G.R. No.

177881

October 13, 2010

EMMANUEL C. VILLANUEVA, vs.

CHERDAN LENDING INVESTORS CORPORATION
FACTS: Spouses Pearedondo obtained from respondent Cherdan Lending
Investors Corporation a loan secured by a real estate mortgage over a parcel of
land. Despite demand, spouses Pearedondo failed to pay the obligation. Hence,
respondent extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage. Cherdan won the bid. Upon
the expiration of the redemption period, the title to the property was
consolidated and a new title was issued in respondents name.
Writ of possession was issued for Cherdan, Emmanuel C. Villanueva moved for
the reconsideration of the order and the setting aside of the writ of possession
on the ground that he is the owner and is in actual possession of the subject
property.
RTC granted Villanuevas motion and ordered that the same be allowed
possession of the property pending finality of decision of the matter. And writ of
possession previously issued in favor of Cherdan was recalled.
Cherdan instituted a special civil action for certiorari before the CA. CA granted
the petition.
The CA held that the pendency of the case for annulment of the foreclosure
proceedings was not a bar to the issuance of the writ of possession. The CA
refused to apply Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which authorizes
the giving of possession of the property to the purchaser or last
redemptioner unless a third party is actually holding the property adverse to
the judgment obligor, ratiocinating that the provision applies only to
execution sales and not to extrajudicial foreclosures of real estate mortgage
under Act 3135.
Issue: W/N a case for annulment of foreclosure is a bar to issuance of writ
of possession.
Held: YES. It is settled that the buyer in a foreclosure sale becomes the absolute
owner of the property purchased if it is not redeemed within one year after the
registration of the sale. As such, he is entitled to the possession of the property
and can demand that he be placed in possession at any time following the
consolidation of ownership in his name and the issuance to him of a new
TCT.23 Time and again, we have held that it is ministerial upon the court to issue
a writ of possession after the foreclosure sale and during the period of
redemption. Upon the filing of an ex parte motion and the approval of the
corresponding bond, the court issues the order for a writ of possession. The writ
of possession issues as a matter of course even without the filing and approval of
a bond after consolidation of ownership and the issuance of a new TCT in the
name of the purchaser.24

This rule, however, is not without exception. Under Section 33, Rule 39 of the
Rules of Court, which is made to apply suppletorily to the extrajudicial
foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Section 6, Act 3135, as amended, the
possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in the
extrajudicial foreclosure unless a third party is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment debtor.
Important: The purchasers right of possession is recognized only as against the
judgment debtor and his successor-in-interest but not against persons whose
right of possession is adverse to the latter.

G.R. No. 199747, April 03, 2013

TEODORO DARCEN, ET. AL. V V.R. GONZALES CREDIT ENTERPRISE
FACTS:
Spouses Mamerto and Flora Darcen begot 7 children (herein petitioners).
Mamerto died leaving 3 parcels of land. Manuel (one of the children) caused the
execution of an Extra-Judicial Settlement of Estate with Waiver by forging the
signatures of the petitioners and their mother Flora. In the said instrument, the
petitioners and their siblings were said to have waived their shares in their
fathers estate in favor of their mother, thus making Flora the sole owner of the
three lots. Manuel loaned from respondent using the parcels of land as mortgage.
Fired destroyed the office of register of deeds including the titles to the parcels of
land.
Respondent demanded payment enforcing the mortgage contract. Petitioner
opposed alleging forgery. Respondent extrajudicially forclosed while petitioners
filed civil case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure.
Foreclosure sale pushed through and respondent won as highest bidder.
Redemption period elapsed and respondent filed for consolidation of title over
the properties and writ of possession. Petitioner filed motion to dismiss on
ground of forum shopping because respondent failed to disclose the pending
civil case.
RTC ruled in favor of respondent. CA affirmed, that the issuance of the writ of
possession is merely a ministerial function of the courta quo, the possession
being incidental to the transfer of title to the new owner.
Issue: W/N petitioners are entitled to possession of the lands pursuant to
Sec. 33 Rule 39 of Rules of Court.
Held: No. The established rule is that the purchaser in an extrajudicial
foreclosure sale becomes the absolute owner of the property if no redemption is
made within one (1) year from the registration of the certificate of sale by those
who are entitled to redeem.27 Possession being a recognized essential attribute
of ownership,28 after consolidation of title the purchaser may demand
possession as a matter of right.29 Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by
Act No. 4118, the issuance of the writ is merely a ministerial function of the RTC,
which the new owner may obtain through an ex parte motion.
Nonetheless, the ministerial duty of the court to issue an ex parte writ of
possession ceases once it appears that there is a third party in possession
of the property, who is a stranger to the mortgage and who claims a right
adverse to that of the debtor/ mortgagor pursuant to Sec. 33 Rule 39 ROC.
However, We find no proof that the petitioners are adverse third-party
claimants entitled to be retained in possession.

It will be noted that 12 years had passed since petitioners brought the action to
annul the mortgage. Even granting that the petitioners should be allowed to
retain possession, the petition has been rendered moot and academic by
the issuance and satisfaction of the writ of possession issued in favor of
respondent.

G.R. No. 200667

March 11, 2013
RURAL BANK OF STA. BARBARA (ILOILO), INC., vs. GERRY CENTENO
Facts:
Spouses Centeno were the previous owners of the subject lots. They mortgaged
the foregoing properties in favor of petitioner Rural Bank of Sta. Barbara (Iloilo),
Inc. as security for a loan. Sps. Centeno, however, defaulted on the loan,
prompting petitioner to cause the extrajudicial foreclosure of the said mortgage.
Peitioner won as highest bidder.
Sps. Centeno failed to redeem the subject lots within the one (1) year redemption
period pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 3135. Nonetheless, they still continued
with the possession and cultivation of the aforesaid properties. Sometime in
1983, respondent Gerry Centeno, son of Sps. Centeno, took over the cultivation of
the same. On March 14, 1988, he purchased the said lots from his parents.
Accordingly, Mrs. Centeno paid the capital gains taxes on the sale transaction and
tax declarations were eventually issued in the name of respondent. While the
latter was in possession of the subject lots, petitioner secured on November 25,
1997 a Final Deed of Sale thereof and in 1998, was able to obtain the
corresponding tax declarations in its name. Petitioner filed for issuance of writ of
possession. Respondent opposed the petition, asserting that he purchased and
has, in fact, been in actual, open and exclusive possession of the same properties
for at least fifteen (15) years.11 He further averred that the foreclosure sale was
null and void owing to the forged signatures in the real estate mortgage.
Moreover, he claims that petitioners rights over the subject lots had already
prescribed.
RTC favored petitioner; CA reversed.
Issue: W/N petitioner is entitled to issuance of writ of possession over
subject lots.
Held: YES. It is well established that after consolidation of title in the purchasers
name for failure of the mortgagor to redeem the property, the purchasers right
to possession ripens into the absolute right of a confirmed owner. At that point,
the issuance of a writ of possession, upon proper application and proof of title, to
a purchaser in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale becomes merely a ministerial
function, unless it appears that the property is in possession of a third party
claiming a right adverse to that of the mortgagor.
In China Banking Corporation v. Lozada, the Court held that the phrase "a third
party who is actually holding the property adversely to the judgment obligor"
contemplates a situation in which a third party holds the property by adverse
title or right, such as that of a co-owner, tenant or usufructuary. The co-owner,
agricultural tenant, and usufructuary possess the property in their own right,
and they are not merely the successor or transferee of the right of possession of
another co-owner or the owner of the property. Notably, the property should not
only be possessed by a third party, but also held by the third party adversely to
the judgment obligor.

In this case, respondent acquired the subject lots from his parents, Sps.
Centeno, on March 14, 1988 after they were purchased by petitioner and its
Certificate of Sale at Public Auction was registered with the Register of
Deeds of Iloilo City in 1971. It cannot therefore be disputed that
respondent is a mere successor-in-interest of Sps. Centeno. Consequently,
he cannot be deemed as a "third party who is actually holding the property
adversely to the judgment obligor" under legal contemplation. Hence, the
RTC had the ministerial duty to issue as it did issue the said writ in
petitioners favor.

A.C. No. 9684, September 18, 2013

MARY ROSE A. BOTO, Complainant, v. SENIOR ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR
VINCENT L. VILLENA, CITY PROSECUTOR ARCHIMEDES V. MANABAT AND
ASSISTANT CITY PROSECUTOR PATRICK NOEL P. DE DIOS, Respondents.
Facts:
An information for Libel against Boto was filed before METC of Taguig by
respondents. She charged respondents with gross ignorance of the law for filing
the information for libel before the MeTC and for opposing the motion to quash
despite the knowledge that the said first level court had no jurisdiction over the
case. She further alleged that when she filed a libel case against a certain Tizon,
the respondents intentionally did not act upon it since Tizon was Sen. Allan Peter
Cayetanos godson. Whereas when Tizon filed a Libel complaint against herein
petitioner, the respondents immediately acted upon it and was even able to
secure an arrest warrant on the same day.
In their comments, respondents averred that the information for libel against
complainant was filed before the MeTC due to inadvertence and that no malice
or gross ignorance of the law attended it. He added that the information was
later on filed with the RTC-Pasig. Villena further alleged that the Honorable
Court (METC) had already determined probable cause when it issued a
warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus, it has effectively mooted the
resolution of any issue concerning jurisdiction, venue and sufficiency of
evidence against the accused.
Issue: W/N Villenas contention is tenable.
Held: NO. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) explicitly provides that
jurisdiction over libel cases are lodged with the RTC.
Manabat and De Dios are reprimanded. While Villena is found liable for
Ignorance of the Law and is hereby FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand
(P10,000.00) Pesos, payable within 30 days from receipt of this resolution with a
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with more
severely.
REASON: When the motion to quash was filed by Boto for lack of
jurisdiction, Villena should have immediately acted on it by not opposing
the dismissal of the case. Villenas comment provides:
the Honorable Court (METC) had already determined probable cause
when it issued a warrant of arrest against the accused. Thus, it has
effectively mooted the resolution of any issue concerning jurisdiction, venue
and sufficiency of evidence against the accused.
Patently, this responsive pleading of Villena demonstrates that he did not know
the elementary rules on jurisdiction. Fundamental is the rule that jurisdiction is
conferred by law and is not within the courts, let alone the parties themselves, to

determine or conveniently set aside.18 It cannot be waived except for those

judicially recognizable grounds like estoppel. And it is not mooted by an action of
a court in an erroneously filed case.
Villena should have even initiated the move for the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of jurisdiction. His dismal failure to apply the basic rule on
jurisdiction amounts to ignorance of the law and reflects his lack of prudence, if
not his incompetence, in the performance of his duties.

G.R. No. 173166

March 13, 2013
PURIFICACION
ESTANISLAO
and
RUPERTO
vs. SPOUSES NORMA GUDITO and DAMIANO GUDITO

ESTANISLAO

Facts:
Petitioners had been renting the subject residential lot since 1934 and even built
the house therein in accordance with their lease contract with Garspar Vazquez,
who was succeeded by his son Victorino and sons wife Ester (Vasquez couple).
Vasquez couple demanded the petitioners to vacate the subject property but the
latter refused. Vasquez refused to accept payment but petitioner, with due notice
to Ester Vasquez, deposited the amount of her monthly rentals at Allied Banking
Corporation under a savings account in the name of Ester Vasquez as lessor.
In the interim, a Deed of Donation was executed by the Vasquez couple in favor
of respondent Norma Gudito. Gudito demanded petitioners to vacate but to no
avail. Hence, Gudito filed a case for Unlawful Detainer/Ejectment against
petitioners before MeTC of Manila. MeTC favored respondents, RTC reversed. CA
reinstated MeTCs decision.
Issue: Who has better right over the possession of the subject property.
Held: SC ruled in favor of Spouses Gudito.
Petitioners strongly argue that respondents cannot evict them from the subject
property pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) 1517, in relation to P.D. 2016, as
the subject property is allegedly within one of the 245 Proclaimed Area for
Priority Development and/or Urban Land Reform No. 1967, as amended by
Presidential Proclamation No. 2284. Petitioners further contend that they were
not aware that the subject property had been acquired by respondents via a
Deed of Donation executed by the Vasquez couple. Thus, they assail that said
donation was merely simulated in order to deprive them of their right of first
refusal to buy the subject property.
The arguments lack merit. To begin with, the only question that the courts must
resolve in an unlawful detainer or ejectment suit is who between the parties is
entitled to the physical or material possession of the property in dispute. In the
case under review, respondents have overwhelmingly established their right of
possession by virtue of the Deed of Donation made in their favor.
Section 5 (c) of Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 states:
Sec. 5. Grounds for judicial ejectment. Ejectment shall be allowed on the
following grounds:
xxxx
(c) Legitimate need of owner/ lessor to repossess his property for his own use or
for the use of any immediate member of his family as a residential unit, such
owner or immediate member not being the owner of any other available
residential unit within the same city or municipality: Provided, however, that the
lease for a definite period has expired: Provided, further, that the lessor has

given the lessee formal notice within three (3) months in advance of the lessors
intention to repossess the property: Provided, finally, that the owner/ lessor is
prohibited from leasing the residential unit or allowing its use by a third party
for at least one year.
Here, it is undisputed that respondents do not own any other lot or real
property except the herein subject lot. They have urgent need of the same
to build their own house to be used as their residence. Also, petitioners had
already been asked to leave the premises as early as 1982, but sternly
refused, hence, its former owners refused to accept their rental payments.
When the same property was donated to respondents, petitioners were
allowed to continue occupying the subject lot since respondents did not as
yet have the money to build a house of their own.1avvphi1 But now that
respondents have sufficient money to build their own house, petitioners
still rebuff respondents demand to vacate the premises and to remove or
demolish their house. Clearly, since respondents have complied with the
requirements of the law, their right to possess the subject property for
their own use as family residence cannot be denied.