This document summarizes a legal case from 1912 regarding an election contest for the provincial governorship of Capiz in the Philippines. According to the initial ballot count, Jose Altavas received 3,542 votes and Ramon Hontiveros received 3,371 votes. However, Hontiveros protested the results. After a trial, the court found that Hontiveros actually received 3,317 votes to Altavas' 2,842. Altavas appealed based on various claims of error. The key issue addressed was whether the deadline for filing an election contest is two weeks after ballots are cast or two weeks after results are proclaimed. Prior cases established the deadline runs from the proclamation date.
This document summarizes a legal case from 1912 regarding an election contest for the provincial governorship of Capiz in the Philippines. According to the initial ballot count, Jose Altavas received 3,542 votes and Ramon Hontiveros received 3,371 votes. However, Hontiveros protested the results. After a trial, the court found that Hontiveros actually received 3,317 votes to Altavas' 2,842. Altavas appealed based on various claims of error. The key issue addressed was whether the deadline for filing an election contest is two weeks after ballots are cast or two weeks after results are proclaimed. Prior cases established the deadline runs from the proclamation date.
This document summarizes a legal case from 1912 regarding an election contest for the provincial governorship of Capiz in the Philippines. According to the initial ballot count, Jose Altavas received 3,542 votes and Ramon Hontiveros received 3,371 votes. However, Hontiveros protested the results. After a trial, the court found that Hontiveros actually received 3,317 votes to Altavas' 2,842. Altavas appealed based on various claims of error. The key issue addressed was whether the deadline for filing an election contest is two weeks after ballots are cast or two weeks after results are proclaimed. Prior cases established the deadline runs from the proclamation date.
This document summarizes a legal case from 1912 regarding an election contest for the provincial governorship of Capiz in the Philippines. According to the initial ballot count, Jose Altavas received 3,542 votes and Ramon Hontiveros received 3,371 votes. However, Hontiveros protested the results. After a trial, the court found that Hontiveros actually received 3,317 votes to Altavas' 2,842. Altavas appealed based on various claims of error. The key issue addressed was whether the deadline for filing an election contest is two weeks after ballots are cast or two weeks after results are proclaimed. Prior cases established the deadline runs from the proclamation date.
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Beltran, Roberto Francisco R.
Hontiveros vs. Altavas
Facts: At the general election held in the Province of Capiz on June 4, 1912, Jose Altavas, according to the proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers, received 3,542 votes, and Ramon Hontiveros received 3,371 votes, for the office of provincial governor. Hontiveros protested. The Court of First Instance, after trial, found that the protestant received 3,317 legal votes and the protestee 2,842. Judgment was entered directing the provincial board of canvassers to correct its canvass accordingly. The protestee appealed. The appellant now insists that the court erred: (1) In not declaring the appellee ineligible to be elected to the office of provincial governor because his certificate of candidacy was not in accordance with the law; (2) in not dismissing the protest upon the ground that the same premature; (3) in not dismissing the protest because it was not presented within the time required by law; (4) in not finding that the provincial board of canvassers issued its proclamation on July 12, 1912; (5) in holding that the document filed by the appellee on July 27 was sufficient to constitute a protest; (6) in not requiring the appellee to make a prima facie showing of fraud or irregularity in the manner of casting or counting the ballots before the ballot boxes were opened on the hearing; (7) in denying his (appellants) request to intervene and select one of the commissioners appointed by the court to examine and recount the ballots; (8) in refusing to allow him or his counsel to be present at the opening of the ballots boxes and the examination and counting of the ballots by the commissioners; and (9) in not permitting him to examine in court the ballots rejected by the commissioners and present additional testimony with reference to the validity of such rejected ballots. Questions relating to the eligibility of candidates to be elected to or hold office cannot be drawn in question in these proceedings. (Topacio vs. Paredes, 23 Phil. Rep., 238.) But if we were now called upon to determine the validity of the appellees certificate, we would hold it sufficient for all purposes. The second, third, and fourth alleged errors may be considered together. The facts are these: The ballots were deposited on June 4, and the counting of the same commenced on the night of the 4th and continued until terminated. The first protest was filed on June 18. In this protest it was alleged that up to the time the provincial board of canvassers had not determined who had been elected provincial governor. No proceedings pertinent to the questions here involved were taken in the Court of Instance until August 10. The provincial board of canvassers met on July 12 and proceeded with a canvass of the returns from the various voting precincts. On that date they completed the canvass of the returns in so far as the offices of delegates to the Assembly and the provincial governor were concerned, and stated that owing to the lateness of the hour they would adjourn until the following day, the 13th, without having canvassed the returns for third member. On the 27th of that month the appellee presented what he called an amended protest and asked permission of the court to substitute this amended protest for the one filed on June 18. This permission was granted. The amended protest is complete in every particular, and it is not necessary to take into consideration for any purpose the protest filed on the 18th of June. In fact, this latter protest was never drawn in question thereafter, or referred to for any material purpose during the trial of the cause in the court below or in this court, except for the purpose of determining from what date the two weeks within which the protest might be filed, as provided in section 27 of Act No. 1582 as amended, should begin to run. Copies of the amended protest were served upon all the candidates voted for on June 4. The word candidates as here used is restricted to those persons who had filed certificates of candidacy with the authorities and who had not on June 4 withdrawn their candidacy.
Issue: Whether the time within which the motion which introduces an election contest for a provincial governorship expires two weeks after the day upon which the ballots are cast or two weeks after the day upon which the provincial board of canvassers determines who has been elected; and in computing the time, should the first or the last day be excluded from the computation
Ruling: This is not the first time that this question has been under consideration by this court. It was directly involved and after a thorough investigation and extended discussions, it was answered in two cases. (Navarro vs. Veloso, 23 Phil. Rep., 625; Manalo vs. Sevilla, ante, 609.) In these cases we held that the two weeks begin to run from the date of the proclamation of the provincial board of canvassers and not from the day the ballots were cast. This question is no longer an open one in this jurisdiction, and if our attention had not been called to a number of adjudicated cases in the United States which it is claimed hold differently, we would say no more upon the question. But in view of these citations, we deem it advisable to somewhat further discuss the matter. Our further remarks, however, will be confined to an attempt to distinguish between the cases relied upon and the law and the conditions in our own jurisdiction. It is believed that no one will disagree with the statement that the Legislature is presumed to have used words in their natural and commonly accepted meaning unless that meaning would contravene the manifest intent of the enactment.