Inchoen Landing - Military Review Must Read
Inchoen Landing - Military Review Must Read
Inchoen Landing - Military Review Must Read
strike at Inchon on
Wolmi Island.
Operation Chromite
Counterattack at Inchon
By J O H N R. B A L L A R D
T
he planning and execution He delegated authority to subordinates
of Operation Chromite by to meet wartime needs while focusing
General Douglas MacArthur on defeating the enemy. Moreover, as
in 1950 established the op- Commander in Chief, Far East
erational art that guides U.S. joint op- (CINCFE), he realized that his head-
erations today. The Inchon invasion quarters was ill-suited to the demands
was one of the best operational-level of war and formed subordinate staffs
case studies in the recent past. for such responsibilities. This decen-
The rapid response to the North tralization in a crisis added to the re-
Korean attack of June 1950 was both sponsiveness of Far East Command
bold and brilliant. Though notoriously (FECOM) component forces.
self-centered, MacArthur was not a mi- MacArthur properly concentrated
cromanager and he had a good sense on strategic issues, mainly keeping
of his role in developing a response. South Korea in the fight. He also dealt
with coalition issues, addressing com-
mand and control as well as readiness
John R. Ballard is a professor at the Naval War College and the author of concerns. Moreover, he led the concept
Upholding Democracy: the United States Military Campaign in Haiti, 1994–1997. development process for Chromite.
0 1
Miles
Source: John Toland, In Mortal Combat: Korea, 1950–1953 (New York: William Morrow, 1991), p. 194.
One task was ensuring the South and became the most critical
support at home for the forces node in the supply line of the commu-
which MacArthur thought nist attack. Moreover, MacArthur knew
necessary. Operational spon- that the city had immense symbolic
sorship of the FECOM theater value and retaking it would inflict a
had been given only recently “devastating psychological setback.” 5
Radford and
to the Chief of Staff, U.S. He focused on this point.
Naval Historical Center
MacArthur in Tokyo,
August 1950.
Army. General J. Lawton MacArthur had encountered sup-
Collins had to supply forces ply shortages during World War II and
and argue for naval and air as- learned the value of operational reach.
sets. As MacArthur told He understood enemy vulnerabilities.
Collins, “Unless provision is Despite tactical accomplishments, as
Nobody is fighting.” 1 He also knew made for the full utilization of our the communists moved southward
that U.S. forces in Japan were not pre- Army-Navy-Air Force team in this shat- their lines of communication grew in-
pared and commented that his first de- tered area, our mission will be costly in creasingly exposed. CINCFE also appre-
cision was to “rely upon strategic ma- life, money, and prestige. At worst it ciated that he must gain time by de-
neuver to overcome the great odds might be doomed.” 4 ploying troops to lure the North
against me. It would be desperate, but The concepts and judgment re- Koreans into a conventional battleline.
it was my only chance.” 2 quired for operational level decisions This would extend enemy road net-
MacArthur formulated a strategic works in depth and breadth
estimate. At its core was the Bluehearts while opposing forces hardened
plan, an indirect approach designed to operational level decisions were and entrenched forward lines.
shatter enemy cohesion. This concept central to the role that MacArthur Value would also accrue as the
remained the driving force in develop- communist forces shifted tacti-
ing and executing Operation Chromite.
played in Chromite cally from movement operations
It sought to counter the strong com- to close assaults against the al-
munist attack indirectly with limited were central to the role that MacArthur lied defensive line around Pusan. All
U.S. capabilities as a lever at a decisive played in Chromite. In particular, his this increased enemy dependence on
point. MacArthur cabled Washington grasp of ideas such as depth and timing supply lines and magnified the surprise
to ensure that decisionmakers grasped was crucial to his counterstroke, but his effect of a deep counterassault.
that “the alternative is a frontal attack knowledge of other operational areas
which can only result in a protracted also warrants attention. For example,
and expensive campaign.” 3 there can be no doubt that he applied
his version of the center of gravity.
Seoul was the hub of all movement in
Unloading men
and equipment.
on the strategic, operational, and tacti- a vision for staff and component ac-
4 Ibid., p. 334.
cal levels are related but not cohesive. tion that reinforced the aim. Through
5 Clay Blair, The Forgotten War: America in
Success on one level cannot balance de- Korea 1950–1953 (New York: Times Books,
long bleak weeks he almost single-
ficiencies on the others over the long 1987), p. 232.
handedly kept efforts focused on the 6 MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 350.
term. The operational brilliance of desired operational outcome. He knew 7 Ibid., p. 346.
MacArthur turned the tide against the command relations and ensured unity 8 Ibid., p. 354.
North Koreans despite tactical deficien- of effort. He was hampered more than
cies and lack of strong regional policy, commanders today by service rivalries
but without strategic context it soon that distorted achievements and used
led to overconfidence, his relief by Tru- the media as a weapon to undermine
man, and stalemate in theater. Opera-
tional brilliance cannot overcome tacti-
cal defeats or strategic shortsightedness.
F
ollowing World War II, Korea was divided
I received your report. I understand the dissatisfaction of
into two zones of occupation along the 38th
Comrade Kim Il-Sung, but he must understand that such a
Parallel. The United States occupied the
large matter in regard to South Korea such as he wants to
southern zone while the north was con-
undertake needs large preparation. The matter must be or-
trolled by the Soviet Union. When no solution to the
ganized so that there would not be too great a risk. If he
issues of reunification emerged, the Republic of Korea
wants to discuss this matter with me, then I will always be
(ROK) was created in August 1948 and Syngman Rhee
ready to receive him and discuss it with him. Transmit all
was elected president. The north held separate elec-
this to Kim Il-Sung and tell him that I am ready to help
tions that autumn which led to the formation of the
him in this matter.
Democratic People’s Republic of Korea and inaugura-
tion of Kim Il-Sung as president. The United States With support from Stalin, the war began with a
maintained a military presence through the Korean surprise attack across the 38 th Parallel on June 25,
Military Assistance Group (KMAG). The Soviets aided 1950. Many North Korean troops were battle tested,
in the buildup of the North Korean military, while having served with the Chinese and Soviet militaries
Kim pressed Josef Stalin for support to unify the coun- during World War II and also with the Chinese in
try by force. their civil war. The ROK army, poorly equipped and
A ciphered cable from the Ambassador of the So- with its combat training incomplete, was aided only
viet Union to Pyongyang, General Terentii Fomich by the 500-man KMAG and proved no match. JFQ
Shtykov, to the Deputy Commissar for Foreign Affairs
Source: Cold War International History Project Bulletin, no. 5
(Spring 1995), pp. 8–9.