Populist Politics in ECE - Smilov
Populist Politics in ECE - Smilov
Populist Politics in ECE - Smilov
The authors and editors wish to thank Rumyana Kolarova, Lena KolarskaBobiska, Andras Sajo and Peter Ue for reviewing the country studies and Kevin DeeganKrause for proofreading.
This publication appears thanks to the generous support of the Trust for Civil Society in Central & Eastern Europe
Bratislava, 2008
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Preface .....................................................................................................................................................................5
The Rise of Populism in Eastern Europe: Policy Paper .....................................................................................7 Daniel Smilov and Ivan Krastev CASE STUDIES: Bulgaria ................................................................................................................................................................ 13 Daniel Smilov Hungary ................................................................................................................................................................ 37 Renata Uitz Poland ................................................................................................................................................................... 69 Jacek Kucharczyk and Olga Wysocka Slovakia ................................................................................................................................................................ 99 Grigorij Mesenikov, Oga Gyrfov, Martin Btora, and Miroslav Kollr
PREFACE
The main goal of the comparative project Populism and Liberal Democracy in Central Eastern Europe, sup ported by Trust for Civil Society in Central and Eastern Europe, was to assess the consequences of and the dan gers related to the rise of populism in Central Eastern Eu rope in pre and especially in postaccession period in new EU member states. In 2007 scholars from four in stitutions Centre for Liberal Strategies (Bulgaria), In stitute for Public Affairs (Slovakia), Institute of Public Affairs (Poland), and Central European University, Le gal Studies Department (Hungary) elaborated national case studies in which they analyzed various factors of populist politics. They did not deal with populism as a societal and political phenomenon or debate the definition and typology of populism, but rather focused on wider societal conditions for populist politics in four mentioned countries, putting them into the context of whole transi tion period after the collapse of communist regimes. At the level of background conditions authors of case studies described the political background underlying the rise of populism in contemporary Central and Eastern Europe. They addressed three groups of questions. First, is there a falling confidence in established political par ties standing behind the transition agenda (or the consen sus formed during the transition period) around issues such as socioeconomic reforms, privatization, restitu tions, EU and NATO membership, financial discipline? Secondly, is there a process of constraining the room for democratic politics, resulting from the growing influence of players such as constitutional courts, independent central banks, independent judiciaries, EU bodies and networks, NATO, thus limiting modus operandi for mainstream parties professing liberal constitutionalism to perform as political actors? Is it therefore possible for a mainstream party to offer a platform significantly dif ferent from the platform of its competitors? Thirdly, to what extent have mainstream parties become alienated from the voters and surrendered the role of formation of political will to other players: media or political new comers, often apparent populists? Authors of the case studies assessed the extent of policy areas dominated by EU bodies in domestic socioeco nomic and political agenda, the foreign policy con straints (NATO, EU), significance of strong independ ent bodies in policy making process (constitutional courts, central banks, regulatory boards, independent judiciaries etc.) as well as civil society actors able to play a formative role in public discourse on important
social issues. They analyzed the issue of transition con sensus whether it exists at all and if so, then to what extent the major parties agree on key policies? What are these policies? When did such a consensus emerge? How stable it is? Are there any parties radically challenging this consensus? Satisfaction of population with politics, an important factor of peoples political behaviour, was analyzed (trust in political parties and representative institutions, level of approval of democracy) as well as public participa tion in politics, turnout in elections, membership in po litical parties, interest groups, NGOs. Media are impor tant actors of public life, therefore analysts could not abandon such issues as involvement of media in electoral and political contests, their political orientation, role in formation of public opinion, party affiliation, and the extent of political control over the public media. In the area of political resources of parties and politi cal players scholars aims was to outline the strategies of successful political players, to define the role of ide ology in party programmes and speeches of leaders. They described the most important areas of disagreement among the main parties since the middle of the 1990s, the main political cleavages related to party competition and the main issues of political discourse. One of the discussed issues is the sociological profile of the support ers of the parties as well as the dynamics of parties sup port/popularity. Other areas of analysis included patron age (the scope for patronage appointments in the economy, public administration, public electronic media, party affiliation as a factor of career chances, and extent of political nomination), nationalism (nationalist appeals as a tool for mobilisation, the link between nationalism and euroscepticism, nationalistic rhetoric in ideological profile of parties), integrity politics (extent of anticor ruption issues on the agenda of political parties and in public debates), personality factors (role of party lead ers in the political process and in communication with their constituencies, and level of trust in politicians), strategies of governing vs. opposition (how political parties cope with changing the roles). As far as the consequences of populism and populist politics for democracy and the rule of law are con cerned, scholars explored some of the more lasting con sequences of the changes in political competition, namely which might pose a threat to democracy and the rule of law. They examined to what extent these changes could possibly lead to an antiliberal political wave in
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Central and Eastern Europe which could endanger po litical stability and the protection of human rights. They analyzed the relationship between majoritarianism and constitutionalism and how committed political parties are to observing constitutional restrictions in the face of popular illiberal demands. Surveyed areas included at titudes toward political opponents, attempts to criminal ise them, using smear campaigns, attacking the integrity March 2008 of rivals, and challenging the right to political participa tion of minorities. Four national case studies served as a factual and ana lytical background for writing the policy paper on the rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe which is included in this publication as a substantive introduc tion.
A spectre is haunting the world: populism. A decade ago, when the new nations were emerging into independ ence, the question that was asked was, how many will go communist? Today, this question, so plausible then, sounds a little out of date. In as far as the rulers of the new states embrace an ideology, it tends more to have a populist character. This observation was made by Ghita Ionescu and Ernest Gellner exactly forty years ago, long enough for populism first to disappear and then to re emerge as the major player in global politics. Now, as then, there can be no doubt about the importance of populism. But now, as then, no one is clear about exactly what it is. Is there one phenomenon corresponding to this one name? Populism is difficult to conceptualize partly because it is extremely contextdependent. Probably, it is more ad equate to speak of populisms in the plural. For example, political scientists use populism to describe both Chavez Venezuela and Putins Russia, even though these are markedly different regimes.1 Although both of them seem to be democracys doubles, they part with liberal democracy in different ways: Putin, in contrast to Chaves, is more marketoriented and cooperative vis vis the US, especially regarding Bushs global war against terror. Philippe Schmitter points out that the concept of populism is often abused in political discourse.2 By calling someone a populist people are just expressing their negative evaluation of a particular actor or politi cal agenda. Overall, populism is most probably a family resemblance concept, so it will be a futile ex ercise to look for a very strict definition of the phenom enon. Nevertheless, the populisms in Central Eastern Europe that are in our primary focus do share some im portant common characteristics.3 First, populists in the region appeal to the people as a whole, as opposed to corrupt and impotent political elites. In other words, they present themselves as an alternative not to a specific political party or platform, but as an alterna tive to the existing representative system as a whole.
They promise to reinvigorate political life, to bring back substance to politics. Secondly, populists (to varying degrees) oppose a key idea of liberal democracy: that the political majority should be limited in important ways by constitutional constraints. The Central European fam ily of populism is openly majoritarian it is centered around the belief that the consent of the majority is the ultimate ground of legitimation in politics. Therefore, this type of populism is particularly opposed to the idea of minority rights. Thirdly, and again to varying de grees, populists challenge at least some elements of what they see as the liberal consensus of the transi tion period: marketoriented reforms, integration in the EuroAtlantic organizations, rejection of nationalistic language and behavior. Populists challenge all or at least some of these taboos, reject the political cor rectness of liberalism, and give an opportunity for the citizens to discuss problems which have been brack eted out by the mainstream parties. Thus, what is striking about the present use of the term populism is the almost unimaginable diversity of poli cies and actors it tries to cover. Yet commentators and political theorists who insist on using populism as a common family name for such diverse political players have a point. Only a vague and illdefined concept like populism can allow us to grasp and reflect on the radi cal transformation of politics that is under way in many places in the world. Although vague and illdefined, the concept of populism does a better job than any of the other currentlycirculating welldefined concepts of cap turing the nature of the challenges facing liberal democ racy today. These challenges emanate not from the rise of antidemocratic and authoritarian alternatives, but from the dangerous mutations within the conceptual realm of democracy. It is obvious that the new populism has lost its original significance as an ideology or expression of agrarian radicalism. Populism is also too thin and eclectic to pretend to be an ideology in the way liberalism, social ism or conservatism is. But the growing interest in
1 2
Democracys Doubles, Journal of Democracy, Volume 17, No. 2, April 2006. A Balance Sheet of the Vices and Virtues of Populisms, paper delivered at the conference the Challenge of New Populism, organized by the Centre for Liberal Strategies, Sofia, in May 2006. For a discussion of populism in Eastern Europe see Cas Mudde, In the Name of the Peasantry, the Proletariat, and the People: Populism in Eastern Europe, in Meny and Surel, Democracies and the Populist Challenge, Palgrave, 2002.
populism has captured the major political trend in our world today: the rise of democratic illiberalism. It is precisely the rise of democratic illiberalism that worries us when we discuss the proliferation of populist revolutions in Latin America, the political turmoil in Central Europe or the political logic behind the no votes in the referenda on the EU Constitution in France and the Netherlands. The new populism does not represent a challenge to democracy understood as free elections or as the rule of the majority. Unlike the extreme parties of the 1930s (fascists, communists), the new populists are not planning to ban elections and to introduce dicta torships. In fact, the new populists like elections and, unfortunately, tend to win them. What they oppose is the partybased representative nature of modern democra cies, the protection of minorities rights, and any con straints on the sovereignty of the people. When we discuss the rise of populism today we refer to the process of the erosion of the liberal consensus that emerged after the end of the Cold War; we refer to the rising tensions between democratic majoritarianism and liberal constitutionalism, the two fundamental elements of liberal democratic regimes. The rise of populism in dicates a decline in the attractiveness of liberal solutions in the fields of politics, economics and culture; it implies an increase in the popularity of the politics of exclusion.
themselves from liberal parties, but after a relatively brief spell things will return to normal. Secondly, there are others who would go as far as to compare the current crisis of liberal democracy with its demise in the interwar period, when right and leftwing extremists subverted the democratic order by abusing its instruments of representation. Admittedly, this is a slightly paranoid and alarmist interpretation, but there is prima facie evidence in its support as well. For instance, in the region there are signs of growing intolerance to ward vulnerable minorities, such as the Roma, resur gence of antiSemitic feelings, calls for taking politics to the streets, and even occasional outbursts of violence. It is true that the constitutional framework of liberal democracy is still intact, but within this framework the dominant mode of making politics becomes illiberal. In other words, the most popular tool to mobilize public support becomes the attack against liberal policies and principles in different areas of governance from immi gration and welfare, to EU integration matters. The dan ger here is obvious: the loyalty to the basic constitutional framework is growing thin, and this in the long run might erode the rule of law, and might lead to the gradual sub version of the regime and its replacement with some form of authoritarianism, or with an aggressively majoritarian and intolerant political model. Finally, there are those who without being alarmist are convinced that the current crisis is not just a temporary aberration, but is an expression of a lasting trend, which will lead to a serious transformation of liberal democ racy. These observers stress the importance of what they see as intensifying problems of the structure of represen tation provided by liberal democracy. Since the plat forms of the mainstream liberal parties grow increasingly similar, people do not see that elections are likely to make any difference. Citizens do have the vote, but in fact they do not have important alternatives to choose from: key issues, such as extensive constitutional frame works, monetary policy (run by independent banks), in ternational relations (determined by participation in or ganizations such as NATO, EU and WTO), are offlim its for routine democratic politics. This lowers the pay off for voting for liberal parties they do not promise to change the essential elements of the status quo. The populists capitalize on this fact by offering to reopen for political competition all these liberal taboos. If this analysis is correct, it appears that liberals have sur rendered active political participation to their populist rivals. Liberal mobilization of voters becomes only possible as a form of veto against some excessive and dangerous candidates or issues. But are voters always going to veto the excesses of populists, if they become firmly entrenched in the political establishment, and if their discourse starts to dominate routine democratic politics?
THE EVIDENCE
On the basis of four structured case studies of Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia we are drawing the fol lowing conclusions about the rise of populism in Cen tral Europe: