REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

G.R. No. 150869

Andes vs. CUEVAS

June 9, 2005,

Facts:
Petitioners alleged, inter alia, that
respondents-minority stockholders committed
acts of mismanagement, fraud and conflict of
interest as directors and officers of the bank.
petitioners are unlawfully deprived of income
from their investment.
Private respondents filed a ComplaintAffidavit5 dated September 15, 1992, docketed
as I.S. No. 95-674 before the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City, charging
petitioners with perjury for making willful and
corrupt assertions of falsehood on material
matters.
In their Counter-Affidavit,9 petitioners
stated that the questioned allegations in their
SEC petition, prepared by their counsel and
couched in legal language, hence, not their
choice, were made in good faith in the course
of an intracorporate controversy.
Petitioners appealed the Mandaluyong
City Prosecutors resolution finding probable
cause against them for perjury, by Petition for
Review dated November 13, 1995, before the
Department of Justice (DOJ).
By Resolution12 of August 16, 1996, the DOJ,
through Assistant Chief State Prosecutor
Apolinario G. Exevea, dismissed the Petition.
Petitioners appealed13 to the Office of the
Secretary of Justice.1awphi1
In the meantime, in the SEC case, after
receiving ex-parte evidence for petitioners
following private respondents declaration in
default for failure to file their Answer within the
reglementary period, the SEC, by Decision14
of October 7, 1997, found in favor of
petitioners.
By Resolution15 of February 18, 1998,
then Secretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III
reversed the August 16, 1996 DOJ Resolution

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |1

and directed the withdrawal of the Information

for perjury against petitioners.
On private respondents Motion for
Reconsideration, then Justice Secretary
Serafin R. Cuevas, by Resolution16 of January
20, 1999, reversed the February 18, 1998
Resolution of then Secretary Bello and directed
the refiling of the Information for perjury against
the petitioners upon the following ratiocination:
The sweeping allegation of respondents that
there were no dividends distributed since
Coloma took over the management of the bank
cannot be explained by their allegation in their
counter-affidavit where they claim that the
previous statement is merely on account of
what they can recall. This is not the way that
they worded their fifth cause of action.
We agree with the motion that the
statement alleging no dividends w[ere]
distributed was to make sure that the
respondents petition with the SEC will be acted
on favorably. With the knowledge that this fact
could be properly verified with the records at
their disposal as majority stockholders, the
intent to assert a falsehood becomes
apparent.17
Petitioners moved for a reconsideration
of then Secretary Cuevas resolution which
was, by Resolution18 of January 26, 2000,
denied. A copy of said Resolution was received
by petitioners on February 1, 2000.
On March 27, 2000, petitioners filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court before the CA. The verification and
certification against non-forum shopping
appended to the petition was signed only by
petitioner Leonardo Andres.19
Petitioners
subsequently
filed,
however, an Amended Petition20 on March 31,
2000 to which was appended a verification and
certification against non-forum shopping signed
by all of them.21
By Resolution22 of April 7, 2000, the
CA dismissed the original petition, ratiocinating

that the verification and certification of nonforum shopping attached thereto was signed by
petitioner Leonardo Andres only and that there
was no showing that he was duly authorized by
the other petitioners to execute the same in
accordance with Section 1 of Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court.
Petitioners
filed
a
Motion
for
Reconsideration23 dated April 17, 2000 which
was denied for lack of merit by the CA by
Resolution of November 14, 2001.
Petitioners move to reconsider by
submitting an amended petition embodying a
new certification against forum-shopping
signed by all of them.
We have time and again ruled that
subsequent compliance does not ipso facto
warrant a reconsideration.This is especially
true now in view of hundred (sic), nay,
thousands of petitions filed with this Court,
making it imperative for Us to enforce the
Rules. While it is true that litigation is not a
game of technicalities, it is equally true that
every case must be prosecuted in accordance
with the prescribed procedure to insure an
orderly and speedy administration of justice.
Moreover, We have earnestly looked
into the substance of the petition by going over
the assailed Resolution of public respondent
dated January 26, 2000, affirming the earlier
Resolution dated January 20, 1999 and
ordering the refiling of the information for
perjury against petitioners. We find no grave
abuse of discretion in both Resolutions.
Held:
petitioners argue that the CA erred in
affirming the January 20, 1999 and January 26,
2000 Resolutions of then Secretary Cuevas
ordering the refiling of the information for
perjury against them.
As a general rule, the Court will not
issue writs of prohibition or injunction,
preliminary or final, to enjoin or restrain criminal

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

prosecution.33 In extreme cases though, the
following exceptions to the rule have been
recognized:
(1) when the injunction is necessary to afford
adequate protection to the constitutional rights
of the accused;
(2) when it is necessary for the orderly
administration of justice or to avoid oppression
or multiplicity of actions;
(3) when there is a prejudicial question which is
subjudice;
(4) when the acts of the officer are without or in
excess of authority;
(5) where the prosecution is under an invalid
law; ordinance or regulation;
(6) when double jeopardy is clearly apparent;
(7) where the Court has no jurisdiction over the
offense;
(8) where it is a case of persecution rather than
prosecution;
(9) where the charges are manifestly false and
motivated by the lust for vengeance; and
(10) when there is clearly no prima facie case
against the accused and a motion to quash on
that ground has been denied.34
Petitioners have not shown, however, that the
case at bar falls within any of the recognized
exceptions above set forth.
Consistent with its policy of noninterference in the conduct of preliminary
investigations, and to leave to the investigating
prosecutor sufficient latitude of discretion in the
exercise of determination of what constitutes
sufficient evidence as will establish probable
cause for filing of an information against a
supposed offender,35 this Court finds no
reason to disturb the finding of the appellate
court that no grave abuse of discretion
attended then Justice Cuevas resolution
finding probable cause for perjury against
petitioners to hale them into court.
Notatudignum is petitioners ventilating
before this Court the merits of their defenses.
The issue of whether they acted in good faith is

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |2

best determined, however, during the trial

proper.36 This is not the occasion for the full
and exhaustive display of their evidence. The
presence or absence of the elements of the
crime is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of
defense that may be passed upon after a fullblown trial on the merits.37
In fine, the validity and merits of a
partys defense or accusation, as well as
admissibility of testimonies and evidence, are
better ventilated during trial proper than at the
preliminary investigation level.38
As for petitioners suggestion that the
DOJ should have deferred to the primary and
exclusive jurisdiction of the SEC as what was
involved was a dispute among stockholders of
the bank, a corporation duly registered with the
SEC, and the allegedly perjurious statements
were made by them in connection with that
case, the same is unavailing. Suffice it to state
that the fact that the parties involved in the
controversy are all stockholders or that the
parties involved are the stockholders and the
corporation does not necessarily place the
dispute within the loop of jurisdiction of the
SEC.39
Apart from the fact that perjury and
intracorporate disputes are two entirely
different matters with entirely different
elements, the SEC has no jurisdiction over
criminal cases like perjury.
At all events, under Section 5.2 of
Republic Act No. 8799, 40 otherwise known as
the Securities Regulation Code, which
amended Section 5 of Presidential Decree 902A,41 whether the issue is intracorporate or not
is no longer material, the SEC having been
divested of its jurisdiction thereover.42

On January 26, 1996, MaricarDimaano

charged her father, Edgardo Dimaano with two
(2) counts of rape and one (1) count of
attempted rape.
Appellant pleaded not guilty to the charges.
Tc: The trial court found the testimony
of complainant to be spontaneous and credible.
She narrated the obscene details of her
harrowing experience which no girl of tender
age would have known unless she herself had
experienced it. It found the delay in reporting
the rape understandable due to the fear
complainant had of her father who had moral
ascendancy over her. Also, the quarrel
between complainant's parents was not
sufficient motive for the wife to lodge a serious
charge of rape against appellant. It disregarded
the
Compromise
Agreement
and
the
SalaysaysaPag-uurongngSumbong
since
complainant was not assisted by a lawyer when
she signed the same. Besides, she testified in
open court that she was pursuing the case
against her father.
Ca affirmed

PP VS DIMAANO
Facts:

Held:
The testimony of Maricar of her
ignominious experience contains all the indicia
of truth. It is spontaneous, direct and clear. It is
vivid and complete with details. Her testimony
is truthful and convincing. Her credibility is
beyond question.
A criminal offense is an outrage to the
sovereign State and to the State belongs the
power to prosecute and punish crimes.30 By
itself, an affidavit of desistance is not a ground
for the dismissal of an action, once it has been
instituted in court. A private complainant loses
the right or absolute privilege to decide whether
the rape charge should proceed, because the
case was already filed and must therefore
continue to be heard by the trial court.31
The gravamen of the offense of rape is
sexual congress with a woman by force and

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

without consent.1wphi1 If the woman is under
12 years of age, proof of force and consent
becomes immaterial not only because force is
not an element of statutory rape, but the
absence of a free consent is presumed.
Conviction will therefore lie, provided sexual
intercourse is proven. But if the woman is 12
years of age or over at the time she was
violated, sexual intercourse must be proven
and also that it was done through force,
violence, intimidation or threat.32
WWe have ruled that in incestuous
rape of a minor, actual force or intimidation
need not even be employed where the
overpowering moral influence of appellant, who
is private complainant's father, would suffice.
The moral and physical dominion of the father
is sufficient to cow the victim into submission to
his beastly desires.33 The instant case is no
exception. Appellant took advantage of his
moral and physical ascendancy to unleash his
lechery upon his daughter.
For complaint or information to be
sufficient, it must state the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given
by the statute; the acts or omissions
complained of as constituting the offense; the
name of the offended party; the approximate
time of the commission of the offense, and the
place wherein the offense was committed.35
What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly
violated,
these
being
mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but
the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited.36 The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense
is intended to be charged, and enable the court
to pronounce proper judgment. No information
for a crime will be sufficient if it does not
accurately and clearly allege the elements of

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |3

the crime charged. Every element of the

offense must be stated in the information. What
facts and circumstances are necessary to be
included therein must be determined by
reference to the definitions and essentials of
the specified crimes. The requirement of
alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to
enable him to suitably prepare his defense. The
presumption is that the accused has no
independent knowledge of the facts that
constitute the offense.37
Notably, the above-cited complaint
upon which the appellant was arraigned does
not allege specific acts or omission constituting
the elements of the crime of rape. Neither does
it constitute sufficient allegation of elements for
crimes other than rape, i.e., Acts of
Lasciviousness. The allegation therein that the
appellant 'tr[ied] and attempt[ed] to rape the
complainant does not satisfy the test of
sufficiency of a complaint or information, but is
merely a conclusion of law by the one who
drafted the complaint. This insufficiency
therefore prevents this Court from rendering a
judgment of conviction; otherwise we would be
violating the right of the appellant to be
informed of the nature of the accusation
against him.
WHEREFORE , the decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.00263
affirming the decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Paraaque City, Branch 257, in
Criminal Cases Nos. 96-125 and 96-150,
finding appellant Edgardo Dimaano GUILTY
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape
committed against his own daughter,
MaricarDimaano, and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua and DEATH, respectively;
and ordering him to pay the complainant in
Criminal Case No. 96-125 the amounts of
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as
moral damages, and P25,000.00 as exemplary

damages, and in Criminal Case No. 96-150 the

amounts of 75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00
as
moral
damages,
and
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, is
AFFIRMED. Appellant is however ACQUITTED
for the crime of attempted rape in Criminal
Case No. 96-151 for failure of the complaint to
allege the specific acts or omissions
constituting the offense.
RODRIGUEZ VS PONFERADA
Facts:
Premises considered, there being
PROBABLE CAUSE to charge respondent for
ESTAFA under Article 315 paragraph 2(d) as
amended by PD 818 and for Violation of Batas
PambansaBlg.
22,
it
is
respectfully
recommended that the attached Information be
approved and filed in Court.
As a consequence thereof, separate
informations were separately filed against
herein [p]etitioner before proper [c]ourts, for
Estafa and [v]iolation of Batas PambansaBlg.
22.
Upon payment of the assessed and
required docket fees by the [p]rivate
[c]omplainant, the informations for [v]iolation of
Batas PambansaBlg. 22 against herein
[p]etitioner were filed and raffled to the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch
42, docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 0108033
to 36.
On the other hand, the informations for
[e]stafa cases against herein [p]etitioner were
likewise filed and raffled to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, docketed as
Criminal Cases Nos. 01-106256 to 59.
On 17 June 2002, petitioner through
counsel filed in open court before the [p]ublic

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

[r]espondent an Opposition to the Formal Entry
of Appearance of the Private Prosecutor dated
14 June 2002.
On 27 June 2002, the [p]ublic
[r]espondent court issued the first assailed
Order allowing the appearance of the [p]rivate
[p]rosecutor in the above-entitled criminal
cases upon payment of the legal fees pursuant
to Section 1 of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court,
as amended.
On 31 July 2002, [a]ccused through
counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration
dated 26 July 2002.
On 16 August 2002, the [p]ublic
[r]espondent court issued the second assailed
Order denying the Motion for Reconsideration
of herein [p]etitioner.[5]
Issue: civil action in BP 22 case not a bar to
civil action in estafa case

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |4

because the dockets of the courts were

clogged with such litigations; creditors were
using the courts as collectors. While ordinarily
no filing fees were charged for actual damages
in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary
inclusion of a civil action with the payment of
filing fees based on the face value of the check
involved was laid down to prevent the practice
of creditors of using the threat of a criminal
prosecution to collect on their credit free of
charge.[21]

action for estafa. Nothing in the current law or

rules on BP 22 vests the jurisdiction of the
corresponding civil case exclusively in the court
trying the BP 22 criminal case.[25]

Clearly, it was not the intent of the

special rule to preclude the prosecution of the
civil action that corresponds to the estafa case,
should the latter also be filed. The crimes of
estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and
distinct from each other. There is no identity of
offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in
one case may be invoked in the other. The
offenses charged in the informations are
perfectly distinct from each other in point of
law, however nearly they may be connected in
point of fact.[22]

Ruling:
In the present cases before us, the
institution of the civil actions with the estafa
cases and the inclusion of another set of civil
actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly
repugnant or inconsistent with each other.
Nothing in the Rules signifies that the
necessary inclusion of a civil action in a
criminal case for violation of the Bouncing
Checks Law[20] precludes the institution in an
estafa case of the corresponding civil action,
even if both offenses relate to the issuance of
the same check.
The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule
111 is explained by Justice Florenz D.
Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the
committee tasked with the revision of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the
special rule on BP 22 cases was added,

What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court

prohibits is the reservation to file the
corresponding civil action. The criminal action
shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. [U]nless a separate civil action has
been filed before the institution of the criminal
action, no such civil action can be instituted
after the criminal action has been filed as the
same has been included therein.[23] In the
instant case, the criminal action for estafa was
admittedly filed prior to the criminal case for
violation of BP 22, with the corresponding filing
fees for the inclusion of the corresponding civil
action paid accordingly.[24]
Furthermore, the fact that the Rules do
not allow the reservation of civil actions in BP
22 cases cannot deprive private complainant of
the right to protect her interests in the criminal

In promulgating the Rules, this Court did not

intend to leave the offended parties without any
remedy to protect their interests in estafa
cases. Its power to promulgate the Rules of
Court is limited in the sense that rules shall not
diminish, increase or modify substantive
rights.[26] Private complainants intervention
in the prosecution of estafa is justified not only
for the prosecution of her interests, but also for
the speedy and inexpensive administration of
justice as mandated by the Constitution.[27]
The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding
that the private prosecutor may intervene
before the RTC in the proceedings for estafa,
despite the necessary inclusion of the
corresponding civil action in the proceedings
for violation of BP 22 pending before the MTC.
A recovery by the offended party under one
remedy, however, necessarily bars that under
the other.
Obviously stemming from the
fundamental rule against unjust enrichment,[28]
this is in essence the rationale for the
proscription in our law against double recovery
for the same act or omission.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED and
the assailed Order AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.

1. Rule on implied institution of civil action

with criminal action
HYATT INDUSTRIAL MANUFACTURING
CORP., petitioner, vs. ASIA DYNAMIC
ELECTRIX CORP. G.R. No. 163597. July 29,
2005

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

SUMMARY:
RTC denied motion to dismiss by Asia
Dynamic Electrix Corporation (Respondent).
Against Respondent.
CA Reversed the said order (Denial to Motion
to
Dismiss
by
respondent).
Favored
respondent.
SC no reversible error in reversing
RTC.Favored Respondent.
FACTS:
Plaintiff
HYATT
INDUSTRIAL
MANUFACTURING (HYATT) filed before the
RTC of Mandaluyong a complaint of recovery
of sum of money against Respondent for
various electrical purchases. Respondent
issued checks amounting to P 1,622, 467.14 in
favour of petitioner. Said checks bounced.
Respondent moved to dismiss the case based
on the following grounds: 1) ) the civil action
was deemed included in the criminal actions for
violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22)
previously filed by petitioner against the officers
of respondent corporation; (2) Section 1(b) of
Rule 111 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure prohibits the filing of a separate civil
action in B.P. 22 cases; and (3) respondent
was guilty of forum shopping and unjust
enrichment.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss in
its order dated December 10, 2001. It ruled that
since the act complained of arose from the
alleged non-payment of the petitioner of its
contractual debt, and not the issuance of
checks with insufficient funds, in accordance
with Article 31 of the Civil Code, the civil action
could proceed independently of the criminal
actions. It said that Section 1(b) of Rule 111 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure does
not apply to the obligation in this case, it
being ex-contractu and not ex-delicto.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner did not violate sec
1(b) of RULE 111 of the Revised Rules of

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |5

Court on Crimininal Procedure when it filed the

complaint in Civil Case No.MC-01- 1493.
RULING:
We agree with the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that upon filing of the criminal cases
for violation of B.P. 22, the civil action for the
recovery of the amount of the checks was also
impliedly instituted under Section 1(b) of Rule
111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure.
Under the present revised Rules, the criminal
action for violation of B.P. 22 shall be deemed
to include the corresponding civil action. The
reservation to file a separate civil action is no
9
longer needed. The Rules provide:
Section 1. Institution of criminal and
civil actions.
(a) xxx
(b) The criminal action for violation of
Batas PambansaBlg. 22 shall be
deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. No reservation to file such
civil action separately shall be allowed.
The foregoing rule was adopted from Circular
No. 57-97 of this Court. It specifically states
that the criminal action for violation of B.P. 22
shall be deemed to include the corresponding
civil action. It also requires the complainant to
pay in full the filing fees based on the amount
of the check involved. Generally, no filing fees
are required for criminal cases, but because of
the inclusion of the civil action in complaints for
violation of B.P. 22, the Rules require the
payment of docket fees upon the filing of the
complaint. This rule was enacted to help declog
court dockets which are filled with B.P. 22
cases as creditors actually use the courts as
collectors. Because ordinarily no filing fee is
charged in criminal cases for actual damages,
the payee uses the intimidating effect of a
criminal charge to collect his credit gratis and
sometimes, upon being paid, the trial court is
not even informed thereof.
2.
When
civil
action
may
proceed
independently? (in Syllabus)

*The only instance when separate proceedings

are allowed is when the civil action is filed
ahead of the criminal case.
* In view of this special rule governing actions
for violation of B.P. 22, Article 31 of the Civil
Code cited by the trial court will not apply to the
case at bar.
Other Notes
*The pendency of the civil action before the
court trying the criminal case bars the filing of
another civil action in another court on the
ground
of litispendentia.
The
elements
of litispendentia as a ground for dismissal of an
action are: (1) identity of parties, or at least
such parties who represent the same interest in
both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and
relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the
same facts; and (3) the identity, with respect to
the two preceding particulars in the two cases,
is such that any judgment that may be
rendered in the pending case, regardless of
which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
CASE NO. 2
GEORGE MANANTAN vs. The Court of
Appeals, GR. 107125, January 29,2001
Summary:
RTC Acquitted Manantan (Petitioner) without
ruling on Civil Liability.
CA Modified RTC decision by ruling
Petitioner to be Civilly Liable.
SC Affirmed CA decision ruling Petitioner to
be Civilly Liable.
FACTS:
Provincial Prosecutor filed information charging
petitioner with Reckless Imprudence resulting
in homicide. Petitioner was driver of
DaangMaharlika (automobile) which side swept
another vehicle operated by Charles Cadamon.
Ruben Nicolas, a passenger (Cadamon
vehicle) died.
RTC acquitted Petitioner. Respondent (Nicolas
spouse) filed notice of appeal on the civil
aspect. Said respondent prayed that decision

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

appealed from be modified and that apellee
(Manantan) be ordered to pay for indemnity
and damages.
CA modified the decision favouring Nicolas
spouse stating:
at the time the accident occurred,
Manantan was in a state of intoxication,
due to his having consumed "all in all,
a total of at least twelve (12) bottles of
6
beerbetween 9 a.m. and 11 p.m." It
found that petitioner's act of driving
while intoxicated was a clear violation
of
Section
53
of
the
Land
Transportation and Traffic Code (R.A.
7
No. 4136) and pursuant to Article
8
2185 of the Civil Code, a statutory
presumption of negligence existed. It
held that petitioner's act of violating the
Traffic Code is negligence in itself
"because the mishap, which occurred,
was the precise injury sought to be
prevented by the regulation."
Petitioner moved for consideration.
ISSUE:
(1) Did the acquittal of petitioner foreclose any
further inquiry by the Court of Appeals as to his
negligence or reckless imprudence?
Our law recognized 2 acquittals with different
effects on the civil liability of the accused.
1. First is an acquittal on the ground that
the accused is not the author of the act
or omission complained of. This
instance closes the door to civil liability,
for a person who has been found to be
not the perpetrator of any act or
omission cannot and can never be held
13
liable for such act or omission. There
being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is
out of the question, and the civil action,
if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than
the delictcomplained of. This is the
situation contemplated in Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
2. second instance is an acquittal based
on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the
accused. In this case, even if the guilt
of the accused has not been
satisfactorily established, he is not
exempt from civil liability which may be
proved by preponderance of evidence
only. (emphasis supplied by nikko) This
is the situation contemplated in Article
16
29 of the Civil Code, where the civil
action for damages is "for the same act
or omission."
*Petitioners claim that CA decision placed him
in DOUBLE JEOPARDY is misplaced. Note,
what was elevated to the Court of appeals by
respondents was the Civil aspect of the said
nd
criminal case. No criminal case (2 ) was
imputed against the petitioner. The court of
appeals did not modify any judgement. Nor did
it order the filing of a second criminal case
against the petitioner.
(2) Did the court a quo err in finding that
petitioner's acquittal did not extinguish his civil
liability?
conclusion of the appellate court that the
acquittal was based on reasonable doubt;
hence, petitioner's civil liability was not
extinguished by his discharge. We note the trial
court's declaration that did not discount the
possibility that "the accused was really
negligent." However, it found that "a hypothesis
inconsistent with the negligence of the accused
presented itself before the Court" and since
said "hypothesis is consistent with the
recordthe Court's mind cannot rest on a
18
verdict of conviction." The foregoing clearly
shows that petitioner's acquittal was predicated
on the conclusion that his guilt had not been
established with moral certainty. Stated
differently, it is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt and a suit to enforce civil
liability for the same act or omission lies.
(3) Did the appellate court commit a reversible
error in failing to apply the Manchester doctrine

Page |6
to CA-G.R. CV No. 19240? (I dunno if this is
included..)
CASE NO. 3
Preliminary Investigation
DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, Petitioners,
vs.
THE
SECOND
DIVISION
OF
THE
SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
SUMARRY:
Sandiganbayan

admitted
Amended
Information in case no. 26381. Against the
Petitioner.
SC ordered reinvestigation. Favored
Petitioner.
FACTS:
DatuGuimidMatalam( Petitioner), ARMM ViceGovernor and Regional Secretary of DAR,
along with some low-ranking officials were
charged with alleged wilful and confederated
refusal of the accused to pay the backwages of
complaining witnesses Ayunan, Abdul Zailon,
Annabelle Zailon, Mabatawan, Mastura, and
Hadil (Ayunan and co.). for the period of
January 1998 to June 1999 amounting to P
1,606, 788.50 as contained in Civil Service
Resolutions Nos. 982027 and 990415 in the
nature of unpaid salaries during the period
which Ayunan and co. have been illegally
terminated.
Matalam filed for Motion for reinvestigation and
the same was conducted wherein petitioner
filed his counter-affidavit. Prosecutor then filed
a Manifestation and Motion to Admit Amended
Information Deleting the Names of Other
Accused
ExceptDatuGuimidMatalam.
Petitioner
filed
Motion
to
Dismissand
Opposition to Admit Amended Information.
Amended Information contained a new charge.
Instead of alleged refusal to pay the
backwages ordered by the Civil Service
Commission, Amended Info. Charged him to
have
orderedwillful, unlawful and illegal
dismissal from the service of the complaining

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

witnesses. He insists that the amended
information charging a separate and entirely
different offense cannot be admitted because
there would be a serious violation of due
process of law. He claims he is entitled to a
preliminary investigation since he was not
informed that he is being charged for the
alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses
and that he was not given the opportunity to
explain.
Issue:
Whether petitioner is entitled to a new
Preliminary Investigation because the corpus
delicti
in
the
Original
Information
(
allegedrefulsal to pay backwages) and the
Amended Information ( termination of services
of Ayunan and co.) are distinct from each other
(?)
HELD:
Petition for Certiorari Granted. Respondent
Court is directed to order the Office of the
Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a preliminary
investigation of the charge.
Ratio:
(Refer to Sec.14 of Rule 110 the Revised ROC)
A substantial amendment consists of the recital
of facts constituting the offense charged and
determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All
16
other matters are merely of form.
The following have been held to be merely
formal amendments: (1) new allegations which
relate only to the range of the penalty that the
court might impose in the event of conviction;
(2) an amendment which does not charge
another offense different or distinct from that
charged in the original one; (3) additional
allegations which do not alter the prosecutions
theory of the case so as to cause surprise to
the accused and affect the form of defense he
has or will assume; (4) an amendment which
does not adversely affect any substantial right
17
of the accused; (5) an amendment that
merely adds specifications to eliminate
vagueness in the information and not to

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |7

introduce new and material facts, and merely

states with additional precision something
which is already contained in the original
information and which adds nothing essential
for conviction for the crime charged.
The test as to whether a defendant is
prejudiced by the amendment has been said to
be whether a defense under the information as
it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any
evidence defendant might have would be
equally applicable to the information in the one
form as in the other. An amendment to an
information which does not change the nature
of the crime alleged therein does not affect the
essence of the offense or cause surprise or
deprive the accused of an opportunity to meet
the new averment had each been held to be
19
one of form and not of substance.
In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed
substantial. The recital of facts constituting the
offense charged was definitely altered. In the
original information, the prohibited act allegedly
committed by petitioner was the illegal and
unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims
of the private complainants, while in the
amended information, it is the illegal dismissal
from the service of the private complainants.
However, it cannot be denied that the alleged
illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary
claims is related to, and arose from, the alleged
illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants.
According to Retired Senior Associate Justice
Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is taken,
the information may be amended in substance
and/or form, without leave of court; but if
amended in substance, the accused is entitled
to another preliminary investigation, unless the
amended charge is related to or is included in
20
the original charge.
Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a
substantial amendment in an information
entitles an accused to another preliminary

investigation. However, if the amended

information contains a charge related to or is
included in the original information, a new
preliminary investigation is not required.
While it is true that the charges in the original
and amended informations are related, i.e., an
inquiry into one would have elicited
substantially, if not precisely, the same facts
that an inquiry into the other would have
21
brought into light, this fact should not
necessarily deprive an accused to his right to a
new preliminary investigation. As above-stated,
the rule is that a new preliminary investigation
is needed if there is a substantial amendment.
The exception, i.e., charge is related or
included in the original information, should not
be applied automatically. The circumstances in
every case must be taken into consideration
before the accused is deprived of another
preliminary investigation.
The following indispensable elements must be
established to constitute a violation of Section
3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended:
1. The accused is a public officer discharging
administrative or official functions or private
persons charged in conspiracy with them;
2. The public officer committed the prohibited
act during the performance of his official duty in
relation to his public position;
3. The public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
4. His action caused undue injury to the
government or any private party, or gave any
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or
preference to such parties.
Although Petitioner already discussed the
circumstances surrounding the termination of
services of the private complainants in his
counter-affidavit, there is nothing therein that
would show that he had already touched the
issue of bad faith or manifest partiality
Although one allegation stemmed from the
other , the court aquo and the prosecutor

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

cannot say the element of evident bad faith,
manifest partiality or gross excusable
negligence
is the same in both. This being
an element of the offense charged, petitioner
should be given the opportunity to thoroughly
adduce evidence on the matter.

G.R. No. 158211

August 31, 2004
ERNESTO J. SAN AGUSTIN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent
Facts:
Luz Tan executed a notarized criminal
complaint and filed the same with the NBI
charging the petitioner, the Barangay Chairman
of Barangay La Huerta, Paraaque City, with
serious illegal detention alleging that the
petitioner detained her husband Vicente Tan,
on June 19, 2002, without lawful ground
therefor. The petitioner complied with the
subpoena and presented himself at the NBI
with the barangay logbook. However, the
petitioner was placed under arrest and
prevented from going back home. State
Prosecutor conducted an inquest investigation
on June 27, 2002 and came out with a
Resolution, on the same day, affirmed by the
Assistant Chief State Prosecutor, finding
probable cause against the petitioner for
serious illegal detention under Article 267 of the
RPC. An Information was filed before the RTC
of Paraaque City, charging the petitioner with
kidnapping/serious illegal detention with no bail
recommended. On July 1, 2002, the petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the
ground that he was illegally arrested and
subjected to an inquest investigation; hence, he
was deprived of his right to a preliminary
investigation. On July 24, 2002, the RTC
issued an Order directing the City Prosecutor to
conduct a reinvestigation within a nonextendible period of forty-five (45) days. CA
affirmed the RTC.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |8

Issue: Whether the inquest conducted was

valid.
Ruling:
Yes. The warrantless arrest or the
detention of petitioner in the instant case does
not fall within the provision of Section 5, Rule
113, Rules on Crim Pro. Consequently, the
inquest investigation conducted by the
State Prosecutor is void because under
Rule 112, Section 7 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal
Procedure,
an
inquest
investigation is proper only when the
suspect is lawfully arrested without a
warrant.
SC agreed with the Court of Appeals
that the absence of a preliminary investigation
does not affect the jurisdiction of the trial court
but merely the regularity of the proceedings. It
does not impair the validity of the Information or
otherwise render it defective. Neither is it a
ground to quash the Information or nullify the
order of arrest issued against him or justify the
release of the accused from detention.
However, the trial court should suspend
proceedings
and
order
a
preliminary
investigation considering that the inquest
investigation
conducted
by
the
State
Prosecutor is null and void.

Issue: The validity of the warrantless arrest

Ruling: The record shows that accusedappellants were arrested without any warrants
from the courts. Contrary to his claim, SPO2
Cernio did not have personal knowledge of
the commission of the crime so as to justify the
warrantless arrest of Renante Mendez.
Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without
warrant under Sec5(b) of Rule 113 of the Rules
of Criminal Procedure must be based upon
"probable cause," which means "an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion." The
grounds of suspicion are reasonable when it is
based on actual facts, i.e., when it is supported
by circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to create the probable cause of
guilt of the person to be arrested. The fact that
these irregularities were never raised before
arraignment, and were therefore considered
waived when accused-appellants entered their
pleas, does not justify the short cuts. These
procedural lapses clearly indicate that the
police had shut its mind off to the possibility
that other parties might have committed the
crime. Wherefore, the acquitted the
appellants.
A.M. No. MTJ-02-1441
July 31, 2002
SPOUSES TERRY and MERLYN GERKEN,
complainants,
vs.
JUDGE ANTONIO C. QUINTOS, Acting
Presiding Judge of the Fourth Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Bagac-Morong,
Bataan, respondent.
Facts:
This is a complaint filed against Judge Antonio
C. Quintos, Acting Presiding Judge of the
Fourth Municipal Circuit Trial Court of BagacMorong, Bataan, for gross ignorance of the law,
grave misconduct, and abuse of authority.
Complainants were accused of kidnapping. It
appears that on August 23, 2000, complainants
were arrested on the strength of a warrant
issued by respondent Judge Antonio C.

G.R. No. 147671

November 21, 2002
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiffappellee, VS RENANTE MENDEZ and BABY
CABAGTONG, accused-appellant.
1

Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of

the Regional Trial Court, Branch 22, Laoang,
Northern Samar, finding accused-appellants
Renante Mendez and Rene "Baby" Cabagtong
guilty of the crime of rape with homicide and
sentencing each of them to death and to
indemnify the heirs of victim Candy Dolim in the
amount of P100,000.00 as damages. RTC
convicted
accused-appellants.
Automatic
review was brought to the SC.

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

Quintos. The OCA therefore recommended that
the
administrative
complaint
against
respondent judge be re-docketed as a regular
administrative matter and that a fine of
P5,000.00 be imposed on him with a warning
that a repetition of the same or similar acts in
the future shall be dealt with more severely.
Issue: Whether the respondent judge validly
issued the warrant of arrest.
Ruling:
No. The SC finds the recommendation of the
OCA to be well taken. The respondent judge
abused his authority in hastily issuing a warrant
of arrest against the accused. Under Rule 112,
6(b), to justify the issuance of such warrant, a
municipal trial judge conducting the preliminary
investigation must ensure that two requisites
concur: (1) there is a finding of probable cause,
and (2) there is a necessity of placing the
respondent under immediate custody in order
not to frustrate the ends of justice. In Criminal
Case No. 2857, the records show that while
respondent judge examined in writing and
under oath the complainant therein and her
witness, no searching questions were asked
by him. As the OCA found, the questions
propounded were perfunctory as they related
only to the personal circumstances of the
complainant Yolanda Cutrer and her witness,
the name of her husband and the respondents
therein, and proof that the alleged kidnap
victim, Jed Cutrer, is the daughter of Yolanda
Cutrer. No evidence was presented to prove
the necessity to place herein complainants
under immediate custody in order not to
frustrate the ends of justice.
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO
ZUNO VS JUDGE ALEJANDRINO C.
CABEBE
Facts:
In
his
complaint,
Chief
State
Prosecutor Zuo alleged that Criminal Case
No. 3950-18 for illegal possession of prohibited

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Page |9

or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional

Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos Norte.
Upon arraignment, all the accused assisted by
their counsel pleaded not guilty for the crime
charged. The prosecution filed with this Court a
petition for change of venue but was denied.
The accused filed a motion for reconsideration.
In the meantime, the proceedings before
respondent's court were suspended.The
accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as
ground the right of the accused to a speedy
trial. Respondent judge motupropio issued an
Order5 granting bail to the accused, fixing the
bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property
bond at P120,000.00, except for accused
Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at
P20,000.00 in cash. Respondent judge issued
the Order without the accused's application or
motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for
reconsideration.6 Instead of acting thereon,
respondent judge issued an order inhibiting
himself from further proceeding with the case,
realizing that what he did was patently
irregular. Complainant thus prays that
respondent judge be dismissed from the
service with forfeiture of all benefits and be
disbarred from the practice of law.
Respondent denied the charges. He
said that what he did was premised on the
constitutional right of the accused to a speedy
trial. He also asserted that there was delay in
the proceedings due to the complainants
frequent absences. The prosecution did not
object to the grant of the bail so he thought it
was okay and that he cannot be
administratively liable for it. Shortly thereafter,
the respondent judge compulsorily retired.
Issue:
WON the judge is guilty of violation of Rule 114
of Rules on Criminal Procedure on the grant of
bail?
Held:
YES. He is guilty of such.

Under the present Rules, a hearing is

mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter
of right or discretion.It must be stressed that
the grant or the denial of bail in cases where
bail is a matter of discretion, hinges on the
issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of
the accused is strong, and the determination of
whether or not the evidence is strong is a
matter of judicial discretion which remains with
the judge. In order for the latter to properly
exercise his discretion, he must first conduct a
hearing to determine whether the evidence of
guilt is strong. In fact, even in cases where
there is no petition for bail, a hearing should
still be held.
There is no question that respondent
judge granted bail to the accused without
conducting a hearing, in violation of Sections 8
and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure, quoted as follows:
"Sec. 8.Burden of proof in bail
application. At the hearing of an
application for bail filed by a person
who is in custody for the commission of
an offense punishable by death,
reclusion
perpetua,
or
life
imprisonment, the prosecution has the
burden of showing that evidence of
guilt is strong. The evidence presented
during the bail hearing shall be
considered automatically reproduced at
the trial but, upon motion of either
party, the court may recall any witness
for additional examination unless the
latter is dead, outside the Philippines,
or otherwise unable to testify."
"Sec. 18.Notice of application to
prosecutor. In the application for bail
under section 8 of this Rule, the court
must give reasonable notice of the
hearing to the prosecutor or require
him to submit his recommendation.
(18a)"

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the
following rules outlining the duties of the judge
in case an application for bail is filed:
1. In all cases whether bail is a matter
of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the
application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion,
conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the
prosecution
refuses
to
present
evidence to show that the guilt of the
accused is strong for the purpose of
enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
3. Decide whether the guilt of the
accused is strong based on the
summary
of
evidence
of
the
prosecution;
4. If the guilt of the accused is not
strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19,
id.); otherwise the petition should be
denied.
Respondent judge did not follow the
above Rules and procedure enumerated in
Cortes. He did not conduct a hearing before he
granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the
prosecution of an opportunity to interpose
objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of
his opinion on the strength or weakness of
evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he
should have conducted a hearing and
thereafter made a summary of the evidence of
the prosecution. The importance of a bail
hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be
downplayed, these are considered aspects of
procedural due process for both the
prosecution and the defense; its absence will
invalidate the grant or denial of bail.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
In Santos vs. Ofilada, we held that the
failure to raise or the absence of an objection
on the part of the prosecution in an application
for bail does not dispense with the requirement
of a bail hearing.
Respondent judge cannot seek refuge
on the alleged absence of objection on the part
of the prosecution to the grant of bail to the
accused.
JOEL P. LIBUIT VS PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES
Facts:
The private complainant, Domingo
delMundo, brought his car for repair at the
PaengMotorworks operated by the petitioner.
The car was received by Jose Bautista, a
mechanic, in the presence of the petitioner who
assured the private complainant that it would
be safe in his motor shop.
When private complainant delMundo
returned to the motor shop in January 1994, he
saw his car by the roadside while the engine
was inside the shop. Bautista explained that
the engine was pulled out because it also
needed repairs. Nevertheless, the petitioner
and Bautista assured him that they would finish
the repair work and deliver the car to
delMundos house after two weeks. However,
the petitioner failed to deliver the car to the
owner. Private complainant gave him another
two weeks to finish the repairs. Thereafter, the
private complainant returned to the motor shop
and found that his car was already missing. He
reported the matter to the police, who
discovered that the petitioner had sold the cars
differential and cylinder head, while the engine
could no longer be found.
The petitioner (Libuit) testified on direct
examination. However, his defense counsel,
Atty. Glenn P. Mendoza of De Jesus Linatoc
and Associates, withdrew from the case after
his initial cross-examination. On motion of the
petitioner, the continuation of his cross-

P a g e | 10
examination was reset to give him time to
engage the services of another counsel. The
petitioner eventually secured the services of
Atty. Jose Dimayuga.
At the subsequent hearings on October
13, 1997, and November 26, 1997, Atty.
Dimayuga failed to appear despite notices. On
motion of the prosecution, the trial court issued
an Order dated November 26, 1997, striking
from the records the petitioners direct
testimony and declaring the case submitted for
decision on the basis of the evidence already
on record.
After further proceedings, the trial court
rendered judgment on January 27, 1999,
finding herein petitioner guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of estafa.
The CA affirmed in toto the decision of
the trial court.
Issue:
WON the petitioner was deprived of his
constitutional right to counsel.
Held:
NO.
The duty of the court to appoint a
counsel de oficio for the accused who has no
counsel of choice and desires to employ the
services of one is mandatory only at the time of
arraignment. No such duty exists where the
accused has proceeded to arraignment and
then trial with a counsel of his own choice.
Worth noting, when the time for the
presentation of evidence for the defense
arrived, and the defendant appeared by himself
alone, the absence of his counsel was
inexcusable.
In the present case, since the petitioner
was represented by counsel de parte at the
arraignment and trial, the trial court could not
be deemed duty-bound to appoint a counsel de
oficio for the continuation of his crossexamination. Indeed, after his initial crossexamination, the trial court granted the
petitioners motion to postpone, giving him

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

sufficient time to engage the services of
another counsel. The failure of Atty. Jose
Dimayuga, his newly hired lawyer, to appear at
the subsequent hearings without reason was
sufficient legal basis for the trial court to order
the striking from the records of his direct
testimony, and thereafter render judgment
upon the evidence already presented. In fact,
the repeated failure to appear of defendants
counsel at the trial may even be taken as a
deliberate attempt to delay the courts
proceedings.
At the most, the appointment of a
counsel de oficio in a situation like the present
case would be discretionary with the trial court,
which discretion will not be interfered with in
the absence of grave abuse. This Court is
convinced that the trial court had been liberal in
granting postponements asked by the petitioner
himself. We think that such liberality removes
any doubt that its order was tainted with grave
abuse of discretion.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES VS ELIZAR
TOMAQUIN
Facts:
Appellant was charged with the crime
of murder for the instantaneous death of
JaquelynLuchavezTatoy. On arraignment he
pleaded
not
guilty.
There
were
no
eyewitnesses to the incident and the
prosecutions evidence aside from the
appellants extrajudicial confession, was mainly
circumstantial. Appellant was investigated and
after being apprised of his rights, he told SPO2
Monilar that he wants Atty. Parawan, their
barangay chairman to assist him. Appellants
extrajudicial confession was taken down
completely in the Cebuano dialect.
On the witness stand, appellant
repudiated his extrajudicial confession, saying
Atty. Parawan merely asked him to sign a blank
sheet of paper and in exchange. AttyParawan
promised to assist him with his expenses.

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
After trial, RTC of Cebu City, Branch
18, rendered a decision convicting appellant of
the crime of Murder.
Issue:
WON a barangay captain who is a lawyer can
be considered an independent counsel within
the purview of Sec. 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.
Held:
NO.
Appellants extrajudicial confession
was taken and transcribed entirely in Cebuano
dialect and should not be admitted by the trial
court as evidence for the prosecution as
provided in Rule 132, Sec. 33 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence.
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an
unofficial
language.-Documents
written in an unofficial language shall
not be admitted as evidence, unless
accompanied with a translation into
English
or
Filipino.
To
avoid
interruption of proceedings, parties or
their attorneys are directed to have
such translation prepared before trial.
Section 12, Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
(1)
Any
person
under
investigation
for
the
commission of an offense shall
have the right to be informed of
his right to remain silent and to
have
competent
and
independent
counsel
preferably of his own choice. If
the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These
rights cannot be waived except
in writing and in the presence
of counsel.
As
heretofore
stated,
Atty.
FortunatoParawan, at that time, was the
barangay captain of Barangay Lorega, Cebu

P a g e | 11
City. Under the 1991 Local Government Code,
a barangay captain performs the following
duties and functions:
(a) The punong barangay, as the chief
executive of the barangay government,
shall exercise such powers and
perform such duties and functions, as
provided by this Code and other laws.
(b) For efficient, effective and
economical governance, the purpose of
which is the general welfare of the
barangay and its inhabitants pursuant
to Section 16 of this Code, the punong
barangay shall:
(1) Enforce all laws and
ordinances which are applicable within
the barangay;

(3) Maintain public order in the

barangay and, in pursuance
thereof, assist the city or
municipal mayor and the
sanggunian members in the
performance of their duties and
functions;
Simply put, Atty. Parawan, as barangay
captain, is called upon to enforce the law and
ordinances in his barangay and ensure peace
and order at all times.
In fact, as barangay captain, Atty.
Parawan is deemed a person in authority under
Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code.
On these bases, it is not legally
possible to consider Atty. Parawan as an
independent counsel of appellant.
In People vs. Culala, the Court
reiterated the rule that a municipal attorney
cannot be an independent counsel because as
a legal officer of the municipality, he provides
legal assistance and support to the mayor and
the municipality in carrying out the delivery of
basic services to the people, including the
maintenance of peace and order, and it was
seriously doubted whether he can effectively

REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW

undertake the defense of the accused without
running into conflict of interests. Thus, the
Court held that he is no better than a fiscal or a
prosecutor who cannot represent the accused
during custodial investigations.
This is reiterated in People vs. Taliman,
and People vs. Velarde,where we further ruled
that a municipal mayor cannot likewise be an
independent counsel as required by the
Constitution.
Neither does Atty. Parawan qualify as a
competent counsel, i.e., an effective and
vigilant counsel. An "effective and vigilant
counsel" necessarily and logically requires that
the lawyer be present and able to advise and
assist his client from the time the confessant
answers the first question asked by the
investigating officer until the signing of the
extrajudicial confession. As held in People vs.
Velarde:
. . . The competent and
independent lawyer so engaged should
be present at all stages of the
interview, counseling or advising
caution reasonably at every turn of the
investigation,
and
stopping
the
interrogation once in a while either to
give advice to the accused that he may
either continue, choose to remain silent
or terminate the interview.
Moreover, the lawyer should ascertain
that the confession is made voluntarily and that
the
person
under
investigation
fully
understands the nature and the consequence
of his extrajudicial confession in relation to his
constitutional rights. A contrary rule would
undoubtedly
be
antagonistic
to
the
constitutional rights to remain silent, to counsel
and to be presumed innocent.
That appellant chose Atty. Parawan
does not estop appellant from complaining
about the latters failure to safeguard his rights.
Clearly, Atty. Parawan failed to meet
the exacting standards of an independent and

CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
competent counsel as required by the
Constitution. Thus, the extrajudicial confession
executed by appellant, even if gospel truth, is
deemed an uncounselled confession and
therefore, inadmissible in evidence.
In this regard, it may not be amiss to
repeat the declaration of the Court in People
vs. Deniega, stressing the role of the courts in
ascertaining that extrajudicial confessions meet
the exacting standards of the Constitution:
Every so often, courts are
confronted with the difficult task of
taking a hard look into the sufficiency of
extra-judicial confessions extracted by
law enforcement authorities as the sole
basis
for
convicting
accused
individuals. In cases of crimes notable
for their brutality and ruthlessness, the
impulse to find the culprits at any cost
occasionally tempts these agencies to
take
shortcuts
and
disregard
constitutional and legal safeguards
intended to bring about a reasonable
assurance that only the guilty are
punished. Our courts, in the process of
establishing guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, play a central role in bringing
about this assurance by determining
whether or not the evidence gathered
by
law
enforcement
agencies
scrupulously meets exacting standards
fixed by the Constitution. If the
standards are not met, the Constitution
provides the corresponding remedy by
providing a strict exclusionary rule, i.e.,
that "[a]ny confession or admission
obtained in violation of (Article III,
Section 12(1) . . . hereof shall be
inadmissible in evidence."
Appellant is acquitted.

P a g e | 12