Balogbog v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No.

83598, 7 March 1997)

FACTS:Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and
accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to
the Court of Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.
Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their
older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as
such they were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso claimed they are not aware that their
brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite
how Gaudioso himself admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the son of his elder brother
Gavino.
In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they presented Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of
Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three
children. Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr. Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.
On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias. She obtained a certificate from the local Civil
Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal
Treasurer Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.
Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil
Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of the alleged marriage was celebrated.
ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.
HELD:Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle
Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents estate.
Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not mean that marriage did not take place. Other
evidence may be presented where in this case evidence consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino
and Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that they are recognized by Gavinos family and
by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino.

Articles 2-6
Cosca v. Palaypayon (237 SCRA 249)
FACTS:Complainants (Juvy Cosca et al.,) are employees of the Municipal Trial Court of Tinambac, Camarines Sur. Respondent Judge Lucio P.
Palaypayon Jr., is the Presiding Judge of the same Court while Nelia Esmeralda-Baroy is the Clerk of Court. An administrative complaint was field with
the Office of the Court Administrator charging respondents , among others, illegal solemnization of marriage. Complainants alleged that respondent
Judge solemnized 6 marriages even without the requisite marriage license. As a consequence, their marriage contracts did not reflect any marriage
license number. The respondent Judge did not sign their marriage contracts and did not indicate the date of solemnization, the reason being that he
allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which was usually several days after the ceremony. Indubitably, the marriage
contracts were not filed with the local civil registrar.
ISSUE:Whether or not the action of respondent Judge proper.
HELD:The Family Code pertinently proves that the formal requisites of marriage are, inter alia, a valid marriage license except in the cases provided for
therein. Complementarily, it declares that the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall generally render the marriage void ab initio and
that , while an irregularity in the formal requisites shall not affect the validity of the marriage, the party or parties responsible for the irregularity shall be
civilly , criminally and administratively liable.
The civil aspect is addressed to the contracting parties and those affected by the illegal marriage, and what we are providing for herein pertains to the
administrative liability of respondents, all without prejudice to their criminal responsible. The Revised Penal Code provides that priests or ministers of
any religious denomination or sect, or civil authorities who shall perform or authorize any illegal marriage ceremony shall be punished in accordance with
the provisions of the Marriage Law. This is of course, within the province of the prosecutorial agencies of the Government.

Enriquez v. Velez (185 SCRA 45)

FACTS; Vitaliana Vargas brothers and sisters unaware of the formers death on August 28, 1988 filed a petition for Habeas Corpus on September 27,
1988 before the RTC of Misamis Oriental alleging that she was forcible taken from her residence sometime in 1987 and was confined by the herein
petitioner, Tomas Eugenio in his palacial residence in Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. The court then issued a writ of habeas corpus but petitioner refused to
surrender the Vitalianas body to the sheriff on the ground that a corpse cannot be subjected to habeas corpus proceedings. Vitaliana, 25 year old
single, died of heart failure due to toxemia of pregnancy in Eugenios residence. The court ordered that the body should be delivered to a funeral parlor
for autopsy but Eugenio assailed the lack of jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner can claim custody of the deceased.
HELD;The court held that the custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to the surviving brothers and sisters pursuant to Section 1103
of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
Persons charged with duty of burial- if the deceased was an unmarried man or woman or a child and left any kin; the duty of the burial shall devolve
upon the nearest kin of the deceased.
Albeit, petitioner claims he is the spouse as contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, Philippine law does not recognize common law marriages
where a man and a woman not legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to the public as husband
and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law
jurisdictions. In addition, it requires that the man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. Whereas, the
petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, legal impediment that disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana.
Wassmer v. Velez (12 SCRA 648)

FACTS:Francisco Velez and Beatriz, following their promise to love, decided to get married. Two days before their marriage Francisco wrote Beatriz telling her that
their marriage had to be postponed as his mother opposes it. A day before his marriage he sent a telegram informing her nothing changed rest assured returning soon.
Francisco was never heard from again. Beatriz sued for damages for breach of promise to marry.
ISSUE:Is breach of promise to marry an actionable wrong?
HELD:The extent to which acts not contrary to law may be perpetrated with impunity, is not limitless for Article 21 of the Civil Code provides that any person who
willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the damages.
This is not a case of mere breach to marry. As stated, mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparation and publicity, only to walk out of it when the matrimony is about to be solemnized, is quite different. This is palpably and unjustifiably contrary to good
customs for which defendant must be held answerable in damages in accordance with Article 21 of the Civil Code.
When a breach to marry is actionable under Article 21 of the Civil Code, moral damages may be awarded under Article 2219(10) of the said Code. Exemplary damages
may also be awarded under Article 2232 of said Code where it is proven that the defendant clearly acted in a wanton, reckless and oppressive manner.

Alcantara v. Alcantara (G.R. No. 167746, August 28, 2007)

FACTS; Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he and Rosita, without securing the required
marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of looking for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev.
Navarro. They got married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo, Manila, on 26 March 1983. The
marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing
on the marriage contract, is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a license with the local
civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives. Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued
declaring their marriage void and ordering the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file.
Rosita however
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced by a certification from the Office of the Civil
Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade
prosecution for concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its involvement and participation in every marriage, in the
maintenance of which the general public is interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this
case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by
the local civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified the parties to whom the marriage license
was issued

Articles 7-10
Navarro v. Domagtoy (A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088, 19 July 1996)

FACTS:Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro filed a complaint on two specific acts committed by respondent Municipal
Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy on the grounds of gross misconduct, ineffiency in offce and ignorance of the law.
It was alleged that Domagtoy solemnized marriage of Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borja on September 27, 1994 despite the knowledge that the groom
has a subsisting marriage with Ida Penaranda and that they are merely separated. It was told that Ida left their conjugal home in Bukidnon and has not
returned and been heard for almost seven years. The said judge likewise solemnize marriage of Floriano Dadoy Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. The judge holds his office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta MonicaBurgos, Surigao del Norte but he solemnized the said wedding at his residence in the municipality of Dapa located 40 to 50 km away.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriages solemnized were void.
HELD:The court held that the marriage between Tagadan and Borja was void and bigamous there being a subsisting marriage between Tagadan and
Penaranda. Albeit, the latter was gone for seven years and the spouse had a well-founded belief that the absent spouse was dead, Tagadan did not
institute a summary proceeding as provided in the Civil Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the effect of
reappearance of the absent spouse.
With regard to the marriage of Sumaylo and Del Rosario, the latter only made the written request where it should have been both parties as stated in
Article 8 of the Family Code. Their non-compliance did not invalidate their marriage however, Domagtoy may be held administratively liable.
Aranas v. Judge Occiano (A.M. No. MTJ-02-1309, 11 April 2002)
FACTS:Petitioner Mercedita Mata Aranes charged respondent Judge Occiano with gross ignorance of the law. Occiano is the presiding judge in Court
of Balatan, Camarines Sur. However, he solemnized the marriage of Aranes and Dominador Orobia on February 17, 2000 at the couples residence in
Nabua, Camarines Sur which is outside his territorial jurisdiction and without the requisite of marriage license.
Before Judge Occiano started the ceremony, he carefully examined the documents and first refused to conduct the marriage and advised them to reset
the date considering the absence of the marriage license. However, due to the earnest pleas of the parties, the influx of visitors and fear that the
postponement of the wedding might aggravate the physical condition of Orobia who just suffered from stroke, he solemnized the marriage on the
assurance of the couple that they will provide the license that same afternoon. Occiano denies that he told the couple that their marriage is valid.
ISSUE: Whether Judge Occiano is guilty of solemnizing a marriage without a duly issued marriage license and conducting it outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
HELD:The court held that the territorial jurisdiction of respondent judge is limited to the municipality of Balatan, Camarines Sur. His act of solemnizing
the marriage of petitioner and Orobia in Nabua, Camarines Sur therefore is contrary to law and subjects him to administrative liability. His act may not
amount to gross ignorance of the law for he allegedly solemnized the marriage out of human compassion but nonetheless, he cannot avoid liability for
violating the law on marriage.

Article 22
Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425)
FACTS:Private respondent Tan Put alleged that she is the widow of Tee Hoon Lim Po Chuan, who was a partner and practically the owner who has
controlling interest of Glory Commercial Company and a Chinese Citizen until his death. Defendant Antonio Lim Tanhu and Alfonso Leonardo Ng Sua
were partners in name but they were mere employees of Po Chuan and were naturalized Filipino Citizens. Tan Put filed complaint against spousespetitoner Lim Tanhu and Dy Ochay including their son Tech Chuan and the other spouses-petitoner Ng Sua and Co Oyo including also their son Eng
Chong Leonardo, that through fraud and machination took actual and active management of the partnership and that she alleged entitlement to share
not only in the capital and profits of the partnership but also in the other assets, both real and personal, acquired by the partnership with funds of the
latter during its lifetime."
Defendants interpose that Tan Put knew and was are that she was merely the common-law wife of Tee Hoon. Tan Put and Tee Hoon were childless but
the former had a foster child, Antonio Nunez.
ISSUE: Whether Tan Put, as she alleged being married with Tee Hoon, can claim from the company of the latters share.
HELD:Under Article 55 of the Civil Code, the declaration of the contracting parties that they take each other as husband and wife "shall be set forth in
an instrument" signed by the parties as well as by their witnesses and the person solemnizing the marriage. Accordingly, the primary evidence of a
marriage must be an authentic copy of the marriage contract. While a marriage may also be proved by other competent evidence, the absence of the
contract must first be satisfactorily explained. Surely, the certification of the person who allegedly solemnized a marriage is not admissible evidence of
such marriage unless proof of loss of the contract or of any other satisfactory reason for its non-production is first presented to the court. In the case at
bar, the purported certification issued by a Mons. Jose M. Recoleto, Bishop, Philippine Independent Church, Cebu City, is not, therefore, competent
evidence, there being absolutely no showing as to unavailability of the marriage contract and, indeed, as to the authenticity of the signature of said
certifier, the jurat allegedly signed by a second assistant provincial fiscal not being authorized by law, since it is not part of the functions of his office.
Besides, inasmuch as the bishop did not testify, the same is hearsay.
Vda. De Chua v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 116835, 5 March 1998)

FACTS:Roberto Lim Chua, during his lifetime, lived out of wedlock with private respondent Florita A. Vallejo from 1970-1981. The couple had two
illegitimate children, Roberto Rafson Alonzo and Rudyard Pride Alonzo, all surnamed Chua. Roberto died intestate in Davao City on May 28, 1992.
Vallejo filed on July 2, 1992 with RTC-Cotabato a petition for declaration of guardianship of the two child and their properties worth P5,000,000.00.
Antonietta Garcia Vda De Chua, the petitioner, filed a motion alleging that she was the true wife of Roberto. However, according to Vallejo, she is not
the surviving spouse of the latter but a pretender to the estate since the deceased never contracted marriage with any woman and died a bachelor.
ISSUE: Whether petitioner is indeed the true wife of Roberto Chua.
HELD:The court ruled that petitioner was not able to prove her status as wife of the decedent. She could not produce the original copy or authenticated
copy of their marriage certificate. Furthermore, a certification from the Local Civil Registrar was presented that no such marriage contract between
petitioner and Roberto Chua was ever registered with them, attested by Judge Augusto Banzali, the alleged person to have solemnized the alleged
marriage, that he has not solemnized such alleged marriage.
Article 25
Republic v. Court of Appeals and Castro (G.R. No. 103047, 12 September 1994)
FACTS:Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did not immediately live together and it was
only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter,
they parted ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.
The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in order her marital status before leaving for US.
She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the
celebration of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.
ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to establish that no marriage license was issued to
the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.
HELD:The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied by any circumstances of suspicion
sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by
any other witnesses is not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore, Cardenas was duly served
with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Article 26
(Correlate with Articles 15-18, Civil Code)
Garcia v. Recio (G.R. No. 138322, 2 October 2002)
FACTS:Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian Citizen, in Malabon, Rizal on March 1, 1987. They lived as husband
and wife in Australia. However, an Australian family court issued purportedly a decree of divorce, dissolving the marriage of Rederick and Editha on May
18, 1989.
On January 12, 1994, Rederick married Grace J. Garcia where it was solemnized at Our lady of Perpetual Help Church, Cabanatuan City. Since
October 22, 1995, the couple lived separately without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. As a matter of fact, while they were still in Australia, their
conjugal assets were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in Australia.
Grace filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy on March 3, 1998, claiming that she learned only in November
1997, Redericks marriage with Editha Samson.
ISSUE: Whether the decree of divorce submitted by Rederick Recio is admissible as evidence to prove his legal capacity to marry petitioner and
absolved him of bigamy.

HELD:The nullity of Redericks marriage with Editha as shown by the divorce decree issued was valid and recognized in the Philippines since the
respondent is a naturalized Australian. However, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondents legal capacity to marry petitioner though the
former presented a divorce decree. The said decree, being a foreign document was inadmissible to court as evidence primarily because it was not
authenticated by the consul/ embassy of the country where it will be used.
Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera (174 SCRA 653)

FACTS:Imelda M. Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, was married with private respondent, Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler, Federal Republic of Germany. They have a child who was born on April 20, 1980 and named Isabella
Pilapil Geiling. Conjugal disharmony eventuated in private respondent and he initiated a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January 1983. The petitioner then filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of property before the RTC
Manila on January 23, 1983.
The decree of divorce was promulgated on January 15, 1986 on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody of the child was granted
to the petitioner.
On June 27, 1986, private respondent filed 2 complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that while still married to Imelda, latter had
an affair with William Chia as early as 1982 and another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983.
ISSUE: Whether private respondent can prosecute petitioner on the ground of adultery even though they are no longer husband and wife as decree of
divorce was already issued.
HELD:The law specifically provided that in prosecution for adultery and concubinage, the person who can legally file the complaint should be the
offended spouse and nobody else. Though in this case, it appeared that private respondent is the offended spouse, the latter obtained a valid divorce in
his country, the Federal Republic of Germany, and said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in so far as he is concerned.
Thus, under the same consideration and rationale, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner and has no legal standing to commence the
adultery case under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
Van Dorn v. Romillo (139 SCRA 139)
FACTS:Alice Reyes Van Dorn, a Filipino Citizen and private respondent, Richard Upton, a US citizen, was married in Hong Kong in 1979. They
established their residence in the Philippines and had 2 children. They were divorced in Nevada, USA in 1982 and petitioner remarried, this time with
Theodore Van Dorn. A suit against petitioner was filed on June 8, 1983, stating that petitioners business in Ermita Manila, the Galleon Shop, is a
conjugal property with Upton and prayed therein that Alice be ordered to render an accounting of the business and he be declared as the administrator
of the said property.
ISSUE: Whether or not the foreign divorce between the petitioner and private respondent in Nevada is binding in the Philippines where petitioner is a
Filipino citizen.
HELD:Private respondent is no longer the husband of the petitioner. He would have no standing to sue petitioner to exercise control over conjugal
assets. He is estopped by his own representation before the court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. Furthermore, aliens may
obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. Petitioner is not bound to
her marital obligations to respondent by virtue of her nationality laws. She should not be discriminated against her own country if the end of justice is to
be served.
Cang v. Court of Appeals (296 SCRA 128)
Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for
legal separation with alimony pendente lite which was approved. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He
was issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of visitation at all reasonable times and places to
petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of the three minor Cang children. The
trial court granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives consent to the adoption of their children. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption necessary.
Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid reason. No such reason was established in the legal
separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this
case precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The petition for adoption must be denied as it
was filed without the required consent of their father who, by law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.
Tenchavez v. Escano (122 Phil. 752)
FACTS:27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor
Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of
the couple and was duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and go-between who had an amorous
relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew
their vows/ marriage in a church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he disagreed for a new
marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back to work in Manila.
Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the United States and filed a complaint for divorce
against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her
marriage to the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten children. She acquired citizenship
on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.
ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the Philippines.
HELD:Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on foreign decrees of absolute divorce between
Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce
in foreign countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the legal separation prayed by
Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not
entitled to recognition neither is the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an invalid divorce
decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

Republic v. Orbecido (G.R. No. 154380, 5 October 2005)

FACTS:Cipriano Orbecido III was married with Lady Myros Villanueva on May 24, 1981 at the United Church of Christ in the Philippines in Ozamis City.
They had a son and a daughter named Kristoffer and Kimberly, respectively. In 1986, the wife left for US bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few years
later, Orbecido discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen and learned from his son that his wife sometime in 2000 had
obtained a divorce decree and married a certain Stanley. He thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether or not Orbecido can remarry under Article 26 of the Family Code.
HELD:The court ruled that taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, Article 26 Par.2 should be interpreted to include
cases involving parties who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner at the time
of the solemnization of the marriage.
Hence, the courts unanimous decision in holding Article 26 Par 2 be interpreted as allowing a Filipino citizen who has been divorced by a spouse who
had acquired a citizenship and remarried, also to remarry under Philippine law.
Marriages Exempt from the License Requirement
Articles 27-34
Ninal v. Bayadog (328 SCRA 122)
FACTS: Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners.
Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and
8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for
at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a
petition for declaration of nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUES:Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
HELD:The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they instituted an affidavit
and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma,
only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with
each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law.
Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Manzano v. Sanchez (A.M. No. MTJ-00-1329, 8 March 2001)
FACTS:Herminia Borja-Manzano was the lawful wife of the late David Manzano having been married on May 21, 1966 in San Gabriel
Archangel Parish in Caloocan. They had four children. On March 22, 1993, her husband contracted another marriage with Luzviminda
Payao before respondent Judge. The marriage contract clearly stated that both contracting parties were separated thus,
respondent Judge ought to know that the marriage was void and bigamous. He claims that when he officiated the marriage of David
and Payao, he knew that the two had been living together as husband and wife for seven years as manifested in their joint affidavit
that they both left their families and had never cohabit or communicated with their spouses due to constant quarrels.

ISSUE: Whether the solemnization of a marriage between two contracting parties who both have an existing marriage can contract
marriage if they have been cohabitating for 5 years under Article 34 of Family Code.
HELD:Among the requisites of Article 34 is that parties must have no legal impediment to marry each other. Considering that both
parties has a subsisting marriage, as indicated in their marriage contract that they are both separated is an impediment that would
make their subsequent marriage null and void. Just like separation, free and voluntary cohabitation with another person for at least 5
years does not severe the tie of a subsisting previous marriage. Clearly, respondent Judge Sanchez demonstrated gross ignorance of
the law when he solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.

Cosca v. Palaypayon (237 SCRA 249)

FACTS:The following are the complainants: Juvy N. Cosca (Stenographer 1), Edmundo B. Peralta (Interpreter 1), Ramon C. Sambo (Clerk II) and Apollo
Villamora (Process Server). Respondents are Judge Lucio Palaypayon Jr., the presiding judge, and Nelia B. Esmeralda-Baroy, clerk of court II. All work
in MTC-Tinambac, Camarines Sur.
Complainants alleged that Palaypayon solemnized marriages even without the requisite of a marriage license. As a consequence, the marriage
contracts of the following couples did not reflect any marriage license number. In addition, Palaypayon did not sign the marriage contracts and did not
indicate the date of solemnization reasoning out that he allegedly had to wait for the marriage license to be submitted by the parties which happens
usually several days after the marriage ceremony.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage solemnized by Judge Palaypayon were valid.
HELD: Bocaya & Besmontes marriage was solemnized without a marriage license along with the other couples. The testimonies of Bocay and
Pompeo Ariola including the photographs taken showed that it was really Judge Palaypayon who solemnized their marriage. Bocaya declared that they
were advised by judge to return after 10 days after the solemnization and bring with them their marriage license. They already started living together as
husband and wife even without the formal requisite. With respect to the photographs, judge explained that it was a simulated solemnization of marriage
and not a real one. However, considering that there were pictures from the start of the wedding ceremony up to the signing of the marriage certificates
in front of him. The court held that it is hard to believe that it was simulated.

Mariategui v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 57062, 24 January 1992)

FACTS:Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 and contracted 3 marriages during his lifetime. He acquired the Muntinlupa Estate while

he was still a bachelor. He had 4 children with his first wife Eusebia Montellano, who died in 1904 namely Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbano and
Ireneo. Baldomera had 7 children namely Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo on the other
hand had a son named Ruperto. On the other hand, Lupos second wife is Flaviana Montellano where they had a daughter named Cresenciana. Lupo
got married for the third time in 1930 with Felipa Velasco and had 3 children namely Jacinto, Julian and Paulina. Jacinto testified that his parents got
married before a Justice of the Peace of Taguig Rizal. The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known in the community to be
such.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage of Lupo with Felipa is valid in the absence of a marriage license.
HELD:Although no marriage certificate was introduced to prove Lupo and Felipas marriage, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts.
Moreover, the mere fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all requisites for its validity are present.
Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman,
deporting themselves as husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in lawful wedlock, there being no divorce,
absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
Republic v. Dayot (G.R. No. 175581, March 28, 2008)
FACTS: Jose and Felisa Dayot were married at the Pasay City Hall on November 24, 1986. In lieu of a marriage license, they executed a sworn
affidavit that they had lived together for at least 5years. On August 1990, Jose contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual. They were both
employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. Felisa then filed on June 1993 an action for bigamy against Jose and an administrative
complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman. On the other hand, Jose filed a complaint on July 1993 for annulment and/or declaration of nullity of
marriage where he contended that his marriage with Felisa was a sham and his consent was secured through fraud.
ISSUE: Whether or not Joses marriage with Felisa is valid considering that they executed a sworn affidavit in lieu of the marriage license requirement.
HELD; CA indubitably established that Jose and Felisa have not lived together for five years at the time they executed their sworn affidavit and
contracted marriage. Jose and Felisa started living together only in June 1986, or barely five months before the celebration of their marriage on
November 1986. Findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are binding in the Supreme Court.
The solemnization of a marriage without prior license is a clear violation of the law and invalidates a marriage. Furthermore, the falsity of the allegation
in the sworn affidavit relating to the period of Jose and Felisas cohabitation, which would have qualified their marriage as an exception to the
requirement for a marriage license, cannot be a mere irregularity, for it refers to a quintessential fact that the law precisely required to be deposed and
attested to by the parties under oath. Hence, Jose and Felisas marriage is void ab initio. The court also ruled that an action for nullity of marriage is
imprescriptible. The right to impugn marriage does not prescribe and may be raised any time.

Void and Voidable Marriages (Articles 35-54)

Article 34
Domingo v. Court of Appeals (226 SCRA 572)
FACTS:Soledad Domingo, married with Roberto Domingo in 1976, filed a petition for the declaration of nullity of marriage and separation of property.
She did not know that Domingo had been previously married to Emerlinda dela Paz in 1969. She came to know the previous marriage when the latter
filed a suit of bigamy against her. Furthermore, when she came home from Saudi during her one-month leave from work, she discovered that Roberto
cohabited with another woman and had been disposing some of her properties which is administered by Roberto. The latter claims that because their
marriage was void ab initio, the declaration of such voidance is unnecessary and superfluous. On the other hand, Soledad insists the declaration of the
nullity of marriage not for the purpose of remarriage, but in order to provide a basis for the separation and distribution of properties acquired during the
marriage.
ISSUE: Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration should only be filed for purposes of remarriage.
HELD:The declaration of the nullity of marriage is indeed required for purposed of remarriage. However, it is also necessary for the protection of the
subsequent spouse who believed in good faith that his or her partner was not lawfully married marries the same. With this, the said person is freed from
being charged with bigamy.
When a marriage is declared void ab initio, law states that final judgment shall provide for the liquidation, partition and distribution of the properties of the
spouses, the custody and support of the common children and the delivery of their presumptive legitimes, unless such matters had been adjudicated in
previous judicial proceedings. Soledads prayer for separation of property will simply be the necessary consequence of the judicial declaration of
absolute nullity of their marriage. Hence, the petitioners suggestion that for their properties be separated, an ordinary civil action has to be instituted for
that purpose is baseless. The Family Code has clearly provided the effects of the declaration of nullity of marriage, one of which is the separation of
property according to the regime of property relations governing them.
Ninal v. Bayadog (328 SCRA 122)
FACTS:Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely Babyline, Ingrid and
Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the
guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later, Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license.
They instituted an affidavit stating that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license.
Pepito died in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of nullity of the
marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage license.
ISSUE: Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
HELD:The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted even though they
instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the time of Pepitos first marriage was
dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20 months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in

fact, and thereafter both Pepito and Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains
that their five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to Norma is still void.
Article 36
Republic v. Molina (G.R. No. 108763, 13 February 1997)
FACTS:The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of
psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband
and a father preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid and assistance and was never
honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit
her work and went to live with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since then he abandoned
them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological incapacity is not mere showing of
irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential
marital responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the marriage did not manifest such characteristics
that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity. The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along
with each other and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In addition, the expert testimony by Dr
Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.
Louel Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, 4 January 1995)
FACTS:Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before a municipal trial court followed shortly
thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named
as Leouel Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her departure, she called her husband and
promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July 1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a
training program under AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personal disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.
Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation. Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always
provide all the specific answers to every individual problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.
Republic v. Quintero-Hamano (G.R. No. 149498, 20 May 2004)
FACTS:Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio Hamano, a Japanese
national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the
Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November
16, 1987.
In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio returned to Japan and promised
to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving
financial support. She wrote him several times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the
country but did not bother to see her nor their child.
Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved. Consequently, in 1996, Lolita
filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by publication. The motion was granted and the summons,
accompanied by a copy of the petition, was published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer.
Toshio filed to respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the prosecutor for
investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous social institution and
marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due to some kind of
psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it would have greatly helped Lolita had she
presented evidence that medically or clinically identified Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is
essential that a person show incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio
was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
Choa v. Choa (H.R. No. 1473376, 26 November 2002)
FACTS:Leni Choa and Alfonso Choa got married in 1981. They have 2 children namely Cheryl Lynne and Albryan. In 1993, Alfonso filed an annulment
of his marriage to Leni. Afterwards, he filed an amended complaint for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on psychological incapacity. The
case went to trial and the trial court further held that Alfonso presented quantum evidence that Leni needs to controvert for the dismissal of the case.

Alfonso claimed that Leni charged him with perjury, concubinage and deportation which shows latters psychological incapacity because according to
him it clearly showed that his wife not only wanted him behind bars but also to banish outside the country.
ISSUE: Whether or not Alfonso Chua presented quantum evidence for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Leni on the ground of psychological
incapacity.
HELD:The court held that documents presented by Alfonso during the trial of the case do not in any way show the alleged psychological incapacity of his
wife. The evidence was insufficient and shows grave abuse of discretion bordering on absurdity. Alfonso testified and complained about three aspects
of Lenis personality namely lack of attention to children, immaturity, and lack of an intention of procreative sexuality and none of these three, singly or
collectively, constitutes psychological incapacity.
Psychological incapacity must be characterized by gravity, juridical antecedence, and incurability. It must be more than just a difficulty, a refusal or a
neglect in the performance of marital obligations. A mere showing of irreconcilable differences and conflicting personalities does not constitute
psychological incapacity.

Antonio v. Reyes (G.R. No. 155800, 10 March 2006)

FACTS:Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year after their first meeting, they got married
at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied
about herself, the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She even did not conceal bearing an
illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for
reconciliation, he finally left her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes declared null and
void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage null and void.
HELD:Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to a mere inability to comply with them.
The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of
Reyes is abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to psychological incapacity. Respondents
fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically
incapacitated as it rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes psychological incapacity have
been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so
grave that a restrictive clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal from contracting
marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based
on love, trust and respect. Furthermore, Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain
unchanged.
Chi Ming Tsoi v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 119190, 16 January 1997)
FACTS:Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May 22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas
expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on
one side thereof, then turned his back and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but during this period, there was no attempt of
sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina
alleged that Chi Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3 inches and 1 cm. when
erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his
wife, she always avoided him and whenever he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.

ISSUE:Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological incapacity ?[i]
HELD:If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage obligations, and the refusal is senseless
and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal
is equivalent to psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or her spouse is considered a
sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based on the universal principle that procreation
of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or
wholeness of the marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above marital obligation is
equivalent to psychological incapacity.
Armida Ferraris v. Brix Ferraris (G.R. No. 162368, 17 July 2006)
FACTS: Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and even during their brief union (for well about a year or
so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time, Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits
that Brix was a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It was only when they started fighting
about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not
understand Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could not relate to her anger, temper and
jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by
Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of
support, and his preference to spend more time with his band mates than his family.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality disorder, the leaving-the-house attitude whenever they
quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more
time with his band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal or unwillingness to assume the
essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further, the expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the
root cause of respondents alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied that such disorder

can be part of his family upbringing She stated that there was a history of Brixs parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course
inconclusive for such has no direct bearing to the case at bar.