SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 133345. March 9, 2000]

JOSEFA CH. MAESTRADO, as substituted by her daughter LOURDES
MAESTRADO-LAVIA and CARMEN CH. ABAYA, petitioners, vs. THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, Ninth Division and JESUS C. ROA,
JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS, respondents. xl-aw
[G.R. No. 133324. March 9, 2000]
JOSEFA CHAVEZ MAESTRADO and CARMEN CHAVES
ABAYA, petitioners, vs. JESUS C. ROA, JR., RAMON P. CHAVES and
NATIVIDAD S. SANTOS,respondents. x-sc
D E C I S I O N
DE LEON, JR., J .:
Before us are two (2) consolidated petitions for review on certiorari of the Decision
[1]
of
the Court of Appeals
[2]
dated November 28, 1997 declaring Lot No. 5872, located in
Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro City, as common property of the heirs of the deceased
spouses, Ramon and Rosario Chaves, and ordering its equal division among all the co-
owners. The Court of Appeals affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
23 of Cagayan de Oro City, which dismissed petitioners action against the private
respondents for Quieting of Title over the said lot.
The pertinent facts are the following: Sc
These consolidated cases involve the status of Lot No. 5872 and the rights of the
contending parties thereto. The said lot which has an area of 57.601 square meters,
however, is still registered in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario
Chaves. The spouses Ramon and Rosario died intestate in 1943 and 1944,
respectively. They were survived by the following heirs, namely: Carmen Chaves-
Abaya, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, Angel Chaves, Amparo Chaves-Roa, Concepcion
Chaves-Sanvictores and Salvador Chaves.
To settle the estate of the said deceased spouses, Angel Chaves initiated intestate
proceedings
[3]
in the Court of First Instance of Manila and was appointed administrator of
said estates in the process. An inventory of the estates was made and thereafter, the
heirs agreed on a project of partition. Thus, they filed an action for partition
[4]
before the
Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental. The court appointed Hernando Roa,
husband of Amparo Chaves-Roa, as receiver. On June 6, 1956, the court rendered a
decision approving the project of partition. However, the records of said case are
missing and although respondents claimed otherwise, they failed to present a copy of
said decision.
This notwithstanding, the estate was actually divided in this wise: (1) Lot No. 3046
situated in Bulalong, Cagayan de Oro City, consisting of 44 hectares of coconut land
was distributed equally among four (4) heirs, namely: (a) Concepcion Chaves-
Sanvictores; (b) Angel Chaves; (c) Amparo Chaves-Roa; and (d) Ramon Chaves, while
(2) Lot Nos. 5925, 5934, 1327 and 5872, all located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro
City and consisting of an aggregate area of 14 hectares was distributed equally
between petitioners (a) Josefa Chaves-Maestrado; and (b) Carmen Chaves-Abaya. Scmis
At the time of the actual partition, Salvador Chaves had already died. His share was
given to his only son, Ramon, who is the namesake of Salvadors father. In 1956, the
year the partition case was decided and effected, receiver Hernando Roa delivered the
respective shares of said heirs in accordance with the above scheme. Subsequently,
Concepcion sold her share to Angel, while Ramon sold his share to Amparo. Hence,
one-half (1/2) of Lot No. 3046 went to Angel and the other half to Amparo.
Significantly, Lot No. 5872 was not included in any of the following documents: (1) the
inventory of properties of the estate submitted to the court in the proceedings for the
settlement of said estate; (2) the project of partition submitted to the court for approval;
(3) the properties receiver Hernando Roa had taken possession of, which he listed in
the "Constancia" submitted to the court; and (4) the court order approving the partition.
Decedent Ramon Chaves acquired Lot No. 5872 from Felomino Bautista, Sr. but he
subsequently delivered it to the spouses Hernando Roa and Amparo Chaves-Roa
[5]
. It
was thereafter delivered to petitioners during the actual partition in 1956, and petitioners
have been in possession of the same since then. Missc
As to the omission of Lot No. 5872 in the inventory and project of partition, the parties
offer different explanations. Respondents claim that due to the series of transactions
involving the said lot, the heirs were unsure if it belonged to the decedents estate at all.
As a result, they deferred its inclusion in the inventory of the properties of the estate and
its distribution pending the investigation of its status. In fact, administrator Angel Chaves
filed a motion in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate to include the said lot in
the inventory but the court did not act on it. Petitioners, on the other hand, insist that the
omission was inadvertent and the inaction of the court on the motion was due to the
compromise agreement entered into by the heirs
[6]
.
Petitioners thesis consists of the existence of an oral partition agreement entered into
by all heirs soon after the death of their parents. The proposed project of partition was
allegedly based on it but the courts order of partition failed to embody such oral
agreement due to the omission of Lot No. 5872. For some reason, however, the actual
partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral agreement.
Petitioners claim that they failed to notice the non-inclusion of Lot No. 5872 in the
courts order. They only realized such fact after the death in 1976 of Silvino Maestrado,
the husband of petitioner Josefa. They discovered among Silvinos belongings, the
partition order and found out that Lot No. 5872 was not included therein.
[7]

In an effort to set things right, petitioners prepared a quitclaim to confirm the alleged oral
agreement. On August 16, 1977, Angel, Concepcion and Ramon signed a notarized
quitclaim in favor of petitioners. Amparo was unable to sign because she had an
accident and had passed away on the following day. It was her heirs who signed a
similarly worded and notarized quitclaim on September 8, 1977.
[8]
Misspped
Respondents dispute the voluntariness of their consent or the consent of their
predecessors-in-interest to the quitclaims. Ramon claims to have been betrayed by his
lawyer, Francisco Velez, who is the son-in-law of petitioner Josefa Maestrado. He
allegedly signed the quitclaim without reading it because his lawyer had already read it.
He believed that since his lawyer was protecting his interests, it was all right to sign it
after hearing no objections from said lawyer. On the other hand, Angel signed the
quitclaim "out of respect" for petitioners. On the other hand, Concepcion signed
because she was misled by alleged misrepresentations in the "Whereas Clauses" of the
quitclaim to the effect that the lot was inadvertently omitted and not deliberately omitted
due to doubts on its status.
[9]
Spped
Six (6) years after the execution of the quitclaims, respondents discovered that Lot No.
5872 is still in the name of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Thus,
on October 14, 1983, respondent Ramon Chaves, the sole heir of Salvador Chaves,
and respondent Jesus Roa, the son of Amparo Chaves-Roa, wrote a letter to their uncle
Angel Chaves to inform him that said property, which they claim to belong to the estate
of their deceased grandparents, has not yet been distributed to the concerned heirs.
Hence, they requested Angel Chaves to distribute and deliver it to the heirs.
[10]
On
October 24, 1983, respondent Natividad Santos, daughter and attorney-in-fact of
Concepcion Chaves-Sanvictores, also wrote a similar letter to Angel Chaves. On
December 1, 1983, Angel Chaves transmitted the said letters to petitioner Carmen
Abaya and requested her to respond.
In response, petitioners filed, on December 22, 1983, an action for Quieting of
Title
[11]
against respondents in the Regional trial Court of Cagayan de Oro. On April 10,
1995, the trial court rendered its Decision in favor of respondents, the dispositive portion
of which reads as follows:
"In view of these facts, the court therefore considers the property, Lot
5872 still common property. Consequently, the property must be divided in
six (6) parts, there being six heirs. But since the group of Jesus Roa
already quitclaimed in favor of plaintiffs and the same is true with Angel
Chaves, the defendants Natividad Santos and Ramon Chaves shall
receive one-sixth (1/6) each out of Lot 5872 and the balance will be
divided equally by the plaintiffs Josefa Chaves-Maestrado represented by
her daughters and the other half to Carmen Chaves-Abaya.
With no other pronouncements. Josp-ped
SO ORDERED."
The petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals which in a Decision, promulgated on
November 28,1997, sustained the said Decision of the trial court, in this wise:
"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Decision dated
April 10, 1995 subject of the appeal, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
Costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. Spp-edjo
SO ORDERED."
On May 29, 1998, petitioner Lourdes Maestrado-Lavina, in substitution of her deceased
mother, Josefa Chaves-Maestrado, filed a petition for review on certiorari with this
Court.
[12]
Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya also filed her own petition for review
on certiorari on June 1, 1998.
[13]
Since the two petitions involve the same facts and
issues, we decided in a Resolution
[14]
to consolidate the said cases.
Petitioner Maestrado-Lavina assigns the following errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL COMMON
PROPERTY, THEREBY EFFECTIVELY NULLIFYING THE VERBAL
PARTITION AGREEMENT REACHED AND IMPLEMENTED BY THE
CHILDREN/HEIRS OF DECEDENTS RAMON AND ROSARIO CHAVES
WAY BACK IN 1956;
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS DECISION DECLARING LOT 5872 AS STILL COMMON
PROPERTY UPON ITS CONCLUSION THAT THE SIGNATURES OF
RESPONDENTS ON THE DULY NOTARIZED QUITCLAIMS WERE
OBTAINED THROUGH FRAUD; Mi-so
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS LEGAL CONCLUSION
THAT, ON THE BASIS ALONE OF THE CLAIMS THAT (A) RAMON
CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM WITHOUT READING IT; AND THAT
(B) ANGEL CHAVES SIGNED THE QUITCLAIM OUT OF RESPECT,
THERE WAS FRAUD AS WOULD VITIATE RESPONDENTS CONSENT
TO THE QUITCLAIMS;
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE TRIAL
COURTS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS HAVE NO CAPACITY TO
SUE FOR QUIETING OF TITLE OR REMOVAL OF CLOUD THEREON
ON THE BASIS ALONE THAT PETITIONERS ARE NOT THE
REGISTERED OWNERS OF LOT 5872;
V. IT BEING UNDISPUTED THAT THE FACTS GIVING RISE TO CLOUD
ON JOSEFAS AND CARMENS OWNERSHIP OVER LOT 5872
SURFACED ONLY IN 1983 AND PETITIONERS FILED THE
CORRESPONDING ACTION TO QUIET TITLE OR REMOVE CLOUD
THEREON ALSO IN 1983, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE TRIAL COURTS CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONERS
ARE GUILTY OF LACHES."
[15]
Ne-xold
Petitioner Carmen Chaves-Abaya, on the other hand, assigns the following errors:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A CLEAR
ERROR IN THE INTERPRETATION OF LAW IN HOLDING THAT THERE
WAS FRAUD IN OBTAINING THE CONSENT OF PRIVATE
RESPONDENT RAMON P. CHAVES AND CONCEPCION CHAVES
SANVICTORES, THE MOTHER OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT
NATIVIDAD SANTOS, TO THE DEEDS OF QUITCLAIM;
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
THE ACTION FOR QUIETING OF TITLE WAS NOT BROUGHT BY THE
PERSON IN WHOSE NAME THE TITLE IS ISSUED; Man-ikx
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PETITIONERS WERE GUILTY OF LACHES FOR HAVING SLEPT ON
THEIR RIGHTS FOR MORE THAN 25 YEARS."
[16]

We grant the consolidated petitions, the same being impressed with merit.
First. Petitioners are proper parties to bring an action for quieting of title. Persons having
legal as well as equitable title to or interest in a real property may bring such action and
"title" here does not necessarily denote a certificate of title issued in favor of the person
filing the suit.
[17]
Moreover, if the plaintiff in an action for quieting of title is in possession
of the property being litigated, such action is imprescriptible.
[18]
One who is in actual
possession of a land, claiming to be the owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right because his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of the courts to
ascertain the nature of the adverse claim and its effects on his title.
[19]
Manik-s
Although prescription and laches are distinct concepts, we have held, nonetheless, that
in some instances, the doctrine of laches is inapplicable where the action was filed
within the prescriptive period provided by law.
[20]
Thus, laches does not apply in this case
because petitioners possession of the subject lot has rendered their right to bring an
action for quieting of title imprescriptible and, hence, not barred by laches. Moreover,
since laches is a creation of equity, acts or conduct alleged to constitute the same must
be intentional and unequivocal so as to avoid injustice.
[21]
Laches operates not really to
penalize neglect or sleeping on ones rights, but rather to avoid recognizing a right when
to do so would result in a clearly inequitable situation.
[22]
Man-ikan
In this case at bench, the cloud on petitioners title to the subject property came about
only on December 1, 1983 when Angel Chaves transmitted respondents letters to
petitioners, while petitioners action was filed on December 22, 1983. Clearly, no laches
could set in under the circumstances since petitioners were prompt and vigilant in
protecting their rights.
Second. Lot No. 5872 is no longer common property of the heirs of the deceased
spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves. Petitioners ownership over said lot was
acquired by reason of the oral partition agreed upon by the deceased spouses
heirs sometime before 1956. That oral agreement was confirmed by the notarized
quitclaims executed by the said heirs on August 16, 1977 and September 8,
1977, supra.
It appeared that the decision in Civil Case No. 867, which ordered the partition of the
decedents estate, was not presented by either party thereto. The existence of the oral
partition together with the said quitclaims is the bone of contention in this case. It
appeared, however, that the actual partition of the estate conformed to the alleged oral
partition despite a contrary court order. Despite claims of private respondents that Lot
No. 5872 was mistakenly delivered to the petitioners, nothing was done to rectify it for a
period of twenty-seven (27) years from 1983. Ol-dmiso
We are convinced, however, that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition
entered into by the heirs/parties. This is the only way we can make sense out of the
actual partition of the properties of the estate despite claims that a court order provided
otherwise. Prior to the actual partition, petitioners were not in possession of Lot No.
5872 but for some reason or another, it was delivered to them. From 1956, the year of
the actual partition of the estate of the deceased Chaves spouses, until 1983, no one
among the heirs questioned petitioners possession of or ownership over said Lot No.
5872. Hence, we are convinced that there was indeed an oral agreement of partition
among the said heirs and the distribution of the properties was consistent with such oral
agreement. In any event, the parties had plenty of time to rectify the situation but no
such move was done until 1983.
A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse
claimant establishes a better right.
[23]
In the instant case it is the petitioners, being the
possessors of Lot No. 5872, who have established a superior right thereto by virtue of
the oral partition which was also confirmed by the notarized quitclaims of the heirs.
Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among
those to whom it may belong.
[24]
It may be effected extra-judicially by the heirs
themselves through a public instrument filed before the register of deeds.
[25]
Nc-m
However, as between the parties, a public instrument is neither constitutive nor an
inherent element of a contract of partition.
[26]
Since registration serves as constructive
notice to third persons, an oral partition by the heirs is valid if no creditors are
affected.
[27]
Moreover, even the requirement of a written memorandum under the statute
of frauds does not apply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are
involved considering that such transaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in
change of ownership but merely a designation and segregation of that part which
belongs to each heir.
[28]
Nc-mmis
Nevertheless, respondent court was convinced that Lot No. 5872 is still common
property of the heirs of the deceased spouses Ramon and Rosario Chaves because the
TCT covering the said property is still registered in the name of the said deceased
spouses. Unfortunately, respondent court was oblivious to the doctrine that the act of
registration of a voluntary instrument is the operative act which conveys or affects
registered land insofar as third persons are concerned. Hence, even without
registration, the contract is still valid as between the parties.
[29]
In fact, it has been
recently held and reiterated by this Court that neither a Transfer Certificate of Title nor a
subdivision plan is essential to the validity of an oral partition.
[30]

In sum, the most persuasive circumstance pointing to the existence of the oral partition
is the fact that the terms of the actual partition and distribution of the estate are identical
to the sharing scheme in the oral partition. No one among the heirs disturbed this status
quo for a period of twenty-seven (27) years.
Finally. The said notarized quitclaims signed by the heirs in favor of petitioners are not
vitiated by fraud. Hence, they are valid.
Since the oral partition has been duly established, the notarized quitclaims confirmed
such prior oral agreement as well as the petitioners title of ownership over the subject
Lot No. 5872. More importantly, independent of such oral partition, the quitclaims in the
instant case are valid contracts of waiver of property rights. Scnc-m
The freedom to enter into contracts, such as the quitclaims in the instant case, is
protected by law
[31]
and the courts are not quick to interfere with such freedom unless the
contract is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public policy or public
order.
[32]
Quitclaims, being contracts of waiver, involve the relinquishment of rights, with
knowledge of their existence and intent to relinquish them.
[33]
The intent to waive rights
must be clearly and convincingly shown. Moreover, when the only proof of intent is the
act of a party, such act should be manifestly consistent and indicative of an intent to
voluntary relinquish a particular right such that no other reasonable explanation of his
conduct is possible.
[34]
Sd-aamiso
In the instant case, the terms of the subject quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and
September 8, 1977 are clear; and the heirs signatures thereon have no other
significance but their conformity thereto resulting in a valid waiver of property
rights.
[35]
Herein respondents quite belatedly and vainly attempted to invoke alleged fraud
in the execution of the said quitclaims but we are not convinced. In other words, the said
quitclaims being duly notarized and acknowledged before a notary public, deserve full
credence and are valid and enforceable in the absence of overwhelming evidence to the
contrary.
[36]
In the case at bench, it is our view and we hold that the execution of the said
quitclaims was not fraudulent.
Fraud refers to all kinds of deception, whether through insidious machination,
manipulation, concealment or misrepresentation to lead another party into error.
[37]
The
deceit employed must be serious. It must be sufficient to impress or lead an ordinarily
prudent person into error, taking into account the circumstances of each case.
[38]
Silence
or concealment, by itself, does not constitute fraud, unless there is a special duty to
disclose certain facts.
[39]
Moreover, the bare existence of confidential relation between
the parties, standing alone, does not raise the presumption of fraud.
[40]
S-daad
Dolo causante or fraud which attends the execution of a contract is an essential cause
that vitiates consent and hence, it is a ground for the annulment of a contract.
[41]
Fraud is
never presumed, otherwise, courts would be indulging in speculations and surmises.
[42]
It
must be established by clear and convincing evidence but it was not so in the case at
bench. A mere preponderance of evidence is not even adequate to prove fraud.
[43]

The instances of fraud allegedly committed in the case at bench are not the kind of
fraud contemplated by law. On the contrary, they constitute mere carelessness in the
conduct of the affairs of the heirs concerned. We have consistently denied relief to a
party who seeks to avoid the performance of an obligation voluntarily assumed because
they turned out to be disastrous or unwise contracts, even if there was a mistake of law
or fact.
[44]
Moreover, we do not set aside contracts merely because solicitation,
importunity, argument, persuasion or appeal to affection were used to obtain the
consent of the other party.
[45]

In a nutshell, the quitclaims dated August 16, 1977 and September 8, 1977 in the case
at bench are valid, duly confirmed and undeniably established the title of ownership of
the petitioners over the subject Lot No. 5872. Scs-daad
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are GRANTED. The Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated November 28, 1997, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
The petitioners action praying for the quieting of their title of ownership over Lot No.
5872, located in Kauswagan, Cagayan de Oro, is granted. Cost against respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Quisumbing, and Buena, JJ., concur. Supr-ema