Sicad Vs Ca

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SPOUSES ERNESTO and EVELYN SICAD, petitioners,

vs. COURT OF APPEALS, CATALINO VALDERRAMA, JUDY CRISTINA M. VALDERRAMA and JESUS
ANTONIO VALDERRAMA, respondents.

Facts:
The present case is an appeal by certiorari concerning the character of a deed entitled Deed of Donation
Inter Vivos executed by Aurora Montinola in favor of her three grandchildren Catalino Valderrama, Judy
Valderrama, and Jesus Valderrama. The deed however provided that that the donation shall be effective
only 10 years after Montinolas death.

Montinolas Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, presented the deed for recording in the Property Registry, and the
Register of Deeds cancelled TCT (the donors title) and in its place, issued another TCT in the names of the
donees. Montinola however retained the owners duplicate copy of the new title as well as the property
itself.

In 1987, Montinola revoked the donation because of acts of ingratitude committed against her by the
Valderramas; that the Valderramas defamed her; that she overheard the Valderramas plotting against her
life (The revocation was based **on the ground of ingratitude committed by said donees against my
person consisting of utterances of defamatory words ** also, the said donees are engaged in criminal
scheme to eliminate me so that they can immediately obtain title to and dispose of the property donated
which they cannot do while I am still alive Montinola reiterated that act of renovatio in her holographic
will dated November 21, 1988, viz.: Teresita and her children (the Valderramas) are not good to me and
they are in a hurry for me to die and they want to kill me and I personally heard it in the extension of the
telephone** I am revoking all my donations to the children and grandchildren of Teresita.)

In 1990, she petitioned to have her title be reinstated and her grandchildrens title be cancelled. She said
that the donation is actually a donation mortis causa and that the same is void because the formalities of a
will were not complied with. In the same year, she sold her property to spouses Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad.

The Valderramas opposed the petition. The donees (Montinolas grandchildren) opposed the petition.
They averred that the donation in their favor was one inter vivos, which, having fully complied with the
requirements therefor set out in Article 729 of the Civil Code, was perfectly valid and efficacious. They also
expressed doubt about the sincerity of their grandmothers intention to recover the donated property,
since she had not pursued the matter of its revocation after having it annotated as an adverse claim.

In 1991, the trial court rendered judgment holding that the donation was indeed inter vivos. Montinola
elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. In 1993, while the case was still pending, Montinola died. The
petition was continued by the spouses Sicad.

The CA affirmed the RTC.

Issue:
Whether or not the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos is actually a donation mortis causa.

Held:
It is actually a donation mortis causa. A donation which pretends to be one inter vivos but withholds form
the donee that right to dispose of the donated property during the donors lifetime is in truth one mortis
causa. In a donation mortis causa the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor
is still alive. The donation in question, though denominated inter vivos, is in truth one mortis causa. It is
further rendered void because the essential requisites for its validity have not been complied with.

The court found circumstances signifying that Aurora never intended the donation to take effect within
her lifetime. First, she expressed that the donation take effect 10 years after her death. Second, she
inserted a prohibition on the sale or encumbrance of the property during the 10 year period. Third, she
continued to possess the property as well as the fruits and authorized such enjoyment in the deed of
donation. Fourth, she retained the certificate of title (which she subsequently alienated in favor of the
Sicads). All these are indisputable acts of ownership. And all these circumstances lead to the conclusion
that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the
donees only after the donors death. In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the
deed of donation in question to Montinolas grandchildren.

The Valderramas argument that the donation is inter vivos in character and that the prohibition against
their disposition of the donated property is merely a condition which, if violated, would give cause for its
revocation, begs the question. It assumes that they have the right to make a disposition of the property,
which they do not. The argument also makes no sense, because if they had the right to dispose of the
property and did in fact dispose of it to a third person, the revocation of the donation they speak of would
be of no utility or benefit to the donor, since such a revocation would not necessarily result in the
restoration of the donors ownership and enjoyment of the property.

The court then concluded that the real nature of a deed is to be ascertained by both its language and the
intention of the parties as demonstrated by the circumstances attendant upon its execution.

It is also error to suppose that the donation under review should be deemed one inter vivos simply
because founded on considerations of love and affection.

Finally, it is germane to advert to the legal principle in Article 1378 of the Civil Code to the effect that in
case of doubt relative to a gratuitous contract, the construction must be that entailing the least
transmission of rights and interests.

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