THIRD DIVISION

LIBRADA M. AQUINO,
Petitioner,





- versus -





ERNEST S. AURE
[1]
,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 153567
Present:

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.


Promulgated:

February 18, 2008
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x


D E C I S I O N


CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:


Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari
[2]
under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rules of Court filed by petitioner Librada M. Aquino (Aquino),
seeking the reversal and the setting aside of the Decision
[3]
dated 17 October
2001 and the Resolution
[4]
dated 8 May 2002 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 63733. The appellate court, in its assailed Decision and Resolution,
reversed the Decision
[5]
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City,
Branch 88, affirming the Decision
[6]
of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Quezon City, Branch 32, which dismissed respondent Ernesto Aures (Aure)
complaint for ejectment on the ground, inter alia, of failure to comply with
barangay conciliation proceedings.

The subject of the present controversy is a parcel of land situated in
Roxas District, Quezon City, with an area of 449 square meters and covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 205447 registered with the Registry of
Deeds of Quezon City (subject property).
[7]


Aure and E.S. Aure Lending Investors, Inc. (Aure Lending) filed a
Complaint for ejectment against Aquino before the MeTC docketed as Civil
Case No. 17450. In their Complaint, Aure and Aure Lending alleged that they
acquired the subject property from Aquino and her husband Manuel (spouses
Aquino) by virtue of a Deed of Sale
[8]
executed on 4 June 1996. Aure claimed
that after the spouses Aquino received substantial consideration for the sale of
the subject property, they refused to vacate the same.
[9]


In her Answer,
[10]
Aquino countered that the Complaint in Civil Case No.
17450 lacks cause of action for Aure and Aure Lending do not have any legal
right over the subject property. Aquino admitted that there was a sale but
such was governed by the Memorandum of Agreement
[11]
(MOA) signed by
Aure. As stated in the MOA, Aure shall secure a loan from a bank or financial
institution in his own name using the subject property as collateral and turn
over the proceeds thereof to the spouses Aquino. However, even after Aure
successfully secured a loan, the spouses Aquino did not receive the proceeds
thereon or benefited therefrom.

On 20 April 1999, the MeTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case No. 17450
in favor of Aquino and dismissed the Complaint for ejectment of Aure and Aure
Lending for non-compliance with the barangay conciliation process, among
other grounds. The MeTC observed that Aure and Aquino are residents of the
same barangay but there is no showing that any attempt has been made to
settle the case amicably at the barangay level. The MeTC further observed
that Aure Lending was improperly included as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 17450
for it did not stand to be injured or benefited by the suit. Finally, the MeTC
ruled that since the question of ownership was put in issue, the action was
converted from a mere detainer suit to one incapable of pecuniary
estimation which properly rests within the original exclusive jurisdiction of the
RTC. The dispositive portion of the MeTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, let this case be, as it is,
hereby ordered DISMISSED. *Aquinos+ counterclaim is likewise
dismissed.
[12]



On appeal, the RTC affirmed the dismissal of the Complaint on the same
ground that the dispute was not brought before the Barangay Council for
conciliation before it was filed in court. In a Decision dated 14 December 2000,
the RTC stressed that the barangay conciliation process is a conditio sine qua
non for the filing of an ejectment complaint involving residents of the
same barangay, and failure to comply therewith constitutes sufficient cause
for the dismissal of the action. The RTC likewise validated the ruling of the
MeTC that the main issue involved in Civil Case No. 17450 is incapable of
pecuniary estimation and cognizable by the RTC. Hence, the RTC ruled:

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the appealed
judgment, it is hereby affirmed in its entirety.
[13]



Aures Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the RTC in an
Order
[14]
dated 27 February 2001.

Undaunted, Aure appealed the adverse RTC Decision with the Court of
Appeals arguing that the lower court erred in dismissing his Complaint for lack
of cause of action. Aure asserted that misjoinder of parties was not a proper
ground for dismissal of his Complaint and that the MeTC should have only
ordered the exclusion of Aure Lending as plaintiff without prejudice to the
continuation of the proceedings in Civil Case No. 17450 until the final
determination thereof. Aure further asseverated that mere allegation of
ownership should not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment suit
since jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and should not
depend on the defenses and objections raised by the parties. Finally, Aure
contended that the MeTC erred in dismissing his Complaint with prejudice on
the ground of non-compliance with barangay conciliation process. He was not
given the opportunity to rectify the procedural defect by going through
the barangay mediation proceedings and, thereafter, refile the Complaint.
[15]


On 17 October 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision, reversing
the MeTC and RTC Decisions and remanding the case to the MeTC for further
proceedings and final determination of the substantive rights of the
parties. The appellate court declared that the failure of Aure to subject the
matter to barangay conciliation is not a jurisdictional flaw and it will not affect
the sufficiency of Aures Complaint since Aquino failed to seasonably raise such
issue in her Answer. The Court of Appeals further ruled that mere allegation of
ownership does not deprive the MeTC of jurisdiction over the ejectment case
for jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by law and is determined
by the allegations advanced by the plaintiff in his complaint. Hence, mere
assertion of ownership by the defendant in an ejectment case will not oust the
MeTC of its summary jurisdiction over the same. The decretal part of the
Court of Appeals Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby
GRANTED - and the decisions of the trial courts below REVERSED and
SET ASIDE. Let the records be remanded back to the court a quo for
further proceedings for an eventual decision of the substantive
rights of the disputants.
[16]



In a Resolution dated 8 May 2002, the Court of Appeals denied the
Motion for Reconsideration interposed by Aquino for it was merely a rehash of
the arguments set forth in her previous pleadings which were already
considered and passed upon by the appellate court in its assailed Decision.

Aquino is now before this Court via the Petition at bar raising the
following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE BARANGAY
CONCILIATION PROCEEDINGS IS A JURISDICTIONAL DEFECT THAT
WARRANTS THE DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT ALLEGATION OF OWNERSHIP OUSTS THE MeTC OF
ITS JURISDICTION OVER AN EJECTMENT CASE.


The barangay justice system was established primarily as a means of
easing up the congestion of cases in the judicial courts. This could be
accomplished through a proceeding before the barangay courts which,
according to the conceptor of the system, the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz
Castro, is essentially arbitration in character, and to make it truly effective, it
should also be compulsory. With this primary objective of the barangay justice
system in mind, it would be wholly in keeping with the underlying philosophy
of Presidential Decree No. 1508, otherwise known as the Katarungang
Pambarangay Law, and the policy behind it would be better served if an out-of-
court settlement of the case is reached voluntarily by the parties.
[17]


The primordial objective of Presidential Decree No. 1508 is to reduce the
number of court litigations and prevent the deterioration of the quality of
justice which has been brought by the indiscriminate filing of cases in the
courts.
[18]
To ensure this objective, Section 6 of Presidential Decree No.
1508
[19]
requires the parties to undergo a conciliation process before the Lupon
Chairman or the Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo as a precondition to filing a
complaint in court subject to certain exceptions
[20]
which are inapplicable to
this case. The said section has been declared compulsory in nature.
[21]


Presidential Decree No. 1508 is now incorporated in Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as The Local Government Code, which took effect on 1
January 1992.

The pertinent provisions of the Local Government Code making
conciliation a precondition to filing of complaints in court, read:

SEC. 412. Conciliation.- (a) Pre-condition to filing of complaint
in court. No complaint, petition, action, or proceeding involving
any matter within the authority of the lupon shall be filed or
instituted directly in court or any other government office for
adjudication, unless there has been a confrontation between the
parties before the lupon chairman or the pangkat, and that no
conciliation or settlement has been reached as certified by the
lupon secretary or pangkat secretary as attested to by the lupon
chairman or pangkat chairman or unless the settlement has been
repudiated by the parties thereto.

(b) Where parties may go directly to court. The parties may
go directly to court in the following instances:

(1) Where the accused is under detention;

(2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of personal
liberty calling for habeas corpus proceedings;

(3) Where actions are coupled with provisional remedies such
as preliminary injunction, attachment, delivery of personal property,
and support pendente lite; and

(4) Where the action may otherwise be barred by the statute
of limitations.

(c) Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural
communities. The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members
of the cultural communities.

SEC. 408. Subject Matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception
Therein. The lupon of each barangay shall have authority to bring
together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality
for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government or any subdivision or
instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the
dispute relates to the performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1)
year or a fine exceeding Five thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in
different cities or municipalities unless the parties thereto agree to
submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in
barangays of different cities or municipalities, except where such
barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto agree to
submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may
determine in the interest of justice or upon the recommendation of
the Secretary of Justice.


There is no dispute herein that the present case was never referred to
the Barangay Lupon for conciliation before Aure and Aure Lending instituted
Civil Case No. 17450. In fact, no allegation of such barangay conciliation
proceedings was made in Aure and Aure Lendings Complaint before the
MeTC. The only issue to be resolved is whether non-recourse to
the barangay conciliation process is a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the
dismissal of the ejectment suit filed with the MeTC.

Aquino posits that failure to resort to barangay conciliation makes the
action for ejectment premature and, hence, dismissible. She likewise avers
that this objection was timely raised during the pre-trial and even
subsequently in her Position Paper submitted to the MeTC.

We do not agree.

It is true that the precise technical effect of failure to comply with the
requirement of Section 412 of the Local Government Code
on barangay conciliation (previously contained in Section 5 of Presidential
Decree No. 1508) is much the same effect produced by non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies -- the complaint becomes afflicted with the vice of
pre-maturity; and the controversy there alleged is not ripe for judicial
determination. The complaint becomes vulnerable to a motion to
dismiss.
[22]
Nevertheless, the conciliation process is not a jurisdictional
requirement, so that non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction
which the court has otherwise acquired over the subject matter or over the
person of the defendant.
[23]


As enunciated in the landmark case of Royales v. Intermediate Appellate
Court
[24]
:


Ordinarily, non-compliance with the condition precedent
prescribed by P.D. 1508 could affect the sufficiency of the plaintiff's
cause of action and make his complaint vulnerable to dismissal on
ground of lack of cause of action or prematurity; but the same
would not prevent a court of competent jurisdiction from
exercising its power of adjudication over the case before it, where
the defendants, as in this case, failed to object to such exercise of
jurisdiction in their answer and even during the entire
proceedings a quo.

While petitioners could have prevented the trial court from
exercising jurisdiction over the case by seasonably taking exception
thereto, they instead invoked the very same jurisdiction by filing an
answer and seeking affirmative relief from it. What is more, they
participated in the trial of the case by cross-examining respondent
Planas. Upon this premise, petitioners cannot now be allowed
belatedly to adopt an inconsistent posture by attacking the
jurisdiction of the court to which they had submitted themselves
voluntarily. x x x (Emphasis supplied.)


In the case at bar, we similarly find that Aquino cannot be allowed to
attack the jurisdiction of the MeTC over Civil Case No. 17450 after having
submitted herself voluntarily thereto. We have scrupulously examined
Aquinos Answer before the MeTC in Civil Case No. 17450 and there is utter
lack of any objection on her part to any deficiency in the complaint which
could oust the MeTC of its jurisdcition.

We thus quote with approval the disquisition of the Court of Appeals:

Moreover, the Court takes note that the defendant [Aquino]
herself did not raise in defense the aforesaid lack of conciliation
proceedings in her answer, which raises the exclusive affirmative
defense of simulation. By this acquiescence, defendant [Aquino] is
deemed to have waived such objection. As held in a case of similar
circumstances, the failure of a defendant [Aquino] in an ejectment
suit to specifically allege the fact that there was no compliance with
the barangay conciliation procedure constitutes a waiver of that
defense. x x x.
[25]



By Aquinos failure to seasonably object to the deficiency in the
Complaint, she is deemed to have already acquiesced or waived any defect
attendant thereto. Consequently, Aquino cannot thereafter move for the
dismissal of the ejectment suit for Aure and Aure Lendings failure to resort to
the barangay conciliation process, since she is already precluded from doing
so. The fact that Aquino raised such objection during the pre-trial and in her
Position Paper is of no moment, for the issue of non-recourse
tobarangay mediation proceedings should be impleaded in her Answer.

As provided under Section 1, Rule 9 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure:

Sec. 1. Defenses and objections not pleaded. Defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer are deemed waived. However, when it appears from the
pleadings or the evidence on record that the court has no
jurisdiction over the subject matter, that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause, or that the
action is barred by a prior judgment or by statute of limitations, the
court shall dismiss the claim. (Emphasis supplied.)


While the aforequoted provision applies to a pleading (specifically, an
Answer) or a motion to dismiss, a similar or identical rule is provided for all
other motions in Section 8 of Rule 15 of the same Rule which states:

Sec. 8. Omnibus Motion. - Subject to the provisions of Section
1 of Rule 9, a motion attacking a pleading, order, judgment, or
proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all
objections not so included shall be deemed waived.


The spirit that surrounds the foregoing statutory norm is to require the
party filing a pleading or motion to raise all available exceptions for relief
during the single opportunity so that single or multiple objections may be
avoided.
[26]
It is clear and categorical in Section 1, Rule 9 of the Revised Rules
of Court that failure to raise defenses and objections in a motion to dismiss or
in an answer is deemed a waiver thereof; and basic is the rule in statutory
construction that when the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.
[27]
As has been our
consistent ruling, where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there
is no occasion for interpretation; there is only room for application.
[28]
Thus,
although Aquinos defense of non-compliance with Presidential Decree No.
1508 is meritorious, procedurally, such defense is no longer available for
failure to plead the same in the Answer as required by the omnibus motion
rule.

Neither could the MeTC dismiss Civil Case No. 17450 motu proprio. The
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide only three instances when the court
may motu propriodismiss the claim, and that is when the pleadings or evidence
on the record show that (1) the court has no jurisdiction over the subject
matter; (2) there is another cause of action pending between the same
parties for the same cause; or (3) where the action is barred by a prior
judgment or by a statute of limitations. Thus, it is clear that a court may
not motu proprio dismiss a case on the ground of failure to comply with the
requirement for barangay conciliation, this ground not being among those
mentioned for the dismissal by the trial court of a case on its own initiative.

Aquino further argues that the issue of possession in the instant case
cannot be resolved by the MeTC without first adjudicating the question of
ownership, since the Deed of Sale vesting Aure with the legal right over the
subject property is simulated.

Again, we do not agree. Jurisdiction in ejectment cases is determined by
the allegations pleaded in the complaint. As long as these allegations
demonstrate a cause of action either for forcible entry or for unlawful
detainer, the court acquires jurisdiction over the subject matter. This principle
holds, even if the facts proved during the trial do not support the cause of
action thus alleged, in which instance the court -- after acquiring jurisdiction --
may resolve to dismiss the action for insufficiency of evidence.

The necessary allegations in a Complaint for ejectment are set forth in
Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, which reads:

SECTION 1. Who may institute proceedings, and when.
Subject to the provisions of the next succeeding section, a person
deprived of the possession of any land or building by force,
intimidation, threat, strategy, or stealth, or a lessor, vendor, vendee,
or other person against whom the possession of any land or building
is unlawfully withheld after the expiration or termination of the right
to hold possession, by virtue of any contract, express or implied, or
the legal representatives or assigns of any such lessor, vendor,
vendee, or other person may at any time within one (1) year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession, bring an
action in the proper Municipal Trial Court against the person or
persons unlawfully withholding or depriving of possession, or any
person or persons claiming under them, for the restitution of such
possession, together with damages and costs.

In the case at bar, the Complaint filed by Aure and Aure Lending on 2
April 1997, alleged as follows:

2. [Aure and Aure Lending] became the owners of a house
and lot located at No. 37 Salazar Street corner Encarnacion Street,
B.F. Homes, Quezon City by virtue of a deed of absolute sale
executed by [the spouses Aquino] in favor of [Aure and Aure
Lending] although registered in the name of x x x Ernesto S. Aure;
title to the said property had already been issued in the name of
[Aure] as shown by a transfer Certificate of Title , a copy of which is
hereto attached and made an integral part hereof as Annex A;

3. However, despite the sale thus transferring ownership of
the subject premises to [Aure and Aure Lending] as above-stated and
consequently terminating *Aquinos+ right of possession over the
subject property, [Aquino] together with her family, is continuously
occupying the subject premises notwithstanding several demands
made by [Aure and Aure Lending] against [Aquino] and all persons
claiming right under her to vacate the subject premises and
surrender possession thereof to [Aure and Aure Lending] causing
damage and prejudice to [Aure and Aure Lending] and making
*Aquinos+ occupancy together with those actually occupying the
subject premises claiming right under her, illegal.
[29]



It can be inferred from the foregoing that Aure, together with Aure
Lending, sought the possession of the subject property which was never
surrendered by Aquino after the perfection of the Deed of Sale, which gives
rise to a cause of action for an ejectment suit cognizable by the MeTC. Aures
assertion of possession over the subject property is based on his ownership
thereof as evidenced by TCT No. 156802 bearing his name. That Aquino
impugned the validity of Aures title over the subject property and claimed that
the Deed of Sale was simulated should not divest the MeTC of jurisdiction over
the ejectment case.
[30]


As extensively discussed by the eminent jurist Florenz D. Regalado
in Refugia v. Court of Appeals
[31]
:

As the law on forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases now
stands, even where the defendant raises the question of ownership
in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved
without deciding the issue of ownership, the Metropolitan Trial
Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
nevertheless have the undoubted competence to resolve the issue
of ownership albeit only to determine the issue of possession.

x x x. The law, as revised, now provides instead that when the
question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession. On its face, the new Rule on
Summary Procedure was extended to include within the jurisdiction
of the inferior courts ejectment cases which likewise involve the
issue of ownership. This does not mean, however, that blanket
authority to adjudicate the issue of ownership in ejectment suits has
been thus conferred on the inferior courts.

At the outset, it must here be stressed that the resolution of
this particular issue concerns and applies only to forcible entry and
unlawful detainer cases where the issue of possession is intimately
intertwined with the issue of ownership. It finds no proper
application where it is otherwise, that is, where ownership is not in
issue, or where the principal and main issue raised in the allegations
of the complaint as well as the relief prayed for make out not a case
for ejectment but one for recovery of ownership.


Apropos thereto, this Court ruled in Hilario v. Court of Appeals
[32]
:

Thus, an adjudication made therein regarding the issue of
ownership should be regarded as merely provisional and, therefore,
would not bar or prejudice an action between the same parties
involving title to the land. The foregoing doctrine is a necessary
consequence of the nature of forcible entry and unlawful detainer
cases where the only issue to be settled is the physical or material
possession over the real property, that is, possession de facto and
not possession de jure.


In other words, inferior courts are now conditionally vested with
adjudicatory power over the issue of title or ownership raised by the parties in
an ejectment suit. These courts shall resolve the question of ownership raised
as an incident in an ejectment case where a determination thereof is necessary
for a proper and complete adjudication of the issue of possession.
[33]


WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition is DENIED. The
Court of Appeals Decision dated 17 October 2001 and its Resolution dated 8
May 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 63733 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the
petitioner.

SO ORDERED.