e<4ressly forbidden by the Gersailles Treaty1 Goering 4ointed out that there was an error in the translation of the document that what the mobiliHation 4lans called for was not occu4ation of the Fhineland but the clearing of river traffic from the Fhine1 But Mr1 Dustice Dac7son was not to be 4ut off so easily1 DA.B8:N: ??-ell these 4re4arations were 4re4arations for the armed occu4ation of the Fhineland were they notOI G:!FING: IThey were general 4re4arations for mobiliHation such as every country ma7es and not for the 4ur4ose of the occu4ation of the Fhineland1I DA.B8:N: IBut they were of a character which had to be 7e4t secret 1 1 1 OI G:!FING: II do not thin7 that I can recall reading beforehand the 4ublication of the mobiliHation 4re4arations of the "nited 8tates1I Dac7son =turning to the #resident of the .ourt> denounced what he called this witness? Iarrogant and contem4tuous attitude toward the Tribunal which is giving him the trial which he never gave a living soul nor dead ones either1I The #resident agreed that Goering?s remar7 was irrelevant but when Dac7son wanted to 4ress the matter saying that Goering was getting 4ro4aganda statements into the record and was successfully turning over control of the trial to the defense the #resident coldly as7ed him I-hat e<actly is the motion you are ma7ing 1 1 1 are you submitting to the Tribunal that the witness has to answer every @uestion yes or no and wait until he is ree<amined for the 4ur4ose of ma7ing any e<4lanation at allO 8urely it is ma7ing too much of a sentence the witness has said whether the "nited 8tates ma7es orders for mobiliHation 4ublic or not 1 1 1 !very country 7ee4s certain things secret1I DA.B8:N: I9et me say that I agree with your Eonor that as far as the "nited 8tates is concerned we are not worried by anything the witness can say about itand we e<4ected 4lenty1 1 1 1 And it does seem to me that this is the beginning of the Trial?s getting out of hand1I TE! #F!8ID!NT: II have never heard it suggested that the counsel for the

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page_#$ #age %* 4rosecution have to answer every irrelevant observation made in crosse<amination1?? /% Mr1 Dustice Dac7son convinced of the rectitude of his high mission re4eated clichJs of Allied war 4ro4aganda that were refuted by the documents he had read or should have read1 At one 4oint he demanded of Goering: I;ou have testified 1 1 1 on interrogation that it was Eitler?s information that the "nited 8tates would never go to war even if attac7ed and that he counted on the isolationists of that country to 7ee4 it out of warOI Goering re4lied: I8uch nonsenseI ho4e you will e<cuse me 1 1 1 I could never have uttered because if a country is attac7ed it defends itself1I/* Eitler had a considerable store of misinformation about the "nited 8tates its decadence and subservience to Dewish influence but both he and Goering had believed from the beginning that if the war lasted the "nited 8tates was certain to ,oin it1 This in fact was given by the 6uehrer as one of the reasons for his attac7 on Fussia1 As early as Duly )( (*/$ he told the assembled com4any of generals and admirals that !ngland continued its ho4eless fight against Germany only because she was counting on Fussia and the "nited 8tates to enter the war10$ The re4orters in the courtroom as well as the defense counsel were im4ressed with the adroitness of Goering?s re4lies to Dac7son?s crosse<amination1 Ee had far less luc7 though with Dac7son?s @uestions about his 4art in the anti-Dewish measures and with the British 4rosecutor 8ir David Ma<well-6yfe who brought out the vulnerable 4oints of Goering?s 4ast: the treatment of 4risoners of war the shooting of fifty British officers who had esca4ed from a 4risoner-of-war cam4 at 8agan the bac7ground of the German attac7s on Eolland and Belgium and ;ugoslavia the war against the 4artisans the system of concentration cam4s and the e<termination of the Dews1 Goering had to listen to some unflattering ,udgments from his fellow defendants1 -hen 84eer s4o7e of his vanity his corru4tion and his mor4hine addiction Goering im4atiently told his assistant counsel that 84eer had always been a traitor1L L No one could wound his vanity without his reacting sometimes viciously1 :ne of his young officers to whom he had ta7en a great li7ing was falsely accused by a su4eriora generalof having re4orted to the 88 that so great was the chaos in the Air 6orce that a successor to Goering was being discussed everywhere1 Goering when told of this alleged remar7 called a courtmartial to try the young officer and said he e<4ected a sentence of guilty to be handed down by si< o?cloc7 that evening1 Ee also ordered that 4re4arations be made for the e<ecution1 :wing to the diligence of the court 4resident 6reiherr von Eammerstein the 4roceedings however were continued the young man?s innocence was established to Goering?s as well as the court?s satisfaction and Goering admitted he had been wrong1 That was the young officer?s good luc7C Goering would certainly have had him shot had he believed him guilty1 Goering had bursts of warmth and good feeling but he did not suffer adversity easily and as his troubles multi4lied he turned increasingly to mor4hine and the wild ho4es that led to his 4romise to 4rovision the 8i<th Army at 8talingrad by means of an airlift1 This was the same shallow o4timism that had led him to say that no bomber would get through to Berlin1 =.hristian 6reiherr von Eammerstein Mein Leben M#rivate 4rinting (*'&N 441 (+(+)>1

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page_$0 #age *$ The reliability of his testimony de4ended largely on whether his re4lies were in accord with what he regarded as his 4rescribed loyalties to his 6uehrer and countryhis roles of the faithful brave soldier1 Ee freely admitted on the witness stand that he had wanted to rearm Germany to get rid of Gersailles and to attach Austria to the Feich and that he had said in (*)0 ??I intend to create an airforce which if the hour should stri7e shall burst u4on the foe li7e a chorus of revenge1 The enemy must have a feeling of having lost before even having fought1I 0( Ee was sure these were the right words to use as they had been to indoctrinate young Air 6orce officers who were building u4 the 9uftwaffe1 Ee also admitted that he had 7nown that the hair shorn from concentration cam4 inmates was to be used for 4ractical 4ur4oses1 But he denied when Ma<well-6yfe @uestioned him that he had ever heard of the Bullet Decree under which Allied 4risoners in Mauthausen were 7illed by an a44aratus that seemingly was designed to measure them but actually was so arranged that it fired a shot into the victim?s head when it was ad,usted1 Goering?s magnificent art collection of ( )$$ or more 4aintings worth he reluctantly calculated at Nuremberg some 0$ million FM =Allied e<4erts 4laced the figure at (%$ million dollars> had come in 4art from 4ro4erty confiscated from Dews who had emigrated or had died in the gas chambers1 It is doubtful that Goering had much genuine feeling for art1 -hat he li7ed was collecting having a renowned museum as 4art of his estate living in style1 Ee wrote to Fosenberg: II have now obtained by means of 4urchase 4resents be@uests and barter 4erha4s the greatest 4rivate collection in Germany at least if not in !uro4e1I0& 8ome of the bartered 4aintings were from the collections of so-called Idegenerate artI confiscated from the museums and 4rivate collections of the Third Feich1 They included the wor7s of great contem4orary 4ainters: Bec7mann George GrosH .hagall Blee Gan Gogh 8ignac .JHanne Gauguin #icasso1 Most of these 4aintings were sent to 8witHerland to be auctioned off to bring in needed foreign e<change1 8ome of the confiscated 4aintings were burned ,ust as the evil boo7s that offended the tastes of the National 8ocialists were burned1L Goering did not dare to hang the IdegenerateI 4aintings even if he had been so dis4osed1 It is not easy to se4arate the overriding 4olitical considerations and the need for 4leasing Adolf Eitler from what Goering might otherwise have chosen1 -hat he li7ed was o4ulence1 Ee had some thic7 car4ets trans4orted from museums to Barinhall1 In (*)+ he too7 a leading 4art in the IcleansingI of the German art galleries by having Idegenerate artI re4laced by 4osterssuch as the grotes@ue 4oster of the 6uehrer mounted E la 8aint Doan on a charger wearing armor and carrying a banner1 Goering had himself 4hotogra4hed admiring L 8uch burnings were symbolic1 Not all the 4roscribed boo7s or 4aintings were destroyed1 Those chosen for destruction in a ceremony of re,ection were the Dewish or 4acifist or antinationalist wor7s1

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page_$1 #age *( the new healthy 4aintings1 An art school was named after him1 Eere 4ainters were trained in the a44roved National 8ocialist style and 4romising students were given financial hel41 Eis name was also attached to a 4riHe of 0 $$$ FM to be awarded to the 4ainter who in the year (*/& 4roduced the best wor7 of art dealing with Germany?s defense forces1 0) The high @uality of his collection at Barinhall and in his seven other residences was due to his buying or stealing the sure thingsFembrandt Goya GelQs@ueHand to his having em4loyed e<4erts who seem to have ac@uired few fraudulent 4ieces1 :nly two fa7es were mentioned at Nuremberga Germeer and a Fembrandt1 Ee had been advised by some of the Third Feich?s most renowned e<4erts1 6ew Germans dared to resist the 4lundering of 6rench art by Goering?s agents as did for one the Fhenish .onservator 6ranH -olff-Metternich1 Goering had 4aid for some of the 4ictures he ac@uired he told his interrogators at Nuremberg out of the art fund Eitler had given him and sometimes out of his own 4oc7et1 !insatHstab Fosenberg ac@uired large numbers of 4aintings and ob>ets )Aart on his behalf1 =Goering never got around to 4aying for them1>L Ee also had substantial gifts from the Eermann Goering Division from German cities from 4rivate individuals and from industrial firms1 A lot of 4eo4le 7new of his e<4ensive tastes and ho4ed to benefit by indulging them1LL -hen Goering did 4ay for 4ictures he ac@uired he did so always in cash1 Ee boasted to an interrogator ??I was the second man in the Feich and always had 4lenty of money1 I would give an order to the Feichsban7 and they would get the money1I -hen as7ed I.ould you get foreign e<change in this wayOI Goering re4lied I;es I was the last court of a44eal1I Eis failure to 4ay Fosenberg did not disturb the relations between the two men for both were declared art lovers1 :n Goering?s fiftieth birthday Fosenberg sent him a seventeenth-century Dutch 4ainting1 In his ac@uisition of 4aintings Goering was by turns e<travagant and mean1 Ee once ac@uired a collection of 4ictures for the sum named by a dealer had them shi44ed to Barinhall and then refused to 4ay more than half of the bill saying it was too high1 Eis wife !mmy who had been with him in the L The Fosenberg staff organiHed twenty-nine large trans4orts of 4aintings1 The meticulous German re4orts showed that more than ()$ freight cars and / $$$ crates were used1 The collections included more than 0 $$$ 4aintings =including icons and hundreds of miniatures> from Fussia #oland 6rance and EollandC costly 4ieces of furniture te<tiles Gobelin ta4estries and rare car4etsC thousands of 4ieces of 4orcelain bronHes and faience along with a great collection of bronHes from !ast Asia1 Among the 4ainters were masters from the entire .ontinent1 Goering got his 4ic7 of these =N TTGI 441 0&+ 0&*>1 Ee also obtained many 4aintings from Italy causing the German Ambassador in Fome Eans von Mac7ensen some un4leasant interviews with Italian authorities who com4lained about Goering?s collecting methods1 =Foger Manvell and Eeinrich 6raen7el Hermann 6oering M9ondon: Eeinemann (*'&N 41 &+0>1 LL Berlin for e<am4le one year sent him as a birthday 4resent a 4ainting worth &0$ $$$ FM =.bi)1 41 &++>1

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page_$2 #age *& gallery when he had agreed to 4ay the 4rice named secretly 4aid the other half1 0/ Goering felt com4elled to own certain 4ictures1 -hether they were 4aid for and by whom did not matter much as long as the transactions did not 4inch his style of living1 :ne of his advisers was Dr1 Eermann Bun,es an art historian1 Ee told Goering as they were loo7ing over art confiscated from Dewish collections in #aris in the Deu de #aume that the 6rench Government was ma7ing trouble1 Gichy was 4rotesting the seiHures being made by the !insatHstab Fosenberg calling them a breach of the Armistice of .om4iVgne1 Goering said to Bun,es ??My orders are controlling1 ;ou will directly follow my orders1I Ee then ordered the 4lunder he had chosen 4ut in freight cars to be attached to his 4rivate train1 -hen Bun,es 4ointed out that Army ,urists attached to the Military .ommander in 6rance would ma7e ob,ections Goering answered IMy dear Bun,es let this be my trouble1 I am the highest ,urist in the state1I00 At Nuremberg Goering denied that he could have said this since he was not in fact the highest ,urist in the 8tate1 The Feichsmarschall?s nearest com4etitor was the 6uehrer who intended to found a museum for his native Austria in 9inH1 Goering often held bac7 from ac@uiring a 4icture he wanted he told his interrogators because the 6uehrer had e<4ressed an interest in it1 Actually he acted on behalf of both Eitler and himself1 Ee 4erformed for the 6uehrer in his order of November 0 (*/$ which read: In conveying the measures ta7en until now for the securing of Dewish art 4ro4erty by the .hief of the Military Administration #aris and the !insatHstab Fosenberg 1 1 1 the art ob,ects brought to the 9ouvre Mlater to the Deu de #aumeN will be dis4osed of in the following way: (1 Those art ob,ects the decision as to the use of which the 6uehrer will reserve for himselfC &1 Those art ob,ects which serve the com4letion of the Feich Marshal?s collectionC )1 Those art ob,ects and library materials which seem useful for the establishment of the Eohe 8chule and for the 4rogram of Feichsleiter FosenbergC /1 Those art ob,ects which are suitable for sending to the German museums 1 1 10' Thus Goering a44eared in another guise as the number-two man of the Feich1 8ince Eitler?s interest in art collecting was s4oradic and he had more on his mind than did the Feichsmarschall Goering had the field 4retty much to himself1 Ee admitted during his interrogations that he had not given the 4aintings and other art he had ac@uired to the Feich although he had tal7ed of his 4ublic s4irit in ac@uiring them1 Ee said he had 4lanned one day to leave them all not to the Feich but to the German 4eo4le10+ It should be borne in mind that Goering was not the first among those con@uerors in history who 4illaged enemy ob>ets )Aart and brought them

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page_$3 #age *) bac7 to their native countries1 :ther museums in !uro4e have from time to time enriched their collections with 4aintings and scul4ture confiscated from foreign countries1 But Goering was wor7ing not for the museums of the Feich but for himself1 Eis was a ,ob of 4rivate 4lunder on the greatest scale ever recorded1 6ifty million mar7s is a low estimate of what the collection he had assembled was worth1 Goering had moved beyond the mar7et4lace to where he could command a 4icture without 4utting a 4rice on it merely by telling Fosenberg or some other 4erson that he wanted it1 This is what nourished him: the 4restige of the 4icture its value as a 4riHed commodity or as decoration and a bac7ground for his uniforms1 Goering?s s4ecial train as he sought to live out the war in as grand a style as he could command was second only to Barinhall in his 4ride of 4ossession1 It consisted actually of two trains: the first 7nown as ??the bomb clearer I with eight regular 4assenger carsC the second with the armor and the lu<ury befitting the second in command of the Feich1 Eis bathroom =one of three> was reserved for his sole use1 -hile he bathed the train sto44ed regardless of what this did to the timetable of other trains using the same trac7s1 At each end of the train =it had a crew and guards of (+( men> were the airdefense batteries manned by twenty men1 Behind the first battery came the baggage cars and then Goering?s car which had two slee4ing rooms with full-siHed beds1 :ne bedroom was for his wife who never used the train1 The ceiling woodwor7 and the furniture were of cherry1 A library stoc7ed mainly with detective stories s4orted heavy car4ets1 The following car was used as a living room1 In the early days of the war movies were shown every night including 6one ,ith the !in) and ca4tured films li7e Garbo?s Ninotchka which was otherwise forbidden in Germany1 Goering li7ed criminal films best of all and he would sometimes lea4 u4 to shout the identity of the murderer before the film had ended: IThere he isPI The ne<t car was the command center in which staff conferences were held at (( A1M1 It was dominated by a large 4icture of Eitler1 Goering?s first tele4hone call daily was to the 6uehrer?s head@uarters the second to his wife1 The food was of an elegant 7ind: strawberries might be flown in from Italy by the accom4anying courier 4lanes rolls and ca7es could be ba7ed in the ovens of the train and an ordinary lunch often included lobster and caviar as well as Italian fruit1 The ten railroad cars had s4ace for the automobiles that might be needed for shorter ,ourneysC among them after the fall of 6rance were two ca4tured American automobiles a 9a8alle and a Buic7 which the Feichsmarschall li7ed to use1 !verything had to be in 4lush style1 Goering?s 7imonos were of brocade and sil7 and the fifty or so uniforms of his own design included fur-lined overcoats1 Ee received countless 4resents from admiring friends but many were contributed by more reluctant givers on whom the bite was 4ut1 :ne gift 4resented to him in (*/$ when he was forty-eight years old was a gold bo< inlaid with ,ewels which an observer calculated to be worth in the neigh-

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page_$4 #age */ borhood of &$ $$$ or )$ $$$ FM1 Another 4resent a bric7 of 4ure gold was estimated to be worth as much as & $$$ $$$ FM1 A full-time technician was in charge of the 4layroom at Barinhall where the toy railroad was housed1 It measured half the siHe of a football field&/$ s@uare meters1 It contained a scene that would delight the heart of any child with its miniature mountains and hills valleys and meadows towers and castles farms and roads1 #lanes could ta7e off on wires that crossed over the landsca4e and dro4 their loads of bombs which went off with a satisfactory bang while fla7 shot at them1 !lectric automobiles ran on the Autobahnen1 Goering could cause collisions and derailments on the railroad1 The s4ort was beloved by his visitors among them the #rince of -ales Mussolini Mi7lWs Eorthy .ount GaleaHHo .iano and ;osu7e Matsuo7a who had once been in charge of the Manchurian railroads1 Ee and Goering 7e4t a grou4 of high officers waiting for an hour while Matsuo7a ran the railroad and later 4layed in Goering?s bowling alley which could double as a shooting range1 As time went on Goering retreated further and further from the war1 :ne of his aides said that what interested Goering was bringing good news to the 6uehrer1 The chances of doing this diminished steadily with the yearsC indeed they went down almost immediately after the fall of 6rance with the failure to 7noc7 out the British 4lanes which 4roved to be faster and more maneuverable than the German aircraft1 :ne of the reasons for this may well have lain in incidents such as the one that occurred when Goering 7e4t the aces of his entourage!rnst "det BodenschatH and Milchwaiting for three days while he went sho44ing in #aris and was unavailable for the necessary consultations and decisions on how to im4rove the German 4lanes in accordance with the recommendations of the men who flew them1 Eitler 7new all too well of Goering?s laHiness and ine4tness1 -hat he believed in and with reason was Goering?s faithfulness1 Ee was however @uoted as saying to a visitor ??;ou should visit Goering at Barinhall a sight worth seeing1I Goering?s res4onsibility for the loss of the German strength in the air was diminished by the 6uehrer?s decision to 4ut man4ower and resources to wor7 on the new wonder wea4ons rather than on the ,ets the Germans were 4roducing in the underground factories in (*//1 The gasoline shortage too became acute1L There was no 4oint said 84eer in building 4lanes that could not be fueled1 Goering told -erner Bross one of his lawyers that his 4lanes had not been able to su44ly 8talingrad because of the lac7 of gasoline1 This was only 4art of the story but Goering was not one to let the facts deter him from coming to a conclusion favorable to himself or his cause1 Tal7ing L #rofessor #ercy 8chramm wrote an o4inion for the Femer trial held in March (*0& in which he said that the destruction of oil resources beginning with the successful Allied air attac7s on the Fumanian #loesti airfields in A4ril (*// alone must have brought the war to an end1 The air raids on #loesti and its neighboring refineries together with the mining of the Danube by Allied air4lanes cut the trans4ort of oil to the Feich in May (*// by 0' 4er centfrom /)$ $$$ tons to &/$ $$$ =Institut fuer Aeitgeschichte Munich Mhereinafter referred to as IAGN Gb ($1$) )0+20&>1

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page_$ #age *0 of the Battle of the Bulge he said the Germans might have won it and driven the invaders from the .ontinent had it not been for some incom4etence on the 4art of the military leaders and the lifting of the fog that had lasted for four days and had enabled the Allied 4lanes with their overwhelming numerical su4eriority to strafe the German troo4s1 But Goering was the commanding officer of the 9uftwaffe and its failure was his failure no matter who else might share the res4onsibility1 The 6uehrer could ma7e no mista7es1 :nly his subordinates could lose battles and ma7e wrong decisions1 Goering by (*// had lost the battle of the air in the -est and his 4lanes had no effect on the course of the struggle in the !ast1 It was his 4lanes that were not flying against the enemy1 6or a short time Goering had succeeded in creating the most 4owerful air force in the world1 It had cleared the s7ies over #oland 6rance Norway ;ugoslavia and Greece1 In .rete his 4aratroo4ers for the first time in the history of warfare ca4tured the ma,or military ob,ective of an island against an entrenched enemy that had control of the seas1 8igns of the limitations of the Air 6orce had a44eared early for e<am4le in the failure to defeat the British Air 6orce and the failure to 4revent the embar7ation at Dun7ir71 But the real trouble started in (*/(1 German calculations greatly underestimated Fussian strength in all arms including air strength and while the 9uftwaffe long dominated the s7ies over Fussia it was never able after the first ma,or successes to give the ground troo4s the su44ort that so greatly aided the victories won before the invasion of the 8oviet "nion1 It was Goering?s o4timism that hel4ed to confirm Eitler in the decision to 7ee4 the 8i<th Army where it was at 8talingrad and to stand adamant against the 4leadings of the Army generals to let General 6riedrich #aulus brea7 out in time1 As much as anything however numbers defeated his 9uftwaffe1 American and British 4roduction could in no way be matched by Germany which in addition was increasingly o4en to air attac71 Des4ite the e<cellent German ,ets Goering had not 7e4t u4 with the technical re@uirements of the air war1 Bombers had to be converted to fighters and all sorts of deficiencies remained unremedied because Goering had not ta7en the time to listen to his technicians and to see to it that new models were 4rovided1 By the time of the Allied invasion of Normandy the Germans defending the 6rench coast had only a handful of 4lanes to send against the American and British bombers1 8o overwhelming was Allied air su4eriority that the :B- orders said that any 4lanes o4erating in the s7ies over the 6rench coast must be regarded as enemies1 Ma<well-6yfe in his crosse<amination told Goering that he 7new him to have been a brave fighter in -orld -ar I1 8o he had been and he never forgot it1 Eis 4hotogra4her saw him in 6rance during -orld -ar II at the site of the airfield where his -orld -ar I 4lanes had been based and noted how different his e<4ression was as he went bac7 over the scene and memories of the solid e<4loits of his career as a flier1 In the last years of -orld -ar II

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page_$! #age *' he flew little although two 4lanes were at his dis4osal1 Ee 7e4t away from the front continued to ta7e mor4hine and lived the life of a feudal 4rince to whom the conferences with the 6uehrer and the time given to the details of being commander in chief of the Air 6orce were trying1 They were diversions from his collecting tri4s and hunting1 Ee even went on hunting tri4s in Fussia while the front-line troo4s 4raised so unstintingly in his s4eeches were dying by the thousands only hundreds of 7ilometers to the !ast1 -as Goering the man of 4eace he described at NurembergO There is no evidence that he wished to ris7 his life or comfort1 Ee did only what the formalities of being the second in command of the Feich armed forces demanded1 Eitler increasingly by4assed him in the conduct of the war1 Their relations however remained intermittently cordial until close to the 6uehrer?s death although the 6uehrer time and again attac7ed him for the failures of the Air 6orce1 They met on Duly &$ (*// the day of the attem4t on Eitler?s life1 As a 7ind of e<4iation for the 4art the generals and Army had 4layed in the attem4t to 7ill the 6uehrer Goering introduced the raised arm as the official salute in the armed forces1 :nly at the very end when Goering did no more than he thought his duty in ta7ing over the reins of government when it seemed that Eitler had decided to remain in Berlin and die with the city did the final brea7 come1 :ther men had su44lanted him in 4ower and during the last wee7s all he retained was the title of Feichsmarschall which he and #rince !ugene in the eighteenth century alone had borne1 The surrender too7 that from him1 A few hours before he was to be hanged he bit into a cyanide ca4sule that had been smuggled to him and died1 Eis ashes were strewn into the Isar along with the ashes of the men e<ecuted1 The Allies wanted no cult of NaHism to have a center around the graves of the dead but Goering had few followers left and no disci4les1 Notes (1 -erner Bross 6es2raeche mit Hermann 6oering =6lensburg and Eamburg: .hristian -olff (*0$> 41 (/)1 &1 .bi)1 41 (+'1 )1 .bi)1 41 &&)1 /1 .hristian 6reiherr von Eammerstein Mein Leben =#rivate 4rinting (*'&>1 01 .harles Bewley Hermann 6oering =Goettingen: Goettinger Gerslagsanstalt (*0'>1 '1 Foger Manvell and Eeinrich 6raen7el Hermann 6oering =9ondon: Eeinemann (*'&>1 +1 !rich GritHbach Hermann 6oering !erk un) Mensch =Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)*> 441 &)*/$1 %1 .harles Bewley Hermann 6oering an) the Thir) /eich =New ;or7: DevinAdair (*'&> 441 )))/1

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page_$" #age *+ *1 Manvell and 6raen7el o2. cit1 ($1 .ount 9utH 8chwerin von Brosig7 o2. cit1 ((1 N IT 41 )$+1 (&1 Theodor !schenburg ??Cur Ermor)ung )es 6enerals Schleicher I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 ( (*0) 441 +(*01 ()1 Eermann Mau I ie AC,eite /evolutionA er F$. %uni 78F9=G ibi)1 Gol1 I No1 & (*0) 441 ((*)+1 (/1 N TTTII )//&-#8 441 &%**$1 (01 Eammerstein o2. cit1 441 ($+* (/'/+1 ('1 D1 B1 Aawodny eath in the "orest =Notre Dame: "niversity of Notre Dame #ress (*'&> 41 ''1 (+1 8ir -inston 81 .hurchill The Secon) !orl) !ar Gol1 IG: The Hinge of "ate =Boston: Eoughton Mifflin .om4any (*0$> 41 +0*1 (%1 N TTTII 41 /((1 (*1 N*A GI )0+0-#8 441 )'++$1 &$1 N TTGI +($-#8 441 &'''+1 N*A III 441 0&0&'1 &(1 9ouis #1 9ochner The 6oebbels iaries 789#789F =Garden .ity N1;1: Doubleday R .om4any Inc1 (*/%> 41 &''1 &&1 N IT 41 0&'1 &)1 N TTGIII (%('-#8 41 0$%1 &/1 .bi)1 41 0$*1 &01 .bi)1 41 0($1 &'1 .bi)1 41 0((1 &+1 .bi)1 41 0&/1 &%1 .bi)1 41 0&01 &*1 .bi)1 41 0&*1 )$1 .bi)1 41 0)%1 )(1 N IT 41 ')/1 )&1 N TTTIT (+$-"88F1 ))1 N IG 41 01 )/1 .bi)1 41 00(1 )01 N TTTIT (+$-"88F 41 /$+1 )'1 .bi)1 41 )%+1 )+1 N IT 41 '%)1 )%1 N*A GII !.-)(+ 41 /$01 )*1 N IT 41 '%%1 /$1 .bi)1 41 0'*1 /(1 N TTGI +)0-#8 441 &+'+%1 /&1 .bi)1 +/$-#8 441 &+*%$1 /)1 N TTII 441 0&'&+1 //1 N*A 8u441 B 441 ((/)/01 /01 Bross o2. cit1 41 &((1 /'1 .bi)1 41 &()1 /+1 .bi)1 41 (&(1 /%1 N IT 441 0$'((1 /*1 .bi)1 41 ///1 0$1 6ranH Ealder (riegstagebuch Gol1 II =8tuttgart: -1 Bohlhammer (*')> 41 /*1

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page_$# #age *% 0(1 N*A II 41 /&01 0&1 N GIII 41 ')1 0)1 Dose4h -ulf ie Bil)en)en (uenste im ritten /eich =Guetersloh: 8igbert Mohn (*')> 441 ((' )'/1 0/1 !dith 8targardt--olff !egbereiter grosser Musiker =Berlin and -iesbaden (*0/> 41 &%/1 Suoted in -ulf o2. cit1 41 )*/1 001 N TTT &0&)-#8 41 0*)1 0'1 N IG (/(-#8 41 %&1 0+1 N*A 8u441 B 41 (()+1

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page_$$ #age ** / The #arty in Action and Theory Martin Bormann The hard core of the #arty was formed by men who made both a career and a religion of the movement1 The 4etty ho4es of thousands of the ran7and-file brethren for ,obs and 4olitical 4referment were not for this fanatical inner circle1 It was the will the 4ersonality the mana of the 6uehrer that gave substance to the core1 Through Eitler a man li7e Martin Bormann was given a historic identity and was able to rise from hel4ing to run a farm to becoming one of the mightiest men in the Feich and to transform his life into a crusade for the ideas he and the 6uehrer shared1 -ithout Eitler Bormann the 4ersonage hardly e<isted1 Eis 2ersona became a 4ro,ection not of himself but of himself in relation to the 6uehrer1 In (*)) Bormann was Fudolf Eess? Stabsleiterthat is the second in command to the 6uehrer?s de4uty1 Ee was in charge of the #arty?s aid fund =Eilfs7asse> and a de4uty in the Feichstag1 It was easy to distinguish men li7e him from the ran7 and file of the #arty who re,oicing in the victory of National 8ocialism set out to ma7e new careers1 Eungry businessmen manufacturers wor7ers and the unem4loyed stormed the #arty in (*)) with 4ro4osals that would ma7e them all rich1 :ne man wanted to manufacture a soa4 on which the form of a swasti7a would be 4ressed1 Another had a 4lan for a shoe-4olish factory to be manned only by National 8ocialistsC he had already had stationery 4rinted on which a44eared the red-and-white #arty emblems he had in mind for the 4ac7age1 Busts of Eitler were turned out to be sold for seven mar7s1 A silver 4in was offered with the 6uehrer?s li7eness on its headC its designer had already he wrote the #arty head@uarters sold

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page_100 #age ($$ many of these and he now @uoted wholesale 4rices for mass consum4tion1 :ffered for sale were swasti7a hand7erchiefsC ??Eeil EitlerI stic7ers to be attached to cigarette 4ac7agesC Damaica rum in a bottle adorned with a swasti7a flagC swasti7as as .hristmas tree ornamentsC and a .hristmas tree in the sha4e of the hoo7ed cross1 A calendar was designed with the anti8emitic slogan IGermany Awa7e1I A confectioner wanted to ma7e IGerman chocolateI and turn over 0 4er cent of the 4rofits to the #arty1 ( Bormann was as gross a man as any of these su44liers of trin7ets but he wanted to reform Germany with fire and sword and mighty symbols not with gadgets and money-ma7ing devices1 Eis ideas were the inner core of what would under him become the #arty .hancellery which screened out 4ro4osals before they reached the 6uehrer1 -ith the same determination and ferocity that characteriHed Eitler and the 88 Bormann set out in the 6uehrer?s name to cleanse or ta7e over the courts the state bureaucracy and Germany?s economic 4olitical and social life1 It was the #arty said Eitler that would control the 8tate not the other way around1 And the man who would control the #arty was Martin Bormann who would get rid of every rival even those who had been Eitler?s closest advisers1 At the end only he and his 6uehrer were left in command and the 6uehrer?s will was his too1 -alter 8chellenberg head of the secret service of the Feich said that Bormann loo7ed li7e a 4riHefighter who measured his o44onent for the 7ill1& :f medium height with thinning blac7 hair thic7 shoulders and a stoo4ing gait he was a man with the same ine<haustible energy that animated Eitler and he wor7ed li7e a demon often at the most trivial assignments that he gave himself1 Nothing was too small or too large for him to be concerned with1 Ee 7e4t a record of Eitler?s table tal7s at the daily lunches1 The 6uehrer had only to mention casually a boo7 he was interested in or a 4erson or sub,ect and a little while later Bormann would 4ut the boo7 or a note of information on his table1 !verything that brought him closer to Eitler was im4ortant and 7e4t his rivals away1 And all were his rivalsEimmler Goebbels Eess 84eer Goering Fosenberg Beitel even the 6uehrer?s doctors1 Bormann loo7ed them over from the moment he got close to the throne getting ready for the 7ill1 Ee was born on Dune (+ (*$$ in Ealberstadt in central Germany the son of a sergeant a trum4eter in a cavalry regiment who later became a 4ostoffice official1 Eis father died two years after Martin Bormann?s birth and 6rau Bormann moved u4 in the social scale soon thereafter marrying a ban7 director1 Bormann attended the Fealgymnasium for a few years but did not receive a di4loma leaving school to wor7 on an estate in Mec7lenburg1 Ee returned to his agricultural 4ursuits after -orld -ar I when he became an ins4ector of the farmlands owned by the Treuenfels family in EerHberg1 Ee had been called u4 for army service only in the last months of the war serving as a cannoneer in a field-artillery regiment1 In (*&$ he ,oined an anti8emitic grou4 called the 8ociety Against the 8u4remacy of the Dews1 At the

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page_101 #age ($( same time he ,oined the so-called Fossbach organiHation which was under the command of a former first lieutenant Gerhard Fossbach1 This grou4 was descended from one of the many free-cor4s com4anies whose mission had been to liberate Germany from the traitors and wea7lings who had been the cause of her defeat1 As a member of the Fossbach grou4 Bormanntogether with Fudolf Eoess the future commandant of AuschwitHtoo7 4art in the murder of -alter Badow the man who allegedly had betrayed to the 6rench one of the great among the NaHi fol7 heroes Albert 9eo 8chlageter =he had been e<ecuted as a saboteur during the 6rench occu4ation of the Fuhr>1 -hile Eoess was sentenced to ten years Bormann as a mere collaborator s4ent only a year in a 9ei4Hig 4rison for his 4art in the 7illing1 =It was this deed that made him eligible many years later to receive the wellnamed ??blood orderI from the 6uehrer1> In (*&0 he ,oined another semimilitary organiHation the 6rontbann1 Two years later he ,oined the National 8ocialist #arty where des4ite his 4revious allegiance to all its 4rinci4les he had a relatively high membershi4 number in the si<ty thousands1 Bormann?s rise in the #arty was steady but uns4ectacular1 Ee was no man for front-4age 4ublicity1 !ven later when he was never long away from the 6uehrer?s side he was rarely 4hotogra4hed and the 4ublic mainly saw him in grou4 4ictures as a nondescri4t stoc7y figure accom4anying his master1 Before he got his ,ob with Fudolf Eess he was attached to National 8ocialist news4a4ers in Thuringia1 In (*&% he was 4romoted to the staff of the 8u4reme .ommand of the 8A1 Ee had the good fortune in (*&* to marry a woman as devoted to National 8ocialist 4rinci4les as heGerda Buch the daughter of a NaHi Feichstag de4uty who had been a ma,or in the Army had undergone his National 8ocialist indoctrination with Dulius 8treicher and was very highly regarded by the 6uehrer1 Eitler was a witness at the wedding1 8i<teen years later Bormann would act in the same ca4acity at Eitler?s wedding with !va Braun for which he made all the arrangements1 -ith Goebbels and Generals -ilhelm Burgdorf and Eans Brebs he signed the marriage certificate as a witness1L The Bormann 4air were in many ways 4erfectly matched1 Both lived 4assionately by and for the National 8ocialist creedsC both detested .hristianity in all its forms whether #rotestant .atholic Dehovah?s -itnesses or any other1 They shared every tenet of the most radical NaHi !eltanschauung whether about the terrible evil of the Dews and the 8lavs or the duty of the German woman to 4rocreate in or out of wedloc71 Bormann said: The 8lavs are to wor7 for us1 Insofar as we do not need them they may die1 Therefore com4ulsory vaccination and German health service are su4erfluous1 The fertility of the 8lavs is undesirable1 They may use contrace4tives or 4ractice abortion the more the better1 !ducation is dangerous1 It is enough if they can count u4 to one hundred1 At best an education L Eitler named Bormann e<ecutor of his will with the right to ma7e all final decisions concerning it1

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page_102 #age ($& which 4roduces useful coolies for us is admissible1 !very educated 4erson is a future enemy1 ) Gerda echoed him1 In a letter of 8e4tember % (*// she wrote: My dearest Eeart: !very single child must realiHe that the Dew is the Absolute !vil in this world and that he must be fought by every means wherever he a44ears MBormann scribbled ??Suite trueI on the marginN1 1 1 1 As long as there e<ists somewhere in the world Germanic 4eo4le who want to wor7 hard cleanly and faithfully and to live according to their own laws in a 8tate befitting their breed the !ternal Dew will try to 4revent it and to annihilate all 4ositive life1 To this Bormann added: I;ou are my dear 7ind good girlPI Gerda Bormann bore her husband ten children of whom the first was named Adolf after his godfather the Feich .hancellor1 The fourth son was named after Eimmler his godfather1 6rau Eimmler and 6rau Bormann saw a good deal of each other while their husbands were awayC and Eimmler and Bormann used u with each other but no love was lost between them1 Bormann was one rival Eimmler feared1 Gerda was such a National 8ocialist that even her relationshi4s to her husband and family were ordered by the #arty notions of the duty of the German woman1 In one letter to his wife Bormann told her how he had overcome the resistance of the actress M who was a friend of the family and Gerda urged him in her ne<t letter to have a child by M1 Gerda 4ro4osed that she herself be 4regnant one year and that the actress ta7e her turn the ne<t year1 In this fashion the 6uehrer would be 4resented with the 4riceless gift of the increase of sound German stoc71 Gerda said it was a thousand 4ities that such fine girls as M should be denied children1 In gratitude for his wife?s understanding Bormann sent her all the letters his mistress had written to him1 The affair with the actress dwindled away and the corres4ondence then too7 account of the state of the 6uehrer?s health and the state of the Feich1 :n 8e4tember (% (*// Gerda told her husband of the visit of the woman novelist Dagmar Brand who declared that Germany would fight within her own frontiers to gain strength for the time when the "nited 8tates and Britain would revolt against the Dewish wire-4ullers1 Then the Germans would sally forth and the small nations would welcome Germany ,ubilantly as a rescuer from Foosevelt 8talin and .hurchillthe 4u44ets of a 4owerful Dewry that had been wor7ing for centuries toward the establishment of a Dewish em4ire1 :n 8e4tember )$ (*// Bormann wrote that the 6uehrer suffering terribly from stomach cram4s had been ta7ing castor oil and had lost si< 4ounds in two days1 In December Bormann told Gerda that the trembling which had started in Eitler?s leg after the bomb e<4loded on Duly &$ now affected the left arm and hand1 In a letter of :ctober + Gerda told her husband how incredible it was that a handful of Dews should be able to turn the whole world to4syturvy1 And on Danuary ( (*/0 she wrote: II am

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page_103 #age ($) boundlessly furious that we with our innate longing for light and sunshine should be com4elled by the Dews to ma7e our abodes as if we were beings of the underground world1?? / Bormann rose to eminence by ma7ing himself indis4ensable1 Ee had a remar7able memory1 Ee wrote hundreds of memoranda on every sub,ect close to his heart: on the church the Dews the 8lavs the treatment to be accorded 4risoners of war the behavior of Gauleiters1 !verything had to be su4ervised controlled made harsher1 Ee wor7ed his way u4 the #arty ladder with a series of limited alliances which were lightly held or dissolved as soon as they had served their 4ur4osealliances with Eess Fosenberg Eimmler Beitel and among others !va Braun who was his assigned dinner 4artner at the Berghof1 Eitler said that Bormann made decisions easy for him1 Bormann was the tireless cler7 who got material together and 4re4ared it so the 6uehrer could deal with it @uic7ly1 -hen Eitler built the Berghof it was Bormann who too7 over all the details 4aying the bills from the Adolf Eitler S2en)e 4roviding the furnishings seeing to the construction of the greenhouses that were to 4rovide the 6uehrer with the fresh vegetables that were his only gastronomic indulgence evicting the villagers and 4utting in their 4lace the 88 men of the 9eibstandarte =his bodyguards> and their barrac7s1 Ee had a 4assion not so much for Eitler as for the means the 6uehrer afforded him to become a figure the world would remember1 In the last days at the Feich .hancellery in Berlin when Eitler was issuing his final orders to none<istent armies Bormann was still stolidly ma7ing notes of what went on1 After he had finished ma7ing his notes he dreamed of a better living after the war was over and li7e many of the other inhabitants of the macabre bun7er he dran71 :ne of the last visitors from the outside world saw him stretched out cold after too much wine with two com4anions10 An eyewitness wrote: Bormann moved about very little 7e4t instead very close to his writing des71 Ee was Irecording the momentous events in the bun7er for 4osterity1I !very word every action went down on his 4a4er1 :ften he would visit this 4erson or that to demand scowlingly what the e<act remar7 had been that 4assed between the 6uehrer and the 4erson he had ,ust had an audience with1 Things that 4assed between other occu4ants of the bun7er were also carefully recorded1 This document was to be s4irited out of the bun7er at the very last moment so that according to the modest Bormann it could Ita7e its 4lace among the greatest cha4ters in German history1I ' Bormann lived wholly within this historical drama that had to be 4layed around the 4ersons of Eitler-Bormann1 The threat of the Fussian advance never disturbed him nearly as much as whether he could overcome his domestic enemies the generals the #arty rivals1 Ee allowed no one said Beitel at Nuremberg to interfere with the Gol7ssturm and the Eigh .ommand had to 7ee4 out of its affairs1+ Although in theory he shared its command with Eimmler it was in fact his own army1 -hen Eitler ordered its

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page_104 #age ($/ founding on 8e4tember &' (*// Bormann said he felt li7e a young mother who had ,ust given birth e<hausted and ha44y1 % The fact that it was an army of boyssome of them twelve years oldand of old men made no difference1L Bormann?s scorched-earth orders went beyond those issued by anyone else1 Nothing at all was to be left of food clothing water 4ower 4lants1 !verything was to be destroyed1 Eimmler and Goering were to be destroyed too1 Ee could convince Eitler that Eimmler too was betraying the 6uehrer1 And it was Bormann who sent the order for the arrest of Feichsmarschall Goering1 In the midst of great decisions of war Bormann was concerned with 4rotocol: whether #arty members had a44lauded at the right s4ots during a 6uehrer s4eechC who was res4onsible when the NaHi salute was given for some minor song instead of for the ??Eorst -essel 9ied I or whether the Eitler,ugend should be 4ermitted to raise their arms and merely shout IEeilI instead of IEeil Eitler1I 8uch rituals were dee4ly symbolic for him1 After the attem4t on Eitler?s life the -ehrmacht too had to give the NaHi salute and say I8ieg EeilI as a greeting when its members were not carrying arms1LL In the minutes of a conference held on Duly (' (*/( he noted that Ithis 4artisan war 1 1 1 enables us to eradicate everyone who o44oses us1I* Ee a44roved of the lynching of Allied airmen who had been shot down1 Eis round-robin letter to grou4 leaders was headed IDustice e<ercised by the 4eo4le against Anglo-American murderers1I($ Ee urged on Eitler and on the staffs ever more brutal measures: more severe treatment of 4risoners of war stronger measures against the churches1 And it was Bormann as much as any man in the Feich who 7e4t the anti-8emitic a44aratus in motion from the time of its first sanctions against the Dews u4 to the 6inal 8olution1 Bormann had a hand in all the /0$ anti-Dewish laws decrees and orders that were issued1 It was he who fearing that some Dews might esca4e the net because they had changed their names wanted I;idI to be a com4ulsory middle name1 Instead a decree was issued ma7ing it obligatory for Dews to add IIsraelI to men?s names and I8arahI to women?s which was not all that Bormann had demanded but would hel4 4revent mista7es1 Ee was a bloodhound for Dews1 Eitler in Berchtesgaden for a time too7 4leasure in the visits of a blond child the daughter of a former officer L The Gol7ssturm called u4 all men between the ages of si<teen and si<ty1 They who were to bring their own clothes and wea4ons calling on their neighbors for anything lac7ing1 = eutsche Allgemeine Ceitung :ctober (* (*//1 8ee also Duergen Thorwald ie grosse "lucht LLBormann 4ointed out to the Gauleiters that the M8tuttgart: 8teingrueben Gerlag (*/*N1> rescue of the 6uehrer was the rescue of the German 4eo4le1 Ee therefore ordered 4ublic demonstrations 4referably out of doors of 4o4ular re,oicing over the failure of the attem4t1 Ee told them too that the 6uehrer did not want them to give the im4ression that the front-line army was involvedC he wanted them to say that it was only a small grou4 of reactionary generals1 Neither the nobility nor the generals as such were to be attac7ed1 ="nited 8tates Document .enter Berlin Mhereinafter referred to as BD.N Bonmann folder &/&1>

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page_10 #age ($0 had won the Iron .ross1 Bormann discovered from a Healous #arty member that the little girl had Dewish blood and forbade her mother to bring the child to see the 6uehrer1 Ee went so far as to try to confiscate co4ies of a boo7 in which the child?s 4icture had a44eared1 Eitler heard the account of why the girl no longer came to visit him from his 4hotogra4her Eeinrich Eoffmann because it was his boo7 that Bormann wanted to 7ee4 from being sold1 (( Bormann also conducted a relentless but unsuccessful cam4aign to have @uarter and half Dews be legally considered full Dews under the Nuremberg 9aws so that the e<termination 4rocess would get them too1 Eis re4resentative was 4resent at the -annsee .onference =see Goering .ha4t1 )>1 It was Bormann who told 8chirach that '$ $$$ Dews in Gienna should be shi44ed to the !ast because their a4artments were needed =see 8chirach .ha4t1 %>1 In Duly (*/) he 4laced the Dews outside all law in order that they might be legally treated as dehumaniHed ob,ects to be destroyed1 Their 4ro4erty would automatically fall to the Feich1 Ee had told visiting Eungarian Minister Bela 9u7acH in March (*/) when he was urging Eungary to ta7e more severe measures against the Dews that !uro4e would only be free of bolshevism when it was free of Dews1 Ee was tireless too in his efforts to rid Germany of .hristian influence1 9i7e Fosenberg he wanted a new scientific National 8ocialist religion1 The churches were to be con@uered with a new ideology1 Ee and Fosenberg were in agreement on this as they were on the need for 4reserving !uro4ean and !astern art by removing it to the Feich but their collaboration sto44ed at this 4oint1 Bormann disli7ed Fosenberg?s high school which never was more than a blue4rint =see Fosenberg in the 4resent cha4ter> because it meant increasing Fosenberg?s im4ortance1 In A4ril (*/) he forced Fosenberg to deliver the art he had collected to the #arty .hancellery1 Bormann li7ed to have a hand in anything that had to do with 7illing the enemies of German blood1 Ee hel4ed get the euthanasia factories going where the feebleminded or those suffering from incurable diseases were shot in the bac7 of the nec7 or given lethal in,ections1 Ee aided the 4lans for steriliHation of those who whether on racial or social grounds were held by the #arty to be unfit to 4rocreate =see 6ric7 .ha4t1 +>1(& Ee wor7ed @uietly and unobtrusively1 -hen he was Eess? second in command he carried out 4olicy made a44ointments and signed chec7s for the visionary Eess had no li7ing for the clutter of details of his office but was interested only in the grand 4ers4ectives offered by an alliance of Northern 4eo4les against the Dews the .ommunists and other mysterious enemies1 Bormann wor7ed hard at the details of everyday mattersC he delighted in them1 8oon no Gauleiter could be a44ointed without his a44roval nor could any ma,or decision be handed down by a #arty court or any decree issued1 The 6uehrer could not find his 4a4ers or sometimes even remember to order a decree drawn u4 without the hel4 of Bormann who was always at Eitler?s elbow or scurrying to fetch something for him1

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page_10! #age ($' After Eess? flight to Britain in (*/( Bormann came into his own1 Ee saw to it that Eess? name disa44eared from #arty records and monuments and that his 4icture was ta7en down in 4ublic 4laces1 Ee immediately set out to widen what had been Eess? domain as Eitler?s de4uty1 Eess? office had been merely a center of #arty activity but Bormann turned it into the #arty .hancellery the o44osite and far more 4otent number of the Feich .hancellery under Eans Eeinrich 9ammers1 ??The #arty gives orders to the 8tate I was 4roclaimed in (*))1 Therefore the 88 4aralleled the ArmyC the 6oreign :ffice had as a rival the Fibbentro4 bureau and Fosenberg?s 6oreign #olicy De4artmentC and alongside the local and national administrative offices were the Gauleiters the Breisleiters and all the rest of the #arty a44aratus under Bormann1 8ince #arty and 8tate were combined in the 4erson of the 6uehrer Bormann could use his 7ey 4osition to invade non-#arty territory1 A year after Eess? flight Bormann became 8ecretary to the 6uehrer1 Ee res4ectfully nudged the 6uehrer to write decrees but undertoo7 this onerous ,ob himself merely getting a44roval from the 6uehrer who had a good deal on his mind1 Ee concerned himself with everything whether it was the courts the Army or the rectitude of all Germans1 It was dangerous for any ,udge to im4ose a sentence less than death if Bormann sensed treason or defeatism in the bac7ground of the accused1 Bormann ordered the Gauleiters to act as ,udges in the last months of the war so there could be no @uestion of the sentences handed down when towns were evacuated or when any soldier sus4ected of desertion was 4ic7ed u41 In the su4erheated atmos4here of the Third Feich death sentences were handed down for any 7ind of critical remar71 :ne woman re4orted to her Gauleiter that a lifelong friend of the family had made slighting remar7s to her about the 6uehrer and had left without saying IEeil Eitler1I The man was arrested and sentenced to death1 A 4ianist who came to Berlin in (*/) to give a concert stayed at the home of a childhood friend of his mother?s1 At brea7fast he said she should ta7e down the 6uehrer?s 4icture and the British should dro4 more bombs so that the war would be over @uic7ly1 8he re4orted the matter to her Gauleiter1 Eer visitor was arrested brought before the Gol7sgericht =#eo4le?s .ourt> and beheaded1 A grou4 of boys listened to the forbidden foreign broadcasts and one of them told another in the s4irit of -ild -est adventure that he was in touch with foreign agents1 In the 4lant where one of their number wor7ed as an a44rentice the boys 4rinted bulletins of what the foreign radio re4orted and they were all arrested1 Although their ages ranged from si<teen to eighteen one was sentenced to death and e<ecutedC the others got long terms of im4risonment1 () Bormann decided who was to see Eitler and when1 -ithout his 4ermission no one from the world outside the 6uehrer?s bun7er could get to the #resence1 Ee 7e4t faithful 4aladins li7e Eoffmann 9ammers Fosenberg and Goebbels as well as high-ran7ing generals from seeing the .hief as he called him until such time as he had im4ressed them with the fact that

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page_10" #age ($+ they must wor7 through him1 Ee once refused to let Eeydrich who had flown from #rague to re4ort on the economic situation in .Hechoslova7ia and to 4resent his 4ro4osals have an audience1 Ee wal7ed with Eitler 4ast the door where Eeydrich had been waiting for hours but the Feichs4rote7tor had no chance to s4ea7 with his 6uehrer who merely loo7ed at him and wal7ed on1 Bormann coolly told Eeydrich the ne<t day that the 6uehrer was not interested in seeing him1 (/ L -hen his rivals did manage to get an audience Bormann arranged to be 4resent1 Ee succeeded in attaining his goalnamely to isolate Eitler who es4ecially late in the war wanted no 4art of reality1 The life in the -olfsschanHe where Bormann lived with him =Bormann also had a house 4rovided by the 8tate in Eitler?s immediate neighborhood in Berchtesgaden> was entirely cut off from the devastation of cities li7e Berlin and Eamburg1 Bormann and Eitler 4referred not to tal7 about such matters and to avoid meeting those who had un4leasant news1 Their way of dealing with it when it had to be confronted was to arrest someone and if 4ossible shoot him1 Generals were e<ecuted for being unable to defend their 4ositions with the odds against them1 Eermann 6egelein an e<-,oc7ey and 88 general =he was Bormann?s friend and !va Braun?s brother-in-law> had left the 6uehrer?s bun7er without 4ermissionC he was discovered in his house in Berlin in civilian clothes and was summarily shot1 Bormann had no difficulty in 4ersuading Eitler that he was surrounded by traitors and he had tor4edoed many of them by the end of the war: EimmlerC GoeringC Fosenberg whose high school he would have a44roved of had it not been the 4ro,ect of a rivalC 8chirach of whose American relatives he informed the 6uehrerC Eans 6ran7 whose blac7-mar7et dealings =see 6ran7 .ha4t1 ((> served as a wea4on against him1LL Although his attac7s on Goebbels were unsuccessful he had terrified the #ro4aganda Minister too des4ite the close friendshi4 Eitler 4rofessed for the entire family that was to die with him1 At Nuremberg Bormann?s lawyer 6riedrich Bergold wor7ed against formidable obstacles1 Eis client was missing1 In addition he had no case of any 7ind for Bormann was guilty of more crimes than the court would be able to ta7e account of1 8o the defense became sim4ly an effort to 4rove that Bormann was dead1LLL In this Dr1 Bergold was unsuccessful and the court condemned Bormann to death in absentia1 Fumors have never died down that he is still alive1 :n May 0 (*'( during the !ichmann trial former Argentine Ambassador to Israel Gregorio To4olews7i said at a L 4ress conference that Bormann had been living in Argentina and was now in BraHil1 8chellenberg sus4ected that either Bormann or Eimmler had arranged for the murder of Eeydrich =-alter 8chellenberg Memoiren M.ologne: Gerlag fuer #oliti7 und -issenschaft (*0'N 441 &0'0+>1 LL Bormann was also behind the trial of 6ran7?s fellow blac7 mar7eteers in #oland =Barl 9asch et al1>1 =8ee 6ran7 .ha4t1 ((1> LLL Bergold was himself convinced his client was no longer living1 =Interview with the writer1>

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page_10# #age ($% :thers have maintained that Bormann was the man who had been a .ommunist 4lant in the 6uehrer?s head@uarters and had been s4irited into 4rotective custody by the Fussians at the end of the war1 8uch evidence as e<ists for this is less than slight though the Fussians certainly had an agent close to the highest echelons in Eitler?s head@uarters and the ability of 8oviet es4ionage to learn accurately of highly classified information in a short time is un@uestionable1 Bormann did from time to time ma7e statements that his hearers remembered as showing how im4ressed he was with .ommunist 4ower1 But this was also true of Eitler who during the war e<4ressed his admiration of 8talin1 Bormann?s career as well as his 4rivate letters breathe a fanaticism and devotion to his master not to be reconciled with a court cons4iracy of any 7ind certainly not with the Dewish-Bolshevi7 cons4iracy he lived to slay1L Bonmann according to rumors has been seen in Italy and even in Germany1 :ne story says that Gerda had a letter from him after Germany?s colla4se1 8he died of cancer in Merano Italy in (*/' and the rumor could not be corroborated1 The stories have 4ersisted ever since Bormann made his way out of the 6uehrer?s bun7er in an attem4t to get to Admiral DoenitH at the new seat of government in 6lensburg1 Ee had gaHed for a little while at the funeral 4yre of !va Braun and Adolf Eitler and given his last NaHi salute1 !yewitnesses have said that they saw him come under the fire of a Fussian tan7 on the -eidendammer bridge and saw him hit1 Two of them said they had seen his cor4se1 Because of the 4ersistence of the rumors the -est Berlin Government ordered that the grave be o4ened where he was su44osed to have been buried1 It was found to be em4ty1 (0 No statute of limitations e<ists for Bormann dead or alive1 The International Military Tribunal sentenced him to death but how such a verdict would be carried out should he ever be found is not very clear1 Ee is still wanted in -est Germany for his crimes against the German 4eo4le com4are with those he committed against the Dews and 8lavs1 In the event that the sentence of the International Military Tribunal could not be carried out Bormann would be tried under German law1 Eis name along with the names of hundreds of others whose whereabouts are not 7nown has been duly recorded by a German ,udge and he is sub,ect to 4rosecution should he ever a44ear1 The com4etition for his ca4ture is truly international from Israel to the 8oviet "nion1 Eis own war he had won1 Ee had remained with the 6uehrer until the end sharing his last hours and then outliving Goebbels who had voluntarily shared the fate of his leader1 Bormann?s enemies in the #arty were defeated or scatteredC he was finally the only one left in authority in the bun7er1 Goering had thought that Eitler would name L General Gehlen former chief of German intelligence for the Bormann as his successor1 !ast 6ront writes in his memoirs that Bormann was a 8oviet agent survived and was living in the "88F in the fifties1 This view remains difficult to reconcile with Bormann?s 4ersonality =Feinhard Gehlen er ienst MMainH: Ease u1 Boehler (*+(N>1

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page_10$ #age ($* Instead Eitler a44ointed Admiral DoenitH as #resident of the Feich and Bormann as #arty Minister in the DoenitH .abinet1 Bormann sent the 6uehrer?s testament on to Admiral DoenitH and told him it was in force1 (' Ee informed DoenitH of the 6uehrer?s death more than twenty-four hours after Eitler had 7illed himself1 During that time it was he who ruled in the shadow of Eitler and who tried to deal with the enemy1 !ven if the Dews and the Bolshevi7s and the .hristian .hurch still remained his domestic victory was well-nigh com4lete1 Fudolf Eess Fudolf Eess and Martin Bormann held the same ironclad 4rinci4les in com4letely different ways1 Eess li7e Bormann considered communism and Dewry the ma,or evils besetting the world and Eitler the ma,or 4ro4het who would rescue it1 Both were unsha7able in their determination to con@uer the evils and e<alt Eitler1 To this end they wor7ed in the same office but there the similarities ended1 Eess was a disturbed mystic an idealist a man with a considerable range of @uir7s1 :ne day Eimmler?s 4hysiothera4ist 6eli< Bersten found Eess with a large magnet swinging over his bedto draw away the malign influences which always threatened him1 9ater Eess showed Bersten a doHen more under his bed1 :ne of the 4sychiatrists who e<amined him after his flight to 8cotland diagnosed him as schiHo4hrenic but stated that his illness had not invaded his entire 4ersonality and that clear areas were often a44arent in which Eess could function well1 It was no doubt owing to his ability to 4erform for longer or shorter 4eriods without showing 4atently abnormal signs that Eess could hold down his im4ortant ,ob in the NaHi #arty and could be tried for his life by the International Military Tribunal which held him legally sane1 -hen his mind was free to o4erate without delusions he was intelligent and often remar7ably shrewd in his ,udgments1 The tests given him while he was in Britain 4laced him in the u44er ($ 4er cent brac7et of intelligence1 =The American 4sychologist who tested him at Nuremberg found him only slightly above average intelligence1> But his 4eriods of normal functioning were intermittent and the 4sychiatrists who e<amined him during the months of his ca4tivity in !ngland had no hesitation in 4ronouncing him a schiHoid 4ersonality suffering from 4aranoia with hysteric inclusions1 8ome years later the 4anel of Allied 4sychiatrists selected by the Nuremberg court after an e<amination of a few hours only found that he suffered from amnesiaa diagnosis that needed am4lification to e<4lain his rambling s4eech at the end of the trial and his behavior during it1(+ Eess was fifty-two years old at the time the trials started1 Ee was born in Ale<andria !gy4t on A4ril &' (%*/1 There he attended a German school for si< years1 At the age of twelve he was sent to a 9utheran school in Bad

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page_110 #age (($ Godesberg1 -hen -orld -ar I bro7e out he volunteered and served for a time in the same com4any as Eitler in the ('th Bavarian Fegiment but the two did not meet until after the war1 Eess later served as a 4ilot in the Army Air 6orce rising to the ran7 of first lieutenant1 After the end of the war he attended the "niversity of Munich where wearing his Army uniform because he could not afford to buy civilian clothes he attended a number of lectures given by the world-renowned 6eo2olitiker Barl Eaushofer1 Eaushofer?s theories had a 4rofound influence on Eess? mind as they did on Eitler?s1 Eaushofer believed in the necessity for Lebensraum for Germany and the !ast was the obvious 4lace to e<4and1 Ee and his son Albrecht who taught at the "niversity of Berlin and with whom Eess also became well ac@uainted wanted friendshi4 with !ngland to be the cornerstone of German 4olicy1 The Munich agreement in (*)% seemed to be the high 4oint of their influence on Eess and Eitler1 =Eess according to Barl Eaushofer held ??a 4rotective handI over Eaushofer?s wife who had some Dewish blood1> (% Eess wanted more than Lebensraum for GermanyC he wanted the Feich 4urified of its contaminating elements1 Ee ,oined the ultranationalist 6reecor4s !44 and in Dune (*&$ the National 8ocialist #arty where he had a membershi4 number only a little higher than Eitler?s who had No1 + while Eess had No1 ('1 Eess became head of the National 8ocialist 8tudent :rganiHation at the "niversity of Munich as well as an 8A leader1 Ee too7 4art in the Beer Eall #utsch of November %* (*&) with the 6uehrer =see 6ran7 .ha4t1 ((>1 Ee was essentially a 4assive man glad to be instructed in his duties and to 4lace himself without @uestion under Eitler?s orders1(* -hen as7ed once what the future 4rogram of the #arty would be he said that he could not give an e<act answer but that the .ommunist #arty must of course be eliminated and the strength of the Government increased1 IThe right thing I he said Iwill occur to the 6uehrer at the decisive moment1 Ee is always given the right thing by 4rovidence1I&$ The National 8ocialists were the #arty that sustained his mystical notion of the way the world must 4rogress1 IThe time I he told one of his friends some years later in (*)$ Iof monarchies and democracies in !uro4e is over the time of .aesarism has come1I&( It was not enough to wait for the 6uehrer or to call u4on his name1 :ne had to will him to be the .aesar1 In (*&/ Eess was sentenced to eighteen months in 9andsberg 4rison where his 6uehrer was also a 4risoner1 Eitler dictated Mein (am2f to him in his cell and Eess wrote later to his wife what was undoubtedly true that the boo7 had many of his own ideas in it1 The two men were released from 9andsberg on the same day and Eess was more than ever the 6uehrer?s 4rivate secretary and ad,utant1 It was a close relationshi4as close as Eitler was li7ely to come to any of his associates1 Eess =along with 8treicher> was one of the few men whom the 6uehrer addressed as u1 They had a great

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page_111 #age ((( deal to give to each other1 Though Eess could correct Eitler?s grammar and s4elling he 7new the 6uehrer to be one of the great men of all timethe .aesar for whom he and Germany had been searching1 Ee willed that Eitler be the chosen man1 Ee was eager with transcendent 4ur4oses in his mind to see7 to reconcile the dis4arate elements in the #artyC to bring the 8ocialists li7e the 8trassers together with the conservative wing and the former German nationalistsC to use 4eo4le wherever they might be fit to serve1 !ven the Lum2en =dregs> he said have their uni@ue @ualities1 Eess lac7ed the swagger and luster of Goering but he nevertheless became the third man in the Feich after Eitler was named Feich .hancellor and he narrowly missed being the designated successor to the 6uehrer1 =According to :tto Dietrich the Feich 4ress chief the 6uehrer decided in (*)/ after visiting Eess? new house in the Isartal on the outs7irts of Munich that he would not designate him as his successor1 The tasteless furnishings had offended Eitler?s aesthetic sensibilities1 A little later he chose Goering for the 4ost1> && -hen Gregor 8trasser left the #arty in December (*)& Eess was a44ointed to ta7e charge of the .entral #olitical .ommittee of the #arty a newly created body designed to ta7e the 4lace of the #arty?s #olitical :rganiHation which had been headed by 8trasser1 The 6uehrer made Eess his de4uty in A4ril (*)) and in December of that year gave him the ran7 of Feichsminister1 Eess 4erformed his duties with utter devotion and some s7ill1 It was he who coined the 4hrase ??Guns before butter1I Eis s4eeches on the whole were no more than short hymns of 4raise of the 6uehrer1 IThere is one man I he said Iwho is always above criticism that is the 6uehrer1 This is because everyone 7nows and feels he is always right and always will be right1 1 1 1 -e believe that the 6uehrer has a higher calling to the sha4ing of Germany?s fate1I All that was needed was Ifaith without criticism surrender to the 6uehrer not to as7 why but the silent carrying out of his orders1I&) Eess the master of ceremonies who wal7ed stiffly to the 4odium before the tumultuous masses of Brownshirts and Blac7shirts called for and eventually obtained from the disci4lined faithful a short 4reliminary worshi4ful silence and then shouted: I.omradesP The 6uehrerPI At one of the great #arty rallies he 4resented Eitler to the 4ac7ed 4halan<es im4atient to hear the voice of the 6uehrer1 -ith an incantation IEitler is the #arty the #arty is Germany1 8ieg Eeil I he turned toward the 6uehrer his grim heavy-featured beetle-browed face1 Then he rela<ed and an e<4ression almost of tenderness came into his face1 ;ears after the Allied 4sychiatrists would s4ea7 of Eess? latent homose<uality although it is unli7ely that they had ever read his s4eeches or seen newsreels of the two together1 According to one story Eess? wife was chosen by Eitler1 The three were sitting in a restaurant the :steria Bavaria in Munich and the 6rau Ilse Eess-tobe said she was undecided what to do whether to study further

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page_112 #age ((& at the university or to ta7e a tri4 to Italy1 Eitler as7ed Ilse why she did not marry Fudolf Eess1 &/ It was a44arently an idea that had not occurred to either Eess or Ilse but they were married a few wee7s later1 Bormann wanted to use the 6uehrer as a means of e<4anding himsif of gaining an identity but Eess thought of Eitler as an agent of higher 4owers a nimbus a 4ure symbol of racial rectitude1 Ee lived in a twilight world of enormous imaginary conflicts1 Both he and Fosenberg believed that Eeinrich Bruening was a secret agent of dar7 forces who would bring the .ommunists to 4ower in the Feich and then after ridding Germany of #rotestant #russia would establish a .atholic dictatorshi41 &0 -hen Eess came down from his world of fantasy he was sim4le and modest1 Ee never wore decorations and he s4ent hours ta7ing his young son for wal7s along the Isar1 Ee had few if any close relationshi4s e<ce4t with 4eo4le li7e the Eaushofers whose ideas were es4ecially congenial to him1 Ee lived by 4rescri4tions which to a large degree were those of the #arty1 Ee wrote a letter to an unmarried mother whose fiance had fallen in battle offering to be the godfather of her child1 The highest law of the Feich he told her was to maintain its 4eo4le1 -hat he as7ed would the #russian Army have been without the bastard ;orc7O Ee ac7nowledged the hard lot of women but it was better he said to have the child than not to have it1&' Eess? flight to Britain was the logical outcome of his structured !eltanschauung1 6ar from being a betrayal of Eitler or the Feich it was a voyage on their behalf and on behalf of the whole civiliHed world1 A few wee7s before he too7 off he told .ount 9utH 8chwerin von Brosig7 the Minister of 6inance in Eitler?s .abinet that the two Germanic nations !ngland and Germany were fighting for the benefit of the laughing Bolshevi7 nation1 Ee was in des4air because !ngland and Germany were tearing one another a4art instead of coming to an understanding and because the British had not res4onded favorably to the 6uehrer?s offer of 4eace1 Ee was sure that if someone could tal7 to authoritative !nglishmenma7e clear to them the Bolshevi7 danger to -estern culture and the fact that Eitler wanted nothing from !nglandan agreement could be reached1 -hen 8chwerin von Brosig7 4ointed out that the British could scarcely trust Eitler after so many bro7en 4romises Eess was as unim4ressed as when Albrecht Eaushofer had told him the same thing1 &+ Eess was uninterested in the lesser as4ects of #arty 4olitics and confused by them1 Ee was a 4uritan by National 8ocialist standards and he had only contem4t for the corru4tion and small-mindedness of many of the #arty functionaries1 Memoranda 4iled u4 in his office while he brooded over the state of Aryan man7ind1 -hen -orld -ar II began he wanted to fly for the Third Feich as he had flown for Im4erial Germany in -orld -ar I but Eitler not only ordered him to stay at his 4ost but forbade any 7ind of flying as too 4erilous1 Eess managed to visit the front line in Belgium and re,oiced in being but a few meters away from the firing1 But more im4ortant

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page_113 #age (() than fighting the war was ma7ing a 4eacebringing the war between the Germanic brothers to an end1 In this he saw himself carrying out the dee4est wishes of the 6uehrer who certainly wanted 4eace with Britain if he could get it on his own terms1 Eitler could not understand why the British 7e4t on fighting a war they could not 4ossibly win unless they confidently e<4ected aid from both Fussia and the "nited 8tates1 The need for some dramatic move to bring about a 4eace seemed overwhelming to Eess as it did to the Eaushofers1 Eess was the man through whom they could influence Eitler and conceivably avert the catastro4he of a German invasion of Britain1 Albrecht Eaushofer told Eess that he sought a ??friendshi4 intensified to fusion with a ,oint fleet a ,oint air force and ,oint 4ossessions in the world I but because the !nglish hated Eitler had no confidence in his 4romises and mistrusted Fibbentro4 he saw little chance Iin the 4resent stage of develo4mentI for the 4ossibility of a settlement between the 6uehrer and !ngland1 Nevertheless he was ready to underta7e a mission to tal7 with the Du7e of Eamilton on neutral soil if he could be given I4recise directives from the highest authority1I Eess had as7ed Eaushofer to come to see him to discuss the 4ossibility of ending this war which was Isuicidal for the white race I and Eaushofer had the im4ression that the conversation too7 4lace with the 7nowledge of Eitler and that Eess would discuss the matter further with the 6uehrer1 &% It is li7ely that he did1 ="lrich von Eassell stated that Eitler agreed with Eess? attem4ting to get in touch with !nglish re4resentatives1>&* 8uch a meeting would have been in line with Eitler?s 4olicy toward !ngland and since he already had the attac7 on 8oviet Fussia in mind had more im4ortance than heretofore1 The u4shot of the discussions between Eess and the Eaushofers was that the Eaushofers were to attem4t to get in touch with the Du7e of Eamilton whom they 7new and whom Eess had met at the :lym4ic Games in (*)' and to arrange his meeting with a German re4resentative in neutral #ortugal1 Albrecht Eaushofer wrote the letter on 8e4tember &) (*/$ but it never reached Eamilton1 It was interce4ted by the British censor who made a co4y of it and the original disa44eared1 :nly months later did a British intelligence officer give Eamilton a co4y of the letter and suggest that he go to 9isbon to discover the intentions of the Germans1 Before Eamilton could ma7e any move in this direction Eess landed in 8cotland1 Eess had decided when an answer did not come to underta7e the mission himself by flying directly to 8cotland where he would see Eamilton who would 4ut him in touch with the Bing and the British 4eace 4arty1 )$ The logical arguments against such a flight had no weight with him1 Being addicted to aberrant schools of medicine Eess landed in 8cotland with a large assortment of drugs and homeo4athic medicaments which British chemists analyHed and found so dilute that they could not tell what was in them1)( Ee was also addicted to astrology and dream boo7s and 4ro4hecies and the clinching reason for his ma7ing the tri4 was a recurrent

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page_114 #age ((/ dream in which he was flying over water on an errand of great im4ortance1 Eaushofer too had 4ro4hetic dreams and in one of them he saw Eess in a 4lane flying on a historic mission1 Eess told the American 4sychiatrist Dr1 Douglas M1 Belley in Nuremberg that #rofessor Eaushofer had seen him in a dream wal7ing through ta4estried halls in British castles on a mission to bring 4eace to the entire world and that an astrologer had 4redicted he was destined to arrange a world 4eace at the end of (*/$1 )& Not only was the flight rooted in Eess? own need to be a savior of the -estern world but was also he believed in line with the 6uehrer?s intentions1 9i7e Na4oleon Eitler had to con@uer either !ngland or Fussia and if he could not get at the one he could certainly reach the throat of the other1 !ngland he was convinced remained in the war solely at the behest of third 4arties and of its own Dews and warmongers1 If she would ma7e 4eace it would sim4lify an attac7 on the 8oviet "nionC and if she 4ersisted in remaining a belligerent he could in any event defeat Fussia in a lightning cam4aign of the 7ind he had waged in 6rance and then turn his attention to Britain and her em4ire1 Eess on his 4art merely wanted !ngland out of the warC Fussia?s role as either friend or foe was secondary1 The attac7 on the 8oviet "nion had been in Eitler?s mind since the fall of 6rance1 But Eess li7e so many others o44osed it1 If !ngland continued in the war Germany would again be fighting on two fronts and having been a soldier in -orld -ar I he 7new a two-front war to be ruinous1 Eaushofer had 4ointed out and Eess agreed with him that for the war with !ngland to continue could only be a disaster for both countries1 It would mean needless bloodshed1 And if Fussia won a war against Germany communism would be victorious on the entire continent the Feich would be destroyed and the British !m4ire would be endangered1)) It was on these assum4tions that the scholarly Eaushofers touched off the tic of the world 4reserver in Eess1 At one stro7e he could do an enormous service for his 6uehrer who wanted 4eace with BritainC for the Germanic raceC and for Germany?s Lebensraum whether through war or treaty with the 8oviet "nion1 Thousands of 4recious Nordic lives would be s4ared and !vil given a death blow1 Eess? farewell letter to the 6uehrer according to Eess? secretary Eildegard 6ath who had read a co4y of it said nothing about ma7ing 4eace with !ngland in order to attac7 Fussia but stressed only the need to 4revent further bloodshed in the war against Britain1 Eitler?s 4ress chief :tto Dietrich who also described the contents of the letter made no mention of Fussia1)/ 6avoring the flight was the fact that Eess 7new -ilhelm Messerschmitt and des4ite the order against his flying had readily 4ersuaded the air4lane builder to let him have a 4lane for 4ractice flights1 Ee was after all the de4uty of the 6uehrer1 9ater when Messerschmitt was sternly brought to tas7 by Goering for letting Eess have the new two-engined M! in which he flew to 8cotland Messerschmitt reminded the Feichsmarschall of Eess? official status1 Goering then was foolish enough to tell him that he should have

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page_11 #age ((0 7nown Eess was craHy to which Messerschmitt made the re4ly that was delightedly @uoted by all the irreverent who learned of it: ??Eow could I be e<4ected to su44ose that one so high in the hierarchy of the Third Feich could be craHyO If that was the case you should have secured his resignation1I )0 Eess made three attem4ts to fly to Britain1 Twice he had to return because of engine trouble but the third flight on May ($ (*/( was successful1 Ee had made careful 4re4arations: he got hold of a to4secret ma4 which was 4rovided by Eitler?s own 4ilot showing the forbidden air Hones and he had e<tra fuel tan7s and a s4ecial radio added to the Messerschmitt?s e@ui4ment1 :nly his ad,utant BarlheinH #intsch was ta7en into his confidence1 Neither 6rau Eess nor the Eaushofers 7new he was attem4ting the flight1 Eess 4arachuted to earth not far from his goal the residence of the Du7e of Eamilton at Dungavel Eouse near Busby in 8cotland1 Ee carried with him visiting cards of Albrecht and Barl Eaushofer his large su44lies of medicaments and notes for the conferences he 4lanned to hold in Britain1 "narmed and dressed in the uniform of a 9uftwaffe ca4tain he was immediately ta7en into custody1 Aside from 4utting him in safe7ee4ing no one 7new e<actly what to do about him either in Britain or in Germany1 Eis treatment in !ngland was always that accorded an invalidat first because he had hurt his bac7 and foot which had been struc7 by the tail of the 4lane after he 4lunged from the coc74it and later because of his mental condition1 :n landing Eess as7ed his ca4tors 4olitely to 4ermit him to see the Du7e of Eamilton and in due course the Du7e and other highly 4laced visitorsamong them a member of the .hurchill .abinet the 9ord .hancellor 8ir Dohn 8imon,ourneyed to the hos4ital where Eess was held to listen to his hour-long monologues delivered in German1 .hurchill did not want to see Eess for it might loo7 as though he were discussing 4eace terms with him1 8ir Dohn 8imon visited Eess under the 4seudonym of Dr1 Guthrie1 In the transcri4t of their one-sided and to4-secret conversation Eess a44eared as ID1I The British Government was naturally interested to learn all it could from its visitor: whether he had come with Eitler?s 7nowledge whether =as the intelligence re4orts increasingly indicated> Eitler was determined to attac7 Fussia and ,ust what had brought Eess to ma7e the flight1 In early interviews e<4licitly and again indirectly Eess denied that Eitler intended to attac7 the 8oviet "nion )' or had 7nown that he was coming to Britain1 Ee merely 7new how much the 6uehrer wanted to come to an understanding with !ngland1 Ee read to Dr1 Guthrie for over an hour from the voluminous notes he had brought along telling him and Dr1 McBenHie =the cover name of Ivone Bir74atric7 from the 6oreign :ffice> of the ini@uities of the Gersailles Treaty of !ngland?s share of guilt for -orld -ar I and of Germany?s as4irations for colonies in Africa =a sub,ect he had often discussed with the Eaushofers who thought !ngland might be willing to ma7e concessions in this area>1

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page_11! #age ((' The heart of Eess? long harangue was that !ngland should control her em4ire without interference from the Feich and Germany should control the continent of !uro4e without interference from Britain1 Eitler he assured his listeners wanted the British !m4ire 4reserved but would not tolerate British interference in the German s4here of interest1 Dr1 Guthrie gently 4ointed out that these were not @uite 4arallel 4atterns for nonintervention1 ??The domestic affairs of the British !m4ire are British I he said and then as7ed Eess IAre all the domestic affairs of the continent of !uro4e GermanOI Eess struggled to ma7e the whole 4icture clear: !ngland was faced with increasingly heavy air attac7s and the "-boat war would become more effective1 Eess said he saw 4lainly the long lines of coffins and the wee4ing mothers1 It was all so sim4le to him: sto4 the civil war between the two Germanic 4eo4les let each stay in its own s4here give Germany its colonies bac7 and all would be well1 Ee had flown into the cam4 of the enemy he said so that he could clarify such matters and ma7e it easier for the British to negotiate without loss of 4restige1 Ee came bac7 a number of times to the @uestion of 4restigeC it was obviously something he considered es4ecially 4recious to the 4roud Britons1 Dr1 Guthrie between times out for rest after the uninterru4ted flood of tal7 wanted details1 G"TEFI!: IMay I as7 one or two things: ?/ueckgabe )er )eutschen (olonien? Mreturn of the German coloniesN1 -ell now am I to understand that includes German 8outh--est AfricaOI D: I;es all German colonies1I G"TEFI!: IBecause sometimes the statement has been made that the German claim did not include 8outh--est Africa1 I am authoriHed then by you at least to say to General MDan .hristianN 8muts that it does include German 8outh--est AfricaOI D: I;es1I DF1 M =in German>: IAnd the Da4anese islands tooOI D: INot the Da4anese islands1I This was the 4artly serious 4artly Gilbert-and-8ullivan dialogue which went on for months with many different interrogators 4olitical and medical1 9ord Beaverbroo7 under the cover name of Dr1 9ivingston came to tal7 with Eess after the invasion of Fussia and Eess told him a victory for !ngland would be a victory for bolshevism1 )+ Eess had ho4ed to be bac7 in Germany within a few days with the British acce4tance of his offer and their counter4ro4osals but he was out of touch with reality1 Neither the British nor the Germans were 4leased with him1 .hurchill was 4uHHled Eitler was enraged and the 4ress of both countries said he was insane1 .hurchill did not want it 7nown that the third man in Germany had come to Britain bearing 4eace offers1 A 4eace 4arty did e<ist in !ngland and it was un4olitic to have a 4ublic discussion about the 4ur4ose of Eess? visit1 A great 4ro4aganda cou4 conceivably might have

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page_11" #age ((+ been made of the curious event that disclosed something of the 7ind of 4ersonalities that were ruling Germany but the British authorities cautiously decided to treat the matter as a medical-4olitical affair1 .hurchill directed on May () three days after the landing that Eess be considered a 4risoner of war isolated interrogated e<amined and well treated1 )% Eitler too had to treat the incident carefully1 Eis de4uty his secretary had flown off without his 7nowledge on a 4eace mission and all he could do was arrest #intsch and cause a statement to be issued that Eess had been deranged by overwor7 and by consulting astrologers and had ta7en it onto himself to ma7e an unauthoriHed flight to the enemy1 -itnesses re4orted that they had seldom seen Eitler in such fury as when he heard the news1 ??I ho4e he dives into the ocean I #aul 8chmidt heard him say1)* It was a 4ro4aganda blow of the first magnitude1 Eess 7new of course of the 4re4arations for the attac7 on the 8oviet "nion and there was no telling what he might divulge to the British1 All the German 4ress and radio could do was to re4eat that Eess had been in 4oor mental health for some time had consulted astrologers and soothsayers and had flown off on a wild errand of his own1 The 6uehrer called the #arty leaders together at the Berghof and told them insanity ran in Eess? family1 /$ But the @uestion that was as7ed silentlyas well as o4enly by men li7e Messerschmittwas how someone so high in the councils of the mighty could have remained so long in his 4osition when the 6uehrer himself said he was insane1 -itticisms went the rounds: IThe Thousand-;ear Feich is now the Eundred-;ear Feich1 -hyO :ne Hero less1I :r IA new office has been createdFeichsemigrantenfuehrer Mhead of emigrants from the FeichN I a 4lay on the titles Feichsmarschall Feichsfuehrer 88 etc./( It seems li7ely that Eess had flown to Britain without the 6uehrer?s 7nowledge although many 4eo4le in Germany were unconvinced of this1 Goering believed that the 6uehrer had sent Eess as did 8chellenberg who was an e<4ert in matters of intelligence1 They thought it would be easy to disavow his mission if it failed1 According to 6rau Eess who had read a co4y of the letter her husband sent to the 6uehrer Eess had told Eitler he could always announce that his de4uty was craHy if the tri4 was unsuccessful1 This seems unconvincing in view of the bad 4ro4aganda effect the Eess mission would be bound to have for the Feich both in Germany and abroad1 #eace feelers could readily be made without sending the de4uty of the 6uehrer to land by 4arachute in enemy country1 Eitler?s 4ress chief :tto Dietrich who saw the letter said that Eess told Eitler the flight was made not from cowardice or wea7ness for it too7 more courage to go to Britain than to stay in Germany but from a desire to establish a 4ersonal contact with !nglishmen he 7new =Eess was born in !gy4t in British-held territory> to reestablish Anglo-German relations in the interest of both 4eo4les and to end the war1 Eess told Eitler he had the definite im4ression when they had last tal7ed together that the 6uehrer too from the bottom of

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page_11# #age ((% his heart wanted a German-!nglish understanding1 Eess had never said a word to Eitler about the flight because he 7new the 6uehrer would have forbidden it1 /& All the British could discover was that Eess believed that Eitler would ma7e 4eace under certain conditions1 The Feich it seemed was a strange and wonderful country that could be run with a combination of the efficiency of the -ehrmacht and the delusional system of a lunatic who had been the ever loyal com4anion and de4uty of the 6uehrer1 Eess was technically a 4risoner of war although he was treated with far more consideration than is usually accorded such a 4erson1 Ee had a house to himself was guarded beyond the usual security measures after his first attem4t to commit suicide and for a time dined every evening with his ca4tors the commander being served first and Eess second1 This however did not allay Eess? conviction that his food was being 4oisoned and he would sometimes ra4idly e<change his 4late with that of the commanding officer to avert the danger1 Ee was e<amined carefully over a long 4eriod of time by a 4anel of 4sychiatrists and other 4hysicians1 Their diagnosis which declared Eess a schiHo4hrenic 4ersonality with hysterical overlay referred to his dys4lastic 4hysi@ue the stigmata of degeneration the missha4en ears the 4rimitive s7ull formation the s4lit 4ersonality1 The British doctors declared that the first amnesia they observed which lasted from November (*/) to Dune (*// was genuine1 There seems small doubt of this since Eess during that time submitted to an !vi4al test which 4ut him in a state of seminarcosis that would 4resumably induce him to answer @uestions without the natural defenses afforded him when he was in 4ossession of his full 4owers1 The 4sychiatrists also discerned what was not infre@uently evident in many of the higher-u4s of the NaHi #arty and 8tatenamely a large feminine inclusion in the ,umbled 4ersonality1 #art of the security staff guarding him were members of the Guardse<am4les of the >eunesse )or<e of !nglandwho ate by themselves and not as members of the mess attended by Eess and the 4olitical officers assigned to him1 The British doctors thought that the homose<ual in him res4onded strongly to these young men whom he saw as re4resentatives of the chivalrous Bing of !ngland whom he had come to save1 :n the other side were the 4olitical and medical officers a very different 7ettle of fish from Eess? 4oint of view1 Eis first suicide attem4t was called in the medical re4ort at attem4t at murder since Eess had seemed 4re4ared to hurl himself on the 4sychiatrist1 The 4ro,ection of his own inca4acities had not been com4lete in Eess? mind the 4sychiatrists thought and at the last moment he 4lunged not at the doctor but over the bannister1/) =9ater he stabbed himself in the chest and also tried to starve himself1> In time Eess grew increasingly ill-tem4ered and confused1 Eis rece4tion in Britain disa44ointed him1 More and more the Dews e<ercised their malevolent influences1 The good Bing of !ngland and the good Du7e of Eamilton were unha44ily confounded by many wic7ed men who tried to 4oison him every

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page_11$ #age ((* day1 Eis enemies 4racticed blac7 arts u4on him using such common4lace devices as ma7ing noises all night to try to rob him of his rest and his sanity1 As he had e<4lained to the Du7e of Eamilton he had come to 8cotland on a mission of humanity and had e<4ected the Bing to grant him a 4arole because he had come of his own free will1 But now magic and deviltry were being inflicted on him1 ??Ee was convinced he was surrounded by secret-service agents who would accom4lish his death by driving him to commit suicide committing a murder staged to loo7 li7e suicide or administering 4oison in his food I wrote one of the British 4sychiatrists1 Eess sometimes lay on the floor of his room writhing in 4ain from real or imaginary stomach cram4s which were stimulated by his su44osed o44ressors1 // -riting to his wife on Danuary (0 (*// he said: II have been sitting here for literally several hours wondering what I can write to you about1 But I get no furtherC and that I regret to say is for a very s4ecial reason1 8ince sooner or later you will notice it or find out about it I may as well tell you: I have com4letely lost my memory1 1 1 1 The reason for it I do not 7now1 The doctor gave me a lengthy e<4lanation but I have meanwhile forgotten what it was1I/0 Ee told his doctors the Fussians were hy4notiHing German troo4s from mysterious centers1 8trange hy4notic influences were also at wor7 on him in his ca4tivity a thousand miles away1 This is the man who was flown bac7 to Germanyto Nurembergto be tried on all four counts of the indictment1 .hurchill had declared in his first memorandum written ,ust after Eess landed that Eess was liable to be tried as a ma,or war criminal but the British also feared that they might have to re4atriate him under the Geneva .onvention before the end of the war because of his mental state1 8witHerland the 4rotecting 4ower of the Feich in Britain had sent re4resentatives to visit Eess and if they had made the recommendation to re4atriate him this would have 4resented embarrassing 4olitical com4licationsnot that the British on their own had much interest in Eess1 The Fussians however did have an interest in him and their mental o4erations were not entirely dissimilar from his1 They had always sus4ected a British 4lot to raise a coalition against them and when 9ord Beaverbroo7 visited 8talin in Moscow the Fussian #remier had 4rom4tly in@uired into the Eess case1 -hy had he flown to !nglandO -hy was he not e<ecutedO At #otsdam 8talin as7ed @uestions again this time of Mr1 Attlee who assured him that Eess would be 4roduced for the forthcoming trials1 The court at Nuremberg a44ointed a medical 4anel from the four 4owers1 The re4orts were somewhat conflicting although the 4anelists all said that Eess could stand trial1 The British called him a 4sycho4athic 4ersonality but not at the moment insane1 =The re4ort of the British 4sychiatrists was signed by among others Dr1 D1 F1 Fees the chief Army 4sychiatrist who had seen Eess over a 4eriod of months1> The American and 6rench doctors found him hysterical and suffering from loss of memory but added that this

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page_120 #age (&$ would not interfere with his com4rehension of the 4roceedings though it would interfere with his res4onse to @uestions relating to his 4ast and to underta7ing his defense1 Three 8oviet 4hysicians and a 6rench doctor said ??At 4resent he is not insane in the strict sense of the word1 Eis amnesia does not 4revent him com4letely from understanding what is going on around him but it will interfere with his ability to conduct his defense and to understand details of the 4ast which would a44ear as factual data1I /' The re4ort by the 8oviet doctors who e<amined him called his malady Ihysterical amnesia the basis of which is a subconscious inclination towards self-defense as well as a deliberate and conscious tendency towards it1I/+ The tribunal as7ed to hear Eess on his own behalf and he made a statement of the 7ind that would have been familiar to his British doctors during one of his clear 4eriods: In order to forestall the 4ossibility of my being 4ronounced inca4able of 4leading in s4ite of my willingness to ta7e 4art in the 4roceedings and to hear the verdict alongside my comrades I would li7e to ma7e the following declaration 1 1 1 : Eenceforth my memory will again res4ond to the outside world1 The reasons for simulating loss of memory were of a tactical nature1 :nly my ability to concentrate is in fact somewhat reduced1/% Eess? first lawyer Guenther von Fohrscheidt cited not only the medical evidence against Eess? sanity which was considerable des4ite the short 4eriod of time he had been e<amined by the doctors at Nuremberg but also his own e<4eriences with his client who he said was manifestly abnormal and unable to 4resent a 4ro4er defense1 =8ome months later Fohrscheidt bro7e his leg and had to withdraw from the case1 Eess?s defense was ta7en over by the able Munich lawyer Alfred 8eidl who also re4resented Eans 6ran71> The #resident of the .ourt declared that Eess could 4ut forward amnesia as 4art of his defense and could say II should have been able to ma7e a better defense if I had been able to remember what too7 4lace at the time1I The tribunal after deliberating decided he could stand trial although it would later again have doubts1 Des4ite his statement to the court that he wished to be tried Eess never too7 the stand1 :nce he had made his s4eech he lost interest in the 4roceedings denied the authority of the court to hold such a trial refused to testify and too7 to reading boo7s during the sessions1 Ee did however 4artici4ate in his fashion in the more informal atmos4here of the interrogations1 These too7 4lace over a considerable 4eriod beginning with his arrival in Nuremberg and e<tending 4ast the end of the trial1 Eess was interrogated in the 4resence of his former secretaryC a naturo4ath whom he had formerly consulted 9udwig 8chmittC and othersnone of whom he could clearly recogniHe1/* Ee had trouble remembering much of his 4ast as the #resident of the .ourt had 4redicted but when the word IDewI came u4 he said IThere

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page_121 #age (&( stirs in me something that is disli7e or that they are not sym4athetic to me or rather that I have no sym4athies for them1?? But he could not recall any reason he said why he should disli7e them1 Ee 7new there had been a war because he had seen the ruins when he was in Brussels only the day before he was interrogated in Nuremberg1 0$ -hen to test his memory he was confronted with Goering he 4rofessed to have only a dim idea of who he was1 -hen Goering tried to remind him of the way Eitler had tal7ed Eess said he could not remember and that the 4icture he had of Eitler in his cell did not s4ea71 Goering was most coo4erative for the meeting gave him an o44ortunity to recall his own s4lendid 4ast1 G:!FING: IDon?t you 7now meOI E!88: INot 4ersonally but I remember your name1I G:!FING: IBut we tal7ed a lot together1I E!88: IThat must have been the case 1 1 1 as the De4uty of the 6uehrer 1 1 1 I must have met the other high 4ersonalities li7e you but I can?t remember anyone1I G:!FING: I6irst I was a 6ield Marshal and later a Feichsmarschal don?t you remember thatOI E!88: INo1I MEe added that if the doctors had not assured him his memory would return he would be driven to des4eration1N G:!FING: IDo you remember that I lived ,ust outside Berlin in a great house in the forest at BarinhallC don?t you remember that you were there many timesO MAnd then s4ea7ing of the (*&) 4utschN Do you remember that you arrested the MinisterOI E!88: II seem to have a 4retty involved 4ast according to that1I G:!FING: IDo you remember that you moved to the -ilhelmstrasse into a 4alace which really belonged to me as the #rime Minister of #russia but I enabled you to live thereOI MGoering was still boasting of his 4alaces for the benefit no doubt of the Allied interrogators1N E!88: II don?t 7now1I G:!FING: IDo you remember Mr1 MesserschmittO 1 1 1 Ee constructed all our fighter 4lanes and he also gave you the 4lane that I refused to give you 1 1 1 with which you flew to !ngland1 Mr1 Messerschmitt gave that to you behind my bac71I MThe AmericanN INT!FF:GAT:F Mto GoeringN: IAll right1 ;ou move over here1I0( A 4rocession of 4eo4le also designed to revive Eess? memory followed: Barl Eaushofer #a4en Messerschmitt !rnest Bohle =he had been leader of the #arty?s 6oreign :rganiHation>1 Bohle reminded Eess of his having been shot in the lungs as a lieutenant in -orld -ar I and tal7ed about his letter to the Du7e of Eamilton which Bohle had translated for him1 Eaushofer called him by his first name gave him news of the Eess family of his wife and young son and told him that Albrecht had been 7illed by the NaHis1 But all this was of no use1 Eess re4eated that he could not remember1

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page_122 #age (&& A little later however on November )$ (*/0 he was to tell the court and his interrogators that he had been acting all this time that the films shown him and the 4eo4le who had reminded him of his 4ast had indeed been familiar to him and that he had been feigning a loss of memory1 The American 4sychologist G1 M1 Gilbert who visited the 4risoners regularly noted Eess? 4leasure at having fooled everyone and a44arently acce4ted Eess? own befuddled estimate of himself1 0& But he and other s4ecialists including the American 4sychiatrist who had Eess under observation soon had to admit that Eess was showing unmista7able signs of deterioration in his thin7ing: his amnesia had returnedC he was a4athetic toward the 4roceedingsC he refused to coo4erate with his lawyerC and he refused to ta7e the stand or to 4lay any 4art in the defense of his life1L 8eidl made the best defense he could1 Ee had chanced to overhear a conversation between Goering and Fibbentro4 in which the Fussian-German secret treaty of August &) (*)* was mentioned and he set out on a search for it1 A co4y of the document came into his hands given him by an un7nown American officer but he was unable to introduce it as evidence because it was a co4y and the Fussian ,udges and 4rosecutors did not want to hear about it1 -hat 8eidl could do was to call witnesses among them 6riedrich Gaus former chief of the 9egal Division of the German 6oreign :ffice who testified on the secret 4rotocols of the August 4act in which Fibbentro4 after tele4honing Eitler for a44roval had declared the Feich not interested 4olitically in 9atvia !stonia and 6inland1 :nly 9ithuania was to come into the German s4here1 9ater Gaus said1 Eitler had a44roved 9ithuania?s going to the 8oviet "nion10) 8ince Eess could have ta7en no 4art in the e<terminations in war crimes or in crimes against humanity the case against him had to be based solely on his having been a member of the cons4iracy to 4lan and wage aggressive war1 -hat 8eidl attem4ted to do was to introduce into the courtroom a tranche )e vie internationale that would show something of the way affairs between great 4owers were often actually conducted when they were stri44ed of their rhetoric and e<hortations1 Eess had nothing to do with the Fusso-German 4act but 8eidl tried to show how relations between the accused Germans and the re4resentatives of one of the four 4eace-loving nations on the bench had in fact been conducted1 Eess too7 4art in the 4roceedings only one more timein his final statement1 Ee as7ed the tribunal if he could address it from his seat because of his ill health and in this 4osition he might have gone on for a L Gilbert who detested all the defendants was later in August (*/' as7ed by long time the court to give a second o4inion on Eess? sanity and whether a 4anel of 4sychiatrists should ree<amine him1 Gilbert said that he had no doubts about the sanity of Eess who was suffering from a hysterical amnesia and that there was no need for another 4sychiatric e<amination1 =N I 441 ('''+1 .f1 also Douglas M1 Belley && *ells in Nuremberg MNew ;or7: Greenberg: #ublishers Inc1 (*/+N1>

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page_123 #age (&) had the #resident not cut him short after twenty minutes1 -hat Eess said was dis,ointed earnest 4aranoid: 8ome of my comrades here can confirm the fact that at the beginning of the 4roceedings I 4redicted the following: (1 That witnesses would a44ear who under oath would ma7e untrue statements while at the same time these witnesses could create an absolutely reliable im4ression and en,oy the best 4ossible re4utation1 &1 That it was to be rec7oned with that the .ourt would receive affidavits containing untrue statements1 )1 That the defendants would be astonished and sur4rised at some German witnesses1 /1 That some of the defendants would act rather strangely: they would ma7e shameless utterances about the 6uehrerC they would incriminate their own 4eo4leC they would 4artially incriminate each other and falsely at that1 #erha4s they would even incriminate themselves and also wrongly1 1 1 1 I made these 4redictions however not only here at the beginning of the Trial but had already made them months before the beginning of the Trial in !ngland to among others Dr1 Dohnston the 4hysician who was with me in Abergavenny1 1 1 1 I said before that a certain incident in !ngland caused me to thin7 of the re4orts of the earlier trials1 The reason was that the 4eo4le around me during my im4risonment acted towards me in a 4eculiar and incom4rehensible way in a way which led me to conclude that these 4eo4le somehow were acting in an abnormal state of mind1 8ome of themthese 4ersons and 4eo4le around me were changed from time to time1 8ome of the new ones who came to me in 4lace of those who had been changed had strange eyes1 They were glassy and li7e eyes in a dream1 This sym4tom however lasted only a few days and then they made a com4letely normal im4ression1 They could no longer be distinguished from normal human beings1 Not only I alone noticed these strange eyes but also the 4hysician who attended me at the time Dr1 Dohnston a British Army doctor a 8cotsman1 In the s4ring of (*/& I had a visitor a visitor who @uite obviously tried to 4rovo7e me and acted towards me in a strange way1 This visitor also had these strange eyes1 Afterwards Dr1 Dohnston as7ed me what I thought of this visitor1 Ee told meI told him I had the im4ression that for some reason or other he was not com4letely normal mentally whereu4on Dr1 Dohnston did not 4rotest as I had e<4ected but agreed with me and as7ed me whether I had not noticed those strange eyes these eyes with a dreamy loo71 Dr1 Dohnston did not sus4ect that he himself had e<actly the same eyes when he came to me1 1 1 1 .oncerning my oath I should also li7e to say that I am not a churchgoerC I have no s4iritual relationshi4 with the .hurch but I am a dee4ly religious 4erson1 I am convinced that my belief in God is stronger than that of most other 4eo4le1 I as7 the Eigh Tribunal to give all the more weight to everything which I declare under oath e<4ressly calling God as my witness1 0/

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page_124 #age (&/ Eess was the first man in history to be found guilty of cons4iracy to wage warfare and of having waged it1 It was a remar7able ,udgment1 In finding him guilty the court declared: Eess was an active su44orter of the 4re4arations for war1 1 1 1 Eis signature established military service1 1 1 1 he e<4ressed a desire for 4eace and advocated international economic coo4eration1 But 1 1 1 none 7new better than Eess how determined Eitler was to realiHe his ambitions how fanatical and violent a man he was1 1 1 1 -ith him on his flight to !ngland Eess carried certain 4eace 4ro4osals which he alleged Eitler was 4re4ared to acce4t1 It is significant to note that this flight too7 4lace only ten days after the date on which Eitler fi<ed && Dune (*/( as the time for attac7ing the 8oviet "nion1 1 1 1 That Eess acts in an abnormal manner suffers from loss of memory and has mentally deteriorated during this Trial may be true1 But there is nothing to show that he does not realiHe the nature of the charges against him or is inca4able of defending himself1 1 1 1 There is no suggestion that Eess was not com4letely sane when the acts charged against him were committed1 1 1 1 Defendant Fudolf Eess the court sentences you to im4risonment for life1 00 .ounterevidence did however e<ist1 It was in the re4ort of the 4sychiatrists who had e<amined Eess in Britain and had found that his aberrations were of long standing1 The court chose to ignore such evidence1 At least two of its membersthe Fussian ,udgeswere unsha7ably convinced =and no doubt had been before the start of the trial> that Eess had flown to Britain for the e<4ress 4ur4ose of arranging a combined Anglo-German attac7 on the 8oviet "nion1 This is 4erha4s why the court too7 4ains in sentencing Eess to refer to his flight?s coming only ten days after Eitler had set the date for the invasion of the 8oviet "nion1 Nevertheless over the 4rotests of the Fussian members of the tribunal Eess? life was s4ared1 In his cell in the #alace of Dustice Eess wrote voluminously but destroyed what he wrote1 Ee refused to see his wife or son when visiting 4rivileges were allowed the 4risoners after the sentences had been 4ronounced1 Ee showed no interest in the verdict and he went to the 4rison at 84andau no more concerned than when he had come to Nuremberg1 Ee had e<4ected he said to be sentenced to death1 Des4ite his refusal to see his family he wrote s4oradically from Nuremberg and then from 84andau 4rison to his wife as he had from !ngland1 Eis letters were affectionate and often detailed as when he recounted his flight to !ngland but they evidenced many of the same sym4toms he showed in the course of the trial1 In his first letter from 84andau written August ) (*/+ he described his newly 4ainted cell with its head cushion and cord mattress and his gardening in the 4rison soil where he raised tobacco and tomatoes1L Ee also said he had not written more from !ngland L The 84andau 4risoners because since he had allegedly lost his memory he was afraid may raise vegetables but not for their own consum4tion1

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page_12 #age (&0 of disclosing in the letters that this was not the case1 It had been a great swindle on his 4art and the British he said 4roudly had admitted they had been ta7en in1 They would 4robably thin7 the sentence was bad enough he wrote but he himself only smiled and he had written to his lawyer 8eidl to 4revent his as7ing for a 4ardon1 8eidl had e<4lained to him that he was not as7ing for a 4ardon but 4ointed out that Eess had been the only 4erson convicted on #oints :ne and Two of the indictmentthat is of 4lotting to wage and then having waged aggressive war and that the sentence was out of 4ro4ortion to the offenses1 :bviously his enemies were still at wor71 In March (*/% Eess wrote to his wife that he had not written for some time but could not give the real reason1 But not only his world was irrational1 Although as Eess had e<4lained in his letter to the Du7e of Eamilton he had gone to !ngland on a mission of humanity he was now sentenced to s4end the rest of his life in the 84andau 4rison for his 4art in 4lanning the attac7s on #oland Norway ;ugoslavia the 9ow .ountries and the othersincluding by im4lication the 8oviet "nion1 Not much could be said on his behalf after his conviction e<ce4t to 4oint out that in normal times he would have been ,udged insane1 !ven under the circumstances it was a curious verdict1 The -estern 4owers since that time have suggested that his sentence might be commuted only to run u4 against a veto of the 8oviet "nion1 After the attac7 of the armed forces of !ngland 6rance and Israel on !gy4t in November (*0' Eess? attorney Alfred 8eidl wrote to the British 6oreign :ffice as7ing whether Anthony !den who was then #rime Minister was to be brought before a court to answer for his 4art in an aggression that had been denounced in countries as far a4art as the 8oviet "nion and the "nited 8tates1 Alfred Fosenberg The chief ideologist of the #arty from the beginning was Alfred Fosenberg a man far more erudite than 8treicher and as im4lacably anti-8emitic anti-.hurch and anti-8lav as Bormann1 Fosenberg came into his own on A4ril &$ (*/( two months before the start of the Fussian cam4aign when Eitler named him .ommissioner for the .entral .ontrol of Suestions .onnected with the !ast !uro4ean Fegion1 :n Duly (+ after Germany?s invasion of Fussia he was a44ointed Feich Minister for the :ccu4ied !astern Territories1 Actually the con@uered 4rovinces of Fussia which were to be his satra4y turned out to be only another of his succession of failures in the 4ractical world of National 8ocialist brass-7nuc7le 4olitics1 Fosenberg was defeated in Fussia as he was in the Feich by ambitions and ho4es out of 4ro4ortion to his talents1 Ee always overestimated himself1 At the end of the war he wrote a letter

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page_12! #age (&' to 6ield Marshal Montgomery from Admiral DoenitH?s head@uarters at 6lensburg 4lacing himself at the Marshal?s dis4osal1 Ee never received an answer1 Instead two British officers came to arrest him1 They told him they had not heard of the letter1 Fosenberg lim4ed off to his ca4tivity =he had long had trouble with his ,oints had in,ured his an7le and could only wal7 with difficulty> and to his trial as a ma,or war criminal1 Eis diary was found by American soldiers in a castle in Bavaria where he had hidden it1 Because he was a voluminous writer the author of many boo7s and 4am4hlets and because the records of his administration of the !astern Territory as well as of his gigantic 4lundering of !uro4ean art were 4reserved little remains un7nown about the 4art he 4layed in the Third Feich1 Fosenberg?s im4ortance was far more formal than real1 In Germany he had resounding titles: Feichsleiter .hief of the 6oreign :ffice of the #arty .ommissioner of the 6uehrer for the 8afeguarding of the National 8ocialist #hiloso4hy1 In actual 4ractice he was elbowed aside1 In theory he was to e<ercise su4reme civil authority in the territories won in battle from the 8oviet "nion 0' and to legislate for the entire area1 The administration of the :ccu4ied !astern Territories was a rat?s nest of com4eting agencies with overla44ing ,urisdictions1 Goering?s staff for the 6our-;ear #lan was in charge of economic affairs but the Army too had an economic staff and Fosenberg?s Feichsministry for these territories had both long-and short-range 4lans for the 8oviet economy1 Bormann and the #arty a44aratus Goebbels and his #ro4aganda Ministry Fibbentro4 and the 6oreign :ffice the Army and the 88all were em4ire builders in Fussia1 Also Todt and 84eer had assignments for traffic and construction that conflicted with what Fosenberg considered his domain10+ Fosenberg signed the decree of December (* (*/( for recruiting forced labor in the !astern Territories1 Ee a44roved on behalf of his Ministry the so-called Eay Action which was a 4lan never carried out for bringing children from ten to fourteen years old from Fussia to the Feich so they could wor7 and at the same time reduce the biological 4otential of the 8oviet "nion1 =8ee 8chirach .ha4t1 %1> :n 4a4er Fosenberg was the civilian .Har of the !ast but 7ey men were a44ointed by the 6uehrer and often they were a44ointed over his head as was the Gauleiter !rich Boch who headed the "7raine1 Fosenberg?s own men had to com4ete with a44ointees of other agencies including Eimmler?s 88 leaders1 8ince Eimmler unli7e Fosenberg was always in close touch with Eitler who made the decisions when authorities conflicted it was Eimmler?s men who became the real rulers of the occu4ied territories1 8ome of Fosenberg?s theoretical subordinatesthe 4ractical men li7e Bochcould match in their brutality the 88 4olice officials and the !insatH commandos but they were not carrying out Fosenberg?s orders1 They were merely the logical e<tension of his basic doctrines1 Ee ob,ected over and over again to the brutality beatings and 7illings that were alienating the 4eo4le of the "7raine and Fussia and the other nationalities

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page_12" #age (&+ from the German cause1 Eowever they were only &ntermenschen li7able 4erha4s and useful but in the case of the Great Fussians 4rimitive and dangerous1 Fosenberg?s tedious writings were the source of his 4referment1 Eis s4eeches and articles =he was editor of the +oelkischer Beobachter and of the Nationalso0ialistische Monatshefte> and above all his Myth of the T,entieth *entury im4ressed Eitler by their bul7 and 4ure doctrinal 4ur4oses1 =Fosenberg said at Nuremberg that he and Eitler had rarely discussed 4hiloso4hy but he 7new they shared the same o4inions1> Fosenberg however was more doctrinaire than Eitler who sometimes commented sarcastically on Fosenberg?s addiction to his 6ermanen cult1 0% In (*&* Fosenberg founded the Militant 9eague for German .ulture which became the National 8ocialist .ultural .ommunity under which the ??8trength through DoyI movement o4erated1 In (*)/ he was named De4uty of the 6uehrer for the 8u4ervision of the !ntire Ideological Training and !ducation of the N8DA#10* In 6ebruary (*/$ when Eitler a44ointed him .ommissioner for the 8afeguarding of the National 8ocialist #hiloso4hy for the #arty and 8tate his res4onsibilities included the indoctrination of the -ehrmacht1 A few days before on Danuary &* (*/$ Eitler gave Fosenberg the ,ob of founding the so-called high school the Hohe Schule which was to be established after the war as the .entral National 8ocialist "niversity1 '$ A great cathedral of NaHi education was 4lanned to rise on the ban7s of the .hiemsee south of Munich1 6or the benefit of his high school Fosenberg set aside a large 4ortion of the confiscated libraries of Dews and Masons1 More than half a million volumes were confiscated and sent to the .entral 9ibrary at the TanHenberg Monastery in .arinthia for safe7ee4ing until they could one day be sent to the .hiemsee1 Fosenberg constantly 4re4ared for historic roles both inside and outside the Feich =he had long as4ired to be 6oreign Minister and was bitterly disa44ointed when Fibbentro4 was named>1 Ee had ho4ed to be the learned chief of German education and the 4roconsul of the !ast but these diHHy heights described in the 4ros4ectuses were never climbed1 The tough men of affairs of the 88 and the commissars who either 4aid no attention to him or li7e Boch fought him tooth and nail ruled the Fussian 4rovinces and Bormann did his best to see to it that the high school remained a moc7-u4 of what was never to be built1 9i7e Eitler Fosenberg was one of the non-Germans who far outdid the native-born in their 4atriotic 4assion for their ado4ted country1 Born in Feval in !stonia on Danuary (& (%*) he came from a family of Germans4ea7ing artisans and small business 4eo4le acutely conscious of their Germanism in the midst of an alien culture1 Fosenberg?s father had a ,ob in a Feval business firmC his grandfather was a shoema7er and head of his guild1 Gossi4 in the #arty said the family was not German at all but was descended from !stonian agricultural laborers who had ta7en the German name of their landlord and 7e4t it after they migrated to the city1 :thers said that Fosen-

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page_12# #age (&% berg was a mi<ture of 6rench or 8lavic and !stonian ancestors1 8ome thought he had Dewish blood and remar7ed when Fosenberg 4ublished a list of 4rominent Fussian officials who were Dews that he must consider himself to be the only Aryan Fosenberg in the world1 '( Fosenberg loo7ed German although he was dar7-haired and had a round s7ull1 Ee was handsome in a grim way1'& Fosenberg attended the Technical Institute =Technische Eochschule> in Figa where he studied architecture and ,oined a student cor4s the Fubonia made u4 of German and 4ro-German students1 Although !stonia was 4art of the .Harist em4ire students were not drafted into the Fussian Army1 Fosenberg thought the reason was that Fussia had enough man4ower without them1 -hen on the a44roach of the German Army in the war of (*(0 the school was moved to Moscow Fosenberg went along with his classmates and married a student he had 7nown for a number of years1 Eis wife Eilda soon fell ill with tuberculosis and had to go to the .rimea for her health1 8he seems to have been of a lively intellectual dis4osition1 Through her Fosenberg was introduced to the wor7s of NietHsche and together they read BalHac Tolstoy and Dostoevs7i while the rest of the 4o4ulation concerned itself with the war1 Fosenberg followed her to the .rimea but had to return to Moscow to ta7e his e<aminations and there he found the revolution in full tide1 -hat his 4olitical views were at this time is not clear but the relative ease with which he moved from one country and allegiance to another suggests they were not strongly held1 8ome of his NaHi critics thought he was 4ro-Fussian at least u4 to the time of the revolution and some thought he had served in the Fussian Army1 :ne of the critics who 7new him says that Fosenberg always avoided the sub,ect1') "ntil (*(% Fosenberg concentrated mainly on architecture and 4ainting1 -hile in !stonia he a44lied himself to being a member in good standing of the German community in the midst of the 9etts and 8lavs and Dews1 -hen the revolution came he shared the beliefwidely current in the Baltic 8tates #oland and Fussiathat the Dews had been res4onsible for it1 Ee welcomed !stonian inde4endence which came as a result of the revolution but he did not ,oin as did most of the young German Balts the Lan)s,ehr to defend the country against bolshevism1 Instead after ma7ing a few s4eeches to his fellow countrymen he emigrated to #aris as did most of the Fussian <migr<s1 There he read for the first time Gobineau and Eouston 8tewart .hamberlain and in his enthusiasm for !ngland the center of the Northern races he tried to get to 9ondon1 The British however were sus4icious in (*(% of the infiltration of .Harist and .ommunist agents and refused Fosenberg an entry 4ermit1 It was only then that Fosenberg turned toward another Nordic country and moved to Munich which li7e #aris was a center of -hite Fussian <migr<s as antiBolshevi7 as Fosenberg1 In Munich in (*(% he e<4lained to the Baltic Inde4endence .ommission which was recruiting soldiers to defend his native land that his wife was ill and he had

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page_12$ #age (&* other 4ressing duties that must 7ee4 him in Germany1 =Fosenberg and Eilda were divorced in the s4ring of (*&)1 8he had left the 8oviet "nion to live in #aris where she later died1> Fosenberg?s visions were =(> the racial su4eriority of the Northern 4eo4les =to which he later added as a corollary the German need of living s4ace>C and =&> the establishing of a new religion National 8ocialism to re4lace the sterile dogmas of .hristianity as well as the cons4iratorial beliefs of the Dews1 6or .hristian love he wanted to substitute National 8ocialist comradeshi41 Ee began to get a sense of his 4ublic mission in (*(% when during the 4eriod of the short-lived Faete Fe4ublic of the .ommunists mainly Dews who seiHed control of Munich for a few bloody days he discovered that he could s4ea7 to a German audience and that 4eo4le listened1 Actually the times were e<4losive and audiences were more than ready to be instructed1 Fosenberg was never an elo@uent s4ea7er1 Ee was humorless dry and longwinded but his denunciation of Dews and .ommunists fell on willing ears in both !stonia and Munich1 In Munich he almost immediately became a member of the German -or7er?s #arty which a few months later became the National 8ocialist #arty1 Ee ,oined it ahead of Eitler1 9ater he wrote that when he first met the 6uehrer he was not overly im4ressed but he @uic7ly came under Eitler?s s4ell1 Eis unsha7able loyalty withstood the severest tests such as Eitler?s neglecting him for his rivals and the signing in August (*)* of the nonaggression 4act with Fussia1 Fosenberg dreamed into<icating dreams of a German Feich that would ta7e over its needed living s4ace from the 8oviet "nion brea7ing u4 for all time the 8lav dominion over the vast stretches of the !astern marches and the dangerous concentration of Great Fussians who were the main su44ort of the .Har?s em4ire and of the .ommunist 8tate as well1 This was to be done by means of coloniHation and by ma7ing alliances with 6inland and with the sub,ect 4eo4les of the "7raine the .aucasus Galicia -hite Futhenia and Tur7estan who had long been chafing under the dominion of Moscow1 Fussia had always been essentially an Asiatic 4ower Fosenberg believed and with its hordes could only be held in chec7 by German force and guile that would divide and rule1 To this end he wanted relatively good treatment for the non-.ommunists and for the minorities of the 8oviet "nion who could 4roduce food and goods and an additional line of defense for the Third Feich against any future Fussian state1 In this view he soon came into shar4 conflict with the 88 and with the administrators Eimmler and Bormann sent to the !ast1L These men li7e Fosenberg were single-minded in their racial mission1 They were also men of action who were not see7ing allies among the natives but obedient slaves who could be L Fosenberg even o44osed the wholesale slaughter of li@uidated at any time1 -hen commissars1 :nly high-ran7ing ones he said should be li7ed in accord with Eitler?s orderC the others should be s4ared and used to administer the occu4ied territory =see Beitel .ha4t1 *>1

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page_130 #age ()$ the Gauleiter of the "7raine !rich Boch was met by a humble delegation sent to greet him with salt and bread he dashed the gifts to the ground shouting that it was an affront for such 4eo4le to dare to offer anything to an official of the Feich1 Boch?s emissaries were not allowed to sit down at the same table with 8lavs not even with those collaborating with the German occu4ation1 Fosenberg thought it 4ossible to have an arm?s-length relation with a "7rainian 4ossibly to give him a drin7 in a friendly fashion but not to get drun7 with him1 Ee fancied himself as an e<4ert not only on how to deal with the 4eo4le of the 8oviet "nion but on all matters that had to do with foreign countries and he wished to im4ress sub,ect nations with German su4eriority without using a club to do it1 In his diary entry of May && (*)/ he recorded his 4rotest against the manner in which the Dewish @uestion was being handled noting the bad 4ro4aganda effect on the outside world of the attac7s instigated by Goebbels? s4eeches and 8treicher?s writings1 Fosenberg was as fanatic in racist matters as any members of the 88 but he ob,ected to their methods as well as to their com4etition1 Ee said that the beatings and 7illings and needless humiliations they inflicted on the 4o4ulations were bound to create undying enmity for the Feich and that !insatH commandos had alienated even the 4ro-Germans in the "7raine who had first welcomed the German troo4s as deliverers1 Nevertheless Fosenberg?s own instructions to the brown-uniformed re4resentatives of his Ministry in the !ast were harsh by almost any standard but Eimmler?s1 :n Dune &$ (*/( he told an audience of his closest co-wor7ers ??-e see absolutely no reason for any obligation on our 4art to feed the Fussian 4eo4le with the 4roducts of this sur4lus region Msouthern Fussia and the northern .aucasusN1 -e 7now this is a hard necessity that lies outside any feelings 1 1 1 the future will hold very hard years in store for the Fussians1I '/ In (*/& he told an audience of Feichs7ommissars IThe @uestion is: -hat s4ares us most in German men and what brings us best to the 4olitical result 1 1 1 that thousands are badly cared for or are badly treated is ta7en for granted1 ;ou don?t have to grow grey hairs over that1I'0 Des4ite such views he never had in mind the mayhem and wholesale slaughter that too7 4lace1 -hen they occurred he s4o7e of the su4erior efficacy of more humane methods and loo7ed the other way1 Not that he was more humane than his rivals1 Ee merely wanted to assert his authority and to im4ose his own 4rogram1 Fosenberg the Balt hated the Great Fussiansthe core of Fussia as he thought of them1 And he had no love for the "7rainians the -hite Fussians or the other nationalities of the 8oviet "nion1 These he thought should become the 4eo4les of autonomous states so that the Moscovites as he called them could be held in chec71 The se4arate nationalities could then be treated well enough to bind them to a German alliance1 6or this 4ur4ose he would use whatever methods were necessary1 The 4roblem was only to convince Eitler that Fosenberg?s 4lans

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page_131 #age ()( were su4erior to those of Boch Goering Bormann Eimmler and the others1 It would be necessary to ta7e as hard a line as they and to want what Eitler wanted1 Thus when Eitler wanted Germans to be resettled in the .rimea Fosenberg told the 6uehrer that he had given earnest thought to the 4roblem of renaming the cities: 8imfero4ol was to be called Gotenburg 8evasto4ol changed to Theoderichhafen1 '' In a memorandum of March ' (*/& he wrote: After continuous observation of the state of affairs in the :ccu4ied !astern Territories I am convinced that German 4olitics may have their own 4ossibly contem4tuous o4inion of the @ualities of the con@uered 4eo4les but that it is not the mission of German 4olitical re4resentatives to 4roclaim measures and o4inions which could eventually reduce the con@uered 4eo4les to dull des4air instead of 4romoting the desired utiliHation of man4ower to ca4acity1 1 1 1 If at home we had to announce our aims to the whole nation most o4enly and aggressively 1 1 1 the 4olitical leaders in the !ast must remain silent where German 4olicy calls for necessary harshness1 1 1 1 ;es a clever German 4olicy may in certain circumstances do more in the German interest through alleviations which do not affect 4olicy and certain humane concessions than through o4en inconsiderate brutality1 '+ Ee 7new what Bormann was doing for he got a memorandum from a member of his staff a Dr1 Mar7ull on the sub,ect of Fosenberg?s corres4ondence with Bormann that said in 4art: Any 4erson reading this corres4ondence is struc7 first of all by the com4lete agreement of conce4ts1 1 1 1 The Minister MFosenbergN not only raises no ob,ections against Bormann?s 4rinci4les or even his 4hraseologyC on the contrary he uses them as a basis for his re4ly and endeavors to show that they are already being 4ut into 4ractice1 1 1 1 Imagine the formulas of Bormann?s letter translated into the language of a member of the German civilian administration and you will get roughly the following views: The 8lavs are to wor7 for us1 Insofar as we do not need them they may die1 1 1 1 !ducation is dangerous1 It is enough if they can count u4 to ($$1 1 1 1 Feligion we leave to them as a means of diversion1 As for food they will not get any more than is necessary1 -e are the mastersC we come first1 These sentences are by no means overstatements1 :n the contrary they are covered word by word by the s4irit and the te<t of Bormann?s letter1 1 1 1 The above-mentioned conce4t of our role in the !ast already e<ists in 4ractice1 1 1 1 there is no divergence of o4inion1 The Minister?s MFosenberg?sN re4ly 1 1 1 might be considered to 4oint in this direction1'% :n the stand at Nuremberg Fosenberg said what he had done was to write an ??a44easingI letter to Bormann and then had gone on to issue decrees setting u4 schools and health control1 That was Fosenberg?s way: to agree with the e<tremists li7e Bormann and Eimmler in an attem4t to ward off the constant attac7s u4on him and to end u4 by acce4ting the 4olicies his enemies im4osed both on the sub,ect 4o4ulations and on him1 Fosenberg had

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page_132 #age ()& vast geo4olitical aims: he wanted Great Fussiaany Great Fussia whether of the .Hars or the 8oviet "nionto be forced to remove its center of gravity to Asia1 The best means for accom4lishing this he thought was to ma7e use of the 8lavs? yearning for a firm and masterful hand and to treat the native 4o4ulations with the vigor and ,ustice that were essential for asserting German moral su4eriority1 '* The natives were to be 4ermitted to wor7 for the German overlords to ta7e 4art in the anti8emitic and anti-Bolshevi7 crusade and to hel4 7ee4 the Moscovites in their 4lace1 Fosenberg?s as4iration to be 6oreign Minister of the Feich was so strong that he had brought himself to e<4ress his disa44ointment to Eitler when the 4ost went to Fibbentro4 in (*)%1 Ee was in fact at least as well @ualified for the ,ob as was Fibbentro4 whose ideas on foreign 4olicy were ,ust as clouded as Fosenberg?s1 :n May (& (*)/ Fosenberg had written a memorandum to Eitler declaring that !ngland?s Air 6orce was really built against 6rance1 !ngland li7e Germany he said was vulnerable to air attac7 and he recommended that Germany and !ngland 4lan to coo4erate in a combined air service to .alcutta through Berlin Buda4est and An7ara and to wor7 together in the event of a Fusso-Da4anese war1+$ In his diary entry for December &' (*)/ he noted that !ngland feared the 6rench Air 6orce and that when Germany had more 4lanes discussions could ta7e 4lace on how the two countries could wor7 together1+( In (*/$ he sent Suisling to have an audience with Eitler1 Fosenberg had met the Norwegian in (*)) and he 7e4t in touch with him as he did with scores of 4eo4le in foreign countries he thought might be useful1+& Eis a44ointment as Feichsminister for the !astern Territories was a com4ensation for his not becoming 6oreign Minister and it was disa44ointing to Fibbentro4 whose res4onsibilities were obviously invaded with this newly created ,ob administering and as it was then thought deciding on 4olicies that would concern the 6oreign :ffice1 The rivalry between Fibbentro4 and Fosenberg was intense1 Fosenberg was head of the 6oreign Affairs :ffice of the #arty =the A#A Aussen4olitisches Amt> one of the 4arallel organiHations designed to 4rovide com4etition for and =should the occasion arise> to su44lant the e<isting 8tate :ffice1 Fosenberg in fact had gone to 9ondon in May (*)) not long after Eitler had come to 4ower to re4resent National 8ocialist views in what he regarded as influential British @uarters and no tri4 =not even any tri4 made by Fibbentro4> was ever more disastrous1 ??A 4onderous lightweight I 8ir Fobert Gansittart called him and the !nglish 4ress saw in him a symbol of NaHi boorishnesssomething Fosenberg made easy for his critics in his 4ontifical 4ress conferences =he s4o7e little !nglish> held in his hotel1 -hen he laid a wreath on the .enota4h it was s4irited away1 Accom4anied by .ount Gottfried von Bismarc7 as inter4reter he was received at the 6oreign :ffice on May % by 8ir Dohn 8imon1 Fosenberg e<4lained how NaHism would be a stabiliHing factor in Germany and on the .ontinent

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page_133 #age ()) against communism1 Ee said that if Eitler disa44eared communism would ta7e his 4lace1 8imon told him with what concern !ngland viewed certain as4ects of the National 8ocialist revolution es4ecially the measures against the Dews1 Fosenberg?s answer was to re4eat his charges against the .ommunists and to say that the German Government?s real aim was the 4reservation of liberty which would be destroyed if the .ommunists had their way1 Ee ac7nowledged that Dews had been de4rived of their ,obs but said they had unrightfully governed Germany since -orld -ar I1 Nothing came of his visit e<ce4t outcries of indignation and he was never to return1 +) Fosenberg?s 6oreign Affairs :ffice of the #arty survived all such e4isodes as well as the steady hostility of the German 6oreign :ffice1 Ee ascribed the success of the Norwegian cam4aign solely to his de4artment for it was he who had 4ut Suisling in touch with the 6uehrer and Admiral Faeder and it was his agents who warned of the imminent Anglo-6rench intervention in Norway while the German 6oreign :ffice officials were sending reassuring re4orts to Berlin1 The victory in Norway Fosenberg wrote was ??a confirmation of the historical tas7 fulfilled by the 6oreign Affairs :ffice of the #artyI and another gratifying 4roof of Fibbentro4?s incom4etence1+/ Eis early writings were not very different from 8treicher?s1 In (*&$ Fosenberg 4ublished The Trail of the %e, in the *ourse of Time 3 ie S2ur )er %u)en im !an)el )er Ceiten5 and .mmorality in the Talmu) 3&nmoral im Talmu)> and in (*&) The -rotocols of Cion an) %e,ish !orl) -olitics 3 ie -rotokolle )er !eisen von Cion un) )ie >ue)ische !elt2olitik>1 In these boo7s Dewish de4ravity and the 4lan to con@uer the world were e<4osed with the full a44aratus of 4seudoscholarshi41 Fosenberg was the original draftsman of the #arty 4rograms that traced the source of German woes to DewishBolshevi7 Mar<ism and to the Dewish materialist influence on the .hristian .hurch1 In his grand synthesis he demanded living s4ace from the 8oviet "nion and a return in the Feich of the Germanic 4agan myth of the blood1 Eis The Myth of the T,entieth *entury was in the home of every Idecent #arty member I as the 4hrase went1 In (*)/ he noted in his diary that &0$ $$$ co4ies had been sold1 By the time the war started the sales figure had gone to over a million although letters in the files of the #arty and the testimony of witnesses at Nuremberg often confessed an inability to get through the boo71 Goebbels laughed at itC Goering said he had never read itC the 6uehrer had only loo7ed at it1 -hat made him im4ortant was the image he 4resented of the erudite dedicated inter4reter of the National 8ocialist mysti@ue1 Eis Myth of the T,entieth *entury des4ite many im4ortunities from bewildered readers and shrewd editors he would never allow to be abridged1 :ne of his admirers Alfred Baeumler wrote a boo7 about it+0 in which he told his readers that The Myth was a hard boo7 to read because such monumental ideas could not be easily gras4ed1 Fosenberg?s style lac7ed rhetoric he said but this was a virtue for Fosenberg did not believe in smoothing over differences but

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page_134 #age ()/ believed in fighting them out in 4olitical battle1 ??The MythIthe myth of blood the new secular sacrament of race =Baeumler wrote 4ara4hrasing Fosenberg> cannot be createdC to win it bac7 is not a deed but an e<4erience1L Fosenberg continued to ma7e s4eeches until the very end1 In (*/0 he was still addressing the troo4s on the !astern front1 At one s4eech in Duesseldorf the mayor introduced him with a trace of unconscious irony: IThe name Fosenberg is a 4rogram1I And indeed it was1 Fosenberg too7 his ideas from all the wide stoc7 of boo7s that confirmed his notions1 Ee told his audiences of #arty leaders that what the hour demanded was a dee4ening of their racist and biological thin7ing1 The 4rimary im4ortance of race in the ma7ing of history was the great discovery of the National 8ocialist revolution1 The German mission he said was to defend with its Nordic blood the divine essence of man1 Face was far more im4ortant than the state and its forms and when the racist doctrine was combined with the mystical 4owers of the 6uehrer to e<4ress the German soul it led ine<orably to the need for Eitler?s assuming com4lete authority over the Feich and the Germanic 4eo4les1 +' The 6uehrer 4ossessed the collective will of the 4eo4le within himself1 The true will of the 4eo4le was the 6uehrer1 Fosenberg was sure he had gotten hold of something dee4ly revolutionary for the whole life of man in all its 4hases1 IThe new gras4 of the world I he told an audience Iis not a dogma but an attitude1I Ee also made the following 4ronouncements: I8oul means race seen from the inside1 1 1 1 Face is the outside of the soul1I++ IMan as a 4ersonality is forming will will is racially determined1I+% I!very form is deed every deed is basically discharged will1I+* IThe 8tate is outside our ideal1 The ideal is the inner side of the 8tate1I%$ Fosenberg never changed after (*(%1 In May (*/0 he told his British ca4tors that what went wrong with the NaHi 8tate was due to the machinations of the Eimmlers and BormannsC that he believed the ideas of National 8ocialism to be as sound as everC that the organiHation sim4ly had not been u4 to the ideas1 !ven in defeat he believed that the NaHi #arty had forced the British and Americans at long last to see the necessity for an alliance with Germany1 %( Des4ite his mystical devotion to the 6uehrer Fosenberg had been sorely tried by the 4act with the 8oviet "nion1 To his diary =entry of August && (*)*> he confided that Ithe ,ourney of our Minister to Moscow is a moral loss in the face of our twenty-year battle in the face of our #arty days in the face of 84ain1I The attem4t of the !nglish and 6rench to win L This was a widely @uoted Fosenbergian dogma: IThe myth has to be a 8oviet e<4erienced and not merely understoodI =see Earry Griessdorff &nsere !eltanschauung MBerlin: Nordland Gerlag (*/(N 41 (&1>1 The Mythus was regarded with awe even by su44osedly learned men1 :ne 4rofessor wrote a boo7 that did no more than define %0$ words of the vocabulary =:tto Gros %0$ !orte Mythus )es &$1 %ahrhun)erts MMunich: Eoheneichen Gerlag (*)%N>1

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page_13 #age ()0 alliance was not as bad because they had never identified the 8oviet "nion with the Third International which for twenty years the NaHis had characteriHed as ??Dewish criminality1I The 6uehrer had said only four years earlier in Fosenberg?s 4resence that he could never ma7e common cause with Moscow because it was not 4ossible to forbid the German 4eo4le to steal and at the same time ma7e friends with the thieves1 Fosenberg blamed the whole affair on Fibbentro4 and his hatred of !ngland1 The German-Fussian embrace over which the German 4ress was so enthusiastic wrote Fosenberg sadly Iis more than 4ainful1I Ee had the feeling he confided in his diary =entry of August &0> that one day the Moscow agreement would avenge itself u4on National 8ocialism and he as7ed himself IEow can we still s4ea7 of the rescue and sha4ing of !uro4e when we must as7 the destroyer of !uro4e to come to our aidO 1 1 1 And again the @uestion 4oses itself: 1 1 1 was it necessary to settle the #olish @uestion now and in this formO No one can give the answer today1 I at least hold Fibbentro4 to be the criminal Iswols7y L who out of his sic7 ,ealousy creates the grounds for his 4olitical ideas1I Fosenberg?s bitter cu4 overflowed when he heard that Fibbentro4 had said that he felt himself among #arty comrades when he was with the Fussians in Moscow1 %& But Fosenberg soon made a 4artial recovery from his disa44ointment at the signing of the 4act1 Ee was assuaged when Goering sent him a friendly telegram and when occasionally the 6uehrer as7ed his advice1 And early in (*/& the 6uehrer a44ointed him to the high office of .hief Indoctrinator for the Ideological "nity of #arty and 8tate1 During the 4eriod of Fusso-German friendshi4 #arty agencies continued to collect material from informants in #oland on the inferiority of the Fussians1%) The following re4orts among others came in: A 8oviet soldier in #oland said that Germany would undoubtedly win the war against the -est but would end u4 .ommunist1 The Fussians bought or stole everything they could lay their hands on in #oland1 Money had little im4ortance for them1 8oviet soldiers 4aid the e@uivalent of &0$ FM for a watch worth a fraction of that1 Boots costing &$ FM went for (0$ FM =one Fussian said of his 4urchase INow I have t,o 4airs of bootsI>1 #oles com4lained that the Fussians stri44ed the leather u4holstery from trains1 A woman said that Fussian officers acting under orders were not friendly to the Germans1 They were re4orted as saying to Germans they met I-e?ll see you again I and this the Germans too7 as a dar7 hint of a later military conflict1 Among the re4orts sent to Fosenberg were stories of the Fussian soldiers? ignorance of the ways of other countries1 =8uch stories would be re4eated years later by the Germans under Fussian occu4ation1> :ne soldier was said to have bought a brassiere and was seen to have used it for earmuffsC another bought fly4a4er which he allegedly too7 L Ale<ander #etrovitch Iswols7y Fussian Ambassador to 6rance to be honeyC another from (*($ to (*(+ was widely thought to have been one of those chiefly res4onsible for .Harist Fussia?s antiGerman 4olicy before -orld -ar I1

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page_13! #age ()' brought bac7 a meat grinder com4laining that he had thought it was an organ1 Fussians always the re4orts said declared that what they saw in #oland they had at home too1 :ne "7rainian lady told her Fussian visitor she was sorry she had no lemon for tea and the Fussian said ??That?s all right our factories are wor7ing night and day and you?ll soon be able to get them1I Fosenberg digested such information and on May ) (*/$ wrote that the Fussian @uestion had to be treated circums4ectly and it was not to be neglected even if it remained in the bac7ground for the 4resent1 But when he was told in A4ril (*/( of Eitler?s 4lan to invade Fussia he returned to his 4redominant notion: the overwhelming danger of the Bolshevi7 allied with the Dew and the Moscovite and the need to ma7e them harmless1 -hile race was all-im4ortant a 4ro4er environment was im4ortant too1 9i7e many other NaHis Fosenberg referred to the Ifilthy human massesI in the big cities1 6ew of the #arty great loved the large cities1 Many of them came from the 4rovinces or from small cities1 Many #arty stalwarts with their longing for the Ifol7ishI roots of Germanic culture regarded the metro4olis as inferior unhealthy degenerate1 #revalent as this belief was not all held it1 Foehm for e<am4le writing to a friend in Berlin from 8outh America 4raised Berlines4ecially its Tur7ish baths which seemed to him in his e<ile the best 4lace in the world1 Foehm?s reasons for li7ing Berlin were 4recisely those denounced by his colleagues1 Fosenberg always clung to the belief that the racist conflict alone was decisive with the lower races warring against the s4iritual su4erior ones1 There were other evils too1 Germany had been rescued from the destruction wrought by democrats and Mar<ists and 4lutocratic false gods under the .hristian heresy by the new religion of race and blood1 All 4arliaments Fosenberg thought were de4endent on high finance and were affiliated with the big intercor4orate trusts or cartels which had enslaved the German 4eo4le1 The war he wrote in the +oelkischer Beobachter of March &* (*/( was the last des4erate attem4t to force the white race to march against !uro4e in an internecine conflict for the benefit of Dewish finance1 The war would be also the cleansing biological world revolution1 Ee was sure that in time other nations would recogniHe that the German tas7 in bringing it about was being accom4lished on behalf of the whole !uro4ean continent1 9iberalism he wrote sinned against the law of nature1 The old effeminate liberal world would have to be re4laced by authority and disci4line1 IThe significance of world history was radiated out from the north over the whole world borne by a blue-eyed blond race which in several great waves determined the s4iritual as4ect of the world1I %/ The contem4orary world revolution lay in the awa7ening of the national ty4es1 There would be no 6ranco-Dewish 4an-!uro4e1 Instead a Nordic !uro4e with a German center would arise1 Face determined everything1 The Da4anese the Negro and the Dew could only be what they wereC they could never be !uro4ean and would therefore

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page_13" #age ()+ have to 4ursue entirely different intellectual and 4olitical aims although the Da4anese could be useful as an ally against the 8oviet "nion1 %0 Fosenberg?s assignment of founding the .entral National 8ocialist "niversity was a characteristic distinction1 It was a grandiose dream and a sanction for 4lunder1 The university was to be divided into a number of institutes: one for the study of the Dewish 4roblem one for geo4olitics and one for research into racial matters1 It was for the high school that the great libraries of the Fothschilds and of Baron van Auylen and the Dewish ban7er 6uerstenberg in Berlin were ransac7ed1 Eitler 4lanning for the reenergiHing of !uro4ean thin7ing declared in a letter of Danuary &* (*/$ that the school was to be a center of research and education under Alfred Fosenberg1 Des4ite the 4rodigious efforts demanded on behalf of the war Fosenberg could announce on Danuary + (*/) that institutes had already been organiHed in 6ran7furt am Main for the investigation of the Dewish @uestion in Ealle for religious research in Eamburg for overseas and colonial research in Biel for German living s4ace in Munich for Indo-Germanic cultural history in 8tuttgart for biology and race and in Tannenberg for German studies1 A few months later in A4ril (*/) Fosenberg said matters were so far advanced that one institute would be o4ened in Marburg on May (1%' But the whole 4rogram remained in the blue4rint stage for a 4ostwar !uro4e1 In these educational 4rograms Fosenberg had com4etition1 Eimmler had a macabre research organiHation founded ??to e<4lore the geogra4hical e<tent s4irit achievement and heritage of the Indo-Germans of Northern race1I Eis organiHationthe Ahnenerbe =ancestral heritage>had among other things a notable collection of s7ulls1 Eimmler also 4lanned to found a National 8ocialist Academy of 8ciences with many institutes which would 4arallel the high school1 -ith more than fifty de4artments and a budget of a million mar7s the Ahnenerbe undertoo7 research and teaching in the social and natural sciencesC in history archeology and fol7loreC even in military coloniHation1 It confiscated boo7s and manuscri4ts of Dewish scholars that seemed in any way useful to its vast 4ur4oses1 Eimmler?s organiHation was ne<t to !insatHstab Fosenberg in combing !uro4e for suitable cultural ob,ects1%+ In his interrogation on A4ril (/ (*/' Fosenberg said he had thought of the boo7s and 4aintings and miscellaneous ob,ects of cultural value his !insatHstab collected not as 4rivate 4ro4erty but as something belonging to hostile organiHations fighting against Germany1 Eis ,ob he had written on A4ril + (*/& was to secure all the material that would be useful for National 8ocialist research and to 4revent its becoming useful to Germany?s enemies1%% A 6uehrer decree announced that Fosenberg would accom4lish his tas7 in coo4eration with the chief of the Eigh .ommand of the -ehrmacht1%* The s4ecial units carrying out his orders in the !ast were subordinate to the service branches of the Army to which they were attached1 9i7e the 8D units they had the right to use the communications of the -ehrmacht and

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page_13# #age ()% to be su44orted by the Army under the orders issued by General !duard -agner for the Eigh .ommand but actually Fosenberg?s influence in the !ast was largely limited to his ??collectionsI on behalf of the culture of the Feich1 Along with his a44aratus of 4lunder for the benefit of the high school Fosenberg?s !insatHstab also had the tas7 of confiscating art treasures in 6rance and the other countries of occu4ied !uro4e mainly for Goering?s 4rivate collection1 In addition to Icultural goods I Fosenberg?s men collected furniture wash basins rugs 7itchenware bottles medicines clothesanything that could be carted and carried away1 :n :ctober ) (*/& he was able to re4ort to the 6uehrer that IAction MIthe furniture actiondirected against Dews and 6reemasons in 6rance and the 9ow .ountries had 4laced (* 0$$ tons of furniture at the dis4osal of Germans who had suffered losses from Allied bombs and that /$ $$$ tons had already been loaded on trains bound for Germany1 *$ In August (*// he re4orted that u4 to then '* '(* Dewish a4artments had been ta7en over and that &' *%/ freight cars ='+/ trains> had carried the goods to Germany1 *( All the furniture movers in #aris had been 4ut to wor7: ( &$$ to ( 0$$ men who daily loaded (0$ truc7s1 In #aris alone )% $$$ a4artments had been cleared of their owners? belongings1 The Military Governor of :ccu4ied 6rance General Barl Eeinrich von 8tuel4nagel com4lained that Fosenberg?s staff in 6rance made no 4ayment for the Dewish 4ro4erty ta7en over1*& Fosenberg regarded it as being without an owner and 8tuel4nagel demanded in vain that this be sto44ed1L Fosenberg at Nuremberg =interrogation of August )$ (*/'> called the accom4lishments of his !insatHstab Fosenberg Ithe biggest art o4eration in history1ILL It was aimed he said only against Dewish and Masonic collections and was not intended 4rimarily to add to the 4ictures in Goering?s museum since the Feichsmarschall already had a great collection1 Goering however turned out to be the chief beneficiary1 Fosenberg testified too that neither he nor his organiHation were ever 4aid a cent by Goering for the 4ictures turned over to him1 Fosenberg still thought this correct1 Ee had felt that such matters should be 7e4t for Eitler?s 4osstwar decision and as bargaining counters at an eventual 4eace conference1 Eis vast o4eration he testified began in Duly (*/$ with the ob,ective of bringing together historical wor7s and of 4rotecting them against the vicissitudes of the war1 In this fashion the Germans would be able to get a com4lete inventory of what was available for their research 4ur4oses1 Ee added that the art ob,ects brought to the Feich might otherwise have been destroyed1 L 6or the Army?s resistance to Fosenberg?s o4erations see -ilhelm Treue ICum nationalso0ialistischen (unstraub in "rankreich I in ?+iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TIII No1 ) (*'0 441 &%0))+1 LL It is li7ely that Fosenberg e<aggerated1 Na4oleon?s collections which included 4aintings assembled from all !uro4e as well as the bronHe horses from the facade of 8aint Mar7?s in Genice and the armories from Na4les Munich and Gienna were 4robably made on a still larger scale1

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page_13$ #age ()* A re4ort on the activities of the !insatHstab Fosenberg for the 4eriod between :ctober (*/$ and Duly (*// summed u4 what had been ta7en as ??ownerless Dewish 4ro4ertyI: &( *$) art ob,ects of all 7inds brought to the Feich in &* shi4ments including ()+ freight cars1 Among them were 0 &%( 4aintings including wor7s by Fembrandt Fubens GelQs@ueH Murillo Goya Boucher -atteau .ranach and FeynoldsC '%/ miniaturesC 0%) te<tiles =Gobelins rugs embroideries>C 0 %&0 handmade art ob,ects =4orcelains bronHes faiences coins>C ( &%' !ast Asiatic art wor7sC &0* art wor7s of anti@uity =scul4ture bronHes vases>C also several hundred icons and a collection of degenerate Bolshevi7 art1 Among & /++ articles of furniture was a collection of 6rench furniture of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries which the re4ort said Iis 4erha4s even more highly to be evaluated than some of the 4ictures1I *) At Nuremberg Fosenberg defended his confiscation of Dewish and Masonic 4ro4erty by 4ointing out that German 4ro4erty worth &0 billion mar7s had been ta7en by the Allies after -orld -ar I and that now in August (*/' all German libraries were in the hands of the Allies1 Ee himself he said had never received anything of value from the confiscations1 But the 4rosecution reminded him that three Dutch 4aintings including a 6ranH Eals had been rescued from his house in Berlin when it was bombed1 Fosenberg said these had been 4resents that his second wife loved anti@ues and that they got a great number of gifts1 Ee stressed that during his whole life he had tried to fight for what he called a healthy develo4ment of man7ind and had tried to inculcate this in his children but he admitted that even the great ideas in NaHism had been in some sense 4erverted in their develo4ment1 Ee confessed that he o4erated under different standards in the !ast than in the -estthat he had 7e4t the thought of the #olish 4ersecution of the Germans in mind when he first undertoo7 the collection of art ob,ects in #oland1*/ A re4ort of 8e4tember &* (*/( from one of his subordinates Feichs7ommissar -ilhelm Bube 4rotested to Fosenberg against the looting by the rival s@uads of the 88 in Mins7 and even told of the need to get hold of a NaHi 4ainter who would be able to re4aint the 4ictures that had been Ithoughtlessly damaged with 7nife slashings1I "nfortunately Bube said millions of mar7s worth of art had been destroyed1 Ee as7ed Fosenberg to ta7e u4 the 4roblem of this vandalism with the armed forces to 4revent future re4etitions and to see to it that those res4onsible be severely 4unished1 A museum of 4rehistoric artifacts had been com4letely devastatedC semi4recious ,ewels had been stolenC and in the university instruments worth hundreds of thousands of mar7s had been destroyed or stolen1*0 Fosenberg in his :lym4ian fashion tried to act on such 4leas1 In the first 4lace in matters of L The -ehrmacht li7e the British and art he felt his ,urisdiction was being challenged1L American forces had officers who were art e<4erts assigned to the ,ob of safeguarding monuments and art in occu4ied territory1 Their activities had nothing in common with Fosenberg?s !insatHstab1

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page_140 #age (/$ And in the second 4lace he ob,ected to the treatment of the native 4eo4les by his enemies in the #arty ,ust as he o44osed the creation of a Fussian army of liberation under General Andrei Glasov which would fight on the German side1 Ee wanted the ??4rotectionI and collection of art to be solely under his command1 And he wanted to use the con@uered s4ace to free it from bolshevism and from any future nationalistic threat to the Feich1 But he had no influence on decisions1 Ee saw Eitler only twice after the war with Fussia started1 Eitler had his own 4lans and his own 4roblems1 Fosenberg could go on writing his memoranda and ma7ing his s4eeches and 4rotests1 Addressing a meeting of Feichs7ommissars in August (*/& after a s4eech by Goering Fosenberg tal7ed about his 4hiloso4hy of the relations of Germans to the !astern 4eo4les1 Ee made the following 4oints: The old 8lavic toughness is now combined with a fanatical 4rimitive 4hiloso4hy1 Bolshevism has swe4t aside the elements really ca4able of culture in Fussia1 -hat the Germans are now seeing is a bedraggled 4eo4le1 But the Germans nevertheless have duties toward them1 Then he said: Many a little 4easant has established himself in this area this new ordering of s4ace and he feels himself a little master and a little 7ing1 That is correct1 1 1 1 In this broad area of the !ast 1 1 1 he must be hard and he must be 1 1 1 ,ust1 1 1 1 The 4eo4les of the !ast 1 1 1 have always had an authoritarian government 1 1 1 MbutN they always cried out for ,ustice1 1 1 1 -e have to find the 4sychological 4oints where we can dominate them with less strength and get the same results as though we had a hundred 4olice battalions1 1 1 1 .rime and 4unishment must be brought into a relationshi41 The 4o4ulation must not be driven to the 4artisans1 This does not mean wea7ness as against toughnessC it is a @uestion of sensible 4olitics1 It does no harm if one or another .ommissar acts in a decent fashion once in a while to one or another "7rainian1 Ee should however not be comradely with them1 1 1 1 But he can 1 1 1 cla4 a man on the shoulder and give him good advice 1 1 1 and buy them a bottle of schna4s1 But he must not get drun7 with them and must 7ee4 his distanceC that is essential for a 4ro4er master in the !ast1 1 1 1 A master is one for whom a man 4laced under him allows himself to be beaten to death1 1 1 1 The 4o4ulation must realiHe there is no way out but to acce4t German leadershi41 1 1 1 The @uestion for us is: -hat s4ares us most in German man4ower and what brings us best to 4olitical successO 1 1 1 The blan7et is short and everyone tries to 4ull as much as 4ossible over to his side1 The Army 1 1 1 strives to 7ee4 itself ready for battle 1 1 1 84eer 1 1 1 demands 4roduction1 -e have the ,ob not only of raising 4roduction in the occu4ied !astern territories but of raising it considerably1 Gauleiter 8auc7el on the orders of the 6uehrer calls for wor7ers 1 1 1 The Fussians too7 (/ to (0 year old boys from factories and shot them so they could not be used by the Germans1 1 1 1 8ometimes when

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page_141 #age (/( the M8auc7elN .ommissars were clever 1 1 1 the wor7ers were brought to the railroad station to the accom4animent of music as they de4arted for their assignments in Germany1 But sometimes other harder methods are used too sometimes thought out and correct and sometimes not thought out and un,ust1 1 1 1 In these cases they Mthe nativesN get the im4ression that there is nothing to distinguish the tri4 to Germany from the tri4 to 1 1 1 8iberia1 1 1 1 I 7now of course that if you bring one and a half million 4eo4le to wor7 you cannot ta7e care of them beautifully1 But in order to obtain a good 4erformance don?t bring in three @uarters of them froHen don?t let them ,ust stand waiting for ten hours and give them much more to eat so they have reserves of strength1 1 1 1 All the 4eo4le of !uro4e are wor7ing in Germany 1 1 1 and Mtell themN since the German soldier fights and bleeds for you you have the duty at least to wor7 here1 1 1 1 But there is no harm if they 4lay the accordion at night and sing and 4aste news4a4er and magaHine cli44ings on the walls1 1 1 1 The !ast has already saved Germany1 All the heads of the farm economy the Breisleiter the young #arty leaders the 8A and 88 leaders 1 1 1 have been tireless in this last hard winter1 1 1 1 Eistory will one day disclose that this was a 4rodigious accom4lishment of the National 8ocialist revolution1 1 1 1 The .ommissar who wor7s there doesn?t thin7 of leaving1 Ee says: here is my little 7ingdomC here I want to wor7 for the rest of my life1 The conflict =between Germany and Fussia> has been ( '$$ years abuilding he said1 ??It must never again be ta7en from German hands 1 1 1 on this s4ace a greater German Feich must rise1 1 1 1 Mstormy a44lauseN1I *' 8ince Fosenberg was battling against a host of enemies his co-wor7ers could be critical1 8ome of the re4orts submitted to him by members of his staff were far more 4erce4tive than most German a44reciations of the situation1*+ :ne of his liaison men attached to the head@uarters of Army Grou4 North wrote in December (*/& that Fussian military strength was by no means bro7enC that 8lav fighting 4ower must be used to win the 4rolonged warC that not enough food was given the FussiansC and that the German combat soldier would 4ay in blood for the 4olicies being 4ursued including the recruiting of forced labor1 Ee recommended land reform =which was 4ermitted s4oradically and always welcomed by the 4easants> 4ointing out that the Fussian farmer was land-hungry1 The 7ol7hoHes should be divided and their land given the farmers1 Ee 4rotested against the beatings and mistreatment of the 4o4ulation which made them ta7e to the woods1 Ee said that the bonus system =that is 4aying for wor7 well done or 4erformed in e<tra hours> was useful where it was in force1 Ee thought the Germans were ma7ing the same mista7es Da4an had made in .hina1 Ee ob,ected to the 4rohibition of the native 4o4ulation to use the German language which he thought was a sign of wea7ness not of strength and made the 4o4ulation thin7 the Germans intended to retreat1 The Fussians he wrote

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page_142 #age (/& thought the Germans meant to 4ut them on a level with the Negro and to e<terminate them1 Ee recommended a com4lete change in 4olicy which Fosenberg would certainly have been glad to ado4t had he not always been overruled1 *% !veryone ranged himself against Fosenberg1 8worn enemies made alliances to do him in1 Fibbentro4 and Eimmler in (*// wor7ed out an agreement whereby Eimmler would recruit 88 units from among the 8oviet nationalities and Fibbentro4 would have authority over any foreign 4olicy matters connected with these 88 legions1 Fosenberg was com4letely e<cluded under this 4act and Eitler refused to receive him1 Fosenberg and the 6uehrer met last in November (*/)1 In :ctober (*// Fosenberg ab,ectly as7ed Eitler if he had any more use to ma7e of him1 ??I beg you my 6uehrer I he wrote Ito tell me if you still want my services in this direction1 1 1 1 I must in view of the develo4ments leave o4en the consideration whether you my 6uehrer see my services as no longer necessary1I ** But Fosenberg stayed on in his Ministry =as one man said Iof the no longer occu4ied territoriesI> fighting his battles to the bitter endnot against Bolshevi7s and Dews and Moscovites but against his colleagues1 #assive corroded by ,ealousy living in his world 4atched out of other 4eo4le?s ideas obtained from scra4s of reading Fosenberg was an easy victim of the men of action1 Eis rivals were always closer to the throne than he for he was dull and verbose and constantly forced Eitler to ma7e difficult decisions1 Ee sent the 6uehrer memoranda and re4orts on the misdeeds or ine4titudes of Goebbels and Fibbentro4C he feuded with 9ey and Eimmler and Bormann and Boch and countless othersC he made enemies of everyone he met for they were all com4etitors in one way or another for his territories1 But he often had a good word to say for Eess before his flight to !ngland and for Goering1 Eess could be de4ended on against Bormann and Goering against Fibbentro4 and Goebbels1 !veryone was trying to gain something from his 4reserves: Goebbels invaded culture Bormann anti-.hristianism Eimmler the Hohe Schule1 6ield Marshal Beitel?s orders of August &* (*/& said the Army was to be fed as far as 4ossible from the !astC Goering was 4ressing his staff to send more grain more 4roduce of all 7inds to the FeichC and Eimmler was in charge of the 4unitive and security measures that drove the 4o4ulation to the 4artisans1 !verywhere Fosenberg turned he met men more able and ruthless than he and with the 4ractical means at hand of accom4lishing their missions1 Fosenberg had remarried in (*&01 Eis wife Eedwig and small daughter =another child had died> were not much more in demand than he1 -hen his wife and daughter too7 refuge toward the end of the war in a relatively safe German town 6rau Fosenberg was as7ed to leave because her 4resence it was thought brought on Allied bombing attac7s1 Ee was a good family man1 -hen Fosenberg went off to his ca4tivity his wife told their daughter

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page_143 #age (/) ??-e lose a good comrade in #a4a I ($$ and this was doubtless no e<aggeration1 -hen the war was lost Fosenberg was bewildered but he clung to his National 8ocialism: IThe leadershi4 of Eitler was the necessary result of a great national self-awarenessC the 6uehrer state an organically understandable new conce4t of the Feich1I($( Ee told his ca4tors that he had been right about race and the Dews whom he had only wanted to send to Madagascar not to e<terminate1 This was true1 Ee had o44osed an inde4endent Dewish state as too dangerous a center of subversion but Dews collected on some island under 4olice surveillance seemed to him a 4ro4er solution of the 4roblem1 Ee was certain that Eitler had been right1 6ate had defeated them both6ate Bormann Goebbels Fibbentro4 et al1 Eow to account for himO 6or one thing he had lived and written as a halfeducated theoretician wor7ing out the acute 4roblems of his early years1 Ee had s4ent his childhood and youth as a self-conscious German in a foreign land that had suddenly while he was still a young man ta7en a revolutionary coursea course that too7 no account of Germanic culture or the leading role of the Germans in the Baltic 8tates or any of the other articles of faith he had lived by1 The Baltic 8tates were traditionally as anti8emitic as Germany and #oland and Fussia1 They were always to 4rovide willing hel4ers for the !insatH .ommandos and Fosenberg had no need of German models to develo4 his anti8emitism1 Ee the dis4laced Nordic found himself in a 4ost--orld -ar I fevered unstable societya society in which it was enough to be German in order to feel martyred and su4erior1 Ee was never to regret the role he had 4layed because li7e !ichmann and so many others he had believed in the necessity for fighting on behalf of the highest manifestation of the human racethe mystical Nordic re4resented at his best by the Germans1 Ee had ordered his thin7ing around this racial myth1 9i7e the Bolshevi7s he so detested he could see in .hristianity only the enemy the sorry survival of a 4ast that had 4revented the Germanic race from attaining its true stature1 Fosenberg learned nothing much in the course of the trial1 Ee still thought NaHism was what he called the !uro4ean answer to the 4roblems of the twentieth century Ithe most noble idea for which a German could use his strength1I Ee stated that NaHism had given the German nation its unity and substance1($& II have served it faithfully and des4ite all errors and human inade@uacies1 I shall also remain true to it as long as I live1I($) -hen his British ca4tors as7ed if he still believed in the Mythus he said that although 4arts of it had been overta7en by events it was still true on the whole and if the 6uehrer had chosen him instead of men li7e Goebbels and Bormann the outcome would have been different1 This he thought Adolf Eitler?s ma,or failure1 The court found him guilty on all four counts and sentenced him to hang1

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page_144 #age (// Notes (1 "nited 8tates Document .enter Berlin =hereinafter referred to as BD.> 8A /*)1 &1 -alter 8chellenberg Memoiren =.ologne: Gerlag fuer #oliti7 und -issenschaft (*0'> 41 &%01 )1 N TI )'-F 441 0/&/)1 /1 E1 F1 Trevor-Fo4er ed1 The Bormann Letters =9ondon: -eidenfeld and Nicolson (*0/>1 01 Gerhard Boldt ie let0ten Tage )er /eichskan0lei =Eamburg and 8tuttgart: Fowohlt (*/+>1 '1 N*A GI )+)/-#8 41 0'(1 +1 N T 41 0*+1 %1 Trevor-Fo4er ed1 o2. cit1 41 (&)1 *1 N*A GII 9-&&( 41 ($%'1 ($1 N TTG $0+-#8 441 ((&()1 ((1 Eeinrich Eoffmann Hitler !as My "rien) =9ondon: Bur7e (*00> 441 (*)*/1 (&1 9Jon #olia7ov and Dosef -ulf as ritte /eich un) seine enker =BerlinGrunewald: Arani (*0*> 441 (/%/*1 ()1 BD. Gol7sgericht1 (/1 N*A GII D+0)-A 441 &(/(* and D-+0)-B 441 &(*&(1 Also 8chellenberg o2. cit1 41 &0+1 (01 Dosef -ulf Martin BormannHitlers Schatten =Guetersloh: 8igbert Mohn (*'&>1 ('1 .bi)1 (+1 D1 F1 Fees ed1 The *ase of /u)olf Hess =9ondon and Toronto: Eeinemann (*/+>1 (%1 -alter 8tubbe ??.n Memoriam: Albrecht Eaushofer I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 ) (*'$ 41 &)%1 (*1 Albert Brebs Ten)en0en un) 6est)lten )er NS A- =8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*0*> 41 &'1 &$1 .bi)1 41 (/*1 &(1 .bi)1 41 (+$1 &&1 :tto Dietrich 7# %ahre mit Hitler =Munich: Isar Gerlag (*00> 41 &$/1 &)1 N TTT &/&'-#8 41 )/01 &/1 Dames 9easor The &ninvite) Envoy =New ;or7: McGraw-Eill Boo7 .om4any (*'&> 41 %/1 &01 Brebs o2. cit1 41 (0(1 &'1 Institut fuer Aeitgeschichte Munich =hereinafter referred to as IAG> MA ))$1 &+1 8chwerin von Brosig7 o2. cit1 41 &/(1 &%1 ocuments on 6erman "oreign -olicy= 787H9? 8eries D Gol1 TI =-ashington: De4artment of 8tate> 441 +%%(1 &*1 Eassell o2. cit1

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page_14 #age (/0 )$1 N TTTGIII (('-M 441 (+/+'1 )(1 Fees ed1 o2. cit1 )&1 Douglas M1 Belley ## *ells in Nuremberg =New ;or7: Greenberg #ublisher Inc1 (*/+>1 ))1 8tubbe o2. cit1 441 &)'0'1 )/1 N T9 Eess-() 441 &+%+*1 Also Dietrich o2. cit1 441 +'++1 )01 9easor o2. cit1 41 +&1 )'1 N*A GIII M-((+ 41 /)1 )+1 N T9 Eess-(0 441 &+**&1 )%1 -inston 81 .hurchill The Secon) !orl) !ar Gol1 III =Boston: Eoughton Mifflin .om4any (*0(>1 )*1 #aul 8chmidt Statist auf )i2lomatischer Buehne 78#F789? =Bonn: Athenaeum (*/*> 41 0)%1 /$1 Dietrich o2. cit1 41 +%1 /(1 Eassell o2. cit1 41('*1 /&1 Dietrich o2. cit1 41 ++1 /)1 Fees ed1 o2. cit1 //1 .bi)1 /01 Ilse Eess Englan);Nuernberg;S2an)auB Ein Schicksal in Briefen =9eoni am 8tarnberger 8ee: Druffel-Gerlag (*0&>1 /'1 N II 441 /%+%%1 /+1 .bi)1 41 /*(1 /%1 .bi)1 41 /*'1 /*1 Nuremberg 8taatsarchiv: *2(&2/' Dose4h BoretHC ((2&02/' 9udwig 8chmittC 6raeulein Eildegard 6ath 6raeulein 84errs n1d1 0$1 N*A 8u441 B 41 ((0%1 0(1 .bi)1 441 (('$')1 0&1 G1 M1 Gilbert Nuremberg iary =New ;or7: 6arrar 8traus R ;oung Inc1 (*/+> 41 0)1 0)1 N T9 Eess-(' 441 &*)*%1 0/1 N TTII 441 )'%+$ )+&1 001 N I 441 &%)%/ )'01 0'1 N*A II 41 '$*1 0+1 Ale<ander Dallin eutsche Herrschaft in /usslan) 7897789? =Duesseldorf: Droste-Gerlag (*0%> 41 *'1 0%1 Eans Buchheim Martin BrosHat Eans-Adolf Dacobsen and Eelmut Brausnic7 Anatomie )es SS;Staates Gol1 II =:lten and 6reiburg i1 Br1: -alter-Gerlag (*'0>1 0*1 N*A I &%%'-#8 41 (+'1 '$1 N TTG ()'-#8 441 &&*)$ '(1 Brebs o2. cit1 41 (%$1 Also 8chwerin von Brosig7 o2. cit1 41 &'&1 '&1 8erge 9ang and !rnst von 8chenc7 eds1 -ortraet eines Menschheitsverhrechers =8t1 Gallen: Aolli7ofer (*/+>1 ')1 Brebs o2. cit1 Also Alfred Fosenberg Let0te Auf0eichnungen =Goettingen: #lesse Gerlag (*00>1 '/1 N TGI ($0%-#8 41 '&&1 '01 N TTTIT "88F(+$ 41 /&(1

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page_14! #age (/' ''1 Eenry #ic7er HitlerAs Table Talk Norman .ameron and F1 E1 8tevens trans1 =9ondon: -eidenfeld and Nicolson (*0)>1 '+1 N TI $/0-#8 41 0/$1 '%1 .bi)1 441 0/&//1 '*1 N*A I &/&'-#8 41 (%+1 +$1 $/*-#8 =IAG>1 +(1 Eans-Guenther 8era4him as 2olitische Tagebuch Alfre) /osenbergs 78F9F? un) 78F89$ =Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*0'>1 +&1 N TI 41 /001 +)1 !1 91 -oodward and Fohan Butler eds1 ocuments on British "oreign -olicy 787878F8 &nd 8eries Gol1 G (*)) Nos1 ((% and )%$ =9ondon: Eer Ma,esty?s 8tationery :ffice (*0'>1 +/1 8era4him o2. cit1 diary entries of A4ril () &+ and )$ (*/$1 +01 Alfred Baeumler Alfre) /osenberg un) )er Mythus )es #$. %ahrhun)erts =Munich: EoheneichenGerlag (*/)>1 +'1 N TTGIII (%(/-#8 441 /)0)*1 ++1 81 Th1 Eart Alfre) /osenberg =Munich: D1 81 9ehmanns Gerlag (*))> 41 (+1 +%1 Baeumler o2. cit1 41 0&1 +*1 Alfred Fosenberg er Mythus )es #$. %ahrhun)erts =Munich: Eoheneichen-Gerlag (*)$> 441 )('(+1 %$1 8era4him o2. cit1 41 &0)1 %(1 9ang and 8chenc7 eds1 o2. cit1 %&1 8era4him o2. cit1 diary entry of :ctober 0 (*)*1 %)1 MA /% =IAG>1 %/1 Fosenberg Mythus= o2. cit1 41 &%1 %01 N*A G &/))-#8 41 **1 %'1 BD. Fosenberg material1 %+1 6ritH T1 !4stein ??-ar-Time Activities of the 88-Ahnenerbe I in Ma< Beloff ed1 On the Track of Tyranny =9ondon: -iener 9ibrary (*'$> 441 +*%(1 %%1 (/0-#8 =IAG>1 %*1 N TTG (/*-#8 41 &)0 and N*A III (0(-#8 441 (*(*&1 *$1 N*A III $/(-#8 441 %$%&1 *(1 N*A GII 9-(%% 441 ($&0&'1 *&1 N*A GI )+''-#8 441 '/'0&1 *)1 N TTGI ($(0=b>-#8 441 0&/)$1 */1 Amen interrogation of 8e4tember &* (*/0 =IAG>1 *01 N*A III ($**-#8 441 +%(%&1 *'1 N TTTIT "88F-(+$ 441 /(&&01 *+1 N*A III ()%(-#8 441 *)&0%1 *%1 .bi)1 **1 Dallin o2. cit1 41 '/'1 Also N T9I 441 (%0*/1 ($$1 9ang and 8chenc7 eds1 o2. cit1 41 )/01 ($(1 .bi)1 41 )&&1 ($&1 Fosenberg Let0te Auf0eichnungen= o2. cit1 ($)1 9ang and 8chenc7 eds1 o2. cit1 441 ))%)*1

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page_14" #age (/+ 0 The Di4lomats Doachim Gon Fibbentro4 NaHi di4lomacy as such scarcely e<isted1 In the first years of his 4ower Eitler concentrated on domestic tas7s: the relief of unem4loyment reorganiHing the state a44aratus getting rid of the 7nown o44onents first in the non-NaHi 4arties and then in (*)/ among the National 8ocialists themselves 4riming the 4um4s of the economy and starting rearmament1L :nly with military strength behind him could he begin his systematic destruction of the Gersailles system and then would follow the ma,or e<4ansion1 Eow far it would go would de4end on eventual 4ower relations and what use could be made of them1 Eitler was to win bloodless di4lomatic victories on an un4recedented scaleeven with a 4articularly ungifted amateur at the head of his 6oreign :fficemainly because the seemingly overwhelming su4eriority of the system of security that 6rance had built u4 on the .ontinent was a ro4e of sand and because Eitler was ready to ta7e ris7s and his o44onents in !ngland and 6rance were not1 "4 to a 4oint he o4erated with great brilliance1 Ee also o4erated with great brutality and had no need of a 6oreign Minister in the traditional sense1 Ee merely needed a man who would run his errands and confirm his ,udgments1 6or this Fibbentro4 was 4erfectly ada4ted1 Almost no one had a good word to say for Fibbentro41 Neither the re4resentatives of the -estern Allies nor the re4resentatives of the neutrals or of Germany?s alliesor even his fellow defendants at the L In Austria alone Eitler ma7ing use of the Austrian National 8ocialists trialthought 4ursued a vigorous 4olicy designed to bring that country immediately into the German orbit1

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page_14# #age (/% anything of his abilities1 Goering 8chacht Neurath #a4en all of whom had had to deal with him thought him incom4etent boastful and vainglorious1 All those who described himwhether it was Goering who had com4eted with him for the ear of the 6uehrer when war threatened or Neurath who had been undermined and succeeded by him or the Allied and neutral di4lomats who had listened to his tiradesused the same e4ithets: arrogant tactless humorless and above all incom4etent1 But because Fibbentro4 had only one desireto say what his 6uehrer wanted to hearhe was 4recisely the man for Eitler1 Doachim Fibbentro4 was born A4ril ) (%*) in -esel a small garrison town on the Fhine in -est4halia near the Dutch border1 Ee came from a res4ectable middleclass family1 Eis father Fichard Fibbentro4 was an Army officer who retired with the ran7 of lieutenant colonelC his mother came from a 8a<on family of landowners1 Fibbentro4 told the court at Nuremberg that his father had resigned because of ??differences connected with the 4erson of the Baiser1I Eis listeners must have found it difficult to understand how such serious differences could have develo4ed given the dis4arity of ran7 between the 8u4reme .ommander of the #russian Army and a lieutenant colonel of artillery1 In his autobiogra4hy written in his cell in Nuremberg Fibbentro4 clarifies the matter somewhat: he says his father resigned because he disa44roved of the Baiser?s dismissal of Bismarc71 Fibbentro4 always inflated circumstances that had to do with himself or his family1 It may be that his father?s retirement had to do with resentment of the Baiser?s action for Fichard Fibbentro4 did not as7 as was usual for 4ermission to wear his uniform on suitable occasions after he resigned1 In any event the father too7 a ,ob with a ban7 and the family moved to 8witHerland where they lived for a year and a half in Arosa before returning to Germany1 Doachim with no ambitions of a scholastic nature @uit the Gymnasium at the age of si<teen1 Ee li7ed travel and s4orts1 8ince the family was not very well off and since he had no serious intellectual interests he concentrated on ma7ing a career for himself with whatever came to hand1 Ee did well1 Ee was to marry Annelies Een7ell the rich daughter of the owner of the cham4agne firm whose wares he re4resented1 Ee added the IvonI to his name by getting himself ado4ted at the age of thirty-two by an aunt whose husband =a lieutenant general> had been 7nighted in (%%/1 By his own standards he was a considerable success long before he met the 6uehrer at Berchtesgaden in (*)& and began his ra4id rise to ta7e his 4lace among the statesmen of the world1 Although of modest formal education Fibbentro4 had an a4titude for languages1 Ee 4ic7ed u4 6rench fluentlyfirst in MetH to which his father had been assigned and then during the family?s stay in 8witHerland1 At the age of si<teen to seventeen he s4ent a year in 9ondon where he lived with an !nglish family and the following year he went to .anada1 Ee became rea-

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page_14$ #age (/* sonably fluent in !nglish although his facility was often overrated by Germans who s4o7e of his 4erfect !nglish1 Actually it was full of Germanisms and 4hrases he obviously thought sounded li7e those of the u44er class he so admired in every country1 At the end of -orld -ar II he addressed a letter to -inston .hurchill =des4ite his years in !ngland he wrote Gincent for the first name> and Anthony !den sent by way of 6ield Marshal Montgomery which was remar7able not only for its unusual synta< but for its total incom4rehension of the sentiments of the non-NaHi world and of the Anglo-8a<on character in 4articular1 The letter mar7ed ??#ersonal and .onfidential I read as follows: Fadio re4orts etc1 which I do not @uite understand but which if they were true would come to it that former collaborators of the 6uehrer are at 4resent soiling their own house are trying to de4reciate the 6uehrer falsify his ideas about !ngland 1 1 1 com4el me to do what I really only wanted to do later on: to 4lace myself at the dis4osal of the British .ommander in .hief1 I shall do it now1 If I did not do so false im4ressions owing to unclear or biassed statements or misunderstandings might arise1 If I went during the advance of the British troo4s in the British occu4ation Hone and not to some other 4lace I did this in the ho4e of being able to reach you easierbut only at a time when the wars of hatred between victors and van@uished would have calmed down 1 1 1to inform you about my last 4olitical conversation with Adolf Eitler1 This conversationduring whichas so often latelythe 6uehrer?s dee4 disa44ointment and embitterment about the failure of a 4olitical conce4tion was evident culminated in a 7ind of last a44eal and a message to the leaders of the British !m4ire1 This a44eal re4resents at the same timeone may well saythe last 4olitical will of a man who as a great idealist has loved his 4eo4le above all 1 1 1 and in whose conce4tion of the world the !nglish-German @uestion has always been the central 4oint of his 4olitical meditations1 I do not 7now if the old and noble !nglish custom of fair 4lay is also a44licable for a defeated foe1 I also do not 7now if you wish to hear the 4olitical testament of a deceased man1 But I could imagine that its contents might be ada4ted to heal wounds 1 1 1 MandN in this 4erilous e4och of our world be able to hel4 bring about a better future for all 4eo4le1 Fibbentro4 went to to say that he would be grateful for the o44ortunity to bring .hurchill and !den the message that had been entrusted to him I4ersonally and verbally1I Ee said he had been a close collaborator of the 6uehrer and had sworn loyalty to him but he 4rudently added Ialthough I have for a long time already not been able to carry my 4oints and views through with him 1 1 1 1I Ee also said that he had wanted to ,oin the fighting in Berlin he had been ready to fly there by a I8torch Airo4lane I but the 6uehrer had sent him a message saying that he a44reciated my intention but as he had already e<4ressed his o4inion on former occasionshe did not want me to ta7e 4art

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page_1 0 #age (0$ in the fights even now1 :ne needed me later and I should therefore go outside the fighting Hone and 7ee4 myself ready for further instructions1 8uch instructions did not come any more as events began to 4reci4itate1 But I 7now that the 6uehrer in giving that order has meant our last conversation for the 4assing on of which I should 7ee4 myself 4re4ared1 ??In s4ite of the diversity of o4inion which e<isted between the 6uehrer and me on foreign 4olitics as well as on @uestions of world 4erce4tion I Fibbentro4 continued he had had the 4ersonal confidence of the 6uehrer u4 to the last1 They had both striven to attain German claims by di4lomatic means and his own wor7 had been devoted to Iconcentration of the greater 4art of the Germans in !uro4e within the Feich 1 1 1 and evolution of the 4rinci4les of world 4erce4tion of the 4arty in such a way that the e<istence or carrying through of such 4rinci4les would not endanger or even ma7e im4ossible the 4eaceful living together and collaboration of Germany with the other nations1I 8o Fibbentro4 had favored toleration in dealing with the churches and Dews and had also tried to build a bridge between National 8ocialism and communism but unfortunately the Iworld 4erce4tionI of the #arty had been too much for him1 :ne thing however on which the 6uehrer and he had always been agreed was that a strong and united Germany as a 4reliminary condition for a stable and flourishing !uro4e could only e<ist in the long run by a close collaboration with Great Britain1 1 1 1 In s4ite of all disa44ointment and embitterment about the re4eated !nglish re,ection of the German offers the !nglish-German collaboration has to this last hour always been the 4olitical creed of the 6uehrer1 Fibbentro4 asserted further that although the 6uehrer obviously did not understand British 4olitics =that being where he himself came in> still Iin an almost 4ro4hetic wayI he had seen the need for Germany?s establishing a stable balance of 4ower in the new !uro4e1 Fibbentro4 s4o7e highly of everyoneof the !nglish and the Fussians and of the "nited 8tatesbut always came bac7 to the need for good !nglishGerman relations1 :n this 4oint =so dear to the heart of Fibbentro4> he and Eitler he wrote had had one of their most harmonious conversations1 Ee himself he added had always considered !ngland his second home and the hatred now felt against Germany by the outside world was incom4rehensible to him1 -hen Germany had been victorious on the .ontinent neither he nor the 6uehrer had wanted to violate !nglish 4restige and esteem in the world1 And as for the concentration cam4s he had had no idea of what was going on in them and had always wanted 4risoners of war treated well1 I-hen once I heard from a di4lomatic re4ort that ill-treatment of Dews in a concentration cam4 in #oland was discussed vehemently in di4lomatic circles abroad I too7 the re4ort at once to the 6uehrer urging immediate change if it were true1 The 6uehrer 7e4t the re4ort to loo7 into the matter but gave me clearly to understand that this was a @uestion of the interior authorities1I

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page_1 1 #age (0( In closing his letter Fibbentro4 re4eated that he had always wanted an !nglishGerman alliance without war but that the 6uehrer had been s7e4tical about such 4lans after the fruitless attem4t in (*/$ to ma7e 4eace with !ngland1 Fibbentro4 was still stout-hearted thoughC he told .hurchill that des4ite the lost war ??I am of the holy conviction that the bringing about of a real friendshi4 between the !nglish and the German 4eo4le is a fundamental necessity1 1 1 1 In order to fulfill this last mission I lay my fate into your hands1I Ee ended with an a44eal: II would be grateful if this letter could not be 4ublished1I ( This was the man whom Eitler had often com4ared to Bismarc71 The letter was long1 Fibbentro4 when aroused or when he was on safe ground was very lo@uacious1 .ount Bernadotte once surre4titiously timed him with a sto4watch and re4orted that he tal7ed for over an hour without letting his guest get a word in1& -henever he recited Eitler?s o4inions he tal7ed at great length but when he was on his own =before he became 6oreign Minister> he often hid behind a mas7 of silence that 4ortentously concealed the fact that he had nothing to say1 ) Fibbentro4 was industrious and had a sense of order1 Ee wor7ed hard fourteen and more hours a day1 Ee wore out his secretaries with the avalanche of wor7 he gave them1 8ince he had so little gift or training for his ,ob he could only master it by overwor7 and multi4lying his 4ersonnel1 -hen he became 6oreign Minister there were & )$$ officials in the 6oreign :ffice and this number he raised to ($ $$$1 Ee created new de4artments with hundreds of em4loyees1 The former three officers of the De4artment of #rotocol he increased to fifty the #ress Division from seven to two hundred1 Both these de4artments re4resented two of his chief interestswho sits ne<t to whom and 4ublicity1 / -ith Heal and devotion Fibbentro4 tried to cover u4 his com4lete lac7 of @ualifications for the ,ob he held1 It was a ,ob for which he had not the slightest training or ca4acity1 -hen he got the a44ointment it sur4rised even his wife who had devoted herself to advancing his fortunes1 In fact Fibbentro4 said it sur4rised him and this is 4robably true too1 .uriously enough he too7 the side of the old-line di4lomats against the #arty1 "nder the Feich .ivil 8ervice 9aw the de4uty to the 6uehrer Fudolf Eess had the right to veto a44ointments to the 6oreign :ffice1 Eis re4resentative !1 -1 Bohle was assigned to the Auswaertiges Amt as 8taatsse7retaer1 Bohle was chief of the #arty?s Auslandsorganisation which Fibbentro4 saw and rightly so as a rival to the 6oreign :ffice for it dealt directly with #arty organiHations and German citiHens in foreign countries1 Fibbentro4 fought against Bohle?s influence and in (*/( after Eess? flight to 8cotland succeeded in getting rid of him1 Fibbentro4 who feared more than anything else the invasion of his ,ealously held domain had one main re@uirement for his underlings: un@uestioning obedience1 -hen he was considering a44ointing -eiHsaec7er as 8taatsse7retaer he as7ed if he could ta7e orders1 Ee informed another of his subordinates Adolf von 8teengracht that foreign

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page_1 2 #age (0& 4olicy was made not by the 6oreign :ffice but by the 6uehrer and himself1 The subordinates he said had no voiceC they were there to carry out orders1 0 -hile he retained the old career officers of his Ministry in their 4osts he insisted that they ,oin the #arty and give evidence of their enthusiasm for it1 Ee arranged for -eiHsaec7er and !rnst -oermann to ,oin the 88 and the entire cor4s of Beamte had to march 4ast him at Tem4elhof field while he gave the NaHi salute1 By (*/$ +( of (&$ higher officials of the 6oreign :ffice had ,oined the #arty1 A good 4ortion of the rest had a44lied but for one reason or another had been re,ected1' L In adding new officials to the mushrooming de4artments Fibbentro4 a44ointed activistsold fighters li7e 6reiherr von Billinger who had been Minister #resident of 8a<ony1 And he a44ointed 88 8tandartenfuehrer Bertling as head of the 88 Dun7erschule in Brunswic7 to school and disci4line the younger men from the Eitler,ugend the 8A and the 88 who were being trained as attachJs1 As a young man Fibbentro4 had chosen to ma7e a career of business + but what he actually did was to try his hand at anything that turned u41 -hen at the age of eighteen he went to .anada where he s4ent two years he wor7ed as a time7ee4er on road gangs and bridge construction in a ban7 and at all sorts of odd ,obs1 Ee was a 4leasant-loo7ing friendly young man who li7ed amateur theatricals and music and 4eo4le too7 to him1 9ater when he felt the need of asserting his authority he assumed theatrical 4oses: he received foreign notables with folded arms and the di4lomatic flun7y?s mas7 of im4assivity1 Eis face twitched on one side and he often closed 4ale watery blue eyes as he harangued his visitors1 As a young man he was merely socially ambitious and with his :ld -orld accent he succeeded in winning the friendly acce4tance of 4rominent .anadians in the cities of their young and booming country1 Ee a44eared at rece4tions of the Governor General in :ttawa and on the tennis courts and dance floors and might have remained in .anada to the end of his days had not war come in (*(/1 6eeling as he said his 4atriotic duty as a German to return to his fatherland he made his way through the then neutral "nited 8tates and 4ast the British bloc7ade to Eolland and to Germany1 Ee fought the war as a lieutenant was wounded got the Iron .ross 6irst .lass and as an officer serving under one of General Eans von 8eec7t?s ad,utants was 4resent during the negotiations leading to the armistice of November (( (*(%1 After being mustered out he became one of the thousands of e<-soldiers milling around in the chaos of 4ostwar Germany with no 4lans for the future nor any clear idea of how the catastro4he had occurred1 -ith his 7nowledge of 6rench and !nglish he got a ,ob in the summer of (*(* with a cotton-im4ort firm in Berlin and soon afterward met Annelies L Dr1 EeinH Guenther 8asse in ?? as -roblem )es )i2lomatischen Nach,uchses im ritten /eich I in "orschungen 0u Staat un) +erfassung =Berlin: Dunc7er und Eumblot n1d1> 4ointed out that such figures can be misleading1 Many of the #arty members were considered dubious and unenthusiastic National 8ocialists1 They ,oined in order to 7ee4 their ,obs or to get 4romoted and the #arty 7new it1

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page_1 3 #age (0) Een7ell whom he married the following year1 The marriage was a ha44y one1 Fibbentro4 gave u4 his ,ob with the cotton im4orters and ,oined the agency 8choeneberg and .om4any re4resenting Een7ell in Berlin1 8oon 8choeneberg became 8choeneberg and Fibbentro41 Along with Een7ell 8e7t they sold large @uantities of Dohnny -al7er and .hartreuse and good brandies for in the hectic 4ostwar years the thirst of the Germans increased with the 4olitical and economic uncertainties1 Fibbentro4 again set out on his travels selling the 4roducts of his com4any in !ngland and 6rance and tal7ing about the muddled 4roblems of the 4ostwar 4eriod with others no better and no worse informed than he1 -ith more money at hand and with the ??vonI that he had attached to his name in (*&0 Fibbentro4 ste44ed into the fashionable world that delighted his soul1 ;ears later in a form he had to fill out for the 88 who insisted on details Fibbentro4 wrote that he had got himself ado4ted and added the IvonI to his name because he did not want the old noble line of the Fibbentro4s to die out %the old noble line that had been established forty years earlier1 Ee 4layed with the idea of running for the Feichstag as a candidate for the Democratic #arty or for the nationalistic Deutsche Gol7s4artei but then sensed that the NaHis were the coming 4arty and too7 ste4s to ,oin them in (*)& ,ust before they too7 4ower and after he succeeded in getting himself introduced to Eitler1 Eis elaborate house his connections through his marriage and his 4resumed 7nowledge of foreign countries and languages im4ressed the 6uehrer who 7new nothing first hand of the world outside Germany and had no desire to learn e<ce4t through a man li7e Fibbentro4 who adroitly confirmed the 6uehrer?s notions1 Thus the !nglish could be anything Eitler wanted them to be: a 4eo4le who had brought civiliHation to many countriesC a 4eo4le who had borne the white man?s burdenC the degenerate descendants of the Germanic race who would no longer fight for their heritageC a Dew-ridden 4eo4leC or a 4eo4le run by the 4lutocracy1 Fibbentro4 had been in !ngland at the time :<ford students had 4ublicly declared they would not fight for their 7ing and country1 This was enough to convince him that !ngland would avoid war at any cost1 In his trial testimony in the interrogations and in the 4osthumous boo7 edited by his widow Fibbentro4 declared that he had always wor7ed for 4eace with !ngland and that he had always admired and sym4athiHed with the British and 6rench and had never underestimated them1 But the testimony against him was overwhelmingly to the contrary1 Goering said that at the time of Munich Fibbentro4 had wanted war and was disa44ointed by the treaty that divided .Hechoslova7ia without war1 .iano maintained that the German 6oreign Minister echoed the war 4lans of his 6uehrer1 :n August (( (*)* .iano?s diary entry read: IThe decision to fight is im4lacable1 Ee MFibbentro4N re,ects any solution which might give satisfaction to Germany and avoid the struggle1I* .iano as7ed him whether Germany wanted the

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page_1 4 #age (0/ .orridor or DanHig and Fibbentro4 re4lied ??Not that any more1 -e want war1I ($ 8ir Nevile Eenderson made similar accusations as did men who wor7ed under Fibbentro4 li7e -eiHsaec7er and !rich Bordt1 The latter told of Fibbentro4?s trying at the last in Munich to get Eitler to ste4 u4 his demands and so Ito rescue his war1I The foreign observersFobert .oulondre AndrJ 6ranUois-#oncet Dac@ues Davignon Birger Dahlerus =he had to deal with Goering in his wellintentioned if amateurish attem4t to act as an intermediary between 9ondon and Berlin>all s4o7e of Fibbentro4?s belligerence1 Fibbentro4 had convinced himself that the 4act with Fussia in August (*)* made !nglish and 6rench intervention im4ossible1 Ee believed that the 4acifism and wea7ness of both !ngland and 6rance would force them to acce4t the German con@uest of #oland without regard to any guarantees they had given1 Britain would never dare o44ose Eitler he told Bordt and if she did she would lose her em4ire and 6rance would bleed to death on the 8iegfried 9ine1 IIf I hear any official e<4ress a different view I will shoot him myself in his office and will be res4onsible for my action1I(( Ee li7ed to demonstrate his National 8ocialist ardor1 Ee told -eiHsaec7er that he would shoot any subordinates who too7 a dim view of the foreign situation1(& Ee was always able to believe what he wanted to or better still what the 6uehrer wanted him to1 :n 6ebruary (' (*/& discussing the American contribution to the cause of the Allies with two members of the Italian Grand .ouncilGiuse44i Bottai and Dino Alfieri =the Italian Ambassador to Germany>he 4ointed out that the "nited 8tates had no military tradition no officers or noncommissioned officers no armaments industry and no wor7ers who li7e those in !uro4e had been trained artisans for generations1 6urthermore he said the "nited 8tates had a 4o4ulation of (&0 million while the A<is and the occu4ied countries could draw on a 4o4ulation of between 0$$ and '$$ million 4eo4le who could 4roduce four times as much as the Americans1 Thus by reducing the 4o4ulation of the "nited 8tates by &0 million leaving out the 4roduction and 4o4ulations of its Allies and adding to the A<is war 4otential the unwilling slave laborers who were wor7ing at gun4oint and within bombing range of the Allies Fibbentro4 managed to wor7 out a wholly s4urious A<is su4eriority of four to one1() Before the "nited 8tates came into the war he said that its intense isolationism would be strengthened by Da4an?s becoming a belligerent1(/ Fibbentro4 had one moment of truth on A4ril &% (*/(1 Ee had 8taatsse7retaer -eiHsaec7er write a memorandum =the sentiments were Fibbentro4?s own> o44osing the Fussian cam4aign1 It read: I can summariHe my o4inion on a German-Fussian conflict in one sentence: if every burned out Fussian city was worth as much to us as a sun7 !nglish battleshi4 then I should be in favor of a German-Fussian war in this summerC I thin7 though that we can win over Fussia only militarily but that we should lose economically1 :ne can 4erha4s find it enticing to give the

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page_1 #age (00 .ommunist system its death blow and 4erha4s say too that it lies in the logic of things to let the !uro4ean-Asiatic continent now march forth against Anglo-8a<ondom and its allies1 But only one thing is decisive: whether this underta7ing would hasten the fall of !ngland1 The memo said further that either !ngland was close to colla4se in which case she would only be encouraged by the Feich?s ta7ing on a new o44onent or if !ngland was not close to a colla4se one could get the idea that Germany had to obtain its food su44ly from the 8oviet land mass by force1 That we will advance militarily u4 to Moscow and beyond victoriously I believe is un@uestionable1 But I thoroughly doubt that we could ma7e use of what was won against the well 7nown 4assive resistance of the 8lavs1 1 1 1 A German attac7 on Fussia would only give a lift to !nglish morale1 It would be evaluated there as German doubt of the success of our war against !ngland1 -e would in this fashion not only admit that the war would still last a long time but we could in this way actually lengthen instead of shorten it1 The memorandum showed insight and 4rescience of a 7ind that Fibbentro4 was not to re4eat during his years in office1 #erha4s it was as much a 4roduct of his disli7e for !ngland as of his 4olitical forebodings1 :therwise Fibbentro4 lived in a dream world where anything that com4orted with his wishes could ha44en1 !arly in (*/0 he sent -erner von 8chmieden to 8witHerland to establish contact with the British and Americans and to warn the Allies against an alliance between ??radical NaHis and .ommunists1I Ee instructed 8chmieden to say that Germany would be satisfied with a 4eace settlement that would bring all Germans within one border and would be ready to coo4erate toward a solution of the Dewish 4roblem1 Its economy would be redesigned to conform with the 4rinci4les of free world trade and religious freedom would be guaranteed1 (' Fibbentro4 got and held the Ministry ,ob only because Eitler wanted to be his own foreign minister and to feel that he was being su44orted in his decisions by a man who 7new the world better than the 4rofessional di4lomats the 6uehrer trusted no more than he did his generals1 In Fibbentro4 he found the man he needed1 The two met first in August (*)& when Fibbentro4 as7ed future #olice #resident of Berlin .ount von Eelldorf whom he had 7nown in -orld -ar I to introduce him to Eitler1L Fibbentro4 thus came late to the NaHis1 -hen he had wanted to run for the Feichstag in the days before the NaHis were 4iling u4 the large votes of (*)( and (*)& he had not considered running as a candidate of the National 8ocialists1 Eelldorf arranged the meeting with Eitler through the then 4owerful Foehm and Fibbentro4 met the 6uehrer at the Berghof1 A few months later early in (*)) a meeting of crucial im4ortance too7 L Eelldorf at this 4eriod a convinced NaHi was a44ointed #olice #resident by Eitler but @uic7ly became disillusioned1 Ee ,oined the Fesistance and was e<ecuted after the attem4t on Eitler?s life in Duly (*//1

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page_1 ! #age (0' 4lace at the manorial house the Fibbentro4s had bought in Berlin-Dahlem1 It was there that #a4en Goering 8taatsse7retaer :tto Meissner and :s7ar von Eindenburg met with the 6uehrer for the final negotiations that led to Eitler?s becoming .hancellor1 It was a historic moment for Eitler and for the others 4resent too as Eitler gave his terms for succeeding 8chleicher1 =#a4en thought that with a conservative nationalist ma,ority in the .abinet he not EitlerC had won1> The meeting too7 4lace at a time when the #arty was woefully short of funds1 8alaries could not be 4aid nor could the 4rinting costs of the +oelkischer Beobachter be met1 In the rich bourgeois atmos4here created by the Een7ell money Fibbentro4 was the self-effacing host and man of the worlda man with 4recisely the same ideas as the 6uehrer1 As soon as Eitler became .hancellor he turned to Fibbentro4 for counsel on foreign affairs1 In (*)) he made him adviser on such matters to himself and to the #arty1 Fibbentro4 was at home in the languages and 4olitics of two of Germany?s chief adversaries and ,udged them in the same light as the 6uehrer did1 Ee read the #aris news4a4er Le Tem2s and The Lon)on Times and translated relevant items for Eitlersomething that Fudolf Eess the 6uehrer?s de4uty and head of the 6oreign De4artment of the #arty was unable to do1 Eitler using one of his favorite devices for undercutting the established Ministry 4ermitted Fibbentro4 to set u4 a bureau to advise him on foreign 4olicy1 It had small beginnings using three or four rooms near Eess? offices and was 4aid for by Fibbentro41 Eitler was 4leased with the results and soon su44lied the bureau with funds of &$ million FM from his own treasury1 The Fibbentro4 Bureau was installed o44osite the -ilhelmstrasse1 It started with fifteen men in (*)/ then rose to fifty and finally to three hundred1 It was made u4 of amateurs li7e its founderyoung men who s4o7e foreign languages who could in many cases 4lace a ??vonI or flashier title before their names and who could furnish their chief and eventually Eitler with the oversim4lified well-digested information he wanted1 They used the re4orts of news corres4ondents and other material gathered from foreign news4a4ers as Neurath would later testify1 8ince Eitler read only German their translations were his only means of getting such foreign news1 The library of the bureau came from confiscated collectionsamong others those of the Deutsche Eochschule fuer #oliti7 in Berlin =it had formerly been subsidiHed by the .arnegie 6oundation> the Eamburg Institute for 6oreign Affairs and Eaushofer?s Geo4olitisches Institut in Munich1 (+ -ith the e<ce4tion of letters addressed to the 6oreign Minister and the 8taatsse7retaer Fibbentro4 was given the corres4ondence addressed to the 6oreign :ffice before the -ilhelmstrasse got it1 Eitler gave him 4ermission to answer ita situation that would have caused a stronger 4ersonality than Neurath to resign as 6oreign Minister long before Eitler as7ed him to ste4 aside in (*)%1 -hen Fibbentro4 was a44ointed 84ecial Ambassador he was not 4laced under the 6oreign :ffice but was made res4onsible to Eitler only1(% In (*)/ Eitler made Fibbentro4 84ecial .ommissioner for Disarma-

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page_1 " #age (0+ ment Suestions a 4ost in which he could ta7e 4art in discussions in #aris 9ondon and Berlin1L 9i7e all his 4redecessors Fibbentro4 failed to 4ersuade the Allies to sign any agreement although he had a small 1ui) 2ro 1uo to offer: the disbanding of the 8A in return for an increase in the Feichswehr1 But 6rance was basically unwilling to concede to Germany =whether the -eimar Fe4ublic or any other German government> the e@uality that would inevitably one day have to be granted1 It made no difference whether a Fibbentro4 or one of the old-line di4lomats re4resented the Feich1 The conferences achieved nothing1 Fibbentro4 had however a considerable success at the Naval .onference in 9ondon on Dune (% (*)0 where he re4resented Germany as 84ecial Ambassador1 Ta7ing 4lace three months after the British note of 4rotest against Germany?s rearming the conference mar7ed a turning 4oint in British 4olicy1 It was the first of Britain?s efforts to limit Eitler?s drive for the domination of the .ontinent by reasonable concessions1 At long last there was recognition of the inevitability of acce4ting Germany as a 4ower with e@ual status in !uro4e1 In the Anglo-German naval agreement reached at the conference a ratio of ($$ to )0 was acce4ted for the res4ective strengths of the two navies1 Fibbentro4 behaved as he was always to do4ushing the German claims as the !nglish said as though the first day of the conference were the last and as though his demands had already been agreed u4on1 In his role as mouth4iece of the 6uehrer he re4eated the rigid formulas that had been furnished him1 6ortunately for him the British Government was des4erately striving to 4revent a war it believed could only be a disaster for Britain1 8o the British gave countenance to this man who only four or five years bac7 had been selling them cham4agne1 Though they were unim4ressed by him as a 4erson or negotiator he returned to Germany in trium4h flourishing the first ac7nowledgment of Germany?s right to rearm1 The agreement as everyone 7new would be a blow to 6rance clinging ferociously to ??legalityI and still in a state of shoc7 over the reintroduction of universal military service in the Feich1 Fibbentro4 at the close of the conference made the 4re4osterous suggestion to the British =one they could scarcely turn down out of hand> that he sto4 off in #aris on his way bac7 to Berlin to e<4lain the whole matter to the 6rench with whom he said he had e<cellent relations1 And this in fact he did volubly instructing the 6rench di4lomats whose manifold troubles with the 8tresa front bro7en could only be multi4lied by his a44earance1 Ee told the court at Nuremberg that he thought his visit had hel4ed the 6rench understand the situation1 Eitler now com4letely 4ersuaded of the abilities of his L Eindenburg had hesitated to a44rove Fibbentro4?s a44ointment but adviser made him Neurath convinced the #resident that this was a 4ost Fibbentro4 could fill1 =Gordon .raig and 6eli< Gilbert eds1 The i2lomats 787878F8 M#rinceton: #rinceton "niversity #ress (*0)N 41 /&)>1

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page_1 # #age (0% Ambassador to Great Britain1 There Fibbentro4 made his memorable gaffe when he a44eared at the rece4tion of the di4lomatic cor4s and greeted the Bing with outstretched arm and a ??Eeil Eitler1I =-riting in his cell in Nuremberg Fibbentro4 declared that Eitler had ordered him to give the NaHi salute but in an interrogation of 8e4tember &$ (*/0 he said he had not been instructed to give it but had intended it as an honor to the British sovereign1 The only certainty is that he had no notion of how the British would react nor was he much interested1 Eis sole concern was to give evidence of his Heal to his master in Berlin1> In !ngland the Fibbentro4s were the very cut and 4attern of the NaHi regime1 -inston .hurchill told of a conversation he had with 6rau von Fibbentro41 To his remar7 that he ho4ed no serious difference would arise between their two countries she re4lied IThis is u4 to you1I This story was denied by 6rau von Fibbentro4 in the volume of her husband?s notes that she edited1 -hile Fibbentro4 was in 9ondon between November (*)' and November (*)+ he made eleven tri4s to Berlin for !ngland was not nearly as much on his mind as were his relations with Eitler1 Ee had no friends at court1 Neurath feared and disli7ed him as did the rest of the 4rofessional di4lomats and the #arty regarded him as an interlo4er who had ,oined u4 far too late1 6or Fibbentro4 everything de4ended on his relations with Eitler1 Ee did all he could to foster a closeness: Ee named one of his children Adolf and he hovered as near to his master as 4ossible1 The only im4ortance of 9ondon was the o44ortunity it gave him of im4ressing the 6uehrer with his indis4ensability1 Fibbentro4 did not 4ractice the arts of traditional di4lomacy1 Ee had the s7ill of the courtier the syco4hant who carefully noted what his master said and then re4eated it later to the 4reoccu4ied 6uehrer who was always 4leased to hear his ,udgments echoed1 Fibbentro4 would e<4ress an o4inion he already 7new to be Eitler?s or would bring him evidence from the foreign 4ress that confirmed the 6uehrer?s low esteem of Germany?s o44onents1 Never once in the twelve years of their relationshi4 was there any trace of serious difference1 At Nuremberg Fibbentro4 tried hard to 4ortray himself as Eitler?s counselor as one who had often e<4ressed an o44osing view1 But no evidence su44orts him aside from his e<4ressed doubt of the wisdom of the Fussian cam4aign1 In all the voluminous records of the Nuremberg trials and in the testimony of his contem4oraries no one had a favorable word for him1 Mussolini although coming more and more under the s4ell of Eitler in (*)* told .iano on March )$ that Fibbentro4 is Ia truly sinister man because he is an imbecile and 4resum4tuous1I The German .ounselor of !mbassy in Fome #rince :tto von Bismarc7 tal7ing to .iano used the same words: IEe is such an imbecile he is a frea7 of nature1I (* 8wiss 4rofessor .arl Da7ob Burc7hardt Eigh .ommissioner of DanHig said that Fibbentro4 was en-

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page_1 $ #age (0* dowed below the average and that one could only e<4ect stu4idities from him1 Bernardo Attolico called him a 4ure dilettante who had no conce4ts and no idea of either international law or history and was dangerous because of his inferiority1 Fibbentro4 he said always tried to terroriHe1 &$ .ount Bernadotte called him a man ??of very small mental stature and moreover rather ridiculous1I&( :tto 87orHeny the 88 colonel who in (*// rescued Mussolini from his Italian ca4tors told of a luncheon at which Fibbentro4 sat on a 7ind of throne while the lesser members of the gathering sat stiffly under him1&& As for Fibbentro4?s wanting Eitler to go to war his demanding the 4ersecution of the Dews his involvement in genocide and the other ca4ital crimes charged against him at NurembergFibbentro4 had 4artici4ated in them all because he was the eager creature of the 6uehrer who had raised him from a member of the striving middle class to the com4any of the great1 It was im4ossible to be unaware of his ignorance1 87orHeny .iano and the German officials of the 6oreign :ffice all noted how little he 7new of matters under discussion1 6ranUois-#oncet asserted that Fibbentro4 had never read either the Gersailles Treaty or the Bellogg-Briand #act1 9i7e so many of the amateur di4lomats of this time =they were by no means confined to the A<is 4owers> Fibbentro4 had a few 4at notions with which to ,ustify the decisions of the 6uehrer1 The fact that these Ie<4lanationsI were often self-contradictory did not disturb him1 :ne such notion was that !ngland in the years before the war was merely trying to gain time to rearm find allies and eventually crush Germany1 A second was that a decadent !ngland would not fight1 Another was the tur4itude of the Dews1 A fourth sub,ect to change was the necessity of a war to the death with communism1 Nevertheless Fibbentro4 eagerly ,ourneyed to Moscow in (*)* to sign the Fusso-German Nonaggression #act and the secret treaty delineating the areas the two countries would occu4y in the Baltic region and in #oland1 Although it is true that he ran through his 4aces there as the messenger of the 6uehrer it had been he told Mussolini on March ($ (*/$ li7e tal7ing with old #arty comrades in the Feich1&) Ee informed the e<4lorer 8ven Eedin an admirer of National 8ocialist Germany that 8talin wanted no war with 6inland that the time of bolshevism was 4ast and that something new and better would rise in Fussia1 Ee unstintingly 4raised 8talin as he had heard Eitler 4raise him1 Ee loved and hated obediently in accordance with what he thought Eitler wanted1 Ee ran his master?s errands whether in #aris or 9ondon or Fome or Moscow 4arroting Eitler?s 4hrases1 At the trial Fibbentro4 as7ed Goering to testify on behalf of his desire for 4eace1 Goering crossed out the line in the affidavit 4re4ared for him by Fibbentro4 that declared that the 6oreign Minister Iwas always Healous MbestrebtN to hel4 the 6uehrer attain his ends by di4lomatic meansI and wrote in its 4lace: II have only heard that Fibbentro4 counselled in favor of war1I As Fibbentro4 continued to urge him to

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page_1!0 #age ('$ testify Goering told their go-between his assistant-counsel Bross ??I can only say what I can witness to Fibbentro4 should leave me in 4eace1I &/ -eiHsaec7er testified at his own trial in (*/% that at the time the British Ambassador to Berlin 8ir Nevile Eenderson had the last des4erate meetings with Fibbentro4 and -eiHsaec7er the 6oreign Minister had said -eiHsaec7er should have thrown Eenderson out instead of trying to clarify matters for him1&0 Fibbentro4?s one concern was to maintain his influence with the 6uehrer1 -hen Eerbert von Dir7sen the German Ambassador to 9ondon at the time of the Munich crisis brought a 4ersonal letter from .hamberlain to Eitler Fibbentro4 refused to let him deliver it1 Ee also 4revented British Ambassador Eenderson from seeing Eitler to tell him 4ersonally about the state of British 4ublic o4inion1 Fibbentro4 had told the 6uehrer re4eatedly that !ngland would not fight and any evidence to the contrary might wea7en his re4utation with him1&' The NaHi bureaucrats li7e the Fussians had a style derived from the head of 8tate and #arty1 Fibbentro4 a4ed Eitler?s monologues and saw his visions1 After disaster had been narrowly averted in the winter of (*/(/& Fibbentro4 told .iano on A4ril &* (*/& that the ice of Fussia that had defeated Na4oleon had been con@uered by the genius of Eitler1&+ Ee told Italian Ambassador Alfieri that the Fussian offensives after 8talingrad had in reality resulted not in victories but merely in territorial gains that Fussian losses had been enormous and that the 4resent offensive would be one of the last the Fussians would be ca4able of1&% "ntil (*/) according to .iano Fibbentro4 7e4t re4eating that the war was won1 After that he changed the tune a little saying I-e cannot lose this war1I Ee told -eiHsaec7er that the 6uehrer could never be mista7en1 At Nuremberg after the motion 4ictures were shown in which he saw his 6uehrer again he told the 4rison 4sychologist Gilbert that he had we4t at the film1 I.an?t you feel the terrific strength of the 4ersonalityOI he as7ed1 .onfused and bro7en Fibbentro4 thought everyone but Eitler was to blame for the atrocities and the catastro4heEimmler for the e<terminations and the Allies for attac7ing Germany when she was defending civiliHation1 Ee wrote in his cell: It has always been the tragic fate of Germany that it had to sto4 the onstorming !ast with its own blood1 It was so from the battle of the .atalaunian 4lains over the wars with Tur7ey that 6rance brought to !uro4e L and u4 to the 4resent world war in which the -estern 4owers by the measures they have ta7en against Germany have o4ened the door to the !ast1 Adolf Eitler to the very end was convinced that it was the great tragedy of this war that in the conflict between two worlds between !ast and -est that the -est fell u4on the bac7 of the L This refers to the alliance of 4eo4le who were fighting for the entire world of culture1&* the 6rench and the Tur7s in the war against .harles G1

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page_1!1 #age ('( Fibbentro4 was unable at Nuremberg to tell a straight story even when he had nothing to conceal1 In the last years of the war he had ta7en large doses of slee4ing 4ills which he thought had affected his memory1 Ee floundered too7 refuge in verbiage and in forgetting and lied when he had to1 During one of his interrogations he said that 8chuschnigg after being de4osed as Austrian .hancellor had been 4laced under house arrest =actually 8chuschnigg had s4ent most of his ca4tivity although he was com4aratively well treated in the 8achsenhausen concentration cam4> because very li7ely he had done ??something against Staatsraeson1I This word =the German translation of Iraison )A<tatI> has many meanings but it is unli7ely that Fibbentro4 7new what they were1 #erha4s he merely meant that 8chuschnigg had done something to in,ure Germany1 -hen he was @uestioned about having said that the chances that !ngland would not go to war were ($$ to ( he e<4lained that he was using di4lomatic language1 In his interrogations he 7e4t using stoc7 !nglish 4hrases he had 4ic7ed u4 such as I@uite im4ossible I Iyou 7now I Iyou see I Iwell I mean1I An e<am4le of his answers: II must say I was less foreign minister than a sort of di4lomatic adviser to the 6uehrer1 8o I had to ta7e a very strong stand against the #arty you see1 6or instance I had a frightful row with 8tretcher about the Dewish @uestion in (*)01I )$ Actually he was as strong an anti-8emite as 8treicher himself1 The memoranda and notes of his views 4reserved statements that could have a44eared in a Stuermer editorial1 At Nuremberg he assured the Allies that he had been no anti-8emite that he had o44osed the mistreatment of the Dews that one of his chief ad,utants and the wife of another were 4artly Dewish that he had thought of the concentration cam4s as a 7ind of 4risonsome sort of 4rison he said where 4eo4le wor7ed1 Then turning to his interrogator in this case Mr1 Dustice Dac7son he added ISuite fran7ly 1 1 1 I was not satisfied with @uite a number of things1I Mr1 Dustice Dac7son was more at home with this 7ind of @uestioning than when he crossed swords with Goering on the 4roblems of 4re4aring to wage aggressive warfare and did a s7illful ,ob on the floundering Fibbentro41 According to the testimony of General !rwin 9ahousen who had been with Fibbentro4 on a 4rivate train in #oland Fibbentro4 had wanted to see houses and villages go u4 in flames and the Dews 7illed1)( Because Fibbentro4 insisted on having a voice in everything that had to do with foreign countries the 6oreign :ffice was dee4ly involved in the e<termination of the Dews and the im4orting of slave labor1 Fibbentro4 had not the slightest ob,ection to Eimmler?s e<terminationsC he insisted only that he be re4resented1 To missions sent abroad by the 6oreign :ffice he added an e<4ert on the Dewish 4roblem1)& Ee a44ointed Martin 9uther a fanatical anti-8emite whom he had 7nown in his li@uor business to head u4 the Feferat #arteithe section of the 6oreign :ffice that dealt with #arty agencies among them the 8D1 The section grew to be a division with &$$ em4loyees and by (*/& Fibbentro4 had made 9uther "ndersecretary of 8tate1 9uther

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page_1!2 #age ('& who was in constant touch with !ichmann conducted the negotiations with the satellite countries on the Dewish de4ortations1L Although Fibbentro4 had had cordial relations with rich Dews before he ,oined the #arty he @uic7ly ado4ted the NaHi tone1 :n August (& (*)% he confided to the 6rench 6oreign Minister Georges Bonnet that the Dews were without e<ce4tion 4ic74oc7ets murderers and thieves1 The 4ro4erty they 4ossessed had been obtained illegally in the first 4lace he said and should be ta7en from themC they should be forced to live in criminal districts where they would be under 4olice observation li7e other criminals1 9ate in the war he e<horted the Fegent of Eungary to move along with the solution of the Dewish 4roblem in Eungary demanding that he 7ill the Dews or 4ut them in concentration cam4s1 )) Nor were his fulminations confined to the Dews1 An enemy was an enemy and he said the Germans in Greece had to be brutal ??to show the Gree7s in iron fashion who is the master1I Ee told .iano and Marshal "go .avallero that DraHa Miha,lavic?sL chetniks had to be e<terminated1 And s4ea7ing of the 4artisan warfare he told Ambassador Dino Alfieri that the bands had to be destroyed including men women and children because they endangered the lives of German and Italian men women and children1)/ Ee favored the lynching of Allied fliers shot down over Germany1 In fact none of the measures ta7en by Eitler found him anything but an<ious to carry them out1 In his a44earances before interrogators he attem4ted as he did in his letter to -inston .hurchill to 4ro,ect a 2ersona of the u44er-class di4lomat as his real identity1 Adolf Eitler he said didn?t li7e di4lomats at all1 The 6oreign :ffice was called the club of the defeatists so you can imagine the difficult 4osition I had and the strong lines which I had to ta7e1 1 1 1 -ith the 6rench we made a sort of treaty1 I don?t 7now whether you 7now that I had been in #aris in (*)% and we closed a sort of nonaggression treaty 1 1 1 then the 6uehrer sent me to Moscow 1 1 1 I had a long discussion with 8talin and Molotov1)0 The 4hrase Iall measures short of warI he thought had been used Iby Mr1 Foosevelt or somebody1I The reason Eitler had not met with 8talin he said was that the 6uehrer did not thin7 8talin would leave Fussia and he did not want to leave Germany1 As7ed whether the 6uehrer had ordered the atrocities committed against the Dews in the concentration cam4s he said II have thought about this again and again1 I am @uite convinced he did not order themC if 4ossibly he 7new about them I do not 7now1I Ee thought there must have been Itremendous outrages somewhere in #olandI but added II don?t remember e<actly1I As for himself he had told the 6uehrer it was I@uite im4ossible to carry out L Martin 9uther had a criminal the racial 4rogram1I Eimmler would not let him see record and was charged with misa44ro4riating funds while he was in the 6oreign :ffice1 Fibbentro4 4revented his being tried1 In (*/) 9uther told Eimmler that Fibbentro4 was craHy and Eimmler re4orted this conversation to Fibbentro41 9uther was sent to a concentration cam4 and died there in (*/01

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page_1!3 #age (') the concentration cam4s and when he learned the truth he had as7ed himself over and over ??-hat can the reason be for 7illing so many 4eo4leO But whyO -hat forO -hat is the reasonOI )' As7ed by one of the American 4rosecuting staff .olonel Brundage =8e4tember () (*/0>: IDo you 7now a man named EodHaL .hancellor of Eungary MsicNOI Fibbentro4 as confused as his @uestioner answered I9et me see nowa .Hechoslova71 No I don?t 7now the name1IL -ithout Eitler Fibbentro4 was befuddled and lost1 During the interrogation of 8e4tember ($ (*/0 he said IThe 6uehrer made a treaty with #oland 4erha4s a little under my advice 1 1 1 If the 6uehrer were here today he?d say ?I ta7e the entire res4onsibility1?I Ee had sought to guide Eitler in small ways he said and had told him for e<am4le that it would be I@uite im4ossibleI to come to an understanding with !ngland without coming to an understanding with 6rance1 After the Allied landings in Africa he had told the 6uehrer II thin7 this situation is serious very serious1 Allow me to ma7e 4eace with Fussia at any sacrifice1I But the 6uehrer had said INo I and si< wee7s before the end he had said IFibbentro4 we?re going to win this war by a nose1I Fibbentro4 said he had an idea at the time this might be true for he had heard that the Germans had some ray 4lanes1 II?m not well u4 I he told his interrogators Ion technical matters wasn?t it ray 4lanes air4lanes sending out raysO I was amaHed1I Fibbentro4 believed whatever was necessary to hel4 him 7ee4 his ,ob1 At the end after Eitler?s death Admiral DoenitH told him over the tele4hone that he was drawing u4 the list of a new .abinet and intended to ma7e 8chwerin von Brosig7 who was Minister of 6inance 6oreign Minister1 To soften the blow he suggested to Fibbentro4 that he thin7 over other 4ossible candidates and ma7e a suggestion1 An hour later Fibbentro4 called bac7 and said he had a candidatehimself1 9i7e so many of the leaders of the Third Feich Fibbentro4 4rofessed to have a great love for the arts and to be a 4assionate collector of 4aintings1 At Nuremberg he engaged his @uestioners in a discussion of "trillo who had been stigmatiHed in the Third Feich as a degenerate artist1 Now said Fibbentro4 he greatly admired "trillo and had bought his 4ictures1 Ee added that he had given Eitler a .ranach which he had seen in the 6uehrer?s bun7er only a few months earlier1 Ee had collected houses too1 :f the si< that he owned one was near Berlin on +0$ hectaresLL of land with a golf course1 Another was a castle in 6uschl Austria not far from 8alHburgC he had ta7en it over from a sister of 6ritH Thyssen and her husband who had been 4ut in a concentration cam41 Ee also had a horse-breeding farm near Aachen and hunting lodges in 8lova7ia and in the 8udetenland where he entertained foreign di4lomats1 These functions continued during the entire 4eriod of the war for Fibbentro4?s notions of the 4lace of s4orts in high L Milan EodHaL was #rime Minister of .Hechoslova7ia di4lomacy too7 only theoretical LL :ne hectare is e@ual to &1/+ acres1 (*)0 to (*)%1

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page_1!4 #age ('/ account of the millions of men fighting on a front hundreds of 7ilometers away1L Fibbentro4?s usual methods were 4erem4tory and often brutal1 =.iano was always sus4icious of him when he was courteous1> -hen he read to 8ir Nevile Eenderson the final German terms Eitler offered to #oland the British Ambassador too7 umbrage at his saying the matter was ??damned seriousI and at his reading the communication at such a s4eed that the words were unintelligible1 Ee as7ed for a co4y of the document but Fibbentro4 refused to let him see it1 The s7illed translator for Eitler and the 6oreign :ffice#aul :tto 8chmidtwho was 4resent at the meeting said later that both men were nervous and that Fibbentro4 read the document at a normal rate of s4eed1 Ambassador Eenderson had a good 7nowledge of German but was not fluent in it and 8chmidt had ho4ed that Eenderson would as7 him to 4rovide a translation1 This Eenderson did not do1 The final German offer reached !ngland by way of Goering who reluctantly gave the te<t to Birger Dahlerus to 4ass on to 9ondon1 Fibbentro4 had had categorical orders from the 6uehrer not to hand over to Eenderson the terms he was ostensibly offering to the #oles which were generous enough on the surface1 Eitler was incensed over the intransigence of the #oles who as the #olish 6oreign Minister .olonel DWHef Bec7 said e<4ected that a revolution would brea7 out in Germany should Eitler go to war and that an armistice would be signed in Berlin a few wee7s after the outbrea7 of hostilities1 Eitler?s hy4othetical offer to #oland had only a 4ro4agandistic significance at this 4oint after he had made his treaty with the Fussians1 Ee had never wanted another Munich and this time he said no swine would de4rive him of a military victory1 9i7e Mussolini he yearned for the sound of the guns and Fibbentro4 yearned along with him1 -hat they both had on their side was a com4lete willingness to go to wara willingness shared by no one else e<ce4t the #oles who had no means of winning a war without the aid of the 8oviet "nion1 The #olish dreams of grandeur matched those of Fibbentro4 and his master1 A #olish em4ire stretching from the Baltic 8ea to the Blac7 8eaC the wea7ening of both its great neighbors leaving #oland with the effective balance of 4owerC the confident e<4ectation of a revolution that would enable the #oles to occu4y Berlinof such stuff was their foreign 4olicy made and it dovetailed into the similarly grandiose schemes of Eitler who 4lanned to ma7e a nation of helots and slaves out of the #oles a 4eo4le without an intellectual class who could only count high enough and read enough to be able to serve their L In :ctober (*)* he as7ed the German Ambassador to Moscow to find out con@uerors1 from 8talin or Molotov if he could not be given hunting grounds in .ar4athia1 !arlier he had as7ed 8talin that the demarcation line be so fi<ed that the Feich would be given the 8uwal7i area in #oland where Fibbentro4 had heard there was e<cellent hunting1 8talin had agreed and Fibbentro4 having dis4atched an official of the 6oreign :ffice to reconnoiter the territory had discovered to his intense disa44ointment that the game was 4oor there1

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page_1! #age ('0 Fibbentro4?s lawyer at Nuremberg told the 4rison 4sychologist that Fibbentro4 was denying to him that he was 4resent at meetings the records showed he had attended1 According to a British observer who saw the defendant in 4rison Fibbentro4 was a nervous and 4hysical wrec7 who did not sit down until told to1 :ne day he wanted to come into court without a nec7tie because he said he could not button his collar =it had not occurred to him that he could wear the tie without buttoning the collarC the tie a44arently had uncomfortable associations with a noose>1 Ee 7e4t saying one thing that was obviously truethat he was against this trial from the start1 Ee had written Mr1 Dustice Dac7son he said to offer to be tried before an American court1 :f the s4ectacle of Germans denouncing Germans he said ??It is really not very nice1I )+ Ee was distressed that so many of his co-wor7ers were testifying against him but he should have been used to contem4t1 Goering at the time of the attem4ted assassination of Eitler on Duly &$ (*// had struc7 at him with his marshal?s baton as Fibbentro4 had uttered some stu4idity and had called him IFibbentro4I without the Ivon1I I;ou cham4agne 4eddler I Goering had shouted Ishut u41I The 6oreign Minister dodged the blow and shouted bac7 II am still 6oreign Minister and my name is von Fibbentro41I)% -hat disturbed him more than anything else was any @uestioning of his role1 -hen Ivone Bir74atric7 interviewed him at Ashcan =the Allied collecting de4ot used before the 4risoners were sent to Nuremberg> and suggested that 4erha4s the 6oreign Minister was not so im4ortant under Eitler Fibbentro4 although he would later use this line as a defense could not bear the suggestion1 II was a man of very considerable im4ortance I he said1)* 8ometimes he was in fact im4ortant although not in a sense he would have acce4ted1 As the .icero documents =see 41 &('> were being evaluated he 4revented some of the re4orts of 91 .1 MoyHisch the German attachJ in An7ara who was dealing with .icero from reaching 8chellenberg1 Fibbentro4 said it was IintolerableI that 8chellenberg should get them1 Fibbentro4?s unwillingness to have Amt GI of the F8EA share the credit for 4roviding what would have been had they been 4ro4erly evaluated 4riceless documents for Germany caused them to be sidetrac7ed and never 4ro4erly used1/$ Fibbentro4 was a frightened man at Nuremberg and he had little defense to offer1 Ee drew the tatters of his di4lomatic finery around him as best he could striving wildly to remain true to the 6uehrer and at the same time to a44ear to have been o44osed to the 4oliciesthe treatment of the Dews war with Britain and 6rance war with ;ugoslavia and the othershe had so loyally and uncom4lainingly 4ursued1 The cross-e<amination was relentless because the documents in his case were as clear as his ine4tness1 In the furor of his daily attem4ts to master the intricacies of his office everything he said had been ta7en down and co4ies made and so when he s4o7e at Nuremberg about his friendly feelings for the Dews and enemy 4risoners of war and for

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page_1!! #age ('' the 6rench and the British and the Eague .onventions a doHen statements he had made could be cited against him1 Ee was never u4 to the 7ind of defense that might have been made for much of the foreign 4olicy1 The records from the Suai d?:rsay ca4tured by the Germans furnished evidence of the @uasi-neutrality of Belgium and EollandC of the need for the German invasion of Norway to forestall a British and 6rench landingC of the irres4onsible 4olicies of the #oles who had clung to the letter of Gersailles but had also invaded their 4eaceful neighbors and had hel4ed dismember .Hechoslova7iaC of the Macht2olitik of the Fussians1 But Fibbentro4 could ma7e no use of any of these matters because they had in fact little to do with the crimes he had committed1 In the later case of one of his subordinates-eiHsaec7er a man of the old 6oreign :fficethe defendant?s German lawyer was able to ma7e sensible use of the words of .lemenceau to the cadets of 8aint-.yr after the end of -orld -ar I1 .lemenceau said ??Don?t fear for your careers gentlemen the 4eace we have made guarantees ten years of disorder in !uro4e for you1I The whole system of the 4ost-Gersailles collective security was bound to brea7 down of itself with its futile attem4t to glue together a series of alliances based on nothing more than the desire to hold down a status 1uo dominated by a wea7 6rance1 And this was to be done with states li7e .Hechoslova7ia where the minorities warred among themselves1 The revolt of 8lova7ia against #rague was a real one and needed little hel4 from the Germans to intensify the resentment of the 8lova7s1 The revolt needed only the 4ossibility of tearing loose from the #rague Government which since (*(* had arrogantly governed what was to have been a federation on the 8wiss model1 #olish and Eungarian attac7s on the territory of .Hechoslova7ia were made 4ossible by the Germans ,ust as was the Fussian attac7 on #oland1 Neither Fibbentro4 nor Eitler created the conditions that demanded the 4artitions for the conditions were 4art of a long history of misgovernment and wrong calculations and un7e4t 4romises1 Fibbentro4 had in fact done all the things charged in the indictment1 Ee had 4lanned to wage Iaggressive war I and so far as his nonbelligerent office 4ermitted had hel4ed to wage it1 Ee had 4artici4ated both in war crimes and in crimes against humanity with no thought as to Eague .onventions or any of the international or other agreements about which he 7new so little1 Eis 4uerilities and disabilities caught u4 with him at Nuremberg1 Eis letter to .hurchill and !denC his fatuous attem4ts to establish a camaraderie with his interrogatorsC his desire to show that he was no anti-8emite no war-monger but a man with 4eace in his heart toward both !ast and -est who had wisely counseled his beloved 6uehrer and then at the end had borne his last message to .hurchill to set aside the results of the war that had cost so many millions of livesthese were 4art of the disorderly wishful thin7ing that had characteriHed his term in the 6oreign 8ervice of Adolf Eitler1 In another

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page_1!" #age ('+ time Fibbentro4 would doubtless have lived out his years as a tolerable businessman tal7ing about the need for a strong Germany ,ust claims to living s4ace and the wic7edness of the Dews1 Ee had the bad luc7 to find in Eitler someone who too7 him almost at his face value1 .onstantin Gon Neurath Two other defendants re4resented the Feich?s 6oreign :ffice: the former 6oreign Minister and Ambassador to !ngland and Italy 6reiherr von NeurathC and the former .hancellor and Ambassador to Austria and Tur7ey 6ranH von #a4en1 -hen Neurath heard of Fibbentro4?s a44ointment as Ambassador to !ngland in Duly (*)' he immediately offered his resignation as 6oreign Minister but Eitler did not acce4t it at that 4oint1 Fibbentro4 from his 4ost in 9ondon was to re4ort directly to Eitler1 This by4assing of Fibbentro4?s nominal su4erior in the manner of his a44ointment and in the conduct of his office understandably irritated Neurath es4ecially since the year before Fibbentro4 had been a44ointed "ndersecretary in the 6oreign :ffice by the 6uehrer also without consulting Neurath who had offered to resign then too1 But these a44ointments were only sam4les of the many bitter doses Neurath was to swallow in the course of the ne<t years1 Eis actual resignation would ta7e 4lace two years later when Eitler with tears in his eyes Neurath said told him that Fibbentro4 was to succeed him as 6oreign Minister1 As for #a4en he would drin7 the same un4alatable brews as Neurath and would continue to serve the regime he came to loathe andin more active ways than Neurathto o44ose1 Ee too would serve out his time in high office as long as the 6uehrer 4ermitted1 Fibbentro4 was ,ealous of both these men as he was of everyonewhether Goebbels or Eimmler or Goering or Fosenbergwho in any way threatened to invade his cherished 4osition as the adviser on foreign affairs to the 6uehrer1 -hen he heard that #a4en after the fall of #oland had discussed Germany?s foreign relations with Eitler he instructed his staff henceforth to give #a4en no information1 The infighting had com4licated 4atterns1 #a4en was convinced that Neurath des4ite his attem4ted resignation had actually wanted Fibbentro4 as ambassador in 9ondon in order to wea7en his influence with the 6uehrer and to 4revent the a44ointment of #a4en to this 4ost1 The machinations of men li7e Neurath and #a4en who were never 4art of the genuine resistance movement tended to be nothing if not o44ortunistic1 They were held together in their uneasy alliances only by a common disli7e of the Fibbentro4s and by a desire to stay in office and to continue to influence decisions or events no matter how feebly1 As Neurath testified at Nuremberg the @uestion for him had been whether to remain the roc7 on the side of the ban7 or the roc7

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page_1!# #age ('% in the stream1 The meta4hor was not ina44ro4riate: he had chosen the stream and it had easily flowed over him1 Ee had affected the current little if at all1 Ee had only become 4art of the riverbed1 Both Neurath and #a4en were conservatives so far as they were anything more than self-serving1 Neurath on his father?s side came from a long line of state officials1 Eis mother?s family were mainly officers in the Austrian Army and members of the 8wabian nobility1 Born on 6ebruary & (%+) Neurath was brought u4 in the manner of the small nobility of -uerttemberg1 Ee was raised on the family estate by 4arents who inculcated roc7bound #rotestant 4rinci4les that sustained him fully until the NaHis came to 4ower1 Ee studied law in the universities of Tuebingen and Berlin to 4re4are himself for the di4lomatic service1 6ranUois-#oncet =who dealt with him while Neurath was 6oreign Minister> li7ed him1 Ee characteriHed Neurath as a man of irre4roachable courtesy an unassertive correct urbane gentleman who had undoubtedly o44osed the war1 Ee thought of him as did the NaHis themselves as one of the old-school di4lomats who would li7e to see Germany acce4ted as an e@ual among the 4owers but who wanted to 4roceed according to the rules1 Neurath ,oined the 6oreign 8ervice in (*$(1 Ee was a member of the consular staff in 9ondon from (*$) to (*$% when he returned to Berlin1 Ee fought in the war of (*(/(% as a ca4tain in a grenadier regiment and was decorated with the Iron .ross 6irst .lass1 As a result of being wounded late in (*(/ he returned to di4lomatic service with Germany?s Tur7ish ally1 /( Because he did not get along well with .hancellor Theobald von Bethmann Eollweg he resigned from his di4lomatic 4ost in (*(' to become head of the .abinet of the Bing of -uerttemberg a ,ob he held until the end of the war1 The Fe4ublican Government a44ointed him Minister to Denmar7 in (*(* and in (*&( Ambassador to Fome1 Ee was Ambassador to Britain from (*)$ to (*)& when #a4en a44ointed him 6oreign Minister a 4ost he continued to hold under .hancellor 8chleicher and Adolf Eitler until (*)%1 Neurath was a man of no cons4icuous talents or vices1 Ee testified at Nuremberg that he stayed on as 6oreign Minister at the e<4ress wish of #resident von Eindenburg1 As one of the so-called conservatives around Eitler his role was to hel4 tame the NaHi revolutionaries and to 7ee4 the foreign 4olicy 4eaceful1 Eindenburg felt so strongly about his continuing as 6oreign Minister Neurath said that he made his remaining in office a condition for the a44ointment of Adolf Eitler as Feich .hancellor1/& Neurath regarded the Gersailles Treaty with as baleful an eye as every other German statesman but he saidand his testimony was corroborated by the 8wiss Minister the #a4al Nuncio and the 6rench and Belgian Ambassadors among othersthat he had wanted to change it by negotiation and the records of his 4ro4osals and di4lomatic conversations bear this out1 Although everything he did had to reflect Eitler?s basic 4olicy of ta7ing one ste4 at a time to dismantle the Gersailles system he was always reason-

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page_1!$ #age ('* able and easy to deal with and seems to have been 4ersuaded this could be done by 4eaceful means1 Ee 4resented the German case coolly and reasonably without any table4ounding1 :n A4ril (' (*)/ he announced that Germany would acce4t the British disarmament 4ro4osals in 4rinci4le and suggested that Germany be granted an air force with short-range 4lanes and without bombers1 In return he said Germany would 4ermit a control commission to assure the nonmilitary character of the 8A and 881 /) A few days later re4lying to 6rench accusations that Germany was inflating its arms budget Neurath 4ointed out that during the 4receding year 6rance had s4ent (' billion francs on her armed forces and now was com4laining over the %*$ million Feichsmar7s that Germany was s4ending1 The 6rench called Germany?s increase of &&$ million Feichsmar7s ??a threat to 4eace I des4ite the fact that their own armaments increase had been far greater than the Germans?1// -hen in (*)' 6rance made her military alliance 4act with Fussia Neurath 4ointed out the vast e<tent of the 6rench system of security: Metro4olitan 6rance with its colonies had a 4o4ulation of almost ($$ millionC in addition she could count as allies Great Britain #oland Belgium and .Hechoslova7ia not to mention the guarantees of the 9ocarno #act that were intended to involve Italy in the case of any violation of 6rench frontiers by Germany1 Now to these formidable numbers aligned against Germany would be added (+0 million Fussiansall of them together de4loying the most overwhelming force in history on the German borders1 In March Neurath 4ro4osed military restrictions for both Germany and Belgium along their common border to be guaranteed by Britain and Italy1 Ee also said that Germany was ready to enter an agreement to limit air forcesC to ban 4oison gas in any future war along with incendiary bombs and any 7ind of bombing of towns and villagesC and to renounce heavy tan7s and heavy artillery1 /0 Eitler was 4robing the soft s4ots in the seemingly im4regnable system of encirclement that 6rance had built around Germany1 Ee had no interest whatever in disarmament but was willing to ma7e any agreement with the Allies that might recogniHe Germany?s right to increase its army and air force1 Then he could ta7e the ne<t ste41 In the !uro4e of the mid-thirties there were always ine@ualities enough to enable Eitler to ma7e further demands whatever reasonable concessions might be made to him1 Ee told not only the Allies but also his own advisers that he wanted 4eace and Neurath believed him1 -hen at the Eossbach conference of November 0 (*)+ L the 6uehrer disclosed his considered intention to go to war Neurath had a heart attac7 but he 7e4t on at his ,ob and 7e4t telling himself that as the roc7 in the stream he might dam or direct the current for on the ban7 he could do nothing1 Ee was never a strong man and he avoided un4leasantness and trouble as far as 4ossible1 Though ready to L 9ieutenant .olonel 6riedrich Eossbach was resign on Fibbentro4?s a44ointment he Eitler?s military attache who recorded what the 6uehrer said1

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page_1"0 #age (+$ made no move when Eitler disclosed that he intended to go to war1 Ee had no causes for which he would do or die not being the stuff of which heroes are madeor NaHis either1 The #arty thought him timid1 6ranUois-#oncet and -eiHsaec7er thought him anything but dynamic1 Ee saw little of Eitler and Eitler with his love for im4rovisation and sur4rise 4aid no attention to him when he wanted to act @uic7ly1 Neurath clutched at straws1 After 9ord Ealifa< and Ivone Bir74atric7 had had a thoroughly de4ressing time with Eitler whom they had found in an evil mood he told them that their visit had nevertheless been useful: ??It was an e<cellent thing to bring the 6uehrer in contact with the outside world1I /' Ee could easily indulge in such glib hy4ocrisies not only for the benefit of his foreign visitors but also for himself1 "4 to the time Eitler came to 4ower Neurath?s career was une<ce4tional1 :bservers who 7new him well"lrich von Eassell whom he had a44ointed Ambassador to Fome 6ranUois-#oncet and Davignon the Belgium Ambassadorthought he was laHy and conventional1 Davignon said he was elo@uent enough E )eu4 but that he made a 4oor s4eech1 #hysically he was im4osing with a heavy e<4ressionless face1 Ee im4ressed his visitors and co-wor7ers with his honesty and good intentions and solid ability to deal in a routine way with the matters at hand1 Ee s4o7e !nglish 6rench and Italian fluently and the re4resentatives of foreign countries li7ed and res4ected him1 It was only when the going turned rough that his defects became a44arent1 Ee acce4ted his rea44ointment as 6oreign Minister from Eitler whom he mistrusted and then the establishment of the Fibbentro4 Bureau which 4aralleled the 6oreign :ffice but was inde4endent of it1 Ee acce4ted the Foehm 4urges =he was to say at Nuremberg that he had heard that he and 6ritsch had been Ion Foehm?s listI>1/+ Ee acce4ted the (ristallnacht and the 4ogroms against the Dews although he undoubtedly o44osed them and thought that they did great harm to Germany?s credit in foreign countries1 -hen Fibbentro4 succeeded him as 6oreign Minister Neurath acce4ted the wholly honorific e<4edient of becoming #resident of a 8ecret .ouncil that held no meetings1 Ee never 4rotested against any of the NaHi e<cesses whether against the Dews or the IAryanI Germans or anyone else1 Ee disli7ed barbaric behavior but he wanted to 7ee4 whatever im4ortant ,ob he held1 8o he comforted himself with the consoling notion that without him matters would certainly be no different and might well be worse1 -hen Fibbentro4 was a44ointed 6oreign Minister Neurath told some of his staff that war could 4robably no longer be avoided but he nevertheless remained eager to be called on by the 6uehrer for any decorative 4ost to which he might be assigned1/% -henever Eitler was successful Neurath congratulated him and went along with the new )e facto situation however doubtful he may have been about it originally1 I;ou may de4lore the fact that Eitler is in 4ower I he told a 6rench di4lomat Ibut this is the fact1I Ee conducted himself accordingly1 IA wea7 nation I he said Iis either booty or a danger I and nothing that

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page_1"1 #age (+( Eitler did either in building u4 Germany?s military strength or in 4utting 4ressure on its neighbors seemed to him to contradict this 4rinci4le1 Eitler?s di4lomacy as well as his cou4s had his full su44ort as long as no large-scale war resulted1 Neurath?s ma,or mista7e came in (*)* when he acce4ted the ,ob of Feichs4rote7tor of .Hechoslova7ia1 The other charges against him at Nuremberg he could 4lausibly refute since the roles he had 4layed in Eitler?s assault on !uro4e were of a 4assive 7ind1 But the 4osition he acce4ted in .Hechoslova7ia was in its nature that of a 4roconsul of National 8ocialism1 -hile Neurath carried out his tas7s with relative humanity he fell into the tra4 of being the correct re4resentative of a criminal state demanding the most brutal 4olicies1 Ee was unable or unwilling to change their basic character or to influence them e<ce4t in minor ways1 Ee did whatever he thought necessary to hold down an im4ortant 4ost1 Ee drafted one of those adulatory messages dictators lovea telegram on behalf of #resident !mil EQcha and the entire 4o4ulation of .Hechoslova7ia assuring Adolf Eitler of their allegiance1 -hen disorders occurred among .Hech students it was his name that a44eared on a decreee of November (( (*)* that closed all .Hech universities for three years1 Eis name also a44eared on the orders to shoot nine of the students who had ta7en 4art in the u4rising although he had 7nown nothing of the incident and had not even been in the country when it occurred1 According to .Hech sources he said to the 4o4ulation ??I shall not hesitate to set u4 a military dictatorshi4 if necessary1 The s4irit of the .Hechs must be bro7en1I /* -hether or not he used these 4recise words he bore the res4onsibility for those whose business it was as he well 7new to brea7 the s4irit of the con@uered1 The Gesta4o and the 8ecurity #olice o4erated not under him in .Hechoslova7ia but under Eimmler1 Eis 8tate 8ecretary Barl Eermann 6ran7 who had been one of the chief NaHi leaders of the 8udetenland had been a44ointed to formulate the German occu4ation 4olicies and to act as the trigger man when the .Hechs retaliated against them1 Eowever the German decrees and countermeasures a44eared under the name and authority of the Feichs4rote7tor1 And in .Hech cities signs reading IFeserved for NeurathI a44eared on the lam44osts1 Ee was a man who found ready e<4lanations convincing to him for any course he too71 Although he testified at Nuremberg that the synagogues remained o4en in #rague while he was there and that far from being anti8emitic he had hel4ed the Dews as much as he could in Germany he had also thought that they had 4enetrated too dee4ly into the German social structure and that the laws directed against them in the 4rofessions and the business and artistic life of Germany were ,ustified1 In a s4eech of 8e4tember (*)) he said IThe stu4id tal7 about 4urely internal affairs as for e<am4le the Dewish @uestion will @uic7ly be silenced if one realiHes that the necessary cleaning u4 of 4ublic life must tem4orarily entail individual cases of 4ersonal

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page_1"2 #age (+& hardshi4 but that nevertheless it only serves to establish all the more firmly the authority of ,ustice and law in Germany1?? 0$ That German life had been too greatly dominated by the alien Dews he still believed he said at Nuremberg but he thought they should have been dealt with in other ways1 And he held much the same views on .Hechoslova7ia1 The vicious decrees may have been written by Eimmler?s re4resentative Barl 6ran7 but Neurath too believed in the Isugarbread and whi4I 4olicy as he said in treatment of .Hechs1 The .Hechs were there to serve the Germans1 In order to carry out their assignments they should be able to s4ea7 fluent German and their marriage laws should follow the German 4attern because the country was to become a colony1 -hen a .Hech committed a crime against a German resident the entire .Hech nation was to be held res4onsible1 If any .Hech did not see the necessity for this he was to be regarded as an enemy of the Feich10( Neurath asserted at Nuremberg that he had delayed as long as he 4ossibly could in issuing the anti-Dewish laws in the 4rotectorate in order to give the Dews an o44ortunity to 4re4are for them but he had acce4ted and agreed with the racial doctrine that declared both .Hechs and Dews inferior 4eo4les1 Nevertheless he thought that any .Hechs who were ca4able of being GermaniHed could be u4graded1 Ee wanted a hard-wor7ing 4ro-German .Hechoslova7ia of artisans and 4roletarians and for this reason he favored the e<4ulsion of the intellectual class which he said had develo4ed in the 4ast twenty years and of those other .Hechs who from a racial 4oint of view should not live in 4ro<imity to Germans10& Ee suited no one in his role of being the conservative old-school German in the new order dominated by the 881 The .Hechs wanted to hang him and Eitler found him too lenient1 At Nuremberg Neurath testified that under his rule .Hech theaters concert halls o4era houses and movies remained o4enC no com4ulsory labor e<istedCL #rague had a .Hech mayor and a German assistant mayor1 In an article in the Euro2aeische /evue of March &* (*)* he wrote that in Bohemia and Moravia Eitler had created conditions for ,ustice that his own ,ob as Feichs4rote7tor was to foster them and that the .Hechs were to develo4 undisturbed1 But his letter of August )( (*/$ to Feich 8ecretary 9ammers revealed a different 4oint of view1 Ee enclosed a memorandum from Barl Eermann 6ran7 with which he said he was in full agreement1 The memorandum made the following 4oints: The seven million .Hechs were a source of L -hen the wor7ing 4ower for Germany1 They could not be de4orted there was no .Hech universities and other institutions of higher learning were ordered closed two members of Neurath?s staff suggested sending the (% $$$ students to forced labor either in Germany or .Hechoslova7ia1 Neurath a44arently too7 no 4osition in the matter1 In an interrogation of 8e4tember (& (*/' he said that .Hech students had been given forty-eight hours to find manual wor71 If unsuccessful they were to be sent to Germany1 =National Archives Mhereinafter referred to as NAN Interrogation of *2(&2/'1 Also N TGII 441 (0 and +(1>

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page_1"3 #age (+) 4lace for them to be sent and some of them were of a blond Germanic ty4e and showed signs of assimilability1 These should be GermaniHed and their standard of living raised1 6armers should be given the advantages of German agricultural 4olicy the middle class and wor7ers assisted youth reeducated1 The .Hech ??historical mythI was to be obliterated and no one would get on without a 4erfect 7nowledge of the German language1 The .Hech language would become a dialect as it had been in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries1 -ith almost % $$$ urban and rural administrative units the Germans had to ma7e use of .Hech administrators on a large scale in order to govern1 The relationshi4 was a sensitive one: the .Hechs should not be com4letly degraded to the status of As7ari or of a ?4urely au<iliary race1I They were to be destroyed not as a 4eo4le but as a nationC they were to be assimilated into Germany1 Any elements who o44osed this 4rocess of GermaniHation would be roughly handled1 Facially unassimilable .Hechs and the intelligentsia who were anti-German would be e<4elled or given Is4ecial treatmentIthat is e<ecuted1L #olitically Bohemia and Moravia were to be 4art of the Feich and for racial reasons they were to be 4o4ulated by Germans and GermaniHed .Hechs1 0) Neurath did not write this memorandum but he did e<4ress concurrence with its views and as7ed 9ammers to arrange an interview with the 6uehrer for him together with his 8tate 8ecretary 6ran710/ At Nuremberg Neurath told the court he had had to say he agreed with the 6ran7 memorandum as a tactic to 4ersuade Eitler toward moderation1 The evidence however did not su44ort him for Eitler had in fact decided in favor of the 4olicy favored by Neurath and 6ran7namely GermaniHation of the .Hechs1 And in a memorandum he did write Neurath e<4ressed similar ideas: IIt will 1 1 1 be a case 1 1 1 of 7ee4ing those .Hechs who are suitable for GermaniHation by individual selective breeding while on the other hand of e<4elling those who are not useful from a racial stand4oint or are enemies of the Feich that is the intelligentsia which has develo4ed in the last twenty years1I00 Neurath was not a man who would favor a 4olicy of e<terminating racially undesirable elements or the anti-German .Hech intelligentsia1 Ee would never have ordered the destruction of 9idice for he disli7ed violent re4risals and 7illings1 Ee ,ust wanted .Hechoslova7ia and its 4eo4le to become as useful to Germany as 4ossible1 It was 6ran7 who wrote about Is4ecial treatment I and it was Neurath wanting to im4ress Eitler with his Heal who said he agreed with what 6ran7 wrote1 -hen the 6uehrer informed him in 8e4tember (*/( that he was sending Eeydrich to #rague because Neurath?s 4olicies were too lenient Neurath refused to return to his 4ost and went on leave1 Eis official resignation did not ta7e 4lace until :ctober (*/)an e<am4le of his clinging to a ,ob and the shadow of res4ectability1 The testimony of L Neurath did not at the time George 81 Messersmith former American .onsul Gen7now the meaning of the term he testified at Nuremberg1 =N TGII 41 ($/1>

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page_1"4 #age (+/ eral in Berlin and later Minister to Austria was categorically denied by Neurath as it was by the other defendants whom Messersmith testified against1 Messersmith?s affidavit 4al4ably e<aggerated in im4ortant 4laces and his testimony that Neurath and #a4en both of whom had 7nown him slightly had disclosed to him the NaHi 4lan for the domination first of Austria and then of .Hechoslova7ia was unli7ely on the face of it1 The trials at Nuremberg and later !ichmann?s trial in Derusalem were to elicit such testimony on the 4art of witnesses who not only wanted to inflate their own roles but were determined to ta7e 4art in bringing the accused to ,ustice1 The court does not seem to have given much weight to testimony that was obviously 4art of a fantasy in which the witnesses 4layed momentous roles against tyranny1 The tyranny was real enough whether or not the accused had 4layed the 4art he was charged with1 In denying Messersmith?s charges both Neurath and #a4en 4ointed out that they would scarcely have disclosed such confidential information even if it had e<isted to a man they 7new so slightly and who was avowedly anti-German1 But Neurath?s defense could not gainsay what he himself had written nor his years of collaboration with the regime he 7new to be criminal1 It was true that he had made no use of the handsome gift the 6uehrer had made to him of &0$ $$$ FM and that he had only acce4ted a German 4ainting of no great value sent to him on his seventieth birthday1 Ee had made little use of the #arty?s Golden Badge of Eonor bestowed u4on him or of the 88 uniform 4rovided for him as for the other high members of the Feich?s di4lomatic service1 It was true too that his efforts to treat the .Hechs with some decency and humanity led to his being re4laced by Feinhard Eeydrich who would 7now how to carry out the measures of the 8D without any attem4t to win the .Hechs over with ??sugarbread1I But Neurath had deserved the dubious honors he acce4ted1 Ee had been one of the bridges between the old Germany and the new1 Things could not be so bad many critics of Eitler?s 4olicies would say if the Neuraths and #a4ens were there1 In A4ril (*/+ months after the Nuremberg trial was over Neurath told an Allied interrogator loo7ing for information for other 4rosecutions that he had 7nown nothing of the e<istence of AuschwitH1 Eis testimony may well be believed for he had no curiosity about un4leasant matters1 0' Neurath had been most useful to Eitler in his 4lace and time1 In (*)& when Eitler was trying to 4ersuade Eindenburg to ma7e him .hancellor one of the 4romises he made to 4rove his moderation was that he would 7ee4 Neurath as 6oreign Minister1 Neurath had not only added res4ectability to Eitler?s government but had also on occasion given him shrewd advice1 In (*)' he told the 6uehrer he did not thin7 6rance and !ngland would react if a German division reoccu4ied the Fhineland1 Ee was well thought of in !ngland and 6rance1 Ee was 7nown to be a gentleman of the old school 4atriotic but o44osed to war and to e<cesses against the Dews or anyone else1 -hen he later continued to defend the regime and acce4ted the office of

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page_1" #age (+0 one of its chief 4roconsuls when he s4o7e of the necessity for Germany?s setting its own house in order without foreign interference and incor4orating the hard-wor7ing 4eo4le of central !uro4e in its new order he did much on behalf of Eitler?s credit among certain conservative circles in Germany if not in foreign countries1 Ee was always willing even if he found it distasteful to wor7 with Eimmler?s man Barl 6ran7 and to have orders for the e<ecution of .Hech hostages go out under his name along with other decrees of re4risal that he did not write1 Neurath was the man !ngland would have li7ed the German Government to send as re4resentative of the Feich at the coronation of !dward GIII1 Ee had many friends in Britain and had been received in 4rivate audience by George G1 !veryone had confidence in him e<ce4t the men of the German Fesistance1 The Fesistance 7new he disli7ed NaHism but also 7new he would do nothing about getting rid of it1 Instead he would continue to serve it in his uncom4laining cautious way1 -eiHsaec7er in (*/$ thought him lost in dreams of victory with no 7nowledge of the sector of the war that was not going well for the Feichfor e<am4le the high losses of submarinesnor was there any serious com4laint to be heard from Neurath about the outrages1 Neurath certainly did not want the .Hechs the #oles or the Dews to be dealt with as he 7new them to be nor had he wanted war but li7e #a4en he could never get off the red car4et until it was ,er7ed out from under him1 Ee told the court in his final 4lea that it should act in the s4irit of 6ran7lin Foosevelt the father of this trial whose lamentable early death had been a loss for the entire world1 Foosevelt he said had laid the groundstone for the tem4le of 4eace of the 4eo4le of the world1 But des4ite such efforts to tal7 the language of Germany?s con@uerors he could be shar4 in his re,oinders to Allied cross-e<aminers1 Ma<well-6yfe at one 4oint im4lied that Neurath was not telling the truth and a moment later Neurath called him a liar1 -hen the Fussian ,udge Ni7itchen7o as7ed him whether he had ever e<4ressed in the 4ress or at any 4ublic meetings any disagreement with Eitler Neurath re4lied ??No 1 1 1 there was no freedom of the 4ress any longer any more than in Fussia1I 0+ Ni7itchen7o said he was not as7ing him about Fussia1 The ,udgment of the court said that Neurath had advised Eitler in connection with the German withdrawal from the Disarmament .onference of (*)) and the 9eague of Nations and on the 4assage of the law for universal military service1 It stated that he had been a 7ey figure in the negotiation of the naval accord with Britain and had told Eitler German troo4s could reoccu4y the Fhineland without re4risals from 6rance1 Ee had also told the "nited 8tates Ambassador to 6rance that the German Government would do nothing in foreign affairs until Ithe Fhineland had been digested I and that once the fortifications there had been constructed and 6rance could not invade Germany at will the other !uro4ean countries would begin to

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page_1"! #age (+' feel differently about their foreign 4olicies1 -ith 7nowledge of Eitler?s aggressive 4lans Neurath had retained a formal relationshi4 with the NaHi Government as Feich Minister -ithout #ortfolio #resident of the 8ecret .abinet .ouncil and member of the Feich Defense .ouncil1 Ee had told the British Ambassador at the time of the Anschluss with Austria that this had not been brought about by a German ultimatum and he had told the .Hechoslova7ian Minister that Germany intended to abide by its arbitration convention with .Hechsolova7ia1 Ee had 4artici4ated in the last 4hase of the negotiations 4receding the Munich 4act1 If one acce4ts the ,udgment?s statements as fact it is difficult to see what was criminal in anything Neurath did as 6oreign Minister1 Eis advice to Eitler on the Fhineland occu4ation and his statement on its refortification were borne out by the events and were no more than the 7ind of a44reciation of the situation that any foreign minister might be e<4ected to ma7e1 It is unli7ly that Neurath 7new of the German ultimatum to 8chuschnigg =see 8eyss-In@uart .ha4t1 ((>C in any event he was no longer in office when it was sent1 Eis statement to the .Hechoslova7ian Minister doubtless seemed to Neurath true at the time and he 4layed a smaller 4art in the destruction of the country than the British and 6rench1 0% Neurath was convicted on all four counts and sentenced to fifteen years in 4rison of which he served eight being one of the few to leave 84andau before the end of his sentence1 An old man of eighty-one and in ill health he returned to his estate at 9einfelder Eof near 8tuttgart on November ' (*0/1 Ee died there on August (/ (*0'1 "nli7e #a4en and Fibbentro4 4erha4s because of his age he made no effort to write his memoirs or to ,ustify his course of action1 6ranH Gon #a4en Three defendants at Nuremberg were found not guilty of the charges against them and were freed by the tribunal from the custody of the Allied governments1 :ne of them was 6ranH von #a4en1 It too7 a long time however before any of the three were out of 4rison1 #a4en li7e the others was 4rom4tly arrested after he left the Nuremberg ,ail1 The German authorities in -uerttemberg and Bavaria brought charges against him and he was 4ut on trial as a ??ma,or offenderI under the denaHification laws1 Two German courts found him guilty1 The first sentenced him early in (*/+ to eight years in 4rison1 The second in Danuary (*/* 4ointing out that he had been in confinement since May % (*/0 4laced him in a lesser category of IoffendersI and freed him with a fine of )$ $$$ mar7s which were to be a contribution to the restitution funds given 4eo4le who had suffered under the NaHis and with further 4enalties that de4rived him of the right to vote to get a 4ension from the 8tate to hold office to wor7 at anything but ordinary labor or to drive a car1

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page_1"" #age (++ The feeling against #a4en among large sections of the German 4ublic es4ecially among the anti-NaHis who held 4olitical office under the Allied occu4ation after the warwas intensely hostile1 The staff of the main hos4ital in Nuremberg drew u4 a resolution saying they did not wish to have him as a 4atient when he sought to go there after his release from ,ail1 In a German 4rison a former 88 man later ,udged insane attac7ed him and bro7e his ,aw and nose1 As in the case of 8chacht a wave of indignation rose over his ac@uittal by the International Military Tribunal1 #eo4le li7e the 8#D =8oHialdemo7ratische #artei Deutschlands> Minister #resident of Bavaria -ilhelm Eoegner 4rofessed themselves unable to understand how the man who had 4layed a leading role in bringing Eitler to 4ower and then had collaborated with him by acce4ting im4ortant offices during all the years Eitler was .hancellor should be freed by the International Military Tribunal or any other court1L At Nuremberg #a4en was formally accused on only one count of the indictment: of having ta7en 4art in the 4re4aration for the waging of aggressive warfare in violation of international treaties1 In the course of his trial the main charge develo4ed against him was that he had 4re4ared the way for Eitler to become .hancellor and then 4layed a crucial role in hel4ing the 6uehrer get his stranglehold on the 4olitical life of the country1 But #a4en could be formally charged only under .ount :ne of the indictment and he had no difficulty in showing that he had in fact always o44osed the war and had regarded it as a catastro4he for Germany1 -hat the German courts accused him of had little to do with the 4re4arations to wage war but a great deal to do with his moral res4onsibilitysomething the Allies could only touch on at Nuremberg1 #a4en li7e Neurath had thrown his full su44ort to the NaHis at critical times1 -ithout his hel4 Eitler might never have succeeded in becoming .hancellor through legal means1 And this matter of legality was of great im4ortanceC it was always to 4lay a decisive role both in Eitler?s thin7ing and in 4ublic o4inion1 It was one of the counters in the defense of the regime by the res4ectable and a4olitical officers and bureaucrats who had been brought u4 to serve the head of state whether they li7ed him or not and whether or not they a44roved his 4olicies1 #a4en came from an ancient -est4halian family1 Ee was a devout .atholic a career officer a monarchist by conviction =although he was a member of the .enter #arty and one of its re4resentatives in the #russian 9andtag>1 Ee had the outward as4ects of conservative res4ectability: he was graceful in manner li7ed horses and rode as a gentleman ,oc7ey and had married the daughter of a rich industrialist1 Ee believed in the benevolent leadershi4 of the ObrigkeitC in decent wages for wor7ers who fitted into their 4lace in a L Eoegner .hristian society of order and mutual good feeling where management made said ??The verdict is a scandal1 I will see to it that these gentlemen are rearrested at the 4rison gatesI =6ranH von #a4en er !ahrheit eine 6asse MMunich: #aul 9ist Gerlag (*0&N 41 '0&>1

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page_1"# #age (+% wise decisions gratefully acce4ted by the underlingsC and in higher farm 4rices for ban7ru4t landowners both small and large1 A general staff officer he had an undistinguished but meritorious military career in -orld -ar I during which he also served as military attachJ to -ashington with lamentable results1 The "nited 8tates De4artment of 8tate re@uested his recall for having attem4ted to organiHe sabotage of American armaments 4roduction for the Allies including a 4lan to blow u4 two .anadian railroad bridges in order to slow down the reinforcement of the British Army in 6rance1 A strong anti-German sentiment had been built u4 in the "nited 8tates by s7illful Allied 4ro4aganda on a thin layer of alleged war crimes1 #a4en contributed to this sentiment1 Eis amateurish dealings with German agents and with adventurers who as4ired to become agents =the man to whom he gave Y0$$ to blow u4 one of the .anadian bridges was arrested when he crossed the border into .anada> were failures1 Ee did achieve one thing for his country: he established a munitions factory wor7ing for Germany in Bridge4ort1 8ince it could not shi4 anything to Germany it had the 4ur4ose of consuming @uantities of scarce raw materials such as gun4owder so as to 4revent their going into war 4roduction for the Allies1 The firm did succeed in buying u4 scarce commodities but its o4erations had no a44reciable effect on the flood of arms and ammunition going overseas1 #a4en?s worst failure came in connection with this dummy com4any1 A member of his staff Dr1 Eeinrich Albert traveling on the 8i<th Avenue elevated in New ;or7 fell aslee4 with his briefcase alongside him full of material including letters com4romising #a4en for involvement in activities on behalf of the .entral #owers1 The aide wo7e u4 befuddled and forgot his briefcase when he left the train at the 0$th 8treet station1 8uddenly remembering it he started bac7 for the train only to see a man going off with it racing to a ta<i and getting away1 Three days later the New ;or7 !orl) told the story of more German cloa7-anddagger machinations in the "nited 8tates1 The article told about #a4en?s attem4t to organiHe wor7ers of German and Austrian descent in 4lants wor7ing for the Allies to 4ersuade them to slow down 4roduction and about his sending information to Germany on shi44ing movements to !ngland and 6rancethrough corres4ondence on what seemed to be commercial transactions1 Nor was this all1 A few wee7s later #a4en wrote a letter to his wife in Germany which he entrusted to an American ,ournalist to deliver 4ast the Allied bloc7ade1 It read in 4art: ??They stole unluc7ily from the good Albert in the !levated a whole thic7 4ortfolio 1 1 1 Eow s4lendid on the !astern frontP I always say to these idiotic ;an7ees that they should shut their mouths or better still e<4ress their admiration for all that heroism1I 0* !nglish officers found this letter as they searched the ,ournalist?s luggage at 6almouth and it was 4ublished in the "nited 8tates1 #a4en was always to have trouble with his 4a4ers1 -hen he was declared 2ersona non grata by the "nited 8tates Government and sent bac7 to Ger-

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page_1"$ #age (+* many with a British safe-conduct on the Dutch shi4 Nor)am British officials searched his baggage as the shi4 sto44ed at 6almouth and over #a4en?s violent 4rotests too7 away 4ersonal 4a4ers filled with further details =including canceled chec7s given the men who were to blow u4 the .anadian bridges> of his attem4ts to set u4 a s4y networ71 This material soon a44eared with devastating effect in Allied 4ro4aganda and in accounts of German onslaughts against American neutrality1 9ater in the war when serving in #alestine #a4en went on leave from NaHareth to Germany and left behind in his @uarters another batch of incriminating documents1 -hen the British ca4tured the ancient town they found the 4a4ers in #a4en?s luggage and made good use of them1 :ne of #a4en?s collaborators .a4tain von Fintelen later charged that as a result of the study of these documents which concerned among other things rebellion in Ireland and India and sabotage in the "nited 8tates a number of the 4lotters were 4ic7ed u4 by the British and Americans and either im4risoned or e<ecuted1 '$ .asting about for a 4lace in the disorganiHed 4olitical life of 4ost--orld -ar I Germany #a4en chose the .atholic .enter #arty for his allegiance and in (*&) bought /+ 4er cent of the stoc7 of its leading 4a4er the 6ermania thus becoming chairman of its board of directors1 Though a monarchist at heart with little confidence in the struggling democracy of -eimar Germany #a4en saw that the .enter #arty with its strong .atholic ties and its middle-of-the-road 4osition had far more a44eal to a wide base of the electorate than one of the nationalist 4arties he might also have chosen as his own1 In his memoirs #a4en said that his gaining control of the 6ermania came as a bombshell to the .enter #arty leadershi41 Ee 4rom4tly fired the editor of the 4a4er and set out to im4ose on the 4arty members his version of the line the 4arty should follow setting off a struggle that was to continue for eight years1 #a4en the dilettante 4olitician with a vague 4rogram was never acce4ted by the 4arty as a valid s4o7esman nor even as a de4endable member1 A few wee7s before he became .hancellor the 4arty disavowed him as a de4uty in the #russian 9andtag1 And although he had 4romised Monsignor Baas the head of the .enter #arty that he would not acce4t the chancellorshi4 in the 4lace of Bruening he did acce4t it and was immediately re4udiated by the .entrist members of the Feichstag as he had been in the 9andtag who voted not to su44ort his government1'( #a4en?s com4letely une<4ected a44ointment to the chancellorshi4 on May )( (*)& seemed absurd and scandalous to observers li7e 6ranUois-#oncet as well as to #a4en?s colleagues1 It seemed to them that in addition to his 4olitical ine<4erience and ine4titude the most 4rimitive 4olitical ethics would have 4revented him from succeeding a member of his own 4arty1 Eis only 4olitical e<4erience had been as a de4uty in the #russian 9andtag where although nominally a .entrist he had been su44orted in the elections by members of other 4artiesfarmers and landowners ma7ing a comfortable if 4recarious living from their farms in -est4halia1 They were mainly national-

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page_1#0 #age (%$ ists fearful of both the radical Fight and 9eft that threatened the stability they yearned for and 4ic7ed their way among the 4latforms 4rograms and candidates of the thirty-two 4arties each with its 4rivate solution for the woes of the nation1 The 4rices of farm 4roducts were catastro4hically low in Germany at the time of the de4ression as they were in the rest of the ca4italist countries including the "nited 8tates1 German farms and estates were heavily mortgaged and the attem4ts by way of farm loans and subsidies to bail out the landowners resulted in re4eated scandals owing to the misuse of the money loaned to the large estates1 Instead of im4roving their farms many owners too7 tri4s to the Fiviera or otherwise dis4orted themselves in nonagricultural 4ursuits1 The farm 4roblem remained unsolved1 #a4en shared the confusion of the agrarians and as one of them o44osed Bruening?s efforts toward a land reform that would have bro7en large and inefficient estates into small holdings1 Eindenburg?s toleration of Bruening?s farm 4olicy cost him the undivided allegiance of the Fight-wing nationalist 4arties which in the first 4residential balloting of (*)& ran a rival candidatethe 8tahlhelm leader Theodor Duesterberg1 Eis candidacy forced the 6ield Marshal who received /*1' 4er cent of the votes into a runoff with Eitler whom he could scarcely bring himself to s4ea7 to1 Eitler got )$1( 4er cent of the votes Duesterberg '1% 4er cent and the other candidates a scattering of votes1 Eindenburg?s re,ection of Bruening and his choice of #a4en came at a time when the aging #resident was showing increasing evidence of senility1 Eindenburg at eighty-five was still ca4able on his ??good daysI of writing a concise estimate of the general 4olitical situation but on other days he was uncertain about the identity of his Feich .hancellor1 '& In this 4eriod Eindenburg turned bac7 more and more to his old habits of thought reciting the military 4rece4ts of obedience and duty and Treue to ,ustify his often arbitrary decisions and violating them himself when he was caught in the welter of 4olicies he could no longer master1 In these last years he relied on four or five 4eo4le he trusted to advise him in the face of the constantly growing threat of the e<treme Fight and 9eft: General -ilhelm Groener an honorable and intelligent man with no gift for 4olitics or for a44earing before the 4ublic who was both the Minister of Defense =since (*&%> and of the Interior =since :ctober (*)(>C Burt von 8chleicher one of the ine4t 4olitical generals in German life a 7ingma7er with burning ambitions of himself one day becoming 7ingC :tto von Meissner the #resident?s 8taatsse7retaer cautious and 7nowledgeableC Eindenburg?s son :s7ar a man of limited understanding whose chief talent lay in being the obse@uious and devoted son of an illustrious fatherC and Eeinrich Bruening a sober scholarly and scru4ulous man who as a former officer although a former lieutenant of reserve had Eindenburg?s res4ect but never his full confidence1 :n the other hand he li7ed and trusted #a4en1

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page_1#1 #age (%( As Eindenburg?s 4roblems multi4lied and the other advisers slowly lost favor the role of his son became more and more im4ortant1 -ho was to see the #resident was decided by :s7ar rather than by the far more so4histicated Meissner who had been 8taatsse7retaer under 6riedrich !bert and continued to serve in that ca4acity under Eindenburg and Eitler1 :s7ar became the main bridge between the #resident and his other advisers1 Groener the former staff officer had little 4olitical shrewdness1 Eindenburg could overloo7 this failing but he could not forgive Groener?s hasty marriage followed five months later by the birth of a son who was nic7named Nurmi after the 6innish runner in ribald Army circles1 Eindenburg was a #russian 4uritan and it was not far from treason for a high officer to do anything that could bring 4ublic ridicule on the Army or the head of state1 In the runoff election when Eindenburg was chosen #resident in (*)& for the second time defeating Eitler with 0) 4er cent of the votes cast =(* )'$ $$$ to () /(% $$$> he owed his re-election to the 4arties of the .enter and the 9eft1 The Fight had 4ut two candidates in the field against himEitler and Duesterberg1 It was the .enter and the 8ocial Democrats =Eindenburg?s chief o44onents in the election of (*&0> who now in their fear of the NaHis 4rovided the crucial su44ort against the radicals of the Fight and 9eft1 9oss of the election was a hard blow to the National 8ocialists who had set high ho4es on it1 Eitler had e<4ected to win with his new allies in Alfred Eugenberg?s 4arty which voted for the un7nown Duesterberg on the first ballot but was instructed to vote for the NaHis in the runoff1 All the election had done for Eitler was to ma7e him a citiHen1 As a stateless 4erson he could not run for the #residency and an obliging National 8ocialist Dietrich Blagges a Minister in the Brunswic7 Government had arranged for his a44ointment to a minor 4ost in the state administration on 6ebruary &0 (*)&1 =8ee .ha4t1 +1> This act conferred German citiHenshi4 on the 6uelirer1 Eindenburg was uneasy in his alliance with Bruening1 Ee resented his de4endence on forces that had formerly o44osed himC the socialism of the 8#D was anathemaC the correct intellectual 4arliamentarian Bruening was never sym4athetic to him1 Bruening?s foreign 4olicies had failed to gain recognition of Germany?s right-toarms e@uality and he had failed to get a customs union with Austria1 Ee could command no stable coalition in the Feichstag and the 4lans to settle war veterans on derelict estates had cost the su44ort of the Fight1 Among the handful of men who now were close to Eindenburg was General von 8chleicher who had served in the same regiment as his son :s7ar1 8chleicher although he had flirted with the 9eft including the .ommunists since the early days of the Fe4ublic remained a monarchist1 As an officer of the general staff he was concerned with 4olitics but seemingly as Eindenburg thought was untainted by them1 -hen 8chleicher 4ro4osed #a4en as Bruening?s successor he 4ic7ed a man who

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page_1#2 #age (%& also a44ealed to Eindenburga man the #resident could both trust and understand1 #a4en?s choice was in a sense a4olitical1 :ne of Bruening?s last acts had been to ban the wearing of uniforms by the 8A and 88 whose incessant 4arades with accom4anying street fighting were an essential 4art of the NaHi strategy to im4ress the electorate and to 4aralyHe their o44onents1 Neither 8chleicher nor Groener nor Eindenburg had fully a44roved of the decree demanded by Bruening1 Im4ortant in 8chleicher?s strategy was the 4lan for strengthening his own and Germany?s military 4osition by using the 8A and the 88 as a militia =their numbers had risen to '$$ $$$ in (*)&> to augment the Army of ($$ $$$ men which was inade@uate to 4rotect the German borders even against the #oles1 The #oles using the disorder created by the NaHis as a 4rete<t might at any time the German Eigh .ommand feared march into !ast #russia as they had into Gilna and the former Fussian 4rovinces on their eastern border1 8o Eindenburg 8chleicher and #a4en were united in their willingness to see the 8A bac7 in the streets1 They considered the ban on them onesided since the uniformed bodies of the other 4artiesthe 8tahlhelm the Feichsbanner of the 8ocialists even the 6ront7aem4ferbund of the .ommunistswere not forbidden although the NaHis had been mainly res4onsible for the violence that came out of the 4ro4aganda marches1 A few months after Bruening had become .hancellor the NaHis had raised their vote from the %$$ $$$ obtained on May &$ (*&% to almost '10 million in the election of 8e4tember (/ (*)$ where /1' million new voters cast their ballots for the first time1 -ith ($+ seats in the Feichstag the National 8ocialists were the second largest 4arty1 The 8ocial Democrats 4olled over %10 million votes and although they were reduced from (0& seats to (/) were the largest 4arty1 The .ommunists had ++ de4utiesC the .enter '%1 Bruening was unable to get this well-organiHed raucous hec7ling brawling National 8ocialist minority off his bac7 and also was unable to organiHe a 4arliamentary ma,ority1 Ee re4resented everything the radicals hated: he was religious and moderate and fearless in denouncing the 6ar Fight and 6ar 9eft1 Ee ruled through the unstable alliance cemented by a common fear of the NaHis and the .ommunists and by the writ of Eindenburg1 The 8ocialists of the 8#D were the unnatural allies of his half-authoritarian .entrist regime1 Because he commanded no 4arliamentary ma,ority he had to rule by 4residential decree1 Eis enemies were all the rest of the 4arties1L -hen in Duly (*)( the ban7s closed and the savings de4artments shut their windows re4arations =in theory> had still to be 4aid the L Bruening?s .abinet of A4ril )$ (*)$ had re4resentatives from five countries that 4arties: .enter =Aentrum> Democrats =Demo7raten> German #eo4le?s #arty =Deutsche Gol7s4artei> Bavarian #eo4le?s #arty =Bayerische Gol7s4artei> and #eo4le?s .onservative #arty =Bonservative Gol7s4artei>1 This gave him a total of &$$ out of /*( votes in the Feichstag1 After the National 8ocialist victory in 8e4tember he attem4ted in :ctober (*)( to form a cabinet ??above the 4arties I in which Eindenburg?s friend Groener was both Minister of Defense and Minister of the Interior1

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page_1#3 #age (%) had won the war and were in the gri4 of the same de4ression1 No -estern nation succeeded in mastering the worsening de4ression and Bruening no longer had any 7ind of economic or 4olitical base to o4erate from1 :n May )$ (*)& the day he resigned and #a4en was a44ointed Eindenburg summoned Eitler and Goering to the 4residential 4alace to tell them the news and to say in a bid for their su44ort that the Feichstag would be dissolved new elections held and the ban on the 8A lifted if Eitler would 4romise to ??tolerateI the #a4en regime1 Eitler did not hesitate to say he wouldC he had confidence in the result of new elections1 Eitler and #a4en met for the first time on Dune * (*)& L a wee7 after #a4en had become .hancellor and both affirmed the 4romises made when the 6uehrer had met Eindenburg: #a4en would lift the ban on the Brownshirts Eitler would tolerate the #a4en .abinet the Feichstag would be dissolved and new elections held1 That was all Eitler needed1 #a4en had no 4o4ular 4olitical su44ort and without the bac7ing of his former .enter #arty a voter could not cast a ballot in his favor even if he wanted to1 -ith the NaHi uniformed formations free to flood bac7 on the streets in a Germany where one-third of the 4o4ulation was living meagerly from 4ublic funds =Bruening in an effort to stabiliHe finances had cut relief allowances of families with children from &$ FM a month to ($ FM and had lowered the salaries of government officials by &$ 4er cent> and no 4art of either economic or 4olitical life was functioning normally #a4en was very nearly the chosen instrument to clear the way for a great NaHi victory1 Ee and Eitler met not in the Feich .hancellery but 4rivately in the home of a friend of 8chleicher?s-erner von Alvensleben a brother of the 4resident of the Eerren7lub and an admirer of Eitler1 The 6uehrer agreed to 7ee4 his Brownshirt de4uties in the Feichstag @uiet while #a4en ,ourneyed to 9ausanne to meet with the Allies1 This concession was in no way inconsistent with Eitler?s 4ur4ose of tolerating #a4en?s government for a short time1 #a4en a man without a 4arty with borrowed 4olicies no different from those of the half-authoritarian half-4arliamentarian men of the Fight and .enter against whom Eitler cam4aigned so successfully could not last long1 The National 8ocialists were certain to increase their numbers at his e<4ense1 And more im4ortant than the Feichstag were the streets1 6ollowing #a4en?s lifting of the 4rohibition against the NaHis wearing uniforms a fresh wave of rioting bro7e out1 Between Dune ( =4ermission to wear the uniforms was given on Dune (/> and Duly &$ +& 4eo4le were 7illed and /*+ badly wounded1 ') In the midst of these signs of revolution the Feichstag was a sounding board1 #a4en li7e Bruening had to govern without a 4arliamentary ma,ority and both had to resort to the device of invo7ing Article /% L This is the date given by #a4en1 Goebbels says they first met on May )( and a number of writers say a second meeting too7 4lace on Dune () =:tto Meissner and Earry -ilde ie Machtergreifung M8tuttgart: D1 G1 .otta?sche Buchhandlung (*0%N 441 %% &+*>1

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page_1#4 #age (%/ of the constitution under which emergency legislationlater to be a44roved by the Feichstagcould be enacted by the .hancellor under a 4residential decree1 Bruening?s cabinet had been based not on #arliament but on Eindenburg1 6rom (*&0 to (*)$ no use of emergency decrees had been made1 6rom December (*)$ to A4ril (*)( (* laws were enacted by the Feichstag and & emergency laws were decreedC from A4ril to December (*)( /$ emergency laws were decreed under Article /% and no law was enacted by the FeichstagC in (*)& 0 laws were a44roved by the Feichstag while 0* emergency laws were decreed1 The Feichstag held */ sessions in (*)$ /( in (*)( and only () in (*)&1 '/ Bruening had had to use Article /% increasingly toward the end of his first term as .hancellor which began in A4ril (*)$ and in his second term which began in :ctober (*)(1 Ee had stayed in office with the hel4 of the 8#D which =however much it disa44roved of his 4arty and 4olicies> wanted at all costs to avoid a Eitler dictatorshi4 of the 6ar Fight that might come at any time either through a general election giving the NaHis and their allies a ma,ority or through Eindenburg?s a44ointing Eitler as .hancellor1 Bruening?s attem4t at agrarian reform as many writers have 4ointed out was the final blow to his relationshi4 with the old #resident who was under great 4ressure =from his friends and landowning neighbors in !ast #russia with estates often mortgaged for more than they were worth> to get rid of the ??agrarian Bolshevi7I who wanted land redistributed for the benefit of the unem4loyed more than he wanted to bail out the landowners1 Bruening was never more than a tolerable e<4edient for Eindenburg and when it had become clear that he could only continue to govern by means of emergency decrees the #resident had turned to one of the last measures o4en to him: creating as he thought through #a4en a regime that this time would be truly Iabove the 4arties I conservative Godfearing and would conceivably bring about a unity of the Fight including the National 8ocialists in a coalition1 #a4en with a coalition cabinet had to use the same tactics as Bruening but he lac7ed the 4arliamentary su44ort of the .enter and 9eft that had bac7ed Bruening and also of most of the Fight1 Ee had a scattering of votes among the nationalist 4arties but no 4o4ular su44ort no 4olitical organiHation of any 7ind1 Eindenburg had told him he wanted a cabinet Iabove 4oliticsImeaning a 4residential cabinet that would not have to try to govern with a ma,ority in #arliament1 -hat he got was a cabinet without a following in or outside the Feichstag1 #a4en and his cabinet of barons industrialists and landowners =it included 6reiherr von Neurath as 6oreign Minister and .ount 8chwerin von Brosig7 who would later serve Eitler as Minister of 6inance> had the short-lived su44ort of the un4redictable 8chleicher who was nursing his own ambitions and of the #resident who li7ed the former general staff officer?s 4leasant and courteous manner his IconservativeI belief in an authoritarian state with due regard for the 4ro4rieties and above all his desire for a restoration of the monarchy1 #a4en

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page_1# #age (%0 seemed to Eindenburg in the welter of the German 4arliamentary system ??a sound man1I #a4en?s religion was also thought to be an advantage for it showed that Eindenburg was not as 4eo4le sometimes said anti-.atholic1 But #a4en could never 4ossibly obtain a wor7ing ma,ority in the Feichstag and Eindenburg could not long su44ort him against the 4olitical realities1 Bruening had been the victim of rising unem4loyment of low 4rices for farm commodities of the dee4ening economic crisis engulfing the -estern world1 The crisis seemed most ho4eless in the Germany of a lost war and 4ostwar inflation1 !verything Bruening had attem4ted seemed doomed to fail or to come too late: the customs union with AustriaC a solution of the farm crisis with controlled 4rices and an agrarian reform that sought to divide u4 the uneconomic estates in !ast #russiaC the recognition of German e@uality in armament either by an increase in the German forces or by a reduction of the forces of the other 4owersC and the effort to end re4arations1 Both in his foreign and his domestic 4olicies he lac7ed the success that s4ar7s a 4o4ular following1 Ee was far from being the demagogue who li7e Eitler could 4romise everything1 #a4en?s solutions were merely tactical1 Ee sought to move the weight of the coalition that had been behind the Bruening Government from the 9eft and .enter to the Fight but in order to do this he had to gain the su44ort not only the toleration of Eitler1 Ee had to bring Eitler into coo4eration with a government without a 4arty1 It was a ho4eless tas71 #a4en came bac7 from the Disarmament .onference at 9ausanne on Duly * (*)& with no more to show for his efforts at gaining arms e@uality for Germany than Bruening had shown before him1 As he made the case for German arms e@uality at 9ausanne he indulged in a characteristic #a4enian gesture1 '0 Ee told Eerriot that since 6rance would always be afraid of German rearmament a 7ind of common general staff should be established: 6rench officers should be assigned to duty in a German general staff and would thereu4on 7now all Germany?s military 4lans once such a staff =forbidden by Gersailles> were recogniHed along with Germany?s right to arms e@uality1 Eerriot according to #a4en succeeded in getting the 4reliminary a44roval of his cabinet for this revolutionary 4ro4osal but !ngland cast a firm veto for if this coo4eration of German and 6rench general staff officers should wor7 out unli7ely as that might be it would lead to an overwhelming military force on the .ontinent and 4ermanently u4set the balance of 4ower1 Neither 6rance nor Germany was 4re4ared for military collaboration after the bitter war1 9i7e so many of #a4en?s solutions the scheme was a fantasy a )eus e4 machina a device1 Ee then sought to have at least the war-guilt clause e<4urgated from the Gersailles Treaty but the 4ro4osal at 9ausanne to annul this article was unanimously defeated1 -hat was decided was that Germany was to ma7e a final re4arations 4ayment of three billion mar7s at a time when the almost ban7ru4t Feich could not 4ay the salaries of its em4loyees1 That was the 4ositive result of the conference and a victory of sorts1 :n the negative side e@uality

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page_1#! #age (%' of armament was still denied1 There was to be no increase in Germany?s armed forces and no decrease in the forces of her neighbors1 #a4en?s offers to the 6rench of a consultative 4act and a combined general staff were no more than gestures1 Germany had nothing to give1 Eer re@uests could easily be turned down for #a4en unli7e 8chleicher was not the man to raise the ghost of Fa4allo of a German shift to the !ast1 -hat could #a4en offer the seven million unem4loyed the owners of closed factories the des4erate farmers that had not been 4romised and failed beforeO !ven if large numbers of voters had wanted to cast a ballot for him what was his 4arty and his 4latformO 6or which de4uties should they voteO -hen he and members of his .abinet a44eared on the hustings after the 9ausanne conference they were greeted with showers of rotten a44les and eggs1 The wellorganiHed o44osition of the 4arliamentary system had no trouble furnishing the man4ower for such demonstrations1 6uthermore #a4en?s own devotion to the 4arliamentary system was lu7ewarm1 :n Duly &$ ,ust before the elections he had become Feichs7ommissar of #russia1 The a44ointment =with Eindenburg and 8chleicher in agreement> was made 4ossible by the use of a 4residential decree ??6or the Festoration of #ublic 8ecurity and :rder in #russia1I #a4en re4laced two 8ocialistsMinister #resident Braun and Minister of the Interior 8everingand the .entrist -elfare Minister Eirtsiefer1 This coalition of three Ministers had lost its long-standing 4arliamentary ma,ority by a combination of NaHi and .ommunist votes but had continued in office as did so many of the German administrations including #a4en?s without a ma,ority in the legislature since the NaHis and .ommunists could scarcely collaborate in forming a government1 Barl 8evering was a well-7nown anti-NaHi who had ordered house searches of members of the 8A and was anathema to Eitler1 "sing as a 4rete<t the disorders of Altona where on Duly (+ (*)& a bloody battle between National 8ocialists and .ommunists had resulted in the death of fifteen men including two uniformed NaHis #a4en too7 over the Government of #russia1 Ee accused 8evering and Braun of being unable to guarantee the security of the 8tate and of having made a deal with the .ommunists who he said were infiltrating the 4olice de4artment1 This was an act of 4ure force of the 7ind the NaHis would later ado4t and it won su44ort from none of the 4arties1 #a4en?s act com4letely illegal under the #russian constitution dissolved the #russian 9andtag1 -ithout consulting the Ministers res4onsible to that body he did away with the 4arliamentary system in that state1 -hatever his motiveswhether to ma7e a show of strength with Eindenburg?s hel4 or to im4ress Eitler and to get rid of a 8ocialist government#a4en?s act was as arbitrary and authoritarian as anything the NaHis might have done1 It lac7ed only the National 8ocialist methods of terror1 -hen #a4en came bac7 from 9ausanne with the small tro4hy of a final settlement of re4arations but without e@uality of armament and without having succeeded in getting rid of the war-guilt clause no alternative e<isted

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page_1#" #age (%+ to bringing the NaHis somehow into the Government1 The o44osition to the National 8ocialists had nothing left but their will to o44ose1 They had not a single success to show in their attem4ts to revive Germany?s internal or e<ternal credit or to counter the 4romises the NaHis made to the electorate1 If either #a4en or Bruening had been able to return from a conference with the Allies with 4ermission for the Germans to have an army of )$$ $$$ men =#a4en had 4romised at 9ausanne that the Germans would ma7e no immediate use of the right to the increase but merely re,oice in the moral victory it re4resented> the issue with the NaHis might have been ,oined1 But that moment never came1 Much too late 8chleicher when he became .hancellor was able to obtain a statement of the Allies? theoretical willingness to grant the Germans arms e@uality1 -hen that ha44ened the NaHi tide was at flood1 The elections of Duly )( (*)& gave the NaHis their greatest victory: a 4o4ular vote of ()1+ million out of )'1% million )+1) 4er cent of the electorate and &)$ seats in the Feichstag =more than double what they had had before>1 The nine middle 4arties were down from ((& seats to only &0 and the German Nationalists had lost / of their /( seats1 The .ommunists were u4 too from ++ to %* seats1 Together the .ommunists and the NaHis had an absolute ma,ority1 The elections left Eitler with far less than a ma,ority even with the addition of the other nationalist 4arties but together with the .ommunists who had elected (/1' 4er cent of the new Feichstag the antidemocratic 4arties now had almost '$ 4er cent of the votes1 6lushed with this monumental victory the 6uehrer as7ed the #resident to receive him1 #owerful forces were urging that Eitler be named Gice-.hancellor1 It was one way to bring the #arty from the streets into the government to have it acce4t res4onsibility1 Among those who urged the a44ointment were Monsignor Baas head of the .enter #arty #a4en and 8chleicher1 A meeting too7 4lace on August () in #a4en?s 4resence1L Eitler came in the com4any of Foehm and 6ric7 neither of whom had made a favorable im4ression on Eindenburg1 -ithout offering his visitors his hand or an invitation to sit down Eindenburg stood leaning on his cane during the twenty-minute meeting1 Eitler told him what he thought the old 6ield Marshal would want to hear: that he wished only to come to 4ower legally to rebuild the economy and in foreign affairs to see7 full e@uality for Germany with sovereignty over her own territories1 This of course must be secured by 4eaceful means and to achieve these goals he should be .hancellor1 Eindenburg listened gravely and then brought u4 his ob,ections to naming Eitler as .hancellor: the acts of gangsterism of the #artyand the murders in Boenigsberg and 8ilesiawhich had increased since the elections1 Ee said that Eitler would have to show that he could wor7 with others with the .enter and the Fight in a coalition government where 4ower was divided and not concentrated in one 4erson1 Eitler said he did not want or demand all 4ower in his hands1 Ee would be L Eitler had tal7ed with #a4en the day before when #a4en had tried to 4ersuade him to become Gice-.hancellor1

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page_1## #age (%% ready to name non-#arty s4ecialists to 7ey ,obs and did not e<4ect all the 4osts in the cabinet to go to the NaHis1 But he came he said to 4resent his case as the leader of the largest 4arty1 Ee would not be Gice-.hancellor or head a coalition government under a mandate of the Feichstag1 Ee needed to be freed of the debates and footlessness of the #arliament and therefore wanted the #resident to a44oint him as .hancellor of another ??4residentialI cabinet1 Nothing Eitler said at this meeting would be li7ely to alienate Eindenburg who thought no more of the 4owerless nonfunctioning #arliament than Eitler did1 The only thing lac7ing at the moment was Eindenburg?s confidence in him1 The first time they had met on :ctober ($ (*)( Eindenburg had been unim4ressed by the obse@uious little man who would cam4aign against him1 Eitler might be a44ointed Minister of .ommunications at the most he had told 8chleicher after that first meeting =8chleicher with his love for maneuver and his dream of controlling Eitler wanted the NaHis brought into the Government> but he would not ma7e him head of the Government1 Now five months and one election later he was still of the same o4inion1 #a4en would change his mind before the #resident did1 The immediate occasion of #a4en?s downfall was the sentencing to death of five NaHis who had 7illed a .ommunist in #otem4a during the night of August ($ (*)&1 The 7illing had been a heinous crime even for a murderous time1 The victim a coal miner named Bonrad #ietrHuch had been tram4led to deathwor7ed over for a half hour before he died with his mother loo7ing on1 The only defense for the 8A men was that they were drun71 #a4en ,ust before the crime was committed had succeeded in getting a 4residential decree that 4rovided for the death 4enalty for 4olitical murders1 The court under the circumstances could do nothing but find the chief cul4rits guilty and to sentence them to death under the decree1 The case 4roduced an outburst of fury from the National 8ocialists1 -hen the verdict was announced Eitler sent a telegram: IMy comrades in the face of this monstrous ,udgment of blood I feel myself bound to you in limitless loyalty1 ;our freedom is from this moment a @uestion of our honor the battle against a regime under which this is 4ossible our duty1I The defense lawyer com4ared the 8A men to brave soldiersC they were acting he said under su4erior orders in attac7ing an enemy insurgent1 9iberal non-NaHi 4a4ers that were o44osed to ca4ital 4unishment also 4rotested against the death 4enalty and #a4en who had denounced the former #russian Government for its evenhanded treatment of Fight and 9eft commuted the sentence to life im4risonment on 8e4tember &1 '' But this was not enough for Eitler1 The 8A men were martyrs and he could have no 4acts with a regime that 4ermitted such heroes even to be arrested1 -hen the Feichstag reconvened on August )$ Goering as the re4resentative of the largest 4arty had been elected #resident with the hel4 of the votes of the .enter whose strategy now li7e #a4en?s was to attem4t

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page_1#$ #age (%* to bring the National 8ocialists into a coalition government1 #a4en had 4re4ared a re4ort of his administration to be delivered at the first wor7ing session of the Feichstag which was held on 8e4tember (& but to his consternation Goering immediately gave the floor to the .ommunist de4uty !rnst Torgler who 4ro4osed a vote of no confidence in the #a4en Government1 #a4en tried in vain to forestall the vote by dissolving the Feichstag before it could act using a 4residential order Eindenburg had signed and sent 4osthaste during a half-hour ad,ournment1 The order of dissolution was in the red 4ortfolio that traditionally contained such decrees1 But Goering steadily loo7ed in the other direction as #a4en held the 4ortfolio before him and when the ballots were counted #a4en had been voted out 0(& to /& 4robably a not inaccurate reflection of his 4o4ularity in the country at large1 New elections were set for November '1 8ince the Feichstag had been dissolved by Eindenburg?s decree #a4en remained in office1 The election of November ' for the first time reduced the NaHi voteby almost two million in the 4o4ular vote and by thirty-four seats in the Feichstag1 National 8ocialism was a 4arty of discontent and des4eration and aside from the fanatical inner core it won and lost millions of votes in 4ro4ortion to the seeming ho4e or ho4elessness of returning to the norms of society1 The election was held after a slight dro4 in the rate of unem4loyment =it went down (&) $$$ in :ctober> and after #a4en acting under an emergency decree had allocated & &$$ $$$ FM to ma7e wor71 Dust before the election there had been a trans4ort stri7e in Berlin in which NaHis and .ommunists had combined to 4aralyHe the city1 The #otem4a murder had also occurred and in the brawls of Duly and August )$$ 4eo4le were 7illed and ( &$$ wounded as a result of acts of 4olitical terror that dramatiHed the drive of violence of the #arty1 #a4en now turned again to Eindenburg as7ing him to breach the constitution1 An emergency e<isted he said that had not been foreseen when the document was written1 Ee needed a few months to govern without a 4arliament and without another election and in that time he would 4ro4ose fundamental changes in the structure of the Government and in the constitution1 Ee 4redicted that in the 4lebiscite that would follow the NaHi wave would subside further than it had subsided on November '1L In other words he was 4ro4osing an interim dictatorshi4 that since it had no visible 4o4ular su44ort could only de4end on the #resident and the Army to 7ee4 it in 4ower1 But now 8chleicher revealed his own ambitions1 9i7e #a4en he wanted a new constitution and he would find his mass following in the 9eft1 Ee declared his willingness to ta7e L #a4en wanted a return to the Bismarc7ian era: #russia over the chancellorshi41 Ee could and the Feich would be united through the 4erson of the #resident1 There would be a bicameral 4arliament the u44er house to be a44ointed by Eindenburg and the lower elected but with the voters e<ercising une@ual franchisesC heads of families and war veterans would get more than one voteC and the Government would be inde4endent of the Feichstag =Meissner and -ilde o2. cit1 41 &%(>1

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page_1$0 #age (*$ s4lit the NaHis he said with his close relations with Gregor 8trasser and other 8ocialist dissidents inside the #arty and when the Feichstag reconvened get a ma,ority from the orthodo< Fight and from the 9eft wing of the divided National 8ocialists1 #a4en declared that 8chleicher could not 4ossibly accom4lish this and Eindenburg agreed1 #a4en was to go ahead and form his new cabinet1 As #a4en and 8chleicher 4arted after the meeting each 7e4t his illusions1 The two were reduced to a struggle for the fading mind of the #resident who alone would determine how and whether the Feichswehr would be used to su44ort a government he constituted1 As they 4arted 8chleicher said to #a4en =what a44lied to both of them as well as to the shade of Martin 9uther>: ??9ittle mon7 little mon7 you have chosen a hard road1I Now 8chleicher 4layed a card #a4en could not match1 -hen the .abinet met on December & 8chleicher said the a44ointment of #a4en as .hancellor in another 4residential cabinet would mean civil warC the NaHis would rise and the Feichswehr could not guarantee 4ublic security in a civil war1 Nothing could have been better calculated to affect Eindenburg than such a warning1 It was bac7ed by a study a general staff officer 9ieutenant .olonel !ugen :tt =later Ambassador to Da4an> had made of the forces at the dis4osal of the Army in the event of a National 8ocialist u4rising which might involve another general stri7e on the 4art of the 9eft1 The Army always had great res4ect for the 4ower of the masses1 The disorders at the end of the war the wave of stri7es in the first years of 4eace and the mass demonstrations of the Fight and 9eft had stam4ed the thin7ing of men li7e 9ieutenant .olonel :tt and Eindenburg1 :tt thought that 4olicing the Feich in the event of large-scale disorders which would give the #oles the o44ortunity of invading the .orridor and the 6rench of again occu4ying the Fhine-Fuhr area 4resented too many dangers for the Army to ris71L In addition 8chleicher 4ointed out that the #russian 4olice in 4articular were badly infected with NaHi 4ro4agandaC and if the .ommunists should also use the occasion to rise =they were now the third largest 4arty in the Feich having won %* seats in the Feichstag in the last election> the army could not guarantee the order or the safety of the country1 Eindenburg had to reverse his decision1 :n December & he a44ointed 8chleicher the new .hancellor and Defense Minister1 #a4en got a 4hotogra4h from the #resident with an inscri4tion reserved usually for military burials: II had a comrade1I #a4en was offered the ambassadorshi4 to 6rance which under most cir- L :tt?s calculation although e<aggerating the li7elihood of the NaHis and .ommunists staging a rising was not far off with regard to #oland1 :n March ' (*)) Marshal DWHef #ilsuds7i ordered a #olish marine infantry battalion to march into the -ester4latte situated at the entrance to the DanHig harbor without 4ermission of the Eigh .ommissioner1 This was inter4reted in some @uarters as an attem4t to 4rovo7e a German countermeasure which in turn would lead the 6rench to ,oin the #oles in ta7ing action =Eans Foss I ie A-raeventivkries2laeneA -ilsu)skis von 78FF I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 III No1 / (*00 441 )//')>1

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page_1$1 #age (*( cumstances he would have been glad to acce4t but Eindenburg as7ed him to stay in Berlin to be on hand to advise him in these uncertain days1 #a4en continued to live in the -ilhelmstrasse1 The house he now occu4ied was formerly assigned to the Minister of the Interior1 It ad,oined the Feich .hancellery where Eindenburg was tem4orarily staying while the 4residential 4alace was being re4aired1 8chleicher newly married continued to live in a house on which he doted in the Alsenstrasse1 The gardens at the bac7 of the houses in which Eindenburg and #a4en were living ad,oined and the two could meet often without ceremony or the 7nowledge of others1 Now that #a4en was no longer in office the #resident believed he could rely more than ever on his disinterested ,udgment1 8chleicher had only one small success in his short term of office1 Ee had always ta7en the 4oint of view held by many of the Feichswehr officers of the 8eec7t 4eriod that Germany must be the balance between !ast and -est1 Ee had conducted a good 4art of the negotiations with the emissaries of the Bolshevi7 Government when after -orld -ar I the two 4ariah 4owers made their @uasimilitary alliance with Fussian officers being schooled in Germany and the forbidden German tan7 and air cadres being trained in Fussia1 8chleicher though was fundamentally a -esterner dee4ly religious friendly to 8ocialists li7e !bert and the moderate labor-union leaders1 In regard to the 8oviet "nion he was a su44orter only of the Fussian military counterweight that 4ro4erly used would enable Germany to match the 4ower of 6rance and the 9ittle !ntente1 Ee told his friends in 9ondon and #arisamong them 6ranUois-#oncetthat this was their last chance to 4reserve a non-NaHi Feich1 !ither Germany would be freed of the onesided disarmament 4rovisions of the Gersailles Treaty or Eitler would come in1 The result was the 6ive-#ower Declaration of December (( (*)& in which Germany was given the theoretical right to arms e@uality1 But this was a straw tossed into a whirlwind1 Theoretical e@uality could not build a 4olitical resistance to Eitler nor could the NaHis be s4lit with what 8chleicher had to offer1 8chleicher had two cards to 4lay1 Ee offered the vice-chancellorshi4 to one of Eitler?s chief critics in the #arty Gregor 8trasser who had long been disaffected by the shar4 turn to the Fight that Eitler had made in his des4erate search for funds and su44ort from the conservative men of affairs in heavy industry and ban7ing1 8trasser was urged to acce4t 8chleicher?s offer by an influential grou4 in the #arty6ric7 6eder and Fosenberg all of whom with the e<ce4tion of 6eder were loyal to Eitlerfor the Defense Minister had something to offer the 9eft wing of the NaHis1 8chleicher 4romised them that the Feichswehr would 4ay the #arty debts which had grown so huge that the 4ayroll and 4rinter?s bills of the +oelkischer Beobachter could no longer be met1 The troubles of the #arty were many1 The reduced vote in the November election Eindenburg?s adamant refusal to name Eitler as .hancellor and

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page_1$2 #age (*& the internal #arty struggle gave some color to 8chleicher?s dream that this was the time to bring the movement down with 4art of its own weight1 8trasser cautious and undecided told 8chleicher he would acce4t the vicechancellorshi4 only if Eitler gave his 4ermission but Eitler instead read him out of the #arty1 The 6uehrer stormed into Berlin and the Eotel Baiserhof to over4ower his 9eft-wing critics with the tumult of elo@uence and energy that had brought him from the beer halls to become Germany?s most 4owerful 4olitical figure with that fanatical conviction and rhetoric that so many audiences would never be able to withstand1 Eitler in his new orientation had had to discard 6eder?s doctrine of the slavery of interestthe only tie that bound 6eder and National 8ocialism1 That the #arty ban7ru4t and held together only by the iron will of one man was in 4recarious sha4e is clear from the testimony of men who li7e Goebbels were wholly devoted to Eitler?s cause1 Eitler said in one of the moments of des4air he was given to that if the #arty fell to 4ieces it would ta7e him only three minutes to finish himself with a 4istol1 Before his Gauleiters in the Baiserhof he shouted and we4t and a greatly devoted follower li7e 8treicher we4t with him at the thought of the 4ossibility of betrayal1 9ater in other times of crisis es4ecially during the war Eitler would give the same evidence of his uncanny ability to convince even those who had the most serious doubts of the wisdom of his decisions1 The (*)& 4lot against his leadershi4 was mastered as so many crises would be by the overwhelming tornado of oratory of the man who had brought them all from 8trasser to Goering to the threshold of 4ower1 But in the bac7ground other 4otent forces were wor7ing for Eitler1 The conservative Fight was ban7ru4t not in money but in ideas1 A letter written in November (*)& to Eindenburg and signed by 8chacht the .ologne ban7er Baron von 8chroeder the former Feich .hancellor .uno and great magnates and industrialists li7e Bru44 8iemens Thyssen Bosch -oermann and Goegler as7ed the #resident to a44oint Eitler as .hancellor1 It was an enlightening list of signers1 Thyssen had su44orted Eitler since the (*&$?s but others li7e Bru44 and 8chacht had disli7ed and distrusted him until recently1 :ne by one they had become convinced that there was no longer an alternative between the e<treme Fight and the e<treme 9eft1 The letter referred to the regime of the former .hancellor1 It 4raised #a4en and his .abinet for their good will but 4ointed out that as the election of November ' had shown they had no 4o4ular su44ort1 In order to overcome the class struggle to unify Germany and to bring an end to the fruitless and endless elections Eitler had to be brought in as .hancellor1 The signers noted that if the .ommunist #arty were e<cluded the combined nationalist forces had a ma,ority in the electorate1 They attac7ed #a4en?s 4lan to change the constitution charging that this would only increase the economic and 4olitical unrest1 They said they were writing because they felt it their bounden duty to as7 Eindenburg to form a 4residential cabinet

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page_1$3 #age (*) this time under leadershi4 of the man with the greatest number of followers in the countrya man who would a44oint the best non-NaHi technical and 4olitical advisers available1 '+ -hile #a4en could not have signed this letter it was not long before he came to have 4recisely the same views as those of his fellow conservatives who had sent it1 8ince the conservative 4arties had not been able to su44ly an alternative to Eitler they could only defeat him in (*)& by convincing Eindenburg and the Army that they had to move against him1 An easier more 4lausible course was to try to ca4ture him to bring him to reasonable 4olicies by giving him limited 4ower and surrounding him with de4endable advisers while the #resident was still alive to hel4 hold him in chec71 #a4en now saw 8chleicher as his enemy1 8chleicher was the man who had turned him out of officethe man who cons4iring with the 9eft wing of the NaHi #arty had forced Eindenburg?s hand in a44ointing a regime without #a4en and without any 4ur4ose other than that of a na7ed military dictatorshi41 Eowever 8chleicher?s attem4t to buy his way into the su44ort of the National 8ocialists with Feichswehr funds could not have much success when the resources of the signers of the letter to Eindenburg could be 4laced at Eitler?s dis4osal1 #a4en on his 4art had both the ear of the #resident and a forum in the Deutscher Blub commonly called Eerren7lub1 This was an organiHation in Berlin to which belonged many leading industrialists high officials and landownersC also many conservative 4oliticians who 7e4t in close touch with the 4olitics and leadershi4 of the chief 4arties mainly of the Fight1 It 4ublished a magaHine called er /ing 3The *ircle> in which #a4en had had an article on the need for the unification of the nationalist forces1 8chleicher had called the article to the attention of Eindenburg when #a4en was the #resident?s candidate for the chancellorshi41 Now #a4en used the Eerren7lub against 8chleicher1 In a s4eech given before some three hundred of these leading members of the conservative 4arties he reviewed the events of his own term of office as well as the 4resent state of Germany and in the view of many of those 4resent he ??called inI the NaHis for his s4eech made it clear that only with the collaboration of Eitler could the essential changes be made and stability be assured1'% No co4ies of the s4eech have survived1 The re4orts on its te<t conflict but at the very least it can be said that it caused the 4ro-NaHi .ologne ban7er 8chroeder who had been one of the signers of the letter to Eindenburg to as7 #a4en to have a tal7 with the 6uehrer1 The Eerren7lub s4eech was given on December (' (*)&1 :n December (* -ilhelm Be44ler a friend of 8chroeder?s and a NaHi wrote to Eitler that #a4en in his tal7 with 8chroeder had said he now realiHed that Eitler?s becoming .hancellor was essential and he would bac7 the 6uehrer?s candidacy fully1 #a4en had told 8chroeder that he had come to see how unde4endable 8chleicher was and that Eindenburg too now realiHed the

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page_1$4 #age (*/ unworthy 4art that 8chleicher had 4layed in many matters including the ending of #a4en?s chancellorshi41 #a4en saw the need for a 4olitical change wanted Eitler to become .hancellor and wanted to have a meeting with him at 8chroeder?s home1 #a4en declared that Be44ler?s letter was written only to overcome Eitler?s aversion to him and that he had never s4o7en to Be44ler who had used this means to get Eitler to come to the meeting for Be44ler 4referred #a4en to 8chleicher and in a letter of December &' wrote 8chroeder that he ho4ed Eitler?s disli7e of #a4en might be overcome1 8chleicher not #a4en he said had really been res4onsible for the failure of Eitler?s tal7 with Eindenburg on August ()a failure that Eitler had ascribed largely to #a4en1 But Be44ler would scarcely have told the 6uehrer categorically that #a4en would bac7 the 6uehrer?s candidacy only to have #a4en tell Eitler when they met on Danuary / at Baron von 8chroeder?s that he was 4ro4osing another vice-chancellorshi4 or as he called it a condominium with 8chleicher as .hancellor1 The meeting was obviously held because #a4en as he himself said was convinced that Eitler and his NaHis had to come into the Government under conditions that so far as 4ossible would 7ee4 the 6uehrer in chec71 Neither 8chroeder nor Be44ler would have been so much in favor of the meeting if all #a4en intended to offer Eitler was merely a strengthened version of what the 6uehrer had already refused when #a4en on August (& had tried to 4ersuade him to go in his .abinet1 A vice-chancellorshi4 even with assurance that it was a condominium would scarcely have a44ealed more strongly to Eitler than the offer #a4en had made before when he had 4romised that he would ste4 down after a 4eriod of collaboration had demonstrated Eitler?s willingness and ability to wor7 in a coalition1 '* The highly secret meeting between Eitler and #a4en too7 4lace at 8chroeder?s house on Danuary /1 Eitler was accom4anied by Eess Eimmler and Be44ler1 8o careful had the security measures been that the rest of Eitler?s escort waited two hours in their automobiles on the road to Duesseldorf without 7nowing his whereabouts1+$ As #a4en entered the house he noticed that he was being 4hotogra4hed1 8o was Eitler when he arrived although #a4en did not see the cameraman1 Then as it turned out a 4hoto was ta7en of the two men by a hidden 4hotogra4her as they were sha7ing hands on their de4arture1 The news4a4er 8chleicher had been subsidiHing from his Ministerial funds the Taegliche /un)schau had 4aid one of Eitler?s 8D men to 7ee4 them informed of his 4lans for travel and it had sent 4hotogra4hers and re4orters to the scene1L The ne<t day the Taegliche /un)schau carried the story on its front 4age1 At Nuremberg #a4en testified that he had tal7ed with Eitler about 4artici4ating in 8chleicher?s Governmentnot of Eitler?s coming in as .han- L Berndorff says the 8D man received ) $$$ FM for the information he sent on =E1 F1 Berndoiff 6eneral 0,ischen Ost un) !est MEamburg: Eoffmann and .am4e n1d1N 41 &&0>1

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page_1$ #age (*0 cellor but of the #arty?s entering the Government and of his acce4ting the same vice-chancellorshi4 he had 7e4t declining1 #a4en?s account of the meeting cannot be true nor can his e<4lanation of his Eerren7lub tal7 be true1 There would have been no 4oint in as7ing Eitler again to become Gice-.hancellor1 The belief of some shrewd observers at the time that #a4en offered Eitler a duumvirate an e@ual sharing of 4ower with himself is the most 4lausible account of what went on1L #a4en wanted to be .hancellor and if he could not he ho4ed to come as close to the occu4ancy of the office as 4ossible1 In any event 8chleicher?s dar7 sus4icions when he incredulously saw the 4ictures of the meeting were certainly ,ustified des4ite the letter that #a4en wrote him that afternoon after he 7new a 4hotogra4h had been ta7en telling him of the meeting and how he had acted on 8chleicher?s behalf1 8chleicher as7ed the #resident not to receive #a4en e<ce4t in his 4resence after what he regarded as blac7 treachery but Eindenburg was not to be told by a subordinate what visitors he could receive and with whom he could consult1 Ee not only continued to see #a4en but also listened to his advice which now was flatly to bring Eitler into the Government as .hancellor1 All that was left to 8chleicher was again to try to ma7e a coalition with s4linter grou4s either with Eugenberg and his small nationalist faction or with Gregor 8trasser and the dissident NaHis for these two could not be combined1 But 8trasser told Eindenburg =8chleicher had succeeded in arranging a meeting between them> that the National 8ocialists could not be s4lit1 The one 4ossible source of a mass following for 8chleicher had disa44eared1 Ee could only rule under Article /% of the constitutiona means which he had only recently told the #resident would bring on civil war if it was attem4ted by #a4en1 +( The election in 9i44e held on Danuary (0 (*)) was used by Eitler as a ma,or test of strength1 The 6uehrer cam4aigned with all the 4ano4ly and ferocity he could con,ure u4 and the National 8ocialists won * out of &( seats =/+1% 4er cent> in the state legislature and )*1' 4er cent of the 4o4ular vote =u4 (+ 4er cent over November>1+& In (*&* they had not had a single seat1 The conservative Fight including Eugenberg?s German Nationalists lost a third of their votes and the 8trasser following inside the #arty had obviously shown itself to be without influence on the ran7 and file of the voters1 It would have been a minor election in another timeC now it was blown u4 as a nationwide ma,or victory1 LL Eitler had shown his #arty to be L #a4en said he offered Eitler a duumvirate with 8chleicher1 But see :tto Meissner Staatssekretaer unter Ebert= Hin)enburg un) Hitler MEamburg: Eoffmann and .am4e (*0$N 41 &'(C and !rwin -ichert ramatische Tage in Hitlers /eich M8tuttgart (*0&N 41 &&C also 8chroeder )))+-#8 =IAG>1 LL As -ucher 4oints out however the NaHis received only 0 $$$ more votes than they had received in the November ' election in Eesse and were ($ 4er cent under their Duly (*)& total =Albert -ucher ie "ahne hoch MMunich: 8ueddeutscher Gerlag (*')N 41 (/&>1

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page_1$! #age (*' united behind him1 :n the (+th he met with Eugenberg who was confronted with a choice between finding some way to acce4t collaboration with Eitler or being swam4ed in the 4olitical tides that as the election in 9i44e had shown were running strongly against him1 Eugenberg had told 8chleicher he was willing to 4artici4ate in the Government as !conomics Minister but 8chleicher could only acce4t that offer by dro44ing the master 4lan he still clung to of s4litting 8trasser?s 9eft-wing NaHis from Eitler1 The last o44osition to Eitler was crumbling1 Eugenberg?s 4arty had 0( seats in the Feichstag not enough to be of any great hel4 to 8chleicher to whom even the 8#D seemed a 4ossible ally for it had (&( seats which would be a substantial bac7ing1 .onceivably the 8#D would ma7e an alliance with him rather than see Eitler come to 4ower but it declined any offers from 8chleicher1 The 4arliamentary system was through whether #a4en or 8chleicher or Eitler was called in as head of the Government but in the case of Eitler no breach of the constitution would occurat least not at the start of a Eitler chancellorshi41 #a4en or 8chleicher could rule only under Article /% and under a 4residential decree designed for emergencies that now had no foreseeable end1 In 8chleicher?s case this would have meant a na7ed military dictatorshi41 -ith Eitler a coalition government commanding all the forces of the Fight of the so-called ??National Fising I and some twofifths of the Feichstag would be in office1 8chleicher?s last card was a wea7 one and 4layed much too late in the game: he tried to secure 6rench consent through 6ranUois-#oncet to adding &$$ $$$ 8A men to the armed forces and he told Eindenburg he would enlist this number of volunteers and use them if necessary against the National 8ocialists1 But this was merely a variation on the very tune he had re,ected1 Ee was offering nothing new1 Ee was merely offering to remain in 4lace of #a4en and he had had no more success in winning 4o4ular su44ort or 4olitical bac7ing in the Feichstag than #a4en and far less than Bruening1 :n Danuary && (*)) another meeting too7 4lace this one at Fibbentro4?s lu<urious house in Berlin-Dahlem1 Eitler 6ric7 and Goering met with #a4en and the #resident?s two other close advisersEindenburg?s son :s7ar and 8taatsse7retaer :tto Meissner1 Meissner tal7ed with Goering who was very conciliatory1 Goering said that the National 8ocialists by no means demanded sole 4ower that they would collaborate with the other 4arties and that they as7ed for only two Ministries out of twelve in a Eitler .abinet which would be a wor7ing coalition of the National 8ocialists and the other nationalist 4arties1 The National 8ocialists would res4ect the constitutionC their goal was to come to 4ower and to remain in 4ower legally and after that the monarchy might be restored1 :s7ar who had always o44osed naming Eitler as .hancellor came away from the meeting he had alone with Eitler silent and 4reoccu4ied1 Ee said little to Meissner during their drive bac7 but what he said revealed that he had been won over: there was no

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page_1$" #age (*+ avoiding naming Eitler as .hancellor1 The 6uehrer was ma7ing enough concessions and solemn 4romises to give a 4lausible reason for a44ointing him1 +) .olonel von Eindenburg who had met Eitler before when the 6uehrer had 4resented himself to his father now was certain that bringing Eitler into the Government was a grim necessity1 #a4en 4layed the leading role from the time of his Eerren7lub s4eech until Eitler became .hancellor1 The 6uehrer some years later in (*)+ in the 4resence of Austrian .hancellor 8chuschnigg than7ed him: ??In the decisive hour of (*)) you saved the Feich from chaos by ma7ing it 4ossible that the controls were 4laced in my hands1I #A#!N: IIndeed my 6uehrer1I EIT9!F: II shall never forget it Eerr von #a4en1I+/ :n Danuary &) 8chleicher 4honed Meissner and as7ed him how he had en,oyed his meal at Fibbentro4?s house1 Eaving given this evidence of the com4etence of his intelligence service 8chleicher met with Eindenburg and tal7ed with him for two hours1 Ee told the #resident the NaHis were through that many of them in their disillusionment were ready to go over to the .ommunists and that he and the #resident had only to show their teeth to set them in full retreat1 The British and 6rench would a44rove an increase in the Feichswehr and with the flood of young volunteers the Army could 4ut down any u4rising1 All 8chleicher needed from the #resident was a blan7 chec7: the full 4ower to rule and to use the Army1 These were notions Eindenburg could not acce4tC he had re,ected them when they were 4resented by #a4en1 .ivil war was anathema to him1 Now he was warned against 8chleicher on every side1 Not a news4a4er with the e<ce4tion of the Taegliche /un)schau su44orted 8chleicher and the military dictatorshi4 he would install1 The .enter and 8#D leaders told Eindenburg that 8chleicher?s 4lans meant a breach of the constitution1 8chleicher wanted the dissolution of the Feichstag which was to convene on Danuary )( and he wanted new elections to be indefinitely 4ost4oned1 But under the constitution the latest 4ossible date for an election after the dissolution of the Feichstag was si<ty days and the com4etent Feichstag committee had ,ust voted against any further 4ost4onement of the session1 6urthermore the NaHis continued to ma7e 4romises and the most a44ealing of them came from Goering whom Eindenburg could trust more than the other National 8ocialists including Eitler for he was a war hero a holder of Germany?s highest decorations1 Goering told Meissner that it might 4rove 4ossible to reestablish the monarchy at some time in the future thus nurturing one of Eindenburg?s fondest dreams after he had reluctantly told the Baiser he must abdicate1 :n Danuary &' two military men called on the #resident: Generals Burt von Eammerstein-!@uord and !rich von dem Bussche1 Bussche had to ma7e a routine military re4ort to Eindenburg and Eammerstein made use of the occasion to go along at a time when he 7new no civilians could be

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page_1$# #age (*% 4resent since Eindenburg would 4ermit only soldiers to discuss military matters1 Eammerstein a44arently told Eindenburg the Army would not tolerate Eitler as .hancellor but he =as well as 8chleicher> was also o44osed to #a4en whose a44ointment might well mean civil war1 -hat Eammerstein seemingly was trying to do was to 7ee4 8chleicher in office as well as to shut the door to Eitler and #a4en but he had no success1 The aged 6ield Marshal told him and Bussche he 7new what the Army would acce4t and they should 4re4are for the ne<t maneuvers and sto4 meddling in 4olitics1 But before they left Eindenburg said ??;ou can?t 4ossibly believe gentlemen that I will ma7e the Austrian cor4oral Feich .hancellor1I In the course of the ne<t few days Eindenburg would discover he had no choice but to do ,ust that1L The visit was the ambivalent start of the generals? cons4iracy against Eitler1 8chleicher resigned on Danuary &% when with nothing to lose he accused Eindenburg of the final crime Treubruch =breach of faith> in dealing behind 8chleicher?s bac7 with #a4en and Eitler1 The ne<t day in a meeting at the Feichswehrministerium at which Generals -ilhelm Adam von Eammerstein-!@uord and von dem Bussche =and one other officer 4robably .olonel Burt von Bredow> were 4resent 8chleicher was urged to set u4 military ruleeven if necessary to arrest Eindenburg to call out the #otsdam garrison with orders to shoot1LL L .om4are -heeler-Bennett and -olfgang 8auer =Barl Dietrich Bracher -olfgang 8auer and Gerhard 8chuiH ie nationalso0ialistische Machtergreifung M.ologne: -estdeutscher Gerlag (*'&N> who believe that Eammerstein acting for 8chleicher wanted Eitler to be named .hancellor to 4revent the a44ointment of #a4en1 8ee also 8chwerin von Brosig7 =o2. cit1> Berndorff =o2 cit1> Meissner =o2 cit1> Eermann 6oertsch =Schul) an) +erhaengnus M8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlag-Anstalt (*0(N> Meissner and -ilde =o2 cit1> Gerhard Fitter = as )eutsche -roblem MMunich: F1 :ldenbourg Gerlag (*0&N> 6rancis .arsten and the account of Eammerstein?s son Bunrat 6reiherr von Eammerstein ISchleicher= Hammerstein un) )ie Machtuebernahme I in "rankfurter Hefte Nov1 (*0'1 8ee also General 6reiherr von dem Bussche "rankfurter Allgemeine Ceitung 6ebruary 0 (*0&1 The testimony is conflicting1 Eammerstein?s aversion to Eitler and NaHism was long-standing1 Bussche says flatly that Eammerstein s4o7e against naming Eitler1 Eammerstein?s own memorandum =written in (*)0 after 8chleicher?s murder> which declared he had urged Eitler?s a44ointment was dictated certainly in large 4art by 4rudence1 In Danuary (*)/ 8chleicher too wrote in the +ossische Ceitung that since the summer of (*)( he had steadfastly been in favor of a National 8ocialist government1 Eammerstein did not want Eitler as Feich .hancellor =in (*)* at the time of the #olish cam4aign he was 4re4ared to arrest him when Eitler 4lanned to visit Eammerstein?s head@uarters on the Fhine> but he wanted civil war even less than he wanted Eitler1 :n the afternoon of Danuary &* (*)) he went to Eitler to e<4ress his concern over the situation and to find out whether Eitler thought the #resident was serious in negotiating with him or was going through motions1 If the latter Eammerstein said he would again attem4t to influence decisions in order to 4revent a heavy misfortune for the fatherland1- LL !gon Bubuscho7 #a4en?s lawyer at Nuremberg stated in (*/+ that Goering had told him that 8chleicher in an effort to remain Minister of Defense in Eitler?s .abinet had offered on Danuary * (*)) to call out the #otsdam garrison to arrest Eindenburg if he continued to o44ose naming Eitler as .hancellor1 Bubuscho7?s statement was confirmed by Neurath who was 4resent as was Beitel when Goering informed Bubuscho7 of the matter =Bubuscho7 affidavit Danuary &' (*/+>1 In the light of 8chleicher?s com4licated 3footnote continue) on ne4t 2age5

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page_1$$ #age (** At Nuremberg two witnesses said that 8chleicher had wanted to arrest Eitler as well as the #resident in a last effort to sto4 the NaHis1 A rumor that a military cou4 was in the offing that the #otsdam garrison had been alerted and given orders to shoot reached Goering and Eitler1 The story undoubtedly 4layed a role in the 7illing of 8chleicher by an 8D detachment the ne<t year during the murders that accom4anied the li@uidation of Foehm and his high officers of the 8A1 But 8chleicher never made such a decision1 That he 4layed with the idea discussed it with General von Eammerstein!@uord and .olonel von Bredow and others is undoubtedly true =it was corroborated by -ilhelm 9euschner former Minister of the Interior in Eesse who said that even in 6ebruary (*)) 8chleicher was still 4lanning a revolt> but no orders reached the #otsdam garrison and none was ever sent out to raise the Army against Eitler not to mention the #resident1 8chleicher could not have 4layed that des4erate card against Germany?s greatest war hero although he might have 4layed it earlier against Eitler and won =cf1 Goering .ha4t1 )>1 +0 It is not 7nown who made the suggestion but it was in any event turned down for this could only be the height of folly as 8chleicher 7new1 To call out the Army against its greatest war hero and the most 4o4ular 4olitical figure in Germany could be nothing but disastrous1 Nor was the Army itself of one mindfar from it1 Many of the generals detested the #arty and its leader and saw clearly where Eitler?s coming to 4ower would be li7ely to lead but even as su44osedly cool-headed an officer as General Eans von 8eec7t had advised his sister to vote for Eitler in the elections of (*)&1 General von Blomberg who was soon to be chosen Minister of Defense was an admirer of the 6uehrer as were many of the younger officers1L 8chleicher was left with nothing but his will to be .hancellor and as for the Feichswehr he and everyone else 7new that in any emergency it would obey the 6ield Marshal who was also the #resident1 8chleicher tendered his resignation on Danuary &% and Eindenburg as7ed #a4en to conduct the negotiations with Eitler for establishing the new government1 In 4rinci4le this 4resented no great difficulty: Eitler must be .hancellor for that was his ma,or conditionC he must 4reside over a 4residential cabinet as had #a4en and 8chleicher before himC the Feichstag must be dissolvedC and new elections must be called for1 The elections were a stumbling bloc7 for Eugenberg with fifty-one German Nationalist de4uties behind him had to be brought into this .abinet of so-called National Fegeneration and still smarting under the defeat of his 4arty in 9i44e he 3footnote continue) from 2revious 2age5 last-minute intrigues Goering may well have been s4ea7ing the truth1 8chleicher at the end was wildly see7ing any means to 7ee4 a decisive voice in 4ublic affairs and he may have made the offer1 But he did nothing beyond that1 L Bruening said that Blomberg was the only NaHi general in (*)(C that he had had a bad fall from a horse and was in a critical nervous stateC and that Bruening had intended to retire him1 Blomberg was sent to Geneva as head of the German military mission as a 4relude to his leaving active service =-ucher o2. cit1 441 (/*(0$>1

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page_200 #age &$$ wanted no new elections that would be all too li7ely to reduce its strength still further1 Eitler was to have two National 8ocialist Ministers: 6ric7 as Minister of the Interior for the Feich and Goering as Minister -ithout #ortfolio and Minister of the Interior for #russia the latter a 4ost that would 4lace the NaHis in charge of the 4olice of the largest state and the one in which the ca4ital was situated1 The rest of the .abinet were the 7ind of men both Eindenburg and #a4en li7ed and trusted: 6ranH 8eldte a leader of the 8tahlhelm and conservatives li7e Neurath and 8chwerin von Brosig7 who had been in #a4en?s .abinet as had 6ranH Guertner the Minister of Dustice1 The rumor of a cou4 by the #otsdam garrison under 8chleicher gave the final im4etus to #a4en?s efforts to form a cabinet on Eitler?s new terms1 Now there seemed no time to be lost for him or for the #resident or for Eitler1 Eindenburg?s last doubts were dis4elled by #a4en who told him what the #resident?s son :s7ar and 8taatsse7retaer Meissner had been saying these last daysthat no sensible alternative e<isted to Eitler?s heading a coalition .abinet in which he would be greatly outnumbered by the conservatives and he and his movement 4ut to constructive wor71 6urthermore said #a4en Eitler had given signs of his reasonableness in agreeing to head such a cabinet which would bring about the long-desired unity of the Fight after the .enter and the 8ocial Democrats had failed1 Eindenburg had to choose between these alternatives: =(> war against the National 8ocialists or the 4ossibility of a civil war with either #a4en or 8chleicher as .hancellor heading a government without a 4o4ular following and denounced by all the 4arties in the FeichstagC and =&> a cabinet under Eitler in a government that would rule legally and with a vast 4o4ular following1 Eindenburg would still have 4referred to a44oint #a4en .hancellor1 Eowever if #a4en were Gice-.hancellor as the second man in a 7ind of duumvirate and Eitler chief of a coalition that could a44eal to the #resident against him the 6uehrer might be tamed1 If Eindenburg could not have #a4en then he would have Eitler and #a4en and he would a44oint as Minister of Defense a man who would if necessary command the Army to move against either Eitler or 8chleicher1 #a4en was delighted1 Ee was to be not only Gice-.hancellor but also the de4uty of the 6uehrerC and Eindenburg who was still wary of Eitler was to meet the latter only in #a4en?s 4resence1 The 6oreign Minister was #a4en?s own a44ointee as were two other members of the .abinet 8chwerin von Brosig7 and Guertner1 #a4en and his friends had not lost he told himself1 :n the contrary they had ca4tured the demagogue who would now be 4ut to wor7 to serve the cause of Germany?s regeneration by ,oining the forces of the conservative Fight1 :n Danuary )$ when the man whom Eindenburg had chosen as the ne<t Minister of Defense General von Blomberg arrived at the Anhalter station in Berlin having been ordered bac7 by the #resident from the Disarmament

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page_201 #age &$( .onference at Geneva he was met by two officers with different orders1 :ne of them was there on behalf of 8chleicher ordering him to re4ort to Blomberg?s su4erior General von Eammerstein-!@uord immediately1 The other was the #resident?s son :s7ar sent to bring Blomberg directly to Eindenburg1 The chain of command began with the #resident as .ommander in .hief of the armed forces and Blomberg was driven to the 4residential 4alace where when Eindenburg administered the oath of office he became the first member of the Eitler Government1 8chleicher had 4layed his last card1 Blomberg might have been arrested had he re4orted to Eammerstein-!@uord1 #a4en told him he had made the right decision1 At ($:/0 A1M1 the .abinet met in Meissner?s office but it was not sworn in by the #resident at ((:$$ as had been 4lanned1 Eitler did what he was so often to do in the years to come when he thought he had the o44osition in a corner: he 4resented new conditions1 Ee irritably told #a4en that Goering should be Feichs7ommissar of #russia as well as its Minister of the Interior and then he sullenly agreed to wait as #a4en 4romised him that the #resident would a44oint Goering to this office when after a little while the 6uehrer had won his confidence1 But Eitler refused to budge an inch on the dissolution of the Feichstag and the new elections1 Eugenberg too was adamant while #a4en Goering and Eitler did their best to overcome his ob,ections1 Eitler 4romised he would 7ee4 his 4resent cabinet in office no matter what the results of the elections might be and he would even add members of other 4arties of the .enter and the Bavarian Gol7s4artei1 6inally Eugenberg gave ground1 Ee agreed to let the #resident ma7e the decision1 Then the .abinet filed in twenty minutes late to be 4resented to the #resident and to be given the oath of office1 #a4en again found reasons for letting Eitler have his way1 New elections he thought would give the conservatives a chance to im4rove their 4osition in the Feichstag and in the .abinet forgetting how well the NaHis had done in the recent 4ast when their street fighters had been held in leash by the 4olice and 4ublic resistance1 Ee too7 no account of what they would be able to do now with the 4restige of office with Eitler the legal head of government and with Goering in control of the #russian 4olice1 Eitler?s ta7ing over the .abinet and then the Feichstag as well as the mind of the #resident came ste4 by ste4 but very ra4idly1 As #a4en was to say later he was the re4resentative of a 6uehrer who would tolerate no re4resentative1 :n the night of Danuary )$ Eitler stood at the window of the .hancellor?s 4alace snuffing u4 the homage of the shouting singing ,ubilant 8A and 88 as they marched by with their flaming torches1 It was one of the two or three great moments of the life of the half-educated Austrian-born former cor4oral =Gefreiter> in the German Army who had lived in flo4houses and had dreamed of ta7ing his revenge on the rich and 4owerful who had once defeated him1 They were the same forces that had defeated Germanythe Dews the 4lutocrats the .ommunistsand now he would confound them all as .hancellor of the Feich1 -hile the following

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page_202 #age &$& story is a4ocry4hal it reveals a large 7ernel of truth1 Eindenburg standing at his window in the 4residential 4alace watching the Brownshirts 4arade was said to have commented: ??I did not 7now we had ta7en so many Fussian 4risoners1I The atmos4here in the .abinet in the first days was relatively friendly and discussions were lively1 Eitler did not force a showdown on any issue once the stage was set for the elections1 The new government must go before the country as one of nationalist unity as well as revolution1 :ther things had to be arranged before the role of the .abinet would become clear1 The revolution was to be made not in the .abinet but in the Feich1 The roles of the Feichstag and the Ministers were small by com4arison for they would @uic7ly fall into line when the wor7 to be done in the streets on the ran7s of the o44osition on the 4ress and on the bureaucracy had begun and heads had begun to roll1 #a4en had thought in terms of the offices held by the conservatives and their ma,ority of non-NaHis but the .abinet was a cor7 in a whirl4ool1 The free discussions continued for a little while but Eitler?s eventual decisions were made without any consultation1 Eugenberg although he was Minister of !conomics found out that the trade unions had been dissolved after the #arty had ta7en them over1 And after mild ob,ections were raised in the .abinet session the first officially tolerated attac7s on the Dews began1 The conservative members of the .abinet soon found themselves debating only with one another for they were ignored as far as 4ractical matters went1 Goebbels and Eess were named Ministers in March and A4ril and by the end of Dune Eugenberg had resigned1 +' Eitler concentrated on the 7ey ob,ectives: winning the uncommitted masses in an election now that the 4olice and the a44aratus of the 8tate were under his control with means of coercion and 4ro4aganda never before o4en to himC and subduing the o44osition by legal semilegal and illegal means1 !very concession made to him was irreversible and usually he as7ed for only a little at a time ta7ing care until he was ready for the 7ill not to show the full length of his claws1 #a4en who deluded himself that he was a lion tamer was never a match for him1 IThey ma7e a mista7e I he said s4ea7ing of the NaHis1 I-e have hired him MEitlerN for ourselves M!ir haben ihn uns engagiertN1I++ But soon Goering was Feichs7ommissar for #russia in 4lace of #a4en and Eindenburg met the 6uehrer without #a4en1 6urthermore #a4en could only su44ort the regime in the election cam4aign for as the Gice.hancellor and de4uty of the 6uehrer he could scarcely criticiHe the .hancellor even if he had been so dis4osed and #a4en at that 4oint was no critic of a government he served with so many vain ho4es and in whose coming to 4ower he had 4layed a leading role1 Eitler moved with daHHling s4eed with the released energy of his years of 4re4aration for this moment1 Ee too7 every advantage of the mista7es of the enemy acting with firm decisionsomething as the war would show that was not easy for him in moments of acute crises1 But he was on firm

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page_203 #age &$) ground at this moment of the destruction of his enemies and of accreting 4ower for his revolution1 :n 6ebruary ( the Eamburg Fed 6ront fighters issued a call to arms to their .ommunist brothers and to all who were not National 8ocialists: ??The day is not far distant when our victorious Fed Army that needs no 4olice to 4rotect it wea4on in hand will drive the deadly enemy of the wor7ing 4eo4le to the devil1I +% Eitler 7new how to deal with such manifestoshe had been writing them himself for ten years1 :n 6ebruary ' the Feichstag was dissolved and new elections were called for March 0 =the fifth balloting within nine months>1 The following day Goering as Minister of the Interior for #russia forbade .ommunist demonstrations and any 4ress attac7s against the National 8ocialist regime1 By 6ebruary &/ the 8A and 88 and 8tahlhelm had been authoriHed to act as au<iliary 4olice1 :n 6ebruary &0 the 8A bro7e into the .ommunist head@uarters in Berlin the Barl 9ieb7necht house and got hold of what they stated to be a large list of incriminating documents written in the same vein as the Eamburg manifesto1 Then on 6ebruary &+ occurred the event the NaHis 7new 4recisely how to usethe burning of the Feichstag building1 At Nuremberg it was confidently asserted and for many years thereafter universally believed that the NaHis in all li7elihood Goering had engineered the burning in order to use the event 4recisely as the #arty used itas the 4rete<t for the wholesale arrests of the .ommunists and for their e<clusion as a 4arty from the Feichstag1 The following day / $$$ .ommunists were 4ut in ,ail1 Although the evidence is still unclear as to 4recisely how the fire was set and whether Marinus van der 9ubbe the anarchist who confessed to the crime acted alone or had hel4 there is considerable doubt as to whether the #arty engineered the blaHe1 But it 7new what to do with the news of the burning1 It was to be a 4ro4aganda 4roof for the #resident and the electorate that they were being saved by the National 8ocialist legions by the 6uehrer and his followers from a .ommunist attem4t to overthrow the forces of law and order and to do what the Eamburg call to arms 4roclaimed: I#re4are the way for the victorious Fed Army the victorious Fevolution of the 9eft1I :n 6ebruary &% Eindenburg issued the order his .hancellor as7ed him for the Decree for the #rotection of the #eo4le and the 8tate setting aside the constitutional guarantees of freedom of s4eech and freedom of assembly and giving the Eitler Government the right to invade the 4rivacy of the mail tele4hone and telegra4h to ma7e house searches and to ta7e over 4olice duties formerly e<ercised by the states1 In the s4ace of two wee7s Eitler toured ten cities in his whirlwind cam4aign and #a4en along with the other conservatives in the coalition .abinet s4o7e on behalf of the regime they now served together1 The great ceremony at the Garrison .hurch in #otsdam o4ened the new session of the Feichstag on March &(1 No members of the 8#D or of the .ommunist #arty were 4resent but the other 4arties were all re4resented1 Eindenburg and Eitler were the chief actors in what seemed to be for the first time a unity of the

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page_204 #age &$/ 8tate under all the forces of the Fightwith a vacant 4lace on the 4latform for the EohenHollern !m4eror who still haunted Eindenburg the monarchist who had e<iled his Bing1 In the election of March 0 the National 8ocialists won /)1* 4er cent of the 4o4ular vote and &%% seats in a Feichstag of '/+ de4utiesa ma,ority if the 0& votes if the nationalist 4arties were added1 :n the same day an amnesty was announced for the NaHis who had been ,ailed in the course of the years of terror and battle on the streets of the German cities and towns including the murderers of #otem4a who only a few months before had been sentenced to death and then had their sentences commuted to life im4risonment1 Im4ortant 4eo4le by the thousands floc7ed to Eitler now that he was .hancellor of Germany1 :n March &% the .atholic bisho4s? conference at 6ulda declared the 4revious warnings and 4rohibitions against ,oining the National 8ocialists rescinded1 6ive days earlier on the fateful March &) the !nabling Act had been 4assed with the .enter #arty of the clerics and of Bruening voting along with the National 8ocialists and the Nationalists in favor of turning over to Eitler the 4owers of the Feichstag1 The necessary two-thirds vote would thus have been secured even without the device of using the fire to e<clude the .ommunists from the Feichstag1 :nly ninetyfour members of the 8#D voted against the law that delivered Germany including its #arliament into Eitler?s hands and /// de4uties voted for it1 #a4en was in favor of the law and Eugenberg?s de4uties voted for it =his 4arty would be dissolved along with all the other 4arties only three months later>1 -ithin two wee7s #a4en was to lose his 4ost of Feichs7ommissar of #russia when Goering too7 over that function on A4ril ($1 As early as Duly ' (*)) Eitler could announce that the revolution was ended although in fact it had ,ust begun1 But the chief laws he had demanded for so many years were enacted or 4roclaimed1 Dews were no longer German citiHens and their 4artici4ation in the 4ublic and 4rivate life of Germany was limitedC the Laen)er had been brought under the control of BerlinC the 8tahlhelm had been made 4art of the 8AC the labor unions had been dissolved at one stro7e and brought into a single National 8ocialist "nionC the farmers had been organiHedC and all 4arties other than the N8DA# =National 8ocialist German -or7ers? #arty> were 4rohibited1 It was mainly conservatives li7e #a4en who made this 4ossible1 Their hel4 was critical and decisive1 Monsignor Baas and a caucus of the delegates of the .enter #arty decided to vote the 4lenary 4owers Eitler demanded1 Theodor Eeuss the future #resident of the Bundesre4ubli7 who detested Eitler voted for the law against his own will but following the decision of his Democratic #arty1 #a4en although warned by his advisers among them !dgar Dung was for it too1 The reason was a44arent: The 4arliamentary system was clearly finishedC a large ma,ority of the country had voted against it in the elections of the last year1 If the .ommunists? votes were added as they should

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page_20 #age &$0 be to the anti4arliamentary bloc the only democratic 4arties left were the 8#D with (&( seats in the Feichstag and 4ossibly the .enter with +/1 4lus a scattering among the s4linter 4arties1 The anti4arliamentary 4arties counted &%% votes of the National 8ocialists 4lus 0& of the Blac7Fed--hite front of the nationalist 4arties and %( .ommunists1 Not much morale was left among the wavering basically uncommitted o44osition1 The 8ocialists remained bitterly o44osed to Eitler and to any e<tension of his 4ower but the .enter and the Fight could and did go along when he made the dose easy enough to swallow1 And 4recedents e<isted for the !nabling Act1 During -orld -ar I the "44er Eouse the Bundesrat had been em4owered to ta7e any needed ste4s to ma7e good any economic damage caused by the war1 The Feichstag had surrendered its 4owers for this 4ur4ose1 And during the -eimar 4eriod the use of 4residential decrees under the continuing emergency of the 4ostwar years and the de4ression had become increasingly fre@uent1 Bruening the democrat had been forced to rely on this ma7eshift as had #a4en and 8chleicher1 !ven in (*&) it had been found necessary to give the confirmed democratic statesman .ustav 8tresemann emergency 4owers ??to ta7e measures which they Mthe GovernmentN regard as essential in economic and social matters1I 6ric7?s draft of the !nabling Act which he 4re4ared as Minister of the Interior was ta7en almost word for word from the te<t of the 4owers granted 8tresemann1 The 4ower demanded by 6ric7 on behalf of the 6uehrer was: ITo ta7e the measures that are necessary for the needs of the 4eo4le and the 8tate1I The only difference was that 8tresemann was given the 4ower to 4romulgate +eror)nungen =decrees> while Eitler could 4roclaim laws1 Eitler could also feel free to order the arrest of the bitter o44onents of the NaHis and 8evering among many others was 4rom4tly cla44ed into ,ail after 4assage of the !nabling Act1 +* The same limitation was voted as in the 8tresemann case: The 4ower granted was only to last Iuntil the 4resent government was re4laced by another1I This enabled those who were turning the authority to legislate and to govern over to Adolf Eitler to convince themselves that they were controlling him1 The !nabling Act was a grant of 4owers to the .abinet not to the .hancellor and the .abinet was a coalition1 If Eitler attem4ted too much #a4en as Gice-.hancellor and a ma,ority would vote against him and the #resident would sustain them for he had the right of veto1 Thus went the reasoning1 The leaders of the .enter told themselves that without the grant of 4ower Eitler could govern by his na7ed will but the !nabling Act 4ut legal bounds to what he could do by granting the 4ower to the Government not to one man1 6urthermore Eitler 4romised he would not misuse the authority that he would res4ect the integrity of the Laen)er and the .enter comforted themselves with the 7nowledge that Eindenburg would not tolerate a one-4arty .abinet1 Eindenburg had insisted on the coalition on a division of the Ministries and if Eitler attem4ted to ta7e over the entire

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page_20! #age &$' .abinet for the NaHis the conservative #resident would intervene1 But even with the law of 6ebruary &% Eitler had the 4ower under Eindenburg?s decree to dissolve a 4arty that threatened the security of the 8tate1 -hen differences grew acute inside the .abinet and Eugenberg said he would resign and go into o44osition Eitler told him he would dismiss all the members of his German Nationalist #eo4le?s #arty in the government bureaucracy and retire them without their 4ensions1 Eundreds of men who li7e Gisevius had been German Nationalists had already gone over to the NaHis1 Anyone with an eye to his own advancement or even to his retirement with a 4ension could note the direction of a wind that was becoming a gale1 By the time Eitler was ready to get rid of Eugenberg and his 4arty on Dune &+ he could do two things at the same time: acce4t Eugenberg?s resignation and dissolve the German Nationalist #eo4le?s #arty along with all the other 4arties1 No one in the .abinet could ma7e a last-ditch stand on any one issue1 Blomberg was both reassured and confirmed in his belief in Eitler?s greatness when the 6uehrer told him the Army would not be used against the .ommunists1 The Army was to 4rotect Germany solely against the foreign enemy1 That of course was the dee4ly held o4inion of the Army and of Eindenburg: the 4olice and the armed forces were two se4arate wea4ons of the 8tate1 A general stri7e with its 4ros4ect of revolution 4resented a far more com4licated military 4roblem than any cam4aign against an e<ternal enemy1 Thus the decrees and laws following the Feichstag fire were acce4ted by Blomberg and the higher officers1 They made no ob,ection to the dissolution of the legislature and 4rerogatives of the Laen)er1 Bavaria -uerttemberg and the rest of the states were to be governed by Feichs7ommissars as #russia had been since #a4en assumed that office and the constitutional regimes of the Laen)er went overboard without dissent from Blomberg or Eindenburg1 Blomberg ordered the Army not to interfere when local officials called for hel41 %$ Eitler informed the .abinet he wanted the swasti7a flag to su44lant the Fe4ublic?s blac7 red and gold1 #a4en o44osed the move and tried to rouse the .abinet against it but Blomberg su44orted Eitler and the matter was settled1 Eitler?s care to 4lease the #resident 4aid off @uic7ly and by A4ril Eindenburg told #a4en he need no longer be 4resent when he received Eitler1 The 6uehrer had viewed this dual audience as evidence of Eindenburg?s mistrust and had as7ed the #resident to be received alone1 The 8A the 6uehrer told Army officers was a 4olitical organiHation and had a role in the Government se4arate from the -ehrmacht1 Ee s4o7e as he had done in Mein (am2f about winning Lebensraum in the !ast about tearing out the Mar<ists root and branch and above all about Germany?s need to rearm1 Army officers were not li7ely to disagree with any of this and the Army had had enough of 4olitics after 8chleicher?s futile attem4t to govern1 As early as 6ebruary ' (*)) one of the few 4ro-NaHi generals Feichenau could say ??Never was the -ehrmacht more identified with the 8tate than today1I Eitler declared that this was a uni@ue 4henomenon in history when

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page_20" #age &$+ the forces of revolution and the res4onsible leaders of the most disci4lined army in the world united in so hearty a fashion for the service of the 4eo4le1 %( #a4en made one bold attem4t to do what he had 4romised himself and his friends he would do: bridle the radicalism the lawlessness of the revolution1 In Marburg on Dune (+ (*)/ he delivered a s4eech written for him by a young assistant !dgar Dung that courageously attem4ted to rally o44osition to the #arty fanatics1 #a4en used the "niversity of Marburg as a 4latform to reach the ear of the 6uehrer more efficaciously than he could when the two of them were alone or in a .abinet meeting1 As usual #a4en tried to disarm #arty critics with a statement of his lofty 4ur4oses1 Ee told his audience =and indirectly Eitler> that his sense of duty to the 6uehrer was so great and so devoted was he to Germany?s regeneration that it ??would be a deadly sin not to s4ea7 out in this decisive 4eriod of the German revolution1I Then he 4lunged into waters that were very nearly to cost him his life a few wee7s later and were to save his life after the war was over1 In the 4ac7ed auditorium of the university #a4en told the students and faculty: -e 7now that rumors and whis4ering 4ro4aganda must be brought out from the dar7ness where they have ta7en refuge1 6ran7 and manly discussion is better for the German 4eo4le than for instance a 4ress without an outlet described by the Minister for #ro4aganda Ias no longer having a face1I This deficiency undoubtedly e<ists1 The function of the 4ress should be to inform the Government where deficiencies have cre4t in where corru4tion has settled down where grave mista7es have been committed where incom4etent men are in the wrong 4laces where offenses are committed against the s4irit of the German revolution1 An anonymous or secret information service however well organiHed it may be can never be a substitute for this tas7 of the 4ress1 6or the news4a4er editor is res4onsible to the law and to his conscience whereas anonymous news sources are not sub,ect to control and are e<4osed to the danger of ByHantinism1 -hen therefore the 4ro4er organs of 4ublic o4inion do not shed sufficient light into the mysterious dar7ness which at 4resent seems to have fallen u4on the German 4ublic the statesman himself must intervene and call matters by their right names1 8uch intervention he continued would demonstrate that the regime was strong enough to bear honest criticism something only wea7lings could not tolerate1 If foreign countries said freedom was dead in Germany his own 4lain s4ea7ing would he said be a 4roof that the German Government was ready to 4ermit debate on vital =brennen)e> @uestions1 Ne<t he attac7ed narrow #arty doctrinaires: It is a matter of historical truth that the necessity for a fundamental change of course was recogniHed and urged even by those who shunned the 4ath of revolution through a mass-4arty1 A claim for revolutionary or nationalist mono4oly by a certain grou4 therefore seems to me e<aggerated @uite a4art from the fact that it disturbs the community1

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page_20# #age &$% After warning against the ??misuse by young revolutionaries es4eciallyI of the word IreactionaryI for those who were conscientiously carrying out their tas7s he commented on the 8tate and the social order: All of life cannot be organiHedC otherwise it becomes mechaniHed1 The 8tate is organiHationC life is growth1 1 1 1 The real revolution of the twentieth century 1 1 1 is that of the heroic god-bound 4ersonality who struggles against 1 1 1 the mechaniHation and collectiviHation which is only the last degeneration of bourgeois liberalism1 1 1 1 The meaning of the new time MCeiten,en)eN is clear: it concerns the decision between believers and nonbelievers whether all eternal values would be seculariHed or not 1 1 1 The time of the emanci4ation of the lowest class against the higher classes is over1 It is not a @uestion of holding one class downthat would be reactionarybut to 4revent one class from dominating the 8tate and trying to achieve total control1 In that case every natural and divine order would be lostC the 4ermanent revolution would threaten1 1 1 1 The goal of the German revolution if it is really to be valid and a 4attern for !uro4e must be based on a natural social order 1 1 1 true authority MHerrschaftN cannot come from one grou4 or class1 The antidemocratic revolution must return to the natural and divine order he said and em4hasiHed how much Eitler wanted the German 4eo4le to retain its feeling for Ia genuine res4onsible ,ust authority1I Ee e<4ressed his thoughts on the single4arty system: Domination by a single 4arty re4lacing the ma,ority-4arty system which rightly has disa44eared a44ears to me historically as a transitional stage ,ustified only as long as the safeguarding of the new 4olitical change demands it and until the new 4rocess of 4ersonal selection begins to function1 :n the religious @uestion he said: It is my conviction that the .hristian doctrine clearly re4resents the religious form of all :ccidental thin7ing and that with the reawa7ening of religious forces the German 4eo4le also will be 4ermeated anew by the .hristian s4irit a s4irit the 4rofundity of which is almost forgotten by a humanity that has lived through the nineteenth century1 A struggle is a44roaching: the decision as to whether the new Feich of the Germans will be .hristian or is to be lost in sectarianism and half-religious materialism1 1 1 1 It would be easy if every attem4t on the 4art of the 8tate to force a reformation were to cease1 It must be admitted that there is a 4olitical element in the o44osition of .hristian grou4s to 8tate and #arty interference1 But this is merely because 4olitical interference in the religious s4here forces those concerned to resist on religious grounds such unnatural 4retensions to total 4ower in this area1 1 1 1 a battle against the church would unleash counter forces that would in the end defeat brute 4ower1 1 1 1 Eow can Germany fulfill her tas7 in !uro4e if we voluntarily 4lace ourselves outside the ran7s of the .hristian 4eo4les1 1 1 1 -e cannot seal ourselves s4iritually within our borders and 4lace ourselves voluntarily in a ghetto1 Eere lies the real reaction 1 1 1

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page_20$ #age &$* Ee defended intellectualism: But once a revolution has been com4leted the Government only re4resents the 4eo4le as a whole and is never the cham4ion of individual grou4s1 1 1 1 National 8ocialism has always fought to re4lace the #arty boo7 with the 4rinci4les of human conduct and achievement1 1 1 1 It is not 4ermissible therefore to dismiss the intellect with the catchword of ??intellectualism1I Deficient or 4rimitive intellects do not ,ustify us in waging war against intellectualism1 And when we com4lain fre@uently today about those of us who are (0$ 4er cent NaHis then we mean those intellectuals without a foundation 4eo4le who would li7e to deny the right of e<istence to scientists of world fame ,ust because they are not #arty members1 1 1 1 -e should 4rotect ourselves from the danger of 4lacing such men of the s4irit outside the community1 1 1 1 Nor should the ob,ection be made that intellectuals lac7 the vitality necessary for the leading of a 4eo4le1 1 1 1 the mista7ing of brutality for vitality would reveal a worshi4 of force which would be dangerous to a 4eo4le1 Ee attac7ed #arty fanatics: They o44ose e@uality before the law 1 1 1 These 4eo4le su44ress that 4illar of the 8tate which alwaysand not only in liberal timeswas called ,ustice1 Their attac7s are directed against the security and freedom of the 4rivate s4here of life which the Germans won in centuries of hardest struggle1 1 1 1 No 4eo4le can endure an eternal revolt from below if it is to answer to history M,enn es vor )er 6eschichte bestehen ,illN1 The Movement must come to a standstill sometimeC a solid social structure must sometime come into e<istence which is held together by an im4artial administration of ,ustice and by an undis4uted governmental 4ower1 Nothing can be achieved by means of everlasting dynamics1 Germany must not go adrift on uncharted seas toward un7nown shores1 1 1 1 No organiHation and no 4ro4aganda however good will in the long run be able to 4reserve confidence1 1 1 1 .onfidence and readiness to coo4erate cannot be won by 4rovocation 1 1 1 nor by threats against hel4less segments of the 4eo4le 1 1 1 The 4eo4le 7now that great sacrifices are e<4ected from them1 They will bear them 1 1 1 if every word of criticism is not ta7en for ill-will and if des4airing 4atriots are not branded as enemies of the 8tate1 The doctrinaire bigots of the #arty had to be silenced: If we deny the great inheritance of culture 1 1 1 we again shall miss the chance that !uro4e has given its central 4eo4le1 1 1 1 If !uro4e wants to 7ee4 alive its claim to world leadershi4 not an hour can be lost to use its 4owers for a s4iritual rebirth and to bury its 4etty @uarrels1 1 1 1 :nly a res4onsible disci4lined 4eo4le will lead it1 %& It is revealing to note the te<tual differences between #a4en?s s4eech and the account he gave of it in his memoirs1 In his memoirs he wrote that he told his audience that National 8ocialism had come to 4ower by democratic means and that the coalition in the .abinet had never foreseen that in the

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page_210 #age &($ 4lace of the 4arties an unchec7ed dictatorshi4 would rule against Dustice 9aw and the .hurch1 Actually he made no such statement in his s4eech1 .om4arison can readily be made since the 4rinted te<t of his s4eech was included among his defense 4a4ers and was 4ublished in the volumes of the Nuremberg trials1 :ne must conclude that #a4en was convinced when he wrote his memoirs that this was what he had meant to sayC that this was what he had believed and was 4erha4s what an astute listener to his courageous tal7 might get out of it1 But he had not actually said it1 Dust before his Marburg s4eech #a4en had made similar comments in addressing a gathering of students at Bonn "niversity on May &*1 Ee told them that the 4roblem of freedom was not essentially solved by the use or nonuse of measures that limited freedom1 ??It has much more to do with a religious rebirth of 4ersonality that grows out of the free devotion MBin)ungN of the individual human being to God1I %) Both these s4eeches were ty4ical of #a4en?s 4hiloso4hy which in general was that of a .hristian .atholic conservative1 They dee4ly im4ressed not only 4eo4le of similar views but also those who were glad to hear such untrammeled sentiments among the disorders of German life1 But the convinced NaHis reacted differently1 The s4eeches gave them the ammunition they needed to drive #a4en as @uic7ly as 4ossible from his 4lace in the .abinet1 Eitler and his convinced NaHis had no interest in Germany?s leadershi4 in a .hristian !uro4e1 They had been fighting for twelve years against these very sentiments which re4eated what Bruening and the bourgeois 4arties had been forever sayingthat here was something to tide the 4eo4le over from 8unday to 8unday while the #arliament debated while the Allies 4romised that some day Germany would have e@ual rights and while the ran7s of the unem4loyed grew1 The Marburg s4eech was received by the #arty in shoc7ed silence1 The +oelkischer Beobachter 4rinted not a word of it1 :nly the "rankfurter Ceitung carried the te<t and Goebbels as soon as he read it forbade its 4ublication1 Eitler merely referred to it in an offhand way in a tal7 with #a4en and attem4ted #a4en wrote later to mollify him1 #a4en 4rotested against Goebbels? forbidding 4ublication and Eitler 4romised to discuss the matter with Eindenburg when he visited the #resident at Neudec7 but he never mentioned the sub,ect again nor did #a4en1 It was a dangerous s4eech coming from a member of the Government and the #arty hierarchy 7new this well1 -hen #a4en a44eared at the racetrac7 in Eamburg a few days after the s4eech the crowds shouted IEeil Marburg1I Eimmler and the 88 7e4t him and Dung in mind for the chance that came a few days later1 Dung who had no high o4inion of #a4en had written the s4eech saying he would use #a4en in the way #a4en had thought of using Eitler to 4lay a useful role1%/ But #a4en was certainly aware of what he was doing and aware of the dangers and therefore was careful to cover

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page_211 #age &(( himself with 4raise of the 6uehrer and to concentrate his fire on the rabid followers1 This was #a4en?s first and last act of high civil courage1 :n Dune )$ (*)/ Eitler moved to li@uidate Foehm and his coterie of the 8A high command and the 88 thus became the chief military arm of the #arty1 #a4en was immediately arrested and was confined to his house for three days and the man who had written the s4eech for him was 7illed along with #a4en?s secretary Eerbert von Bose and his enemy General 8chleicher1 =In his memoirs #a4en 4roudly listed the .onservatives who had wor7ed with him when the !nabling Act was ado4ted: BoseC -ilhelm von Betteler who was to be 7illed by the NaHis in (*)%C and Tschirsch7y who emigrated to !ngland in (*)0 because the Gesta4o threatened his life1 #a4en wanted his readers to understand how anti-NaHi these men were1 8o they were undoubtedly1 But they were either li@uidated or sent into e<ile and #a4en continued to serve the regime that had done away with them1> #a4en busied himself with serving the cause of the revolution at the same time consoling himself that what he did was also the wor7 of the 9ord1 In Duly (*)) he had negotiated a concordat with the Gatican which for a time effectively blunted .atholic o44osition to Eitler?s regime1 But the continued flagrant attac7s on both churchmen and institutions brought some of the clergy and laymen into an o44osition that was not to be @uieted by flourishing a treaty1 :n Danuary (0 (*)/ #a4en declared in the Boersen0eitung: ??The Third Feich under the leadershi4 of Adolf Eitler 1 1 1 is the first state in the world in which the higher 4rinci4les of the #o4e are not only recogniHed but carried out in 4ractice1I #a4en was always concerned for Eitler?s formal observations of the 4ro4rieties where the .hurch was concerned1 Dust after Eitler became .hancellor #a4en 4ersuaded him against Bormann?s ob,ections to send a re4resentative to Trier on one solemn ecclesiastical occasion1 Ee 4rotested to the 6uehrer when he received com4laints about some outrageous attac7 on the clergy but he continued to serve the Government1 9i7e Neurath and 8chacht he was distressed over the hooliganism of the 8A with its onslaughts against the Dews1 After the 8A had been made au<iliary 4olice their anti-8emitic activities had an official character1 Though #a4en himself believed that too many Dews were in 4ublic office and in the 4rofessions he counted as victory the fact that the 6uehrer was 4ersuaded to e<em4t among the non-Aryan officials who must resign their 4osts those who had served their country in the front line in -orld -ar I or had been government officials before the start of the war1 The e<em4tion was a res4ectable achievement but it was due far more to Eitler?s need to move slowly in the face of Eindenburg?s allegiance to German frontline soldiers and old officials than to counsel or 4rotests from the conservative faction in the .abinet1 The Nuremberg 9aws of (*)0 were antici4ated in the non-Aryan clauses that were e<tended to the Army in the decree of Dune ( (*))1 By

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page_212 #age &(& 6ebruary (*)/ no Dewish officer could serve =even if he had been in the front line in -orld -ar I> in a ran7 of battalion commander or higher1 The .abinet and the Army went beyond these 4roscri4tions1 In Duly (*)) Blomberg and the Army Eigh .ommand allowed #arty 4ro4aganda to circulate in barrac7s libraries and service centers and by the s4ring of (*)/ Blomberg ordered instruction on 4olitical 4roblems to be given the armed forces1 The -ehrmacht as the 4rotector of NaHi Germany he said needed a44ro4riate bac7ground for its tas71 %0 Men li7e #a4en always had a 1ui) 2ro 1uo for their conscience1 -hen the .hurch was attac7ed #a4en could 4oint to his concordat the first such treaty with the Gatican that #rotestant Germany had had in centuries1 -hen the Army without 4rotest allowed a fraction of its officer cor4s to be dismissed and 4olitical 4ro4aganda to become 4art of its training 4rogram officers who might @uestion such orders could 4oint to the decision of the 6uehrer that the Army alone was now the nation?s bearer of arms and the 8A was no longer a rival for the 8A had only a 4olitical function and its leaders might be li@uidated if they became unduly ambitious or overste44ed their functions1 In similar fashion #a4en swallowed the bitter dose of being arrested for three days when the e<ecutions of Foehm and of 8A leaders were going on and two men among his close collaborators were murdered1 These were a44arently evidences of the growing 4ains of the revolution1 #a4en found it intolerable that he had been under arrest that the 88 had sealed off his office and gone through his 4a4ers1 Ee told Eitler he could not attend the Feichstag session in which the 6uehrer e<4lained to the nation how narrowly he had rescued it from the machinations of the cons4irators1 #a4en said his honor had been com4romised when although a member of the Government he had been arrested1 Ee also demanded that the body of the murdered Bose be returned to his family so it could be 4ro4erly buried and he sent the widow of !dgar Dung the sum of ( $$$ FM1 But then 6rau Dung heard no more from him nor did he attend the funeral of her husband who li7e 8chleicher had been hunted down by the 881 It would be unwise to show too much sym4athy1 The Army generals too acce4ted the murder of its Jminence grise and former Minister of -ar along with that of his wife1 Eowever a meeting of the 8chlieffen 8ociety made u4 of distinguished senior officers 4assed a resolution declaring that 8chleicher had not committed an act of treason1 -ith the ( $$$ FM to Dung?s widow and the resolution on 8chleicher the dead were safely interred1 After Dune )$ #a4en never again too7 4art in a .abinet meeting1 Ee tendered his resignation as Gice-.hancellor to ta7e effect in 8e4tember1 In his letter of Duly (& to the 6uehrer #a4en 4raised him for having ta7en full res4onsibility for everything that had occurred in 4utting down the revolt1 ??Allow me to say I he wrote Ihow manly and humanly great of you I thin7 this is 1 1 1 your courageous and firm intervention have met with nothing but recognition throughout the entire world1I Ee assured Eitler of his unchanged

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page_213 #age &() admiration and devotion and as7ed him to tell the Feichstag that #a4en?s honor and authority were unim4eached1 Ee also as7ed that Bose?s case be cleared u4 4ublicly1 %' The day after Eitler made his s4eech of Duly () to the Feichstag a session which #a4en had declined to attend #a4en wrote him again telling him how he would li7e to clas4 his hand to than7 him for his rescue of the country and to congratulate him ??for all you have given anew to the German nation by crushing the intended second revolution1I The 4raise accom4anied #a4en?s 4lea for Eitler to ma7e a statement this time on behalf of #a4en?s loyalty because 4re4osterous charges were being made against him including the calumny that he had a 4lan to murder men li7e Goering and Goebbels1%+ A few days later on Duly &0 the attem4ted cou4 of the National 8ocialists in Austria too7 4lace1 It failed but not until .hancellor Dollfuss =against whose authoritarian regime Austrian 8ocialists had also attem4ted a rising including an unsuccessful attac7 on the .hancellor?s life> had been 7illed =see 8eyss-In@uart .ha4t1 ((>1 Eitler needed someone who would mollify and reassure the new Austrian Government a .atholic and non-NaHi and #a4en acce4ted the 4ost of Ambassador !<traordinary1 The 4rosecution lawyers at Nuremberg attac7ed him shar4ly for his behavior but #a4en had the standard answer: Going to Austria enabled him to wor7 for a 4eaceful settlement in the interest of both countries1 Eindenburg died ,ust before #a4en left for Gienna but #a4en did not see him1 Eitler got to the deathbed while the old man still had moments of consciousness1 The .hancellor had to be in attendance on this solemn occasion1 :ne of the chief reasons for his being there was to 4re4are the way for his succeeding Eindenburg as #resident1 #a4en had drawn u4 a testament for Eindenburg with accom4anying documents that he said Eitler had a44roved in 4rinci4le in which Eindenburg called on the German 4eo4le to restore the monarchy1 Eindenburg according to #a4en decided on reflection to address the documents not to the German 4eo4le but to the 6uehrer as a recommendation1 Eitler being e<tremely an<ious to get hold of these documents sent #a4en to Neudec7 after the #resident?s death1 #a4en 4rom4tly gave both 4a4ers to Eitler1 The one the official will was 4ublished1 It 4raised Eitler for his wor7 as .hancellor and called on the country to be loyal to him1 The other statement which had to do with the 4ossible establishing of a monarchy sim4ly disa44eared1 Eitler by unanimous vote of the .abinet became #resident as well as Feich .hancellor and the armed forces too7 their oath of fidelity to him only hours later for this was a crucial matter in Eitler?s mind1 :nce the oath was ta7en the Army was his the officer cor4s bound to him in the unconditional obedience it owed the head of state whether 7ing or 4resident1 6rom that day until Eitler?s death the oath was a controlling obligation for the ma,ority of -ehrmacht officers and soldiers1 In Austria another #a4en associate was murdered1 Baron von Betteler

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page_214 #age &(/ who was violently anti-Eitler had been entrusted by #a4en with secret 4a4ers which Betteler had ta7en for safe7ee4ing to 8witHerland1 6rom there he went on to Gienna where the Gesta4o murdered him at about the time #a4en was viewing the victory 4arade of German units as the Anschluss was being celebrated1 #a4en 4rotested offered an award of &$ $$$ FM for the arrest of the 4er4etrators and as7ed Eitler to hel4 find them1 But the 6uehrer never answered his letter Instead #a4en was given the #arty?s Golden Badge of Eonor1 9ater a woman testified that he had called it a dog tag but he did 7ee4 it1 Eis role as seen by the 4rosecution at Nuremberg in the 4re4arations for the Anschluss was a ma,or but @uasi-legal one1 No incriminating evidence was brought against him1 The underground wor7 was done by the Austrian National 8ocialists themselves and by the agents with which the German 4arty and secret services flooded the country1 The chief cause of the overwhelming Austrian sentiment in favor of the Anschluss came from the 4ost--orld -ar I circumstances in which Austria found itself chronically ban7ru4t and de4endent on the traditional enemy Italy to 7ee4 the NaHis from ta7ing 4ower1 .hancellor von 8chuschnigg who had succeeded Dollfuss could not ho4e to maintain his country?s inde4endence once Italy and Germany came to an understanding1 =8ee 8eyssIn@uart .ha4t1 ((1> In (*)% #a4en accom4anied 8chuschnigg to Berchtesgaden when Eitler in the 4resence of his generals forced the Austrian .hancellor to sign the document ma7ing 8eyss-In@uart Minister of #ublic 8ecurity with the 4ower of controlling the 4olice freeing any NaHis under 4olitical arrest adding one hundred German officers to the Austrian Army and ma7ing it legal to ,oin the National 8ocialist #arty which became coe@ual with the other Austrian 4olitical organiHations1 In return Eitler guaranteed Austrian inde4endence at least until he could claim that one of the clauses of the agreement had been violated1 #a4en had told 8chuschnigg that only sub,ects on which the two governments were agreed would be brought u4 at the meeting1 Ee 4robably was acting in good faith1 ;ears later 8chuschnigg thought that he had been but Eitler did not 4ay much attention to #a4en nor did he conceal his willingness to use force if 8chuschnigg did not sign1 -hen a few wee7s after the signing of the agreement the Austrian .hancellor called the ill-fated and ill-4lanned 4lebiscite which he intended to be a great 4ublic affirmation of confidence in his 4olicies he su44lied the 4rete<t for the Anschluss the 6uehrer was waiting for1 The voting was clearly rigged: :nly those over twenty-five could vote thus e<cluding the youth who were the mainstays of NaHi strength1 The 4lebiscite was to be held four days after it was announced1 It would be almost as hard to vote ??NoI as it was in NaHi Germany =see 8eyss-In@uart .ha4t1 ((>1 #a4en had had nothing to do with the suddenly im4rovised 4lans for the German divisions crossing the Austrian borderan invasion that resulted

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page_21 #age &(0 only in ??The 6lower -arI as the German soldiers marched 4ast the ,ubilant 4o4ulation with Austrian troo4s ha44ily ,oining the German formations1L Eitler had given his army no advance notice either1 No General 8taff 4lan e<isted for an Austrian cam4aign nor were the troo4s 4re4ared for one1 Tan7s bro7e down1 The march 4lans were im4rovised1 But the soldiers were greeted with delirious enthusiasm by the Austrians who were thoroughly tired of their drab unho4eful life and yearning for the boom and glitter and future offered them by the Third Feich1 #a4en had earned his 4lace in the reviewing stand with Eitler but it cost him dearly1 Ee was e<cited over this relatively 4eaceful solution of the Austrian 4roblem in Germany?s favor his mission to Austria was crowned with success he had been honored with the dubious gewgaw of the #arty1 But another of his co-wor7ers and friends Baron von Betteler had been murdered by the regime he had hel4ed bring to Austria1 #a4en stood with Eitler acce4ting the homage of the crowd after the 6uehrer?s trium4hal entry into the city where the .hancellor =now of both countries> once had sold 4ostcards and eaten in sou4 7itchens that fed the unem4loyed1 It was a moment of soul-searching for #a4en1 Eis choice of the regime to serve seemed right in many ways1 A German and .atholic country had been added to the borders of the Feich and #a4en had done his duty in re4resenting in legal fashion the legitimate interests not only of Germany but of Austria too1 But the murders were counting u4 and it too7 some effort to attribute the beatings and the 4ersecution of the Dews that started immediately to the lunatic fringe of the #arty or to the into<ication that accom4anied the great victory of National 8ocialism in undoing the wor7 of the Allied treaty-ma7ers who wanted to condemn both countries to wea7ness and destitution1 The e<cesses #a4en still ho4ed would not last1 Ee and men li7e him held fast to this ho4e or ignored such events for even the Austrian .ardinal InnitHer and the rest of the higher .atholic hierarchy welcomed the Anschlussthe union of the two German countriesand en,oined their 4arishioners to acce4t it with enthusiasm1 #a4en saw with sorrow the violence of the attac7 on the .hurch that followed the 4eriod of re,oicing1 8oon after the Anschluss .ardinal InnitHer?s 4alace was invaded by NaHi hoodlums and looted and the .ardinal was barricaded in one of its rooms1 #riests and nuns in Austria as in Germany were hauled before courts to be accused of homose<uality or subversive 4olitical views or both1 The .ardinal and the Gatican 4rotested as did #a4en1 The 4rotests were waved aside and the attac7 on the .hurch never ceased1 Eundreds of 4riests as well as #rotestant ministers were sent to con- L The Tavs 4lot =see 8eyss-In@uart .ha4t1 ((> included a 4lan to murder #a4en in the German !mbassy in Gienna1 This would be an e<cuse for German intervention =:swald Dutch The Errant i2lomat M9ondon: !dward Arnold (*/$N 441 &/*0$1 Also #a4en-84ruch7ammer interrogation of 6ebruary &+ (*/% MMunich AmtsgerichtN1>

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page_21! #age &(' centration cam4s some of them because they 4reached against the regime others because they were denounced still others because they were members of the Fesistance1 -hen -orld -ar II started #a4en acce4ted the last 4ost he would hold for the Third Feichthat of Ambassador to Tur7ey1 Ee had fought in Tur7ey during -orld -ar I and was highly esteemed there1 Ee 4erformed his ambassadorial duties as well as might be e<4ected 4erha4s better1 It was he who discovered and made use of the remar7able s4y called .icero who through #a4en 4rovided the German intelligence with the 4lace and time of the Allied landing in Normandy1 Eis information would have been 4riceless had it been 4ro4erly evaluated and acted u4on in Berlin1 #a4en had some discreet relations too with the German Fesistance1 :ne member .ount #feil who testified for him at his first trial in a German court said #a4en was considered for the 4ost of 6oreign Minister by the leaders of the cons4iracy and #a4en declared at the trial that he would have been glad to coo4erate if the Attentat =attem4t on Eitler?s life> had been successful1 But he was never a member of the Fesistance e<ce4t in theory1 Ee was never considered reliable enough or bold enough by the men who were ris7ing their lives in the Duly (*// 4lot to be included in any of their serious discussions or 4lans for a 4ost-Eitler government1 #a4en?s name a44eared on none of the lists 4re4ared by .arl Goerdeler or his cocons4iratorsC he was an outsider there too1 #a4en?s guilt could only be decided by a German court by men and women who had lived through the time when he had made his decision on whether to s4ea7 u4 against the Eitler tyranny or to bear with it1 :n March &0 (*)) soon after Eitler had ta7en over full 4ower #a4en had sent a telegram to The Ne, 'ork Times in which he said that Dews could live com4letely unmolested in Germany if they stayed out of 4olitics but in his o4inion there were too many Dews in 4ublic life in literature theater and films and es4ecially in law1 %% This was 4ublished four days before the boycott of Dewish business too7 4lace and before the wides4read 4ublicity given the acts of hooliganism committed by the 8A thugs1 But countless e4isodes of the same 7ind had occurred before the telegram was sent although not on so great a scale1 The 8A and 88 were establishing their own unofficial concentration cam4s1 The first ones a44eared in March (*)) where Dews were wor7ed over and held 4risoner1 #a4en could not have been unaware of these acts of terrorism because he said later that he 4rotested to Eitler against them1 In Nuremberg he tried to ,ustify his activities1 Ee believed himself to be a reasonable man1 Ee had been in favor of a 4ure race as he had said in Danuary (*)/ but did not every country have the right to 4rotect its bloodO #a4en wanted the Dews to be treated as foreigners in Germany1 They were not to be citiHens but their rights would be defined and safeguarded by law and when e<cesses occurred one could 4rotest against them1 In his view it

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page_21" #age &(+ must be 7e4t in mind that too many of them had 4ositions of 4rominence and that they were a foreign body within the German community1 #a4en saw all these matters in a mild genteel light1 ??There can certainly be no ob,ection to 7ee4ing the uni@ue @uality of a 4eo4le as clean as 4ossible and to awa7en the sense of a 4eo4les? community I he had said in a s4eech at GleiwitH in (*)/1 %* And in writing to Eitler he had stressed the similarity of their views: I!s4ecially 4leasing is the growing revulsion 4articularly of the wor7ers to Dewish dominance1I*$ In a word #a4en was wea71 Ee held no views that were not sub,ect to modification when it seemed e<4edient to change them1 But he was no moral coward1 Eis s4eech at Marburg was an act of great courage and in the first Eitler .abinet he stood u4 to Eitler more than any of his colleagues did1 Nor was he without generosity: Ee told 8evering who was testifying against #a4en at his trial in the German court that their 4olitical differences did not affect his high esteem of 8evering as a man1 The remar7 resulted in a half-hearted com4liment from 8evering who had ,ust called him a liar to the effect that he was attac7ing not #a4en 4ersonally but only his 4olitical career1*( All in all it was a shabby career for a man who with every formal advantage of family 4osition and with many of the sound instincts of the German conservative sim4ly could not bring himself to face the dee4er realities of his own and his country?s 4redicament1 Eis heart bled for his coreligionists for the 4ersecuted Dews for the men and women de4rived of due 4rocess of the law for the war that he 7new in (*)* was surely coming for all the suffering and in,ustices the National 8ocialists were inflicting but he served the 6uehrer and acce4ted the #arty?s Golden Badge of Eonor the ambassadorshi4s the rewards of high 4lace1 At Nuremberg telling about the 4reliminaries to his meeting with Eitler while 8chleicher was .hancellor he said the Eerren7lub was called that to distinguish it from a woman?s club1 *& Actually as he and every German-s4ea7ing 4erson in the courtroom 7new Herren as the name was used for this club was as close an a44ro<imation as the members could devise to IGentlemen1I #a4en?s other attem4ts to describe its functions to the Allies were e@ually fatuous1 8ocialists and even .ommunists he said were invited there1 Ee meant as s4ea7ers for the club was concerned with 4olitics but it sounded as though they might have been members and the Eerren7lub was the inveterate enemy of such elements1 #a4en certainly had every right to belong to the Eerren7lub but his attem4ts to e<4lain away its function were 4art of the disingenuousness that 4lagued him all his life1 In one outburst of 4ride he said in a s4eech made while he was still Gice-.hancellor on November ) (*)) that he had been the 4athbrea7er for the NaHis1 II have tried with all my strength to ta7e 4art in the reconstruction and rebirth of our homeland1I*) The NaHis for him once he decided to ,oin Eitler were Ithe young fighting freedom movement1I The good 9ord had

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page_21# #age &(% blessed Germany by giving it in times of dee4 distress a 6uehrer who would lead it through all crises and moments of danger with the sure instincts of the statesman to a ha44y future1 */ -hile it is true that he was soon disillusioned he continued to 4raise Eitler1 After the murders of Bose and Dung he than7ed the 6uehrer for his s4eech in the Feichstag e<4laining why he had been forced to ta7e such measures1 Ee would be most grateful he said if Eitler would ma7e a 4ublic announcement that #a4en was a worthy 4erson loyal to the 6uehrer and his wor71*0 This was #a4en1 If he could rescue some shreds of res4ectability he could acce4t almost anything even his own arrest and the murder of his friends1 All he wanted was the restoration of his honor the o44ortunity to 7ee4 face1 Ee ventured no further than the fringes of the FesistanceC he wanted to get in touch with FooseveltC he tal7ed of !uro4ean solidarity and the long tradition of !uro4ean culture1 But he shran7 from the idea of actually holding Eitler to accountarresting or if necessary 7illing himfor enormities committed1 #a4en wanted to stay alive not only as a human being but as a 4erson of im4ortance1 Ee succeeded in the first and to some degree in the second goal1 But the Germans after Nuremberg turned their bac7s on him refusing to acce4t the stories which he certainly believed himself of his efforts to bring Eitler and the #arty to some semblance of .hristian morals1 Eis native city which had once bestowed honorary citiHenshi4 u4on him and named a street after him refused him the right to live there1 A hos4ital in Nuremberg refused him admission1 The Bundesre4ubli7 refused him a 4ension1 And yet he had done more than many who fared better in -est Germany after the war1 Ee had s4o7en at Marburg1 Notes (1 N*A GII 9-+/ 441 %)*/+1 &1 .ount 6ol7e Bernadotte The *urtain "alls =New ;or7: Alfred A1 Bno4f Inc1 (*/0>1 )1 E1 F1 Berndorff 6eneral 0,ischen Ost un) !est =Eamburg: Eoffmann and .am4e n1d1>1 /1 Margaret Boveri er i2lomat vor 6ericht =Berlin and Eannover: Minerva Gerlag (*/%> 41 /$1 01 Gordon A1 .raig and 6eli< Gilbert eds1 The i2lomats 787878F8 =#rinceton: #rinceton "niversity #ress (*0)> 41 /)01 '1 #aul 8eabury The !ilhelmstrasse =Ber7eley: "niversity of .alifornia #ress (*0/>1 +1 6ermania 6ebruary ' (*)%1 %1 N TTTG ')'-D 41 &))1 Also N*A GII D-+//-A 441 (*%**1 *1 .ount GaleaHHo .iano .iano?s Hi))en iary 78FI78FH =New ;or7: !1 #1 Dutton R .o1 Inc1 (*0)> 41 ((*1 ($1 .bi)1 41 0%&1

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page_21$ #age &(* ((1 !rich Bordt Nicht aus )en Akten =8tuttgart: "nion Deutsche Gerlags GmbE1 (*0$> 41 ))&1 (&1 -eiHsaec7er Gernehmungs4roto7oll +*(&1 Also -alther Eofer ie Entfesselung )es C,etten !eltkrieges =6ran7furt a1M1: 81 6ischer Gerlag (*'/> 41 ('+1 ()1 6(0(+& Bonn Auswaertiges Amt1 (/1 Michael 6reund ed1 6eschichte )es C,eiten !eltkrieges in okumenten Gol1 I =6reiburg: Eerder Gerlag (*0)> 41 &+01 (01 Eans-Adolf Dacobsen 78F8789? er C,eite !eltkrieg in *hronik un) okumenten =Darmstadt: -ehr und -issen Gerlag (*'(> 41 &)'1 ('1 N: &'(% Interrogation 8ummary -erner von 8chmieden Dune &' (*/+ =Fi,7sinstituut voor :orlogsdocumentatie AmsterdamC hereinafter referred to as Amsterdam>1 (+1 8eabury o2. cit1 441 0&0)1 (%1 .raig and Gilbert eds1 o2. cit1 (*1 .iano o2. cit1 41 (0(1 &$1 .arl D1 Burc7hardt Meine an0iger Mission 78FI78F8 =Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Gerlag (*'&> 41 )$+1 &(1 Bernadotte o2. cit1 41 )*1 &&1 :tto 87orHeny 6eheimkomman)o Skor0eny =Eamburg: Eansa Gerlag Dosef Toth (*0$> 41 (')1 &)1 ocuments on 6erman "oreign -olicy 787H789? 8eries D Gol1 GIII =-ashington: De4artment of 8tate> 41 %%'1 &/1 Bross o2. cit1 41 (&(1 &01 Trials of !ar *riminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals &n)er *ontrol *ouncil La, No. 7$= Nuremberg 789:98 Gol1 TII =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice> 41 *&+1 Eereinafter referred to as T!*1 &'1 #aul 8eabury ??Fibbentro4 and the German 6oreign :ffice I in -olitical Science Juarterly December (*0(1 Also Eoffmann o2. cit1 41 (('1 &+1 .iano o2. cit1 41 /++1 &%1 N TTTG +/(-D 441 /0%'(1 &*1 Doachim von Fibbentro4 C,ischen Lon)on un) Moskau =9eoni: Druffel-Gerlag (*0)> 41 &'%1 )$1 Interrogation August &* (*/0 =National Archives -ashington D1.1C hereinafter referred to as NA>1 )(1 N II 41 //%1 )&1 8eabury IFibbentro4 and the German 6oreign :ffice I o2. cit1 ))1 N TTTG +)'-D 41 /&%1 )/1 .bi)1 +)0-D 441 /&)&0 and +/(-D 41 /'&1 )01 Interrogation August &* (*/0 =NA>1 )'1 Interrogation 8e4tember ($ (*/0 =NA>1 )+1 Gilbert o2. cit1 )%1 !berhard Aeller 6eist )er "reiheitB er #$. %uli =Munich: Gotthold Mueller Gerlag (*')> 41 /&&1 )*1 Ivone Bir74atric7 The .nner *ircle =9ondon: The Macmillan .om4any 9td1 (*0*> 41 (*+1 /$1 8chellenberg o2. cit1 /(1 N TGI 41 0*/1

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page_220 #age &&$ /&1 .bi)1 41 '$%1 /)1 N T9 Neurath-'*1 //1 .bi)1 Neurath-+/1 /01 .bi)1 Neurath-((& and Neurath-(('1 /'1 Bir74atric7 o2. cit1 41 *%1 /+1 N TGI 41 '((1 /%1 .bi)1 41 '$/1 /*1 *0echoslovakia "ights Back =-ashington: American .ouncil on #ublic Affairs (*/)> 441 ((% (&)1 0$1 N TIT 41 //+1 0(1 N TGII 441 0*+)1 0&1 .bi)1 41 '(1 0)1 N*A 8u441 A )%0*-#8 441 0*%'(/1 Also N TGII 441 '('01 0/1 N TGII 41 0*1 001 .bi)1 41 '(1 0'1 Interrogation A4ril (+ (*/+ =NA>1 0+1 N TGII 41 ($(1 0%1 N I 441 ))))/1 0*1 :swald Dutch The Errant i2lomat =9ondon: !dward Arnold (*/$> 41 '(1 '$1 6ranH von #a4en er !ahrheit eine 6asse =Munich: #aul 9ist Gerlag (*0&> 41 ($+1 Also Dutch o2. cit1 41 +%1 '(1 Meissner and -ilde o2. cit1 Also #a4en o2. cit1 '&1 !rich Matthias ??Hin)enburg 0,ischen )en "ronten 78F#=G +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 ( (*'$ 441 +%%&1 ')1 Eeinrich Bennec7e Hitler un) )ie SA =Munich: :lHog (*'&>1 '/1 :tto Meissner Staatssekretaer unter Ebert= Hin)enburg un) Hitler =Eamburg: Eoffmann and .am4e (*0$> 41 &($1 '01 -ilhelm Deist ISchleicher un) )ie )eutsche Abruestungs2olitik im %umiK %uli 78F# I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 & (*0* 441 (')+'1 Also #a4en o2. cit1 441 &$&+1 Also !douard Eerriot %a)is Gol1 II =#aris: 6lammarion (*0&> 41 )/+1 ''1 #aul Blu7e I er "all -otem2a I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte1 Gol1 G No1 ) (*0+ 441 &+**+1 '+1 Berndorff o2. cit1 441 &&$&&1 '%1 Theodor !schenburg I6ranH von #a4en I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 & (*0) 441 (0)'*1 '*1 Thilo Gogelsang /eichs,ehr= Staat un) NS A- =8tuttgart: Deutsche GerlagsAnstalt (*'&>1 Also 6ranH von #a4en Einige Bemerkungen 0um Buch G/eichs,ehr= Staat un) NS A-G von r. Thilo +ogelsang =#rivate 4rinting n1d1>1 +$1 Dietrich o2. cit1 41 (%01 +(1 Meissner and -ilde o2. cit1 41 (0%1 +&1 .bi)1 41 (0*1 +)1 .bi)1 41 (')1 +/1 Burt von 8chuschnigg Austrian /e1uiem =New ;or7: G1 #1 #utnam?s 8ons (*/'> 41 &'1 +01 N IT 41 &/*1

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page_221 #age &&( +'1 Anton Fitthaler ??Eine Eta22e auf Hitlers !eg 0ur ungeteilten Macht I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No & (*'$ 441 (*)&(%1 Also N T9 #a4en-%+ and #a4en-%%1 ++1 Barl Dietrich Bracher IStufen totalitaerer 6leichschaltungB ie Befestigung )er nationalso0ialistischen Herrschaft 78FFF9 I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IG No1 ( (*0' 441 )$/&1 Also 8chwerin von Brosig7 o2. cit1 41 (/+1 +%1 Adam Buc7reis -olitik )es #$. %ahrhun)erts Gol1 I !eltgeschichte 78$778F: =Nuremberg: #anorama-Gerlag n1d1> 41 0+*1 +*1 Eans 8chneider I as Ermaechtigungsgeset0 vom #9. Maer0 78FF I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 ) (*0) 441 (*+&&(1 %$1 Barl Dietrich Bracher -olfgang 8auer and Gerhard 8chulH ie nationalso0ialistische Machtergreifung =.ologne: -estdeutscher Gerlag (*'&> 441 +&$ ff1 %(1 .bi)1 41 +(+1 Also SchulthessA Euro2aeischer 6eschichtskalen)er Gol1 9TTG =Munich: .1 E1 Bec7?sche Gerlagsbuchhandlung (*)0> 41 //1 %&1 Eans-Adolf Dacobsen and -erner Dochmann Ausge,aehlte okumente 0ur 6eschichte )es Nationalso0ialismus 78FF789? =Bielefeld: Gerlag Neue Gesellschaft (*'(>1 Also N T9 #a4en-(( and N TGI 441 &*&*01 %)1 6ranH von #a4en er !ahrheit eine 6asse 41 )/)1 %/1 #a4en 84ruch7ammer: Affidavit !dmund 6orschbach of Danuary )( (*/+ =Munich Amtsgericht>1 %01 Bracher 8auer and 8chulH o2. cit1 41 *(*1 %'1 N*A 8u441 A D-+(' 441 *)%)*1 %+1 .bi)1 D-+(% 441 */$/(1 %%1 N GI 41 %%1 Also N TGI 41 &+/1 %*1 N TGI 441 &+/+01 *$1 #a4en 84ruch7ammer =Munich Amtsgericht>1 *(1 #a4en 84ruch7ammer: 8evering testimony of Danuary &% (*/+ =Munich Amtsgericht>1 *&1 #a4en interrogation of 8e4tember (+ (*/'1 *)1 #a4en 84ruch7ammer =Munich Amtsgericht>1 */1 N TGI 441 )/)//1 Also N*A II 41 *)$1 *01 N*A 8u441 A D-+(0 441 *)')+C D-+(% 441 */$/(1

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page_222 #age &&& ' The #arty and Big Business E,almar 8chacht The -estern as well as the 8oviet 4rosecutors at Nuremberg were dee4ly convinced that German big businessthe industrialists and ban7erswere the real forces behind the movement that had brought Eitler to 4ower and 7e4t him there1 In this classic Mar<ist view widely shared by non-Mar<ists of a generation brought u4 on the notions of the 4aramountcy of economic over 4olitical forces of the guilt of the munition ma7ers for instigating wars Eitler was the 4u44et not the industrialists and ban7ers1 And of the men held res4onsible for ma7ing Eitler .hancellor and then aiding him in his anti-.ommunist and antilabor 4ur4oses E,almar 8chacht was among the most 4rominent1 The 4rosecution called him the wiHard of Germany?s autar7y and the res4ectable front for the activist hoodlums who clubbed the o44osition off the streets1 But this view was a considerable distortion of what went on for neither 8chacht nor any other of the big-business leaders was a match for Eitler1 6or brief intervals they might indulge themselves in the illusion that they were influencing or even controlling the 6uehrer =??I have got Eitler by the throat I ( 8chacht boasted to a friend in the mid-thirties the same sentiments #a4en e<4ressed when he ,oined Eitler?s coalition .abinet> but in fact it was always the 6uehrer who used them and a good number including 8chacht ended u4 in concentration cam4s1 8chacht came from a middle-class family that for generations had lived in 8chleswig-Eolstein1 Eis father emigrated to America in the (%+$?s and became an American citiHen1 8chacht?s mother twentyone years old when she married followed1 But Germany after the victory in (%+( over 6rance seemed as 4romising for a young businessman as the 9and of #romise itself

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page_223 #age &&) and after s4ending si< years in America the 8chachts returned to the Feich to see7 their fortune1 They had a hard time but managed to educate three sons one of whom born Danuary && (%++ was named Eorace Greeley E,almar 8chacht in honor of a man the father greatly admired1 Greeley a friend of .arl 8churH and a democrat with literary embellishments was the 7ind of man the culture-loving Germans of that 4eriod too7 to be the very 4attern of the free enlightened man of the New -orld and after the 8chachts returned to Germany they 7e4t alive the memory of their New -orld hero1 E,almar always considered himself a ??democratIC after -orld -ar I he hel4ed found the German Democratic #arty although characteristically he thought of himself as a monarchist at the same time1 Ee saw no inconsistency in these 4olitical 4ositions ,ust as he would discover none in his notions of the com4atibility of free enter4rise and National 8ocialism1 E,almar 8chacht was a man of many a4titudes1 After attending the Gymnasium at Eamburg he first studied medicine at Biel then German 4hilology at Berlin and 4olitical science at Munich before ta7ing his degree at the "niversity of Berlin in economics1 As he said of himself his bent was 4ractical not theoretical1 & -ith his considerable intelligencehe had the highest IS among the Nuremberg defendantsand his @uic7 gras4 of the essence of monetary 4roblems he made his way ra4idly in the ban7ing world1 Ee became a director of the National Ban7 at the age of thirty-nine after having wor7ed for thirteen years in the Dresdner Ban7 where he was one of its chief officers between (*$% and (*(0 and having headed a 4rivate ban71 Gain ambitious and shrewd he had interests unusual in an as4iring ban7er1 As a young man in addition to his university studies he wrote criticisms of 4lays and art e<hibits for news4a4ersC all his life he com4osed verses and ma<ims that dis4layed a mild literary talent although never as great as he himself believed1 The verses were written for all occasions and in his autobiogra4hy the author 4roudly 4rints a good many stanHas on his travels and rhymed commentaries on 4olitical and business occasions that would not otherwise have seen 4rint1 These verses and ma<ims such as I!ating 7ee4s body and soul together drin7ing se4arates them I are no better and no worse than many businessmen write for their own 4leasure and as they li7e to say for their friends1) During -orld -ar I 8chacht on leave from the Dresdner Ban7 had a tem4orary ,ob in the economic section of the efficient German-occu4ation administration in Belgium1 Ee was no table thum4er but a conscientious bureaucrat see7ing to obtain as high a Belgian contribution to Germany?s war 4roduction as the circumstances 4ermitted1 Germany?s defeat left 8chacht incredulous1 Above all the disorders in the streets the o4en threat of revolution a44alled this man of system and figures that balanced1 8chacht who became 4resident of the Feichsban7 in (*&) at the age of forty-si< was mainly res4onsible for devising the means of sto44ing the catastro4hic inflation of that year with a new currency bac7ed by foreign loans1 After -orld -ar I the Feichsban7 had 4ermitted the 4rinting 4resses

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page_224 #age &&/ to run night and day turning out worthless mar7s =Heros were added daily> because the ban7?s directors said they had no way of 7nowing what re4arations would actually be re@uired by the Allies and at what conceivable rate they could stabiliHe the mar7 against foreign currencies li7e the dollar1 8chacht went to !ngland and 4ersuaded the governor of the Ban7 of !ngland Montagu Norman to ma7e the loan against which the new mar7 was to be secured1 8elf-confident and with a useful touch of irritability 8chacht did not easily tolerate the arrogance and incivility of many of the Allied officials with whom he had to deal after -orld -ar I1 Ee once abru4tly left the office of the 6rench 6oreign Minister because he was 7e4t waiting twenty minutes and he had to be hauled bac7 by a 4anting functionary who ran after him and 4romised an immediate audience1 But 8chacht and Montagu Norman got along well from the start and after -orld -ar II 8chacht could not understand why he was denied an !nglish visa to attend the funeral services for his old friend1 8chacht never had any sense of guilt about anything he didC he could never understand why he was brought to trial either by the Allies or by the Germans1 The only im4risonment he found com4rehensible at least 2ost facto was when the Gesta4o 4ic7ed him u4 on Duly &) (*// after the attem4t on Eitler?s life and 7e4t him ,ailed until the Americans rescued him1 But if the NaHis had won 8chacht might well have been ,ust as aggrieved as he was by his later arrests for he was always a 4rudent o44onent of Eitler even when he violently disagreed with his 4olicies1 8chacht had done much on Eitler?s behalf in the early (*)$?s when the cause had been greatly in need of his services and he 7e4t a discreet distance from any 4lot against Eitler demanding his active 4artici4ation1 Ee left direct action to the military and to others bolder of heart but he urged the 4lotters ononce in (*/) so hotly that his host had to intervene between the ban7er and one of the cons4irators General 6ritH 9indemann1L 8chacht was a stalwart nationalist in 4olitics who li7e the rich German industrialists and li7e Eitler too said he wanted a strong economy in a strong state1 Ee was angered by the 6rench attem4ts after -orld -ar I to divide Germany their invasion of the Fuhr and their demand for re4arations that could not 4ossibly be 4aid1 8chacht 4ointed out that the amount demanded was twelve times the si< billion gold francs Germany had obtained from 6rance in (%+(1 Germany had demanded then what amounted to (($ FM 4er head in 6rench currency of (%'* the year before the 6ranco#russian -ar or )1& 4er cent of the ca4ital of the 4o4ulation of 6rance as of that year1 But the amount to be e<acted from Germany at the end of -orld -ar I came to )% 4er cent of the 4o4ulation?s ca4ital or ( )0$ FM 4er head for each German as of (*()1 6rench re4arations had amounted to &0 L The time to act was now 8chacht told 9indemannC the generals were delaying too long1 But it was eventually 9indemann not 8chacht who was e<ecuted for his 4art in the Duly &$ revolt =N T9I 41 )$$ Gronau affidavit 8chacht-)*>1

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page_22 #age &&0 4er cent of the 6rench income of (%'* but the German re4arations were &&$ 4er cent of the German income of (*() =6rench re4arations amounted to ($$ 4er cent of the monetary metal of 6rance German re4arations were & &$$ 4er cent of the monetary metal of the Feich>1 / 8chacht and men li7e him were outraged not only at the economic and 4olitical treatment accorded Germany but at what they regarded as the undeserved contem4t with which the Allies treated them1 -hen during the first meetings where 6renchmen dealt with the German economic delegation 8chacht com4lained to a 6rench general of the 4oor food and lodgings assigned the Germans the general sai ??;ou forget you lost the war1I -oodrow -ilson had s4o7en with a golden tongue of many laudable things including self-determination the German delegation said but neither that 4rinci4le nor any other that might benefit them a44lied to the Germans1L IA sound economy in a strong state I was what Eitler said he wanted when he tal7ed to the men of industry and to the chief businessmen of the Fuhr1 Not only was the state to be strong and the economy sound but there would be no stri7es for as 8chacht was to say in his memorable Boenigsberg s4eech of August (% (*)0 after he became Minister of !conomics the em4loyers and the wor7ers had the same obligation as the soldiers to wor7 for the entire society: IDust as the soldier in the -ehrmacht does his duty so must each +olks comrade have the feeling that in the economy too he stands in the service of the whole1I0 As a witness at one of his later trials said =after his ac@uittal at Nuremberg German courts were to be busy with him for five years> 8chacht was a member of only one 4arty the 8chacht 4arty1 Ee was im4ressed with Eitler 4erha4s not as dee4ly so as his fervent letters of 4raise to the 6uehrer in the early thirties would suggest but rather along the lines 8chacht indicated in a s4eech he made in New ;or7 .ity in (*)(: II am no National 8ocialist but the basic ideas of National 8ocialism contain a good deal of truth1I' In Germany he was to 4raise National 8ocialism far more fulsomely than in New ;or7 but he was always cool to the idea of warC he could never acce4t the giddy noneconomic 4olicies of Goering that a44ealed to Eitler?s 4olitical thin7ing1 Eaving done an enormous service to the #arty by ma7ing it loo7 res4ectable when it des4erately needed money from the solid industrialists of the Fuhr he @uic7ly bro7e with it as far as active 4artici4ation in the regime was concerned and his outraged feeling that it was he who had been re,ected by Eitler led to contem4t for and then hatred of the #arty1 Ee e<4lained his remaining as Minister -ithout #ortfolio to himself as well as to the Allied and German ,udges by maintaining that the Fesistance had urged him to 7ee4 this 4ost a defense that was corroborated by a number of witnesses1 L A44ro<imately '$ 4er cent of the 4eo4le of "44er 8ilesia des4ite an Allied army of occu4ation and great 4ressure on the 4art of the #oles voted in a 4lebiscite in March (*&( for the territory to be 4art of Germany but four-fifths of that valuable industrial area was nevertheless awarded to #oland1

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page_22! #age &&' This however was a stoc7 8chachtian e<4lanation of the 7ind he used at Nuremberg1 Ee had reluctantly acce4ted the #arty?s Golden Badge of Eonor he said because he had found it useful during the war for getting automobiles and railroad trans4ortation otherwise hard to come by1 9i7e almost all ban7ers 8chacht was o44osed to any ma,or war1 Dodi and Beitel testified that his economic measures the money he made available for rearmament from his ingenious credit devices would have 4rovided no more than twenty-seven or twenty-eight divisions scarcely enough for 4urely defensive 4ur4oses in a Germany surrounded by the armies of a 4otential coalition that included #oland .Hechoslova7ia 6rance Fussia and Great Britain1 American visitors including 8umner -elles -illiam .1 Bullitt Ambassador Dodd and the consular officer 81F1 6uller Dr1 + as well as 4eo4le 8chacht tal7ed to in the "nited 8tates were convinced he was a man of 4eace1 Nothing in his career contradicts this conclusion des4ite the 4rosecution?s charges at Nuremberg that he not only had 4lotted to wage war but had made the war 4ossible by his financial blac7 magic1 In fact he had to leave his 4osts as Minister of !conomics Feichsban74raesident and #leni4otentiary for the -ar !conomy giving way to Goering and 6un7 because he regarded the rate and siHe of German armament dangerous to the economy as well as to the 4eace of !uro4e1 Ee wanted to cut down on the armament 4rogram as early as (*)0 and as he told Gisevius to 4revent the catastro4he of an inflation and a war1% 8chacht was solidly behind Eitler u4 to (*)0 des4ite the doubts that arose in his mind during the Foehm 4utsch and his ban7er?s revulsion at the humiliating and illegal measures of the Gesta4o which went as far as to 4ut a micro4hone in his office1 Eis first serious com4laints aside from those having to do with economic 4olicy were directed against the Gesta4o which he believed with reason to be sus4icious of him1 Eis friend Gisevius brought to his office an e<4ert from the same secret 4olice that had installed the micro4hone who 4rom4tly found it1 But 8chacht?s wincing at the Foehm murders and his well-grounded sus4icions of the Gesta4o did not 4revent him from attending the 8e4tember #arty Days in (*)0 and from declaring there ??6or this Third Feich that our 6uehrer has made us a gift of we will wor7 together as long as breath is in our bodies1 I Nor indeed as late as March (*)% did his revulsion sto4 him from telling the em4loyees of the Gienna ban7 that Ino one can find his future with us who is not with a full heart behind Adolf Eitler1I* Although a 6reemason he made an obli@ue attac7 on the Masons when he said in his Boenigsberg s4eech of which he was always so 4roud that not all who had been 6reemasons were scoundrels1($ In his 9ei4Hig s4eech of A4ril / (*)0 when he o44osed individual IactionsI against Dews he declared that not every Dew was to be 7illed nor was every Mason guilty of high treason1 Ee added that his foreign friends were of little hel4 when they said he was against Adolf Eitler1((

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page_22" #age &&+ Eis s4eeches were often studded with anti-8emitic sentiments although all through his trial and in his autobiogra4hy he stoutly denied that he was an anti-8emite1 Nevertheless on November (( (*)) he tal7ed before a women?s club in Berlin of which his wife was 4resident and @uoted 9uther to show the necessity and ,ustification for anti-8emitism at the time when the Dews were first beginning to feel the lash of the NaHi whi41 9uther too 8chacht said had rightly seen the ??fol7ish incom4atibilityI of the Dew in German society and had gras4ed the fateful essentials of the Dewish 4roblem1 8chacht added that it was not a contem4orary 4roblem that over the centuries the same com4laints had been made of the Dews1 (& The solutions 8chacht sought for the Dewish @uestion were harsh but only in an economic sense1 Ee wanted to e<terminate not the Dews but their 4olitical and economic influence in Germany1 In (*)/ he concluded the I#altreu agreementI with the -orld Aionist :rganiHation 4ermitting Dews who could 4ay (0 $$$ FM to emigrate1 Dews in #alestine were to acce4t German e<4orts so that the e@uivalent e<change would be released1() By (*)% (+$ $$$ Dews reached #alestine under this agreement1(/ 9ate in (*)% 8chacht 4ro4osed a 4lan for (0$ $$$ Dews =in the course of three years the number would rise to /$$ $$$> who wanted to emigrate from Germany to leave the country1 :ne-fourth of the Dewish 4ro4erty confiscated in the Feich or about (10 billion FM would be set aside as a trust fund1 Against this fund IInternational DewryI would ma7e a loan that would enable the Dews to emigrate1 Germany was to re4ay this sum and meet the interest charges by increasing e<4ortsC that is the stolen funds were to be made antise4tic through an international consortium and 4ut to wor7 on behalf of the 4eo4le they had been ta7en fromanother 4ractical solution1 But this 4lan wor7ed out by 8chacht after he was no longer Minister of !conomics was 4revented from becoming o4erational by the war1(0 8chacht?s shrewd 4racticality led him to su44ort Eitler in the first 4lace1 !arly in (*)$ he wrote a letter to the Berliner Tageblatt in which he said that Eitler was no 4olitical leader and was ca4italiHing on the unrest in the country1 But Eitler won a ma,or 4olitical victory in the 8e4tember (*)$ elections when the NaHis became the second largest 4arty in the Feichstag1 8chacht had resigned his 4ost as 4resident of the Feichsban7 in March because he increasingly o44osed the economic and 4olitical 4olicies of the -eimar Government es4ecially the growing foreign debt =he was always im4atient of 4eo4le who disregarded his adviceC to be worth wor7ing with 4eo4le had to be either members of the 8chacht 4arty or at least in a 4otential coalition with it>1 In that year of unem4loyment 8chacht read Mein (am2f during a tri4 to the "nited 8tates and became convinced of Eitler?s 4olitical genius as well as of the ine4titude of the leadershi4 o44osing him1 Ee had met Goering and early in (*)( he was invited to the future Feichsmarschall?s a4artment in Berlin for dinner1 6ritH Thyssen and Goebbels were there and Eitler came in late to tal7 to the small gathering for two

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page_22# #age &&% hours1 8chacht found him ??com4letely acce4table1I Eitler?s 4rogram for Germany?s economic recovery sounded reasonable even by 8chacht?s sober standards for the 6uehrer always had a gift for telling listeners who were im4ortant to him what they wanted to hear1 Ee confirmed 8chacht?s image of a man of enormous energy and a born 4olitical leader who could restore the de4ression-ridden dee4ly corroded economic and 4olitical structure1 8chacht was still formally the non-NaHi but he was ready to use his influence to raise money for the #arty1 Ee set forth on ,ourneys in and outside Germany to tal7 as he said to ?leading circles I going as far as .o4enhagen Bern 8toc7holm and New ;or7 to tell the 4eo4le of influence and substance about the 4light of the Feich the need for ending re4arations and the Nationalist movement under Eitler1 In New ;or7 he e<4lained to an audience highly critical of National 8ocialism that he 4ersonally did not ta7e Adolf Eitler too seriously but the movement was constitutional and he assured the Dews among his listeners that they had no reason to fear for their coreligionists in the Feich1 (' Although Bruening called on him for financial advice during the dee4ening de4ression 8chacht?s talents his National 8ocialist biogra4her 6ranH Feuter 4ointed out were solely at Eitler?s dis4osal1(+ Ee undoubtedly ho4ed to influence Eitler on the side of IconservativeI economic 4olicies1 9i7e 6un7 8chacht declared that he wanted to retain as much of the free mar7et as could be rescuedC li7e #a4en and the other ban7ers and industrialists who were edging toward the #arty he wanted the Government to ta7e a variety of socalled conservative measures: to rearm within 4rudent economic limits but to 7ee4 out of war at all costs to reduce the number of Dews in the arts and 4rofessions and government to restore em4loyment through useful 4ublic wor7s to defeat the threat of communism to 4ut an end to stri7es and to the ho4elessness of millions of German wor7ers1 Before (*)$ Eitler had few 4i4elines to the funds of big business1 6ritH Thyssen had been won to the cause of the #arty as early as (*&) and had contributed he wrote later about a million mar7s to it1(% !mil Birdorf director general of the Fhenish--est4halian .oal 8yndicate was another rich NaHi sym4athiHer1 Eitler?s financial su44ort in the early days however had come not as large sums from big industry but as small contributions from #arty members and men li7e Munich 4iano manufacturer .arl Bechstein and Munich 4ublisher Eugo Bruc7mann1 Big business was cautious and dubiousBru44 lost his misgivings only in (*)(but 8chacht?s endorsement of the 6uehrer undoubtedly hel4ed the #arty to ta4 sources of money that had hitherto been fearful of its economic Iradicalism1I It was in the 4eriod after the election of 8e4tember (*)$ that 8chacht Baron Burt von 8chroeder of .ologne and the 4rominent industrialists :tto -olff Georg von 8chnitHler of the Board of Directors of I1G1 6arben Albert Goegler of the "nited 8teel -or7s and August Fosterg of the 4otash industry began to be active with both their chec7boo7s and their influence

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page_22$ #age &&* on Eitler?s behalf1 The chief businessmen of northern Germany attended a meeting arranged by Thyssen at the Industry .lub in Duesseldorf a year before Eitler became .hancellor to hear the 6uehrer?s views1 9i7e 8chacht they were favorably im4ressed although many of them were reluctant to commit themselves1 They were favorably im4ressed largely because they had so few alternatives1L (* Most of the men of big industry continued to drag their feet1 In a letter to Eitler of A4ril (& (*)& 8chacht said he had not unfortunately been able to get the hel4 he had ho4ed for from the industrialists to 4ersuade them ??to come out for you o4enly I although he had received many e<4ressions of sym4athetic interest1 But he told Eitler Ithey are unclear on your economic 4rogram1I 8ome of them had e<4ressed their willingness to finance along with 8chacht an economic center where National 8ocialist 4rinci4les could be studied and brought into agreement with those of a 4ros4erous 4rivate economy1 The battle against socialism was sim4le 8chacht said and he thought it could be successful1 There was an a44arent conflict he wrote in (*)& between individualism and socialism but 4ara4hrasing Eitler he said that they could be reconciled in the higher demands of the whole society1 8chacht was ready to ta7e over the su4ervision of such a center1 Ee ended his letter by e<4ressing ho4e that the increased strain of these last days had not im4aired Eitler?s health1&$ -hatever doubts about Eitler 8chacht may have had he never after 8e4tember (*)$ saw any alternative to Eitler as .hancellor1LL Ee thought Eitler would be tamed by becoming .hancellor and by the conservatives who would be 4art of his government and that the 6uehrer could be taught the 4rinci4les of a sound economy an o4inion shared by #a4en and the conservative members of the Be44ler circle1LLL By November (*)& 8chacht and his friends were ready to sign the fateful letter urging Eindenburg to a44oint Eitler .hancellor1&( =*f1 #a4en .ha4t1 01> 8chacht was un@uestionably one of the 7ey 4eo4le to rescue Eitler when the tide could have turned against him1 In (*)& after the crushing e<4enses of two elections within a few months #arty funds were at an all-time low1 After 4henomenal gains L 8ome su44ort of Eitler came from foreign countries1 The Dutch oil magnate Eenri Deterding who had an estate in Mec7lenburg made siHable contributions1 The NaHis also tried to get su44ort from Eenry 6ord but had no success1 LL 8chacht himself was the candidate for .hancellor 4ro4osed to #resident Eindenburg by the Feich Association of German Industries in (*)& but this was the only following he had1 LLL A grou4 of wealthy businessmen was formed in the autumn of (*)( at the suggestion of Adolf Eitler by -ilhelm Be44ler1 Be44ler a successful entre4reneur and 4ro-NaHi was a44ointed Eitler?s economic adviser at a time when 6eder?s activities =see #a4en .ha4t1 0> were reduced1 The 4ur4ose Eitler told Be44ler was to Ibring together a circle of business leaders who have 4roved themselves in industry1 Eitler suggested that I should form these men into a circle so that they could advise me1 Ee mentioned also that it was in no way necessary that these 4eo4le be members of the #arty1I =Arthur 8chweitHer Big Business in the Thir) /eich MBloomington: Indiana "niversity #ress (*'/N 441 ($$($(1 T!* 6lic7 case GI1>

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page_230 #age &)$ in the Duly election the National 8ocialists lost thirty-four seats in November1 Eitler could not even raise the funds to 4ay for the ne<t wee7s? #arty activities the costs of meetings the 4rinting bills the rallies1 It was with the hel4 of men li7e 8chacht that the considerable sums needed to tide him over were obtained1 8chacht wrote to the 6uehrer on November (& (*)& congratulating him on the firm stand he had ta7en after the election and e<4ressing the belief that Eitler would be .hancellor1 ??It seems I 8chacht added Ithat our attem4ts to get subscri4tions from the economy have not been in vain1I 8chacht sorrowed over the unwillingness of heavy industry =Sch,erin)ustrie> to go along with National 8ocialism and said they got their name from Sch,erfaelligkeitbeing hard to move1 8chacht also sent along a genteel ban7er?s admonition and e<4ressed his ho4e that the little e<aggerations necessary in the 4ro4aganda of the ne<t few wee7s would not give Eitler?s enemies the chance to disarm him1 IThe stronger your internal 4osition I he told the 6uehrer in his avuncular fashion Ithe more dignified can be the form of battle1 The more the situation is decided in your favor the more you can avoid 4ersonalities in the cam4aign1 I am filled with confidence that the whole 4resent system is with certainty leading toward oblivion1I && :n 6ebruary &$ after Eitler had become .hancellor 8chacht acted as treasurer of a meeting of twenty-five leaders of the Feich Association of German Industry that too7 4lace at Goering?s residence1 Three million mar7s were collected1 Bru44 who was #resident of the Feich Association was 4resent as were Goegler 8chnitHler and Bose from I1 G1 6arben1 8chacht according to 8chnitHler acted Ias a 7ind of host1I 8chacht later sent all the funds collected to Fudolf Eess for the NaHis although the money raised was in theory to be divided among the three nationalist 4arties in Eitler?s coalition Governmentthe German #eo4le?s #arty the German National #eo4le?s #arty and the National 8ocialists1 This would be a long-term investment Goering told the industrialists for if Eitler were given the 4owers he would demand of the Feichstag it would be the last election for at least ten years and 4erha4s a century1 Goering was 4ro4hetic as far as election contributions were concernedC big industry would give no more money for the winning of voters after 6ebruary (*))1 It would however through the Be44ler circle and by direct contributions ma7e many and handsome gifts in the future to the #arty and to members of its high command: to Eimmler and Goering as well as to Eitler1 L&) L In order to sto4 the Iwild collection drivesI of the #arty Gustav Bru44 after the burning of the Feichstag arranged for a IEitler DonationI to be made through the IcontributionI of $1$) 4er cent of the salaries and wages 4aid em4loyees of the German trade associations1 A half billion mar7s were collected by this means and 4laced at Eitler?s dis4osal during the NaHi 4eriod1 Bru44 could well afford to ma7e his own giftsC 4rofits of the firm went u4 from ($% million mar7s in (*)& to &)& million in (*)0 =Arthur 8chweitHer IBusiness #olicy in a Dictatorshi4 I in The Business History /evie, Gol1 TTTGIII No1 / (*'/ 441 /())%>1

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page_231 #age &)( :n March (+ less than two wee7s after the March 0 election in which Eitler received /)1* 4er cent of the votes 8chacht was again named 4resident of the Feichsban7 a 4ost he had held under the -eimar Government1 Eitler felt that the very man to send to the !conomic .onference in 9ondon and to the "nited 8tates was 8chacht a ban7er of 4robity and common sense who could discuss ways and means of countering the worldwide de4ression with the e<4erts and 4oliticians of many countries1 In New ;or7 8chacht told his audience that many 4eo4le made the mista7e of thin7ing of Germany as a dictatorshi4 but nothing could be more democratic than the 4resent government1 And he said it should be easy for the governments of 6ran7lin Foosevelt and Adolf Eitler to collaborate because of the close similarity between them1 The crisis he said was moral not economic1 The Ne, 'ork Times hailed the s4eech as ??humane and courageous1I 8chacht made some forty s4eeches in the "nited 8tates he tal7ed over a nationwide radio hoo7u4 and his articles a44eared in news4a4ers as widely se4arated as the New ;or7 Heral) Tribune and the :maha Bee1 &/ The accounts of 8chacht?s relations with the Foosevelt Administration are conflicting1 8chacht re4orted that the #resident received him cordially in May (*)) and when 8chacht told him Germany might have to default on the interest 4ayments =he meant transfer 4ayments>&0 of her American loans Foosevelt he wrote in his memoirs laughed and sla44ed his thigh1 IIt would serve the -all 8treet ban7ers right I the #resident said1&' But the American Ambassador to Germany -illiam !1 Dodd recorded in his diary that Foosevelt disli7ed 8chacht?s arrogant bearing1&+ .ordell Eull found 8chacht Isim4le and unaffected I but he was outraged at the announcement 8chacht had made on May % the day before they met that the German Government would cease 4ayments abroad on the Feich?s foreign debts1 All 8chacht could say was that he was e<tremely sorry and he had not foreseen Eull?s reactions1&% Actually 8chacht had been given the authority when he left for the "nited 8tates to determine when the moratorium would begin1 Ee had strongly disa44roved of Germany?s ta7ing out the loans in the first 4laceC now one way of hel4ing to finance the rearmament which he li7e Eitler regarded as all im4ortant would be to sto4 transfer 4ayments on foreign loans1&* 8chacht no doubt was genuinely of the o4inion that the 6uehrer 4lanned no war because that was what Eitler 7e4t saying and that was what 8chacht wanted to believe1 In his financial calculations for the future he allowed for a limited rearmament that he thought Germany could afford1 Ee believed a degree of autar7y to be thrust u4on Germany which lac7ed credit and gold and faced boycotts because of its anti-8emitic measures1 If he had been left to himself his 4rogram of 4ublic wor7s would have relied heavily on constructing irrigation 4ro,ects and building factories1 But he agreed with Eitler that a vast 4rogram of 4ublic wor7s including housing develo4ments and the building of the Autobahnen would be a 4owerful answer to the de4ression1 Fearmament he 7new must be the center of the German eco-

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page_232 #age &)& nomic effort under Eitler1 #artly because of 8chacht?s s7ill the economy began to 4ic7 u4 ra4idly des4ite its burden of 4rice controls @uotas and im4ort and e<4ort restrictions1 Ee undoubtedly would have 4referred dro44ing these restraints for li7e most German ban7ers and economists he li7ed a free-mar7et economy that relied only as needful on government intervention1 Ee also undoubtedly would have 4referred to do without the basic shift of the economy to rearmament for a huge military machine1 #rice controls could dam4en the inflation but 8chacht feared that ra4id and e<aggerated rearming was an e<cessive drain on raw materials and the Feich?s resourcesC what he wanted was a strong efficient German Army not the nation in arms that was Eitler?s goal1 6or some time he and Eitler saw matters in the same light1 In August (*)/ the 6uehrer a44ointed 8chacht as acting Minister of !conomics and less than a year later when he was Minister of !conomics he was named General #leni4otentiary for the -ar !conomy1 "4 to a 4oint 8chacht did all he was e<4ected to do1 Ee devised an e<traordinarily com4licated and successful series of ban7ing measures designed to s4ar7 the ra4idly e<4anding economy??a daring credit 4olicy I he called it1 In order to 4revent 4rinting money he financed rearmament in 4art through so-called Mefo bills =Mefo was an abbreviation for Metallurgische 6orschungsgesellschaft a dummy com4any formed by four great concerns: 8iemens Gutehoffnungshuette Bru44 and Fheinstahl with a ca4ital of only one million mar7s>1 The Mefo bills were guaranteed by the Government and could be discounted at any German ban71 They ran for si< months but could be e<tended and the Feichsban7 would rediscount them at any time within the last three months of the earliest date of maturity1 )$ Thus the Feichsban7 in effect loaned money to the Government a 4ractice which was illegal under e<isting statutes but credit to the amount of twelve billion mar7s was 4rovided the munitions industry in this fashion without floating new loans or increasing the money su44ly1 8chacht had thought correctly that the Mefo bills which 4aid / 4er cent interest would bring out a good deal of money lying fallow in the vaults of German business concerns that because of the financial uncertainties had been uninvested1 But the / 4er cent interest and the readiness of the Feichsban7 to e<change the Mefo bills for money at any time 4ut these hidden funds to wor7 and si< billion mar7s were unearthed from this source1)( In addition 8chacht used bloc7ed funds =of foreigners> de4osited in the Feichsban7 which gave him added 4leasure for as he said IThe Feichsban7 invested the ma,or 4art of Feichsban7 accounts owned by foreigners 1 1 1 in armament draughts1 :ur armaments are therefore being financed 4artially with the assets of our 4olitical o44onents1I)& -hen he became Minister of !conomics 8chacht set out with what he called Ithe New #lan I designed to streamline and control everything the Feich bought abroad and everything that was im4orted1 Twenty-five su4er-

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page_233 #age &)) visory bodies were formed which had authority over all foreign trade1 A series of bilateral barter agreements were conducted mostly with southeastern !uro4ean countries and 8outh America through which more than half of Germany?s trade was channeled1 In addition restrictions were im4osed on the demands for foreign e<change and on e<4ort licenses and German travel abroad was for the most 4art 4rohibited1 8chacht set u4 clearing agreements through which German im4orters 4aid the costs of their transactions by de4ositing mar7s with the German clearing agencyC these sums were transferred as a credit to the clearing agency of the e<4orting country1 The e<4orter was thus 4aid in his own currencyC and since the countries of southeast !uro4e and 8outh America had large raw material and agricultural sur4luses they des4erately needed to get rid of on almost any terms they did business1 8chacht?s 4lans for bilateral trade agreements were 4artial answers to the boycotts against German goods1 Any boycott 8chacht 4ointed out would hurt the Australian shee4 raiser the 84anish orange grower the American cotton 4lanter the 8cottish herring fisherman as well as Germany1 Ee was ready to deal with every country that would ma7e a satisfactory trade agreement including the 8oviet "nion and in (*)0 he succeeded in securing a credit from Fussia for &$$ million mar7s to run over a 4eriod of five years1 A year later the Feichsban7 had a favorable balance of trade with the 8oviet "nion of some (0 million mar7s1 )) 8chacht could write 4roudly three years after he became !conomics Minister ??The success of the New #lan can be 4roved by means of a few figures1 .alculated according to @uantity the im4ort of finished 4roducts was throttled by ') 4er cent between (*)/ and (*)+1 :n the other hand the im4ort of ores was increased by ()& 4er cent of 4etroleum by ((' 4er cent of grain by ($& 4er cent and of rubber by +( 4er cent1I)/ -ithin the Feich allotments were stringentC in 8e4tember (*)/ 8chacht issued a decree declaring: IAll raw materials in Germany are allocated and their use for 4rocessing for other than war or otherwise absolutely vital goods is 4rohibited1I)0 Thousands of decrees were re@uired to administer the system1 8chacht re@uisitioned all German foreign-e<change reservesC his Ministry controlled in effect every mar7 s4ent in foreign trade as well as German e<4orts1 The New #lan was so successful that Dohn Maynard Beynes later declared that !ngland might have to imitate it after the war1)' But although 8chacht said many of the same things that Eitler did about the 4rimacy of s4irit over economics and echoed the sentiments of Mein (am2f about the need for wor7er and ca4italist to 4ut their abilities at the service of the entire German community he 7new and cared about a sound fiscal 4olicy and Eitler had no interest whatever in such matters1 8chacht?s Mefo bills were intended to be re4aid after five years from the ta<es 4aid in from the e<4anding economyC and they could have been 8chacht said at Nuremberg had Eitler and Goering not wanted everything 4lowed into new armament1 A number of events disturbed 8chacht during this 4eriod1 Ee said at

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page_234 #age &)/ Nuremberg that while he was shoc7ed by the 7illings at the time of the Foehm 4utsch he was even more dee4ly u4set by the 6ritsch affair =*f1 Goering .ha4t1 & and 6ran7 .ha4t1 ((>1 Nevertheless he went down the line with Eitler as long as he thought the 6uehrer?s economic 4olicies could be made amenable to his own1 In his s4eech to the .entral Association of Ban7s and Ban7ing .oncerns of 6ebruary &' (*)/ he said ??The tas7 of the men now at the head of ban7ing affairs can be fulfilled only when they devote themselves to the s4irit of the new state1 If this should not be the case with one or another of you he must disa44ear from the scene as @uic7ly as 4ossible1I )+ Although in (*)0 8chacht began his cam4aign to cut down on armament s4ending he had nothing but 4ublic 4raise for what was being done1 :n March / (*)0 he said at the 9ei4Hig 84ring 6air: My so-called foreign friends do neither me nor the situation nor themselves any good when they try to bring me into o44osition to the allegedly im4ossible National 8ocialist economic theories and declare me to some e<tent the 4rotector of economic reason1 I can assure you that everything I say and do has the com4lete a44roval of the 6uehrer and that I would not say or do anything that does not have his a44roval1 Therefore it is not I but the 6uehrer who is the 4rotector of economic reason1 The strength of the National 8ocialist regime lies in the unified will directed through the 6uehrer and in the enthusiastic and unconditional devotion of his cowor7ers and of the 4eo4le to him1)% In his Boenigsberg s4eech of August (% (*)0 8chacht dealt with matters that were troubling him1 Tal7ing warily to his 6uehrer and to his conservative admirers as did #a4en in his Marburg s4eech 8chacht mi<ed fulsome 4raise and guarded criticism1 Ee said: In a time in which many circles abroad are 4leased to stam4 every smashed window4ane in Germany as a cultural infamy disregarding the fact that those circles themselves have smashed more window4anes than the 4olitical leaders of the world can ever 4ay for with their 4eace efforts in such a time I should li7e to em4hasiHe 1 1 1 that we have the heartiest desire to conduct 4eaceful economic and cultural e<change with all 4eo4le and nations of the earth1 1 1 1 -hose heart would not beat higher when he reads these sentences: IThe flag is more than a ban7 account I IThe 4eo4le is 4rimary not the economyOI 8uch sentences are disarmingly correct but can the economist use them for his 4ractical wor7O 1 1 1 My view that the rearmament of our 4eo4le demands the concentration of everyone as well as all economic and financial forces was countered by the argument that only old women would wring their hands and as7: I-ho will 4ay for all thisOI 1 1 1 Adolf Eitler has called the German 4eo4le to this new almost im4ossible effort with boundless courage statesmanli7e s7ill and with an unerring sense of res4onsibility toward historyC and the im4ossible has become fact1 1 1 1 The 4olitics of our 6uehrer can only be successful when the 4eo4le in unanimous solidarity in a single concentration of will 4lace themselves behind them1 Dust as the soldier in the -ehrmacht does his duty so must

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page_23 #age &)0 each citiHen have the feeling that in the economy too he wor7s in the service of the whole community1 1 1 1 "nfortunately not all of our com4atriots are conscious of this1 1 1 1 Then there are those of our contem4oraries who are best remembered by the saying ??9ord save me from my friends1I Those are the 4eo4le who heroically smear window4anes in the middle of the night who brand every German who trades in a Dewish store as a traitor who condemn every former 6reemason as a worthless character and who in the ,ust fight against 4riests and ministers who tal7 4olitics from the 4ul4it cannot themselves distinguish between religion and misuse of the 4ul4it1 IThe goal of such 4eo4le I 8chacht added however with his ban7er?s 4reference for the middle of the road Iis generally correct and good1I There was no 4lace for secret organiHations in the Third Feich he said and the 4riests should ta7e care of the souls not of the 4olitics of their 4arishioners1 Ee continued: The Dews must realiHe that their influence in Germany has disa44eared for all time1 -e wish to 7ee4 our 4eo4le and our culture 4ure and distinctive ,ust as the Dews have always demanded this of themselves 1 1 1 But the solution of these 4roblems must be brought about under state leadershi4 and cannot be left to unregulated individual actions which have a disturbing influence on the national economy and which have therefore been re4eatedly forbidden by governmental as well as #arty agencies 1 1 1 The economy is a very sensitive organism1 !very disturbance from whatever direction it may come acts as sand in the machine1 8ince our economy is closely allied with that of foreign countries not one of us 1 1 1 can be indifferent to what conse@uences these disturbances can have at home and abroad1 It is absolutely necessary for the leadershi4 of our economic 4olicies that confidence in Germany as a constitutional state remains unsha7en1 No one in Germany is without rights1 1 1 1 The Dew can become neither a citiHen nor a fellow German1 But 1 1 1 he must not be under arbitrary action but under the law 1 1 1 I em4hasiHe now that all of us are in the same boat and no one will be given the o44ortunity to get out1 There is only one thing1 .onfidence in the seaworthiness of this shi4 and in the ca4tain?s leadershi4 of the German shi4 of state1 )* This was a s7illful s4eech aimed at 8chacht?s critics at those who caused disorder and 4ro4erty damage and above all at the 6uehrer who had to learn to listen more closely to what 8chacht said1 At a meeting two days later 8chacht again denounced Ithe unlawful activitiesI against Dews which were hurting German e<4orts1 Ee was es4ecially incensed over 8treicher?s having 4rinted in er Stuermer the 4icture of a manager of the Feichsban7 calling him a traitor because he had traded with a Dew1 The Dew 8chacht said was the holder of an Iron .ross from -orld -ar I and 8chacht demanded an a4ology from 8treicher1 Ee told the gathering that since he himself was not a #arty member he would buy wherever he wanted to1/$ 8chacht always flourished a measure of inde4endence where the

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page_23! #age &)' mar7et or the Feichsban7 were concerned and the 8treichers were detestable to him1 But any criticism of Eitler or high 4olicy was out of the @uestion1 In a conversation with the American 81 F1 6uller Dr1 on 8e4tember &) (*)0 8chacht said that Eitler was necessary to the German 4eo4le who were *0 4er cent behind him that ??they want and need Eitler1IL 8chacht said that he was conservative the Army was conservative and Eitler too was turning to the conservative sidebecause that was essential for a statesman1 In answer to 6uller?s @uestion as to whether the Army really wanted Eitler 8chacht re4lied I-ithout a doubt1 Eitler is a necessity to them and to Germany1I 8chacht told 6uller that Germany needed colonies and that Germans o44osed as did Eitler a socialist state where the im4ulses of develo4ment came from the Government1 In answer to 6uller?s remar7 that Germany?s treatment of the Dews was resented in the "nited 8tates 8chacht said he had ,ust e<4lained to Mr1 -arburg that the Dews must sto4 ma7ing such an outcrythey would always be inferior to the Germans in the Feich and should acce4t the government 4rotection being offered them1 Ee told 6uller he was at liberty to re4eat to #resident Foosevelt all that 8chacht was telling him1 /( George Messersmith the veracity of whose testimony by affidavit at Nuremberg was shar4ly attac7ed by the defense lawyers =he was given to using high colors in de4icting his relations to the NaHi great> re4orted that 8chacht had told him between (*)$ and (*)/ that the NaHis would 4lunge Germany into war and the rest of the world too if they were not sto44edwords that 8chacht 4robably would not have used to a foreign ac@uaintance1 Messersmith thought that 8chacht was no ca4tive of the NaHis but an o44ortunist a view shared by a far more reliable and astute observer 6ranUois-#oncet1/& 8chacht mas7ed his increasing differences with Goering by doggedly 4raising EitlerC there was no other way to reach the 6uehrer1 :n Danuary )$ (*)+ on the occasion of his receiving the #arty?s Golden Badge of Eonor 8chacht e<4ressed his gratitude: I-e must devote ourselves with all our hearts and strength to the 6uehrer and to the Feich1 The German future lies in the hands of our 6uehrer1I/) :n A4ril &( he added I:ur 6uehrer Adolf Eitler u4held by the veneration of a whole nation 1 1 1 has won for himself the soul of the German 4eo4le 1 1 1 :nly those closest to him 7now how difficult the burden of res4onsibility is how sorrowful the hours during which decisions have to be made 1 1 1I // :n March &( (*)% after the Anschluss with Austria 8chacht who had already resigned as Minister of !conomics but was still #resident of the Feichsban7 made a s4eech in Gienna in which he stressed that of course Austria had a s4ecial mission as did Bavaria and #russia but that there was no German mission outside Germany1 8chacht said that the method of L 6uller according to Ambassador Dodd had been sent to tal7 with 8chacht and other leading Germans by #resident Foosevelt1

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page_23" #age &)+ achieving the Anschluss had been ado4ted as the result of countless 4erfidies -ilson?s fourteen 4oints and the frustrated readiness of both Austria and Germany for the customs union that could not be made1 Ee told how the Austrian National Assembly had as7ed for union with Germany after -orld -ar I and when the treaty of 8t1 Germain was signed in the museum room for e<tinct races .lemenceau said that the site fitted the Austrians 4erfectly1 Ee reiterated that in 6ebruary (*&( the Austrian National .ouncil had again voted for the Anschluss and *%10 4er cent of the voters in the Tyrol and more than ** 4er cent in 8alHburg had voted for it1 Ee concluded that the grumblers should be told that everyone cannot be satisfiedC that this deed was accom4lished only ??by our Adolf Eitler1I And 8chacht as7ed his audience to swear allegiance to the 6uehrer1 /0 8chacht had bro7en with Eitler he said at Nuremberg as soon as it became evident that Germany was going to build armed forces far beyond its economic ca4acity and when he realiHed that Eitler was 4re4aring not to bring Germany as an e@ual to the conference table but to wage war1 This 4osturing was an e<aggeration1 -hat he had done was to try over a 4eriod of years to ma7e concessions and to bring Eitler to the 8chacht 4arty1 The battle was never directly with Eitler but with his faithful 4aladin Eermann Goering and in (*)+ 8chacht?s differences with Goering became so acute that the two no longer could wor7 together1 Goering was slavishly following the will of the 6uehrer with no more regard for economics than his master while 8chacht was stubbornly trying to be a ban7er as well as a devoted follower1 It was inevitable that 8chacht and Goering would clash1 8chacht never had li7ed Goering1 Ee disli7ed his ostentation his theatrical costumesC 8chacht was not the man to a44reciate Goering?s a44earing at social gatherings as a 4rimitive German hunter carrying a s4ear or dressing in a Foman toga rouging his chee7s and dis4laying 4ainted toenails through his sandals1 8chacht in his frosty was came to des4ise him after Goering was given charge of the German economy in (*)' as head of the 6our-;ear #lan1 Ee brought to this 4osition grandiose notions about a sub,ect on which 8chacht thought him com4letely ignorant1 -hen Goering was made .ommissioner of 6oreign !<change and Faw Materials in May (*)' the two men claimed ,urisdiction over the same economic fieldsand they a44roached their tas7s with diametrically o44osed views1 8chacht thought it would be ruinous to ste4 u4 4roduction on the scale now being ordered by Eitler and Goering and he told Goering in a meeting in May (*)' that it was Eitler?s intention that the 4ace of rearmament be maintained only through (*)'1 Goering was incensed and declared that he had never heard of any limitations to be im4osed on rearmament1 As the tension between the two men increased Goering said he would 4ersonally e<amine the records of 8chacht?s de4artments to ma7e sure he was not guilty of bad ,udgment1/' -hen 8chacht stubbornly re4eated that to 4roduce uneconomically was to waste the substance of the 4eo4le Goering re4lied laconically II tell you if the 6uehrer

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page_23# #age &)% wishes it then two times two are five1?? /+ 8chacht?s notions of fiscal solvency seemed old fashioned and absurd to the revolutionaries he had determined to advise1 In order to 4rovide the foreign e<change to obtain raw materials li7e co44er and lead 8chacht wanted the Feich to e<4ort more goods1 :therwise he said the Feich would go ban7ru4t1 Goering was merely im4atient of such old-hat orthodo< ban7ing notions1 .redit would be decreedC the economy was what he and Eitler wanted it to be1 In (*)+ 8chacht received the #arty?s Golden Badge of Eonor but a few months later he was effectively removed from the official life of the country in everything but title1 The 4a4er agreements he and Goering arrived at were soon disregarded by Goering and Eitler had no hesitationwhen the two men clashedin bac7ing his faithful 4aladin over the shriveled ban7er in a froc7 coat1 8chacht had never even been a #arty memberC men li7e Eimmler from the first had o44osed his a44ointmentC he was only useful as a show4iece for the Army and big business and to devise ingenious methods for 4roviding credit and foreign e<change1 The Army bac7ed 8chacht?s attem4ts to limit rearmament against Goering?s headlong measures but Goering?s 4olicies were Eitler?s and by November the struggle between Goering and 8chacht had come to a crisis1 Goering in his measureless vanity said to 8chacht IBut I have to be able to give you directives I and 8chacht disdainful as always of the 4retense of the man answered INot to me but to my successor1I/% That was the last time he saw Goering until they met again at Nuremberg though Goering tele4honed him after the incident to tell 8chacht he was sitting in his chair in the Ministry of !conomics1 8chacht resigned both as Minister of !conomics and as #leni4otentiary for the -ar !conomy in November (*)+ but Eitler solaced him with much the same device he used on Neurath: he a44ointed him Minister -ithout #ortfolioa 4ost 8chacht told a friend he could not ris7 refusing1/* Ee remained 4resident of the Feichsban7Eitler rea44ointed him in March (*)%but his relationshi4 with the 6uehrer steadily deteriorated and a memorandum 8chacht sent in early Danuary (*)* in which he again o44osed the e<cessive e<4enditures for armament was the last straw1 Eitler as7ed him to resign on Danuary &$ but 8chacht continued to receive the full salary he had been 4aid as 4resident of the Feichsban7'$ $$$ FM a year1 Ee retained the title Minister -ithout #ortfolio and received the &/ $$$ FM annual salary of that 4osition10$ In the autumn of (*)* at the start of the war 8chacht tried to get from his American ac@uaintances an invitation to visit the "nited 8tates where he ho4ed to 4ersuade #resident Foosevelt to act as mediator between Germany and the Allies but he received neither the invitation nor 4ermission from the 6uehrer to underta7e such a mission10( After the fall of 6rance Eitler trium4hantly as7ed 8chacht at a rece4tion what he thought of the great military success and 8chacht re4orted in his memoirs that he merely re4lied IMay God 4rotect you1I Des4ite his growing disenchantment 8chacht was much too cautious to

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page_23$ #age &)* involve himself irretrievably in a cons4iracy against Eitler1 In (*)% he tal7ed and 4lotted with most of the generals who were determined to overthrow Eitler in the event of war with the great 4owers1 Ee agreed with General !dwin von -itHleben one of the chief cons4irators that a military regime should be established by a cou4 to be followed by a 4o4ular vote1 But in (*/& when he received the s4eech a member of the Fesistance Feichsregierungsrat Dr1 Eans von Dohnanyi was 4re4ared to give when a cou4 succeeded 8chacht read only the first words??Eitler is deadIand said he would read the rest when the event really too7 4lace1 0& As7ed by "lrich von Eassell German Ambassador to Italy and one of the men who would be 7illed as a result of the Duly &$ 4lot if he would ,oin the .abinet of the new Government 8chacht said that it was too early to tal7 of such matters although he offered to try to use his influence with the Allies on behalf of the 4ro4osed Government1 At the time of 8chacht?s involvement in these intrigues .arl Goerdeler 6abian von 8chlabrendorff and others were trying to get a commitment from 9ondon and -ashington for something less than unconditional surrender if Eitler was overthrown1 8chacht ,oined nothing dangerous to his life or the future of his family1 "ntil (*)% when he was fiftyfive years old he was married to a woman who was so 4ro-NaHi she would tolerate no criticism of the the 6uehrer or the #arty1 8ince 8chacht was unmista7ably a critic and his wife re4eated what he said outside the family circle the relationshi4 became increasingly strained and they se4arated that year1 8chacht remarried in March (*/(1 Eis second wife was thirty years younger than he and they had two daughters1 They were not long to have a 4eaceful family life together1 In November (*/& 8chacht wrote a barbed letter to his old enemy Goering ob,ecting to conscri4ting fifteen-year-old boys and telling the Feichsmarschall that this would be a burden on the fighting morale of the German 4eo4le1 In addition he 4ointed out to the chief of the 9uftwaffe that the antici4ated @uic7 victory over !ngland by the Air 6orce had not materialiHed nor had Germany been free of enemy air raids1 IThe re4eated announcements I 8chacht wrote Ithat the Fussian resistance was definitely bro7en have been 4roved to be untrue1 1 1 1 Allied su44lies of arms to Fussia and the man4ower reserves of Fussia 1 1 1 have been sufficient to bring continuous counterattac7s against our !astern front1I 8chacht then commented on the Allied landings in North Africa and the failure of the German "-boats to 4revent the trans4ort of enemy war material10) It was a bold and foolish letter for Goering had said that the German 4eo4le could call him Meyer if a single bomb dro44ed on German cities but it was the 6uehrer who had 4rematurely announced the victory over Fussia1 The re4ly to 8chacht came in the form of letters from 9ammers and Goering1 9ammers informed 8chacht that on Danuary &( (*/) because of 8chacht?s attitude Ito the fateful battle of the German nation I the 6uehrer had decided to dismiss him as Minister -ithout #ortfolio1 Goering wrote IMy answer to your

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page_240 #age &/$ defeatist letter that undermines the 4owers of resistance of the German 4eo4le is that I e<4el you herewith from the #russian 8tate .ouncil1?? 0/ 8chacht was arrested on Duly &( (*// the day after the attem4t on Eitler?s life and he was to s4end the ne<t four years in twenty-three 4risons German and Allied1 Before the end of the war he was im4risoned in three NaHi concentration cam4s: Favensbruec7 6lossenbuerg and DachauC the Americans too7 him into custody in #ustertal Austria where a number of former Gesta4o 4risoners had been shi44ed1 At Nuremberg 8chacht said he and the other defendants were treated as though they had already been found guilty1 Ee com4lained that the American commandant of the 4rison would not 4ermit him to climb on the chair in his cell to loo7 out of the window that he was not 4ermitted to slee4 on his side that the radios of the GIs 4layed IDon?t 6ence Me InI too loudly that visitors came as to a Hoo chewing gum and loud and contem4tuous1 :nce when he was 4hotogra4hed without a collar while he was eating he threw the contents of a coffee 4ot over the cameramanan action the commandant of the 4rison called a defamation of the American uniform1 The American guards however loved the e4isode and ha44ily re4laced the coffeewhich was officially denied himwith all he could drin71L After the Nuremberg tribunal found 8chacht not guilty of the charges brought against him the German courts brought him to trial1 Ee was sentenced to eight years? im4risonment as a ma,or offender under the denaHification laws1 Though the full sentence was never served he was not freed until 8e4tember & (*/% and he was not com4letely cleared until 8e4tember (*0$100 Two years of his 4rison terms he s4ent in solitary confinement1 8chacht li7e Goering had an easy time with those of his cross-e<aminers who struggled to fit onto the stubborn facts their stereoty4es of German big business the cons4iracy to commit aggressive warfare and 8chacht?s connection with the great 4lot1 The indictment against him was drawn u4 in a scra44y fashionC it accused him of having been a member of the Feichstag and the 4rosecution said that as such 8chacht had voted for the !nabling Act to give Eitler full 4owers1 But 8chacht had never been a member of the Feichstag and thus could not have voted for the !nabling Act1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son cross-e<amining 8chacht on the latter?s demands for a return of the former German colonies swiftly too7 umbrage at 8chacht?s calling them German 4ro4erty1 IAnd your 4ro4erty as you call it I said Dac7son Iwere African colonies1I 8chacht re4lied that the use of the word I4ro4ertyI was not invented by him but a44eared in the te<t of the Gersailles Treaty1 8ince in some cases confusion was combined with an uncertain familiarity L !veryone involved in the American occu4ation at this 4oint was li7ely to be in uniform which facilitated identification since it hel4ed to distinguish from the native 4o4ulation many of the occu4ation officials who s4o7e !nglish with mar7ed accents1 :nce when 8chacht a4ologiHed to an American member of the 4rosecution staff for his bad !nglish the man re4lied IIt?s a lot better than most of my colleagues?1I

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page_241 #age &/( with the !nglish language the sense of some of the interrogations is not always easy to follow1 An American 4rosecutor @uestioning 8chacht about the costs of German rearmament as7ed on :ctober () (*/0 ??;ou would not say that the figure of )0 billions was fantastic li7e the figure of *$ billions that Eitler saidO 0' In a @uestion about aggression the 4rosecutor as7ed 8chacht on :ctober (' (*/0 I-hen did it first come to your mind that the e<tent of the German armament was in such a 4osition as to cause the danger of war in itselfOI0+ #roceeding to the international situation 4receding the war 8chacht?s interrogator staggered onto the 4roblem of Austria and the Anschluss which the 4rosecution often s4o7e of as Ithe ra4e of AustriaI although no country had ever more willingly come under the domination of another than the im4overished and strife-ridden Austria came to the embrace of Eitler?s booming Feich1 The 4rosecutor struggled mightily with this ra4e of Austria1 Ee said IAustrian reservists were called u4 1 1 1 Does that come bac7 to your memoryO I am ,ust trying to get the framewor7 on the situation1I 8chacht re4lied that he did not 7now1 The 4rosecutor said I-ell but you were a living man at the time1 -e all were and we were very influential as a matter of fact1 -hat I am trying to do is to as7 you whether you remember 1 1 1 the tension that e<isted in !uro4e 1 1 1I0% A day later he returned to the sub,ect: IThere was I he told 8chacht Iat that time already a tension in !uro4e 1 1 1 There were statements and declarations by the 4owers with res4ect to guaranteeing integrities and all the im4lications that we 7new from the last war 1 1 1I 8chacht re4lied I;es1I0* During the course of these interrogations 8chacht e<4lained one role an army 4lays in international 4olitics1 In (*)& he said the Allies had forbidden the customs union 4ro4osed by Austria to 7ee4 the country from ban7ru4tcy and com4lete des4air as to its enonomic future1 But in (*)% the Allies had acce4ted the Anschlussthis was the difference between confronting a strong and a wea7 -ehrmacht1 The American 4rosecutor was obviously confused not only by the com4le<ities of the international situation with which he was struggling but also by the meaning of some of the words in the wor7ing vocabulary1 IGis-Z-vis I es4ecially troubled him and he could not always distinguish it from IagainstI or Iversus1I The following dialogues too7 4lace: #F:8!."T:F: The 4osition you too7 as I understand it was that the -ehrmacht was im4ortant not so much as an aggressive wea4on against strong countries Austria and .Hechoslova7ia as against or vis-Z-vis if you will the larger 4owers the concert of nations in !uro4e1 1 1 1'$ #F:8!."T:F: In other words the army stood there 1 1 1 as a wea4on 1 1 1 vis-Z-vis the Austrians1 8.EA.ET: Not vis-Z-vis the Austrians but vis-Z-vis the Allies1 #F:8!."T:F: I am a little na[ve about these things I must say1 ;ou say 1 1 1 not vis-Zvis Austria but against the #owersO 8.EA.ET: Not against the #owers but vis-Z-vis the #owers1 '(

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page_242 #age &/& #F:8!."T:F: The Anschluss with Austria was not certainly by virtue of any international agreement was itO 8.EA.ET: No but they tolerated it1 '& 8chacht then said that the Anschluss had been achieved by 4ro4aganda and 4olitical 4ressure that military force had nothing directly to do with it but that the very e<istence of the -ehrmacht as a 4ower behind the 4ro4aganda and 4olitical 4ressure had a lot to do with the success of the cou41 Ee added that he did not 7now how far the 4ressure would have succeeded if no -ehrmacht had been there1 #F:8!."T:F: -hat I mean is did you at that time credit the -ehrmacht as an instrument for the achievement of Eitler?s march into AustriaO 1 1 1') -as there a mobiliHationO Do you rememberO 8.EA.ET: I don?t 7now1 -as thereO #F:8!."T:F: I am ,ust wondering what you remember about it1'/ -ould you deny that there was tension in !uro4e and the threat of a war 4rior to the Austrian AnschlussO 8chacht re4lied that Eitler intended to force the Anschluss but there was no threat of war from the German side1 The 4rosecutor then as7ed ??;ou realiHe of course that the .Hechs had an army and the .Hechs had munition wor7s as well did they notOI'0 Suestions on other sub,ects could be e@ually inane1 Feferring to a meeting between 8chacht and Ambassador Bullitt the American 4rosecutor said I 1 1 1 to refresh your recollection I will tell you that that was in November of (*)+1 ;ou don?t doubt that do youOI 8chacht re4lied INo I don?t doubt it at all1I'' 84ea7ing of 8chacht?s wavering relations with Eitler the 4rosecutor as7ed IThis meeting that you had after Munich 1 1 1 this attendance that you had was that a voluntary attendance on Eitler 1 1 1 OI'+ INow did you again renew that situation in (*/(OI'% The man with the highest IS among the twenty-one defendants had no trouble answering such @uestions1 There were others however that did not come so easily1 8chacht had certainly a44roved of the 4rinci4les of the anti-8emitic laws including de4riving Dews of German citiHenshi41 Ee too thought the !astern Dews who had come to Germany after -orld -ar I were a 4oor lot with no morals who 4referred to do no useful wor71 Ee wanted the ,obs o4en to Dews to be limited by 4ercentagesa 4rotective device he thought should be ado4ted by countries other than Germany1 That he o44osed however the rowdyism of the NaHis the bro7en windows of the (ristallnacht the destruction of Dewish 4ro4erty and then of the Dews themselves goes without saying1 8chacht was no radical1 Ee chose Eitler calculatedly and with forethought as the only one of the nonleftist 4olitical leaders who could be elected by a siHable minority of the German 4eo4le as the sole alternative to chaos and communism and a world in which 8chacht would 4lay no role1 None of his thin7ing had dis4osed him against the main tenets of the

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page_243 #age &/) NaHis1 Although at the age of thirty-two he had been de4uty director of the Dresdner Ban7 his doctoral dissertation on mercantilism had dealt with ??the mor4hine of the trust but the eli<ir of life of the cartel I one of those 4hiloso4hical-economic distinctions that the non-German world finds so hard to follow1 The German inflation which had reached the 4oint where one gold mar7 was worth a billion 4a4er onesC the threat of communismC the 4rotracted de4ressionC and above all Eitler?s victories at the 4olls together with his a44arent reasonableness when he s4o7e at such functions at the Goering dinnerall these elements led 8chacht to thin7 that new measures were essential and Eitler might well be brought into a coalition where his 4olitical magnetism could be retained but the noisy 4ro4aganda and unsound ideas removed1 In any event 8chacht thought that there was no alternative to himwithout the relatively disci4lined and nationalistic NaHis the country would automatically fall 4rey to the 9eft to communism1 Eitler?s 4rogram of housing and Autobahnen to counter unem4loyment was 8chacht?s too and when he visited 6ran7lin Foosevelt in (*)) there seemed to have been no essential differences in the economic solutions the two men discussed1 8chacht re4orted in his boo7 that Foosevelt told him he made a fine im4ression1 8chacht also met and attended a dinner given by David 8arnoff of the Fadio .or4oration of America1 Ten of 8arnoff?s doHen or so guests were Dews and 8chacht re4orted that he s4o7e as carefully and circums4ectly as 4ossible and that no discussion followed the s4eech1 Afterward 8arnoff said IDoctor you?ve been a very good s4ort1I 8chacht declared that 8umner -elles too had a good o4inion of him and when -elles came to Germany in (*/$ he had as7ed to see 8chacht alone a re@uest that Fibbentro4 o44osed1 But -elles and 8chacht nevertheless did have a tal7 together and 8chacht said he 4ut his life into -elles? hands by telling 4lainly what he thought of Eitler with whom by that time he had bro7en1 8chacht felt later that -elles could certainly have demolished the charges against him at Nuremberg by testifying for him and that the De4artment of 8tate could have made the record of the tal7s available but neither -elles nor his su4eriors saw fit to do this1 Ambassador Dodd 7nowing of 8chacht?s aversion to the NaHis urged 8chacht in the late (*)$?s to emigrate to the "nited 8tates instead of remaining in Germany where his life was in danger1 But the record of 8chacht?s su44ort of Eitler when he thought the NaHis could be brought within a conservative strong nationalist state was clear enough1 In (*)& 8chacht had written to Eitler I;our movement is carried internally by so strong a truth and necessity that victory in one form or another cannot elude you for long1I '* Goebbels too attested to 8chacht?s reliabilityC he had written in his diary I8chacht absolutely re4resents our 4oint of view1 Ee is one of the few who acce4ts the 6uehrer?s 4osition entirely1I+$ Eassell noted in his diary the incongruity of 8chacht?s remaining as a member of Eitler?s .abinet when he in 4rivate conversations was so

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page_244 #age &// critical of the regime1 8chacht came to hate Eitler but he continued to serve him until he was dismissed from one after another of his various 4osts1 Ee thought Fibbentro4 e<traordinarily stu4id and incom4etent Goering dishonest and 6un7 alcoholic and homose<ualC but he did not leave such com4any of his own free will1 The Nuremberg court freed himalthough the Fussians voted for finding him guilty1 In its ,udgment the court said that it had not been 4roved beyond a reasonable doubt that 8chacht had 7nown of Eitler?s 4lan for aggression1 +( Although his German ,ail sentence was annulled he was never to get a clean bill of health from many of his critics1 In (*0( a .anadian who met him in Indonesia refused to sha7e hands with him1 Barl 8evering =see #a4en .ha4t1 0> said 8chacht was the one man for whom he could not subordinate feelings of 4ersonal animosity and other members of the Fesistance felt the same way1 Among the Americans his stoc7 was not high either1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son found his ac@uittal ??regrettable1I+& The Military Governor of -uerttemberg Baden .harles M1 9a 6ollette said his comments when he heard that 8chacht was freed by the German a44ellate court would be un4rintable1L The "nited 8tates denaHification officer for that state said the decision was Iincom4rehensible1ILL !ither 8chacht was a big war criminal or he was nothing1+) -hen 8chacht was released after his last 4rison term in (*/% he had two mar7s fifty 4fennigs in his 4oc7et and seemingly no ho4e of soon bettering his fortunes =he testified he had one million mar7s when the NaHis arrested him in Duly (*//> for he could not 4ractice his 4rofession nor was he to be allowed to drive a car1 But his rise after he was again able to return to business was ra4id1 Ee was invited to consult on economic matters with governments !ast and -esteven in Nuremberg the American 4rosecution had him draw u4 a memorandum on a solution for the economic 4light of Germany and his services were immediately in demand as soon as he was able to use them1 6or there was no @uestion of his abilities1 The -ehrmacht 4ro4erly e<4ressed its a44reciation in (*)% for all he had done in ma7ing 4ossible the rearmament of the Feich1 Eis wor7able system of controls of what went out of and came into Germany and his cautious attem4t to 7ee4 rearmament within the ca4acity of German industry without causing inflation made him one of the 7ey figures of the decade when the financiers and economists of the world were struggling with unem4loyment and blowing on the embers of the recovery from the de4ression that had hit all the nations of the -est1 There is no reason to doubt the essential truth of what 8chacht told the court at Nuremberg1 Ee had su44orted the 6uehrer until he became con- L 9a 6ollette was also De4uty .hief .ounsel at the later trial in Nuremberg of the German ,udges1 LL The court reversed its decision to free 8chacht a little while later but by then 8chacht had moved to the British Hone1

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page_24 #age &/0 vinced that Eitler would lead the country into war he said and he had always o44osed the e<cesses of the #arty rowdies and of the 6uehrer himself1 Ee had ho4ed in his hubris to be able to harness the hurricane but had been carried along with it until he himself very nearly fell victim to it and ended u4 in the concentration cam4s of the 88 with other conservatives from the Army and official life of whom Eimmler and the Gesta4o had any doubts1 Eis failure to see dee4ly into events or to see un4leasant realities was the same as Dodl?s but in a minor civilian 7ey and he had bro7en with the leader in timeor better said the leader had bro7en with him in time1 9i7e 8chacht Eitler found it easy to choose between his 4ur4oses and another?s1 Des4ite the mutual words of 4raise there had never been any genuine sym4athy between the two1 Eitler said once that 8chacht had always o44osed him and Goering?s testimony bears this out des4ite his conflicting statement that 8chacht must have gone along with the rearmament 4rogram or Eitler would not have tolerated him in office1 8chacht undoubtedly a44roved of the general 4rogram of rearming but he tried to bra7e it to 7ee4 it within German resources1 Goering says too that 8chacht always 4ainted things in e<treme colors once even telling Eitler that what the 6uehrer 4ro4osed would ban7ru4t the country1 8chacht in a word had been an o44ortunist as so many observers said he was but a cautious one who never involved himself in anything beyond re4air1 Eis anti-8emitism was of the cautious conventional 7ind too1 The e<terminations were a horror to him as they were to all res4ectable 4eo4le in Germany1 But his nationalism his offended 4ride as a German after the defeat of -orld -ar I and his belief in the maleficence of the !astern Dews and in the necessity of getting Dews out of the healthy German communal life 4ermitted him to ta7e an im4ortant 4art in the regime that was to e<terminate them1 8chacht did not brea7 with the #arty on the Dewish @uestion although he undoubtedly de4lored the bro7en windows and the rabble in the streets 4reying u4on the Dews but because Goering was invading his domain and the economic ris7s of Eitler?s 4olicies were becoming too great1 !ven so he stayed on in the .abinet until he was told to leave with the conventional e<cuse that without him matters would be worse1 6or he was always right always inca4able of ma7ing a mista7e and the worst turn Eitler or anyone else could ta7e was to turn away from the 8chacht 4arty1 -alther !manuel 6un7 -alther 6un7 the man who succeeded 8chacht as Minister of !conomics in (*)% was the final cause of 8chacht?s dismissal in (*)* as 4resident of the Feichsban71 :n Danuary + (*)* 8chacht had written a memorandum to Eitler telling him that the too ra4id 4ace of rearmament would have disastrous conse@uences for the German economy1 The memorandum had

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page_24! #age &/' irritated Eitler but it was not until he heard the tidings 6un7 brought to him a few days later that he could bring himself to dismiss 8chacht1 During a meeting with 6un7 and 8chwerin von Brosig7 soon after 8chacht had written the memorandum 8chacht said that the Feichsban7 would not grant a short-term credit of one hundred million mar7s at the end of Danuary that the Feich was ban7ru4t and Brosig7 should tell this to Eitler1 Brosig7 4rudently declined to bring such a message to the 6uehrer but 6un7 re4orted the conversation to Eitler the ne<t day and 8chacht?s active career on behalf of the Feich?s economy was over1 +/ :n Danuary (* (*)* 6un7 too7 over the 4ost of 4resident of the Feichsban7 as he had assumed the other offices 8chacht had held1 8chacht thought little of his successor1 Ee said that 6un7 was a harmless homose<ual an alcoholic1L Ee felt that 6un7 was ine4t in financial matters and too easily led by the 6uehrer in his economic decisions1 8ince the latter charge was also leveled against 8chacht it may 4ro4erly be regarded with sus4icion but it is nevertheless true1 6un7 was another of the self-styled free enter4risers who li7e 8chacht said he had ,oined the #arty in order to 4reserve the mar7et economy1 The notions of German big businessmen and of the ban7ers li7e 8chacht easily accommodated themselves for a time at least to those of the #arty1 Almost all German businessmen believed in thera4eutic doses of government intervention and in a 4owerful well-dis4osed government to administer them1 In (*&0 the same Feich Association of German Industry that was to bac7 8chacht?s candidacy for the chancellorshi4 was addressed by .arl Duisberg of I1 G1 6arben as follows: ??Be united united unitedP 1 1 1 -e ho4e that our words of today will be heard and will find the strong man for he is always necessary for us Germans as we have seen in the case of Bismarc7 1 1 1I In (*&' Duisberg told the same grou4: IIf Germany is again to be great all classes of our 4eo4le must come to the realiHation that leaders are necessary who can act without concern for the ca4rices of the masses1I In (*)$ he attac7ed the 4rinci4le of the democracy of the mar7et4lace of the ability of the consumer to choose well among com4eting 4roducts: I 1 1 1 the masses who neither were e<4ert nor were able to become e<4ert in economic matters1I+0 These men were accustomed to cartels to trade agreements to the traditional mechanisms by which the mar7et is rigged on behalf of order and sound business morals but more im4ortant 4erha4s their 4hiloso4hy and training made them sus4icious of the ca4rices of the unregulated mar7et which bought their 4roducts and made them men of business instead of bureaucrats1 After the war a number of communications from Eitler were found in the Bru44 files1 :ne said: I#rivate enter4rise cannot be maintained in the age of democracyC it is conceivable only if the 4eo4le have a sound idea of L Belgian Ambassador Davignon said that 6un7 was so drun7 at one of his own 4arties that he could not say good-bye to his guestsC and others too corroborate 8chacht =cf1 .urt Fiess %ose2h 6oebbels MBaden-Baden: Dreiec7 Gerlag (*/*N 41 (0$>1

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page_24" #age &/+ authority and 4ersonality1 !verything 4ositive good and valuable that has been achieved in the world of economics and culture is solely attributable to 4ersonality1?? +' 8uch sentiments were echoed by Gustav Bru44 and by many other entre4reneurs1 !verything in German economic life was organiHed from the to4 down1 The com4eting industries of the Fuhr the firms that su44lied them and agriculture too had cartelsand the wor7ers of course had unions1 "nionism had begun in Germany and the ma,ority of German wor7ers a44roved of cartels which they believed made for ,ob stability1 The free 4lay of the democratic mar7et led to all 7inds of uncertainties such as 4rice cutting which led to wage cutting and layoffs1 The cure for the de4ression was sought by both ca4ital and labor in government action on a grand scale1 In the world of German big business 6un7 who never o44osed any measure Eitler favored was not much more erratic than the entre4reneurs of I1 G1 6arben and Bru44 or than 8chacht who for all his ingenious 4rice controls and @uotas and efforts toward autar7y always regarded himself a free enter4riser1 6un7 li7e 8chacht had close relations with some of the great industrialists of Germany and used his influence with them on behalf of the #arty1 In the classical 4attern of German conservatives 6un7 saw Eitler as the sole alternative to the .ommunists ta7ing over the ban7ru4t economy and the im4otent -eimar 4arliamentary democracy1 6un7 after (*)( was another front man for the #arty1 Ee too 7new a lot of influential 4eo4le including the #resident of Germany and during his fre@uent visits to Eindenburg in the crucial year of (*)& he was one of the conservatives who assured the old man that Eitler was not as blac7 as re4orts 4ainted him1 6un7 was born in Boenigsberg on August (% (%*$ the third child of a #russian family of businessmen and artisans1 Ee grew u4 to be a man of many talents interested in a wide variety of sub,ects including 4olitical economy law 4hiloso4hy literature and musicall of which he studied at one time or another1 9i7e so many of the to4 NaHis he loved music and 4layed the 4iano e<tremely well1 Before -orld -ar I he too7 courses in 4hiloso4hy at the "niversity of Berlin then shifted to law and later too7 u4 4olitical economics1 At the same time he wrote financial articles for 9ei4Hig and Berlin news4a4ers1 -hen -orld -ar I began he was drafted into the Army but was discharged in (*(' because of ill health =he had a defective bladder that troubled him the rest of his life>1 6ollowing his release from the Army he too7 a ,ob on the conservative Berliner Boersen0eitung one of the foremost financial news4a4ers in Germany and by (*&$ was chief editor of its business section1 6un7 had a few ideas that a44ealed to his businessmen readers was 4assionately anti-Mar<ist and was an able financial re4orter1 In (*&& he became editor of the 4a4er a 4ost he 7e4t until he resigned to devote all his time to #arty wor71 Eis articles followed the line of the fle<ible 4ostwar economists declaring the wor7ers? demands for higher wages to be inflationary but also favoring ta<ing

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page_24# #age &/% away any war 4rofits that remained after the German colla4se1 9i7e 8chacht he was strongly nationalistC he attac7ed the 6rench invasion of the Fuhr o44osed the ineffectual -eimar 4arliamentary system and wanted what his National 8ocialist biogra4her characteriHed as a ??national constructive integrated economic system tied into the social structure and res4onsible to the needs of the general 4ublic1I ++ 6un7 7new Gregor 8trasser well and a44roved of his theories1 8trasser he said at Nuremberg was a man who favored free enter4rise a statement in accord with 6un7?s woolly thin7ing for 8trasser as he must have 7nown was actually one of the few convinced socialists among the NaHis1 It was through 8trasser that he met Eitler in (*)( and became a #arty member1+% 6un7 was another of the men with IconservativeI economic 4rinci4les and connectionsli7e Be44lerwhom Eilter could ma7e good use of and he was soon named Eitler?s 4ersonal economic adviser and chief of the #arty :ffice for #rivate !conomy1 -ith the head of every third German family unem4loyed in the late twenties and early thirties 6un7 offered the standard solutions for reviving the economy that were to be ado4ted by most of the countries of the industrial -est1 Ee 4ro4osed 4ublic wor7s a vast road-building 4rogram the ste44ing u4 of automobile manufacture and mechaniHation of German farms1 These 4rograms with easier credit to be obtained through the Feichsban7 and a sound currency he believed would bring Germany out of the de4ression1 6un7 had many tal7s with 4rominent NaHis who told him they held the same views1 Goering told him he too believed in the role the creative that is the entre4reneurial 4ersonality must 4lay in the economyscarcely anyone in the #arty did not1 6un7 for his 4art acce4ted the "uehrer2rin0i2C for how else was a strong nationalistic solvent Germany to emerge from the de4ressionO By (*)& he was chief of the #arty?s .ommittee on !conomic #olicy with its strange array of advisers including the entre4reneur -ilhelm Be44ler Gottfried 6eder and Gregor 8trasser for whom on occasion 6un7 wrote s4eeches1 6un7?s main ,ob however was liaison between the #arty and big business and he was admirably ada4ted for it since he s4o7e the language and held the views of both at the same time1 At Nuremberg he said he ,oined the #arty to convert it to free enter4rise1+* Ee very li7ely told the same thing to the industrialists he 7new in (*)(1 In any event the Fuhr industrialists were much in favor of his acting as an adviser to Eitler for they felt that with men li7e 6un7 and 8chacht informing the 6uehrer on economic 4roblems he would become more reasonable1%$ 6un7 was elected to the Feichstag in Duly (*)&1 In March (*)) after Eitler came to 4ower he was given 4osts under Goebbels as "ndersecretary of the Feich Ministry for !nlightenment and #ro4aganda #ress .hief of the Government =Feichsregierung> and .hairman of the Board of Directors of the Feich Broadcasting .om4any1%( Ee held these ,obs until he returned to his economic duties in (*)% when he succeeded 8chacht as Minister of !conomics1 In the course of the ne<t two years he too7 over 8chacht?s other

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page_24$ #age &/* 4osts as 4resident of the Feichsban7 and #leni4otentiary of the -ar !conomy1 6un7 never had 8chacht?s difficulty in getting along with Goering1 Ee acce4ted the Feichsmarschall?s 4reeminence in the economic s4hereas in all elseand whatever economic 4rogram Eitler decided on was good enough for him1 6un7 declared that he wanted the economy to function as a wholeC food 4roduction industry forest and agricultural lands were to be bound together with strong central controls over wages and 4rices financing and credit1 In s4eech after s4eech during the war he 4ro4agated the doctrines of a controlled economy in a Feich that would lead !uro4e after the war and be inde4endent of bloc7ades and the machinations of the im4erialist democracies and their unholy alliance with 8oviet Fussia1 Ee denounced the ??money im4erialismI of Anglo-American ca4italism and re4eated what Eitler had always declared that money gets its value from the authority of the state and the labor of its 4eo4le1 %& Gold with its base in finance ca4ital 6un7 said would be the 7ey to American 4ostwar 4lans1 The "nited 8tates would carry on the British im4erialism of the nineteenth century1 But !uro4e would now be inde4endent of such abracadabra1%) The countries of !uro4e had the chance to wor7 together in a common mar7et that had never e<isted before he said and it would be rationally organiHed under the aus4ices of the German victory1 6un7 hammered on NaHi 4rewar themes of the world economic disturbances caused by countries li7e the "nited 8tates1 The value of money was determined not by the inter4lay of international forces and influences but by national and social valuesC wor7 was the 7ey to a sound currency1 :n the other hand 6un7 4ointed out Germany after the war would have enough gold to 4ay its international obligations in this metal if need be1 Thus he ado4ted from Eitler the strategy of 4reaching whatever doctrine was needed to convince his audience at the moment1 !uro4e was to live it u4 with Autobahnen safeguarded against accidents and its economy was to be made 4roof against the vicissitudes of the ca4italistic com4etitive 4rice changes without the unwieldy massive bureaucratiHation and collectiviHation of the Bolshevi7 system with which the -estern democracies were allied1%/ The views 6un7 held were not only those of Eitler but those with minor variations of the industrialists he had hel4ed 4ersuade to ma7e contributions to the #arty1 6un7 said in one of his interrogations that three grou4s of industrialists had formed in the #arty: one around Eimmler one around Foehm and a third around the 6uehrer1 The last grou4 made their chief contributions either to Eitler directly or to one of 6un7?s agents1%0 The methods of contributing were the only differences among the grou4sC but it was an honor and a considerable advantage to be one of the insiders in the Eimmler or Eitler circle1 The two main charges against 6un7 at Nuremberg were based on his 4art in drafting the laws to drive the Dews from the German economy and on his

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page_2 0 #age &0$ dealings with the 88 in which as 4resident of the Feichsban7 he was accused of having received 4ersonal ob,ects of value ta7en from the Dews before they were slaughtered1 6rom (*/& on the 88 made unusual ban7ing de4osits of gold teeth eyeglass frames 4latinum and gold rings diamonds watches earrings s4oons 7nives and for7s as well as foreign currency and stoc7s and bonds1 Twelve 7ilos of 4earls alone had been de4osited in the Feichsban7 after one delivery1 %' The ,ewelry was sent to the official Berlin 4awnsho4 and the de4osits were used as security for loans for s4ecial 4ur4osesof which Eimmler had a great many1 The de4osits were used mainly to finance the wide-ranging 88 economic enter4rises manned by concentrationcam4 labor =see 84eer .ha4t1 (&>1 8uch shi4ments had been delivered to !mil #uhl vice-4resident of the Feichsban7 who declared in an affidavit that he had told 6un7 about them and that 6un7 had seen them when he visited the vaults from time to time1%+ #uhl who later a44eared as a witness formally retracted the statements he had made in his affidavit denying that either he or 6un7 had 7nown of the contents of these ??closed de4ositsI which had been 4laced in sac7s or bo<es1 But :swald #ohl an 88 Gru44enfuehrer who headed the 88 industrial em4ire of concentrationcam4 wor7ers told of discussions about the deliveries with both 6un7 and #uhl to whom the contents of the 88 booty were described in detail1 #ohl said he had accom4anied 6un7 and #uhl in a visit to the vaults of the ban7 after which they and the 88 men had gone to lunch together1%% :n the stand at Nuremberg and in the course of si<teen interrogations 6un7 denied that he had 7nown anything whatever of the contents of the de4osits1 Ee said he had thought that they were the usual coins and foreign e<change the 88 routinely brought in1 The 4rosecution however had made motion 4ictures of the de4osits of gold teeth ,ewelry and 4earls that made the Feichsban7 loo7 a good deal more li7e a hoc7 sho4 than a ban71 It could be shown also that the 88 had sent 6un7 a letter than7ing him ceremoniously for the understanding he had shown toward their enter4rises including a loan of eight million mar7s he had arranged Iso wor7ers in the concentration cam4s can be useful both economically and in their reeducation1I%* !ven at 84andau 6un7 denied that he had 7nown what 7ind of security he was getting at the Feichsban7 and it is 4ossible he was telling the truth1 But this 4oint seems of small moment com4ared with the 7nowledge which he did not deny having1 -hether or not he 4ermitted himself to investigate the contents of the 88 shi4ments he certainly 7new that he was acce4ting the 4ro4erty of murdered 4eo4le to finance the 88 use of concentrationcam4 labor1 6un7 hel4ed looting in other ways too1 Ee was in charge of the funds of the Foges Gesellschaft =see 8eyss-In@uart .ha4t1 ((> used for buying goods in 6rance on the blac7 mar7et1 The money came from the e<cess occu4ation costs 4aid by 6ranceC and thirty million mar7s in 6rench francs

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page_2 1 #age &0( according to the testimony at the trial were needed every ten days when the 4urchases were at their height1 *$ Nor was there any denial of his close identification with other ways in which the #arty and its friends o4erated to reward the faithful1 :n the occasion of his fiftieth birthday he was given a (($acre estate in Bavaria by a grou4 of industrialists who always seemed to be on hand to su44ly the NaHi Bon0en with what they needed1 -hen des4ite his comfortable salary =which with e<tras came to '$ $$$ FM a year*(> the running e<4enses and ta<es of the gift house 4roved too high for 6un7 Goering obligingly 4resented him with )$$ $$$ FM to which Eitler added 0&$ $$$ and thus the Minister of !conomics was bailed out of his financial troubles1 Ee e<4lained at Nuremberg that he had used the money to create two foundations for the benefit of the war needy among the families of the em4loyees of the Feichsban7 and the Ministry of !conomics but he had obviously regarded himself as coming under the foundations? 4rovisions1 -hen @uestioned about the treatment of the Dews 6un7 was so overcome at one of his early interrogations that he we4t as he confessed his guilt1 Ee admitted that he had 7nown of the 4lundering of Dewish 4ro4erty1 This was a considerable understatement for he had drawn u4 the laws of November (*)% that e<4elled the Dews from German economic life 4rohibiting them after Danuary ( (*)* from ta7ing 4art in any wholesale or retail trade from the craftsmen and tradesmen in small sho4s to the managers of largescale enter4rise1 Ee had been a cons4icuous member of the meeting that too7 4lace after the (ristallnacht*& =see Goering .ha4t1 )> and it was he the handy ,ournalist who gave the occasion its name1 Ee said at Nuremberg that he had de4lored the (ristallnacht as had Goering and 8chacht and #a4en and everyone it seemed but Goebbels1 If so it did not 4revent him from drawing u4 the law that 4unished the Dews for having their sho4s raided1 Nevertheless he was one of the more humane NaHis1 An affidavit secured in his defense related how as Feich #ress .hief he had 4ermitted Dews to remain on the staff of the "rankfurter Ceitung after (*)) and another witness told how 6un7 maintained friendly relations with Fichard 8trauss even after 8trauss had fallen into disgrace with the regime because he had written a letter on behalf of a Dewish colleague1*) Another affidavit that of Ministerial .ouncilor Ballus told how 6un7 had tried to hel4 a Dewish com4oser 9eo Blech who had been a director of the Berlin 8tate :4era1*/ 6un7?s relations with the #arty fanatics were not always com4letely harmonious1 8treicher had once written to warn him: ??;ou are loo7ed u4on in certain #arty circles as the secret e<4onent of certain 4owers that have no 4lace in the #arty1 I have always defended you against the various 4rominent #arty members who have attac7ed youbut your letter of :ctober )( (*)/ raises doubts1I =6un7 had written to 8treicher to 4rotest the rude treatment accorded a Norwegian vice-consul by NaHi hoodlums treatment

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page_2 2 #age &0& recorded with 4raise in er Stuermer1> *0 Ee thought of himself as a man of infinite sensibility a man of feeling and fine taste@ualities cons4icuously lac7ing in brawlers li7e 8treicher1 6un7 4referred more genteel National 8ocialists1 6un7?s testimony at Nuremberg threw some light on the relations between industry and the #arty1 Ee 4ointed out that big German firms li7e big industry in other countries gave funds to com4eting 4arties whether or not they a44roved of their 4rinci4les and that the amount given the NaHis was small in com4arison to the sums given some of the other 4artiesthe German #eo4le?s #arty and the German Nationalists for e<am4le1 !ven the 8ocial Democrats were heavily su44orted by industry1 "4 to (*)( 6un7 said he doubted that big industry had given more than one million mar7s to the National 8ocialist #arty1*' In (*)& the 6lic7 firm gave *0$ $$$ FM to #resident von Eindenburg to hel4 his cam4aign in the 4residential election and also 0$ $$$ FM to the NaHis1 In (*)) they gave ($$ $$$ FM to the Nationalist #eo4le?s #arty and (&$ $$$ FM to the NaHis1 Big business however soon made both 4eace and an alliance with the National 8ocialists1 6or a time industry and the Army wor7ed together su44orting 8chacht in his efforts to control the inflated arms budget to restrain the economic and social 4rograms of the radical NaHis and to establish at the same time military 4olitical and economic inde4endence for the Feich1*+ After the dismissal of 8chacht such conservative forces had to deal with 6un7 who docilely did what Eitler ordered1 Big business survived and flourished in a fashion under the NaHis but the word ??underI must be em4hasiHed1 Men of business either became NaHified and made their 4eace with the #arty as did Gustav Bru44 or fled the country as did Thyssen1 A few such as 8chacht 4layed a small 4rudent role in the FesistanceC others li7e 6un7 ,ust went along1 8ome of the directors of the large firms were 4ro-NaHi including directors of 8iemens I1 G1 6arben Bru44 and several Eamburg shi44ing com4anies1 These firms1 6un7 said in (*)) raised seven million mar7s for the #arty1*% This amount however was raised after Eitler was .hancellor and 6un7 calculated that big business as a whole contributed three billion mar7safter the 6uehrer was established in 4owerto the Adolf Eitler 84ende a fund used for the relief of the 4oor and indigent of whom there had been millions until unem4loyment began to be whittled down1 :n 6ebruary &+ (*)0 I1 G1 6arben gave /$$ $$$ FM to the National Trust =Nationale Treuhan)> which was to be administered by 8chacht as trustee and on 8e4tember )$ (*)% the same concern made Eitler a 4resent of 0$$ $$$ FM for use in the 8udetenland after it had been returned to the Feich1 Eitler 4resented this money to the 8udeten Felief 6und1 Eitler actually did not li7e industrialists any more than he li7ed generals1 The Feichswirtschaftsrat a council of re4resentative industrialists who were su44osed to advise the Government on economic matters had but one meet-

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page_2 3 #age &0) ing1 In the thirties the 6uehrer invited 4rominent businessmen and their wives to a rece4tion and concert once a year only1 These occasions were 7nown to the initiates as ??money arias I and every guest who attended had to 4ledge a contribution1 Those invited gave u4 to ($$ $$$ FM each and on one occasion the collection came to over three million mar7s1 ** :nly one industrialist bal7ed at the strong-arm measures and 6un7 said that the #arty too7 immediate re4risals against himC for once the NaHis came into 4ower no business could be carried on without government a44roval and license1 !conomic chambers e<isted in each Gau and first 8chacht then 6un7 controlled foreign trade while Goering as Minister -ithout #ortfolio for the 6our-;ear #lan devoted his energies s4ecifically to organiHing German industry for war1 As many economists have 4ointed out the German economy before Eitler came to 4ower was ready to be ta7en over by a strong man1($$ "nder the -eimar Fe4ublic 4rices of raw materials were controlledC government loans or as it turned out gifts were made to the owners of great estates in !ast #russiaC 7ey 4ublic utilities tele4hone telegra4h the railroads gas and water su44lies were government-ownedC agriculture was bolstered by subsidies and tariffsC government funds were made available to 4rivate ban7s that had no ca4ital left after the (*&) inflationC and the ban7s in turn controlled much of German 4rivate industry1 The great vertical trusts the & 0$$ cartels the labor unions far more 4owerful than those in the "nited 8tates all loo7ed to the 8tate to revive the economy after the inflation was followed within a few years by the de4ression1 After -orld -ar I Germany had lost () 4er cent of its territory +/ 4er cent of its iron ore &' 4er cent of its coal1 Its entire merchant fleet all vessels of more than ( '$$ tons dis4lacement had been ta7en by the Allies as had a @uarter of its fishing fleetC 0$$$ locomotives and (0$ $$$ railway cars had been surrenderedC all Germany?s colonies had been given u41 Added to everything else the Feich was saddled with the re4arations including the costs of the occu4ying Allied troo4s1 Dohn Maynard Beynes estimated that Germany was called on to 4ay about three times more than its utmost ca4acity1 ($( -ith 4roblems of these dimensions before them everyone from the wor7er out of a ,ob to the industrialists loo7ed to the Government whether Bruening was its head or Eitler1 6un7 and his friends wanted what a later economist would call IorganiHed ca4italism1I Its organiHation led some of the best-7nown firms in the Feich to em4loy slave and concentration-cam4 wor7ers and it brought about such voluntary associations as the .ircle of 6riends of Eeinrich Eimmler1 This circle which included among its members the head of the #otash 8yndicate and other ma,or industrialists 4ut millions of mar7s at the dis4osal of the Feichsfuehrer 881 The donors neither e<4ected nor received any accounting of the funds? use1 -itnesses in the 6lic7 trial testified that businessmen offered large sums to become members of the circle but such re@uests were refusedC it was a closed circle1 Being a IfriendI of Eimmler

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page_2 4 #age &0/ brought not only 4restige but 4ractical advantages such as allocations of concentration-cam4 wor7ers when labor became very scarce1 The 6riends met every second Monday in Berlin and attendance records were sent to Eimmler1 The money given the Feichsfuehrer was used for e<4enses he could not finance out of his own official budget1 The grou4 visited Dachau in (*)+ and the Eigh .ommand head@uarters in (*/)1 In return for their largesse some of them received high ran7s in the 881 Baron von 8chroeder for e<am4le became a Brigadefuehrer the 88 e@uivalent of a brigadier generalC :tto 8teinbrinc7 who had been a submarine officer in -orld -ar I and was now an im4ortant figure in the coal industry held the same ran71 ($& The .ircle of 6riends had originally been an advisory grou4 that was su44osed to hel4 the 6uehrer 4lan measures against unem4loyment but it was diverted to 4artici4ate in Eimmler?s manifold hobbies1 :n May % (*/& 8chroeder gave Eimmler one million mar7s on behalf of the 6riends for his use for ??scientificI 4ur4oses1 Eimmler than7ed him for his generosity and said that the Baron 7new he could not ma7e 4lans for more than three days ahead but he ho4ed to be able to get to the ne<t evening meeting1 -hen Eimmler became Feichsinnenminister 8chroeder congratulated him on August &+ (*/) e<4ressing his ,oy on the occasion which he further brightened by sending another million mar7s from the .ircle of 6riends1 The sum was contributed by 8iemens I1 G1 6arben the Middle German 8teelwor7s the Deutsche Ban7 the 4etroleum grou4 and others1($) By A4ril / (*/) the .ircle had forty-four members and although the secretary had to note that Eimmler had been away for two years he added that a good many meetings had been held in his absence and all sorts of enlightening tal7s had been given1 Eis re4ort of that evening sent on to Eimmler said that one 88 man had told of his e<4eriences and then everyone had had dinnerC included was a list of those absent and the information that thirty-eight invitations had been issued and that a man named Bingel had been absent eight timesC .ount von Bismarc7 three timesCFheinhart chairman of the board of directors of the .ommerH Ban7 twelve timesC an 88 ma,or general eleven timesC an 88 brigadier general twenty-three timesC and 8ecretary of 8tate Bleimann thirty-one times1($/ -hen the grou4 was first formed on his behalf Eimmler had e<4lained that he lac7ed funds for various cultural 4ur4oses in which he was interested as well as for benefactions and for certain emergencies1 In accord with the cultural 4rogram lecturers came not only from the ran7s of the 88 but from men who had climbed or were e<4erts on the Eimalayas e<cavators ethnologists historians who told of their research on the life of Eenry the 9ion and .harles the Great archeologists who re4orted on their diggings in the 9ueneburg Eeath1 Eimmler needed money for all this cultural activity and for the advancement of science as well for he was interested in many 7inds of research from the torture e<4eriments in the concentration cam4s to a brandnew and wildly im4lausible theory on the Ice Age1

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page_2 #age &00 The NaHis once they came to 4ower ruled with a heavy handalthough they had said they wanted merely to direct the economy not administer it1 Thyssen failed to attend a meeting called by GoeringC he left the country instead1 8uch meetings were not called com4ulsory but Thyssen had ta7en the only other road if one did not choose to show his solidarity with the 4ur4oses of the #arty1 After he left Germany Thyssen?s 4ro4erty was confiscated and when the NaHis eventually caught u4 with him he was 4ut in a concentration cam4 where he remained until the American forces arrived1 6un7 ac7nowledged his guilt at Nuremberg1 Ee said ??I 4laced the will of the 8tate before my own conscience and my inner sense of duty1I ($0 This statement sums u4 well what he did and wherein his guilt lay1 Ee was found guilty of having ta7en 4art in waging aggressive warfare and of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity1 Ee had aided in the e<4loitation of occu4ied territories and had 4artici4ated indirectly in the slave-labor o4erations both by lending money to Eimmler and by being a member of the .entral #lanning Board1 But as the court said he was never a dominant figure and it was this that saved him from the hangman1 Ee was sentenced to life im4risonment1 In 84andau he read Banthis real 4resent concern he said in (*/+and he and 84eer wor7ed in the garden and washed the laundry of the other 4risoners1 Ee had diabetes but American doctors were doing well treating it and told him he could live to be a hundred1 In 4rison he said he thought he should never have acce4ted the ,ob as head of the !conomics Ministry because it was against his nature1 And when nature is assaulted in this fashion he added she revenges herself1 Eis wife he told his interrogator =Bem4ner> in (*/+ lived in a small inn in a small townC all their worldly wealth had been ta7en or stolen from them1($' !very two months he could tal7 to a visitor a44roved by the 4rison authorities in the 4resence of two guards for fifteen minutes1 Ee could write and receive every four wee7s one letter of no more than ()$$ words1($+ But his luc7 turned in the (*0$?s1 The 84ruch7ammer 4roceedings in (*/+ had confiscated all his 4ro4erty valued at 0*$ (%) DM in August (*/*1 During the 4roceedings he had not been heard in his own defense because of his enforced confinement in 84andau1 The Allied 4rison authorities would not 4ermit him to leave the 4rison to testify nor would they give his lawyer 4ermission to visit him for the conversation would have had to do with the Nuremberg trial which was a forbidden sub,ect1 Eis lawyer in the German .ourt of A44eals Eans Fechenberg succeeded in getting the ,udgment reversed in (*0+ by 4leading that 6un7 was actually a 4risoner of war and therefore his 4ro4erty could not be confiscated1 6un7 was an inmate of a military 4rison after having been tried by an international military court1 6urthermore when he had been arrested he had been immediately classified by his American ca4tors as a 4risoner of war and given a number as such1 The A44ellate .ourt agreed with Fechenberg?s argument and reversed the

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page_2 ! #age &0' decision of the 84ruch7ammer 4roceedings1 In the same year (*0+ 6un7 was released from 84andau because of ill healththree years before his death1 6un7 was another of those middle-class correct time servers who were caught in the s4iritual and intellectual chaos of 4ost--orld -ar I Germany1 Ee came late to the #arty but he never had any criticisms to ma7e of its doctrines which he li7ed to thin7 could be ada4ted to the more civiliHed 4ur4oses he had in mind1 Eis 4en and glib ,ournalistic formulations were 4laced at the service of Eitler because 6un7 saw no one else who could rescue the Feich from ban7ru4tcy and communism1 Ee was a wea7 not very intelligent man and he gladly went along with a movement that included him among those who held high office and received 4rincely gifts1 :nce the structure colla4sed he could readily see how ,erry-built it had been which is what every o44ortunist observes when his ho4eful 4lans go wrong1 Notes (1 N TII 41 &($1 &1 Eenri Bertrand Le )octeur Schacht =#aris: Gallimard (*)*>1 )1 E,almar 8chacht (leine Bekenntnisse =#rivate 4rinting (*/*>1 /1 E,almar 8chacht as En)e )er /e2arationen =:ldenburg: Gerhard 8talling (*)(> 441 &*)$1 01 E,almar 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens =Bad -oerishofen: Bindler R 8chiermeyer Gerlag (*0)> 41 *1 '1 8chacht 84ruch7ammer 8tuttgart Gol1 III 41 /% =IAG>1 +1 N*A GII !.-/0$ 441 0$&*1 %1 N TII 441 (%% ff1 *1 N*A GII !.-&*+-A 441 )*//$&1 8chacht 84ruch7ammer 8tuttgart =IAG>1 ($1 N*A GII !.-/)) 441 /%'*/1 ((1 8chacht 84ruch7ammer 8tuttgart Gol1 I =IAG>1 (&1 .bi)1 Gol1 IG 41 /0%1 ()1 !arl F1 Bec7 +er)ict on Schacht =Tallahassee: 6lorida 8tate "niversity #ress (*00> 441 +0+'1 (/1 Buchheim et al.= o2. cit1 Gol1 II 41 )&$1 (01 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens 441 /%(%&1 Faul Eilberg The estruction of the Euro2ean %e,s =.hicago: Suadrangle Boo7s (*'(> 41 *+1 Bec7 o2. cit1 441 +0+' ()())1 ocuments on 6erman "oreign -olicy= 787H789? 8eries D Gol1 G =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice> Document ''(1 8chacht 84ruch7ammer 8tuttgart Gol1 I 41 &&) Gol1 II 441 /)' /+' =IAG>1 ('1 Bec7 o2. cit1 (+1 6ranH Feuter Schacht =8tuttgart and Berlin: Deutsche Gerlagsanstalt (*)+> 441 (()(/1 (%1 6ritH Thyssen . -ai) Hitler =New ;or7: 6arrar R Fhinehart Inc1 (*/(> 41 ())1

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page_2 " #age &0+ (*1 8chacht interrogation Duly )( (*/+ =NA>1 &$1 6ritH Blein ??Neue okumente 0ur /olle Schachts bei )er +orbereitung )er Hitler)iktatur I in Ceitschrift fuer 6eschichts,issenschaft Gol1 G No1 / (*0+ 441 %(%&&1 &(1 N*A GI )*$(-#8 441 +*'*%1 &&1 N*A GII !.-/0' 441 0(&()1 &)1 N*A GI D-&$( 41 ($%$1 .bi)1 D-&$/ 41 ($%01 N*A GII !./)* 441 0$(&1 &/1 Bec7 o2. cit1 41 /)1 &01 Gerhard 91 -einberg ISchachts Besuch in )en &SA im %ahre (*)) I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TI No1 & (*') 441 (''%$1 &'1 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens 41 )*(1 &+1 -illiam !1 Dodd Ambassa)or o))As iary (*))(*)% =New ;or7: Earcourt Brace R -orld Inc1 (*/(> 441 /01 &%1 .ordell Eull The Memoirs of *or)ell Hull Gol1 I =New ;or7: The Macmillan .om4any (*/%> 441 &)+)%1 &*1 Bec7 o2. cit1 41 /&1 6ranH Fenter o2. cit1 441 (&%)(1 N*A GII !.-/)+ 441 /*0**1 N*A III (('%#8 441 %&+)$1 )$1 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens 41 /$$1 E,almar 8chacht Abrechnung mit Hitler =Eamburg and 8tuttgart: Fowohlt Gerlag (*/%> 441 %0%'1 )(1 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens 41 /$(1 )&1 N*A III (('%-#8 441 %&+)$1 ))1 Bec7 o2. cit1 41 0*1 )/1 N*A GII !.-'(( 441 0%*'$&1 )01 .bi)1 !.-(&% 41 '$$1 )'1 Bec7 o2. cit1 )+1 8chacht 84ruch7ammer 8tuttgart Gol1 I 41 (% =IAG>1 )%1 N TTTGI /(0-!. 41 /%%1 )*1 .bi)1 /))-!. 441 0$&(&1 Also N*A GII !.-/)) 441 /%'*/1 /$1 NG-/$'+ @uoted in Eilberg o2. cit1 41 &(1 /(1 N*A GII !.-/0$ 441 0$)*1 /&1 .bi)1 !./0( 441 0$*($1 /)1 .bi)1 !.-0$$ 41 0+%1 //1 .bi)1 !.-0$( 441 0+*%)1 /01 .bi)1 !.-&*+-A 441 )*//$&1 /'1 Amos !1 8im4son IThe 8truggle for the .ontrol of the Germany !conomy (*)')+ I in %ournal of Mo)ern History (*0* 441 )+/01 N*A III ()$(-#8 441 %+*%&1 /+1 8im4son o2. cit1 Bec7 o2. cit1 41 %01 Eans B1 Gisevius Bis 0um bitteren En)e Gol1 I =Aurich: 6retH R -asmuth Gerlag (*/'> 41 &((1 N TTTIII 4 0'&1 /%1 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens 41 /+)1 /*1 Bec7 o2. cit1 0$1 N TTTII )+&/-#8 41 0)%1 0(1 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens 441 0(0(+1 Bec7 o2. cit1 41 (/'1 0&1 8chacht I: %ahre meines Lebens 41 0)&1 0)1 N*A GI )+$$-#8 441 /$/01 0/1 8chacht I: %ahres meines Lebens 441 0&+&*1 001 Bec7 o2. cit1

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page_2 # #age &0% 0'1 N*A GI )+&+-#8 41 /%$1 0+1 .bi)1 )+&%-#8 41 /%01 0%1 .bi)1 )+&%-#8 41 /%+1 0*1 .bi)1 )+&*-#8 41 0$'1 '$1 .bi)1 )+&*-#8 41 0&*1 '(1 .bi)1 )+&+-#8 41 /%)1 '&1 .bi)1 )+&%-#8 41 /*(1 ')1 .bi)1 )+&+-#8 41 /%(1 '/1 .bi)1 )+&%-#8 41 /%+1 '01 .bi)1 )+&%-#8 441 /%**(1 ''1 .bi)1 )+&*-#8 41 0$/1 '+1 .bi)1 )+&*-#8 41 0$'1 '%1 .bi)1 )+&*-#8 41 0((1 '*1 N*A II 41 +/$1 +$1 N*A G &/$*-#8 41 %)1 +(1 N I 41 )($1 +&1 Fobert E1 Dac7son Fe4ort to the #resident in The Ne, 'ork Times :ctober (' (*/'1 +)1 %ackson /e2ort 41 &0/1 +/1 8chwerin von Brosig7 o2 cit1 441 (*(*&1 +01 T!* I1 G1 6arben GII 441 (+&+)1 +'1 .bi)1 41 00%1 ++1 #aul :estreich !alther "unk= ein Leben fuer )ie !irtschaft =Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*/$> 41 '%1 +%1 6un7 interrogation of November 0 (*/0 =NA>1 +*1 6un7 interrogation at Ashcan Detention .enter of Dune &% (*/0 =IAG>1 %$1 A1 Eeinrichsbauer Sch,erin)ustrie un) -olitik =!ssenBettwig: -est Gerlag (*/*>1 %(1 N TTTII )0$0-#8 441 )/'/+1 .bi)1 )0))-#8 441 )0/001 %&1 -alther 6un7 !irtschaftsor)nung gegen !aehrungsmechanismus =Boenigsberg (*//>1 %)1 -alther 6un7 as ,irtschaftliche 6esicht )es neuen Euro2a =Berlin: Danuary (0 (*/&>1 -alther 6un7 !irtschaftsor)nung im neuen Euro2a Fede gehalten vor der 8uedosteuro4agesellschaft in -ien on Dune (& (*/( =Gienna: 8uedost-!cho Gerlagsgesellschaft (*/(>1 %/1 -alther 6un7 6run)sact0e )er )eutschen Aussenhan)els2olitik un) )as -roblem )er internationalen +erschul)ung s4eech given in Bremen on Dune (' (*)% =Berlin: Dun7er und Duennhau4t Gerlag (*)%>1 6un7 as ,irtschaftliche 6esicht )es neuen Euro2a1 %01 6un7 interrogation at Ashcan Detention .enter of Dune &% (*/0 =IAG>1 %'1 N TIII 441 0%$%( '$&)1 %+1 N*A 8u441 A )*//-#8 441 '+$+(1 .bi)1 )*/+-#8 441 '+0+'1 %%1 N TTTIG /$/0-#8 441 (($()1 %*1 88 &(&0 letter of Duly &( (*/& =BD.>1 *$1 N TIII 441 (+*%$1 *(1 I /&(0)/ 6un7 interrogation of Dune / (*/0 =BD.>1 *&1 N TTGIII (%('-#8 441 /**0/$1

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page_2 $ #age &0* *)1 N T9 Document 6un7-( 441 (%)%%1 .bi)1 Document 6un7-& 441 (%%%*1 */1 .bi)1 6un7-(0 441 (*'*%1 Also 6un7 84ruch7ammer testimony by Annemarie 8chlusnus and 6rau Buennec7e of 8e4tember (0 (*0' =Munich: Amtsgericht>1 *01 I /&(0)/ letter of November ) (*)/ =BD.>1 *'1 6un7 interrogation at Ashcan Detention .enter of Dune &% (*/0 =IAG>1 *+1 8chweitHer o2. cit1 *%1 6un7 interrogation at Ashcan Detention .enter of Dune &% (*/0 =IAG>1 **1 .bi)1 6un7 84ruch7ammer #ietHsche affidavit of 6ebruary &) (*0) =Munich: Amtsgericht>1 ($$1 Gustav 8tol4er eutsche !irtschaft (%+$(*/$ =8tuttgart: 6ranH-Mittelbach Gerlag (*0$>1 9ouis #1 9ochner Tycoons an) Tyrant =.hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*0/>1 ($(1 8tol4er o2. cit1 41 %*1 ($&1 T!* 6lic7 GI 41 &+%1 ($)1 .bi)1 441 &'*+$1 ($/1 .bi)1 41 &''1 ($01 N TIII 41 (&$1 ($'1 6un7 interrogation May (* (*/+ =IAG>1 ($+1 6un7 84ruch7ammer Eeinrich Eoffmann Dr1 =Munich: Amtsgericht>1

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page_2!0 #age &'$ + The 9aw -ilhelm 6ric7 Aside from Eess the only one among the defendants at Nuremberg who failed to ta7e the stand to e<4lain his 4ast was the former Minister of the Interior -ilhelm 6ric7 one of the most notable among the early National 8ocialists1 -hile still an official in the Munich 4olice de4artment he too7 a leading 4art in the attem4ted 4utsch of November (*&) and wore the highest of #arty honor badges the Blutor)en for his services on that historic occasion1 6ric7 had been head of the 4olitical section of the Munich 4olice until (*&) when he too7 over the criminal section1 It was he who had ordered the 4olice not to intervene when Eitler 4roclaimed the revolution on November %1 There were too few 4olice he told his subordinates to attem4t to 4ut down the u4risingC they should do no more than act as observers and see that order was maintained1 Eitler had assigned 6ric7 to wor7 with former Munich #olice #resident !rnst #oehner to ta7e over 4olice head@uarters on behalf of the revolution1 But before 6ric7 could actindeed hours before Eitler began his march on the 6eldherrnhalleboth 6ric7 and #oehner were arrested1 !verything went wrong with the 4utsch1 Although Eitler announced that both the Feichswehr and the 4olice were already serving under the swasti7a neither one showed the slightest inclination to ,oin the u4rising1 6ric7 was already in ,ail at seven o?cloc7 on the morning of November * the time he had been ordered to ta7e over the 4olice1 Ee s4ent four months in 4rison while he was being interrogated1 Ee then was tried along with Eitler 9udendorff and the other members of the high command and was given a sentence

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page_2!1 #age &'( later sus4ended of one year and three months1 The court dealt in lenient fashion with these fanatics of a new orderno doubt im4ressed by the 4resence of 9udendorff and also by their nationalist idealism and their resolve to rescue Germany even by illegal means from its tumults and sorrows1 Ead the revolt been successful 6ric7 was to have been made #olice #resident of Munich a 4ost that u4 to that time had seemed the most daHHling to which he could as4ire1 6ric7 the 4olice official was a devoted if cry4to-National 8ocialist from the earliest days of the #arty when as he said during his and Eitler?s trial he and #oehner could hold a 4rotecting hand over the 6uehrer and the movement1 ( At least once 6ric7 was able on his own authority to free Eitler from 4olice custody after he had been arrested1 Because of the ,ob he held with the 4olice 6ric7 formally was not a #arty memberC he ,oined officially only in (*&0 when the #arty was reconstituted after Eitler?s release from the 9andsberg 4rison1 Eitler however had won his su44ort the first time 6ric7 met him in #oehner?s office which the 6uehrer was visiting on one of his many errands to get hel4 to confound the .ommunist #arty =this time he had wanted a .ommunist 4ublication forbidden>1 Both 6ric7 and #oehner were strongly rightist as were most of their colleagues and their su4eriors in the various Bavarian Government agencies1 They hated communism and 4arties that fought it immediately won their su44ort1 6ric7?s develo4ing allegiance to the NaHis was readily tolerated by conservatives such as Bavarian Minister #resident Gustav Fitter von Bahr who was a monarchist1 "nli7e 6ric7 and #oehner Bahr was willing to hel4 the NaHis only u4 to a certain 4ointC when the revolt started he ,oined the forces that 4ut it down1 6ric7 was made for the #arty and the #arty for him1 Ee was an active and methodical man and was as convinced of the need for the revolution as any of the street brawlers in the 8A1 Ee brought the order and the !uer)e of the trained German bureaucrat to the #arty hierarchy1 No ??TI was uncrossed in his memoranda no III without a dot1 The laws and decrees he would one day draw u4 had staying 4ower1 As his #arty biogra4her said of him he drafted the basic laws Iclassical in form and with e4ochma7ing contents I under which the other bureaucrats of the National 8ocialist state could o4erate with the good conscience that everything they did was legally im4eccable1& In (*/) when the 6inal 8olution was in full 4rogress 6ric7 could issue a decree in effect 4lacing Dews outside the law and turning them over to the Gesta4oC this decree was based on a law he had drawn u4 and signed in 8e4tember (*)0 before the li@uidation of the Dews had been dreamed of1 6ric7 was of 4easant stoc7 as his admirers never tired of 4ointing out when he was introduced at #arty gatheringsC Isound healthy 4easant stoc7 I was the 4hrase1 Ee was born on March (& (%++ in AlsenH in the #alatinate the son of a schoolteacher and a farmer?s daughter Eenriette 8chmidt1 Ee attended the +olksschule and Gymnasium at Baiserslautern then studied

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page_2!2 #age &'& law at the universities of Munich Goettingen and BerlinC he wrote his doctor?s thesis at Eeidelberg where he got his degree in (*$(1 Eis dissertation on the com4licated Bavarian laws dealing with the formerly 4rivately run mail service was never 4ublished because 6ric7 could not afford to 4ay for the 4rinting1 Thus his highly 4riHed doctor?s title could be @uestioned by strict constructionists of academic re@uirements1 Ee was something of an athlete in his cautious way cautious 4ossibly because his constitution was not robust1 =Ee had a wea7 chest his biogra4her later wrote to e<4lain why he had not fought in -orld -ar I1 But he swam and rowed and snowshoed his admiring chronicler also 4ointed outC he was an eminent man but a regular fellow1> Eis life was ordered around his stac7s of 4a4ers1 Ee often wor7ed from eight in the morning until midnight ungrudgingly1 ) 6ric7 4racticed law 4rivately for three years before ta7ing a 4ost in the Munich 4olice de4artment where from (*$/ to (*$+ he dealt with economic crimes1 Ee then got a ,ob in the .ounty 9egal Division as an assessor an assistant Lan)rat where he s4ent most of the war years1 -hen a socialist critic as7ed him later why he had not been a soldier he 4iously e<4lained that he had done his duty where his Bavarian Bing had 4ut him which is to say he continued at his legal tas7s and was 4ut in charge of handing out the ration boo7s1 There were no scandals in his administrative 4recincts1 Ee filled out forms drew u4 the com4licated legal documents German administrators delight in and awaited the victory1 Ee remained in this ,ob for ten years then returned after the war to the 4olitical section of the 4olice directorate at Munich1 Ee e<4erienced as a 4ersonal affront the riots in the streets of Munich that followed the defeat of Germany1 They were an unwarranted attac7 on his carefully 4reserved order of files and documented security where everything had its 4ro4er 4lace and only needed a 4racticed hand to bring it to light to annotate it and to file it again among the other elaborately 4hrased and 4aragra4hed formulations that 7e4t the world tidy1 At the time of the Faetere4ubli7 when a .ommunist government ruled Munich from mid-A4ril to May (*(* 6ric7 the 4oliceman was on their list of hostages1 Ee was luc7yC ten 4eo4le who were ta7en as hostages were shot in the courtyard of the 9uit4old Gymnasium before the revolt was 4ut down1 6ric7 came to 7now a good deal about the 6uehrer and his National 8ocialists when they a44lied to the 4olice for 4ermits to hold their meetings1 As he became better ac@uainted with Eitler he 7new that this man had many of the answers he and the staggering -eimar Fe4ublic had been loo7ing forC here was the 4erson to build the strong state where .ommunists and 9eftwing demagogues would be 4ut in their 4lace which was ,ail1 Always a man of strict duty 6ric7 7new the im4ortance of 4ro4er draftsmanshi4 on behalf of the great goals of the National 8ocialist 8tate1 At Nuremberg after he was sentenced he said:

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page_2!3 #age &') I have a clear conscience 1 1 1 My entire life was s4ent in the service of my 4eo4le and my fatherland1 To them I have devoted the best of my strength in the loyal fulfillment of my duty1 I am convinced that no 4atriotic American or citiHen of any other country would have acted differently in my 4lace 1 1 1 6or to have acted any differently would have been a breach of my oath of allegiance and high treason1 In fulfilling my legal and moral duties I believe that I have deserved 4unishment no more than have the tens of thousands of faithful German civil servants and officals in the 4ublic service who have already been detained in cam4s for over a year merely because they did their duty1 I feel in duty and honor bound as a former long-standing 4ublic minister to remember them here in gratitude1 / Ee had drawn u4 his administrative charts regulations decrees and laws as he 7new they should a44ear with no loo4holes no overla44ings and with an eye to the future1 Ee recogniHed two authorities com4etent to decide their own 4rinci4les: one was the 8tate when it was 4urged of its nonGerman afflictionsC the other was his own bureaucratic conscience which was strict within its de4artmental limits but never found itself in conflict with any decision of the 6uehrer?s1 Eitler in turn could for years ma7e good use of this devoted technician1 In Mein (am2f he mentioned 6ric7 and #oehner as the only two men in government 4ositions who had the right to collaborate in the establishment of a Bavarian nation1 ??They alone I Eitler said Ihad the courage to be Germans first and then officials1I0 9i7e his ,urist colleague Eans 6ran7 6ric7 resisted the machinations of such savage rivals as Eimmler and Eeydrich =both of whom for a time were technically subordinate to him>1 -hen they flouted his authority while carrying out their own s4ecial and murderous missions and 4ursued their em4ire building what they did became illegal a threat to the high 4ur4oses of the new order1 Eitler never lost his 4owerful attraction for him1 :nly one month after being sentenced for his 4art in the (*&) u4rising 6ric7 ran for a seat in the Feichstag and he was one of the four down-the-line National 8ocialist de4uties elected1 The #arty had been formally dissolved but the cry4toNational 8ocialists and their allies of the German 6ol7ish #arty =Deutsche Goel7ische #artei> in an uneasy coalition called the National 8ocialist 6reedom Movement had thirty-two delegates in the Feichstag following the election of May / (*&/ nine of whom were National 8ocialists1 The two elements had in common mainly a sworn enmity to the 4arliamentary system1 The 6reedom Movement delegates had as nominal leader not Adolf Eitler who was in ,ail but Albrecht von Graefe who had none of the talents needed to bind his membershi4 together or to a44eal to the electorate1L In the following election on December + (*&/ the elected delegates from this coalition fell to fourteen one short of the number re@uired to form a recog- L In addition to Graefe 9udendorff and Gregor 8trasser were leading members of the National 8ocialist 6reedom Movement1

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page_2!4 #age &'/ niHed ??fractionI in the Feichstag1 The 6reedom Movement was badly s4litC the members of the 6ol7ish #arty were divided but they felt themselves su4erior in numbers and talents to the remnants of the National 8ocialists1 6rom the beginning 6ric7 echoed Eitler?s words declaring it to be his tas7 in the Feichstag not to su44ort but to undermine the 4arliamentary system1 6ric7 s4o7e with all the assurance of the ideologue who 7nows his cause must trium4h1 I:ur 4artici4ation in the #arliament I he told the Feichstag Idoes not indicate a su44ort but rather an undermining of the 4arliamentary system1 It does not indicate that we renounce our anti4arliamentary attitude but that we are fighting the enemy with his own wea4ons1I ' In (*&/ immediately after his election 6ric7 introduced a bill the first of the racial measures he would 4ro4ose to e<clude Dews from 4ublic office and reduce their 4artici4ation in German economic and 4olitical life1 Fadicals of the Fight made headlines with their incessant attac7s on their world of enemiesC 6ric7 told the Feichstag that behind all re4ublics was nothing more than moneybags1 Ee denounced both the ca4italist e<4loiters and the materialists of the 9eft1 INot the economy but 4olitics is our fate 1 1 1 the creative 6ol7 I he said and he warned the 8#D De4uty Gerhart 8eger I-hen we are in 4ower we will 4ut you all in ,ail1I+ In 6ebruary (*&0 two months after Eitler =who had been released from 4rison ,ust before .hristmas> reestablished his 4arty 6ric7 and the three other NaHi delegates withdrew from the coalition1 The NaHis again began their slow rise to 4ower attracting a few delegates from the other Fight-wing 4arties all of which lac7ed a 4ersonality with the dynamism and forensic 4ower of Eitler1 Eitler determined now to ma7e use of the 4arliamentary system in order to destroy it1 Eis attem4t at revolution through an u4rising had failedC from now on he would ma7e much of legality1 Ee would come to 4ower by ceaseless 4ro4aganda by means that even his enemies must acce4t by recruiting elements from any @uarter 9eft or Fight willing to su44ort his revolution1 A new coalition called the 6ol7ish -or7ing Association =Goel7ische Arbeitsgemeinschaft> was established in Dune and managed to reach the number of fifteen re@uired for a fractionC eleven delegates were from the German 6ol7ish #arty =which gained a member De4uty Best from the German Nationalist #arty> and four were National 8ocialists1 The coalition of the 6ol7ish -or7ing Association dissolved in (*&+1 6ric7 then became undis4uted floor leader of the tiny but now inde4endent NaHi grou4 of seven members and although a 4oor s4ea7er he was the most cons4icuous leader of the anti4arliamentary delegates1 In the election of May &$ (*&% the National 8ocialists now firmly under Eitler?s leadershi4 sent to the /*(-member Feichstag twelve delegatesamong them Goebbels and Goering 6eder and 8trassernot enough for a fraction but more than enough for a noisy 4ro4aganda a44aratus1 In December (*&* 6ric7 was elected Minister of the Interior and !du-

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page_2! #age &'0 cation in Thuringia by a vote of &% to && of the #rovincial Diet1 This was a result of the NaHi u4surge in the Lan) elections in which they 4olled the third largest vote and thus became members of the coalition government1 Eitler chose him to be the first NaHi Minister of a German state and 6ric7 as always was eager to do his duty1 Ee fought tenaciously in Thuringia on behalf of his National 8ocialist 4rinci4les1 Ee dismissed two-thirds of the higher officials in his MinistryC he a44ointed a NaHi racial theorist one Dr1 Eans Guenther to the faculty of the "niversity of Dena overruling the vote of the 4rofessoriatC and he installed another National 8ocialist #aul 8chultHeNaumburg as 4rinci4al of the "nited National Academy of Arts in -eimar1 Ee forbade the 4laying of ??Nigger DaHHI in Thuringian beer halls and restaurants1 Ee introduced NaHi-flavored 4rayers into the school system three of which the 8u4reme .ourt of 9ei4Hig found unconstitutional1L Ee infiltrated the 4olice de4artment with #arty members including a NaHi #resident of #olice in -eimar1 % 6ric7 not only sought to reform Thuringia but also set out to ma7e the 6uehrer a German citiHen1 Eitler had been stateless since (*&/ and in (*&0 he had formally renounced his Austrian citiHenshi4 in the event that he still had it1* Ee therefore could not run for the #residency1 No matter how many millions of roaring followers he collected they had no chance to vote for him1 6ric7 tried first in Bavaria at the end of (*&* but the Bavarians declined to act 4artly on the ground that Eitler had been convicted of high treason1 6ric7 tried again a few months later in Thuringia by a44ointing Eitler as a Gendarmerie .ommissioner in Eildburghausen but the attem4t fell through either because Eitler did not want to become a citiHen by way of the Gendarmerie .ommission or because the 4ressure on the Thuringian authorities to 4revent the fa7e a44ointment was too strong1 6ric7 had made a good case for his 6uehrer citing Eitler?s war record as a frontline fighter for Germany but he had not gone through the right channels1 6ric7 had a44ointed Eitler on his own during the summer when colleagues were on vacation and the Thuringian Minister-#resident as well as the central government of the Feich in the 4erson of the .hancellor Bruening Minister of Defense Groener and 8taatsse7retaer #uender found that 6ric7?s action had not been 4ro4erly a44roved by the constituted authorities1 Eitler therefore still was not a German citiHen1 But the matter was never 4ressedC Eitler had more decorous ways of L :ne called IA #rayer for 6reedom from Betrayal and Treason I becoming a citiHen1 read as follows: I6ather in Eeaven I believe in your com4lete 4ower ,ustice and love1 I believe in my German 4eo4le and fatherland1 I believe that its freedom will come through the 6ather in Eeaven if we believe in our own strengthI =Eans #fundtner r. !ilhelm "rick un) sein Ministerium MMunich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)+N 41 (%%>1 The 4rayers were denounced by both #rotestants and .atholicsC one 4astor wrote: I-e want a German and .hristian education but we 7now no .hristianity without tolerance and a great-hearted mildness and no nationalism without humanityI =Eans 6abricius /eichsinnenminister r. "rickB )er revolutionaere Staatsmann MBerlin: Deutsche Bulturwacht (*)*N>1

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page_2!! #age &'' 6ric7 was forced to resign in A4ril (*)( a victim Eitler said of German treachery1 Eis one-man cam4aign in the Thuringian Government however had created such resistance both in and outside the Lan) that Berlin for a time refused to 4ay the regular subsidies to Thuringia where the ma,ority of the Government and the 9andtag were infuriated with 6ric7?s strong-arm tactics1 Eitler got his citiHenshi4 with the hel4 of 6ric7 in Brunswic7 where a National 8ocialist Minister of the Interior Blagges was a member of the Government on 6ebruary & (*)& when he was made a 8tate .ouncilor by the Budget .ommittee of the 9andtag1 The 6uehrer was formally attached to Brunswic7?s !mbassy in Berlin where he too7 his oath of office on 6ebruary &' swearing to su44ort the constitution of Brunswic7 and of the Feich1 That was the last he saw of the !mbassy1 Eitler?s su44orters had 4ointed out that with his 4olitical connections he could bring new industries to Brunswic7?s sagging economy but he did nothing at all1 Nor did he acce4t his salary of )&$1+$ FM a month but suggested it be given to the unem4loyed1 There had been many attem4ts to ma7e Eitler a citiHen by way of some 7ind of state ,ob1 :ne such 4lan was to have him a44ointed a 4rofessor in the Technische Eochschule and 8taatsminister Blagges said on the 6uehrer?s behalf that he was the author of a basic scientific wor7Mein (am2fas well as the leader of a great 4olitical movement1 Ee would Blagges said bring great 4restige to the faculty1 Blagges was not able to convince the faculty1 ($ 9ong before Eitler came to 4ower 6ric7 was clearly established as one of the foremost NaHis1 A re4ort of the #russian 4olice of (*)$ called him the number-two man of the #arty ran7ing ne<t to the 6uehrer1 Eitler leaned heavily on his 4edantic talents1 6ric7 not only had led the NaHi de4uties in the Feichstag but had been called on by the 6uehrer at critical times to negotiate with the o44osition1 Eitler sent 6ric7 with Goering to 8chleicher when the general wanted to a44oint Gregor 8trasser as Gice-.hancellor in an effort to s4lit the National 8ocialists1 6ric7 favored 8trasser?s acce4ting the 4ost ho4ing in this way to drive a wedge into the Government?s forces but he unconditionally acce4ted Eitler?s refusal to 4ermit a National 8ocialist to enter the 8chleicher .abinet =see #a4en .ha4t1 0>1 6ric7 also accom4anied Eitler during the negotiations with #a4en when the 6uehrer?s coalition government was being discussed and Eitler turned to him for dealing with the leader of the .entrist #arty Monsignor Baas whose votes were needed to give Eitler the full legislative and e<ecutive 4owers of the !nabling Act1 After becoming .hancellor Eitler immediately a44ointed 6ric7 as Minister of the Interior in his .abinet1 Goering as Minister -ithout #ortfolio was the only other National 8ocialist in what Eindenburg and #a4en had convinced themselves was to be a coalition government in which #a4en re4resenting the #resident would be able to veto any e<treme legislation1

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page_2!" #age &'+ 6ric7 4rom4tly called for the enactment of the !nabling 9aw that would mean the end of any legislative or ,udicial control over anything Adolf Eitler decided to do1 The veto was never to be used never could be usedC Eitler moved too @uic7ly and too e<4ertly1 6ric7 was the fanatical technician chosen by the 6uehrer to 4re4are in final legal form the hundreds of documents decrees laws and regulations that would effect the centraliHation and racial revolution of the NaHi 8tate leaving #a4en and all the other conservatives of the coalition no more than hel4less bystanders1 6ar less flamboyant than 6ran7 the wordy theoretician and trial lawyer 6ric7 was the well trained official as well as the #arty whi4 and 4olitical organiHer and he moved in on his tas7 with a cold fervor1 :ne law and decree ordered by Eitler and formulated by 6ric7 followed another: )e facto dissolution of the .ommunist #arty and confiscation of its 4ro4ertyC dissolution of the trades unions and of the 8ocial Democratic #arty and confiscation of its 4ro4ertyC ban on new 4arties or reestablishment of old ones1 :n 6ebruary &% (*)) the day after the Feichstag fire he 4romulgated the law for the #rotection of #eo4le and 8tate which abolished civil rights free assembly and 4rivacy of the mails and tele4hones and 4ermitted house searches without warrants1 A month later on March &/ (*)) 6ric7 signed the !nabling Act the law for !limination of the Misery of the #eo4le and the Feich that gave Eitler the legal right to 4romulgate lawseven if they were unconstitutionalwithout the a44roval of the Feichstag1 6ric7 had 4romised the o44osition de4uties in the Feichstag that they would all be 4ut in ,ail and he now was in a 4osition to carry out his threat1 The decrees he formulated and signed had been in his mind for many yearsC they were 4art of the long-4lanned NaHi legislation and the Dews had not been forgotten1 6ric7 and Eitler on A4ril + (*)) signed the law for the Feestablishment of the #rofessional .ivil 8ervice the first of a series of NaHi formulations that 4rettified and made as 4lausible as 4ossible to the non-NaHi world the onslaughts on the Dews1 The law 4rovided for the retirement from the civil service of non-Aryans and of those whose 4olitical records were dubious1 It was a first ste4 only for with Eindenburg as #resident the 6uehrer and 6ric7 had to tread carefully when former soldiers were involved1 Eindenburg wrote a letter to Eitler on A4ril / (*)) in which he told the Feich .hancellor that his attention had been called to the dismissal from the civil service of Dewish ,udges and lawyers who had fought for Germany1 Ee ob,ected to this and he said it was ??4ersonally insu44ortable I something he could not tolerate in the cases of Dews who had been wounded or who had been frontline soldiers1 Ee told Eitler that if there was no s4ecial reason for the dismissal of such men they should remain in the civil service1 Eitler re4lied res4ectfully on the ne<t day and after 4ointing mechanically to the gross in,ustices Germans had suffered for these many years from the Dews he nevertheless agreed that in view of the #resident?s generous concern for such

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page_2!# #age &'% 4eo4le he would tell 6ric7 that he should draft the law to ta7e care of such cases1 (( As a result the dismissals were to affect no one who had fought for Germany in -orld -ar I or whose father or son had been 7illed in the war nor those who had been in government em4loy before August ( (*(/1 Non-Aryan officials who had been on a government staff since November * (*(% were to be dismissed immediately with three months? salary but they might be given a 4ension of one-third of their salary if they had de4endent relatives1 No 4ension was to be 4aid for less than ten years? service1 This was a 7ey law the first legal ste4 toward the 6inal 8olution1 6ric7 blandly defended it in a s4eech he delivered to the foreign di4lomatic cor4s and news4a4er corres4ondents in Berlin on 6ebruary (0 (*)/1 Ee told them that Germany wanted only to be master in its own houseC that Dews had held too many influential 4ositions in leading 4osts and 4rofessionsC that /% 4er cent of the doctors were Dews 0/ 4er cent of the lawyers %$ 4er cent of the directors of theatersC that they were dis4ro4ortionately im4ortant in business and industry1 Therefore he said foreigners got a wrong im4ression of Germany1 Ee 4ointed out that both the "nited 8tates and Australia had immigration @uotas and that Greece and Tur7ey had e<changed 4o4ulations in (*&) so there was nothing new in what the Germans were trying to do to 4romote the racial homogeneity of their country1 They were not forcing the Dews to migrate but were only reestablishing the civil service in a most generous s4irit1 The way chosen could not have been more legal or more mild1 The Dewish officials had not been thrown out of their ,obs but had been retired with honor and with 4ensions1 The Germans? racial laws were no reflection on other racesC the .hinese had their ancestor worshi4 the Da4anese their ideal of the samurai1 The German 4rogram 6ric7 told his audience was long-rangeonly the 6uehrer would determine when and how the ne<t ste4s would be ta7en1(& 6ric7 was a stern anti-8emite1 In a s4eech in the Feichstag on May &+ (*&/ he @uoted 8treicher?s lurid accounts in er Stuermer of alleged Dewish se<ual crimes as well as the s4urious te<ts 8treicher loved so well1 6rom socalled Talmudic sources he remar7ed that for the Dews the non-Dewish woman was an animal1 6ric7 then 4ro4osed a law to 4rotect German womanhood from the Dews that would forbid mi<ed marriages =ten years later he would sign it>1 Nevertheless officials in 6ric7?s Ministry and 6ric7 himself too7 a relatively liberal 4osition in the anti-8emitic measures 4ro4osed after the NaHis rose to 4ower1 6ric7 was a legalist1 Eis anti-8emitism was orderlyC it was to be construed within limits in a conte<t where racial considerations were 4aramount but where the attitudes of other 4eo4les must also have consideration1 Face was all-im4ortant he told his foreign listeners in (*)/ and in a s4eech he made in 9uebec7 two years later he told his German audience that their conce4t of race was difficult for foreigners to understand1 It was not an article for e<4ort1 The German racial laws were not to be

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page_2!$ #age &'* seen se4arately but as 4art of the National 8ocialist 4hiloso4hy where freedom and honor held a central 4lace in a racially conscious community1 :n 8e4tember (0 (*)0 he signed the law forbidding marriage between Dews and Germans1 No woman under the age of forty-five was 4ermitted to be a servant in a Dewish householdC Dews were not allowed to dis4lay the national flag1 :nly those of German or related Aryan blood could be German citiHens1 Two months later on November (/ Eitler 6ric7 and Eess signed the regulation that determined who was a Dew1 It declared that a Dew was anyone descended from three Dewish grand4arents or from two if he 4racticed the Dewish religion1 The Mischlinge were those with either one or two grand4arents who were racially full Dews1 () These Mischlinge were always to 4resent an insu4erable 4roblem to the National 8ocialist 8tate1 Although 6ric7 declared in an article on race 4ublished in the eutsche %uristen0eitung that the sin7ing of the racial level had been the main cause of the dying out of cultures he nevertheless favored not the e<clusion of but a @uota system for Dews in the universities and technical schools =which the law of A4ril &0 (*)) 4rovided for> and he also 4ointed out to his readers that the Germans were not a 4ure race1 It was this latter argument that 6ric7?s assistants used in ma7ing their case for treating the half-Dews and @uarter-Dews either as a se4arate category or as Germansnot as the e<treme racists demanded as Dews1 :ne elo@uent memorandum from 6ric7?s Ministry written on :ctober (( (*)0 4ointed out that /$ $$$ to /0 $$$ of the &$$ $$$ half-Dews in the Third Feich were eligible for the -ehrmacht1 Many had war decorationsat least one had a #our Ie MJriteand if these Mischlinge were discriminated against the half-Dews who had fought for Germany would be worse off than many foreigners who had fought against the Feich1(/ This 4roblem would 4lague the National 8ocialists until the end1 A later memorandum written during the war by Dr1 Bernhard 9oesener in 6ric7?s Ministry mentioned the case of a first lieutenant a half-Dew who had been recalled to active duty1 Ee had been wounded twice and awarded an Iron .rossC he was now si<tysi< years old and had been threatened with arrest by the 4olice in the town where he lived because he had been seen tal7ing to Aryans on the street and ta7ing wal7s as freely as if he were a German1(0 9oesener re4eated in effect what 6ric7 had writtenthe Germans for centuries had absorbed alien and undesirable blood from the !ast and this Mischlinge grou4 would be the last bearers of the Dewish bloodstream that would enter the German community for marriage between Dews and Germans was now forbidden1 Many of these Mischlinge felt themselves entirely German and 9oesener summing u4 his case for their being recogniHed as Germans said that this solution would silence foreign criticismC it would 4revent families from being torn a4artC it would close the gate to the enormous corru4tion li7ely to follow if local authorities could determine who was a

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page_2"0 #age &+$ DewC it would 4revent the blac7mail that also would surely be 4art of a system where the individual?s racial status was uncertain1 The &$$ $$$ Mischlinge if acce4ted as Germans would be 4ro-German instead of enemies of the Third Feichthis 9oesener cannily 4ointed out made a difference of /$$ $$$ 4eo4le1 The 4roblem was never to be resolved1 !ichmann and others li7e him wanted half-Dews to be considered Dews with the e<ce4tion of those married to .hristians and at a meeting on August * (*/( he said that all others should be steriliHed without e<ce4tion1 (' The battle continued through the entire NaHi 4eriodC every solution was 4rovisional1 In the -ehrmacht a commanding officer often 4rotected the status of the Mischlinge under him against assaults of the racial 4uristsC the more circums4ect referred individual cases to the 6uehrer1 Eitler alone could decide whether a Mischling or in very rare cases even a full Dew was to be officially declared Aryan1 In theory it re@uired a decree from him to ma7e a Mischling eligible as an officer in the -ehrmacht or in the Government and Eitler issued such documents with considerable reluctance1 The files of 6ric7?s Ministry show that ((% Mischlinge soldiers and their wives were declared German on 8e4tember ($ (*/& along with (*+ civilians wor7ing for the Army and +* others1 In addition &0% Mischlinge were declared eligible to be officers and ))* Dews who were so-called 6eltungs>u)en =those with one Aryan grand4arent> were awarded the status of Mischlinge(+ =see .ha4ts1 ($ and (/>1 6ric7?s Ministry was a center of the controversy1 The 9oesener memorandum and others argued that a decision to regard the Mischlinge as Dews would be destructive of the German community1 Ealf of the MischlingeAs biological inheritance was German and their 4arents and grand4arents often had Aryan relatives all of whom would be alienated to some degree by creating such a legal and 4sychological cleavage in their families1 In the discussions in the mid-thirties 6ric7 and 8chacht too7 the same 4osition on behalf of their MinistriesC the Dews must be eliminated from leading 4ositions in the German community but this must be done in a legal and orderly fashion1 The Dewish 4roblem would best be solved in 6ric7?s o4inion by emigration1 Ee also 4ointed out in a dry and ob,ective memorandum that it was unli7ely that Dews would be 4ermitted to enter other countries whether in !uro4e the Near !ast or North America and therefore since the Dews had diminishing economic o44ortunities in Germany the welfare agencies of the Third Feich must 4re4are to carry a vast burden of relief1 The racial laws were e<tended from the civil servants doctors and lawyers to Dews engaged in industry and commerce1 :n 8e4tember &) (*)0 in a conference attended by 6ric7 and 8chacht it was decided that Dews were to be e<cluded from any 4ositions in industry re@uiring s4ecial confidenceC Dewish a44rentices could only wor7 for Dewish firmsC only German citiHens could hold leading 4ositions in German economic life1(% The consensus of the meeting was that Mischlinge in industry were to be regarded as Germans

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page_2"1 #age &+( and the conferees o44osed the widely used 4lacards announcing that Dews were not wanted in 4ublic 4laces and also the attem4t to e<clude Dews from theaters1 9i7e many other German men ine<orably bent on high 4ur4oses 6ric7 thought the Nuremberg 9aws not only essential for Germany but good for the Dews1 They gave the Dews legal status within the German 8tate which had the same right 6ric7 said as all other states to determine who should be a citiHen and who not1 -ith the Feich?s officialdom ??restored I that is 4urged of Dews and the legal measures ta7en to rid the 8tate of any o44osition the 9aw for 8ecuring the "nity of #arty and 8tate too7 the last ideological ste41 8igned on December ( (*)) it declared that the National 8ocialist #arty was the bearer of the conce4t of the 8tate and was inse4arable from it1 6ric7 had underwritten the revolution1 The doctrine that the #arty controls the 8tate not the other way around was establishedC civil liberties were abolished as were o44osition 4artiesC and the final attac7 on the Dews which would de4rive them not only of certain 4roscribed 4ositions but of any ,obs at all and finally of their lives and 4ro4erty had been mounted1 In (*)) and (*)/ 6ric7 signed &)0 laws and decreesC he could a44oint or dismiss any mayorC he had turned the regular German 4olice formerly divided by regions into a networ7 controlled from BerlinC he had made the use of warrants for arrests and house searches unnecessaryC and the way was 4re4ared for the Gesta4o and the 4olice state that 6ric7 o44osed only when he was not the chief 4oliceman1 :n Dune (& (*)/ he issued the only directive to which his counsel at Nuremberg could 4oint that defended the legal 4rinci4les which must have concerned him before the war1 I#rotective custodyI had been introduced by the Gesta4oC this device li7e so many NaHi inventions or ada4tations was named so as to seem designed for the benefit of its victims1 Almost as soon as Goering founded the Gesta4o it could at any time and without a warrant 4lace under 4rotective arrest anyone who endangered the 8tate or who because of antisocial activities might be endangered by the indignant healthy racial sense of the community retaliating against them1 :ne such arrest that disturbed 6ric7 involved a lawyer re4resenting a widow whose husband was murdered during the Foehm 4utsch and who could not collect her insurance because the victim had allegedly committed suicide1 The lawyer in order to bring 4ressure on the insurance com4any had to go before a 84ruch7ammer =the e@uivalent of an American trial court> and charge that the man had in fact not committed suicide but had been 7illed during the 4urge1 The lawyer was arrested by the Gesta4o and 4laced in 4rotective custody1 :ther similar cases distressed 6ric7 for he felt his authority challenged and an order of March (( (*)/ for which of course he had to get Eitler?s a44roval stated his 4osition1 The order declared that a 4erson might be 4laced in 4rotective custody only if his behavior immediately endangered 4ublic safetyC this form of arrest was not to be em4loyed

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page_2"2 #age &+& against 4eo4le who were ma7ing use of civil or 4ublic law or against lawyers re4resenting their clients? interests or against anyone for 4ersonal or economic reasons such as against a 4erson who wanted an increase in salary1 6ric7 e<4ressly rescinded the 4revious regulations 4ermitting such arrests on the orders of district 4oliceC 4olitical arrests for the 4ur4ose of 4rotective custody could now be made only by higher officials and every case was to come to 6ric7?s attention1 ??In the future I he wrote II will relentlessly 4unish the abuse of arrest1I (* It was a bold move to assert his authority but it had little effect1 6ric7 a44ointed to 4olice assignments under his Ministry of the Interior or a44roved the a44ointments of both Eeinrich Eimmler and Feinhard EeydrichC soon they li7e the Gesta4o =ta7en from the Ministry of the Interior in November (*))> sli44ed away from his authority1 6or a time Eimmler signed letters as coming from 6ric7?s Ministry but by (*)' as Feichsfuehrer 88 he became virtually inde4endent1 The secret 4olice as Goering and later Eimmler argued 4ersuasively with the 6uehrer needed to be free of any de4artment controlsC they had to smite the enemies of #arty and 8tate without regard to such 4ettifogging measures as 6ric7 had in mind with his March (*)/ decree1 Eitler agreedC he would tolerate no legal 4aragra4hs or reactionary notions of the rights of the accused that could interfere with ma7ing his enemies harmless1 6ric7 was defeated in his effort to bring a legal code into the methods of the secret 4olice but he clearly had no consuming interest in the 4light of those arrested1 :ther laws he signed abolishing civil rights and confiscating 4ro4erty for racial or 4olitical reasons were measures stri44ing the 4o4ulation or undesirable 4arts of it of 4ersonal and 4ro4erty rights1 :nly in the case of this one law did 6ric7 a44ear as a defender of the German legal tradition1 The chief witness called on his behalf at Nuremberg Eans Gisevius said that 6ric7 had been a44alled by the murders at the time of the Foehm 4utsch in Dune (*)/C but there was no doubt that 6ric7 together with Eitler and the Minister of Dustice had signed the law of Duly ) (*)/ that declared the e<ecutions on that occasion legitimate Ifor the self-defense of the 8tate1IL&$ The 4ortrait of 6ric7 that Gisevius and 6ric7?s lawyer :tto #annenbec7er 4resented at Nuremberg was that of a devoted administrator with essentially humanitarian 4rinci4les an official having no real 4ower but functioning under the orders handed down by Eitler and Goering a man doing his feeble best to 4rotect the innocent and to carry out his assignments in the whirl4ool of a 4ermanent revolution1 Gisevius said 6ric7 even disclosed to him in (*)/ that a Gesta4o 4lot was afoot to murder 6ric7 while he was on holiday in Bavaria1 Gisevius L :n Duly () the Feichstag met heard Eitler testified that he had as7ed his friend Arthur on the sub,ect a44roved the .abinet decision and e<4ressed its than7s to the 6uehrer for his Ienergetic and resolute rescue of the fatherland from civil war and chaosI =Adam Buc7reis -olitik )es #$. %ahrhun)erts =Nuremberg: #anorama-Gerlag n1d1> 41 '$'>1

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page_2"3 #age &+) Nebe an official in the Gesta4o if this were true and that Nebe had said the matter had been discussed1 The story seems unli7ely1 6ric7 undoubtedly was nervous at the time of the Foehm 7illingsas were others in high 4ositions li7e #a4en and 8chachtbut .abinet Ministers in the Third Feich were not as readily murdered as were o44osition generals li7e 8chleicher 4olitical writers li7e Dung and unruly members of the #arty who were considered a threat to its leadershi41 Never for a moment was 6ric7 an o44onent of EitlerC no record e<ists of his having ob,ected to any 4olicy the 6uehrer a44rovedC he was no danger to the merging #arty-8tate he was one of its 4illars1 And in his single attem4t to assert his authority over the secret 4olice he was sim4ly overruled4rotective custody continued to be invo7ed whenever the Gesta4o wanted to ma7e an arrest and 7ee4 a man in 4rison or a concentration cam4 without going through the courts1 There was no need to murder 6ric71 Eis love of 4a4erwor7 could be ignored by Eimmler after 6ric7 a44ointed him .hief of the German #olice and at all times by Goering who was the more 4owerful 4ersonality and with his fascinating 4lans for rebuilding not only a secret 4olice but a German Air 6orce and the war economy was far closer to Eitler1 -hen during the days of the Foehm e<ecutions 6ric7 as7ed Goering what was going on Goering merely told him to go home and not to worry1 6ric7 mee7ly acce4ted the advice1 -hile Goering was conducting the 4urge o4eration and deciding on who was to be 7illed in Berlin and Eitler was ta7ing care of the heart of the revolt in the Munich area 6ric7 stayed away from his office for three days1 -hen he returned he was ready to agree that what had been done was legal and to continue to wor7 at any ,obs assigned him1 6ric7 4layed a characteristic role in the #arty?s war with the church1 Ee had always thought of himself as a religious manC the #arty seemed to him to be doing the 9ord?s wor71 In the running battles the #rotestant 4astors had with some of their ecclesiastical brethren as well as with the atheistic movement of German Believers 6ric7 again re4resented the conservative wing of the #arty: he wanted to act legally and he had considerable sym4athy for the ministers who o44osed the intervention of the #arty actions1 Eitler was indifferent to religionC it had no mystical or transcendental meaning for himC but both the #rotestant and .atholic churches were institutions and as such they had to be ta7en into account1 In the early stages of his rule he wanted no religious warsC he wanted the churches to su44ort his 4olicies1 The #arty?s coming to 4olitical 4ower released a 4arallel movement within the #rotestant church that sought to establish the religious counter4art of the #arty: the +oelkische church which as one of its su44orters #astor Eossenfelder said was intended to be the ??8A Desus .hrist1I &( Another National 8ocialist faction wanted a /eich churchC both grou4s demanded a church that was 4olitically oriented and National 8ocialist to the core1 Germany was to rearm to be free of GersaillesC any Dewish converts were to be thrown outC they wanted Adolf Eitler?s 4rogram with ecclesiastical

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page_2"4 #age &+/ trimmings1 But from Eitler?s 4oint of view a +oelkische church could be dangerous tooC he 4referred a state church a 4olitical instrument he could wield himself1 6ric7 Goering and Gauleiter Bube were honorary members of a grou4 calling themselves German .hristians who met in Berlin in A4ril (*)) to 4roclaim the right of .hristian believers to a revolution and the need for a /eich church1 They delighted in such statements as ??God made us Germans1 Germandom is a gift of God1 God wants me to fight for my Germany 1 1 1 The state of Adolf Eitler calls on the churchC the church must heed the call1I && 8uch 4ronouncements #arty surveillance of sermons and church 4ublications and dissolution of church youth organiHations immediately gave rise to strong 4rotests on the 4art of both .atholic and #rotestant ministers1 Eitler in March (*)) named a crusading nationalist and anti-8emitic clergyman 9udwig Mueller as his 4leni4otentiary to the #rotestant church1 Mueller whom Eitler had met in (*&' and admired for views identical to his own was given the assignment of setting u4 a nationalist #rotestant German church1 Des4ite Eitler?s bac7ing of Mueller for the 4ost of Feich Bisho4 the #rotestant synod meeting on May &+ (*)) defeated Mueller?s candidacy by a vote of () to (( and 4roceeded to elect #astor 6riedrich von Bodelschwingh who re4resented the o44osition1 The militant German .hristians went into action in true National 8ocialist fashion1 Meetings of 4rotest were held called by the 8A and 88C telegrams of 4rotest were filedC 4ress attac7s were mountedC and Mueller denounced the election of Bodelschwingh as illegal citing the law that any such a44ointment had to be a44roved by the #russian 8tate Government1 :n Eitler?s orders 6ric7 had a tal7 with #astor von Bodelschwingh who felt himself obliged to resign on Dune &/ having held office for less than a month1 Now 4rotests flooded in from the other side many of which reached Eindenburg who was sorely disturbed at these evidences of internal #rotestant conflict1 The 6uehrer eager to still any doubts on the 4art of the #resident called on 6ric7 to settle the matter1 6ric7 for a time did nothing1 A new church constitution was being written and he wanted to have the legal documents u4 to date before he acted1 But history was in motion and events could not be sto44ed1 9udwig Mueller using the well-tried #arty methods of dealing with the o44osition occu4ied the buildings of the .hurch "nion with 8A men1 Ee then dissolved the old committee that had been wor7ing on the constitution1 6ric7 and the 6uehrer were an<ious to avoid o4en conflict in the church and they re4roached the e<treme wing of the German .hristians1 6ric7 on Duly (( said that the National 8ocialist tas7 was greatly endangered when there was loose tal7 of continuing the revolution or of a second revolution1 I-hoever tal7s in this fashion should be told that he o44oses the 6uehrer and will be so treated I he declared1 Ee was only echoing what Eitler had

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page_2" #age &+0 ,ust said on Duly ' when the 6uehrer told the Feichsstatthalter that the revolution was over that the #arty had become the 8tate and that other organiHations must not e<ert se4arate authority1 Eitler?s and 6ric7?s words could have referred to either the 8A a year before the Dune 7illings or to the German .hristians1 &) But Eitler o4enly su44orted the Mueller faction of the German .hristians who wanted the church brought into the state a44aratusto become as they said 4art of the outward order of the National 8ocialist Feich1 The German .hristians won a ma,ority in the Duly &) church elections and in 8e4tember 9udwig Mueller was duly elected Feichsbischof1 The struggle within the ran7s of the German .hristians continued and a +olkskirche =4eo4le?s church> grou4 set out to rid the church of any taint of :rientalism that is of the :ld Testament and the teachings of ??FabbiI #aul1 Mueller on his 4art 4reached untrammeled love for the fatherland and the 6uehrer and the 4aramount duty of being a German1 9utheran ministers li7e Martin Dibelius and Martin Niemoeller were incensed1 They were not only confronted by the #arty?s su44ort of the German .hristians but were attac7ed by the German Believers a collection of 4seudomystical non .hristian Ifol7ishI elements with some ($ $$$ members1 They too were enthusiastic National 8ocialists and they believed that the 4agan northern Germanic elements in the German society the Baldur-8iegfried IndoGermanic religion should ta7e the 4lace of the !astern-8emitic ty4e Members had to swear they were free of Dewish or colored blood that they were not 6reemasons or Desuits and that they belonged to no other religion1 The .onfessional 8ynod =Bekenntnissyno)e> of the Alt4reussische "nion of the 9utheran .hurch a grou4 founded by #astor Niemoeller and other eminent #rotestant ministers meeting in Berlin-Dahlem March /0 (*)0 acce4ted the challenge and drew u4 a 4roclamation1 It read: -e see our 4eo4le threatened with a deadly danger1 The danger lies in a new religion1 The church has by order of its Master to see to it that in our 4eo4le .hrist is given the honor that is 4ro4er to the Dudge of the world 1 1 1 The 6irst .ommandment says IThou shalt have no other gods before me1I The new religion is a re,ection of the 6irst .ommandment1 (> In it the racist-fol7ish 4hiloso4hy becomes a myth1 In it blood and race fol7ishness honor and freedom become a false God1 &> The new religion demands belief in an eternal Germany in 4lace of the belief in the eternal 7ingdom of our Master and 8avior Desus .hrist1 )> This insane belief ma7es itself a God from man?s image and being 1 1 1 It is anti-.hristianism1 In the face of the tem4tation and danger of this religion 1 1 1 we must bear witness to our country and 4eo4le that: (> The state has its authority and 4ower through the commandment and the mercy of God who alone grants and limits all human authority1

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page_2"! #age &+' -hoever 4laces blood race and +olkstum in the 4lace of God as the creator and 9ord over the authority of the state undermines the state1 &> !arthly ,ustice fails to ac7nowledge its heavenly ,udge and 4rotector and the state itself loses its sovereignty when it lets itself be clothed with the mantle of the eternal ,udge and ma7es its own authority the highest and final one in all the areas of life1 )> :bediently and than7fully the church recogniHes the authority of the state founded and limited through God?s word1 Therefore it cannot bow before the total 4retension to authority that binds conscience which the new religion of the state 4rescribes1 Dedicated to God?s word the church is in duty bound to witness before state and 4eo4le the sole authority of Desus .hrist who alone has the 4ower to bind conscience and to free it1 To him is given all 4ower in Eeaven and on earth1 &/ 6ric7 forbade the reading of this 4roclamation from the 4ul4it and some 0$$ ministers were arrested because they did read it1&0 After tedious negotiations with two re4resentatives of the synod -raeses Boch and Bisho4 Marahrens 6ric7 finally gave 4ermission for the 4roclamation to be read on the condition that a 4aragra4h be added saying that it was directed against the neo-heathen religion and that the synod wished to warn the 4eo4le and 8tate of this threatening danger1 6ric7 was on the side of the 9utheran .hristiansC the 4astors who tal7ed with him were convinced of this1 But his official view was Eitler?sthat the 8tate should be neutral in inner-church controversies a bland 4osition that attem4ted to avoid as long as 4ossible the issues the conservative 4astors thought a matter of life and death1&' "4 to (*)0 Eitler was 4reoccu4ied with many things other than the church controversy1 The o4inion held of Germany in foreign countries was still of some im4ortance to him as were the 4rotests that reached Eindenburg1 -hen Neurath re4orted to 6ric7 that the attac7s on the traditional church were in,uring Germany?s re4utation abroad 6ric7 could use this in his cautious su44ort of the antiMueller 4osition1&+ But by (*)0 the situation had hardened and the valiant band of stubborn 9utheran 4astors with their stream of memorials and 4rotests had to be silenced1 6ric7 had to tell his friends in the church that the Government could no longer be neutralC that dar7 4olitical forces lur7ed behind the flag of the defenders of the old church and were using a religious controversy for their own 4ur4oses1 The Minister of the Interior who for a short time had been the chief su44ort of the religious function of the church ca4itulated when Eitler tired of the badgering and the resistance to what he wanted done1 A se4arate .hurch Ministry was established on Duly (' (*)0 and 6ric7 was relieved of dealing with the 4roblem1 All this however was not the chief trouble 6ric7 had with the church1 8ince the beginning of the seiHure of 4ower the National 8ocialists had wanted in o44osition to the dee4est beliefs of both #rotestant and .atholic

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page_2"" #age &++ churches to steriliHe or to 7ill the unfit1L .onfirmed criminals the feebleminded the insane any threat to the racial integrity of the +olk was to be removedeither through steriliHation or e<ecution1 The law for the #revention of :ffs4ring with Eereditary Diseases was issued on Duly (/ (*))1 It 4rovided for the steriliHation of anyone suffering from a severe mental illness such as schiHo4hrenia or a manic-de4ressive 4sychosis from hereditary 8aint Gitus?s dance or hereditary blindness or a severe 4hysical malformation1 !ach case would come before a eugenics? court on the a44lication of the family a civil-service doctor or the head of a nursing homeC and the court over which a doctor 4resided would decide by a ma,ority vote whether or not to a44rove the a44lication1 An a44eal might be ta7en to a higher eugenics? court which was constituted in the same fashion as the original court1 6rom time to time changes were made in the 4roceduresC for e<am4le under a 6ric7 decree of August && (*)' no #arty member could be steriliHed without the a44roval of the #arty authorities1 &% 6ric7 said that the whole 4erson must be ta7en into consideration when the decision was madeC by that he no doubt meant that redeeming racial or other @ualities highly regarded in #arty doctrine should 4revent a too literal following of the statute that he had signed along with Eitler and the Minister of Dustice1 If a Gauleiter disagreed with the findings of the eugenics? court he was to 4ut the matter in 6ric7?s handsC all such cases were to be handled as ??urgent and secret1I By (*/& all the Dews remaining at liberty in Eolland were to be steriliHed regardless of their mental or 4hysical health =see 8eyss-In@uart .ha4t1 ((>1 -ithin Germany the mentally sic7 and the feebleminded were no longer being steriliHedC they were being 7illed1LL Ten thousand Germans witnesses later testified were 7illed at Eadamar alone by lethal in,ections or 4illsC homes for the insane the feebleminded and the aged and all similar establishments in Germany and Austria by the beginning of (*/$ were 4otential or active e<termination centers1 The victims were GermansAryansand their families were usually told they had died of 4neumonia or of other natural causes1 But the real story could not be su44ressed1 Felatives assured the authorities of their loyalty and as7ed to be told L These actions were to be ta7en in accordance with a 4re-NaHi how a brother or sister doctrine of the so-called 8ocial Darwinists1 Adolf Eitler eagerly seiHed u4on this theory which maintained that the law of the survival of the fittest in the natural world a44lied to society too1 The unfit must be eliminated1 6riedrich 9enH wrote: IThe goal of socialism is not the individual but the race1I Eitler in a s4eech to officer candidates in (*// said IIn every 4art of her realm nature teaches us that the 4rinci4le of selection governs her that the stronger are the victors and the wea7 go under1 8he teaches us that what man7ind often sees as brutality 1 1 1 is a basic necessity in order to bring about the higher develo4ment of living creatures 1 1 1 nature above all 7nows nothing of humanitarianism 1 1 1 on the contrary wea7ness is a ground for condemnationI =Buchheim et al.= o2. cit1 Gol1 II 441 &*'*+>1 LL 6ric7 said in an interrogation of 8e4tember (' (*/' that Eitler had ordered mercy deaths in a letter of 8e4tember ( (*)* =NA>1 By the summer of (*/$ it had been decided that all incurable mental 4atients should be 7illed =!arl -1 Bintner ed1 Ha)amar Trial of Alfons (lein= A)olf !allmann= et al1 M9ondon !dinburgh Glasgow: -illiam Eodge (*/%N>1 .oncentration cam4s were also combed for victims1

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page_2"# #age &+% or son or daughter had really died1 :ne mother had a son who was an e4ile4tic and had been steriliHed1 8oon after she sent him tobacco she received his ashes in an urn1 Des4ite his illness he had been able to wor7 a good deal of the timehe had done most of the farm chores when he had been at homebut an anonymous authority had decided on his death1 &* The individuals in charge of such institutions 4rotested for the law that 6ric7 had drawn u4 in the summer of (*/$ on the 6uehrer?s order was secret and the 4ublic had never heard of it1 Being conscientious bureaucrats they ob,ected to what they regarded as high-handed 4roceedings =one su4erintendent com4lained that if such measures had to be ta7en they should be done legally and that the 4atients should be given a hearing>1)$ The 4rovincial bisho4 of the 9utheran .hurch in -uerttemberg Dr1 -urm writing a letter of shoc7ed 4rotest to 6ric7 said the local 4o4ulation saw the smo7e rising from the crematorium near the home in Marbach which the 8amaritan 6oundation had established to loo7 after 4hysically and mentally inca4acitated 4ersons1 8inister rumors the bisho4 wrote were going aroundC and among the victims he said flatly were wounded veterans of -orld -ar I e4ile4tics and other 4eo4le ca4able of wor7ing1)( The Bisho4 of 9imburg wrote a solemn condemnation of the 7illings at Eadamar to the Minister of Dustice Guertner and sent a co4y to 6ric71 The bisho4 said that children watching the hos4ital busses go by said ??Eere come the murder wagons I and told one another that if they did not behave they too would end u4 in the ba7e ovens1)& A sermon on August ) (*/( by the Bisho4 of Muenster .lemens August .ount von Galen forced the Government to a decision1 The bisho4 had long been a critic of the #artyC in (*)/ he had s4o7en out against its racial 4olicies and in Duly (*/( had 4reached a sermon in which he denounced the unlawful arrests of the secret 4olice1 In the August sermon he told his congregation of the re4orts concerning the 7illings in the institutionsof the murders he called them of those who could no longer wor71 IThese are our brothers and sisters I he said and he as7ed his listeners how long the rest of them could e<4ect to live if the measure of their life s4an was its 4roductivity1 No one?s life was safe any longer he told them and he as7ed who now could have confidence in his doctor1 It was a blistering sermon and the decision had to be made either to arrest Galen and the others who were 4ublicly 4rotesting or to sto4 the 7illings1 Bisho4 von Galen delivered his sermon at the start of the Fussian cam4aign when Eitler had troubles enough without ta7ing on the outraged churchmen and their followers1 The 7illings were sus4endedC but they were sto44ed only as a beltline 4roduction1)) They went on s4oradically until the end of the warC NaHi doctrine never changed and whenever a local #arty or 88 leader thought it necessary the e<ecutions began again1 It sometimes seemed too much trouble to evacuate such a hos4italC in one case near the end of the war although truc7s were at hand the inmates

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page_2"$ #age &+* of a home for the feebleminded were sim4ly ta7en out and shot instead of being sent to safety before the advancing Fussians1 No one in authority ob,ected to thisC on the contrary it was regarded as a sensible act of war and saving of scarce resources1 6ric7 could frame the decrees Eitler could order their sus4ension for 4ro4agandistic reasons but everyone 7new that ??useless feedersI could always be gotten rid of1 After the German 4atients in Eadamar had been e<ecuted their 4laces were ta7en by the babies of #olish and Fussian women who were wor7ing for the Germans1 The foreign babies were 7illed by in,ections1 They too were useless feeders1 )/ The 7illing of wea7minded or insane Germans and of the babies of inferior races was all one to the 4ersonnel of the hos4ital1 :ne of the nurses was so devout that she brought in 4riests to hear the confessions of the German 4atients before they were 7illed and so full of charitable im4ulses that she bought toys for the condemned children in her care1)0 6ric7?s 4art in the 7illings of the Germans was clear enough =the other deaths at Eadamar and elsewhere occurred after he was no longer Minister of the Interior>1 8ometime in the summer of (*/$ he had drawn u4 and signed the secret law 4roviding for the 7illing of aged and incurably ill citiHens of the Third Feich1)' Ee had received re4ort after re4ort showing that its 4rovisions were being carried out1 :ne such re4ort written on May ' (*/( to the director of the hos4ital at Baufbeuren said II have the honor to inform you that the female 4atients transferred from your institute on November % (*/$ to the institutions in Grafenec7 Bernburg 8onnenstein and Eartheim all died in November of last year1I)+ Eow many 4eo4le were 7illed under the euthanasia law can only be guessed atC the 4rosecution at Nuremberg said &+0 $$$ were 4ut to death including +0 $$$ old 4eo4le but later calculations were between +$ $$$%$ $$$1)% The 7illings were meant to be 7e4t secret the 4ersonnel of the homes were sworn to silence and only in rare cases were relatives told what had ha44enedwhen their devotion to the #arty and their understanding of the necessity for 4urging the Feich of its incom4etents seemed beyond re4roach1 :therwise the condemned ones li7e the inmates of the concentration cam4s officially died of natural causes1 6ric7 was a remote but convinced 4artici4ant in these 7illings1 Ee did not delight in them but he thought they were necessary as he thought the laws he signed that 4laced the Dews outside the law and into the sole 4ower of the 4olice and guards of the concentration and e<termination cam4s were necessary1 In more than one s4eech he echoed Eitler saying that race and blood were decisive for a 4eo4le that biological substance determined its fate and that if this were so its 4hysically or mentally inferior members as well as its enemies had to be dis4osed of1 Ee saw as his su4reme duty the carrying out the 6uehrer?s decreesC for what Eitler 4roclaimed was law the highest law of the land1 That was why he un@uestioningly signed the decree of Duly ) (*)/ declaring the Foehm murders a legal act of state1 In the end

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page_2#0 #age &%$ his 4rinci4les left him too defenseless against the whims of the 6uehrer1 Eitler told Goebbels in (*/) that he was very dissatisfied with 6ric7 who he said was old and used u41 But as in the case of so many others who had fallen from grace 6ric7 had no successor readily available and if Eitler dismissed 6ric7 there would be an immediate battle to be his successor as Minister of the Interior1 Eimmler Terboven and 8tuc7art Eitler said were all as4irants for the 4ost but the 6uehrer was thin7ing of a44ointing Arthur Greiser Gauleiter of -artheland if he did dismiss 6ric71 )* Eitler finally did get rid of 6ric7 on August &$ (*/)C he a44ointed him Feich #rotector of Bohemia and Moravia to re4lace Neurath but he too7 care to see that the real 4ower remained in the hands of Barl Eermann 6ran7 one of Eimmler?s men1 Eimmler got another ,ob he had been loo7ing for: he was named Minister of the Interior1 6ric7?s duties in .Hechoslova7ia were routine1 Ee as7ed for and received ??suitable I that is 4retentious residences in #rague and in the countrysideC he had the 4ower of 4ardon for 4ersons convicted of crimes committed against the 8tate a 4rivilege which he never a44ears to have e<ercised1 Ee went through the motions of being the highest-ran7ing official in .Hechoslova7ia issuing the regulations for 4roviding the slave labor for 8auc7el and for maintaining order among the hostile 4o4ulation1 6ric7 continued to hold the ran7 of Feich MinisterC and because by (*/) the basic laws and decrees for the Feich had been issued it 4erha4s did not matter much to him whether he had one 4ost or another1 The main thing was to do his duty1 Although he did not testify in his own defensehe told 6ritHsche it was uselesshe seems to have been genuinely convinced of his innocence1 -hat had he done that was wrong from the 4oint of view of a true believerO Ee had obeyed the orders of the legal head of stateC he had loyally served the cause of the #arty in whose 4rinci4les he devoutly believedC he had drawn u4 the laws that were essential to its well-being and 4reservation1 The concentration cam4s and the F8EA had been under his nominal control but actually they were soon under Eimmler and he had done his best to limit some of the illegalities he 7new were ta7ing 4lace1 Ee had never had much to do with the concentration cam4s although an unconvincing witness at Nuremberg declared that he had visited Dachau where he had shown great interest in the e<4eriments 4erformed on the inmates by Dr1 8igmund Fascher1 6ric7?s guilt was of a 7ind that he could no longer com4rehend1 #erha4s the early 6ric7 the assessor in a 4rovincial administration or a member of the economics division of the Munich 4olice would have understood the nature of his com4licity in the crimes of the NaHi 8tate of his having made it legally 4ossible for thousands of Germans and millions of Dews to be 7illed legally1 But 6ric7even at Nuremberg even after the testimony of the survivors had been heard and the atrocity films had been shownfelt that he had only wor7ed long hours given the best of his talents to

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page_2#1 #age &%( the ordained authorities and always done his duty for them and for his 4eo4le1 -ith the e<ce4tion of his closing statement to the court he was silent1 Ee obviously thought it would not be 4ossible to e<4lain to a tribunal made u4 of the enemies of the theories and 4ractices of the Third Feich that he had always believed in law and order that he had administered both devotedly with the sole ob,ect of 4urifying Germany of its racial contagions and securing its future1 Ee had done all within his 4ower and within the limits of his !eltanschauung to further the renewal of Germany to strengthen it by law and decree and to defend it against the hosts of evil1 The court found him guilty on every count e<ce4t that of having 4lanned to wage aggressive war and sentenced him to death1 Ee told the 4rison 4sychologist that was the only decision he had e<4ected1 The tribunal was o4erating on another system and wavelength of communication and he 7new he could never reach its ear with the story he had to tell1 Notes (1 Eans 6abricius /eichsinnenminister r. "rickB )er revolutionaere Staatsmann =Berlin: Deutsche Bulturwacht (*)*>1 &1 N*A G )((*-#8 41 %*)1 Eans #fundtner r. !ilhelm "rick un) sein Ministerium =Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)+>1 )1 6abricius o2. cit1 Also #fundtner o2. cit1 /1 N TTII 41 )%01 01 N*A II )(&0-#8 41 '001 '1 N*A G &+/&-#8 41 )%)1 +1 -ilhelm 6ric7 ie Nationalso0ialisten im /eichstag (*&/(*&% =Munich: 6ranH !her Gerlag (*&%>1 %1 N*A G )()&-#8 441 *$'($1 Eans EeinH 8adila-Mantau &nsere /eichsregierung =Berlin: .1 A1 -eller (*)'>1 ??Dr1 -ilhelm 6ric7 I in National;so0ialistische Monatshefte August / (*)$ 441 &&*)(1 *1 D1 .1 -att I ie bayerischen Bemuehungen um Aus,eisung Hitlers (*&/ I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 ) (*0% 441 &+$%$1 ($1 N*A G )()&-#8 441 *$'($1 N*A GI ))**-#8 441 (('(+1 Fudolf Morsey IHitler als Braunsch,eiger /egierungsrat I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 / (*'$ 441 /(*/%1 Eelmut Eeiber A)ol2h Hitler =Berlin: .ollo@uium Gerlag (*'$>1 .uno Eor7enbach as eutsche /eich von 787H bis heute =Berlin: Gerlag fuer #resse -irtschaft und #oliti7 (*)$>1 SchulthessA Euro2Lischer 6eschichtskalen)er Gol1 9TTIII (*)& =Munich: .1 E1 Bec7?sche Gerlagsbuchhandlung (*))>1 ((1 Dohannes Eohlfeld ed1 okumente )er eutschen -olitik un) 6eschichte von 7H9H bis 0ur 6egen,art Gol1 IG =Berlin: Do7umenten-Gerlag Dr Eerbert -endler R .o1 n1d1> 441 /+0$1

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page_2#2 #age &%& (&1 -ilhelm 6ric7 ie /assengeset0gebung )es ritten /eiches =Munich: 6ranH !her Gerlag (*)/>1 ()1 N*A IG (/(+-#8 41 %1 (/1 6 +( 9oesener Memorandum =IAG>1 (01 .bi)1 December / (*/(1 -alter 8trauss ?? as /eichsministerium )es .nnern un) )ie %u)engeset0gebung I AurHeichnungen von Dr1 Bernhard 9oesener in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IT No1 ) (*'( 441 &'&)()1 ('1 6 +( o2. cit1 (+1 .bi)1 (%1 .bi)1 (*1 N*A III ++*-#8 441 0000+ &$1 Eohlfeld ed1 o2. cit1 Gol1 IG1 &(1 Eans Buchheim 6laubenskrise im ritten /eich =8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*0)> 41 *&1 &&1 .bi)1 41 %01 &)1 Eeiber o2. cit1 &/1 Buchheim o2. cit1 441 (*(*&1 &01 .bi)1 41 (*&1 &'1 Eeinrich Eermelin7 ed1 (irche im (am2f =Tuebingen and 8tuttgart: Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*0$>1 &+1 -alter .onrad er (am2f um )ie (an0leien =Berlin: Toe4elmann (*0+>1 &%1 N TTTG (%(-D 441 /$/&1 &*1 .bi)1 *$'-D 441 '%0%'1 )$1 N*A 8u441 A M-(0( 441 (&('(%1 )(1 .bi)1 M-(0& 441 (&(%&01 )&1 N*A III '(0-#8 441 //*0(1 ))1 Annedore 9eber "uer un) !i)er =Berlin: Mosai7-Gerlag (*'(>1 )/1 !arl -1 Bintner ed1 Ha)amar Trial of Alfons (lein= A)olf !allmann= et al1 =9ondon: -illiam Eodge (*/%>1 )01 .bi)1 testimony Irmgard Euber1 )'1 N*A IG (00'-#8 441 ((((&1 )+1 .bi)1 ('*'-#8 441 &$&)1 )%1 N G 441 )'&')1 )*1 !G %)( Dose4h Goebbels Tagebuch1 Gol1 I entry for 6ebruary &) (*/) 41 &+& =IAG>1

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page_2#3 #age &%) % The ;outh 9eader Baldur Gon 8chirach 6or boys and girls of NaHi Germany the indoctrination into the world of Baldur von 8chirach youth leader of the Third Feich began officially at the age of ten1 8tarting in (*)* on A4ril &$ Eitler?s birthday the children who in the course of the year became ten years old were formally inducted into the Dungvol7 and Dungmaedel1 The boy the -im2f =the word is Austrian and means ??ladI or Is@uirtI> was given his nec7erchief and sli4 7not and a 4erformance boo7 that would be im4ortant to him for the rest of his life1 It would record his 4rogress for the eight years he remained in the Eitler,ugendC how he had 4erformed in the -im2fe test of his cultural and athletic achievements =the test was given him after his first four months in the organiHation and included his reciting the main events in the life of Adolf Eitler>C and then through the years the badges he won and what his youth leaders thought of him1 The Dungmaedel too had to undergo similar tests but girls were the future mothers of the nation and while they sang the same songs and denounced the same enemies of the 6uehrer as did the boys their indoctrination was intended to 4re4are them to be the future hel4mates of the warrior males and to beget new ones1 At the age of fourteen the boys and girls went on from the Dungvol7 and Dungmaedel to the more advanced Eitler,ugend for the boys and Bund Deutscher Maedel for the girls1 At the age of eighteen they graduated into the adult world of the #arty in theory at least fully indoctrinated to live and die for the 6uehrer1 The youth movement had started in Berlin at the turn of the century and got its 4re--orld -ar I name when in (*$( a grou4 of students and other

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page_2#4 #age &%/ young men christened themselves the -andervoegel1 The movement began soon after the migration of large numbers of Germans from the country to the city and the -andervoegel brought young 4eo4le bac7 to the out-of-doors1 They left the cities behind to commune with nature in the woods and at la7eside refuges as far as 4ossible from the urban industrial centers that were e<4loding all over Germany1 L The youth movement was no wee7end affair1 The -andervoegel was a way of life a 4rotest against the adult society of strict categories of money and business success1 It re,ected class distinctionsC a member had only to be young and a good comrade to love nature and deny the city1 The young 4eo4le marched but not in ste4C it was a movement of individuals of nonconformists1 Many of them were nonsmo7ers and dran7 no alcoholC they felt themselves 4art of a secret order allied against the blea7 world of their 4arents1 The -andervoegel were a Germanic 4henomenonC they were strong in Austria and had grou4s in 8witHerland as well as in Germany but they never s4read to the rest of !uro4e1 Their idealism was of a romantic Teutonic 7ind1 The ,ourney which was the center of the movement was a ,ourney away from the the city but to no end1 :n the ,ourney one might find the rare blue flower that grew in lonely 4laces but that was allC the ,ourney itself was enough1 8ome grou4s among the -andervoegel were nationalistic and anti-8emiticC they were all against intellectualism and for the ??whole man I the healthy self-sufficient future citiHen of a better world1 The Buende which succeeded the -andervoegel after -orld -ar I were better organiHed1LL They had leaders and differing 4ur4oses and they re4resented religious and 4olitical grou4sC there were nationalist socialist #rotestant and .atholic members of the Buende1 The ,ourney was no longer the center of the movementC the new center was the Lagerthe discussion around a cam4fire and if the Buende had a common symbol it was this fire with a s4ea7er standing in front of it to enlighten them1 -omen 4layed only a minor role in both the -andervoegel and the Buende1 -hen women?s organiHations e<isted they were usually se4arate from the men?s although girls were admitted to some of the male Buende1 ( At the start of -orld -ar I the -andervoegel had some &0 $$$ membersC (0 $$$ of them fought for Germany some + $$$ of whom did not return from the war1 In the Buende 4eriod the number of members was much higherC in (*)& the National 8ocialist youth alone had &$ $$$ 4aying and &$ $$$ L Between (%0$ and (*$$ Dortmund had grown from + 0$$ to (/$ $$$ inhabitantsC Eamburg from (00 $$$ to +%$ $$$C Munich from )0 $$$ to 0$$ $$$ =D1 6reund @uoted by #ierre LL The name Bertau< La vie 1uoti)ienne en Allemagne M#aris: Eachette (*'&N 41 (%'>1 designated the loosely organiHed youth movement of the -eimar Fe4ublic1 The Buende?s Feich .ommittee which re4resented some /10 million members included all the youth organiHations aside from those of the .ommunists National 8ocialists and Dews =Barl :1 #aetel I ie )eutsche %ugen)be,egung als 2olitisches -haenomen I in -olitische Stu)ien Duly (*0+ 41 )>1

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page_2# #age &%0 non4aying members1 & L This was a small re4resentation since the #arty that year 4olled si< million votes1 .atholic youth in the various Buende numbered over a million and the #rotestant Buende totaled (1/ million1) 6ar from the sim4licities of the -andervoegel where at the end of a ,ourney a viscous chea4 broth called Schleim =consisting mainly of barley and water> was coo7ed u4 the members of the many Buende led an organiHed life of 4lanned 4olitical discussionsC the members of #arty organiHations often too7 4art in street brawls where so many of the issues of the -eimar 4eriod were fought out1 The NaHi youths would invade .ommunist sections of the German citiesC fighting was often fierce and sometimes boys were 7illed to become if they were National 8ocialists the revered martyrs of Baldur von 8chirach?s later 4ageants1 8chirach ,oined the #arty in (*&0 when he was eighteen years old1 Born in Berlin one of four children from a well-to-do family he was too young to ta7e 4art in -orld -ar I1 Ee was the 7ind of young man the Germans call sch,aermerischa lad with a sentimental longing for adventure lin7ed to high 4ursuits and a love of 4oetry tales of derring-do and literary discussions that do not 4lace too great a strain on one?s intellectual ca4acities1 Ee s4o7e !nglish wellC he was three-@uarters American1LL Eis father .arl Bailey-Norris von 8chirach had been an officer in the Garde-Buerassier-Fegiment of -ilhelm II from which he had resigned in (*$% to become director of the .ourt later the National Theater in -eimar where Baldur grew u41 In this environment Baldur early ac@uired a 4recocious love for the theater music and literaturees4ecially he told the court at Nuremberg for Goethe1 But he soon had things other than the theater on his mind1 6irst -orld -ar I came then his father lost his ,ob during the revolution that followedC and the family 7new the bitterness shared by so many middle-class 4eo4le in those years of being downgraded in status as well as income1 In (*(+ when he was ten years old Baldur ,oined his first youth organiHationthe ;oung Germans? 9eague a grou4 given to hi7es and singing on the march and around cam4fires1 At this time he also attended a country boarding school conducted by Eermann 9ietH one of the founders of the 9anderHiehungsheime movement which also had a 4rogram for youth1 9ietH had the idea that a school should mirror the stateand his students L By the end of (*)& membershi4 in the Eitler,ugend rose to over ($$ $$$ 4racticed =-erner Blose 6eneration im 6leichschritt M:ldenbourg and Eamburg: Gerhard 8talling Gerlag (*'/N 41 &01> LL Baldur von 8chirach?s 4aternal grandfather had lived for a time in the "nited 8tates where he had fought as a ma,or in the .ivil -ar1 Ee married an American girl !liHabeth BaileyNorris in #hiladel4hia in (%'* and then returned to Germany with her1 Baldur?s father was born in Biel and he too married an American girl !mma Tillou during a visit to the "nited 8tates =Ma< von 8chirach: 6eschichte )er "amilie von Schirach MBerlin: -alter de Gruyter Gerlag (*)*N>1

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page_2#! #age &%' =for a time> self-government in a discreetly su4ervised fashion1 At the end of -orld -ar I Baldur ,oined still another youth organiHation the Bna44enschaft a 4atriotic grou4 of youths who tal7ed about the ini@uities of Gersailles and the misdeeds of the .ommunists and the Dews who had brought the revolution u4on them1 Ee eagerly heard the s4ea7ers visiting -eimar who said the same things such as .ount !rnst Hu Feventlow Fosenberg 8treicher and 8auc7el and he began reading anti-8emitic literatureincluding Eenry 6ord?s The .nternational %e, and Eouston 81 .hamberlain?s The "oun)ations of the Nineteenth *entury1 In -eimar in (*&' he first met Eitler who was visiting the city with his de4uty Eess to ma7e a s4eech1 Baldur had read Mein (am2f in (*&0 and from the first 4age this boo7 that confirmed everything he believed was a bible to him1 Eitler advised him to go to Munich to the city that was the beating heart of the #arty and Baldur who as4ired to write decided to attend the university there1 Ee had ,oined the 8A when he was eighteen and in the "niversity of Munich he eagerly set out to recruit students for the #arty1 Ee was a conventionally attractive young man serious 4lum4 well mannered and voluble although he s4o7e in a somewhat stilted humorless style with solemn earnestness and in sentences that were studded with clichJs1 This flat oratorical style was unusual among #arty s4ea7ers but he was successful enough in tal7ing to his student audiences that in (*&* he was made leader of the National 8ocialist 8tudents? "nion1 8chirach was always 4roud of having been elected to the ,ob at a students? meeting at GraH#arty 4osts were invariably bestowed only by higher authorityand Eitler had 4rom4tly confirmed his selection1 In (*)( 8chirach was named Feich youth leader of the National 8ocialist #arty1 As such he was for a year on Foehm?s staff of the 8A 8u4reme .ommand and from then on he gave full time to his #arty duties1 A year later Eitler always lavish with titles and @uic7 to 4romote those he thought worthy made him in addition Feich 9eader for ;outh !ducation of the N8DA#1 In (*)) he was made youth leader of the German Feich a 4osition he held for a time under his codefendant 6ric7 who was then Minister of the Interior1 By (*)' 8chirach at the age of twenty-nine was one of the leading officials of the Feich re4orting directly to the 6uehrer1 Ee was a somewhat effeminate young man1 Eis contem4oraries s4o7e derisively of his girlish bedroom and living room decorated in white and those who disli7ed him said he loo7ed li7e a trans4lanted Berliner in his incongruous Bavarian shorts1 / But it was not easy to 4lease everyone in the #arty1 The main thing was to 4lease the 6uehrer and this 8chirach did with odes of adulation in te<ts and rituals and in endless ceremonials intended to ma7e German youth into little samurai who as the youth leader said would not only ardently 4erform but also willingly die for Eitler1 Many 4eo4le disli7ed 8chirachC he was corny and he clung ostentatiously to his u44er middle-class origins =at one meeting of the Eitler,ugend in

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page_2#" #age &%+ Eamburg the leaders stayed at the Teutonic and chea4 hotel the Eein Godewind but 8chirach s4ent the night alone at the delu<e Gier DahresHeiten>1 Ee was ob,ectionable enough that some of the #arty leaders wanted to get rid of him but Eitler was convinced of his choice and 8chirach stayed1 Eow could anything serious be wrong with a man who wrote: That is the greatest thing about him That he is not only our leader and a great hero But himself u4right firm and sim4le 1 1 1 in him rest the roots of our world1 And his soul touches the stars And yet he remains a man li7e you and me1 To which in 8chirach?s verses Eitler re4lies: ;ou are a thousand behind me ;ou are me and I am you I have no thoughts that have not moved in your hearts And if I form wordsC I 7now none that are not one with your will 6or I am you and you are me and we all believe Germany in you1 0 This is not far from what Eitler actually said in 8e4tember (*)' to the men of his (am2fverbaen)e: ??This is the miracle of our time that you have found me among so many millions1I And that I have found you is Germany?s good fortune1I' 8chirach and Eitler were clearly of one mind when they dealt with the mysti@ue of the 6uehrer?s leadershi41 8chirach?s 4assionate devotion to Eitler swe4t everything before it and only in the su4erheated atmos4here in which the young 4eo4le 4aid their homage could his adulation be recorded without embarrassment1 I:ne thing is stronger than you my 6uehrer I he said on the occasion of the Feich #arty Day in (*)' with Eitler listening gravely Ithat is the love of young Germans for you1 There are many ha44y hours in the year of the youth1 This however in every year is one of our ha44iest1 Because more than any other 4eo4le my 6uehrer we feel ourselves to be chained to your 4erson by our name1 ;our name is the ha44iness of the youth your name my 6uehrer is our immortality1I + This was only the beginning1 As 8chirach warmed to his assignment he had to reach even higher to e<4ress the ecstasy he felt1 At another meeting of the Eitler,ugend he said: This 8unday morning ceremony doesn?t aim at 4resenting arguments 1 1 1 but at imbuing life and men with courage and strength to fulfill their greater and lesser tas7s through un@ualified faith in the divine 4ower and the ideology of the 6uehrer and his movement1 1 1 1 The service of Germany a44ears to us to be 1 1 1 the service of GodC the banner of the Third Feich a44ears to us to be Eis banner and the 6uehrer of the 4eo4le is the savior whom Ee sent to rescue us from the calamity and 4eril into which we were actually 4lunged by the most 4ious 4arties of the defunct -eimar Fe4ublic1%

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page_2## #age &%% The 4arallels to .hristian devotional themes were many1 ;oung 4eo4le recited such 4rayers as the following before an evening meal: 6uehrer my 6uehrer given me by God #rotect and 4reserve my life for long1 ;ou rescued Germany from its dee4est need1 I than7 you for my daily bread1 8tay for a long time with me leave me not1 6uehrer my 6uehrer my faith my light Eeil my 6uehrer1 * !ven 7indergarten children might recite a secular 4rayer when they began their day?s activities: ??6old hands bow headsC thin7 always on the 6uehrer1I 8chirach was a great man for 4ageants1 To see one boy after another ste4 u4 and deliver a burst of heroic or devotional lines brought him some of his most titillating moments es4ecially as he wrote many of the 4arts himself1 The Eitler ;outh was full of togetherness1 -hile they marched the boys and girls sang songs ta7en from a44roved songboo7s in which a number of the Lie)er had been written by 8chirach1 The ceremonies and indoctrination courses for boys and girls were designed to sha4e them in the new revolutionary mold to detach them from the non-NaHi 4ast to substitute Eitler not only for the former heroes of German history and fol7lore but for the most sacred symbols of the .hristian religion1 Days of dedication were held when the children would chant in res4onsive readings: I-here one wal7s his ste4 is lost where a thousand wal7 his ste4 has its full weight1I Then followed the words of the 6uehrer: IMy will has to be the creed 1 1 1 that is your faith1 My faith is to me as it is to youeverything in this world1I The children of the Dungvol7 and Dungmaedel then made their vows of allegiance: II 4romise to do my duty in the Eitler,ugend in love and fidelity to the 6uehrer and to our flag1I The elder brothers and sisters swore a Ibodily oathI of loyalty1 Their lines read: IThe 6uehrer of Great Germany has many in the world who hate himC they have maliciously 4re4ared his grave on land and water1I None of this however would avail such forces of evil for there were enough Isword bearersI and Itrue onesI to 4rotect him1 The children declared they would never s4ea7 of III but only of Iwe1I They chanted that they were 4art of the IGodwilled German community I that where they stood stood faithfulness Iand our march is its order1I($ :n the days of these 4ageants there would be no school and after the war started #arty re4orts said that 4arents came in increasing numbers that these were now more family occasions than they had been in the 4ast1 More teachers came too the re4orts said but unfortunately church attendance was also u41 This undesirable develo4ment occurred the observer thought because of the increasing losses at the front and the alacrity of the clergy to ta7e advantage of the many war deaths to hold services1 #eo4le were now going to church who had never gone before and as the re4orts dolefully conceded

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page_2#$ #age &%* many #arty members even 4referred to have such memorial services 4erformed by the church rather than by the #arty1 (( The shadow of war intensified 8chirach?s devotional e<ercises1 Eere is his ??instructional descri4tionI of a 4rogram for Eitler ;outh meetings in (*)+ to be used for Iflag 4arades celebrations etc1I A 6lag #arade The detail has assembled1 The leader on duty announces this to the cam4 leader1 IEeil Eitler cam4 detail1I IEeil Eitler1I The leader on duty gives the 4arole for the day: I!yes frontP The 4arole for today is: Eerbert Nor7us1I A boy says: I-e don?t mourn at cold cas7ets -e ste4 u4 and say: there was one -ho dared that which we all dare1 Eis mouth is silent1 -e ste4 u4 and say: The comradeshi4 is immutable1 Many die1 Many are born1 The world is large which encloses them1 The word however which we have sworn to The word is not lost even to the dead1 That means: the duty is greater than the world1I 1 1 1 Then the cam4 leader s4ea7s for the fallen comrade: I:n Danuary &/ (*)( at BeusHel7ietH in Berlin our fifteen-year-old comrade Eerbert Nor7us was slain by .ommunists1 As a Eitler ;outh he had done nothing but his duty and that caused the hatred of the .ommunists1 -e 7now that for the sa7e of our dead comrade there will never be an understanding between Bolshevism and usPI The leader on duty: IAttentionP -e sing while raising the flag: ?A young nation is rising ready to storm 1 1 1? Feady to raise the flag 1 1 1 !yes rightP Faise the flagPI The leaders of the cam4 units at once give the command for marching off1 !<am4les of suitable 4aroles for the day: Arminius Geiserich Te,a -idu7ind Eeinrich I Eeinrich der 9oewe Braunschweig 6ranH von 8ic7ingen Gneisenau Bluecher Gerdun Immelmann 6eldherrnhalle Nuernberg1 6lag Mottos Ee who loves the nation 4roves it only by the sacrifices he is ready to ma7e for it1 Adolf Eitler1 Thou art the most beautiful of all that waved for us Thou art the 4ower which recruits every fighter Thou even sanctifiest the sinner who dies for thee Thou high hand with which the heroes 4ray1 6ervor and will thou art of us all1

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page_2$0 #age &*$ -ho fell for thee a symbol he becomes of thee1 Thou art the bridge between there and here1 Eail to those who fall in thy shadow1 Baldur von 8chirach (& -hat 8chirach was doing from the beginning was 4re4aring the 4erfect 88 man1 Ee nourished himself and the boys and girls with fragments of wisdom and 4oetic tags ta7en from a large stoc7 of Teutonic authors1 8chirach himself in his student days used to meet with a grou4 of young men under a 4ortrait of Na4oleon to read and discuss the runeli7e 4oems of 8tefan George and his love for Fil7e at his least abstruse is 4lainly visible in 8chirach?s own contributions to the re4ertoire of the Eitler,ugend1 Ee was filled with the a4horisms that delighted the hearts of the #arty members1 ??;outh must be led by youth I I;outh 7nows no su4eriors only leaders I he told his audiences for the NaHi movement itself li7e its Italian counter4art was Ia youth movement1I IThe Eitler ;outh is not a founding of the 8tate for youth but a founding of youth for the 8tate1I() 6iovene00a never was slighted by either Eitler or Mussolinithe 6uehrer always concealed the fact that he needed glasses to read by and long after the young 6ascists who had marched on Fome were middle-aged Mussolini made his now cor4ulent followers lea4 about in e<ercises designed to show that they were still the lads who had ca4tured the ca4ital for the 4arty1 Mussolini and Eitler told their 4eo4le and the world that they were the leaders of the young nationsC they had cast off the errors of the wea7lings of the 4ast and thus would now lead their 4eo4les to a thousand-year Feich or a new em4ire of the .aesars1 8chirach fitted 4erfectly into this design1 I-e are the soldiers of the future I he had the boys and girls sing1L And he could bring the house down when he told them what he had learned from his old headmaster 9ietH: the Eitler,ugend were building a youth state that is a state for youth1 It was the s4irit of the 88 he cherished not its military 4osturesthose would come later1 8chirach never wanted his young men to do military drill and des4ite what the Nuremberg indictment said he never ImilitariHedI his boys and girls1 The most the boys got in the way of wea4ons were smallbore rifles and target 4ractice1 It was their souls he was afterC their bodies were only to be made fit to carry out the assignments they would later be given to com4lete training in their heaven-sent mission of living and dying for the 6uehrer1 But while the boys were in the Eitler,ugend they had little to do with military matters before the start of the war1 8chirach himself 4referred one observer noted 4oetry to steel helmets and guns and even though one of the L This was wrongly translated at youth leaders said the boys must be able to handle a gun the trial as I-e are the future soldiers I and was cited as evidence of 8chirach?s desire to militariHe the German youth1 But the original te<t states what 8chirach and Eitler wanted the youth to as4ire to be: the militant sha4ers of the future1

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page_2$1 #age &*( as readily as they handled a fountain 4en they had to learn this a4titude with 1 &&?s for 8chirach resolutely held out against a s4ecifically military training1 Ee nevertheless 4re4ared the young 4eo4le for the role that Eitler a44reciated above all others: that of unconditional obedience to the 6uehrer1 The youth said 8chirach re4resent ??not their own interest but the well-being of GermanyC the will of the 6uehrer is living for them1I INothing for us ourselves everything for Germany1I They were soldiers not only of the future but of the idea he told themC and he too7 over the old slogans of the -andervoegel and Buende merely giving them a new direction1 IThe wor7ing lad whose heart beats hot for the 6uehrer is more essential for Germany than the highly educated esthete1 Eigher than the shar4est intellect we cherish a true and brave heart1 The ones who are cold and intelligent can ma7e mista7esC the true ones are always right1 The intelligent ones want advantages for themselvesC the true ones want nothingC they 7now only their duty1I (/ And what Eimmler 4lanned in the way of 88 cadres formed from among the nations of !uro4e 8chirach wanted for the youth of !uro4e who were to unite in a mystical fashion under these 4rinci4les of the Eitler,ugend1 Gisitors from all over the world came to see himC Boy 8cout leaders youth grou4s from 6rance and !ngland and ;ugoslavia from Italy and 6inland and the "nited 8tates1 There was much idealism in what he was doing and 4reaching1 9i7e the 8A uniforms of the (*&$?s the brown shirt of the ED and the white blouse and blue s7irt of the BDM were intended to conceal any economic differences among members to enable the 4oor and 4ure of heart to meet their more highly 4laced contem4oraries as e@uals1 The Eitler,ugend had drawn its membershi4 largely from the 4roletariat or the 4roletarianiHed middle classes before the #arty too7 4ower1L(0 Their rivals considered them activists street fighters and brawlers li7e their elders in the 8A1 They were regarded with derision by members of the more so4histicated Buende until the boys in the Buende too were forced to become ED members1 The Buende then found their own watchwords ado4ted sometimes with minor changes by those they had thought of as IhoodlumsI on the march1 I:nly what is eternally young is to find its homeland in our Germany I 8chirach said and the eternally young if they too7 a 4ro4erly reverent attitude were given a warm and well-organiHed welcome when they visited Germany after (*)) from whatever country they camee<ce4t for Dews of course1 The songs of the Eitler,ugend were less than welcoming when they dealt with the Dews1 :ne of them went to the tune of the student song ISocrates= SocratesPI: L In (*)& '* 4er cent of the ED were factory wor7ers or mechanics ($ 4er cent were in business (& 4er cent in school and the rest came from a scattering of occu4ations and many were unem4loyed1 =Blose o2. cit1 41 (+1 Arno Bloenne Hitler>ugen) MEannover and 6ran7furt a1M1: Norddeutsche Gerlagsanstalt :1 Goedel (*00N 41 ((1>

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page_2$2 #age &*& : friends listen to the ballad :f what ha44ened long ago -hen there governed here before us The system the system1 .urly hair croo7ed nose Ee ran around in this land And thought himself strong and 4owerful Isidor Isidor1 After a few stanHas devoted to the misdeeds of the .atholics and ca4italists came the climactic stanHa: Now Michel is master in his house And within it?s comfortable again The others fled the country !migrantP !migrantP (' 8uch songs 4ro4erly belonged to the movement for the Eitler,ugend had been given its name by none other than Dulius 8treicher1 Eitler himself 8chirach said had thought of having a youth movement in the #artyall the 4arties in the early twenties had them including the 8ocial Democrats and the .ommunists and in Austria they formed 4art of the National 8ocialist movement1 Burt Gruber who had long been identified with nationalist youth organiHations in (*&' had founded the first grou4 of young National 8ocialists1 -hen Gruber first met Eitler in the early twenties he started a youth brigade he called the Dungsturm and in (*&0 he was head of the grandiosely named Greater German ;outh Movement1 The story of the founding of the ED is told somewhat differently by a man who 7new the 4rinci4al figures among the early NaHis1 Albert Brebs who was Gauleiter of Eamburg when Eitler cast him out of the #arty in (*)& had been a member of the 4re-Eitler youth movement and he said that Arnold #eters a seventeen-year-old boy from a wor7er?s family was the originator of the ED1 #eters had belonged to the Fed 6alcons and later to the 8ocialist -or7ers? ;outh =8oHialistische Arbeiter,ugend> and when at seventeen he became a convinced National 8ocialist he was too young to ,oin the #arty1 #eters therefore 4ro4osed to the #arty leadershi4 that they establish a "nion of German -or7ing ;outh without any direct connection with the #arty although the youth would be 4re4ared for their future roles as #arty members1 #eters began to enlist his members at the same time as #arty circles in Munich were 4lanning a Eitler ;outh1 #eters declined to change the name of this grou4 to any of those suggested by his elders =The Defense of ;outh was one suggestionC another was The ;outh 8A>1 Eess and Brebs agreed with #eters as far as the organiHational 4lan went but Eess wanted the name ??Eitler ;outhI ado4ted and eventually he turned the 4ractical decisions over to Gruber and to 6ranH von #feffer who between May (*&' and (*)$ was head of the 8A1 #feffer saw in the ED an o44ortunity to feed

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page_2$3 #age &*) new recruits into his legions of the 8A and Gruber who was in the s4orting goods business saw the chance to sell more brown shirts canteens drums and so on1 Brebs who was then leader of the :rtsgru44e Eamburg was instructed either to bring the Eamburger "nion of -or7ing ;outh into the ED or to dissolve them1 Brebs obeyed1 But #eters refused and that was the end of his organiHation1 (+ Gruber and #feffer?s 4rogram for the Eitler,ugend was intended to ma7e them ??honorably hard I able to battle ideologically and with their fists against the members of the Buende and they succeeded1 Their boys were a raw grou4 outwardly disci4lined and s4oiling for a fight as they marched or filled the great tent encam4ment at the (*)$ #arty celebration in Nuremberg1 8chirach saw the Eitler,ugend differently1 Ne<t to the 6uehrer he best loved culture and he had great faith in the 4ower of highsounding 4hrases tableaus and indoctrination through dramatics1 Ee had never belonged to the Eitler,ugend but he @uic7ly made u4 for his lac7 of formal training by instinctive feeling for that which was necessary to accom4lish what he and the 6uehrer so ardently desireda huge cadre of German youth that would be 4re4ared for the dangerous life of the single-minded un@uestioning #arty member in the Third Feich1 Gruber and #feffer wanted young 8A menC 8chirach wanted the soldiers of the future the men who would one day if all went well rule Germany and !uro4e in the name of the 6uehrer and in unconditional obedience to him1 8chirach?s ideological contribution as far as he had one was what he borrowed from 9ietHa youth state1 The Eitler,ugend u4 to his time was merely a grou4 of youth cells an ad,unct of the 8A under men who li7e #feffer were far more concerned with the organiHation of adults than of the young1 The 8A had been the first seedbed of the ED and thus 8chirach found himself in (*)( under Foehm who had succeeded #feffer as head of the 8A1 8chirach e<4lained to Eitler the need for an inde4endent youth movement and he cited the various slogans he had 4ic7ed u4 to further his causeIyouth must be inde4endent I Iyouth must lead youth1I 8ince Eitler always li7ed a multi4licity of organiHations and was already becoming dubious of Foehm?s 4retentions to 4ower he was easily 4ersuaded1 It was 8chirach who established the Eitler ;outh in the image the Nuremberg tribunal and the world outside Germany found so obno<ious1 The boys and girls 4aid membershi4 fees until the start of the war and until (*)' ,oined voluntarily1 After (*)' membershi4 was com4ulsory but actually not all young 4eo4le were forced to ,oin until (*)*1 !ven then this was true only for the small towns and villagesC in the bigger cities it was sometimes 4ossible to esca4e the movement or even to carry on a resistance within it des4ite the close watch maintained by the ED 8treifendienst and other 4olicing organiHations1 After the #arty came to 4ower it did not ta7e 8chirach long to move in on the rival youth organiHations1 :n A4ril 0 (*)) in enthusiastic imitation of their elders? raids on the enemies of the #arty members of the Eitler,ugend

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page_2$4 #age &*/ began their invasions of the head@uarters and local offices of the Buende1 In Berlin on that day the head@uarters of the Feich .ommittee of the German ;outh Grou4s =Feichsausschuss der deutschen Dugendverbaende> which was headed by General 9udwig Gogt were occu4ied1 The organiHation had many 8ocial Democrats in leading 4ositions but in any event no rival organiHations in any form were to be tolerated1 It was in 4art a ludicrous 4erformanceC one little Eitler boy who had the tas7 of standing guard over a woman secretary of the Buende as7ed her 4ermission to throw into her wastebas7et the wra44ing of a sandwich he had brought with him1 The .ommunist #arty and its youth organiHations had already been forbidden and the leaders arrested1 The center of the 8ocialist -or7ers ;outh Movement was also ta7en over by a ??roll commandoI of the Eitler,ugend who among other things made off with ('$ weather4roof ,ac7ets1 The members of the nationalist 8charnhorst "nion were allowed for a time to 7ee4 their uniforms but they had to wear ED armbands1 They too were forced to come under the control of 8chirach in the same way as their elders in the 8tahlhelmthe organiHation of former German frontline soldierswere incor4orated into the 8A1 The Grossdeutscher Bund under Admiral Adolf von Trotha made u4 of a grou4 of nationalistic youth organiHations was ordered dissolved on Dune (+ (*)) the day 8chirach was named Feich youth leader1 A great Lager of the Grossdeutscher Bund held in Dune was its last formal ceremony1 The boys sang the old song of the resisters ILever )ot als Slav I and IEine feste Burg ist unser 6ott I but the encam4ment was surrounded by 4olice and 88 and the boys were sent home1 (% Trotha a friend of Eindenburg?s 4rotested1 Ee wrote a letter to Eitler and tried to 4ersuade Eindenburg to intervene1 As a result he became a sus4icious 4ersonC his house was searched and his activities carefully scrutiniHed1 But later in (*)' Trotha made his 4eaceC he acce4ted an honorary fuehrershi4 in the Navy Division of the ED1 General Gogt too discreetly moved over from the head@uarters of the German ;outh Grou4s to the ED and received the gold medal of the Eitler ;outh in recognition of his decision1L The offices of these organiHations of the former Buende were all occu4ied and their ban7 accounts seiHed1 Most of the leaders of the Buende had already ta7en cover1 6ive leaders of the Deutsche 6reischar on March % (*)) announced they had ,oined the Eitler,ugendC its national leaders declared no one who had not found a 4lace in National 8ocialist Germany could remain a member in the 6reischar1(* The e<ecutive committee of the Grossdeutscher Bund on A4ril (0 (*)) decided that its members should ,oin the Eitler,ugend ho4ing in this way to 7ee4 their young 4eo4le under their own leadershi41 8ome leaders of the other Buende organiHations @uic7ly got ,obs in the Eitler,ugend which was sorely in L In (*)/ ($$ $$$ ED need of leaders1 8ome ,oined the 8A some the 88 and some a who had attended the #otsdam meeting in (*)& received this honor =Blose o2. cit1 41 &0>1

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page_2$ #age &*0 very few went into the Fesistance where they continued to meet secretly with their boys1 Many of these youth leaders and the boys too ended u4 in concentration cam4s1 &$ The Boy 8couts were allowed to continue until (*)/ because 8chirach thought their connections with foreign countries might be useful to the EDC but they too had to be dissolved and their membershi4 ta7en into the ED1 The #rotestant youth organiHations ca4itulated more @uic7ly than the .atholic ones because the latter were for a time 4rotected by the concordat which Eitler made with the Gatican on Duly &* (*))1 But the .atholics too soon found themselves under heavy fire they could not withstand1 9i7e the #rotestants many of them went over to the Eitler,ugend of their own accordC some of the 4riests and higher clergy urged their 4arishioners to let their children ,oin the Eitler,ugend because they saw the danger of staying out or because they were carried away by the National 8ocialist fervor1 There was much tal7 of the necessity of ta7ing 4art in the new movement1 :ne writer said it would be ??de4lorable if a young German were to stand aside now with his hands in his 4oc7ets 1 1 1 instead of 4artici4ating with his whole heart in the new start of the nation1IL&( In one way or another the clergy acce4ted 8chirach?s statement of his own belief in the need for unity1 Ee had said II belong to no confession neither #rotestant nor .atholic1 I believe only in Germany1I The #rotestants sometimes as7ed for their own dissolution1 The magaHine Evangelium im ritten /eich ran an article in 8e4tember (*)) declaring that the young 4eo4les? organiHations of the churches should be dissolved1&& 6or it soon became a44arent that 8chirach and his #arty were not going to 4ermit a double membershi4 in any youth organiHationevery notion of o44osition had to be eliminated1 Double membershi4 which by then was allowed only to .atholic youth was finally forbidden by 8chirach on A4ril (% (*)+ and that was to mean the end of the se4arate .atholic youth organiHations1&) 8chirach?s attac7 on his rivals was unrelenting1 Eis most 4owerful 4ro4aganda wea4on against a grou4 he wished to destroy against the so-called Icultural bolshevistsI the NaHis detested was characteristic of the National 8ocialist attac7 on the aesthetics of any non-#arty members on anyone who a44roved of modern art or 4ainting or literature or who did not show the 4ro4er enthusiasm for the cultural accom4lishments of the #arty1 All Buende members were accused of Icultural bolshevismI and of the 4olitical variety tooC both #rotestant and .atholic organiHations were denounced for harboring the remnants of the bolshevists who had been driven underground1 8chirach said in (*)) when he forbade membershi4 in the Buende that its L The #rotestant surrender was s4eeded by the agreement youth movement was Ibolmade between 8chirach and the NaHi Feich Bisho4 9udwig Mueller =see 6ric7 .ha4t1 +> in December (*)) which declared that the #rotestant youth grou4s were all to go over to the Eitler,ugend1 :ther #rotestant ministers such as #astor Niemoeller and -uerttemberg 9andesbischof -urm o4enly o44osed the #arty and all its wor7s including its youth movement but such outs4o7en men were few1

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page_2$! #age &*' shevism ?? and as the attac7 mounted against the .atholics he re4eated this accusation until in (*)% the .atholic youth movement suffered the same fate as the #rotestant and was formally forbidden1 But long before then the 4ressures were difficult to resist1 In these years when unem4loyment was still a bitter 4roblem an a44rentice got a ,ob more @uic7ly if he was a member of the Eitler,ugend1 :nly Eitler,ugend members got 4riHes for their school wor71 &/ In Eesse in (*)) the head of an artisans? guild of s7illed wor7ers told 4arents that their duty was to enroll their sons and daughters in the EDonly those youth who did ,oin the statement said could be e<4ected to be trained as a44rentices1&0 Any attem4t to stay out of the ED was dangerous1 In -iesbaden on May ) (*/( the fuehrer of Bann %$ sent out the following summons: IThe ED comes to you today with the @uestion: why are you still outside the ran7s of the EDO -e ta7e it that you acce4t our 6uehrer Adolf Eitler1 But you can only do this if you also acce4t the ED created by him1 If you are for the 6uehrer therefore for the ED then sign the enclosed a44lication1 If you are not willing to ,oin the ED then write us that on the enclosed blan71I&' This blan7 was a form calling for the signature of the father and son and a statement of where they both were em4loyed1 In effect writing out reasons for not ,oining was a44lying to a concentration cam41 .ontests were held among the schools which obtained flags as soon as they had enrolled *$ 4er cent of their 4u4ils in the Eitler,ugend1 8igns in a factory warned young a44rentices that they could be dismissed from trade schools if they had not ,oined the German -or7 6ront =DA6 Deutsche Arbeitsfront> and to ,oin the DA6 one had to be a member of the ED1&+ There was also a threat to im4ose a deadline for ,oining the Eitler,ugendC if one were not in it in time he or she might be barred forever from membershi4 and then every career and every 4ossibility of further study would be closed1 9eaders were needed to ta7e care of the huge influ< of new members1 In (*)& there had been (& $$$ leadersC by (*)/ they numbered )'+ $$$C by (*)' =when membershi4 in the ED became com4ulsory> /*' $$$C and two years later in (*)% +&$ $$$1 These however were 4eo4le who gave some s4are time to leading the Eitler,ugendC some % $$$ were full-time carefully trained members of its leadershi4 staff1&% These men and women were efficiently indoctrinated1 They s4ent eight wee7s wor7ing in a s4ecial training school one year in a leadershi4 academy three wee7s in an industry outside Germany and si< months in industry inside Germany1 8choolteachers floc7ed to the ED in drovesC it was not easy for them to stay outside the most im4ortant concerns of their charges and the activities of the Eitler,ugend always too7 4recedence over any notions of formal education1 NaHi Germany vibrated with #arty activity and whenever drives were organiHed marches were held1 In any 7ind of #arty or national celebration the boys and girls were not

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page_2$" #age &*+ su44osed to bother about attending classesthat would have been intellectualism something NaHis hated as much as cultural bolshevism1 !very young 4erson was to be in the Eitler,ugend and it was to have something for everyone1 The Dungvol7 and Dungmaedel learned arts and craftsC the -im2fe collected for the !interhilfeC in (*)% 0$ $$$ boys were enrolled in the Naval "nitC *$ $$$ in the Motor .or4sC +% $$$ in the 6lying .or4s where model 4lanes were made by the Dungvol7 and the older boys learned to fly gliders and sail 4lanes and studied the rudiments of navigation1 An intensely active life was offered the boys and girls1 MagaHines were 4ublished: er -im2f and as >unge eutschlan)= %ungvolkC for the girls The 6erman 6irl 3 as eutsche Mae)el> and 6irls 'our !orl) 3Mae)chen Eure !elt5M The 'oung !orl) 3 ie >unge !elt5= ie Hitler>ugen)1 &* :ne 4ublication a44eared under the aus4ices of the ;outh Eostel Association'outh an) Homelan) 3%ugen) un) Heimat51 Another a44ealed to the music lovers among the youngMusic in 'outh an) "olk 3Musik in %ugen) un) +olk5. !ill an) -o,er 3!ille un) Macht5 was 4ublished for the youth leaders1 There was even a 4ublication for the deafThe Source 3 ie Juelle5and magaHines were 4rinted in braille for the blind1)$ The Eitler,ugend had its own news service and as the boundaries of the Feich e<4anded it established another one for the !ast the Ost)ienst covering Austria .Hechoslova7ia the Baltic countries #oland ;ugoslavia and Fumania1 Both the female guardians of the Bund Deutscher Maedel and the male leaders were trained for their ma,or tas7: indoctrinating their charges with National 8ocialist morality1 They 7e4t the children busy at a thousand small tas7s intended to divert and entertain them many of the 7ind they would have been engaged in any youth organiHation but the one overriding 4ur4ose drilled incessantly into the Eitler,ugend was their ultimate duty of allegiance unto death to the 6uehrer1 ??-e were born to die for Germany I was one of the watchwords and this is what the boys learned to do1 The 88 #anHer Division Eitler,ugend made u4 only of members of the organiHation was almost totally destroyed in (*// at .aenC thousands of them 8chirach related had fought brilliantly at 8evasto4oland had died there too1 The normal routine of the Eitler,ugend filled the wee71 In addition to the cam4s and hi7ing tri4s evenings s4ent together at the youth homes =Heimaben)e> were devoted to lectures and hobbies and story tellingC films were shown at small cost&$ 4fennigs1 -hen the war came boys and girls collected old clothes and bones and 4a4erC -im2fe struggled under loads of blan7ets and overcoats sacrificed for the troo4s fighting in FussiaC girls visited the wounded and sang for them handed out coffee and food at railroad stations too7 care of traveling mothers and their children1 After Eitler too7 4ower no 4ublic demonstration in the Feich could be held

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page_2$# #age &*% without the uniformed boys and girls1 They marched they ran errands they trudged off to encam4ments sometimes they went on long tri4s =6ross;fahrten>in (*)* from -est4halia to Gienna for e<am4leand some even went to foreign countries until the war 4ut an end to such e<cursions1 The movement was intended to give a new meaning to the life of the children and young 4eo4le to loosen their ties to the church to the family if they were not fanatical NaHis and to the 4ast1 It had the same aims as the .ommunist youth movement and in certain ways was modeled on it: the antireligious 4ro4aganda the reverence for the leader the idealiHed notion of the selflessness of the individual who ta7es on meaning only as 4art of a grou4 the em4hasis on mass e<ercises1 But the role of German women was very different from that of women in the 8oviet "nion1 These German girlsin the small bourgeois image of women that Eitler had grown u4 with to which were added the racial 4ur4oses of the Third Feichwere to be good and 4rolific German mothersC many a family was horrified to learn that a daughter was also getting a head start in res4onding to this e<hortation of the 6uehrer1 6or Eimmler and Bormann were not always 4reaching to deaf ears when they s4o7e of the duty of the German woman to bear racially sound children and the unim4ortance of whether this was accom4lished in or out of wedloc71 Lebensborn the well-organiHed and efficient 88 home for unwed mothers who were vastly 4raised by the Eimmlers and Bormanns and their female counter4arts got some of its clientele from girls of the Bund Deutscher Maedel who had come under the influence of a leader who urged them to do their share in the tas7s assigned the women of the Third Feich1 :ne of the boo7s 8chirach wrote was called /evolution in E)ucation )( in which this is what he said he was trying to accom4lish: ??They Mthe youthN re4resent not their interests but the well being of the nation 1 1 1 Nothing for ourselves everything for Germany1I IThe Eitler ;outh is a 4hiloso4hical educational community 1 1 1 Mthe memberN a soldier of an idea1I The most 4romising soldiers of the idea chosen from among the boys with outstanding records in the Dungvol7 were to be sent at the age of twelve to the Adolf Eitler schools which were established on Danuary (+ (*)+ by the 6uehrer1 These schools were 4art of the Eitler,ugend 4art of the vast 4rogram of indoctrination and the boys and their teachers a44eared in classroom in uniform1 All e<4enses of the boys in theory were 4aid1L -hen they got their di4lomas at the age of eighteen the decree founding the schools declared: I!very career of the #arty and the 8tate is o4en to them1I The Adolf Eitler schools were intended to be the 4reschools for the :rdensburgen which were the final training 4laces for the elite cadres of the #arty whose members would one day ta7e 4art in ruling the Feich and if all went well L This was true only in theoryC in 4ractice the 4arents were e<4ected to ma7e contributions to the Adolf Eitler S2en)e =Dietrich :rlow I ie A)olf Hitler Schulen I in +iertel >ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TIII No1 ) (*'0 441 &+/%/>1

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page_2$$ #age &** much of !uro4e1 Three :rdensburgen were established: at Broessinsee in #omerania Gogelsang in the Fhineland and 8onthofen in the Allgaeuer Al4s1 In a s4artan environment the students =Or)ens>unker> were given a vigorous three-year training 4rogram to be followed by another half year in Marienburg in #russia1 The Or)ens>unker were to marry as soon as 4ossiblenot later than twenty-five yearsso the race could have the full benefit of their breeding1 )& The Adolf Eitler schools had a varied curriculum1 The boys were given the usual academic sub,ects but in addition they had intensive courses in 4hysical conditioning and #arty ideology1 :f the first grou4 that got its Abitur in (*/& '+ 4er cent chose #arty service as a career and only ($ 4er cent wanted to be -ehrmacht officers1)) They were carefully chosen from -im2fe whose families were racially and 4olitically im4eccable and who had been nominated by their local youth leaders to the territorial leader1 Great em4hasis was laid on tests of strength and courage but the academic curriculum was much the same as that in the other Oberschule1 8tudents were allowed considerable freedom in classC their teacher was not as in most German schools merely a su4erior but was su44osed to be a friend and comrade as well1 The boys got no mar7s but at the end of the year had to ta7e 4art in a ty4ically NaHi ??4erformance com4etition1I There was no religious educationC as one of the chief NaHi 4edagogues said IThe right of the 4eo4le brea7s the right of the church 1 1 1 the right of the Gol7 alone is God?s right1I)/ The Eitler,ugend reached a membershi4 in (*)* of almost nine million1 A reasonably good 4erformance in it was essential for a boy or girl to be allowed to enter any university or technical school and many 4ositions before membershi4 was com4ulsory were de4endent on having belonged to it1 Teaching for e<am4le could not be left to those who had not been fully indoctrinatedC every teacher who came into the school system who had been young enough to be eligible for the Eitler,ugend had to show his card1 The movement had its own 4olice forcethe 8treifendienstwhich was started in (*)/ and which by an agreement made in (*)% between 8chirach and Eimmier was to be regarded as a 4re-88 service that would lead its members directly at the age of eighteen into one of the branches of the 88: the Gerfuegungstru44en =later the -affen 88> the Dun7er schools or the Toten7o4f units1 The latter although the boys in the 8treifendienst did not 7now it were to be used as guards in the concentration cam4s1 The 8treifendienst was from the beginning a ,uvenile model of the 88 4olice system intended to ferret out cons4iracy among the young to detect those who were critical of or who o44osed the regime and to s4ot children who failed to ,oin the ED1 Members of the 8treifendienst visited beer halls and 4atrolled railroad stationsC they su4ervised encam4mentsC they 7e4t order1 :ne illegal cartoon that a44eared surre4titiously in (*)+ showed the 8treifendienst combing the countryside for youthful malefactors and four

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page_300 #age )$$ hus7y 4atrolmen guarding a s7inny little boy who was being led by one of them with a ro4e1 It was a youthful secret service and military 4olice designed to do for the ED what the 8i4o and 8D did for the country at large1 )0 Duvenile crime went down in the early years of the National 8ocialist ta7e-over1 Abortions almost disa44eared =in (*/$ there were less than a third of what there had been in (*)(> as the #arty 4reached the glory of motherhood in and out of wedloc71 8ecret re4orts give a great deal of s4ace to homose<uality in the Eitler,ugend which the NaHi e<4erts blamed on the Buendist 4ast of many of the Eitler,ugend and their leaders1 Total crimes committed by young 4eo4le in (*)) and (*)/ were twothirds of the number in (*)&1 The figures gradually rose however and new crimes were committed that had not been 4unishable under the -eimar Fe4ublic: /assenschan)e or shaming the race that is having se<ual intercourse with any of the inferior races such as #oles Dews Fussians and l<se ma>est<ma7ing any 7ind of derogatory remar7 about the 6uehrer or the #arty1 Fobbery went u4 with the blac7outsC se<ual offenses rose with the start of the war when girls found it daring and e<citing to visit the neighborhoods of factories and troo4 centers to find themselves a 4artner for the night1 Money seems to have 4layed a minor role in these encounters1 The girls themselves were often well 4aid in factories where they were doing war wor7C many of them as the confidential re4orts show were very young from thirteen to fifteen years old1 8ome of them committed /assenschan)e the re4orts said with #oles in a nearby cam41)' :n the whole the ED did a thorough ,ob of indoctrination of its youth1 It selected whatever seemed useful from the -andervoegel and the Buendethe ,ourney the cam4fire the singing the comradeshi4and added the doses of idealism that were so dear to 8chirach?s heart1 ??Nothing for ourselves everything for Germany I as he said1 But it was not Germany that gave the youth their 4ur4ose but Eitler1 The magaHine -im2f in its issue of 8e4tember (*/$ 4resented its readers with a 4rose 4oem on Ithe gentle hand of the 6uehrer1I It read: INow all German hearts belong to the 6uehrer1 Eis hand is the fate of our fatherland1 All that ha44ens that determines our 4resent is his will 1 1 1 The hand of our 6uehrer leads us 1 1 1I A boo7 of tales 4ublished in (*)0 for the ED 6efolgschaft =the /etinue> gave its readers as a battle cry: INo one shall live after the 9eader?s death1I)+ That was what the Eitler,ugend was intended to 4roducea 6efolgschaft for the 6uehrerand every move the boys and girls madeeven their 4laywas 4art of an ideological 4rogram1 The -arole of the S2orts)ienst was: I9et us 4raise what ma7es hardI =I6elobt sei ,as hart machtI>1 Eitler had said in (*)0 I;outh must be swift as greyhounds tough as leather and hard as Bru44 steel1IL)% And L The words also a44ear in Mein (am2f when he was writing about the early #arty members1

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page_301 #age )$( another time he told his listeners ??In my :rdensburgen a youth will grow u4 that will terrify the world1I )* 8chirach and his organiHation did all they could to fit their charges to the 4rescri4tions1 I;our body belongs to your nation I the boys and girls were toldC I;ou have the duty to be healthy1I /$ 8chirach a master of kitsch named (*)* as Ithe year of the duty to be healthy1I The Eitler,ugend could be a desolate succession of com4ulsory events for many members but the Dungvol7 and the Dungmaedel on the whole had a good time1 Many of their leaders came from the Buende and the old habits of solicitude for their young charges 4ersisted1 -hen a child bred on his march his leaders often too7 the occasion to sto4 and rest and chat and sometimes to shoulder the heavy 4ac7s1 The hi7e of the Dungvol7 was less organiHed less li7e a military formation than that of the ED and both the -im2f and the Dungmaedel en,oyed the world of cam4ing with its camaraderie and its relatively light duties1 The boys sle4t sometimes in barns sometimes in tents but tents were forbidden the Dungmaedel who were assigned more substantial shelter1 6or all ages the cam4fire of the -andervogel and the Buende remained the focus of the ritual a magic center of light and shadow that made even the set s4eeches different from those of the Heimaben)e1 In a forest clearing or on the shore of a la7e or sea the children huddled together singing often absurd songs about how they would deal with the rotten bones of the enemies of the 6uehrerC but they sat in the firelight with the night all around them certain that they at least were warm and e<alted among the children of the earth 4art of a great movement that would bring ever more glory to their fatherland and its leader1 The Dungvol7 and Dungmaedel es4ecially were an obedient army of boys and girlsC they esca4ed the tougher more dee4ly indoctrinated leaders of their older brothers and sisters1 It was mainly in the s4ecial services of the Eitler,ugend 4ro4erin the ED Navy Motor .or4s and 6lying "nitsthat something of the freedom and s4irit of 4lay of the Dungvol7 still remained1 6or the ED the fire was not only a center of the cam4 but also a 4lace where school ca4s were burned to demonstrate the new solidarity of youth as o44osed to the 4articularism of geogra4hy or income or statusC and boo7s could be burned in them too as the children learned1 .hildren of all ages were useful to the economy1 Boys and girls wor7ed on farmsC they were needed es4ecially during the war to hel4 gather the harvest and to hand out ration boo7s1 Girls wor7ed in stores that were shorthandedC they too7 care of childrenC they were trained in first aid and acted as medical assistants and as air-raid wardens1 The boys when the war started were also on service during air-raid alarms and as fire fightersC their training led them easily to fit in wherever they were neededfinally into the soldier clothes that often were much too big for them but in which they fought valiantly far too well for their own or Germany?s good1 8chirach was in charge of all youth education outside the schools and as

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page_302 #age )$& ty4ical of his sentimental notions he established in (*)+ a s4ecial branch of the BDM the BDM !erk or section called 6aith and Beauty =6laube un) Schoenheit>1 Girls from the ages of seventeen to twenty-one were intended to enter this branch of the ED to develo4 their s4iritual and 4hysical graces1 It was a volunteer 4lan that was never fully realiHed because of the war1 The girls were to ta7e 4art in a common 4rogram of wor7 and 4lay to become 4riHe e<hibits of the National 8ocialist ideal of woman1 They could go to dances but on such occasions they were su44osed to wear the holiday dress of the BDM that was shown for the first time at the Nuremberg #arty Days1 Ten to fifteen girls belonged to a ??wor7 communityI =an Arbeitsgemeinschaft> a number of which in turn made u4 a grou41 The girls wore BDM uniforms on all occasions had calisthenics and s4orts together 4erformed health services 4layed music and did house and farm wor71 The 6aith and Beauty 4rogram was intended to 4ermit the thoroughly indoctrinated girls to glide effortlessly into the 6rauenschaft when they became twenty-one years old1 It might have done so were it not for the war and the need to engage in sterner tas7s1 The 6laube un) Schoenheit handboo7 for (*/) has reci4es in itC the calendar tells what day Goering and 6rederic7 the Great were born when 6rance signed the armistice in (*/$ when Eerbert Nor7us was 7illedC it is illustrated with 4ictures of Baldur von 8chirach his successor Arthur A<mann and Adolf Eitler?s motherC and the te<t has hints on how to wash materials and how to color !aster eggs and accounts of how one girl felt as she sang with her grou4 to wounded soldiers1 :ther s7etches tell how the 4ower of #aris over women?s fashions has been bro7en in favor of sensible clothes for womenC another combining both 6aith and Beauty advises the girls to loo7 in the mirror a good deal to study themselves so they can be convinced bearers of German culture1 IThe time of the small middle-class servile modest German girl is over and 6laube un) Schoenheit has underta7en the education of women so that the coming generations will be free to create from their sure instincts 1 1 1I At the far end of the s4ectrum of 6aith and Beauty was the so-called Eay Action a 4lan to bring boys between the ages of ten to fourteen from the occu4ied territories of 8oviet Fussia to the Feich1 Although he had ceased to be active head of the Eitler,ugend in (*/$ 8chirach was accused at Nuremberg of com4licity in this 7idna44ing o4eration because in (*/) when the Eay Action too7 4lace he was still on 4a4er the highest official of the youth movement in the Feich =his title was De4uty to the 6uehrer for the Ins4ection of the Eitler ;outh>1 6or si< months in (*/$ 8chirach served in the German Army rising from cor4oral to lieutenant1 At the end of the 6rench cam4aign he was summoned to a conference with Eitler who told him he wanted him to be Governor and Gauleiter of Gienna1 8chriach was to 7ee4 his #arty offices to continue as Feich leader of youth education and to remain res4onsible for the Eitler,ugend to the 6uehrer1 Eis assistant Arthur A<mann was chosen to ta7e his

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page_303 #age )$) 4lace as full-time /eichs>ugen)fuehrer and 8chirach his wife and four children moved to the governor?s 4alace in the city which they @uic7ly ado4ted as their own1 Gienna?s cultural tradition the 4restige of his office the high style in which the 8chirachs livedseventeen servants 8chirach?s enemies 4ointed out were re@uired to run his household and this in wartimesoon made Gienna very dear to the 8chirachs1 But Gienna was his downfall1 8chirach had so many ,obs he could be accused of 4artici4ating in almost all the ini@uities that too7 4lace: of com4licity in the Eay Action because he was still the youth leader of the trans4ortation of the Dews to the !ast from Gienna because he was Governor and Gauleiter of the city and of the use of slave labor in his administrative area1 Eis activities in Gienna also 4ut him in dee4 trouble with the 6uehrer1 The court in its ,udgment did not dwell on 8chirach?s res4onsibility for the Eay ActionC it merely said he had 7nown about it1 Actually he had only the remotest connection with it1 The action began in Duly (*//C its name came from the initial letters of heimatlos= elternlos= unterkunftslos which described swarms of Fussian children without a country or families or shelter who were living somehow behind the German lines begging stealing and staying alive as best they could1 Their 4arents either had gone to the wor7 battalions of the Germans or had fled to territory held by the 8oviet "nion or to the 4artisans1 The children wandered in hungry droves through the countryside in much the same way the ragged bands of or4hans after the revolution of (*(+ had lived for years off the land and streets of the 8oviet "nion until the Government finally rounded them u41 In (*// these children were not only a 4roblem for the German armies they were a danger1 8ome of them were used by the 4artisans to bring information on the German units and at best it was im4ossible to 4rovide for their care and safety at a time when the -ehrmacht was feeling the full weight of the Fussian counteroffensives1 :lder boys and girls had been recruited as hel4ers for the 9uftwaffe the :rganiHation Todt and the 88C they could move with the troo4s in the often 4reci4itate retreatsC but the younger ones were only a burden1L 8chirach had been in charge of founding settlements for German children as far as 4ossible from the threat of the air raids and the fighting1 In (*/) the Germans attem4ted to do much the same thing for the Fussian children by establishing under the Eitler,ugend the Feich -elfare :rganiHation and Fosenberg?s :rganiHation !ast children?s villages where the children would L As late as the s4ring of (*// the 88 called on boys and girls to ,oin u4 as ??an 88 hel4er for a new and more beautiful homeland in a united !uro4e with unity freedom and ,ustice 1 1 1 ;ou can loo7 forward to a ha44y and fortunate future 1 1 1 be in the advance guard in rebuilding your own country 1 1 1 Adolf Eitler calls you1 8how yourself worthy of his confidence1I If not enough young 4eo4le volunteered they were drafted1 In (*///0 there were &( $$$ of these 88 hel4ers and )/ *$$ were in the 9uftwaffe =Fobert EerHog Besat0ungsver,altungen in )en beset0ten Ostgebieten 8tudien des Instituts fuer BesatHungsfragen in Tuebingen Hu den deutschen BesetHungen im &1 -elt7rieg Nr1 (* Tuebingen (*'$>1

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page_304 #age )$/ live together and wor7 on gardening and farm 4ro,ects1 But with the increasing violence of the Fussian attac7 the villages were constantly threatenedC two of them were overrun by 4artisans and German accounts said the children in them had been 7illed1 /( A re4ort from the German Army Grou4 .enter =Eeeresgru44e Mitte> said in mid-(*// that they had /$ $$$ to 0$ $$$ of these children from ten to fourteen in their territory and they wanted them sent to Germany1 There they could be trained as a44rentices and wor7 in various trades1 In addition the 88 memorandum on behalf of the action 4ointed out that their loss would be a damage to 8oviet Fussia?s biological 4otential1/& The Army refused to turn the homeless children over to 8auc7elC a44arently the notion of forced labor for children was too much for the officers of Eeeresgru44e Mitte1 But sending them bac7 to Germany to learn a trade or to the Todt :rganiHation was a tolerable idea1 The Army also 4ro4osed that a number of mothers be sent with the children to Germany but this was never done1 Not many children were sent to the FeichC only between & 0$$ and ) $$$ arrived there before Dune && (*// when the German front bro7e under the onslaught of the new Fussian offensive and the 4ro,ect was abandoned1 The only wor7 the children ever did was 4erformed in their own 7itchens in a cam4 set u4 in a barrac7s at Dessau and in a cam4 where foreign wor7ers were stationed1 8chirach?s 4art in all this was only nominal as was his connection with a similar youth o4eration in (*/)1 8ome ;ugoslav children had been brought to Gienna in that year from 8erbia where they had been housed in a 4olice barrac7sC they 4erformed odd ,obs wor7ing in the 7itchen shining shoes ta7ing over other small household dutiesa 4recursor to the Eay Action1 8chirach as the court said had 7nown of these cases1 Ee was still head of the youth of the Feich and as such he had a formal connection with the 4art the Eitler,ugend 4layed in the Eay Action1 It had sent both male and female leaders to the !ast to hel4 in the ,ob of rounding u4 and ta7ing care of the Fussian children1 -ith the lurid 4icture of 8auc7el?s ??actionsI before the court as well as the e<4licit statement of Army Grou4 .enter that these children too were to be sent by force to wor7 for German masters the case on its face seemed blac7 enough to warrant the charge against 8chirach1 In truth however neither 8chirach nor the Army nor Fosenberg?s organiHation nor the German -elfare :rganiHation seemed to have done anything in this instance that could be called criminal1 8chirach had a much closer connection with other crimes against humanity1 As Governor Defense .ommissioner and Gauleiter of Gienna he too7 a leading 4art in the de4ortation of Dews from the city1 At a meeting in :ctober (*/$ at which Eitler and Bormann were 4resent 8chirach told 6ran7 as the grou4 was discussing the anti-Dewish measures and 4lans that the General Government would have to ta7e '$ $$$ Dews from Gienna1/) Eitler wanted Gienna which he had always thought es4ecially IDew ridden I to be

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page_30 #age )$0 ??cleansedI of its non-Germanic elements =soon he would demand that all .Hechs also be forced to leave the city>1 In (*/( the trans4orts that would by (*/& lead to the e<termination cam4s were well under way1 The orders came from Eitler the de4ortations were under the command of Eeinrich Eimmler and 8chirach was no more than a dutiful administrator in hel4ing carry them out1 Ee readily admitted at Nuremberg that he had been an anti-8emite from the time he had read Eouston 8tewart .hamberlain?s and Eenry 6ord?s writings and when the Dews of Gienna were shi44ed off he declared that the action was a contribution to !uro4ean culture1 Ee denied at Nuremberg not only in court but 4rivately to his lawyer that he had 7nown that the Dews were destined for the 6inal 8olutionC the shi4ments from Gienna with the NaHis? 4assion for finding seemingly harmless 4hrases for obscene deeds were called Ab,an)erungstrans2orte emigration trans4orts1 The orders were e<4licit that the de4ortations must not be called evacuations or resettlements =&msie)lungen> which were becoming tainted words for the Dews and the collecting centers were to be 7nown as emigration cam4s1 // 8chirach was no doubt telling the truth when he s4o7e of the early stages of the evacuations of the 4eriod (*/$/(the 6inal 8olution began only in (*/&and he had no reason to believe at the beginning that the Dews were being shi44ed to the !ast for any reason but to rid the Feich of them and to send them to ghettos or cam4s where they would wor71 But later in (*/& 8chirach as Defense .ommissioner was on the carefully selected distribution list of 4eo4le who received the wee7ly and monthly re4orts from Eeydrich?s office about the e<terminations and he had to admit at Nuremberg that he had eventually come to 7now what was going on1 8chirach was however no violent anti8emiteC curiously enough considering his high 4osts in the #arty he scarcely mentions Dews in his 4ublished s4eeches to the Eitler,ugend1 The ED sang anti-8emitic songsC they were instructed in their Heimaben)e in the malefactions of world DewryC but 8chirach seems to have had no great interest in the 4roblem1 6rau von 8chirach was accused in #arty re4orts sent to Bormann soon after the 8chirachs went to Gienna of buying a 4air of stoc7ings worth twenty mar7s in a Dewish storea serious misdemeanor for the wife of a Gauleiter1/0 8chirach acce4ted Eitler?s and Eimmler?s decisions in this as in almost all other matters but he too7 no more than a 4assive routine 4art in the trans4orts and in the indoctrination of the German youth1 Ee made no ob,ectionsC he had none to ma7e1 Ee believed that Germany had to be freed of its DewsC and when the 6uehrer decided they were to be 7illed he acce4ted that decision too1 But the 8chirachs were mild-mannered if ambitious 4eo4le and they could be disturbed by brutality when they were eyewitnesses of it1 In late Dune (*/) when 8chirach and his wife were visiting the 6uehrer at Berchtesgaden 6rau von 8chirach who had 7nown Eitler since she was a young girlshe was the daughter of his 4hotogra4her Eeinrich Eoffmantold the 6uehrer

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page_30! #age )$' how revolted she had been when she had chanced to see from her hotel window in Amsterdam a de4ortation of Dewish women who were driven onto truc7s amid shrie7s and blows1 8chirach was already in disfavor with the 6uehrer for s4onsoring an art e<hibit in Gienna that had shown the wor7 of 4ainters 4roscribed in the Feich1 Eitler coldly informed 6rau von 8chirach that she was sentimental and he wanted to hear no more of the story which she had na[vely believed would be news to him1 As for 8chirach Eitler turned savagely against him on this occasion and everything 8chirach said irritated him to the 4oint of fury1 /' Goebbels who was also staying at the Berghof wrote in his diary that he felt sorry for the 6uehrer whose many burdens were only added to by 8chirach?s blundering1/+ It was on this luc7less occasion too that 8chirach ventured to s4ea7 to the 6uehrer about the great cultural tradition of Gienna and his ho4es for the refurbishment of the city when the war was over1 !verything 8chirach said now was a red flag to EitlerC the 6uehrer shouted that Gienna could never com4ete with Berlin that it was a city of second ran7 and would stay that way1 Goebbels wrote that 6rau von 8chirach had tears in her eyes as all their ho4es for a daHHling future for Gienna and no doubt for themselves were dashed1 It was morning when Eitler went to bed and the 8chirachs left the !agle?s Nest that afternoon without seeing him again1 8chirach never came bac7 into favor1 Fumors accumulated that he was to be dismissed from his 4ost1 9ey who had friendly feelings for him visited him in Gienna and warned him of his 4recarious 4osition1 Fe4orts from the 8D told how badly 8chirach was 4erforming his administrative functionsC he was reacting they said to crisis situations as they arose but never leading never ta7ing the res4onsibility to be e<4ected of a Gauleiter1 The #arty re4orts re4eated the old charges that 8chirach was interested in 4olite society not in the 4eo4leC he mistrusted them and they him1/% Fibbentro4 at Nuremberg declared he was 4resent when at the end of (*/) Eimmler told the 6uehrer he wanted to arrest 8chirach and bring him before a 4eo4le?s court1 A re4ort had come from Bormann that 8chirach had called war with the "nited 8tates disastrous for Germany1 The 6uehrer did not act on Eimmler?s suggestion Fibbentro4 said because the arrest and trial of a Governor would ma7e a bad im4ressionC but 8chirach remained in disgrace1 Goering declared at Nuremberg that in (*// he tore u4 a telegram from 8chirach 4ro4osing that Fibbentro4 be dro44ed and a new 6oreign Minister be 4ut in his 4lace because Eitler would have ta7en the 4ro4osal so ill that Goering feared for 8chirach?s safety1 /* 8chirach was so doubtful of his own security that he had a s@uad from the Grossdeutschland Division in which he had served in (*/$ assigned to 4rotect his 4erson against a raid by Eimmler?s 8810$ The rough and tough 88 men too7 no 4ains to conceal their disli7e of him1 ??A -im2f in Gienna I they called him1 :ne informer re4orted that 8chirach said he could not live without his household hel4 because otherwise he would have to 4olish his own shoes and get his own

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page_30" #age )$+ ration boo7sC this remar7 was made at a time when Gienna was being flooded with refugees from the !astern territories the German front lines were colla4sing under the Fussian attac7 and Gienna was not far from the ra4idly advancing 8oviet armies1 0( 8chirach was not a criminalC in another era he might have been a teacher a director of dramatics a boy?s club leader the scoutmaster of a local church1 6rom (*)) on he gladly too7 4art in a regime that he regarded as leading a revolutionary crusade and re,oiced in the high life and the o44ortunity it gave him of 4ersuading himself that he was not only a man of culture but one of the 4owers of enlightenment in a coarse 4lebeian world1 The criminality of the Eitler Government he chose to ignore1 Ee did not li7e the (ristallnachtC he did not want war nor did he want to train his boys as soldiers1 The latter could come later as could war if the world were so foolish as to challenge the 6uehrer?s desire for a strong Germany a Germany which would lead !uro4e1 Ee wanted to serve his adored 6uehrer and to teach others their duty toward him1 The ready-made 4hrases that 4leased him and thousands of other youth leaders seemed the ultimate wisdom to them1 ??;outh must be led by youthIta7en from GoetheI6uehrer order we followIta7en from Eitler: 8chirach as7ed for nothing dee4er or wiser or more telling than such 4rofundities1 Ee was given occasionally to harsh statements that the 4rosecution used with telling effect against him1 -hen Eeydrich was 7illed in .Hechoslova7ia 8chirach 4ro4osed that in retaliation German 4lanes bomb an !nglish cultural center1 8omewhat devious reasoning led him to this conclusion: the British were urging the .Hechs to resist the German occu4ation he said whereas left to themselves the .Hechs and the Germans got on well togetherC therefore the British were res4onsible for Eeydrich?s murder1 8ince culture was always on 8chirach?s mind the worst damage that could be done the British in his estimation was to bomb a historic city1 German estimates of his character were not far wrong1 Ee was indeed no leader e<ce4t of 4eo4le much younger than he1 Ee was a 4olite e<cited uncritical sch,aermerisch admirer of the accom4lishments of the standard authors and artists of Germany1 Ee oversim4lified a world that was too com4licated for him with a sentimental imitation of Eoelderlin?s com4ressed lines 4roducing such insi4id and unins4ired ideas as: IThe flag comes before all1I Believing in Eitler?s greatness he admitted at Nuremberg that he had misled a generation of German youth1 Ee had acce4ted everything the 6uehrer decided1 6orced labor was no 4roblem for himC as Gauleiter of Gienna he coo4erated gladly with 8auc7elC the evacuation of the Dews 4resented only technical 4roblems and cultural advantages1 The court dealt harshly with him1 The tribunal stressed the Anschluss with AustriaC the occu4ation of that country by the Feich it said was a crime that came within the ,urisdiction of the tribunal1 It found 8chirach innocent of 4lanning to commit aggression although it said he had given 4remilitary

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page_30# #age )$% training to the Eitler,ugend1 The court found him guilty of having committed crimes against humanity and sentenced him to twenty years on that count1 The sentence was based on 8chirach?s connection with the de4ortation of the Dews slave labor his 7nowledge of the Eay Action his recommendation that a British cultural center be bombed1 Eis main malefactions however had been directed against his own country not against the Dews or nationals of other nationsC 8chirach saw this better than the court1 The misleading of youth is always a serious crime and it was 8chirach?s chief one1 Ee had not trained his ED for war he had done worse: he had taught them for years that their highest duty was to say ??;ou order my 6uehrerwe follow1I Notes (1 6eli< Faabe ie Buen)ische %ugen) =8tuttgart: Brentano Gerlag (*'(>1 &1 Arno Bloenne Hitler>ugen) =Eannover and 6ran7furt a1M1: Norddeutsche Gerlagsanstalt :1 Goedel (*00>1 )1 Barl Bnoll ie 6esellung )er )eutschen %ugen) in )er 6egen,art1 Dissertation Munich (*'& 41 +'1 /1 Brebs o2. cit 41 &)&1 01 Baldur von 8chirach ie "eier )er Neuen "ront =Munich: Deutscher Gol7sverlag n1d1>1 '1 -erner Blose 6eneration im 6leichschritt =:ldenburg and Eamburg: Gerhard 8talling Gerlag (*'/> 41 +%1 +1 N*A IG (/0%-#8 441 &&&)1 %1 N TIG 441 /%$%(1 *1 Manfred #rie47e ie evangelische %ugen) im ritten /eich (*))(*)' =Eannover and 6ran7furt a1M1: Norddeutsche Gerlagsanstalt :1 Goedel (*'$> 41 */1 ($1 MA /% =IAG>1 ((1 .bi)1 (&1 N TTT &/)'-#8 441 /%%0$&1 ()1 N TTGII (/0%-#8 41 &)%1 (/1 Baldur von 8chirach /evolution )er Er0iehung =Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)%>1 (01 Bloenne o2. cit1 ('1 N TTT &/)'-#8 441 /*+*%1 (+1 Brebs o2. cit1 441 /*0(1 (%1 -alter A1 9a@ueur ie )eutsche %ugen)be,egung =.ologne: Gerlag -issenschaft und #oliti7 (*'&> 41 &(*1 (*1 Barl :1 #aetel I ie )eutsche %ugen)be,egung als 2olitisches -haenomen I in -olitische Stu)ien Duly (*0+ 441 *($1 &$1 Arno Bloenne 6egen )en Strom =Eannover and 6ran7furt a1M1: Norddeutsche Gerlagsanstalt :1 Goedel (*0+>1 &(1 #rie47e o2. cit1

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page_30$ #age )$* &&1 .bi)1 41 '%1 &)1 Bloenne Hitler>ugen)1 &/1 Blose o2. cit1 &01 Bloenne 6egen )en Strom 41 /01 &'1 Blose o2. cit1 41 /+1 &+1 .bi)1 41 /+1 &%1 .bi)1 41 +*1 &*1 .bi)1 41 (0(1 )$1 N TTTII ))/*-#8 441 (*0*+1 )(1 8chirach /evolution )er Er0iehung1 )&1 Fudolf BenHe Er0iehung im 6ross)eutschen /eich =6ran7furt a1M1: MoritH Diesterweg Gerlag (*/)>1 ))1 Blose o2. cit1 41 &$'1 )/1 .bi)1 41 &$%1 )01 Bloenne 6egen )en Strom 41 (&/1 )'1 Feichs,ugendfuehrer ed1 (riminalitaet un) 6efaehr)ung )er %ugen) =Berlin (*/(>1 )+1 Eorst -agenfuehr ed1 6efolgschaft =Eamburg: Eanseatische Gerlagsanstalt (*)0>1 )%1 Blose o2. cit1 41 ($%1 )*1 .bi)1 41 (&&1 /$1 .bi)1 441 ($*($1 /(1 Fobert EerHog Besat0ungsver,altung in )en beset0ten Ostgebieten= Abteilung %ugen) =Tuebingen: Institut fuer BesatHungsfragen (*'$> 41 /'1 /&1 .bi)1 41 /+1 N TTG $)(-#8 441 %%*&1 /)1 N TIG 441 0$*($1 //1 !ichmann ((0&: ??Fe4ort of December &* (*/( on the conversations of the leader of the MDewishN Bulturgemeinde with :bersturmbannfuehrer Brenner signed Dosef 9oewenherHI =Derusalem Israel: Eichmann Trial /ecor) mimeogra4hed (*'(>1 /01 6A *(2'% 41 (0&% =IAG>1 /'1 N TIG 441 /&+&%1 /+1 !D %)2( Dose4h Goebbels: Tagebuch Gol1 I (*/) =un4ublished> =IAG>1 /%1 6A *(2'% 441 (/*$ (0(+ =IAG>1 /*1 8auter 4a4ers =IAG>1 0$1 N TIG 41 /)(1 0(1 6A *(2' 41 (0&$ =IAG>1

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page_310 #age )($ * The #arty the #olice 6orces and the Army ??-e Eave Been Born in BattleI :nly a few years before the twenty-two were brought to trial almost all of them at one time or another had attended a different 7ind of solemn occasion in Nurembergthe #arty days that too7 4lace every year for a wee7 in 8e4tember1 These latter celebrations had started in the early years of the movement with 4arades of the Brownshirts and continued s4oradically until the great victory of (*)) when the #arty too7 over the Government1 Then the #arty days truly began1 The bells of the great cathedrals rang first when the 6uehrer arrived at the railroad station then a wee7 later as he de4arted in an aureole of adoration from the hundreds of thousands of members of #arty formations from all over Germany1 #robably no other country in the world could have suffered such oratory1 The s4eeches were long and re4etitive and when they sto44ed the 4arades started1 The Eitler,ugend 4araded as did the -or7 8ervice with 4ic7s and shovels and delegations re4resenting the new Gaue1 Army regiments marched and Eitler drove slowly in his o4en automobile 4ast the ecstatic crowds1 The onloo7ers including foreigners were often as im4ressed as the 4artici4ants with the athletic well-drilled 4ageant designed to celebrate Germany?s reborn strength although many foreigners and even Germans had difficulty 7ee4ing their brea7fasts down1 These were the unforgettable days when the 6uehrer re4orted on the accom4lishments of the year to his liegemena favorite word of the cult of the 6ermanen that was being established by the Fosenbergs and Eimmlersand they to him1 :n the huge Ae44elin field where thousands could turn and wheel and other thousands loo7 on a great )0$-meter-long tribune was

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page_311 #age )(( erected for Nuremberg was the city of the #arty days of the Feich as Munich was the city of the #arty1 In (*)' the Feich #arty Day of Eonor as the celebration that year was called too7 4lace in this field1L 6or two hours /0 $$$ men of the -or7 8ervice marched by shouldering their shovelsC later at night the torches of the )$ $$$ 4olitical leaders accom4anied by a sea of &0 $$$ flags filed by too and all the #arty great came to march or be marched by to ta7e the salute and to s4ea71 They were all there: Eimmler Baltenbrunner Eess 9ey Goebbels 6ran7 6ritsch of the Army Faeder of the Navy and Goering of the 9uftwaffe Fosenberg and 8treicher of course for this was his home city1 8ince this was a 4eo4le?s holiday half a million celebrants were s4read out over the o4en s4aces1 The s4eeches could be based on facts although they could not mention any of the 4rices 4aid as the #arty too7 over1 By (*)' unem4loyment had gone down steadily until it virtually had disa44earedC conscri4tion started in (*)0 and rearmament accelerated as the 4ublic-wor7s 4ro,ects and then heavy and light industry got under way for war 4roduction1 The Dews and the Bolshevi7s were denounced in Fosenberg?s s4eechC the decisive world battle was being fought he said1 The Bolshevi7s intended to destroy the world to thrust it into a chaotic whirl4ool1 ??Bolshevism is the 4reconcerted attem4t of Dewry to establish its reign over all the 4eo4les1 The battle against it is a world battle in the truest sense of the word in which Adolf Eitler is the historical leader1 There can be no reconciliation between these two e<tremes1 Bolshevism must be destroyed if !uro4e is to be healed1I ( The leader of the German women?s organiHation 6rau 8choltH-Blin7 a blonde middle-aged woman with an unsmiling taut face told how indifferently des4ite the theoretical e@uality of the se<es the Fussians regarded the 4osition of womenC how abortions had been freely 4ermitted in the 8oviet "nion with such a conse@uent low birth rate that the laws had to be changed ma7ing abortions more difficult to obtain1 6rau 8choltH-Blin7 related how in Fussia 8talin called on the 8oviet women to hel4 in the struggle for the victory of bolshevism and she in turn called on German women to do their share in the struggle of good against evil1 Allied with the 6uehrer and other women of the non-Bolshevi7 world they would be able to guarantee 4eace she said1 The 6uehrer re4lied assailing the doctrine of e@ual rights for men and womenC man?s ,ob he said was to 4rotect the whole of the society woman?s was the family her husband her children her home1 The child not the new factories Eitler told them was the symbol of the success of their wor71 No one he shouted could understand the National 8ocialist movement better than the German womanand these words brought forth a thunderous outburst of a44lause1 -hen it subsided 6rau 8choltH-Blin7 4romised in the name of all German women to try in the future to hel4 lighten the 6uehrer?s burdens as far as they could1 LThe celebration of (*)) was called the Feich #arty Day of GictoryC (*)/ was the Day of -illC and (*)0 the Day of 6reedom1

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page_312 #age )(& Ne<t Eitler tal7ed to the Eitler,ugend1 Ee told them how luc7y they were to be living in such momentous times when a new 4rototy4e of beauty was emerging in GermanyC in 4lace of the cor4ulent beer drin7er of the caricaturist?s 4en and the 4hotogra4her?s lens one saw the slender willowy young athletes1 ??It is a stirring time but we should not com4lain I Eitler told them Iwe are used to battles for we have been born in battle we have emerged from battle we want to 4lant our feet in our earth and will succumb to no attac71 And you will be near me if this hour should ever comeP ;ou will stand before me beside me and behind me and will hold our banners highP 1 1 1 -e will be victorious again1I & There was no lac7 of reci4rocal 4raise and one-sided worshi41 To the (($ $$$ men in the Ibrown storm columns I the 8A the 88 the National 8ocialist Motor .or4s and the #arty Air .or4s the 6uehrer shouted IEail my menPI to which they shouted bac7 IEail my 6uehrerPI Then the 6uehrer said II 7now that I have built no useless wor71 It will stand fast and towering in the most distant times McheersN1 Believe me it is indeed wonderful for me to live in this time and to be able to be your leader and the .hancellor of the German Feich McheersN1I) The Minister of Defense Blomberg s4o7e too1 6ollowing the 4rotocol of the meetings he shouted IHeil Sol)atenPI to which the troo4s res4onded with a thunderous echoing IHeil1I Ee said IIn this hour we thin7 of the man who gave us our fieldbadges and to whom in unsha7eable fealty we are bound1L Adolf Eitler our 6uehrer and Feichs7anHler the highest commander of the German -ehrmacht of our German 4eo4le and fatherland Sieg HeilPILL/ The last s4eech at Nuremberg was always that of the 6uehrer who in (*)' denounced the Bolshevi7 infection and the democracies and with ringing words reminded his listeners of all they owed him1 I-hat would have ha44ened to Germany I he as7ed Iif in (*(* an un7nown soldier had not had the belief the readiness to defend and to sacrifice the courage and will to give of himself so as to rescue the German nation from its ignominy1I0 Along with these mammoth ceremonies were others of less notoriety but still of considerable im4ortance because they re4resented the mystical but brutally realistic mumbo-,umbo of the rival of the #arty and the Armythe L The battle flags of the -ehrmacht a44eared at the (*)' Nuremberg rally for the first time1 LL Blomberg was the second-to-last Minister of Defense the Feich was to have1 Eindenburg had chosen him because he thought Blomberg to be a non4olitical general who had astutely conducted military discussions with the Allied 4owers at Geneva1 Blomberg loo7ed li7e a soldierC his military bearing was im4ressive1 But his nic7name was IFubber 9ion I and he soon became a convinced National 8ocialist1 A field marshal of the Army as well as head of the armed forces he was forced to @uit his 4ost some two years later in Danuary (*)% because of his marriage to a registered 4rostitute1 The 6uehrer however was able to soothe his own 4ride which had been damaged when he learned the truth about the 4ast of the bride after he and Goering had attended the marriage ceremony by himself ta7ing over the 4ost of Minister of Defense1

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page_313 #age )() 881 Aside from its oath to the 6uehrer the 88 was bound only to its leader Eeinrich Eimmler1 In (*)/ when the order to 4ut down the so-called Foehm 4utsch was given no member of the 88 had hesitated to shoot former comrades in the 8A1 :nce a year in a monastery in -ebelsberg the inner circle of the 88 met in an atmos4here of secrecy and elegance =a silver 4late with his name engraved on it hung on the bac7 of each man?s chair>1 This was the meeting of the twelve men who formed the 8ecret Inner :rder of the 88 and was a manifestation of the Eimmlerian conce4t of a new aristocracy that would rule the German then the !uro4ean 4eo4les and 4ossibly the entire world1 Eimmler whose father was a greengrocer and a devout .hristian founded this order on the 4attern of the Desuits and he believed fanatically in a future dominated by the 88 and cemented by such slogans as ??My honor is called loyalty1I Eimmler said that the word of an 88 man to another their handsha7e was weightier and more binding than any legal document and long before the NaHis too7 4ower his a44roval was essential before 88 men could marry1 This was a 4recaution not only to ma7e certain that the marriage was 4ure Aryan on both sides but to 4revent the infusion of any foreign blood =even 6rench blood was undesirable>1 -alter 8chellenberg who rose high in the 88 and 8D des4ite his being married to a #olish woman always had the threat of a re4risal for his m<salliance hanging over his head1 The 88 man was su44ose to defend his honor in a dis4ute with another 88 man or another character worthy of such combat in a duel according to the Eimmlerian 4rescri4tions and his obligations included safeguarding the honor of the wives and daughters of other 88 men1 But unfortunately for some of the membershi4 the 88 man could be sentenced to death for too great admiration of his comradeshomose<uality in the 88 was 4unishable said Eimmler =and his word in this organiHation was law> by death or im4risonment where there were no mitigating circumstances1 6or the 88 too so-called Dun7er schools were established for training 88 officers the future commanders of the em4ire that Germany was to create in !uro4e1 The 88 man had to be able to trace his Aryan lineage bac7 to (+0$ without a dro4 of 4rofane blood and had to show that the bride of his choice could do the same1 Ee had to be able and willing to 7ill at a moment?s notice the enemies of his race and to steel himself against any unmanly or un-88 emotions when he saw the blood run in the trenches that his defenseless victims had to dig for themselves before they were shot1 In a s4eech to the -ehrmacht in (*)* Eimmler told how with such high standards only ($ to (0 4er cent of the a44licants could be acce4ted by the 881 And even they had to go through a long a44renticeshi41 At eighteen after having graduated from the Eitler,ugend a young man could volunteer to become an a44licant for the 881 Ee was tested over and over for his 4olitical and 4hysical @ualitiesC he had to show that his family suffered from no

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page_314 #age )(/ heritable disease and he had to a44ear before a commission which included along with 88 officers ??s4ecialistsI in racial matters and medical doctors who 7new about racial stigmata1 The height and body build of the a44licant were carefully correlated1 No one could be under (1+$ meters and if he were over (1%$ or (1%0 although this was in itself gratifying the height must be balanced by the harmony of the rest of the bodythe lower thigh for e<am4le must be in 4ro4ortion to the u44er1 The hands the gait the bearing must be those of the desirable 88 man an ideal 4hysical and 4sychological ty4e on whose s4ecifications they had been wor7ing since (*)( said Eimmler1 After three months the eighteen-year-old was sworn in ta7ing his oath of fealty to the 6uehrer and became a candidate an An,aerter1 In the course of the ne<t year he had to win his 8A s4ort badge1 At nineteen he went to the 9abor 8ervice and after that to the -ehrmacht1 After his two years of service with the armed forces he returned to the 88but still remained a candidate1 Eis indoctrination in the ideology of the movement was Healously continued and he was instructed in the racial and marriage doctrines the rules that concerned his own biological inheritance and descendants and the @uestions that touched on the honor of an 88 man1 6inally on November * of the year following his return to the 88 from the -ehrmacht he became a full-fledged 88 man1 ' Eimmler made use of the idea of the 6ermanen to e<tend the recruiting of the 881 -hen the war came 6innish Dutch Norwegian Danish 6lemish and later -alloon volunteers were eligible to ,oin 88 formations and swear allegiance to the 6uehrer of the 6ermanen Adolf Eitler1L Thus a su4ranational body com4eting with the regimes of Terboven in Norway and 8eyss-In@uart in Eolland and the Bormann networ7 of #arty administrators was established1 If Germany won the war the 88 not Bormann or the Army would 4rovide the leaders of the future !uro4e as Eimmler saw it1 Many of these foreign 88 units were as enthusiastic in fighting for the cause of NaHidom as any of the German leaders1 9Jon Degrelle who commanded the -alloon legion was one of them he and his men fought throughout the war on the !astern front and of the original %$$ Belgian volunteers only three survivedof whom Degrelle was one1 The censored mail of 88 foreign volunteers is as filled with ecstatic 4raise of the 6uehrer and the racial 4ur4ose of the 88 as that of any Feich German1+ The 88 was essentially a 4olice formation1 Although the -affen 88 which first saw action in the #olish cam4aign gradually grew to number '$$ $$$ men and too7 4art with the Army in the frontline fighting it fought under Eimmler the 4oliceman and when it sought recruits among the Germanic brethren it started with the 4olice of the northern countries1 Technically it L -ith time and the deterioration of the military situation almost all the nationalities that came near or under the control of German arms were added: 6renchmen 9atvians !stonians "7rainians .roats Bosnians Italians Bulgarians Fomanians Tur7o-Tartars AHerbai,anis Eungarians even a scattering of Britons1

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page_31 #age )(0 was 4art neither of the 4olice nor of the -ehrmacht although its troo4s thought of themselves as an elite branch of the armed forces and were often better armed and e@ui44ed than the Army1L It was Eitler and Eimmler?s armed force1 The 4rotective duties of the 88 as a whole were internal as well as e<ternal and thus it was in com4etition with both the Army and the forces of administration in the con@uered territories and through the 8D in Germany1 % German generals in #oland 4rotested against the activities of the 881 General Dohannes Blas7owitH described the atrocities in a memorandum that reached the 6uehrer who 4aid no attention to it1 :ther high officers also com4lained =see The :rganiHations .ha4t1 (/>1 :n November &) (*)* General of Artillery -alter #etHel re4orting on the -arthegau =in #oland> said the situation was 4eaceful but that reconstruction was not being hel4ed by the 88 which regarded itself as a state within a state1 Ee com4lained of the arbitrary arrests and internment of #oles and of the 88 4lundering driving Dews through the streets with heavy leather whi4s =Ochsen0iemer> and beating them in synagogues and forcing a man who had dirtied his 4ants to smear the faces of his coreligionists with his e<crement1* !rnst Baltenbrunner The 88 re4resentative in the doc7 at Nuremberg in the 4lace of Eeinrich Eimmler was !rnst Baltenbrunner who after (*/) had headed u4 the F8EA the Feich 8ecurity Main :ffice with the ran7 of 88 :bergru44enfuehrer and General of the #olice1 "nder the F8EA were the 8ecret #olice of the Feich with the authority of the concentration and e<termination cam4s behind themC the 8ecurity #olice =8I#:>C the Gesta4oC the .riminal #olice =well shortened to Bri4o>C and the 8D or 8ecurity 8ervice1 Baltenbrunner was directly res4onsible to Eimmler who was Feichsfuehrer 88 and as !ichmann?s su4erior =!ichmann was chief of Amt IG B/ of the F8EA> was in charge of the ??actionsI against the Dews that is their organiHed e<termination1 The F8EA had been founded by Baltenbrunner?s 4redecessor Feinhard Eeydrich who by (*/( had ta7en over on behalf of Eimmler one 4olice organiHation after the other until they were all under the F8EA1 "nder F8EA too were the !insatHgru44en the s4ecial mobile units for use in the !ast which had first a44eared in #oland1 They had the mission in the 8oviet "nion of e<terminating Dews commissars and other undesirables as well as L The formations of the -affen 88 fought with great courage as well as brutality1 Their 4ercentage of losses was considerably higher than the Army?s and Army generals li7e !berhard von Mac7ensen often 4raised their courage and fighting @ualities1 Their 4olitical indoctrination however 4re4ared many of the -affen 88 members to 4artici4ate in the atrocities that flawed their military record =George E1 8tein The !affen SS MIthaca: .ornell "niversity #ress (*''N>1

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page_31! #age )(' fighting the 4artisan bands that 4lagued the German rear areas1 A directive of March () (*/( signed by 6ield Marshal Beitel said that the Feichsfuehrer 88 Eeinrich Eimmler would carry out in Fussia s4ecial duties by order of the 6uehrer and that Eimmler would act on his own res4onsibility in this area1 :n A4ril / si< wee7s before the attac7 on Fussia the Suartermaster General of the Army !duard -agner started negotiations on a written agreement with the F8EA which was drafted by -alter 8chellenberg of the 8D1 In this document the Army agreed that the !insatHgru44en would be given food trans4ortation and communication facilities by the Army but the directives for the missions of these grou4s would come from the F8EA1 The arrangements between the :BE the Eigh .ommand of the Army and the F8EA were com4leted late in May ,ust before the attac7 on Fussia had begun1 The rear areas of the Army aside from tactical matters were 4laced under the Feichsfuehrer 88 and the realm of Eimmler in the !ast e<4anded ra4idly1 It was difficult for the civilian victims of the war in Fussia to discriminate between the German units that were attac7ing them1 In the following account from one of the witnesses at the !ichmann trial members of the -ehrmacht and of the 8A are almost certainly wrongly identified: :ne morning the Dewish @uarter was sealed offC these were streets inhabited mainly by Dews1 German soldiers and officers bro7e savagely into the housesC they shouted at the men to leave the homes they threw everything out of the cu4boards they beat 4eo4le u4 they shot and 7illed many1 1 1 1 They assembled mainly elderly male Dews and all of them were 4ut in the great synagogue in MielicHC there they were slaughteredalmost all the Dews were 7illed1 Those who tried to esca4e through the windows were shot from the outside1 In the morning units in blac7 and green uniforms surrounded the 4lace and they too7 us out of our homes and ordered us to the mar7et4lace1 #eo4le who could not run the sic7 were shot sometimes in their bedsC others were later 4laced in the center of the mar7et4lace1 Then young men were selected and ordered to ste4 asideC the women children and old 4eo4le were ro4ed off in a long column and we were in the middle1 These were 88 8D and 8A 4eo4le1 1 1 1 -hen we arrived there they surrounded us with such heavily armed units the li7e of which I had only seen at the front1 Then they told us to stand in a semicircle and told us that we were setting out on a march and that we had to hand over everything which we 4ossessedmoney gold silver watchesonly twenty Hloty were left to each man1 They ordered us not to s4ea7 not to turn around not to loo7 at or come into contact with each other and said that whoever violated these orders would be shot1 1 1 1 Then we were given the order to set out and march1 :ne girl managed to run after the column and she shouted all the time ??6ather Mother1I Eere .hola .henis M4honetic s4ellingN the girl was ta7en away1 -e did not 7now what ha44ened to her1 All we heard was a shot1 6rom time to time whoever halted and tried to arrange his clothes was told to leave the column and then we heard a shot behind us1 That is how we marched in the mud because this was the heaviest rainy season1 It was

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page_31" #age )(+ in December1 Then when we were already sitting or lying down on the floor they came and argued with us and told us that we were to blame for the war1 They too7 all the sacred articles and they too7 the two Dewish elders with beards1 -e heard that others were also ta7en1 -e 7new that two hundred 4eo4le were ta7en away1 And we never saw them anymore1 -e did not 7now what ha44ened to them1 -e still had ho4e that 4erha4s this was not a death march1 The ne<t morning we were 4laced in rows again1 But there were only three 4eo4le to a row now1?? ($ Eow much the Army and the civilian administrative non-88 a44aratus in the !ast 7new of the mass murders committed by the 8D the !insatH7ommandos and the other 4olice formations would be the sub,ect of long debate not only at the trials but also in the years to come1 The F8EA wor7ed by reason of its nature in secrecy1 -hat actually went on in the concentration and later in the e<termination cam4s was 7nown to only a small grou4C from the beginning the inmates were sworn not to disclose what they had seen or e<4erienced if they returned to their families on 4ain of being sent bac7 to the cam4s again1 In the case of the e<termination cam4s for an official to disclose what he 7new was 4unishable by death and the train crews and guards who too7 the 4risoners to these cam4s were changed at the outs7irts of the cam4s1 6rau Eoess who herself lived in AuschwitH as7ed her husband if the rumors she had heard of the gassings were true and was reluctantly told they were by her husband the commander of the cam4 who was himself res4onsible for the 7illings of hundreds of thousands of inmates1 The e<ecutions conducted by the !insatH7ommandos too were ordered to ta7e 4lace far from Army units1 The official mission of these units was described as being res4onsible for the security of the Army in the rear areas a tas7 that @uic7ly involved them in the intense and bitter war against the 4artisans as well as the IactionsI against the Dews which was their 4rinci4al assignment1 But 7illings on the scale of those 4racticed by the 8D and the !insatHgru44en could not be 7e4t secretC witness after witness from the Army and the civil administration testified at Nuremberg and later trials that they had seen or heard of them1 The stories were horrifying but they might be accounted for these witnesses said if a man was not too curious or did not care to s4eculate on other 4ossibilities but acce4ted the e<4lanation that the 7illings were 4art of the battle against the 4artisans and the infiltrators who more and more successfully o4erated behind the German lines1 In this relentless war where no holds were barred the Army was glad to get what hel4 it could from the 4olice and the 8Dwhatever its commanders might thin7 of these formationsbut even under these circumstances indirect evidence shows how little the Army en,oyed the 4resence of the !insatH and the 88 4olice forces1 Eimmler and his subordinates wrote many re4orts and 4rotests about the little com4rehension the Army had for their wor7 of the officers? avoiding them of never being invited to -ehrmacht social

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page_31# #age )(% gatherings although they also referred to gratifying e<ce4tions1L But in the nature of the assignment given Eimmler collaboration between the Army and the 4olice units began with the Fussian cam4aign1 The 8D leader sometimes in fact had command over small Army units in the war against the 4artisans although this warfare too was theoretically under the sole command of the Army in the o4erational areas1 In s4ecific actions Army units were 4laced under an 88 or 8D officer de4ending on which troo4 leader had the largest contingent1 (( After (*/) all 4artisan warfare was 4laced under the command of Eimmler1LL In addition under the .ommissar :rder the Army was directed to turn over ca4tured commissars and 2olitruks to the 8D for e<ecution1 Many troo4 commanders refused to do this1 But there had to be close collaboration by the Army Eigher 88 and #olice leaders and the 8D in the battles against the 4artisans who became an increasingly deadly menace to the communications of the fighting troo4s as the war went on1 The Army 4layed no active role in the 8D and !insatH e<terminations of the Dews1 In a number of cases when a field commander learned details of what the e<termination units actually did he ordered them out of his territory and could enforce the order because these men were fed and su44lied by the Army under the agreement Eimmler and Eeydrich had reached with Suartermaster General !duard -agner1 The e<ecutions too7 4lace behind the frontline area of the Army under the direct command of Eimmler and his 8D subordinates first Eeydrich and then Baltenbrunner1 Toward the end of the war even Eimmler said he had to watch out for Baltenbrunner1 Baltenbrunner would use any wea4on to advance himself and anyone might be his victim1 A giant of a man heavy-set with a thic7 nec7 that went u4 li7e a bloc7 from his shoulders to his head with 4iercing brown eyes a dee4 scar that rose from the left of his mouth to his nose and bad teeth with some missing Baltenbrunner loo7ed li7e what he wasa 7iller1 Eimmler?s s7illful 4hysiothera4ist 6eli< Bersten who e<amined all the men the Feichsfuehrer 88 a44ointed to high office said he had never had such an o< of a man in his office nor one so stu4id1 Baltenbrunner Bersten added had to get drun7 to become ca4able of reasoning1 That is an e<aggeration for Baltenbrunner o4erated in a ,ungle of enemies where some of the shrewdest and most ruthless members of the Feich?s secret services were at homeC and men li7e Eeydrich and 8chellenberg who detested him feared him too1 A Doctor of 9aw who early discovered a talent for combining 4olice and 4olitical wor7 in the Austria of 4ost--orld L In some cases Army formations resorted to force against the 88 when it tried to ta7e Dewish wor7ers away from the Army as ha44ened in #rHemysl1 *f1 Eaengeordner 8chriftgut 4ersoenlicher 8tab F688 8D re4orts 88-%%+ BD.1 =8ee The :rganiHations .ha4t1 (/1> LL After the attem4t on Eitler?s life on Duly &$ (*// Eimmler also became chief of the Eome Army1 Ee was thus in command of both the 4olice and the military formations on German soil =8iegfried -est4hal Heer in "esseln1 MBonn: Athenaeum Gerlag (*0&N 41 *%>1 =8ee The :rganiHations .ha4t1 (/1>

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page_31$ #age )(* -ar I he had as his ambition when the NaHis too7 Austria to be 8taatsse7retaer for Internal 8ecurity for Austriathat is head of the 8D1 But Eeydrich 4revented his getting that ,ob and he was made Eigher 88 and #olice .hief for Gienna1 Ee was virtually un7nown when after Eeydrich?s death he was une<4ectedly a44ointed head of the F8EA1 8chellenberg boasted in his memoirs that he would have been given the a44ointment but for his youthC in any event Eimmler 4ro4osed and Eitler a44roved the naming of Baltenbrunner on Danuary)$ (*/)1 Baltenbrunner too made his alliances with whatever strong battalions were available to him1 Eermann 6egelein the former ,oc7ey who had married the sister of !va Braun was one of his friends and he got along with Bormann who in turn was see7ing allies against Eimmler1 Baltenbrunner 7new the war was lost after the German defeat at 8talingrad and he made a number of attem4ts to get in touch with the Allies with the ho4e of saving his own nec71 In (*// wor7ing through the Austrian-born Gesta4o man -ilhelm Eoettl and the wily 8chellenberg he tried to arrange for tal7s with re4resentatives of the Allies1 Eoetti was then in touch with Allen Dulles in 8witHerland and Baltenbrunner seems to have believed that the 88 under his direction alone could arrange for an armistice and 4erha4s he might ma7e a deal for his own head1 Baltenbrunner also had his lines out in 8weden and Bernadotte visited him the day before he had an a44ointment with Eimmler to discuss the Feichsfuehrer?s 4lans for a deal to end hostilities with the -est1 Baltenbrunner cons4ired against a world of enemiesC he had feelers out to the Allies not only as a 4ossible means of rescuing himself but in 4art at least to do in Eimmler who was also trying to o4en negotiations and find some way to save his own s7in1 Baltenbrunner li7e Eimmler had monumental 4lans but Baltenbrunner?s were limited to feathering his own nestC his blue4rints lac7ed the mysti@ue the mumbo-,umbo of Eimmler?s1 Baltenbrunner and other members of the to4 echelon of the 8D hated and mistrusted Admiral .anaris and the Abwehr which they believed not only to be engaged in treasonable activities but also to be a center of every viceC Baltenbrunner said that %$ 4er cent of the Abwehr were se<ually 4erverted and could be bribed and that .anaris was a masochist a sadist and a homose<ual of both active and 4assive character at the same time1 (& In 6ebruary (*// Baltenbrunner finally succeeded in ta7ing over the Abwehr and ma7ing it 4art of F8EA1 In March he had the further satisfaction although he got no useful information of interrogating Admiral .anaris before his e<ecution1 It was one of Baltenbrunner?s last moments of trium4h over the forces ranged against him1 .anaris was a 4illar of the Fesistance movement and for years had s7illfully managed to elude Baltenbrunner and the 8D and to 4rotect many of the 4lotters until the attem4t on Eitler?s life was made1() Baltenbrunner lived well according to his lights but under the strain

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page_320 #age )&$ of his manifold duties he smo7ed about a hundred cigarettes a day and dran7 heavily1 8chellenberg described finding him at his des7 at eleven o?cloc7 in the morning drin7ing one brandy after the other and said that Baltenbrunner insisted that 8chellenberg drin7 along with him1 !ven in (*)% when he lived in Gienna Eimmler had to bail him out of his debts and to warn that his Lebensstil including his e<4ensive a4artment was far beyond his means1 Eimmler in addition to the warning 4resented him with &$$$ FM from s4ecial fundsC Baltenbrunner was his 7ind of o4erator and Eimmler could in such cases overloo7 minor moral frailties1 (/ 6or Baltenbrunner?s hatred of the Dews matched his and !ichmann?s1 Baltenbrunner assigned two of the most notorious e<terminators in Eungary Gites !ndre and 9asHlo Ba7y to wor7 with !ichmann in sending the Dews remaining there to the e<termination cam4s1(0 -hen the fantastic negotiations were going on between Eimmler and Doel Brand to trade Dews for Allied truc7s Baltenbrunner li7e !ichmann did his best to sabotage them1 Baltenbrunner told the ma,or of Gienna 88 Brigadefuehrer Barl Blasch7e to whom he used u that the Dewish women and children should be held for a few days in the concentration cam4 near Gienna and should not be allowed to leave because they were destined for a s4ecial action which was trans4ortation to an e<termination cam4not to 8witHerland1 :nly )$ 4er cent of the (& $$$ Dews still alive after being shi44ed to Gienna would be fit to wor7 he told Blasch7e and nonwor7ing Dews had a short life1(' Ee was against any rescue o4eration he said because he thought it would turn Adolf Eitler against the 881 Baltenbrunner was tireless in hunting down Dews for the gas chambers1 8hortly after he became chief of F8EA he had 0$$$ Dews under si<ty transferred to AuschwitH from the relative safety of Theresienstadt1 Ee then com4lained that the Dews over si<ty in that ghetto city were disease carriers and that they also tied u4 the energies of younger Dews who might be doing some useful wor71 Baltenbrunner as7ed Eimmler for his a44roval to send these old 4eo4le too to AuschwitH assuring his chief that he would be careful not to choose any Dews with im4ortant connections in foreign countries or with high war decorations1 Eimmler who was now busy trying to ingratiate himself with the neutrals and the Allies told Baltenbrunner that the Dews should be allowed to live and die in this old 4eo4le?s ghetto in 4eace1(+ Toward the end of the war Eimmler 4layed an unaccustomed humanitarian role when Baltenbrunner set out on his 7illing e<4edition1 Again in the autumn of (*// he told Baltenbrunner according to another 88 witness that no further e<terminations must ta7e 4lace1 ??I hold you 4ersonally res4onsible I he wrote Ieven if this order should not be strictly adhered to by subordinate offices1I(% Baltenbrunner had no heroes neither Eimmler nor the 6uehrer nor the Germans nor the Austrians1 Ee was a gangster filled with hatred and resent-

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page_321 #age )&( ment and 4lans for im4roving his own condition1 Ee had the ear of Eitler because in the last year he was often in the 6uehrer?s head@uarters and with this direct line he could circumvent Eimmler when necessary1 But his varied ambitionsone was to su44lant Fibbentro4 as 6oreign Ministerhad no focusC he ,ust wanted to get on in his ,aundiced world1 Ee could win the small battlesC he could defeat Barl -olff the 88 military governor in Italy under Besselring by re4orting to Eimmler on -olff?s dealings with the AlliesC he could overcome one enemy after anotherC but at the end on Eimmler?s orders he was only 4ut in charge of the ho4eless o4erations to create the last defense of the Feich the Al2enfestung1 Eis ho4es that he could negotiate on behalf of the 88 with the Allies after he had made an im4ression of humanitarian goodwill on them were 4re4osterous1 Ee ordered Mauthausen to be surrendered intact to General #atton but the commander of the cam4 88 Ma,or 6ranH Aiereis who was mortally wounded as he attem4ted to esca4e at the time of the cam4?s surrender on his deathbed told an American officer that Baltenbrunner had wanted to blow u4 all the inmates1 (* 8imilar testimony was given by two witnesses with regard to Dachau 9andsberg and MuehldorfC Gauleiters testified that Baltenbrunner had wanted the 9uftwaffe to bomb these cam4s to 7ill the 4risoners and had 4lanned to 4oison the inmates of Dachau1&$ This action had been 4revented by one of the Gauleiters who 4leaded lac7 of gasoline and bombs and by a run of bad weather1&( !ven a few days before the end of the war on A4ril &+ (*/0 according to a former 88 colonel Baltenbrunner told the commandant of Mauthausen that ($$$ inmates must die each day1 && Eow could Baltenbrunner it may well be as7ed have been trying to curry favor with the Allies by such humanitarian acts as handing over Mauthausen to #atton while at about the same time he was 4lanning to 7ill its inmates as well as those of other concentration cam4sO The answer may lie in his 4rimitive character and his drun7enness1 Baltenbrunner?s first instinct was to 7illC but even more im4ortant than his sadism was his own s7in and in bursts of alcoholic eu4horia he came to thin7 he might be able to save it1 Ee could only s@uirm under the weight of the testimony at Nuremberg1 Ee declared wildly that he barely 7new Adolf !ichmannC although they had not only collaborated in the Dewish e<terminations for years they had been boyhood friends in 9inH1 Ee claimed that he had heard that the Dews were being 7illed in the concentration cam4s but had been told by Eimmler that he should not be burdened with this 4roblem1 Baltenbrunner had a cerebral hemorrhage on November (% at the start of the trial and was able to attend sessions only intermittently in December and Danuary1 Eis testimony however although com4letely unreliable showed no other signs of mental deterioration1 Ee had always dis4layed the characteristics he evidenced at NurembergC

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page_322 #age )&& he was blustering and devious and when he was confronted with unmista7able evidence of his 4erfidy he sim4ly denied it1 :ne of Goering?s lawyers said Baltenbrunner had convinced himself that he had run nothing more than an intelligence agency in the F8EA1 But selfdece4tion on such a monumental scale was im4ossible1 9i7e Eitler Baltenbrunner was an AustrianC he was born on :ctober / (*$) in the little town of Fied on the Inn near Eitler?s birth4lace Braunau1 The son of a lawyer he studied law at the technical college =Technische Eochschule> in GraH after attending the Fealgymnasium at 9inH1 Ee too7 his degree of Doctor of 9aw in (*&' and wor7ed for a year for the court at 8alHburg and then in a law office in 9inH1 Ee married and begot three children1 Ee ,oined the #arty in (*)& and in (*)0 became leader of the Austrian 881 Arrested by the Gienna Government when Dollfuss was murdered he led a hunger stri7e of the ,ailed NaHis1 At the time of the Anschluss he 4roudly announced to Eimmler ??The 88 is in formation awaiting further orders1I &) After the death of Eeydrich he reached the summit of his career when he became chief of the Feich 8ecurity Main :ffice with his s4here of interest in southeastern !uro4e Bulgaria and Greece although li7e Eimmler his concerns were far ranging1 Ee thought it should be com4ulsory for all German women over thirty-five to have childrenC if the children could not be fathered by the women?s husbands the fathers of families with more than four children should be made available1 Baltenbrunner believed in the o44osite course for inferior racesC the Dews should be e<terminated and the 8lavs should gradually die out by way of steriliHation and the annihilation of their leaders1 Baltenbrunner wanted Allied airmen 4arachuting from their 4lanes to be lynched and he ordered the 4olice not only not to interfere with the enraged 4o4ulace but to encourage them1&/ -hen Eeinrich Mueller the chief of the Gesta4o as7ed him what to do with twenty-five 6rench 4rostitutes who were suffering from sy4hilis Baltenbrunner said to shoot them1 This was his formula for any 4roblem involving enemies who fell into his hands1 Ee signed the orders for e<ecutions at Mauthausen of officers and noncommissioned officers other than British and American as well as foreign civilian wor7ers who had re4eatedly esca4ed who were 7illed by a bullet in the bac7 of the nec7 as they were su44osedly having their height measured1 -hen the International Fed .ross in@uired about the e<ecutions of British and American 4risoners of war Baltenbrunner suggested that the deaths be e<4lained by stories of bombing attac7s on the cam4s or of 4risoners shot while attem4ting to esca4e1&0 Duergen 8troo4 88 #olice 9eader of the -arsaw district who commanded the mi<ed forces that raHed the -arsaw ghetto testified that Baltenbrunner gave the orders as to how the o4eration was to be conducted and for the e<ecutions1&' -hen discussions were going on in 6ebruary (*/0 as to whether 4risoners of the Gesta4o in Berlin should be trans4orted elsewhere in Germany or shot Baltenbrunner made the decision

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page_323 #age )&) for e<ecutions ??in an e<tremely hasty and su4erficial mannerI even by the easy standards of the Gesta4o men 4resent1 &+ Baltenbrunner admitted to none of these charges des4ite all the witnesses and the overwhelming evidence against him1 :n the stand under the searching @uestioning of British 4rosecutor .olonel Amen he could only deny the authenticity of his own signature and declare that the witnesses were lying who said they had seen him in Mauthausen when 7illings were staged in his honor by gas hanging and shooting1 !veryone was lying who said the head of the 8ecret #olice of Germany had anything to do with the e<ecutions or the arrests that sent 4eo4le in the occu4ied countries to forced labor or concentration cam4s1 Ee admitted he had 7nown about the e<istence of the Ishow cam4I of Theresienstadt where 4rominent Dews or those in 4referred categories such as former German soldiers were herded together in a ghetto city with coffee houses and cultural and academic activities on dis4lay for the visits of the International Fed .ross and other neutral investigators1 Baltenbrunner testified that he had re4eatedly tal7ed with the 6uehrer about the concentration cam4s but that Eitler had as often told him they were none of his affair1 IThey are I the 6uehrer had said Imy arrangement with Eimmler1I Ee admitted he had 7nown of the !insatH formations but said their e<cesses were Eimmler?s fault1 Ee thought that Fibbentro4 was in a 4osition to have influenced Eitler against war and when as7ed a @uestion again about the concentration cam4s he said blandly that Eimmler must have 7nown of the mistreatment of the 4risoners in them1 Baltenbrunner declared that Eimmler after the death of Eeydrich had directed the entire F8EA until he himself was forced to ta7e over the ,ob on Danuary (0 (*/) Eimmler retaining only the e<ecutive branches IG =Gesta4o> and G =6oreign 8ecret 8ervice>1 Eis own res4onsibility he said had been one in name only and his real function was to ma7e Iob,ective re4ortsI1 #erha4s he said #ohl had issued orders in his name and :swald #ohl and Fichard Gluec7s =both administrators in the concentration-cam4 system> and Eimmler too had been res4onsible for the Ihorrible rumorsI that circulated about the activities in the concentration cam4s1&% 9i7e so many others Baltenbrunner declared that he had tried to resign on the issue of the concentration cam4s1 In (*)% he had remonstrated with the 6uehrer on the treatment of the Dews but that was all he could do since he had to 7ee4 resolutely on with his 4art of the war effort1 Ee said that he regarded himself as a soldier as having been commanded to head u4 the F8EA1&* In an interrogation of :ctober (0 (*/0 he confronted the former Eungarian Minister of the Interior Gabor Ga,na who testified that Baltenbrunner had 4romised every 4ossible assistance to the Eungarian 4olice in trans4orting Dews to the German e<termination cam4s and had said the trans4ort and feeding of the victims en route would be ta7en care of by the Army1 8uch testimony Baltenbrunner always said was either mista7en or a lie1 :n the ne<t day he denied having written a re4ort which he had signed

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page_324 #age )&/ and sent to Goering Eimmler and Fibbentro4 recommending the e<ecutions of enemy ??terror fliers I nor was he able to remember a meeting of Duly ' (*// where as the written records showed he had agreed that lynching or e<ecution by the 8D should be the rule in such cases1 )$ !ichmann in de4artment IG B/ Baltenbrunner said had been res4onsible for solving the Dewish @uestion and he himself had 7nown nothing of the 4ersecution of the Dews when he too7 office as chief of the F8EA in (*/)1 Ee admitted 7nowing of the e<istence of the gas truc7s in which Dews were as4hy<iated and s4ea7ing of concentration cam4s he said he believed Goering had first thought u4 the idea in (*))1)( Ee was vague about the vast a44aratus of the F8EA1 Eis ,ob he said had been to re4ort mainly on the morale of the 4o4ulation and these re4orts had been sent to Amt (( headed by :tto :hlendorf which dealt with internal 4olitical @uestions1 Baltenbrunner had trouble identifying many documents he had signedC at a hearing on :ctober ($ (*/0 he could not for e<am4le identify his signature on a commando order and said 4erha4s a rubber stam4 had been used without his 7nowledge1 Eis @uestioner as7ed him how he could e<4ect any reasonable man to believe him in the face of this denial of written evidence and Baltenbrunner could only re4ly IThat I don?t 7now1I These flounderings at Nuremberg contrasted shar4ly with the clear re4orts he sent on with accom4anying notes to Bormann and Eitler after the arrest of the cons4irators of Duly &$1 The re4orts although not written by Baltenbrunner were interrogations of his devising1 They were 4recise accounts of why the attac7 on the life of the 6uehrer had been made what the cons4irators had found intolerable in the National 8ocialist regime and why1 Between the lines may be discerned Baltenbrunner?s own vendettas his 4ersonal attac7s on his rivals: on Goering who the cons4irators say is enriching himself from 4ublic sources and in his manner of living and 4ersonal conduct is in no way ade@uate to the demands of the warC on Fibbentro4 the incom4etent who the cons4irators say made his foreign 4olicy at the 4oint of a bayonet and with whom no foreign government will deal now at a time when secret negotiations are needed and there is still the 4ossibility of 4laying Germany?s enemies off against each other1 Baltenbrunner said too that the cons4irators thought Fibbentro4 had wanted war against !ngland because he had been received in an unfriendly fashion as ambassador that his vanity had been hurt by a country that li7e all foreign countries had only contem4t for his di4lomatic abilities1 6urthermore he said or said the cons4irators believed Fibbentro4 had mis,udged !nglandC it was not decadent as he claimed1 And as for Fussia Fibbentro4 would be useless dealing with 8talin because it was he who had signed the nonaggression 4act with Molotov1)& Ee 7new his re4orts would be read carefully by Eitler and 7ee4ing within the bounds of what the 4risoners actually said he s7illfully 4layed on

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page_32 #age )&0 motives that would be certain to arouse Eitler?s resentment1 Baltenbrunner @uoted the cons4irators as saying: 9oo7 at the Gauleiter loo7 at the Breiswalter and how they enrich themselves1 Is it bearable in a war that high and even the highest dignitaries ta7e over foreign 4ro4erty in Germany and the occu4ied territories in the most shameless manner and swim in well-being while millions of German families endure star7 needO 1 1 1 -hile our soldiers are fighting bleeding and dying at the front men li7e Goering Goebbels 9ey and others live a life of lu<uryC they rob fill their cellars and attics and demand that the 4eo4le hold out while they themselves and their followers shy away in a cowardly fashion from the sacrifices of the front1 )) The re4orts written by :bersturmbannfuehrer von Biel4ins7i and forwarded by Baltenbrunner contain more than indirect attac7s on Baltenbrunner?s enemies1 The im4ortant 4assages were underlined and in these as well as in the general te<t are ideas Baltenbrunner and Eimmler had been revolving in their minds1 The re4ortssimilar to what Baltenbrunner was telling the 6uehrer in their daily conferences@uote only what is always referred to as ??the cli@ue of cons4irators I but no attentive reader could miss the well-founded criticisms Baltenbrunner 4assed along: that .abinet meetings in the time of Bismarc7 were held where advisers were allowed to state their o4inions but now one man alone made the decisionsC that Ieven officers who at first in a negative way had had an honorable concern with the war situation and the fate of the 4eo4le had little by little been drawn into the whirl4ool of the cons4iracy1I Baltenbrunner li7e Bormann Eimmler and the others who got close to the #resence was intent not only on getting rid of the o44osition to his own em4ire building but in forcing Eitler to rely more on him and 4erha4s even to 4re4are the way for Eitler?s recogniHing one day the need for someone elsefor Baltenbrunner for e<am4leto negotiate in his stead with the Allies1 The re4orts 4ulled no 4unchesC they contained the criticisms that had been made for years by the secret o44osition that came to include even some 88 men li7e the chief of the criminal 4olice and a former !insatH leader Arthur Nebe1 Eitler lost many of his formerly devoted admirers as he lived more and more in the fantasies and intuitions that were no longer a match for the odds against him or for the ob,ective calculations of the generals1 The re4orts were coated with a light covering of flattery telling of the indignation with few e<ce4tions of the German 4eo4le at the attem4t on Eitler?s life and of the admission of the cons4irators that the death of Eitler would have meant the loss of the war for Germany1 But the overwhelming im4ression given was of the wides4read networ7 of cons4iracy reaching into every layer of German society and the reasonableness of the conclusions contained in the documents the cons4irators had 4re4ared for their a44eal to the German 4eo4le1 The sugarcoating wears through very @uic7ly1 -hen the corru4tion

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page_32! #age )&' in the NaHi regime was mentioned the re4orts were careful to 4oint out that the cons4irators too lived well =government gasoline was used for nefarious enter4risesC men li7e 8tauffenberg had tobacco and alcohol in their homes> and they comment on the 4erfidy of the enemythe "nited 8tates for e<am4lethousands of 7ilometers from the field of battle entering the war only for ca4italist motives1 A few 4aragra4hs of such 4alatable comments a44eared followed by 4age after 4age of the most bitter attac7s by the o44onents of Eitler?s tyranny1 !ven the re4orts on the trials of the cons4irators while accom4anied by descri4tions of the a44roval of the 4o4ulation as the malefactors were brought to ,ustice nevertheless told of the resentment of some of the citiHensmainly among the intelligentsiawho said the trials were show trials li7e those the Fussians 4ut on1 )0 :ther Germans said that Foland 6reisler the ferocious #resident of the .ourt behaved in a way unbecoming to the highest court in Germany1 8till other anonymous critics said that it was strange that men who were given the highest decorations by the Government and the 6uehrer and whose deeds were celebrated in the 4ress were now regarded as foolish ab,ect and uncertain1 The foreign 4ress too was @uoted in a way that could give small comfort to Bormann and to Eitler1 The Neue Cuercher Ceitung for e<am4le reminded its readersand through Baltenbrunner the 6uehrerthat when Italy surrendered in 8e4tember (*/) Eitler had said that a treason li7e that of Badoglio would be im4ossible in Germany1 And in some of its accounts of the hearings of the cons4irators the Baltenbrunner re4orts 4ointed out that as an e<cuse these men said they were honorably concerned with the fate of Germany1 )' The s4lit between the #arty and the Army was clearly described1 The -ehrmacht said the re4orts was never 4leased at being commanded by an outsider one not a member of the cor4s and not even an officer1 In the nineteenth century and under the -eimar Fe4ublic the Army had been e<4ected to be non4olitical but now its officers felt they were commanded and influenced not only by Eitler but by 4eo4le outside the officer cor4s1 The Army was no longer the sole bearer of armsC the 88 had come in as its rival1 :ne of the cons4irators General Eenning von Tresc7ow said that not even small troo4 movements could be ordered without a44roval of high authority1 And the Baltenbrunner re4orts did not fail to 4oint out that criticism among the 4ublic re4eated that of the cons4irators in com4laining about the corru4tion and smoothness of the lives of the Bon0en1)+ Baltenbrunner hit where he 7new it would hurt1 Many of the cons4irators had formerly been loyal NaHis who had gradually become enemies because the facts of life were not consonant with the NaHi 4rinci4les of the general 4rofit coming before self-4rofit =Nut0 vor Eigenut0> because they lost the feeling of ,ustice of /echtsgefuehl1 :ne man said he was also dubious of the conduct of leading 4ersonalities ??es4ecially of the Feichsmarschall who in his 4ersonal life and leadershi4 in no way is e@ual to the demands of

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page_32" #age )&+ the war1?? Another said IMy 4ersonal o4inion continues to be the same as it was and I still a44rove of National 8ocialism as we understood it and as it was taught to us during the years of struggle for 4ower1 But what a44ears today as its realiHation I no longer can call good1 1 1 1 The good foot-slogger Mbraver Lan)serN means little as against the vast number of corru4t #arty members who hide out in the bases and in the homeland and have everything they can use1I Another said II a44rove the !eltanschauung 1 1 1 including the #arty 4rogram but li7e every decent 4erson I condemn the encroachments M&ebergriffeN of the individual #arty comrades1 1 1 1 -e want a leadershi4 that is an e<am4le in its conduct and deeds1I )% 84eer too was identified as having tal7ed matters over with members of the cons4iracy but the re4ort said that he would have nothing to do with violence against the regime1 9esser men than 84eer were arrested and e<ecuted merely for having heard of the 4lans for a revolt and not having re4orted them but 84eer?s influence with the 6uehrer was able to withstand even such accusations1 Baltenbrunner and his 4olice did a thorough ,ob of laying bare the 4lot and its ramifications1 The secret 4olice the courts and Eitler himself 7new everything the cons4irators had thought and 4lannedand whyas well as how wides4read the o44osition was including labor unionists former enthusiastic #arty members war heroes and members of the 881 Baltenbrunner 4erha4s s7illfully 4re4aring the way for a future denunciation re4orted that even he was thought by some of the German 4eo4le to have been involved in the cons4iracy1 8ince members of the 88 had been trying to get in touch with the Allies =Eimmler was as Baltenbrunner well 7new> this suggestive statement may have been the first warning to Eitler that even his most trusted 4olicemen were loo7ing in other directions for their salvation1 The tribunal found Baltenbrunner guilty on two of the three counts with which he was charged: war crimes and crimes against humanityC he was found not guilty of 4lanning to wage aggressive war1 No one not even Baltenbrunner could have @uarreled with the verdict1 Eis only recorded com4laint against the treatment of the Dews was that the concentration-cam4 inmates sent to forced labor died faster than they could be 4ut to wor71 Ee was one of the 4henomena of the NaHi 4eriod a shrewd on-the-ma7e lawyer with a touch of nostalgia at the end of the war as a44eared in his re4orts for due 4rocess of law and a state where o4inions li7e his own would be listened to by the 6uehrer1 At bottom he was a cold and ruthless 7iller who gladly did without any legal forms if the renunciation meant fewer Dews or 8lavs fewer Goebbelses or Goerings or 9eys or Fibbentro4s1 Eaving no defense that could 4ossibly stand u4 Baltenbrunner decided that the court was an enemy court and that he would deny everything1 This at least was Goering?s view of his attitude and it 4erha4s comes as close to the e<4lanation of Baltenbrunner?s behavior at Nuremberg as any other1 Baltenbrunner regarded himself as a soldier as did !ichmann and 8D

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page_32# #age )&% commanders li7e -alter 8chellenberg and !insatH commanders li7e :hlendorf who boasted that his unit had li@uidated *$ $$$ Dews in the Baltic 8tates1 Baltenbrunner said that as head of the F8EA he had received his soldier?s 4ay and li7e a soldier had obeyed orders and stuc7 to his 4ost1 8oldiers they all were so they told one anotherand they finally came to believe it themselvessoldiers 4erforming harder tas7s than the men at the front but essential tas7s on behalf of the 4urity of the race and its future1 :ne British ,udge at a later trial indignantly said to a concentrationcam4 guard who had s4o7en of returning to the troo4s after having been on leave ??To the troo4sO ;ou were no soldier you were a concentration-cam4 guardPI But these were the views of the normal world not of the dream world of the NaHi 8tate1 8chellenberg and :hlendorf testified that the Army had 7nown all about the 8D and !insatH activitiesC but both had to retreat under the shar4 @uestioning of 9aternser the lawyer defending the Eigh .ommand and they finally admitted that their missions of 7illing Dews could be divulged to no one and that 8chellenberg had never mentioned the e<terminations when he drew u4 the contract with General -agner =see The :rganiHations .ha4t1 (/>1 It was clear however from the strong 4rotests on the 4art of the Army in some sectors that many German generals did 7now1 The @uestion the court had to answer at Nuremberg had to do 4rimarily with the guilt of Beitel and Dodl in the murders as well as in the other three 4oints of the indictment against them1 6or Baltenbrunner no @uestions were left o4en1 -ilhelm Beitel The 4rosecution one of Dodl?s lawyers said treated 6ield Marshal Beitel and .olonel General Dodl as inse4arable twins1 But few in the #arty or the -ehrmachtand certainly not Adolf Eitler,udged them ali7e1 Dodl was a Bavarian with few of the gay careless Iliving-it-u4I @ualities 4o4ularly su44osed to be BayrischC he was sober intelligent methodical and 4ractical a thoroughly ca4able officer and one moreover with his own o4inions1 Ee became devoted to Eitler only gradually as the 6uehrer re4eatedly daHHled him with intuitive flashes of when and how to act in both 4olitical and military affairs1 Dodl had been dubious of Eitler and only after such successes as the reoccu4ation of the Fhineland the Anschluss Munich and the victories in the -est did he develo4 his awed regard for Eitler?s genius1 But in the course of their relationshi4 he argued stiffly with Eitler on a number of military decisions and stubbornly stood his ground when the 6uehrer reacted with Sturm un) rang1 Beitel on the other hand who had been schooled in the #russian Army and who re4resented to the Allies at Nuremberg the 4rototy4e of a #russian officer was never much more than an efficient yes-man1 Never during his

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page_32$ #age )&* five years as chief of :B- did he argue against a Eitler decision although li7e Fibbentro4 he did go so far as to write a memorandum advising against the Fussian cam4aign before it started1 According to a witness at Nuremberg Admiral .anaris had regarded Beitel as a ty4e of noncommissioned officer blown u4 to su4erhuman 4ro4ortions and had felt that des4ite his monocle and absurd swagger he was essentially the obse@uious military cler7 signing on the dotted line and dutifully initialing orders even those he 7new to be @uestionable if not criminal1 )* Neither Beitel nor Dodl had any 4ower of commandC as chief of the :B- the Eigh .ommand of the Armed 6orces Beitel was the channel through which Eitler communicated orders to the Army the Air 6orce and the Navy1 It was clear not only from the testimony of witnesses but also from the structure of the -ehrmacht that orders going to either the Air 6orce or Navy could not originate with Beitel since their commanders Feichsmarschall Eermann Goering of the 9uftwaffe and Admiral Faeder and then DoenitH of the Navy would have immediately resisted any interference with their authority on his 4art however subservient they might be to the 6uehrer1 They acce4ted orders from Beitel only because the orders came through him from Eitler1/$ At Nuremberg Admiral Faeder?s testimony on the 6ield Marshal?s defects of character and 4rofessional ca4abilities dee4ly distressed Beitelso dee4ly in fact that he wrote a note to his lawyer Dr1 :tto Nelte telling Nelte that he must feel free to resign his mandate after Faeder?s testimony but 4ointing out that if Faeder really had believed him so incom4etent as chief of :B- he should have told the 6uehrer so and should not have collaborated with such a bungler for five and a half years1 The Army too had its chief of staff and its own chain of command and Beitel des4ite the high ran7 of Generalfeldmarschall given him after the fall of 6rance told the field commanders only what Eitler ordered him to 4ass along1 In time es4ecially when orders became im4ossible to carry out Beitel became 7nown to his colleagues as Nickesel =a toy don7ey that nods its head> and Lakaitel a 4un on the word ??lac7eyIC it was this servile @uality that enabled him to last out the war when so many able men were relieved of their commands or shot by order of the 6uehrer1 !veryone 7new that to head :B- was a than7less ,obC no one intrigued to win this 4ost as they did the others1 The criticisms of Beitel were inevitable for no other 7ind of man could have held the ,ob1/( Although Beitel had served in the #russian Army where the form and 4attern of the general staff officer had its origins he was as far from being the conventional #russian officer as Dodl was from the stoc7 figure of the ,olly Bavarian1 Ee loo7ed the 4art but the steel was lac7ing1 The Beitel family came not from #russia but from Eannover and Beitel?s grandfather had so disli7ed the #russians that he would not let his son a44ear in his house in Army uniform1 In (%+( Beitel?s father bought a farmstead in Brunswic7 a large tract called Eelmscherode near Gandersheim in the

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page_330 #age ))$ western 4art of the state1 -ilhelm Bodewin Dohann Gustav Beitel was born there on 8e4tember && (%%&1 Eis mother A4ollonia Gissering came from a bourgeois landed family and the young son wanted above any other career o4en to him to be a 9andwirt a large-scale farmer li7e his ancestors1 After the death of his mother and his father?s remarriage however he was told that Eelmscherode could not su44ort two families1 Ee was an obedient boy and in the s4ring of (*$$ having ta7en his Abitur he cheerfully ,oined the /'th 6ield Artillery Fegiment in -olfenbuettel in which his father had entered him1 Beitel would have 4referred the cavalry but the family could not afford the added e<4ense of su44lying him with a horse1 Ee had been an average student at the Gymnasium and had gotten along well with both his su4eriors and his schoolmates1 Ee was tractable not overly intelligentaverage they called himand one of his schoolmasters said ??;ou?d do a hundred times better at ta7ing 8aint #aul out for a ride with some mettlesome horses than you would at understanding him1I Beitel develo4ed into a solid de4endable ty4e: a man who followed instructions and who was able to smooth over differences when they arose a conciliator who avoided rather than overcame obstacles and who carefully re4eated what his su4eriors had taught him1 Ee served with his artillery regiment as a lieutenant in the march into Belgium and 6rance in (*(/ and was slightly wounded in 8e4tember1 In March (*(0 he was transferred to the General 8taff of the Tth Feserve .or4s from which he was moved in Duly to the Great General 8taff where he was entitled to wear the General 8taff trousers with their red stri4es1 As he wrote to his father on March (( (*(0 he could than7 his 4referment in 4art at least to chanceC he had ta7en 4art during the 4rewar (*(/ maneuvers in the General 8taff ins4ection tri4 and had favorably im4ressed the visiting staff officers1 /& Beitel stayed in the Army after (*(%1 Eis wife 9isa 6ontaine whom he had married ,ust before the start of the war came from a well-to-do family of landowners and brewers1 The Beitels therefore were not among the victims of the economic crises that roc7ed Germany in the 4ostwar years1 The Beitels were always careful with their money and always used what they had circums4ectly1 -hen they traveled to an official ceremony Beitel used the automobile 4laced at his dis4osal but his wife went by trolleycar1 They were bourgeois 4eo4le and both had dee4 feeling for the land and the formerly wellto-do who had lived by it1 Beitel sorrowfully re4orted in one of his letters that in (reis 8chlochau alone in the s4ring of (*)( forty-three estates of /' $$$ Morgen =about )$ $$$ acres> had been ta7en over by creditors1/) This was the year in which he now a colonel and chief of the organiHation division of the General 8taff together with Ma,or General -ilhelm Adam and .olonel -alther von Brauchitsch made a two-wee7 tri4 to Fussia1L Beitel was greatly im4ressed with the 8oviet "nion its immense s4aces its raw materials and the eagerness and tem4o of its wor7ers1 L Adam was chief of T( =o4erations> Brauchitsch of T/ =training>1

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page_331 #age ))( Beitel was never a man to see what went on below surfaces1 Ee was a hard wor7er who busied himself with innumerable burdensome details and he stayed at his ,ob from early morning until late at night usually seven days a wee71 Eis su4eriors valued him for his enormous industry and his ability to carry out assignments with considerable efficiency and dis4atch1 By (*)/ at the age of fifty-two he was a ma,or generalC he was a man who acce4ted all the conventional views of General 8taff officers and in addition he had a high tolerance for National 8ocialism but not for the 8A?s incor4oration into the Army with its leaders as officers1L The Army was for Beitel not only the center of his own life but the center of Germany1 The Air 6orce and Navy had their 4lace but only the Army would be the decisive factor if war came he wrote in a memorandum a44raising Germany?s military 4osition1 That was what every General 8taff officer believed and Beitel?s memorandum was as acce4table to the General 8taff as to Eitler1 Eitler had chosen him as chief of :B- in 6ebruary (*)% because he seemed to be the 7ind of man he could trust to carry out his assignment1 6ield Marshal von Blomberg whose chief of staff Beitel had been and who had 7nown him since (*(+ told the 6uehrer that Beitel would be no more than a good section chief to which Eitler re4lied ??That?s what I wantI And in this matter as in many others the 6uehrer?s intuition was correct1LL In (*)% the chief of the General 8taff of the Army General Bec7 along with other high-ran7ing officers 4lanned a cou2 )A<tat and the arrest of Eitler if he brought on a war against .Hechoslova7ia that would mean the inevitable defeat of the Feich by the overwhelming su4erior forces of the coalition against Germany1 This was a 7ey year in Eitler?s ta7eover of the Army1 .olonel General von 6ritsch who had been a44ointed .ommander in .hief of the Army in 6ebruary (*)/ and 6ield Marshal von Blomberg who had been made Minister of Defense in Eitler?s first .abinet both lost their offices1LLL General 9udwig Bec7 who became chief of the General 8taff in (*)0 when it was reestablished moved into o4en o44osition to Eitler1 Bec7 was the center of the cons4iracy of Army generals which included many of the men who would ta7e 4art in the attentat of Duly &$1 IA good L Eis wife 9isa in March (*)) after the #otsdam ceremonies wrote to her mother that although she never could be a National 8ocialist she was enormously enthusiastic about EitlerC a few months later she said his s4eeches were master4ieces1 LL Eitler had 7nown little of BeitelC when he ordered him to re4ort he referred to him as General von Beitel =-alter GoerlitH (eitel+erbrecher o)er Offi0ierO MGoettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*'(N 41 ($+>1 LLL At the time when Blomberg made his ill-advised second marriage his youngest daughter Dorothee was engaged to Beitel?s son 9ieutenant Barl EeinH Beitel1 -hen the un4leasant 4roof that Blomberg?s new wife had been a registered 4rostitute was laid on the des7 of the #olice #resident of Berlin .ount von Eelldorf he went with the documents to Beitel1 Beitel characteristically sideste44edC he sent Eelldorf to Goering who in turn went to Eitler with the bad news1 9ater when Blomberg was honeymooning in Italy he wrote to Beitel as7ing whether if he divorced his wife he might be reinstated1 Beitel instead of advising him turned the letter over to Eitler who would have none of the idea =see also Goering .ha4t1 )>1

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page_332 #age ))& section chief?? was e<actly what Eitler needed for the chief of :B- would be no more than Eitler?s 4ersonal chief of staff1 Beitel was not a member of this cons4iracyC neither then nor later would he dream of being untrue to his leader no matter what catastro4he might befall his country1 Both he and Dodl o44osing the advice of the generals at the front would agree when the time came with Eitler?s orders for the encircled 8i<th Army at 8talingrad to fight on against ho4eless odds1 Beitel in the autobiogra4hical account he wrote at Nuremberg told of occasions when he resisted Eitler1 :nce in A4ril (*/$ he reacted strongly against Eitler?s ta7ing the administration of Norway from the Army and 4utting it in the hands of Gauleiter Terboven1 Ee threw his briefcase on the table he said and wal7ed out1 // This scene was also described by Dodl who witnessed it1/0 Again in the autumn of (*/( Beitel had a difference of o4inion with Eitler offered his resignation and thought of suicide but he overcame his des4air and stayed on1 In (*/) both he and Dodl too7 the 4art of 6ield Marshal 8igmund 9ist who had fallen into grave disfavor by his cam4aign in the .aucasus and Eitler refused for months to sha7e hands with either of them1 But such moments came seldomC and toward the end when Eitler?s fury had no limits they never recurred1 Beitel?s most im4ortant and historic assignments before the start of the war were a44earances in an actor?s role at two meetings with foreign statesmen1 Ee was on hand when .hancellor von 8chuschnigg was summoned to Berchtesgaden to hear Eitler?s demands that 8chuschnigg renounce his Ianti-German 4olicyI and collaborate with the Austrian NaHisC Beitel?s 4resence was intended to im4ress 8chuschnigg with Germany?s determination to march if the Austrian .hancellor was unwilling to sign the agreement 4re4ared for him1 Beitel?s second theatrical a44earance came on March (/ (*)* when !mil EQcha #resident of .Hechoslova7ia was ordered to visit Eitler at the Feich .hancellery1 Again Beitel was 4resent along with Goering to act the 4art of the im4erturbable military commander awaiting the final order to stri7e as EQcha in the early hours of the (0th was forced to sign the document that 4laced what remained of his country under the 4rotection of the 6uehrer1 Beitel admitted at Nuremberg that his 4resence in Eitler?s office at a dramatic moment had been 4rearranged to ste4 u4 the 4sychological 4ressure on EQcha1 Ee had recited his lines in answer to Eitler?s @uestion saying that the orders had gone out for the Army to cross the demarcation lines of rum4 .Hechoslova7ia and to occu4y #rague1 Thus he had 4layed his 4art in the coercion of the e<hausted and ill old man who had to sign the 4a4er 4ushed before him1 Beitel went along with everything Eitler demanded of him1 Ee owed his high 4referment to the 6uehrer1 As a young officer he had never dreamed of becoming a 6ield MarshalC he 7new his limitations and only by the grace of Eitler had he transcended them1 Ee re4aid the 6uehrer with un@uestioning devotion1 Eis signature a44eared on orders and directives that were to

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page_333 #age ))) hel4 ma7e the war in the !ast as ruthless as any in history1 Ee had written in his order of December (' (*/& dealing with the 4artisans: The 6uehrer has received re4orts that some members of the armed forces ta7ing 4art in the actions against the bands have been held to account to their disadvantage for their behavior in battle1 The 6uehrer has therefore ordered: The enemy is sending into the 4artisan battle well-trained fanatical communistically schooled fighters who shrin7 from no act of violence1 More than ever before is it a @uestion of to be or not to be1 This war no longer has anything to do with 7nightly conduct or with the agreements of the Geneva .onvention1 If this war is not fought with the greatest brutality against the bands both in the !ast and in the Bal7ans then in the foreseeable future the strength at our dis4osal will not be sufficient to be able to master this 4lague1 The troo4s are therefore em4owered and are in duty bound in this war to use without mitigation even against women and children any means that will lead to success1 .onsiderations of any 7ind are a crime against the German 4eo4le and the soldier at the front1 1 1 1 /' Insurmountable ob,ections e<isted he said to any chivalrous idea of warfare when the Germans invaded Fussia1 Beitel forwarded the orders to shoot 4risoners of war if they were commissars or 2olitruks ca4tured in the uniform of the Fed Army or Allied soldiers sent on missions of sabotage even if they were in uniform1/+ :n Dune &' (*// he signed the order that only Allied soldiers ma7ing 4arachute landings at the Normandy beachhead were to be s4ared from e<ecution if ca4turedC any others were to be regarded as saboteurs and were to be 7illed in battle or turned over to the 8D which meant e<ecution1/% Beitel ordered that every village in which 4artisans were found must be burned down and all victims sus4ected of offenses against the German troo4s shot without trial1 At the end of the war he was to turn such directives against German generals1 :n A4ril () (*/0 with Eeinrich Eimmler he issued an order declaring that cities that were traffic centers had to be defended to the last man1 The battle commander in each city was to be held res4onsible for carrying out the order and if he did anything to wea7en it he was to be made harmless or to be condemned to death1/* Beitel also signed the order for the 7illing of fifty to one hundred hostages for the murder of one German soldier in the !ast although he told the Nuremberg court he had 4ro4osed ratios of only five or ten to one1 Eitler had overruled him so he sent out the order for the higher numbers1 Ee was also accused by a witness General !rwin 9ahousen of the Abwehr of having ordered the retaliatory 7illing of two 6rench generals: the slaying 4lanned by the 8D of General Eenri Giraud who had esca4ed in (*/& from a German 4rison near DresdenC and the Abwehr?s 7illing of General Ma<ime -eygand who Beitel thought might become a center of 6rench resistance in North Africa1 Beitel denied these accusations saying that 9ahousen had misunderstood his concern with these casesC as a result of Eitler?s constant in@uiries he had merely

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page_334 #age ))/ intended to 4lace both generals under arrest1 But if 9ahousen who was in direct touch with Beitel had misunderstood him who else would have 7nown the men were only to be arrestedO Beitel ordered that Fussian 4risoners of war were to be tatooed on the buttoc7s because thousands esca4ed and were difficult to identify when they mingled with the local 4o4ulation in the !ast1 The order 4roduced such an immediate and vigorous reaction from commandants of 4rison cam4s and even from Fibbentro4 who in this case 4ointed to international law forbidding such 4ractices that Beitel rescinded it before it could be carried out1 :ne cam4 commander told him that the Fussians would retaliate by branding German 4risoners on the forehead1 That was language Beitel understoodC a re4risal was something he res4ected1 Beitel?s authority was actually limited to issuing the orders given him by Eitler1 8ince neither he nor Dodl had authority to give orders or directives on their own they signed or initialed them on behalf of or on the authority of the 6uehrer1 Beitel would a44arently sign anything Eitler gave him1 -itnesses testified to his 4assive ferocity: 9ahousen wrote in his diary while they were traveling together in the 6uehrer?s train in "44er 8ilesia on 8e4tember (& (*)* that Beitel had s4o7en of the need of e<terminating the #olish intellectuals along with the 4riests 4astors nobles and Dews who would be the center of the Fesistance1 Eitler said Beitel had decided to brea7 the will of the #olish 4eo4le1L Beitel was echoing here the current #arty lineC the same words were being used by Eimmler and Fibbentro41 0$ General Ni7olaus von 6al7enhorst who had commanded the German forces in Norway testified that he tried to save the lives of British .ommandos who had been ca4tured at 8tavanger Norway in November (*/& but that Beitel told him they had to be shot1 6al7enhorst had at least wanted the 4risoners to be interrogated first but they were 7illed at once10( Beitel told 6al7enhorst that the 6uehrer had issued the order and 6al7enhorst would have to abide by it1 The same thing ha44ened 6al7enhorst testified when Norwegian seamen trying to esca4e to !ngland were ca4tured off the coast of Norway in March (*/)1 These men too were shot without courts-martial10& Another witness Doachim von und Hur Gathen testified in his interrogation of November )$ (*/0 that Beitel had 4ro4osed the 7illing of terror fliers on the order of any Army or Air 6orce officer of a ran7 not lower than regimental commander1 Ee said that the 9uftwaffe staff was o44osed to this but Goering had ordered the Air 6orce not to intervene against the ??well-,ustified fury of the 4o4ulation1I0) Beitel fitted 4erfectly into the National 8ocialist scheme of things1 -hen Blomberg resigned the 6uehrer himself became with the decree of 6ebru- L 9ahousen told Beitel that Ithe world would eventually hold the -ehrmacht under whose eyes such things had ha44ened res4onsible for these deeds1I Beitel re4lied that the 6uehrer had already decided on this matter1 Ee made it clear to the .ommander in .hief of the Army that if the -ehrmacht did not want any 4art in these occurrences it would have to acce4t the 88 and Gesta4o as rivals =N*A G )$/+-#8 41 +'*>1

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page_33 #age ))0 ary / (*)% head of the armed forces with no intermediaries1 ??6rom now on I Eitler declared II will directly and 4ersonally ta7e over the su4reme command of the entire -ehrmacht1 The former -ehrmacht :ffice in the -ar Ministry becomes the Eigh .ommand of the Armed 6orces and comes immediately under my command as my military staff1 At the head of the staff of the Eigh .ommand stands the former chief of the -ehrmacht :ffice MBeitelN1I At this 4oint Beitel as .hief of 8taff of the Armed 6orces became not only chief of Eitler?s wor7ing staff but as re4resentative of the -ehrmacht with the ran7 of minister a member of the .ouncil of Ministers for Defense of the Feich1 But since no such council was needed =see The :rganiHations .ha4t1 (/> because Eitler undertoo7 to defend the Feich in his own ca4acity as head of the #arty the Government the Armed 6orces the 6oreign :ffice and the Dudiciary Beitel?s main duty was merely to obtain Eitler?s decisions on all basic military @uestions and after they were drafted and a44roved by the 6uehrer to countersign them1 In the autumn of (*// when for the first time it became legal for an Army officer to ,oin the #arty Beitel received the #arty?s Golden Badge of Eonor and contributed ( $$$ FM to the #arty funds1 Ee never lost his faith in his masterC he stated at Nuremberg I!ven today I am a convinced adherent of Adolf EitlerIC however he added cautiously Ithis does not e<clude my re,ecting some items of the #arty 4rogram1I 0/ :n March )$ (*/( almost three months before the start of the Fussian cam4aign Eitler told Beitel Ealder and other members of the Eigh .ommand that the war to come was a clash of two ideologies that bolshevism was criminality and communism an enormous danger to the future of the Feich1 -e must forget the 6uehrer said any conce4t of comradeshi4 between soldiers in this war1 A .ommunist is no comrade before or after the battleC this is a war of e<termination1 The generals were to overcome their 4ersonal scru4les for harshness today meant leniency in the future100 Therefore Eitler demanded what came to be called the .ommissar :rder =)er (ommissarbefehl> the order to shoot any #arty officials commissars or 2olitruks ca4tured in battle immediately without a court-martial or legal 4rocedures of any 7ind1 :ther generals immediately called it a criminal order but Beitel never made the slightest ob,ection to itC he acce4ted it as a matter of course1 :n May (& (*/( General -arlimont with the a44roval of General Dodl sent to Eitler a draft of a 4ro4osed directive of :BE including a memorandum of Alfred Fosenberg and :B-?s 4ro4osals1 :BE recommended in accord with Eitler?s 4ur4oses: (1 #olitical officials and leaders McommissarsN are to be li@uidated1 &1 Insofar as they are ca4tured by the troo4s an officer with authority to im4ose disci4linary 4unishment decides whether the given individual must be li@uidated1 6or such a decision the fact suffices that he is a 4olitical official1 )1 #olitical leaders in the troo4s MFed ArmyN are not recogniHed as 4rison-

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page_33! #age ))' ers of war and are to be li@uidated at the latest in the 4risoner-of-war transit cam4s1 0' Fosenberg wanted the li@uidation order limited to high 4arty functionaries and -arlimont?s draft 4ro4osed li@uidating only commissars who fought against the German troo4s and leaving unharmed those who too7 no 4art in hostilities1 This was -arlimont?s and Dodl?s attem4t to water down the order in some degree1 -arlimont said later that the Army had 7nown that if he did not draw u4 the .ommissar :rder someone in the 88 would1 The final .ommissar :rder of Dune ' followed in the main the -arlimont draft: in the battle area commissars who fought against German troo4s were to be li@uidated immediately1 The others for the time being were to be left unharmed1 In the rear areas any commissars who had been seiHed because of doubtful behavior were to be turned over to the 8D10+ Beitel obediently sent along the (ommissarbefehl1 Gery nearly every general e<ce4t Beitel 4rotested against it =see The :rganiHations .ha4t1 (/>1 At Nuremberg he e<4ressed mi<ed feelings about it1 During one interrogation he called it a Sch,einereiC at other times he re4eated what he had doubtless said at the time that commissars were not soldiers but 4arty functionaries not bearers of arms but 4olitical inciters1 The ma,ority of the German generals and field marshals had strongly disagreed with this reasoning however1 They 4ointed out that commissars and other 4arty functionaries wore military uniforms fought alongside the Fed Army and could not legally be distinguished from any other 4risoner of war1 That this order was immediately recogniHed as illegal was clear when on May (/ (*/( Beitel ordered that it be transmitted by word of mouth only and the written records always be destroyed1 At Nuremberg Beitel e<cused the fact that the (ommissarbefehl and similar orders were issued before the start of the Fussian cam4aign by saying that the Germans had 7nown before the war started what would ha44en1 ;ugoslavia he said had shown what Fussian tactics might be li7e1 The country was honeycombed with Bolshevi7 agents when the Germans invaded1 All Eitler?s orders and decrees he said were reactions and countermeasures to ??misbehavior and rebellion in the occu4ied territories1I0% And on May () (*/( Beitel signed a directive issued by the 6uehrer which was to be an additional reason for Brauchitsch?s issuing his Maintenance of Disci4line order =see The :rganiHations .ha4t1 (/>1 It read: The a44lication of martial law aims in the first 4lace at maintaining )isci2line1 The fact that the o4erational areas in the !ast are so far-flung the battle strategy which this necessitates and the 4eculiar @ualities of the enemy confront the courts-martial with 4roblems which being understaffed they cannot solve while hostilities are in 4rogress 1 1 1 unless ,urisdiction is confined in the first instance to its main tas71

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page_33" #age ))+ This is 4ossible only if the troo2s themselves ta7e ruthless action against any threat from the enemy 4o4ulation1 1 1 1 I1 Treatment of offenses committed by enemy civilians: (1 "ntil further notice the military courts and the courts-martial will not be com4etent for crimes committe) by enemy civilians1 &1 6uerrillas should be dis4osed of ruthlessly by the military whether they are fighting or in flight1 1 1 1 )1 -here measures of this 7ind M7illing 4artisans in actionN are not followed or are not 4ossible the sus2ecte) 2ersons are to be taken before an officer imme)iately. He ,ill )eci)e ,hether they ,ill be shot1 In the case of localities where the -ehrmacht has been treacherously or maliciously attac7ed collective measures of force may be ta7en on the order of an officer of at least the ran7 of battalion commander if circumstances do not 4ermit a @uic7 identification of individual offenders1 1 1 1 II1 Treatment of offenses committed against inhabitants by members of the Armed 6orces and its em4loyees: (1 -ith regard to offenses committed against enemy civilians by members of the !ehrmacht and its em4loyees 2rosecution is not obligatory even where the deed is at the same time a military crime or offense1 &1 -hen >u)ging such offenses it must be borne in mind 1 1 1 that the colla4se of Germany in (*(% the subse@uent sufferings of the German 4eo4le and the fight against National 8ocialism which cost the blood of innumerable su44orters of the movement were caused 4rimarily by Bolshevi7 influence and that no German has forgotten this fact1 )1 Therefore the ,udicial authority will decide in such cases whether a disci4linary 4enalty is indicated or whether legal measures are necessary1 In the case of offenses against inhabitants it will order a court;martial only if maintenance of )isci2line or security of the "orces calls for such a measure1 This a44lies for instance to serious offenses originating in lac7 of self-control in se<ual matters or in a criminal dis4osition and to those which indicate that the troo4s are threatening to get out of hand1 :ffenses which have resulted in senseless destruction of billets or stores of other ca4tured material to the disadvantage of our 6orces should as a rule be ,udged no less severely1 1 1 1 III1 -ithin their s4here of com4etence Military .ommanders are 2ersonally res4onsible for seeing that: (1 every commissioned officer of the units under their command is instructed 4rom4tly and in the most em4hatic manner on 4rinci4les set out under I above1 &1 their legal advisers are notified 4rom4tly of these instructions and of verbal information in ,hich the 2olitical intentions of the High *omman) ,ere e42laine) to *;in;*s1 )1 only those court sentences are confirmed which are in accordance

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page_33# #age ))% with the 4olitical intentions of the Eigh .ommand1 0* M!m4hasis in original1N Beitel was as anti-8emitic as his being Eitler?s mouth4iece re@uired1 Ee directed that no soft-hearted or even merely efficient commander use Dews in the military government or in any useful ca4acity even to aid the tas7s of the Army1 :n 8e4tember (& (*/( Beitel said that isolated instances of disobedience made it necessary for him to remind the troo4s of the directives for the conduct of the Army in Fussia that the fight against bolshevism necessitated ??indiscriminate and energetic accom4lishment of this tas7 es4ecially also against the Dews the main carriers of Bolshevism1 6or such reasons any coo4eration of the Armed 6orces with the Dewish 4o4ulation 1 1 1 as well as the use of any single Dew in any 4referred au<iliary 4osition will have to cease1I'$ Beitel was a hard liner on every occasion when he was sure of Eitler?s views1 :n 8e4tember (0 (*/( when Admiral .anaris sent a memorandum strongly o44osing the treatment accorded 8oviet 4risoners of war Beitel wrote on the margin: IThe observations corres4ond to the soldierly notions of chivalrous warfare1 -e are dealing here with the destruction of a 4hiloso4hy1 Therefore I a44rove the measures and sanction them1I'( Ee signed Eitler?s Night and 6og decree on December + (*/(1 This action he said at Nuremberg was one of the three he most regretted1 Another was the e<ecution of fifty FA6 officers who had esca4ed from the 8agan 4rison cam4 in 8ilesia had been reca4tured and then had been shot1L The third involved the orders for the conduct of the war in Fussia1'& The Night and 6og decree was designed to stri7e terror in the ran7s of all resisters 4articularly those in 6rance and the 9ow .ountries1 "nder it 4eo4le sus4ected of crimes against the German occu4ation were sim4ly to disa44ear after they were turned over to the Gesta4o1 Night and 6og =this was the 6uehrer?s coinage> was a substitute for the death 4enaltyC the 4risoners no longer e<isted for the outside world1 They were trans4orted clandestinely to the Feich by the Gesta4o and then to an anonymous 4lace in a concentration cam41 They went into the night and fog and no word would be heard from them by their families and friends1 .oncerning Night and 6og Beitel said at Nuremberg that he had inserted before the order the words: IIt is the will of the 6uehrer after long consideration I to show to the commanders receiving it that he himself disa44roved1 This is as far as his criticism could go1 An order of Beitel?s of 8e4tember % (*/& called for the introduction of L !ighty members of the FA6 including !nglish Belgian 6rench Gree7 Norwegian #olish and .Hech officers had tunneled out of 8agan1 6our were 4rom4tly caught in the tunnel and seventy-si< esca4ed1 :f these three were never found and fifteen were reca4tured in the immediate neighborhood1 Beitel ordered these sent bac7 to the cam4 and thus saved their lives1 The other fifty ca4tured in various 4arts of Germany the 6uehrer ordered to be shot immediately1 Beitel o44osed the e<ecutions but could not 4revent them =N T 441 0'/'+>1

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page_33$ #age ))* com4ulsory labor in the occu4ied territories and 4rohibited wor7ers from changing em4loyment without 4ermission1 ') In addition he a44roved shooting stri7ing railroad men in Eolland as a re4risal for this act of 4assive resistance1 Many of the orders Beitel signed and sent on were so manifestly illegal under 4revious German military law that Beitel had to ta7e the 4art of the lawbrea7ers1 -hen the 4ro4osal was made in the latter 4art of the war that German civilians be allowed or encouraged to lynch Allied fliers who were forced to land Beitel seemingly went along with the lynchers: ??I am against legal 4rocedure I he said Iit does not wor7 out1I'/ Actually he strongly o44osed 7illing Allied fliersC what he did was as usual to attem4t to stall for time and in this he was successful1 No order to e<ecute Allied bombing crews was ever issued1 Beitel?s orders reflected no more than Eitler?s mounting wrath1 In Dune (*)* the Army 8ervice Fegulations e<4ressing the traditional views of the Army Eigh .ommand declared that war was waged only against the armed forces of the enemy1 8u44lies vital to the troo4s could be obtained only against 4aymentC cultural monuments were to be s4aredC 4risoners were not to be mishandled and were to be allowed to retain their 4ersonal effects1 They were to be 7illed only if they tried to esca4e1 In Danuary (*/$ before the 4artisan war had become the ma,or threat it was to be in Fussia the German orders to troo4s fighting guerrillas corres4onded almost word for word to the Eague rules on land warfare under which guerrillas might be threatened with death and confiscation of their 4ro4erty if they could not be identified as soldiers but which nevertheless s4elled out the offenses that made a 4artisan liable to such 4unishment1 All this however changed even before the war with Fussia started1 And Beitel dutifully changed too whether the orders he signed had to do with 7illing soldiers or civilians1 The underlying lawlessness and brutality were always 4resenteven after the defeat of 6rance in 8e4tember (*/$1 Beitel declared that the 6uehrer wanted the 6rench to be treated from the 4olitical angle onlyC it made no difference he said if the economy was destroyed1 The Army should use force only if there were disturbances1 To an ob,ection that 6rance would become a center of unrest Beitel re4lied IThen we?ll shoot1I'0 But such threats and the shooting of 6rench hostages were small events when com4ared to the ma,or struggle of two world views in Fussia1 Not only the Fussian economy was to be destroyed but the civilian 4o4ulation as well if they were sus4ected of collaborating with the enemy forces in the German rear1 But Beitel?s direct influence in the conduct of the Fussian cam4aign was slight since it was the Eigh .ommand of the Army not of the Armed 6orces that under Eitler directed the war in the !ast1 Eitler late in (*/( after dismissing 6ield Marshal von Brauchitsch became .ommander in .hief of the Army in addition to being .ommander in .hief of the Armed 6orces1 At this time the :BE li7e the :B- became nothing more than his 4ersonal staff1 Nevertheless it was Beitel and :B- that issued or

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page_340 #age )/$ a44roved 4atently criminal orders such as the one signed by General Feinec7e for use of wea4ons without hesitation against Fussian 4risoners of war1 Beitel at Nuremberg could only defend these measures and the others that resulted in the death of hundreds of thousands of Fussian 4risoners by citing the advanced age of many of the German guards who he claimed were often attac7ed by 8oviet 4risoners1 Beitel was also charged with having ordered the shac7ling of !nglish 4risoners of war on their way to 4rison cam4s and the e<ecution of Allied .ommando troo4s who were to be turned over to the 8D by the Army and Navy even when ca4tured in uniform1 These orders Beitel defended as re4risals for the shac7ling of German 4risoners at the time the British raided Die44e and for the e<ecution of others1L Beitel said that the Germans had 4roof both from the actions of the .ommandos who had landed at Die44e and from ca4tured British orders that the .ommandos were instructed to use every atrocious and illegal means to accom4lish their mission1LL Toward the close of the war in Duly (*// Beitel?s signature was the last of three a44earing on two orders concerning the chain of command that mar7ed what a few years before would have been a revolution in the armed forces1 As the enemy was about to invade Germany Eeinrich Eimmler was 4ut in charge not only of the 88 the Gesta4o and the 8ecret #olice but of the Eome ArmyC in addition the Gauleiters were to be the recruiters for the nondescri4t forces of the Gol7ssturm that were being gathered from among the very young and the old1 Both Bormann and 9ammers on behalf of the #arty signed their names on these military orders before Beitel docilely affi<ed his1 Beitel was a member of the court of honor that e<4elled from the Army the accused officers who too7 4art in the Duly &$ (*// 4lot against EitlerC in Beitel?s eyes this was the gravest crime that anyone could commit1 ;et he had li7ed .anaris one of the chief members of the Fesistance and after .anaris? arrest he sent money to aid his family1 It was Beitel who hel4ed the slightly wounded Eitler out of the bun7er that day and he 7new now that the 6uehrer felt he could trust him even if he aided the family of one of the would-be assassins1 Beitel had dee4 4ersonal loyalties and .anaris? family had been guilty of no crime1 -hen Beitel had first heard in (*/) that General :ster was involved in a cons4iracy he sim4ly refused to believe it and forced the witness to withdraw his charges1 '' If Beitel 7new the war was lostand one family re4ort said he was doubtful of a German victory even in the autumn of (*/(he gave no sign of it1 Ee told his Fussian interrogator at Bad Mondorf that in the summer L 6rench 4risoners were also shac7led after two hundred esca4ed1 LL The ca4tured British Han)book of .nstructions on Ho, to *on)uct .rregular !arfare bore out Beitel?s defense: British .ommandos were told ??to use any wea4ons including bro7en bottles in hand to hand fighting against the enemy 1 1 1I These documents however could not be introduced at the International Military Tribunal trial although they were brought into evidence two years later at the trial of 9eeb et al1

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page_341 #age )/( of (*// he had thought that the war could no longer be won by military means that the matter now had to be turned over to the 4oliticians1 If this statement has any clear meaning it must be that he still thought a German victory somehow 4ossible1 '+ In a letter to his wife dated August &* (*/) he wrote that the war had been going on for four years and ??when the Bolshevi7i will sin7 to their 7nees one 7nows not but before then we can never have 4eace1I'% The letter was written following the devastating British air attac7 on Eamburg which the German Air 6orce could not 4revent months after ma,or German defeats in Fussia and Africa and after Mussolini had been forced from office1 In the last days of the war he and Dodi im4ortuned the 6uehrer to leave his bun7er in Berlin and to go south to Bavaria and the mythical redoubt1 :nly when Eitler ordered him to leave did Beitel go for he needed the leader even when there was nothing to lead1 -hen as7ed at Nuremberg whether he would behave in the same fashion again he answered: I would rather choose death than to let myself be drawn into the net of such 4ernicious methods1 1 1 1 I believed but I erred and I was not in a 4osition to 4revent what ought to have been 4revented1 That is my guilt1 It is tragic to have to realiHe that the best I had to give as a soldier obedience and loyalty was e<4loited for 4ur4oses which could not be recogniHed at the time and that I did not see that there is a limit set even for a soldier?s 4erformance of his duty1 That is my fate1'* Eis fate had not been as high flown as his 4rose1 Ee had servilely acce4ted the small and large ignominies of Eitler?s scorn1 Eitler said he had the brains of an usher in a moving 4icture theater and Beitel when as7ed how relations were between the 6uehrer and :B- said II don?t 7now he tells me nothingC he only s4its at me1I+$ Ee had to do without smo7ing the cigars he was addicted to for hours at a time while he was with the 6uehrer who would not 4ermit Beitel to smo7e in his 4resence1 Eis 4ro4osal that General von 6al7enhorst be given charge of the Norwegian cam4aign led the 6uehrer to interview 6al7enhorst and then to a44oint him but he did so without consulting Beitel further1 Beitel saw his brother officers defamed called cowards and some of them shot for disobedience when they ordered a retreat to save the lives of their troo4s1 Ee sent the s@uad of 88 men and Army officers to 6ield Marshal Fommel that gave Fommel the chance to 4oison himself or come before a 4eo4le?s court1 And in a letter to his wife he re4eated the official story that this leader Iblessed by GodI had been critically in,ured in an automobile accident1+( Ee was never 4ermitted to criticiHe a 4ro4osal by the 6uehrer1 Eis first loyalty was to Eitler and he never deviated from his single-minded blind and numb devotionand there is no evidence that he ever wanted to1 Ee had begun by saying I;es 8ir I when the 6uehrer s4o7e and at the end he was only a muchdecorated and well-4aid flun7ey1

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page_342 #age )/& -hen he was found guilty and sentenced to hang both Beitel and his wife refused to 4ermit his attorney Dr1 Nelte to a44eal the sentence1 Beitel admitted his guiltC the facts he said had been 4roven but he ho4ed the court would understand that he too had been a victim both of the 6uehrer and of fate1 A slightly different turn of the wheel and he would have been a farmerC another turn an artillery officer or a general staff officer under Bec7 or Blomberg1 Ee acce4ted his death sentenceC all he wanted from the court was 4ermission to be shot instead of dying by the ro4e1 This symbolic to7en of a soldier?s death was denied him1 Alfred Dodl Alfred Dodl was resistant to the charisma of the 6uehrer and his National 8ocialism before Eitler became .hancellor1 !ven at the time of the solemn ceremonies at #otsdam on March &( (*)) where the #resident of the Feich and his .hancellor celebrated the rebirth of a German nationalist state Eitler to Dodl was a mounteban7 a charlatan1 But Dodl struggled with conflicting emotions1 Eindenburg the revered 6ield Marshal and head of state had chosen Eitler and on 6ebruary ( the day after Eitler became .hancellor Dodl told a grou4 of officers that the 6uehrer had come to 4ower legallyC according to the constitution and the laws of the Feich he was the duly a44ointed 4olitical leader of the 8tate1 To criticiHe Eitler was to criticiHe Eindenburg1 +& That was the first time Dodl was forced to choose between duty and conscience so far as the 6uehrer was concerned and this conflict gradually resolved as he came under the s4ell of Eitler after the bloodless victories of the years before the war and the lightning cam4aigns against #oland Norway and above all 6rance1 Dodl had fought in 6rance in -orld -ar I where soldiers had died by the hundreds of thousands to win a few yards of ground but the 6uehrer?s brilliant strategy con@uered the entire country in a few wee7s1 Ee firmly believed Eitler to be what his most devoted admirers said he was ??the greatest military leader of all timesI =)er groesste "el)herr aller Ceiten> a 4hrase that gradually became more and more ironic as the victories dwindled and then turned into catastro4hic defeats until the a44ellation itself was shortened to the derisive abbreviation GroefaH1 But Eitler was never to become the GroefaH for Dodl although he @uarreled with the 6uehrer and he did something that few generals dared dotell him he was wrong1 Not many such scenes too7 4lace1 There could not be many for a general who dealt with Eitler either obeyed or was retired or shot1 But Dodl was one of the few ready to brave the 6uehrer?s towering rages when Dodl 7new a disastrous military decision was being made although morally disastrous decisions were something else again1 :ne head-on collision that nearly cost Dodl his ,ob occurred in August (*/&1 Eitler was furious with 6ield Marshal

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page_343 #age )/) 9ist commanding the newly formed Army Grou4 A for the cam4aign 9ist was waging in the .aucasus1 The 6uehrer had never li7ed 9ist but had reluctantly a44ointed him on Beitel?s and Ealder?s urging and because he had no li7ely candidate of his own at hand1L Eitler as always was 4laying for high sta7es: the oil area of GroHny and the mouth of the Golga at Astra7han1 :nly the ca4ture of Ba7u was he ready to 4ost4one if necessary to the ne<t year1 But again it was getting late in the season and the 6uehrer was nervous and im4atient1 Eitler accused 9ist of 4reventing an 88 #anHerdivision from ca4turing Fostow and fumed at the uncertain 4rogress of the o4erations on his mountain front1 The 6uehrer sent Dodl by 4lane to a cor4s of 9ist?s army battling for the .aucasus 4asses and Dodl having tal7ed with its commander General Bonrad and the 6ield Marshal agreed with them that the 6uehrer?s orders to 4ress forward at all costs were im4ossible to carry out1 Dodl returned to the 6uehrer?s head@uarters and this conversation too7 4lace: D:D9: ??I am convinced by my flight to the .aucasus that sending in 4arachute troo4s to Tua4se in all li7elihood would lead to their destruction1 The difficulty of the terrain is so great 1 1 1 that their being reinforced in time doesn?t seem 4ossible1 A thrust of the mountain troo4s over the 4asses is ,ust as un4romising1 1 1 1 -hile I was there the first snow had already fallen1 The commanding general MBonradN as7ed me to obtain 4ermission to 4ull bac7 the advance units that are two 7ilometers beyond the 4asses1 I thin7 that only a slow nibbling away on the road to Tua4se is 4ossible1 -hether that can be done this year seems very doubtful to me1 6ield Marshal 9ist is of the same o4inionI EIT9!F: INaturally Dodl the 6ield Marshal can scarcely be of any other o4inion since this muddle is owing to his brilliant leadershi41 1 1 1 I D:D9: IAs far as I can see 9ist at the start did everything he should have1 Ee had to e<4ect the strongest resistance on the road and therefore he had to try to by4ass it by going through the 4asses1 The only mista7e one can 4ossibly re4roach him for is that his forces are too massed and now obli@ue thrusts in the mountains are difficult to carry out1 But that in the first 4lace is the fault of the Army M:BEN1I EIT9!F: IThen his leadershi4 was not stiff enough1 1 1 1 I D:D9: I:ne has to see these mountain roads my 6uehrer to be able to really ,udge all the trouble that a #anHerdivision runs into there1I EIT9!F: II didn?t send you Dodl to hear you re4ort on all the difficulties1 ;ou were su44osed to re4resent my view that 4aratroo4ers were to be landed in Tua4se1 That was your ,ob1 Instead of that you come bac7 com4letely under the influence of the front commanders and become the mega4hone of these gentlemen1 I didn?t need to send you there for that1 This morning the L .olonel General 6ranH Ealder was .hief of 8taff of :BE1 GoerlitH believed that Eitler?s disli7e of 9ist went bac7 to (*)( when 9ist as commander of the Infantry 8chool in Dresden had ta7en disci4linary measures against young officers =6aehnriche> for National 8ocialist activities1

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page_344 #age )// mountain cor4s has already re4orted they have to bring bac7 their advanced units on the 4asses1 A44arently that?s the only success of your flight1 1 1 1 D:D9 =rising>: ??If you want to lose your 4aratroo4ers then dro4 them on Tua4se1 And the same thing will ha44en to the mountain troo4s if they have to go over the 4asses at this time of year1 In addition I was not sent to carry orders but to e<amine the situation1 If it was only necessary to transmit an order I wasn?t needed1I EIT9!F: I;ou should have carried through my order against the resistance I so often encounter1 That was your tas7 General Dodl1 ;ou haven?t done it1 Than7 you very much1I +) Dodl left the room without re4lying and Eitler told his ad,utant General Fudolf 8chmundt that from then on he would not eat at the same table with Beitel and Dodl1 8tenogra4hers would henceforth be 4resent so his words could not again be twisted1 Beitel was sent to tell 9ist that he was dismissed from his command and Eitler 4lanned to re4lace Dodl with #aulus as soon as 8talingrad was ca4turedwhich in August (*/& seemed almost in #aulus? gras41 Eitler in his first rage thought of court-martialing Dodl but he cooled off sufficiently to tolerate his 4resence1 Ee refused to sha7e hands with either Dodl or Beitel although all Beitel had done was to 4ro4ose 9ist as commander of the .aucasus Army1 +/ The more wrong decisions the 6uehrer made the less o44osition he could tolerate1 :n other occasions too Dodl too7 issue with Eitler1 Ee heatedly argued against the .ommando :rder although the 6uehrer was determined to issue it and was su44orted by Beitel1L Dodl also tried unsuccessfully to 7ee4 Ealder at his 4ost when Eitler decided to get rid of him1 But these were s4arse and minor differences over a long 4eriod of faithful collaboration and when the attem4t to 7ill Eitler was made on Duly &$ (*// Dodl was a44alled1 Ee said he did not 7now whether he could bear to 4ut on his uniform again1 At the same time he used the events of Duly &$ to teach the 6uehrer a lesson1 .olonel von Bonin who had been retired from the Army in (*)) for his unfriendly attitude toward National 8ocialism was arrested as a sus4icious character in Duly (*//1 Dodl li7ed and admired Bonin and he said to Eitler I;ou cannot be sur4rised my 6uehrer if you throw a man li7e Bonin into ,ail without any 4roofs being found and a44arently only on the basis of rumor that the s4irit of Duly &$ dominates the General 8taff1I+0 Dodl never com4letely lost his National 8ocialist faith or his belief in its dogmas nor did he ever learn to distinguish what was true from the NaHi cla4tra41 !ven on 8e4tember ' (*/0 in 4rison he said he thought that the mission of the #arty had been to free Germany from the s4iritual cultural and economic domination of the Dews1 The #arty had fought against com- L According to the un4ublished diary of Ma,or General !ngel when Dodl was first told by 8chmundt to issue the .ommando :rder Dodl said I#lease give him my best regards but I will not issue an order li7e that1I The 6uehrer thereu4on drew u4 the order himself =N TG 41 )(%>1

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page_34 #age )/0 munism and the Gersailles Treaty and although it had been without money or influence it had won *' 4er cent of the vote of the German 4eo4le1 It must therefore have had something said Dodl and he recited the standard ,ustifications for the NaHi 8tate of the thirties: National 8ocialism had brought unity to Germany im4roved the health services and mother and child care given vacations to wor7ers and restored Germany as a great 4ower1 It had 4roduced ??a friendly atmos4hereI in !ngland and 6rance and the hearts and the sym4athies of all Germans had gone out to the 6uehrer1 This said Dodl will always remain in the German memory1 Ee was still im4ressed with .hurchill?s 4raise of Eitler in (*)% and 4ointed out that any evidences of criminality in National 8ocialism obviously could not have been clear at that time1 Ee thought 4erha4s because he was so uns7illed in these @uestions that the fatal 4eriod had come with the 4olitical decisions of (*)* and he said he ho4ed the court would clarify the @uestion of such guilt1 Dodl said Eitler had feared the increasing strength of Fussia1 In any event he had thought that what he called Ithe dee4 methodical mannerI of Eitler?s thin7ing had 4revented any rash action on the 6uehrer?s 4art in (*)*1 But he added that in history and war success alone counts and that this s4o7e against Adolf Eitler1 Ee defended the seemingly un4rovo7ed attac7s that Eitler ordered under the doctrine of Inational rights under an emergency I and said Germany had invaded neutrals only when it was 7nown their territory would soon be made use of by the enemy1 Dodl made no case for war aggressive or otherwiseC he said that 4eo4le acce4ted it as a stro7e of fate as something li7e sic7ness or death and the Germans loved war no more than any other 4eo4le1 They could only be blamed for electing a regime which they must have 7nown would use force to regain their lost liberty and give the country a means for its develo4ment1 +' And he freely admitted he had shared these views1 IMy aims I he told the officers of the o4erations staff of :B- on Duly &/ (*// Iwere by and large the aims of the movement since my thin7ing was always nationalistic social and anti-.atholic1I++ Eis testimony in (*/0 and (*/' was substantially the same as what he had written in the s4eeches and in his diary at the time the events too7 4lace1 Dodl was born in -uerHburg on May ($ (%*$1 Eis father was a ca4tain in the &nd Bavarian 6ield Artillery FegimentC his mother was from an Austrian 4easant family from Gilshofen on the Danube1 The family was .atholic and thought of themselves as religious but unli7e most devout Bavarians they did not go to church1 :ne uncle was a 4rofessor of 4hiloso4hy and another commanded the /th Bavarian Artillery Fegiment which Dodl ,oined after he had ta7en his Abitur and attended the cadet school on a scholarshi41 Eis father?s 4ension of )%)* FM a year as a retired artillery lieutenant colonel did not leave enough money over to 4ay his son?s board which came to &&0 FM a month1 Dodl?s scholastic 4erformance was satisfactory and unim4ressive1 At the Theresiengymnasium in Munich his mar7s

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page_34! #age )/' were satisfactory to goodonly in religion was he ??very good1I 9ater as a cadet he had an average record with a few 4unishments for minor esca4ades1 :nce he was given a twentyfour-hour house arrest and a cut in his rations for climbing out a window after the evening meal and smo7ing in the courtyard1 The re4ort noted as a mitigating circumstance that he had immediately admitted his guilt1 Another time he came bac7 from his 8unday leave twenty five minutes late because he had missed a connecting train1 The 4enalty this time was again less to eat and he was forbidden to leave the school grounds1 Eis schoolwor7 here too was ,udged satisfactory although he had to re4eat the fourth class because as he wrote in an autobiogra4hical s7etch in Nuremberg he gave too much time to s4orts1 Eis industry and attention were mar7ed IgreatI and his general achievement Ifair1I +% In (*($ Dodl ,oined his artillery regiment as a 6aehnrich or sublieutenant and the ne<t year he met his first wife Irma .ountess von Bullion whom he married in (*()1L It was a successful marriageC the somewhat 4hlegmatic intelligent young officer who li7ed women and dancing and society adored his attractive vivacious wife1 At the very start of -orld -ar I on August &/ (*(/ Dodl then a first lieutenant was wounded by a grenade s4linter1 #artly recovered he returned to his regiment in December but again had to be o4erated on and the s4linter in his thigh finally removed1 Dodl served as an artilleryman on both the Fussian and the 6rench fronts but he found time between battles to read omnivorously in history biogra4hy and 4hiloso4hy and to come to some conclusions about the future of Germany1 Ee disa44roved of the Baiser?s leadershi4 and became antimonarchicalC he felt that 6rance and Germany must somehow settle their historic differences that the eternal conflict was a disaster for both countries1 After the armistice he thought of studying medicine but decided to stay on in the Army1 Eis su4eriors thought well of himC an army re4ort calls him Ivery thoughtful decisive energetic a good s4orts man Mhe was an enthusiastic mountain climberN eager an e<cellent leader and suitable for higher command1I+* Dodl was one of the few military men who was wholeheartedly in favor of the !bert re4ublican governmentC he had vague ho4es for the develo4ment of a 8ocial Democratic #arty that would bridge the ga4 to the conservatives and bring unity to the country But he was more directly concerned with the future of the Army1 In (*&$ he ,oined the secret general staffcamou flaged as the Tru22enamtthat was forbidden under the Gersailles Treaty1 In (*&+&% he served as commander of a battery in the +th Artillery FegimentC in (*&* then a ma,or he was assigned as an instructor to ,unior officers1 6rom (*)& to (*)0 he was in the o4erations section of the ArmyC from (*)0 to (*)% he was chief of the national defense section of the -ehrmacht- L Near the end of the war after the death of his first wife Dodl married 9uise von Benda1

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page_34" #age )/+ samtthe office that later became :B-1 In (*)% he was ordered to Gienna to become commander of an artillery divisionC in August (*)* he was recalled to Berlin and :B- as chief of the o4erations staff =-ehrmacht fuehrungsstab>1 Ee became general of artillery in (*/$ and colonel general only in (*// des4ite his 4ro<imity to the source of all 4romotions1 Eitler never made him a field marshal 4erha4s because Beitel already held that ran71 Dodl always was regarded as a com4etent officer1L General 9udwig Bec7 thought him the best of his age grou4 but they bro7e on what later develo4ed to be one of the most vulnerable s4ots in Dodl?s !eltanschauung: his naivete in 4olitical matters1 Dodl unli7e Bec7 was able to acce4t the e<cesses of the #arty and its formations after Eitler became .hancellor because he thought of them as the ??children?s sic7nessesI of a revolution and he believed that only if the Army had the full confidence of the 6uehrer could it main tain its central im4ortance in the German 4olity against the #arty and the 881 Bec7 on the other hand after a brief 4eriod of o4timism in (*)) regarded National 8ocialism as a threat to all the dee4ly rooted traditions of 4olitical orderC and Eitler it soon became clear to him was basically an irres4onsible o44ortunistic leader who was li7ely to 4lunge the country into war by whim1 By (*)% Dodl found the Army?s critical attitude to Eitler insu44ortable1 Dodl?s diary entry for August ($ (*)% read: I was summoned to the Berghof with senior officers of the Army1 After dinner the 6uehrer tal7ed for nearly three hours e<4laining his line of thought on 4olitical @uestions1 Thereafter certain of the generals tried to 4oint out to the 6uehrer that we were by no means ready1 This was to say the least unfortunate1 There are a number of reasons ror this 4usillanimous attitude which is unha44ily fairly wides4read in the Army General 8taff1 To begin with the General 8taff is obsessed with memories of the 4ast and instead of doing what it is told and getting on with its military ,ob thin7s it is res4onsible for 4olitical decisions1 It does get on with its ,ob with all its old devotion but its heart is not in it because in the last analysis it does not believe in the genius of the 6uehrer1 \]\]\]\]\]\]\]\]\]\]\]\] It is tragic that the 6uehrer should have the whole nation behind him with the single e<ce4tion of the Army generals1 In my o4inion it is only by action that they can now atone for their faults of lac7 of character and disci4line1 It is the same 4roblem as in (*(/1 There is only one undisci4lined element in the Armythe generals and in the last analysis this comes from the fact that they are arrogant1 They have neither confidence nor disci4line because they cannot recogniHe the 6uehrer?s genius1 This is no doubt to L In (*)' when he was a colonel and again in (*)+ he was offered the 4ost of .hief of 8taff of the 9uftwaffe which would have been a 4romotion1 Ee declined because he said he felt bound to the Army =9etter to General 8tum4f Duly (*)'1 Also diary entry A4ril ($ (*)+ (+%$-#8>1

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page_34# #age )/% some e<tent due to the fact that they still loo7 on him as the .or4oral of the 6irst -orld -ar instead of the greatest statesman since Bismarc71 %$ Dodl li7e Beitel saw in Eitler a 4olitical and military geniusC and as he stayed on year after year he could only 7ee4 increasing his own sta7es in bac7ing Eitler?s gambles1 The 6uehrer?s head@uarters he said was a cross between a monastery and a concentration cam4 and he could bear to live in it solely because of his faith that the 6uehrer alone could rescue the Feich1 The endless conferences often with dilettantes li7e Goering over4erforming were hard to bear1 At one meeting Goering com4lained that his Eermann Goering Division was being torn a4art because of wrong decisions by the Army1 L Dodl flared u41 !very ensign he told the Feichsmarschall 7new that it was sometimes necessary to brea7 u4 divisionsC they learned it in war school and anyone who has not understood such an elementary 4rinci4le never learns it later1 !veryone in the room loo7ed at the 6uehrer to see how he would react but all he said turning to Dodl was ??#lease continue1I%( Dodl wrote to his wife from his cell in Nuremberg that he had 7nown by (*/& that Germany could not win the war but if this is true he did not 4ermit the thought to affect anything he did or said1 As the fortunes of war turned against Germany Dodl could only write grimly that Germany must win and Iif a soldier can?t believe in that then he should shoot himself1I And he bolstered his s4irits with high ho4es for the new wea4ons which he thought Eitler with his military genius would 7now how to use1 Ee tal7ed with Eitler for the first time on the 6uehrer?s train early in the #olish cam4aign and he was with him steadily from then on1 Ee came slowly under Eitler?s s4ell but gave his devotion unstintingly when he did1 :n :ctober &% (*)* he wrote to Barl 8chwabe the #resident of the German #olice 6orce in Bruenn Moravia I;ou 1 1 1 will contribute your weighty share to 7ee4ing the .Hechs at it and not letting them 4er7 u41I And then than7ing Dr1 8chwabe for his words of a44reciation he de4recated his own Imodest contribution in the shadow of the 4owerful 4ersonality of our 6uehrer1I%& :n March / (*/$ he wrote in his diary IThe 6uehrer gave his wonderful tal7 on the occasion of the heroes? memorial day1I In Fussia in the winter of (*/(/& when catastro4he suddenly threatened the German armies Dodl said he had never had more admiration for the 6uehrerC the strength of his iron will had held the wea7ening front all along the line against a Bolshevi7 brea7through1 L The Eermann Goering Division was formed in (*/& from the Feichsmarschall?s 4ersonal regiment and was listed in ty4ical Goering fashion as a I4arachute-tan7 division1I 8ince its officers mostly came from the 9uftwaffe they had little or no training in infantry warfare and it suffered high losses1 Nevertheless the division was later e<4anded to a cor4s but in (*// when Goering was no longer in favor it was turned over to the Army1 Before then it fought under Besselring in Italy =Besselring himself was a field marshal of the 9uftwaffe> and Goering did not hesitate at times to give the division direct orders1 =6rido von 8enger und !tterlin (rieg in Euro2a M.ologne-Berlin: Bie4enheuer and -itsch (*'$N 441 ('& (+'1 -est4hal o2. cit1 41 *$1>

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page_34$ #age )/* A year later in a s4eech to assembled Gauleiters in Munich on November + (*/) he said that the National 8ocialist movement had 4re4ared the way for the liberation from Gersailles the reawa7ening of the will to fight and the rearming of the German 4eo4le1 Then he said: My most 4rofound confidence is however based u4on the fact that at the head of Germany there stands a man who by his entire develo4ment his desires and striving can only have been destined by fate to lead our 4eo4le into a brighter future1 In defiance of all views to the contrary I must here testify that he is the soul not only of the 4olitical but also of the military conduct of the war and that the force of his will4ower and the creative riches of his thought animate and hold together the whole of the German Armed 6orces with res4ect to strategy organiHation and munitions of war1 8imilarly the unity of 4olitical and military command which is so im4ortant is 4ersonified by him in a way such as has never been 7nown since the days of 6rederic7 the Great1 1 1 1 A !uro4e under the whi4 of American Dews or Bolshevi7 commissars is unthin7able1 Ee testified he told them at this hour ??not with the li4s but with my dee4est heart: that our trust and faith in the 6uehrer is boundless1 1 1 1 that we will cast off all who are soft and forget their duties1 1 1 1 that we shall win because we must win since otherwise world history would have lost all meaning1IL %) Dodl was always 4ragmatic about the rules of war and international law and he acce4ted for the most 4art Eitler?s readiness to transgress them when it seemed necessary or useful1 Ee thought Germany had made a mista7e in -orld -ar I in admitting violations of international agreementsC if for e<am4le a German hos4ital shi4 was sun7 a British hos4ital shi4 might be tor4edoed as a re4risal but the Germans should say it was a mista7e1 !ven at Nuremberg he said that u4 to March (*//the time of the shooting of the fifty FA6 fliersthe 6uehrer had never issued a criminal order1 Eitler had done nothing that could not be ,ustified under international law or as a re4risal1%/ :n the stand he made a good defense of many of his military activitieshe had li7e Beitel o44osed the .ommando :rder and the 8agan shootingsbut as soon as the barbed @uestioning of his British cross-e<aminer dealt with other than military affairs Dodl made a 4oor im4ression1 Suestioning Dodl on the Anschluss with Austria the British 4rosecutor Mr1 Foberts as7ed: I8o the Armed 6orces of Germany then marched into AustriaO That is rightOI D:D9: IThat is rightC the -ehrmacht marched in1I F:B!FT8: IAnd Austria from that day received all the benefits of National 8ocialism is that rightOI L Dodl said at Nuremberg that these were merely notes for a s4eech but in any event his sentiments when he gave the tal7 were undoubtedly the same1

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page_3 0 #age )0$ D:D9: ??That is a 4olitical @uestion1 At any rate it could 4erha4s have become the ha44iest country on earth1I F:B!FT8: II wasn?t as7ing what it could have become but what it received1 It received the 88 the Gesta4o the concentration cam4s the su44ression of o44onents and the 4ersecution of Dews didn?t itOI D:D9: IThose are @uestions with which I did not concern myself1 Those @uestions you have to 4ut to the com4etent authorities1I %0 The com4etent authority was of course the 6uehrer and it was convenient for Dodl to believe that when 8chuschnigg was de4osed he was 4laced under Ihonorary arrest1I 8uch notions enabled him to live in the military com4artment of his mind to re,oice in the rece4tion of the German troo4s by the cheering flower-throwing 4o4ulation of Austria and to ignore the Dews cleaning u4 the streets with toothbrushes1 .om4etent authorities or the Ichildren?s sic7nessesI of NaHism would account for such events which in any case were insignificant com4ared with the historical moment of German reunion1 As time went on Dodl?s attitude li7e Beitel?s reflected the mounting tension and brutality of the war Eitler was waging1 In his diary entry of March / (*/$ before the Norwegian cam4aign Dodl noted that IEimmler or .anaris should 4rovide 4ersonnel who are familiar with the Eague rulesI in itself an interesting observationbut to believe for a moment that Eimmler who was already o4erating savagely in #oland might have 4eo4le under him concerned with the Eague or any other rules of international law was at least na[ve1 Eimmler however was also one of those who were com4etent in their s4ecialiHed fields chosen by the 6uehrer1 :nce the war against Fussia started and with it the wellorganiHed guerrilla resistance that was so im4ortant to the 8oviet strategy the no-holds-barred directives from :B- became e<4licit1 :n Duly &) (*/( Dodl ordered on behalf of the 6uehrer: In view of the vast siHe of the occu4ied areas in the !ast the forces available for establishing security in these areas will be sufficient only if all resistance is 4unished not by legal 4rosecution of the guilty but by the s4reading of such terror by the occu4ying 4ower as is a44ro4riate to eradicate every inclination to resist among the 4o4ulation1 The com4etent commanders must find the means of 7ee4ing order 1 1 1 not by demanding more security forces but by a44lying suitable Draconic methods 1 1 1%' :n Dune (& (*/& he noted in his diary: The German field gendarmes have arrested a "stashi com4any for atrocities against the civil 4o4ulation in !ast BosniaC they have disarmed and im4risoned them1L The 6uehrer has not a44roved this measure ordered by the commander of the +$%th Division because it undermines the author- L The "stashi were .roat militia recruited by Ante #avelicL chief of the .roat state who fought on the German side1

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page_3 1 #age )0( ity of the "stashi1 1 1 1 This will do more damage to 4eace and order in .roatia than the unrest caused by the atrocities1 %+ :n 8e4tember (' (*// he wrote: The enemy is on German soil1 6anatical determination is needed1 !very 4illbo< city and village should become a fortress to ma7e the enemy smash himself to bits and Germans should be ready to die in hand to hand fighting1 -e can no longer have large-scale o4erations1 All we can do is to hold our 4ositions or die1 The officer cor4s is res4onsible for 7indling this fanaticism1 Anyone who fails whether he is an officer or enlisted man should be eliminated or called to account1%% Two months later he was echoing Eitler?s savage orders to the Army: If as a result of negligence or lac7 of energy on the 4art of commanders or troo4s the enemy succeeds in brea7ing into the fortified Hone Mof the 8iegfried 9ineN that constitutes a crime of incalculable conse@uence1 The 6uehrer is determined 1 1 1 to bring those res4onsible to ,ustice immediately1 %* Dodl was never to believe himself guilty of any of the crimes with which he was charged1 The most he conceded even to himself was that the Germans had not clung to ,ustice as they should have in the conduct of the warC even if the enemy had committed its wrongful acts first the Germans would have done better to hold to what was right than to rely on force1*$ As his lawyer 4ointed out Dodl had had three wee7s to burn his documents before he surrendered to the Allies but he turned them all over to his ca4tors1 Ee said at Nuremberg @uoting General !isenhower that not only are soldiers 4resented with the war they must fight but with the chec7 afterward1 Ee regarded all the cam4aigns on which Germany embar7ed as basically ,ustified1 In Norway he believedand here the evidence bears him outthe Germans had merely landed a few days before the British and the 6rench1 Ee believed both Belgium and Eolland to be unneutral allowing 6rench and British 4lanes to fly over their territory ta7ing 4art in conferences with the General 8taff of the Allies and in his view thus ma7ing 4ossible a stri7e at the vulnerable Fuhr1 Ee had o44osed aid to the Italians fighting Greece his lawyer said but here as elsewhere Eitler made the decision1 Ee thought that General DusanL 8imovic?sL cou2 )A<tat in ;ugoslavia which resulted in a com4lete shift from a 4ro-German 4olicy to an anti-German one was instigated by British and Fussian agents that the German troo4s in Bulgaria were thereby threatened and that the Fussian telegram of friendshi4 to Belgrade and the ;ugoslav de4loyment of troo4s had ,ustified Eitler?s decision to attac71 But he had urged that an ultimatum be delivered before the German armies invaded and before the German bombs came down on Belgrade1 Its not being sent was another decision made by the com4etent authority1 Dodl was always convinced that Germany was fighting a 4reventive war in

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page_3 2 #age )0& Fussia1 A great many generals and observers including Dan Masary7 agreed that the German invasion had forestalled the Fussian Army that 8talin had every intention of ordering an attac7 on Germany and that Eitler had sur4rised him on Dune && (*/(1 The main body of evidence is against this thesis but there was nevertheless seemingly a good deal of evidence to sustain it1 The Fussians had built air fields on the territory bordering the German lines military roads had been constructed and some German generals thought that the 4ositions the Fussians had overrun in their first attac7 had been designed as ,um4ing-off 4laces rather than defense 4oints1 Masary7 bitter o44onent of Eitler as he was credited the 6uehrer?s e<traordinary intuition with having divined 8talin?s 4lans and anti-NaHi German scholars years after Dodl?s e<ecution believed as firmly as he that the German drive into Fussia had merely antici4ated a Fussian attac7 on Germany1 *( In addition the nature of the war in Fussia the fierce ideological struggle of two conflicting faiths seemed to Dodl to ,ustify the harsh measures that were ado4ted1 .orrect and meticulous in carrying out his duties Dodl acted always under the overriding belief that Eitler was a genius the savior of a country that would have otherwise fallen 4rey to Dewry and Mar<ism and his criticisms of the 6uehrer had to do only with the success or failure of s4ecific military actions1 :nce unconditional surrender was announced as an Allied goal Dodi said at Nuremberg Germany had no alternative to fighting on but he was for fighting ,ust as des4erately before .asablanca as after1 Ee ho4ed vaguely that the fundamental contradictions between Fussia and the -est might bring some sort of com4romise 4eace1 But he had no notion of how the rest of the world had reacted to the diabolism and atrocities of the NaHi regime and by e<tension of the German Army in which he 4layed a leading 4art1 Ee declared at Nuremberg that he had not 7nown of the e<terminations and the !insatH 7illingsC even if this was true he had 7nown of much else and had either loo7ed the other way or countersigned the orders1 Dodl?s anti-8emitism had no 4ersonal feeling in itC he could be 4olite even friendly to individual Dews1 :ne Dewish woman offered to testify on his behalf at NurembergC a Mrs1 Mos7ovitch wrote to Dodl?s lawyer in November and said she would li7e to tell how General Dodl and his wife had tried to hel4 her in March (*)* when she was attem4ting to leave Germany1 But Dodl had acce4ted the thesis of the collective res4onsibility of Dewry for Germany?s troubles before and after -orld -ar I1 At Nuremberg he referred to the Dews ??who wanted the destruction of Germany I and he was never to rid himself of this central article of the NaHi creed nor was he able to com4rehend his own 4art in the e<cesses of the war that Eitler conducted1 After his arrest he wrote to his wife that he thought he might be re@uired to be more than a witness in the forthcoming trials at Nuremberg but he never for a moment regarded himself as a war criminal because he thought he had done no more than obey orders from the duly elected head of state orders with which he had often disagreed and in some instances which he

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page_3 3 #age )0) had attem4ted to circumvent1 -hat else could he have doneO he as7ed1 Ee had not been allowed to resignC he could only 4rotest and then obey1 Ee 4ointed out too at Nuremberg that the 4rosecution could than7 its own obedient soldiers for being in a 4osition to 4rosecute1 *& :ne of Dodl?s two lawyers #rofessor 6ranH !<ner who li7e Eermann Dahrreissthe associate counselwas not a 4racticing lawyer but an A7ademi7er a distinguished 4rofessor of law had agreed to ta7e the case only he said because he had 7nown Dodl for many years and was convinced of his im4eccable character1 !<ner and the general became closer friends in the course of the trial when !<ner em4loyed 6rau Dodl in his office and !<ner conducted a s4irited and erudite defense of his clientand an im4assioned one for he believed dee4ly in the innocence of the man he was defending1 Allied officers showed sym4athy for Dodl1 The American guards 4resented arms when he left the 4rison at 6lensburg a young officer told 6rau Dodl that he wished her husband well and an American colonel called him ??a fine soldier1I But following their ca4ture and early im4risonment at 6lensburg Dodl and Beitel were sent to the collecting de4ot of the former NaHi great with the code name of Ashcan at Mondorf in 9u<embourg1 No longer were they treated as defeated but res4ectable military men or 4risoners of war1 At Ashcan and at Dustbin near 6ran7fort they officially became what they were to be until the end of their days: ma,or war criminals1 -hen they arrived at the #alace of Dustice in Nuremberg this verdict was confirmed: I;ou are no longer .olonel General Dodl but war criminal Dodl I the commander of the 4rison told him whereu4on both Dodl and Beitel had their shoulder bars ri44ed off1 6rau Dodl and 6rau Beitel shared the burdens of the wives whose husbands were to be triedC they lived together in Berchtesgaden before the trial started and 6rau Dodl went to Nuremberg1 The families of the accused had a grim time and received a mi<ed reaction from both the Germans and the con@uerors1 6rau Goering one day was loo7ing with her little daughter !dda at a news4a4er 4icture of her husband when an American woman ,ournalist wal7ed u4 to her and drew her finger across the nec7 of the Feichsmarschall1 Germans were often o4enly hostile to all the accused including these defeated generals who had lost their glittering uniforms and the warC they were easy sca4egoats for the universal suffering1 A German lawyer ob,ected to eating with 6rau Dodl because he said she was the wife of a war criminalC an American told her there was no difference between an 8D man and her husband1 But one day on her way to the 4rison 6rau Dodl was introduced to an American ca4tain and although she did not 7now whether to offer him her hand he too7 hers in his and said IMa?am I wish to God your husband gets through all this safely1I !ven victims of the NaHis could feel the same way1 6rau Dodl received a letter from a 6rench woman who wrote: IDodl was a real soldier1 Ee fought for his country as have soldiers of all times1 #art of my family died in

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page_3 4 #age )0/ concentration cam4s1 I as7 you to believe in my 4rofound and sym4athetic sym4athy1 Anne Marie de #ontavice1?? And from other German officers awaiting their trialsManstein -agner -est4hal Besselring BrauchitschDodl was given two 4recious 4ac7ages of cigarettes addressed: ITo our dear Dodl1I Admiral Faeder who had denounced Beitel 4raised Dodl in his interrogation for his soldierly @ualities and his courage in standing u4 to Eitler1 Dodl had married his second wife 9uise von Benda on the day that General #atton crossed the Fhine at Femagen but they had s4ent very little time together as the German war machine careened to its end1 After Dodl?s arrest 6rau Dodl had to find a room for herself in a battered house in Nuremberg where she was fortunate enough to get a ,ob on !<ner?s staff1 8he had to hitchhi7e on the Autobahn when she had to return to Bavaria to renew ration cou4ons1 8he 4aid for her trans4ortation with the American cigarettes that were 4art of her 4ay1 Dodl however des4ite his inner certainty of innocence had initialed clearly illegal orders such as the one Beitel issued on May () (*/( for the shooting without trial of enemy civilians guilty of offenses against German troo4s1 *) Ee had forwarded Eitler?s orders that a ca4itulation of neither Moscow nor 9eningrad should be acce4ted if it were offeredC he had 4assed along the order for e<ecuting .ommandosC he had told the Gauleiters in November (*/) that forced labor was to be recruited with remorseless vigor in 6rance and Belgium that too many 4eo4le among the 4o4ulation were doing nothing1*/ Ee had 4ro4osed that the .ommissar :rder issued before the war started be defended as a retaliatory measure1 Ee had sent along the order for a scorched earth 4olicy in Norway that had resulted according to the Norwegian Government?s estimate in damage to or destruction of )$ $$$ houses and the forcible evacuation of the 4o4ulation that lived in the northern districts1 A defense could be made for Dodl?s 4art in such measures1 In the case of 9eningrad and Moscow his lawyer 4ointed out the commanders of those cities never offered to surrender so the charge was made for a crime that was not committed1 As for the .ommissar :rder he had had no 4art in drafting it although he had been shown a co4y1 Dodl said the Germans were aware of how .ommunists o4eratedhe mentioned the Munich Faetere4ubli7 =see Fosenberg .ha4t1 /C 6ric7 .ha4t1 +>but he himself had wanted to wait to see what they did in this war before a44lying such measures and if they acted as they had before he would then ta7e this as a re4risal measure1 The translation too had shown Dodl?s marginal note in an unnecessarily bad light1 Ee had written: IMan 0ieht es am besten auf als /e2ressalie1I This had been translated in !nglish as: IIt is therefore best to brand 1 1 1I whereas as !<ner said the 4lain sense was IIt is best to handle it as a re4risal1I IAuf0iehen I said Dodl meant arrange not conceal which would have been Ivortaeuschen1I Dodl in short had e<4ected the 7ind of savage warfare that

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page_3 #age )00 develo4ed in the !ast but the orders which he initialed hel4ed to 4roduce it1 *0 Dodl had flatly refused to draft the .ommando :rder but here again he was of two minds1 Ee 7new that many of the British .ommandos were acting in an illegal fashion and thus in his view 4laced themselves outside military lawC but he also 7new that under the Eitler order all .ommandos were to be e<ecuted no matter how they behaved1 It was this order that Dodl ob,ected to but nevertheless distributed although he attem4ted to 7ee4 it confined to troo4s who had acted ??in an unsoldierly fashion1I In every country Dodl said the 4o4ulation was forced to wor7C and in the case of fortifications in 6rance and Belgium the 4o4ulation had often wor7ed with enthusiasm because they ho4ed they might thus s4are the areas where they lived from the destruction of the invasion1*' In the case of Norway as the Germans were retreating to the still incom4leted 9yngen 9ine the order for the evacuation of the 4o4ulation !<ner said was given to 4revent endangering the 4o4ulation in the battle areaC when houses were destroyed he added this was not done wantonly but to 4revent their use by 4artisans and the advancing Fussians1 8uch destruction may be carried out IlegallyI under international law when it is essential to military o4erations1 Dodl?s brother 6erdinand was a general in command of German troo4s in northern Norway1 Ee 4rotested heatedly against the order and discussed with his brother Alfred how it could be softenedC the demolitions were carried out as humanely as 4ossible under the circumstances1 The 6uehrer had ordered the destruction on the advice of his civilian commissar TerbovenC Dodl had not been consulted but had only drafted and distributed the order and had done his best to hold the demolitions to a minimum1 L*+ The 4rosecution charged that Dodl had used his 4osition his 4ersonal influence and his close relationshi4 to the 6uehrer to hel4 the NaHi cons4irators come to 4ower and consolidate their control over GermanyC he had 4romoted the 4re4arations for aggressive war in contradiction to international treaties agreements and assurances and he had committed the 7ind of war crimes and crimes against humanity that have been described1*% In his summary of Duly &' (*/' Dac7son accused Dodl as a member of the Defense .ouncil of having made in Danuary (*)/ a mobiliHation calendar for &/$ $$$ industrial establishments and of wanting to 7ee4 to the Geneva .onvention as a dodgeusing its advantages but by no means being limited by it1** Dodl was one of the greatly needed e<4erts said Dac7son along with Beitel and Faeder and DoenitH and others without whom the NaHis could not have o4erated1 Ee was one of those who wanted the land and goods of their L A later American court at Nuremberg found .olonel General 9othar Fendulic who had carried out the order not guilty of having caused needless destruction in Norway and Dodl?s brother when tried before a Norwegian court was not even charged with the crime =IAG Dodl 41 )0C Munich 84ruch7ammer &. S. vs. List= Trials of !ar *riminals 41 (&*'>1

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page_3 ! #age )0' neighbors1 No soldier he said stood above Beitel and Dodl in the military hierarchy1 And who nourished Eitler?s notion of Germany?s invincibility if not these two and Faeder and DoenitHO ($$ 8ir Eartley 8hawcross following Mr1 Dustice Dac7son accused Dodl and the other members of the Eigh .ommand of having had a chief role in Germany?s rearming of having ta7en 4art in ??the first ste4Ithe reoccu4ation of the Fhinelandand in the ne<t ste4the occu4ation of Austriaand then in the occu4ation of the whole of .Hechoslova7ia as well as in the later aggressions against #oland and other countries1 IThe 7illing of combatants in war is ,ustifiable both in international and in munici4al law only where the war itself is legal I he said1 IBut where a war is illegal as a war started not only in breach of the #act of #aris but without any sort of warning or declaration clearly is there is nothing to ,ustify the 7illing and these murders are not to be distinguished from those of any other lawless robber bands1I($( The defense not only of Beitel and Dodl but of all the accused in the matter of aggressive war was underta7en by #rofessor Eermann Dahrreiss an authority on international law one of Dodl?s defending lawyers1 Dahrreiss argued long and learnedly before a session of the court =when the chief 4rosecutors of Britain 6rance and the "nited 8tates were absent> that the whole system of collective security had bro7en down as was evident in the American declaration of neutrality in (*)* and in the 8oviet 4osition with regard to the German-#olish conflict1 The British Government itself had ac7nowledged in 8e4tember (*)* that the security machinery of the 9eague had not functioned and in fact had bro7en down and as a result members of the 9eague had declared their neutralitya view that Neville .hamberlain had stated 4lainly on 6ebruary && (*)% before the Anschluss with Austria1 The British Dahrreiss 4ointed out had made reservations to their adherence to the Bellogg-Briand #act retaining their right to a free hand in areas where they had a s4ecial interest1 The right of any sovereign state to wage a defensive war and to decide whether it was a defensive war was Ian inalienable right to all statesC without that right sovereignty does not e<ist1I The com4lete uncertainty about the meaning of the obligations of the treaty was clear in Bellogg?s own statement in his note of Dune &0 (*&% to the nine signatories: IThe right of self-defense 1 1 1 is inherent in every sovereign state and is im4licit in every treaty1 !very nation 1 1 1 is alone com4etent to decide whether circumstances re@uire recourse to war in self-defense1I American senators in the debate over ratification of the 4act declared it to be no more than an international embrace and a fruitful source of a future war a gigantic 4iece of hy4ocrisy a guarantee of the British world em4ire and of the un,ust status 1uo of the Gersailles Treaty on behalf of !ngland and 6rance1 :ne American authority #hili4 Marshall Brown declared that the 4act with its ine4tness had indeed merely brought into the world the horrible s4ecter of Iundeclared war1I But leaving aside the Italian-!thio4ian

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page_3 " #age )0+ -ar where collective security had failed either to 4revent the war or to 4revent the Italian victory nowhere had a 4ossibility arisen of the 4unishment of a state for breach of the treatynot to mention the 4unishment of individuals1 A breach of the treaty would be any violation of international lawit was no more than a delict an offense but not a crime not a 4unishable act1 In any event Dahrreiss said sentences against individuals for breach of the 4eace between states would be ??com4letely new under the as4ect of law something revolutionarily new1I ($& Answering the scholarly historical summary of #rofessor Dahrreiss 8ir Eartley said it might be true that a sovereign state alone could decide whether it was threatened by an enemy and thus ta7e recourse to arms and it might also be true that under international law a decision to go to war was an act of state and not a crime of individuals1 But he stated under the charter of this tribunal the 4lanning 4re4aration initiation or waging of a war of aggression or of a war in violation of international treaties was a crime and Dodl and the others had committed it1 They were unable to show that their wars were neither wars of aggression nor wars that had not ta7en 4lace in violation of treaties1 -hat were they trying to do as7ed 8ir Eartley deny the ,urisdiction of the tribunal in this matterO The right to selfdefense could no more be misused by a state than by an individual and a state li7e an individual made a decision to act on its own ris71 The first man to have been accused of murder may have com4lained that no court had tried such a case before1 The only innovation the charter had introduced was to 4rovide the long-overdue machinery to enforce an already e<isting law1 As for the acts of these individuals they li7e 4irates or s4ies or bloc7ade runners could be 4unished under international law1 If a state said 8ir Eartley sent a body of 4eo4le into the territory of another state to murder and rob could anyone argue that the individual member of such a grou4 would not be 4unished merely because he had acted on behalf of a stateO($) The defense of su4erior orders was e<cluded by the charter1 "nder Article % a 4enalty might be made milder because of the necessity for obeying but there was no rule for finding immune to 4unishment those who obeyed an order against the natural law out of which international law develo4ed even though the order might be legal in the country where it was given1 If international law was to be a44lied at all it must be su4erior to munici4al law in this res4ect1 And by any test of international law of common conscience of elementary humanity such orders were illegal1 These men had created the dictatorshi4 under which they now sought to hide their res4onsibility1 !ven if as Dodl said they had been arrested for disobedience would that not have been better than carrying out such ordersO But in fact they had forged these 4lans as well as carried them out1 They were the ones above all who might have advised restrained or halted Eitler instead of encouraging him1($/ 8hawcross was intent on hanging not only Beitel and Dodl DoenitH and Faeder but the German Army and Navy1 The Eigh .ommand and Balten-

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page_3 # #age )0% brunner he said bore res4onsibility for the .ommando :rder of :ctober (% (*/& that 4rovided for the e<ecution not of s4ies but of soldiers in uniform1 Beitel had signed the Nacht un) Nebel decree of December + (*/( and had made the curious comment when he a44eared before the Nuremberg court that ??4enal servitude would be considered dishonorable by these 4atriots1 By going to Germany they would suffer no dishonor1I Beitel too 8hawcross charged had said in answer to a 9uftwaffe general?s ob,ection that it was too com4licated to hand over stri7ing railway wor7ers to the 8D I 1 1 1 other effective measures are to be ta7en ruthlessly and inde4endently 1 1 1I ($0 Thus Dodl and Beitel?s case and that of DoenitH and Faeder were e@uated to the lowest common denominator of Baltenbrunner1 Dodl?s chief defense counsel 6ranH !<ner defended him with energy and s7ill1 Dodl !<ner 4ointed out had never been a I#arty general1I Aside from the officers among the accused he had 7nown only 6ric7 whom he had met on official business and he had tried to 4revent the naming of a INaHi generalI li7e Feichenau to the 4ost of .ommander in .hief of the Army1 Ee had tried to bloc7 off Eimmler?s 88 and the #arty a44aratus from the -ehrmacht1 !<ner said that Dodl?s ,ob had nothing to do with 4lans for waging aggressive war and that u4 to (*)% Germany could 4ut into the field not a si<th of the forces her li7ely enemies6rance #oland and .Hechoslova7iacould muster1 In (*)+ Germany had but one battleshi4 and even in (*)* had not more than twenty-si< ocean-going "-boatsless than onetenth those of !ngland and 6rance1 The only war 4lans were those for defending her eastern borders1 No de4loyment 4lan e<isted against Austria1 I.ase :ttoI referred to an intervention there in the event that a Ea4sburg restoration should be attem4ted but no 4lan was wor7ed outintervention was merely a 4ossibility1($' Dodl had not been 4resent at the meeting at :bersalHberg of 6ebruary (& (*)% and Eitler?s tele4hone call to be 4re4ared to march into Austria two days later had ta7en him by sur4rise1 The troo4s were com4letely un4re4ared to wage warC the Austrians had crossed the frontier to Germany to greet them and Austrian soldiers had ,oined them in the march to Gienna1 Fegarding .Hechoslova7ia the 6uehrer had said he would under all circumstances avoid a conflict with the -est and would achieve a 4eaceful solution1 Dodl?s suggestion that an incident could be created as a motive to invade .Hechoslova7ia was no more than the ruse )e guerre used by all armies including those of ancient Greece but in fact no such incident had occurred1 The 8udetenland had greeted the arrival of the German troo4s with the same enthusiasm as Austria and Dodl had ta7en no 4art in the invasion of the rest of .Hechoslova7ia ordered by Eitler in March (*)*1($+ As for #oland when Dodl left Berlin no 4lan e<isted for invasion and when he returned on August &) (*)* the 4lan in which he had ta7en no 4art was already 4re4ared1 The fact brought out by the 4rosecution that he had been on the 6uehrer?s train that served as head@uarters on 8e4tember

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page_3 $ #age )0* ) (*)* is scarcely a serious charge against a soldier1 The Germans had every legal right to send their freighters into Norwegian territorial waters and the !nglish interference with this traffic was a clear breach of Norway?s neutrality1 Dodl was convinced even after the war said !<ner that the Germans had forestalled an !nglish landing at the last moment and the decision for the German invasion had been Eitler?s not hisC Dodl had merely agreed that it was essential1 ($% The Italians had invaded Greeceor had attem4ted toin early :ctober (*/$1 -hen Eitler came to the aid of Mussolini in late March (*/( Gree7 territory was already being used by !ngland British troo4s having landed on the mainland on March ) (*/( after .rete had come under British control1 -ith 8aloni7a and other Gree7 territory that could be used by FA6 bombers in British hands the danger to Germany?s sources of Fumanian oil was acute1 -orld -ar I had made the results of such an occu4ation clear1 Eitler?s decision to attac7 ;ugoslavia after the 8imovicL 4utsch had drawn that country from its 4ro-A<is 4olicy was made the day following the cou41 The German Army had made no 4re4arations for this attac7 and Dodl had wanted an ultimatum sent to ;ugoslavia ??to ma7e things unambiguous I but Eitler would not even consider the idea1 Again Dodl thought Eitler had correctly estimated the Fussian 4artici4ation in the revolutionary change of 4olicy in ;ugoslaviawhich Dodl thought was borne out by the 8oviet telegram of friendshi4 and the eventual 4act of friendshi4 established between Belgrade and Moscow1($* As for the Fussian cam4aign !<ner said the Germans in May and Dune (*/$ had only from five to si< divisions in the !ast while thirty 8oviet divisions had marched into Bessarabia1 Although Fussia it seemed to Dodl should have been one of the countries ma7ing common cause against !ngland (($ relations between Berlin and the Bremlin had deteriorated as 8oviet 4ressure increased in the Bal7ans and in the Baltic countries1L The ten infantry divisions and two 4anHer divisions Germany had sent to the General Government of #oland were there Dodl said to 4rotect the oil regions of Fumania against a sudden Fussian attac71 The un4leasant evidences of Fussian 4lans increased after the Gienna arbitration of August )$ (*/$ when Germany had guaranteed the borders of Fumaniaa move clearly directed against Fussia1 Dodl believed with Eitler that the 8oviet "nion had determined to destroy Germany at a time when the latter nation was fully engaged against !ngland1((( A German intelligence re4ort of 8e4tember (% (*/$ tells of antiGerman 4ro4aganda being used in the Fed Army the Fussian assum4tion of German intentions to attac7 and the thesis that the German-Fussian conflict was L Although Dodl did not say so Molotov in his visit to Berlin had demanded what a later German historian was to call the e@uivalent of the tro4hies of a victorious war from Germanycontrol of the 87agerra7 as well as the Dardanelles =EansGuenter 8era4him and Andreas Eillgruber IHitlers Entschluss 0um Angriff auf /usslan) I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 II No1 ) (*0/>1

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page_3!0 #age )'$ inevitable1 ((& Thus Eitler had rec7oned with a Fussian attac7 in the summer of (*/( or the winter of (*/(/&1 The failure of the tal7s with Molotov led the 6uehrer to order on December (% (*/$ the military 4re4arations for the attac7 but these were to be changed if the situation clarified1L Dodl as a s4ecialist had 4ointed out the formidable military ris7 of a war with Fussia which should only be decided on when all 4olitical means of averting a Fussian attac7 were e<hausted1 Ee was convinced that Eitler had e<hausted such 4olitical attem4ts1 In early 6ebruary (*/( Fussia had (0$ divisions two-thirds of its entire forces on the German front1 The telegram of friendshi4 Fussia sent to ;ugoslavia after the anti-German 4utsch of March &+ (*/( was the last straw for Eitler1(() A genuine 4reventive war is one sanctioned even by the Bellogg-Briand #act and the German generals had trustworthy re4orts of Fussian war 4re4arations which were later confirmed when they invaded Fussia1 The large number of new air fields near the border and the German ma4s in the hands of the Fussian staff led 6ield Marshal Gerd von Fundstedt and General =then 9ieutenant .olonel> August -inter among others to the same conclusions1 Dodl was certain Eitler would never had gone to war with Fussia were he not utterly convinced no other alternative remainedC the ris7s of a two-front war were abundantly clear to him1 Dodl?s ,ob was to su44ort the Eigh .ommand through the o4erational leadershi4 of the -ehrmacht1 Ee was the adviser to the 6uehrer in all o4erational @uestionsC as in the case of every country that has this system he served not in a commanding but in an advisory assisting e<ecutive function1 Ee was not Beitel?s chief of staff but chief of the most im4ortant de4artment of :B-C he had nothing to do with the other de4artments of :B-1 Ee was not Beitel?s re4resentative in BerlinC Admiral .anaris was1 In the 6uehrer?s head@uarters was only the Armed 6orces :4erations 8taff for whom Dodl re4orted directly to the 6uehrer1 Ee had no command authority whatever and no soldier decides whether a war is to be fought or not only how it is to be fought1 The ,ob of a general to 4re4are and if necessary carry out war 4lans is very different from inciting the 4olitical arm of the government to go to war1((/ It was Dodl?s duty to ma7e 4lans and whether or not they were used did not de4end on him1 As for his 4artici4ation in aggressions he first had to be able to recogniHe them as such1 6rom the re4orts reaching himand he believed themthe enemy either was acting in an unneutral fashion or was 4re4aring to attac71 It is a 4olitical @uestion to be decided by the 4olitical authority whether or not to go to war1 ??:ne should consider I !<ner said Ithe e<traordinary conse@uences which would arise from a different conce4tion: the com4etent authority would declare war and the .hief of the General 8taff who regards this war as contrary to international law would L Actually 4re4arations started well before then1 .f1 Gerhard 91 -einberg 6ermany an) the Soviet &nion 78F87897= Stu)ies in East Euro2ean History Gol1 I =9eiden: Brill (*0/>1

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page_3!1 #age )'( fail to coo4erate1 :r the .hief of MtheN General 8taff ha44ens to be of the same o4inion as the head of the 8tate but one of the army commanders has ob,ections and refuses to march while another one has doubts and has to thin7 it over first1?? !ven for scholars of international law the conce4ts of aggressive and illegal war are com4letely unclarifiedC therefore how can a general who lives far from these considerations ma7e a legal investigation of themO And even if he has recogniHed the war as illegal he 6Inds himself in a tragic situation1 !<ner said I:n one hand there is his obvious duty toward his own country which he has ta7en an oath as a soldier to fulfill on the other side this obligation not to su44ort any war of aggression a duty which forces him to commit high treason and desertion and to brea7 his oath1I In fact he added the situation is that as long as there is no su4erstate authority im4artially 4rescribing the duty of an individual and 4rotecting him against 4unishment for high treason no officer can be held criminally res4onsible for a breach of the 4eaceC on the one hand the 4rosecution re4roached the generals for having been 4oliticians as well as soldiers and on the other it insisted that they should have o44osed the 4olitical leadershi4 that they should have been not merely soldiers but also 4oliticians1 ((0 Dodl as7ed for nineteen witnesses at Nuremberg but he was 4ermitted only fourC the others testified by means of interrogations1 The man who was slated to succeed him in (*/& 6ield Marshal #aulus came to Nuremberg and told what he 7new of the criminal war in which Eitler had engaged his country but did not im4licate either Dodl or Beitel in any s4ecific criminal acts1 To the Germans who observed him closely in the courtroom #aulus seemed to be under heavy 4sychological 4ressure owing no doubt in 4art to the fact that he would in due course return to the 8oviet "nion1 Dodl defended himself vigorously both on the witness stand and in interrogations on the first two charges against himself and Beitel and the General 8taff1 A soldier he too maintained cannot be held res4onsible for 4olitical decisions of the head of stateC he cannot weigh the 4ros and cons of why he draws u4 war 4lans and carries them out1 Discussing aggressive warfare he said in his interrogation of August )$ (*/0 if was never legitimate to attac7 a country of whose neutrality one is sure such as 8witHerlandC but Belgium and Eolland he thought were 4ro-Ally and their territory might be used and their sovereignty infringed u4on by the !nglish without serious resistance on their 4art1 As7ing about the attac7 on 6rance the American 4rosecutor said II ta7e it that your attitude concerning the attac7 on 6rance was that the most favorable o4eration should be used regardless of whether it meant the invasion of countries with which Germany was at 4eace1I Dodl re4lied II do not hold this o4inion unreservedly but I do hold that when a nation is fighting for its life it has the right to use such means as it can to carry on warfare1I The 4rosecution under its 4reconce4tion of a cons4iracy to commit aggression re4orted in its account of the interrogation of August &+ (*/0

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page_3!2 #age )'& that Dodl ??admittedI he had tested the .Hech defenses which were similar to the Maginot 9ine as a 4reliminary measure for the attac7 on 6rance1 Describing an interrogation of :ctober ( (*/0 it said that he had IadmittedI that Barbarossa was the code name for the Fussian o4eration1 Dodl had also IadmittedI in an interrogation of August &* (*/0 Ithat he engaged in the 4lanning of o4erations for the Fussian cam4aign1I A more serious charge that he had said that as far as he was concerned 4artisans should be drawn and @uartered he admitted too in his interrogation of November % (*/0 but he said this had been merely a ,o7e an attem4t to ma7e the needless destruction of villages Eitler had in mind seem absurd and he 4ointed out that he had succeeded in 4ersuading the 6uehrer to agree that villages would not be burned down once the local fighting was over1 Eitler?s decisions Dodl said were final and they were his entirelyC once they were made no further discussion was tolerated1 The 6uehrer got the material he needed from his subordinates brooded over it sometimes for days and then 4roceeded to give the order which would then be wor7ed out by Dodl?s chief of staff General -arlimont1 Dodl then would edit the ty4escri4t and give it to the 6uehrer who made further changes1L The early 4lans for the -estern cam4aign for e<am4le were changed com4letely by Eitler who ado4ted Manstein?s idea of brea7ing through the Ardennes 6orest and then turning west to the coast thus reversing the old 8chlieffen 4lan of 7ee4ing the right flan7 strong and attac7ing #aris in an envelo4ing movement1 ((' Dodl?s day in his Nuremberg cell began at ':)$ A1M1 when his glasses and a 4encil were returned to him along with his sus4enders1 Ee then made his bed and read until +:)$ when he went to the barber sho4 to be shaved1 Brea7fast followed after which he swe4t out his cell cleaned his boots and brushed his uniform which was brought from the common room where the 4risoners? clothes were 7e4t1 Ee then did sitting-u4 e<ercises washed and dressed1 Neither he nor the other 4risoners got the full American ration and he lost fifteen 4ounds during his im4risonment1 Ee s4ent his time reading and trying to thin7 his way through the catastro4he1 :ne of the boo7s he read was A Tale of T,o *ities another was Eamsun?s The !an)erer1 In a guessing game the news4a4ermen 4layed he was given a small chance of being found not guiltyC only thirteen thought he would be sentenced to death as against fourteen for DoenitH thirteen for Faeder and twenty-nine for Beitel1 Dodl was able to bear his fate with considerable e@uanimity1 Ee too7 slee4ing 4ills only occasionally after sentence of death was 4ronounced u4on him1 Ee did not want to a44eal his sentence although at the urging of his wife and his lawyer he did eventually 4ermit an a44eal to be made1 L Dodl had been mainly res4onsible for the 4hrasing of the !ehrmachtberichtethe official war communi@uJs1 Ee wrote well and the re4orts were carefully designed to be as factual as 4ossible and to be ada4ted above all to the needs and morale of the German troo4s =!rich Muraws7i er )eutsche !ehrmachtberichte 78F8789? MBo44ard: Boldt (*'&N 8chriften des Bundesarchivs *>1

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page_3!3 #age )') -hen he had to a44ear at the last visit of his wife shac7led to a guard he a4ologiHed in a letter to her but said he actually felt as though the guard had been shac7led to him rather than the other way around1 Ee never had any sense of guilt1L 9i7e so many other officers and officials in the Third Feich Dodl had loo7ed the other way when he heard of the atrocious means with which Eitler was conducting the war and the e<termination of the Dews the 8lavs the Gy4sies and the commissars1 8till he was vastly overwor7ed1 During the entire war he had only one leaveC '$ $$$ messages a year went across his des7 many of which had to be signedC and it was not 4ossible as he 4ointed out in his trial to investigate the legality of each of these1 Believing in Eitler in the ,ustice of the war in the attac7 the Dews were ma7ing on Germany in the nefariousness of the enemy who combined the forces of bolshevism and ca4italism in its effort to overthrow National 8ocialism Dodl gratefully acce4ted the golden #arty badge in (*// as something he had earned by single-mindedly serving his leader1 But unli7e Beitel and so many others he never received any financial evidence of Eitler?s gratitude1 Ee was never given a 4enny by the 6uehrer1 Dodl li7e the other military men had the bad luc7 to revere the wrong head of state1 Ee was not an evil man or a wea7 one and those who 7new him outside the 6uehrer head@uarters li7ed and res4ected him1 !<ner said when he visited him after the verdict was 4ronounced ??-e have to be ashamed to come to you I to which Dodl added in writing to his wife: II must rather be ashamed to have brought him to this situation1I Eis last letters contained much more feeling for his wife?s suffering than for his own situation1 Ee said he ho4ed when the day of e<ecution came she would have a friend nearby whose arm could be around her1 Ee who had sent so many men to their death he said could not himself be afraid of death which would be a liberation with no more guards and no more 4rison1 It seems unli7ely that Dodl would have been sentenced to death by a later court1LL Generals as dee4ly involved in criminal orders as he had been had their lives s4ared and were soon free including Manstein Besselrng and even Bach-Aelews7i who on behalf of the 88 had led the attac7 against the -arsaw u4rising1 They all were released in the s4ace of a few years1 Dodl had the misfortune to be tried too early1 Eis guilt was 4robably no greater L II have to loo7 fate in the eye I he wrote his wife1 IThe .ourt is the .ourt of the victors and remains a 4olitical instrument1 It will always have the a44earance of ,ustice but it has the tas7 of 4unishing the ma,or war criminals1I LL Testimony was introduced at the Eau4ts4ruch7ammer 4roceedings in Munich in (*0) where Dodl in effect was found not guilty of the main charges brought against him at Nuremberg declaring that one of the 6rench ,udges at Nuremberg Donnedieu de 6abres had said in (*/* that the verdict against Dodl was a mista7e =Affidavit by !rich 8chwinge #rofessor of 9aw Marburg "niversity>1 Alfred 8eidl who had been counsel for Fudolf Eess at Nuremberg re4resented Dodl?s widow in her successful attem4t before the five members of the Eau4ts4ruch7ammer to rehabilitate him and to annul the German 4enalties against his 4ro4erty =IAG #roceedings Eau4ts4ruch7ammer>1

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page_3!4 #age )'/ than that of the Allied generals who told the .ommandos to fight without regard to the rules of war and the Allied strategists who ordered the annihilation bombings of Dresden Eamburg Berlin and other German cities1 It is true that Dodl had 4ro4osed in Dune (*/$ long before the British had begun the mass bombing of German cities that German ??terror attac7sI on !nglish cities be declared a re4risal1 But neither Dodl nor his o44osite numbers among the Allies were interested in anything more than a ,ustification for using whatever methods they believed to be essential to gain victory1 Dodl said 4lainly that international law should be used as a means of battle and that illegal acts should be countered with illegal acts instead of by a44eals to the law against the enemy?s breaches of the law1 ((+ Ee used the same reasoning when the .ommissar :rder came before him1 Ee was against it but his only sign of resistance was again to suggest that it be ,ustified as a re4risal a re4risal before the war started1 Dodl?s misfortune was that he had one ste4 at a time become 4art of a criminal governmentC he too7 a leading role in its military establishment even when he 7new that it had murdered one former chief of the Feichswehr and had degraded and humiliated another after bringing false charges against him1 Dodl came to acce4t violence in 4ublic life as well as orders he 7new to be illegalC he reacted only when irrational military decisions were made1 The 7illing of the Dews may have disturbed him but if it did no evidence e<istsC the beatings and 7illings of Fussian 4risoners of war the use of slave labor the de4ortations the collaboration of the Army with the 8D the collective measures against civilian 4o4ulations very nearly everything was ignored or condoned and acce4ted if it led to victory1 Eis soldierly @ualities were absorbed in the <tat criminel although with more luc7 he would have served a better cause with as much devotion and s7ill1 Notes (1 er -arteitag )er Ehre =Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)'> 441 ($)/1 &1 .bi)1 441 (%(%01 )1 .bi)1 441 &/00$1 /1 .bi)1 441 &%/%01 01 .bi)1 41 )$+1 '1 IEimmler Fede I in Sammelheft ausge,aehlter +ortraege un) /e)en =Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)*>1 +1 9Jon Degrelle ie verlorene Legion =8tuttgart: Geritas Gerlag (*00> 41 (++1 %1 Eans Buchheim IDie 88 in der Gerfassung des Dritten Feiches I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 III No1 & (*00 441 (&+0+1 *1 6riedrich Meyer-Abich ed1 ie Masken fallen =Eamburg: Morawe and 8cheffelt Gerlag (*/*> 441 /)/01

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page_3! #age )'0 ($1 Eichmann Trial= Session 777= August Hth= 78:7 =Derusalem: !ichmann Trial Fecord mimeogra4hed (*'(>1 ((1 N*A GI )+(0-#8 4 /)(1 (&1 Baltenbrunner interrogation of 8e4tember (' (*/' =IAG>1 ()1 Barl EeinH Abshagen *anaris =8tuttgart: "nion Gerlag (*0*>1 (/1 Eimmler letter of 8e4tember & (*)% =BD.>1 (01 Gerald Feitlinger The SSB Alibi of a Nation =9ondon: -illiam Eeinemann (*0+> 441 )0(0&1 ('1 N*A GI )%$)-#8 41 +)%1 (+1 Faul Eilberg The estruction of the Euro2ean %e,s =.hicago: Suadrangle Boo7s (*'(> 441 &%)%/1 Eimmler files folder (&' =BD.>1 (%1 N TI 41 ))/1 (*1 N TTTIII )%+$-#8 441 &+*%'1 &$1 N IG )/'&-#8 441 )$'+1 &(1 N*A GI )/'&-#8 441 ('('01 &&1 N TI 41 ))01 &)1 N*A G &*)%-#8 41 '$01 &/1 .bi)1 &**$-#8 441 '*/*01 &01 .bi)1 &'1 N TI 441 )0/001 &+1 .bi)1 )%)%-#8 41 )/$1 &%1 Baltenbrunner interrogation of 8e4tember &( (*/0 =IAG>1 &*1 Baltenbrunner interrogation of :ctober 0 (*/0 =IAG>1 )$1 N*A III +)0-#8 441 0)))01 )(1 Baltenbrunner interrogations of 8e4t1 &% (*/0 and :ct1 )( (*/0 =IAG>1 )&1 Archiv #eter ed1 S2iegelbil) einer +ersch,oerungB ie (altenbrunner;Berichte an Bormann un) Hitler ueber )as Attentat vom #$. %uli 7899 =8tuttgart: 8eewald Gerlag (*'(> 41 )001 ))1 .bi)1 441 )&+&%1 )/1 .bi)1 41 (&/1 )01 .bi)1 41 &+'1 )'1 .bi)1 41 &%01 )+1 .bi)1 441 0&0&%1 )%1 .bi)1 441 )&0&+1 )*1 N*A GIII !rwin 9ahousen 8tatement GI 441 '%&%)1 /$1 N*A GI )+$&-#8 441 /(((&1 #eter Bor 6es2raeche mit Hal)er =-iesbaden: 9imes Gerlag (*0$>1 /(1 -alter GoerlitH (eitel+erbrecher o)er Offi0ierO =Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*'(>1 /&1 .bi)1 41 &*1 /)1 .bi)1 41 /+1 //1 .bi)1 41 &)$1 /01 N TTGII (%$*-#8 41 /&&1 /'1 N TTTIT $''-"B 441 (&%&*1 /+1 N TTGI %%/-#8 441 /$'%1 /%1 N*A III 00(-#8 441 //$/(1 /*1 Burt Detlev Moeller as let0te (a2itel =Eamburg: Eoffmann and .am4e Gerlag (*/+> 441 '/'01

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page_3!! #age )'' 0$1 9ahousen interrogation of A4ril + (*/+ =NA>1 0(1 6al7enhorst interrogation of November && (*/0 =NA>1 0&1 6al7enhorst interrogation of :ctober &0 (*/0 =NA>1 0)1 Doachim von und Hur Gathen interrogation of November )$ (*/0 =NA>1 0/1 N*A IG (*0/-#8 441 0*&*+1 001 6ranH Ealder (reigstagebuch Gol1 II =8tuttgart: -1 Bohlhammer (*')> 441 ))')+1 0'1 N TTGI %%/-#8 441 /$'%1 0+1 Buchheim et al.= o2. cit1 Gol1 II 441 &&0&+1 0%1 N*A GIII 441 '%(%&1 0*1 N*A GI 0$-. 441 %+)+01 Also N TTTIG 441 &0&001 '$1 N*A III %+%-#8 41 ')'1 '(1 Buchheim et al.= o2. cit1 Gol1 II 441 &0(0&1 '&1 N T 41 '&+1 ')1 N*A III 00'&-#8 41 //)1 '/1 N TIT 41 /++1 '01 N TTTGI /$*-!. 41 /%$1 ''1 GoerlitH o2. cit1 41 /))1 '+1 -ilhelm ArentH trans1 ??Die Gernehmung von Generalfeldmarschall Beitel durch die 8ow,ets I in !ehr,issenschaftliche /un)schau (*'( 441 '0('&1 '%1 GoerlitH o2. cit1 41 )&)1 '*1 N TTII 41 )+%1 +$1 "lrich von Eassell +om an)eer eutschlan) =Aurich and 6reiburg i1 Br1: Atlantis (*/'> 41 &)$1 +(1 GoerlitH o2. cit1 441 )&0&'1 +&1 N TG Affidavit of General Nicholaus von Gormann 441 &%'%+1 +)1 Adolf Eeusinger Befehl im !i)erstreit =Tuebingen: Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*0+> 441 (*%&$$1 +/1 GoerlitH o2. cit1 441 )$/'1 Bordt !ahn un) !irklichkeit1 Dodl 84ruch7ammer =IAG>1 T!* Eigh .ommand .ase 9ist interrogation of March / (*/' 441 &'%/ ff1 9uise Dodl un4ublished biogra4hy of General Alfred Dodl =hereinafter referred to as Dodl ms1>1 +01 Dodl 84ruch7ammer Affidavit of 9ieutenant .olonel !rnst Dohn von 6reyand 8e4tember ( (*0& =IAG>1 Dodl ms1 The scene was described to 9uise Dodl by Ma,or Buechs who was 4resent1 +'1 N*A GIII 441 ''&'*1 ++1 N*A IG (%$%-#8 41 )++1 +%1 Dodl documents in 4ossession of 9uise Dodl1 +*1 Dodl documents in 4ossesion of 9uise Dodl Fe4ort of Duly &0 (*(*1 %$1 -alter -arlimont .nsi)e HitlerAs Hea)1uarters 78F89? =New ;or7: 6rederic7 A1 #raeger Inc1 (*'/> 441 ()(/ ('(+1 %(1 Dodl 84ruch7ammer Affidavit of 9ieutenant .olonel !rnst Dohn von 6reyand 8e4tember ( (*0& =IAG>1 %&1 N*A 8u441 A D-%%0 41 ($&/1 %)1 N*A GII 9-(+& 441 *&) *+)+/1 %/1 N TG 441 /*' 0$0+1 %01 .bi)1 441 /0+0%1 %'1 N TIT .-0& 41 0$$1

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page_3!" #age )'+ %+1 N TTGIII (%$+-#8 41 )*01 %%1 MA ((* =IAG>1 %*1 -arlimont o2. cit1 41 /+*1 *$1 Doachim 8chulH ie let0ten F$ Tage =8tuttgart: 8teingrueben-Gerlag (*0(> 41 (&$1 *(1 *f1 Eans-Guenter 8era4him and Andreas Eillgruber ??Hitlers Entschluss 0um Angriff auf /usslan) I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol II No1 ) (*0/ 441 &/$0/1 *&1 Guenter 9ewy I8u4erior :rders Nuclear -arfare and the Dictators I in American -olitical Science /evie, March (*'( 41 &&1 *)1 N*A III %%'-#8 41 ')+1 */1 N*A GII 9-(+& 41 *'(1 *01 N TG 41 ($1 *'1 .bi)1 41 /*01 *+1 .bi)1 441 /*+*%1 *%1 N I 441 +++%1 **1 N TIT 441 /$%()1 ($$1 .bi)1 441 /&')$1 ($(1 .bi)1 41 /0%1 ($&1 N TGII 441 /'/*/1 ($)1 N TIT 441 /0* /'/'01 ($/1 .bi)1 41 /''1 ($01 .bi)1 441 /+*%$ and D-++$ 41 /%&1 ($'1 .bi)1 41 01 ($+1 N TGIII 441 0$'($1 N TIT 441 (+1 ($%1 N TIT 441 +*1 ($*1 .bi)1 441 (&()1 (($1 N*A 8u441 A (++'-#8 441 /$/'1 (((1 N*A GI .-(+$ 441 *++($$&1 ((&1 .bi)1 41 *%+1 (()1 N TIT 441 ()(01 ((/1 .bi)1 441 (0 &$&(1 ((01 .bi)1 441 &$&&1 (('1 *f1 Eans-Adolf Dacobsen ed1 okumente 0um !estfel)0ug 789$ =Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*'$>1 Eans-Adolf Dacobsen "all 6elb =-iesbaden: 6ranH 8teiner Gerlag (*0+>1 ((+1 N TTTG D-'$' 41 (%(1 N*A 8u441 A (++'-#8 441 /$/'1

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page_3!# #age )'% ($ The Navy !rich Faeder !rich Faeder the 4redecessor of DoenitH as .ommander in .hief of the German Navy was of middle-class origins1 The German Navy had never had the #russian-Dun7er tradition of the Army?s officer cor4s1 They recruited their officers mainly from nonaristocratic families =DoenitH came from a #russian line of farmers civil servants 4astors teachers and a s4rin7ling of officers>1 Faeder?s father was a language teacher in a secondary school in Eamburg before he became headmaster of the 6riedrich -ilhelm Fealgymnasium in the little town of Gruenberg in 8ilesia1 Faeder?s mother was the daughter of a musician and the future admiral was brought u4 in a humanistic God-fearing atmos4here of learning and middle-class culture with a considerable degree of what could be called 4ermissiveness for when at the age of eighteen he announced that he wanted to become a naval officer his 4arents made no ob,ection1 Although u4 to this 4oint the young Faeder had been studying Gree7 and 9atin te<ts and other sub,ects remote from the life of a sailor his father 4rom4tly too7 ste4s to enroll him as a cadet1L Faeder was a good officer from the start1 Ee made one of the 4re-orld -ar I cruises to the :rient with a flotilla of German warshi4s under command of #rince Eeinrich and he later served as a watch officer on the 4rince?s flagshi4 in home waters1 -ith only fifteen other young officers he attended the Naval Academy =Marinea7ademie> in Biel for two years a 4re4aration for high command in the Navy designed to give s4ecial train- L Gree7 was not 4art of the curriculum of the Fealgymnasium and Faeder too7 4rivate lessons in that language1

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page_3!$ #age )'* ing to selected officers who would serve on shi4s of the line and on the admiralty staff1 The Naval Academy did not aim as did the -ar Academy =Briegsa7ademie> on behalf of the Army to turn out General 8taff officersC it concentrated on the 4rofessional training of the German naval officers with a good deal of em4hasis on naval history and foreign languages1 Faeder was sent to Fussia for three months in (*$/ during the Fusso-Da4anese -ar to further his 7nowledge of Fussian which he had chosen as his language study at the Naval Academy1 Eis early career was varied1 Ee served two years in the naval intelligence bureau a news-gathering and 4ublishing service that had nothing to do with es4ionage and after returning to sea was une<4ectedly assigned to the Baiser?s yacht Hohen0ollern where he was navigation officer1 There he learned to mi< with the men who were running not only the Navy but the country1 Feturning to line duty he served on the staff of Admiral Ei44er commanding the reconnaissance forces and he too7 4art during -orld -ar I in the early mining and hit-and-run raids of the German surface shi4s against the !nglish coast1 During this time his su4eriors were sufficiently im4ressed by him for the Naval .hief of 8taff Bonteradmiral von Trotha to as7 his advice on the German o4erations in the 87agerra7an unusual distinction for a ,unior officer1 Ee too7 4art in the historic battle between the British and German high-seas fleets at Dutland in which the Germans inflicted greater damage on the enemy than they received but were nevertheless forced to retreat to their massive inactivity in their relatively safe harbors still facing the numerically far su4erior British fleet1 Toward the end of the war Faeder was freed of his staff duties and given command of the light cruiser *oeln which was used for reconnaissance and antimining assignments in the North 8ea1 -hile the *oeln was laid u4 for re4airs he was named a member of the German armistice delegation that met at 84a to 4re4are for what they ho4efully thought would be an honorable 4eace with the Allies1 But the terms of the armistice as well as the revolt in the German Navy too7 Faeder and a good many more li7e him by sur4rise1 The s4ectacle of sailors mutinying the one-sided conditions of the armistice and then the 4eace treaty were a 4rofound shoc71 ( Faeder could rationaliHe what had ha44ened by ascribing the mutinies to the wor7 of demogogues the 9eft wing and he remained in the service to hel4 4ut the 4ieces together1L The @uestion confronting him as it L Faeder li7e most German naval officers was a44alled at the mutiny of the German sailors in (*(%1 This e<4erience was one of the main causes Admiral Assmann who served under Faeder believes of Faeder?s autocratic handling of naval affairs and of his em4hasis on disci4line1 It was also one of the reasons for his bac7ing the Fight-wing Ba44 4utsch led by a minor 4olitical figure Dr1 -olfgang Ba44 and General -alther von 9uettwitH who in March (*&$ tried to de4ose the -eimar Government with the hel4 of the naval brigade !hrhardt1 Because he had sided with the mutineers Faeder was assigned for two years to incons4icuous duty in the Navy archives =6rancis 91 .arsten /eichs,ehr un) -olitik 787H78FF M.ologne and Berlin: Bie4enhever R -itsch (*'/1N>1

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page_3"0 #age )+$ confronted the other Navy and Army officers who stayed on after the colla4se was how they could defend the country in the 4ostwar violence and chaos with the limitations im4osed u4on them1 Faeder testified at Nuremberg that the German Navy had followed on the whole the 4rovisions of the Gersailles Treaty and had dealt fairly with the Allied commission that su4ervised the disarmament 4rovisions1 No submarines were built for Germany although dummy com4anies set u4 in 84ain and Eolland hel4ed the Navy 7ee4 its hand in submarine construction by 4roviding designs for undersea vessels for other countries1 The Navy sent thirty engineers and designers to Eolland where two 0$$-ton "-boats were built for Tur7ey in (*&0 and a German "-boat designer went in (*&/ to 6inland where submarines were built for 6inland that were 4rototy4es for later German "-boats1 8till others were constructed under the su4ervision of the German technicians for 8weden Eolland and 84ain but since the com4anies built none for the German Navy this construction was all within the 4rovisions of the Gersailles TreatyC German e<4erts could act on behalf of other nations in neutral countries1 & L The actual violations of the treaty were very minor and were clearly far more concerned with defensive than offensive emergencies1 #ractice antiaircraft batteries were set u4 old mine swee4ers were armed with ($10cm1 guns and one machine gun for use against aircraft1 This was illegal since no antiaircraft guns were 4ermitted the -eimar Fe4ublic1 8ome /) $$$ gas mas7s were manufactured instead of the 4ermitted && 0$$ (%0 movable guns were salvaged for the Army and not all the 4rescribed demolitions were made at Eeligoland1) The violations were no menace to any country1 -eimar Germany 4roduced ) '+0 mines =& $$$ more than the ( ''0 4ermitted under Gersailles> and with them the Navy could close off an area of some twenty-seven nautical miles1 The German defense at Nuremberg tried to show the number of mines needed for a thoroughgoing o4eration1 8ome idea of this they 4ointed out may be had from the fact that the British had laid from /$$ $$$ to 0$$ $$$ mines in the North 8ea during -orld -ar I and the German 9uftwaffe in one action alone at the start of -orld -ar II laid )$ $$$ to 0$ $$$ mines1 The Navy also moved guns of the coast-defense fortification farther a4art so they could not be 7noc7ed out with one shot which was a breach of the treaty as was the re4lacing of the 4ermissible si< (0cm1 guns with three (+cm1 ones and 7ee4ing antiaircraft batteries1 Another subterfuge was the Navy?s retaining *' guns si< of them of large caliber which they were su44osed to have scra44ed1/ Most of these 4ost-orld -ar I measures were ta7en in the face of what L The funds for such enter4rises were 4rovided by the Defense Ministry and were in the charge of .a4tain 9ohmann of the German Navy1 9ohmann also established a number of commercial com4anies including one for 4roducing 4atriotic moving 4ictures1 The result was a financial disaster and a great 4ublic scandal when the machinations were uncovered in (*&+1

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page_3"1 #age )+( the Germans believed in the early (*&$?s to be imminent danger #olish attac71 The #oles had ta7en over Gilna without serious o44osition from the Allies or the 9eague of Nations and Faeder testified at Nuremberg that the Germans 7new that in the event of a #olish attac7 the 6rench intended to su44ort their allies the #oles1 The Navy therefore had the tas7with the insignificant forces remaining after surrender of the high-seas fleet and its scuttling at 8ca4a 6lowof sto44ing the 6rench fleet from entering the Baltic1 The German Navy in many categories had not built u4 to the tonnages allotted it1 "nder the Gersailles Treaty it was allowed eight cruisers =it had si<> and thirty-two destroyers =it had twelve>1 The secret arms budget that had to be 4roof against the 4acifist vigilance of the 8ocial Democrats amounted to between five and si< million mar7s or a little more than a million and a @uarter dollars and even in the (*&$?s that did not buy much armament naval or otherwise1 Neither in the 4re-NaHi 4eriod nor under Eitler did the Germans build? to the tonnages allowed for Eitler?s concern was the Army and Air 6orcethe Navy was seldom u44ermost in his mind1 In allocation of resources for rearmament it ran third1 0 Faeder was a considerable distance from the devout NaHi that DoenitH was but after meeting Eitler in (*)) he considered the 6uehrer a greatly gifted man endowed with a charisma so 4owerful that Faeder sought to avoid 4ersonal meetings1 9i7e so many others Faeder had seen evidence of the 6uehrer?s ability to convince 4eo4le of the soundness of his views against their will and better ,udgment and he 7e4t away from the occasions when he might have to be alone with Eitler1 DoenitH told his lawyer that Faeder was 4resent at conferences with Eitler only when ordered there and that he left as soon as 4ossible1L -hen Eitler commanded the German troo4s to march into the Fhineland Faeder was against the move but when the 6rench failed to react with decision he agreed that Eitler had been right as he was to be later at the time of Munich1 Faeder wrote concerning the Fhineland: ??-e admit we were wrong the 6uehrer was right1 -e won because we had the stronger nerves and stuc7 it out1I' Faeder had a son-in-law with one-@uarter Dewish blood who emigrated from Germany and lived abroad so his anti-8emitism was tem4ered com4ared with that of DoenitH although he too did not hesitate to denounce the Dews or to acce4t the golden #arty badge in (*)+1 In a s4eech on March (& (*)* on the occasion of Eeroes? Memorial Day he s4o7e of National 8ocialism which originated he said from the s4irit of the German fighting soldier and he 4raised Ithe clear and uns4aring summons to fight bolshevism and international Dewry whose race-destroying activities we have sufficiently e<4erienced on our own 4eo4le 1 1 1 the 4arasites of a foreign race1I But Dews testified for him at Nuremberg telling of his hel4 in 7ee4ing L DoenitH after he became Grossadmiral stayed at the 6uehrer?s head@uarters sometimes for days at a time1

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page_3"2 #age )+& them out of concentration cam4s1 Ee also intervened with the 88 on behalf of #astor Niemoeller who was then in Buchenwald to attem4t to get him freed1 + Faeder never was close to the #arty bigwigshe came to regard Goering as an im4lacable enemy of the Navy1 The Feichsmarschall =then .olonel General> in his attem4t to defend his domain against all comers had succeeded in reversing the decision made before Eitler came to 4ower that allowed the Navy to have its own 4lanes1 Goering insisted that the Navy as7 for su44ort of the 9uftwaffe when it needed hel4 and ma7e use of the 9uftwaffe?s 4ilots and 4lanes which were sometimes refused when the Air 6orce deemed other missions more im4ortant1 Faeder said at Nuremberg that as a result countless errors were made that were e<tremely costly to the Navy1 The Ark /oyal was incorrectly re4orted sun7C in Norway a battleshi4 was identified as a destroyerC on 6ebruary & (*/$ two German destroyers were sun7 by an ine<4erienced 9uftwaffe 4ilotC and the submarines were seldom given ade@uate hel41 !ventually he and DoenitH succeeded in convincing a reluctant Eitler of the necessity of the Navy?s having its own 4lanes1 Goering in ,ealousy of the Navy once said to Eitler that it was true that Faeder had the Navy in good sha4e but the admiral went to church and the 6uehrer could thereu4on draw his own conclusions of Faeder?s attitude toward National 8ocialism1 The Feichsmarschall went to Eitler with the firsthand news gathered by his air-force re4orting service and thus was able to give false and invariably o4timistic re4orts to the 6uehrer Faeder thought on what had ha44ened on land and sea and in the air1 Nor did Goering ever let himself be slighted in the 4icture he drew1 Goering?s close relationshi4 to Eitler disturbed Faeder because the combination of the Feichsmarschall?s vanity and incom4etence led him constantly to get what he wanted by intrigue or direct a44eals to the 6uehrer regardless of the needs of the armed forces1 Faeder was convinced that Goering had hel4ed s4ring the tra4 on the German Minister of -ar Blomberg whose wedding to a 4rostitute both Goering and Eitler attended1 The marriage could only result once the facts were 7nown in Blomberg?s resignation and Faeder believed Goering had 4romoted the marriage and Eitler?s 4resence at the ceremony so he could get Blomberg?s ,ob1 Faeder sat on the court which tried the former .hief of 8taff of the Army 6ritsch who might have been Blomberg?s successor and here again Faeder thought the charges of homose<uality against 6ritsch had been trum4ed u4 by Goering to get rid of a rival who also might be a successor to Blomberg1 6ritsch was in fact Faeder?s candidate for the -ar Ministry but Eitler declined to name him even though the court =of which Goering was 4resident> found him innocent1 Faeder was dis@uieted by Goering?s a44ointment on 6ebruary / (*)% as Generalfeldmarschall1 Faeder had refused the e@uivalent ran7 in (*)0 when

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page_3"3 #age )+) Eitler had wanted to ma7e him grand admiral with a field marshal?s baton =the first officer of that ran7 since -orld -ar I> because this would have meant his outran7ing 6ritsch1 Goering?s 4romotion and his boundless ambition as well as his malign influence on Eitler caused Faeder to thin7 much about resigning in the course of (*)%1 Ee again declined the 4romotion to grand admiral in (*)% but the Navy clearly needed an officer of e@ual ran7 with the increasing number of field marshals and when in (*)* Eitler again wanted to ma7e him grand admiral he acce4ted the 4romotion1 "4 to the start of the war he still considered leaving the service but once hostilities began he could not resign1 Ee left only in (*/) when his differences with Eitler on the strategy of the Navy became intolerable to both1 Eis last words to the 6uehrer when he retired were: ??#lease 4rotect the Navy and my successor against Goering1I Faeder did not get along well with the #arty Bon0en and the 881 Eeydrich too was an enemy1 The man who headed the 8D and ruled .Hechoslova7ia until Dune (*/& had been a naval officer and Faeder had dismissed him from the service in (*)( for the disre4utable 4art he 4layed in an affair involving a young girl1 Eeydrich had never forgiven him and Faeder was sure he was an im4lacable enemy1 Faeder shared the wides4read contem4t for Fibbentro4 who he believed mainly res4onsible for Eitler?s wrong ideas about !ngland and the 6uehrer?s doubts that the British would fight1 9i7e the rest of the Navy men who had fought in -orld -ar I Faeder 7new and res4ected the fighting @ualities of the !nglish and never acce4ted the stoc7 NaHi beliefs about Britain?s decadence1 But Eitler believed what he wanted to hear and Faeder was as 4owerless against the imbecilities of Fibbentro4 as against the decision to fight Fussiaa country he also 7new something about1 In general Faeder held views characteristic of the Navy1 Ee was an aloof man tolerating no differences of o4inion once he had made u4 his mind on any matter that had to do with the Navy1 But officers were officers and comrades regardless of what the #arty said on the matter and during the entire war many men who were Mischlinge continued at their 4osts1 Faeder testified that he had lost only two officers under the Nuremberg 9aws and both of them got good ,obs in civilian life with the hel4 of the Navy1 In another case he made use of his friendly relations with Eess to 7ee4 a Mischling in active service1 The Navy on the whole was freer than the Army of #arty surveillance and could always 4lead its need for highly trained and s4ecialiHed officers1 Moreover it was a service with which Eitler and most of the #arty hierarchy had no e<4erience1 The NaHi movement was born in the mountains and villages and cities of 8outh Germany and AustriaC it had no connection with the cosmo4olitanism of the sea1 The 6uehrer himself always regarded the Navy with a mi<ture of res4ect and sus4icion1 Faeder had a furious res4onse from Eitler when he refused to give the naval attachJ at the 6uehrer?s head@uarters 4ermission to marry1 The officer whom Eitler

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page_3"4 #age )+/ li7ed had made false statements in his a44lication and Faeder wanted to cashier him as he had Eeydrich1 In the end the man left the Navy and Eitler had him ta7en into the #arty bureaucracy1 The Navy was stiff-nec7ed com4ared to the ArmyC its organiHation was far more com4act the chain of command demanding close 4ersonal as well as 4rofessional relationshi4s and it had more success in 4rotecting its men and in maintaining its standards of disci4line regardless of the #arty views1 Although the Navy was fairly well re4resented in the Duly &$ 4lot against Eitler only one naval man beside Admiral .anaris was e<ecuted1 The others were 4rotected anonymously by DoenitH?s well-7nown National 8ocialist 4rinci4lesC since his loyalty to the 6uehrer was beyond re4roach he was able to fend off the 8D and the Gesta4o1 !ven DoenitH for all his devotion to Eitler 7e4t a man in service who could have been shot for what he had said1 A ca4tain told one of DoenitH?s ad,utants .a4tain von Davidson that he would be glad if his son one day were to sail on a shi4 named Alfre) (ran0fel)er =BranHfelder was one of the cons4irators in the Duly 4lot>1 % But the main charges against Faeder at Nuremberg were of another 7ind1 -hen he was accused of having cons4ired to commit aggressive warfare the Allied 4rosecution had the Norwegian cam4aign mainly in mind for Faeder at the start of the war in a conference of :ctober ($ (*)* had urged on Adolf Eitler the case for establishing German bases in Norway to conduct the submarine war against Britain and to secure the vital trans4orts of iron ore from 8weden1 Faeder influenced by studies made by Gice-Admiral -olfgang -egener had been convinced for some years of the need in the event of war of ac@uiring bases in Norway and Denmar71 In his conference with Eitler he 4ro4osed 4utting 4olitical 4ressure on Norway with the hel4 of the 8oviet "nion to ac@uire Norwegian bases1* Ee also thought and with good reason that the !nglish and 6rench would attem4t to sto4 the ore shi4ments to Germany by one means or another including if necessary their occu4ying the Norwegian harbors where the su44lies were loaded1 Ee 7new too that this blow would be as damaging to the Feich as the loss of the Fumanian oil fields at the other end of !uro4ewhere the -estern Allies were also bound to be active by sabotage bombing or invasion whether or not the oil fields were under control of a neutral country1 General Maurice Gamelin and his staff had 4lanned for four 6rench and nine !nglish air grou4s to be ready to attac7 Ba7u and Batum using Tur7ish and 6rench bases1($ The weight of the Norwegian cam4aign lay mainly on the German Navy which had the tas7 of trans4orting and 4rotecting the landing forces against an overwhelmingly su4erior enemy fleet1 -ith hel4 of the 9uftwaffe and sur4rise it might succeed in its tas7 but it also would need luc71 As events turned out it had all three1 6or both sides 7new the im4ortance of the 8wedish iron ore and the long Norwegian coastline within which freighters could move under the 4rotection of Norwegian neutrality until they reached

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page_3" #age )+0 the short run across the Baltic to the nearest 4ort and where they would have the cover of German air and naval su44ort against Allied attac7s1 -inston .hurchill wrote his first memorandum on the sub,ect of Norway shortly after the start of the war1 :n 8e4tember (* (*)* he detailed ??the im4ortance of sto44ing the Norwegian trans4ortation of 8wedish iron ore from Narvi71I By December he was ready to ta7e stern measures against the neutrals under whose 4rotection the Germans were getting su44lies1 :n December (' he wrote of the need to mine Norwegian waters and to occu4y Norwegian bases and 4erha4s the 8wedish minefields: IThe final tribunal is our own conscience 1 1 1 8mall nations must not tie our hands when we are fighting for their rights and freedom1 The letter of the law must not in su4reme emergency obstruct those who are charged with its 4rotection and enforcement 1 1 1 Eumanity rather than legality must be our guide1I (( This was the 4eriod when the Allies had great ho4es of winning the war without the carnage of -orld -ar Iby fighting at the edges by denying the Germans essential commodities through their bloc7ade or ta7ing over the sources of su44ly1 If Ba7u oil and 8wedish ore could be denied the Germans the war would be over before long1 And when the 8oviet "nion attac7ed 6inland at the end of (*)* ta7ing advantage of the marvelous o44ortunity 4resented by its 4act with Germany to im4rove the 4rotection of its coast against a 4ossible future change of 4olicy on the 4art of the Feich the -estern Allies saw o44ortunity not only of hel4ing the 6inns who had the sym4athy of !uro4e including the still uncommitted neutrals in 8candinavia and the "nited 8tates but of using the occasion to occu4y the Norwegian 4orts1 The 6rench an<ious to 7ee4 the war as far as 4ossible from their borders were ready to act1 They agreed without consulting the British to send 0$ $$$ men and ($$ air4lanes which they could ill s4are as an e<4editionary force of volunteers to land in Norway and move across 8weden to 6inland1(& The British too although they felt that the 6rench had somewhat forced their hand agreed to send three to four divisions as well as air su44ort1 But the 8wedes would have none of thisC they were too conscious of German 4owerC des4ite their sym4athy for 6inland they said no to the Allied re@uest for 4ermission to cross 8wedish territory1 The strength and courage of the fle<ible individualistic 6innish defense along with the massive ine4titude of the Fussian attac7 astonished and delighted the world1 !ven the Italians and Germans showed 4ro-6innish sym4athies1 The 8wedes were delighted more than most1 But their neutrality was as dee4ly rooted as their res4ect for the might of the German Army1 6innish ca4itulation however became inevitable once the 8oviet "nion brought its full 4ower to bear1 The Fussians had first used troo4s mainly from the 9eningrad garrison and were seemingly un4re4ared for the ferocity of the 6innish defense in the forest warfare their men were forced to fight1 In addition it is li7ely that they were victims of their own 4ro4aganda which often affected even the 8oviet officials who con,ured it1 The Fussian high

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page_3"! #age )+' command had seemingly convinced themselves that their troo4s would be welcomed by the 6inns as an army of liberation freeing them from their im4erialistic and ca4italistic masters1 The 4oor 4erformance of the 8oviet soldiers even in victory led many in the Allied cam4 to congratulate themselves in having esca4ed a Fussian alliance1 But for the Allies it was still necessary to de4rive the Germans of the 4rotection of Norwegian neutrality that let them get the iron ore 4ast British sea 4ower and this had to be done with or without the 4lan to aid the 6inns1 The chance came with the successful British attac7 on the German shi4 Altmark1 The Altmark a su44ly shi4 carrying British 4risoners had succeeded in eluding the British bloc7ade and sailed from 8outh America to the coast of Norway1 There Norwegian officers ins4ected it and satisfied themselves that it was unarmed and that its 4resence in no way violated Norwegian neutralityC it therefore could sail legally along the neutral coast until it reached waters controlled by the German Navy and 9uftwaffe1 But .hurchill and the British Admiralty ordered the destroyer *ossack to attac7 the Altmark and get the 4risoners off1 The crew of the *ossack boarded the Altmark1 A number of the German crew were 7illed including some trying to esca4e across the ice of the f,ord1 The 4risoners were freed and to the sur4rise of everyone were found to be in good 4hysical condition although doctors and medical su44lies were ready on the assum4tion they would be living s7eletons1 The Germans as was customary with them at this stage of the war had treated the 4risoners well and there was no need for medical services1 A hue and cry rose over the attac71 The ca4tain of the British shi4 was decorated for his e<4loit to the intense indignation of the Germans who 4ointed not only to violation of Norwegian neutrality but to the dead sailors shot while trying to save themselves1 The Norwegians 4rotested on their own account but they were unable and unwilling to 4ress the case too far1 9i7e every other non-A<is country in !uro4e they were strongly 4ro-AllyC and they had not hesitated to lease their entire merchant fleet to the British on most favorable terms1 The British 7new they had the su44ort of the world including the "nited 8tates in whatever they did to defeat Eitler and .hurchill was sure the ne<t ste4s too would be acce4ted and a44roved1 These ste4s included the mining of Norwegian territorial waters followed by occu4ation of Norwegian 4orts by a combined British-6rench landing force1 The mining o4eration was set for A4ril / and on assum4tion the Germans would react 4rom4tly the British-6rench force was embar7ed for Narvi7 with other contingents to land in 8tavanger and Trondheim1 But the Germans were there before them by a matter of hours1 Faeder and the Eigh .ommand of the Navy had long been aware of the strategic necessity for 7ee4ing the Norwegian harbors out of the hands of the Allies1 :n the whole they would have been glad to 7ee4 Norway neutral thus to continue to use her territorial waters but they doubted that this would be 4ossible for long1 The British were as fully aware of the im4ortance

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page_3"" #age )++ of the shi4mentsthe Germans got ten million tons of high-grade ore a yearand of the safe-4assage route to Germany by way of ice-free Narvi7 through which one-third of the ore came1 The Germans soon received information from the 4ro-NaHi grou4s in Norway headed by former Minister of -ar Gid7un Suisling of British-6rench 4re4arations for the landings1 Suisling had been brought to visit Faeder through Fosenberg who as Eitler?s commissioner for ideological education of the National 8ocialist #arty had been in touch with the Norwegian NaHi #arty =Nas,onal 8amling> headed by Suisling1 The German legation was unim4ressed by Suisling re4orting to Berlin that he was not to be ta7en seriously but the 6oreign :ffice of the #arty through Fosenberg too7 a different view1 Faeder recommended that Eitler see Suisling and the Norwegian had hel4ed to convince them both of the imminence of an Allied landing although the German Minister to Norway doubted that it would be attem4ted in the near future1 () The Germans found 6rench documents bearing on the 4re4arations for war in the -est the Norwegian cam4aign and offensive actions in the Bal7ans in a freight train on a siding in the little town of 9a .haritJ as well as in the Suai d?:rsay1 They included messages and memoranda from General Gamelin and Daladier and the ca4tured minutes of the 8u4reme -ar .ouncil which were to be confirmed later by -inston .hurchill when he 4ublished his memoirs1 Faeder had these documents for his defense at Nuremberg but the British 4rimly refused defense attorney 8iemers? re@uest on behalf of Faeder for access to Admiralty files from A4ril (*)* to A4ril (*/$1 Any 4lans for 8candinavia had not been 4ut into effect the British wrote because the decision had been made not to intervene unless the Germans did so first1 ??It is assumed I the letter said Ithat the re@uest relates to matters other than the laying of minefields in Norwegian waters by the forces of Eis Ma,esty?s Government which action is a matter of 4ublic 7nowledge1I(/ All the communication left out was the critical fact that the Allies 7new the Germans would have to react and were determined to force the issue either by way of intervention in 6inland or by direct action in Norway1 Faeder had in his 4ossession the telegram Daladier sent to the 6rench Ambassador in 9ondon .harles .orbin on 6ebruary &( (*/$ about 4re4arations for landing in Norway: 1 1 1 :ur main aim 1 1 1 is to cut Germany off from its ore su44ly 1 1 1 :n the other hand it is very li7ely that if we don?t e<4loit the Altmark .ase u4 to the 4oint of ta7ing over 1 1 1 bases in Norway 8weden out of fear of Germany and in doubt of the effectiveness of our su44ort will ignore 6inland?s call for hel4 and shut us off from its territory 1 1 1(0 Faeder also had General Gamelin?s notes of March (' (*/$ commenting on future conduct of the war:I 1 1 1The first necessity is a shar4ening of the bloc7ade1I This might force the Germans to attac7 Belgium and Eolland if they were no longer a hel4 to circumvent the bloc7ade1 8weden?s ore was es-

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page_3"# #age )+% sential to Germany and 8weden and Norway could be threatened with re4risals1 The Allies had to act @uic7ly said Gamelin and with more vigor1 ??The e<4erience of si< months of war shows that the neutrals fear Germany1 -ithout being as threatening we must let them feel our strength 1 1 1I (' In addition Faeder had the German translation of the minutes of the si<th session of the 8u4reme Allied -ar .ouncil on March &% (*/$: The 8u4reme .ouncil agrees that the 6rench and British Governments on Monday the (st of A4ril will deliver a note to the Norwegian and 8wedish Governments 1 1 1 =to the effect that> the Allied governments cannot 4ermit any further attac7s on 6inland =she had made 4eace on March (&> by either the 8oviet or the German Governments1 If such an attac7 nevertheless ta7es 4lace and the Norwegian and the 8wedish Governments refuse to su44ort the a44ro4riate countermeasures of the Allied governments on behalf of 6inland and furthermore should these governments attem4t to bloc7 such measures of assistance then the Allies will regard this an act against their vital interests that will call for an a44ro4riate reaction1 Any e<clusive 4olitical agreement that 8weden and Norway ma7e with Germany will be regarded by the Allied governments as a hostile act even if such an agreement would have as its e<4licit aim the defense of 6inland 1 1 1 Any attem4t of the 8oviet Government to obtain from Norway a 4ort on the Atlantic coast contradicts the vital interests of the Allies and would call for a44ro4riate countermeasures1 The Allied governments must ta7e a44ro4riate measures 1 1 1 in the event that the 8wedish and Norwegian Governments sto4 or reduce the delivery of goods and tonnage which the Allied governments regard as absolutely necessary for the carrying on of the war 1 1 1 In consideration of the fact 1 1 1 that the Allies are conducting the war for aims that concern the small states as much as themselves the Allies cannot 4ermit that the further develo4ment of the war be endangered by the advantages that 8weden and Norway are granting Germany 1 1 1 After this note on A4ril 0 the mine laying in Norwegian territorial waters and the action against German shi44ing is to ta7e 4lace in order to drive it out of territorial waters 1 1 1 :4eration IFoyal MarineI for the laying of mines in the Fhine estuary is to begin on A4ril / and the air action on A4ril (0 1 1 1 The measures at hand are to be ta7en to cut down the German oil su44lies coming from Fumania 1 1 1(+: Another document Faeder had was a telegram from the 6rench military attacheJ in 9ondon to General Gamelin dated A4ril & (*/$: IThe British have reserved three 4laces for General Audet on a cruiser 1 1 1 The first trans4ort 1 1 1 leaves on A4ril 0th 1 1 1I(% The date for the mine laying in Norwegian waters was changed on A4ril ) from the 0th to the %th and only by this chance Faeder 4ointed out in his memoirs were the Germans first in Norway when they landed on the *th1 In the attac7 on Norway Faeder 4lanned to ma7e use of a ruse )e guerre a chicanery a44roved by international law whereby an enemy shi4 may disguise itself as a friend and fly a foreign flag if it lowers it and flies its own

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page_3"$ #age )+* once the shooting begins1 Eowever Faeder feared that with the !nglish fleet in action the German shi4s might be confusedC the British flag was not flown1 Faeder ordered the German bloc7ade brea7ers to 4enetrate the :slo f,ord with lights onC the other shi4s were to be blac7ed out1 The only 4ersonnel on dec7 were to be gun crews1 .hallenges were to be answered in !nglish and the names of British shi4s were to be given when @uestions were as7ed1 ??8ay ?#lease re4eat last signal im4ossible to understand1? Then if firing begins say ?8to4 firing British shi4 good friend1? If the destination were as7ed say ?Going Bergen 4ursuing German steamers1?I (* Faeder?s 4artici4ation in a cons4iracy to wage aggressive war was limited to defensive strategies1 It was clear to him as to any sailor in his right mind that the German Navy could not successfully fight the British Navy together with its allies1 Moreover Faeder gave a tal7 ,ust before the start of the war in which he told his audience in 8winemuende that war with the -est would mean "inis 6ermaniae1 9i7e DoenitH he drew the conclusions he was loo7ing for from among Eitler?s many 4ronouncements mainly from those in which the 6uehrer s4o7e of the need for an understanding with Britain1 Although he attended to4-secret meetings including the so-called Eossbach conference on November 0 (*)+ where Eitler told of his 4lans for gaining living s4ace for Germany Faeder 4referred to acce4t Goering?s e<4lanation that the s4eech was only an incitement to the generals to s4eed rearmament1 :ther Navy as well as Army officers too7 the November 0 s4eech at face valueC .olonel General Bec7 4lanned to arrest Eitler if he ordered an attac7 which as those of Bec7?s mind thought could only end in destruction of Germany1 Faeder merely doubted that it should be ta7en seriously1 Ee never ,oined the Fesistance never thought of it1 Basically Faeder got what he wanted from Eitler a Navy 4re4ared to defend the country against any 4ower on the .ontinent1 I-here I get my armored shi4s from is all the same to me I Faeder had once said1 Eis whole career bore out this easy dictum1 The Foehm 4utsch the (ristallnacht the concentration cam4s Eimmler?s 4olicehe could and did acce4t them all if he got his shi4s and freedom to use them in a sailorli7e fashion free from interference of men li7e Goering1 :nce the war started Faeder wanted it waged 4rimarily against !nglandC he thought a landing in Britain could have been made successfully in (*/$ but that it would re@uire com4lete su44ort from the air1 =:n this 4oint he and Eitler and the generals agreed1> But Goering?s 9uftwaffe was never able to win com4lete or even 4redominant control of the air over Britain1 8hould the invasion of !ngland not ta7e 4lace Faeder wanted to ca4ture 8ueH and Gibraltar de4riving !ngland of control and bases in the Mediterranean1 This he said with his o44ortunistic habit of ma7ing the best of things would be more im4ortant than ca4ture of the British Isles1 !ngland was the enemy Faeder believed and he had no doubt of the necessity of ousting the British from the Gree7 bases they had ta7en over and occu4ying the country1 Ee had

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page_3#0 #age )%$ the same reasons for this strategy as he had for invasion of Norway: either Germany or !ngland would occu4y the country1 The British seiHed control of 8aloni7a as they did in -orld -ar I and even if Italy had not launched the attac7 on Greece in early (*/( Germany would have had to invade that country if only to 7ee4 the British out1 Faeder?s memorandum to Eitler on 84ain and #ortugal em4hasiHed the same alternatives1 !ngland?s occu4ation of the Iberian 4eninsula was a grave dangerC Faeder did not want to intervene there he wrote in another memorandum of (*/&1 Germany was far too in volved on too many fronts but if !ngland too7 over the 84anish and #ortuguese 4orts it would have catastro4hic results for Germany?s submarine cam4aign1 A British occu4ation had to be 4revented at all costs he stressed1 Britain was always u44ermost in Faeder?s mind1 -hen the @uestion was being debated in the Eigh .ommand in December (*)* as to whether the 4lans for the Bismarck were to be sold to the Fussians Faeder said he favored letting the Fussians buy them1 Ee also later warned the 6uehrer against occu4ying Troms^ in Norway because he thought this might offend Fussia but Eitler 4aid no attention to either of his 4ieces of advice1 Faeder?s one fear was that the Bismarck 4lans might fall into the hands of the British1 Britain remained the chief enemy for him more so than for DoenitH who was far more influenced by National 8ocialist ideology and whose ultimate enmity was therefore reserved for bolshevism1 Faeder was ta7en 4risoner by the Fussians in #otsdam brought with his wife to a villa near Moscow and although he went a full day without food after his arrest he was on the whole well-treated he told the court at Nuremberg1 9ater when neither he nor officials of the -estern Allies could get in touch with his wife who was being held in a 8oviet 4rison he may have felt differently but Fussia was never the chief antagonist for the German Navy e<ce4t for the NaHified officers1 As soon as he heard of the 4lans for it Faeder o44osed the war against Fussia1 Ee wrote a memorandum to Admiral Burt Assmann on Danuary ($ (*// mar7ed for Assmann?s own use in which he re4eated that he had never been convinced of the ??com4elling necessityI for Barbarossa as the 6uehrer called the Fussian cam4aign1 &$ The 4rosecution accused him of instigating Da4anese aggression of urging Eitler as early as March (% (*/( to induce Da4an to seiHe 8inga4ore1 Faeder had told Eitler: Da4an must ta7e ste4s to seiHe 8inga4ore as soon as 4ossible since the o44ortunity will never again be as favorable =whole !nglish 6leet containedC un4re4aredness of "8A for war against Da4anC inferiority of "8 6leet vis-Z-vis the Da4anese>1 Da4an is indeed ma7ing 4re4arations for this action but according to all declarations made by Da4anese officers she will only carry it out if Germany 4roceeds to land in !ngland1 Germany must therefore concentrate all her efforts on s4urring Da4an to act immediately1 If Da4an has 8inga4ore all other !ast Asiatic @uestions regarding the "8A

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page_3#1 #age )%( and !ngland are thereby solved =Guam #hili44ines Borneo Dutch !ast Indies>1 Da4an wishes if 4ossible to avoid war against "8A1 8he can do so if she determinedly ta7es 8inga4ore as soon as 4ossible1 &( To charge the commander-in-chief of a belligerent navy with trying to gain an ally in the battle against the enemy was curious indeed1 The Americans and British who used all their elo@uence to 4ersuade the Fussians to breach their non-aggression 4act with Da4an at a time when Da4an was trying to get the 8oviet "nion to act as mediator in its war against the -est were never 4ut on trial1 Nor had the attem4t to win an ally ever been defined as a crime before Nuremberg1 Faeder of course would have been delighted to have Da4an ,oin the fight against his chief adversary !ngland without bringing in the "nited 8tates1 Although he was convicted of 4lanning and waging aggressive warfare the main charge against Faeder as against DoenitH was that he had committed war crimes1 Eis method of conducting submarine warfare including sin7ing of the Athenia while condemned by the court was not legally held against him1L As in DoenitH?s case the tribunal cited the American and British orders to their submarine commanders which balanced that account1 The last and most serious charge against him involved his 4art in carrying out the so-called .ommando :rder1 The .ommando :rder was issued by Eitler on :ctober (% (*/& two months after the British attac7 at Die44e on August (* (*/& =see .ha4t1 *>1 The order had been brewing in the 6uehrer?s mind ever since the raid1 6irst to discourage such raids Eitler authoriHed the German radio to broadcast that sabotage and terror units would be treated as bandits in the future and e<terminated1 Then he issued the .ommando :rder as a direct ??6uehrer orderI to his armed forces1 It was sent out with twelve co4ies and unli7e the .ommissar :rder it directly affected the Navy1 The 6uehrer wrote a 4rologue that declared: I6or some time our enemies have made use of meth- L Faeder?s 4art in the sin7ing of the Athenia and its aftermath was minor des4ite his res4onsibility as .ommander in .hief of the Navy1 -hen he first heard of the incident he made in@uiries and was told that no "-boat was nearer than seventy-five miles to where the Athenia had been sun71 Faeder therefore told the American chargJ d?affaires in good faith =Americans had been lost when the Athenia went down> that the German Navy was not res4onsible1 8ome two wee7s later on 8e4tember &+ when the &-)$ returned to harbor at -ilhelmshaven its commander :berleutnant 9em4 re4orted to Admiral DoenitH that he had sun7 the Athenia in error1 DoenitH sent 9em4 by air4lane to Berlin where the "-boat ca4tain e<4lained to Faeder what had ha44ened1 Faeder re4orted to Eitler who for 4olitical reasons ordered that the matter be 7e4t secret1 Faeder decided no court-martial should be held because the submarine commander had acted in good faith and had made an understandable error1 A month later the +oelkischer Beobachter 4ublished an article blaming the sin7ing of the Athenia on the British1 Faeder declared he 7new nothing of this move beforehand and if he had he would have 4revented the article?s a44earance1 The log of the &-)$ which was seen by many 4eo4le had to be changed if the official denials of the sin7ing were to be sustained1 The tribunal a44arently believed Faeder?s defenseC in its ,udgment it merely stated the facts ma7ing no findings =N TIG D-'0* 441 +%%$>1 8ee 441 )*&ff1 and .ha4ter ()1

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page_3#2 #age )%& ods of waging war that are outside the Geneva agreements1?? && The .ommandos the 6uehrer said were in 4art made u4 of criminals released from 4risons and ca4tured orders showed that they were instructed not only to manacle any 4risoners they too7 but to 7ill them when they threatened in any way to obstruct the mission1 In addition Allied orders had been found demanding the 7illing of any 4risoners ta7en1 Eitler?s res4onse was ty4icalhe ordered e<termination1 Ee wrote: I therefore order that from now on all enemies on so-called .ommando missions in !uro4e or Africa challenged by German troo4s even if they are to all a44earances soldiers in uniform or demolition troo4s whether armed or unarmed in battle or in flight are to be slaughtered to the last man1 It does not ma7e any difference whether they landed from shi4s or air4lanes for their attac7s or whether they were dro44ed by 4arachutes1 !ven if these individuals when found should a44arently seem to give themselves u4 no 4ardon is to be granted them on 4rinci4le1 In each individual case full information is to be sent to the :B- for 4ublication in the :B- communi@uJ1 The .ommandos Eitler said were immediately to be turned over to the 8D1 Any military 4rotection such as being sent to 4risoner-of-war cam4s was forbidden1 The order did not a44ly to regular 4risoners of war ta7en in the course of battle1 And Eitler added that every commanding officer would be held to account before a court-martial Iwho has either failed in his duty to the troo4s in communicating this order or who acts contrary to it1I&) Faeder?s guilt the court said lay in his 4assing on this infamous order1 In fact the Naval Eigh .ommand noted when two ca4tured .ommandos were e<ecuted in Bordeau< by a firing s@uad of the German Navy that this was done Iin accordance with the 6uehrer?s s4ecial order but it is nevertheless new in international law since the soldiers were in uniform1I&/ The naval war staff was rightC the shooting was something new in international law1 The 4roblems raised by the .ommandos were new tooC they arose from the many uses to which new wea4ons might be 4ut1 Air4lanes and gliders could land small units behind enemy linesC two-man submarines rubber boats 4arachutes could set the .ommandos down in enemy territory with the mission of blowing u4 shi4s harbor installations railroads or anything else of military value1 The .ommandos had to stri7e swiftly to 4ost4one any alarm as long as they could and to get away as fast as 4ossible1 Their ,ob was to destroy and to terroriHe to let Germans 7now they were never safe1 8ometimes they wore civilian clothing under their uniforms =those who landed at Bordeau< had been ca4tured in olive green uniforms under which were the anonymous garments they ho4ed to esca4e in>1 -hen the British landed at Die44e the Germans ca4tured many .ommandos and with them their orders as to how to behave1 In addition they had testimony of German survivors who had been held 4risoner by the land-

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page_3#3 #age )%) ing force1 The 4icture was not a 4retty one1 The Die44e landing too7 4lace after the war had considerably deteriorated from the forms of the fighting in 6rance and in North Africa where in the first battles neither Allied nor German 4lanes machine-gunned an enemy on the desert after his 4lane was downed1 Thousands of Germans in Fussia however following the 6uehrer?s directives issued through :B- considered themselves ,ustified in 4aying no attention to the military conventions they had observed in the -est1 Mass e<ecutions of civilians by 8D and !insatH grou4s too7 4lace behind the front linesC 4olitical officers ca4tured in uniform in battle were shot by the Army1 But the British had e<4erienced little or nothing of this 7ind of German ruthlessnessC the war at sea was fierce but 7e4t within visible bounds of humanityC cities had been bombed on both sides with considerable civilian loss of lifeC but the .ommando orders the British issued had no direct relation with any of these events1 They a44arently resulted from the same thin7ing as caused .hurchill to a44rove saturation bombing of German citiesC he wanted to brea7 the German will to continue the war1 The anti-NaHi feeling in !ngland was intense and it easily led to a conviction that any means was ,ustifiable that would defeat Eitler and the NaHi movement in which the British 4laced the ma,ority of the German 4eo4le1 Eitler this time had not e<aggeratedC the order issued to British sabotage troo4s was as brutal and 4rimitive as anything the NaHis had dreamed u41 It read: ;our value to the war effort as a live and effective 7iller is great1 1 1 1 The only way to achieve this is never to give the enemy a chance the days when we could 4ractice the rules of s4ortsmanshi4 are over1 6or the time being every soldier must be a 4otential gangster and must be 4re4ared to ado4t their methods whenever necessary1 In the 4ast we as a nation have not loo7ed u4on gangsters and their methods with favourC the time has now come when we are com4elled to ado4t some of their methods1 1 1 1 Femember you are not a wrestler trying to render your enemy hel4less you have to 7ill1 And remember you are out to 7ill not to hold him down until the referee has finished counting1 1 1 1 In finishing off an o44onent use him as a wea4on as it were beating his head on the curb or any convenient stone1 Do not forget that good wea4ons are often lying about ready at hand1 A bottle with the bottom smashed off is more effective than a na7ed hand in gouging an o44onent?s face1 1 1 1 The vulnerable 4arts of the enemy are the heart s4ine and 4rivates1 Bic7 him or 7nee him as hard as you can in the for71 -hile he is doubled u4 in 4ain get him on the ground and stam4 his head in1 At least some of the .ommandos were 4rovided with an ingenious device: two guns stra44ed under the arm4its of a troo4er fired when his arms were raised in seeming surrender1 The chains used on the 4risoners who were

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page_3#4 #age )%/ trussed in the Die44e raid were called ??death slingsI in the .ommando handboo71 A noose was 4assed over the head and around the nec7 of the man shac7led then the end of an attached chain was tied to his bent legs1 Thus with every movement the victim hel4ed to strangle himself1 The time of death could be determined for no human being could long lie in this 4osition without being forced to stretch out his legsC the muscle tension became unbearable1 This handboo7 however could only be 4roduced in a later trial1 The #resident of the .ourt at Nuremberg reminded the defense that they were not trying the victorious 4owers and the British .ommando orders and the events at Die44e were brought into the trial record only by witnesses? reference to them1 &0 DoenitH and Faeder both testified that they had regarded the 6uehrer?s order as a re4risal1 Faeder went to Die44e shortly after the British raid and heard firsthand evidence of how the .ommandos had behaved1 Ee saw no reason to 4rotest the .ommando :rder as the generals had the .ommissar :rder because in fact it seemed to him 4erfectly legal1 Moreover the Navy was directly involved in only two or three e4isodes1 :ne was the alleged handing over to the 8D at the end of :ctober (*/& of a member of a British .ommando unit that had landed in Norway with orders to attac7 the Tir2it0 lying in doc7 at Trondheim1 The attac7 made by si< !nglishmen and four Norwegians had failed and the entire grou4 with the e<ce4tion of one British seaman Fobert #aul !vans esca4ed across the 8wedish border1 !vans was ca4tured wearing civilian clothes with a holster for carrying a 4istol under his arm4it and a 7nuc7le-duster1 Ee was shot by the 8D according to Eitler?s orders1 The 4rosecution charged that the Navy ca4tured him but the arrest was made by the 8i4o =the 8ecurity #olice> the German records showed1 A German admiral interrogated !vans before his e<ecution but otherwise the Navy had not been involved1 Another case however directly im4licated the Navy1 :n December % (*/& at 9e Gerdon near Bordeau< two British sailors were ca4tured who said they were shi4wrec7ed1 Their faces were 4ainted green and near where they were 4ic7ed u4 a rubber boat was discovered along with e<4losives and ma4s1 Immediately after they were interrogated the Navy commander ordered them shot for attem4ted sabotage1 The shootings were delayed because of a re@uest from #aris from the 8D and a Navy ca4tain who wanted further @uestioning1 More interrogations were ordered by the Navy .ommand Grou4 -est and the shooting was 4ost4oned1 -hen they were finished the men were delivered to the 4rofessional @uestioning of the 8D since the Navy observed that routine interrogations elicited little useful information in such cases1 #ermission was as7ed by the 8D on December ($ to delay the e<ecution of the men for three days but on December (( they were shot by a Navy detail of one officer and si<teen men1&' The war diary of Admiral Dohannes Bachmann the German flag officer in command of western 6rance read: I8hooting of two !nglish 4risoners was

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page_3# #age )%0 carried out by a unit 1 1 1 attached to the harbor command Bordeau< in the 4resence of an officer of the 8D on order of the 6uehrer1?? A note a44eared in green 4encil on the margin o44osite this entry that said: I8D should have done this1 #hone flag officer in charge in future cases1I The two .ommandos -allace and !wart were the advance 4arty of a grou4 of five two-man sabotage units sent to the Gironde estuaryC and while Bachmann was recording the 4roceedings against the two ca4tured .ommandos one German shi4 after another re4orted damage from mines e<4loding against their hulls in the harbor of Bordeau<1 Adhesive mines had been attached below the waterline1L :f the ten .ommandos involved in this o4eration four in addition to -allace and !wart were ca4tured on December (& one man was drowned in carrying out the o4eration and the rest esca4ed to 84ain1 The four were e<ecuted on March &) by the 8D1 Faeder?s lawyer brought u4 another case which occurred after Faeder had retired involving seven seamen =si< of the Norwegian Navy and one of the Foyal Navy> who were ca4tured near Bergen in Duly (*/)1 Although they were wearing uniforms and the 8D man and the Navy Intelligence officers who interrogated them recommended treatment as 4risoners of war the Navy handed them over to the 8D for shooting a44arently because Norwegian shi4s such as the one on which these men were ca4tured belonged to the Norwegian motor tor4edoboat flotilla and were fre@uently used for sabotage o4erations1 The Navy commander regarded the men des4ite their battle dress as saboteurs therefore coming under the 6uehrer order1 After the e<ecution their bodies were weighted and thrown into the sea with a de4th charge attached to them1 &+ No direct evidence connected Faeder or DoenitH with any of these e<ecutions1 Faeder testified and witnesses corroborated him that he had 7nown nothing of these cases used by the 4rosecution as evidence against him1 Billing of the two Bordeau< .ommandos had not been re4orted to him although he was familiar enough with the general instructions res4onsible for their e<ecution1 :n 6ebruary (( (*/) a little more than a wee7 after Faeder retired the Navy :4erations Division International 9aw and #riHes 8ection sent out an advice to the effect that a wrong im4ression seemingly e<isted in the Navy as well as in the Army and all commanders in all theaters were threatened following the 6uehrer?s orders with court-martial 4roceedings if they Ihave neglected their duty in informing the troo4s about the order against saboteurs1I The communication went on to say: L The chief of counterintelligence Admiral .anaris one of the 7ey members of the Fesistance movement who des4ite being an im4lacable enemy of Eitler remained in charge of the Abwehr until Duly &$ (*// telegra4hed the following message to the Eigh .ommand at the -olfsschanHe on December (+ (*/&: I8ome five e<4losions mouth of Gironde at Bordeau<1 8abotage vs1 ore shi4s Alabama and -ortlan) and vs1 shi4s Tannenfels and res)en1 In view of statements of the two men shot this 4robably must have been done with magnetic mines1 MsignedN .anarinsI =N:B--$$& IAG>1

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page_3#! #age )%' "niformed 4risoners acting on military orders must be shot even after they surrender voluntarily and as7 to be s4ared1 :n the other hand 1 1 1 the annihilation of sabotage troo4s in battle is not to be 7e4t secret at all but on the contrary should be 4ublished in the armed forces communi@uJ1 The 4ur4ose of these measures i.e1 to discourage enemy sabotage o4erations cannot be accom4lished if the enemy .ommando troo4s do not learn that certain death and not safe im4risonment awaits them1 8ince the saboteurs are to be e<terminated at once unless for military reasons they are needed for a short time for interrogation this office believes it necessary to inform all members of the armed forces at the front and all officers at home dealing with such 4roblems that all saboteurs of this ty4e should be annihilated even if they are in uniform1 &% It was the advice admitted difficult to 7now what came under the term ??saboteur1I It did not a44ly to troo4s underta7ing large-scale o4erations or to large-scale airborne landings or to o4en warfare1 But if the troo4s? orders were to destroy factories bridges or railroad installations the men involved came under the e<termination order1 The Navy Division said: It can be assumed that security III is familiar with the 6uehrer directive and can therefore answer any ob,ections of the :BE General 8taff and the Air 6orce :4erations 8taff1 -ith regard to the Navy the @uestion is whether this case should not be used after a conference with the .ommander in .hief Navy to ma7e sure that all de4artments concerned are @uite clear as to how .ommando troo4s are to be treated1&* The Navy undoubtedly bore the res4onsibility for the e<ecutions in the case of the men who were shot in Bergen1 They were ca4tured by Navy unitsC Navy counterintelligence interrogated them and on direct orders from the sea command at Bergen turned the men over to the 8D1 A discussion then arose between the higher leaders of the 8D to whom the interrogator had re4orted and the admiral in commandC this discussion led to the admiral?s decision that these men came under the 6uehrer order1 In this unusual case both the 8D man and the Abwehr officers who conducted the interrogation told their su4eriors that the ca4tured men in their o4inion should be treated as 4risoners of war but the admiral disregarding this advice decided they must be shot1 8ometimes it should be observed contrary decisions were made1 In one case in late :ctober (*// the :B- told the 8D and 8i4o that three men who had been ca4tured near Gerona had been im4ro4erly turned over to the 8D and were in fact genuine 4risoners of war1 The only event in the three cases that could be said to have occurred counter to Faeder?s orders or e<4ectations was the shooting of the saboteurs by the Navy firing s@uad at Bordeau<1 !verything else including the e<ecutions he had a44roved in 4rinci4leas he said he regarded the .ommando :rder as a legitimate re4risal1 The commanding admiral at Bordeau< Bachmann was dubious too about the Navy?s doing the 7illing1 :n the whole Faeder too7 the same view of international law as did the

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page_3#" #age )%+ chief officers and officials of the -estern Allies1 :n :ctober (0 (*)* at the start of the war he wrote a memorandum that stated: Military success can be most confidently e<4ected if we attac7 British sea-communications wherever they are accessible to us with the greatest ruthlessness 1 1 1 It is desirable to base all military measures ta7en on e<isting International 9awC however measures which are considered necessary from a military 4oint of view 4rovided a decisive success can be e<4ected from them will have to be carried out even if they are not covered by e<isting International 9aw1 In 4rinci4le therefore any means of warfare which is effective in brea7ing enemy resistance should be used on some legal conce4tion even if that entails the creation of a new code of naval warfare1 )$ :ut of conte<t these may sound li7e hard canting words but they match what .hurchill and the British and 6rench high commands said when they s4o7e of the need of de4riving Germany of 8wedish iron ore and on the other occasions when Norwegian neutrality was being discussed1 6urthermore Faeder?s words e<4ress the 4hiloso4hy behind what both sides did in the course of the war1 Faeder 4ut u4 some resistance to the NaHi attem4t to determine naval 4olicies in ideological matters1 As Goering said of himand Faeder remar7s with some 4ride in his memoirs that he made no secret of thishe went to church and he 4reserved church services in the Navy although the #arty Healots es4ecially Goebbels tried to hinder or get rid of them1 Ee was cautious howeverC in (*)+ he told a Navy 4astor that he was not there to wage 4olitical warfare against NaHism but to show himself a genuine disci4le of .hrist with all earnestness and without com4romise1 Through him too the Navy managed to retain The Naval Officer as Lea)er an) Teacher its old manual of indoctrination for officers written by Borvetten7a4itaen 8iegfried 8orge before the NaHis came to 4ower1 It was used until (*// when :Bmanaged to ma7e the Navy get rid of it because of its ??humanistic foundations1I)( Both Faeder and DoenitH had their only serious @uarrels with Eitler when the 6uehrer attac7ed the Navy1 Faeder?s attem4ts to resign came as a result of such @uarrels1 Eitler im4ugned Faeder?s 4rofessional ,udgment1 In (*)% the 6uehrer criticiHed the Navy?s 4lans for shi4building in general and for the Bismarck and the Tir2it0 in 4articular for their too wea7 armament and too low s4eed1 This together with Faeder?s builtin mistrust of Eitler was enough to cause him to leave the room where the 6uehrer was haranguing him in the 4resence of Beitel and to as7 for his demission1 Eitler cooled down as he often did when the mysteries of the Navy were concerned and as7ed Faeder to stay1 In December (*/& Eitler feverishly awaited a ma,or success as the big shi4s attac7ed a large Allied convoy going to Murmans7C but the commanding officer decided that continuing the action that had resulted in sin7ing two !nglish destroyers as well as damaging the German warshi4 A)miral Hi22er would be too 4recarious in the short northern day1 Ee ordered

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page_3## #age )%% the shi4s to return to their base and Faeder bac7ed u4 his decision1 Eitler was furious and berated Faeder for his 4olicies again in the 4resence of Beitel for a full hour until Faeder as7ed to see Eitler alone and told him he had to resign1 Nor did Eitler this time relent1 Although Faeder was nominally made Ins4ector of the Navy a 4ost in which he might have continued to e<ert some influence his services were never called on again e<ce4t for a few ceremonial occasions: he attended the funeral of Bing Boris of Bulgaria in 8ofia and later he 4resented a motor boat to Admiral Eorthy in Buda4est on behalf of the 6uehrer1 Eitler did not 4resent him with the usual oa7 leaves for his Bnight?s .ross on occasion of his retirement1 The 6uehrer had been thwarted in his high e<4ectations of a victory at sea in the dar7 days of the loss of the 8talingrad army and he turned ho4efully to DoenitH and the submarines1 Faeder never won the battle with Eitler on behalf of his shi4s1 In the early 4art of the war he attem4ted to e<4lain to a dubious 6uehrer that the big shi4s even in their harbors whether in 6rance or in Norwegian f,ords forced the Allies to 7ee4 large forces on handforces that would be freed if the German battleshi4s were scra44ed as Eitler wanted them to be1 Faeder e<4lained that the Allies had to detach their own battleshi4s for guarding convoys or 7ee4 them near the German coast for instant use in case a ma,or battle of surface craft should develo41 Britain could not ta7e the ris7 of the German heavy cruisers and battleshi4s brea7ing through thus leaving Allied merchant shi4s and the British coast un4rotected even for a short time1 Eitler was never fully convinced1 The loss of ma,or shi4sthe 6raf S2ee the Bismarckand the e<4erience during -orld -ar I =which the 6uehrer was determined not to re4eat> when the battleshi4s tied u4 for most of the war led Eitler to outbursts of fury against the Navy when anything went wrong on the high seas1 Inaction was wrong and so was any battle that was lost1 No serious moral issues came between Faeder and Eitler although Faeder regarded the attac7 on Fussia as a breach of the 8oviet-German nonaggression 4actC nor did he li7e the vulgar destructions of the (ristallnacht or the NaHi war on the churches1 None of these things however led to any 4rotests on his 4art1 These came only when the Navy was the ob,ect of attac71 Ee never thought of resistance1 The Foehm 4utsch and the 6ritsch affair left him 4erha4s saddened but he was unwilling to ta7e any countermeasures for his friend 6ritsch1 True after 6ritsch?s ac@uittal on the charges of homose<uality Faeder ostentatiously had the Navy salute his visit to the flagshi4 with a fifteen-gun salute1 :therwise the admiral was silent1 In his farewell tal7 to the conference of flag officers in mid-Danuary (*/) after his final @uarrel with Eitler he said: 6or the first time in this war the German 4eo4le are fortunate enough to meet their enemies with a united 4hiloso4hy by reason of an ideology which is 4redominant among the whole 4eo4le 1 1 1 I believe it is one of the highest tas7s of the officer cor4s to recogniHe these facts 1 1 1 and to a4-

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page_3#$ #age )%* 4reciate them as the sources of tremendous moral force 1 1 1 I as7 you all to ma7e every effort to occu4y yourselves still further and more searchmgly from a higher stand4oint with the Nationail 8ocialist ideology1 1 1 1 Today the life of the 2eo2le must de4end on these tas7s as 4rimarily on the totality of National 8ocialist ideas1 The nation 4ersonifies the ambition and substance of our whole life1 Its thousand-year-old tas7s and struggles reach to the Eeavens from which the influence of God governs all living creatures 1 1 1 National 8ocialism is what is held in common above all 7eenly desired 4ersonal convictions1 6rom it alone therefore can grow the uniformity of ideas in the officers? cor4s which is necessary to swee4 the nation and the services on toward the high aims which we wish to attain1 1 1 1 It is @uite obvious from the great common tas7 of educating the German to his new aim as indicated above that there must be a com4lete mutual trust in the relationshi4 to the #arty which can only e<ist if both sides have recogniHed their duty1 L Although this was a ceremonial tal7 and Eitler and the #arty would be sensitive to what he said the words were nevertheless in accord with Faeder?s conduct ever since Eitler too7 4ower1 National 8ocialism might have some regrettable sides but it was a means to an end and the end which was a unified Germany 4residing over a coo4erative and bloc7ade-4roof !uro4e could also be 4art of the Bingdom of Eeaven1 Faeder was not without civil courageC he did use his influence in a number of cases to hel4 Dews or 4art Dews whom he 7new and on behalf of #astor Niemoeller a former submarine officer1 9ate in the war too he intervened with Eimmler whose 4olice had ,ailed and tortured Faeder?s friend Dr1 :tto Gessler1 Gessler a former member of the 8#D and Feich Defense Minister had suggested some measures that might im4rove the failing civilian morale and because this sounded li7e criticism if not defeatism and because of Gessler?s 4olitical bac7ground he was arrested at the time of the attem4t on Eitler?s life along with hundreds of other men and women with sus4icious 4olitical 4asts1 Faeder at some ris7 to himself in those days of long 7nives got in touch with Eimmler and Eitler and tried to 4rotect Gessler1 6urthermore he saw Gessler after the former minister was released from 4rison and he even was able to 4rovide Gessler with a remodeled truc7 for traveling =Gessler was not allowed to use trains>1 But Faeder acce4ted the rest of NaHism faute )e mieu4 and he also acce4ted the golden #arty badge and on his si<ty-fifth birthday a 4resent of &0$ $$$ FM from the 6uehrer1 If he got not only his battleshi4s but the means of 4rotecting them from assaults of the amateurs including Eitler he could ma7e his tacit 4acts1 But he was never self-see7ing1 Eis lances were bro7en for the Navy not for himself1 L The final ??Address of the Naval 8u4reme .ommander Grossadmiral Dr1h1c1 Faeder at the conference of 6lag :fficers and .ommanding :fficers of the Navy at the 8u4reme .ommand Eead@uarters of the Navy Berlin Danuary (&(0 (*/)1I Grossadmiral Faeder had been given the title of Doctor of #hiloso4hy honoris causa by the .hristian-Albrechts "niversity in (*&' for his History of 6erman *ruiser !arfare in !orl) !ar . =/%* -#8 MIAGN>1

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page_3$0 #age )*$ Faeder was defended with great s7ill and devotion by his chief counsel -alter 8iemers a Eamburg lawyer he had not 7nown before1 The admiral characteristicallyfor he was convinced of his unblemished characterthought it an advantage that he and his lawyer had not met 4reviouslyC in this way 8iemers could start without 4re,udice1 8iemers obviously convinced the charges against his client were without substance called a succession of witnesses whose testimony on behalf of Faeder and the Navy was most informative and li7e DoenitH?s counsel1 :tto BranHbuehler he was a dignified and learned figure in that hostile courtroom1 Neither 8iemers nor BranHbuehler could get direct access to Allied orders such as those regarding Norway but they 4atched the story together from material BranHbuehler?s assistant Mec7el was able to get from well-dis4osed Americans and Britishers in 9ondon1 8iemers was also able to 4ut on the stand former 8#D Minister of the Interior Barl 8evering who could remind the court as a man who had bitterly o44osed Eitler how many 4rominent foreigners had dined with and 4raised the 6uehrer during the 4eriod Faeder was .ommander in .hief of the Navy1 Admiral !rich 8chulte-Moenting commanding admiral in 6rance was an e<cellent witness not only for Faeder but for the Navy as he e<4lained how a non-NaHi officer loo7ed on the trivial violations of Gersailles in the face of the need for defending the country1 A former state secretary in the foreign office 6reiherr von -eiHsaec7er who had been a member of the Fesistance and would soon be tried before another Nuremberg court testified on the secret treaty that had accom4anied the German-Fussian nonaggression treaty1 The Fussian 4rosecutor ob,ectedas he always didto any mention of this sensitive sub,ect1 ??-e are e<amining the crimes of the ma,or German criminals I Fuden7o said1 I-e are not investigating the foreign 4olicies of other states1I )& .losely read the defense successfully refuted the main charges or at least e<4lained them in such fashion as to 4lace Faeder as far as his military career was concerned in no worse light than his accusers1 It was true that he had served a criminal regime but he had never 7nown it as suchChe li7e DoenitH was busy with the war at sea1 Nothing for which he was res4onsibleneither waging submarine warfare while he was .ommander in .hief nor acce4ting the .ommando :rder as a re4risal and a means of combatting a new form of atrocious warfarewas essentially different from either the theory or the 4ractice of Allied naval commanders1 The counts on aggressive warfare were without substance1 As any naval officer would and must Faeder too7 orders analyHed the strategic situationwhether in Norway or on the high seasastutely and ob,ectively and he fought decently1 After Faeder was convicted and sentenced to life im4risonment =a sentence he begged the court to change to shooting> a Norwegian officer visited him in 84andau1 The officer filled with resentment against all Germans had to @uestion him in connection with the im4ending trials in Norway of alleged collaborators1 The following dialogue too7 4lace:

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page_3$1 #age )*( #!99!8TAD: ??Are you called FaederOI FA!D!F: I#lease who are youOI #!99!8TAD: I6irst 9ieutenant #ellestad1I FA!D!F: IIt would be more to the 4oint to have said so at first as is customary between soldiers1I #!99!8TAD: IBut you?re not a soldier any more1I FA!D!F: II?ve been an honorable soldierC I em4hasiHe with all decisiveness that you are not following the general usages1 I re4eat: don?t say Faeder to me1 :nly my su4eriors can do that1I #!99!8TAD: II?ve heard you1 I ought to and will call you Faeder and nothing else1I FA!D!F: IThen I won?t answer you1 -hat do you thin7 that you?re my su4eriorOI #!99!8TAD: I-hat do you thin7 reallyOI FA!D!F: II thin7 I?ll go right away1 I have no reason to s4ea7 to you1I #!99!8TAD: I;ou?ll sit here until we?re through with you1 -hat do you want and how do you want to be addressedOI FA!D!F: II want to be called Eerr Faeder1I #!99!8TAD: I-e 7now something about your countrymen and how we were addressed in Norway and you are being much more 4olitely addressed than many of your countrymen did MsicN or tal7ed to us1I FA!D!F: IThe Navy always treated the Norwegians decently and courteously 1 1 1 and the Norwegians recogniHed this1I #!99!8TAD: II thin7 too the Navy by and large behaved decently1I FA!D!F: IThen why are we @uarrelingO -ill you call me Eerr Faeder or notOI #!99!8TAD: II can call you 8ir1 That will 4robably satisfy you1I FA!D!F: I.ertainly you can?t call me u1I )) Faeder won his 4oint and had earned it1 They shaved his head after his conviction =he was over seventy then> and handcuffed him to an M# so that when he wrote a note to his visiting lawyer the soldier?s hand moved with his across the 4a4er1 Eis wife who had committed no crime that was ever identified was im4risoned by the Fussians until 8e4tember (*/*1 Not until March (*0$ could she visit her husband and then only for fifteen minutes every two months1 They tal7ed with a double-mesh wire between them under su4ervision of officers from the four nations that run 84andau and who often Faeder said interru4ted the conversation1 6rom his Berlin 4rison he could write one letter a month to his family1 The 4risoners were allowed no conversation with each other and until the summer of (*0/ they were forbidden to tal7 with one another during their wor7 whether they 4asted 4a4ers or did cleaning or wor7ed in the garden1 They were not even allowed to tal7 Faeder wrote with the 6rench 4rison 4riest although they were given careful and IcorrectI medical attention1 #ermission was denied him to attend burial services of his only son who died while Faeder was in 4rison1 Faeder was suddenly released when he was eighty years old1 Eaving no

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page_3$2 #age )*& in7ling of what was to come he was brought to a room where his civilian clothing was laid out and was told he could leave1 Faeder was released after indefatigable labors by -alter 8iemers his lawyer at Nuremberg1 8iemers could have wor7ed on the sym4athies of the British 6rench and Americans who were by now doubtful of the usefulness of 7ee4ing Faeder in 4rison1 It would have been easy to circulate a 4etition for clemency and mighty voices would have been heard on Faeder?s behalf1 But 8iemers wor7ed @uietly behind the scenes to convince the Fussians who are always the stumbling bloc7 at 84andau that no threat to world 4eace would come from the old man leaning on two canes1 Eis tactics were slow but successful and the Fussians agreed with their three former allies that he could be released from 4rison1 Faeder survived long enough to write his memoirs and to attend a few ceremonies including one with DoenitH on the occasion of dedication of the naval war memorial in -ilhelmshaven in (*0+1 There they were 4hotogra4hed DoenitH with his hand under Faeder?s arm unostentatiously hel4ing to 7ee4 him steady1 Both of them were free but with many memories of deeds done and undone1 Barl DoenitH Both the German admirals on trial at Nuremberg Barl DoenitH and !rich Faeder were charged with the gravest crimes that could be laid to seafaring men1 Not only were they accused of 4lotting to wage aggressive warfare and then having waged it =the latter was at least consonant with the 4rofession of arms> but they were charged with war crimes with the war crime of any naval officer: they had made no effort to rescue the survivors of tor4edoed shi4s but instead had ordered survivors shot as they sat or lay in boats or floated in the water1 In addition DoenitH and Faeder had sent to their deaths according to the 4rosecution hundreds of noncombatants including women and children who had been 4assengers on merchant shi4s1 Barl DoenitH who commanded the German submarines during -orld -ar II first as their immediate chief and then as .ommander in .hief of the Navy had determined "-boat strategy from the beginning of the war until the end1 Ee was 4rimarily a submarine officer so much so that his concentration on the "-boats rather than on the entire Navy and its over-all strategy led Faeder to recommend Admiral Folf .arls ahead of DoenitH as commander-in-chief in (*/)1 In addition DoenitH was one of the few convinced National 8ocialist officers in the German Navy1 :ver and over again he made ringing addresses with loud 4olitical overtones to the German sailors and to the nation 4raising ??the heaven-sent leadershi4I in the 4erson of the 6uehrer1 DoenitH not only never @uestioned the #arty 4olicies in any res4ect but ado4ted its basic usages and s4o7e of the Dews in tones used by Gauleiters1 Ee was com4letely devoted to Eitler1 I-e are worms com4ared with him I

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page_3$3 #age )*) he told a cheering crowd in Berlin in (*/) adding that Eitler foresaw everything and made no mis,udgments1 !ven at the end of the war DoenitH ordered the ubi@uitous 4ictures of Eitler ta7en down from 4ublic view only a full wee7 after the surrender1 DoenitH was the descendant of a long line of farmers who had lived in -est4halia for centuries and later moved to near Magdeburg1 In recent times members of the family left the land to become 4astors 4rofessors officers businessmen and industrialists and to one such the engineer !mil DoenitH and his wife Anna Barl DoenitH was born on 8e4tember (' (%*( in Berlin-Gruenau1 The boy attended the Fealgmnasium in -eimar and after getting his Abitur entered the training school of the Im4erial Navy on A4ril ( (*($1 In (*(& he was assigned to the light cruiser Breslau which at the start of -orld -ar I together with the battle cruiser 6oeben bro7e through the British Mediterranean fleet to the Dardanelles to ,oin the Tur7ish forces fighting against the Fussian fleet in the Blac7 8ea1 DoenitH remained in Near !astern waters until :ctober (*(' when he was ordered to the submarine fleet where he served first as watch officer of the &;F8 and then as commander of the &;:H1 In early :ctober (*(% DoenitH?s submarine was sun7 after he had tor4edoed a British shi4 in a convoy near MaltaC he was ta7en 4risoner and remained in a British 4risoner-of-war cam4 until Duly (*(*1 "4on his release he returned to active duty as commander of a tor4edo boatC in (*&) he was assigned to the staff of the tor4edo-boat ins4ectorate in Biel and after that to Navy head@uarters in Berlin1 In (*&+ he returned to sea duty as a navigation officer and in (*)$ was made chief of a destroyer flotilla1 6rom (*)$ to (*)/ he was head of the Admiralty staff division of the Eigh .ommand of the North 8ea and then was given command of the cruiser Em)en1 In (*)0 he was assigned the ,ob of rebuilding the German "-boat fleet which he commanded at the outbrea7 of the war1L As commander in chief of submarines DoenitH was a s7illful courageous and often chivalrous officer1 The increase in efficiency of communications and wea4ons since -orld -ar I had given certain advantages to the "-boats at the start of the war1 They could be sent to o4erate in 4ac7s in the good hunting grounds that had been discovered by air reconnaissance or by other submarinesC they could rendeHvous with surface and "-boat tan7ers that could 4rovide the life-giving fuel1 Toward the latter 4art of the war the faster engine and the snor7el enabled "-boats to cruise for wee7s at a time underwater at s4eeds high enough to enable them to overta7e convoys1 Their wea4ons were better too: the tor4edo that showed no wa7e that homed in on the sound of a 4ro4eller and the magnetic mines that wrought considerable destruction in the early 4art of the war were formidable new devices L In the s4ring of (*(' DoenitH married Ingeborg -eber the daughter of General !rich -eber1 They had three children a daughter and two sons both of whom were 7illed in the war =the elder a lieutenant senior grade whose s4eed boat was sun7 in the !nglish .hannel in (*// the other a ,unior lieutenant who lost his life on a submarine>1 The daughter married an outstanding "boat commander Guenter Eessler1

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page_3$4 #age )*/ when they wor7ed 4ro4erly1 There were new wea4ons against the "-boats tooC radar could 4ic7 u4 the low silhouette of the submarine through fog and nightC de4th charges were im4roved and new tactics of dro44ing them were develo4edC and above all there was the air4lane that could s4ot the "-boats and bear down on them with such s4eed that they were often caught on or near the surface1 Although from the very start of the war DoenitH and his fellow officers of the submarine service chafed at the restrictions Eitler for 4olitical reasons 4laced on their activities they observed them on the whole but they argued against them as best they could1 It was all very well they said if high 4olicy re@uired them to let Allied shi4s sail by their tor4edo tubes but Germany could not win the war with such tactics1 A British shi4 carrying &$ $$$ troo4s had been allowed to run 4ast a submarine that was in a 4osition to tor4edo her because the commander in the night could not be sure it was not a 6rench shi4 and 6rance was to be 7e4t as @uiescent as 4ossible1 6rom the beginning DoenitH wanted an unrestricted submarine bloc7ade around the British Isles one that would allow the submarine commanders to sin7 on sight any shi4 found there1 Not until Danuary ( (*/$ however was Faeder able to 4ersuade Eitler to issue the orderC it was the 6uehrer?s strategy to 7ee4 hostilities in the )rNle )e guerre stage until he was ready to stri7e1 The German Admiralty?s orders in the early stages of the war were for immediate attac7 on both enemy and neutral shi4s that HigHagged were blac7ed out or radioed the 4osition of a submarine they sighted1 :ther shi4s were first to be visited and searched and their crews 4laced in a 4osition of safety as demanded by the Eague .onvention1L The sin7ing of the 4assenger shi4 Athenia a few days after the start of the war was an error for the commander of the &; F$ which sun7 her too7 her for a troo4 carrier1 8he was blac7ed out and following a HigHag courseand he had ,ust let a real troo4 carrier the uchess of Be)for) of &$ $$$ register tons go by on assum4tion that she was a 4assenger shi41 British 4assenger shi4s were used as needed as troo4 trans4orts and it was not always 4ossible for a submarine commander to tell which service they were in1 Eitler was concerned enough with neutral o4inion to order as a conse@uence of the sin7ing of the Athenia that no 4assenger shi4s even in convoys were to be sun71 )/ :n the whole in those early days the so-called legal forms of warfare were maintained at sea as they were on the land by the regular armed forces1 The British Admiralty in (*)% a year before the start of the war instructed all shi4s to wireless their 4osition on sighting a submarine thus L The (*)' 9ondon #rotocols which re4eated the 4rovisions of the Eague .onvention also re@uired that a merchant shi4 whether armed or not be visited and searchedC if it was found to be carrying contraband the crew had to be 4ut in a 4lace of safety before it was sun71 But it could be sun7 without visit and search if it was in a convoy defended itself or was a troo4 trans4ort1

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page_3$ #age )*0 ma7ing them as the Germans 4ointed out 4art of a sea-wide s4otting a44aratus1 After the start of the war British ca4tains followed these instructions almost without e<ce4tion !arly in 8e4tember (*)* a German submarine san7 the Blairlogie as it tried to esca4e while sending its 4osition and of course that of the submarine1 But along with routine sin7ings went acts of a 7ind that traditionally had distinguished war from mere mutual butchery1 -hen the British shi4 "anan Hea) was tor4edoed the submarine still on the surface was attac7ed by British 4lanes one of which it shot down1 A number of the German crew had been wounded as they manned the antiaircraft gun on the submarine?s dec7 and the British 4ilot of the downed 4lane was rescued by one of the men who had been hit in the attac7C des4ite a shell s4linter in his bac7 the German s4rang into the water after the 4ilot and brought him on board the "-boat1 The submarine then headed for Fey7,avi7 Iceland to hand over the 4ilot for medical care and only then continued what the Germans who even at sea considered the Army the dominant service called ??the march !ast1I -hen on 8e4tember 0 (*)* a German "boat san7 the British shi4 /oyal Sce2tre the submarine commander stood by while the survivors were transferred to the British steamer Bro,ning1 A month later another submarine which had sun7 the Gree7 steamer iamantin with its lifeboats u4 4ic7ed u4 the entire crew and brought them to safety1 )0 In another case in the early months of the war a German submarine sto44ed a British shi4 and ordered the crew into a lifeboat but when the commander of the submarine saw the 4oor state of the boat he told the s7i44er to reembar7 his crew of thirteen and ma7e full s4eed to the nearest British 4ort1 Ee also gave him a bottle of German gin and told him I;ou !nglish are no good sending a shi4 to sea with a boat li7e that1)' A month after the start of the war "-boat ca4tains des4ite considerable losses and damage suffered from 4lanes and armed shi4s were still directed to aid in the rescue of crews of sun7en shi4s if doing so did not endanger the submarine and not to attac7 4assenger shi4s without warning even if they were armed unless they were carrying troo4s1 8hortly after the orders be came more elastic and more difficult for a commander to follow: "-boats were not to tor4edo unarmed 4assenger shi4s not in convoy and with more than (&$ 4eo4le on board =this number the submarine commanders were told could be calculated by counting the number of lifeboatsC noting the number of dec7s and estimating the length of the 4romenade dec7s would assist their calculations>1)+ But the war hardened ra4idly1 The desire to sin7 more shi4s without unduly endangering the submarine which was as vulnerable to so-called defensive armament as to any other cou4led with British 4ractices soon forced a change in "-boat tactics1 Fe4orts almost immediately came to the German Admiralty that British shi4s were using radio to summon aid from the air and only a month after the start of the war came the order

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page_3$! #age )*' from -inston .hurchill to ram any submarine sighted1 ??Fam it or attac7 it with de4th charges if e@ui44ed to do so1I )% This followed the announcement made by .hurchill as 6irst 9ord of the Admiralty on 8e4tember &' (*)* that all British shi4s were to be armed1L Not only British shi4s attem4ted to ram the "-boatsC the Danish shi4 +en)ia tried the maneuver on 8e4tember )$ (*)* as did the 8wedish shi4 6un and both were sun71 DoenitH said at Nuremberg that the German commanders at that time were still ordered to conduct their o4erations in accord with the rules of international law1 They were 4rovided with a I4riHe dis7 I a mechanical 4ortable legal adviser with information about what they could do under the naval conventions and which su44lied the submarine commanders with the relevant 4aragra4hs of the 4riHe ordinances1 The 4riHe dis7 showed immediately whether for e<am4le a neutral shi4 with contraband should be sun7 or ca4tured or allowed to 4roceed on its voyage1)* It was standard 4ractice for "-boat ca4tains to give 4osition medical su44lies and water to the survivors of shi4s sun71 :n the whole the Germans reacted to what the British were doing1 A German order of 8e4tember / (*)* read: I:n the 6uehrer?s orders no hostile action is to be ta7en against 4assenger shi4s for the time being even when in convoy1I/$ Then the British began to shi4 troo4s to 6rance in such vessels and on :ctober &* (*)* a different order was issued: I#assenger liners in enemy convoys may be sub,ected to immediate unrestricted armed attac7 by "-boats1I/( As submarines were fired on increasingly by merchant vessels the German Admiralty ordered on November + (*)*: I"-boats are 4ermitted to attac7 immediately with all wea4ons at their command all 4assenger shi4s which can be identified with certainty as enemy shi4s and whose armament is detected or already 7nown1I/& !ven blac7ed-out 4assenger shi4s were not to be attac7edC the order 4ermitting their tor4edoing came only on 6ebruary &) (*/$1 The reasons for these orders are not difficult to see1 Eitler ho4ed to 7ee4 6rance and !ngland from full-scale 4artici4ation in a war he 4referred to fight by stages1 The Navy understood his 4ur4osesC the Naval :4erations 8taff echoing Faeder?s memorandum stated on :ctober (0 (*)*: It is still desirable to base military measures on the e<isting 4rinci4le of international lawC but military measures recogniHed as necessary must be ta7en if they seem li7ely to lead to decisive military successes even if they L The British orders issued in (*)% regarding cases of an enemy?s observing international law read: IAs the armament is solely for the 4ur4ose of self-defense it must only be used against an enemy who is clearly attem4ting to ca4ture or sin7 the merchant shi4 1 1 1 :nce it is clear that resistance will be necessary if ca4ture is to be averted fire should be o4ened immediately1I And against an enemy acting in defiance of international law the orders read: IIt will then be 4ermissible to o4en fire on an enemy vessel 1 1 1 even before she Mthe merchant shi4N has attac7ed 1 1 1I =N TIII 441 &0'0+>1 :f course in 4ractice the submarine commander could not distinguish whether a shi4 was firing on him in order to esca4e or because its ca4tain believed the submarine to be violating international law1

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page_3$" #age )*+ are not admitted by international law1 6or that reason the military wea4on which effectively brea7s the enemy?s 4owers of resistance must on 4rinci4le be given a legal base even if new rules of naval warfare have to be created for that 4ur4ose1 /) But modern war tends to deteriorate ra4idly because the ,ob however concealed by the traditional forms of chivalry is to 7ill and destroy not only the soldiers but the will of a country to continue to fight1 :ne submarine surfaced and the British shi4 it had tor4edoed immediately o4ened fire1 In another case the Germans com4lained that soldiers were hidden all over the dec7 of a seemingly 4eaceful merchantman which was ready for action and whose armament included de4th charges on the dec71 The German Navy behaved correctly as do most branches of the armed forces of any country when the cost is not too great1 DoenitH 4ointed out that the Navy always recogniHed the immunity of hos4ital shi4s although in the early 4art of the war the Germans themselves had none e<ce4t in the Baltic where the Geneva .onvention was not recogniHed between 8oviet Fussia and the Feich1 According to the testimony of a German officer during the trials not one hos4ital shi4 was sun7 by the Germans during -orld -ar II although a German hos4ital shi4 the Tuebingen was sun7 =doubtless in error> by the British in the Mediterranean1 :n A4ril ( (*/0 the American submarine Jueenfish san7 the Da4anese 4assenger shi4 A,a Maru of (( &0* tons1 The A,a Maru carrying Fed .ross su44lies to Allied 4risoners of war had been given a safe conduct by the Allies on her voyage to and from Malaya and the Dutch Northeast Indies1 :nly one man survived the sin7ing which was certainly due not to ruthlessness but to a regrettable error on the 4art of the American submarine commander1 Ee was court-martialed and found guilty of negligence1// DoenitH testified that it usually too7 the German Admiralty four wee7s to ado4t measures to counter what the British were doing1 But he also 7new that the British bloc7ade of the Feich ??had to be bro7en one way or another I and the submarine arm which he called Ia res4ectable firm I had a huge tas7 in fighting against an enemy who numerically was vastly su4erior1 After the fall of 6rance the German Admiralty on August (+ (*/$ ordered that any shi4 could be sun7 that came within the Hone the Americans had forbidden to their own vessels =an area of some +0$ $$$ sea miles stretching from the 6aeroes to Bordeau< and 0$$ miles west of the coast of Ireland>1 No nonsense now about visit and search and Faeder ordered that if a neutral shi4 were sun7 a mine rather than a submarine should be blamed whenever 4ossible1 This was meant to confuse the enemy as well as to 4lacate the neutrals who were warned in effect not to trade with Britain on 4ain of losing their shi4s and the lives of their crews1 This was a far cry from the conce4t of close bloc7ade which can only be enforced by a su4erior fleet within an area where it commands the e<its and entrances to harbors1 But the British were ,ust as far from former notions of inter-

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page_3$# #age )*% national law with their own measures of bloc7ade and their definitions of contraband1 Both sides regarded the other as lawless and both were right1 A nation as the German :4erations 8taff re4ort said will always ado4t measures that will lead to decisive results in a war1 The Feich started the war with a relatively small submarine fleet1 The Germans had fifty-si< "-boats of which DoenitH testified thirty had com4leted their tests by Duly (*)* and of these only fifteen were ca4able of navigating in the Atlantic1L By late (*/$ and early (*/( the Germans DoenitH said were down to eighteen high-seas "-boatsC and since only one-third of a submarine fleet can be in o4erational areas at a time =one-third is at home 4re4aring to go to sea the other third on its way to the battle stations> si< or sometimes only three submarines were in action against the enemy1 In other words (&$ to &/$ men were actively fighting the naval war against !ngland1 If the submarines? early success was out of all 4ro4ortion to their numbers so were their losses1 A higher 4ro4ortion of submarines was sun7 in the early months of the war than at any other time even when the Allied countermeasures were at their most efficient during the times of the great convoys to !ngland and to Fussia of (*/) and (*//1 This ratio was the result of the small number of submarines o4erating com4ared to later years1 Nevertheless in (*/) DoenitH was forced for some time to sus4end o4erations in the North Atlantic since losses of German "-boats were insu44ortable1 In December (*/& ('/ submarines were assigned to o4erations in the Atlantic but of these only about forty were at their battle stations at one time1 In addition there were twenty-four "-boats assigned to the Mediterranean twenty-one to the North 8ea and three to the Blac7 8ea1 The hardest convoy battle came in March (*/) when out of a single convoy the "-boats san7 twenty-one shi4s with (/( $$$ GFT and damaged one or two others1 But the radar and air coverage became too much for the "-boats and seven submarines were sun7 fighting against one convoy although they san7 00 +'( tons1 In another encounter the "-boats san7 almost )$ $$$ tons but three were lost and such attrition over a 4eriod of time was unbearable for the highly trained crews were not easily re4laceable nor with the strain on the German war effort were the shi4s1LL L This was DoenitH?s testimony at Nuremberg1 ;ears later in his boo7 7$ %ahre un) #$ Tage he said the number of "-boats was twenty-two =Barl DoenitH 7$ %ahre un) #$ Tage MBonn: Athenaeum-Geriag (*0%N 41 /*1 N TIII 441 &/* )$*>1 LL German losses in (*)* were (+1 0 4er cent in (*/$ ()1/ 4er cent in (*/( ((1/ 4er cent in (*/& %1* 4er cent1 As im4roved radar and air 4rotection were added to Allied defensive measures they rose to *1& 4er cent in the three-month 4eriod from Danuary to March1 (*/)1 In May of that year DoenitH had to send his "-boats out of the North Atlantic1 Des4ite every stratagem he could thin7 u4ordering for e<am4le submarines in the Bay of Biscay to stay on the surface and to shoot it out with British 4lanes or diving to avoid the fighthe could not seriously menace Allied convoys again until Dune (*//1 At that time the new and faster submarines were ready e@ui44ed with the snor7el that enabled them to ta7e in air and recharge their batteries while underwater1 The new 3footnote continue) on ne4t 2age5

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page_3$$ #age )** DoenitH and the German Navy from their 4oint of view were u4 against a virulent case of Anglo-8a<on 4seudomorality1 :n the one hand both !ngland and the "nited 8tates regarded with horror the sin7ing without warning of merchant shi4s carying noncombatants even though the shi4s were armed1 These allies were 4owerful in surface shi4s and could hold to the traditional moralities of sea warfare far better than a country li7e Germany that had to rely on new wea4ons1 In -orld -ar I Americans were moved to a high 4itch of indignation when the Lusitania was sun7 even though she was a British shi4 she was listed as an armed merchantman in the British Naval #oc7etboo7 of (*(/ and the most valuable single item of her cargo was ammunition1L :n the other hand first Britain and then both countries bloc7aded Germany in -orld -ar II as they had in -orld -ar I without regard to international convention on contraband1 In -orld -ar I they had tried to 7ee4 every commodity out of Germany including food and all nonmilitary su44lies and the civil 4o4ulation had suffered severely for eight months after the end of hostilities as the bloc7ade continued1 It was a way of 4utting 4ressure on the Germans to sign the 4eace treaty which was ratified by Germany on Duly ($ (*(*1 The bloc7ade was lifted two days later on the (&th1 The Allies also used 4recisely the same tactics against enemy shi44ing that they officially com4lained ofa circumstance the court at Nuremberg too7 into account1 It was the only time the tribunal 4ermitted the defense of tu @uo@ue1 The British would not recogniHe the Fed .ross mar7ings on German 4lanes see7ing to rescue fliers who had bailed out over the !nglish .hannel and the German Admiralty acce4ted their shooting at these 4lanes without 4rotest because no s4ecific international arrangement on the status of such 4lanes had ever been reached1 But the orders to ram and to attac7 with de4th charges and the decision to arm all vessels and to radio 4ositions 3footnote continue) from 2revious 2age5 "-boats could cruise for wee7s at a time without surfacingC they could run submerged from the North 8ea to .a4etown and bac7 and fire their tor4edoes from a de4th of fifty meters1 They had an underwater s4eed of eighteen miles 4er hour1 The snor7el could be installed on old submarines as well and DoenitH ordered that no "-boat be used after Dune ( without it1 6rom the time of the invasion of Normandy in Dune (*// to the end of August the Germans e@ui44ed thirty "-boats with the deviceC in this short 4eriod of the revival of submarine strength they san7 twelve shi4s of 0' %/0 tons five war vessels and four landing craft1 A wea4on that never came into action was the TTI a ty4e of "-boat that an American commander called ??so advanced no 4ractical defense e<isted against it1I By the end of the war ((* of these were built1 :ne was on its way to the .aribbean at the time of the surrender but none fired a tor4edo1 They were &0$ feet long with a low silhouette and since they could fight entirely underwater were undetectable by radar1 They carried twenty tor4edoes on long 4atrols and twenty-three normally1 They could fire a second salvo within five minutes of the first1 Many of the features of these "-boats are still in use in the American Navy =9t1 .ommander A1 N1 Glennon "181N1 IThe -ea4on that .ame Too 9ate I in &.S. Naval .nstitute -rocee)ings Mar1 (*'( 441 %0*)>1 L The Lusitania had 0 /'% cases of ammunition on board / &$$ of which contained a total of ($ (2& tons of gun4owderfive 4ounds to the case =!dwin Borchard and -1 #1 9age Neutrality for the &nite) States MNew Eaven: ;ale "niversity #ress (*0+N>1

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page_400 #age /$$ when a "-boat was sighted made it im4rudent for a submarine to visit and search1 In Norway and on the high seas both the !nglish and the Americans could act in ways that seemed to the Germans clearly illegalC not only did the British mine Norwegian territorial waters and attac7 an unarmed German shi4 inside them but the commander of the British shi4 that breached Norway?s neutrality was 4resented with a citation and a medal1 The "nited 8tates which was technically at 4eace with Germany for a year and a half after the start of the war 4ermitted American warshi4s to shadow German submarines and to re4ort their 4ositions1 British shi4s were re4aired in American shi4yardsC fifty destroyers were turned over to !ngland in return for the lease of bases in British 4ossessions1 #resident Foosevelt DoenitH 4ointed out sent a mission of naval officers under command of an admiral to 9ondon to wor7 out means of coo4eration between the Anglo-8a<on navies1 In 4lace of the three-mile limit formerly internationally recogniHed as mar7ing a nation?s sovereignty Foosevelt im4osed a )$$-mile limit which included both American and .anadian waters within which no German submarine could enter1 If it did it was to be regarded as an enemy and if 4ossible destroyed1 :n A4ril (% (*/( Admiral Bing announced an American security Hone e<tending & )$$ nautical miles off the east coast to within +/$ sea miles of !uro4e thus including the AHores in the American security area and on Duly + (*/( the "nited 8tates too7 over the 4rotection of Iceland1 :n Dune &$ (*/$ the German submarine &;#$F sighted the battleshi4 "88 Te4as in a British bloc7ade Hone1 8ince the "-boat commander was uncertain whether or not it had been lend-leased to !ngland he attac7ed but the tor4edoes missed1 Eitler who for all his loathing of Foosevelt and the democracy he headed was an<ious to 7ee4 the "nited 8tates out of the war ordered that the 4erformance not be re4eated1 The -ar Diary of the Naval :4erations 8taff for March 0 (*/$ stated: -ith reference to the conduct of economic warfare orders are given to the Naval 6orces that "8 shi4s are not to be sto44ed seiHed or sun71 The reason is the assurance given by the .ommander in .hief to the American Naval AttachJ whom he received on &$ 6ebruary that German submarines had orders not to sto4 any American shi4s whatsoever1 All 4ossibility of difficulties arising between the "8A and Germany as a result of economic warfare are thereby to be eliminated from the start1 /0 The American neutral Hone of )$$ miles off the coast was recogniHed in a directive of the German Admiralty of A4ril / (*/(1 :n 8e4tember / (*/( the &;:?# was attac7ed with two de4th charges and in return fired two tor4edoes at an un7nown destroyer that turned out to be the "88 6reer1 The submarine commander discovered only the day after the attac7 that the destroyer was American1 Des4ite the facts Foosevelt announced that the German attac7 on the 6reer had been un4rovo7ed and

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page_401 #age /$( denounced the 4iracy of the "-boat1 American warshi4s sailed with British convoys and two of the destroyers ta7ing 4art in these actions the (earney and the /euben %ames were struc7 by tor4edoes1L :n 8e4tember (0 (*/( the American 8ecretary of the Navy ordered American naval vessels to sin7 any German shi4 attac7ing Allied commerce whether surface or underwater craft1 /' The American Navy according to Admiral Bing too7 a realistic view of all this1 It regarded attac7s of the submarines as understandable under the circumstances and not as an aggression against the "nited 8tates but this was far from true of the administration1 Foosevelt used the incidents to move the "nited 8tates as close to war as he could without a vote of .ongress1 Ee declared an unlimited national emergency something never 7nown in American history before and he ordered American warshi4s to shoot first on sighting any German submarine1 German "-boats were unleashed against American shi4s only on December * (*/( after the declaration of war and they caused heavy losses off the American coast1 The region between .a4e Eatteras and south of 6lorida for a time saw some cons4icuous submarine successesthe coastal 4orts were lighted and even in the relatively shallow waters only eight to ten meters dee4 the submarines found targets for their tor4edoes1 These sin7ings must have been balm to the 6uehrer?s ego for it was not li7e him to suffer aggressions without re4lying a hundredfold if he could and his restraint with regard to American 4rovocations es4ecially after he threw his armies against the 8oviet "nion in Dune (*/( was owing solely to a desire to 7ee4 the "nited 8tates out of the war as long as 4ossible1 German success in the use of submarines was regarded with admiration by their allies in Italy and Da4an but neither country imitated the tactics successfully although the Da4anese submarine command as7ed for German instructors and German liaison officers ,ourneyed to To7yo1 The strategy of the two navies as of the armed forces in general was never coordinated1 The Da4anese went their own way and the Germans theirs1 The Italians however res4onding to a German re@uest on Duly &/ (*/$ ,oined the Germans in the Atlantic sending twenty-two submarines to Bordeau<1 DoenitH declared that they were most coo4erative but their training was sim4ly not u4 to the ,ob before them1 The Atlantic was an alien sea to the Italians and their re4orts of where they were and what shi44ing they s4otted were inaccurate1 DoenitH stationed the Italian submarines where they would be least threatened from the air but they maneuvered inefficiently when they came to attac7 or they failed to attac7 or they came on the scene too late1 The Italians had been trained to wait for shi4s to cross their 4aths1 Individual L The /euben %ames was one of five destroyers escorting a fast convoyC after she was tor4edoed her de4th charges a44arently e<4loded and casualties were heavy1 :ut of a crew of ('$ only /0 survived1 The (earney also suffered heavy losses1 =8amuel !liot Morison The Battle of the Atlantic MBoston: 9ittle Brown and .om4any (*0$NC 9anger and Gleason The &n)eclare) !ar MNew ;or7: Ear4er and Fow #ublishers (*0)N>1

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page_402 #age /$& commanders attac7ing shi4s not in convoy often showed great daring and initiative1 The tactics against convoys however were something else again1 A total of only twenty tons of shi44ing a day for each "-boat was sun7 by Italian submarines in &/) sea days1 The Germans in )+% sea days san7 in the same area /0) (** GFT or ( ((0 tons 4er shi4 day1 Moreover as DoenitH 4ointed out the Germans did not have the benefit of the years of training the Italians had for submarines were forbidden the -eimar Fe4ublic1 8ome failures of the Italian submarine warfare were due to technical deficienciesC the submarines had no ventilator mast as 4art of the conning tower so when traveling on the surface they had to sail with the tower o4en which was im4ossible in the heavy seas of the Atlantic though 4erfectly comfortable in the Mediterranean1 8uch defects could be re4aired but with few e<ce4tions the Italian war effort at sea as on land was without enthusiasm or indeed much if any desire to fight1 The war was never 4o4ular in Italy nor were the NaHis1 The Germans with inade@uate forces for the main theater of naval war in the Atlantic disli7ed diverting submarines to the Mediterranean but with the mounting and eventually catastro4hic losses of A<is shi4s su44lying the North African Italo-German armies the Admiralty was forced to send "-boats to these shallow dangerous waters1 There occurred one of the few atrocities committed by German submarines the basis of one of the chief charges against DoenitH at Nuremberg1 The most serious charge leveled against DoenitH was his alleged violation of the customs and usages of war1 Ee issued the so-called Laconia :rder in which he declared that the rescue of shi4wrec7ed survivors after a sin7ing was contrary to the most 4rimitive re@uirements of self-4reservation1 In tal7s to submarine crews he also allegedly issued most ambiguous verbal orders =for which one German submarine commander was later e<ecuted after a trial by a British court> that seemed to demand that a submarine ca4tain shoot the crews of tor4edoed enemy shi4s1 The .ommando :rder affected DoenitH only tangentially since when it was issued he was in charge of "-boats which had nothing to do with either the ca4ture or the later treatment of saboteurs and when he became .ommander in .hief it was already in force1 :tto BranHbuehler a ca4tain in the German Navy and one of the ablest lawyers on either side at Nuremberg made a brilliant defense1 Ee cited testimony from Allied as well as German sources telling of DoenitH?s chivalryC shi4wrec7ed crews on his order had been given food and rumC an American ca4tain had than7ed the Germans for treatment accorded him and his crewC Allied and neutral shi4s had been given medical assistanceC a submarine commander had hel4ed to right ca4siHed lifeboats des4ite the danger to his "boat from attac7 by air4lanes1 The defense also cited DoenitH?s messages before 8e4tember (*/& of a44roval for the rescue of survivors of a sin7ing =in one instance si< enemy survivors were ta7en on board a sub-

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page_403 #age /$) marine the &;#$: where they had s4ent two wee7s after their 4lane had been shot down in August (*/(>1 :ne of the turning 4oints of the submarine cam4aign and of treatment of survivors of tor4edoed shi4s came with the sin7ing of the British 4assenger shi4 Laconia an event that gave rise to a grave charge against DoenitH1 The Laconia of (* *'0 tons was tor4edoed in the mid8outh Atlantic between the -est African coast and BraHil on 8e4tember (& (*/&1 8he carried & +)& 4assengers and crew including some ( %$$ Italian 4risoners of war being trans4orted to !ngland from North Africa where they had been ca4tured1 The Laconia was a legitimate target for a "-boat1 8he mounted two /1+-inch naval guns of Da4anese manufacture from -orld -ar I si< three-inch antiaircraft guns si< (10-inch guns four ra4id-firing Bofors guns and two grou4s of two-inch roc7etsmore than was needed to sin7 a submarine1 6urther on 4revious voyages she had served as a troo4 shi41 This time in addition to the crew of /') men there were &%' British military men %$ civilian 4assengers including women and children =mostly returning home from 8ueH or the British colonies> the Italian 4risoners and ($) #oles a com4any from a division formed in A4ril (*/& in Teheran1 They were now acting as ,ailors for the Italians on board1 The weather was clear the sea calm and the Laconia san7 slowly enough for everyone e<ce4t the Italian 4risoners of war to get off the shi41 The ma,ority of the Italians who had been loc7ed u4 in the hold were caught there but some 0$$ managed to brea7 out having fought off their #olish guards and most of them got off the shi41 Because of the LaconiaAs list many of the lifeboats and rafts could not be lowered1 After the shi4 went down Ba4itaenleutnant -erner Eartenstein the commander of the &;7?: who had sun7 her saw immediately that hundreds of the survivors would 4erish in the waters infested with shar7 and barracuda unless emergency rescue measures could be ta7en1 Ee heard calls for hel4 in Italian and discovered to his dismay that a large number of Italian 4risoners of war had been on board1 Ee wirelessed DoenitH: ??8un7 1 1 1 Britisher Laconia 1 1 1 unfortunately with (0$$ Mactually (%$$N Italian war 4risoners1 "4 to now *$ fished out1 #lease instruct1I DoenitH des4ite the standing rule of all navies that waging war ta7es 4recedence over rescuing detached two submarines the &;?$: and the &;?$I underway to missions in the area off 6reetown to ta7e 4art in the rescue o4eration and re@uested the Italian commandant stationed at Bordeau< to send the Italian submarine *a22ellini which was o4erating in the area1L The Gichy Government was also as7ed to send surface shi4s from Da7ar1 L DoenitH also ordered a third "-boat the &;9?8 to the rescue scene1 8he was a su44ly shi4 without tor4edo tubes and was too far away its commander thought to be able to reach the survivors at the time the other "-boats would arrive1 Ee also had to s4are fuel so he could su44ly the submarines of this so-called #olar Bear Grou41 Ee accordingly decided not to attem4t to ta7e 4art in the o4erationthe 7ind of reasonable disobedience of orders 4ermitted in Navy 4ractice1

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page_404 #age /$/ Eartenstein with DoenitH?s 4ermission sent a radio message in !nglish en clair guaranteeing the safety of any Allied vessel that would aid in the rescue 4roviding it did not attac7 his "-boat1 The &;7?: too7 &'$ survivors on board rescuing friend and foe im4artiallyC half of them were transferred to the &;?$: when it came a day later1 The &;?$I arriving soon after 4ic7ed u4 (0+ others from the water and overfilled lifeboats ma7ing its dec7s too crowded1 The three submarines each too7 a row of lifeboats in tow the &;7?: flying a large Fed .ross flag four meters s@uare to identify the rescue wor71 But a four-motor American 9iberator bomber s4otted the &;7?: flew over the scene and after circling the submarines and the lifeboats went away1 -hen it returned a half hour later it carried out five bombing attac7s on the submarine from a height of eighty meters des4ite a radio message from Eartenstein that he had !nglish on board and signals from an FA6 officer in a lifeboat using an Aldis lam41 :ne bomb struc7 a lifeboat the &;7?: was towing a near hit ca4siHed anotherC there were 7illed and wounded and the submarine was damaged by a bomb hitting amidshi4s directly under the control room1 The 4lane flying at a low level on its first bombing run over the submarine was an easy target for the &;7?:?s antiaircraft gun but Eartenstein forbade its being used although he cursed his decision as the 4lane?s last two bombs were aimed at his shi41 Ee wirelessed to DoenitH: ??Both 4erisco4es are at 4resent out of order1 Brea7ing off rescueC all off board 4utting out toward west will re4ort1I The survivors were 4ut bac7 into the water near lifeboats that could ta7e them on board and Eartenstein had to use what he called Imild forceI to get some of the terrified Italians to leave his shi41 The Italians thin and half na7ed were in 4oor 4hysical sha4e1 They had been 4ut on rations of bread and water for days for having violated the no-smo7ing rule in the hold of the Laconia and for having tried to brea7 into the shi4?s storeroom1 But Eartenstein had to 4ut them off his shi4C he then was able to ma7e emergency re4airs to the &;7?: and he remained on the scene1 DoenitH had to ma7e a soulsearching decision1 Eitler got co4ies of the e<change of messages with the submarine commanders1 The 6uehrer had doubtless only a44roved the rescue o4eration in the first 4lace because of its mollifying effect on German-Italian relations but if one of the "-boats should be badly damaged or sun7 DoenitH would have to ta7e full res4onsibility for the loss of German lives1 At the beginning of the o4eration Admiral Burt 6ric7e tele4honing DoenitH in his #aris head@uarters from Berlin told him IThe 6uehrer has been informed of the Laconia affair1 Ee is dis4leased and as7s you urgently if you continue the rescue o4erations not to ta7e any ris7s with the "-boats 1 1 1 no ris7s at all 1 1 1I /+ Many of DoenitH?s own staff o44osed continuing the o4eration after the bombing of the &; 7?: but he re4lied II can?t sim4ly 4ut these 4eo4le in the water1 I will go on as before1I/% DoenitH ordered only Eartenstein to brea7 off his rescue o4erationsC

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page_40 #age /$0 "-boat commanders -uerdemann and 8chacht in the &;?$: and &;?$I carrying survivors continued toward the rendeHvous with the 6rench shi4s from Da7ar1 DoenitH signaled Eartenstein: ??8to4 rescue1 .hec7 fuel tor4edoes su44lies and e@ui4ment then re4ort1I This message was followed by a signal to the other submarines: IThe Tommy is a swine the submarine?s safety must in no circumstances be ris7ed even if rescue o4erations have to be sto44ed1 Femember that 4rotection of submarines by enemy is com4letely ruled out1 8chacht and -uerdemann give your 4ositions1I /* 8chacht re4lied that he had on board one British officer si<teen children and fifteen women and was towing seven boats with ))$ survivors in them1 -uerdemann had (/& Italians on board and nine women and children1 :n the (+th the &;?$: with its (0( survivors was bombed by a sea4lane1 Three bombs detonated near her but she had dived in time reached a de4th of si<ty meters and was undamaged1 DoenitH sent another order telling the two "-boat commanders that only Italians were to be 7e4t on board1 8chacht 4ut his British 4assengers in lifeboats with the e<ce4tion of two officers he 7e4t as 4risoners1L Ee then made off for the rendeHvous where he transferred the Italians and gave the 6rench shi4s the 4osition of the survivors1 -uerdemann delivered all his 4assengers to the 6rench sloo4 Annamite which had been sent to aid the rescue1 The Gichy Government too had a hard decision to ma7e since sending shi4s to rendeHvous with German submarines could easily have un4leasant conse@uences should the 6rench shi4s be sighted by the British1 Nevertheless three 6rench shi4s the sloo4s Annamite and umont; )A&rville and the cruiser 6loire were dis4atched to the scene and carried out their assignment without untoward incidents although the ca4tain of the 6loire had some nervous moments when a 8underland a44roached his shi41 Ee had to decide whether to shoot at it when it came close to bombing range and was getting ready to give the order when it turned away1 The rescue o4eration as such was a success: A total of ($)* men women and children were brought on board the 6loire /& on the Annamite1 The others were brought in by the submarines and lifeboats1 The *a22ellini rescued +$ or so some of whom died of shar7 bites and e<haustionC the rest were transferred to the umont;)A&rville 7ee4ing eight on board =two !nglishmen and si< Italians>1 :f ($) #oles +) were rescued as were /0$ Italians out of the ( %$$ a few of whom died almost immediately1 #ictures were ta7en of the survivors as they landed in Gibraltar and .asablancaC the German submarine ca4tains were given testimonials of gratitudethey had turned over their officers? @uarters to the women and children and had even 4rovided them cold cream eau de cologne and the creature comforts they could su44ly1 The submarines returned with their e<hausted crews to their home 4ort1 L Because he had orders to 7ee4 two British officers 4risoner he too7 one man from a lifeboat1

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page_40! #age /$' But on 8e4tember (+ and again on the &$th as a result of the bombing of the &;7?: DoenitH sent a signal to the commanders of all "-boats telling them they were under no circumstances to attem4t to rescue or to give aid to lifeboats1 8ubmarine commanders were too 4rone to ta7e a chance on air attac7sC after the Laconia e<4erience he felt he must give them no choice1 Ee therefore issued the Laconia :rder which read: (> No attem4t of any 7ind must be made at rescuing members of shi4s sun7 and this includes 4ic7ing u4 4ersons in the water and 4utting them in lifeboats righting ca4siHed lifeboats and handing over food and water1 Fescue runs counter to the most 4rimitive demands of warfare for the destruction of enemy shi4s and crews1 &> :rders on bringing along ca4tains and chief engineers remain in force1 )> 8hi4wrec7ed only to be rescued in case their information is im4ortant for the boat1 /> Be hard remember that the enemy has no regard for women and children when he bombs German cities1 0$ DoenitH said at Nuremberg that two men on his staff .a4tain Guenther Eessler and Admiral !berhard Godt had o44osed sending the order1 Godt denied this at Nuremberg but it seems unli7ely that DoenitH would have so testified if they had not in fact o44osed sending it1 It was clearly a hard order to send and to obey1 The lesson for DoenitH and the German Navy seemed clear1 :bviously no rescue o4eration could be underta7en without grave danger to the submarines and their crews1 That the "boats had been dis4atched to save Italians is 4lain from the radio e<change1 -hen 8chacht commanding the &;?$I re4orted that he had ta7en women and children on board and given warm food and drin7 to 4eo4le in the lifeboats the German submarine command had wirelessed bac7: ??;our conduct was wrong1 Boat dis4atched to aid the Italian allies and not for the rescue of !nglish and #oles1I0( Nevertheless the "-boat crews had made no distinction in the nationality of the 4eo4le they 4ic7ed u41 DoenitH?s willingness to detach submarines from their battle stations for a rescue o4eration and Eitler?s tacit a44roval can only be attributed to the 4resence of the Italians on board the Laconia but once the rescue was started the Italians were given no 4riority1 The rescue was a s4ectacular one made under great 4sychological stress and DoenitH was its chief organiHer10& The mystery of what had ha44ened on the Allied side has not to this date been fully cleared u41 No Anglo-American rescue shi4s ever a44eared1 The British and Americans 7new immediately of the sin7ing1 Not only had the 9iberator re4orted it but the Laconia before she went down had flashed along with her 4osition an 888 that she was being attac7ed by a "-boat and Eartenstein re4eatedly radioed his call for hel4 in !nglish1 It is 7nown that the messages were received by the British Admiralty and that Allied shi4s

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page_40" #age /$+ were in the neighborhood1 A later British re4ort said that rescue attem4ts were 4lanned and that the 9iberator attac7 had ta7en 4lace because of a misunderstanding1L 0) In the summer of (*') in an interview with a re4orter from the 9ondon Sun)ay E42ress the American officer who was res4onsible for the decision to attac7 the &;7?: Fobert .1 Fichardson now a brigadier general attached to the NAT: forces said he had done the right thing1 Fichardson was in command of the (st .om4osite 8@uadron "181 Army Air 6orce at Ascension Island which was a secret base1 Eis British liaison officer re4orted to him that the Laconia had been sun7 and as7ed Fichardson if he could send hel41 Two British freighters were in the neighborhood but they needed air reconnaissance to s4ot survivors1 Fichardson dis4atched the 9iberator whose ca4tain first thought the submarine was British although it did not answer his recognition signals1 Fichardson and his staff however thought a German "-boat was rescuing German and Italian 4risoners of war who the British liaison officer had told him were on board1 Fichardson therefore ordered the bombings he told his interviewer without 7nowing British were among the survivors1 ??ButI he added Ieven if we had it would have made no difference1 I would have given the order anyway1I Fichardson thought the safety of the two freighters was his 4rimary res4onsibility1 Ee said IIt was a sim4le wartime decision and I have not thought much about it since 1 1 1 It was wartime and the submarine had to be destroyed1 The ma,or consideration was not to lose two Allied shi4s1I0/ 8ubmarine war admittedly raised difficult @uestions1 Eitler considered the 4ossibility of ordering the destruction of crews of tor4edoed Allied shi4s su44lying both the air war against the Feich and the Fussian armies1 If shi4s and their cargoes were sun7 it became increasingly clear American 4roduction could re4lace themC but crews needed a long 4eriod of training and if they could be 7illed the submarine war would be more effective1 DoenitH wrote to Eitler on May (/ (*/& as7ing for 4riorities to im4rove the tor4edoes so the shi4s they struc7 would sin7 more ra4idly thus 4reventing the rescue of crews1 Ee also e<4ressly 4ointed out to the 6uehrer that it was not 4ossible to attac7 the crews of merchant vessels once they were in the lifeboatsC the only way to 4revent them from sailing again was to use more efficient @uic7er-acting tor4edoes that would not give them a chance to get off the shi4C anything else DoenitH refused to consider1 The Laconia :rder was a harsh one but worse evidence was to be cited against DoenitH in connection with the charges against the commander of a submarine o4erating in the Mediterranean in late (*/&1 The incident that brought DoenitH closest to the gallows concerned the &;H?# commanded by an ine<4erienced man Ba4itaenleutnant EeinH !c71 !c7 fired on the crew of L The official British naval historian .a4tain 81 -1 Fos7ill wrote on 6ebruary ( (*0* in The Sun)ay Times: IIn this affair DoenitH and his crews were doubtless largely in the right1I

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page_40# #age /$% a shi4 he had sun7 in the Mediterranean and at his trial he made a half-hearted defense that directly involved DoenitH 4leading that he had acted under orders1 Eis testimony was corroborated by :berleutnant #eter Dosef Eeisig who swore that he had heard DoenitH in either 8e4tember or :ctober (*/& in the course of instructions on how to conduct "-boat warfare tell officers in training not only that they should ma7e rescue im4ossible but that 4riority of attac7 should be against rescue shi4s1 00 DoenitH according to Eeisig re4eated much of what the 6uehrer had said to the visiting Da4anese envoy Eiroshi :shima a little while before that the "nited 8tates had enormous construction ca4acity but that crews were the bottlenec7 of the Allied su44ly line1 The "nited 8tates might 4roduce a million tons of shi44ing a month but without crews the shi4s would be useless1 Eeisig?s testimony was corroborated by that of Borvetten7a4itaen Barl EeinH Moehle who had ta7en 4art in seventeen missions as commander of a submarine and later had briefed "-boat ca4tains before they left harbor10' DoenitH?s orders Moehle testified were that both shi4s and their crews should be the ob,ect of attac71 Moehle not only cited the Laconia :rder but said he had been told by members of the Admiralty staff that a raft a "-boat had sighted in the Bay of Biscay carrying five survivors should have been destroyed1 Ee testified further that orders were given that no events contravening international law were to be written u4 in the logs1 Moehle s4o7e with considerable authority for he was the senior officer of the 0th "-boat 6lotilla1 Eis and Eeisig?s testimony was shar4ly contradicted not only by DoenitH but by a long list of other submarine officers who had received the Laconia :rder and heard DoenitH?s verbal instructions1 None of them had thought they were being encouraged to shoot at shi4wrec7ed crews1 As for the men on the raft in the Bay of Biscay DoenitH maintained that he had re4rimanded the "-boat ca4tain for the o44osite reasonC he had told him the men should have been ta7en aboard the submarine for the information they might give and to ma7e sure they would not return to duty1L0+ A number of the orders DoenitH issued however did sound ambiguous1 In (*/$ as losses of "-boats mounted under the air attac7 and de4th charges of the British defense he told the submarine crews ??-eather conditions and distance from the coast are not to be ta7en into account1 #ay attention only to your own shi4 and to the ne<t attac71 -e must be hard in this war1I0% By (*/) the gloves were off1 :n :ctober + of that year he sent out an order: IA so-called rescue shi4 is generally attached to every convoy 1 1 1 e@ui44ed with 4lanes large motor boats and heavily armed 1 1 1 so that they are often called "-boat tra4s by the commanders1I Then came the fateful sentence: L DoenitH could show that in (*/) he had admonished a "-boat ca4tain for not having ta7en on board survivors from an !nglish shi4 who were floating on a raft because he might have gotten im4ortant information from them1 That would be the only reason for rescuing them1

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page_40$ #age /$* ??In view of the desired destruction of shi4s? crews their sin7ing is of great value1I 0* Another charge made against him that German submarines had deliberately fired on the crews of shi4s DoenitH could meet with reasonable e<4lanations1 A survivor of the Noreen Mary said that the shi4 had been swe4t by machine-gun fire from the attac7ing "-boat which had also fired on the lifeboats1 A witness from the Antonica which had been sun7 at night after a surface attac7 lasting less than twenty minutes said the AntonicaAs lifeboats too had been fired on1 But DoenitH 4ointed out that shi4wrec7ed crews including Germans often had the im4ression they were being directly fired at when a submarine was attem4ting to sin7 a shi4 by gunfire and that the accuracy of the testimony was dubious1 The witness from the Noreen Mary swore he saw a swasti7a 4ainted on the hull of the "-boat but DoenitH 4ointed out that no submarine ever had gone to sea decorated with such a device1 As for the Antonica had the submarine commander wanted to 7ill the crew he would not have bro7en off the action after the twenty minutes it too7 to sin7 the shi41 The case of Ba4itaenleutnant !c7 who commanded the &;H?# was different1 !c7 san7 the Gree7 tram4 steamer -eleus in the Mediterranean on the night of March ()2(/ (*//1 The -eleus a siHable shi4 of % %)) tons was struc7 by two tor4edoes and went down in about three minutes1 A doHen or so of the crew of thirty-five managed to get on life rafts and the &;H?# attac7ed them with machine guns and hand grenades1 9ieutenant !c7 was twenty-nine years old a volunteer for the submarine service and this was his first cruise in command of a "-boat1 Ee sailed out of Biel on Danuary (% (*// moved south along the Atlantic coast and then 4roceeded to the 4erilous shoal waters of the Mediterranean1 6our sister shi4s of the &;H?# all new and commanded by e<4erienced officers had been sun7 in the Mediterranean and !c7 was nervous1 The Mediterranean area was 7nown as a graveyard for "-boats and !c7 could see immediately why it had the re4utation1 The &;H?# had to run submerged after it sighted the -eleus because of the danger from the air ="-boats in the Mediterranean usually ran submerged by day and surfaced only by night>1 Eis 4osition was in range of Allied land-based aircraft and two 4lanes were sighted ,ust before his tor4edo attac7 was made1 -hen he surfaced after the tor4edoing !c7 ordered the shi4?s arms to be brought on dec7 he said because submarines were sometimes fired on after a shi4 went down1 Also he intended to sin7 the -eleus wrec7age because floating debris would show that submarines were o4erating in the vicinity1 Ee too7 two survivors on board for interrogation and after @uestioning them he 4ut them bac7 on their raft1 The submarine then moved away to a distance of about half a mile to get her machine guns ready as it turned out and when she slowly sailed bac7 she flashed her signal light to illuminate the targets1 Eand grenades were then thrown among the wrec7age which was also machine-gunned1 The firing

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page_410 #age /($ lasted for five hours and only three men all of them wounded survived in the shar7-infested waters1 The three were 4ic7ed u4 on A4ril &$ by a #ortuguese shi41 :ne other man lived on the raft for twenty-five days before he died of his wounds1 The "-boat itself was later beached in 8omaliland by !c7 after it had sun7 a trans4ort and then had been bombed by a British 4lane1 !c7?s defense was ??o4erational necessityI and the order to ta7e no survivors on board1 Eis crew too7 refuge in the same 4lea and in Isu4erior ordersI that had come from the ca4tain1 !c7 thought he said that the lives of his crew and the safety of his shi4 de4ended on his destroying any traces of wrec7age1 A 4lane seeing wrec7age would send out an alarm that in short order could result in the s4otting and sin7ing of a "-boat in those shallow waters1 !c7 therefore told his crew Iwith a heavy heartI that they must obliterate any signs of the sin7ing and to steel their resolve he reminded them of the German women and children at home suffering under the heavy Allied air attac7s1 Eis e<ecutive officer Eoffmann wanted to use the large )1+cm1 gun the submarine carried against the rafts which were set on hollow 4ontoons but the "-boat was too close for such a large wea4on to be aimed1 8ome difficulties occurred among the crew1 Both Eoffmann and the medical officer on board a man named -eiss4fennig volunteered to man the machine gun although regulations in the German Navy forbade a medical officer to shoot1 The engineer officer 9enH who fired the gun 4art of the time told !c7 he was o44osed to the whole o4eration1 Ee too7 over the machine gun however because he believed that the man who ordinarily would have done the ,ob a nineteen-year-old 4etty officer named -olfgang 8chwender had an illegitimate child and 9enH testified that he thought 8chwender unworthy of carrying out this assignment1 8chwender therefore shot only one burst at the targets before he was ordered to cease firing1 Although 9enH told !c7 flatly that he disagreed with his order to fire on the wrec7age the "boat ca4tain informed him that the shooting had to be carried out1 9enH then too7 the gun from 8chwender and fired he admitted at a human sha4e because if a survivor had to die he should be 7illed by someone li7e himself rather than by a man li7e 8chwender1 9ater his 4lace was ta7en by -eiss4fennig and then Eoffmann1 The submarine cruised among the wrec7age firing intermittently hand grenades were used as well as the machine guns and the "-boat even tried ramming but much of the debris including a buoy mar7ed -eleus remained afloat1 !c7?s trial too7 4lace while the Nuremberg 4roceedings were going on which undoubtedly inhibited his defense since he had a chance to save his own nec7 only by 4lacing res4onsibility on DoenitH1 The defense of su4erior orders was made without much conviction by one of !c7?s lawyers but !c7 himself refused to say he had been following DoenitH?s instructions1 Before his trial he was confronted with 9enH?s damning affidavit which told how the engineer officer had o44osed the order to sin7 the wrec7age and related how

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page_411 #age /(( !c7 had told him to go ahead with the shooting1 !c7 as7ed for 4ermission to s4ea7 to 9enH to find out whether he had made the statement voluntarily1 Ee was given an hour by the British authorities to ma7e u4 his mind whether he wanted to issue a statement in rebuttal but decided against ma7ing one e<ce4t to say on the sub,ect of su4erior orders that he had never been told to shoot at survivors1 Ee did not wish to comment further on the 9enH affidavit1 The decision to sin7 the wrec7age !c7 admitted was his own1 Ee said that he had seen no survivors on the rafts =this must have seemed unli7ely to the court since he had 4ut the two men interrogated bac7 on one> and that he had never intended the destruction of any human being1 Ee swore that no survivors were on the rafts when hand grenades were thrown1 The defense testimony was unconvincing1 -hy should 9enH have disagreed with the order to shoot at the wrec7age if it alone was to be destroyedO !c7half admitting his guiltsaid he did not thin7 the survivors could live in any caseC they could not be ta7en on board because of the Admiralty?s orders nor could they be given 4rovisions enough to last until they might get to land1 A -eleus survivor testified that a voice had cried out in !nglish from the submarine ??Bill them all1I But !c7 was sure no one had said that1 Ee admitted that he had been de4ressed after so many hours of shooting and that his crew had been dis4irited too which was why he had addressed them over the louds4ea7er and told them why they had to carry out such an assignment1 The #resident of the -eleus .ourt as7ed him why if he was concerned only with sin7ing the wrec7age he had such a heavy heart and why he had made the reference to the Allied bombing of German women and children if the crew were shooting only at rubber rafts1 !c7 re4eated that he had thought the survivors could not live in any case but he said he regretted the shooting1 !c7?s guilt was incontestable although his counsel tried to show that the "-boat commander thought he was obeying the orders handed down to him1 The defense cited the case of the British shi4 *aroline in which an American court in (%/$ held a man accused of murder not guilty because he had acted on su4erior orders of a duly constituted officer of Eis Ma,esty?s Government1 !c7?s one 4ossible use of the American court?s decision would have been to testify as did his witness Eeisig that DoenitH?s orders had not been clear to him or that they had in fact re@uired that he 7ill any survivors1 This !c7 refused to do although Eeisig by his testimony had o4ened the way for such a defense1 Eeisig was a close friend of the "-boat?s e<ecutive officer August EoffmannC they had discussed the case together and Eeisig convinced that DoenitH in any case would be convicted by the court at Nuremberg saw a chance to save Eoffmann1 In his unsuccessful attem4t to rescue his friend he 4laced DoenitH in mortal danger1L '$ L A witness for DoenitH at Nuremberg Admiral Gerhard -agner testified that Eeisig had told him while they were in the Nuremberg 4rison together that he had only wanted to save the lives of the young submarine officersC he had been told the evidence against DoenitH in any event was overwhelming =N TIII 41 /'$>1

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page_412 #age /(& But !c7 would go no further than to say he had wanted to destroy the wrec7age in accordance with the orders given him which is 4robably trueC the human lives !c7 thought had to be sacrificed1 :ne of the defense lawyers #rofessor -1 -egner a German e<4ert on international law who a44eared on behalf of all the defendants based his main defense on a legal doctrine acce4ted on the .ontinent: !c7 had found himself in a state of e<treme emergency a situation which the law describes as so overwhelming as to leave the 4er4etrator without a choice if he is to survive1 6or this argument he also used the case of the *aroline which while in American waters where insurgents against the .anadian Government were loading guns and ammunition had been attac7ed by a loyal .anadian contingent which boarded the shi4 and then cut it loose to dash itself to 4ieces over Niagara 6alls1 Two American lives were lost and a number of .anadians wounded as a result of the attac71 An American court in (%/$ acce4ted the 4lea that the 7illings had occurred legitimately because of su4erior orders and the nature of the emergency1 Also testifying for !c7 was Ba4itaenleutnant Adalbert 8chnee who said he himself had been on si<teen submarine 4atrols that he had warned !c7 before he sailed that his assignment was a difficult one and that losses in the Mediterranean area had been high1 In fact all the submarines of the ty4e that !c7 commanded had been sun71 8chnee testified too that in !c7?s 4lace he would have tried to destroy the wrec7age1 In answer to the court?s s7e4tical @uestion whether in any event oil 4atches would not have shown that a sin7ing had occurred 8chnee answered that oil 4atches could be attributed to the clearing of bilge by observing 4lanes but debris was clear evidence of a sin7ing1 It would not have been better 8chnee testified for !c7 to leave the site of the sin7ing because he could have made no more than (0$ miles in the course of a night?s sailing and could readily have been 4ic7ed u4 by Allied search 4lanes1 As for the use of machine guns 8chnee said they were the only wea4on that could be used under the circumstances because they are effective against flat targets1 Ee 4ointed out too that both !c7 and his crew were under great strain after the twomonth voyage from the Atlantic into the Mediterranean and while floating wrec7age is not im4ortant in the Atlantic where the submarine can get away it is of crucial im4ortance in shallow seas1 But the loyal 8chnee was forced by the 4rosecution to admit that !c7 must have lost his nerve and that he himself would not have acted as !c7 did had he been confronted with the same situation1 !c7 was only moderately well defended1 :ne of his counsel #rofessor -egner was given as were many of the Germans a44earing before Allied courts to flattering the con@uerorsin this case the British who were conducting the -eleus trial1 -egner confided to the court that his heart was bro7en when the war started and he was now e<hausted1 Ee s4o7e learnedly in defending !c7?s carrying out of su4erior orders of the doctrine that the 7ing the sovereign can do no wrong but the Dudge Advocate caught him u4 easily saying ??If you find any authority ,ustifying the 7illing of survivors of

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page_413 #age /() a sun7en shi4 when they are in the water will you try to come to it @uic7ly1?? '( -egner could only re4eat that he had to stay u4 all night to 4re4are the case and told the court that he regretted he had not been able to do better: II am tired because I had to do this during the night for you1I he said1 II was not u4 to my tas7 I am sorry to say but I ho4e I have not ta7en u4 your time without being able to hel4 you1I'& Three of the Germans were sentenced to deaththe men immediately res4onsible for the shootings: !c7 Eoffmann and -eiss4fennig1 9enH was sentenced to life im4risonment and 8chwender the unworthy one got fifteen years1') But these men had not involved DoenitH directly and he was aided in his defense by affidavits of former "-boat commanders who were being held in Allied 4rison cam4s declaring that they had never been told to attac7 enemy crews although they had been ordered not to endanger their shi4s and not to rescue anyone if that would endanger them1 :ne "-boat ca4tain Eans -itt said DoenitH had categorically refused to 4ermit attac7s on shi4wrec7ed crewswhich had been 4ro4osed as a re4risal when German survivors re4orted they had been fired on by British shi4s1'/ 8i<ty-seven "-boat commanders at the British 4risoner-of-war cam4 at 6eatherstone #ar7 declared under oath that DoenitH had never given them either oral or written orders to 7ill the survivors of shi4s they had sun71'0 The !c7 case was the only one during the entire war where a clear case occurred of a "-boat?s firing on the survivors of a tor4edoed shi4 and to this e<tent the so-called ambiguity of DoenitH?s orders cannot be easily sustained1 6or if he had told the ca4tains of submarines orally or in writing what Eeisig Moehle and conceivably !c7 had understood him to say many more such cases must have occurred1 The evidence not only from the affidavits of the ca4tured German submarine officers but in the conte<t of what DoenitH had said and written and of the 4erformance of hundreds of submarine commanders and their crews was in DoenitH?s favor1 Ee had certainly tried to 4revent his submarines and their crews from being unnecessarily im4eriled again as they had in the Laconia rescue and he had coldly diagnosed the bottlenec7 of the Allied war effort on the high seas as 4ersonnel rather than shi4s1 Ee wanted to cause as high losses among the enemy forces as he could inflict to accom4lish his aim of reducing the Allied war 4otential as far as 4ossible1 Demanding more efficient tor4edoes and refusing to ta7e survivors on "-boats was one thingC 7illing them another1 Moreover the tenor of the orders declaring the rescue of 4ersonnel to be undesirable conflicted in no way with the theory and 4ractice of what the Allies did in the course of the war although the Nuremberg court made it clear that it would hear no evidence of what the Allies had been doing1 The #resident of the .ourt said the tribunal would not 4ermit a @uestion to be as7ed about the treatment of German sabotage units1 I-e are not trying whether any other 4owers have committed breaches of international law or of crimes against humanity or war crimes but whether these defendants

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page_414 #age /(/ have ?? he declared when 9aternser tried to show what 4ractices on both sides actually were1 '' The defense urged that the German acts be ,udged in conte<tin light of the conduct of the entire war and the actions of the Allies1 Admiral Bernhard Fogge who had commanded the German au<iliary cruiser Atlantis in November (*/( testified that after the sin7ing of his shi4 and the su44ly shi4 -ython no attem4t was made by the British to rescue the /(/ crewmen1 They were eventually 4ic7ed u4 by four German "-boats later ,oined by four Italian submarines and brought bac7 0 $$$ miles from the -est African coast to Germany1 The British destroyer *ossack which violated Norwegian neutrality to ca4ture the unarmed German su44ly shi4 Altmark in Norwegian territorial waters and to release )$$ British 4risoners of war who were on the shi4 fired on the German sailors fleeing across the ice and water of the f,ord1 8i< of them had been 7illed three others were severely and five lightly wounded1 The British commander of the destroyer was congratulated by the Bing and the 6irst 9ord of the Admiralty -inston .hurchill awarded him the 8ervice .ross for heroism1 Nor was this the only occasion Germans charged that the British shot at and 7illed survivors in the water and in lifeboats1 The same thing allegedly ha44ened in the sin7ing of the German mineswee4er &lm on 8e4tember (/ (*/& and at Narvi7 where a British commandant defended the 7illing of German sailors esca4ing from a shi4 sun7 in the harbor with the statement: IThe usages of war 4ermit shooting at crews to 4revent their reaching shore and re,oining the enemy?s fighting forces1I'+ 6ew attem4ts were made by Allied submarines to rescue enemy survivors after their shi4s were sun7 and many instances occurred where German crews in lifeboats or rafts re4orted they were fired u4on by Allied 4lanes or shi4s1 DoenitH said he 7new of no case where an !nglish submarine had rescued German or Italian survivors of a convoy sun7 in the Mediterranean nor had there been any rescues by British submarines of survivors of German shi4s sun7 in Norwegian waters1 -hen Eitler late in the war 4ro4osed to DoenitH that the Feich denounce the Geneva .onvention in retaliation for the Allied attac7s on German cities DoenitH told him that the disadvantages of such a move would be greater than the advantages1 9i7e Dodl DoenitH thought it would be better to act in s4ecific instances without giving any advance notice and thus to Isave face1I'% Eere again what DoenitH meant was not clearC he claimed at Nuremberg he had wanted to 4revent German soldiers from surrendering to the Allieswhich they were then doing by the thousands in res4onse he said to Allied 4ro4aganda1 It is most li7ely that he meant what the words say that in individual instances illegal methods might be used that contravened the Geneva .onvention without officially denouncing it1 The fierce Allied bombardments of German cities could easily of themselves evo7e such statements1 DoenitH?s trial defense was sorely burdened with his boundless devotion

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page_41 #age /(0 to the 6uehrer and his fulsome 4raise of Eitler on both 4ublic and 4rivate occasions1 !ven after Eitler?s death DoenitH in broadcasting to the German 4eo4le and to the armed forces told of imaginary e<4loits of his heroe<4loits however which he undoubtedly believed to be true1 After in accord with Eitler?s will he had ta7en over the #residency of the tottering Feich and command of its armed forces he declared over the radio that Eitler?s career had been a single life of service to the German 4eo4le1 The 6uehrer had died a hero to the end devoted to Germany and to !uro4e and to the whole world of (ultur against the Bolshevi7 tidal wave1 Ee had fallen fighting the enemy as one of the greatest heroes of German history1 In 4roud honor DoenitH said he lowered the flags before him1 DoenitH undoubtedly believed all he said1 Ee had always revered Eitler and at the time the news from the bun7er in Berlin was most unclearC DoenitH had been named Eitler?s successor in the 6uehrer?s last order1 Goebbels named Feich .hancellor had committed suicide when DoenitH got the news of his own succession as head of state1 Eitler might have died as DoenitH thought he hadC the 6uehrer had always 4romised to fight to the last1 Ee had stubbornly remained in Berlin against the 4leadings of Dodl and Beitel and of all the others to die with the city1 It would ta7e DoenitH a long time to revise his o4inion of his leader1 :ver and over again DoenitH made ringing addresses to the German sailors and to the nation 4raising everything about Eitlerhis 4eerless leadershi4 his infallibility1 Almost a year after the surrender of the 8i<th Army at 8talingrad on December (+ (*/) he told the commanders of the Navy how dee4ly he believed in the ideological education of the German soldier the holy Heal and fanaticism with which the country must fight1 '* Two months later on 6ebruary (0 (*// he addressed another meeting of the same commanders in the same vein1 ??6rom the very start the whole officers? cor4s I he said Imust be so indoctrinated that it feels itself co-res4onsible with the National 8ocialist state in its entirety1 The officer is the e<4onent of the state1 The idle chatter that the officer is non-4olitical is nonsense1I+$ DoenitH re4eatedly declared that he had uncom4romisingly acce4ted the National 8ocialist ideals and unconditionally given his fealty to the 6uehrer1 In addition he said at Nurembergand this was doubtless much more sur4rising to the courtthat he had never received an order from Eitler that was not in accord with international law or that violated in any way the ethics of war1 This was doubtless true1 Eitler disli7ed the oceanC it was alien to him1 Ee once told a German naval ca4tain he would be seasic7 for two wee7s if he went to sea1 Eitler li7ed the techni@ues of the Navy and its efficiency but he 7new nothing of its mysteries and left them to the e<4erts1+( In shar4 distinction to the land war Eitler had interfered little with the war at sea1 DoenitH carried his single-minded message to the entire nation1 Ee told the Germans that they must cling to the 6uehrer in fanatical allegiance and love1 IGerman men and women I he as7ed over the German networ7s on

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page_41! #age /(' March (& (*// ??what would have become of our country today if the 6uehrer had not united us under National 8ocialismO 84lit 4arties beset with the s4reading 4oison of Dewry and vulnerable to it because we lac7ed the defense of our 4resent uncom4romising ideology we would long since have succumbed under the burden of this war and delivered ourselves u4 to the enemy who would have mercilessly destroyed us1I +& :n Duly &( (*// a day after the attem4t on Eitler?s life he s4o7e again: IEoly anger and measureless wrath fill us today over the criminal attac7 that was su44osed to have cost the life of our beloved 6uehrer1I Ee went on to s4ea7 of Ithe insane little cli@ue of generals 1 1 1 with their boundless stu4idity that would have led to the e<termination of our 4eo4le the enslaving of our men 1 1 1 and uns4ea7able misery1 The Navy I he said Iremains true to its oath in its unwavering fidelity to the 6uehrer unconditional in its Jlan and readiness for battle 1 1 1 They will ta7e orders only from me the .ommander in .hief of the Navy and from its own commanders 1 1 1I+) Never in the 6uehrer?s lifetime did DoenitH waver in his adoration1 Ee told the Navy on New ;ear?s Day (*// IThe 6uehrer shows us the way and the goal1 -e follow him with body and soul in a great German future1I+/ :n 8e4tember (0 (*// he s4o7e of Ithe enormous strength the 6uehrer radiates his unwavering confidence his far-sighted a44raisal of the Italian situation have made it very clear that we are all insignificant in com4arison with him 1 1 1 Anyone who believes he can do better than the 6uehrer is silly1I+0 :n March &+ (*/0 he told the German 4eo4le they had to believe unreservedly in their leadershi41 IAdolf Eitler I he said Ihas always been rightI even though ,ustification for his decisions sometimes only a44eared wee7s after they were ta7en1+' :n A4ril (( (*/0 he declared I:nly the 6uehrer has for years realiHed with what danger Bolshevism threatens !uro4e 1 1 1 4erha4s even this year !uro4e will realiHe that Adolf Eitler is the only statesman of stature in !uro4e 1 1 1 !uro4e?s blindness will one day come to a sudden end and thereby bring Germany 4sychological hel4 and 4olitical 4ossibilities arising therefrom1I++ !ven after the Nuremberg trials DoenitH continued his dogged one-trac7 defense of Eitler1 In a meeting with one of his lawyers 6regatten7a4itaen Mec7el in Duly (*/' before the verdicts were announced DoenitH e<4lained in detail to Mec7el how Eitler had been able to 7ee4 such a hold on the belief and loyalty of so many of his followers even in the years of reverses1 DoenitH com4ared the 6uehrer to Na4oleon who was also considered a criminal after his deathC but the ,udgment of Na4oleon?s contem4orary detractors he 4ointed out was com4letely revised forty years later1 DoenitH referred to Eitler?s uncanny sense for the right decision that for e<am4le had 7e4t him from acce4ting the Gice-.hancellorshi4 in #a4en?s .abinet that against the advice of his generals had led to occu4ation of the Fhineland and to the other great bloodless victories as well as to the trium4hs of the warall of which stam4ed him for the man he was1 !ngland said DoenitH

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page_41" #age /(+ was always bound to o44ose the strongest 4ower in !uro4e and if a wic7ed Eitler hadn?t e<isted a wic7ed militarism would have had to be destroyed in his 4lace along with a too 4owerful Germany1 Eitler?s one mista7e DoenitH thought was starting the armed conflict in (*)* which des4ite the tem4orary 4act with Fussia was really a two-front war from the start1 !ither Fussia or !ngland had to be 7noc7ed out if Germany was to win and DoenitH said he had no doubt whatever that Fussia in (*/( was 4re4aring to attac71 Eere too the 6uehrer had been right in sensing Fussian 4lans for aggression and German field marshals li7e Manstein and Fundstedt confirmed Eitler?s intuition that the Fussians had made vast offensive 4re4arations and that they had been caught off base in the swift and une<4ected German attac71 The inhumanities of the National 8ocialist regime DoenitH thought were the fault of Eimmler?s 4olice but even the terrorist methods were by no means confined to Germany1 The 4olice in the Anglo-8a<on countries too did not always wear 7id gloves1 In addition DoenitH told Mec7el the Gesta4o had often been right as when it had 4re4ared dossiers against men li7e 8chacht and .anaris1 And on the favorable side no corru4tion 4aralleling that of -orld -ar I besmirched Germany during -orld -ar II1 No blac7 mar7et flourished there were no Dewish 4rofiteers the 4ress and films and art were clean1 .orru4tion e<isted only in Eimmler?s realm and in men li7e Goering1 DoenitH thought his idol had remained fit and com4etent as ever until the very endC Eitler had seen treason all around him and Eitler had been right in this too1 +% Eitler?s military blunders his senseless defense of every foot of ground in Fussia that cost the German armies so much blood including the lives of generals ordered 7illed because they were unwilling to sacrifice their troo4s to Eitler?s mania made no im4ression on DoenitH1 :n 6ebruary (0 (*// in his address to the higher officers of the Navy he said he was in com4lete agreement with the strategy of the 6uehrerhad the Army retreated in Fussia the enemy would now be at the German bordersand he too believed that there should be no unnecessary withdrawals1 Ee said this after s4ending days at the 6uehrer?s head@uarters while Eitler was ordering e<hausted and battle-worn troo4s to stand fast without reserves on a front e<tending across Fussia1 The des4erate im4ortunities of the field commanders and even on occasion of :B- seemed to have made no more im4ression on him than they did on Eitler1 No alternative e<isted for the German Army and Navy but to fight hard at all 4oints and to follow Eitler with un@uestioning faith DoenitH told his naval officers1 The 4olitical contradictions among the Allies were obvious he said and if the Allies saw that they could in the near future bring Germany to her 7nees their alliance would hold togetherC but if they saw that Germany would fight to the last the conflict in their war aims would become a44arent1 ??8tand to the bitter end stand where you are I he said echoing the 6uehrer1 IThis is the terrible need of the momentC be militarily correct

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page_41# #age /(% and you can change the 4olitical situation1?? The relative strength of the Germans com4ared to the Fussians was ( to 0 but the losses were ( to %1 DoenitH too7 comfort in this as well as in the e<haustion of the 8oviet troo4s and the German tenacity that was holding off the Allies in Italy as well as in Fussia1 I!ngland does not want Fussia to run !uro4e they want the Fussians and the Germans to lose as much blood as 4ossible but they also want to end the war as soon as 4ossible1I +* DoenitH never changed1 Two 7inds of 4eo4le e<isted: those who were German 4atriots and those who were not1 The soldier he told German naval officers in the autumn of (*// had to be anti-Mar<ist and anti-8emitic as well for during the -eimar Fe4ublic the Dews had tried to ma7e a laughing stoc7 of the military virtues of loyalty involvement in a cause devotion willingness to sacrifice1 I-e must follow the 6uehrer with all our souls I he told them and at this last stage of the war he still ranged himself against the critics who com4lained that the Eigh .ommand should have done this or that differently1 I8illy criticism I DoenitH called it for Ione cannot change what has ha44ened1I%$ DoenitH li7e Eitler was convinced that the Allied demand for unconditional surrender made it im4ossible to do anything but fight to the last and ho4e that the underlying 4olitical differences among the Allies came to the surface1 I;ou cannot ma7e yourself defenseless I he told the officers Iand then tal7 4eace even the smallest wea4on in your hands im4roves your 4osition1 -ould the Fussians I he as7ed Iafter the Germans were defeated have the slightest interest in maintaining German industryO They would I he said Ide4ort Germans of both se<es who would never see their homes again1I%( DoenitH many years later defended his 4olicy of having continued the war even when it was ho4eless1 Ee saw the ma4 of Germany as it was to be divided among the three 4owers according to the Morgenthau 4lan and he believed this could mean the end of the German nation1 Ee @uoted too the Fussian writer Ilya !hrenburg who was im4ortuning the Fussian soldiers to IBill Bill Bill no one is innocent living or unborn1I !hrenburg had written: IBrea7 with force the racial arrogance of the German women1 Ta7e them as your 4ro4er booty1 Bill you brave forward storming Fed Army men1I L%& The war DoenitH was convinced could not be won after the failure of the submarine offensive in (*/) and he told Eitler so1 But he fought on even in the s4ring of (*/0 and had he not ordered the last resistance he told his interrogators at Nuremberg three and a half million soldiers would have gone into Fussian ca4tivity1 The Fussans even with the best will in the world which was certainly lac7ing could not have ta7en care of so many L Although the original of this @uotation has not been found German witnesses said it was used as a leaflet distributed in (*// among Fussian troo4s and 4rinted in Fussian frontline news4a4ers1 It was @uoted by the former 8oviet officer 8abi7--egulow in an article I! -rob>e)enno> 6ermani>iI =IIn .on@uered GermanyI> 4ublished in (*/+1 6urthermore it is not very different from other summons to slaughter that !hrenburg certainly wrote1

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page_41$ #age /(* 4risonersC even in the -est many German soldiers had died because of inade@uate care by the -estern Allies1 6urthermore DoenitH 4ointed out the German troo4s would not have obeyed the orders to stand where they were and let 8oviet troo4s ca4ture them1 In addition he had to consider the 4light of the refugees1L Ee sent 0$ $$$ of his sailors with no training in such warfare to fight on the land and he also a44roved Eitler?s scorched-earth orders that included destruction of naval installationsC for the big thing DoenitH said as early as (*/) was to save !uro4e from bolshevism1 In the course of the war DoenitH and Faeder both often re4eated that the chief enemy was !ngland but as far as DoenitH was concerned these were no more than clichJs1 !very German sailor said that the British were the main enemy because they faced !ngland on every front1 No Fussian submarines were in the Baltic1LL The only 4lace the German and 8oviet naval forces met on water was in the Blac7 8ea but the British were everywhere and were overwhelmingly su4erior in both world wars in the number of shi4s they could bring into battle1 Aside from this formal sailor tal7 on behalf of the inferior German Navy the real enemy was not the British but the 8oviet "nion which DoenitH li7e the ran7 and file of the NaHi #arty identified with world Dewry1 DoenitH once he left behind the wellordered charts of his Navy and its submarines was a confused man1 Ee had no com4ass for 4olitics1 -ithin the area of his com4etence he was enormously resourceful and his chief ob,ect of devotion was always the German Navy1 "4on it he s4ent his s7ill and dee4est emotions1 -hen Eitler once referred to the feats of the British Navy DoenitH flared u4 even to his revered 6uehrer and said coldly that the German Navy was certainly better than the British that the British were o4erating after all with a mar7ed su4eriority of numbers and that the German sailors were accom4lishing everything that could 4ossibly be demanded of them1 Goering was an enemy of both DoenitH and Faeder1 The Feichsmarschall always ,ealous of his 4rerogatives o44osed 4lacing reconnaissance tor4edo and bomber 4lanes under Navy command although the 9uftwaffe could not su44ly the technical training demanded for identifying shi4s laying mines and attac7ing with tor4edoes from the air1 The Navy its commanders were convinced had to train its own fliers who could then be de4ended on to L The German Navy 4erformed a 4rodigious tas7 in evacuating soldiers and refugees from the Baltic1 More than a million and a half 4eo4le were rescued from the Fussians in warshi4s and 4assenger shi4s des4ite Fussian air su4eriority and the 4resence of twenty-two 8oviet submarines in the evacuation area after the surrender of 6inland1 A number of German shi4s were sun7 with very heavy loss of lifeC &$ $$$ died in the course of the o4erations that began in the autumn of (*// and continued even after the German surrender1 :nly $1/* 4er cent of those trans4orted by the Navy were lost com4ared with (01% 4er cent of those who attem4ted to esca4e by the land route where ( '$$ $$$ died =Bidlingmaier o2. cit1>1 LL No Fussian submarines o4erated in the Baltic until near the end of the war when they could use 6innish bases1

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page_420 #age /&$ send along accurate information on enemy shi4s and carry out s4ecial assignments1 :nce when Goeringto cover u4 one of his own innumerable failuresin the 4resence of the 6uehrer com4lained of the use the Navy had made of the small and fast surface shi4s that made hit-andrun raids on !nglish shi44ing DoenitH e<4loded and said to him ??Feichsmarschall I will tolerate no criticism of the Navy from you you have more than enough to do with your 9uftwaffe1I The 6uehrer showed where his sentiments lay by inviting DoenitH to brea7fast and ta7ing a cool leave of Goering1 DoenitH had fre@uent if im4ersonal connections with the #arty hierarchy es4ecially after he became .ommander in .hief1 Ee felt it his duty and 4rivilege not only to be 4resent at the 6uehrer conferences but to s4end some time at Eitler?s head@uarters and a 4refabricated house that had been used by the 6uehrer during the #olish cam4aign was 4ut at his dis4osal1 DoenitH told a meeting he addressed of Feichsleiters and Gauleiters in #osen that he had been invited to tal7 by Bormann and of course he would acce4t such a re@uest from him at any time because the 4illars of the National 8ocialist 8tate at this critical ,uncture had to be close to one another1 %) Eis 4ersonal relations with the #arty leaders were never intimateC the only test for DoenitH was their allegiance to Eitler1 Eaving heard the news from Bormann that Eimmler was attem4ting 4eace negotiations in 8weden and should be regarded as a traitor DoenitH received Eimmler and his guard of si< 88 men in #loenafter Eitler?s will had made him #residentwith a coc7ed revolver on his des7 and brus@uely refused to give the Feichsfuehrer 88 the 4lace he as7ed for in the .abinet1 Eimmler des4erately clinging to any flimsy shred of res4ectability he could gras4 assured DoenitH he would gladly be the second man in his government but the admiral would have none of him1 Nor at the end were DoenitH?s relations with Bormann and Goebbels any better1 In the atmos4here of sus4icion and treason that surrounded Eitler and his liegemen at the end DoenitH in fact ordered their arrest if they should a44ear at his head@uarters in #loen but by this time Bormann had disa44eared and Goebbels had committed suicide1 Fibbentro4 too wanted a 4lace as 6oreign Minister in DoenitH?s .abinet1 The British he said would always be glad to deal with him1 DoenitH ignoring the naming of 8eyss-In@uart as 6oreign Minister in Eitler?s will a44ointed .ount 8chwerin von Brosig7 to the almost imaginary 4ost1 DoenitH never benefited as did so many =including Faeder> who had won the 4ersonal regard of the 6uehrer from any of the largesse Eitler so generously bestowed on his favoritesof whom DoenitH was certainly one1 Ee never received any of Eitler?s 4rincely giftsC no cash e<ce4t his salary ever was offered him1 #erha4s the fact that Eitler had no genuine sym4athy for the Navy nor much understanding of its function led him to treat his admirals on the whole differently from the generals and civil officials whose wor7 he a44roved of1 -hen Faeder in (*/( got his gift it was 4erha4s because

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page_421 #age /&( he was .ommander in .hief of a service for which the 6uehrer still had high ho4es1 The testimony that undoubtedly saved DoenitH?s life at Nuremberg came from Admiral NimitH and from the British Admiralty1 Both sources admitted that from the beginning of the war they =the "nited 8tates in the #acific and the British in the 87agerra7> had ordered their submarines to sin7 any shi4 on sight without regard to visit and search1L The lawyers re4resenting Faeder and DoenitH sent a @uestionnaire to Admiral NimitH and in his answers NimitH affirmed that the entire #acific :cean had been declared a theater of o4erations where American submarines were ordered to attac7 without warningan order that went far beyond the German one that at the start of the war limited such attac7s to the so-called immediate bloc7ade Hone about the British Isles1 In the American orders the only e<ce4tions to the unrestricted submarine war were hos4ital shi4s and vessels that had been 4rovided with a safe conduct1 6urthermore these orders had gone into effect on the first day of the war December + (*/(C they did not arise as did the German measures as a result of develo4ments of the war1 NimitH also testified that it was not the 4ractice of American submarines to rescue survivors if such a rescue would be an undue or additional haHard to the submarine which was limited both by its small 4assenger-carrying facilities and by the suicidal and homicidal tendences of Da4anese who were ta7en 4risoner1 It was NimitH testified unsafe to rescue many survivors although they were fre@uently given rubber boats and 4rovisions1 Almost invariably NimitH wrote any 4risoners had to be brought aboard a submarine by force1 None of the American 4ractices he said was based on re4risals against Da4anese submarine warfare1 Ee had thought the unrestricted submarine warfare fully ,ustified by the tactics of the Da4anese attac7 on #earl Earbor1 %/ German witnesses testifying on behalf of DoenitH told of the strict orders the German Navy was under to follow the customs and usages of war as well as the Geneva and Eague .onventions1%0 Both Allied and German nationals told of the tolerable conditions 4risoners of war lived under in German naval #cam4s1 A former German naval ,udge 6ritH Daec7el testified to the Navy?s strict enforcement of military law against its own 4ersonnel1 :ne sailor had been e<ecuted for having wor7ed with a 6rench criminal ring that stole 4ro4erty from Dews on the assum4tion that such activity since it concerned Dews was no crime1 Ee was sentenced to death and his accom4lice to twelve years1 Another sailor who stole from Fussians was also given the death 4enalty as was one who committed ra4e in Greece1%' ??-e are a res4ectable firm I DoenitH had said at the start of the war and he considered himself and Faeder the res4ectable heads of it1 At first as the war ended it seemed that the Allies had ta7en the same view of him1 Dust L The British orders were to sin7 any German shi4 by day and any shi4 by night sailing in the 87agerra71

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page_422 #age /&& after the surrender when DoenitH first dealt with Allied commanders he was given the usual military honors accorded an honorable if defeated enemy: the Allied soldiers 4resented arms the officers e<changed salutes1L But all this changed when he and Dodl on May && were ta7en on board the houseboat -atria lying near 6lensburg where DoenitH had had his head@uarters since May &1LL They had become war criminals1 No one 4resented arms: a grou4 of 4hotogra4hers descended on them ta7ing their 4ictures in their new role of accused men who were to stand trial for their lives1 Eitler?s successor the commander of submarines as well as the last .ommander in .hief of the German Navy had to go before the court to show if he could to ??the chief enemy !nglandI that he had waged war according to rules that !ngland herself was not always ready to follow1 The Fussians in the 4erson of one of the 8oviet 4rosecutors .olonel #o7rovs7y denounced him on a 4riori grounds1 #o7rovs7y as7ed at Nuremberg I-ill you deny DoenitH that you were always 4reaching and always encouraging in every way the murder of defenseless 4eo4le from among the members of the German Armed 6orces for 4urely 4olitical reasons and that you always loo7ed u4on such murders as acts of military valor and heroismOI %+ This was vastly e<aggeratedC at the end of the trial the case against DoenitH came down to the ambiguity of his orders concerning treatment of shi4wrec7ed crews orders that in their effect were essentially no different from what the Allies were doing1 That and his 4ro-NaHism his blind devotion to the 6uehrer his anti-8emitism the damning fact that he had been named by Eitler as #resident of the Feich were the charges left against him1 The court found DoenitH guilty of having committed crimes against 4eace but not of having cons4ired to commit them1 Ee was also found guilty of war crimesC his 4lea of tu @uo@ue for German conduct of submarine warfare was acce4ted but the court said he was involved in the .ommando :rder in that he 4ermitted it to stand after he became .ommander in .hiefC that he had 7nown at least after a conference on December (( (*// that concentration-cam4 4risoners might be used as wor7ers in the navy yards1 And it declared rather wea7ly IEe admits he 7new of concentration cam4s1 A man in his 4osition must necessarily have 7nown that citiHens of occu4ied countries in large numbers were confined in concentration cam4s1I%% This was undoubtedly true but how was it a crime in the man who commanded the German Navy to have 7nown that such cam4s e<istedO DoenitH however had 7nown nothing of the e<termination cam4sC until the end of the war L -inston .hurchill had sent a memorandum to the 6oreign :ffice saying: II neither 7now nor care about DoenitH1 Ee may be a war criminal 1 1 1 the @uestion for us is has he any 4ower to get the Germans to lay down their arms and hand them over @uic7ly without more loss of life 1 1 1 It must of course be remembered that DoenitH is a useful tool that will have to be written off against his war atrocities for being in command of submarines 1 1 1I =Brian Gardner The 'ear that *hange) the !orl) MNew ;or7: .oward-Mc.ann (*'/N 441 (+&+)>1 LL DoenitH had moved from #loen in Eolstein when its ca4ture was threatened by the British to ma7eshift head@uarters in 6lensburg1

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page_423 #age /&) their e<istence was a carefully guarded secret and the affairs of the Navy were as remote from them as was 4ossible in the Third Feich1 The court merely commented on the ambiguity of DoenitH?s orders with regard to shi4wrec7ed crews but it too7 a sterner view of his advice to the 6uehrer on the Geneva .onvention1 Eere it thought DoenitH intended to breach the .onvention1 It found in his 4ro4er treatment of 4risoners of war a mitigating circumstance1 And with regard to one of the main concerns of the tribunalthe waging of aggressive warfarethe ,udgment in surely one of the most curious statements made on that solemn occasion declared: ??It is clear that his "-boats few in number at the time were fully 4re4ared to wage warIa strange finding against a commander of submarines of any nationality1 DoenitH was sentenced to ten years a sentence that too7 account of his guilt for having submarines under his command ready to shoot and which is a long time for having headed a res4ectable firm1 DoenitH had been a good submarine officer a staunch salty man of the Navy and beyond this world he was lostC his 4olitical o4inions were no more than stale re4etitions of what #arty orators said: !ngland wanted to destroy GermanyC the Dews and bolshevism were wor7ing ceaselessly for her destructionC Eitler had cleansed Germany of its 4oisonsC the country had to fight to the last man against the 4lot to destroy itC and so on1 -hen an inconvenient fact came to light it was 4assed off as a misunderstanding1 DoenitH seemed 4roof against learning anything newC the accumulation of testimony on the NaHi barbarities and the insane orders given by the 6uehrer that sacrificed German armies and cities left DoenitH merely with the same o4inions he had during the war1 Minor figures li7e Eimmler were res4onsibleC the 6uehrer was still beyond criticismIcom4ared with him we others are worms1I But slowly and subconsciously he did learnC somewhere in his sailor?s al4habet of soldierly duties and eternal vows of obedience and duty to be fulfilled the words and meanings came together in a fashion different than they had before1 By the time he wrote his memoirs ten years after the trial he 7new that the men of Duly &$ could have been 4atriots even that some of them 4ossessed the highest virtues of self-sacrifice and love of country1 The evidence finally reached him too of the atrocities1 But he clung to his 4rescri4tion the necessity for having continued the war the need to hold out1 Ee had fought at sea against formidable odds with the wea4ons at hand and with as good a conscience as his o44onents that he was defending his country1 Ee lac7ed what another defendant =Beitel> who also stood before the same court called a sense of res4onsibility to anything non-German that went beyond what the 4atriots of the Third Feich believed Iright1I Ee was so far removed from 4olitical realities that a meeting he attended debated whether the Allies might let him continue as head of state1 Ee too7 refuge while he was at Nuremberg in another tu @uo@ue: the Allied bombing of German civilians the harsh Allied treatment of Germans the 4olitical dif-

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page_424 #age /&/ ferences among them that demonstrated the hollowness of their own claims to moral su4eriorityC he was the narrow and efficient officer who saw the enemy 4lainly that was 4ointed out to him and was ready to fight this enemy to the death1 DoenitH had learned his manual on the duty of a naval officer word for word but his ma<ims were ada4ted to an orderly traditional government not to a criminal head of state who @uoted the same soldierly te<ts even as he was slaying millions of defenseless 4eo4le1 DoenitH 7new only that enemies were all around and had to be fought to the bitter end1 Ee fought well according to the tough if not deliberately inhumane canons of military men of the twentieth century1 American and British naval officers wrote to him de4loring the verdict1 More than one hundred American ca4tains and admirals s4ontaneously sent him letters 4raising his conduct of the war and de4loring the verdict1 They said usually that he had done for his country what they had done for theirsC he had fought honorably and well and they wanted him to 7now they thought so1 Notes (1 !rich Faeder Mein Leben Gol1 I =Tuebingen: 6ritH 8chlichtenmayer Gerlag (*0'>1 &1 .bi)1 441 &)()&1 )1 N TTTIG $(+-. 441 ('/+'1 .bi)1 (0'-. 441 0)$'$'1 /1 N TIII 441 '&+)(1 N TIG 441 ('1 N TTTIG $)&-. 441 &$0('1 N TTTG %0/-D 441 00/'%1 01 N TIG 41 &0$1 '1 N*A 8u441 A D%++ 441 **+($()1 +1 N OOO.+ ('(-. 441 '/+'(1 N TTTG '0)-D 441 )($(/1 %1 -alter Baum ??Marine= Nationalso0ialismus un) !i)erstan) I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TI No1 ( (*') 41 )+1 *1 .arl-A<el GemHell /ae)er= Hitler un) Skan)inavien =9und: 87ans7a .entraltryc7eriet (*'0 and 6ran7furt a1M1: Bernard R Graefe Gerlag fuer -ehrwesen> 441 &('(+1 ($1 N T9I Faeder-/( 441 &'&*1 ((1 .hurchill o2. cit1 Gol1 I 441 0))/+1 (&1 .bi)1 41 0+)1 ()1 -alter Eubatsch !eseruebung =Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*'$> 41 )$1 (/1 N T9I Faeder-()$ 441 %0%'1 (01 .bi)1 Faeder-++ 441 )/)+1 ('1 .bi)1 Faeder-/( 441 &'&*1 (+1 .bi)1 Faeder-%) 441 /0/+1 (%1 .bi)1 Faeder-%0 441 /+/%1 (*1 N*A GI .-((0 441 *(/(01 N TTTIG ((0-. 441 )/&')1 &$1 N*A GI .-'' 41 %%+1

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page_42 #age /&0 &(1 N*A II .-(0& 41 %'&1 &&1 N TTGI /*%-#8 441 ($$(1 &)1 .bi). N TIII 441 0$)/1 &/1 N . 41 )(+1 &01 T!* Gol1 TI 441 (0*'/1 &'1 N + 41 &+%1 N TTTIG (+'-. 441 +/+''1 N TTTIT $0+-"B 41 (&/1 &+1 N TIII 41 0$*1 N TTTG '/*-D 441 )$()1 N*A 8u44l1 A D-*(* 441 ($*$*+1 &%1 N TTTIG (+%-. 441 ++$+*1 N*A GI .-(+% 441 ($(&(/1 &*1 .bi)1 441 ++$+* ($(&(/1 )$1 N*A II 441 %')'/1 )(1 Faeder o2. cit1 Gol1 I 41 &/&C Gol1 II 41 (//1 )&1 N TIG 41 &%/1 ))1 Faeder interrogation of 6ebruary &' (*/+ =IAG>1 )/1 Barl DoenitH 7$ %ahre un) &$ Tage =Bonn: Athenaeum-Gerlag (*0%> 41 0*1 )01 MA (%/ =IAG>1 )'1 N TIII 41 /$+1 )+1 N TTG '/&-D 41 &0%1 )%1 N TIII 41 /(&1 )*1 .bi)1 41 00$1 /$1 .bi)1 41 /()1 /(1 .bi)1 /&1 .bi)1 /)1 .bi)1 41 /(/1 //1 8amuel !liot Morison History of the &nite) States Naval O2erations in !orl) !ar .. Gol1 TIG =Boston: 9ittle Brown and .om4any (*/+0*> 441 &*$*(1 /01 N TIII 41 /&$1 /'1 DoenitH o2. cit1 41 (*&1 /+1 9Jonce #eillard The Laconia Affair trans1 by :liver .oburn =New ;or7: G1 #1 #utnam?s 8ons (*')> 41 ()&1 /%1 DoenitH o2. cit1 41 &0'1 /*1 #eillard o2. cit1 41 (%)1 0$1 N TTTG ')$-D 441 &('(%1 0(1 .bi)1 0&1 .bi)1 //'-D 441 ((%&)1 N T9 DoenitH-(* &$ && &* /( and 0)1 0)1 81 -1 Fos7ill !hite Ensign =Anna4olis: "nited 8tates Naval Institute (*'$> 41 &&01 0/1 Gerald Bemmett =9ondon> Sun)ay E42ress August / (*')1 001 N TTT 41 ('$1 0'1 N TTG )%&-#8 441 )*//$(1 0+1 N TIII 441 /&)&/1 N T9 DoenitH-&+ 0) and '+1 0%1 N*A GII D-'/& 41 (&/1 0*1 .bi)1 D-'') 41 (+$1 '$1 N + 441 &&'&+1 '(1 Dohn .ameron ed1 The -eleus Trial =9ondon !dinburgh and Glasgow: -illiam Eodge (*/%> 41 **1

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page_42! #age /&' '&1 .bi)1 41 ($)1 ')1 .bi)1 '/1 N T9 DoenitH-/( 441 '''*1 '01 .bi)1 DoenitH0) 41 %$1 ''1 N TIII 41 0&(1 '+1 N T9 DoenitH-)* 441 '('01 '%1 N TTTIG (0%-. 441 '/(//1 '*1 N*A GII //)-D 441 0/001 +$1 .bi)1 '/$-D 41 (('1 +(1 Baum o2. cit1 441 ('/%1 +&1 N TIII &%+%#8 41 )*&1 +)1 N*A G &%+%-#8 441 0/(/&1 +/1 .bi)1 &%+%-#81 +01 6rancis E1 Einsley HitlerAs StrategyB The Naval Evi)ence =.ambridge: .ambridge "niversity #ress (*0(> 41 &)$1 +'1 MA (&+2& (&*0+ =IAG>1 ++1 N*A GII '0$-D 441 (0$0(1 +%1 Baum A8 (%($ "nterredung mit 6regatten7a4itaen Mec7el =IAG>1 +*1 N TTTG '/$-D 441 &)+/01 %$1 DoenitH s4eech of :ctober (% (*// =BD.>1 %(1 .bi)1 %&1 DoenitH o2. cit1 41 /)(1 %)1 Baum A8 (%($ =IAG>1 %/1 N T9 DoenitH-($$ 441 ($%((1 %01 .bi)1 DoenitH-/% 441 '*+)1 %'1 .bi)1 DoenitH-/* 441 +/+*1 %+1 N TIII 41 )**1 %%1 N I 41 )(/1

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page_42" #age /&+ (( The #roconsuls Eans 6ran7 Eans 6ran7 was Governor General of what was left of #oland a cut-down 4iece of territory some two-fifths of its 4rewar area =the rest of the #olish 4rovinces had been incor4orated into the Feich for resettlement by +olks)eutsche mainly from !astern !uro4e>1 6ran7 had only a theoretical bac7ground for this 4ost1 Ee had been the chief legal authority of the #arty almost from the time he received his law degree in (*&'1 Because of his youthhe was born in (*$$he had served only one year in the Army during -orld -ar I and then had ,oined a 6rei7or4s formation to hel4 oust the .ommunist Faetere4ubli7 that ruled Munich for a few bloody days in A4ril (*(*1 Anti.ommunist anti-8emitic an admirer of 84engler and of @uasi-socialist doctrines 6ran7 in (*(* ,oined the German -or7ers? #arty which within a few months became the National 8ocialist German -or7ers? #arty1 9ater he ,oined the 8A1 Ee too7 4art in the attem4ted 4utsch of (*&) in which he had been given the assignment of occu4ying a bridge crossing the Isar1 A number of the burghers of Munich unim4ressed at this early date by the nondescri4t Brownshirts commented derisively on 6ran7 and his armed warriors1 :ne man as7ed himhe was twenty-three years old at the timeif his mother 7new he was out with all these deadly wea4ons1 -hen no enemy a44eared at the bridge 6ran7 returned to the Buergerbraeu Beller where the high command of the revolution had its head@uarters and ,oined Eitler and Goering Eess and Eimmler 9udendorff and their 8A followers on the march that was to end in a burst of gunfire when it reached the 6eldherrnhalle1

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page_42# #age /&% A 4olitically ambitious young lawyer convinced of the ,ust cause and eventual success of the National 8ocialists 6ran7 in :ctober (*&+ read in the +oelkischer Beobachter of the 4light of twelve young 8A hooligans who had swaggered into a Berlin restaurant where a number of Dews were eating and had been arrested when they started to brea7 u4 the 4lace in 4rotest against the 4resence of the Dews1 6ran7 a44eared in court to defend them and since the Brownshirts were storm troo4ers one of whose main ,obs it was to ??win the streetsI for the #arty he thereafter was 7e4t busy1 :ne such case @uic7ly followed another/$ $$$ trials were conducted between (*&0 and (*)) 6ran7 wrote in his autobiogra4hy1 Ee was also one of two lawyers for the three young artillery lieutenants Eanns 9udin Fichard 8cheringer and Eans 6riedrich -endtnone older than twenty-fourbrought u4 for trial in "lm in (*)$ on charges of high treason because as NaHi sym4athiHers they had s4read NaHi 4ro4aganda in the Army and had allegedly 4lanned to hel4 overthrow the Government1 6ran7 called Adolf Eitler as a witness for the defendants and Eitler made the most of the occasion =which was the way he and 6ran7 had 4lanned it> to lecture the court and ma7e headlines in the news4a4ers on the high 4atriotism of the #arty its aim to come to 4ower legally and the selfless motives that had animated the young officers who had ,oined the ran7s of the National 8ocialists1 In the course of the 4roceedings Eitler also told the court that because of the treason and corru4tion in -eimar?s 4arliamentary system when the National 8ocialists too7 4owerwhich they would do legally but inevitablya true German law and com4rehension of 4atriotic duty would ta7e the 4lace of what was 4assing for ,ustice and citiHenshi4 in the degenerate -eimar Fe4ublic1 Ee added that when that time came heads would roll1 ( Although 4roof of high treason was lac7ing the three lieutenants were clearly guilty of 4olitical activity which was forbidden to soldiers and were sentenced to a year and a half?s im4risonment1 :ne of the three 8cheringer disillusioned with the 6uehrer in the course of his im4risonment became converted to communism1 -endt later ,oined :tto 8trasser?s dissident grou4 within the National 8ocialist #arty and emigrated at the time 8trasser did in (*))1 :nly 9udin remained a National 8ocialist after his im4risonment1 6ran7 declared at Nuremberg that he himself had always believed in a state under law1 Ee said he had reminded the ,urists of the Third Feich that the law had to underlie any act of stateeven in some mystical sense any act of the 6uehrer?s1 9aw a44lied e@ually to the regular courts of the Feich and to the 4olice and the s4ecial tribunals called #eo4le?s .ourts designed to hand down @uic7 and fierce decisions1 The 6uehrer =Ithat great man I 6ran7 still called him in (*/'> had however one cons4icuous failing: he mistrusted both the law and lawyers and 6ran7 was unable to 4ersuade him otherwise1 6ran7 in fact struggled for some of the traditional conce4ts

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page_42$ #age /&* of law against the revolutionary 4olice ,ustice of the Third Feich1 After Eitler too7 4ower 6ran7 made innumerable s4eeches u4 and down Germany 4raising the su4remacy of the law and ma7ing half-veiled references to the outrageous behavior of the Gesta4o and the security 4olice when they by4assed the courts and threw 4risoners into concentration cam4s and sometimes 7illed them without any 7ind of legal 4roceeding1 -hen 6ran7 became Bavarian Minister of Dustice before the state ministries were dissolved and he was made Minister -ithout #ortfolio he immediately had a number of brushes with Eeinrich Eimmler and the 881 In (*)) after a grou4 of 88 men 7illed a number of Dews in Aschaffenburg the 88 men were arrested1 88 authorities claimed their men were not sub,ect to civil authorityC 6ran7 @uestioned the validity of the 88 claim but all he could do was as7 the Bavarian Minister-#resident to discuss the situation with Eimmler and Eimmler?s then-su4erior Foehm1L 8oon after this 88 guards in Dachau 7illed three 4risonerstwo ??AryanI Germans and a Dew and Eimmler again demanded that no charges be brought against them1 The Bavarian Minister of the Interior Adolf -agner wrote to 6ran7 as7ing him to sto4 any legal 4roceedings in what was a 4olitical act of state that is a #arty and 4olice matter which he did1 & Another case involved a Munich lawyer a Dr1 8trauss who had died under sus4icious circumstances while a 4risoner at Dachau1 6ran7 heard that 8trauss had been murdered and he wanted to investigate this case too but Eimmler refused admission to the concentration cam4 either to him or to his agents1 Eitler bac7ed Eimmler as he had in the other casesone of the early instances where the 4ower of the Gesta4o and 88 too7 4recedence over any of the rival government or #arty agencies1 6ran7 had to acce4t these decisions as he had to acce4t many more li7e them in his years of service to what he rationaliHed into a 4seudolegal form as an authoritarian state based on the 6uehrer4rinHi4 which would be at the same time a state based on law: a Feichsstaat1 The inherent contradiction of this rationale never ceased to trouble him during the nine years in which he held high office in the Feich and he 4reached a mi<ed and confused doctrine of the su4remacy of the law so long as it did not conflict with the will of the 6uehrer1 In all 6ran7?s s4eeches to legal gatherings on the necessity for nurturing the innate Germanic love of ,ustice 6ran7 4rudently re4eated that the law was what brought the +olk ha44iness and that Eitler?s word was law and his will gave the law its legitimacy1 6or his services during the years of struggle when the #arty was slowly on the rise =he defended Eitler alone in (0$ suits> 6ran7 was made the leading ,urist of the Feich1 Ee was #resident of the Academy of German 9aw a Feichsleiter of the #arty the founder of the Institute of German 9aw and #resident of the International .hamber of the 9aw where A<is ,urists could L At this time Foehm as head of the 8A outran7ed EimmlerC the 88 was under him and he had an 88 ad,utant1

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page_430 #age /)$ e<change uncritical o4inionsall #arty organiHations designed to 7ee4 the 4racticing lawyers in the Feich aware of their duties under the new legal 4rinci4les of the National 8ocialist 8tate1 An even greater sign of confidence in his discretion and 4owers of ,udicious in@uiry was manifested in (*)$ when Eitler entrusted to him research into the 6uehrer?s own family tree1 Dis@uieting rumors had been s4reading that the 6uehrer had Dewish blood and Eitler was an<ious to be able to 4rove once and for all that the calumny was without foundation1 6ran7 undertoo7 this delicate tas7 and he declared in the autobiogra4hy written in his cell at Nuremberg that what he had discovered made it a44ear 4ossible if not li7ely that Eitler?s father had been half Dewish1 The main facts are clear enough1 Eitler?s grandmother a 6raeulein Maria Anna 8chic7lgruber wor7ed as a coo7 for a well-todo Dewish family named 6ran7enberger1 The 6ran7enbergers had a son who was nineteen years old at the time Eitler?s forty-two-year-old grandmother bore a child out of wedloc7 and the Dewish family 4aid for the su44ort of the child u4 to the time it was fourteen years old1 6ran7 wrote that the money was given to avoid a 4ublic scandal1 A44arently although 6ran7 does not say so 6raeulein 8chic7lgruber had threatened to bring a suit against the 6ran7enbergers1 6ran7 wrote that many letters were subse@uently e<changed between them and Eitler?s grandmother which seemed to him to be evidence of a cordial relationshi41 Nevertheless both he and Eitler were convinced that the child was actually the offs4ring of a millwor7er Dohann Georg Eiedler a second cousin of 6raeulein 8chic7lgruber who five years after the birth of the child married her and legitimatiHed her son1 But 6ran7 writing in Nuremberg no longer for the benefit of the 6uehrer was also of the o4inion that it was not out of the @uestion that Eitler?s father who later changed his name from Eiedler to Eitler was half Dewish1 This 4ossibility which 6ran7 wrote down for the benefit of 4osterity is one of numerous reconstructions of the non-Aryan descent of 4rominent NaHis that went the rounds of gossi4 in National 8ocialist Germany =for e<am4le the 4roof that .anaris was alleged to have of Eeydrich?s half-Dewish ancestry was widely believed in the #arty>1 Therefore the illegitimacy of Eitler?s father is certain but the evidence beyond this is flimsy1 -hat seems most li7ely is that Eiedler who legitimatiHed the young boy Alois who grew u4 to become Eitler?s father was in fact the father of the child1 It is not at all unusual in southern Germany and in Austria for children to be born out of wedloc7C one or two are often 4resent at their 4arents? wedding and no taint attaches to them1 The Eitler family was by no means an e<ce4tion to this wides4read custom1 Not only was Eitler?s father Alois born before his 4arents were married but he in turn married three timesC and while his first wife Anna Glasl-Eoerer was still living his second wife-to-be 6ranHis7a MatHelsberger bore him a child Eitler?s half-brother Alois1 After his second wife died he married Eitler?s mother Blara

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page_431 #age /)( #oelHl and she bore her first son Gustav five months later1 ) It seems li7ely that the 6ran7enbergers as 6ran7 said were trying to avoid a 4ublic scandal when they agreed to 4ay for the costs of raising the child which can only mean that 6raeulein 8chic7lgruber must have named their young son as the father of her child1 This is the core of the mystery: why should the 6ran7enbergers 4ay and subse@uently 7ee4 u4 a corres4ondence if they felt they had been railroaded into 4aying for the baby of their coo7 by a man other than their sonO The matter remains a mystery but at any rate in 4roviding for Eitler?s family the 6ran7enbergers were also contributing to one of the great ironies of history1 After the Germans con@uered #oland 6ran7 became the first civilian administrator of the so-called General Government that 4art of #oland that was not anne<ed to Germany but was designed to be the homeland of the #olish hewers of wood and drawers of water for the Third Feich1 6ran7 was named Governor General on :ctober &' (*)* with his ca4ital at .racow succeeding the military governor1 The Army was not reluctant to give u4 its administrative duties in the occu4ied territory where 4olice and 88 activities were outside its control and were causing many officers including the military governor General Blas7owitH to 4rotest1 6ran7 held on to his 4ost until the Germans? final retreat in (*/0 but his 4osition as the leading NaHi ,urist did not last nearly that long1 In (*/& as a result of his attac7s on arbitrary 4olice authority Eitler relieved him ostensibly at 6ran7?s re@uest of the #arty offices he had held1 Eitler 7e4t him on in the General Government solely because as he told Goebbels 6ran7 had a ,ob that could only be done with force and his successor would not be li7ely to do much better in administering the 4rovince which was a center of #olish resistance1 A member of the Feichstag from (*)$ on 6ran7 was one of the hundred-odd de4uties elected before the big swing to Eitler too7 4lace in (*)&1 Eis chief role however was that of administrator of NaHi doctrines and 4ractices in the !ast1 Ee was a dedicated anti-8emite and the #oles not much higher in his esteem than the Dews were an inferior race fit only to serve the Germans to be ??good I to behave themselves and to do as their masters told them without as7ing any @uestions1L Eimmler re4orted from his s4ecial L At a meeting held in Berlin on 8e4tember &( (*)* Eeydrich reca4itulating what Eitler and Eimmler had said made a s4eech at which Adolf !ichmann among other 88 bureau chiefs and !insatH leaders was 4resent1 Eeydrich declared: About the develo4ment of former #oland the trend of thought is that the former German districts will become German and in addition a foreign-language district will be set u4 with .racow as its ca4ital 1 1 1 The solution of the #olish 4roblem as has been re4eatedly e<4lained will be carried out by distinguishing between the stratum of leaders M#olish intelligentsiaN and between the lowest stratum that of the laborers1 :f the 4olitical leaders in the occu4ied territories at the most ) 4er cent have remained1 These ) 4er cent must also be rendered harmless and they will be brought to concentration cam4s1 The o4erational grou4s MEinsat0gru22enN will 4re4are lists of outstanding leaders and also lists of the middle class of teachers clergy nobility legionnaires returning officers etc. These too are to be arrested and to be moved into the remaining area1 The care of the souls of the #oles will be 4laced in the 3footnote continues on ne4t 2age5

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page_432 #age /)& train on May &% (*/$ that the 6uehrer had read his si<-4age memorandum on the treatment of the !astern 4eo4les had a44roved and wanted 6ran7 to read it1 #oles Eimmler had written were to be taught to do sim4le arithmetic =to count u4 to 0$$> to write their names to learn that it was a divine law to obey the Germans1 Those #oles who went to Germany to labor would be leaderless wor7ing 4eo4le but they would live better than their fellow countrymen in #oland and under German instruction contribute as sim4le wor7ers to construction and building of a cultural nature1 #olish children of German ancestry might be brought to Germany and trained to live as GermansC these would become 4art of German society and would change their #olish names to avoid being humiliated by the Germans1 / !ven in death #oles were not allowed to mingle with the GermansC in German-occu4ied territory #oles were buried in a 4art of the cemetery that had its own entrances and e<its in cases where it could not be entirely segregated from the German burial ground10 No #olish intelligentsia was to be 4ermitted to e<ist in the General Government1 "niversities and other institutions of higher learning were closed and intellectuals as a class were to be gotten rid of by way of forced labor and the concentration cam4s for Eitler regarded them as im4lacable enemies of Germany and of no use anyway in a country destined to 4rovide 4ic7-and-shovel wor7ers1 As attac7s on German soldiers and 4olice increased a ??4acification actionI was ordered1 Thousands of #oles were arrested by the German 4olice and sent to concentration cam4s where most of them died1 !very 4rofessor in the "niversity of .racow was arrested and sent to a concentration cam4 inside Germany1 6ran7 declared at Nuremberg that he had succeeded in obtaining the release of some of these men but he admitted that on the whole he had a44roved of the action as a means of restoring order and blunting the Fesistance movement1 6ran7 disagreed with none of the measures advocated by Eimmler and EeydrichC when he resisted them it was never for ideological or humanitarian reasons1_ -hen 6ran7 too7 office as Governor he issued a series of draconian decrees for both #oles and Dews1 Ee declared German to be the official language of the Government although #olish might also be used1 #oles could be sentenced to death for anything they might do directed against either the Feich or German sovereignty or for any act involving the use of force against a German1 Any sign of hostility of a #ole toward a German or 3footnote continue) from 2revious 2age5 hands of .atholic 4riests from the -est but these will not be allowed to s4ea7 #olish1 The 4rimitive #oles will be included in the labor forces as nomadic laborers and in time they will be evacuated from the German-language area into the foreign-language area 1 1 1 .ommanders of !insatH grou4s 1 1 1 must weigh how on the one hand to include the 4rimitive #oles within the framewor7 of labor and how at the same time to evacuate them1 The aim is: The #ole is to remain a seasonal laborerthe eternal nomad1 Eis 4ermanent 4lace of residence must be in the vicinity of .racow =!ichmann Trial 8ession ('/ Document *%)1 Derusalem Israel: !ichmann Trial Fecord mimeogra4hed (*'(>1

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page_433 #age /)) German authority was 4unishable by death1 Death was also the 4enalty for damage to any 4ublic installation1 :nce when 6ran7 heard that in #rague red 4osters were being nailed to walls and 4osts announcing the deaths of .Hechs e<ecuted as re4risals for acts against the Germans he said that if he were to do that in #oland there would not be trees enough on which to nail the 4lacards1 Eis ,ob as he told his aides was to u4root the former ruling classes in #oland and he did it with a will1 In addition as Governor General 6ran7 had the right to confiscate 4rivate 4ro4erty which he did not only on behalf of the Feich but for himself1 -hen the Americans too7 an inventory of his house near the 8chliersee in southern Germany in (*/0 they found a da Ginci 4ortrait of .ecilia Gallerani and a landsca4e by Fembrandt both stolen from the .racow .Hartorys7i galleryC a code< of BalthaHar BemC ornamental vestments including one decorated with 4earlsC a gilded chalice and an ivory chest from the .racow cathedralC a fourteenth-century Madonna with child from the .racow National MuseumC and 4ortraits by Gerard Dou Ary de Gois Terborch and #inturicchio among others1 ' Eis Governor?s 4alace in .racow visitors re4orted had the best table in !uro4e and during the entire war the choicest wines and foods were servedC even at the end when all !uro4e including Germany was going hungry ( $$$ eggs a month were consumed at the Governor?s table along with huge @uantities of meat and geese and butter1 6rau 6ran7 one German informant said en,oyed a salary from the Academy of German 9aw of +0$ FM a month in addition to a free railroad tic7et from Berlin to Munich and both the Army and 88 re4orts stated that she smuggled food and su44lies of all 7inds across the German-#olish frontier =illegal truc7loads 4rotected by the Governor?s authority also crossed the border without search> and her railroad car was 7nown as the ??smugglers coach1I+ Many of these re4orts came from the 88 dossier collected on the 6ran7s as a result of the Governor General?s continual challenging of the 4lace of the 88 and the 4olice a44aratuses in #oland which were nominally under his authority but which in fact too7 their orders from the Feichsfuehrer 881 In s4eech after s4eech 6ran7 re4eated to his staff that he made the final decisions in #oland that he held his office by virtue of Adolf Eitler?s a44ointment and disobedience to him was disobedience to the 6uehrer that only two authorities e<isted in #olandthe authority of the -ehrmacht which was limited and his own which under the 6uehrer was absolute1 But in reality as 6ran7 slowly learned his 4osition was very different from what it was in theory1 88 :bergru44enfuehrer 6riedrich--ilhelm Brueger 4olice chief of the General Government was indeed 8taatsse7retaer of security under 6ran7 but although he 4olitely listened to 6ran7 he too7 his orders from the Feichsfuehrer 88 not from the Governor General1 6ran7 fought a ho4eless battle against this division of authority1 Ee told his governors who had originally been called district leaders but were u4graded in title for

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page_434 #age /)/ reasons of 4restige that they had the full 4owers granted by him in their districts but that of course they must coo4erate with the 4olice and 88 formations which he said cautiously were under the governors but were sub,ect to Eimmler?s directives1L Eimmler who distrusted everyone and had undercover men everywhere mistrusted 6ran7 more than most1 Ee had a file 4re4ared on the General Governor and in it were accounts of the ??endless corru4tionI of the 6ran7s: the lavish dinners they gave the dealings on the blac7 mar7et with the #oles % and with the Dews in the ghetto to which 6rau 6ran7 made fre@uent visits for loot of all 7inds which could be IboughtI for fractions of its value1 6ran7?s sister too as well as relatives of 6rau 6ran7 went bac7 and forth to the ghetto where furs and ,ewelry were to be had at 4rices such highly 4laced 4ersons could fi< for themselvesC the Dews called these deals ta4atieren which was a 4rudently disguised way of saying confiscation1LL The Dews were starving in their ghettoC children and old 4eo4le were dying by the hundreds as can be seen in the terrible moving 4ictures Goebbels made for 4ro4aganda 4ur4oses in the Feich1 Ee never dared show them in Germany these 4ictures showing the dar7 rooms and emaciated faces and birdli7e legs and arms the eight-and nine-year-olds dancing ,er7ily in their rags in the streets to earn a crust of bread from 4eo4le who had none to give1 Thus while the Governor General with his decrees 7e4t food out of the ghetto his wife hel4ed to 4rovide the means to bring it in as did one of 6ran7?s retinue a man named 9orenH 9oev chief of the .entral :ffice of Administration in -arsaw who was tried by the 88 for his dealings in the blac7 mar7et1 9oev bought a gold fountain 4en in the ghetto as a birthday 4resent for his chief the Governor General and he also bought furs1 6ran7 said he had not 7nown of the source of the fountain 4en and as for the furs the German administrators needed them in the cold northern climate1* !veryone dealt in the #olish blac7 mar7et where currency had little value but one 4aint brush or a dress would buy a cow a 4air of boots fetched ( 0$$ Hlotys and one horseshoe nail was worth ) FM1($ Eimmler?s main drive was for the ac@uisition of 4ower1 The vast number of 7illings he ordered were final 4roof for him of his near omni4otence and li7e many 7illers he 4rided himself on his integrity in lesser mattersC he tolerated no chicanery in the 881 Dealings such as those 6ran7 and 9asch indulged in genuinely re4elled Eimmler but he could not dislodge 6ran7 from his ,ob mainly because as the 6uehrer told Goebbels 6ran7 had an im4ossible ,ob anyway and the available re4lacements would be no better1 But the re4orts continued to 4our inC only visitors who brought 4resents were L :riginally there were four of these governorsC another was added after the Germans con@uered Galicia1 LL The Governor of Fadom Barl 9asch who owed his a44ointment to 6ran7 was denounced by Eimmler for his Igigantic corru4tion1I 9asch testified against 6ran7 in hearings conducted by Eimmler?s 88 re4resentatives but was nevertheless turned over to the Gesta4o and li@uidated1

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page_43 #age /)0 welcome to the Governor?s 4alace one 88 informer said and Army re4orts on the state of the General Government referred to the ??unbelievable conductI of the 6ran7s1L At the end of the war when .racow was being evacuated some of the art treasures 6ran7 had collected were left behind as the Fed armies moved swiftly ahead after their halt at the -eichsel =a halt to 4ermit the Germans to 4ut down the -arsaw u4rising and to s4are themselves having to deal with the troublesome #oles>1 The German Army re4orts said that along with the 6ran7s? art treasures were secret documents a lu<urious armored Mercedes and large @uantities of wines and food1 (( By (*/) 6ran7 had gained in stature1 Ee was a world figure with his own 4alace and his 4rivate railroad car with the sim4le identification in bronHe letters of IGovernor General I for he was the only one with that title in all the Feich and its de4endencies1 Ee ruled his satra4y from the ghettos to the Governor?s 4alace with an iron hande<ce4t of course for the 4olice whose com4lete obedience continued to elude him1 6ran7 for five years ran a small but delu<e imitation of the NaHi 8tate1 9i7e the 6uehrer he had a de4uty a higher 88 and 4olice leader and de4artments of the interior ,ustice education construction and 4ro4aganda1 A4ing Eitler he called himself Ia fanatic of administrationI with everything so far as he could manage under his control1 6ran7 imitated the forms that Eitler had ado4ted as much he could: for his conferences he had the same horseshoe-sha4ed table at the center of which he 4resided and he imitated the 6uehrer too in having a cor4s of stenogra4hers ta7e down what he said on these occasions1 These imitation Itable tal7sI were the source of the thirty-eight volumes of so-called diary that he turned over to the Allies when he was arrested1 The ac@uisition of booty he said is one of the strongest instincts of man7ind and with the Governor?s e<am4le before them his aides did their best to enrich not only the Feich with what they too7 out of #oland but themselves as well1 Americans found ($ $$$ boo7s and large chemical su44lies which had been ta7en from the "niversity of .racow and brought to Germany where they were stam4ed as the 4ro4erty of the Institute for !astern Fesearch =Institut fuer :starbeit> an organiHation founded in (*/$ by 6ran7 to investigate various as4ects of occu4ied #oland1(& Altar 4ieces were ta7en from churches food was confiscated from the #olish 4easants and almost everything was stolen from the Dews1 Thus with the su44lies that had to be shi44ed to the Feich the local re@uisitions and the 4rivate 4lunder shortages of all 7inds increased from month to month1 !verything edible or wearable ra4idly disa44eared and mar7et 4rices s7yroc7eted by ) $$$ and / $$$ 4er cent1() By (*/) the entire 4o4ulation of the General Government was liable to L 6ran7 grandly had his son ta7en to Munich in (*/& at least one of his 88 critics said so that the child might have the e<4erience of hearing an air-raid siren something he had not yet heard in the Bavarian countryside where he lived and rarer too in that year than it would be later on1

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page_43! #age /)' forced labor and the decrees 6ran7 issued made increasing demands1 Eis first order on :ctober &' (*)* had 4laced the 4o4ulation from ages eighteen to si<ty at the dis4osal of the occu4ation for reconstruction of wardamaged areas and on December (/ another decree had made young 4eo4le of both se<es from the ages of fourteen to eighteen sub,ect to labor conscri4tion1 (/ "nem4loyment as in the case of all the occu4ied countries was high =there were two million unem4loyed in #oland at the end of hostilities> and the occu4ying 4ower under the Eague .onvention which the Germans had no intention of following had the obligation to 7ee4 the 4o4ulation fed as well as the right to demand wor7 of them as long as it was not war wor71 The German decrees however immediately established what was in effect slave labor1 Dews were 4aid two Hloty =about forty cents> a day1 Although 6ran7 said they wor7ed well he added that this money was not earned but was 4aid them as it was the #oles as an act of charity1 The wor7 done in this fashion the Germans said 4aid for the food 7itchens that were set u4 in .racow and other citiesfor the Dews were not yet being e<terminated1 By May () (*/& all the inhabitants of the General Government regardless of age or se< were liable to com4ulsory labor of any 7ind1(0 It was 6ran7 who rounded u4 for 8auc7el the forced laborers sent to Germany and the two men saw eye to eye on the need for su44lying the Feich with #olish labor and for feeding them enough to 7ee4 them energetic1 In the General Government 4ay was considered by the #arty theoreticians a 7ind of alms1 #oles had no right to wages1 6ran7 wanted them given 4ay incentives to get them to wor7 at full s4eed4art as he called it of his ??tic7lingI techni@ue1 IThe struggle for the achievement of our aims I 6ran7 announced Iwill be 4ursued cold-bloodedly 1 1 1 we sto4 at nothing and stand doHens of 4eo4le against the wall1I(' 6ood rations for the 4art of the 4o4ulation not wor7ing for Germany were to be 7e4t at a minimum 6ran7 had said at the beginning of the occu4ation and these 4eo4le need not wear leather shoes wooden shoes would do1(+ Ee 7e4t re4eating in his s4eeches to his staff to the -ehrmacht and to the 4olice that the #oles must be treated Iwith iron hardness1I The Germans would not shrin7 from draconic measures1(% #oland would never rise again he told them1 German colonialism in that country would not be li7e the wea7 colonialism in Africa: the General Government was to be a wor7 reservoir and nothing more1 In :ctober (*/$ 6ran7 informed a gathering of German soldiers that they could write to their families bac7 in the Feich that there were not so many lice and Dews in #oland any more although he added Iof course I could not eliminate all lice and Dews in only one year?s time1I The figure of the louse occurs more than once in the Governor?s writing and s4eeches1 Addressing a meeting of his staff in Danuary (*/$ he said: IMy relations with the #oles are li7e the relations between the ant and the 4lant louse1 -hen I treat the #oles in a hel4ful way when so to s4ea7 I tic7le them in a friendly manner it is to get them to wor7 for me1I(*

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page_43" #age /)+ 6ran7 the 4roconsul the legalist was never the sadistic 7iller that men li7e Eimmler Eeydrich and Boch were1 Ee wanted the #oles and the Dews to wor7 and he ob,ected when irre4laceable Dewish artisans were ta7en from their war wor7 and sent off to the e<termination cam4s for this damaged the German war effort1 The Dews and the #oles had wor7 to do and the 7illings gave him no 4leasure although he acce4ted the basic 4remises: the Dews eventually had to be gotten rid ofC the #oles could continue to e<ist but only insofar as they were useful to the Feich1 An estimated ) /+/ $$$ Dews lived in all of #oland when the Germans invadedC about ( /$$ $$$ were in the General Government1 Before 6ran7 too7 over Eeydrich had establishd the first ghetto on the first day of the war and he 4lanned to shi4 all the Dews in the rest of the country to the General Government to clear the other #olish 4rovinces for German settlement1 The trans4orts&$$ $$$ #oles and Dews in two monthscame in to the General Government without 6ran7?s having been 4reviously notified and he 4rotested about being forced to ta7e care of these large numbers with the limited facilities at his dis4osal1 At this time the Dews were not su44osed to remain long in #oland but were to be shi44ed to Madagascar as the 6oreign :ffice suggested in (*/$ or some other distant area of settlement1 The 4o4ulation of the Dews in the General Government went u4 to ( '$$ $$$ and 6ran7 ,ourneyed to Berlin to 4rotest in 4erson to Goering that he could not ta7e care of such numbers that were merely dum4ed on him1 Ee won his 4oint and after March &) (*/$ no further trans4orts were allowed to go to the General Government without 6ran7?s 4ermission1 Ee e<4ected to get rid of the Dews he had @uic7lyC they would go to Madagascar 6ran7 said 4iece by 4iece man by man girl by girl1 9ublin would become a decent city again fit for the German 4eo4le of the occu4ation to live in and .racow which 6ran7 said was ??crawling with Dews so that a decent 4erson would not ste4 into the street I was soon cleared of Dews as they were sent to the ghettoes established in -arsaw 9emberg and 9odH1 The -arsaw ghetto was set u4 ostensibly to control an e4idemic of s4otted fever but other reasons were also given: Dewish blac7-mar7et activities and 4rice gouging and then 4olitical and moral grounds were also alleged1 Both trolley and bus lines had to be rerouted for the ghettoes were to be cut off com4letely from the outside world1 There were /+$ $$$ Dews in the -arsaw ghetto and ('$ $$$ in 9odH1 Both were administered by a commissar who in turn dealt with the Dewish .ouncil under a Dewish chairman who held the title of mayor1 In this fashion the Dews themselves were made res4onsible for the administration of the ghetto1 In the -arsaw ghetto & /$$ Dewish 4olicemen 7e4t order and Germans had only to 4ass their orders along to the Dewish .ouncil1 The Dewish .ouncil 4rovided the labor battalions and su4ervised the chea4 4roduction of the ghetto where uniforms ammunition bo<es leather and wooden shoes brushes brooms mattresses and containers were manufactured and re4air wor7 of all 7inds might be gotten by the Germans

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page_43# #age /)% for the Dews in #oland were s7illed artisans a fact that hel4ed to 7ee4 thousands of them alive for some years after the -annsee .onference decreed their e<termination1 :n Duly )( (*/( Goering signed the message to Eeydrich that charged him to bring about the final solution of the Dewish 4roblem =see Goering .ha4t1 )>1 The -annsee .onference followed on Danuary &$ (*/& and 6ran7 sent his de4uty Buehler to re4resent him1 The Madagascar 4lan had fallen through1 There was no longer any 4ossibility of trans4orting millions of Dews to a remote 6rench island1 Instead they were to be sent to the !ast organiHed into gigantic labor columns which in the course of time with insufficient food and the e<hausting wor7 would dwindle to a hard coreC after that the e<terminations would begin in cam4s e@ui44ed for that 4ur4ose1 It was in the General Government that the evacuation to the e<termination cam4s began1 In December (*/( 6ran7 told a meeting of soldiers ??As far as the Dews are concerned I want to tell you @uite fran7ly that they must be done away with in one way or another1I Ee re4eated these 4hrases to his cabinet meeting in .racow and added: Before I continue I want to beg you to agree with me on the following formula: -e will 4rinci4ally have 4ity on the German 4eo4le only and on nobody else in the entire world 1 1 1 This war would be only a 4artial success if the whole lot of Dewry survived it while we shed our best blood to save !uro4e1 My attitude toward the Dews will therefore be based solely on the e<4ectation that they must disa44ear1 They must be done away with 1 1 1 Gentlemen I must as7 you to rid yourselves of all feeling of 4ity1 -e must annihilate the Dews wherever we find them and wherever it is 4ossible 1 1 1 The General Government will have to become ,ust as free of the Dews as the Feich1 &$ The 88 and 8D did the actual clearing of the ghettos with the hel4 of the 4olice forces and au<iliaries1 By December (*/& %0 4er cent of the Dews of the General Government had been trans4orted to e<termination centers1&( The rest of the Dews were 7e4t as a labor force in concentration cam4s where they wor7ed for the 88 industries1 The food situation by (*/& had become catastro4hic: a million Dews could no longer be fed 6ran7 wrote in his diaryC the total bread ration was to be canceled for them1 Fations would be 4rovided only for the )$$ $$$ Dews who wor7ed for the Germans as craftsmenC the others would get nothing1 And the #oles would not do much better1 IBefore the German 4eo4le are to e<4erience starvation I he told his aides Ithe occu4ied territories and their 4eo4le will be e<4osed to starvation 1 1 1 The new demands Mfrom GermanyN will be fulfilled e<clusively at the e42ense of the foreign 2o2ulation M6ran7?s italicsN1 It must be done cold-bloodedly and without 4ity 1 1 1I The #olish economy 6ran7 continued would feel the 4inch as would the trans4ort system1 IIn view of the worsening living conditions e<traordinary hardshi4

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page_43$ #age /)* will set in for railroad wor7ers and other categoriesC as the 4revious @uantities of food were already insufficient 1 1 1L The Germans in this area will not feel it1?? German soldiers returning to the Feich could bring bac7 anything they could carry along1 IThat we sentence one to two million Dews to die of hunger should be noted only marginally 1 1 1I && In Nuremberg where he became a convert to Foman .atholicism he said that the trial had sha7en him that he fully realiHed the enormity of the crimes that had been committed and in which he himself had 4artici4ated: IA thousand years shall 4ass I he told the court in the memorable 4hrase Iand this guilt of Germany shall not have been erased1I But he had been aware of his own res4onsibility much earlier as was shown for e<am4le when he told a gathering of his co-wor7ers on Danuary &0 (*/) =s4ea7ing now of #oles not Dews> I-e must not be s@ueamish when we learn that a total of (+ $$$ have been shot 1 1 1 -e are now duty bound to hold together 1 1 1 we who are gathered together here figure on Mr1 Foosevelt?s list of war criminals1 I have the honor of being Number :ne1 -e have so to s4ea7 become accom4lices in the world historic sense1I&) Ee regretted the de4ortation of Dewish man4ower that was still usable(*/) was the 4ea7 year of the mass e<ecutions in the e<termination cam4sbut the decision for their annihilation had been made in higher @uarters1 A great building 4ro,ect in the General Government had to be abandoned and this could have gone forward 6ran7 4ointed out had the thousands of Dews who were e<4erts at their trades been allowed to remain at wor71 -hether 6ran7 in coming to this conclusion was more concerned with the 4roduction of his General Government or his 4rivate war with Eimmler is a @uestion1 6or he waged a continuous war over a 4eriod of five years against Eimmler?s incursions on his territory and Eimmler in turn so BachAelews7i testified at Nuremberg called 6ran7 a traitor because 6ran7 defended both #olish and Dewish wor7ers against the increasing 88 demands for arrests and de4ortations1 But this was scarcely more than a ,urisdictional @uarrel1 -hen 6ran7 com4lained of the manner in which his 8tate 8ecretary and head of the 4olice Brueger had carried out Eimmler?s orders for arrests what he was em4hasiHing was that Brueger had acted without consulting himC this was ty4ical he said of the way the 4olice behaved following the orders of the Feichsfuehrer Iabout which I had no 7nowledge in contradiction to the 6uehrer?s directives and to which I had not given my consent1I 6ran7?s 4rotests about such matters as well as about the trans4orts of the Dews who were dum4ed on him were based not on the brutality of the evacuations or the deaths that occurred en route but on the need for his having to find a 4lace for these Dews the danger of e4idemics which might s4read to the rest of the 4o4ulation of the General Government and the fact that they were ordered by rival authorities without consulting him1 All that really interested L In the s4ring of (*/$ 6ran7 was told the #olish wor7er was getting only '$$+$$ calories a day instead of the necessary & &$$ =N TTIT &&))-#8 41 )*0>1

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page_440 #age //$ 6ran7 was that he be ac7nowledged the ultimate 4ower in his government as a 4roconsul following the directives of the distant 6uehrer but sovereign in the state he ruled1 Ee had been he confessed at Nuremberg an anti8emiteC the Dews he believed were res4onsible for the war and they were Germany?s im4lacable enemies1 ??Thin7 I he said in (*// when things were going badly for the Feich Iwhat would have ha44ened if the two million Dews who had once lived in #oland were there now to aid our enemies1I 9i7e 84eer and 8auc7el he was willing to 4ermit them to wor7 while they could and ob,ected to other Feich agencies ta7ing them off and e<terminating good techniciansC and while they wor7ed he wanted them and the #oles too to be fed so they could accom4lish their tas7s1 6ran7 had 7nown from the beginning about the 4lanned e<termination of the Dews and had a44roved it1 IThe Dews I he said Iwe will deal with in one way or anotherIC and the ghettos were as he 7new only a beginning in the 4rocess of IcleansingI !uro4e of the Dews1 Eis feelings for the #oles fluctuated in a wider arc1 -ith his love for music =he was a gifted 4ianist> and his desire to ma7e some headway against the bitter #olish resistance to his rule he established a .ho4in museum in .racowsomething the #oles themselves had not been able to do in twenty years one of his admirers told himand an orchestra that was 4ermitted to 4lay for the German officials in the Government1 Ee 4ressed for higher rations for #oles wor7ing for the Germans and even went so far in (*// as to tell the #oles they too might become 4art of the new !uro4e1 All 6ran7 was trying to do was to 7ee4 a semblance of order in his General Government and in addition get any hel4 he could muster against the #olish underground1 To this end he tried to win over the #olish clergy telling -arsaw Archbisho4 Dan 8a4ieha who com4lained to him of the 7illings of .atholic 4riests in the concentration cam4s that this was nothing to what the Fussians would do if they invaded #oland1 6ran7 would have li7ed to enlist a #olish legion at this des4erate 4oint in Germany?s affairs but nothing came of this 4lan or of his attem4t to create a #olish committee of advisors to his government who would in fact have nothing more to do than transmit his orders to the 4o4ulation1 The #olish committee would have been the e@uivalent of the Dewish .ouncils1 Both Eimmler and the 6uehrer however remained adamant on any @uestion that had to do with altering the 4lanned future of the territory and 4eo4les they had set out to con@uer in the !ast1 -hen they yielded at any 4oint as when former 8oviet General Glasov finally was able under the 88 to send 4art of his Fussian army into action their moves came so grudgingly and so late as to be of little use1 The worse the war went for Germany the more 6ran7?s friendly feelings for the #oles increasedC but his sentiments never went beyond the 4oint he had reached when he declared in a s4eech to his staff that the #oles might wor7 to hel4 Germany win the war and after that he didn?t care if they became mince-

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page_441 #age //( meat1 6ran7?s only resistance to acts of violence committed against the #oles and Dews came when he was not consulted about them1 Nevertheless 6ran7?s was a dee4ly divided nature1 Ee turned over the damning volumes of his diaries to the Allies at Nuremberg he ac7nowledged his own guilt for the atrocities committed and he always retained at least the dregs of a genuine feeling for what he continued to regard as the ma,esty of the law1 Ee made s4eech after s4eech that seemed designed as much to convince himself as his hearers of the need for a system of law and ,ustice in any state including the Third Feich for the inde4endence of the ,udiciary for nurturing the inner sense of ,ustice of the 4eo4le1 Ee said that in the case of the Germans this necessity was es4ecially acute because the German sense of ,ustice was both a tribal and racial inheritance =ur)eutsch> and a state without ,ustice could not survive1 A good 4art of his rhetoric was directed against Eimmler and the erosion of 6ran7?s own authority as Governor of #oland but through all his s4eeches on this sub,ect and in his diary too there is a thread of continuityC his belief that the law must 4reserve its integrityC the accused if he is a German must be given a hearing by a com4etent ,udgeC he must have defense counselC and he must be charged with a crime that was such before he committed it1 -hat 6ran7 7e4t saying he wantedan authoritarian state under lawwas a fabulous beast1 At the time of the Foehm 4utsch 6ran7 was Minister of Dustice in Bavaria1 Told of the arrests being made by order of the 6uehrer he hurried to the 4rison where the 8A leaders were being brought under 88 guard and herded into cells in the same fashion many of them in their time had brought 4risoners into the 8A 7angaroo courts where Dews and other enemies of the 8tate were sometimes 7illed and sometimes beaten before being sent on to the early versions of the concentration cam4s1 Now themselves accused of a cons4iracy to ta7e 4ower the to4 brass of the stormtroo4ers had been arrested1 The list of cons4irators had been com4iled by the 6uehrer himself and many of the names on it such as General von 8chleicher #a4en?s assistants Bose and Dung and Gregor 8trasser were those of 4eo4le who had nothing whatever to do with the 8A but were merely under sus4icion of being dangerous to Eitler1 The ma,ority however were Brownshirt leaders and all those brought into the 4rison of the Ministry of Dustice were 8A men1 The building swarmed with 88 men under the command of 8e44 Dietrich and #rince -aldec7 but 6ran7 nevertheless visited the cells including the one Foehm had been thrown into1 6ran7 told Foehm what he told the other 4risoners that he was safe in his charge from any act of violence on the 4art of the 88 because he was in the 4alace of ,ustice1 6ran7?s confidence in the writ of his own authority did not last long for Dietrich and -aldec7 told him they had orders to shoot the (($ men whose names a44eared on Eitler?s list1 6ran7 refused to allow the order to be carried out and Dietrich tele4honed Eitler at the Brown Eouse in Munich1

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page_442 #age //& Ee first reached Fudolf Eess the 6uehrer?s de4uty and then Eitler came to the tele4hone and Dietrich handed the receiver to 6ran71 An irate 6uehrer told 6ran7 that these men were criminals and he the Feichs7anHler not 6ran7 decided what was to be done with themC the arrested 8A men were only in 6ran7?s ,ail because it was a convenient 4lace to bring them1 Then Eitler was gone and Eess was on the tele4hone againC he told 6ran7 bluntly to carry out the order1 6ran7?s legalistic mind was affrontedC some of these 4risoners had marched with him and with the 6uehrer at the time of the (*&) u4rising and were old #arty fighters he had defended in the courts of the -eimar Fe4ublic and they were to be shot down without a trial or any 7ind of court 4roceeding by an order given by two 88 officers and confirmed over the tele4hone1 Ee stalled for time telling Eess that the men had been dragged out of bed without wea4ons or signs of having 4lans of any 7ind that they gave no im4ression of 4re4aring an u4rising and among them were some of the most decorated officers of -orld -ar I1 In (*)/ while Eindenburg was still alive Eitler was not yet the all4owerful ruler he was to become a few years later1 According to 6ran7 the 6uehrer called the Feichs4raesident and got Eindenburg?s authority to e<ecute the enemies of the 8tate who had 4lanned to rise against him and 7ill him but by the time Eitler did this his fury had abated1 -hen ne<t the tele4hone rang 6ran7 heard the voice of Eess who told him to 4roceed immediately with the e<ecutions of the men whose names he would read to him1 Ee thereu4on read nineteen names that did not include Foehm?s1 6ran7 again tried to as7 on what legal grounds these men had been condemned but this served only to bring a furious Eitler again to the 4hone1 Eitler told him 4erem4torily to obey orders that the e<istence of the Feich was at sta7eone of the first times Eitler automatically identified his own fate with that of Germany1 -hen they ne<t met Eitler said according to 6ran7 ??;ou?re a fine Minister of Dustice tal7ing about 4aragra4hs when they wanted to 7ill me1I &/ The nineteen were shot and a few hours later the 6uehrer ordered Foehm?s e<ecution1 6ran7?s resistance oddly enough did not disturb the relationshi4 between Eitler and his former defense counsel1 Eitler hated what he regarded as the small-minded 4aragra4h-hunting 4ettifogging lawyerC his #eo4le?s .ourts made u4 of three laymen who were always #arty members and two 4olitically de4endable hand-4ic7ed ,udges were founded after the burning of the Feichstag and the incom4rehensibleto Eitlerfreeing by the court of four of the defendants all of them .ommunists1 Eitler became increasingly im4atient of German ,udges who handed out sentences that seemed to him too light1 Ee read the court decisions carefully and again and again when he thought a ,ail sentence handed down too mild he changed it to a death sentence1 :n A4ril &' (*/& at the last session of the Feichstag in which the docile de4uties voted him full 4ower over German ,uris4rudence he said I6rom now on I will interfere and ,udges who do not 7now the demands of the hour will be removed from their 4osts1 I will

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page_443 #age //) never rest until every German sees that it is shameful to be a man of law1?? &0 As early as (*)/ at the time of the Foehm 4utsch Eitler had referred to himself as the highest ,udge in the Feich when he orderd the arrest and e<ecution of at least a hundred 4eo4le1 6ran7 if he were to remain in the 6uehrer?s good graces had to ta7e the same view of the law to declare there could be no crime without 4unishment that the ,udge?s ,ob as he said Iis to 4rotect the concrete order of the community to get rid of wrong-doersC to avenge conduct disturbing to the community 1 1 1 The basis of all sources of law is the National 8ocialist 4hiloso4hy es4ecially as it is e<4ressed in the #arty 4rogram and the utterances of our 6uehrer1 No ,udge has the right to @uestion decisions of the 6uehrer whether they are given in the form of laws or decrees 1 1 1 9egal conce4ts 4romulgated before the National 8ocialist revolution may not be used if their use would affront the healthy sentiments of the 4eo4le1I&' 6ran7 was never able to solve this dilemma by any 4rocess of reasoning1 Ee wor7ed both sides of the street tal7ing of law and ,ustice and at the same time telling the ,udge who must be inde4endent and o44ose the arbitrary seiHures of life and 4ro4erty by the 4olice that the law was what Eitler said it was for he was Germany and Germany was Eitler1 6ran7 in Danuary (*)' too7 his first ste4 in both directions when he told the ,udges of Germany in a directive that too7 on a @uasi-official character when it was 4ublished in the yearboo7 6erman La, IThe ,udge is not set u4 over and above the citiHen of the 8tate but he is a member of the living community of the German 4eo4le1I&+ The Feich itself he went on was but a ,uridical formulation of the historical will of the 6uehrer1 -hether the 6uehrer rules according to a regular constitution or not is not a @uestion of law he said the @uestion of law is only whether the 6uehrer assures the life of the 4eo4le in what he does1 -hy did the 8tate have to have concentration cam4s he as7ed an audience in the same year where 4eo4le could be sent without a warrantO :nly because of the danger of bolshevism he answered and since Germany under Eitler would always be living in a state of emergency threatened by Dews and Bolshevi7s the need for the cam4s continued1 In (*/& when 6ran7 tal7ed on the sub,ect of the law as the foundation stone of the 4eo4le?s community he s4o7e on the same general to4ic that seemingly gave him no 4eace1 Ee told a "niversity of Munich audience on Duly &$ that 4erha4s only he could give the tal7 because he was an Iold fighterI and a Feichsleiter and thus was in a 4osition to defend ,udges and lawyers against the insu44ortable attac7s that were being made on them1 An article in the 88 4a4er as Sch,ar0e (or2s had called ,udges and lawyers Ilittle cloaca animals I in the @uaint NaHi verbiage of true believers aroused as they thought the 6uehrer wanted them to be1 6ran7 said that since the 6uehrer had given him the title of 9eader of the .hamber of 9aw of the Feich =Feichsrechtsamt> it was his duty to 4rotest1 At this 4oint the record of the meeting noted Ia storm of a44lauseI from the audience and 6ran7

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page_444 #age /// went on to re4eat what he had been saying for yearswithout ,ustice there is no community and for the obtaining of ,ustice an inde4endent ,udge was needed1 The belief in this form of ,ustice was one of the oldest Germanic cultural attributes1 It was not 4ossible for a ,udge to be a danger to the 8tate1 The only danger was to those who wanted something other than ,ustice1 !ven a bad ,udge gives a defendant the chance to be heard and without this hearing any action against a defendant is merely an arbitrary 4olice measure1 ??It may seem I he blea7ly told his audience Ias though I am giving you a 4rogram for the future 1 1 1 that reality s4ea7s another language1I And thus having used u4 his shots aimed at the realm of Eeinrich Eimmler he carefully made sure of his lines of security1 IAdolf Eitler lives I he said Ithe 4icture of the 6uehrer is the sun and we are the fighters in his service and we as7 of him: 6uehrer 4rotect the ,ustice of the Feich too1I IThe German 4eo4le I 6ran7 added Ihad had their u4s and downs historically but one thing had always remained luminous 1 1 1 the belief in a higher order of e<istence and the indestructible law of our 4eo4le1I &% This was all very well on the immediate occasion of a s4eech given before an audience in a university where students had dared to show signs of resistance to the #arty =It was at the "niversity of Munich that a brother and sister Eans and 8o4hie 8choll 4re4ared their anti-NaHi 4osters and where a large audience of students o4enly dis4layed their anti4athy to #arty s4ea7ers1> 8uch 4eo4le could be told that Germany must never be a 4olice state that 4ower alone does not ma7e a state and that brutality is not the same as strengthC whether they believed him or not they gladly heard 6ran7 on this sub,ect1 6ran7 was an easy target for the Feichsfuehrer 88 and Bormann and the other direct actionists whom he censured1 Eis own corru4tion and Eitler?s mistrust and disli7e of lawyers and legality when it 4revented him from doing something he wanted to do left 6ran7 immured in his #olish satra4y1 Eitler did not bother to get rid of him there but he de4rived him of his audience of lawyers and students and the balm to his conscience they 4rovided1 6ran7 acce4ted this decision without demur as from the beginning he had acce4ted the many 4arado<es of his s4irited if theoretical cam4aign on behalf of the law1 Eis was one of the countless number of schiHoid natures of the Feich1 Almost everything he did in #oland contradicted his statements on the sanctity of the law but of course law for #oles was something else than it was for Germans1 -hen the so-called I4acifying actionI designed to sto4 by terror #olish acts of resistance against the German occu4iers was underway 6ran7 said on May )$ (*/$C IAny attem4t on the 4art of the legal authorities to intervene in the action underta7en with the hel4 of the 4olice should be considered as treason to the 8tate and to German interests1I &* This 4acifying action he said lay outside the sco4e of normal legal 4rocedures =the victims were arrested and either e<ecuted or sent to concentration cam4s>1 6ran7 said the 4olice and he were coo4erating and whether the action was carried out by the 4olice or by his men made no difference

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page_44 #age //0 for the 4olice were under him1 The latter 4art of the statement was a considerable e<aggeration but he succeeded in ma7ing clear that there was no com4etition in this wholesale 7illing1 The 4roblem he said was to li@uidate the ruling class of #oland and to ma7e sure that it was not re4laced1 In #oland 6ran7?s Germanic feeling for the sacredness of law and ,ustice 4layed no role whatever1 Neither the lives nor the 4ro4erty of these 4eo4le had the slightest right to 4rotection if he decided otherwise and he fre@uently did1 The defense of the law for him li7e the sanctity of the word of an 88 man for Eimmler was an outward and visible sign of a lost rectitudeC it was the same 4sychological defense that concentration-cam4 guards made use of when they called themselves soldiers or that the gunmen of the !insatH s@uads or commandants of e<termination cam4s used when they s4o7e of their insu44ortably hard tas71 Eoess the commandant of AuschwitH thought he was more sensitive than most 4eo4lea defect he declared that he sought to cover u4 with an icy e<terior1 !ichmann said much the same thingC he was so sensitive he confessed in the course of his hearings in Israel that he could not bear the sight of blood and so could not have been a doctor1 6or 6ran7 self-rescue too7 the form of his ho4eless fight on behalf of the law in an authoritarian state1 Ee actually ran small ris7s on behalf of his often reiterated ideal if indeed that ideal ever was much more than a wea4on against Eimmler1 The 6uehrer as 6ran7 7new was not li7ely to forget the old fighters of which 6ran7 was oneC even when they irritated Eitler they rarely fell far from grace unless they cons4ired against him or @uestioned his mana something that 6ran7 never did1 Nevertheless in at least one 4art of 6ran7?s mind some vestiges remained of what his old teachers had told him about the sanctity stability and mysti@ue of the law1 Eis 4osturing was not all a charadeC the attem4t to save the lives of the 8A men for e<am4le even against the will of the 6uehrer evidenced this1 6ran7 allowed the nineteen to be shotC he had no way of 4reventing it aside from o4en revolt which was unthin7able and he did manage to save the others1 In this instance he had nothing to gain and much to lose1 The division in his soul may also be seen in his conversion to .atholicism and his ab,ect confessions of guilt which were only occasionally tem4ered by attac7s on the Allies for their treatment of the Germans1 Again in his autobiogra4hy he a4ostro4hiHed the #olish 4eo4le whose ruling classes he had striven to annihilate wishing them and their country a flourishing and eternal life1 6ran7 7new what his fate would be at NurembergC he had 7nown it years before as was shown when he told his aides about the list of war criminals he headed1 "nli7e 8auc7el who was sur4rised that after all the 4raise that had been bestowed u4on him for his efforts in 4roviding wor7ers for the Feich he should be suddenly flung into 4rison and accused of war crimes and crimes against humanity 6ran7 acce4ted now that the NaHi furors had subsided the 4oint of view of the non-NaHi world and of his accusers1 At Nuremberg the ideal of the law for him was vastly overshadowed

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page_44! #age //' by reflections on a far higher 4ower and on the eternity to which he had hel4ed to send so many thousands of hel4less 4eo4le1 Ee attac7ed Eitler who he thought had betrayed the trust and devotion millions of Germans had 4laced in himC the 6uehrer the godless one had deluded them all although it is not easy to see what 6ran7 learned in Nuremberg about either his leader or what went on under him that he had not 7nown before1 The testimony he had heard in the courtroom had sha7en him to his roots he said1 But why had itO -hat could he have heard in Nuremberg that he had not 7nown when he had the 4ower of life and death in the General GovernmentO #erha4s he came blin7ing bac7 into the light of the ordinary world where he had once studied law and acce4ted the norms with which he had been brought u4 and which a44eared only wanly and from time to time in his mind when during the long NaHi years at intervals he duly 4aid them li4 service1 Eitler had given him a great deal a 4rovince of his own high life a chieftainshi4 of the master race and this had almost but never @uite converted him to the same role of e<terminator that Eimmler had assumed1 Artur 8eyssIn@uart 8eyss-In@uart a De4uty Governor of 6ran7?s in #oland had also after the Anschluss been .hancellor of Austria for four days1 -ith a lim4 a bald s4ot and thic7 heavy-rimmed glasses he loo7ed at Nuremberg 4recisely li7e what he was: a serious-minded middle-aged attorney1 Eis lawyer o4ened the defense with the words of the man 8eyss-In@uart had hel4ed de4ose Burt 8chuschnigg the .hancellor of Austria before him ??May God 4rotect Austria1I It was a feeble gambitfor 8eyss li7e the 6uehrer had dreamed and wor7ed most of his life for the Anschluss of Austria to Germany1 The 4rotection of Austria he gladly would have left to Eitler?s Feich and only after that 4erha4s to God1 8eyss-In@uart li7e so many of his countrymen thought the 4osition of Austria after -orld -ar I s4iritually economically and 4olitically ho4eless unless Austria became 4art of the German 8tate1 Austria never recovered from the war after which a half million men =their families brought the total to over a million> out of a 4o4ulation of si< million were unem4loyed in the shrun7en remnant of the em4ire that with its mi<ture of races and geogra4hy had given an economic unity to the Danube area and a 4ros4erity its inhabitants were not to 7now again until years after the end of -orld -ar II1 Men who li7e 8eyss-In@uart ,oined the NaHis or one of the other e<tremist 4arties wor7ing for the Anschluss after Eitler came to 4ower were convinced that no other 4ossible means of survival e<isted for their country which had twice voted for union with Germany long before their fellow countryman Eerr Eitler became .hancellor of the German Feich1 -hen Austrians had a chance to e<4ress their 4references they voted overwhelm-

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page_44" #age //+ ingly for the union with Germany1 After -orld -ar I the Austrian #rovisional National Assembly declared Austria 4art of the German Fe4ublic a declaration re4eated a few months later by the .onstitutional National Assembly1 #lebiscites held in (*&( in the Tyrol were *% 4er cent for Anschluss1 8eyss-In@uart was born in (%*& on the frontier of the 8lav world in the little town of Iglau in Moravia which was then a 4rovince of the AustroEungarian !m4ire1 At the age of fifteen he moved with his family to Gienna where after ta7ing his Abitur he studied law at the university1 In (*(/ he enlisted in the AustroEungarian ArmyC he fought on the Fussian and Italian fronts and was wounded and decorated for valor in the 4resence of the enemy1 8eyss received his law degree during a furlough in (*(+ and after the war he mildly 4ros4ered at his 4ractice1 Ee was a devoted .atholic but as in the case of thousands of his Austrian co-religionists his German nationalist sentiments com4letely dominated his 4olitical thin7ing1 Ee ,oined one of the many cons4iratorial nationalist and racist organiHations that s4rang u4 in Austria as in Germany and became a member of the German Brotherhood =die deutsche Gemeinschaft> the stated aim of which was to liberate the German 4eo4le from Dewish influence1 It was a secret organiHation run on the hierarchical 4rinci4les that governed all such underground grou4s of the 4eriod with the lower echelons sub,ect to authority of the higher1 The Brotherhood had suborganiHations with different names designed to bring in members who might shy away from the austere tenets of the 4arent grou4 but all of these grou4s had three re@uirements: the member must be of German blood must not be a 6reemason and must not be married to a Dewess1 6ounders were the elite of the BrotherhoodC later members were sworn to carry out the orders and assignments given them by those with a low number in the organiHation1 Members? names were not to be mentioned when they ,oined the society1 The members were on the whole a heterogeneous lot although they included some well-7nown 4olitical figures including the future .hancellor !ngelbert Dollfuss1 Dollfuss was a staunch clericalist but he was also ,ust as staunch an anti-8emite and anti8ocial Democrat1 Ee became a bitter o44onent of the National 8ocialists and of the Anschluss once Eitler became .hancellor but in the early days he and men li7e 8eyss-In@uart made common cause based on their anti-8emitism anti-6reemasonry and belief in the need for Austria to be 4art of a Greater Germany1 There were many gatherings such as those of the Brotherhood in the 4ostwar years in both Austria and Germany as well as other countries of !uro4e1 They were made u4 of men who had fought in the war and come bac7 to civilian life bewildered by the defeat or as in 6rance and Italy by what was regarded as the futility of the victory and the blasted ho4es that followed it1 In all the countries of !uro4e little grou4s from the .ommunists and anarchists of the 9eft to the genuine and 4roto-6ascists of the Fight met

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page_44# #age //% secretly to 4lan a world nearer to their hearts? desire1 The grou4s were es4ecially numerous in countries where the e<-soldiers of an army that had lost the war found themselves facing a future they could not assess in any way in terms of their own e<4erience of the 4ast1 Im4erial Austria was gone and in its 4lace were a rum4 state a 4o4ulation now cut off by tariff barriers and the succession states cut off from the balanced economy the former 4olyglot em4ire had 4rovided1 "nion with Germany was forbidden by the con@uerors who could scarcely have been e<4ected to countenance a German state bigger than the one they had been able to defeat only with the hel4 of an overseas non-!uro4ean 4ower1 All through Germany and Austria the 4rotest against the defeat was lin7ed with sentiments that had to do with Germanism with the feeling that it was the foreign bodies that had 7illed the em4ireC the 8lavs and the Dews had betrayed the Germans who had rightfully dominated the cultural 4olitical and social life of these mi<ed 4o4ulations1 In the 4lace of the German states had come synthetic constructions li7e .Hechoslova7ia and the whole ric7ety structure of 4ostwar !uro4e was held together by a coalition of wea7ness1 The German character of Austria was undeniable as was the 4ro-German leaning of its 4o4ulation even after Eitler became .hancellor1L 8eyss-In@uart?s relation to the early Austrian NaHi #arty was tenuous1 Ee ,oined the 8tyrian Eome Guard which later went over en bloc to the National 8ocialistsC the Austro-German Gol7sbundC and the 6atherland 6ront a strongly nationalistic organiHation which also amalgamated with the NaHis in later years1 In addition from (*)& on he 4aid dues of &$ schillings a month to the NaHi #arty1 Thus as he assured Eimmler after the Anschluss when his #arty regularity was being @uestioned he had from that year considered himself a member of the #arty1 But 8eyss-In@uart had to argue both sides of his own case for when he was defending his career as a National 8ocialist at Nuremberg he made much of the fact that he had 4ut off officially ,oining the #arty as long as 4ossible because he was a .atholic and had de4lored their acts of violence1 Ee solemnly assured Eimmler however that he had never sent a telegram of good wishes to the new .hancellor when Dollfuss too7 office1 8eyss un@uestionably subscribed to the main tenets of the NaHis long before he ,oined them1 Eis belief in a Greater Germany his anti-8emitism and anti-6reemasonry his un@uestioning ac@uiescence in the authoritarian form of the 4arties he did ,oin as well as his 4aying dues and the subse@uent use the German National 8ocialist leadershi4 made of L During the trial of 8eyss-In@uart 8umner -elles who had mar7ed anti-German feelings could nevertheless be cited by the defense1 In his Time for ecision -elles wrote that .hancellor 8chuschnigg had admitted that if the Germans invaded Austria a ma,ority of the country would welcome them but if the Italians came the country would rise against them as one man1 ;et u4 to a few months before the Anschluss Italy was the chief 4rotector of Austrian sovereignty against Germany and when the Austrian .hancellor Dollfuss was murdered in a rising of the NaHis in (*)/ the Italians 4rom4tly mobiliHed their Al4ine divisions and sent them to their 4ositions at the Brenner #ass1

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page_44$ #age //* him evidence the stages of a tentative and then an all-out #arty member1 Ee 4ictured himself at Nuremberg as a nationalist and a believer in the Anschluss through natural evolutionary historical forces1 Ee was actually as 8chuschnigg said of him a limited Austrian NaHiC he was cautious correct and far removed from the murderers and brawling militant leaders li7e .a4tain 9eo4old who while he was nominally head of the #arty in Austria denounced 8eyss for lac7 of fervor and disobedience to #arty disci4line1L )$ 8eyss was easily 4ersuaded of what he wanted to believe1 Ee testified at Nuremberg that he had heard conditions were good at AuschwitH and that the cam4 had a hundred-4iece orchestra1 Ee said that this information had ended his in@uiries into the e<termination cam4 of which he had heard some dis@uieting rumors1 Ee had sent a member or two of his staff to as7 @uestions and when they returned with the answers he wanted to hear that was enough1 In Austria 8chuschnigg regarded 8eyss as a moderate a man with whom he could deal and who could re4resent him to Eitler and at the same time 7ee4 in chec7 the wild men of the #arty1 This was what 8eyss-In@uart the .atholic Austrian NaHi wanted to do1 The murder of Dollfuss by the Austrian 88 in (*)/ had a44alled him1 It was not only an act of brutality and violence foreign to 8eyss-In@uart it was a tragic deed that did great damage to the goal dearest to his heartthe Anschluss1 !vents however were always stronger than 8eyss-In@uart?s good intentions1LL 8chuschnigg never fully trusted 8eyss and only reluctantly a44ointed him to be 8tate .ouncilor early in (*)+ following the meeting with Eitler of Duly (*)' designed to reduce tension between the two countries1 At this meeting 8chuschnigg had agreed to a44oint a National 8ocialist to his cabinet and he made a member of the #arty former 8tate .ouncilor !dmund von Glaise-Eorstenau Minister -ithout #ortfolio1 8eyss was elevated to the ran7 of minister only after the stormy meeting between 8chuschnigg and the 6uehrer at Berchtesgaden on 6ebruary (& (*)% and his a44ointment was an e<4ress condition of the agreement reached there1 The #resident of Austria -ilhelm Mi7las too7 no more 7indly to him1 At first when 8chuschnigg told him the conditions of the Berchtesgaden agreement he refused to a44rove 8eyss as Minister of the InteriorC only when 8chuschnigg said the alternative was his resignation as .hancellor did he yield1 Mi7las testified at a later trial at Nuremberg that he had never overcome his disli7e of 8eyss1 Ee struggled against 8eyss? influence until he was de4osed after his futile effort to 7ee4 Austria inde4endent1 But Mi7las said he had been deserted by everyone by his former foreign allies and by his own countrymenC even 8chuschnigg had left him L 9eo4old later a lieutenant colonel was 7illed in action in Fussia1 LL 8eyss attended the same Desuit school as 8chuschnigg the 8tella Matutina and served in the Army with Dollfuss1

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page_4 0 #age /0$ to ta7e the final ste4s in relin@uishing Austrian sovereignty1 8eyss-In@uart acted out the 4art that had been written for him when he too7 his 4lace in the 8chuschnigg government in (*)+1 Eis first ,ob as 8tate .ouncilor was to serve as a safety valve for the embittered NaHis to listen to their com4laints and to try to im4rove their lot1 Although 8eyss had told both Eitler and 8chuschnigg that he would not become a Tro,an horse that is 4recisely what he became and his ,ob as Minister of the Interior was to mediate between them on the one hand to 4re4are the way for the Anschluss on the other to 4revent another 4utsch of the 7ind that had 7illed Dollfuss and greatly damaged for a time the 4ro-German movement in Austria1 -hen 8eyss ,ourneyed to Berlin to re4ort to the 6uehrer and when he returned to Gienna to re4ort to 8chuschnigg he had nothing to conceal1 Ee could tell both men to whom he believed he owed his conflicting allegiance what the other said because the longrange incom4atibility of their 4olicies was 4lain enough and could not 4ossibly be 4ursued for many months without a final test of strength1 8chuschnigg could only ho4e to yield as little as 4ossible to Eitler and to gain time that would bring foreign su44ort1 After becoming Minister of the Interior 8eyss greeted Eitler with outstretched arm and ??Eeil Eitler I recogniHing him in his fashion he thought as leader of the Germanic 4eo4les1 -hen he returned to Austria he greeted 8chuschnigg as head of the Austrian 8tate1 Austria no longer had any freedom of action after sanctions were im4osed by !ngland and 6rance against Italy at the time of the !thio4ian war1 :nce Mussolini had to turn to Eitler for su44ort against Italy?s former allies the cause of inde4endent Austria was lost1 Nor was the Austrian internal situation 4ro4itious1 8chuschnigg?s was an authoritarian government and li7e that of Dollfuss had to rule without elections =8eyss-In@uart?s lawyer at Nuremberg could well as7 Mi7las how he had held on to the 4residencyno election had ta7en 4lace nor could one ta7e 4lace without immediate danger of civil war>1 Dollfuss had ruled with much the same methods as Eitler although he never had the fanatical and wides4read su44ort that Eitler had in Germany1 .onfronted with .ommunist and 8ocial Democratic o44osition on the one side and the NaHis on the other Dollfuss had declared the NaHi #arty illegal in Dune (*))1 A few months later he 4ut down an u4rising of the 8ocial Democratic #arty and its armed Schut0bun) with a ruthlessness that even included the use of artillery against the wor7ers? housing develo4ment in Gienna1 The casualties included thirtyodd dead and &$$ woundedC Dollfuss? moral credit inside and outside Austria could never recover from this act of violence1 In 6ebruary (*)/ the Austrian 8ocialists organiHed an attem4t on his life and a few months later in Duly their mortal enemies the NaHis 7illed him1 Although a .atholic 8eyss was against the Austrian brand of clericalism of both Dollfuss and 8chuschnigg1 Their 4olicy was one of de4endence on

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page_4 1 #age /0( the Gatican he thought instead of on Berlin and this 4olicy could only result in the 4er4etuation of an Austria of the 4ost-(*(% variety torn by internal dissension constantly on the verge of civil war burdened with chronic economic de4ression1 That this view was shared by thousands of his countrymen4robably by the vast ma,oritywas shown not only by the votes for the Anschluss right after the war but by the well-nigh unanimous testimony of witnesses to the ecstatic welcome by the 4o4ulation when the German troo4s finally marched in1 The German invasion was called ??the flower war I and it bore far more resemblance to a Mardi Gras than to a military action and occu4ation such as too7 4lace when the Germans marched into #rague1 Behind the ,ubilation lay the ban7ru4tcy of the Austrian regime and 8eyss 4layed no more than a messenger?s role in the last fateful events which were brought on by 8chuschnigg himself1 8eyss? a44ointment as Minister of the Interior was a signal to the Austrian NaHi #arty that better times were coming1 The #arty had been officially outlawed since the murder of Dollfuss but the members were now allowed to raise their right arms in the NaHi salute and to say IEeil Eitler I 4rovided this was not done in a 4rovocative way1 Eundreds of National 8ocialists were released from 4rison under the terms of the Berchtesgaden agreement and 8eyss-In@uart ,oined Glaise-Eorstenau as a member of the Government1 -hat constituted 4rovocative or antigovernment behavior was now inter4reted by a NaHi Minister of the Interior who was also head of the 4olice and res4onsible for internal security1 Thus although swasti7a insignia were not su44osed to be worn in 4ublic the #arty members bought them in many Austrian towns and then marched through the streets with their colors flying without interference from the 4olice who were more li7ely than not to be 4ro-NaHi themselves and in any event were under 8eyss-In@uart?s orders1 IThe movement was no longer hindered by 8eyss? 4olice1I )( Feacting to the steadily increasing 4ressure Eitler could 4lace u4on him once Italy no longer 4layed the role of 4rotecting 4ower 8chuehnigg made a fatal blunder1 Ee was to 7now no 4eace after the meeting with Eitler at Berchtesgaden where Eitler from the first moment attac7ed 8chuschnigg for sabotaging German-Austrian relations stormed at him for his anti-Germanism and wor7ed himself into such a fury that both 8chuschnigg and his "ndersecretary of 6oreign Affairs Guido 8chimdt thought they would be arrested1 8chuschnigg had agreed to the meeting only when 6ranH von #a4en the German Ambassador acting a44arently in good faith had told him no une<4ected demands would be made of him1 The meeting was su44osed to deal with 4oints of friction that had a44eared since the (*)' agreement which would be again confirmed and #a4en told 8chuschnigg such direct conversations would hel4 ma7e Eitler more conciliatory toward Austria1 But #a4en?s o4timism was com4letely unfounded1 8chuschnigg was met at Berchtesgaden by three German generals who

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page_4 2 #age /0& although they said themselves that they did not 7now why they were 4resent stood behind so to s4ea7 every word Eitler uttered1 In the course of the stormy session with Eitler the Austrian .hancellor received the ultimatum he eventually had to acce4t with only minor changes1 In addition to naming 8eyss-In@uart and a44ointing another NaHi Dr1 Eans 6ischboec7 L to a high economic 4ost that would smooth the way for union with Germany 8chuschnigg had to agree to reinstate all NaHi officials and officers who had been relieved of their duties and most im4ortant in Article ' to declare everyone free to 4rofess the National 8ocialist creed and to admit National 8ocialists with e@ual status to the 6atherland 6ront1 There they would be 4ermitted ??to develo4 legal activities in accordance with Austrian law I although the NaHi #arty remained illegal1 The Austrian NaHis could well re,oiceC it was only a matter of time now1 Eitler held all the cardsC with a 4owerful National 8ocialist movement inside the country two members of the #arty in the 8chuschnigg cabinet and Austria isolated Eitler had only to maneuver with far less s7ill than he had needed to become the legal .hancellor of Germany1 8chuschingg 4layed into Eitler?s hands1 -hen the heat became too intense with the rowdy NaHi street demonstrations and the li7elihood of another 4utsch in the offing he decided to call a 4lebiscite that would convince the outside world that the National 8ocialists were a disre4utable minority in a country that stood behind its .hancellor and #resident1 The 4lebiscite was rigged1 :nly those over twenty-four years of age could vote1 The 4lebiscite was announced on March * only four days before the voting would ta7e 4laceC since no voting lists were 4re4ared it was to be held under the control of 8chuschnigg?s 4arty the 6atherland 6ront which would decide who could vote in im4rovised booths 4rovided with ballots that li7e those in the Feich made it difficult for INoI votes to be counted1 The voting would ta7e 4lace without secrecy which would ma7e it almost im4ossible for government officials for e<am4le to vote INo1I 8ince large numbers of the anti8chuschnigg forces were not yet twenty-four and because under the Austrian constitution a 4lebiscite could only be held if it were called for by the #resident and a44roved by a #arliamentneither of which had ta7en 4lace when 8chuschnigg announced his decisionthe whole 4rocess held vast 4romise of fraud1 It could only have been designed to gain a vote of confidence that could never have been obtained through normal voting 4rocedures1 Eitler moved swiftly and he turned 8eyss-In@uart now the chosen instrument into the Tro,an horse that 8eyss had sworn he would never become1 :n 6riday March (( (*)% 8chuschnigg learned early in the morning that the German-Austrian border had been closedC German customs officials were not at their 4osts1 A little while later 8eyss-In@uart a44eared in the L 6ischboec7 would later serve as 8eyss-In@uart?s !conomic .ommissioner in Eolland1

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page_4 3 #age /0) .hancellor?s office with Glaise-Eorstenau who had ,ust flown in from Berlin and they demanded that the 4lebiscite be 4ut off1 NaHi sound truc7s already were announcing the 4ost4onement and the 8A was in the streets1 8chuschnigg agreed to the 4ost4onement and it was already too lateC Eitler was not going to be content with half measures this time1 .haracteristically he raised the ante1 At ((:)$ in the morning 8eyss-In@uart tele4honed Goering to tell him the German demands were acce4ted but now there were other demands1 Goering said 8chuschnigg must resign and 8eyss-In@uart ta7e his 4lace as .hancellor1 8chuschnigg again s4arred for timeC but he had no cards to 4lay1 Ee thought of tele4honing MussoliniC he even 4ut in the call but canceled it for Mussolini would not move1 The Austrian 6oreign :ffice re4orted: ??The Italian Government declares it can give no advice under these circumstances in case such advice would be as7ed for1I 8chuschnigg could do nothing but resign and this he did in the afternoon of the (&th although after seeing Mi7las he said he intended to continue in office as e<-.hancellor until his successor was a44ointed1 But the Gesta4o was now in the chancellery and 8chuschnigg told Mi7las that there was no alternative to the a44ointment of 8eyss-In@uart who was after all a moderate1 -ith 8chuschnigg?s broadcast to the Austrian 4eo4le announcing his retirement =made from the same room where Dollfuss had been slain four years earlier> inde4endent Austria came to its end1 8eyss made a broadcast too as Minister of 8ecurity as7ing the country to maintain order and soon afterward Mi7las yielding to overwhelming force duly a44ointed him .hancellor1 )& Goering had 4re4ared a telegram to be signed and sent by 8eyss-In@uart that called in the German Army to 4reserve order in Austria1 8ince 8eyss had become .hancellor in 8chuschnigg?s 4lace this telegram would 4lace the seal of legality so cherished by Eitler after the failure of his (*&) 4utsch on the occu4ation1 8eyss denied at Nuremberg that he sent the telegram and in fact there is no evidence that he did1L Nor did he send the code word =IAgreedI> Goering had suggested he use in 4lace of the actual telegram indicating that the te<t of the 4re4ared telegram was in force1 8eyss did what he had always been 4rone to doC he went along without com4romising himself1 In the course of one of the many tele4hone conversations held the night of the ((th as the tension mounted and Eitler Goering Goebbels and com4any eagerly awaited the 4lay-by-4lay news from Austria the German 8taatsse7retaer -ilhelm Be44ler who had ,ust flown in to Gienna from Berlin told Dietrich head of the Feich News Bureau that L The te<t of the telegram was as follows: The 4rovisional Austrian government that after the demission of the 8chuschnigg regime sees its tas7 as that of restoring 4eace and order in Austria directs to the German Government its urgent re@uest to assist its tas7 and hel4 it to 4revent bloodshed1 To this end it as7s the German Government to send German troo4s as soon as 4ossible MN*A G &/')-#8 41 &$+N1

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page_4 4 #age /0/ 8eyss-In@uart had indeed agreed1 Be44ler had 4ressed 8eyss for action on the telegram and 8eyss had wearily said ??-ell you 7now my 4ositiondo what you want1I )) The telegram was merely a coverC whether or not it was sent made no difference1 The orders to the troo4s had been givenC they were to march and would in any case have been received ,oyously by the 4o4ulation1 But 8eyss held out1 The Austrian NaHi to the end he as7ed the 6uehrer if Austrian to7en troo4s might not march into Germany as a symbol of the togetherness of the countries and Eitler agreed to the gesture1 The 4lan that was carried out on March (( was the same one the Austrian 4olice had ca4tured in a raid on a NaHi head@uarters in Gienna in 6ebruary (*)+the so-called Tavs 4lan1 8igned by Fudolf Eess it declared that in view of the international situation the time was ri4e for Germany to move1 Demonstrations were to be engineered by the National 8ocialists in Austria then an ultimatum was to go to the Austrian Government demanding that NaHi #arty members enter the Government and government forces withdraw from the frontiers1 In case of a refusal German troo4s were to march1 But if the Austrian Government agreed to acce4t the ultimatum the Austrian NaHis were to move into government agencies the 6atherland 6ront and 4rofessional organiHations on a basis of e@uality with the other 4arties1 In any event as 8chuschnigg recalled the ca4tured Tavs documents in (*/0 the Germans had made their 4lans for moving into Austria on the same 4rete<t that was used when the real Anschluss came that the Government Iis no longer in a 4osition to co4e with the unrest in the country1 In this case the German Army marches into Austria to restore order1L)/ #resident Mi7las held on to his office for a few days and 8eyss remained as .hancellor for a s4ace of four days until Austria was incor4orated into the Feich on March (0 and needed no se4arate chancellery1 8eyssIn@uart treated 8chuschnigg most courteously ta7ing him home in his own car after the radio tal7 to the Austrian 4eo4le1 The 88 and the 8A were in control of the streets and of the chancellery and as 8chuschnigg was soon to learn =for he was 4rom4tly 4ut under house arrest> they had orders to see that he did not esca4e from the country1 The .ouncil of Ministers met on March (0 (*)% and amended the constitution to ma7e Austria 4art of the Feich1 "nder the authoritarian regimes of Dollfuss and 8chuschnigg this too was legalC no 4lebiscite or legislative act was needed1 The NaHis held a 4lebiscite a month later on A4ril &$ and the Austrian voters overwhelmingly a44roved the act of the L Guido 8chmidt the former Austrian Minister of 6oreign Affairs testified at Nuremberg that as he remembered the 4lan it included the 4ossibility of shooting the German Ambassador to Austria 6ranH von #a4en in order to create an incident that would ,ustify German armed intervention =N TGI 41 ('$>1 A similar 4lan at the time of the .Hech crisis was discussed in NaHi circlesC it involved an attem4t on the life of the German Minister !rnst !isenlohr which would be blamed on the .Hechs1

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page_4 #age /00 .ouncil1 Although it was not easy to vote ??No I the enthusiasm of the Austrians for their change of citiHenshi4 was undeniable1 8eyss-In@uart was introduced a few hours after the .ouncil met as 8tatthalter =Governor> the chief civic administrator of the country he had delivered to its new rulers1 But his actions in the course of the moves and countermoves leading to the Anschluss were not contem4tible nor were they different from what either 8chuschnigg or Mi7las had e<4ected of him1 Ee tried to 7ee4 the revolution decorous and when he hastened to 9inH to welcome the 6uehrer he declared in his s4eech what everyone 7new to be true and what he had been saying for yearsthat he had been waiting a long time for this moment of unification of the two German 4eo4les and that along with his Austrian com4atriots he re,oiced in 4lacing his country?s destiny in the hands of the 6uehrer1L 8ome wee7s later on A4ril + (*)% 8eyss returned to the sub,ect and told a Berlin audience gathered at the 84ort4alast: The National 8ocialist #arty in Austria never tried to hide its inclination for a greater Germany1 That Austria would one day return to the Feich was a matter of course for all National 8ocialists and for true Germans in Austria1 I as7ed the 6uehrer for armed assistance to save Austria from a civil war and from the fate of 84ain because I had information that the wor7ers? militia was to act as an armed military force at the 8chuschnigg 4lebiscite1 )0 Eere trying to inflate the 4art he had 4layed in bringing Austria IHeim ins /eich I he asserted the o44osite of what he was to say in his own defense at Nuremberg where he declared that he had not invited the Germans to come in to maintain order in the country1 Although he had sent neither the telegram nor the code word at this high 4oint in the fortunes of Germany he was delighted to 7ee4 alive the im4ression that he had1 In a letter to Goering more than a year later on Duly (/ (*)* 8eyss wrote in the same vein as he did to Eimmler who was sus4icious of the intensity of 8eyss? German National 8ocialist Heal1 8eyss e<4lained how indis4ensable he himself had been to the Anschluss and attem4ted to ward off the attac7s of the old fighters who li7e Eimmler were never convinced of his unconditional #arty loyalty1 Ee wrote to Goering: I 7now I am not of an active fighting nature unless final decisions are at sta7e1 ;et I 7now that I cling with uncon@uerable tenacity to the goal in which I believe1 That is greater Germany and the 6uehrer1 And if some 4eo4le are already tired out from the struggle and some have been 7illed in the fight I am still around somewhere and ready to go into action 1 1 1 I told myself in Duly (*)/ that we must fight this clerical regime on its own ground in order to let the 6uehrer use whatever method he desires1 L 8eyss was a good s4ea7er but of an academic 7ind that contrasted with the tub thum4ing of much of the NaHi oratory =-ilfred von :ven Mit 6oebbels bis 0um En)e MBuenos Aires: Duerer Gerlag (*/*N>1

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page_4 ! #age /0' I have stuc7 to this attitude with an iron determination because I and my friends had to fight against the whole 4olitical church 6reemasonry Dewry in short against everything in Austria1 The slightest wea7ness 1 1 1 would have de4rived the 6uehrer of the means and tools to carry out his ingenious 4olitical solution for Austria 1 1 1 I have been fully conscious of the fact that I am following a 4ath which is not com4rehensible to the masses and also not to my #arty comrades1 I followed it calmly and would without hesitation have followed it again because I am satisfied that at one 4oint I could serve the 6uehrer as a tool in his wor7 even though my former attitude even now gives occasion to very worthy and honorable #arty comrades to doubt my trustworthiness1 I have never 4aid attention to such things because I am satisfied with the o4inion which the 6uehrer and the men close to him have of me1 )' Both Goering and Eitler acce4ted this view of 8eyss-In@uart?s contribution to the Anschluss1 But in fact his #arty loyalty had not been as whole-hearted as 8eyss would have had them believeC it was actually closer to what he later sought to convince the Nuremberg tribunal it had been1 8eyss had lived for the Anschluss and he wanted to be out in front on the winning side =he immediately a44ointed as a member of his cabinet a hatchet man Baltenbrunner to his own old 4ost as Minister of the Interior> and from the time the revolt against 8chuschnigg was successful he went along with the strong battalions trying to convince all who would listen that he had never faltered in his sense of National 8ocialist duty1 But he had once com4lained before the Anschluss that as .hancellor he would be forced to a44oint NaHis to high 4osts and others? doubts of his #arty Heal in the years of struggle which he was never fully able to overcome were well founded1 As he wrote to Goering he was not of an active fighting nature1 Two years ela4sed after the events of (*)% before he too7 over the ,ob that delivered him to the high court at Nuremberg and earned him his death sentence1 In (*)* Eitler toyed with the idea of ma7ing 8eyss Ambassador to 8lova7ia after that country became a German satellite but 8eyss? ran7 as a Feichsminister -ithout #ortfolio seemed too high for such an insignificant 4ost1)+ Nothing he did in Austria where he served for fourteen months as Feich Governor of Gienna or later in #oland would have mar7ed him as one of the chief war criminals although he dutifully 4laced his rubber stam4 on the orders to de4ort Dews from Gienna and to confiscate their 4ro4erty along with that of the 6reemasons and Boy 8couts1 -holesale arrests of Dews and 8ocialists in Gienna began in the first hours of the Anschluss and two wee7s later the first de4ortations to Dachau began1 In #oland when he served under 6ran7 he issued no orders or 4roclamations on his own but merely re4eated what the other high and low officials were saying1 But he did his somewhat routine ,ob efficiently and at the brea7fast in the Governor?s 4alace at .racow where 6ran7 said farewell to him each man e<travagantly 4raised the other1

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page_4 " #age /0+ 8eyss-In@uart went directly from #oland to the highest administrative 4ost in Eolland where he remained until the end of the war1 In #oland he did no more than energetically second the 4olicies of his immediate su4erior Eans 6ran71 In some ways he resembled 6ran71 Both were lawyers both were 4assionately fond of music both were legalists for whom Eitler had contem4t but whom he nevertheless used and both were convinced of the vast role Germany must 4lay in Middle and !astern !uro4e1 8eyss was a more cultivated man than 6ran7 but he shared 6ran7?s anti-8emitism as well as his attitude toward the #oles1 In addition 4erha4s because he had been brought u4 in the neighborhood of a 8lavic culture 8eyss felt a mystical attraction for the tas7 he believed destiny had set the German nation in the !ast1 There was indeed wor7 to do in the -est he said but in the !ast there was a German mission to be 4erformed and this mission had to do with the need for Lebensraum for ac@uiring the s4ace occu4ied by an inferior culture and GermaniHing it1 8eyss-In@uart did not remain long in #oland =he too7 over his ,ob as De4uty Governor on :ctober (& (*)* and he left on May (% (*/$ to become Feichs7ommissar of Eolland> but he im4ressed those he met both su4eriors and underlings with his devotion to the 4ur4oses of the Third Feich1 Ee had time to ma7e an e<tended ins4ection tri4 through the General Government and to re4eat at every sto4 what his chief was saying that the #oles were to wor7 for the Germans that no other 4ossibility e<isted for them and that the Dews were to be made harmless1 But 8eyss unli7e 6ran7 4ic7ed u4 nothing for himself on his ,ourneysC he served the Feich in #oland as he had in Austria as a bureaucrat1 In Eolland where he held the highest civil authority =as Feichs7ommissar> he did his best for the Dutch as he testified at Nuremberg so long as they collaborated or at least caused no trouble1 Ee was 4roud of his recordC he had confiscated for the armed forces of the Feich he told his accusers only 0$ $$$ of the millions of bicycles in EollandC he had refused he said to increase the 0$-million-mar7s-a-month charge the Germans were e<tracting to meet the costs of the occu4ation =actually the Dutch 4aid twice as much>C and under his rule he 4ointed out &/$ $$$ Dutch had ??volunteeredI for labor service with the Germans com4ared to only /$ $$$ 6rench under the German military government1L In addition he told the court he had tried to increase food rations for Dutch wor7ers as well as for the rest of their countrymen and the success of his efforts he said a44eared in the 4o4ulation statistics which des4ite the des4erate food shortages in the last months of the war went u4 from % %/0 0/( in (*/$ to * )$$ $$$ in (*/01 :n numerous occasions he succeeded in reducing the number of hostages shot in re4risal for attac7s on the German occu4ation authority =in one instance from &0$ to 0$C in another where a German railroad train had L Not many of these were actually volunteers1 Among other measures Dutch authorities in the autumn of (*/$ decreed that any wor7er who refused to go to Germany would lose his ration cou4ons1

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page_4 # #age /0% been blown u4 and twenty-five 4ersons had been sentenced to die 8eyss got the number down to five>1 Ee had nothing against the shootings in 4rinci4leC he merely wanted none of the trouble that would be sure to arise from wholesale e<ecutions or other overly severe measures1 "nli7e 6ran7 whose 4osition as Governor on 4a4er at least was uni@ue 8eyss acted as Feichs7ommissar the same 4ost that Terboven held in Norway1 "nder Eitler?s decree of May (% (*/$ the Feichs7ommissar for the Netherlands was directly subordinate to the 6uehrer and re4resented the su4reme civil 4ower of the Government1 8eyss had com4lete legislative 4ower he could issue decrees and he could set u4 courts and bureaus to govern the country1 -hat he had to do basically was to follow instructions issued by the 6uehrer1 Ee o4erated with four German de4uties.ommissioners Generaland at the beginning of his rule with an administrative a44aratus of Dutch civil servants under eleven 8ecretaries General the chief civil officers in the Netherlands all of whom had held the same 4osts under the Foyal Government1 In both Norway and Eolland such administrations 7e4t u4 the fiction of inde4endent countriesin both cases 4o4ulated by 4eo4le of Germanic stoc7that once rid of their 4ro-Allied and Dewish influence might ta7e their 4lace in hel4ing the Third Feich rule !uro4e1 In Norway Suisling was the leader of the Germanic movement as well as head of the 4u44et government1 Mussert his Dutch counter4art was leader only of the Netherlands National 8ocialist #arty although he too as4ired to head a Dutch government with more than an administrative a44aratus1L Neither Suisling nor Mussert had any mass following1 8eyss did L Anton Adrian Mussert was a Dutch engineer who founded the Dutch National 8ocialist #arty in (*)(1 At the age of forty-three he lost his ,ob in the 4ublic-wor7s de4artment of the 4rovince of "trecht for his 4olitical activities1 Ee was married to an aunt some fourteen years older than he1 Eis a44arent desire to submit to authority was transferred though never @uite intact to the 6uehrer1 6or Mussert was also a Dutch nationalist and an admirer of both Mussolini?s 6ascism and the NaHis and he wanted to be head of a National 8ocialist Dutch 8tate of a Greater Netherlands which would include Belgian 6landers1 Ee 4re4ared in (*/$ an ambitious 4lan for a 9eague of Germanic #eo4les which would include Germany the 8candinavian countries and the Netherlands1 The 9eague would be led by Eitler but the com4onent nations were to be inde4endent and have armies of their own1 Ee tried re4eatedly to get the 6uehrer?s a44roval of this united front of the Germanic 4eo4les with Eolland at this stage one of its salients under leadershi4 of the Feich1 Ee swore an oath of fealty to Eitler whom he saw as leader of this Teutonic order but he resented the idea that Dutchmen should be regarded as Germans and in his three long interviews with the 6uehrer and in many s4eeches he tried to draw a 4atriotic line between German im4erialism and what he 4ro4erly sus4ected to be a 4lan to incor4orate Eolland into the Feich as Austria had been1 Eitler told him that a union of national states a Feich of the German nations was im4ossible and said that Mussert must be willing to ma7e sacrifices of his national sentiments as the 6uehrer himself had been des4ite his Austrian birth1 The future as Eitler saw it could only be won through the leadershi4 of the Feich1 Ee never stated his ob,ect of anne<ation outright but he made his 4ur4ose clear and Mussert resisted without however coming to a brea71 8im4leminded and tenacious Mussert said once that he would either land in the Eague or in Dachau but he did neither1 Ee came before a Dutch court at the end of the war was found guilty and 3footnote continue) on ne4t 2age5

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page_4 $ #age /0* his best to encourage the 4ro-German forces under Mussert but Terboven o44osed the similar movement in Norway because he trusted no Norwegians1 During the occu4ation the 88 recruited in both Norway and Eolland from 6lemish volunteers as well as from the -alloons of Belgium under the Fe<ist leader Degrelle obtaining foreign but ??GermanicI legions whose members swore allegiance to Adolf Eitler and would one day so it was 4lanned hel4 4olice the .ontinent on behalf of an even greater German em4ire1L 8eyss according to his 88 #olice .hief Eanns Albin Fauter favored ma7ing Mussert 4rime minister of a Dutch government but 8eyss was too convinced of strong Dutch reactions and too doubtful of Mussert?s @ualifications to try to ma7e him a Suisling1 )% In the early days of the German occu4ation 8eyss would have 4referred dealing with a middle-class coalition 4arty the Nederlandse "nie than with Mussert?s grou4 of National 8ocialists alone but Eitler recogniHed Mussert as the re4resentative of the Dutch 4eo4le and 4arties other than the N8B were forbidden1)* Although Mussert and Eitler in their meetings gravely discussed the wide range of the common battle against bolshevism the 6uehrer too was disinclined to set u4 a @uasiinde4endent Dutch government a44aratus for he had other 4lans for the Netherlands and the Germanic states1 8eyss? alleged idea of raising Mussert?s status was re4orted to Eimmler by Fauter but Eimmler of course wanted none of it1 Both he and Fauter mistrusted Mussert because of his stubborn Dutch nationalism1 Fost van Tonnnigen an economist who had once wor7ed for the 9eague of Nations was their candidate to head the Dutch National 8ocialists1LL They thought him both more intelligent and more amenable than Mussert1 8eyss-In@uart?s ,ob as he saw it was a 4atriotic one and he had no ambitions beyond it1 Ee was to 7ee4 the Dutch 4acified to use the economy and the 4eo4le for the benefit of the German war machine to shift the anti-German sentiment of the country to an understanding and acce4tance of its Germanic mission1 8eyss among his offices was an :bersturmbannfuehrer in the 88 =li7e all high NaHi civil officials he held an honorary ran7> and he too7 this 4osition seriously too1 Ee thought he had a degree of authority in his daily encounters with the 88 officials by virtue of his high ran7 in that organiHation and his esteem for it but he never had the 3footnote continue) from 2revious 2age5 was e<ecuted =MA ))% MIAGN1 Meeting of December (/ (*/&1 -erner -armbrunn The utch &n)er 6erman Occu2ation 789$789? M8tanford: 8tanford "niversity #ress (*')N>1 According to 4ostwar estimates the Dutch National 8ocialist movement 4robably reached a membershi4 of %% $$$ although some sources 4laced it as high as ($$ $$$1 Between + $$$ and % $$$ Dutch National 8ocialists and &$ $$$ to &0 $$$ men from the rest of the 4o4ulation fought in the war on the German side1 L !ven 9atin elements were eligible however for these 88 forces: 6rance was re4resented by the .harlemagne Division Belgium by I6landernI as well as I-allonia1I LL Fost van Tonningen li7e so many ardent National 8ocialists was an outlander1 Ee was born in 8uraba,a brought u4 in Eolland and became one of the most radical members of the Dutch National 8ocialist #arty =Gustav 8teinbauer un4ublished manuscri4t>1

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page_4!0 #age /'$ bitter conflicts with Eimmler that bedeviled 6ran71 Ee did however have the same battle with the Eigher 88 and #olice .hief Fauterwho was a44ointed to his Netherlands 4ost without 8eyss? 7nowing about itas did 6ran7 with Brueger1L Both Fauter and Brueger had orders from Eimmler to concern themselves with anything of a 4olitical nature occurring in their res4ective domains that would otherwise have come solely under the civil administrations1 In the 4lanned confusion of the NaHi organiHations such concerns had wide ambiance for Fauter was 8eyss? su4erior in the 88 although in the administrative a44aratus he nominally was 4laced under him and Fauter in his ca4acity as Eigher 88 and #olice .hief too7 his orders directly from Eimmler1 /$ 8eyss lac7ed 6ran7?s 4retensions and flamboyance and he had no desire to @uarrel with Eimmler or the 88 for he admired both1 Ee solved his 4roblem by 4rofessing that Fauter was obeying his own orders1 ??I myself have given the Eigher 88 and #olice 9eader I he wrote Iall the 4ower which an administrator of courts needs I thus ma7ing a claim of authority of the same 7ind that 6ran7 4retended to1 But the source of authority for the 88 courts came not from the Feichs7ommissar but from Eimmler and the best 8eyss could do was to maintain the fiction that the system functioned as he said it did with himself at its head1/( 8eyss thought the great 4ersonages of the Feich inca4able of any wrongful actthat is of any act of in,ustice against a German1 Ee was a singleminded man who fully identified himself with the cause of a Greater Germany finding without undue difficulty the soothing e<4lanations he needed to fit the decisions he made or acce4ted on behalf of his historic mission1 :nly in the last months of the war when Eitler?s scorched-earth directives =which the Army was inclined to follow> threatened Eolland with senseless destruction did he revoltC for he wished the Dutch no ill and was bewildered by their inability to see how well he and the Germans meant by them1 Ee refused to order the flooding of a number of the 4olders and agreed with 84eer with whom he tal7ed that the demolitions must be held to a minimum both in Germany and in the occu4ied countries1 This is not to say that 8eyss was moved mainly by humane sym4athies1 6ar from it1 In the General Government he was as harsh as 6ran7 in 4lotting the tragic roles of the #oles and the Dews1 -hen 8auc7el came to him in Eolland with the @uotas of forced labor to come from the Netherlands 8eyss 4rovided them without reluctanceC he would have li7ed the Dutch to volunteer but if they did not then they had to be 4ic7ed u4 and sent off to wor7 in Eolland Belgium 6rance or the Feich1 In Fotterdam and other cities 8eyss-In@uart ordered the great raHHias in which Dutchmen were rounded u4 for forced labor and he never hesitated to use the same hard measures that obtained everywhere in NaHi-occu4ied !uro4e to 4ut down any show of resistance1 -hen on 6ebruary &0&' (*/( in 4rotest against L Fauter also was an Austrian who had been a member of the underground NaHi #arty1

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page_4!1 #age /'( the raHHias in the Dewish @uarter of Amsterdam a general stri7e was called 8eyss-In@uart im4osed a fine of (0 $$$ $$$ guldens on Amsterdam & 0$$ $$$ on Eilversum and 0$$ $$$ on Aaandam1 /& 8eyss in any case could not understand why the Dutch refused to ta7e 4art in the anti8emitic crusade1 -ith the e<ce4tion of some 4eo4le in the rural areas the Dutch had never been anti8emitic and 8eyss was shoc7ed in May (*/& when as a demonstration against the Dews? being forced to wear the yellow 8tar of David hundreds of 4eo4le in Amsterdam and elsewhere wore yellow flowers1 8eyss also hel4ed to administer the hostage system1 In (*/$ he sent '$$ 4rominent Dutchmen as hostages to se4arate barrac7s in Buchenwald where they were given s4ecial 4rivileges and lived far better than the other inmates of the cam41 In (*/( they were transferred to internment centers in Eolland1 Another thousand hostages were 4ic7ed u4 in (*/&1 Almost all of them were released by 8e4tember (*// but after that members of Fesistance grou4s who were caught might sim4ly be shot out of hand1 The Dutch Fesistance had a slow but lu<uriant growth1 Mussert?s National 8ocialists in (*)0 mustered some % 4er cent of the total Dutch vote a number that was reduced to / 4er cent by (*)+1 -ith the e<ce4tion of this grou4 the Dutch 4eo4le from the start of the invasion were anti-NaHi1 The Dutch had no tradition of enmity with Germany and the sudden assault on them seemed shameless to every Dutchman1 An attem4t was made by 8eyss and the Dutch National 8ocialists to ,ustify the German attac7 by Eolland?s 4ro-Allied sentiments and the 4art the Dutch secret service had 4layed in the Genloo incident in which 8D men mas@uerading as members of the Fesistance against Eitler had dealt with !nglish agents and then seiHed them on Dutch territory1 The negotiations the !nglish agents had conducted in Eolland were held in the 4resence of re4resentatives of the head of the Dutch secret service Ma,or General D1 -1 van :orschot whose liaison officer was fatally shot when the AngloDutch 4arty was ca4tured by the Germans1 And what seemed to have been an act of terroristic destructionthe bombing of Fotterdam after the city had been surrendereda44eared to be a sign of singular NaHi ferocity1 Actually as Goering testified at Nuremberg and as later investigations demonstrated the Dutch willingness to negotiate a surrender had been communicated to the Germans too late to call off the attac7 on what had u4 to then been a well-defended city1 The radio 4hones were not o4erating 4ro4erly for the 4lanes? crews had 4ulled in their trailing antennas once they got over hostile territory and the flares the Germans 4laced to signal the 4ilots not to dro4 their bombs were recogniHed by half the bombing grou4 which turned bac71 The other half did the bombing1/) Numbed with the defeat and uncertain of the future the country as a whole ado4ted a wait-and-see attitude although the first underground news4a4er had a44eared a day after the occu4ation began1 The Dutch li7e the 6rench were im4ressed by the correct behavior of the German soldiers

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page_4!2 #age /'& and the initial mildness of the rule the occu4ation under 8eyss-In@uart im4osed1 8ome resented the Sueen?s having ta7en refuge in !ngland1 8eyss? early re4orts were o4timisticC he wrote that there was no sabotage and no need to fear active resistance1 // But this state of affairs did not last long1 The first organiHed resistance started a few wee7s after the end of hostilities in the summer of (*/$1 It called itself the :rde Dienst =the :rder 8ervice> and it was nationwide by November1 The first intention of the :rder 8ervice was to set u4 when the time came a transitional government to maintain order after a German colla4se and its main tas7 meanwhile was sending on military information to !ngland1 :ther Fesistance organiHations li7e the Bno74loegen raided Dutch offices to get hold of ration boo7s for those 4ersons who went underground1 8abotage in the early days of the German occu4ation was mainly the wor7 of individuals not of organiHations li7e Bno74loegen or :rder 8ervice1 But as the occu4ation measures grew more harsh 4articularly with the brutal carrying out of anti-Dewish actions and the arrest of Dutch hostages both as a re4risal for the arrest of German nationals in the Dutch !ast Indies and as a guarantee against acts of sabotage the Dutch Fesistance hardened1 -ith the German attac7 on 8oviet Fussia members of the .ommunist #arty ste44ed u4 their 4art in the Fesistance where hitherto they had 4layed a lone role for their own 4urely 4olitical ends fomenting small-scale stri7es and attac7ing in their underground 4a4ers the Allies the Dutch Government in 9ondon and the Germans1 After Dune && (*/( they were an im4ortant 4art of the active Fesistance as they were throughout occu4ied !uro4e and in the Feich itself1L No .ommunists however were among the hostagesC .ommunists were made 4risoners not hostages1 The hostages might be treated with com4arative courtesy when they were loc7ed u4C as members of a Germanic stoc7 they were entitled to s4ecial 4rivileges and they lived for a time in a s4ecial section of Buchenwald1 It was there for e<am4le that the noted Dutch historian #ieter Geyl wrote his memorable wor7 on historical writing Na2oleonB "or an) Against1 But relatively comfortable or not the 4risoners were held for 4ossible slaughter1 6rom the beginning the radio broadcasts from 9ondon fanned the flame of the Fesistance movement1 The Dutch Sueen s4o7e and the BB. after Duly (*/$ beamed a 4rogram Fadio :ran,e as well as its own broadcasts in Dutch1 German countermeasures were ineffectiveC des4ite threats of heavy 4enalties it was easy to tune in on the BB. and the ris7s of discovey were small1 In (*/) after the May stri7e the 88 confiscated all Dutch radios but 88 #olice .hief Fauter estimated that one out of five sets was not turned in and many Dutchmen had thriftily surrendered their old sets and 7e4t L 8eyss? lawyer Gustav 8teinbauer recorded that .ommunists had testified they a44roved of the shooting of Dutch hostages by the Germans because 4rominent bourgeois were being done away with and Dutch hostility to the Germans was being strengthened =8teinbauer manuscri4t>1

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page_4!3 #age /') the good ones1 Fadio :ran,e 7e4t the Dutch in touch with the 6ree -orld and with the voices of those the 4o4ulation was convinced would one day deliver them1 It hel4ed them endure the Allied bombing attac7sC it advised them on strategy =to boycott the -interhel4 collections to go into hiding when labor drafts threatened>C it warned against 4olitical assassinations which Fadio Moscow advocated1 A two-way service from and to Eolland grew u4: Dutch Fesistance grou4s sent word on conditions in Eolland to 9ondon by way of a courier service to 8witHerland and 8weden as well as by clandestine radio senders1 A National :rganiHation for Assistance to Divers and a National Action Grou4 to hel4 both Dews and .hristians who had ??submergedI were soon formed1 The great stri7es that resulted in 8eyss-In@uart?s establishing summary courts and the threat of e<ecution or im4risonment of thousands of stri7ers added both to the need for the o4erations of the Fesistance and to recruiting for its organiHations1 In (*/) with the threat of an Allied invasion in the offing the military commander of the Netherlands General 6riedrich .hristian .hristiansen issued a decree to reintern the )$$ $$$ Dutch soldiers the Germans had ca4tured and released in (*/$1 Thousands of these former soldiers went underground many of them ready to wor7 for the Fesistance1 :f the Dutch veterans who did re4ort for internment thousands could do so safely because they already had obtained e<em4tion 4a4ers from the Germans allowing them to wor7 in Eolland in the interest of the Germandominated war economy1 !ight thousand Dutch veterans were sent to the Feich1 /0 The .ouncil of the Fesistance was formed in the s4ring of (*/)1 Its aim was to unify the various Fesistance grou4s and while it never accom4lished this it did become a nationwide a44aratus with a hard core of organiHers and more than & $$$ co-wor7ers who could be called on for s4ecific actions1 In addition a National .ommittee consisting mainly of students and 4rofessional 4eo4le was formedC doHens of clandestine news4a4ers were 4ublishedC and sabotage was organiHed following instructions from 9ondon and in the case of the underground .ommunist a44aratus from Moscow1 The British set u4 a 84ecial :4erations !<ecutive with the ,ob of 4arachuting men and su44lies to the Dutch Fesistance and ste44ing u4 sabotage1 Although the organiHation was soon infiltrated by German agents the 8:! too7 4art in destructions in (*// which with the situation deteriorating everywhere were blows at both German morale and installations1 Dutch saboteurs damaged 7ey sections in industrial 4lants wor7ing for the Germans and in some cases blew u4 whole 4lantsC they attac7ed German troo4 trainsC Dutch National 8ocialists es4ecially among the 4olice were assassinatedC the chiefs of 4olice in Ni,megen and "trecht were 7illed as were 4rominent collaborationists informers and German agents1 In an early re4ort 8eyss wrote that 4erha4s a third of the 4o4ulation of the Netherlands was ready to collaborate with the Germans and that 4er-

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page_4!4 #age /'/ centage is 4robably not far from accurate1 Ee tried to rule with moderation1 Ee im4osed no 4recensorshi4 of Dutch 4a4ersonly severe 4enalties if they 4ublished anything that might be construed as anti-German1 /' Ee even tolerated a degree of anti-Germanism in his administration1 Ee told the eleven 8ecretaries General the 4ermanent heads of the Dutch ministries that they could resign if they li7ed =the Sueen before going to !ngland had as7ed them to stay on in their 4osts> but if they stayed on he e<4ected their full coo4eration1 Ee 4romised Dutch officials that if they came to him with their grievances he would listen and if they chose to retire they would get their full 4ensions1 Thus he succeeded for a time in retaining the chief de4artment heads who would be in a 4osition to 7ee4 the wheels of Dutch 4roduction rolling now in the direction of the Feich1 8eyss also made adroit use of a mi<ture of Dutch National 8ocialists and of German administrators1 Fost van Tonningen 8ecretary General of the De4artment of 6inance and #resident of the Netherlands Ban7 the rival of Mussert for leadershi4 in the N8B =the National 8ocialist Movement of the Netherlands> was 4ut in charge of 84ecial !conomic Affairs where he served the cause of the Feich until the end of the war1L These maneuvers were only 4artly successful1 As the Germans increased their 4ressure on the Dutch 8eyss had to ta7e measures against those who failed to do what he wanted or who did it in lu7ewarm fashion1 A few months after the occu4ation began the Dutch 8ecretary for Defense .1 Fingeling ob,ected to Dutch factories? manufacturing arms for the Germans and he was forced to resign1 By (*/) only three of the 8ecretaries General who had been in office before the war held their ,obs1 By that time too the mayors of all the ma,or cities had been re4laced either by Dutch National 8ocialists or at least by 4ro-Germans1 The attem4t to reorganiHe Eolland according to the ideological 4rinci4les of the Third Feich was mar7edly unsuccessful1 The devoted civil servants with their 4rofessional habits of duty wor7ed along but as the struggle intensified they 4erformed their tas7s more and more grudgingly and with a more benevolent eye on industrial sabotage1 8eyss founded guilds among the 4rofessions where the members were su44osed to learn how advantageous it would be to coo4erate with the Feich1 Ee started the Bultur7amer a cultural organiHation that arranged for concerts and readings of German and Dutch literature1 Ee attem4ted to reorganiHe the 4rofessions on the authoritarian 4atterns of the Feich but the doctors for one grou4 immediately resisted his attem4t to install the NaHi system of a 4olitical medical guild and they remained among the stoutest and best organiHed of the anti-German grou4s in Eolland all during the war1 Nor did 8eyss have much luc7 with the other 4rofessionsC a re4ort of one of his assistants said that of )$ $$$ teachers only &%$ were National 8ocialists1/+ 8ome of these 4eo4le went underground others stayed on in the tric7y L Ee committed suicide in Dune (*/01

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page_4! #age /'0 world between genuine collaboration and what they thought of as doing their duty to the Dutch 4eo4le1 :ne of the 4atriotic Dutchmen who remained on doggedly at his 4ost des4ite bitter criticism was Eans Ma< Eirschfeld 8ecretary General of Agriculture 6ishing .ommerce Industry and 8hi44ing1 8eyss made no difficulties about dealing with him although Eirschfeld?s father was a Dew1L 8eyss-In@uart?s crimes in Eolland were ty4ical of the NaHi Gauleiter?s1 Ee 4artici4ated with conviction in the anti-Dewish measures that as always were gradual1LL Ee issued the first of a series of anti-Dewish decrees in Eolland in the autumn of (*/$ and under them not only Dews as defined in the Nuremberg 9aws =full Dews or Dews with one .hristian grand4arent or Mischlinge who 4racticed the Dewish religion> had to register but 4eo4le with only one Dewish grand4arent1 9i7e 6ran7 he dealt with the Dewish .ouncil =Doodse Faad> when he had orders either for 4roviding labor or for sending Dews to the transit cam4s established in Eolland tem4orary and des4erately crowded @uarters used before the 4risoners were sent to the !ast1 Dews over the age of fifteen had to carry identity cards on which a ??DI was stam4ed1 After introducing the Dutch version of the Nuremberg 9aws he decreed the first ste4s to get rid of the Dews in business and 4ublic and 4rofessional life1 The ne<t ste4 was to send them to the Dutch forced-labor and concentration cam4s and by (*/& he was ready to do his share in shi44ing them off to the gas chambers1 /% In November (*/& the Dewish fur and te<tile wor7ers who had been wor7ing for the Feich?s armament industry were sent to AuschwitH1 Amsterdam which had been the center of the diamondcutting mar7et of the world was em4tied of its Dews of whom some ( &$$ were sent to the Gught concentration cam4 where they were used in war wor7 until (*// under the su4ervision of the 881 Then they too with their irre4laceable s7ills develo4ed over centuries were sent off to AuschwitH1 L Eirschfeld attested both at Nuremberg and in a boo7 4ublished many years later to 8eyss? courtesy and his efforts to carry out his orders as humanely as he could =N TGI 441 &($('1 E1 M1 Eirschfeld Herinneringen uit )e Be0ettingsti>) MAmsterdam-!lsevier-Brussels: (*'$N>1 LL 8eyss-In@uart said at Nuremberg: I will say @uite o4enly that since the 6irst -orld -ar and the 4ostwar 4eriod I was an anti-8emite and went to Eolland as sach1 I need not go into detail about that here1 I have said all that in my s4eeches and would refer you to them1 I had the im4ression which will be confirmed everywhere that the Dews of course had to be against National 8ocialist Germany1 There was no discussion of the @uestion of guilt as far as I was concerned1 As head of an occu4ied territory I had only to deal with the fact1 I had to realiHe that 4articularly from the Dewish circles I had to rec7on with resistance defeatism and so on1 I told Generaloberst von Brauchitsch .ommander in .hief of the Army that in the Netherlands I would remove Dews from leading 4osts in the economy the 4ress and the administration1 The measures ta7en by me from May (*/$ to March (*/( were limited to that1 The Dewish officials were dismissed but they were given 4ensions1 The Dewish firms were registered and the heads of the firms were dismissed MN TG 41 '''N1

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page_4!! #age /'' Ee had not he testified at Nuremberg ob,ected when Eeydrich told him that Dews in Eolland would have to be interned but agreed that it was necessary1 It was for this reason he said that he had ordered the registration of the Dews in March (*/(1 8eyss-In@uart added ??And then things went on ste4 by ste41I A44ro<imately (/$ $$$ Dews lived in Eolland before the war1 #erha4s &$ $$$ of them were in mi<ed marriages and &$ $$$ more were Mischlinge1 They were all cleared out with the e<ce4tion of Dews in one of the 4rivileged marriages or of Mischlinge1 Fauter wrote to Eeydrich in 8e4tember (*/& that he 4lanned to send the Dewish 4artners of mi<ed marriages to the !ast if they had no Mischlinge children1 /* Those Dews and Mischlinge who remained had to submit to being steriliHed1 It was not enough if the 4artner of the marriage was sterileC the Dew had to be made Iracially harmlessI and if so he could esca4e de4ortationhe could even wal7 the streets without the 8tar of David1 8eyss-In@uart o44osed steriliHing Dewish womenC he said the o4eration was too dangerous1 The steriliHation when it was done was 4erformed by German 4hysicians but many of the certificates according to Feitlinger were fa7es sold by the Gesta4o to Dews who had money1 Dutch doctors in many cases 4rovided Dews with certificates declaring them sterile so that no o4eration had to be 4erformed1 In (*// % '$$ Dutch Dews in mi<ed marriages were at liberty in the Netherlands and of these & &0' had a certificate showing they had been steriliHed10$ :f the (/$ $$$ Dews who had been in Eolland when the Germans invaded two-thirds were 7illed in the e<termination cam4s1 They died in Mauthausen and 8obibor in AuschwitH and Bergen-Belsen1 A few of them who had served with the German Army in -orld -ar I were sent to Theresienstadt and some of them survived along with those who had esca4ed the gas chambers of the e<termination cam4s1L The ste4s as 8eyss-In@uart said came one by one1 The Dutch Dews had no chance to esca4e as the Danish Dews did by boat across the relatively narrow sea that se4arated Denmar7 from 8weden1 !ngland was a long way off and on every land side was German-held territory1 The first measures 8eyss too7 were designed to get rid of the Dews in official economic and 4rofessional life of the Netherlands1 The Dews of Eolland were widely se4arated economically1 Many of them were 4eddlers or wor7ed at menial laborC a few were counted among the wealthy families of AmsterdamC L 8ome (($ $$$ Dutch Dews were sent to #oland and .Hechoslova7ia ($0 $$$ of them to e<termination cam4sC 0 $$$ went to Theresienstadt of whom ( )$$ survivedC & $$$ committed suicide1 The only Dews left in Eolland in the last year of the war were those who were hidden of whom there were &0 $$$ in (*/&among them Anne 6ran7 and her familybut of these only % $$$ survived until the end along with those in the mi<ed marriages who managed to esca4e de4ortation1 A total of 0 /0$ of the de4orted Dews returned from all the concentration cam4s including Theresienstadt =-armbrunn o2 cit1 41 '%1 #ersonal letter to author from Dr1 91 de Dong director Fi,7instituut voor :orlogsdocumentatie Amsterdam>1

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page_4!" #age /'+ and there was a thriving middle grou41 There were &( $$$ enter4rises in Eolland owned or controlled by DewsC most were small businesses but this number included four big de4artment stores three ban7s and hundreds of wholesale and retail distributors1 A firm had to be registered if one member of its board of directors was a Dew and2or if more than one-@uarter of its ca4ital was owned by a Dew1 0( These firms were given a chance to ??AryaniHeI voluntarily and a carrion-see7ing host of German firms came to Eolland to buy in1 8eyss had to a44rove the transactions for the Dewish firms in Eolland as in Germany were li7ely to go for some ($ 4er cent of their value in the 4anic of the forced sales1 8eyss created a bureau for the e<amination of such transactions =-irtschaft4ruefstelle>1 In addition if the 4rice involved was more than ($$ $$$ gulders a General7ommissariat com4osed of three German ban7ers had to a44rove1 #rices under these controls went higher but they never com4ared onerously with the assets and the German buyers had ten years in which to 4ay1 About ($ $$$ of the Dewish-owned firms were li@uidated outrightC the others were allowed to AryaniHe themselves or were ac@uired by German interests1 :n Danuary &( (*/( 8eyss-In@uart wrote to Bormann that /$$ enter4rises worth '$ million FM had been sold to Dutch firms and )/$ worth ($) million FM had gone to the Germans1 There were &0$ firms being held in reserve to be made available later to German soldiers10& By August (*/( all Dewish assets were bloc7edincluding valuables cash and securities1 The Dews of Eolland were forced by a decree of 8eyss-In@uart of May &( (*/& to turn over to the designated ban7ing firm 9i44mann Fosenthal R .o1 of Amsterdam all rights to 4ro4erty art ob,ects articles of gold 4latinum and silver and 4earls and 4recious stones1 They were allowed to 7ee4 wedding rings and a silver service of four 4ieces: 7nife for7 table s4oon and teas4oon as well as their dentures of 4recious metals10) No Dew was allowed to receive more than &0$ guldens a month for his 4ersonal use1 8eyss-In@uart testified at Nuremberg that the Feich in all had confiscated the sum of /$$ $$$ $$$ guldens from the Dews1 But some of the Dews had been able to bribe their way out of the country officially or unofficially by way of funds they held in 8wiss ban7s or other sources of foreign e<change1 A good many things could be bought in Eolland besides the steriliHation certificates and the most im4ortant of these were e<it 4ermits1 #art of the deals made when Dewish enter4rises were sold might be the right to migrateC one Dresdener Ban7 official s4o7e of Ithe ransoming of Dutch Dews against the 4ayment of a 4enance in 8wiss francs1I0/ By (*/& when the de4ortations were at hand the ransom had gone u4 from &$ $$$ 8wiss francs to ($$ $$$ and even that sum would no longer get an entire family out of the country1 All the anti-Dewish measures ta7en in Eolland whether they had to do with confiscating small 4rivate Dewish 4ro4erty or ta7ing over the great Fosenthal library which had been given by the owner to the Dutch 8tate met

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page_4!# #age /'% with 8eyss-In@uart?s wholehearted a44roval1 Ee made a s4eech on March (& (*/( in Amsterdam after the mass stri7es too7 4lace saying that the Germans did not wish to 4ut unnecessary burdens on the Dutch but the Dews were not Dutch1 Ee added: The Dews are the enemy of National 8ocialism 1 1 1 6rom the time of their emanci4ation their methods were directed to the annihilation of the fol7ish and moral worth of the German 4eo4le and to re4lace a national and res4onsible ideology with international nihilism1 It was really they who stabbed the Army in the bac7 which bro7e the resistance of the Germans Min -orld -ar IN 1 1 1 The Dews are the enemy with whom no armistice or 4eace can be made 1 1 1 -e will smite the Dews where we meet them and whoever goes along with them must ta7e the conse@uences1 00 It is small wonder that stimulated by 8eyss-In@uart?s anti-8emitic ardor the Dutch National 8ocialists some months after the start of the occu4ation tried to stage a (ristallnacht of their own1 In 6ebruary (*/( they invaded Dewish homes and sho4s in the Dewish @uarter of Amsterdam and they were resisted by both Dews and Dutchmen1 :ne of the Dutch NaHis was beaten u4 so badly that he died later1 A few days afterward a German security-4olice 4atrol attem4ting to raid an a4artment in the southern 4art of Amsterdam was attac7ed by Dews with among other wea4ons vials of ammoniaC one 4oliceman was slightly wounded1 As a re4risal raHHias were held in the Dewish @uarter of Amsterdam and )%* young Dews were 4ac7ed off to concentration cam4s1 It was the raHHias that set off the mass sym4athy stri7es of the Dutch wor7ers: more than ($$ $$$ wal7ed out of armament factories shi4yards sto44ed wor7 utilities no longer functioned traffic sto44ed1 The stri7e was bro7en after two days by the threat of the German military commandant to invo7e the death 4enalty for sabotage if the men did not go bac7 to wor71 The )%* Dews who were soon followed by &)$ more were sent first to Buchenwald where 0* died and then the survivors were shi44ed to Mauthausen in Austria where witnesses have described the 8isy4hean tas7 given the 4risoners who had to carry great roc7s u4 the (/% ste4s that led to the to4 of the @uarry and if they slowed down or fell from e<haustion they were beaten1 They died under this treatment1 8ome of them lin7ed hands and threw themselves from the to4 of the cliff to the stones far below4arachutists the 88 guards called these men1 :nly one man survived1 Ee had been 7e4t hidden by other inmates in Buchenwald1 8eyss-In@uart had nothing to do directly with sending these men to Mauthausen but he 4rovided the conte<t in his civil administration of which the anti8emitic laws the secret 4olice and the so-called security measure were an essential 4art1 Ee 4resided over the ??Dewish conferences I held with re4resentatives of the security 4olice the 6oreign :ffice and the .ommissioners General which decided how the decisions for arrests and de4orta-

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page_4!$ #age /'* tions arrived at by the F8EA =main office of the Feich 8ecurity 8ervice> should be carried out1 -hatever warm feelings he may have had for the Dutch as one of the Germanic 4eo4les they never 4revented him from doing what he too7 to be his stern duty1 In 8e4tember (*// 8eyssIn@uart issued a warning to the 4o4ulation reminding them that they were res4onsible for any damage done German railroad or 4ostal installations in their districts and he added: ??The 4o4ulation of such communities may therefore e<4ect re4risals in the form of seiHure of 4ro4erty and the destruction of houses or grou4s of houses1 I advise the communities to arrange for ade@uate 4rotection of the means of trans4ortation and communication 1 1 1 by 4atrols or other effective means1I The actual dirty wor7 was done by the 4olice as may be seen in an order of December (*// following the shooting of two 4olicemen by members of the Fesistance1 It read: IThe 8u4erior 88 and #olice .hief gives notice 1 1 1 that inde4endent of further investigation of the 4er4etrators two houses were blasted and (& Netherlanders were e<ecuted at the 4lace of one of the crimes as re4risals1I 0' A decree issued by 8eyss on :ctober ( (*// ordered all Dutchmen between the ages of seventeen and forty to register for labor service and to a44ear immediately e@ui44ed for wor7 with warm clothing stout shoes blan7ets and mess gear1 Ee 4romised to 4ay five guldens a day and to ta7e care of relatives left behind1 Anyone trying to resist or esca4e would be shot1 The decree was issued on behalf of the -ehrmacht by 8eyss as Feichs7ommissar of the Netherlands1 By the end of the year Dutch males u4 to the age of forty-two had to register10+ In the late autumn of (*// as Goebbels 4roclaimed total war 8eyss-In@uart 4rom4tly announced that he had done his 4art in Eolland1 An action he said had been conducted at Fotterdam on November * and ($ with great successC % $$$ soldiers with no mentionable casualties had 4ic7ed u4 0/ $$$ Dutchmen ca4able of bearing arms against Germany and had sent (/ $$$ of them to wor7 in the NetherlandsC the rest went to the Feich10% About '0$ of them managed to esca4ea small 4ercentage obviously1 In a similar action of Menschenfang =mantra4> the -ehrmacht com4lained it lost valuable Dutch wor7ers who were sim4ly arrested and sent off to do any 7ind of wor7 assigned regardless of their s4ecial s7ills10* The ratio of si< hostages shot for every German or Dutch collaborator 7illed by the Fesistance was lowC the usual rate was ten and sometimes even fifty to one de4ending on what Feich authorities regarded as the heinousness of the crime and what was needed in the way of terror to 4revent a recurrence1 In (*// a Dutch hel4er of the 8D was 7illed and a German wounded and Berlin ordered fifty hostages 7illed1 8eyss always o44osed the e<ecution of such a ratio of hostages as did the Army whose .hief of 8taff in Eolland General EeinH Eelmut von -uehlisch 4rotested the e<cessive

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page_4"0 #age /+$ numbers the 4olice 4lanned to e<ecute1 '$ Fauter?s notice of the shootings 4ointed out that investigations were still in 4rogress and more might be 7illed when the in@uiry reached its end1L The e<ecution of hostages for such acts of violence was in fact no violation of the Eague .onventions which merely declared that the occu4ying 4ower should 7ee4 the number down to humane 4ro4ortions1 This too 8eyss tried to accom4lish1 6or the Dutch reacted violently to the wholesale shootings of 4eo4le who far more often than not were com4letely innocent1 :ne German re4ort said that even circles friendly to the Germans were becoming hostile as a result of the cold-blooded e<ecutions of men the German secret 4olice deemed dangerous: the intelligentsia Dutch nationalists or 8ocial Democrats high civil servants the liberal 4rofessions the leading social and 4olitical grou4s1 8eyssIn@uart had the same im4ossible tas7 as every other German governor of occu4ied territory: to 7ee4 the country @uiet so the German rear would not be menaced to 7ee4 the 4o4ulation wor7ing for the German -ehrmacht and civil economyC when acts of sabotage occurred to 4unish them severely enough so as to deter such activities in the future and yet to restrain the 4unishment to 4revent even greater numbers of the 4o4ulation from ,oining the ran7s of the active Fesistance1 8eyss-In@uart attem4ted to meet the dilemma in a number of ways: he tried to ca,ole the Dutch to hold out rewards for collaboration to restrain e<cessive German demands1 Ee constantly reminded the Dutch they were a Germanic 4eo4le1 Ee fostered business 4rofessional and cultural circles of Dutch-German collaboration1 Ee 4lanned a /eichsschule for Eolland that would bear the name of a seventeenthcentury Dutch 4oet Marni< van 8t1 Aldegonde who had been 4ro-German and a close associate of -illiam the 8ilent1 6or the school he ho4ed to get funds which he calculated would run to about 0$$ $$$ FM a year for each branch and he wanted three branches1 In this school Dutchmen would be educated for a genuine and long-range collaboration with the Feich1'( Ee intervened with Eimmler against the draconian 88 4unishmentsC he tried to ma7e the Dutch themselves ta7e on the ,ob of 4olicing their districts by turning over the res4onsibility for maintaining the 4eace to local authorities as well as to the Dutch National 8ocialists and the ardent 4ro-German collaborators1 In (*/) at the time of the great stri7es he also had to a44oint summary courts =8tandgerichte> with the 4ower to 4ronounce sentences ranging from one year to deathC for to stri7e was to commit sabotage1 At the same time he e<horted the Dutch to do their share in the war against bolshevism1 Ee even ho4ed to recruit )$$ $$$ Dutch National 8ocialists for 4olice wor7 in L In (*/0 when Fauter was badly wounded and a number of the men with him were 7illed as members of the Fesistance attac7ed the car he was riding in Eimmler wanted 0$$ hostages shot as a re4risal1 8eyss told his lawyer he had 4revented the shootingsC communications with Berlin were uncertain at this date and he was able to circumvent Eimmler?s orders =8teinbauer manuscri4t>1

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page_4"1 #age /+( the "7raine where they would relieve the hard-4ressed Germans in their bloody war with the 4artisans1 Ee wanted the actual ,ob of recruiting the men to be done by Mussert1 Although the negotiations with Berlin dragged on for months time as well as the 6uehrer?s reluctance to see any non-Germans ta7ing 4art in governing the !astern territories wor7ed against the 4lan1 Nothing came of the idea1 No one wanted to ,oin a lost war and everyone but the Germans 7new it was lost1 8chemes were also afoot to coloniHe the !ast with a Dutch 4o4ulation1 Fosenberg as .ommissioner for !astern Territories wanted a Dutch settlement on the Baltic and the :ost.om4agnie was organiHed in Eolland by Dutch NaHis to assist the movement1 :ne Dutch writer thought five million of his countrymen might be settled thereC some of the s4ecialists in Berlin thought of three million1 Toward the end of the war the 6uehrer at long last did 4ermit non-Germans to underta7e minor occu4ation duties in the !ast for the sorely tried German Army the 4olice and the 88 units sim4ly could not carry out their assignments1 Almost from the start of the !astern cam4aign the Army made use of Fussian hel4ers =Eiwis> recruited from among the local 4o4ulation1 A decree of A4ril (% (*// issued by Goering said that Belgians Bulgarians Danes !stonians 6inns 6renchmen Dutchmen 9atvians Norwegians 9ithuanians Eungarians and even .roats might now be used in the limited military service of manning antiaircraft guns and similar activities1 In addition the 6uehrer gave 4ermission for the army of the former 8oviet General Glasov troo4s recruited from among Fussian 4risoners of war to be sent into action1 They were to be used only in the -estunder Eimmler who was now head of the reserve army as well as of the -affen 881 !arlier at the beginning of the Fussian cam4aign divisions from the Feich?s military and ideological allies were used on the Fussian frontC these included Italian 84anish and Fumanian troo4s along with the 88 divisions recruited in the -est from Belgium Eolland and Norwaya motley gathering of what NaHi 4ro4agandists referred to as a "nited !uro4e1 It was through the hinge in the German lines manned by Fumanian and Italian troo4s that the initial brea7through at 8talingrad was made1 But the 88 formations fought very well the Dutch among them1 The Dutch 4olice however were never used for they were never recruited1L The )$$ $$$ Dutchmen who in (*/) and later would 4olice the !ast for the Germans were a figment of 8eyssIn@uart?s imagination1 8eyss did manage to 7ee4 a Dutch administrative a44aratus functioning and to do remar7ably well with it1 The Dutch e<4orts to Germany in (*/$ were double what they had been in (*)% and went to three times as much in the ne<t years although by (*// the total Dutch national 4roduct was only half of what it had been in (*)*1 By Danuary (*/0 the level had gone down to &0 4er cent of (*)%1 '& The Germans used Dutch 4olice the numL Fauter re4orted to Eimmler that & $$$ Dutchmen had volunteered as au<iliary 4olice =Eilfs4oliHei> as a result of the recruiting a44eal =MA ))$ /+/$>1

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page_4"2 #age /+& bers of which Fauter increased in (*/$ by ta7ing in men from the demobiliHed ArmyC they turned the anachronistic locally administered forces into a central state 4olice1 In March (*/( 8eyss in res4onse to Fauter?s re@uest 4roclaimed a 4olice state of siege which made any disobedience to 4olice orders sub,ect to the death 4enalty1 This authority was used however only onceduring the May (*/) stri7es1 9i7e other NaHi 4roconsuls o4erating in foreign territory 8eyssIn@uart turned to the stic7-and-carrot techni@ues so useful for recalcitrant 4o4ulations1 In May (*/) he ordered that Dutchmen called u4 for labor should no longer receive ration cards and that no unem4loyment com4ensation be given any others fit to wor7 who did not volunteer for labor in the Feich1 ') 8eyss testified at Nuremberg that 0)$ $$$ Dutchmen wor7ed for Germany of whom less than half were ??volunteers1I'/ Thousands of these so-called volunteers only 4ined under heavy 4ressure and threats from the Germans and the Dutch authorities wor7ing under them1L :n the other hand 8eyss su44lied e<tra food for Dutch children and he declared at Nuremberg although Dutch historians have been unable to find any evidence to su44ort his claim that he tried to im4rove the living conditions of Dutch wor7ers in Germany who he said ob,ected to being housed in barrac7s1 In any event they ob,ected to much more for they li7e the other foreign labor in the Feich were sub,ect to the local #arty and economic authorities of wherever they chanced to be and wor7ing and living conditions could be intolerable1LL Before the nons4ecialist Dutch Dews were de4orted they were sent to Dutch 4eat bogs for the manual wor7 the NaHis valued so highly as a means of 4unishment and humiliation for the largely middle-class Dutch Dews1 If they were s4ecialiHed wor7ers li7e the diamond cutters from Amsterdam they might wor7 for the Army where they would be 7e4t alive longer than L As early as (*/$ Dutch unem4loyed were refused unem4loyment com4ensation if they would not acce4t ,obs in Germany1 By (*/& those who refused to go to the Feich were ta7en there by force or 4ut in s4ecial cam4s =-armbrunn o2. cit1 41 +/>1 LL An order of A4ril && (*/) 4ermitted Dutch Norwegians and other 4referred nationalities including American and British 4risoners of war wor7ing for German enter4rises to wal7 outside their cam4s for two hours a wee71 The racial bac7ground of foreign wor7ers as well as their 4olitical sym4athies were a constant source of concern and tribulation for the Feich authorities1 Italians the briefings said were allies were brothers-in-arms 4art of the (am2fgemeinschaft and the treatment therefore accorded Italian wor7ers was to ta7e this into account1 The Northern 4eo4le the cam4 authorities were reminded were racially closer to the Germans however and it was the tas7 of the Feich authorities to win their allegiance away from the democracies1 A Merkblatt issued in (*/& said that the racially assimilable 6lemish wor7ers were to be treated li7e Germans1 They could go to German schools and marry Germans and when they returned to their homes they would act as 4ro4agandists for the Feich1 8till the non-Germans had to realiHe that it was the Germans who were the leaders in the new !uro4e1 But field re4orts of the Gesta4oone from .ologne for e<am4le on Danuary + (*/)told how bad conditions in the German wor7 cam4s could beC they were so insu44ortable in fact that more and more foreign wor7ers who had volunteered were fleeing1 The re4orts said the wor7ers refused to acce4t the conditions under which they wor7ed and lived and characteristically urged as a solution not an im4rovement in their treatment but instead that Ithe shar4est measures be ta7enI and that those wor7ers reca4tured be turned over immediately to the Gesta4o =BD. Gesta4o re4orts>1

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page_4"3 #age /+) if they were em4loyed by one of the German industrial firms for the Army could and did resist the de4ortation of wor7ers needed for its 4ur4oses1 But the Army could not com4ete against the 88 in the long runC most of these s4ecialists were brought to the Gught concentration cam4 where they wor7ed under Eimmler from November (*/& until their de4ortation to the !ast in March (*//1 8ome &$$ were sent to Bergen-Belsen where they were 7e4t at s4ecialiHed wor7 and a handful survived until the end of the war1 The rest along with the 4eat cutters died at AuschwitH1 Dutch wor7ers were used in Eolland Belgium northern 6rance and in the Feich in the Bru44 firmwhich they called a 4lague firm =-est "irma>and I1 G1 6arben and in the bloc7ed 4lants where 84eer could use their talents1 :ver *& $$$ Dutch wor7ers went to Germany in (*/$C the ne<t year the number rose to (0$ $$$C by (*/& it was &'$ $$$ and by (*/0 it was over 0$$ $$$1L Between /$$ $$$ and 0$$ $$$ Dutch wor7ers were unem4loyed in Dune (*/$ at least half of them as a result of the German occu4ation and the first attem4ts the Germans made to recruit labor were aimed at this grou4 and at the s4ecialists1 In Eolland as elsewhere as volunteers dwindled and German needs for wor7ers grew conscri4tion and mass arrests were resorted to1 A German re4ort to 8auc7el from the Feichs7ommissar?s office in Eolland dated Dune (*/) stated that the entire class of the years born from (*&( to (*&/ had been registered and that && *%' wor7ers as a result had been sent to Germany1 And the re4ort added giving credit where credit was due ??:nly owing to the hard wor7 of the Germans in Eolland was this 4ossible1I Dutch university and technological-school students were immediately liable for labor conscri4tion after they had com4leted their studies1 Eolland was s@ueeHed to the 4ul41 !verything manufactured was 4roduced for the Germans and in addition the country was 4lundered1 !ven Mussert an 8D re4ort said called what the Germans were doing robbery1 '0 German soldiers were allowed to send bac7 in a single 4ac7age to the Feich ( $$$ grams of food or anything else they had gotten hold of and there was no limit to the number of 4ac7ages nor any ins4ection of them at the border1 6or two years 8eyss? civilian authorities in Eolland were also able to shi4 such 4ac7ages but with diminishing goods in the Dutch blac7 mar7et and the mounting shortages in both Germany and Eolland 8eyss sto44ed this so-called ISchle22;Erlass I the Itow decreeI as the Germans called it for civilians1'' The currency frontier between the two countries was eliminated to ma7e such transactions easierthe mar7 was as good in Eolland as in Germany and the rate of e<change set by the Germans was ( gulden to (1)) FM instead of the 4rewar (1+$1 The blac7 mar7et in the occu4ied countries was fostered and used by the L Dutch estimates of the number of their wor7ers in Germany are (*/$: *& +$$C (*/(: (0( &$$C (*/&: &') )$$C (*/): )%& ($$C (*//: )%% *$$1 The numbers of unem4loyed were in A4ril (*/$ &(( $$$C in May (*/$ )&0 $$$C and in Dune (*/$ between /$$ $$$ and 0$$ $$$ =de Dong o2. cit1>1

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page_4"4 #age /+/ German authorities1 A secret re4ort of Danuary (0 (*/) by a German Air 6orce colonel D1 Gelt,ens was sent to a long distribution list including Goering as head of the 6our-;ear #lan his de4uties the high commands of the Army and Navy Eimmler as F688 the Feich Minister of Nutrition 6inance and !conomy the main office for Feich 8ecurity the military commanders in the occu4ied territories and 8eyss-In@uart1 The 4ur4ose of the memorandum was to bring u4 to date the accounts of the goods being su44lied to the Germans by way of the blac7 mar7ets in 8erbia and the occu4ied -estern countries and also to ma7e a 4rogress re4ort on the dismantling of Dutch harbor installations and machines from shut-down 4lants which were sent to the Feich and of the results of the so-called ??.hristmas Action1I The latter was designed to 4rovide .hristmas 4resents for the German 4eo4le some )$$ million FM worth which were to be collected in Eolland between August and December (*/&1 The time had been short .olonel Gelt,ens wrote so only &// million FM worth could be bought u4 but still some & )$$ bo<cars were filled with cosmetics toys and gifts designed mostly for distribution in bomb-damaged areas1 Gelt,ens thought that a good deal of harbor e@ui4ment not being sufficiently used in Eolland could be shifted to the Feich and thereu4on had seiHed it for use in :slo and Eamburg1 Ee also arranged for the shi44ing to the Feich of machinery from Dutch 4lants that were idle although he 4ointed out that such measures met with resistance not only from the 4lant owners but from the state authorities in the occu4ied territories1 8eyss-In@uart whose ,ob it was to 7ee4 Eolland 4acified as well as 4roductive undoubtedly 4referred to see such 4lants remain in Eolland where they could also 4roduce for the Feich if they had man4ower and raw materials1 The decision however was not his1 Gelt,ens? ,ob as 4leni4otentiary for s4ecial missions eventually brought an end to the blac7 mar7et but before that ha44ened he used it for the benefit of the Feich to get the hidden stoc7 to get hold of the Iillegal 4roduction1I German authorities 8eyss-In@uart among them had tried first to sto4 the trading in the blac7 mar7et but when the difficulties of this tas7 became a44arent the decision was made to use it instead1 But since German agencies would bid against one another and the o4erators in the blac7 mar7et were able as a result to boost 4rices continually it became necessary to centraliHe the buying1 To this end the Germans established the Foges Trading .om4any a government agency whose ,ob it was to do the buying of raw materials and to arrange for their trans4ortation1 Gelt,ens as 4leni4otentiary set 4rices and @uality standards for the sale to the 4urchasers in the Feich1 Ee re4orted that +) '%0 ('& FM worth of goods including raw diamonds metals leather furniture food and lu<ury goods had been bought in Eolland since he had ta7en over1 Gelt,ens wanted as usual harsh 4enalties against any retail dealers who bid u4 4rices when they bought from manufacturers and wholesalers on the blac7 mar7et1 It was a canny arrange-

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page_4" #age /+0 ment for although the 4rices were high they were in large 4art 4aid for by the occu4ied countries1 Gelt,ens calculated that of the 4urchases in 6rance amounting to ( ($+ +*& %(* FM a44ro<imately *&* ($$ $$$ FM were financed by the 6rench1 '+ In this matter as in the costs of the German occu4ation where German accounts said the Dutch su44lied all the needs so nothing came out of the Feich budget the Dutch financed their own destitution1 Their contribution came in all so later German estimates declared to more than (& $)$ million FM1'% Gelt,ens had five su4ervisory de4artments under him =one for Eolland was in The Eague>1 In Eolland the directive for the o4eration read: ??Instructions for the winding u4 of stoc7s of merchandise of uncertain origin1I To 4ut his activities in the best 4ossible light when he bought what was needed on the blac7 mar7et Gelt,ens wor7ed under what was called a Idecree on the clarification of une<4lained goods I or alternatively a Igeneral decree1I Ee wrote that among the 4ersonnel that would have to be em4loyed if the blac7 mar7et was to be brought under control were s4ies and agents 2rovocateurs for it was a tric7y 4lace even for Germans o4erating under a general decree1 Dutch 4lants with half or more of their 4roduction going for the benefit of the Feich were to be shi44ed to Germany1 8eyss-In@uart said at Nuremberg that had Germany won the war the Dutch would have had claims against the Feich coming to more than / 0$$ million guldens for un4aid deliveries and re@uisitions1'* In A4ril (*/& 8eyss called on the Dutch to ma7e a IvoluntaryI contribution of 0$ million guldens a month as their share of the costs of Germany?s cam4aign in the !ast and to ma7e it retroactive to Duly (* (*/(1 The IvoluntaryI contribution alone came to & (0$ million FM1 In addition to the occu4ation costs the Germans removed more than )1' billion guldens? worth of Dutch industrial 4roduction and raw materialsa grand total of goods and services estimated at (*)% 4rices of ((1/ billion guldens1L+$ The Germans missed nothing1 8eyss com4lained that the Army was ta7ing from their stalls Dutch horses aged from four to fourteen years but the L 8eyss-In@uart testified at Nuremberg that the Dutch were 4aying occu4ation costs of 0$ million FM a month =N TG 41 '0&>1 But he understated the amount by half1 The Dutch figures were considerably higher and more accurate: they calculated that seven months of occu4ation in (*/$ had cost /++ million guldensC in (*/( ( (&/ millionC in (*/& ( (%( millionC in (*/) ( )&% millionC in (*// ( +0+ millionC and in the four months of (*/0 to /%* millionor a total of ' )0' million guldens1 These were the costs in Eolland aloneC in addition were the considerable sums charged to the Dutch for administration e<4enses for the occu4ation incurred in Germany =N TGI 41 &&) (&) F61 N TTTGIII 441 0&))'>1 Eolland one German re4ort of :ctober ($ (*// 4ointed out was the only country in !uro4e that 4aid not only for the subsistence of troo4s and other direct occu4ation e<4enses but also for the e<ternal costs of occu4ation1 Dutch ta<es doubled in the course of the war1 The Netherlands 4aid the occu4ation costs in gold as long as it lasted and then in Feichsmar7s1 The German re4ort said that in effect goods could be im4orted from Eolland without 4ayment1

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page_4"! #age /+' com4laint was made not on behalf of the Dutch economy but because the officers re@uisitioning the horses were not wor7ing through him1 The numbers of livestoc7 dro44ed shar4ly1 #oultry went down *$ 4er centC && 4ercentC of the cattle and two-thirds of the hogs were slaughtered1 By the end of (*/) the Germans had ta7en off '$$ $$$ hogs &+0 $$$ cattle and )$ $$$ tons of 4reserved meat1 The Army and the civil occu4ation lived off the Netherlands and its 4roducts hel4ed 7ee4 u4 the standard of living in the Feich too1 6rom the Dutch railways more than half the locomotives were ta7en as well as &% *0$ freight cars out of a total of )$ $$$ and ( //' 4assenger cars out of ( +0$1 6ifty trolley cars were shi44ed to EamburgC a million bicycles were confiscated as were (10 million tons of shi44ing and '$$ $$$ radio sets1 8eyss-In@uart himself ordered the confiscation of such items as the microsco4es in the "niversity of "trecht which were needed by the 88 in their hos4itals1 .urrent demands from the Germans in Danuary (*// were for +$) million FM worth of machinery of which in the month of Danuary only '( million FM worth could be delivered1 +( In March (*/) 8eyss-In@uart ordered all the technical e@ui4ment machinery and blue4rints of a 4lant still o4erating in Eolland to be delivered loc7 stoc7 and barrel to the Brunswic7 branch of the Eermann Goering -er7e1 9ater when the demolition orders came all the machinery and raw materials that could be ta7en from the doomed Dutch factories were ordered sent to the Feich1 ??Femoval .ommandos I that is grou4s of technicians wor7ing under the IMachine #ool :ffice I were given the ,ob of finding what machines and su44lies could be shi44ed to Germany and then sending them there1 All the gold in the vaults of the Dutch ban7s had been immediately ta7en over1 After (*// it was German 4olicy mainly because of the threat of the invasion and the hostility of the Dutch 4o4ulation to shi4 to the Feich entire factories that had been wor7ing for Germany1 !verything disa44eared from the mar7et e<ce4t rationed foods1 Dewish houses and a4artments sometimes loo7ed as if they had been bombed because the Dutch neighbors of the former occu4ants demolished them to 7ee4 their own buildings in re4airC the only su44lies available were from such em4ty dwellings1 -hatever Dews 6reemasons and the 4roscribed Dehovah?s -itnesses or other IinternationalI sects owned was confiscated1 8eyss-In@uart declared the Masons in Eolland Ienemies of the 4eo4le I a formula used against them in every country where the NaHis could get at them beginning with Austria1 8eyss on behalf of the 8tate confiscated the 4ro4erty of the Masonic :rderworth he estimated between % and * million guldens+&as he did the 4ossessions of the Dutch royal family which had gone to !ngland1 The 4alace at Nordeinde under the decree of confiscation 8eyss had 4ro4osed to the 6uehrer was stri44ed of furniture silverware linen 4aintings and ta4 estries the wine cellars were gutted and even household utensils were ta7en

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page_4"" #age /++ off1 8ome of the stolen goods from the 4alaces was sent to a convalescent home for German generals1 8eyss had wanted to turn over any money obtained from such actions to the #arty but such sums were used in other divers ways1 The Dews for e<am4le 4aid for the construction of the concentration cam4 at Gught which cost (/ million guldens1 8ome /$$ million guldens 8eyss estimated at Nuremberg were ta7en from the Dutch Dews from whom literally everything of value was stolen1 !ven wedding rings which they at first had been allowed to 7ee4 in the end became 4art of the loot for they were ta7en away at the e<termination cam4s1 In addition enormous booty came from confiscation in the form of boo7s art collections that had been the 4ro4erty of Dews furniture and all the 4ersonal and collective 4ossessions of the officially declared enemies of the Feich1 The confiscation of 4aintings and ob>ets )Aart from the Dews and Masons the Theoso4hists 84iritists and !s4erantists was in Eolland as elsewhere in the hands of the !insatHstab Fosenberg which 4ic7ed u4 the Germans estimated loot to the value of )$ to /$ million FM1 +) The Fosenberg staff began their o4erations in the Netherlands as soon as the wor7 could be 4ro4erly organiHedin 8e4tember (*/$1 6rom the Masons old boo7s including an invaluable 8ans7rit collection were listed and 4ac7ed in ninety-si< cases and shi44ed to Germany where they became 4art of the rising accumulation of 4lunder the Feich?s emissaries were gathering from all !uro4e1 It is interesting to note in this connection that the -ehrmacht 4unished 4lundering with the death 4enalty and its harshest 4enalties were often e<acted in the course of the warC even a general who had 4lundered goods in ;ugoslavia was e<ecuted1 But the rules of the !insatHstab Fosenberg and of other government agencies were the o44osite of this1 Millions of dollars worth of loot were collected including some of the best Dutch 4aintings which went to brighten Goering?s Barinhall1 Eolland with its Fembrandts and its Italian and 84anish master4ieces was one of the chief sources of Goering?s art collection1 The 6uehrer too was able to get hold of some of the Dutch 4aintings at what was described as ??e<traordinarily low 4rices1I+/ 8eyss-In@uart did not 4ersonally benefit from the 4ossibilities o4en to him but he did what he could to further the activities of Fosenberg and the Feichsmarschall1 Aside from the 6uehrer Goering was 8eyss-In@uart?s sole su4erior in administering the Dutch economy for Eolland?s 4roduction was 4art of the 6our-;ear #lan1 8eyss testified at Nuremberg that the only use he had made of his advantageous 4osition was when he had bought two or three 4ictures in Eolland and 4resented them to the art museum in Gienna1 At one of his interrogations he said he had 4aid %$$ $$$ guldens for a Germeer using government funds 4rovided for the 4ur4ose1L This and a 4roscribed Gan Gogh he sent to the Gienna museum1 Eere too he wanted nothing for himselfC he was merely as a matter of 4olicy ready to lend his L Interrogation of August )( (*/'1 The 4ainting was a fa7e 4roduced by the greatly gifted forger Gan Meegeren who also sold one of his IGermeersI to Goering1

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page_4"# #age /+% aid to confiscations of every 7ind and these at the end of the war included clothing he ordered ta7en from the inhabitants of a Dutch town an act he e<cused by saying it would have been lost in any case owing to the fighting in the area1 But on the whole 8eyss-In@uart wanted things done legally and according to form with all the recei4ts duly filed1 Ee said at Nuremberg he had resented the wild 4ogroms begun against the Dews and Dewish 4ro4erty in Gienna when the threadbare NaHi hoodlums had flung them-selves on the booty in the first days of the Anschluss1 8eyss was still indignant in (*/0 at the way the hoodlums had gone about the robbery and he also said he thought it bad that the Dews received no com4ensation1 But they got no com4ensation in Eolland eitherC what really disturbed 8eyss-In@uart was the untidiness of the action1 It seemed to him un-German1 9i7e 6ran7 8eyss had to deal with his 88 officer Fauter whose duty it was to see that the so-called 4olitical tas7s were ta7en care of according to Eimmler?snot 8eyss-In@uart?snotions1 And the 4olitical assignments as the 88 saw them included much more than 4olice wor71 The 6inal 8olution was in the hands of the F688 and so were re4risals against sabotage or anything else that might threaten the security of the country1 Thus 8eyss too 4roclaimed his authority loudly more e<4licitly than he could enforce it if Eimmler wanted something else1 ??I will give the orders and they must be carried out strictly by everybody1 In the 4resent situation MDanuary (*/)N the refusal to carry out such an order can only be called sabotage1 It is e@ually certain that we must more than ever su44ress all resistance against the struggle for life1I +0 In another s4eech 8eyss s4o7e of the need for annihilating the enemies of Germany1 I-e remain human because we do not torture our o44onents1 -e must remain hard in annihilating them1I+' These words cited by the court in its ,udgment against 8eyss-In@uart had been designed more to im4ress Eimmler and the 6uehrer than to increase the number of e<ecutions1 Eimmler writing Fauter in :ctober (*/& said that 8eyss-In@uart had agreed that the li@uidation of the Dews was now a matter entirely for the 4olice indicating that 8eyss-In@uart had attem4ted to inter4ose on behalf of his civil authority1 ++ But no records e<ist of his 4rotesting about anything e<ce4t details of the treatment details for e<am4le such as the overcrowding in the -esterbor7 cam4 where () $$$ Dews had been sent far more than it could 4rovide for and where ) $$$ had to lie on the floor1 Not the e<terminations but the manner in which the Dews were handled on their way to them concerned him1 Ee remonstrated with Fauter about this and Fauter re4orted to Eimmler1 But in :ctober (*/& Eimmler wrote another of his fre@uent letters to Fauter and told him trium4hantly that 8eyss wanted to coo4erate more closely than ever before1 If 8eyss was a 4ious .atholic he was a more 4ious National 8ocialist1 No measures ta7en against the .hurcheven the invasions of monasteries and nunneries in Eolland in the search for 4riests and nuns of Dewish origin

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page_4"$ #age /+* seem to have diminished his enthusiasm for National 8ocialism1 Ee faith fully re4eated the words and views of the 6uehrer and the minor satellites and he doubtless believed them all1L In Dune (*/) when the German losses had become catastro4hic on the !astern front he told a gathering in 8onthofen that the losses in -orld -ar I had been high too but one should thin7 of the numbers of 4eo4le who committed suicide and of those who were never born and that these latter were higher than the numbers who died in wars1 The !ast he added to com4lete the 4icture was the horde of Genghis Bhan and the Dews1 These were s4eeches that could have been made and were made by hundreds of NaHi small fry1 But the ga4 between 8eyss and them had never been great1 8eyss-In@uart?s @ualms easily disa44eared when he had no alternatives1 Ee saved what he could of Dutch land from floodings of buildings from burning of hostages from e<ecutions but only so much as could be defended before the baleful scrutiny of the 6uehrer1 It is true that at the end he told Eitler that Eolland should not be defended E outrance because of the catastro4he this would bring on the Dutch 4eo4le and that he had tried to ma7e a 4act with the Fesistance to the effect that he would ta7e no action against them and would 4ermit the distribution of Allied food to the starving 4o4ulation if the Fesistance ceased its sabotage1 8uch humanitarian ideas a44ealed to him es4ecially when they had to do with the Germanic 4eo4les1 But even this came only wee7s before the end of the war in A4ril (*/01 Eis attem4t to sto4 the senseless demolitions came ,ust before then after he had tal7ed with 84eer and they had agreed that nothing more was to be gained by following the orders for destruction which had become insane1 8eyss-In@uart even tried to 7ee4 the Army from flooding some of the fields to 4revent 4ossible Allied 4aratroo4 landings but this too came in the last wee7s when there no longer seemed much 4oint in being hard1 Ee undoubtedly had no enmity for the Dutch1 If they collaborated he wished them well and wanted them to share in the new order in !uro4e1 Ee had not ordered the most drastic re4risalsC it was General .hristiansen not 8eyss-In@uart who decided on the destructions to be carried out in the village of #uttenC it was Berlin that demanded the shooting of so many hostagesC in the manhunts he was carrying out orders1 :ne of the witnesses at Nuremberg 61 -immer who had been 8eyss-In@uart?s .ommissioner General for Administration and Dustice testified that the Fosenthal library consisting of (0$ $$$ volumes had indeed been moved to the Feich in (0$ crates but that this had been done against 8eyss-In@uart?s instructionsC there is no reason to doubt that 8eyss would have 4referred to 7ee4 the library in his domain in Eolland1 Ee confiscated everything he thought the Germans needed more than the Dutch such as woolen goods which he too7 from the L :nce in discussing Americans he said that the women were all ali7e their hair and ma7eu4 were the same and that they re4resented the decultivation and actually the e<tinguishing of a true civiliHation and what was truly racial1

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page_4#0 #age /%$ 4o4ulation as early as (*/( when the German Army was having a cold winter in FussiaC and by (*/) he was ta7ing off te<tiles clothes underwear furniture and household articles as well1 +% But such re@uisitions could be defended if not solely on military grounds as being incited by the ruthlessness of the Allied bombings and the necessity of su44lying Germans who had lost their 4ossessions1 Moreover the orders came from Eitler who wanted the Dutch and the other 4eo4le in occu4ied territories as well as the Germans to feel the effect of the air war1 8till houses were blown u4 not by the Army for military reasons but on 8eyss? orders as a re4risal against sabotage and he could also order that a news4a4er that failed to 4ublish an article against the stri7ing Dutch railway wor7ers be destroyed1 6or 8eyss had to be brutal to demonstrate his National 8ocialist Heal in such emergencies both to show his mettle as Feichs7ommissar and to fend off Eimmler1 8eyss-In@uart was named by Eitler as 6oreign Minister to the DoenitH cabinet the careta7er regime that ruled for a few days but DoenitH chose in his 4lace .ount 8chwerin von Brosig71 8eyss was ca4tured soon after the surrender by the British in Eamburg and tried as a ma,or war criminal1 The Nuremberg court found him guilty on three of the four counts against him1 Ee had not 4lanned to wage aggressive warfare the ,udgment said but he had waged it and he had committed war crimes and crimes against humanity1 It is difficult to agree that he had waged any 7ind of war as the generals and di4lomats and 4ro4agandists waged it1 The Anschluss which the court called ??forcible anne<ation I was far from a war and 8eyss had nothing to do with the decisions to invade #oland the 9ow .ountries or ;ugoslavia nor did he 4lot against any of the intended victims of Eitler?s 4lans1 But of the other counts against him the crimes against humanity and the war crimes there can be no doubt1 8eyss from the time of the NaHi ta7eover of Austria hel4ed in the e<4ulsion and humiliation and 4lundering of the Dews and he was at least a silent 4artner in the e<terminations1 Against the Dutch the ,udgment said he had been ruthless in a44lying terrorism and in annihilating his o44onents and des4ite the e<aggeration in describing what 8eyss had actually done in contrast to what he had made small effort to 4revent being done the words Iannihilating the o44onentI were his own1 Notes (1 Gogelsang o2. cit1 441 /('(%1 &1 D-*&' @uoted in Eilberg o2. cit1 41 &$1 )1 August BubiHe7 'oung Hitler =9ondon: Allan -ingate (*0/>1 /1 I enkschrift Himmlers ueber )ie Behan)lung )er "rem)voelkischen im Osten 3Mai 789$5 I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 G No1 & (*0+ 441 (*'*+1 01 Bernhard 8tasiews7i I ie (irchen2olitik )er Nationalso0ialisten im

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page_4#1 #age /%( !arthegau 78F8789? ?? in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 ( (*0* 41 0%1 '1 )%)0-#8 =IAG>1 +1 N*A GI )%(0-#8 41 +0(1 %1 MA )&+ =IAG>1 *1 .bi)1 ($1 NG /'&( =IAG>1 ((1 N*A GI )%(/-#8 441 +/&/01 .bi)1 )%(0-#8 441 +/00&1 (&1 )%)/-#8 =IAG>1 ()1 NG /'&( =IAG>1 (/1 N*A GI )/'%-#8 41 ('*1 N*A 8u441 B 441 ()*)*/1 (01 N*A 8u441 B 41 ()*/1 ('1 N*A II &&))-F-#8 41 '/)1 (+1 !.-( =IAG>1 (%1 N TTIT 41 )'*1 (*1 .bi)1 &$1 N*A IG &&))-D#8 441 %*(*&1 &(1 N: 0(*) Borherr re4ort of A4ril (* (*/) =IAG>1 &&1 N*A IG &&))-!-#8 441 %*/*$$1 &)1 .bi)1 &&))-AA-#8 41 *(+1 &/1 Eans 6ran7 .m Angesicht )es 6algens =Munich: 6riedrich Alfred Bec7 Gerlag (*0)> 41 (0/1 &01 Eubert 8chorn er /ichter im ritten /eich =6ran7furt a1M1: Gittorio Blostermann (*0*> 41 ((1 &'1 .bi)1 441 +%+*1 &+1 .bi)1 41 +%1 &%1 6ran7 o2. cit1 &*1 N TII 41 )+1 )$1 NG )&%& =IAG>1 )(1 -ladimir von Eartlieb -aroleB as /eich =Gienna and 9ei4Hig: Adolf 9user Gerlag (*)*> 41 /**1 )&1 N*A G )&0/-#8 41 *%01 ))1 .bi)1 )/1 .bi)1 &**/-#8 441 +$)%1 )01 +oelkischer Beobachter A4ril % (*)% )*%+-#8 =IAG>1 )'1 N TTIT &&(*-#8 441 ))()'1 )+1 NG (&%' =IAG>1 )%1 MA )&% (/%0C MA )&% ($&) =IAG>1 Eans-Dietrich 9ooc7 ICur A6rossgermanischen -olitikA )es ritten /eiches I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol GIII No1 ( (*'$ 441 )+ '/1 )*1 9ooc7 o2. cit1 441 )+'/1 /$1 Eans Buchheim I ie hoeheren 88- un) -oli0eifuehrer I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TI No1 / (*') 441 )'&*(1 /(1 N TGI 41 &$%1 /&1 Eilberg o2. cit1 41 )+)1 /)1 David Irving The estruction of res)en =9ondon: -illiam Bimber R .o1 (*')>1 //1 N TTGI **+-#8 41 /&/1

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page_4#2 #age /%& /01 #ersonal letter from Dr1 91 de Dong director Fi,7sinstituut voor :orlogsdocumentatie Amsterdam1 /'1 N*A III **+-#8 441 '/(0'1 /+1 MA )&% ($)' =IAG>1 /%1 Feitlinger The "inal Solution 441 ))&)01 /*1 Eilberg o2. cit1 41 )+'1 0$1 .bi)1 41 )++1 0(1 N*A GI ))))-#8 441 0%'&1 0&1 D '$ Fi,7sinstituut voor :orlogsdocumentatie Amsterdam1 Eereinafter referred to as Amsterdam1 0)1 N*A GI )))'-#8 441 '/+$1 0/1 Eilberg o2. cit1 41 )+$1 001 N TTTII )/)$-#8 441 &%/%*1 0'1 N*A III ((')-#8 441 %(*&$1 0+1 .bi)1 (('&-#8 41 %(+1 0%1 NIB (&*&0 =Amsterdam>1 0*1 N*A G )$$)-#8 441 +&'&+1 '$1 MA )&% ($(' =IAG>1 '(1 MA )&% =IAG>1 '&1 -erner -armbrunn The utch &n)er 6erman Occu2ation (*/$(*/0 =8tanford: 8tanford "niversity #ress (*')> 441 +(+&1 ')1 N TGI 41 &&(1 '/1 N TG 41 '')1 '01 MA )&% =IAG>1 ''1 N TGI 441 '('&1 '+1 N*A IG (+'0-#8 441 )&0/)1 '%1 N*A GII !.-%' 41 &+/1 '*1 N TGI 41 +$1 +$1 -armbrunn o2. cit1 41 +%1 +(1 N G 41 00*1 +&1 F6-(0)& =IAG>1 +)1 N G 41 )/*1 +/1 N IT 41 (&*1 N TGI 41 +)1 +01 N TTTII )/)$-#8 441 &%/%*1 +'1 N G 41 )0&1 ++1 MA &)% =IAG>1 +%1 N GII 41 ($&1

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page_4#3 #age /%) (& The -ar #lant and 6orced 9abor Albert 84eer :ne of the genuinely gifted men to become 4art of the NaHi war a44aratus was the architect Albert 84eer1 84eer became Minister of Arms and Munitions in (*/& when he was thirty-si< years old after 6ritH Todt builder of the -est -all as well as of more durable structures li7e the Autobahnen had been 7illed in an air4lane accident1 But 84eer was far abler than his 4redecessor who was mainly an engineer an efficient organiHer of large-scale construction1L 84eer got rid as far as he could of the system of coercionC he 4ut full res4onsibility for the efficiency of a 4lant into the hands of the local managerC he im4rovised e<horted 4arceled out authority among bureaucrats and entre4reneurs and hundreds of his de4uties were ??honorary co-wor7ers I borrowed from 4rivate industry for the duration of the war and 4aid only a fraction of what they had been getting as managers or technicians1 Ee resisted anyone when 4roduction was threatenedEimmler Bormann Goebbels and finally Eitler himself1 Ee too7 over the ,ob of increasing German armaments in the face of the increasingly devastating bombardments of the industrial centers and did so well that although the cities of the Feich became rubble and hundreds of thousands of their inhabitants victims of the incendiaries bloc7busters blasting and fire storms German war 4roduction went u4 during the entire 4eriod of his ministry until (*/01 It was owing to 84eer that the biggest year of German manufacture of L An article by Alan 81 Milward 4ointed out that many of 84eer?s organiHational reforms had already been introduced by Todt =+iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TIG No1 ( (*'' 441 /$0%>1

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page_4#4 #age /%/ arms was (*//C only ten months before the end of the war German 4roduction of air4lanes and munitions reached an all-time high des4ite the thousands of bombers attac7ing German cities around the cloc7 the closing ring of Allied armies and the bloc7ade1 In (*// seven times as many wea4ons were 4roduced as in (*/& five and a half times the number of armored vehicles and si< times the amount of ammunitions but only )$ 4er cent more wor7ers were em4loyed1 ( 84eer made few ma,or miscalculationsC he had no 4art in the decision to 4ut so much material and labor in the costly ??GI wea4ons e<4enditures he would have 4referred to see devoted to fighter 4lanes so bitterly needed against the Allied bombers1 Ee o44osed the diversion of so much labor to the construction of underground factories when other 4roduction was vitally neededC nor was it his beltline of factories that failed1 The German tan7s and 4lanes became s4oradically useless after May (*// because fuel was lac7ing following the massed Allied attac7s on the synthetic gasoline 4lantsC in these bombings 84eer declared at Nuremberg *$ 4er cent of German fuel 4roduction was destroyed1 84eer?s achievement was of a divided character1 Ee always thought of himself as an artist and he was certainly a builder and organiHer of monumental 4ro,ects that were intended not only to rescue the Feich from defeat but to hel4 create a res4lendent and com4letely imaginary future Germany in which they would 4rovide a scale of living never before a44roached in the worldC and 84eer the builder served with all his talents a nihilistic leader who built only in his own image and who would blow everything u4 when his luc7 ran out1 In the closing months of the war when Eitler was at his most deadly in dealing with doubters even when they were old #arty comradeswhich 84eer was not =he had ,oined the #arty only in (*)&>84eer told the 6uehrer bluntly the war was lost1 It was the 7ind of statement that cost the head of many a man who made it to the wrong 4erson for this was defeatism which immediately became high treason when the Gesta4o and the Gol7sgericht not to mention the 6uehrer himself heard of it1 84eer in addition disobeyed the direct and unconditional order of Eitler to blow u4 not only military strong4oints and 4lants that could be useful to the Allies but also those that were the sources of German subsistence then and in the futurethe factories and bridges shi4s freight cars locomotives and railroad installations 4ower stations and water su44lies of the cities lying in the 4ath of the advancing Allied armies1 As one device for salvaging everything he 4ossibly could he @uoted to Bormannwho wanted the German 4eo4le to be forced to converge in the center of the country where they would fight to the last leaving only scorched earth behind themEitler?s assurances that the lost territories would soon be reca4tured1 Des4ite the 6uehrer?s e<4licit directives 84eer therefore ordered that factories were to be merely I4aralyHed I not destroyed and moreover this was to be done only at the last moment 7ee4ing 4roduction and machinery intact as long

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page_4# #age /%0 as 4ossible and then with luc7 the Allies would ta7e the factories over without serious damage1L & 84eer salved his 4atriotic conscience by telling himself that in any event the Allies would gain little or nothing by ca4turing the factories since owing to the deficiencies in trans4ort they at best could not use them for at least nine months1) In this way he saved the Minette mines in 6rance from destruction telling Bormann and the other #arty fanatics that a German counterattac7 would soon restore them to the Feich?s uses1 No one he wrote to Eitler had the right to order the destruction of the means of survival of the nation1 And when he finally became convinced that Eitler was identifying with his own lost cause the fate of the 4eo4le he had 4rofessed to love so dee4ly 84eer 4lanned to 7ill him1 8ince everyone who visited the 6uehrer was searched after the Duly &$ attem4t on Eitler?s life 84eer wanted to 4ut 4oison-gas grenades in the ventilating system of Eitler?s bun7er in Berlin and he was 4revented from carrying out his 4ur4ose only because the ingenious idea 4roved to be technically im4racticable1 Eitler with his 4rimitive instinct for danger had ordered a bric7 chimney four meters high to be built around the vents so they could not be tam4ered with/ But des4ite his furious resistance to Eitler?s orders for senseless destruction 84eer was one of the very last among the faithful and unfaithful to ta7e his farewell of the 6uehrerC he flew to Berlin to rescue a family friend from the doomed city and at Eitler?s re@uest s4ent the night in the 6uehrer?s bun7er only a few days before Eitler committed suicide1 In his fashion he remained devoted to the man who had 4robably wished him as well as Eitler could wish anyoneC but 84eer would have 7illed the 6uehrer and the #arty leaders with his own hands rather than acce4t the senseless loss of the machines that would 7ee4 the threadbare survivors of the war alive1 Ee intended to 7ill Eimmler Goebbels and Bormann the chief advocates of scorched earth along with EitlerC he organiHed the automatic 4istols and the cars that would ambush them and he 4lanned to drive one of the cars himself1 But the 4lot failed when 84eer found no way to get at Eitler and these others at the same time1 Ee came to the same conclusions as the cons4irators of Duly &$ but in terms of his s4ecialty which had more to do with the efficient manufacture of goods than of ideas1 8ome of the 4eo4le around Eitler including 84eer thought 84eer en,oyed a s4ecial freedom with the 6uehrer because he was an architecta brilliant 4ractitioner of the 4rofession that Eitler had once chosen for himself and to which the 6uehrer gave his full amateur talents when he set out to rebuild the Feich after he became .hancellor1 84eer became Eitler?s chief architect in (*)/ when he was only twentynine years old1 Ee was born in Mannheim L ??#aralysisI meant 4artial dismantling removing essential 4arts from the machinery shi44ing them from the 4lants hiding them but not damaging the machinery which must begin as soon as 4ossible to wor7 again for whatever 7ind of Germany might survive the war1

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page_4#! #age /%' on March (* (*$0 the son and grandson of architects1 After ta7ing his Abitur he studied architecture at Barlsruhe Munich and Berlin where when Eitler too7 4ower he was an assistant at the Technische Eochschule and 4racticing his 4rofession at the same time1 Ee dee4ly im4ressed the 6uehrer with his new Feichstag which not only was designed in the heroic style the 6uehrer so doted on but also was erected in a shorter time than anyone would have thought li7ely1 84eer then as later was 4rodigal with wor7ers and used twice as many as more economical architects might have demanded1 Eitler gave him the tas7 of re4lanning Berlin and along with it the s4iritual home of the #artyNuremberg1 84eer told the court that if he had been free to carry out his blue4rints the Feich would have had some of the largest buildings in the world and the whole earthsha7ing 4lan would have cost less than two months of war1 0 84eer thought that if Eitler had 4ermitted himself to have a friend 84eer might have been the one chosen because of their common interest1 6or whatever reason 84eer was able to tal7 to the 6uehrer in words no one else dared use without incurring any of the 4enalties inflicted on the generals for e<am4le who dared to be critical1 ??:ff with their headsI was for doubtful military men and 4oliticiansC 84eer was neither but he was otherwise everything that Eitler had once dreamed of becoming himself1 Ee told the 6uehrer the tas7 given him was non4oliticalC it had to be carried out by technicians and e<4erts of all descri4tions including the ' $$$ Ihonorary co-wor7ers I many of whom too7 a dim view of the #arty1 Ee recalled this 4ronouncement to Eitler over and over again when the #arty the Gauleiters and the 88 tried to invade his domain where they thought high treason lur7ed1 84eer began his rearguard action his one-man resistance movement late in the war after the invasion of Germany had started but once he began to resist he was ready to go ,ust as far as the men of Duly &$1 Although he never ,oined them he was highly enough regarded by the cons4irators to be their choice for Minister of !conomics in the new regime that would succeed Eitler?s and the 6uehrer not only 7new about this but was constantly reminded of it by Bormann and the others who never had believed in 84eer?s loyalty1 In his meetings with Eitler as well as in the memoranda he sent him 84eer became increasingly defeatist and in mid-March (*/0 he wrote a long re4ort to the 6uehrer telling him 4lainly that German industry would colla4se within four to eight wee7s with certainty and that the war could not be continued after this brea7down1 84eer wrote to Eitler: The 4eo4le in this war have fulfilled their duty and their tas7 under circumstances far worse than in any 4revious war1 It is certainly not due to any failure of theirs if the war is lost1 1 1 1 -e must do everything to maintain even if 4erha4s in a most 4rimitive manner a basis of e<istence for the nation to the last1 1 1 1 No one may ta7e the 4osition that the fate of the German 4eo4le is bound to his own1 1 1 1 No one has the right to

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page_4#" #age /%+ destroy industrial 4lants coal mines electrical and other 4ower centers trans4ort facilities inland waterways and such1 -hereas u4 to now 4lants have been 4aralyHed 1 1 1 for a 4eriod of one to two months so they could be 4ut into use again @uic7ly when they were reca4tured the same stand 4oint must now 4revail even if a recon@uest does not seem 4ossible 1 1 1 It is of course necessary to destroy bridges over the main rivers as long as it is 4ossible to slow u4 the enemy advance1 But it cannot 4ossibly be the 4ur4ose of a war leadershi4 in the homeland to blow u4 so many bridges that with the diminished resources in the 4eriod after the war it will ta7e years to rebuild this traffic networ71 The 4re4ared demolitions of the bridges in Berlin for e<am4le would have as a result that the city of Berlin could no longer be su44lied with food and would ma7e industrial 4roduction and the life of the 4eo4le in this city im4ossible for years to come1 These demolitions would mean the death of Berlin1 The demolitions in the Fuhr area of the many railroad bridges over the smaller canals and valleys or of the viaducts would 4revent the Fuhr from underta7ing the 4roduction that is essential to re4lace the bridges1 1 1 1 -e have no right at this stage of the war to carry out destructions which would stri7e at the life of the nation1 If the enemy wishes to destroy this nation which has fought with uni@ue bravery then this historic shame will rest solely on him1 -e have the obligation of leaving to the nation everything 4ossible that in the remote future might be able to insure it a reconstruction1 ' The memorandum ended without the customary ??Eeil mein 6uehrer1IL 84eer o4enly sabotaged Eitler?s ordersC he had high e<4losives which were su44osed to be used to blow u4 coal mines hidden from the demolition s@uads and he issued machine 4istols to factories so their wor7ers could resist any attem4ts to destroy them1 84eer succeeded in saving innumerable 4lants dams and bridges in Germany and the occu4ied countries and he o4erated im4artially against the Gauleiters 88 officers and Army engineer detachments that were determined to carry out orders to blow them u41LL Ee was tireless in his efforts to 4revent demolitionsC it was because of his insistence that orders were sent through :Bto 4reserve intact im4ortant railroad lines that would otherwise have been blown u41+ It was on March &* that 84eer wrote Eitler a stinging letter summing u4 their conversation of the day before: If I write to you again it is because I am not in the 4osition on emotional grounds to share my thoughts with you by word of mouth1 6irst I must tell you how 4roud and ha44y I would be if I might continue to wor7 for Germany as your collaborator1 To leave my 4ost even if you ordered me to do so in this decisive time would seem li7e desertion to the German 4eo4le L The uni@ue freedom with which 84eer wrote and tal7ed to Eitler was not one-sided1 The 6uehrer told him during one conversation that he 7new Goering to be corru4t and a do4e addict =N TGI 41 0)(>1 LL 6ailing to carry out such orders could easily mean death1 Eitler on March (% (*/0 ordered the e<ecution of eight officers for not blowing u4 a bridge =.bi)1 41 /*'>1

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page_4## #age /%% and to my loyal co-wor7ers1 Nevertheless I am in duty bound to tell you without regard to any 4ersonal conse@uences 4lainly and unadornedly what my inner feelings are with regard to the situation1 I have always told youas one of the few co-wor7erso4enly and honorably what I thin7 and I shall continue to do so1 ;ou distinguished yesterday between the recognition of realities through which one can be convinced that the war no longer may be won and the belief that des4ite everything it may all come out all right1 1 1 1 My belief in a ha44y turn of fate for us was unbro7en u4 to March (%1 1 1 1 I am an artist and as such was given a ,ob that was com4letely alien and difficult1 I have done much for Germany1 -ithout my wor7 the war might have been lost in (*/&/)1 I mastered the ,ob not as a s4ecialist but with the characteristics 4ro4er to an artist: with the belief in his tas7 and in success with the instinct for what is right with a sense for generous solutions with an inner integrity without which no artist can find 4ro4er solutions1 I believe in the future of the German 4eo4le1 1 1 1 I was desolate when I saw in the days of victory in (*/$ how we in the broadest circles of our leadershi4 lost our bearing1 Eere was the time when 4rovidence demanded of us decorum and inner modesty1 Then victory would have been ours1 1 1 1 A 4recious year was lost for armament and develo4ment through easy-going ways and laHiness and then as though 4rovidence wanted to warn us bad luc7 trailed our military accom4lishments 1 1 1 The frost before Moscow the fog at 8talingrad and the clear s7y over the winter offensive of (*// M84eer is here tal7ing of the German Ardennes offensive where the weather 4layed a role but certainly not a decisive one in bringing the attac7 to a haltN 1 1 1 -hen on March (% I gave you my memorandum I was sure you would a44rove com4letely the conclusions1 I had drawn for the 4reservation of our 4eo4le1 6or you yourself once said that the tas7 of the leadershi4 of a state is to 4revent its 4eo4le at the end of a lost war from coming to an heroic end1 Nevertheless you said on that evening if we have not misunderstood you clearly and unmista7ably: ??If the war is lost the 4eo4le are lost too1 1 1 1 It is not necessary to bother about the fundament that the 4eo4le will need for its most 4rimitive future e<istence1 :n the contrary it would be better to destroy these things1 6or the 4eo4le have shown themselves wea7er and the future belongs entirely to the stronger 4eo4les of the !ast1 Those who survive the war will in any event be only the inferior onesC the best have fallen1I Eearing these words I was most dee4ly sha7en1 1 1 1 "4 to then I had believed with all my heart in a good end to this war1 I ho4ed that not only our new wea4ons and 4lanes but above all the fanatical growing belief in our future would rouse the 4eo4le and the leadershi4 to the last sacrifices1 I was then myself determined to ta7e a glider and fly against the Fussian 4ower stations and through my 4ersonal involvement to hel4 out to change fate and at the same time to set an e<am4le1 I can however no longer believe in the success of our affairs if in these decisive months at the same time and according to 4lan we destroy the substance of our 4eo4le1 That is so great an in,ustice against our 4eo4le that fate could never again mean well by us1

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page_4#$ #age /%* 84eer then re4eated what he had written on March (0: -hat generations have built u4 we are not 4ermitted to destroy1 If the enemy does so and thus e<terminates the German 4eo4le then the historic guilt is his alone1 1 1 1 I can only continue my wor7 with inner 4robity and with conviction and belief in the future when you my 6uehrer ac7nowledge as you have before the necessity for maintaining the substance of our 4eo4le1 1 1 1 ;our order of March (* (*/0 ta7es away the last industrial 4ossibilities and 7nowledge of it will throw the 4o4ulation into the greatest des4air1L 1 1 1 I as7 you therefore not to com4lete this act of destruction against your 4eo4le1 8hould you be able to ma7e this decision in whatever form then I will again have the faith and the courage to be able to wor7 with the greatest energy1 1 1 1 ?? % And this letter he closed with the words IMay God #rotect Germany1I 84eer did succeed in getting Eitler to modify this insane order1 Ee drew u4 what became the 6uehrer decree of March )$ which declared that since the destruction order was given to 4revent the use of the installations by the enemy demolitions were only to be carried out under immediate threat of ca4ture and were not to wea7en the German ability to fight1 Bridges and traffic installations were to be destroyed entirely but su44ly 4lants need only be 4aralyHed1 Total destruction of es4ecially im4ortant 4lants was only to be carried out with the a44roval of 84eerC and the #arty 8tate and Armed 6orces were to assist him1 This document was a remar7able tribute to 84eer?s influence on Eitler1 In addition 84eer was enabled to issue a directive under his own signature on the same date to accom4any the Eitler decree declaring that his 4revious orders for 4aralyHing industrial and su44ly 4lants were still in effect1 Total destruction of the most im4ortant 4lants and of their essential 4arts was to be carried out only by order of the 6uehrer transmitted through him and 84eer would name such factories with the counsel of the chairman of the armament committees1* 84eer?s victory was the more astonishing for its ta7ing 4lace at a time when Eitler sus4ected high treason on every side when he was ordering death 4enalties for his closest former collaborators and when the ho4eless battles of the remnants of the German armies were being fought only to give him a few more wee7s of life1 At this time when Eitler was identifying the fate L Eitler?s order of March (* re4eated that everything must be done to wea7en the enemy and to 4revent his farther advance1 !very 4ossibility of damaging the stri7ing 4ower of the enemy directly or indirectly must be utiliHed1 Industrial installations should not be 4aralyHed but destroyed: It is a mista7e to believe that traffic communications industrial and su44ly centers left undamaged or 4aralyHed for a short time can be used again when they are reca4tured1 The enemy in his retreat Mthis was Eitler?s answer to 84eerN will leave us scorched earth with no regard for the 4o4ulation1 Therefore I order: all military traffic information industrial and su44ly centers as well as stoc7s inside Germany that could be of any use to the enemy 1 1 1 are to be destroyed1 The order was to be sent to troo4 commanders with the greatest 4ossible s4eed =N T9I 41 /)$>1

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page_4$0 #age /*$ of the German 4eo4le with his own 84eer succeeded in brea7ing through the im4enetrable barriers of fantasyC he forced the 6uehrer to change his mind1 84eer was the only man who succeeded in doing this and Eitler seemingly bore him no ill will1 A radio s4eech 84eer wanted to ma7e early in A4ril (*/0 was canceled by Goebbels who thought it defeatist but on A4ril (' in Eamburg 84eer made a recording of another s4eech which he 4lanned to have broadcast when the time cameafter Eitler?s death1 In it he said that further destruction or even ??4aralyHingI o4erations were not to be carried out that they were forbidden in Germany and the occu4ied territories1 No bridges were to be blown u4 and their demolition charges were to be removedC 4rotection was to be 4rovided for factories railroads and communication installations1 Anyone who resisted the order was to be dealt with by the Army and the Gol7ssturm =in which only volunteers were henceforth to serve> if necessary by force of arms1 #risoners of war and foreign wor7ers were to remain in their cam4s but if they were already on the road toward their homes they should be sent on their way1 #olitical 4risoners and Dews in concentration cam4s were to be se4arated from the asocial 4risoners and be turned over unharmed to the Allies when the occu4ying troo4s a44eared1 Any -erewolf activity was to sto41 ($ Although this s4eech was never delivered all 84eer?s orders were given in its s4irit1 Ee made no secret of his im4lacable o44ostion to Eimmler 9ey Bormann 8auc7el Goebbels and all the other down-theline #arty men who interfered with his ,ob of su44lying Germany with wea4ons and while ho4e remained of obtaining a stalemate or somehow tolerable conditions for Germany?s survival1 A resourceful man of affairs when it came to 4roducing goods with any means at hand 84eer too7 forced labor for granted but he wanted a reasonable wor7 wee7 because 4roduction slac7ened off if too much was demanded1 Ee was against a long twelve-hour day and yet since the country had come to live under a constant emergency a seventy-two-hour wee7 was by no means uncommon for concentrationcam4 wor7ers in the 84eer-controlled enter4rises1 Ee used concentration-cam4 wor7ers late in the war as little as 4ossible the tribunal conceded in its ,udgment but not for humane reasons but be cause he had to deal with Eimmler to obtain their services1L At Nuremberg 84eer defended the use of forced foreign labor in Germany saying he was no international lawyer but he had not thought the 4ractice to be illegalC moreover he had managed to 7ee4 thousands of factory hands at wor7 in their own countries rather than de4orting them1 Ee had succeeded in getting L 84eer had nothing 2er se against using concentration-cam4 wor7ers1 In (*)% he 4lanned with Eimmler to use inmates for manufacturing bric7s and stonewor7 under the 88 so that concentration cam4s too would be 4roductive =Eans Buchheim Martin BrosHat Eans-Adolf Dacobsen Eelmut Brausnic7 Anatomie )es SS;Staates =:lten and 6reiburg i1 Br1: -alter-Gerlag (*'0> Gol1 II 441*&*)>1

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page_4$1 #age /*( the factories assigned to him in foreign countries ??bloc7ed I so 4eo4le wor7ing in them could not be sent out of the country at the behest of one of the com4eting NaHi collectors of labor and because the men had more incentive to wor7 in their own country and avoid being de4orted1 Ee used both the entre4reneur and the factory wor7er as humanely as he could under the heavy 4ressures of the constant crises besetting the Feich but he wanted German women to be forced to wor7 too a ste4 that Eitler and 8auc7el with their sentimental image of German womanhood were most reluctant to ta7e1 84eer?s remar7able success in increasing 4roduction came from his gift of im4rovisation and his clear sense of how to organiHe1 Ee used beltlines and manufactured standardiHed 4arts in scattered factories so that if one factory was destroyed the finished tan7s or whatever could still be 4roduced1 Ee gave bonuses threatened 4unishments and got rid of as many administrative bureaucrats as he could1 The last accom4lishment was close to his heartC he was grateful for the fire that destroyed thousands of documents in his ministry and he used the occasion he told his cowor7ers to dro4 a long list of officials from their ,obs1 I-e cannot e<4ect occurrences of this 7ind will continuously bring new vigor to our wor7 I he told his colleagues1 (( Ee was o44osed to large aggregates 4referring a large number of smaller enter4risesC huge factories he thought 4roduced huge bureaucracies1 Ee ran his vast 4roduction em4ire with a minimum of man4owerC he had twentyone main committees which were res4onsible for the finished 4roducts of the armament industry and twelve so-called IringsI to 4rovide for the delivery of raw materials1 The committees and rings had the tas7 of streamlining 4roduction and deciding on what the factories should concentrate and on how any im4rovements in manufacture or use of materials might be made1 The committees and rings did the 4lanning wor7ing closely with the over-all #lanning .ommission and 84eer 7e4t em4hasiHing that their chairmen must 7ee4 in close 4ersonal touch with the multifarious web of assignments that had to be carried out according to the directives1 The ,ob of the committees 84eer said was mainly to bac7 u4 the factory manager1 !<change of information between 4lants was constant and secret material including 4atents was made available to all factories as were any new discoveries1 84eer gave the German 4lants what they always tended to lac7: fle<ibility and a 4lant-wide morale a sense of comradeshi4 and of wor7ing for the general cause with enthusiasm without regard to salary and social differences1 The main incentives for the wor7ers were 4rovided to be sure by the war but they also 7new that only in this in 84eer?s fashion could the 4revious methods of coercion be 7e4t out of the 4lants1 Always lur7ing in the bac7ground was the #arty and its hostility to business and industry and anything it did not directly control1 Both the committees and the rings were com4osed of mi<ed grou4s from the -ehrmacht and technical e<4erts from industry1 The decision on the develo4ment of new wea4ons was in the hands of the chairmen of the committees who were com4any of-

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page_4$2 #age /*& ficials engineers and construction men and any decision they made could be overruled only by 84eer or by the -ehrmacht or by Eitler himself1 The 4lant managers had com4lete authority in their own 4lants as far as 84eer could give it to them and 7ee4 them free from #arty interference1 Eis remar7able record was by no means owing to the underground factories of which so much was later to be heard1 They 4rovided but a small fraction of German 4roductionC at the end of the war only )$$ $$$ s@uare meters of such 4lants e<isted although there were 4lans for three million s@uare meters more to come1 Both 84eer and 6ield Marshal Milch who was one of the chief men res4onsible for the 4roduction of fighter 4lanes for which the underground 4lants were mainly built and who sat with 84eer on the .entral #lanning Board as well as on the Daeger 8taff L were against the building of these 4lants because the idea they said had occurred to Goering too late in the war and the time and man4ower needed for their building would be better utiliHed to 4roduce 4lanes in the factories already available1 84eer gladly hired anyone who was able to do the 7ind of ,ob he needed and Goebbels Baltenbrunner and Bormann called his ministry a nest of anti-#arty sentiment and activity which it undoubtedly was by their standards in view of the ceaseless attem4ts of its chief to ste4 u4 4roduction regardless of the race or 4olitical sentiments of his 4roducers and his single-minded efforts to circumvent the destruction orders1 84eer was glad to em4loy Dews or 8lavs #oles "7rainians .Hechs and Fussians all the hated inferior 4eo4le if only they could 4roduce1 Ee gratefully 4ut concentration-cam4 inmates and 4risoners of war to wor7 for his enter4rises1 6oreign wor7ers of all nationalities =volunteers forced laborers concentration-cam4 wor7ers and 4risoners of war> made u4 /$ 4er cent of the 4ersonnel of the German war factories1 (& More than two and a half million 6renchmen wor7ed for Germanyof the more than one million 6rench 4risoners of war only some /% $$$ were unem4loyed1 There were more than a half million Dutchmen and (0$ $$$ Belgians and wor7ers came by the millions from the !ast1LL() L Milch when he started the Daeger 8taff in March (*// was given the tas7 of deciding on the new models and at the same time raising the 4roduction of German fighter 4lanes from ( $$$ to ) $$$ a month but he immediately called on 84eer and thus the two of them sitting both on the .entral #lanning Board and the Daeger 8taff almost com4letely re4laced Goering in the economic s4here1 Milch was always ready to subordinate himself to 84eer whom he regarded with unstinting admiration1 LL A decree issued by the .hief of 8taff of :BE on 6ebruary ' (*/) declared it was the duty of everyonemale and femalefrom the ages of fourteen to si<ty-five to wor7 in the o4erational areas of the !ast1 84ecial rules were to be established for the Dews and a wor7 4eriod of fifty-four hours 4er wee7 was to be standard with overtime night and 8unday wor7 a 4ossibility1 Fegular sic7ness benefits however were to a44ly1 At a later meeting in Fovno on March ($ it was noted that ??a million or more wor7ers were to be shi44ed out within the ne<t four months I largely for agricultural wor7the 84eer enter4rises would get the factory labor from the -est1 8uch was the need for labor that the 8D on March (* (*/) was directed by 8turmbannfuehrer .hristensen to rela< its most brutal measures in the warfare against the 4artisans which resulted in so many of the civilian 4o4ulation ,oining the bands1 The harsh 4ractices .hristensen listed were the shooting of the Eungarian Dews farm wor7ers and children and the burning down of villages1 Ee ordered that such measures be curtailed that Is4ecial treatmentI be limited1 6or the time being 3footnote continue) on ne4t 2age5

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page_4$3 #age /*) 84eer wanted them treated well and 4aid on scales that com4ared with the Germans otherwise they would not wor7 4ro4erly1 Ee never hesitated either to ma7e use of the 88 or to fight it1 Ee elbowed Eimmler out of setting u4 more concentration-cam4 factories bringing these wor7ers as far as he could under his own authority and he merely agreed to su44ly Eimmler?s -affen 88 divisions with more war material in 4ro4ortion to the concentration-cam4 wor7ers the Feichsfuehrer 88 made available1 84eer forbade the Gesta4o from ma7ing arrests in his factories and 4rotested against their 4ractice of holding 4risoners for months because of some minor defect in their 4a4ers when they might otherwise be wor7ing1 Eis battle was against whatever they or anyone else did that lost wor7ers for the Feich1 (/ In Dune (*// 84eer made use of his close relationshi4 with Eitler to 4rotest to him the stu4id misuse of Fussian 4risoners of war by the 88 4ointing out that thousands of them had been shi44ed to 88 factories from 4lants where they had been usefully em4loyed and that most of them were s7illed s4ecialists1L 84eer?s 4rotest was a direct attac7 on Eimmler who was e<tending his em4ire as far as it would go1 The 88 had begun to 4roduce goods on its own account with a woodwor7ing 4lant in DachauC this was successful enough from Eimmler and #ohl?s 4oint of view to warrant e<tending the 88 enter4rises to other concentration cam4sto :ranienburg Buchenwald Neuengamme1 In addition concentration-cam4 labor was su44lied on a rental basis to outside factories that needed it1 Eimmler wanted to 7ee4 all concentration-cam4 labor available for these 88 factories alone but 84eer was able to convince the 6uehrer that war 4roduction would be damaged by such a wide-scale diversion of Germany?s scarce machine tools1 Eimmler in his efforts to recruit labor ordered that )0 $$$ !astern wor7ers who had breached their labor contract be sent ??by the @uic7est meansI to one of these concentration cam4s where he could ma7e use of them1LL The only ones to 3footnote continue) from 2revious 2age5 .ommunist #arty functionaries activists etc1 were only to be listed but neither they nor their close relatives were to be arrested1 Members of the .omsomols were to be a44rehended only if they held leading 4ositions1 -hen villages were burned down the entire 4o4ulation must be 4ut at the dis4osal of the German authorities and .hristensen added this classical statement on behalf of more humane measures: IAs a rule no more children will be shotI =N TTTI )$(&-#8 441 /%(*0>1 L 84eer testified at Nuremberg that :B- had o44osed using 4risoners of war e<ce4t for Fussians and Italian internees in the armament industries because the Geneva .onvention forbade the use of ca4tured military 4ersonnel in such wor71 The 4rohibition however did not a44ly to the 8oviet "nion which had never signed such international agreements1 Eis reasoning again was entirely 4ragmaticC he e<4lained that the 4risoners of war were mainly 4roducing goods that were not s4ecifically military according to the Geneva .onventionC he did not regard the wor7 the 6rench 4risoners of war were doing as armament 4roduction since in modern war almost any 4roduct could have a military use1 8ome /$$ $$$ 4risoners of war he testified were used directly in the armament industry but of these from &$$ $$$ to )$$ $$$ were Italian the rest Fussian =N TGI 41 /0&>1 LL The contracts the free wor7ers signed stated that they agreed not to disclose what they had seen in Germany when they returned homeC that they were to re4ort any 4ro4aganda or es4ionage immediately to the German managementC and that they covenanted to wor7 conscientiously and well and to be 4unished if the necessity should arise under German law =Dune (*/) BD.>1

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page_4$4 #age /*/ be e<em4t were those in solitary confinement awaiting further interrogation1 (0 84eer stormed against both the attem4ts of 8auc7el to ta7e wor7ers from the 4rotected industries he had set u4 in the occu4ied countries and the 88 4ractice of arresting German and foreign wor7ers on some trivial 4rete<t and sending them to concentration cam4s1 8uch wor7ers he said li7e the 4risoners of war never came bac7 to the 4laces where they had been em4loyed and their services were lost as they disa44eared into the labyrinths of Eimmler?s domains for the 88 used them in any 7ind of wor71 Ee com4lained to Eitler that )$ $$$ to /$ $$$ wor7ers a month were thus 7idna44ed out of the economy by Eimmler1(' Ee told the 6uehrer too that the Fussians es4ecially the women wor7ers if decently treated were usually content with their lot1 Ee wanted humane treatment for the same reasons he wanted coal and oil for his machines but he loved machines better than 4eo4le1 In one conference he suggested that in order to obtain 6rench s4ecialists who were 4risoners of war for German factories the rumor be s4read that such men would be freed if they volunteered1 The 6rench would have a list of such e<4erts and once the Germans had it on hand they could sim4ly conscri4t the s4ecialists1 There was no great harm in 84eer but he was a machine man an efficiency e<4ert and the human beings were essential counters in his tas71 Eis admiration for the order of the machines that he understood so well even led him at the end of the war to try to sto4 the manufacture of e<4losives to 4revent their being used to blow u4 the factories Germany would so des4erately need after the fighting was over1 :nce he recogniHed the war was lost he threw in his handC his factories had to 4lay a role in the futureC 4roduction for its own sa7e had no meaning for him1 Nor did he have any confidence in the miracle wea4ons the G-(s and G-&s1 Ee fought against the manufacture of the new and 4otent gases Tabun and 8arin which German chemists had succeeded in 4roducing and against which no gas mas7s were said to be effective1(+ Tabun and 8arin were five times more 4owerful than the former war gases and Goebbels and Bormann and a handful of scorched-earth fanatics wanted to use them to sto4 the Allied advance1 Eitler however came to agree with the arguments of 84eer and the generals that it would be catastro4hic for Germany to use 4oison gases in view of the Allied control of the air and their almost unhindered ability to hit the German cities with bombsincluding gas bombsin retaliation and 84eer was finally able to sto4 the manufacture of the gases1 -ith the 4roclamation by Eitler of total war on Duly &0 (*// German men from the ages of si<teen to si<ty-five and women from seventeen to fifty had to register for wor71 At long last 84eer?s contention that German man and es4ecially woman 4ower was not being ade@uately em4loyed was ac7nowledged in the 6uehrer decree1 84eer had always wanted the factories manned by German rather than foreign labor largely because indigenous labor would not increase the demand on the food su44lies1 But the decree came too late for 84eer?s 4ur4oseC the millions of foreign wor7ers were already in

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page_4$ #age /*0 Germany and it was 4recisely at this time that the Allied bombardments of the synthetic oil 4lants made much of the 4roduction useless1 German cities had long been under heavy bombardment and no careful canvass of how many women were wor7ing and whether their ,obs were indis4ensable could be made1 -hole bloc7s of houses were disa44earing at a timeC the tas7 of finding living @uarters lining u4 for food and getting to and from wor7 if a woman had a ,ob too7 strength enoughC and the ??combing-outI s@uads sent by the #arty only increased an<ieties without adding much to the labor force1 Many women with children were sent to the country and sometimes whole schools were evacuated1 The wor7ing mother stayed at her ,ob1 But what she did and how long she wor7ed could not longer be efficiently controlled1 84eer acted on behalf of his own technocracyC he gladly too7 what labor he could from whatever sourceC he was gratified by the good 4erformance of concentrationcam4 wor7ers in his factories and he would have wanted more of them e<ce4t for the constant threat of Eimmler?s interference1 Ee estimated at Nuremberg that not more than )) $$$ to )' $$$ inmates of these cam4s were at wor7 in the war factories although they 4ut in much more time than the othersfrom seventy-two to even a hundred hours a wee71 "nder some of the cam4 commanders :bergru44enfuehrer #ohl told his chief Eeinrich Eimmler there were no limits to the hours of concentrationcam4 labor1 The-cam4 commander alone decided how long the 4risoners had to wor7 but in any event wor7 brea7s must be 7e4t to a minimum1 INoon intervals I said #ohl Ionly for the ta7ing of meals are forbidden1I (% 8ince the concentrationcam4 laborers 84eer had in his factories were for the most 4art mi<ed in with other wor7ers their hours were li7ely to be limited and in any event he was against long hours because they were inefficient1 But he highly a44roved of concentrationcam4 labor for his war industries as he did 4risoners of war volunteers and forced laborers1 In none of his countless re4orts memoranda or s4eeches however did he write or say anything other than to urge that they be ade@uately fed and rewarded for their 4erformance1 In the environment of hostility and violence in which he o4erated he was one of the mildest of the to4 government officials1 Eis country was as he saw it in a life-or-death struggle with its enemiesC every German must do his share either at the front or in the factories and the 4eo4le in the occu4ied countries must wor7 too ho4efully in their own 4lants where they would do their ,obs more efficiently1 84eer did not thin7 it his concern to decide the legality of what was being done but his im4rovised system was based far more on rewards than on 4unishments and the ty4ical NaHi e<hortations to be ruthless and to ta7e no account of the suffering of foreigners never a44ear in anything 84eer wrote or said1 Ee conceded in his re4orts that a small ma,ority of his wor7ers both German and foreign needed to be disci4lined on occasion to be sent for a 4eriod to s4ecial cam4s or even to concentration cam4s if they deliberately committed ma,or infractions of the wor7 rules or sabotage1 But on the whole he used the carrot rather than

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page_4$! #age /*' the stic71 Ee had wor7ed closely with the 88 when he too7 over the :rganiHation Todt which was then o4erating in the .rimea where re4airs of all 7inds had to be made to roads and bridges and buildings1 84eer used Fussian conscri4t labor under 88 guards but no charges were ever made that he was res4onsible for any mistreatment of the wor7ers1 (* 84eer too turned over all his documents to the Allies while he was still free in the belief that he had nothing to hideC he had been assigned an im4ortant technical tas7 and had carried it out1 Thus the Allies had 4ossession of his entire corres4ondence and the 4icture that emerged from it was that of a man for whom nothing was more im4ortant than his ob,ectives1 Ee hovered busily over his em4loyees writing a shar4 letter to Fibbentro4 when his cowor7ers were slighted at an official function and the #arty brass ste44ed out in front to ta7e the bows leaving the 84eer contingents who actually did the wor7 in the bac7ground1 ??;ou 7now I he wrote Fibbentro4 Ithat I 4ersonally set little store by such things as table order or the distribution of awardsC I never attend such occasions if it is not absolutely essential1I Nevertheless 84eer commented those who did the wor7 should have a 4lace ne<t to the chief functionaries at the ceremonies celebrating what they had built1 I;ou 7now how I disli7e discussions of these matters I he wrote Ibut I cannot tolerate a situation where my closest associates who have volunteered to wor7 on their own time are 4ushed to one side1I In the same vein 84eer re4rimanded his own cowor7ers who seemed to him in any way la< in their de4artmental loyalties1 If under the 4ressure from outside agencies colleagues a44eared to be in the slightest degree diverted from the ,obs he had assigned them 84eer was immediately on the war4ath1 Eere again he used his reward-and-4unishment formula telling them that they could not serve two masters but if they carried out the assignments he gave them they could call themselves IDe4uty Architects of the General Building Ins4ector of the German ca4ital1I&$ If however they did not immediately 4romise to wor7 for him alone he 4ointed out that he had the 4ower and would use it to abrogate their contracts in whole or in 4art1 -hen one of his assistants un7nown to 84eer wrote a strongly unfavorable letter to Bormann on a man 84eer wanted to a44oint a ministerial adviser 84eer demanded that his assistant be sent to a concentration cam4 and he discharged another member of his staff who was im4licated1&( 84eer had a continual and lively corres4ondence with the entire NaHi hierarchy beginning with Goering who always concerned with his 4rerogatives even when he no longer was ca4able of carrying out a siHable fraction of his assignments com4lained bitterly of decisions that had been ta7en in the economic s4here without consulting him1 8ince he was head of the 6our;ear #lan no im4ortant ste4 said the Feichsmarschall could 4ro4erly be ta7en without consulting him and 84eer re4lied that he doubtless had enemies in the Feichsmarschall?s entourage who cast a false light on what he was doing but he had to ma7e decisions to 4erform his ,ob 4ro4erly and he

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page_4$" #age /*+ reminded Goering that a higher authority was over them both that they too must wor7 4atriotically together for the 6uehrer1 Goering was evidently a44eased for the main tenor of his corres4ondence with 84eer was friendly after that and he made no further remonstrances1 84eer had to deal with everyone in the higher echelonswith the Feichs7ommissar Terboven in Norway with Eans 6ran7 in #oland with Barl Eermann 6ran7 in .Hechoslova7ia with the Army and Navy and Air 6orce with Gauleiters and #arty leaders of all conditionsand as long as they did not interfere with his tas7 he was e@ually courteous to them all even the malodorous Eeydrich1 But 84eer was @uic7 to sense any encroachment on his territorywhether an attem4t on 9ey?s 4art to underta7e a 4ro,ect 84eer thought should be under himself && or the actions of any of the other muddleheaded NaHi functionaries out to e<tend their satra4ies1 :ne s4eech of 8auc7el?s immediately caused him to 4rotest because 84eer said 8auc7el used the occasion as a 4latform to state his 4retensions to controlling what use was made of the labor he recruited1 More than once 84eer com4lained to Eitler that he thought 8auc7el needed to be 7e4t in line by more 4owerful wea4ons than he himself had immediately at hand1 :ne of 84eer?s collaborators General of Artillery -agner de4artment head in the armaments industry com4lained in a letter to Goebbels a co4y of which he sent to 84eer that 8auc7el was unwilling to use the Eungarian Dews or 4ermit them to enter his Gau of Thuringia1 84eer strongly ob,ected to this for these concentrationcam4 wor7ers were industrious and other Gauleiters might follow 8auc7el?s bad 4recedent and refuse to admit the Dews into their Gaue which would badly hurt German 4roduction1 The 4resence of the Dews 84eer said 4erha4s for the record was disturbing to him too but this was an emergency and since the Dews were in concentration cam4s they could not offend the sensibility of the German 4eo4le or damage them in any way1&) :f one trans4ort of 0$* !astern wor7ers 8auc7el sent 84eer wrote in indignation on Danuary &0 (*// ('( were children from one month to fourteen years oldC fortynine men and si<ty-nine women were in such a 4hysical state as to be inca4able of wor7ing and thus 0) 4er cent of the entire grou4 could not be em4loyed1 8ome months later he denied 8auc7el?s re@uest for + $$$ wor7ers to be ta7en tem4orarily from the armament factories and to be used in manufacturing sugar telling 8auc7el he certainly must be able to round u4 wor7ers for a short time without disru4ting an essential branch of German industry1 Ee could write a twelve-4age letter to the 6uehrer to buttress his 4osition against 8auc7el1 8auc7el must regard himself as 84eer?s assistant 84eer told EitlerC 84eer himself must decide how wor7ers were to be em4loyed1&/ And he turned down Beitel?s re@uest for his 7ey wor7ers as coolly as 8auc7el?s for by (*// he had convinced Eitler that 4roduction was as im4ortant as the front1&0 Ee was e@ually shar4 with 6ran7 who 4lanned useless 4ro,ects for the General Government and told 6ran7 that only if he was certain he could finish a building =a ban7 that could be used as tem4orary slee4ing @uarters for two hundred 4eo4le> with local labor that could not be used elsewhere

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page_4$# #age /*% might he 4roceed with the 4ro,ect1 :therwise the labor was needed in the Feich1 :n other occasions he re4rimanded 6ran7 for his e<travagant use of materials1 &' 84eer made many visits to the front after which he was accustomed to writing long memoranda recommending im4rovements in wea4ons and tan7s and on one occasion he noted 4lacards in store windows of the Fadom district which he considered e<travagant1 ??I must as7 you to see to it that the 4lanning and carrying out of all measures is done with the least e<4ense of wor7 and material I he told the Governor who too7 no such 4arsimonious view of his rights and 4rivileges1 84eer was still a youngish man when he undertoo7 the tas7 of 4roviding Germany with its war materials and he had small 4atience with either slowmoving bureaucrats or entre4reneurs1 Ee de4lored what he called the advanced age of successful German businessmen and wanted the head of any firm who was fifty-five years old or more to have an assistant who was to be no more than forty years old1 ;outh and decentraliHation and sim4lification were three of his 4rimary reci4es for im4roving the German war effort1 The sim4le #anHer fist that re4laced the relatively cumbersome antitan7 wea4ons and could be shot by one man was his notion of a 4ro4er gun1 6ive million of them were 4roduced in (*// but 84eer was able to 4oint out that more than a million were 4roduced in the month of March (*/0 alone des4ite all the shortages the bombardments and the loss of territory that had shrun7 Germany to the siHe of a small wedge between the Allied armies1&+ But even 84eer?s innumerable ,obs his constant s4eechma7ing and ,ourneys to the front his conferences with Eitler de4artment heads generals and admirals did not wholly fill his time1 Ee continued all during the war to 4lan for grandiose future cities with green belts s4orts facilities and underground railway stations and where the occu4ants of a4artment houses would not have to leave their immediate neighborhood to sho4 for everything they neededC he foresaw vast 4ro,ects where traffic would be rerouted through congested areas li7e the Fuhr and through cities1 :n Danuary ($ (*// he wrote that a million wor7ers would be needed to rebuild German cities after the war1 A4artments in huge barrac7s would be built for young married 4eo4leC /$$ $$$ maybe '$$ $$$ would be 4rovided in a year and in addition two and a half million dwellings would be constructed on conventional lines so that the housing crisis would be solved in three years1&% 84eer as7ed Goering to use his influence with Terboven in Norway to ma7e sure the cutting of a natural stone available there would continue des4ite the demands of the war so it could be shi44ed to the Feich1 Ee 4aid out large sums =(0$ $$$ FM for garden figures 0$$ $$$ FM to a scul4tor for the monumental and heroic statues he and Eitler so admired> des4ite his dedication to channeling German resources into war 4roduction1 6or the training of artisans in Germany 84eer wanted /$$ FM a year to be given a44renticesC to ma7e sure of the interest of the young wor7ers he as7ed that

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page_4$$ #age /** they invest ($$ FM in their training in return for which they would get from the 8tate 0$$ FM a semester1 &* Ee could overloo7 everything that marred his ideal 4icture of a rationally functioning !uro4ean economy buttressed with vast building 4ro,ects and integrated industries1 :nly a few wee7s before the end of the war on A4ril * (*/0 he said that Germany had built u4 in the occu4ied territories a !uro4ean economy in the real sense1 6rance Belgium and Eolland had been 4ermitted to manufacture the 7inds of goods for which their factories were best e@ui44ed and they had even been enabled to rebuild when rebuilding was 4ossible1 It was tragic 84eer thought that this coo4erative wor7 was now being bro7en down but he was ho4eful that the future would restore this !uro4ean integration1 6or he saw clearly as he told the court at Nuremberg that the future would 4roduce intercontinental roc7ets ca4able of destroying cities anywhere on the globe and that the nations of the new and old worlds must collaborate or 4erish1 -hat he failed to notice was the effect of the #andora?s bo< of hatred he with his magic enter4rises had hel4ed to o4en on the world1 ??"se the shar4est measures I he told 8auc7el regarding recruitingC in effect get the wor7ers in any way you need to1 84eer was an<ious as he had always been to comb as many as he could from German sources and he was sure in Duly (*// that )$$ $$$ house wor7ers could be 4ut to wor7 in his factories1)$ But a few months earlier he as7ed Eimmler to 4rovide /$$ $$$ wor7ers from AuschwitHC even ($ $$$ he said would be fine1)( Two months later he a44ealed again to EimmlerC foreign wor7ers were becoming much scarcerC the concentration-cam4 inmates were sorely needed1 #eo4le were counters for himC the Eungarian Dews whose use he said offended his Aryan sensibilities were nevertheless good wor7ers and he wanted them brought to Germany where their talents could be 4ro4erly em4loyed1 Ee was indifferent to whether the 4risoners of war in his factories were 6rench or Fussian or ItalianC he measured them with his 4recise im4ersonal mind solely by their 4erformance1 As the Allied circle drew close around Germany 84eer made careful calculations of how long the Feich could last under the loss of the territory raw materials and factories that fell into the hands of the enemy1 Thin7ing of himself always as an artist he wrote an angry 4rotest in (*// to the Army because it would not give a 4ainter 4ermission to visit the -est -allC artists he said were as necessary as the cameramen who were doing films for the wee7ly news roundu4s1 -hen DoenitH after he became #resident as7ed 84eer to become Minister of !conomics 84eer declinedC at the time he wrote to 6oreign Minister 8chwerin von Brosig7 who had succeeded Fibbentro4 in the admiral?s cabinet that it was as incongruous for an artist to continue to ta7e on such ,obs as it had been to em4loy a cham4agne salesman as 6oreign Minister1 -hat was 84eer?s guiltO At Nuremberg he acce4ted he said the common res4onsibility of German leaders even in an authoritarian system for what had been done and certainly his own for what had gone on in the area of

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page_ 00 #age 0$$ his authority1 )& 84eer was self-confident and com4osed on the witness stand1 Ee refused in answer to a 4rosecution demand to name the 4eo4le in Eitler?s entourage of whom he was criticalthis was no time for 4rofessional or 4ersonal recriminationsand the Fussian 4rosecutor @uestioning him had no success against his @uiet self-assurance1 8oviet 4rosecutors tended to re4eat @uestions which their -estern colleagues had already as7ed and to which ade@uate answers had already been given by the defendantswhether because the Fussians did not follow the trial closely or which is more li7ely because they wanted their own record of their 4atriotic role in the court 4roceedings to be clear when they returned to Moscow1 The 8oviet 4rosecutor who cross-e<amined 84eer Fagins7y at one 4oint told 84eer that if he did not wish to he need not answer a @uestion truthfully but the #resident of the .ourt intervened to say that 84eer had already and 4ro4erly answered the @uestion1 84eer told Fagins7y when as7ed how he had come to wor7 so closely with the 6uehrer des4ite his nefarious character that the Fussians too had read Mein (am2f and yet had made their 4act with Eitler1 The dialogue became lively with im4lications1 Fagins7y as7ed him if it was not true that he had given himself without reservations to his war tas7s1 8#!!F: ??;es I believe that was the custom in your 8tate too1I FAGIN8B;: II am not as7ing you about our 8tate1 -e are now tal7ing about your 8tate 1 1 1I 8#!!F: I;es1 I only wanted to e<4lain this to you because a44arently you do not a44reciate why in time of war one should acce4t the 4ost of Armament Minister1 If the need arises that is a matter of course and I cannot understand why you do not a44reciate that and why you want to re4roach me for it1I FAGIN8B;: II understand you 4erfectly1I 8#!!F: IGood1I)) 84eer defended the concerns that em4loyed concentration-cam4 laborC he 4ointed out that the firms had no control over the cam4s which were run by the 88 and the com4any officers were not even allowed to ins4ect them1 And to this statement he added with true German entre4reneurial grandeur IThe head of a 4lant could not bother about conditions in such a cam41I)/ Almost the whole of German 4roduction by (*// was in his hands including the defense 4lants for the Army Navy and Air 6orce as well as those manufacturing consumer goodsC only the 88 4lants were outside his authority1 In addition 84eer acted as chairman of the Daeger 8taff with 6ield Marshal Milch as co-chairman1 This committee of three members with e@ual 4owers and votes had infringed as Eitler intended it should on the last remnants of Goering?s former em4ire but the Feichsmarschall by (*// when the Daeger committee was established had to 4arcel out most of the territory over which he had formerly ruled1 84eer though until Dune &$ (*// when Goering finally turned over the 4lants to him had only limited authority over the factories 4roducing for the 9uftwaffe which were manned in 4art by half-

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page_ 01 #age 0$( starved Fussian wor7ers because the Feichsmarschall to the end clung to every 4rerogative as long as he could1 84eer tried to im4rove the Fussians? rations as well as those of the other wor7ing 4risoners and he always o44osed the barbed wire around the wor7 cam4s because of its bad effect on morale1 6rom time to time he succeeded in getting su44lementary meals for these wor7ers and after he got those he tried to have consumer goods made available to them but any such successes were short-lived1 The scarcity of food as a result of the bombardments and the subse@uent derangement of trans4ort was genuine enough although there was always enough for the civilian 4o4ulation and whatever 84eer managed to obtain for his wor7ers the Fussians always got less than the others who labored for the Germans e<ce4t for the Dews1 The final malign effect of the 6uehrer4rinHi4 84eer said at Nuremberg was that every order even if it was criminal or insane was su44osed to be carried out unconditionally without criticism1 But obviously he only became aware of this at the very end of the warC u4 to the scorched-earth order he was concerned solely with his enormous assignment1 8ecure in his own sense of the correctness of what he was doing he visited countless factories and tal7ed with the men including forced laborers with no escort such as accom4anied other NaHi ministers1 A wide cross section of Germans always had confidence in him from members of the Fesistance to Guderian and Dodl both of whom tal7ed o4enly to him about Eitler?s arbitrary and unreasonable decisions1 -hen they com4lained to 84eer they no longer had much will left to cross Eitler face to face1 84eer confessed at Nuremberg that he did not try more than once or twice to a44roach the 6uehrer directly with criticisms eitherC the scenes he said could be too 4ainful1 German war 4roduction des4ite 84eer?s efforts was always com4licated by the incessant battle for 4ower within the 8tate and #arty a44aratus1 Before 84eer became Minister of Armaments and instituted his system of self-res4onsibility for industry a 4lant manager faced being sent to a concentration cam4 if he failed to meet his arbitrarily set norms of 4roduction1 It had been a coercive system and 84eer tried with success to find a substitute for the rewards and 4unishments of the com4etitive freeenter4rise system under the conditions of the war economy1 Ee s4ent hours tal7ing to meetings of Gauleiters and the statistics of what he accom4lished were so overwhelming that these u4holders of the true faith often bro7e out in loud a44lause des4ite their sus4icions of him1 Eis s4eeches were s7illfully ada4ted to the Gauleiters? mentality1 Before 4rocurement was coordinated he told one meeting of Gauleiters at #osen on August ) (*// the amount of co44er demanded by se4arate de4artments was more than the total su44ly in the world1 Ee gave them astonishing figures on 4roduction: in (*/( +0 million shells had been turned outC in (*// /$% million would be made1 Then he gave the figures of fighter-4lane 4roduction under his Daeger committee: ) ((0 fighter 4lanes and interce4tors were constructed des4ite the Allied

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page_ 02 #age 0$& bombings in Duly1 Ee added that new "-boats that had been only s7etches in 8e4tember were being actually 4ut in service in May with a 4romise of forty-four a month to come later in the year1 These were statistics the most stu4id among the Gauleiters could understand1 And 84eer told them too of the bureaucratic troubles they themselves 7new so well for they often caused them1 Ee related how he had found (%$ $$$ gasoline cans in Breslau lying unused because they had been classified as drin7ing canteens destined for Fommel?s army in Africa and had never been returned to their status as containers for gasoline1 Ee had found truc7s immobiliHed because tires were lac7ing and had got them on the road within hoursC he found other truc7s in Army garages( $$$ of them in Giennawhile #anHers could not be shi44ed to the front for lac7 of them1 !ven the Gauleiters were enthusiastic at least while they were under his s4ell1 But the #arty never gave u4 the battle1 )0 8auc7el in the chain of command under 84eer tried constantly to e<4and and strengthen his own organiHation at 84eer?s e<4ense1 Eimmler tried to do the same thing with his 88 factoriesC the Gauleiters under Bormann were always 4ressing for increased authority over the 4lant managers and 84eer?s ??honorary co-wor7ers I whom they regarded as well-heeled saboteurs1 Goering gave u4 his authority reluctantly retreating ste4 by ste41 :n A4ril && (*/& he announced that within the framewor7 of the 6our-;ear #lan which he directed the .entral #lanning Board would be set u4 with three members 84eer Milch and Boerner as his 4ersonal re4resentatives1 The board was to have the res4onsibility of administering the entire economyC allocating raw materials es4ecially iron metals and coalC and deciding on how many wor7ers would be needed for the agreed-on 4roduction1L These decisions had to be fle<ible since the 6uehrer?s ideas changed on 4rioritiesC one month anti-aircraft defense too7 first 4laceC another tan7s and bombers or fighters had the highest 4riorities and materials had to be shifted accordingly1 The members of the .entral #lanning .ommission theoretically had e@ual voices in the decisionsthe one im4ortant e<ce4tion to the 6uehrer4rinHi4 it was 4ointed out at Nuremberg1 A unanimous vote was re@uired for a decision and thus any of the three could cast a veto1 The committee was dominated however by 84eer to whom both Milch and Boerner were entirely ready to turn over the im4ortant decisions on 4roduction and as time went on Goering too had been glad to see 84eer ta7e charge after he found his own accumulating failures harder and harder to e<4lain1 84eer and the .entral #lanning Board continually demanded of 8auc7el that he con,ure u4 more thousands of wor7ers and 8auc7el struggling to carry out his 4art of the 4atriotic effort once 4romised L #aul Boerner was chairman of the board of directors of the Eermann a million fresh Goering -er7e as well as 8taatsse7retaer and 4ermanent De4uty of the .ommissioner for the 6our;ear #lan1 Eis a44ointment was a face-saving deviceC Goering would have no voice in the decisions made by the committee1

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page_ 03 #age 0$) wor7ers1 Ee was only able to 4roduce &$ $$$1 But this ha44ened toward the end of the war when all su44lies were failing including man4ower and the means for getting it and u4 to (*// he 4roduced his millions of wor7ers1 6urthermore 8auc7el had increasingly stiff com4etition in the battle for obtaining man4ower and 84eer was one of his chief com4etitors1 6or while 84eer demanded the vast contingents of new wor7ers he at the same time made it im4ossible for 8auc7el to get them from the bloc7ed factories where they were concentrated1 84eer insisted that 8auc7el 7ee4 out of these factories1 8auc7el com4laining to the 6uehrer that 84eer was hoarding in these enter4rises labor that was bitterly needed in Germany demanded the right to investigate 84eer?s use of man4owerC to send his own men into the bloc7ed factories to determine whether how and if what they were 4roducing was really essential to the total war effort1 84eer was able on the whole to defend his bloc7ed factories successfully for when it come to a showdown Eitler 7new that 84eer was indis4ensable and that his methods had wor7ed miracles1 8auc7el on the other hand was ordered to get hold of so and so many millions of wor7ers and not only 84eer was a com4etitor but Eimmler the Army which needed wor7ers in the rear areas and the 9uftwaffe which recruited civilian hel4ers and before (*// gathered its own labor for aircraft 4roduction1 8auc7el had other 4roblems as well: he needed millions of wor7ers for agriculture1 Eere too 84eer demanded that those @ualified be released for factory wor7 between harvest time and s4ring1 But as 8auc7el resentfully 4ointed out many of them never returned for the s4ring 4lanting but stayed on in 84eer?s factories1 84eer the court found had not been guilty of 4lanning or waging aggressive warfare but he was guilty of war crimes and crimes against humanity 1 Ee had 7nown the court said that his war factories were using slave laborC he had been 4resent at the conference with Eitler where it was agreed that 8auc7el was to bring in foreign labor by force and at the meeting where 8auc7el had been told to su44ly at least four million new wor7ers from foreign countries1 84eer had also as7ed for s4ecific nationalities to be 4rovidedFussians for e<am4leand his bloc7ed factories too were illegal although the tribunal conceded that because of them thousands of foreign wor7ers had been enabled to stay in their own countries1 The court also noted that 84eer had wanted to use as few concentration-cam4 wor7ers as 4ossiblebecause it said he mistrusted Eeinrich Eimmler?s ambitions1 The ,udgment declared that he had not been directly concerned with the cruelty of the slave-labor system but he had 7nown of it and 7new his demands for labor meant that violence would be used in recruiting man4ower1 Ee had also com4lained about malingering and the court @uoted his saying:??There is nothing to be said against the 88 and 4olice ta7ing drastic ste4s and 4utting those 7nown as slac7ers in concentration cam4s1I But again the ,udgment 4ointed out he had insisted on ade@uate food and wor7ing conditions being 4rovided the labor force so that it could wor7 efficiently1 And last of all the tribunal

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page_ 04 #age 0$/ mentioned without comment that he had told Eitler the war was lost and that he had o44osed the scorched-earth 4olicy1 Then the court sentenced him to twenty years a sentence 84eer said after his release he acce4ted1 6ritH 8auc7el The man who was head of the forced-labor 4rogram from March &( (*/& until the end of the war was the Gauleiter of Thuringia e<-sailor and factory and construction wor7er !rnst 6riedrich .hristo4h 8auc7el whose given names were commonly shortened to 6ritH1 8auc7el had wor7ed for 84eer in -eimar before the war and in Berlin when 84eer built the new Feichstag but he owed his demanding 4ost not to his 4rofessional training but to his having been an indefatigable and fervent leader of the #arty in Thuringia since the early days of the movement1 It was Bormann not 84eer who recommended him to Eitler1 A man was needed from whom the Gauleiters would ta7e orders and the rough and ready 8auc7el who was in every way one of them seemed to the 6uehrer a good choice for the greatest slave roundu4 in history although 84eer 4ro4osed another Gauleiter named Ean7e for the ,ob1 8auc7el carried out his assignment with tireless efficiency as well as with a gross brutal goodwill as he organiHed his manhunt for the millions of 4eo4le to be ca,oled or dragooned to wor7 in the factories and on the farms of the Feich1 Eis mandate was farreaching1 The /eichsgeset0blatt recorded his 4ower by virtue of a decree signed by Eitler 9ammers and Beitel on March &( (*/& to carry out the mobiliHation of German and foreign wor7ers including 4risoners of war in the Feich and in all the territories occu4ied by Germany within the framewor7 of the 6our-;ear #lan1L )' "nder the decree issued by Goering a few days later on March &+ 8auc7el was accorded the right which had been delegated to the Feichsmarschall by the 6uehrer to issue instructions to ??the highest Feich authorities I to the Feich #rotector the Governor General the military commanders and the heads of the civil administration1 :n 8e4tember )$ Adolf Eitler gave 8auc7el the additional authority to a44oint commissioners to the civil and military administrations of occu4ied territories and these de4uties too would be entitled to issue directives to military and civil authorities in charge of labor allocation1)+ 8auc7el was a44ointed by the 6uehrer himself and thus his authority was limited only by someone li7e 84eer who also had direct access to Eitler and thus might be able when conflicting ambitions met head on to obtain a decision favorable to his own 4lans1 -hile 84eer a44ointed technicians 8auc7el named all the Gauleiters to his staffC one of his first decrees issued L The 4rogram was on a far greater scale than that of the IEindenburg 4rogramI of -orld -ar I1 It was wor7ed out before the war by the Eigh .ommand of the Armed 6orces and the civilian government with the unions1

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page_ 0 #age 0$0 on A4ril ' (*/& formally designated them as his commissioners in their res4ective districts and declared that the chiefs of the highest state and economic offices were to advise them1 )% Ee had 4romised the 6uehrer when he too7 the ,ob to wor7 with ??fanatical devotionI and this he did until (*/0 when to his genuine sur4rise he found that the war was lost and the world outside the one he had lived in so long with his 6uehrer and his #arty chiefs regarded him as a criminal1 8auc7el was a family man on a heroic scaleC he had ten children two of whom were 7illed in the course of the war1 Ee was also a man of the 4eo4leC his wife he was 4roud to tell the court was the daughter of a 8ocial Democrat and although he had attended a Gymnasium until he was fifteenobtaining the Mittlere /eifeL)*he had been a merchant sailor before -orld -ar I1 Dust after that war started he was ca4tured by the 6rench and he s4ent almost five years as a 4risoner in 6rance where he was thrown in with a number of other German ca4tives some of whom later became im4ortant in the 4olitical and military life of the Third Feich1 In the course of the long conversations he had with them he became for the first time concerned with 4olitics1 8auc7el was born in Eassfurt am Main on :ctober &+ (%*/1 Eis father was a 4ostman his mother a seamstress and it was she whose e<tra earnings made it 4ossible for the only child to go beyond the Gol7sschule1 Ee was fifteen years old when he went to sea and wor7ed on Norwegian and 8wedish sailing shi4s as well as German steamers1 9i7e so many men from the interior of maritime countries who have had a landloc7ed u4bringing 8auc7el never lost his love for the sea or his desire to serve his country as a sailor1 :nce in the course of -orld -ar II when his landsman?s ,ob seemed too much for him he stowed away on a submarine and had to be recalled by a wireless order from DoenitH who 4ointed out at Nuremberg that 8auc7el must have had a strong call to frontline dutyC he could have no ho4e for martial glory by serving on a "-boat1 8auc7el studied engineering for two years after the first war su44orting himself at odd ,obs1 Ee officially ,oined the National 8ocialists in (*&0 but as early as (*&( he was ma7ing s4eeches for the #arty and in (*&/ he was one of its chief reorganiHersC after the failure of Eitler?s 4utsch had scattered its leadershi4 he busied himself gathering recruits for it1 Eis #arty card had a relatively low number ()*01/$ In addition to being made Gauleiter of Thuringia in (*&+ he served in the Thuringian 9andtag from (*&+ to (*)) in which year he was a44ointed Feichsstatthalter of Thuringia and was elected to the Feichstag1 -ith the start of -orld -ar II he was made one of the Feich Defense .ommissars but being a man of considerable energy as well as having been de4rived of 4artici4ating in -orld -ar I he yearned for a more active role1 -hen 8auc7el was given the ,ob of #leni4otentiary for L The Mittlere /eife is less than an Abitur which is usually earned by the student at eighteen and which @ualifies him for the university1

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page_ 0! #age 0$' 9abor Allocation Eitler told him to his delight that now he could be a soldier again and 8auc7el gratefully acce4ted this view of his tas71 Ee told the court at Nuremberg that he regarded himself as a soldier1 As in the case of the concentration-cam4 guards it was easier not to call a nasty ,ob by its right nameC it needed to be dignified1 Eis de4uties wore the uniforms of Army officers not only for 4ur4oses of identification in the occu4ied areas but because in 8auc7el?s and Eitler?s view they were conducting a military o4eration1 /( 8auc7el became the greatest slaver of all time but he had no notion that he would reach this eminence when he too7 over the ,ob of 4roviding wor7ers for the booming industries of the Feich that had to be 7e4t going while millions of men were under arms1 8auc7el was a sim4le manC the war had to be fought and won and the armies that would do the ,ob had to be su44lied1 :n :ctober ( (*)% almost a year before the war started the 8u4reme .ommand of the German Armed 6orces had made 4lans to use forced labor both of 4risoners of war and of civilians in the occu4ied countries1/& And on May &) (*)* Eitler with the #olish cam4aign only months away had reaffirmed the 4olicy with regard to civilian labor in a meeting with military leaders including Goering Faeder and Beitel1 Ee had said: ??If fate brings us into conflict with the -est the 4ossession of e<tensive areas in the !ast will be an advantage1 1 1 1 The 4o4ulation of non-German areas will 4erform no military service and will be available as a source of labor1I/) The 4rogram was well under way before 8auc7el too7 over the ,ob1 Thousands of Dutch #olish and 6rench wor7ers had already gone to the Feich1 In 8e4tember (*/( Bormann had sent out a memorandum originating in :B- on the treatment of Fussian 4risoners of war saying that those willing to wor7 were to be correctly treated but em4hasiHing that bolshevism was the deadly enemy of National 8ocialism and that the smallest sign of o44osition should be met by ruthless and energetic measures1 To brea7 any resistance the memorandum said wea4ons should be mercilessly used1// Feinhard Eeydrich .hief of the 8ecurity #olice on 6ebruary &$ (*/& a month before 8auc7el became #leni4otentiary ordered that no Asiatics be sent to Germany1 The Fussian 4risoners of war who were shi44ed to the Feich had to be e<amined first by the 8DC they were to be sent in closed trans4orts to wor7 se4arately from other nationalities and in their free time and =this 4rovision included the Fussian women wor7ing on farms> were not to come in touch with the local 4o4ulation1 The conditions for the wor7ers from the Baltic 8tates were to be much the same but because they were not .ommunists they did not re@uire the same strict security measures although they too were to be held in close confinement1/0 8auc7el too7 the high 4ur4ose of his assignment for granted and as an honor bestowed u4on him1 Fecruiting labor whether in #oland or any other occu4ied country seemed a reasonable if difficult mission to him1 -hether

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page_ 0" #age 0$+ the wor7ers came voluntarily or by force he wanted them to be treated as well as was necessary for them to wor7 efficiently and he gladly 4rovided them with ade@uate nourishment clothing and housing1 Ee announced his 4rogram in a long memorandum on A4ril &$ (*/&: ??All these 4eo4le must be fed housed and treated in such a way that with the least 4ossible outlay the greatest 4ossible results will be achieved1I /' In the earlier stages of the Fussian cam4aign es4ecially wor7ers had as added inducements to volunteer to go to Germany not only the 4romise of food and wages for themselves but increased rations for their families at home1 6amilies could receive in addition (&$ rubles a month deducted from the 4ay of the wor7er1L 8auc7el?s recruiting drive started in a relatively humane fashionor at least with certain humane intentions and instructions from him1 6rom the beginning however wor7ing and living conditions for thousands of the labor force were subhuman1 6or one thing there sim4ly was not enough habitable s4ace available for all these thousands of 4eo4leC for another many cam4 managers either had no interest in how foreign laborers lived or en,oyed mistreating them1 The attitude of the 88 toward the foreign wor7ers was summed u4 by Eitler: I-hat does it matter to usO 9oo7 away if it ma7es you sic71I/+ 8auc7el either was unaware of much of what went on or ignored it1 8ince thousands of foreign wor7ers on farms and in factories were moderately well treated it was 4ossible for him to concentrate his thin7ing on those1 It was to be ta7en for granted 8auc7el said that the Germans would act correctly toward their con@uered enemies Ieven when they are the most terrible and irreconcilable and we will do this too when we e<4ect a useful 4erformance from them1I 9i7e Eimmler 8auc7el thought of the German as unimaginably chivalrous even when confronted with hard tas7s that demanded much of his finer nature and humane sentiments1 6oreign wor7ers were su44osed to receive the same insurance benefits as did the Germans and their trans4ort treatment and housing in the Feich were intended by 8auc7el at least to ma7e them content to be there1 8auc7el stoutly maintained at Nurembergand his own records bore him outthat he had no design of im4osing inhuman conditions of labor on his charges and he had little authority over their living and wor7ing conditions once he had delivered them to the German wor7 cam4s1 Ee too struggled against the fi<ed beliefs L A main goal of the cam4aign in the !ast it was made clear from the start of the war was to ma7e Germany bloc7ade 4roof to 4rovide the Feich with the food raw materials and laboring 4o4ulations it needed for the war and the years that would follow after Germany became a world 4ower1 The !astern 4olicy too was meant to de4rive #oland and Fussia of not only an industrial but also a biological 4otentialC for the !astern wor7ers were almost always se4arated from their families and the se<es were segregated in Germany1 The so-called Eay Action =see 8chirach .ha4t1 %> was originally intended to send to the Feich Fussian children from ten to fourteen years old who could be trained as a44rentices and it was 4ointed out that not only would they be hel4ful to the economy but their 4resence in Germany would also cut down on the future breeding 4otential of the !ast1

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page_ 0# #age 0$% of thousands of his #arty comrades that foreign wor7ers were less im4ortant than house animals1 /% And his re4eated orders for im4roving their lot had little relationshi4 to what actually ha44ened1 9i7e 84eer he wanted no barbed wire around the wor7 cam4s and he 7e4t re4eating that only wellcared-for wor7ers did their ,obs 4ro4erly1 But his own assignment was to round u4 the millions of wor7ers needed to man the German factories and the longer the war lasted the more difficult it became1 At first in the occu4ied Fussian 4rovinces and the Baltic countries which had been under 8oviet occu4ation more than in #oland both men and women were often glad to have a chance to get the higher 4ay and better rations 4romised them if they would go to Germany1 8auc7el was undoubtedly serious about the 4romises made to these 4eo4le and he told his recruiters that they must not lie and that he wanted the wor7ers to be accorded the treatment they had been led to e<4ect1 In 6rance he could ma7e use in the beginning of two 4owerful inducements to volunteers1 :ne was the offer to 4risoners of war of immediate release from their cam4s if they signed a contract to wor7 in a German factory and the other was to e<change one 4risoner of war for every three 6rench civilian volunteers for wor7 in the Feich1 The offer to 4risoners of war was ta7en u4 by many of the 6rench ca4tivesone entire cam4 it was said at Nuremberg ??volunteeredI for wor7but 4art of the bargain was that they would first be furloughed for two wee7s and of the % $$$ who signed u4 & $$$ disa44eared after they got bac7 to 6rance1/* :ne thing is certain: 8auc7el never for a moment thought of his assignment as conflicting with international law1 Ee wanted to 4rovide the same conditions of 4ay and wor7 for the !astern wor7ers as for other foreign labor in German factories1 Ee had been told by Eitler he said virtuously at Nuremberg that the use of foreign labor was not contrary to the Eague .onventionC but in any event the 6uehrer had e<4lained since Fussia was not a signatory to the Eague treaty its 4rovisions would not a44ly to 8oviet citiHens1 It is of course highly unli7ely that 8auc7el cared much one way or the other about such legal niceties until at Nuremberg they became more im4ortant than they had been in the Third Feich1 -hen 8auc7el became #leni4otentiary for 9abor Allocation he too7 over a ,ob that had been largely in Goering?s hands as Minister for the 6our-;ear #lan1 A decree of :ctober &' (*)* issued in accordance with the 4lans made earlier in (*)% and (*)* had made #oles in the General Government from the ages of eighteen to si<ty sub,ect to com4ulsory labor10$ Although it 4rovided that 4ayment was to be made Iat fair ratesI and the welfare of the wor7ers? families was to be safeguarded Ias far as 4ossible I Goering had made it 4lain that these 4eo4le were to be wor7ed to the uttermost for the benefit of the Feich1 I!verything not needed I the Feichsmarschall said Ifor the na7ed life of the countryI was to go to GermanyC this included factories too unless they could be used immediately more easily and more efficiently where they were on behalf of

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page_ 0$ #age 0$* 4roduction for Germany1 0( !ven eight-year-olds could be conscri4ted when they seemed either dangerous or a nuisance to the German occu4ants10& The Governor General of #oland Eans 6ran7 wrote to Goering on Danuary &0 (*/$ saying that the su44ly and trans4ortation to Germany of at least one million #oles male and female of whom at least +0$ $$$ were to be agricultural wor7ers must be arranged1 Ee wrote to a rece4tive minister for Goering had already 4ointed out the need for im4orting a million wor7ers1 -hen +olks)eutsche =4eo4le of German descent born in a foreign country> from Fumania were ??resettledI in #oland and too7 over #olish farms the former owners might either be sent as laborers to Germany or allowed to remain in their villages to wor7 there for the German settlers10) Before 8auc7el was a44ointed to his ,ob !astern labor was used mainly in the occu4ied areas1 The Fussian cam4aign with its insatiable demands for more man4ower at the front and for the su44lies to feed and e@ui4 the Army caused huge ga4s to a44ear among the ran7s of German wor7ers1 It was 8auc7el?s tas7 to fill them to bring in the essential man4ower and woman-4ower from the occu4ied -est and !ast by 4romises or by force1 Ee said once that if more wor7ers had been obtainable in (*/&/) 8talingrad might not have been lost1 And he genuinely felt 4erha4s because of his undemanding bac7ground as a sailor in the 4re--orld -ar I merchant shi4s that the treatment of the laborers brought to the Feich was e<cellent for he wrote to Eitler on March ($ (*/): II tell you that all the wor7ers of foreign nations are being une<ce4tionably treated correctly and decently well ta7en care of and well clothed1 1 1 1 Never before in the history of the world have foreign wor7ers been so well treated1I0/ Nevertheless and this seemed to him in no way inconsistent with the rest of his re4ort he said too that they were wor7ing without a sto4 ten hours a day and their 4roduction varied between '0 4er cent and ($$ 4er cent of that of the German wor7ers IA mighty addition to the reservoir that our enemies do not have1IL00 8auc7el for his 4art undoubtedly wanted his reservoir to be useful and he demanded that the undernourished receive medicine and food and good care for they Imust be given the feeling it is to their own interest to wor7 loyally for Germany1I0' All he could do was to ma7e such ho4eful s4eechesC he did not run the cam4s1 L Eours varied greatly1 Many wor7 days for foreign labor averaged thirteen hours and wages 4aid were 4urely theoretical since fines ta<es and other deductions 7e4t them down so the wor7er rarely received more than a mar7 or two a wee7 after the deductions1 :f a foreign wor7er?s 4ay %$ 4er cent was deducted one way or another 8auc7el said at Nuremberg1 A Fussian volunteer wor7er testified that he was given three-@uarters of a liter of tea at four in the morning when his day started and a @uart of nondescri4t sou4 fourteen hours later1 This together with &/$ grams of bread was his daily ration for hard labor =N TTG $0/-#8 441 ($(((>1 !yewitness re4orts tell of Fussian wor7ers catching mice and coo7ing them after s7inning them with bits of glass and metal =T!* Bru44 IT 41 ($0%1 N TTTG D-)(' 441 '''+> and of wor7ers being beaten for stealing a crumb of bread =N*A GII D-)$0 441 ()(/>1 The ,udgment in the I1 G1 6arben case stated that the com4any had 4rovided e<tra rations of hot sou4 at its own e<4ense but the wor7ers were still greatly undernourished =T!* 6arben GIII 41 ((%0>1

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page_ 10 #age 0($ 8auc7el?s wor7ers came from all the occu4ied countries of !uro4e1 Ee had agreements with the Gichy Government to secure labor from central 6ranceC with the military governor of northern 6rance and BelgiumC with 8eyss-In@uart in EollandC with the administrators and governors of all the satra4ies1 In theory he was to have the coo4eration of the Army1 :n :ctober () (*/& for e<am4le he as7ed Beitel for assistance in recruiting 0$$ $$$ Fussian wor7ers before the end of the year and another 0$$ $$$ by the end of A4ril (*/)1 0+ But in 4ractice 8auc7el was still com4laining at Nuremberg this hel4 was rarely forthcoming1 Generals said they had more than enough to do with fighting the war1 8uch hel4 as 8auc7el got was s4oradic and de4endent on local conditions1 An o4erational order of Army Grou4 8outh for e<am4le was issued on August (+ (*/) as 4art of the tactics to slow the Fussian advance ??to recruit and trans4ort to the Feich 1 1 1 all labor forces MbornN during (*&' and (*&+1I0% In December of the same year with the German Army retreating all along the !astern front an Army order from the threatened rear area of Belilov7a-Berditchev-Ahitomir was issued to evacuate the entire male 4o4ulation from fifteen to si<ty-five years old together with the livestoc71 In the -est in :ctober (*/& the military governor of northern 6rance and Belgium General Ale<ander von 6al7enhausen although strongly o44osed to the use of forced labor on 8auc7el?s order issued a decree for recruiting men from the ages of eighteen to fifty and single women from twenty-one to twenty-five10* In November (*/) General Dodl told an audience of Gauleiters at Munich: IIn my o4inion the time has come to ta7e ste4s with remorseless vigor and resolution in Denmar7 Eolland 6rance and Belgium to com4el thousands of idle 4ersons to carry out fortification wor7 which ta7es 4recedence over all other tas7s1 The necessary orders for this have already been given1I'$ And in the !ast too the Army similarly recruited masses of wor7ers for re4airing roads and bridges clearing debris and building fortifications1 But it did not often hel4 in rounding u4 the contingents 8auc7el was sending to the Feich1 8auc7el with the 6uehrer?s su44ort usually managed to get the formal bac7ing of the Eigh .ommand1 Ee met with General -arlimont in Duly (*// and as a result :B- 4re4ared an order that when the troo4s were not engaged in military tas7s they were to be made available for 8auc7el?s 4ur4oses1 8auc7el declared at Nuremberg that he had acce4ted this order with gratitude but it was never carried out1 8auc7el was always disa44ointed by the lac7 of coo4eration of the field commanders1 Army generals more than once 4rotested that 8auc7el?s methods of recruiting drove men and women to the 4artisans and 8auc7el com4lained that the Army regarded his mission as infamous1 In Italy 6ield Marshal Besselring said the recruiting drives had a bad effect not only on war 4roduction but on the entire Italian theater of war1 Besselring wanted voluntary recruiting or none and 8auc7el 4rotested that in Italy and elsewhere the soldiers instead of hel4ing tried to 4rotect the civilian 4o4ulation from his recruiting s@uads1'( 8uch hel4 as 8auc7el got

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page_ 11 #age 0(( from the Army was largely limited to the convoys of Fussian 4risoners of war and the actions in the rear areas where the battle against the 4artisans was being waged1 Members of the 4artisan bands were either shot or sent to labor cam4s1 #artisans however were a tough core of resistance and German security agencies were not eager to have them in the Feich1 8auc7el organiHed so-called 4rotection s@uads mi<ed grou4s of local 4olice and his own em4loyees to get at the wor7ers in the -estC sometimes churches or moving-4icture theaters were surrounded and hundreds of 4risoners corralled at a time1 8auc7el denied in Nuremberg that he had actually conscri4ted in this fashion saying that the men in the moving-4icture theater had com4leted one ,ob and were suddenly needed for another which was why they were so summarily sent off1 Eis defense seemed an unli7ely one but 8auc7el had written a letter to Eeinrich Eimmler 4rotesting against such an ??actionI in FussiaC 4ic7ing u4 4eo4le in this fashion and sending them to Germany he wrote to the Feichsfuehrer 88 on March &* (*/) damaged everything he was trying to do1 '& Eowever this may be 8auc7el was an old sailor and he admitted to shanghaiing wor7ers in 6rance by 4aying agents to get them drun7 and to deliver them to the recruiting centers1 Ee once boasted that of all the millions of wor7ers in the Feich not more than &$$ $$$ had come willingly and while he tried des4erately at Nuremberg to e<4lain his words as having been a foolish e<aggeration they were certainly true for his recruiting after (*/) and 4robably earlier as well1 !very German factory wanted more wor7ers1 I1 G1 6arben for e<am4le went after concentration-cam4 labor and got it1 :ne of its officers wrote: I:ur new friendshi4 with the 88 is 4roving very 4rofitable1I') Eimmler in turn as we have seen corralled wor7ers from industry and sent them to concentration cam4s where he could use them as he wished1 84eer always needed more wor7ers than he could get for his factories and he wanted 8auc7el to ta7e them not only from foreign countries but from German agriculture and households and hotels where he said guests could serve themselves1 8auc7el?s de4artment was a turbulent center of conflicting demands1 84eer demanded 8auc7el?s agricultural wor7ers and closed his factories in 6rance to 8auc7el?s recruitersC at the same time the 6uehrer ordered 8auc7el to get a million wor7ers from 6rance on the basis of estimates of theoretically available man4ower that Goering had given him1 8ince the 6rench 4olice too7 neither 4leasure nor 4ains in rounding u4 their com4atriots and the German s@uads were inade@uate in numbers 8auc7el?s drives in 6rance as in the !ast 4roduced fewer and fewer wor7ers as time went on1 -hen the 8i<th Army was lost at 8talingrad in (*/) both 84eer and Goebbels e<4lained to 8auc7el that it could be re4laced by a careful combing of the German bureaucracy =84eer in 4articular was always convinced that the Army had too many su44ort troo4s and that German man4ower was being used inefficiently> but 8auc7el said at Nuremberg that there had been

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page_ 12 #age 0(& no 4ossibility of obtaining the needed numbers of soldiers from his source1 Most of the officials and em4loyees wor7ing in Germany were over fifty-five and had already been thoroughly screened for military duty1 8auc7el struggled des4erately with the im4ossible demands 4laced u4on him for huge numbers of s7illed and uns7illed labor to be allocated to rival sectors of the economy1 Getting even one coal miner he com4lained bitterly meant a selection from among five to seven 4ossible candidates after the wor7ers had been collected1 8auc7el?s early assignments in the !ast as well as in the -est had not with the 4owers given him been overly difficult to fulfill although they were demanding enough1 In (*/& for e<am4le he was ordered to 4roduce &$ $$$ s4ecialiHed wor7ers from Eolland and he did that easily for the men had to eat and to 4rovide for their families =8ee 8eyssIn@uart .ha4t1 ((>1 In the course of the twelve months between A4ril (*/& and A4ril (*/) 8auc7el had considerable successC he rounded u4 ) ')% $0' wor7ers of all descri4tions for the German economy and in addition ( '&& %&* 4risoners of war1 '/ But as the military situation and wor7ing conditions deteriorated the labor su44ly went down tooC the streams of volunteers dried u4 and thousands of men and women in the occu4ied territories disa44eared into the underground or ,oined 4artisan bands1 The ??8auc7el actionsI in Eolland as in the !ast became sudden raids where 0$ $$$ men were ruthlessly rounded u4 in one day as ha44ened in Fotterdam1 Dutch factories had to be combed by German commissions for s4ecialists to be sent to the Feich1 8auc7el was told the over-all number of wor7ers that must be 4rovided for a given economic area and then he would 4ass along the @uotas to the occu4ied countries under civilian controlto 8eyss-In@uart in Eolland and to 6ran7 in #olandfor the occu4iers to fill with the aid of the de4uties he sent them1 In Fussia he had to deal not only with Fosenberg who had merely nominal authority but with actual rulers such as !rich Boch Gauleiter of the "7raine and with the 88 and the Army who wanted to have nothing to do with him e<ce4t turning over any 4artisans who had survived1 8auc7el was a Gauleiter by 4rofessionC he acce4ted as a matter of course the essentially inferior status of the !astern or even the -estern foreign wor7ers com4ared with the Germans1 :n :ctober ) (*/& in a letter to Fosenberg he demanded Ithe ruthless a44lication of all measuresI in order to get two million Fussian wor7ers1 A re4ort of :ctober &0 (*/& from Fosenberg?s office on the roundu4 of wor7ers in the !ast said: I ?Fecruiting? methods were used which 4robably have their 4recedent only in the blac7est 4eriods of the slave trade1 A regular manhunt was inaugurated 1 1 1 more than ($$ $$$ had to be sent bac7 because of serious illness or other inca4acity for wor71I'0 A letter from Fosenberg to 8auc7el of December &( (*/& enclosed re4orts that had come to Fosenberg?s attention on the beating of foreign wor7ers as they were being rounded u4 and trans4orted and of the burning

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page_ 13 #age 0() down of the houses of those who had not re4orted when called u41 ??All measures =in the !ast> are 4ermitted to enable the German administration to carry out their tas7s1I This was the general directive and 8auc7el?s motley collection of local 4olice and German agents was not greatly im4ressed with the necessity for good treatment when 8auc7el at the same time demanded that his millions of wor7ers be delivered by any means at hand1 -or7ers were sometimes manacledC they traveled fifty and eighty ,ammed together in freight cars to the Feich sometimes going days without food or waterC and when they arrived at their destination their living @uarters could be subhuman1L They wor7ed in Germany in the clothes they came in and even if they were sic7 they had to wor71 '' 8auc7el told one meeting of Army and Navy officers Gauleiters and 88 men in A4ril (*/) that even the !astern wor7ers who were former Bolshevi7s had souls and he intended to care for themC he wanted no besmirching of Germany?s fair name or of his own but the millions had to be recruited or the war would be lost1 That was his dilemmarecruiting the millions with a 4ic7-u4 collection of ruffians both foreign and German whose sole ,ob was to deliver the human goods at any cost1 The Germans s@uads had long been told of the essential inferiority of the 4eo4le they were sending to the Feich1 8auc7el?s e<hortations to treat them decently had no effect whatever on how his s@uads behaved1 These were 8unday sermons1 In a letter he wrote to the Gauleiters on March (/ (*/) he said: IBut since we will need foreign labor for many years and the 4ossibility of re4lacing them is very limited I cannot e<4loit them on a short-term 4olicy nor can I allow wasting of their wor7ing ca4acity1I '+ But the brutal recruiting the undernourishment the beatings went on as before because the Gauleiters and their men and the 4rotection s@uads and the 4olice and the 88 had overwhelming numbers to deliver and send to wor71 They did not doubt that these 4eo4le were natural enemies of the Feich and were worthy of being fed and 7e4t alive solely for its 4ur4oses1 8auc7el could 4reach his gos4el but his men had to bring in the man4ower and 8auc7el himself had his motives for such humanitarianism: I8laves who are underfed diseased resentful des4airing and filled with hate will never yield that ma<imum of out4ut which they might achieve under normal conditions1I 8auc7el could 4ersuade some of his colleagues of the common sense of what he was trying to do1 !ven Goebbels agreed that only ade@uately fed 4risoners could do a day?s wor71 And as of 6ebruray * (*/& the #oles and the Fussian 4risoners of war who were wor7ing in Germany theoretically L !yewitnesses tell of Bru44 wor7ers being housed in what were described as Idog 7ennels I in ash bins and ba7ing ovens in one 4lant =T!* Bru44 IT 41 (&/)C N*A GII D-))* 441 &%&*>C in barrac7s unheated in winter in cellars where they had to slee4 in 4ools of water of their marching ten and more 7ilometers to wor7 and then bac7 again to their wretched @uarters =Daeger testimony N TG 441 &'/%)1 N TTTG D-&0% 441 000'1 .bi)1 D-)(' 441 '''+1 .bi)1 D-)&( 441 +/+01 N*A GI D-&+& 441 (((((&1 T!* Bru44 IT 41 (&&1 NIB *)$(>1

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page_ 14 #age 0(/ got & (0' calories a dayC heavy wor7ers & '(0C very heavy wor7ers & *$*C those who wor7ed long hours and at night & &//1 By com4arison the normal German consumer got & %/' caloriesC the heavy wor7er ) (0*C and the very heavy wor7er ) %)*1 '% Fe4orts varied shar4ly on what the 4risoners actually received1 Another witness testified that in (*/& German heavy wor7ers got 0 $$$ calories but !astern wor7ers only & $$$ in the two meals they received a day1'* 9ater as we have seen the rations would go far lower than that1 The food given the !astern wor7ers was vastly inferior to that given other nationalities and when the !astern laborer occasionally was given meat it had been 4ronounced dangerous by veterinarians since the slaughtered animals were tubercular1L But 8auc7el li7e 84eer undoubtedly wanted all wor7ers to 4roduce as much as they 4ossibly could without useless distinctions being made among the nationalities of Germany?s enemies1 And as the war crisis dee4ened ideological dogmas wea7ened1 Those who wanted more sensible treatment for the Fussians were able to ma7e a little headway against the racial 4uristsC the Army that former General Glasov recruited was 4ut to some if limited use on the -estern front and 8auc7el was able to issue a decree on March &0 (*// that 4rovided for the same wages for the des4ised !astern wor7ers as for other foreigners1 Nevertheless 8auc7el was second to none in his devotion to National 8ocialist 4rinci4lesC he believed in all the dogmas and he was resolutely administering his slave driving both domestic and foreign in territories where men li7e Eimmler 9ey Eeydrich and 6ran7 were res4onsible for the conditions under which foreign laborers wor7ed and whose decrees made far more rigorous distinctions between !astern and -estern wor7ers than anything found in 8auc7el?s files1 :n March ' (*/( a year before 8auc7el became head of the labor allocation the following rules were issued for #olish wor7ers in the state of Baden by the Minister of 6inance and !conomy: :n 4rinci4le farm wor7ers of #olish nationality no longer have the right to com4lainC conse@uently no com4laints may be acce4ted by an official agency1 1 1 1 6arm wor7ers of #olish nationality may no longer leave the localities in which they are em4loyed1 1 1 1 The use of bicycles or any form of 4ublic trans4ortation 1 1 1 as well as church going is forbidden1 1 1 1 Gisits to theaters cinemas or other cultural entertainments are strictly 4rohibited for farm wor7ers of #olish nationality 1 1 1 !very em4loyer has the right to give cor4oral 4unishment 1 1 1 and may not be called to account for this by any official agency1+$ If a #ole was im4udent or did not wor7 4ro4erly he was to be re4orted and his em4loyer would get a re4lacement1 In addition there was to be heavy 4unishment for the em4loyer if he did not 7ee4 the necessary distance between himself and his wor7ers1 ??!<tra rations are strictly 4ro- L Goering s4o7e of Is4ecial foodI for the FussiansIcats horses etc1Iand of 4roviding them as a rule with wooden shoes =N III 41 /0*>1

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page_ 1 #age 0(0 hibited1 1 1 1 All this does not a44ly to 4risoners of war who are under the -ehrmacht which has its own regulations1?? +( The German labor administration in Breslau stam4ed the 4icture of a 4ig on #olish wor7 cards and although 8auc7el said at Nuremberg he had never seen this device the general idea was certainly not unfamiliar to him1 #oles and Fussians were 4rimitive 4eo4leC the #arty never tired of telling how dangerous they were in their inferiority1 German farmers were told in the circular ,ust cited that if they had no room for the #olish wor7ers in their homes they could be 4ut in cattle stalls1+& All 7inds of restrictions were im4osed on !astern wor7ers as 4art of the measures for security for maintaining German racial 4urity and status as another caste1 -omen wor7ing in German households were allowed outside the home only once a wee7 for three hoursC they had to be bac7 by dar7 or by % #1M1 in the summer1+) 6ran7 and the occu4ation authorities in #oland acting on the 6uehrer?s and Goering?s orders demanded the ruthless slaughter of cattleC the shi44ing to the Feich of all machines raw materials and wor7ers that might be useful to the German economyC the stri44ing of #olish agriculture and industry of everything but the bare essentialsC the closing of high schools technical schools and universities to 7ee4 a #olish intelligentsia from emerging1 I#oland I 6ran7 re4orted Iwill be handled as a colony the #oles will be the slaves of the Great German -orld !m4ire1I +/ #oland was to be turned into a 4urely agrarian country1 Eimmler s4ea7ing to his 88 officers said: Gery fre@uently a member of the -affen 88 thin7s about the de4ortation of the 4eo4le here 1 1 1 !<actly the same thing ha44ened in #oland in weather /$` below Hero where we had to haul away thousands tens of thousands a hundred thousandC where we had to have the toughnessyou should hear this and also forget it againto shoot thousands of leading #oles1+0 #olish and Fussian wor7ers wore on their sleeves an identification 4atch with an I:I for Ostarbeiter =!astern wor7er> and they were ordered to be as com4letely se4arated as 4ossible from the Germans as though they had some incurable disease that could be communicated by touch or by sight1L+' !ven in the case of Is4ecial treatmentI there were 4articular regulations for !astern wor7ers who tried to esca4e1 They were to be hanged where other 4risoners could see what ha44ened to them1 The Gesta4o en,oined functionaries on 6ebruary ) (*/) to see to it that !astern wor7ers did not use the railroadsif they needed to see one another e<changes should be arranged so they could wor7 at the same 4lace1 In general the wor7ers were to use the railroads only to go to the hos4ital or to visit a doctor in a neighboring villageC in such cases they must be accom4anied by a German1++ L :nly in the summer of (*// did Eimmler give 4ermission to those !astern wor7ers who were 4erforming well for the Germans to wear a different 7ind of 4atchone with a sunflower on it =BD.>1

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page_ 1! #age 0(' !astern women were not su44osed to bear childrenC a Gesta4o re4ort of 8e4tember / (*// said that in 6ran7en the increase in foreign births was becoming dangerous and the only way to deal with the situation was abortions1 The father was to be disclosed =4resumably for 4unitive measures> and a form was made available with which the woman could authoriHe the o4eration1L +% 8auc7el ob,ected to none of this1 All he wanted was a wor7 force1 :ne of his earliest decrees on May + (*/& declared that accommodations must be models of order and cleanliness and hygiene to convince the wor7ers of German su4eriority s7ill ,ustice and integrity1 New bed linen however since su44lies were short could be ordered by the factories only in e<ce4tional cases and then only for women1 But the forced laborers could all save for hy4othetical future e<4enditures even if they had no claim to any free time1+* A few wee7s later he sent a decree to the German 4lant managers: !astern wor7ers must be treated decently1 No unnecessary suffering is to be inflicted aside from what is caused by war shortages and no unnecessary harshness is to be 4ermitted1 .om4laints are to be carefully investigated 1 1 1 It is not necessary to se4arate families1 The wor7ers are to be 4aid according to the decisions on the !astern wor7ers 1 1 1%$ :n Danuary ' (*/) he told %$$ of his labor recruiters that the wor7 4rogram should be the best life insurance for the foreign wor7er1%( Ee told the Gauleiters on :ctober ' (*/& ??Beaten half-starved and dead Fussians do not su44ly us with coal and are entirely useless for iron and steel 4roduction 1 1 1 They are an immense burden to our 4eo4le and a scandal in the eyes of the world1I%& And addressing the !astern wor7ers themselves he said: If you do your duty then the German Feich will be your hel4er1 ;ou will be treated in a way that is consistent with how you conduct yourselves 1 1 1 8ince your relatives at home receive financial su44ort and you get free meals and lodging you get corres4ondingly less wages1 6rom these no ta< or other deductions are to be 4aid1%) A brochure distributed to !astern wor7ers told them: The 6uehrer of the Great German Feich and his incom4arable victorious army have freed you from an insane and criminal bolshevism1 That is why you have come to Germany to show your gratitude in a 4ractical form1 The 6uehrer of the Great German Feich and the Feichmarschall of the Great German Feich and head of the 6our-;ear #lan have therefore in their great 7indness and humane view of my re4ort on your willingness to wor7 decided to increase your wages1 6ood may be obtained with this L #regnancies of foreign women wor7ers were fre@uentC of '++ e<amined in December (*/& eleven were found to be certainly 4regnant and two were li7ely so =T!* Bru44 IT 41 %*0 NIB *)$(>1

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page_ 1" #age 0(+ increaseC savings are 4ossible letters will be allowed as well as 4a4ers and radios and films and such1 1 1 1 -or7 well and see to it that your fellow wor7ers do this too1 If you tolerate bad elements among you and bad wor7 you endanger the 4rivileges given you1 Femember that the German 4eo4le have underta7en a heroic and mighty battle for the freedom of man7ind1 1 1 1 remember you get the same food as the German 4eo4le and in the same amounts1 8o big-hearted have their leaders and the German 4eo4le shown themselves you must show that you are worthy of them1 Be industrious and above all follow orders 1 1 1 be courteous and res4onsive to your su4eriors1 %/ In the s4ring of (*/) in an address he was 4re4aring for his co-wor7ers 8auc7el wrote: #ayment is to be made according to wor7 done1 There is to be no grossness or bad manners 1 1 1 The foreign wor7er should feel it is in his dee4est interest to wor7 for Germany 1 1 1 There should be no arbitrary decisions no unnecessary harshness rudeness or insults when you deal with these wor7ers1 This is com4letely unworthy of the German official and em4loyee 1 1 1 -ritten in a 4lane over Fussian territory A4ril &$ (*/)1%0 These were 8auc7el?s directives and this was his defense at Nuremberg1L But the realities of the wor7 cam4s and the conditions under which thousands of the forced laborers lived were something else again1 It was however the German =not the foreign> accounts of actual conditions that were the most devastating answer to 8auc7el?s mild directives1 Gesta4o re4orts were matter of fact1 They were meant merely to give information so ste4s could be ta7en for greater securityC they had nothing of course to suggest as had 8auc7el for the welfare of the wor7ers1 These re4orts tell of Fussian wor7ers rubbing the leaves of a 4lant called Hahnenfuss =crow foot> on their s7ins to wor7 u4 a blister as big as a haHelnut which would then be rubbed with salt and wash 4owder until it was infected1 :thers dran7 salt water to ma7e their feet swell and some even cho44ed off their fingers1 :ne man am4utated both his hands by 4lacing them on the railroad trac7s before an oncoming trainC the Gesta4o re4ort indignantly declared this to be Iwor7 sabotage I and the writer recommended that such 4eo4le be sent to a concentration cam4 and on no account allowed to go bac7 to Fussia and thus inform their countrymen remaining in Germany how they could get out of their ,obs1LL%' 8auc7el was found guilty on two counts: of having committed war crimes and crimes against humanity1 Nevertheless the German 4olicy was not wholly different from that of the Allies after they ca4tured millions of German L 8auc7el?s directives were often re4eated by an agency such as the German 9abor 6ront which declared too that 4risoners were to be treated Isternly but ,ustly1I LL The Gesta4o also ob,ected to the influence of the JmigrJ Fussians on the wor7ers re4orting that they brought to the wor7ers news4a4ers and 4ro4aganda in favor of a greater Fussia1 These JmigrJs said the Gesta4o re4ort were of course against the .ommunists but they wanted no more than a change of management =August ) (*/& BD.>1

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page_ 1# #age 0(% soldiers and occu4ied the country1 The Allies were however inflicting 4unishment as a retaliation for the damage and atrocities that had been committed by the Third Feich and even the first German directivesbefore retaliation could be thought ofhad gone beyond what had 4reviously been regarded as consonant with military or international law1 Fe@uisitions the German directives stated could be made not only for the armed forces =which international law countenanced> but for general domestic needs1 %+ German lawyers would later argue before American tribunals =I1 G1 6arben Bru44 cases> that forced labor too was not a wide de4arture from what had long been regarded as the traditional obligations of the van@uished to the victor1 Germany or any occu4ying 4ower had the right during the war to ma7e use of local laborC she had the duty in fact to 4rovide the means of livelihood of the 4o4ulation and it made no substantial difference if such wor7 was done in Germany or in the occu4ied country 4rovided the wor7ers were decently treated1 6urthermore they argued it was an im4ossible incongruity for the 4o4ulation of a defeated 6rance for e<am4le to live at ease while the Germans were fighting on behalf of !uro4e against bolshevism1 If Germany had the obligation to see that the 6rench were well fed the 6rench 4eo4le had the obligation to wor71L In this century forced labor has been a wides4read 4henomenon both in the domestic affairs of countries li7e NaHi Germany and 8oviet Fussia and as an aftermath of war1 In (*/' General .lay ordered the registration in the American Aone of Germany of all 4ersons ca4able of wor7 between the ages of fourteen to si<ty-five for men and fifteen to fifty for women1 ??All 4ersons inca4able of wor7 because of illness disability etc1 must 4resent to the labor office 4roof of inca4acity1 The labor office is em4owered to direct com4ulsory labor when necessary1ILL%% And as one of the German lawyers in a later trial in Nuremberg =the 6lic7 case> 4ointed out the Allies had stated in (*/) their intention of using forced wor7ers outside Germany after the war and not only did they e<4ress the intention but they carried it out1 8oviet Fussia too7 from German territory and from among the 4risoners of war hundreds of thousands even millions of forced laborers =it was in 4art at least by such labor that 8talingrad was rebuilt and the 8oviet roc7et 4rogram develo4ed>1 Not only Fussia made use of such labor1 6rance was given hundreds of thousands of German 4risoners of war L The #resident of the .ourt e<4ressing in his guarded fashion the traditional view said in the course of 84eer?s trial that it made little or no difference where a man was forced to wor7C the 4oint was that he was coerced1 IIf they were forced to wor7 there M6ranceN it is ,ust as illegal as if they had been brought to Germany to be forced to wor71 At least that is the suggestion that is made by the 4rosecutionI =N TGI 41 /'&>1 LL "nder Allied .ontrol 9aw No1 ) of 6ebruary (+ (*/' German males from fourteen to si<ty-five and women from fifteen to fifty were sub,ect to com4ulsory laborC the 4enalty for disobedience was im4risonment and having their ration cards ta7en away a 4enalty that the International Military Tribunal declared inhuman when it was inflicted by the Germans1

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page_ 1$ #age 0(* ca4tured by the Americans and their 4hysical condition became so bad that American Army authorities themselves 4rotested1 In !ngland and in the "nited 8tates too German 4risoners of war were being 4ut to wor7 long after the surrender and in Fussia thousands of them wor7ed until the mid-(*0$?s1 At the time the 6lic7 trial was held in A4ril (*/+ L the Fussians were still holding more than two and a half million German 4risoners many of whom were being used at hard labor and the 8oviet "nion had de4orted thousands of German civilians from the east Hone of Germany for the same 4ur4ose1 Members of #arliament and others among the Allied nationals called this 4ractice ??utterly wrong I but it nevertheless continued years after the Nuremberg trials were over1 It is undoubtedly true that what 8auc7el and his goon s@uads did was substantially different from the 4ractices of Britain and the "nited 8tates1 The sudden raHHias resulting in the ruthless de4ortation of the 4eo4le caught in raids the trans4orting of wor7ers in chains to the Feich the setting u4 of factories in Mauthausen and Buchenwald where human s7eletons wor7ed for some of the most res4ectable firms in German industry to say nothing of the scale of the o4erations and the length of time they lasted re@uired a National 8ocialist or similar totalitarian !eltanschauung1 Nevertheless ideological convictions had been im4ortant on both sidesC the NaHis saw the war 4rimarily as one of na7ed survival with no humanitarian or legal considerations a44lying to the Fussians1 The Allies held the Germans res4onsible for starting and waging an illegal war in an illegal fashionC the German 4eo4le therefore had the obligation to re4air some of the damage they had wantonly caused and to e<4iate their own crime of using forced labor1 8auc7el who had 4romised to carry out Eitler?s orders with Ifanatical devotion I had done 4recisely that and he no doubt unwillingly had been the indirect cause of the deaths of thousands of 4eo4le and the humiliation and suffering of additional hundreds of thousands more1 But he had tried to be more IcorrectI than he could be under the NaHi rules1 :n A4ril (0 (*/& on behalf of the millions of Fussian wor7ers he declared: IThe better nourished they are the better they will 4erform1I %* As soon as he too7 office he sought higher wages for these laborers than Goering would concede =8auc7el wanted them to be able to earn half what the German wor7ers received and what they could not s4end in their cam4s they could 7ee4 for savings accounts>1 8auc7el intended to recruit from /$$ $$$ to 0$$ $$$ Fussian women wor7ersvolunteers as far as 4ossiblefor German household hel4 but he never succeeded in getting more than a fraction of them1 9i7e Eitler he was tender on the sub,ect of German womanhoodC he was L :ne of the main charges against the officers of the 6lic7 concern was that they had used slave labor1

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page_ 20 #age 0&$ convinced that German women deserved this household hel4 for he wanted them to be at home1L 8auc7el told his own staff that no 4romise should be made to foreign wor7ers that could not be 7e4t but the demands made u4on him were not to be met with 4ious wishes or humane sentiments1 The wor7ers had to be brought in and the measures needed to get them became increasingly severe in both the -est and the !ast1 In March (*// 8auc7el wrote to Eitler that the German 4olice were not numerous enough to deal with 6rench wor7ers who failed to a44ear when they were ordered to do so1 A million wor7ers were needed and if the 4resent measures for obtaining them were inade@uate Germany would be forced to call u4 certain age classes or to conscri4t all 6rench males as a military re@uisition1 *$ In that 4art of 6rance outside the ,urisdiction of military government the arrangements for conscri4ting labor were made directly with Gichy with 9aval and his colleagues1 8auc7el 84eer and 9aval met together in #aris where 8auc7el made the same s4eech he made in Belgium and the Feich and Eolland stressing that Germany was fighting the battle for !uro4ean civiliHation and the least the rest of the .ontinent could do was to wor7 for the common cause1 Germany?s enormous sacrifices were being ill re@uited by 6rench wor7ers who fled to the Ma@uis and by the 4olice and officials who bore the res4onsibilities to su44ly them either lightly or not at all1 9aval had to agree reluctantly that the death sentence could be inflicted on 6rench officials who sabotaged the recruiting of labor1*( But both he and #Jtain fought a steady rearguard action against the German demands for more and more 6rench wor7ers to be 4roduced no matter how1 :nly in Duly (*// did #Jtain agree to raise the wor7 wee7 from forty to forty-eight hours inside 6rance1 A decree of 8e4tember / (*/& of the Gichy Government re@uired 6renchmen between the ages of eighteen to fifty to register for wor7 if they were not already wor7ing more than thirty hours a wee71 :n 6ebruary (' (*/) another decree was issued that young men between the ages of twenty-one and twenty-three were to be forced to wor71*& In (*// 6rench males between si<teen and si<ty and women between eighteen and forty-five were declared liable for com4ulsory labor and according to an agreement made between 8auc7el and Marshal #Jtain women between fifteen and twenty-five were to be em4loyed only where they lived1LL*) Des4ite L No German women 8auc7el and Eitler had agreed ought to be wor7ing in a factory in twenty years1 Goebbels noted in his war diary on 6ebruary (' (*/) that 8auc7el had come to see that his wea7 4olicy with regard to the use of German female labor had failed but by the time 8auc7el and Eitler were ready to conscri4t women it was too late1 Goebbels said that out of 0 $$$ women called u4 in Berlin by 8auc7el?s bureau only &$$ re4orted for factory wor7 =!D %)2( IAG>1 LL 8auc7el wrote to the 6uehrer on Danuary && (*// while he was still negotiating with the 6rench authorities that Marshal #Jtain had agreed to women between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five being forced to wor7 but only in their own homes and women from twenty si< to forty-five were to wor7 in 6rance but were not to be sent to Germany1 The actual law however did not include the wor7 service of girls from fifteen to eighteen1

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page_ 21 #age 0&( innumerable evasions and the tacit or active hel4 of many 6rench officials including 4olice in aiding esca4es in the course of the war +)% $$$ 6rench men and women were forced to wor7 for Germany in the bloc7ed 6rench factories and %+0 *0& wor7ed in factories in Germany in addition to almost one million 4risoners of war1L */ .aught as he was between the demands of the war machine and 4oints of view as wide a4art as those of Besselring and Eimmler 8auc7el used whatever methods came to hand to get his @uotas1 The carrot and stic7 was his rough formula: ca,olments 4romises of rewards for wor7 well done but when these failed clubs bayonets and the lashes of his recruiters1 As increasing numbers sli44ed away from the trans4orts he ordered handcuffs to be usedbut 8auc7el said that their use should be as unobtrusive as 4ossible1 After 8talingrad the stic7 had to ta7e the 4lace of the carrot1 Ee wor7ed on a colossal scale1 In Duly (*/& when accurate figures were available 0 (&/ $$$ wor7ers from the occu4ied countries were 7nown to be wor7ing in Germany1 At the end of the war when figures became unreliable there were still some five million thereC from seven to ten million in all had been brought to the Feich1 8ome of them including 4risoners of war had managed to return home and thousands had died in trans4orts and in Germany1*0 6rom the documentsthe orders and s4eeches and memoranda he wrote at the timeit a44ears that on the whole 8auc7el?s defense at Nuremberg was honest1 Ee had wanted his wor7ers treated decently enough both on humanitarian grounds and because they could wor7 better for the Feich and its victory1 But the directives he received from the always starving industrial a44aratus from the .entral #lanning .ommission from Eimmler and from Eitler left him with the sole 4roblem of bringing in millions of wor7ersand if they could not be recruited one way obviously others had to be used1 The legality or ??correctnessI of the German conscri4tion of foreign labor and the treatment of the sub,ugated nations and 4eo4les as the 4lundered source of su44ly never troubled 8auc7el1 Eis unconditional devotion to the 6uehrer his aversion to any 7ind of intellectual effort =he never read a boo7 he said at Nuremberg> his acce4tance of every NaHi dogma left him without a doubt of the ,ustice of all he was told to do1 It led him at Nuremberg to say his conscience was clear or at least that it had been at the time he was o4erating the greatest slave trade in history1 Afterward at Nuremberg he said he had been a44alled at the evidence brought to light at the trialC he bowed his head before the victims he told his ,udges1 But at the time it sim4ly never occurred to him that what he was doing was not necessary or legalhe only wanted it done as humanely as 4ossible1 L German sources said that in (*/& some /$$ $$$ 6rench had volunteered for wor7 in Germany but that in two IactionsI in (*/) after the defection of Italy only // '$$ 6rench-men had been obtained of the sought-for *$$ $$$ =N*A 8u441 A (*'/-#8 41 /$&>1

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page_ 22 #age 0&& Ee was found guilty of having committed crimes against humanity and war crimes and was sentenced to be hanged1 The death 4enalty might be considered out of 4ro4ortion to his res4onsibility in the light of what the 8tate demanded of him in time of war and of what the later 4ractices of the victorious countries would be1 In any event none of the men res4onsible for the same or similar decisions in the Allied cam4 was ever tried although the number of forced laborers they had wor7ing for them would reach the millions too1 In the case of the !nglish and the Americans the wor7ing 4risoners in their hands were well fed and well ta7en care ofC in the case of the Fussians and the 6rench the treatment could be abominable1 True what they did might be defended under the doctrine of tu @uo@ue but if so this was a defense the Germans were 4ermitted only once in the Nuremberg trialin the case of submarine warfareand everywhere else it was barred1 Notes (1 N TGI 41 //%1 &1 N T9I 84eer-(% telety4e to Bormann of 8e4tember (0 (*// 441 /(+&$1 )1 N TGI 41 /%'1 /1 .bi)1 41 /*01 01 .bi)1 41 /)$1 '1 .bi)1 41 /*+1 N T9I 84eer-&) 441 /&$&01 +1 N TGI 41 0$$1 %1 N T9I 84eer-&/ 441 /&0&*1 *1 .bi)1 84eer-&% 84eer-&* 441 /)))+1 ($1 .bi)1 84eer-)$ 441 /)+)%1 ((1 N TGI 41 /)01 (&1 N III 41 /001 ()1 N G 41 0$01 (/1 N TGI 441 /+(+/ 0(+(%1 N T9I 441 /$%('1 (01 N III 441 /'/'01 ('1 N TGI 41 /+/1 (+1 .bi)1 41 0&+1 (%1 N III 441 /'('&1 (*1 MA )&% =IAG>1 &$1 F ) Bureau Min1 84eer &2( =Bundesarchiv BoblenH>1 &(1 .bi)1 84eer '2)1 &&1 .bi)1 84eer (2((1 &)1 .bi)1 84eer ((2(1 &/1 .bi)1 84eer '2)1 &01 .bi)1 84eer (&2&1 &'1 .bi)1 84eer ((2(1 &+1 .bi)1 84eer '2(1 &%1 .bi)1 84eer )2(1

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page_ 23 #age 0&) &*1 .bi)1 84eer &2(1 )$1 .bi)1 84eer 02& letter to 8auc7el of Duly (/ (*//1 )(1 .bi)1 84eer ((2(1 )&1 N TGI 41 0%'1 ))1 .bi)1 41 0+$1 )/1 .bi)1 41 0/'1 )01 )*'+-#8 =IAG>1 )'1 N III 41 /0/1 )+1 .bi)1 (*$)-#8 41 /+$1 )%1 N GIII 441 (/&/)1 )*1 8auc7el 6ragebogen =BD.>1 /$1 MA ()0 =IAG>1 /(1 8auc7el interrogation of 8e4tember &$ (*/0 =IAG>1 /&1 N G 41 )*(1 /)1 G1 8chmundt ??Bericht ueber )ie Bes2rechung Hitlers am &)1 Mai (*)* I in Ausge,aehlte okumente 0ur 6eschichte )es Nationalso0ialismus (*))/0 =Bielefeld: Gerlag Neue Gesellschaft (*'(>1 //1 N TTGII (0(*-#8 441 &+)%)1 /01 NG %/% =IAG>1 /'1 N TTG $('-#8 41 '*1 /+1 T!* Gol1 GII 41 0%1 /%1 N: )/+$ =IAG>1 /*1 N TGIII F6-&& 41 /*+1 N*A 8u441 B 41 +)(1 0$1 N*A G &'()-#8 41 ))'1 0(1 N TTTGI /($-!. 441 /%&%)1 0&1 N III F-($) 41 //%1 0)1 MA )$) 0%*+($ =IAG>1 0/1 0$( G. ($) 41 (0( =Nuremberg 8taatsarchiv>1 001 N TTGII (+)*-#8 41 0*/1 0'1 N TIG 41 ')&1 0+1 NG ()(' =IAG>1 0%1 N III )$($-#8 41 /&(1 0*1 N TTTGIII F6-(0 441 0$$)1 '$1 N*A GII 9-(+& 41 *'(1 '(1 N*A GI )%(*-#8 441 +'+'*1 '&1 MA )(' Eimmler files =IAG>1 ')1 T!* Gol1 GIII 41 ($0(1 '/1 N III 41 /%/1 '01 .bi)1 41 /&&1 ''1 N*A III $0/-#8 441 *$**1 '+1 N G '))-#8 41 0((1 '%1 N TG 8auc7el-/+ 41 &'%1 '*1 N III affidavit of Dr1 -ilhelm Daeger 41 //&1 +$1 .bi)1 $'%-!. 441 //*0(1 N TTTGI $'%-!. 441 ()&)01 +(1 .bi)1 +&1 .bi)1 +)1 N TG 41 (')1 +/1 N TTTGI )//-!. 41 )&*1

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page_ 24 #age 0&/ +01 N*A IG (*(%-#8 8e4tember + (*/$ 41 00)1 +'1 N*A G )$/$-#8 441 +//0'1 ++1 Gesta4o re4orts =BD.>1 +%1 .bi)1 +*1 N*A G )$//-#8 441 +0''/1 %$1 N T9I 8auc7el(' 441 &(%(*1 %(1 .bi)1 8auc7el-%& 441 &&0&%1 %&1 !.-)(' =IAG>1 %)1 N T9I 8auc7el-(' 41 &&&1 %/1 6oreign -or7ers 8auc7el Mer7blatt No1 ( =BD.>1 %01 N T9I 8auc7el-%/ 441 &&%/$1 %'1 Gesta4o re4orts 8e4tember (*/& =BD.>1 %+1 N*A GII !.E-($ 441 ')$)(1 %%1 Man2o,er =:ffice of the Military Governor Danuary (*/'> 441 )01 %*1 N TTTGI 41 )(&1 *$1 N*A GI )%(*-#8 441 +'$+&1 *(1 N G 41 0$/1 *&1 MA (&) *%(+' =IAG>1 *)1 N G 41 /*/1 */1 N G 41 0$01 *01 N G 441 (&%&*1

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page_ 2 #age 0&0 () The #ro4agandist ??This Is Eans 6ritHscheI NaHi 4ro4aganda had been a 4owerful instrument for the schooling of the German 4eo4le in the doctrines of the new order and for waging the war but its chief was dead1 Goebbels had died in the 6uehrer bun7er in Berlin by his own handC his wife had 7illed herself together with their si< children because a world without the 6uehrer and National 8ocialism seemed to her as threatening and im4ossible to live in as the terrible wasteland Goebbels had hel4ed to 4roduce for the Dews1 Goebbels and his family were among the last victims of his own fluent oratory and fi<ed ideas in which he believed with all the energy of his wiry missha4en body and twisted mind1 -ith his death the Allies were 4ut to it to find a substitute1 Eans 6ritHsche .hief of German broadcasting made ca4tive in Berlin by the Fussians seemed on the face of it a li7ely one1 Ee had tried to surrender what was left of Berlin to General Ahu7ovhe had remained a man of im4ortance until the very end1 Eis broadcasts beginning IHier s2richt Hans "rit0sche I were 7nown to every German and to thousands of foreigners for 6ritHsche s4o7e regularly on the radio networ7 of the Greater Germany1 Ee had been a commentator on 4olitical events since #a4en was .hancellor in (*)&1 Ee was the author of a large number of boo7s and articles all of them dedicated to convincing the German 4eo4le that what Eitler decreed e<4ressed their own will and 4ur4ose and was the only 4ossible decision1 A 4leasant-loo7ing man of medium siHe with regular features and brown haira convincing 4itchmanhe would have made an e<cellent television commentator1

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page_ 2! #age 0&' In the view of some among the Allied 4rosecutors the German 4eo4le were merely the 4assive instrument on which the s7illed #arty 4ro4agandists had 4layed to 4roduce calculated results1 In the view of othersof the 6rench 4articularlythe German 4eo4le had been the willing collaborators in their own undoing and had needed no 4ro4aganda only instructions1 The Fussians however loo7ed on 4ro4aganda in the same way the National 8ocialists did as an essential 4art of the education and administration of a country1 They too7 it for granted as one of the 4rimary instruments at the dis4osal of a state1 They thought 6ritHsche and his collaborators had used it only too well in 4re4aring and waging the war1 Eitler had written in Mein (am2f: ??#ro4aganda is a truly terrible wea4on in the hands of the e<4ert1I They regarded 6ritHsche as an e<4ert1 The Fussians treated 6ritHsche relatively well as they did Faeder with whom he was flown from Moscow to Berlin1 They did not harm him 4hysically although they sub,ected him to a hunger cure in the 9ub,an7a 4rison where he was held in solitary confinement They even gave him boo7s to 7ee4 in his cellC he was however unable to read them since they too7 away his glasses1 They @uestioned him closely and then gave him the 4rotocol of his interrogation to sign that 4ut in his mouth e<actly the same ready-made 4hrases other German 4risoners who were being held by them were alleged to have used1 -hat they accused him of was essentially no different from what the -estern Allies alleged he had done: he had incited the Germans to wage war against other countries and races and to commit war crimes and crimes against humanity1 In addition from the 4oint of view of the -estern Allies 6ritHsche had sinned against the truth as well as against the German 4eo4le and against them1 Ee had vilified the Dews and he had lied to incite the Germans in their criminal acts sometimes in grotes@ue fashion as when he declared in re4eated broadcasts that the British themselves had sun7 the Athenia1 6ritHsche had ta7en a leading 4art in the criminal NaHi cons4iracy and made its successes 4ossible1 The Fussian view of his misdeeds was more concentrated1 8ince neither war nor 4eace can be waged without 4ro4aganda and 6ritHsche was one of the 7ey 4eo4le in the German 4ro4aganda a22arat he was clearly guilty of the charges against him and he should now ta7e 4art in the 8oviet view in the 4ro4aganda case against him and in his own undoing1 The .hief 8oviet #rosecutor General Fuden7o following this tactic offered him an o44ortunity for giving some of the most telling answers the defendants made in the course of the trial1 Fuden7o as7ed 6ritHsche how long he had 7nown about the 4lanned attac7 on Fussia1 I6ive or si< hours before I 6ritHsche answered1 Then the following e<change too7 4lace: F"D!NB:: I;ou will now be handed document "88F-/*)1 It is your radio s4eech in connection with the aggression against #oland1 1 1 1 Eave you ac@uainted yourself with this documentOI 6FITA8.E!: I;es indeed1I

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page_ 2" #age 0&+ F"D!NB:: ??;ou do not deny that on &* August (*)* you made this s4eechOI 6FITA8.E!: INo I do not deny that1 I should ,ust li7e to refer to the factI F"D!NB:: I!<cuse me1 #lease answer my @uestion first and give your e<4lanations later1 This was on &* AugustO ;ou do not deny it1 I am as7ing you did you yourself believe in these e<4lanations of unavoidable war with #olandO Did you yourself believe this at that momentOI 6FITA8.E!: I-hether at that moment I considered a war unavoidable that I am not in a 4osition to tell you1 But I am able to tell you one thing: I did not believe that Germany was to blame1 That if this tension should lead to a warI F"D!NB:: IThat is enough1I 6FITA8.E!: II as7 to be allowed to addI F"D!NB:: IBut 4lease be brief1I TE! #F!8ID!NT: IGeneral Fuden7o let the man answer1I F"D!NB:: IIf you 4lease1I 6FITA8.E!: IAt that time it was a matter of great satisfaction to me that in the wee7s that followed I could see from the 8oviet 4ress that 8oviet Fussia and its Government shared the German o4inion of the @uestion of war guilt in this case1I F"D!NB:: II believe it is not the time to discuss this now nor did I as7 for e<4lanations on this sub,ect1 ;ou did not answer my @uestion but let us 4ass on to another @uestion1I ( The 8oviet 4rosecutors in such cases were used to more docile witnesses who either would not bring u4 such embarrassing matters or could be shouted down if by any chance they tried to1 At another 4oint in his crosse<amination General Fuden7o demanded that 6ritHsche admit that the activity of German 4ro4aganda was against the church =Nuremberg 4resented the first s4ectacle since (*(+ of 8oviet 4rosecutors concerning themselves with the heinousness of antireligious 4olicies>1 The crime however was 4art of the indictment against 6ritHsche and his codefendants which read: The NaHi cons4irators by 4romoting beliefs and 4ractices incom4atible with .hristian teaching sought to subvert the influence of the churches over the 4eo4le and in 4articular over the youth of Germany1 They avowed their aim to eliminate the .hristian churches in Germany and sought to substitute therefor NaHi institutions and NaHi beliefs and 4ursued a 4rogram of 4ersecution of 4riests clergy and members of monastic orders whom they deemed o44osed to their 4ur4oses and confiscated church 4ro4erty1 & 6ritHsche denied that the official 4ro4aganda line had sought to 4ersecute the churches but he said it was true of the unofficial #arty 4ro4aganda1 Eis answer was e@uivocal1 National 8ocialist leaders and dogmas were basically uncom4romisingly antireligious =one of the charges Goering had made to the 6uehrer against Faeder was that he went to church> and Eitler told Goebbels once the war was over he would deal finally with the churches1)

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page_ 2# #age 0&% 6ritHsche was correct insofar as the radio and 4ress did not indulge in a cam4aign of antireligious 4olemics as was the case in 8oviet Fussia1 Fuden7o?s cross-e<amination was in the grandiose manner 4eculiar to 8oviet 4rosecutors who were used to having their witnesses where they wanted them: F"D!NB:: ??:f course you are aware that in the :B- there was a s4ecial section for 4ro4aganda which was subordinate directly to defendant Dodl1I 6FITA8.E!: IThat was 7nown to me but you are mista7en if you are under the im4ression that the de4artment was under defendant Dodl1 It was under the ,urisdiction of General von -edelI F"D!NB:: IGery well1 I do not wish to deal with this sub,ect any longer1I / The 8oviet 4rosecutors often had a bad time at Nuremberg1 In the courtroom they 4aid little attention to what had been as7ed before by other Allied 4rosecutors and re4eated @uestions that had already been fully answered by a defendant1 They seemed always to be in unfamiliar legal territoryC a trial for them was a 4iece of 4ro4aganda nothing more1 The tas7 of the court was to 4rovide a bac7ground and to 4ubliciHe the self-condemnations of the accused1 In case after case they returned doggedly to the only formula they 7new: get the confession of the accused ac7nowledged in o4en court1 The #resident again and again 4ointed out to the Fussians that they were going over ground that had been well covered a short time before1 The Fussian 4rosecutors were 7eyed to Moscow standards and no doubt to the higher Moscow scrutiny of the trial recordtheir su4eriors would concern themselves with what they had said not with the legal 4oints made by the -estern Allies1 In one hearing before the trial started 8oviet .olonel 9iatscheff who had interrogated 6ritHsche in the 9ub,an7a 4rison and then accom4anied him to Nuremberg again e<amined him1 This latter interrogation too7 4lace in the 4resence of re4resentatives of the -estern 4owers and a battery of translators1 9iatscheff according to an account 6ritHsche wrote later had brought with him the full German te<t of 6ritHsche?s radio s4eeches which the Fussians had recorded1 The defense was always unable to get a co4y of this document for the Fussians flatly denied they had the te<t when 6ritHsche?s lawyer as7ed for it1 The defense had to content itself with a 4artial transcri4t of 6ritHsche?s tal7s made by the British1 It is not 4ossible to say whether in fact 9iatscheff had all the s4eechesC he did read from the te<t of one broadcast made ,ust before the end of the war and accused 6ritHsche of having tried to recruit on behalf of the -erewolves the bands of guerrilla fighters Eimmler and Bormann 4lanned to raise1 The grou4s were to be com4osed mostly of teen-age boys and girls and were to destroy military installations and murder Allied troo4s when they occu4ied German territory1 6ritHsche denied the accusation but he added

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page_ 2$ #age 0&* that the Allies could scarcely call the -erewolves criminal when they so highly 4riHed the heroic deeds of the 4artisans and the Ma@uisC he had made no attem4t to recruit -erewolves but merely made a 4ro4aganda case of this double-tal7 of the Allies1 But he had signed in Moscow a statement saying he had called on the 4o4ulation to murder the soldiers and officers of the victorious armies and to commit acts of sabotage1 0 .olonel 9iatscheff had shown him his signature as General Fuden7o would do later in the courtroom on a 4rotocol of his hearings in Moscow1 And in the interrogation room at Nuremberg 6ritHsche wrote later he could say something that was not 4ermitted him in the courtroom: he said he had told .olonel 9iatscheff not only that the 4rotocol was wrong from start to finish and none of the @uestions had been as7ed and none of the answers given in the form the colonel had them but that he had signed so that the three-man tribunal that met twice a month in Moscow and had the right to 4ronounce death without the accused being heard in his own defense could immediately sentence him to death1L Ee had been starved and endlessly interrogatedC he saw no 4ros4ect of a trial and by signing he thought he could get 4eace even if it was of the grave1' Ee re4eated his charges although in another conte<t in the courtroom1 General Fuden7o again read to him what he had allegedly written in Moscow: F"D!NB: MreadingN: ?? ?During a long time I was one of the leaders of German 4ro4aganda 1 1 1 I must say that Goebbels valued me as a convinced National 8ocialist and a ca4able ,ournalist so that I was considered his confidential aide in the German 4ro4aganda machine1? Is that correctOI 6FITA8.E!: IMr1 #rosecutor that is not correct1 I 7now that I have signed this re4ort but at the very moment I signed it in Moscow I stated: ?;ou can do what you li7e with this record 1 1 1? I state that not a single one of the @uestions contained in this re4ort was 4ut to me in that same form and I go on to declare that not a single one of the answers in that record was given by me in that form and I signed it for reasons which I will e<4lain to you in detail if you want me to1I F"D!NB:: I;ou therefore do not confirm these statementsOI 6FITA8.E!: INo only the signature is true1I F"D!NB:: IAll right let us say only the signature is true1I TE! #F!8ID!NT: I:ne moment1 -hat is it you are saying DefendantO Are you saying that you did not sign this document or that you didOI 6FITA8.E!: IMr1 #resident I signed the document although its contents did not corres4ond with my own statements1I TE! #F!8ID!NT: I-hy did you do thatOI 6FITA8.E!: II gave that signature after very solitary confinement which lasted for several monthsC and I wrote that signature because one of my fellow 4risoners with whom I came into contact once had told me that once every month a court was 4ronouncing sentences based merely on such L 6ritHsche testified before the court that the tribunal met once a month1

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page_ 30 #age 0)$ records and without interrogationC and I ho4ed that in this manner I would at least achieve being sentenced and thus terminate my confinement1 8o as not to be misunderstood I should li7e to em4hasiHe that no force was used and that I was treated very humanely even if my detention was very severe1?? F"D!NB:: IGery well1 :f course you never thought Defendant 6ritHsche that after all you had done you would be sent to a sanatoriumO It is obvious that you had to land in a 4rison and a 4rison is always a 4rison1 This was ,ust an aside however1I + The discre4ancies in what 6ritHsche writing after the Nuremberg trial gave as his reasons for signing the 4rotocols and what he told the court are characteristic1 6ritHsche was glib and intelligent and he ada4ted himself readily to an audience1 There is little @uestion that the Fussians 4rovided the 4hrasing of many of his answersC the evidence for this lies in the verbal similarity which the 8oviet 4rosecutors never bothered to disguise that runs through so many of the alleged answers given in their interrogations: II hel4ed the 6ascist war criminals to attac7 their 4eace-loving victimsI or II did all I could to further the criminal 4lans of the Eitlerites I and so on1 8uch words were 4ut in witnesses? mouths1 -hen the former commander of the 8i<th Army 6ield Marshal #aulus came from Fussian im4risonment to testify at Nuremberg he said in o4en court s4ea7ing of the 4re4arations for the cam4aign against Fussia IAll these measures show that this was a matter of a criminal attac71I 6ritHsche allegedly admitted in Moscow that he had 4re4ared aggressions against Austria and .Hechoslova7ia and that he had tried to get the German 4eo4le ready for world domination1 In connection with the attac7s on Belgium Norway Eolland and Denmar7 he said II ordered a similar calumnious 4ro4aganda 1 1 1 and attem4ted in this way to ,ustify this or that aggressive action on the 4art of Germany1I Admiral Eans Goss who was held by the Fussians also signed a document saying 6ritHsche had 4reached Ithat Germans were members of a su4erior raceI and that he had tried to ,ustify Iwhat the German assassins had done in #oland and Fussia1I% 6ield Marshal 6erdinand 8choerner also a ca4tive in Moscow signed a statement in which he allegedly said that 6ritHsche?s 4olitical activity led to Iunleashing of the world war against democratic countries1 1 1 1 According to the criminal instructions of the Eitler government MheN consciously fed the 4eo4le with lies1I* But 6ritHsche was nevertheless 4utting a gloss on what he had actually written and saidC the idea that he had wanted to die in a 8oviet 4rison was a flourish something 4erha4s to evo7e sym4athy from German readers for he was to have far more difficulty convincing German courts of his innocence than he was the Allies at Nuremberg1 6ritHsche was one of the technicians of the National 8ocialists and Goebbels had used him1 A clear and 4ersuasive s4ea7er 6ritHsche was a

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page_ 31 #age 0)( 4ro4agandist who li7e the -ehrmacht commentator General Burt Dittmar made a good im4ression on the more critical among his listeners for he avoided as far as he could the e<treme claims and unli7ely o4timism that caused many a German to switch off a broadcast es4ecially in the later years when the news was all bad1 Ee too lost his resonance with sections of his audience1 8D re4orts on his broadcasts in (*/) said mass audiences were no longer im4ressed by his ironical styleC he was more 4o4ular among farmers than among city dwellers1 But he had not much 4alatable news to comment on by (*/) and the 8D said his style had been better ada4ted to the victories1 They recommended to the #arty chancellery that his tal7s be sto44ed for a while but this was not doneC Goebbels wanted him at his 4ost1 ($ Eis full name was August 6ranH Anton Eans 6ritHsche1 Ee was born on A4ril &( (*$$ in Bochum in -est4halia the son of a 4ost-office official1 Ee attended the humanistic Gymnasia at Ealle28aale Breslau and 9ei4Hig and fought in -orld -ar I as a 4rivate soldier1 :n his return from the war he studied economics history and 4hiloso4hy at various universities without ta7ing a degree1 In (*&) he got a ,ob as editor of the -reussische %ahrbuecher a monthly review of cultural 4olitical and economic affairs a44ealing to a conservative middle-class 4ublic1 After that he held a variety of 4osts wor7ing successively for the !elt2olitische /un)schau as editor of the Telegra2hen &nion and then as editor in chief of the -ireless News 8ervice 4art of the Eugenberg em4ire of news4a4ers and motion 4ictures1L(( In the late summer of (*)& he went to the German radio and a year later was made head of the Broadcasting 8ervice1 Ee ,oined the #arty in May (*)) some months after Eitler too7 4ower but nothing in his broadcasts or writings changed very much from what he had written before1 Ee told his Allied interrogators he had once after -orld -ar I thought of becoming a .ommunist but had fallen under the influence of Moeller van den Bruc7 and other nationalist anti-8emitic writers who had turned him in the o44osite direction1(& 6ritHsche needed a hard and fast !eltanschauungC once he had that he could ma7e everything 4lausible to himself and to his audience1 Ee was always an able ,ournalist who had no difficulty e<4laining to the German 4eo4le what was going on in the a44roved 4attern and 4hraseologyC he not only broadcast in the autumn of (*/( that the war against Fussia was won which was the official view of the 6uehrer but gave his own most lucid reasons for the statement1 Ee attac7ed the Allied leaders as directedChe ,ustified the German invasionsC he followed the line at every critical 4oint1 :nly a few times did he refuse to do something that Goebbels wanted done1 :ne such case had to do with Austria1 At the time Dollfuss was murdered 6ritHsche refused to transmit the o4timistic re4orts coming L The Eugenberg 4ress had a nationalistic line not far removed from that of the NaHis1

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page_ 32 #age 0)& out of Gienna from Theodor Eabicht one of the leading Austrian National 8ocialists telling how the revolt was s4reading because he did not trust Eabicht1 Goebbels fired him for insubordination but a few days later 6ritHsche was reinstated because it turned out his estimate of the situation had been correct1 Goebbels would have been in an embarrassing situation had the Eabicht re4orts been transmitted in Germany1 8ober convincing literate 6ritHsche was the 7ind of man the National 8ocialists needed for a certain 4ortion of their audience1 8ome 4eo4le thought his voice sounded li7e Goebbels? and Goebbels was the chief and most articulate of the NaHi s4ellbinders aside from the 6uehrer himself1 6ritHsche a44ealed to Germans who were not fanatical #arty members and even to those who distrusted the run-of-the-mill e<4ositors1 Eis tactic was closer to that of the -ehrmacht communi@uJs than to the #arty war drummers1 6ritHsche said at Nuremberg that he had believed in Eitler?s 4eaceful intentionsC in the official reasons given for the attac7 on #oland including the fa7ed story of the #olish ca4ture of the German radio stations at GleiwitHC in what he had been told by the Navy about the im4ossibility of the AtheniaAs having been sun7 by a German submarine for the Admiralty said none had been in the neighborhood1 And he convincingly 4assed along his own sentiments to the listeners who sat before the si<teen million German radio sets1 In fact he was a fle<ible o4eratorC he had wor7ed for Eugenberg for years but when Eugenberg lost out in the struggle for 4ower 6ritHsche told his colleagues ??Now we?ll hunt the old silver fo<1I This at least was the gossi4 about him and it was undoubtedly not far from the truth1 Goebbels needed him and admired his wor7 on the whole but was sometimes critical1 In his diary entry for 6ebruary (+ (*/& Goebbels wrote: I am having some trouble with the 4ress because it doesn?t ta7e to my suggestions as I should li7e1 6ritHsche is altogether too much on the side of the 4ress1 -hy the 4ress ought to howl with ,oy at being given such material for commentary1 Instead the bourgeois 4a4ers es4ecially seem to be so tired of using this material that I could burst with anger1 () 6ritHsche?s irony he thought was not wor7ing on the masses1 But he said this too late in the war when as he well 7new no rhetoric could gloss over the blea7 facts1(/ 6rom the beginning of their relationshi4 the two men collaborated at arm?s length1 6ritHsche declared that he had never belonged to the circle of intimates Goebbels had around himC they met only officially1 But it is clear that for many years they regarded one another highly1 6ritHsche was wor7ing as head of the -ireless News 8ervice in (*)& and when Goebbels too7 that over in May (*)) he continued 6ritHsche in his ,ob and in addition made him head of the News 8ervice in the #ress 8ection of the #ro4aganda Ministry the de4artment that told the German news4a4ers

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page_ 33 #age 0)) what to 4rint1 9ater Goebbels a44ointed him de4uty and then head of the German #ress 8ection a 4osition 6ritHsche 7e4t until (*/& when he left the #ress 8ection and got the resounding title of #leni4otentiary for the #olitical :rganiHation of the Greater German Fadio at the same time becoming chief of the Fadio Division of the #ro4aganda Ministry1 -hen Goebbels in May (*)) as7ed 6ritHsche to stay on as head of the -ireless 8ervice he attached conditions which were brought to 6ritHsche by emissaries Eorst Dressler-Andress who was head of the Fadio Division of the #arty and an assistant 8adila-Mantau1 Goebbels? conditions were three: first that 6ritHsche discharge all DewsC second that he discharge all em4loyees of the -ireless 8ervice who did not immediately ,oin the #artyC and third that he hire one of the men Goebbels had sent to him 8adila-Mantau1 Two of the conditions 6ritHsche turned downC he only acce4ted the naming of 8adila-Mantau as an assistant1 Ee told Goebbels that the Dews wor7ing for the -ireless 8ervice had contracts and were with the e<ce4tion of one editor in minor clerical 4ositionsC they must be given time to ma7e other arrangements1 6ritHsche told the court at Nuremberg that all the Dews em4loyed by the -ireless 8ervice had soon gotten other ,obs in Germany or had emigrated and found ,obs =the editor for e<am4le in #aris>1 Ee fired neither them nor the ??AryanI em4loyees who did not want to be #arty membersC he either 7e4t them on or hel4ed them to find ,obs1 But his resistance was always circums4ectC two secretaries who were #arty members soon too7 the 4lace of two old ones who with his hel4 got other 4ositions in less sensitive enter4rises1 6ritHsche thought that Goebbels had ta7en a li7ing to him as early as (*&% because of a friendly article on National 8ocialism 6ritHsche had written1 But Goebbels ob,ected in (*)& to an article by 6ritHsche on the #otem4a case in which 6ritHsche criticiHed Eitler for sending a telegram of sym4athy to the five young NaHi hoodlums who had 7illed a .ommunist wor7er and had themselves been sentenced to death1 Des4ite this la4se Goebbels 7e4t 6ritHsche at this 4ost in (*)) because the substance of what he had written was 4alatable enough even for a fanatic li7e the #ro4aganda Minister who had few re4lacements of 6ritHsche?s caliber1 6ritHsche?s anti-8emitism was of the stoc7 variety1 Eis broadcasts had a good many unfavorable references to Dews but he detested 8treicher and wanted to have er Stuermer banned for he thought it harmful to the German cause both inside and outside the Feich1 Ee a44roached the sub,ect of the Dews in much the same way his former chief Eugenberg didC they were both ardent nationalists who wanted to see a resurgent Germany e@ui44ed with a 4owerful army again and they disli7ed the Dews who were mainly re4resented in the 9eft-wing 4arties that were antinationalist and anti--ehrmacht1 It was not much of a ste4 for him to formulate these ideas so that they would be acce4table to Goebbels as head of all German 4ro4aganda1 6ritHsche maintained the same constant but rela-

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page_ 34 #age 0)/ tively mild tem4erature of anti-8emitism throughout the 4eriod he served the Third Feich and beyond1 In the account of the trial he wrote years after the war may be detected the same 4oints of view that had animated his broadcasts1 The Dews were still the enemy but he said their enmity was understandable1 6ritHsche had two main ,obs in the Third Feich one with the radio the other with the 4ress1 "nder him along with radio news broadcasting were the chief news4a4er wire services that went to foreign countries: Transocean !uro4a4ress 6astservice =!ildienst> and the German News 8ervice =Deutsches Nachrichtenbuero>1 In December (*)% he became head of the German #ress 8ection1 This meant that he was res4onsible for some & )$$ daily news4a4ers and these together with the Feich?s magaHines had to be tightly coordinated with the high 4olicies enunciated by Goebbels on behalf of Eitler1 6ritHsche was an ideal man for this ,ob as he was for his radio assignmentC he had wor7ed for years for 4rivately owned news4a4ers and not only 7new the im4ortant writers but also since he had convinced himself 7new how to 4ersuade them to write in their best style in the new vein1 The National 8ocialists from the start tolerated no heterodo< nonsense in cultural affairs1 !very 4iece of information to be 4rinted or broadcast and any means of communication with the 4ublic were carefully su4ervised1 To accom4lish this screening Goebbels had organiHed the Feich .ultural .hamber under a law of 8e4tember && (*))1 The chamber consisted of seven de4artments: Music the #lastic Arts Theater -riting #ress Fadio and 6ilm1 -alther 6un7 one of the other defendants at Nuremberg was head of the #ress Division until 8e4tember (*)+ when he became !conomics Minister1 Ee was re4laced by a 4rofessional ,ournalist :tto Dietrich with whom 6ritHsche was not to get along as well1 They had different notions on how the news should be handled es4ecially when it began to be un4leasant1 But before the war and in its early stages the relationshi4 was tolerable to both1 Dietrich was a formidable man for he had the ear of the 6uehrer and regarded himself 6ritHsche thought as Eitler?s 4ersonal 4ress chief1 !ven Goebbels had to deal gingerly with him1 9i7e all those who got close to the throne Dietrich was ,ealous of his 4rerogativesC he regarded the 4ress as his 4rovince and he alone re4resented it to the 6uehrer1 Ee was able to 4revent the a44ointment Goebbels wanted to ma7e of a 4ress liaison officer at the 6uehrer?s head@uarters and Goebbels both feared and mistrusted him1 But Dietrich stayed at his ,ob until March (*/0 when Goebbels at last trium4hant said ??And he thought he could out4lay me1I (0 Together with a man from the 6oreign :ffice Dietrich met every day with Goebbels? re4resentatives in the #ro4aganda Ministry1 :ut of these meetings he emerged with the daily theme =Tages2arole> for the news4a4ers1 Goebbels got a co4y of itC 6ritHsche was told what it was usually over the tele4hone1 6ritHsche also attended Goebbels? daily staff conference or was given his directives

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page_ 3 #age 0)0 over the tele4hone before calling the news4a4er men together for their se4arate briefings1 They were told what to em4hasiHe and what to 4lay down and were regularly given a list of sub,ects and names the Government did not want mentioned in the news1 (' Between (0$ and &0$ re4resentatives of the chief German 4a4ers were usually 4resent at these briefings conducted by 6ritHsche and a still smaller grou4 of &$ to &0 selected ,ournalists met under 6ritHsche?s chairmanshi4 for more intimate behind-the-scenes sessions1 The other 4a4ers either got ready-to-be-4rinted handouts from the #ress De4artment or confidential written instructions of much the same 7ind given orally in the daily briefings1 -ee7ly and monthly 4eriodicals were given a more detailed information service1 Thus the entire 4ress as 6ritHsche said at Nuremberg became a 4ermanent 4art of the #ro4aganda Ministry1 The Tages2arole was read slowly to the assembled grou4 so everyone could write it down accurately and it was always mar7ed either secret or confidentialC any mention of it in the 4ress was forbidden1 A breach of the rule would result in the cul4rit?s being brought before a 4rofessional court that had the right to oust him1 The 4ress to the last country news4a4er dutifully em4hasiHed the Tages2arole in their editorials1 The Authoritarian 8tate the Need for 9iving 84ace the 9eadershi4 #rinci4le the .ons4iracy of -orld Dewry the Bolshevi7 Danger the #lutocratic Democracies the 8oviet "nionall were 4raised or damned at the same time and according to the same 4rinci4les1 After 6ritHsche too7 over the budget of the German #ress 8ection went u4 ten times what it had been1 The 4a4ers were told what they could 4ublish what they couldn?t 4ublish but could use as information and what they were forbidden to 4ublish1 Not only were re4resentatives of the 6oreign :ffice 4resent but after the start of the war the Eigh .ommand sent officers to 4rovide additional bac7ground for the inter4retation to be 4ut on the news from the front1 The 4ress 4erformed in virtual unisonC at the time the Funciman mission was sent to .Hechoslova7ia it was told to 4lay u4 the antiGerman incidents in that country: the terroriHation of the 8udetenlaender by the .Hechs and how 8lova7s were being 7idna44ed1(+ 6or a long 4eriod after Danuary (*)/ when Eitler and #ilsuds7i made their nonaggression 4act =+erstaen)igungs2akt> the 4ress could 4rint nothing attac7ing the #oles1 Then in the s4ring of (*)* the ban was lifted and the anti-#olish cam4aign began1 The 4ress of the Feich could also be used as 4art of the elaborate camouflage needed to 4re4are the Fussian cam4aign1 Goebbels told the assembled news4a4er men a few wee7s before the invasion that some among them thought the Feich would attac7 Fussia but the real aim was against !ngland1 ??#lease ada4t your wor7 accordingly I he said to them1(% The newsmen were also instructed in the shadings of what the #ro4aganda Ministry considered the true image of the Feich and its leader1 6ritHsche told them on A4ril (& (*/( they could use the sentence which was going the rounds of the highest circles of Eitler idolators only in this

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page_ 3! #age 0)' fashion: ??Adolf Eitler will go into history as one of the greatest military geniuses of all time1I !ven that 4hrasing would be damaging enough when the defeats started1 It was on the radio that 6ritHsche made the re4utation that brought him before the court at Nuremberg1 Ee had s4o7en over the radio since (*)&1 6irst he had a wee7ly 4rogram of both domestic and foreign broadcasts and with the mounting e<citement at the start of the war he s4o7e every day1 The daily broadcasts lasted for only a few months because 6ritHsche was a very busy man with his unwieldly #ress 8ection to manage articles to write and s4eeches to give1 The tal7s dwindled to three then two times then once a wee7 and toward the end of the war they came at even greater intervals1 6ritHsche was a s4ellbinder in the Goebbelian mold1 Ee had the same self-assured alternately biting and eu4horic 4resentation as did Goebbels and what he said was crystal clear even to a mass audience1 6ritHsche?s style set him off shar4ly from most of the 4ress and radio commentary which was filled with the #arty clichJs sentimentalities and turgid writing to which this generation of revolutionary Germans had become accustomed1 Eis tas7 was a good deal easier at the start of the war when the s4eed and e<tent of the -ehrmacht victories astonished not only the outside world but the Eigh .ommand and the German 4eo4le themselves 6ritHsche could let himself go with the rhetoric and the heavy sarcasm so beloved by NaHi s4ea7ers beginning with Eitler and going down through the ran7s of the 4aragra4h writers of the +oelkischer Beobachter1 After the defeat of 6rance 6ritHsche announced that there was a rumor abroad that British 4arachutists had landed in Italy1 This said 6ritHsche the Germans found most amusing1 The 6uehrer had as7ed the British to let him 7now 4lease when they intended to come at which time he would withdraw the German troo4s-so that the British could land safely1 This motif was 4aralleled by the recurrent 4laying on the radio and in the movies of the overly o4timistic British song I-e?ll Eang :ur -ashing on the 8iegfried 9ine1I 6ritHsche was all reasonableness in the early 4art of the warC he could often afford to be because the enemy gave him all o4enings1 The German Navy and Air 6orce 6ritHsche said would 4revent the delivery of 9end-9ease shi4ments from the "nited 8tates to the continent of !uro4e1 Germany in fact was building a new .ontinent free of the mutual hatreds which for centuries had been fanned by Britain1 :n March (% (*/( he told the German 4eo4le: America?s aid for Britain began with a s4eech a s4eech by #resident Foosevelt which started off with the sentence that whatever he would have to say would be recorded by history word for word1 -ell it is always a rather dubious matter to want to interfere with the Muse of Eistory or to attem4t to guide her 4en1 It mostly ha44ened that history 4aid no attention to the words which were whis4ered in her ear but that she entered the deeds which were achieved into her great boo71 1 1 1 Foosevelt of course started from the assum4tion on which his 9end and 9ease Bill also rests

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page_ 3" #age 0)+ the assum4tion that the form of life of the young nations with an authoritarian government is nothing but the outcome of the tyranny of a handful of men1 Foosevelt also silently assumed that the nations in @uestion that is to say 4articularly the German nation had either been too wea7 to resist tyranny or that they light-heartedly followed some dictators or others only to destroy the culture of man7ind and the achievements of civiliHation1 The great sage of the New -orld 7nows of course full well that for instance the 6uehrer of the German 4eo4le did not seiHe 4ower as a dictator but that he too7 over when he had the absolute ma,ority of the German 4eo4le behind himstrictly according to the rules of the democratic game1 A ma,ority which after his advent to 4ower grew until it became a unity 1 1 1?? 6ritHsche went on to remind his readers of the !eltanschauung that illuminated everything for National 8ocialists: But the crown of all wrongly a44lied Fooseveltian logic is the sentence: IThere never was a race and never will be a race which can serve the rest of man7ind as a master1I Eere too we can only a44laud Mr1 Foosevelt1 #recisely because there is no race which can be the master of the rest of man7ind we Germans have ta7en the liberty of brea7ing the domination of Dewry and of its ca4ital in Germany of Dewry which believed itself to have inherited the crown of secret world domination1 And he added returning to 4rosaic 4olitical affairs when Foosevelt tal7ed about 4olitical freedom he should ma7e it a 4oint to see the Indian ministers who were being held in British 4risons1 (* -hen Germany invaded ;ugoslavia 6ritHsche said that this action was the result of the British va ban1ue 4olicy of ris7 and lose everything on the turn of a card1 Germany had reached the end of her 4atience with such rec7less irres4onsibility and Adolf Eitler had decided to turn over the re4resentation of German interests in ;ugoslavia to that force which seems solely in a 4osition to 4rotect right and reasonthe -ehrmacht1 -e are full of gratitude to the 6uehrer?s farseeing 4olicy which has antici4ated all eventualities1 It was the fatal mista7e of our enemies that they had relied on 4recisely those JmigrJs who had failed in Germany to be their e<4erts on German 4roblems and of course they had been wrongly informed1 Germany had never as7ed the "nited 8tates or Britain to change their form of government but these 4owers throw democratic 4rinci4les overboard when they demand that the Feich change hers1 The Germans had had such an unha44y e<4erience with the freedom of the individual that they had decided to 4ut into the hands of the 6uehrer all decisions to con@uer and safeguard the freedom of the community1&$ This was ,ust the 7ind of thing German audiences loved to hear1 It was 4itched in the same 7ey as the 6uehrer?s oratoryC it was beamed to a 4eo4le who had been fearful of a general !uro4ean war and its conse@uences and who had been une<4ectedly re4rieved by the miraculous swift victories that

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page_ 3# #age 0)% contrasted so marvelously with the murderous trench warfare of -orld -ar I1 -hat 6ritHsche said was the easier to swallow because it was washed down by the heady wine of the brilliant con@uests1 6ritHsche?s broadcasts before the war had also found a @uic7 resonance1 It was easy to e<4lain to the German 4eo4le the reasons for the reoccu4ation of the Fhineland for the Anschluss for Munichas long as no war was involved1 As the artificial 4ower com4le< of Gersailles disintegrated as the Feich became a 4ower again and Eitler won bloodless victory after victory 6ritHsche was not alone in his boundless admiration for the 6uehrer who had restored Germany?s 4osition in !uro4e1 Ee could readily tell enthusiastic audiences of Germans as well as admiring foreigners that the genius of one man had accom4lished what all the statesmen and generals of the -ilhelminian Feich and of the -eimar Fe4ublic had been 4owerless to do1 Eitler?s 4o4ularity in Germany was self-4ro4elling1 No one in German history had brought to the Feich so much territory and 4restige so many +olks)eutsche P as had Eitler in the s4ace of five years and all without the firing of a shot1 The 4a4er tigers of Gersailles were torn to shredsC the millions of dead of -orld -ar I had not died in vain after all1 -ith the start of the Fussian cam4aign 6ritHsche?s tas7 became more difficult1 There had not been time to 4re4are the German 4ublic for the attac7 which had a bad association for Germans of all ran7s1 This was the twofront war that had defeated Germany in -orld -ar IC many of Eitler?s closest advisers had argued against it1 But 6ritHsche for a time could continue to tell of daHHling victory after victory1 In addition he began to broadcast accounts of atrocities that with the e<ce4tion of isolated incidents in the #olish cam4aign had been hitherto lac7ing in the German re4orts1 Ee needed now to add fear and hatemuch more hateto his mi<ture1 Eis broadcasts told of the horrors German soldiers had to confront in Fussia1 Ee whi44ed u4 his audience with descri4tions designed to ,ustify Eitler?s brutal orders and the high losses the German Army was beginning to suffer1 As early as Duly 0 (*/( he said over the radio: !ven worse than the mar7s of the mental economic and social terror e<ercised by the Dewish commissars were those of 4hysical terror which the German Army met along the road of its victory1 1 1 1 It was only the 6uehrer?s decision to stri7e in time that saved our land from being overrun 1 1 1 A few hours before the fall of 9vov Bolshevist agents including women gave vent to their hatred and fury against hel4less "7rainian 4risoners1 Into<icated with bloodlust 1 1 1 these monsters fell u4on their victims with machine guns 4istols and 7nives1 Nor was murder the worst of the atrocities 4er4etrated1&( The German 4ro4aganda com4any observers had seen these cor4ses1L L Accom4anying the German armies from the start of the war were uniformed cameramen along with re4orters and other writers whose ,ob it was to 4rovide the films 4hotogra4hs and news stories for the home front1

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page_ 3$ #age 0)* 6ritHsche did not invent them1 There had been mass murders of "7rainians who had been arrested by the NBGD on sus4icion of anti-8oviet activity and who could not be evacuated before the Germans occu4ied the area1 But the &ntermenschen line had to be wor7ed hard now because the German 4o4ulation des4ite the succession of brilliant victories was still dis@uieted1 The Fussian cam4aign had come as a shoc7C they had to be shown what horrors the omniscient 6uehrer had s4ared them and how unavoidable the war was1 6ritHsche also 4ursued the main theme of the 6uehrer and of 8treicher s4ea7ing of this Dewish united front of the godless and the hy4ocrites of the .ommunists and the fat moneybags there the e<tremes touchC they are made of the same dirt1 Mais7y the godless Fussian Ambassador to 9ondon visits 8aint #aul?s 1 1 1 the Dew is master in the art of transformation he uses economic liberalism that leads from the liberation of Dewish ca4italism to the slavery of Dewish bolshevism1 1 1 1 -hatever the Moscow Dews invent is ta7en at its face value in !ngland1 && German sentiment li7e that of all 4eo4les? was fluid1 .ontrary to what 6ritHsche had said in re4ly to the Foosevelt s4eech Eitler had not come to 4ower with a ma,ority of the votes but with )+ 4er cent of them1 And the show of unity was window dressing as the 4lots against Eitler would demonstrate1 The 6uehrer?s 4o4ularity undoubtedly went u4 with the victories on the home front over unem4loyment the retrieving of German 4restige in the councils of !uro4e with rearmament and a decisive if 4rimitive di4lomacy and the easy and easily ,ustifiable con@uests of Austria the 8udetenland and Memel1 But the German 4eo4le were afraid of war1 Eitler noted how silent the Berliners had been when he had sent tan7s through the city at the time of the .Hech crisis and what he saw disgusted him1 8ome of the chief 4ro4aganda devices fell flat as both German and foreign observers re4ortedC the (ristallnacht and other blatantly anti-8emitic demonstrations too had a 4oor echo among the German 4ublic1 -hat every 4ro4agandist has to deal with is the mi<ture of ob,ective facts and the readiness of readers and hearers to acce4t loaded inter4retations of them1 The Fussian cam4aign from the start was difficult to ??sell1I None other than Eitler had told the Germans of the folly of the leadershi4 facing a twofront war in (*(/ and now he willfully did what he had so long denounced1 6ritHsche li7e countless others might have been convinced that this was a 4reventive war that Eitler had struc7 ,ust before the (0$ Fussian divisions mobiliHed on the German border marchedC but the gnawing doubts of the necessity for the attac7 and of its success would not vanish1 The 4ro4aganda had to turn now to the theme of a life-or-death struggle 4laying u4 the horrors of the Dewish Bolshevi7 cons4iracy and the 7ind of war it was waging for the 6uehrer?s orders to the generals to 7ill commissars in uniform without trial and to ignore the Eague and Geneva .onventions had to be ,ustified1 Bill or be 7illed became the uns4o7en daily 4arole behind the 4arole1

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page_ 40 #age 0/$ The one ho4e for 7ee4ing German morale at the high 4itch it reached with the fall of 6rance and the subse@uent victories was the si<-wee7 war against Fussia that Eitler announced would be his aim when he first tal7ed to his generals about his decision to invade the 8oviet "nion1 8o 4owerful was his wishful thin7ing that the 6uehrer and the 4ro4aganda a44aratus announced its fulfillment1 :n :ctober * (*/( 6ritHsche broadcast: ??-ith the formations already encircled MMarshal 8emanN Timoshen7o has sacrificed 1 1 1 the last remaining armies of full fighting strength of the total 8oviet front1 As the Feich #ress .hief em4hasiHed today the military outcome is no longer doubtful1I But this was the last claim of its 7ind the 4ro4aganda authorities would ma7e1 The German ,uggernaut first slowed down by the autumnal rains and the mud was caught in the sudden and early freeHe of the Fussian winterthe coldest in a hundred years1 It was also caught in Eitler?s decision to turn Guderian?s tan7s from the center and the attac7 on Moscow to the south and the great but indecisive victories at Biev1 By the end of November 6ritHsche was em4hasiHing not the battles but the wire-4ulling behind the scenes1 In late November he e<4lained to his listeners: I-hile the clever Dews in Moscow and 9ondon always had something new and interestingamusing combinations 4e44ery rumorsif they didn?t re4ort truthfully they at least inter4reted interestingly1I .ommenting on the renewal of the Anti.omintern #act he came bac7 to the main theme: I 1 1 1 4lutocrats democrats and Dews started this war 1 1 1 The curtain has been blown aside 1 1 1 such a breath of wind became evident when the Dewish National .ouncil was stu4id enough to send a telegram to Mr1 Foosevelt e<4ressing the congratulations of Dewry on the outbrea7 of the war 1 1 1I &) Two wee7s after #earl Earbor 6ritHsche turned again to the cause of all the trouble in the worldthe Dew1 The Germans had no stomach for war against the "nited 8tates1 In December (*/( they had trouble enough on their hands with the 8oviet forces and the Fussian winter1 No Da4anese victories could com4ensate for the dread occasioned by the overwhelming coalition now ranged against the Feich and its allies1 6ritHsche had hammered before on the theme of the world Dewish cons4iracyC when "nited 8tates forces had landed in Iceland he had said this was evidence of it1 Now he came close to what 8treicher was writing in er Stuermer: The fate of Dewry in !uro4e has turned out to be as un4leasant as the 6uehrer 4redicted it would be in the event of a !uro4ean war1 After the e<tension of the war instigated by Dews this un4leasant fate may also s4read to the New -orld for you can hardly assume that the nations of the New -orld will 4ardon the Dews for the misery of which the nations of the :ld -orld did not absolve them1&/ Now the Hau2tmotiv of his broadcasts became the fight the brave soldiers of the Allies were ma7ing on behalf of the Dews and the Bolshevi7s the

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page_ 41 #age 0/( alliance of the 4lutocratic democracies and the .ommunist hordes all of them serving the world enemy1 Inters4ersed was the 4raise of Eitler which never flagged: ??This one man?s wor7 and struggle which is at the same time the 4icture of the entire nation?s wor7 and struggle1 1 1 1 Truly I felt that destiny itself was s4ea7ing with the words of the 6uehrer1I &0 These endless eulogies were inters4ersed with evidence of the threat that now hung over every German not only from the 8oviet "nion but from the -est as well1 6ritHsche @uoted Goebbels? editorial in the +oelkischer Beobachter of May &% (*// with its citations from the Army Juarterly: IGermany must be more desolate than the 8ahara1I And from the Ne,s *hronicle: I-e are for destroying every living being in Germany: man woman and child bird and insect1 -e wouldn?t let a blade of grass grow1I And from E1G1 -ells: ITreat the Germans li7e a no<ious tribe of natives1I 6rom Faymond .la44er: ITerror and brutality are the best side of the air war1I Ee @uoted what he called an official re4ort of the .hurch of !ngland made on May &% (*/): IIt is a 4erverse view of .hristianity to e<4ect that civilians shouldn?t be 7illed1I Ee also cited the Archbisho4 of ;or7 .yrill Garbett as having said in his 4astoral letter of Dune (*/) IIt is only a small evil to bombard German civilians1I&' 6ritHsche broadcast until the last hours of the war and until then or very nearby he a44ears to have believed his own 4ro4aganda1 -hen the British and Americans landed at Normandy he told the German 4eo4le this was the hour the German Army had been waiting for1 The defenses had long been 4re4aredC the German Army was ready to s4ring the tra41 -hen the Allied bridgehead was won and consolidated 6ritHsche shifted to the acts of banditry committed behind their s4earhead as bolshevism followed in their wa7e1&+ The tone grew increasingly shrillC he @uoted the .sraelitisches !ochenblatt fuer )ie Sch,ei0 which had made a survey of Dews in leading 4ositions in the -est and he said that the Dews were ready to remove by murder if necessary 4eo4le inconvenient to their cause1 As the destruction of German cities from the Allied bombing attac7s became more catastro4hic 6ritHsche could only em4hasiHe Allied air losses and the success of German defenseC nor could he avoid telling of the ma,or retreats in Fussia1 Ee 4reserved his re4utation for candor by saving that it was true the German armies were not willingly giving u4 so much ground but he also reminded his listeners how essential the earlier victories had been that now 4ermitted them to wage the war so far from the homeland1 6ritHsche was in the same fi< as his listeners: they could ho4e together for more miracle wea4ons and for dissension among the Allies1 Meanwhile 6ritHsche could only tell them they had no alternative but to fight1 IEold out to the last I he said and later the German courts would re4eat these words to him that were connected with the senseless slaughter of thousands of soldiers and civilians including children drafted into the Army to 4rolong the war for a few wee7s1

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page_ 42 #age 0/& In (*/& 6ritHsche ,oined the 8i<th Army at 8talingrad for a few months as a member of a 4ro4aganda com4any in Infantry Division )%*1 Ee re4orted directly to General =later 6ield Marshal> #aulus and was dee4ly im4ressed by his resoluteness and @ualities of command1L 6ritHsche ne<t saw #aulus in Nuremberg where #aulus was brought by 8oviet ca4tors to testify against Beitel and Dodl and the German Eigh .ommand1 6ritHsche was still the e<4ert glib re4orterC what he saw in #aulus was a man merely brainwashed by the Fussians not the commander who had been left with his Army by the 6uehrer to be destroyed because Eitler could not bring himself to admit his strategy had been wrong1 #aulus was cross-e<amined by the German lawyers who gave him the only o44ortunity he would have on either side of the Iron .urtain to give some indication of why he was testifying against his brother officers and his own 4ast1 Dodl?s lawyer #rofessor !<ner as7ed #aulus if he was teaching in the Moscow war college or whether he had another 4ost in Moscow1 #aulus answered ??NoI to both these @uestions1 But that they were as7ed and that #aulus in answer to the direct e<amination of General Fuden7o used the well-7nown and worn 4hrases common to those who had been interrogated often enough by the NBGD gave the courtroom the bac7ground1 #aulus said in re4ly to Fuden7o?s @uestion about the 4re4arations for the attac7 on the 8oviet "nion in which he himself had ta7en 4art: IAll these measures show that this was a matter of a criminal attac71I #aulus remembered nothing in answer to !<ner?s @uestions of the massing of (00 Fussian divisions on the German border nor under the @uestioning of the counsel for :B- 9aternser of the meeting on the :bersalHberg where Eitler had given his 4artially convincing version of the 8oviet menace1 In his account of the Nuremberg trial 6ritHsche made much of these matters in ,ustifying himself1 Des4ite what he told the court and what he later wrote Eitler had fought no 4reventive war but had without 4rovocation ,um4ed on the 8oviet "nion1 The Fussian Army had been caught flat-footedC for some hours it did not even have orders from Moscow to fire bac71 In s4ite of re4eated warnings from many sources including the British Fussian agents in Germany and the 8oviet master s4y in Da4an Fichard 8orge 8talin would not budge from his fi<ed o4inion that Eitler would not attac71 &% Fussia was almost com4letely un4re4ared for the onslaught1 Nor did #aulus need to be brainwashed to tell that the 6uehrer?s stubborn 4ride had caused an entire German army to be lost when he refused to let #aulus brea7 out from 8talingrad while there was time1 Before the war?s end #aulus undoubtedly was given the full treatment by the NBGD and the 4ro4aganda a44aratus for he and many of his chief officers ,oined the 6ree Germany .ommittee and broadcast to the German troo4s urging them to end the senseless struggle1 But 6ritHsche even at the trial was clinging L 6ritHsche was flown out of the 8talingrad front to ta7e over his new 4ost as #leni4otentiary for the #olitical :rganiHation of the Greater German Fadio1

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page_ 43 #age 0/) to his own brand of 4ro4aganda still thin7ing of the 4reventive war and the du4licities of the other side1 6ritHsche in his defense contrasted what he had said during the war with the remar7 an Allied commentator made on a film being shown in the courtroom at Nuremberg: ??Eere you see Germans laughing over hanged ;ugoslavs1I Never 6ritHsche said had he tried to awa7en hatred for a 4eo4leC he had s4o7en strongly against governments and systems but he had not 4reached hatred1 Ee had resisted the line ado4ted in high @uarters that raged against the 4ersons of Foosevelt and .hurchill and 8talin and their chief advisers as well as against the systems they re4resented1 Ee had in fact he said in answer to the direct e<amination of his chief counsel Dr1 6ritH collected anti-German caricatures and anti-German war films from -orld -ar I and 4resented them to audiences of ,ournalists and radio s4ea7ers with a commentary of his own1 -hat he had wanted to do was show what the untutored enemy thought of Germans and how unfair and absurd the caricatures were1 These themes were very dear to the hearts of German 4atriots but were far removed from the frothings of the #arty 4ro4agandists? attac7s on the &ntermenschen and du4es on the o44osite side of the line1 6ritHsche 4layed heavily on the Allied demand for unconditional surrender on the su4er-Gersailles that would follow a new lost war and once he wryly remar7ed to the court in this connection: IIt does not behoove me today to ma7e a com4arison with reality1I 6ritH then as7ed him if he had not learned from the broadcasts of the Allies that their fight was directed not against the German 4eo4le but against their leaders1 6ritHsche answered I:n the contrary I did not 7ee4 it from them but re4eatedly @uoted it1 Eowever I called it ?incredible1? 6or e<am4le I once used the tric7 of @uoting the wording of a medieval declaration of war in which it had already been said that a war was declared only on the Bing of 6rance but that one wanted to bring freedom to the 6rench 4eo4le1I Ee had never used the 4hrase Imaster raceI and indeed said he had 4rohibited its use by the German radio and 4ress1 Ee thought that the term had been invented by a man who had been indicted at Nuremberg but who had esca4ed trial by hanging himselfDr1 9eyand that it had been enormously if silently influential in the thin7ing of the 881 At any rate he had not used it1L &* 6ritHsche idealiHed himself at Nuremberg1 Ee swore solemnly that he had never lied or committed a single falsification in the case of any serious @uestions of 4olicy or of the conduct of the war adding: Eow often I myself became the victim of a falsehood or a lie I cannot say after the revelations of this trial1 The same is true as far as I 7now of all my fellow wor7ers but I do not by any means want to deny that I L Actually the 4hrase a44ears for the most 4art in s4eeches or writings by #arty leaders designed to im4ress the 88 4olice and administrative forces in the !ast with the im4ortance of their tas71 6ritHsche was too intelligent to have used it for a mass audience on the radio that was monitored by the Allies1

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page_ 44 #age 0// and my fellow wor7ers selected news and @uotations following a certain tendency1 It is the curse of 4ro4aganda during war that one wor7s only with blac7 and white 1 1 1 But to my 7nowledge it is a mista7e to believe that in the #ro4aganda Ministry thousands of little lies were hatched out1 1 1 1 If we had lied on a thousand small things the enemy would have been able to deal with us more easily than was the case1 )$ -hat he wanted to do was to win the coo4eration of the 4eo4les Germany had invaded so he was elaborately reasonable in attem4ting to show them why they ought to en,oy their ca4tivity more than they did1 In his somewhat inverted scale of values the murder of Eeydrich was a 4ro4aganda success for Germany because it was regarded in Germany at least as an outrage1 The destruction of 9idice as a retaliation he called ??a tremendous success for the Allies1I 6ritHsche e<4lained to the 4eo4le of the occu4ied countries how much Germany was doing for them how industrial activity in their countries was rising how su44lies of food were being brought in from the FeichC he told them that schools were being o4ened or reo4ened and cities su44lied des4ite the sabotage of the obtuse resistance1 It was sim4ly not true he declared at Nuremberg that the Germans had lived well while the occu4ied countries starved1 The Feich had done what it could and had far-reaching 4lans for the future of its victims1 6ritHsche had wanted a Magna .harta for !uro4e which would define the basic rights of the !uro4ean nations1 -hen 6ritHsche returned from the front in (*/& Goebbels 4romised him the charter would be 4roclaimed1 Ee had dreamed of a united !uro4e of a union of the countries of the .ontinent with Germany on a basis of e@uality1 )( -hen he used harsh words about the Fussians they were against the 8oviet system not against the Fussian 4eo4le1 This is what he meant in a s4eech to which the 4rosecution referred as evidence of 6ritHsche?s incitements to hatred1 In it he had declared IIn this battle in the !ast it is not one ideology fighting against another not one 4olitical system against another but culture civiliHation and human dignity have revolted against devilish 4rinci4les of an underworld1I)& Ee tal7ed often about the atrocities committed by the Fussians and the horror with which the German soldiers had seen the evidences of them1 Ee told his listeners that Moscow had agreed that the crimes had been committed but attem4ted to blame them on the Germans1 And then in the courtroom at Nuremberg he reaffirmed much of what he had said during the war: I 1 1 1 the absolute cleanliness and honesty of the whole German conduct of the war1 I still believe today that murder and violence and 8onder7ommandos only clung li7e a foreign body li7e a boil to the morally sound body of the German 4eo4le and their Armed 6orces1I)) Ee told the court he had 7nown nothing of the removal of Dews from the occu4ied countries although he admitted he had heard that certain individuals both Dews and non-Dews were being arrested1 Ee also 7new that

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page_ 4 #age 0/0 millions of foreign laborers were wor7ing for the Feich but he did not consider them slaves for he ??saw them daily wal7ing about free on the streets of all the cities1I Ee got a good many re4orts about these wor7ersC all of them said they were treated in e<actly the same fashion as Germans1 Ee also got re4orts that the inferior status decreed for the !astern wor7ers at the beginning had been remedied and he even got com4laints from Germans that foreign wor7ers were better treated than they1 Ee often tal7ed with these wor7ers and said he had heard no s4ecial com4laints from them1 Ee never 7new that some of them had come to Germany involuntarilyC the most damaging re4orts that reached him said foreign wor7ers had been given e<travagant 4romises when they were recruited and 6ritHsche 4rotested against this 4ractice for it was damaging to his 4ro4aganda1 As a man to whom all the sources of information all foreign broadcasts had been available he strained the credulity of his listeners by telling the Nuremberg court that he had never heard about the mistreatment of foreign wor7ers in Germany1 As for the charges of anti-8emitism he said he was never for Ia noisy anti8emitismIC he was always moderate1 Not only had he twice tried to get er Stuermer banned but he never in his thirteen years of broadcasting @uoted the 4a4er1 Ee had once been as7ed to censor it but he had declined to do thisC he ,ust wanted to get rid of the 4a4er for it had only to be literally @uoted in the foreign 4ress to be convincing anti-German 4ro4aganda1 But he wanted to cut down the 4redominant influence of Dews in German 4olitics economy and culture after -orld -ar IC he believed Dews ought to be restricted in the 4rofessions to their numerical ratio to Germans1 After the outbrea7 of -orld -ar II he set out with enthusiasm to combat the anti-German 4ro4aganda of e<iles li7e !mil 9udwig and other writers for the JmigrJ 4ress1 Ee learned only at Nuremberg that something more was at sta7e in (*)* than Eitler?s demand for a road through the .orridor and the city of DanHig and that the 6uehrer had indeed 4lanned a new 4artition of #oland and a much more terrible fate for the Dews1 IIf I had 7nown of these things at the time then I would have 4ictured the role of Dewish 4ro4aganda before the war @uite differently I he said1 The IDewry De4artmentI that 7e4t u4 a drum fire of anti-8emitic agitation was a branch of the #ro4aganda Ministry but 6ritHsche never had anything directly to do with it1 8till another service of this 7ind he said was maintained by the #arty under the title IThe National 8ocialist .orres4ondenceIC this was issued under aus4ices of the Feich #ress :ffice of the N8DA# a 4urely #arty 4roduction with which 6ritHsche also had no connection1 Eis s4eech about the un4leasant fate of the Dews in !uro4e that would s4read to the New -orld had not meant he said at Nuremberg that he 7new of the murders but merely that he wanted Dews eliminated from 4olitics and economic life1 Ee could not have meant the murders for they had not yet occurred and the evacuations were not to be carried out for another year or

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page_ 4! #age 0/' two1 The s4eech he said was really concerned with the #earl Earbor attac7 then being investigated in the "nited 8tates and in this connection he informed his listeners that a Dewish National .ouncil had told #resident Foosevelt they wanted the "nited 8tates to enter the war1 6ritHsche admitted using the formula of the Dewish-democratic-4lutocratic-Bolshevi7 agitators and tal7ing on the sub,ect of Dewish influence on British 4oliciesC but he said none of this had to do with the idea of e<termination or 4ersecution1 :nce in 6ebruary or March (*/& he received a letter from an 88 man who commanded a unit that had orders to 7ill the Dews and the "7rainian intellectuals in his area1 The 88 commander had a nervous brea7down as a result of his assignment and wrote to 6ritHsche from a hos4ital1 Ee chose 6ritHsche because he said he had confidence in him and because he could not use official channels to ma7e his disclosures1 Ee begged 6ritHsche to withhold his name for he was bound by his oath to silence and brea7ing it would cost him his life1 -hat did 6ritHsche do with this informationO Ee went with it immediately to none other than Feinhard Eeydrich and as7ed him 4ointblan7 ??Is your 88 there for the 4ur4ose of committing mass murdersOI Eeydrich was indignant that such a @uestion could be as7ed but he told 6ritHsche that 4erha4s a man li7e Gauleiter Boch might be guilty of such a misuse of the 88 and said he would investigate1 The ne<t day he called 6ritHsche and told him Boch had indeed attem4ted to carry out such an action but had referred to orders from the 6uehrer and Eeydrich was continuing his investigation1 Two days later Eeydrich called again and told 6ritHsche that Eitler had e<4ressly declared he had given no such order and Eeydrich was now starting an investigation of Boch1 Eeydrich said IBelieve me Eerr 6ritHsche anyone who has the re4utation of being cruel does not have to be cruel he can act humanely1I )/ And there the matter ended1 6ritHsche made further investigations on his way to the front to ,oin #aulus? 8i<th ArmyC he as7ed colleagues connected with the Biev broadcasting stations what they 7new about such matters1 Ee was told that there had been shootings but they had come about as a result of sabotage where bloc7s of houses had been blown u4 in Biev by 8oviet time bombs and many German soldiers had lost their lives1 8oviet citiHens had been shot but the e<ecutions had all followed courts-martial1 6ritHsche?s further in@uirieshe tal7ed with 88 officers and with "7rainiansconfirmed these stories1 They all said the same thing that e<ecutions had ta7en 4lace only following due legal 4roceedings1 6ritHsche admitted he had also heard stories of similar German atrocities from the Allied radio stations and had in@uired about these at the F8EA for the alleged brutalities mostly concerned the 88 and the Gesta4o1 Among those who gave him the answers that all was well was Adolf !ichmann1 The F8EA 4eo4le always told 6ritHsche the same thing either that a re4ort was false or that it had a legal basis1 6ritHsche collected both the charges that came u4 through the foreign

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page_ 4" #age 0/+ 4ress and radio and the answers given him by the F8EA in the archive 7nown as the Schnell)ienst =Suic7 8ervice> designed to 4rovide a re4ository of bac7ground information for broadcasts and articles for the @uic7 refutation of foreign anti-German broadcasts1 -ith the success of Allied 4ro4aganda in -orld -ar I in mind 6ritHsche 7e4t close trac7 of foreign broadcasts and news4a4ers1 At the start of the war one of his co-wor7ers from the Schnell)ienst gathered material for an article ??In % -ee7s of -ar ($+ 9ies1I At the start of the war against #oland the enemy 4ress accused the Germans of stealing the Blac7 Madonna of .Hestochowa and to counter the story 6ritHsche immediately arranged for foreign ,ournalists to visit the s4ot and see for themselves that the Madonna was in 4lace1 Ee used the same tactics when a British 4a4er the Ne,s *hronicle claimed in (*)* that the Germans had 7illed ($ $$$ .Hechs in #rague including the 9ord Mayor1 Ee invited German and foreign newsmen to visit #rague to tal7 with the 9ord Mayor and see for themselves that no massacre had ta7en 4lace1L 6ritHsche said he 7new the enemy was ma7ing a business of lying so when he heard the stories of genuine atrocities they seemed to him of a 4iece with the earlier fabrications1 Thus when Goebbels told him the Dews were being shi44ed from Berlin to cam4s in the !ast he believed himC the idea that they were being ta7en to e<termination cam4s never occurred to him1 -hen he heard of 4ogroms during the occu4ation of 9vov and Bovno he was told they had been carried out by the local 4o4ulationbut 6ritHsche nevertheless was critical of Goebbels the Gesta4o and the officials of the administration because he said II referred re4eatedly to the legal 4olitical and moral necessity of 4rotecting these Dews who after all had been entrusted to our care1I )0 6ritHsche also heard of the gassing of Dews in vans a story broadcast after the Fussians reca4tured Bhar7ov and again he went to see7 advice this time to Goebbels1 Goebbels 4romised to in@uire into the matter with Eimmler and Eitler and the ne<t day he called u4 6ritHsche and said the stories were not trueC they were merely an invention of Fussian 4ro4aganda1 The same thing ha44ened with regard to concentration cam4s1 6ritHsche 7new that they e<isted but he believed that only enemies of the 8tate were sent to them1 Ee once was told by a ,ournalist who had been sent to :ranienburg that while he had not been tortured other inmates had been1 Again 6ritHsche turned to his su4eriors: to Goebbels and also to Goering who was then #russian #rime Minister1 An investigation 6ritHsche was told had been started and as a result the cam4 commandant was sentenced to death1 Eis further in@uiries about the treatment given #astor Niemoeller and the Austrian .hancellor 8chuschnigg all received reassuring answers1 Ee visited a concentration cam4 only once1 In the winter of (*//(*/0 he went to the administration building at :ranienburg where he tal7ed with a L The story arose from the demonstration of #rague students on the anniversary of .Hechoslova7ia?s inde4endence during which ( &$$ were arrested and nine shot1

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page_ 4# #age 0/% number of the 4risoners in the 4resence of guards1 The 4risoners told him they were well enough treatedC they com4lained only that they had been un,ustly arrested1 The officials at the cam4 assured him the internees were treated not only humanely but well1 8umming u4 his sentiments at Nuremberg 6ritHsche said that he now realiHed he had been wrong in his estimate of Eitler and the cause which he had servedC he 7new now that the 6uehrer had wanted to e<terminate the German 4eo4le and his own last act on May & (*/0 had been to broadcast the story of Eitler?s suicide so as to 4revent any legend about him from starting1 During his months in 4rison 6ritHsche learned of the tortures undergone by 4risoners of the Gesta4o from a fellow 4risoner who had been in their hands1 6urther he learned that the idea of a 4reventive war by Eitler had not much validity1 Another 4risoner General Niedermeier who shared a cell with the inter4reter who had been 4resent told him that Molotov in (*/( had 4ut forth no new demands when he visited Berlin but had merely wanted Germany to carry out what had been agreed u4on1 The last 4oint 6ritHsche wanted to ma7e had to do with the murder of five million Dews1 Ee had heard and seen the evidence of these 7illings in Nuremberg and he said it had convinced and sha7en him1 The court acce4ted or three-@uarters of it did what 6ritHsche told themC 4ro4aganda was a new wea4on no international codes e<isted to define its e<cesses as they did for land and naval warfare and 6ritHsche?s 4erformance was not substantially different from that of the Allied 4ro4agandistshe was merely on the other side1L -hen he asserted that he had never consciously lied in im4ortant matters this was certainly news for the assembled Allied and German listeners but there is no doubt that 6ritHsche believed what he said1 Eis account of the trial written after it was over and his testimony before the German courts were elaborations on the theme not only of his own essential integrity but of that of the German 4eo4le and of a number of his fellow defendants in the great trial1 In the 4ages of his reminiscences of the trial he lu7ewarmly defended Fibbentro4 who he thought did himself needless harm in his testimony and 8auc7el who had the welfare of foreign wor7ers at heartC even Baltenbrunner got a good word when 6ritHsche 4raised the ob,ective @uality of the re4orts that came from one of his offices1 6ritHsche was accustomed to ma7ing a case1 Eis entire training was for 4utting the best 4ossible face on events both 4leasant and un4leasantC the habit was ingrained or 4erha4s better said the man who could learn the habit was born to be the most 4ersuasive of 4ro4agandiststhe man who believes in what he is selling1 Ee readily deceived himself1 -hen he needed to believe that Eitler had forestalled a Fussian attac7 by his invasion he believed itC when the Allies won and he was 4laced on trial he needed to L The Fussian ,udges dissented as they did in the cases of 8chacht and #a4en1 6ritHsche was guiltythat is why he had been brought to trial1

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page_ 4$ #age 0/* be convinced of the nefariousness of the designs of the 6uehrer and he swung over to the 4revailing 4ostwar view of both Allies and Germans1 8till he 4layed it safeC everything had to be understood in conte<t1 The Fussian divisions had been massed on the German frontier but General Niedermeier 7new that Molotov had made no unfriendly demands1 Both stories were right1 Ee was an echo chamberC even when he wrote the boo7 about the trial he was a44ealing to a different 4ostwar audience than the one he had been addressing in the #alace of Dustice1 Ee was addressing Germans and while it was necessary to admit the monstrous crimes committed in the name of the German 4eo4le it was im4ortant to e<4lain how the Allies too were guilty and how many mitigating circumstances there had been for the defendants in the doc71 Ee had always been able to trim his o4inions1 :nce the NaHis were in 4ower and 6ritHsche had ,oined them Eugenberg for whom he had wor7ed in amity and seeming agreement for many years overnight became the fo< who had to be hunted1 -hen 6ritHsche had doubts about what was ha44ening to the Dews he turned to official channels to the e<ecutioners to find out if the stories were true1 Ee as7ed Eeydrich he as7ed Goebbels and !ichmann and Eimmler1 -hen he wanted to chec7 further he tal7ed to other German officials or to "7rainians who would scarcely dare tell a German of his eminence anything unfavorable to the Feich1 Ee visited :ranienberg but only got as far as the administration building where again he @uestioned officials and 4risoners with their guards 4resent1 It is obvious that he was not interested in getting at the facts but at the 4alatable facts1 Ee wanted to be able to refute what he heard from the Allied broadcasts not to confirm it1 Although he said he had made no call to arms to the -erewolves he came close to itC he had broadcast on A4ril (+ (*/0: 9et no one be sur4rised to find the civilian 4o4ulation wearing civilian clothes still continuing the fight in the regions already occu4ied and even after occu4ation has ta7en 4lace1 -e shall call this 4henomenon ??-erewolfI since it will have arisen without any 4reliminary 4lanning and without a definite organiHation out of the very instinct of life1 )' This was not a call to arms e<ce4t for those who wanted to fightC it was of a 4iece with his clarion IEold out to the last I and he could not have continued to broadcast without saying these things1 Ee 7e4t his ,ob and said his brave words until the endC then he made a new case for himself before a different and more critical audience1 The German courts too7 a much sterner view of his transgressions than did the high court at Nuremberg1 "nder the denaHification laws he was sentenced by the 84ruch7ammer at Nuremberg to nine years at hard labor as a ma,or offender1 Ee lost his rights to a 4ension and to voteC he could never hold 4ublic office again or be a news4a4erman or broadcaster1 After he was

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page_ 0 #age 00$ freed he could wor7 only as a common laborer1 In addition he was to 4ay the costs of the trial1 This was all standard 4rocedure for those found guilty under the denaHification laws1 The verdict of the great trial at Nuremberg was @uoted by 6ritHsche and his lawyer but this time he was being tried by 4eo4le who had heard his broadcasts who had lived under the regime he served and who were unim4ressed by disclaimers of res4onsibility dedicated devotion to the truth and the unfortunate dece4tion he had suffered by believing what he was told1 The transcri4t of the Nuremberg trial was introduced as evidence in his German trial as was the te<t of his broadcasts a document that had been lac7ing e<ce4t for cut versions of some of the tal7s su44lied by the British1 But 6ritHsche?s defense was not 4roof against the charge that he had been one of the wheels of the National 8ocialist Government in 4eace and war and had served the aims of the Eitler state as best he could1 The German 4olice wanted to arrest him right after he was freed at Nuremberg1 But his lawyer Dr1 6ritH waved the decision of the Nuremberg .ourt at his would-be ,ailers and 6ritHsche was not ta7en into custody until 6ebruary / (*/+1 Ee told the German court that he welcomed the o44ortunity to state his case that he wanted the trial so he surrendered himself to the 84ruch7ammer at Nuremberg which had a re4utation for being severe1 This court with the full te<ts of his broadcasts before it could refute some of the testimony 6ritHsche had given at the great trial1 Ee had said for e<am4le that the Dews had started this war and now they had to 4ay for itC far from 7ee4ing away from the vitriolic 4ersonal attac7s he had said at the trial he had avoided he had called Foosevelt ??craHyI and Ia criminal 4hantast I and .hurchill Isatanic I and the court 4ointed out that only when Goebbels told him that the war was irretrievably lost when Fussians were fighting in the streets of Berlin and grenades bursting in the radio station where he was broadcasting had he finally acce4ted Germany?s defeat4erha4s another e<am4le of his ability to believe whatever was necessary1 Ee also testimony showed was directly res4onsible for the e<ecution of a man a Dohannes -ild who had written him anonymous letters 4rotesting his broadcasts and enclosing crude drawings of Eitler?s great-grandfather de4icted as an orangutan wearing a helmetC -ild had called the 6uehrer Ia bloodthirsty croo71I 6ritHsche turned the material over to the security 4oliceC the man was traced tried and e<ecuted1 6ritHsche sought to 4lead in e<tenuation that he had not called in the Gesta4o but this could not have mattered much to Eerr -ild1 The 4rosecution at his 84ruch7ammer trial =all of whom including the ,udges were long-time enemies of the NaHi regime> accused him of having a44roved of the #arty?s ta7ing over the unions and of having seen their leaders arrested and many of them 7illed and it said 6ritHsche had 7nown about these events as well as any man in Germany1 Ee had strengthened anti-8emitism the German court found had

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page_ 1 #age 00( given the German 4eo4le false information and had urged them on to battle long after the war was lost1 Ee was 4ardoned on August * (*0$ and freed on 8e4tember &* (*0$1 The #resident of the 84ruch7ammer 8achs said the sentence of nine years seemed dis4ro4ortionately hard in the climate of (*0$1 8achs visited 6ritHsche in ,ail and the 4rison authorities too had occasion to observe him1 They all said they saw no sign of re4entance1 Ee was still self-confident and brashC he felt su4erior to the 4rison disci4line and saw no reason to acce4t criticism1 )+ Ee was still 4laying the role of the fanatic of ,ustice1 This was the o4inion of the director of the 4rison and 8achs said he could only agree with it1 But 6ritHsche was freed nonetheless in time to live a cou4le of years with his second wife =he had been divorced after the initial trial>1 Ee died of cancer on 8e4tember &+ (*0) in a hos4ital in .ologne convinced he had done all his 4ower to serve his country1 Notes (1 N TGII 41 &(%1 &1 N I 41 ))1 )1 Dose4h Goebbels !ar iary =un4ublished> entry for Dune ) (*/& 41 0) =IAG>1 /1 N TGII 41 (*+1 01 Interrogation of 8e4tember (& (*/0 =Amtsgericht>1 '1 Eildegard 84ringer Es s2rach Hans "rit0sche =8tuttgart: Thiele Gerlag (*/*>1 Eildegard 84ringer as Sch,ert auf )er !aage =Eeidelberg: Burt Gowinc7el Gerlag (*0)>1 +1 N TGII 441 &$)/1 %1 Interrogation of 8e4tember (/ (*/0 =Amtsgericht>1 *1 N TGII 41 &('1 ($1 8D re4orts: Bassel A4ril &+ (*/)C -uerHburg May )( (*/) =Amtsgericht>1 ((1 N*A G 41 **)1 (&1 .bi)1 ()1 9ouis #1 9ochner The 6oebbels iaries 789#789F =Garden .ity: Doubleday R .om4any Inc1 (*/%>1 (/1 -ilfred von :ven Mit 6oebbels bis 0um En)e =Buenos Aires: Durer (*/*> 41 ()%1 (01 .bi)1 ('1 Dietrich o2. cit. N TTTII )/'*-#8 441 )$0&%1 NG /)0( =IAG>1 (+1 NG )')) =IAG>1 (%1 N TGII 41 &0&1 (*1 N TTTII )$'/-#8 441 )&)/1 &$1 6ritHsche 84ruch7ammer broadcast of May % (*/( =Amtsgericht>1 &(1 6ritHsche 84ruch7ammer =Amtsgericht>1

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page_ 2 #age 00& &&1 N TTTII )$'/-#8 441 )$)*1 &)1 6ritHsche 84ruch7ammer 6ritHsche broadcasts =Amtsgericht>1 &/1 N TTTII 41 )%1 &01 6ritHsche 84ruch7ammer broadcast of :ctober / (*/( =Amtsgericht>1 &'1 .bi)1 broadcast of May &%&* (*//1 N TTGII ('+'-#8 441 /)')+1 &+1 6ritHsche 84ruch7ammer broadcast of 8e4tember * (*// =Amtsgericht>1 &%1 Gi7tor Maevs7ii ??Tovarishch /ichar) Sorge I in -rav)a 8e4tember / (*'/C The Ne, 'ork Times 8e4tember 0 (*'/1 &*1 N TGII 441 (/%0$1 )$1 .bi)1 441 (0/001 )(1 .bi)1 41 (0*1 )&1 .bi)1 41 ('(1 ))1 .bi)1 41 ('&1 )/1 .bi)1 41 (+&1 )01 .bi)1 41 (++1 )'1 N I "88F-/*' 41 )0)1 )+1 6ritHsche 84ruch7ammer August * (*0$ =Amtsgericht>1

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page_ 3 #age 00) (/ The :rganiHations Along with the men of flesh and blood who sat in the 4risoners? doc7 si< organiHations were accused of being criminalthat is the 4rosecution as7ed the tribunal to declare it a crime for an individual to have belonged to them1 These were the Feichs7abinett the 9eadershi4 .or4s of the #arty the 88 and 8D =including the .riminal #olice the 8ecurity #olice and the F8EA> the 8A the Gesta4o and the General 8taff and Eigh .ommand1 8uch a declaration would sim4lify thousands of 4ending trialsC even though the 4rosecution declared that an accused 4erson would be entitled to a hearing before a court and thus given the o44ortunity to show he had ,oined one of the 4roscribed grou4s involuntarily it would be 2rima facie a criminal offense to have been a member1 The organiHations 4resented a ma,or issue in the view of the 4rosecution1 Mr1 Dustice Dac7son stated ??It would be a greater catastro4he to ac@uit these organiHations than it would be to ac@uit the entire twenty-two individual defendants in the bo<1I ( The 4recedents for declaring an organiHation criminal were such laws as the British India Act of (%)' =if it were 4roved a man was a member of the Thugs he might be given a life sentence at hard labor> the American laws against the Bu Blu< Blan and the .alifornia Act against criminal syndicalism of (*(*1 Another American 4recedent was the law of Dune &% (*/$ declaring it unlawful for anyone to organiHe or 7nowingly ,oin any society grou4 or assembly formed to overthrow the Government by force1& 8oviet Fussia had laws 4rohibiting Icriminal gangsI that were directed against Ibanditry1I Fuden7o said that under 8oviet law a 4erson might be considered a member of such an organiHation even if he did not formally belong to it1 6rench law 4rohibited membershi4 in subversive organiHationsC and in German law too both in the -eimar 4eriod and earlier it had been

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page_ 4 #age 00/ a crime to belong to a secret organiHation that was antigovernment1 In (*&) for e<am4le the National 8ocialist #arty the .ommunist #arty and the German #eo4le?s 6reedom #arty were declared illegal1 -hat the 4rosecution was getting at was clear and 4lausible enough1 It seemed to the Allies that while crimes had been committed by individuals they had nevertheless had to act togetherC and on the basis of the evidence accumulated before and during the trial some of the grou4s these individuals belonged to were not much different from a band of thugs in India or anywhere else sworn to 7ill or des4oil their victims1 Ead the 8A not marched through the streets of Germany beating u4 and sometimes murdering their enemies yelling their slogans in front of Dewish sho4s holding their 7angaroo courts after the #arty too7 4owerO The guilt of the 88 the 8D and the Gesta4o too seemed 4atent enough1 These had been no ordinary organiHationsC the 88 had run the concentration cam4sC the 8D controlled the intelligence service within Germany and much of the e<termination a44aratus outside the countryC the Gesta4o was the very symbol of a terroristic 4olice force1 The #arty had administered much of the daily life of the 4o4ulation through the 4olitical leadersfrom the Gauleiter the Breisleiter and such eminences who su4ervised the economic and 4olitical life of their districts down to the Bloc7wart who saw to it that flags were dis4layed on 4atriotic occasions and noted who failed to hang one out or to subscribe to the +oelkischer Beobachter1 The Feichs7abinett had in theory for a time hel4ed govern the country as they voted unanimously in favor of the 6uehrer?s decisions and 4aved the way for his assuming sole 4ower =see #a4en .ha4t1 0>1 84earheading all the criminal organiHations in the o4inion of many observers both in and outside the courtroom was the German General 8taff1 An American Assistant #rosecutor Brigadier General Telford Taylor summed u4 this view at Nuremberg: These characteristics of the German military leaders are dee4 and 4ermanent1 1 1 1 Their 4hiloso4hy is so 4erverse that they regard a lost war and a defeated and 4rostrate Germany as a glorious o44ortunity to start again on the same terrible cycle1 1 1 1 -e are at gri4s here with something big and evil and durableC something that was not born in (*)) or even (*&( 1 1 1 The tree which bore this fruit Mhuman s7ins being used as lam4shades in concentration cam4sN is German militarism1 1 1 1 The first ste4s toward the revival of German militarism have been ta7en right here in this courtroom1 ) 8uch views were wides4read1 8umner -elles wrote: The authority to which the German 4eo4le have so often and so disastrously res4onded was not in reality the German em4eror of yesterday or the Eitler of today but the German General 8taff 1 1 1 the real master of the German race namely German militarism 4ersonified in and channeled through the German General 8taff 1 1 1 It is this living continuing

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page_ #age 000 destructive force that must be e<tir4ated if the German 4eo4le are ever to ma7e a constructive contribution to the stability of !uro4e and if any organiHed international society is to be able to safeguard the security of free 4eo4les 1 1 1 The German General 8taff is convinced that over a 4eriod of years it can gain a controlling influence in labor unions in chambers of commerce and through these channels an indirect influence in the 4ress1 / !ach of the organiHations in theory was re4resented by at least one of the defendants at the trial1 The General 8taff and Eigh .ommand had five re4resentatives: Goering Beitel Dodl DoenitH and Faeder1 The 9eadershi4 .or4s brought 8auc7el and 8treicherC the .abinet Goering Neurath Fibbentro4 #a4en and 8chachtC the 88 and 8D BaltenbrunnerC the 8A had a number of honorary members among the defendantsC and the Gesta4o was re4resented although inade@uately by Eermann Goering who had founded it but had been re4laced by Eimmler in (*)'1 The organiHations were sometimes ably sometimes windily defended in the latter cases with many citations from anti@uity and from Goethe1 They were assigned counsel mainly from among the lawyers who were ta7ing 4art in the defense of individuals1 !gon Bubuscho7 who was #a4en?s lawyer was one of three attorneys given the ,ob of re4resenting the Feichs7abinettC Fobert 8ervatius who defended 8auc7el a44eared for the 9eadershi4 .or4sC Eans 9aternser who was co-counsel for 8eyss-In@uart and 6ranH !<ner who re4resented Dodl a44eared for the General 8taff and Eigh .ommand1 The un4romising ,ob of defending the Gesta4o went to an able lawyer Fudolf Mer7el1 The German lawyers were faced here as they were in their other defense assignments with a tas7 of formidable 4ro4ortions1 They needed to get affidavits from thousands of members of the accused organiHations almost all of whom were in 4risoner-of-war cam4s1 Although the court did its best to 4rovide trans4ortation for the lawyers and access to the cam4s it was no easy matter to get aroundC in the case of 4risoners in the Fussian Hone it was sometimes im4ossible1 But the German lawyers succeeded in obtaining over )$$ $$$ affidavits1 0 Three thousand documents were submitted and &$$ witnesses heard before commissions or before the tribunal1L More documents than these were sent out from the 4risoner-of-war cam4s1 :ne of the lawyers told the court that he had been unable to get the affidavits 4re4ared in one of the cam4s because the cam4 commander said this would contravene his orders to 7ee4 the 4risoners from communicating with the outside world1 Nor could many witnesses be brought from the 4risoner-of-war cam4s in the Fussian Hone1 The orders of the commanders of those cam4s came not from the International Military Tribunal but from 4oints east1 :ne of the ob,ections the Germans made to the indictment of the organi- L These figures include the much smaller number of affidavits and witnesses submitted on behalf of the twenty-two defendants1

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page_ ! #age 00' Hations was the collective guilt it im4lied1 More than four and a half million men had been in the 8A hundreds of thousands more had been in the 88 some '$$ $$$ to +$$ $$$ in the 9eadershi4 .or4s1 A @uarter to half of the German 4o4ulation would be involved in the indictments Bubuscho7 4ointed out and under the Allied .ontrol .ouncil 9aw No1 ($ if the organiHations were found guilty the mere fact of anyone?s having belonged to one of them would leave him o4en to the 4enalties including death 4rescribed in that document1L The whole conce4t it seemed either was a regression to medieval notions LL or re4resented a wholesale ,udgment of the 7ind that the -estern 4owers themselves were condemning1 :f chief im4ortance among the tribulations of the defense counsel for most of the organiHations was the character of their witnesses1 8ome of them were ho4elessly bewildered by finding themselves in an anti-NaHi world1 :ne man a 4astor testifying on behalf of the 8A before a commission a44ointed to ta7e evidence declared that he was unable to say that the 8A had been anti-8emitic1 ' -itnesses for the 88 s4o7e of its belief in God of its high moral 4rinci4les + of Eimmler?s e<hortations that held the 88 to strict ethical duties such as said one witness former 88 ,udge Guenther Feinec7e the u4holding of the sanctity of 4rivate 4ro4erty and consideration for the religious conviction of others1 Now we 7now he said that Eimmler had another face which he hid from the ran7 and file1 But at the time Feinec7e and his comrades had thought only of the moral commandments that were higher than the law itself1% Another 88 ,udge told how well 4risoners were fed at such cam4s as Buchenwald AuschwitH and Dachau and how it was forbidden for guards to stri7e them1* In all the @uotations from Eimmler?s 8unday sermons on the word of an 88 man?s being more im4ortant than any signed contract it was not easy to recogniHe the 88 that subsidiHed the ghastly medical e<4eriments at Dachau or the divisions that conducted the massacres at :radour and in the !ast where eyewitnesses told of Fussian women and children shut u4 in barns which were then set on fire1($ The 8D too had its ha4less defenders: one man told of how it had organiHed meetings in Germany where everyone who came could s4ea7 his mind o4enly and where it was even 4ossible to tal7 of dissolving the #arty1(( Another solemnly swore that the 8D had never had orders to li@uidate the Dews1(& L .ontrol .ouncil 9aw No1 ($ was 4romulgated by all four 4owers on December &$ (*/0 to establish ??a uniform legal basis 1 1 1 for the 4rosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders other than those dealt with by the International Military Tribunal1I Membershi4 in categories of criminal grou4s or organiHations as s4ecified by the International Military Tribunal was also a crime1 The occu4ying 4owers in the four Hones were to arrest anyone sus4ected of having committed any of these crimes and to bring them to trial1 LL In the Middle Ages the inhabitants of a German town were all considered guilty if a 4eace brea7er too7 refuge among them and they did not surrender himC they could be slaughtered to the last man woman and child =Gerhard Fauschenbach er Nuerenberger -ro0ess gegen )ie Organisationen MBonn: 9udwig Foehrscheid Gerlag (*0/N 41 (%>1

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page_ " #age 00+ The 4olitical leaders too although some of them admitted they had re4orted on their constituents? #arty loyalty described themselves as humane fellows who 4rotected Allied flyers from the angry 4o4ulace who 4layed no 4art in the 4ersecution of the Dews and had 7nown nothing of the atrocities in the concentration cam4s but on the contrary had hel4ed out the families of inmates1 () :ne of them who saw the crematory ovens in AuschwitH thought them ??very hygienic1I (/ Asocial 4eo4le and delin@uents were in the concentration cam4s one man said and he had thoroughly a44roved of the Gesta4o and 88 because from what he 7new they had only useful 4atriotic functions1(0 The counsel for the 8A made their case on the large numbers who had been forced to ,oin the organiHation and on its ra4id loss of im4ortance after the Foehm 4urge1 :ne of the 8A lawyers Georg Boehm 4ointed out that under the German .ivil 8ervice 9aw ado4ted in (*)+ every young German official had had to belong to a #arty formation and if his 4hysical condition 4ermitted to either the 8A or the 881 There was no esca4ing membershi4 in the 8A for any student in a university or technical schoolC they came under the ,urisdiction of the local Stuerme and only after they had ,oined were they enrolled in the National 8ocialist 8tudents? 9eague1(' The 8A lawyers further 4ointed out that among the four and a half million members of the organiHation 4erha4s & 4er cent had committed the atrocities and contributed to the disorders charged in the indictmentin other words the 8A was a mass organiHation which thousands of Germans had in one way or another been forced to ,oin1 !gon Bubuscho7 a44earing for the Feichs7abinett told the tribunal that this was a wholly legal grou4 established under German law which moreover 4rovided for criminal 4roceedings only against individuals1 6urthermore the .abinet had ta7en little 4art in law or decision ma7ingC it had not been consulted when the Nuremberg 9aws were issued or at the time of the occu4ation of the Fhineland about which the Ministers were told only after the event1 The .ommander in .hief of the -ehrmacht could only attend meetings when the 6uehrer s4ecifically invited him and a Minister li7e 8chirach could a44ear only when some @uestion involving his Eitler,ugend was to come u4 and the 6uehrer wanted to hear his views1 Meetings became less and less fre@uent as Eitler tired of any discussions1 The .abinet Ministers 4re4ared drafts of recommendations to be submitted to Eitler1 These they tal7ed over first with their de4artments but there was no discussion of them in the .abinet meetings1 !very 4olitical decision was made by the 6uehrer himselfC the bills to be enacted were circulated among the Ministers beforehand but Eitler alone determined what was to become law1 The 6uehrer referring to the .abinet had said he wanted no club of defeatists discussing his 4lans and in many Ministries a subordinate might be entrusted with secret information furnished by the Feich .hancellery that

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page_ # #age 00% was not meant to be given the Minister1 Femaining a member was an em4ty honor1 .ounsel for the 88 8D and Gesta4o did what they could with bad cases1 They limited themselves to arguing against the notion of collective guilt =one of them said that had been the reason given for the re4risal murder of the inhabitants of 9idice> and to 4ointing out that many of the members of the organiHations had not been involved in the atrocities and that one of these bodies was often mista7en for the other since the 88 the .riminal #olice the 8ecurity #olice and the 8D all wore similar uniforms during the war and could only be distinguished by the relatively small identifying badges1 It was a wea7 defense and was made without conviction on the 4art of the lawyers1 The most elo@uent and telling defense was 4resented by Eans 9aternser on behalf of the General 8taff and the Eigh .ommand1 The #resident of the .ourt who was shar4 with a number of the German lawyers who com4lained about the trouble they were having with the Fussians or in getting co4ies of documents they needed too7 occasion to com4liment 9aternser as he delivered his carefully 4re4ared scholarly 4resentation1 9aternser 4oint by 4oint refuted the testimony of the witnesses a44earing against the General 8taff some of whom li7e the 88 Generals 8chellenberg and :hlendorf wanted to strengthen whatever case they had by 4lacing as much blame as 4ossible for the atrocities on the Army1 The Army had done its military ,ob 9aternser maintained and no more1 In the days when Fussian soldiers were being ta7en 4risoner in large numbers commanding generals had ordered their troo4s to share rations with the 8oviet 4risoners of war1 #lundering was forbidden in Fussia as well as in the -est and death sentences were carried out against soldiers found guilty of ra4e or mistreating the 4o4ulation1 The .ommissar :rder had been disobeyed in the only way it could be by being ignored and circumvented1L 6ield Marshal von Brauchitsch issued his Maintenance of Disci4line :rder on May &/ (*/( almost a month before the start of the attac7 on the 8oviet "nion1 It was e<4ressly designed Brauchitsch testified to mitigate the effects of Eitler?s .ommissar :rder which had dee4ly disturbed all the generals 4resent including Brauchitsch when the 6uehrer on March )$ had announced his intention to issue it1 (+ The Brauchitsch order which was distributed to )/$ commands =the same number that got the .ommissar :rder> told the commanders that movement L The order for ??the "se of .ourt Martials in the Barbarossa AreaI =Erlass ueber )ie Ausuebung )er (riegsgerichtbarkeit im 6ebiet GBarbarossaI> 4ermitting the German troo4s to ta7e e<treme measures against the civilian 4o4ulation without recourse to military courts and without necessarily being sub,ect to 4rosecution for any such action even if it had been a military crime was issued on May () (*/(1 The .ommissar :rder was issued on Dune ' as a su44lement to the order of May () =Buchheim et al.= o2. cit1 Gol1 II 441 (+'++ &&01 8Hymon Datner *rimes Against -O!As M-arsaw: Aachodnia Agenc,a #rasowa (*'/N>1

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page_ $ #age 00* and combat were the real tas7 of the troo4s and they should not conduct mo44ing-u4 o4erations1 "nder all circumstances e<cesses of individual members of the Army were to be 4revented lest the troo4s become unmanageable1 (% The Brauchitsch order was vaguehad it been anything else Eitler would have countermanded it1 Issuing vague su44lemental orders was the same method the Army used during the #olish cam4aign to wea7en Eitler?s orders that soldiers not be 4unished for any offenses against Dews1 The Army su44lement to the directives 4rovided for the usual court-martial 4roceedings in the event that a soldier had won any 4ersonal advantage or had enriched himself by any act he had underta7en against Dews1(* -itnesses testified that the .ommissar :rder was withdrawn in (*/& when General Burt AeitHler finally succeeded in ma7ing clear to the 6uehrer how damaging it was to the German causethe commissars naturally urged the troo4s to fight to the last1 No subse@uent evidence has come to light however to show that Eitler ever formally withdrew the order although General AeitHler told General Adolf Eeusinger in (*// that he had succeeded after a long struggle in getting Eitler to rescind it1&$ -hat seems to have ha44ened was that Eitler made use of a halfway measure instead of canceling the order1 The official diary of the Eistorical 8ection of :B- for May ' (*/& read: ??The 6uehrer gives instructions that in order to increase the readiness to desert or to ca4itulate of 8oviet Fussian troo4s who have been surrounded authoriHation is given tem4orarily and as an e<4eriment for a guarantee to be given in such cases that the lives of commanders commissars and 4olitru7s will be s4ared1I&( That was the )e facto end of the Bommissarbefehl1 But u4 to that time it had been only s4oradically carried out1 In the first months of the war field commanders when re4orts were demanded on how many commissars were e<ecuted often fa7ed the figures by using those for commissars who had been 7illed in battle1 8uch re4orts sto4 in (*/&1 The Army also resisted the .ommando :rder on such a scale that Eitler had to threaten 4unishment if it was not carried out1 This latter order was in another category for here one of 9aternser?s witnesses said what other Army and Navy witnesses also testified that he had thought it a legal re4risal1 The Army had 4layed no 4art 9aternser maintained in the e<termination of the Dews1 The !insatH s@uads were directly under the orders of Eimmler and were assigned to the rear areas behind the fighting front1L The authority of the Army field commander was limited to the Hone of combat which was defined as the front and a rear area of about ten 7ilometers =roughly as far as enemy artillery could reach>1&& Beyond this distance the 4olitical authority L Beitel?s directive of March () read: In the Hone of o4erations of the Army the Feichsfuehrer 88 receives s4ecial tas7s in 4re4aration for 4olitical administration by the direction of the 6uehrer tas7s which result from the final encounter of two 4olitical systems1 -ithin the framewor7 of these tas7s the Feichsfuehrer acts inde4endently and on his own res4onsibilityI =N TTGI //+-#8 41 0/>1

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page_ !0 #age 0'$ too7 over1L Most of the generals said they had 7nown nothing of the li@uidationsC the Army was res4onsible only for su44lying the rations and the gasoline of the !insatH formations that were 4resumably organiHing the rear territory for the coming civilian administration and also s4earheading the endless cam4aign behind the lines of the fighting troo4s against the 4artisans1 6ield commanders too7 action when they heard rumors of the !insatH s@uads? e<ecutions1 6ield Marshal von Bleist for e<am4le called the Eigher 88 and the #olice 9eaders to him as soon as he heard such a re4ort and told them he would 4ermit no e<cesses in the area of his commandC the !insatH leaders assured him that none were ta7ing 4lace and that they had orders forbidding any unduly harsh measuies1 6ield Marshal von Manstein testified at his trial that he had ordered an investigation and was told by his officers that the rumors were not true1LL 9aternser 4roduced witnesses or their affidavits to show that wounded Fussian soldiers were treated e<actly li7e the Germans and when infantile 4aralysis bro7e out in a 4risoner-of-war cam4 the German Army had sent a 4lane to the Feich for serum1 As for the treatment of 4risoners of war from the armies of the -estern Allies 9aternser 4roduced letters of than7s received by German cam4 commanders from former ca4tive British soldiers1 9aternser countered the charges that the German Army had willfully destroyed churches and historical monuments in the 8oviet "nion by bringing out testimony to the contrary that those that had not already been turned into museums and wor7sho4s by the 8oviet authorities had been 4reserved1 The Tolstoy museum at ;asnia #olyana as one e<am4le was not damaged during the fighting and German occu4ation1 8uch destruction as did occur such as the great damage caused at 9eningrad by the German bombardment he characteriHed as having been done under ??military necessity1I :n the high seas too 9aternser said the Germans had followed the customs and usages of war1 The Scharnhorst and the 6neisenau had rescued survivors of a British au<iliary cruiser the /a,al2in)i des4ite the fact that the shi4 had sent out a call for hel4 as she was being attac7ed and a converging British force might well have cut off the return voyage of the German shi4s1 L The Army made an agreement with the Gesta4o and 88 in late A4ril (*/( when the o4erations of the 4olice units behind the front lines were being 4lanned before the start of the Fussian cam4aign1 General -agner re4resenting 6ield Marshal von Brauchitsch met with Eeinrich Mueller chief of the Gesta4o Feinhard Eeydrich and -alter 8chellenberg of the 88 to arrange for the division of res4onsibility1 The Army was to feed and billet the 4olice units that would be used behind the front under Eimmler?s command but the Army generals had com4lete authority in the combat Hone =9eeb .ase TII 41 &(&) MGoettingenN>1 LL The evidence in the Manstein case is very contradictory1 88 generals said he had welcomed their coo4eration and while as 9aternser showed they may have e<aggerated Manstein?s favorable attitude he had certainly issued orders of which they could wholly a44rove1 :n November &$ (*/( he addressed himself to his troo4s insisting Ithat the Dewish Bolshevi7 system be wi4ed out once and for all 1 1 1 The German soldier therefore not only has the tas7 of destroying this system 1 1 1 he is the avenger of all the cruelties committed against him and the German 4eo4leI =N TTTIG /$'/-#8 41 ()$>1

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page_ !1 #age 0'( 9aternser tried to show and the American Army an) Navy %ournal agreed with him in an article 4ublished in December (*/0 L that the indictment of the German Eigh .ommand was an indictment not of the German Army only but also of the military 4rofession as such1 Generals 9aternser said do not 4re4are for aggressive warfare they 4re4are for warC that is their ,ob1 6urthermore the indictment declared that there was a grou4 or organiHation where there was none1 In Eitler?s time no general staff for all the armed forces e<isted as had been the case in -orld -ar I1 The Navy had no general or admiralty staff of any 7ind1 The :ber7ommando des Eeeres the Eigh .ommand of the Army had consisted to be sure of a .hief of 8taff and other staff officers but it was a 4urely technical organiHation and between (*)0 and (*)% General Bec7 who was chief of :BE was received by Adolf Eitler only twice1 The only thing voluntary about belonging to the Eigh .ommand :B- or to the Army General 8taff :BE was the act of ,oining the FeichswehrC after that an officer was 4romoted or assigned to a 4ost by his su4eriors1 And far from lusting after war as the 4rosecution alleged was characteristic of the #russian and German generals 9aternser 4ointed out how clearly eminent German generals had s4o7en against war1 Eelmut von Molt7e had called war ??the last means of the safeguarding the e<istence inde4endence and honor of a state I and had added: It is to be ho4ed that this last means will be a44lied ever more infre@uently with our 4rogressing culture1 -ho would wish to deny that every war even a victorious one constitutes a misfortune for one?s own nation because no territorial aggrandiHement no war re4arations amounting to billions can re4lace the loss of life and offset the grief of mourning families1 &) The ideal of the German General 8taff officer as stated before -orld -ar I by Alfred von 8chlieffen was the 4recise o44osite of that of the NaHis: ITo be rather than to a44earIto 7ee4 away from every form of 4ublicity to do the ,ob assigned @uietly and modestly1 LL 9aternser also @uoted Mac7ensen who in -orld -ar I had given the orders that led to the brea7through at Gorlice1 Mac7ensen said on the day the German forces attac7ed: Today my e<4ectations center around a murderous battle 1 1 1 It is e<4ected of me that I should win a great success but decisive and great successes in war are mostly achieved at the cost of considerable losses1 Eow many death sentences does my order of attac7 involveO It is this thought that weighs heavily on me whenever I give an orderC but I am myself acting under order driven by unavoidable necessity1 Eow many of the strong and healthy boys who marched 4ast me yesterday and are today L Mr1 Dustice Dac7son called the article a44earing in the Army an) Navy %ournal nonsense when it said he had sought to discredit the 4rofession of arms =The Ne, 'ork Times December 0 (*/0>1 LL 8chlieffen also said: I!ven a victorious war is a national disasterI =T!* 9eeb T 41 ('$>1

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page_ !2 #age 0'& on their way to the front lines will lie dead on the battlefield within a few days 1 1 1 Many of the radiant 4airs of eyes into which I was able to loo7 will soon be closed forever 1 1 1 That is the reverse side of a military leader?s ,ob1 &/ The Eigh .ommand of the Armed 6orces :B- 9aternser said was no more than Eitler?s o4erations staffC it had no 4ower to issue orders e<ce4t as Eitler directed1 Its 4ower and authority from the beginning were resisted by :BE as well as by the 9uftwaffe and NavyC only the 6uehrer held the reins1&0 The (&* officers the 4rosecution indicted under the name of General 8taff and Eigh .ommand were neither a grou4 nor an organiHationC they were the se4arate ??holders of the highest ran7s in the German Armed 6orcesI 4erha4s but they had to be sought out one by one1 They had no common denominator other than high ran71 They belonged to different agencies and neither before nor during the war did they ever meet together1 The 8chlieffen 8ociety also declared by the 4rosecution to be a cons4iratorial association of General 8taff officers met once a year to listen to a lecture and a re4ort1 Its 4ur4ose was Ito cultivate the s4irit of comradeshi4 between former General 8taff officers and those on active service I nothing more1 -hen from time to time Eitler met with the commanders in chief of Army grou4s the meetings always were concerned with 4urely military @uestions1 The commanders had no organiHed contact with one another1 Eitler said 9aternser had attac7ed the generals as an obsolete class that had failed Ias early as (*(/ I and only nine generals and admirals had held on to their 4osts during the entire war1 None of them had been in Eitler?s confidence and Manstein who had been told nothing of the 6uehrer?s 4lans had to 4re4are the orders for the march into the Fhineland only the day before it occurred1 At the time of the Anschluss the Army had been given no advance notice of the march into Austria and had no 4lans for one1 General Bec7 wrote a memorandum when war seemed li7ely between Germany and .Hechoslova7ia saying that Germany could not fight both 6rance and Britain and o44osing Eitler?s 4lans for a showdown1 The cam4aign against #oland came as a sur4rise to the Army1L After the cam4aign was over the Eigh .ommand o44osed Eitler?s 4lan to invade the 9ow .ountries and 6rance and although the Army believed that the war against Fussia was a 4reventive action it o44osed becoming involved in a two-front war1&' :f seventeen field marshals ten were relieved of their commands by the 6uehrer in the course of the war three were 7illed in the rising of Duly &$ (*// two were 7illed in action one was ta7en 4risoner and only one remained throughout the war without being sub,ect to disci4line1 :f thirty-si< generals twenty-si< were removed from their 4osts of whom three were L In Eitler?s view the #olish cam4aign was not a war but a Is4ecial em4loymentI of the -ehrmachtC he therefore wanted no 4reliminary ste4s ta7en to disturb the life of the country1 The Army mobiliHed in stages =-alter -arlimont .nsi)e HitlerAs Hea)1uarters 78F89? MNew ;or7: 6rederic7 A1 #raeger Inc1 (*'/N 41 &'>1

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page_ !3 #age 0') e<ecuted and two were dishonorably dischargedC seven were 7illed in action and only three remained in service throughout the war without disci4linary action1 &+ This was the grou4 or organiHation as 9aternser described it that the 4rosecution regarded as the longest lived and most sinister among the organiHations that was even now 4lanning new wars as it too7 every defeat as an im4ulse for fresh con@uests1 The tribunal was influenced only in 4art by the 4rosecution?s arguments1 The court held that the General 8taff and Eigh .ommand were not a grou4 or organiHation and therefore with some reluctance found them not guilty but made 4lain that its finding was based on this consideration and on the relatively small number of men involved who could be brought to trial se4arately not on what the German generals had done during the war1 6or it said the high German military leaders were res4onsible in large measure for the misery and suffering of millions1 It added: They have been a disgrace to the honorable 4rofession of arms1 -ithout their military guidance the aggressive ambitions of Eitler and his fellowNaHis would have been academic and sterile1 Although they were not a grou4 1 1 1 they were certainly a ruthless military caste1 The contem4orary German militarism flourished briefly with its recent ally National 8ocialism as well as or better than it had in the generations of the 4ast1 Many of these men have made a moc7ery of the soldier?s oath of obedience to military orders1 -hen it suits their defense they say they had to obeyC when confronted with Eitler?s brutal crimes which are shown to have been within their general 7nowledge they say they disobeyed1 The truth is that they actively 4artici4ated in all these crimes or sat silent and ac@uiescent witnessing the commission of crimes on a scale larger and more shoc7ing than the world has ever had the misfortune to 7now1 This must be said1 -here the facts warrant it these men should be brought to trial so that those among them who are guilty of these crimes should not esca4e 4unishment1&% Thus the General 8taff and Eigh .ommand were ,udged not guilty as were the Feich .abinet which the court said had not been an organiHation after (*)+ and the 8A which had been reduced in significance after the 4urge of (*)/1 The other organiHations the 88 =including the General 88 the Deathhead "nits the -affen 88 and the 4olice forces> Gesta4o 8D and 9eadershi4 .or4s were all found guilty1 The 9eadershi4 .or4s was declared guilty only in its u44er echelons of Gauleiter Breisleiter and :rtsgru44enleiter and the verdict included the Amtsleiter only when they were heads of staffs of the higher de4artments1 The court too7 4ains to 4oint out that guilt was always 4ersonal that mass 4unishments might not be inflicted and that 4unishments might never be greater than those 4rovided for in the denaHification laws of the four Hones1 The British Hone did away with the death 4enalty for belonging to an organiHation and 4rovided for im4risonment not to e<ceed ten years1&*

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page_ !4 #age 0'/ The evidence that has come to light since the tribunal handed down its decision does not seem to cast doubt on its verdicts on the 4art of any of the organiHationsthe Gesta4o 8D 9eadershi4 .or4s and 88 have fared no better in the ,udgment of historians since the trial1 It is true that many of the 88 men were drafted and some members of the Eitler ;outh were shanghaied into the Blac7shirt formations but the com4onent organiHations on the whole 4layed the roles during the war that the tribunal found them guilty of and the efforts of the former members of the -affen 88 to rehabilitate their organiHation as nothing more than an elite fighting unit of the German forces have had no success among either German or other historians1 The court?s observations on the German General 8taff and Eigh .ommand have fared differently1 As early as (*0$ when at the time of the Borean war it began to seem desirable to the -estern Allies to include German military units among the forces of the 6ree -orld strong revisionist tendencies develo4ed among Germany?s former enemies as far as the Army was concerned1 General Dwight !isenhower at the re@uest of #resident Truman ,ourneyed to the Bundesre4ubli7 when the reluctant Germans were debating whether or not to reintroduce conscri4tion to tell the German 4eo4le that its Army had never by its conduct during -orld -ar II lost its honor1 Eis was only one of the first of such official statements that were to be often re4eated by men who had fought against the Third Feich1 Much of the writing on the German Army 4ublished since the war has been influenced by the !ast--est struggle1 8oviet German !ast-Aone and other writers behind the Iron .urtain have re4eated not only that the German Eigh .ommand of -orld -ar II was guilty of the crimes charged but that members of the Eigh .ommand were now eagerly welcomed in the Bundeswehr where they were 4re4aring new aggressions and new war crimes and crimes against humanity1 But the record is more com4licated than either the new-found friends or the old enemies 4roclaim1 The subse@uent trials of the German generals held by the American Military Tribunal at Nuremberg as well as those before other Allied and German courts together with the study of documents that have come to light bear out 9aternser?s case only in 4art1L The generals in the first 4lace were a mi<ed grou41 :n the whole they were strongly anti-.ommunist and in varying degrees anti8emitic1LL Before -orld -ar I no Dew could serve as an officer in the #russian Army and although some & $$$ Dews were commissioned in the course of the war and )0 $$$ were decorated for bravery many high-ran7ing officers remained im4lacably anti- L The later Nuremberg trials including .ase No1 + against 6ield Marshal -ilhelm 9ist General 9othar Fendulic and ten others and .ase No1 (& against 6ield Marshals 9eeb Buechler and twelve others although called military were held before American civilian ,udges1 LL General -est4hal declared ??the Army was not friendly to Dews but was not anti-8emitically inclined I meaning one gathers that it did not favor active measures against Dews =Barl Demeter as )eutsche Offi0ierkor2s in 6esellschaft un) Staat 7:?$789? M6ran7furt a1M1: Bernard R Graef Gerlag fuer -ehrwesen (*'&N 41 &$/>1

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page_ ! #age 0'0 8emitic1 6ritsch who lost his office because of Eitler and the machinations of the 88 and who said before the #olish cam4aign he would serve with his regiment ??only as a target because I cannot stay at home I shared with Eitler only one sentimentantagonism toward the Dews1 )$ Anti-8emitism was one of the strongest bonds between 9udendorff and the NaHis1L Army frontline news4a4ers ran the same 7ind of attac7s on the Dews as did the #arty 4ress1)( Army commanders li7e 6ield Marshal von Fundstedt were careful to 4oint out that dealing with .ommunist and Dewish elements among the civilian 4o4ulation of the 8oviet "nion was a matter for the 8D and that soldiers were not to ta7e 4art in any atrocities committed by the "7rainian 4o4ulation or to 4hotogra4h them1 But that was allC the e<cesses were bad for disci4line otherwise they were no affair of the Army1)& Beitel obediently issued directives in the same language that Eimmler might have used1 8ome of the generals li7e 6ield Marshal -alter von Feichenau who commanded Army Grou4 8outh on the Fussian front and General Eermann Feinec7e who commanded the 4risoner-of-war cam4s during the Fussian cam4aign and was one of the ,udges at the trial of the generals after the Duly &$ attem4t on Eitler?s life were not easily distinguishable from the high command of the 88 in their hatred of Dews and .ommunists and the orders they issued were made in the letter and s4irit of the 6uehrer?s most vindictive directives1LL :thers li7e Manstein were caught in a one-sided conflict between their years of schooling in honorable warfare and L Bach-Aelews7i who became chief of the anti4artisan units and a general in the 88 first ,oined the Army in (*(/1 Ee had been forced he testified at Nuremberg to resign in (*&/ when two of his sisters married Dews1 Bach-Aelews7i was not one of the most reliable witnesses but this 4art of his statement could be true although what he was trying to e<4lain to the court was the bac7ground to his 88 career1 Ee said he had ,oined the National 8ocialists because he feared anti-8emitism might again ruin his career =N*A GI )+(&-#8 41 /&0>1 LL Feichenau?s directive of :ctober ($ (*/( read: The most essential aim of war against the Dewish-Bolshevistic system is a com4lete destruction of their means of 4ower and the elimination of Asiatic influence from the !uro4ean culture1 1 1 1 The soldier in the !astern Territories is not merely a fighter 1 1 1 but also a bearer of ruthless national ideology and the avenger of bestialities which have been inflicted u4on German and racially related nations1 Therefore the soldier must have full understanding for the necessity of a severe but ,ust revenge on subhuman Dewry =N IG 41 /0*>1 The order of 8e4tember % (*/( sent out by General Feinec7e read: Bolshevism is the mortal enemy of National 8ocialist Germany1 6or the first time the German soldier faces an enemy not trained merely as a soldier but with Bolshevi7 4olitical schooling which is so 4ernicious to the 4eo4le1 6or this reason the Fussian soldier loses all claim to treatment as an honorable soldier according to the Geneva convention1 The order then went on to say that rifle butts and similar wea4ons were to be used against Fussian 4risoners of war at the slightest sign of resistance active or 4assiveC they were to be fired on immediately without calling on them to halt or firing a warning shot if they attem4ted to esca4e1 IAs a rule the use of arms against 8oviet 4risoners of war is legal1I Fussian 4risoners were to be chosen by the Germans to act as a 7ind of 4olice and they were to be armed with clubs and whi4s which were e<4ressly forbidden the Germans as beneath their status =N TTGII (0(*-#8 441 &+)%)>1

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page_ !! #age 0'' an ideology to which they in large 4art subscribed1 Thus Manstein testified at Nuremberg and at his own later trial that he had ordered the death sentence for a German soldier who had committed ra4e in Fussia and the courtmartial of a soldier he had seen beat a Fussian 4risoner and that never in his command had the .ommissar :rder been carried out but he was also the man who had written that the goal of the war was ??the e<termination of the Dewish Bolshevi7 system1I )) General Ealder who was no friend of National 8ocialism but a member of the Fesistance nevertheless could calmly write in his war diary two and a half months before the start of the Fussian cam4aign: IDestruction of Bolshevi7 .ommissars and the .ommunist Intelligentsia1 The new states must be socialist states and without their own intelligentsia1 A new intelligentsia must be 4revented from arising1 A 4rimitive socialist intelligentsia is enough here1IL)/ General =later 6ield Marshal> Georg von Buechler commanding the !ighteenth Army in Fussia testified that he had never had the .ommissar :rder in his hands but the 4rosecution could show in his trial that if that was true he had nevertheless ta7en lethal measures against 4eo4le other than commissars1 Ee had ordered the e<ecution of anyone who could not 4lausibly e<4lain his 4resence in the area under Buechler?s authority he had used 8oviet 4risoners of war to clear minefields and he had issued orders that made it easy for his soldiers to tolerate such crimes and worse ones1 :n Duly && (*/$ he told his troo4s II as7 further that any soldier es4ecially officers refrain from criticisms of the racial struggle which is being carried out in for e<am4le the treatment of the #olish minority the Dews and church matters1 The racial struggle which has raged in the !ast for centuries re@uires for its final racial solution decisive measures carried out in an energetic manner1I)0 And yet Buechler only a few months before during the #olish cam4aign had ordered courts-martial over Eimmler?s 4rotests for those who had committed atrocities in the area of the Third Army then under his command1 Buechler a44arently had first gotten used to atrocities and then had come to a44rove them1)' In the autumn of (*/( when the Eigh .ommand discussed e<ecutions of feebleminded 4atients in Fussian asylums General Ealder noted that such 7illings were necessary1)+ This seems to have been the 4osition of the generals at the front who were mainly concerned with 7ee4ing the rear area free of trouble1)% In December (*/( &)$ to &/$ women 4atients in the 8oviet hos4ital at Ma7ar,ewo were li@uidated and the re4orts of such e<ecutions in the course of the usual Army routine would have gone to 9eeb and Buechler among others1LL The reason given for the 7illings at Ma7ar,ewo was the L Ealder was @uoting the 6uehrer when he wrote these lines but he gives no sign that he did not acce4t them1 LL The !ighteenth Army re4ort said that the commander in chief =Buechler> assented to the solution of the 4roblem of the asylum but Buechler denied at his trial that he had ever heard of the e<ecutions at Ma7ar,ewo =T!* 9eeb T 441 (&$$ (&$&>1

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page_ !" #age 0'+ danger of infection to the troo4s since no medicines were available for these women and diseases li7e s4otted fever were a constant menace1 )* General Foettiger commanding the 6ourth Army said in an interrogation on December % (*/0 that the troo4s in the !ast were told ??from the highest authority 1 1 1 to use the harshest methods1I "nder these circumstances it is not sur4rising that Army re4orts com4lain that for many German soldiers fighting the 4artisans Iit is second nature to go around beating the civilian 4o4ulation with a club1I/$ .ommissars and 2olitruks were certainly shot but officer after officer testified that the .ommissar :rder had never been carried out and figures they cited on the whole substantiate their denials1/( 6ield Marshal -ilhelm von 9eeb 4ointed out during his trial that between & $$$ and & 0$$ commissars and 2olitruks must have been assigned to the &$$ $$$&&$ $$$ Fussian troo4s who had been ca4tured within a short 4eriod at the start of the war and yet only *' were re4orted e<ecuted in accordance with the 6uehrer order and some of those had certainly been 7illed in action1L/& Nevertheless the men of #anHer Grou4 ) for e<am4le were told that they were not to s4are the bearers of the enemy ideology but to 7ill them1LL/) 9eeb?s figures seem far too lowC some have concluded that several hundred commissars were e<ecuted in the early months of the cam4aign1// L 9eeb was one of the generals who did not hesitate to ta7e issue with Eitler1 Ee energetically o44osed on :ctober (( (*)* an attac7 on the 9ow .ountries and 6rance it was another thing he wrote to defend Germany against attac7 and the Army was 4re4ared to do this =Eans-Adolf Dacobsen ed1 okumente 0ur +orgeschichte )es !estfel)0uges 78F8789$ MGoettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*0'N 441 +*%0>1 In a memorandum of :ctober )( (*)* addressed to Brauchitsch he urged that an autonomous .Hechoslova7ia be reconstituted together with an inde4endent #oland and that if 4ossible 4eace be made with the -estern 4owers1 If Eitler did not agree 9eeb urged that the generals commanding the three army grou4s resign in a body =Gert Buchheit Sol)atentum un) /ebellion MFastatt2Baden: Grot?sche Gerlagbuchhandlung (*'(N 41 &/(1 Dacobsen o2. cit1 441 %0%'>1 LL Before the war started commissars were believed to be the most fanatical 4olitical soldiers in the 8oviet Army1 After the fighting was underway their role was confirmed in interrogations and by instructions ca4tured from the Fussians by German units1 :ne such read: 1 1 1 The 4atriotic war is the most ,ustified of all wars 1 1 1 officers and soldiers must never forget that the great 8talin stands at the head of our forces no matter how difficult the situation at the front1 The whole 8lavic world unites for the destruction of fascism 1 1 1 The war commissar is the eye and ear of bolshevism and of the 8oviet "nion 1 1 1 the moral leader of his unit 1 1 1 the military leader of his unit ne<t to the commander1 It is his ,ob to see that all comrades and 4olitical wor7ers give a courageous e<am4le to the troo4s 1 1 1 Ee is an e<am4le of bravery and courage in battlethe bravest soldier in his unit1 Death or victory are the laws for .ommunists and .omsomols at the front1 The commissar and the commander are fully res4onsible 1 1 1 any attem4t to go over to the enemy is to be met at once by shooting1 The tas7 of the commissars and 4olitical wor7ers is to educate their men in the s4irit of hate 1 1 1 The commissars were to give daily 4olitical instructions to their troo4s and to organiHe 4artisan o4erations in German occu4ied territory =N: /+%/ MIAGN>1

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page_ !# #age 0'% 6ield Marshal Buechler wrote on :ctober &' (*/(: ??Nothing 4articular to re4ort1 8i<teen commissars shot1IL Army re4orts gave advice to the individual commanders that commissars who had torn off their insignia could be discovered because the 4art of their uniform under these badges was of a different color1 /0 Another bit of advice said they might be recogniHed by their gold teeth since only commissars would be li7ely to afford them1/' The 4reachments of the ideological struggle too7 effect1 An :BE directive for the treatment of Fussian 4risoners of war declared that the Geneva .onvention was not valid for the 8oviet "nion and that the regulations for treating Fussian 4risoners were entirely different from those for -estern 4risoners1 Military service for the 8oviet "nion was not to be considered military duty and because of the murders committed by the Fussians Iit is characteriHed in its totality as a crime1I Eence the validity of international legal standards said .anaris in 4rotesting against this :BE statement was denied in the war against bolshevism1 This he added Iwould lead to arbitrary mistreatment and murder1I/+ .anaris did not understate the matter1 :f the 0 +$$ $$$ Fussian 4risoners of war only two million survived1LL These included the contingents aiding the Germans: the Glasov army and the Armenian .aucasian and Muhammadan formations1/% #risoners died on the roads as they marched for e<am4le from Biev where '$$ $$$ had been ca4tured as much as a thousand 7ilometers to their 4rison cam41/* A critical Army re4ort had said it was stu4id to shoot those who could go no farther in the middle of a village10$ They died of undernourishment and of disease because the mass of 4risoners was so great the Germans could not ta7e care of them and because they were in bad 4hysical condition when they surrendered1 But they also died because of criminal orders and because large numbers were shot for breaches of disci4line or as re4risals for the shootings of Germans by 4artisans1 But 8oviet 4risoners of war also wor7ed for the Germans1LLL These were the ones mainly who survivedC for Feinec7e made it clear that only those who wor7ed were to be fed1 :n the other hand thousands of Fussians including 4risoners of war voluntarily retreated with the German armies when the tide turned L These are routine re4ortsC others read: IIn the course of the afternoon )$/$ 4risoners of war were ta7en away 1 1 1 sus4ected of being commissars I and I%$ 4artisans () commissars ) women were shotI =N:B&&'/ &(%' (0)% &(+*1 8ee also N:B- &$'& (&&$ (0)' &++( ))0)>1 Also N:B- ))(% +2%2/( demanding Ia re4ort on the number of commissars 7illed u4-to-date and further re4orts every two wee7s1I Also N:B- &&)*: I9eave 4olitical commissars aloneC they will be ta7en care of later by s4ecial commandos1I LL 8ome /+) $$$ were e<ecuted according to official German figures =Ale<ander Dallin 6erman /ule in /ussia 7897789? M9ondon: The Macmillan .om4any (*0+N 441 /$+ /&+>1 LLL The Fussians 4ointed out at Nuremberg that 8oviet 4risoners were 4aid half the wages of 4risoners of war from the -estern Allies wor7ing for the Germans($ to '$ 4fennigs a day instead of 1&$ to (1&$ FM =N TTTIT /&+-"88F 441 0(0('>1

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page_ !$ #age 0'* and the 8oviet armies too7 the offensive1 Thousands more ,oined the German Army as Eiwis =Hilfs,illige> hel4ers manning antiaircraft guns and 4erforming noncombatant ,obs1 Treatment de4ended on the local commander and the evidence is clear that thousands of Fussian 4risoners of war fared as well as the circumstances 4ermitted1 The Army in waging war against the 4artisans as well as against the regular 8oviet Army used as its orders demanded ??the harshest methods1I The bitter 4artisan war had little 4lace for any of the amenities of warfare in the -est1 #artisan warfare which was fought in the roads and forests and villages of the rear areas was usually conducted with mi<ed units of #olice 8D and -ehrmacht under the command of a Eigher 88 and #olice officer1 In cases where -ehrmacht units outnumbered the others an Army commander might be in charge1 0( German forces had ca4tured 4artisan manuals of instruction telling the units that any means were ,ustified against the invaders and the evidence the Army saw before them made it 4lain enough that the instructions were being followed1 #artisans had missions to infiltrate the German lines and to use women agents to 4ut 4oison in the Germans? food1 German soldiers found the bodies of comrades with eyes gouged out and of others who had been crucified and they reacted with fire and sword1 Gillages from which the 4artisans o4erated were burned down the male inhabitants slaughtered the women sent to wor71 The decision as to the e<tent of the re4risals was made not by a military court or by higher authority but by the troo4 leader of the action1 No holds were barred in the !ast on either side10& Dodl discussing with Eitler how to fight the war against the 4artisans said that the 88 had more e<4erience in these matters than the Army1 Eitler re4lied IThey do have the greater e<4erience1 But ,ust listen to what is said about the 88 because they have that e<4erience1 It is always said that they are brutal1I To this Dodl said IThat?s not true at all1 They do it very s7illfullyC they do everything with sugar4lums and the whi4 as it?s done everywhere else in the world1I0) In Dune (*/( #anHer Grou4 ) was instructed that if the Tilsit-Insterburg railroad line was damaged all the village inhabitants who lived along it were to be shot1 If any doubt e<isted in the mind of the commander sus4icions would have to suffice10/ A forty-five-4age re4ort of the commander of the Army 4olice of Eeeresgru44e Nord was made on Duly )( (*/& to Buechler and Manstein describing measures that had been ta7en against the 4artisans1 It said Gy4sies were a real dangerC if only some of those under sus4icion were dealt with the remainder would still be enemies of the -ehrmacht and therefore they must all be ruthlessly e<terminated1 This was in accord with National 8ocialist racial doctrines but Gy4sies were considered generally unreliable and li7ely to be used as s4ies100 As an ethnic grou4 they were mar7ed for li@uidationnot some Gy4sies hel4ing the 4artisansC Gy4sies as such10' The disregard of soldierly tradition was not limited to the war against

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page_ "0 #age 0+$ the 4artisansC Feichenau ordered that every man woman and child trying to esca4e from 9eningrad was to be fired on1 8ome of the Eigher #olice and 8D commanders re4orting bac7 to Eimmler told of their good relationshi4 with the Army1 :ne such re4ort of November ) (*/( called it ??e<cellent I but added that only the Dewish 4roblem was a bloc7 and that Army commanders had ob,ected to the transfer to the 8D of )'& Dewish 4risoners of war1 I"nfortunately I said the writer Ithe !insatH has to suffer more or less hidden re4roaches for their steadfast attitude on the Dewish 4roblem I and he com4lained further that one cam4 commander had forbidden the !insatH units to enter the transit cam41 A new order from Feichenau directed the Army to coo4erate1 0+ 88 9ieutenant General -alter 8chellenberg of the 8D declared his relations with the Army to be goodC with General !rich Eoe4ner they were Iclose almost heartfelt1I0% Another Ma,or General of #olice and of the -affen 88 !rnst Fode said at Nuremberg that the fact that Dews were turned over to the 8D was 4roof that the e<ecutions had the Army?s a44roval10* 9i7e the .ommissar :rder the .ommando :rder =see Beitel .ha4t1 * and Faeder .ha4t1 ($> aroused strong reactions when it was distributed =Fommel burned his co4y as soon as he got it> but here too councils were divided as to whether it was ,ustified or not1 Besselring testified that it had been carried out only once in the area under his command by General Anton DostlerC although .ommandos often landed behind his lines they were otherwise always treated as ordinary 4risoners of war1L'$ :ther .ommandos were shot however and many of the officers of the Army and Navy who carried out the order thought it ,ustified1 8ome generals refused to order their troo4s to round u4 labor in occu4ied countries saying they had more 4ressing duties1 But others 4articularly as the situation worsened too7 another view and the -ehrmacht in one o4eration 4rovided & $$$ troo4s to comb an area for wor7ers1 In all the !astern territory the 4o4ulation was re@uired to construct roads and defenses and in some cases the civil 4o4ulation had to wor7 an eleven-hour day1 '( Fe@uisitions were ruthless1 A counterintelligence =Ab,ehr> re4ort 4rotested the Army?s ta7ing the last hen and the last cow from the Fussian 4easants1'& The Army 4layed mainly a 4assive 4art in the roundu4s and shootings of the Dews in the !ast1 :n the whole troo4 commanders shared the views of the 88 although they did not li7e the way the !insatH o4erated1 .ommenting on the cam4aign against the 4artisans an Army 6ield #olice re4ort 4ointed out that Dews often denied their racial origins and a 4hysical ins4ection might be necessaryobviously to determine whether they were to be se4arated after their ca4ture from the other 4risoners and delivered to the L General Dostler ordered the shooting without trial of fifteen American .ommandos who had landed in Italy on a sabotage mission although they were wearing uniforms and had no civilian clothes1 Dostler was tried and e<ecuted1

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page_ "1 #age 0+( 8D1L Dews were not to be 7e4t in 4risoner-of-war cam4s1 -hile Army commanders re4eatedly 4rotested the brutal treatment of the Dews and sometimes too7 ste4s to 4rotect them when they were wor7ing for the -ehrmacht the Army officers in such cases were usually 4owerless against the 88 and the orders coming from the 6uehrer or from his a44ointed s4ecialists in solving the Dewish 4roblem1 In addition some of their own commanders li7e Feichenau told the troo4s of the necessity for ??the severe but ,ust retribution against the Dewish subhuman elements1I ') General Eans Foettiger who had been .hief of 8taff of the 6ourth Army testified at Nuremberg that the 8D units in the front areas where he served caused great disturbances among the civil 4o4ulation and 6ield Marshal Guenther von Bluge was forced to order them to withdraw1 Their wild7illing of Dews and others Bluge said so aroused the 4o4ulation that they threatened the security of the Army1 But such an order as Bluge issued was not long livedC other 8D units soon were reassigned on orders from Berlin1 Then too as the 88 General Fode 4ointed out had the field marshals felt as strongly as they later said they had about the o4erations of the 8D they could have made a united 4rotest which would have resulted in a change of missions and methods1 But the Army needed the anti4artisan units and although individual commanders ordered that the war against the 4artisans be waged no more severely than necessary it often seemed essential to annihilate an enemy that himself used the most atrocious methods of fighting1'/ -hen individual commanders ob,ected to the brutalities not much could be done aside from underta7ing isolated acts of resistance or ma7ing formal 4rotests1 General Blas7owitH in :ctober (*)* after the end of the #olish cam4aign wrote a memorandum to 6ield Marshal -alther von Brauchitsch denouncing the atrocities of the 88 and the 4olice formations in #oland and although Dodl said at Nuremberg that he had heard of the document he had never read it for it never got to :B-1 Brauchitsch did nothing about itC Eitler was merely irritated by it1 8ome months later on 6ebruary ' (*/$ Blas7owitH told his officers that the 88 and #olice had 7illed ($ $$$ #oles and Dews and the -ehrmacht was 4owerless to intervene1 Blas7owitH said the formations res4onsible should be sent from the area for among other things the atrocities were having a bad effect on the morale of the troo4s who oscillated in their reactions between revulsion and hate for the German authorities who were res4onsible1 Ee said the Army too had e<ecuted #oles L The Army also had orders to turn over any Dews or Gy4sies among its 4risoners of war or cor4s of military hel4ers to the 8D =9eeb .ase TII &*)% N:B- &0)0 MGoettingenN1 !1 E1 8tone ed1 Trial of Nikolaus von "alkenhorst M9ondon !dinburgh and Glasgow: -illiam Eodge R .o1 9td1 (*/*N Gol1 GI 441 (' ($0 ()) &+$>1 A re4ort of the 6ield #olice to the !leventh Army stated that four Dews were still living in the area of 8argil and the 8D had been notifiedC and another re4ort from the M#s of the same army told of the e<ecutions of twenty-five Dews and .ommunists =9eeb .ase TII +(&a N:B- (&%0 MGoettingenN>1

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page_ "2 #age 0+& but only for acts of sabotage or because they had forbidden wea4ons and the 4o4ulation understood the necessity for such security measures1 But what was going on under the 88 and #olice rule was something entirely different and such measures could never con@uer the #oles1 :n the contrary what was going on was dangerous for military security1 '0 Blas7owitH was not an e<ce4tionC a re4ort of the Army command at #osen in November (*)* ob,ected to the 88 interference with the administration of the area the senseless e<ecutions the 4lundering and the grave e<cesses1'' General -ilhelm "le< 4rotesting the 88 brutalities in a memorandum of 6ebruary & (*/$ s4o7e of the ??incom4rehensible lac7 of human and moral sensibilities so that one can really s4ea7 of a bestialiHing M+ertierungN1I "le< said the only way out of this unworthy situation that besmirched the honor of the entire German 4eo4le was to brea7 u4 all the 4olice formations and their higher leaders1'+ The German Army in its cam4aigns in the -est and in #oland had the strictest orders to follow international law and even its enemies ac7nowledged that on the whole it had1 Men li7e Blas7owitH were dee4ly affronted when they saw such atrocities committed in the name of their country and they too7 what measures they couldshort of resigningto have them sto44ed1 But as German lawyers were to 4oint out later the crucial fact in the assessing of res4onsibility for ta7ing 4art in a crime is whether it might have been 4revented and here the military commanders for the most 4art were 4owerless1 They might circumvent the .ommissar :rder but they had no 4ower of disci4line or 4unishment over 88 and !insatH s@uads1 The records are filled with 4rotests of the generals but on the other hand they are blan7 regarding further action1 -hen 6ield Marshal Fommel wanted to ta7e measures against the 88 Das Feich Division for the massacre at :radour he was told by Eitler that he had nothing to do with the matter1'% -hen the 88 Adolf Eitler Division shot Dews the Army commander wanted to ta7e disci4linary action against them but the division had moved out the Army re4ort said and he could do nothing further1'* .olonel 6riedrich Daeger who commanded the island of .orfu s4o7e of his abhorrence for the de4ortation of Dews that the Army was carrying out1 :n the other hand General "lrich Bleemann who commanded the German forces at Fhodes ordered the evacuation of Dews from the island to be ruthlessly 4ursued by the troo4s Iwith National 8ocialist Heal1I Because of the lac7 of sufficient shi4s to trans4ort the refugees they seem to have been deliberately drowned1+$ Dodl who disli7ed the .ommissar :rder when he first heard of it merely wondered if it might not be ,ustified as a re4risalalthough this was some months before the cam4aign against Fussia had started1 But 6ield Marshal Besselring for e<am4le could not 4revent the 7illings of ))0 Italian hostages in the Ardeatine .aves which were carried out on Eitler?s orders by the 8D1+( Nor could the Army command in northern Greece 4revent the 7illing at Blissura in May (*// of nine babies under one year old &* children of

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page_ "3 #age 0+) the ages of one to five and )$ old 4eo4le between si<ty and ninety after German soldiers had been fired on by 4artisans from the village and two 7illed1 An 88 officer had ordered Blissura to be ??combed through I and he later claimed that the 7illings had occurred as his 88 regiment reca4tured the town1 But witnesses testified that most of the 7illings had been deliberate and while a number of Army officers 4rotested when they learned of the massacre the higher echelons 4referred to acce4t the story of the 88 commander1 +& The authority for such actions came from the 6uehrer himself1 The Army 7new of the wholesale 7illings1 8oldiers witnessed them by chance and re4orted on themC slaughter on the scale of the massacres in the !ast could not be hidden1 Documents submitted at the later trials of the generals in Nuremberg showed clearly that (st Army .or4s had 7nown what the !insatH s@uads were doing and that Dews and Gy4sies were being Is4ecially treatedIthe eu4hemism for e<ecuted1+) A staff officer of Eeeresgru44e Mitte officially re4orted in December (*/( that the facts of the atrocities were widely 7nown and that the shooting of Dews 4risoners and commissars was re,ected almost generally in the officer cor4s1+/ A member of the German 6oreign :ffice also testified to the wides4read rumors of the mass e<ecutions that followed the ca4ture of Biev and he said that of course the Eigh .ommand had been aware of them1+0 General 9ahousen one of the chief witnesses at the first Nuremberg trial told the Allies that he had 7nown of the e<ecutions of Fussian 4risoners of war1+' Army orders had to be couched in the terms of the 6uehrer?s directives1 The enemy was to see his land and houses destroyed as far as they could be of use to him Ifor a long time I Eitler?s directive read and the Army orders followed it: IThe enemy must have only useless land that cannot be lived on1I 8tone houses were to be blown u4 the others burnedC railroads dams and anything that could hel4 the enemy were to be destroyed1 ++ General Feinec7e declared that bolshevism was the mortal enemy of National 8ocialism and anyone showing any friendliness to Fussian 4risoners of war should be 4unished1+% Feichenau in his order of :ctober ($ (*/( told his troo4s to use draconic measures and added: the feeding of the natives and of 4risoners of war who are not wor7ing for the Armed 6orces from Army 7itchens is a 1 1 1 misunderstood humanitarian act as is the giving of cigarettes and bread1 1 1 1 -hen retreating the 8oviets have often set buildings on fire1 The troo4s should be interested in e<tinguishing fires only as far as it is necessary to secure sufficient numbers of billets1 :therwise the disa44earance of symbols of the former Bolshevistic rule even in the form of buildings is 4art of the struggle of destruction1 Neither historic nor artistic considerations are of any im4ortance in the !astern Territories1+* Almost the same words were used by Manstein in addressing his troo4s in November (*/(1%$ An order of August + (*/( to the TTT Army .or4s

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page_ "4 #age 0+/ told the troo4s they were not harsh enough in their attitude toward Fussian 4risoners of war ta7ing into consideration their ??inhuman brutality1I %( :rders of a com4letely o44osite 7ind were also issued: General Eans Feinhardt commanding the T9Ist Army #anHer .or4s had his 4ro4aganda com4any 4re4are a statement on the I#olitical Tas7 of the German 8oldier in Fussia "nder Total -ar I in which he told his troo4s the Germans were ma7ing no war against 4eo4les1 :n the contrary Feinhardt said the Fussians must be won to the German side so they could be used against bolshevism1 Ee added that the Fussian was honorable in his character truthloving loyal and accustomed to sufferC that he bore with hard measures but he wanted ,usticeC that he was not for bolshevism but was a 4atriotic Fussian1 The Germans should not be lenient with bolshevism but the good Fussian was no enemy1 Feinhardt?s words came somewhat late in the war =in May (*/)> but commanders li7e him undoubtedly hel4ed to account for the thousands of Fussians who willingly retreated with the German armies1L%& The mi<ed story of the behavior of the German Eigh .ommand was of strict disci4line the following of the military conventions in conducting the war in the -est LL but of a very different 7ind of war in the !ast where before the start of the Fussian cam4aign 6uehrer directives demanded that the Army fight without 4aying any attention to the rules of war1 As German lawyers in later trials were to observe however neither in -orld -ar II nor in the subse@uent minor wars have war crimes and crimes against humanity been confined to Germans1 The inherent contradictions in the waging of modern war with its im4ersonal wea4ons of mass destruction and in the demand for absolute obedience on the one hand and for 4reserving some 7ind of human decency on the other have never been solved either by the German or by any other army in this time1 :ne German lawyer recounted the following incidents: in the wa7e of -orld -ar II when a Dutch unit o4erating against native troo4s was ordered to burn down a village in Indonesia and they refused the men were given heavy 4enalties by their L Feinhardt also used Brauchitsch?s order on disci4line to countermand the .ommissar :rder which he said flatly would not be carried out in his cor4s1 Eis immediate su4erior General Eoe4ner agreed with him as did Generals Eoch and "llers4erger 6ield Marshal von Bluge and many others1 =9eeb .ase TII &*%( and )))0 session of March &+ (*/% =Goettingen>1 Also T!* 9eeb TI>1 Feinhardt also ordered the e<ecution of three German soldiers who had tossed a grenade into a bun7er instead of bringing out the 4artisans who were hidden there as 4risoners of war =9eeb .ase TII )/+% =Goettingen>1 LL IThe 4eo4le their 4ro4erty 4ublic installations and the economy are to be s4ared monuments as far as 4ossible are to be 4rotected1I Troo4 commanders were to act ruthlessly against German soldiers? 4lundering and to assure the nourishment of the civil 4o4ulation and the continuing of economic life1 8oldiers were to 4ay in cash at local 4rices for 4urchases u4 to 0$$ FMC for anything costing more s4ecial recei4t forms were issued1 Ta7ing any goods without 4ayment was forbidden and was 4unished as 4lundering =N TTT &)&*-#8 441 &(((*>1

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page_ " #age 0+0 su4eriors for insubordination1 An !nglish 4atrol o4erating in Burma 7illed between twenty and thirty unarmed Da4anese 4risoners because to leave them unharmed where they were would have betrayed the whereabouts of the British troo4s1 The German lawyer 4ointed out the inconsistency between these men going un4unished and the case of the German submarine commander !c7 who tried to 7ill the survivors of the shi4 he had sun7 for the same reasonthat they would betray the 4resence of his "-boat in the shallow Mediterranean waters =see DoenitH .ha4t1 ($>and who was subse@uently sentenced to death by an Allied court1 %) Any crimes the German Army may have committed were matched by those of the Fussian armies and by the 4artisans fighting on behalf of their countries and of the 8oviet "nion1 A German lawyer who had studied the record estimated that the 4artisans committed several thousand crimes a day without telling how he arrived at this figure and that one of their own guerrilla leaders boasted that they had accounted for the deaths of more than 0$$ $$$ German soldiers1 The -estern Allies themselves were ca4able of a 7ind of warfare that was not foreseen in the Eague .onventions such as the orders given the British soldiers in the Han)book of .rregular !arfare1 :ne of the few international conventions that had a general observance was the one against the 7illing of 4risoners of war but here again the records show that not only the German soldiers in the 8oviet "nion failed to follow it1 !ven during the American .ivil -ar General 8herman ordered the e<ecution of si<ty-four .onfederate 4risoners of war after twenty-seven of his own soldiers had been found 7illed with signs 4inned to them saying ??death to the 4lunderers1I%/ As for the 7illing of hostages it is an old and de4lorable 4ractice but it is one of the few ways of 4reventing the 7illing of one?s own troo4s by 4artisans or other staunch 4atriots on the home front1 During the Fusso-Tur7ish war =(%++(%+%> the Fussian commander in Thessaly had the inhabitants of houses from which shots had come hanged at their doorste4s1 And after the close of -orld -ar II the 6rench commander at 8tuttgart threatened to 7ill Germans at the rate of twenty-five to one a figure that was u44ed to two hundred to one by the Americans in the EarH region of Germany1 At Feutlingen the 6rench shot four German hostages for the 7illing of a 6rench soldier1 In 8e4tember (*// forty German 4risoners of war were shot by the 6rench because a Fussian battalion in German service had allegedly committed atrocities and on the same day forty more Germans were e<ecuted a44arently for the same reason1 !ight German 4risoners were shot by an American detachment in the s4ring of (*/0 after an American had been 7illed by someone shooting from a house1 General Fudolf 9ehmann Dudge Advocate General with :B- told Admiral .anaris head of German counterintelligence that about ($ $$$ German 4risoners of war had been e<ecuted by the Allies and that the Germans had

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page_ "! #age 0+' to ta7e re4risals1 .anaris 4ointed out that this was illegal under international law but 9ehmann said some 7ind of re4risal had to be underta7en and when .anaris was given the facts he agreed1 %0 The tribunal?s denunciation of the Eigh .ommand went too farC it did not a44ly to many honorable officers who were ty4ical of the old General 8taff however well it fitted many of the others who shared the racial or 4olitical views of Adolf Eitler1 -hat they all had done was to serve a criminal regime with much the same devotion courage and s7ill they would have given an em4eror or 4resident in the tradition of a legitimate normal government1 They had given countenance to illegal orders as they had to the murder of 8chleicher and the humiliation of 6ritsch1 Many of them had refused to carry out such orders and many of the best had ,oined the Fesistance when they had to ma7e the terrible decision of conscience as to whether they would rise in time of war against a head of state who they saw was destroying Germany or to fight on only against the foreign enemy1 -hen they had acted against Eitler they had acted aloneC no gleam of ho4e came from outside Germany no German government in e<ile e<isted and the Allies would hear of nothing but unconditional surrender1 All that was left them was their own consciences1 8ome of those who had fought on ho4elessly until the end of the war were as o44osed to Eitler as those who 4lotted against him but they saw their duty otherwise1%' The landmar7s outside the individual conscience for those who resisted as well as those who fought on had disa44eared1 8u4erior orders were su44osed to come from a head of state who thought and lived and made his decisions in terms of the tradition and military code that had nourished them all1 But Eitler was sui generis a nihilist a demonic revolutionary a 4rimitive destructive force a man with no code but his own 4ur4oses and the Army had no instructions in its handboo7s or in its codes on how to obey and serve that 7ind of head of state1 The Eigh .ommand was a long way from the cons4iratorial grou4 of the 4rosecution?s imaginings but ste4 by ste4 it also moved a long way from the values of the officer cor4s of Molt7e 8chlieffen and Eindenburg1 The generals were caught in a monumental dilemma1 #atriotism duty and honor became li7e everything else in the Third Feich what Eitler said they were and how could they serve Germany against its enemies when its chief enemy might be the head of state they had sworn to obeyO 8ome of them li7e Dodl who had disli7ed or been s7e4tical of Eitler came to revere him for his geniusC others remained dubiousC still others wavered between belief and mistrustC and some in the end convinced of his 4erfidy tried to 7ill him1 But they all if one can s4ea7 of such dis4arate men as a grou4 were caught in a tragedy that was not of their ma7ing1 Their ,ob was to defend the Feich against its e<ternal foes and they had no ready wea4ons against its head of state and their commander in chief1 8te4 by ste4 they yielded ground to him and to the #artyC its swasti7a a44eared on their

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page_ "" #age 0++ helmets and its 4reachments in their barrac7s and in many of their heads and at the end those who remained ado4ted its salute and shared with it the destruction of the country they all 4laced above life itself1 Notes (1 N*A 8u441 A 41 &*(1 &1 History of &N!** 41 )$)1 )1 N TTII 441 &*/*'1 /1 8umner -elles The Time for ecision =New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*//> 441 ))%/'1 01 N TTII 441 (+0 &)*1 '1 Theo4hil Burgstaller testimony .ommission #rotocol Dune () (*/' =IAG>1 +1 6ritH 8chwaben testimony .ommission #rotocol Duly ( (*/' 441 (*&% ff1 =IAG>1 %1 Guenther Feinec7e testimony .ommission #rotocols Duly 0' (*/' 441 &'0+ ff1 =IAG>1 *1 N TT Georg Bonrad Morgen testimony 441 /%+0(01 N T9II 88-'0 88-'+ Georg Bonrad Morgen affidavits 441 00('01 ($1 SS im Einsat0 =Berlin: Bongress-Gerlag (*0+> 441 &*))%& 00(0/1 ((1 Eans Foessner testimony .ommission #rotocol 441 &'&$ ff1 =IAG>1 (&1 Eans !hlich testimony .ommission #rotocol Duly / (*/' =IAG>1 ()1 Bruno Biedemann testimony .ommission #rotocol Dune &+ (*/' 41 &$&0 =IAG>1 (/1 Albert Eoffmann testimony .ommission #rotocol Duly ) (*/' 441 &)'' ff1 =IAG>1 (01 !duard Buehl testimony .ommission #rotocol Dune &% (*/' 441 &&'$ ff1 =IAG>1 ('1 N TTI 441 /$%($1 (+1 8Hymon Datner *rimes Against -O!As =-arsaw: Aachodnia Agenc,a #rasowa (*'/> 41 +(1 (%1 T!* Gol1 TI 441 0(%(*1 N TT 41 0%&1 N:B- ))0+ =IAG>1 (*1 Dudge Advocate General !rich 9attmann testimony of December % (*/+ /&0+ Interrogation 8ummary =IAG>1 &$1 Adolf Eeusinger Befehl im !i)erstreit =TuebingenC Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*0+> 41 &*01 &(1 -alter -arlimont .nsi)e HitlerAs Hea)1uarters 78F$9? =New ;or7: 6rederic7 A1 #raeger Inc1 (*'/> 441 ('*+$1 &&1 N TTII 41 +01 &)1 .bi)1 41 0%1 &/1 .bi)1 441 0%0*1 &01 -arlimont o2. cit1 &'1 N TTII 41 %/1 &+1 .bi)1 41 %'1 &%1 .bi)1 441 0&&&)1

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page_ "# #age 0+% &*1 History of &N!** 41 )&(1 )$1 9etters to Baronin von 8chutHbar of December (( (*)% and August + (*)* cited in Dohn -1 -heeler-Bennett The Nemesis of -o,er =9ondon: The Macmillan .om4any 9td1 (*0/> 441 )+*%(1 )(1 9Jon #olia7ov and Dose4h -ulf as ritte /eich un) seine iener =Berlin-Grunewald: Arani Gerlags-GmbE1 (*0'> 441 )*%/('1 )&1 Document .T9GIII-)& cited in ibi)1 41 /0*1 ))1 N*A 8u441 A /$'/-#8 41 %&+1 )/1 Ealder o2. cit1 entry of March )$C (*/( Gol1 II 41 ))+1 )01 T!* Gol1 T 41 /(1 9eeb .ase TII &+(0 =Goettingen>1 )'1 Gert Buchheit Sol)atentum un) /ebellion =Fastatt2Baden: Grot?sche Gerlagsbuchhandlung (*'(> 41 &$%1 )+1 Ealder o2. cit1 entry of 8e4tember &' (*/( Gol1 III 41 &0&1 )%1 T!* Gol1 T 441 (&$0+1 )*1 N:B- &&'% =IAG>1 /$1 N*A GI )+()-#8 41 /&*1 N:B- &0)0 41 )% =Goettingen>1 :BE /%4age re4ort of Duly )( (*/& =IAG>1 /(1 General Nehring?s affidavit :B- )&/ =IAG>1 General Dessloch?s affidavit :B- 0$( =IAG>1 /&1 T!* Gol1 T 41 ($*%1 /)1 .bi)1 41 (())1 //1 Datner o2. cit1 41 +%1 /01 N:B- &&)* =IAG>1 /'1 NI ('$$ 8e4tember (' (*/) =IAG>1 /+1 T!* 9eeb TI 8e4tember (0 (*/( 41 )1 /%1 Buchheim et al.= o2. cit1 Gol1 II 41 (*+1 /*1 Duergen Thorwald !en sie ver)erben ,ollen =8tuttgart: 8teingruebenGerlag (*0&>1 0$1 0$( G . ($) 41 ()% =Nuremberg 8taatsarchiv>1 0(1 N*A GI )+(+-#8 Eeusinger testimony 41 /)/1 0&1 Dohn A1 Armstrong ed1 Soviet -artisans in !orl) !ar .. =Madison: "niversity of -isconsin #ress (*'/>1 9eeb .ase TII )+*0 =Goettingen>1 0)1 6eli< Gilbert Hitler irects His !ar =New ;or7: :<ford "niversity #ress (*0(> 41 %1 0/1 N:B- &'+& =IAG>1 001 *f1 Eans-Doachim Doering ?? ie Motive )er Cigeuner; e2ortation vom Mai 789$ I in +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 / (*0* 441 /(*&%1 0'1 N:B&0)0 41 )* =Goettingen>1 0+1 N: )(0+ =IAG>1 0%1 N TTTII )+($-#8 41 /+(1 0*1 .bi)1 )+('-#8 441 /%&%)1 '$1 Besselring hearing Duly ) (*/' =IAG>1 '(1 T!* A4ril &/ (*// 9eeb TI 41 &%&1 '&1 0$( G . ($) 41 ()% =Nuremberg 8taatsarchiv>1 ')1 N TTTG /((-D order of :ctober ($ (*/( 41 %01 '/1 N*A GI )+()-#8 )+(/-#8 )+(0-#8 )+('-#81 441 /&*))1

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page_ "$ #age 0+* '01 Blas7owitH interrogation of :ctober &* (*/0 =NA>1 Dacobsen and Dochmann eds1 o2. cit1 6ebruary ' (*/$1 ''1 N TTTG /(*-D 41 %+1 '+1 Document .TTTGI-(0 cited in #olia7ov and -ulf o2. cit1 41 0(%1 '%1 Desmond ;oung /ommelThe esert "o4 =New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*0$> 41 &$+1 '*1 9eeb .ase TII )()+ =Goettingen>1 +$1 Buchheit o2. cit1 41 &*(1 #olia7ov and -ulf o2. cit1 441 )00'(1 +(1 Eans 9aternser +ertei)igung )eutscher Sol)aten =Bonn: Girardet (*0$>1 +&1 N:B- /'* =IAG>1 +)1 N:B- &*++ =IAG>1 9eeb .ase TII &*/) =Goettingen>1 +/1 Buchheim et al.= o2. cit1 Gol1 II 41 )+'1 +01 Braeutigam interrogation of May 0 (*/% =NA>1 +'1 9ahousen interrogation of 8e4tember &/ (*/0 =NA>1 ++1 T!* 9eeb TI 41 )($1 N:B- ()$$1 0$( G . ($) 41 (%0 =Nuremberg 8taatsarchiv>1 +%1 N TTGII (0(*-#8 441 &+0+'1 +*1 N TTTG /((-D 441 %(%'1 %$1 N TTTIG /$'/-#8 441 (&*)&1 %(1 T!* 9eeb TI 441 '+'*1 N:B- (*$'1 %&1 9eeb .ase TII )/*+ =Goettingen>1 %)1 August von Bnieriem The Nuremberg Trials =.hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*0*> 41 &0/1 %/1 .bi)1 441 )'% )%01 %01 9eeb .ase TII %&*( =Goettingen>1 %'1 6rido von 8enger und !tterlin (rieg in Euro2a =.ologne and Berlin: Bie4enheuer R -itsch (*'$>1

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page_ #0 #age 0%$ (0 Two Decades 9ater The trial has left many @uestions unanswered1 -as the NaHi 4eriod as some Germans say an aberration of a basically humane and enlightened society or was it the final e<4ression of the furor teutonicus always latent in the German characterO -ere the twenty-two defendants tried involved in crimes s4ecifically related to German traits or were they li7e the accused before conventional tribunals guilty or innocent of s4ecific criminal acts that might occur in any countryO Is there or was there as some writers have alleged a 4aranoid Germany or a Germany dominated by a father image that made it easier for these men than for 6renchmen !nglishmen or Americans to say ??6uehrer commandC we follow I whatever the conse@uences to themselves or to their countryO -as the Eitler dictatorshi4 a 4urely German 4henomenonO .ould it have occurred in the forms we have witnessed anywhere else in the worldO .ould it have been 4revented had the o44osition been more resolute or given the German character and the e<ternal situation was it inevitabledid there have to be either Eitler or someone li7e himO To as7 such @uestions is essentially to as7 whether there is a fi<ed German characterC it is not very different from as7ing whether the eternal Dew e<ists or 4erfidious Albion or the s4iritless serfs of a Fussian state whether under the .Hars or the 8ecretaries of the .ommunist #arty1 And it is evident that what 4asses for national character changesC the volatile !liHabethan !nglishman bore little resemblance to the slow-4aced 4hlegmatic inscrutable Britisher of the nineteenth centuryC -ashington?s 6arewell Address was written for a different audience of Americans from the one that met in 8an 6rancisco for the founding of the "N in (*/01 The saberrattling 6rance

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page_ #1 #age 0%( of the Bourbons and Na4oleons could be contrasted a hundred years ago with the 4eace-loving gemuetliche Germans who 4referred beer steins to mus7ets and a variety of 4rovincial courts and customs to domination by a centraliHed Feich1 !very society has in it at all times negative criminal sadistic asocial forces1 -hat holds them in chec7 more than law and 4olice is the consensus of the societya general belief that des4ite everything wrong and stu4id and muddleheaded in its 4olitics the state is a going concern that will somehow ma7e its way into the future1 The German 8tate between (%+$ and (*(/ had such a consensus1 But the German society after -orld -ar I was sic7C it was 4sychologically bled white1 9i7e so many American 8outherners after the .ivil -ar millions of Germans were unable to digest a defeat that was made the more incom4rehensible by a warguilt clause in the Treaty of Gersailles that neither the German 4eo4le nor many future historians would regard as ,ust by the measures codifying international ??moralityI that a44lied only to Germans by an inflation that wi4ed out their savings by re4arations by unending 4olitical disorder and an economy that soon a44eared to 4roduce more unem4loyment than goods1 A Eitler who before (*(/ was the inmate of a flo4 house in Gienna was after the war listened to in a society of the disinherited1 A man li7e Goering no longer had a 4lace no longer had any 4ur4ose unless it might be to redress the wrongs inflicted by the Treaty of Gersailles1 The 8treichers e<ist everywhereand in a sic7 society they can flourish1 The generals and the admirals li7e the generals and the admirals of every country had the ,ob of 4rotecting their 4eo4le with the forces at hand and in the case of 4ost--orld -ar I Germany this seemed im4ossible without violating the treaty that was the cornerstone of a ric7ety structure of legality dominated by a 6rance that the German armies had twice defeated in the s4ace of less than half a century1 These military men were Germans and nothing they did as a grou4 seems very different from what the generals and admirals of any nationality would have been li7ely to do under the same circumstances1 As for the di4lomats only oneFibbentro4was in his absurd fashion a man of the revolution1 Ee got along well with his .anadian !nglish and 6rench friends before and after -orld -ar I and with Dews before he ,oined EitlerC not very intelligent but ingratiating and ambitious he would have done well selling his wares in any conventional society1 Neurath the res4ectable if unins4ired functionary of the 6oreign :fficeC #a4en the 4leasant well-bred o44ortunist who nevertheless s4o7e u4 at Marburgsuch men are in the foreign service of every country dealing for and with administrations of which they disa44rove and 7ee4ing their ,obs as long as they can1 The 8chachts and the 6un7s can only be brac7eted by their offices1 8chacht tal7ed the same language as the financiers of !ngland and the "nited 8tates and would have been at home in any foreign ban7 or chan-

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page_ #2 #age 0%& cellery while 6un7 owed his eminence solely to the revolution1 In the 6un7s we 4erceive the officials of the borderland territory that leads over to the 4urely National 8ocialist to the German 4henomenon1 6un7 was never more than a second-class financier who acce4ted gold teeth because they too 4assed for security in the ban7s of the Third Feich1 The Fosenbergs Baltenbrunners 8eyss-In@uarts were all fellow travelers of the anti-.ommunist revolution of a counterrevolution that too7 hold in Germany although it started in Italy1 They were international in their a4titudes and to some degree in their bac7grounds1 Fosenberg the Balt who may have fought in the Fussian Army of -orld -ar I was an ideologue not without resemblances to Eouston 8tewart .hamberlain .ount Gobineau and Eenry 6ord1 Baltenbrunner was li7e 8eyss-In@uart an Austrian lawyer but there the resemblance between the two ceases1 6or 8eyss li7e 6ric7 and to some degree li7e 6ran7 was a circums4ect man of law dominated by a fanatical ideology while Baltenbrunner was a man of the secret 4olice another international ty4e that is at home in the MGDs and the security forces of every totalitarian state1 As for 84eer and 6ritHsche they too might have o4erated in any society that offered them the chances for the e<ercise of their talents1 6ritHsche the 4lausible 4itchman needed mass medianews4a4ers and the radioto 4ersuade his audienceC 84eer needed the efficient hard-wor7ing German artisan to attain his most dramatic resultsotherwise he could be the technician the organiHer the rationaliHer of a wor7 force anywhere1 Eess and 8chirach both risen to e<alted 4ositions as a result of the National 8ocialist revolution were undoubtedly ty4ical 4roducts of its doctrines but they might have fitted into the 4attern of any ideological movement one the dour devoted logic-4roof a4ostle of the su4eriority of the Northern races and of the wisdom of the 6uehrerC the other the eternal boy scout eager idealistic when it came to Germans sentimental full of bad 4oetry and easy solutionshis 7ind too is international and when the 8chirachs are not 4art of youth movements they may lead church 4ageants or amateur theatricals or ta7e 4art in marches with u4lifting slogans1 !very country has its s4ecial brand of cruelty of brutality1 There are many ways to 7ill and to ,ustify 7illings1 The British and Americans for e<am4le have 4referred to use long-range methods of e<termination with their bombings of civilian centers and the hunger bloc7ade that was 7e4t in force after the armistice of -orld -ar I until the German Government signed the treaty that every German would regard as infamous1 The orders given the British .ommandos in -orld -ar II were as illegal and brutal as the .ommissar :rderC and it is not easy to see the German Army issuing a similar order or the 88 either because their own gangster tactics had to be mas7ed with elaborate moral im4eratives that tal7ed a good deal about honor1 The Government of 8oviet Fussia has also been the e<ecutioner of millions of its 4eo4le including officers of its 4re--orld -ar II Army not to mention

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page_ #3 #age 0%) the #olish officers who died in the Batyn forest1 6ew individuals in the 8oviet Army raised a finger against the dictator 8talinC the e@uivalent of the German resistance to Eitler so far as we 7now never e<isted in the 8oviet "nion1 The class enemy in Fussia has been as ruthlessly e<terminated as were the Dews in the Third Feich1 The #olish officers li7e victims of the -arsaw u4rising were 7illed because they too were regarded as class and ethnic enemies1 -hat mar7ed the German slaughter was its cool im4ersonal organiHational efficiency the methodical lists of e<ecutions the Gesta4o and 8D o4erations the com4licated 8tate and #arty bureaucracy that listed sorted catalogued and 7e4t such accurate files that almost nothing was lost from the 4lunder1 #ogroms racial murders lynchings have usually been s4ontaneous local reactions toward 4eo4le believed to be inferior1 In the Third Feich they were the result of a well-considered duly codified and 4aragra4hed 4ublic 4olicy1 -hen all the tu @uo@ues are ta7en into consideration it still seems that the crimes of the NaHi regime su44orted for some twelve years by the sacrifices and Treue of huge sections of the 4o4ulation were a 4henomenon not to be matched elsewhere in the civiliHed world1 -hile few of the defendants and still fewer 4ro4ortionally of the German 4eo4le too7 a direct 4art in the 7illings and only a small fraction of the 4o4ulation 7new about them the German 4eo4le all 7new that Eitler was telling the truth when he said that in the event of war he would not li7e to be a Dew in the Third Feich1 The Fesistance too it may be added was characteristically GermanC its idealism its willingness to sacrifice its careful 4lanning its obvious blunders its selflessnessthis was no ,unta as4iring to ,obs and 4ower1 The single-minded 4ursuit on the 4art of men li7e !ichmann Bormann Eeydrich and Baltenbrunner of their goal of getting rid of Dews was evidence of their fanaticismC and fanatics while not limited to Germans or Austrians have an easier time attaining their goals when they have the a44aratus of a devoted well-trained bureaucracy at their dis4osal1 It was above all the crime of mass murder that was being tried at Nuremberg and the 4ersons believed to be im4licated in it were not only the men in the doc7 but millions of their countrymen outside the walls of the #alace of Dustice1 Nothing li7e these beltline mass murders had ever occurred in the entire history of man?s inhumanity and the smo7e of the crematories covered the entire 4roceedings from the start of the trial to its end and beyond1 The other charges might have been dealt with in a 4urely ,udicial fashion had it not been for the mass slaughter of these defenseless 4eo4le1 -e have seen what role the individual defendants 4layed in the e<terminations but no matter what the degree of individual guilt or innocence these murders dominated the trial of the twenty-two and the attitudes of the 4rosecution of the defense of the ,udges and of the German 4eo4le toward the trial and toward themselves1 The defendants were deliberately

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page_ #4 #age 0%/ selected to re4resent what the Allies regarded as the high command of the NaHi #arty and 8tate1 But it was widely believed that their guilt was not entirely unli7e that of the individual German in the cross section of the 4o4ulation that served in the armed forces the bureaucracy the 4olice the 4arty formations the factories and on the farms1 It might be conceded that millions of 4eo4le 7new nothing of the e<terminations1 It was certain however that they all 7new a great deal about the 4ersecutions and that they nevertheless too7 arms against the world to 7ee4 these men in 4ower1 The trial therefore was the trial of the Germans1 #robably no army in history fought better than the German Army in -orld -ar II and certainly none fought in a worse cause1 6rom Norway to the .aucasus from the North Atlantic to the deserts of Africa the German troo4s battled with a courage and s7ill and fortitude that could be the envy of any military commander1 But they fought although they did not 7now it for nothing at all for a nonworld a diabolic and antihuman system that in the end following the orders of the 6uehrer would grind them down as sadistically as it would the Dews and the Bolshevi7s1 The German 4eo4le had shown themselves the wea7er said EitlerC what remained of them was not worthy to survive1 It is not easy to thin7 of let us say Italians or British or Americans fighting as des4erately in such a cause but to thousands of Germans it was not such a cause any more than chattel slavery was the cause for which the .onfederate soldier fought in the American .ivil -ar1 The doctrines of racism were undoubtedly widely acce4ted among the German 4eo4le although we have only the records of what they were taught not what they believed but it should be borne in mind that racism too is no German mono4oly1 The res4onses of siHable sections of the "nited 8tates and of 8outh Africa to the 4roblem of race are not totally different from those of the Third Feich1 !ven in the "nited 8tates thousands of Americans of Da4anese ancestry with the a44roval of the 8u4reme .ourt could be 4ut into well-run concentration cam4s during -orld -ar II for no crime other than that of being Da4anese1 And the hostility of millions of whites to Negroes as such is of long standing in thousands of non-Germanic communities in many countries1 Abundant evidence too lies before us in our time that the hostility can be 4roof against reason and the standards of morality that are otherwise firmly rooted in the society and that it can eru4t into slaughter1 8o 4erha4s we may say this: something not unli7e the National 8ocialist 4henomenon e<ists 4otentially in many non-Germanic areasC it is 7e4t in chec7 when the society is functioning when it 4ursues its normal unthreatened courses1 The fanaticism even of a final solution lur7s in the bac7ground latent ready to stri7e to s4read to im4ress its image of the 4ure society whenever it can gain enough converts and those may come when 4eo4le see no other way to turn1 #a4en Neurath Dodl Faeder

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page_ # #age 0%0 8chacht in the course of time and for varying 4eriods came to acce4t National 8ocialism although not until the alternatives seemed e<hausted not until Eitler succeeded with his legerdemain in winning internal and e<ternal victories that the 4arties of reason and goodwill had failed to win1 6or it should be remembered that only two contem4orary 4olitical systems have 4resented a blue4rint for rationaliHing the technological society with its recurrent economic crises and tidal waves of unem4loyment: communism and its mirror image fascismNational 8ocialism1 To millions of their adherents and to many observers who never ado4ted all their 4rinci4les communism or National 8ocialism 4articularly in times of de4ression and crises has seemed to have the answers lac7ing in the traditional societies they re4laced and it was not only the defendants at Nuremberg who believed that a leader of genius had at long last come u4 with the hitherto missing answers1 Eitler?s rise might have been 4reventedwe have seen the attem4ts at resistancehad there been more resolution and more 7nowledge of the conse@uences of his revolution on the 4art not only of Germans but also of the statesmen in foreign countries who made it im4ossible for the re4ublican government of the -eimar 4eriod to rema7e a viable and self-res4ecting Germany to ta7e its e@ual 4lace among the nations of the .ontinent1 It was for e<am4le the Munich agreement 4arado<ically the first serious attem4t of the victorious 4owers to remedy the inferior treatment accorded Germans in the 4ost--orld -ar I world that at a critical time 7e4t Eitler in 4ower1 Bec7 and the other generals tried to 4revent a war against the seemingly overwhelming coalition that would be ranged against Germany in (*)%C the cons4iracy was defeated by the Allies? readiness to concede to Eitler what they never had been willing to grudge in any im4ortant measure to his democratic 4redecessors1 -hen the Eitler in ourselves as Ma< #icard once called it is recogniHed National 8ocialism remains in its massive form a Germanic 4henomenon1 8imilar movements in other countries no more com4are with its wholesale 4rotracted assault on the -estern tradition than they could with the disci4lined 4halan<es of the German Army and the German wor7 force still struggling at the end toward no goal at all1 It seems im4ossible that a 84eer in the face of the bombings the shortages the ho4elessness of the strategic situation could for all his talent have organiHed the wor7ers of Italy or 6rance or the "nited 8tates or !ngland to 4roduce what he was able to achieve in the dying days of the Third Feich1 #erha4s he might have been able to accom4lish something of the 7ind in the 8oviet "nion or in Da4an where the habits of obedience and lac7 of criticism of authority are not dissimilar to those in Germany1 6or this is something which if not s4ecifically Germanic nevertheless clearly divided German habits of thought from for e<am4le the American cynicismthe Bron< cheer the ineradicable sus4icion that any leader is li7ely to have clay in both his feet and his head1

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page_ #! #age 0%' This @uality of res4ect for the Obrigkeit has changed in the -est Germany of 4ost--orld -ar II1 If after the war Adenauer seemed to have become another father figure for Germans he never evo7ed wanted or could have had the 7ind of syco4hantic hero worshi4 accorded many of his historic 4redecessors1 Nor has anyone else on the 4olitical scene during the twenty years since the end of -orld -ar II seemed ca4able of ins4iring among Germans anything more than the limited confidence Americans or British accord their 4oliticians1 The NaHi 4eriod seems truly to have been an aberration in German history a grotes@ue summation of a German national character that had never before had a Eitler as head of stateC and the aberration is not li7ely to occur again not in the !ast or in the -est or in any combination of the two1 No radical rightist 4arty in the Bundesre4ubh7 has been able to build u4 any 7ind of mass following or even to stay long on the ballot under the constitutional re@uirement that it 4oll at least 0 4er cent of the total vote1 The swasti7as that have a44eared on Dewish synagogues in -est Germany have been the handiwor7 of a few young hoodlums and any sign of anti-8emitism or of any revival of National 8ocialism is immediately and unanimously denounced by the entire German 4ress as well as by 4ublic o4inion1 A few ,ournals of insignificant circulation continue to ,ustify the NaHi 4eriod but both among the German youth and among their elders the 4a4ers have no influence and the number of readers to which they a44eal while showing s4oradic signs of growth remains a lunatic fringe1L The NaHi 4eriod was a time when the criminal 4sycho4aths too7 over and no one 7nows better than the German 4eo4le what its costs came to1 A trial had to ta7e 4lace for 4olitical and for 4sychological reasonsC what the NaHis had done was no matter of lurid 4ro4aganda li7e the stories of the 4riests used as bell cla44ers to stir emotions in -orld -ar I1 8hoc7ing crimes had been committed war crimes and murder on a huge scaleC the @uestion was how their 4er4etrators were to be dealt with so that victors and those of the van@uished ca4able of reeducation would see at long last that ,ustice was being done1 Admittedly the @uestion became more com4licated when the attem4t was made to create new law to try acts of violence that have been crimes for millennia along with acts that had never before been considered crimes and to try them before a court com4osed only of the victorious 4owers1 6or many the trial was faulted from the beginning1 8tate and federal ,udges including L In (*0* the total membershi4 of the radical right was 0' &$$C in (*'/ it was && 0$$1 Its chief re4resentative the Deutsche Feichs4artei 4olled in (*/* (1% 4er cent of the German voteC in (*0) (1( 4er centC and (*'( $1% 4er cent1 :nly in the local elections of the Fhineland #alatinate did the 4arty have a tem4orary success when in (*0* it 4olled 01( 4er cent of the vote and elected one re4resentative1 Ee was however defeated in (*')1 The vote in (*'' of between + and % 4er cent in Eesse and Bavaria for the National Democratic 4arty is the highest right radical 4arties have attained1 Its members are a mi<ed grou4 and have included even anti-NaHis as well as neo-NaHis1

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page_ #" #age 0%+ the .hief Dustice of the "nited 8tates 8u4reme .ourt were dubious of its morality and its dicta as were ,unsts and 4oliticians in the "nited 8tates !ngland 6rance and Germany1 L :thers saw in it the ho4e of the world the milestone of a new era the tablets of a new international code made 4ossible by indicting the worst of crimesthe waging of aggressive war1 8o confident were they of the long-range validity of the court?s findings and the vitality of the "N that many of them as late as (*0$ no longer felt it necessary to codify rules of war1 -ar itself was outlawedC how could rules be established for an illegal thingOLL ( 8ecretary 8timson in the Danuary (*/+ issue of "oreign Affairs wrote: -e have now seen again 1 1 1 what has been 4roved in (*(+that 4eace is indivisible 1 1 1 The man who ma7es aggressive war at all ma7es it against all man7ind1 This is an e<act not a rhetorical descri4tion of the crime of aggressive war 1 1 1 There was somewhere in our distant 4ast a first case of L .hief Dustice 8tone s4ea7ing of the 4ower of the victors over the van@uished wrote: ??It would not disturb me greatly if that 4ower were o4enly and fran7ly used to 4unish the German leaders for being a bad lot but it disturbs me some to have it dressed u4 in the habiliments of the common law and the constitutional safeguards to those charged with crimeI =Al4heus T1 Mason I!<tra-Dudicial -or7 for Dudges: The Giews of .hief Dustice 8tone I Harvar) La, /evie, Gol1 9TGII No1 & December (*0)>1 8enator Taft said much the same thing: IMy ob,ection to the Nuremberg trials is that while clothed with the forms of ,ustice they were in fact an instrument of government 4olicy determined months before at ;alta and Teheran I and he too ob,ected to their 2ost facto law =Desche7 o2. cit1 41 (01 The Ne, 'ork Times :ctober ' (*/'>1 Dudge Fadhabinode #al a member of the .alcutta Eigh .ourt and of the International Military Tribunal for the 6ar !ast wrote IThe so-called trial held according to the definition of crime now given by the victors obliterates the centuries of civiliHation which stretch between us and the summary slaying of the defeated in a war1 A trial with law thus 4rescribed will only be a sham em4loyment of legal 4rocess for the satisfaction of a thirst for revengeI =M1 #1 A1 Ean7ey -olitics= Trials an) Errors M.hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*0$N 41 &'>1 #rotests against the trials were also made by among others the secretary of the American Association of International 9aw #itman B1 #otter =letter to The Ne, 'ork Times Dune & (*/'> and 6ederal Dudge .harles !1 -yHans7i Dr1 =*f1 also Maugham o2. cit1C and Montgomery Belgion +ictorAs %ustice M.hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*/*N>1 :n the other side -alter 9i44mann com4ared Nuremberg with the Magna .harts habeas cor4us and the Bill of Fights: IA develo4ment in human ,ustice which our descendants may well consider the event of modern timesI =The Ne, 'ork Times Dune % (*/'1>1 LL The 4rinci4le that war is a crime has been discussed and a44roved in declarations in the "nited Nations but there the matter rests1 :n December (( (*/' the General Assembly of the "N voted unanimously that it affirms the 4rinci4les of international law recogniHed by the .harter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and the ,udgment of the TribunalC Directs the .ommittee on the codification of international law 1 1 1 to treat as a matter of 4rimary im4ortance for the formulation in the conte<t of a general codification of offenses against the 4eace and security of man7ind or of an international criminal code of the 4rinci4les recogniHed in the charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal and in the ,udgment of the Tribunal1 =History of the &nite) Nations !ar *rimes *ommission M9ondon: E1 M1 8tationery :ffice (*/%N 41 &'$>1

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page_ ## #age 0%% murder 1 1 1 The charge of aggressive war is unsound therefore only if the community of nations did not believe in (*)* that aggressive war was an offense1 Merely to ma7e such a suggestion however is to discard it 1 1 1 That only eight of the twenty-two defendants had been found guilty of cons4iracy seemed sur4rising to him and he added that the atomic bomb had been used by the "nited 8tates to save lives not only of our troo4s but of the enemy as well1 & In (*/% the members of the International 9aw .ommittee of the "N were given the tas7 of carrying out the December (*/' vote of the Assembly to formulate the findings of Nuremberg and in (*0$ they 4roduced seven 4rinci4les which the committee em4hasiHed were merely formulations and were not to be ta7en as an attem4t to evaluate the Nuremberg 4rinci4les in the light of international law1 The General Assembly agreed1 8ubse@uent attem4ts to define such offenses have been no more concrete1 :n Danuary &( (*0( the Genocide .onvention came into effect1 This convention for the 4revention and 4unishment of mass murders had been unanimously ado4ted by the General Assembly on December * (*/% but it was a statement of 4rinci4le only1 The detection and 4unishment of any malefactor is left for the signatory 4owers to arrange1 And neither in the (*0' re4ort of the 84ecial .ommittee on the Suestion of Defining Aggression nor in any subse@uent attem4t to deal with the matter has the "nited Nations succeeded in coming u4 with a definition of aggression1) Des4ite many eu4horic views li7e those of Mr1 8timson the e<istence of armed conflicts following -orld -ar II was unmista7able whether they were called limited wars or 4olice actions1 Behind the forms of hostilities was the s4ecter of another war different from any of these and from any in the 4ast a war served by com4uters and waged by missiles that would attac7 entire 4o4ulations1 As one international lawyer observed: ??:ne must as7 oneself whether the revolution in the nature of war by the new wea4ons will not mean only the disa44earance of the laws of war but in its conse@uence a ra4id fall of the whole law of nations1I/ A committee of the International Fed .ross in (*0( found that many of the 4rovisions of the Eague .onventions were no longer a44licable and a committee of the American 8ociety of International 9aw in (*0& declared the laws of war to be in Ia chaotic state1I0 Three of the 4risoner-of-war conventions ado4ted in Geneva in (*/* came to be @uestioned within a year for as the Borean war showed 4risoners of war in ideological conflicts may have uses for the belligerent nations long after active hostilities have ceased for the ca4tives1 .hinese .ommunist and North Borean soldiers after being made 4risoners staged riots in their detention cam4s1 .a4tured American soldiers were 4ut under 4hysical and 4sychological Ireeducation 4rocessesI to ma7e them denounce their own country and its allegedly inhu-

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page_ #$ #age 0%* man methods of warfare1 Nor is it easy under conditions of modern warfare to find a 4rotecting 4ower satisfactory to both sides to oversee the treatment of 4risoners of war1 .ommunist countries @uestion the im4artiality of the Fed .ross which they regard as a tool of the -est1 ' 8ince 6ebruary (*0' the "nited 8tates has been bound by four multilateral treaties drawn u4 in (*/*1 Their 4rovisions are incor4orated in the American Army "iel) Manual of (*0' which 4rovides that hostages may not be ta7enC re4risals may be ta7en only against enemy soldiers who have not yet been made 4risonersC 4artisans and members of the Fesistance are accorded a legal status if they can be readily identified carry arms o4enly and conduct their o4erations in accordance with the laws and customs of warC medical su44lies and essential food for children may not be sub,ect to bloc7adeC only the civilian 4o4ulation over eighteen may be forced to wor7 and then only within the occu4ied territory on essential tas7s for the occu4ying 4ower on 4ublic utilities or in other wor7 on behalf of the 4o4ulation1 .ivilians may not be sent outside their own country e<ce4t for their own security or for im4erative military reasons1 #risoners of war may not be 7illed because a danger e<ists that they may be freed by their own troo4s or because they hinder the movements of the forces that ca4tured them1 Ta<es are to be levied against the enemy 4o4ulation to 4ay for the costs of occu4ation onlythe occu4ying 4ower is not to ta< to enrich itself1 In these laws of warfare no attem4t was made to ban new wea4onsC the bombardment of undefended 4laces is 4rohibited but if a city or town is surrounded by detached defense 4ositions or has soldiers in it or 4assing through it it is not considered undefended1 In other words in 4ractice little or no distinction is made between combatants and noncombatants in conducting bombing o4erations1+ Nevertheless on the whole these are humanitarian conventions that if followed would ameliorate the lot of both civilian 4o4ulations and 4risoners of war1 In addition with the 4roblem of su4erior orders in mind both the American and the British military manuals declare that a soldier is obliged to obey lawful orders only1% The -est German .onstitution or Basic 9aw declares in Article &0 that international law is 4art of German 6ederal 9aw1 No order is to be carried out in the Army of the Bundesre4ubli7 if it would lead to the committing of a crime or a transgression1 In the 8oviet "nion a soldier has the right to com4lain to his su4eriors if he receives an order he deems unlawfulC he incurs no res4onsibility for an unlawful order issued by an officerC the res4onsibility is that of the officer alone unless the order is clearly criminal in which case both the soldier and the officer are res4onsible1 As for the resort to war the two worlds.ommunist and non-.ommunistremain divided1 6or the .ommunists any war of ??national liberationI

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page_ $0 #age 0*$ is a ??,ust war I as is any war in which a .ommunist country is engaged1L The aggressor is identified well ahead of time and the war criminals are its heads of state and government1 8o far the -estern 4owers have succeeded in using the counterformulas of Nuremberg only in isolated cases1 During the Borean war and the fortuitous absence of the 8oviet "nion from the 8ecurity .ouncil members of the "nited Nations sent troo4s to aid the American and 8outh Borean forcesC but the troo4s fought under an American commander and not as an army re4resenting a su4ranational organiHation bent on subduing an illegal attac71 In general ma,or conflicts remain non,usticiable1 The recurrent flare-u4s over Berlin the .uban crisis and the fighting in Gietnam are in a different category from border dis4utes between India and #a7istan Arab-Israeli incidents and civil war in the .ongo1 The difference lies in how dee4ly the ma,or 4owers es4ecially the 8oviet "nion and the "nited 8tates are involved1 In ma,or conflicts it is obviously true that to be successfully indicted an aggressor or a war criminal one must first lose the war1 No victor is li7ely to call himself by such names or to submit to an international court =nor does one e<ist> where he would be answerable to such chargesthe aggressors must be members of the defeated nation1 This holds true for the commission of war crimes and crimes against humanityC such crimes can only be committed by members of the losing side1 -ho other than the victor is to ,udge themO 8ince the end of the various trials of the Germans and Da4anese no one has been haled before an international tribunal for any of the delicts 4unished at Nuremberg although in the last twenty years the world has not been lac7ing in armed conflicts and atrocities1 The trials that have ta7en 4lace have been held under the aus4ices of 4owers that have held 4risoners and could enforce their own notions of guilt and innocence1 In these latter years it would be difficult to find many cases in which accused enemies were found not guilty1 As for the basic crime the German 6ederal Fe4ublic declares in its constitution that 4re4arations for aggressive war are illegal and are to be 4unished1 There the matter rests as it does in the "N1 In its legal statutes the Bundesre4ubli7 has made no 4rovision for 4unishing whoever might be 4lotting aggression1 In 4lace of the legally undefinable word a committee on international and foreign law of the #hiladel4hia Bar Association has L 9enin called -orld -ar I an im4erialist war on both sides1 IIt is unavoidable I he wrote Ithat im4erialism must often create national warsI =.m2erialism as the Highest Stage of *a2italism (*(' .ollected -or7s MMoscow (*/'N 41 %0$>1 In November (*/* 8oviet 6oreign Minister Gyshins7y told the "nited Nations that war was inevitable in ca4italist im4erialist countries but Ithe 4ower of the solidarity of the 4eace loving countries is ca4able 1 1 1 of rescuing the world from this terrible catastro4heI =Desche7 o2. cit1 41 &&+>1 Des4ite the 4ost-8talin doctrine of 4eaceful coe<istence the same denunciations have recurred in every case where the "nited 8tates whether in .uba or Africa or Asia has o44osed 8oviet 4olicy =cf1 Feinhart Maurach ie (riegsverbrecher2ro0esse gegen )eutsche 6efangene in )er So,>etunion MEamburg: Arbeitsgemeinschaft vom Foten BreuH in Deutschland (*0$N>1

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page_ $1 #age 0*( suggested that the term ??aggressorI be abandoned and an effort made to define as a crime against the 4eo4le of the world the attem4t to do bodily harm to those individuals outside areas governed by the accused1 * In short no international instrument whether court or 4olice 4ower e<ists that may be said to carry out the doctrines of the Nuremberg tribunal and their reaffirmation by the "nited Nations1 The "N .harter 4rovides that only states may be 4arties before the International .ourt of Dustice1 The German lawyers at Nuremberg held the same view and they still do1 No individual they said could commit a crime against international law which is binding u4on states1 An individual could only commit a crime under munici4al law for which statutes and 4enalties and means of enforcement e<ist and it was the munici4al law of his own country that could be invo7ed against him if he refused to serve in its armed forces because he thought his government an aggressor1($ In addition one of the 4oints re4eatedly made by the German defense lawyers at the trial seems to be substantiated by the Declaration of Euman Fights ado4ted by the General Assembly of the "nited Nations on December ($ (*/%1 It reads: INo one shall be held guilty of any 4enal offense on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a 4enal offense under national or international law at the time when it was committed1 Nor shall a heavier 4enalty be im4osed than the one that was a44licable at the time the 4enal offense was committed1I -hatever else may be said of the Bellogg-Briand #act which the German defendants were accused of having violated there was nothing in it or in any national legislation or other treaty that made its violation the 4enal offense of an individual1 ;et aggression remains with us1 The word is still 4art of the language of statesmen 4ublicists and commentators1 #ublic o4inion which is an essential under4inning for modern war even of the limited variety we have seen 4racticed in the 4ast twenty years still ma7es use of the conce4t of aggressor and still demands that the enemy be so stigmatiHed1 And in an era when one bomb carries three times more destructive 4ower than all the e<4losives used during -orld -ar II more than forensic debate is involved1 By (*/* Mr1 Dustice Dac7son himself had come to e<4ress some doubts of what had been accom4lished at Nuremberg1(( But the general revulsion to war all over the globe was such that governments had to ,ustify an armed conflict as a war of defense a war against im4erialism or in,usticenever as a war for Lebensraum or glory1 Thus Nuremberg was attem4ting to say something that was universally felt was trying to reify to codify to ma7e 4lain in some sense that war for millions of 4eo4le had another meaning from what it had in 4ast centuries1 -ar had become very different from the 7ind of conflict Gattel described in the eighteenth century: IAt the 4resent day war is carried on by the regular armiesC the 4eo4le the 4easantry the townsfol7 have nothing to fear from the sword of the enemy1I (& The tribunal was doubtless not the best forum to establish the rules for a

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page_ $2 #age 0*& new order1 The victors ,udging the van@uished accusing them of crimes which in some cases had been 4artici4ated in by one of the countries re4resented on the bench and which in others =the Batyn murders> had been committed by it did not have the moral or ,udicial stature to command the long-term res4ect of ,urists and 4ublic o4inion throughout the world1 At its best in the 4erson es4ecially of the #resident of the .ourt the tribunal could demonstrate a remar7able fairness and a fine show of legal forms but in the treatment of the defendants and their counsel it was often evident that a long bitter war had ,ust ended between the countries re4resented by the 4rosecution and the ,udges and the country re4resented by the defeated1 A few months after the end of a war it was humanly im4ossible to hold trials that would be convincing in their manifest ,ustice to the van@uished as well as to the victors and to later generations1 And yet what in an im4erfect world was to be doneO To have added neutrals to the bench would have strengthened the authority of the court although it might not have affected the verdicts substantially1 !veryone 7new by (*/0 of the mass murders and the war crimes committed by the National 8ocialist Government1 9ess was 7nown of the crimes committed by the Allies1 But in what never-never land could the men who fought against Eitler?s tyranny and his gas chambers be held to account for the manner in which they had won the warO The bombing of Dresden to ta7e an e<am4le was undoubtedly an atrocitybut before what court would -inston .hurchill be tried for having 4ermitted the attac7O Eiroshima it may be well argued too was an atrocity and if not Eiroshima then certainly the bomb thrown over Nagasa7i when Da4an and all the rest of the world 7new that the "nited 8tates had the atomic wea4on and the means of using it1 In the cases of both Dresden and these Da4anese cities the attac7s occurred when the war was won1 .ould Messrs1 Truman and 8timson be haled before any court for these actsO And if they should have been before what courtO And what 4recedents or 4rinci4les might have allowed the victors to 4unish their own leaders des4ite the crimes of the enemyO In a world of mi<ed human affairs where a rough ,ustice is done that is better than lynching or being shot out of hand Nuremberg may be defended as a 4olitical event if not as a court1 6or one thing it brought documents and witnesses to light that succeeded in convincing some of the defendants that they had been serving a criminal regime far worse than anything they had ever 7nown or e<4ected to 7now1 It caused Eans 6ran7 to say that a thousand years would 4ass and the guilt of Germany would not be erased and this was done by submitting evidencenot by the rhetorical flights of the 4remature one-worlders but by the testimony of witnesses and the accumulation of thousands of documents that made a legal case against many of the defendants1 8ome of the sentences as we have seen seem too severe and in the case of the men who were e<ecuted they were irreversible1 Nor were the long years s4ent in 84andau to be restored to those who were given

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page_ $3 #age 0*) dis4ro4ortionate ,ail sentences1 And yet unfair as these sentences too may have been they still com4are favorably with those meted out to innocent 4eo4le by the regime these men served to be sure some of them blindly and served well1 It is out of such records that the estate not only of Germans but of other 4eo4les as well may be reevaluated1 The lot of a man under a dictatorshi4 demands both more and less of him than in the free worldless if he goes along and acce4ts his assignments of duty and obedienceC more far more if he resists and thereby ris7s everything to let his conscience s4ea71 Not many of the men whose careers we have reviewed resisted1 The generals remained generals carrying out their ordersC the functionaries did their ,obs some of them with a 4assion beyond the call of duty some of them reluctantly when they disagreed1 It is interesting to s4eculate on whether their successors of any nationality may act differently1 During the late Algerian war where atrocities were by no means lac7ing a number of high 6rench officers resigned rather than carry out their orders1 This was 4erha4s some refle< of the Nuremberg trials of revulsion from the criminal behavior of hitherto honorable men which has been codified in military manuals1L At least it may be said that the full evidence of what the leaders of the National 8ocialist 8tate s4o7e and did and thought lies before us1 Not much of im4ortance remains unrevealed about the nature of NaHism1 In a certain sense the trial succeeded in doing what ,udicial 4roceedings are su44osed to do: it convinced even the guilty that the verdict against them was ,ust1 8o millions of Germans felt after the war NaHis and non-NaHis ali7e1 But in some of the individual cases of the Nuremberg trial this was manifestly not so1 After trials where German generals were sentenced to death sentences were commuted to im4risonment and they were soon freed1 It is difficult to avoid the uneasy notion that a man li7e General Dodl was e<ecuted because he came before the tribunal of the first trial instead of before a later court or 4receding the e<ecutive clemency that mar7ed the years after (*/'1 :ne red thread runs through the trial and binds in a curious way both the victors and the van@uished1 It is the 4ower e<erted by an ideology1 The 4ower was manifested in those on the German side who acce4ted the fi<ed ideas of their society in their Fussian o44osite members who could coolly accuse the Germans of a crime they 7new the defendants had not committed =the Batyn massacre> in the American and British who could swallow almost any legal nostrum as long as it made them see a 4ostwar L The 6rench officers resigned in a democratic stateC to resign or resist in a totalitarian state is something else again1 In the case of Germany Eitler would rather have shot one of his generals than allow him to resign for moral reasons and to ,oin the Fesistance was not only to ris7 one?s own life and endanger the lives of one?s family but to act alone or at best with a handful of trusted friends1 The rest of the worlde<ce4t for the Fussians who had 4ragmatic uses for ithad no interest in the German FesistanceC nothing it did or offered found any echo among the -estern Allies1

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page_ $4 #age 0*/ society of their imagining1 8mall things were rescued at Nuremberg =although they meant in some cases the difference between life and death> such as the uns4o7en 4rinci4le that no one be convicted of the same crime the Allies conceded their side had committedC that no one be hanged for the crime of having waged or 4lotted to wage war1 6or the dee4er answers we must loo7 to history and its meaning for ourselves1 Notes (1 Dose4h 91 BunH ??The .haotic 8tate of the 9aws of -ar and the "rgent Necessity for their Fevision I in American %ournal of .nternational La, Danuary (*0(1 &1 Eenry 91 8timson IThe Nuremberg Trial 9andmar7 in 9aw I in "oreign Affairs Gol1 TTG Danuary (*/+ 441 (+*%*1 )1 IGenocide: A .ommentary on the .onvention I in 'ale La, %ournal Gol1 9GIII (*/* 441 ((/&0+1 !ric Gabus La criminalit< )e la guerre Dissertation "niversitJ de GenVve =Geneva: !ditions GJnJrales (*0)>1 /1 Ma< Euber @uoted in Dose4h 91 BunH IThe 9aws of -ar I in American %ournal of .nternational La, A4ril (*0' 41 ))+1 01 -rocee)ings American Society of .nternational La, Gol1 T9GI (*0&1 '1 Dose4h B1 Belley IA 9egal Analysis of the .hanges in -ar I in Military La, /evie, Duly (*'(1 +1 -illiam 61 6ratcher IThe New 9aw of 9and -arfare I in Missouri La, /evie, A4ril (*0+1 The La, of Lan) !arfare. e2artment of the Army "iel) Manual "M #I7$ =-ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*0'>1 %1 Guenter 9ewy I8u4erior :rders Nuclear -arfare and the Dictates of .onsidence I in The American -olitical Science /evie, March (*'( 441 )&)1 *1 Dohn F1 Mc.onnell I.an 9aw Im4ede Aggressive -arOI in American Bar Association %ournal 6ebruary (*'/1 ($1 Eerbert Braus IThe Nuremberg Trial of the Ma,or -ar .riminals: Feflections After 8eventeen ;ears I in e -aul La, /evie, Gol1 TIII No1 & (*'/ 441 &))/+1 .arl Eaensel IThe Nuremberg Trial Fevisited I in ibi)1 441 &/%0*1 :tto BranHbuehler INuremberg !ighteen ;ears Afterwards I in e -aul La, /evie, Gol1 TIG No1 & (*'0 441 )))/+1 :tto #annenbec7er IThe Nuremberg -ar-.rimes Trial I in ibi)1 441 )/%0%1 ((1 INuremberg in Fetros4ect I in *ana)ian Bar /evie, Gol1 TTGII August8e4tember (*/*1 (&1 Belley o2. cit1

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page_ $ #age 0*0 Bibliogra4hy Abshagen Barl EeinH1 *anaris1 8tuttgart: "nion Gerlag (*0*1 Akten 0ur )eutschen aus,aertigen -olitik (*(%(*/01 8er1 D (*)+(*/01 Gols1 IGII Baden-Baden: Im4rimerie Nationale (*0$(*'/1 Gols1 GIIIT Baden-Baden26ran7furt a1M1: B1 Be44ler Gerlag B1G1 Gol1 TI Teil ( and & Bonn: Gebr1 Eermes B1G1 American Army an) Navy %ournal =now called The %ournal of the Arme) "orces> December (*/01 Andics Eellmut1 er Staat )en keiner ,ollte1 Gienna: Eerder Gerlag (*'&1 Archiv #eter ed1 S2iegelbil) einer +ersch,oerungB ie (altenbrunner; Berichte an Bormann un) Hitler ueber )as Attentat vom &$1 %uli (*//1 8tuttgart: 8eewald Gerlag (*'(1 ArentH -ilhelm trans1 ??Die Gernehmung von Generalfeldmarschall Beitel durch die 8ow,ets1I !ehr,issenschaftliche /un)schau (*'(1 1 IDie Gernehmung von Generaloberst Dodl durch die 8ow,ets1I !ehr,issenschaftliche /un)schau (*'(1 Armstrong Dohn A1 ed1 Soviet -artisans in !orl) !ar ..1 Madison: "niversity of -isconsin #ress (*'/1 Assmann Burt1 eutsche Schicksals>ahre1 -iesbaden: Broc7haus Gerlag (*0(1 1 IDer deutsche "-Boots7rieg und die Nuernberger Fechtss4rechung1I Marine /un)schau Danuary (*0)1 1 IGrossadmiral Dr1 hc1 Faeder und der Aweite -elt7rieg1I Marine /un)schau (*'(1 Auerbach Eellmuth1 IDie !inheit Dirlewanger1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 T No1 ) (*'&1 IAusgewaehlte Briefe von Generalma,or Eelmuth 8tieff1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 II No1 ) (*0/1 Ausge,aehlte /e)en )es "uehrers1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)%1 Baeumler Alfred1 Alfre) /osenberg un) )er Mythus )es &$1 %ahrhun)erts1 Munich: Eoheneichen-Gerlag (*/)1 Ball-Baduri Burt Da7ob1 as Leben )er %u)en in eutschlan) im %ahre (*))1 6ran7furt a1M1: !uro4aeische Gerlagsanstalt (*')1

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page_ $! #age 0*' BardVche Maurice1 ie -olitik )er Cerstoerung1 Goettingen: #lesse Gerlag (*0$1 Basic "iel) Manual "M &+($1 /ules of Lan) !arfare1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/$1 Bauer !lvira1 Ein Bil)erbuch fuer 6ross un) (lein1 Nuremberg: 8tuermer-Gerlag (*)'1 Bauer 6ritH1 ie (riegsverbrecher vor 6ericht1 Aurich and New ;or7: !uro4a Gerlag (*/01 Baum -alter1 ??Marine nationalsoHialismus und -iderstand1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TI No1 ( (*')1 1 IDie Feichsreform im Dritten Feich1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 III No1 ( (*001 Bec7 !arl F1 +er)ict on Schacht1 Tallahassee: 6lorida 8tate "niversity #ress (*001 Bec7er Eoward1 6erman 'outhB Boun) or "ree1 New ;or7: :<ford "niversity #ress (*'(1 Bec7er Dosef1 IAentrum und !rmaechtigungsgesetH (*)/1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IT No1 & (*'(1 Bein Ale<ander1 IDer moderne Antisemitismus und seine Bedeutung fuer die Dudenfrage1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 / (*0%1 Belgion Montgomery1 +ictorAs %ustice1 .hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*/*1 Bell George B1 A1 IDie :e7umene und die innerdeutsche :44osition1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 G No1 / (*0+1 Bennec7e Eeinrich1 Hitler un) )ie SA1 Munich: Guenter :lHog Gerlag (*'&1 Benton -ilbourn !1 and George Grimm eds1 NurembergB 6erman +ie,s of the !ar Trial1 Dallas: 8outhern Methodist "niversity #ress (*001 BenHe Fudolf1 Er0iehung im gross)eutschen /eich1 6ran7furt a1M1: MoritH Diesterweg Gerlag (*/)1 Bernadotte .ount 6ol7e1 The *urtain "alls1 New ;or7: Alfred A1 Bno4f Inc1 (*/01 Berndoff E1 F1 6eneral 0,ischen Ost un) !est1 Eamburg: Eoffmann und .am4e Gerlag n1d1 Bertrand Eenri1 Le )octeur Schacht1 #aris: Gallimard (*)*1 Bertrau< #ierre1 La +ie Juoti)ienne en Allemagne1 #aris: Eachette (*'&1 Bewley .harles1 Hermann 6oering1 Goettingen: Goettinger-Gerlagsanstalt (*0'1 1 Hermann 6oering an) the Thir) /eich1 New ;or7: Devin-Adair (*'&1 Bidlingmaier Ingrid1 Entstehung un) /aeumung )er Ostsee; Brueckenkoe2fe (*/01 Nec7argemuend: 8charnhorst Buch7ameradschaft (*'&1 Billung F1 ie 6eschichte einer Be,egung1 Munich: 6unc7 Gerlag (*)(1 Blumentritt Guenther1 +on /un)ste)t= the Sol)ier an) the Man1 Trans1 .uthbert Feavely1 9ondon: :dhams #ress (*0&1 Boberach EeinH ed1 Mel)ungen aus )em /eich1 Neuwied and Berlin: Eermann 9uchterhand Gerlag (*'01 Boersen0eitung Danuary (0 (*)/1 Boissier #ierre1 +oelkerrecht un) Militaerbefehl1 8tuttgart: B1 61 Boehler Gerlag (*0)1 Boldt Gerhard1 ie let0ten Tage )er /eichskan0lei1 Eamburg: Fowohlt Gerlag (*/+1 Bonnet Georges1 "in )Aune Euro2e1 Geneva: 9es !ditions du .heval AilJ (*/%1 Bor #eter1 6es2raeche mit Hal)er1 -iesbaden: 9imes Gerlag (*0$1

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page_ $" #age 0*+ Borchard !dwin and -illiam #otter 9age1 Neutrality for the &nite) States1 New Eaven: ;ale "niversity #ress (*)+1 Bormann Martin1 Le Testament -oliti1ue )e Hitler1 Notes Fecueillies 4ar Martin Bormann1 #aris: 9ibrairie ArthVme 6ayard (*0*1 Boveri Margaret1 er i2lomat vor 6ericht1 Berlin and Eannover: Minerva Gerlag (*/%1 Bracher Barl Dietrich1 ??Das Anfangsstadium der Eitlerschen Aussen4oliti71I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 G No1 ( (*0+1 1 ie Aufloesung )er !eimarer /e2ublik1 8tuttgart: Fing-Gerlag (*001 1 I8tufen totalitaerer Gleichschaltung: Die Befestigung der nationalsoHialistischen Eerrschaft (*)))/1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IG No1 ( (*0'1 Bracher Barl Dietrich -olfgang 8auer and Gerhard 8chulH1 ie nationalso0ialistische Machtergreifung1 .ologne: -estdeutscher Gerlag (*'&1 The British Han)book of .rregular !arfare1 Suoted in Trials of !ar *riminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals un)er *ontrol *ouncil La, No1 ($ October (*/'A2ril (*/*1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/'(*/* Gol1 TI1 British Manual of Military La,1 9ondon: .ommand of the Army .ouncil (*&*1 Bross -erner1 6es2raeche mit Hermann 6oering1 6lensburg and Eamburg: .hristian -olff Gerlag (*0$1 BrosHat Martin1 IAum 8treit um den Feichstagsbrand1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 ) (*'$1 1 IAur #erversion der 8traf,ustiH im Dritten Feich1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 / (*0%1 Bruegel D1 -1 IDas 8chic7sal der 8trafbestimmungen des Gersailler Gertrages1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 ) (*0%1 Brungs .olonel Bernard D1 IThe 8tatus of Biolgical -arfare in International 9aw1I Military La, /evie, A4ril (*'/1 Buchheim Eans1 6laubenskrise im ritten /eich1 8tuttgart: Deutsche GerlagAnstalt (*0)1 1 IDie hoeheren 88-und #oliHeifuehrer1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TI No1 / (*')1 1 IDie 88 in der Gerfassung des Dritten Feiches1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 III No1 & (*001 Buchheim Eans et al. Anatomie )es SS; Staates1 & vols1 :lten and 6reiburg i1 Br1: -alter-Gerlag (*'01 Buchheit Gert1 Sol)atentum un) /ebellion1 Fastatt2Baden: Grote?sche Gerlagsbuchhandlung (*'(1 Buc7reis Adam1 -olitik )es &$1 %ahrhun)erts1 ) vols1 =(*$((*)*>1 Nuremberg: #anorama-Gerlag n1d1 The Bulletin1 Bonn: #ress and Information :ffice of the German 6ederal Government Danuary + (*'/C March (' (*'01 Bulloc7 Alan1 HitlerA Stu)y in Tyranny1 New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*0&1 Burc7hardt .arl D1 Meine an0iger Mission (*)+(*)*1 Munich: Deutscher Taschenbuch Gerlag (*'&1

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page_ $# #age 0*% Bussche 6reiherr von dem1 "rankfurter Allgemeine Ceitung 6ebruary 0 (*0&1 Butler !wan and Gordon ;oung1 Marshal !ithout 6lory1 9ondon: Eodder R 8toughton 9td1 (*0(1 .ameron Dohn ed1 The -eleus TrialB Trial of Hein0 Eck= August Hoffmann= !alter !eiss2fennig= Hans /ichar) Len0= an) !olfgang Sch,en)er1 In !ar *rimes Trials ed1 8ir David Ma<well-6yfe1 9ondon !dinburgh and Glasgow: -illiam Eodge (*/%1 .arsten 6rancis 91 /eichs,ehr un) -olitik (*(%(*))1 .ologne and Berlin: Bei4enheuer R -itsch (*'/1 .astell .lementine Hu ed1 6laube un) Schoenheit. Ein Bil)buch von )en (+&( >aehrigen Mae)eln1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 n1d1 .astellan Georges1 Le /<armament clan)estin )u /eich1 #aris: #lon (*0/1 .hurchill 8ir -inston 81 The Secon) !orl) !ar1 ' vols1 Boston: Eoughton Mifflin .om4any (*/%(*0)1 .iano .ount GaleaHHo1 *ianoAs Hi))en iary (*)+(*)%1 Trans1 Andreas Mayor1 New ;or7: !1 #1 Dutton R .o1 Inc1 (*0)1 .onrad -alter1 er (am2f um )ie (an0leien1 Berlin: Toe4elmann (*0+1 .oulondre Fobert1 e Stalin E Hitler. Souvenirs )e )eu4 ambassa)es (*)')*1 #aris: Eachette (*0$1 .raig Gordon A1 and 6eli< Gilbert eds1 The i2lomats (*(*(*)*1 #rinceton: #rinceton "niversity #ress (*0)1 .Hech-Dochberg !rich1 A)olf Hitler un) sein Stab1 :ldenburg i1 :1: Gerhard 8talling Gerlag (*))1 *0echoslovakia "ights Back1 -ashington: American .ouncil on #ublic Affairs (*/)1 Dahlerus Birger1 er let0te +ersuch1 Munich: Nym4henburger Gerlagshandlung (*/%1 Dallin Ale<ander1 eutsche Herrschaft in /usslan) (*/((*/01 Duesseldorf: Droste-Gerlag (*0%1 1 6erman /ule in /ussia (*/((*/01 9ondon: The Macmillan .om4any 9td1 (*0+1 Daniel %. Le -roblQme )u ch@timent )es crimes )e guerre )Aa2rQs les enseignements )e la )eu4iQme guerre mon)iale1 .airo: F1 8chindler (*/'1 Datner 8Hymon1 *rimes Against -O!As1 -arsaw: Aachodnia Agenc,a #rasowa (*'/1 Davignon Dac@ues1 Berlin (*)'/$1 Souvenirs )Aune mission1 #aris: !ditions "niversitaires (*0(1 Degrelle 9Jon1 ie verlorene Legion1 8tuttgart: Geritas Gerlag (*001 Deist -ilhelm1 ??8chleicher und die deutsche Abruestungs4oliti7 im Duni2Duli (*)&1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 & (*0*1 Demeter Barl1 as )eutsche Offi0ierkor2s in 6esellschaft un) Staat ('0$(*/01 6ran7furt a1M1: Bernard R Graefe Gerlag fuer -ehrwesen (*'&1 IDen7schrift Eimmlers ueber die Behandlung der 6remdvoel7ischen im :sten =Mai (*/$>1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 G No1 & (*0+1 Deuerlein !rnst1 IDo7umentation1 Eitlers !intritt in die #oliti7 und die Feichswehr1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 & (*0*1

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page_ $$ #age 0** eutsche Allgemeine Ceitung :ctober (* (*//1 Dietrich :tto1 Mit Hitler in )ie Macht1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)%1 1 (& %ahre mit Hitler1 Munich: Isar Gerlag (*001 Dissmann -illi and Ma< -egner eds1 %ungen un) Mae)el im (rieg1 Berlin and 9ei4Hig: 6ranH 8chneider Gerlag (*/(1 ocuments on 6erman "oreign -olicy (*(%(*/01 8er1 D (*)+(*/0 (( vols1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice1 ocuments on &nite) States "oreign /elations (*/)//1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice1 Dodd Thomas D1 ??The Nuremberg Trials1I %ournal of *riminal La, an) *riminology Gol1 TTTGII Danuary (*/+1 Dodd -illiam !1 Ambassa)or o))As iary (*))(*)%1 New ;or7: Earcourt Brace R -orld Inc1 (*/(1 DoenitH Barl1 ($ %ahre un) &$ Tage1 Bonn: Athenaeum-Gerlag (*0%1 Doering Eans-Doachim1 IDie Motive der Aigeuner-De4ortation vom Mai (*/$1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 / (*0*1 okumente un) Materialien aus )er +orgeschichte )es C,eiten !eltkrieges aus )em Archiv )es eutschen Aus,aertigen Amtes (*)+)%1 Berlin: Ministerium fuer Auswaertige Angelegenheiten der "d88F n1d1 Donnedieu de Babres Eenri1 Le -rocQs )e Nuremberg1 #aris: !ditions DomatMontchrestien (*/+1 Dos #assos Dohn1 IDer Auto7oenig1 Aum Bilde von Eenry 6ord1I Sue))eutsche Ceitung May 02' (*'&1 IDr1 -ilhelm 6ric71I Nationalso0ialistische Monatshefte August / (*)$1 Dunbar N1 .1 E1 IAct of 8tate in the 9aw of -ar I %uri)ical /evie, December (*')1 Dutch :swald1 The Errant i2lomat1 9ondon: !dward Arnold (*/$1 !arle George E1 I6DF?s Tragic Mista7e1I *onfi)ential August &0 (*0%1 !dmunds #almer D1 IIm4ressions of the Athens .onference on -orld #eace Through 9aw1I .llinois Bar %ournal November (*'/1 !hard Eans1 IThe Nuremberg Trial Against the Ma,or -ar .riminals and International 9aw1I American %ournal of .nternational La, Gol1 T9III A4ril (*/*1 Eichmann Trial1 Mimeogra4hed trial record1 Derusalem (*'(1 !4stein 6ritH T1 I-ar-Time Activities of the 88-Ahnenerbe1I In On the Track of Tyranny ed1 Ma< Beloff1 9ondon: -iener 9ibrary (*'$1 ie Erhebung )er oesterreichischen Nationalso0ialisten im %uli (*)/ =A7ten der Eistorischen Bommission des Feichsfuehrers 88>1 Gienna: !uro4a Gerlag (*'01 !schenburg Theodor1 IAur !rmordung des Generals von 8chleicher1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 ( (*0)1 1 I6ranH von #a4en1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 & (*0)1 Euro2aeische /evue1 March &* (*)*1 !yc7 !rich1 6eschichte )er !eimarer /e2ublik1 & vols1 !rlenbach-Aurich and 8tuttgart: !ugen Fentsch Gerlag (*0'1

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page_!00 #age '$$ 1 ??#a4en als Eistori7er1I eutsche /un)schau (*0&1 6abricius Eans1 /eichsinnenminister r. "rickB )er revolutionaere Staatsmann1 Berlin: Deutsche Bulturwacht (*)*1 "aschismus6ettoMassenmor)1 6ran7furt a1M1: Foederberg-Gerlag (*'$1 6oertsch Eermann1 Schul) un) +erhaengnis1 8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*0(1 "oreign /elations of the &nite) States. The *onference of Berlin 3the -ots)am *onference5 (*/01 & vols1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*'$1 6ranUois-#oncet AndrJ1 Souvenirs )Aune Ambassa)e E Berlin Se2tembre (*)(Octobre (*)%1 #aris: !rnest 6lammarion (*/'1 6ran7 Eans1 IDiary1I )% vols1 un4ublished1 -ashington: National Archives1 1 "rie)rich Niet0sche1 Bra7au: Burg Gerlag (*//1 1 .m Angesicht )es 6algens1 Munich: 6riedrich Alfred Bec7 Gerlag (*0)1 1 Neues eutsches /echt1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)'1 1 ie Technik )es Staates1 Berlin 9ei4Hig and Gienna: Der Fechtsverlag (*/&1 6ranH--illing Georg1 ie Hitlerbe,egung1 Eamburg: F1 v1 Dec7er?s Gerlag G1 8chenc7 (*'&1 6ratcher -illiam 61 IThe New 9aw of 9and -arfare1I Missouri La, /evie, A4ril (*0+1 6reund Michael ed1 6eschichte )es C,eiten !eltkrieges in okumenten1 ) vols1 6reiburg: Eerder Gerlag (*0)1 6ric7 -ilhelm1 I!in Gol7ein Feich1I -ae)agogisches Maga0in (*)/1 1 "reiheit un) Bin)ung )er Selbstver,altung1 Munich: 6ranH !her Gerlag (*)+1 1 6ermany S2eaks1 9ondon: Butterworth R .o1 9td1 (*)%1 1 IBam4fHiel der deutschen 8chule1I -ae)agogisches Maga0in (*))1 1 ie Nationalso0ialisten im /eichstag (*&/(*&%1 Munich: 6ranH !her Gerlag (*&%1 1 ie /assengeset0gebung )es ritten /eiches1 Munich: 6ranH !her Gerlag (*)/1 1 I8tudent im Gol71I -ae)agogisches Maga0in (*)/1 6ric7 -ilhelm and Arthur Guett1 Nor)isches 6e)ankengut im ritten /eich1 Munich: D1 61 9ehmanns Gerlag (*)'1 6riedman #hili41 Ausch,it01 Buenos Aires: 8ociedad Eebraica Argentina (*0&1 6ritHsche Eans1 (rieg )en (riegshet0ern1 Berlin: Brunner-Gerlag -illi Bischoff (*/$1 1 Ceugen gegen Englan)1 Duesseldorf: Goel7ischer Gerlag (*/(1 I6uehrer .onferences on Matters Dealing with the German Navy1I Mimeogra4hed1 -ashington: :ffice of Naval Intelligence "8 De4artment of the Navy1 6un7 -alther1 6run)saet0e )er )eutschen Aussenhan)els2olitik un) )as -roblem )er internationalen +erschul)ung1 Berlin: Dun7er und Duennhau4t Gerlag (*)%1

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page_!01 #age '$( 1 as ,irtschafthche 6esicht )es neuen Euro2a1 #am4hlet1 Berlin Danuary (0 (*/&1 1 !irtschaftsor)nung gegen !aehrungsmechanismus1 #am4hlet1 Boenigsberg (*//1 1 !irtschaftsor)nung im neuen Euro2a1 Gienna: 8uedost-!cho Gerlagsgesellschaft (*/(1 Gabus !ric1 La *riminalit< )e la guerre1 Dissertation "niversitJ de GenVve1 Geneva: !ditions GJnJrales (*0)1 Gardner Brian1 The 'ear that *hange) the !orl)1 New ;or7: .oward-Mc.ann Inc1 (*'/1 Gardner Fichard N1 ??The Develo4ment of the #eace Bee4ing .a4acity of the "N1I Annual -rocee)ings of the American Society of .nternational La, A4ril &0&+ (*')1 er gelbe "leck1 Mit einem Gorwort von 9eon 6euchtwanger1 #aris: !dition du .arrefour (*)'1 GemHell .arl-A<el1 /ae)er= Hitler un) Skan)inavien1 9und: 87ans7a .entraltryc7ereiet (*'0 and 6ran7furt a1M1: Bernard R Graefe Gerlag fuer -ehrwesen1 IGenocide1I 'ale La, %ournal Gol1 9GIII (*/* 441 ((/&0+1 GentH !rwin1 as Lan)>ahr1 !berswalde: Gerlagsgesellschaft F1 Mueller (*)'1 6ermania 6ebruary ' (*)%1 Gibson Eugh ed1 The *iano iaries (*)*(*/)1 Garden .ity: Doubleday R .om4any Inc1 (*/'1 Gilbert 6eli<1 Hitler irects His !ar1 New ;or7: :<ford "niversity #ress (*0(1 Gilbert G1 M1 Nuremberg iary1 New ;or7: 6arrar 8traus R ;oung Inc1 (*/+1 Gisevius Eans B1 Bis 0um bitteren En)e1 Aurich: 6retH R -asmuth Gerlag (*/'1 Glennon A1 N1 IThe -ea4on that .ame Too 9ate1 I &.S. Naval .nstitute -rocee)ings March (*'(1 Gluec7 8heldon1 The Nuremberg Trial an) Aggressive !ar1 New ;or7: Alfred A1 Bno4f Inc1 (*/'1 1 !ar *riminalsB Their -rosecution an) -unishment1 New ;or7: Alfred A1 Bno4f Inc1 (*//1 Goebbels Dose4h1 +om (aiserhof 0ur /eichskan0lei1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)/1 1 I-ar Diary1I "n4ublished1 Munich: Institut fuer Aeitgeschichte1 Goering Eermann1 Aufbau einer Nation1 Berlin: !1 81 Mittler R 8ohn (*)/1 GoerlitH -alter1 er )eutsche 6eneralstab1 6ran7furt a1M1: Gerlag der 6ran7furter Eefte (*0$1 1 (eitel+erbrecher o)er Offi0ierO Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*'(1 Gostner !rwin1 ($$$ Tage im (C1 Innsbruc7: -agner?sche "niversitaets-Buch-druc7erei (*/01 Greens4an Morris1 The Mo)ern La, of Lan) !arfare1 Ber7eley: "niversity of .alifornia #ress (*0*1 Greiner Eelmuth1 ie Oberste !ehrmachtfuehrung (*)*(*/)1 -iesbaden: 9imes Gerlag (*0(1 Grewe -ilhelm and :1 Buester1 Nuernberg als /echtsfrageB Eine iskussion1 8tuttgart: !rnst Blett Gerlag (*/+1 Griessdorff Earry1 &nsere !eltanschauung. Berlin: Nordland Gerlag (*/(1

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page_!02 #age '$& GritHbach !rich1 Hermann 6oeringB !erk un) Mensch1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)*1 Gros :tto1 %0$ !orte Mythus )es &$1 %ahrhun)erts1 Munich: Eoheneichen Gerlag (*)%1 Gunther Dohn1 .nsi)e Euro2e1 New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*/$1 Eaensel .arl1 ??The Nuremberg Trial Fevisited1I e -aul La, /evie, Gol1 TIII No1 & 84ring8ummer (*'/1 1 as Organisationsverbrechen1 Munich and Berlin: Biederstein Gerlag (*/+1 Eagemeyer Eans 91 ed1 Einsamkeit un) 6emeinschaft1 8tuttgart: 84emann Gerlag (*)*1 Eagen Eans -1 C,ischen Ei) un) Befehl1 Munich: Tuermer Gerlag (*0*1 Eager Gustav1 "uehrer im neuen eutschlan)1 Berlin: Gerlag fuer soHiale !thi7 und Bunst4flege n1d1 Ealder 6ranH1 (riegstagebuch1 ) vols1 8tuttgart: -1 Bohlhammer Gerlag (*'&(*'/1 Eammerstein .hristian 6reiherr von1 Mein Leben1 #rivate 4rinting (*'&1 Eammerstein Bunrat 6reiherr von1 I8chleicher Eammerstein und die Machtuebernahme1I "rankfurter Hefte No1 (( (*0'1 Ean7ey M1 #1 A1 -olitics= Trials an) Errors1 .hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*0$1 Earris -hitney F1 Tyranny on TrialB The Evi)ence at Nuremberg1 Dallas: 8outhern Methodist "niversity #ress (*0/1 Eart 81 Th1 Alfre) /osenberg1 Munich: D1 81 9ehmanns Gerlag (*))1 Eart -1 !1 HitlerAs 6enerals1 9ondon: .resset #ress (*//1 Eartlieb -ladimir von1 -aroleB as /eich1 Gienna and 9ei4Hig: Adolf 9user Gerlag (*)*1 Eartmann Martha1 Mae)el= Sonne= Celte1 Berlin: Dunge Generation Gerlag n1d1 Eassell "lrich von1 +om an)eren eutschlan)1 Aurich and 6reiburg i1 Br1: Atlantis Gerlag (*/'1 Eedin 8ven1 Ohne Auftrag in Berlin1 Buenos Aires: Duerer Gerlag (*/*1 Eeiber Eelmut1 A)olf Hitler1 Berlin: .ollo@uium Gerlag (*'$1 1 IAus den A7ten des Gauleiters Bube1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IG No1 ( (*0'1 1 IDer 6all Gruens4an1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 G No1 & (*0+1 ed1 Hitlers Lagebes2rechungen1 8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*'&1 1 IAur DustiH im Dritten Feich: Der 6all !lias1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 G No1 ) (*001 Eeiden Bonrad1 Hitler1 & vols1 Aurich: !uro4a Gerlag (*)'(*)+1 Eeinrichsbauer A1 Sch,erin)ustrie un) -olitik1 !ssen-Bettwig: -est Gerlag (*/*1 EeinHe Burt and Barl 8chilling eds1 ie /echts2rechung )er Nuernberger Militaertribunale1 Bonn: Girardet Gerlag (*0&1 Eelwig -erner1 ie Blaue Blume )es !an)ervogels1 Guetersloh: 8igbert Mohn Gerlag (*'$1

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page_!03 #age '$) Een7ys Feinhard1 ie nationalso0ialistischen 6e,altverbrechen1 8tuttgart: BreuH-Gerlag (*'/1 Eermelin7 Eeinrich ed1 (irche im (am2f1 Tuebingen and 8tuttgart: Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*0$1 Eerriot !douard1 %a)is1 Gol1 II1 #aris: !rnest 6lammarion (*0&1 EerHog Fobert1 Besat0ungsver,altung in )en beset0ten Ostgebieten= Abteilung %ugen)1 Tuebingen: Institut fuer BesatHungsfragen (*'$1 Eess Ilse1 Englan)NuernbergS2an)auB Ein Schicksal in Briefen1 9eoni am 8tarnberger 8ee: Druffel-Gerlag (*0&1 1 6efangener )es "rie)ens. Neue Briefe aus S2an)au1 9eoni am 8tarnberger 8ee: Druffel-Gerlag (*001 Eeusinger Adolf1 Befehl im !i)erstreit1 Tuebingen and 8tuttgart: Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*0+1 Eilberg Faul1 The estruction of the Euro2ean %e,s1 .hicago: Suadrangle Boo7s (*'(1 ??Eimmler Fede1I Sammelheft ausge,aehlter +ortraege un) /e)en1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)*1 Einsley 6rancis E1 HitlerAs StrategyB The Naval Evi)ence1 .ambridge: .ambridge "niversity #ress (*0(1 Eirschfeld E1 M1 Herinneringen uit )e Be0ettingsti>)1 Amsterdam: !lsevier (*'$1 History of the &nite) Nations !ar *rimes *ommission1 .om4iled by the "nited Nations -ar .rimes .ommission1 9ondon: E1 M1 8tationery :ffice (*/%1 Eitler Adolf1 Mein (am2f1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*/(1 Eoehn Feinhard1 ie Armee als Er0iehungsschule )er Nation. as En)e einer .)ee1 Bad EarHburg: Gerlag fuer -issenschaft -irtschaft und Techni7 (*')1 Eoeing Trude ed1 %ungmae)elleben. Ein %ahrbuch fuer %(/ >aehrige Mae)el1 9ei4Hig: Gerlag 8chmidt R 84ringer n1d1 Eoess Fudolf1 (omman)ant in Ausch,it01 8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*0%1 Eofer -alther1 ie Entfesselung )es C,eiten !eltkrieges1 6ran7furt a1M1: 81 6ischer Gerlag (*'/1 Eoffmann Eeinrich1 Hitler !as My "rien)1 9ondon: Bur7e #ublishing .om4any 9td1 (*001 Eohlfeld Dohannes ed1 okumente )er )eutschen -olitik un) 6eschichte von (%/% bis 0ur 6egen,art1 Gol1 IG1 Berlin: Do7umenten-Gerlag Dr1 Eerbert -endler R .o1 n1d1 Eor7enbach .uno1 as eutsche /eich von (*(% bis heute1 Berlin: Gerlag fuer #resse -irtschaft und #oliti7 (*)$1 Eossbach 6riedrich1 C,ischen !ehrmacht un) Hitler (*)/(*)%1 -olfenbuettel and Eannover: -olfenbuetteler Gerlagsanstalt (*/*1 Eubatsch -alther1 !eseruebung1 Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*'$1 Eull .ordell1 The Memoirs of *or)ell Hull1 & vols1 New ;or7: The Macmillan .om4any (*/%1 Irving David1 The estruction of res)en1 9ondon: -illiam Bimber R .o1 (*')1 Dac7son Fobert E1 The Nuremberg *ase1 New ;or7: Alfred A1 Bno4f Inc1 (*/+1

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page_!04 #age '$/ 1 ??Nuremberg in Fetros4ect1I *ana)ian Bar /evie, Gol1 TTGII August8e4tember (*/*1 1 /e2ort =De4artment of 8tate #ublication &/&$>1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/01 1 /e2ort to the .nternational *onference on Military Trials= Lon)on (*/0 =De4artment of 8tate #ublication )$%$>1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/*1 Dacobsen Eans-Adolf ed1 okumente 0um !estfel)0ug (*/$1 Goettingen: Muster-schmidtGerlag (*'$1 ed1 okumente 0ur +orgeschichte )es !estfel)0uges (*)*(*/$1 Goettingen: Musterschmit-Gerlag (*0'1 1 "all 6elb1 -iesbaden: 6ranH 8teiner Gerlag (*0+1 1 (*)*(*/01 er C,eite !eltkrieg in *hronik un) okumenten1 Darmstadt: -ehr und -issen Gerlag (*'(1 Dacobsen Eans-Adolf and -erner Dochmann eds1 Ausge,aehlte okumente 0ur 6eschichte )es Nationalso0ialismus (*))(*/01 Bielefeld: Gerlag Neue Gesellschaft (*'(1 Das4ers Gotthard1 I"eber die "rsachen des Aweiten -elt7rieges1 Au den Buechern von A1 D1 #1 Taylor und David 91 Eoggan1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 T No1 ) (*'&1 Das4ers Barl1 IThe 8ignificance of the Nuremberg Trials for Germany and the -orld1I Notre ame La,yer Gol1 TTII Danuary (*/+1 Desche7 Eans-Eeinrich1 ie +erant,ortlichkeit )er Staatsorgane nach +oelkerstrafrecht1 Bonn: 9udwig Foehrscheid Gerlag (*0&1 Donca Barol and Alfred BoniecHny eds1 "estung Breslau1 -arsaw: #anstwowe L -ydawnictwo Nau7owe (*'&1 Doos Dose4h1 So sah ich sie1 Augsburg: -infried -er7 (*0%1 %u)enfragen 6ebruary ($ (*//1 %u)gment of the .nternational Tribunal for the "ar East1 To7yo November (*/%1 %ue)ische Selbstbekenntnisse1 9ei4Hig: Eammer Gerlag (*&*1 Bamenets7i Ihor1 HitlerAs Occu2ation of &kraine1 Milwau7ee: Mar@uette "niversity #ress (*0'1 (astner;Bericht ueber Eichmanns Menschenhan)el in &ngarn1 Munich: Bindler Gerlag (*'(1 Beenen D1 B1 and B1 61 Brown1 *rimes Against .nternational La,1 -ashington: #ublic Affairs #ress (*0$1 (eesingAs *ontem2orary Archives1 Gol1 G1 9ondon (*/)(*/'1 Belley Douglas M1 && *ells in Nuremberg1 New ;or7: Greenberg: #ublisher Inc1 (*/+1 Belley Dose4h B1 IA 9egal Analysis of the .hanges in -ar1I Military La, /evie, Duly (*'(1 Belsen Eans1 La, an) -eace in .nternational /elations1 .ambridge: Earvard "niversity #ress (*/&1 1 -eace Through La,1 .ha4el Eill: "niversity of North .arolina #ress (*//1 Bemmet Gerald1 Sun)ay E42ress 9ondon August / (*')1 Bem4ner Fobert M1 -1 Eichmann un) (om2li0en1 Aurich 8tuttgart and Gienna: !uro4a Gerlag (*'(1

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page_!0 #age '$0 Bersten 6eli<1 Totenko2f un) Treue1 Eamburg: Fobert Moehlich Gerlag (*0&1 Besselring Albert1 Sol)at bis 0um let0ten Tag1 Bonn: Athenaeum-Gerlag (*0)1 Bintner !arl -1 ed1 Ha)amar Trial of Alfons (lein= A)olf !allman= et al1 9ondon: -illiam Eodge (*/%1 Bir74atric7 Ivone1 The .nner *ircle. Memoirs1 9ondon: The Macmillan .om4any 9td1 (*0*1 Blee Barl ed1 okumente 0um &nternehmen AASeeloe,e1I Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*0*1 Blein 6ritH1 INeue Do7umente Hur Folle 8chachts bei der Gorbereitung der Eitlerdi7tatur1I Ceitschrift fuer 6eschichts,issenschaft Gol1 G No1 / (*0+1 Bloenne Arno1 IDie deutsche Fussland-und BesatHungs4oliti7 (*/(/01I Stimmen )er Ceit (*00(*0'1 1 6egen )en Strom1 Eannover and 6ran7furt a1M1: Norddeutsche Gerlagsanstalt :1 Goedel (*0+1 1 Hitler>ugen)1 Eannover and 6ran7furt a1M1: Norddeutsche Gerlagsanstalt :1 Goedel (*001 Blose -erner1 6eneration im 6leichschritt1 :ldenburg and Eamburg: Gerhard 8talling Gerlag (*'/1 Blu7e #aul1 IDer 6all #otem4a1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 G No1 ) (*0+1 Bnieriem August von1 The Nuremberg Trials1 .hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*0*1 Bnoll Barl1 ie 6esellung )er )eutschen %ugen) in )er 6egen,art1 Dissertation1 Munich (*'&1 Boessler Ma<imilian1 IAmerican -ar .rimes Trials in !uro4e1I 6eorgeto,n La, %ournal November (*0$1 Bogon !ugen1 er SS Staat1 6ran7furt a1M1: !uro4aeische Gerlagsanstalt (*/'1 Boller Barl1 er let0te Monat1 Mannheim: -ohlgemuth Gerlag (*/*1 Bomitee der Antifaschistischen -iderstands7aem4fer in der Deutschen Demo7ratischen Fe4ubli7 ed1 SS im Einsat01 Berlin: Bongress-Gerlag (*0+1 (on0entrationslager Buchen,al)1 Gol1 I1 -eimar: Thueringer Gol7sverlag (*/*1 Bordt !rich1 Nicht aus )en Akten1 8tuttgart: "nion Deutsche Gerlagsgesellschaft (*0$1 1 !ahn un) !irklichkeit1 8tuttgart: "nion Deutsche Gerlagsgesellschaft (*/%1 Brannhals Eanns von1 er !arschauer Aufstan) (*//1 6ran7furt a1M1: Bernard R .raefe Gerlag fuer -ehrwesen (*'&1 BranHbuehler :tto1 INuremberg !ighteen ;ears Afterwards1I e -aul La, /evie, Gol1 TIG No1 & 84ring8ummer (*'01 1 /ueckblick auf Nuernberg1 Eamburg: Aeit Gerlag !1 8chmidt (*/*1 Braus Eerbert1 IThe Nuremberg Trial of the Ma,or -ar .riminals: Feflections after 8eventeen ;ears1I e -aul La, /evie, Gol1 TIII No1 & 84ring8ummer (*'/1 Braus :tto and !rich Bul7a1 ie To)esfabrik1 Berlin: Bongress Gerlag (*0%1 Brebs Albert1 Ten)en0en un) 6estalten )er NS A-1 8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*0*1 Broch Eugo1 /osenberg un) )ie Bibel1 9ei4Hig: Theodor 6ritsch (*)01

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page_!0! #age '$' BubiHe7 August1 'oung Hitler1 9ondon: Allan -ingate 9td1 (*0/1 BunH Dosef 91 ??The .haotic 8tate of the 9aws of -ar and the "rgent Necessity for their Fevision1I American %ournal of .nternational La, Danuary (*0(1 1 IThe 9aws of -ar1I American %ournal of .nternational La, A4ril (*0'1 9ang 8erge and !rnst von 8chenc7 eds1 -ortraet eines Menschheitsverbrechers. Nach )en hinterlassenen Memoiren )es ehemaligen /eichsministers Alfre) /osenberg1 8t1 Gallen: Aolli7ofer (*/+1 9angbein Eermann1 !ir haben es getan1 Gienna: !uro4a Gerlag (*'/1 9ange !itel1 er /eichsmarschall im (riege1 8tuttgart: .urt !1 8chwab (*0$1 9anger -1 91 and !1 81 Gleason1 The &n)eclare) !ar (*/$/(1 New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*0)1 9a@ueur -alter A1 ie )eutsche %ugen)be,egung1 .ologne: Gerlag -issenschaft und #oliti7 (*'&1 9aternser Eans1 +ertei)igung )eutscher Sol)aten1 Bonn: Girardet Gerlag (*0$1 The La, of Lan) !arfare. e2artment of the Army "iel) Manual "M &+($1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*0'1 9awrence 9ord Dustice =9ord :a7sey>1 IThe Nuremberg Trial1I .nternational Affairs Gol1 TTIII A4ril (*/+1 9easor Dames1 The &ninvite) Envoy1 New ;or7:McGraw-Eill Boo7 .om4any (*'&1 9eber Annedore and 6reya Graefin von Molt7e1 "uer un) !i)er1 Berlin: Mosai7Gerlag (*'(1 9eibholH Gerhard1 I?Aggression? als Heitgeschichtliches #roblem1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 & (*0%1 9eur 8alvatore 81 I1 *rimini )i guerra e )elitti contro lAumanitE1 Fome: !diHioni 9a .iviltZ .attolica (*/%1 9ewy Guenter1 I8u4erior :rders Nuclear -arfare and the Dictates of .onscience: The Dilemma of Military :bedience in the Atomic Age1I The American -olitical Science /evie, March (*'(1 9eyen 6erdinand #rinH von der1 /ueckblick 0um Mauer,al)1 Munich: Bidderstein (*'01 9?Euillier 61 IDoachim von Fibbentro41I /evue )AHistoire )e la eu4iQme 6uerre Mon)iale1 #aris: #resses "niversitaires de 6rance (*0+1 9iddell Eart B1 E1 The 6erman 6enerals Talk1 New ;or7: -illiam Morrow and .om4any Inc1 (*/%1 Life May &% (*/01 9i44e Gi7tor von der1 Nuernberger Tagebuchnoti0en November 789? bis Oktober (*/'1 6ran7furt a1M1: 6ritH Bna44 (*0(1 9ochner 9ouis #1 The 6oebbels iaries (*/&(*/)1 Garden .ity: Doubleday R .om4any Inc1 (*/%1 1 Tycoons an) Tyrant1 .hicago: Eenry Fegnery .om4any (*0/1 9ooc7 EansDietrich1 IAur ?Grossgermanischen #oliti7? des Dritten Feiches1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 ( (*'$1 9ossberg Bernhard von1 .m !ehrmachtfuehrungsstab1 Eamburg: E1 N1 Noel7e Gerlag (*/*1 9uedde-Neurath -alter1 /egierung oeint0. ie let0ten Tage )es ritten /eiches1 Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*0)1

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page_!0" #age '$+ Maevs7ii Gi7tor1 ??Tovarishch Fichard 8orge I in -rav)a 8e4tember / (*'/1 The Ne, 'ork Times 8e4tember 0 (*'/1 Manstein !rich von1 Aus einem Sol)atenleben: (%%+(*)*1 Bonn: Athenaeum-Gerlag (*0%1 1 +erlorene Siege1 Bonn: Athenaeum-Gerlag (*0*1 Manvell Foger and Eeinrich 6raen7el1 octor 6oebbelsB His Life an) eath1 New ;or7: 8imon and 8chuster Inc1 (*'$1 1 Hermann 6oering1 9ondon: -illiam Eeinemann 9td1 (*'&1 Marsale7 Eans1 Mauthausen mahnt1 Gienna: Mauthausen-Bomitee des Bundesverbandes der oesterreichischen BAler Eaeftlinge und 4olitisch Gerfolgten 8elbstverlag (*0$1 Masch7e Eermann M1 as (ru22;&rteil1 Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*0(1 Maschmann Melita1 "a0it1 8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*')1 Mason Al4heus T1 I!<tra-Dudicial -or7 for Dudges: The Giews of .hief Dustice 8tone1I Harvar) La, /evie, Gol1 9TGII No1 & December (*0)1 Matthias !rich1 IEindenburg Hwischen den 6ronten (*)&1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 ( (*'$1 1 IDie 8itHung der Feichstagsfra7tion des Aentrums am &)1 MaerH (*))1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IG No1 ) (*0'1 Mau Eermann1 IDie ?Aweite Fevolution?Der )$1 Duni (*)/1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 & (*0)1 Maugham Giscount1 &NO an) !ar *rimes1 9ondon: Dohn Murray #ublishers 9td1 (*0(1 Maurach Feinhart1 ie (riegsverbrecher2ro0esse gegen )eutsche 6efangene in )er So,>etunion1 Eamburg (*0$1 Mc.onnell Dohn F1 I.an 9aw Im4ede Aggressive -arOI American Bar Association %ournal 6ebruary (*'/1 Meissner :tto1 Staatssekretaer unter Ebert= Hin)enburg un) Hitler1 Eamburg: Eoffmann and .am4e (*0$1 Meissner :tto and Earry -ilde1 ie Machtergreifung1 8tuttgart: D1 G1 .otta?sche Buchhandlung (*0%1 ie Memoiren )es Stabchefs /oehm1 8aarbruec7en: "ranus-Gerlag (*)/1 Mer7er Manfred1 ie )eutsche -olitik gegenueber )em S2anischen Buergerkrieg1 Bonn: 9udwig Foehrscheid Gerlag (*'(1 Merle Marcel1 Le -rocQs )e Nuremberg et le ch@timent )es criminels )e guerre1 #aris: !ditions A1 #edone (*/*1 Meyer-Abich 6riedrich ed1 ie Masken fallen1 Eamburg: Morawe R 8cheffelt Gerlag (*/*1 MeyrowitH Eenri1 La r<2ression 2ar les tribunau4 alleman)s )es crimes contre lAhumanit<1 #aris: #ichor et Durand-AuHias (*'$1 Militaerstrafgeset0buch in )er "assung vom 7$. Oktober 789$mit Einfuehrungsgeset0 un) (riegsstrafrechtsor)nung1 Berlin: -alter de Gruyter Gerlag (*/)1 Milward Alan 81 I6ritH Todt als Minister fuer Bewaffnung und Munition1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TIG No1 ( (*''1 Moeller Burt Detlev1 as let0te (a2itel1 Eamburg: Eoffmann and .am4e Gerlag (*/+1

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page_!0# #age '$% Mommsen Eans1 ??Der nationalsoHialistiche #oliHeistaat und die Dudenverfolgung vor (*)%1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 T No1 ( (*'&1 Morison 8amuel !liot1 History of the &nite) States Naval O2erations in !orl) !ar ..1 Gols1 I and TIG1 Boston: 9ittle Brown and .om4any (*/+(*0*1 Morsey Fudolf1 IEitler als Braunschweiger Fegierungsrat1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 / (*'$1 1 IEitlers Gerhandlungen mit der Aentrumsfuehrung am )(1 Danuar (*))1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IT No1 & (*'(1 Mosley 8ir :swald1 The "acts1 9ondon: !u4horian Distribution (*0+1 Muns7e Eilde ed1 Mae)el im ritten /eich1 Berlin: 6reiheitsverlag (*)01 Muraws7i !rich1 er )eutsche !ehrmachtbericht (*)*(*/01 Bo44ard: Earald Boldt Gerlag (*'&1 Namier 9ewis1 .n the Na0i Era1 9ondon: The Macmillan .om4any 9td1 (*0&1 Na0i *ons2iracy an) Aggression % vols1 and 8u441 A and B1 -ashington: :ffice of the "8 .hief of .ounsel for #rosecution of A<is .riminality (*/'1 Neinast Ma,or -illiam E1 I"nited 8tates "se of Biological -arfare1I Military La, /evie, A4ril (*'/1 Nelte :tto1 as Nuernberger &rteil un) )ie Schul) )er 6enerale1 #am4hlet1 Eannover: Gerlag Das Andere Deutschland (*/+1 Neuhaeusler Dohannes1 (reu0 un) Hakenkreu0 & vols1 Munich: Gerlag der 7atholischen Birche Bayerns (*/'1 Neumann #eter1 The Black March1 Trans1 .onstantine 6itHgibbon1 New ;or7: Bantam Boo7s Inc1 (*'$1 Ne,s *hronicle =9ondon> Danuary (*)%1 The Ne, 'ork Times December 0 (*/0C Dune & Dune % :ctober ' :ctober (' (*/'1 Niemoeller -ilhelm1 ie evangelische (irche im ritten /eich1 Bielefeld: 9udwig Bechauf Gerlag (*0'1 IDer :berste Befehlshaber1 !in Nuernberger Ges4raech mit Generaloberst DodlI =by an anonymous German defense lawyer>1 Nation Euro2a May (*'$1 :?Brien -illiam G1 I8ome #roblems of the 9aw of -ar in 9imited Nuclear -arfare1I Military La, /evie, :ctober (*'(1 Occu2ation of %a2an =De4artment of 8tate #ublication &'+(>1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice1 :ervi7 Nils1 IDas englischnorwegische Eandelsab7ommen und die alliierten Interventions4laene im russisch-finnischen Brieg1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IG No1 / (*0'1 :estreich #aul1 !alther "unk= ein Leben fuer )ie !irtschaft1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*/$1 :44enheimer 91 .nternational La, =%th ed1>1 !d1 E1 9auter4acht1 9ondon New ;or7 Toronto: 9ongmans Green R .o1 9td1 (*0/1 :rlow Dietrich1 IDie Adolf-Eitler-8chulen1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TIII No1 ) (*'01 :ven -ilfred von1 Mit 6oebbels bis 0um En)e1 Buenos Aires: Duerer Gerlag (*/*1 #aetel Barl :1 IDie deutsche Dugendbewegung als 4olitisches #haenomen1I -olitische Stu)ien Duly (*0+1

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page_!0$ #age '$* 1 ??Geschichte und 8oHiologie der 881I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 II No1 ( (*0/1 1 %ugen)be,egung un) -olitik1 Bad Godesberg: Goggenreiter Gerlag (*'(1 #aget F1 T1 MansteinB His *am2aigns an) His Trial1 9ondon: -illiam .ollins 8ons R .o1 9td1 (*0(1 #al F1 #1 .nternational Military Tribunal for the "ar East= issenting %u)gment1 .alcutta: 8anyal (*0)1 #annenbec7er :tto1 IThe Nuremberg -ar-.rimes Trial1I e -aul La, /evie, Gol TIG No1 & 84ring8ummer (*'01 #a4en 6ranH von1 Einige Bemerkungen 0um Buch G/eichs,ehr= Staat un) NS A-G von r. Thilo +ogelsang1 #rivate 4rinting n1d1 1 Euro2a ,as nunR Goettingen: Goettinger Gerlagsanstalt (*0/1 1 er !ahrheit eine 6asse1 Munich: #aul 9ist Gerlag (*0&1 "ran0 von -a2en!egbereiter )es Nationalso0ialismus1 #am4hlet1 Bielefeld: 6reie #resse n1d1 #ar7er Dohn D1 IThe Nuremberg Trial1I %ournal of the American %u)icature Society Gol1 TTT December (*/'1 er -arteitag )er Ehre1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)'1 #eillard 9Jonce1 The Laconia Affair1 Trans1 :liver .oburn1 New ;or7: G1 #1 #utnam?s 8ons (*')1 #fundtner Eans1 r. !ilhelm "rick un) sein Ministerium1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)+1 #hili44es Famond ed1 Trial of %ose2h (ramer an) "orty;four Others 3The Belsen Trial51 9ondon !dinburgh Glasgow: -illiam Eodge (*/*1 #ic7er Eenry1 HitlerAs Table Talk1 Trans1 Norman .ameron and F1 E1 8tevens1 9ondon: -iedenfeld and Nicolson (*0)1 1 Hitlers Tischges2raeche im "uehrerhau2t1uartier (*/(/&1 Bonn: Athenaeum-Gerlag (*0(1 er -im2f 8e4tember (*/$1 #ohle EeinH1 er /un)funk als .nstrument )er -olitik1 Eamburg: Eans Bredow Institut (*001 #olia7ov 9Jon and Dosef -ulf1 as ritte /eich un) seine enker1 Berlin-Grunewald: Arani (*0*1 1 as ritte /eich un) seine iener1 Berlin-Grunewald: Arani (*0'1 -olnische okumente 0ur +orgeschichte )es (rieges1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*/$1 #om4e .1 A1 Aggressive !ar an .nternational *rime1 The Eague: Martinus Ni,hoff (*0)1 #rie47e Manfred1 ie evangelische %ugen) im ritten /eich (*))(*)'1 Eannover and 6ran7furt a1M1: Norddeutsche Gerlagsanstalt :1 Goedel (*'$1 -rocee)ings American Society of .nternational La,1 Gol1 T9GI (*0&1 #ross Earry1 +or un) nach Hitler1 :lten and 6reiburg i1 Br1: -alter-Gerlag (*'&1 -unishment for !ar *rimes. The .nterallie) ocuments Signe) at St. %amesA -alace= Lon)on () %anuary (*/& an) /elative ocuments1 9ondon: E1 M1 8tationery :ffice Duly (*/&1

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page_!10 #age '($ #utt7amer Barl Des7o von1 ie unheimliche See1 Gienna and Munich: Barl Buehne Gerlag (*0&1 Faabe 6eli<1 ie buen)ische %ugen)1 8tuttgart: Brentano Gerlag (*'(1 Fabenau 6riedrich von1 SeecktB Aus seinem Leben (*(%(*)'1 9ei4Hig: Ease R Boehler Gerlag (*/$1 Faeder !rich1 Mein Leben1 & vols1 Tuebingen: 6ritH 8chlichtenmayer Gerlag (*0'(*0+1 Fan7 Fichard1 ??Modern -ar and the Galidity of Treaties1I *ornell La, Juarterly 84ring8ummer (*0)1 Faschhofer Eermann1 er "all Oberlaen)er1 Tuebingen: 6ritH 8chlichtenmayer Gerlag (*'&1 Fauschenbach Gerhard1 er Nuernberger -ro0ess gegen )ie Organisationen1 Bonn: 9udwig Foehrscheid Gerlag (*0/1 IDie Fede Eimmlers vor den Gauleitern am )1 August (*//1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 / (*0)1 Fees D1 F1 ed1 The *ase of /u)olf HessB A -roblem in iagnosis an) "orensic -sychiatry1 9ondon and Toronto: -illiam Eeinemann 9td1 (*/+1 Feichs,ugendfuehrer ed1 H% im ienst1 Berlin: Bernard R Graefe Gerlag (*/$1 1 %ahrbuch )es B M; !erkes 6laube un) Schoenheit (*/)1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 1 as %ugen),ohnheim1 8tubenrauch Gerlagsbuchhandlung (*/)1 1 (riminalitaet un) 6efaehr)ung )er %ugen)1 Berlin (*/(1 Feid Thorburn and Dames 61 8ams1 I.onference on -orld #eace Through 9aw Eeld at To7yo and 9agos1I American Bar Association %ournal Duly (*'&1 Feitlinger Gerald1 The "inal Solution1 9ondon: Gallentine Mitchell R .o1 (*0)1 1 The SSB Alibi of a Nation1 9ondon: -illiam Eeinemann 9td1 (*0+1 1 IThe Truth About Eitler?s ?.ommissar :rder1?I *ommentary Duly (*0*1 Fendulic 9othar1 6ekaem2ft= gesiegt= geschlagen1 Eeidelberg: Gerlag -elsermuehl (*0&1 Feuter 6ranH1 Schacht1 8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*)+1 Fibbentro4 Doachim von1 C,ischen Lon)on un) Moskau1 9eoni am 8tarnberger 8ee: Druffel-Gerlag (*0)1 Fiess .urt1 %ose2h 6oebbels= A Biogra2hy1 Garden .ity: Doubleday R .om4any Inc1 (*/%1 Fintelen .a4tain von1 The ark .nva)er1 9ondon: 9ovat Dic7son (*))1 Fitter Gerhard1 as )eutsche -roblem1 Munich: F1 :ldenbourg Gerlag (*'&1 Fitthaler Anton1 I!ine !ta44e auf Eitlers -eg Hur ungeteilten Macht1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 & (*'$1 Foberts 8te4hen E1 The House that Hitler Built1 New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*)%1 Foh 6ranH1 Entartete (unst1 Eannover: 6ac7eltraeger-Gerlag 8chmidt-Buester (*'&1 Fosenberg Alfred1 Let0te Auf0eichnungen1 Goettingen: #lesse Gerlag (*001 1 er Mythus )es #$. %ahrhun)erts1 Munich: Eoheneichen-Gerlag (*)$1 1 ie -rotokolle )er !eisen von Cion un) )ie >ue)ische !elt2olitik1 Munich: EoheneichenGerlag (*&)1

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page_!11 #age '(( 1 Sammelheft ausge,aehlter +ortraege un) /e)en fuer )ie Schulung in national2olitischer Cielset0ung1 Berlin Aentralverlag der N8DA# (*)*1 1 ie S2ur )er %u)en im !an)el )er Ceiten1 Munich: Gol7sverlag (*&$1 1 er staatsfein)liche Cionismus1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)%1 1 &nmoral im Talmu)1 Munich: Gol7sverlag (*&$1 Fos7ill 81 -1 The !ar at Sea (*)*(*/01 9ondon: E1 M1 8tationery :ffice (*0'1 1 !hite Ensign. The British Navy at !ar (*)*(*/01 Anna4olis: "8 Naval Institute (*'$1 Foss Eans1 ??Die ?#raeventiv7riegs4laene? #ilsuds7is von (*))1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 III No1 / (*001 8adila-Mantau Eans EeinH ed1 eutsche "uehrer. eutsches Schicksal1 Berlin: Fiegler (*))1 1 &nsere /eichsregierung1 Berlin: .1 A1 -eller (*)'1 8and Trude1 Cicke0acke Lan)>ahr HeilP 8tuttgart: "nion Deutsche Gerlagsgesellschaft (*)%1 8asse EeinH Guenther1 IDas #roblem des di4lomatischen Nachwuchses im Dritten Feich1I "orschungen 0u Staat un) +erfassung1 Berlin: Dunc7er R Eumblot n1d1 8atterfield Dohn .1 IThe 8an Dose .onference on -orld #eace Through 9aw1I American Bar Association %ournal :ctober (*'(1 8autter Feinhold1 Hitler>ugen)1 Munich: .arl Foehrig Gerlag (*/&1 8chacht E,almar1 Abrechnung mit Hitler1 Eamburg and 8tuttgart: Fowohlt Gerlag (*/%1 1 as En)e )er /e2arationen1 :ldenburg: Gerhard 8talling Gerlag (*)(1 1 (leine Bekenntnisse1 #rivate 4rinting (*/*1 1 I: %ahre meines Lebens1 Bad -oerishofen: Bindler R 8chiermeyer Gerlag (*0)1 8chaefer -erner1 (on0entrationslager Oranienburg1 Berlin: Buch-und Tiefdruc7 Gesellschaft (*)/1 8chaumburg-9i44e 6riedrich .hristian #rinH Hu1 C,ischen (rone un) (erker1 -iesbaden: 9imes Gerlag (*0&1 8chellenberg -alter1 Memoiren1 .ologne: Gerlag fuer #oliti7 und -issenschaft (*0'1 8chierer Eerbert1 as Ceitschriften,esen )er %ugen)be,egung1 Dissertation1 Berlin-.harlottenburg: 9orentH (*)%1 8chirach Baldur von1 ie "eier )er Neuen "ront1 Munich: Gol7sverlag n1d1 1 ie Hitler>ugen).)ee un) 6estalt1 Berlin (*)/1 1 /e)e 0ur Eroeffnung )er Mo0art,oche1 -eimar: Gesellschaft der Biblio4hilen (*/)1 1 /evolution )er Er0iehung. /e)en aus )en %ahren )es Aufbaus1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)%1 1 as !iener (ultur2rogramm1 Fede im -iener Burgtheater A4ril ' (*/(1 Gienna: 6ranH !her Gerlag Aweigniederlassung1 1 !ille un) Macht1 Fede Duly ( (*)%1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*)%1

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page_!12 #age '(& 8chirach Ma< von1 6eschichte )er "amilie von Schirach1 Berlin: -alter de Gruyter Gerlag (*)*1 8chlabrendorff 6abian von1 Offi0iere gegen Hitler1 Aurich: !uro4a Gerlag (*/'1 8chmidt #aul1 Statist auf )i2lomatischer Buehne (*&)(*/01 Bonn: Athenaeum Gerlag (*/*1 8chmidt-#auli !dgar von1 Hitlers (am2f um )ie Macht1 Berlin: Georg 8tril7e Gerlag (*))1 1 ie Maenner um Hitler1 Berlin: Gerlag fuer Bultur4oliti7 (*)&1 8chmundt G1 ??Bericht ueber die Bes4rechung Eitlers am &)1 Mai (*)*1I In Ausge,aehlte okumente 0ur 6eschichte )es Nationalso0ialismus (*))/0 ed1 Eans-Adolf Dacobsen and -erner Dochmann1 Bielefeld: Gerlag Neue Gesellschaft (*'(1 8chnabel Feimund1 Macht ohne Moral1 6ran7furt a1M1: Foederbergverlag (*0+1 8chneider Eans1 IDas !rmaechtigungsgesetH vom &/1 MaerH (*))1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 ) (*0)1 8chneider #eter1 IFechtssicherheit und richterliche "nabhaengig7eit aus der 8icht des 8D1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IG No1 / (*0'1 8chorn Eubert1 er /ichter im ritten /eich1 6ran7furt a1M1: Gittorio Blostermann Gerlag (*0*1 8chroeter EeinH1 Stalingra)1 Trans1 .onstantine 6itHgibbon1 New ;or7: Ballantine Boo7s Inc1 (*0%1 8chuetHe E1 A1 ie /e2ressalie unter beson)erer Beruecksichtigung )er (riegsverbrecher2ro0esse1 Bonn: 9udwig Foehrscheid Gerlag (*0$1 SchulthessA Euro2aeischer 6eschichtskalen)er1 Gols1 9TTIII and 9TTG1 Munich: .1 E1 Bec7?sche Gerlagsbuchhandlung (*)& (*)01 8chulH Doachim1 ie let0ten )$ Tage1 8tuttgart: 8teingrueben-Gerlag (*0(1 8chuschnigg Burt von1 Austrian /e1uiem1 New ;or7: G1 #1 #utnam?s 8ons (*/'1 1 Ein /e1uiem in /ot;!eiss;/ot1 Aurich: AmstutH Eerdeg R .o1 (*/'1 8chwarH #aul1 This Man /ibbentro2. His Life an) Times1 New ;or7: Dulian Meissner (*/)1 8chweitHer Arthur1 Big Business in the Thir) /eich1 Bloomington: Indiana "niversity #ress (*'/1 1 IBusiness #olicy in a Dictatorshi41I The Business History /evie, Gol1 TTTGIII No1 / (*'/1 8chwerdtfeger-Ay4ress Gertrud1 as ist )er ,eibliche Arbeits)ienst1 Berlin: Dunge Generation Gerlag (*/$1 8chwerin von Brosig7 .ount 9utH1 Es geschah in eutschlan)1 Tuebingen and 8tuttgart: Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*0&1 8eabury #aul1 IFibbentro4 and the German 6oreign :ffice1I -olitical Science Juarterly December (*0(1 1 The !ilhelmstrasse1 Ber7eley: "niversity of .alifornia #ress (*0/1 8enger und !tterlin 6rido von1 (rieg in Euro2a1 .ologne and Berlin: Bie4enheuer R -itsch (*'$1 8era4him Eans-Guenter1 as 2olitische Tagebuch Alfre) /osenbergs (*)/)0 un) (*)*/$1 Goettingen: Musterschmidt-Gerlag (*0'1 8era4him Eans-Guenter and Andreas Eillgruber1 IEitlers !ntschluss Hum An-

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page_!13 #age '() griff auf Fussland1?? +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 II No1 ) (*0/1 8eyss-In@uart Artur1 .)ee un) 6estalt )es /eiches1 No 4ublisher no date1 8iegert Barl1 /e2ressalie= /e1uisition un) hoeherer Befehl1 Goettingen: Goettinger Gerlagsanstalt (*0)1 8im4son Amos !1 IThe 8truggle for the .ontrol of the German !conomy (*)')+1I %ournal of Mo)ern History (*0*1 87orHeny :tto1 6eheimkomman)o Skor0eny1 Eamburg: Eansa Gerlag Dosef Toth (*0$1 8nyder :rville .1 IIt?s Not 9aw1 The -ar Guilt Trials1I (entucky La, %ournal November (*/*1 8ohn 9ouis B1 I"1 N1 .harter Fevision and the Fule of 9aw: A #rogram for #eace1I North,estern La, /evie, Danuary-6ebruary (*0'1 Sol)aten;Ceitung =Munich> May (' and &0 (*'&1 8ontheimer Burt1 Anti)emokratisches enken in )er !eimarer /e2ublik1 Munich: Nym4henburger Gerlagshandlung (*'&1 84eer Albert ed1 Neue )eutsche Baukunst1 Berlin: Gol7 und Feich Gerlag (*/$1 84eidel Eans1 .nvasion (*//1 Tuebingen: Fainer -underlich Gerlag Eermann 9eins (*/*1 84ringer Eildegard1 Es s2rach Hans "rit0sche1 8tuttgart: Thiele Gerlag (*/*1 1 as Sch,ert auf )er !aage1 Eeidelberg: Burt Gowinc7el Gerlag (*0)1 8tahn F1 :1 and 6ili44o Bo,ano eds1 !ir habenAs ge,agtP 8tuttgart and Berlin: D1 G1 .otta?sche Buchhandlung (*)/1 8tasiews7i Bernhard1 IDie Birchen4oliti7 der NationalsoHialisten im -arthegau (*)*(*/01I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 ( (*0*1 8tein George E1 The !affen SS1 Ithaca: .ornell "niversity #ress (*''1 8teinbauer Gustav1 .ch ,ar +ertei)iger in Nuernberg1 Blagenfurt: !duard Baiser Gerlag (*0$1 8tevens !1 E1 ed1 Trial of Nikolaus von "alkenhorst1 9ondon !dinburgh and Glasgow: -illiam Eodge R .o1 (*/*1 8timson Eenry 91 IThe Nuremberg Trial 9andmar7 in 9aw1I "oreign Affairs Gol1 TTG Danuary (*/+1 8todte Eermann1 ie !egbereiter )es Nationalso0ialismus1 9uebec7: Fahtgens (*)'1 8toec7er Da7ob1 Maenner )es )eutschen Schicksals1 Berlin: :swald Arnold Gerlag (*/*1 8tol4er Gustav1 eutsche !irtschaft (%+$(*/$1 8tuttgart: 6ranH-Mittelbach Gerlag (*0$1 8trasser :tto1 Hitler un) ich1 Buenos Aires: !ditorial Tren7elbach (*/$1 8trauss -alter1 IDas Feichsministerium des Innern und die DudengesetHgebung1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 IT No1 ) (*'(1 8treicher Dulius1 (am2f )em !eltfein). /e)en aus )er (am2f0eit1 Gesammelt und bearbeitet von Dr1 EeinH #reiss1 Nuremberg: 8tuermer-Gerlag (*)%1 Stroo2 Bericht. Es gibt keinen >ue)ischen !ohnbe0irk in !arschau mehr1 Neuwied: Eermann 9uchterhand Gerlag (*'$1 8tubbe -alter1 IIn Memoriam Albrecht Eaushofer1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 ) (*'$1

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page_!14 #age '(/ 8tudnitH Eans-Georg von1 Als Berlin brannte1 8tuttgart: -1 Bohlhammer Gerlag (*')1 er Stuermer Danuary (* (*&+1 Sun)ay Times 6ebruary ( (*0*1 er Tag von -ots)am1 Munich: Der Dugendverlag (*))1 ??Tatsachen s4rechen fuer den 8ieg1I Die Feden der Feichsminister 84eer und Dr1 Goebbels im Berliner 84ort4alast am 01 Duni (*/)1 Taylor Telford1 "inal /e2ort to the Secretary of the Army on the Nuremberg !ar *rimes Trials un)er *ontrol *ouncil La, No. 7$1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/*1 1 S,or) an) S,astika1 New ;or7: 8imon and 8chuster Inc1 (*0&1 Thorwald Duergen1 as En)e an )er Elbe1 8tuttgart: 8teingruebenGerlag (*0$1 1 ie grosse "lucht1 8tuttgart: 8teingrueben-Gerlag (*/*1 ed1 Ernst Heinkel. Stuemisches Leben1 8tuttgart: Mundus Gerlag (*0)1 1 !en sie ver)erben ,ollen1 8tuttgart: 8teingrueben-Gerlag (*0&1 Thursfield E1 G1 ed1 BrasseyAs Naval Annual (*/%1 New ;or7: The Macmillan .om4any1 Thyssen 6ritH1 . -ai) Hitler1 New ;or7: 6arrar R Finehart Inc1 (*/(1 Tiburtius D1 IEitlers letHte Tage1I er Bun) 6ebruary (+ (*0)1 Tobias 6ritH1 er /eichstagsbran)B Legen)e un) !irklichkeit1 Fastatt2Baden: Grote?sche Gerlagsbuchhandlung (*'&1 Tondel 9yman Dr1 IThe !uro4ean .onference on -orld #eace Through the Fule of 9aw1I American Bar Association %ournal December (*'&1 Trainin A1 N1 Hitlerite /es2onsibility un)er *riminal La,1 !d1 A1 ;1 Gishins7y1 Trans1 Andrew Fothstein1 9ondon: Eutchinson R .o1 9td1 (*/01 1 La /es2onsibilit< 2<nale )es Hitl<riens1 #aris: 9a #resse 6ranUaise et !trangVre (*/01 Treue -ilhelm1 IAum nationalsoHialistischen Bunstraub in 6ran7reich1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TIII No1 ) (*'01 Trevor-Fo4er E1 F1 The Bormann LettersB The 2rivate corres2on)ence bet,een Martin Bormann an) his ,ife from %anuary (*/) to A2ril (*/01 9ondon: -eidenfeld R Nicolson (*0/1 1 The Last ays of Hitler1 New ;or7: The Macmillan .om4any (*/+1 1 IMartin Bormann1I er Monat May (*0/1 Trial of the Ma>or !ar *riminals before the .nternational Military Tribunal= Nuremberg (/ November (*/0($ October (*/'1 /& vols1 Nuremberg (*/+(*/*1 =:fficial te<t in the !nglish language1> Trials of !ar *riminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals un)er *ontrol *ouncil La, No1 ($ October (*/'-A2ril (*/*1 (0 vols1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*/'(*/*1 &nite) States House of /e2resentativesB Select *ommittee on the (atyn "orest Massacre. Hearings: %&n) *ongress (st an) &n) sessions (*0(0&1 -ashington: "8 Government #rinting :ffice (*0&1 "termann -ilhelm ed1 %ungenEure !elt1 Munich: Aentralverlag der N8DA# 6ranH !her Nachf1 (*/(1 Ganwel7enhuyHen Dean1 IDie Niederlande und der ?Alarm? im Danuar (*/$1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GIII No1 ( (*'$1

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page_!1 #age '(0 Geale 61 D 1#1 A)vance to Barbarism1 A44leton -is1: .1 .1 Nelson #ublishing .o1 (*0)1 Gigrabs Georg1 ??Die 8tellungnahme der -estmaechte und Deutschlands Hu den baltischen 8taaten im 6ruehling und 8ommer (*)*1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GII No1 ) (*0*1 +oelkischer Beobachter A4ril % (*)%C March &* (*/(C May &% (*//1 Gogelsang .arl -alther1 ieter lernt fliegen1 !isenberg2Thueringen and 9ei4Hig: Dege Gerlag (*/)1 Gogelsang Thilo1 IAur #oliti7 8chleichers gegenueber der N8DA# (*)&1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 ( (*0%1 1 /eichs,ehr= Staat un) NS A-1 8tuttgart: Deutsche Gerlags-Anstalt (*'&1 Goggenreiter Eeinrich ed1 Taschenbuch fuer )en )eutschen %ugen)fuehrer1 #otsdam: 9udwig Goggenreiter Gerlag n1d1 -agenfuehr Eorst ed1 6efolgschaft1 Eamburg: Eanseatische Gerlagsanstalt (*)01 -arlimont -alter1 .nsi)e HitlerAs Hea)1uarters (*)*/01 New ;or7: 6rederic7 A1 #raeger Inc1 (*'/1 -armbrunn -erner1 The utch &n)er 6erman Occu2ation (*/$(*/01 8tanford: 8tanford "niversity #ress (*')1 -att D1 .1 IDie bayerischen Bemuehungen um Ausweisung Eitlers (*&/1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 GI No1 ) (*0%1 -einberg Gerhard 91 IDer deutsche !ntschluss Hum Angriff auf die 8ow,etunion1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 I No1 / (*0)1 1 6ermany an) the Soviet &nion (*)*(*/(1 9eiden: Brill (*0/1 1 I8chachts Besuch in den "8A im Dahre (*))1I +iertel>ahrshefte fuer Ceitgeschichte Gol1 TI No1 & (*')1 -eiHsaec7er !rnst von1 Erinnerungen1 Munich: #aul 9ist Gerlag (*0$1 -elles 8umner1 The Time for ecision1 New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*//1 -endt Eans1 Hitler regiert1 Berlin: !1 81 Mittler R 8ohn (*))1 !er .stAsO Berlin: Degener Gerlag (*)01 -est4hal 8iegfried1 Heer in "esseln1 Bonn: Athenaeum-Gerlag (*0&1 -heeler-Bennett Dohn !. The Nemesis of -o,er1 9ondon: The Macmillan .om4any 9td1 (*'(1 -ichert !rwin1 ramatische Tage in Hitlers /eich1 8tuttgart (*0&1 -ilmows7y Tilo 6reiherr von1 !arum ,ur)e (ru22 verurteiltO Duesseldorf and Gienna: !con-Gerlag (*'&1 -oodward !1 91 and Fohan Butler eds1 ocuments on British "oreign -olicy (*(*)* &nd series Gol1 G (*))1 9ondon: E1 M1 8tationery :ffice (*0'1 -right Suincy1 IThe :utlawing of -ar and the 9aw of -ar1I American %ournal of .nternational La, Duly (*0)1 1 IThe #revention of Aggression1I American %ournal of .nternational La, Duly (*0'1 -ucher Albert1 ie "ahne hoch1 Munich: 8ueddeutscher Gerlag (*')1 -ulf Dosef1 ie bil)en)en (uenste im ritten /eich1 Guetersloh: 8igbert Mohn Gerlag (*')1 1 as ritte /eich un) seine +ollstrecker1 Berlin-Grunewald: Arani (*'(1

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page_!1! #age '(' 1 Martin BormannHitlers Schatten1 Guetersloh: 8igbert Mohn Gerlag (*'&1 ;oung Desmond1 /ommelB The esert "o41 New ;or7: Ear4er R Fow #ublishers Incor4orated (*0$1 Aawodny D1 B1 eath in the "orest1 Notre Dame: "niversity of Notre Dame #ress (*'&1 Aeller !berhard1 6eist )er "reiheitB er &$1 %uli1 Munich: Gotthold Mueller Gerlag (*')1 Aoller Albert1 Hitler 2rivat1 Duesseldorf: Droste Gerlag (*/*1

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page_!1!%0 #hoto 8ection Image not available #lace of Dustice and 4rison =Hoffmann -hoto> Image not available .ourtroom =Hoffmann -hoto> Image not available The tribunal from left to right: Golch7ov "88FC Ni7itchen7o "88FC Bir7ett !nglandC 9ord Dustice 9awrence !nglandC Biddle "8AC #ar7er "8AC de Gabres 6ranceC 6alco 6rance =Hoffmann -hoto> Image not available The defendants first ro,: Goering Eess Fibbentro4 Beitel Baltenbrunner Fosenberg 6ran7 6ric7 8treicher 6un7 8chacht secon) ro,: DoenitH Faeder 8chirach 8auc7el Dodl #a4en 8eyss-In@uart 84eer Neurath 6ritHsche =Hoffmann -hoto> Image not available 9ord Dustice 9awrence =Hoffman -hoto> Image not available Mr1 Dustice Dac7son =&llstein -hoto> Image not available Dulius 8treicherr August (*)0 =&llstein -hoto> Image not available 8treicher during the trial =&llstein -hoto> Image not available Goering being congratulatd by Eitler on his forty-fifth birthday =&llstein -hoto> Image not available Goering in court =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available Martin Bormann Fudolf Eess and Fobert 9ey at a meeting of Feichsleiter in (*)0 =&llstein -hoto> Image not available Fudolf Eess in 84andau =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available Eess during the trial =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available Alfred Fosenberg in 9ondon (*)) =&llstein -hoto> Image not available Fosenberg during the trial =Hoffmann -hoto> Image not available Doachim von Fibbentro4 6oreign Minister =&llstein -hoto> Image not available Fibbentro4 at the singng of the ??friendshi4 treatyI with the 8oviet "nion with 8talin =right> and Molotov =seate)> =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available Fibbentro4 tal7ing with his lawyer Martin Eorn at Nuremberg =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available .onstantin von Neurath =right> with Eermann Goering at a rece4tion for .ount .iano =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available Neurath with his daughter after his release from 84andau =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available Gice-.hancellor 6ranH von #a4en with Eitler and Goebbels =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available #a4en after his arest at Ninth Army Eead@uarters =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available #a4en Ambassador in An7ara =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available E,almar 8chacht and the 6uechrer =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available 8chacht and his wife after the Nuremberg verdict =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available -alther 6un7 in 84andau =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available 6un7 ta7ing office as Minister of !conomics1 Goering at left =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available -ilhelm 6ric7 Minister of the Interior =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available remberg =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available Baldur von 8chirach with boys of the Eitler,ugend (*)' =&llstein -hoto> Image not available 8chirach at Nuremberg =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available !rnst Baltenbrunner after his sentence =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available 6ield Marshal -ilhelm Beitel =right> with Admiral Faeder and 6ield Marshal Milch greeting the 6uehrer in March (*/& =SD)). +erlg -hoto> Image not available Beitel in the courtroom =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available General Alfred Dodl =Luise %o)l -hoto> Image not available Dodl in the courtroom =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available !rich Faeder and Barl DoenitH (*)* =&llstein -hoto> Image not available DoenitH after his release from 84andau

=!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available Admiral !rich Faeder =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available Eans 6ran7 Minister of Dustice (*)) =&llstein -hoto> Image not available 6ran7 as Governor General in #oland (*/$ =&llstein -hoto> Image not available Artur 8eyss-In@uart in Gienna =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available 8eyss-In@uart after the Anschluss =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available 6ritH 8auc7el after he was named #leni4otentiary for the Allocation of 9abor =SD)). +erlag -hoto> Image not available Albert 84eer =!i)e !orl) -hoto> Image not available Eans 6ritHche =SD)). +erlag -hoto>

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page_!1$ #age '(* Inde< A Adam Gen1 -ilhelm (*% ))$ Adenauer Bonrad 0%' A)miral Hi22er =shi4> )%+ Adolf Eitler Division 0+& Adolf Eitler schools &*% &** Adolf Eitler S2en)e ($) Aggressive war ( &* )0+C as crime / (&(0 (*C conce4t of ($(0C trial of individuals for (&()C Fussian 4osition on ()C conce4t re war of liberation ()C Germany indicted for waging &)C relation to international law )'$'( 0%+*( Ahrens .ol1 6riedrich +) Alabama =shi4> )%0n Albania (0 Albert Dr1 Eeinrich (+% Albrecht Fal4h G1 &(n Alderman 8idney 81 &(n Alfieri Dino (0/ ('$ ('& Allied .ontrol .ouncil (/n (% &* %) 00' Allied 8u4reme .ouncil / Allies: military occu4ation of Germany /C terror bombing of cities )) '$ %)%/ )'/C air su4remacy '&C attac7s on Fumanian oilfields */nC invasion of Normandy *0C submarine warfare 4olicy /&( Altmark =shi4> )+' )++ /(/ Alvensleben -erner von (%) Amen .ol1 Dohn Earlan &(n )&) American 8ociety of International 9aw 0%% Anders Gen1 -ladyslaw +&+/ Annamite =shi4> /$0 Anschluss. See Austria Anti-.omintern #act 0/$ Anti-Dewish -orld 9eague /+ Anti-8emitism: 8treicher?s /$0+ 2assimC history of /$/&C in "8A /(C in er Stuermer ///0C attem4ts to combat /*C in !ngland 0(C decrees issued by Bormann ($/C in .Hechoslova7ia (+(+&C in German youth movement &%/ &%' &*(*&1 See also .oncentration cam4sC De4ortationsC !insatH commandosC !<terminationsC 6orced laborC GhettosC DewsC Nuremberg 9aws Anti;Stuermer =news4a4er> /* Antonica =shi4> /$* Ardeatine .aves 0+& Argentina &% Army1 See German Army Army an) Navy %ournal 0'( Army Juarterly 0/( Aschaffenburg cam4 /&* Ashcan1 See International Military Tribunal Assmann Adm1 Burt )%$ Association of Dewish -ar Geterans 00 Astel Burt 0/00 Athenia =shi4> )%( 0&' 0)& Atlantis =shi4> /(/ Attlee .lement &' ((* Attolico Bernardo (0* AuschwitH cam4 %* ($( (+/ )(+ )&$ //0 //* /'0 /'' /+) /** 00' 00+

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page_!20 #age '&$ Austria: German invasion of &)C 6ric7 in &'C Anschluss +( (+' &(/(0 &)')+ &/(/& )&& //'/+ /0$ /0(0'C treatment of Dews +*C e<4ro4riation of 4ro4erty +*C National 8ocialism &() &(/C NaHi attac7 on .hurch &(0('C 4ost---I conditions //'/%C nationalist organiHations //+/% A,a Maru =shi4> )*+ A<mann Arthur )$&) B Bachmann Adm1 Dohannes )%/%0 Bach-Aelews7i !rich von dem )') /)* 0'0n Baeumler Alfred ()))/ Ba7y 9asHlo )&$ Bal7ans (* Basic "iel) Manual /ules of Lan) !arfare ="8A> &$n Beaverbroo7 9ord ((*C 4seudonym Dr1 9ivingston ((' Bechstein .arl &&% Bec7 .ol1 DWHef '( ('/ Bec7 Gen1 9udwig &&n ))( )/+ )+* 0'( 0%0 Beer Eall #utsch (($ &'$'( /&+ Belgium: --I war trials /C --I invasion by Germany ((nC --II invasion by Germany &) Bergen-Belsen cam4 /'' /+) Bergold 6riedrich ($+ Berlin (* Berliner Boersen0eitung =news4a4er> &/+ Berliner Tageblatt =news4a4er> &&+ Bernadotte .ount 6ol7e (0( (0* Bernburg hos4ital &+* Bertling 88 8tandartenfuehrer (0& Bethmann Eollweg Theobald von & ) ('% Bevin !rnest &' Biddle 6rancis ' (' (% &(n Bir7ett 8ir -illiam Norman &(n Bismarc7 .ount Gottfried von ()& Bismarc7 #rince :tto von (0% Bismarck =shi4> )%$ )%+ )%% Blac7 mar7et /)/ /+)+0 Blairlogie =shi4> )*0 Blasch7e Barl )&$ Blas7owitH Gen1 Dohannes )(0 /)( 0+( 0+& Blech 9eo &0( Blomberg 6ield Marshal -erner von +$ (** &$$ &$' )(& ))( ))/ )+& Bodelschwingh 6riedrich von &+/ BodenschatH Gen1 Barl */ Boehm Georg 00+ Boersen0eitung =news4a4er> &(( Bohle !1 -1 (0( Bonde Baron Bnut '( '& %' Bonin .olonel von )// Bonnet Georges ('& Boris Bing of Bulgaria )%% Bormann Gerda Buch ($() ($% Bormann Martin '$ (&0 (&' (&* (/& &*% )$0 )$' )(/ )(* )&0 )/$ /&$ /%)%' /*& 0$' 0&% 0%)C disa44earance of &0 ($+%C named at IMT &0C trial in absentia &+C 4lan to eliminate Dews /*C relationshi4 to Eitler ** ($) ($'* ((&C for #arty control of 8tate ($$C 4hysi@ue ($$C biogra4hical s7etch ($$(C role in murder of Badow ($(C rise in #arty ($( ($) ($'C attitude toward 8lavs ($(&C relationshi4 with Eimmler ($&C scorched-earth orders ($/C a44roves lynching of Allied airmen ($/C anti-8emitism ($/0C antireligion efforts ($0C role in e<ecutions ($0C sentence at IMT ($%C attitude toward communism ($* Bosch Dr1 Barl (*& Bose Eerbert von &(( &(& &(% //( Bottai Giuse44e (0/ Brand Dagmar ($& Brand Doel )&$ Brauchitsch 6ield Marshal -alther von '% ))$ ))* )0/ 00%0* 0'$n 0+( Braun !va ($( ($) ($+ ($% Braun :tto (%' Bredow .ol1 Burt von (*% (** Brest-9itovs7 Treaty /) British Manual of Military La, &$n Bross -erner */ ('$ Brown #hili4 Marshall )0' Bro,ning =shi4> )*0 Bruc7mann Eugo &&% Bruening Eeinrich ((& (+*%+ 2assim &$/ &$0 &&% &'0 Brundage .olonel (') Buchenwald cam4 /)n )+& /'( /'& /'% /*) 0(* Buehler Dr1 Dosef /)% Bullitt -illiam .1 &&' &/&

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page_!21 #age '&( Bund Duetscher Maedel /' &%) &*+ &*% )$& Bun,es Dr1 Eermann *& Burc7hardt .arl Da7ob (0%0* Burgdorf Gen1 -ilhelm ($( Bussche Gen1 !rich von dem (*+*% . .anaris Adm1 -ilhelm )(* )&* )/$ )'$ )+/ /)$ 0'% 0+0+' *a22ellini =submarine> /$) /$0 .arls Admiral Folf )*& .avallero Marshal "go ('& .enter #arty =German> (+* (%( (%& &$/ &$0 &'' .hamberlain Eouston 8tewart /( (&% )$0 0%& .hamberlain Neville ('$ .hristiansen Gen1 6riedrich .hristian /') /+* /*&n .hurchill 8ir -inston % (+ &(n (0% )/0 )%) )%+ /(/ /&&nC warning on war crimes ': sto4s investigation of Batyn murders +&C view of Eess? flight ((' ((+C letter from Fibbentro4 (/*0(C on intervention in Norway )+0++C orders for conduct of submarine warfare )*' .iano .ount GaleaHHo */ (0)0/ (0%'$ ('& ('/ .icero =s4y> ('0 &(' .la44er Faymond 0/( .lay Gen1 9ucius D1 0(% .lemenceau Georges / ('' .ollective security 4olicy ($(& ('' )0'1 See also 6rance .ommando :rder )00 )0% )%(%' 0+$ .ommissar :rder )(% ))0)' 00%0* 0'' 0'+ 0+$ 0+& .ommunist #arty =German> '+ (($ (%& (%' (%+ (*$ &$/C e<cluded from Feichstag &$)C dissolution of &'+1 See also Feichstag fire .oncentration cam4s + &% *$ ('&') &(' &0$ &%$ &** )(+ )&) )&/C tattoos in % *C brutality toward children *C starvation in *C recovery of ,ewelry in *C gassing *C first founded '+C forced labor in /*&*/1 See also AschaffenburgC AuschwitHC Bergen-BelsenC BuchenwaldC DachauC 6lossenbuergC EadamarC MauthausenC NeuengammeC :radourC :ranienburgC Favensbruec7C 8achsenhausenC 8aganC 8obiborC Theresienstadt Gught .onfessional 8ynod =Bekenntnissyno)e> of the Alt4reussische "nion of the 9utheran .hurch &+0+' .orbin .harles )++ *ossack =shi4> )+' /(/ .oulondre Fobert (0/ .uno -ilhelm (*& .Hechoslova7ia %'C invasion of by Germany &)C under German occu4ation (+(+) D Dachau cam4 * 0& 0/ &/$ &0/ &%$ )&( /0' /*) 00' Dahlerus Birger '( %' %+ (0/ ('/ Daladier bdouard )++ Davidson .a4tain von )+/ Davignon Dac@ues (0/ (+$ &/' earborn .n)e2en)ent =news4a4er> /& Degrelle .ol1 9Jon /0* Democratic #arty =German> &&) Denmar7 German invasion of (0n &) De4ortations 0 (* ($0 ('& )$/0 /)%/$ Deterding Eenri &&*n iamantin =shi4> )*0 Dibelius Martin &+0 Dietrich :tto ((( ((/ ((+ /0) 0)/ Dietrich 8e44 //( //& Dimitrov Georgi '+'% Dir7sen Eerbert von ('$ Dittmar Gen1 Burt 0)( Dodd Thomas D1 + &(n Dodd -illiam !1 &&' &)( &/) DoenitH Anna )*) DoenitH !mil )*) DoenitH Ingeborg -eber )*)n DoenitH Adm1 Barl +) ($% )&* )00 )0+ )0% )'& )'% )+( )+/ )%( )*$ 000C named by IMT ' &0C defense at IMT )) /$&) /&(C a44ointed Eitler?s successor ($*C 4ostEitler cabinet (') /%$ /**C involvement in .ommando :rder )%0C relationshi4 with Eitler )%+ )*&*) /(/(0C charges against at IMT )*& /$& /$) /$+ /$*C National 8ocialism )*& /(0('C bac7ground and early career )*)C as commander in chief of submarines )*)/(/ 2assimC role in Laconia affair /$)+C alleged role in -eleus sin7ing /$+()C o44osition to Fussian cam4aign /(+C relationshi4 with Goering

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page_!22 #age '&& /(*&$C arrest by Allies /&&C conviction and sentence by IMT /&&&) Dohnanyi Dr1 Eans von &)* Dollfuss !nglebert &() &(/ )&& //+ //* /0$ /0/ 0)( Dostler Gen1 Anton 0+$ Dresden )) /$ res)en =shi4> )%0n Dressler-Andress Eorst 0)) Drunon bdouard /( Duehring !ugen /$ Duesterberg Theodor (%$ (%( Duisberg .arl &/' umont; )A&rville =shi4> /$0 Dun7ir7 *0 Dustbin1 See International Military Tribunal ! !arle George +& !bert 6riedrich (%( (*( !c7 Ba4itaenleutnant EeinH /$+ /$*() 0+0 !den Anthony (&0C Fibbentro4 letter to (/*0( E)inburgh /evie, ((n !hrenburg Ilya /(% !ichmann Adolf (+n '$'( (/) ('& (+/ )&$ )&( )&/ )&+ //0 0/' 0%)C esca4e of &+C attends -annsee .onference +0C trial ($+ )('(+ !insatH commandos (&' (/) )(0(+ )%) 00*'$ !insatHstab Fosenberg %0 *( *& ()+)* /++1 See also Fosenberg !lsenhower Gen1 Dwight D1 0'/ Em)en =shi4> )*) !nabling Act &$/0 &'+1 See also Eitler !ndre Gites )&$ !4enstein Eermann von '/ !stonia (0 Euro2iaeische /evue (+& !uthanasia ($0 0'''+1 See also !<terminations !vans Fobert #aul )%/ !wart =British .ommando> )%0 !<ner Dr1 6ranH )) )0) )00 )0%'( 0/& !<terminations 0* (* /$ '& +0 &+++* /+% 0%)%/C of 8lavs %C cam4s for 0/ )(+ )&) )&/ /)% /)* /'' =see also .oncentration cam4s>C Goering?s order for +0C in the !ast by the 88 and 8D /)% 0+$+&1 See also Anti-8emitismC !insatH commandosC !uthanasiaC Gas chambers 6 6abres Donnedieu de )')n 6alco Fobert ($n (% &(n 6al7enhausen Gen1 Ale<ander von 0($ 6al7enhorst Gen1 Ni7olaus von ))/ )/( "anan Hea) =shi4> )*0 6arben I1 G1 &&n &&% &/' &0/ /+) 0(( 6ath Eildegard ((/ 6eder Gottfried /)n (*(*& &/% 6egelein 88 Gen1 Eermann ($+ )(* 6ichte Dohann Gottlieb /( 6inal 8olution1 See !<terminations 6inland: British and 6rench aid to (0nC invasion by Fussia )+0+' 6ischboec7 Dr1 Eans +* /0& 6ive-#ower Declaration of December (( (*)& (*( 6lic7 6riedrich &&n &0& 0(* 6lossenbuerg cam4 &/$ 6oc7 Baroness .arin von1 See Goering .arin 6o77er com4any '0 6ol7ish -or7ing Association =Goel7ische Arbeitsgemeinschaft> &'/ 6orced labor &0 0$'&&C use of Germans in )&))C feeding of %$%(C use by Germany %&%)C in Fussia %)C use of children )$/C in #oland /)0)'C in 6rance 0$% 0($ 0(( 0&$&(C in Italy 0($C rations for 0()(/ 6ord Eenry /& &&*n )$0 0%& 6our-;ear #lan '$ +0 +% +* %& (&' &)+ /++1 See also Goering "raenkische Ceitung =news4a4er> /& 6rance ) / (+n &&C list of --I war criminals )C ,udges at IMT 0C underground in 0C view of NaHis at IMT +C re4resented at 9ondon Agreements (%C members of IMT &(nC wanted to try a Bru44 &+C anti-8emitism in /(C Armistice of .am4iVgne *&C German confiscation of 4ro4erty in *& ()%C 4ost-Gersailles security system (/+ ('*C role in Norwegian cam4aign )+++%C forced labor in 0$% 0($ 0(( 0(% 0&$&( "rance %uive= La =Drunon> /( 6ranUois-#oncet AndrV '( (0/ (0* ('% (+$ (+* (*( (*' &)' 6ran7 6rau /)/ 6ran7 Eans + * (&$ /0+ /*+C guilt of

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page_!23 #age '&) 'C named by IMT &0C blac7-mar7et dealings used against ($+C bac7ground and early #arty activity /&+&%C conce4t of su4remacy of law /&%&* //)/0C @uestions authority of 88 /&*C #arty and 8tate offices held /&*)(C does research of Eitler?s family tree /)$)(C relieved of #arty offices /)(C Governor General of #oland /)(/(C racism /)( /)& //$/(C confiscation of art and 4ro4erty /)) /)0C imitation of Eitler /)0C ob,ects to de4ortations of Dews /)+ /)*C 7nowledge of own guilt /)* //( //0C relationshi4 with Eimmler /)* //(C role in Foehm 4utsch //(/&C ??4acifying actionI in #oland ////0C conversion to Foman .atholicism //0C use of forced labor 0$* 0(/ 6ran7 Barl Eermann (+(+) (+0 &%$ /*+ 6ran7enberger family /)( "rankfurter Ceitung =news4a4er> &($ &0( 6ree Germany movement &* 6reisler Foland )&' 6ric7 Eenriette 8chmidt &'( 6ric7 -ilhelm '+ (%+ (*( (*' &$$C guilt of 'C indictment at IMT &' &%(C anti-8emitism /% &'+'*C drafter of !nabling Act &$0C role in Beer Eall #utsch and early #arty activity &'$''C bac7ground and early life &'('&C anti-8emitic legislation of &'( &'+'% &+( &%$C as legal draftsman for NaHis &') &'++( &+++%C a44ointment to Eitler?s .abinet &''C su44ort of Eitler &+)C role in #arty?s war with church &+)++C involvement in e<terminations &+*C re4laces Neurath in .Hechoslova7ia &%$ 6ric7e Adm1 Burt /$/ 6ritsch .ol1 Gen1 6reiherr -erner von &&n '%'* +$ (+$ )+& )%% 0'0 0+' 6ritH Dr1 EeinH 0/) 00$ 6ritHsche Eans )& 0%&C indictment at IMT &' )(C ca4ture by Fussians )$ 0&'C broadcasts 0&0 0)'/(C testimony at IMT 0&')$ 0/)/'C alleged recruiting for -erewolves 0&%&* 0/*C role in aggression 0)$C bac7ground and early career 0)(C relationshi4 with Goebbels 0)())C anti-8emitism 0)))/ 0/$/( 0///+ 00$C 4osition in Third Feich 0)/C 4ress briefings 0)/)0C defense at IMT 0/&/) 0/%C visit to :ranienburg 0/+/%C trial by German courts 0/*0$C 4ardon 00( 6rontbann organiHation ($( 6uerstenberg =ban7er> ()+ 6uller 81 F1 Dr1 &&' &)' 6un7 6rau: im4risonment )$ 6un7 -alther &% +* &&' &&% &// 0)/ 0%&C indictment at IMT &' &/*0$C role in dismissal of 8chacht &/0/'C bac7ground and early career &/+C economic 4ro4osals &/%/*C election to Feichstag and #arty a44ointments &/%/*C treatment of Dews &0(C conviction at IMT and later trials &000' G Gafencu Grigore )/ Galen Bisho4 .lemens August .ount von &+% Gamelin Gen1 Maurice )++ )+% Garbett Archbisho4 .yrill 0/( Gas chambers * +'1 See also !<terminations Gathen Doachim von und Hur ))/ Gaus 6riedrich )& )0 6efolgschaft 3/etinue5 =boo7> )$$ Geneva .onvention &( George G Bing of !ngland (+0 German Air 6orce =9uftwaffe> '$ */*01 See also Goering German Army &&n (&' 0%/C 8i<th Army )) '$ *0 ))& 0)$C 6reecor4s !44 (($C Army Grou4 North (/( 0'*C Army Grou4 .enter )$/C Army Grou4 A )/)C Army Grou4 8outh 0($C .ommunications Fegiment 0)+C !ighteenth Army 0''C #anHer Grou4 ) 0'+ 0'*C 6ourth Army 0+(C Adolf Eitler Division 0+&C Ist Army .or4s 0+)C TTT Army .or4s 0+)+/C T9Ist Army #anHer .or4s 0+/C guilt of leaders 'C falsely accused of mass murder at Batyn % +( 0%)C regulations for obeying su4erior orders &$C feud with Gesta4o '%C relation to 8A and 88 +$ ($' )(/(% )&' 0+&+)C anti-8emitism in &(((& 0'/''C enters Austria =IThe 6lower -arI> &(/(0C role in e<terminations 00*'$ 0+$+(C involvement in Duly &$ 4lot 0'&C action against 4artisans 0'*C racist doctrines and treatment of Gy4sies 0'*+$1 See also DodlC BeitelC :B-

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page_!24 #age '&/ German Believers =sect> &+) &+0 German Brotherhood =Austria> //+ German .hristians =sect> &+/ &+0 German 6ol7ish #arty =Deutsche Goel7ische #artei> &')'/ 6ermania =news4a4er> (+* German Nationalist #arty &0& German Nationalist #eo4le?s #arty &$' &)$ German Navy &0 )'%/&/ 2assimC guilt of leaders 'C defense of tu @uo@ue ))C 4ost---I mutinies )'*C follows 4rovisions of Gersailles )+$+(C waging of submarine warfare )*//(/1 See also DoenitHC Faeder German #eo4le?s #arty &)$ &0& German -or7ers? #arty =later National 8ocialist -or7ers? #arty> /) German -or7 6ront =DA6 Deutsche Arbeitsfront> &*' Germany: guilt of leaders ( & ' () ('C res4onsibility for --I )C Allied military occu4ation of /C guilt of ,udges 'C guilt of ban7ers 'C guilt of industrialists ' (/n && =see also Bru44>C conce4t of collective guilt + )0)' 00'C mass e<terminations in +* &/ =see also !<terminations>C --I re4arations ((n (%0 &&/&0 &0)C "8 intervention against (&C Fussian view of historical im4erialism ()C invasion of 8candinavia (0n )+/+*C economy and rearmament && &) &0 &' %) (0+ ('* (*( &// )$( )$) )$/ /%)%/ /*(*& 0$(& =see also 6un7C 8chacht>C Lebensraum &&C violations of Gersailles Treaty &&C racism &) /$/( 0&0' &+++* =see also Anti-8emitismC Dews>C leaves International Disarmament .onference and 9eague of Nations &) (+0C occu4ation of the Fhineland &) &/ %%C nonaggression 4act with Fussia &) &/ )& )0 (0* )*$C Fussian cam4aign &) &/ )0(0& )0*'$ 0)%)*C invasion of .Hechoslova7ia &)C invasion of Austria &)C relationshi4 with Da4an &) )/C collaboration with Italy &)C invasion of #oland &/ %& 0)0C trials of war criminals by &%&*C denaHification 4roceedings in &*C bombing of cities ))C invention of term ??Third Feich I /$C 4ost---I situation /$ /& &0) 0%(C 4ublic unaware of atrocities 0/C Fesistance in 0/ (+0 &(' &&0 &*/*0 0%)C (*&+ amnesty ''C relationshi4 of #arty to 8tate ($' =see also National 8ocialist German -or7ers? #arty>C 4olitical 4arties in (*)$ (%&nC labor unions dissolved &$/ &/+C youth movement in &%)%/ =see also 8chirach>C ,uvenile delin@uency in )$$C --I bloc7ade against )**1 See also National 8ocialist German -or7ers? =NaHi> #arty Gessler Dr1 :tto )%* Gesta4o =Geheime 8taats4oliHei> (+( &+( &+&C criminality of ('C establishment of (+ '+C at IMT 00) 00/ 00+ 00% 0') 0'/ Geyl #ieter /'& Ghettos 0& +*%$ )&$ /)/ Gilbert Dr1 G1 M1 (&& ('$ Giraud Gen1 Eenri ))) Gisevius Eans '* +$ &$' &&' &+&+) Glaise-Eorstenau !dmund von //* /0$ /0) 6loire =shi4> /$0 Gluec7s Fichard )&) 6neisenau =shi4> 0'$ Gobineau .ount Dose4h Arthur de /$ (&% 0%& Godt Adm1 !berhard /$' Goebbels #aul Dose4h '$ '* +'+% ($$ ($% (&' (/& ('+ (%)n (*& &$& &($ &() &&+ &/) )%+ /&$ /)( /)/ /0) /'* /%) /*$ /*& 0() 0&0 0&+ 0)()0C guilt of 'C re4resentatives for at IMT &'C death before trial &+C organiHed (ristallnacht /% +%C su44lants Goering '&C witness at Eitler?s wedding ($(C fear of Bormann ($+ Goedeler .arl &(' &)* Goering .arin '0 '' Goering !dda // Goering !mmy 8onnemann )$ %+n *(*& Goering 6ranHis7a '/ Goering Eeinrich !rnst ')'/ Goering Eermann &&n ($$ ($+ ((( ()0 (/% (0) (0' ('/ ('+ (%) (*& (*' (*+ (*%n (** &$$ &() &&' &&+ &)$ &/% &/* &'' &+) &+/ )$' )&/ )&* ))& ))/ )%+ /(+ /&+ /*'*+ /*% 0$$( 0$& 0$' 0(* 000C guilt of 'C founds Gesta4o (+ '+ &+(C loss of

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page_!2 #age '&0 favor in #arty &/ '$'( '&C named as Eitler?s successor &/ &' '$ '%C at IMT &/ )/ 0*'& +$ +( +/+0 *$C role in economy and rearmament &0 +( +0 *$ &0)C relationshi4 to 8treicher //C art collection /' ') %0 *$*)C ()% /++ =see also !isatHstab Fosenberg>C anti-8emitism /* '& +0 +%%$C over 9uftwaffe '& */*'C ??.all me Meyer I '&C calls -annsee .onference '&C meets Eerbert Eoover ')C bac7ground and early life ')'/C Air 6orce 4ilot in --I '/ *0*'C 4ost---I ,obs in 8candinavia '0C marries Baroness .arin von 6oc7 '0C early #arty activity '0 ''C head of 8A ''C addiction to mor4hine ''C election to Feichstag '' '+ (%%%*C early 8tate offices '+ &$( &$& &$/C accuses .ommunists of Feichstag fire '+'% &$)C 4resides over trial of 6ritsch '% +$C role in Foehm 4utsch '*C involvement in downfall of Blomberg +$C arrest and treatment by Allies +$+(C role in Anschluss +( /0) /00 /0'C charges on Batyn murders +(+/C Green #ortfolio 4lan for Fussia %$C transmits scorched-earth order %&C role in shooting of Iterror fliers I %)%/C fidelity to Eitler %0%'C attem4ts to 4revent --II %'%+C IS of %+C relationshi4 with Fibbentro4 %+ (0*'$ ('0C suicide *'C reaction to Eess? flight to Britain ((+C confrontation with Eess at IMT (&(C relationshi4 with Faeder )+&+) Graefe Albrecht von &') Grafennec7 hos4ital &+* 6raf S2ee =shi4> )%% Great Britain: ca4tives mistreated in --I )C 4ost---I security of /C ,udges at IMT 0 &(nC members of "N -ar .rimes .ommission 0C 9ondon Agreement (%C attac7ed by Da4an &)C 4re4ared invasion of Norway &% )(C handboo7 of irregular warfare ))C .ommandos )) )/$C anti-8emitism in /( 0(C Air 6orce *0C Naval .onference of Dune (% (*)0 (0+C submarine warfare conduct )*//$$ 2assimC use of forced labor 0(%(* Greece: ,udges at an IMT 0C German invasion of &) Greenland (0n 6reer =shi4> /$$( GritHbach !rich '0n Groener Gen1 -ilhelm (%$%& &00 Gros AndrJ ($n (&() Grossdeutscher Bund &*/ Gruber Burt &*& &*) Gruhn !rna +$ Guderian General EeinH 0/$ Guenter Eans 61 B1 /$ &'0 Guertner 6ranH &+% 6un =shi4> )*' Guthrie Dr1 See 8imon 8ir Dohn Gy4sies mass murders of % E Eabicht Theodor 0)& EQcha !mil (+( ))& Eadamar cam4 &++ &+% Ealder .ol1 Gen1 6ranH )/) )// 0'' Ealifa< 9ord '( %' (+$ Eamilton Du7e of (() ((0 Eammerstein-!@uord Gen Burt von (*+** &$( Eartenstein Ba4itaenleutnant -erner /$)' Eartheim hos4ital &+* Eassell "lrich von (() (+$ &)* &/) Eaushofer Albrecht (($ ((&(0 (&( Eaushofer Barl (($ ((& ((/ ((0 (&( Eay Action (&' )$&/ 0$'n Eedin 8ven (0* Eeisig :berleutnant #eter Dosef /$% /(( /() Eelldorf .ount -olf von +$ (00 ))(n Eenderson 8ir Neville '( '& (0/ ('/ Eermann Goering Division )/% Eerriot !douard (%0 Eess Ilse ((((& ((0 ((+ Eess Fudolf &&n )0 **($( ($) ($0 (/& (0( (0' (*/ &)$ &*& /&+ //& /0/ 0%&C guilt of 'C indictment at IMT &0&' ((* (&/C 4eace efforts &' ((%C flight to Britain &' ($' ((&(% (&/C relationshi4 to Eitler &' '% ($*(&C sanity &' ($* ((+&& (&/C order to 7ee4 Dews in industry 00C in 9andsberg 4rison ''C bac7ground and early life ($*($C role in #arty and 8tate (($(& &$&C wife selected by Eitler ((((&C interest in @uac7ery and astrology (()(/C o44osition to attac7 on Fussia ((/C interrogations by IMT (&$&&C confrontation with Goering at IMT (&(C defense

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page_!2! #age '&' at IMT (&&C final statement at IMT (&&&)C confinement in 84andau (&/&0 Eessler .a4t1 Guenter )*)n /$' Eeusinger Gen1 Adolf 00* Eeuss Theodor &$/ Eeydrich Feinhard &' '& '* +0 +' +* %& ($+ (+) (+/ &+& )$+ )(0 )(% )(* )&& /)$ /)(n /)+ /)% /'' 0$' 0(/ 0// 0/' 0'$n Eiedler Dohann Georg /)$ Eimmler Eeinrich &&n &0 '$ +$ %/ ($$ ($) ($+ (&' (&* (/& ('$ ('+ (+( (*/ &($ &)$ &/0 &0/ &+& &+) )(* )&$ )&)&0 )&+ ))) )0$ )%* /&$ /&+ /&* /)/ /)+ /)* /// //% /0* /'$ /+$ /+( /%) /** 0(( 0(/ 0(0 0&% 000 00' 00*C guilt of 'C AryaniHed .hrist /0C 4ro4osals to eliminate Dews /*C su44lants Goering '&C over Gesta4o '%C role in Foehm 4utsch '*C organiHation Ahnenerbe ()+C recruits for 88 (/&C control of concentration cam4s ('&')C as Minister of Interior &%$C relationshi4 to youth movement &*% &**C role in de4ortations )$0C head of 88 )() )(/ )(+C head of Eome Army )(%nC distrust of 6ran7 /)/ Eindenburg Ma,1 :s7ar von (0' (%$ (%( (*' (*+ &$$ Eindenburg #aul von Benec7endorf und von )* (0+n ('% (%$&() 2assim &0& &+/ &+' &*/ )/& //&C listed as --I war criminal & )C Dews see7 clemency from 00n Hin)enburg =dirigible> /0 Ei44er Admiral )'* Eirschfeld Eans Ma< /'0 Eitler Adolf: named as war criminal 'C assassination 4lots against &&n )* '* ($& ($/ )&/&+ )// )+/C su44orted by industrialists &&n &&%&* &0&0)C relationshi4 with Goering &/ '$'( '+ '% %' *& */ *'C relationshi4 with Eess &' ($*(& ((' ((+C becomes .hancellor )* '+ (0' (++ (%+&$( &'''+C ado4ts name ??Third Feich I /$C relationshi4 with 8treicher /$ /& // 0+C anti-8emitism /$ /& /% 0$ 00n +%C early #arty activity /) '0 &'$'( &')'/ /&%C as G-man /)nC AryaniHation of .hrist /0C bans er Stuermer 0$C conceived of as German hero 00C in 9andsberg 4rison '' &'$'(C during Foehm 4utsch '* //(/)C at marriage of Blomberg +$C scorched-earth order for Fussia %&C order for e<ecution of Iterror fliers I %/C misinformed about "8A 4olicy %*C collection of artwor7 *&C relationshi4 with Bormann **($)C marriage to !va Braun ($(C death ($% ($*C admiration of 8talin ($%C names successors ($*C a44ointments of Fosenberg (&0&+ ()0C as collective will of German 4eo4le ()/ /&* //)C see7s Fibbentro4?s counsel on foreign affairs (0'C terms to #oland ('/C relationshi4 with Neurath (+$ (+/+0C in (*)& run-off elections (%$ (%(C German citiHenshi4 (%( &'0 &''C relationshi4 with #a4en (%)C ta7es control of government &$(+ &()C during Anschluss &(/ /**0/C dismisses 8chacht &/0/'C indifference to religion and acts against &+)C attention to youth &*$C ta7eover of Army ))( ))/)0 ))*/$C 4re4arations for Fussian cam4aign )'$C relationshi4 with Faeder )%+%*C role in Laconia affair /$/C conduct of submarine warfare /$+ /(/C family bac7ground /)$)(C attitude toward law //&//C rise of 0%0 Eitler Alois /)$ Eitler Anna Glasl-Eoerer /)$ Eitler 6ranHis7a MatHelsberger /)$ Eitler Blara #oelHl /)$)( Eitler,ugend =Eitler ;outh ED> ($/ &%))$& 2assim )($ 00+C 88 #anHer Division &*+ EodHa L Milan (') Eoegner -ilhelm (++ Eoess Fudolf %* )(+ //0C role in murder of Badow ($( Eoettl -ilhelm )(* Eoffmann August /($ /() Eoffmann Eeinrich ($0 ($' )$0 Eolland1 See Netherlands Eoover Eerbert ') Eorthy Adm1 Mi7lWs */ )%% Eossbach 9t1 .ol1 6riedrich ('*n Eossbach conference ('* )+* Eossenfelder the Feverend &+) Eugenberg Alfred (%( (*0 (*' (** &$( &$& &$' 0)) Eull .ordell 0 (+

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page_!2" #age '&+ Eundt-Fadows7y Eartwig /( Eungary * ($0 I Iceland (0n .mmorality in the Talmu) 3&nmoral im Talmu)> =Fosenberg> ()) IMT1 See International Military Tribunal Indochina &) InnitHer .ardinal &(0 International 9aw .ommittee of the "nited Nations 0%% International Military Tribunal =IMT>: American attitude toward (C 4reconce4tions &C documents & )$ )( )))/C site 0'C industrialists before '+C false charges on Batyn massacre %C indictment of organiHations (0(+ 00)00 00+ 0')C established by 9ondon Agreement (%C charter of (%&$C ma,or crimes at (*C ma7eu4 of court &(C general indictment &&&/C twenty-four defendants> &/&+ =see also individual defendants>C resultant trials &%C German defense counsel )$)' 0000'C law under which defendants tried )(C conduct of )()&C Ashcan Dustbin de4ots ('0 )0)C defense of su4erior orders )0+C indictment of General 8taff and Eigh .ommand 00)00 00%+'C indictment of Gesta4o 00) 00/ 00+ 00% 0') 0'/C indictment of 8A 00)0+ 0')C indictment of 88 and 8D 00)0% 0') 0'/C indictment of 9eadershi4 .or4s 00) 00' 0') 0'/C indictment of .abinet 00) 00/ 00+ 0') International Fed .ross +) )&& )&) 0%% 0%* Israel % .sraelitisches !ochenblatt fuer )ie Sch,ei0 =news4a4er> 0 0/( Iswols7y Ale<ander #etrovitch ()0 Italy )C --I alliance with Germany /C attac7s on 6rance and Albania (0nC collaboration with Germany &)C submarine warfare /$() D Dac7son Fobert E1 +)) 2assim '$ '% +& +/ +0 %/ %%%* ('( ('0 &/$ &// )00 00) 0'(n 0*( Daec7el 6ritH /&( Daeger .ol1 6riedrich 0+& Daeger 8taff /*& 0$$ Dahrreiss Eermann )0) )0+ Da4an ) )%$%(C trial of war criminals 0C war of aggression (0nC nonaggression 4act with Fussia (0nC collaboration with Germany &)C attac7 on #earl Earbor &)C conduct of naval war ))C submarine warfare /$( Deu de #aume *& Dewish .ouncil =#oland> /)+)% Dewish 6ront 9ine 8oldiers /* Dews: atrocities against 0 =see also !<terminations>C mass murders of % ('( )(0 )(+ )(% )&$&) )&/C Eungarians in AuschwitH *C treatment in .Harist Fussia ((C crimes against lin7ed to aggressive war (&C as ob,ects of racist doctrines /$/& =see also Anti-8emitism>C alleged res4onsibility for ills of Germany /$ /& /)C charged with Mar<ism and Darwinism /&C confiscation of 4ro4erty of /'/+ +0 +' (&+ ()%)* &0$ &0( /'+'% /+'++C #olish in Germany /+/%C attem4ts to combat anti-8emitic 4ro4aganda /*C Madagascar 4ro4osed as home for /*C NaHi attitude toward emigration of 0&C in German Army 00 &'*+$ 0'/'0C ste4s ta7en against in Germany +0+*C treatment in Austria +* ($0C badges for +*C treatment in Eungrary ('&C treatment in Greece ('&C first attac7s on &$&C German citiHenshi4 revo7ed &$/C legislation against &'/ &'++(C definition of by law &'*C steriliHation in Netherlands &++C treatment in Netherlands /'0'* Dodl Gen1 Alfred & )) &&' ))& )/( 0($ 000 0'* 0+( 0+&C named at IMT &0C NaHi 4rograms 0(C awe of Eitler )&% )/& )/+/* )0&C role in .ommissar :rder ))0 ))' )// )/* )0/ )'/C disagreements with Eitler )/&//C National 8ocialism of )///0C early life and career )/0/+C defense at IMT )/*0$ )0''&C orders issued for Eitler )0$0(C )0/C view of Fussian cam4aign )0(0& )0*'$C attitude toward own guilt )0(0)C anti-8emitism )0&C role in .ommando :rder )0/ )00C charges against at IMT )000'C sentence and im4risonment )'&'/C arrest by Allies /&&

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page_!2# #age '&% Dodl 6erdinand )00 Dodl Irma )/' Dodl 9uise )/' )0) )0/ Dowett 8ir -illiam (/ (% Duly &$ 4lot1 See Eitler Adolf Dung !dgar &$/ &$+ &($(& &(% &+) //( Dungmaedel &%) &%% &*+ )$( Dungvol7 &%) &%% &*+ )$( B Baas Monsignor (+* (%+ &$/ &'' Badow -alter ($( Bahr Gustav Fitter von &'( Baiser -ilhelm Institut =Berlin> 0) Ballus EeinH Barl &0( Baltenbrunner Dr1 !rnst '( %/ )0+0% /0' /*& 000 0%&C guilt of 'C named at IMT &0C early #arty offices )(%(*C role in e<terminations )(% )&$&) )&+C head of F8EA )(* )&& )&%C bac7ground and early career )&&C defense at IMT )&)C re4orts to Eitler )&/&'C guilt on IMT charges )&+ Batyn forest murders % +( 0%) Baufbeuren hos4ital &+* (earney =shi4> /$( Beitel A4ollonia Gissering ))$ Beitel 9isa 6ontaine ))$ ))(n Beitel 6ield Marshal -ilhelm ($$ ($) (/& (*%n &&' )// )0/ )00 )0+ )0% )') )%+ )%% 0$' 000 0'0C guilt of 'C named by IMT &0C directive for Eimmler in Fussia )('C o44osition to Fussian cam4aign )&*C bac7ground and early career )&*)$C head of :B- )&* ))()0C orders for destruction and e<ecutions ))))/ )/$C role in .ommissar :rder ))0)'C anti-8emitism ))%C forced-labor decree ))*C relationshi4 with Eitler )/(C sentence at IMT )/& Belley Dr1 Douglas M1 ((/ Bellogg-Briand #act (& (0* )0'0+ )'$ 0*( Bem4ner Fobert M1 &(n Be44ler -ilhelm (*) (*/ &&*n &/% /0)0/ Bersten 6eli< ($* )(% Besselring 6ield Marshal Albert )&( )/%n )0/ )') 0($ 0+$ 0+& Betteler -ilhelm von &(( &()(0 Beynes Dohn Maynard &)) &0) Biel4ins7i von :bersturmbannfuehrer )&0 Billinger 6reiherr von (0& Bing Admiral !rnest Dose4h /$$( Birdorf !mil &&% Bir74atric7 Ivone ('0 (+$C 4seudonym Dr1 McBenHie ((0 Blagges Dietrich (%( &'' Bleemann Gen1 "lrich 0+& Bleist Gen1 !wald von 0'$ Blissura massacre 0+&+) Bluge 6ield Marshal Guenther von 0+( Bna44enschaft =4atriotic grou4> &%' Bno74loegen =Fesistance grou4> /'& Boch the Feverend &+' Boch !rich (&' (&+ ()$ (/& /)+ 0(& 0/' Boerner #aul 0$& Bonrad General )/) Bordt !rich (0/ BoHels7 cam4 +) BranHbuehler :tto +) )*$ /$& Brause-Densen .a4t1 #aulli '/ Brebs Albert &*& Brebs Gen1 Eans ($( Bri4o =Briminal4oliHei .riminal #olice> 00) (ristallnacht /+ /% +' +% (+$ &0( Brueger 6riedrich--ilhelm /)) /)* Bru44 Berta von &' Bru44 von Bohlen und Ealbach Alfried &+ Bru44 von Bohlen und Ealbach Gustav ' &&nC &'&+ &* (*& &&% &)$ &/'/+ &0& /+) Bube -ilhelm ()* &+/ Bubuscho7 !gon (*%n 0000+ Buechler 6ield Marshal Georg von 0'' 0'% 0'* 9 Laconia =shi4> /$)+ Laconia :rder /$' /$% 9a 6ollette .harles M1 &// 9ahousen Gen1 !rwin ('( ))))/ 0+) 9ammers Eans Eeinrich1 ($' (+& (+) &)*/$ )/$ 9anderHiehungsheime =youth> movement &%0 9andsberg 4rison '' (($ 9asch Barl /)/ Last Attem2t= The =Dahlerus> %+ 9aternser Dr1 Eans +) /(/ 0/& 000 00%'& 9atvia (0

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page_!2$ #age '&* 9ausanne Disarmament .onference at (%0%' 9awrence 9ord Dustice Geoffrey =#resident of the .ourt> (* &(n )()) +) %) %% (&$ 9eague of Nations (& (0n Lebensborn &*% Lebensraum && (($ &$' 9eeb 6ield Marshal -ilhelm von 0'' 0'+ 9ehmann Gen1 Fudolf 0+0+' 9eibstandarte =88 unit> ($) 9em4 :berleutnant )%(n 9enard #hili44 0) 9eningrad %$ 9enH =naval officer> /($ /(( /() 9eo4old .a4tain //* 9euschner -ilhelm (** 9ey Fobert + &0 (/& /*+ 9iatscheff .olonel 0&% 0&* 9ietH Eermann &%0%' Life magaHine (+ Light= The =news4a4er> /* 9indemann Gen1 6ritH &&/ 9i44mann -alter 0%+n 9ist 6ield Marshal 8igmund ))& )/) 9ithuania (0 9ivingston Dr1 See Beaverbroo7 Llan)overy *astle =shi4> ) 9loyd George David )/ 9ocarno #act ('* 9oesener Dr1 Bernhard &'*+$ 9oev 9orenH /)/ 9ohmann .a4tain )+$ 9ondon Agreement *($ (%1 See also International Military TribunalC 9ondon .onference 9ondon .onference (&(/ (*C definition of criminal aggression at (0C indictment of NaHi organiHations (0(+C establishes ty4e of trials to be held (+(%1 See also International Military TribunalC 9ondon Agreement 9ondon Times= The (0' 9ubbe Mannus van der '+n &$) 9udendorff Gen1 !rich & ) &'$ &'( &')n /&+ 0'0 9udin Eanns /&% 9udwigsburg &* 9uftwaffe1 See German Air 6orce 9u7acH Bela ($0 9u44e =mayor of Nuremberg> 0/ Lusitania =shi4> )** 9uther Martin ="nder 8ecretary of 8tate> ('('& 9u<embourg &) 9yngen 9ine )00 M MacArthur Gen1 Douglas 0 Mac7ensen 6ield Marshal August von 0'('& Ma77abi /* Manstein Gen1 6ritH !rich von )0/ )') /(+ 0'$ 0'0'' 0'* 0+) Marahrens Bisho4 &+' Mar7ov Dr1 Mar7o +& Mar7ull Dr1 ()( Marr -ilhelm /$ Mars -er7e =factory> /' Marshall Gen1 George .1 )/ Mar< Dr1 Eanns 0( Mass murders1 See !<terminations Matsuo7a ;osu7e */ Mauthausen cam4 )&(&) /'' /'% 0(* Ma<well-6yfe 8ir David ($n &(n )0 %* *0 (+0 May Barl %& Mayr .a4tain /)n McBenHie Dr1 See Bir74atric7 Mec7el 6regatten7a4itaen )*$ /(' /(+ Mefo bills &)& &)) Mein (am2f =Eitler> /% (($ &$' &)) &') &'' 0&' Meissner :tto (%$ (%( (*' (*+ &$$ &$( Mengele Dr1 6ritH * &% Menthon 6ranUois de &(n Mer7el Dr1 Fudolf 000 Messerschmitt -ilhelm ((/(0 (&( Messersmith George 81 (+)+/ &)' MetHger #rofessor &% Miha,lavic = ra0a ('& Mi7las -ilhelm //*0$ /0)00 Milch 6ield Marshal !rhard '$ '& %0 */ /*& 0$$ 0$& Militant 9eague for German .ulture (&+ Moehle Borvetten7a4itaen Barl EeinH /$% /() Moeller van den Bruc7 Arthur /$ 0%( Molotov Gyacheslav Mi7hailovich 0 ' 0/% 0/* Molt7e Eelmut von 0'( Montgomery 6ield Marshal Bernard (&' (/* Morgenthau Eenry (+

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page_!30 #age ')$ Moscow Declaration 0 Mosley :swald 0( MoyHisch 91 .1 ('0 Mueller Eeinrich )&& 0'$n Mueller 9udwig &+/+' Mueller Ma< /( Munich Agreement %+ Munich Faetere4ubli7 /) (&* &'& )0/ /&+ Mussert Anton Adrian /0%0* /'( /'/ /+( /+) Mussolini Benito */ (0% (0* &*$ )/( )0* /0$ /0) Myth of the T,entieth *entury= The =Fosenberg> (&+ ()))/ N Nationalist #eo4le?s #arty &0& Nas,onal 8amling =Norwegian NaHi #arty> )++ National 8ocialist .ultural .ommunity (&+ National 8ocialist 6reedom Movement &')'/ National 8ocialist German -or7ers? =NaHi> #arty (%& (%) (%' (%+ (*0 (*' &$/ &)$C screening for after --II /C indictment of leaders and organiHations at IMT ' (0(+ &&&/ )' **C rise to 4ower +C antireligion % &) &/ &+)++ 0&+&%C law under %C 4olice a44aratus (+nC su44orted by industrialists &&n &0&00C dictatorshi4 &&nC destruction of trade unions &)C terrorist methods &)C effects on minds of youth &/C documents at IMT ))C cult of 4hysical fitness /*C election results '' '+ (%( (%+ (%* (*0 &$/ &$0C burning of boo7s *$C #arty offices 4arallel to 8tate ($'C #olitical :rganiHation (((C .entral #olitical .ommittee of (((C 6oreign Affairs :ffice =A#A Aussen4olitisches Amt> ()& ())C early goals (/+C #arty finances (*(*& &&%)$C early coalitions with other 4arties &')'/C conce4t of #arty as 8tate &+(C #arty Days in Nuremberg )($(&C in Norway =Nas,onal 8amling> )++C growth in Austria /0(C in Netherlands =N8B> /0% /0* /'(C revival of 0%' Nationalso0ialistische Monatshefte =news4a4er> (&+ Navy1 See DoenitHC German NavyC Faeder Nebe Arthur &+&+) )&0 Nederlandse "nie /0* Nelte Dr1 :tto )&* )/& Netherlands: refusal to surrender -illiam II ) /C Fesistance 0 /'(')C German invasion of &)C Da4an attac7s &)C food shortages /0+C under German occu4ation /0+%$C confiscation of 4ro4erty in /0+ /+) /+0%$C Dutch NaHi #arty /0% /0* /'(C forced labor in /'$'( /'* /+&+) 0($ 0(&C lac7 of anti-8emitism /'( Netherlands Dewish .ouncil =Doodse Faad> /'0 Neuengamme cam4 /*) Neue Cuercher Ceitung =news4a4er> )&' Neurath .onstantin von &% +/ (/% (0' (%/ &(( &%$ 000C named at IMT &0C relieved of .Hech 4ost )*C o44osed Eitler as .hancellor )*C relationshi4 to Fibbentro4 (0%C succeeded by Fibbentro4 ('+ (+$C bac7ground and early 4olitical career ('%C as 6oreign Minister ('% (+$C relationshi4 to Eitler (+$ (+/+0C anti-8emitism (+(+&C as Feichs4rote7tor of .Hechoslova7ia (+(+)C mistrusted by Fesistance (+0C charges against and conviction at IMT (+0+'C Feich offices (+'C death (+' Ne,s *hronicle =9ondon> 0$ 0/( New ;or7 Heral) Tribune &)( Ne, 'ork Times= The &(' &)( New ;or7 !orl) (+% Niedermeier General 0/% 0/* Niemoeller Martin &+0 )+& )%* Night and 6og decrees =Nacht un) Nebel> ))% )0% Ni7itchen7o I1 T1 ' ($n () (/ (' (% (* &(n &' (+0 NimitH Adm1 .hester )) /&( Nitti 6rancesco / Nor)am =shi4> (+* Noreen Mary =shi4> /$* Norman Montagu &&/ Norway (0n &) )0%0* )+/+* N8B =Dutch NaHi #arty> /0% /0* /'( N8DA#1 See National 8ocialist German -or7ers? =NaHi> #arty Nuremberg ( (* Nuremberg 9aws /$ 00n 0' +0 ($0 &(( &+( )+) 00+ Nuremberg trials1 See International Military Tribunal

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page_!31 #age ')( : :hlendorf :tto )&/ )&% 00% :B- =:ber7ommando der -ehrmacht Eigh .ommand> charges and trial at IMT 0' (' && &0 00)00 00%+'1 See also DoenitHC DodlC BeitelC Faeder :lym4ic Games =(*)'> /* 0' (() :maha Bee &)( :orschot Ma,1 Gen1 D1 -1 /'( :radour 6rench village massacre in 00' 0+& :ranienburg cam4 /*) 0/+/% :rde Dienst =:rder 8ervice Fesistance grou4> /'& :rdensburgen =schools> &*%** )$( :rganiHation Todt )$) /*' :shima Eiroshi /$% :ster Gen1 Eans )/$ :tt 9t1 .ol1 !ugen (*$ # #al Fadhabinode 0%+n #annenbec7er :tto &+& #a4en 6ranH von '+ (&( (/% ('+ ('% (+/ &'' &+)C guilt of 'C trials &0 (+' (++C secretary shot )/C serves NaHis in Austria )* &()C as Ambassador to Tur7ey )* &('C 4rotected by Goering during Foehm 4utsch '*C role in Eitler?s becoming .hancellor (0' (++ (%+&$(C bac7ground (+++*C early 4olitical career and a44ointed .hancellor (+*%(C as .hancellor (+* (%$ (%)%*C relationshi4 with Eitler (%) &&&C s4eech at "niversity of Marburg &$+(( &(+C arrest during Foehm 4urge &((C anti-8emitism &(( &('(+C religion and concordat with Gatican &(( &(&C resignation as Gice-.hancellor &(&C relationshi4 with Fesistance &('C role in Anschluss /0( #ar7er Dohn D1 &(n #atton Gen1 George 81 )&( #aulus 6ield Marshal 6riedrich &* )) *0 )// )'( 0)$ 0/& #avelic Ante )0$n #earl Earbor &) )/ -eleus =shi4> 0 -eleus trial /$+() #eters Arnold &*& #etHel Gen1 -alter )(0 #feffer 6ranH von &*&*) #feil .ount &(' #ietrHuch Bonrad (%% #ilsuds7i Marshal DWHef 0)0 #intsch BarlheinH ((0 ((+ #oehner !rnst &'$ &'( #ogroms1 See (ristallnacht #ohl :swald &+&% &0$ )&) /*) #o7rovs7y .ol1 ;1 G1 &(n /&& #oland: underground 0C Batyn massacre % +(+/C (%') u4rising ((nC Fussia in (* &/C German invasion of &)C General Government under 6ran7 &0 /)(/(C #olish Dews in Germany /+/%C anti-8emitism in /%C Army +)C resistance to Eitler ('/C forced labor in /)0)' 0$%* 0(/(0C treatment of Dews /)'/&C food rations under General Government /)%)* #o4ov 8imon '+ -ortlan) =shi4> )%0n #otsdam ' && ((* #otter #itman B1 0%+n #risoners of war 0 (* %*C mass murders of % =see also Batyn forest murders>C Fussian treatment of )&))C use in German industry %) =see also 6orced labor>C Germans used in 6rance and "88F %)C treatment of Fussians 0'%'* 0+) -reussische %ahrbuecher =monthly> 0)( -rotocols of Cion an) %e,ish !orl) -olitics 3 ie -rotokolle )er !eisen von Cion un) )ie >ue)ische !elt2olitik =Fosenberg> ()) #uender 8taatsse7retaer &'0 #uhl !mil &0$ -ython =shi4> /(/ S Jueenfish =submarine> )*+ Suisling Gid7un ()& ()) )++ /0% F Fadio :ran,e =Dutch> /'&') Faeder Adm1 !rich )0 ()) )&* )0/ )00 )0+ )0% )'& /(*&( 0$' 0&+ 000C named by IMT &0C ca4ture by Fussians )$ )%$C 4ur4orted suicide attem4t )$nC IMT charges against )( )+/ )%$%( )*&C defense at IMT )) )*$C at trial of 6ritsch '%C relationshi4 with Goering '* )+&+)C bac7ground and early career )'%+$C anti-8emitism )+(+)C relationshi4 with Eitler )+( )+)+/ )+* )%+%*C role in Norwegian cam4aign )+/+*C sees Britain as 4rime enemy )+*%$C o44osition to Fussian cam4aign )%$C role in .ommando :r-

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page_!32 #age ')& der )%(%' )*$C view of international law )%'C conviction and im4risonment )*$*& Faetere4ubli71 See Munich Faetere4ubli7 Fagins7y M1 ;1 &(n 0$$ Fascher Dr1 8igmund &%$ Fath !rnst vom /% +' Fauter Eanns Albin /0* /'$ /'&') /+$ /+(n /+& Favensbruec7 cam4 &/$ /a,al2in)i =shi4> 0'$ Fechenberg Eans &00 Feich Association of German Industry &' &&*n &)$ Feichenau 6ield Marshal -alter von +$ &$' 0'0 0+$ 0+) /eichsgeset0blatt +' Feichstag fire '+'% &$) Feinec7e Guenther 00' Feinec7e Gen1 Eermann 0'0 0'% 0+) Feinhardt Gen1 Eans 0+/ Feinhardt Gen1 -alther '/'0 Feitlinger Gerald /'' Fenan !rnest /$ Fenewal Movement of German Dews =!rneuerungsbewegung der ,uedischen Deutschen> /* Fesistance movement1 See individual countries /euben %ames =shi4> /$( Feuter 6ranH &&% /evolt Against *ivili0ation 3 er (ulturumstur0= )ie rohung )er &ntermenschen5 =8toddard> /& /evolution in E)ucation =8chirach> &*% Fibbentro4 Annelies von (/% (0% Fibbentro4 Doachim von &&n )& +( %/ (&' ()0 (/& ('+ (*' &/) &// )$' )&) )&/ ))/ /&$ 0/% 000C guilt of 'C named at IMT &0C as 6oreign Minister +/ (0(0& (00C rivalry with Goering %+C un4o4ular (/+/%C marries Annelies Een7ell (/%C early life and bac7ground (/%/*C letter to .hurchill and !den (/*0( ('& (''C relationshi4 to Eitler (0$ (000% ('$ (')C toleration for churches and Dews (0$C early career and interest in 4olitics (0&0)C attitude toward nonaggression 4act with Fussia (0/C attitude toward 4ossible American intervention (0/C o44osition to Fussian cam4aign (0/00C a44ointments and rise to 4ower (0'0%C di4lomacy (0'0*C at IMT (0*'( ('0''C anti-8emitism ('(C favors lynching Allied fliers ('&C art collection (') Fibes Auguste .ham4etier de &(n Fichardson Gen1 Fobert .1 /$+ Fichthofen Baron Manfred von '/ Fichthofen 8@uadron '/ Fiec7e Eans Doachim !rnst %( /ing= er =magaHine> (*) Fingeling .1 /'/ Fintelen .a4tain von (+* /ising Ti)e of *olor= The =8toddard> /& Foberts G1 D1 &(n )/*0$ Fode 88 Gen1 !rnst 0+( Foehm !rnst (+ )* /)n '' '* +$ ()' (0/ (+$ (%+ (** &(( &(& &+(+) &+* &*) )%% /&* //(/& Foettiger Gen1 Eans 0'+ 0+( Fogge Adm1 Bernhard /(/ Fohrscheidt Guenther von (&$ Fommel 6ield Marshal !rwin )/( 0+$ 0+& Foosevelt 6ran7lin Delano ' % (& (0n (' (% (+0 &(% &)' &)% &/) 0/'C demands unconditional surrender /C --II warning on war crimes 'C on guilt of Eigh .ommand &&C meets 8chacht &)C o4inion of 8talin &/C informed of Batyn murder accusations +&C im4oses neutral naval Hone /$$ Fosen !ri7 von %' Fosenberg Alfred &&n *( ($$ ($) ($+ ((& ('+ (*( 0(& 0%&C guilt of 'C named by IMT &0C racism /& ()$)( ()/ ()')+ (/)C desires a NaHi religion ($0C #arty a44ointments and titles (&0&+ ()0C arrest of (&'C role in use of forced labor (&' ()*(/( )$) )$/C founding of Eigh 8chool (&+ ()+C relationshi4 with Eitler (&+ (&* (/)C bac7ground and early life (&+&%C studies and marriage (&%&*C basic tenets (&*C conflict with Eimmler and 88 (&* ()+C relationshi4 with Bormann (&* ()()&C rivalry with Fibbentro4 ()&C (*)) tri4 to !ngland ()&C early writings ())C o44oses nonaggression 4act with Fussia ()/)'C assigned foundation of NaHi university ()+C confiscation of artwor7s and 4ro4erty ()+ =see also !insatHstab Fosenberg>C NaHi rivals (/&C IMT sentence (/)C role in .ommissar :rder ))0)' Fosenberg Eedwig (/&/)

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page_!33 #age ')) Fosenberg Eilda (&% (&* Fosenheim Bavaria ') Fosenman 8amuel (% Fossbach Gerhard ($( Fosterg August &&% Fothschild family ()+ Fotterdam )) /'( Foyal #russian .adet .or4s '/ /oyal Sce2tre =shi4> )*0 F8EA =Feichssicherheitshau4tamt Main :ffice of Feich 8ecurity> (+n &0 )(0(' Fuden7o Gen1 F1 &(n )& 0&'&* 00) FuetH =NaHi anti-8emite> /% Fundstedt 6ield Marshal Gerd von &&n )'$ /(+ 0'0 Fussia1 See "nion of 8oviet 8ocialist Fe4ublics 8 8A =8turmabteilung> (' +$ ($( (0+ ('* )('C 4urges in (+C Goering made head ofC ''C Foehm 4utsch '* =see also Foehm>C uniforms banned (%&C #otem4a murder (%%C authoriHation for &$)C function of &$'C attac7s on Dews &((C relationshi4 to youth movement &*( &*)C at IMT 00)0+ 0') 8achsenhausen cam4 ('( 8adila-Mantau 0)) 8agan cam4 %* ))% 8a4ieha Archbisho4 Dan //$ 8arnoff David &/) 8auc7el 6ritH (/$ /+) /*/ 0$& 0$) 0/% 000C named at IMT &0C administration of forced labor %) )$/ /)' 0$/(%C guilt //0 0(+(% 0&&C bac7ground and early career 0$/'C su44ort of Army 0($((C devotion to Eitler 0&(C defense at IMT 0&( 8chacht Earro ="-boat commander> /$0 /$' 8chacht Dr1 E,almar (/% (*& &(( &+) 000 0%(C guilt of 'C named at IMT &'C arrest by NaHis )* &&/ &/$ &/0C testimony on Goering at IMT '$C IS of %+ &&)C bac7ground and early career &&&&)C 4ost---I currency reform &&)&/C trials by German courts &&0 &/$C o44osition to war &&'C IMT charges against &&' &/$C anti-8emitism &&+ &)0 &/& &/0C relationshi4 with Eitler &&+&% &)+)* &/)/0C wor7 with #arty finances &&%)$C travels in "nited 8tates &&% &)(C role in rearmament and 4ublic wor7s &)()& &)% &/) &// &0&C established Mefo bills &)&C ??New #lanI for Feich &)&C troubled by NaHi e<cesses &)/)0C differences with Goering &)')*C marriages &)*C relationshi4 with Fesistance &)* &// &0&C IMT interrogation on Anschluss &/(/&C end of career &/0/' Scharnhorst =shi4> 0'$ 8charnhorst "nion &*/ 8chellenberg -alter ($$ ($+n ((+ ('0 )(' )(%&$ )&% 00% 0'$n 0+$ 8cheringer Fichard /&% 8chic7lgruber Anna Maria /)$ /)( 8chirach Baldur von 0%&C named at IMT &0C as leader of youth movement &0 &%))$% 2assimC anti-8emitism ($0 )$0C American relatives revealed to Eitler ($+C bac7ground and early life &%0%'C meets Eitler and early #arty a44ointments &%'C adulation of Eitler &%'C Governor and Gauleiter of Gienna )$&/C loss of favor with Eitler )$'C IMT charges against and conviction )$+% 8chirach .arl Bailey-Norris von &%0 8chirach 6rau von )$ )$0' 8chlabrendorff 6abian von &)* 8chlageter Albert 9eo ($( 8chleicher Gen1 Burt von '* (0' ('% (%$** 2assim &$0 &$' &(( &(+ &'' &+) //( 0+' 8chlieffen Alfred von 0'( 8chlieffen 8ociety &(& 0'& 8chmidt Guido /0( /0/n 8chmidt #aul :tto ((+ ('/ 8chmieden -erner von (00 8chmitt 9udwig (&$ 8chmundt Fudolf )// 8chnee Ba4itaenleutnant Adalbert /(& Schnell)ienst archives 0/+ 8chnitHler Georg von &&% &)$ 8choeller Gauamtsleiter /' 8choerner 6ield Marshal 6erdinand 0)$ 8choll Eans /// 8choll 8o4hie /// 8choltH-Blin7 Gertrud )(( 8chramm #ercy */n 8chroeder Baron Burt von (*&*/ &&% &0/ 8chulte-Moenting Adm1 !rich )*$ 8chultHe-Naumburg #aul &'0 8churH .arl &&)

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page_!34 #age ')/ 8chuschnigg Burt von +( ('( (+' &(/ ))& )0$ //'00 2assim 8chutHstaffel1 See 88 8chwabe Barl )/% Sch,ar0e (or2s= as =news4a4er> //) 8chwender -olfgang /($ /() 8chwerin von Brosig7 .ount 9utH ((& (') (%/ &$$ &/' /&$ /%$ 8D =8icherheitsdienst> (+n 0) )(0 )(' )(% )(*C e<ecution of .ommandos )%)%'C e<terminations in the !ast /)% 0+$+&C at IMT 00)0% 0')'/ 8eec7t Gen1 Eans von (** 8eger Gerhart &'/ 8eidl Alfred )0 (&$ (&& (&0 8evering Barl (%' &(+ &// )*$ 8eyss-In@uart Artur )(/ 0%&C Feichs7ommissar of the Netherlands &0 /0+%$C named by IMT &0C Austrian a44ointments &(/ //*0( /0&C role in Anschluss //' //%0$ /0&0'C bac7ground and early career //+C early #arty activity //%C anti-8emitism //% /0+ /'0n /+%C anticlericalism /0$0(C service in #oland /0'0+C relationshi4 with 88 /0*'$ /+%C anti-Dewish measures in the Netherlands /'0'*C National 8ocialism of /+%+*C conviction at IMT /%$ 8hawcross 8ir Eartley &(n &+ )0'0% 8henin 91 F1 &(n 8icherheitsdienst1 See 8D 8icherheits4oliHei1 See 8i4o 8iegfried 9ine (0/ 8iemens com4any (*& &0/ 8iemers Dr1 -alter )$n )0 )*$ )*& 8i7ors7i Gen1 -ladyslaw +& 8ilber Dr1 !rwin /* 8imon 8ir Dohn: 4seudonym Dr1 Guthrie ((0 ((' ()&)) 8imovic = 6en usan )0( )0* 8inga4ore )/ 8i4o =8icherheits4oliHei 8ecurity #olice> 00) 87agerra7 )) 87orHeny :tto (0* 8obibor cam4 /'' 8ocial Darwinists /$ &++n 8ocial Democratic #arty =8#D 8oHialdemo7ratische #artei Deutschlands> /) '+ (++ (%( (%& (%/ (*' &$)0 &'+ 8ocialist -or7ers ;outh Movement &*/ 8ociety Against the 8u4remacy of Dews ($$ 8onnenstein hos4ital &+* 8orge Fichard 0/& 8orge .a4t1 8iegfried )%+ 8otmann .olonel &% 84eer Albert '$ %* */ ($$ (&' /+) 0%&C named in IMT indictment &0C head of all German war 4roduction &0C 4lan to 7ill Eitler )*C su44lants Goering '&C in 84andau &00C success in war 4roduction /%) /*(*& 0$$ 0$(C o44osition to scorched-earth order /%/%* 0$(C relationshi4 with Eitler /%/%' /%**$ /*)C bac7ground and early life /%0%'C use of forced labor /*$*' 0$$C relationshi4 with NaHi hierarchy /*'*%C sought for DoenitH?s .abinet /**C guilt /**0$$ 0$)/ 88 =8chutHstaffel> +$ (&' ('*C action in -arsaw +C criminality of ('C role in Foehm 4utsch '*C 4arallels to Army ($'C foreign recruits for (/& )(/ /0* /+(C uniforms banned (%&C authoriHed &$)C becomes military arm of #arty &((C industrialists holding ran7 in &0/C relationshi4 to youth movement &*$ &*( &**)$$C organiHation of &** )(/)(0C basic tenets of and training for )(&(/C re4resentatives for at IMT )(0C collects dossier on 6ran7 /)))0C role in e<termi nations in the !ast /)% 0+$+&C at IMT 00)0% 0') 0'/ 8tac7 General +$ 8tahlhelm &$) 8tahmer :tto +(+) %' 8talin Dose4h &/ ((* (0* 0/& 0/)C at #otsdam ' &' 8talingrad )) '$ */ *0 ))& 0(( Stars an) Stri2es =4a4er> )/ 8tauffenberg .ol1 .laus 8chen7 Graf von )&' 8teengracht Adolf von (0( 8teinbauer Gustav /'&n 8teinbrinc7 :tto &0/ 8teriliHation ($0 &++ 8tettinius !dward F1 ' (' (% 8timson Eenry 91 ' (& (' (% && 0%+%% 8toddard 9othro4 /& 8tone Earlan 61 )& 0%+n 8torey .ol1 Fobert G1 &(n 8trasser Gregor '' '* ((( (*$*& (*0 &/% &')n &'' //( 8trauss Dr1 /&* 8trauss Fichard &0(

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page_!3 #age ')0 8treicher Dulius 0* '' ($( (&0 ('( (*& &0( 0)) 000C guilt of 'C anti8emitism &0 /$0+ 2assimC named at IMT &0C arrest of &+C fidelity to Eitler /$ //C bac7ground and early life /&C IS of /&C writings /&C Gauleiter and 8tatthalter of Nuremberg /& /'/+C early #arty activity /)C marriages /)//C relationshi4 with Goering //C as a teacher //C corru4tion of // /'/+C sadism /0/'C AryaniHed .hrist /0C accused of ra4e and libel /'C role in demolition of Nuremberg synagogue /+C libel suits against /%C stories for children /*0$C IMT charges against 0(C collection of 4ornogra4hy 0/C slander 0/C last words 0+C Eitler addresses as u (($C gives name to Eitler,ugend &*& 8treicher Bunigunde Foth /) ??8trength Through DoyI movement (&+ 8tresemann Gustav &$0 8troo4 Duergen )&& 8tuel4nagel Gen1 Barl Eeinrich von ()% Stuermer= er =news4a4er> /$ /& ///0 /* 0$0( 0) 00 0+ &0& 0)) 0/0 8turmabteilung1 See 8A 8ubmarine warfare ) )) )*//(/ Sun)ay E42ress =9ondon news4a4er> /$+ T Taegliche /un)schau =news4a4er> (*/ (*+ Taft Fobert 0%+n Tanev Gasili '+ Tannenfels =shi4> )%0n TanHenberg Monastery (&+ Tavs 4lot &(0 /0/ Taylor Brig1 Gen1 Telford &(n &&n Telegra2hen &nion 0)( Tem2s= Le =news4a4er> (0' Terboven Dose4h %& )(/ ))& /0% /0* /*+ /*% Te4as =shi4> /$$ Theresienstadt )&$ )&) /'' Thyssen 6ritH &&n (*& &&+&* &0& &00 Timoshen7o Marshal 8eman 0/$ Tir2it0 =shi4> )%/ )%+ Todt 6ritH &0 (&' /%) Tonningen Fost van /0* /'/ To4olews7i Gregorio ($+ Torgler !rnst (%* Trial of the %e, in the *ourse of Time= The 3 ie S2ur )er %u)en in !an)el )er Ceiten> =Fosenberg> ()) Trainin A1 N1 ($n ()(/ (* Treitsch7e Eeinrich von /( Tresc7ow Gen1 Eenning von )&' Trials1 See International Military Tribunal Trotha Adm1 Adolf von &*/ )'* Truman Earry 8 )) 0'/C at #otsdam 'C on guilt of Eigh .ommand && Tschirsch7y 6ritH-Guenther Baron von &(( Tuebingen =shi4> )*+ " &F$ =submarine> )%(n &7?: =submarine> /$) /$/ /$' /$+ &#$F =submarine> /$$ &?$: =submarine> /$) /$0 &?$I =submarine> /$)' &:?# =submarine> /$$ &H?# =submarine> /$+ /$* "det !rnst */ "le< Gen1 -ilhelm 0+& &lm =shi4> /(/ "nion of 8oviet 8ocialist Fe4ublics ="88F>: on "nited Nations -ar .rimes .ommission 0C underground in 0C .Harist treatment of Dews ((nC Fusso-6innish war () (0n )+0+'C relationshi4 with Americans at 9ondon .onference (/C territory at time of 9ondon .onference (0C nonaggression 4act with Da4an (0nC attitude toward indicting organiHations ('C Moscow declaration (%C .rimea declaration (%C sign 9ondon Agreement (%C actions at 9ondon .onference (*C members of the International Military Tribunal &(nC nonaggression 4act with Germany &) &/C invasion by Germany &)C religion in &/C sus4icions of Eess? flight to Britain &0C trials of war criminals &*)$C anti8emitism in /(C role in the Batyn forest massacre +(+/C forced labor in %) 0$%($ 0(%C revolution of (*(% (&%C strength of army (/(/& "nions dissolution of in Germany &'+ "nited Nations 0 (/n (' &% %) 0%% 0*$ 0*( "nited 8tates of America: ,udges at International Military Tribunal 0 =see also Dac7son>C re4resentatives on "nited Nations -ar .rimes .ommission 0C .ongressional declaration on war crimes 'C list of ma,or war criminals 'C intervention in .uba against 84ain ((nC anti-isolationism in (&C 9eague of Nations (&C 9end 9ease 4rogram (&C entry into

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page_!3! #age ')' --II (& %*C 4osition at 9ondon .onference (/C invasion of North Africa (0nC occu4ation of Iceland and Greenland (0nC ta7es 4art in drawing u4 9ondon Agreement (%C members of International Military Tribunal &(nC attac7ed at #earl Earbor &)C courts at Nuremberg &*C naval war against Da4an ))C racism in /( 0)C --II naval 4olicy /$$(C 9iberator bombs rescue shi4s /$/ /$+C use of forced labor 0(%(*C treaties on conduct of warfare 0%* "stachi =.roat militia> )0$0( G Gabres Donnedieu de &(n Ga,na Gabor )&) Gan der 9ubbe Marinus1 See 9ubbe Gansittart 8ir Fobert ()& Gelt,ens .ol1 D1 /+/+0 +en)ia =shi4> )*' Genloo incident /'( Gersailles Treaty ) ((n +0 %% (0* ('%'* (%0 )0'0+ )+$+( 0%(C German violations of && &/C as no basis for arguments at IMT )& Glasov Gen1 Andrei (/$ //$ /+( 0(/ 0'% Goegler Albert (*& &&% &)$ +oelkischer Beobachter =news4a4er> (&+ ()' (0' (*( &($ /&% 0/( Gogt Gen1 9udwig &*/ Golch7ov 9t1 .ol1 A1 61 &(n Gol7ssturm ($)/ Goss Adm1 Eans 0)$ +ossische Ceitung =news4a4er> (*%n Gught cam4 /'' /+) /++ Gyshins7y Andrei )& - -agner Adolf /&* -agner Gen1 !dward ()% )(' )(% )&% )0/ /*+ 0'$n -agner Adm1 Gerhard /((n -ahmund Adolf /( -aldec7-#yrmont #rince of //( -allace =British .ommando> )%0 -andervogel &%/ &%0 &*( )$$ -annsee .onference 0' '& +0 ($0 /)% -ar criminals: --I &/C ma,or 0C site of trials for 'C those to be tried by IMT (%C number tried &%C trials before Allied courts &%C esca4e of &%C trials before German courts &%&*C trials before "8 courts &*C confiscation of 4ro4erty of )$C total trials of )$n1 See also International Military Tribunal -ar .rimes & ) (* &$ &)&/ -arburg =American ban7er> 8chacht meets &)' -arlimont Gen1 -alter %/ ))0 ))' 0($ -arsaw ))C ghetto + )&& /)+)% -eber Gen1 !rich )*)n -egener Gice-Adm1 -olfgang )+/ -egner #rofessor -1 /(& -eimar Fe4ublic1 See Germany -eiss4fennig =German naval officer> /($ /() -eiHsaec7er !rnst von %+ (0( (0& (0/ ('$ ('' (+$ (+0 )*$ -endt Eans 6riedrich /&% -elles 8umner && &&' &/) //%n 00/ -ells E1 G1 0/( !elt2olitische /un)schau =news4a4er> 0)( -est4hal Gen1 8iegfried )0/ -eygand Gen1 Ma<ime ))) -ild Dohannes 00$ -illiam II Baiser: listed as --I war criminal &/ () -ilson -oodrow / &&0 -immer 61 /+* -inter Gen1 August )'$ -itt Eans /() -itHleben Gen1 !rwin von &)* -oermann !rnst (0& (*& -olff Barl )&( -olff :tto &&% -olff-Metternich 6ranH *( -orld -ar I: war criminal trials &/C German res4onsibility for )C 84ecial .ommittee for trials )C conce4t of su4erior orders in &$C German rearmament after && -uehlisch Gen1 EeinH Eelmut von /'*+$ -uerdemann ="-boat commander> /$0 -urm Bisho4 &+% -yHans7i .harles !1 Dr1 0%+n ; ;oung Germans? 9eague &%0 ;ugoslavia &) A AeitHler Gen1 Burt 00* Ahu7ov Marshal Georgi 0&0 Aiereis Ma,1 6ranH )&( Aorya N1 D1 &(n Auylen Baron van ()+

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page_!3" #age ')+ About the Author Image not available !ugene Davidson is the author of numerous boo7s on the NaHi regime including The Making of A)olf Hitler and The &nmaking of A)olf Hitler =both available from the "niversity of Missouri #ress>1 Davidson who lives in 8anta Barbara .alifornia is #resident !meritus of the .onference on !uro4ean #roblems and former #resident of the 6oundation for 6oreign Affairs1

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