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Tuzon v. CA

The Supreme Court ruled that the refusal of the mayor and treasurer to issue a license to a thresher operator was not unjustified or done in bad faith, as there was no evidence that their refusal was motivated by malice, personal spite, or gross negligence. While the resolution requiring a 1% donation was valid, compliance was not mandatory. The thresher operator could have signed under protest and later challenged it in court while continuing his business. The issue of the validity of the resolution itself was not raised in this petition.

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Maya Julieta Catacutan-Estabillo
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334 views

Tuzon v. CA

The Supreme Court ruled that the refusal of the mayor and treasurer to issue a license to a thresher operator was not unjustified or done in bad faith, as there was no evidence that their refusal was motivated by malice, personal spite, or gross negligence. While the resolution requiring a 1% donation was valid, compliance was not mandatory. The thresher operator could have signed under protest and later challenged it in court while continuing his business. The issue of the validity of the resolution itself was not raised in this petition.

Uploaded by

Maya Julieta Catacutan-Estabillo
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
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DOMINGO A. TUZON and LOPE C. MAPAGU vs.

HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and


SATURNINO T. JURADO

G.R. No. 90107
August 21, 1992

FACTS:

In March 14, 1977, the Sangguniang Bayan of Camalaniugan, Cagayan, unanimously
adopted Resolution No. 9, wherein the municipality has embarked in the construction of
Sports and Nutrition Center, and as a fund-raising scheme, to help finance the
construction of the project, it solicits 1% donation from the thresher operators who will
apply for a permit to thresh within the jurisdiction of this municipality, of all the palay
threshed by them to help finance the continuation of the construction of the Sports and
Nutrition Center Building. To implement the resolution, petitioner Lope C. Mapagu, then
incumbent municipal treasurer, prepared an agreement document for signature of all
thresher/owner/operators applying for a mayors permit.

Soon thereafter, private respondent Saturnino T. Jurado sent his agent to the municipal
treasurers office to pay the license fee of P285.00 for thresher operators. Mapagu
refused to accept the payment and required him to first secure a mayors permit. For his
part, Mayor Domingo Tuzon, the herein other petitioner, said that Jurado should first
comply with Resolution No. 9 and sign the agreement before the permit could be issued.
Jurado ignored the requirement. Instead, he sent the P285.00 license fee by postal
money order to the office of the municipal treasurer who, however, returned the said
amount. The reason given was the failure of the respondent to comply with Resolution
No. 9.

On April 4, 1977, Jurado filed with the Court of First Instance of Cagayan a special civil
action for mandamus with actual and moral damages to compel the issuance of the
mayors permit and license. On May 31, 1977, he filed another petition with the same
court. this time for declaratory judgment against the said resolution (and the
implementing agreement) for being illegal either as a donation or as a tax measure.
Named defendants were the same respondents and all the members of the Sangguniang
Bayan of Camalaniugan.

RTC: resolution is valid and NO malice on the part of the mayor and treasurer.

CA: resolution is valid but attended by malice on the part of the mayor and treasurer,
and awarded damages to Jurado.

ISSUES & HELD:

1. Whether refusal on the part of the petitioners in granting the license is unjustified
and constitutes bad faith.

NO. The private respondent anchors his claim for damages on Art. 27 of the NCC.
1

According to Phil. Match Co. Ltd. v. City of Cebu, the provision presupposes that the refusal
or omission of a public official to perform his official duty is attributable to malice or
inexcusable negligence. In the present case, it has not even been alleged that the Mayor
Tuzons refusal to act on the private respondents application was an attempt to compel
him to resort to bribery to obtain approval of his application. It cannot be said either that
the mayor and the municipal treasurer were motivated by personal spite or were grossly
negligent in refusing to issue the permit and license to Jurado.

It is no less significant that no evidence has been offered to show that the petitioners
singled out the private respondent for persecution. Neither does it appear that the
petitioners stood to gain personally from refusing to issue to Jurado the mayors permit and
license he needed. The petitioners were not Jurados business competitors nor has it been
established that they intended to favor his competitors. On the contrary, the record
discloses that the resolution was uniformly applied to all the threshers in the
municipality without discrimination or preference.

The private respondent complains that as a result of the petitioners acts, he was prevented
from operating his business all this time and earning substantial profit therefrom, as he had
in previous years. But as the petitioners correctly observed, he could have taken the
prudent course of signing the agreement under protest and later challenging it in
court to relieve him of the obligation to "donate." Pendente lite, he could have continued
to operate his threshing business and thus avoided the lucro cesante that he now says was
the consequence of the petitioners wrongful act. He could have opted for the less obstinate
but still dissentient action, without loss of face, or principle, or profit.

2. Compliance with Resolution No. 9 and its implementing agreement is NOT
mandatory

This issue has NOT been raised in this petition as an assigned error of the
respondent court. The measures have been sustained in the challenged decision, from
which the respondent has not appealed. The decision is final and binding as to him. It is
true that he did question the measures in his Comment, but only half-heartedly and
obliquely, to support his claim for damages. We may therefore defer examination of these
measures to a more appropriate case, where it may be discussed more fully by the proper
parties.
2


1
. Art. 27. Any person suffering material or moral loss because a public servant or employee refuses
or neglects, without just cause, to perform his official duty may file an action for damages and
other relief against the latter, without prejudice to any disciplinary administrative action that
may be taken.
2
. While it would appear from the wording of the resolution that the municipal government merely
intends to "solicit" the 1% contribution from the threshers, the implementing agreement seems to
make the donation obligatory and a condition precedent to the issuance of the mayors permit.
This goes against the nature of a donation, which is an act of liberality and is never obligatory.
If, on the other hand, it is to be considered a tax ordinance, then it must be shown in view of the
challenge raised by the private respondents to have been enacted in accordance with the
requirements of the Local Tax Code. These would include the holding of a public hearing on the


measure and its subsequent approval by the Secretary of Finance, in addition to the usual
requisites for publication of ordinances in general.

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