President McKinley & American Imperialism
President McKinley & American Imperialism
President McKinley & American Imperialism
AIR UNIVERSITY
by
April 1998
The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do
not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of
Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the
ii
Contents
Page
DISCLAIMER ................................................................................................................ ii
PREFACE...................................................................................................................... iv
ABSTRACT .................................................................................................................. vi
Spain....................................................................................................................... 12
HOSTILITIES .............................................................................................................. 16
Economic Imperialism?........................................................................................... 27
CONCLUSION............................................................................................................. 35
BIBLIOGRAPHY......................................................................................................... 37
iii
Preface
This year marks the centennial of the Spanish-American War, the war that launched
America onto the international stage as a major actor. American involvement in this war
did not become the subject of my research because of the anniversary, however, the
The journey I made to arrive at the decision to write about this topic was, to say the
least, a torturous trip. I had initially been interested in the history of the United States’
interactions with non-Westphalian state actors, but discovered I could not do justice to
this topic in a thirty-page report because the number of non-state actors had really
proliferated in recent years. I went back in history to find a time in which I could refine
The Filipino Insurrection was the perfect war to study the interaction of the United
States with Spain, a state actor in the Westphalian sense of the term, and the Filipino
McKinley’s motivations to retain all of the Philippines following the defeat of the
Spanish Asiatic Squadron in Manila Bay and the skill in which he attained his political
objectives. A case study of McKinley failed to provide me with material for my first
topic; he completely ignored the insurrectionists. What became so interesting was how
he shaped his domestic policy and American public opinion to ensure the success of his
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expansionist foreign policy. I decided I wanted to find out more about this remarkable
McKinley’s story would not have been told in this report without the help of several
people. It would be unpardonable not to mention them here even though I can never
accurately portray the assistance they provided me at every turn. I would first like to
acknowledge my research advisor, Major Carl Baner. Carl had to put up with the twists
and turns of this report and valiantly attempted to keep me on track. This paper would
My sincere thanks are extended to Dr. John Beeler of the University of Alabama
History Department. Dr. Beeler graciously read this paper and provided feedback at a
level of expertise I am fortunate to have received. His common sense approach to writing
This report’s first words would never have been recorded had it not been for the
excellent support, assistance, and patience exhibited by the Air University library staff
during hours of research. The librarians never faltered in their quest to train me while
helping me. I owe them more thanks than I can adequately express.
I must finally acknowledge the support and understanding of my family. They have
contributed to this paper in their own way, one that normally entailed sacrifice. If this
report had a dedication it would be theirs. Of course, even though the previously
mentioned individuals have left their indelible mark on this paper, the contents of this
v
AU/ACSC/197/1998-04
Abstract
President of the United States as a means to stimulate the domestic economy and increase
American international prestige. This expansion was critical to the continued economic
growth of the United States and its emergence as a world power. This report looks at
McKinley’s expansionist foreign policy and asserts it was tied directly to attaining
economic markets and prosperity for the United States and not, as is commonly believed,
a moral duty to help our “little brown brothers.”1 This foreign policy designed to achieve
economic growth conflicted with what many believed were the very foundations of our
Constitution, the belief that no man should be ruled by another without consent. America
had gained its independence from Great Britain because of the widespread acceptance of
this belief and now, a little more than a hundred years later, the country was
The anti-imperialist movement and members of McKinley’s own party opposed his
expansionist plans. The President knew he had to have the unqualified support of the
American people to attain his foreign policy objectives. His subsequent domestic policy
campaign stressed that a moral duty had fallen upon America’s shoulders, not that this
form of colonialism would bring in more money. The argument that the acquisition of
the Philippines was a duty from God that could not be refused was successful. The
American public quickly rallied behind McKinley. The subsequent public pressure on
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Congress ensured ratification of all subsequent treaties and policies ensuring American
annexation of the Philippines and several lesser islands throughout the Pacific.
This report describes McKinley’s expansionist beliefs, the reasons for those beliefs,
and looks at his method of ensuring public support for his expansionist policies.
McKinley was not a politician that was inclined to share his political decisions. He was
hard to pin down on issues and left very little written material (primarily political
speeches and rhetoric) for historical review. The policies of McKinley are therefore left
open to interpretation. This report relies on primary source material from key members
Notes
1
The term little brown brother was commonly used to describe both Filipinos and
Cubans and was prevalent in America during the 1890s. Its use was so common it has
become the title of a book on American expansion in the Philippines. Leon Wolff, Little
Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co., Inc., 1961). This term
reflects the Social Darwinist beliefs, common at that time, that the Anglo-Saxon was the
superior culture and race and had “a social law of service” to help our “inferior brothers.”
Paul Crook, Darwinism, War, and History (Cambridge: University Press, 1994), 96. The
prevalence of this view is reinforced by Dewey’s private letters, in which he writes that
the Filipinos “should be treated kindly, exactly as you would treat children, for they are
little else.” Phillip C.Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1938), 331.
vii
Chapter 1
Thus began the Philippine Insurrection, a conflict that would officially last three
years and open a century that would find the United States repeatedly entangled in armed
struggles on the Asian continent. This engagement of an armed Filipino patrol by Private
Grayson marked the beginning of the Philippine Insurrection on February 4, 1899. While
the actual event initiating the commencement of open hostilities may be easily
determined, the events leading up to this exchange of gunfire and the struggle that
expansion for the United States. This expansion was never intended to include the
Philippine Islands until they were delivered to President McKinley by Admiral Dewey
following the defeat of the Spanish Asian Squadron in the Battle of Manila Bay. The
acquisition of these islands forced President McKinley to weigh the Philippines’ strategic
expansion was a divisive foreign policy issue in both McKinley’s own Republican Party
and in the Congress.2 McKinley’s skillful crafting of American public opinion and
domestic policies provided him with the leverage he needed to attain his foreign policy
goals.
associated with colonialism. The United States had fought a war of independence from
its own colonial master and had just finished another war over the rights of one man to
rule another against his will. It seemed to many members of Congress that imperialism
and expansion sacrificed the ideals at the very core of American political and ideological
thought.
The American people became the key to McKinley’s expansionist goals. His ability
to sway public opinion was due in part to his Social Darwinism argument. McKinley
argued that America had a God given responsibility to help inferior races. He convinced
the American public that our involvement in the Philippines was not colonialism or
inferior race of people. The economic advantages and international prestige resulting
from American involvement in the Philippines was only a benefit of doing one’s duty.
There is little argument over the economic and strategic importance of the
Philippines to the United States in 1898. The islands provided access to China, a great
market which, at the time, was being exploited by several European nations. The
potential of this market was not lost on a President elected to economically revive
America which, during the 1896 election, was in the midst of the worst depression the
country had yet experienced. The Philippine archipelago also provided the U.S. Navy
with ports and potential coaling stations. These forward bases were the lifeblood of a
coal-powered fleet and effectively extended the range of United States military might.
Notes
Chapter 2
The Spanish
—Jose Rizal
To understand America involvement in the Philippines, one must first understand the
role the Spanish played in the islands. Spanish involvement dates back to the early 16th
century. The Spanish, under the auspices of Ferdinand Magellan, first came to the
Philippines sometime in March 1521. Two thousand warriors under the command of a
Magellan, eager to prove Spain was a powerful ally, attacked the Mactans, Cebuan
enemies. The odds certainly did not favor Magellan; his fifty men conducted a sea
landing against over 1500 Mactan warriors. Magellan’s firearms and European tactics
failed to carry the day for the Spanish. The Mactans forced the Spanish contingent off
the beach, killing Magellan in the process.2 The remaining Spaniards, not welcome in the
The survivors of Magellan’s ill fated voyage eventually returned to Spain with tales
of new trading partners, lands to colonize, and natives ready for conversion to
Catholicism. Spain returned to the Philippines, during the reign of Phillip II, for a stay
that would last virtually uninterrupted for the next 350 years.
Spanish rule varied in its harshness over three and half centuries of colonialism.
There was a historical pattern of Filipino unrest and violence, which led to ruthless
Spanish repression.3 This pattern of unsuccessful rebellion traces its roots as far back in
Spanish rule slowly improved during the mid-nineteenth century. A public building
program was initiated in 1860 and, later that year, the imperial government allowed
native newspapers. Three years later a religiously based public education system was
established. Within fourteen years of its inception 1,608 primary schools, with a total
Such reforms, however, did not forestall the insurrections. Ironically enough, the
improvements begun in 1860 led to the downfall of Spanish rule in the Philippines. The
reforms helped to create a new middle class among the Filipinos. This relatively
comfortable class found it easier to send their children to Spanish schools. The children
were, in turn, the first generation of Filipinos to receive higher education and they
became the first Filipino upper class. This generation also furnished the early ideologists
The most notable child of this generation was Jose Rizal. Rizal was born June 19,
1861 in Calamba, a town very close to Manila. Rizal was a foreign-trained doctor who
had studied in Madrid, Paris, Heidelberg, and Berlin as well as in the Philippines.6
Rizal’s early reputation as a Filipino patriot stemmed from his 200,000-page novel
entitled Noli Me Tangere. Although banned by the Spanish, it energized the Filipino
Jose Rizal was an inspiration to the Filipino people. He was a reformer, however,
not a revolutionary. He believed freedom for the Filipino people could be achieved under
Spanish rule.8 Rizal founded the Liga Filipina, a nationalist order consisting primarily of
intellectuals. The Liga Filipina was not a severe threat to Spanish rule, it merely
The Spaniards, refusing to accept any change to the colonial system that had been in
place for centuries, believed Rizal was a threat to their rule. The Liga Filipina movement
was never a serious danger to the Spanish primarily because it attracted the class of
people that had prospered under Spanish rule. These people were known as the
Illustrados. More radical nationalist groups, however, did pose a threat to Spanish
authority. The best known of these groups was the Katipunan, which advocated outright
independence for the Philippines. The Katipunan ranks consisted primarily of urban,
The Katipunan and the Illustrados formed a brief and uneasy alliance during the
1896 revolt. The alliance was destined to fail primarily because it could not overcome
the large class distinctions between the two groups. The goals of the two groups and
their reasons for participation in the insurrection were too divergent to promote an
reform. These ambitions threatened the very existence of the Illustrados who wanted a
voice in the present Spanish government and retention of their advantages under the
current system.9
The Spanish response to this revolt was typical. Mass arrests resulted in trials and
executions. Property owners had their land confiscated. The Spanish, using the unrest to
rid themselves of all potential adversaries, seized the opportunity to arrest Rizal, even
though he had refused to cooperate with the Katipunan. Interestingly enough, he had
volunteered to serve as a doctor for the Spanish army during military operations against
Cuban revolutionaries and was aboard a ship headed to Cuba when he was arrested.
arrested and tried for his responsibility in inciting the Filipino uprising.10 Jose Rizal was
Katipunan assistance to escape the Spanish authorities twice because he did not want to
independence, the circumstances of his death made Rizal a martyr and in death he
Rizal’s execution did not end the Filipino revolt but it did pave the way for a new
national hero and it was Emilio Aquinaldo who assumed this role. Aquinaldo was born
in Cavite province in 1869. He was very prominent in the 1896 revolt raising a 30,000-
man army and forming a Central Revolutionary Committee.11 Aquinaldo emerged as the
President of the revolutionary government following a brief power struggle with the
founder of the Katipunan movement. This Filipino revolt was the most successful to
date. Aquinaldo, however, did not believe the rebellion would be successful because of
division in his own political camp and a lack of funding to sustain the rebellion. He
agreed to peace talks with the Spanish Governor General Fernando Prinio de Rivera.
Prinio de Rivera convinced Aquinaldo that defeat of the insurrection was inevitable.
Aquinaldo agreed to peace talks and displayed a penchant for accepting verbal
where “the conditions were not reduced to writing” assuming the negotiator “pledged his
claimed the other party did not honor their agreement. This occurred during the Treaty of
Biak-na-Bato and would occur later when Aquinaldo was working with American Consul
Pratt and Admiral Dewey. Aquinaldo signed the treaty of Biak-na-Bato, without a
written record of the treaty terms, on December 14, 1897. Shortly after signing he left
the islands in exile bound for Hong Kong ending this phase of the Filipino insurrection.
This is not the final chapter in the history of Filipino revolt against Spain, although
the clock was quickly running down on Spanish colonial rule in the Philippines. The
after Aquinaldo’s departure.13 Spain’s focus started to shift, however, from its internal
Philippine and Cuban problems to the external threats posed by the United States during
Notes
1
David Bernstein, The Philippine Story (New York: Farrar, Strauss and Company,
1947), 32.
2
Ibid., 33. Magellan’s actual cause of death is disputed in different sources.
Bernstein writes that a poisonous arrow killed Magellan. Another account describes how
he was hacked to death on the beach by several Mactans. At either rate, this was the end
of the first Spanish presence in the Philippines. Humabon killed Magellan’s deputy
following the failed attack and chased the Spanish away.
3
Ibid., 35.
Notes
4
Ibid., 37.
5
Ibid.
6
There is little doubt Rizal was an intelligent man, he learned to speak Japanese in
one month. Ibid., 55.
7
Ibid., 54.
8
Ibid., 55.
9
Most Illustrados, including Jose Rizal, rejected the Katipunan movement because it
threatened to destroy the Illustrados way of life. Many Illustrados assisted the Spanish
and, later, the Americans against the insurgent movement. Stuart C. Miller, Benevolent
Assimilation (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1982), 33.
10
Bernstein, The Philippine Story, 58-59.
11
Ibid., 62.
12
Ibid., 64.
13
Several things caused the failure of the truce. The Spanish failed to completely
honor the monetary settlement and institute reforms while the Filipinos failed to turn in
the agreed number and type of weapons. Aquinaldo eventually used most of the money
he received from the settlement to buy weapons prior to his return to the Philippines.
Chapter 3
McKinley never discussed with me his reasons for taking the Philippine
Islands. Taft said the United States blundered into colonization. If it was
a blunder it was done deliberately.
—Elihu Root1
The last half of the nineteenth century witnessed the growth of the United States in
international power and foreign relations. The great powers of Europe viewed the United
States as a second rate power in 1871, albeit one that could tip the balance of power in
their favor if required. The European powers began to court the United States as a result,
America’s amazing growth, as measured in the 1880’s, was due to large population
increases, agricultural production unsurpassed any where in the world, and an excellent
transportation net capable of exporting excess crops. America became the world
production leader for coal, iron, and lead within the next decade.3 Congress increased
defense spending to protect this new found prosperity, authorizing new coastal
fortifications and a new naval fleet consisting of heavily gunned steel warships in the
10
1880’s. This fleet surpassed the Austrian-Hungry and Italian navies and was the equal of
Germany’s.4
Alfred Thayer Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History, 1660-1783 (1890)
dominated American geopolitical thought in the 1890’s.5 Mahan espoused the need for
securing command of the sea. Command of the sea allowed uninterrupted flow of
commercial shipping. This trade required ships to carry the cargo, a strong navy to
protect shipping and overseas bases.6 This equation also requires permanent trading
partners, often provided by colonies during this era. Colonies frequently performed a
dual role for their imperial master. They served as an exclusive trading partner and
provided overseas bases for the navy. The last allowed steam ships and navies to
resupply, coal, and undertake repairs. America had a strong navy but did not have
colonies or overseas bases necessary for trade with China, hence the need for expansion. 7
Expansion did not occur until 1898 but it had been on the minds of politicians and
military leaders for several years. General Arthur MacArthur outlined the need for
United States expansion and “sovereignty of the Pacific” in his “Chinese Memorandum”
published in 1883.8 Most military leaders believed Far East bases would ensure access to
Asian markets and “protect American citizens and American interests.”9 Mahan, an
ardent imperialist, was also an enthusiastic social Darwinist and advocated expansion on
Seward’s purchase of Alaska but Congress spent most of the late nineteenth century
refusing to ratify treaties granting the United States overseas bases. The Senate rejected
11
opportunities to annex Hawaii in 1867, 1893, and 1897. The Senate also refused to ratify
a treaty providing the United States exclusive basing rights in Samoa in 1872.10
McKinley personally desired expansion. He had submitted the third Hawaiian treaty
the Senate rejected in 1897 and he quickly accepted the annexation of the Wake Islands
in 1898. McKinley favored the annexation of the Samoan Islands and placed the islands
under the navy’s administration when the Senate finally approved a treaty in 1900.11
When asked about the intentions of the United States in regards to the Philippines shortly
after Dewey’s victory he remarked “we should hold on to what we’ve got.”12
Westward expansion would provide the United States with new markets and new sources
of raw materials. In the fall of 1897, Senator Albert Beveridge succinctly argued the
economic need for expansion.13 McKinley wanted access to the Chinese markets and had
watched the Europeans position themselves to colonize the country.14 McKinley was
genuinely concerned about access to Chinese markets because of the actions of the
European powers.
Spain
The immediate source of dispute between the United States and Spain was halfway
around the world from the Far East. America had been sympathetic to the struggles of
Spain’s colonial subjects in the Caribbean, especially on Cuba, for many years. The tiny
island nation was virtually on America’s doorstep and the Spanish attempts to crush the
Cuban rebels were duly reported in the American press. In 1873-74 the Virginius
incident almost provoked war between the two countries. This episode involved the
Spanish seizure of a United States flagged vessel carrying arms to Cuban insurrectionists.
12
The Spanish summarily executed the officers and crew of this vessel, most of who were
Americans, and the two countries almost went to war until a last minute diplomatic
Rebellion flared into flame again in the 1890s when Spanish repression reached new
levels of brutality and terror. Captain-General Valeriano Weyler became the most
notorious Spaniard in Cuba and, to many Americans, seemed to embody all that was
wrong with Spanish rule in particular and colonialism in general. Weyler established
concentration camps throughout Cuba in 1896.16 These camps housed the civilian
population in squalid conditions in order to undercut public support for the Cuban
insurrectionists. Weyler’s policies “inflamed the American press, public, pulpit, and
diplomatic means to resolve the situation in Cuba but neither was able to influence
The situation between the United States and Spain continued to deteriorate. Events
cascaded out of control in February 1898. A private letter written by Enrique de Lome,
the Spanish Minister to Washington was forwarded to the press by a Cuban sympathizer
and published.18 The contents of this letter referred to McKinley as “weak and a bidder
for the admiration of the crowd” and described him as a “would-be politician.”19 This
personal attack on the President outraged the American people and undermined their trust
in Spain.
The de Lome letter was followed a week later by the sinking of the USS Maine in
Havana harbor. The explosion of the Maine was heralded on paper headlines throughout
the country. An investigation of the disaster failed to determine the actual cause of the
13
Maine’s sinking. America’s “Yellow Press,” however, took every opportunity to blame
the Spanish.20 The United States, it seemed, had reached a point in which war with Spain
was inevitable.
McKinley was notably silent concerning these events; he still entertained thoughts of
averting a war once things settled down. His hopes of reaching a diplomatic solution
were unfulfilled. The events surrounding the de Lome letter and the Maine forced
McKinley’s hand. On April 4, 1898 the President submitted the draft of his war message
to Congress, that detailed his reasons for intervention in Cuba. It failed to mention the
Philippines at all.21
Notes
1
Secretary of War Elihu Root, in a letter to the author, discussing President
McKinley’s intentions regarding the retention of the Philippine Islands following the
Spanish American War. Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, Mead and Co.,
1938), 329.
2
In 1871 the European powers courted the United States in an attempt to gain
advantage in dealings with other European powers. Examples of these attempts include
negotiations between the United States and Russia during the Russian problems in the
Turkish Straits. Russia successfully used the threat of American involvement in other
parts of the world to help attain a new strait convention with England. Germany also
used talks with the United States to distract England during the Franco-Prussian War.
The growing importance of the United States was further evidenced when all of the great
European powers except Austria-Hungry had raised their Diplomatic Legations in
Washington to Embassies by 1892. Earnest R. May, Imperial Democracy:The
Emergence of America as a Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961),
4-5.
3
Ibid., p.6-7.
4
Ibid., 7.
5
A comprehensive, yet concise, reading on Mahan’s naval strategy can be found in
The Art of War in World History. Mahan, Alfred Thayer. “Naval Strategy.” In The Art
of War in World History. Edted by Gerard Chaliand. Berkeley, California: University of
California Press, 1994, 787-807.
6
May, Imperial Democracy, 8.
7
Challener discusses the influence of Mahan on U.S. policy and Navy’s desire to
obtain Subig Bay in the Philippines and Guantanimo Bay Bay in Cuba. Richard D.
Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1973), 39, 183.
14
Notes
8
MacArthur bases his “Sovereignty” argument on the needs of the United States to
“attain natural growth” and exists as a “commanding and prosperous society.” Brian M.
Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940 (Chapel Hill,
North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 6.
9
Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy, 9.
10
James C. Bradford, ed., Crucible of Empire. (Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute
Press, 1993), xvi-xvii.
11
Ibid., xviii.
12
H. Wayne Morgan, America’s Road to Empire (New York, John Wiley and Sons,
Inc., 1965), 75.
13
Excerpt from Beveridge’s speech arguing for expansion, “American factories are
making more than the American people can use; American soil is producing more than
they can consume. Fate has written our policy for us; the trade of the world must and
shall be ours.” David Bain, Sitting in Darkness (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company,
1984), 68.
14
Much to the chagrin of McKinley and American business concerns, the Europeans
were posturing themselves for a run on China. The French had annexed Indochina, the
Germans were operating out of Kiaochow Bay, and the Russians had moved into Port
Arthur, all during the period 1894-1897. Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire:
American Resistance to Philippine War (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Schenkman, 1972),
67.
15
Henry Cabot Lodge, The War With Spain (New York, Harper & Brothers
Publishers, 1900), 11.
16
These camps were known as reconcentration camps. The American press would
label American camps in the Philippines serving the same purpose years later the same
thing.
17
Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 6.
18
This letter not only showed Spanish disdain for McKinley, it also proved Spain
was dealing dishonestly with the United States in regards to Cuba. Ibid., 43.
19
Ibid.
20
America’s “Yellow Press” has often been credited with responsibility for creating
war frenzy in America prior to the Spanish-American War. The most notable “Yellow
Press” publishers, William Randolph Hearst and Joseph Pulitzer, went to great lengths to
increase circulation, often sensationalizing stories and asserting unfounded accusations.
The Maine incident is an example of this. The term “Yellow Press” is so described
because of the color of the ink used in drawing the paper’s cartoons.
21
Morgan, America’s Road to Empire, 61.
15
Chapter 4
Hostilities
Our concern was not for territory or trade or empire, but for the people
whose interests and destiny, without our willing it, had been put in our
hands
—William McKinley1
—William McKinley2
sinking of the Maine once war with Spain had been declared. He believed it was in the
best interests of the United States to expand beyond its geographical borders and he was
now presented with an opportunity to achieve these goals. McKinley knew this
expansion would broaden foreign trade and he quickly annexed both Hawaii and the
eventually building a pan-isthmus canal and the purchase of the Dutch West Indies.3
The role of the Philippines in achieving these policy objectives came about almost
accidentally. Admiral Dewey’s victory over the Spanish in Manila Bay had been the
fruition of Naval planning since 1895, a plan McKinley knew of and signed into order in
April 1898.4 This plan was designed to defeat the Spanish naval presence in the Pacific
16
allowing the small American military to focus on the Cuban Theater of operations and
reported to have had to use a schoolbook map of the orient to follow Dewey’s reports
because he did not know where the Philippines was located.5 This story has often been
used to support the belief that McKinley did not have designs on the Philippine
archipelago. McKinley himself said the acquisition of the Philippines was “a trust we
There is literature, however, indicating that McKinley was aware of the Philippines
and may have planned on acquiring them along with Hawaii and Guam. Secretary of
War Russell A. Alger wrote in his memoirs that McKinley planned to send an army of
occupation to the Philippines before Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay.7 McKinley knew of
Dewey’s mission before the Battle of Manila Bay. Manila papers reported weeks prior to
the attack that the Spanish Asiatic Squadron was Dewey’s objective.8 American industry,
a great friend to the President, worked in the Philippines for years prior to the Spanish
There is also research indicating McKinley had designs on the Philippines from the
very start of the war. This research claims McKinley’s primary war objective in the
Pacific was not the destruction of the Spanish Asiatic Squadron but the acquisition of
commercial and military footholds in the Philippines. 9 The dilapidated condition of the
Spanish squadron lends credence to this argument; this fleet may have been incapable of
17
One thing is certain, McKinley could have ordered Dewey to leave the Philippines as
soon as word of the destruction of the Spanish fleet was received. Dewey had
accomplished the stated objective, securing the American West Coast from raids and
Merritt, best known for his exploits as a “boy general” in the American Civil War.
Merritt arrived in Manila with an American Army of Volunteers specifically recruited for
this campaign. These volunteers were not a professional army but had been specifically
trained for operations in the Philippines.11 Merritt quickly lay siege to the city and it’s
Merritt faced two problems. One of these was the Spanish Garrison and the other
Aquinaldo’s Filipino army. Aquinaldo had returned to the Philippines on an U.S. Navy
ship to assist in the defeat of the Spanish garrison at Manila. Aquinaldo believed he was
fighting for Filipino independence. Merritt felt comfortable with the military problems
presented by the Spanish garrison but he did not like the situation in which he found
himself regarding Aquinaldo. Merritt did not understand the United States position and
he repeatedly sought further guidance from the Secretary of War concerning the insurgent
forces beginning as early as May 15, 1898.12 Merritt finally received an official policy
answer in August 1898 when instructions directed that there would be “no joint
occupation of Manila” and that the General was “authorized to use whatever means …are
General Merritt arranged the withdrawal of insurgent forces from Manila and the
surrender of the Spanish Garrison. The capitulation of Spanish forces was complete and
18
the Philippines had been liberated from Spanish control, only to find themselves under
the control of the Americans. Merritt transferred command to General Elwell S. Otis
August 26, 1898 and departed the Philippines for Paris to participate in the Treaty
negotiations with the Spanish.14 The surrender of the Spanish physically marked the end
The defeat of the Spanish at Manila created enormous possibilities for the United
States. Although there is evidence that suggests the seizure of the Philippines was the
none of it is conclusive.15 Most likely the acquisition of the Philippines fit into the
administration’s general policy of expansionism and had not been a specific objective
prior to Dewey’s victory at Manila Bay. In other words, the Philippines became a target
of opportunity and they were, as the old saying goes, just too good for McKinley to pass
up. The United States was on the verge of expanding its political and economic influence
into Asia and becoming a genuine world power.16 All McKinley needed to do was
determine the fate of the Philippines to realize his foreign policy objectives.
following the surrender of the Spanish Garrison in Manila. Aquinaldo believed he had
been dealt with dishonestly by the American diplomatic corps and military. First Merritt,
and then Otis, never really understood the status of Aquinaldo or his army. These
problems all stem from the lack of national objectives and foreign policy regarding the
Philippines. It would take time for McKinley to determine the Philippines future once it
19
became his for the taking, but the Filipinos quickly understood the fate of their country
The insurrection began in February 1899 when Private Grayson fired on the Filipino
patrol. The insurrection lasted three years and generally followed three distinct phases.
The first of these phases was conventional warfare between the Filipino and American
armies. The Filipino army had been soundly defeated during this phase and was forced to
transition to guerilla war. This marked the second phase of the struggle and the last one
directly influenced by McKinley policy. The third phase was marked by atrocities on
both sides as war weariness settled over the American military, politicians, and public.
This phase indicates the beginnings of a distinct shift in American public opinion.
Otis had defeated the Filipinos in a conventional war. He promptly declared the
insurrection over, changed command with General Arthur MacArthur and returned home
amid great fanfare, crowned the nation’s newest hero. McKinley was Otis’ biggest
cheerleader, the timing of the victory declaration was perfect. It fit in perfectly with
McKinley’s reelection plans and campaign. Expansion had occurred, the military had
proven itself effective, and the navy had freedom of movement throughout the Pacific
Ocean. Euphoric crowds greeted the President everywhere he went and the anti-
imperialists were notably silent. All that remained for the United States was to start
reaping the economic rewards that accrue to the colonial master. The problem was that
the war was not over. The lull in the fighting was not attributable to the defeat of the
guerilla war.
20
MacArthur knew the war was not over but had only entered a different phase.17 His
reports fell on deaf ears in Washington, however, until the scope and intensity of conflict
American casualties, which seemed to validate the belief in the United States that the war
was over. McKinley may not have purposely misled the American people about the true
nature of the situation in the Philippines but he maintained an illusion of peace only
Both Aquinaldo and McKinley anxiously awaited the 1900 Presidential elections but
with different outcomes in mind. Both men sensed the elections would be a turning point
in the war. Aquinaldo issued instructions to his forces to assume a guerilla war at least
until the 1900 election when there was a chance a more sympathetic American
administration would be voted into office.18 Aquinaldo may have believed this election
was his only chance to secure independence for the Philippines and he was willing to take
desperate action. He sent representatives to the United States to approach the Democratic
Party and promised a cessation of all hostilities if their candidate, William Jennings
Bryan, were elected.19 The Democrats, fearing Republican charges of treason, refused to
see them.
MacArthur, on the other hand, could not conduct any large-scale offensive
operations until after the election. United States policy shifted dramatically following
resistance to American rule.20 Root instructed MacArthur to resort to the methods used
against American-Indians in the west.21 The army shifted from the civil-military and
21
humanitarian assistance role they had been fulfilling, with heavy pre-election press
coverage, to one of eradicating the Filipino insurgents.22 Fresh American troops began to
arrive in the islands following the election, eventually totaling more than 70,000 soldiers
in December 1900.23
annihilation based on the campaigns against the American Indians and instituted General
Orders 100, declaring part time guerillas no better than spies and pirates, undeserving of
prisoner of war status.24 He declared martial law and took steps to separate the
insurgents from their population support bases. As a measure to ensure loyalty to the
the insurrection. Aquinaldo quickly, and publicly, recognized United States sovereignty
and requested that all insurgents stop fighting. Most insurrection leaders surrendered in
the next few months. The bottom had fallen out of the insurrection by the summer of
1901.25
serve as an indication to the American public that the military situation was finally under
control. MacArthur knew this transition of power was premature. The insurrection was
over in several provinces but continued to rage in isolated districts such as Batangas and
Samar. MacArthur’s reports once more fell on deaf ears, primarily because they
22
conflicted with the administration’s official version of the situation. The transfer of
command authority occurred on July 4, 1901 when MacArthur ceded authority over civil
affairs to William H. Taft and military affairs to General Adna Chaffee.26 Control of the
Philippines was now in civilian, not military, hands for the first time since the Americans
The war slowly wound down. Filipino resistance ended on Samar in October 1901
and on Batangas in April 1902.27 The insurrection was finally snuffed out. President
Roosevelt officially declared the insurrection over on July 4, 1902 after three and a half
years of armed resistance to American rule. Something this fiercely contested does not
just stop, however, the fighting, mostly sporadic, continued for ten more years.28
Notes
1
Excerpt from a speech to the Boston Home Market Club, February 16, 1899.
William McKinley, Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley (New York,
Doubleday and McClure Co., 1900), 187.
2
Excerpt from a speech at Ackley, Iowa. Ibid., 303.
3
Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kansas, The
Regents Press of Kansas, 1980), 33.
4
Ibid., 95. Admiral Dewey had actually been “on station” in Hong Kong since late
1897 in preparation for the attack on the Spanish Asiatic Squadron. H. Wayne Morgan,
America’s Road to Empire (New York, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965), 62.
5
Morgan, Road to Empire, 74.
6
McKinley, Speeches, 187.
7
Daniel B. Schirmer, Republic or Empire: American Resistance to Philippine War
(Cambridge, Massachusetts, Schenkman, 1972), 67 and Smith, Ephraim K., “William
McKinley’s Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical Debate on the Taking of the
Philippine Islands.” Crucible of Empire, Edited by James C. Bradford. (Annapolis,
Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1993), 222.
8
Stuart C. Miller, Benevolent Assimilation: the American Conquest of the
Philippines (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1982), 13.
9
Smith, Enduring Legacy, 222.
10
Leon Wolff, Little Brown Brother (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Co.,
Inc., 1961), 45.
11
Brian M. Linn, Guardians of Empire: The U.S. Army and the Pacific, 1902-1940
(Chapel Hill, North Carolina, The University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 14.
23
Notes
12
United States Adjutant Generals Office. Correspondence Relating to the War
With Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief
Expedition, April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 (Washington: Center of Military History,
U.S. Army, 1993), 645.
13
Secretary of War response dated August 17, 1898 in reply to General Merritt’s
request for further guidance on use of force to ensure Filipinos “submit to the authority of
the United States.” Ibid., 754.
14
This is indicative of the role American military leaders had in foreign policy
development. Both Merritt and Mahan were present at the Paris talks and McKinley
placed “great importance” on the advice of Merritt and Dewey. Richard D. Challener,
Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy (Princeton, Princeton University
Press, 1973), 77, and USAGO, Correspondence, 765.
15
Daniel B. Schirmer, Ephrain K. Smith, and Stuart C. Miller each cite evidence
lending credence to the argument McKinley deliberately planned to obtain the
Philippines for American use. The vast preponderance of literature, however, tends to
support the more traditional view that the Philippines were acquired as part of a general
policy of expansion and not as a specific acquisition. Schirmer, Republic of Empire, 67;
Smith, Enduring Legacy, 222; Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 13.
16
Gould, The Presidency of McKinley, 96.
17
Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 150.
18
Schirmer, Republic or Empire, 187.
19
Ibid., 219.
20
Gould, The Presidency of McKinley, 24.
21
Brian Linn, The U. S. Army and Counterinsurgency in the Philippine War, 1899-
1902 (Chapel Hill: The University of North Caroline Press, 1989), 23.
22
Ibid., 24.
23
This was destined to be the highest American troop presence during the
insurrection. Ibid.
24
Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 161-2, 212.
25
Ibid., 171.
26
Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 174.
27
Uldarico S. Baclagon, Philippines Campaigns (Manila: Graphic House, 1952),
128.
28
Bain, Sitting in Darkness, 386.
24
Chapter 5
—William McKinley1
Historians have been troubled for years by the lack of information on McKinley’s
personal opinions regarding the retention of the Philippines. A review of the Library of
McKinley gave the illusion he was a reluctant imperialist. He reported that he “didn’t
want the Philippines” and that they were “a gift from the gods.”3 McKinley did,
boundaries. He was an astute enough politician, however, to know this would require the
support of the American people long after the patriotic fever of the Spanish-American
McKinley believed expansion could only occur with the blessing of the American
people. His decision-making processes regarding retention of the islands reflect this
negotiate an end to the Spanish-American War directed that they “demand no more than
Luzon, Guam, and Puerto Rico.”4 McKinley realized American public opinion was
25
solidly in favor of expansion through the retention of the Philippines. This realization
came while he was on a speaking tour shaping American public opinion and campaigning
for Republican candidates prior to the 1898 mid-term election. As his tour progressed,
his speeches became more blatantly imperialist in nature and continued to receive wild
applause.5 The President had repeatedly stressed the themes of economic necessity and
moral duty during his speaking tour and America responded; expansion was a means to
help inferior races and spread Christianity.6 McKinley, knowing he had the support of
the American people, changed his instructions to the Peace Commission on October 25,
would provide America but he faced opposition to his plans from anti-imperialist
movements and from members of both the Democratic Party and his own Republican
Party. Social Darwinist theories and beliefs prevalent in Anglo-Saxon culture during this
period influenced him and he used their arguments to influence the American people.
McKinley decided upon expansion for economic reasons and then undertook a program
to ensure the American public’s enthusiasm for the war carried over into support for
expansion. This public support would ensure his Republican dominated, and heretofore
sympathetic, Congress would continue to vote for his policies. The Republican Party
held the presidency and controlled the Congress in 1898. Many prominent Republicans
were staunch anti-expansionists and were opposed to the governing of a country desiring
independence, such as the Philippines. This view is congruent with the party’s tradition
that only 35 years before had fought to end slavery in America and claimed Abraham
26
Economic Imperialism?
There was widespread belief that the acquisition of the Philippine Islands, Hawaii,
and Guam would maintain American Far East interest, unlock the doors to the orient, and
McKinley believed America should “keep all we get” while fighting the war with
Spain and should “keep what we want” once the war was over.8 There were several
reasons why McKinley wanted to keep the Philippines, most of them economic. Several
noted Republicans spoke of the commercial value of the Philippines. Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge believed “we must on no account let the islands go…we hold the other side
of the Pacific and the value to this country is almost beyond imagination.”9 Senator
Albert Beveridge had been arguing for expansion in support of America’s economy since
1897 because “American factories were producing more than the American people can
use; American soil is producing more than they can consume.”10 McKinley’s Secretary
of the Interior and his Attorney General both advised keeping the Philippines for their
“commercial value.”11
advantages that would accrue to America. As noted earlier, McKinley had been
“profoundly influenced by the European partitioning of China and viewed the Philippines
as a possible foothold in the Orient.”12 This “penetration and, ultimately, the domination
13
of the fabled China market” was the sole American ambition in the Pacific. The
Philippines and other expansion acquisitions were means to that end. Lobbying efforts
American businesses wanted better trading facilities and demanded an Open Door policy
27
allowing unimpeded accesses to the markets. The New York Chamber of Commerce
went as far as personally petitioning the President to protect their interests in China.
American economic concerns were decisive factors behind the American war with
Spain. There is evidence suggesting that the retention of the Philippines was becoming
an economic necessity to the United States if the latter’s economic growth were to
continue. Increased American productivity and exports worth over 1.2 billion dollars in
Governmental concerns about the fecundity of the islands are indicated by instructions
McKinley ensured his Peace Commission knew his economic concerns about the islands.
He included a statement in the directions to his delegation that the United States could
Moorefield Storey asserts that possession of the islands was not “unsought by the
fortune of war,” as McKinley was fond of proclaiming, but was the product of a war of
conquest.16 The American expansion resulting from the Spanish-American War secured
American commercial access to Asian markets and did so without the burdens of more
The financial worth of the Philippines could only be imagined in 1898 but, by 1900,
Americans were tallying the returns. The Philippine Islands, Senator H. C. Lodge
argued, were advantageous to the American people. The islands provided America a
foothold in the east and resulted in increased commerce with China. The Philippine
Islands were so lucrative, Lodge stated, that income from them was able to pay for the
28
Lodge also argued that the Philippines’ vast natural resources were virtually
untouched and waiting for American industry and knowledge to tap. Hemp, hardwood
forests, copper, and coal topped the list of products waiting for American exploitation.
“market for our products.”18 He discussed the United States trade deficit with the
Philippines that had existed in 1896. That deficit had been wiped out; only four years
later there was a trade surplus.19 The economic news was just as good concerning China;
This evidence suggests that the Philippines were “acquired to meet the demands of
powers appeared to threaten United States’ interests. Domestically, the country was in
the midst of the worst depression America had yet experienced and McKinley had been
elected to lead America out of this depression and into prosperity.21 One of the roads to
McKinley clearly wanted expansion for economic reasons but he also believed he
had a moral duty to alleviate the suffering in the Philippines. Social Darwinism had
helped to form the American public psyche and, indirectly, influenced the role America
played in the Philippines. Public opinion, influenced by the press, strongly favored the
Spanish-American War partly because the United States had a “social law of service” to
inferior races and cultures.22 This favorable opinion carried over to annexation because
29
Social Darwinism was a prevalent social concept throughout Europe and America at
the end of the 19th century. Social Darwinism argued that certain races and cultures were
superior to others and these superior races, in a reference to Darwin’s survival of the
fittest concept, naturally came to rule inferior ones. These attitudes of western
Social Darwinists, based on their own personal beliefs, used their theories to argue
either for or against the war. Lester Frank Ward was a prominent American Sociologist
and Social Darwinist who argued for war with Spain. He wrote that “racial struggle and
war were perfectly normal and healthy conditions” and “just as man has gained dominion
over the animal world, so the highest type of man shall gain dominion over all of the
expansion for several reasons, all of which are racially motivated. The “Northern
Nations” needed tropical possessions as a source for raw materials. These possessions
efficient.”25
It is interesting to note that this type of racial prejudice was ingrained in American
thought and significantly influenced United States foreign policy. Understanding this
during America’s expansionist period and makes it easier to see how McKinley could
convince the American public that the United States had a moral responsibility in the
Philippines.26
implication that the Filipinos could not govern themselves was a phrase often uttered by
30
McKinley and his cabinet. Secretary of War Elihu Root insisted Filipinos were incapable
of self-government.27 Secretary of State John Hay also argued retention of the islands
sentiment led him,” set out to ensure the American public supported his foreign policy.29
Shaping foreign policy through American public opinion became increasingly important
viewed his speaking tour prior to the 1898 mid-term elections as an opportunity to gain
the American public’s support for his policies. He would do the same thing during the
McKinley used the public response to his speeches to send messages to Congress
that the public was in his corner. He rhetorically asks the public in one of his speeches,
“If, following the clear precepts of duty, territory falls to us, and the welfare of an alien
people requires our guidance and protection, who will shrink from the responsibility,
grave though it may be?”30 McKinley continued his public affairs campaign for his
Philippine policy even after the treaty with Spain was ratified in Congress. In a speech to
the Boston Home Market Club he comments on the American commitment in the
Philippines, “it is a trust we have not sought; it is a trust from which we will not flinch.”31
Interestingly enough, several Filipinos had hoped McKinley would commit America
31
internal anarchy and European colonial powers that he was convinced that “frank and
loyal acceptance of the sovereignty of America” was the best course for his people.32
McKinley rarely used economic arguments in his speeches because the Social
Darwinist theories worked so well with the public. The need to help our “little brown
brothers,” as both the Filipino and Cuban people were known in America, sufficiently
sold the President’s foreign policy to the people and it was a policy Congressmen would
fail to support it at their own peril. McKinley proclaimed that the sole American purpose
in regard to the Philippines was to safeguard “the welfare and happiness and the rights of
McKinley’s plan, therefore, was to administer the islands in order to prepare the
Philippine nation for self-rule while protecting them from the traditional colonial powers
lurking in the wings. McKinley publicly stated that abandonment of the Philippines
would result in the islands becoming the “helpless spoil of some other nation.”34 It
became evident to everyone involved that a European power would annex the islands if
the United States did not. Root expressed his concern that an American withdrawal
would leave the Philippines subject to control by a European power.35 There is ample
reason to believe the Philippines would become the colony of one of the European
powers. Dewey wrote that the English, Russian, and German navies maintained a
presence after his victory in Manila Bay. Hay, in a conversation with England’s Joseph
Chamberlain, learned that Kaiser Wilhelm would have taken “Uncle Sam by the scruff of
32
Notes
1
McKinley’s original instructions to his Peace Commission concerning Spanish
concessions prior to their departure for the Paris Peace Talks. Stuart C. Miller,
Benevolent Assimilation (New Haven, Conneticut: Yale University Press, 1982), 20.
2
Smith, Ephraim K., “William McKinley’s Enduring Legacy: The Historiographical
Debate on the Taking of the Philippine Islands.” In Crucible of Empire, Edited by James
C. Bradford (Annapolis, Maryland, Naval Institute Press, 1993), 205. Smith is quoting
Ernest R. May but fails to provide a citation.
3
Ibid., 207.
4
Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 20.
5
McKinley, William, Speeches and Addresses of Wiliam McKinley: From March 1,
1897 – May 30, 1900 (New York, Doubleday and McClure, 1900), 187-269, and Miller,
Benevolent Assimilation, 23.
6
Earnest R. May, Imperial Democracy Democracy: The Emergence of America as a
Great Power (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1961), 10.
7
Richard D. Challener, Admirals, Generals, and American Foreign Policy
(Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1973), 9.
8
Smith, Enduring Legacy, 209.
9
May, Imperial Democracy, 245.
10
David H. Bain, Sitting in Darkness: Americans in the Philippines (Boston,
Houghton Mifflin, 1984), 68.
11
May, Imperial Democracy, 250-1.
12
Smith, Enduring Legacy, 210.
13
Thomas McCormick Jr. as quoted by Smith. Ibid., 218.
14
Ibid., 212.
15
Ibid., 213.
16
Moorefield Storey and Marcial P. Lichauco, The Conquest of the Philippines by
the United States 1898-1925 (New York, G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1926), v.
17
Lodge, Henry Cabot, “Speech to the Senate, March 7, 1900”, in American
Imperialism in 1898, edited by Theodore P. Greene (Boston, D.C. Heath and Company,
1955), 73.
18
Ibid.
19
In 1896 the Philippines exported $4,308,000 worth of goods to America while
importing only $94,000. In 1900 American exports soared to $20,000,000 while imports
also rose to $9,000,000. Ibid.
20
Smith, Enduring Legacy, 213.
21
H. Wayne Morgan, America’s Road to Empire (John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1965),
14.
22
Paul Crook, Darwinism, War, and History (Cambridge: University Press, 1994),
96.
23
Ibid., 2.
24
Lester Frank Ward as quoted by Crook, Darwinism, War, and History, 95 .
25
Ibid., 96.
26
There is an excellent discussion of this theory and its impact on the Spanish-
American war in Crook’s Darwinism, War, and History.
33
Notes
27
Phillip C. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York, Dodd, Mead and Co., 1938), 332.
28
Willam R. Thayer, The Life and Letters of John Hay (Boston, HoughtonMifflin
Co., 1915), 198.
29
Smith, Enduring Legacy, 206.
30
Lewis L. Gould, The Presidency of William McKinley (Lawrence, Kansas, The
Regents Press of Kansas, 1980.
31
William McKinley, Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley from March 1,
1897 to May 30, 1900 (New York, Doubleday and McClure Co., 1900), 187.
32
Miller, Benevolent Assimilation, 39.
33
Gould, Presidency of McKinley, 151.
34
Alexander K. McClure and Charles Norris, The Authentic Life of William
McKinley (Washington, W.E. Scull, 1901), 277-8.
35
Jessup, Root, 346-8.
36
Thayer, John Hay, 200.
34
Chapter 6
Conclusion
We accept the fact that the Philippine Islands are ours today and that we
are responsible for them before the world.
The decision of the United States to retain the Philippine Islands will continue to be
the subject of debate as long as there is discussion about American expansion. One thing
all sources of information agree upon is the impotence of Filipinos in determining the fate
of their country. The United States recognized Spain as the legitimate authority in the
archipelago, not Aquinaldo and his Revolutionary Council.2 The United States, upon
receiving the Philippines from Spain, chose not to treat the Filipinos as legitimate actors.
The subsequent interaction between America and the Filipino insurrectionists were the
economic incentives and expansionist desires seem to have driven McKinley’s foreign
policy decisions. McKinley’s initial decision to retain only bases for coaling stations did
not guarantee economic return from his investment. Coaling stations, in lieu of complete
annexation, could have granted the Philippines independence under a United States
protectorate, but McKinley had no assurances he could defend the islands in this manner.
35
The President had repeatedly told the American people they had a moral obligation
to help the Filipinos, doing anything else would be shirking their duty which he called a
“providence from God.”3 Whether this help was out of a sense of racial and cultural
superiority or out of concern for their fellow man is open to debate. McKinley certainly
used this theme to shape American public opinion and gather support for his expansionist
foreign policy.
The United States rarely provides humanitarian assistance programs in the face of an
armed insurrection unless there is something of vital interest to the country. McKinley
believed access to China was in the vital interests of America in 1898 and was willing to
fight to ensure that access. American public support was McKinley’s domestic key to
ensuring expansion. It was in the interest of this country, and the presidential
territorial expansion for the United States to develop new markets, sources of raw
materials, and stepping-stones to the China market. These economic motivations were
the primary reason the United States refused to recognize Emilio Aquinaldo and the
Notes
1
Senator Lodge addressing the Senate March 7, 1900. Lodge, Henry Cabot,
“Speech to the Senate, March 7, 1900”, in American Imperialism in 1898, edited by
Theodore P. Greene (Boston, D.C. Heath and Company, 1955), 70.
2
United States Adjutant Generals Office. Correspondence Relating to the War With
Spain: Including the Insurrection in the Philippine Islands and the China Relief
Expedition, April 15, 1898 to July 30, 1902 (Washington: Center of Military History,
U.S. Army, 1993), 757.
3
William McKinley, Speeches and Addresses of William McKinley (New York,
Doubleday and McClure Company, 1900), 187.
36
Bibliography
Books
37
Articles
38
39