1

Imprudence and negligence. Any person who, by reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its medium period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be imposed; if it would have constituted a light felony, the penalty of arresto menor in its maximum period shall be imposed. Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed. When the execution of the act covered by this article shall have only resulted in damage to the property of another, the offender shall be punished by a fine ranging from an amount e ual to the value of said damages to three times such value, but which shall in no case be less than twenty!five pesos. A fine not exceeding two hundred pesos and censure shall be imposed upon any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall cause some wrong which, if done maliciously, would have constituted a light felony. "n the imposition of these penalties, the court shall exercise their sound discretion, without regard to the rules prescribed in Article sixty!four. #he provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable$ 1. When the penalty provided for the offense is e ual to or lower than those provided in the first two paragraphs of this article, in which case the court shall impose the penalty next lower in degree than that which should be imposed in the period which they may deem proper to apply. %. When, by imprudence or negligence and with violation of the Automobile &aw, to death of a person shall be caused, in which case the defendant shall be punished by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. 'eckless imprudence consists in voluntary, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. (imple imprudence consists in the lack of precaution displayed in those cases in which the damage impending to be caused is not immediate nor the danger clearly manifest. #he penalty next higher in degree to those provided for in this article shall be imposed upon the offender who fails to lend on the spot to the in)ured parties such help as may be in this hand to give. Structurally, these nine paragraphs are collapsible into four sub!groupings relating to *1+ the penalties attached to the uasi!offenses of ,imprudence- and ,negligence- *paragraphs 1!%+; *%+ a modified penalty scheme for either or both uasi!offenses *paragraphs .!/, 0 and 1+; *.+ a generic rule for trial courts in imposing penalties *paragraph 2+; and */+ the definition of ,reckless imprudence- and ,simple imprudence- *paragraphs 3!4+. Conceptually, uasi!offenses penali5e ,the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous recklessness, lack of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible,-6107 unlike willful offenses which punish the intentional criminal act. #hese structural and conceptual features of uasi!offenses set them apart from the mass of intentional crimes under the first 1. #itles of 8ook "" of the 'evised 9enal :ode, as amended. "ndeed, the notion that uasi!offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penali5ed under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. As early as the middle of the last century, we already sought to bring clarity to this field by rejecting in Quizon v. Justice of the Peace of Pampanga the proposition that ,reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it x x x- 6137 on three points of analysis$ *1+ the ob)ect of punishment in uasi!crimes *as opposed to intentional crimes+; *%+ the legislative intent to treat uasi!crimes as distinct offenses *as opposed to subsuming them under the mitigating circumstance of minimal intent+ and; *.+ the different penalty structures for uasi!crimes and intentional crimes$ #he proposition *inferred from Art. . of the 'evised 9enal :ode+ that ,reckless imprudence- is not a crime in itself but simply a way of committing it and merely determines a lower degree of criminal liability is too broad to deserve un ualified assent. #here are crimes that by their structure cannot be committed through imprudence$ murder, treason, robbery, malicious mischief, etc. "n truth, criminal negligence in our 'evised 9enal :ode is treated as a mere uasi offense, and dealt with separately from willful offenses. "t is not a mere uestion of classification or terminology. In intentional crimes, the act itself is punished in negligence or imprudence, !hat is principally penalized is the mental attitude or condition behind the act, the dangerous rec"lessness, lac" of care or foresight, the imprudencia punible . xxxx

#ere criminal negligence but a modality in the commission of felonies, operating only to reduce the penalty therefor, then it !ould be absorbed in the mitigating circumstances of $rt. %&, specially the lac" of intent to commit so grave a !rong as the one actually committed . ;urthermore, the theory would re uire that the corresponding penalty should be fixed in proportion to the penalty prescribed for each crime when committed willfully. ;or each penalty for the willful offense, there would then be a corresponding penalty for the negligent variety. 8ut instead, our 'evised 9enal :ode *Art. .02+ fixes the penalty for reckless imprudence at arresto mayor maximum, to prision correccional 6medium7, if the willful act would constitute a grave felony, notwithstanding that the penalty for the latter could range all the way from prision mayor to death, according to the case. It can be seen that the actual penalty for criminal negligence bears no relation to the individual !illful crime, but is set in relation to a !hole class, or series, of crimes.6147 *<mphasis supplied+ #his explains why the technically correct way to allege uasi!crimes is to state that their commission results in damage, either to person or property.6117 "vler v. (an 9edro, G.R. No. 172716, November 17, 2010 'eckless imprudence generally defined by our penal law consists in voluntarily but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. 6.17 "mprudence connotes a deficiency of action. "t implies a failure in precaution or a failure to take the necessary precaution once the danger or peril becomes foreseen. 6/=7 #hus, something more than mere negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle is necessary to constitute the offense of reckless driving, and a willful and wanton disregard of the conse uences is re uired.6/17 Willful, wanton or reckless disregard for the safety of others within the meaning of reckless driving statutes has been held to involve a conscious choice of a course of action which in)ures another, either with knowledge of serious danger to others involved, or with knowledge of facts which would disclose the danger to any reasonable person.6/%7 >ence, in prosecutions for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property, whether or not one of the drivers of the colliding automobiles is guilty of the offense is a uestion that lies in the manner and circumstances of the operation of the motor vehicle,6/.7 and a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt re uires the concurrence of the following elements, namely, *a+ that the offender has done or failed to do an act; *b+ that the act is voluntary; *c+ that the same is without malice; *d+ that material damage results; and *e+ that there has been inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the offender. 6//7 Among the elements constitutive of the offense, what perhaps is most central to a finding of guilt is the conclusive determination that the accused has exhibited, by his voluntary act without malice, an inexcusable lack of precaution because it is that which supplies the criminal intent so indispensable as to bring an act of mere negligence and imprudence under the operation of the penal law.6/27 #his, because a conscious indifference to the conse uences of the conduct is all that that is re uired from the standpoint of the frame of mind of the accused, 6/07 that is, without regard to whether the private offended party may himself be considered likewise at fault. "nasmuch as the 'evised 9enal :ode, however, does not detail what particular act or acts causing damage to property may be characteri5ed as reckless imprudence, certainly, as with all criminal prosecutions, the in uiry as to whether the accused could be held liable for the offense is a uestion that must be addressed by the facts and circumstances uni ue to a given case. #hus, if we must determine whether petitioner in this case has shown a conscious indifference to the conse uences of his conduct, our attention must necessarily drift to the most fundamental factual predicate. And we proceed from petitioner?s contention that at the time the collision took place, he was carefully driving the car as he in fact approached the intersection on second gear and that his speed allegedly was somewhere between %2 and .= kph which under normal conditions could be considered so safe and manageable as to enable him to bring the car to a full stop when necessary. Aside from the entry in the #A"', however, which noted petitioner?s speed to be beyond what is lawful, the physical evidence on record likewise seems to negate petitioner?s contention. #he photographs taken of Arnold?s car clearly show that the extent of the damage to it could not have been caused by petitioner?s car running on second gear at the speed of %2!.= kph. #he fact that the hood of Arnold?s car was violently wrenched as well as the fact that on impact the car even turned around 14= degrees and was hurled several feet away from the )unction to the outer lane of @rtigas Avenuewhen in fact Arnold had already established his turn to the left on the inner lane and into the opposite laneclearly demonstrate that the force of the collision had been created by a speed way beyond what petitioner?s estimation. 'ate of speed, in connection with other circumstances, is one of the principal considerations in determining whether a motorist has been reckless in driving an automobile,6/37 and evidence of the extent of the damage caused may show the force of the impact from which the rate of speed of the vehicle may be modestly inferred. 6/47 While an adverse inference may be gathered with respect to reckless driving6/17 from proof of excessive speed under the circumstances 62=7as in this case where the #A"' itself shows that petitioner approached the intersection in excess of lawful speedsuch proof raises the presumption of imprudent driving which may be overcome by evidence, 6217 or, as otherwise stated, shifts the burden of proof so as to re uire the accused to show that under the circumstances he was not driving in a careless or imprudent manner.62%7 We find, however, that petitioner has not been able to discharge that burden inasmuch as the physical evidence on record is heavy with conviction way more than his bare assertion that his speed at the time of the incident was well within

what is controllable. "ndeed, the facts of this case do warrant a finding that petitioner, on approach to the )unction, was traveling at a speed far greater than that conveniently fixed in his testimony. "nsofar as such facts are consistent with that finding, their truth must reasonably be admitted.62.7 (peeding, moreover, is indicative of imprudent behavior because a motorist is bound to exercise such ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with the conditions encountered on the road. What is reasonable speed, of course, is necessarily sub)ective as it must conform to the peculiarities of a given case but in all cases, it is that which will enable the driver to keep the vehicle under control and avoid in)ury to others using the highway. 62/7 #his standard of reasonableness is actually contained in (ection .2 of '.A. Ao. /1.0. "t states$ (<:. .2. 'estriction as to speed.(*a+ Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a highway at such speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than will permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop within the assured clear distance ahead. <ven apart from statutory regulations as to speed, a motorist is nevertheless expected to exercise ordinary care and drive at a reasonable rate of speed commensurate with all the conditions encountered 6227 which will enable him to keep the vehicle under control and, whenever necessary, to put the vehicle to a full stop to avoid in)ury to others using the highway.
6207

"t is must be stressed that this restriction on speed assumes more importance where the motorist is approaching an intersection. @rdinary or reasonable care in the operation of a motor vehicle at an intersection would naturally re uire more precaution than is necessary when driving elsewhere in a street or highway. 6237 A driver approaching an intersection is generally under duty, among others, to be vigilant and to have the vehicle under control as to be able to stop at the shortest possible notice,6247 that is, he must look for vehicles that might be approaching from within the radius that denotes the limit of danger.6217 (ince compliance with this duty is measured by whether an approaching motorist has exercised the level of precaution re uired under the circumstances, then with more reason that he exhibit a relatively higher level of care when the intersection is blind at the point where the roads meet. "n other words, where the view at an intersection is obstructed and an approaching motorist cannot get a good view to the right or left until he is close to the intersection, prudence would dictate that he take particular care to observe the traffic before entering the intersection or otherwise use reasonable care to avoid a collision,60=7 which means that he is bound is to move with the utmost caution until it is determinable that he can proceed safely and at the slowest speed possible 6017 so that the vehicle could be stopped within the distance the driver can see ahead.60%7 @n this score, what brings certain failure in petitioner?s case is his own admission that he had not seen Arnold?s car making a left turn at the intersection. @f course, there had been an arduous debate at the trial as to whether Arnold?s car was in motion or at a full stop at the intersection moments before the collision; nevertheless, inasmuch as he *Arnold+, as shown by the evidence, had been able to establish himself at the intersection significantly ahead of petitioner, it defies logic to accord even a semblance of truth to petitioner?s assertion that he had not seen Arnold?s car entering the intersection laterally from his left especially when the said car admittedly had already taken two feet of the other lane of the roadthe lane on which petitioner was proceeding to crossand well beyond the median line of the intersecting road on which Arnold proceeded after making the turn. "ndeed, not even the fact that the view at the intersection was blocked by the flower bed on the traffic island could provide an excuse for petitioner as it has likewise been established that he approached the intersection at such a speed that could not, as in fact it did not, enable him to arrest his momentum and forestall the certainty of the collision. "t can only be surmised at this point that petitioner had inexcusably fallen short of the standard of care in a situation which called for more precaution on the highway in failing to make an observation in the interest at least of his own safety whether or not it was safe to enter the crossing. (ince he is chargeable with what he should have observed only had he exercised the commensurate care re uired under the circumstances of the case, the inescapable conclusion is that he had inexcusably breached the elementary duties of a responsible, prudent and reasonable motorist. "n general, the degree of care and attention re uired of a driver in a particular case in exercising reasonable care will vary with and must be measured in the light of all the surrounding circumstances, such that it must be commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the in)uries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle. 60.7"n other words, he must observe a sense of proportionality between precaution and the peculiar risks attendant or even inherent in the condition of the road60/7 which are open to ordinary observation.6027 #he ultimate test, in other words, is to be found in the reasonable foreseeability that harm might result if commensurate care is not exercised. "t is not necessary, however, that a motorist actually foresee the probability of harm or that the particular in)ury which resulted was foreseeable; it would suffice that he, in the position of an ordinary prudent man, knowing what he knew or should have known, anticipate that harm of a general nature as that suffered was to materiali5e. 6007 #he evidence in this case is teeming with suggestion that petitioner had failed to foresee the certainty of the collision that was about to happen as he entered the )unction in uestion especially considering that his lateral vision at the intersection was blocked by the structures on the road. "n the same way, he failed to solidly establish that such failure to foresee the danger lurking on the road could be deemed excusable as indeed

his contention that he was running at a safe speed is totally negated by the evidence derived from the physical facts of the case. Bet, petitioner clings to a chance of ac uittal. "n his petition, he theori5es that the negligence of Arnold, which according to the :ourt of Appeals was incipient in character, was actually the principal determining factor which caused the mishap and the fact that the #A"' indicated that Arnold had no right of way, it is he himself who had the status of a favored driver. #he contention is utterly without merit.

"n traffic law parlance, the term ,right of way- is understood as the right of one vehicle to proceed in a lawful manner in preference to another approaching vehicle under such circumstances of direction, speed and proximity as to give rise to a danger of collision unless one of the vehicles grants precedence to the other. 6037 Although there is authority to the effect that the right of way is merely of statutory creation and exists only according to express statutory provision, 6047 it is generally recogni5ed, where no statute or ordinance governs the matter, that the vehicle first entering an intersection is entitled to the right of way, and it becomes the duty of the other vehicle likewise approaching the intersection to proceed with sufficient care to permit the exercise of such right without danger of collisions. 6017 "n our setting, the right of way rule is governed by (ection /% of 'epublic Act *'.A.+ Ao. /1.0, 63=7 which materially provides$ Section 42. Right of Way. *a+ When two vehicles approach or enter an intersection at approximately the same time, the driver of the vehicle on the left shall yield the right of way to the vehicle on the right, except as otherwise hereinafter provided. #he driver of any vehicle traveling at an unlawful speed shall forfeit any right which he might otherwise have hereunder. *b+ #he driver of a vehicle approaching but not having entered an intersection shall yield the right of a way to a vehicle within such intersection or turning therein to the left across the line of travel of such first!mentioned vehicle, provided the driver of the vehicle turning left has given a plainly visible signal of intention to turn as re uired in this Act. x x x. #he provision governs the situation when two vehicles approach the intersection from the same direction and one of them intends make a turn on either side of the road. 8ut the rule embodied in the said provision, also prevalent in traffic statutes in the Cnited (tates, has also been liberally applied to a situation in which two vehicles approach an intersection from directly opposite directions at approximately the same time on the same street and one of them attempts to make a left!hand turn into the intersecting street, so as to put the other upon his right, the vehicle making the turn being under the duty of yielding to the other.6317 Aevertheless, the right of way accorded to vehicles approaching an intersection is not absolute in terms. "t is actually sub)ect to and is affected by the relative distances of the vehicles from the point of intersection. 63%7 #hus, whether one of the drivers has the right of way or, as sometimes stated, has the status of a favored driver on the highway, is a uestion that permeates a situation where the vehicles approach the crossing so nearly at the same time and at such distances and speed that if either of them proceeds without regard to the other a collision is likely to occur. 63.7 @therwise stated, the statutory right of way rule under (ection /% of our traffic law applies only where the vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time and not where one of the vehicles enter the )unction substantially in advance of the other. Whether two vehicles are approaching the intersection at the same time does not necessarily depend on which of the vehicles enters the intersection first. 'ather, it is determined by the imminence of collision when the relative distances and speeds of the two vehicles are considered. 63/7 "t is said that two vehicles are approaching the intersection at approximately the same time where it would appear to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence in the position of the driver approaching from the left of another vehicle that if the two vehicles continued on their courses at their speed, a collision would likely occur, hence, the driver of the vehicle approaching from the left must give the right of precedence to the driver of the vehicle on his right.6327 Aevertheless, the rule re uiring the driver on the left to yield the right of way to the driver on the right on approach to the intersection, no duty is imposed on the driver on the left to come to a dead stop, but he is merely re uired to approach the intersection with his vehicle under control so that he may yield the right of way to a vehicle within the danger 5one on his right.6307 >e is not bound to wait until there is no other vehicle on his right in sight before proceeding to the intersection but only until it is reasonably safe to proceed. 6337 #hus, in $dzuara v. Court of $ppeals,6347 it was established that a motorist crossing a thru!stop street has the right of way over the one making a turn; but if the person making the turn has already negotiated half of the turn and is almost on the other side so that he is already visible to the person on the thru!street, he is bound to give way to the former. Doreover, in a prosecution for reckless or dangerous driving, the negligence of the person who was in)ured or who was the driver of the motor vehicle with which the accused?s vehicle collided does not constitute a defense. 6317 "n fact, even where such driver is said to be guilty of a like offense, proof thereof may never work favors to the case of the accused. 64=7 "n other words, proof that the offended party was also negligent or imprudent in the operation of his automobile bears little

weight, if at all, at least for purposes of establishing the accused?s culpability beyond reasonable doubt. >ence, even if we are to hypothesi5e that Arnold was likewise negligent in neglecting to keep a proper lookout as he took a left turn at the intersection, such negligence, contrary to petitioner?s contention, will nevertheless not support an ac uittal. At best, it will only determine the applicability of several other rules governing situations where concurring negligence exists and only for the purpose of arriving at a proper assessment of the award of damages in favor of the private offended party. 8ut it must be asked$ do the facts of the case support a finding that Arnold was likewise negligent in executing the left turnE #he answer is in the negative. "t is as much unsafe as it is un)ust to assume that Arnold, )ust because the #A"' so indicated that he at the time had no right of way, that Arnold had performed a risky maneuver at the intersection in failing to keep a proper lookout for oncoming vehicles. "n fact, aside from petitioner?s bare and self!serving assertion that Arnold?s fault was the principal determining cause of the mishap as well as his allegation that it was actually Arnold?s car that came colliding with his car, there is no slightest suggestion in the records that could tend to negate what the physical evidence in this case has established. :learly, it was petitioner?s negligence, as pointed out by the @(F, that proximately caused the accident. ;inally, on the issue of damages, inasmuch as petitioner had not extended efforts to present countervailing evidence disproving the extent and cost of the damage sustained by Arnold?s car, the award assessed and ordered by the trial court must stand. All told, it must be needlessly emphasi5ed that the measure of a motorist?s duty is such care as is, under the facts and circumstances of the particular case, commensurate with the dangers which are to be anticipated and the in)uries which are likely to result from the use of the vehicle, and in proportion to or commensurate with the peculiar risk attendant on the circumstances and conditions in the particular case, 6417 the driver being under the duty to know and to take into consideration those circumstances and factors affecting the safe operation of the vehicle which would be open to ordinary observation.64%7 *:aminos, Gr. v. 9eople, F.'. Ao. 1/3/.3, Day 4, %==1+ @n the first issue, we find and so resolve that respondent 9eople of the 9hilippines was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner (uelto swerved the bus to the right with recklessness, thereby causing damage to the terrace of private respondent?s apartment. Although she did not testify to seeing the incident as it happened, petitioner (uelto himself admitted this in his answer to the complaint in :ivil :ase Ao. H!1.!10=21, and when he testified in the trial court. (uelto narrated that he suddenly swerved the bus to the right of the road causing it to hit the column of the terrace of private respondent. 9etitioners were burdened to prove that the damage to the terrace of private respondent was not the fault of petitioner (uelto. We have reviewed the evidence on record and find that, as ruled by the trial court and the appellate court, petitioners failed to prove that petitioner acted on an emergency caused by the sudden intrusion of a passenger )eepney into the lane of the bus he was driving. "t was the burden of petitioners herein to prove petitioner (uelto?s defense that he acted on an emergency, that is, he had to swerve the bus to the right to avoid colliding with a passenger )eep coming from <I(A that had overtaken another vehicle and intruded into the lane of the bus. #he sudden emergency rule was enunciated by this :ourt in )an v. Court of $ppeals,6%.7 thus$ 6@7ne who suddenly finds himself in a place of danger, and is re uired to act without time to consider the best means that may be adopted to avoid the impending danger, is not guilty of negligence if he fails to adopt what subse uently and upon reflection may appear to have been a better method unless the emergency in which he finds himself is brought about by his own negligence. Cnder (ection .3 of 'epublic Act Ao. /1.0, as amended, otherwise known as the &and #ransportation and #raffic :ode, motorists are mandated to drive and operate vehicles on the right side of the road or highway$ (<:. .3. *riving on right side of high!ay. + Cnless a different course of action is re uired in the interest of the safety and the security of life, person or property, or because of unreasonable difficulty of operation in compliance herewith, every person operating a motor vehicle or an animal!drawn vehicle on a highway shall pass to the right when meeting persons or vehicles coming toward him, and to the left when overtaking persons or vehicles going the same direction, and when turning to the left in going from one highway to another, every vehicle shall be conducted to the right of the center of the intersection of the highway. (ection .2 of the law provides, thus$ (ec. .2. 'estriction as to speed.(*a+ Any person driving a motor vehicle on a highway shall drive the same at a careful and prudent speed, not greater nor less than is reasonable and proper, having due regard for the traffic, the width of the highway, and of any other condition then and there existing; and no person shall drive any motor vehicle upon a high!ay at such a speed as to endanger the life, limb and property of any person, nor at a speed greater than !ill permit him to bring the vehicle to a stop !ithin the assured clear distance ahead *emphasis supplied+. "n relation thereto, Article %142 of the Aew :ivil :ode provides that ,unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been negligent, if at the time of mishap, he was violating any traffic

regulation.- 8y his own admission, petitioner (uelto violated the &and #ransportation and #raffic :ode when he suddenly swerved the bus to the right, thereby causing damage to the property of private respondent. >owever, the trial court correctly re)ected petitioner (uelto?s defense, in light of his contradictory testimony vis!J! vis his :ounter!Affidavit submitted during the preliminary investigation$ "t is clear from the photographs submitted by the prosecution *<xhs. :, I, F, > K "+ that the commercial apartment of Ir. Laldellon sustained heavy damage caused by the bus being driven by (uelto. -"t seems highly improbable that the said damages were not caused by a strong impact. And, it is uite reasonable to conclude that, at the time of the impact, the bus was traveling at a high speed when (uelto tried to avoid the passenger )eepney.- (uch a conclusion finds support in the decision of the (upreme :ourt in 9eople vs. "son, 13. (:'A 114, where the :ourt stated that ,physical evidence is of the highest order. "t speaks more elo uently than a hundred witnesses.- #he pictures submitted do not lie, having been taken immediately after the incident. #he damages could not have been caused except by a speeding bus. >ad the accused not been speeding, he could have easily reduced his speed and come to a full stop when he noticed the )eep. Were he more prudent in driving, he could have avoided the incident or even if he could not avoid the incident, the damages would have been less severe. "n addition to this, the accused has made conflicting statements in his counter!affidavit and his testimony in court. "n the former, he stated that the reason why he swerved to the right was because he wanted to avoid the passenger )eepney in front of him that made a sudden stop. 8ut, in his testimony in court, he said that it was to avoid a passenger )eepney coming from <I(A that was overtaking by occupying his lane. (uch glaring inconsistencies on material points render the testimony of the witness doubtful and shatter his credibility. ;urthermore, the variance between testimony and prior statements renders the witness unreliable. (uch inconsistency results in the loss in the credibility of the witness and his testimony as to his prudence and diligence. As already maintained and concluded, the severe damages sustained could not have resulted had the accused acted as a reasonable and prudent man would. #he accused was not diligent as he claims to be. What is more probable is that the accused had to swerve to the right and hit the commercial apartment of the plaintiff because he could not make a full stop as he was driving too fast in a usually crowded street.6%/7 Doreover, if the claim of petitioners were true, they should have filed a third!party complaint against the driver of the offending passenger )eepney and the ownerMoperator thereof. 9etitioner (uelto?s reliance on the sudden emergency rule to escape conviction for the crime charged and his civil liabilities based thereon is, thus, futile. @n the second issue, we agree with the contention of petitioners that respondents failed to prove that the damages to the terrace caused by the incident amounted to 91==,===.==. #he only evidence adduced by respondents to prove actual damages claimed by private respondent were the summary computation of damagemade by <ngr. Gesus '. 'egal, Gr. amounting to 9131,=44./0 and the receipt issued by the 88 :onstruction and (teel ;abricator to private respondent for 9.2,===.== representing cost for carpentry works, masonry, welding, and electrical works. 'espondents failed to present 'egal to testify on his estimation. "n its five!page decision, the trial court awarded 912=,===.== as actual damages to private respondent but failed to state the factual basis for such award. "ndeed, the trial court merely declared in the decretal portion of its decision that the ,sum of 912=,===.== as reasonable compensation sustained by plaintiff for her damaged apartment.- #he appellate court, for its part, failed to explain how it arrived at the amount of 91==,===.== in its three!page decision. #hus, the appellate court merely declared$ With respect to the civil liability of the appellants, they contend that there was no urgent necessity to completely demolish the apartment in uestion considering the nature of the damages sustained as a result of the accident. :onse uently, appellants continue, the award of 912=,===.== as compensation sustained by the plaintiff!appellee for her damaged apartment is an unconscionable amount. #he damaged portions of the apartment in uestion are not disputed. :onsidering the aforesaid damages which are the direct result of the accident, the reasonable, and ade uate compensation due is hereby fixed at 91==,===.==.6%27 Cnder Article %111 of the Aew :ivil :ode, actual damages include all the natural and probable conse uences of the act or omission complained of, classified as one for the loss of what a person already possesses * da,o emergente+ and the other, for the failure to receive, as a benefit, that which would have pertained to him * lucro cesante+. As expostulated by the :ourt in P-.C Shipping and /ransport Corporation v. Court of $ppeals $6%07 Cnder Article %111 of the :ivil :ode, actual or compensatory damages are those awarded in satisfaction of, or in recompense for, loss or in)ury sustained. #hey proceed from a sense of natural )ustice and are designed to repair the wrong that has been done, to compensate for the in)ury inflicted and not to impose a penalty. "n actions based on torts or uasi!delicts, actual damages include all the natural and probable conse uences of the act or omission complained of. #here are two kinds of actual or compensatory damages$ one is the loss of what a person already possesses * da,o emergente+, and the other is the failure to receive as a benefit that which would have pertained to him *lucro cesante+.6%37

#he burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. #he burden is to establish one?s case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side, is superior to that of the other. Actual damages are not presumed. #he claimant must prove the actual amount of loss with a reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence obtainable. (pecific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne must be pointed out. Actual damages cannot be anchored on mere surmises, speculations or con)ectures. As the :ourt declared$ As stated at the outset, to enable an in)ured party to recover actual or compensatory damages, he is re uired to prove the actual amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the best evidence available. #he burden of proof is on the party who would be defeated if no evidence would be presented on either side. >e must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence which means that the evidence, as a whole, adduced by one side is superior to that of the other. "n other words, damages cannot be presumed and courts, in making an award, must point out specific facts that could afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory or actual damages are borne. 6%47 #he :ourt further declared that ,where goods are destroyed by the wrongful act of defendant, the plaintiff is entitled to their value at the time of the destruction, that is, normally, the sum of money which he would have to pay in the market for identical or essentially similar goods, plus in a proper case, damages for the loss of the use during the period before replacement.6%17 While claimants? bare testimonial assertions in support of their claims for damages should not be discarded altogether, however, the same should be admitted with extreme caution. #heir testimonies should be viewed in light of claimants? self! interest, hence, should not be taken as gospel truth. (uch assertion should be buttressed by independent evidence. "n the language of the :ourt$ ;or this reason, Iel 'osario?s claim that private respondent incurred losses in the total amount of 90,/.4,=/4.== should be admitted with extreme caution considering that, because it was a bare assertion, it should be supported by independent evidence. Doreover, because he was the owner of private respondent corporation whatever testimony he would give with regard to the value of the lost vessel, its e uipment and cargoes should be viewed in the light of his self!interest therein. We agree with the :ourt of Appeals that his testimony as to the e uipment installed and the cargoes loaded on the vessel should be given credence considering his familiarity thereto. >owever, we do not subscribe to the conclusion that his valuation of such e uipment, cargo, and the vessel itself should be accepted as gospel truth. We must, therefore, examine the documentary evidence presented to support Iel 'osario?s claim as regards the amount of losses.6.=7 An estimate of the damage cost will not suffice$ 9rivate respondents failed to adduce ade uate and competent proof of the pecuniary loss they actually incurred. "t is not enough that the damage be capable of proof but must be actually proved with a reasonable degree of certainty, pointing out specific facts that afford a basis for measuring whatever compensatory damages are borne. 9rivate respondents merely sustained an estimated amount needed for the repair of the roof of their sub)ect building. What is more, whether the necessary repairs were caused only by petitioner?s alleged negligence in the maintenance of its school building, or included the ordinary wear and tear of the house itself, is an essential uestion that remains indeterminable. 6.17 We note, however, that petitioners adduced evidence that, in their view, the cost of the damage to the terrace of private respondent would amount to 922,===.==.6.%7 Accordingly, private respondent is entitled to 922,===.== actual damages. We also agree with petitioner (uelto?s contention that the trial court erred in sentencing him to suffer a straight penalty of one *1+ year. #his is so because under the third paragraph of Article .02 of the 'evised 9enal :ode, the offender must be sentenced to pay a fine when the execution of the act shall have only resulted in damage to property. *Darikina Auto &ine #ransport :orp. v. 9eople, G.R. No. 152040, Darch .1, %==0+ "n spite of said ruling, petitioner Danliclic can still be held liable for the mishap. #he afore! uoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or e0 delicto and not to a civil action arising from uasi!delict or culpa a1uiliana. #he extinction of civil liability referred to in 9ar. *e+ of (ection ., 'ule 111 6now (ection % *b+ of 'ule 1117, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 1== of the 'evised 9enal :ode, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a 1uasi2delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the accused. 6..7 A uasi!delict or culpa a1uiliana is a separate legal institution under the :ivil :ode with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from a delict or crime N a distinction exists between the civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for uasi!delicts or culpa e0tra2contractual. #he same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a crime under the 9enal :ode, or create an action for uasi!delicts or culpa e0tra2contractual under the :ivil :ode.6./7 "t is now settled that ac uittal of the accused, even if based on a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability based on uasi delict. 6.27 "n other words, if an accused is ac uitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. >owever, if an accused is ac uitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or omission complained of *or that there is declaration in a final )udgment that the fact from which the

civil might arise did not exist+, said ac uittal closes the door to civil liability based on the crime or e0 delicto. "n this second instance, there being no crime or delict to speak of, civil liability based thereon or e0 delicto is not possible. "n this case, a civil action, if any, may be instituted on grounds other than the delict complained of. As regards civil liability arising from uasi!delict or culpa a1uiliana, same will not be extinguished by an ac uittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of *or that there is declaration in a final )udgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist+. #he responsibility arising from fault or negligence in a 1uasi2delict is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from negligence under the 9enal :ode. 6.07 An ac uittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil case6.37 based on uasi!delict or culpa a1uiliana. *Danliclic v. :alaunan, G.R. No. 150157, Ganuary %2, %==3+ a close examination of the left side of the car as seen from the pictures *<xhibits ,;-, ,G-, ,O- and ,&-+, reveals scratch marks running from the back of the car towards its center. "t is therefore not a far!fetched conclusion that the scratch marks were caused by the right fender of the trailer!truck before it rested on the center of the car. #he presence of those scratch marks at the back of the car indicates that the trailer!truck bumped the car from behind. Article .02 of the 'evised 9enal :ode provides that reckless imprudence consists in voluntarily, but without malice, doing or failing to do an act from which material damage results by reason of inexcusable lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such act, taking into consideration his employment or occupation, degree of intelligence, physical condition and other circumstances regarding persons, time and place. >ere, the prosecution proved and as sustained by the lower court, the car was clearly ahead of the trailer truck prior to the collision. >ence, it was incumbent upon the appellant to reduce his speed or apply on the brakes of the truck in order to allow the car to safely negotiate a left turn at the intersection. ;ailing, thus, in observing the necessary precaution to avoid inflicting in)ury or damage to others, We consider appellant to be recklessly imprudent in operating his vehicle. *Leneracion v. 9eople, G.R. No. 137447. January 31, 2005) A man must use common sense, and exercise due reflection in all his acts; it is his duty to be cautious, careful, and prudent, if not from instinct, then through fear of incurring punishment. >e is responsible for such results as anyone might foresee and for acts which no one would have performed except through culpable abandon. @therwise his own person, rights and property, and those of his fellow!beings, would ever be exposed to all manner of danger and in)ury. 6%/7 #he test for determining whether a person is negligent in doing an act whereby in)ury or damage results to the person or property of another is this$ :ould a prudent man, in the position of the person to whom negligence is attributed, foresee harm to the person in)ured as a reasonable conse uence of the course actually pursuedE "f so, the law imposes a duty on the actor to refrain from that course or to take precautions to guard against its mischievous results, and the failure to do so constitutes negligence. 'easonable foresight of harm, followed by the ignoring of the admonition born of this prevision, is always necessary before negligence can be held to exist.6%27 *PP v !e "o Santo # 1315$$ # %arc& 27, 2001+ Aegligence has been defined as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance which the circumstances )ustly demand, whereby such other person suffers in)ury.
6./7

#he elements of simple negligence$ are *1+ that there is lack of precaution on the part of the offender; and *%+ that the damage impending to be caused is not immediate or the danger is not clearly manifest. Assuming arguendo that petitioner had been negligent, it must be shown that his negligence was the proximate cause of the accident. 9roximate cause is defined as that which, in the natural and continuous se uence, unbroken by any efficient, intervening cause, produces the in)ury, and without which the result would not have occurred.6/17 "n order to establish a motoristPs liability for the negligent operation of a vehicle, it must be shown that there was a direct causal connection between such negligence and the in)uries or damages complained of. #hus, negligence that is not a substantial contributing factor in the causation of the accident is not the proximate cause of an in)ury.6/%7 *Faid v. 9eople, F.'. Ao. 1310.0, April 3, %==1+